,,ved,,nta-,s,,tras  ,with the          
,commentary by  ,,sa,,nkar,,ch,,rya     
,translated by ,,george ,,thibaut  ,part
 ,i     ,,contents4   ,,introduction    
,,ved,,nta-,s,,tras ,,with ,,the        
,,commentary ,,by ,,sa,,nkar,,ch,,rya4  
,,adhy,,ya ,i4    ,pda ,i4    ,pda ,,ii4
    ,pda ,,iii4    ,pda ,,iv4           
,,adhy,,ya ,,ii4    ,pda ,i4    ,pda    
,,ii4         99       99       99      
99       99  ,transliteration of        
,oriental ,alphabets adopted for the    
,translations of the ,sacred ,books of  
the ,east4  ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this 
book contains many words with one or two
 letters in the word printed in italics2
 those letters are transcribed by       
enclosing them in slashes1 e4g4         
karmak_/nd_/a has the letters nd in     
italics4  ,also1 the symbol  is used    
before the letter n to indicate a       
horizontal bar across the top4          
,,introduction4   ,to the sacred        
literature of the ,brahmans1 in the     
strict sense of the term1 i4e4 to the   

,veda1 there belongs a certain number of
 complementary works without whose      
assistance the student is1 according to 
,hindu notions1 unable to do more than  
commit the sacred texts to memory4 ,in  
the first place all ,vedic texts must1  
in order to be understood1 be read      
together with running commentaries such 
as ,sya_/n_/a's commentaries on the     
,sa_/m_/hits and ,brhma_/n_/as1 and the 
,bhshyas ascribed to ,sankara on the    
chief ,upanishads4 ,but these           
commentaries do not by themselves       
conduce to a full comprehension of the  
contents of the sacred texts1 since they
 confine themselves to explaining the   
meaning of each detached passage without
 investigating its relation to other    
passages1 and the whole of which they   
form part2 considerations of the latter 
kind are at any rate introduced         
occasionally only4 ,the task of taking a
 comprehensive view of the contents of  
the ,vedic writings as a whole1 of      
systematising what they present in an   

unsystematical form1 of showing the     
mutual co-ordination or subordination of
 single passages and sections1 and of   
reconciling contradictions--which1      
according to the view of the orthodox   
commentators1 can be apparent only--is  
allotted to a separate sstra or body of 
doctrine which is termed ,mm_/m_/s1 i4e4
 the investigation or enquiry ,greek3   
kat ezochaen1 viz4 the enquiry into the 
connected meaning of the sacred texts4  
,of this ,mm_/m_/s two branches have to 
be distinguished1 the so-called earlier 
7prva7 ,mm_/m_/s1 and the later 7uttara7
 ,mm_/m_/s4 ,the former undertakes to   
systematise the karmak_/nd_/a1 i4e4 that
 entire portion of the ,veda which is   
concerned with action1 pre-eminently    
sacrificial action1 and which comprises 
the ,sa_/m_/hits and the ,brhma_/n_/as  
exclusive of the ra_/n_/yaka portions2  
the latter performs the same service    
with regard to the so-called            
j_/_/naka_/nd_/a1 i4e4 that part of the 
,vedic writings which includes the      

ra_/n_/yaka portions of the             
,brhma_/n_/as1 and a number of detached 
treatises called ,upanishads4 ,its      
subject is not action but knowledge1    
viz4 the knowledge of ,brahman4  ,at    
what period these two _/s_/stras first  
assumed a definite form1 we are unable  
to ascertain4 ,discussions of the nature
 of those which constitute the          
subject-matter of the ,prva ,mm_/m_/s   
must have arisen at a very early period1
 and the word ,mm_/m_/s itself together 
with its derivatives is already employed
 in the ,brhma_/n_/as to denote the     
doubts and discussions connected with   
certain contested points of ritual4 ,the
 want of a body of definite rules       
prescribing how to act1 i4e4 how to     
perform the various sacrifices in full  
accordance with the teaching of the     
,veda1 was indeed an urgent one1 because
 it was an altogether practical want1   
continually pressing itself on the      
adhvaryus engaged in ritualistic duties4
 ,and the task of establishing such     

rules was moreover a comparatively      
limited and feasible one2 for the       
members of a certain ,vedic skh or      
school had to do no more than to digest 
thoroughly their own brhma_/n_/a and    
sa_/m_/hit1 without being under any     
obligation of reconciling with the      
teaching of their own books the         
occasionally conflicting rules implied  
in the texts of other skhs4 ,it was     
assumed that action1 as being something 
which depends on the will and choice of 
man1 admits of alternatives1 so that a  
certain sacrifice may be performed in   
different ways by members of different  
,vedic schools1 or even by the followers
 of one and the same skh4  ,the ,uttara 
,mm_/m_/s-_/s_/stra may be supposed to  
have originated considerably later than 
the ,prva ,mm_/m_/s4 ,in the first      
place1 the texts with which it is       
concerned doubtless constitute the      
latest branch of ,vedic literature4 ,and
 in the second place1 the subject-matter
 of those texts did not call for a      

systematical treatment with equal       
urgency1 as it was in no way connected  
with practice2 the mental attitude of   
the authors of the ,upanishads1 who in  
their lucubrations on ,brahman and the  
soul aim at nothing less than at        
definiteness and coherence1 may have    
perpetuated itself through many         
generations without any great           
inconvenience resulting therefrom4  ,but
 in the long run two causes must have   
acted with ever-increasing force1 to    
give an impulse to the systematic       
working up of the teaching of the       
,upanishads also4 ,the followers of the 
different ,vedic skhs no doubt          
recognised already at an early period   
the truth that1 while conflicting       
statements regarding the details of a   
sacrifice can be got over by the        
assumption of a vikalpa1 i4e4 an        
optional proceeding1 it is not so with  
regard to such topics as the nature of  
,brahman1 the relation to it of the     
human soul1 the origin of the physical  

universe1 and the like4 ,concerning     
them1 one opinion only can be the true  
one1 and it therefore becomes absolutely
 incumbent on those1 who look on the    
whole body of the ,upanishads as        
revealed truth1 to demonstrate that     
their teaching forms a consistent whole 
free from all contradictions4 ,in       
addition there supervened the external  
motive that1 while the karmak_/nd_/a of 
the ,veda concerned only the higher     
castes of brahmanically constituted     
society1 on which it enjoins certain    
sacrificial performances connected with 
certain rewards1 the j_/_/nk_/nd_/a1 as 
propounding a certain theory of the     
world1 towards which any reflecting     
person inside or outside the pale of the
 orthodox community could not but take  
up a definite position1 must soon have  
become the object of criticism on the   
part of those who held different views  
on religious and philosophic things1 and
 hence stood in need of systematic      
defence4  ,at present there exists a    

vast literature connected with the two  
branches of the ,mm_/m_/s4 ,we have1 on 
the one hand1 all those works which     
constitute the ,prva                    
,mm_/m_/s-_/s_/stra--or as it is often1 
shortly but not accurately1 termed1 the 
,mm_/m_/s-_/s_/stra--and1 on the other  
hand1 all those works which are commonly
 comprised under the name               
,vednta-_/s_/stra4 ,at the head of this 
extensive literature there stand two    
collections of ,stras 7i4e4 short       
aphorisms constituting in their totality
 a complete body of doctrine upon some  
subject71 whose reputed authors are     
,jainini and ,bdarya_/n_/a4 ,there can1 
however1 be no doubt that the           
composition of those two collections of 
,stras was preceded by a long series of 
preparatory literary efforts of which   
they merely represent the highly        
condensed outcome4 ,this is rendered    
probable by the analogy of other        
_/s_/stras1 as well as by the exhaustive
 thoroughness with which the ,stras     

perform their task of systematizing the 
teaching of the ,veda1 and is further   
proved by the frequent references which 
the ,stras make to the views of earlier 
teachers4 ,if we consider merely the    
preserved monuments of ,indian          
literature1 the ,stras 7of the two      
,mm_/m_/ss as well as of other          
_/s_/stras7 mark the beginning2 if we1  
however1 take into account what once    
existed1 although it is at present      
irretrievably lost1 we observe that they
 occupy a strictly central position1    
summarising1 on the one hand1 a series  
of early literary essays extending over 
many generations1 and forming1 on the   
other hand1 the head spring of an ever  
broadening activity of commentators as  
well as virtually independent writers1  
which reaches down to our days1 and may 
yet have some future before itself4     
,the general scope of the two           
,mm_/m_/s-stras and their relation to   
the ,veda have been indicated in what   
precedes4 ,a difference of some         

importance between the two has1 however1
 to be noted in this connexion4 ,the    
systematisation of the karmak_/nd_/a of 
the ,veda led to the elaboration of two 
classes of works1 viz4 the ,kalpa-stras 
on the one hand1 and the ,prva          
,mm_/m_/s-stras on the other hand4 ,the 
former give nothing but a description as
 concise as possible of the sacrifices  
enjoined in the ,brhma_/n_/as2 while the
 latter discuss and establish the       
general principles which the author of a
 ,kalpa-stra has to follow1 if he wishes
 to render his rules strictly           
conformable to the teaching of the      
,veda4 ,the j_/_/nak_/nd_/a of the      
,veda1 on the other hand1 is            
systematised in a single work1 viz4 the 
,uttara ,mm_/m_/s or ,vednta-stras1     
which combine the two tasks of concisely
 stating the teaching of the ,veda1 and 
of argumentatively establishing the     
special interpretation of the ,veda     
adopted in the ,stras4 ,this difference 
may be accounted for by two reasons4 ,in

 the first place1 the contents of the   
karmak_/nd_/a1 as being of an entirely  
practical nature1 called for summaries  
such as the ,kalpa-stras1 from which all
 burdensome discussions of method are   
excluded2 while there was no similar    
reason for the separation of the two    
topics in the case of the purely        
theoretical science of ,brahman4 ,and1  
in the second place1 the ,vednta-stras  
throughout presuppose the ,prva         
,mm_/m_/s-stras1 and may therefore      
dispense with the discussion of general 
principles and methods already          
established in the latter4  ,the time at
 which the two ,mm_/m_/s-stras were     
composed we are at present unable to fix
 with any certainty2 a few remarks on   
the subject will1 however1 be made later
 on4 ,their outward form is that common 
to all the so-called ,stras which aims  
at condensing a given body of doctrine  
in a number of concise aphoristic       
sentences1 and often even mere detached 
words in lieu of sentences4 ,besides the

 ,mm_/m_/s-stras this literary form is  
common to the fundamental works on the  
other philosophic systems1 on the ,vedic
 sacrifices1 on domestic ceremonies1 on 
sacred law1 on grammar1 and on metres4  
,the two ,mm_/m_/s-stras occupy1        
however1 an altogether exceptional      
position in point of style4 ,all ,stras 
aim at conciseness2 that is clearly the 
reason to which this whole species of   
literary composition owes its existence4
 ,this their aim they reach by the rigid
 exclusion of all words which can       
possibly be spared1 by the careful      
avoidance of all unnecessary            
repetitions1 and1 as in the case of the 
grammatical ,stras1 by the employment of
 an arbitrarily coined terminology which
 substitutes single syllables for entire
 words or combination of words4 ,at the 
same time the manifest intention of the 
,stra writers is to express themselves  
with as much clearness as the           
conciseness affected by them admits of4 
,the aphorisms are indeed often concise 

to excess1 but not otherwise            
intrinsically obscure1 the manifest care
 of the writers being to retain what is 
essential in a given phrase1 and to     
sacrifice only what can be supplied1    
although perhaps not without difficulty1
 and an irksome strain of memory and    
reflection4 ,hence the possibility of   
understanding without a commentary a    
very considerable portion at any rate of
 the ordinary ,stras4 ,altogether       
different is the case of the two        
,mm_/m_/s-stras4 ,there scarcely one    
single ,stra is intelligible without a  
commentary4 ,the most essential words   
are habitually dispensed with2 nothing  
is1 for instance1 more common than the  
simple ommission of the subject or      
predicate of a sentence4 ,and when here 
and there a ,stra occurs whose words    
construe without anything having to be  
supplied1 the phraseology is so         
eminently vague and obscure that without
 the help derived from a commentary we  
should be unable to make out to what    

subject the ,stra refers4 ,when         
undertaking to translate either of the  
,mm_/m_/s-stras we therefore depend     
altogether on commentaries2 and hence   
the question arises which of the        
numerous commentaries extant is to be   
accepted as a guide to their right      
understanding4  ,the commentary here    
selected for translation1 together with 
,bdarya_/n_/a's ,stras 7to which we     
shall henceforth confine our attention  
to the exclusion of ,jaimini's ,prva    
,mm_/m_/s-stras71 is the one composed by
 the celebrated theologian _/,s_/ankara 
or1 as he is commonly called1           
_/,s_/ankar_/k_/rya4 ,there are obvious 
reasons for this selection4 ,in the     
first place1 the _/,s_/ankara-bhshya    
represents the so-called orthodox side  
of ,brahminical theology which strictly 
upholds the ,brahman or highest ,self of
 the ,upanishads as something different 
from1 and in fact immensely superior to1
 the divine beings such as ,vish_/n_/u  
or ,siva1 which1 for many centuries1    

have been the chief objects of popular  
worship in ,india4 ,in the second place1
 the doctrine advocated by _/,s_/ankara 
is1 from a purely philosophical point of
 view and apart from all theological    
considerations1 the most important and  
interesting one which has arisen on     
,indian soil2 neither those forms of the
 ,vednta which diverge from the view    
represented by _/,s_/ankara nor any of  
the non-,vedntic systems can be compared
 with the so-called orthodox ,vednta in 
boldness1 depth1 and subtlety of        
speculation4 ,in the third place1       
_/,s_/ankara's bhashya is1 as far as we 
know1 the oldest of the extant          
commentaries1 and relative antiquity is 
at any rate one of the circumstances    
which have to be taken into account1    
although1 it must be admitted1 too much 
weight may easily be attached to it4    
,the _/,s_/ankara-bhshya further is the 
authority most generally deferred to in 
,india as to the right understanding of 
the ,vednta-stras1 and ever since       

_/,s_/ankara's time the majority of the 
best thinkers of ,india have been men   
belonging to his school4 ,if in addition
 to all this we take into consideration 
the intrinsic merits of _/,s_/ankara's  
work which1 as a piece of philosophical 
argumentation and theological           
apologetics1 undoubtedly occupies a high
 rank1 the preference here given to it  
will be easily understood4  ,but to the 
,european--or1 generally1               
modern--translator of the ,vednta-stras 
with _/,s_/ankara's commentary another  
question will of course suggest itself  
at once1 viz4 whether or not            
_/,s_/ankara's explanations faithfully  
render the intended meaning of the      
author of the ,stras4 ,to the ,indian   
,pandit of _/,s_/ankara's school this   
question has become an indifferent one1 
or1 to state the case more accurately1  
he objects to it being raised1 as he    
looks on _/,s_/ankara's authority as    
standing above doubt and dispute4 ,when 
pressed to make good his position he    

will1 moreover1 most probably not enter 
into any detailed comparison of         
_/,s_/ankara's comments with the text of
 ,bdarya_/n_/a's ,stras1 but will rather
 endeavour to show on speculative       
grounds that _/,s_/ankara's             
philosophical view is the only true one1
 whence it of course follows that it    
accurately represents the meaning of    
,bdarya_/n_/a1 who himself must         
necessarily be assured to have taught   
the true doctrine4 ,but on the modern   
investigator1 who neither can consider  
himself bound by the authority of a name
 however great1 nor is likely to look to
 any ,indian system of thought for the  
satisfaction of his speculative wants1  
it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce
 from the outset in the interpretations 
given of the ,vednta-stras--and the     
,upanishads--by _/,s_/ankara and his    
school1 but to submit them1 as far as   
that can be done1 to a critical         
investigation4  ,this is a task which   
would have to be undertaken even if     

_/,s_/ankara's views as to the true     
meaning of the ,stras and ,upanishads   
had never been called into doubt on     
,indian soil1 although in that case it  
could perhaps hardly be entered upon    
with much hope of success2 but it       
becomes much more urgent1 and at the    
same time more feasible1 when we meet in
 ,india itself with systems claiming to 
be ,vedntic and based on interpretations
 of the ,stras and ,upanishads more or  
less differing from those of            
_/,s_/ankara4 ,the claims of those      
systems to be in the possession of the  
right understanding of the fundamental  
authorities of the ,vednta must at any  
rate be examined1 even if we should     
finally be compelled to reject them4    
,it appears that already at a very early
 period the ,vednta-stras had come to be
 looked upon as an authoritative work1  
not to be neglected by any who wished to
 affiliate their own doctrines to the   
,veda4 ,at present1 at any rate1 there  
are very few ,hindu sects not interested

 in showing that their distinctive      
tenets are countenanced by              
,bdarya_/n_/a's teaching4 ,owing to this
 the commentaries on the ,stras have in 
the course of time become very numerous1
 and it is at present impossible to give
 a full and accurate enumeration even of
 those actually existing1 much less of  
those referred to and quoted4 ,mr4      
,fitz-,edward ,hall1 in his             
,bibliographical ,index1 mentions       
fourteen commentaries1 copies of which  
had been inspected by himself4 ,some    
among these 7as1 for instance1 ,rmnuja's
 ,vednta-sra1 ,no4 ,,xxxv7 are indeed   
not commentaries in the strict sense of 
the word1 but rather systematic         
expositions of the doctrine supposed to 
be propounded in the ,stras2 but1 on the
 other hand1 there are in existence     
several true commentaries which had not 
been accessible to ,fitz-,edward ,hall4 
,it would hardly be practical--and      
certainly not feasible in this place--to
 submit all the existing bhshyas to a   

critical enquiry at once4 ,all we can do
 here is to single out one or a few of  
the more important ones1 and to compare 
their interpretations with those given  
by _/,s_/ankara1 and with the text of   
the ,stras themselves4  ,the bhshya1    
which in this connexion is the first to 
press itself upon our attention1 is the 
one composed by the famous ,vaishnava   
theologian and philosopher ,rmnuja1 who 
is supposed to have lived in the twelfth
 century4 ,the ,rmnuja or1 as it is     
often called1 the _/,s_/r-bhshya appears
 to be the oldest commentary extant next
 to _/,s_/ankara's4 ,it is further to be
 noted that the sect of the ,rmnujas    
occupies a pre-eminent position among   
the ,vaishnava1 sects which themselves1 
in their totality1 may claim to be      
considered the most important among all 
,hindu sects4 ,the intrinsic value of   
the _/,s_/r-bhshya moreover is--as every
 student acquainted with it will be     
ready to acknowledge--a very high one2  
it strikes one throughout as a very     

solid performance due to a writer of    
extensive learning and great power of   
argumentation1 and in its polemic parts1
 directed chiefly against the school of 
_/,s_/ankara1 it not unfrequently       
deserves to be called brilliant even4   
,and in addition to all this it shows   
evident traces of being not the mere    
outcome of ,rmnuja's individual views1  
but of resting on an old and weighty    
tradition4  ,this latter point is       
clearly of the greatest importance4 ,if 
it could be demonstrated or even        
rendered probable only that the oldest  
bhshya which we possess1 i4e4 the       
_/,s_/ankara-bhshya1 represents an      
uninterrupted and uniform tradition     
bridging over the interval between      
,bdarya_/n_/a1 the reputed author of the
 ,stras1 and _/,s_/ankara2 and if1 on   
the other hand1 it could be shown that  
the more modern bhshyas are not         
supported by old tradition1 but are     
nothing more than bold attempts of      
clever sectarians to force an old work  

of generally recognised authority into  
the service of their individual tenets2 
there would certainly be no reason for  
us to raise the question whether the    
later bhshyas can help us in making out 
the true meaning of the ,stras4 ,all we 
should have to do in that case would be 
to accept _/,s_/ankara's interpretations
 as they stand1 or at the utmost to     
attempt to make out1 if at all possible1
 by a careful comparison of             
_/,s_/ankara's bhshya with the text of  
the ,stras1 whether the former in all   
cases faithfully represents the purport 
of the latter4  ,in the most recent book
 of note which at all enters into the   
question as to how far we have to accept
 _/,s_/ankara as a guide to the right   
understanding of the ,stras 7,mr4 ,a4   
,gough's ,philosophy of the ,upanishads7
 the view is maintained 7pp4 #bci ff47  
that _/,s_/ankara is the generally      
recognised expositor of true ,vednta    
doctrine1 that that doctrine was handed 
down by an unbroken series of teachers  

intervening between him and the         
,strakra1 and that there existed from   
the beginning only one ,vednta doctrine1
 agreeing in all essential points with  
the doctrine known to us from           
_/,s_/ankara's writings4 ,mr4 ,gough    
undertakes to prove this view1 firstly1 
by a comparison of _/,s_/ankara's system
 with the teaching of the ,upanishads   
themselves2 and1 secondly1 by a         
comparison of the purport of the        
,stras--as far as that can be made out  
independently of the commentaries--with 
the interpretations given of them by    
_/,s_/ankara4 ,to both these points we  
shall revert later on4 ,meanwhile1 ,i   
only wish to remark concerning the      
former point that1 even if we could show
 with certainty that all the ,upanishads
 propound one and the same doctrine1    
there yet remains the undeniable fact of
 our being confronted by a considerable 
number of essentially differing         
theories1 all of which claim to be      
founded on the ,upanishads4 ,and with   

regard to the latter point ,i have to   
say for the present that1 as long as we 
have only _/,s_/ankara's bhshya before  
us1 we are naturally inclined to find in
 the ,stras--which1 taken by themselves1
 are for the greater part               
unintelligible--the meaning which       
_/,s_/ankara ascribes to them2 while a  
reference to other bhshyas may not      
impossibly change our views at          
once4--,meanwhile1 we will consider the 
question as to the unbroken uniformity  
of ,vedntic tradition from another point
 or view1 viz4 by enquiring whether or  
not the ,stras themselves1 and the      
_/,s_/ankara-bhshya1 furnish any        
indications of there having existed     
already at an early time essentially    
different ,vedntic systems or lines of  
,vedntic speculation4  ,beginning with  
the ,stras1 we find that they supply    
ample evidence to the effect that       
already at a very early time1 viz4 the  
period antecedent to the final          
composition of the ,vednta-stras in     

their present shape1 there had arisen   
among the chief doctors of the ,vednta  
differences of opinion1 bearing not only
 upon minor points of doctrine1 but     
affecting the most essential parts of   
the system4 ,in addition to             
,bdarya_/n_/a himself1 the reputed      
author of the ,stras1 the latter quote  
opinions ascribed to the following      
teachers3 treya1 _/s_/marathya1         
,au_/d_/ulomi1 ,krsh_/n_/gini1          
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna1 ,jaimini1 ,bdari4  
,among the passages where diverging     
views of those teachers are recorded and
 contrasted three are of particular     
importance4 ,firstly1 a passage in the  
fourth pda of the fourth adhyya 7,stras 
#e-g71 where the opinions of various    
teachers concerning the characteristics 
of the released soul are given1 and     
where the important discrepancy is noted
 that1 according to ,au_/d_/ulomi1 its  
only characteristic is thought          
7_/k_/aitanya71 while ,jaimini maintains
 that it possesses a number of exalted  

qualities1 and ,bdarya_/n_/a declares   
himself in favour of a combination of   
those two views4--,the second passage   
occurs in the third pda of the fourth   
adhyya 7,stras #g-ad71 where ,jaimini   
maintains that the soul of him who      
possesses the lower knowledge of        
,brahman goes after death to the highest
 ,brahman1 while ,bdari--whose opinion  
is endorsed by _/,s_/ankara--teaches    
that it repairs to the lower ,brahman   
only--,finally1 the third and most      
important passage is met with in the    
fourth pda of the first adhyya 7,stras  
#bj-bb71 where the question is discussed
 why in a certain passage of the        
,brhadra_/n_/yaka ,brahman is referred  
to in terms which are strictly          
applicable to the individual soul only4 
,in connexion therewith the ,stras quote
 the views of three ancient teachers    
about the relation in which the         
individual soul stands to ,brahman4     
,according to _/s_/marathya 7if we      
accept the interpretation of his view   

given by _/,s_/ankara and _/,s_/ankara's
 commentators7 the soul stands to       
,brahman in the bhedbheda relation1 i4e4
 it is neither absolutely different nor 
absolutely non-different from it1 as    
sparks are from fire4 ,audulomi1 on the 
other hand1 teaches that the soul is    
altogether different from ,brahman up to
 the time when obtaining final release  
it is merged in it1 and                 
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna finally upholds the 
doctrine that the soul is absolutely    
non-different from ,brahman2 which1 in1 
some way or other presents itself as the
 individual soul4  ,that the ancient    
teachers1 the ripest outcome of whose   
speculations and discussions is embodied
 in the ,vednta-stras1 disagreed among  
themselves on points of vital importance
 is sufficiently proved by the three    
passages quoted4 ,the one quoted last is
 specially significant as showing that  
recognised authorities--deemed worthy of
 being quoted in the ,stras--denied that
 doctrine on which the whole system of  

_/,s_/ankara hinges1 viz4 the doctrine  
of the absolute identity of the         
individual soul with ,brahman4  ,turning
 next to the _/,s_/ankara-bhshya itself1
 we there also meet with indications    
that the ,vedntins were divided among   
themselves on important points of dogma4
 ,these indications are indeed not      
numerous3 _/,s_/ankara1 does not on the 
whole impress one as an author          
particularly anxious to strengthen his  
own case by appeals to ancient          
authorities1 a peculiarity of his which 
later writers of hostile tendencies have
 not failed to remark and criticise4    
,but yet more than once _/,s_/ankara    
also refers to the opinion of 'another1'
 viz41 commentator of the ,stras1 and in
 several places _/,s_/ankara's          
commentators explain that the 'other'   
meant is the ,v_/ri_/ttikra 7about whom 
more will be said shortly74 ,those      
references as a rule concern minor      
points of exegesis1 and hence throw     
little or no light on important         

differences of dogma2 but there are two 
remarks of _/,s_/ankara's at any rate   
which are of interest in this connexion4
 ,the one is made with reference to     
,stras #g-ad of the third pda of the    
fourth adhyya2 'some1' he says there1   
'declare those ,stras1 which ,i look    
upon as setting forth the siddhnta view1
 to state merely the prvapaksha2' a     
difference of opinion which1 as we have 
seen above1 affects the important       
question as to the ultimate fate of     
those who have not reached the knowledge
 of the highest ,brahman4--,and under   
,i1 #c1 #ai _/,s_/ankara1 after having  
explained at length that the individual 
soul as such cannot claim any reality1  
but is real only in so far as it is     
identical with ,brahman1 adds the       
following words1 'apare tu vdina_/h_/   
pramrthikam eva jaiva_/m_/ rpam iti     
manyante asmady_/s_/ _/k_/a ke_/k_/it1' 
i4e4 other theorisers again1 and among  
them some of ours1 are of opinion that  
the individual soul as such is real4'   

,the term 'ours1' here made use of1 can 
denote only the ,aupanishadas or        
,vedntins1 and it thus appears that     
_/,s_/ankara himself was willing to     
class under the same category himself   
and philosophers who--as in later times 
the ,rmnujas and others--looked upon the
 individual soul as not due to the      
fictitious limitations of ,my1 but as   
real in itself2 whatever may be the     
relation in which they considered it to 
stand to the highest ,self4  ,from what 
precedes it follows that the ,vedntins  
of the school to which _/,s_/ankara     
himself belonged acknowledged the       
existence of ,vedntic teaching of a type
 essentially different from their own4  
,we must now proceed to enquire whether 
the ,rmnuja system1 which likewise      
claims to be ,vednta1 and to be founded 
on the ,vednta-stras1 has any title to  
be considered an ancient system and the 
heir of a respectable tradition4  ,it   
appears that ,rmnuja claims--and by     
,hindu writers is generally admitted--to

 follow in his bhshya the authority of  
,bodhyana1 who had composed a v_/ri_/tti
 on the ,stras4 ,thus we read in the    
beginning of the _/,s_/r-bhshya         
7,pandit1 ,new ,series1 ,,vii1 p4 #afc71
 ',bhagavad-bodhyanak_/ri_/t_/m_/       
vistrn_/m_/ brahmastra-v_/ri_/tti_/m_/  
prv_/k_/ry_/h_/ sa_/m_/kikshipus        
tanmatnusre_/n_/a strkshar_/n_/i        
vykhysyante4' ,whether the ,bodhyana to 
whom that v_/ri_/tti is ascribed is to  
be identified with the author of the    
,kalpa-stra1 and other works1 cannot at 
present be decided4 ,but that an ancient
 v_/ri_/tti on the ,stras connected with
 ,bodhyana's name actually existed1     
there is not any reason to doubt4 ,short
 quotations from it are met with in a   
few places of the _/,s_/r-bhshya1 and1  
as we have seen above1 _/,s_/ankara's   
commentators state that their author's  
polemical remarks are directed against  
the ,v_/ri_/ttikra4 ,in addition to     
,bodhyana1 ,rmnuja appeals to quite a   
series of ancient                       

teachers--prv_/k_/rys--who carried on   
the true tradition as to the teaching of
 the ,vednta and the meaning of the     
,stras4 ,in the ,vedrthasangraha--a work
 composed by ,rmnuja himself--we meet in
 one place with the enumeration of the  
following authorities3 ,bodhyana1       
_/,t_/anka1 ,drami_/d_/a1 ,guhadeva1    
,kapardin1 ,bharu_/k_/i1 and quotations 
from the writings of some of these are  
not unfrequent in the ,vedrthasangraha1 
as well as the _/,s_/r-bhshya4 ,the     
author most frequently quoted is        
,drami_/d_/a1 who composed the          
,drami_/d_/a-bhshya2 he is sometimes    
referred to as the bhshyakra4 ,another  
writer repeatedly quoted as the vkyakra 
is1 ,i am told1 to be identified with   
the _/,t_/anka mentioned above4 ,i      
refrain from inserting in this place the
 information concerning the relative age
 of these writers which may be derived  
from the oral tradition of the ,rmnuja  
sect4 ,from another source1 however1 we 
receive an intimation that              

,drami_/d_/_/k_/rya or                  
,dravi_/d_/_/k_/rya preceded            
_/,s_/ankara in point of time4 ,in his  
_/t_/k on _/,s_/ankara's bhshya to the  
,chndogya ,upanishad ,,iii1 #aj1 #d1    
nandagiri remarks that the attempt made 
by his author to reconcile the          
cosmological views of the ,upanishad    
with the teaching of ,sm_/ri_/ti on the 
same point is a reproduction of the     
analogous attempt made by the           
,dravi_/d_/_/k_/rya4  ,it thus appears  
that that special interpretation of the 
,vednta-stras with which the            
_/,s_/r-bhshya makes us acquainted is   
not due to innovating views on the part 
of ,rmnuja1 but had authoritative       
representatives already at a period     
anterior to that of _/,s_/ankara4 ,this 
latter point1 moreover1 receives        
additional confirmation from the        
relation in which the so-called ,rmnuja 
sect stands to earlier sects4 ,what the 
exact position of ,rmnuja was1 and of   
what nature were the reforms that       

rendered him so prominent as to give his
 name to a new sect1 is not exactly     
known at present2 at the same time it is
 generally acknowledged that the        
,rmnujas are closely connected with the 
so-called ,bhgavatas or ,p_/k_/artras1  
who are known to have existed already at
 a very early time4 ,this latter point  
is proved by evidence of various kinds2 
for our present purpose it suffices to  
point to the fact that1 according to the
 interpretation of the most             
authoritative commentators1 the last    
,stras of the second pda of the second  
adhyya 7,vednta-stras7 refer to a       
distinctive tenet of the                
,bhgavatas--which tenet forms part of   
the ,rmnuja system also--viz4 that the  
highest being manifests itself in a     
fourfold form 7vyha7 as ,vsudeva1       
,sankarsha_/n_/a1 ,pradyumna1           
,aniruddha1 those four forms being      
identical with the highest ,self1 the   
individual soul1 the internal organ     
7manas71 and the principle of egoity    

7ahankra74 ,whether those ,stras embody 
an approval of the tenet referred to1 as
 ,rmnuja maintains1 or are meant to     
impugn it1 as _/,s_/ankara thinks2 so   
much is certain that in the opinion of  
the best commentators the ,bhgavatas1   
the direct forerunners of the ,rmnujas1 
are mentioned in the ,stras themselves1 
and hence must not only have existed1   
but even reached a considerable degree  
of importance at the time when the      
,stras were composed4 ,and considering  
the general agreement of the systems of 
the earlier ,bhgavatas and the later    
,rmnujas1 we have a full right to       
suppose that the two sects were at one  
also in their mode of interpreting the  
,vednta-stras4  ,the preceding          
considerations suffice1 ,i am inclined  
to think1 to show that it will by no    
means be wasted labour to enquire how   
,rmnuja interprets the ,stras1 and      
wherein he differs from _/,s_/ankara4   
,this in fact seems clearly to be the   
first step we have to take1 if we wish  

to make an attempt at least of advancing
 beyond the interpretations of          
scholiasts to the meaning of the ,stras 
themselves4 ,a full and exhaustive      
comparison of the views of the two      
commentators would indeed far exceed the
 limits of the space which can here he  
devoted to that task1 and will1         
moreover1 be made with greater ease and 
advantage when the complete ,sanskrit   
text of the _/,s_/r-bhshya has been     
printed1 and thus made available for    
general reference4 ,but meanwhile it is 
possible1 and--as said before--even     
urged upon a translator of the ,stras to
 compare the interpretations1 given by  
the two bhshyakras1 of those ,stras1    
which1 more than others1 touch on the   
essential points of the ,vednta system4 
,this will best be done in connexion    
with a succinct but full review of the  
topics discussed in the adhikara_/n_/as 
of the ,vednta-stras1 according to      
_/,s_/ankara2 a review which--apart from
 the side-glances at ,rmnuja's          

comments--will be useful as a guide     
through the ,stras and the              
_/,s_/ankara-bhshya4 ,before1 however1  
entering on that task1 ,i think it      
advisable to insert short sketches of   
the philosophical systems of            
_/,s_/ankara as well as of ,rmnuja1     
which may be referred to when1 later on 
discrepancies between the two           
commentators will be noted4 ,in these   
sketches ,i shall confine myself to the 
leading features1 and not enter into any
 details4 ,of _/,s_/ankara's system we  
possess as it is more than one          
trustworthy exposition2 it may suffice  
to refer to ,deussen's ,system of the   
,vednta1 in which the details of the    
entire system1 as far as they can be    
learned from the ,stra-bhshya1 are      
represented fully and faithfully1 and to
 ,gough's ,philosophy of the ,upanishads
 which1 principally in its second       
chapter1 gives a lucid sketch of the    
_/,s_/ankara ,vednta1 founded on the    
,stra-bhshya1 the ,upanishad bhshyas1   

and some later writers belonging to     
_/,s_/ankara's school4 ,with regard to  
,rmnuja's philosophy our chief source   
was1 hitherto1 the ,rmnuja chapter in   
the ,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha2  
the short sketch about to be given is   
founded altogether on the _/,s_/r-bhshya
 itself4  ,what in _/,s_/ankara's       
opinion the ,upanishads teach1 is       
shortly as follows4--,whatever is1 is in
 reality one2 there truly exists only   
one universal being called ,brahman or  
,paramtman1 the highest ,self4 ,this    
being is of an absolutely homogeneous   
nature2 it is pure ',being1' or1 which  
comes to the same1 pure intelligence or 
thought 7_/k_/aitanya1 j_/_/na74        
,intelligence or thought is not to be   
predicated of ,brahman as its attribute1
 but constitutes its substance1 ,brahman
 is not a thinking being1 but thought   
itself4 ,it is absolutely destitute of  
qualities2 whatever qualities or        
attributes are conceivable1 can only be 
denied of it4--,but1 if nothing exists  

but one absolutely simple being1 whence 
the appearance of the world by which we 
see ourselves surrounded1 and1 in which 
we ourselves exist as individual        
beings8--,brahman1 the answer runs1 is  
associated with a certain power called  
,my or avidy to which the appearance of 
this entire world is due4 ,this power   
cannot be called 'being' 7sat71 for     
'being' is only ,brahman2 nor can it be 
called 'non-being' 7asat7 in the strict 
sense1 for it at any rate produces the  
appearance of this world4 ,it is in fact
 a principle of illusion2 the           
undefinable cause owing to which there  
seems to exist a material world         
comprehending distinct individual       
existences4 ,being associated with this 
principle of illusion1 ,brahman is      
enabled to project the appearance of the
 world1 in the same way as a magician is
 enabled by his incomprehensible magical
 power to produce illusory appearances  
of animate and inanimate beings4 ,my    
thus constitutes the updna1 the material

 cause of the world2 or--if we wish to  
call attention to the circumstance that 
,my belongs to ,brahman as a            
_/s_/akti--we may say that the material 
cause of the world is ,brahman in so far
 as it is associated with ,my4 ,in this 
latter quality ,brahman is more properly
 called _/s_/vara1 the ,lord4  ,my1     
under the guidance of the ,lord1        
modifies itself by a progressive        
evolution into all the individual       
existences 7bheda71 distinguished by    
special names and forms1 of which the   
world consists2 from it there spring in 
due succession the different material   
elements and the whole bodily apparatus 
belonging to sentient ,beings4 ,in all  
those apparently1 individual forms of   
existence the one indivisible ,brahman  
is present1 but1 owing to the particular
 adjuncts into which ,my has specialised
 itself1 it appears to be broken up--it 
is broken up1 as it were--into a        
multiplicity1 of intellectual or        
sentient principles1 the so-called jvas 

7individual or personal souls74 ,what is
 real in each jva is only the universal 
,brahman itself2 the whole aggregate of 
individualising bodily organs and mental
 functions1 which in our ordinary       
experience separate and distinguish one 
jva from another1 is the offspring of   
,my and as such unreal4  ,the phenomenal
 world or world of ordinary experience  
7vyavahra7 thus consists of a number of 
individual souls engaged in specific    
cognitions1 volitions1 and so on1 and of
 the external material objects with     
which those cognitions and volitions are
 concerned4 ,neither the specific       
cognitions nor their objects are real in
 the true sense of the word1 for both   
are altogether due to ,my4 ,but at the  
same time we have to reject the         
idealistic doctrine of certain ,bauddha 
schools according to which nothing      
whatever truly exists1 but certain      
trains of cognitional acts or ideas to  
which no external objects correspond2   
for external things1 although not real  

in the strict sense of the word1 enjoy  
at any rate as much reality as the      
specific cognitional acts whose objects 
they are4  ,the non-enlightened soul is 
unable to look through and beyond ,my1  
which1 like a veil1 hides from it its   
true nature4 ,instead of recognising    
itself to be ,brahman1 it blindly       
identifies itself with its adjuncts     
7updhi71 the fictitious offspring of    
,my1 and thus looks for its true ,self  
in the body1 the sense organs1 and the  
internal organ 7manas71 i4e4 the organ  
of specific cognition4 ,the soul1 which 
in reality is pure intelligence1        
non-active1 infinite1 thus becomes      
limited in extent1 as it were1 limited  
in knowledge and power1 an agent and    
enjoyer4 ,through its actions it burdens
 itself with merit and demerit1 the     
consequences of which it has to bear or 
enjoy in series of future embodied      
existences1 the ,lord--as a retributor  
and dispenser--allotting to each soul   
that form of embodiment to which it is  

entitled by its previous actions4 ,at   
the end of each of the great world      
periods called kalpas the ,lord retracts
 the whole world1 i4e4 the whole        
material world is dissolved and merged  
into non-distinct ,my1 while the        
individual souls1 free for the time from
 actual connexion with updhis1 lie in   
deep slumber as it were4 ,but as the    
consequences of their former deeds are  
not yet exhausted1 they have again to   
enter on embodied existence as soon as  
the ,lord sends forth a new material    
world1 and the old round of birth1      
action1 death begins anew to last to all
 eternity as it has lasted from all     
eternity4  ,the means of escaping from  
this endless sa_/ms_/ra1 the way out of 
which can never be found by the         
non-enlightened soul1 are furnished by  
the ,veda4 ,the karmak_/nd_/a indeed1   
whose purport it is to enjoin certain   
actions1 cannot lead to final release2  
for even the most meritorious works     
necessarily lead to new forms of        

embodied existence4 ,and in the         
j_/_/nak_/nd_/a of the ,veda also two   
different parts have to be              
distinguished1 viz41 firstly1 those     
chapters and passages which treat of    
,brahman in so far as related to the    
world1 and hence characterised by       
various attributes1 i4e4 of _/s_/vara or
 the lower ,brahman2 and1 secondly1     
those texts which set forth the nature  
of the highest ,brahman transcending all
 qualities1 and the fundamental identity
 of the individual soul with that       
highest ,brahman4 ,devout meditation on 
,brahman as suggested by passages of the
 former kind does not directly lead to  
final emancipation2 the pious worshipper
 passes on his death into the world of  
the lower ,brahman only1 where he       
continues to exist as a distinct        
individual soul--although in the        
enjoyment of great power and            
knowledge--until at last he reaches the 
highest knowledge1 and1 through it1     
final release4--,that student of the    

,veda1 on the other hand1 whose soul has
 been enlightened by the texts embodying
 the higher knowledge of ,brahman1 whom 
passages such as the great saying1      
',that art thou1' have taught that there
 is no difference between his true ,self
 and the highest ,self1 obtains at the  
moment of death immediate final release1
 i4e4 he withdraws altogether from the  
influence of ,my1 and asserts himself in
 his true nature1 which is nothing else 
but the absolute highest ,brahman4      
,thus _/,s_/ankara4--,according to      
,rmnuja1 on the other hand1 the teaching
 of the ,upanishads has to be summarised
 as follows4--,there exists only one    
all-embracing being called ,brahman or  
the highest ,self of the ,lord4 ,this   
being is not destitute of attributes1   
but rather endowed with all imaginable  
auspicious qualities4 ,it is not        
'intelligence1'--as _/,s_/ankara        
maintains1--but intelligence is its     
chief attribute4 ,the ,lord is          
all-pervading1 all-powerful1            

all-knowing1 all-merciful2 his nature is
 fundamentally antagonistic to all evil4
 ,he contains within himself whatever   
exists4 ,while1 according to            
_/,s_/ankara1 the only reality is to be 
found in the non-qualified homogeneous  
highest ,brahman which can only be      
defined as pure ',being' or pure        
thought1 all plurality being a mere     
illusion2 ,brahman--according to        
,rmnuja's view--comprises within itself 
distinct elements of plurality which all
 of them lay claim to absolute reality  
of one and the same kind4 ,whatever is  
presented to us by ordinary experience1 
viz4 matter in all its various          
modifications and the individual souls  
of different classes and degrees1 are   
essential real constituents of          
,brahman's nature4 ,matter and souls    
7a_/k_/it and _/k_/it7 constitute1      
according to ,rmnuja's terminology1 the 
body of the ,lord2 they stand to him in 
the same relation of entire dependence  
and subserviency in which the matter    

forming an animal or vegetable body     
stands to its soul or animating         
principle4 ,the ,lord pervades and rules
 all things which exist--material or    
immaterial--as their antarymin2 the     
fundamental text for this special       
,rmnuja tenet--which in the writings of 
the sect is quoted again and again--is  
the so-called antarymin brhma_/n_/a4    
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g7 which says1  
that within all elements1 all sense     
organs1 and1 lastly1 within all         
individual souls1 there abides an inward
 ruler whose body those elements1       
sense-organs1 and individual souls      
constitute4--,matter and souls as       
forming the body of the ,lord are also  
called modes of him 7prakra74 ,they are 
to be looked upon as his effects1 but   
they have enjoyed the kind of individual
 existence which is theirs from all     
eternity1 and will never be entirely    
resolved into ,brahman4 ,they1 however1 
exist in two different1 periodically    
alternating1 conditions4 ,at some times 

they exist in a subtle state in which   
they do not possess those qualities by  
which they are ordinarily known1 and    
there is then no distinction of         
individual name and form4 ,matter in    
that state is unevolved 7avyakta72 the  
individual souls are not joined to      
material bodies1 and their intelligence 
is in a state of contraction1           
non-manifestation 7sanko_/k_/a74 ,this  
is the pralaya state which recurs at the
 end of each kalpa1 and ,brahman is then
 said to be in its causal condition     
7kra_/n_/vasth74 ,to that state all     
those scriptural passages refer which   
speak of ,brahman or the ,self as being 
in the beginning one only1 without a    
second4 ,brahman then is indeed not     
absolutely one1 for it contains within  
itself matter and souls in a germinal   
condition2 but as in that condition they
 are so subtle as not to allow of       
individual distinctions being made1 they
 are not counted as something second in 
addition to ,brahman4--,when the pralaya

 state comes to an end1 creation takes  
place owing to an act of volition on the
 ,lord's part4 ,primary unevolved matter
 then passes over into its other        
condition2 it becomes gross and thus    
acquires all those sensible attributes1 
visibility1 tangibility1 and so on1     
which are known from ordinary           
experience4 ,at the same time the souls 
enter into connexion with material      
bodies corresponding to the degree of   
merit or demerit acquired by them in    
previous forms of existence2 their      
intelligence at the same time undergoes 
a certain expansion 7vik_/s_/a74 ,the   
,lord1 together with matter in its gross
 state and the 'expanded' souls1 is     
,brahman in the condition of an effect  
7kryvasth74 ,cause and effect are thus  
at the bottom the same2 for the effect  
is nothing but the cause which has      
undergone a certain change              
7pari_/n_/ma74 ,hence the cause being   
known1 the effect is known likewise4    
,owing to the effects of their former   

actions the individual souls are        
implicated in the sa_/m_/sra1 the       
endless cycle of birth1 action1 and     
death1 final escape from which is to be 
obtained only through the study of the  
j_/_/nak_/nd_/a of the ,veda4           
,compliance with the injunctions of the 
karmak_/nd_/a does not lead outside the 
sa_/m_/sra2 but he who1 assisted by the 
grace of the ,lord1 cognizes--and       
meditates on--him in the way prescribed 
by the ,upanishads reaches at his death 
final emancipation1 i4e4 he passes      
through the different stages of the path
 of the gods up to the world of ,brahman
 and there enjoys an everlasting        
blissful existence from which there is  
no return into the sphere of            
transmigration4 ,the characteristics of 
the released soul are similar to those  
of ,brahman2 it participates in all the 
latter's glorious qualities and powers1 
excepting only ,brahman's power to emit1
 rule1 and retract the entire world4    
,the chief points in which the two      

systems sketched above agree on the one 
hand and diverge on the other may be    
shortly stated as follows4--,both       
systems teach advaita1 i4e4 non-duality 
or monism4 ,there exist not several     
fundamentally distinct principles1 such 
as the prak_/r_/iti and the purushas of 
the ,snkhyas1 but there exists only one 
all-embracing being4 ,while1 however1   
the advaita taught by _/,s_/ankara is a 
rigorous1 absolute one1 ,rmnuja's       
doctrine has to be characterised as     
visish_/t_/a advaita1 i4e4 qualified    
non-duality1 non-duality with a         
difference4 ,according to ,sankara1     
whatever is1 is ,brahman1 and ,brahman  
itself is absolutely homogeneous1 so    
that all difference and plurality must  
be illusory4 ,according to ,rmnuja also1
 whatever is1 is ,brahman2 but ,brahman 
is not of a homogeneous nature1 but     
contains within itself elements of      
plurality owing to which it truly       
manifests itself in a diversified world4
 ,the world with its variety of material

 forms of existence and individual souls
 is not unreal ,my1 but a real part of  
,brahman's nature1 the body investing   
the universal ,self4 ,the ,brahman of   
_/,s_/ankara is in itself impersonal1 a 
homogeneous mass of objectless thought1 
transcending all attributes2 a personal 
,god it becomes only through its        
association with the unreal principle of
 ,my1 so that--strictly                 
speaking--_/,s_/ankara's personal ,god1 
his _/s_/vara1 is himself something     
unreal4 ,rmnuja's ,brahman1 on the other
 hand1 is essentially a personal ,god1  
the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a
 real world permeated and animated by   
his spirit4 ,there is thus no room for  
the distinction between a param         
nirgu_/n_/am and an apara_/m_/          
sagu_/n_/am brahma1 between ,brahman and
 _/s_/vara4--_/,s_/ankara's individual  
soul is ,brahman in so far as limited by
 the unreal updhis due to ,my4 ,the     
individual soul of ,rmnuja1 on the other
 hand1 is really individual2 it has     

indeed sprung from ,brahman and is never
 outside ,brahman1 but nevertheless it  
enjoys a separate personal existence and
 will remain a personality for          
ever--,the release from sa_/m_/sra      
means1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 the   
absolute merging of the individual soul 
in ,brahman1 due to the dismissal of the
 erroneous notion that the soul is      
distinct from ,brahman2 according to    
,rmnuja it only means the soul's passing
 from the troubles of earthly life into 
a kind of heaven or paradise where it   
will remain for ever in undisturbed     
personal bliss4--,as ,rmnuja does not   
distinguish a higher and lower ,brahman1
 the distinction of a higher and lower  
knowledge is likewise not valid for him2
 the teaching of the ,upanishads is not 
twofold but essentially one1 and leads  
the enlightened devotee to one result   
only #a4  ,i now proceed to give a      
conspectus of the contents of the       
,vednta-stras according to _/,s_/ankara 
in which at the same time all the more  

important points concerning which       
,rmnuja disagrees will be noted4 ,we    
shall here have to enter into details   
which to many may appear tedious4 ,but  
it is only on a broad substratum of     
accurately stated details that we can   
hope to establish any definite          
conclusions regarding the comparative   
value of the different modes of         
interpretation which have been applied  
to the ,stras4 ,the line of             
investigation is an entirely new one1   
and for the present nothing can be taken
 for granted or known4--,in stating the 
different heads of discussion 7the      
so-called adhikara_/n_/as71 each of     
which comprises one or more ,stras1 ,i  
shall follow the subdivision into       
adhikara_/n_/as adopted in the          
,vysdhika-ra_/n_/aml1 the text of which 
is printed in the second volume of the  
,bibliotheca ,indica edition of the     
,stras4   ,,first ,,adhy,,ya4 ,p,,da ,i4
   ,the first five adhikara_/n_/as lay  
down the fundamental positions with     

regard to ,brahman4 ,adhik4 ,i 7#a7 #b  
treats of what the study of the ,vednta 
presupposes4 ,adhik4 ,,ii 7#b7 defines  
,brahman as that whence the world       
originates1 and so on4 ,adhik4 ,,iii    
7#c7 declares that ,brahman is the      
source of the ,veda4 ,adhik4 ,,iv 7#d7  
proves ,brahman to be the uniform topic 
of all ,vednta-texts4 ,adhik4 ,v 7#e-aa7
 is engaged in proving by various       
arguments that the ,brahman1 which the  
,vednta-texts represent as the cause of 
the world1 is an intelligent principle1 
and cannot be identified with the       
non-intelligent pradhna from which the  
world springs according to the ,snkhyas4
  ,with the next adhikara_/n_/a there   
begins a series of discussions of       
essentially similar character1 extending
 up to the end of the first adhyya4 ,the
 question is throughout whether certain 
terms met with in the ,upanishads denote
 ,brahman or some other being1 in most  
cases the jva1 the individual soul4     
_/,s_/ankara remarks at the outset that1

 as the preceding ten ,stras had settled
 the all-important point that all the   
,vednta-texts refer to ,brahman1 the    
question now arises why the enquiry     
should be continued any further1 and    
thereupon proceeds to explain that the  
acknowledged distinction of a higher    
,brahman devoid of all qualities and a  
lower ,brahman characterised by         
qualities necessitates an investigation 
whether certain ,vedic texts of prim    
facie doubtful import set forth the     
lower ,brahman as the object of devout  
meditation1 or the higher ,brahman as   
the object of true knowledge4 ,but that 
such an investigation is actually       
carried on in the remaining portion of  
the first adhyya1 appears neither from  
the wording of the ,stras nor even from 
_/,s_/ankara's own treatment of the     
,vedic texts referred to in the ,stras4 
,in ,i1 #a1 #bj1 for instance1 the      
question is raised whether the golden   
man within the sphere of the sun1 with  
golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured

 eyes--of whom the ,chndogya ,upanishad 
speaks in #a1 #f1 #f--;is an individual 
soul abiding within the sun or the      
highest ,lord4 _/,s_/ankara's answer is 
that the passage refers to the ,lord1   
who1 for the gratification of his       
worshippers1 manifests himself in a     
bodily shape made of ,my4 ,so that      
according to _/,s_/ankara himself the   
alternative lies between the sagu_/n_/a 
,brahman and some particular individual 
soul1 not between the sagu_/n_/a        
,brahman and the nirgu_/n_/a ,brahman4  
,adhik4 ,,vi 7#ab-ai7 raises the        
question whether the nandamaya1         
mentioned in ,taittirya ,upanishad ,,ii1
 #e1 is merely a transmigrating         
individual soul or the highest ,self4   
_/,s_/ankara begins by explaining the   
,stras on the latter supposition--and   
the text of the ,stras is certainly in  
favour of that interpretation--gives1   
however1 finally the preference to a    
different and exceedingly forced        
explanation according to which the      

,stras teach that the nandamaya is not  
,brahman1 since the ,upanishad expressly
 says that ,brahman is the tail or      
support of the nandamaya#c4--,rmnuja's  
interpretation of ,adhikara_/n_/a ,,vi1 
although not agreeing in all particulars
 with the former explanation of         
_/,s_/ankara1 yet is at one with it in  
the chief point1 viz4 that the nandamaya
 is ,brahman4 ,it further deserves      
notice that1 while _/,s_/ankara looks on
 ,adhik4 ,,vi as the first of a series  
of interpretatory discussions1 all of   
which treat the question whether certain
 ,vedic passages refer to ,brahman or   
not1 ,rmnuja separates the              
adhikara_/n_/a from the subsequent part 
of the pda and connects it with what had
 preceded4 ,in ,adhik4 ,v it had been   
shown that ,brahman cannot be identified
 with the pradhna2 ,adhik4 ,,vi shows   
that it is different from the individual
 soul1 and the proof of the fundamental 
position of the system is thereby       
completed#d4--;,adhik4 ,,vii 7#bj1 #ba7 

demonstrates that the golden person seen
 within the sun and the person seen     
within the eye1 mentioned in ,ch4 ,up4  
,i1 #f1 are not some individual soul of 
high eminence1 but the supreme          
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,viii 7#bb7 teaches 
that by the ether from which1 according 
to ,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #i1 all beings         
originate1 not the elemental ether has  
to be understood but the highest        
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,ix 7#bc74 ,the     
pr_/n_/a also mentioned in ,ch4 ,up4 ,i1
 ii1 #e denotes the highest             
,brahman#e--;,adhik4 ,x 7#bd-bg7 teaches
 that the light spoken of in ,ch4 ,up4  
,,iii1 #ac1 #g is not the ordinary      
physical light but the highest          
,brahman#f4--;,adhik4 ,,xi 7#bh-ca7     
decides that the pr_/n_/a mentioned in  
,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b is ,brahman4       
,p,,da ,,ii4   ,adhik4 ,i 7#a-h7 shows  
that the being which consists of mind1  
whose body is breath1 c41 mentioned in  
,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 is not the        
individual soul1 but ,brahman4 ,the     

,stras of this adhikara_/n_/a           
emphatically dwell on the difference of 
the individual soul and the highest     
,self1 whence _/,s_/ankara is obliged to
 add an explanation--in his comment on  
,stra #f--to the effect that that       
difference is to be understood as not   
real1 but as due to the false limiting  
adjuncts of the highest ,self4--,the    
comment of ,rmnuja throughout closely   
follows the words of the ,stras2 on     
,stra #f it simply remarks that the     
difference of the highest ,self from the
 individual soul rests thereon that the 
former as free from all evil is not     
subject to the effects of works in the  
same way as the soul is #g4--;,adhik4   
,,ii 7#i1 #aj7 decides that he to whom  
the ,brahmans and ,kshattriyas are but  
food 7,ka_/th_/a4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #be7 is  
the highest ,self4--,adhik4 ,,iii 7#aa1 
#ab7 shows that the two entered into the
 cave 7,ka_/th_/a ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #a7 are  
,brahman and the individual             
soul#h4--;,adhik4 ,,iv 7#ac-ag7 shows   

that the person within the eye mentioned
 in ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 #a is          
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,v 7#ah-bj7 shows    
that the ruler within 7antarymin7       
described in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1  
#c is ,brahman4 ,stra #bj clearly       
enounces the difference of the          
individual soul and the ,lord2 hence    
_/,s_/ankara is obliged to remark that  
that difference is not real4--,adhik4   
,,vi 7#ba-bc7 proves that that which    
cannot be seen1 c1 mentioned in         
,mu_/nd_/aka ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #c is         
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,vii 7#bd-cb7 shows 
that the tman vai_/s_/vnara of ,ch4 ,up4
 ,v1 #aa1 #f is ,brahman4   ,p,,da      
,,iii4   ,adhik4 ,i 7#a-g7 proves that  
that within which the heaven1 the earth1
 c4 are woven 7,mu_/nd_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1
 #e7 is ,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,ii 7#h1 #i7
 shows that the bhman referred to in    
,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bc is                 
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,iii 7#aj-ab7       
teaches that the ,imperishable in which1
 according to ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 

#h1 the ether is woven is               
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,iv 7#ac7 decides   
that the highest person who is to be    
meditated upon with the syllable ,om1   
according to ,pra_/s_/na ,up4 ,v1 #e1 is
 not the lower but the higher           
,brahman4--,according to ,rmnuja the two
 alternatives are ,brahman and ,brahm   
7jvasamash_/t_/irpoz_/nd_/dhipatis      
_/k_/aturmukha_/h_/74--,adhik4 ,v and   
,,vi 7comprising1 according to          
_/,s_/ankara1 ,stras l#d-bl7 discuss the
 question whether the small ether within
 the lotus of the heart mentioned in    
,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a is the elemental   
ether or the individual soul or         
,brahman2 the last alternative being    
finally adopted4 ,in favour of the      
second alternative the prvapakshin      
pleads the two passages ,ch4 ,up4       
,,viii1 #c1 #d and ,,viii1 #ab1 #c1     
about the serene being 7samprasda72 for 
by the latter the individual soul only  
can be understood1 and in the chapter1  
of which the latter passage forms part1 

there are ascribed to it the same       
qualities 7viz4 freeness from sin1 old  
age1 death1 c47 that were predicated in 
,,viii1 #a1 of the small ether within   
the heart4--,but the reply to this is1  
that the second passage refers not to   
the 7ordinary7 individual soul but to   
the soul in that state where its true   
nature has become manifest1 i4e4 in     
which it is ,brahman2 so that the       
subject of the passage is in reality not
 the so-called individual soul but      
,brahman4 ,and in the former of the two 
passages the soul is mentioned not on   
its own account1 but merely for the     
purpose of intimating that the highest  
,self is the cause through which the    
individual soul manifests itself in its 
true nature4--,what ,rmnuja understands 
by the virbhva of the soul will appear  
from the remarks on ,,iv1 #d4  ,the two 
next ,stras 7#bb1 #bc7 constitute1      
according to _/,s_/ankara1 a new        
adhikara_/n_/a 7,,vii71 proving that he 
'after whom everything shines1 by whose 

light all this is lighted' 7,ka_/th_/a  
,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ae7 is not some material
 luminous body1 but ,brahman            
itself4--,according to ,rmnuja the two  
,stras do not start a new topic1 but    
merely furnish some further arguments   
strengthening the conclusion arrived at 
in the preceding ,stras4#i  ,adhik4     
,,viii 7#bd1 #be7 decides that the      
person of the size of a thumb mentioned 
in ,ka_/th_/a ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab is not 
the individual soul but ,brahman4  ,the 
two next adhikara_/n_/as are of the     
nature of a digression4 ,the passage    
about the angush_/th_/amtra was         
explained on the ground that the human  
heart is of the size of a span2 the     
question may then be asked whether also 
such individuals as belong to other     
classes than mankind1 more particularly 
the ,gods1 are capable of the knowledge 
of ,brahman3 a question finally answered
 in the affirmative4--,this discussion  
leads in its turn to several other      
digressions1 among which the most       

important one refers to the problem in  
what relation the different species of  
beings stand to the words denoting them 
7,stra #bh74 ,in connexion herewith     
_/,s_/ankara treats of the nature of    
words 7_/s_/abda71 opposing the opinion 
of the ,mm_/m_/saka ,upavarsha1         
according to whom the word is nothing   
but the aggregate of its constitutive   
letters1 to the view of the grammarians 
who teach that over and above the       
aggregate of the letters there exists a 
super-sensuous entity called            
'spho_/t_/a1' which is the direct cause 
of the apprehension of the sense of a   
word 7,adhik4 ,,ix2 ,stras #bf-cc74     
,adhik4 ,x 7#cd-ch7 explains that       
_/,s_/dras are altogether disqualified  
for ,brahmavidy4  ,stra #ci constitutes1
 according to _/,s_/ankara1 a new       
adhikara_/n_/a 7,,xi71 proving that the 
pr_/n_/a in which everything trembles1  
according to _/,k_/a_/th_/a ,up4 ,,ii1  
#f1 #b1 is ,brahman4--,according to     
,rmnuja the ,stra does not introduce a  

new topic but merely furnishes an       
additional reason for the decision      
arrived at under ,stras #bd1 #be1 viz4  
that the angus_/th_/amtra is ,brahman4  
,on this supposition1 ,stras #bd-ci form
 one adhikara_/n_/a in which #bf-ch     
constitute a mere digression led up to  
by the mention made of the heart in     
#be4--,the angus_/th_/mtra is referred  
to twice in the ,ka_/th_/a ,upanishad1  
once in the passage discussed 7,,ii1 #d1
 #ab71 and once in ,,ii1 #f1 #ag 7'the  
,person not larger than a thumb'74 ,to  
determine what is meant by the          
angus_/th_/mtra1 ,rmnuja says1 we are   
enabled by the passage ,,ii1 #f1 #b1 #c1
 which is intermediate between the two  
passages concerning the angus_/th_/mtra1
 and which clearly refers to the highest
 ,brahman1 of which alone everything can
 be said to stand in awe4  ,the next    
,stra 7#dj7 gives rise to a similar     
difference of opinion4 ,according to    
_/,s_/ankara it constitutes by itself a 
new adhikara_/n_/a 7,,xii71 proving that

 the 'light' 7jyotis7 mentioned in ,ch4 
,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c is the highest     
,brahman4--,according to ,rmnuja the    
,stra continues the preceding           
adhikara_/n_/a1 and strengthens the     
conclusion arrived at by a further      
argument1 referring to ,ka_/th_/a ,up4  
,,ii1 #e1 #ae--;a passage intermediate  
between the two passages about the      
angush_/th_/amtra--which speaks of a    
primary light that cannot mean anything 
but ,brahman4 ,the ,stra has in that    
case to be translated as follows3 '7,the
 angush_/th_/amtra is ,brahman7 because 
7in a passage intervening between the   
two7 a light is seen to be mentioned    
7which can be ,brahman only74'  ,the    
three last ,stras of the pda are1       
according to _/,s_/ankara1 to be divided
 into two adhikara_/n_/as 7,,xiii and   
,,xiv71 ,stra #da deciding that the     
ether which reveals names and forms     
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ad7 is not the      
elemental ether but ,brahman2 and #db1  
#dc teaching that the vij_/_/namaya1 'he

 who consists of knowledge1' of         
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g is not the  
individual soul but                     
,brahman4--,according to ,rmnuja the    
three ,stras make up one single         
adhikara_/n_/a discussing whether the   
,chandogya ,upanishad passage about the 
ether refers to ,brahman or to the      
individual soul in the state of release2
 the latter of these two alternatives   
being suggested by the circumstance that
 the released soul is the subject of the
 passage immediately preceding          
7',shaking off all evil as a horse      
shakes off his hair1' c474 ,stra #da    
decides that 'the ether 7is ,brahman7   
because the passage designates the      
nature of something else1' c4 7i4e4 of  
something other than the individual     
soul2 other because to the soul the     
revealing of names and forms cannot be  
ascribed1 c47--,but1 an objection is    
raised1 does not more than one          
scriptural passage show that the        
released soul and ,brahman are          

identical1 and is not therefore the     
ether which reveals names and forms the 
soul as well as ,brahman8--7,the two1   
,stra #db replies1 are different7       
'because in the states of deep sleep and
 departing 7the highest ,self7 is       
designated as different' 7from the      
soul7--which point is proved by the same
 scriptural passages which _/,s_/ankara 
adduces2--and 'because such terms as    
,lord and the like' cannot be applied to
 the individual soul 7#dc74 ,reference  
is made to ,,iv1 #d1 #ad1 where all     
jagadvypra is said to belong to the     
,lord only1 not to the soul even when in
 the state of release4   ,p,,da ,,iv4   
,the last pda of the first adhyya is    
specially directed against the ,snkhyas4
  ,the first adhikara_/n_/a 7#a-g7      
discusses the passage ,ka_/th_/a ,up4   
,i1 #c1 #aj2 #aa1 where mention is made 
of the ,great and the ,undeveloped--both
 of them terms used with a special      
technical sense in the                  
,snkhya-_/s_/stra1 avyakta being a      

synonym for pradhna4--_/,s_/ankara shows
 by an exhaustive review of the topics  
of the ,ka_/th_/a ,upanishad that the   
term avyakta has not the special meaning
 which the ,snkhyas attribute to it1 but
 denotes the body1 more strictly the    
subtle body 7skshma _/s_/arra71 but at  
the same time the gross body also1 in so
 far as it is viewed as an effect of the
 subtle one4  ,adhik4 ,,ii 7#h-aj7      
demonstrates1 according to _/,s_/ankara1
 that the tricoloured aj spoken of in   
_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e is not the      
pradhna of the ,snkhyas1 but either that
 power of the ,lord from which the world
 springs1 or else the primary causal    
matter first produced by that           
power4--,what ,rmnuja in                
contradistinction from _/,s_/ankara     
understands by the primary causal       
matter1 follows from the short sketch   
given above of the two systems4  ,adhik4
 ,,iii 7#aa-ac7 shows that the pa_/k_/a 
pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ mentioned in ,b_/ri_/4 
,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag are not the          

twenty-five principles of the           
,snkhyas4--,adhik4 ,,iv 7#ad1 #ae7      
proves that ,scripture does not         
contradict itself on the all-important  
point of ,brahman1 i4e4 a being whose   
essence is intelligence1 being the cause
 of the world4  ,adhik4 ,v 7#af-ah7 is1 
according to _/,s_/ankara1 meant to     
prove that 'he who is the maker of those
 persons1 of whom this is the work1'    
mentioned in ,kau4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ai1 is   
not either the vital air or the         
individual soul1 but ,brahman4--,the    
subject of the adhikara_/n_/a is        
essentially the same in ,rmnuja's view2 
greater stress is1 however1 laid on the 
adhikara_/n_/a being polemical against  
the ,snkhyas1 who wish to turn the      
passage into an argument for the pradhna
 doctrine4  ,the same partial difference
 of view is observable with regard to   
the next adhikara_/n_/a 7,,vi2 ,stras   
#ai-bb7 which decides that the ',self to
 be seen1 to be heard1' c4 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e7 is the highest ,self1

 not the individual soul4 ,this latter  
passage also is1 according to ,rmnuja1  
made the subject of discussion in order 
to rebut the ,snkhya who is anxious to  
prove that what is there inculcated as  
the object of knowledge is not a        
universal ,self but merely the ,snkhya  
purusha4  ,adhik4 ,,vii 7#bc-bg7 teaches
 that ,brahman is not only the efficient
 or operative cause 7nimitta7 of the    
world1 but its material cause as well4  
,the world springs from ,brahman by way 
of modification 7pari_/n_/ma2 ,stra     
#bf74--,rmnuja views this adhikara_/n_/a
 as specially directed against the      
,se_/s_/vara-snkhyas who indeed admit   
the existence of a highest ,lord1 but   
postulate in addition an independent    
pradhna on which the ,lord acts as an   
operative cause merely4  ,adhik4 ,,viii 
7#bh7 remarks that the refutation of the
 ,snkhya views is applicable to other   
theories also1 such as the doctrine of  
the world having originated from atoms4 
,after this rapid survey of the contents

 of the first adhyya and the succinct   
indication of the most important points 
in which the views of _/,s_/ankara and  
,rmnuja diverge1 we turn to a short     
consideration of two questions which    
here naturally present themselves1 viz41
 firstly1 which is the principle on     
which the ,vedic passages referred to in
 the ,stras have been selected and      
arranged2 and1 secondly1 if1 where      
_/,s_/ankara and ,rmnuja disagree as to 
the subdivision of the ,stras into      
,adhikara_/n_/as1 and the determination 
of the ,vedic passages discussed in the 
,stras1 there are to be met with any    
indications enabling us to determine    
which of the two commentators is right4 
7,the more general question as to how   
far the ,stras favour either            
_/,s_/ankara's or ,rmnuja's general     
views cannot be considered at present47 
,the ,hindu commentators here and there 
attempt to point out the reason why the 
discussion of a certain ,vedic passage  
is immediately followed by the          

consideration of a certain other one4   
,their explanations--which have         
occasionally been referred to in the    
notes to the translation--rest on the   
assumption that the ,strakra in         
arranging the texts to be commented upon
 was guided by technicalities of the    
,mm_/m_/s-system1 especially by a regard
 for the various so-called means of     
proof which the ,mm_/m_/saka employs for
 the purpose of determining the proper  
meaning and position of scriptural      
passages4 ,but that this was the guiding
 principle1 is rendered altogether      
improbable by a simple tabular statement
 of the ,vedic passages referred to in  
the first adhyya1 such as given by      
,deussen on page #acj2 for from the     
latter it appears that the order in     
which the ,stras exhibit the scriptural 
passages follows the order in which     
those passages themselves occur in the  
,upanishads1 and it would certainly be a
 most strange coincidence if that order 
enabled us at the same time to exemplify

 the various pram_/n_/as of the         
,mm_/m_/s in their due systematic       
succession4  ,as ,deussen's statement   
shows1 most of the passages discussed   
are taken from the ,chndogya ,upanishad1
 so many indeed that the whole first    
adhyya may be said to consist of a      
discussion of all those ,chndogya       
passages of which it is doubtful whether
 they are concerned with ,brahman or    
not1 passages from the other ,upanishads
 being brought in wherever an           
opportunity offers4 ,considering the    
prominent position assigned to the      
,upanishad mentioned1 ,i think it likely
 that the ,strakra meant to begin the   
series of doubtful texts with the first 
doubtful passage from the ,chndogya1 and
 that hence the sixth adhikara_/n_/a    
which treats of the anndamaya mentioned 
in the ,taittirya ,upanishad has1 in    
agreement with ,rmnuja's views1 to be   
separated from the subsequent           
adhikara_/n_/as1 and to be combined with
 the preceding ones whose task it is to 

lay down the fundamental propositions   
regarding ,brahman's nature4--,the      
remaining adhikara_/n_/as of the first  
pda follow the order of passages in the 
,chndogya ,upanishad1 and therefore call
 for no remark2 with the exception of   
the last adhikara_/n_/a1 which refers to
 a ,kaushtaki passage1 for whose being  
introduced in this place ,i am not able 
to account4--,the first adhikara_/n_/a  
of the second pda returns to the        
,chndogya ,upanishad4 ,the second one   
treats of a passage in the ,ka_/th_/a   
,upanishad where a being is referred to 
which eats everything4 ,the reason why  
that passage is introduced in this place
 seems to be correctly assigned in the  
_/,s_/r-bhshya1 which remarks that1 as  
in the preceding ,stra it had been      
argued that the highest ,self is not an 
enjoyer1 a doubt arises whether by that 
being which eats everything the highest 
,self can be meant#aj--,the third       
adhikara_/n_/a again1 whose topic is the
 'two entered into the cave' 7,ka_/th_/a

 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #a71 appears1 as ,rmnuja  
remarks1 to come in at this place owing 
to the preceding adhikara_/n_/a2 for if 
it could not be proved that one of the  
two is the highest ,self1 a doubt would 
attach to the explanation given above of
 the 'eater' since the 'two entered into
 the cave1' and the 'eater' stand under 
the same prakara_/n_/a1 and must        
therefore be held to refer to the same  
matter4--,the fourth adhikara_/n_/a is  
again occupied with a ,chndogya         
passage4--,the fifth adhikara_/n_/a1    
whose topic is the ,ruler within        
7antarymin71 manifestly owes its place1 
as remarked by ,rmnuja also1 to the fact
 that the ,vedic passage treated had    
been employed in the preceding          
adhikara_/n_/a 7,i1 #b1 #ad7 for the    
purpose of strengthening the argument   
#aa4--,the sixth adhikara_/n_/a1 again1 
which discusses 'that which is not seen'
 7adre_/s_/ya2 ,mu_/nd_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1  
#f71 is clearly introduced in this place
 because in the preceding adhikara_/n_/a

 it had been said that ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a1
 c4 denote the highest ,self2--,the     
reasons to which the last adhikara_/n_/a
 of the second pda and the first and    
third adhikara_/n_/as of the third pda  
owe their places are not apparent 7the  
second adhikara_/n_/a of the third pda  
treats of a ,chndogya passage74 ,the    
introduction1 on the other hand1 of the 
passage from the ,pra_/s_/na ,upanishad 
treating of the akshara4 ,o_/m_/kra is  
clearly due to the circumstance that an 
akshara1 of a different nature1 had been
 discussed in the preceding             
adhikara_/n_/a4--,the fifth and sixth   
adhikara_/n_/as investigate ,chndogya   
passages4--,the two next ,stras 7#bb1   
#bc7 are1 as remarked above1 considered 
by _/,s_/ankara to constitute a new     
adhikara_/n_/a treating of the 'being   
after which everything shines'          
7,mu_/nd_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aj72 while  
,rmnuja looks on them as continuing the 
sixth adhikara_/n_/a4 ,there is one     
circumstance which renders it at any    

rate probable that ,rmnuja1 and not     
_/,s_/ankara1 here hits the intention of
 the author of the ,stras4 ,the general 
rule in the first three pdas is that1   
wherever a new ,vedic passage is meant  
to be introduced1 the subject of the    
discussion1 i4e4 that being which in the
 end is declared to be ,brahman is      
referred to by means of a special word1 
in most cases a nominative form #ab4    
,from this rule there is in the         
preceding part of the adhyya only one   
real exception1 viz4 in ,i1 #b1 #a1     
which possibly may be due to the fact   
that there a new pda begins1 and it     
therefore was considered superfluous to 
indicate the introduction of a new topic
 by a special word4 ,the exception      
supplied by ,i1 #c1 #ai is only an      
apparent one2 for1 as remarked above1   
,stra #ai does not in reality begin a   
new adhikara_/n_/a4 ,a few exceptions   
occurring later on will be noticed in   
their places4--,now neither ,stra #bb   
nor ,stra #bc contains any word         

intimating that a new ,vedic passage is 
being taken into consideration1 and     
hence it appears preferable to look upon
 them1 with ,rmnuja1 as continuing the  
topic of the preceding                  
adhikara_/n_/a4--,this conclusion       
receives an additional confirmation from
 the position of the next               
adhikara_/n_/a1 which treats of the     
being 'a span long' mentioned in        
,ka_/th_/a ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab2 for the  
reason of this latter passage being     
considered here is almost certainly the 
reference to the alpa_/s_/ruti in ,stra 
#ba1 and1 if so1 the angush_/th_/amtra  
properly constitutes the subject of the 
adhikara_/n_/a immediately following on 
,adhik4 ,v1 ,,vi2 which1 in its turn1   
implies that ,stras #bb1 #bc do not form
 an independent adhikara_/n_/a4--,the   
two next adhikara_/n_/as are            
digressions1 and do not refer to special
 ,vedic passages4--,stra #ci forms a new
 adhikara_/n_/a1 according to           
_/,s_/ankara1 but not according to      

,rmnuja1 whose opinion seems again to be
 countenanced by the fact that the ,stra
 does not exhibit any word indicative of
 a new topic4 ,the same difference of   
opinion prevails with regard to ,stra   
#dj1 and it appears from the translation
 of the ,stra given above1 according to 
,rmnuja's view1 that 'jyoti_/h_/' need  
not be taken as a nominative4--,the last
 two adhikara_/n_/as finally refer1     
according to ,rmnuja1 to one ,chndogya  
passage only1 and here also we have to  
notice that ,stra #db does not comprise 
any word intimating that a new passage  
is about to be discussed4  ,from all    
this we seem entitled to draw the       
following conclusions4 ,the ,vedic      
passages discussed in the three first   
pdas of the ,vednta-stras comprise all  
the doubtful--or at any rate all the    
more important doubtful--passages from  
the ,chndogya ,upanishad4 ,these        
passages are arranged in the order in   
which the text of the ,upanishad        
exhibits them4 ,passages from other     

,upanishads are discussed as            
opportunities offer1 there being always 
a special reason why a certain ,chndogya
 passage is followed by a certain       
passage from some other ,upanishad4     
,those reasons can be assigned with     
sufficient certainty in a number of     
cases although not in all1 and from     
among those passages whose introduction 
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for  
some are eliminated by our following the
 subdivision of the ,stras into         
adhikara_/n_/as adopted by ,rmnuja1 a   
subdivision countenanced by the external
 form of the ,stras4  ,the fourth pda of
 the first adhyya has to be taken by    
itself4 ,it is directed specially and   
avowedly against ,snkhya-interpretations
 of ,scripture1 not only in its earlier 
part which discusses isolated passages1 
but also--as is brought out much more   
clearly in the _/,s_/r-bhshya than by   
_/,s_/ankara--in its latter part which  
takes a general survey of the entire    
scriptural evidence for ,brahman being  

the material as well as the operative   
cause of the world4  ,deussen 7p4 #bba7 
thinks that the selection made by the   
,strakra of ,vedic passages setting     
forth the nature of ,brahman is not in  
all cases an altogether happy one4 ,but 
this reproach rests on the assumption   
that the passages referred to in the    
first adhyya were chosen for the purpose
 of throwing light on what ,brahman is1 
and this assumption can hardly be       
upheld4 ,the ,vednta-stras as well as   
the ,prv ,mm_/m_/s-stras are throughout 
,mm_/m_/s i4e4 critical discussions of  
such scriptural passages as on a prim   
facie view admit of different           
interpretations and therefore           
necessitate a careful enquiry into their
 meaning4 ,here and there we meet with  
,sutrs which do not directly involve a  
discussion of the sense of some         
particular ,vedic passage1 but rather   
make a mere statement on some important 
point4 ,but those cases are rare1 and it
 would be altogether contrary to the    

general spirit of the ,sutrs to assume  
that a whole adhyya should be devoted to
 the task of showing what ,brahman is4  
,the latter point is sufficiently       
determined in the first five 7or six7   
adhikara_/n_/as2 but after we once know 
what ,brahman is we are at once         
confronted by a number of ,upanishad    
passages concerning which it is doubtful
 whether they refer to ,brahman or not4 
,with their discussion all the remaining
 adhikara_/n_/as of the first adhyya are
 occupied4 ,that the ,vednta-stras view 
it as a particularly important task to  
controvert the doctrine of the ,snkhyas 
is patent 7and has also been fully      
pointed out by ,deussen1 p4 #bc74 ,the  
fifth adhikara_/n_/a already declares   
itself against the doctrine that the    
world has sprung from a non-intelligent 
principle1 the pradhna1 and the fourth  
pda of the first adhyya returns to an   
express polemic against ,snkhya         
interpretations of certain ,vedic       
statements4 ,it is therefore perhaps not

 saying too much if we maintain that the
 entire first adhyya is due to the wish1
 on the part of the ,strakra1 to guard  
his own doctrine against ,snkhya        
attacks4 ,whatever the attitude of the  
other so-called orthodox systems may be 
towards the ,veda1 the ,snkhya system is
 the only one whose adherents were      
anxious--and actually attempted--to     
prove that their views are warranted by 
scriptural passages4 ,the ,snkhya       
tendency thus would be to show that all 
those ,vedic texts which the ,vedntin   
claims as teaching the existence of     
,brahman1 the intelligent and sole cause
 of the world1 refer either to the      
pradhna or some product of the pradhna1 
or else to the purusha in the ,snkhya   
sense1 i4e4 the individual soul4 ,it    
consequently became the task of the     
,vedntin to guard the ,upanishads       
against misinterpretations of the kind1 
and this he did in the first adhyya of  
the ,vednta-stras1 selecting those      
passages about whose interpretation     

doubts were1 for some reason or other1  
likely to arise4 ,some of the passages  
singled out are certainly obscure1 and  
hence liable to various interpretations2
 of others it is less apparent why it   
was thought requisite to discuss them at
 length4 ,but this is hardly a matter in
 which we are entitled to find fault    
with the ,strakra2 for no modern        
scholar1 either ,european or ,hindu1    
is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at 
home1 on the one hand1 in the religious 
and philosophical views which prevailed 
at the time when the ,stras may have    
been composed1 and1 on the other hand1  
in the intricacies of the ,mm_/m_/s1 to 
judge with confidence which ,vedic      
passages may give rise to discussions   
and which not4  ,notes3  ,footnote #a3  
,the only 'sectarian' feature of the    
,sr-bhshya is1 that identifies ,brahman 
with ,vish_/n_/u or ,nrya_/n_/a2 but    
this in no way affects the              
interpretations put on the ,stras and   
,upanishads4 ,nrya_/n_/a is in fact     

nothing but another name of ,brahman4   
,footnote #b3 ,the ,roman numerals      
indicate the number of the              
adhikara_/n_/a2 the figures in          
parentheses state the ,stras comprised  
in each adhikara_/n_/a4  ,footnote #c3  
,deussen's supposition 7pp4 #cj1 #aej7  
that the passage conveying the second   
interpretation is an interpolation is   
liable to two objections4 ,in the first 
place1 the passage is accepted and      
explained by all commentators2 in the   
second place1 _/,s_/ankara in the       
passage immediately preceding ,stra #ab 
quotes the adhikara_/n_/a 'nandamayo s  
bhyst' as giving rise to a discussion   
whether the param or the aparam brahman 
is meant4 ,now this latter point is not 
touched upon at all in that part of the 
bhshya which sets forth the former      
explanation1 but only in the subsequent 
passage1 which refutes the former and   
advocates the latter interpretation4    
,footnote #d3 ,eva_/m_/ jij_/_/anasya   
brahma_/nas_/                           

_/ko_/tanabhogvabhutaga_/d_/arupsattvara
1 istamomayapradhnd vyv_/ri_/ttir ukt1  
idn_/m_/ karmava_/s_/vat                
trigu_/n_/atmakaprik_/ri_/u             
sa_/m_/sangammittanmvidhn               
intadukhasagaranimajjaon_/s_/addh_/h_/4 
_/k_/i pratya gaumano nyan              
nikhilaheyapratauka_/m_/ miatimyanandam 
brahmeti pratipadyate1 anandamayo bhyst4
  ,footnote #e3 ,there is no reason to  
consider the passage 'atra ke_/k_/it' in
 _/,s_/ankara's bhashya on ,sutra #bc an
 interpolation as ,deussen does 7p4     
#cj74 ,it simply contains a criticism   
passed by _/,s_/ankara on other         
commentators4  ,footnote #f3 ,to the    
passages on pp4 #aej and #aec of the    
,sanskrit text1 which ,deussen thinks to
 be interpolations1 there likewise      
applies the remark made in the preceding
 note4  ,footnote #g3 ,gvaysa iva       
parasypi brahma_/n_/a_/h_/              
_/s_/arrantarvaititvam abhyupagata_/m_/ 
_/k_/et tadvad eva                      
_/s_/arrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopab

hogapraptir hi _/k_/en na1              
hetuvai_/s_/eshyat1 na hi               
_/s_/arrntarvartitvam eva               
sukhadukhopabhogahetu_/h_/ api tu       
pu_/n_/yapparnpakarmaparavasatva_/m_/   
ta_/k_/ _/,k_/pahatappmana_/h_/         
parahtmano na sambhavati4  ,footnote #h3
 ,the second interpretation given on pp4
 #ahd-e of the ,sanskrit text 7beginning
 with apara ha7 ,deussen considers to be
 an interpolation1 caused by the        
reference to the ,paingi upanishad in   
_/,s_/ankara's comment on ,i1 #c1 #g 7p4
 #bcb74 ,but there is no reason         
whatsoever for such an assumption4 ,the 
passage on p4 #bcb shows that           
_/,s_/ankara considered the explanation 
of the mantra given in the              
,paingi-upanishad worth quoting1 and is 
in fact fully intelligible only in case 
of its having been quoted before by     
_/,s_/ankara himself4--,that the 'apara'
 quotes the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka not  
according to the ,ka_/n_/va text--to    
quote from which is _/,s_/ankara's      

habit--but from the ,madhyandina text1  
is due just to the circumstance of his  
being an 'apara1' i4e4 not _/,s_/ankara4
  ,footnote #i3 ,ita_/s_/ _/k_/aitad    
evam4 ,anuk_/ri_/tes tasya _/k_/a4      
,tasya daharksasya parabrahma_/n_/o     
snukrd ayam apahatappmatvdigu_/n_/ako   
vimuktabandha_/h_/ pratyagtm na         
daharak_/s_/a_/h_/ tadanukras           
tatsmya_/m_/ tath hi pratyaglmanozpi    
vimuktasya parabrahmnukra_/h_/ sryate   
yad pa_/s_/ya_/h_/ pa_/s_/yate          
rukmavar_/n_/a_/m_/ kartram _/s_/a_/m_/ 
purusha_/m_/ brahmayoni_/m_/ tad vidvn  
pu_/n_/yappe vidhya nira_/g_/ana_/h_/   
parama_/m_/ smyam upaitty atos'nukart   
prajpativkyanirdish_/t_/a_/h_/          
anukrya_/m_/ para_/m_/ brahma na        
dahark_/s_/a_/h_/4 ,api _/k_/a smaryate4
 ,sa_/m_/sri_/n_/oszpi muktvasthy_/m_/  
paramasmypattilaksha_/n_/a_/h_/         
parabrahmnukra_/h_/ smaryate ida_/m_/   
j_/_/nam upsritya1 c4--,ke_/k_/id       
anuk_/ri_/tes tasya _/k_/pi smaryate iti
 _/k_/a stradvayam                      

adhikara_/n_/ntara_/m_/ tam eva bhntam  
anubhti sarva_/m_/ tasya bhs sarvam     
ida_/m_/ vibhtty asy_/h_/ _/s_/rute_/h_/
 parabrahmaparatvanir_/n_/ayya          
prav_/ri_/tta_/m_/ vadanti4 ,tat tv     
ad_/ris_/yatvdigu_/n_/ako dharmokte_/h_/
 dyubhvdyyatana_/m_/ sva_/s_/abdd ity   
adhi kara_/n_/advayena tasya            
prakara_/n_/asya                        
brahmavishayatvapratipdant              
jyoti_/sk_/ara_/n_/bhidhnt ity dishu    
parasya brahma_/n_/o bhrpatvvagates     
_/k_/a prvapakshnutthnd ayukta_/m_/     
strksharavairpya_/k_/ _/k_/a4  ,footnote
 #aj3 ,yadi paramtm na bhokt eva_/m_/   
taihi bhokt _/i_/tay pratyamno jva eva  
syd ity sankyha att4  ,footnote #aa3    
,sthndivyapade_/s_/_/k_/ _/k_/a ity atra
 ya_/h_/ _/k_/akshushi tish_/th_/ann ity
 din pratipdyamna_/m_/ _/k_/akshushi    
sthitiniyamandika_/m_/ paramtmana eveti 
siddha_/m_/ k_/ri_/tv akshipurushasya   
paramtmatva_/m_/ sdhitam idni_/m_/ tad  
eva samarthayate antary4  ,footnote #ab3
 nandamaya_/h_/ ,i1 #a1 #ab2 anta_/h_/  

,i1 i1 #bj2 k_/s_/a_/h_/ ,i1 #a1 #bb2   
prna_/h_/ ,i1 #a1 #bc2 jyoti_/h_/ ,i1   
#a1 #bd2 prna_/h_/ ,i1 #a1 #bh2 att ,i1 
#b1 #i2 guh_/m_/ pravish_/t_/au ,i1 #b1 
#aa2 antara ,i1 #b1ac2 antarym ,i1 #b1  
#ah2 ad_/ris_/yatvdigu_/n_/aka_/h_/ ,i1 
#b1 #ba2 vai_/s_/vnara_/h_/ ,i1 #b1 #bd2
 dyubhvdyyatanam ,i1 #c1 #a2 bhm ,i1 #c1
 #h2 aksheram ,i1 #c1 #aj2 sa_/h_/ ,i1  
#c1 #ac2 dahara_/h_/ ,i1 #c1 #ad2       
pramita_/h_/ ,i1 #c1 #bd2 7jyoti_/h_/   
#dj27 k_/s_/a_/h_/ ,i1 #c1da4   ,,second
 ,,adhy,,ya4   ,the first adhyya has    
proved that all the ,vednta-texts       
unanimously teach that there is only one
 cause of the world1 viz4 ,brahman1     
whose nature is intelligence1 and that  
there exists no scriptural passage which
 can be used to establish systems       
opposed to the ,vednta1 more especially 
the ,snkhya system4 ,the task of the two
 first pdas of the second adhyya is to  
rebut any objections which may be raised
 against the ,vednta doctrine on purely 
speculative grounds1 apart from         

scriptural authority1 and to show1 again
 on purely speculative grounds1 that    
none of the systems irreconcilable with 
the ,vednta can be satisfactorily       
established4   ,p,,da ,i4               
,adhikara_/n_/a ,i refutes the ,snkhya  
objection that the acceptation of the   
,vednta system involves the rejection of
 the ,snkhya doctrine which after all   
constitutes a part of ,sm_/ri_/ti1 and  
as such has claims on                   
consideration4--,to accept the          
,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1 the ,vedntin        
replies1 would compel us to reject other
 ,sm_/ri_/tis1 such as the              
,manu-sm_/ri_/ti1 which are opposed to  
the ,snkhya doctrine4 ,the conflicting  
claims of ,sm_/ri_/tis can be settled   
only on the ground of the ,veda1 and    
there can be no doubt that the ,veda    
does not confirm the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1
 but rather those ,sm_/ri_/tis which    
teach the origination of the world from 
an intelligent primary cause4  ,adhik4  
,,ii 7#c7 extends the same line of      

argumentation to the ,yoga-sm_/ri_/ti4  
,adhik4 ,,iii 7#d-aa7 shows that        
,brahman1 although of the nature of     
intelligence1 yet may be the cause of   
the non-intelligent material world1 and 
that it is not contaminated by the      
qualities of the world when the latter  
is refunded into ,brahman4 ,for ordinary
 experience teaches us that like does   
not always spring from like1 and that   
the qualities of effected things when   
the latter are refunded into their      
causes--as when golden ornaments1 for   
instance1 are melted and thereby become 
simple gold again--do not continue to   
exist in those causes4--,here also the  
argumentation is specially directed     
against the ,snkhyas1 who1 in order to  
account for the materiality and the     
various imperfections of the world1     
think it necessary to assume a causal   
substance participating in the same     
characteristics4  ,adhik4 ,,iv 7#ab7    
points out that the line of reasoning   
followed in the preceding adhikara_/n_/a

 is valid also against other theories1  
such as the atomistic doctrine4  ,the   
one ,stra 7#ac7 constituting ,adhik4 ,v 
teaches1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 that
 although the enjoying souls as well as 
the objects of fruition are in reality  
nothing but ,brahman1 and on that       
account identical1 yet the two sets may 
practically be held apart1 just as in   
ordinary life we hold apart1 and        
distinguish as separate individual      
things1 the waves1 ripples1 and foam of 
the sea1 although at the bottom waves1  
ripples1 and foam are all of them       
identical as being neither more nor less
 than sea-water4--,the _/,s_/r-bhshya   
gives a totally different interpretation
 of the ,stra1 according to which the   
latter has nothing whatever to do with  
the eventual non-distinction of enjoying
 souls and objects to be enjoyed4       
,translated according to ,rmnuja's view1
 the ,stra runs as follows3 ',if        
non-distinction 7of the ,lord and the   
individual souls7 is said to result from

 the circumstance of 7the ,lord himself7
 becoming an enjoyer 7a soul71 we refute
 this objection by instances from       
every-day experience4' ,that is to say3 
,if it be maintained that from our      
doctrine previously expounded1 according
 to which this world springs from the   
,lord and constitutes his body1 it      
follows that the ,lord1 as an embodied  
being1 is not essentially different from
 other souls1 and subject to fruition as
 they are2 we reply that the ,lord's    
having a body does not involve his being
 subject to fruition1 not any more than 
in ordinary life a king1 although       
himself an embodied being1 is affected  
by the experiences of pleasure and pain 
which his servants have to              
undergo4--,the construction which       
,rmnuja puts on the ,stra is not        
repugnant either to the words of the    
,stra or to the context in which the    
latter stands1 and that it rests on     
earlier authority appears from a        
quotation made by ,rmnuja from the      

,drami_/d_/abhshyakra#ac4  ,adhik4 ,,vi 
7#ad-bj7 treats of the non-difference of
 the effect from the cause2 a ,vednta   
doctrine which is defended by its       
adherents against the ,vai_/s_/eshikas  
according to whom the effect is         
something different from the            
cause4--,the divergent views of         
_/,s_/ankara and ,rmnuja on this        
important point have been sufficiently  
illustrated in the general sketch of the
 two systems4  ,adhik4 ,,vii 7#ba-bc7   
refutes the objection that1 from the    
,vedic passages insisting on the        
identity of the ,lord and the individual
 soul1 it follows that the ,lord must be
 like the individual soul the cause of  
evil1 and that hence the entire doctrine
 of an all-powerful and all-wise ,lord  
being the cause of the world has to be  
rejected4 ,for1 the ,strakra remarks1   
the creative principle of the world is  
additional to1 i4e4 other than1 the     
individual soul1 the difference of the  
two being distinctly declared by        

,scripture4--,the way in which the three
 ,stras constituting this adhikara_/n_/a
 are treated by _/,s_/ankara on the one 
hand and ,rmnuja on the other is        
characteristic4 ,rmnuja throughout      
simply follows the words of the ,stras1 
of which ,stra #ba formulates the       
objection based on such texts as ',thou 
art that1' while ,stra #bb replies that 
,brahman is different from the soul1    
since that is expressly declared by     
,scripture4 _/,s_/ankara1 on the other  
hand1 sees himself obliged to add that  
the difference of the two1 plainly      
maintained in ,stra #bb1 is not real1   
but due to the soul's fictitious        
limiting adjuncts4  ,adhik4 ,,viii 7#bd1
 #be7 shows that ,brahman1 although     
destitute of material and instruments of
 action1 may yet produce the world1 just
 as gods by their mere power create     
palaces1 animals1 and the like1 and as  
milk by itself turns into curds4        
,adhik4 ,,ix 7#bf-bi7 explains that1    
according to the express doctrine of    

,scripture1 ,brahman does not in its    
entirety pass over into the world1 and1 
although emitting the world from itself1
 yet remains one and undivided4 ,this is
 possible1 according to _/,s_/ankara1   
because the world is unreal2 according  
to ,rmnuja1 because the creation is     
merely the visible and tangible         
manifestation of what previously existed
 in ,brahman in a subtle imperceptible  
condition4  ,adhik4 ,x 7#cj1 #ca7       
teaches that ,brahman1 although         
destitute of instruments of action1 is  
enabled to create the world by means of 
the manifold powers which it possesses4 
,adhik4 ,,xi 7#cb1 #cc7 assigns the     
motive of the creation1 or1 more        
properly expressed1 teaches that        
,brahman1 in creating the world1 has no 
motive in the strict sense of the word1 
but follows a mere sportive impulse4    
,adhik4 ,,xii 7#cd-cf7 justifies        
,brahman from the charges of partiality 
and cruelty which might be brought      
against it owing to the inequality of   

position and fate of the various animate
 beings1 and the universal suffering of 
the world4 ,brahman1 as a creator and   
dispenser1 acts with a view to the merit
 and demerit of the individual souls1   
and has so acted from all eternity4     
,adhik4 ,,xiii 7#cg7 sums up the        
preceding argumentation by declaring    
that all the qualities of               
,brahman--omniscience and so on--are    
such as to capacitate it for the        
creation of the world4   ,p,,da ,,ii4   
,the task of the second pda is to       
refute1 by arguments independent of     
,vedic passages1 the more important     
philosophical theories concerning the   
origin of the world which are opposed to
 the ,vednta view4--,the first          
adhikara_/n_/a 7#a-aj7 is directed      
against the ,snkhyas1 whose doctrine had
 already been touched upon incidentally 
in several previous places1 and aims at 
proving that a non-intelligent first    
cause1 such as the pradhna of the       
,snkhyas1 is unable to create and       

dispose4--,the second adhikara_/n_/a    
7#aa-ag7 refutes the ,vai_/s_/eshika    
tenet that the world originates from    
atoms set in motion by the              
ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a4--,the third and fourth
 adhikara_/n_/as are directed against   
various schools of ,bauddha             
philosophers4 ,adhik4 ,,iii 7#ah-bg7    
impugns the view of the so-called       
sarvstitvavdins1 or bhyrthavdins1 who   
maintain the reality of an external as  
well as an internal world2 ,adhik4 ,,iv 
7#bh-cb7 is directed against the        
vij_/_/navdins1 according to whom ideas 
are the only reality4--,the last ,stra  
of this adhikara_/n_/a is treated by    
,rmnuja as a separate adhikara_/n_/a    
refuting the view of the ,mdhyamikas1   
who teach that everything is void1 i4e4 
that nothing whatever is real4--,adhik4 
,v 7#cc-cf7 is directed against the     
doctrine of the ,jainas2 ,adhik4 ,,vi   
7#cg-da7 against those philosophical    
schools which teach that a highest ,lord
 is not the material but only the       

operative cause of the world4  ,the last
 adhikara_/n_/a of the pda 7#db-de7     
refers1 according to the unanimous      
statement of the commentators1 to the   
doctrine of the ,bhgavatas or           
,p_/k_/artras4 ,but _/,s_/ankara and    
,rmnuja totally disagree as to the drift
 of the ,strakra's opinion regarding    
that system4 ,according to the former it
 is condemned like the systems          
previously referred to2 according to the
 latter it is approved of4--,stras #db  
and #dc1 according to both commentators1
 raise objections against the system2   
,stra #db being directed against the    
doctrine that from the highest being1   
called ,vsudeva1 there is originated    
,sankarsha_/n_/a1 i4e4 the jiva1 on the 
ground that thereby those scriptural    
passages would be contradicted which    
teach the soul's eternity2 and ,stra #dc
 impugning the doctrine that from       
,sankarsha_/n_/a there springs          
,pradyumna1 i4e4 the manas4--,the ,stra 
on which the difference of              

interpretation turns is #dd4 ,literally 
translated it runs1 ',or1 on account of 
there being' 7or1 'their being'7        
'knowledge and so on1 there is          
non-contradiction of that4'--,this      
means1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 ',or1 
if in consequence of the existence of   
knowledge and so on 7on the part of     
,sankarsha_/n_/a1 c4 they be taken not  
as soul1 mind1 c4 but as ,lords of      
pre-eminent knowledge1 c471 yet there is
 non-contradiction of that 7viz4 of the 
objection raised in ,stra #db against   
the ,bhgavata doctrine74'--,according to
 ,rmnuja1 on the other hand1 the ,stra  
has to be explained as follows3 ',or1   
rather there is noncontradiction of that
 7i4e4 the ,pa_/k_/artra doctrine7 on   
account of their being knowledge and so 
on 7i4e4 on account of their being      
,brahman74' ,which means3 ,since        
,sankarsha_/n_/a and so on are merely   
forms of manifestation of ,brahman1 the 
,p_/k_/artra doctrine1 according to     
which they spring from ,brahman1 is not 

contradicted4--,the form of the ,stra   
makes it difficult for us to decide     
which of the two interpretations is the 
right one2 it1 however1 appears to me   
that the explanations of the 'v' and of 
the 'tat1' implied in ,rmnuja's comment1
 are more natural than those resulting  
from _/,s_/ankara's interpretation4 ,nor
 would it be an unnatural proceeding to 
close the polemical pda with a defence  
of that doctrine which--in spite of     
objections--has to be viewed as the true
 one4   ,p,,da ,,iii4   ,the third pda  
discusses the question whether the      
different forms of existence which1 in  
their totality1 constitute the world    
have an origin or not1 i4e4 whether they
 are co-eternal with ,brahman1 or issue 
from it and are refunded into it at     
stated intervals4  ,the first seven     
adhikara_/n_/as treat of the five       
elementary substances4--,adhik4 ,i      
7#a-g7 teaches that the ether is not    
co-eternal with ,brahman1 but springs   
from it as its first effect4--,adhik4   

,,ii 7#h7 shows that air springs from   
ether2 ,adhik4 ,,iv1 ,v1 ,,vi 7#aj2 #aa2
 #ab7 that fire springs from air1 water 
from fire1 earth from water4--,adhik4   
,,iii 7#i7 explains by way of digression
 that ,brahman1 which is not some       
special entity1 but quite generally     
'that which is1' cannot have originated 
from anything else4  ,adhik4 ,,vii 7#ac7
 demonstrates that the origination of   
one element from another is due1 not to 
the latter in itself1 but to ,brahman   
acting in it4  ,adhik4 ,,viii 7#ad7     
teaches that the reabsorption of the    
elements into ,brahman takes place in   
the inverse order of their emission4    
,adhik4 ,,ix 7#ae7 remarks that the     
indicated order in which the emission   
and the reabsorption of the elementary  
substances take place is not interfered 
with by the creation and reabsorption of
 the organs of the soul1 i4e4 the sense 
organs and the internal organ 7manas72  
for they also are of elemental nature1  
and as such created and retracted       

together with the elements of which they
 consist4  ,the remainder of the pda is 
taken up by a discussion of the nature  
of the individual soul1 the             
jva4--,adhik4 ,x 7#af7 teaches that     
expressions such as ',devadatta is      
born1' ',devadatta has died1' strictly  
apply to the body only1 and are         
transferred to the soul in so far only  
as it is connected with a body4  ,adhik4
 ,,xi 7#ag7 teaches that the individual 
soul is1 according to ,scripture1       
permanent1 eternal1 and therefore not1  
like the ether and the other elements1  
produced from ,brahman at the time of   
creation4--,this ,stra is of course     
commented on in a very different manner 
by _/,s_/ankara on the one hand and     
,rmnuja on the other4 ,according to the 
former1 the jva is in reality           
identical--and as such co-eternal--with 
,brahman2 what originates is merely the 
soul's connexion with its limiting      
adjuncts1 and that connexion is moreover
 illusory4--,according to ,rmnuja1 the  

jva is indeed an effect of ,brahman1 but
 has existed in ,brahman from all       
eternity as an individual being and as a
 mode 7prakra7 of ,brahman4 ,so indeed  
have also the material elements2 yet    
there is an important distinction owing 
to which the elements may be said to    
originate at the time of creation1 while
 the same cannot be said of the soul4   
,previously to creation the material    
elements exist in a subtle condition in 
which they possess none of the qualities
 that later on render them the objects  
of ordinary experience2 hence1 when     
passing over into the gross state at the
 time of creation1 they may be said to  
originate4 ,the souls1 on the other     
hand1 possess at all times the same     
essential qualities1 i4e4 they are      
cognizing agents2 only1 whenever a new  
creation takes place1 they associate    
themselves with bodies1 and their       
intelligence therewith undergoes a      
certain expansion or development        
7viksa72 contrasting with the unevolved 

or contracted state 7sanko_/k_/a7 which 
characterised it during the preceding   
pralaya4 ,but this change is not a      
change of essential nature              
7svarpnyathbhva7 and hence we have to   
distinguish the souls as permanent      
entities from the material elements     
which at the time of each creation and  
reabsorption change their essential     
characteristics4  ,adhik4 ,,xii 7#ah7   
defines the nature of the individual    
soul4 ,the ,stra declares that the soul 
is 'j_/_/a4' ,this means1 according to  
_/,s_/ankara1 that intelligence or      
knowledge does not1 as the              
,vai_/s_/eshikas teach1 constitute a    
mere attribute of the soul which in     
itself is essentially non-intelligent1  
but is the very essence of the soul4    
,the soul is not a knower1 but          
knowledge2 not intelligent1 but         
intelligence4--,rmnuja1 on the other    
hand1 explains 'j_/_/a' by              
'j_/_/at_/ri_/1' i4e4 knower1 knowing   
agent1 and considers the ,stra to be    

directed not only against the           
,vai_/s_/eshikas1 but also against those
 philosophers who--like the ,snkhyas and
 the ,vedntins of _/,s_/ankara's        
school--maintain that the soul is not a 
knowing agent1 but pure                 
_/k_/aitanya4--,the wording of the ,stra
 certainly seems to favour ,rmnuja's    
interpretation2 we can hardly imagine   
that an author definitely holding the   
views of _/,s_/ankara should1 when      
propounding the important dogma of the  
soul's nature1 use the term j_/_/a of   
which the most obvious interpretation   
j_/_/t_/ri_/1 not j_/_/nam4  ,adhik4    
,,xiii 7#ai-cb7 treats the question     
whether the individual soul is a_/n_/u1 
i4e4 of very minute size1 or            
omnipresent1 all-pervading 7sarvagata1  
vypin74 ,here1 again1 we meet with      
diametrically opposite views4--,in      
_/,s_/ankara's opinion the ,stras #ai-ch
 represent the prvapaksha view1         
according to which the jva is a_/n_/u1  
while ,stra #bi formulates the siddhnta1

 viz4 that the jva1 which in reality is 
all-pervading1 is spoken of as a_/n_/u  
in some scriptural passages1 because the
 qualities of the internal organ--which 
itself is a_/n_/u--constitute the       
essence of the individual soul as long  
as the latter is implicated in the      
sa_/m_/sra4--,according to ,rmnuja1 on  
the other hand1 the first ,stra of the  
adhikara_/n_/a gives utterance to the   
siddhnta view1 according to which the   
soul is of minute size2 the ,stras      
#bj-be confirm this view and refute     
objections raised against it2 while the 
,stras #bf-bi resume the question       
already mooted under ,stra #ah1 viz4 in 
what relation the soul as knowing agent 
7j_/_/t_/ri_/7 stands to knowledge      
7j_/_/na74--,in order to decide between 
the conflicting claims of these two     
interpretations we must enter into some 
details4--_/,s_/ankara maintains that   
,stras #ai-bh state and enforce a       
prvapaksha view1 which is finally       
refuted in #bi4 ,what here strikes us at

 the outset1 is the unusual length to   
which the defence of a mere prim facie  
view is carried2 in no other place the  
,stras take so much trouble to render   
plausible what is meant to be rejected  
in the end1 and an unbiassed reader will
 certainly feel inclined to think that  
in #ai-bh we have to do1 not with the   
preliminary statement of a view finally 
to be abandoned1 but with an elaborate  
bon fide attempt to establish and       
vindicate an essential dogma of the     
system4 ,still it is not altogether     
impossible that the prvapaksha should   
here be treated at greater length than  
usual1 and the decisive point is        
therefore whether we can1 with          
_/,s_/ankara1 look upon ,stra #bi as    
embodying a refutation of the prvapaksha
 and thus implicitly acknowledging the  
doctrine that the individual soul is    
all-pervading4 ,now ,i think there can  
be no doubt that _/,s_/ankara's         
interpretation of the ,stra is          
exceedingly forced4 ,literally          

translated 7and leaving out the         
non-essential word 'prj_/_/avat'7 the   
,stra runs as follows3 ',but on account 
of that quality 7or those qualities2 or 
else on account of the quality--or      
qualities--of that7 being the essence1  
7there is7 that designation 7or the     
designation of that74' ,this            
_/,s_/ankara maintains to mean1         
',because the qualities of the buddhi   
are the essence of the soul in the      
sa_/m_/sra state1 therefore the soul    
itself is sometimes spoken of as        
a_/n_/u4' ,now1 in the first place1     
nothing in the context warrants the     
explanation of the first 'tat' by       
buddhi4 ,and--which is more             
important--in the second place1 it is   
more than doubtful whether on           
_/,s_/ankara's own system the qualities 
of the buddhi--such as pleasure1 pain1  
desire1 aversion1 c4--can with any      
propriety be said to constitute the     
essence of the soul even in the         
sa_/m_/sra state4 ,the essence of the   

soul in whatever state1 according to    
_/,s_/ankara's system1 is knowledge or  
intelligence2 whatever is due to its    
association with the buddhi is          
non-essential or1 more strictly1 unreal1
 false4  ,there are no similar          
difficulties in the way of ,rmnuja's    
interpretation of the adhikara_/n_/a4   
,he agrees with _/,s_/ankara in the     
explanation of ,stras #ai-ce1 with this 
difference that he views them as setting
 forth1 not the prvapaksha1 but the     
siddhnta4 ,stras #bf-bh also are        
interpreted in a manner not very        
different from _/,s_/ankara's1 special  
stress being laid on the distinction    
made by ,scripture between knowledge as 
a mere quality and the soul as a knowing
 agent1 the substratum of knowledge4    
,this discussion naturally gives rise to
 the question how it is that ,scripture 
in some places makes use of the term    
vij_/_/na when meaning the individual   
soul4 ,the answer is given in ,stra #bi1
 ',the soul is designated as knowledge  

because it has that quality for its     
essence1' i4e4 because knowledge is the 
essential characteristic quality of the 
soul1 therefore the term 'knowledge' is 
employed here and there to denote the   
soul itself4 ,this latter interpretation
 gives rise to no doubt whatever4 ,it   
closely follows the wording of the text 
and does not necessitate any forced     
supplementation4 ,the 'tu' of the ,stra 
which1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 is    
meant to discard the prvapaksha1 serves 
on ,rmnuja's view to set aside a        
previously-raised objection2 an         
altogether legitimate assumption4  ,of  
the three remaining ,stras of the       
adhikara_/n_/a 7#cj-cb71 #cj explains1  
according to _/,s_/ankara1 that the soul
 may be called a_/n_/u1 since1 as long  
as it exists in the sa_/m_/sra          
condition1 it is connected with the     
buddhi4 ,according to ,rmnuja the ,stra 
teaches that the soul may be called     
vij_/_/na because the latter constitutes
 its essential quality as long as it    

exists4--,stra #ca intimates1 according 
to _/,s_/ankara1 that in the states of  
deep sleep1 and so on1 the soul is      
potentially connected with the buddhi1  
while in the waking state that connexion
 becomes actually manifest4 ,the same   
,stra1 according to ,rmnuja1 teaches    
that j_/_/t_/ri_/tva is properly said to
 constitute the soul's essential nature1
 although it is actually manifested in  
some states of the soul only4--,in ,stra
 #cb1 finally1 _/,s_/ankara sees a      
statement of the doctrine that1 unless  
the soul had the buddhi for its limiting
 adjunct1 it would either be permanently
 cognizing or permanently non-cognizing2
 while1 according to ,rmnuja1 the ,stra 
means that the soul would either be     
permanently cognizing or permanently    
non-cognizing1 if it were pure knowledge
 and all-pervading 7instead of being    
_/j_/t_/ri_/ and a_/n_/u1 as it is in   
reality74--,the three ,stras can be made
 to fit in with either interpretation1  
although it must be noted that none of  

them explicitly refers to the soul's    
connexion with the buddhi4  ,adhik4     
,,xiv and ,,xv 7#cc-ci2 #dj7 refer to   
the kart_/ri_/tva of the jva1 i4e4 the  
question whether the soul is an agent4  
,stras #cc-ci clearly say that it is    
such4 ,but as1 according to             
_/,s_/ankara's system1 this cannot be   
the final view1--the soul being         
essentially non-active1 and all action  
belonging to the world of updhis1--he   
looks upon the next following ,stra     
7#dj7 as constituting an adhikara_/n_/a 
by itself1 and teaching that the soul is
 an agent when connected with the       
instruments of action1 buddhi1 c41 while
 it ceases to be so when dissociated    
from them1 'just as the carpenter acts  
in both ways1' i4e4 just as the         
carpenter works as long as he wields his
 instruments1 and rests after having    
laid them aside4--,rmnuja1 perhaps more 
naturally1 does not separate ,stra #dj  
from the preceding ,stras1 but          
interprets it as follows3 ,activity is  

indeed an essential attribute of the    
soul2 but therefrom it does not follow  
that the soul is always actually active1
 just as the carpenter1 even when       
furnished with the requisite            
instruments1 may either work or not     
work1 just as he pleases4  ,adhik4 ,,xvi
 7#da1 #db7 teaches that the soul in its
 activity is dependent on the ,lord who 
impels it with a view to its former     
actions4  ,adhik4 ,,xvii 7#dc-ec7 treats
 of the relation of the individual soul 
to ,brahman4 ,stra #dc declares that the
 individual soul is a part 7a_/ms_/a7 of
 ,brahman1 and the following ,stras show
 how that relation does not involve     
either that ,brahman is affected by the 
imperfections1 sufferings1 c4 of the    
souls1 or that one soul has to          
participate in the experiences of other 
souls4 ,the two commentators of course  
take entirely different views of the    
doctrine that the soul is a part of     
,brahman4 ,according to ,rmnuja the     
souls are in reality parts of           

,brahman#ad2 according to ,sankara the  
'a_/ms_/a' of the ,stra must be         
understood to mean 'a_/ms_/a iva1' 'a   
part as it were2' the one universal     
indivisible ,brahman having no real     
parts1 but appearing to be divided owing
 to its limiting adjuncts4--,one ,stra  
7#ej7 in this adhikara_/n_/a calls for  
special notice4 ,according to ,sankara  
the words 'bhsa eva _/k_/a' mean '7the  
soul is7 a mere reflection1' which1 as  
the commentators remark1 is a statement 
of the so-called pratibimbavda1 i4e4 the
 doctrine that the so-called individual 
soul is nothing but the reflection of   
the ,self in the buddhi2 while ,stra #dc
 had propounded the so-called           
ava_/kkh_/edavda1 i4e4 the doctrine that
 the soul is the highest ,self in so far
 as limited by its adjuncts4--,according
 to ,rmnuja the bhsa of the ,stra has to
 be taken in the sense of hetvbhsa1 a   
fallacious argument1 and the ,stra is   
explained as being directed against the 
reasoning of those ,vedntins according  

to whom the soul is ,brahman in so far  
as limited by non-real adjuncts#ae4     
,p,,da ,,iv4   ,adhik4 ,i1 ,,ii1 ,,iii  
7#a-d2 #e-f2 #g7 teach that the         
pr_/n_/as 7by which generic name are    
denoted the buddhndriyas1 karmen-driyas1
 and the manas7 spring from ,brahman2   
are eleven in number2 and are of minute 
size 7a_/n_/u74  ,adhik4 ,,iv1 ,v1 ,,vi 
7#h2 #i-ab2 #ac7 inform us also that the
 mukhya pr_/n_/a1 i4e4 the vital air1 is
 produced from ,brahman2 that it is a   
principle distinct from air in general  
and from the pr_/n_/as discussed above2 
and that it is minute 7a_/n_/u74        
,adhik4 ,,vii and ,,viii 7#ad-af2       
#ag-ai7 teach that the pr_/n_/as are    
superintended and guided in their       
activity by special divinities1 and that
 they are independent principles1 not   
mere modifications of the mukhya        
pr_/n_/a4  ,adhik4 ,,ix 7#bj-bb7        
declares that the evolution of names and
 forms 7the nmarpavykara_/n_/a7 is the  
work1 not of the individual soul1 but of

 the ,lord4  ,notes3  ,footnote #ac3    
,lokavat1 ,yath loke                    
rja_/s_/sannuvartin_/m_/ _/k_/a         
rjnugrahanigrahak_/ri_/takhadukhayoges'p
i na sa_/s_/arravamtre_/n_/a ssake rjany
 api                                    
_/s_/sannuv_/ri_/ttyauv_/ri_/ttinimittas
ukhadukhayor bhokt_/ri_/vaprasanga_/h_/4
 ,yathha ,drami_/d_/abhshyakra_/h_/ yath
 loke rj pra_/k_/uradanda_/s_/ke        
ghores'narthasa_/m_/ka_/t_/es'pi        
prade_/s_/e vartamnoszpi                
vyajandyavadhtadeho doshair na sprisyate
 abhipret_/ms_/ _/k_/a lokn             
paripiplayishati bhog_/ms_/ _/k_/a      
gandhdn avi_/s_/vajanopabhogyn dhrayati 
tathsau loke_/s_/varo                   
bhramatsvasmait_/h_/ya_/k_/amato doshair
 na sp_/ris_/yate rakshati _/k_/a lokn  
brahmalokdi_/ms_/                       
_/k_/vi_/s_/vajanopabhogyn dhrayatti4   
,footnote #ad3 ,gvasya                  
kart_/ri_/tva_/m_/ paramapurushyattam   
ity uktam4 ,idnm kim aya_/m_/ gva_/h_/  
parasmd atyantabhinna_/h_/ uta param eva

 brahma bhrntam uta                     
brahmaivopdhyava_/kkh_/innam atha       
brahm_/ms_/a iti sa_/m_/sayyate         
_/s_/rutivipraticpatte_/h_/             
sa_/m_/saya_/h_/4 ,nanu tadananyam      
rambha_/n_/a_/s_/abddibhya_/h_/         
adhika_/m_/ tu bhedanirdesd ity         
atraivyam aitho nir_/n_/ta_/h_/         
,satya_/m_/ sa eva                      
nntvaikatva_/s_/rutivipratipatty        
skshipya jvasya brahm_/ms_/atvopapdanena
 vi_/s_/eshato nir_/n_/yate4 ,yvad dhi  
jvasya brahm_/m_/satva_/m_/ na          
nir_/n_/tam tvaj jvasya                 
brahmanosnanyatva_/m_/ brahma_/n_/as    
tasmd adhikatv_/m_/ _/k_/a na           
pratitish_/th_/ati4 ,ki_/m_/ tvat       
prptam4 ,atyanta_/m_/ bhinna iti4       
,kuta_/h_/4 ,j_/_/j_/_/nau dvv          
itydibhedanirde_/s_/t4 ,j_/_/j_/_/ayor  
abheda_/s_/rutayas tv agnin si_/k_/ed   
itivad viruddhrthapratipdand            
aupa_/k_/rikya_/h_/1                    
,brahma_/n_/os_/ms_/o jva ity api na    
sdhya_/h_/1 ekavastvekade_/s_/av_/k_/ hy

 a_/ms_/a_/s_/sabda_/h_/1 jvasya        
brahmaikade_/s_/atve tadgat dosh        
brahma_/n_/i bhaveyu_/h_/4 ,na _/k_/a   
brahmakha_/nd_/o jva ity                
a_/ms_/atvopapatti_/h_/                 
kha_/nd_/annarhatvd brahma_/n_/a_/h_/   
prguktadoshaprasang_/k_/ _/k_/a1 tasmd  
atyantabhinnasya tada_/ms_/atva_/m_/    
durupapdam4 ,yadv bhrnta_/m_/ brahmaiva 
jva_/h_/4 ,kuta_/h_/4 ,tat tvam asi ayam
 tm brahmetydibrahmtmabhvopade_/s_/t1   
nntmatvavdinyas tu                      
pratyakshdisiddhrthnuvditvd             
ananyathsiddhdvaitopade_/s_/aparbhi_/h_/
 _/s_/rutibhi_/h_/ pratyakshdaya_/s_/   
_/k_/a avidyntargata_/h_/               
khypyante4--,athav                      
brahmaivndyupdhyava_/kkh_/inna_/m_/     
jva_/h_/4 ,kuta_/h_/4 ,tata eva         
brahmtmabhvopade_/s_/at4 ,na _/k_/yam   
updhir bhrntiparikalpita ita vaktu_/m_/ 
sakya_/m_/                              
bandhamokshdivyavasthnupapatter4 ,ity   
eva_/m_/ prtptesbhidhyate4 ,brahm_/ms_/a
 iti4 ,kuta_/h_/4 ,nnvyapade_/s_/d      

anyath _/k_/aikatvena vyapade_/s_/d     
ubhayath hi vyapade_/s_/o d_/ris_/yate4 
,nvvyapade_/s_/as tvat                  
srash_/tri_/tva_/rig_/yatva--niyant_/ri_
/tvaniymyatva--sarvaj_/_/atvj_/_/atva-- 
svdhnatvapardhnatva--_/s_/uddhatv_/s_/ud
dhatva--                                
kaly_/n_/agu_/n_/karatvavipartatva--pati
tva_/s_/eshatvdibhir d_/ris_/yate4      
,anyath _/k_/bhedena vyapade_/s_/os pi  
tat tvam asi ayam tm brahmetydibhir     
d_/ris_/yate4 ,api d_/s_/akitavditvam   
apy adhyate eke1 brahma ds brahma ds    
brahmeme kitav ity tharva_/n_/ik        
brahma_/n_/o d_/s_/akitavditvam apy     
adhyate1 tata_/s_/ _/k_/a               
sarvajvavypitvena abhedo                
vyapadi_/s_/yata it artha_/h_/4 ,evam   
ubhayavyapade_/s_/amukhyatvasiddhaye    
jvosya_/m_/ brahma_/n_/os_/ms_/a ity    
abhyupagantavya_/h_/4  ,footnote #ae3   
,nanu bhrntabrahmajvavdeszpy            
avidyk_/ri_/topdhibhedd                 
bhogavyavasthdaya upapadyanta ata ha1   
bhsa eva _/k_/a4                        

,akha_/nd_/aikarasaprak_/s_/amtratvarpas
ya                                      
svarpatirodhnaprvakopdhibhedopapdanahetu
r bhsa eva4 ,prak_/s_/aikasvarpasya     
prak_/s_/atirodhna_/m_/                 
prak_/s_/an_/s_/a eveti prg evopapditam4
 bhs eveti v p_/th_/a_/h_/1 tath sati   
hetava bhs_/h_/4   ,,third ,,adhy,,ya4  
,p,,da ,i4   ,adhik4 ,i 7#a-g7 teaches  
that the soul1 when passing out of the  
body at the time of death1 remains      
invested with the subtle material       
elements 7bhtaskshma7 which serve as an 
abode to the pr_/n_/as attached to the  
soul4  ,adhik4 ,,ii 7#h-aa7 shows that1 
when the souls of those who had enjoyed 
the reward of their good works in the   
moon descend to the earth in order to   
undergo a new embodiment1 there cleaves 
to them a remainder 7anu_/s_/aya7 of    
their former deeds which determines the 
nature of the new embodiment4  ,adhik4  
,,iii 7#ab-ba7 discusses the fate after 
death of those whom their good works do 
not entitle to pass up to the moon4     

,adhik4 ,,iv1 ,v1 ,,vi 7#bb2 #bc2       
#bd-bg7 teach that the subtle bodies of 
the souls descending from the moon      
through the ether1 air1 c41 do not      
become identical with ether1 air1 c41   
but only like them2 that the entire     
descent occupies a short time only2 and 
that1 when the souls finally enter into 
plants and so on1 they do not           
participate in the life of the latter1  
but are merely in external contact with 
them4   ,p,,da ,,ii4   ,adhik4 ,i 7#a-f7
 treats of the soul in the dreaming     
state4 ,according to _/,s_/ankara the   
three first ,stras discuss the question 
whether the creative activity ascribed  
to the soul in some scriptural passages 
produces things as real as those by     
which the waking soul is surrounded1 or 
not2 ,stra #c settles the point by      
declaring that the creations of the     
dreaming soul are mere ',my1' since they
 do not fully manifest the character of 
real objects4 ,stra #d adds that dreams1
 although mere ,my1 yet have a prophetic

 quality4 ,stras #e and #f finally reply
 to the question why the soul1 which    
after all is a part of the ,lord and as 
such participates in his excellencies1  
should not be able to produce in its    
dreams a real creation1 by the remark   
that the soul's knowledge and power are 
obscured by its connexion with the gross
 body4  ,the considerably diverging     
interpretation given of this            
adhikara_/n_/a by ,rmnuja has the       
advantage of more closely connecting the
 ,stras with each other4 ,according to  
him the question is not whether the     
creations of a dream are real or not1   
but whether they are the work of the    
individual soul or of the ,lord acting  
within the soul4 ,stras #a and #b set   
forth the prvapaksha4 ,the creations of 
dreams 7are the work of the individual  
soul72 for thus ,scripture declares3    
',and the followers of some _/s_/ks     
declare 7the soul to be7 a creator1' c4 
,the third ,stra states the siddhnta    
view3 ',but the creations of dreams are 

,my1 i4e4 are of a wonderful nature 7and
 as such cannot be effected by the      
individual soul71 since 7in this life7  
the nature 7of the soul7 is not fully   
manifested4' ,concerning the word 'my1' 
,rmnuja remarks1 'my_/s_/abdo hy        
_/sk_/aryav_/k_/ janaka_/s_/ya kule jt  
devamyeva nirmit itydishu tath          
dar_/s_/ant4' ,the three remaining      
,stras are exhibited in the             
_/,s_/r-bhshya in a different order1 the
 fourth ,stra1 according to             
_/,s_/ankara1 being the sixth according 
to ,rmnuja4 ,stras #d and #e 7according 
to ,rmnuja's numeration7 are explained  
by ,rmnuja very much in the same way as 
by _/,s_/ankara2 but owing to the       
former's statement of the subject-matter
 of the whole adhikara_/n_/a they       
connect themselves more intimately with 
the preceding ,stras than is possible on
 _/,s_/ankara's interpretation4 ,in     
,stra #f 7s_/k_/aka_/s_/ _/k_/ hi7      
,rmnuja sees a deduction from the       
siddhnta of the adhikara_/n_/a1         

',because the images of a dream are     
produced by the highest ,lord himself1  
therefore they have prophetic           
significance4'  ,adhik4 ,,ii teaches    
that in the state of deep dreamless     
sleep the soul abides within ,brahman in
 the heart4  ,adhik4 ,,iii 7#i7 expounds
 the reasons entitling us to assume that
 the soul awakening from sleep is the   
same that went to sleep4--,adhik4 ,,iv  
7#i7 explains the nature of a swoon4    
,adhik4 ,v 7#aa-ba7 is1 according to    
_/,s_/ankara1 taken up with the question
 as to the nature of the highest        
,brahman in which the individual soul is
 merged in the state of deep sleep4     
,stra #aa declares that twofold         
characteristics 7viz4 absence and       
presence of distinctive attributes1     
nirvi_/s_/eshatva and savi_/s_/eshatva7 
cannot belong to the highest ,brahman   
even through its stations1 i4e4 its     
limiting adjuncts2 since all passages   
which aim at setting forth ,brahman's   
nature declare it to be destitute of all

 distinctive attributes4--,the fact1    
,stra #ab continues1 that in many       
passages ,brahman is spoken of as       
possessing distinctive attributes is of 
no relevancy1 since wherever there are  
mentioned limiting adjuncts1 on which   
all distinction depends1 it is specially
 stated that ,brahman in itself is free 
from all diversity2 and--,stra #ac      
adds--in some places the assumption of  
diversity is specially objected         
to4--,that ,brahman is devoid of all    
form 7,stra #ad71 is the pre-eminent    
meaning of all ,vednta-texts setting    
forth ,brahman's nature4--,that ,brahman
 is represented as having different     
forms1 as it were1 is due to its        
connexion with its 7unreal7 limiting    
adjuncts2 just as the light of the sun  
appears straight or crooked1 as it were1
 according to the nature of the things  
he illuminates 7#ae74--,the             
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka expressly        
declares that ,brahman is one uniform   
mass of intelligence 7#af72 and the same

 is taught in other scriptural passages 
and in ,sm_/ri_/ti 7l#g74--;,at the     
unreality of the apparent manifoldness  
of the ,self1 caused by the limiting    
adjuncts1 aim those scriptural passages 
in which the ,self is compared to the   
sun1 which remains one although his     
reflections on the surface of the water 
are many 7#ah74--,nor must the objection
 be raised that that comparison is      
unsuitable1 because the ,self is not    
material like the sun1 and there are no 
real updhis separate from it as the     
water is from the sun2 for the          
comparison merely means to indicate     
that1 as the reflected image of the sun 
participates in the changes1 increase1  
decrease1 c41 which the water undergoes 
while the sun himself remains unaffected
 thereby1 so the true ,self is not      
affected by the attributes of the       
updhis1 while1 in so far as it is       
limited by the latter1 it is affected by
 them as it were 7#ai1 #bj74--,that the 
,self is within the updhis1 ,scripture  

declares 7#ba74  ,from the above        
explanation of this important           
adhikara_/n_/a the one given in the     
,sr-bhshya differs totally4 ,according  
to ,rmnuja the adhikara_/n_/a raises the
 question whether the imperfections     
clinging to the individual soul 7the    
discussion of which has now come to an  
end7 affect also the highest ,lord who1 
according to ,scripture1 abides within  
the soul as antarymin4 ',notwithstanding
 the abode 7of the highest ,self within 
the soul7 7it is7 not 7affected by the  
soul's imperfections7 because everywhere
 7the highest ,self is represented7 as  
having twofold characteristics 7viz4    
being1 on one hand1 free from all evil1 
apahatappman1 vijara1 vim_/ri_/tyu1 c41 
and1 on the other hand1 endowed with all
 auspicious qualities1 satyakma1        
satyasa_/m_/kalpa1 c47 7#aa74--,should  
it be objected that1 just as the soul   
although essentially free from          
evil--according to the ,prajpativkya in 
the ,chndogya--yet is liable to         

imperfections owing to its connexion    
with a variety of bodies1 so the        
antarymin also is affected by abiding   
within bodies2 we deny this because in  
every section of the chapter referring  
to the antarymin 7in the                
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka7 he is expressly 
called the ,immortal1 the ruler within2 
which shows him to be free from the     
shortcomings of the jiva 7#ab74--,some1 
moreover1 expressly assert that1        
although the ,lord and the soul are     
within one body1 the soul only is       
imperfect1 not the ,lord 7dv supar_/n_/ 
sayuj sakhy7 7#ac74--,should it be said 
that1 according to the ,chndogya1       
,brahman entered together with the souls
 into the elements previously to the    
evolution of names and forms1 and hence 
participates in the latter1 thus        
becoming implicated in the sa_/m_/sra2  
we reply that ,brahman1 although        
connected with such and such forms1 is  
in itself devoid of form1 since it is   
the principal element 7agent2 pradhna7  

in the bringing about of names and forms
 7according to 'k_/s_/o ha vai nmarpayor
 nirvahit'7 7#ad74--;,but does not the  
passage 'satya_/m_/ j_/_/nam anantam    
brahma' teach that ,brahman is nothing  
but light 7intelligence7 without any    
difference1 and does not the passage    
'neti neti' deny of it all              
qualities8--,as in order1 we reply1 not 
to deprive passages as the one quoted   
from the ,taittirya of their purport1 we
 admit that ,brahman's nature is light1 
so we must also admit that ,brahman is  
satyasa_/m_/kalpa1 and so on2 for if    
not1 the passages in which those        
qualities are asserted would become     
purportless 7#ae74--,moreover the       
,taittirya passage only asserts so much1
 viz4 the prak_/s_/arpat of ,brahman1   
and does not deny other qualities       
7l#f74--;,and the passage 'neti neti'   
will be discussed later on4--,the       
ubhayalingatva of ,brahman in the sense 
assigned above is asserted in many      
places _/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti       

7#ag74--;,because ,brahman although     
abiding in many places is not touched by
 their imperfections1 the similes of the
 reflected sun1 of the ether limited by 
jars1 c41 are applicable to it          
7#ah74--,should it be said that the     
illustration is not an appropriate one1 
because the sun is apprehended in the   
water erroneously only while the        
antarymin really abides within all      
things1 and therefore must be viewed as 
sharing their defects 7#ai72 we reply   
that what the simile means to negative  
is merely that ,brahman should1 owing to
 its inherence in many places1          
participate in the increase1 decrease1  
and so on1 of its abodes4 ,on this view 
both similes are appropriate            
7#bj74--;,analogous similes we observe  
to be employed in ordinary life1 as when
 we compare a man to a lion 7#ba74      
,stras #bb-cj constitute1 according to  
_/,s_/ankara1 a new adhikara_/n_/a      
7,,vi71 whose object it is to show that 
the clause 'not so1 not so' 7neti neti2 

,b_/ri_/hadr7 negatives1 not ,brahman   
itself1 but only the two forms of       
,brahman described in the preceding part
 of the chapter4 ,stras #bc-bf further  
dwell on ,brahman being in reality      
devoid of all distinctive attributes    
which are altogether due to the updhis4 
,the last four ,stras return to the     
question how1 ,brahman being one only1  
the souls are in so many places spoken  
of as different from it1 and1 two       
explanatory hypotheses having been      
rejected1 the conclusion is arrived at  
that all difference is unreal1 due to   
fictitious limiting adjuncts4           
,according to ,rmnuja1 ,stras #bb ff4   
continue the discussion started in ,stra
 #aa4 ,how1 the question is asked1 can  
the ubhayalingatva of ,brahman be       
maintained considering that the 'not so1
 not so' of the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka  
denies of ,brahman all the previously   
mentioned modes 7prakra71 so that it can
 only be called that which is           
7sanmtra78--,the reply given in ,stra   

#bb is that 'not so1 not so' does not   
deny of ,brahman the distinctive        
qualities or modes declared previously  
7for it would be senseless at first to  
teach them1 and finally to deny them    
again#af71 but merely denies the        
prk_/ri_/taitvattva1 the previously     
stated limited nature of ,brahman1 i4e4 
it denies that ,brahman possesses only  
the previously mentioned qualifications4
 ,with this agrees1 that subsequently to
 'neti neti' ,scripture itself          
enunciates further qualifications of    
,brahman4 ,that ,brahman as stated above
 is not the object of any other means of
 proof but ,scripture is confirmed in   
,stra #bc1 ',scripture declares ,brahman
 to be the non-manifest4'--,and the     
intuition 7skshtkkra7 of ,brahman ensues
 only upon its sa_/m_/rdhana1 i4e4 upon 
its being perfectly pleased by the      
worshipper's devotion1 as ,scripture and
 ,sm_/ri_/ti declare 7#bd74--,that this 
interpretation of 'neti' is the right   
one1 is likewise shown by the fact that 

in the same way as prak_/s_/a1          
luminousness1 j_/_/na1 intelligence1 c41
 so also the quality of being           
differentiated by the world             
7prapa_/k_/avsish_/t_/at7 is intuited as
 non-different1 i4e4 as likewise        
qualifying ,brahman2 and that           
prak_/s_/a1 and so on1 characterise     
,brahman1 is known through repeated     
practice 7on the part of _/ri_/shis like
 ,vmadeva7 in the work of sa_/m_/rdhana 
mentioned before 7#be74--;,for all these
 reasons ,brahman is connected with the 
infinite1 i4e4 the infinite number of   
auspicious qualities2 for thus the      
twofold indications 7linga7 met with in 
,scripture are fully justified          
7#bf74--;,in what relation1 then1 does  
the a_/k_/id vastu1 i4e4 the            
non-sentient matter1 which1 according to
 the b_/ri_/hadara_/n_/yaka1 is one of  
the forms of ,brahman1 stand to the     
latter8--,non-sentient beings might1 in 
the first place1 be viewed as special   
arrangements 7sa_/m_/sthanavisesh_/h_/7 

of ,brahman1 as the coils are of the    
body of the snake2 for ,brahman is      
designated as both1 i4e4 sometimes as   
one with the world 7,brahman is all     
this1 c471 sometimes as different from  
it 7,let me enter into those elements1  
c47 7#bg74--,or1 in the second place1   
the relation of the two might be viewed 
as analogous to that of light and the   
luminous object which are two and yet   
one1 both being fire 7#bh74--,or1 in the
 third place1 the relation is like that 
stated before1 i4e4 the material world  
is1 like the individual souls 7whose    
case was discussed in ,,ii1 #c1 #dc71 a 
part--a_/ms_/a--of ,brahman 7#bi1 #cj74 
,adhik4 ,,vii 7#ca-cg7 explains how some
 metaphorical expressions1 seemingly    
implying that there is something        
different from ,brahman1 have to be     
truly understood4  ,adhik4 ,,viii       
7#ch-da7 teaches that the reward of     
works is not1 as ,jaimini opines1 the   
independent result of the works acting  
through the so-called aprva1 but is     

allotted by the ,lord4   ,p,,da ,,iii4  
,with the third pda of the second adhyya
 a new section of the work begins1 whose
 task it is to describe how the         
individual soul is enabled by meditation
 on ,brahman to obtain final release4   
,the first point to be determined here  
is what constitutes a meditation on     
,brahman1 and1 more particularly1 in    
what relation those parts of the        
,upanishads stand to each other which   
enjoin identical or partly identical    
meditations4 ,the reader of the         
,upanishads cannot fail to observe that 
the texts of the different _/s_/khs     
contain many chapters of similar1 often 
nearly identical1 contents1 and that in 
some cases the text of even one and the 
same _/s_/kh exhibits the same matter in
 more or less varied forms4 ,the reason 
of this clearly is that the common stock
 of religious and philosophical ideas   
which were in circulation at the time of
 the composition of the ,upanishads     
found separate expression in the        

different priestly communities2 hence   
the same speculations1 legends1 c4      
reappear in various places of the sacred
 ,scriptures in more or less differing  
dress4 ,originally1 when we may suppose 
the members of each ,vedic school to    
have confined themselves to the study of
 their own sacred texts1 the fact that  
the texts of other schools contained    
chapters of similar contents would      
hardly appear to call for special note  
or comment2 not any more than the       
circumstance that the sacrificial       
performances enjoined on the followers  
of some particular _/s_/kh were found   
described with greater or smaller       
modifications in the books of other     
_/s_/khs also4 ,but already at a very   
early period1 at any rate long before   
the composition of the ,vednta-stras in 
their present form1 the ,vedic          
theologians must have apprehended the   
truth that1 in whatever regards         
sacrificial acts1 one _/s_/kh may indeed
 safely follow its own texts1           

disregarding the texts of all other     
_/s_/khs2 that1 however1 all texts which
 aim at throwing light on the nature of 
,brahman and the relation to it of the  
human soul must somehow or other be     
combined into one consistent            
systematical whole equally valid for the
 followers of all ,vedic schools4 ,for1 
as we have had occasion to remark above1
 while acts may be performed by         
different individuals in different ways1
 cognition is defined by the nature of  
the object cognised1 and hence can be   
one only1 unless it ceases to be true   
cognition4 ,hence the attempts1 on the  
one hand1 of discarding by skilful      
interpretation all contradictions met   
with in the sacred text1 and1 on the    
other hand1 of showing what sections of 
the different ,upanishads have to be    
viewed as teaching the same matter1 and 
therefore must be combined in one       
meditation4 ,the latter is the special  
task of the present pda4  ,adhik4 ,i and
 ,,ii 7#a-d2 #e7 are concerned with the 

question whether those vidys1 which are 
met with in identical or similar form in
 more than one sacred text1 are to be   
considered as constituting several      
vidys1 or one vidy only4 _/,s_/ankara   
remarks that the question affects only  
those vidys whose object is the         
qualified ,brahman2 for the knowledge of
 the non-qualified ,brahman1 which is of
 an absolutely uniform nature1 can of   
course be one only wherever it is set   
forth4 ,but things lie differently in   
those cases where the object of         
knowledge is the sagu_/n_/am brahma or  
some outward manifestation of ,brahman2 
for the qualities as well as            
manifestations of ,brahman are many4    
,anticipating the subject of a later    
adhikara_/n_/a1 we may take for an      
example the so-called                   
_/,s_/_/nd_/ilyavidy which is met with  
in ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 again--in an   
abridged form--in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1 #f1
 and1 moreover1 in the tenth book of the
 _/,s_/atapathabrhma_/n_/a 7,x1 #f1 #c74

 ,the three passages enjoin a meditation
 on ,brahman as possessing certain      
attributes1 some of which are specified 
in all the three texts 7as1 for         
instance1 manomayatva1 bhrpatva71 while 
others are peculiar to each separate    
passage 7pr_/n_/a_/s_/arratva and       
satyasa_/m_/kalpatva1 for instance1     
being mentioned in the ,chndogya        
,upanishad and                          
_/,s_/atapatha-brhma_/n_/a1 but not in  
the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka ,upanishad1  
which1 on its part1 specifies           
sarvava_/s_/itva1 not referred to in the
 two other texts74 ,here1 then1 there is
 room for a doubt whether the three     
passages refer to one object of         
knowledge or not4 ,to the devout        
,vedntin the question is not a purely   
theoretical one1 but of immediate       
practical interest4 ,for if the three   
texts are to be held apart1 there are   
three different meditations to be gone  
through2 if1 on the other hand1 the vidy
 is one only1 all the different         

qualities of ,brahman mentioned in the  
three passages have to be combined into 
one meditation4--,the decision is here1 
as in all similar cases1 in favour of   
the latter alternative4 ,a careful      
examination of the three passages shows 
that the object of meditation is one    
only2 hence the meditation also is one  
only1 comprehending all the attributes  
mentioned in the three texts4  ,adhik4  
,,iii 7#f-h7 discusses the case of vidys
 being really separate1 although        
apparently identical4 ,the examples     
selected are the udgthavidys of the     
,chndogya ,upanishad 7,i1 #a-c7 and the 
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka ,upanishad 7,i1  
#c71 which1 although showing certain    
similarities--such as bearing the same  
name and the udgtha being in both       
identified with pr_/n_/a--yet are to be 
held apart1 because the subject of the  
,chndogya vidy is not the whole udgtha  
but only the sacred syllabic ,om1 while 
the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka ,upanishad   
represents the whole udgtha as the      

object of meditation4  ,stra #i         
constitutes in _/,s_/ankara's view a new
 adhikara_/n_/a 7,,iv71 proving that in 
the passage1 ',let a man meditate' 7,ch4
 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #a71 the ,o_/m_/kra and   
the udgtha stand in the relation of one 
specifying the other1 the meaning being1
 ',let a man meditate on that ,o_/m_/kra
 which1' c4--,according to ,rmnuja's    
interpretation1 which seems to fall in  
more satisfactorily with the form and   
the wording of the ,stra1 the latter    
merely furnishes an additional argument 
for the conclusion arrived at in the    
preceding adhikara_/n_/a4--,adhik4 ,v   
7#aj7 determines the unity of the       
so-called pr_/n_/a-vidys and the        
consequent comprehension of the         
different qualities of the pr_/n_/a1    
which are mentioned in the different    
texts1 within one meditation4  ,adhik4  
,,vi comprises1 according to            
_/,s_/ankara1 the ,stras #aa-ac4 ,the   
point to be settled is whether in all   
the meditations on ,brahman all its     

qualities are to be included or only    
those mentioned in the special vidy4    
,the decision is that the essential and 
unalterable attributes of ,brahman1 such
 as bliss and knowledge1 are to be taken
 into account everywhere1 while those   
which admit of a more or less 7as1 for  
instance1 the attribute of having joy   
for its head1 mentioned in the ,taitt4  
,up47 are confined to special           
meditations4--,adhik4 ,,vii 7#ad1 #ae71 
according to _/,s_/ankara1 aims at      
proving that the object of ,ka_/th_/a4  
,up4 ,,iii1 #aj1 #aa is one only1 viz4  
to show that the highest ,self is higher
 than everything1 so that the passage   
constitutes one vidy only4--,adhik4     
,,viii 7#af1 #ag7 determines1 according 
to _/,s_/ankara1 that the ,self spoken  
of in ,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a is not a
 lower form of the ,self 7the so-called 
strtman71 but the highest ,self2 the    
discussion of that point in this place  
being due to the wish to prove that the 
attributes of the highest ,self have to 

be comprehended in the ,aitarcyaka      
meditation4  ,according to ,rmnuja the  
,stras #aa-ag constitute a single       
adhikara_/n_/a whose subject is the same
 as that of _/,s_/ankara's sixth        
adhikar_/n_/a4 ,stras #aa-ac are1 on the
 whole1 explained as by _/,s_/ankara2   
,stra #ab1 however1 is said to mean1    
',such attributes as having joy for its 
head1 c4 are not to be viewed as        
qualities of ,brahman1 and therefore not
 to be included in every meditation2 for
 if they were admitted as qualities1    
difference would be introduced into     
,brahman's nature1 and that would       
involve a more or less on ,brahman's    
part4' ,stras #ad-ag continue the       
discussion of the passage about the     
priya_/s_/irastva4--,if                 
priya_/s_/irastva1 c4 are not to be     
viewed as real qualities of ,brahman1   
for what purpose does the text mention  
them8--',because1' ,stra #ad replies1   
'there is no other purpose1 ,scripture  
mentions them for the purpose of pious  

meditation4'--,but how is it known that 
the ,self of delight is the highest     
,self8 7owing to which you maintain that
 having limbs1 head1 c4 cannot belong to
 it as attributes47--',because1' ,stra  
#ae replies1 'the term ,self 7tm        
nandamaya7 is applied to it4'--,but in  
the previous parts of the chapter the   
term ,self 7in tma pra_/n_/amaya1 c47 is
 applied to non-,selfs also2 how then do
 you know that in tm nandamaya it       
denotes the real ,self8--',the term     
,self1' ,stra #af replies1 'is employed 
here to denote the highest ,self as in  
many other passages 7tma v idam eka1    
c471 as we conclude from the subsequent 
passage1 viz4 he wished1 ,may ,i be     
many4'--,but1 an objection is raised1   
does not the context show that the term 
',self1' which in all the preceding     
clauses about the pr_/n_/amaya1 c4      
denoted something other than the ,self1 
does the same in nandamaya tman1 and is 
not the context of greater weight than a
 subsequent passage8--,to this question 

asked in the former half of #ag 7anvayd 
iti _/k_/et7 the latter half replies1   
',still it denotes the ,self1 owing to  
the affirmatory statement1' i4e4 the    
fact of the highest ,self having been   
affirmed in a previous passage also1    
viz4 ,,ii1 #a1 ',from that ,self sprang 
ether4'  ,adhik4 ,,ix 7#ah7 discusses a 
minor point connected with the          
pr_/n_/asa_/m_/vda4--,the subject of    
,adhik4 ,x 7#ai7 has been indicated     
already above under ,adhik4 ,i4--,adhik4
 ,,xi 7#bj-bb7 treats of a case of a    
contrary nature2 in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1  
#e1 ,brahman is represented first as    
abiding in the sphere of the sun1 and   
then as abiding within the eye2 we      
therefore1 in spite of certain          
counter-indications1 have to do with two
 separate vidys4--,adhik4 ,,xii 7#bc7   
refers to a similar case2 certain       
attributes of ,brahman mentioned in the 
,r_/n_/yanya-khila have not to be       
introduced into the corresponding       
,chndogya vidy1 because the stated      

difference of ,brahman's abode involves 
difference of vidy4--,adhik4 ,,xiii     
7#bd7 treats of another instance of two 
vidyas having to be held apart4  ,adhik4
 ,,xiv 7#be7 decides that certain       
detached mantras and brhma_/n_/a        
passages met with in the beginning of   
some ,upanishads--as1 for instance1 a   
brhma_/n_/a about the mahvrata ceremony 
at the beginning of the                 
,aitareya-ra_/n_/yaka--do1              
notwithstanding their position which    
seems to connect them with the          
brahmavidy1 not belong to the latter1   
since they show unmistakable signs of   
being connected with sacrificial acts4  
,adhik4 ,,xv 7#bf7 treats of the        
passages stating that the man dying in  
the possession of true knowledge shakes 
off all his good and evil deeds1 and    
affirms that a statement1 made in some  
of those passages only1 to the effect   
that the good and evil deeds pass over  
to the friends and enemies of the       
deceased1 is valid for all the passages4

  ,stras #bg-cj constitute1 according to
 _/,s_/ankara1 two adhikara_/n_/as of   
which the former 7,,xvi2 #bg1 #bh7      
decides that the shaking off of the good
 and evil deeds takes place--not1 as the
 ,kaush4 ,up4 states1 on the road to    
,brahman's world--but at the moment of  
the soul's departure from the body2 the 
,kaushitaki statement is therefore not  
to be taken literally4--,the latter     
adhikara_/n_/a 7,,xvii2 #bi1 #cj7 treats
 of the cognate question whether the    
soul that has freed itself from its     
deeds proceeds in all cases on the road 
of the gods 7as said in the ,kaush4     
,up471 or not4 ,the decision is that he 
only whose knowledge does not pass      
beyond the sagu_/n_/am brahma proceeds  
on that road1 while the soul of him who 
knows the nirgu_/n_/am brahma becomes   
one with it without moving to any other 
place4  ,the _/,s_/r-bhshya treats the  
four ,stras as one adhikara_/n_/a whose 
two first ,stras are explained as by    
_/,s_/ankara1 while ,stra #bi raises an 

objection to the conclusion arrived at1 
'the going 7of the soul on the path of  
the gods7 has a sense only if the soul's
 freeing itself from its works takes    
place in both ways1 i4e4 partly at the  
moment of death1 partly on the road to  
,brahman2 for otherwise there would be a
 contradiction' 7the contradiction being
 that1 if the soul's works were all     
shaken off at the moment of death1 the  
subtle body would likewise perish at    
that moment1 and then the bodiless soul 
would be unable to proceed on the path  
of the gods74 ,to this ,stra #cj        
replies1 ',the complete shaking off of  
the works at the moment of death is     
possible1 since matters of that kind are
 observed in ,scripture1' i4e4 since    
scriptural passages show that even he   
whose works are entirely annihilated1   
and who has manifested himself in his   
true shape1 is yet connected with some  
kind of body2 compare the passage1      
'para_/m_/ jyotir upasampadya svena     
rpe_/n_/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti

 kr_/d_/an ramamna_/h_/ sa svar_/d_/    
bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu          
kma_/k_/ro bhavati4' ,that subtle body  
is not due to karman1 but to the soul's 
vidymhtmya4--,that the explanation of   
the _/,s_/r-bhshya agrees with the text 
as well as _/,s_/ankara's1 a comparison 
of the two will show2 especially forced 
is _/,s_/ankara's explanation of        
'arthavattvam ubhayath1' which is said  
to mean that there is arthavattva in one
 case1 and non-arthavattva in the other 
case4  ,the next ,stra 7#ca7 constitutes
 an adhikara_/n_/a 7,,xviii7 deciding   
that the road of the gods is followed   
not only by those knowing the vidys     
which specially mention the going on    
that road1 but by all who are acquainted
 with the sagu_/n_/a-vidys of           
,brahman4--,the explanation given in the
 _/,s_/r-bhshya 7in which ,stras #ca and
 #cb have exchanged places7 is similar1 
with the difference however that all who
 meditate on ,brahman--without any      
reference to the distinction of         

nirgu_/n_/a and sagu_/n_/a--proceed     
after death on the road of the gods4    
7,the _/,s_/r-bhshya reads 'sarveshm1'  
i4e4 all worshippers1 not 'sarvsm1' all 
sagu_/n_/a-vidys47  ,adhik4 ,,xix 7#cb7 
decides that1 although the general      
effect of true knowledge is release from
 all forms of body1 yet even such beings
 as have reached perfect knowledge may  
retain a body for the purpose of        
discharging certain offices4--,in the   
_/,s_/r-bhshya1 where the ,stra follows 
immediately on ,stra #cj1 the           
adhikara_/n_/a determines1 in close     
connexion with #cj1 that1 although those
 who know ,brahman as a rule divest     
themselves of the gross body--there     
remaining only a subtle body which      
enables them to move--and no longer     
experience pleasure and pain1 yet       
certain beings1 although having reached 
the cognition of ,brahman1 remain       
invested with a gross body1 and hence   
liable to pleasure and pain until they  
have fully performed certain duties4    

,adhik4 ,,xx 7#cc7 teaches that the     
negative attributes of ,brahman         
mentioned in some vidys--such as its    
being not gross1 not subtle1 c4--are to 
be included in all meditations on       
,brahman4--,adhik4 ,,xxi 7#cd7          
determines that ,k_/th_/a ,up4 ,,iii1   
#a1 and ,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 constitute 
one vidy only1 because both passages    
refer to the highest ,brahman4          
,according to ,rmnuja the ,stra contains
 a reply to an objection raised against 
the conclusion arrived at in the        
preceding ,stra4--,adhik4 ,,xxii 7#ce1  
#cf7 maintains that the two passages1   
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d and ,,iii1 #e1 
constitute one vidy only1 the object of 
knowledge being in both cases ,brahman  
viewed as the inner ,self of            
all4--,adhik4 ,,xxiii 7#cg7 on the      
contrary decides that the passage ,ait4 
r4 ,,ii1 #b1 #d1 #f constitutes not one 
but two meditations4--,adhik4 ,,xxiv    
7#ch7 again determines that the vidy of 
the ,true contained in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   

,v1 #d1 #e1 is one only--,according to  
,rmnuja1 ,stras #ce-ch constitute one   
adhikara_/n_/a only whose subject is the
 same as that of ,,xxii according to    
_/,s_/ankara4  ,adhik4 ,,xxv 7#ci7      
proves that the passages ,ch4 ,up4      
,,viii1 #a and ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 
#bb cannot constitute one vidy1 since   
the former refers to ,brahman as        
possessing qualities1 while the latter  
is concerned with ,brahman as destitute 
of qualities4--,adhik4 ,,xxvi 7#dj1 #da7
 treats1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 of a
 minor question connected with ,ch4 ,up4
 ,v1 #aa ff4--,according to the         
_/,s_/r-bhshya1 ,stras #ci-da form one  
adhikara_/n_/a whose first ,stra reaches
 essentially the same conclusion as     
_/,s_/ankara under #ci4 ,stras #dj1 #da 
thereupon discuss a general question    
concerning the meditations on ,brahman4 
,the qualities1 an opponent is supposed 
to remark1 which in the two passages    
discussed are predicated of             
,brahman--such as va_/s_/itva1          

satyakmatva1 c4--cannot be considered   
real 7pramrthika71 since other passages 
7sa esha neti neti1 and the like7       
declare ,brahman to be devoid of all    
qualities4 ,hence those qualities cannot
 be admitted into meditations whose     
purpose is final release4--,to this     
objection ,stra #dj replies1 '7,those   
qualities7 are not to be left off 7from 
the meditations on ,brahman71 since 7in 
the passage under discussion as well as 
in other passages7 they are stated with 
emphasis#ag4'--;,but1 another objection 
is raised1 ,scripture says that he who  
meditates on ,brahman as satyakma1 c4   
obtains a mere perishable reward1 viz4  
the world of the fathers1 and similar   
results specified in ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1  
#b2 hence1 he who is desirous of final  
release1 must not include those         
qualities of ,brahman in his            
meditation4--,to this objection ,stra   
#da replies1 ',because that 7i4e4 the   
free roaming in all the worlds1 the     
world of the fathers1 c47 is stated as  

proceeding therefrom 7i4e4 the approach 
to ,brahman which is final release7 in  
the case of 7the soul7 which has        
approached ,brahman2' 7therefore a      
person desirous of release1 may include 
satyakmatva1 c4 in his meditations47    
,adhik4 ,,xxvii 7#db7 decides that those
 meditations which are connected with   
certain matters forming constituent     
parts of sacrificial actions1 are not to
 be considered as permanently requisite 
parts of the latter4--,adhik4 ,,xxviii  
7#dc7 teaches that1 in a ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
passage and a similar ,ch4 ,up4 passage1
 ,vyu and ,pr_/n_/a are not to be       
identified1 but to be held              
apart4--,adhik4 ,,xxix 7#dd-eb7 decides 
that the firealtars made of mind1 c41   
which are mentioned in the ,agnirahasya1
 do not constitute parts of the         
sacrificial action 7so that the mental1 
c4 construction of the altar could      
optionally be substituted for the actual
 one71 but merely subjects of           
meditations4  ,adhik4 ,,xxx 7#ec1 #ed7  

treats1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 in   
the way of digression1 of the question  
whether to the ,self an existence       
independent of the body can be assigned1
 or not 7as the ,materialists           
maintain74--,according to the           
_/,s_/r-bhshya the adhikara_/n_/a does  
not refer to this wide question1 but is 
concerned with a point more immediately 
connected with the meditations on       
,brahman1 viz4 the question as to the   
form under which1 in those meditations1 
the ,self of the meditating devotee has 
to be viewed4 ,the two ,stras then have 
to be translated as follows3 ',some     
7maintain that the soul of the devotee  
has1 in meditations1 to be viewed as    
possessing those attributes only which  
belong to it in its embodied state1 such
 as j_/_/at_/ri_/tva and the like71     
because the ,self is 7at the time of    
meditation7 in the body4'--,the next    
,stra rejects this view1 ',this is not  
so1 but the separatedness 7i4e4 the pure
 isolated state in which the ,self is at

 the time of final release when it is   
freed from all evil1 c47 7is to be      
transferred to the meditating ,self71   
because that will be#ah the state 7of   
the ,self in the condition of final     
release74'  ,adhik4 ,,xxxi 7#ee1 #ef7   
decides that meditations connected with 
constituent elements of the sacrifice1  
such as the udgitha1 are1 in spite of   
difference of svara in the udgitha1 c41 
valid1 not only for that _/s_/kh in     
which the meditation actually is met    
with1 but for all _/s_/khs4--,adhik4    
,,xxxii 7#eg7 decides that the          
,vai_/s_/vnara ,agni of ,ch4 ,up4 ,v1   
#aa ff4 is to be meditated upon as a    
whole1 not in his single parts4--,adhik4
 ,,xxxiii 7#eh7 teaches that those      
meditations which refer to one subject1 
but as distinguished by different       
qualities1 have to be held apart as     
different meditations4 ,thus the        
daharavidy1 _/,s_/a_/nd_/ilyavidy1 c4   
remain separate4  ,adhik4 ,,xxxiv 7#ei7 
teaches that those meditations on       

,brahman for which the texts assign one 
and the same fruit are optional1 there  
being no reason for their being         
cumulated4--,adhik4 ,,xxxv 7#fj7 decides
 that those meditations1 on the other   
hand1 which refer to special wishes may 
be cumulated or optionally employed     
according to choice4--,adhik4 ,,xxxvi   
7#fa-ff7 extends this conclusion to the 
meditations connected with constituent  
elements of action1 such as the udgtha4 
,p,,da ,,iv4   ,adhik4 ,i 7#a-ag7 proves
 that the knowledge of ,brahman is not  
kratvartha1 i4e4 subordinate to action1 
but independent4--,adhik4 ,,ii 7#ah-bj7 
confirms this conclusion by showing that
 the state of the pravrjins is enjoined 
by the sacred law1 and that for them    
vidy only is prescribed1 not            
action4--,adhik4 ,,iii 7#ba1 #bb7       
decides that certain clauses forming    
part of vidys are not mere stutis       
7arthavdas71 but themselves enjoin the  
meditation4--,the legends recorded in   
the ,vednta-texts are not to be used as 

subordinate members of acts1 but have   
the purpose of glorifying--as           
arthavdas--the injunctions with which   
they are connected 7,adhik4 ,,iv1 #bc1  
#bd74--;,for all these reasons the      
rdhvaretasa_/h_/ require no actions but 
only knowledge 7,adhik4 ,v1             
#be74--,nevertheless the actions        
enjoined by ,scripture1 such as         
sacrifices1 conduct of certain kinds1   
c41 are required as conducive to the    
rise of vidy in the mind 7,adhik4 ,,vi1 
#bf1 #bg74--;,certain relaxations1      
allowed by ,scripture1 of the laws      
regarding food1 are meant only for cases
 of extreme need 7,adhik4 ,,vii1        
#bh-cl74--,the _/s_/ramakarm_/n_/i are  
obligatory on him also who does not     
strive after mukti 7,adhik4 ,,viii1     
#cb-ce74--,those also who1 owing to     
poverty and so on1 are an_/s_/rama have 
claims to vidy 7,adhik4 ,,ix1           
#cf-ci74--;,an rdhvaretas cannot revoke 
his vow 7,adhik4 ,x1 #dj74--;,expiation 
of the fall of an rdhvaretas 7,adhik4   

,,xi1 #da1 #db74--;,exclusion of the    
fallen rdhvaretas in certain cases      
7,adhik4 ,,xii1 #dc74--,those           
meditations1 which are connected with   
subordinate members of the sacrifice1   
are the business of the priest1 not of  
the yajamna 7,adhik4 ,,xiii1            
#dd-df74--;,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #e1 #a 
enjoins mauna as a third in addition to 
blya and p_/nd_/itya 7,adhik4 ,,xiv1    
#dg-di74--;,by blya is to be understood 
a childlike innocent state of mind      
7,adhik4 ,,xv1 #ej74  ,stras #ea and #eb
 discuss1 according to ,rmnuja1 the     
question when the vidy1 which is the    
result of the means described in ,,iii1 
#d1 arises4 ,stra #ea treats of that    
vidy whose result is mere exaltation    
7abhyudaya71 and states that 'it takes  
place in the present life1 if there is  
not present an obstacle in the form of a
 prabalakarmntara 7in which latter case 
the vidy arises later only71 on account 
of ,scripture declaring this 7in various
 passages74'--,stra #eb1 ',thus there is

 also absence of a definite rule as to  
7the time of origination of7 that       
knowledge whose fruit is release1 it    
being averred concerning that one also  
that it is in the same condition 7i4e4  
of sometimes having an obstacle1        
sometimes not74'--_/,s_/ankara1 who     
treats the two ,stras as two            
adhikara_/n_/as1 agrees as to the       
explanation of #ea1 while1 putting a    
somewhat forced interpretation on #eb1  
he makes it out to mean that a more or  
less is possible only in the case of the
 sagu_/n_/a-vidys4  ,notes3  ,footnote  
#af3 ,all the mentioned modes of        
,brahman are known from ,scripture only1
 not from ordinary experience4 ,if the  
latter were the case1 then1 and then    
only1 ,scripture might at first refer to
 them 'anuvdena1' and finally negative  
them4  ,footnote #ag3 ,rmnuja has here  
some strong remarks on the improbability
 of qualities emphatically attributed to
 ,brahman1 in more than one passage1    
having to be set aside in any           

meditation3 ',na _/k_/a                 
mtpit_/ri_/sahasrebhyo-pi               
vatsalatara_/m_/ sstra_/m_/ pratrakavad 
apramrthikau nirasanyau gu_/n_/au       
pram_/n_/ntarpratipannau                
dare_/n_/opadi_/s_/ya                   
sa_/m_/sra_/k_/akraparivartanena prvam  
eva bambhramyamnn mumukshn bhyo-pi      
bhramayitum alam4'  ,footnote #ah3 ,the 
_/,s_/r-bhshya as well as several other 
commentaries reads tadbhvabhvitvt for   
_/,s_/ankara's tadbhvbhvitvt4   ,,fourth
 ,,adhy,,ya4 ,p,,da ,i4                 
,adhikara_/n_/a ,i 7#a1 #b74--,the      
meditation on the tman enjoined by      
,scripture is not an act to be          
accomplished once only1 but is to be    
repeated again and again4  ,adhik4 ,,ii 
7#c74--,the devotee engaged in          
meditation on ,brahman is to view it as 
constituting his own ,self4  ,adhik4    
,,iii 7#d74--,to the rule laid down in  
the preceding adhikara_/n_/a the        
so-called pratkopsanas1 i4e4 those      
meditations in which ,brahman is viewed 

under a symbol or outward manifestation 
7as1 for instance1 mano brahmety upsta7 
constitute an exception1 i4e4 the       
devotee is not to consider the pratka as
 constituting his own ,self4  ,adhik4   
,,iv 7#e74--;,in the pratkopsanas the   
pratka is to be meditatively viewed as  
being one with ,brahman1 not ,brahman as
 being one with the pratka4--,rmnuja    
takes ,stra #e as simply giving a reason
 for the decision arrived at under ,stra
 #d1 and therefore as not constituting a
 new adhikara_/n_/a4  ,adhik4 ,v        
7#f74--;,in meditations connected with  
constitutives of sacrificial works 7as1 
for instance1 ya evsau tapati tam       
udgtham upsta7 the idea of the divinity1
 c4 is to be transferred to the         
sacrificial item1 not vice versa4 ,in   
the example quoted1 for instance1 the   
udgtha is to be viewed as ditya1 not    
ditya as the udgtha4  ,adhik4 ,,vi      
7#g-aj74--,the devotee is to carry on   
his meditations in a sitting            
posture4--_/,s_/ankara maintains that   

this rule does not apply to those       
meditations whose result is             
sa_/m_/yagdar_/s_/ana2 but the ,stra    
gives no hint to that effect4  ,adhik4  
,,vii 7#aa74--,the meditations may be   
carried on at any time1 and in any      
place1 favourable to concentration of   
mind4  ,adhik4 ,,viii 7#ab74--,the      
meditations are to be continued until   
death4--_/,s_/ankara again maintains    
that those meditations which lead to    
sa_/m_/yagdar_/s_/ana are excepted4     
,adhik4 ,,ix 7#ac74--,when through those
 meditations the knowledge of ,brahman  
has been reached1 the vidvn is no longer
 affected by the consequences of either 
past or future evil deeds4  ,adhik4 ,x  
7#ad74--;,good deeds likewise lose their
 efficiency4--,the literal translation  
of the ,stra is1 ',there is likewise    
non-attachment 7to the vidvn7 of the    
other 7i4e4 of the deeds other than the 
evil ones1 i4e4 of good deeds71 but on  
the fall 7of the body1 i4e4 when death  
takes place74' ,the last words of the   

,stra1 'but on the fall1' are separated 
by _/,s_/ankara from the preceding part 
of the ,stra and interpreted to mean1   
'when death takes place 7there results  
mukti of the vidvn1 who through his     
knowledge has freed himself from the    
bonds of works74'--,according to ,rmnuja
 the whole ,stra simply means1 ',there  
is likewise non-attachment of good deeds
 7not at once when knowledge is         
reached71 but on the death of the       
vidvn#ai4'  ,adhik4 ,,xi 7#ae74--,the   
non-operation of works stated in the two
 preceding adhikara_/n_/as holds good   
only in the case of anrabdhakrya works1 
i4e4 those works which have not yet     
begun to produce their effects1 while it
 does not extend to the rabdhakrya works
 on which the present existence of the  
devotee depends4  ,adhik4 ,,xii 7#af1   
#ag74--;,from the rule enunciated in    
,adhik4 ,x are excepted such sacrificial
 performances as are enjoined           
permanently 7nitya73 so1 for instance1  
the agnihotra1 for they promote the     

origination of knowledge4  ,adhik4      
,,xiii 7#ah74--,the origination of      
knowledge is promoted also by such      
sacrificial works as are not accompanied
 with the knowledge of the upsanas      
referring to the different members of   
those works4  ,adhik4 ,,xiv 7#ai74--,the
 rabdhakrya works have to be worked out 
fully by the fruition of their effects2 
whereupon the vidvn becomes united with 
,brahman4--,the 'bhoga' of the ,stra is1
 according to _/,s_/ankara1 restricted  
to the present existence of the devotee1
 since the complete knowledge obtained  
by him destroys the nescience which     
otherwise would lead to future          
embodiments4 ,according to ,rmnuja a    
number of embodied existences may have  
to be gone through before the effects of
 the rabdhakrya works are exhausted4    
,p,,da ,,ii4   ,this and the two        
remaining pdas of the fourth adhyya     
describe the fate of the vidvn after    
death4 ,according to _/,s_/ankara we    
have to distinguish the vidvn who       

possesses the highest knowledge1 viz4   
that he is one with the highest         
,brahman1 and the vidvn who knows only  
the lower ,brahman1 and have to refer   
certain ,stras to the former and others 
to the latter4 ,according to ,rmnuja the
 vidvn is one only4  ,adhik4 ,i1 ,,ii1  
,,iii 7#a-f74--,on the death of the     
vidvn 7i4e4 of him who possesses the    
lower knowledge1 according to           
_/,s_/ankara7 his senses are merged in  
the manas1 the manas in the chief vital 
air 7pr_/n_/a71 the vital air in the    
individual soul 7jva71 the soul in the  
subtle elements4--,according to ,rmnuja 
the combination 7sampatti7 of the senses
 with the manas1 c4 is a mere           
conjunction 7sa_/m_/yoga71 not a merging
 7laya74  ,adhik4 ,,iv 7#g74--,the vidvn
 7i4e4 according to _/,s_/ankara1 he who
 possesses the lower knowledge7 and the 
avidvn1 i4e4 he who does not possess any
 knowledge of ,brahman1 pass through the
 same stages 7i4e4 those described      
hitherto7 up to the entrance of the     

soul1 together with the subtle elements1
 and so on into the n_/d_/s4--,the vidvn
 also remains connected with the subtle 
elements because he has not yet         
completely destroyed avidy1 so that the 
immortality which ,scripture ascribes to
 him 7am_/ri_/tatva_/m_/ hi vidvn       
abhya_/s_/nute7 is only a relative      
one4--,rmnuja quotes the following text 
regarding the immortality of the vidvn3 
',yad sarve pramu_/k_/yante km yessya   
h_/ri_/di sthit_/h_/ atha               
martyosm_/ri_/to bhavaty atra brahma    
sama_/s_/nute1'  and explains that the  
immortality which is here ascribed to   
the vidvn as soon as he abandons all    
desires can only mean the               
destruction--mentioned in the preceding 
pda--of all the effects of good and evil
 works1 while the 'reaching of ,brahman'
 can only refer to the intuition of     
,brahman vouchsafed to the meditating   
devotee4  ,adhik4 ,v 7#h-aa7 raises2    
according to _/,s_/ankara1 the question 
whether the subtle elements of which    

,scripture says that they are combined  
with the highest deity 7teja_/h_/       
parasy_/m_/ devatym7 are completely     
merged in the latter or not4 ,the answer
 is that a complete absorption of the   
elements takes place only when final    
emancipation is reached2 that1 on the   
other hand1 as long as the sa_/m_/sra   
state lasts1 the elements1 although     
somehow combined with ,brahman1 remain  
distinct so as to be able to form new   
bodies for the soul4  ,according to     
,rmnuja the ,stras #h-aa do not         
constitute a new adhikara_/n_/a1 but    
continue the discussion of the point    
mooted in #g4 ,the immortality there    
spoken of does not imply the separation 
of the soul from the body1 'because     
,scripture declares sa_/m_/sra1 i4e4    
embodiedness up to the reaching of      
,brahman' 7tasya tvad eva _/k_/ira_/m_/ 
yvan na vimokshye atha sampatsye7       
7#h74--,that the soul after having      
departed from the gross body is not     
disconnected from the subtle elements1  

is also proved hereby1 that the subtle  
body accompanies it1 as is observed from
 authority#bj 7#i74--;,hence the        
immortality referred to in the          
scriptural passage quoted is not        
effected by means of the total          
destruction of the body 7#aj74  ,adhik4 
,,vi 7#ab-ad7 is of special             
importance4--,according to _/,s_/ankara 
the ,stras now turn from the discussion 
of the departure of him who possesses   
the lower knowledge only to the         
consideration of what becomes of him who
 has reached the higher knowledge4 ,so  
far it has been taught that in the case 
of relative immortality 7ensuing on the 
apara vidy7 the subtle elements1        
together with the senses and so on1     
depart from the body of the dying       
devotee2 this implies at the same time  
that they do not depart from the body of
 the dying sage who knows himself to be 
one with ,brahman4--,against this latter
 implied doctrine ,stra #ab is supposed 
to formulate an objection4 ',if it be   

said that the departure of the pr_/n_/as
 from the body of the dying sage is     
denied 7viz4 in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1
 #e1 na tasya pr_/n_/a utkrmanti1 of him
 the pr_/n_/as do not pass out72 we     
reply that in that passage the genitive 
tasya has the sense of the ablative     
tasmt1 so that the sense of the passage 
is1 from him1 i4e4 from the jva of the  
dying sage1 the pr_/n_/as do not depart1
 but remain with it4'--,this objection  
_/,s_/ankara supposes to be disposed of 
in ,stra #ac4 ',by some there is given a
 clear denial of the departure of the   
pr_/n_/as in the case of the dying      
sage1' viz4 in the passage ,b_/ri_/4    
,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #aa1 where              
,yj_/_/avalkya instructs rtabhga that1  
when this man dies1 the pr_/n_/as do not
 depart from it 7asmt2 the context      
showing that asmt means 'from it1' viz4 
from the body1 and not 'from him1' viz4 
the jva74--,the same view is1 moreover1 
confirmed by ,sm_/ri_/ti passages4      
,according to ,rmnuja the three ,stras  

forming _/,s_/ankara's sixth            
adhikara_/n_/a do not constitute a new  
adhikara_/n_/a at all1 and1 moreover1   
have to be combined into two ,stras4    
,the topic continuing to be discussed is
 the utkrnti of the vidvn4 ,if1 ,stra   
#ab says1 the utkrnti of the pr_/n_/as  
is not admitted1 on the ground of the   
denial supposed to be contained in      
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #e2 the reply  
is that the sense of the tasya there is 
'_/s_/rrt' 7so that the passage means1  
'from him1 i4e4 the jva1 the pr_/n_/as  
do not depart'72 for this is clearly    
shown by the reading of some1 viz4 the  
,mdhyandinas1 who1 in their text of the 
passage1 do not read 'tasya' but        
'tasmt4'--,with reference to the        
instruction given by ,yj_/_/avalkya to  
rtabhga1 it is to be remarked that      
nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha'  
to be the sage who knows                
,brahman4--,and1 finally1 there are     
,sm_/ri_/ti passages declaring that the 
sage also when dying departs from the   

body4  ,adhik4 ,,vii and ,,viii 7#ae1   
#af7 teach1 according to _/,s_/ankara1  
that1 on the death of him who possesses 
the higher knowledge1 his pr_/n_/as1    
elements1 c4 are merged in ,brahman1 so 
as to be no longer distinct from it in  
any way4  ,according to ,rmnuja the two 
,stras continue the teaching about the  
pr_/n_/as1 bhtas1 c4 of the vidvn in    
general1 and declare that they are      
finally merged in ,brahman1 not merely  
in the way of conjunction 7sa_/m_/yoga71
 but completely4#ba  ,adhik4 ,,ix       
7#ag74--_/,s_/ankara here returns to the
 owner of the apar vidy1 while ,rmnuja  
continues the description of the utkrnti
 of his vidvn4--,the jva of the dying   
man passes into the heart1 and thence   
departs out of the body by means of the 
n_/d_/is2 the vidvn by means of the     
n_/d_/i called sushum_/n_/1 the avidvn  
by means of some other n_/d_/4  ,adhik4 
,x 7#ah1 #ai74--,the departing soul     
passes up to the sun by means of a ray  
of light which exists at night as well  

as during day4  ,adhik4 ,,xi 7#bj1      
#ba74--;,also that vidvn who dies during
 the dakshi_/n_/yana reaches ,brahman4  
,p,,da ,,iii4   ,adhik4 ,i1 ,,ii1 ,,iii 
7#a-c7 reconcile the different accounts 
given in the ,upanishads as to the      
stations of the way which leads the     
vidvn up to ,brahman4  ,adhik4 ,,iv     
7#d-f7--;,by the 'stations' we have1    
however1 to understand not only the     
subdivisions of the way but also the    
divine beings which lead the soul on4   
,the remaining part of the pda is by    
_/,s_/ankara divided into two           
adhikara_/n_/as4 ,of these the former   
one 7#g-ad7 teaches that the ,brahman to
 which the departed soul is led by the  
guardians of the path of the gods is not
 the highest ,brahman1 but the effected 
7krya7 or qualified 7_/s_/agu_/n_/a7    
,brahman4 ,this is the opinion          
propounded in ,stras #g-aa by ,bdari1   
and1 finally1 accepted by _/,s_/ankara  
in his commentary on ,stra #ad4 ,in     
,stras #ab-ad ,jaimini defends the      

opposite view1 according to which the   
soul of the vidvn goes to the highest   
,brahman1 not to the kryam brahma4 ,but 
,jaimini's view1 although set forth in  
the latter part of the adhikara_/n_/a1  
is1 according to _/,s_/ankara1 a mere   
prvapaksha1 while ,bdari's opinion      
represents the siddhnta4--,the latter of
 the two adhikara_/n_/as 7,,vi of the   
whole pda2 #ae1 #af7 records the opinion
 of ,bdarya_/n_/a on a collateral       
question1 viz4 whether1 or not1 all     
those who worship the effected ,brahman 
are led to it4 ,the decision is that    
those only are guided to ,brahman who   
have not worshipped it under a pratka   
form4  ,according to ,rmnuja1 ,stras    
#g-af form one adhikara_/n_/a only1 in  
which the views of ,bdari and of        
,jaimini represent two prvapakshas1     
while ,bdarya_/n_/a's opinion is adopted
 as the siddhnta4 ,the question is      
whether the guardians of the path lead  
to ,brahman only those who worship the  
effected ,brahman1 i4e4                 

,hira_/n_/yagarbha1 or those who worship
 the highest ,brahman1 or those who     
worship the individual soul as free from
 ,prak_/ri_/ti1 and having ,brahman for 
its ,self 7ye pratyagtmna_/m_/          
prak_/ri_/tiviyukta_/m_/ brahmtmakam    
upsate74--,the first view is maintained 
by ,bdari in ,stra #g1 ',the guardians  
lead to ,brahman those who worship the  
effected ,brahman1 because going is     
possible towards the latter only2' for  
no movement can take place towards the  
highest and as such omnipresent         
,brahman4--,the explanation of ,stra #i 
is similar to that of _/,s_/ankara2 but 
more clearly replies to the objection   
7that1 if ,hira_/n_/yagarbha were meant 
in the passage1 'purusho _/s_/a         
mnava_/h_/ sa etn brahma gamayati1' the 
text would read 'sa etn brahm_/n_/am    
gamayati'7 that ,hira_/n_/yagarbha is   
called ,brahman on account of his       
nearness to ,brahman1 i4e4 on account of
 his prathamajatva4--,the explanation of
 #aj1 #aa is essentially the same as in 

_/,s_/ankara2 so also of l#b-l#d4--,the 
siddhnta view is established in ,stra   
#ac1 ',it is the opinion of             
,bdarya_/n_/a that it1 i4e4 the ga_/n_/a
 of the guardians1 leads to ,brahman    
those who do not take their stand on    
what is pratka1 i4e4 those who worship  
the highest ,brahman1 and those who     
meditate on the individual ,self as     
dissociated from prak_/ri_/ti1 and      
having ,brahman for its ,self1 but not  
those who worship ,brahman under        
pratkas4 ,for both views--that of       
,jaimini as well as that of ,bdari--are 
faulty4' ,the krya view contradicts such
 passages as 'asm_/k_/ charrt samutthya 
para_/m_/ jyotir upasampadya1' c42 the  
para view1 such passages as that in the 
pa_/k_/gni-vidy1 which declares that ya 
ittha_/m_/ vidu_/h_/1 i4e4 those who    
know the pa_/k_/gni-vidy1 are also led  
up to ,brahman4   ,p,,da ,,iv4   ,adhik4
 ,i 7#a-c7 returns1 according to        
_/,s_/ankara1 to the owner of the par   
vidy1 and teaches that1 when on his     

death his soul obtains final release1 it
 does not acquire any new               
characteristics1 but merely manifests   
itself in its true nature4--,the        
explanation given by ,rmnuja is         
essentially the same1 but of course     
refers to that vidvn whose going to     
,brahman had been described in the      
preceding pda4  ,adhik4 ,,ii 7#d7       
determines that the relation in which   
the released soul stands to ,brahman is 
that of avibhga1 non-separation4 ,this1 
on _/,s_/ankara's view1 means absolute  
non-separation1 identity4--,according to
 ,rmnuja the question to be considered  
is whether the released soul views      
itself as separate 7p_/ri_/thagbhta7    
from ,brahman1 or as non-separate       
because being a mode of ,brahman4 ,the  
former view is favoured by those        
_/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti passages     
which speak of the soul as being with1  
or equal to1 ,brahman2 the latter by1   
such passages as tat tvam asi and the   
like4#bb  ,adhik4 ,,iii 7#e-g7 discusses

 the characteristics of the released    
soul 7i4e4 of the truly released soul1  
according to _/,s_/ankara74 ,according  
to ,jaimini the released soul1 when     
manifesting itself in its true nature1  
possesses all those qualities which in  
,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a and other      
places are ascribed to ,brahman1 such as
 apahatappmatva1 satyasa_/m_/kalpatva1  
c41 ai_/s_/varya4--,according to        
,au_/d_/ulomi the only characteristic of
 the released soul is                   
_/k_/aitanya4--,according to ,bdaryana  
the two views can be combined           
7_/,s_/ankara remarking that            
satyasa_/m_/kalpatva1 c4 are ascribed to
 the released soul vyavahrpekshay74     
,adhik4 ,,iv 7#h-i7 returns1 according  
to _/,s_/ankara1 to the apar vidy1 and  
discusses the question whether the soul 
of the pious effects its desires by its 
mere determination1 or uses some other  
means4 ,the former alternative is       
accepted--,according to ,rmnuja the     
adhikara_/n_/a simply continues the     

consideration of the state of the       
released1 begun in the preceding        
adhikara_/n_/a4 ,of the released soul it
 is said in ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c   
that after it has manifested itself in  
its true nature it moves about playing  
and rejoicing with women1 carriages1 and
 so on4 ,the question then arises       
whether it effects all this by its mere 
sa_/m_/kalpa 7it having been shown in   
the preceding adhikara_/n_/a that the   
released soul is1 like the ,lord1       
satyasa_/m_/kalpa71 or not4 ,the answer 
is in favour of the former alternative1 
on account of the explicit declaration  
made in ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #b1 ',by his  
mere will the fathers come to receive   
him4'  ,adhik4 ,v 7#aj-ad7 decides that 
the released are embodied or disembodied
 according to their wish and will4      
,adhik4 ,,vi 7#aa1 #ab7 explains how the
 soul of the released can animate       
several bodies at the same time4--,stra 
#ab gives1 according to _/,s_/ankara1   
the additional explanation that those   

passages which declare the absence of   
all specific cognition on the part of   
the released soul do not refer to the   
partly released soul of the devotee1 but
 either to the soul in the state of deep
 sleep 7svpyaya  sushupti71 or to the   
fully released soul of the sage         
7sampatti  kaivalya74--,rmnuja explains 
that the passages speaking of absence of
 consciousness refer either to the state
 of deep sleep1 or to the time of dying 
7sampatti  mata_/n_/am according to 'vn 
manasi sampadyate1' c474  ,adhik4 ,,vii 
7#ag-ba74--,the released jvas           
participate in all the perfections and  
powers of the ,lord1 with the exception 
of the power of creating and sustaining 
the world4 ,they do not return to new   
forms of embodied existence4  ,after    
having1 in this way1 rendered ourselves 
acquainted with the contents of the     
,brahma-stras according to the views of 
_/,s_/ankara as well as ,rmnuja1 we have
 now to consider the question which of  
the two modes of interpretation         

represents--or at any rate more closely 
approximates to the true meaning of the 
,stras4 ,that few of the ,stras are     
intelligible if taken by themselves1 we 
have already remarked above2 but this   
does not exclude the possibility of our 
deciding with a fair degree of certainty
 which of the two interpretations       
proposed agrees better with the text1 at
 least in a certain number of cases4    
,we have to note in the first place     
that1 in spite of very numerous         
discrepancies1--of which only the more  
important ones have been singled out in 
the conspectus of contents1--the two    
commentators are at one as to the       
general drift of the ,stras and the     
arrangement of topics4 ,as a rule1 the  
adhikara_/n_/as discuss one or several  
,vedic passages bearing upon a certain  
point of the system1 and in the vast    
majority of cases the two commentators  
agree as to which are the special texts 
referred to4 ,and1 moreover1 in a very  
large number of cases the agreement     

extends to the interpretation to be put 
on those passages and on the ,stras4    
,this far-reaching agreement certainly  
tends to inspire us with a certain      
confidence as to the existence of an old
 tradition concerning the meaning of the
 ,stras on which the bulk of the        
interpretations of _/,s_/ankara as well 
as of ,rmnuja are based4  ,but at the   
same time we have seen that1 in a not   
inconsiderable number of cases1 the     
interpretations of _/,s_/ankara and     
,rmnuja diverge more or less widely1 and
 that the ,stras affected thereby are1  
most of them1 especially important      
because bearing on fundamental points of
 the ,vednta system4 ,the question then 
remains which of the two interpretations
 is entitled to preference4  ,regarding 
a small number of ,stras ,i have already
 7in the conspectus of contents7 given  
it as my opinion that ,rmnuja's         
explanation appears to be more worthy of
 consideration4 ,we meet1 in the first  
place1 with a number of cases in which  

the two commentators agree as to the    
literal meaning of a ,stra1 but where   
_/,s_/ankara sees himself reduced to the
 necessity of supplementing his         
interpretation by certain additions and 
reservations of his own for which the   
text gives no occasion1 while ,rmnuja is
 able to take the ,stra as it stands4   
,to exemplify this remark1 ,i again     
direct attention to all those ,stras    
which in clear terms represent the      
individual soul as something different  
from the highest soul1 and concerning   
which _/,s_/ankara is each time obliged 
to have recourse to the plea of the     
,stra referring1 not to what is true in 
the strict sense of the word1 but only  
to what is conventionally looked upon as
 true4 ,it is1 ,i admit1 not altogether 
impossible that _/,s_/ankara's          
interpretation should represent the real
 meaning of the ,stras2 that the latter1
 indeed1 to use the terms employed by   
,dr4 ,deussen1 should for the nonce set 
forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to   

the common notions of mankind1 which1   
however1 can be rightly understood by   
him only to whose mind the esoteric     
doctrine is all the while present4 ,this
 is not impossible1 ,i say2 but it is a 
point which requires convincing proofs  
before it can be allowed4--,we have had1
 in the second place1 to note a certain 
number of adhikara_/n_/as and ,stras    
concerning whose interpretation         
_/,s_/ankara and ,rmnuja disagree       
altogether2 and we have seen that not   
unfrequently the explanations given by  
the latter commentator appear to be     
preferable because falling in more      
easily with the words of the text4 ,the 
most striking instance of this is       
afforded by the #acth adhikara_/n_/a of 
,,ii1 #c1 which treats of the size of   
the jva1 and where ,rmnuja's explanation
 seems to be decidedly superior to      
_/,s_/ankara's1 both if we look to the  
arrangement of the whole adhikara_/n_/a 
and to the wording of the single ,stras4
 ,the adhikara_/n_/a is1 moreover1 a    

specially important one1 because the    
nature of the view held as to the size  
of the individual soul goes far to      
settle the question what kind of ,vednta
 is embodied in ,bdarya_/n_/a's work4   
,but it will be requisite not only to   
dwell on the interpretations of a few   
detached ,stras1 but to make the attempt
 at least of forming some opinion as to 
the relation of the ,vednta-stras as a  
whole to the chief distinguishing       
doctrines of _/,s_/ankara as well as    
,rmnuja4 ,such an attempt may possibly  
lead to very slender positive results2  
but in the present state of the enquiry 
even a merely negative result1 viz4 the 
conclusion that the ,stras do not teach 
particular doctrines found in them by   
certain commentators1 will not be       
without its value4  ,the first question 
we wish to consider in some detail is   
whether the ,stras in any way favour    
_/,s_/ankara's doctrine that we have to 
distinguish a twofold knowledge of      
,brahman1 a higher knowledge which leads

 to the immediate absorption1 on death1 
of the individual soul in ,brahman1 and 
a lower knowledge which raises its owner
 merely to an exalted form of individual
 existence4 ,the adhyya first to be     
considered in this connexion is the     
fourth one4 ,according to _/,s_/ankara  
the three latter pdas of that adhyya are
 chiefly engaged in describing the fate 
of him who dies in the possession of the
 lower knowledge1 while two sections    
7,,iv1 #b1 #ab-ad2 ,,iv1 #d1 #a-g7 tell 
us what happens to him who1 before his  
death1 had risen to the knowledge of the
 highest ,brahman4 ,according to        
,rmnuja1 on the other hand1 the three   
pdas1 referring throughout to one       
subject only1 give an uninterrupted     
account of the successive steps by which
 the soul of him who knows the ,lord    
through the ,upanishads passes1 at the  
time of death1 out of the gross body    
which it had tenanted1 ascends to the   
world of ,brahman1 and lives there for  
ever without returning into the         

sa_/m_/sra4  ,on an a priori view of the
 matter it certainly appears somewhat   
strange that the concluding section of  
the ,stras should be almost entirely    
taken up with describing the fate of him
 who has after all acquired an          
altogether inferior knowledge only1 and 
has remained shut out from the true     
sanctuary of ,vedntic knowledge1 while  
the fate of the fully initiated is      
disposed of in a few occasional ,stras4 
,it is1 ,i think1 not too much to say   
that no unbiassed student of the ,stras 
would--before having allowed himself to 
be influenced by _/,s_/ankara's         
interpretations--imagine for a moment   
that the solemn words1 ',from thence is 
no return1 from thence is no return1'   
with which the ,stras conclude1 are     
meant to describe1 not the lasting      
condition of him who has reached final  
release1 the highest aim of man1 but    
merely a stage on the way of that soul  
which is engaged in the slow progress of
 gradual release1 a stage which is      

indeed greatly superior to any earthly  
form of existence1 but yet itself       
belongs to the essentially fictitious   
sa_/m_/sra1 and as such remains         
infinitely below the bliss of true      
mukti4 ,and this  priori                
impression--which1 although no doubt    
significant1 could hardly be appealed to
 as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed
 consideration of the two sets of ,stras
 which _/,s_/ankara connects with the   
knowledge of the higher ,brahman4 ,how  
these ,stras are interpreted by         
_/,s_/ankara and ,rmnuja has been stated
 above in the conspectus of contents2   
the points which render the             
interpretation given by ,rmnuja more    
probable are as follows4 ,with regard to
 ,,iv1 #b1 #ab-ad1 we have to note1 in  
the first place1 the                    
circumstance--relevant although not     
decisive in itself--that ,stra #ab does 
not contain any indication of a new     
topic being introduced4 ,in the second  
place1 it can hardly be doubted that the

 text of ,stra #ac1 'spash_/t_/o hy     
ekeshm1' is more appropriately          
understood1 with ,rmnuja1 as furnishing 
a reason for the opinion advanced in the
 preceding ,stra1 than--with            
_/,s_/ankara--as embodying the          
refutation of a previous statement 7in  
which latter case we should expect not  
'hi' but 'tu'74 ,and1 in the third      
place1 the 'eke1' i4e4 'some1' referred 
to in ,stra #ac would1 on _/,s_/ankara's
 interpretation1 denote the very same   
persons to whom the preceding ,stra had 
referred1 viz4 the followers of the     
,k_/n_/va-_/s_/kh 7the two ,vedic       
passages referred to in #ab and #ac     
being ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #e1 and  
,,iii1 #b1 #aa1 according to the        
,k_/n_/va recension72 while it is the   
standing practice of the ,stras to      
introduce1 by means of the designation  
'eke1' members of ,vedic _/s_/khs1      
teachers1 c4 other than those alluded to
 in the preceding ,stras4 ,with this    
practice ,rmnuja's interpretation1 on   

the other hand1 fully agrees2 for1      
according to him1 the 'eke' are the     
,mdhyandinas1 whose reading in ,b_/ri_/4
 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #e1 viz4 'tasmt1'       
clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in   
the corresponding passage of the        
,k_/n_/vas denotes the _/s_/rira1 i4e4  
the jva4 ,i think it is not saying too  
much that _/,s_/ankara's explanation1   
according to which the 'eke' would      
denote the very same ,k_/n_/vas to whom 
the preceding ,stra had referred--so    
that the ,k_/n_/vas would be            
distinguished from themselves as it     
were--is altogether impossible4  ,the   
result of this closer consideration of  
the first set of ,stras1 alleged by     
_/,s_/ankara to concern the owner of the
 higher knowledge of ,brahman1 entitles 
us to view with some distrust           
_/,s_/ankara's assertion that another   
set also--,,iv1 #d1 #a-g--;has to be    
detached from the general topic of the  
fourth adhyya1 and to be understood as  
depicting the condition of those who    

have obtained final absolute release4   
,and the ,stras themselves do not tend  
to weaken this preliminary want of      
confidence4 ,in the first place their   
wording also gives no indication        
whatever of their having to be separated
 from what precedes as well as what     
follows4 ,and1 in the second place1 the 
last ,stra of the set 7#g7 obliges      
_/,s_/ankara to ascribe to his truly    
released souls qualities which clearly  
cannot belong to them2 so that he       
finally is obliged to make the          
extraordinary statement that those      
qualities belong to them                
'vyavahrpekshay1' while yet the purport 
of the whole adhikara_/n_/a is said to  
be the description of the truly released
 soul for which no vyavahra exists6     
,very truly _/,s_/ankara's commentator  
here remarks1 'atra ke_/k_/in muhyanti  
akha_/n_/da_/k_/inmtrajnn muktasyjnbhvt 
kuta j_/_/nika-dharmayoga_/h_/1' and the
 way in which thereupon he himself      
attempts to get over the difficulty     

certainly does not improve matters4  ,in
 connexion with the two passages        
discussed1 we meet in the fourth adhyya 
with another passage1 which indeed has  
no direct bearing on the distinction of 
apar and par vidy1 but may yet be       
shortly referred to in this place as    
another and altogether undoubted        
instance of _/,s_/ankara's              
interpretations not always agreeing with
 the text of the ,stras4 ,the ,stras    
#g-af of the third pda state the        
opinions of three different teachers on 
the question to which ,brahman the soul 
of the vidvn repairs on death1          
or--according to ,rmnuja--the           
worshippers of which ,brahman repair to 
7the highest7 ,brahman4 ,rmnuja treats  
the views of ,bdari and ,jaimini as two 
prvapakshas1 and the opinion of         
,bdarya_/n_/a--which is stated last--as 
the siddhnta4 _/,s_/ankara1 on the other
 hand1 detaching the ,stras in which    
,bdarya_/n_/a's view is set forth from  
the preceding part of the adhikara_/n_/a

 7a proceeding which1 although not      
plausible1 yet cannot be said to be     
altogether illegitimate71 maintains that
 ,bdari's view1 which is expounded      
first1 represents the siddhnta1 while   
,jaimini's view1 set forth subsequently1
 is to be considered a mere prvapaksha4 
,this1 of course1 is altogether         
inadmissible1 it being the invariable   
practice of the ,vednta-stras as well as
 the ,prva ,mm_/m_/s-stras to conclude  
the discussion of contested points with 
the statement of that view which is to  
be accepted as the authoritative one4   
,this is so patent that _/,s_/ankara    
feels himself called upon to defend his 
deviation from the general rule         
7,commentary on ,,iv1 #d1 #ac71 without1
 however1 bringing forward any arguments
 but such as are valid only if          
_/,s_/ankara's system itself is already 
accepted4  ,the previous considerations 
leave us1 ,i am inclined to think1 no   
choice but to side with ,rmnuja as to   
the general subject-matter of the fourth

 adhyya of the ,stras4 ,we need not     
accept him as our guide in all          
particular interpretations1 but we must 
acknowledge with him that the ,stras of 
the fourth adhyya describe the ultimate 
fate of one and the same vidvn1 and do  
not afford any basis for the distinction
 of a higher and lower knowledge of     
,brahman in _/,s_/ankara's sense4  ,if  
we have not to discriminate between a   
lower and a higher knowledge of         
,brahman1 it follows that the           
distinction of a lower and a higher     
,brahman is likewise not valid4 ,but    
this is not a point to be decided at    
once on the negative evidence of the    
fourth adhyya1 but regarding which the  
entire body of the ,vednta-stras has to 
be consulted4 ,and intimately connected 
with this investigation--in fact1 one   
with it from a certain point of view--is
 the question whether the ,stras afford 
any evidence of their author having held
 the doctrine of ,my1 the principle of  
illusion1 by the association with which 

the highest ,brahman1 in itself         
transcending all qualities1 appears as  
the lower ,brahman or _/s_/vara4 ,that  
,rmnuja denies the distinction of the   
two ,brahmans and the doctrine of ,my we
 have seen above2 we shall1 however1 in 
the subsequent investigation1 pay less  
attention to his views and              
interpretations than to the indications 
furnished by the ,stras themselves4     
,placing myself at the point of view of 
a _/,s_/ankara1 ,i am startled at the   
outset by the second ,stra of the first 
adhyya1 which undertakes to give a      
definition of ,brahman4 ',brahman is    
that whence the origination and so on   
7i4e4 the sustentation and reabsorption7
 of this world proceed4' ,what1 we must 
ask1 is this ,stra meant to             
define8--,that ,brahman1 we are inclined
 to answer1 whose cognition the first   
,stra declares to constitute the task of
 the entire ,vednta2 that ,brahman whose
 cognition is the only road to final    
release2 that ,brahman in fact which    

_/,s_/ankara calls the highest4--,but1  
here we must object to ourselves1 the   
highest ,brahman is not properly defined
 as that from which the world           
originates4 ,in later ,vedntic writings1
 whose authors were clearly conscious of
 the distinction of the higher absolute 
,brahman and the lower ,brahman related 
to ,my or the world1 we meet with       
definitions of ,brahman of an altogether
 different type4 ,i need only remind the
 reader of the current definition of    
,brahman as sa_/k_/-_/k_/id-nanda1 or1  
to mention one individual instance1     
refer to the introductory _/s_/lokas of 
the ,pa_/k_/ada_/s_/ dilating on the    
sa_/m_/vid svayam-prabh1 the            
self-luminous principle of thought which
 in all time1 past or future1 neither   
starts into being nor perishes 7,p4,d4  
,i1 #g74 ',that from which the world    
proceeds' can by a _/,s_/ankara be      
accepted only as a definition of        
_/s_/vara1 of ,brahman which by its     
association with ,my is enabled to      

project the false appearance of this    
world1 and it certainly is as improbable
 that the ,stras should open with a     
definition of that inferior principle1  
from whose cognition there can accrue no
 permanent benefit1 as1 according to a  
remark made above1 it is unlikely that  
they should conclude with a description 
of the state of those who know the lower
 ,brahman only1 and thus are debarred   
from obtaining true release4 ,as soon1  
on the other hand1 as we discard the    
idea of a twofold ,brahman and conceive 
,brahman as one only1 as the            
all-enfolding being which sometimes     
emits the world from its own substance  
and sometimes again retracts it into    
itself1 ever remaining one in all its   
various manifestations--a conception    
which need not by any means be modelled 
in all its details on the views of the  
,rmnujas--the definition of ,brahman    
given in the second ,stra becomes       
altogether unobjectionable4  ,we next   
enquire whether the impression left on  

the mind by the manner in which         
,bdarya_/n_/a defines ,brahman1 viz4    
that he does not distinguish between an 
absolute ,brahman and a ,brahman        
associated with ,my1 is confirmed or    
weakened by any other parts of his work4
 ,the ,stras being throughout far from  
direct in their enunciations1 we shall  
have to look less to particular terms   
and turns of expression than to general 
lines of reasoning4 ,what in this       
connexion seems specially worthy of     
being taken into account1 is the style  
of argumentation employed by the        
,strakra against the ,snkhya doctrine1  
which maintains that the world has      
originated1 not from an intelligent     
being1 but from the non-intelligent     
pradhna4 ,the most important ,stras     
relative to this point are to be met    
with in the first pda of the second     
adhyya4 ,those ,stras are indeed almost 
unintelligible if taken by themselves1  
but the unanimity of the commentators as
 to their meaning enables us to use them

 as steps in our investigation4 ,the    
sixth ,stra of the pda mentioned replies
 to the ,snkhya objection that the      
non-intelligent world cannot spring from
 an intelligent principle1 by the remark
 that 'it is thus seen1' i4e4 it is a   
matter of common observation that       
non-intelligent things are produced from
 beings endowed with intelligence2 hair 
and nails1 for instance1 springing from 
animals1 and certain insects from       
dung4--,now1 an argumentation of this   
kind is altogether out of place from the
 point of view of the true _/,s_/nkara4 
,according to the latter the            
non-intelligent world does not spring   
from ,brahman in so far as the latter is
 intelligence1 but in so far as it is   
associated with ,my4 ,my is the updna of
 the material world1 and ,my itself is  
of a non-intelligent nature1 owing to   
which it is by so many ,vedntic writers 
identified with the prak_/ri_/ti of the 
,snkhyas4 ,similarly the illustrative   
instances1 adduced under ,stra #i for   

the purpose of showing that effects when
 being reabsorbed into their causal     
substances do not impart to the latter  
their own qualities1 and that hence the 
material world also1 when being refunded
 into ,brahman1 does not impart to it   
its own imperfections1 are singularly   
inappropriate if viewed in connexion    
with the doctrine of ,my1 according to  
which the material world is no more in  
,brahman at the time of a pralaya than  
during the period of its subsistence4   
,according to _/,s_/nkara the world is  
not merged in ,brahman1 but the special 
forms into which the updna of the world1
 i4e4 ,my1 had modified itself are      
merged in non-distinct ,my1 whose       
relation to ,brahman is not changed     
thereby4--,the illustration1 again1     
given in ,stra #bd of the mode in which 
,brahman1 by means of its inherent      
power1 transforms itself into the world 
without employing any extraneous        
instruments of action1 'kshravad dhi1'  
'as milk 7of its own accord turns into  

curds71' would be strangely chosen      
indeed if meant to bring nearer to our  
understanding the mode in which ,brahman
 projects the illusive appearance of the
 world2 and also the analogous instance 
given in the ,stra next following1 'as  
,gods and the like 7create palaces1     
chariots1 c4 by the mere power of their 
will7'--which refers to the real        
creation of real things--would hardly be
 in its place if meant to illustrate a  
theory which considers unreality to be  
the true character of the world4 ,the   
mere cumulation of the two essentially  
heterogeneous illustrative instances    
7kshravad dhi2 devdivat71 moreover1     
seems to show that the writer who had   
recourse to them held no very definite  
theory as to the particular mode in     
which the world springs from ,brahman1  
but was merely concerned to render      
plausible in some way or other that an  
intelligent being can give rise to what 
is non-intelligent without having       
recourse to any extraneous means4#bc    

,that the ,my doctrine was not present  
to the mind of the ,strakra1 further    
appears from the latter part of the     
fourth pda of the first adhyya1 where it
 is shown that ,brahman is not only the 
operative but also the material cause of
 the world4 ,if anywhere1 there would   
have been the place to indicate1 had    
such been the author's view1 that       
,brahman is the material cause of the   
world through ,my only1 and that the    
world is unreal2 but the ,stras do not  
contain a single word to that effect4   
,stra #bf1 on the other hand1 exhibits  
the significant term 'pari_/n_/mt2'     
,brahman produces the world by means of 
a modification of itself4 ,it is well   
known that later on1 when the           
terminology of the ,vednta became       
definitely settled1 the term            
'pari_/n_/vada' was used to denote that 
very theory to which the followers of   
_/,s_/ankara are most violently opposed1
 viz4 the doctrine according to which   
the world is not a mere vivarta1 i4e4 an

 illusory manifestation of ,brahman1 but
 the effect of ,brahman undergoing a    
real change1 may that change be         
conceived to take place in the way      
taught by ,rmnuja or in some other      
manner4--,with regard to the last-quoted
 ,stra1 as well as to those touched upon
 above1 the commentators indeed maintain
 that whatever terms and modes of       
expression are apparently opposed to the
 vivartavda are in reality reconcilable 
with it2 to ,stra #bf1 for instance1    
,govindnanda remarks that the term      
'pari_/n_/ma' only denotes an effect in 
general 7kryamtra71 without implying    
that the effect is real4 ,but in cases  
of this nature we are fully entitled to 
use our own judgment1 even if we were   
not compelled to do so by the fact that 
other commentators1 such as ,rmnuja1 are
 satisfied to take 'pari_/n_/ma' and    
similar terms in their generally        
received sense4  ,a further section     
treating of the nature of ,brahman is   
met with in ,,iii1 #b1 #aa ff4 ,it is1  

according to _/,s_/ankara's view1 of    
special importance1 as it is alleged to 
set forth that ,brahman is in itself    
destitute of all qualities1 and is      
affected with qualities only through its
 limiting adjuncts 7updhis71 the        
offspring of ,my4 ,i have above 7in the 
conspectus of contents7 given a somewhat
 detailed abstract of the whole section 
as interpreted by _/,s_/ankara on the   
one hand1 and ,rmnuja on the other hand1
 from which it appears that the latter's
 opinion as to the purport of the group 
of ,stras widely diverges from that of  
_/,s_/ankara4 ,the wording of the ,stras
 is so eminently concise and vague that 
,i find it impossible to decide which of
 the two commentators--if indeed        
either--is to be accepted as a          
trustworthy guide2 regarding the sense  
of some ,stras _/,s_/ankara's           
explanation seems to deserve preference1
 in the case of others ,rmnuja seems to 
keep closer to the text4 ,i decidedly   
prefer1 for instance1 ,rmnuja's         

interpretation of ,stra #bb1 as far as  
the sense of the entire ,stra is        
concerned1 and more especially with     
regard to the term                      
'prak_/ri_/taitvattvam1' whose proper   
force is brought out by ,rmnuja's       
explanation only4 ,so much is certain   
that none of the ,stras decidedly       
favours the interpretation proposed by  
_/,s_/ankara4 ,whichever commentator we 
follow1 we greatly miss coherence and   
strictness of reasoning1 and it is thus 
by no means improbable that the section 
is one of those--perhaps not few in     
number--in which both interpreters had  
less regard to the literal sense of the 
words and to tradition than to their    
desire of forcing ,bdarya_/n_/a's ,stras
 to bear testimony to the truth of their
 own philosophic theories4  ,with       
special reference to the ,my doctrine   
one important ,stra has yet to be       
considered1 the only one in which the   
term 'my' itself occurs1 viz4 ,,iii1 #b1
 #c4 ,according to _/,s_/ankara the     

,stra signifies that the environments of
 the dreaming soul are not real but mere
 ,my1 i4e4 unsubstantial illusion1      
because they do not fully manifest the  
character of real objects4 ,rmnuja 7as  
we have seen in the conspectus7 gives a 
different explanation of the term 'my1' 
but in judging of _/,s_/ankara's views  
we may for the time accept              
_/,s_/ankara's own interpretation4 ,now1
 from the latter it clearly follows that
 if the objects seen in dreams are to be
 called ,my1 i4e4 illusion1 because not 
evincing the characteristics of reality1
 the objective world surrounding the    
waking soul must not be called ,my4 ,but
 that the world perceived by waking men 
is ,my1 even in a higher sense than the 
world presented to the dreaming         
consciousness1 is an undoubted tenet of 
the _/,s_/nkara ,vednta2 and the ,stra  
therefore proves either that            
,bdarya_/n_/a did not hold the doctrine 
of the illusory character of the world1 
or else that1 if after all he did hold  

that doctrine1 he used the term 'my' in 
a sense altogether different from that  
in which _/,s_/ankara employs it4--,if1 
on the other hand1 we1 with ,rmnuja1    
understand the word 'my' to denote a    
wonderful thing1 the ,stra of course has
 no bearing whatever on the doctrine of 
,my in its later technical sense4  ,we  
now turn to the question as to the      
relation of the individual soul to      
,brahman4 ,do the ,stras indicate       
anywhere that their author held         
_/,s_/ankara's doctrine1 according to   
which the jva is in reality identical   
with ,brahman1 and separated from it1 as
 it were1 only by a false surmise due to
 avidy1 or do they rather favour the    
view that the souls1 although they have 
sprung from ,brahman1 and constitute    
elements of its nature1 yet enjoy a kind
 of individual existence apart from it8 
,this question is in fact only another  
aspect of the ,my question1 but yet     
requires a short separate treatment4    
,in the conspectus ,i have given it as  

my opinion that the ,stras in which the 
size of the individual soul is discussed
 can hardly be understood in            
_/,s_/ankara's sense1 and rather seem to
 favour the opinion1 held among others  
by ,rmnuja1 that the soul is of minute  
size4 ,we have further seen that ,stra  
#ah of the third pda of the second      
adhyya1 which describes the soul as     
'j_/_/a1' is more appropriately         
understood in the sense assigned to it  
by ,rmnuja2 and1 again1 that the ,stras 
which treat of the soul being an agent1 
can be reconciled with _/,s_/ankara's   
views only if supplemented in a way     
which their text does not appear to     
authorise4--,we next have the important 
,stra ,,ii1 #c1 #dc in which the soul is
 distinctly said to be a part 7a_/ms_/a7
 of ,brahman1 and which1 as we have     
already noticed1 can be made to fall in 
with _/,s_/ankara's views only if       
a_/ms_/a is explained1 altogether       
arbitrarily1 by 'a_/ms_/a iva1' while   
,rmnuja is able to take the ,stra as it 

stands4--,we also have already referred 
to ,stra #ej1 'bhsa eva _/k_/a1' which  
_/,s_/ankara interprets as setting forth
 the so-called pratibimbavda according  
to which the individual ,self is merely 
a reflection of the highest ,self4 ,but 
almost every ,stra--and ,stra #ej forms 
no exception--being so obscurely        
expressed1 that viewed by itself it     
admits of various1 often totally        
opposed1 interpretations1 the only safe 
method is to keep in view1 in the case  
of each ambiguous aphorism1 the general 
drift and spirit of the whole work1 and 
that1 as we have seen hitherto1 is by no
 means favourable to the pratibimba     
doctrine4 ,how indeed could ,stra #ej1  
if setting forth that latter doctrine1  
be reconciled with ,stra #dc1 which says
 distinctly that the soul is a part of  
,brahman8 ,for that #dc contains1 as    
_/,s_/ankara and his commentators aver1 
a statement of the ava_/kkh_/edavda1 can
 itself be accepted only if we interpret
 a_/ms_/a by a_/ms_/a iva1 and to do so 

there is really no valid reason         
whatever4 ,i confess that ,rmnuja's     
interpretation of the ,stra 7which      
however is accepted by several other    
commentators also7 does not appear to me
 particularly convincing2 and the ,stras
 unfortunately offer us no other        
passages on the ground of which we might
 settle the meaning to be ascribed to   
the term bhsa1 which may mean           
'reflection1' but may mean hetvbhsa1    
i4e4 fallacious argument1 as well4 ,but 
as things stand1 this one ,stra cannot1 
at any rate1 be appealed to as proving  
that the pratibimbavda which1 in its    
turn1 presupposes the myvda1 is the     
teaching of the ,stras4  ,to the        
conclusion that the ,strakra did not    
hold the doctrine of the absolute       
identity of the highest and the         
individual soul in the sense of         
_/,s_/ankara1 we are further led by some
 other indications to be met with here  
and there in the ,stras4 ,in the        
conspectus of contents we have had      

occasion to direct attention to the     
important ,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #bb1 which    
distinctly enunciates that the ,lord is 
adhika1 i4e4 additional to1 or different
 from1 the individual soul1 since       
,scripture declares the two to be       
different4 ,analogously ,i1 #b1 #bj lays
 stress on the fact that the _/s_/rra is
 not the antarymin1 because the         
,mdhyandinas1 as well as the ,k_/n_/vas1
 speak of him in their texts as         
different 7bhedena enam adhyate71 and in
 #bb the _/s_/rra and the pradhna are   
referred to as the two 'others' 7itarau7
 of whom the text predicates distinctive
 attributes separating them from the    
highest ,lord4 ,the word 'itara' 7the   
other one7 appears in several other     
passages 7,i1 #a1 #af2 ,i1 #c1 #af2     
,,ii1 #a1 #ba7 as a kind of technical   
term denoting the individual soul in    
contradistinction from the ,lord4 ,the  
_/,s_/nkaras indeed maintain that all   
those passages refer to an unreal       
distinction due to avidy4 ,but this is  

just what we should like to see proved1 
and the proof offered in no case amounts
 to more than a reference to the system 
which demands that the ,stras should be 
thus understood4 ,if we accept the      
interpretations of the school of        
_/,s_/ankara1 it remains altogether     
unintelligible why the ,strakra should  
never hint even at what _/,s_/ankara is 
anxious again and again to point out at 
length1 viz4 that the greater part of   
the work contains a kind of exoteric    
doctrine only1 ever tending to mislead  
the student who does not keep in view   
what its nature is4 ,if other reasons   
should make it probable that the        
,strakra was anxious to hide the true   
doctrine of the ,upanishads as a sort of
 esoteric teaching1 we might be more    
ready to accept _/,s_/ankara's mode of  
interpretation4 ,but no such reasons are
 forthcoming2 nowhere among the avowed  
followers of the _/,s_/ankara system is 
there any tendency to treat the kernel  
of their philosophy as something to be  

jealously guarded and hidden4 ,on the   
contrary1 they all1 from ,gau_/d_/apda  
down to the most modern writer1 consider
 it their most important1 nay1 only task
 to inculcate again and again in the    
clearest and most unambiguous language  
that all appearance of multiplicity is a
 vain illusion1 that the ,lord and the  
individual souls are in reality one1 and
 that all knowledge but this one        
knowledge is without true value4  ,there
 remains one more important passage     
concerning the relation of the          
individual soul to the highest ,self1 a 
passage which attracted our attention   
above1 when we were reviewing the       
evidence for early divergence of opinion
 among the teachers of the ,vednta4 ,i  
mean ,i1 #d1 #bj-bb1 which three ,stras 
state the views of _/s_/marathya1       
,au_/d_/ulomi1 and ,k_/s_/akr_/ri_/tsna 
as to the reason why1 in a certain      
passage of the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka1  
characteristics of the individual soul  
are ascribed to the highest ,self4 ,the 

siddhnta view is enounced in ,stra #bb1 
'avasthiter iti                         
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna_/h_/' i4e4          
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna 7accounts for the   
circumstance mentioned7 on the ground of
 the 'permanent abiding or abode4' ,by  
this 'permanent abiding' _/,s_/ankara   
understands the ,lord's abiding as1 i4e4
 existing as--or in the condition       
of--the individual soul1 and thus sees  
in the ,stra an enunciation of his own  
view that the individual soul is nothing
 but the highest ,self1                 
'avik_/ri_/ta_/h_/ parame_/s_/varo jvo  
nnya_/h_/4' ,rmnuja on the other hand1  
likewise accepting ,k_/saak_/ri_/tsna's 
opinion as the siddhnta view1 explains  
'avasthiti' as the ,lord's permanent    
abiding within the individual soul1 as  
described in the                        
antarymin-brhma_/n_/a4--,we can hardly  
maintain that the term 'avasthiti'      
cannot have the meaning ascribed to it  
by ,sa_/n_/kara1 viz4 special state or  
condition1 but so much must be urged in 

favour of ,rmnuja's interpretation that 
in the five other places where avasthiti
 7or anavasthiti7 is met with in the    
,stras 7,i1 #b1 #ag2 ,,ii1 #b1 #d2 ,,ii1
 #b1 #ac2 ,,ii1 #c1 #bd2 ,,iii1 #c1 #cb7
 it regularly means permanent abiding or
 permanent abode within something4  ,if1
 now1 ,i am shortly to sum up the       
results of the preceding enquiry as to  
the teaching of the ,stras1 ,i must give
 it as my opinion that they do not set  
forth the distinction of a higher and   
lower knowledge of ,brahman2 that they  
do not acknowledge the distinction of   
,brahman and _/s_/vara in _/,s_/ankara's
 sense2 that they do not hold the       
doctrine of the unreality of the world2 
and that they do not1 with _/,s_/ankara1
 proclaim the absolute identity of the  
individual and the highest ,self4 ,i do 
not wish to advance for the present     
beyond these negative results4 ,upon    
,rmnuja's mode of                       
interpretation--although ,i accept it   
without reserve in some important       

details--,i look on the whole as more   
useful in providing us with a powerful  
means of criticising _/,s_/ankara's     
explanations than in guiding us         
throughout to the right understanding of
 the text4 ,the author of the ,stras may
 have held views about the nature of    
,brahman1 the world1 and the soul       
differing from those of _/,s_/ankara1   
and yet not agreeing in all points with 
those of ,rmnuja4 ,if1 however1 the     
negative conclusions stated above should
 be well founded1 it would follow even  
from them that the system of            
,bdarya_/n_/a had greater affinities    
with that of the ,bhgavatas and ,rmanuja
 than with the one of which the         
_/,s_/ankara-bhshya is the classical    
exponent4  ,it appears from the above   
review of the teaching of the ,stras    
that only a comparatively very small    
proportion of them contribute matter    
enabling us to form a judgment as to the
 nature of the philosophical doctrine   
advocated by ,bdarya_/n_/a4 ,the reason 

of this is that the greater part of the 
work is taken up with matters which1    
according to _/,s_/ankara's terminology1
 form part of the so-called lower       
knowledge1 and throw no light upon      
philosophical questions in the stricter 
sense of the word4 ,this circumstance is
 not without significance4 ,in later    
works belonging to _/,s_/ankara's school
 in which the distinction of a higher   
and lower vidy is clearly recognised1   
the topics constituting the latter are  
treated with great shortness2 and       
rightly so1 for they are unable to      
accomplish the highest aim of man1 i4e4 
final release4 ,when we therefore1 on   
the other hand1 find that the subjects  
of the so-called lower vidy are treated 
very fully in the ,vednta-stras1 when we
 observe1 for instance1 the almost      
tedious length to which the             
investigation of the unity of vidys     
7most of which are so-called sagu_/n_/a1
 i4e4 lower vidys7 is carried in the    
third adhyya1 or the fact of almost the 

whole fourth adhyya being devoted to the
 ultimate fate of the possessor of the  
lower vidy2 we certainly feel ourselves 
confirmed in our conclusion that what   
_/,s_/ankara looked upon as             
comparatively unimportant formed in     
,bdarya_/n_/a's opinion part of that    
knowledge higher than which there is    
none1 and which therefore is entitled to
 the fullest and most detailed          
exposition4  ,the question as to what   
kind of system is represented by the    
,vednta-stras may be approached in      
another way also4 ,while hitherto we    
have attempted to penetrate to the      
meaning of the ,stras by means of the   
different commentaries1 we might try the
 opposite road1 and1 in the first place1
 attempt to ascertain independently of  
the ,stras what doctrine is set forth in
 the ,upanishads1 whose teaching the    
,stras doubtless aim at systematising4  
,if1 it might be urged1 the ,upanishads 
can be convincingly shown to embody a   
certain settled doctrine1 we must       

consider it at the least highly probable
 that that very same doctrine--of       
whatever special nature it may be--is   
hidden in the enigmatical aphorisms of  
,bdarya_/n_/a4#bd  ,i do not1 however1  
consider this line of argumentation a   
safe one4 ,even if it could be shown    
that the teaching of all the chief      
,upanishads agrees in all essential     
points 7a subject to which some         
attention will be paid later on71 we    
should not on that account be entitled  
unhesitatingly to assume that the ,stras
 set forth the same doctrine4 ,whatever 
the true philosophy of the ,upanishads  
may be1 there remains the undeniable    
fact that there exist and have existed  
since very ancient times not one but    
several essentially differing systems1  
all of which lay claim to the           
distinction of being the true           
representatives of the teaching of the  
,upanishads as well as of the ,stras4   
,let us suppose1 for argument's sake1   
that1 for instance1 the doctrine of ,my 

is distinctly enunciated in the         
,upanishads2 nevertheless ,rmnuja and1  
for all we know to the contrary1 the    
whole series of more ancient            
commentators on whom he looked as       
authorities in the interpretation of the
 ,stras1 denied that the ,upanishads    
teach ,my1 and it is hence by no means  
impossible that ,bdarya_/n_/a should    
have done the same4 ,the  priori style  
of reasoning as to the teaching of the  
,stras is therefore without much force4 
,but apart from any intention of        
arriving thereby at the meaning of the  
,stras there1 of course1 remains for us 
the all-important question as to the    
true teaching of the ,upanishads1 a     
question which a translator of the      
,stras and _/,s_/ankara cannot afford to
 pass over in silence1 especially after 
reason has been shown for the conclusion
 that the ,stras and the                
_/,s_/ankara-bhshya do not agree        
concerning most important points of     
,vedntic doctrine4 ,the ,stras as well  

as the later commentaries claim1 in the 
first place1 to be nothing more than    
systematisations of the ,upanishads1 and
 for us a considerable part at least of 
their value and interest lies in this   
their nature4 ,hence the further        
question presents itself by whom the    
teaching of the ,upanishads has been    
most adequately systematised1 whether by
 ,bdarya_/n_/a1 or _/,s_/ankara1 or     
,rmnuja1 or some other commentator4     
,this question requires to be kept      
altogether separate from the enquiry as 
to which commentator most faithfully    
renders the contents of the ,stras1 and 
it is by no means impossible that       
_/,s_/ankara1 for instance1 should in   
the end have to be declared a more      
trustworthy guide with regard to the    
teaching of the ,upanishads than        
concerning the meaning of the ,stras4   
,we must remark here at once that1      
whatever commentator may be found to    
deserve preference on the whole1 it     
appears fairly certain already at the   

outset that none of the systems which   
,indian ingenuity has succeeded in      
erecting on the basis of the ,upanishads
 can be accepted in its entirety4 ,the  
reason for this lies in the nature of   
the ,upanishads themselves4 ,to the     
,hindu commentator and philosopher the  
,upanishads came down as a body of      
revealed truth whose teaching had1      
somehow or other1 to be shown to be     
thoroughly consistent and free from     
contradictions2 a system had to be      
devised in which a suitable place could 
be allotted to every one of the         
multitudinous statements which they make
 on the various points of ,vedntic      
doctrine4 ,but to the ,european scholar1
 or in fact to any one whose mind is not
 bound by the doctrine of _/,s_/ruti1 it
 will certainly appear that all such    
attempts stand self-condemned4 ,if      
anything is evident even on a cursory   
review of the ,upanishads--and the      
impression so created is only           
strengthened by a more careful          

investigation--it is that they do not   
constitute a systematic whole4 ,they    
themselves1 especially the older ones1  
give the most unmistakable indications  
on that point4 ,not only are the        
doctrines expounded in the different    
,upanishads ascribed to different       
teachers1 but even the separate sections
 of one and the same ,upanishad are     
assigned to different authorities4 ,it  
would be superfluous to quote examples  
of what a mere look at the ,chndogya    
,upanishad1 for instance1 suffices to   
prove4 ,it is of course not impossible  
that even a multitude of teachers should
 agree in imparting precisely the same  
doctrine2 but in the case of the        
,upanishads that is certainly not       
antecedently probable4 ,for1 in the     
first place1 the teachers who are       
credited with the doctrines of the      
,upanishads manifestly belonged to      
different sections of ,brahminical      
society1 to different ,vedic _/s_/khs2  
nay1 some of them the tradition makes   

out to have been kshattriyas4 ,and1 in  
the second place1 the period1 whose     
mental activity is represented in the   
,upanishads1 was a creative one1 and as 
such cannot be judged according to the  
analogy of later periods of ,indian     
philosophic development4 ,the later     
philosophic schools as1 for instance1   
the one of which _/,s_/ankara is the    
great representative1 were no longer    
free in their speculations1 but strictly
 bound by a traditional body of texts   
considered sacred1 which could not be   
changed or added to1 but merely         
systematised and commented upon4 ,hence 
the rigorous uniformity of doctrine     
characteristic of those schools4 ,but   
there had been a time when1 what later  
writers received as a sacred legacy1    
determining and confining the whole     
course of their speculations1 first     
sprang from the minds of creative       
thinkers not fettered by the tradition  
of any school1 but freely following the 
promptings of their own heads and       

hearts4 ,by the absence of school       
traditions1 ,i do not indeed mean that  
the great teachers who appear in the    
,upanishads were free to make an        
entirely new start1 and to assign to    
their speculations any direction they   
chose2 for nothing can be more certain  
than that1 at the period as the outcome 
of whose philosophical activity the     
,upanishads have to be considered1 there
 were in circulation certain broad      
speculative ideas overshadowing the mind
 of every member of ,brahminical        
society4 ,but those ideas were neither  
very definite nor worked out in detail1 
and hence allowed themselves to be      
handled and fashioned in different ways 
by different individuals4 ,with whom the
 few leading conceptions traceable in   
the teaching of all ,upanishads first   
originated1 is a point on which those   
writings themselves do not enlighten us1
 and which we have no other means for   
settling2 most probably they are to be  
viewed not as the creation of any       

individual mind1 but as the gradual     
outcome of speculations carried on by   
generations of ,vedic theologians4 ,in  
the ,upanishads themselves1 at any rate1
 they appear as floating mental         
possessions which may be seized and     
moulded into new forms by any one who   
feels within himself the required       
inspiration4 ,a certain vague knowledge 
of ,brahman1 the great hidden being in  
which all this manifold world is one1   
seems to be spread everywhere1 and often
 issues from the most unexpected        
sources4 _/,s_/vetaketu receives        
instruction from his father ,uddlaka2   
the proud ,grgya has to become the pupil
 of ,ajta_/s_/atru1 the king of ,k_/s_/2
 ,bhujyu ,shyyani receives answers to   
his questions from a ,gandharva         
possessing a maiden2 ,satyakma learns   
what ,brahman is from the bull of the   
herd he is tending1 from ,agni and from 
a flamingo2 and ,upako_/s_/ala is taught
 by the sacred fires in his teacher's   
house4 ,all this is of course legend1   

not history2 but the fact that the      
philosophic and theological doctrines of
 the ,upanishads are clothed in this    
legendary garb certainly does not       
strengthen the expectation of finding in
 them a rigidly systematic doctrine4    
,and a closer investigation of the      
contents of the ,upanishads amply       
confirms this preliminary impression4   
,if we avail ourselves1 for instance1 of
 ,m4 ,paul ,rgnaud's ,matriaux pour     
servir  l',histoire de la ,philosophie  
de l',inde1 in which the philosophical  
lucubrations of the different           
,upanishads are arranged systematically 
according to topics1 we can see with    
ease how1 together with a certain       
uniformity of general leading           
conceptions1 there runs throughout      
divergence in details1 and very often   
not unimportant details4 ,a look1 for   
instance1 at the collection of passages 
relative to the origination of the world
 from the primitive being1 suffices to  
show that the task of demonstrating that

 whatever the ,upanishads teach on that 
point can be made to fit into a         
homogeneous system is an altogether     
hopeless one4 ,the accounts there given 
of the creation belong1 beyond all doubt
 to different stages of philosophic and 
theological development or else to      
different sections of priestly society4 
,none but an ,indian commentator would1 
,i suppose1 be inclined and sufficiently
 courageous to attempt the proof that1  
for instance1 the legend of the tman    
purushavidha1 the ,self in the shape of 
a person which is as large as man and   
woman together1 and then splits itself  
into two halves from which cows1 horses1
 asses1 goats1 c4 are produced in       
succession 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #d71 
can be reconciled with the account given
 of the creation in the ,chndogya       
,upanishad1 where it is said that in the
 beginning there existed nothing but the
 sat1 'that which is1' and that feeling 
a desire of being many it emitted out of
 itself ether1 and then all the other   

elements in due succession4 ,the former 
is a primitive cosmogonic myth1 which in
 its details shows striking analogies   
with the cosmogonic myths of other      
nations2 the latter account is fairly   
developed ,vednta 7although not ,vednta 
implying the ,my doctrine74 ,we may     
admit that both accounts show a certain 
fundamental similarity in so far as they
 derive the manifold world from one     
original being2 but to go beyond this   
and to maintain1 as _/,s_/ankara does1  
that the tman purushavidha of the       
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka is the so-called 
,virg of the latter ,vednta--implying   
thereby that that section consciously   
aims at describing only the activity of 
one special form of _/s_/vara1 and not  
simply the whole process of creation--is
 the ingenious shift of an orthodox     
commentator in difficulties1 but nothing
 more4  ,how all those more or less     
conflicting texts came to be preserved  
and handed down to posterity1 is not    
difficult to understand4 ,as mentioned  

above1 each of the great sections of    
,brahminical priesthood had its own     
sacred texts1 and again in each of those
 sections there existed more ancient    
texts which it was impossible to discard
 when deeper and more advanced          
speculations began in their turn to be  
embodied in literary compositions1 which
 in the course of time likewise came to 
be looked upon as sacred4 ,when the     
creative period had reached its         
termination1 and the task of collecting 
and arranging was taken in hand1 older  
and newer pieces were combined into     
wholes1 and thus there arose collections
 of such heterogeneous character as the 
,chndogya and ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka    
,upanishads4 ,on later generations1 to  
which the whole body of texts came down 
as revealed truth1 there consequently   
devolved the inevitable task of         
establishing systems on which no        
exception could be taken to any of the  
texts2 but that the task was1 strictly  
speaking1 an impossible one1 i4e4 one   

which it was impossible to accomplish   
fairly and honestly1 there really is no 
reason to deny4  ,for a comprehensive   
criticism of the methods which the      
different commentators employ in        
systematizing the contents of the       
,upanishads there is no room in this    
place4 ,in order1 however1 to illustrate
 what is meant by the 'impossibility1'  
above alluded to1 of combining the      
various doctrines of the ,upanishads    
into a whole without doing violence to a
 certain number of texts1 it will be as 
well to analyse in detail some few at   
least of _/,s_/ankara's interpretations1
 and to render clear the considerations 
by which he is guided4  ,we begin with a
 case which has already engaged our     
attention when discussing the meaning of
 the ,stras1 viz4 the question          
concerning the ultimate fate of those   
who have attained the knowledge of      
,brahman4 ,as we have seen1 _/,s_/ankara
 teaches that the soul of him who has   
risen to an insight into the nature of  

the higher ,brahman does not1 at the    
moment of death1 pass out of the body1  
but is directly merged in ,brahman by a 
process from which all departing and    
moving1 in fact all considerations of   
space1 are altogether excluded4 ,the    
soul of him1 on the other hand1 who has 
not risen above the knowledge of the    
lower qualified ,brahman departs from   
the body by means of the artery called  
sushum_/n_/1 and following the so-called
 devayna1 the path of the gods1 mounts  
up to the world of ,brahman4 ,a review  
of the chief ,upanishad texts on which  
_/,s_/ankara founds this distinction    
will show how far it is justified4  ,in 
a considerable number of passages the   
,upanishads contrast the fate of two    
classes of men1 viz4 of those who       
perform sacrifices and meritorious works
 only1 and of those who in addition     
possess a certain kind of knowledge4    
,men of the former kind ascend after    
death to the moon1 where they live for a
 certain time1 and then return to the   

earth into new forms of embodiment2     
persons of the latter kind proceed on   
the path of the gods--on which the sun  
forms one stage--up to the world of     
,brahman1 from which there is no return4
 ,the chief passages to that effect are 
,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj2 ,kaush4 ,up4 ,i1 #b  
ff42 ,mu_/nd_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #i ff42    
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #ae ff42       
,pra_/s_/na ,up4 ,i1 #i ff4--,in other  
passages only the latter of the two     
paths is referred to1 cp4 ,ch4 ,up4     
,,iv1 #ae2 ,,viii #f1 #e2 ,taitt4 ,up4  
,i1 #f2 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #h1 #i2
 ,v1 #aj2 ,maitr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #cj1 to    
mention only the more important ones4   
,now an impartial consideration of those
 passages shows ,i think1 beyond any    
doubt1 that what is meant there by the  
knowledge which leads through the sun to
 the world of ,brahman is the highest   
knowledge of which the devotee is       
capable1 and that the world of ,brahman 
to which his knowledge enables him to   
proceed denotes the highest state which 

he can ever reach1 the state of final   
release1 if we choose to call it by that
 name4--,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj says1 ',those 
who know this 7viz4 the doctrine of the 
five fires71 and those who in the forest
 follow faith and austerities go to     
light1' c4--,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae is      
manifestly intended to convey the true  
knowledge of ,brahman2 ,upako_/s_/ala's 
teacher himself represents the          
instruction given by him as superior to 
the teaching of the sacred fires4--,ch4 
,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #e quotes the old      
_/s_/loka which says that the man moving
 upwards by the artery penetrating the  
crown of the head reaches the           
,immortal4--,kaush4 ,up4 ,i1 #b--which  
gives the most detailed account of the  
ascent of the soul--contains no         
intimation whatever of the knowledge of 
,brahman1 which leads up to the ,brahman
 world1 being of an inferior            
nature4--,mu_/nd_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #i     
agrees with the ,chndogya in saying that
 ',those who practise penance and faith 

in the forest1 tranquil1 wise1 and      
living on alms1 depart free from        
passion1 through the sun1 to where that 
immortal ,person dwells whose nature is 
imperishable1' and nothing whatever in  
the context countenances the assumption 
that not the highest knowledge and the  
highest ,person are there referred      
to4--,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #h quotes 
old _/s_/lokas clearly referring to the 
road of the gods 7'the small old path'71
 on which 'sages who know ,brahman move 
on to the svargaloka and thence higher  
on as entirely free4--,that path was    
found by ,brahman1 and on it goes       
whoever knows ,brahman4'--,b_/ri_/4 ,up4
 ,,vi1 #b1 #ae is another version of the
 ,pa_/k_/gnividy1 with the variation1   
',those who know this1 and those who in 
the forest worship faith and the ,true1 
go to light1' c4--,pra_/s_/na ,up4 #a1  
#aj says1 ',those who have sought the   
,self by penance1 abstinence1 faith1 and
 knowledge gain by the northern path    
ditya1 the sun4 ,there is the home of   

the spirits1 the immortal free from     
danger1 the highest4 ,from thence they  
do not return1 for it is the            
end4'--,maitr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #cj quotes    
_/s_/lokas1 ',one of them 7the arteries7
 leads upwards1 piercing the solar orb3 
by it1 having stepped beyond the world  
of ,brahman1 they go to the highest     
path4'  ,all these passages are as clear
 as can be desired4 ,the soul of the    
sage who knows ,brahman passes out by   
the sushum_/n_/1 and ascends by the path
 of the gods to the world of ,brahman1  
there to remain for ever in some        
blissful state4 ,but1 according to      
_/,s_/ankara1 all these texts are meant 
to set forth the result of a certain    
inferior knowledge only1 of the         
knowledge of the conditioned ,brahman4  
,even in a passage apparently so        
entirely incapable of more than one     
interpretation as ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,vi1  
#b1 #ae1 the ',true1' which the holy    
hermits in the forest are said to       
worship1 is not to be the highest       

,brahman1 but only                      
,hira_/n_/yagarbha6--,and why8--,only   
because the system so demands it1 the   
system which teaches that those who know
 the highest ,brahman become on their   
death one with it1 without having to    
resort to any other place4 ,the passage 
on which this latter tenet is chiefly   
based is ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #f1   
#g1 where1 with the fate of him who at  
his death has desires1 and whose soul   
therefore enters a new body after having
 departed from the old one1 accompanied 
by all the pr_/n_/as1 there is          
contrasted the fate of the sage free    
from all desires4 ',but as to the man   
who does not desire1 who not desiring1  
freed from desires is satisfied in his  
desires1 or desires the ,self only1 the 
vital spirits of him 7tasya7 do not     
depart--being ,brahman he goes to       
,brahman4'  ,we have seen above 7p4     
lxxx7 that this passage is referred to  
in the important ,stras on whose right  
interpretation it1 in the first place1  

depends whether or not we must admit the
 ,strakra to have acknowledged the      
distinction of a par and an apar vidy4  
,here the passage interests us as       
throwing light on the way in which      
_/,s_/ankara systematises4 ,he looks on 
the preceding part of the chapter as    
describing what happens to the souls of 
all those who do not know the highest   
,brahman1 inclusive of those who know   
the lower ,brahman only4 ,they pass out 
of the old bodies followed by all       
pr_/n_/as and enter new bodies4 ,he1 on 
the other hand1 section #f continues1   
who knows the true ,brahman1 does not   
pass out of the body1 but becomes one   
with ,brahman then and there4 ,this     
interpretation of the purport of the    
entire chapter is not impossibly right1 
although ,i am rather inclined to think 
that the chapter aims at setting forth  
in its earlier part the future of him   
who does not know ,brahman at all1 while
 the latter part of section #f passes on
 to him who does know ,brahman 7i4e4    

,brahman pure and simple1 the text      
knowing of no distinction of the        
so-called lower and higher ,brahman74   
,in explaining section #f _/,s_/ankara  
lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya   
pr_/n_/a utkrmanti1' 'his vital spirits 
do not pass out1' taking this to signify
 that the soul with the vital spirits   
does not move at all1 and thus does not 
ascend to the world of ,brahman2 while  
the purport of the clause may simply be 
that the soul and vital spirits do not  
go anywhere else1 i4e4 do not enter a   
new body1 but are united1 somehow or    
other1 with ,brahman4 ,on _/,s_/ankara's
 interpretation there immediately arises
 a new difficulty4 ,in the _/s_/lokas1  
quoted under sections #h and #i1 the    
description of the small old path which 
leads to the svargaloka and higher on   
clearly refers--as noticed already      
above--to the path through the veins1   
primarily the sushum_/n_/1 on which1    
according to so many other passages1 the
 soul of the wise mounts upwards4 ,but  

that path is1 according to _/,s_/ankara1
 followed by him only who has not risen 
above the lower knowledge1 and yet the  
_/s_/lokas have manifestly to be        
connected with what is said in the      
latter half of #f about the owner of the
 par vidy4 ,hence _/,s_/ankara sees     
himself driven to explain the _/s_/lokas
 in #h and #i 7of which a faithful      
translation is given in ,professor ,max 
,mller's version7 as follows3  #h4 ',the
 subtle old path 7i4e4 the path of      
knowledge on which final release is     
reached2 which path is subtle1 i4e4     
difficult to know1 and old1 i4e4 to be  
known from the eternal ,veda7 has been  
obtained and fully reached by me4 ,on it
 the sages who know ,brahman reach final
 release 7svargaloka_/s_/abda_/h_/      
samnihitaprakara_/n_/t                  
mokshbhidhyaka_/h_/74  #i4 ',on that    
path they say that there is white or    
blue or yellow or green or red 7i4e4    
others maintain that the path to final  
release is1 in accordance with the      

colour of the arteries1 either white or 
blue1 c42 but that is false1 for the    
paths through the arteries lead at the  
best to the world of ,brahman1 which    
itself forms part of the sa_/m_/sra72   
that path 7i4e4 the only path to        
release1 viz4 the path of true          
knowledge7 is found by ,brahman1 i4e4 by
 such ,brhma_/n_/as as through true     
knowledge have become like ,brahman1' c4
  ,a significant instance in truth of   
the straits to which thorough-going     
systematisers of the ,upanishads see    
themselves reduced occasionally6  ,but  
we return to the point which just now   
chiefly interests us4 ,whether          
_/,s_/ankara's interpretation of the    
chapter1 and especially of section #f1  
be right or wrong1 so much is certain   
that we are not entitled to view all    
those texts which speak of the soul     
going to the world of ,brahman as       
belonging to the so-called lower        
knowledge1 because a few other passages 
declare that the sage does not go to    

,brahman4 ,the text which declares the  
sage free from desires to become one    
with ,brahman could not1 without due    
discrimination1 be used to define and   
limit the meaning of other passages met 
with in the same ,upanishad even--for as
 we have remarked above the             
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka contains pieces  
manifestly belonging to different stages
 of development2--much less does it     
entitle us to put arbitrary             
constructions on passages forming part  
of other ,upanishads4 ,historically the 
disagreement of the various accounts is 
easy to understand4 ,the older notion   
was that the soul of the wise man       
proceeds along the path of the gods to  
,brahman's abode4 ,a later--and1 if we  
like1 more philosophic--conception is   
that1 as ,brahman already is a man's    
,self1 there is no need of any motion on
 man's part to reach ,brahman4 ,we may  
even apply to those two views the terms 
apar and par--lower and                 
higher--knowledge4 ,but we must not     

allow any commentator to induce us to   
believe that what he from his advanced  
standpoint looks upon as an inferior    
kind of cognition1 was viewed in the    
same light by the authors of the        
,upanishads4  ,we turn to another       
,upanishad text likewise touching upon  
the point considered in what precedes1  
viz4 the second ,brhma_/n_/a of the     
third adhyya of the                     
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka4 ,the discussion 
there first turns upon the grahas and   
atigrahas1 i4e4 the senses and organs   
and their objects1 and ,yjavalkya       
thereupon explains that death1 by which 
everything is overcome1 is itself       
overcome by water2 for death is fire4   
,the colloquy then turns to what we must
 consider an altogether new topic1      
rtabhga asking1 ',when this man 7ayam   
purusha7 dies1 do the vital spirits     
depart from him or not8' and ,yjavalkya 
answering1 ',no1 they are gathered up in
 him2 he swells1 he is inflated2        
inflated the dead 7body7 is             

lying4'--,now this is for _/,s_/ankara  
an important passage1 as we have already
 seen above 7p4 lxxxi72 for he employs  
it1 in his comment on ,ved4-stra ,,iv1  
#b1 #ac1 for the purpose of proving that
 the passage ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #f
 really means that the vital spirits do 
not1 at the moment of death1 depart from
 the true sage4 ,hence the present      
passage also must refer to him who      
possesses the highest knowledge2 hence  
the 'ayam purusha' must be 'that man1'  
i4e4 the man who possesses the highest  
knowledge1 and the highest knowledge    
then must be found in the preceding     
clause which says that death itself may 
be conquered by water4 ,but1 as ,rmnuja 
also remarks1 neither does the context  
favour the assumption that the highest  
knowledge is referred to1 nor do the    
words of section #aa contain any        
indication that what is meant is the    
merging of the ,self of the true ,sage  
in ,brahman4 ,with the interpretation   
given by ,rmnuja himself1 viz4 that the 

pr_/n_/as do not depart from the jva of 
the dying man1 but accompany it into a  
new body1 ,i can agree as little        
7although he no doubt rightly explains  
the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general71
 and am unable to see in the passage    
anything more than a crude attempt to   
account for the fact that a dead body   
appears swollen and inflated4--,a little
 further on 7section #ac7 rtabhga asks  
what becomes of this man 7ayam purusha7 
when his speech has entered into the    
fire1 his breath into the air1 his eye  
into the sun1 c4 ,so much here is clear 
that we have no right to understand by  
the 'ayam purusha' of section #ac       
anybody different from the 'ayam        
purusha' of the two preceding sections2 
in spite of this _/,s_/ankara--according
 to whose system the organs of the true 
sage do not enter into the elements1 but
 are directly merged in                 
,brahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of
 section #ac to be the                  
'asa_/m_/yagdar_/s_/in1' i4e4 the person

 who has not risen to the cognition of  
the highest ,brahman4 ,and still a      
further limiting interpretation is      
required by the system4 ,the            
asa_/m_/yagdar_/s_/in also--who as such 
has to remain in the sa_/m_/sra--cannot 
do without the organs1 since his jva    
when passing out of the old body into a 
new one is invested with the subtle     
body2 hence section #ac cannot be taken 
as saying what it clearly does say1 viz4
 that at death the different organs pass
 into the different elements1 but as    
merely indicating that the organs are   
abandoned by the divinities which1      
during lifetime1 presided over them6    
,the whole third adhyya indeed of the   
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka affords ample    
proof of the artificial character of    
_/,s_/ankara's attempts to show that the
 teaching of the ,upanishads follows a  
definite system4 ,the eighth            
brhma_/n_/a1 for instance1 is said to   
convey the doctrine of the highest      
non-related ,brahman1 while the         

preceding brhma_/n_/as had treated only 
of _/s_/vara in his various aspects4    
,but1 as a matter of fact1 brhma_/n_/a  
#h1 after having1 in section #h1        
represented ,brahman as destitute of all
 qualities1 proceeds1 in the next       
section1 to describe that very same     
,brahman as the ruler of the world1 ',by
 the command of that ,imperishable sun  
and moon stand apart1' c42 a clear      
indication that the author of the       
,upanishad does not distinguish a higher
 and lower ,brahman in--_/,s_/ankara's  
sense4--,the preceding brhma_/n_/a 7#g7 
treats of the antarymin1 i4e4 ,brahman  
viewed as the internal ruler of         
everything4 ,this1 according to         
_/,s_/ankara1 is the lower form of      
,brahman called _/s_/vara2 but we       
observe that the antarymin as well as   
the so-called highest ,brahman described
 in section #h is1 at the termination of
 the two sections1 characterised by     
means of the very same terms 7#g1 #bc3  
,unseen but seeing1 unheard but hearing1

 c4 ,there is no other seer but he1     
there is no other hearer but he1 c42 and
 #h1 #aa3 ,that ,brahman is unseen but  
seeing1 unheard but hearing1 c4 ,there  
is nothing that sees but it1 nothing    
that hears but it1 c474--,nothing can be
 clearer than that all these sections   
aim at describing one and the same      
being1 and know nothing of the          
distinctions made by the developed      
,vednta1 however valid the latter may be
 from a purely philosophic point of     
view4  ,we may refer to one more similar
 instance from the ,chndogya ,upanishad4
 ,we there meet in ,,iii1 #ad with one  
of the most famous vidys describing the 
nature of ,brahman1 called after its    
reputed author the ,s_/nd_/ilya-vidy4   
,this small vidy is decidedly one of the
 finest and most characteristic texts2  
it would be difficult to point out      
another passage setting forth with      
greater force and eloquence and in an   
equally short compass the central       
doctrine of the ,upanishads4 ,yet this  

text1 which1 beyond doubt1 gives        
utterance to the highest conception of  
,brahman's nature that ,s_/nd_/ilya's   
thought was able to reach1 is by        
_/,s_/ankara and his school again       
declared to form part of the lower vidy 
only1 because it represents ,brahman as 
possessing qualities4 ,it is1 according 
to their terminology1 not j_/_/na1 i4e4 
knowledge1 but the injunction of a mere 
upsan1 a devout meditation on ,brahman  
in so far as possessing certain definite
 attributes such as having light for its
 form1 having true thoughts1 and so on4 
,the ,rmnujas1 on the other hand1 quote 
this text with preference as clearly    
describing the nature of their highest1 
i4e4 their one ,brahman4 ,we again allow
 that _/,s_/ankara is free to deny that 
any text which ascribes qualities to    
,brahman embodies absolute truth2 but we
 also again remark that there is no     
reason whatever for supposing that      
,s_/nd_/ilya1 or whoever may have been  
the author of that vidy1 looked upon it 

as anything else but a statement of the 
highest truth accessible to man4  ,we   
return to the question as to the true   
philosophy of the ,upanishads1 apart    
from the systems of the                 
commentators4--,from what precedes it   
will appear with sufficient distinctness
 that1 if we understand by philosophy a 
philosophical system coherent in all its
 parts1 free from all contradictions and
 allowing room for all the different    
statements made in all the chief        
,upanishads1 a philosophy of the        
,upanishads cannot even be spoken of4   
,the various lucubrations on ,brahman1  
the world1 and the human soul of which  
the ,upanishads consist do not allow    
themselves to be systematised simply    
because they were never meant to form a 
system4 _/,s_/_/nd_/ilya's views as to  
the nature of ,brahman did not in all   
details agree with those of             
,yj_/_/avalkya1 and ,uddlaka differed   
from both4 ,in this there is nothing to 
wonder at1 and the burden of proof rests

 altogether with those who maintain that
 a large number of detached philosophic 
and theological dissertations1 ascribed 
to different authors1 doubtless         
belonging to different periods1 and not 
seldom manifestly contradicting each    
other1 admit of being combined into a   
perfectly consistent whole4  ,the       
question1 however1 assumes a different  
aspect1 if we take the terms            
'philosophy' and 'philosophical system1'
 not in the strict sense in which       
_/,s_/ankara and other commentators are 
not afraid of taking them1 but as       
implying merely an agreement in certain 
fundamental features4 ,in this latter   
sense we may indeed undertake to        
indicate the outlines of a philosophy of
 the ,upanishads1 only keeping in view  
that precision in details is not to be  
aimed at4 ,and here we finally see      
ourselves driven back altogether on the 
texts themselves1 and have to           
acknowledge that the help we receive    
from commentators1 to whatever school   

they may belong1 is very inconsiderable4
 ,fortunately it cannot be asserted that
 the texts on the whole oppose very     
serious difficulties to a right         
understanding1 however obscure the      
details often are4 ,concerning the      
latter we occasionally depend entirely  
on the explanations vouchsafed by the   
scholiasts1 but as far as the general   
drift and spirit of the texts are       
concerned1 we are quite able to judge by
 ourselves1 and are even specially      
qualified to do so by having no         
particular system to advocate4  ,the    
point we will first touch upon is the   
same from which we started when         
examining the doctrine of the ,stras1   
viz4 the question whether the           
,upanishads acknowledge a higher and    
lower knowledge in _/,s_/ankara's sense1
 i4e4 a knowledge of a higher and a     
lower ,brahman4 ,now this we find not to
 be the case4 ,knowledge is in the      
,upanishads frequently opposed to avdy1 
by which latter term we have to         

understand ignorance as to ,brahman1    
absence of philosophic knowledge2 and1  
again1 in several places we find the    
knowledge of the sacrificial part of the
 ,veda with its supplementary           
disciplines contrasted as inferior with 
the knowledge of the ,self2 to which    
latter distinction the ,mu_/nd_/aka ,up4
 7,i1 #d7 applies the terms apar and par
 vdy4 ,but a formal recognition of the  
essential difference of ,brahman being  
viewed1 on the one hand1 as possessing  
distinctive attributes1 and1 on the     
other hand1 as devoid of all such       
attributes is not to be met with        
anywhere4 ,brahman is indeed sometimes  
described as sagu_/n_/a and sometimes as
 nirgu_/n_/a 7to use later terms72 but  
it is nowhere said that thereon rests a 
distinction of two different kinds of   
knowledge leading to altogether         
different results4 ,the knowledge of    
,brahman is one1 under whatever aspects 
it is viewed2 hence the circumstance    
7already exemplified above7 that in the 

same vidys it is spoken of as sagu_/n_/a
 as well as nirgu_/n_/a4 ,when the mind 
of the writer dwells on the fact that   
,brahman is that from which all this    
world originates1 and in which it rests1
 he naturally applies to it distinctive 
attributes pointing at its relation to  
the world2 ,brahman1 then1 is called the
 ,self and life of all1 the inward      
ruler1 the omniscient ,lord1 and so on4 
,when1 on the other hand1 the author    
follows out the idea that ,brahman may  
be viewed in itself as the mysterious   
reality of which the whole expanse of   
the world is only an outward            
manifestation1 then it strikes him that 
no idea or term derived from sensible   
experience can rightly be applied to it1
 that nothing more may be predicated of 
it but that it is neither this nor that4
 ,but these are only two aspects of the 
cognition of one and the same entity4   
,closely connected with the question as 
to the double nature of the ,brahman of 
the ,upanishads is the question as to   

their teaching ,my4--,from ,colebrooke  
downwards the majority of ,european     
writers have inclined towards the       
opinion that the doctrine of ,my1 i4e4  
of the unreal illusory character of the 
sensible world1 does not constitute a   
feature of the primitive philosophy of  
the ,upanishads1 but was introduced into
 the system at some later period1       
whether by ,bdarya_/n_/a or _/,s_/ankara
 or somebody else4 ,the opposite view1  
viz4 that the doctrine of ,my forms an  
integral element of the teaching of the 
,upanishads1 is implied in them         
everywhere1 and enunciated more or less 
distinctly in more than one place1 has  
in recent times been advocated with much
 force by ,mr4 ,gough in the ninth      
chapter of his ,philosophy of the       
,upanishads4  ,in his ,matriaux1 c4 ,m4 
,paul ,rgnaud remarks that 'the doctrine
 of ,my1 although implied in the        
teaching of the ,upanishads1 could      
hardly become clear and explicit before 
the system had reached a stage of       

development necessitating a choice      
between admitting two co-existent       
eternal principles 7which became the    
basis of the ,snkhya philosophy71 and   
accepting the predominance of the       
intellectual principle1 which in the end
 necessarily led to the negation of the 
opposite principle4'--,to the two       
alternatives here referred to as        
possible we1 however1 have to add a     
third one1 viz4 that form of the ,vednta
 of which the theory of the ,bhgavatas  
or ,rmnujas is the most eminent type1   
and according to which ,brahman carries 
within its own nature an element from   
which the material universe originates2 
an element which indeed is not an       
independent entity like the pradhna of  
the ,snkhyas1 but which at the same time
 is not an unreal ,my but quite as real 
as any other part of ,brahman's nature4 
,that a doctrine of this character      
actually developed itself on the basis  
of the ,upanishads1 is a circumstance   
which we clearly must not lose sight of1

 when attempting to determine what the  
,upanishads themselves are teaching     
concerning the character of the world4  
,in enquiring whether the ,upanishads   
maintain the ,my doctrine or not1 we    
must proceed with the same caution as   
regards other parts of the system1 i4e4 
we must refrain from using              
unhesitatingly1 and without careful     
consideration of the merits of each     
individual case1 the teaching--direct or
 inferred--of any one passage to the end
 of determining the drift of the        
teaching of other passages4 ,we may     
admit that some passages1 notably of the
 ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka1 contain at any 
rate the germ of the later developed ,my
 doctrine#be1 and thus render it quite  
intelligible that a system like         
_/,s_/ankara's should evolve itself1    
among others1 out of the ,upanishads2   
but that affords no valid reason for    
interpreting ,my into other texts which 
give a very satisfactory sense without  
that doctrine1 or are even clearly      

repugnant to it4 ,this remark applies in
 the very first place to all the        
accounts of the creation of the physical
 universe4 ,there1 if anywhere1 the     
illusional character of the world should
 have been hinted at1 at least1 had that
 theory been held by the authors of     
those accounts2 but not a word to that  
effect is met with anywhere4 ,the most  
important of those accounts--the one    
given in the sixth chapter of the       
,chndogya ,upanishad--forms no          
exception4 ,there is absolutely no      
reason to assume that the 'sending      
forth' of the elements from the         
primitive ,sat1 which is there described
 at length1 was by the writer of that   
passage meant to represent a vivarta    
rather than a pari_/n_/ma that the      
process of the origination of the       
physical universe has to be conceived as
 anything else but a real manifestation 
of real powers hidden in the primeval   
,self4 ,the introductory words1         
addressed to _/,s_/vetaketu by ,uddlaka1

 which are generally appealed to as     
intimating the unreal character of the  
evolution about to be described1 do not1
 if viewed impartially1 intimate any    
such thing#bf4 ,for what is capable of  
being proved1 and manifestly meant to be
 proved1 by the illustrative instances  
of the lump of clay and the nugget of   
gold1 through which there are known all 
things made of clay and gold8 ,merely   
that this whole world has ,brahman for  
its causal substance1 just as clay is   
the causal matter of every earthen pot1 
and gold of every golden ornament1 but  
not that the process through which any  
causal substance becomes an effect is an
 unreal one4 ,we--including             
,uddlaka--may surely say that all       
earthen pots are in reality nothing but 
earth--the earthen pot being merely a   
special modification 7vikra7 of clay    
which has a name of its own--without    
thereby committing ourselves to the     
doctrine that the change of form1 which 
a lump of clay undergoes when being     

fashioned into a pot1 is not real but a 
mere baseless illusion4  ,in the same   
light we have to view numerous other    
passages which set forth the successive 
emanations proceeding from the first    
principle4 ,when1 for instance1 we meet 
in the ,ka_/th_/a ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #aj1 in  
the serial enumeration of the forms of  
existence intervening between the gross 
material world and the highest ,self    
7the ,person71 with the 'avyk_/ri_/ta1' 
the ,undeveloped1 immediately below the 
purusha2 and when again the ,mu_/nd_/aka
 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b1 speaks of the 'high 
,imperishable' higher than which is the 
heavenly ,person2 there is no reason    
whatever to see in that ',undeveloped'  
and that 'high ,imperishable' anything  
but that real element in ,brahman from  
which1 as in the ,rmnuja system1 the    
material universe springs by a process  
of real development4 ,we must of course 
render it quite clear to ourselves in   
what sense the terms 'real' and 'unreal'
 have to be understood4 ,the ,upanishads

 no doubt teach emphatically that the   
material world does not owe its         
existence to any principle independent  
from the ,lord like the pradhna of the  
,snkhyas2 the world is nothing but a    
manifestation of the ,lord's wonderful  
power1 and hence is unsubstantial1 if we
 take the term 'substance' in its strict
 sense4 ,and1 again1 everything material
 is immeasurably inferior in nature to  
the highest spiritual principle from    
which it has emanated1 and which it now 
hides from the individual soul4 ,but    
neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority
 of the kind mentioned constitutes      
unreality in the sense in which the ,my 
of _/,s_/ankara is unreal4 ,according to
 the latter the whole world is nothing  
but an erroneous appearance1 as unreal  
as the snake1 for which a piece of rope 
is mistaken by the belated traveller1   
and disappearing just as the imagined   
snake does as soon as the light of true 
knowledge has risen4 ,but this is       
certainly not the impression left on the

 mind by a comprehensive review of the  
,upanishads which dwells on their       
general scope1 and does not confine     
itself to the undue urging of what may  
be implied in some detached passages4   
,the ,upanishads do not call upon us to 
look upon the whole world as a baseless 
illusion to be destroyed by knowledge2  
the great error which they admonish us  
to relinquish is rather that things have
 a separate individual existence1 and   
are not tied together by the bond of    
being all of them effects of ,brahman1  
or ,brahman itself4 ,they do not say    
that true knowledge sublates this false 
world1 as _/,s_/ankara says1 but that it
 enables the sage to extricate himself  
from the world--the inferior mrta rpa of
 ,brahman1 to use an expression of the  
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka--and to become   
one with ,brahman in its highest form4  
',we are to see everything in ,brahman1 
and ,brahman in everything2' the natural
 meaning of this is1 'we are to look    
upon this whole world as a true         

manifestation of ,brahman1 as sprung    
from it and animated by it4' ,the myvdin
 has indeed appropriated the above      
saying also1 and interpreted it so as to
 fall in with his theory2 but he is able
 to do so only by perverting its        
manifest sense4 ,for him it would be    
appropriate to say1 not that everything 
we see is in ,brahman1 but rather that  
everything we see is out of ,brahman1   
viz4 as a false appearance spread over  
it and hiding it from us4  ,stress has  
been laid#bg upon certain passages of   
the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka which seem to
 hint at the unreality of this world by 
qualifying terms1 indicative of duality 
or plurality of existence1 by means of  
an added 'iva1' i4e4 'as it were'       
7yatrnyad iva syt2 yatra dvaitam iva    
bhavati2 tm dhyyatva lelyatva74 ,those  
passages no doubt readily lend          
themselves to ,my interpretations1 and  
it is by no means impossible that in    
their author's mind there was something 
like an undeveloped ,my doctrine4 ,i    

must1 however1 remark that they1 on the 
other hand1 also admit of easy          
interpretations not in any way          
presupposing the theory of the unreality
 of the world4 ,if ,yj_/_/avalkya refers
 to the latter as that 'where there is  
something else as it were1 where there  
is duality as it were1' he may simply   
mean to indicate that the ordinary      
opinion1 according to which the         
individual forms of existence of the    
world are opposed to each other as      
altogether separate1 is a mistaken one1 
all things being one in so far as they  
spring from--and are parts of--,brahman4
 ,this would in no way involve duality  
or plurality being unreal in            
_/,s_/ankara's sense1 not any more than1
 for instance1 the modes of ,spinoza are
 unreal because1 according to that      
philosopher1 there is only one universal
 substance4 ,and with regard to the     
clause 'the ,self thinks as it were' it 
has to be noted that according to the   
commentators the 'as it were' is meant  

to indicate that truly not the ,self is 
thinking1 but the upadhis1 i4e4         
especially the manas with which the     
,self is connected4 ,but whether these  
upadhis are the mere offspring of ,my1  
as _/,s_/ankara thinks1 or real forms of
 existence1 as ,rmnuja teaches1 is an   
altogether different question4  ,i do   
not wish1 however1 to urge these last   
observations1 and am ready to admit that
 not impossibly those iva's indicate    
that the thought of the writer who      
employed them was darkly labouring with 
a conception akin to--although much less
 explicit than--the ,my of _/,s_/ankara4
 ,but what ,i object to is1 that        
conclusions drawn from a few passages   
of1 after all1 doubtful import should be
 employed for introducing the ,my       
doctrine into other passages which do   
not even hint at it1 and are fully      
intelligible without it4#bh  ,the last  
important point in the teaching of the  
,upanishads we have to touch upon is the
 relation of the jvas1 the individual   

souls to the highest ,self4 ,the special
 views regarding that point held by     
_/,s_/ankara and ,rmnuja1 as have been  
stated before4 ,confronting their       
theories with the texts of the          
,upanishads we must1 ,i think1 admit    
without hesitation1 that _/,s_/ankara's 
doctrine faithfully represents the      
prevailing teaching of the ,upanishads  
in one important point at least1 viz4   
therein that the soul or ,self of the   
sage--whatever its original relation to 
,brahman may be--is in the end          
completely merged and indistinguishably 
lost in the universal ,self4 ,a         
distinction1 repeatedly alluded to      
before1 has indeed to be kept in view   
here also4 ,certain texts of the        
,upanishads describe the soul's going   
upwards1 on the path of the gods1 to the
 world of ,brahman1 where it dwells for 
unnumbered years1 i4e4 for ever4 ,those 
texts1 as a type of which we may take1  
the passage ,kausht4 ,up4 ,i--the       
fundamental text of the ,rmnujas        

concerning the soul's fate after        
death--belong to an earlier stage of    
philosophic development2 they manifestly
 ascribe to the soul a continued        
individual existence4 ,but mixed with   
texts of this class there are others in 
which the final absolute identification 
of the individual ,self with the        
universal ,self is indicated in terms of
 unmistakable plainness4 ',he who knows 
,brahman and becomes ,brahman2' 'he who 
knows ,brahman becomes all this2' 'as   
the flowing rivers disappear in the sea 
losing their name and form1 thus a wise 
man goes to the divine person4' ,and if 
we look to the whole1 to the prevailing 
spirit of the ,upanishads1 we may call  
the doctrine embodied in passages of the
 latter nature the doctrine of the      
,upanishads4 ,it is1 moreover1 supported
 by the frequently and clearly stated   
theory of the individual souls being    
merged in ,brahman in the state of deep 
dreamless sleep4  ,it is much more      
difficult to indicate the precise       

teaching of the ,upanishads concerning  
the original relation of the individual 
soul to the highest ,self1 although     
there can be no doubt that it has to be 
viewed as proceeding from the latter1   
and somehow forming a part of it4       
,negatively we are entitled to say that 
the doctrine1 according to which the    
soul is merely brahma bhrntam or brahma 
mayopadhikam1 is in no way countenanced 
by the majority of the passages bearing 
on the question4 ,if the emission of the
 elements1 described in the ,chndogya   
and referred to above1 is a real        
process--of which we saw no reason to   
doubt--the jva tman with which the      
highest ,self enters into the emitted   
elements is equally real1 a true part or
 emanation of ,brahman itself4  ,after  
having in this way shortly reviewed the 
chief elements of ,vedntic doctrine     
according to the ,upanishads1 we may    
briefly consider _/,s_/ankara's system  
and mode of interpretation--with whose  
details we had frequent opportunities of

 finding fault--as a whole4 ,it has been
 said before that the task of reducing  
the teaching of the whole of the        
,upanishads to a system consistent and  
free from contradictions is an          
intrinsically impossible one4 ,but the  
task once being given1 we are quite     
ready to admit that _/,s_/ankara's      
system is most probably the best which  
can be devised4 ,while unable to allow  
that the ,upanishads recognise a lower  
and higher knowledge of ,brahman1 in    
fact the distinction of a lower and     
higher ,brahman1 we yet acknowledge that
 the adoption of that distinction       
furnishes the interpreter with an       
instrument of extraordinary power for   
reducing to an orderly whole the        
heterogeneous material presented by the 
old theosophic treatises4 ,this becomes 
very manifest as soon as we compare     
_/,s_/ankara's system with that of      
,rmnuja4 ,the latter recognises only one
 ,brahman which is1 as we should say1 a 
personal ,god1 and he therefore lays    

stress on all those passages of the     
,upanishads which ascribe to ,brahman   
the attributes of a personal ,god1 such 
as omniscience and omnipotence4 ,those  
passages1 on the other hand1 whose      
decided tendency it is to represent     
,brahman as transcending all qualities1 
as one undifferenced mass of impersonal 
intelligence1 ,rmnuja is unable to      
accept frankly and fairly1 and has to   
misinterpret them more or less to make  
them fall in with his system4 ,the same 
remark holds good with regard to those  
texts which represent the individual    
soul as finally identifying itself with 
,brahman2 ,rmnuja cannot allow a        
complete identification but merely an   
assimilation carried as far as possible4
 _/,s_/ankara1 on the other hand1 by    
skilfully ringing the changes on a      
higher and a lower doctrine1 somehow    
manages to find room for whatever the   
,upanishads have to say4 ,where the text
 speaks of ,brahman as transcending all 
attributes1 the highest doctrine is set 

forth4 ,where ,brahman is called the    
,all-knowing ruler of the world1 the    
author means to propound the lower      
knowledge of the ,lord only4 ,and where 
the legends about the primary being and 
its way of creating the world become    
somewhat crude and gross1               
,hira_/n_/yagarbha and ,virj are        
summoned forth and charged with the     
responsibility4 ,of ,virj ,mr4 ,gough   
remarks 7p4 #ee7 that in him a place is 
provided by the poets of the ,upanishads
 for the purusha of the ancient         
_/ri_/shis1 the divine being out of whom
 the visible and tangible world         
proceeded4 ,this is quite true if only  
we substitute for the 'poets of the     
,upanishads' the framers of the orthodox
 ,vednta system--for the ,upanishads    
give no indication whatever that by     
their purusha they understand not the   
simple old purusha but the ,virj        
occupying a definite position in a      
highly elaborate system2--but the mere  
phrase1 'providing a place' intimates   

with sufficient clearness the nature of 
the work in which systematisers of the  
,vedntic doctrine are engaged4          
_/,s_/ankara's method thus enables him  
in a certain way to do justice to       
different stages of historical          
development1 to recognise clearly       
existing differences which other        
systematisers are intent on             
obliterating4 ,and there has yet to be  
made a further and even more important  
admission in favour of his system4 ,it  
is not only more pliable1 more capable  
of amalgamating heterogeneous material  
than other systems1 but its fundamental 
doctrines are manifestly in greater     
harmony with the essential teaching of  
the ,upanishads than those of other     
,vedntic systems4 ,above we were unable 
to allow that the distinction made by   
_/,s_/ankara between ,brahman and       
_/s_/vara is known to the ,upanishads2  
but we must now admit that if1 for the  
purpose of determining the nature of the
 highest being1 a choice has to be made 

between those texts which represent     
,brahman as nirgu_/n_/a1 and those which
 ascribe to it personal attributes1     
_/,s_/ankara is right in giving         
preference to texts of the former kind4 
,the ,brahman of the old ,upanishads1   
from which the souls spring to enjoy    
individual consciousness in their waking
 state1 and into which they sink back   
temporarily in the state of deep        
dreamless sleep and permanently in      
death1 is certainly not represented     
adequately by the strictly personal     
_/s_/vara of ,rmnuja1 who rules the     
world in wisdom and mercy4 ,the older   
,upanishads1 at any rate1 lay very      
little stress upon personal attributes  
of their highest being1 and hence       
_/,s_/ankara is right in so far as he   
assigns to his hypostatised personal    
_/s_/vara#bi a lower place than to his  
absolute ,brahman4 ,that he also        
faithfully represents the prevailing    
spirit of the ,upanishads in his theory 
of the ultimate fate of the soul1 we    

have already remarked above4 ,and       
although the ,my doctrine cannot1 in my 
opinion1 be said to form part of the    
teaching of the ,upanishads1 it cannot  
yet be asserted to contradict it openly1
 because the very point which it is     
meant to elucidate1 viz4 the mode in    
which the physical universe and the     
multiplicity of individual souls        
originate1 is left by the ,upanishads   
very much in the dark4 ,the later growth
 of the ,my doctrine on the basis of the
 ,upanishads is therefore quite         
intelligible1 and ,i fully agree with   
,mr4 ,gough when he says regarding it   
that there has been no addition to the  
system from without but only a          
development from within1 no graft but   
only growth4 ,the lines of thought which
 finally led to the elaboration of the  
full-blown ,my theory may be traced with
 considerable certainty4 ,in the first  
place1 deepening speculation on ,brahman
 tended to the notion of advaita being  
taken in a more and more strict sense1  

as implying not only the exclusion of   
any second principle external to        
,brahman1 but also the absence of any   
elements of duality or plurality in the 
nature of the one universal being       
itself2 a tendency agreeing with the    
spirit of a certain set of texts from   
the ,upanishads4 ,and as the fact of the
 appearance of a manifold world cannot  
be denied1 the only way open to         
thoroughly consistent speculation was to
 deny at any rate its reality1 and to   
call it a mere illusion due to an unreal
 principle1 with which ,brahman is      
indeed associated1 but which is unable  
to break the unity of ,brahman's nature 
just on account of its own unreality4   
,and1 in the second place1 a more       
thorough following out of the conception
 that the union with ,brahman is to be  
reached through true knowledge only1 not
 unnaturally led to the conclusion that 
what separates us in our unenlightened  
state from ,brahman is such as to allow 
itself to be completely sublated by an  

act of knowledge2 is1 in other words1   
nothing else but an erroneous notion1 an
 illusion4--,a further circumstance     
which may not impossibly have           
co-operated to further the development  
of the theory of the world's unreality  
will be referred to later on4#cj  ,we   
have above been obliged to leave it an  
open question what kind of ,vednta is   
represented by the ,vednta-stras1       
although reason was shown for the       
supposition that in some important      
points their teaching is more closely   
related to the system of ,rmnuja than to
 that of _/,s_/ankara4 ,if so1 the      
philosophy of _/,s_/ankara would on the 
whole stand nearer to the teaching of   
the ,upanishads than the ,stras of      
,bdarya_/n_/a4 ,this would indeed be a  
somewhat unexpected conclusion--for1    
judging a priori1 we should be more     
inclined to assume a direct propagation 
of the true doctrine of the ,upanishads 
through ,bdarya_/n_/a to                
_/,s_/ankara--but a priori              

considerations have of course no weight 
against positive evidence to the        
contrary4 ,there are1 moreover1 other   
facts in the history of ,indian         
philosophy and theology which help us   
better to appreciate the possibility of 
,bdarya_/n_/a's ,stras already setting  
forth a doctrine that lays greater      
stress on the personal character of the 
highest being than is in agreement with 
the prevailing tendency of the          
,upanishads4 ,that the pure doctrine of 
those ancient ,brahminical treatises    
underwent at a rather early period      
amalgamations with beliefs which most   
probably had sprung up in altogether    
different--priestly or                  
non-priestly--communities is a          
well-known circumstance2 it suffices for
 our purposes to refer to the most      
eminent of the early literary monuments 
in which an amalgamation of the kind    
mentioned is observable1 viz4 the       
,bhagavadgt4 ,the doctrine of the       
,bhagavadgt represents a fusion of the  

,brahman theory of the ,upanishads with 
the belief in a personal highest        
being--,k_/ri_/sh_/n_/a or              
,vish_/n_/u--which in many respects     
approximates very closely to the system 
of the ,bhgavatas2 the attempts of a    
certain set of ,indian commentators to  
explain it as setting forth pure        
,vednta1 i4e4 the pure doctrine of the  
,upanishads1 may simply be set aside4   
,but this same ,bhagavadgt is quoted in 
,bdarya_/n_/a's ,stras 7at least        
according to the unanimous explanations 
of the most eminent scholiasts of       
different schools7 as inferior to       
_/,s_/ruti only in authority4 ,the      
,stras1 moreover1 refer in different    
places to certain ,vedntic portions of  
the ,mahbhrata1 especially the twelfth  
book1 several of which represent forms  
of ,vednta distinctly differing from    
_/,s_/ankara's teaching1 and closely    
related to the system of the ,bhgavatas4
  ,facts of this nature--from entering  
into the details of which we are        

prevented by want of space--tend to     
mitigate the prim facie strangeness of  
the assumption that the ,vednta-stras1  
which occupy an intermediate position   
between the ,upanishads and             
_/,s_/ankara1 should yet diverge in     
their teaching from both4 ,the ,vednta  
of ,gau_/d_/apda and _/,s_/ankara would 
in that case mark a strictly orthodox   
reaction against all combinations of    
non-,vedic elements of belief and       
doctrine with the teaching of the       
,upanishads4 ,but although this form of 
doctrine has ever since _/,s_/ankara's  
time been the one most generally        
accepted by ,brahminic students of      
philosophy1 it has never had any        
wide-reaching influence on the masses of
 ,india4 ,it is too little in sympathy  
with the wants of the human heart1      
which1 after all1 are not so very       
different in ,india from what they are  
elsewhere4 ,comparatively few1 even in  
,india1 are those who rejoice in the    
idea of a universal non-personal essence

 in which their own individuality is to 
be merged and lost for ever1 who think  
it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of 
the ,infinite4'#ca ,the only forms of   
,vedntic philosophy which are--and can  
at any time have been--really popular1  
are those in which the ,brahman of the  
,upanishads has somehow transformed     
itself into a being1 between which and  
the devotee there can exist a personal  
relation1 love and faith on the part of 
man1 justice tempered by mercy on the   
part of the divinity4 ,the only         
religious books of widespread influence 
are such as the ,rmyan of ,tulsids1     
which lay no stress on the distinction  
between an absolute ,brahman            
inaccessible to all human wants and     
sympathies1 and a shadowy ,lord whose   
very conception depends on the illusory 
principle of ,my1 but love to dwell on  
the delights of devotion to one all-wise
 and merciful ruler1 who is able and    
willing to lend a gracious ear to the   
supplication of the worshipper4         

99       99       99       99       99  
,the present translation of the         
,vednta-stras does not aim at rendering 
that sense which their author may have  
aimed at conveying1 but strictly follows
 _/,s_/ankara's interpretation4 ,the    
question as to how far the latter agrees
 with the views held by ,bdarya_/n_/a   
has been discussed above1 with the      
result that for the present it must1 on 
the whole1 be left an open one4 ,in any 
case it would not be feasible to combine
 a translation of _/,s_/ankara's        
commentary with an independent version  
of the ,stras which it explains4        
,similar considerations have determined 
the method followed in rendering the    
passages of the ,upanishads referred to 
in the ,stras and discussed at length by
 _/,s_/ankara4 ,there also the views of 
the commentator have to be followed     
closely2 otherwise much of the comment  
would appear devoid of meaning4 ,hence1 
while of course following on the whole  
the critical translation published by   

,professor ,max ,mller in the earlier   
volumes of this ,series1 ,i had1 in a   
not inconsiderable number of cases1 to  
modify it so as to render intelligible  
_/,s_/ankara's explanations and         
reasonings4 ,i hope to find space in the
 introduction to the second volume of   
this translation for making some general
 remarks on the method to be followed in
 translating the ,upanishads4  ,i regret
 that want of space has prevented me    
from extracting fuller notes from later 
scholiasts4 ,the notes given are based1 
most of them1 on the _/t_/ks composed by
 nandagiri and ,govindnanda 7the former 
of which is unpublished as yet1 so far  
as ,i know71 and on the ,bhmat4  ,my    
best thanks are due to ,pa_/nd_/its ,rma
 ,mi_/s_/ra _/,s_/strin and ,gangdhara  
_/,s_/strin of the ,benares ,sanskrit   
,college1 whom ,i have consulted on     
several difficult passages4 ,greater    
still are my obligations to ,pa_/nd_/it 
,ke_/s_/ava _/,s_/strin1 of the same    
institution1 who most kindly undertook  

to read a proof of the whole of the     
present volume1 and whose advice has    
enabled me to render my version of more 
than one passage more definite or       
correct4  ,notes3  ,footnote #ai3 ,nanu 
vidusho z pi                            
setikartavyatkopsananirv_/ri_/ttaye     
v_/ri_/shyanndiphalnsh_/t_/ny eva       
katha_/m_/ tesh_/m_/ virodhd vin_/s_/a  
u_/k_/yate4 ,tatrha pte tv iti4         
_/,s_/arrapte tu tesh_/m_/              
vin_/s_/a_/h_/ _/s_/arraptd rdhv_/m_/ tu
 vidynugu_/n_/ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/aphalni    
suk_/ri_/tni na_/s_/yantty artha_/h_/4  
,footnote #bj3 ,upalabhyate hi devaynena
 panth ga_/kkh_/ato vidushas tam        
pratibruyt satyam bryd iti _/k_/andramas
 sa_/m_/vdava_/k_/anena                 
_/s_/arrasadbhva_/h_/1 ata_/h_/         
skshma_/s_/arram anuvartate4  ,footnote 
#ba3 ,when the jva has passed out of the
 body and ascends to the world of       
,brahman1 it remains enveloped by the   
subtle body until it reaches the river  
,vijar4 ,there it divests itself of the 

subtle body1 and the latter is merged in
 ,brahman44  ,footnote #bb3 ,kim        
aya_/m_/ para_/m_/1 yotir               
upasampanna_/h_/                        
saivabandhavinirmukta_/h_/ pratyagatma  
svatmana_/m_/ paramtmana_/h_/           
p_/rit_/hagbhutam anubhavati uta        
tatprahratay tadavibhaktam iti visnye   
so1 _/s_/nate sarvn kamn saha           
brahma_/n_/ vipas_/k_/it pasya_/h_/     
pasyate rukmavar_/n_/a_/m_/ kartaram    
sa_/m_/ purusha_/m_/ brahmayoni_/m_/ tad
 vidvin pu_/n_/yapape vidhuya           
niragana_/h_/ parama_/m_/ smyam upaiti  
ida_/m_/ janam upasritya mama sdharinyam
 gata_/h_/ sarve1 punopajyante pralayena
 vyathanti _/k_/etyadysruysm_/nt_/ibhyo 
muktasta pare_/n_/a                     
shityasmyasdharmyvagamt                 
p_/ri_/thagbhutam anubhavatu prpte      
u_/k_/yate4 ,avibhgeneti4 ,parasmd      
brahmana_/h_/ svatmanam                 
avibhgennubhavati mukta_/h_/4           
,kuta_/h_/4 ,d_/ri_/shtatvt4 ,para_/m_/ 
brahmopasampadya                        

niv_/ri_/ttavidynrodhanasya yathtathyena
 svtamano d_/ri_/sh_/ta_/tvt4           
,svatmana_/h_/ ssvarpa_/m_/ hi tat tvam 
asy ayam tm brahma aitadtmyam ida_/m_/  
sarva_/m_/ sarva_/m_/ khalv ida_/m_/    
brahnetydismndhikara_/n_/yanirdesai_/h_/
 ya tmani tishtan atmano ntaro yam tm na
 veda yastatm sarra_/m_/ ya tmnam antaro
 yamayati tmntaryamy am_/ri_/tah        
anta_/h_/ pravishta_/h_/ sst annm       
itydibhis _/k_/a paramatmtmaka_/m_/     
ta_/kk_/hartatay tatpraktabhtam iti     
pratipditam avashitei iti               
kasak_/ri_/stnety atrto vibhagenaha_/m_/
 brahmsmty cvanubhavati4  ,footnote #bc3
 _/,s_/ankara's favourite illustrative  
instance of the magician producing      
illusive sights is--significantly       
enough--not known to the ,stras4        
,footnote #bd3 ,cp4 ,gough's ,philosophy
 of the ,upanishads1 pp4 #bdj ff4       
,footnote #be3 ,it is well known that1  
with the exception of the               
_/,s_/vitsvatara and ,maitryanya1 none  
of the chief ,upanishads exhibits the   

word 'my4' ,the term indeed occurs in   
one place in the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka2
 but that passage is a quotation from   
the _/,ri_/k ,sa_/m_/bit in which my    
means 'creative power4' ,cp4 ,p4        
,rgnaud1 ,la ,my1 in the ,revue de      
l',histoire des ,religions1 tome xii1   
,no4 #c1 #ahhe4  ,footnote #bf3 ,as is  
demonstrated very satisfactorily by     
,rmnuja4  ,footnote #bg3 ,gough1        
,philosophy of the ,upanishads pp4 #bac 
ff4  ,footnote #bh3 ,i cannot discuss in
 this place the ,my passages of the     
,svetsvatara and the ,maitryanya        
,upanishads4 ,reasons which want of     
space prevents me from setting forth in 
detail induce me to believe that neither
 of those two treatises deserves to be  
considered by us when wishing to        
ascertain the true immixed doctrine of  
the ,upanishads4  ,footnote #bi3 ,the   
_/s_/vara who allots to the individual  
souls their new forms of embodiment in  
strict accordance with their merit or   
demerit cannot be called anything else  

but a personal ,god4 ,that this personal
 conscious being is at the same time    
identified with the totality of the     
individual souls in the unconscious     
state of deep dreamless sleep1 is one of
 those extraordinary contradictions     
which thorough-going systematisers of   
,vedntic doctrine are apparently unable 
to avoid altogether4  ,footnote #cj3    
,that section of the introduction in    
which the point referred to in the text 
is touched upon will ,i hope form part  
of the second volume of the translation4
 ,the same remark applies to a point    
concerning which further information had
 been promised above on page v4         
,footnote #ca3    ,cos tra questa       
,immensit s'annega il pensier mio1   ,e 
il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare4  
,,leopardi4      ,,ved,,nta-,s,,tras    
,,with  _/,s_/,a,,nkara ,,bh,,shya4     
_/,s_/,a,,nkara',s ,,introduction       
,,first ,,adhy,,ya4  ,,first ,p,,da4    
,,reverence ,,to ,,the ,,august         
,v,,sudeva6  ,it is a matter not        

requiring any proof that the object and 
the subject#cb whose respective spheres 
are the notion of the ',thou' 7the      
,non-,ego#cc7 and the ',ego1' and which 
are opposed to each other as much as    
darkness and light are1 cannot be       
identified4 ,all the less can their     
respective attributes be identified4    
,hence it follows that it is wrong to   
superimpose#cd upon the subject--whose  
,self is intelligence1 and which has for
 its sphere the notion of the ,ego--the 
object whose sphere is the notion of the
 ,non-,ego1 and the attributes of the   
object1 and vice vers to superimpose the
 subject and the attributes of the      
subject on the object4 ,in spite of this
 it is on the part of man a natural#ce  
procedure--which which has its cause in 
wrong knowledge--not to distinguish the 
two entities 7object and subject7 and   
their respective attributes1 although   
they are absolutely distinct1 but to    
superimpose upon each the characteristic
 nature and the attributes of the other1

 and thus1 coupling the ,real and the   
,unreal#cf1 to make use of expressions  
such as ',that am ,i1' ',that is        
mine4#cg'--;,but what have we to        
understand by the term                  
'superimposition8'--,the apparent       
presentation1 in the form of            
remembrance1 to consciousness of        
something previously observed1 in some  
other thing4#ch  ,some indeed define the
 term 'superimposition' as the          
superimposition of the attributes of one
 thing on another thing4#ci ,others1    
again1 define superimposition as the    
error founded on the non-apprehension of
 the difference of that which is        
superimposed from that on which it is   
superimposed4#dj ,others#da1 again1     
define it as the fictitious assumption  
of attributes contrary to the nature of 
that thing on which something else is   
superimposed4 ,but all these definitions
 agree in so far as they represent      
superimposition as the apparent         
presentation of the attributes of one   

thing in another thing4 ,and therewith  
agrees also the popular view which is   
exemplified by expressions such as the  
following3 ',mother-of-pearl appears    
like silver1' ',the moon although one   
only appears as if she were double4'    
,but how is it possible that on the     
interior ,self which itself is not an   
object there should be superimposed     
objects and their attributes8 ,for every
 one superimposes an object only on such
 other objects as are placed before him 
7i4e4 in contact with his sense-organs71
 and you have said before that the      
interior ,self which is entirely        
disconnected from the idea of the ,thou 
7the ,non-,ego7 is never an object4 ,it 
is not1 we reply1 non-object in the     
absolute sense4 ,for it is the object of
 the notion of the ,ego#db1 and the     
interior ,self is well known to exist on
 account of its immediate 7intuitive7   
presentation4#dc ,nor is it an          
exceptionless rule that objects can be  
superimposed only on such other objects 

as are before us1 i4e4 in contact with  
our sense-organs2 for non-discerning men
 superimpose on the ether1 which is not 
the object of sensuous perception1      
dark-blue colour4  ,hence it follows    
that the assumption of the ,non-,self   
being superimposed on the interior ,self
 is not unreasonable4  ,this            
superimposition thus defined1 learned   
men consider to be ,nescience 7avidy71  
and the ascertainment of the true nature
 of that which is 7the ,self7 by means  
of the discrimination of that 7which is 
superimposed on the ,self71 they call   
knowledge 7vidy74 ,there being such     
knowledge 7neither the ,self nor the    
,non-,self7 are affected in the least by
 any blemish or 7good7 quality produced 
by their mutual superimposition#dd4 ,the
 mutual superimposition of the ,self and
 the ,non-,self1 which is termed        
,nescience1 is the presupposition on    
which there base all the practical      
distinctions--those made in ordinary    
life as well as those laid down by the  

,veda--between means of knowledge1      
objects of knowledge 7and knowing       
persons71 and all scriptural texts1     
whether they are concerned with         
injunctions and prohibitions 7of        
meritorious and non-meritorious         
actions71 or with final                 
release#de4--;,but how can the means of 
right knowledge such as perception1     
inference1 c41 and scriptural texts have
 for their object that which is         
dependent on ,nescience#df8--;,because1 
we reply1 the means of right knowledge  
cannot operate unless there be a knowing
 personality1 and because the existence 
of the latter depends on the erroneous  
notion that the body1 the senses1 and so
 on1 are identical with1 or belong to1  
the ,self of the knowing person4 ,for   
without the employment of the senses1   
perception and the other means of right 
knowledge cannot operate4 ,and without a
 basis 7i4e4 the body#dg7 the senses    
cannot act4 ,nor does anybody act by    
means of a body on which the nature of  

the ,self is not superimposed#dh4 ,nor  
can1 in the absence of all that#di1 the 
,self which1 in its own nature is free  
from all contact1 become a knowing      
agent4 ,and if there is no knowing      
agent1 the means of right knowledge     
cannot operate 7as said above74 ,hence  
perception and the other means of right 
knowledge1 and the ,vedic texts have for
 their object that which is dependent on
 ,nescience4 7,that human cognitional   
activity has for its presupposition the 
superimposition described above71       
follows also from the non-difference in 
that respect of men from animals4       
,animals1 when sounds or other sensible 
qualities affect their sense of hearing 
or other senses1 recede or advance      
according as the idea derived from the  
sensation is a comforting or disquieting
 one4 ,a cow1 for instance1 when she    
sees a man approaching with a raised    
stick in his hand1 thinks that he wants 
to beat her1 and therefore moves away2  
while she walks up to a man who advances

 with some fresh grass in his hand4     
,thus men also--who possess a higher    
intelligence--run away when they see    
strong fierce-looking fellows drawing   
near with shouts and brandishing swords2
 while they confidently approach persons
 of contrary appearance and behaviour4  
,we thus see that men and animals follow
 the same course of procedure with      
reference to the means and objects of   
knowledge4 ,now it is well known that   
the procedure of animals bases on the   
non-distinction 7of ,self and           
,non-,self72 we therefore conclude that1
 as they present the same appearances1  
men also--although distinguished by     
superior intelligence--proceed with     
regard to perception and so on1 in the  
same way as animals do2 as long1 that is
 to say1 as the mutual superimposition  
of ,self and ,non-,self lasts4 ,with    
reference again to that kind of activity
 which is founded on the ,veda          
7sacrifices and the like71 it is true   
indeed that the reflecting man who is   

qualified to enter on it1 does so not   
without knowing that the ,self has a    
relation to another world2 yet that     
qualification does not depend on the    
knowledge1 derivable from the           
,vednta-texts1 of the true nature of the
 ,self as free from all wants1 raised   
above the distinctions of the           
,brhma_/n_/a and ,kshattriya-classes and
 so on1 transcending transmigratory     
existence4 ,for such knowledge is       
useless and even contradictory to the   
claim 7on the part of sacrificers1 c4 to
 perform certain actions and enjoy their
 fruits74 ,and before such knowledge of 
the ,self has arisen1 the ,vedic texts  
continue in their operation1 to have for
 their object that which is dependent on
 ,nescience4 ,for such texts as the     
following1 ',a ,brhma_/n_/a is to       
sacrifice1' are operative only on the   
supposition that on the ,self are       
superimposed particular conditions such 
as caste1 stage of life1 age1 outward   
circumstances1 and so on4 ,that by      

superimposition we have to understand   
the notion of something in some other   
thing we have already explained4 7,the  
superimposition of the ,non-,self will  
be understood more definitely from the  
following examples47 ,extra-personal    
attributes are superimposed on the      
,self1 if a man considers himself sound 
and entire1 or the contrary1 as long as 
his wife1 children1 and so on are sound 
and entire or not4 ,attributes of the   
body are superimposed on the ,self1 if a
 man thinks of himself 7his ,self7 as   
stout1 lean1 fair1 as standing1 walking1
 or jumping4 ,attributes of the         
sense-organs1 if he thinks ',i am mute1 
or deaf1 or one-eyed1 or blind4'        
,attributes of the internal organ when  
he considers himself subject to desire1 
intention1 doubt1 determination1 and so 
on4 ,thus the producer of the notion of 
the ,ego 7i4e4 the internal organ7 is   
superimposed on the interior ,self1     
which1 in reality1 is the witness of all
 the modifications of the internal      

organ1 and vice vers the interior ,self1
 which is the witness of everything1 is 
superimposed on the internal organ1 the 
senses1 and so on4 ,in this way there   
goes on this natural beginning--and     
endless superimposition1 which appears  
in the form of wrong conception1 is the 
cause of individual souls appearing as  
agents and enjoyers 7of the results of  
their actions71 and is observed by every
 one4  ,with a view to freeing one's    
self from that wrong notion which is the
 cause of all evil and attaining thereby
 the knowledge of the absolute unity of 
the ,self the study of the ,vednta-texts
 is begun4 ,that all the ,vednta-texts  
have the mentioned purport we shall show
 in this so-called                      
_/,s_/riraka-mm_/m_/s4#ej  ,of this     
,vednta-mm_/m_/s about to be explained  
by us the first ,stra is as follows4    
#a4 ,then therefore the enquiry into    
,brahman4  ,the word 'then' is here to  
be taken as denoting immediate          
consecution2 not as indicating the      

introduction of a new subject to be     
entered upon2 for the enquiry into      
,brahman 7more literally1 the desire of 
knowing ,brahman7 is not of that        
nature#ea4 ,nor has the word 'then' the 
sense of auspiciousness 7or blessing72  
for a word of that meaning could not be 
properly construed as a part of the     
sentence4 ,the word 'then' rather acts  
as an auspicious term by being          
pronounced and heard merely1 while it   
denotes at the same time something else1
 viz4 immediate consecution as said     
above4 ,that the latter is its meaning  
follows moreover from the circumstance  
that the relation in which the result   
stands to the previous topic 7viewed as 
the cause of the result7 is non-separate
 from the relation of immediate         
consecution4#eb  ,if1 then1 the word    
'then' intimates immediate consecution  
it must be explained on what antecedent 
the enquiry into ,brahman specially     
depends2 just as the enquiry into active
 religious duty 7which forms the subject

 of the ,prv ,mm_/m_/s7 specially       
depends on the antecedent reading of the
 ,veda4 ,the reading of the ,veda indeed
 is the common antecedent 7for those who
 wish to enter on an enquiry into       
religious duty as well as for those     
desirous of knowing ,brahman74 ,the     
special question with regard to the     
enquiry into ,brahman is whether it     
presupposes as its antecedent the       
understanding of the acts of religious  
duty 7which is acquired by means of the 
,prv ,mm_/m_/s74 ,to this question we   
reply in the negative1 because for a man
 who has read the ,vednta-parts of the  
,veda it is possible to enter on the    
enquiry into ,brahman even before       
engaging in the enquiry into religious  
duty4 ,nor is it the purport of the word
 'then' to indicate order of succession2
 a purport which it serves in other     
passages1 as1 for instance1 in the one  
enjoining the cutting off of pieces from
 the heart and other parts of the       
sacrificial animal4#ec 7,for the        

intimation of order of succession could 
be intended only if the agent in both   
cases were the same2 but this is not the
 case71 because there is no proof for   
assuming the enquiry into religious duty
 and the enquiry into ,brahman to stand 
in the relation of principal and        
subordinate matter or the relation of   
qualification 7for a certain act7 on the
 part of the person qualified#ed2 and   
because the result as well as the object
 of the enquiry differs in the two      
cases4 ,the knowledge of active         
religious duty has for its fruit        
transitory felicity1 and that again     
depends on the performance of religious 
acts4 ,the enquiry into ,brahman1 on the
 other hand1 has for its fruit eternal  
bliss1 and does not depend on the       
performance of any acts4 ,acts of       
religious duty do not yet exist at the  
time when they are enquired into1 but   
are something to be accomplished 7in the
 future72 for they depend on the        
activity of man4 ,in the                

,brahma-mm_/m_/s1 on the other hand1 the
 object of enquiry1 i4e4 ,brahman1 is   
something already accomplished          
7existent71--for it is eternal1--and    
does not depend on human energy4 ,the   
two enquiries differ moreover in so far 
as the operation of their respective    
fundamental texts is concerned4 ,for the
 fundamental texts on which active      
religious duty depends convey           
information to man in so far only as    
they enjoin on him their own particular 
subjects 7sacrifices1 c472 while the    
fundamental texts about ,brahman merely 
instruct man1 without laying on him the 
injunction of being instructed1         
instruction being their immediate       
result4 ,the case is analogous to that  
of the information regarding objects of 
sense which ensues as soon as the       
objects are approximated to the senses4 
,it therefore is requisite that         
something should be stated subsequent to
 which the enquiry into ,brahman is     
proposed4--,well1 then1 we maintain that

 the antecedent conditions are the      
discrimination of what is eternal and   
what is non-eternal2 the renunciation of
 all desire to enjoy the fruit 7of one's
 actions7 both here and hereafter2 the  
acquirement of tranquillity1            
self-restraint1 and the other means#ee1 
and the desire of final release4 ,if    
these conditions exist1 a man may1      
either before entering on an enquiry    
into active religious duty or after     
that1 engage in the enquiry into        
,brahman and come to know it2 but not   
otherwise4 ,the word 'then' therefore   
intimates that the enquiry into ,brahman
 is subsequent to the acquisition of the
 above-mentioned 7spiritual7 means4     
,the word 'therefore' intimates a       
reason4 ,because the ,veda1 while       
declaring that the fruit of the         
agnihotra and similar performances which
 are means of happiness is non-eternal  
7as1 for instance4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1
 #f1 ',as here on earth whatever has    
been acquired by action perishes so     

perishes in the next world whatever is  
acquired by acts of religious duty'71   
teaches at the same time that the       
highest aim of man is realised by the   
knowledge of ,brahman 7as1 for instance1
 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 ',he who knows  
,brahman attains the highest'72         
therefore the enquiry into ,brahman is  
to be undertaken subsequently to the    
acquirement of the mentioned means4  ,by
 ,brahman is to be understood that the  
definition of which will be given in the
 next ,stra 7,i1 #a1 #b72 it is         
therefore not to be supposed that the   
word ,brahman may here denote something 
else1 as1 for instance1 the brahminical 
caste4 ,in the ,stra the genitive case  
7'of ,brahman2' the literal translation 
of the ,stra being 'then therefore the  
desire of knowledge of ,brahman'7       
denotes the object1 not something       
generally supplementary 7_/s_/esha#ef72 
for the desire of knowledge demands an  
object of desire and no other such      
object is stated4--,but why should not  

the genitive case be taken as expressing
 the general complementary relation 7to 
express which is its proper office78    
,even in that case it might constitute  
the object of the desire of knowledge1  
since the general relation may base     
itself on the more particular           
one4--,this assumption1 we reply1 would 
mean that we refuse to take ,brahman as 
the direct object1 and then again       
indirectly introduce it as the object2  
an altogether needless procedure4--,not 
needless2 for if we explain the words of
 the ,stra to mean 'the desire of       
knowledge connected with ,brahman' we   
thereby virtually promise that also all 
the heads of discussion which bear on   
,brahman will be treated4--,this reason 
also1 we reply1 is not strong enough to 
uphold your interpretation4 ,for the    
statement of some principal matter      
already implies all the secondary       
matters connected therewith4 ,hence if  
,brahman1 the most eminent of all       
objects of knowledge1 is mentioned1 this

 implies already all those objects of   
enquiry which the enquiry into ,brahman 
presupposes1 and those objects need     
therefore not be mentioned1 especially  
in the ,stra4 ,analogously the sentence 
'there the king is going' implicitly    
means that the king together with his   
retinue is going there4 ,our            
interpretation 7according to which the  
,stra represents ,brahman as the direct 
object of knowledge7 moreover agrees    
with ,scripture1 which directly         
represents ,brahman as the object of the
 desire of knowledge2 compare1 for      
instance1 the passage1 ',that from      
whence these beings are born1 c41 desire
 to know that4 ,that is ,brahman'       
7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a74 ,with passages
 of this kind the ,stra only agrees if  
the genitive case is taken to denote the
 object4 ,hence we do take it in that   
sense4 ,the object of the desire is the 
knowledge of ,brahman up to its complete
 comprehension1 desires having reference
 to results#eg4 ,knowledge thus         

constitutes the means by which the      
complete comprehension of ,brahman is   
desired to be obtained4 ,for the        
complete comprehension of ,brahman is   
the highest end of man1 since it        
destroys the root of all evil such as   
,nescience1 the seed of the entire      
,sa_/m_/sra4 ,hence the desire of       
knowing ,brahman is to be entertained4  
,but1 it may be asked1 is ,brahman known
 or not known 7previously to the enquiry
 into its nature78 ,if it is known we   
need not enter on an enquiry concerning 
it2 if it is not known we can not enter 
on such an enquiry4  ,we reply that     
,brahman is known4 ,brahman1 which is   
all-knowing and endowed with all powers1
 whose essential nature is eternal      
purity1 intelligence1 and freedom1      
exists4 ,for if we consider the         
derivation of the word ',brahman1' from 
the root b_/ri_/h1 'to be great1' we at 
once understand that eternal purity1 and
 so on1 belong to ,brahman#eh4 ,moreover
 the existence of ,brahman is known on  

the ground of its being the ,self of    
every one4 ,for every one is conscious  
of the existence of 7his7 ,self1 and    
never thinks ',i am not4' ,if the       
existence of the ,self were not known1  
every one would think ',i am not4' ,and 
this ,self 7of whose existence all are  
conscious7 is ,brahman4 ,but if ,brahman
 is generally known as the ,self1 there 
is no room for an enquiry into it6 ,not 
so1 we reply2 for there is a conflict of
 opinions as to its special nature4     
,unlearned people and the ,lokyatikas   
are of opinion that the mere body       
endowed with the quality of intelligence
 is the ,self2 others that the organs   
endowed with intelligence are the ,self2
 others maintain that the internal organ
 is the ,self2 others1 again1 that the  
,self is a mere momentary idea2 others1 
again1 that it is the ,void4 ,others1   
again 7to proceed to the opinion of such
 as acknowledge the authority of the    
,veda71 maintain that there is a        
transmigrating being different from the 

body1 and so on1 which is both agent and
 enjoyer 7of the fruits of action72     
others teach that that being is enjoying
 only1 not acting2 others believe that  
in addition to the individual souls1    
there is an all-knowing1 all-powerful   
,lord#ei4 ,others1 finally1 7i4e4 the   
,vedntins7 maintain that the ,lord is   
the ,self of the enjoyer 7i4e4 of the   
individual soul whose individual        
existence is apparent only1 the product 
of ,nescience74  ,thus there are many   
various opinions1 basing part of them on
 sound arguments and scriptural texts1  
part of them on fallacious arguments and
 scriptural texts misunderstood#fj4 ,if 
therefore a man would embrace some one  
of these opinions without previous      
consideration1 he would bar himself from
 the highest beatitude and incur        
grievous loss4 ,for this reason the     
first ,stra proposes1 under the         
designation of an enquiry into ,brahman1
 a disquisition of the ,vednta-texts1 to
 be carried on with the help of         

conformable arguments1 and having for   
its aim the highest beatitude4  ,so far 
it has been said that ,brahman is to be 
enquired into4 ,the question now arises 
what the characteristics of that        
,brahman are1 and the reverend author of
 the ,stras therefore propounds the     
following aphorism4  #b4 7,brahman is   
that7 from which the origin1 c4 7i4e4   
the origin1 subsistence1 and            
dissolution7 of this 7world proceed74   
,the term1 c4 implies subsistence and   
re-absorption4 ,that the origin is      
mentioned first 7of the three7 depends  
on the declaration of ,scripture as well
 as on the natural development of a     
substance4 ,scripture declares the order
 of succession of origin1 subsistence1  
and dissolution in the passage1 ,taitt4 
,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 ',from whence these     
beings are born1' c4 ,and with regard to
 the second reason stated1 it is known  
that a substrate of qualities can       
subsist and be dissolved only after it  
has entered1 through origination1 on the

 state of existence4 ,the words 'of     
this' denote that substrate of qualities
 which is presented to us by perception 
and the other means of right knowledge2 
the genitive case indicates it to be    
connected with origin1 c4 ,the words    
'from which' denote the cause4 ,the full
 sense of the ,stra therefore is3 ,that 
omniscient omnipotent cause from which  
proceed the origin1 subsistence1 and    
dissolution of this world--which world  
is differentiated by names and forms1   
contains many agents and enjoyers1 is   
the abode of the fruits of actions1     
these fruits having their definite      
places1 times1 and causes#fa1 and the   
nature of whose arrangement cannot even 
be conceived by the mind1--that cause1  
we say1 is ,brahman4 ,since the other   
forms of existence 7such as increase1   
decline1 c47 are included in            
origination1 subsistence1 and           
dissolution1 only the three latter are  
referred to in the ,stra4 ,as the six   
stages of existence enumerated by       

,yska#fb are possible only during the   
period of the world's subsistence1 it   
might--were they referred to in the     
,stra--be suspected that what is meant  
are not the origin1 subsistence1 and    
dissolution 7of the world7 as dependent 
on the first cause4 ,to preclude this   
suspicion the ,stra is to be taken as   
referring1 in addition to the world's   
origination from ,brahman1 only to its  
subsistence in ,brahman1 and final      
dissolution into ,brahman4  ,the origin1
 c4 of a world possessing the attributes
 stated above cannot possibly proceed   
from anything else but a ,lord          
possessing the stated qualities2 not    
either from a non-intelligent           
prdhana#fc1 or from atoms1 or from      
non-being1 or from a being subject to   
transmigration#fd2 nor1 again1 can it   
proceed from its own nature 7i4e4       
spontaneously1 without a cause71 since  
we observe that 7for the production of  
effects7 special places1 times1 and     
causes have invariably to be employed4  

7,some of7 those who maintain a ,lord to
 be the cause of the world#fe1 think    
that the existence of a ,lord different 
from mere transmigrating beings can be  
inferred by means of the argument stated
 just now 7without recourse being had to
 ,scripture at all74--,but1 it might be 
said1 you yourself in the ,stra under   
discussion have merely brought forward  
the same argument6--,by no means1 we    
reply4 ,the ,stras 7i4e4 literally 'the 
strings'7 have merely the purpose of    
stringing together the flowers of the   
,vednta-passages4 ,in reality the       
,vednta-passages referred to by the     
,stras are discussed here4 ,for the     
comprehension of ,brahman is effected by
 the ascertainment1 consequent on       
discussion1 of the sense of the         
,vednta-texts1 not either by inference  
or by the other means of right          
knowledge4 ,while1 however1 the         
,vednta-passages primarily declare the  
cause of the origin1 c41 of the world1  
inference also1 being an instrument of  

right knowledge in so far as it does not
 contradict the ,vednta-texts1 is not to
 be excluded as a means of confirming   
the meaning ascertained4 ,scripture     
itself1 moreover1 allows argumentation2 
for the passages1 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1  
#d1 #e 7'the ,self is to be heard1 to be
 considered'71 and ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 
#b 7'as the man1 c41 having been        
informed1 and being able to judge for   
himself1 would arrive at ,gandhra1 in   
the same way a man who meets with a     
teacher obtains knowledge'71 declare    
that human understanding assists        
,scripture#ff4  ,scriptural text1 c4#fg1
 are not1 in the enquiry into ,brahman1 
the only means of knowledge1 as they are
 in the enquiry into active duty 7i4e4  
in the ,prva ,mim_/m_/s71 but scriptural
 texts on the one hand1 and             
intuition#fh1 c41 on the other hand1 are
 to be had recourse to according to the 
occasion3 firstly1 because intuition is 
the final result of the enquiry into    
,brahman2 secondly1 because the object  

of the enquiry is an existing           
7accomplished7 substance4 ,if the object
 of the knowledge of ,brahman were      
something to be accomplished1 there     
would be no reference to intuition1 and 
text1 c41 would be the only means of    
knowledge4 ,the origination of something
 to be accomplished depends1 moreover1  
on man since any action either of       
ordinary life1 or dependent on the ,veda
 may either be done or not be done1 or  
be done in a different way4 ,a man1 for 
instance1 may move on either by means of
 a horse1 or by means of his feet1 or by
 some other means1 or not at all4 ,and  
again 7to quote examples of actions     
dependent on the ,veda71 we meet in     
,scripture with sentences such as the   
following3 ',at the atirtra he takes the
 sho_/d_/asin cup1' and 'at the atirtra 
he does not take the sho_/d_/asin cup2' 
or1 'he makes the oblation after the sun
 has risen1' and1 'he makes the oblation
 when the sun has not yet risen4' ,just 
as in the quoted instances1 injunctions 

and prohibitions1 allowances of optional
 procedure1 general rules and exceptions
 have their place1 so they would have   
their place with regard to ,brahman also
 7if the latter were a thing to be      
accomplished74 ,but the fact is that no 
option is possible as to whether a      
substance is to be thus or thus1 is to  
be or not to be4 ,all option depends on 
the notions of man2 but the knowledge of
 the real nature of a thing does not    
depend on the notions of man1 but only  
on the thing itself4 ,for to think with 
regard to a post1 'this is a post or a  
man1 or something else1' is not         
knowledge of truth2 the two ideas1 'it  
is a man or something else1' being      
false1 and only the third idea1 'it is a
 post1' which depends on the thing      
itself1 falling under the head of true  
knowledge4 ,thus true knowledge of all  
existing things depends on the things   
themselves1 and hence the knowledge of  
,brahman also depends altogether on the 
thing1 i4e4 ,brahman itself4--,but1 it  

might be said1 as ,brahman is an        
existing substance1 it will be the      
object of the other means of right      
knowledge also1 and from this it follows
 that a discussion of the ,vednta-texts 
is purposeless4--,this we deny2 for as  
,brahman is not an object of the senses1
 it has no connection with those other  
means of knowledge4 ,for the senses     
have1 according to their nature1 only   
external things for their objects1 not  
,brahman4 ,if ,brahman were an object of
 the senses1 we might perceive that the 
world is connected with ,brahman as its 
effect2 but as the effect only 7i4e4 the
 world7 is perceived1 it is impossible  
to decide 7through perception7 whether  
it is connected with ,brahman or        
something else4 ,therefore the ,stra    
under discussion is not meant to        
propound inference 7as the means of     
knowing ,brahman71 but rather to set    
forth a ,vednta-text4--,which1 then1 is 
the ,vednta-text which the ,stra points 
at as having to be considered with      

reference to the characteristics of     
,brahman8--,it is the passage ,taitt4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 ',bh_/ri_/gu ,vru_/n_/i 
went to his father ,varu_/n_/a1 saying1 
,sir1 teach me ,brahman1' c41 up to     
',that from whence these beings are     
born1 that by which1 when born1 they    
live1 that into which they enter at     
their death1 try to know that4 ,that is 
,brahman4' ,the sentence finally        
determining the sense of this passage is
 found ,,iii1 #f3 ',from bliss these    
beings are born2 by bliss1 when born1   
they live2 into bliss they enter at     
their death4' ,other passages also are  
to be adduced which declare the cause to
 be the almighty ,being1 whose essential
 nature is eternal purity1 intelligence1
 and freedom4  ,that ,brahman is        
omniscient we have been made to infer   
from it being shown that it is the cause
 of the world4 ,to confirm this         
conclusion1 the ,strakra continues as   
follows3  #c4 7,the omniscience of      
,brahman follows7 from its being the    

source of ,scripture4  ,brahman is the  
source1 i4e4 the cause of the great body
 of ,scripture1 consisting of the       
_/,ri_/g-veda and other branches1 which 
is supported by various disciplines     
7such as grammar1 nyya1 pur_/n_/a1 c472 
which lamp-like illuminates all things2 
which is itself all-knowing as it were4 
,for the origin of a body of ,scripture 
possessing the quality of omniscience   
cannot be sought elsewhere but in       
omniscience itself4 ,it is generally    
understood that the man from whom some  
special body of doctrine referring to   
one province of knowledge only          
originates1 as1 for instance1 grammar   
from ,p_/n_/ini possesses a more        
extensive knowledge than his work1      
comprehensive though it be2 what idea1  
then1 shall we have to form of the      
supreme omniscience and omnipotence of  
that great ,being1 which in sport as it 
were1 easily as a man sends forth his   
breath1 has produced the vast mass of   
holy texts known as the _/,ri_/g-veda1  

c41 the mine of all knowledge1          
consisting of manifold branches1 the    
cause of the distinction of all the     
different classes and conditions of     
gods1 animals1 and men6 ,see what       
,scripture says about him1 ',the        
_/,ri_/g-veda1 c41 have been breathed   
forth from that great ,being' 7,b_/ri_/4
 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #aj74  ,or else we may  
interpret the ,stra to mean that        
,scripture consisting of the            
_/,ri_/g-veda1 c41 as described above1  
is the source or cause1 i4e4 the means  
of right knowledge through which we     
understand the nature of ,brahman4 ,so  
that the sense would be3 through        
,scripture only as a means of knowledge 
,brahman is known to be the cause of the
 origin1 c41 of the world4 ,the special 
scriptural passage meant has been quoted
 under the preceding ,stra 'from which  
these beings are born1' c4--,but as the 
preceding ,stra already has pointed out 
a text showing that ,scripture is the   
source of ,brahman1 of what use then is 

the present ,stra8--,the words of the   
preceding ,stra1 we reply1 did not      
clearly indicate the scriptural passage1
 and room was thus left for the         
suspicion that the origin1 c41 of the   
world were adduced merely as determining
 an inference 7independent of           
,scripture74 ,to obviate this suspicion 
the ,stra under discussion has been     
propounded4  ,but1 again1 how can it be 
said that ,scripture is the means of    
knowing ,brahman8 ,since it has been    
declared that ,scripture aims at action 
7according to the ,prva ,mm_/m_/s ,stra 
,i1 #b1 #a1 ',as the purport of         
,scripture is action1 those scriptural  
passages whose purport is not action are
 purportless'71 the ,vednta-passages    
whose purport is not action are         
purportless4 ,or else if they are to    
have some sense1 they must either1 by   
manifesting the agent1 the divinity or  
the fruit of the action1 form           
supplements to the passages enjoining   
actions1 or serve the purpose of        

themselves enjoining a new class of     
actions1 such as devout meditation and  
the like4 ,for the ,veda cannot possibly
 aim at conveying information regarding 
the nature of accomplished substances1  
since the latter are the objects of     
perception and the other means of proof 
7which give sufficient information about
 them2 while it is the recognised object
 of the ,veda to give information about 
what is not known from other sources74  
,and if it did give such information1 it
 would not be connected with things to  
be desired or shunned1 and thus be of no
 use to man4 ,for this very reason      
,vedic passages1 such as 'he howled1    
c41' which at first sight appear        
purposeless1 are shown to have a purpose
 in so far as they glorify certain      
actions 7cp4 ,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,i1 #b1 #g1    
',because they stand in syntactical     
connection with the injunctions1        
therefore their purport is to glorify   
the injunctions'74 ,in the same way     
mantras are shown to stand in a certain 

relation to actions1 in so far as they  
notify the actions themselves and the   
means by which they are accomplished4   
,so1 for instance1 the mantra1 ',for    
strength thee 7,i cut2' which           
accompanies the cutting of a branch     
employed in the                         
dar_/s_/apr_/n_/amsa-sacrifice74 ,in    
short1 no ,vedic passage is seen or can 
be proved to have a meaning but in so   
far as it is related to an action4 ,and 
injunctions which are defined as having 
actions for their objects cannot refer  
to accomplished existent things4 ,hence 
we maintain that the ,vednta-texts are  
mere supplements to those passages which
 enjoin actions2 notifying the agents1  
divinities1 and results connected with  
those actions4 ,or else1 if this be not 
admitted1 on the ground of its involving
 the introduction of a subject-matter   
foreign to the ,vednta-texts 7viz4 the  
subject-matter of the ,karmak_/nd_/a of 
the ,veda71 we must admit 7the second of
 the two alternatives proposed above    

viz47 that the ,vednta-texts refer to   
devout meditation 7upsan7 and similar   
actions which are mentioned in those    
very 7,vednta7 texts4 ,the result of all
 of which is that ,scripture is not the 
source of ,brahman4  ,to this           
argumentation the ,strakra replies as   
follows3  #d4 ,but that 7,brahman is to 
be known from ,scripture71 because it is
 connected 7with the ,vednta-texts7 as  
their purport4  ,the word 'but' is meant
 to rebut the prva-paksha 7the prim     
facie view as urged above74 ,that       
all-knowing1 all-powerful ,brahman1     
which is the cause of the origin1       
subsistence1 and dissolution of the     
world1 is known from the ,vednta-part of
 ,scripture4 ,how8 ,because in all the  
,vednta-texts the sentences construe in 
so far as they have for their purport1  
as they intimate that matter 7viz4      
,brahman74 ,compare1 for instance1      
',being only this was in the beginning1 
one1 without a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 
#b1 #a72 ',in the beginning all this was

 ,self1 one only' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1   
#a1 #a72 ',this is the ,brahman without 
cause and without effect1 without       
anything inside or outside2 this ,self  
is ,brahman perceiving everything'      
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai72 ',that  
immortal ,brahman is before' 7,mu4 ,up4 
,,ii1 #b1 #aa72 and similar passages4   
,if the words contained in these        
passages have once been determined to   
refer to ,brahman1 and their purport is 
understood thereby1 it would be improper
 to assume them to have a different     
sense2 for that would involve the fault 
of abandoning the direct statements of  
the text in favour of mere assumptions4 
,nor can we conclude the purport of     
these passages to be the intimation of  
the nature of agents1 divinities1 c4    
7connected with acts of religious duty72
 for there are certain scriptural       
passages which preclude all actions1    
actors1 and fruits1 as1 for instance1   
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ac1 ',then by 
what should he see whom8' 7which passage

 intimates that there is neither an     
agent1 nor an object of action1 nor an  
instrument47 ,nor again can ,brahman1   
though it is of the nature of an        
accomplished thing1 be the object of    
perception and the other means of       
knowledge2 for the fact of everything   
having its ,self in ,brahman cannot be  
grasped without the aid of the          
scriptural passage ',that art thou'     
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g74 ,nor can it   
rightly be objected that instruction is 
purportless if not connected with       
something either to be striven after or 
shunned2 for from the mere comprehension
 of ,brahman's ,self1 which is not      
something either to be avoided or       
endeavoured after1 there results        
cessation of all pain1 and thereby the  
attainment of man's highest aim4 ,that  
passages notifying certain divinities1  
and so on1 stand in subordinate relation
 to acts of devout meditation mentioned 
in the same chapters may readily be     
admitted4 ,but it is impossible that    

,brahman should stand in an analogous   
relation to injunctions of devout       
meditation1 for if the knowledge of     
absolute unity has once arisen there    
exists no longer anything to be desired 
or avoided1 and thereby the conception  
of duality1 according to which we       
distinguish actions1 agents1 and the    
like1 is destroyed4 ,if the conception  
of duality is once uprooted by the      
conception of absolute unity1 it cannot 
arise again1 and so no longer be the    
cause of ,brahman being looked upon as  
the complementary object of injunctions 
of devotion4 ,other parts of the ,veda  
may have no authority except in so far  
as they are connected with injunctions2 
still it is impossible to impugn on that
 ground the authoritativeness of        
passages conveying the knowledge of the 
,self2 for such passages have their own 
result4 ,nor1 finally1 can the          
authoritativeness of the ,veda be proved
 by inferential reasoning so that it    
would be dependent on instances observed

 elsewhere4 ,from all which it follows  
that the ,veda possesses authority as a 
means of right knowledge of ,brahman4   
,here others raise the following        
objection3--,although the ,veda is the  
means of gaining a right knowledge of   
,brahman1 yet it intimates ,brahman only
 as the object of certain injunctions1  
just as the information which the ,veda 
gives about the sacrificial post1 the   
havanya-fire and other objects not known
 from the practice of common life is    
merely supplementary to certain         
injunctions#fi4 ,why so8 ,because the   
,veda has the purport of either         
instigating to action or restraining    
from it4 ,for men fully acquainted with 
the object of the ,veda have made the   
following declaration1 ',the purpose of 
the ,veda is seen to be the injunction  
of actions' 7,bhshya on ,jaimini ,stra  
,i1 #a1 #a72 ',injunction means passages
 impelling to action' 7,bh4 on ,jaim4   
,s4 ,i1 #a1 #b72 ',of this 7viz4 active 
religious duty7 the knowledge comes from

 injunction' 7part of ,jaim4 ,s4 ,i1 #a1
 #e72 ',the 7words7 denoting those      
7things7 are to be connected with 7the  
injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage7   
whose purport is action' 7,jaim4 ,s4 ,i1
 #a1 #be72 ',as action is the purport of
 the ,veda1 whatever does not refer to  
action is purportless' 7,jaim4 ,s4 ,i1  
#b1 #a74 ,therefore the ,veda has a     
purport in so far only as it rouses the 
activity of man with regard to some     
actions and restrains it with regard to 
others2 other passages 7i4e4 all those  
passages which are not directly         
injunctive7 have a purport only in so   
far as they supplement injunctions and  
prohibitions4 ,hence the ,vednta-texts  
also as likewise belonging to the ,veda 
can have a meaning in the same way only4
 ,and if their aim is injunction1 then  
just as the agnihotra-oblation and other
 rites are enjoined as means for him who
 is desirous of the heavenly world1 so  
the knowledge of ,brahman is enjoined as
 a means for him who is desirous of     

immortality4--,but--somebody might      
object--it has been declared that there 
is a difference in the character of the 
objects enquired into1 the object of    
enquiry in the karma-k_/nd_/a 7that part
 of the ,veda which treats of active    
religious duty7 being something to be   
accomplished1 viz4 duty1 while here the 
object is the already existent          
absolutely accomplished ,brahman4 ,from 
this it follows that the fruit of the   
knowledge of ,brahman must be of a      
different nature from the fruit of the  
knowledge of duty which depends on the  
performance of actions#gj4--,we reply   
that it must not be such because the    
,vednta-texts give information about    
,brahman only in so far as it is        
connected with injunctions of actions4  
,we meet with injunctions of the        
following kind1 ',verily the ,self is to
 be seen' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e72
 ',the ,self which is free from sin that
 it is which we must search out1 that it
 is which we must try to understand'    

7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a72 ',let a man 
worship him as ,self' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,i1 #d1 #g72 ',let a man worship the    
,self only as his true state' 7,b_/ri_/4
 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #ae72 ',he who knows      
,brahman becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #b1 #i74 ,these injunctions rouse
 in us the desire to know what that     
,brahman is4 ,it1 therefore1 is the task
 of the ,vednta-texts to set forth      
,brahman's nature1 and they perform that
 task by teaching us that ,brahman is   
eternal1 all-knowing1 absolutely        
self-sufficient1 ever pure1 intelligent 
and free1 pure knowledge1 absolute      
bliss4 ,from the devout meditation on   
this ,brahman there results as its      
fruit1 final release1 which1 although   
not to be discerned in the ordinary way1
 is discerned by means of the _/s_/stra4
 ,if1 on the other hand1 the            
,vednta-texts were considered to have no
 reference to injunctions of actions1   
but to contain statements about mere    
7accomplished7 things1 just as if one   

were saying 'the earth comprises seven  
dvipas1' 'that king is marching on1'    
they would be purportless1 because then 
they could not possibly be connected    
with something to be shunned or         
endeavoured after4--,perhaps it will    
here be objected that sometimes a mere  
statement about existent things has a   
purpose1 as1 for instance1 the          
affirmation1 ',this is a rope1 not a    
snake1' serves the purpose of removing  
the fear engendered by an erroneous     
opinion1 and that so likewise the       
,vednta-passages making statements about
 the non-transmigrating ,self1 have a   
purport of their own 7without reference 
to any action71 viz4 in so far as they  
remove the erroneous opinion of the     
,self being liable to                   
transmigration4--,we reply that this    
might be so if just as the mere hearing 
of the true nature of the rope dispels  
the fear caused by the imagined snake1  
so the mere hearing of the true nature  
of ,brahman would dispel the erroneous  

notion of one's being subject to        
transmigration4 ,but this is not the    
case2 for we observe that even men to   
whom the true nature of ,brahman has    
been stated continue to be affected by  
pleasure1 pain1 and the other qualities 
attaching to the transmigratory         
condition4 ,moreover1 we see from the   
passage1 _/,bri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e1   
',the ,self is to be heard1 to be       
considered1 to be reflected upon1' that 
consideration and reflection have to    
follow the mere hearing4 ,from all this 
it results that the sstra can be        
admitted as a means of knowing ,brahman 
in so far only as the latter is         
connected with injunctions4  ,to all    
this1 we1 the ,vedntins1 make the       
following reply3--,the preceding        
reasoning is not valid1 on account of   
the different nature of the fruits of   
actions on the one side1 and of the     
knowledge of ,brahman on the other side4
 ,the enquiry into those actions1       
whether of body1 speech1 or mind1 which 

are known from _/,s_/ruti and           
,sm_/ri_/ti1 and are comprised under the
 name 'religious duty' 7dharma71 is     
carried on in the ,jaimini ,stra1 which 
begins with the words 'then therefore   
the enquiry into duty2' the opposite of 
duty also 7adharma71 such as doing harm1
 c41 which is defined in the prohibitory
 injunctions1 forms an object of enquiry
 to the end that it may be avoided4 ,the
 fruits of duty1 which is good1 and its 
opposite1 which is evil1 both of which  
are defined by original ,vedic          
statements1 are generally known to be   
sensible pleasure and pain1 which make  
themselves felt to body1 speech1 and    
mind only1 are produced by the contact  
of the organs of sense with the objects1
 and affect all animate beings from     
,brahman down to a tuft of grass4       
,scripture1 agreeing with observation1  
states that there are differences in the
 degree of pleasure of all embodied     
creatures from men upward to ,brahman4  
,from those differences it is inferred  

that there are differences in the       
degrees of the merit acquired by actions
 in accordance with religious duty2     
therefrom again are inferred differences
 in degree between those qualified to   
perform acts of religious duty4 ,those  
latter differences are moreover known to
 be affected by the desire of certain   
results 7which entitles the man so      
desirous to perform certain religious   
acts71 worldly possessions1 and the     
like4 ,it is further known from         
,scripture that those only who perform  
sacrifices proceed1 in consequence of   
the pre-eminence of their knowledge and 
meditation1 on the northern path 7of the
 sun2 ,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #a71 while mere
 minor offerings1 works of public       
utility and alms1 only lead through     
smoke and the other stages to the       
southern path4 ,and that there also     
7viz4 in the moon which is finally      
reached by those who have passed along  
the southern path7 there are degrees of 
pleasure and the means of pleasure is   

understood from the passage ',having    
dwelt there till their works are        
consumed4' ,analogously it is understood
 that the different degrees of pleasure 
which are enjoyed by the embodied       
creatures1 from man downward to the     
inmates of hell and to immovable things1
 are the mere effects of religious merit
 as defined in ,vedic injunctions4 ,on  
the other hand1 from the different      
degrees of pain endured by higher and   
lower embodied creatures1 there is      
inferred difference of degree in its    
cause1 viz4 religious demerit as defined
 in the prohibitory injunctions1 and in 
its agents4 ,this difference in the     
degree of pain and pleasure1 which has  
for its antecedent embodied existence1  
and for its cause the difference of     
degree of merit and demerit of animated 
beings1 liable to faults such as        
ignorance and the like1 is well         
known--from _/,s_/ruti1 ,sm_/ri_/ti1 and
 reasoning--to be non-eternal1 of a     
fleeting1 changing nature 7sa_/m_/sra74 

,the following text1 for instance1 ',as 
long as he is in the body he cannot get 
free from pleasure and pain' 7,ch4 ,up4 
,,viii1 #ab1 #a71 refers to the         
sa_/m_/sra-state as described above4    
,from the following passage1 on the     
other hand1 ',when he is free from the  
body then neither pleasure nor pain     
touches him1' which denies the touch of 
pain or pleasure1 we learn that the     
unembodied state called 'final release' 
7moksha7 is declared not to be the      
effect of religious merit as defined by 
,vedic injunctions4 ,for if it were the 
effect of merit it would not be denied  
that it is subject to pain and pleasure4
 ,should it be said that the very       
circumstance of its being an unembodied 
state is the effect of merit1 we reply  
that that cannot be1 since ,scripture   
declares that state to be naturally and 
originally an unembodied one4 ',the wise
 who knows the ,self as bodiless within 
the bodies1 as unchanging among changing
 things1 as great and omnipresent does  

never grieve' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #bb72    
',he is without breath1 without mind1   
pure' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b72 ',that  
person is not attached to anything'     
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ae7ga4 ,all  
which passages establish the fact that  
so-called release differs from all the  
fruits of action1 and is an eternally   
and essentially disembodied state4      
,among eternal things1 some indeed may  
be 'eternal1 although changing'         
7pari_/n_/minitya71 viz4 those1 the idea
 of whose identity is not destroyed1    
although they may undergo changes2 such1
 for instance1 are earth and the other  
elements in the opinion of those who    
maintain the eternity of the world1 or  
the three gu_/n_/as in the opinion of   
the ,snkhyas4 ,but this 7moksha7 is     
eternal in the true sense1 i4e4 eternal 
without undergoing any changes          
7k_/ta_/sthanitya71 omnipresent as      
ether1 free from all modifications1     
absolutely self-sufficient1 not composed
 of parts1 of self-luminous nature4     

,that bodiless entity in fact1 to which 
merit and demerit with their            
consequences and threefold time do not  
apply1 is called release2 a definition  
agreeing with scriptural passages1 such 
as the following3 ',different from merit
 and demerit1 different from effect and 
cause1 different from past and future'  
7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ad74 ,it#gb 7i4e4   
moksha7 is1 therefore1 the same as      
,brahman in the enquiry into which we   
are at present engaged4 ,if ,brahman    
were represented as supplementary to    
certain actions1 and release were       
assumed to be the effect of those       
actions1 it would be non-eternal1 and   
would have to be considered merely as   
something holding a pre-eminent position
 among the described non-eternal fruits 
of actions with their various degrees4  
,but that release is something eternal  
is acknowledged by whoever admits it at 
all1 and the teaching concerning        
,brahman can therefore not be merely    
supplementary to actions4  ,there are1  

moreover1 a number of scriptural        
passages which declare release to follow
 immediately on the cognition of        
,brahman1 and which thus preclude the   
possibility of an effect intervening    
between the two2 for instance1 ',he who 
knows ,brahman becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4  
,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i72 ',all his works    
perish when ,he has been beheld1 who is 
the higher and the lower' 7,mu4 ,up4    
,,ii1 #b1 #h72 ',he who knows the bliss 
of ,brahman fears nothing' 7,taitt4 ,up4
 ,,ii1 #i72 ',o ,janaka1 you have indeed
 reached fearlessness' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4  
,,iv1 #b1 #d72 ',that ,brahman knew its 
,self only1 saying1 ,i am ,brahman4     
,from it all this sprang' 7,b_/ri_/4    
,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj72 ',what sorrow1 what  
trouble can there be to him who beholds 
that unity8' 7s4 ,up4 #g47 ,we must     
likewise quote the passage1--,b_/ri_/4  
,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj1 7',seeing this the    
_/,ri_/shi ,vmadeva understood3 ,i was  
,manu1 ,i was the sun1'7 in order to    
exclude the idea of any action taking   

place between one's seeing ,brahman and 
becoming one with the universal ,self2  
for that passage is analogous to the    
following one1 'standing he sings1' from
 which we understand that no action due 
to the same agent intervenes between the
 standing and the singing4 ,other       
scriptural passages show that the       
removal of the obstacles which lie in   
the way of release is the only fruit of 
the knowledge of ,brahman2 so1 for      
instance1 ',you indeed are our father1  
you who carry us from our ignorance to  
the other shore' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72  
',i have heard from men like you that he
 who knows the ,self overcomes grief4 ,i
 am in grief4 ,do1 ,sir1 help me over   
this grief of mine' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1   
#a1 #c72 ',to him after his faults had  
been rubbed out1 the venerable          
,sanatkumra showed the other side of    
darkness' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74   
,the same is the purport of the ,stra1  
supported by arguments1 of 7,gautama7   
krya1 ',final release results from the  

successive removal of wrong knowledge1  
faults1 activity1 birth1 pain1 the      
removal of each later member of the     
series depending on the removal of the  
preceding member' 7,nyy4 ,s4 ,i1 i1 #b72
 and wrong knowledge itself is removed  
by the knowledge of one's ,self being   
one with the ,self of ,brahman4  ,nor is
 this knowledge of the ,self being one  
with ,brahman a mere 7fanciful7         
combination#gc1 as is made use of1 for  
instance1 in the following passage1     
',for the mind is endless1 and the      
,vi_/s_/vedevas are endless1 and he     
thereby gains the endless world'        
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #i7gd2 nor is
 it an 7in reality unfounded7 ascription
 7superimposition7#ge1 as in the        
passages1 ',let him meditate on mind as 
,brahman1' and 'ditya is ,brahman1 this 
is the doctrine' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 
#a2 #ai1 #a71 where the contemplation as
 ,brahman is superimposed on the mind1  
ditya and so on2 nor1 again1 is it 7a   
figurative conception of identity7      

founded on the connection 7of the things
 viewed as identical7 with some special 
activity1 as in the passage1 ',air is   
indeed the absorber2 breath is indeed   
the absorber#gf' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1   
#a2 #c72 nor is it a mere 7ceremonial7  
purification of 7the ,self constituting 
a subordinate member7 of an action 7viz4
 the action of seeing1 c41 ,brahman71 in
 the same way as1 for instance1 the act 
of looking at the sacrificial butter#gg4
 ,for if the knowledge of the identity  
of the ,self and ,brahman were          
understood in the way of combination and
 the like1 violence would be done       
thereby to the connection of the words  
whose object1 in certain passages1 it   
clearly is to intimate the fact of      
,brahman and the ,self being really     
identical2 so1 for instance1 in the     
following passages1 ',that art thou'    
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',i am        
,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj72 
',this ,self is ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4    
,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai74 ,and other texts   

which declare that the fruit of the     
cognition of ,brahman is the cessation  
of ,ignorance would be contradicted     
thereby2 so1 for instance1 ',the fetter 
of the heart is broken1 all doubts are  
solved' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h74 ,nor1 
finally1 would it be possible1 in that  
case1 satisfactorily to explain the     
passages which speak of the individual  
,self becoming ,brahman3 such as ',he   
who knows ,brahman becomes ,brahman'    
7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i74 ,hence the   
knowledge of the unity of ,brahman and  
the ,self cannot be of the nature of    
figurative combination and the like4    
,the knowledge of ,brahman does1        
therefore1 not depend on the active     
energy of man1 but is analogous to the  
knowledge of those things which are the 
objects of perception1 inference1 and so
 on1 and thus depends on the object of  
knowledge only4 ,of such a ,brahman or  
its knowledge it is impossible to       
establish1 by reasoning1 any connection 
with actions4  ,nor1 again1 can we      

connect ,brahman with acts by           
representing it as the object of the    
action of knowing4 ,for that it is not  
such is expressly declared in two       
passages1 viz4 ',it is different from   
the known and again above 7i4e4         
different from7 the unknown' 7,ken4 ,up4
 ,i1 #c72 and ',how should he know him  
by whom he knows all this8' 7,b_/ri_/4  
,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ac47 ,in the same way   
,brahman is expressly declared not to be
 the object of the act of devout        
meditation1 viz4 in the second half of  
the verse1 ,ken4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 whose     
first half declares it not to be an     
object 7of speech1 mind1 and so on71    
',that which is not proclaimed by       
speech1 by which speech is proclaimed1  
that only know to be ,brahman1 not that 
on which people devoutly meditate as    
this4' ,if it should be objected that if
 ,brahman is not an object 7of speech1  
mind1 c47 the sstra can impossibly be   
its source1 we refute this objection by 
the remark that the aim of the sstra is 

to discard all distinctions fictitiously
 created by ,nescience4 ,the sstra's    
purport is not to represent ,brahman    
definitely as this or that object1 its  
purpose is rather to show that ,brahman 
as the eternal subject 7pratyagtman1 the
 inward ,self7 is never an object1 and  
thereby to remove the distinction of    
objects known1 knowers1 acts of         
knowledge1 c41 which is fictitiously    
created by ,nescience4 ,accordingly the 
sstra says1 ',by whom it is not thought 
by him it is thought1 by whom it is     
thought he does not know it2 unknown by 
those who know it1 it is known by those 
who do not know it' 7,ken4 ,up4 ,,ii1   
#c72 and ',thou couldst not see the seer
 of sight1 thou couldst not hear the    
hearer of hearing1 nor perceive the     
perceiver of perception1 nor know the   
knower of knowledge' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iii1 #d1 #b74 ,as thereby 7i4e4 by the
 knowledge derived from the sstra7 the  
imagination of the transitoriness of    
,release which is due to ,nescience is  

discarded1 and ,release is shown to be  
of the nature of the eternally free     
,self1 it cannot be charged with the    
imperfection of non-eternality4 ,those1 
on the other hand1 who consider ,release
 to be something to be effected properly
 maintain that it depends on the action 
of mind1 speech1 or body4 ,so1 likewise1
 those who consider it to be a mere     
modification4 ,non-eternality of        
,release is the certain consequence of  
these two opinions2 for we observe in   
common life that things which are       
modifications1 such as sour milk and the
 like1 and things which are effects1    
such as jars1 c41 are non-eternal4 ,nor1
 again1 can it be said that there is a  
dependance on action in consequence of  
7,brahman or ,release7 being something  
which is to be obtained#gh2 for as      
,brahman constitutes a person's ,self it
 is not something to be attained by that
 person4 ,and even if ,brahman were     
altogether different from a person's    
,self still it would not be something to

 be obtained2 for as it is omnipresent  
it is part of its nature that it is ever
 present to every one1 just as the      
7all-pervading7 ether is4 ,nor1 again1  
can it be maintained that ,release is   
something to be ceremonially purified1  
and as such depends on an activity4 ,for
 ceremonial purification 7sa_/m_/skra7  
results either from the accretion of    
some excellence or from the removal of  
some blemish4 ,the former alternative   
does not apply to ,release as it is of  
the nature of ,brahman1 to which no     
excellence can be added2 nor1 again1    
does the latter alternative apply1 since
 ,release is of the nature of ,brahman1 
which is eternally pure4--,but1 it might
 be said1 ,release might be a quality of
 the ,self which is merely hidden and   
becomes manifest on the ,self being     
purified by some action2 just as the    
quality of clearness becomes manifest in
 a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by 
means of the action of rubbing4--,this  
objection is invalid1 we reply1 because 

the ,self cannot be the abode of any    
action4 ,for an action cannot exist     
without modifying that in which it      
abides4 ,but if the ,self were modified 
by an action its non-eternality would   
result therefrom1 and texts such as the 
following1 'unchangeable he is called1' 
would thus be stultified2 an altogether 
unacceptable result4 ,hence it is       
impossible to assume that any action    
should abide in the ,self4 ,on the other
 hand1 the ,self cannot be purified by  
actions abiding in something else as it 
stands in no relation to that extraneous
 something4 ,nor will it avail to point 
out 7as a quasi-analogous case7 that the
 embodied ,self 7dehin1 the individual  
soul7 is purified by certain ritual     
actions which abide in the body1 such as
 bathing1 rinsing one's mouth1 wearing  
the sacrificial thread1 and the like4   
,for what is purified by those actions  
is that ,self merely which is joined to 
the body1 i4e4 the ,self in so far as it
 is under the power of ,nescience4 ,for 

it is a matter of perception that       
bathing and similar actions stand in the
 relation of inherence to the body1 and 
it is therefore only proper to conclude 
that by such actions only that something
 is purified which is joined to the     
body4 ,if a person thinks ',i am free   
from disease1' he predicates health of  
that entity only which is connected with
 and mistakenly identifies itself with  
the harmonious condition of matter 7i4e4
 the body7 resulting from appropriate   
medical treatment applied to the body   
7i4e4 the ',i' constituting the subject 
of predication is only the individual   
embodied ,self74 ,analogously that ,i   
which predicates of itself1 that it is  
purified by bathing and the like1 is    
only the individual soul joined to the  
body4 ,for it is only this latter       
principle of egoity                     
7aha_/m_/kart_/ri_/71 the object of the 
notion of the ego and the agent in all  
cognition1 which accomplishes all       
actions and enjoys their results4 ,thus 

the mantras also declare1 ',one of them 
eats the sweet fruit1 the other looks on
 without eating' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1  
#a72 and ',when he is in union with the 
body1 the senses1 and the mind1 then    
wise people call him the ,enjoyer' 7,ka4
 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #d74 ,of ,brahman1 on  
the other hand1 the two following       
passages declare that it is incapable of
 receiving any accretion and eternally  
pure1 ',he is the one ,god1 hidden in   
all beings1 all-pervading1 the ,self    
within all beings1 watching over all    
works1 dwelling in all beings1 the      
witness1 the perceiver1 the only one2   
free from qualities' 7_/,s_/v4 ,up4     
,,vi1 #aa72 and ',he pervaded all1      
bright1 incorporeal1 scatheless1 without
 muscles1 pure1 untouched by evil'      
7_/s_/4 ,up4 #h74 ,but ,release is      
nothing but being ,brahman4 ,therefore  
,release is not something to be         
purified4 ,and as nobody is able to show
 any other way in which ,release could  
be connected with action1 it is         

impossible that it should stand in any1 
even the slightest1 relation to any     
action1 excepting knowledge4  ,but1 it  
will be said here1 knowledge itself is  
an activity of the mind4 ,by no means1  
we reply2 since the two are of different
 nature4 ,an action is that which is    
enjoined as being independent of the    
nature of existing things and dependent 
on the energy of some person's mind2    
compare1 for instance1 the following    
passages1 ',to whichever divinity the   
offering is made on that one let him    
meditate when about to say vasha_/t_/'  
7,ait4 ,brhm4 ,,iii1 #h1 #a72 and ',let 
him meditate in his mind on the sandhy4'
 ,meditation and reflection are indeed  
mental1 but as they depend on the       
7meditating1 c47 person they may either 
be performed or not be performed or     
modified4 ,knowledge1 on the other hand1
 is the result of the different means of
 7right7 knowledge1 and those have for  
their objects existing things2 knowledge
 can therefore not be either made or not

 made or modified1 but depends entirely 
on existing things1 and not either on   
,vedic statements or on the mind of man4
 ,although mental it thus widely differs
 from meditation and the like4  ,the    
meditation1 for instance1 on man and    
woman as fire1 which is founded on ,ch4 
,up4 ,v1 #g1 #a2 #h1 #a1 ',the fire is  
man1 ,o ,gautama2 the fire is woman1 ,o 
,gautama1' is on account of its being   
the result of a ,vedic statement1 merely
 an action and dependent on man2 that   
conception of fire1 on the other hand1  
which refers to the well-known 7real7   
fire1 is neither dependent on ,vedic    
statements nor on man1 but only on a    
real thing which is an object of        
perception2 it is therefore knowledge   
and not an action4 ,the same remark     
applies to all things which are the     
objects of the different means of right 
knowledge4 ,this being thus that        
knowledge also which has the existent   
,brahman for its object is not dependent
 on ,vedic injunction4 ,hence1 although 

imperative and similar forms referring  
to the knowledge of ,brahman are found  
in the ,vedic texts1 yet they are       
ineffective because they refer to       
something which cannot be enjoined1 just
 as the edge of a razor becomes blunt   
when it is applied to a stone4 ,for they
 have for their object something which  
can neither be endeavoured after nor    
avoided4--,but what then1 it will be    
asked1 is the purport of those sentences
 which1 at any rate1 have the appearance
 of injunctions2 such as1 ',the ,self is
 to be seen1 to be heard about8'--,they 
have the purport1 we reply1 of diverting
 7men7 from the objects of natural      
activity4 ,for when a man acts intent on
 external things1 and only anxious to   
attain the objects of his desire and to 
eschew the objects of his aversion1 and 
does not thereby reach the highest aim  
of man although desirous of attaining   
it2 such texts as the one quoted divert 
him from the objects of natural activity
 and turn the stream of his thoughts on 

the inward 7the highest7 ,self4 ,that   
for him who is engaged in the enquiry   
into the ,self1 the true nature of the  
,self is nothing either to be           
endeavoured after or to be avoided1 we  
learn from texts such as the following3 
',this everything1 all is that ,self'   
7,b_/ri_/1 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',but    
when the ,self only is all this1 how    
should he see another1 how should he    
know another1 how should he know the    
knower8' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae72
 ',this ,self is ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai74 ,that the knowledge
 of ,brahman refers to something which  
is not a thing to be done1 and therefore
 is not concerned either with the       
pursuit or the avoidance of any object1 
is the very thing we admit2 for just    
that constitutes our glory1 that as soon
 as we comprehend ,brahman1 all our     
duties come to an end and all our work  
is over4 ,thus _/,s_/ruti says1 ',if a  
man understands the ,self1 saying1 ,i am
 he1 what could he wish or desire that  

he should pine after the body8'         
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ab47 ,and    
similarly ,sm_/ri_/ti declares1 ',having
 understood this the understanding man  
has done with all work1 ,o ,bhrata'     
7,bha4 ,gt ,,xv1 #bj74 ,therefore       
,brahman is not represented as the      
object of injunctions4  ,we now proceed 
to consider the doctrine of those who   
maintain that there is no part of the   
,veda which has the purport of making   
statements about mere existent things1  
and is not either an injunction or a    
prohibition1 or supplementary to either4
 ,this opinion is erroneous1 because the
 soul 7purusha71 which is the subject of
 the ,upanishads1 does not constitute a 
complement to anything else4 ,of that   
soul which is to be comprehended from   
the ,upanishads only1 which is          
non-transmigratory1 ,brahman1 different 
in nature from the four classes of      
substances#gi1 which forms a topic of   
its own and is not a complement to      
anything else2 of that soul it is       

impossible to say that it is not or is  
not apprehended2 for the passage1 ',that
 ,self is to be described by ,no1 no6'  
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #bf7         
designates it as the ,self1 and that the
 ,self is cannot be denied4 ,the        
possible objection that there is no     
reason to maintain that the soul is     
known from the ,upanishads only1 since  
it is the object of self-consciousness1 
is refuted by the fact that the soul of 
which the ,upanishads treat is merely   
the witness of that 7i4e4 of the object 
of self-consciousness1 viz4 the jvtman74
 ,for neither from that part of the     
,veda which enjoins works nor from      
reasoning1 anybody apprehends that soul 
which1 different from the agent that is 
the object of self-consciousness1 merely
 witnesses it2 which is permanent in all
 7transitory7 beings2 uniform2 one2     
eternally unchanging2 the ,self of      
everything4 ,hence it can neither be    
denied nor be represented as the mere   
complement of injunctions2 for of that  

very person who might deny it it is the 
,self4 ,and as it is the ,self of all1  
it can neither be striven after nor     
avoided4 ,all perishable things indeed  
perish1 because they are mere           
modifications1 up to 7i4e4 exclusive of7
 the soul4 ,but the soul is             
imperishable#hj1 as there is no cause   
why it should perish2 and eternally     
unchanging1 as there is no cause for its
 undergoing any modification2 hence it  
is in its essence eternally pure and    
free4 ,and from passages1 such as       
',beyond the soul there is nothing2 this
 is the goal1 the highest road' 7,ka4   
,up4 ,i1 #c1 #aa71 and ',that soul1     
taught in the ,upanishads1 ,i ask thee' 
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #bf71 it     
appears that the attribute of resting on
 the ,upanishads is properly given to   
the soul1 as it constitutes their chief 
topic4 ,to say1 therefore1 that there is
 no portion of the ,veda referring to   
existing things1 is a mere bold         
assertion4  ,with regard to the         

quotations made of the views of men     
acquainted with the purport of the      
_/,s_/stra 7who alone were stated to    
have declared that the ,veda treats of  
actions7 it is to be understood that    
they1 having to do with the enquiry into
 duty1 refer to that part of the        
_/,s_/stra which consists of injunctions
 and prohibitions4 ,with regard to the  
other passage quoted 7'as action is the 
purport of the ,veda1 whatever does not 
refer to action is purportless'7 we     
remark that if that passage were taken  
in an absolutely strict sense 7when it  
would mean that only those words which  
denote action have a meaning71 it would 
follow that all information about       
existent things is meaningless#ha4 ,if1 
on the other hand1 the ,veda--in        
addition to the injunctions of activity 
and cessation of activity--does give    
information about existent things as    
being subservient to some action to be  
accomplished1 why then should it not    
give information also about the existent

 eternally unchangeable ,self8 ,for an  
existent thing1 about which information 
is given1 does not become an act        
7through being stated to be subservient 
to an act74--,but1 it will be said1     
although existent things are not acts1  
yet1 as they are instrumental to action1
 the information given about such things
 is merely subservient to               
action4--,this1 we reply1 does not      
matter2 for although the information may
 be subservient to action1 the things   
themselves about which information is   
given are already intimated thereby as  
things which have the power of bringing 
about certain actions4 ,their final end 
7prayojana7 indeed may be subserviency  
to some action1 but thereby they do not 
cease to be1 in the information given   
about them1 intimated in                
themselves4--,well1 and if they are thus
 intimated1 what is gained thereby for  
your purpose#hb8 ,we reply that the     
information about the ,self1 which is an
 existing thing not comprehended from   

other sources1 is of the same nature 7as
 the information about other existent   
things72 for by the comprehension of the
 ,self a stop is put to all false       
knowledge1 which is the cause of        
transmigration1 and thus a purpose is   
established which renders the passages  
relative to ,brahman equal to those     
passages which give information about   
things instrumental to actions4         
,moreover1 there are found 7even in that
 part of the ,veda which treats of      
actions7 such passages as 'a            
,brhma_/n_/a is not to be killed1' which
 teach abstinence from certain actions4 
,now abstinence from action is neither  
action nor instrumental to action4 ,if1 
therefore1 the tenet that all those     
passages which do not express action are
 devoid of purport were insisted on1 it 
would follow that all such passages as  
the one quoted1 which teach abstinence  
from action1 are devoid of purport--a   
consequence which is of course          
unacceptable4 ,nor1 again1 can the      

connexion in which the word 'not' stands
 with the action expressed by the verb  
'is to be killed'--which action is      
naturally established#hc--;be used as a 
reason for assuming that 'not' denotes  
an action non-established elsewhere#hd1 
different from the state of mere        
passivity implied in the abstinence from
 the act of killing4 ,for the peculiar  
function of the particle 'not' is to    
intimate the idea of the non-existence  
of that with which it is connected1 and 
the conception of the non-existence 7of 
something to be done7 is the cause of   
the state of passivity4 7,nor can it be 
objected that1 as soon as that momentary
 idea has passed away1 the state of     
passivity will again make room for      
activity2 for7 that idea itself passes  
away 7only after having completely      
destroyed the natural impulse prompting 
to the murder of a ,brhma_/n_/a1 c41    
just as a fire is extinguished only     
after having completely consumed its    
fuel74 ,hence we are of opinion that the

 aim of prohibitory passages1 such as 'a
 ,brhma_/n_/a is not to be killed1' is a
 merely passive state1 consisting in the
 abstinence from some possible action2  
excepting some special cases1 such as   
the so-called ,prajpati-vow1 c4#he      
,hence the charge of want of purpose is 
to be considered as referring 7not to   
the ,vednta-passages1 but only7 to such 
statements about existent things as are 
of the nature of legends and the like1  
and do not serve any purpose of man4    
,the allegation that a mere statement   
about an actually existent thing not    
connected with an injunction of         
something to be done1 is purposeless    
7as1 for instance1 the statement that   
the earth contains seven dvpas7 has     
already been refuted on the ground that 
a purpose is seen to exist in some such 
statements1 as1 for instance1 'this is  
not a snake1 but a rope4'--,but how     
about the objection raised above that   
the information about ,brahman cannot be
 held to have a purpose in the same way 

as the statement about a rope has one1  
because a man even after having heard   
about ,brahman continues to belong to   
this transmigratory world8--,we reply as
 follows3 ,it is impossible to show that
 a man who has once understood ,brahman 
to be the ,self1 belongs to the         
transmigratory world in the same sense  
as he did before1 because that would be 
contrary to the fact of his being       
,brahman4 ,for we indeed observe that a 
person who imagines the body1 and so on1
 to constitute the ,self1 is subject to 
fear and pain1 but we have no right to  
assume that the same person after       
having1 by means of the ,veda1          
comprehended ,brahman to be the ,self1  
and thus having got over his former     
imaginings1 will still in the same      
manner be subject to pain and fear whose
 cause is wrong knowledge4 ,in the same 
way we see that a rich householder1     
puffed up by the conceit of his wealth1 
is grieved when his possessions are     
taken from him2 but we do not see that  

the loss of his wealth equally grieves  
him after he has once retired from the  
world and put off the conceit of his    
riches4 ,and1 again1 we see that a      
person possessing a pair of beautiful   
earrings derives pleasure from the proud
 conceit of ownership2 but after he has 
lost the earrings and the conceit       
established thereon1 the pleasure       
derived from them vanishes4 ,thus       
_/,s_/ruti also declares1 ',when he is  
free from the body1 then neither        
pleasure nor pain touches him' 7,ch4    
,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,if it should be 
objected that the condition of being    
free from the body follows on death     
only1 we demur1 since the cause of man  
being joined to the body is wrong       
knowledge4 ,for it is not possible to   
establish the state of embodiedness upon
 anything else but wrong knowledge4 ,and
 that the state of disembodiedness is   
eternal on account of its not having    
actions for its cause1 we have already  
explained4 ,the objection again1 that   

embodiedness is caused by the merit and 
demerit effected by the ,self 7and      
therefore real71 we refute by remarking 
that as the 7reality of the7 conjunction
 of the ,self with the body is itself   
not established1 the circumstance of    
merit and demerit being due to the      
action of the ,self is likewise not     
established2 for 7if we should try to   
get over this difficulty by representing
 the ,self's embodiedness as caused by  
merit and demerit7 we should commit the 
logical fault of making embodiedness    
dependent on merit and demerit1 and     
again merit and demerit on embodiedness4
 ,and the assumption of an endless      
retrogressive chain 7of embodied states 
and merit and demerit7 would be no      
better than a chain of blind men 7who   
are unable to lead one another74        
,moreover1 the ,self can impossibly     
become an agent1 as it cannot enter into
 intimate relation to actions4 ,if it   
should be said that the ,self may be    
considered as an agent in the same way  

as kings and other great people are 7who
 without acting themselves make others  
act7 by their mere presence1 we deny the
 appositeness of this instance2 for     
kings may become agents through their   
relation to servants whom they procure  
by giving them wages1 c41 while it is   
impossible to imagine anything1         
analogous to money1 which could be the  
cause of a connexion between the ,self  
as lord and the body1 and so on 7as     
servants74 ,wrong imagination1 on the   
other hand1 7of the individual ,self1   
considering itself to be joined to the  
body17 is a manifest reason of the      
connexion of the two 7which is not based
 on any assumption74 ,this explains also
 in how far the ,self can be considered 
as the agent in sacrifices and similar  
acts#hf4 ,here it is objected that the  
,self's imagination as to the body1 and 
so on1 belonging to itself is not false1
 but is to be understood in a derived   
7figurative7 sense4 ,this objection we  
invalidate by the remark that the       

distinction of derived and primary      
senses of words is known to be          
applicable only where an actual         
difference of things is known to exist4 
,we are1 for instance1 acquainted with a
 certain species of animals having a    
mane1 and so on1 which is the exclusive 
primary object of the idea and word     
'lion1' and we are likewise acquainted  
with persons possessing in an eminent   
degree certain leonine qualities1 such  
as fierceness1 courage1 c42 here1 a well
 settled difference of objects existing1
 the idea and the name 'lion' are       
applied to those persons in a derived or
 figurative sense4 ,in those cases1     
however1 where the difference of the    
objects is not well established1 the    
transfer of the conception and name of  
the one to the other is not figurative1 
but simply founded on error4 ,such is1  
for instance1 the case of a man who at  
the time of twilight does not discern   
that the object before him is a post1   
and applies to it the conception and    

designation of a man2 such is likewise  
the case of the conception and          
designation of silver being applied to a
 shell of mother-of-pearl somehow       
mistaken for silver4 ,how then can it be
 maintained that the application of the 
word and the conception of the ,ego to  
the body1 c41 which application is due  
to the non-discrimination of the ,self  
and the ,not-,self1 is figurative       
7rather than simply false78 considering 
that even learned men who know the      
difference of the ,self and the         
,not-,self confound the words and ideas 
just as common shepherds and goatherds  
do4  ,as therefore the application of   
the conception of the ,ego to the body  
on the part of those who affirm the     
existence of a ,self different from the 
body is simply false1 not figurative1 it
 follows that the embodiedness of the   
,self is 7not real but7 caused by wrong 
conception1 and hence that the person   
who has reached true knowledge is free  
from his body even while still alive4   

,the same is declared in the _/,s_/ruti 
passages concerning him who knows       
,brahman3 ',and as the slough of a snake
 lies on an ant-hill1 dead and cast     
away1 thus lies this body2 but that     
disembodied immortal spirit is ,brahman 
only1 is only light' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iv1 #d1 #g72 and ',with eyes he is    
without eyes as it were1 with ears      
without ears as it were1 with speech    
without speech as it were1 with a mind  
without mind as it were1 with vital airs
 without vital airs as it were4'        
,sm_/ri_/ti also1 in the passage where  
the characteristic marks are enumerated 
of one whose mind is steady 7,bha4 ,gt  
,,ii1 #ed71 declares that he who knows  
is no longer connected with action of   
any kind4 ,therefore the man who has    
once comprehended ,brahman to be the    
,self1 does not belong to this          
transmigratory world as he did before4  
,he1 on the other hand1 who still       
belongs to this transmigratory world as 
before1 has not comprehended ,brahman to

 be the ,self4 ,thus there remain no    
unsolved contradictions4  ,with         
reference again to the assertion that   
,brahman is not fully determined in its 
own nature1 but stands in a             
complementary relation to injunctions1  
because the hearing about ,brahman is to
 be followed by consideration and       
reflection1 we remark that consideration
 and reflection are themselves merely   
subservient to the comprehension of     
,brahman4 ,if ,brahman1 after having    
been comprehended1 stood in a           
subordinate relation to some            
injunctions1 it might be said to be     
merely supplementary4 ,but this is not  
the case1 since consideration and       
reflection no less than hearing are     
subservient to comprehension4 ,it       
follows that the _/,s_/stra cannot be   
the means of knowing ,brahman only in so
 far as it is connected with            
injunctions1 and the doctrine that on   
account of the uniform meaning of the   
,vednta-texts1 an independent ,brahman  

is to be admitted1 is thereby fully     
established4 ,hence there is room for   
beginning the new _/,s_/stra indicated  
in the first ,stra1 ',then therefore the
 enquiry into ,brahman4' ,if1 on the    
other hand1 the ,vednta-texts were      
connected with injunctions1 a new       
_/,s_/stra would either not be begun at 
all1 since the _/,s_/stra concerned with
 injunctions has already been introduced
 by means of the first ,stra of the     
,prva ,mm_/m_/s1 ',then therefore the   
enquiry into duty2' or if it were begun 
it would be introduced as follows3      
',then therefore the enquiry into the   
remaining duties2' just as a new portion
 of the ,prva ,mm_/m_/s ,stras is       
introduced with the words1 ',then       
therefore the enquiry into what         
subserves the purpose of the sacrifice1 
and what subserves the purpose of man'  
7,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #a1 #a74 ,but as the 
comprehension of the unity of ,brahman  
and the ,self has not been propounded   
7in the previous _/,s_/stra71 it is     

quite appropriate that a new _/,s_/stra1
 whose subject is ,brahman1 should be   
entered upon4 ,hence all injunctions and
 all other means of knowledge end with  
the cognition expressed in the words1   
',i am ,brahman2' for as soon as there  
supervenes the comprehension of the     
non-dual ,self1 which is not either     
something to be eschewed or something to
 be appropriated1 all objects and       
knowing agents vanish1 and hence there  
can no longer be means of proof4 ,in    
accordance with this1 they 7i4e4 men    
knowing ,brahman7 have made the         
following declaration3--',when there has
 arisen 7in a man's mind7 the knowledge1
 ,i am that which is1 ,brahman is my    
,self1 and when1 owing to the sublation 
of the conceptions of body1 relatives1  
and the like1 the 7imagination of7 the  
figurative and the false ,self has come 
to an end#hg2 how should then the       
effect#hh 7of that wrong imagination7   
exist any longer8 ,as long as the       
knowledge of the ,self1 which ,scripture

 tells us to search after1 has not      
arisen1 so long the ,self is knowing    
subject2 but that same subject is that  
which is searched after1 viz4 7the      
highest ,self7 free from all evil and   
blemish4 ,just as the idea of the ,self 
being the body is assumed as valid 7in  
ordinary life71 so all the ordinary     
sources of knowledge 7perception and the
 like7 are valid only until the one     
,self is ascertained4'  7,herewith the  
section comprising the four ,stras is   
finished#hi47  ,so far it has been      
declared that the ,vednta-passages1     
whose purport is the comprehension of   
,brahman being the ,self1 and which have
 their object therein1 refer exclusively
 to ,brahman without any reference to   
actions4 ,and it has further been shown 
that ,brahman is the omniscient         
omnipotent cause of the origin1         
subsistence1 and dissolution of the     
world4 ,but now the ,snkhyas and others 
being of opinion that an existent       
substance is to be known through other  

means of proof 7not through the ,veda7  
infer different causes1 such as the     
pradhna and the like1 and thereupon     
interpret the ,vednta-passages as       
referring to the latter4 ,all the       
,vednta-passages1 they maintain1 which  
treat of the creation of the world      
distinctly point out that the cause 7of 
the world7 has to be concluded from the 
effect by inference2 and the cause which
 is to be inferred is the connexion of  
the pradhna with the souls 7purusha74   
,the followers of ,ka_/n_/da again infer
 from the very same passages that the   
,lord is the efficient cause of the     
world while the atoms are its material  
cause4 ,and thus other argumentators    
also taking their stand on passages     
apparently favouring their views and on 
fallacious arguments raise various      
objections4 ,for this reason the teacher
 7,vysa7--thoroughly acquainted as he is
 with words1 passages1 and means of     
proof--proceeds to state as prim facie  
views1 and afterwards to refute1 all    

those opinions founded on deceptive     
passages and fallacious arguments4      
,thereby he at the same time proves     
indirectly that what the ,vednta-texts  
aim at is the comprehension of ,brahman4
  ,the ,snkhyas who opine that the      
non-intelligent pradhna consisting of   
three constituent elements 7gu_/n_/a7 is
 the cause of the world argue as        
follows4 ,the ,vednta-passages which you
 have declared to intimate that the     
all-knowing all-powerful ,brahman is the
 cause of the world can be consistently 
interpreted also on the doctrine of the 
pradhna being the general cause4        
,omnipotence 7more literally3 the       
possession of all powers7 can be        
ascribed to the pradhna in so far as it 
has all its effects for its objects4    
,all-knowingness also can be ascribed to
 it1 viz4 in the following manner4 ,what
 you think to be knowledge is in reality
 an attribute of the gu_/n_/a of        
,goodness#ij1 according to the          
,sm_/ri_/ti passage 'from ,goodness     

springs knowledge' 7,bha4 ,gt ,,xiv1    
#ag74 ,by means of this attribute of    
,goodness1 viz4 knowledge1 certain men  
endowed with organs which are effects   
7of the pradhna7 are known as           
all-knowing ,yogins2 for omniscience is 
acknowledged to be connected with the   
very highest degree of ',goodness4' ,now
 to the soul 7purusha7 which is         
isolated1 destitute of effected organs1 
consisting of pure 7undifferenced7      
intelligence it is quite impossible to  
ascribe either all-knowingness or       
limited knowledge2 the pradhna1 on the  
other hand1 because consisting of the   
three gu_/n_/as1 comprises also in its  
pradhna state the element of ,goodness  
which is the cause of all-knowingness4  
,the ,vednta-passages therefore in a    
derived 7figurative7 sense ascribe      
all-knowingness to the pradhna1 although
 it is in itself non-intelligent4       
,moreover you 7the ,vedntin7 also who   
assume an all-knowing ,brahman can      
ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far 

only as that term means capacity for all
 knowledge4 ,for ,brahman cannot always 
be actually engaged in the cognition of 
everything2 for from this there would   
follow the absolute permanency of his   
cognition1 and this would involve a want
 of independence on ,brahman's part with
 regard to the activity of knowing4 ,and
 if you should propose to consider      
,brahman's cognition as non-permanent it
 would follow that with the cessation of
 the cognition ,brahman itself would    
cease4 ,therefore all-knowingness is    
possible only in the sense of capacity  
for all knowledge4 ,moreover you assume 
that previously to the origination of   
the world ,brahman is without any       
instruments of action4 ,but without the 
body1 the senses1 c4 which are the      
instruments of knowledge1 cognition     
cannot take place in any being4 ,and    
further it must be noted that the       
pradhna1 as consisting of various       
elements1 is capable of undergoing      
modifications1 and may therefore act as 

a 7material7 cause like clay and other  
substances2 while the uncompounded      
homogeneous ,brahman is unable to do so4
  ,to these conclusions he 7,vysa7      
replies in the following ,stra4  #e4 ,on
 account of seeing 7i4e4 thinking being 
attributed in the ,upanishads to the    
cause of the world2 the pradhna7 is not 
7to be identified with the cause        
indicated by the ,upanishads2 for7 it is
 not founded on ,scripture4  ,it is     
impossible to find room in the          
,vednta-texts for the non-intelligent   
pradhna1 the fiction of the ,snkhyas2   
because it is not founded on ,scripture4
 ,how so8 ,because the quality of       
seeing1 i4e4 thinking1 is in ,scripture 
ascribed to the cause4 ,for the passage1
 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 7which begins3     
',being only1 my dear1 this was in the  
beginning1 one only1 without a second1' 
and goes on1 ',it thought 7saw71 may ,i 
be many1 may ,i grow forth4 ,it sent    
forth fire1'7 declares that this world  
differentiated by name and form1 which  

is there denoted by the word 'this1' was
 before its origination identical with  
the ,self of that which is and that the 
principle denoted by the term 'the      
being' 7or 'that which is'7 sent forth  
fire and the other elements after having
 thought4 ,the following passage also   
7',verily in the beginning all this was 
,self1 one only2 there was nothing else 
blinking whatsoever4 ,he thought1 shall 
,i send forth worlds8 ,he sent forth    
these worlds1' ,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1   
#b7 declares the creation to have had   
thought for its antecedent4 ,in another 
passage also 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c7 it is 
said of the person of sixteen parts1    
',he thought1 c4 ,he sent forth         
,pr_/n_/a4' ,by 'seeing' 7i4e4 the verb 
'seeing' exhibited in the ,stra7 is not 
meant that particular verb only1 but any
 verbs which have a cognate sense2 just 
as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to   
denote any kind of offering4 ,therefore 
other passages also whose purport it is 
to intimate that an all-knowing ,lord is

 the cause of the world are to be quoted
 here1 as1 for instance1 ,mu4 ,up4 ,i1  
#a1 #i1 ',from him who perceives all and
 who knows all1 whose brooding consists 
of knowledge1 from him is born that     
,brahman1 name and form and food4'  ,the
 argumentation of the ,snkhyas that the 
pradhna may be called all-knowing on    
account of knowledge constituting an    
attribute of the gu_/n_/a ,goodness is  
inadmissible4 ,for as in the            
pradhna-condition the three gu_/n_/as   
are in a state of equipoise1 knowledge  
which is a quality of ,goodness only is 
not possible#ia4 ,nor can we admit the  
explanation that the pradhna is         
all-knowing because endowed with the    
capacity for all knowledge4 ,for if1 in 
the condition of equipoise of the       
gu_/n_/as1 we term the pradhna          
all-knowing with reference to the power 
of knowledge residing in ,goodness1 we  
must likewise term it little-knowing1   
with reference to the power impeding    
knowledge which resides in ,passion and 

,darkness4  ,moreover a modification of 
,goodness which is not connected with a 
witnessing 7observing7 principle        
7skshin7 is not called knowledge1 and   
the non-intelligent pradhna is destitute
 of such a principle4 ,it is therefore  
impossible to ascribe to the pradhna    
all-knowingness4 ,the case of the       
,yogins finally does not apply to the   
point under consideration2 for as they  
possess intelligence1 they may1 owing to
 an excess of ,goodness in their nature1
 rise to omniscience#ib4--,well then    
7say those ,snkhyas who believe in the  
existence of a ,lord7 let us assume that
 the pradhna possesses the quality of   
knowledge owing to the witnessing       
principle 7the ,lord71 just as the      
quality of burning is imparted to an    
iron ball by fire4--,no1 we reply2 for  
if this were so1 it would be more       
reasonable to assume that that which is 
the cause of the pradhna having the     
quality of thought i4e4 the all-knowing 
primary ,brahman itself is the cause of 

the world4  ,the objection that to      
,brahman also all-knowingness in its    
primary sense cannot be ascribed        
because1 if the activity of cognition   
were permanent1 ,brahman could not be   
considered as independent with regard to
 it1 we refute as follows4 ,in what way1
 we ask the ,snkhya1 is ,brahman's      
all-knowingness interfered with by a    
permanent cognitional activity8 ,to     
maintain that he1 who possesses eternal 
knowledge capable to throw light on all 
objects1 is not all-knowing1 is         
contradictory4 ,if his knowledge were   
considered non-permanent1 he would know 
sometimes1 and sometimes he would not   
know2 from which it would follow indeed 
that he is not all-knowing4 ,this fault 
is however avoided if we admit          
,brahman's knowledge to be              
permanent4--,but1 it may be objected1 on
 this latter alternative the knower     
cannot be designated as independent with
 reference to the act of knowing4--,why 
not8 we reply2 the sun also1 although   

his heat and light are permanent1 is    
nevertheless designated as independent  
when we say1 'he burns1 he gives        
light#ic4'--;,but1 it will again be     
objected1 we say that the sun burns or  
gives light when he stands in relation  
to some object to be heated or          
illuminated2 ,brahman1 on the other     
hand1 stands1 before the creation of the
 world1 in no relation to any object of 
knowledge4 ,the cases are therefore not 
parallel4--,this objection too1 we      
reply1 is not valid2 for as a matter of 
fact we speak of the ,sun as an agent1  
saying 'the sun shines' even without    
reference to any object illuminated by  
him1 and hence ,brahman also may be     
spoken of as an agent1 in such passages 
as 'it thought1' c41 even without       
reference to any object of knowledge4   
,if1 however1 an object is supposed to  
be required 7'knowing' being a          
transitive verb while 'shining' is      
intransitive71 the texts ascribing      
thought to ,brahman will fit all the    

better4--,what then is that object to   
which the knowledge of the ,lord can    
refer previously to the origin of the   
world8--,name and form1 we reply1 which 
can be defined neither as being         
identical with ,brahman nor as different
 from it1 unevolved but about to be     
evolved4 ,for if1 as the adherents of   
the ,yoga-_/s_/stra assume1 the ,yogins 
have a perceptive knowledge of the past 
and the future through the favour of the
 ,lord2 in what terms shall we have to  
speak of the eternal cognition of the   
ever pure ,lord himself1 whose objects  
are the creation1 subsistence1 and      
dissolution of the world6 ,the objection
 that ,brahman1 previously to the origin
 of the world1 is not able to think     
because it is not connected with a body1
 c4 does not apply2 for ,brahman1 whose 
nature is eternal cognition--as the     
sun's nature is eternal                 
luminousness--can impossibly stand in   
need of any instruments of knowledge4   
,the transmigrating soul 7sa_/m_/srin7  

indeed1 which is under the sway of      
,nescience1 c41 may require a body in   
order that knowledge may arise in it2   
but not so the ,lord1 who is free from  
all impediments of knowledge4 ,the two  
following ,mantras also declare that the
 ,lord does not require a body1 and that
 his knowledge is without any           
obstructions4 ',there is no effect and  
no instrument known of him1 no one is   
seen like unto him or better2 his high  
power is revealed as manifold1 as       
inherent1 acting as knowledge and       
force4' ',grasping without hands1       
hasting without feet1 he sees without   
eyes1 he hears without ears4 ,he knows  
what can be known1 but no one knows him2
 they call him the first1 the great     
person' 7_/,s_/v4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h2 ,,iii1 
#ai74  ,but1 to raise a new objection1  
there exists no transmigrating soul     
different from the ,lord and obstructed 
by impediments of knowledge2 for        
_/,s_/ruti expressly declares that      
'there is no other seer but he2 there is

 no other knower but he' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4
 ,,iii1 #g1 #bc74 ,how then can it be   
said that the origination of knowledge  
in the transmigrating soul depends on a 
body1 while it does not do so in the    
case of the ,lord8--,true1 we reply4    
,there is in reality no transmigrating  
soul different from the ,lord4 ,still   
the connexion 7of the ,lord7 with       
limiting adjuncts1 consisting of bodies 
and so on1 is assumed1 just as we assume
 the ether to enter into connexion with 
divers limiting adjuncts such as jars1  
pots1 caves1 and the like4 ,and just as 
in consequence of connexion of the      
latter kind such conceptions and terms  
as 'the hollow 7space7 of a jar1' c4 are
 generally current1 although the space  
inside a jar is not really different    
from universal space1 and just as in    
consequence thereof there generally     
prevails the false notion that there are
 different spaces such as the space of a
 jar and so on2 so there prevails       
likewise the false notion that the ,lord

 and the transmigrating soul are        
different2 a notion due to the          
non-discrimination of the 7unreal7      
connexion of the soul with the limiting 
conditions1 consisting of the body and  
so on4 ,that the ,self1 although in     
reality the only existence1 imparts the 
quality of ,selfhood to bodies and the  
like which are ,not-,self is a matter of
 observation1 and is due to mere wrong  
conception1 which depends in its turn on
 antecedent wrong conception4 ,and the  
consequence of the soul thus involving  
itself in the transmigratory state is   
that its thought depends on a body and  
the like4  ,the averment that the       
pradhna1 because consisting of several  
elements1 can1 like clay and similar    
substances1 occupy the place of a cause 
while the uncompounded ,brahman cannot  
do so1 is refuted by the fact of the    
pradhna not basing on ,scripture4 ,that1
 moreover1 it is possible to establish  
by argumentation the causality of       
,brahman1 but not of the pradhna and    

similar principles1 the ,strakra will   
set forth in the second ,adhyya 7,,ii1  
#a1 #d1 c474  ,here the ,snkhya comes   
forward with a new objection4 ,the      
difficulty stated by you1 he says1 viz4 
that the non-intelligent pradhna cannot 
be the cause of the world1 because      
thought is ascribed to the latter in the
 sacred texts1 can be got over in       
another way also1 viz4 on the ground    
that non-intelligent things are         
sometimes figuratively spoken of as     
intelligent beings4 ,we observe1 for    
instance1 that people say of a          
river-bank about to fall1 'the bank is  
inclined to fall 7pipatishati71' and    
thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as 
if it possessed intelligence4 ,so the   
pradhna also1 although non-intelligent1 
may1 when about to create1 be           
figuratively spoken of as thinking4     
,just as in ordinary life some          
intelligent person after having bathed1 
and dined1 and formed the purpose of    
driving in the afternoon to his village1

 necessarily acts according to his      
purpose1 so the pradhna also acts by the
 necessity of its own nature1 when      
transforming itself into the so-called  
great principle and the subsequent forms
 of evolution2 it may therefore         
figuratively be spoken of as            
intelligent4--,but what reason have you 
for setting aside the primary meaning of
 the word 'thought' and for taking it in
 a figurative sense8--,the observation1 
the ,snkhya replies1 that fire and water
 also are figuratively spoken of as     
intelligent beings in the two following 
scriptural passages1 ',that fire        
thought2 that water thought' 7,ch4 ,up4 
,,vi1 #b1 #c2 #d74 ,we therefrom        
conclude that thought is to be taken in 
a figurative sense there also where     
,being 7,sat7 is the agent1 because it  
is mentioned in a chapter where         
7thought7 is generally taken in a       
figurative sense#id4  ,to this          
argumentation of the ,sdkhya the next   
,stra replies3  #f4 ,if it is said that 

7the word 'seeing'7 has a figurative    
meaning1 we deny that1 on account of the
 word ,self 7being applied to the cause 
of the world74  ,your assertion that the
 term ',being' denotes the              
non-intelligent pradhna1 and that       
thought is ascribed to it in a          
figurative sense only1 as it is to fire 
and water1 is untenable4 ,why so8 ,on   
account of the term ',self4' ,for the   
passage ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 which begins
 ',being only1 my dear1 this was in the 
beginning1' after having related the    
creation of fire1 water1 and earth 7'it 
thought1' c42 'it sent forth fire1' c471
 goes on--denoting the thinking         
principle of which the whole chapter    
treats1 and likewise fire1 water1 and   
earth1 by the term--'divinities'--as    
follows1 ',that divinity thought3 ,let  
me now enter those three divinities with
 this living ,self 7jva4 tman7 and      
evolve names and forms4' ,if we assumed 
that in this passage the non-intelligent
 pradhna is figuratively spoken of as   

thinking1 we should also have to assume 
that the same pradhna--as once          
constituting the subject-matter of the  
chapter--is referred to by the term     
'that divinity4' ,but in that case the  
divinity would not speak of the jva as  
',self4' ,for by the term ',jva' we must
 understand1 according to the received  
meaning and the etymology of the word1  
the intelligent 7principle7 which rules 
over the body and sustains the vital    
airs4 ,how could such a principle be the
 ,self of the non-intelligent pradhna8  
,by ',self' we understand 7a being's7   
own nature1 and it is clear that the    
intelligent ,jva cannot constitute the  
nature of the non-intelligent pradhna4  
,if1 on the other hand1 we refer the    
whole chapter to the intelligent        
,brahman1 to which thought in its       
primary sense belongs1 the use of the   
word ',self' with reference to the ,jva 
is quite adequate4 ,then again there is 
the other passage1 ',that which is that 
subtle essence1 in it all that exists   

has its self4 ,it is the true4 ,it is   
the ,self4 ,that art thou1 ,o           
_/,s_/vetaketu' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g1
 c474 ,here the clause ',it is the      
,self' designates the ,being of which   
the entire chapter treats1 viz4 the     
subtle ,self1 by the word ',self1' and  
the concluding clause1 'that art thou1  
,o _/,s_/vetaketu1' declares the        
intelligent _/,s_/vetaketu to be of the 
nature of the ,self4 ,fire and water1 on
 the other hand1 are non-intelligent1   
since they are objects 7of the mind71   
and since they are declared to be       
implicated in the evolution of names and
 forms4 ,and as at the same time there  
is no reason for ascribing to them      
thought in its primary sense--while the 
employment of the word ',self' furnishes
 such a reason with reference to the    
,sat--the thought attributed to them    
must be explained in a figurative sense1
 like the inclination of the river-bank4
 ,moreover1 the thinking on the part of 
fire and water is to be understood as   

dependent on their being ruled over by  
the ,sat4 ,on the other hand1 the       
thought of the ,sat is1 on account of   
the word ',self1' not to be understood  
in a figurative sense4#ie  ,here the    
,snkhya comes forward with a new        
objection4 ,the word ',self1' he says1  
may be applied to the pradhna1 although 
unintelligent1 because it is sometimes  
figuratively used in the sense of 'that 
which effects all purposes of another2' 
as1 for instance1 a king applies the    
word ',self' to some servant who carries
 out all the king's intentions1         
',bhadrasena is my 7other7 ,self4' ,for 
the pradhna1 which effects the enjoyment
 and the emancipation of the soul1      
serves the latter in the same way as a  
minister serves his king in the affairs 
of peace and war4 ,or else1 it may be   
said1 the one word ',self' may refer to 
non-intelligent things as well as to    
intelligent beings1 as we see that such 
expressions as 'the ,self of the        
elements1' 'the ,self of the senses1'   

are made use of1 and as the one word    
'light' 7jyotis7 denotes a certain      
sacrifice 7the jyotish_/t_/oma7 as well 
as a flame4 ,how then does it follow    
from the word ',self' that the thinking 
7ascribed to the cause of the world7 is 
not to be taken in a figurative sense8  
,to this last argumentation the ,strakra
 replies3  #g4 7,the pradhna cannot be  
designated by the term ',self'7 because 
release is taught of him who takes his  
stand on that 7the ,sat74  ,the         
non-intelligent pradhna cannot be the   
object of the term ',self' because in   
the passage ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b ff41     
where the subtle ,sat which is under    
discussion is at first referred to in   
the sentence1 ',that is the ,self1' and 
where the subsequent clause1 ',that art 
thou1 ,o _/,s_/vetaketu1' declares the  
intelligent _/,s_/vetaketu to have his  
abode in the ,self1 a passage subsequent
 to the two quoted 7viz4 'a man who has 
a teacher obtains true knowledge2 for   
him there is only delay as long as he is

 not delivered1 then he will be         
perfect'7 declares final release4 ,for  
if the non-intelligent pradhna were     
denoted by the term ',sat' and did      
comprehend--by means of the phrase      
',that art thou'--persons desirous of   
final release who as such are           
intelligent1 the meaning could only be  
',thou art non-intelligent2' so that    
,scripture would virtually make         
contradictory statements to the         
disadvantage of man1 and would thus     
cease to be a means of right knowledge4 
,but to assume that the faultless       
_/s_/stra is not a means of right       
knowledge1 would be contrary to reason4 
,and if the _/s_/stra1 considered as a  
means of right knowledge1 should point  
out to a man desirous of release1 but   
ignorant of the way to it1 a            
non-intelligent ,self as the real ,self1
 he would--comparable to the blind man  
who had caught hold of the ox's         
tail#if--;cling to the view of that     
being the ,self1 and thus never be able 

to reach the real ,self different from  
the false ,self pointed out to him2     
hence he would be debarred from what    
constitutes man's good1 and would incur 
evil4 ,we must therefore conclude that1 
just as the _/s_/stra teaches the       
agnihotra and similar performances in   
their true nature as means for those who
 are desirous of the heavenly world1 so 
the passage 'that is the ,self1 that art
 thou1 ,o _/,s_/vetaketu1' teaches the  
,self in its true nature also4 ,only on 
that condition release for him whose    
thoughts are true can be taught by means
 of the simile in which the person to be
 released is compared to the man        
grasping the heated axe 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1
 #af74 ,for in the other case1 if the   
doctrine of the ,sat constituting the   
,self had a secondary meaning only1 the 
cognition founded on the passage 'that  
art thou' would be of the nature of a   
fanciful combination only#ig1 like the  
knowledge derived from the passage1 ',i 
am the hymn' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b1    

#f71 and would lead to a mere transitory
 reward2 so that the simile quoted could
 not convey the doctrine of release4    
,therefore the word ',self' is applied  
to the subtle ,sat not in a merely      
figurative sense4 ,in the case of the   
faithful servant1 on the other hand1 the
 word ',self' can--in such phrases as   
',bhadrasena is my ,self'--be taken in a
 figurative sense1 because the          
difference between master and servant is
 well established by perception4        
,moreover1 to assume that1 because words
 are sometimes seen to be used in       
figurative senses1 a figurative sense   
may be resorted to in the case of those 
things also for which words 7i4e4 ,vedic
 words7 are the only means of knowledge1
 is altogether indefensible2 for an     
assumption of that nature would lead to 
a general want of confidence4 ,the      
assertion that the word ',self' may     
7primarily7 signify what is             
non-intelligent as well as what is      
intelligent1 just as the word 'jyotis'  

signifies a certain sacrifice as well as
 light1 is inadmissible1 because we have
 no right to attribute to words a       
plurality of meanings4 ,hence 7we rather
 assume that7 the word ',self' in its   
primary meaning refers to what is       
intelligent only and is then1 by a      
figurative attribution of intelligence1 
applied to the elements and the like    
also2 whence such phrases as 'the ,self 
of the elements1' 'the ,self of the     
senses4' ,and even if we assume that the
 word ',self' primarily signifies both  
classes of beings1 we are unable to     
settle in any special case which of the 
two meanings the word has1 unless we are
 aided either by the general heading    
under which it stands1 or some          
determinative attributive word4 ,but in 
the passage under discussion there is   
nothing to determine that the word      
refers to something non-intelligent1    
while1 on the other hand1 the ,sat      
distinguished by thought forms the      
general heading1 and _/,s_/vetaketu1    

i4e4 a being endowed with intelligence1 
is mentioned in close proximity4 ,that a
 non-intelligent ,self does not agree   
with _/,s_/vetaketu1 who possesses      
intelligence1 we have already shown4    
,all these circumstances determine the  
object of the word ',self' here to be   
something intelligent4 ,the word        
'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an   
appropriate example2 for according to   
common use it has the settled meaning of
 'light' only1 and is used in the sense 
of sacrifice only on account of the     
arthavda assuming a similarity 7of the  
sacrifice7 to light4  ,a different      
explanation of the ,stra is also        
possible4 ,the preceding ,stra may be   
taken completely to refute all doubts as
 to the word ',self' having a figurative
 or double sense1 and then the present  
,stra is to be explained as containing  
an independent reason1 proving that the 
doctrine of the pradhna being the       
general cause is untenable4  ,hence the 
non-intelligent pradhna is not denoted  

by the word ',self4' ,this the teacher  
now proceeds to prove by an additional  
reason4  #h4 ,and 7the pradhna cannot be
 denoted by the word ',self'7 because   
there is no statement of its having to  
be set aside4  ,if the pradhna which is 
the ,not-,self were denoted by the term 
',being' 7,sat71 and if the passage     
',that is the ,self1 that art thou1 ,o  
_/,s_/vetaketu1' referred to the        
pradhna2 the teacher whose wish it is to
 impart instruction about the true      
,brahman would subsequently declare that
 the pradhna is to be set aside 7and the
 true ,brahman to be considered72 for   
otherwise his pupil1 having received the
 instruction about the pradhna1 might   
take his stand on the latter1 looking   
upon it as the ,non-,self4 ,in ordinary 
life a man who wishes to point out to a 
friend the 7small7 star ,arundhat at    
first directs his attention to a big    
neighbouring star1 saying 'that is      
,arundhat1' although it is really not   
so2 and thereupon he withdraws his first

 statement and points out the real      
,arundhat4 ,analogously the teacher 7if 
he intended to make his pupil understand
 the ,self through the ,non-,self7 would
 in the end definitely state that the   
,self is not of the nature of the       
pradhna4 ,but no such statement is made2
 for the sixth ,prap_/th_/aka arrives at
 a conclusion based on the view that the
 ,self is nothing but that which is 7the
 ,sat74  ,the word 'and' 7in the ,stra7 
is meant to notify that the             
contradiction of a previous statement   
7which would be implied in the rejected 
interpretation7 is an additional reason 
for the rejection4 ,such a contradiction
 would result even if it were stated    
that the pradhna is to be set aside4    
,for in the beginning of the            
,prap_/th_/aka it is intimated that     
through the knowledge of the cause      
everything becomes known4 ,compare the  
following consecutive sentences1 ',have 
you ever asked for that instruction by  
which we hear what cannot be heard1 by  

which we perceive what cannot be        
perceived1 by which we know what cannot 
be known8 ,what is that instruction8    
,as1 my dear1 by one clod of clay all   
that is made of clay is known1 the      
modification 7i4e4 the effect7 being a  
name merely which has its origin in     
speech1 while the truth is that it is   
clay merely1' c4 ,now if the term ',sat'
 denoted the pradhna1 which is merely   
the cause of the aggregate of the       
objects of enjoyment1 its knowledge1    
whether to be set aside or not to be set
 aside1 could never lead to the         
knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers  
7souls71 because the latter is not an   
effect of the pradhna4 ,therefore the   
pradhna is not denoted by the term      
',sat4'--,for this the ,strakra gives a 
further reason4  #i4 ,on account of 7the
 individual ,soul7 going to the ,self   
7the ,self cannot be the pradhna74      
,with reference to the cause denoted by 
the word ',sat1' ,scripture says1 ',when
 a man sleeps here1 then1 my dear1 he   

becomes united with the ,sat1 he is gone
 to his own 7,self74 ,therefore they say
 of him1 he sleeps 7svapiti71 because he
 is gone to his own 7svam apta74' 7,ch4 
,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a47 ,this passage       
explains the well-known verb 'to sleep1'
 with reference to the soul4 ,the word1 
'his own1' denotes the ,self which had  
before been denoted by the word ,sat2 to
 the ,self he 7the individual soul7     
goes1 i4e4 into it it is resolved1      
according to the acknowledged sense of  
api-i1 which means 'to be resolved      
into4' ,the individual soul 7jva7 is    
called awake as long as being connected 
with the various external objects by    
means of the modifications of the       
mind--which thus constitute limiting    
adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends     
those external objects1 and identifies  
itself with the gross body1 which is one
 of those external objects#ih4 ,when1   
modified by the impressions which the   
external objects have left1 it sees     
dreams1 it is denoted by the term       

'mind#ii4' ,when1 on the cessation of   
the two limiting adjuncts 7i4e4 the     
subtle and the gross bodies71 and the   
consequent absence of the modifications 
due to the adjuncts1 it is1 in the state
 of deep sleep1 merged in the ,self as  
it were1 then it is said to be asleep   
7resolved into the ,self74 ,a similar   
etymology of the word 'h_/ri_/daya' is  
given by _/s_/ruti1 ',that ,self abides 
in the heart4 ,and this is the          
etymological explanation3 he is in the  
heart 7h_/ri_/di ayam74' 7,ch4 ,up4     
,,viii1 #c1 #c47 ,the words a_/s_/anya  
and udany are similarly etymologised3   
'water is carrying away what has been   
eaten by him2' 'fire carries away what  
has been drunk by him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 
#h1 #c2 #e74 ,thus the passage quoted   
above explains the resolution 7of the   
soul7 into the ,self1 denoted by the    
term ',sat1' by means of the etymology  
of the word 'sleep4' ,but the           
intelligent ,self can clearly not       
resolve itself into the non-intelligent 

pradhna4 ,if1 again1 it were said that  
the pradhna is denoted by the word      
'own1' because belonging to the ,self   
7as being the ,self's own71 there would 
remain the same absurd statement as to  
an intelligent entity being resolved    
into a non-intelligent one4 ,moreover   
another scriptural passage 7viz4        
'embraced by the                        
intelligent--praj_/_/a--,self he knows  
nothing that is without1 nothing that is
 within1' ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba7 
declares that the soul in the condition 
of dreamless sleep is resolved into an  
intelligent entity4 ,hence that into    
which all intelligent souls are resolved
 is an intelligent cause of the world1  
denoted by the word ',sat1' and not the 
pradhna4--,a further reason for the     
pradhna not being the cause is          
subjoined4  #aj4 ,on account of the     
uniformity of view 7of the              
,vednta-texts1 ,brahman is to be        
considered the cause74  ,if1 as in the  
argumentations of the logicians1 so in  

the ,vednta-texts also1 there were set  
forth different views concerning the    
nature of the cause1 some of them       
favouring the theory of an intelligent  
,brahman being the cause of the world1  
others inclining towards the pradhna    
doctrine1 and others again tending in a 
different direction2 then it might      
perhaps be possible to interpret such   
passages as those1 which speak of the   
cause of the world as thinking1 in such 
a manner as to make them fall in with   
the pradhna theory4 ,but the stated     
condition is absent since all the       
,vednta-texts uniformly teach that the  
cause of the world is the intelligent   
,brahman4 ,compare1 for instance1 ',as  
from a burning fire sparks proceed in   
all directions1 thus from that ,self the
 pr_/n_/as proceed each towards its     
place2 from the pr_/n_/as the gods1 from
 the gods the worlds' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1
 #c74 ,and 'from that ,self sprang      
ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a74 ,and    
'all this springs from the ,self' 7,ch4 

,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #a74 ,and 'this        
pr_/n_/a is born from the ,self' 7,pr4  
,up4 ,,iii1 #c72 all which passages     
declare the ,self to be the cause4 ,that
 the word ',self' denotes an intelligent
 being1 we have already shown4  ,and    
that all the ,vednta-texts advocate the 
same view as to an intelligent cause of 
the world1 greatly strengthens their    
claim to be considered a means of right 
knowledge1 just as the corresponding    
claims of the senses are strengthened by
 their giving us information of a       
uniform character regarding colour and  
the like4 ,the all-knowing ,brahman is  
therefore to be considered the cause of 
the world1 'on account of the uniformity
 of view 7of the ,vednta-texts74'--,a   
further reason for this conclusion is   
advanced4  #aa4 ,and because it is      
directly stated in ,scripture 7therefore
 the all-knowing ,brahman is the cause  
of the world74  ,that the all-knowing   
,lord is the cause of the world1 is also
 declared in a text directly referring  

to him 7viz4 the all-knowing one71 viz4 
in the following passage of the         
mantropanishad of the                   
_/,s_/vet_/s_/vataras 7,,vi1 #i7 where  
the word 'he' refers to the previously  
mentioned all-knowing ,lord1 ',he is the
 cause1 the lord of the lords of the    
organs1 and there is of him neither     
parent nor lord4' ,it is therefore      
finally settled that the all-knowing    
,brahman is the general cause1 not the  
non-intelligent pradhna or anything     
else4  ,in what precedes we have shown1 
availing ourselves of appropriate       
arguments1 that the ,vednta-texts       
exhibited under ,stras ,i1 #a-aa1 are   
capable of proving that the all-knowing1
 all-powerful ,lord is the cause of the 
origin1 subsistence1 and dissolution of 
the world4 ,and we have explained1 by   
pointing to the prevailing uniformity of
 view 7,i1 #aj71 that all ,vednta-texts 
whatever maintain an intelligent cause4 
,the question might therefore be asked1 
',what reason is there for the          

subsequent part of the ,vednta-stras8'  
7as the chief point is settled already47
  ,to this question we reply as follows3
 ,brahman is apprehended under two      
forms2 in the first place as qualified  
by limiting conditions owing to the     
multiformity of the evolutions of name  
and form 7i4e4 the multiformity of the  
created world72 in the second place as  
being the opposite of this1 i4e4 free   
from all limiting conditions whatever4  
,compare the following passages3        
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae1 ',for     
where there is duality as it were1 then 
one sees the other2 but when the ,self  
only is all this1 how should he see     
another8' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bd1 #a1     
',where one sees nothing else1 hears    
nothing else1 understands nothing else1 
that is the greatest4 ,where one sees   
something else1 hears something else1   
understands something else1 that is the 
little4 ,the greatest is immortal2 the  
little is mortal2' ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1  
#ab1 #g1 ',the wise one1 who having     

produced all forms and made all names1  
sits calling 7the things by their       
names#ajj72' _/,s_/v4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai1   
',who is without parts1 without actions1
 tranquil1 without faults1 without      
taint1 the highest bridge of            
immortality1 like a fire that has       
consumed its fuel2' ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1
 #c1 #f1 ',not so1 not so2' ,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #h1 ',it is neither     
coarse nor fine1 neither short nor      
long2' and 'defective is one place1     
perfect the other4' ,all these passages1
 with many others1 declare ,brahman to  
possess a double nature1 according as it
 is the object either of ,knowledge or  
of ,nescience4 ,as long as it is the    
object of ,nescience1 there are applied 
to it the categories of devotee1 object 
of devotion1 and the like#aja4 ,the     
different modes of devotion lead to     
different results1 some to exaltation1  
some to gradual emancipation1 some to   
success in works2 those modes are       
distinct on account of the distinction  

of the different qualities and limiting 
conditions#ajb4 ,and although the one   
highest ,self only1 i4e4 the ,lord      
distinguished by those different        
qualities constitutes the object of     
devotion1 still the fruits 7of devotion7
 are distinct1 according as the devotion
 refers to different qualities4 ,thus   
,scripture says1 ',according as man     
worships him1 that he becomes2' and1    
',according to what his thought is in   
this world1 so will he be when he has   
departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1   
#ad1 #a74 ,sm_/ri_/ti also makes an     
analogous statement1 ',remembering      
whatever form of being he leaves this   
body in the end1 into that form he      
enters1 being impressed with it through 
his constant meditation' 7,bha4 ,gt     
,,viii1 #f74  ,although one and the same
 ,self is hidden in all beings movable  
as well as immovable1 yet owing to the  
gradual rise of excellence of the minds 
which form the limiting conditions 7of  
the ,self71 ,scripture declares that the

 ,self1 although eternally unchanging   
and uniform1 reveals itself#ajc in a    
graduated series of beings1 and so      
appears in forms of various dignity and 
power2 compare1 for instance 7,ait4 r4  
,,ii1 #c1 #b1 #a71 ',he who knows the   
higher manifestation of the ,self in    
him#ajd1' c4 ,similarly ,sm_/ri_/ti     
remarks1 ',whatever being there is of   
power1 splendour or might1 know it to   
have sprung from portions of my glory'  
7,bha4 ,gt1 ,x1 #da72 a passage         
declaring that wherever there is an     
excess of power and so on1 there the    
,lord is to be worshipped4 ,accordingly 
here 7i4e4 in the ,stras7 also the      
teacher will show that the golden person
 in the disc of the ,sun is the highest 
,self1 on account of an indicating sign1
 viz4 the circumstance of his being     
unconnected with any evil 7,ved4 ,s4 ,i1
 #a1 #bj72 the same is to be observed   
with regard to ,i1 #a1 #bb and other    
,stras4 ,and1 again1 an enquiry will    
have to be undertaken into the meaning  

of the texts1 in order that a settled   
conclusion may be reached concerning    
that knowledge of the ,self which leads 
to instantaneous release2 for although  
that knowledge is conveyed by means of  
various limiting conditions1 yet no     
special connexion with limiting         
conditions is intended to be intimated1 
in consequence of which there arises a  
doubt whether it 7the knowledge7 has the
 higher or the lower ,brahman for its   
object2 so1 for instance1 in the case of
 ,stra ,i1 #a1 #abaje4 ,from all this it
 appears that the following part of the 
_/,s_/stra has a special object of its  
own1 viz4 to show that the ,vednta-texts
 teach1 on the one hand1 ,brahman as    
connected with limiting conditions and  
forming an object of devotion1 and on   
the other hand1 as being free from the  
connexion with such conditions and      
constituting an object of knowledge4    
,the refutation1 moreover1 of           
non-intelligent causes different from   
,brahman1 which in ,i1 #a1 #aj was based

 on the uniformity of the meaning of the
 ,vednta-texts1 will be further detailed
 by the ,strakra1 who1 while explaining 
additional passages relating to         
,brahman1 will preclude all causes of a 
nature opposite to that of ,brahman4    
#ab4 7,the ,self7 consisting of bliss   
7is the highest ,self7 on account of the
 repetition 7of the word 'bliss1' as    
denoting the highest ,self74  ,the      
,taittirya-upanishad 7,,ii1 #a-e71 after
 having enumerated the ,self consisting 
of food1 the ,self consisting of the    
vital airs1 the ,self consisting of     
mind1 and the ,self consisting of       
understanding1 says1 ',different from   
this which consists of understanding is 
the other inner ,self which consists of 
bliss4' ,here the doubt arises whether  
the phrase1 'that which consists of     
bliss1' denotes the highest ,brahman of 
which it had been said previously1 that 
',it is true ,being1 ,knowledge1 without
 end1' or something different from      
,brahman1 just as the ,self consisting  

of food1 c41 is different from it4--,the
 prvapakshin maintains that the ,self   
consisting of bliss is a secondary 7not 
the principal7 ,self1 and something     
different from ,brahman2 as it forms a  
link in a series of ,selfs1 beginning   
with the ,self consisting of food1 which
 all are not the principal ,self4 ,to   
the objection that even thus the ,self  
consisting of bliss may be considered as
 the primary ,self1 since it is stated  
to be the innermost of all1 he replies  
that this cannot be admitted1 because   
the ,self of bliss is declared to have  
joy and so on for its limbs1 and because
 it is said to be embodied4 ,if it were 
identical with the primary ,self1 joy   
and the like would not touch it2 but the
 text expressly says ',joy is its head2'
 and about its being embodied we read1  
',of that former one this one is the    
embodied ,self' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71
 i4e4 of that former ,self of           
,understanding this ,self of bliss is   
the embodied ,self4 ,and of what is     

embodied1 the contact with joy and pain 
cannot be prevented4 ,therefore the     
,self which consists of bliss is nothing
 but the transmigrating ,soul4  ,to this
 reasoning we make the following        
reply3--,by the ,self consisting of     
bliss we have to understand the highest 
,self1 'on account of repetition4' ,for 
the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied  
to the highest ,self4 ,so ,taitt4 ,up4  
,,ii1 #g1 where1 after the clause ',that
 is flavour'--which refers back to the  
,self consisting of bliss1 and declares 
it to be of the nature of flavour--we   
read1 ',for only after having perceived 
flavour can any one perceive delight4   
,who could breathe1 who could breathe   
forth if that ,bliss existed not in the 
ether 7of the heart78 ,for he alone     
causes blessedness2' and again1 ,,ii1   
#h1 ',now this is an examination of     
,bliss2' ',he reaches that ,self        
consisting of ,bliss2' and again1 ,,ii1 
#i1 ',he who knows the ,bliss of        
,brahman fears nothing2' and in         

addition1 ',he understood that ,bliss is
 ,brahman' 7,,iii1 #f74 ,and in another 
scriptural passage also 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
,,iii1 #i1 #bh71 ',knowledge and bliss  
is ,brahman1' we see the word 'bliss'   
applied just to ,brahman4 ,as1          
therefore1 the word 'bliss' is          
repeatedly used with reference to       
,brahman1 we conclude that the ,self    
consisting of bliss is ,brahman also4   
,the objection that the ,self consisting
 of bliss can only denote the secondary 
,self 7the ,sa_/m_/srin71 because it    
forms a link in a series of secondary   
,selfs1 beginning with the one          
consisting of food1 is of no force1 for 
the reason that the ,self consisting of 
bliss is the innermost of all4 ,the     
_/,s_/stra1 wishing to convey           
information about the primary ,self1    
adapts itself to common notions1 in so  
far as it at first refers to the body   
consisting of food1 which1 although not 
the ,self1 is by very obtuse people     
identified with it2 it then proceeds    

from the body to another ,self1 which   
has the same shape with the preceding   
one1 just as the statue possesses the   
form of the mould into which the molten 
brass had been poured2 then1 again1 to  
another one1 always at first            
representing the ,non-,self as the      
,self1 for the purpose of easier        
comprehension2 and it finally teaches   
that the innermost ,self#ajf1 which     
consists of bliss1 is the real ,self4   
,just as when a man1 desirous of        
pointing out the star ,arundhat to      
another man1 at first points to several 
stars which are not ,arundhat as being  
,arundhat1 while only the star pointed  
out in the end is the real ,arundhat2 so
 here also the ,self consisting of bliss
 is the real ,self on account of its    
being the innermost 7i4e4 the last74    
,nor can any weight be allowed to the   
objection that the attribution of joy   
and so on1 as head1 c41 cannot possibly 
refer to the real ,self2 for this       
attribution is due to the immediately   

preceding limiting condition 7viz4 the  
,self consisting of understanding1 the  
so-called vij_/_/nakosa71 and does not  
really belong to the real ,self4 ,the   
possession of a bodily nature also is   
ascribed to the ,self of bliss1 only    
because it is represented as a link in  
the chain of bodies which begins with   
the ,self consisting of food1 and is not
 ascribed to it in the same direct sense
 in which it is predicated of the       
transmigrating ,self4 ,hence the ,self  
consisting of bliss is the highest      
,brahman4  #ac4 ,if 7it be objected that
 the term nandamaya1 consisting of      
bliss1 can7 not 7denote the highest     
,self7 on account of its being a word   
denoting a modification 7or product72   
7we declare the objection to be7 not    
7valid7 on account of abundance1 7the   
idea of which may be expressed by the   
affix maya47  ,here the prvapakshin     
raises the objection that the word      
nandamaya 7consisting of bliss7 cannot  
denote the highest                      

,self4--,why8--,because the word        
nandamaya is understood to denote       
something different from the original   
word 7i4e4 the word nanda without the   
derivative affix maya71 viz4 a          
modification2 according to the received 
sense of the affix maya4 'nandamaya'    
therefore denotes a modification1 just  
as annamaya 7consisting of food7 and    
similar words do4  ,this objection is1  
however1 not valid1 because 'maya' is   
also used in the sense of abundance1    
i4e4 denotes that where there is        
abundance of what the original word     
expresses4 ,so1 for instance1 the phrase
 'the sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the 
sacrifice is abounding in food' 7not 'is
 some modification or product of food'74
 ,thus here ,brahman also1 as abounding 
in bliss1 is called nandamaya4 ,that    
,brahman does abound in bliss follows   
from the passage 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1    
#h71 where1 after the bliss of each of  
the different classes of beings1        
beginning with man1 has been declared to

 be a hundred times greater than the    
bliss of the immediately preceding      
class1 the bliss of ,brahman is finally 
proclaimed to be absolutely supreme4    
,maya therefore denotes abundance4  #ad4
 ,and because he is declared to be the  
cause of it1 7i4e4 of bliss2 therefore  
maya is to be taken as denoting         
abundance47  ,maya must be understood to
 denote abundance1 for that reason also 
that ,scripture declares ,brahman to be 
the cause of bliss1 ',for he alone      
causes bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74  
,for he who causes bliss must himself   
abound in bliss2 just as we infer in    
ordinary life1 that a man who enriches  
others must himself possess abundant    
wealth4 ,as1 therefore1 maya may be     
taken to mean 'abundant1' the ,self     
consisting of bliss is the highest      
,self4  #ae4 ,moreover 7the nandamaya is
 ,brahman because7 the same 7,brahman7  
which had been referred to in the mantra
 is sung1 7i4e4 proclaimed in the       
,brhma_/n_/a passage as the nandamaya47 

,the ,self1 consisting of joy1 is the   
highest ,brahman for the following      
reason also#ajg4 ,on the introductory   
words 'he who knows ,brahman attains the
 highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a71 there
 follows a mantra proclaiming that      
,brahman1 which forms the general topic 
of the chapter1 possesses the qualities 
of true existence1 intelligence1        
infinity2 after that it is said that    
from ,brahman there sprang at first the 
ether and then all other moving and     
non-moving things1 and that1 entering   
into the beings which it had emitted1   
,brahman stays in the recess1 inmost of 
all2 thereupon1 for its better          
comprehension1 the series of the        
different ,selfs 7'different from this  
is the inner ,self1' c47 are enumerated1
 and then finally the same ,brahman     
which the mantra had proclaimed1 is     
again proclaimed in the passage under   
discussion1 'different from this is the 
other inner ,self1 which consists of    
bliss4' ,to assume that a mantra and the

 ,brhma_/n_/a passage belonging to it   
have the same sense is only proper1 on  
account of the absence of contradiction 
7which results therefrom72 for otherwise
 we should be driven to the unwelcome   
inference that the text drops the topic 
once started1 and turns to an altogether
 new subject4  ,nor is there mentioned a
 further inner ,self different from the 
,self consisting of bliss1 as in the    
case of the ,self consisting of food1   
c4#ajh ,on the same 7i4e4 the ,self     
consisting of bliss7 is founded1 ',this 
same knowledge of ,bh_/ri_/gu and       
,varu_/n_/a2 he understood that bliss is
 ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f74    
,therefore the ,self consisting of bliss
 is the highest ,self4  #af4 7,the ,self
 consisting of bliss is the highest     
,self17 not the other 7i4e4 the         
individual ,soul71 on account of the    
impossibility 7of the latter            
assumption74  ,and for the following    
reason also the ,self consisting of     
bliss is the highest ,self only1 not the

 other1 i4e4 the one which is other than
 the ,lord1 i4e4 the transmigrating     
individual soul4 ,the personal soul     
cannot be denoted by the term 'the one  
consisting of bliss4' ,why8 ,on account 
of the impossibility4 ,for ,scripture   
says1 with reference to the ,self       
consisting of bliss1 ',he wished1 may ,i
 be many1 may ,i grow forth4 ,he brooded
 over himself4 ,after he had thus       
brooded1 he sent forth whatever there   
is4' ,here1 the desire arising before   
the origination of a body1 c41 the      
non-separation of the effects created   
from the creator1 and the creation of   
all effects whatever1 cannot possibly   
belong to any ,self different from the  
highest ,self4  #ag4 ,and on account of 
the declaration of the difference 7of   
the two1 the nandamaya cannot be the    
transmigrating soul74  ,the ,self       
consisting of bliss cannot be identical 
with the transmigrating soul1 for that  
reason also that in the section treating
 of the ,self of bliss1 the individual  

soul and the ,self of bliss are         
distinctly represented as different2    
,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 ',it 7i4e4 the   
,self consisting of bliss7 is a flavour2
 for only after perceiving a flavour can
 this 7soul7 perceive bliss4' ,for he   
who perceives cannot be that which is   
perceived4--,but1 it may be asked1 if he
 who perceives or attains cannot be that
 which is perceived or attained1 how    
about the following _/,s_/ruti- and     
,smr_/ri_/ti-passages1 ',the ,self is to
 be sought2' ',nothing higher is known  
than the attainment of the              
,self#aji8'--,this objection1 we reply1 
is legitimate 7from the point of view of
 absolute truth74 ,yet we see that in   
ordinary life1 the ,self1 which in      
reality is never anything but the ,self1
 is1 owing to non-comprehension of the  
truth1 identified with the ,non-,self1  
i4e4 the body and so on2 whereby it     
becomes possible to speak of the ,self  
in so far as it is identified with the  
body1 and so on1 as something not       

searched for but to be searched for1 not
 heard but to be heard1 not seized but  
to be seized1 not perceived but to be   
perceived1 not known but to be known1   
and the like4 ,scripture1 on the other  
hand1 denies1 in such passages as 'there
 is no other seer but he' 7,b_/ri_/4    
,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bc71 that there is in  
reality any seer or hearer different    
from the all-knowing highest ,lord4     
7,nor can it be said that the ,lord is  
unreal because he is identical with the 
unreal individual soul2 for7#aaj the    
,lord differs from the soul             
7vij_/_/ntman7 which is embodied1 acts  
and enjoys1 and is the product of       
,nescience1 in the same way as the real 
juggler who stands on the ground differs
 from the illusive juggler1 who1 holding
 in his hand a shield and a sword1      
climbs up to the sky by means of a rope2
 or as the free unlimited ether differs 
from the ether of a jar1 which is       
determined by its limiting adjunct1     
7viz4 the jar47 ,with reference to this 

fictitious difference of the highest    
,self and the individual ,self1 the two 
last ,stras have been propounded4  #ah4 
,and on account of desire 7being        
mentioned as belonging to the nandamaya7
 no regard is to be had to what is      
inferred1 7i4e4 to the pradhna inferred 
by the ,snkhyas47  ,since in the passage
 'he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i    
grow forth1' which occurs in the chapter
 treating of the nandamaya 7,taitt4 ,up4
 ,,ii1 #f71 the quality of feeling      
desire is mentioned1 that which is      
inferred1 i4e4 the non-intelligent      
pradhna assumed by the ,snkhyas1 cannot 
be regarded as being the ,self          
consisting of bliss and the cause of the
 world4 ,although the opinion that the  
pradhna is the cause of the world1 has  
already been refuted in the ,stra ,i1   
#a1 #e1 it is here1 where a favourable  
opportunity presents itself1 refuted for
 a second time on the basis of the      
scriptural passage about the cause of   
the world feeling desire1 for the       

purpose of showing the uniformity of    
view 7of all scriptural passages74  #ai4
 ,and1 moreover1 it 7i4e4 ,scripture7   
teaches the joining of this 7i4e4 the   
individual soul7 with that1 7i4e4 the   
,self consisting of bliss71 on that     
7being fully known74  ,and for the      
following reason also the term1 'the    
,self consisting of bliss1' cannot      
denote either the pradhna or the        
individual soul4 ,scripture teaches that
 the individual soul when it has reached
 knowledge is joined1 i4e4 identified1  
with the ,self of bliss under           
discussion1 i4e4 obtains final release4 
,compare the following passage 7,taitt4 
,up4 ,,ii1 #g71 ',when he finds freedom 
from fear1 and rest in that which is    
invisible1 incorporeal1 undefined1      
unsupported1 then he has obtained the   
fearless4 ,for if he makes but the      
smallest distinction in it there is fear
 for him4' ,that means1 if he sees in   
that ,self consisting of bliss even a   
small difference in the form of         

non-identity1 then he finds no release  
from the fear of transmigratory         
existence4 ,but when he1 by means of the
 cognition of absolute identity1 finds  
absolute rest in the ,self consisting of
 bliss1 then he is freed from the fear  
of transmigratory existence4 ,but this  
7finding absolute rest7 is possible only
 when we understand by the ,self        
consisting of bliss1 the highest ,self1 
and not either the pradhna or the       
individual soul4 ,hence it is proved    
that the ,self consisting of bliss is   
the highest ,self4  ,but1 in reality1   
the following remarks have to be made   
concerning the true meaning of the word 
'nandamaya#aaa4' ,on what grounds1 we   
ask1 can it be maintained that the affix
 'maya' after having1 in the series of  
compounds beginning with annamaya and   
ending with vij_/_/namaya1 denoted mere 
modifications1 should all at once1 in   
the word nandamaya1 which belongs to the
 same series1 denote abundance1 so that 
nandamaya would refer to ,brahman8 ,if  

it should be said that the assumption is
 made on account of the governing       
influence of the ,brahman proclaimed in 
the mantra 7which forms the beginning of
 the chapter1 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii71 we    
reply that therefrom it would follow    
that also the ,selfs consisting of food1
 breath1 c41 denote ,brahman 7because   
the governing influence of the mantra   
extends to them also74--,the advocate of
 the former interpretation will here1   
perhaps1 restate an argument already    
made use of above1 viz4 as follows3 ,to 
assume that the ,selfs consisting of    
food1 and so on1 are not ,brahman is    
quite proper1 because after each of them
 an inner ,self is mentioned4 ,after the
 ,self of bliss1 on the other hand1 no  
further inner ,self is mentioned1 and   
hence it must be considered to be       
,brahman itself2 otherwise we should    
commit the mistake of dropping the      
subject-matter in hand 7as which        
,brahman is pointed out by the mantra71 
and taking up a new topic4--,but to this

 we reply that1 although unlike the case
 of the ,selfs consisting of food1 c41  
no inner ,self is mentioned after the   
,self consisting of bliss1 still the    
latter cannot be considered as ,brahman1
 because with reference to the ,self    
consisting of bliss ,scripture declares1
 ',joy is its head4 ,satisfaction is its
 right arm4 ,great satisfaction is its  
left arm4 ,bliss is its trunk4 ,brahman 
is its tail1 its support4' ,now1 here   
the very same ,brahman which1 in the    
mantra1 had been introduced as the      
subject of the discussion1 is called the
 tail1 the support2 while the five      
involucra1 extending from the involucrum
 of food up to the involucrum of bliss1 
are merely introduced for the purpose of
 setting forth the knowledge of         
,brahman4 ,how1 then1 can it be         
maintained that our interpretation      
implies the needless dropping of the    
general subject-matter and the          
introduction of a new topic8--,but1 it  
may again be objected1 ,brahman is      

called the tail1 i4e4 a member of the   
,self consisting of bliss2 analogously  
to those passages in which a tail and   
other members are ascribed to the ,selfs
 consisting of food and so on4 ,on what 
grounds1 then1 can we claim to know that
 ,brahman 7which is spoken of as a mere 
member1 i4e4 a subordinate matter7 is in
 reality the chief matter referred      
to8--,from the fact1 we reply1 of       
,brahman being the general              
subject-matter of the chapter4--,but1 it
 will again be said1 that interpretation
 also according to which ,brahman is    
cognised as a mere member of the        
nandamaya does not involve a dropping of
 the subject-matter1 since the nandamaya
 himself is ,brahman4--,but1 we reply1  
in that case one and the same ,brahman  
would at first appear as the whole1 viz4
 as the ,self consisting of bliss1 and  
thereupon as a mere part1 viz4 as the   
tail2 which is absurd4 ,and as one of   
the two alternatives must be preferred1 
it is certainly appropriate to refer to 

,brahman the clause ',brahman is the    
tail' which contains the word           
',brahman1' and not the sentence about  
the ,self of ,bliss in which ,brahman is
 not mentioned4 ,moreover1 ,scripture1  
in continuation of the phrase1 ',brahman
 is the tail1 the support1' goes on1    
',on this there is also the following   
_/s_/loka3 ,he who knows the ,brahman as
 non-existing becomes himself           
non-existing4 ,he who knows ,brahman as 
existing him we know himself as         
existing4' ,as this _/s_/loka1 without  
any reference to the ,self of bliss1    
states the advantage and disadvantage   
connected with the knowledge of the     
being and non-being of ,brahman only1 we
 conclude that the clause1 ',brahman is 
the tail1 the support1' represents      
,brahman as the chief matter 7not as a  
merely subordinate matter74 ,about the  
being or non-being of the ,self of      
bliss1 on the other hand1 a doubt is not
 well possible1 since the ,self of bliss
 distinguished by joy1 satisfaction1 c41

 is well known to every one4--,but if   
,brahman is the principal matter1 how   
can it be designated as the mere tail of
 the ,self of bliss 7',brahman is the   
tail1 the support'78--,its being called 
so1 we reply1 forms no objection2 for   
the word tail here denotes that which is
 of the nature of a tail1 so that we    
have to understand that the bliss of    
,brahman is not a member 7in its literal
 sense71 but the support or abode1 the  
one nest 7resting-place7 of all worldly 
bliss4 ,analogously another scriptural  
passage declares1 ',all other creatures 
live on a small portion of that bliss'  
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #cb74         
,further1 if by the ,self consisting of 
bliss we were to understand ,brahman we 
should have to assume that the ,brahman 
meant is the ,brahman distinguished by  
qualities 7savi_/s_/esha71 because it is
 said to have joy and the like for its  
members4 ,but this assumption is        
contradicted by a complementary passage 
7,,ii1 #i7 which declares that ,brahman 

is the object neither of mind nor       
speech1 and so shows that the ,brahman  
meant is the 7absolute7 ,brahman 7devoid
 of qualities71 ',from whence all       
speech1 with the mind1 turns away unable
 to reach it1 he who knows the bliss of 
that ,brahman fears nothing4' ,moreover1
 if we speak of something as 'abounding 
in bliss#aab1' we thereby imply the     
co-existence of pain2 for the word      
'abundance' in its ordinary sense       
implies the existence of a small measure
 of what is opposed to the thing whereof
 there is abundance4 ,but the passage so
 understood would be in conflict with   
another passage 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bd71 
',where one sees nothing else1 hears    
nothing else1 understands nothing else1 
that is the ,infinite2' which declares  
that in the ,infinite1 i4e4 ,brahman1   
there is nothing whatever different from
 it4 ,moreover1 as joy1 c4 differ in    
each individual body1 the ,self         
consisting of bliss also is a different 
one in each body4 ,brahman1 on the other

 hand1 does not differ according to     
bodies2 for the mantra at the beginning 
of the chapter declares it to be true   
,being1 knowledge1 infinite1 and another
 passage says1 ',he is the one ,god1    
hidden in all beings1 all-pervading1 the
 ,self within all beings' 7_/,s_/v4 ,up4
 ,,vi1 #aa74 ,nor1 again1 does          
,scripture exhibit a frequent repetition
 of the word 'nandamaya2' for merely the
 radical part of the compound 7i4e4 the 
word nanda without the affix maya7 is   
repeated in all the following passages2 
',it is a flavour1 for only after       
seizing flavour can any one seize bliss4
 ,who could breathe1 who could breathe  
forth1 if that bliss existed not in the 
ether8 ,for he alone causes             
blessedness2' ',now this is an          
examination of bliss2' ',he who knows   
the bliss of that ,brahman fears        
nothing2' ',he understood that bliss is 
,brahman4' ,if it were a settled matter 
that ,brahman is denoted by the term1   
'the ,self consisting of bliss1' then we

 could assume that in the subsequent    
passages1 where merely the word 'bliss' 
is employed1 the term 'consisting of    
bliss' is meant to be repeated2 but that
 the ,self consisting of bliss is not   
,brahman1 we have already proved by     
means of the reason of joy being its    
head1 and so on4 ,hence1 as in another  
scriptural passage1 viz4 ',brahman is   
knowledge and bliss' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iii1 #i1 #bh71 the mere word 'bliss'  
denotes ,brahman1 we must conclude that 
also in such passages as1 ',if that     
bliss existed not in the ether1' the    
word bliss is used with reference to    
,brahman1 and is not meant to repeat the
 term 'consisting of bliss4' ,the       
repetition of the full compound1        
'consisting of bliss1' which occurs in  
the passage1 ',he reaches that ,self    
consisting of bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1
 #h71 does not refer to ,brahman1 as it 
is contained in the enumeration of      
,non-,selfs1 comprising the ,self of    
food1 c41 all of which are mere effects1

 and all of which are represented as    
things to be reached4--,but1 it may be  
said1 if the ,self consisting of bliss1 
which is said to have to be reached1    
were not ,brahman--just as the ,selfs   
consisting of food1 c4 are not          
,brahman--then it would not be declared 
7in the passage immediately following7  
that he who knows obtains for his reward
 ,brahman4--,this objection we          
invalidate by the remark that the text  
makes its declaration as to             
,brahman--which is the tail1 the        
support--being reached by him who knows1
 by the very means of the declaration as
 to the attainment of the ,self of      
bliss2 as appears from the passage1 ',on
 this there is also this _/s_/loka1 from
 which all speech returns1' c4 ,with    
reference1 again1 to the passage1 ',he  
desired3 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow    
forth1' which is found in proximity to  
the mention of the ,self consisting of  
bliss1 we remark that it is in reality  
connected 7not with the ,self of bliss  

but with7 ,brahman1 which is mentioned  
in the still nearer passage1 ',brahman  
is the tail1 the support1' and does     
therefore not intimate that the ,self of
 bliss is ,brahman4 ,and1 on account of 
its referring to the passage last quoted
 7'it desired1' c471 the later passage  
also1 ',that is flavour1' c41 has not   
the ,self of bliss for its              
subject4--,but1 it may be objected1 the 
7neuter word7 ,brahman cannot possibly  
be designated by a masculine word as you
 maintain is done in the passage1 ',he  
desired1' c4--,in reply to this         
objection we point to the passage       
7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a71 ',from that    
,self sprang ether1' where1 likewise1   
the masculine word ',self' can refer to 
,brahman only1 since the latter is the  
general topic of the chapter4 ,in the   
knowledge of ,bh_/ri_/gu and ,varu_/n_/a
 finally 7'he knew that bliss is        
,brahman'71 the word 'bliss' is rightly 
understood to denote ,brahman1 since we 
there meet neither with the affix       

'maya1' nor with any statement as to joy
 being its head1 and the like4 ,to      
ascribe to ,brahman in itself joy1 and  
so on1 as its members1 is impossible1   
unless we have recourse to certain1     
however minute1 distinctions qualifying 
,brahman2 and that the whole chapter is 
not meant to convey a knowledge of the  
qualified 7savi_/s_/esha7 ,brahman is   
proved by the passage 7quoted above71   
which declares that ,brahman transcends 
speech and mind4 ,we therefore must     
conclude that the affix maya1 in the    
word nandamaya1 does not denote         
abundance1 but expresses a mere effect1 
just as it does in the words annamaya   
and the subsequent similar compounds4   
,the ,stras are therefore to be         
explained as follows4 ,there arises the 
question whether the passage1 ',brahman 
is the tail1 the support1' is to be     
understood as intimating that ,brahman  
is a mere member of the ,self consisting
 of bliss1 or that it is the principal  
matter4 ,if it is said that it must be  

considered as a mere member1 the reply  
is1 ',the ,self consisting of bliss on  
account of the repetition4' ,that means3
 ,brahman1 which in the passage 'the    
,self consisting of bliss1' c41 is      
spoken of as the tail1 the support1 is  
designated as the principal matter 7not 
as something subordinate74 ,on account  
of the repetition2 for in the memorial  
_/s_/loka1 'he becomes himself          
non-existing1' ,brahman alone is        
reiterated4 ',if not1 on account of the 
word denoting a modification2 not so1 on
 account of abundance4' ,in this ,stra  
the word 'modification' is meant to     
convey the sense of member4 ,the        
objection that on account of the word   
'tail1' which denotes a mere member1    
,brahman cannot be taken as the         
principal matter must be refuted4 ,this 
we do by remarking that there is no     
difficulty1 since a word denoting a     
member may be introduced into the       
passage on account of pr_/k_/urya#aac4  
,pr_/k_/urya here means a phraseology   

abounding in terms denoting members4    
,after the different members1 beginning 
with the head and ending with the tail1 
of the ,selfs1 consisting of food1 c4   
have been enumerated1 there are also    
mentioned the head and the other limbs  
of the ,self of bliss1 and then it is   
added1 ',brahman is the tail1 the       
support2' the intention being merely to 
introduce some more terms denoting      
members1 not to convey the meaning of   
'member1' 7an explanation which is      
impossible7 because the preceding ,stra 
already has proved ,brahman 7not to be a
 member1 but7 to be the principal       
matter4 ',and because he is declared to 
be the cause of it4' ,that means3       
,brahman is declared to be the cause of 
the entire aggregate of effects1        
inclusive of the ,self1 consisting of   
bliss1 in the following passage1 ',he   
created all whatever there is' 7,taitt4 
,up4 ,,ii1 #f74 ,and as ,brahman is the 
cause1 it cannot at the same time be    
called the member1 in the literal sense 

of the word1 of the ,self of bliss1     
which is nothing but one of ,brahman's  
effects4 ,the other ,stras also 7which  
refer to the ,self of bliss#aad7 are to 
be considered1 as well as they may1 as  
conveying a knowledge of ,brahman1 which
 7,brahman7 is referred to in the       
passage about the tail4  #bj4 ,the one  
within 7the sun and the eye7 7is the    
highest ,lord71 on account of his       
qualities being declared#aae4  ,the     
following passage is found in ,scripture
 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #f1 #f ff471 ',now that 
person bright as gold who is seen within
 the sun1 with beard bright as gold and 
hair bright as gold1 bright as gold     
altogether to the very tips of his      
nails1 whose eyes are like blue lotus2  
his name is ,ut1 for he has risen       
7udita7 above all evil4 ,he also who    
knows this rises above all evil4 ,so    
much with reference to the devas4' ,and 
further on1 with reference to the body1 
',now the person who is seen in the     
eye1' c4 ,here the following doubt      

presents itself4 ,do these passages     
point out1 as the object of devotion    
directed on the sphere of the sun and   
the eye1 merely some special individual 
soul1 which1 by means of a large measure
 of knowledge and pious works1 has      
raised itself to a position of eminence2
 or do they refer to the eternally      
perfect highest ,lord8  ,the prvapakshin
 takes the former view4 ,an individual  
soul1 he says1 is referred to1 since    
,scripture speaks of a definite shape4  
,to the person in the sun special       
features are ascribed1 such as the      
possession of a beard as bright as gold 
and so on1 and the same features        
manifestly belong to the person in the  
eye also1 since they are expressly      
transferred to it in the passage1 ',the 
shape of this person is the same as the 
shape of that person4' ,that1 on the    
other hand1 no shape can be ascribed to 
the highest ,lord1 follows from the     
passage 7,kau4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #ae71 ',that
 which is without sound1 without touch1 

without form1 without decay4' ,that an  
individual soul is meant follows        
moreover from the fact that a definite  
abode is mentioned1 ',he who is in the  
sun2 he who is in the eye4' ,about the  
highest ,lord1 who has no special abode1
 but abides in his own glory1 no similar
 statement can be made2 compare1 for    
instance1 the two following passages1   
',where does he rest8 ,in his own       
glory8' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bd1 #a72 and 
'like the ether he is omnipresent1      
eternal4' ,a further argument for our   
view is supplied by the fact that the   
might 7of the being in question7 is said
 to be limited2 for the passage1 ',he is
 lord of the worlds beyond that1 and of 
the wishes of the devas1' indicates the 
limitation of the might of the person in
 the sun2 and the passage1 ',he is lord 
of the worlds beneath that and of the   
wishes of men1' indicates the limitation
 of the might of the person in the eye4 
,no limit1 on the other hand1 can be    
admitted of the might of the highest    

,lord1 as appears from the passage      
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb71 ',he is 
the ,lord of all1 the king of all       
things1 the protector of all things4 ,he
 is a bank and a boundary so that these 
worlds may not be confounded2' which    
passage intimates that the ,lord is free
 from all limiting distinctions4 ,for   
all these reasons the person in the eye 
and the sun cannot be the highest ,lord4
  ,to this reasoning the ,stra replies1 
',the one within1 on account of his     
qualities being declared4' ,the person  
referred to in the passages concerning  
the person within the sun and the person
 within the eye is not a transmigrating 
being1 but the highest ,lord4 ,why8     
,because his qualities are declared4    
,for the qualities of the highest ,lord 
are indicated in the text as follows4   
,at first the name of the person within 
the sun is mentioned--'his name is      
,ut'--and then this name is explained on
 the ground of that person being free   
from all evil1 ',he has risen above all 

evil4' ,the same name thus explained is 
then transferred to the person in the   
eye1 in the clause1 'the name of the one
 is the name of the other4' ,now1 entire
 freedom from sin is attributed in      
,scripture to the highest ,self only2   
so1 for instance 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 
#a71 ',the ,self which is free from     
sin1' c4 ,then1 again1 there is the     
passage1 ',he is _/,ri_/k1 he is ,sman1 
,uktha1 ,yajus1 ,brahman1' which        
declares the person in the eye to be the
 ,self of the _/,ri_/k1 ,sman1 and so   
on2 which is possible only if that      
person is the ,lord who1 as being the   
cause of all1 is to be considered as the
 ,self of all4 ,moreover1 the text1     
after having stated in succession       
_/,ri_/k and ,sman to have earth and    
fire for their ,self with reference to  
the ,devas1 and1 again1 speech and      
breath with reference to the body1      
continues1 '_/,ri_/k and ,sman are his  
joints1' with reference to the ,devas1  
and 'the joints of the one are the      

joints of the other1' with reference to 
the body4 ,now this statement also can  
be made only with regard to that which  
is the ,self of all4 ,further1 the      
passage1 ',therefore all who sing to the
 ,vn sing him1 and from him also they   
obtain wealth1' shows that the being    
spoken of is the sole topic of all      
worldly songs2 which again holds true of
 the highest ,lord only4 ,that absolute 
command over the objects of worldly     
desires 7as displayed1 for instance1 in 
the bestowal of wealth7 entitles us to  
infer that the ,lord is meant1 appears  
also from the following passage of the  
,bhagavad-gt 7,x1 #da71 ',whatever being
 there is possessing power1 glory1 or   
strength1 know it to be produced from a 
portion of my energy#aaf4' ,to the      
objection that the statements about     
bodily shape contained in the clauses1  
',with a beard bright as gold1' c41     
cannot refer to the highest ,lord1 we   
reply that the highest ,lord also may1  
when he pleases1 assume a bodily shape  

formed of ,my1 in order to gratify      
thereby his devout worshippers4 ,thus   
,sm_/ri_/ti also says1 ',that thou seest
 me1 ,o ,nrada1 is the ,my emitted by   
me2 do not then look on me as endowed   
with the qualities of all beings4' ,we  
have further to note that expressions   
such as1 ',that which is without sound1 
without touch1 without form1 without    
decay1' are made use of where           
instruction is given about the nature of
 the highest ,lord in so far as he is   
devoid of all qualities2 while passages 
such as the following one1 ',he to whom 
belong all works1 all desires1 all sweet
 odours and tastes' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1   
#ad1 #b71 which represent the highest   
,lord as the object of devotion1 speak  
of him1 who is the cause of everything1 
as possessing some of the qualities of  
his effects4 ,analogously he may be     
spoken of1 in the passage under         
discussion1 as having a beard bright as 
gold and so on4 ,with reference to the  
objection that the highest ,lord cannot 

be meant because an abode is spoken of1 
we remark that1 for the purposes of     
devout meditation1 a special abode may  
be assigned to ,brahman1 although it    
abides in its own glory only2 for as    
,brahman is1 like ether1 all-pervading1 
it may be viewed as being within the    
,self of all beings4 ,the statement1    
finally1 about the limitation of        
,brahman's might1 which depends on the  
distinction of what belongs to the gods 
and what to the body1 has likewise      
reference to devout meditation only4    
,from all this it follows that the being
 which ,scripture states to be within   
the eye and the sun is the highest      
,lord4  #ba4 ,and there is another one  
7i4e4 the ,lord who is different from   
the individual souls animating the sun1 
c471 on account of the declaration of   
distinction4  ,there is1 moreover1 one  
distinct from the individual souls which
 animate the sun and other bodies1 viz4 
the ,lord who rules within2 whose       
distinction 7from all individual souls7 

is proclaimed in the following          
scriptural passage1 ',he who dwells in  
the sun and within the sun1 whom the sun
 does not know1 whose body the sun is1  
and who rules the sun within2 he is thy 
,self1 the ruler within1 the immortal'  
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #i74 ,here   
the expression1 ',he within the sun whom
 the sun does not know1' clearly        
indicates that the ,ruler within is     
distinct from that cognising individual 
soul whose body is the sun4 ,with that  
,ruler within we have to identify the   
person within the sun1 according to the 
tenet of the sameness of purport of all 
,vednta-texts4 ,it thus remains a       
settled conclusion that the passage     
under discussion conveys instruction    
about the highest ,lord4  #bb4 ,the     
k_/s_/a1 i4e4 ether 7is ,brahman7 on    
account of characteristic marks 7of the 
latter being mentioned74  ,in the       
,chndogya 7,i1 #i7 the following passage
 is met with1 ',what is the origin of   
this world8' ',ether1' he replied4 ',for

 all these beings take their rise from  
the ether only1 and return into the     
ether4 ,ether is greater than these1    
ether is their rest4'--,here the        
following doubt arises4 ,does the word  
'ether' denote the highest ,brahman or  
the elemental ether8--,whence the       
doubt8--,because the word is seen to be 
used in both senses4 ,its use in the    
sense of 'elemental ether' is well      
established in ordinary as well as in   
,vedic speech2 and1 on the other hand1  
we see that it is sometimes used to     
denote ,brahman1 viz4 in cases where we 
ascertain1 either from some             
complementary sentence or from the fact 
of special qualities being mentioned1   
that ,brahman is meant4 ,so1 for        
instance1 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 ',if   
that bliss existed not in the ether2'   
and ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ad1 ',that which 
is called ether is the revealer of all  
forms and names2 that within which forms
 and names are#aag that is ,brahman4'   
,hence the doubt4--,which sense is then 

to be adopted in our case8--,the sense  
of elemental ether1 the prvapakshin     
replies2 because this sense belongs to  
the word more commonly1 and therefore   
presents itself to the mind more        
readily4 ,the word 'ether' cannot be    
taken in both senses equally1 because   
that would involve a 7faulty7           
attribution of several meanings to one  
and the same word4 ,hence the term      
'ether' applies to ,brahman in a        
secondary 7metaphorical7 sense only2 on 
account of ,brahman being in many of its
 attributes1 such as all pervadingness  
and the like1 similar to ether4 ,the    
rule is1 that when the primary sense of 
a word is possible1 the word must not be
 taken in a secondary sense4 ,and in the
 passage under discussion only the      
primary sense of the word 'ether' is    
admissible4 ,should it be objected that1
 if we refer the passage under          
discussion to the elemental ether1 a    
complementary passage 7'for all these   
beings take their rise from the ether   

only1 c4'7 cannot be satisfactorily     
accounted for2 we reply that the        
elemental ether also may be represented 
as a cause1 viz4 of air1 fire1 c4 in due
 succession4 ,for we read in ,scripture 
7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a71 ',from that    
,self sprang ether1 from ether air1 from
 air fire1 and so on4' ,the qualities   
also of being greater and of being a    
place of rest may be ascribed to the    
elemental ether1 if we consider its     
relations to all other beings4          
,therefore we conclude that the word    
'ether' here denotes the elemental      
ether4  ,to this we reply as            
follows3--,the word ether must here be  
taken to denote ,brahman1 on account of 
characteristic marks of the latter being
 mentioned4 ,for the sentence1 ',all    
these beings take their rise from the   
ether only1' clearly indicates the      
highest ,brahman1 since all             
,vednta-texts agree in definitely       
declaring that all beings spring from   
the highest ,brahman4--,but1 the        

opponent may say1 we have shown that the
 elemental ether also may be represented
 as the cause1 viz4 of air1 fire1 and   
the other elements in due               
succession4--,we admit this4 ,but still 
there remains the difficulty1 that1     
unless we understand the word to apply  
to the fundamental cause of all1 viz4   
,brahman1 the affirmation contained in  
the word 'only' and the qualification   
expressed by the word 'all' 7in 'all    
beings'7 would be out of place4         
,moreover1 the clause1 ',they return    
into the ether1' again points to        
,brahman1 and so likewise the phrase1   
',ether is greater than these1 ether is 
their rest2' for absolute superiority in
 point of greatness ,scripture          
attributes to the highest ,self only2   
cp4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #c1 ',greater 
than the earth1 greater than the sky1   
greater than heaven1 greater than all   
these worlds4' ,the quality of being a  
place of rest likewise agrees best with 
the highest ,brahman1 on account of its 

being the highest cause4 ,this is       
confirmed by the following scriptural   
passage3 ',knowledge and bliss is       
,brahman1 it is the rest of him who     
gives gifts' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 
#bh74 ,moreover1 ,jaivali finding fault 
with the doctrine of _/,s_/lvatya1 on   
account of 7his sman7 having an end     
7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #h1 #h71 and wishing to  
proclaim something that has no end      
chooses the ether1 and then1 having     
identified the ether with the ,udgtha1  
concludes1 ',he is the ,udgtha greater  
than great2 he is without end4' ,now    
this endlessness is a characteristic    
mark of ,brahman4 ,to the remark that   
the sense of 'elemental ether' presents 
itself to the mind more readily1 because
 it is the better established sense of  
the word k_/s_/a1 we reply1 that1       
although it may present itself to the   
mind first1 yet it is not to be         
accepted1 because we see that qualities 
of ,brahman are mentioned in the        
complementary sentences4 ,that the word 

k_/s_/a is also used to denote ,brahman 
has been shown already2 cp4 such        
passages as1 ',ether is the revealer of 
all names and forms4' ,we see1 moreover1
 that various synonyma of k_/s_/a are   
employed to denote ,brahman4 ,so1 for   
instance1 _/,ri_/k ,sa_/m_/h4 ,i1 #afd1 
#ci1 ',in which the ,vedas are#aah1 in  
the ,imperishable one 7i4e4 ,brahman71  
the highest1 the ether 7vyoman71 on     
which all gods have their seat4' ,and   
,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f1 ',this is the   
knowledge of ,bh_/ri_/gu and            
,varu_/n_/a1 founded on the highest     
ether 7vyoman74' ,and again1 ',om1 ka is
 ,brahman1 ether 7kha7 is ,brahman'     
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aj1 #e71 and 'the old 
ether' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1 #a7aai4 ,and 
other similar passages4 ,on account of  
the force of the complementary passage  
we are justified in deciding that the   
word 'ether1' although occurring in the 
beginning of the passage1 refers to     
,brahman4 ,the case is analogous to that
 of the sentence1 ',agni 7lit4 the fire7

 studies a chapter1' where the word     
agni1 although occurring in the         
beginning1 is at once seen to denote a  
boy#abj4 ,it is therefore settled that  
the word 'ether' denotes ,brahman4  #bc4
 ,for the same reason breath 7is        
,brahman74  ,concerning the udgtha it is
 said 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #aj1 #i71          
',prastot_/ri_/1 that deity which       
belongs to the prastva1 c41' and1       
further on 7,i1 #aa1 #d2 #e71 ',which   
then is that deity8 ,he said3 ,breath4  
,for all these beings merge into breath 
alone1 and from breath they arise4 ,this
 is the deity belonging to the prastva4'
 ,with reference to this passage doubt  
and decision are to be considered as    
analogous to those stated under the     
preceding ,stra4 ,for while in some     
passages--as1 for instance1 ',for       
indeed1 my son1 mind is fastened to     
pr_/n_/a1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #b2 and1 
'the pr_/n_/a of pr_/n_/a1' ,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ah--the word 'breath' is
 seen to denote ,brahman1 its use in the

 sense of a certain modification of air 
is better established in common as well 
as in ,vedic language4 ,hence there     
arises a doubt whether in the passage   
under discussion the word pr_/n_/a      
denotes ,brahman or 7ordinary7 breath4  
,in favour of which meaning have we then
 to decide8  ,here the prvapakshin      
maintains that the word must be held to 
denote the fivefold vital breath1 which 
is a peculiar modification of wind 7or  
air72 because1 as has been remarked     
already1 that sense of the word pr_/n_/a
 is the better established one4--,but   
no1 an objector will say1 just as in the
 case of the preceding ,stra1 so here   
also ,brahman is meant1 on account of   
characteristic marks being mentioned2   
for here also a complementary passage   
gives us to understand that all beings  
spring from and merge into pr_/n_/a2 a  
process which can take place in         
connexion with the highest ,lord        
only4--,this objection1 the prvapakshin 
replies1 is futile1 since we see that   

the beings enter into and proceed from  
the principal vital air also4 ,for      
,scripture makes the following statement
 7,sat4 ,br4 ,x1 #c1 #c1 #f71 ',when man
 sleeps1 then into breath indeed speech 
merges1 into breath the eye1 into breath
 the ear1 into breath the mind2 when he 
awakes then they spring again from      
breath alone4' ,what the ,veda here     
states is1 moreover1 a matter of        
observation1 for during sleep1 while the
 process of breathing goes on           
uninterruptedly1 the activity of the    
sense organs is interrupted and again   
becomes manifest at the time of awaking 
only4 ,and as the sense organs are the  
essence of all material beings1 the     
complementary passage which speaks of   
the merging and emerging of the beings  
can be reconciled with the principal    
vital air also4 ,moreover1 subsequently 
to pr_/n_/a being mentioned as the      
divinity of the prastva the sun and food
 are designated as the divinities of the
 udgitha and the pratibra4 ,now as they 

are not ,brahman1 the pr_/n_/a also1 by 
parity of reasoning1 cannot be ,brahman4
  ,to this argumentation the author of  
the ,stras replies3 ,for the same reason
 pr_/n_/a--that means3 on account of the
 presence of characteristic marks--which
 constituted the reason stated in the   
preceding ,stra--the word pr_/n_/a also 
must be held to denote ,brahman4 ,for   
,scripture says of pr_/n_/a also1 that  
it is connected with marks              
characteristic of ,brahman4 ,the        
sentence1 ',all these beings merge into 
breath alone1 and from breath they      
arise1' which declares that the         
origination and retractation of all     
beings depend on pr_/n_/a1 clearly shows
 pr_/n_/a to be ,brahman4 ,in reply to  
the assertion that the origination and  
retractation of all beings can be       
reconciled equally well with the        
assumption of pr_/n_/a denoting the     
chief vital air1 because origination and
 retractation take place in the state of
 waking and of sleep also1 we remark    

that in those two states only the senses
 are merged into1 and emerge from1 the  
chief vital air1 while1 according to the
 scriptural passage1 ',for all these    
beings1 c41' all beings whatever into   
which a living ,self has entered1       
together with their senses and bodies1  
merge and emerge by turns4 ,and even if 
the word 'beings' were taken 7not in the
 sense of animated beings1 but7 in the  
sense of material elements in general1  
there would be nothing in the way of    
interpreting the passage as referring to
 ,brahman4--,but1 it may be said1 that  
the senses together with their objects  
do1 during sleep1 enter into pr_/n_/a1  
and again issue from it at the time of  
waking1 we distinctly learn from another
 scriptural passage1 viz4 ,kau4 ,up4    
,,iii1 #c1 ',when a man being thus      
asleep sees no dream whatever1 he       
becomes one with that pr_/n_/a alone4   
,then speech goes to him with all       
names1' c4--,true1 we reply1 but there  
also the word pr_/n_/a denotes 7not the 

vital air7 but ,brahman1 as we conclude 
from characteristic marks of ,brahman   
being mentioned4 ,the objection1 again1 
that the word pr_/n_/a cannot denote    
,brahman because it occurs in proximity 
to the words 'food' and 'sun' 7which do 
not refer to ,brahman71 is altogether   
baseless2 for proximity is of no avail  
against the force of the complementary  
passage which intimates that pr_/n_/a is
 ,brahman4 ,that argument1 finally1     
which rests on the fact that the word   
pr_/n_/a commonly denotes the vital air 
with its five modifications1 is to be   
refuted in the same way as the parallel 
argument which the prvapakshin brought  
forward with reference to the word      
'ether4' ,from all this it follows that 
the pr_/n_/a1 which is the deity of the 
prastva1 is ,brahman4  ,some            
7commentators7#aba quote under the      
present ,stra the following passages1   
'the pr_/n_/a of pr_/n_/a' 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ah71 and 'for to        
pr_/n_/a mind is fastened' 7,ch4 ,up4   

,,vi1 #h1 #b74 ,but that is wrong since 
these two passages offer no opportunity 
for any discussion1 the former on       
account of the separation of the words1 
the latter on account of the general    
topic4 ,when we meet with a phrase such 
as 'the father of the father' we        
understand at once that the genitive    
denotes a father different from the     
father denoted by the nominative4       
,analogously we infer from the          
separation of words contained in the    
phrase1 'the breath of breath1' that the
 'breath of breath' is different from   
the ordinary breath 7denoted by the     
genitive 'of breath'74 ,for one and the 
same thing cannot1 by means of a        
genitive1 be predicated of--and thus    
distinguished from--itself4 ,concerning 
the second passage we remark that1 if   
the matter constituting the general     
topic of some chapter is referred to in 
that chapter under a different name1 we 
yet conclude1 from the general topic1   
that that special matter is meant4 ,for 

instance1 when we meet in the section   
which treats of the jyotish_/t_/oma     
sacrifice with the passage1 'in every   
spring he is to offer the jyotis        
sacrifice1' we at once understand that  
the word denotes the jyotish_/t_/oma4   
,if we therefore meet with the clause   
'to pr_/n_/a mind is fastened' in a     
section of which the highest ,brahman is
 the topic1 we do not for a moment      
suppose that the word pr_/n_/a should   
there denote the ordinary breath which  
is a mere modification of air4 ,the two 
passages thus do not offer any matter   
for discussion1 and hence do not furnish
 appropriate instances for the ,stra4   
,we have shown1 on the other hand1 that 
the passage about the pr_/n_/a1 which is
 the deity of the prastva1 allows room  
for doubt1 prvapaksha and final         
decision4  #bd4 ,the 'light' 7is        
,brahman71 on account of the mention of 
feet 7in a passage which is connected   
with the passage about the light74      
,scripture says 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ac1  

#g71 ',now that light which shines above
 this heaven1 higher than all1 higher   
than everything1 in the highest worlds  
beyond which there are no other worlds  
that is the same light which is within  
man4' ,here the doubt presents itself   
whether the word 'light' denotes the    
light of the sun and the like1 or the   
highest ,self4 ,under the preceding     
,stras we had shown that some words     
which ordinarily have different meanings
 yet in certain passages denote         
,brahman1 since characteristic marks of 
the latter are mentioned4 ,here the     
question has to be discussed whether1 in
 connexion with the passage quoted1     
characteristic marks of ,brahman are    
mentioned or not4  ,the prvapakshin     
maintains that the word 'light' denotes 
nothing else but the light of the sun   
and the like1 since that is the ordinary
 well-established meaning of the term4  
,the common use of language1 he says1   
teaches us that the two words 'light'   
and 'darkness' denote mutually opposite 

things1 darkness being the term for     
whatever interferes with the function of
 the sense of sight1 as1 for instance1  
the gloom of the night1 while sunshine  
and whatever else favours the action of 
the eye is called light4 ,the word      
'shines' also1 which the text exhibits1 
is known ordinarily to refer to the sun 
and similar sources of light2 while of  
,brahman1 which is devoid of colour1 it 
cannot be said1 in the primary sense of 
the word1 that it 'shines4' ,further1   
the word jyotis must here denote light  
because it is said to be bounded by the 
sky 7'that light which shines above this
 heaven'74 ,for while it is impossible  
to consider the sky as being the        
boundary of ,brahman1 which is the ,self
 of all and the source of all things    
movable or immovable1 the sky may be    
looked upon as forming the boundary of  
light1 which is a mere product and as   
such limited2 accordingly the text says1
 'the light beyond heaven4'--,but light1
 although a mere product1 is perceived  

everywhere2 it would therefore be wrong 
to declare that it is bounded by the    
sky6--,well1 then1 the prvapakshin      
replies1 let us assume that the light   
meant is the first-born 7original7 light
 which has not yet become               
tripartite#abb4 ,this explanation again 
cannot be admitted1 because the         
non-tripartite light does not serve any 
purpose4--,but1 the prvapakshin resumes1
 ,why should its purpose not be found   
therein that it is the object of devout 
meditation8--,that cannot be1 we reply2 
for we see that only such things are    
represented as objects of devotion as   
have some other independent use of their
 own2 so1 for instance1 the sun 7which  
dispels darkness and so on74 ,moreover  
the scriptural passage1 ',let me make   
each of these three 7fire1 water1 and   
earth7 tripartite1' does not indicate   
any difference#abc4 ,and even of the    
non-tripartite light it is not known    
that the sky constitutes its            
boundary4--,well1 then 7the prvapakshin 

resumes1 dropping the idea of the       
non-tripartite light71 let us assume    
that the light of which the text speaks 
is the tripartite 7ordinary7 light4 ,the
 objection that light is seen to exist  
also beneath the sky1 viz4 in the form  
of fire and the like1 we invalidate by  
the remark that there is nothing        
contrary to reason in assigning a       
special locality to fire1 although the  
latter is observed everywhere2 while to 
assume a special place for ,brahman1 to 
which the idea of place does not apply  
at all1 would be most unsuitable4       
,moreover1 the clause 'higher than      
everything1 in the highest worlds beyond
 which there are no other worlds1' which
 indicates a multiplicity of abodes1    
agrees much better with light1 which is 
a mere product 7than with ,brahman74    
,there is moreover that other clause1   
also1 ',that is the same light which is 
within man1' in which the highest light 
is identified with the gastric fire 7the
 fire within man74 ,now such            

identifications can be made only where  
there is a certain similarity of nature2
 as is seen1 for instance1 in the       
passage1 ',of that person ,bh_/h_/ is   
the head1 for the head is one and that  
syllable is one' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1 #e1
 #c74 ,but that the fire within the     
human body is not ,brahman clearly      
appears from the passage1 ',of this we  
have visible and audible proof' 7,ch4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #ac1 #g2 #h71 which declares
 that the fire is characterised by the  
noise it makes1 and by heat2 and        
likewise from the following passage1    
',let a man meditate on this as that    
which is seen and heard4' ,the same     
conclusion may be drawn from the        
passage1 ',he who knows this becomes    
conspicuous and celebrated1' which      
proclaims an inconsiderable reward only1
 while to the devout meditation on      
,brahman a high reward would have to be 
allotted4 ,nor is there mentioned in the
 entire passage about the light any     
other characteristic mark of ,brahman1  

while such marks are set forth in the   
passages 7discussed above7 which refer  
to pr_/n_/a and the ether4 ,nor1 again1 
is ,brahman indicated in the preceding  
section1 'the ,gyatr is everything      
whatsoever exists1' c4 7,,iii1 #ab72 for
 that passage makes a statement about   
the ,gyatr metre only4 ,and even if that
 section did refer to ,brahman1 still   
,brahman would not be recognised in the 
passage at present under discussion2 for
 there 7in the section referred to7 it  
is declared in the clause1 ',three feet 
of it are the ,immortal in heaven'--that
 heaven constitutes the abode2 while in 
our passage the words 'the light above  
heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary4
 ,for all these reasons the word jyotis 
is here to be taken in its ordinary     
meaning1 viz4 light4  ,to this we make  
the following reply4 ,the word jyotis   
must be held to denote ,brahman4 ,why8  
,on account of the feet 7quarters7 being
 mentioned4 ,in a preceding passage     
,brahman had been spoken of as having   

four feet 7quarters74 ',such is the     
greatness of it2 greater than it is the 
,person 7purusha74 ,one foot of it are  
all the beings1 three feet of it are the
 ,immortal in heaven4' ,that which in   
this passage is said to constitute the  
three-quarter part1 immortal and        
connected with heaven1 of ,brahman1     
which altogether comprises four         
quarters2 this very same entity we      
recognise as again referred to in the   
passage under discussion1 because there 
also it is said to be connected with    
heaven4 ,if therefore we should set it  
aside in our interpretation of the      
passage and assume the latter to refer  
to the ordinary light1 we should commit 
the mistake of dropping1 without need1  
the topic started and introducing a new 
subject4 ,brahman1 in fact1 continues to
 form the subject-matter1 not only of   
the passage about the light1 but        
likewise of the subsequent section1 the 
so-called ,s_/nd_/ilya-vidy 7,ch4 ,up4  
,,iii1 #ad74 ,hence we conclude that in 

our passage the word 'light' must be    
held to denote ,brahman4 ,the objection 
7raised above7 that from common use the 
words 'light' and 'to shine' are known  
to denote effected 7physical7 light is  
without force2 for as it is known from  
the general topic of the chapter that   
,brahman is meant1 those two words do   
not necessarily denote physical light   
only to the exclusion of ,brahman#abd1  
but may also denote ,brahman itself1 in 
so far as it is characterised by the    
physical shining light which is its     
effect4 ,analogously another mantra     
declares1 'that by which the sun shines 
kindled with heat' 7,taitt4 ,br4 ,,iii1 
#ab1 #i1 #g74 ,or else we may suppose   
that the word jyotis here does not      
denote at all that light on which the   
function of the eye depends4 ,for we see
 that in other passages it has          
altogether different meanings2 so1 for  
instance1 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #e1  
',with speech only as light man sits1'  
and ,taitt4 ,sa4 ,i1 #f1 #c1 #c1 ',may  

the mind1 the light1 accept1' c4 ,it    
thus appears that whatever illuminates  
7in the different senses of the word7   
something else may be spoken of as      
'light4' ,hence to ,brahman also1 whose 
nature is intelligence1 the term 'light'
 may be applied2 for it gives light to  
the entire world4 ,similarly1 other     
scriptural passages say1 ',him the      
shining one1 everything shines after2 by
 his light all this is lighted' 7,kau4  
,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ae72 and ',him the gods 
worship as the light of lights1 as the  
immortal' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1     
#af74 ,against the further objection    
that the omnipresent ,brahman cannot be 
viewed as bounded by heaven we remark   
that the assignment1 to ,brahman1 of a  
special locality is not contrary to     
reason because it subserves the purpose 
of devout meditation4 ,nor does it avail
 anything to say that it is impossible  
to assign any place to ,brahman because 
,brahman is out of connexion with all   
place4 ,for it is possible to make such 

an assumption1 because ,brahman is      
connected with certain limiting         
adjuncts4 ,accordingly ,scripture speaks
 of different kinds of devout meditation
 on ,brahman as specially connected with
 certain localities1 such as the sun1   
the eye1 the heart4 ,for the same reason
 it is also possible to attribute to    
,brahman a multiplicity of abodes1 as is
 done in the clause 7quoted above7      
'higher than all4' ,the further         
objection that the light beyond heaven  
is the mere physical light because it is
 identified with the gastric fire1 which
 itself is a mere effect and is inferred
 from perceptible marks such as the heat
 of the body and a certain sound1 is    
equally devoid of force2 for the gastric
 fire may be viewed as the outward      
appearance 7or symbol7 of ,brahman1 just
 as ,brahman's name is a mere outward   
symbol4 ,similarly in the passage1 ',let
 a man meditate on it 7the gastric      
light7 as seen and heard1' the          
visibility and audibility 7here         

implicitly ascribed to ,brahman7 must be
 considered as rendered possible through
 the gastric fire being the outward     
appearance of ,brahman4 ,nor is there   
any force in the objection that ,brahman
 cannot be meant because the text       
mentions an inconsiderable reward only2 
for there is no reason compelling us to 
have recourse to ,brahman for the       
purpose of such and such a reward only1 
and not for the purpose of such and such
 another reward4 ,wherever the text     
represents the highest ,brahman--which  
is free from all connexion with         
distinguishing attributes--as the       
universal ,self1 it is understood that  
the result of that instruction is one   
only1 viz4 final release4 ,wherever1 on 
the other hand1 ,brahman is taught to be
 connected with distinguishing          
attributes or outward symbols1 there1 we
 see1 all the various rewards which this
 world can offer are spoken of2 cp4 for 
instance1 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bd1 
',this is he who eats all food1 the     

giver of wealth4 ,he who knows this     
obtains wealth4' ,although in the       
passage itself which treats of the light
 no characteristic mark of ,brahman is  
mentioned1 yet1 as the ,stra intimates1 
the mark stated in a preceding passage  
7viz4 the mantra1 ',such is the         
greatness of it1' c47 has to be taken in
 connexion with the passage about the   
light as well4 ,the question how the    
mere circumstance of ,brahman being     
mentioned in a not distant passage can  
have the power of divorcing from its    
natural object and transferring to      
another object the direct statement     
about light implied in the word 'light1'
 may be answered without difficulty4    
,the passage under discussion runs#abe1 
'which above this heaven1 the light4'   
,the relative pronoun with which this   
clause begins intimates1 according to   
its grammatical force#abf1 the same     
,brahman which was mentioned in the     
previous passage1 and which is here     
recognised 7as being the same which was 

mentioned before7 through its connexion 
with heaven2 hence the word jyotis      
also--which stands in grammatical       
co-ordination to 'which'--must have     
,brahman for its object4 ,from all this 
it follows that the word 'light' here   
denotes ,brahman4  #be4 ,if it be       
objected that 7,brahman is7 not         
7denoted7 on account of the metre being 
denoted2 7we reply7 not so1 because thus
 7i4e4 by means of the metre7 the       
direction of the mind 7on ,brahman7 is  
declared2 for thus it is seen 7in other 
passages also74  ,we now address        
ourselves to the refutation of the      
assertion 7made in the prvapaksha of the
 preceding ,stra7 that in the previous  
passage also ,brahman is not referred   
to1 because in the sentence1 ',gyatr is 
everything whatsoever here exists1' the 
metre called ,gyatr is spoken of4--,how 
7we ask the prvapakshin7 can it be      
maintained that1 on account of the metre
 being spoken of1 ,brahman is not       
denoted1 while yet the mantra 'such is  

the greatness of it1' c41 clearly sets  
forth ,brahman with its four            
quarters8--,you are mistaken 7the       
prvapakshin replies74 ,the sentence1    
',gyatr is everything1' starts the      
discussion of ,gyatr4 ,the same ,gyatr  
is thereupon described under the various
 forms of all beings1 earth1 body1      
heart1 speech1 breath2 to which there   
refers also the verse1 'that ,gyatr has 
four feet and is sixfold4' ,after that  
we meet with the mantra1 ',such is the  
greatness of it4' c4 ,how then1 we ask1 
should this mantra1 which evidently is  
quoted with reference to the ,gyatr     
7metre7 as described in the preceding   
clauses1 all at once denote ,brahman    
with its four quarters8 ,since therefore
 the metre ,gyatr is the subject-matter 
of the entire chapter1 the term         
',brahman' which occurs in a subsequent 
passage 7'the ,brahman which has thus   
been described'7 must also denote the   
metre4 ,this is analogous to a previous 
passage 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #aa1 #c1 ',he 

who thus knows this ,brahma-upanishad'71
 where the word ,brahma-upanishad is    
explained to mean ,veda-upanishad4 ,as  
therefore the preceding passage refers  
7not to ,brahman1 but7 to the ,gyatr    
metre1 ,brahman does not constitute the 
topic of the entire section4  ,this     
argumentation1 we reply1 proves nothing 
against our position4 ',because thus    
direction of the mind is declared1' i4e4
 because the ,brahma_/n_/a passage1     
',gyatr indeed is all this1' intimates  
that by means of the metre ,gyatr the   
mind is to be directed on ,brahman which
 is connected with that metre4 ,of the  
metre ,gyatr1 which is nothing but a    
certain special combination of          
syllables1 it could not possibly be said
 that it is the ,self of everything4 ,we
 therefore have to understand the       
passage as declaring that ,brahman1     
which1 as the cause of the world1 is    
connected with that product also whose  
name is ,gyatr1 is 'all this2' in       
accordance with that other passage which

 directly says1 ',all this indeed is    
,brahman' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a74   
,that the effect is in reality not      
different from the cause1 we shall prove
 later on1 under ,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #ad4   
,devout meditation on ,brahman under the
 form of certain effects 7of ,brahman7  
is seen to be mentioned in other        
passages also1 so1 for instance1 ,ait4  
r4 ,,iii1 #b1 #c1 #ab1 ',for the        
,bahv_/rik_/as consider him in the great
 hymn1 the ,adhvaryus in the sacrificial
 fire1 the ,chandogas in the ,mahvrata  
ceremony4' ,although1 therefore1 the    
previous passage speaks of the metre1   
,brahman is what is meant1 and the same 
,brahman is again referred to in the    
passage about the light1 whose purport  
it is to enjoin another form of devout  
meditation4  ,another commentator#abg is
 of opinion that the term ,gyatr 7does  
not denote ,brahman in so far as viewed 
under the form of ,gyatr1 but7 directly 
denotes ,brahman1 on account of the     
equality of number2 for just as the     

,gyatr metre has four feet consisting of
 six syllables each1 so ,brahman also   
has four feet1 7i4e4 quarters47         
,similarly we see that in other passages
 also the names of metres are used to   
denote other things which resemble those
 metres in certain numerical relations2 
cp4 for instance1 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1   
#h1 where it is said at first1 ',now    
these five and the other five make ten  
and that is the ,k_/ri_/ta1' and after  
that 'these are again the ,virj which   
eats the food4' ,if we adopt this       
interpretation1 ,brahman only is spoken 
of1 and the metre is not referred to at 
all4 ,in any case ,brahman is the       
subject with which the previous passage 
is concerned4  #bf4 ,and thus also 7we  
must conclude1 viz4 that ,brahman is the
 subject of the previous passage71      
because 7thus only7 the declaration as  
to the beings1 c4 being the feet is     
possible4  ,that the previous passage   
has ,brahman for its topic1 we must     
assume for that reason also that the    

text designates the beings and so on as 
the feet of ,gyatr4 ,for the text at    
first speaks of the beings1 the earth1  
the body1 and the heart#abh1 and then   
goes on 'that ,gyatr has four feet and  
is sixfold4' ,for of the mere metre1    
without any reference to ,brahman1 it   
would be impossible to say that the     
beings and so on are its feet4          
,moreover1 if ,brahman were not meant1  
there would be no room for the verse1   
',such is the greatness1' c4 ,for that  
verse clearly describes ,brahman in its 
own nature2 otherwise it would be       
impossible to represent the ,gyatr as   
the ,self of everything as is done in   
the words1 ',one foot of it are all the 
beings2 three feet of it are what is    
immortal in heaven4' ,the purusha-skta  
also 7_/,ri_/k ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #ij7      
exhibits the verse with sole reference  
to ,brahman4 ,sm_/ri_/ti likewise       
ascribes to ,brahman a like nature1 ',i 
stand supporting all this world by a    
single portion of myself' 7,bha4 ,gt ,x1

 #db74 ,our interpretation moreover     
enables us to take the passage1 'that   
,brahman indeed which1' c4 7,,iii1 #ab1 
#g71 in its primary sense1 7i4e4 to     
understand the word ,brahman to denote  
nothing but ,brahman47 ,and1 moreover1  
the passage1 'these are the five men of 
,brahman' 7,,iii1 #ac1 #f71 is          
appropriate only if the former passage  
about the ,gyatr is taken as referring  
to ,brahman 7for otherwise the          
',brahman' in 'men of ,brahman' would   
not be connected with the previous      
topic74 ,hence ,brahman is to be        
considered as the subject-matter of the 
previous passage also4 ,and the decision
 that the same ,brahman is referred to  
in the passage about the light where it 
is recognised 7to be the same7 from its 
connexion with heaven1 remains unshaken4
  #bg4 ,the objection that 7the ,brahman
 of the former passage cannot be        
recognised in the latter7 on account of 
the difference of designation1 is not   
valid because in either 7designation7   

there is nothing contrary 7to the       
recognition74  ,the objection that in   
the former passage 7'three feet of it   
are what is immortal in heaven'71 heaven
 is designated as the abode1 while in   
the latter passage 7'that light which   
shines above this heaven'71 heaven is   
designated as the boundary1 and that1 on
 account of this difference of          
designation1 the subject-matter of the  
former passage cannot be recognised in  
the latter1 must likewise be refuted4   
,this we do by remarking that in either 
designation nothing is contrary to the  
recognition4 ,just as in ordinary       
language a falcon1 although in contact  
with the top of a tree1 is not only said
 to be on the tree but also above the   
tree1 so ,brahman also1 although being  
in heaven1 is here referred to as being 
beyond heaven as well4  ,another        
7commentator7 explains3 just as in      
ordinary language a falcon1 although not
 in contact with the top of a tree1 is  
not only said to be above the top of the

 tree but also on the top of the tree1  
so ,brahman also1 which is in reality   
beyond heaven1 is 7in the former of the 
two passages7 said to be in heaven4     
,therefore the ,brahman spoken of in the
 former passage can be recognised in the
 latter also1 and it remains therefore a
 settled conclusion that the word       
'light' denotes ,brahman4  #bh4         
,pr_/n_/a 7breath7 is ,brahman1 that    
being understood from a connected       
consideration 7of the passages referring
 to pr_/n_/a74  ,in the                 
,kaushtaki-brhma_/n_/a-upanishad there  
is recorded a legend of ,indra and      
,pratardana which begins with the words1
 ',pratardana1 forsooth1 the son of     
,divodsa came by means of fighting and  
strength to the beloved abode of ,indra'
 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a74 ,in this legend
 we read3 ',he said3 ,i am pr_/n_/a1 the
 intelligent ,self 7praj_/_/tman71      
meditate on me as ,life1 as             
,immortality' 7,,iii1 #b74 ,and later on
 7,,iii1 #c71 ',pr_/n_/a alone1 the     

intelligent ,self1 having laid hold of  
this body1 makes it rise up4' ,then1    
again 7,,iii1 #h71 ',let no man try to  
find out what speech is1 let him know   
the speaker4' ,and in the end 7,,iii1   
#h71 ',that breath indeed is the        
intelligent ,self1 bliss1 imperishable1 
immortal4'--,here the doubt presents    
itself whether the word pr_/n_/a denotes
 merely breath1 the modification of air1
 or the ,self of some divinity1 or the  
individual soul1 or the highest         
,brahman4--,but1 it will be said at the 
outset1 the ,stra ,i1 #a1 #ba already   
has shown that the word pr_/n_/a refers 
to ,brahman1 and as here also we meet   
with characteristic marks of ,brahman1  
viz4 the words 'bliss1 imperishable1    
immortal1' what reason is there for     
again raising the same doubt8--,we      
reply3 ,because there are observed here 
characteristic marks of different kinds4
 ,for in the legend we meet not only    
with marks indicating ,brahman1 but also
 with marks pointing to other beings    

,thus ,indra's words1 ',know me only'   
7,,iii1 #a7 point to the ,self of a     
divinity2 the words1 ',having laid hold 
of this body it makes it rise up1' point
 to the breath2 the words1 ',let no man 
try to find out what speech is1 let him 
know the speaker1' point to the         
individual soul4 ,there is thus room for
 doubt4  ,if1 now1 the prvapakshin      
maintains that the term pr_/n_/a here   
denotes the well-known modification of  
air1 i4e4 breath1 we1 on our side1      
assert that the word pr_/n_/a must be   
understood to denote ,brahman4--,for    
what reason8--,on account of such being 
the consecutive meaning of the passages4
 ,for if we examine the connexion of the
 entire section which treats of the     
pr_/n_/a1 we observe that all the single
 passages can be construed into a whole 
only if they are viewed as referring to 
,brahman4 ,at the beginning of the      
legend ,pratardana1 having been allowed 
by ,indra to choose a boon1 mentions the
 highest good of man1 which he selects  

for his boon1 in the following words1   
',do you yourself choose that boon for  
me which you deem most beneficial for a 
man4' ,now1 as later on pr_/n_/a is     
declared to be what is most beneficial  
for man1 what should pr_/n_/a denote but
 the highest ,self8 ,for apart from the 
cognition of that ,self a man cannot    
possibly attain what is most beneficial 
for him1 as many scriptural passages    
declare4 ,compare1 for instance1        
_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 ',a man who   
knows him passes over death2 there is no
 other path to go4' ,again1 the further 
passage1 ',he who knows me thus by no   
deed of his is his life harmed1 not by  
theft1 not by bhr_/n_/ahaty' 7,,iii1    
#a71 has a meaning only if ,brahman is  
supposed to be the object of knowledge4 
,for1 that subsequently to the cognition
 of ,brahman all works and their effects
 entirely cease1 is well known from     
scriptural passages1 such as the        
following1 ',all works perish when he   
has been beheld who is the higher and   

the lower' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h74    
,moreover1 pr_/n_/a can be identified   
with the intelligent ,self only if it is
 ,brahman4 ,for the air which is        
non-intelligent can clearly not be the  
intelligent ,self4 ,those characteristic
 marks1 again1 which are mentioned in   
the concluding passage 7viz4 those      
intimated by the words 'bliss1'         
'imperishable1' 'immortal'7 can1 if     
taken in their full sense1 not be       
reconciled with any being except        
,brahman4 ,there are1 moreover1 the     
following passages1 ',he does not       
increase by a good action1 nor decrease 
by a bad action4 ,for he makes him whom 
he wishes to lead up from these worlds  
do a good deed2 and the same makes him  
whom he wishes to lead down from these  
worlds do a bad deed2' and1 ',he is the 
guardian of the world1 he is the king of
 the world1 he is the ,lord of the      
world' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,all this
 can be properly understood only if the 
highest ,brahman is acknowledged to be  

the subject-matter of the whole chapter1
 not if the vital air is substituted in 
its place4 ,hence the word pr_/n_/a     
denotes ,brahman4  #bi4 ,if it be said  
that 7,brahman is7 not 7denoted7 on     
account of the speaker denoting himself2
 7we reply that this objection is not   
valid7 because there is in that         
7chapter7 a multitude of references to  
the interior ,self4  ,an objection is   
raised against the assertion that       
pr_/n_/a denotes ,brahman4 ,the word    
pr_/n_/a1 it is said1 does not denote   
the highest ,brahman1 because the       
speaker designates himself4 ,the        
speaker1 who is a certain powerful god  
called ,indra1 at first says1 in order  
to reveal himself to ,pratardana1 ',know
 me only1' and later on1 ',i am         
pr_/n_/a1 the intelligent ,self4' ,how1 
it is asked1 can the pr_/n_/a1 which    
this latter passage1 expressive of      
personality as it is1 represents as the 
,self of the speaker1 be ,brahman to    
which1 as we know from ,scripture1 the  

attribute of being a speaker cannot be  
ascribed2 compare1 for instance1        
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #h1 ',it is   
without speech1 without mind4' ,further 
on1 also1 the speaker1 i4e4 ,indra1     
glorifies himself by enumerating a      
number of attributes1 all of which      
depend on personal existence and can in 
no way belong to ,brahman1 ',i slew the 
three-headed son of ,tvash_/tri_/2 ,i   
delivered the ,arunmukhas1 the devotees1
 to the wolves1' and so on4 ,indra may  
be called pr_/n_/a on account of his    
strength4 ,scripture says1 ',strength   
indeed is pr_/n_/a1' and ,indra is known
 as the god of strength2 and of any deed
 of strength people say1 ',it is        
,indra's work4' ,the personal ,self of a
 deity may1 moreover1 be called an      
intelligent ,self2 for the gods1 people 
say1 possess unobstructed knowledge4 ,it
 thus being a settled matter that some  
passages convey information about the   
personal ,self of some deity1 the other 
passages also--as1 for instance1 the one

 about what is most beneficial for      
man--must be interpreted as well as they
 may with reference to the same deity4  
,hence pr_/n_/a does not denote         
,brahman4  ,this objection we refute by 
the remark that in that chapter there   
are found a multitude of references to  
the interior ,self4 ,for the passage1   
',as long as pr_/n_/a dwells in this    
body so long surely there is life1'     
declares that that pr_/n_/a only which  
is the intelligent interior ,self--and  
not some particular outward deity--has  
power to bestow and to take back life4  
,and where the text speaks of the       
eminence of the pr_/n_/as as founded on 
the existence of the pr_/n_/a1 it shows 
that that pr_/n_/a is meant which has   
reference to the ,self and is the abode 
of the sense-organs4#abi  ,of the same  
tendency is the passage1 ',pr_/n_/a1 the
 intelligent ,self1 alone having laid   
hold of this body makes it rise up2' and
 the passage 7which occurs in the       
passus1 ',let no man try to find out    

what speech is1' c471 ',for as in a car 
the circumference of the wheel is set on
 the spokes and the spokes on the nave1 
thus are these objects set on the       
subjects 7the senses7 and the subjects  
on the pr_/n_/a4 ,and that pr_/n_/a     
indeed is the ,self of pr_/n_/a1        
blessed1 imperishable1 immortal4' ,so   
also the following passage which1       
referring to this interior ,self1       
forming as it were the centre of the    
peripherical interaction of the objects 
and senses1 sums up as follows1 ',he is 
my ,self1 thus let it be known2' a      
summing up which is appropriate only if 
pr_/n_/a is meant to denote not some    
outward existence1 but the interior     
,self4 ,and another scriptural passage  
declares 'this ,self is ,brahman1       
omniscient'#acj 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1   
#e1 #ai74 ,we therefore arrive at the   
conclusion that1 on account of the      
multitude of references to the interior 
,self1 the chapter contains information 
regarding ,brahman1 not regarding the   

,self of some deity4--,how then can the 
circumstance of the speaker 7,indra7    
referring to himself be explained8  #cj4
 ,the declaration 7made by ,indra about 
himself1 viz4 that he is one with       
,brahman7 7is possible7 through         
intuition vouched for by ,scripture1 as 
in the case of ,vmadeva4  ,the          
individual divine ,self called ,indra   
perceiving by means of _/ri_/shi-like   
intuition#aca--the existence of which is
 vouched for by ,scripture--its own     
,self to be identical with the supreme  
,self1 instructs ,pratardana 7about the 
highest ,self7 by means of the words    
',know me only4'  ,by intuition of the  
same kind the _/ri_/shi ,vmadeva reached
 the knowledge expressed in the words1  
',i was ,manu and ,srya2' in accordance 
with the passage1 ',whatever deva was   
awakened 7so as to know ,brahman7 he    
indeed became that' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 
#d1 #aj74 ,the assertion made above 7in 
the prvapaksha of the preceding ,stra7  
that ,indra after saying1 ',know me     

only1' glorifies himself by enumerating 
the slaying of ,tvash_/tri_/'s son and  
other deeds of strength1 we refute as   
follows4 ,the death of ,tvash_/tri_/'s  
son and similar deeds are referred to1  
not to the end of glorifying ,indra as  
the object of knowledge--in which case  
the sense of the passage would be1      
',because ,i accomplished such and such 
deeds1 therefore know me'--but to the   
end of glorifying the cognition of the  
highest ,self4 ,for this reason the     
text1 after having referred to the      
slaying of ,tvash_/tri_/'s son and the  
like1 goes on in the clause next        
following to exalt knowledge1 ',and not 
one hair of me is harmed there4 ,he who 
knows me thus by no deed of his is his  
life harmed4'--7,but how does this      
passage convey praise of                
knowledge87--,because1 we reply1 its    
meaning is as follows3 ',although ,i do 
such cruel deeds1 yet not even a hair of
 mine is harmed because ,i am one with  
,brahman2 therefore the life of any     

other person also who knows me thus is  
not harmed by any deed of his4' ,and the
 object of the knowledge 7praised by    
,indra7 is nothing else but ,brahman    
which is set forth in a subsequent      
passage1 ',i am pr_/n_/a1 the           
intelligent ,self4' ,therefore the      
entire chapter refers to ,brahman4  #ca4
 ,if it be said 7that ,brahman is7 not  
7meant71 on account of characteristic   
marks of the individual soul and the    
chief vital air 7being mentioned72 we   
say no1 on account of the threefoldness 
of devout meditation 7which would result
 from your interpretation72 on account  
of 7the meaning advocated by us7 being  
accepted 7elsewhere72 and on account of 
7characteristic marks of ,brahman7 being
 connected 7with the passage under      
discussion74  ,although we admit1 the   
prvapakshin resumes1 that the chapter   
about the pr_/n_/a does not furnish any 
instruction regarding some outward      
deity1 since it contains a multitude of 
references to the interior ,self2 still 

we deny that it is concerned with       
,brahman4--,for what reason8--,because  
it mentions characteristic marks of the 
individual soul on the one hand1 and of 
the chief vital air on the other hand4  
,the passage1 ',let no man try to find  
out what speech is1 let him know the    
speaker1' mentions a characteristic mark
 of the individual soul1 and must       
therefore be held to point out as the   
object of knowledge the individual soul 
which rules and employs the different   
organs of action such as speech and so  
on4 ,on the other hand1 we have the     
passage1 ',but pr_/n_/a alone1 the      
intelligent ,self1 having laid hold of  
this body makes it rise up1' which      
points to the chief vital air2 for the  
chief attribute of the vital air is that
 it sustains the body4 ,similarly1 we   
read in the colloquy of the vital airs  
7,pra4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c71 concerning speech
 and the other vital airs1 ',then       
pr_/n_/a 7the chief vital air7 as the   
best said to them3 ,be not deceived2 ,i 

alone dividing myself fivefold support  
this body and keep it4' ,those1 again1  
who in the passage quoted above read    
'this one 7masc471 the body#acb' must   
give the following explanation1         
,pr_/n_/a having laid hold of this one1 
viz4 either the individual soul or the  
aggregate of the sense organs1 makes the
 body rise up4 ,the individual soul as  
well as the chief vital air may justly  
be designated as the intelligent ,self2 
for the former is of the nature of      
intelligence1 and the latter 7although  
non-intelligent in itself7 is the abode 
of other pr_/n_/as1 viz4 the sense      
organs1 which are the instruments of    
intelligence4 ,moreover1 if the word    
pr_/n_/a be taken to denote the         
individual soul as well as the chief    
vital air1 the pr_/n_/a and the         
intelligent ,self may be spoken of in   
two ways1 either as being non-different 
on account of their mutual concomitance1
 or as being different on account of    
their 7essentially different7 individual

 character2 and in these two different  
ways they are actually spoken of in the 
two following passages1 ',what is       
pr_/n_/a that is praj_/_/1 what is      
praj_/_/ that is pr_/n_/a2' and1 ',for  
together do these two live in the body  
and together do they depart4' ,if1 on   
the other hand1 pr_/n_/a denoted        
,brahman1 what then could be different  
from what8 ,for these reasons pr_/n_/a  
does not denote ,brahman1 but either the
 individual soul or the chief vital air 
or both4  ,all this argumentation1 we   
reply1 is wrong1 'on account of the     
threefoldness of devout meditation4'    
,your interpretation would involve the  
assumption of devout meditation of three
 different kinds1 viz4 on the individual
 soul1 on the chief vital air1 and on   
,brahman4 ,but it is inappropriate to   
assume that a single sentence should    
enjoin three kinds of devout meditation2
 and that all the passages about the    
pr_/n_/a really constitute one single   
sentence 7one syntactical whole7 appears

 from the beginning and the concluding  
part4 ,in the beginning we have the     
clause ',know me only1' followed by ',i 
am pr_/n_/a1 the intelligent ,self1     
meditate on me as ,life1 as             
,immortality2' and in the end we read1  
',and that pr_/n_/a indeed is the       
intelligent ,self1 blessed1             
imperishable1 immortal4' ,the beginning 
and the concluding part are thus seen to
 be similar1 and we therefore must      
conclude that they refer to one and the 
same matter4 ,nor can the characteristic
 mark of ,brahman be so turned as to be 
applied to something else2 for the ten  
objects and the ten subjects 7subjective
 powers7#acc cannot rest on anything but
 ,brahman4 ,moreover1 pr_/n_/a must     
denote ,brahman 'on account of 7that    
meaning7 being accepted1' i4e4 because  
in the case of other passages where     
characteristic marks of ,brahman are    
mentioned the word pr_/n_/a is taken in 
the sense of ',brahman4' ,and another   
reason for assuming the passage to refer

 to ,brahman is that here also1 i4e4 in 
the passage itself there is 'connexion' 
with characteristic marks of ,brahman1  
as1 for instance1 the reference to what 
is most beneficial for man4 ,the        
assertion that the passage1 ',having    
laid hold of this body it makes it rise 
up1' contains a characteristic mark of  
the chief vital air1 is untrue2 for as  
the function of the vital air also      
ultimately rests on ,brahman it can     
figuratively be ascribed to the latter4 
,so ,scripture also declares1 ',no      
mortal lives by the breath that goes up 
and by the breath that goes down4 ,we   
live by another in whom these two       
repose' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #e74 ,nor  
does the indication of the individual   
soul which you allege to occur in the   
passage1 ',let no man try to find out   
what speech is1 let him know the        
speaker1' preclude the view of pr_/n_/a 
denoting ,brahman4 ,for1 as the         
passages1 ',i am ,brahman1' ',that art  
thou1' and others1 prove1 there is in   

reality no such thing as an individual  
soul absolutely different from ,brahman1
 but ,brahman1 in so far as it          
differentiates itself through the mind  
7buddhi7 and other limiting conditions1 
is called individual soul1 agent1       
enjoyer4 ,such passages therefore as the
 one alluded to1 7viz4 'let no man try  
to find out what speech is1 let him know
 the speaker1'7 which1 by setting aside 
all the differences due to limiting     
conditions1 aim at directing the mind on
 the internal ,self and thus showing    
that the individual soul is one with    
,brahman1 are by no means out of place4 
,that the ,self which is active in      
speaking and the like is ,brahman       
appears from another scriptural passage 
also1 viz4 ,ke4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 ',that     
which is not expressed by speech and by 
which speech is expressed that alone    
know as ,brahman1 not that which people 
here adore4' ,the remark that the       
statement about the difference of       
pr_/n_/a and praj_/_/ 7contained in the 

passage1 ',together they dwell in this  
body1 together they depart'7 does not   
agree with that interpretation according
 to which pr_/n_/a is ,brahman1 is      
without force2 for the mind and the     
vital air which are the respective      
abodes of the two powers of cognition   
and action1 and constitute the limiting 
conditions of the internal ,self may be 
spoken of as different4 ,the internal   
,self1 on the other hand1 which is      
limited by those two adjuncts1 is in    
itself non-differentiated1 so that the  
two may be identified1 as is done in the
 passage 'pr_/n_/a is praj_/_/4'  ,the  
second part of the ,stra is explained in
 a different manner also#acd1 as        
follows3 ,characteristic marks of the   
individual soul as well as of the chief 
vital air are not out of place even in a
 chapter whose topic is ,brahman4 ,how  
so8 ',on account of the threefoldness of
 devout meditation4' ,the chapter aims  
at enjoining three kinds of devout      
meditation on ,brahman1 according as    

,brahman is viewed under the aspect of  
pr_/n_/a1 under the aspect of praj_/_/1 
and in itself4 ,the passages1 ',meditate
 7on me7 as life1 as immortality4 ,life 
is pr_/n_/a1' and ',having laid hold of 
this body it makes it rise up4          
,therefore let man worship it alone as  
uktha1' refer to the pr_/n_/a aspect4   
,the introductory passage1 ',now we     
shall explain how all things become one 
in that praj_/_/1' and the subsequent   
passages1 ',speech verily milked one    
portion thereof2 the word is its object 
placed outside2' and1 ',having by       
praj_/_/ taken possession of speech he  
obtains by speech all words c41' refer  
to the praj_/_/ aspect4 ,the ,brahman   
aspect finally is referred to in the    
following passage1 ',these ten objects  
have reference to praj_/_/1 the ten     
subjects have reference to objects4 ,if 
there were no objects there would be no 
subjects2 and if there were no subjects 
there would be no objects4 ,for on      
either side alone nothing could be      

achieved4 ,but that is not many4 ,for as
 in a car the circumference of the wheel
 is set on the spokes and the spokes on 
the nave1 thus are these objects set on 
the subjects and the subjects on the    
pr_/n_/a4' ,thus we see that the one    
meditation on ,brahman is here          
represented as threefold1 according as  
,brahman is viewed either with reference
 to two limiting conditions or in       
itself4 ,in other passages also we find 
that devout meditation on ,brahman is   
made dependent on ,brahman being        
qualified by limiting adjuncts2 so1 for 
instance 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #b71    
',he who consists of mind1 whose body is
 pr_/n_/a4' ,the hypothesis of ,brahman 
being meditated upon under three aspects
 perfectly agrees with the pr_/n_/a     
chapter#ace2 as1 on the one hand1 from a
 comparison of the introductory and the 
concluding clauses we infer that the    
subject-matter of the whole chapter is  
one only1 and as1 on the other hand1 we 
meet with characteristic marks of       

pr_/n_/a1 praj_/_/1 and ,brahman in     
turns4 ,it therefore remains a settled  
conclusion that ,brahman is the topic of
 the whole chapter4  ,notes3  ,footnote 
#cb3 ,the subject is the universal ,self
 whose nature is intelligence 7_/k_/u72 
the object comprises whatever is of a   
non-intelligent nature1 viz4 bodies with
 their sense organs1 internal organs1   
and the objects of the senses1 i4e4 the 
external material world4  ,footnote #cc3
 ,the object is said to have for its    
sphere the notion of the 'thou'         
7yushmat71 not the notion of the 'this' 
or 'that' 7idam71 in order better to    
mark its absolute opposition to the     
subject or ,ego4 ,language allows of the
 co-ordination of the pronouns of the   
first and the third person 7',it is ,i1'
 ',i am he who1' c42 ete vayam1 ame     
vayam smahe71 but not of the            
co-ordination of the pronouns of the    
first and second person4  ,footnote #cd3
 ,adhysa1 literally 'superimposition' in
 the sense of 7mistaken7 ascription or  

imputation1 to something1 of an         
essential nature or attributes not      
belonging to it4 ,see later on4         
,footnote #ce3 ,natural1 i4e4 original1 
beginningless2 for the modes of speech  
and action which characterise           
transmigratory existence have existed1  
with the latter1 from all eternity4     
,footnote #cf3 ,i4e4 the intelligent    
,self which is the only reality and the 
non-real objects1 viz4 body and so on1  
which are the product of wrong          
knowledge4  ,footnote #cg3 ',the body1  
c4 is my ,self2' 'sickness1 death1      
children1 wealth1 c41 belong to my      
,self4'  ,footnote #ch3 ,literally 'in  
some other place4' ,the clause 'in the  
form of remembrance' is added1 the      
,bhmat remarks1 in order to exclude     
those cases where something previously  
observed is recognised in some other    
thing or place2 as when1 for instance1  
the generic character of a cow which was
 previously observed in a black cow     
again presents itself to consciousness  

in a grey cow1 or when ,devadatta whom  
we first saw in ,p_/t_/aliputra again   
appears before us in ,mhishmat4 ,these  
are cases of recognition where the      
object previously observed again        
presents itself to our senses2 while in 
mere remembrance the object previously  
perceived is not in renewed contact with
 the senses4 ,mere remembrance operates 
in the case of adhysa1 as when we       
mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which
 is at the time not present but         
remembered only4  ,footnote #ci3 ,the   
so-called anyathkhytivdins maintain that
 in the act of adhysa the attributes of 
one thing1 silver for instance1 are     
superimposed on a different thing       
existing in a different place1          
mother-of-pearl for instance 7if we take
 for our example of adhysa the case of  
some man mistaking a piece of           
mother-of-pearl before him for a piece  
of silver74 ,the tmakhytivdins maintain 
that in adhysa the modification1 in the 
form of silver1 of the internal organ   

and action which characterise           
transmigratory existence have existed1  
with the latter1 from all eternity4     
,footnote #dj3 ,this is the definition  
of the akhytivdins4  ,footnote #da3     
,some anyathkhytivdins and the          
,mdhyamikas according to nanda ,giri4   
,footnote #db3 ,the pratyagtman is in   
reality non-object1 for it is           
svayamprak_/s_/a1 self-luminous1 i4e4   
the subjective factor in all cognition4 
,but it becomes the object of the idea  
of the ,ego in so far as it is limited1 
conditioned by its adjuncts which are   
the product of ,nescience1 viz4 the     
internal organ1 the senses and the      
subtle and gross bodies1 i4e4 in so far 
as it is jva1 individual or personal    
soul4 ,cp4 ,bhmat1 pp4 #bb1 #bc3        
'_/k_/idtmaiva svayamprak_/s_/oszpi     
buddhydivishayavi_/kkh_/ura_/n_/t       
katha_/mk_/id asm                       
upratyayavishayoszha_/m_/krspada_/m_/   
jva iti _/k_/a jantur iti _/k_/a        
ksheuaja iti _/k_/khyyate4'  ,footnote  

#dc3 ,translated according to the       
,bhmat4 ,we deny1 the objector says1 the
 possibility of adhysa in the case of   
the ,self1 not on the ground that it is 
not an object because self-luminous 7for
 that it may be an object although it is
 self-luminous you have shown71 but on  
the ground that it is not an object     
because it is not manifested either by  
itself or by anything else4--,it is     
known or manifest1 the ,vedntin replies1
 on account of its immediate            
presentation 7aparokshatvt71 i4e4 on    
account of the intuitional knowledge we 
have of it4 nanda ,giri construes the   
above clause in a different way3        
asmatpratyayvishayatveszpy aparokshatvd 
ekntenvishayatvbbvt tasminn             
ahankrdyadhysa ity artha_/h_/4          
,aparokshatvam api kai_/sk_/id tmano    
nesh_/t_/am ity sankyha pratyagtmeti4   
,footnote #dd3 ,tatraiva_/m_/ sati      
evambhtavastutattvvadhra_/n_/e sati4    
,bh4 ,tasminn adhyse uktartyzvidyvmake  
sati4 ,go4 ,yatrtmani buddhydau v yasya 

buddhyder tmano vdhysa_/h_/ tena        
buddhydi-nsztmn va                      
k_/ri_/tensz_/s_/anaydidoshe_/n_/a      
_/k_/aitanyagu_/n_/ena _/k_/tmntm v     
vastuto na svalpenpi yujyate4 nanda     
,giri4  ,footnote #de3 ,whether they    
belong to the karmak_/nd_/1 i4e4 that   
part of the ,veda which enjoins active  
religious duty or the j_/_/nak_/nd_/a1  
i4e4 that part of the ,veda which treats
 of ,brahman4  ,footnote #df3 ,it being 
of course the function of the means of  
right knowledge to determine ,truth and 
,reality4  ,footnote #dg3 ,the ,bhmat   
takes adhish_/th_/nam in the sense of   
superintendence1 guidance4 ,the senses  
cannot act unless guided by a           
superintending principle1 i4e4 the      
individual soul4  ,footnote #dh3 ,if    
activity could proceed from the body    
itself1 non-identified with the ,self1  
it would take place in deep sleep also4 
,footnote #di3 ,i4e4 in the absence of  
the mutual superimposition of the ,self 
and the ,non-,self and their attributes4

  ,footnote #ej3 ,the ,mm_/m_/s1 i4e4   
the enquiry whose aim it is to show that
 the embodied ,self1 i4e4 the individual
 or personal soul is one with ,brahman4 
,this ,mm_/m_/s being an enquiry into   
the meaning of the ,vednta-portions of  
the ,veda1 it is also called ,vednta    
mm_/m_/s4  ,footnote #ea3 ,ndhikrrtha   
iti4 ,tatra hetur brahmeti4             
,asyrtha_/h_/1 km ayam atha_/s_/abdo    
brahmaj_/_/ne_/kkh_/y_/h_/ kim          
vntar_/n_/tavi_/k_/rasya                
athave_/kkh_/vi_/s_/esha_/n_/aj_/_/nasyr
ambhrtha_/h_/4 ,ndya_/h_/ tasy          
mm_/m_/spravartikys tadapravartyatvd    
anrabhyatvt tasy_/s_/ _/k_/ottaratra    
pratyadhikara_/n_/am apratipdant4 ,na   
dvityoztha_/s_/abdennantaryoktidvr      
vi_/s_/ish_/t_/dhikryasamarpa_/n_/e     
sdhana_/k_/atush_/t_/aysampannn_/m_/    
brahmadhtadvi_/k_/rayor anarthitvd      
vi_/k_/rnrambhn na _/k_/a               
vi_/k_/ravidhiva_/s_/d adhikr           
kalpya_/h_/ prrambhasypi tulyatvd       
adhikri_/n_/a_/s_/ _/k_/a               

vidhyapekshitopdhitvn na t_/ri_/tya_/h_/
                                        
brahmaj_/_/nasynandaskshtkratvendhikryat
ve z pyaprdhnyd atha_/s_/abdsambandht   
tasmn nrambhrthateti4 nanda ,giri4      
,footnote #eb3 ,any relation in which   
the result1 i4e4 here the enquiry into  
,brahman may stand to some antecedent of
 which it is the effect may be comprised
 under the relation of nantarya4        
,footnote #ec3 ,he cuts off from the    
heart1 then from the tongue1 then from  
the breast4  ,footnote #ed3 ,where one  
action is subordinate to another as1 for
 instance1 the offering of the prayjas  
is to the                               
dar_/s_/apr_/n_/amsa-sacrifice1 or where
 one action qualifies a person for      
another as1 for instance1 the offering  
of the dar_/s_/apr_/n_/amsa qualifies a 
man for the performance of the          
,soma-sacrifice1 there is unity of the  
agent1 and consequently an intimation of
 the order of succession of the actions 
is in its right place4  ,footnote #ee3  

,the 'means' in addition to _/s_/ama and
 dama are discontinuance of religious   
ceremonies 7uparati71 patience in       
suffering 7titiksh71 attention and      
concentration of the mind 7samdhna71 and
 faith 7_/s_/raddh74  ,footnote #ef3    
,according to ,p_/n_/ini ,,ii1 #c1 #ej  
the sixth 7genitive7 case expresses the 
relation of one thing being generally   
supplementary to1 or connected with1    
some other thing4  ,footnote #eg3 ,in   
the case of other transitive verbs1     
object and result may be separate2 so1  
for instance1 when it is said 'grma_/m_/
 ga_/kkh_/ati1' the village is the      
object of the action of going1 and the  
arrival at the village its result4 ,but 
in the case of verbs of desiring object 
and result coincide4  ,footnote #eh3    
,that ,brahman exists we know1 even     
before entering on the ,brahma-mm_/m_/s1
 from the occurrence of the word in the 
,veda1 c41 and from the etymology of the
 word we at once infer ,brahman's chief 
attributes4  ,footnote #ei3 ,the three  

last opinions are those of the followers
 of the ,nyya1 the ,snkhya1 and the     
,yoga-philosophy respectively4 ,the     
three opinions mentioned first belong to
 various materialistic schools2 the two 
subsequent ones to two sects of ,bauddha
 philosophers4  ,footnote #fj3 ,as1 for 
instance1 the passages 'this person     
consists of the essence of food2' 'the  
eye1 c4 spoke2' 'non-existing this was  
in the beginning1' c4  ,footnote #fa3   
,so the compound is to be divided       
according to n4 ,gi4 and ,go42 the ,bh4 
proposes another less plausible         
division4  ,footnote #fb3 ,according to 
,nirukta ,i1 #b the six bhvavikr_/h_/   
are3 origination1 existence1            
modification1 increase1 decrease1       
destruction4  ,footnote #fc3 ,the       
pradhna1 called also prak_/ri_/ti1 is   
the primal causal matter of the world in
 the _/,s_/nkhya-system4 ,it will be    
fully discussed in later parts of this  
work4 ,to avoid ambiguities1 the term   
pradhna has been left untranslated4 ,cp4

 ,snkhya ,krik #c4  ,footnote #fd3      
,ke_/k_/it tu hira_/n_/yagaroha_/m_/    
sa_/m_/sri_/n_/am evgamj jagaddhetum    
_/k_/akshate4 nanada ,giri4  ,footnote  
#fe3 ,viz4 the ,vai_/s_/eshikas4        
,footnote #ff3 tmana_/h_/ _/s_/ruter ity
 artha_/h_/4 nanda ,giri4  ,footnote    
#fg3 ,text 7or direct statement71       
suggestive power 7linga71 syntactical   
connection 7vkya71 c41 being the means  
of proof made use of in the ,prva       
,mm_/m_/s4  ,footnote #fh3 ,the         
so-called skshtkra of ,brahman4 ,the c4 
comprises inference and so on4          
,footnote #fi3 ,so1 for instance1 the   
passage 'he carves the sacrificial post 
and makes it eight-cornered1' has a     
purpose only as being supplementary to  
the injunction 'he ties the victim to   
the sacrificial post4'  ,footnote #gj3  
,if the fruits of the two _/s_/stras    
were not of a different nature1 there   
would be no reason for the distinction  
of two _/s_/stras2 if they are of a     
different nature1 it cannot be said that

 the knowledge of ,brahman is enjoined  
for the purpose of final release1 in the
 same way as sacrifices are enjoined for
 the purpose of obtaining the heavenly  
world and the like4  ,footnote #ga3 ,the
 first passage shows that the ,self is  
not joined to the gross body2 the second
 that it is not joined to the subtle    
body2 the third that is independent of  
either4  ,footnote #gb3 nanda ,giri     
omits 'ata_/h_/4' ,his comment is3      
p_/ri_/thagjij_/_/svishayatv_/k_/ _/k_/a
 dharmdyasp_/ri_/sh_/t_/atva_/m_/       
brahma_/n_/o yuktam ityha2 tad iti2     
ata_/h_/ _/s_/abdap_/th_/e              
dharmdyasparse                          
karmaphalavailaksba_/n_/ya_/m_/         
hetk_/ri_/tam4--,the above translation  
follows ,govindnanda's first            
explanation4 ,tat kaivalyam brahmaiva   
karmaphalavilaksha_/n_/atvd ity         
artha_/h_/4  ,footnote #gc3 ,sampat4    
,sampan nmlpe vastuny lambane smnyena   
kena_/k_/in mahato vastuna_/h_/         
sampdanam4 nanda ,giri4  ,footnote #gd3 

,in which passage the mind1 which may be
 called endless on account of the       
infinite number of modifications it     
undergoes1 is identified with the       
,vi_/s_/vedevas1 which thereby          
constitute the chief object of the      
meditation2 the fruit of the meditation 
being immortality4 ,the identity of the 
,self with ,brahman1 on the other hand1 
is real1 not only meditatively imagined1
 on account of the attribute of         
intelligence being common to both4      
,footnote #ge3 ,adhysa_/h_/             
_/s_/stratoitasmi_/m_/s taddh_/h_/4     
,sampadi sampdyamnasya prdhnyennudhynam1
 adhyse tu lambanasyeti                 
vi_/s_/esha_/h_/4 nanda ,giri4          
,footnote #gf3 ,air and breath each     
absorb certain things1 and are1         
therefore1 designated by the same term  
'absorber4' ,seya_/m_/                  
sa_/m_/vargad_/ri_/sh_/t_/ir vyau       
pr_/n_/e _/k_/a da_/s_/_/s_/gata_/m_/   
jagad dar_/s_/ayati yath jvtmani        
b_/rim_/ha_/n_/akriyay                  

brahmad_/ri_/sh_/t_/iram_/ri_/tatvyaphal
yakalpata iti4 ,bhmati4  ,footnote #gg3 
,the butter used in the up_/ms_/uyja is 
ceremonially purified by the wife of the
 sacrificer looking at it2 so1 it might 
be said1 the ,self of him who meditates 
on ,brahman 7and who as                 
kart_/ri_/--agent--stands in a          
subordinate anga-relation to the karman 
of meditation7 is merely purified by the
 cognition of its being one with        
,brahman4  ,footnote #gh3 ,an hypothesis
 which might be proposed for the purpose
 of obviating the imputation to moksha  
of non-eternality which results from the
 two preceding hypotheses4  ,footnote   
#gi3 ,viz4 things to be originated 7for 
instance1 gha_/t_/a_/m_/ karoti71 things
 to be obtained 7grma_/m_/              
ga_/kkh_/ati71 things to be modified    
7suvar_/n_/a_/m_/ ku_/nd_/ala_/m_/      
karoti71 and things to be ceremonially  
purified 7vrhn prokshati74  ,footnote   
#hj3 ,whence it follows that it is not  
something to be avoided like transitory 

things4  ,footnote #ha3 ,that1 for      
instance1 in the passage 'he is to      
sacrifice with ,soma1' the word 'soma1' 
which does not denote an action1 is     
devoid of sense4  ,footnote #hb3 ,i4e4  
for the purpose of showing that the     
passages conveying information about    
,brahman as such are justified4 ,you    
have 7the objector maintains7 proved    
hitherto only that passages containing  
information about existent things are   
admissible1 if those things have a      
purpose2 but how does all this apply to 
the information about ,brahman of which 
no purpose has been established8        
,footnote #hc3 ,it is 'naturally        
established' because it has natural     
motives--not dependent on the           
injunctions of the ,veda1 viz4 passion  
and the like4  ,footnote #hd3           
,elsewhere1 i4e4 outside the ,veda4     
,footnote #he3 ,the above discussion of 
the prohibitory passages of the ,veda is
 of a very scholastic nature1 and       
various clauses in it are differently   

interpreted by the different            
commentators4 _/,s_/ankara endeavours to
 fortify his doctrine1 that not all     
parts of the ,veda refer to action by an
 appeal to prohibitory passages which do
 not enjoin action but abstinence from  
action4 ,the legitimacy of this appeal  
might be contested on the ground that a 
prohibitory passage also1 7as1 for      
instance1 'a ,brhma_/n_/a is not to be  
killed1'7 can be explained as enjoining 
a positive action1 viz4 some action     
opposed in nature to the one forbidden1 
so that the quoted passage might be     
interpreted to mean 'a determination1 c4
 of not killing a ,brhma_/n_/a is to be 
formed2' just as we understand something
 positive by the expression 'a          
non-,brhma_/n_/a1' viz4 some man who is 
a kshattriya or something else4 ,to this
 the answer is that1 wherever we can1 we
 must attribute to the word 'not' its   
primary sense which is the absolute     
negation of the word to which it is     
joined2 so that passages where it is    

joined to words denoting action must be 
considered to have for their purport the
 entire absence of action4 ,special     
cases only are excepted1 as the one     
alluded to in the text where certain    
prohibited actions are enumerated under 
the heading of vows2 for as a vow is    
considered as something positive1 the   
non-doing of some particular action must
 there be understood as intimating the  
performance of some action of an        
opposite nature4 ,the question as to the
 various meanings of the particle 'not' 
is discussed in all treatises on the    
,prv ,mm_/m_/s2 see1 for instance1      
,arthasamgraha1 translation1 p4 #ci ff4 
,footnote #hf3 ,the ,self is the agent  
in a sacrifice1 c4 only in so far as it 
imagines itself to be joined to a body2 
which imagination is finally removed by 
the cognition of ,brahman4  ,footnote   
#hg3 ,the figurative ,self1 i4e4 the    
imagination that wife1 children1        
possessions1 and the like are a man's   
,self2 the false ,self1 i4e4 the        

imagination that the ,self acts1        
suffers1 enjoys1 c4  ,footnote #hh3     
,i4e4 the apparent world with all its   
distinctions4  ,footnote #hi3 ,the words
 in parentheses are not found in the    
best manuscripts4  ,footnote #ij3 ,the  
most exalted of the three constituent   
elements whose state of equipoise       
constitutes the pradhna4  ,footnote #ia3
 ,knowledge can arise only where        
,goodness is predominant1 not where the 
three qualities mutually counterbalance 
one another4  ,footnote #ib3 ,the excess
 of ,sattva in the ,yogin would not     
enable him to rise to omniscience if he 
did not possess an intelligent principle
 independent of ,sattva4  ,footnote #ic3
 ,ananda ,giri comments as follows3     
paroktnupapatlim nirasitum p_/rikkh_/ati
 idam iti4 ,prak_/ri_/tyarthbhvt        
pratyayrthbhvd v brahma_/n_/o           
sarvaj_/_/ateti pra_/s_/nam eva         
praka_/t_/ayati katham iti4             
,prathama_/m_/ pratyha yasyeti4         
,ukta_/m_/ vyatirckadvr viyz_/rin_/oti  

anityatve hti4 ,dvitiya_/m_/ _/s_/ankate
 j_/_/neti4 ,svato nityasypi j_/_/nasya 
tattadarthva_/kkh_/innasya kryatvt tatra
 svtantryam pratyayrtho                 
brahma_/n_/a_/h_/ sidhyatty ha4--,the   
knowledge of ,brahman is eternal1 and in
 so far ,brahman is not independent with
 regard to it1 but it is independent    
with regard to each particular act of   
knowledge2 the verbal affix in 'jnti'   
indicating the particularity of the act4
  ,footnote #id3 ,in the second         
,kha_/nd_/a of the sixth ,prap_/th_/aka 
of the ,ch4 ,up4 'aikshata' is twice    
used in a figurative sense 7with regard 
to fire and water72 it is therefore to  
be understood figuratively in the third 
passage also where it occurs4  ,footnote
 #ie3 ,so that1 on this latter          
explanation1 it is unnecessary to assume
 a figurative sense of the word         
'thinking' in any of the three passages4
  ,footnote #if3 ,a wicked man meets in 
a forest a blind person who has lost his
 way1 and implores him to lead him to   

his village2 instead of doing so the    
wicked man persuades the blind one to   
catch hold of the tail of an ox1 which  
he promises would lead him to his place4
 ,the consequence is that the blind man 
is1 owing to his trustfulness1 led even 
farther astray1 and injured by the      
bushes1 c41 through which the ox drags  
him4  ,footnote #ig3 ,cp4 above1 p4 #cj4
  ,footnote #ih3 ,so according to the   
commentators1 not to accept whose       
guidance in the translation of          
scholastic definitions is rather        
hazardous4 ,a simpler translation of the
 clause might however be given4         
,footnote #ii3 ,with reference to ,ch4  
,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #b4  ,footnote #ajj3 ,the
 wise one1 i4e4 the highest ,self2 which
 as jvtman is conversant with the names 
and forms of individual things4         
,footnote #aja3 ,i4e4 it is looked upon 
as the object of the devotion of the    
individual souls2 while in reality all  
those souls and ,brahman are one4       
,footnote #ajb3 ,qualities1 i4e4 the    

attributes under which the ,self is     
meditated on2 limiting conditions1 i4e4 
the localities--such as the heart and   
the like--which in pious meditation are 
ascribed to the ,self4  ,footnote #ajc3 
nanda ,giri reads vish_/t_/asya for     
vishk_/ri_/tasya4  ,footnote #ajd3 ,cp4 
the entire passage4 ,all things are     
manifestations of the highest ,self     
under certain limiting conditions1 but  
occupying different places in an        
ascending scale4 ,in unsentient things1 
stones1 c4 only the satt1 the quality of
 being manifests itself2 in plants1     
animals1 and men the ,self manifests    
itself through the vital sap2 in animals
 and men there is understanding2 higher 
thought in man alone4  ,footnote #aje3  
nanda ,giri on the preceding passage    
beginning from 'thus here also3' na     
kevala_/m_/ dvaividhyam                 
brahma_/n_/a_/h_/ _/s_/rutism_/ri_/tyor 
eva siddha_/m_/ ki_/m_/ tu strak_/ri_/to
 api matam ity ha1 evam iti1            
_/s_/rutism_/ri_/tyor iva prak_/ri_/te  

pi _/s_/stre dvairpyam brahma_/n_/o     
bhavati2 tatra sopdhikabrahmavishayam   
antastaddharmdhikara_/n_/am udharati    
dityeti2 uktanyya_/m_/ tulyade_/s_/eshu 
prasrayati evam iti2                    
sopdhikopade_/s_/avan                   
nirupdhikopade_/s_/a_/m_/ dar_/s_/ayati 
evam itydin1 tmaj_/_/ana_/m_/           
nir_/n_/etavyam iti sambandha_/h_/2     
ayaprasangam ha pareti2                 
annamaydyupdhidvrokasya katham          
paravidyvishayatva_/m_/ tatrha updhti2  
nir_/n_/ayakramam ha vkyeti1 uktrtham   
adhikara_/n_/a_/m_/ kvstty              
sankyokta_/m_/ yatheti4  ,footnote #ajf3
 ,after which no other ,self is         
mentioned4  ,footnote #ajg3 ,the        
previous proofs were founded on linga2  
the argument which is now propounded is 
founded on prakara_/n_/a4  ,footnote    
#ajh3 ,while1 in the case of the ,selfs 
consisting of food and so on1 a further 
inner ,self is duly mentioned each time4
 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be concluded    
that the ,selfs consisting of food1 c41 

are likewise identical with the highest 
,self referred to in the mantra4        
,footnote #aji3 ,yadi labdh na          
labdhavya_/h_/ katha_/m_/ tarhi         
paramtmano vastutobhinnena jvtman       
paramtm labhyata ity artha_/h_/4 ,bhmat4
  ,footnote #aaj3 ,yath paramesvard     
bhinno jvtm drash_/t_/ na bhavaty evam  
gvtmanozpi drash_/t_/ur na bhinna_/h_/  
parame_/s_/vara iti1 jvasynirv_/k_/yarve
 parame_/s_/varozpy anirv_/k_/ya_/h_/   
syd ity ata ha parame_/s_/varas tv      
avidykalpitd iti4 ,ananda ,giri4        
,footnote #aaa3 ,the explanation of the 
nandamaya given hitherto is here        
recalled1 and a different one given4    
,the previous explanation is attributed 
by ,go4 n4 to the v_/ri_/ttikra4        
,footnote #aab3 ,in which sense1 as     
shown above1 the word nandamaya must be 
taken if understood to denote ,brahman4 
,footnote #aac3 ,i4e4 the word          
translated hitherto by abundance4       
,footnote #aad3 ,see ,i1 #a1 #ae-ai4    
,footnote #aae3 ,the preceding          

adhikara_/n_/a had shown that the five  
,selfs 7consisting of food1 mind1 and so
 on71 which the ,taitt4 ,up4 enumerates1
 are introduced merely for the purpose  
of facilitating the cognition of        
,brahman considered as devoid of all    
qualities2 while that ,brahman itself is
 the real object of knowledge4 ,the     
present adhikara_/n_/a undertakes to    
show that the passage about the golden  
person represents the savi_/s_/esha     
,brahman as the object of devout        
meditation4  ,footnote #aaf3 ,so that   
the real giver of the gifts bestowed by 
princes on poets and singers is         
,brahman4  ,footnote #aag3 ,or else     
'that which is within forms and names4' 
,footnote #aah3 ,viz4 as intimating it4 
,thus n4 ,gi4 and ,go4 n4 against the   
accent of _/rik_/_/h_/4 ,sya_/n_/a      
explains _/rik_/_/h_/ as genitive4      
,footnote #aai3 ,o_/m_/krasya           
pratkatvena v_/k_/akatvena lakshakatvena
 v brahmatvam uktam1 om iti1 ka_/m_/    
sukha_/m_/ tasyrthendriyayogajatva_/m_/ 

vrayitu_/m_/ kham iti1 tasya            
bhtka_/s_/atva_/m_/ vyseddhum pur_/n_/am
 ity uktam4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #abj3    
,the doubt about the meaning of a word  
is preferably to be decided by means of 
a reference to preceding passages2 where
 that is not possible 7the doubtful word
 occurring at the beginning of some new 
chapter7 complementary1 i4e4 subsequent 
passages have to be taken into          
consideration4  ,footnote #aba3 ,the    
v_/ri_/ttikra1 the commentators say4    
,footnote #abb3 ,i4e4 which has not been
 mixed with water and earth1 according  
to ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #c4 ,before that 
mixture took place light was entriely   
separated from the other elements1 and  
therefore bounded by the latter4        
,footnote #abc3 ,so as to justify the   
assumption that such a thing as         
non-tripartite light exists at all4     
,footnote #abd3 ,brahma_/n_/o           
vyava_/kkh_/idya                        
teja_/h_/samarpakatva_/m_/              
vi_/s_/eshakatvam1                      

tadabhvozvi_/s_/eshakatvam4 n4 ,gi4     
,footnote #abe3 ,if we strictly follow  
the order of words in the original4     
,footnote #abf3 ,svasmarthyena          
sarvanmna_/h_/                          
sannihitaparmar_/s_/itvava_/s_/ena4     
,footnote #abg3 ,the v_/ri_/ttikra      
according to ,go4 n4 in his _/t_/k on   
the bhshya to the next ,stra4  ,footnote
 #abh3 ,concerning the difficulty       
involved in this interpretation1 cp4    
,deussen1 p4 #ahc1 note4  ,footnote     
#abi3 ,the text runs1 'astitve _/k_/a   
pr_/n_/n_/m_/ ni_/hs_/reyasam1' and ,go4
 n4 explains 'astitve pr_/n_/asthitau   
pr_/n_/n_/m_/ indriy_/n_/m sthitir ity  
arthata_/h_/ _/s_/rutim ha4' ,he as well
 as n4 ,gi4 quotes as the text of the   
scriptural passage referred to 'athto   
ni_/hs_/reyasdnam ity di4' ,but if      
instead of 'astitve _/k_/a' we read     
'asti tv eva1' we get the concluding    
clause of ,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 as given
 in ,cowell's edition44  ,footnote #acj3
 ,whence we know that the interior ,self

 referred to in the ,kau4 ,up4 is       
,brahman4  ,footnote #aca3 ,i4e4        
spontaneous intuition of supersensible  
truth1 rendered possible through the    
knowledge acquired in former existences4
  ,footnote #acb3 ,ima_/m_/ _/s_/arram  
instead of ida_/m_/ _/s_/arram4         
,footnote #acc3 ,pa_/k_/a               
_/s_/abddaya_/h_/ pa_/k_/a              
p_/ri_/thivydaya_/s_/ _/k_/a da_/s_/a   
bhtamtr_/h_/ pa_/k_/a buddhndriy_/n_/i  
pa_/k_/a buddhaya iti da_/s_/a          
praj_/_/mtr_/h_/4 ,yadv                 
j_/_/nendriyrth_/h_/ pa_/k_/a           
karzmendriyrth_/s_/ _/ka_/ pa_/k_/eti   
da_/s_/a bhtamtr_/h_/                   
dvividhnndriy_/n_/i praj_/_/mtr         
da_/s_/eti bhva_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote
 #acd3 ,viz4 by the v_/ri_/ttikra4      
,footnote #ace3 ,ihpi tad yujyate       
explaining the 'iha tadyogt' of the     
,stra4     ,,second ,p,,da4  ,,reverence
 ,,to ,,the ,,highest ,,self6   ,in the 
first pda ,brahman has been shown to be 
the cause of the origin1 subsistence1   

and reabsorption of the entire world1   
comprising the ether and the other      
elements4 ,moreover1 of this ,brahman1  
which is the cause of the entire world1 
certain qualities have 7implicitly7 been
 declared1 such as all-pervadingness1   
eternity1 omniscience1 its being the    
,self of all1 and so on4 ,further1 by   
producing reasons showing that some     
words which are generally used in a     
different sense denote ,brahman also1 we
 have been able to determine that some  
passages about whose sense doubts are   
entertained refer to ,brahman4 ,now     
certain other passages present          
themselves which because containing only
 obscure indications of ,brahman give   
rise to the doubt whether they refer to 
the highest ,self or to something else4 
,we therefore begin the second and third
 pdas in order to settle those doubtful 
points4  #a4 7,that which consists of   
mind is ,brahman7 because there is      
taught what is known from everywhere4   
,scripture says1 ',all this indeed is   

,brahman1 beginning1 ending1 and        
breathing in it2 thus knowing let a man 
meditate with calm mind4 ,now man is    
made of determination 7kratu72 according
 to what his determination is in this   
world so will he be when he has departed
 this life4 ,let him therefore form this
 determination3 he who consists of mind1
 whose body is breath 7the subtle       
body71' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad74      
,concerning this passage the doubt      
presents itself whether what is pointed 
out as the object of meditation1 by     
means of attributes such as consisting  
of mind1 c41 is the embodied            
7individual7 soul or the highest        
,brahman4  ,the embodied ,self1 the     
prvapakshin says4--,why8--,because the  
embodied ,self as the ruler of the      
organs of action is well known to be    
connected with the mind and so on1 while
 the highest ,brahman is not1 as is     
declared in several scriptural passages1
 so1 for instance 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1  
#b71 ',he is without breath1 without    

mind1 pure4'--,but1 it may be objected1 
the passage1 ',all this indeed is       
,brahman1' mentions ,brahman directly2  
how then can you suppose that the       
embodied ,self forms the object of      
meditation8--,this objection does not   
apply1 the prvapakshin rejoins1 because 
the passage does not aim at enjoining   
meditation on ,brahman1 but rather at   
enjoining calmness of mind1 the sense   
being3 because ,brahman is all this1    
tajjaln1 let a man meditate with a calm 
mind4 ,that is to say3 because all this 
aggregate of effects is ,brahman only1  
springing from it1 ending in it1 and    
breathing in it2 and because1 as        
everything constitutes one ,self only1  
there is no room for passion2 therefore 
a man is to meditate with a calm mind4  
,and since the sentence aims at         
enjoining calmness of mind1 it cannot at
 the same time enjoin meditation on     
,brahman#acf2 but meditation is         
separately enjoined in the clause1 ',let
 him form the determination1 i4e4       

reflection4' ,and thereupon the         
subsequent passage1 ',he who consists of
 mind1 whose body is breath1' c4 states 
the object of the meditation in words   
indicatory of the individual soul4 ,for 
this reason we maintain that the        
meditation spoken of has the individual 
soul for its object4 ,the other         
attributes also subsequently stated in  
the text1 ',he to whom all works1 all   
desires belong1' c4 may rightly be held 
to refer to the individual soul4 ,the   
attributes1 finally1 of being what      
abides in the heart and of being        
extremely minute which are mentioned in 
the passage1 ',he is my ,self within the
 heart1 smaller than a corn of rice1    
smaller than a corn of barley1' may be  
ascribed to the individual soul which   
has the size of the point of a goad1 but
 not to the unlimited ,brahman4 ,if it  
be objected that the immediately        
following passage1 'greater than the    
earth1' c41 cannot refer to something   
limited1 we reply that smallness and    

greatness which are mutually opposite   
cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the
 same thing2 and that1 if one attribute 
only is to be ascribed to the subject of
 the passage1 smallness is preferable   
because it is mentioned first2 while the
 greatness mentioned later on may be    
attributed to the soul in so far as it  
is one with ,brahman4 ,if it is once    
settled that the whole passage refers to
 the individual soul1 it follows that   
the declaration of ,brahman also1       
contained in the passage1 ',that is     
,brahman' 7,,iii1 #ad1 #d71 refers to   
the individual soul#acg1 as it is       
clearly connected with the general      
topic4 ,therefore the individual soul is
 the object of meditation indicated by  
the qualities of consisting of mind and 
so on4  ,to all this we reply3 ,the     
highest ,brahman only is what is to be  
meditated upon as distinguished by the  
attributes of consisting of mind and so 
on4--,why8--',on account of there being 
taught here what is known from          

everywhere4' ,what is known from all    
,vednta-passages to be the sense of the 
word ,brahman1 viz4 the cause of the    
world1 and what is mentioned here in the
 beginning words of the passage1 7'all  
this indeed is ,brahman1'7 the same we  
must assume to be taught here as        
distinguished by certain qualities1 viz4
 consisting of mind and so on4 ,thus we 
avoid the fault of dropping the         
subject-matter under discussion and     
needlessly introducing a new            
topic4--,but1 it may be said1 it has    
been shown that ,brahman is1 in the     
beginning of the passage1 introduced    
merely for the purpose of intimating the
 injunction of calmness of mind1 not for
 the purpose of intimating ,brahman     
itself4--,true1 we reply2 but the fact  
nevertheless remains that1 where the    
qualities of consisting of mind1 c4 are 
spoken of1 ,brahman only is proximate   
7i4e4 mentioned not far off so that it  
may be concluded to be the thing        
referred to71 while the individual soul 

is neither proximate nor intimated by   
any word directly pointing to it4 ,the  
cases of ,brahman and the individual    
soul are therefore not equal4  #b4 ,and 
because the qualities desired to be     
expressed are possible 7in ,brahman2    
therefore the passage refers to         
,brahman74  ,although in the ,veda which
 is not the work of man no wish in the  
strict sense can be expressed#ach1 there
 being no speaker1 still such phrases as
 'desired to be expressed1' may be      
figuratively used on account of the     
result1 viz4 7mental7 comprehension4    
,for just as in ordinary language we    
speak of something which is intimated by
 a word and is to be received 7by the   
hearer as the meaning of the word71 as  
'desired to be expressed2' so in the    
,veda also whatever is denoted as that  
which is to be received is 'desired to  
be expressed1' everything else 'not     
desired to be expressed4' ,what is to be
 received as the meaning of a ,vedic    
sentence1 and what not1 is inferred from

 the general purport of the passage4    
,those qualities which are here desired 
to be expressed1 i4e4 intimated as      
qualities to be dwelt on in meditation1 
viz4 the qualities of having true       
purposes1 c4 are possible in the highest
 ,brahman2 for the quality of having    
true purposes may be ascribed to the    
highest ,self which possesses unimpeded 
power over the creation1 subsistence1   
and reabsorption of this world4         
,similarly the qualities of having true 
desires and true purposes are attributed
 to the highest ,self in another        
passage1 viz4 the one beginning1 ',the  
,self which is free from sin' 7,ch4 ,up4
 ,,viii1 #g1 #a74 ,the clause1 ',he     
whose ,self is the ether1' means 'he    
whose ,self is like the ether2' for     
,brahman may be said to be like the     
ether on account of its omnipresence and
 other qualities4 ,this is also         
expressed by the clause1 ',greater than 
the earth4' ,and the other explanation  
also1 according to which the passage    

means 'he whose ,self is the ether' is  
possible1 since ,brahman which as the   
cause of the whole world is the ,self of
 everything is also the ,self of the    
ether4 ,for the same reasons he is      
called 'he to whom all works belong1 and
 so on4' ,thus the qualities here       
intimated as topics of meditation agree 
with the nature of ,brahman4 ,we further
 maintain that the terms 'consisting of 
mind1' and 'having breath for its body1'
 which the prvapakshin asserts cannot   
refer to ,brahman1 may refer to it4 ,for
 as ,brahman is the ,self of everything1
 qualities such as consisting of mind   
and the like1 which belong to the       
individual soul1 belong to ,brahman     
also4 ,accordingly _/,s_/ruti and       
,sm_/ri_/ti say of ,brahman1 ',thou art 
woman1 thou art man2 thou art youth1    
thou art maiden2 thou as an old man     
totterest along on thy staff2 thou art  
born with thy face turned everywhere'   
7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c71 and 'its     
hands and feet are everywhere1 its eyes 

and head are everywhere1 its ears are   
everywhere1 it stands encompassing all  
in the world' 7,bha4 ,gt ,,iii1 #ac74   
,the passage 7quoted above against our  
view71 ',without breath1 without mind1  
pure1' refers to the pure 7unrelated7   
,brahman4 ,the terms 'consisting of     
mind2 having breath for its body1' on   
the other hand1 refer to ,brahman as    
distinguished by qualities4 ,hence1 as  
the qualities mentioned are possible in 
,brahman1 we conclude that the highest  
,brahman only is represented as the     
object of meditation4  #c4 ,on the other
 hand1 as 7those qualities7 are not     
possible 7in it71 the embodied 7soul is7
 not 7denoted by manomaya1 c474  ,the   
preceding ,stra has declared that the   
qualities mentioned are possible in     
,brahman2 the present ,stra states that 
they are not possible in the embodied   
,self4 ,brahman only possesses1 in the  
manner explained1 the qualities of      
consisting of mind1 and so on2 not the  
embodied individual soul4 ,for qualities

 such as expressed in the words1 ',he   
whose purposes are true1 whose ,self is 
the ether1 who has no speech1 who is not
 disturbed1 who is greater than the     
earth1' cannot easily be attributed to  
the embodied ,self4 ,by the term        
'embodied' 7_/s_/rra7 we have to        
understand 'residing' in a body4 ,if it 
be objected that the ,lord also resides 
in the body#aci1 we reply1 ,true1 he    
does reside in the body1 but not in the 
body only2 for _/s_/ruti declares him to
 be all-pervading2 compare1 ',he is     
greater than the earth2 greater than the
 atmosphere1 omnipresent like the ether1
 eternal4' ,the individual soul1 on the 
other hand1 is in the body only1 apart  
from which as the abode of fruition it  
does not exist4  #d4 ,and because there 
is a 7separate7 denotation of the object
 of activity and of the agent4  ,the    
attributes of consisting of mind1 and so
 on1 cannot belong to the embodied ,self
 for that reason also1 that there is a  
7separate7 denotation of the object of  

activity and of the agent4 ,in the      
passage1 ',when ,i shall have departed  
from hence ,i shall obtain him' 7,ch4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #d71 the word 'him'    
refers to that which is the topic of    
discussion1 viz4 the ,self which is to  
be meditated upon as possessing the     
attributes of consisting of mind1 c41 as
 the object of an activity1 viz4 as     
something to be obtained2 while the     
words1 ',i shall obtain1' represent the 
meditating individual ,self as the      
agent1 i4e4 the obtainer4 ,now1 wherever
 it can be helped1 we must not assume   
that one and the same being is spoken of
 as the agent and the object of the     
activity at the same time4 ,the relation
 existing between a person meditating   
and the thing meditated upon requires1  
moreover1 different abodes4--,and thus  
for the above reason1 also1 that which  
is characterised by the attributes of   
consisting of mind1 and so on1 cannot be
 the individual soul4  #e4 ,on account  
of the difference of words4  ,that which

 possesses the attributes of consisting 
of mind1 and so on1 cannot be the       
individual soul1 for that reason also   
that there is a difference of words4    
,that is to say1 we meet with another   
scriptural passage of kindred           
subject-matter 7_/,s_/at4 ,br4 ,x1 #f1  
#c1 #b71 ',like a rice grain1 or a      
barley grain1 or a canary seed or the   
kernel of a canary seed1 thus that      
golden person is in the ,self4' ,there  
one word1 i4e4 the locative 'in the     
,self1' denotes the embodied ,self1 and 
a different word1 viz4 the nominative   
'person1' denotes the ,self             
distinguished by the qualities of       
consisting of mind1 c4 ,we therefrom    
conclude that the two are different4    
#f4 ,and on account of ,sm_/ri_/ti4     
,sm_/ri_/ti also declares the difference
 of the embodied ,self and the highest  
,self1 viz4 ,bha4 ,gt ,,xviii1 #fa1     
',the ,lord1 ,o ,arjuna1 is seated in   
the heart of all beings1 driving round  
by his magical power all beings 7as if  

they were7 mounted on a machine4'  ,but 
what1 it may be asked1 is that so-called
 embodied ,self different from the      
highest ,self which is to be set aside  
according to the preceding ,stras8      
_/,s_/ruti passages1 as well as         
,sm_/ri_/ti1 expressly deny that there  
is any ,self apart from the highest     
,self2 compare1 for instance1 ,b_/ri_/4 
,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bc1 ',there is no other
 seer but he2 there is no other hearer  
but he2' and ,bha4 ,gt ,,xiii1 #b1 ',and
 know me also1 ,o ,bhrata1 to be the    
kshetiaj_/_/a in all kshetras4'  ,true1 
we reply1 7there is in reality one      
universal ,self only47 ,but the highest 
,self in so far as it is limited by its 
adjuncts1 viz4 the body1 the senses1 and
 the mind 7mano-buddhi71 is1 by the     
ignorant1 spoken of as if it were       
embodied4 ,similarly the ether1 although
 in reality unlimited1 appears limited  
owing to certain adjuncts1 such as jars 
and other vessels4 ,with regard to this 
7unreal limitation of the one ,self7 the

 distinction of objects of activity and 
of agents may be practically assumed1 as
 long as we have not learned--from the  
passage1 ',that art thou'--that the     
,self is one only4 ,as soon1 however1 as
 we grasp the truth that there is only  
one universal ,self1 there is an end to 
the whole practical view of the world   
with its distinction of bondage1 final  
release1 and the like4  #g4 ,if it be   
said that 7the passage does7 not 7refer 
to ,brahman7 on account of the smallness
 of the abode 7mentioned71 and on       
account of the denotations of that 7i4e4
 of minuteness72 we say1 no2 because    
7,brahman7 has thus to be contemplated1 
and because the case is analogous to    
that of ether4  ,on account of the      
limitation of its abode1 which is       
mentioned in the clause1 ',he is my     
,self within the heart1' and on account 
of the declaration as to its minuteness 
contained in the direct statement1 ',he 
is smaller than a grain of rice1' c42   
the embodied soul only1 which is of the 

size of an awl's point1 is spoken of in 
the passage under discussion1 and not   
the highest ,self4 ,this assertion made 
above 7in the prvapaksha of ,stra ,i1   
and restated in the prvapaksha of the   
present ,stra7 has to be refuted4 ,we   
therefore maintain that the objection   
raised does not invalidate our view of  
the passage4 ,it is true that a thing   
occupying a limited space only cannot in
 any way be spoken of as omnipresent2   
but1 on the other hand1 that which is   
omnipresent1 and therefore in all places
 may1 from a certain point of view1 be  
said to occupy a limited space4         
,similarly1 a prince may be called the  
ruler of ,ayodhy although he is at the  
same time the ruler of the whole        
earth4--,but from what point of view can
 the omnipresent ,lord be said to occupy
 a limited space and to be minute8--,he 
may1 we reply1 be spoken of thus1       
'because he is to be contemplated thus4'
 ,the passage under discussion teaches  
us to contemplate the ,lord as abiding  

within the lotus of the heart1          
characterised by minuteness and similar 
qualities--which apprehension of the    
,lord is rendered possible through a    
modification of the mind--just as ,hari 
is contemplated in the sacred stone     
called _/,s_/lagrm4 ,although present   
everywhere1 the ,lord is pleased when   
meditated upon as dwelling in the heart4
 ,the case is1 moreover1 to be viewed as
 analogous to that of the ether4 ,the   
ether1 although all-pervading1 is spoken
 of as limited and minute1 if considered
 in its connexion with the eye of a     
needle2 so ,brahman also4 ,but it is an 
understood matter that the attributes of
 limitation of abode and of minuteness  
depend1 in ,brahman's case1 entirely on 
special forms of contemplation1 and are 
not real4 ,the latter consideration     
disposes also of the objection1 that if 
,brahman has its abode in the heart1    
which heart-abode is a different one in 
each body1 it would follow that it is   
affected by all the imperfections which 

attach to beings having different       
abodes1 such as parrots shut up in      
different cages1 viz4 want of unity1    
being made up of parts1 non-permanency1 
and so on4  #h4 ,if it is said that     
7from the circumstance of ,brahman and  
the individual soul being one7 there    
follows fruition 7on the part of        
,brahman72 we say1 no2 on account of the
 difference of nature 7of the two74     
,but1 it may be said1 as ,brahman is    
omnipresent like ether1 and therefore   
connected with the hearts of all living 
beings1 and as it is of the nature of   
intelligence and therefore not different
 from the individual soul1 it follows   
that ,brahman also has the same fruition
 of pleasure1 pain1 and so on 7as the   
individual soul74 ,the same result      
follows from its unity4 ,for in reality 
there exists no transmigratory ,self    
different from the highest ,self2 as    
appears from the text1 ',there is no    
other knower but he' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iii1 #g1 #bc71 and similar passages4  

,hence the highest ,self is subject to  
the fruition connected with             
transmigratory existence4  ,this is not 
so1 we reply2 because there is a        
difference of nature4 ,from the         
circumstance that ,brahman is connected 
with the hearts of all living beings it 
does not follow that it is1 like the    
embodied ,self1 subject to fruition4    
,for1 between the embodied ,self and the
 highest ,self1 there is the difference 
that the former acts and enjoys1        
acquires merit and demerit1 and is      
affected by pleasure1 pain1 and so on2  
while the latter is of the opposite     
nature1 i4e4 characterised by being free
 from all evil and the like4 ,on account
 of this difference of the two1 the     
fruition of the one does not extend to  
the other4 ,to assume merely on the     
ground of the mutual proximity of the   
two1 without considering their          
essentially different powers1 that a    
connexion with effects exists 7in       
,brahman's case also71 would be no      

better than to suppose that space is on 
fire 7when something in space is on     
fire74 ,the same objection and          
refutation apply to the case of those   
also who teach the existence of more    
than one omnipresent ,self4 ,in reply to
 the assertion1 that because ,brahman is
 one and there are no other ,selfs      
outside it1 ,brahman must be subject to 
fruition since the individual soul is   
so1 we ask the question3 ,how have you1 
our wise opponent1 ascertained that     
there is no other ,self8 ,you will      
reply1 we suppose1 from scriptural texts
 such as1 ',that art thou1' ',i am      
,brahman1' ',there is no other knower   
but he1' and so on4 ,very well1 then1 it
 appears that the truth about scriptural
 matters is to be ascertained from      
,scripture1 and that ,scripture is not  
sometimes to be appealed to1 and on     
other occasions to be disregarded4      
,scriptural texts1 such as 'that art    
thou1' teach that ,brahman which is free
 from all evil is the ,self of the      

embodied soul1 and thus dispel even the 
opinion that the embodied soul is       
subject to fruition2 how then should    
fruition on the part of the embodied    
soul involve fruition on the part of    
,brahman8--,let1 then1 the unity of the 
individual soul and ,brahman not be     
apprehended on the ground of            
,scripture4--,in that case1 we reply1   
the fruition on the part of the         
individual soul has wrong knowledge for 
its cause1 and ,brahman as it truly     
exists is not touched thereby1 not any  
more than the ether becomes really      
dark-blue in consequence of ignorant    
people presuming it to be so4 ,for this 
reason the ,strakra says#adj 'no1 on    
account of the difference4' ,in spite of
 their unity1 fruition on the part of   
the soul does not involve fruition on   
the part of ,brahman2 because there is a
 difference4 ,for there is a difference 
between false knowledge and perfect     
knowledge1 fruition being the figment of
 false knowledge while the unity 7of the

 ,self7 is revealed by perfect          
knowledge4 ,now1 as the substance       
revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be 
affected by fruition which is nothing   
but the figment of false knowledge1 it  
is impossible to assume even a shadow of
 fruition on ,brahman's part4  #i4 ,the 
eater 7is the highest ,self7 since what 
is movable and what is immovable is     
mentioned 7as his food74  ,we read in   
the ,ka_/th_/avall 7,i1 #b1 #be71 ',who 
then knows where ,he is1 ,he to whom the
 ,brahmans and ,kshattriyas are but     
food1 and death itself a condiment8'    
,this passage intimates1 by means of the
 words 'food' and 'condiment1' that     
there is some eater4 ,a doubt then      
arises whether the eater be ,agni or the
 individual soul or the highest ,self2  
for no distinguishing characteristic is 
stated1 and ,agni as well as the        
individual soul and the highest ,self is
 observed to form1 in that ,upanishad1  
the subjects of questions#ada4  ,the    
prvapakshin maintains that the eater is 

,agni1 fire being known from ,scripture 
as well 7cp4 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #f7 
as from ordinary life to be the eater of
 food4 ,or else the individual soul may 
be the eater1 according to the passage1 
',one of them eats the sweet fruit'     
7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ,on the other
 hand1 the eater cannot be ,brahman on  
account of the passage 7which forms the 
continuation of the one quoted from the 
,mu4 ,up471 ',the other looks on without
 eating4'  ,the eater1 we reply1 must be
 the highest ,self 'because there is    
mentioned what is movable and what is   
immovable4' ,for all things movable and 
immovable are here to be taken as       
constituting the food1 while death is   
the condiment4 ,but nothing beside the  
highest ,self can be the consumer of all
 these things in their totality2 the    
highest ,self1 however1 when reabsorbing
 the entire aggregate of effects may be 
said to eat everything4 ,if it is       
objected that here no express mention is
 made of things movable and things      

immovable1 and that hence we have no    
right to use the 7alleged7 mention made 
of them as a reason1 we reply that this 
objection is unfounded2 firstly1 because
 the aggregate of all living beings is  
seen to be meant from the circumstance  
of death being the condiment2 and1      
secondly1 because the ,brahmans and     
,kshattriyas may here1 on account of    
their pre-eminent position1 be viewed as
 instances only 7of all beings74        
,concerning the objection that the      
highest ,self cannot be an eater on     
account of the passage quoted 7'the     
other looks on without eating'71 we     
remark that that passage aims at denying
 the fruition 7on the part of the       
highest ,self7 of the results of works1 
such fruition being mentioned in        
immediate proximity1 but is not meant to
 negative the reabsorption of the world 
of effects 7into ,brahman72 for it is   
well established by all the             
,vednta-texts that ,brahman is the cause
 of the creation1 subsistence1 and      

reabsorption of the world4 ,therefore   
the eater can here be ,brahman only4    
#aj4 ,and on account of the topic under 
discussion4 ,that the highest ,self only
 can be the eater referred to is        
moreover evident from the passage 7,ka4 
,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ah71 7',the knowing ,self 
is not born1 it dies not'71 which shows 
that the highest ,self is the general   
topic4 ,and to adhere to the general    
topic is the proper proceeding4         
,further1 the clause1 ',who then knows  
where he is1' shows that the cognition  
is connected with difficulties2 which   
circumstance again points to the highest
 ,self4  #aa4 ,the 'two entered into the
 cave' 7are the individual soul and the 
highest ,self71 for the two are         
7intelligent7 ,selfs 7and therefore of  
the same nature71 as it is seen 7that   
numerals denote beings of the same      
nature74  ,in the same ,ka_/th_/avall we
 read 7,i1 #c1 #a71 ',there are the two 
drinking the reward of their works in   
the world1 7i4e4 the body17 entered into

 the cave1 dwelling on the highest      
summit4 ,those who know ,brahman call   
them shade and light2 likewise those    
householders who perform the            
,tri_/n_/_/k_/iketa sacrifice4'  ,here  
the doubt arises whether the mind       
7buddhi7 and the individual soul are    
referred to1 or the individual soul and 
the highest ,self4 ,if the mind and the 
individual soul1 then the individual    
soul is here spoken of as different from
 the aggregate of the organs of action1 
7i4e4 the body17 among which the mind   
occupies the first place4 ,and a        
statement on this point is to be        
expected1 as a question concerning it is
 asked in a preceding passage1 viz4 ,i1 
#a1 #bj1 ',there is that doubt when a   
man is dead--some saying he is2 others1 
he is not4 ,this ,i should like to know 
taught by thee2 this is the third of my 
boons4' ,if1 on the other hand1 the     
passage refers to the individual soul   
and the highest ,self1 then it intimates
 that the highest ,self is different    

from the individual soul2 and this also 
requires to be declared here1 on account
 of the question contained in the       
passage 7,i1 #b1 #ad71 ',that which thou
 seest as different from religious duty 
and its contrary1 from effect and cause1
 from the past and the future1 tell me  
that4'  ,the doubt to which the passage 
gives rise having thus been stated1 a   
caviller starts the following objection3
 neither of the stated views can be     
maintained4--,why8--,on account of the  
characteristic mark implied in the      
circumstance that the two are said to   
drink1 i4e4 to enjoy1 the fruit of their
 works in the world4 ,for this can apply
 to the intelligent individual soul     
only1 not to the non-intelligent buddhi4
 ,and as the dual form 'drinking'       
7pibantau7 shows that both are drinking1
 the view of the two being the buddhi   
and the individual soul is not tenable4 
,for the same reason the other opinion  
also1 viz4 of the two being the         
individual soul and the highest ,self1  

cannot be maintained2 for drinking 7i4e4
 the fruition of reward7 cannot be      
predicated of the highest ,self1 on     
account of the mantra 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 
#a1 #a71 ',the other looks on without   
eating4'  ,these objections1 we reply1  
are without any force4 ,just as we see  
that in phrases such as 'the men with   
the umbrella 7lit4 the umbrella-men7 are
 walking1' the attribute of being       
furnished with an umbrella which        
properly speaking belongs to one man    
only is secondarily ascribed to many1 so
 here two agents are spoken of as       
drinking because one of them is really  
drinking4 ,or else we may explain the   
passage by saying that1 while the       
individual soul only drinks1 the ,lord  
also is said to drink because he makes  
the soul drink4 ,on the other hand1 we  
may also assume that the two are the    
buddhi and the individual soul1 the     
instrument being figuratively spoken of 
as the agent--a figure of speech        
exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel

 cooks 7the food74' ,and in a chapter   
whose topic is the soul no two other    
beings can well be represented as       
enjoying rewards4 ,hence there is room  
for the doubt whether the two are the   
buddhi and the individual soul1 or the  
individual soul and the highest ,self4  
,here the prvapakshin maintains that the
 former of the two stated views is the  
right one1 because the two beings are   
qualified as 'entered into the cave4'   
,whether we understand by the cave the  
body or the heart1 in either case the   
buddhi and the individual soul may be   
spoken of as 'entered into the cave4'   
,nor would it be appropriate1 as long as
 another interpretation is possible1 to 
assume that a special place is here     
ascribed to the omnipresent ,brahman4   
,moreover1 the words 'in the world of   
their good deeds' show that the two do  
not pass beyond the sphere of the       
results of their good works4 ,but the   
highest ,self is not in the sphere of   
the results of either good or bad works2

 according to the scriptural passage1   
',it does not grow larger by works nor  
does it grow smaller4' ,further1 the    
words 'shade and light' properly        
designate what is intelligent and what  
is non-intelligent1 because the two are 
opposed to each other like light and    
shade4 ,hence we conclude that the      
buddhi and the individual soul are      
spoken of4  ,to this we make the        
following reply3--,in the passage under 
discussion the individual soul          
7vij_/_/ntman7 and the highest ,self are
 spoken of1 because these two1 being    
both intelligent ,selfs1 are of the same
 nature4 ,for we see that in ordinary   
life also1 whenever a number is         
mentioned1 beings of the same class are 
understood to be meant2 when1 for       
instance1 the order is given1 ',look out
 for a second 7i4e4 a fellow7 for this  
bull1' people look out for a second     
bull1 not for a horse or a man4 ,so here
 also1 where the mention of the fruition
 of rewards enables us to determine that

 the individual soul is meant1 we       
understand at once1 when a second is    
required1 that the highest ,self has to 
be understood2 for the highest ,self is 
intelligent1 and therefore of the same  
nature as the soul4--,but has it not    
been said above that the highest ,self  
cannot be meant here1 on account of the 
text stating that it is placed in the   
cave8--,well1 we reply1 _/s_/ruti as    
well as sm_/ri_/ti speaks of the highest
 ,self as placed in the cave4 ,compare1 
for instance 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ab71   
',the ,ancient who is hidden in the     
cave1 who dwells in the abyss2' ,taitt4 
,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 ',he who knows him hidden
 in the cave1 in the highest ether2'    
and1 ',search for the ,self entered into
 the cave4' ,that it is not contrary to 
reason to assign to the omnipresent     
,brahman a special locality1 for the    
purpose of clearer perception1 we have  
already demonstrated4 ,the attribute of 
existing in the world of its good works1
 which properly belongs to one of the   

two only1 viz4 to the individual soul1  
may be assigned to both1 analogously to 
the case of the men1 one of whom carries
 an umbrella4 ,their being compared to  
light and shade also is unobjectionable1
 because the qualities of belonging and 
not belonging to this transmigratory    
world are opposed to each other1 like   
light and shade2 the quality of         
belonging to it being due to ,nescience1
 and the quality of not belonging to it 
being real4 ,we therefore understand by 
the two 'entered into the cave1' the    
individual soul and the highest         
,self4--,another reason for this        
interpretation follows4  #ab4 ,and on   
account of the distinctive qualities    
7mentioned74  ,moreover1 the distinctive
 qualities mentioned in the text agree  
only with the individual ,self and the  
highest ,self4 ,for in a subsequent     
passage 7,i1 #c1 #c71 ',know the ,self  
to be the charioteer1 the body to be the
 chariot1' which contains the simile of 
the chariot1 the individual soul is     

represented as a charioteer driving on  
through transmigratory existence and    
final release1 while the passage 7#i71  
',he reaches the end of his journey1 and
 that is the highest place of           
,vish_/n_/u1' represents the highest    
,self as the goal of the driver's       
course4 ,and in a preceding passage     
also1 7,i1 #b1 #ab1 ',the wise1 who by  
means of meditation on his ,self1       
recognises the ,ancient who is difficult
 to be seen1 who has entered into the   
dark1 who is hidden in the cave1 who    
dwells in the abyss1 as ,god1 he indeed 
leaves joy and sorrow far behind1'7 the 
same two beings are distinguished as    
thinker and as object of thought4 ,the  
highest ,self is1 moreover1 the general 
topic4 ,and further1 the clause1 ',those
 who know ,brahman call them1' c41 which
 brings forward a special class of      
speakers1 is in its place only if the   
highest ,self is accepted 7as one of the
 two beings spoken of74 ,it is therefore
 evident that the passage under         

discussion refers to the individual soul
 and the highest ,self4  ,the same      
reasoning applies to the passage 7,mu4  
,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a71 ',two birds1       
inseparable friends1' c4 ,there also the
 ,self is the general topic1 and hence  
no two ordinary birds can be meant2 we  
therefore conclude from the             
characteristic mark of eating1 mentioned
 in the passage1 ',one of them eats the 
sweet fruit1' that the individual soul  
is meant1 and from the characteristic   
marks of abstinence from eating and of  
intelligence1 implied in the words1     
',the other looks on without eating1'   
that the highest ,self is meant4 ,in a  
subsequent mantra again the two are     
distinguished as the seer and the object
 of sight4 ',merged into the same tree  
7as it were into water7 man grieves at  
his own impotence 7an_/s_/71 bewildered2
 but when he sees the other ,lord       
7_/s_/a47 contented and knows his glory1
 then his grief passes away4'  ,another 
7commentator7 gives a different         

interpretation of the mantra1 ',two     
birds inseparable1' c4 ,to that mantra1 
he says1 the final decision of the      
present head of discussion does not     
apply1 because it is differently        
interpreted in the ,paingi-rahasya      
,brhma_/n_/a4 ,according to the latter  
the being which eats the sweet fruit is 
the sattva2 the other being which looks 
on without eating1 the individual soul  
7j_/_/a72 so that the two are the sattva
 and the individual soul                
7kshetraj_/_/a74 ,the objection that the
 word sattva might denote the individual
 soul1 and the word kshetraj_/_/a1 the  
highest ,self1 is to be met by the      
remark that1 in the first place1 the    
words sattva and kshetraj_/_/a have the 
settled meaning of internal organ and   
individual soul1 and are in the second  
place1 expressly so interpreted there1  
7viz4 in the ,paingi-rahasya17 ',the    
sattva is that by means of which man    
sees dreams2 the embodied one1 the seer1
 is the kshetraj_/_/a2 the two are      

therefore the internal organ and the    
individual soul4' ,nor does the mantra  
under discussion fall under the         
prvapaksha propounded above4 ,for it    
does not aim at setting forth the       
embodied individual soul1 in so far as  
it is characterised by the attributes   
connected with the transmigratory state1
 such as acting and enjoying2 but in so 
far rather as it transcends all         
attributes connected with the sa_/m_/sra
 and is of the nature of ,brahman1 i4e4 
is pure intelligence2 as is evident from
 the clause1 ',the other looks on       
without eating4' ,that agrees1 moreover1
 with _/s_/ruti and sm_/ri_/ti passages1
 such as1 ',that art thou1' and ',know  
me also to be the individual soul'      
7,bha4 ,gt ,,xiii1 #b74 ,only on such an
 explanation of the passage as the      
preceding one there is room for the     
declaration made in the concluding      
passage of the section1 ',these two are 
the sattva and the kshetraj_/_/a2 to him
 indeed who knows this no impurity      

attaches#adb4'--;,but how can1 on the   
above interpretation1 the               
non-intelligent sattva 7i4e4 the        
internal organ7 be spoken of as an      
enjoyer1 as is actually done in the     
clause1 ',one of them eats the sweet    
fruit8'--,the whole passage1 we reply1  
does not aim at setting forth the fact  
that the sattva is an enjoyer1 but      
rather the fact that the intelligent    
individual soul is not an enjoyer1 but  
is of the nature of ,brahman4 ,to that  
end#adc the passage under discussion    
metaphorically ascribes the attribute of
 being an enjoyer to the internal organ1
 in so far as it is modified by         
pleasure1 pain1 and the like4 ,for all  
acting and enjoying is at the bottom    
based on the non-discrimination 7by the 
soul7 of the respective nature of       
internal organ and soul3 while in       
reality neither the internal organ nor  
the soul either act or enjoy2 not the   
former1 because it is non-intelligent2  
not the latter1 because it is not       

capable of any modification4 ,and the   
internal organ can be considered as     
acting and enjoying1 all the less as it 
is a mere presentment of ,nescience4 ,in
 agreement with what we have here       
maintained1 ,scripture 7',for where     
there is as it were duality there one   
sees the other1' c42 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4     
,,iv1 #e1 #ae7 declares that the        
practical assumption of agents1 and so  
on--comparable to the assumption of the 
existence of elephants1 and the like1   
seen in a dream--holds good in the      
sphere of ,nescience only2 while the    
passage1 ',but when the ,self only is   
all this1 how should he see another8'   
declares that all that practically      
postulated existence vanishes for him   
who has arrived at discriminative       
knowledge4  #ac4 ,the person within 7the
 eye7 7is ,brahman7 on account of the   
agreement 7of the attributes of that    
person with the nature of ,brahman74    
,scripture says1 ',he spoke3 ,the person
 that is seen in the eye that is the    

,self4 ,this is the immortal1 the       
fearless1 this is ,brahman4 ,even though
 they drop melted butter or water on it 
7the eye7 it runs away on both sides1'  
c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 #a74  ,the     
doubt here arises whether this passage  
refers to the reflected ,self which     
resides in the eye1 or to the individual
 ,self1 or to the ,self of some deity   
which presides over the sense of sight1 
or to the ,lord4  ,with reference to    
this doubt the prvapakshin argues as    
follows3 ,what is meant 7by the person  
in the eye7 is the reflected ,self1 i4e4
 the image of a person 7reflected in the
 eye of another73 for of that it is well
 known that it is seen1 and the clause1 
',the person that is seen in the eye1'  
refers to it as something well known4   
,or else we may appropriately take the  
passage as referring to the individual  
,self4 ,for the individual ,self        
7cognitional ,self1 vij_/_/ntman7 which 
perceives the colours by means of the   
eye is1 on that account1 in proximity to

 the eye2 and1 moreover1 the word       
',self' 7which occurs in the passage7   
favours this interpretation4 ,or else   
the passage is to be understood as      
referring to the soul animating the sun 
which assists the sense of sight2       
compare the passage 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1 
#e1 #b71 ',he 7the person in the sun7   
rests with his rays in him 7the person  
in the right eye74' ,moreover1 qualities
 such as immortality and the like 7which
 are ascribed to the subject of the     
scriptural passage7 may somehow belong  
to individual deities4 ,the ,lord1 on   
the other hand#add1 cannot be meant1    
because a particular locality is spoken 
of4  ,against this we remark that the   
highest ,lord only can be meant here by 
the person within the eye4--,why8--',on 
account of the agreement4' ,for the     
qualities mentioned in the passage      
accord with the nature of the highest   
,lord4 ,the quality of being the ,self1 
in the first place1 belongs to the      
highest ,lord in its primary            

7non-figurative or non-derived7 sense1  
as we know from such texts as ',that is 
the ,self1' ',that art thou4'           
,immortality and fearlessness again are 
often ascribed to him in ,scripture4    
,the location in the eye also is in     
consonance with the nature of the       
highest ,lord4 ,for just as the highest 
,lord whom ,scripture declares to be    
free from all evil is not stained by any
 imperfections1 so the station of the   
eye also is declared to be free from all
 stain1 as we see from the passage1     
',even though they drop melted butter or
 water on it it runs away on both       
sides4' ,the statement1 moreover1 that  
he possesses the qualities of           
sa_/m_/yadvma1 c4 can be reconciled with
 the highest ,lord only 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1
 #ae1 #b1 ',they call him               
,sa_/m_/yadvma1 for all blessings 7vma7 
go towards him 7sa_/m_/yanti74 ,he is   
also vman1 for he leads 7nayati7 all    
blessings 7vma74 ,he is also ,bhman1 for
 he shines 7bhti7 in all worlds'74      

,therefore1 on account of agreement1 the
 person within the eye is the highest   
,lord4  #ad4 ,and on account of the     
statement of place1 and so on4  ,but how
 does the confined locality of the eye  
agree with ,brahman which is omnipresent
 like the ether8--,to this question we  
reply that there would indeed be a want 
of agreement if that one locality only  
were assigned to the ,lord4 ,for other  
localities also1 viz4 the earth and so  
on1 are attributed to him in the        
passage1 ',he who dwells in the earth1' 
c4 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c74 ,and 
among those the eye also is mentioned1  
viz4 in the clause1 ',he who dwells in  
the eye1' c4 ,the phrase 'and so on1'   
which forms part of the ,stra1 intimates
 that not only locality is assigned to  
,brahman1 although not 7really7         
appropriate to it1 but that also such   
things as name and form1 although not   
appropriate to ,brahman which is devoid 
of name and form1 are yet seen to be    
attributed to it4 ,that1 in such        

passages as ',his name is ut1 he with   
the golden beard' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #f1 #g1
 #f71 ,brahman although devoid of       
qualities is spoken of1 for the purposes
 of devotion1 as possessing qualities   
depending on name and form1 we have     
already shown4 ,and we have1 moreover1  
shown that to attribute to ,brahman a   
definite locality1 in spite of his      
omnipresence1 subserves the purposes of 
contemplation1 and is therefore not     
contrary to reason#ade2 no more than to 
contemplate ,vish_/n_/u in the sacred   
_/s_/lagrm4  #ae4 ,and on account of the
 passage referring to that which is     
distinguished by pleasure 7i4e4         
,brahman74  ,there is1 moreover1 really 
no room for dispute whether ,brahman be 
meant in the passage under discussion or
 not1 because the fact of ,brahman being
 meant is established 'by the reference 
to that which is distinguished by       
pleasure4' ,for the same ,brahman which 
is spoken of as characterised by        
pleasure in the beginning of the        

chapter#adf1 viz4 in the clauses1       
',breath is ,brahman1 ,ka is ,brahman1  
,kha is ,brahman1' that same ,brahman we
 must suppose to be referred to in the  
present passage also1 it being proper to
 adhere to the subject-matter under     
discussion2 the clause1 ',the teacher   
will tell you the way#adg1' merely      
announcing that the way will be         
proclaimed by the teacher2 not that a   
new subject will be started4--,how then1
 it may be asked1 is it known that      
,brahman1 as distinguished by pleasure1 
is spoken of in the beginning of the    
passage8--,we reply3 ,on hearing the    
speech of the fires1 viz4 ',breath is   
,brahman1 ,ka is ,brahman1 ,kha is      
,brahman1' ,upako_/s_/ala says1 ',i     
understand that breath is ,brahman1 but 
,i do not understand that ,ka or ,kha is
 ,brahman4' ,thereupon the fires reply1 
',what is ,ka is ,kha1 what is ,kha is  
,ka4' ,now the word ,kha denotes in     
ordinary language the elemental ether4  
,if therefore the word ,ka which means  

pleasure were not applied to qualify the
 sense of ',kha1' we should conclude    
that the name ,brahman is here          
symbolically#adh given to the mere      
elemental ether as it is 7in other      
places7 given to mere names and the     
like4 ,thus also with regard to the word
 ,ka1 which1 in ordinary language1      
denotes the imperfect pleasure springing
 from the contact of the sense-organs   
with their objects4 ,if the word ,kha   
were not applied to qualify the sense of
 ,ka we should conclude that ordinary   
pleasure is here called ,brahman4 ,but  
as the two words ,ka and ,kha 7occur    
together and therefore7 qualify each    
other1 they intimate ,brahman whose     
,self is pleasure4 ,if#adi in the       
passage referred to 7viz4 ',breath is   
,brahman1 ,ka is ,brahman1 ,kha is      
,brahman'7 the second ,brahman 7i4e4 the
 word ,brahman in the clause ',ka is    
,brahman'7 were not added1 and if the   
sentence would run ',ka1 ,kha is        
,brahman1' the word ,ka would be        

employed as a mere qualifying word1 and 
thus pleasure as being a mere quality   
would not be represented as a subject of
 meditation4 ,to prevent this1 both     
words--,ka as well as ,kha--are joined  
with the word ,brahman 7',ka 7is7       
,brahman1 ,kha 7is7 ,brahman'74 ,for the
 passage wishes to intimate that        
pleasure also1 although a quality1      
should be meditated upon as something in
 which qualities inhere4 ,it thus       
appears that at the beginning of the    
chapter ,brahman1 as characterised by   
pleasure1 is spoken of4 ,after that the 
,grhapatya and the other sacred fires   
proclaim in turns their own glory1 and  
finally conclude with the words1 ',this 
is our knowledge1 ,o friend1 and the    
knowledge of the ,self2' wherein they   
point back to the ,brahman spoken of    
before4 ,the words1 ',the teacher will  
tell you the way' 7which form the last  
clause of the concluding passage71      
merely promise an explanation of the    
way1 and thus preclude the idea of      

another topic being started4 ,the       
teacher thereupon saying1 ',as water    
does not cling to a lotus leaf1 so no   
evil deed clings to one who knows it'   
7which words intervene between the      
concluding speech of the fires and the  
information given by the teacher about  
the person within the eye7 declares that
 no evil attacks him who knows the      
person within the eye1 and thereby shows
 the latter to be ,brahman4 ,it thus    
appears that the teacher's intention is 
to speak about that ,brahman which had  
formed the topic of the instruction of  
the fires2 to represent it at first as  
located in the eye and possessing the   
qualities of ,sa_/m_/yadvma and the     
like1 and to point out afterwards that  
he who thus knows passes on to light and
 so on4 ,he therefore begins by saying1 
',that person that is seen in the eye   
that is the ,self4'  #af4 ,and on       
account of the statement of the way of  
him who has heard the ,upanishads4  ,the
 person placed in the eye is the highest

 lord for the following reason also4    
,from _/s_/ruti as well as sm_/ri_/ti we
 are acquainted with the way of him who 
has heard the ,upanishads or the secret 
knowledge1 i4e4 who knows ,brahman4     
,that way1 called the path of the gods1 
is described 7,pra4 ,up4 ,i1 #aj71      
',those who have sought the ,self by    
penance1 abstinence1 faith1 and         
knowledge gain by the northern path the 
sun4 ,this is the home of the spirits1  
the immortal1 free from fear1 the       
highest4 ,from thence they do not       
return2' and also 7,bha4 ,gt ,,viii1    
#bd71 ',fire1 light1 the bright         
fortnight1 the six months of the        
northern progress of the sun1 on that   
way those who know ,brahman go1 when    
they have died1 to ,brahman4' ,now that 
very same way is seen to be stated1 in  
our text1 for him who knows the person  
within the eye4 ,for we read 7,ch4 ,up4 
,,iv1 #ae1 #e71 ',now whether people    
perform obsequies for him or no he goes 
to light2' and later on1 ',from the sun 

7he goes7 to the moon1 from the moon to 
lightning4 ,there is a person not human1
 he leads them to ,brahman4 ,this is the
 path of the gods1 the path that leads  
to ,brahman4 ,those who proceed on that 
path do not return to the life of man4' 
,from this description of the way which 
is known to be the way of him who knows 
,brahman we ascertain that the person   
within the eye is ,brahman4  #ag4 7,the 
person within the eye is the highest71  
not any other ,self2 on account of the  
non-permanency 7of the other ,selfs7 and
 on account of the impossibility 7of the
 qualities of the person in the eye     
being ascribed to the other ,selfs74    
,to the assertion made in the prvapaksha
 that the person in the eye is either   
the reflected ,self or the cognitional  
,self 7the individual soul7 or the ,self
 of some deity the following answer is  
given4--,no other ,self such as1 for    
instance1 the reflected ,self can be    
assumed here1 on account of             
non-permanency4--,the reflected ,self1  

in the first place1 does not permanently
 abide in the eye4 ,for when some person
 approaches the eye the reflection of   
that person is seen in the eye1 but when
 the person moves away the reflection is
 seen no longer4 ,the passage ',that    
person within the eye' must1 moreover1  
be held1 on the ground of proximity1 to 
intimate that the person seen in a man's
 own eye is the object of 7that man's7  
devout meditation 7and not the reflected
 image of his own person which he may   
see in the eye of another man74 ,let1   
then1 another man approach the devout   
man1 and let the latter meditate on the 
image reflected in his own eye1 but seen
 by the other man only4 ,no1 we reply1  
for we have no right to make the        
7complicated7 assumption that the devout
 man is1 at the time of devotion1 to    
bring close to his eye another man in   
order to produce a reflected image in   
his own eye4 ,scripture1 moreover1 7viz4
 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #i1 #a1 ',it 7the    
reflected ,self7 perishes as soon as the

 body perishes1'7 declares the          
non-permanency of the reflected         
,self4--,and1 further1 'on account of   
impossibility' 7the person in the eye   
cannot be the reflected ,self74 ,for    
immortality and the other qualities     
ascribed to the person in the eye are   
not to be perceived in the reflected    
,self4--,of the cognitional ,self1 in   
the second place1 which is in general   
connexion with the whole body and all   
the senses1 it can likewise not be said 
that it has its permanent station in the
 eye only4 ,that1 on the other hand1    
,brahman although all-pervading may1 for
 the purpose of contemplation1 be spoken
 of as connected with particular places 
such as the heart and the like1 we have 
seen already4 ,the cognitional ,self    
shares 7with the reflected ,self7 the   
impossibility of having the qualities of
 immortality and so on attributed to it4
 ,although the cognitional ,self is in  
reality not different from the highest  
,self1 still there are fictitiously     

ascribed to it 7adhyropita7 the effects 
of nescience1 desire and works1 viz1    
mortality and fear2 so that neither     
immortality nor fearlessness belongs to 
it4 ,the qualities of being the         
sa_/m_/yadvma1 c4 also cannot properly  
be ascribed to the cognitional ,self1   
which is not distinguished by lordly    
power 7ai_/s_/varya74--,in the third    
place1 although the ,self of a deity    
7viz4 the sun7 has its station in the   
eye--according to the scriptural        
passage1 ',he rests with his rays in    
him'--still ,selfhood cannot be ascribed
 to the sun1 on account of his          
externality 7pargrpatva74 ,immortality1 
c4 also cannot be predicated of him1 as 
,scripture speaks of his origin and his 
dissolution4 ,for the 7so-called7       
deathlessness of the gods only means    
their 7comparatively7 long existence4   
,and their lordly power also is based on
 the highest ,lord and does not         
naturally belong to them2 as the mantra 
declares1 ',from terror of it 7,brahman7

 the wind blows1 from terror the sun    
rises2 from terror of it ,agni and      
,indra1 yea1 ,death runs as the         
fifth4'--,hence the person in the eye   
must be viewed as the highest ,lord     
only4 ,in the case of this explanation  
being adopted the mention 7of the person
 in the eye7 as something well known and
 established1 which is contained in the 
words 'is seen' 7in the phrase 'the     
person that is seen in the eye'71 has to
 be taken as referring to 7the mental   
perception founded on7 the _/s_/stra    
which belongs to those who know2 and the
 glorification 7of devout meditation7   
has to be understood as its purpose4    
#ah4 ,the internal ruler over the devas 
and so on 7is ,brahman71 because the    
attributes of that 7,brahman7 are       
designated4  ,in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1  
#g1 #a ff4 we read1 ',he who within     
rules this world and the other world and
 all beings1' and later on1 ',he who    
dwells in the earth and within the      
earth1 whom the earth does not know1    

whose body the earth is1 who rules the  
earth within1 he is thy ,self1 the ruler
 within1 the immortal1' c4 ,the entire  
chapter 7to sum up its contents7 speaks 
of a being1 called the antarymin 7the   
internal ruler71 who1 dwelling within1  
rules with reference to the gods1 the   
world1 the ,veda1 the sacrifice1 the    
beings1 the ,self4--,here now1 owing to 
the unusualness of the term 7antarymin71
 there arises a doubt whether it denotes
 the ,self of some deity which presides 
over the gods and so on1 or some ,yogin 
who has acquired extraordinary powers1  
such as1 for instance1 the capability of
 making his body subtle1 or the highest 
,self1 or some other being4 ,what       
alternative then does recommend itself8 
,as the term is an unknown one1 the     
prvapakshin says1 we must assume that   
the being denoted by it is also an      
unknown one1 different from all those   
mentioned above4--,or else it may be    
said that1 on the one hand1 we have no  
right to assume something of an         

altogether indefinite character1 and    
that1 on the other hand1 the term       
antarymin--which is derived from        
antaryamana 7ruling within7--cannot be  
called altogether unknown1 that         
therefore antarymin may be assumed to   
denote some god presiding over the      
earth1 and so on4 ,similarly1 we read   
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #af71 ',he   
whose dwelling is the earth1 whose sight
 is fire1 whose mind is light1' c4 ,a   
god of that kind is capable of ruling   
the earth1 and so on1 dwelling within   
them1 because he is endowed with the    
organs of action2 rulership is therefore
 rightly ascribed to him4--,or else the 
rulership spoken of may belong to some  
,yogin whom his extraordinary powers    
enable to enter within all things4--,the
 highest ,self1 on the other hand1      
cannot be meant1 as it does not possess 
the organs of action 7which are required
 for ruling74  ,to this we make the     
following reply4--,the internal ruler1  
of whom ,scripture speaks with reference

 to the gods1 must be the highest ,self1
 cannot be anything else4--,why         
so8--,because its qualities are         
designated in the passage under         
discussion4 ,the universal rulership    
implied in the statement that1 dwelling 
within1 it rules the entire aggregate of
 created beings1 inclusive of the gods1 
and so on1 is an appropriate attribute  
of the highest ,self1 since omnipotence 
depends on 7the omnipotent ruler7 being 
the cause of all created things4--,the  
qualities of ,selfhood and immortality  
also1 which are mentioned in the        
passage1 ',he is thy ,self1 the ruler   
within1 the immortal1' belong in their  
primary sense to the highest            
,self4--,further1 the passage1 ',he whom
 the earth does not know1' which        
declares that the internal ruler is not 
known by the earth-deity1 shows him to  
be different from that deity2 for the   
deity of the earth knows itself to be   
the earth4--,the attributes 'unseen1'   
'unheard1' also point to the highest    

,self1 which is devoid of shape and     
other sensible qualities4--,the         
objection that the highest ,self is     
destitute of the organs of action1 and  
hence cannot be a ruler1 is without     
force1 because organs of action may be  
ascribed to him owing to the organs of  
action of those whom he rules4--,if it  
should be objected that if we once admit
 an internal ruler in addition to the   
individual soul we are driven to assume 
again another and another ruler ad      
infinitum2 we reply that this is not the
 case1 as actually there is no other    
ruler 7but the highest ,self#aej74 ,the 
objection would be valid only in the    
case of a difference of rulers actually 
existing4--,for all these reasons1 the  
internal ruler is no other but the      
highest ,self4  #ai4 ,and 7the internal 
ruler is7 not that which the ,sm_/ri_/ti
 assumes1 7viz4 the pradhna17 on account
 of the statement of qualities not      
belonging to it4  ,good so far1 a       
,snkhya opponent resumes4 ,the          

attributes1 however1 of not being seen1 
c41 belong also to the pradhna assumed  
by the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1 which is     
acknowledged to be devoid of form and   
other sensible qualities4 ,for their    
,sm_/ri_/ti says1 ',undiscoverable1     
unknowable1 as if wholly in sleep'      
7,manu ,i1 #e74 ,to this pradhna also   
the attribute of rulership belongs1 as  
it is the cause of all effects4         
,therefore the internal ruler may be    
understood to denote the pradhna4 ,the  
pradhna has1 indeed1 been set aside     
already by the ,stra ,i1 #a1 #e1 but we 
bring it forward again1 because we find 
that attributes belonging to it1 such as
 not being seen and the like1 are       
mentioned in ,scripture4  ,to this      
argumentation the ,strakra replies that 
the word 'internal ruler' cannot denote 
the pradhna1 because qualities not      
belonging to the latter are stated4     
,for1 although the pradhna may be spoken
 of as not being seen1 c1 it cannot be  
spoken of as seeing1 since the ,snkhyas 

admit it to be non-intelligent4 ,but the
 scriptural passage which forms the     
complement to the passage about the     
internal ruler 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1   
#g1 #bc7 says expressly1 ',unseen but   
seeing1 unheard but hearing1 unperceived
 but perceiving1 unknown but            
knowing4'--,and ,selfhood also cannot   
belong to the pradhna4  ,well1 then1 if 
the term 'internal ruler' cannot be     
admitted to denote the pradhna1 because 
the latter is neither a ,self nor       
seeing2 let us suppose it to denote the 
embodied 7individual7 soul1 which is    
intelligent1 and therefore hears1 sees1 
perceives1 knows2 which is internal     
7pratya_/k_/71 and therefore of the     
nature of ,self2 and which is immortal1 
because it is able to enjoy the fruits  
of its good and evil actions4 ,it is1   
moreover1 a settled matter that the     
attributes of not being seen1 c41 belong
 to the embodied soul1 because the agent
 of an action1 such as seeing1 cannot at
 the same time be the object of the     

action4 ,this is declared in scriptural 
passages also1 as1 for instance         
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d1 #b71 ',thou  
couldst not see the seer of sight4' ,the
 individual soul is1 moreover1 capable  
of inwardly ruling the complex of the   
organs of action1 as it is the enjoyer4 
,therefore the internal ruler is the    
embodied soul4--,to this reasoning the  
following ,stra replies4  #bj4 ,and the 
embodied soul 7also cannot be understood
 by the internal ruler71 for both also  
7i4e4 both recensions of the ,b_/ri_/had
 ra_/n_/yaka7 speak of it as different  
7from the internal ruler74  ,the word   
'not' 7in the ,stra7 has to be supplied 
from the preceding ,stra4 ,although the 
attributes of seeing1 c41 belong to the 
individual soul1 still as the soul is   
limited by its adjuncts1 as the ether is
 by a jar1 it is not capable of dwelling
 completely within the earth and the    
other beings mentioned1 and to rule     
them4 ,moreover1 the followers of both  
_/s_/khs1 i4e4 the ,k_/n_/vas as well as

 the ,mdhyandinas1 speak in their texts 
of the individual soul as different from
 the internal ruler1 viz4 as            
constituting1 like the earth1 and so on1
 his abode and the object of his rule4  
,the ,k_/n_/vas read 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iii1 #g1 #bb71 ',he who dwells in     
knowledge2' the ,mdhyandinas1 ',he who  
dwells in the ,self4' ,if the latter    
reading is adopted1 the word ',self'    
denotes the individual soul2 if the     
former1 the individual soul is denoted  
by the word 'knowledge2' for the        
individual soul consists of knowledge4  
,it is therefore a settled matter that  
some being different from the individual
 soul1 viz4 the lord1 is denoted by the 
term 'internal ruler4'--,but how1 it may
 be asked1 is it possible that there    
should be within one body two seers1    
viz4 the lord who rules internally and  
the individual soul different from      
him8--,why--we ask in return--should    
that be impossible8--,because1 the      
opponent replies1 it is contrary to     

scriptural passages1 such as1 ',there is
 no other seer but he1' c41 which deny  
that there is any seeing1 hearing1      
perceiving1 knowing ,self1 but the      
internal ruler under discussion4--,may1 
we rejoin1 that passage not have the    
purpose of denying the existence of     
another ruler8--,no1 the opponent       
replies1 for there is no occasion for   
another ruler 7and therefore no occasion
 for denying his existence71 and the    
text does not contain any specification1
 7but merely denies the existence of any
 other seer in general47  ,we therefore 
advance the following final refutation  
of the opponent's objection4--,the      
declaration of the difference of the    
embodied ,self and the internal ruler   
has its reason in the limiting adjunct1 
consisting of the organs of action1     
presented by ,nescience1 and is not     
absolutely true4 ,for the ,self within  
is one only2 two internal ,selfs are not
 possible4 ,but owing to its limiting   
adjunct the one ,self is practically    

treated as if it were two2 just as we   
make a distinction between the ether of 
the jar and the universal ether4 ,hence 
there is room for those scriptural      
passages which set forth the distinction
 of knower and object of knowledge1 for 
perception and the other means of proof1
 for the intuitive knowledge of the     
apparent world1 and for that part of    
,scripture which contains injunctions   
and prohibitions4 ,in accordance with   
this1 the scriptural passage1 ',where   
there is duality1 as it were1 there one 
sees another1' declares that the whole  
practical world exists only in the      
sphere of ,nescience2 while the         
subsequent passage1 ',but when the ,self
 only is all this1 how should he see    
another8' declares that the practical   
world vanishes in the sphere of true    
knowledge4  #ba4 ,that which possesses  
the attributes of invisibility and so on
 7is ,brahman71 on account of the       
declaration of attributes4  ,scripture  
says1 ',the higher knowledge is this by 

which the ,indestructible is            
apprehended4 ,that which cannot be seen 
nor seized1 which is without origin and 
qualities1 without eyes and ears1       
without hands and feet1 the eternal1    
all-pervading1 omnipresent1             
infinitesimal1 that which is            
imperishable1 that it is which the wise 
regard as the source of all beings'     
7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e2 #f74--;,here the 
doubt arises whether the source of all  
beings which is spoken of as            
characterised by invisibility1 c4 be the
 prdhana or the embodied soul1 or the   
highest ,lord4  ,we must1 the           
prvapakshin says1 understand by the     
source of all beings the non-intelligent
 prdhana because 7in the passage        
immediately subsequent to the one       
quoted7 only non-intelligent beings are 
mentioned as parallel instances4 ',as   
the spider sends forth and draws in its 
thread1 as plants grow on the earth1 as 
from the living man hairs spring forth  
on the head and the body1 thus          

everything arises here from the         
,indestructible4'--,but1 it may be      
objected1 men and spiders which are here
 quoted as parallel instances are of    
intelligent nature4--,no1 the           
prvapakshin replies2 for the intelligent
 being as such is not the source of the 
threads and the hair1 but everybody     
knows that the non-intelligent body of  
the spider ruled by intelligence is the 
source of the threads2 and so in the    
case of man also4--,while1 moreover1 in 
the case of the preceding ,stra1 the    
pradhna hypothesis could not be         
accepted1 because1 although some        
qualities mentioned1 such as            
invisibility and so on1 agreed with it1 
others such as being the seer and the   
like did not2 we have here to do only   
with attributes such as invisibility    
which agree with the pradhna1 no        
attribute of a contrary nature being    
mentioned4--,but the qualities mentioned
 in the complementary passage 7,mu4 ,up4
 ,i1 #a1 #i71 ',he who knows all and    

perceives all1' do not agree with the   
non-intelligent pradhna2 how1 then1 can 
the source of all beings be interpreted 
to mean the pradhna8--,to this the      
prvapakshin replies3 ,the passage1 ',the
 higher knowledge is that by which the  
,indestructible is apprehended1 that    
which cannot be seen1' c41 points1 by   
means of the term 'the ,indestructible1'
 to the source of all beings            
characterised by invisibility and       
similar attributes4 ,this same          
',indestructible' is again mentioned    
later on in the passage1 ',it is higher 
than the high ,imperishable4' ,now that 
which in this latter passage is spoken  
of as higher than the ,imperishable may 
possess the qualities of knowing and    
perceiving everything1 while the pradhna
 denoted by the term 'the ,imperishable'
 is the source of all beings4--,if1     
however1 the word 'source' 7yoni7 be    
taken in the sense of operative cause1  
we may by 'the source of the beings'    
understand the embodied ,self also1     

which1 by means of merit and demerit1 is
 the cause of the origin of the complex 
of things4  ,to this we make the        
following reply4--,that which here is   
spoken of as the source of all beings1  
distinguished by such qualities as      
invisibility and so on1 can be the      
highest ,lord only1 nothing             
else4--,whereupon is this conclusion    
founded8--,on the statement of          
attributes4 ,for the clause1 ',he who is
 all-knowing1 all-perceiving1' clearly  
states an attribute belonging to the    
highest ,lord only1 since the attributes
 of knowing all and perceiving all      
cannot be predicated either of the      
non-intelligent pradhna or the embodied 
soul whose power of sight is narrowed by
 its limiting conditions4 ,to the       
objection that the qualities of knowing 
and perceiving all are1 in the passage  
under discussion1 attributed to that    
which is higher than the source of all  
beings--which latter is denoted by the  
term 'the ,imperishable'--not to the    

source itself1 we reply that this       
explanation is inadmissible because the 
source of all beings1 which--in the     
clause1 ',from the ,indestructible      
everything here arises'--is designated  
as the material cause of all created    
beings1 is later on spoken of as        
all-knowing1 and again as the cause of  
all created beings1 viz4 in the passage 
7,i1 #a1 #i71 ',from him who knows all  
and perceives all1 whose brooding       
consists of knowledge1 from him is born 
that ,brahman1 name1 form1 and food4'   
,as therefore the ,indestructible which 
forms the general topic of discussion   
is1 owing to the identity of            
designation1 recognised 7as being       
referred to in the later passage also71 
we understand that it is the same       
,indestructible to which the attributes 
of knowing and perceiving all are       
ascribed4--,we further maintain that    
also the passage1 ',higher than the high
 ,imperishable1' does not refer to any  
being different from the imperishable   

source of all beings which is the       
general topic of discussion4 ,we        
conclude this from the circumstance that
 the passage1 ',he truly told that      
knowledge of ,brahman through which he  
knows the imperishable true person1'    
7,i1 #b1 #ac2 which passage leads on to 
the passage about that which is higher  
than the ,imperishable17 merely declares
 that the imperishable source of all    
beings1 distinguished by invisibility   
and the like--which formed the subject  
of the preceding chapter--will be       
discussed4 ,the reason why that         
imperishable source is called higher    
than the high ,imperishable1 we shall   
explain under the next                  
,stra4--,moreover1 two kinds of         
knowledge are enjoined there 7in the    
,upanishad71 a lower and a higher one4  
,of the lower one it is said that it    
comprises the _/,ri_/g-veda and so on1  
and then the text continues1 ',the      
higher knowledge is that by which the   
,indestructible is apprehended4' ,here  

the ,indestructible is declared to be   
the subject of the higher knowledge4 ,if
 we now were to assume that the         
,indestructible distinguished by        
invisibility and like qualities is      
something different from the highest    
,lord1 the knowledge referring to it    
would not be the higher one4 ,for the   
distinction of lower and higher         
knowledge is made on account of the     
diversity of their results1 the former  
leading to mere worldly exaltation1 the 
latter to absolute bliss2 and nobody    
would assume absolute bliss to result   
from the knowledge of the               
pradhna4--,moreover1 as on the view we  
are controverting the highest ,self     
would be assumed to be something higher 
than the imperishable source of all     
beings1 three kinds of knowledge would  
have to be acknowledged1 while the text 
expressly speaks of two kinds           
only4--,further1 the reference to the   
knowledge of everything being implied in
 the knowledge of one thing--which is   

contained in the passage 7,i1 #a1 #c71  
',sir1 what is that through which if it 
is known everything else becomes        
known8'--is possible only if the        
allusion is to ,brahman the ,self of    
all1 and not either to the pradhna which
 comprises only what is non-intelligent 
or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the 
objects of enjoyment4--,the text1       
moreover1 by introducing the knowledge  
of ,brahman as the chief subject--which 
it does in the passage 7,i1 #a1 #a71    
',he told the knowledge of ,brahman1 the
 foundation of all knowledge1 to his    
eldest son ,atharvan'--and by afterwards
 declaring that out of the two kinds of 
knowledge1 viz4 the lower one and the   
higher one1 the higher one leads to the 
comprehension of the ,imperishable1     
shows that the knowledge of the         
,imperishable is the knowledge of       
,brahman4 ,on the other hand1 the term  
'knowledge of ,brahman' would become    
meaningless if that ,imperishable which 
is to be comprehended by means of it    

were not ,brahman4 ,the lower knowledge 
of works which comprises the            
_/,ri_/g-veda1 and so on1 is mentioned  
preliminarily to the knowledge of       
,brahman for the mere purpose of        
glorifying the latter2 as appears from  
the passages in which it 7the lower     
knowledge7 is spoken of slightingly1    
such as 7,i1 #b1 #g71 ',but frail indeed
 are those boats1 the sacrifices1 the   
eighteen in which this lower ceremonial 
has been told4 ,fools who praise this as
 the highest good are subject again and 
again to old age and death4' ,after     
these slighting remarks the text        
declares that he who turns away from the
 lower knowledge is prepared for the    
highest one 7,i1 #b1 #ab71 ',let a      
,brhama_/n_/a after he has examined all 
these worlds which are gained by works  
acquire freedom from all desires4       
,nothing that is eternal 7not made7 can 
be gained by what is not eternal 7made74
 ,let him in order to understand this   
take fuel in his hand and approach a    

guru who is learned and dwells entirely 
in ,brahman4'--,the remark that1 because
 the earth and other non-intelligent    
things are adduced as parallel          
instances1 that also which is compared  
to them1 viz4 the source of all beings  
must be non-intelligent1 is without     
foundation1 since it is not necessary   
that two things of which one is compared
 to the other should be of absolutely   
the same nature4 ,the things1 moreover1 
to which the source of all beings is    
compared1 viz4 the earth and the like1  
are material1 while nobody would assume 
the source of all beings to be          
material4--,for all these reasons the   
source of all beings1 which possesses   
the attributes of invisibility and so   
on1 is the highest ,lord4  #bb4 ,the two
 others 7i4e4 the individual soul and   
the pradhna7 are not 7the source of all 
beings7 because there are stated        
distinctive attributes and difference4  
,the source of all beings is the highest
 ,lord1 not either of the two others1   

viz4 the pradhna and the individual     
soul1 on account of the following reason
 also4 ,in the first place1 the text    
distinguishes the source of all beings  
from the embodied soul1 as something of 
a different nature2 compare the passage 
7,,ii1 #a1 #b71 ',that heavenly person  
is without body1 he is both without and 
within1 not produced1 without breath and
 without mind1 pure4' ,the distinctive  
attributes mentioned here1 such as being
 of a heavenly nature1 and so on1 can in
 no way belong to the individual soul1  
which erroneously considers itself to be
 limited by name and form as presented  
by ,nescience1 and erroneously imputes  
their attributes to itself4 ,therefore  
the passage manifestly refers to the    
,person which is the subject of all the 
,upanishads4--,in the second place1 the 
source of all beings which forms the    
general topic is represented in the text
 as something different from the        
pradhna1 viz4 in the passage1 ',higher  
than the high ,imperishable4' ,here the 

term ',imperishable' means that         
undeveloped entity which represents the 
seminal potentiality of names and forms1
 contains the fine parts of the material
 elements1 abides in the ,lord1 forms   
his limiting adjunct1 and being itself  
no effect is high in comparison to all  
effects2 the whole phrase1 ',higher than
 the high ,imperishable1' which         
expresses a difference then clearly     
shows that the highest ,self is meant   
here4--,we do not on that account assume
 an independent entity called pradhna   
and say that the source of all beings is
 stated separately therefrom2 but if a  
pradhna is to be assumed at all 7in     
agreement with the common opinion7 and  
if being assumed it is assumed of such a
 nature as not to be opposed to the     
statements of ,scripture1 viz4 as the   
subtle cause of all beings denoted by   
the terms 'the ,undeveloped' and so on1 
we have no objection to such an         
assumption1 and declare that1 on account
 of the separate statement therefrom1   

i4e4 from that pradhna1 'the source of  
all beings' must mean the highest       
,lord4--,a further argument in favour of
 the same conclusion is supplied by the 
next ,stra4  #bc4 ,and on account of its
 form being mentioned4  ,subsequently to
 the passage1 ',higher than the high    
,imperishable1' we meet 7in the passage1
 ',from him is born breath1' c47 with a 
description of the creation of all      
things1 from breath down to earth1 and  
then with a statement of the form of    
this same source of beings as consisting
 of all created beings1 ',fire is his   
head1 his eyes the sun and the moon1 the
 quarters his ears1 his speech the      
,vedas disclosed1 the wind his breath1  
his heart the universe2 from his feet   
came the earth2 he is indeed the inner  
,self of all things4' ,this statement of
 form can refer only to the highest     
,lord1 and not either to the embodied   
soul1 which1 on account of its small    
power1 cannot be the cause of all       
effects1 or to the pradhna1 which cannot

 be the inner ,self of all beings4 ,we  
therefore conclude that the source of   
all beings is the highest ,lord1 not    
either of the other two4--,but wherefrom
 do you conclude that the quoted        
declaration of form refers to the source
 of all beings8--,from the general      
topic1 we reply4 ,the word 'he' 7in the 
clause1 ',he is indeed the inner ,self  
of all things'7 connects the passage    
with the general topic4 ,as the source  
of all beings constitutes the general   
topic1 the whole passage1 from ',from   
him is born breath1' up to1 ',he is the 
inner ,self of all beings1' refers to   
that same source4 ,similarly1 when in   
ordinary conversation a certain teacher 
forms the general topic of the talk1 the
 phrase1 ',study under him2 he knows the
 ,veda and the ,vedngas thoroughly1' as 
a matter of course1 refers to that same 
teacher4--,but how can a bodily form be 
ascribed to the source of all beings    
which is characterised by invisibility  
and similar attributes8--,the statement 

as to its nature1 we reply1 is made for 
the purpose of showing that the source  
of all beings is the ,self of all       
beings1 not of showing that it is of a  
bodily nature4 ,the case is analogous to
 such passages as1 ',i am food1 ,i am   
food1 ,i am the eater of food' 7,taitt4 
,up4 ,,iii1 #aj1 #f74--,others1 however1
 are of opinion#aea that the statement  
quoted does not refer to the source of  
all beings1 because that to which it    
refers is spoken of as something        
produced4 ,for1 on the one hand1 the    
immediately preceding passage 7',from   
him is born health1 mind1 and all organs
 of sense1 ether1 air1 light1 water1 and
 the earth1 the support of all'7 speaks 
of the aggregate of beings from air down
 to earth as something produced1 and1 on
 the other hand1 a passage met with     
later on 7',from him comes ,agni1 the   
sun being his fuel1' up to ',all herbs  
and juices'7 expresses itself to the    
same purpose4 ,how then should all at   
once1 in the midst of these two passages

 7which refer to the creation71 a       
statement be made about the nature of   
the source of all beings8--,the         
attribute of being the ,self of all     
beings1 7which above was said to be     
mentioned in the passage about the      
creation1 ',fire is his head1' c41 is   
not mentioned there but7 is stated only 
later on in a passage subsequent to that
 which refers to the creation1 viz4     
',the ,person is all this1 sacrifice1'  
c4 7,,ii1 #a1 #aj74--,now1 we see that  
_/s_/ruti as well as sm_/ri_/ti speaks  
of the birth of ,prajpati1 whose body is
 this threefold world2 compare          
_/,ri_/g-veda ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #aba1 #a1  
',hira_/n_/ya-garbha arose in the       
beginning2 he was the one born ,lord of 
things existing4 ,he established the    
earth and this sky2 to what ,god shall  
we offer our oblation8' where the       
expression 'arose' means 'he was born4' 
,and in sm_/ri_/ti we read1 ',he is the 
first embodied one1 he is called the    
,person2 as the primal creator of the   

beings ,brahman was evolved in the      
beginning4' ,this ,person which is 7not 
the original ,brahman but7 an effect    
7like other created beings7 may be      
called the internal ,self of all beings 
7as it is called in ,,ii1 #a1 #d71      
because in the form of the ,self of     
breath it abides in the ,selfs of all   
beings4--,on this latter explanation    
7according to which the passage1 ',fire 
is his head1' c41 does not describe the 
nature of the highest ,lord1 and can    
therefore not be referred to in the     
,stra7 the declaration as to the ,lord  
being the 'nature' of all which is      
contained in the passage1 ',the ,person 
is all this1 sacrifice1' c41 must be    
taken as the reason for establishing the
 highest ,lord1 7i4e4 as the passage    
which1 according to the ,stra1 proves   
that the source of all beings is the    
highest ,lord#aeb47  #bd4 ,vai_/s_/vnara
 7is the highest ,lord7 on account of   
the distinction qualifying the common   
terms 7,vai_/s_/vnara and ,self74  7,in 

,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aa ff47 a discussion     
begins with the words1 ',what is our    
,self1 what is ,brahman8' and is carried
 on in the passage1 ',you know at       
present that ,vai_/s_/vnara ,self1 tell 
us that2' after that it is declared with
 reference to ,heaven1 sun1 air1 ether1 
water1 and earth1 that they are         
connected with the qualities of having  
good light1 c41 and1 in order to        
disparage devout meditation on them     
singly1 that they stand to the          
,vai_/s_/vnara in the relation of being 
his head1 c41 merely2 and then finally  
7,v1 #ah7 it is said1 ',but he who      
meditates on the ,vai_/s_/vnara ,self as
 measured by a span1 as abhivimna#aec1  
he eats food in all worlds1 in all      
beings1 in all ,selfs4 ,of that         
,vai_/s_/vnara ,self the head is        
,sutejas 7having good light71 the eye   
,vi_/s_/varpa 7multiform71 the breath   
,p_/ri_/thagvartman 7moving in various  
courses71 the trunk ,bahula 7full71 the 
bladder ,rayi 7wealth71 the feet the    

earth1 the chest the altar1 the hairs   
the grass on the altar1 the heart the   
,grhapatya fire1 the mind the ,anvhrya  
fire1 the mouth the havanya             
fire4'--,here the doubt arises whether  
by the term ',vai_/s_/vnara' we have to 
understand the gastric fire1 or the     
elemental fire1 or the divinity         
presiding over the latter1 or the       
embodied soul1 or the highest           
,lord4--,but what1 it may be asked1     
gives rise to this doubt8--,the         
circumstance1 we reply1 of              
',vai_/s_/vnara' being employed as a    
common term for the gastric fire1 the   
elemental fire1 and the divinity of the 
latter1 while ',self' is a term applying
 to the embodied soul as well as to the 
highest ,lord4 ,hence the doubt arises  
which meaning of the term is to be      
accepted and which to be set aside4     
,which1 then1 is the alternative to be  
embraced8--,vai_/s_/vnara1 the          
prvapakshin maintains1 is the gastric   
fire1 because we meet1 in some passages1

 with the term used in that special     
sense2 so1 for instance 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
,v1 #i71 ',agni ,vai_/s_/vnara is the   
fire within man by which the food that  
is eaten is cooked4'--,or else the term 
may denote fire in general1 as we see it
 used in that sense also2 so1 for       
instance 7_/,ri_/g-veda ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1  
#hh1 #ab71 ',for the whole world the    
gods have made the ,agni ,vai_/s_/vnara 
a sign of the days4' ,or1 in the third  
place1 the word may denote that divinity
 whose body is fire4 ,for passages in   
which the term has that sense are       
likewise met with2 compare1 for         
instance1 _/,ri_/g-veda ,sa_/m_/h4 ,i1  
#ih1 #a1 ',may we be in the favour of   
,vai_/s_/vnara2 for he is the king of   
the beings1 giving pleasure1 of ready   
grace2' this and similar passages       
properly applying to a divinity endowed 
with power and similar qualities4       
,perhaps it will be urged against the   
preceding explanations1 that1 as the    
word ,vai_/s_/vnara is used in          

co-ordination with the term ',self1' and
 as the term ',self' alone is used in   
the introductory passage 7',what is our 
,self1 what is ,brahman8'71             
,vai_/s_/vnara has to be understood in a
 modified sense1 so as to be in harmony 
with the term ,self4 ,well1 then1 the   
prvapakshin rejoins1 let us suppose that
 ,vai_/s_/vnara is the embodied ,self   
which1 as being an enjoyer1 is in close 
vicinity to the ,vai_/s_/vnara fire1#aed
 7i4e4 the fire within the body17 and   
with which the qualification expressed  
by the term1 ',measured by a span1' well
 agrees1 since it is restricted by its  
limiting condition 7viz4 the body and so
 on74--,in any case it is evident that  
the term ,vai_/s_/vnara does not denote 
the highest ,lord4  ,to this we make the
 following reply4--,the word            
,vai_/s_/vnara denotes the highest      
,self1 on account of the distinction    
qualifying the two general              
terms4--,although the term ',self1' as  
well as the term ',vai_/s_/vnara1' has  

various meanings--the latter term       
denoting three beings while the former  
denotes two--yet we observe a           
distinction from which we conclude that 
both terms can here denote the highest  
,lord only2 viz4 in the passage1 ',of   
that ,vai_/s_/vnara ,self the head is   
,sutejas1' c4 ,for it is clear that that
 passage refers to the highest ,lord in 
so far as he is distinguished by having 
heaven1 and so on1 for his head and     
limbs1 and in so far as he has entered  
into a different state 7viz4 into the   
state of being the ,self of the         
threefold world72 represents him1 in    
fact1 for the purpose of meditation1 as 
the internal ,self of everything4 ,as   
such the absolute ,self may be          
represented1 because it is the cause of 
everything2 for as the cause virtually  
contains all the states belonging to its
 effects1 the heavenly world1 and so on1
 may be spoken of as the members of the 
highest ,self4--,moreover1 the result   
which ,scripture declares to abide in   

all worlds--viz4 in the passage1 ',he   
eats food in all worlds1 in all beings1 
in all ,selfs'--is possible only if we  
take the term ,vai_/s_/vnara to denote  
the highest ,self4--,the same remark    
applies to the declaration that all the 
sins are burned of him who has that     
knowledge1 ',thus all his sins are      
burned1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #bd1         
#c74--,moreover1 we meet at the         
beginning of the chapter with the words 
',self' and ',brahman2' viz4 in the     
passage1 ',what is our ,self1 what is   
,brahman8' ,now these are marks of      
,brahman1 and indicate the highest ,lord
 only4 ,hence he only can be meant by   
the term ,vai_/s_/vnara4  #be4 7,and7   
because that which is stated by         
,sm_/ri_/ti 7i4e4 the shape of the      
highest ,lord as described by           
,sm_/ri_/ti7 is an inference 7i4e4 an   
indicatory mark from which we infer the 
meaning of _/,s_/ruti74  ,the highest   
,lord only is ,vai_/s_/vnara1 for that  
reason also that ,sm_/ri_/ti ascribes to

 the highest ,lord only a shape         
consisting of the threefold world1 the  
fire constituting his mouth1 the        
heavenly world his head1 c4 ,so1 for    
instance1 in the following passage1 ',he
 whose mouth is fire1 whose head the    
heavenly world1 whose navel the ether1  
whose feet the earth1 whose eye the sun1
 whose ears the regions1 reverence to   
him the ,self of the world4' ,the shape 
described here in ,sm_/ri_/ti allows us 
to infer a _/,s_/ruti passage on which  
the ,sm_/ri_/ti rests1 and thus         
constitutes an inference1 i4e4 a sign   
indicatory of the word ',vai_/s_/vnara' 
denoting the highest ,lord4 ,for1       
although the quoted ,sm_/ri_/ti passage 
contains a glorification#aee1 still even
 a glorification in the form in which it
 there appears is not possible1 unless  
it has a ,vedic passage to rest         
on4--,other ,sm_/ri_/ti passages also   
may be quoted in connexion with this    
,stra1 so1 for instance1 the following  
one1 ',he whose head the wise declare to

 be the heavenly world1 whose navel the 
ether1 whose eyes sun and moon1 whose   
ears the regions1 and whose feet the    
earth1 he is the inscrutable leader of  
all beings4'  #bf4 ,if it be maintained 
that 7,vai_/s_/vnara is7 not 7the       
highest ,lord7 on account of the term   
7viz4 ,vai_/s_/vnara1 having a settled  
different meaning71 c41 and on account  
of his abiding within 7which is a       
characteristic of the gastric fire72 7we
 say7 no1 on account of the perception  
7of the highest ,lord71 being taught    
thus 7viz4 in the gastric fire71 and on 
account of the impossibility 7of the    
heavenly world1 c4 being the head1 c4 of
 the gastric fire71 and because they    
7the ,vjasaneyins7 read of him 7viz4 the
 ,vai_/s_/vnara7 as man 7which term     
cannot apply to the gastric fire74      
,here the following objection is        
raised4--,vai_/s_/vnara cannot be the   
highest ,lord1 on account of the term1  
c41 and on account of the abiding       
within4 ,the term1 viz4 the term        

,vai_/s_/vnara1 cannot be applied to the
 highest ,lord1 because the settled use 
of language assigns to it a different   
sense4 ,thus1 also1 with regard to the  
term ,agni 7fire7 in the passage        
7_/,s_/at4 ,br4 ,x1 #f1 #a1 #aa71 ',he  
is the ,agni ,vai_/s_/vnara4' ,the word 
'c4' 7in the ,stra7 hints at the fiction
 concerning the three sacred fires1 the 
grhapatya being represented as the      
heart1 and so on1 of the ,vai_/s_/vnara 
,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #ah1               
#baef74--,moreover1 the passage1        
',therefore the first food which a man  
may take is in the place of homa' 7,ch4 
,up4 ,v1 #ai1 #a71 contains a           
glorification of 7,vai_/s_/vnara7 being 
the abode of the oblation to            
,pr_/n_/a#aeg4 ,for these reasons we    
have to understand by ,vai_/s_/vnara the
 gastric fire4--,moreover1 ,scripture   
speaks of the ,vai_/s_/vnara as abiding 
within4 ',he knows him abiding within   
man2' which again applies to the gastric
 fire only4--,with reference to the     

averment that on account of the         
specifications contained in the passage1
 ',his head is ,sutejas1' c41           
,vai_/s_/vnara is to be explained as the
 highest ,self1 we 7the prvapakshin7    
ask3 ,how do you reach the decision that
 those specifications1 although agreeing
 with both interpretations1 must be     
assumed to refer to the highest ,lord   
only1 and not to the gastric fire8--,or 
else we may assume that the passage     
speaks of the elemental fire which      
abides within and without2 for that that
 fire is also connected with the        
heavenly world1 and so on1 we understand
 from the mantra1 ',he who with his     
light has extended himself over earth   
and heaven1 the two halves of the world1
 and the atmosphere' 7_/,ri_/g-veda     
,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #hh1 #c74--,or else the  
attribute of having the heavenly world1 
and so on1 for its members may1 on      
account of its power1 be attributed to  
that divinity which has the elemental   
fire for its body4--,therefore          

,vai_/s_/vnara is not the highest ,lord4
  ,to all this we reply as              
follows4--,your assertions are          
unfounded1 'because there is taught the 
perception in this manner4' ,the reasons
 7adduced in the former part of the     
,stra71 viz4 the term1 and so on1 are   
not sufficient to make us abandon the   
interpretation according to which       
,vai_/s_/vnara is the highest           
,lord4--,why8--,on account of perception
 being taught in this manner1 i4e4      
without the gastric fire being set      
aside4 ,for the passages quoted teach   
the perception of the highest ,lord in  
the gastric fire1 analogously to such   
passages as ',let a man meditate on the 
mind as ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1
 #a74--,or else they teach that the     
object of perception is the highest     
,lord1 in so far as he has the gastric  
fire called ,vai_/s_/vnara for his      
limiting condition2 analogously to such 
passages as ',he who consists of mind1  
whose body is breath1 whose form is     

light' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #baeh74   
,if it were the aim of the passages     
about the ,vai_/s_/vnara to make        
statements not concerning the highest   
,lord1 but merely concerning the gastric
 fire1 there would be no possibility of 
specifications such as contained in the 
passage ',his head is ,sutejas1' c4     
,that also on the assumption of         
,vai_/s_/vnara being either the divinity
 of fire or the elemental fire no room  
is to be found for the said             
specifications1 we shall show under the 
following ,stra4--,moreover1 if the mere
 gastric fire were meant1 there would be
 room only for a declaration that it    
abides within man1 not that it is man4  
,but1 as a matter of fact1 the          
,vjasaneyins speak of him--in their     
sacred text--as man1 ',this ,agni       
,vai_/s_/vnara is man2 he who knows this
 ,agni ,vai_/s_/vnara as man-like1 as   
abiding within man1' c4 7_/,s_/at4 ,br4 
,x1 #f1 #a1 #aa74 ,the highest ,lord1 on
 the other hand1 who is the ,self of    

everything1 may be spoken of as well as 
man1 as abiding within man4--,those who1
 in the latter part of the ,stra1 read  
'man-like' 7puru-shavidham7 instead of  
'man' 7purusham71 wish to express the   
following meaning3 ,if ,vai_/s_/vnara   
were assumed to be the gastric fire     
only1 he might be spoken of as abiding  
within man indeed1 but not as man-like4 
,but the ,vjasaneyins do speak of him as
 man-like1 ',he who knows him as        
man-like1 as abiding within man4'--,the 
meaning of the term man-like is to be   
concluded from the context1 whence it   
will be seen that1 with reference to    
nature1 it means that the highest ,lord 
has the heaven for his head1 c41 and is 
based on the earth2 and with reference  
to man1 that he forms the head1 c41 and 
is based on the chin 7of the devout     
worshipper#aei74  #bg4 ,for the same    
reasons 7the ,vai_/s_/vnara7 cannot be  
the divinity 7of fire71 or the element  
7of fire74  ,the averment that the      
fanciful attribution of members         

contained in the passage ',his head is  
,sutejas1' c4 may apply to the elemental
 fire also which from the mantras is    
seen to be connected with the heavenly  
world1 c41 or else to the divinity whose
 body is fire1 on account of its power1 
is refuted by the following remark3 ,for
 the reasons already stated             
,vai_/s_/vnara is neither the divinity  
nor the element4 ,for to the elemental  
fire which is mere heat and light the   
heavenly world and so on cannot properly
 be ascribed as head and so on1 because 
an effect cannot be the ,self of another
 effect4--,again1 the heavenly world    
cannot be ascribed as head1 c4 to the   
divinity of fire1 in spite of the power 
of the latter2 for1 on the one hand1 it 
is not a cause 7but a mere effect71 and 
on the other hand its power depends on  
the highest ,lord4 ,against all these   
interpretations there lies moreover the 
objection founded on the inapplicability
 of the term ',self4'  #bh4 ,jaimini    
7declares that there is7 no             

contradiction even on the assumption of 
a direct 7worship of the highest ,lord  
as ,vai_/s_/vnara74  ,above 7,stra #bf7 
it has been said that ,vai_/s_/vnara is 
the highest ,lord1 to be meditated upon 
as having the gastric fire either for   
his outward manifestation or for his    
limiting condition2 which interpretation
 was accepted in deference to the       
circumstance that he is spoken of as    
abiding within--and so on4--,the teacher
 ,jaimini however is of opinion that it 
is not necessary to have recourse to the
 assumption of an outward manifestation 
or limiting condition1 and that there is
 no objection to refer the passage about
 ,vai_/s_/vnara to the direct worship of
 the highest ,lord4--,but1 if you reject
 the interpretation based on the gastric
 fire1 you place yourself in opposition 
to the statement that ,vai_/s_/vnara    
abides within1 and to the reasons       
founded on the term1 c4 7,s4 #bf74--,to 
this we reply that we in no way place   
ourselves in opposition to the statement

 that ,vai_/s_/vnara abides within4 ,for
 the passage1 ',he knows him as         
man-like1 as abiding within man1' does  
not by any means refer to the gastric   
fire1 the latter being neither the      
general topic of discussion nor having  
been mentioned by name before4--,what   
then does it refer to8--,it refers to   
that which forms the subject of         
discussion1 viz4 that similarity to man 
7of the highest ,self7 which is         
fancifully found in the members of man  
from the upper part of the head down to 
the chin2 the text therefore says1 ',he 
knows him as man-like1 as abiding within
 man1' just as we say of a branch that  
it abides within the tree#afj4--,or else
 we may adopt another interpretation and
 say that after the highest ,self has   
been represented as having the likeness 
to man as a limiting condition1 with    
regard to nature as well as to man1 the 
passage last quoted 7',he knows him as  
abiding within man'7 speaks of the same 
highest ,self as the mere witness       

7skshin2 i4e4 as the pure ,self1        
non-related to the limiting             
conditions74--,the consideration of the 
context having thus shown that the      
highest ,self has to be resorted to for 
the interpretation of the passage1 the  
term ',vai_/s_/vnara' must denote the   
highest ,self in some way or other4 ,the
 word ',vi_/s_/vnara' is to be explained
 either as 'he who is all and man 7i4e4 
the individual soul71' or 'he to whom   
souls belong' 7in so far as he is their 
maker or ruler71 and thus denotes the   
highest ,self which is the ,self of all4
 ,and the form ',vai_/s_/vnara' has the 
same meaning as ',vi_/s_/vnara1' the    
taddhita-suffix1 by which the former    
word is derived from the latter1 not    
changing the meaning2 just as in the    
case of rkshasa 7derived from rakshas71 
and vyasa 7derived from vayas74--,the   
word ',agni' also may denote the highest
 ,self if we adopt the etymology        
agniagra_/n_/1 i4e4 he who leads in     
front4--,as the ,grhapatya-fire finally1

 and as the abode of the oblation to    
breath the highest ,self may be         
represented because it is the ,self of  
all4  ,but1 if it is assumed that       
,vai_/s_/vnara denotes the highest      
,self1 how can ,scripture declare that  
he is measured by a span8--,on the      
explanation of this difficulty we now   
enter4  #bi4 ,on account of the         
manifestation1 so _/s_/marathya opines4 
,the circumstance of the highest ,lord  
who transcends all measure being spoken 
of as measured by a span has for its    
reason 'manifestation4' ,the highest    
,lord manifests himself as measured by a
 span1 i4e4 he specially manifests      
himself for the benefit of his          
worshippers in some special places1 such
 as the heart and the like1 where he may
 be perceived4 ,hence1 according to the 
opinion of the teacher _/s_/marathya1   
the scriptural passage which speaks of  
him who is measured by a span may refer 
to the highest ,lord4  #cj4 ,on account 
of remembrance2 so ,bdari opines4  ,or  

else the highest ,lord may be called    
'measured by a span' because he is      
remembered by means of the mind which is
 seated in the heart which is measured  
by a span4 ,similarly1 barley-corns     
which are measured by means of prasthas 
are themselves called prasthas4 ,it must
 be admitted that barley-grains         
themselves have a certain size which is 
merely rendered manifest through their  
being connected with a prastha measure2 
while the highest ,lord himself does not
 possess a size to be rendered manifest 
by his connexion with the heart4 ,still 
the remembrance 7of the ,lord by means  
of the mind7 may be accepted as offering
 a certain foundation for the _/,s_/ruti
 passage concerning him who is measured 
by a span4--,or else#afa the ,stra may  
be interpreted to mean that the ,lord1  
although not really measured by a span1 
is to be remembered 7meditated upon7 as 
being of the measure of a span2 whereby 
the passage is furnished with an        
appropriate sense4--,thus the passage   

about him who is measured by a span may1
 according to the opinion of the teacher
 ,bdari1 be referred to the highest     
,lord1 on account of remembrance4  #ca4 
,on the ground of imaginative           
identification 7the highest ,lord may be
 called prde_/s_/amtra71 ,jaimini       
thinks2 for thus 7,scripture7 declares4 
,or else the passage about him who is   
measured by a span may be considered to 
rest on imaginative                     
combination4--,why8--,because the       
passage of the ,vjasaneyibrhma_/n_/a    
which treats of the same topic          
identifies heaven1 earth1 and so        
on--which are the members of            
,vai_/s_/vnara viewed as the ,self of   
the threefold world--with certain parts 
of the human frame1 viz4 the parts      
comprised between the upper part of the 
head and the chin1 and thus declares the
 imaginative identity of ,vai_/s_/vnara 
with something whose measure is a span4 
,there we read1 ',the ,gods indeed      
reached him1 knowing him as measured by 

a span as it were4 ,now ,i will declare 
them 7his members7 to you so as to      
identify him 7the ,vai_/s_/vnara7 with  
that whose measure is a span2 thus he   
said4 ,pointing to the upper part of the
 head he said3 ,this is what stands     
above 7i4e4 the heavenly world7 as      
,vai_/s_/vnara 7i4e4 the head of        
,vai_/s_/vnara#afb74 ,pointing to the   
eyes he said3 ,this is he with good     
light 7i4e4 the sun7 as ,vai_/s_/vnara  
7i4e4 the eye of ,v474 ,pointing to the 
nose he said3 ,this is he who moves on  
manifold paths 7i4e4 the air7 as        
,vai_/s_/vnara 7i4e4 the breath of ,v474
 ,pointing to the space 7ether7 within  
his mouth he said3 ,this is the full one
 7i4e4 the ether7 as ,vai_/s_/vnara4    
,pointing to the saliva within his mouth
 he said3 ,this is wealth as            
,vai_/s_/vnara 7i4e4 the water in the   
bladder of ,v474 ,pointing to the chin  
he said3 ,this is the base as           
,vai_/s_/vnara 7i4e4 the feet of        
,v474'--,although in the                

,vjasaneyi-brhma_/n_/a the heaven is    
denoted as that which has the attribute 
of standing above and the sun as that   
which has the attribute of good light1  
while in the ,chndogya the heaven is    
spoken of as having good light and the  
sun as being multiform2 still this      
difference does not interfere 7with the 
unity of the vidy7#afc1 because both    
texts equally use the term 'measured by 
a span1' and because all _/s_/khs       
intimate the same4--,the above          
explanation of the term 'measured by a  
span1' which rests on imaginative       
identification1 the teacher ,jaimini    
considers the most appropriate one4     
#cb4 ,moreover they 7the ,jblas7 speak  
of him 7the highest ,lord7 in that 7i4e4
 the interstice between the top of the  
head and the chin which is measured by a
 span74  ,moreover the ,jblas speak in  
their text of the highest ,lord as being
 in the interstice between the top of   
the head and the chin4 ',the unevolved  
infinite ,self abides in the avimukta   

7i4e4 the non-released soul74 ,where    
does that avimukta abide8 ,it abides in 
the ,vara_/n_/ and the ,ns1 in the      
middle4 ,what is that ,vara_/n_/1 what  
is that ,ns8' ,the text thereupon       
etymologises the term ,vara_/n_/ as that
 which wards off 7vrayati7 all evil done
 by the senses1 and the term ,ns as that
 which destroys 7n_/s_/ayati7 all evil  
done by the senses2 and then continues1 
',and what is its place8--,the place    
where the eyebrows and the nose join4   
,that is the joining place of the       
heavenly world 7represented by the upper
 part of the head7 and of the other     
7i4e4 the earthly world represented by  
the chin74' 7,jbla ,up4 ,i47--,thus it  
appears that the scriptural statement   
which ascribes to the highest ,lord the 
measure of a span is appropriate4 ,that 
the highest ,lord is called abhivimna   
refers to his being the inward ,self of 
all4 ,as such he is directly measured1  
i4e4 known by all animate beings4 ,or   
else the word may be explained as 'he   

who is near everywhere--as the inward   
,self--and who at the same time is      
measureless' 7as being infinite74 ,or   
else it may denote the highest ,lord as 
him who1 as the cause of the world1     
measures it out1 i4e4 creates it4 ,by   
all this it is proved that              
,vai_/s_/vnara is the highest ,lord4    
,notes3  ,footnote #acf3 ,the clause 'he
 is to meditate with a calm mind' if    
taken as a gu_/n_/avidhi1 i4e4 as       
enjoining some secondary matter1 viz4   
calmness of mind of the meditating      
person1 cannot at the same time enjoin  
meditation2 for that would involve a    
so-called split of the sentence         
7vkyabheda74  ,footnote #acg3 ,jvezpi   
dehdib_/rim_/hanj jystvanyyd v          
brahmatety artha_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4          
,footnote #ach3 ,the discussion is      
brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in  
the ,stra whose meaning is 'expressed1  
aimed at1' but more literally 'desired  
to be expressed4'  ,footnote #aci3      
,because he is vypin4  ,footnote #adj3  

,another interpretation of the later    
part of ,stra4  ,footnote #ada3 ,cp4    
,ka_/th_/a ,up1 ,i1 #a1 #ac2 #bj2 ,i1   
#b1 #ad4  ,footnote #adb3 ,freedom from 
impurity can result only from the       
knowledge that the individual soul is in
 reality ,brahman4 ,the commentators    
explain rajas by avidy4  ,footnote #adc3
 ,tadartham iti1 jvasya                 
brahmasiddhyartham iti yvat1            
_/k_/aitanya_/kh_/ypann dh_/h_/sukhdin  
pari_/n_/amata iti1 tatra purushozpi    
bhakt_/ri_/tvam ivnubhavati na tattvata 
iti vaktum adhyropayati4 nanda ,giri4   
,footnote #add3 ,who1 somebody might    
say1 is to be understood here1 because  
immortality and similar qualities belong
 to him not somehow only1 but in their  
true sense4  ,footnote #ade3 ,the       
_/t_/ks say that the contents of this   
last sentence are hinted at by the word 
'and' in the ,stra4  ,footnote #adf3    
,i4e4 at the beginning of the           
instruction which the sacred fires give 
to ,upako_/s_/ala1 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aj  

ff4  ,footnote #adg3 ,which words       
conclude the instruction given by the   
fires1 and introduce the instruction    
given by the teacher1 of which the      
passage 'the person that is seen in the 
eye1' c4 forms a part4  ,footnote #adh3 
_/s_/rayntarapratyayasy_/s_/rayntare    
kshepa_/h_/ pratka_/h_/1 yath           
brahma_/s_/abda_/h_/ paramtmavishayo    
nmdishu kshipyate4 ,bh4  ,footnote #adi3
 ,the following sentences give the      
reason why1 although there is only one  
,brahman1 the word ,brahman is repeated4
  ,footnote #aej3 ,according to         
,scripture1 ,niranku_/s_/a_/m_/         
sarvaniyantritva_/m_/ _/s_/rauta_/m_/ na
 _/k_/a tdri_/s_/e sarvaniyantari bhedo 
na _/k_/numna_/m_/ _/s_/rutibhditam     
uttish_/th_/ati4 nanda ,giri4 ,or else1 
as ,go4 n4 remarks1 we may explain3 as  
the highest ,self is not really         
different from the individual soul4 ,so 
also ,bhmat3 ,na _/h_/navasth1 na hi    
niyantrantara_/m_/ tena niyamyate       
ki_/m_/ tu yo jvo niyant lokasiddha_/h_/

 sa                                     
paramtmevopdhyava_/kkh_/edakalpitabheda_
/h_/4  ,footnote #aea3                  
,v_/ri_/ttik_/ri_/dvykhym dshayati1 ,go4
 n42 ekade_/s_/ina_/m_/ dshayati1 nanda 
,giri2 tad etat                         
paramatenkshepasamdhnbhy_/m_/ vykhyya   
svamatena vy_/k_/ash_/t_/e1 puna_/h_/   
_/s_/abdozpi prvasmd vi_/s_/esha_/m_/   
dyotayann asyesh_/t_/at_/m_/            
s_/k_/ayati1 ,bhmat4--,the statement of 
the two former commentators must be     
understood to mean--in agreement with   
the ,bhmat--that _/,s_/ankara is now    
going to refute the preceding           
explanation by the statement of his own 
view4 ,thus ,go4 n4 later on explains   
'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe4'          
,footnote #aeb3 ,the question is to what
 passage the 'rpopanyst' of the ,stra   
refers4--,according to the opinion set  
forth first it refers to ,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1
 #a1 #d ff4--,but1 according to the     
second view1 ,,ii1 #a1 #d to ,,ii1 #a1  
#i1 cannot refer to the source of all   

beings1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 because 
that entire passage describes the       
creation1 the inner ,self of which is   
not the highest ,self but ,prajpati1    
i4e4 the ,hira_/n_/yagarbha or ,strtman 
of the later ,vednta1 who is himself an 
'effect1' and who is called the inner   
,self1 because he is the breath of life 
7pr_/n_/a7 in everything4--,hence the   
,stra must be connected with another    
passage1 and that passage is found in   
,,ii1 #a1 #aj1 where it is said that the
 ,person 7i4e4 the highest ,self7 is all
 this1 c4  ,footnote #aec3 ,about which 
term see later on4  ,footnote #aed3     
,srre laksha_/n_/ay                     
vai_/s_/vnara_/s_/abdopapattim ha       
tasyeti4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #aee3 ,and  
as such might be said not to require a  
basis for its statements4  ,footnote    
#aef3 ,na _/k_/a grhapatydih_/ri_/daydit
 brahma_/n_/a_/h_/ sambhavin4 ,bhmat4   
,footnote #aeg3 ,na _/k_/a              
pr_/n_/hutyadhikara_/n_/at z nyatra     
ja_/th_/argner yujyate4 ,bhmat4         

,footnote #aeh3 ,according to the former
 explanation the gastric fire is to be  
looked on as the outward manifestation  
7pratka7 of the highest ,lord2 according
 to the latter as his limiting          
condition4  ,footnote #aei3 ,i4e4 that  
he may be fancifully identified with the
 head and so on of the devout           
worshipper4  ,footnote #afj3 ,whereby we
 mean not that it is inside the tree1   
but that it forms a part of the         
tree4--,the ,vai_/s_/vnara ,self is     
identified with the different members of
 the body1 and these members abide      
within1 i4e4 form parts of the body4    
,footnote #afa3 ,parim_/n_/asya         
h_/ri_/da_/y_/advrropitasya             
smaryam_/n_/e katham ropo               
vishayavishayitvena bhedd ity _/s_/ankya
 vykhyntaram ha prde_/s_/eti4 nanda     
,giri4  ,footnote #afb3 ,atra sarvatra  
vai_/s_/vnara_/s_/abdas                 
tadangapara_/h_/4 ,go4 n4  ,footnote    
#afc3 ,which unity entitles us to use   
the passage from the _/,s_/at4 ,br4 for 

the explanation of the passage from the 
,ch4 ,up4     ,,third ,p,,da4           
,,reverence ,,to ,,the ,,highest ,,self6
   #a4 ,the abode of heaven1 earth1 and 
so on 7is ,brahman71 on account of the  
term 'own1' i4e4 ,self4  ,we read 7,mu4 
,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #e71 ',he in whom the    
heaven1 the earth1 and the sky are      
woven1 the mind also with all the vital 
airs1 know him alone as the ,self1 and  
leave off other words6 ,he is the bridge
 of the ,immortal4'--,here the doubt    
arises whether the abode which is       
intimated by the statement of the heaven
 and so on being woven in it is the     
highest ,brahman or something else4     
,the prvapakshin maintains that the     
abode is something else1 on account of  
the expression1 ',it is the bridge of   
the ,immortal4' ,for1 he says1 it is    
known from every-day experience that a  
bridge presupposes some further bank to 
which it leads1 while it is impossible  
to assume something further beyond the  
highest ,brahman1 which in ,scripture is

 called 'endless1 without a further     
shore' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab74  
,now if the abode is supposed to be     
something different from ,brahman1 it   
must be supposed to be either the       
pradhna known from ,sm_/ri_/ti1 which1  
as being the 7general7 cause1 may be    
called the 7general7 abode2 or the air  
known from _/,s_/ruti1 of which it is   
said 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #b1     
',air is that thread1 ,o ,gautama4 ,by  
air as by a thread1 ,o ,gautama1 this   
world and the other world and all beings
 are strung together'71 that it supports
 all things2 or else the embodied soul  
which1 as being the enjoyer1 may be     
considered as an abode with reference to
 the objects of its fruition4  ,against 
this view we argue with the strakra as  
follows3--',of the world consisting of  
heaven1 earth1 and so on1 which in the  
quoted passage is spoken of as woven    
7upon something71 the highest ,brahman  
must be the abode4'--,why8--,on account 
of the word 'own1' i4e4 on account of   

the word ',self4' ,for we meet with the 
word ',self' in the passage1 ',know him 
alone as the ,self4' ,this term ',self' 
is thoroughly appropriate only if we    
understand the highest ,self and not    
anything else4--7,to propound another   
interpretation of the phrase            
'sva_/s_/abdt' employed in the ,stra47  
,sometimes also ,brahman is spoken of in
 _/,s_/ruti as the general abode by its 
own terms 7i4e4 by terms properly       
designating ,brahman71 as1 for instance 
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi4 #h1 #d71 ',all these   
creatures1 my dear1 have their root in  
the being1 their abode in the being1    
their rest in the being#afd4'--7,or else
 we have to explain 'sva_/s_/abdena' as 
follows71 ,in the passages preceding and
 following the passage under discussion 
,brahman is glorified with its own      
names#afe2 cp4 ,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #aj1 
',the ,person is all this1 sacrifice1   
penance1 ,brahman1 the highest          
,immortal1' and ,,ii1 #b1 #aa1 ',that   
immortal ,brahman is before1 is behind1 

,brahman is to the right and left4'     
,here1 on account of mention being made 
of an abode and that which abides1 and  
on account of the co-ordination         
expressed in the passage1 ',brahman is  
all' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aa71 a       
suspicion might arise that ,brahman is  
of a manifold variegated nature1 just as
 in the case of a tree consisting of    
different parts we distinguish branches1
 stem1 and root4 ,in order to remove    
this suspicion the text declares 7in the
 passage under discussion71 ',know him  
alone as the ,self4' ,the sense of which
 is3 ,the ,self is not to be known as   
manifold1 qualified by the universe of  
effects2 you are rather to dissolve by  
true knowledge the universe of effects1 
which is the mere product of ,nescience1
 and to know that one ,self1 which is   
the general abode1 as uniform4 ,just as 
when somebody says1 ',bring that on     
which ,devadatta sits1' the person      
addressed brings the chair only 7the    
abode of ,devadatta71 not ,devadatta    

himself2 so the passage1 ',know him     
alone as the ,self1' teaches that the   
object to be known is the one uniform   
,self which constitutes the general     
abode4 ,similarly another scriptural    
passage reproves him who believes in the
 unreal world of effects1 ',from death  
to death goes he who sees any difference
 here' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #aa74 ,the  
statement of co-ordination made in the  
clause ',all is ,brahman' aims at       
dissolving 7the wrong conception of the 
reality of7 the world1 and not in any   
way at intimating that ,brahman is      
multiform in nature#aff2 for the        
uniformity 7of ,brahman's nature7 is    
expressly stated in other passages such 
as the following one1 ',as a mass of    
salt has neither inside nor outside1 but
 is altogether a mass of taste1 thus    
indeed has that ,self neither inside nor
 outside1 but is altogether a mass of   
knowledge' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1    
#ac74--;,for all these reasons the abode
 of heaven1 earth1 c4 is the highest    

,brahman4--,against the objection that  
on account of the text speaking of a    
'bridge1' and a bridge requiring a      
further bank1 we have to understand by  
the abode of heaven and earth something 
different from ,brahman1 we remark that 
the word 'bridge' is meant to intimate  
only that that which is called a bridge 
supports1 not that it has a further     
bank4 ,we need not assume by any means  
that the bridge meant is like an        
ordinary bridge made of clay and wood4  
,for as the word setu 7bridge7 is       
derived from the root si1 which means   
'to bind1' the idea of holding together1
 supporting is rather implied in it than
 the idea of being connected with       
something beyond 7a further bank74      
,according to the opinion of another    
7commentator7 the word 'bridge' does not
 glorify the abode of heaven1 earth1 c41
 but rather the knowledge of the ,self  
which is glorified in the preceding     
clause1 ',know him alone as the ,self1' 
and the abandonment of speech advised in

 the clause1 'leave off other words2' to
 them1 as being the means of obtaining  
immortality1 the expression 'the bridge 
of the immortal' applies#afg4 ,on that  
account we have to set aside the        
assertion that1 on account of the word  
'bridge1' something different from      
,brahman is to be understood by the     
abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on4  #b4 
,and on account of its being designated 
as that to which the ,released have to  
resort4  ,by the abode of heaven1 earth1
 and so on1 we have to understand the   
highest ,brahman for that reason also   
that we find it denoted as that to which
 the ,released have to resort4--,the    
conception that the body and other      
things contained in the sphere of the   
,not-self are our ,self1 constitutes    
,nescience2 from it there spring desires
 with regard to whatever promotes the   
well-being of the body and so on1 and   
aversions with regard to whatever tends 
to injure it2 there further arise fear  
and confusion when we observe anything  

threatening to destroy it4 ,all this    
constitutes an endless series of the    
most manifold evils with which we all   
are acquainted4 ,regarding those on the 
other hand who have freed themselves    
from the stains of ,nescience desire    
aversion and so on1 it is said that they
 have to resort to that1 viz4 the abode 
of heaven1 earth1 c4 which forms the    
topic of discussion4 ,for the text1     
after having said1 ',the fetter of the  
heart is broken1 all doubts are solved1 
all his works perish when ,he has been  
beheld who is the higher and the lower' 
7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h71 later on      
remarks1 ',the wise man freed from name 
and form goes to the divine ,person who 
is greater than the great' 7,mu4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #b1 #h74 ,that ,brahman is that  
which is to be resorted to by the       
released1 is known from other scriptural
 passages1 such as ',when all desires   
which once entered his heart are undone 
then does the mortal become immortal1   
then he obtains ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4    

,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #g74 ,of the pradhna and 
similar entities1 on the other hand1 it 
is not known from any source that they  
are to be resorted to by the released4  
,moreover1 the text 7in the passage1    
',know him alone as the ,self and leave 
off other words'7 declares that the     
knowledge of the abode of heaven and    
earth1 c4 is connected with the leaving 
off of all speech2 a condition which1   
according to another scriptural passage1
 attaches to 7the knowledge of7         
,brahman2 cp4 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1  
#ba1 ',let a wise ,brhma_/n_/a1 after he
 has discovered him1 practise wisdom4   
,let him not seek after many words1 for 
that is mere weariness of the           
tongue4'--,for that reason also the     
abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 is   
the highest ,brahman4  #c4 ,not 7i4e4   
the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4 cannot   
be7 that which is inferred1 7i4e4 the   
pradhna71 on account of the terms not   
denoting it4  ,while there has been     
shown a special reason in favour of     

,brahman 7being the abode71 there is no 
such special reason in favour of        
anything else4 ,hence he 7the strakra7  
says that that which is inferred1 i4e4  
the pradhna assumed by the              
,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1 is not to be        
accepted as the abode of heaven1 earth1 
c4--,why8--,on account of the terms not 
denoting it4 ,for the sacred text does  
not contain any term intimating the     
non-intelligent pradhna1 on the ground  
of which we might understand the latter 
to be the general cause or abode2 while 
such terms as 'he who perceives all and 
knows all' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i7       
intimate an intelligent being opposed to
 the pradhna in nature4--,for the same  
reason the air also cannot be accepted  
as the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so   
on4  #d4 7,nor7 also the individual soul
 7pr_/n_/abh_/ri_/t74  ,although to the 
cognitional 7individual7 ,self the      
qualities of ,selfhood and intelligence 
do belong1 still omniscience and similar
 qualities do not belong to it as its   

knowledge is limited by its adjuncts2   
thus the individual soul also cannot be 
accepted as the abode of heaven1 earth1 
c41 for the same reason1 i4e4 on account
 of the terms not denoting              
it4--,moreover1 the attribute of forming
 the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 
cannot properly be given to the         
individual soul because the latter is   
limited by certain adjuncts and         
therefore non-pervading 7not            
omnipresent7#afh4--,the special         
enunciation 7of the individual soul7 is 
caused by what follows#afi4--,the       
individual soul is not to be accepted as
 the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4 for the 
following reason also4  #e4 ,on account 
of the declaration of difference4  ,the 
passage ',know him alone as the ,self'  
moreover implies a declaration of       
difference1 viz4 of the difference of   
the object of knowledge and the knower4 
,here the individual soul as being that 
which is desirous of release is the     
knower1 and consequently ,brahman1 which

 is denoted by the word 'self' and      
represented as the object of knowledge1 
is understood to be the abode of heaven1
 earth1 and so on4--,for the following  
reason also the individual soul cannot  
be accepted as the abode of heaven1     
earth1 c4  #f4 ,on account of the       
subject-matter4  ,the highest ,self     
constitutes the subject-matter 7of the  
entire chapter71 as we see from the     
passage1 ',sir1 what is that through    
which1 when it is known1 everything else
 becomes known8' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #c7 
in which the knowledge of everything is 
declared to be dependent on the         
knowledge of one thing4 ,for all this   
7i4e4 the entire world7 becomes known if
 ,brahman the ,self of all is known1 not
 if only the individual soul is         
known4--,another reason against the     
individual soul follows4  #g4 ,and on   
account of the two conditions of        
standing and eating 7of which the former
 is characteristic of the highest ,lord1
 the latter of the individual soul74    

,with reference to that which is the    
abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 the  
text says1 ',two birds1 inseparable     
friends1' c4 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 
,this passage describes the two states  
of mere standing1 i4e4 mere presence1   
and of eating1 the clause1 ',one of them
 eats the sweet fruit1' referring to the
 eating1 i4e4 the fruition of the       
results of works1 and the clause1 ',the 
other one looks on without eating1'     
describing the condition of mere        
inactive presence4 ,the two states      
described1 viz4 of mere presence on the 
one hand and of enjoyment on the other  
hand1 show that the ,lord and the       
individual soul are referred to4 ,now   
there is room for this statement which  
represents the ,lord as separate from   
the individual soul1 only if the passage
 about the abode of heaven and earth    
likewise refers to the ,lord2 for in    
that case only there exists a continuity
 of topic4 ,on any other supposition the
 second passage would contain a         

statement about something not connected 
with the general topic1 and would       
therefore be entirely uncalled          
for4--,but1 it may be objected1 on your 
interpretation also the second passage  
makes an uncalled-for statement1 viz4 in
 so far as it represents the individual 
soul as separate from the ,lord4--,not  
so1 we reply4 ,it is nowhere the purpose
 of ,scripture to make statements       
regarding the individual soul4 ,from    
ordinary experience the individual soul1
 which in the different individual      
bodies is joined to the internal organs 
and other limiting adjuncts1 is known to
 every one as agent and enjoyer1 and we 
therefore must not assume that it is    
that which ,scripture aims at setting   
forth4 ,the ,lord1 on the other hand1   
about whom ordinary experience tells us 
nothing1 is to be considered as the     
special topic of all scriptural         
passages1 and we therefore cannot assume
 that any passage should refer to him   
merely casually#agj4--,that the mantra  

'two birds1' c4 speaks of the ,lord--and
 the individual soul we have already    
shown under ,i1 #b1 #aa4--;,and if1     
according to the interpretation given in
 the ,paingi-upanishad 7and quoted under
 ,i1 #b1 #aa71 the verse is understood  
to refer to the internal organ 7sattva7 
and the individual soul 7not to the     
individual soul and the ,lord71 even    
then there is no contradiction 7between 
that interpretation and our present     
averment that the individual soul is not
 the abode of heaven and earth74--,how  
so8--,here 7i4e4 in the present ,stra   
and the ,stras immediately preceding7 it
 is denied that the individual soul     
which1 owing to its imagined connexion  
with the internal organ and other       
limiting adjuncts1 has a separate       
existence in separate bodies--its       
division being analogous to the division
 of universal space into limited spaces 
such as the spaces within jars and the  
like--is that which is called the abode 
of heaven and earth4 ,that same soul1 on

 the other hand1 which exists in all    
bodies1 if considered apart from the    
limiting adjuncts1 is nothing else but  
the highest ,self4 ,just as the spaces  
within jars1 if considered apart from   
their limiting conditions1 are merged in
 universal space1 so the individual soul
 also is incontestably that which is    
denoted as the abode of heaven and      
earth1 since it 7the soul7 cannot really
 be separate from the highest ,self4    
,that it is not the abode of heaven and 
earth1 is therefore said of the         
individual soul in so far only as it    
imagines itself to be connected with the
 internal organ and so on4 ,hence it    
follows that the highest ,self is the   
abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on4--,the
 same conclusion has already been       
arrived at under ,i1 #b1 #ba2 for in the
 passage concerning the source of all   
beings 7which passage is discussed under
 the ,stra quoted7 we meet with the     
clause1 ',in which heaven and earth and 
the sky are woven4' ,in the present     

adhikara_/n_/a the subject is resumed   
for the sake of further elucidation4    
#h4 ,the bhman 7is ,brahman71 as the    
instruction about it is additional to   
that about the state of deep sleep 7i4e4
 the vital air which remains awake even 
in the state of deep sleep74  ,we read  
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bc2 #bd71 ',that     
which is much 7bhman7 we must desire to 
understand4--,sir1 ,i desire to         
understand it4--,where one sees nothing 
else1 hears nothing else1 understands   
nothing else1 that is what is much      
7bhman74 ,where one sees something else1
 hears something else1 understands      
something else1 that is the             
,little4'--,here the doubt arises       
whether that which is much is the vital 
air 7pr_/n_/a7 or the highest           
,self4--,whence the doubt8--,the word   
'bhman1' taken by itself1 means the     
state of being much1 according to its   
derivation as taught by ,p_/n_/ani1     
,,vi1 #d1 #aeh4 ,hence there is felt the
 want of a specification showing what   

constitutes the ,self of that muchness4 
,here there presents itself at first the
 approximate passage1 ',the vital air is
 more than hope' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #ae1 
#a71 from which we may conclude that the
 vital air is bhman4--,on the other     
hand1 we meet at the beginning of the   
chapter1 where the general topic is     
stated1 with the following passage1 ',i 
have heard from men like you that he who
 knows the ,self overcomes grief4 ,i am 
in grief4 ,do1 ,sir1 help me over this  
grief of mine2' from which passage it   
would appear that the bhman is the      
highest ,self4--,hence there arises a   
doubt as to which of the two            
alternatives is to be embraced1 and     
which is to be set aside4  ,the         
prvapakshin maintains that the bhman is 
the vital air1 since there is found no  
further series of questions and answers 
as to what is more4 ,for while we meet  
with a series of questions and answers  
7such as1 ',sir1 is there something     
which is more than a name8'--',speech is

 more than name4'--',is there something 
which is more than speech8'--',mind is  
more than speech'71 which extends from  
name up to vital air1 we do not meet    
with a similar question and answer as to
 what might be more than vital air 7such
 as1 ',is there something which is more 
than vital air8'--',such and such a     
thing is more than vital air'74 ,the    
text rather at first declares at length 
7in the passage1 ',the vital air is more
 than hope1' c47 that the vital air is  
more than all the members of the series 
from name up to hope2 it then           
acknowledges him who knows the vital air
 to be an ativdin1 i4e4 one who makes a 
statement surpassing the preceding      
statements 7in the passage1 ',thou art  
an ativdin4 ,he may say ,i am an        
ativdin2 he need not deny it'72 and it  
thereupon 7in the passage1 ',but he in  
reality is an ativdin who declares      
something beyond by means of the        
,true'#aga71--not leaving off1 but      
rather continuing to refer to the       

quality of an ativdin which is founded  
on the vital air1--proceeds1 by means of
 the series beginning with the ,true1 to
 lead over to the bhman2 so that we     
conclude the meaning to be that the     
vital air is the bhman4--,but1 if the   
bhman is interpreted to mean the vital  
air1 how have we to explain the passage 
in which the bhman is characterised4    
',where one sees nothing else8' c4--,as1
 the prvapakshin replies1 in the state  
of deep sleep we observe a cessation of 
all activity1 such as seeing1 c41 on the
 part of the organs merged in the vital 
air1 the vital air itself may be        
characterised by a passage such as1     
',where one sees nothing else4'         
,similarly1 another scriptural passage  
7,pra4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b2 #c7 describes at  
first 7in the words1 ',he does not hear1
 he does not see1' c47 the state of deep
 sleep as characterised by the cessation
 of the activity of all bodily organs1  
and then by declaring that in that state
 the vital air1 with its five           

modifications1 remains awake 7',the     
fires of the pr_/n_/as are awake in that
 town'71 shows the vital air to occupy  
the principal position in the state of  
deep sleep4--,that passage also1 which  
speaks of the bliss of the bhman 7',the 
bhman is bliss1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bc71 
can be reconciled with our explanation1 
because ,pra4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f declares    
bliss to attach to the state of deep    
sleep 7',then that god sees no dreams   
and at that time that happiness arises  
in his body'74--,again1 the statement1  
',the bhman is immortality' 7,ch4 ,up4  
,,vii1 #bd1 #a71 may likewise refer to  
the vital air2 for another scriptural   
passage says1 ',pr_/n_/a is immortality'
 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b74--;,but how can 
the view according to which the bhman is
 the vital air be reconciled with the   
fact that in the beginning of the       
chapter the knowledge of the ,self is   
represented as the general topic 7',he  
who knows the ,self overcomes grief1'   
c478--,by the ,self there referred to1  

the prvapakshin replies1 nothing else is
 meant but the vital air4 ,for the      
passage1 ',the vital air is father1 the 
vital air is mother1 the vital air is   
brother1 the vital air is sister1 the   
vital air is teacher1 the vital air is  
,brhma_/n_/a' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #ae1    
#a71 represents the vital air as the    
,self of everything4 ,as1 moreover1 the 
passage1 ',as the spokes of a wheel rest
 in the nave1 so all this rests in      
pr_/n_/a1' declares the pr_/n_/a to be  
the ,self of all--by means of a         
comparison with the spokes and the nave 
of a wheel--the pr_/n_/a may be         
conceived under the form of bhman1 i4e4 
plenitude4--,bhman1 therefore1 means the
 vital air4  ,to this we make the       
following reply4--,bhman can mean the   
highest ,self only1 not the vital       
air4--,why8--',on account of information
 being given about it1 subsequent to    
bliss4' ,the word 'bliss' 7samprasda7   
means the state of deep sleep1 as may be
 concluded1 firstly1 from the etymology 

of the word 7',in it he1 i4e4 man1 is   
altogether pleased--samprasdati'7--and1 
secondly1 from the fact of samprasda    
being mentioned in the                  
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka together with the
 state of dream and the waking state4   
,and as in the state of deep sleep the  
vital air remains awake1 the word       
'samprasda' is employed in the ,stra to 
denote the vital air2 so that the ,stra 
means1 'on account of information being 
given about the bhman1 subsequently to  
7the information given about7 the vital 
air4' ,if the bhman were the vital air  
itself1 it would be a strange proceeding
 to make statements about the bhman in  
addition to the statements about the    
vital air4 ,for in the preceding        
passages also we do not meet1 for       
instance1 with a statement about name   
subsequent to the previous statement    
about name 7i4e4 the text does not say  
'name is more than name'71 but after    
something has been said about name1 a   
new statement is made about speech1     

which is something different from name  
7i4e4 the text says1 ',speech is more   
than name'71 and so on up to the        
statement about vital air1 each         
subsequent statement referring to       
something other than the topic of the   
preceding one4 ,we therefore conclude   
that the bhman also1 the statement about
 which follows on the statement about   
the vital air1 is something other than  
the vital air4 ,but--it may be          
objected--we meet here neither with a   
question1 such as1 ',is there something 
more than vital air8' nor with an       
answer1 such as1 ',that and that is more
 than vital air4' ,how1 then1 can it be 
said that the information about the     
bhman is given subsequently to the      
information about the vital             
air8--,moreover1 we see that the        
circumstance of being an ativdin1 which 
is exclusively connected with the vital 
air1 is referred to in the subsequent   
passage 7viz4 ',but in reality he is an 
ativdin who makes a statement surpassing

 7the preceding statements7 by means of 
the ,true'74 ,there is thus no          
information additional to the           
information about the vital air4--,to   
this objection we reply that it is      
impossible to maintain that the passage 
last quoted merely continues the        
discussion of the quality of being an   
ativdin1 as connected with the knowledge
 of the vital air2 since the clause1    
',he who makes a statement surpassing1  
c4 by means of the ,true1' states a     
specification4--,but1 the objector      
resumes1 this very statement of a       
specification may be explained as       
referring to the vital air4 ,if you ask 
how1 we refer you to an analogous case4 
,if somebody says1 ',this ,agnihotrin   
speaks the truth1' the meaning is not   
that the quality of being an ,agnihotrin
 depends on speaking the truth2 that    
quality rather depends on the 7regular  
performance of the7 agnihotra only1 and 
speaking the truth is mentioned merely  
as a special attribute of that special  

,agnihotrin4 ,so our passage also 7',but
 in reality he is an ativdin who makes a
 statement1 c4 by means of the ,true'7  
does not intimate that the quality of   
being an ativdin depends on speaking the
 truth1 but merely expresses that       
speaking the truth is a special         
attribute of him who knows the vital    
air2 while the quality of being an      
ativdin must be considered to depend on 
the knowledge of the vital air4--,this  
objection we rebut by the remark that it
 involves an abandonment of the direct  
meaning of the sacred text4 ,for from   
the text1 as it stands1 we understand   
that the quality of being an ativdin    
depends on speaking the truth2 the sense
 being3 ,an ativdin is he who is an     
ativdin by means of the ,true4 ,the     
passage does not in anyway contain a    
eulogisation of the knowledge of the    
vital air4 ,it could be connected with  
the latter only on the ground of general
 subject-matter 7prakara_/n_/a7#agb2    
which would involve an abandonment of   

the direct meaning of the text in favour
 of prakara_/n_/a#agc4--,moreover1 the  
particle but 7',but in reality he is1'  
c471 whose purport is to separate 7what 
follows7 from the subject-matter of what
 precedes1 would not agree 7with the    
pr_/n_/a explanation74 ,the following   
passage also1 ',but we must desire to   
know the ,true' 7,,vii1 #af71 which     
presupposes a new effort1 shows that a  
new topic is going to be entered        
upon4--,for these reasons we have to    
consider the statement about the ativdin
 in the same light as we should consider
 the remark--made in a conversation     
which previously had turned on the      
praise of those who study one           
,veda--that he who studies the four     
,vedas is a great ,brhma_/n_/a2 a remark
 which we should understand to be       
laudatory of persons different from     
those who study one ,veda1 i4e4 of those
 who study all the four ,vedas4 ,nor is 
there any reason to assume that a new   
topic can be introduced in the form of  

question and answer only2 for that the  
matter propounded forms a new topic is  
sufficiently clear from the circumstance
 that no connexion can be established   
between it and the preceding topic4 ,the
 succession of topics in the chapter    
under discussion is as follows3 ,nrada  
at first listens to the instruction     
which ,sanatkumra gives him about       
various matters1 the last of which is   
,pr_/n_/a1 and then becomes silent4     
,thereupon ,sanatkumra explains to him  
spontaneously 7without being asked7 that
 the quality of being an ativdin1 if    
merely based on the knowledge of the    
vital air--which knowledge has for its  
object an unreal product1--is devoid of 
substance1 and that he only is an       
ativdin who is such by means of the     
,true4 ,by the term 'the ,true' there is
 meant the highest ,brahman2 for        
,brahman is the ,real1 and it is called 
the ',true' in another scriptural       
passage also1 viz4 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1   
#a1 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is 

,brahman4' ,nrada1 thus enlightened1    
starts a new line of enquiry 7',might   
,i1 ,sir1 become an ativdin by the      
,true8'7 and ,sanatkumra then leads him1
 by a series of instrumental steps1     
beginning with understanding1 up to the 
knowledge of bhman4 ,we therefrom       
conclude that the bhman is that very    
,true whose explanation had been        
promised in addition to the 7knowledge  
of the7 vital air4 ,we thus see that the
 instruction about the bhman is         
additional to the instruction about the 
vital air1 and bhman must therefore mean
 the highest ,self1 which is different  
from the vital air4 ,with this          
interpretation the initial statement1   
according to which the enquiry into the 
,self forms the general subject-matter1 
agrees perfectly well4 ,the assumption1 
on the other hand 7made by the          
prvapakshin71 that by the ,self we have 
here to understand the vital air is     
indefensible4 ,for1 in the first place1 
,self-hood does not belong to the vital 

air in any non-figurative sense4 ,in the
 second place1 cessation of grief cannot
 take place apart from the knowledge of 
the highest ,self2 for1 as another      
scriptural passage declares1 ',there is 
no other path to go' 7_/,s_/vet4 ,up4   
,,vi1 #ae74 ,moreover1 after we have    
read at the outset1 ',do1 ,sir1 lead me 
over to the other side of grief' 7,ch4  
,up4 ,,vii1 #a1 #c71 we meet with the   
following concluding words 7,,vii1 #bf1 
#b71 ',to him1 after his faults had been
 rubbed out1 the venerable ,sanatkumra  
showed the other side of darkness4' ,the
 term 'darkness' here denotes           
,nescience1 the cause of grief1 and so  
on4--,moreover1 if the instruction      
terminated with the vital air1 it would 
not be said of the latter that it rests 
on something else4 ,but the brhma_/n_/a 
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #a7 does say1    
',the vital air springs from the ,self4'
 ,nor can it be objected against this   
last argument that the concluding part  
of the chapter may refer to the highest 

,self1 while1 all the same1 the bhman   
7mentioned in an earlier part of the    
chapter7 may be the vital air4 ,for1    
from the passage 7,,vii1 #bd1 #a71      
7',sir1 in what does the bhman rest8 ,in
 its own greatness1' c471 it appears    
that the bhman forms the continuous     
topic up to the end of the              
chapter4--,the quality of being the     
bhman--which quality is                 
plenitude--agrees1 moreover1 best with  
the highest ,self1 which is the cause of
 everything4  #i4 ,and on account of the
 agreement of the attributes 7mentioned 
in the text74  ,the attributes1         
moreover1 which the sacred text ascribes
 to the bhman agree well with the       
highest ,self4 ,the passage1 ',where one
 sees nothing else1 hears nothing else1 
understands nothing else1 that is the   
bhman1' gives us to understand that in  
the bhman the ordinary activities of    
seeing and so on are absent2 and that   
this is characteristic of the highest   
,self1 we know from another scriptural  

passage1 viz4 ',but when the ,self only 
is all this1 how should he see another8'
 c4 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae74     
,what is said about the absence of the  
activities of seeing and so on in the   
state of deep sleep 7,pra4 ,up4 ,,iv1   
#b7 is said with the intention of       
declaring the non-attachedness of the   
,self1 not of describing the nature of  
the pr_/n_/a2 for the highest ,self 7not
 the vital air7 is the topic of that    
passage4 ,the bliss also of which       
,scripture speaks as connected with that
 state is mentioned only in order to    
show that bliss constitutes the nature  
of the ,self4 ,for ,scripture says      
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #cb71 ',this  
is his highest bliss4 ,all other        
creatures live on a small portion of    
that bliss4'--,the passage under        
discussion also 7',the bhman is bliss4  
,there is no bliss in that which is     
little 7limited74 ,the bhman only is    
bliss'7 by denying the reality of bliss 
on the part of whatever is perishable   

shows that ,brahman only is bliss as    
bhman1 i4e4 in its plenitude1--,again1  
the passage1 ',the bhman is             
immortality1' shows that the highest    
cause is meant2 for the immortality of  
all effected things is a merely relative
 one1 and another scriptural passage    
says that 'whatever is different from   
that 7,brahman7 is perishable'          
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d1              
#b74--,similarly1 the qualities of being
 the ,true1 and of resting in its own   
greatness1 and of being omnipresent1 and
 of being the ,self of everything which 
the text mentions 7as belonging to the  
bhman7 can belong to the highest ,self  
only1 not to anything else4--,by all    
this it is proved that the bhman is the 
highest ,self4  #aj4 ,the ,imperishable 
7is ,brahman7 on account of 7its7       
supporting 7all things7 up to ether4    
,we read 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #g2 
#h74 ',in what then is the ether woven1 
like warp and woof8--,he said3 ,o ,grg1 
the ,brhma_/n_/as call this the akshara 

7the ,imperishable74 ,it is neither     
coarse nor fine1' and so on4--,here the 
doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' 
means 'syllable' or 'the highest ,lord4'
  ,the prvapakshin maintains that the   
word 'akshara' means 'syllable' merely1 
because it has1 in such terms as        
akshara-sammnya1 the meaning of         
'syllable2' because we have no right to 
disregard the settled meaning of a word2
 and because another scriptural passage 
also 7',the syllable ,om is all this1'  
,ch4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #bc1 #d7 declares a     
syllable1 represented as the object of  
devotion1 to be the ,self of all4  ,to  
this we reply that the highest ,self    
only is denoted by the word             
'akshara4'--,why8--,because it 7the     
akshara7 is said to support the entire  
aggregate of effects1 from earth up to  
ether4 ,for the sacred text declares at 
first that the entire aggregate of      
effects beginning with earth and        
differentiated by threefold time is     
based on ether1 in which it is 'woven   

like warp and woof2' leads then 7by     
means of the question1 ',in what then is
 the ether woven1 like warp and woof8'7 
over to the akshara1 and1 finally1      
concludes with the words1 ',in that     
akshara then1 ,o ,grg1 the ether is     
woven1 like warp and woof4'--,now the   
attribute of supporting everything up to
 ether cannot be ascribed to any being  
but ,brahman4 ,the text 7quoted from the
 ,ch4 ,up47 says indeed that the        
syllable ,om is all this1 but that      
statement is to be understood as a mere 
glorification of the syllable ,om       
considered as a means to obtain         
,brahman4--,therefore we take akshara to
 mean either 'the ,imperishable' or     
'that which pervades2' on the ground of 
either of which explanations it must be 
identified with the highest ,brahman4   
,but--our opponent resumes--while we    
must admit that the above reasoning     
holds good so far that the circumstance 
of the akshara supporting all things up 
to ether is to be accepted as a proof of

 all effects depending on a cause1 we   
point out that it may be employed by    
those also who declare the pradhna to be
 the general cause4 ,how then does the  
previous argumentation specially        
establish ,brahman 7to the exclusion of 
the pradhna78--,the reply to this is    
given in the next ,stra4  #aa4 ,this    
7supporting can71 on account of the     
command 7attributed to the              
,imperishable1 be the work of the       
highest ,lord only74  ,the supporting of
 all things up to ether is the work of  
the highest ,lord only4--,why8--,on     
account of the command4--,for the sacred
 text speaks of a command 7',by the     
command of that akshara1 ,o ,grg1 sun   
and moon stand apart6' ,,iii1 #h1 #i71  
and command can be the work of the      
highest ,lord only1 not of the          
non-intelligent pradhna4 ,for           
non-intelligent causes such as clay and 
the like are not capable of command1    
with reference to their effects1 such as
 jars and the like4  #ab4 ,and on       

account of 7,scripture7 separating 7the 
akshara7 from that whose nature is      
different 7from ,brahman74  ,also on    
account of the reason stated in this    
,stra ,brahman only is to be considered 
as the ,imperishable1 and the supporting
 of all things up to ether is to be     
looked upon as the work of ,brahman     
only1 not of anything else4 ,the meaning
 of the ,stra is as follows4 ,whatever  
things other than ,brahman might        
possibly be thought to be denoted by the
 term 'akshara1' from the nature of all 
those things ,scripture separates the   
akshara spoken of as the support of all 
things up to ether4 ,the scriptural     
passage alluded to is ,,iii1 #h1 #aa1   
',that akshara1 ,o ,grg1 is unseen but  
seeing1 unheard but hearing1 unperceived
 but perceiving1 unknown but knowing4'  
,here the designation of being unseen1  
c4 agrees indeed with the pradhna also1 
but not so the designation of seeing1   
c41 as the pradhna is                   
non-intelligent4--,nor can the word     

akshara denote the embodied soul with   
its limiting conditions1 for the passage
 following on the one quoted declares   
that there is nothing different from the
 ,self 7'there is nothing that sees but 
it1 nothing that hears but it1 nothing  
that perceives but it1 nothing that     
knows but it'72 and1 moreover1 limiting 
conditions are expressly denied 7of the 
akshara7 in the passage1 ',it is without
 eyes1 without ears1 without speech1    
without mind1' c4 7,,iii1 #h1 #h74 ,an  
embodied soul without limiting          
conditions does not exist#agd4--;,it is 
therefore certain beyond doubt that the 
,imperishable is nothing else but the   
highest ,brahman4  #ac4 ,on account of  
his being designated as the object of   
sight 7the highest ,self is meant1 and7 
the same 7is meant in the passage       
speaking of the meditation on the       
highest person by means of the syllable 
,om74  7,in ,pra4 ,up4 ,v1 #b7 the      
general topic of discussion is set forth
 in the words1 ',o ,satyakma1 the       

syllable ,om is the highest and also the
 other ,brahman2 therefore he who knows 
it arrives by the same means at one of  
the two4' ,the text then goes on1       
',again1 he who meditates with this     
syllable ,om of three mtrs on the       
highest ,person1' c4--,here the doubt   
presents itself1 whether the object of  
meditation referred to in the latter    
passage is the highest ,brahman or the  
other ,brahman2 a doubt based on the    
former passage1 according to which both 
are under discussion4  ,the prvapakshin 
maintains that the other1 i4e4 the lower
 ,brahman1 is referred to1 because the  
text promises only a reward limited by a
 certain locality for him who knows it4 
,for1 as the highest ,brahman is        
omnipresent1 it would be inappropriate  
to assume that he who knows it obtains a
 fruit limited by a certain locality4   
,the objection that1 if the lower       
,brahman were understood1 there would be
 no room for the qualification1 'the    
highest person1' is not valid1 because  

the vital principal 7pr_/n_/a7 may be   
called 'higher' with reference to the   
body#age4  ,to this we make the         
following reply3 ,what is here taught as
 the object of meditation is the highest
 ,brahman only4--,why8--,on account of  
its being spoken of as the object of    
sight4 ,for the person to be meditated  
upon is1 in a complementary passage1    
spoken of as the object of the act of   
seeing1 ',he sees the person dwelling in
 the castle 7of the body2 purusham      
puri_/s_/ayam71 higher than that one who
 is of the shape of the individual soul1
 and who is himself higher 7than the    
senses and their objects74' ,now1 of an 
act of meditation an unreal thing also  
can be the object1 as1 for instance1 the
 merely imaginary object of a wish4 ,but
 of the act of seeing1 real things only 
are the objects1 as we know from        
experience2 we therefore conclude1 that 
in the passage last quoted1 the highest 
7only real7 ,self which corresponds to  
the mental act of complete intuition#agf

 is spoken of as the object of sight4   
,this same highest ,self we recognise in
 the passage under discussion as the    
object of meditation1 in consequence of 
the term1 'the highest                  
person4'--,but--an objection will be    
raised--as the object of meditation we  
have the highest person1 and as the     
object of sight the person higher than  
that one who is himself higher1 c42 how1
 then1 are we to know that those two are
 identical8--,the two passages1 we      
reply1 have in common the terms         
'highest' 7or 'higher1' para7 and       
'person4' ,and it must not by any means 
be supposed that the term jvaghana#agg  
refers to that highest person which1    
considered as the object of meditation1 
had previously been introduced as the   
general topic4 ,for the consequence of  
that supposition would be that that     
highest person which is the object of   
sight would be different from that      
highest person which is represented as  
the object of meditation4 ,we rather    

have to explain the word jvaghana as    
',he whose shape#agh is characterised by
 the jvas2' so that what is really meant
 by that term is that limited condition 
of the highest ,self which is owing to  
its adjuncts1 and manifests itself in   
the form of jvas1 i4e4 individual souls2
 a condition analogous to the limitation
 of salt 7in general7 by means of the   
mass of a particular lump of salt4 ,that
 limited condition of the ,self may     
itself be called 'higher1' if viewed    
with regard to the senses and their     
objects4  ,another 7commentator7 says   
that we have to understand by the word  
'jvaghana' the world of ,brahman spoken 
of in the preceding sentence 7'by the   
,sman verses he is led up to the world  
of ,brahman'71 and again in the         
following sentence 7v4 #g71 which may be
 called 'higher1' because it is higher  
than the other worlds4 ,that world of   
,brahman may be called jvaghana because 
all individual souls 7jva7 with their   
organs of action may be viewed as       

comprised 7sanghta  ghana7 within       
,hira_/n_/yagarbha1 who is the ,self of 
all organs1 and dwells in the           
,brahma-world4 ,we thus understand that 
he who is higher than that jvaghana1    
i4e4 the highest ,self1 which           
constitutes the object of sight1 also   
constitutes the object of meditation4   
,the qualification1 moreover1 expressed 
in the term 'the highest person' is in  
its place only if we understand the     
highest ,self to be meant4 ,for the     
name1 'the highest person1' can be given
 only to the highest ,self1 higher than 
which there is nothing4 ,so another     
scriptural passage also says1 ',higher  
than the person there is nothing--this  
is the goal1 the highest road4' ,hence  
the sacred text1 which at first         
distinguishes between the higher and the
 lower ,brahman 7'the syllable ,om is   
the higher and the lower ,brahman'71 and
 afterwards speaks of the highest       
,person to be meditated upon by means of
 the syllable ,om1 gives us to          

understand that the highest ,person is  
nothing else but the highest ,brahman4  
,that the highest ,self constitutes the 
object of meditation1 is moreover       
intimated by the passage declaring that 
release from evil is the fruit 7of      
meditation71 ',as a snake is freed from 
its skin1 so is he freed from           
evil4'--,with reference to the objection
 that a fruit confined to a certain     
place is not an appropriate reward for  
him who meditates on the highest ,self1 
we finally remark that the objection is 
removed1 if we understand the passage to
 refer to emancipation by degrees4 ,he  
who meditates on the highest ,self by   
means of the syllable ,om1 as consisting
 of three mtrs1 obtains for his 7first7 
reward the world of ,brahman1 and after 
that1 gradually1 complete intuition4    
#ad4 ,the small 7ether7 7is ,brahman7 on
 account of the subsequent 7arguments74 
,we read 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #a71    
',there is this city of ,brahman1 and in
 it the palace1 the small lotus1 and in 

it that small ether4 ,now what exists   
within that small ether that is to be   
sought for1 that is to be understood1'  
c4--,here the doubt arises whether the  
small ether within the small lotus of   
the heart of which ,scripture speaks1 is
 the elemental ether1 or the individual 
soul 7vij_/_/ntman71 or the highest     
,self4 ,this doubt is caused by the     
words 'ether' and 'city of ,brahman4'   
,for the word 'ether1' in the first     
place1 is known to be used in the sense 
of elemental ether as well as of highest
 ,brahman4 ,hence the doubt whether the 
small ether of the text be the elemental
 ether or the highest ether1 i4e4       
,brahman4 ,in explanation of the        
expression 'city of ,brahman1' in the   
second place1 it might be said either   
that the individual soul is here called 
,brahman and the body ,brahman's city1  
or else that the city of ,brahman means 
the city of the highest ,brahman4 ,here 
7i4e4 in consequence of this latter     
doubt7 a further doubt arises as to the 

nature of the small ether1 according as 
the individual soul or the highest ,self
 is understood by the ,lord of the city4
  ,the prvapakshin maintains that by the
 small ether we have to understand the  
elemental ether1 since the latter       
meaning is the conventional one of the  
word k_/s_/a4 ,the elemental ether is   
here called small with reference to its 
small abode 7the heart74--,in the       
passage1 ',as large as this ether is1 so
 large is that ether within the heart1' 
it is represented as constituting at the
 same time the two terms of a           
comparison1 because it is possible to   
make a distinction between the outer and
 the inner ether#agi2 and it is said    
that 'heaven and earth are contained    
within it1' because the whole ether1 in 
so far as it is space1 is one#ahj4--,or 
else1 the prvapakshin continues1 the    
'small one' may be taken to mean the    
individual soul1 on account of the term1
 'the city of ,brahman4' ,the body is   
here called the city of ,brahman because

 it is the abode of the individual soul2
 for it is acquired by means of the     
actions of the soul4 ,on this           
interpretation we must assume that the  
individual soul is here called ,brahman 
metaphorically4 ,the highest ,brahman   
cannot be meant1 because it is not      
connected with the body as its lord4    
,the lord of the city1 i4e4 the soul1 is
 represented as dwelling in one spot of 
the city 7viz4 the heart71 just as a    
real king resides in one spot of his    
residence4 ,moreover1 the mind 7manas7  
constitutes the limiting adjunct of the 
individual soul1 and the mind chiefly   
abides in the heart2 hence the          
individual soul only can be spoken of as
 dwelling in the heart4 ,further1 the   
individual soul only can be spoken of as
 small1 since it is 7elsewhere2         
_/,s_/vet4 ,up4 ,v1 #h7 compared in size
 to the point of a goad4 ,that it is    
compared 7in the passage under          
discussion7 to the ether must be        
understood to intimate its non          

difference from ,brahman4--,nor does the
 scriptural passage say that the 'small'
 one is to be sought for and to be      
understood1 since in the clause1 ',that 
which is within that1' c41 it is        
represented as a mere distinguishing    
attribute of something else#aha4  ,to   
all this we make the following          
reply3--,the small ether can mean the   
highest ,lord only1 not either the      
elemental ether or the individual       
soul4--,why8--,on account of the        
subsequent reasons1 i4e4 on account of  
the reasons implied in the complementary
 passage4 ,for there1 the text declares 
at first1 with reference to the small   
ether1 which is enjoined as the object  
of sight1 ',if they should say to him1' 
c42 thereupon follows an objection1     
',what is there that deserves to be     
sought for or that is to be understood8'
 and thereon a final decisive statement1
 ',then he should say3 ,as large as this
 ether is1 so large is that ether within
 the heart4 ,both heaven and earth are  

contained within it4' ,here the teacher1
 availing himself of the comparison of  
the ether within the heart with the     
known 7universal7 ether1 precludes the  
conception that the ether within the    
heart is small--which conception is     
based on the statement as to the        
smallness of the lotus1 i4e4 the        
heart--and thereby precludes the        
possibility of our understanding by the 
term 'the small ether1' the elemental   
ether4 ,for1 although the ordinary use  
of language gives to the word 'ether'   
the sense of elemental ether1 here the  
elemental ether cannot be thought of1   
because it cannot possibly be compared  
with itself4--,but1 has it not been     
stated above1 that the ether1 although  
one only1 may be compared with itself1  
in consequence of an assumed difference 
between the outer and the inner         
ether8--,that explanation1 we reply1 is 
impossible2 for we cannot admit that a  
comparison of a thing with itself may be
 based upon a merely imaginary          

difference4 ,and even if we admitted the
 possibility of such a comparison1 the  
extent of the outer ether could never be
 ascribed to the limited inner ether4   
,should it be said that to the highest  
,lord also the extent of the 7outer7    
ether cannot be ascribed1 since another 
scriptural passage declares that he is  
greater than ether 7_/,s_/a4 ,br1 ,x1   
#f1 #c1 #b71 we invalidate this         
objection by the remark1 that the       
passage 7comparing the inner ether with 
the outer ether7 has the purport of     
discarding the idea of smallness 7of the
 inner ether71 which is prim facie      
established by the smallness of the     
lotus of the heart in which it is       
contained1 and has not the purport of   
establishing a certain extent 7of the   
inner ether74 ,if the passage aimed at  
both1 a split of the sentence#ahb would 
result4--,nor1 if we allowed the        
assumptive difference of the inner and  
the outer ether1 would it be possible to
 represent that limited portion of the  

ether which is enclosed in the lotus of 
the heart1 as containing within itself  
heaven1 earth1 and so on4 ,nor can we   
reconcile with the nature of the        
elemental ether the qualities of        
,self-hood1 freeness from sin1 and so   
on1 7which are ascribed to the 'small'  
ether7 in the following passage1 ',it is
 the ,self free from sin1 free from old 
age1 from death and grief1 from hunger  
and thirst1 of true desires1 of true    
purposes4'--,although the term ',self'  
7occurring in the passage quoted7 may   
apply to the individual soul1 yet other 
reasons exclude all idea of the         
individual soul being meant 7by the     
small ether74 ,for it would be          
impossible to dissociate from the       
individual soul1 which is restricted by 
limiting conditions and elsewhere       
compared to the point of a goad1 the    
attribute of smallness attaching to it1 
on account of its being enclosed in the 
lotus of the heart4--,let it then be    
assumed--our opponent remarks--that the 

qualities of all-pervadingness1 c4 are  
ascribed to the individual soul with the
 intention of intimating its            
non-difference from ,brahman4--,well1 we
 reply1 if you suppose that the small   
ether is called all-pervading because it
 is one with ,brahman1 our own          
supposition1 viz4 that the              
all-pervadingness spoken of is directly 
predicated of ,brahman itself1 is the   
much more simple one4--,concerning the  
assertion that the term 'city of        
,brahman' can only be understood1 on the
 assumption that the individual soul    
dwells1 like a king1 in one particular  
spot of the city of which it is the     
,lord1 we remark that the term is more  
properly interpreted to mean 'the body  
in so far as it is the city of the      
highest ,brahman2' which interpretation 
enables us to take the term ',brahman'  
in its primary sense#ahc4 ,the highest  
,brahman also is connected with the     
body1 for the latter constitutes an     
abode for the perception of             

,brahman#ahd4 ,other scriptural passages
 also express the same meaning1 so1 for 
instance1 ,pra4 ,up4 ,v1 #e1 ',he sees  
the highest person dwelling in the city'
 7purusha  puri_/s_/aya71 c41 and       
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ah1 ',this    
person 7purusha7 is in all cities       
7bodies7 the dweller within the city    
7puri_/s_/aya74'--,or else 7taking      
brahmapura to mean jvapura7 we may      
understand the passage to teach that    
,brahman is1 in the city of the         
individual soul1 near 7to the devout    
worshipper71 just as ,vish_/n_/u is near
 to us in the                           
,slagrma-stone4--,moreover1 the text    
7,,viii1 #a1 #f7 at first declares the  
result of works to be perishable 7'as   
here on earth whatever has been acquired
 by works perishes1 so perishes whatever
 is acquired for the next world by good 
actions1' c471 and afterwards declares  
the imperishableness of the results     
flowing from a knowledge of the small   
ether1 which forms the general subject  

of discussion 7'those who depart from   
hence after having discovered the ,self 
and those true desires1 for them there  
is freedom in all worlds'74 ,from this  
again it is manifest that the small     
ether is the highest ,self4--,we now    
turn to the statement made by the       
prvapakshin1'that the sacred text does  
not represent the small ether as that   
which is to be sought for and to be     
understood1 because it is mentioned as a
 distinguishing attribute of something  
else1' and reply as follows3 ,if the    
7small7 ether were not that which is to 
be sought for and to be understood1 the 
description of the nature of that ether1
 which is given in the passage 7'as     
large as this ether is1 so large is that
 ether within the heart'71 would be     
devoid of purport4--,but--the opponent  
might say--that descriptive statement   
also has the purport of setting forth   
the nature of the thing abiding within  
7the ether72 for the text after having  
raised an objection 7in the passage1    

',and if they should say to him3 ,now   
with regard to that city of ,brahman and
 the palace in it1 i4e4 the small lotus 
of the heart1 and the small ether within
 the heart1 what is there within it that
 deserves to be sought for or that is to
 be understood8'7 declares1 when        
replying to that objection1 that heaven1
 earth1 and so on1 are contained within 
it 7the ether71 a declaration to which  
the comparison with the ether forms a   
mere introduction4--,your reasoning1 we 
reply1 is faulty4 ,if it were admitted1 
it would follow that heaven1 earth1 c41 
which are contained within the small    
ether1 constitute the objects of search 
and enquiry4 ,but in that case the      
complementary passage would be out of   
place4 ,for the text carrying on1 as the
 subject of discussion1 the ether that  
is the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4--by   
means of the clauses1 ',in it all       
desires are contained1' ',it is the     
,self free from sin1' c41 and the       
passage1 ',but those who depart from    

hence having discovered the ,self1 and  
the true desires' 7in which passage the 
conjunction 'and' has the purpose of    
joining the desires to the              
,self7--declares that the ,self as well1
 which is the abode of the desires1 as  
the desires which abide in the ,self1   
are the objects of knowledge4 ,from this
 we conclude that in the beginning of   
the passage also1 the small ether       
abiding within the lotus of the heart1  
together with whatever is contained     
within it as earth1 true desires1 and so
 on1 is represented as the object of    
knowledge4 ,and1 for the reasons        
explained1 that ether is the highest    
,lord4  #ae4 7,the small ether is       
,brahman7 on account of the action of   
going 7into ,brahman7 and of the word   
7brahmaloka72 for thus it is seen 7i4e4 
that the individual souls go into       
,brahman is seen elsewhere in           
,scripture72 and 7this going of the     
souls into ,brahman constitutes7 an     
inferential sign 7by means of which we  

may properly interpret the word         
'brahmaloka'74  ,it has been declared   
7in the preceding ,stra7 that the small 
7ether7 is the highest ,lord1 on account
 of the reasons contained in the        
subsequent passages4 ,these subsequent  
reasons are now set forth4--,for this   
reason also the small 7ether7 can be the
 highest ,lord only1 because the passage
 complementary to the passage concerning
 the small 7ether7 contains a mention of
 going and a word1 both of which        
intimate the highest ,lord4 ,in the     
first place1 we read 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 
#c1 #b71 ',all these creatures1 day     
after day going into that ,brahma-world1
 do not discover it4' ,this passage     
which refers back1 by means of the word 
',brahma-world1' to the small ether     
which forms the general subject-matter1 
speaks of the going to it of the        
creatures1 i4e4 the individual souls1   
wherefrom we conclude that the small    
7ether7 is ,brahman4 ,for this going of 
the individual souls into ,brahman1     

which takes place day after day in the  
state of deep sleep1 is seen1 i4e4 is   
met with in another scriptural passage1 
viz4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a1 ',he       
becomes united with the ,true1' c4 ,in  
ordinary life also we say of a man who  
lies in deep sleep1 'he has become      
,brahman1' 'he is gone into the state of
 ,brahman4'--,in the second place1 the  
word ',brahma-world1' which is here     
applied to the small 7ether7 under      
discussion1 excludes all thought of the 
individual soul or the elemental ether1 
and thus gives us to understand that the
 small 7ether7 is ,brahman4--,but could 
not the word ',brahma-world' convey as  
well the idea of the world of him whose 
throne is the lotus#ahe8--;,it might do 
so indeed1 if we explained the compound 
',brahma-world' as 'the world of        
,brahman4' ,but if we explain it on the 
ground of the coordination of both      
members of the compound--so that        
',brahma-world' denotes that world which
 is ,brahman--then it conveys the idea  

of the highest ,brahman only4--,and that
 daily going 7of the souls7 into        
,brahman 7mentioned above7 is1 moreover1
 an inferential sign for explaining the 
compound ',brahma-world1' on the ground 
of the co-ordination of its two         
constituent members4 ,for it would be   
impossible to assume that all those     
creatures daily go into the world of the
 effected 7lower7 ,brahman2 which world 
is commonly called the ,satyaloka1 i4e4 
the world of the ,true4  #af4 ,and on   
account of the supporting also          
7attributed to it71 7the small ether    
must be the ,lord7 because that         
greatness is observed in him 7according 
to other scriptural passages74  ,and    
also on account of the 'supporting' the 
small ether can be the highest ,lord    
only4--,how8--,the text at first        
introduces the general subject of       
discussion in the passage1 ',in it is   
that small ether2' declares thereupon   
that the small one is to be compared    
with the universal ether1 and that      

everything is contained in it2          
subsequently applies to it the term     
',self1' and states it to possess the   
qualities of being free from sin1 c42   
and1 finally1 declares with reference to
 the same general subject of discussion1
 ',that ,self is a bank1 a limitary     
support 7vidh_/ri_/ti71 that these      
worlds may not be confounded4' ,as      
'support' is here predicated of the     
,self1 we have to understand by it a    
supporting agent4 ,just as a dam stems  
the spreading water so that the         
boundaries of the fields are not        
confounded1 so that ,self acts like a   
limitary dam in order that these outer  
and inner worlds1 and all the different 
castes and _/s_/ramas may not be        
confounded4 ,in accordance with this our
 text declares that greatness1 which is 
shown in the act of holding asunder1 to 
belong to the small 7ether7 which forms 
the subject of discussion2 and that such
 greatness is found in the highest ,lord
 only1 is seen from other scriptural    

passages1 such as ',by the command of   
that ,imperishable1 ,o ,grg1 sun and    
moon2 are held apart' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #h1 #i74 ,similarly1 we read in  
another passage also1 about whose       
referring to the highest ,lord there is 
no doubt1 ',he is the ,lord of all1 the 
king of all things1 the protector of all
 things4 ,he is a bank and a limitary   
support1 so that these worlds may not be
 confounded' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1  
#bb7--;,hence1 on account of the        
'supporting1' also the small 7ether7 is 
nothing else but the highest ,lord4     
#ag4 ,and on account of the settled     
meaning4  ,the small ether within cannot
 denote anything but the highest ,lord  
for this reason also1 that the word     
'ether' has 7among other meanings7 the  
settled meaning of 'highest ,lord4'     
,compare1 for instance1 the sense in    
which the word 'ether' is used in ,ch4  
,up4 ,,viii1 #ad1 ',he who is called    
ether is the revealer of all forms and  
names2' and ,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #i1 #a1 ',all 

these beings take their rise from the   
ether1' c4 ,on the other hand1 we do not
 meet with any passage in which the word
 'ether' is used in the sense of        
'individual soul4'--,we have already    
shown that the word cannot1 in our      
passage1 denote the elemental ether2    
for1 although the word certainly has    
that settled meaning1 it cannot have it 
here1 because the elemental ether cannot
 possibly be compared to itself1 c4 c4  
#ah4 ,if it be said that the other one  
7i4e4 the individual soul7 7is meant7 on
 account of a reference to it 7made in a
 complementary passage71 7we say7 no1 on
 account of the impossibility4  ,if the 
small 7ether7 is to be explained as the 
highest ,lord on account of a           
complementary passage1 then1 the        
prvapakshin resumes1 we point out that  
another complementary passage contains a
 reference to the other one1 i4e4 to the
 individual soul3 ',now that serene     
being 7literally3 serenity1 complete    
satisfaction71 which after having risen 

out from this earthly body and having   
reached the highest light1 appears in   
its true form1 that is1 the ,self2 thus 
he spoke' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #d74   
,for there the word 'serenity1' which is
 known to denote1 in another scriptural 
passage1 the state of deep sleep1 can   
convey the idea of the individual soul  
only when it is in that state1 not of   
anything else4 ,the 'rising from the    
body' also can be predicated of the     
individual soul only whose abode the    
body is2 just as air1 c41 whose abode is
 the ether1 are said to arise from the  
ether4 ,and just as the word 'ether1'   
although in ordinary language not       
denoting the highest ,lord1 yet is      
admitted to denote him in such passages 
as1 ',the ether is the revealer of forms
 and names1' because it there occurs in 
conjunction with qualities of the       
highest ,lord1 so it may likewise denote
 the individual soul ,hence the term    
'the small ether' denotes in the passage
 under discussion the individual soul1  

'on account of the reference to the     
other4'  ,not so1 we reply1 'on account 
of the impossibility4' ,in the first    
place1 the individual soul1 which       
imagines itself to be limited by the    
internal organ and its other adjuncts1  
cannot be compared with the ether4 ,and1
 in the second place1 attributes such as
 freedom from evil1 and the like1 cannot
 be ascribed to a being which           
erroneously transfers to itself the     
attributes of its limiting adjuncts4    
,this has already been set forth in the 
first ,stra of the present              
adhikara_/n_/a1 and is again mentioned  
here in order to remove all doubt as to 
the soul being different from the       
highest ,self4 ,that the reference      
pointed out by the prvapakshin is not to
 the individual soul will1 moreover1 be 
shown in one of the next ,stras 7,i1 #c1
 #ba74  #ai4 ,if it be said that from   
the subsequent 7chapter it appears that 
the individual soul is meant71 7we point
 out that what is there referred to is7 

rather 7the individual soul in so far7  
as its true nature has become manifest  
7i4e4 as it is non-different from       
,brahman74  ,the doubt whether1 'on     
account of the reference to the other1' 
the individual soul might not possibly  
be meant1 has been discarded on the     
ground of 'impossibility4' ,but1 like a 
dead man on whom am_/ri_/ta has been    
sprinkled1 that doubt rises again1      
drawing new strength from the subsequent
 chapter which treats of ,prajpati4 ,for
 there he 7,prajpati7 at the outset     
declares that the ,self1 which is free  
from sin and the like1 is that which is 
to be searched out1 that which we must  
try to understand 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1
 #a72 after that he points out that the 
seer within the eye1 i4e4 the individual
 soul1 is the ,self 7'that person that  
is seen in the eye is the ,self1'       
,,viii1 #g1 #c72 refers again and again 
to the same entity 7in the clauses ',i  
shall explain him further to you1'      
,,viii1 #i1 #c2 ,,viii1 #aj1 #d72 and   

7in the explanations fulfilling the     
given promises7 again explains the      
7nature of the7 same individual soul in 
its different states 7',he who moves    
about happy in dreams is the ,self1'    
,,viii1 #aj1 #a2 ',when a man being     
asleep1 reposing1 and at perfect rest   
sees no dreams1 that is the ,self1'     
,,viii1 #aa1 #a74 ,the clause attached  
to both these explanations 7viz4 ',that 
is the immortal1 the fearless2 that is  
,brahman'7 shows1 at the same time1 the 
individual soul to be free from sin1 and
 the like4 ,after that ,prajpati1 having
 discovered a shortcoming in the        
condition of deep sleep 7in consequence 
of the expostulation of ,indra1 ',in    
that way he does not know himself that  
he is ,i1 nor does he know these        
beings1' ,,viii1 #aa1 #b71 enters on a  
further explanation 7',i shall explain  
him further to you1 and nothing more    
than this'71 begins by blaming the      
7soul's7 connexion with the body1 and   
finally declares the individual soul1   

when it has risen from the body1 to be  
the highest person4 7',thus does that   
serene being1 arising from this body1   
appear in its own form as soon as it has
 approached the highest light4 ,that is 
the highest person4'7--,from this it    
appears that there is a possibility of  
the qualities of the highest ,lord      
belonging to the individual soul also1  
and on that account we maintain that the
 term1 'the small ether within it1'     
refers to the individual soul4  ,this   
position we counter-argue as follows4   
',but in so far as its nature has become
 manifest4' ,the particle 'but' 7in the 
,stra7 is meant to set aside the view of
 the prvapakshin1 so that the sense of  
the ,stra is1 ',not even on account of  
the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the
 small ether being the individual soul  
is possible1 because there also that    
which is meant to be intimated is the   
individual soul1 in so far only as its  
7true7 nature has become manifest4' ,the
 ,stra uses the expression 'he whose    

nature has become manifest1' which      
qualifies jva41 the individual soul1    
with reference to its previous          
condition#ahf4--,the meaning is as      
follows4 ,prajpati speaks at first of   
the seer characterised by the eye       
7',that person which is within the eye1'
 c472 shows thereupon1 in the passage   
treating of 7the reflection in7 the     
waterpan1 that he 7viz4 the seer7 has   
not his true ,self in the body2 refers  
to him repeatedly as the subject to be  
explained 7in the clauses ',i shall     
explain him further to you'72 and having
 then spoken of him as subject to the   
states of dreaming and deep sleep1      
finally explains the individual soul in 
its real nature1 i4e4 in so far as it is
 the highest ,brahman1 not in so far as 
it is individual soul 7',as soon as it  
has approached the highest light it     
appears in its own form'74 ,the highest 
light mentioned1 in the passage last    
quoted1 as what is to be approached1 is 
nothing else but the highest ,brahman1  

which is distinguished by such          
attributes as freeness from sin1 and the
 like4 ,that same highest ,brahman      
constitutes--as we know from passages   
such as 'that art thou'--the real nature
 of the individual soul1 while its      
second nature1 i4e4 that aspect of it   
which depends on fictitious limiting    
conditions1 is not its real nature4 ,for
 as long as the individual soul does not
 free itself from ,nescience in the form
 of duality--which ,nescience may be    
compared to the mistake of him who in   
the twilight mistakes a post for a      
man--and does not rise to the knowledge 
of the ,self1 whose nature is           
unchangeable1 eternal ,cognition--which 
expresses itself in the form ',i am     
,brahman'--so long it remains the       
individual soul4 ,but when1 discarding  
the aggregate of body1 sense-organs and 
mind1 it arrives1 by means of           
,scripture1 at the knowledge that it is 
not itself that aggregate1 that it does 
not form part of transmigratory         

existence1 but is the ,true1 the ,real1 
the ,self1 whose nature is pure         
intelligence2 then knowing itseif to be 
of the nature of unchangeable1 eternal  
,cognition1 it lifts itself above the   
vain conceit of being one with this     
body1 and itself becomes the ,self1     
whose nature is unchanging1 eternal     
,cognition4 ,as is declared in such     
scriptural passages as ',he who knows   
the highest ,brahman becomes even       
,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i74    
,and this is the real nature of the     
individual soul by means of which it    
arises from the body and appears in its 
own form4  ,here an objection may be    
raised4 ,how1 it is asked1 can we speak 
of the true nature 7svarpa7 of that     
which is unchanging and eternal1 and    
then say that 'it appears in its own    
form 7true nature78' ,of gold and       
similar substances1 whose true nature   
becomes hidden1 and whose specific      
qualities are rendered non-apparent by  
their contact with some other substance1

 it may be said that their true nature  
is rendered manifest when they are      
cleaned by the application of some acid 
substance2 so it may be said1 likewise1 
that the stars1 whose light is during   
daytime overpowered 7by the superior    
brilliancy of the sun71 become manifest 
in their true nature at night when the  
overpowering 7sun7 has departed4 ,but it
 is impossible to speak of an analogous 
overpowering of the eternal light of    
intelligence by whatever agency1 since1 
like ether1 it is free from all contact1
 and since1 moreover1 such an assumption
 would be contradicted by what we       
actually observe4 ,for the 7energies of7
 seeing1 hearing1 noticing1 cognising   
constitute the character of the         
individual soul1 and that character is  
observed to exist in full perfection1   
even in the case of that individual soul
 which has not yet risen beyond the     
body4 ,every individual soul carries on 
the course of its practical existence by
 means of the activities of seeing1     

hearing1 cognising2 otherwise no        
practical existence at all would be     
possible4 ,if1 on the other hand1 that  
character would realise itself in the   
case of that soul only which has risen  
above the body1 the entire aggregate of 
practical existence1 as it actually     
presents itself prior to the soul's     
rising1 would thereby be contradicted4  
,we therefore ask3 ,wherein consists    
that 7alleged7 rising from the body8    
,wherein consists that appearing 7of the
 soul7 in its own form8  ,to this we    
make the following reply4--,before the  
rise of discriminative knowledge the    
nature of the individual soul1 which is 
7in reality7 pure light1 is             
non-discriminated as it were from its   
limiting adjuncts consisting of body1   
senses1 mind1 sense-objects and         
feelings1 and appears as consisting of  
the energies of seeing and so on4       
,similarly--to quote an analogous case  
from ordinary experience--the true      
nature of a pure crystal1 i4e4 its      

transparency and whiteness1 is1 before  
the rise of discriminative knowledge 7on
 the part of the observer71             
non-discriminated as it were from any   
limiting adjuncts of red or blue colour2
 while1 as soon as through some means of
 true cognition discriminative knowledge
 has arisen1 it is said to have now     
accomplished its true nature1 i4e4      
transparency and whiteness1 although in 
reality it had already done so before4  
,thus the discriminative knowledge1     
effected by _/,s_/ruti1 on the part of  
the individual soul which previously is 
non-discriminated as it were from its   
limiting adjuncts1 is 7according to the 
scriptural passage under discussion7 the
 soul's rising from the body1 and the   
fruit of that discriminative knowledge  
is its accomplishment in its true       
nature1 i4e4 the comprehension that its 
nature is the pure ,self4 ,thus the     
embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of
 the ,self are due merely to            
discrimination and non-discrimination1  

in agreement with the mantra1 ',bodiless
 within the bodies1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1  
#b1 #bb71 and the statement of          
,sm_/ri_/ti as to the non-difference    
between embodiedness and                
non-embodiedness ',though dwelling in   
the body1 ,o ,kaunteya1 it does not act 
and is not tainted' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1  
#ca74 ,the individual soul is therefore 
called ',that whose true nature is      
non-manifest' merely on account of the  
absence of discriminative knowledge1 and
 it is called ',that whose nature has   
become manifest' on account of the      
presence of such knowledge4             
,manifestation and non-manifestation of 
its nature of a different kind are not  
possible1 since its nature is nothing   
but its nature 7i4e4 in reality is      
always the same74 ,thus the difference  
between the individual soul and the     
highest ,lord is owing to wrong         
knowledge only1 not to any reality1     
since1 like ether1 the highest ,self is 
not in real contact with anything4  ,and

 wherefrom is all this to be            
known8--,from the instruction given by  
,prajpati who1 after having referred to 
the jva 7'the person that is seen in the
 eye1' c471 continues ',this is the     
immortal1 the fearless1 this is         
,brahman4' ,if the well-known seer      
within the eye were different from      
,brahman which is characterised as the  
immortal and fearless1 it would not be  
co-ordinated 7as it actually is7 with   
the immortal1 the fearless1 and         
,brahman4 ,the reflected ,self1 on the  
other hand1 is not spoken of as he who  
is characterised by the eye 7the seer   
within the eye71 for that would render  
,prajpati obnoxious to the reproach of  
saying deceitful things4--,so also1 in  
the second section1 the passage1 ',he   
who moves about happy in dreams1' c4    
does not refer to a being different from
 the seeing person within the eye spoken
 of in the first chapter1 7but treats of
 the same topic7 as appears from the    
introductory clause1 ',i shall explain  

him further to you4' ,moreover#ahg1 a   
person who is conscious of having seen  
an elephant in a dream and of no longer 
seeing it when awake discards in the    
waking state the object which he had    
seen 7in his sleep71 but recognises     
himself when awake to be the same person
 who saw something in the dream4--,thus 
in the third section also ,prajpati does
 indeed declare the absence of all      
particular cognition in the state of    
deep sleep1 but does not contest the    
identity of the cognising ,self 7',in   
that way he does not know himself that  
he is ,i1 nor all these beings'74 ,the  
following clause also1 ',he is gone to  
utter annihilation1' is meant to        
intimate only the annihilation of all   
specific cognition1 not the annihilation
 of the cogniser4 ,for there is no      
destruction of the knowing of the knower
 as--according to another scriptural    
passage 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1       
#cj7--that is imperishable4--,thus1     
again1 in the fourth section the        

introductory phrase of ,prajpati is1 ',i
 shall explain him further to you and   
nothing different from this2' he        
thereupon refutes the connexion 7of the 
,self7 with the body and other limiting 
conditions 7',maghavat1 this body is    
mortal1' c471 shows the individual      
soul--which is there called 'the serene 
being'--in the state when it has reached
 the nature of ,brahman 7',it appears in
 its own form'71 and thus proves the    
soul to be non-different from the       
highest ,brahman whose characteristics  
are immortality and fearlessness4  ,some
 7teachers7 however are of opinion that 
if the highest ,self is meant 7in the   
fourth section7 it would be             
inappropriate to understand the words   
',this 7him7 ,i will explain further1'  
c41 as referring to the individual soul1
 and therefore suppose that the         
reference is 7not to the individual soul
 forming the topic of the three         
preceding sections1 but7 to the ,self   
possessing the qualities of freeness    

from sin1 c41 which ,self is pointed out
 at the beginning of the entire chapter 
7,,vii1 #a74--;,against this            
interpretation we remark that1 in the   
first place1 it disregards the direct   
enunciation of the pronoun 7i4e4 the    
'this' in 'this ,i will explain'7 which 
rests on something approximate 7i4e4    
refers to something mentioned not far   
off71 and1 in the second place1 is      
opposed to the word 'further' 7or       
'again'7 met with in the text1 since    
from that interpretation it would follow
 that what had been discussed in the    
preceding sections is not again         
discussed in the subsequent section4    
,moreover1 if ,prajpati1 after having   
made a promise in the clause1 ',this ,i 
shall explain' 7where that clause occurs
 for the first time71 did previously to 
the fourth section explain a different  
topic in each section1 we should have to
 conclude that he acted                 
deceitfully4--,hence 7our opinion about 
the purport of the whole chapter remains

 valid1 viz4 that it sets forth how7 the
 unreal aspect of the individual soul as
 such--which is a mere presentation of  
,nescience1 is stained by all the       
desires and aversions attached to agents
 and enjoyers1 and is connected with    
evils of various kinds--is dissolved by 
true knowledge1 and how the soul is thus
 led over into the opposite state1 i4e4 
into its true state in which it is one  
with the highest ,lord and distinguished
 by freedom from sin and similar        
attributes4 ,the whole process is       
similar to that by which an imagined    
snake passes over into a rope as soon as
 the mind of the beholder has freed     
itself from its erroneous imagination4  
,others again1 and among them some of   
ours 7asmady_/s_/ _/k_/a4 ke_/k_/it71   
are of opinion that the individual soul 
as such is real4 ,to the end of refuting
 all these speculators who obstruct the 
way to the complete intuition of the    
unity of the ,self this                 
_/s_/rraka-_/s_/stra has been set forth1

 whose aim it is to show that there is  
only one highest ,lord ever unchanging1 
whose substance is cognition#ahh1 and   
who1 by means of ,nescience1 manifests  
himself in various ways1 just as a      
thaumaturg appears in different shapes  
by means of his magical power4 ,besides 
that ,lord there is no other substance  
of cognition4--,if1 now1 the ,strakra   
raises and refutes the doubt whether a  
certain passage which 7in reality7      
refers to the ,lord does refer to the   
individual soul1 as he does in this and 
the preceding ,stras#ahi1 he does so for
 the following purpose4 ,to the highest 
,self which is eternally pure1          
intelligent and free1 which is never    
changing1 one only1 not in contact with 
anything1 devoid of form1 the opposite  
characteristics of the individual soul  
are erroneously ascribed2 just as       
ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the 
colourless ether4 ,in order to remove   
this erroneous opinion by means of      
,vedic passages tending either to prove 

the unity of the ,self or to disprove   
the doctrine of duality--which passages 
he strengthens by arguments--he insists 
on the difference of the highest ,self  
from the individual soul1 does however  
not mean to prove thereby that the soul 
is different from the highest ,self1    
but1 whenever speaking of the soul1     
refers to its distinction 7from the     
,self7 as forming an item of ordinary   
thought1 due to the power of ,nescience4
 ,for thus1 he thinks1 the ,vedic       
injunctions of works which are given    
with a view to the states of acting and 
enjoying1 natural 7to the               
non-enlightened soul71 are not          
stultified4--,that1 however1 the        
absolute unity of the ,self is the real 
purport of the _/s_/stra's teaching1 the
 ,strakra declares1 for instance1 in ,i1
 #a1 #cjaij4 ,the refutation of the     
reproach of futility raised against the 
injunctions of works has already been   
set forth by us1 on the ground of the   
distinction between such persons as     

possess full knowledge1 and such as do  
not4  #bj4 ,and the reference 7to the   
individual soul7 has a different        
meaning4  ,the alleged reference to the 
individual soul which has been pointed  
out 7by the prvapakshin7 in the passage 
complementary to the passage about the  
small ether 7',now that serene being1'  
c41 ,,viii1 #c1 #d7 teaches1 if the     
small ether is interpreted to mean the  
highest ,lord1 neither the worship of   
the individual soul nor any             
qualification of the subject under      
discussion 7viz4 the small ether71 and  
is therefore devoid of meaning4--,on    
that account the ,stra declares that the
 reference has another meaning1 i4e4    
that the reference to the individual    
soul is not meant to determine the      
nature of the individual soul1 but      
rather the nature of the highest ,lord4 
,in the following manner4 ,the          
individual soul which1 in the passage   
referred to1 is called the serene being1
 acts in the waking state as the ruler  

of the aggregate comprising the body and
 the sense-organs2 permeates in sleep   
the na_/d_/s of the body1 and enjoys the
 dream visions resulting from the       
impressions of the waking state2 and1   
finally1 desirous of reaching an inner  
refuge1 rises in the state of deep sleep
 beyond its imagined connexion with the 
gross and the subtle body1 reaches the  
highest light1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman
 previously called ether1 and thus      
divesting itself of the state of        
specific cognition appears in its own   
7true7 nature4 ,the highest light which 
the soul is to reach and through which  
it is manifested in its true nature is  
the ,self1 free from sin and so on1     
which is there represented as the object
 of worship4--,in this sense the        
reference to the individual soul can be 
admitted by those also who maintain that
 in reality the highest ,lord is meant4 
#ba4 ,if it be said that on account of  
the scriptural declaration of the       
smallness 7of the ether7 7the ,lord     

cannot be meant2 we reply that7 that has
 been explained 7before74  ,the         
prvapakshin has remarked that the       
smallness of the ether stated by        
,scripture 7',in it is that small       
ether'7 does not agree with the highest 
,lord1 that it may however be predicated
 of the individual soul which 7in       
another passage7 is compared to the     
point of a goad4 ,as that remark calls  
for a refutation we point out that it   
has been refuted already1 it having been
 shown--under ,i1 #b1 #g--that a        
relative smallness may be attributed to 
the ,lord4 ,the same refutation is--as  
the ,stra points out--to be applied here
 also4--,that smallness is1 moreover1   
contradicted by that scriptural passage 
which compares 7the ether within the    
heart7 with the known 7universal7 ether4
 7',as large as is this ether so large  
is the ether within the heart4'7  #bb4  
,on account of the acting after 7i4e4   
the shining after71 7that after which   
sun1 moon1 c4 are said to shine is the  

highest ,self71 and 7because by the     
light7 of him 7all this is said to be   
lighted74  ,we read 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1
 #aj1 and ,ka4 ,up4 ,v1 #ae71 ',the sun 
does not shine there1 nor the moon and  
the stars1 nor these lightnings1 much   
less this fire4 ,after him when he      
shines everything shines2 by the light  
of him all this is lighted4' ,the       
question here arises whether he 'after  
whom when he shines everything shines1  
and by whose light all this is lighted1'
 is some luminous substance1 or the     
highest ,self 7prj_/_/a tman74  ,a      
luminous substance1 the prvapakshin     
maintains4--,why8--,because the passage 
denies the shining only of such luminous
 bodies as the sun and the like4 ,it is 
known 7from every-day experience7 that  
luminous bodies such as the moon and the
 stars do not shine at daytime when the 
sun1 which is itself a luminous body1 is
 shining4 ,hence we infer that that     
thing on account of which all this1     
including the moon1 the stars1 and the  

sun himself1 does not shine is likewise 
a thing of light4 ,the 'shining after'  
also is possible only if there is a     
luminous body already1 for we know from 
experience that 'acting after'          
7imitation7 of any kind takes place only
 when there are more than one agent of  
similar nature2 one man1 for instance1  
walks after another man who walks       
himself4 ,therefore we consider it      
settled that the passage refers to some 
luminous body4  ,to this we reply that  
the highest ,self only can be           
meant4--,why8--,on account of the acting
 after4 ,the shining after mentioned in 
the passage1 ',after him when he shines 
everything shines1' is possible only if 
the prj_/_/a ,self1 i4e4 the highest    
,self1 is understood4 ,of that prj_/_/a 
,self another scriptural passage says1  
',his form is light1 his thoughts are   
true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #b74 ,on   
the other hand1 it is not by any means  
known that the sun1 c4 shines after some
 other luminous body4 ,moreover1 on     

account of the equality of nature of all
 luminous bodies such as the sun and the
 like1 there is no need for them of any 
other luminous body after which they    
should shine2 for we see that a lamp1   
for instance1 does not 'shine after'    
another lamp4 ,nor is there any such    
absolute rule 7as the prvapakshin       
asserted7 that acting after is observed 
only among things of similar nature4 ,it
 is rather observed among things of     
dissimilar nature also2 for a red-hot   
iron ball acts after1 i4e4 burns after  
the burning fire1 and the dust of the   
ground blows 7is blown7 after the       
blowing wind4--,the clause 'on account  
of the acting after' 7which forms part  
of the ,stra7 points to the shining     
after 7mentioned in the scriptural      
_/s_/loka under discussion72 the clause 
'and of him' points to the fourth pda of
 the same _/s_/loka4 ,the meaning of    
this latter clause is that the cause    
assigned for the light of the sun1 c4   
7in the passage 'by the light of him    

everything is lighted'7 intimates the   
prj_/_/a ,self4 ,for of that ,self      
,scripture says1 ',him the gods worship 
as the light of lights1 as immortal     
time' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #af74   
,that1 on the other hand1 the light of  
the sun1 the moon1 c1 should shine by   
some other 7physical7 light is1 in the  
first place1 not known2 and1 in the     
second place1 absurd as one 7physical7  
light is counteracted by another4--,or  
else the cause assigned for the shining 
does not apply only to the sun and the  
other bodies mentioned in the _/s_/loka2
 but the meaning 7of the last pda7      
rather is--as we may conclude from the  
comprehensive statement 'all this'--that
 the manifestation of this entire world 
consisting of names and forms1 acts1    
agents and fruits 7of action7 has for   
its cause the existence of the light of 
,brahman2 just as the existence of the  
light of the sun is the cause of the    
manifestation of all form and           
colour4--,moreover1 the text shows by   

means of the word 'there' 7'the sun does
 not shine there1' c47 that the passage 
is to be connected with the general     
topic1 and that topic is ,brahman as    
appears from ,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #e1    
',in whom the heaven1 the earth1 and the
 sky are woven1' c4 ,the same appears   
from a passage subsequent 7on the one   
just quoted and immediately preceding   
the passage under discussion74 ',in the 
highest golden sheath there is the      
,brahman without passion and without    
parts2 that is pure1 that is the light  
of lights1 that is it which they know   
who know the ,self4' ,this passage      
giving rise to the question1 ',how is it
 the light of lights8' there is occasion
 for the reply given in ',the sun does  
not shine there1' c4--,in refutation of 
the assertion that the shining of       
luminous bodies such as the sun and the 
moon can be denied only in case of there
 being another luminous body--as1 for   
instance1 the light of the moon and the 
stars is denied only when the sun is    

shining--we point out that it has been  
shown that he 7the ,self7 only can be   
the luminous being referred to1 nothing 
else4 ,and it is quite possible to deny 
the shining of sun1 moon1 and so on with
 regard to ,brahman2 for whatever is    
perceived is perceived by the light of  
,brahman only so that sun1 moon1 c4 can 
be said to shine in it2 while ,brahman  
as self-luminous is not perceived by    
means of any other light4 ,brahman      
manifests everything else1 but is not   
manifested by anything else2 according  
to such scriptural passages as1 ',by the
 ,self alone as his light man sits1' c4 
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #f71 and ',he 
is incomprehensible1 for he cannot be   
comprehended '7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b1 
#d74  #bc4 ,moreover ,sm_/ri_/ti also   
speaks of him 7i4e4 of the prj_/_/a     
,self as being the universal light74    
,moreover that aspect of the prj_/_/a   
,self is spoken of in ,sm_/ri_/ti also1 
viz4 in the ,bhagavad ,gt 7,,xv1 #f1    
#ab71 ',neither the sun1 nor the moon1  

nor the fire illumines that2 having gone
 into which men do not return1 that is  
my highest seat4' ,and ',the light which
 abiding in the sun illumines the whole 
world1 and that which is in the moon and
 that which is in the fire1 all that    
light know to be mine4'  #bd4 ,on       
account of the term1 7viz4 the term     
'lord' applied to it7 the 7person7      
measured 7by a thumb7 7is the highest   
,lord74  ,we read 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1  
#ab71 ',the person of the size of a     
thumb stands in the middle of the       
,self1' c41 and 7,,ii1 #d1 #ac71 ',that 
person1 of the size of a thumb1 is like 
a light without smoke1 lord of the past 
and of the future1 he is the same to-day
 and to-morrow4 ,this is that4'--,the   
question here arises whether the person 
of the size of a thumb mentioned in the 
text is the cognitional 7individual7    
,self or the highest ,self4  ,the       
prvapakshin maintains that on account of
 the declaration of the person's size   
the cognitional ,self is meant4 ,for to 

the highest ,self which is of infinite  
length and breadth ,scripture would not 
ascribe the measure of a span2 of the   
cognitional ,self1 on the other hand1   
which is connected with limiting        
adjuncts1 extension of the size of a    
span may1 by means of some fictitious   
assumption1 be predicated4 ,sm_/ri_/ti  
also confirms this1 ',then ,yama drew   
forth1 by force1 from the body of       
,satyavat the person of the size of a   
thumb tied to ,yama's noose and         
helpless' 7,mahbh4 ,,iii1 #afgfc74 ,for 
as ,yama could not pull out by force the
 highest ,self1 the passage is clearly  
seen to refer to the transmigrating     
7individual soul7 of the size of a      
thumb1 and we thence infer that the same
 ,self is meant in the ,vedic passage   
under discussion4  ,to this we reply    
that the person a thumb long can only be
 the highest ,lord4--,why8--,on account 
of the term 'lord of the past and of the
 future4' ,for none but the highest     
,lord is the absolute ruler of the past 

and the future4--,moreover1 the clause  
'this is that' connects the passage with
 that which had been enquired about1 and
 therefore forms the topic of           
discussion4 ,and what had been enquired 
about is ,brahman1 ',that which thou    
seest as neither this nor that1 as      
neither effect nor cause1 as neither    
past nor future1 tell me that' 7,i1 #b1 
#ad74--',on account of the term1' i4e4  
on account of the direct statement1 in  
the text1 of a designation1 viz4 the    
term ',lord1' we understand that the    
highest ,lord is meant#aia4--;,but still
 the question remains how a certain     
extension can be attributed to the      
omnipresent highest ,self4--,the reply  
to this is given1 in the next ,stra4    
#be4 ,but with reference to the heart   
7the highest ,self is said to be of the 
size of a span71 as men are entitled 7to
 the study of the ,veda74  ,the measure 
of a span is ascribed to the highest    
,lord1 although omnipresent with        
reference to his abiding within the     

heart2 just as to ether 7space7 the     
measure of a cubit is ascribed with     
reference to the joint of a bamboo4     
,for1 on the one hand1 the measure of a 
span cannot be ascribed directly to the 
highest ,self which exceeds all measure1
 and1 on the other hand1 it has been    
shown that none but the highest ,lord   
can be meant here1 on account of the    
term ',lord1' and so on4--,but--an      
objection may be raised--as the size of 
the heart varies in the different       
classes of living beings it cannot be   
maintained that the declaration of the  
highest ,self being of the size of a    
thumb can be explained with reference to
 the heart4--,to this objection the     
second half of the ,stra replies3 ,on   
account of men 7only7 being entitled4   
,for the _/s_/stra1 although propounded 
without distinction 7i4e4 although not  
itself specifying what class of beings  
is to proceed according to its          
precepts71 does in reality entitle      
men#aib only 7to act according to its   

precepts72 for men only 7of the three   
higher castes7 are1 firstly1 capable 7of
 complying with the precepts of the     
_/s_/stra72 are1 secondly1 desirous 7of 
the results of actions enjoined by the  
_/s_/stra72 are1 thirdly1 not excluded  
by prohibitions2 and are1 fourthly1     
subject to the precepts about the       
upanayana ceremony and so on#aic4 ,this 
point has been explained in the section 
treating of the definition of adhikra   
7,prva ,mm4 ,s4 ,,vi1 #a74--,now the    
human body has ordinarily a fixed size1 
and hence the heart also has a fixed    
size1 viz4 the size of a thumb4 ,hence1 
as men 7only7 are entitled to study and 
practise the _/s_/stra1 the highest     
,self may1 with reference to its        
dwelling in the human heart1 be spoken  
of as being of the size of a thumb4--,in
 reply to the prvapakshin's reasoning   
that on account of the statement of size
 and on account of ,sm_/ri_/ti we can   
understand by him who is of the size of 
a thumb the transmigrating soul only1 we

 remark that--analogously to such       
passages as ',that is the ,self1' ',that
 art thou'--our passage teaches that the
 transmigrating soul which is of the    
size of a thumb is 7in reality7         
,brahman4 ,for the ,vednta-passages have
 a twofold purport2 some of them aim at 
setting forth the nature of the highest 
,self1 some at teaching the unity of the
 individual soul with the highest ,self4
 ,our passage teaches the unity of the  
individual soul with the highest ,self1 
not the size of anything4 ,this point is
 made clear further on in the           
,upanishad1 ',the person of the size of 
a thumb1 the inner ,self1 is always     
settled in the heart of men4 ,let a man 
draw that ,self forth from his body with
 steadiness1 as one draws the pith from 
a reed4 ,let him know that ,self as the 
,bright1 as the ,immortal' 7,,ii1 #f1   
#ag74  #bf4 ,also 7beings7 above them1  
7viz4 men7 7are qualified for the study 
and practice of the ,veda71 on account  
of the possibility 7of it71 according to

 ,bdarya_/n_/a4  ,it has been said above
 that the passage about him who is of   
the size of a thumb has reference to the
 human heart1 because men are entitled  
to study and act according to the       
_/s_/stra4 ,this gives us an occasion   
for the following discussion4--,it is   
true that the _/s_/stra entitles men1   
but1 at the same time1 there is no      
exclusive rule entitling men only to the
 knowledge of ,brahman2 the teacher1    
,bdarya_/n_/a1 rather thinks that the   
_/s_/stra entitles those 7classes of    
beings7 also which are above men1 viz4  
gods1 and so on4--,on what account8--,on
 the account of possibility4--,for in   
their cases also the different causes on
 which the qualification depends1 such  
as having certain desires1 and so on1   
may exist4 ,in the first place1 the gods
 also may have the desire of final      
release1 caused by the reflection that  
all effects1 objects1 and powers are    
non-permanent4 ,in the second place1    
they may be capable of it as their      

corporeality appears from mantras1      
arthavdas1 itihsas1 pur_/n_/as1 and     
ordinary experience4 ,in the third      
place1 there is no prohibition          
7excluding them like _/,s_/dras74 ,nor  
does1 in the fourth place1 the          
scriptural rule about the               
upanayana-ceremony annul their title2   
for that ceremony merely subserves the  
study of the ,veda1 and to the gods the 
,veda is manifest of itself 7without    
study74 ,that the gods1 moreover1 for   
the purpose of acquiring knowledge1     
undergo discipleship1 and the like1     
appears from such scriptural passages as
 ',one hundred and one years ,indra     
lived as a disciple with ,prajpati'     
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #aa1 #c71 and        
',bh_/ri_/gu ,vru_/n_/i went to his     
father ,varu_/n_/a1 saying1 ,sir1 teach 
me ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1       
#a74--;,and the reasons which have been 
given above against gods and _/ri_/shis 
being entitled to perform religious     
works 7such as sacrifices71 viz4 the    

circumstance of there being no other    
gods 7to whom the gods could offer      
sacrifices71 and of there being no other
 _/ri_/shis 7who could be invoked during
 the sacrifice71 do not apply to the    
case of branches of knowledge4 ,for     
,indra and the other gods1 when applying
 themselves to knowledge1 have no acts  
to perform with a view to ,indra1 and so
 on2 nor have ,bh_/ri_/gu and other     
_/ri_/shis1 in the same case1 to do     
anything with the circumstance of their 
belonging to the same gotra as          
,bh_/ri_/gu1 c4 ,what1 then1 should     
stand in the way of the gods' and       
_/ri_/shis' right to acquire            
knowledge8--,moreover1 the passage about
 that which is of the size of a thumb   
remains equally valid1 if the right of  
the gods1 c4 is admitted2 it has then   
only to be explained in each particular 
case by a reference to the particular   
size of the thumb 7of the class of      
beings spoken of74  #bg4 ,if it be said 
that 7the corporeal individuality of the

 gods involves7 a contradiction to      
7sacrificial7 works2 we deny that1 on   
account of the observation of the       
assumption 7on the part of the gods7 of 
several 7forms74  ,if the right of the  
gods1 and other beings superior to men1 
to the acquisition of knowledge is      
founded on the assumption of their      
corporeality1 c41 we shall have to      
admit1 in consequence of that           
corporeality1 that ,indra and the other 
gods stand in the relation of           
subordinate members 7anga7 to           
sacrificial acts1 by means of their     
being present in person just as the     
priests are4 ,but this admission will   
lead to 'a contradiction in the         
sacrificial acts1' because the          
circumstance of the gods forming the    
members of sacrificial acts by means of 
their personal presence1 is neither     
actually observed nor possible4 ,for it 
is not possible that one and the same   
,indra should1 at the same time1 be     
present in person at many sacrifices4   

,to this we reply1 that there is no such
 contradiction4--,why8--,on account of  
the assumption of several 7forms74 ,for 
it is possible for one and the same     
divine ,self to assume several forms at 
the same time4--,how is that            
known8--,from observation4--,for a      
scriptural passage at first replies to  
the question how many gods there are1 by
 the declaration that there are ',three 
and three hundred1 three and three      
thousand1' and subsequently1 on the     
question who they are1 declares ',they  
7the #cjc and #cjjc7 are only the       
various powers of them1 in reality there
 are only thirty-three gods' 7,b_/ri_/4 
,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #a1 #b72 showing thereby
 that one and the same divine ,self may 
at the same time appear in many forms4  
,after that it proceeds to show that    
these thirty-three gods themselves are  
in reality contained in six1 five1 c41  
and1 finally1 by replying to the        
question1 ',who is the one god8' that   
,breath is the one god1 shows that the  

gods are all forms of ,breath1 and that 
,breath1 therefore1 can at the same time
 appear in many forms4--,sm_/ri_/ti also
 has a similar statement1 ',a ,yogin1 ,o
 hero of the ,bharatas1 may1 by his     
power1 multiply his ,self in many       
thousand shapes1 and in them walk about 
on the earth4 ,in some he may enjoy the 
objects1 in others he may undergo dire  
penance1 and1 finally1 he may again     
retract them all1 just as the sun       
retracts the multitude of his rays4' ,if
 such ,sm_/ri_/ti passages as the above 
declare that even ,yogins1 who have     
merely acquired various extraordinary   
powers1 such as subtlety of body1 and   
the like1 may animate several bodies at 
the same time1 how much more capable of 
such feats must the gods be1 who        
naturally possess all supernatural      
powers4 ,the gods thus being able to    
assume several shapes1 a god may divide 
himself into many forms and enter into  
relation with many sacrifices at the    
same time1 remaining all the while      

unseen by others1 in consequence of his 
power to render himself invisible4  ,the
 latter part of the ,stra may be        
explained in a different manner also1   
viz4 as meaning that even beings        
enjoying corporeal individuality are    
seen to enter into mere subordinate     
relation to more than one action4       
,sometimes1 indeed1 one individual does 
not at the same time enter into         
subordinate relation to different       
actions2 one ,brhma_/n_/a1 for instance1
 is not at the same time entertained by 
many entertainers4 ,but in other cases  
one individual stands in subordinate    
relation to many actions at the same    
time2 one ,brhma_/n_/a1 for instance1   
may constitute the object of the        
reverence done to him by many persons at
 the same time4 ,similarly1 it is       
possible that1 as the sacrifice consists
 in the parting 7on the part of the     
sacrificer with some offering7 with a   
view 7to some divinity71 many persons   
may at the same time part with their    

respective offerings1 all of them having
 in view one and the same individual    
divinity4 ,the individuality of the gods
 does not1 therefore1 involve any       
contradiction in sacrificial works4     
#bh4 ,if it be said 7that a             
contradiction will result7 in respect of
 the word2 we refute this objection on  
the ground that 7the world7 originates  
from the word1 as is shown by perception
 and inference4  ,let it then be granted
 that1 from the admission of the        
corporeal individuality of the gods1 no 
contradiction will result in the case of
 sacrificial works4 ,still a            
contradiction will result in respect of 
the 'word' 7_/s_/abda74--,how8--,the    
authoritativeness of the ,veda has been 
proved 'from its independence1' basing  
on the original 7eternal7 connection of 
the word with its sense 7'the thing     
signified'7#aid4 ,but now1 although a   
divinity possessing corporeal           
individuality1 such as admitted above1  
may1 by means of its supernatural       

powers1 be able to enjoy at the same    
time the oblations which form part of   
several sacrifices yet it will1 on      
account of its very individuality1 be   
subject to birth and death just as we   
men are1 and hence1 the eternal         
connexion of the eternal word with a    
non-eternal thing being destroyed1 a    
contradiction will arise with regard to 
the authoritativeness proved to belong  
to the word of the ,veda4  ,to this we  
reply that no such contradiction        
exists4--,why8--',on account of their   
origin from it4' ,for from that very    
same word of the ,veda the world1 with  
the gods and other beings1              
originates4--,but--an objection will be 
raised--in ,stra ,i1 #a1 #b 7',that     
whence there is the origin1 c4 of this  
world'7 it has been proved that the     
world originates from ,brahman2 how then
 can it be said here that it originates 
from the word8 ,and1 moreover1 even if  
the origin of the world from the word of
 the ,veda be admitted1 how is the      

contradiction in regard to the word     
removed thereby1 inasmuch as the ,vasus1
 the ,rudras1 the dityas1 the           
,vi_/s_/vedevas1 and the ,maruts#aie are
 non-eternal beings1 because produced2  
and if they are non-eternal1 what is    
there to preclude the non-eternality of 
the ,vedic words ,vasu1 c4 designating  
them8 ,for it is known from every-day   
life that only when the son of          
,devadatta is born1 the name            
,yaj_/_/adatta is given to him 7lit4    
made for him7#aif4 ,hence we adhere to  
our opinion that a contradiction does   
arise with regard to the 'word4'  ,this 
objection we negative1 on the ground    
that we observe the eternity of the     
connexion between such words as cow1 and
 so on1 and the things denoted by them4 
,for1 although the individuals of the   
7species denoted by the word7 cow have  
an origin1 their species#aig does not   
have an origin1 since of 7the three     
categories7 substances1 qualities1 and  
actions the individuals only originate1 

not the species4 ,now it is with the    
species that the words are connected1   
not with the individuals1 which1 as     
being infinite in number1 are not       
capable of entering into that connexion4
 ,hence1 although the individuals do not
 originate1 no contradiction arises in  
the case of words such as cow1 and the  
like1 since the species are eternal4    
,similarly1 although individual gods are
 admitted to originate1 there arises no 
contradiction in the case of such words 
as ,vasu1 and the like1 since the       
species denoted by them are eternal4    
,and that the gods1 and so on1 belong to
 different species1 is to be concluded  
from the descriptions of their various  
personal appearance1 such as given in   
the mantras1 arthavdas1 c4 ,terms such  
as ',indra' rest on the connexion 7of   
some particular being7 with some        
particular place1 analogously to terms  
such as 'army-leader2' hence1 whoever   
occupies that particular place is called
 by that particular name4--,the         

origination of the world from the 'word'
 is not to be understood in that sense1 
that the word constitutes the material  
cause of the world1 as ,brahman does2   
but while there exist the everlasting   
words1 whose essence is the power of    
denotation in connexion with their      
eternal sense 7i4e4 the k_/r_/itis      
denoted71 the accomplishment of such    
individual things as are capable of     
having those words applied to them is   
called an origination from those words4 
,how then is it known that the world    
originates from the word8--',from       
perception and inference4' ,perception  
here denotes ,scripture which1 in order 
to be authoritative1 is independent 7of 
anything else74 ',inference' denotes    
,sm_/r_/iti which1 in order to be       
authoritative1 depends on something else
 7viz4 ,scripture74 ,these two declare  
that creation is preceded by the word4  
,thus a scriptural passage says1 ',at   
the word these ,prajpati created the    
gods2 at the words were poured out he   

created men2 at the word drops he       
created the fathers2 at the words       
through the filter he created the ,soma 
cups2 at the words the swift ones he    
created the stotra2 at the words to all 
he created the _/s_/astra2 at the word  
blessings he created the other beings4' 
,and another passage says1 ',he with his
 mind united himself with speech 7i4e4  
the word of the ,veda4--,b_/ri_/4 ,up4  
,i1 #b1 #d74 ,thus ,scripture declares  
in different places that the word       
precedes the creation4--,sm_/r_/ti also 
delivers itself as follows1 ',in the    
beginning a divine voice1 eternal1      
without beginning or end1 formed of the 
,vedas was uttered by ,svayambh1 from   
which all activities proceeded4' ,by the
 'uttering' of the voice we have here to
 understand the starting of the oral    
tradition 7of the ,veda71 because of a  
voice without beginning or end          
'uttering' in any other sense cannot be 
predicated4--,again1 we read1 ',in the  
beginning ,mahe_/s_/vara shaped from the

 words of the ,veda the names and forms 
of all beings and the procedure of all  
actions4' ,and again1 ',the several     
names1 actions1 and conditions of all   
things he shaped in the beginning from  
the words of the ,veda' 7,manu ,i1 #ba74
 ,moreover1 we all know from observation
 that any one when setting about some   
thing which he wishes to accomplish     
first remembers the word denoting the   
thing1 and after that sets to work4 ,we 
therefore conclude that before the      
creation the ,vedic words became        
manifest in the mind of ,prajpati the   
creator1 and that after that he created 
the things conesponding to those words4 
,scripture also1 where it says 7,taitt4 
,br4 ,,ii1 #b1 #d1 #b7 'uttering bhr he 
created the earth1' c41 shows that the  
worlds such as the earth1 c4 became     
manifest1 i4e4 were created from the    
words bhr1 c4 which had become manifest 
in the mind 7of ,prajpati74  ,of what   
nature then is the 'word' with a view to
 which it is said that the world        

originates from the 'word8'--,it is the 
spho_/t_/a1 the prvapakshin says4#aih   
,for on the assumption that the letters 
are the word1 the doctrine that the     
individual gods1 and so on1 originates  
from the eternal words of the ,veda     
could not in any way be proved1 since   
the letters perish as soon as they are  
produced 7i4e4 pronounced74 ,these      
perishable letters are moreover         
apprehended as differing according to   
the pronunciation of the individual     
speaker4 ,for this reason we are able to
 determine1 merely from the sound of the
 voice of some unseen person whom we    
hear reading1 who is reading1 whether   
,devadatta or ,yaj_/_/adatta or some    
other man4 ,and it cannot be maintained 
that this apprehension of difference    
regarding the letters is an erroneous   
one2 for we do not apprehend anything   
else whereby it is refuted4 ,nor is it  
reasonable to maintain that the         
apprehension of the sense of a word     
results from the letters4 ,for it can   

neither be maintained that each letter  
by itself intimates the sense1 since    
that would be too wide an               
assumption2#aii nor that there takes    
place a simultaneous apprehension of the
 whole aggregate of letters2 since the  
letters succeed one another in time4    
,nor can we admit the explanation that  
the last letter of the word together    
with the impressions produced by the    
perception of the preceding letters is  
that which makes us apprehend the sense4
 ,for the word makes us apprehend the   
sense only if it is itself apprehended  
in so far as having reference to the    
mental grasp of the constant connexion  
7of the word and the sense71 just as    
smoke makes us infer the existence of   
fire only when it is itself apprehended2
 but an apprehension of the last letter 
combined with the impressions produced  
by the preceding letters does not       
actually take place1 because those      
impressions are not objects of          
perception4#bjj ,nor1 again1 can it be  

maintained that 7although those         
impressions are not objects of          
perception1 yet they may be inferred    
from their effects1 and that thus7 the  
actual perception of the last letter    
combined with the impressions left by   
the preceding letters--which impressions
 are apprehended from their effects--is 
that which intimates the sense of the   
word2 for that effect of the            
impressions1 viz4 the remembrance of the
 entire word1 is itself something       
consisting of parts which succeed each  
other in time4--,from all this it       
follows that the spho_/t_/a is the word4
 ,after the apprehending agent1 i4e4 the
 buddhi1 has1 through the apprehension  
of the several letters of the word1     
received rudimentary impressions1 and   
after those impressions have been       
matured through the apprehension of the 
last letter1 the spho_/t_/a presents    
itself in the buddhi all at once as the 
object of one mental act of             
apprehension4--,and it must not be      

maintained that that one act of         
apprehension is merely an act of        
remembrance having for its object the   
letters of the word2 for the letters    
which are more than one cannot form the 
object of one act of apprehension4--,as 
that spho_/t_/a is recognised as the    
same as often as the word is pronounced1
 it is eternal2 while the apprehension  
of difference referred to above has for 
its object the letters merely4 ,from    
this eternal word1 which is of the      
nature of the spho_/t_/a and possesses  
denotative power1 there is produced the 
object denoted1 i4e4 this world which   
consists of actions1 agents1 and results
 of action4  ,against this doctrine the 
reverend ,upavarsha maintains that the  
letters only are the word4--,but--an    
objection is raised--it has been said   
above that the letters no sooner        
produced pass away6--,that assertion is 
not true1 we reply2 for they are        
recognised as the same letters 7each    
time they are produced anew74--,nor can 

it be maintained that the recognition is
 due to similarity only1 as in the case 
of hairs1 for instance2 for the fact of 
the recognition being a recognition in  
the strict sense of the word is not     
contradicted by any other means of      
proof4--,nor1 again1 can it be said that
 the recognition has its cause in the   
species 7so that not the same individual
 letter would be recognised1 but only a 
letter belonging to the same species as 
other letters heard before72 for1 as a  
matter of fact1 the same individual     
letters are recognised4 ,that the       
recognition of the letters rests on the 
species could be maintained only if     
whenever the letters are pronounced     
different individual letters were       
apprehended1 just as several cows are   
apprehended as different individuals    
belonging to the same species4 ,but this
 is actually not the case2 for the      
7same7 individual letters are recognised
 as often as they are pronounced4 ,if1  
for instance1 the word cow is pronounced

 twice1 we think not that two different 
words have been pronounced1 but that the
 same individual word has been          
repeated4--,but1 our opponent reminds   
us1 it has been shown above1 that the   
letters are apprehended as different    
owing to differences of pronunciation1  
as appears from the fact that we        
apprehend a difference when merely      
hearing the sound of ,devadatta or      
,yaj_/_/adatta reading4--,although1 we  
reply1 it is a settled matter that the  
letters are recognised as the same1 yet 
we admit that there are differences in  
the apprehension of the letters2 but as 
the letters are articulated by means of 
the conjunction and disjunction 7of the 
breath with the palate1 the teeth1 c471 
those differences are rightly ascribed  
to the various character of the         
articulating agents and not to the      
intrinsic nature of the letters         
themselves4 ,those1 moreover1 who       
maintain that the individual letters are
 different have1 in order to account for

 the fact of recognition1 to assume     
species of letters1 and further to admit
 that the apprehension of difference is 
conditioned by external factors4 ,is it 
then not much simpler to assume1 as we  
do1 that the apprehension of difference 
is conditioned by external factors while
 the recognition is due to the intrinsic
 nature of the letters8 ,and this very  
fact of recognition is that mental      
process which prevents us from looking  
on the apprehension of difference as    
having the letters for its object 7so   
that the opponent was wrong in denying  
the existence of such a process74 ,for  
how should1 for instance1 the one       
syllable ga1 when it is pronounced in   
the same moment by several persons1 be  
at the same time of different nature1   
viz4 accented with the udtta1 the       
anudtta1 and the ,svarita and nasal as  
well as non-nasal#bja8 ,or              
else#bjb--;and this is the preferable   
explanation--we assume that the         
difference of apprehension is caused not

 by the letters but by the tone         
7dhvani74 ,by this tone we have to      
understand that which enters the ear of 
a person who is listening from a        
distance and not able to distinguish the
 separate letters1 and which1 for a     
person standing near1 affects the       
letters with its own distinctions1 such 
as high or low pitch and so on4 ,it is  
on this tone that all the distinctions  
of udtta1 anudtta1 and so on depend1 and
 not on the intrinsic nature of the     
letters2 for they are recognised as the 
same whenever they are pronounced4 ,on  
this theory only we gain a basis for the
 distinctive apprehension of the udtta1 
the anudtta1 and the like4 ,for on the  
theory first propounded 7but now        
rejected71 we should have to assume that
 the distinctions of udtta and so on are
 due to the processes of conjunction and
 disjunction described above1 since the 
letters themselves1 which are ever      
recognised as the same1 are not         
different4 ,but as those processes of   

conjunction and disjunction are not     
matter of perception1 we cannot         
definitely ascertain in the letters any 
differences based on those processes1   
and hence the apprehension of the udtta 
and so on remains without a basis4--,nor
 should it be urged that from the       
difference of the udtta and so on there 
results also a difference of the letters
 recognised4 ,for a difference in one   
matter does not involve a difference in 
some other matter which in itself is    
free from difference4 ,nobody1 for      
instance1 thinks that because the       
individuals are different from each     
other the species also contains a       
difference in itself4  ,the assumption  
of the spho_/t_/a is further gratuitous1
 because the sense of the word may be   
apprehended from the letters4--,but--our
 opponent here objects--,i do not assume
 the existence of the spho_/t_/a4 ,i1 on
 the contrary1 actually perceive it2 for
 after the buddhi has been impressed by 
the successive apprehension of the      

letters of the word1 the spho_/t_/a all 
at once presents itself as the object of
 cognition4--,you are mistaken1 we      
reply4 ,the object of the cognitional   
act of which you speak is simply the    
letters of the word4 ,that one          
comprehensive cognition which follows   
upon the apprehension of the successive 
letters of the word has for its object  
the entire aggregate of the letters     
constituting the word1 and not anything 
else4 ,we conclude this from the        
circumstance that in that final         
comprehensive cognition there are       
included those letters only of which a  
definite given word consists1 and not   
any other letters4 ,if that cognitional 
act had for its object the              
spho_/t_/a--i4e4 something different    
from the letters of the given word--then
 those letters would be excluded from it
 just as much as the letters of any     
other word4 ,but as this is not the     
case1 it follows that that final        
comprehensive act of cognition is       

nothing but an act of remembrance which 
has the letters of the word for its     
object4--,our opponent has asserted     
above that the letters of a word being  
several cannot form the object of one   
mental act4 ,but there he is wrong      
again4 ,the ideas which we have of a    
row1 for instance1 or a wood or an army1
 or of the numbers ten1 hundred1        
thousand1 and so on1 show that also such
 things as comprise several unities can 
become the objects of one and the same  
cognitional act4 ,the idea which has for
 its object the word as one whole is a  
derived one1 in so far as it depends on 
the determination of one sense in many  
letters#bjc2 in the same way as the idea
 of a wood1 an army1 and so on4         
,but--our opponent may here object--if  
the word were nothing else but the      
letters which in their aggregate become 
the object of one mental act1 such      
couples of words as jr and rj or pika   
and kapi would not be cognised as       
different words2 for here the same      

letters are presented to consciousness  
in each of the words constituting one   
couple4--,there is indeed1 we reply1 in 
both cases a comprehensive consciousness
 of the same totality of letters2 but   
just as ants constitute the idea of a   
row only if they march one after the    
other1 so the letters also constitute   
the idea of a certain word only if they 
follow each other in a certain order4   
,hence it is not contrary to reason that
 the same letters are cognised as       
different words1 in consequence of the  
different order in which they are       
arranged4  ,the hypothesis of him who   
maintains that the letters are the word 
may therefore be finally formulated as  
follows4 ,the letters of which a word   
consists--assisted by a certain order   
and number--have1 through traditional   
use1 entered into a connexion with a    
definite sense4 ,at the time when they  
are employed they present themselves as 
such 7i4e4 in their definite order and  
number7 to the buddhi1 which1 after     

having apprehended the several letters  
in succession1 finally comprehends the  
entire aggregate1 and they thus         
unerringly intimate to the buddhi their 
definite sense4 ,this hypothesis is     
certainly simpler than the complicated  
hypothesis of the grammarians who teach 
that the spho_/t_/a is the word4 ,for   
they have to disregard what is given by 
perception1 and to assume something     
which is never perceived2 the letters   
apprehended in a definite order are said
 to manifest the spho_/t_/a1 and the    
spho_/t_/a in its turn is said to       
manifest the sense4  ,or let it even be 
admitted that the letters are different 
ones each time they are pronounced2 yet1
 as in that case we necessarily must    
assume species of letters as the basis  
of the recognition of the individual    
letters1 the function of conveying the  
sense which we have demonstrated in the 
case of the 7individual7 letters has    
then to be attributed to the species4   
,from all this it follows that the      

theory according to which the individual
 gods and so on originate from the      
eternal words is unobjectionable4  #bi4 
,and from this very reason there follows
 the eternity of the ,veda4  ,as the    
eternity of the ,veda is founded on the 
absence of the remembrance of an agent  
only1 a doubt with regard to it had been
 raised owing to the doctrine that the  
gods and other individuals have sprung  
from it4 ,that doubt has been refuted in
 the preceding ,stra4--,the present     
,stra now confirms the1 already         
established1 eternity of the ,veda4 ,the
 eternity of the word of the ,veda has  
to be assumed for this very reason1 that
 the world with its definite 7eternal7  
species1 such as gods and so on1        
originates from it4--,a mantra also     
7',by means of the sacrifice they       
followed the trace of speech2 they found
 it dwelling in the _/ri_/shis1'        
_/,ri_/g-veda ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #ga1 #c7   
shows that the speech found 7by the     
_/ri_/shis7 was permanent4--,on this    

point ,vedavysa also speaks as follows3 
',formerly the great _/ri_/shis1 being  
allowed to do so by ,svayambh1 obtained1
 through their penance1 the ,vedas      
together with the itihsas1 which had    
been hidden at the end of the yuga4'    
#cj4 ,and on account of the equality of 
names and forms there is no             
contradiction 7to the eternity of the   
word of the ,veda7 in the renovation 7of
 the world72 as is seen from _/,s_/ruti 
and ,sm_/ri_/ti4  ,if--the prvapakshin  
resumes--the individual gods and so on  
did1 like the individual animals1       
originate and pass away in an unbroken  
succession so that there would be no    
break of the course of practical        
existence including denominations1      
things denominated and agents           
denominating2 the connexion 7between    
word and thing7 would be eternal1 and   
the objection as to a contradiction with
 reference to the word 7raised in ,stra 
#bg7 would thereby be refuted4 ,but if1 
as _/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti declare1  

the whole threefold world periodically  
divests itself of name and form1 and is 
entirely dissolved 7at the end of a     
kalpa71 and is after that produced anew2
 how can the contradiction be considered
 to have been removed8  ,to this we     
reply3 ',on account of the sameness of  
name and form4'--,even then the         
beginninglessness of the world will have
 to be admitted 7a point which the      
teacher will prove later on3 ,,ii1 #a1  
#cf74 ,and in the beginningless         
sa_/m_/sra we have to look on the       
7relative7 beginning1 and the           
dissolution connected with a new kalpa  
in the same light in which we look on   
the sleeping and waking states1 which1  
although in them according to ,scripture
 7a kind of7 dissolution and origination
 take place1 do not give rise to any    
contradiction1 since in the later waking
 state 7subsequent to the state of      
sleep7 the practical existence is       
carried on just as in the former one4   
,that in the sleeping and the waking    

states dissolution and origination take 
place is stated ,kaush4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #c1 
',when a man being asleep sees no dream 
whatever he becomes one with that       
pr_/n_/a alone4 ,then speech goes to him
 with all names1 the eye with all forms1
 the ear with all sounds1 the mind with 
all thoughts4 ,and when he awakes then1 
as from a burning fire1 sparks proceed  
in all directions1 thus from that ,self 
the pr_/n_/as proceed1 each towards its 
place2 from the pr_/n_/as the gods1 from
 the gods the worlds4'  ,well1 the      
prvapakshin resumes1 it may be that no  
contradiction arises in the case of     
sleep1 as during the sleep of one person
 the practical existence of other       
persons suffers no interruption1 and as 
the sleeping person himself when waking 
from sleep may resume the very same form
 of practical existence which was his   
previously to his sleep4 ,the case of a 
mahpralaya 7i4e4 a general annihilation 
of the world7 is however a different    
one1 as then the entire current of      

practical existence is interrupted1 and 
the form of existence of a previous     
kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent    
kalpa no more than an individual can    
resume that form of existence which it  
enjoyed in a former birth4  ,this       
objection1 we reply1 is not valid4 ,for 
although a mahpralaya does cut short the
 entire current of practical existence1 
yet1 by the favour of the highest ,lord1
 the ,lords 7_/s_/vara71 such as        
,hira_/n_/yagarbha and so on1 may       
continue the same form of existence     
which belonged to them in the preceding 
kalpa4 ,although ordinary animated      
beings do not1 as we see1 resume that   
form of existence which belonged to them
 in a former birth2 still we cannot     
judge of the ,lords as we do of ordinary
 beings4 ,for as in the series of beings
 which descends from man to blades of   
grass a successive diminution of        
knowledge1 power1 and so on1 is         
observed--although they all have the    
common attribute of being animated--so  

in the ascending series extending from  
man up to ,hira_/n_/yagarbha1 a         
gradually increasing manifestation of   
knowledge1 power1 c4 takes place2 a     
circumstance which _/,s_/ruti and       
,sm_/ri_/ti mention in many places1 and 
which it is impossible to deny4 ,on that
 account it may very well be the case   
that the ,lords1 such as                
,hira_/n_/yagarbha and so on1 who in a  
past kalpa were distinguished by        
superior knowledge and power of action1 
and who again appear in the present     
kalpa1 do1 if favoured by the highest   
,lord1 continue 7in the present kalpa7  
the same kind of existence which they   
enjoyed in the preceding kalpa2 just as 
a man who rises from sleep continues the
 same form of existence which he enjoyed
 previously to his sleep4 ,thus         
,scripture also declares1 ',he who first
 creates ,brahman 7,hira_/n_/yagarbha7  
and delivers the ,vedas to him1 to that 
,god who is the light of his own        
thoughts1 ,i1 seeking for release1 go   

for refuge' 7_/,s_/vet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ah74
 _/,s_/aunaka and others moreover       
declare 7in the ,anukrama_/n_/s of the  
,veda7 that the ten books 7of the       
_/,ri_/g-veda7 were seen by             
,madhu_/kkh_/andas and other            
_/ri_/shis4#bjd ,and1 similarly1        
,sm_/ri_/ti tells us1 for every ,veda1  
of men of exalted mental vision         
7_/ri_/shis7 who 'saw' the subdivisions 
of their respective ,vedas1 such as     
k_/nd_/as and so on4 ,scripture also    
declares that the performance of the    
sacrificial action by means of the      
mantra is to be preceded by the         
knowledge of the _/ri_/shi and so on1   
',he who makes another person sacrifice 
or read by means of a mantra of which he
 does not know the _/ri_/shi1 the metre1
 the divinity1 and the ,brhma_/n_/a1    
runs against a post1 falls into a       
pit#bje1 c4 c41 therefore one must know 
all those matters for each mantra'      
7rsheya ,brhma_/n_/a1 first             
section74--,moreover1 religious duty is 

enjoined and its opposite is forbidden1 
in order that the animate beings may    
obtain pleasure and escape pain4 ,desire
 and aversion have for their objects    
pleasure and pain1 known either from    
experience or from ,scripture1 and do   
not aim at anything of a different      
nature4 ,as therefore each new creation 
is 7nothing but7 the result of the      
religious merit and demerit 7of the     
animated beings of the preceding        
creation71 it is produced with a nature 
resembling that of the preceding        
creation4 ,thus ,sm_/ri_/ti also        
declares1 ',to whatever actions certain 
of these 7animated beings7 had turned in
 a former creation1 to the same they    
turn when created again and again4      
,whether those actions were harmful or  
harmless1 gentle or cruel1 right or     
wrong1 true or untrue1 influenced by    
them they proceed2 hence a certain      
person delights in actions of a certain 
kind4'--,moreover1 this world when being
 dissolved 7in a mahpralaya7 is         

dissolved to that extent only that the  
potentiality 7_/s_/akti7 of the world   
remains1 and 7when it is produced again7
 it is produced from the root of that   
potentiality2 otherwise we should have  
to admit an effect without a cause4 ,nor
 have we the right to assume            
potentialities of different kind 7for   
the different periods of the world74    
,hence1 although the series of worlds   
from the earth upwards1 and the series  
of different classes of animate beings  
such as gods1 animals1 and men1 and the 
different conditions based on caste1    
_/s_/rama1 religious duty and fruit 7of 
works71 although all these we say are   
again and again interrupted and         
thereupon produced anew2 we yet have to 
understand that they are1 in the        
beginningless sa_/m_/sara1 subject to a 
certain determinateness analogous to the
 determinateness governing the connexion
 between the senses and their objects4  
,for it is impossible to imagine that   
the relation of senses and sense-objects

 should be a different one in different 
creations1 so that1 for instance1 in    
some new creation a sixth sense and a   
corresponding sixth sense-object should 
manifest themselves4 ,as1 therefore1 the
 phenomenal world is the same in all    
kalpas and as the ,lords are able to    
continue their previous forms of        
existence1 there manifest themselves1 in
 each new creation1 individuals bearing 
the same names and forms as the         
individuals of the preceding creations1 
and1 owing to this equality of names and
 forms1 the admitted periodical         
renovations of the world in the form of 
general pralayas and general creations  
do not conflict with the                
authoritativeness of the word of the    
,veda4 ,the permanent identity of names 
and forms is declared in _/,s_/ruti as  
well as ,sm_/ri_/ti2 compare1 for       
instance1 _/,ri_/k4 ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #aij1
 #c1 ',as formerly the creator ordered  
sun and moon1 and the sky1 and the air1 
and the heavenly world2' which passage  

means that the highest ,lord arranged at
 the beginning of the present kalpa the 
entire world with sun and moon1 and so  
on1 just as it had been arranged in the 
preceding kalpa4 ,compare also ,taitt4  
,brhm4 ,,iii1 #a1 #d1 #a1 ',agni        
desired3 ,may ,i become the consumer of 
the food of the gods2 for that end he   
offered a cake on eight potsherds to    
,agni and the ,k_/ri_/ttiks4' ,this     
passage1 which forms part of the        
injunction of the ish_/t_/i to the      
,nakshatras1 declares equality of name  
and form connecting the ,agni who       
offered and the ,agni to whom he        
offered4#bjf  ,sm_/ri_/ti also contains 
similar statements to be quoted here2   
so1 for instance1 ',whatever were the   
names of the _/ri_/shis and their powers
 to see the ,vedas1 the same the ,unborn
 one again gives to them when they are  
produced afresh at the end of the night 
7the mahpralaya74 ,as the various signs 
of the seasons return in succession in  
their due time1 thus the same beings    

again appear in the different yugas4    
,and of whatever individuality the gods 
of the past ages were1 equal to them are
 the present gods in name and form4'    
#ca4 ,on account of the impossibility of
 7the gods being qualified7 for the     
madhu-vidy1 c41 ,jaimini 7maintains7 the
 non-qualification 7of the gods for the 
,brahma-vidy74  ,a new objection is     
raised against the averment that the    
gods1 c4 also are entitled to the       
knowledge of ,brahman4 ,the teacher1    
,jaimini1 considers the gods and similar
 beings not to have any                 
claim4--,why8--,on account of the       
impossibility1 in the case of the       
so-called ,madhu-vidy1 c4 ,if their     
claim to the knowledge of ,brahman were 
admitted1 we should have to admit their 
claim to the madhu-vidy 7'the knowledge 
of the honey'7 also1 because that also  
is a kind of knowledge not different    
7from the knowledge of ,brahman74 ,but  
to admit this latter claim is not       
possible2 for1 according to the passage1

 ',the ,sun is indeed the honey of the  
devas' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a71 men   
are to meditate on the sun 7the god     
ditya7 under the form of honey1 and how1
 if the gods themselves are admitted as 
meditating worshippers1 can ditya       
meditate upon another ditya8--,again1   
the text1 after having enumerated five  
kinds of nectar1 the red one1 c4        
residing in the sun1 and after having   
stated that the five classes of gods1   
viz4 the ,vasus1 ,rudras1 dityas1       
,maruts1 and ,sdhyas1 live on one of    
these nectars each1 declares that 'he   
who thus knows this nectar becomes one  
of the ,vasus1 with ,agni at their head1
 he sees the nectar and rejoices1 c41   
and indicates thereby that those who    
know the nectars enjoyed by the ,vasus1 
c41 attain the greatness of the ,vasus1 
c4' ,but how should the ,vasus          
themselves know other ,vasus enjoying   
the nectar1 and what other              
,vasu-greatness should they desire to   
attain8--,we have also to compare the   

passages ',agni is one foot1 ditya is   
one foot1 the quarters are one foot'    
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 #b72 ',air is    
indeed the absorber' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1   
#c1 #a72 'ditya is ,brahman1 this is the
 doctrine4' ,all these passages treat of
 the meditation on the ,self of certain 
divinities1 for which meditation these  
divinities themselves are not           
qualified4--,so it is likewise          
impossible that the _/ri_/shis          
themselves should be qualified for      
meditations connected with _/ri_/shis1  
such as expressed in passages like      
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #d1 ',these two
 are the _/ri_/shis ,gautama and        
,bharadvja2 the right ,gautama1 the left
 ,bharadvja4'--,another reason for the  
non-qualification of the gods is stated 
in the following ,stra4  #cb4 ,and 7the 
devas1 c4 are not qualified7 on account 
of 7the words denoting the devas1 c47   
being 7used7 in the sense of 7sphere of7
 light4  ,to that sphere of light1 the  
prvapakshin resumes1 which is stationed 

in the sky1 and during its diurnal      
revolutions illumines the world1 terms  
such as ditya1 i4e4 the names of devas1 
are applied1 as we know from the use of 
ordinary language1 and from ,vedic      
complementary passages#bjg4 ,but of a   
mere sphere of light we cannot          
understand how it should be endowed with
 either a bodily form1 consisting of the
 heart and the like1 or intelligence1 or
 the capability of forming wishes#bjh4  
,for mere light we know to be1 like     
earth1 entirely devoid of intelligence4 
,the same observation applies to ,agni  
7fire71 and so on4 ,it will perhaps be  
said that our objection is not valid1   
because the personality of the devas is 
known from the mantras1 arthavdas1      
itihsas1 pur_/n_/as1 and from the       
conceptions of ordinary life#bji2 but we
 contest the relevancy of this remark4  
,for the conceptions of ordinary life do
 not constitute an independent means of 
knowledge2 we rather say that a thing is
 known from ordinary life if it is known

 by the 7acknowledged7 means of         
knowledge1 perception1 c4 ,but none of  
the recognised means of knowledge1 such 
as perception and the like1 apply to the
 matter under discussion4 ,itihsas and  
pur_/n_/as again being of human origin1 
stand themselves in need of other means 
of knowledge on which to base4 ,the     
arthavda passages also1 which1 as       
forming syntactical wholes with the     
injunctory passages1 have merely the    
purpose of glorifying 7what is enjoined 
in the latter71 cannot be considered to 
constitute by themselves reasons for the
 existence of the personality1 c4 of the
 devas4 ,the mantras again1 which1 on   
the ground of direct enunciation1 c41   
are to be employed 7at the different    
stages of the sacrificial action71 have 
merely the purpose of denoting things   
connected with the sacrificial          
performance1 and do not constitute an   
independent means of authoritative      
knowledge for anything#baj4--;,for these
 reasons the devas1 and similar beings1 

are not qualified for the knowledge of  
,brahman4  #cc4 ,bdarya_/n_/a1 on the   
other hand1 7maintains7 the existence   
7of qualification for ,brahma-vidy on   
the part of the gods72 for there are    
7passages indicatory of that74  ,the    
expression 'on the other hand' is meant 
to rebut the prvapaksha4 ,the teacher1  
,bdarya_/n_/a1 maintains the existence  
of the qualification on the part of the 
gods1 c4 ,for1 although the             
qualification of the gods cannot be     
admitted with reference to the          
madhu-vidy1 and similar topics of       
knowledge1 in which the gods themselves 
are implicated1 still they may be       
qualified for the pure knowledge of     
,brahman1 qualification in general      
depending on the presence of desire1    
capability1 c4#baa ,nor does the        
impossibility of qualification in       
certain cases interfere with the        
presence of qualification in those other
 cases where it is not impossible4 ,to  
the case of the gods the same reasoning 

applies as to the case of men2 for among
 men also1 all are not qualified for    
everything1 ,brhma_/n_/as1 for instance1
 not for the rjasya-sacrifice#bab4      
,and1 with reference to the knowledge of
 ,brahman1 ,scripture1 moreover1        
contains express hints notifying that   
the devas are qualified2 compare1 for   
instance1 _/,br_/i4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj1   
',whatever ,deva was awakened 7so as to 
know ,brahman7 he indeed became that2   
and the same with _/ri_/shis2' ,ch4 ,up4
 ,,viii1 #g1 #b1 ',they said3 ,well1 let
 us search for that ,self by which1 if  
one has searched it out1 all worlds and 
all desires are obtained4 ,thus saying1 
,indra went forth from the ,devas1      
,viro_/k_/ana from the ,asuras4'        
,similar statements are met with in     
,sm_/ri_/ti1 so1 for instance1 in the   
colloquy of the ,gandharva and          
,yj_/_/avalkya#bac4--;,against the      
objection raised in the preceding ,stra 
7#cb7 we argue as follows4 ,words like  
ditya1 and so on1 which denote devas1   

although having reference to light and  
the like1 yet convey the idea of certain
 divine ,selfs 7persons7 endowed with   
intelligence and pre-eminent power2 for 
they are used in that sense in mantras  
and arthavda passages4 ,for the devas   
possess1 in consequence of their        
pre-eminent power1 the capability of    
residing within the light1 and so on1   
and to assume any form they like4 ,thus 
we read in ,scripture1 in the arthavda  
passage explaining the words 'ram of    
,medhtithi1' which form part of the     
,subrahma_/n_/ya-formula1 that ',indra1 
having assumed the shape of a ram1      
carried off ,medhtithi1 the descendant  
of ,ka_/n_/va' 7,sha_/d_/v4 ,br4 ,i1    
#a74 ,and thus ,sm_/ri_/ti says that    
'ditya1 having assumed the shape of a   
man1 came to ,kunt4' ,moreover1 even in 
such substances as earth1 intelligent   
ruling beings must be admitted to       
reside1 for that appears from such      
scriptural passages as 'the earth       
spoke1' 'the waters spoke1' c4 ,the     

non-intelligence of light and the like1 
in so far as they are mere material     
elements1 is admitted in the case of the
 sun 7ditya71 c4 also2 but--as already  
remarked--from the use of the words in  
mantras and arthavdas it appears that   
there are intelligent beings of divine  
nature 7which animate those material    
elements74  ,we now turn to the         
objection 7raised above by the          
prvapakshin7 that mantras and arthavdas1
 as merely subserving other purposes1   
have no power of setting forth the      
personality of the devas1 and remark    
that not the circumstance of            
subordination or non-subordination to   
some other purpose1 but rather the      
presence or absence of a certain idea   
furnishes a reason for 7our assuming7   
the existence of something4 ,this is    
exemplified by the case of a person who1
 having set out for some other purpose1 
7nevertheless7 forms the conviction of  
the existence of leaves1 grass1 and the 
like1 which he sees lying on the        

road4--,but1 the prvapakshin may here   
object1 the instance quoted by you is   
not strictly analogous4 ,in the case of 
the wanderer1 perception1 whose objects 
the grass and leaves are1 is active1 and
 through it he forms the conception of  
their existence4 ,in the case of an     
arthavda1 on the other hand1 which1 as  
forming a syntactical unity with the    
corresponding injunctory passage1 merely
 subserves the purpose of glorifying    
7the latter71 it is impossible to       
determine any energy having a special   
object of its own4 ,for in general any  
minor syntactical unity1 which is       
included in a more comprehensive        
syntactical unity conveying a certain   
meaning1 does not possess the power of  
expressing a separate meaning of its    
own4 ,thus1 for instance1 we derive1    
from the combination of the three words 
constituting the negative sentence1     
'7,do7 not drink wine1' one meaning     
only1 i4e4 a prohibition of drinking    
wine1 and do not derive an additional   

meaning1 viz4 an order to drink wine1   
from the combination of the last two    
words1 'drink wine4'--,to this objection
 we reply1 that the instance last quoted
 is not analogous 7to the matter under  
discussion74 ,the words of the sentence 
prohibiting the drinking of wine form   
only one whole1 and on that account the 
separate sense which any minor          
syntactical unity included in the bigger
 sentence may possess cannot be         
accepted4 ,in the case of injunction and
 arthavda1 on the other hand1 the words 
constituting the arthavda form a        
separate group of their own which refers
 to some accomplished thing#bad1 and    
only subsequently to that1 when it comes
 to be considered what purpose they     
subserve1 they enter on the function of 
glorifying the injunction4 ,let us      
examine1 as an illustrative example1 the
 injunctive passage1 ',he who is        
desirous of prosperity is to offer to   
,vyu a white animal4' ,all the words    
contained in this passage are directly  

connected with the injunction4 ,this is1
 however1 not the case with the words   
constituting the corresponding arthavda 
passage1 ',for ,vyu is the swiftest     
deity2 ,vyu he approaches with his own  
share2 he leads him to prosperity4' ,the
 single words of this arthavda are not  
grammatically connected with the single 
words of the injunction1 but form a     
subordinate unity of their own1 which   
contains the praise of ,vyu1 and glorify
 the injunction1 only in so far as they 
give us to understand that the action   
enjoined is connected with a            
distinguished divinity4 ,if the matter  
conveyed by the subordinate 7arthavda7  
passage can be known by some other means
 of knowledge1 the arthavda acts as a   
mere anuvda1 i4e4 a statement referring 
to something 7already known7#bae4 ,when 
its contents are contradicted by other  
means of knowledge it acts as a         
so-called gu_/n_/avda1 i4e4 a statement 
of a quality#baf4 ,where1 again1 neither
 of the two mentioned conditions is     

found1 a doubt may arise whether the    
arthavda is to be taken as a gu_/n_/avda
 on account of the absence of other     
means of knowledge1 or as an arthavda   
referring to something known 7i4e4 an   
anuvda7 on account of the absence of    
contradiction by other means of proof4  
,the latter alternative is1 however1 to 
be embraced by reflecting people4--,the 
same reasoning applies to mantras also4 
,there is a further reason for assuming 
the personality of the gods4 ,the ,vedic
 injunctions1 as enjoining sacrificial  
offerings to ,indra and the other gods1 
presuppose certain characteristic shapes
 of the individual divinities1 because  
without such the sacrificer could not   
represent ,indra and the other gods to  
his mind4 ,and if the divinity were not 
represented to the mind it would not be 
possible to make an offering to it4 ,so 
,scripture also says1 ',of that divinity
 for which the offering is taken he is  
to think when about to say vausha_/t_/' 
7,ai4 ,br4 ,,iii1 #h1 #a74 ,nor is it   

possible to consider the essential form 
7or character7 of a thing to consist in 
the word only#bag2 for word 7denoting7  
and thing 7denoted7 are different4 ,he  
therefore who admits the                
authoritativeness of the scriptural word
 has no right to deny that the shape of 
,indra1 and the other gods1 is such as  
we understand it to be from the mantras 
and arthavdas4--,moreover1 itihsas and  
pur_/n_/as also--because based on mantra
 and arthavda which possess             
authoritative power in the manner       
described--are capable of setting forth 
the personality1 c4 of the devas4       
,itihsa and pur_/n_/a can1 besides1 be  
considered as based on perception also4 
,for what is not accessible to our      
perception may have been within the     
sphere of perception of people in       
ancient times4 ,sm_/ri_/ti also declares
 that ,vysa and others conversed with   
the gods face to face4 ,a person        
maintaining that the people of ancient  
times were no more able to converse with

 the gods than people are at present1   
would thereby deny the 7incontestable7  
variety of the world4 ,he might as well 
maintain that because there is at       
present no prince ruling over the whole 
earth1 there were no such princes in    
former times2 a position by which the   
scriptural injunction of the            
rjasya-sacrifice#bah would be           
stultified4 ,or he might maintain that  
in former times the spheres of duty of  
the different castes and _/s_/ramas were
 as generally unsettled as they are now1
 and1 on that account1 declare those    
parts of ,scripture which define those  
different duties to be purposeless4 ,it 
is therefore altogether unobjectionable 
to assume that the men of ancient times1
 in consequence of their eminent        
religious merit1 conversed with the gods
 face to face4 ,sm_/ri_/ti also declares
 that 'from the reading of the ,veda    
there results intercourse with the      
favourite divinity' 7,yoga ,stra ,,ii1  
#dd74 ,and that ,yoga does1 as          

,sm_/ri_/ti declares1 lead to the       
acquirement of extraordinary powers1    
such as subtlety of body1 and so on1 is 
a fact which cannot be set aside by a   
mere arbitrary denial4 ,scripture also  
proclaims the greatness of ,yoga1       
',when1 as earth1 water1 light1 heat1   
and ether arise1 the fivefold quality of
 ,yoga takes place1 then there is no    
longer illness1 old age1 or pain for him
 who has obtained a body produced by the
 fire of ,yoga' 7_/,s_/vet4 ,up4 ,,ii1  
#ab74 ,nor have we the right to measure 
by our capabilities the capability of   
the _/ri_/shis who see the mantras and  
brhma_/n_/a passages 7i4e4 the          
,veda74--,from all this it appears that 
the itihsas and pur_/n_/as have an      
adequate basis4--,and the conceptions of
 ordinary life also must not be declared
 to be unfounded1 if it is at all       
possible to accept them4  ,the general  
result is that we have the right to     
conceive the gods as possessing personal
 existence1 on the ground of mantras1   

arthavdas1 itihsas1 pur_/n_/as1 and     
ordinarily prevailing ideas4 ,and as the
 gods may thus be in the condition of   
having desires and so on1 they must be  
considered as qualified for the         
knowledge of ,brahman4 ,moreover1 the   
declarations which ,scripture makes     
concerning gradual emancipation#bai     
agree with this latter supposition only4
  #cd4 ,grief of him 7i4e4 of           
,jna_/s_/ruti7 7arose7 on account of his
 hearing a disrespectful speech about   
himself2 on account of the rushing on of
 that 7grief7 7,raikva called him       
_/,s_/dra72 for it 7the grief7 is       
pointed at 7by ,raikva74  7,in the      
preceding adhikara_/n_/a7 the           
exclusiveness of the claim of men to    
knowledge has been refuted1 and it has  
been declared that the gods1 c4 also    
possess such a claim4 ,the present      
adhikara_/n_/a is entered on for the    
purpose of removing the doubt whether1  
as the exclusiveness of the claim of    
twice-born men is capable of refutation1

 the _/,s_/dras also possess such a     
claim4  ,the prvapakshin maintains that 
the _/,s_/dras also have such a claim1  
because they may be in the position of  
desiring that knowledge1 and because    
they are capable of it2 and because     
there is no scriptural prohibition      
7excluding them from knowledge7         
analogous to the text1 ',therefore#bbj  
the _/,s_/dra is unfit for sacrificing' 
7,taitt4 ,sa_/m_/h4 ,,vii1 #a1 #a1 #f74 
,the reason1 moreover1 which            
disqualifies the _/,s_/dras for         
sacrificial works1 viz4 their being     
without the sacred fires1 does not      
invalidate their qualification for      
knowledge1 as knowledge can be          
apprehended by those also who are       
without the fires4 ,there is besides an 
inferential mark supporting the claim of
 the _/,s_/dras2 for in the so-called   
sa_/m_/varga-knowledge he 7,raikva7     
refers to ,jna_/s_/ruti ,pautrya_/n_/a1 
who wishes to learn from him1 by the    
name of _/,s_/dra ',fie1 necklace and   

carnage be thine1 ,o _/,s_/dra1 together
 with the cows' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b1    
#c74 ,sm_/ri_/ti moreover speaks of     
,vidra and others who were born from    
_/,s_/dra mothers as possessing eminent 
knowledge4--,hence the _/,s_/dra has a  
claim to the knowledge of ,brahman4  ,to
 this we reply that the _/,s_/dras have 
no such claim1 on account of their not  
studying the ,veda4 ,a person who has   
studied the ,veda and understood its    
sense is indeed qualified for ,vedic    
matters2 but a _/,s_/dra does not study 
the ,veda1 for such study demands as its
 antecedent the upanayana-ceremony1 and 
that ceremony belongs to the three      
7higher7 castes only4 ,the mere         
circumstance of being in a condition of 
desire does not furnish a reason for    
qualification1 if capability is absent4 
,mere temporal capability again does not
 constitute a reason for qualification1 
spiritual capability being required in  
spiritual matters4 ,and spiritual       
capability is 7in the case of the       

_/,s_/dras7 excluded by their being     
excluded from the study of the          
,veda4--,the ,vedic statement1 moreover1
 that the _/,s_/dra is unfit for        
sacrifices intimates1 because founded on
 reasoning1 that he is unfit for        
knowledge also2 for the argumentation is
 the same in both cases#bba4--,with     
reference to the prvapakshin's opinion  
that the fact of the word '_/,s_/dra'   
being enounced in the                   
sa_/m_/varga-knowledge constitutes an   
inferential mark 7of the _/,s_/dra's    
qualification for knowledge71 we remark 
that that inferential mark has no force1
 on account of the absence of arguments4
 ,for the statement of an inferential   
mark possesses the power of intimation  
only in consequence of arguments being  
adduced2 but no such arguments are      
brought forward in the passage          
quoted4#bbb ,besides1 the word          
'_/,s_/dra' which occurs in the         
sa_/m_/varga-vidy would establish a     
claim on the part of the _/,s_/dras to  

that one vidy only1 not to all vidys4   
,in reality1 however1 it is powerless1  
because occurring in an arthavda1 to    
establish the _/,s_/dras' claim to      
anything4--,the word '_/,s_/dra' can    
moreover be made to agree with the      
context in which it occurs in the       
following manner4 ,when ,jna_/s_/ruti   
,pautrya_/n_/a heard himself spoken of  
with disrespect by the flamingo 7',how  
can you speak of him1 being what he is1 
as if he were like ,raikva with the     
car8' ,,iv1 #a1 #c71 grief 7su_/k_/7    
arose in his mind1 and to that grief the
 _/ri_/shi ,raikva alludes with the word
 _/,s_/dra1 in order to show thereby his
 knowledge of what is remote4 ,this     
explanation must be accepted because a  
7real7 born _/,s_/dra is not qualified  
7for the sa_/m_/varga-vidy74 ,if it be  
asked how the grief 7su_/k_/7 which had 
arisen in ,jnasruti's mind can be       
referred to by means of the word        
_/,s_/dra1 we reply3 ,on account of the 
rushing on 7drava_/n_/a7 of the grief4  

,for we may etymologise the word        
_/,s_/dra by dividing it into its parts1
 either as 'he rushed into grief        
7_/,s_/u_/k_/am abhidudrva7 or as 'grief
 rushed on him1' or as 'he in his grief 
rushed to ,raikva2' while on the other  
hand it is impossible to accept the word
 in its ordinary conventional sense4    
,the circumstance 7of the king actually 
being grieved7 is moreover expressly    
touched upon in the legend#bbc4  #ce4   
,and because the kshattriyahood 7of     
,jna_/s_/ruti7 is understood from the   
inferential mark 7supplied by his being 
mentioned7 later on with                
_/,k_/aitraratha 7who was a kshattriya  
himself74  ,jna_/s_/ruti cannot have    
been a _/,s_/dra by birth for that      
reason also that his being a kshattriya 
is understood from an inferential sign1 
viz4 his being mentioned together 7in   
one chapter7 with the kshattriya        
_/,k_/aitraratha ,abhipratrin4 ,for1    
later on1 i4e4 in the passage           
complementary to the sa_/m_/varga-vidy1 

a kshattriya _/,k_/aitrarathi           
,abhipratrin is glorified1 ',once while 
_/,s_/aunaka ,kpeya and ,abhipratrin    
,kkshaseni were being waited on at their
 meal a religious student begged of     
them' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #e74 ,that   
this ,abhipratrin was a _/,k_/aitrarathi
 7i4e4 a descendant of _/,k_/itraratha7 
we have to infer from his connexion with
 a ,kpeya4 ,for we know 7from           
_/,s_/ruti7 about the connexion of      
_/,k_/itraratha himself with the ,kpeyas
 7'the ,kpeyas made _/,k_/itraratha     
perform that sacrifice2' ,t_/nd_/ya4    
,br4 ,,xx1 #ab1 #e71 and as a rule      
sacrificers of one and the same family  
employ officiating priests of one and   
the same family4 ,moreover1 as we       
understand from ,scripture 7'from him a 
_/,k_/aitrarathi descended who was a    
prince#bbd'7 that he 7_/,k_/aitraratha7 
was a prince1 we must understand him to 
have been a kshattriya4 ,the fact now of
 ,jna_/s_/ruti being praised in the same
 vidy with the kshattriya ,abhipratrin  

intimates that the former also was a    
kshattriya4 ,for as a rule equals are   
mentioned together with equals4 ,that   
,jna_/s_/ruti was a kshattriya we       
moreover conclude from his sending his  
door-keeper and from other similar signs
 of power 7mentioned in the             
text74--,hence the _/,s_/dras are not   
qualified 7for the knowledge of         
,brahman74  #cf4 ,on account of the     
reference to ceremonial purifications   
7in the case of the higher castes7 and  
on account of their absence being       
declared 7in the case of the            
_/,s_/dras74  ,that the _/,s_/dras are  
not qualified1 follows from that        
circumstance also that in different     
places of the vidys such ceremonies as  
the upanayana and the like are referred 
to4 ,compare1 for instance1 _/,s_/at4   
,br4 ,,xi1 #e1 #c1 #ac1 ',he initiated  
him as a pupil2' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a1   
#a1 ',teach me1 ,sir6 thus he approached
 him2' ,pra4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 ',devoted to  
,brahman1 firm in ,brahman1 seeking for 

the highest ,brahman they1 carrying fuel
 in their hands1 approached the         
venerable ,pippalda1 thinking that he   
would teach them all that4'--,thus the  
following passage also1 ',he without    
having made them undergo the upanayana  
7said7 to them' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aa1 #g71
 shows that the upanayana is a          
well-established ceremony#bbe4--,with   
reference to the _/,s_/dras1 on the     
other hand1 the absence of ceremonies is
 frequently mentioned2 so1 for instance1
 ,manu ,x1 #d1 where they are spoken of 
as 'once born' only 7'the _/,s_/dra is  
the fourth caste1 once-born'71 and ,manu
 ,x1 #abf1 ',in the _/,s_/dra there is  
not any sin1 and he is not fit for any  
ceremony4'  #cg4 ,and on account of     
7,gautama7 proceeding 7to initiate      
,jbla7 on the ascertainment of 7his7 not
 being that 7i4e4 a _/,s_/dra74  ,the   
_/,s_/dras are not qualified for that   
reason also that ,gautama1 having       
ascertained ,jbla not to be a _/,s_/dra 
from his speaking the truth1 proceeded  

to initiate and instruct him4 ',none who
 is not a ,brhma_/n_/a would thus speak 
out4 ,go and fetch fuel1 friend1 ,i     
shall initiate you4 ,you have not       
swerved from the truth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1
 #d1 #e72 which scriptural passage      
furnishes an inferential sign 7of the   
_/,s_/dras not being capable of         
initiation74  #ch4 ,and on account of   
the prohibition1 in ,sm_/ri_/ti1 of 7the
 _/,s_/dras'7 hearing and studying 7the 
,veda7 and 7knowing and performing7     
7,vedic7 matters4  ,the _/,s_/dras are  
not qualified for that reason also that 
,sm_/ri_/ti prohibits their hearing the 
,veda1 their studying the ,veda1 and    
their understanding and performing      
,vedic matters4 ,the prohibition of     
hearing the ,veda is conveyed by the    
following passages3 ',the ears of him   
who hears the ,veda are to be filled    
with 7molten7 lead and lac1' and ',for a
 _/,s_/dra is 7like7 a cemetery1        
therefore 7the ,veda7 is not to be read 
in the vicinity of a _/,s_/dra4' ,from  

this latter passage the prohibition of  
studying the ,veda results at once2 for 
how should he study ,scripture in whose 
vicinity it is not even to be read8     
,there is1 moreover1 an express         
prohibition 7of the _/,s_/dras studying 
the ,veda74 ',his tongue is to be slit  
if he pronounces it2 his body is to be  
cut through if he preserves it4' ,the   
prohibitions of hearing and studying the
 ,veda already imply the prohibition of 
the knowledge and performance of ,vedic 
matters2 there are1 however1 express    
prohibitions also1 such as 'he is not to
 impart knowledge to the _/,s_/dra1' and
 'to the twice-born belong study1       
sacrifice1 and the bestowal of          
gifts4'--,from those _/,s_/dras1        
however1 who1 like ,vidura and 'the     
religious hunter1' acquire knowledge in 
consequence of the after effects of     
former deeds1 the fruit of their        
knowledge cannot be withheld1 since     
knowledge in all cases brings about its 
fruit4 ,sm_/ri_/ti1 moreover1 declares  

that all the four castes are qualified  
for acquiring the knowledge of the      
itihsas and pur_/n_/as2 compare the     
passage1 ',he is to teach the four      
castes' 7,mahbh474--,it remains1        
however1 a settled point that they do   
not possess any such qualification with 
regard to the ,veda4  #ci4 7,the        
pr_/n_/a is ,brahman71 on account of the
 trembling 7predicated of the whole     
world74  ,the discussion of             
qualification for ,brahma-knowledge--on 
which we entered as an opportunity      
offered--being finished we return to our
 chief topic1 i4e4 the enquiry into the 
purport of the ,vednta-texts4--,we read 
7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #b71 ',whatever    
there is1 the whole world when gone     
forth trembles in the pr_/n_/a4 ,it 7the
 pr_/n_/a7 is a great terror1 a raised  
thunderbolt4 ,those who know it become  
immortal#bbf4'--,this passage declares  
that this whole world trembles1 abiding 
in pr_/n_/a1 and that there is raised   
something very terrible1 called a       

thunderbolt1 and that through its       
knowledge immortality is obtained4 ,but 
as it is not immediately clear what the 
pr_/n_/a is1 and what that terrible     
thunderbolt1 a discussion arises4  ,the 
prvapakshin maintains that1 in          
accordance with the ordinary meaning of 
the term1 pr_/n_/a denotes the air with 
its five modifications1 that the word   
'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its
 ordinary sense1 and that thus the whole
 passage contains a glorification of    
air4 ,for1 he says1 this whole world    
trembles1 abiding within air with its   
five forms--which is here called        
pr_/n_/a--and the terrible thunderbolts 
also spring from air 7or wind7 as their 
cause4 ,for in the air1 people say1 when
 it manifests itself in the form of     
,parjanya1 lightning1 thunder1 rain1 and
 thunderbolts manifest                  
themselves4--,through the knowledge of  
that air immortality also can be        
obtained2 for another scriptural passage
 says1 ',air is everything by itself1   

and air is all things together4 ,he who 
knows this conquers death4'--,we        
therefore conclude that the same air is 
to be understood in the passage under   
discussion4  ,to this we make the       
following reply4--,brahman only can be  
meant1 on account of what precedes as   
well as what follows4 ,in the preceding 
as well as the subsequent part of the   
chapter ,brahman only is spoken of2 how 
then can it be supposed that in the     
intermediate part all at once the air   
should be referred to8 ,the immediately 
preceding passage runs as follows1      
',that only is called the ,bright1 that 
is called ,brahman1 that alone is called
 the ,immortal4 ,all worlds are         
contained in it1 and no one goes beyond 
it4' ,that the ,brahman there spoken of 
forms the topic of our passage also1 we 
conclude1 firstly1 from proximity2 and1 
secondly1 from the circumstance that in 
the clause1 ',the whole world trembles  
in pr_/n_/a' we recognise a quality of  
,brahman1 viz4 its constituting the     

abode of the whole world4 ,that the word
 pr_/n_/a can denote the highest ,self  
also1 appears from such passages as 'the
 pr_/n_/a of pr_/n_/a' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4  
,,iv1 #d1 #ah74 ,being the cause of     
trembling1 moreover1 is a quality which 
properly appertains to the highest ,self
 only1 not to mere air4 ,thus ,scripture
 says1 ',no mortal lives by the pr_/n_/a
 and the breath that goes down4 ,we live
 by another in whom these two repose'   
7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e #e74 ,and also in   
the passage subsequent to the one under 
discussion1 7',from terror of it fire   
burns1 from terror the sun burns1 from  
terror ,indra and ,vyu1 and ,death as   
the fifth run away1'7 ,brahman1 and not 
the air1 must be supposed to be spoken  
of1 since the subject of that passage is
 represented as the cause of fear on the
 part of the whole world inclusive of   
the air itself4 ,thence we again        
conclude that the passage under         
discussion also refers to ,brahman1     
firstly1 on the ground of proximity2    

and1 secondly1 because we recognise a   
quality of ,brahman1 viz4 its being the 
cause of fear1 in the words1 ',a great  
terror1 a raised thunderbolt4' ,the word
 'thunderbolt' is here used to denote a 
cause of fear in general4 ,thus in      
ordinary life also a man strictly       
carries out a king's command because he 
fearfully considers in his mind1 ',a    
thunderbolt 7i4e4 the king's wrath1 or  
threatened punishment7 is hanging over  
my head2 it might fall if ,i did not    
carry out his command4' ,in the same    
manner this whole world inclusive of    
fire1 air1 sun1 and so on1 regularly    
carries on its manifold functions from  
fear of ,brahman2 hence ,brahman as     
inspiring fear is compared to a         
thunderbolt4 ,similarly1 another        
scriptural passage1 whose topic is      
,brahman1 declares1 ',from terror of it 
the wind blows1 from terror the sun     
rises2 from terror of it ,agni and      
,indra1 yea1 ,death runs as the         
fifth4'--,that ,brahman is what is      

referred to in our passage1 further     
follows from the declaration that the   
fruit of its cognition is immortality4  
,for that immortality is the fruit of   
the knowledge of ,brahman is known1 for 
instance1 from the mantra1 ',a man who  
knows him only passes over death1 there 
is no other path to go' 7_/,s_/vet4 ,up4
 ,,vi1 #ae74--,that immortality which   
the prvapakshin asserts to be sometimes 
represented as the fruit of the         
knowledge of the air is a merely        
relative one2 for there 7i4e4 in the    
chapter from which the passage is       
quoted7 at first the highest ,self is   
spoken of1 by means of a new topic being
 started 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d71 and
 thereupon the inferior nature of the   
air and so on is referred to4           
7',everything else is evil4'7--,that in 
the passage under discussion the highest
 ,self is meant appears finally from the
 general subject-matter2 for the        
question 7asked by ,na_/k_/iketas in ,i1
 #b1 #ad1 ',that which thou seest as    

neither this nor that1 as neither effect
 nor cause1 as neither past nor future  
tell me that'7 refers to the highest    
,self4  #dj4 ,the light 7is ,brahman71  
on account of that 7,brahman7 being seen
 7in the scriptural passage74  ,we read 
in ,scripture1 ',thus does that serene  
being1 arising from this body1 appear in
 its own form as soon as it has         
approached the highest light' 7,ch4 ,up4
 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c74 ,here the doubt      
arises whether the word 'light' denotes 
the 7physical7 light1 which is the      
object of sight and dispels darkness1 or
 the highest ,brahman4  ,the prvapakshin
 maintains that the word 'light' denotes
 the well-known 7physical7 light1       
because that is the conventional sense  
of the word4 ,for while it is to be     
admitted that in another passage1       
discussed under ,i1 #a1 #bd1 the word   
'light' does1 owing to the general topic
 of the chapter1 divest itself of its   
ordinary meaning and denote ,brahman1   
there is in our passage no similar      

reason for setting the ordinary meaning 
aside4 ,moreover1 it is stated in the   
chapter treating of the n_/d_/s of the  
body1 that a man going to final release 
reaches the sun 7',when he departs from 
this body then he departs upwards by    
those very rays2' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 
#e74 ,hence we conclude that the word   
'light' denotes1 in our passage1 the    
ordinary light4  ,to this we make the   
following reply4--,the word 'light' can 
denote the highest ,brahman only1 on    
account of that being seen4 ,we see that
 in the whole chapter ,brahman is       
carried on as the topic of discussion4  
,for the ,self1 which is free from sin1 
c4 is introduced as the general         
subject-matter in ,,viii1 #g1 #a 7'the  
,self which is free from sin'72 it is   
thereupon set forth as that which is to 
be searched out and to be understood    
7,,viii1 #g1 #a72 it is carried on by   
means of the clauses1 ',i shall explain 
that further to you' 7,,viii1 #i1 #c    
ff472 after that freedom from body is   

said to belong to it1 because it is one 
with light 7'when he is free from the   
body then neither pleasure nor pain     
touches him1' ,,viii1 #ab1 #a7--;and    
freedom from body is not possible       
outside ,brahman--and it is finally     
qualified as 'the highest light1 the    
highest person' 7,,viii1 #ab1           
#c74--;,against the statement1 made by  
the prvapakshin1 that ,scripture speaks 
of a man going to release as reaching   
the sun1 we remark1 that the release    
there referred to is not the ultimate   
one1 since it is said to be connected   
with going and departing upwards4 ,that 
the ultimate release has nothing to do  
with going and departing upwards we     
shall show later on4  #da4 ,the ether is
 7,brahman71 as it is designated as     
something different1 c4 7from name and  
form74  ,scripture says1 ',he who is    
called ether1 7k_/s_/a7 is the revealer 
of all forms and names4 ,that within    
which these forms and names are         
contained is the ,brahman1 the          

,immortal1 the ,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 
#ad1 #a74  ,there arising a doubt       
whether that which here is called ether 
is the highest ,brahman or the ordinary 
elemental ether1 the prvapakshin        
declares that the latter alternative is 
to be embraced1 firstly1 because it is  
founded on the conventional meaning of  
the word 'ether2' and1 secondly1 because
 the circumstance of revealing names and
 forms can very well be reconciled with 
the elemental ether1 as that which      
affords room 7for all things74          
,moreover1 the passage contains no clear
 indicatory mark of ,brahman1 such as   
creative power1 and the like4  ,to this 
we reply1 that the word 'ether' can here
 denote the highest ,brahman only1      
because it is designated as a different 
thing1 c4 ,for the clause1 ',that within
 which these two are contained is       
,brahman1' designates the ether as      
something different from names and      
forms4 ,but1 excepting ,brahman1 there  
is nothing whatever different from name 

and form1 since the entire world of     
effects is evolved exclusively by names 
and forms4 ,moreover1 the complete      
revealing of names and forms cannot be  
accomplished by anything else but       
,brahman1 according to the text which   
declares ,brahman's creative agency1    
',let me enter 7into those beings7 with 
this living ,self 7jva tman71 and evolve
 names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1  
#b74 ,but--it may be said--from this    
very passage it is apparent that the    
living ,self also 7i4e4 the individual  
soul7 possesses revealing power with    
regard to names and forms4--,true1 we   
reply1 but what the passage really      
wishes to intimate1 is the              
non-difference 7of the individual soul  
from the highest ,self74 ,and the very  
statement concerning the revealing of   
names and forms implies the statement of
 signs indicatory of ,brahman1 viz4     
creative power and the like4--,moreover1
 the terms 'the ,brahman1 the ,immortal1
 the ,self' 7,,viii1 #ad7 indicate that 

,brahman is spoken of4  #db4 ,and 7on   
account of the designation7 7of the     
highest ,self7 as different 7from the   
individual soul7 in the states of deep  
sleep and departing4  ,in the sixth     
prap_/th_/aka of the                    
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka there is given1  
in reply to the question1 ',who is that 
,self8' a lengthy exposition of the     
nature of the ,self1 ',he who is within 
the heart1 among the pr_/n_/as1 the     
person of light1 consisting of          
knowledge' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1    
#g74 ,here the doubt arises1 whether the
 passage merely aims at making an       
additional statement about the nature of
 the transmigrating soul 7known already 
from other sources71 or at establishing 
the nature of the non-transmigrating    
,self4  ,the prvapakshin maintains that 
the passage is concerned with the nature
 of the transmigrating soul1 on account 
of the introductory and concluding      
statements4 ,for the introductory       
statement1 ',he among the pr_/n_/as who 

consists of knowledge1' contains marks  
indicatory of the embodied soul1 and so 
likewise the concluding passage1 ',and  
that great unborn ,self is he who       
consists of cognition1' c4 7,,iv1 #d1   
#bb74 ,we must therefore adhere to the  
same subject-matter in the intermediate 
passages also1 and look on them as      
setting forth the same embodied ,self1  
represented in its different states1    
viz4 the waking state1 and so on4  ,in  
reply to this1 we maintain that the     
passage aims only at giving information 
about the highest ,lord1 not at making  
additional statements about the embodied
 soul4--,why8--,on account of the       
highest ,lord being designated as       
different from the embodied soul1 in the
 states of deep sleep and of departing  
from the body4 ,his difference from the 
embodied soul in the state of deep sleep
 is declared in the following passage1  
',this person embraced by the           
intelligent 7prj_/_/a7 ,self knows      
nothing that is without1 nothing that is

 within4' ,here the term1 'the person1' 
must mean the embodied soul2 for of him 
it is possible to deny that he knows1   
because he1 as being the knower1 may    
know what is within and without4 ,the   
'intelligent ,self1' on the other hand1 
is the highest ,lord1 because he is     
never dissociated from intelligence1    
i4e4--in his case--all-embracing        
knowledge4--,similarly1 the passage     
treating of departure1 i4e4 death 7'this
 bodily ,self mounted by the intelligent
 ,self moves along groaning'71 refers to
 the highest ,lord as different from the
 individual ,self4 ,there also we have  
to understand by the 'embodied one' the 
individual soul which is the ,lord of   
the body1 while the 'intelligent one' is
 again the ,lord4 ,we thus understand   
that 'on account of his being designated
 as something different1 in the states  
of deep sleep and departure1' the       
highest ,lord forms the subject of the  
passage4--,with reference to the        
prvapakshin's assertion that the entire 

chapter refers to the embodied ,self1   
because indicatory marks of the latter  
are found in its beginning1 middle1 and 
end1 we remark that in the first place  
the introductory passage 7',he among the
 pr_/n_/as who consists of cognition'7  
does not aim at setting forth the       
character of the transmigrating ,self1  
but rather1 while merely referring to   
the nature of the transmigrating ,self  
as something already known1 aims at     
declaring its identity with the highest 
,brahman2 for it is manifest that the   
immediately subsequent passage1 'as if  
thinking1 as if moving'#bbg1 aims at    
discarding the attributes of the        
transmigrating ,self4 ,the concluding   
passage again is analogous to the       
initial one2 for the words1 ',and that  
great unborn ,self is he who1' c41 mean3
 ,we have shown that that same          
cognitional ,self1 which is observed    
among the pr_/n_/as1 is the great unborn
 ,self1 i4e4 the highest ,lord--,he1    
again1 who imagines that the passages   

intervening 7between the two quoted7 aim
 at setting forth the nature of the     
transmigrating ,self by representing it 
in the waking state1 and so on1 is like 
a man who setting out towards the east1 
wants to set out at the same time       
towards the west4 ,for in representing  
the states of waking1 and so on1 the    
passage does not aim at describing the  
soul as subject to different states or  
transmigration1 but rather as free from 
all particular conditions and           
transmigration4 ,this is evident from   
the circumstance that on ,janaka's      
question1 which is repeated in every    
section1 ',speak on for the sake of     
emancipation1' ,yaj_/_/avalkya replies  
each time1 ',by all that he is not      
affected1 for that person is not        
attached to anything' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,,iv1 #c1 #ad-af74 ,and later on he says
 7,,iv1 #c1 #bb71 ',he is not followed  
by good1 not followed by evil1 for he   
has then overcome all the sorrows of the
 heart4' ,we have1 therefore1 to        

conclude that the chapter exclusively   
aims at setting forth the nature of the 
non-transmigrating ,self4  #dc4 ,and on 
account of such words as ,lord1 c4      
,that the chapter aims at setting forth 
the nature of the non-transmigrating    
,self1 we have to conclude from that    
circumstance also that there occur in it
 terms such as ,lord and so on1         
intimating the nature of the            
non-transmigrating ,self1 and others    
excluding the nature of the             
transmigrating ,self4 ,to the first     
class belongs1 for instance1 ',he is the
 lord of all1 the king of all things1   
the protector of all things4' ,to the   
latter class belongs the passage1 ',he  
does not become greater by good works1  
nor smaller by evil works4'--,from all  
which we conclude that the chapter      
refers to the non-transmigrating highest
 ,lord4  ,notes3  ,footnote #afd3 ,from 
passages of which nature we may infer   
that in the passage under discussion    
also the 'abode' is ,brahman4  ,footnote

 #afe3 ,from which circumstance we may  
conclude that the passage under         
discussion also refers to ,brahman4     
,footnote #aff3 ,yat sarvam             
avidyropita_/m_/ tat sarva_/m_/         
paramrthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat 
sarvam ity artha_/h_/4 ,bhmat4          
,footnote #afg3 ,so that the passage    
would have to be translated1 ',that1    
viz4 knowledge1 c4 is the bridge of the 
,immortal4'  ,footnote #afh3 ,bhogyasya 
bhokt_/ris_/eshatvt tasyyatanatvam uktam
 _/s_/ankyha na _/k_/eti1               
jvasyd_/ri_/sh_/t_/advr                 
dyubhvdinimittatvezpi na sksht          
tadyatanatvam aupdhikatvenvibhutvd ity  
artha_/h_/4 nanda ,giri4  ,footnote     
#afi3 ,it would not have been requisite 
to introduce a special ,stra for the    
individual soul--which1 like the air1 is
 already excluded by the preceding      
,stra--if it were not for the new       
argument brought forward in the         
following ,stra which applies to the    
individual soul only4  ,footnote #agj3  

,if the individual soul were meant by   
the abode of heaven1 earth1 c41 the     
statement regarding _/s_/vara made in   
the passage about the two birds would be
 altogether abrupt1 and on that ground  
objectionable4 ,the same difficulty does
 not present itself with regard to the  
abrupt mention of the individual soul   
which is well known to everybody1 and to
 which therefore casual allusions may be
 made4--,i subjoin nanda ,giri's        
commentary on the entire passage3       
,jvasyopdhyaikyenvivakshitatvt          
tadj_/_/nezpi sarvaj_/_/nasiddhes       
tasyyatanatvdyabhve hetvantara_/m_/     
v_/k_/yam ity _/s_/ankya stre_/n_/a     
pariharati kuta_/sk_/etydin4 ,tad       
vy_/k_/ash_/t_/e dyubhvdti4             
,nirde_/s_/am eva dar_/s_/ayati tayor   
iti4 ,vibhaktyartham ha tbhy_/m_/       
_/k_/eti4 ,sthitye_/s_/varasydanj       
jvasa_/m_/grahezpi katham               
_/s_/varasyaiva vi_/s_/vyatanatva_/m_/  
tadha yadti4                            
_/s_/varasyyanatvenprak_/ri_/tatve      

jvap_/ri_/thakkathannupapattir ity uktam
 eva vyatirekadvrha anyatheti4          
,jvasyyatanatvenprak_/ri_/tatve         
tulynupapattir iti _/s_/ankate nanviti4 
,tasyaikyrtha_/m_/ lokasiddhasynuvdatvn 
naivam ity ha neti4                     
,jvasyprvatvbhvenpratipdyatvam eva      
praka_/t_/ayati kshetraj_/_/o hti4      
_/s_/varasypi lokavdisiddhatvd          
apratipdyatety _/s_/ankyha _/s_/varas tv
 iti4  ,footnote #aga3 ,as might be the 
prim facie conclusion from the particle 
'but' introducing the sentence 'but he  
in reality1' c4  ,footnote #agb3 ,it    
being maintained that the passage       
referred to is to be viewed in connexion
 with the general subject-matter of the 
preceding past of the chapter4          
,footnote #agc3 ,and would thus involve 
a violation of a fundamental principle  
of the ,mm_/m_/s4  ,footnote #agd3 ,a   
remark directed against the possible    
attempt to explain the passage last     
quoted as referring to the embodied     
soul4  ,footnote #age3 ,pi_/nd_/a_/h_/  

sthlo deha_/h_/1 pr_/n_/a_/h_/ strtm4   
nanda ,giri4-,the lower ,brahman        
7hira_/n_/yagarbha on strtman7 is the   
vital principle 7pr_/n_/a7 in all       
creatures4  ,footnote #agf3             
,sa_/m_/yagdar_/s_/ana1 i4e4 complete   
seeing or intuition2 the same term which
 in other places--where it is not       
requisite to insist on the idea of      
'seeing' in contradistinction from      
'reflecting' or 'meditating'--is        
rendered by perfect knowledge4          
,footnote #agg3 ,translated above by 'of
 the shape of the individual soul4'     
,footnote #agh3 ,pa_/n_/ini ,,iii1 #c1  
#gg1 'mrtta_/m_/ ghana_/h_/4'  ,footnote
 #agi3 ,so that the interpretation of   
the prvapakshin cannot be objected to on
 the ground of its involving the        
comparison of a thing to itself4        
,footnote #ahj3 ,so that no objection   
can be raised on the ground that heaven 
and earth cannot be contained in the    
small ether of the heart4  ,footnote    
#aha3 ,viz4 of that which is within it4 

nanda ,giri proposes two explanations3  
na _/k_/eti1                            
paravi_/s_/esha_/n_/atvenety atra paro  
dahark_/s_/a updnt tasminn iti          
saptamyanta-ta_/kkh_/abdasyeti          
_/s_/esha_/h_/4 ,yadv para_/s_/abdo s   
nta_/h_/sthavastuvishayas               
tadvi_/s_/esha_/n_/alvena tasminn iti   
dahark_/s_/asyokter ity artha_/h_/4     
,ta_/kkh_/abdasya                       
samnik_/ri_/sh_/t_/nvayayoge            
viprak_/ri_/sh_/t_/nvayasya jaghanyatvd 
k_/s_/ntargata_/m_/ dhyeyam iti         
bhva_/h_/4  ,footnote #ahb3 ,a          
vkyabheda--split of the sentence--takes 
place according to the ,mmm_/s_/ when   
one and the same sentence contains two  
new statements which are different4     
,footnote #ahc3 ,while the explanation  
of ,brahman by jva would compel us to   
assume that the word ,brahman           
secondarily denotes the individual soul4
  ,footnote #ahd3 ,upalabdher           
adhish_/th_/nam brahma_/n_/a deha       
ishyate4 ,tensdhra_/n_/atvena deho      

brahmapuram bhavet4 ,bhmat4  ,footnote  
#ahe3 ,i4e4 ,brahm1 the lower ,brahman4 
,footnote #ahf3 ,the masculine          
'virbhtasvarpa_/h_/' qualifies the      
substantive jva_/h_/ which has to be    
supplied4 ,properly speaking the jva    
whose true nature has become manifest1  
i4e4 which has become ,brahman1 is no   
longer jva2 hence the explanatory       
statement that the term jva is used with
 reference to what the jva was before it
 became ,brahman4  ,footnote #ahg3 ,to  
state another reason showing that the   
first and second chapters of ,prajpati's
 instruction refer to the same subject4 
,footnote #ahh3 ,i4e4 of whom cognition 
is not a mere attribute4  ,footnote     
#ahi3 ,although in reality there is no  
such thing as an individual soul4       
,footnote #aij3 ,nanu jvabrahma_/n_/or  
aikyam na kvpi strakro mukhato vadati   
kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva1 ato naikyam 
ish_/t_/am tatrha pratipdyam tv iti4    
,footnote #aia3 ,this last sentence is  
directed against the possible objection 

that '_/s_/abda1' which the ,stra brings
 forward as an argument in favour of the
 highest ,lord being meant1 has the     
sense of 'sentence' 7vkya71 and is      
therefore of less force than linga1 i4e4
 indicatory or inferential mark which is
 represented in our passage by the      
angush_/th_/amtrat of the purusha1 and  
favours the jva interpretation4         
_/,s_/abda1 the text remarks1 here means
 _/s_/ruti1 i4e4 direct enunciation1 and
 _/s_/ruti ranks1 as a means of proof1  
higher than linga4  ,footnote #aib3     
,i4e4 men belonging to the three upper  
castes4  ,footnote #aic3 ,the first     
reason excludes animals1 gods1 and      
_/ri_/shis4 ,gods cannot themselves     
perform sacrifices1 the essential       
feature of which is the parting1 on the 
part of the sacrificer1 with an offering
 meant for the gods4 _/,ri_/shis cannot 
perform sacrifices in the course of     
whose performance the ancestral         
_/ri_/shis of the sacrificer are        
invoked4--,the second reason excludes   

those men whose only desire is          
emancipation and who therefore do not   
care for the perishable fruits of       
sacrifices4--,the third and fourth      
reasons exclude the _/,s_/dras who are  
indirectly disqualified for _/s_/stric  
works because the ,veda in different    
places gives rules for the three higher 
castes only1 and for whom the ceremony  
of the upanayana--indispensable for all 
who wish to study the ,veda--is not     
prescribed4--,cp4 ,prva ,mm_/m_/s ,stras
 ,,vi1 #a4  ,footnote #aid3 ,the        
reference is to ,prva ,mm_/m_/s ,stras  
,i1 #a1 #e 7not to ,i1 #b1 #ba1 as      
stated in ,muir's ,sanskrit ,texts1     
,,iii1 p4 #fi74  ,footnote #aie3 ,in    
which classes of beings all the gods are
 comprised4  ,footnote #aif3 ,which     
shows that together with the            
non-eternality of the thing denoted     
there goes the non-eternality of the    
denoting word4  ,footnote #aig3         
k_/ri_/ti1 best translated by ,greek3   
eidos4  ,footnote #aih3 ,the            

prvapakshin1 i4e4 here the grammarian   
maintains1 for the reasons specified    
further on1 that there exists in the    
case of words a supersensuous entity    
called spho_/t_/a which is manifested by
 the letters of the word1 and1 if       
apprehended by the mind1 itself         
manifests the sense of the word4 ,the   
term spho_/t_/a may1 according as it is 
viewed in either of these lights1 be    
explained as the manifestor or that     
which is manifested4--,the spho_/t_/a is
 a grammatical fiction1 the word in so  
far as it is apprehended by us as a     
whole4 ,that we cannot identify it with 
the 'notion' 7as ,deussen seems inclined
 to do1 p4 #hj7 follows from its being  
distinctly called v_/k_/aka or          
abhidhyaka1 and its being represented as
 that which causes the conception of the
 sense of a word 7arthadhhetu74         
,footnote #aii3 ,for that each letter by
 itself expresses the sense is not      
observed2 and if it did so1 the other   
letters of the word would have to be    

declared useless4  ,footnote #bjj3 ,in  
order to enable us to apprehend the     
sense from the word1 there is required  
the actual consciousness of the last    
letter plus the impressions of the      
preceding letters2 just as smoke enables
 us to infer the existence of fire only 
if we are actually conscious of the     
smoke4 ,but that actual consciousness   
does not take place because the         
impressions are not objects of          
perceptive consciousness4  ,footnote    
#bja3 ',how should it be so8' i4e4 it   
cannot be so2 and on that account the   
differences apprehended do not belong to
 the letters themselves1 but to the     
external conditions mentioned above4    
,footnote #bjb3 ,with 'or else' begins  
the exposition of the finally accepted  
theory as to the cause why the same     
letters are apprehended as different4   
,hitherto the cause had been found in   
the variety of the updhis of the        
letters4 ,now a new distinction is made 
between articulated letters and         

non-articulated tone4  ,footnote #bjc3  
,i4e4 it is not directly one idea1 for  
it has for its object more than one     
letter2 but it may be called one in a   
secondary sense because it is based on  
the determinative knowledge that the    
letters1 although more than one1 express
 one sense only4  ,footnote #bjd3 ,which
 circumstance proves that exalted       
knowledge appertains not only to        
,hira_/n_/yagarbha1 but to many beings4 
,footnote #bje3 ,viz4 naraka1 the       
commentaries say4  ,footnote #bjf3      
,asmin kalpe sarveshm pr_/n_/inm        
dhapkaprak_/s_/akr yozyam agnir         
d_/ris_/yate sozyam agni_/h_/ prvasmin  
kalpe manushya_/h_/ san                 
devatvapadaprpaka_/m_/                  
karmnush_/th_/ysmin kalpa etaj janma    
labdhavn ata_/h_/ prvasmin kalpe sa     
manushyo bhvin_/m_/ sa_/m_/j_/_/m       
_/sri_/tygnir iti                       
vyapadi_/s_/yate4--,sya_/n_/a on the    
quoted passage4  ,footnote #bjg3 ,as1   
for instance1 ',so long as ditya rises  

in the east and sets in the west' 7,ch4 
,up4 ,,iii1 #f1 #d74  ,footnote #bjh3   
,whence it follows that the devas are   
not personal beings1 and therefore not  
qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman4
  ,footnote #bji3 ,yama1 for instance1  
being ordinarily represented as a person
 with a staff in his hand1 ,varu_/n_/a  
with a noose1 ,indra with a thunderbolt1
 c4 c4  ,footnote #baj3 ,on the proper  
function of arthavda and mantra         
according to the ,mm_/m_/s1 cp4         
,arthasa_/m_/graha1 ,introduction4      
,footnote #baa3 ,see above1 p4 #aig4    
,footnote #bab3 ,which can be offered by
 kshattriyas only4  ,footnote #bac3     
_/,s_/rautalingennumnabdha_/m_/         
dar_/s_/ayitv smrtenpi tadbdha_/m_/     
dar_/s_/yati smrtam iti4 ,ki_/m_/ atra  
brahma am_/ri_/tam ki_/m_/ svid vedyam  
anuttamam1 _/k_/intayet tatra vai gatv  
gandharvo mm ap_/rikkh_/ata1            
,vi_/s_/vvasus tato rjan                
vedntaj_/_/nakovida iti mokshadharme    
janakayj_/_/avalkyasa_/m_/vdt           

prahldjagarasa_/m_/vad_/k_/             
_/k_/oktnumnsiddhir ity artha_/h_/4     
,footnote #bad3 ,as opposed to an action
 to be accomplished4  ,footnote #bae3   
,of this nature is1 for instance1 the   
arthavda1 ',fire is a remedy for cold4' 
,footnote #baf3 ,of this nature is1 for 
instance1 the passage 'the sacrificial  
post is the sun' 7i4e4 possesses the    
qualities of the sun1 luminousness1 c42 
a statement contradicted by perception74
  ,footnote #bag3 ,and therefore to     
suppose that a divinity is nothing but a
 certain word forming part of a mantra4 
,footnote #bah3 ,the rjasya-sacrifice is
 to be offered by a prince who wishes to
 become the ruler of the whole earth4   
,footnote #bai3 ,in one of whose stages 
the being desirous of final emancipation
 becomes a deva4  ,footnote #bbj3 ,the  
commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on 
account of his being devoid of the three
 sacred fires4' ,this explanation does  
not1 however1 agree with the context of 
the ,taitt4 ,sa_/m_/h4  ,footnote #bba3 

,the _/,s_/dra not having acquired a    
knowledge of ,vedic matters in the      
legitimate way1 i4e4 through the study  
of the ,veda under the guidance of a    
guru1 is unfit for sacrifices as well as
 for vidy4  ,footnote #bbb3 ,the linga  
contained in the word '_/,s_/dra' has no
 proving power as it occurs in an       
arthavda-passage which has no authority 
if not connected with a corresponding   
injunctive passage4 ,in our case the    
linga in the arthavda-passage is even   
directly contradicted by those          
injunctions which militate against the  
_/,s_/dras' qualification for ,vedic    
matters4  ,footnote #bbc3 ,ha_/m_/savkyd
 tmanozndara_/m_/ _/s_/rutv             
jna_/s_/rute_/h_/ _/s_/ug utpannety etad
 eva katha_/m_/ gamyate yensau          
_/s_/dra_/s_/abdena s_/k_/yate tatrha   
sp_/ris_/yate _/k_/eti4 nanda ,giri4    
,footnote #bbd3 ,i translate this       
passage as ,i find it in all ,,mss4 of  
_/,s_/ankara consulted by me 7noting1   
however1 that some ,,mss4 read          

_/k_/aitrarathinmaika_/h_/74 nanda ,giri
 expressly explains tasmd by            
_/k_/aitrarathad ity artha_/h_/4--,the  
text of the ,t_/nd_/ya ,br4 runs3       
tasm_/k_/ _/k_/aitrarathnm eka_/h_/     
kshatrapatir gyate1 and the commentary  
explains3 tasmt kra_/n_/d adypi         
_/k_/itrava_/ms_/otpannn_/m_/ madhye eka
 eva rj kshatrapatir baldhipatir        
bhavati4--,grammar does not authorise   
the form _/k_/ahraratha used in the     
,stra4  ,footnote #bbe3 ,the king       
,a_/s_/vapati receives some             
,brhma_/n_/as as his pupils without     
insisting on the upanayana4 ,this       
express statement of the upanayana      
having been omitted in a certain case   
shows it to be the general rule4        
,footnote #bbf3 ,as the words stand in  
the original they might be translated as
 follows 7and are so translated by the  
prvapakshin71 ',whatever there is1 the  
whole world trembles in the pr_/n_/a1   
there goes forth 7from it7 a great      
terror1 viz4 the raised thunderbolt4'   

,footnote #bbg3 ,the stress lies here on
 the 'as if4' which intimate that the   
,self does not really think or move4    
,,fourth ,p,,da4  ,,reverence ,,to ,,the
 ,,highest ,,self6   #a4 ,if it be said 
that some 7mention7 that which is based 
on inference 7i4e4 the pradhna72 we deny
 this1 because 7the term alluded to7    
refers to what is contained in the      
simile of the body 7i4e4 the body       
itself72 and 7that the text7 shows4  ,in
 the preceding part of this work--as    
whose topic there has been set forth an 
enquiry into ,brahman--we have at first 
defined ,brahman 7,i1 #a1 #b72 we have  
thereupon refuted the objection that    
that definition applies to the pradhna  
also1 by showing that there is no       
scriptural authority for the latter 7,i1
 #a1 #e71 and we have shown in detail   
that the common purport of all          
,vednta-texts is to set forth the       
doctrine that ,brahman1 and not the     
pradh_/n_/a1 is the cause of the world4 
,here1 however1 the ,snkhya again raises

 an objection which he considers not to 
have been finally disposed of4  ,it has 
not1 he says1 been satisfactorily proved
 that there is no scriptural authority  
for the pradhna2 for some _/s_/khs      
contain expressions which seem to convey
 the idea of the pradhna4 ,from this it 
follows that ,kapila and other supreme  
_/ri_/shis maintain the doctrine of the 
pradhna being the general cause only    
because it is based on the ,veda4--,as  
long therefore as it has not been proved
 that those passages to which the       
,snkhyas refer have a different meaning 
7i4e4 do not allude to the pradhna71 all
 our previous argumentation as to the   
omniscient ,brahman being the cause of  
the world must be considered as         
unsettled4 ,we therefore now begin a new
 chapter which aims at proving that     
those passages actually have a different
 meaning4  ,the ,snkhyas maintain that  
that also which is based on inference1  
i4e4 the pradhna1 is perceived in the   
text of some _/s_/khs4 ,we read1 for    

instance1 they say1 in the ,k_/th_/aka  
7,i1 #c1 #aa71 ',beyond the ,great there
 is the ,undeveloped1 beyond the        
,undeveloped there is the ,person4'     
,there we recognise1 named by the same  
names and enumerated in the same order1 
the three entities with which we are    
acquainted from the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1 
viz4 the great principle1 the           
,undeveloped 7the pradhna71 and the     
soul#bbh4 ,that by the ,undeveloped is  
meant the pradhna is to be concluded    
from the common use of ,sm_/ri_/ti and  
from the etymological interpretation of 
which the word admits1 the pradhna being
 called undeveloped because it is devoid
 of sound and other qualities4 ,it      
cannot therefore be asserted that there 
is no scriptural authority for the      
pradhna4 ,and this pradhna vouched for  
by ,scripture we declare to be the cause
 of the world1 on the ground of         
,scripture1 ,sm_/ri_/ti1 and            
ratiocination4  ,your reasoning1 we     
reply1 is not valid4 ,the passage from  

the ,k_/th_/aka quoted by you intimates 
by no means the existence of that great 
principle and that ,undeveloped which   
are known from the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti4  
,we do not recognise there the pradhna  
of the ,snkhyas1 i4e4 an independent    
general cause consisting of three       
constituting elements2 we merely        
recognise the word ',undeveloped1' which
 does not denote any particular         
determined thing1 but may--owing to its 
etymological meaning1 'that which is not
 developed1 not manifest'--denote       
anything subtle and difficult to        
distinguish4 ,the ,snkhyas indeed give  
to the word a settled meaning1 as they  
apply it to the pradhna2 but then that  
meaning is valid for their system only1 
and has no force in the determination of
 the sense of the ,veda4 ,nor does mere 
equality of position prove equality of  
being1 unless the latter be recognised  
independently4 ,none but a fool would   
think a cow to be a horse because he    
sees it tied in the usual place of a    

horse4 ,we1 moreover1 conclude1 on the  
strength of the general subject-matter1 
that the passage does not refer to the  
pradhna the fiction of the ,snkhyas1 'on
 account of there being referred to that
 which is contained in the simile of the
 body4' ,this means that the body which 
is mentioned in the simile of the       
chariot is here referred to as the      
,undeveloped4 ,we infer this from the   
general subject-matter of the passage   
and from the circumstance of nothing    
else remaining4--,the immediately       
preceding part of the chapter exhibits  
the simile in which the ,self1 the body1
 and so on1 are compared to the lord of 
a chariot1 a chariot1 c41 ',know the    
,self to be the lord of the chariot1 the
 body to be the chariot1 the intellect  
the charioteer1 and the mind the reins4 
,the senses they call the horses1 the   
objects of the senses their roads4 ,when
 he 7the ,self7 is in union with the    
body1 the senses and the mind1 then wise
 people call him the enjoyer4' ,the text

 then goes on to say that he whose      
senses1 c4 are not well controlled      
enters into sa_/m_/sra1 while he who has
 them under control reaches the end of  
the journey1 the highest place of       
,vish_/n_/u4 ,the question then arises3 
,what is the end of the journey1 the    
highest place of ,vish_/n_/u8 ,whereupon
 the text explains that the highest     
,self which is higher than the senses1  
c41 spoken of is the end of the journey1
 the highest place of ,vish_/n_/u4      
',beyond the senses there are the       
objects1 beyond the objects there is the
 mind1 beyond the mind there is the     
intellect1 the great ,self is beyond the
 intellect4 ,beyond the great there is  
the ,undeveloped1 beyond the            
,undeveloped there is the ,person4      
,beyond the ,person there is            
nothing--this is the goal1 the highest  
,road4' ,in this passage we recognise   
the senses1 c4 which in the preceding   
simile had been compared to horses and  
so on1 and we thus avoid the mistake of 

abandoning the matter in hand and taking
 up a new subject4 ,the senses1 the     
intellect1 and the mind are referred to 
in both passages under the same names4  
,the objects 7in the second passage7 are
 the objects which are 7in the former   
passage7 designated as the roads of the 
senses2 that the objects are beyond     
7higher than7 the senses is known from  
the scriptural passage representing the 
senses as grahas1 i4e4 graspers1 and the
 objects as atigrahas1 i4e4 superior to 
the grahas 7,b_/ri_/ ,up4 ,,iii1 #b74   
,the mind 7manas7 again is superior to  
the objects1 because the relation of the
 senses and their objects is based on   
the mind4 ,the intellect 7buddhi7 is    
higher than the mind1 since the objects 
of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by
 means of the intellect4 ,higher than   
the intellect is the great ,self which  
was represented as the lord of the      
chariot in the passage1 ',know the ,self
 to be the lord of the chariot4' ,that  
the same ,self is referred to in both   

passages is manifest from the repeated  
use of the word ',self2' that the ,self 
is superior to intelligence is owing to 
the circumstance that the enjoyer is    
naturally superior to the instrument of 
enjoyment4 ,the ,self is appropriately  
called great as it is the master4--,or  
else the phrase 'the great ,self' may   
here denote the intellect of the        
first-born ,hira_/n_/yagarbha which is  
the basis of all intellects2 in         
accordance with the following           
,sm_/ri_/ti-passage it is called mind1  
the great one2 reflection1 ,brahman2 the
 stronghold1 intellect2 enunciation1 the
 ,lord2 highest knowledge1              
consciousness2 thought1 remembrance#bbi1
 and likewise with the following        
scriptural passage1 ',he                
7,hira_/n_/ya-garbha7 who first creates 
,brahman and delivers the ,vedas to him'
 7_/,s_/vet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ah74 ,the      
intellect1 which in the former passage  
had been referred to under its common   
name buddhi1 is here mentioned          

separately1 since it may be represented 
as superior to our human intellects4 ,on
 this latter explanation of the term    
'the great ,self1' we must assume that  
the personal ,self which in the simile  
had been compared to the charioteer is1 
in the latter passage1 included in the  
highest person 7mentioned last72 to     
which there is no objection1 since in   
reality the personal ,self and the      
highest ,self are identical4--,thus     
there remains now the body only which   
had before been compared to a chariot4  
,we therefore conclude that the text    
after having enumerated the senses and  
all the other things mentioned before1  
in order to point out the highest place1
 points out by means of the one         
remaining word1 viz4 avyakta1 the only  
thing remaining out of those which had  
been mentioned before1 viz4 the body4   
,the entire passage aims at conveying   
the knowledge of the unity of the inward
 ,self and ,brahman1 by describing the  
soul's passing through sa_/m_/sra and   

release under the form of a simile in   
which the body1 c4 of the soul--which is
 affected by ,nescience and therefore   
joined to a body1 senses1 mind1         
intellect1 objects1 sensations1 c4--are 
compared to a chariot1 and so on4--,in  
accordance with this the subsequent     
verse states the difficulty of knowing  
the highest place of ,vish_/n_/u 7'the  
,self is hidden in all beings and does  
not shine forth1 but it is seen by      
subtle seers through their sharp and    
subtle intellect'71 and after that the  
next verse declares ,yoga to be the     
means of attaining that cognition4 ',a  
wise man should keep down speech in the 
mind1 he should keep down the mind in   
intelligence1 intelligence he should    
keep down within the great ,self1 and he
 should keep that within the quiet      
,self4'--,that means3 ,the wise man     
should restrain the activity of the     
outer organs such as speech1 c41 and    
abide within the mind only2 he should   
further restrain the mind which is      

intent on doubtful external objects     
within intelligence1 whose              
characteristic mark is decision1        
recognising that indecision is evil2 he 
should further restrain intelligence    
within the great ,self1 i4e4 the        
individual soul or else the fundamental 
intellect2 he should finally fix the    
great ,self on the calm ,self1 i4e4 the 
highest ,self1 the highest goal1 of     
which the whole chapter treats4--,if we 
in this manner review the general       
context1 we perceive that there is no   
room for the pradhna imagined by the    
,snkhyas4  #b4 ,but the subtle 7body is 
meant by the term avyakta7 on account of
 its capability 7of being so            
designated74  ,it has been asserted1    
under the preceding ,stra1 that the term
 'the ,undeveloped' signifies1 on       
account of the general subject-matter   
and because the body only remains1 the  
body and not the pradhna of the         
,snkhyas4--,but here the following doubt
 arises3 ,how can the word 'undeveloped'

 appropriately denote the body which1 as
 a gross and clearly appearing thing1   
should rather be called vyakta1 i4e4    
that which is developed or manifested8  
,to this doubt the ,stra replies that   
what the term avyakta denotes is the    
subtle causal body4 ,anything subtle may
 be spoken of as ,undeveloped4 ,the     
gross body indeed cannot directly be    
termed 'undeveloped1' but the subtle    
parts of the elements from which the    
gross body originates may be called so1 
and that the term denoting the causal   
substance is applied to the effect also 
is a matter of common occurrence2       
compare1 for instance1 the phrase 'mix  
the ,soma with cows1 i4e4 milk'         
7_/,ri_/g-veda4 ,s4 ,,ix1 #df1 #d74     
,another scriptural passage also--'now  
all this was then undeveloped'          
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g7--shows that 
this1 i4e4 this developed world with its
 distinction of names and forms1 is     
capable of being termed undeveloped in  
so far as in a former condition it was  

in a merely seminal or potential state1 
devoid of the later evolved distinctions
 of name and form4  #c4 7,such a        
previous seminal condition of the world 
may be admitted7 on account of its      
dependency on him 7the ,lord72 7for such
 an admission is7 according to reason4  
,here a new objection is raised4--,if1  
the opponent says1 in order to prove the
 possibility of the body being called   
undeveloped you admit that this world in
 its antecedent seminal condition before
 either names or forms are evolved can  
be called undeveloped1 you virtually    
concede the doctrine that the pradhna is
 the cause of the world4 ,for we        
,snkhyas understand by the term pradhna 
nothing but that antecedent condition of
 the world4  ,things lie differently1 we
 rejoin4 ,if we admitted some antecedent
 state of the world as the independent  
cause of the actual world1 we should    
indeed implicitly1 admit the pradhna    
doctrine4 ,what we admit is1 however1   
only a previous state dependent on the  

highest ,lord1 not an independent state4
 ,a previous stage of the world such as 
the one assumed by us must necessarily  
be admitted1 since it is according to   
sense and reason4 ,for without it the   
highest ,lord could not be conceived as 
creator1 as he could not become active  
if he were destitute of the potentiality
 of action4 ,the existence of such a    
causal potentiality renders it moreover 
possible that the released souls should 
not enter on new courses of existence1  
as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge4
 ,for that causal potentiality is of the
 nature of ,nescience2 it is rightly    
denoted by the term 'undeveloped2' it   
has the highest ,lord for its           
substratum2 it is of the nature of an   
illusion2 it is a universal sleep in    
which are lying the transmigrating souls
 destitute for the time of the          
consciousness of their individual       
character4#bcj ,this undeveloped        
principle is sometimes denoted by the   
term k_/s_/a1 ether2 so1 for instance1  

in the passage1 ',in that ,imperishable 
then1 ,o ,grg1 the ether is woven like  
warp and woof' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1   
#h1 #aa74 ,sometimes1 again1 it is      
denoted by the term akshara1 the        
,imperishable2 so1 for instance 7,mu4   
,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b71 ',higher1 than the  
high ,imperishable4' ,sometimes it is   
spoken of as ,my1 illusion2 so1 for     
instance 7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aj71    
',know then ,prak_/ri_/ti is ,my1 and   
the great ,lord he who is affected with 
,my4' ,for ,my is properly called       
undeveloped or non-manifested since it  
cannot be defined either as that which  
is or that which is not4--,the statement
 of the ,k_/th_/aka that 'the           
,undeveloped is beyond the ,great one'  
is based on the fact of the ,great one  
originating from the ,undeveloped1 if   
the ,great one be the intellect of      
,hira_/n_/yagarbha4 ,if1 on the other   
hand1 we understand by the ,great one   
the individual soul1 the statement is   
founded on the fact of the existence of 

the individual soul depending on the    
,undeveloped1 i4e4 ,nescience4 ,for the 
continued existence of the individual   
soul as such is altogether owing to the 
relation in which it stands to          
,nescience4 ,the quality of being beyond
 the ,great one which in the first place
 belongs to the ,undeveloped1 i4e4      
,nescience1 is attributed to the body   
which is the product of ,nescience1 the 
cause and the effect being considered as
 identical4 ,although the senses1 c4 are
 no less products of ,nescience1 the    
term 'the ,undeveloped' here refers to  
the body only1 the senses1 c4 having    
already been specially mentioned by     
their individual names1 and the body    
alone being left4--,other interpreters  
of the two last ,stras give a somewhat  
different explanation#bca4--,there are1 
they say1 two kinds of body1 the gross  
one and the subtle one4 ,the gross body 
is the one which is perceived2 the      
nature of the subtle one will be        
explained later on4 7,ved4 ,s4 ,,iii1   

#a1 #a47 ,both these bodies together    
were in the simile compared to the      
chariot2 but here 7in the passage under 
discussion7 only the subtle body is     
referred to as the ,undeveloped1 since  
the subtle body only is capable of being
 denoted by that term4 ,and as the      
soul's passing through bondage and      
release depends on the subtle body1 the 
latter is said to be beyond the soul1   
like the things 7arthavat71 i4e4 just as
 the objects are said to be beyond the  
senses because the activity of the      
latter depends on the objects4--,but    
how--we ask interpreters--is it possible
 that the word ',undeveloped' should    
refer to the subtle body only1 while1   
according to your opinion1 both bodies  
had in the simile been represented as a 
chariot1 and so equally constitute part 
of the topic of the chapter1 and equally
 remain 7to be mentioned in the passage 
under discussion78--,if you should      
rejoin that you are authorised to settle
 the meaning of what the text actually  

mentions1 but not to find fault with    
what is not mentioned1 and that the word
 avyakta which occurs in the text can   
denote only the subtle body1 but not the
 gross body which is vyakta1 i4e4       
developed or manifest2 we invalidate    
this rejoinder by remarking that the    
determination of the sense depends on   
the circumstance of the passages        
interpreted constituting a syntactical  
whole4 ,for if the earlier and the later
 passage do not form a whole they convey
 no sense1 since that involves the      
abandonment of the subject started and  
the taking up of a new subject4 ,but    
syntactical unity cannot be established 
unless it be on the ground of there     
being a want of a complementary part of 
speech or sentence4 ,if you therefore   
construe the connexion of the passages  
without having regard to the fact that  
the latter passage demands as its       
complement that both bodies 7which had  
been spoken of in the former passage7   
should be understood as referred to1 you

 destroy all syntactical unity and so   
incapacitate yourselves from arriving at
 the true meaning of the text4 ,nor must
 you think that the second passage      
occupies itself with the subtle body    
only1 for that reason that the latter is
 not easily distinguished from the      
,self1 while the gross body is easily so
 distinguished on account of its readily
 perceived loathsomeness4 ,for the      
passage does not by any means refer to  
such a distinction--as we conclude from 
the circumstance of there being no verb 
enjoining it--but has for its only      
subject the highest place of            
,vish_/n_/u1 which had been mentioned   
immediately before4 ,for after having   
enumerated a series of things in which  
the subsequent one is always superior to
 the one preceding it1 it concludes by  
saying that nothing is beyond the       
,person4--,we might1 however1 accept the
 interpretation just discussed without  
damaging our general argumentation2 for 
whichever explanation we receive1 so    

much remains clear that the ,k_/th_/aka 
passage does not refer to the pradhna4  
#d4 ,and 7the pradhna cannot be meant7  
because there is no statement as to 7the
 avyakta7 being something to be         
cognised4  ,the ,snkhyas1 moreover1     
represent the pradhna as something to be
 cognised in so far as they say that    
from the knowledge of the difference of 
the constitutive elements of the pradhna
 and of the soul there results the      
desired isolation of the soul4 ,for     
without a knowledge of the nature of    
those constitutive elements it is       
impossible to cognise the difference of 
the soul from them4 ,and somewhere they 
teach that the pradhna is to be cognised
 by him who wishes to attain special    
powers4--,now in the passage under      
discussion the avyakta is not mentioned 
as an object of knowledge2 we there meet
 with the mere word avyakta1 and there  
is no sentence intimating that the      
avyakta is to be known or meditated     
upon4 ,and it is impossible to maintain 

that a knowledge of things which        
7knowledge7 is not taught in the text is
 of any advantage to man4--,for this    
reason also we maintain that the word   
avyakta cannot denote the pradhna4--,our
 interpretation1 on the other hand1 is  
unobjectionable1 since according to it  
the passage mentions the body 7not as an
 object of knowledge1 but merely7 for   
the purpose of throwing light on the    
highest place of ,vish_/n_/u1 in        
continuation of the simile in which the 
body had been compared to a chariot4    
#e4 ,and if you maintain that the text  
does speak 7of the pradhna as an object 
of knowledge7 we deny that2 for the     
intelligent 7highest7 ,self is meant1 on
 account of the general subject-matter4 
,here the ,snkhya raises a new          
objection1 and maintains that the       
averment made in the last ,stra is not  
proved1 since the text later on speaks  
of the pradhna--which had been referred 
to as the ,undeveloped--as an object of 
knowledge4 ',he who has perceived that  

which is without sound1 without touch1  
without form1 without decay1 without    
taste1 eternal1 without smell1 without  
beginning1 without end1 beyond the great
 and unchangeable1 is freed from the    
jaws of death' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1     
#ae74 ,for here the text speaks of the  
pradhna1 which is beyond the great1     
describing it as possessing the same    
qualities which the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti  
ascribes to it1 and designating it as   
the object of perception4 ,hence we     
conclude that the pradhna is denoted by 
the term avyakta4  ,to this we reply    
that the passage last quoted does       
represent as the object of perception   
not the pradhna but the intelligent1    
i4e4 the highest ,self4 ,we conclude    
this from the general subject-matter4   
,for that the highest ,self continues to
 form the subject-matter is clear from  
the following reasons4 ,in the first    
place1 it is referred to in the passage1
 ',beyond the person there is nothing1  
this is the goal1 the highest ,road2' it

 has further to be supplied as the      
object of knowledge in the passage1     
',the ,self is hidden in all beings and 
does not shine forth1' because it is    
there spoken of as difficult to know2   
after that the restraint of passion1 c4 
is enjoined as conducive to its         
cognition1 in the passage1 ',a wise man 
should keep down speech within the      
mind2' and1 finally1 release from the   
jaws of death is declared to be the     
fruit of its knowledge4 ,the ,snkhyas1  
on the other hand1 do not suppose that a
 man is freed from the jaws of death    
merely by perceiving the pradhna1 but   
connect that result rather with the     
cognition of the intelligent            
,self4--,the highest ,self is1 moreover1
 spoken of in all ,vednta-texts as      
possessing just those qualities which   
are mentioned in the passage quoted     
above1 viz4 absence of sound1 and the   
like4 ,hence it follows1 that the       
pradhna is in the text neither spoken of
 as the object of knowledge nor denoted 

by the term avyakta4  #f4 ,and there is 
question and explanation relative to    
three things only 7not to the pradhna74 
,to the same conclusion we are led by   
the consideration of the circumstance   
that the ,ka_/th_/avall-upanishad brings
 forward1 as subjects of discussion1    
only three things1 viz4 the fire        
sacrifice1 the individual soul1 and the 
highest ,self4 ,these three things only 
,yama explains1 bestowing thereby the   
boons he had granted1 and to them only  
the questions of ,na_/k_/iketas refer4  
,nothing else is mentioned or enquired  
about4 ,the question relative to the    
fire sacrifice is contained in the      
passage 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #ac71 ',thou 
knowest1 ,o ,death1 the fire sacrifice  
which leads us to ,heaven2 tell it to   
me1 who am full of faith4' ,the question
 as to the individual soul is contained 
in ,i1 #a1 #bj1 ',there is that doubt   
when a man is dead1 some saying1 he is2 
others1 he is not4 ,this ,i should like 
to know1 taught by thee2 this is the    

third of my boons4' ,and the question   
about the highest ,self is asked in the 
passage 7,i1 #b1 #ad71 ',that which thou
 seest as neither this nor that1 as     
neither effect nor cause1 as neither    
past nor future1 tell me that4'--,the   
corresponding answers are given in ,i1  
#a1 #ae1 ',yama then told him that fire 
sacrifice1 the beginning of all the     
worlds1 and what bricks are required for
 the altar1 and how many2' in the       
passage met with considerably later on  
7,,ii1 #e1 #f2 #g71 ',well then1 ,o     
,gautama1 ,i shall tell thee this       
mystery1 the old ,brahman and what      
happens to the ,self after reaching     
death4 ,some enter the womb in order to 
have a body as organic beings1 others go
 into inorganic matter according to     
their work and according to their       
knowledge2' and in the passage 7,i1 #b1 
#ah71 ',the knowing ,self is not born   
nor does it die1' c42 which latter      
passage dilates at length on the highest
 ,self4 ,but there is no question       

relative to the pradhna1 and hence no   
opportunity for any remarks on it4      
,here the ,snkhya advances a new        
objection4 ,is1 he asks1 the question   
relative to the ,self which is asked in 
the passage1 ',there is that doubt when 
a man is dead1' c41 again resumed in the
 passage1 ',that which thou seest as    
neither this nor that1' c1 or does the  
latter passage raise a distinct new     
question8 ,if the former1 the two       
questions about the ,self coalesce into 
one1 and there are therefore altogether 
two questions only1 one relative to the 
fire sacrifice1 the other relative to   
the ,self4 ,in that case the ,stra has  
no right to speak of questions and      
explanations relating to three          
subjects4--,if the latter1 you do not   
consider it a mistake to assume a       
question in excess of the number of     
boons granted1 and can therefore not    
object to us if we assume an explanation
 about the pradhna in excess of the     
number of questions asked4  ,to this we 

make the following reply4--,we by no    
means assume a question in excess of the
 number of boons granted1 being         
prevented from doing so by the influence
 of the opening part of that syntactical
 whole which constitutes the            
,ka_/th_/avall-upanishad4 ,the          
,upanishad starts with the topic of the 
boons granted by ,yama1 and all the     
following part of the ,upanishad--which 
is thrown into the form of a colloquy of
 ,yama and ,na_/k_/iketas--carries on   
that topic up to the very end4 ,yama    
grants to ,na_/k_/iketas1 who had been  
sent by his father1 three boons4 ,for   
his first boon ,na_/k_/iketas chooses   
kindness on the part of his father      
towards him1 for his second boon the    
knowledge of the fire sacrifice1 for his
 third boon the knowledge of the ,self4 
,that the knowledge of the ,self is the 
third boon appears from the indication  
contained in the passage 7,i1 #a1 #bj71 
',there is that doubt--2 this is the    
third of my boons4'--,if we therefore   

supposed that the passage1 ',that which 
thou seest as neither this nor that1'   
c41 raises a new question1 we should    
thereby assume a question in excess of  
the number of boons granted1 and thus   
destroy the connexion of the entire     
,upanishad4--,but--the ,snkhya will     
perhaps interpose--it must needs be     
admitted that the passage last quoted   
does raise a new question1 because the  
subject enquired about is a new one4    
,for the former question refers to the  
individual soul1 as we conclude from the
 doubt expressed in the words1 ',there  
is that doubt when a man is dead--some  
saying1 he is2 others1 he is not4' ,now 
this individual soul1 as having definite
 attributes1 c41 cannot constitute the  
object of a question expressed in such  
terms as1 ',this which thou seest as    
neither this nor that1' c42 the highest 
,self1 on the other hand1 may be        
enquired about in such terms1 since it  
is above all attributes4 ,the appearance
 of the two questions is1 moreover1 seen

 to differ2 for the former question     
refers to existence and non-existence1  
while the latter is concerned with an   
entity raised above all definite        
attributes1 c4 ,hence we conclude that  
the latter question1 in which the former
 one cannot be recognised1 is a separate
 question1 and does not merely resume   
the subject of the former one4--,all    
this argumentation is not valid1 we     
reply1 since we maintain the unity of   
the highest ,self and the individual    
,self4 ,if the individual ,self were    
different from the highest ,self1 we    
should have to declare that the two     
questions are separate independent      
questions1 but the two are not really   
different1 as we know from other        
scriptural passages1 such as ',thou art 
that4' ,and in the ,upanishad under     
discussion also the answer to the       
question1 ',that which thou seest as    
neither this nor that1' viz4 the        
passage1 ',the knowing ,self is not     
born1 it dies not'--which answer is     

given in the form of a denial of the    
birth and death of the ,self-clearly    
shows that the embodied ,self and the   
highest ,self are non-different4 ,for   
there is room for a denial of something 
only when that something is possible1   
and the possibility of birth and death  
exists in the embodied ,self only1 since
 it is connected with the body1 but not 
in the highest ,self4--,there is1       
moreover1 another passage conveying the 
same meaning1 viz4 ,,ii1 #d1 #d1 ',the  
wise when he knows that that by which he
 perceives all objects in sleep or in   
waking1 is the great omnipresent ,self1 
grieves no more4' ,this passage makes   
the cessation of all grief dependent on 
the knowledge of the individual ,self1  
in so far as it possesses the qualities 
of greatness and omnipresence1 and      
thereby declares that the individual    
,self is not different from the highest 
,self4 ,for that the cessation of all   
sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of
 the highest ,self1 is a recognised     

,vednta tenet4--,there is another       
passage also warning men not to look on 
the individual ,self and the highest    
,self as different entities1 viz4 ,,ii1 
#d1 #aj1 ',what is here the same is     
there2 and what is there the same is    
here4 ,he who sees any difference here  
goes from death to death4'--,the        
following circumstance1 too1 is worthy  
of consideration4 ,when ,na_/k_/iketas  
has asked the question relating to the  
existence or non-existence of the soul  
after death1 ,yama tries to induce him  
to choose another boon1 tempting him    
with the offer of various objects of    
desire4 ,but ,na_/k_/iketas remains     
firm4 ,thereupon ,death1 dwelling on the
 distinction of the ,good and the       
,pleasant1 and the distinction of wisdom
 and ignorance1 praises ,na_/k_/iketas1 
',i believe ,na_/k_/iketas to be one who
 desires knowledge1 for even many       
pleasures did not tear thee away' 7,i1  
#b1 #d72 and later on praises the       
question asked by ,na_/k_/iketas1 ',the 

wise who1 by means of meditation on his 
,self1 recognises the ,ancient who is   
difficult to be seen1 who has entered   
into the dark1 who is hidden in the     
cave1 who dwells in the abyss1 as ,god1 
he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far     
behind' 7,i1 #b1 #ab74 ,now all this    
means to intimate that the individual   
,self and the highest ,self are         
non-different4 ,for if ,na_/k_/iketas   
set aside the question1 by asking which 
he had earned for himself the praise of 
,yama1 and after having received that   
praise asked a new question1 all that   
praise would have been bestowed on him  
unduly4 ,hence it follows that the      
question implied in ,i1 #b1 #ad1 ',that 
which thou seest as neither this nor    
that1' merely resumes the topic to which
 the question in ,i1 #a1 #bj had        
referred4--,nor is there any basis to   
the objection that the two questions    
differ in form4 ,the second question1 in
 reality1 is concerned with the same    
distinction as the first4 ,the first    

enquires about the existence of the soul
 apart from the body1 c42 the second    
refers to the circumstance of that soul 
not being subject to sa_/m_/sra4 ,for as
 long as ,nescience remains1 so long the
 soul is affected with definite         
attributes1 c42 but as soon as          
,nescience comes to an end1 the soul is 
one with the highest ,self1 as is taught
 by such scriptural texts as ',thou art 
that4' ,but whether ,nescience be active
 or inactive1 no difference is made     
thereby in the thing itself 7viz4 the   
soul74 ,a man may1 in the dark1 mistake 
a piece of rope lying on the ground for 
a snake1 and run away from it1          
frightened and trembling2 thereon       
another man may tell him1 ',do not be   
afraid1 it is only a rope1 not a snake2'
 and he may then dismiss the fear caused
 by the imagined snake1 and stop        
running4 ,but all the while the presence
 and subsequent absence of his erroneous
 notion1 as to the rope being a snake1  
make no difference whatever in the rope 

itself4 ,exactly analogous is the case  
of the individual soul which is in      
reality one with the highest soul1      
although ,nescience makes it appear     
different4 ,hence the reply contained in
 the passage1 ',it is not born1 it dies 
not1' is also to be considered as       
furnishing an answer to the question    
asked in ,i1 #a1 #bj4--,the ,stra is to 
be understood with reference to the     
distinction of the individual ,self and 
the highest ,self which results from    
,nescience4 ,although the question      
relating to the ,self is in reality one 
only1 yet its former part 7,i1 #a1 #bj7 
is seen specially to refer to the       
individual ,self1 since there a doubt is
 set forth as to the existence of the   
soul when1 at the time of death1 it     
frees itself from the body1 and since   
the specific marks of the               
sa_/m_/sra-state1 such as activity1 c4  
are not denied2 while the latter part of
 the question 7,i1 #b1 #ad71 where the  
state of being beyond all attributes is 

spoken of1 clearly refers to the highest
 ,self4--,for these reasons the ,stra is
 right in assuming three topics of      
question and explanation1 viz4 the fire 
sacrifice1 the individual soul1 and the 
highest ,self4 ,those1 on the other     
hand1 who assume that the pradhna       
constitutes a fourth subject discussed  
in the ,upanishad1 can point neither to 
a boon connected with it1 nor to a      
question1 nor to an answer4 ,hence the  
pradhna hypothesis is clearly inferior  
to our own4  #g4 ,and 7the case of the  
term avyakta7 is like that of the term  
mahat4  ,while the ,snkhyas employ the  
term 'the ,great one1' to denote the    
first-born entity1 which is mere        
existence#bcb 78 viz4 the intellect71   
the term has a different meaning in     
,vedic use4 ,this we see from its being 
connected with the ,self1 c4 in such    
passages as the following1 ',the great  
,self is beyond the ,intellect' 7,ka4   
,up4 ,i1 #c1 #aj72 ',the great          
omnipresent ,self' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1   

#bc72 ',i know that great person'       
7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,we thence  
conclude that the word avyakta also1    
where it occurs in the ,veda1 cannot    
denote the pradhna4--,the pradhna is    
therefore a mere thing of inference1 and
 not vouched for by ,scripture4  #h4    
7,it cannot be maintained that aj means 
the pradhna7 because no special         
characteristic is stated2 as in the case
 of the cup4  ,here the advocate of the 
pradhna comes again forward and         
maintains that the absence of scriptural
 authority for the pradhna is not yet   
proved4 ,for1 he says1 we have the      
following mantra 7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iv1  
#e71 ',there is one aj#bcc1 red1 white1 
and black1 producing manifold offspring 
of the same nature4 ,there is one aja   
who loves her and lies by her2 there is 
another who leaves her after having     
enjoyed her4'--,in this mantra the words
 'red1' 'white1' and 'black' denote the 
three constituent elements of the       
pradhna4 ,passion is called red on      

account of its colouring1 i4e4          
influencing property2 ,goodness is      
called white1 because it is of the      
nature of ,light2 ,darkness is called   
black on account of its covering and    
obscuring property4 ,the state of       
equipoise of the three constituent      
elements1 i4e4 the pradhna1 is denoted  
by the attributes of its parts1 and is  
therefore called red-white-black4 ,it is
 further called aj1 i4e4 unborn1 because
 it is acknowledged to be the           
fundamental matter out of which         
everything springs1 not a mere          
effect4--,but has not the word aj the   
settled meaning of she-goat8--,true2 but
 the ordinary meaning of the word cannot
 be accepted in this place1 because true
 knowledge forms the general            
subject-matter4--,that pradhna produces 
many creatures participating in its     
three constituent elements4 ,one unborn 
being loves her and lies by her1 i4e4   
some souls1 deluded by ignorance1       
approach her1 and falsely imagining that

 they experience pleasure or pain1 or   
are in a state of dulness1 pass through 
the course of transmigratory existence4 
,other souls1 again1 which have attained
 to discriminative knowledge1 lose their
 attachment to prak_/ri_/ti1 and leave  
her after having enjoyed her1 i4e4 after
 she has afforded to them enjoyment and 
release4--,on the ground of this        
passage1 as interpreted above1 the      
followers of ,kapila claim the authority
 of ,scripture for their pradhna        
hypothesis4  ,to this argumentation we  
reply1 that the quoted mantra by no     
means proves the ,snkhya doctrine to be 
based on ,scripture4 ,that mantra1 taken
 by itself1 is not able to give         
additional strength to any doctrine4    
,for1 by means of some supposition or   
other1 the terms aj1 c4 can be          
reconciled with any doctrine1 and there 
is no reason for the special assertion  
that the ,snkhya doctrine only is meant4
 ,the case is analogous to that of the  
cup mentioned in the mantra1 ',there is 

a cup having its mouth below and its    
bottom above' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 
#c74 ,just as it is impossible to decide
 on the ground of this mantra taken by  
itself what special cup is meant--it    
being possible to ascribe1 somehow or   
other1 the quality of the mouth being   
turned downward to any cup--so here also
 there is no special quality stated1 so 
that it is not possible to decide from  
the mantra itself whether the pradhna is
 meant by the term aj1 or something     
else4--,but in connexion with the mantra
 about the cup we have a supplementary  
passage from which we learn what kind of
 cup is meant1 ',what is called the cup 
having its mouth below and its bottom   
above is this head4'--,whence1 however1 
can we learn what special being is meant
 by the aj of the                       
_/,s_/vet_/s_/vatara-upanishad8--,to    
this question the next ,stra replies4   
#i4 ,but the 7elements7 beginning with  
light 7are meant by the term aj72 for   
some read so in their text4  ,by the    

term aj we have to understand the causal
 matter of the four classes of beings1  
which matter has sprung from the highest
 ,lord and begins with light1 i4e4      
comprises fire1 water1 and earth4--,the 
word 'but' 7in the ,stra7 gives emphasis
 to the assertion4--,this aj is to be   
considered as comprising three          
elementary substances1 not as consisting
 of three gu_/n_/as in the ,snkhya      
sense4 ,we draw this conclusion from the
 fact that one _/s_/kh1 after having    
related how fire1 water1 and earth      
sprang from the highest ,lord1 assigns  
to them red colour1 and so on4 ',the red
 colour of burning fire 7agni7 is the   
colour of the elementary fire 7tejas71  
its white colour is the colour of water1
 its black colour the colour of earth1' 
c4 ,now those three elements--fire1     
water1 and earth--we recognise in the   
_/,s_/vet_/s_/vatara passage1 as the    
words red1 white1 and black are common  
to both passages1 and as these words    
primarily denote special colours and can

 be applied to the ,snkhya gu_/n_/as in 
a secondary sense only4 ,that passages  
whose sense is beyond doubt are to be   
used for the interpretation of doubtful 
passages1 is a generally acknowledged   
rule4 ,as we therefore find that in the 
_/,s_/vet_/s_/vatara--after the general 
topic has been started in ,i1 #a1 ',the 
,brahman-students say1 ,is ,brahman the 
cause8'--the text1 previous to the      
passage under discussion1 speaks of a   
power of the highest ,lord which        
arranges the whole world 7'the ,sages   
devoted to meditation and concentration 
have seen the power belonging to ,god   
himself1 hidden in its own qualities'72 
and as further that same power is       
referred to in two subsequent           
complementary passages 7',know then1    
,prak_/ri_/ti is ,my1 and the great     
,lord he who is affected with ,my2' 'who
 being one only rules over every germ2' 
,,iv1 #aj1 #aa72 it cannot possibly be  
asserted that the mantra treating of the
 aj refers to some independent causal   

matter called pradhna4 ,we rather       
assert1 on the ground of the general    
subject-matter1 that the mantra         
describes the same divine power referred
 to in the other passages1 in which     
names and forms lie unevolved1 and which
 we assume as the antecedent condition  
of that state of the world in which     
names and forms are evolved4 ,and that  
divine power is represented as          
three-coloured1 because its products1   
viz4 fire1 water1 and earth1 have three 
distinct colours4--,but how can we      
maintain1 on the ground of fire1 water1 
and earth having three colours1 that the
 causal matter is appropriately called a
 three-coloured aj8 if we consider1 on  
the one hand1 that the exterior form of 
the genus aj 7i4e4 goat7 does not inhere
 in fire1 water1 and earth2 and1 on the 
other hand1 that ,scripture teaches     
fire1 water1 and earth to have been     
produced1 so that the word aj cannot be 
taken in the sense                      
'non-produced#bcd4'--,to this question  

the next ,stra replies4  #aj4 ,and on   
account of the statement of the         
assumption 7of a metaphor7 there is     
nothing contrary to reason 7in aj       
denoting the causal matter72 just as in 
the case of honey 7denoting the sun7 and
 similar cases4  ,the word aj neither   
expresses that fire1 water1 and earth   
belong to the goat species1 nor is it to
 be explained as meaning 'unborn2' it   
rather expresses an assumption1 i4e4 it 
intimates the assumption of the source  
of all beings 7which source comprises   
fire1 water1 and earth71 being compared 
to a she-goat4 ,for as accidentally some
 she-goat might be partly red1 partly   
white1 partly black1 and might have many
 young goats resembling her in colour1  
and as some he-goat might love her and  
lie by her1 while some other he-goat    
might leave her after having enjoyed    
her2 so the universal causal matter     
which is tri-coloured1 because          
comprising fire1 water1 and earth1      
produces many inanimate and animate     

beings similar to itself1 and is enjoyed
 by the souls fettered by ,nescience1   
while it is abandoned by those souls    
which have attained true                
knowledge4--,nor must we imagine that   
the distinction of individual souls1    
which is implied in the preceding       
explanation1 involves that reality of   
the multiplicity of souls which forms   
one of the tenets of other philosophical
 schools4 ,for the purport of the       
passage is to intimate1 not the         
multiplicity of souls1 but the          
distinction of the states of bondage and
 release4 ,this latter distinction is   
explained with reference to the         
multiplicity of souls as ordinarily     
conceived2 that multiplicity1 however1  
depends altogether on limiting adjuncts1
 and is the unreal product of wrong     
knowledge merely2 as we know from       
scriptural passages such as1 ',he is the
 one ,god hidden in all beings1         
all-pervading1 the ,self in all beings1'
 c4--,the words 'like the honey' 7in the

 ,stra7 mean that just as the sun1      
although not being honey1 is represented
 as honey 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a71 and    
speech as a cow 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,v1 #h71
 and the heavenly world1 c4 as the fires
 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #i71 so here 
the causal matter1 although not being a 
she-goat1 is metaphorically represented 
as one4 ,there is therefore nothing     
contrary to reason in the circumstance  
of the term aj being used to denote the 
aggregate of fire1 water1 and earth4    
#aa4 7,the assertion that there is      
scriptural authority for the pradhna1 c4
 can7 also not 7be based7 on the mention
 of the number 7of the ,sankhya         
categories71 on account of the diversity
 7of the categories7 and on account of  
the excess 7over the number of those    
categories74  ,the attempt to base the  
,snkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking 
of the aj having failed1 the ,snkhya    
again comes forward and points to       
another mantra3 ',he in whom the five   
five-people and the ether rest1 him     

alone ,i believe to be the ,self2 ,i who
 know believe him to be ,brahman'       
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag74 ,in this
 mantra we have one word which expresses
 the number five1 viz4 the five-people1 
and then another word1 viz4 five1 which 
qualifies the former2 these two words   
together therefore convey the idea of   
five pentads1 i4e4 twenty-five4 ,now as 
many beings as the number twenty-five   
presupposes1 just so many categories the
 ,snkhya system counts4 ,cp4 ,snkhya    
,krik1 #c3 ',the fundamental causal     
substance 7i4e4 the pradhna7 is not an  
effect4 ,seven 7substances71 viz4 the   
,great one 7,intellect71 and so on1 are 
causal substances as well as effects4   
,sixteen are effects4 ,the soul is      
neither a causal substance nor an       
effect4' ,as therefore the number       
twenty-five1 which occurs in the        
scriptural passage quoted1 clearly      
refers to the twenty-five categories    
taught in the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti1 it    
follows that the doctrine of the        

pradhna1 c4 rests on a scriptural basis4
  ,to this reasoning we make the        
following reply4--,it is impossible to  
base the assertion that the pradhna1 c4 
have ,scripture in their favour on the  
reference to their number which you     
pretend to find in the text1 'on account
 of the diversity of the ,snkhya        
categories4' ,the ,snkhya categories    
have each their individual difference1  
and there are no attributes belonging in
 common to each pentad on account of    
which the number twenty-five could be   
divided into five times five4 ,for a    
number of individually separate things  
can1 in general1 not be combined into   
smaller groups of two or three1 c4      
unless there be a special reason for    
such combination4--,here the ,snkhya    
will perhaps rejoin that the expression 
five 7times7 five is used only to denote
 the number twenty-five which has five  
pentads for its constituent parts2 just 
as the poem says1 'five years and seven 
,indra did not rain1' meaning only that 

there was no rain for twelve            
years4--,but this explanation also is   
not tenable4 ,in the first place1 it is 
liable to the objection that it has     
recourse to indirect indication4#bce ,in
 the second place1 the second 'five'    
constitutes a compound with the word    
'people1' the ,brhma_/n_/a-accent       
showing that the two form one word      
only4#bcf ,to the same conclusion we are
 led by another passage also 7,taitt4   
,sa_/m_/h4 ,i1 #f1 #b1 #b1 pa_/k_/n_/m_/
 tv pa_/k_/ajannm1 c47 where the two    
terms constitute one word1 have one     
accent and one case-termination4 ,the   
word thus being a compound there is     
neither a repetition of the word 'five1'
 involving two pentads1 nor does the one
 five qualify the other1 as the mere    
secondary member of a compound cannot be
 qualified by another word4--,but as the
 people are already denoted to be five  
by the compound 'five-people1' the      
effect of the other 'five' qualifying   
the compound will be that we understand 

twenty-five people to be meant2 just as 
the expression 'five five-bundles'      
7pa_/k_/a pa_/k_/apulya_/h_/7 conveys   
the idea of twenty-five bundles4--,the  
instance is not an analogous one1 we    
reply4 ,the word 'pa_/k_/apli' denotes a
 unity 7i4e4 one bundle made up of five 
bundles7 and hence when the question    
arises1 ',how many such bundles are     
there8' it can be qualified by the word 
'five1' indicating that there are five  
such bundles4 ,the word                 
pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/1 on the other hand1    
conveys at once the idea of distinction 
7i4e4 of five distinct things71 so that 
there is no room at all for a further   
desire to know how many people there    
are1 and hence no room for a further    
qualification4 ,and if the word 'five'  
be taken as a qualifying word it can    
only qualify the numeral five 7in       
five-people72 the objection against     
which assumption has already been       
stated4--,for all these reasons the     
expression the five five-people cannot  

denote the twenty-five categories of the
 ,snkhyas4--,this is further not        
possible 'on account of the excess4'    
,for on the ,snkhya interpretation there
 would be an excess over the number     
twenty-five1 owing to the circumstance  
of the ether and the ,self being        
mentioned separately4 ,the ,self is     
spoken of as the abode in which the five
 five-people rest1 the clause ',him ,i  
believe to be the ,self' being connected
 with the 'in whom' of the antecedent   
clause4 ,now the ,self is the           
intelligent soul of the ,snkhyas which  
is already included in the twenty-five  
categories1 and which therefore1 on     
their interpretation of the passage1    
would here be mentioned once as         
constituting the abode and once as what 
rests in the abode6 ,if1 on the other   
hand1 the soul were supposed not to be  
compiled in the twenty-five categories1 
the ,snkhya would thereby abandon his   
own doctrine of the categories being    
twenty-five4 ,the same remarks apply to 

the separate mention made of the        
ether4--,how1 finally1 can the mere     
circumstance of a certain number being  
referred to in the sacred text justify  
the assumption that what is meant are   
the twenty-five ,snkhya categories of   
which ,scripture speaks in no other     
place8 especially if we consider that   
the word jana has not the settled       
meaning of category1 and that the number
 may be satisfactorily accounted for on 
another interpretation of the passage4  
,how1 then1 the ,snkhya will ask1 do you
 interpret the phrase 'the five         
five-people8'--,on the ground1 we reply1
 of the rule ,p_/n_/ini ,,ii1 #a1 #ej1  
according to which certain compounds    
formed with numerals are mere names4    
,the word pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ thus is not  
meant to convey the idea of the number  
five1 but merely to denote certain      
classes of beings4 ,hence the question  
may present itself1 ,how many such      
classes are there8 and to this question 
an answer is given by the added numeral 

'five4' ,there are certain classes of   
beings called five-people1 and these    
classes are five4 ,analogously we may   
speak of the seven seven-_/ri_/shis1    
where again the compound denotes a class
 of beings merely1 not their            
number4--,who then are those            
five-people8--,to this question the next
 ,stra replies4  #ab4 7,the             
pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ are7 the breath and so 
on1 7as is seen7 from the complementary 
passage4  ,the mantra in which the      
pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ are mentioned is       
followed by another one in which breath 
and four other things are mentioned for 
the purpose of describing the nature of 
,brahman4 ',they who know the breath of 
breath1 the eye of the eye1 the ear of  
the ear1 the food of food1 the mind of  
mind#bcg4' ,hence we conclude1 on the   
ground of proximity1 that the           
five-people are the beings mentioned in 
this latter mantra4--,but how1 the      
,snkhya asks1 can the word 'people' be  
applied to the breath1 the eye1 the ear1

 and so on8--,how1 we ask in return1 can
 it be applied to your categories8 ,in  
both cases the common meaning of the    
word 'people' has to be disregarded2 but
 in favour of our explanation is the    
fact that the breath1 the eye1 and so   
on1 are mentioned in a complementary    
passage4 ,the breath1 the eye1 c4 may be
 denoted by the word 'people' because   
they are connected with people4         
,moreover1 we find the word 'person1'   
which means as much as 'people1' applied
 to the pr_/n_/as in the passage1       
',these are the five persons of         
,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ac1 #f72   
and another passage runs1 ',breath is   
father1 breath is mother1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4
 ,,vii1 #ae1 #a74 ,and1 owing to the    
force of composition1 there is no       
objection to the compound being taken in
 its settled conventional               
meaning#bch4--;,but how can the         
conventional meaning be had recourse to1
 if there is no previous use of the word
 in that meaning8--,that may be done1 we

 reply1 just as in the case of udbhid   
and similar words#bci4 ,we often infer  
that a word of unknown meaning refers to
 some known thing because it is used in 
connexion with the latter4 ,so1 for     
instance1 in the case of the following  
words3 ',he is to sacrifice with the    
udbhid2 he cuts the ypa2 he makes the   
vedi4' ,analogously we conclude that the
 term pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/1 which1 from the 
grammatical rule quoted1 is known to be 
a name1 and which therefore demands a   
thing of which it is the name1 denotes  
the breath1 the eye1 and so on1 which   
are connected with it through their     
being mentioned in a complementary      
passage4--,some commentators explain the
 word pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ to mean the      
,gods1 the ,fathers1 the ,gandharvas1   
the ,asuras1 and the ,rakshas4 ,others1 
again1 think that the four castes       
together with the ,nishdas are meant4   
,again1 some scriptural passage         
7_/,ri_/g-veda ,sa_/m_/h4 ,,viii1 #ec1  
#g7 speaks of the tribe of 'the         

five-people1' meaning thereby the       
created beings in general2 and this     
latter explanation also might be applied
 to the passage under discussion4 ,the  
teacher 7the ,strakra71 on the other    
hand1 aiming at showing that the passage
 does not refer to the twenty-five      
categories of the ,snkhyas1 declares    
that on the ground of the complementary 
passage breath1 c4 have to be           
understood4  ,well1 let it then be      
granted that the five-people mentioned  
in the ,mdhyandina-text are breath1 c4  
since that text mentions food also 7and 
so makes up the number five74 ,but how  
shall we interpret the ,k_/n_/va-text   
which does not mention food 7and thus   
altogether speaks of four things        
only78--,to this question the next ,stra
 replies4  #ac4 ,in the case of 7the    
text of7 some 7the ,k_/n_/vas7 where    
food is not mentioned1 7the number five 
is made full7 by the light 7mentioned in
 the preceding mantra74  ,the           
,k_/n_/va-text1 although not mentioning 

food1 makes up the full number five1 by 
the light mentioned in the mantra       
preceding that in which the five-people 
are spoken of4 ,that mantra describes   
the nature of ,brahman by saying1 ',him 
the gods worship as the light of        
lights4'--,if it be asked how it is     
accounted for that the light mentioned  
in both texts equally is in one text to 
be employed for the explanation of the  
five-people1 and not in the other text2 
we reply that the reason lies in the    
difference of the requirements4 ,as the 
,mdhyandinas meet in one and the same   
mantra with breath and four other       
entities enabling them to interpret the 
term1 'the five-people1' they are in no 
need of the light mentioned in another  
mantra4 ,the ,k_/n_/vas1 on the other   
hand1 cannot do without the light4 ,the 
case is analogous to that of the        
,sho_/d_/a_/s_/in-cup1 which1 according 
to different passages1 is either to be  
offered or not to be offered at the     
atirtra-sacrifice4  ,we have proved     

herewith that ,scripture offers no basis
 for the doctrine of the pradhna4 ,that 
this doctrine cannot be proved either by
 ,sm_/ri_/ti or by ratiocination will be
 shown later on4  #ad4 7,although there 
is a conflict of the ,vednta-passages   
with regard to the things created1 such 
as7 ether and so on2 7there is no such  
conflict with regard to the ,lord7 on   
account of his being represented 7in one
 passage7 as described 7in other        
passages71 viz4 as the cause 7of the    
world74  ,in the preceding part of the  
work the right definition of ,brahman   
has been established2 it has been shown 
that all the ,vednta-texts have ,brahman
 for their common topic2 and it has been
 proved that there is no scriptural     
authority for the doctrine of the       
pradhna4--,but now a new objection      
presents itself4  ,it is not            
possible--our opponent says--to prove   
either that ,brahman is the cause of the
 origin1 c4 of the world1 or that all   
,vednta-texts refer to ,brahman2 because

 we observe that the ,vednta-texts      
contradict one another4 ,all the        
,vednta-passages which treat of the     
creation enumerate its successive steps 
in different order1 and so in reality   
speak of different creations4 ,in one   
place it is said that from the ,self    
there sprang the ether 7,taitt4 ,up4    
,,ii1 #a72 in another place that the    
creation began with fire 7,ch4 ,up4     
,,vi1 #b1 #c72 in another place1 again1 
that the ,person created breath and from
 breath faith 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #d72 in  
another place1 again1 that the ,self    
created these worlds1 the water 7above  
the heaven71 light1 the mortal 7earth71 
and the water 7below the earth7 7,ait4  
r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #b2 #c74 ,there no     
order is stated at all4 ,somewhere else 
it is said that the creation originated 
from the ,non-existent4 ',in the        
beginning this was non-existent2 from it
 was born what exists' 7,taitt4 ,up4    
,,ii1 #g72 and1 ',in the beginning this 
was non-existent2 it became existent2 it

 grew' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai1 #a74 ,in  
another place1 again1 the doctrine of   
the ,non-existent being the antecedent  
of the creation is impugned1 and the    
,existent mentioned in its stead4       
',others say1 in the beginning there was
 that only which is not2 but how could  
it be thus1 my dear8 ,how could that    
which is be born of that which is not8' 
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a2 #b47 ,and in   
another place1 again1 the development of
 the world is spoken of as having taken 
place spontaneously1 ',now all this was 
then undeveloped4 ,it became developed  
by form and name' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1   
#d1 #g74--;,as therefore manifold       
discrepancies are observed1 and as no   
option is possible in the case of an    
accomplished matter#bdj1 the            
,vednta-passages cannot be accepted as  
authorities for determining the cause of
 the world1 but we must rather accept   
some other cause of the world resting on
 the authority of ,sm_/ri_/ti and       
,reasoning4  ,to this we make the       

following reply4--,although the         
,vednta-passages may be conflicting with
 regard to the order of the things      
created1 such as ether and so on1 they  
do not conflict with regard to the      
creator1 'on account of his being       
represented as described4' ,that means3 
such as the creator is described in any 
one ,vednta-passage1 viz4 as            
all-knowing1 the ,lord of all1 the ,self
 of all1 without a second1 so he is     
represented in all other                
,vednta-passages also4 ,let us consider1
 for instance1 the description of       
,brahman 7given in ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a
 ff474 ,there it is said at first1      
',truth1 knowledge1 infinite is         
,brahman4' ,here the word 'knowledge1'  
and so likewise the statement1 made     
later on1 that ,brahman desired 7,,ii1  
#f71 intimate that ,brahman is of the   
nature of intelligence4 ,further1 the   
text declares#bda that the cause of the 
world is the general ,lord1 by          
representing it as not dependent on     

anything else4 ,it further applies to   
the cause of the world the term ',self' 
7,,ii1 #a71 and it represents it as     
abiding within the series of sheaths    
beginning with the gross body2 whereby  
it affirms it to be the internal ,self  
within all beings4 ,again--in the       
passage1 ',may ,i be many1 may ,i grow  
forth'--it tells how the ,self became   
many1 and thereby declares that the     
creator is non-different from the       
created effects4 ,and--in the passage1  
',he created all this whatever there    
is'--it represents the creator as the   
,cause of the entire world1 and thereby 
declares him to have been without a     
second previously to the creation4 ,the 
same characteristics which in the above 
passages are predicated of ,brahman1    
viewed as the ,cause of the world1 we   
find to be predicated of it in other    
passages also1 so1 for instance1 ',being
 only1 my dear1 was this in the         
beginning1 one only1 without a second4  
,it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow

 forth4 ,it sent forth fire' 7,ch4 ,up4 
,,vi1 #b1 #a2 #c71 and ',in the         
beginning all this was ,self1 one only2 
there was nothing else blinking         
whatsoever4 ,he thought1 shall ,i send  
forth worlds8' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1  
#a2 #b47 ,the ,vednta-passages which are
 concerned with setting forth the cause 
of the world are thus in harmony        
throughout4--,on the other hand1 there  
are found conflicting statements        
concerning the world1 the creation being
 in some places said to begin with      
ether1 in other places with fire1 and so
 on4 ,but1 in the first place1 it cannot
 be said that the conflict of statements
 concerning the world affects the       
statements concerning the cause1 i4e4   
,brahman1 in which all the ,vednta-texts
 are seen to agree--for that would be an
 altogether unfounded                   
generalization2--and1 in the second     
place1 the teacher will reconcile later 
on 7,,ii1 #c7 those conflicting passages
 also which refer to the world4 ,and1 to

 consider the matter more thoroughly1 a 
conflict of statements regarding the    
world would not even matter greatly1    
since the creation of the world and     
similar topics are not at all what      
,scripture wishes to teach4 ,for we     
neither observe nor are told by         
,scripture that the welfare of man      
depends on those matters in any way2 nor
 have we the right to assume such a     
thing2 because we conclude from the     
introductory and concluding clauses that
 the passages about the creation and the
 like form only subordinate members of  
passages treating of ,brahman4 ,that all
 the passages setting forth the creation
 and so on subserve the purpose of      
teaching ,brahman1 ,scripture itself    
declares2 compare ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1   
#d1 ',as food too is an offshoot1 seek  
after its root1 viz4 water4 ,and as     
water too is an offshoot1 seek after its
 root1 viz4 fire4 ,and as fire too is an
 offshoot1 seek after its root1 viz4 the
 ,true4' ,we1 moreover1 understand that 

by means of comparisons such as that of 
the clay 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #d7 the   
creation is described merely for the    
purpose of teaching us that the effect  
is not really different from the cause4 
,analogously it is said by those who    
know the sacred tradition1 ',if creation
 is represented by means of 7the similes
 of7 clay1 iron1 sparks1 and other      
things2 that is only a means for making 
it understood that 7in reality7 there is
 no difference whatever' 7,gau_/d_/ap4  
,k4 ,,iii1 #ae74--,on the other hand1   
,scripture expressly states the fruits  
connected with the knowledge of         
,brahman1 ',he who knows ,brahman       
obtains the highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1
 #a72 ',he who knows the ,self overcomes
 grief' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a1 #c72 ',a  
man who knows him passes over death'    
7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,that fruit 
is1 moreover1 apprehended by intuition  
7pratyaksha71 for as soon as1 by means  
of the doctrine1 ',that art thou1' a man
 has arrived at the knowledge that the  

,self is non-transmigrating1 its        
transmigrating nature vanishes for him4 
,it remains to dispose of the assertion 
that passages such as ',non-being this  
was in the beginning' contain           
conflicting statements about the nature 
of the cause4 ,this is done in the next 
,stra4  #ae4 ,on account of the         
connexion 7with passages treating of    
,brahman1 the passages speaking of the  
,non-being do not intimate absolute     
,non-existence74  ,the passage          
',non-being indeed was this in the      
beginning' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g7 does 
not declare that the cause of the world 
is the absolutely ,non-existent which is
 devoid of all ,selfhood4 ,for in the   
preceding sections of the ,upanishad    
,brahman is distinctly denied to be the 
,non-existing1 and is defined to be that
 which is 7',he who knows the ,brahman  
as non-existing becomes himself         
non-existing4 ,he who knows the ,brahman
 as existing him we know himself as     
existing'72 it is further1 by means of  

the series of sheaths1 viz4 the sheath  
of food1 c41 represented as the inner   
,self of everything4 ,this same ,brahman
 is again referred to in the clause1    
',he wished1 may ,i be many2' is        
declared to have originated the entire  
creation2 and is finally referred to in 
the clause1 ',therefore the wise call it
 the true4' ,thereupon the text goes on 
to say1 with reference to what has all  
along been the topic of discussion1 ',on
 this there is also this _/s_/loka1     
,non-being indeed was this in the       
beginning1' c4--,if here the term       
',non-being' denoted the absolutely     
,non-existent1 the whole context would  
be broken2 for while ostensibly         
referring to one matter the passage     
would in reality treat of a second      
altogether different matter4 ,we have   
therefore to conclude that1 while the   
term ',being' ordinarily denotes that   
which is differentiated by names and    
forms1 the term ',non-being' denotes the
 same substance previous to its         

differentiation1 i4e4 that ,brahman is1 
in a secondary sense of the word1 called
 ,non-being1 previously to the          
origination of the world4 ,the same     
interpretation has to be applied to the 
passage ',non-being this was in the     
beginning' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai1 #a72  
for that passage also is connected with 
another passage which runs1 ',it became 
being2' whence it is evident that the   
',non-being' of the former passage      
cannot mean absolute ,non-existence4    
,and in the passage1 ',others say1      
,non-being this was in the beginning'   
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a71 the reference 
to the opinion of 'others' does not mean
 that the doctrine referred1 to         
7according to which the world was       
originally absolutely non-existent7 is  
propounded somewhere in the ,veda2 for  
option is possible in the case of       
actions but not in the case of          
substances4 ,the passage has therefore  
to be looked upon as a refutation of the
 tenet of primitive absolute            

non-existence as fancifully propounded  
by some teachers of inferior            
intelligence2 a refutation undertaken   
for the purpose of strengthening the    
doctrine that this world has sprung from
 that which is4--,the following passage 
again1 ',now this was then undeveloped1'
 c4 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g71 does   
not by any means assert that the        
evolution of the world took place       
without a ruler2 as we conclude from the
 circumstance of its being connected    
with another passage in which the ruler 
is represented as entering into the     
evolved world of effects1 ',he entered  
thither to the very tips of the         
finger-nails' c4 ,if it were supposed   
that the evolution of the world takes   
place without a ruler1 to whom could the
 subsequent pronoun 'he' refer 7in the  
passage last quoted7 which manifestly is
 to be connected with something         
previously intimated8 ,and as ,scripture
 declares that the ,self1 after having  
entered into the body1 is of the nature 

of intelligence 7'when seeing1 eye by   
name2 when hearing1 ear by name2 when   
thinking1 mind by name'71 it follows    
that it is intelligent at the time of   
its entering also4--,we1 moreover1 must 
assume that the world was evolved at the
 beginning of the creation in the same  
way as it is at present seen to develop 
itself by names and forms1 viz4 under   
the rulership of an intelligent creator2
 for we have no right to make           
assumptions contrary to what is at      
present actually observed4 ,another     
scriptural passage also declares that   
the evolution of the world took place   
under the superintendence of a ruler1   
',let me now enter these beings with    
this living ,self1 and let me then      
evolve names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1
 #c1 #b74 ,the intransitive expression  
',it developed itself' 7vykriyata2 it   
became developed7 is to be viewed as    
having reference to the ease with which 
the real agent1 viz4 the ,lord1 brought 
about that evolution4 ,analogously it is

 said1 for instance1 that 'the cornfield
 reaps itself' 7i4e4 is reaped with the 
greatest ease71 although there is the   
reaper sufficient 7to account for the   
work being done74--,or else we may look 
on the form vykriyata as having         
reference to a necessarily implied      
agent2 as is the case in such phrases as
 'the village is being approached'      
7where we necessarily have to supply 'by
 ,devadatta or somebody else'74  #af4   
7,he whose work is this is ,brahman71   
because 7the 'work'7 denotes the world4 
,in the ,kaushtaki-brhma_/n_/a1 in the  
dialogue of ,blki and ,ajta_/s_/atru1 we
 read1 ',o ,blki1 he who is the maker of
 those persons1 he of whom this is the  
work1 he alone is to be known' 7,kau4   
,up4 ,,iv1 #ai74 ,the question here     
arises whether what is here inculcated  
as the object of knowledge is the       
individual soul or the chief vital air  
or the highest ,self4  ,the prvapakshin 
maintains that the vital air is meant4  
,for1 in the first place1 he says1 the  

clause 'of whom this is the work' points
 to the activity of motion1 and that    
activity rests on the vital air4 ,in the
 second place1 we meet with the word    
'pr_/n_/a' in a complementary passage   
7',then he becomes one with that        
pr_/n_/a alone'71 and that word is well 
known to denote the vital air4 ,in the  
third place1 pr_/n_/a is the maker of   
all the persons1 the person in the sun1 
the person in the moon1 c41 who in the  
preceding part of the dialogue had been 
enumerated by ,blki2 for that the sun   
and the other divinities are mere       
differentiations of pr_/n_/a we know    
from another scriptural passage1 viz4   
',who is that one god 7in whom all the  
other gods are contained78 ,pr_/n_/a and
 he is ,brahman1 and they call him      
,that' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1       
#i74--,or else1 the prvapakshin         
continues1 the passage under discussion 
represents the individual soul as the   
object of knowledge4 ,for of the soul   
also it can be said that 'this is the   

work1' if we understand by 'this' all   
meritorious and non-meritorious actions2
 and the soul also1 in so far as it is  
the enjoyer1 can be viewed as the maker 
of the persons enumerated in so far as  
they are instrumental to the soul's     
fruition4 ,the complementary passage1   
moreover1 contains an inferential mark  
of the individual soul4 ,for            
,ajta_/s_/atru1 in order to instruct    
,blki about the 'maker of the persons'  
who had been proposed as the object of  
knowledge1 calls a sleeping man by      
various names and convinces ,blki1 by   
the circumstance that the sleeper does  
not hear his shouts1 that the pr_/n_/a  
and so on are not the enjoyers2 he      
thereupon wakes the sleeping man by     
pushing him with his stick1 and so makes
 ,blki comprehend that the being capable
 of fruition is the individual soul     
which is distinct from the pr_/n_/a4 ,a 
subsequent passage also contains an     
inferential mark of the individual soul1
 viz4 ',and as the master feeds with his

 people1 nay1 as his people feed on the 
master1 thus does this conscious ,self  
feed with the other ,selfs1 thus those  
,selfs feed on the conscious ,self'     
7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #bj74 ,and as the     
individual soul is the support of the   
pr_/n_/a1 it may itself be called       
pr_/n_/a4--,we thus conclude that the   
passage under discussion refers either  
to the individual soul or to the chief  
vital air2 but not to the ,lord1 of whom
 it contains no inferential marks       
whatever4  ,to this we make the         
following reply4--,the ,lord only can be
 the maker of the persons enumerated1 on
 account of the force of the            
introductory part of the section4 ,blki 
begins his colloquy with ,ajta_/s_/atru 
with the offer1 ',shall ,i tell you     
,brahman8' ,thereupon he enumerates some
 individual souls residing in the sun1  
the moon1 and so on1 which participate  
in the sight of the secondary ,brahman1 
and in the end becomes silent4          
,ajta_/s_/atru then sets aside ,blki's  

doctrine as not referring to the chief  
,brahman--with the words1 ',vainly did  
you challenge me1 saying1 ,shall ,i tell
 you ,brahman1' c4--and proposes the    
maker of all those individual souls as a
 new object of knowledge4 ,if now that  
maker also were merely a soul           
participating in the sight of the       
secondary ,brahman1 the introductory    
statement which speaks of ,brahman would
 be futile4 ,hence it follows that the  
highest ,lord himself is meant4--,none1 
moreover1 but the highest ,lord is      
capable of being the maker of all those 
persons as he only is absolutely        
independent4--,further1 the clause 'of  
whom this is the work' does not refer   
either to the activity of motion nor to 
meritorious and non-meritorious actions2
 for neither of those two is the topic  
of discussion or has been mentioned     
previously4 ,nor can the term 'work'    
denote the enumerated persons1 since the
 latter are mentioned separately--in the
 clause1 ',he who is the maker of those 

persons'--and as inferential marks 7viz4
 the neuter gender and the singular     
number of the word karman1 work7        
contradict that assumption4 ,nor1 again1
 can the term 'work' denote either the  
activity whose object the persons are1  
or the result of that activity1 since   
those two are already implied in the    
mention of the agent 7in the clause1    
',he who is the maker'74 ,thus there    
remains no other alternative than to    
take the pronoun 'this' 7in ',he of whom
 this is the work'7 as denoting the     
perceptible world and to understand the 
same world--as that which is made--by   
the term 'work4'--,we may indeed admit  
that the world also is not the previous 
topic of discussion and has not been    
mentioned before2 still1 as no          
specification is mentioned1 we conclude 
that the term 'work' has to be          
understood in a general sense1 and thus 
denotes what first presents itself to   
the mind1 viz4 everything which exists  
in general4 ,it is1 moreover1 not true  

that the world is not the previous topic
 of discussion2 we are rather entitled  
to conclude from the circumstance that  
the various persons 7in the sun1 the    
moon1 c47 which constitute a part of the
 world had been specially mentioned     
before1 that the passage in question is 
concerned with the whole world in       
general4 ,the conjunction 'or' 7in 'or  
he of whom1' c47 is meant to exclude the
 idea of limited makership2 so that the 
whole passage has to be interpreted as  
follows1 ',he who is the maker of those 
persons forming a part of the world1 or 
rather--to do away with this            
limitation--he of whom this entire world
 without any exception is the work4'    
,the special mention made of the persons
 having been created has for its purpose
 to show that those persons whom ,blki  
had proclaimed to be ,brahman are not   
,brahman4 ,the passage therefore sets   
forth the maker of the world in a double
 aspect1 at first as the creator of a   
special part of the world and thereupon 

as the creator of the whole remaining   
part of the world2 a way of speaking    
analogous to such every-day forms of    
expression as1 ',the wandering          
mendicants are to be fed1 and then the  
,brhma_/n_/as#bdb4' ,and that the maker 
of the world is the highest ,lord is    
affirmed in all ,vednta-texts4  #ag4 ,if
 it be said that this is not so1 on     
account of the inferential marks of the 
individual soul and the chief vital air2
 we reply that that has already been    
explained4  ,it remains for us to refute
 the objection that on account of the   
inferential marks of the individual soul
 and the chief vital air1 which are met 
with in the complementary passage1      
either the one or the other must be     
meant in the passage under discussion1  
and not the highest ,lord4--,we         
therefore remark that that objection has
 already been disposed of under ,i1 #a1 
#ca4 ,there it was shown that from an   
interpretation similar to the one here  
proposed by the prvapakshin there would 

result a threefold meditation one having
 ,brahman for its object1 a second one  
directed on the individual soul1 and a  
third one connected with the chief vital
 air4 ,now the same result would present
 itself in our case1 and that would be  
unacceptable as we must infer from the  
introductory as well as the concluding  
clauses1 that the passage under         
discussion refers to ,brahman4 ,with    
reference to the introductory clause    
this has been already proved2 that the  
concluding passage also refers to       
,brahman1 we infer from the fact of     
there being stated in it a pre-eminently
 high reward1 ',warding off all evil he 
who knows this obtains pre-eminence     
among all beings1 sovereignty1          
supremacy4'--,but if this is so1 the    
sense of the passage under discussion is
 already settled by the discussion of   
the passage about ,pratarda_/n_/a 7,i1  
#a1 #ca72 why1 then1 the present        
,stra8--,no1 we reply2 the sense of our 
passage is not yet settled1 since under 

,i1 #a1 #ca it has not been proved that 
the clause1 ',or he whose work is this1'
 refers to ,brahman4 ,hence there arises
 again1 in connexion with the present   
passage1 a doubt whether the individual 
soul and the chief vital air may not be 
meant1 and that doubt has again to be   
refuted4--,the word pr_/n_/a occurs1    
moreover1 in the sense of ,brahman1 so  
in the passage1 ',the mind settles down 
on pr_/n_/a' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1       
#b74--,the inferential marks of the     
individual soul also have1 on account of
 the introductory and concluding clauses
 referring to ,brahman1 to be explained 
so as not to give rise to any           
discrepancy4  #ah4 ,but ,jaimini thinks 
that 7the reference to the individual   
soul7 has another purport1 on account of
 the question and answer2 and thus some 
also 7read in their text74  ,whether the
 passage under discussion is concerned  
with the individual soul or with        
,brahman1 is1 in the opinion of the     
teacher ,jaimini1 no matter for dispute1

 since the reference to the individual  
soul has a different purport1 i4e4 aims 
at intimating ,brahman4 ,he founds this 
his opinion on a question and a reply   
met with in the text4 ,after            
,ajta_/s_/atru has taught ,blki1 by     
waking the sleeping man1 that the soul  
is different from the vital air1 he asks
 the following question1 ',blki1 where  
did this person here sleep8 ,where was  
he8 ,whence came he thus back8' ,this   
question clearly refers to something    
different from the individual soul4 ,and
 so likewise does the reply1 ',when     
sleeping he sees no dream1 then he      
becomes one with that pr_/n_/a alone2'  
and1 ',from that ,self all pr_/n_/as    
proceed1 each towards its place1 from   
the pr_/n_/as the gods1 from the gods   
the worlds4'--,now it is the general    
,vednta doctrine that at the time of    
deep sleep the soul becomes one with the
 highest ,brahman1 and that from the    
highest ,brahman the whole world        
proceeds1 inclusive of pr_/n_/a1 and so 

on4 ,when ,scripture therefore          
represents as the object of knowledge   
that in which there takes place the deep
 sleep of the soul1 characterised by    
absence of consciousness and utter      
tranquillity1 i4e4 a state devoid of all
 those specific cognitions which are    
produced by the limiting adjuncts of the
 soul1 and from which the soul returns  
when the sleep is broken2 we understand 
that the highest ,self is               
meant4--,moreover1 the                  
,vjasaneyi_/s_/kh1 which likewise       
contains the colloquy of ,blki and      
,ajta_/s_/atru1 clearly refers to the   
individual soul by means of the term1   
'the person consisting of cognition'    
7vij_/_/namaya71 and distinguishes from 
it the highest ,self 7',where was then  
the person consisting of cognition8 and 
from whence did he thus come back8'     
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #af72 and later
 on1 in the reply to the above question1
 declares that 'the person consisting of
 cognition lies in the ether within the 

heart4' ,now we know that the word      
'ether' may be used to denote the       
highest ,self1 as1 for instance1 in the 
passage about the small ether within the
 lotus of the heart 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1  
#a1 #a74 ,further on the ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
says1 ',all the ,selfs came forth from  
that ,self2' by which statement of the  
coming forth of all the conditioned     
,selfs it intimates that the highest    
,self is the one general cause4--,the   
doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the 
sleeping person1 viz4 that the          
individual soul is different from the   
vital air1 furnishes at the same time a 
further argument against the opinion    
that the passage under discussion refers
 to the vital air4  #ai4 7,the ,self to 
be seen1 to be heard1 c4 is the highest 
,self7 on account of the connected      
meaning of the sentences4  ,we read in  
the ,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka1 in the      
,maitrey-brhma_/n_/a the following      
passage1 ',verily1 a husband is not dear
 that you may love the husband1 c4 c42  

verily1 everything is not dear that you 
may love everything2 but that you may   
love the ,self therefore everything is  
dear4 ,verily1 the ,self is to be seen1 
to be heard1 to be perceived1 to be     
marked1 ,o ,maitrey6 ,when the ,self has
 been seen1 heard1 perceived1 and known1
 then all this is known' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4
 ,,iv1 #e1 #f74--;,here the doubt arises
 whether that which is represented as   
the object to be seen1 to be heard1 and 
so on1 is the cognitional ,self 7the    
individual soul7 or the highest         
,self4--,but whence the                 
doubt8--,because1 we reply1 the ,self   
is1 on the one hand1 by the mention of  
dear things such as husband and so on1  
indicated as the enjoyer whence it      
appears that the passage refers to the  
individual soul2 and because1 on the    
other hand1 the declaration that through
 the knowledge of the ,self everything  
becomes known points to the highest     
,self4  ,the prvapakshin maintains that 
the passage refers to the individual    

soul1 on account of the strength of the 
initial statement4 ,the text declares at
 the outset that all the objects of     
enjoyment found in this world1 such as  
husband1 wife1 riches1 and so on1 are   
dear on account of the ,self1 and       
thereby gives us to understand that the 
enjoying 7i4e4 the individual7 ,self is 
meant2 if thereupon it refers to the    
,self as the object of sight and so on1 
what other ,self should it mean than the
 same individual ,self8--,a subsequent  
passage also 7viz4 ',thus does this     
great ,being1 endless1 unlimited1       
consisting of nothing but knowledge1    
rise from out of these elements1 and    
vanish again after them4 ,when he has   
departed there is no more knowledge'71  
which describes how the great ,being    
under discussion rises1 as the ,self of 
knowledge1 from the elements1 shows that
 the object of sight is no other than   
the cognitional ,self1 i4e4 the         
individual soul4 ,the concluding clause 
finally1 ',how1 ,o beloved1 should he   

know the knower8' shows1 by means of the
 term 'knower1' which denotes an agent1 
that the individual soul is meant4 ,the 
declaration that through the cognition  
of the ,self everything becomes known   
must therefore not be interpreted in the
 literal sense1 but must be taken to    
mean that the world of objects of       
enjoyment is known through its relation 
to the enjoying soul4  ,to this we make 
the following reply4--,the passage makes
 a statement about the highest ,self1 on
 account of the connected meaning of the
 entire section4 ,if we consider the    
different passages in their mutual      
connexion1 we find that they all refer  
to the highest ,self4 ,after ,maitrey   
has heard from ,yj_/_/avalkya that there
 is no hope of immortality by wealth1   
she expresses her desire of immortality 
in the words1 ',what should ,i do with  
that by which ,i do not become immortal8
 ,what my ,lord knoweth tell that to    
me2' and thereupon ,yj_/_/avalkya       
expounds to her the knowledge of the    

,self4 ,now ,scripture as well as       
,sm_/ri_/ti declares that immortality is
 not to be reached but through the      
knowledge of the highest ,self4--,the   
statement further that through the      
knowledge of the ,self everything       
becomes known can be taken in its direct
 literal sense only if by the ,self we  
understand the highest cause4 ,and to   
take it in a non-literal sense 7as the  
prvapakshin proposes7 is inadmissible1  
on account of the explanation given of  
that statement in a subsequent passage1 
viz4 ',whosoever looks for the ,brahman 
class elsewhere than in the ,self1 is   
abandoned by the ,brahman class4' ,here 
it is said that whoever erroneously     
views this world with its ,brahmans and 
so on1 as having an independent         
existence apart from the ,self1 is      
abandoned by that very world of which he
 has taken an erroneous view2 whereby   
the view that there exists any          
difference is refuted4 ,and the         
immediately subsequent clause1 ',this   

everything is the ,self1' gives us to   
understand that the entire aggregate of 
existing things is non-different from   
the ,self2 a doctrine further confirmed 
by the similes of the drum and so       
on4--,by explaining further that the    
,self about which he had been speaking  
is the cause of the universe of names1  
forms1 and works 7',there has been      
breathed forth from this great ,being   
what we have as _/,ri_/gveda1' c47      
,yj_/_/avalkya again shows that it is   
the highest ,self4--,to the same        
conclusion he leads us by declaring1 in 
the paragraph which treats of the       
natural centres of things1 that the     
,self is the centre of the whole world  
with the objects1 the senses and the    
mind1 that it has neither inside nor    
outside1 that it is altogether a mass of
 knowledge4--,from all this it follows  
that what the text represents as the    
object of sight and so on is the highest
 ,self4  ,we now turn to the remark made
 by the prvapakshin that the passage    

teaches the individual soul to be the   
object of sight1 because it is1 in the  
early part of the chapter denoted as    
something dear4  #bj4 7,the circumstance
 of the soul being represented as the   
object of sight7 indicates the          
fulfilment of the promissory statement2 
so _/s_/marathya thinks4  ,the fact that
 the text proclaims as the object of    
sight that ,self which is denoted as    
something1 dear indicates the fulfilment
 of the promise made in the passages1   
',when the ,self is known all this is   
known1' ',all this is that ,self4' ,for 
if the individual soul were different   
from the highest ,self1 the knowledge of
 the latter would not imply the         
knowledge of the former1 and thus the   
promise that through the knowledge of   
one thing everything is to be known     
would not be fulfilled4 ,hence the      
initial statement aims at representing  
the individual ,self and the highest    
,self as non-different for the purpose  
of fulfilling the promise made4--,this  

is the opinion of the teacher           
_/s_/marathya#bdc4  #ba4 7,the initial  
statement identifies the individual soul
 and the highest ,self7 because the soul
 when it will depart 7from the body7 is 
such 7i4e4 one with the highest ,self72 
thus ,au_/d_/ulomi thinks4  ,the        
individual soul which is inquinated by  
the contact with its different limiting 
adjuncts1 viz4 body1 senses1 and mind   
7mano-buddhi71 attains through the      
instrumentality of knowledge1           
meditation1 and so on1 a state of       
complete serenity1 and thus enables     
itself1 when passing at some future time
 out of the body1 to become one with the
 highest ,self2 hence the initial       
statement in which it is represented as 
non-different from the highest ,self4   
,this is the opinion of the teacher     
,au_/d_/ulomi4--,thus ,scripture says1  
',that serene being arising from this   
body appears in its own form as soon as 
it has approached the highest light'    
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c74--;,in      

another place ,scripture intimates1 by  
means of the simile of the rivers1 that 
name and form abide in the individual   
soul1 ',as the flowing rivers disappear 
in the sea1 having lost their name and  
their form1 thus a wise man freed from  
name and form goes to the divine ,person
 who is greater than the great' 7,mu4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h74 ,i4e4 as the rivers
 losing the names and forms abiding in  
them disappear in the sea1 so the       
individual soul also losing the name and
 form abiding in it becomes united with 
the highest person4 ,that the latter    
half of the passage has the meaning here
 assigned to it1 follows from the       
parallelism which we must assume to     
exist between the two members of the    
comparison#bdd4  #bb4 7,the initial     
statement is made7 because 7the highest 
,self7 exists in the condition 7of the  
individual soul72 so ,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna
 thinks4  ,because the highest ,self    
exists also in the condition of the     
individual soul1 therefore1 the teacher 

,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna thinks1 the initial 
statement which aims at intimating the  
non-difference of the two is possible4  
,that the highest ,self only is that    
which appears as the individual soul1 is
 evident from the ,brhma_/n_/a-passage1 
',let me enter into them with this      
living ,self and evolve names and       
forms1' and similar passages4 ,we have  
also mantras to the same effect1 for    
instance1 ',the wise one who1 having    
produced all forms and made all names1  
sits calling the things by their names' 
7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #g7bde4 ,and    
where ,scripture relates the creation of
 fire and the other elements1 it does   
not at the same time relate a separate  
creation of the individual soul2 we have
 therefore no right to look on the soul 
as a product of the highest ,self1      
different from the latter4--,in the     
opinion of the teacher                  
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna the non-modified    
highest ,lord himself is the individual 
soul1 not anything else4 _/s_/marathya1 

although meaning to say that the soul is
 not 7absolutely7 different from the    
highest ,self1 yet intimates by the     
expression1 ',on account of the         
fulfilment of the promise'--which       
declares a certain mutual               
dependence--that there does exist a     
certain relation of cause and effect    
between the highest ,self and the       
individual soul#bdf4 ,the opinion of    
,au_/d_/ulomi again clearly implies that
 the difference and non-difference of   
the two depend on difference of         
condition#bdg4 ,of these three opinions 
we conclude that the one held by        
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna accords with        
,scripture1 because it agrees with what 
all the ,vednta-texts 7so1 for instance1
 the passage1 ',that art thou'7 aim at  
inculcating4 ,only on the opinion of    
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna immortality can be  
viewed as the result of the knowledge of
 the soul2 while it would be impossible 
to hold the same view if the soul were a
 modification 7product7 of the ,self and

 as such liable to lose its existence by
 being merged in its causal substance4  
,for the same reason1 name and form     
cannot abide in the soul 7as was above  
attempted to prove by means of the      
simile of the rivers71 but abide in the 
limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the
 soul itself in a figurative sense only4
 ,for the same reason the origin of the 
souls from the highest ,self1 of which  
,scripture speaks in some places as     
analogous to the issuing of sparks from 
the fire1 must be viewed as based only  
on the limiting adjuncts of the soul4   
,the last three ,stras have further to  
be interpreted so as to furnish replies 
to the second of the prvapakshin's      
arguments1 viz4 that the                
,b_/ri_/hadra_/n_/yaka passage          
represents as the object of sight the   
individual soul1 because it declares    
that the great ,being which is to be    
seen arises from out of these elements4 
',there is an indication of the         
fulfilment of the promise2 so           

_/s_/marathya thinks4' ,the promise is  
made in the two passages1 ',when the    
,self is known1 all this is known1' and 
',all this is that ,self4' ,that the    
,self is everything1 is proved by the   
declaration that the whole world of     
names1 forms1 and works springs from one
 being1 and is merged in one being#bdh2 
and by its being demonstrated1 with the 
help of the similes of the drum1 and so 
on1 that effect and cause are           
non-different4 ,the fulfilment of the   
promise is1 then1 finally indicated by  
the text declaring that that great      
,being rises1 in the form of the        
individual soul1 from out of these      
elements2 thus the teacher _/s_/marathya
 thinks4 ,for if the soul and the       
highest ,self are non-different1 the    
promise that through the knowledge of   
one everything becomes known is capable 
of fulfilment4--',because the soul when 
it will depart is such2 thus            
,au_/d_/ulomi thinks4' ,the statement as
 to the non-difference of the soul and  

the ,self 7implied in the declaration   
that the great ,being rises1 c47 is     
possible1 because the soul when--after  
having purified itself by knowledge1 and
 so on--it will depart from the body1 is
 capable of becoming one with the       
highest ,self4 ,this is ,au_/d_/ulomi's 
opinion4--',because it exists in the    
condition of the soul2 thus             
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna opines4' ,because   
the highest ,self itself is that which  
appears as the individual soul1 the     
statement as to the non-difference of   
the two is well-founded4 ,this is the   
view of the teacher ,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna4
  ,but1 an objection may be raised1 the 
passage1 ',rising from out of these     
elements he vanishes again after them4  
,when he has departed there is no more  
knowledge1' intimates the final         
destruction of the soul1 not its        
identity with the highest ,self6--,by no
 means1 we reply4 ,the passage means to 
say only that on the soul departing from
 the body all specific cognition        

vanishes1 not that the ,self is         
destroyed4 ,for an objection being      
raised--in the passage1 ',here thou hast
 bewildered me1 ,sir1 when thou sayest  
that having departed there is no more   
knowledge'4 ,scripture itself explains  
that what is meant is not the           
annihilation of the ,self1 ',i say      
nothing that is bewildering4 ,verily1   
beloved1 that ,self is imperishable1 and
 of an indestructible nature4 ,but there
 takes place non-connexion with the     
mtrs4' ,that means3 ,the eternally      
unchanging ,self1 which is one mass of  
knowledge1 cannot possibly perish2 but  
by means of true knowledge there is     
effected its dissociation from the mtrs1
 i4e4 the elements and the sense organs1
 which are the product of ,nescience4   
,when the connexion has been solved1    
specific cognition1 which depended on   
it1 no longer takes place1 and thus it  
can be said1 that ',when he has departed
 there is no more knowledge4'  ,the     
third argument also of the prvapakshin1 

viz4 that the word 'knower'--which      
occurs in the concluding passage1 ',how 
should he know the knower8'--denotes an 
agent1 and therefore refers to the      
individual soul as the object of sight1 
is to be refuted according to the view  
of ,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna4--,moreover1 the 
text after having enumerated--in the    
passage1 ',for where there is duality as
 it were1 there one sees the other1'    
c4--all the kinds of specific cognition 
which belong to the sphere of ,nescience
 declares--in the subsequent passage1   
',but when the ,self only is all this1  
how should he see another8'--that in the
 sphere of true knowledge all specific  
cognition such as seeing1 and so on1 is 
absent4 ,and1 again1 in order to obviate
 the doubt whether in the absence of    
objects the knower might not know       
himself1 ,yj_/_/avalkya goes on1 ',how1 
,o beloved1 should he know himself1 the 
knower8' ,as thus the latter passage    
evidently aims at proving the absence of
 specific cognition1 we have to conclude

 that the word 'knower' is here used to 
denote that being which is knowledge1   
i4e4 the ,self4--,that the view of      
,k_/s_/ak_/ri_/tsna is scriptural1 we   
have already shown above4 ,and as it is 
so1 all the adherents of the ,vednta    
must admit that the difference of the   
soul and the highest ,self is not real1 
but due to the limiting adjuncts1 viz4  
the body1 and so on1 which are the      
product of name and form as presented by
 ,nescience4 ,that view receives ample  
confirmation from ,scripture2 compare1  
for instance1 ',being only1 my dear1    
this was in the beginning1 one1 without 
a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a72     
',the ,self is all this' 7,ch4 ,up4     
,,vii1 #be1 #b72 ',brahman alone is all 
this' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aa72 ',this 
everything is that ,self' 7,b_/ri_/4    
,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',there is no other 
seer but he' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 
#bc72 ',there is nothing that sees but  
it' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1          
#aa74--;,it is likewise confirmed by    

,sm_/ri_/ti2 compare1 for instance1     
',vsudeva is all this' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1
 #ai72 ',know me1 ,o ,bhrata1 to be the 
soul in all bodies' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1  
#b72 ',he who sees the highest ,lord    
abiding alike within all creatures'     
7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #bg74--,the same     
conclusion is supported by those        
passages which deny all difference2     
compare1 for instance1 ',if he thinks1  
that is one and ,i another2 he does not 
know' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj72     
',from death to death he goes who sees  
here any diversity' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4     
,,iv1 #d1 #ai74 ,and1 again1 by those   
passages which negative all change on   
the part of the ,self2 compare1 for     
instance1 ',this great unborn ,self1    
undecaying1 undying1 immortal1 fearless 
is indeed ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4     
,,iv1 #bd74--,moreover1 if the doctrine 
of general identity were not true1 those
 who are desirous of release could not  
be in the possession of irrefutable     
knowledge1 and there would be no        

possibility of any matter being well    
settled2 while yet the knowledge of     
which the ,self is the object is        
declared to be irrefutable and to       
satisfy all desire1 and ,scripture      
speaks of those1 ',who have well        
ascertained the object of the knowledge 
of the ,vednta' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1   
#f74 ,compare also the passage1 ',what  
trouble1 what sorrow can there be to him
 who has once beheld that unity8'       
7,i_/s_/4 ,up4 #g47--;,and ,sm_/ri_/ti  
also represents the mind of him who     
contemplates the ,self as steady 7,bha4 
,g4 ,,ii1 #ed74  ,as therefore the      
individual soul and the highest ,self   
differ in name only1 it being a settled 
matter that perfect knowledge has for   
its object the absolute oneness of the  
two2 it is senseless to insist 7as some 
do7 on a plurality of ,selfs1 and to    
maintain that the individual soul is    
different from the highest ,self1 and   
the highest ,self from the individual   
soul4 ,for the ,self is indeed called by

 many different names1 but it is one    
only4 ,nor does the passage1 ',he who   
knows ,brahman which is real1 knowledge1
 infinite1 as hidden in the cave'       
7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a71 refer to some  
one cave 7different from the abode of   
the individual soul7#bdi4 ,and that     
nobody else but ,brahman is hidden in   
the cave we know from a subsequent      
passage1 viz4 ',having sent forth he    
entered into it' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1    
#f71 according to which the creator only
 entered into the created               
beings4--,those who insist on the       
distinction of the individual and the   
highest ,self oppose themselves to the  
true sense of the ,vednta-texts1 stand  
thereby in the way of perfect knowledge1
 which is the door to perfect beatitude1
 and groundlessly assume release to be  
something effected1 and therefore       
non-eternal#bej4 7,and if they attempt  
to show that moksha1 although effected1 
is eternal7 they involve themselves in a
 conflict with sound logic4  #bc4       

7,brahman is7 the material cause also1  
on account of 7this view7 not being in  
conflict with the promissory statements 
and the illustrative instances4  ,it has
 been said that1 as practical religious 
duty has to be enquired into because it 
is the cause of an increase of          
happiness1 so ,brahman has to be        
enquired into because it is the cause of
 absolute beatitude4 ,and ,brahman has  
been defined as that from which there   
proceed the origination1 sustentation1  
and retractation of this world4 ,now as 
this definition comprises alike the     
relation of substantial causality in    
which clay and gold1 for instance1 stand
 to golden ornaments and earthen pots1  
and the relation of operative causality 
in which the potter and the goldsmith   
stand to the things mentioned2 a doubt  
arises to which of these two kinds the  
causality of ,brahman belongs4  ,the    
prvapakshin maintains that ,brahman     
evidently is the operative cause of the 
world only1 because ,scripture declares 

his creative energy to be preceded by   
reflection4 ,compare1 for instance1     
,pra4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c2 #d3 ',he reflected1
 he created pr_/n_/a4' ,for observation 
shows that the action of operative      
causes only1 such as potters and the    
like1 is preceded by reflection1 and    
moreover that the result of some        
activity is brought about by the        
concurrence of several factors#bea4 ,it 
is therefore appropriate that we should 
view the prime creator in the same      
light4 ,the circumstance of his being   
known as 'the ,lord' furnishes another  
argument4 ,for lords such as kings and  
the son of ,vivasvat are known only as  
operative causes1 and the highest ,lord 
also must on that account be viewed as  
an operative cause only4--,further1 the 
effect of the creator's activity1 viz4  
this world1 is seen to consist of parts1
 to be non-intelligent and impure2 we   
therefore must assume that its cause    
also is of the same nature2 for it is a 
matter of general observation that cause

 and effect are alike in kind4 ,but that
 ,brahman does not resemble the world in
 nature1 we know from many scriptural   
passages1 such as ',it is without parts1
 without actions1 tranquil1 without     
fault1 without taint' 7_/,sv_/e4 ,up4   
,,vi1 #ai74 ,hence there remains no     
other alternative but to admit that in  
addition to ,brahman there exists a     
material cause of the world of impure   
nature1 such as is known from           
,sm_/ri_/ti#beb1 and to limit the       
causality of ,brahman1 as declared by   
,scripture1 to operative causality4  ,to
 this we make the following             
reply4--,brahman is to be acknowledged  
as the material cause as well as the    
operative cause2 because this latter    
view does not conflict with the         
promissory statements and the           
illustrative instances4 ,the promissory 
statement chiefly meant is the following
 one1 ',have you ever asked for that    
instruction by which that which is not  
heard becomes heard2 that which is not  

perceived1 perceived2 that which is not 
known1 known8' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #c47
 ,this passage intimates that through   
the cognition of one thing everything   
else1 even if 7previously7 unknown1     
becomes known4 ,now the knowledge of    
everything is possible through the      
cognition of the material cause1 since  
the effect is non-different from the    
material cause4 ,on the other hand1     
effects are not non-different from their
 operative causes2 for we know from     
ordinary experience that the carpenter1 
for instance1 is different from the     
house he has built4--,the illustrative  
example referred to is the one mentioned
 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #d71 ',my dear1 as
 by one clod of clay all that is made of
 clay is known1 the modification 7i4e4  
the effect7 being a name merely which   
has its origin in speech1 while the     
truth is that it is clay merely2' which 
passage again has reference to the      
material cause4 ,the text adds a few    
more illustrative instances of similar  

nature1 ',as by one nugget of gold all  
that is made of gold is known2 as by one
 pair of nail-scissors all that is made 
of iron is known4'--,similar promissory 
statements are made in other places     
also1 for instance1 ',what is that      
through which if it is known everything 
else becomes known8' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 
#c47 ,an illustrative instance also is  
given in the same place1 ',as plants    
grow on the earth' 7,i1 #a1             
#g74--;,compare also the promissory     
statement in ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1   
#f1 ',when the ,self has been seen1     
heard1 perceived1 and known1 then all   
this is known2' and the illustrative    
instance quoted 7,,iv1 #e1 #h71 ',now as
 the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot  
be seized externally1 but the sound is  
seized when the drum is seized or the   
beater of the drum4'--,similar          
promissory statements and illustrative  
instances which are to be found in all  
,vednta-texts are to be viewed as       
proving1 more or less1 that ,brahman is 

also the material cause of the world4   
,the ablative case also in the passage1 
',that from whence 7yata_/h_/7 these    
beings are born1' has to be considered  
as indicating the material cause of the 
beings1 according to the grammatical    
rule1 ,p_/n_/4 ,i1 #d1 #cj4--,that      
,brahman is at the same time the        
operative cause of the world1 we have to
 conclude from the circumstance that    
there is no other guiding being4        
,ordinarily material causes1 indeed1    
such as lumps of clay and pieces of     
gold1 are dependent1 in order to shape  
themselves into vessels and ornaments1  
on extraneous operative causes such as  
potters and goldsmiths2 but outside     
,brahman as material cause there is no  
other operative cause to which the      
material cause could look2 for          
,scripture says that previously to      
creation ,brahman was one without a     
second4--,the absence of a guiding      
principle other than the material cause 
can moreover be established by means of 

the argument made use of in the ,stra1  
viz4 accordance with the promissory     
statements and the illustrative         
examples4 ,if there were admitted a     
guiding principle different from the    
material cause1 it would follow that    
everything cannot be known through one  
thing1 and thereby the promissory       
statements as well as the illustrative  
instances would be stultified4--,the    
,self is thus the operative cause1      
because there is no other ruling        
principle1 and the material cause       
because there is no other substance from
 which the world could originate4  #bd4 
,and on account of the statement of     
reflection 7on the part of the ,self74  
,the fact of the sacred texts declaring 
that the ,self reflected likewise shows 
that it is the operative as well as the 
material cause4 ,passages like ',he     
wished1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow     
forth1' and ',he thought1 may ,i be     
many1 may ,i grow forth1' show1 in the  
first place1 that the ,self is the agent

 in the independent activity which is   
preceded by the ,self's reflection2 and1
 in the second place1 that it is the    
material cause also1 since the words    
',may ,i be many' intimate that the     
reflective desire of multiplying itself 
has the inward ,self for its object4    
#be4 ,and on account of both 7i4e4 the  
origin and the dissolution of the world7
 being directly declared 7to have       
,brahman for their material cause74     
,this ,stra supplies a further argument 
for ,brahman's being the general        
material cause4--,brahman is the        
material cause of the world for that    
reason also that the origination as well
 as the dissolution of the world is     
directly spoken of in the sacred texts  
as having ,brahman for their material   
cause1 ',all these beings take their    
rise from the ether and return into the 
ether' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #i1 #a74 ,that    
that from which some other thing springs
 and into which it returns is the       
material cause of that other thing is   

well known4 ,thus the earth1 for        
instance1 is the material cause of rice1
 barley1 and the like4--,the word       
'directly' 7in the ,stra7 notifies that 
there is no other material cause1 but   
that all this sprang from the ether     
only4--,observation further teaches that
 effects are not re-absorbed into       
anything else but their material causes4
  #bf4 7,brahman is the material cause7 
on account of 7the ,self7 making itself2
 7which is possible7 owing to           
modification4  ,brahman is the material 
cause for that reason also that         
,scripture--in the passage1 ',that made 
itself its ,self' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1   
#g7--represents the ,self as the object 
of action as well as the agent4--,but   
how can the ,self which as agent was in 
full existence previously to the action 
be made out to be at the same time that 
which is effected by the action8--,owing
 to modification1 we reply4 ,the ,self1 
although in full existence previously to
 the action1 modifies itself into       

something special1 viz4 the ,self of the
 effect4 ,thus we see that causal       
substances1 such as clay and the like1  
are1 by undergoing the process of       
modification1 changed into their        
products4--,the word 'itself' in the    
passage quoted intimates the absence of 
any other operative cause but the ,self4
  ,the word 'pari_/n_/mt' 7in the ,stra7
 may also be taken as constituting a    
separate ,stra by itself1 the sense of  
which would be3 ,brahman is the material
 cause of the world for that reason     
also1 that the sacred text speaks of    
,brahman and its modification into the  
,self of its effect as co-ordinated1    
viz4 in the passage1 ',it became sat and
 tyat1 defined and undefined' 7,taitt4  
,up4 ,,ii1 #f74  #bg4 ,and because      
,brahman is called the source4  ,brahman
 is the material cause for that reason  
also that it is spoken of in the sacred 
texts as the source 7yoni72 compare1 for
 instance1 ',the maker1 the ,lord1 the  
person who has his source in ,brahman'  

7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c72 and ',that   
which the wise regard as the source of  
all beings' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #f74 ,for
 that the word 'source' denotes the     
material cause is well known from the   
use of ordinary language2 the earth1 for
 instance1 is called the yoni of trees  
and herbs4 ,in some places indeed the   
word yoni means not source1 but merely  
place2 so1 for instance1 in the mantra1 
',a yoni1 ,o ,indra1 was made for you to
 sit down upon' 7_/,ri_/k4 ,sa_/m_/h4   
,i1 #ajd1 #a74 ,but that in the passage 
quoted it means 'source' follows from a 
complementary passage1 ',as the spider  
sends forth and draws in its threads1'  
c4--,it is thus proved that ,brahman is 
the material cause of the world4--,of   
the objection1 finally1 that in ordinary
 life the activity of operative causal  
agents only1 such as potters and the    
like1 is preceded by reflection1 we     
dispose by the remark that1 as the      
matter in hand is not one which can be  
known through inferential reasoning1    

ordinary experience cannot be used to   
settle it4 ,for the knowledge of that   
matter we rather depend on ,scripture   
altogether1 and hence ,scripture only   
has to be appealed to4 ,and that        
,scripture teaches that the ,lord who   
reflects before creation is at the same 
time the material cause1 we have already
 explained4 ,the subject will1 moreover1
 be discussed more fully later on4  #bh4
 ,hereby all 7the doctrines concerning  
the origin of the world which are       
opposed to the ,vednta7 are explained1  
are explained4  ,the doctrine according 
to which the pradhna is the cause of the
 world has1 in the ,stras beginning with
 ,i1 #a1 #e1 been again and again       
brought forward and refuted4 ,the chief 
reason for the special attention given  
to that doctrine is that the            
,vednta-texts contain some passages     
which1 to people deficient in mental    
penetration1 may appear to contain      
inferential marks pointing to it4 ,the  
doctrine1 moreover1 stands somewhat near

 to the ,vednta doctrine since1 like the
 latter1 it admits the non-difference of
 cause and effect1 and it1 moreover1 has
 been accepted by some of the authors of
 the ,dharma-stras1 such as ,devala1 and
 so on4 ,for all these reasons we have  
taken special trouble to refute the     
pradhna doctrine1 without paying much   
attention to the atomic and other       
theories4 ,these latter theories1       
however1 must likewise be refuted1 as   
they also are opposed to the doctrine of
 ,brahman being the general cause1 and  
as slow-minded people might think that  
they also are referred to in some ,vedic
 passages4 ,hence the ,strakra formally 
extends1 in the above ,stra1 the        
refutation already accomplished of the  
pradhna doctrine to all similar         
doctrines which need not be demolished  
in detail after their great protagonist1
 the pradhna doctrine1 has been so      
completely disposed of4 ,they also are1 
firstly1 not founded on any scriptural  
authority2 and are1 secondly1 directly  

contradicted by various ,vedic          
passages4--,the repetition of the phrase
 'are explained' is meant to intimate   
that the end of the adhyya has been     
reached4  ,notes3  ,footnote #bbh3 ,the 
,great one is the technical ,snkhya-term
 for buddhi1 avyakta is a common        
designation of pradhna or prak_/ri_/ti1 
and purusha is the technical name of the
 soul4 ,compare1 for instance1 ,snkhya  
,kr4 #b1 #c4  ,footnote #bbi3           
,sa_/m_/kalpavikalparpamanana_/s_/akty  
haira_/n_/yagarbh buddhir manas         
tasy_/h_/ vyash_/t_/imana_/h_/su        
samash_/t_/itay vyptim ha mahn iti4     
,sa_/m_/kalpdi_/s_/ktitay tarhi         
sa_/m_/dehtmatva_/m_/ tatrha matir iti4 
,mahatvam upapdayati brahmeti4          
,bhogyajtdhratvam ha pr iti4            
,ni_/sk_/aytmakatvam ha buddhir iti4    
,krti_/s_/aktimattvam ha khytir iti4    
,niyamana_/s_/aktimatvam aha _/s_/vara  
iti4 ,loke yat prak_/ri_/sh_/t_/a_/m_/  
j_/_/nam tatosnatirekam ha praj_/_/eti4 
,tatphalam api tato nrthntaravishayam   

ity ha sa_/m_/vid iti4                  
_/,k_/itpradhnatvam ha _/k_/itir iti4   
,j_/_/atasarvrtbnusa_/m_/dhna_/s_/aktim 
ha sm_/ri_/tis _/k_/eti4 nanda ,giri4   
,footnote #bcj3 ,nanu na bja_/s_/aktir  
vidyay dahyate vastutvd tmavan nety ha  
avidyeti4 ,ke_/k_/it tu pratijvam       
avidya_/s_/aktibhedam i_/kkh_/anti tan  
na avyaktvyk_/ri_/tdi_/s_/abdys tasy    
bhedakbhvd ekatvexpi sva_/s_/akty       
vi_/k_/itrakryakaratvd ity ha avyakteti4
 ,na _/k_/a tasy jv_/s_/rayatva_/m_/    
jva_/s_/abdav_/k_/yasya kalpitatvd      
avidyrpatvt ta_/kkh_/abdalakshyasya     
brahmvyatirekd ity ha parame_/s_/vareti4
 ,myvidyayor bhedd _/s_/varasya         
my_/s_/rayatva_/m_/ jvnm                
avidy_/s_/rayateti vadanta_/m_/ pratyha 
mymayti4 ,yath myvino my paratantr      
tathaishpty artha_/h_/4 ,prattau        
tasy_/s_/ _/k_/etanpekshm ha mahsuptir  
iti4 nanda ,giri4  ,footnote #bca3      
,stradvayasya v_/ri_/ttik_/ri_/dvykhynam
 utthpayati4 ,go4 n4                    
_/k_/ryade_/s_/yamatam utthpayati4 n4   

,gi4  ,footnote #bcb3 ,the commentators 
give different explanations of the      
,sattmtra of the text4--,sattmtre       
sattvapradhnaprak_/ri_/ter              
dyapari_/n_/me4 ,go4                    
n4--,bhogpavargapurushrthasya           
maha_/kkh_/abditabuddhikryatvt          
purushpekshitaphalakra_/n_/a_/m_/ sad   
u_/k_/yate tatra bhvapratyayos'pi       
svarprtho na smnyav_/k_/ krynumeya_/m_/ 
mahan na pratyaksham iti                
mtra_/s_/abda_/h_/4 nanda ,giri4        
,footnote #bcc3 ,as the meaning of the  
word aj is going to be discussed1 and as
 the author of the ,stras and           
_/,s_/ankara seem to disagree as to its 
meaning 7see later on71 ,i prefer to    
leave the word untranslated in this     
place4--_/,s_/ankara reads--and         
explains1--in the mantra1 sarp_/h_/ 7not
 sarpm7 and bhuktabhogm1 not            
bhuktabhogym4  ,footnote #bcd3 ,here    
there seems to be a certain discrepancy 
between the views of the ,stra writer   
and _/,s_/ankara4 ,govindnanda notes    

that according to the ,bhshyak_/ri_/t aj
 means simply my--which interpretation  
is based on prakara_/n_/a--while1       
according to the ,stra-k_/ri_/t1 who    
explains aj on the ground of the        
,chndogya-passage treating of the three 
primary elements1 aj denotes the        
aggregate of those three elements       
constituting an                         
avntaraprak_/ri_/ti4--,on _/,s_/ankara's
 explanation the term aj presents no    
difficulties1 for my is aj1 i4e4 unborn1
 not produced4 ,on the explanation of   
the ,stra writer1 however1 aj cannot    
mean unborn1 since the three primary    
elements are products4 ,hence we are    
thrown back on the r_/dh_/i             
signification of aj1 according to which 
it means she-goat4 ,but how can the     
avntara-prak_/ri_/ti be called a        
she-goat8 ,to this question the next    
,stra replies4  ,footnote #bce3         
,indication 7laksha_/n_/1 which consists
 in this case in five times five being  
used instead of twenty-five7 is         

considered as an objectionable mode of  
expression1 and therefore to be assumed 
in interpretation only where a term can 
in no way be shown to have a direct     
meaning4  ,footnote #bcf3 ,that         
pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ is only one word       
appears from its having only one accent1
 viz4 the udtta on the last syllable1   
which udtta becomes anudtta according to
 the rules laid down in the ,bhshika    
,stra for the accentuation of the       
_/,s_/atapatha-brhma_/n_/a4  ,footnote  
#bcg3 ,so in the ,mdhyandina recension  
of the ,upanishad2 the ,k_/n_/va        
recension has not the clause 'the food  
of food4'  ,footnote #bch3 ,this in     
answer to the ,snkhya who objects to    
jana when applied to the prna1 c4 being 
interpreted with the help of            
laksha_/n_/2 while if referred to the   
pradhna1 c4 it may be explained to have 
a direct meaning1 on the ground of      
yaugika interpretation 7the pradhna     
being jana because it produces1 the     
mahat c4 being jana because they are    

produced74 ,the ,vedntin points out that
 the compound pa_/k_/ajan_/h_/ has its  
own r_/dh_/i-meaning1 just as           
a_/s_/vakar_/n_/a1 literally horse-ear1 
which conventionally denotes a certain  
plant4  ,footnote #bci3 ,we infer that  
udbhid is the name of a sacrifice       
because it is mentioned in connexion    
with the act of sacrificing2 we infer   
that the ypa is a wooden post because it
 is said to be cut1 and so on4          
,footnote #bdj3 ,option being possible  
only in the case of things to be        
accomplished1 i4e4 actions4  ,footnote  
#bda3 ,according to ,go4 n4 in the      
passage1 ',that made itself its ,self'  
7,,ii1 #g72 according to n4 ,giri in the
 passage1 ',he created all' 7,,ii1 #f74 
,footnote #bdb3 ,by the ,brhma_/n_/as   
being meant all those ,brhma_/n_/as who 
are not at the same time wandering      
mendicants4  ,footnote #bdc3 ,the       
comment of the ,bhmat on the ,stra runs 
as follows3 ,as the sparks issuing from 
a fire are not absolutely different from

 the fire1 because they participate in  
the nature of the fire2 and1 on the     
other hand1 are not absolutely          
non-different from the fire1 because in 
that case they could be distinguished   
neither from the fire nor from each     
other2 so the individual souls          
also--which are effects of ,brahman--are
 neither absolutely different from      
,brahman1 for that would mean that they 
are not of the nature of intelligence2  
nor absolutely non-different from       
,brahman1 because in that case they     
could not be distinguished from each    
other1 and because1 if they were        
identical with ,brahman and therefore   
omniscient1 it would be useless to give 
them any instruction4 ,hence the        
individual souls are somehow different  
from ,brahman and somehow               
non-different4--,the technical name of  
the doctrine here represented by        
_/s_/marathya is bhedbhedavda4          
,footnote #bdd3 ,bhmat3 ,the individual 
soul is absolutely different from the   

highest ,self2 it is inquinated by the  
contact with its different limiting     
adjuncts4 ,but it is spoken of1 in the  
,upanishad1 as non-different from the   
highest ,self because after having      
purified itself by means of knowledge   
and meditation it may pass out of the   
body and become one with the highest    
,self4 ,the text of the ,upanishad thus 
transfers a future state of             
non-difference to that time when        
difference actually exists4 ,compare the
 saying of the ,p_/k_/artrikas3 ',up to 
the moment of emancipation being reached
 the soul and the highest ,self are     
different4 ,but the emancipated soul is 
no longer different from the highest    
,self1 since there is no further cause  
of difference4'--,the technical name of 
the doctrine advocated by ,au_/d_/ulomi 
is satyabhedavda4  ,footnote #bde3      
,compare the note to the same mantra as 
quoted above under ,i1 #a1 #aa4         
,footnote #bdf3 ,and not the relation of
 absolute identity4  ,footnote #bdg3    

,i4e4 upon the state of emancipation and
 its absence4  ,footnote #bdh3          
,upapdita_/m_/ _/k_/eti1                
sarvasytmamtratvam iti _/s_/esha_/h_/4  
,upapdanaprakra_/m_/ s_/k_/ayati eketi4 
,sa yathrdrendhangner                   
itydinaikaprasavatvam1 yath sarvsm apm  
itydin _/k_/aikapralayatva_/m_/         
sarvasyoktam4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #bdi3  
,so according to ,go4 n4 and n4 ,gi41   
although their interpretations seem not 
to account sufficiently for the ekm of  
the text4--,k_/mk_/id evaikm iti        
jvasthnd anym ity artha_/h_/4 ,go4      
n4--,jvabhvena pratibimbdhrtiriktm ity  
artha_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #bej3    
,while release1 as often remarked1 is   
eternal1 it being in fact not different 
from the eternally unchanging ,brahman4 
,footnote #bea3 ,i4e4 that the operative
 cause and the substantial cause are    
separate things4  ,footnote #beb3 ,viz4 
the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti4     ,,second    
,,adhy,,ya4  ,,first ,p,,da4            
,,reverence ,,to ,,the ,,highest ,,self6

   #a4 ,if it be objected that 7from the
 doctrine expounded hitherto7 there     
would result the fault of there being no
 room for 7certain7 ,sm_/ri_/tis2 we do 
not admit that objection1 because 7from 
the rejection of our doctrine7 there    
would result the fault of want of room  
for other ,sm_/ri_/tis4  ,it has been   
shown in the first adhyya that the      
omniscient ,lord of all is the cause of 
the origin of this world in the same way
 as clay is the material cause of jars  
and gold of golden ornaments2 that by   
his rulership he is the cause of the    
subsistence of this world once          
originated1 just as the magician is the 
cause of the subsistence of the magical 
illusion2 and that he1 lastly1 is the   
cause of this emitted world being       
finally reabsorbed into his essence1    
just as the four classes of creatures   
are reabsorbed into the earth4 ,it has  
further been proved1 by a demonstration 
of the connected meaning of all the     
,vednta-texts1 that the ,lord is the    

,self of all of us4 ,moreover1 the      
doctrines of the pradhna1 and so on1    
being the cause of this world have been 
refuted as not being scriptural4--,the  
purport of the second adhyya1 which we  
now begin1 is to refute the objections  
7to the doctrine established hitherto7  
which might be founded on ,sm_/ri_/ti   
and ,reasoning1 and to show that the    
doctrines of the pradhna1 c4 have only  
fallacious arguments to lean upon1 and  
that the different ,vednta-texts do not 
contradict one another with regard to   
the mode of creation and similar        
topics4--,the first point is to refute  
the objections based on ,sm_/ri_/ti4    
,your doctrine 7the prvapakshin says7   
that the omniscient ,brahman only is the
 cause of this world cannot be          
maintained1 'because there results from 
it the fault of there being no room for 
7certain7 ,sm_/ri_/tis4' ,such          
,sm_/ri_/tis are the one called ,tantra 
which was composed by a _/ri_/shi and is
 accepted by authoritative persons1 and 

other ,sm_/ri_/tis based on it#bec2 for 
all of which there would be no room if  
your interpretation of the ,veda were   
the true one4 ,for they all teach that  
the non-intelligent pradhna is the      
independent cause of the world4 ,there  
is indeed room 7a raison d'tre7 for     
,sm_/ri_/tis like the ,manu-sm_/ri_/ti1 
which give information about matters    
connected with the whole body of        
religious duty1 characterised by        
injunction#bed and comprising the       
agnihotra and similar performances4     
,they tell us at what time and with what
 rites the members of the different     
castes are to be initiated2 how the     
,veda has to be studied2 in what way the
 cessation of study has to take place2  
how marriage has to be performed1 and so
 on4 ,they further lay down the manifold
 religious duties1 beneficial to man1 of
 the four castes and _/s_/ramas#bee4    
,the ,kpila ,sm_/ri_/ti1 on the other   
hand1 and similar books are not         
concerned with things to be done1 but   

were composed with exclusive reference  
to perfect knowledge as the means of    
final release4 ,if then no room were    
left for them in that connexion also1   
they would be altogether purposeless2   
and hence we must explain the           
,vednta-texts in such a manner as not to
 bring them into conflict with the      
,sm_/ri_/tis mentioned#bef4--;,but how1 
somebody may ask the prvapakshin1 can   
the eventual fault of there being left  
no room for certain ,sm_/ri_/tis be used
 as an objection against that sense of  
_/,s_/ruti which--from various reasons  
as detailed under ,i1 #a and ff4--has   
been ascertained by us to be the true   
one1 viz4 that the omniscient ,brahman  
alone is the cause of the world8--,our  
objection1 the prvapakshin replies1 will
 perhaps not appear valid to persons of 
independent thought2 but as most men    
depend in their reasonings on others1   
and are unable to ascertain by          
themselves the sense of _/,s_/ruti1 they
 naturally rely on ,sm_/ri_/tis1        

composed by celebrated authorities1 and 
try to arrive at the sense of _/,s_/ruti
 with their assistance2 while1 owing to 
their esteem for the authors of the     
,sm_/ri_/tis1 they have no trust in our 
explanations4 ,the knowledge of men like
 ,kapila ,sm_/ri_/ti declares to have   
been _/ri_/shi-like and unobstructed1   
and moreover there is the following     
_/,s_/ruti-passage1 ',it is he who1 in  
the beginning1 bears in his thoughts the
 son1 the _/ri_/shi1 kapila#beg1 whom he
 wishes to look on while he is born'    
7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,v1 #b74 ,hence their   
opinion cannot be assumed to be         
erroneous1 and as they moreover         
strengthen their position by            
argumentation1 the objection remains    
valid1 and we must therefore attempt to 
explain the ,vednta-texts in conformity 
with the ,sm_/ri_/tis4  ,this objection 
we dispose of by the remark1 ',it is not
 so because therefrom would result the  
fault of want of room for other         
,sm_/ri_/tis4'--,if you object to the   

doctrine of the ,lord being the cause of
 the world on the ground that it would  
render certain ,sm_/ri_/tis purposeless1
 you thereby render purposeless other   
,sm_/ri_/tis which declare themselves in
 favour of the said doctrine4 ,these    
latter ,sm_/ri_/ti-texts we will quote  
in what follows4 ,in one passage the    
highest ,brahman is introduced as the   
subject of discussion1 ',that which is  
subtle and not to be known2' the text   
then goes on1 ',that is the internal    
,self of the creatures1 their soul1' and
 after that remarks ',from that sprang  
the ,unevolved1 consisting of the three 
gu_/n_/as1 ,o best of ,brhma_/n_/as4'   
,and in another place it is said that   
'the ,unevolved is dissolved in the     
,person devoid of qualities1 ,o         
,brhma_/n_/a4'--,thus we read also in   
the ,pur_/n_/a1 ',hear thence this short
 statement3 ,the ancient ,nrya_/n_/a is 
all this2 he produces the creation at   
the due time1 and at the time of        
reabsorption he consumes it again4' ,and

 so in the ,bhagavadgt also 7,,vii1 #f71
 ',i am the origin and the place of     
reabsorption of the whole world4' ,and  
pastamba too says with reference to the 
highest ,self1 ',from him spring all    
bodies2 he is the primary cause1 he is  
eternal1 he is unchangeable' 7,dharma   
,stra ,i1 #h1 #bc1 #b74 ,in this way    
,sm_/ri_/ti1 in many places1 declares   
the ,lord to be the efficient as well as
 the material cause of the world4 ,as   
the prvapakshin opposes us on the ground
 of ,sm_/ri_/ti1 we reply to him on the 
ground of ,sm_/ri_/ti only2 hence the   
line of defence taken up in the ,stra4  
,now it has been shown already that the 
_/,s_/ruti-texts aim at conveying the   
doctrine that the ,lord is the universal
 cause1 and as wherever different       
,sm_/ri_/tis conflict those maintaining 
one view must be accepted1 while those  
which maintain the opposite view must be
 set aside1 those ,sm_/ri_/tis which    
follow _/,s_/ruti are to be considered  
as authoritative1 while all others are  

to be disregarded2 according to the     
,stra met with in the chapter treating  
of the means of proof 7,mm4 ,stra ,i1   
#c1 #c71 ',where there is contradiction 
7between _/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti7    
7,sm_/ri_/ti7 is to be disregarded2 in  
case of there being no 7contradiction7  
7,sm_/ri_/ti is to be recognised7 as    
there is inference 7of ,sm_/ri_/ti being
 founded on _/,s_/ruti74'--,nor can we  
assume that some persons are able to    
perceive supersensuous matters without  
_/,s_/ruti1 as there exists no efficient
 cause for such perception4 ,nor1 again1
 can it be said that such perception may
 be assumed in the case of ,kapila and  
others who possessed supernatural       
powers1 and consequently unobstructed   
power of cognition4 ,for the possession 
of supernatural powers itself depends on
 the performance of religious duty1 and 
religious duty is that which is         
characterised by injunction#beh2 hence  
the sense of injunctions 7i4e4 of the   
,veda7 which is established first must  

not be fancifully interpreted in        
reference to the dicta of men           
'established' 7i4e4 made perfect1 and   
therefore possessing supernatural       
powers7 afterwards only4 ,moreover1 even
 if those 'perfect' men were accepted as
 authorities to be appealed to1 still1  
as there are many such perfect men1 we  
should have1 in all those cases where   
the ,sm_/ri_/tis contradict each other  
in the manner described1 no other means 
of final decision than an appeal to     
_/,s_/ruti4--,as to men destitute of the
 power of independent judgment1 we are  
not justified in assuming that they will
 without any reason attach themselves to
 some particular ,sm_/ri_/ti2 for if    
men's inclinations were so altogether   
unregulated1 truth itself would1 owing  
to the multiformity of human opinion1   
become unstable4 ,we must therefore try 
to lead their judgment in the right way 
by pointing out to them the conflict of 
the ,sm_/ri_/tis1 and the distinction   
founded on some of them following       

_/,s_/ruti and others not4--,the        
scriptural passage which the prvapakshin
 has quoted as proving the eminence of  
,kapila's knowledge would not justify us
 in believing in such doctrines of      
,kapila 7i4e4 of some ,kapila7 as are   
contrary to ,scripture2 for that passage
 mentions the bare name of ,kapila      
7without specifying which ,kapila is    
meant71 and we meet in tradition with   
another ,kapila1 viz4 the one who burned
 the sons of ,sagara and had the surname
 ,vsudeva4 ,that passage1 moreover1     
serves another purpose1 7viz4 the       
establishment of the doctrine of the    
highest ,self17 and has on that account 
no force to prove what is not proved by 
any other means1 7viz4 the supereminence
 of ,kapila's knowledge47 ,on the other 
hand1 we have a _/,s_/ruti-passage which
 proclaims the excellence of ,manu#bei1 
viz4 ',whatever ,manu said is medicine' 
7,taitt4 ,sa_/m_/h4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aj1 #b74 
,manu himself1 where he glorifies the   
seeing of the one ,self in everything   

7'he who equally sees the ,self in all  
beings and all beings in the ,self1 he  
as a sacrificer to the ,self attains    
self-luminousness1' i4e4 becomes        
,brahman1 ,manu ,sm_/ri_/ti ,,xii1 #ia71
 implicitly blames the doctrine of      
,kapila4 ,for ,kapila1 by acknowledging 
a plurality of ,selfs1 does not admit   
the doctrine of there being one         
universal ,self4 ,in the ,mahabhrata    
also the question is raised whether     
there are many persons 7souls7 or one2  
thereupon the opinion of others is      
mentioned1 ',there are many persons1 ,o 
,king1 according to the ,snkhya and     
,yoga philosophers2' that opinion is    
controverted 'just as there is one place
 of origin1 7viz4 the earth17 for many  
persons1 so ,i will proclaim to you that
 universal person raised by his         
qualities2' and1 finally1 it is declared
 that there is one universal ,self1 ',he
 is the internal ,self of me1 of thee1  
and of all other embodied beings1 the   
internal witness of all1 not to be      

apprehended by any one4 ,he the         
all-headed1 all-armed1 all-footed1      
all-eyed1 all-nosed one moves through   
all beings according to his will and    
liking4' ,and ,scripture also declares  
that there is one universal ,self1      
',when to a man who understands the     
,self has become all things1 what       
sorrow1 what trouble can there be to him
 who once beheld that unity8' 7_/s_/4   
,up #g72 and other similar passages4    
,all which proves that the system of    
,kapila contradicts the ,veda1 and the  
doctrine of ,manu who follows the ,veda1
 by its hypothesis of a plurality of    
,selfs also1 not only by the assumption 
of an independent pradhna4 ,the         
authoritativeness of the ,veda with     
regard to the matters stated by it is   
independent and direct1 just as the     
light of the sun is the direct means of 
our knowledge of form and colour2 the   
authoritativeness of human dicta1 on the
 other hand1 is of an altogether        
different kind1 as it depends on an     

extraneous basis 7viz4 the ,veda71 and  
is 7not immediate but7 mediated by a    
chain of teachers and tradition4  ,hence
 the circumstance that the result 7of   
our doctrine7 is want of room for       
certain ,sm_/ri_/tis1 with regard to    
matters contradicted by the ,veda1      
furnishes no valid objection4--,an      
additional reason for this our opinion  
is supplied by the following ,stra4  #b4
 ,and on account of the non-perception  
of the others 7i4e4 the effects of the  
pradhna1 according to the ,snkhya       
system74  ,the principles different from
 the pradhna1 but to be viewed as its   
modifications which the 7,snkhya7       
,sm_/ri_/ti assumes1 as1 for instance1  
the great principle1 are perceived      
neither in the ,veda nor in ordinary    
experience4 ,now things of the nature of
 the elements and the sense organs1     
which are well known from the ,veda1 as 
well as from experience1 may be referred
 to in ,sm_/ri_/ti2 but with regard to  
things which1 like ,kapila's great      

principle1 are known neither from the   
,veda nor from experience--no more than1
 for instance1 the objects of a sixth   
sense--,sm_/ri_/ti is altogether        
impossible4 ,that some scriptural       
passages which apparently refer to such 
things as the great principle have in   
reality quite a different meaning has   
already been shown under ,i1 #d1 #a4    
,but if that part of ,sm_/ri_/ti which  
is concerned with the effects 7i4e4 the 
great principle1 and so on7 is without  
authority1 the part which refers to the 
cause 7the pradhna7 will be so likewise4
 ,this is what the ,stra means to       
say4--,we have thus established a second
 reason1 proving that the circumstance  
of there being no room left for certain 
,sm_/ri_/tis does not constitute a valid
 objection to our doctrine4--,the       
weakness of the trust in reasoning      
7apparently favouring the ,snkhya       
doctrine7 will be shown later on under  
,,ii1 #a1 #d ff4  #c4 ,thereby the ,yoga
 7,sm_/ri_/ti7 is refuted4  ,this ,stra 

extends the application of the preceding
 argumentation1 and remarks that by the 
refutation of the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti the
 ,yoga-sm_/ri_/ti also is to be         
considered as refuted2 for the latter   
also assumes1 in opposition to          
,scripture1 a pradhna as the independent
 cause of the world1 and the 'great     
principle1' c4 as its effects1 although 
neither the ,veda nor common experience 
favour these views4--,but1 if the same  
reasoning applies to the ,yoga also1 the
 latter system is already disposed of by
 the previous arguments2 of what use    
then is it formally to extend them to   
the ,yoga8 7as the ,stra does47--,we    
reply that here an additional cause of  
doubt presents itself1 the practice of  
,yoga being enjoined in the ,veda as a  
means of obtaining perfect knowledge2   
so1 for instance1 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1  
#d1 #e1 '7,the ,self7 is to be heard1 to
 be thought1 to be meditated upon#bfj4' 
,in the _/,s_/vet_/s_/vatara ,upanishad1
 moreover1 we find various injunctions  

of ,yoga-practice connected with the    
assumption of different positions of the
 body2 c42 so1 for instance1 ',holding  
his body with its three erect parts     
even1' c4 7,,ii1 #h74  ,further1 we find
 very many passages in the ,veda which  
7without expressly enjoining it7 point  
to the ,yoga1 as1 for instance1 ,ka4    
,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #aa1 ',this1 the firm    
holding back of the senses1 is what is  
called ,yoga2' ',having received this   
knowledge and the whole rule of ,yoga'  
7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #ah72 and so on4   
,and in the ,yoga-_/s_/stra itself the  
passage1 ',now then ,yoga1 the means of 
the knowledge of truth1' c4 defines the 
,yoga as a means of reaching perfect    
knowledge4 ,as thus one topic of the    
_/s_/stra at least 7viz4 the practice of
 ,yoga7 is shown to be authoritative1   
the entire ,yoga-sm_/ri_/ti will have to
 be accepted as unobjectionable1 just as
 the ,sm_/ri_/ti referring to the       
ash_/t_/aks#bfa4--,to this we reply that
 the formal extension 7to the ,yoga1 of 

the arguments primarily directed against
 the ,snkhya7 has the purpose of        
removing the additional doubt stated in 
the above lines2 for in spite of a part 
of the ,yoga-sm_/ri_/ti being           
authoritative1 the disagreement 7between
 ,sm_/ri_/ti and _/,s_/ruti7 on other   
topics remains as shown                 
above4--,although#bfb there are many    
,sm_/ri_/tis treating of the soul1 we   
have singled out for refutation the     
,snkhya and ,yoga because they are      
widely known as offering the means for  
accomplishing the highest end of man and
 have found favour with many competent  
persons4 ,moreover1 their position is   
strengthened by a ,vedic passage        
referring to them1 ',he who has known   
that cause which is to be apprehended by
 ,snkhya and ,yoga he is freed from all 
fetters' 7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ac74    
7,the claims which on the ground of this
 last passage might be set up for the   
,snkhya and ,yoga-sm_/ri_/tis in their  
entirety7 we refute by the remark that  

the highest beatitude 7the highest aim  
of man7 is not to be attained by the    
knowledge of the ,snkhya-sm_/ri_/ti     
irrespective of the ,veda1 nor by the   
road of ,yoga-practice4 ,for ,scripture 
itself declares that there is no other  
means of obtaining the highest beatitude
 but the knowledge of the unity of the  
,self which is conveyed by the ,veda1   
',over death passes only the man who    
knows him2 there is no other path to go'
 7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,and the   
,snkhya and ,yoga-systems maintain      
duality1 do not discern the unity of the
 ,self4 ,in the passage quoted 7',that  
cause which is to be apprehended by     
,snkhya and ,yoga'7 the terms ',snkhya' 
and ',yoga' denote ,vedic knowledge and 
meditation1 as we infer from            
proximity#bfc4 ,we willingly allow room 
for those portions of the two systems   
which do not contradict the ,veda4 ,in  
their description of the soul1 for      
instance1 as free from all qualities the
 ,snkhyas are in harmony with the ,veda 

which teaches that the person 7purusha7 
is essentially pure2 cp4 ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
,,iv1 #c1 #af4 ',for that person is not 
attached to anything4' ,the ,yoga again 
in giving rules for the condition of the
 wandering religious mendicant admits   
that state of retirement from the       
concerns of life which is known from    
scriptural passages such as the         
following one1 ',then the parivrjaka    
with discoloured 7yellow7 dress1 shaven1
 without any possessions1' c4 7,jbla    
,upan4 ,,iv74  ,the above remarks will  
serve as a reply to the claims of all   
argumentative ,sm_/ri_/tis4 ,if it be   
said that those ,sm_/ri_/tis also       
assist1 by argumentation and proof1 the 
cognition of truth1 we do not object to 
so much1 but we maintain all the same   
that the truth can be known from the    
,vednta-texts only2 as is stated by     
scriptural passages such as ',none who  
does not know the ,veda perceives that  
great one' 7,taitt4 ,br4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #i1
 #g72 ',i now ask thee that person      

taught in the ,upanishads' 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up1 ,,iii1 #i1 #bf72 and others4  #d4  
7,brahman can7 not 7be the cause of the 
world7 on account of the difference of  
character of that1 7viz4 the world72 and
 its being such1 7i4e4 different from   
,brahman7 7we learn7 from ,scripture4   
,the objections1 founded on ,sm_/ri_/ti1
 against the doctrine of ,brahman being 
the efficient and the material cause of 
this world have been refuted2 we now    
proceed to refute those founded on      
,reasoning4--,but 7to raise an objection
 at the outset7 how is there room for   
objections founded on ,reasoning after  
the sense of the sacred texts has once  
been settled8 ,the sacred texts are     
certainly to be considered absolutely   
authoritative with regard to ,brahman as
 well as with regard to religious duty  
7dharma74--7,to this the prvapakshin    
replies71 ,the analogy between ,brahman 
and dharma would hold good if the matter
 in hand were to be known through the   
holy texts only1 and could not be       

approached by the other means of right  
knowledge also4 ,in the case of         
religious duties1 i4e4 things to be     
done1 we indeed entirely depend on      
,scripture4 ,but now we are concerned   
with ,brahman which is an accomplished  
existing thing1 and in the case of      
accomplished things there is room for   
other means of right knowledge also1 as1
 for instance1 the case of earth and the
 other elements shows4 ,and just as in  
the case of several conflicting         
scriptural passages we explain all of   
them in such a manner as to make them   
accord with one1 so _/,s_/ruti1 if in   
conflict with other means of right      
knowledge1 has to be bent so as to      
accord with the letter4 ,moreover1      
,reasoning1 which enables us to infer   
something not actually perceived in     
consequence of its having a certain     
equality of attributes with what is     
actually perceived1 stands nearer to    
perception than _/,s_/ruti which conveys
 its sense by tradition merely4 ,and the

 knowledge of ,brahman which discards   
,nescience and effects final release    
terminates in a perception 7viz4 the    
intuition--skshtkra--of ,brahman71 and  
as such must be assumed to have a seen  
result 7not an unseen one like          
dharma7#bfd4 ,moreover1 the scriptural  
passage1 ',he is to be heard1 to be     
thought1' enjoins thought in addition to
 hearing1 and thereby shows that        
,reasoning also is to be resorted to    
with regard to ,brahman4 ,hence an      
objection founded on ,reasoning is set  
forth1 ',not so1 on account of the      
difference of nature of this            
7effect74'--,the ,vedntic opinion that  
the intelligent ,brahman is the material
 cause of this world is untenable       
because the effect would in that case be
 of an altogether different character   
from the cause4 ,for this world1 which  
the ,vedntin considers as the effect of 
,brahman1 is perceived to be            
non-intelligent and impure1 consequently
 different in character from ,brahman2  

and ,brahman again is declared by the   
sacred texts to be of a character       
different from the world1 viz4          
intelligent and pure4 ,but things of an 
altogether different character cannot   
stand to each other in the relation of  
material cause and effect4 ,such        
effects1 for instance1 as golden        
ornaments do not have earth for their   
material cause1 nor is gold the material
 cause of earthen vessels2 but effects  
of an earthy nature originate from earth
 and effects of the nature of gold from 
gold4 ,in the same manner this world1   
which is non-intelligent and comprises  
pleasure1 pain1 and dulness1 can only be
 the effect of a cause itself           
non-intelligent and made up of pleasure1
 pain1 and dulness2 but not of ,brahman 
which is of an altogether different     
character4 ,the difference in character 
of this world from ,brahman must be     
understood to be due to its impurity and
 its want of intelligence4 ,it is impure
 because being itself made up of        

pleasure1 pain1 and dulness1 it is the  
cause of delight1 grief1 despondency1   
c41 and because it comprises in itself  
abodes of various character such as     
heaven1 hell1 and so on4 ,it is devoid  
of intelligence because it is observed  
to stand to the intelligent principle in
 the relation of subserviency1 being the
 instrument of its activity4 ,for the   
relation of subserviency of one thing to
 another is not possible on the basis of
 equality2 two lamps1 for instance1     
cannot be said to be subservient to each
 other 7both being equally              
luminous74--,but1 it will be said1 an   
intelligent instrument also might be    
subservient to the enjoying soul2 just  
as an intelligent servant is subservient
 to his master4--,this analogy1 we      
reply1 does not hold good1 because in   
the case of servant and master also only
 the non-intelligent element in the     
former is subservient to the intelligent
 master4 ,for a being endowed with      
intelligence subserves another          

intelligent being only with the         
non-intelligent part belonging to it1   
viz4 its internal organ1 sense organs1  
c42 while in so far as it is intelligent
 itself it acts neither for nor against 
any other being4 ,for the ,snkhyas are  
of opinion that the intelligent beings  
7i4e4 the souls7 are incapable of either
 taking in or giving out anything#bfe1  
and are non-active4 ,hence that only    
which is devoid of intelligence can be  
an instrument4 ,nor#bff is there        
anything to show that things like pieces
 of wood and clods of earth are of an   
intelligent nature2 on the contrary1 the
 dichotomy of all things which exist    
into such as are intelligent and such as
 are non-intelligent is well            
established4 ,this world therefore      
cannot have its material cause in       
,brahman from which it is altogether    
different in character4--,here somebody 
might argue as follows4 ,scripture tells
 us that this world has originated from 
an intelligent cause2 therefore1        

starting from the observation that the  
attributes of the cause survive in the  
effect1 ,i assume this whole world to be
 intelligent4 ,the absence of           
manifestation of intelligence 7in this  
world7 is to be ascribed to the         
particular nature of the                
modification#bfg4 ,just as undoubtedly  
intelligent beings do not manifest their
 intelligence in certain states such as 
sleep1 swoon1 c41 so the intelligence of
 wood and earth also is not manifest    
7although it exists74 ,in consequence of
 this difference produced by the        
manifestation and non-manifestation of  
intelligence 7in the case of men1       
animals1 c41 on the one side1 and wood1 
stones1 c4 on the other side71 and in   
consequence of form1 colour1 and the    
like being present in the one case and  
absent in the other1 nothing prevents   
the instruments of action 7earth1 wood1 
c47 from standing to the souls in the   
relation of a subordinate to a superior 
thing1 although in reality both are     

equally of an intelligent nature4 ,and  
just as such substances as flesh1 broth1
 pap1 and the like may1 owing to their  
individual differences1 stand in the    
relation of mutual subserviency1        
although fundamentally they are all of  
the same nature1 viz4 mere modifications
 of earth1 so it will be in the case    
under discussion also1 without there    
being done any violence to the          
well-known distinction 7of beings       
intelligent and non-intelligent74--,this
 reasoning--the prvapakshin replies--if 
valid might remove to a certain extent  
that difference of character between    
,brahman and the world which is due to  
the circumstance of the one being       
intelligent and the other               
non-intelligent2 there would1 however1  
still remain that other difference which
 results from the fact that the one is  
pure and the other impure4 ,but in      
reality the argumentation of the        
objector does not even remove the       
first-named difference2 as is declared  

in the latter part of the ,stra1 ',and  
its being such we learn from            
,scripture4' ,for the assumption of the 
intellectuality of the entire           
world--which is supported neither by    
perception nor by inference1 c4--must be
 considered as resting on ,scripture    
only in so far as the latter speaks of  
the world as having originated from an  
intelligent cause2 but that scriptural  
statement itself is contradicted by     
other texts which declare the world to  
be 'of such a nature1' i4e4 of a nature 
different from that of its material     
cause4 ,for the scriptural passage1 ',it
 became that which is knowledge and that
 which is devoid of knowledge' 7,taitt4 
,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 which teaches that a    
certain class of beings is of a         
non-intelligent nature intimates thereby
 that the non-intelligent world is      
different from the intelligent          
,brahman4--,but--somebody might again   
object--the sacred texts themselves     
sometimes speak of the elements and the 

bodily organs1 which are generally      
considered to be devoid of intelligence1
 as intelligent beings4 ,the following  
passages1 for instance1 attribute       
intelligence to the elements4 ',the     
earth spoke2' ',the waters spoke'       
7_/,s_/at4 ,br4 ,,vi1 #a1 #c1 #b2 #d72  
and1 again1 ',fire thought2' ',water    
thought' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c2 #d74  
,other texts attribute intelligence to  
the bodily organs1 ',these pr_/n_/as    
when quarrelling together as to who was 
the best went to ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #g72 and1 again1 ',they  
said to ,speech3 ,do thou sing out for  
us' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #b74--,to   
this objection the prvapakshin replies  
in the following ,stra4  #e4 ,but 7there
 takes place7 denotation of the         
superintending 7deities71 on account of 
the difference and the connexion4  ,the 
word 'but' discards the doubt raised4   
,we are not entitled to base the        
assumption of the elements and the sense
 organs being of an intellectual nature 

on such passages as 'the earth spoke1'  
c4 because 'there takes place denotation
 of that which presides4' ,in the case  
of actions like speaking1 disputing1 and
 so on1 which require intelligence1 the 
scriptural passages denote not the mere 
material elements and organs1 but rather
 the intelligent divinities which       
preside over earth1 c41 on the one hand1
 and ,speech1 c41 on the other hand4    
,and why so8 ',on account of the        
difference and the connexion4' ,the     
difference is the one previously        
referred to between the enjoying souls1 
on the one hand1 and the material       
elements and organs1 on the other hand1 
which is founded on the distinction     
between intelligent and non-intelligent 
beings2 that difference would not be    
possible if all beings were intelligent4
 ,moreover1 the ,kaushtakins in their   
account of the dispute of the pr_/n_/as 
make express use of the word            
'divinities' in order to preclude the   
idea of the mere material organs being  

meant1 and in order to include the      
superintending intelligent beings4 ,they
 say1 ',the deities contending with each
 for who was the best2' and1 again1     
',all these deities having recognised   
the pre-eminence in pr_/n_/a' 7,kau4    
,up4 ,,ii1 #ad74--;,and1 secondly1      
,mantras1 ,arthavdas1 ,itihsas1         
,pur_/n_/as1 c4 all declare that        
intelligent presiding divinities are    
connected with everything4 ,moreover1   
such scriptural passages as ',agni      
having become ,speech entered into the  
mouth' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #b1 #d7 show 
that each bodily organ is connected with
 its own favouring divinity4 ,and in the
 passages supplementary to the quarrel  
of the pr_/n_/as we read in one place   
how1 for the purpose of settling their  
relative excellence1 they went to       
,prajpati1 and how they settled their   
quarrel on the ground of presence and   
absence1 each of them1 as ,prajpati had 
advised1 departing from the body for    
some time 7',they went to their father  

,prajpati and said1' c12 ,ch4 ,up4 ,v1  
#a1 #g72 and in another place it is said
 that they made an offering to pr_/n_/a 
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #ac71 c42 all 
of them proceedings which are analogous 
to those of men1 c41 and therefore      
strengthen the hypothesis that the text 
refers to the superintending deities4   
,in the case of such passages as1 ',fire
 thought1' we must assume that the      
thought spoken of is that of the highest
 deity which is connected with its      
effects as a superintending             
principle4--,from all this it follows   
that this world is different in nature  
from ,brahman1 and hence cannot have it 
for its material cause4  ,to this       
objection raised by the prvapakshin the 
next ,stra replies4  #f4 ,but it is     
seen4  ,the word 'but' discards the     
prvapaksha4  ,your assertion that this  
world cannot have originated from       
,brahman on account of the difference of
 its character is not founded on an     
absolutely true tenet4 ,for we see that 

from man1 who is acknowledged to be     
intelligent1 non-intelligent things such
 as hair and nails originate1 and that1 
on the other hand1 from avowedly        
non-intelligent matter1 such as         
cow-dung1 scorpions and similar animals 
are produced4--,but--to state an        
objection--the real cause of the        
non-intelligent hair and nails is the   
human body which is itself              
non-intelligent1 and the non-intelligent
 bodies only of scorpions are the       
effects of non-intelligent dung4--,even 
thus1 we reply1 there remains a         
difference in character 7between the    
cause1 for instance1 the dung1 and the  
effect1 for instance1 the body of the   
scorpion71 in so far as some            
non-intelligent matter 7the body7 is the
 abode of an intelligent principle 7the 
scorpion's soul71 while other           
non-intelligent matter 7the dung7 is    
not4 ,moreover1 the difference of       
nature--due to the cause passing over   
into the effect--between the bodies of  

men on the one side and hair and nails  
on the other side1 is1 on account of the
 divergence of colour1 form1 c41 very   
considerable after all4 ,the same remark
 holds good with regard to cow-dung and 
the bodies of scorpions1 c4 ,if absolute
 equality were insisted on 7in the case 
of one thing being the effect of        
another71 the relation of material cause
 and effect 7which after all requires a 
distinction of the two7 would be        
annihilated4 ,if1 again1 it be remarked 
that in the case of men and hair as well
 as in that of scorpions and cow-dung   
there is one characteristic feature1 at 
least1 which is found in the effect as  
well as in the cause1 viz4 the quality  
of being of an earthy nature2 we reply  
that in the case of ,brahman and the    
world also one characteristic feature1  
viz4 that of existence 7satt71 is found 
in ether1 c4 7which are the effects7 as 
well as in ,brahman 7which is the       
cause74--,he1 moreover1 who on the      
ground of the difference of the         

attributes tries to invalidate the      
doctrine of ,brahman being the cause of 
the world1 must assert that he          
understands by difference of attributes 
either the non-occurrence 7in the world7
 of the entire complex of the           
characteristics of ,brahman1 or the     
non-occurrence of any 7some or other7   
characteristic1 or the non-occurrence of
 the characteristic of intelligence4    
,the first assertion would lead to the  
negation of the relation of cause and   
effect in general1 which relation is    
based on the fact of there being in the 
effect something over and above the     
cause 7for if the two were absolutely   
identical they could not be             
distinguished74 ,the second assertion is
 open to the charge of running counter  
to what is well known2 for1 as we have  
already remarked1 the characteristic    
quality of existence which belongs to   
,brahman is found likewise in ether and 
so on4 ,for the third assertion the     
requisite proving instances are wanting2

 for what instances could be brought    
forward against the upholder of         
,brahman1 in order to prove the general 
assertion that whatever is devoid of    
intelligence is seen not to be an effect
 of ,brahman8 7,the upholder of ,brahman
 would simply not admit any such        
instances7 because he maintains that    
this entire complex of things has       
,brahman for its material cause4 ,and   
that all such assertions are contrary to
 ,scripture1 is clear1 as we have       
already shown it to be the purport of   
,scripture that ,brahman is the cause   
and substance of the world4 ,it has     
indeed been maintained by the           
prvapakshin that the other means of     
proof also 7and not merely sacred       
tradition7 apply to ,brahman1 on account
 of its being an accomplished entity    
7not something to be accomplished as    
religious duties are72 but such an      
assertion is entirely gratuitous4 ,for  
,brahman1 as being devoid of form and so
 on1 cannot become an object of         

perception2 and as there are in its case
 no characteristic marks 7on which      
conclusions1 c4 might be based71        
inference also and the other means of   
proof do not apply to it2 but1 like     
religious duty1 it is to be known solely
 on the ground of holy tradition4 ,thus 
,scripture also declares1 ',that        
doctrine is not to be obtained by       
argument1 but when it is declared by    
another then1 ,o dearest6 it is easy to 
understand' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #i74 ,and
 again1 ',who in truth knows it8 ,who   
could here proclaim it1 whence this     
creation sprang8' 7_/,ri_/g-v4          
,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #abi1 #f74 ,these two    
mantras show that the cause of this     
world is not to be known even by divine 
beings 7_/s_/vara7#bfh of extraordinary 
power and wisdom4  ,there are also the  
following ,sm_/ri_/ti passages to the   
same effect3 ',do not apply reasoning to
 those things which are                 
uncognisable#bfi2' ',unevolved he is    
called1 uncognisable1 unchangeable2'    

',not the legions of the gods know my   
origin1 not the great _/ri_/shis4 ,for  
,i myself am in every way the origin of 
the gods and great _/ri_/shis' 7,bha4   
,g4 ,x1 #b74--;,and if it has been      
maintained above that the scriptural    
passage enjoining thought 7on ,brahman7 
in addition to mere hearing 7of the     
sacred texts treating of ,brahman7 shows
 that reasoning also is to be allowed   
its place1 we reply that the passage    
must not deceitfully be taken as        
enjoining bare independent              
ratiocination1 but must be understood to
 represent reasoning as a subordinate   
auxiliary of intuitional knowledge4 ,by 
reasoning of the latter type we may1 for
 instance1 arrive at the following      
conclusions2 that because the state of  
dream and the waking state exclude each 
other the ,self is not connected with   
those states2 that1 as the soul in the  
state of deep sleep leaves the          
phenomenal world behind and becomes one 
with that whose ,self is pure ,being1 it

 has for its ,self pure ,being apart    
from the phenomenal world2 that as the  
world springs from ,brahman it cannot be
 separate from ,brahman1 according to   
the principle of the non-difference of  
cause and effect1 c4#bgj ,the           
fallaciousness of mere reasoning will   
moreover be demonstrated later on 7,,ii1
 #a1 #aa74--;,he#bga1 moreover1 who     
merely on the ground of the sacred      
tradition about an intelligent cause of 
the world would assume this entire world
 to be of an intellectual nature would  
find room for the other scriptural      
passage quoted above 7',he became       
knowledge and what is devoid of         
knowledge'7 which teaches a distinction 
of intellect and non-intellect2 for he  
could avail himself of the doctrine of  
intellect being sometimes manifested and
 sometimes non-manifested4 ,his         
antagonist1 on the other hand 7i4e4 the 
,snkhya71 would not be able to make     
anything of the passage1 for it         
distinctly teaches that the highest     

cause constitutes the ,self of the      
entire world4  ,if1 then1 on account of 
difference of character that which is   
intelligent cannot pass over into what  
is non-intelligent1 that also which is  
non-intelligent 7i4e4 in our case1 the  
non-intelligent pradhna of the ,snkhyas7
 cannot pass over into what is          
intelligent4--7,so much for argument's  
sake17 but apart from that1 as the      
argument resting on difference of       
character has already been refuted1 we  
must assume an intelligent cause of the 
world in agreement with ,scripture4  #g4
 ,if 7it is said that the effect is7    
non-existent 7before its origination72  
we do not allow that because it is a    
mere negation 7without an object74  ,if 
,brahman1 which is intelligent1 pure1   
and devoid of qualities such as sound1  
and so on1 is supposed to be the cause  
of an effect which is of an opposite    
nature1 i4e4 non-intelligent1 impure1   
possessing the qualities of sound1 c41  
it follows that the effect has to be    

considered as non-existing before its   
actual origination4 ,but this           
consequence cannot be acceptable to     
you--the ,vedntin--who maintain the     
doctrine of the effect existing in the  
cause already4  ,this objection of      
yours1 we reply1 is without any force1  
on account of its being a mere negation4
 ,if you negative the existence of the  
effect previous to its actual           
origination1 your negation is a mere    
negation without an object to be        
negatived4 ,the negation 7implied in    
'non-existent'7 can certainly not have  
for its object the existence of the     
effect previous to its origination1     
since the effect must be viewed as      
'existent1' through and in the ,self of 
the cause1 before its origination as    
well as after it2 for at the present    
moment also this effect does not exist  
independently1 apart from the cause2    
according to such scriptural passages   
as1 ',whosoever looks for anything      
elsewhere than in the ,self is abandoned

 by everything' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1   
#d1 #f74 ,in so far1 on the other hand1 
as the effect exists through the ,self  
of the cause1 its existence is the same 
before the actual beginning of the      
effect 7as after it74--,but ,brahman1   
which is devoid of qualities such as    
sound1 c41 is the cause of this world   
7possessing all those                   
qualities76--,true1 but the effect with 
all its qualities does not exist without
 the ,self of the cause either now or   
before the actual beginning 7of the     
effect72 hence it cannot be said that   
7according to our doctrine7 the effect  
is non-existing before its actual       
beginning4--,this point will be         
elucidated in detail in the section     
treating of the non-difference of cause 
and effect4  #h4 ,on account of such    
consequences at the time of reabsorption
 7the doctrine maintained hitherto7 is  
objectionable4  ,the prvapakshin raises 
further objections4--,if an effect which
 is distinguished by the qualities of   

grossness1 consisting of parts1 absence 
of intelligence1 limitation1 impurity1  
c41 is admitted to have ,brahman for its
 cause1 it follows that at the time of  
reabsorption 7of the world into         
,brahman71 the effect1 by entering into 
the state of non-division from its      
cause1 inquinates the latter with its   
properties4 ,as therefore--on your      
doctrine--the cause 7i4e4 ,brahman7 as  
well as the effect is1 at the time of   
reabsorption1 characterised by impurity 
and similar qualities1 the doctrine of  
the ,upanishads1 according to which an  
omniscient ,brahman is the cause of the 
world1 cannot be upheld4--,another      
objection to that doctrine is that in   
consequence of all distinctions passing 
at the time of reabsorption into the    
state of non-distinction there would be 
no special causes left at the time of a 
new beginning of the world1 and         
consequently the new world could not    
arise with all the distinctions of      
enjoying souls1 objects to be enjoyed   

and so on 7which are actually observed  
to exist74--,a third objection is that1 
if we assume the origin of a new world  
even after the annihilation of all      
works1 c4 7which are the causes of a new
 world arising7 of the enjoying souls   
which enter into the state of           
non-difference from the highest         
,brahman1 we are led to the conclusion  
that also those 7souls7 which have      
obtained final release again appear in  
the new world4--,if you finally say1    
',well1 let this world remain distinct  
from the highest ,brahman even at the   
time of reabsorption1' we reply that in 
that case a reabsorption will not take  
place at all1 and that1 moreover1 the   
effect's existing separate from the     
cause is not possible4--,for all these  
reasons the ,vednta doctrine is         
objectionable4  ,to this the next ,stra 
replies4  #i4 ,not so2 as there are     
parallel instances4  ,there is nothing  
objectionable in our system4--,the      
objection that the effect when being    

reabsorbed into its cause would         
inquinate the latter with its qualities 
does not damage our position 'because   
there are parallel instances1' i4e4     
because there are instances of effects  
not inquinating with their qualities the
 causes into which they are reabsorbed4 
,things1 for instance1 made of clay1    
such as pots1 c41 which in their state  
of separate existence are of various    
descriptions1 do not1 when they are     
reabsorbed into their original matter   
7i4e4 clay71 impart to the latter their 
individual qualities2 nor do golden     
ornaments impart their individual       
qualities to their elementary material1 
i4e4 gold1 into which they may finally  
be reabsorbed4 ,nor does the fourfold   
complex of organic beings which springs 
from earth impart its qualities to the  
latter at the time of reabsorption4 ,you
 7i4e4 the prvapakshin71 on the other   
hand1 have not any instances to quote in
 your favour4 ,for reabsorption could   
not take place at all if the effect when

 passing back into its causal substance 
continued to subsist there with all its 
individual properties4 ,and#bgb that in 
spite of the non-difference of cause and
 effect the effect has its ,self in the 
cause1 but not the cause in the effect1 
is a point which we shall render clear  
later on1 under ,,ii1 #a1 #ad4          
,moreover1 the objection that the effect
 would impart its qualities to the cause
 at the time of reabsorption is         
formulated too narrowly because1 the    
identity of cause and effect being      
admitted1 the same would take place     
during the time of the subsistence 7of  
the effect1 previous to its             
reabsorption74 ,that the identity of    
cause and effect 7of ,brahman and the   
world7 holds good indiscriminately with 
regard to all time 7not only the time of
 reabsorption71 is declared in many     
scriptural passages1 as1 for instance1  
',this everything is that ,self'        
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',the    
,self is all this' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1    

#be1 #b72 ',the immortal ,brahman is    
this before' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aa72 
',all this is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4      
,,iii1 #ad1 #a74  ,with regard to the   
case referred to in the                 
_/,s_/ruti-passages we refute the       
assertion of the cause being affected by
 the effect and its qualities by showing
 that the latter are the mere fallacious
 superimpositions of nescience1 and the 
very same argument holds good with      
reference to reabsorption also4--,we can
 quote other examples in favour of our  
doctrine4 ,as the magician is not at any
 time affected by the magical illusion  
produced by himself1 because it is      
unreal1 so the highest ,self is not     
affected by the world-illusion4 ,and as 
one dreaming person is not affected by  
the illusory visions of his dream       
because they do not accompany the waking
 state and the state of dreamless sleep2
 so the one permanent witness of the    
three states 7viz4 the highest ,self    
which is the one unchanging witness of  

the creation1 subsistence1 and          
reabsorption of the world7 is not       
touched by the mutually exclusive three 
states4 ,for that the highest ,self     
appears in those three states1 is a mere
 illusion1 not more substantial than the
 snake for which the rope is mistaken in
 the twilight4 ,with reference to this  
point teachers knowing the true         
tradition of the ,vednta have made the  
following declaration1 ',when the       
individual soul which is held in the    
bonds of slumber by the beginningless   
,my awakes1 then it knows the eternal1  
sleepless1 dreamless non-duality'       
7,gau_/d_/ap4 ,kr4 ,i1 #af74  ,so far we
 have shown that--on our doctrine--there
 is no danger of the cause being        
affected at the time of reabsorption by 
the qualities of the effect1 such as    
grossness and the like4--,with regard to
 the second objection1 viz4 that if we  
assume all distinctions to pass 7at the 
time of reabsorption7 into the state of 
non-distinction there would be no       

special reason for the origin of a new  
world affected with distinctions1 we    
likewise refer to the 'existence of     
parallel instances4' ,for the case is   
parallel to that of deep sleep and      
trance4 ,in those states also the soul  
enters into an essential condition of   
non-distinction2 nevertheless1 wrong    
knowledge being not yet finally         
overcome1 the old state of distinction  
re-establishes itself as soon as the    
soul awakes from its sleep or trance4   
,compare the scriptural passage1 ',all  
these creatures when they have become   
merged in the ,true1 know not that they 
are merged in the ,true4 ,whatever these
 creatures are here1 whether a lion1 or 
a wolf1 or a boar1 or a worm1 or a      
midge1 or a gnat1 or a mosquito1 that   
they become again' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i1 
#b2 #c7 ,for just as during the         
subsistence of the world the phenomenon 
of multifarious distinct existence1     
based on wrong knowledge1 proceeds      
unimpeded like the vision of a dream1   

although there is only one highest ,self
 devoid of all distinction2 so1 we      
conclude1 there remains1 even after     
reabsorption1 the power of distinction  
7potential distinction7 founded on wrong
 knowledge4--,herewith the objection    
that--according to our doctrine--even   
the finally released souls would be born
 again is already disposed of4 ,they    
will not be born again because in their 
case wrong knowledge has been entirely  
discarded by perfect knowledge4--,the   
last alternative finally 7which the     
prvapakshin had represented as open to  
the ,vedntin71 viz4 that even at the    
time of reabsorption the world should   
remain distinct from ,brahman1 precludes
 itself because it is not admitted by   
the ,vedntins themselves4--,hence the   
system founded on the ,upanishads is in 
every way unobjectionable4  #aj4 ,and   
because the objections 7raised by the   
,snkhya against the ,vednta doctrine7   
apply to his view also4  ,the doctrine  
of our opponent is liable to the very   

same objections which he urges against  
us1 viz4 in the following manner4--,the 
objection that this world cannot have   
sprung from ,brahman on account of its  
difference of character applies no less 
to the doctrine of the pradhna being the
 cause of the world2 for that doctrine  
also assumes that from a pradhna devoid 
of sound and other qualities a world is 
produced which possesses those very     
qualities4 ,the beginning of an effect  
different in character being thus       
admitted1 the ,snkhya is equally driven 
to the doctrine that before the actual  
beginning the effect was non-existent4  
,and1 moreover1 it being admitted 7by   
the ,snkhya also7 that at the time of   
reabsorption the effect passes back into
 the state of non-distinction from the  
cause1 the case of the ,snkhya here also
 is the same as ours4--,and1 further1 if
 7as the ,snkhya also must admit7 at the
 time of reabsorption the differences of
 all the special effects are obliterated
 and pass into a state of general       

non-distinction1 the special fixed      
conditions1 which previous to           
reabsorption were the causes of the     
different worldly existence of each     
soul1 can1 at the time of a new         
creation1 no longer be determined1 there
 being no cause for them2 and if you    
assume them to be determined without a  
cause1 you are driven to the admission  
that even the released souls have to    
re-enter a state of bondage1 there being
 equal absence of a cause 7in the case  
of the released and the non-released    
souls74 ,and if you try to avoid this   
conclusion by assuming that at the time 
of reabsorption some individual         
differences pass into the state of      
non-distinction1 others not1 we reply   
that in that case the latter could not  
be considered as effects of the         
pradhna#bgc4--;,it thus appears that all
 those difficulties 7raised by the      
,snkhya7 apply to both views1 and cannot
 therefore be urged against either only4
 ,but as either of the two doctrines    

must necessarily be accepted1 we are    
strengthened--by the outcome of the     
above discussion--in the opinion that   
the alleged difficulties are no real    
difficulties#bgd4  #aa4 ,if it be said  
that1 in consequence of the             
ill-foundedness of reasoning1 we must   
frame our conclusions otherwise2 7we    
reply that7 thus also there would result
 non-release4  ,in matters to be known  
from ,scripture mere reasoning is not to
 be relied on for the following reason  
also4 ,as the thoughts of man are       
altogether unfettered1 reasoning which  
disregards the holy texts and rests on  
individual opinion only has no proper   
foundation4 ,we see how arguments1 which
 some clever men had excogitated with   
great pains1 are shown1 by people still 
more ingenious1 to be fallacious1 and   
how the arguments of the latter again   
are refuted in their turn by other men2 
so that1 on account of the diversity of 
men's opinions1 it is impossible to     
accept mere reasoning as having a sure  

foundation4 ,nor can we get over this   
difficulty by accepting as well-founded 
the reasoning of some person of         
recognised mental eminence1 may he now  
be ,kapila or anybody else2 since we    
observe that even men of the most       
undoubted mental eminence1 such as      
,kapila1 ,ka_/n_/da1 and other founders 
of philosophical schools1 have          
contradicted one another4  ,but 7our    
adversary may here be supposed to say71 
we will fashion our reasoning otherwise1
 i4e4 in such a manner as not to lay it 
open to the charge of having no proper  
foundation4 ,you cannot1 after all1     
maintain that no reasoning whatever is  
well-founded2 for you yourself can found
 your assertion that reasoning has no   
foundation on reasoning only2 your      
assumption being that because some      
arguments are seen to be devoid of      
foundation other arguments as belonging 
to the same class are likewise devoid of
 foundation4 ,moreover1 if all reasoning
 were unfounded1 the whole course of    

practical human life would have to come 
to an end4 ,for we see that men act1    
with a view to obtaining pleasure and   
avoiding pain in the future time1 on the
 assumption that the past1 the present1 
and the future are uniform4--,further1  
in the case of passages of ,scripture   
7apparently7 contradicting each other1  
the ascertainment of the real sense1    
which depends on a preliminary          
refutation of the apparent sense1 can be
 effected only by an accurate definition
 of the meaning of sentences1 and that  
involves a process of reasoning4 ,thus  
,manu also expresses himself3           
',perception1 inference1 and the        
_/s_/stra according to the various      
traditions1 this triad is to be known   
well by one desiring clearness in regard
 to right4--,he who applies reasoning   
not contradicted by the ,veda to the    
,veda and the 7,sm_/ri_/ti7 doctrine of 
law1 he1 and no other1 knows the law'   
7,manu ,sm_/ri_/ti ,,xii1 #aje1 #ajf74  
,and that 'want of foundation'1 to which

 you object1 really constitutes the     
beauty of reasoning1 because it enables 
us to arrive at unobjectionable         
arguments by means of the previous      
refutation of objectionable             
arguments#bge4 7,no fear that because   
the prvapaksha is ill-founded the       
siddhnta should be ill-founded too27 for
 there is no valid reason to maintain   
that a man must be stupid because his   
elder brother was stupid4--,for all     
these reasons the want of foundation    
cannot be used as an argument against   
reasoning4  ,against this argumentation 
we remark that thus also there results  
'want of release4' ,for although with   
regard to some things reasoning is      
observed to be well founded1 with regard
 to the matter in hand there will result
 'want of release1' viz4 of the         
reasoning from this very fault of       
ill-foundedness4 ,the true nature of the
 cause of the world on which final      
emancipation depends cannot1 on account 
of its excessive abstruseness1 even be  

thought of without the help of the holy 
texts2 for1 as already remarked1 it     
cannot become the object of perception1 
because it does not possess qualities   
such as form and the like1 and as it is 
devoid of characteristic signs1 it does 
not lend itself to inference and the    
other means of right knowledge4--,or    
else 7if we adopt another explanation of
 the word 'avimoksha'7 all those who    
teach the final release of the soul are 
agreed that it results from perfect     
knowledge4 ,perfect knowledge has the   
characteristic mark of uniformity1      
because it depends on accomplished      
actually existing things2 for whatever  
thing is permanently of one and the same
 nature is acknowledged to be a true or 
real thing1 and knowledge conversant    
about such is called perfect knowledge2 
as1 for instance1 the knowledge embodied
 in the proposition1 'fire is hot4'     
,now1 it is clear that in the case of   
perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of  
men's opinions is impossible4 ,but that 

cognitions founded on reasoning do      
conflict is generally known2 for we     
continually observe that what one       
logician endeavours to establish as     
perfect knowledge is demolished by      
another1 who1 in his turn1 is treated   
alike by a third4 ,how therefore can    
knowledge1 which is founded on          
reasoning1 and whose object is not      
something permanently uniform1 be       
perfect knowledge8--,nor can it be said 
that he who maintains the pradhna to be 
the cause of the world 7i4e4 the        
,snkhya7 is the best of all reasoners1  
and accepted as such by all             
philosophers2 which would enable us to  
accept his opinion as perfect           
knowledge4--,nor can we collect at a    
given moment and on a given spot all the
 logicians of the past1 present1 and    
future time1 so as to settle 7by their  
agreement7 that their opinion regarding 
some uniform object is to be considered 
perfect knowledge4 ,the ,veda1 on the   
other hand1 which is eternal and the    

source of knowledge1 may be allowed to  
have for its object firmly established  
things1 and hence the perfection of that
 knowledge which is founded on the ,veda
 cannot be denied by any of the         
logicians of the past1 present1 or      
future4 ,we have thus established the   
perfection of this our knowledge which  
reposes on the ,upanishads1 and as apart
 from it perfect knowledge is           
impossible1 its disregard would lead to 
'absence of final release' of the       
transmigrating souls4 ,our final        
position therefore is1 that on the      
ground of ,scripture and of reasoning   
subordinate to ,scripture1 the          
intelligent ,brahman is to be considered
 the cause and substance of the world4  
#ab4 ,thereby those 7theories7 also     
which are not accepted by competent     
persons are explained4  ,hitherto we    
have refuted those objections against   
the ,vednta-texts which1 based on       
reasoning1 take their stand on the      
doctrine of the pradhna being the cause 

of the world2 7which doctrine deserves  
to be refuted first71 because it stands 
near to our ,vedic system1 is supported 
by somewhat weighty arguments1 and has1 
to a certain extent1 been adopted by    
some authorities who follow the         
,veda4--,but now some dull-witted       
persons might think that another        
objection founded on reasoning might be 
raised against the ,vednta1 viz4 on the 
ground of the atomic doctrine4 ,the     
,strakra1 therefore1 extends to the     
latter objection the refutation of the  
former1 considering that by the conquest
 of the most dangerous adversary the    
conquest of the minor enemies is already
 virtually accomplished4 ,other         
doctrines1 as1 for instance1 the atomic 
doctrine of which no part has been      
accepted by either ,manu or ,vysa or    
other authorities1 are to be considered 
as 'explained1' i4e4 refuted by the same
 reasons which enabled us to dispose of 
the pradhna doctrine4 ,as the reasons on
 which the refutation hinges are the    

same1 there is no room for further      
doubt4 ,such common arguments are the   
impotence of reasoning to fathom the    
depth of the transcendental cause of the
 world1 the ill-foundedness of mere     
,reasoning1 the impossibility of final  
release1 even in case of the conclusions
 being shaped 'otherwise' 7see the      
preceding ,stra71 the conflict of       
,scripture and ,reasoning1 and so on4   
#ac4 ,if it be said that from the       
circumstance of 7the objects of         
enjoyment7 passing over into the enjoyer
 7and vice vers7 there would result     
non-distinction 7of the two72 we reply  
that 7such distinction7 may exist       
7nevertheless71 as ordinary experience  
shows4  ,another objection1 based on    
reasoning1 is raised against the        
doctrine of ,brahman being the cause of 
the world4--,although ,scripture is     
authoritative with regard to its own    
special subject-matter 7as1 for         
instance1 the causality of ,brahman71   
still it may have to be taken in a      

secondary sense in those cases where the
 subject-matter is taken out of its     
grasp by other means of right knowledge2
 just as mantras and arthavdas have     
occasionally to be explained in a       
secondary sense 7when the primary1      
literal sense is rendered impossible by 
other means of right knowledge#bgf74    
,analogously reasoning is to be         
considered invalid outside its          
legitimate sphere2 so1 for instance1 in 
the case of religious duty and its      
opposite#bgg4--;,hence ,scripture cannot
 be acknowledged to refute what is      
settled by other means of right         
knowledge4 ,and if you ask1 ',where does
 ,scripture oppose itself to what is    
thus established8' we give you the      
following instance4 ,the distinction of 
enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is    
well known from ordinary experience1 the
 enjoyers being intelligent1 embodied   
souls1 while sound and the like are the 
objects of enjoyment4 ,devadatta1 for   
instance1 is an enjoyer1 the dish 7which

 he eats7 an object of enjoyment4 ,the  
distinction of the two would be reduced 
to non-existence if the enjoyer passed  
over into the object of enjoyment1 and  
vice vers4 ,now this passing over of one
 thing into another would actually      
result from the doctrine of the world   
being non-different from ,brahman4 ,but 
the sublation of a well-established     
distinction is objectionable1 not only  
with regard to the present time when    
that distinction is observed to exist1  
but also with regard to the past and the
 future1 for which it is inferred4 ,the 
doctrine of ,brahman's causality must   
therefore be abandoned1 as it would lead
 to the sublation of the                
well-established distinction of enjoyers
 and objects of enjoyment4  ,to the     
preceding objection we reply1 ',it may  
exist as in ordinary experience4' ,even 
on our philosophic view the distinction 
may exist1 as ordinary experience       
furnishes us with analogous instances4  
,we see1 for instance1 that waves1 foam1

 bubbles1 and other modifications of the
 sea1 although they really are not      
different from the sea-water1 exist1    
sometimes in the state of mutual        
separation1 sometimes in the state of   
conjunction1 c4 ,from the fact of their 
being non-different from the sea-water1 
it does not follow that they pass over  
into each other2 and1 again1 although   
they do not pass over into each other1  
still they are not different from the   
sea4 ,so it is in the case under        
discussion also4 ,the enjoyers and the  
objects of enjoyment do not pass over   
into each other1 and yet they are not   
different from the highest ,brahman4    
,and although the enjoyer is not really 
an effect of ,brahman1 since the        
unmodified creator himself1 in so far as
 he enters into the effect1 is called   
the enjoyer 7according to the passage1  
',having created he entered into it1'   
,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 still after     
,brahman has entered into its effects it
 passes into a state of distinction1 in 

consequence of the effect acting as a   
limiting adjunct2 just as the universal 
ether is divided by its contact with    
jars and other limiting adjuncts4 ,the  
conclusion is1 that the distinction of  
enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is    
possible1 although both are             
non-different from ,brahman1 their      
highest cause1 as the analogous instance
 of the sea and its waves demonstrates4 
#ad4 ,the non-difference of them 7i4e4  
of cause and effect7 results from such  
terms as 'origin' and the like4         
,the#bgh refutation contained in the    
preceding ,stra was set forth on the    
condition of the practical distinction  
of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment    
being acknowledged4 ,in reality1        
however1 that distinction does not exist
 because there is understood to be      
non-difference 7identity7 of cause and  
effect4 ,the effect is this manifold    
world consisting of ether and so on2 the
 cause is the highest ,brahman4 ,of the 
effect it is understood that in reality 

it is non-different from the cause1 i4e4
 has no existence apart from the        
cause4--,how so8--',on account of the   
scriptural word origin and others4' ,the
 word 'origin' is used in connexion with
 a simile1 in a passage undertaking to  
show how through the knowledge of one   
thing everthing is known2 viz4 ,ch4 ,up4
 ,,vi1 #a1 #d1 ',as1 my dear1 by one    
clod of clay all that is made of clay is
 known1 the modification 7i4e4 the      
effect2 the thing made of clay7 being a 
name merely which has its origin in     
speech1 while the truth is that it is   
clay merely2 thus1' c4--,the meaning of 
this passage is that1 if there is known 
a lump of clay which really and truly is
 nothing but clay#bgi1 there are known  
thereby likewise all things made of     
clay1 such as jars1 dishes1 pails1 and  
so on1 all of which agree in having clay
 for their true nature4 ,for these      
modifications or effects are names only1
 exist through or originate from speech 
only1 while in reality there exists no  

such thing as a modification4 ,in so far
 as they are names 7individual effects  
distinguished by names7 they are untrue2
 in so far as they are clay they are    
true4--,this parallel instance is given 
with reference to ,brahman2 applying the
 phrase 'having its origin in speech' to
 the case illustrated by the instance   
quoted we understand that the entire    
body of effects has no existence apart  
from ,brahman4--,later on again the     
text1 after having declared that fire1  
water1 and earth are the effects of     
,brahman1 maintains that the effects of 
these three elements have no existence  
apart from them1 ',thus has vanished the
 specific nature of burning fire1 the   
modification being a mere name which has
 its origin in speech1 while only the   
three colours are what is true' 7,ch4   
,up4 ,,vi1 #d1 #a74--,other sacred texts
 also whose purport it is to intimate   
the unity of the ,self are to be quoted 
here1 in accordance with the 'and       
others' of the ,stra4 ,such texts are1  

',in that all this has its ,self2 it is 
the ,true1 it is the ,self1 thou art    
that' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',this  
everything1 all is that ,self'          
7_/,bri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',brahman
 alone is all this' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1
 #aa72 ',the ,self is all this' 7,ch4   
,up4 ,,vii1 #be1 #b72 ',there is in it  
no diversity' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1     
#be74--,on any other assumption it would
 not be possible to maintain that by the
 knowledge of one thing everything      
becomes known 7as the text quoted above 
declares74 ,we therefore must adopt the 
following view4 ,in the same way as     
those parts of ethereal space which are 
limited by jars and waterpots are not   
really different from the universal     
ethereal space1 and as the water of a   
mirage is not really different from the 
surface of the salty steppe--for the    
nature of that water is that it is seen 
in one moment and has vanished in the   
next1 and moreover1 it is not to be     
perceived by its own nature 7i4e4 apart 

from the surface of the desert#bhj7--2  
so this manifold world with its objects 
of enjoyment1 enjoyers and so on has no 
existence apart from ,brahman4--,but--it
 might be objected--,brahman has in     
itself elements of manifoldness4 ,as the
 tree has many branches1 so ,brahman    
possesses many powers and energies      
dependent on those powers4 ,unity and   
manifoldness are therefore both true4   
,thus1 a tree considered in itself is   
one1 but it is manifold if viewed as    
having branches2 so the sea in itself is
 one1 but manifold as having waves and  
foam2 so the clay in itself is one1 but 
manifold if viewed with regard to the   
jars and dishes made of it4 ,on this    
assumption the process of final release 
resulting from right knowledge may be   
established in connexion with the       
element of unity 7in ,brahman71 while   
the two processes of common worldly     
activity and of activity according to   
the ,veda--which depend on the          
karmak_/nd_/a--may be established in    

connexion with the element of           
manifoldness4 ,and with this view the   
parallel instances of clay c4 agree very
 well4  ,this theory1 we reply1 is      
untenable because in the instance       
7quoted in the ,upanishad7 the phrase   
'as clay they are true' asserts the     
cause only to be true while the phrase  
'having its origin in speech' declares  
the unreality of all effects4 ,and with 
reference to the matter illustrated by  
the instance given 7viz4 the highest    
cause1 ,brahman7 we read1 ',in that all 
this has its ,self2' and1 again1 ',that 
is true2' whereby it is asserted that   
only the one highest cause is true4 ,the
 following passage again1 ',that is the 
,self2 thou art that1 ,o                
_/,s_/vetaketu6' teaches that the       
embodied soul 7the individual soul7 also
 is ,brahman4 7,and we must note that7  
the passage distinctly teaches that the 
fact of the embodied soul having its    
,self in ,brahman is self-established1  
not to be accomplished by endeavour4    

,this doctrine of the individual soul   
having its ,self in ,brahman1 if once   
accepted as the doctrine of the ,veda1  
does away with the independent existence
 of the individual soul1 just as the    
idea of the rope does away with the idea
 of the snake 7for which the rope had   
been mistaken74 ,and if the doctrine of 
the independent existence of the        
individual soul has to be set aside1    
then the opinion of the entire          
phenomenal world--which is based on the 
individual soul--having an independent  
existence is likewise to be set aside4  
,but only for the establishment of the  
latter an element of manifoldness would 
have to be assumed in ,brahman1 in      
addition to the element of              
unity4--,scriptural passages also 7such 
as1 ',when the ,self only is all this1  
how should he see another8' ,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ac7 declare that for him
 who sees that everything has its ,self 
in ,brahman the whole phenomenal world  
with its actions1 agents1 and results of

 actions is non-existent4 ,nor can it be
 said that this non-existence of the    
phenomenal world is declared 7by        
,scripture7 to be limited to certain    
states2 for the passage ',thou art that'
 shows that the general fact of ,brahman
 being the ,self of all is not limited  
by any particular state4 ,moreover1     
,scripture1 showing by the instance of  
the thief 7,ch4 ,,vi1 #af7 that the     
false-minded is bound while the         
true-minded is released1 declares       
thereby that unity is the one true      
existence while manifoldness is evolved 
out of wrong knowledge4 ,for if both    
were true how could the man who         
acquiesces in the reality of this       
phenomenal world be called              
false-minded#bha8 ,another scriptural   
passage 7'from death to death goes he   
who perceives therein any diversity1'   
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai7 declares  
the same1 by blaming those who perceive 
any distinction4--,moreover1 on the     
doctrine1 which we are at present       

impugning1 release cannot result from   
knowledge1 because the doctrine does not
 acknowledge that some kind of wrong    
knowledge1 to be removed by perfect     
knowledge1 is the cause of the          
phenomenal world4 ,for how can the      
cognition of unity remove the cognition 
of manifoldness if both are true8       
,other objections are started4--,if we  
acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute   
unity1 the ordinary means of right      
knowledge1 perception1 c41 become       
invalid because the absence of          
manifoldness deprives them of their     
objects2 just as the idea of a man      
becomes invalid after the right idea of 
the post 7which at first had been       
mistaken for a man7 has presented       
itself4 ,moreover1 all the texts        
embodying injunctions and prohibitions  
will lose their purport if the          
distinction on which their validity     
depends does not really exist4 ,and     
further1 the entire body of doctrine    
which refers to final release will      

collapse1 if the distinction of teacher 
and pupil on which it depends is not    
real4 ,and if the doctrine of release is
 untrue1 how can we maintain the truth  
of the absolute unity of the ,self1     
which forms an item of that doctrine8   
,these objections1 we reply1 do not     
damage our position because the entire  
complex of phenomenal existence is      
considered as true as long as the       
knowledge of ,brahman being the ,self of
 all has not arisen2 just as the        
phantoms of a dream are considered to be
 true until the sleeper wakes4 ,for as  
long as a person has not reached the    
true knowledge of the unity of the      
,self1 so long it does not enter his    
mind that the world of effects with its 
means and objects of right knowledge and
 its results of actions is untrue2 he   
rather1 in consequence of his ignorance1
 looks on mere effects 7such as body1   
offspring1 wealth1 c47 as forming part  
of and belonging to his ,self1 forgetful
 of ,brahman being in reality the ,self 

of all4 ,hence1 as long as true         
knowledge does not present itself1 there
 is no reason why the ordinary course of
 secular and religious activity should  
not hold on undisturbed4 ,the case is   
analogous to that of a dreaming man who 
in his dream sees manifold things1 and1 
up to the moment of waking1 is convinced
 that his ideas are produced by real    
perception without suspecting the       
perception to be a merely apparent      
one4--,but how 7to restate an objection 
raised above7 can the ,vednta-texts if  
untrue convey information about the true
 being of ,brahman8 ,we certainly do not
 observe that a man bitten by a         
rope-snake 7i4e4 a snake falsely        
imagined in a rope7 dies1 nor is the    
water appearing in a mirage used for    
drinking or bathing#bhb4--,this         
objection1 we reply1 is without force   
7because as a matter of fact we do see  
real effects to result from unreal      
causes71 for we observe that death      
sometimes takes place from imaginary    

venom1 7when a man imagines himself to  
have been bitten by a venomous snake17  
and effects 7of what is perceived in a  
dream7 such as the bite of a snake or   
bathing in a river take place with      
regard to a dreaming person4--,but1 it  
will be said1 these effects themselves  
are unreal6--,these effects themselves1 
we reply1 are unreal indeed2 but not so 
the consciousness which the dreaming    
person has of them4 ,this consciousness 
is a real result2 for it is not sublated
 by the waking consciousness4 ,the man  
who has risen from sleep does indeed    
consider the effects perceived by him in
 his dream such as being bitten by a    
snake1 bathing in a river1 c4 to be     
unreal1 but he does not on that account 
consider the consciousness he had of    
them to be unreal likewise4--7,we remark
 in passing that7 by this fact of the   
consciousness of the dreaming person not
 being sublated 7by the waking          
consciousness7 the doctrine of the body 
being our true ,self is to be considered

 as refuted#bhc4--,scripture also 7in   
the passage1 ',if a man who is engaged  
in some sacrifice undertaken for some   
special wish sees in his dream a woman1 
he is to infer therefrom success in his 
work'7 declares that by the unreal      
phantom of a dream a real result such as
 prosperity may be obtained4 ,and1      
again1 another scriptural passage1 after
 having declared that from the          
observation of certain unfavourable     
omens a man is to conclude that he will 
not live long1 continues 'if somebody   
sees in his dream a black man with black
 teeth and that man kills him1'         
intimating thereby that by the unreal   
dream-phantom a real fact1 viz4 death1  
is notified4--,it is1 moreover1 known   
from the experience of persons who      
carefully observe positive and negative 
instances that such and such dreams are 
auspicious omens1 others the reverse4   
,and 7to quote another example that     
something true can result from or be    
known through something untrue7 we see  

that the knowledge of the real sounds   
,a4 c4 is reached by means of the unreal
 written letters4 ,moreover1 the reasons
 which establish the unity of the ,self 
are altogether final1 so that           
subsequently to them nothing more is    
required for full satisfaction#bhd4 ,an 
injunction as1 for instance1 ',he is to 
sacrifice' at once renders us desirous  
of knowing what is to be effected1 and  
by what means and in what manner it is  
to be effected2 but passages such as1   
',thou art that1' ',i am ,brahman1'     
leave nothing to be desired because the 
state of consciousness produced by them 
has for its object the unity of the     
universal ,self4 ,for as long as        
something else remains a desire is      
possible2 but there is nothing else     
which could be desired in addition to   
the absolute unity of ,brahman4 ,nor can
 it be maintained that such states of   
consciousness do not actually arise2 for
 scriptural passages such as1 ',he      
understood what he said' 7,ch4 ,up4     

,,vii1 #ah1 #b71 declare them to occur1 
and certain means are enjoined to bring 
them about1 such as the hearing 7of the 
,veda from a teacher7 and the recital of
 the sacred texts4 ,nor1 again1 can such
 consciousness be objected to on the    
ground either of uselessness or of      
erroneousness1 because1 firstly1 it is  
seen to have for its result the         
cessation of ignorance1 and because1    
secondly1 there is no other kind of     
knowledge by which it could be sublated4
 ,and that before the knowledge of the  
unity of the ,self has been reached the 
whole real-unreal course of ordinary    
life1 worldly as well as religious1 goes
 on unimpeded1 we have already          
explained4 ,when1 however1 final        
authority having intimated the unity of 
the ,self1 the entire course of the     
world which was founded on the previous 
distinction is sublated1 then there is  
no longer any opportunity for assuming a
 ,brahman comprising in itself various  
elements4  ,but--it may be said--7that  

would not be a mere assumption1 but7    
,scripture itself1 by quoting the       
parallel instances of clay and so on1   
declares itself in favour of a ,brahman 
capable of modification2 for we know    
from experience that clay and similar   
things do undergo modifications4--,this 
objection--we reply--is without force1  
because a number of scriptural passages1
 by denying all modification of         
,brahman1 teach it to be absolutely     
changeless 7k_/t_/astha74 ,such passages
 are1 ',this great unborn ,self2        
undecaying1 undying1 immortal1 fearless1
 is indeed ,brahman' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4    
,,iv1 #d1 #be72 ',that ,self is to be   
described by ,no1 no' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #i1 #bf72 ',it is neither coarse 
nor fine' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1    
#h74 ,for to the one ,brahman the two   
qualities of being subject to           
modification and of being free from it  
cannot both be ascribed4 ,and if you    
say1 ',why should they not be both      
predicated of ,brahman 7the former      

during the time of the subsistence of   
the world1 the latter during the period 
of reabsorption7 just as rest and motion
 may be predicated 7of one body at      
different times78' we remark that the   
qualification1 'absolutely changeless'  
7k_/t_/astha71 precludes this4 ,for the 
changeless ,brahman cannot be the       
substratum of varying attributes4 ,and  
that1 on account of the negation of all 
attributes1 ,brahman really is eternal  
and changeless has already been         
demonstrated4--,moreover1 while the     
cognition of the unity of ,brahman is   
the instrument of final release1 there  
is nothing to show that any independent 
result is connected with the view of    
,brahman1 by undergoing a modification1 
passing over into the form of this      
world4 ,scripture expressly declares    
that the knowledge of the changeless    
,brahman being the universal ,self leads
 to a result2 for in the passage which  
begins1 ',that ,self is to be described 
by ,no1 no1' we read later on1 ',o      

,janaka1 you have indeed reached        
fearlessness' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b1 
#d74 ,we have then#bhe to accept the    
following conclusion that1 in the       
sections treating of ,brahman1 an       
independent result belongs only to the  
knowledge of ,brahman as devoid of all  
attributes and distinctions1 and that   
hence whatever is stated as having no   
special fruit of its own--as1 for       
instance1 the passages about ,brahman   
modifying itself into the form of this  
world--is merely to be applied as a     
means for the cognition of the absolute 
,brahman1 but does not bring about an   
independent result2 according to the    
principle that whatever has no result of
 its own1 but is mentioned in connexion 
with something else which has such a    
result1 is subordinate to the           
latter#bhf4 ,for to maintain that the   
result of the knowledge of ,brahman     
undergoing modifications would be that  
the ,self 7of him who knows that7 would 
undergo corresponding modifications#bhg 

would be inappropriate1 as the state of 
filial release 7which the soul obtains  
through the knowledge of ,brahman7 is   
eternally unchanging4  ,but1 it is      
objected1 he who maintains the nature of
 ,brahman to be changeless thereby      
contradicts the fundamental tenet       
according to which the ,lord is the     
cause of the world1 since the doctrine  
of absolute unity leaves no room for the
 distinction of a ,ruler and something  
ruled4--,this objection we ward off by  
remarking that omniscience1 c4 7i4e4    
those qualities which belong to ,brahman
 only in so far as it is related to a   
world7 depend on the evolution of the   
germinal principles called name and     
form1 whose essence is ,nescience4 ,the 
fundamental tenet which we maintain 7in 
accordance with such scriptural passages
 as1 ',from that ,self sprang ether1'   
c42 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a7 is that the  
creation1 sustentation1 and reabsorption
 of the world proceed from an           
omniscient1 omnipotent ,lord1 not from a

 non-intelligent pradhna or any other   
principle4 ,that tenet we have stated in
 ,i1 #a1 #d1 and here we do not teach   
anything contrary to it4--,but how1 the 
question may be asked1 can you make this
 last assertion while all the while you 
maintain the absolute unity and         
non-duality of the ,self8--,listen how4 
,belonging to the ,self1 as it were1 of 
the omniscient ,lord1 there are name and
 form1 the figments of ,nescience1 not  
to be defined either as being 7i4e4     
,brahman71 nor as different from it#bhh1
 the germs of the entire expanse of the 
phenomenal world1 called in _/,s_/rut   
and ,sm_/ri_/ti the illusion 7my71 power
 7_/s_/akt71 or nature 7prak_/ri_/ti7 of
 the omniscient ,lord4 ,different from  
them is the omniscient ,lord himself1 as
 we learn from scriptural passages such 
as the following1 ',he who is called    
ether is the revealer of all forms and  
names2 that within which these forms and
 names are contained is ,brahman' 7,ch4 
,up4 ,,viii1 #ad1 #a72 ',let me evolve  

names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1   
#b72 ',he1 the wise one1 who having     
divided all forms and given all names1  
sits speaking 7with those names7'       
7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #g72 ',he who   
makes the one seed manifold' 7_/,s_/ve4 
,up4 ,,vi1 l#b74--,thus the ,lord       
depends 7as ,lord7 upon the limiting    
adjuncts of name and form1 the products 
of ,nescience2 just as the universal    
ether depends 7as limited ether1 such as
 the ether of a jar1 c47 upon the       
limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars1 
pots1 c4 ,he 7the ,lord7 stands in the  
realm of the phenomenal in the relation 
of a ruler to the so-called jvas        
7individual souls7 or cognitional ,selfs
 7vij_/_/ntman71 which indeed are one   
with his own ,self--just as the portions
 of ether enclosed in jars and the like 
are one with the universal ether--but   
are limited by aggregates of instruments
 of action 7i4e4 bodies7 produced from  
name and form1 the presentations of     
,nescience4 ,hence the ,lord's being a  

,lord1 his omniscience1 his omnipotence1
 c4 all depend on the limitation due to 
the adjuncts whose ,self is ,nescience2 
while in reality none of these qualities
 belong to the ,self whose true nature  
is cleared1 by right knowledge1 from all
 adjuncts whatever4 ,thus ,scripture    
also says1 ',where one sees nothing     
else1 hears nothing else1 understands   
nothing else1 that is the ,infinite'    
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bd1 #a72 ',but when  
the ,self only has become all this1 how 
should he see another8' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 
,,ii1 #d1 #ac47 ,in this manner the     
,vednta-texts declare that for him who  
has reached the state of truth and      
reality the whole apparent world does   
not exist4 ,the ,bhagavadgt also 7',the 
,lord is not the cause of actions1 or of
 the capacity of performing actions1 or 
of the connexion of action and fruit2   
all that proceeds according to its own  
nature4 ,the ,lord receives no one's sin
 or merit4 ,knowledge is enveloped by   
,ignorance2 hence all creatures are     

deluded2' ,bha4 ,g4 ,v1 #ad2 #ae7       
declares that in reality the relation of
 ,ruler and ruled does not exist4 ,that1
 on the other hand1 all those           
distinctions are valid1 as far as the   
phenomenal world is concerned1          
,scripture as well as the ,bhagavadgt   
states2 compare ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1
 #bb1 ',he is the ,lord of all1 the king
 of all things1 the protector of all    
things2 he is a bank and boundary1 so   
that these worlds may not be            
confounded2' and ,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #fa1
 ',the ,lord1 ,o ,arjuna1 is seated in  
the region of the heart of all beings1  
turning round all beings1 7as though7   
mounted on a machine1 by his delusion4' 
,the ,strakra also asserts the          
non-difference of cause and effect only 
with regard to the state of ,reality2   
while he had1 in the preceding ,stra1   
where he looked to the phenomenal world1
 compared ,brahman to the ocean1 c41    
that comparison resting on the          
assumption of the world of effects not  

yet having been refuted 7i4e4 seen to be
 unreal74--,the view of ,brahman as     
undergoing modifications will1 moreover1
 be of use in the devout meditations on 
the qualified 7sagu_/n_/a7 ,brahman4    
#ae4 ,and because only on the existence 
7of the cause7 7the effect7 is observed4
  ,for the following reason also the    
effect is non-different from the cause1 
because only when the cause exists the  
effect is observed to exist1 not when it
 does not exist4 ,for instance1 only    
when the clay exists the jar is observed
 to exist1 and the cloth only when the  
threads exist4 ,that it is not a general
 rule that when one thing exists another
 is also observed to exist1 appears1 for
 instance1 from the fact1 that a horse  
which is other 7different7 from a cow is
 not observed to exist only when a cow  
exists4 ,nor is the jar observed to     
exist only when the potter exists2 for  
in that case non-difference does not    
exist1 although the relation between the
 two is that of an operative cause and  

its effect#bhi4--;,but--it may be       
objected--even in the case of things    
other 7i4e4 non-identical7 we find that 
the observation of one thing regularly  
depends on the existence of another2    
smoke1 for instance1 is observed only   
when fire exists4--,we reply that this  
is untrue1 because sometimes smoke is   
observed even after the fire has been   
extinguished2 as1 for instance1 in the  
case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in 
jars4--,well1 then--the objector will   
say--let us add to smoke a certain      
qualification enabling us to say that   
smoke of such and such a kind#bij does  
not exist unless fire exists4--,even    
thus1 we reply1 your objection is not   
valid1 because we declare that the      
reason for assuming the non-difference  
of cause and effect is the fact of the  
internal organ 7buddhi7 being affected  
7impressed7 by cause and effect         
jointly#bia4 ,and that does not take    
place in the case of fire and           
smoke4--,or else we have to read 7in the

 ,stra7 'bhvt1' and to translate1 'and  
on account of the existence or          
observation4' ,the non-difference of    
cause and effect results not only from  
,scripture but also from the existence  
of perception4 ,for the non-difference  
of the two is perceived1 for instance1  
in an aggregate of threads1 where we do 
not perceive a thing called 'cloth1' in 
addition to the threads1 but merely     
threads running lengthways and          
crossways4 ,so again1 in the threads we 
perceive finer threads 7the aggregate of
 which is identical with the grosser    
threads71 in them again finer threads1  
and so on4 ,on the ground of this our   
perception we conclude that the finest  
parts which we can perceive are         
ultimately identical with their causes1 
viz4 red1 white1 and black 7the colours 
of fire1 water1 and earth1 according to 
,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #d72 those1 again1 with 
air1 the latter with ether1 and ether   
with ,brahman1 which is one and without 
a second4 ,that all means of proof lead 

back to ,brahman 7as the ultimate cause 
of the world2 not to pradhna1 c471 we   
have already explained4  #af4 ,and on   
account of that which is posterior 7i4e4
 the effect7 being that which is4  ,for 
the following reason also the effect is 
to be considered as non-different 7from 
the cause74 ,that which is posterior in 
time1 i4e4 the effect1 is declared by   
,scripture to have1 previous to its     
actual beginning1 its ,being in the     
cause1 by the ,self of the cause merely4
 ,for in passages like1 ',in the        
beginning1 my dear1 this was that only  
which is' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c72 and1
 ',verily1 in the beginning this was    
,self1 one only' 7,ait4 ,ar4 ,,ii1 #d1  
#a1 #a71 the effect which is denoted by 
the word 'this' appears in grammatical  
co-ordination with 7the word denoting7  
the cause 7from which it appears that   
both inhere in the same substratum74 ,a 
thing1 on the other hand1 which does not
 exist in another thing by the ,self of 
the latter is not produced from that    

other thing2 for instance1 oil is not   
produced from sand4 ,hence as there is  
non-difference before the production 7of
 the effect71 we understand that the    
effect even after having been produced  
continues to be non-different from the  
cause4 ,as the cause1 i4e4 ,brahman1 is 
in all time neither more nor less than  
that which is1 so the effect also1 viz4 
the world1 is in all time only that     
which is4 ,but that which is is one     
only2 therefore the effect is           
non-different from the cause4  #ag4 ,if 
it be said that on account of being     
denoted as that which is not 7the effect
 does7 not 7exist before it is actually 
produced72 7we reply7 not so1 7because  
the term 'that which is not' denotes7   
another quality 7merely72 7as appears7  
from the complementary sentence4  ,but1 
an objection will be raised1 in some    
places ,scripture speaks of the effect  
before its production as that which is  
not2 so1 for instance1 ',in the         
beginning this was that only which is   

not' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai1 #a72 and    
',non-existent#bib indeed this was in   
the beginning' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 
,hence ,being 7sattvam7 cannot be       
ascribed to the effect before its       
production4  ,this we deny4 ,for by the 
,non-existence of the effect previous to
 its production is not meant absolute   
,non-existence1 but only a different    
quality or state1 viz4 the state of name
 and form being unevolved1 which state  
is different from the state of name and 
form being evolved4 ,with reference to  
the latter state the effect is called1  
previous to its production1 non-existent
 although then also it existed identical
 with its cause4 ,we conclude this from 
the complementary passage1 according to 
the rule that the sense of a passage    
whose earlier part is of doubtful       
meaning is determined by its            
complementary part4 ,with reference to  
the passage4 ',in the beginning this was
 non-existent only1' we remark that what
 is there denoted by the word           

',non-existing' is--in the complementary
 passage1 ',that became                 
existent'--referred to by the word      
'that1' and qualified as ',existent4'   
,the word 'was' would1 moreover1 not    
apply to the 7absolutely7 ,non-existing1
 which cannot be conceived as connected 
with prior or posterior time4--,hence   
with reference to the other passage     
also1 ',non-existing indeed1' c41 the   
complementary part1 ',that made itself  
its ,self1' shows1 by the qualification 
which it contains1 that absolute        
,non-existence is not meant4--,it       
follows from all this that the          
designation of ',non-existence' applied 
to the effect before its production has 
reference to a different state of being 
merely4 ,and as those things which are  
distinguished by name and form are in   
ordinary language called 'existent1' the
 term 'non-existent' is figuratively    
applied to them to denote the state in  
which they were previously to their     
differentiation4  #ah4 ,from reasoning  

and from another ,vedic passage4  ,that 
the effect exists before its origination
 and is non-different from the cause1   
follows from reasoning as well as from a
 further scriptural passage4  ,we at    
first set forth the                     
argumentation4--,ordinary experience    
teaches us that those who wish to       
produce certain effects1 such as curds1 
or earthen jars1 or golden ornaments1   
employ for their purpose certain        
determined causal substances such as    
milk1 clay1 and gold2 those who wish to 
produce sour milk do not employ clay1   
nor do those who intend to make jars    
employ milk and so on4 ,but1 according  
to that doctrine which teaches that the 
effect is non-existent 7before its      
actual production71 all this should be  
possible4 ,for if before their actual   
origination all effects are equally     
non-existent in any causal substance1   
why then should curds be produced from  
milk only and not from clay also1 and   
jars from clay only and not from milk as

 well8--,let us then maintain1 the      
asatkryavdin rejoins1 that there is     
indeed an equal non-existence of any    
effect in any cause1 but that at the    
same time each causal substance has a   
certain capacity reaching beyond itself 
7ati_/s_/aya7 for some particular effect
 only and not for other effects2 that1  
for instance1 milk only1 and not clay1  
has a certain capacity for curds2 and   
clay only1 and not milk1 an analogous   
capacity for jars4--,what1 we ask in    
return1 do you understand by that       
'ati_/s_/aya8' ,if you understand by it 
the antecedent condition of the effect  
7before its actual origination71 you    
abandon your doctrine that the effect   
does not exist in the cause1 and prove  
our doctrine according to which it does 
so exist4 ,if1 on the other hand1 you   
understand by the ati_/s_/aya a certain 
power of the cause assumed to the end of
 accounting for the fact that only one  
determined effect springs from the      
cause1 you must admit that the power can

 determine the particular effect only if
 it neither is other 7than cause and    
effect7 nor non-existent2 for if it were
 either1 it would not be different from 
anything else which is either           
non-existent or other than cause and    
effect1 7and how then should it alone be
 able to produce the particular effect87
 ,hence it follows that that power is   
identical with the ,self of the cause1  
and that the effect is identical with   
the ,self of that power4--,moreover1 as 
the ideas of cause and effect on the one
 hand and of substance and qualities on 
the other hand are not separate ones1   
as1 for instance1 the ideas of a horse  
and a buffalo1 it follows that the      
identity of the cause and the effect as 
well as of the substance and its        
qualities has to be admitted4 ,let it   
then be assumed1 the opponent rejoins1  
that the cause and the effect1 although 
really different1 are not apprehended as
 such1 because they are connected by the
 so-called samavya connexion#bic4--;,if1

 we reply1 you assume the samavya       
connexion between cause and effect1 you 
have either to admit that the samavya   
itself is joined by a certain connexion 
to the two terms which are connected by 
samavya1 and then that connexion will   
again require a new connexion 7joining  
it to the two terms which it binds      
together71 and you will thus be         
compelled to postulate an infinite      
series of connexions2 or else you will  
have to maintain that the samavya is not
 joined by any connexion to the terms   
which it binds together1 and from that  
will result the dissolution of the bond 
which connects the two terms of the     
samavya relation#bid4--,well then1 the  
opponent rejoins1 let us assume that the
 samavya connexion as itself being a    
connexion may be connected with the     
terms which it joins without the help of
 any further connexion4--,then1 we      
reply1 conjunction 7sa_/m_/yoga7 also   
must be connected with the two terms    
which it joins without the help of the  

samavya connexion2 for conjunction also 
is a kind of connexion#bie4--,moreover1 
as substances1 qualities1 and so on are 
apprehended as standing in the relation 
of identity1 the assumption of the      
samavya relation has really no purport4 
,in what manner again do you--who       
maintain that the cause and the effect  
are joined by the samavya               
relation--assume a substance consisting 
of parts which is an effect to abide in 
its causes1 i4e4 in the material parts  
of which it consists8 ,does it abide in 
all the parts taken together or in each 
particular part8--,if you say that it   
abides in all parts together1 it follows
 that the whole as such cannot be       
perceived1 as it is impossible that all 
the parts should be in contact with the 
organs of perception4 7,and let it not  
be objected that the whole may be       
apprehended through some of the parts   
only71 for manyness which abides in all 
its substrates together 7i4e4 in all the
 many things71 is not apprehended so    

long as only some of those substrates   
are apprehended4--,let it then be       
assumed that the whole abides in all the
 parts by the mediation of intervening  
aggregates of parts#bif4--;,in that     
case1 we reply1 we should have to assume
 other parts in addition to the primary 
originative parts of the whole1 in order
 that by means of those other parts the 
whole could abide in the primary parts  
in the manner indicated by you4 ,for we 
see 7that one thing which abides in     
another abides there by means of parts  
different from those of that other      
thing71 that the sword1 for instance1   
pervades the sheath by means of parts   
different from the parts of the sheath4 
,but an assumption of that kind would   
lead us into a regressus in infinitum1  
because in order to explain how the     
whole abides in certain given parts we  
should always have to assume further    
parts#big4--,well1 then1 let us maintain
 the second alternative1 viz4 that the  
whole abides in each particular         

part4--,that also cannot be admitted2   
for if the whole is present in one part 
it cannot be present in other parts     
also2 not any more than ,devadatta can  
be present in _/,s_/rughna and in       
,p_/t_/aliputra on one and the same day4
 ,if the whole were present in more than
 one part1 several wholes would result1 
comparable to ,devadatta and            
,yaj_/_/adatta1 who1 as being two       
different persons1 may live one of them 
at _/,s_/rughna and the other at        
,p_/t_/aliputra4--,if the opponent      
should rejoin that the whole may be     
fully present in each part1 just as the 
generic character of the cow is fully   
present in each individual cow2 we point
 out that the generic attributes of the 
cow are visibly perceived in each       
individual cow1 but that the whole is   
not thus perceived in each particular   
part4 ,if the whole were fully present  
in each part1 the consequence would be  
that the whole would produce its effects
 indifferently with any of its parts2 a 

cow1 for instance1 would give milk from 
her horns or her tail4 ,but such things 
are not seen to take place4  ,we proceed
 to consider some further arguments     
opposed to the doctrine that the effect 
does not exist in the cause4--,that     
doctrine involves the conclusion that   
the actual origination of an effect is  
without an agent and thus devoid of     
substantial being4 ,for origination is  
an action1 and as such requires an      
agent#bih1 just as the action of walking
 does4 ,to speak of an action without an
 agent would be a contradiction4 ,but if
 you deny the pre-existence of the      
effect in the cause1 it would have to be
 assumed that whenever the origination  
of a jar1 for instance1 is spoken of the
 agent is not the jar 7which before its 
origination did not exist7 but something
 else1 and again that when the          
origination of the two halves of the jar
 is spoken of the agent is not the two  
halves but something else4 ,from this it
 would follow that the sentence1 'the   

jar is originated' means as much as 'the
 potter and the other 7operative7 causes
 are originated#bii4' ,but as a matter  
of fact the former sentence is never    
understood to mean the latter2 and it   
is1 moreover1 known that at the time    
when the jar originates1 the potter1 c4 
are already in existence4--,let us then 
say1 the opponent resumes1 that         
origination is the connexion of the     
effect with the existence of its cause  
and its obtaining existence as a        
,self4--,how1 we ask in reply1 can      
something which has not yet obtained    
existence enter into connexion with     
something else8 ,a connexion is possible
 of two existing things only1 not of one
 existing and one non-existing thing or 
of two non-existing things4 ,to         
something non-existing which on that    
account is indefinable1 it is moreover  
not possible to assign a limit as the   
opponent does when maintaining that the 
effect is non-existing before its       
origination2 for experience teaches us  

that existing things only such as fields
 and houses have limits1 but not        
non-existing things4 ,if somebody should
 use1 for instance1 a phrase such as the
 following one1 ',the son of a barren   
woman was king previously to the        
coronation of ,pr_/n_/avarman' the      
declaration of a limit in time implied  
in that phrase does not in reality      
determine that the son of the barren    
woman1 i4e4 a mere non-entity1 either   
was or is or will be king4 ,if the son  
of a barren woman could become an       
existing thing subsequently to the      
activity of some causal agent1 in that  
case it would be possible also that the 
non-existing effect should be something 
existing1 subsequently to the activity  
of some causal agent4 ,but we know that 
the one thing can take place no more    
than the other thing2 the non-existing  
effect and the son of the barren woman  
are both equally non-entities and can   
never be4--,but1 the asatkryavdin here  
objects1 from your doctrine there       

follows the result that the activity of 
causal agents is altogether purposeless4
 ,for if the effect were lying already  
fully accomplished in the cause and were
 non-different from it1 nobody would    
endeavour to bring it about1 no more    
than anybody endeavours to bring about  
the cause which is already fully        
accomplished previously to all          
endeavour4 ,but as a matter of fact     
causal agents do endeavour to bring     
about effects1 and it is in order not to
 have to condemn their efforts as       
altogether useless that we assume the   
non-existence of the effect previously  
to its origination4--,your objection is 
refuted1 we reply1 by the consideration 
that the endeavour of the causal agent  
may be looked upon as having a purpose  
in so far as it arranges the causal     
substance in the form of the effect4    
,that1 however1 even the form of the    
effect 7is not something previously     
non-existing1 but7 belongs to the ,self 
of the cause already because what is    

devoid of ,selfhood cannot be begun at  
all1 we have already shown above4--,nor 
does a substance become another         
substance merely by appearing under a   
different aspect4 ,devadatta may at one 
time be seen with his arms and legs     
closely drawn up to his body1 and       
another time with his arms and legs     
stretched out1 and yet he remains the   
same substantial being1 for he is       
recognised as such4 ,thus the persons   
also by whom we are surrounded1 such as 
fathers1 mothers1 brothers1 c41 remain  
the same1 although we see them in       
continually changing states and         
attitudes2 for they are always          
recognised as fathers1 mothers1         
brothers1 and so on4 ,if our opponent   
objects to this last illustrative       
example on the ground that fathers1     
mothers1 and so on remain the same      
substantial beings1 because the         
different states in which they appear   
are not separated from each other by    
birth or death1 while the effect1 for   

instance a jar1 appears only after the  
cause1 for instance the clay1 has       
undergone destruction as it were 7so    
that the effect may be looked upon as   
something altogether different from the 
cause72 we rebut this objection by      
remarking that causal substances also   
such as milk1 for instance1 are         
perceived to exist even after they have 
entered into the condition of effects   
such as curds and the like 7so that we  
have no right to say that the cause     
undergoes destruction74 ,and even in    
those cases where the continued         
existence of the cause is not perceived1
 as1 for instance1 in the case of seeds 
of the fig-tree from which there spring 
sprouts and trees1 the term 'birth'     
7when applied to the sprout7 only means 
that the causal substance1 viz4 the     
seed1 becomes visible by becoming a     
sprout through the continual accretion  
of similar particles of matter2 and the 
term 'death' only means that1 through   
the secession of those particles1 the   

cause again passes beyond the sphere of 
visibility4 ,nor can it be said that    
from such separation by birth and death 
as described just now it follows that   
the non-existing becomes existing1 and  
the existing non-existing2 for if that  
were so1 it would also follow that the  
unborn child in the mother's womb and   
the new-born babe stretched out on the  
bed are altogether different beings4    
,it would further follow that a man is  
not the same person in childhood1       
manhood1 and old age1 and that terms    
such as father and the like are         
illegitimately used4--,the preceding    
arguments may also be used to refute the
 7,bauddha doctrine7 of all existence   
being momentary only#cjj4  ,the doctrine
 that the effect is non-existent        
previously to its actual origination1   
moreover1 leads to the conclusion that  
the activity of the causal agent has no 
object2 for what does not exist cannot  
possibly be an object2 not any more than
 the ether can be cleft by swords and   

other weapons for striking or cutting4  
,the object can certainly not be the    
inherent cause2 for that would lead to  
the erroneous conclusion that from the  
activity of the causal agent1 which has 
for its object the inherent cause1 there
 results something else 7viz4 the       
effect74 ,and if 7in order to preclude  
this erroneous conclusion7 the opponent 
should say that the effect is 7not      
something different from the cause1 but7
 a certain relative power 7ati_/s_/aya7 
of the inherent cause2 he thereby would 
simply concede our doctrine1 according  
to which the effect exists in the cause 
already4  ,we maintain1 therefore1 as   
our final conclusion1 that milk and     
other substances are called effects when
 they are in the state of curds and so  
on1 and that it is impossible1 even     
within hundreds of years1 ever to bring 
about an effect which is different from 
its cause4 ,the fundamental cause of all
 appears in the form of this and that   
effect1 up to the last effect of all1   

just as an actor appears in various     
robes and costumes1 and thereby becomes 
the basis for all the current notions   
and terms concerning the phenomenal     
world4  ,the conclusion here            
established1 on the ground of reasoning1
 viz4 that the effect exists already    
before its origination1 and is          
non-different from its cause1 results   
also from a different scriptural        
passage4 ,as under the preceding ,stra a
 ,vedic passage was instanced which     
speaks of the non-existing1 the         
different passage referred to in the    
present ,stra is the one 7,ch4 ,up4     
,,vi1 #b1 #a7 which refers to that which
 is4 ,that passage begins1 ',being only 
was this in the beginning1 one without a
 second1' refers1 thereupon1 to the     
doctrine of the ,non-existent being the 
cause of the world 7',others say1       
,non-being was this in the beginning'71 
raises an objection against that        
doctrine 7',how could that which is be  
born of that which is not8'71 and1      

finally1 reaffirms the view first set   
forth1 ',only ,being was this in the    
beginning4' ,the circumstance that in   
this passage the effect1 which is       
denoted by the word 'this1' is by       
,scripture1 with reference to the time  
previous to its origination1 coordinated
 with the cause denoted by the term     
',being1' proves that the effect exists 
in--and is non-different from--the      
cause4 ,if it were before its           
origination non-existing and after it   
inhered in its cause by samavya1 it     
would be something different from the   
cause1 and that would virtually imply an
 abandonment of the promise made in the 
passage1 ',that instruction by which we 
hear what is not heard1' c4 7,,vi1 #a1  
#c74 ,the latter assertion is ratified1 
on the other hand1 through the          
comprehension that the effect exists    
in--and is not different from-the cause4
  #ai4 ,and like a piece of cloth4  ,as 
of a folded piece of cloth we do not    
know clearly whether it is a piece of   

cloth or some other thing1 while on its 
being unfolded it becomes manifest that 
the folded thing was a piece of cloth2  
and as1 so long as it is folded1 we     
perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth
 but not of what definite length and    
width it is1 while on its being unfolded
 we know these particulars1 and at the  
same time that the cloth is not         
different from the folded object2 in the
 same way an effect1 such as a piece of 
cloth1 is non-manifest as long as it    
exists in its causes1 i4e4 the threads1 
c4 merely1 while it becomes manifest and
 is clearly apprehended in consequence  
of the operations of shuttle1 loom1     
weaver1 and so on4--,applying this      
instance of the piece of cloth1 first   
folded and then unfolded1 to the general
 case of cause and effect1 we conclude  
that the latter is non-different from   
the former4  #bj4 ,and as in the case of
 the different vital airs4  ,it is a    
matter of observation that when the     
operations of the different kinds of    

vital air--such as pr_/n_/a the         
ascending vital air1 apna the descending
 vital air1 c4--are suspended1 in       
consequence of the breath being held so 
that they exist in their causes merely1 
the only effect which continues to be   
accomplished is life1 while all other   
effects1 such as the bending and        
stretching of the limbs and so on1 are  
stopped4 ,when1 thereupon1 the vital    
airs again begin to act1 those other    
effects also are brought about1 in      
addition to mere life4--,nor must the   
vital airs1 on account of their being   
divided into classes1 be considered as  
something else than vital air2 for wind 
7air7 constitutes their common          
character4 ,thus 7i4e4 in the manner    
illustrated by the instance of the vital
 airs7 the non-difference of the effect 
from the cause is to be conceived4--,as1
 therefore1 the whole world is an effect
 of ,brahman and non-different from it1 
the promise held out in the scriptural  
passage that ',what is not heard is     

heard1 what is not perceived is         
perceived1 what is not known is known'  
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #c7 is             
fulfilled#cja4  #ba4 ,on account of the 
other 7i4e4 the individual soul7 being  
designated 7as non-different from       
,brahman7 there would attach 7to        
,brahman7 various faults1 as1 for       
instance1 not doing what is beneficial4 
,another objection is raised against the
 doctrine of an intelligent cause of the
 world4--,if that doctrine is accepted1 
certain faults1 as1 for instance1 doing 
what is not beneficial1 will attach 7to 
the intelligent cause1 i4e4 ,brahman71  
'on account of the other being          
designated4' ,for ,scripture declares   
the other1 i4e4 the embodied soul1 to be
 one with ,brahman1 as is shown by the  
passage1 ',that is the ,self2 that art  
thou1 ,o _/,s_/vetaketu6' 7,ch4 ,up4    
,,vi1 #h1 #g47--,or else 7if we         
interpret 'the other' of the ,stra in a 
different way7 ,scripture declares the  
other1 i4e4 ,brahman1 to be the ,self of

 the embodied soul4 ,for the passage1   
',having created that he entered into   
it1' declares the creator1 i4e4 the     
unmodified ,brahman1 to constitute the  
,self of the embodied soul1 in          
consequence of his entering into his    
products4 ,the following passage also1  
',entering 7into them7 with this living 
,self ,i will evolve names and forms'   
7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b71 in which the  
highest divinity designates the living  
7soul7 by the word ',self1' shows that  
the embodied ,self is not different from
 ,brahman4 ,therefore the creative power
 of ,brahman belongs to the embodied    
,self also1 and the latter1 being thus  
an independent agent1 might be expected 
to produce only what is beneficial to   
itself1 and not things of a contrary    
nature1 such as birth1 death1 old age1  
disease1 and whatever may be the other  
meshes of the net of suffering4 ,for we 
know that no free person will build a   
prison for himself1 and take up his     
abode in it4 ,nor would a being1 itself 

absolutely stainless1 look on this      
altogether unclean body as forming part 
of its ,self4 ,it would1 moreover1 free 
itself1 according to its liking1 of the 
consequences of those of its former     
actions which result in pain1 and would 
enjoy the consequences of those actions 
only which are rewarded by pleasure4    
,further1 it would remember that it had 
created this manifold world2 for every  
person who has produced some clearly    
appearing effect remembers that he has  
been the cause of it4 ,and as the       
magician easily retracts1 whenever he   
likes1 the magical illusion which he had
 emitted1 so the embodied soul also     
would be able to reabsorb this world    
into itself4 ,the fact is1 however1 that
 the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its  
own body even4 ,as we therefore see that
 'what would be beneficial is not done1'
 the hypothesis of the world having     
proceeded from an intelligent cause is  
unacceptable4  #bb4 ,but the separate   
7,brahman1 i4e4 the ,brahman separate   

from the individual souls7 7is the      
creator72 7the existence of which       
separate ,brahman we learn7 from the    
declaration of difference4  ,the word   
'but' discards the prvapaksha4--,we     
rather declare that that omniscient1    
omnipotent ,brahman1 whose essence is   
eternal pure cognition and freedom1 and 
which is additional to1 i4e4 different  
from the embodied ,self1 is the creative
 principle of the world4 ,the faults    
specified above1 such as doing what is  
not beneficial1 and the like1 do not    
attach to that ,brahman2 for as eternal 
freedom is its characteristic nature1   
there is nothing either beneficial to be
 done by it or non-beneficial to be     
avoided by it4 ,nor is there any        
impediment to its knowledge and power2  
for it is omniscient and omnipotent4    
,the embodied ,self1 on the other hand1 
is of a different nature1 and to it the 
mentioned faults adhere4 ,but then we do
 not declare it to be the creator of the
 world1 on account of 'the declaration  

of difference4' ,for scriptural passages
 7such as1 ',verily1 the ,self is to be 
seen1 to be heard1 to be perceived1 to  
be marked1' ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e2
 ',the ,self we must search out1 we must
 try to understand1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1  
#g1 #a2 ',then he becomes united with   
the ,true1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a2     
',this embodied ,self mounted by the    
intelligent ,self1' ,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1
 #c1 #ce7 declare differences founded on
 the relations of agent1 object1 and so 
on1 and thereby show ,brahman to be     
different from the individual           
soul4--,and if it be objected that there
 are other passages declaratory of      
non-difference 7for instance1 ',that art
 thou'71 and that difference and        
non-difference cannot co-exist because  
contradictory1 we reply that the        
possibility of the co-existence of the  
two is shown by the parallel instance of
 the universal ether and the ether      
limited by a jar4--,moreover1 as soon   
as1 in consequence of the declaration of

 non-difference contained in such       
passages as 'that art thou1' the        
consciousness of non-difference arises  
in us1 the transmigratory state of the  
individual soul and the creative quality
 of ,brahman vanish at once1 the whole  
phenomenon of plurality1 which springs  
from wrong knowledge1 being sublated by 
perfect knowledge1 and what becomes then
 of the creation and the faults of not  
doing what is beneficial1 and the like8 
,for that this entire apparent world1 in
 which good and evil actions are done1  
c41 is a mere illusion1 owing to the    
non-discrimination of 7the ,self's7     
limiting adjuncts1 viz4 a body1 and so  
on1 which spring from name and form the 
presentations of ,nescience1 and does in
 reality not exist at all1 we have      
explained more than once4 ,the illusion 
is analogous to the mistaken notion we  
entertain as to the dying1 being born1  
being hurt1 c4 of ourselves 7our ,selfs2
 while in reality the body only dies1 is
 born1 c474 ,and with regard to the     

state in which the appearance of        
plurality is not yet sublated1 it       
follows from passages declaratory of    
such difference 7as1 for instance1      
',that we must search for1' c47 that    
,brahman is superior to the individual  
soul2 whereby the possibility of faults 
adhering to it is excluded4  #bc4 ,and  
because the case is analogous to that of
 stones1 c4 7the objections raised7     
cannot be established4  ,as among       
minerals1 which are all mere            
modifications of earth1 nevertheless    
great variety is observed1 some being   
precious gems1 such as diamonds1 lapis  
lazuli1 c41 others1 such as crystals and
 the like1 being of medium value1 and   
others again stones only fit to be flung
 at dogs or crows2 and as from seeds    
which are placed in one and the same    
ground various plants are seen to       
spring1 such as sandalwood and          
cucumbers1 which show the greatest      
difference in their leaves1 blossoms1   
fruits1 fragrancy1 juice1 c42 and as one

 and the same food produces various     
effects1 such as blood and hair2 so the 
one ,brahman also may contain in itself 
the distinction of the individual ,selfs
 and the highest ,self1 and may produce 
various effects4 ,hence the objections  
imagined by others 7against the doctrine
 of ,brahman being the cause of the     
world7 cannot be                        
maintained4--,further#cjb arguments are 
furnished by the fact of all effect     
having1 as ,scripture declares1 their   
origin in speech only1 and by the       
analogous instance of the variety of    
dream phantoms 7while the dreaming      
person remains one74  #bd4 ,if you      
object on the ground of the observation 
of the employment 7of instruments72 7we 
say71 ,no2 because as milk 7transforms  
itself1 so ,brahman does74  ,your       
assertion that the intelligent ,brahman 
alone1 without a second1 is the cause of
 the world cannot be maintained1 on     
account of the observation of employment
 7of instruments74 ,for in ordinary life

 we see that potters1 weavers1 and other
 handicraftsmen produce jars1 cloth1 and
 the like1 after having put themselves  
in possession of the means thereto by   
providing themselves with various       
implements1 such as clay1 staffs1       
wheels1 string1 c42 ,brahman1 on the    
other hand1 you conceive to be without  
any help2 how then can it act as a      
creator without providing itself with   
instruments to work with8 ,we therefore 
maintain that ,brahman is not the cause 
of the world4  ,this objection is not   
valid1 because causation is possible in 
consequence of a peculiar constitution  
of the causal substance1 as in the case 
of milk4 ,just as milk and water turn   
into curds and ice respectively1 without
 any extraneous means1 so it is in the  
case of ,brahman also4 ,and if you      
object to this analogy for the reason   
that milk1 in order to turn into curds1 
does require an extraneous agent1 viz4  
heat1 we reply that milk by itself also 
undergoes a certain amount of definite  

change1 and that its turning is merely  
accelerated by heat4 ,if milk did not   
possess that capability of itself1 heat 
could not compel it to turn2 for we see 
that air or ether1 for instance1 is not 
compelled by the action of heat to turn 
into sour milk4 ,by the co-operation of 
auxiliary means the milk's capability of
 turning into sour milk is merely       
completed4 ,the absolutely complete     
power of ,brahman1 on the other hand1   
does not require to be supplemented by  
any extraneous help4 ,thus ,scripture   
also declares1 ',there is no effect and 
no instrument known of him1 no one is   
seen like unto him or better2 his high  
power is revealed as manifold1 as       
inherent1 acting as force and knowledge'
 7_/,s_/ve4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h74 ,therefore  
,brahman1 although one only1 is1 owing  
to its manifold powers1 able to         
transform itself into manifold effects2 
just as milk is4  #be4 ,and 7the case of
 ,brahman is7 like that of gods and     
other beings in ordinary experience4    

,well1 let it be admitted that milk and 
other non-intelligent things have the   
power of turning themselves into sour   
milk1 c4 without any extraneous means1  
since it is thus observed4 ,but we      
observe1 on the other hand1 that        
intelligent agents1 as1 for instance1   
potters1 proceed to their several work  
only after having provided themselves   
with a complete set of instruments4 ,how
 then can it be supposed that ,brahman1 
which is likewise of an intelligent     
nature1 should proceed without any      
auxiliary8  ,we reply1 ',like gods and  
others4' ,as gods1 fathers1 _/ri_/shis1 
and other beings of great power1 who are
 all of intelligent nature1 are seen to 
create many and various objects1 such as
 palaces1 chariots1 c41 without availing
 themselves of any extraneous means1 by 
their mere intention1 which is effective
 in consequence of those beings'        
peculiar power--a fact vouchsafed by    
mantras1 arthavdas1 itihsas1 and        
pur_/n_/as2--and as the spider emits out

 of itself the threads of its web2 and  
as the female crane conceives without a 
male2 and as the lotus wanders from one 
pond to another without any means of    
conveyance2 so the intelligent ,brahman 
also may be assumed to create the world 
by itself without extraneous means4     
,perhaps our opponent will argue against
 all this in the following style4--,the 
gods and other beings1 whom you have    
quoted as parallel instances1 are really
 of a nature different from that of     
,brahman4 ,for the material causes      
operative in the production of palaces  
and other material things are the bodies
 of the gods1 and not their intelligent 
,selfs4 ,and the web of the spider is   
produced from its saliva which1 owing to
 the spider's devouring small insects1  
acquires a certain degree of            
consistency4 ,and the female crane      
conceives from hearing the sound of     
thunder4 ,and the lotus flower indeed   
derives from its indwelling intelligent 
principle the impulse of movement1 but  

is not able actually to move in so far  
as it is a merely intelligent being#cjc2
 it rather wanders from pond to pond by 
means of its non-intelligent body1 just 
as the creeper climbs up the            
tree4--,hence all these illustrative    
examples cannot be applied to the case  
of ,brahman4  ,to this we reply1 that we
 meant to show merely that the case of  
,brahman is different from that of      
potters and similar agents4 ,for while  
potters1 c41 on the one side1 and gods1 
c41 on the other side1 possess the      
common attribute of intelligence1       
potters require for their work          
extraneous means 7i4e4 means lying      
outside their bodies7 and gods do not4  
,hence ,brahman also1 although          
intelligent1 is assumed to require no   
extraneous means4 ,so much only we      
wanted to show by the parallel instance 
of the gods1 c4 ,our intention is to    
point out that a peculiarly conditioned 
capability which is observed in some one
 case 7as in that of the potter7 is not 

necessarily to be assumed in all other  
cases also4  #bf4 ,either the           
consequence of the entire 7,brahman     
undergoing change7 has to be accepted1  
or else a violation of the texts        
declaring ,brahman to be without parts4 
,hitherto we have established so much   
that ,brahman1 intelligent1 one1 without
 a second1 modifying itself without the 
employment of any extraneous means1 is  
the cause of the world4--,now1 another  
objection is raised for the purpose of  
throwing additional light on the point  
under discussion4--,the consequence of  
the ,vednta doctrine1 it is said1 will  
be that we must assume the entire       
,brahman to undergo the change into its 
effects1 because it is not composed of  
parts4 ,if ,brahman1 like earth and     
other matter1 consisted of parts1 we    
might assume that a part of it undergoes
 the change1 while the other part       
remains as it is4 ,but ,scripture       
distinctly declares ,brahman to be      
devoid of parts4 ,compare1 ',he who is  

without parts1 without actions1         
tranquil1 without fault1 without taint' 
7_/,sv_/e4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 ',that      
heavenly person is without body1 he is  
both without and within1 not produced'  
7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b72 ',that great  
,being is endless1 unlimited1 consisting
 of nothing but knowledge' 7,b_/ri_/4   
,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab72 ',he is to be      
described by ,no1 no' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #i1 #b1f72 ',it is neither coarse
 nor fine' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1   
#h72 all which passages deny the        
existence of any distinctions in        
,brahman4--,as1 therefore1 a partial    
modification is impossible1 a           
modification of the entire ,brahman has 
to be assumed4 ,but that involves a     
cutting off of ,brahman from its very   
basis4--,another consequence of the     
,vedntic view is that the texts         
exhorting us to strive 'to see' ,brahman
 become purposeless2 for the effects of 
,brahman may be seen without any        
endeavour1 and apart from them no       

,brahman exists4--,and1 finally1 the    
texts declaring ,brahman to be unborn   
are contradicted thereby4--,if1 on the  
other hand--in order to escape from     
these difficulties--we assume ,brahman  
to consist of parts1 we thereby do      
violence to those texts which declare   
,brahman not to be made up of parts4    
,moreover1 if ,brahman is made up of    
parts1 it follows that it is            
non-eternal4--,hence the ,vedntic point 
of view cannot be maintained in any way4
  #bg4 ,but 7this is not so71 on account
 of scriptural passages1 and on account 
of 7,brahman7 resting on ,scripture     
7only74  ,the word 'but' discards the   
objection4--,we deny this and maintain  
that our view is not open to any        
objections4--,that the entire ,brahman  
undergoes change1 by no means follows   
from our doctrine1 'on account of sacred
 texts4' ,for in the same way as        
,scripture speaks of the origin of the  
world from ,brahman1 it also speaks of  
,brahman subsisting apart from its      

effects4 ,this appears from the passages
 indicating the difference of cause and 
effect '7,that divinity thought7 let me 
enter into these three divinities with  
this living ,self and evolve names and  
forms2' and1 ',such is the greatness of 
it1 greater than it is the ,person2 one 
foot of him are all things1 three feet  
are what is immortal in heaven' 7,ch4   
,up4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #f72 further1 from the 
passages declaring the unmodified       
,brahman to have its abode in the heart1
 and from those teaching that 7in       
dreamless sleep7 the individual soul is 
united with the ,true4 ,for if the      
entire ,brahman had passed into its     
effects1 the limitation 7of the soul's  
union with ,brahman7 to the state of    
dreamless sleep which is declared in the
 passage1 'then it is united with the   
,true1 my dear1' would be out of place2 
since the individual soul is always     
united with the effects of ,brahman1 and
 since an unmodified ,brahman does not  
exist 7on that hypothesis74 ,moreover1  

the possibility of ,brahman becoming the
 object of perception by means of the   
senses is denied while its effects may  
thus be perceived4 ,for these reasons   
the existence of an unmodified ,brahman 
has to be admitted4--,nor do we violate 
those texts which declare ,brahman to be
 without parts2 we rather admit ,brahman
 to be without parts just because       
,scripture reveals it4 ,for ,brahman    
which rests exclusively on the holy     
texts1 and regarding which the holy     
texts alone are authoritative--not the  
senses1 and so on--must be accepted such
 as the texts proclaim it to be4 ,now   
those texts declare1 on the one hand1   
that not the entire ,brahman passes over
 into its effects1 and1 on the other    
hand1 that ,brahman is without parts4   
,even certain ordinary things such as   
gems1 spells1 herbs1 and the like       
possess powers which1 owing to          
difference of time1 place1 occasion1 and
 so on1 produce various opposite        
effects1 and nobody unaided by          

instruction is able to find out by mere 
reflection the number of these powers1  
their favouring conditions1 their       
objects1 their purposes1 c42 how much   
more impossible is it to conceive       
without the aid of ,scripture the true  
nature of ,brahman with its powers      
unfathomable by thought6 ,as the        
,pur_/n_/a says3 ',do not apply         
reasoning to what is unthinkable6 ,the  
mark of the unthinkable is that it is   
above all material causes#cjd4'         
,therefore the cognition of what is     
supersensuous is based on the holy texts
 only4  ,but--our opponent will         
say--even the holy texts cannot make us 
understand what is contradictory4       
,brahman1 you say1 which is without     
parts undergoes a change1 but not the   
entire ,brahman4 ,if ,brahman is without
 parts1 it does either not change at all
 or it changes in its entirety4 ,if1 on 
the other hand1 it be said that it      
changes partly and persists partly1 a   
break is effected in its nature1 and    

from that it follows that it consists of
 parts4 ,it is true that in matters     
connected with action 7as1 for instance1
 in the case of the two ,vedic          
injunctions 'at the atirtra he is to    
take the sho_/d_/a_/s_/in-cup1' and 'at 
the atirtra he is not to take the       
sho_/d_/a_/s_/in-cup'7 any contradiction
 which may present itself to the        
understanding is removed by the optional
 adoption of one of the two alternatives
 presented as action is dependent on    
man2 but in the case under discussion   
the adoption of one of the alternatives 
does not remove the contradiction       
because an existent thing 7like         
,brahman7 does not 7like an action which
 is to be accomplished7 depend on man4  
,we are therefore met here by a real    
difficulty4  ,no1 we reply1 the         
difficulty is merely an apparent one2 as
 we maintain that the 7alleged7 break in
 ,brahman's nature is a mere figment of 
,nescience4 ,by a break of that nature a
 thing is not really broken up into     

parts1 not any more than the moon is    
really multiplied by appearing double to
 a person of defective vision4 ,by that 
element of plurality which is the       
fiction of ,nescience1 which is         
characterised by name and form1 which is
 evolved as well as non-evolved1 which  
is not to be defined either as the      
,existing or the ,non-existing1 ,brahman
 becomes the basis of this entire       
apparent world with its changes1 and so 
on1 while in its true and real nature it
 at the same time remains unchanged1    
lifted above the phenomenal universe4   
,and as the distinction of names and    
forms1 the fiction of ,nescience1       
originates entirely from speech only1 it
 does not militate against the fact of  
,brahman being without parts4--,nor have
 the scriptural passages which speak of 
,brahman as undergoing change the       
purpose of teaching the fact of change2 
for such instruction would have no      
fruit4 ,they rather aim at imparting    
instruction about ,brahman's ,self as   

raised above this apparent world2 that  
being an instruction which we know to   
have a result of its own4 ,for in the   
scriptural passage beginning ',he can   
only be described by ,no1 no' 7which    
passage conveys instruction about the   
absolute ,brahman7 a result is stated at
 the end1 in the words ',o ,janaka1 you 
have indeed reached fearlessness'       
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b1 #d74--;,hence 
our view does not involve any real      
difficulties4  #bh4 ,for thus it is in  
the 7individual7 ,self also1 and various
 7creations exist in gods#cje1 c474     
,nor is there any reason to find fault  
with the doctrine that there can be a   
manifold creation in the one ,self1     
without destroying its character4 ,for  
,scripture teaches us that there exists 
a multiform creation in the one ,self of
 a dreaming person1 ',there are no      
chariots in that state1 no horses1 no   
roads1 but he himself creates chariots1 
horses1 and roads' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iv1
 #c1 #aj74 ,in ordinary life too        

multiform creations1 elephants1 horses1 
and the like are seen to exist in gods1 
c41 and magicians without interfering   
with the unity of their being4 ,thus a  
multiform creation may exist in ,brahman
 also1 one as it is1 without divesting  
it of its character of unity4  #bi4 ,and
 because the objection 7raised against  
our view7 lies against his 7the         
opponent's7 view likewise4  ,those also 
who maintain that the world has sprung  
from the pradhna implicitly teach that  
something not made up of parts1         
unlimited1 devoid of sound and other    
qualities--viz4 the pradhna--is the     
cause of an effect--viz4 the            
world--which is made up of parts1 is    
limited and is characterised by the     
named qualities4 ,hence it follows from 
that doctrine also either that the      
pradhna as not consisting of parts has  
to undergo a change in its entirety1 or 
else that the view of its not consisting
 of parts has to be abandoned4--,but--it
 might be pleaded in favour of the      

,snkhyas--they do not maintain their    
pradhna to be without parts2 for they   
define it as the state of equilibrium of
 the three gu_/n_/as1 ,goodness1        
,passion1 and ,darkness1 so that the    
pradhna forms a whole containing the    
three gu_/n_/as as its parts4--,we reply
 that such a partiteness as is here     
proposed does not remove the objection  
in hand because still each of the three 
qualities is declared to be in itself   
without parts#cjf4 ,and each gu_/n_/a by
 itself assisted merely by the two other
 gu_/n_/as constitutes the material     
cause of that part of the world which   
resembles it in its nature#cjg4--,so    
that the objection lies against the     
,snkhya view likewise4--,well1 then1 as 
the reasoning 7on which the doctrine of 
the impartiteness of the pradhna rests7 
is not absolutely safe1 let us assume   
that the pradhna consists of parts4--,if
 you do that1 we reply1 it follows that 
the pradhna cannot be eternal1 and so   
on4--,let it then be said that the      

various powers of the pradhna to which  
the variety of its effects is pointing  
are its parts4--,well1 we reply1 those  
various powers are admitted by us also  
who see the cause of the world in       
,brahman4  ,the same objections lie     
against the doctrine of the world having
 originated from atoms4 ,for on that    
doctrine one atom when combining with   
another must1 as it is not made up of   
parts1 enter into the combination with  
its whole extent1 and as thus no        
increase of bulk takes place we do not  
get beyond the first atom4#cjh ,if1 on  
the other hand1 you maintain that the   
atom enters into the combination with a 
part only1 you offend against the       
assumption of the atoms having no parts4
  ,as therefore all views are equally   
obnoxious to the objections raised1 the 
latter cannot be urged against any one  
view in particular1 and the advocate of 
,brahman has consequently cleared his   
doctrine4  #cj4 ,and 7the highest       
divinity is7 endowed with all 7powers7  

because that is seen 7from ,scripture74 
,we have stated that this multiform     
world of effects is possible to         
,brahman1 because1 although one only1 it
 is endowed with various powers4--,how  
then--it may be asked--do you know that 
the highest ,brahman is endowed with    
various powers8--,he is1 we reply1      
endowed with all powers1 'because that  
is seen4' ,for various scriptural       
passages declare that the highest       
divinity possesses all powers1 ',he to  
whom all actions1 all desires1 all      
odours1 all tastes belong1 he who       
embraces all this1 who never speaks1 and
 is never surprised' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1  
#ad1 #d72 ',he who desires what is true 
and imagines what is true' 7,ch4 ,up4   
,,viii1 #g1 #a72 ',he who knows all 7in 
its totality71 and cognizes all 7in its 
detail'7 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',by   
the command of that ,imperishable1 ,o   
,grg1 sun and moon stand apart'         
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #i72 and     
other similar passages4  #ca4 ,if it be 

said that 7,brahman is devoid of powers7
 on account of the absence of organs2   
7we reply that7 this has been explained 
7before74  ,let this be                 
granted4--,scripture1 however1 declares 
the highest divinity to be without      
7bodily7 organs of action#cji2 so1 for  
instance1 in the passage1 ',it is       
without eyes1 without ears1 without     
speech1 without mind' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4   
,,iii1 #h1 #h74 ,being such1 how should 
it be able to produce effects1 although 
it may be endowed with all powers8 ,for 
we know 7from mantras1 arthavdas1 c47   
that the gods and other intelligent     
beings1 though endowed with all powers1 
are capable of producing certain effects
 only because they are furnished with   
bodily instruments of action4 ,and1     
moreover1 how can the divinity1 to whom 
the scriptural passage1 ',no1 no1'      
denies all attributes1 be endowed with  
all powers8  ,the appropriate reply to  
this question has been already given    
above4 ,the transcendent highest        

,brahman can be fathomed by means of    
,scripture only1 not by mere reasoning4 
,nor are we obliged to assume that the  
capacity of one being is exactly like   
that which is observed in another4 ,it  
has likewise been explained above that  
although all qualities are denied of    
,brahman we nevertheless may consider it
 to be endowed with powers1 if we assume
 in its nature an element of plurality1 
which is the mere figment of ,nescience4
 ,moreover1 a scriptural passage        
7',grasping without hands1 hastening    
without feet1 he sees without eyes1 he  
hears without ears' _/,s_/ve4 ,up4      
,,iii1 #ai7 declares that ,brahman      
although devoid of bodily organs1       
possesses all possible capacities4  #cb4
 7,brahman is7 not 7the creator of the  
world71 on account of 7beings engaging  
in any action7 having a motive4         
,another objection is raised against the
 doctrine of an intelligent cause of the
 world4--,the intelligent highest ,self 
cannot be the creator of the sphere of  

this world1 'on account of actions      
having a purpose4'--,we know from       
ordinary experience that man1 who is an 
intelligent being1 begins to act after  
due consideration only1 and does not    
engage even in an unimportant           
undertaking unless it serves some       
purpose of his own2 much less so in     
important business4 ,there is also a    
scriptural passage confirming this      
result of common experience1 ',verily   
everything is not dear that you may have
 everything2 but that you may love the  
,self therefore everything is dear'     
7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e74 ,now the 
undertaking of creating the sphere of   
this world1 with all its various        
contents1 is certainly a weighty one4   
,if1 then1 on the one hand1 you assume  
it to serve some purpose of the         
intelligent highest ,self1 you thereby  
sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for
 by ,scripture2 if1 on the other hand1  
you affirm absence of motive on its     
part1 you must affirm absence of        

activity also4--,let us then assume that
 just as sometimes an intelligent person
 when in a state of frenzy proceeds1    
owing to his mental aberration1 to      
action without a motive1 so the highest 
,self also created this world without   
any motive4--,that1 we reply1 would     
contradict the omniscience of the       
highest ,self1 which is vouched for by  
,scripture4--,hence the doctrine of the 
creation proceeding from an intelligent 
,being is untenable4  #cc4 ,but         
7,brahman's creative activity7 is mere  
sport1 such as we see in ordinary life4 
,the word 'but' discards the objection  
raised4--,we see in every-day life that 
certain doings of princes or other men  
of high position who have no unfulfilled
 desires left have no reference to any  
extraneous purpose2 but proceed from    
mere sportfulness1 as1 for instance1    
their recreations in places of          
amusement4 ,we further see that the     
process of inhalation and exhalation is 
going on without reference to any       

extraneous purpose1 merely following the
 law of its own nature4 ,analogously1   
the activity of the ,lord also may be   
supposed to be mere sport1 proceeding   
from his own nature#caj1 without        
reference to any purpose4 ,for on the   
ground neither of reason nor of         
,scripture can we construe any other    
purpose of the ,lord4 ,nor can his      
nature be questioned4#caa--;,although   
the creation of this world appears to us
 a weighty and difficult undertaking1 it
 is mere play to the ,lord1 whose power 
is unlimited4 ,and if in ordinary life  
we might possibly1 by close scrutiny1   
detect some subtle motive1 even for     
sportful action1 we cannot do so with   
regard to the actions of the ,lord1 all 
whose wishes are fulfilled1 as          
,scripture says4--,nor can it be said   
that he either does not act or acts like
 a senseless person2 for ,scripture     
affirms the fact of the creation on the 
one hand1 and the ,lord's omniscience on
 the other hand4 ,and1 finally1 we must 

remember that the scriptural doctrine of
 creation does not refer to the highest 
reality2 it refers to the apparent world
 only1 which is characterised by name   
and form1 the figments of ,nescience1   
and it1 moreover1 aims at intimating    
that ,brahman is the ,self of           
everything4  #cd4 ,inequality 7of       
dispensation7 and cruelty 7the ,lord    
can7 not 7be reproached with71 on       
account of his regarding 7merit and     
demerit72 for so 7,scripture7 declares4 
,in order to strengthen the tenet which 
we are at present defending1 we follow  
the procedure of him who shakes a pole  
planted in the ground 7in order to test 
whether it is firmly planted71 and raise
 another objection against the doctrine 
of the ,lord being the cause of the     
world4--,the ,lord1 it is said1 cannot  
be the cause of the world1 because1 on  
that hypothesis1 the reproach of        
inequality of dispensation and cruelty  
would attach to him4 ,some beings1 viz4 
the gods and others1 he renders         

eminently happy2 others1 as for instance
 the animals1 eminently unhappy2 to some
 again1 as for instance men1 he allots  
an intermediate position4 ,to a ,lord   
bringing about such an unequal condition
 of things1 passion and malice would    
have to be ascribed1 just as to any     
common person acting similarly2 which   
attributes would be contrary to the     
essential goodness of the ,lord affirmed
 by _/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti4         
,moreover1 as the infliction of pain and
 the final destruction of all creatures 
would form part of his dispensation1 he 
would have to be taxed with great       
cruelty1 a quality abhorred by low      
people even4 ,for these two reasons     
,brahman cannot be the cause of the     
world4  ,the ,lord1 we reply1 cannot be 
reproached with inequality of           
dispensation and cruelty1 because he is 
bound by regards4 ,if the ,lord on his  
own account1 without any extraneous     
regards1 produced this unequal creation1
 he would expose himself to blame2 but  

the fact is1 that in creating he is     
bound by certain regards1 i4e4 he has to
 look to merit and demerit4 ,hence the  
circumstance of the creation being      
unequal is due to the merit and demerit 
of the living creatures created1 and is 
not a fault for which the ,lord is to   
blame4 ,the position of the ,lord is to 
be looked on as analogous to that of    
,parjanya1 the ,giver of rain4 ,for as  
,parjanya is the common cause of the    
production of rice1 barley1 and other   
plants1 while the difference between the
 various species is due to the various  
potentialities lying hidden in the      
respective seeds1 so the ,lord is the   
common cause of the creation of gods1   
men1 c41 while the differences between  
these classes of beings are due to the  
different merit belonging to the        
individual souls4 ,hence the ,lord1     
being bound by regards1 cannot be       
reproached with inequality of           
dispensation and cruelty4--,and if we   
are asked how we come to know that the  

,lord1 in creating this world with its  
various conditions1 is bound by regards1
 we reply that ,scripture declares that2
 compare1 for instance1 the two         
following passages1 ',for he 7the ,lord7
 makes him1 whom he wishes to lead up   
from these worlds1 do a good deed2 and  
the same makes him1 whom he wishes to   
lead down from these worlds1 do a bad   
deed' 7,kaush4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h7cab2 and1 
',a man becomes good by good work1 bad  
by bad work' 7,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 
#ac74 ,sm_/ri_/ti passages also declare 
the favour of the ,lord and its opposite
 to depend on the different quality of  
the works of living beings2 so1 for     
instance1 ',i serve men in the way in   
which they approach me' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,iv1
 #aa74  #ce4 ,if it be objected that it 
7viz4 the ,lord's having regard to merit
 and demerit7 is impossible on account  
of the non-distinction 7of merit and    
demerit1 previous to the first          
creation72 we refute the objection on   
the ground of 7the world7 being without 

a beginning4  ,but--an objection is     
raised--the passage1 ',being only this  
was in the beginning1 one1 without a    
second1' affirms that before the        
creation there was no distinction and   
consequently no merit on account of     
which the creation might have become    
unequal4 ,and if we assume the ,lord to 
have been guided in his dispensations by
 the actions of living beings subsequent
 to the creation1 we involve ourselves  
in the circular reasoning that work     
depends on diversity of condition of    
life1 and diversity of condition again  
on work4 ,the ,lord may be considered as
 acting with regard to religious merit  
after distinction had once arisen2 but  
as before that the cause of inequality1 
viz4 merit1 did not exist1 it follows   
that the first creation must have been  
free1 from inequalities4  ,this         
objection we meet by the remark1 that   
the transmigratory world is without     
beginning4--,the objection would be     
valid if the world had a beginning2 but 

as it is without beginning1 merit and   
inequality are1 like seed and sprout1   
caused as well as causes1 and there is  
therefore no logical objection to their 
operation4--,to the question how we know
 that the world is without a beginning1 
the next ,stra replies4  #cf4 7,the     
beginninglessness of the world7         
recommends itself to reason and is seen 
7from ,scripture74  ,the                
beginninglessness of the world          
recommends itself to reason4 ,for if it 
had a beginning it would follow that1   
the world springing into existence      
without a cause1 the released souls also
 would again enter into the circle of   
transmigratory existence2 and further1  
as then there would exist no determining
 cause of the unequal dispensation of   
pleasure and pain1 we should have to    
acquire in the doctrine of rewards and  
punishments being allotted1 without     
reference to previous good or bad       
action4 ,that the ,lord is not the cause
 of the inequality1 has already been    

remarked4 ,nor can ,nescience by itself 
be the cause1 and it is of a uniform    
nature4 ,on the other hand1 ,nescience  
may be the cause of inequality1 if it be
 considered as having regard to merit   
accruing from action produced by the    
mental impressions or wrath1 hatred1 and
 other afflicting passions#cac4 ,without
 merit and demerit nobody can enter into
 existence1 and again1 without a body   
merit and demerit cannot be formed2 so  
that--on the doctrine of the world      
having a beginning--we are led into a   
logical see-saw4 ,the opposite doctrine1
 on the other hand1 explains all matters
 in a manner analogous to the case of   
the seed and sprout1 so that no         
difficulty remains4--,moreover1 the fact
 of the world being without a beginning1
 is seen in _/,s_/ruti and ,sm_/ri_/ti4 
,in the first place1 we have the        
scriptural passage1 ',let me enter with 
this living ,self 7jva7'1 c4 7,ch4 ,up4 
,,vi1 #c1 #b74 ,here the circumstance of
 the embodied ,self 7the individual     

soul7 being called1 previously to       
creation1 'the living ,self'--a name    
applying to it in so far as it is the   
sustaining principle of the             
pr_/n_/as--shows that this phenomenal   
world is without a beginning4 ,for if it
 had a beginning1 the pr_/n_/as would   
not exist before that beginning1 and how
 then could the embodied ,self be       
denoted1 with reference to the time of  
the world's beginning1 by a name which  
depends on the existence of those       
pr_/n_/as4 ,nor can it be said that it  
is so designated with a view to its     
future relation to the pr_/n_/as2 it    
being a settled principle that a past   
relation1 as being already existing1 is 
of greater force than a mere future     
relation4--,moreover1 we have the       
mantra1 ',as the creator formerly       
devised 7akalpaya7 sun and moon         
7_/,ri_/4 ,sa_/m_/h4 ,x1 #aij1 #c71     
which intimates the existence of former 
,kalpas4 ,sm_/ri_/ti also declares the  
world to be without a beginning1        

',neither its form is known here1 nor   
its end1 nor its beginning1 nor its     
support' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #c74 ,and the 
,pur_/n_/a also declares that there is  
no measure of the past and the future   
,kalpas4  #cg4 ,and because all the     
qualities 7required in the cause of the 
world7 are present 7in ,brahman74  ,the 
teacher has now refuted all the         
objections1 such as difference of       
character1 and the like1 which other    
teachers have brought forward against   
what he had established as the real     
sense of the ,veda1 viz4 that the       
intelligent ,brahman is the cause and   
matter of this world4  ,now1 before     
entering on a new chapter1 whose chief  
aim it will be to refute the 7positive7 
opinions held by other teachers1 he sums
 up the foregoing chapter1 the purport  
of which it was to show why his view    
should be accepted4--,because1 if that  
,brahman is acknowledged as the cause of
 the world1 all attributes required in  
the cause 7of the world7 are seen to be 

present--,brahman being all-knowing1    
all-powerful1 and possessing the great  
power of ,my1--on that account this our 
system1 founded on the ,upanishads1 is  
not open to any objections4  ,notes3    
,footnote #bec3 ,the ,sm_/ri_/ti called 
,tantra is the ,snkhya_/s_/stra as      
taught by ,kapila2 the                  
,sm_/ri_/ti-writers depending on him are
 suri1 ,pa_/k_/a_/s_/ikha1 and others4  
,footnote #bed3 ,mm_/m_/s ,s4 ,i1 #a1   
#b3 _/k_/odanlaksha_/n_/osxrtho         
dharma_/h_/4 ,commentary3 _/k_/odan iti 
kriyy_/h_/ pravartaka_/m_/ va_/k_/anam  
hu_/h_/4  ,footnote #bee3 ,purushrtha2  
in opposition to the rules referred to  
in the preceding sentence which are     
kratvartha1 i4e4 the acting according to
 which secures the proper performance of
 certain rites4  ,footnote #bef3 ,it    
having been decided by the ,prv         
,mm_/m_/s already that ,sm_/ri_/tis     
contradicted by _/,s_/ruti are to be    
disregarded4  ,footnote #beg3 ,on the   
meaning of 'kapila' in the above        

passage1 compare the ,introduction to   
the ,upanishads1 translated by ,max     
,mller1 vol4 ii1 p4 xxxviii ff4--,as    
will be seen later on1 _/,s_/ankara1 in 
this bhshya1 takes the ,kapila referred 
to to be some _/ri_/shi4  ,footnote     
#beh3 ,i4e4 religious duty is known only
 from the injunctive passages of the    
,veda4  ,footnote #bei3 ,after it has   
been shown that ,kapila the dvaitavdin  
is not mentioned in _/,s_/ruti1 it is   
now shown that ,manu the sarvtmavdin is 
mentioned there4  ,footnote #bfj3 ,in   
which passage the phrase 'to be         
meditated upon' 7nididhys7 indicates the
 act of mental concentration            
characteristic of the ,yoga4  ,footnote 
#bfa3 ,the ash_/t_/aks 7certain         
oblations to be made on the eighth days 
after the full moons of the seasons     
hemanta and _/s_/i_/s_/ira7 furnish the 
stock illustration for the doctrine of  
the ,prv ,mim4 that ,sm_/ri_/ti is      
authoritative in so far as it is based  
on _/,s_/ruti4  ,footnote #bfb3 ,but    

why--it will be asked--do you apply     
yourself to the refutation of the       
,snkhya and ,yoga only1 and not also to 
that of other ,sm_/ri_/tis conflicting  
with the ,vednta views8  ,footnote #bfc3
 ,i4e4 from the fact of these terms     
being employed in a passage standing    
close to other passages which refer to  
,vedic knowledge4  ,footnote #bfd3 ,the 
cognition of ,brahman terminates in an  
act of anubhava2 hence as it has been   
shown that reasoning is more closely    
connected with anubhava than _/,s_/ruti 
is1 we have the right to apply reasoning
 to _/,s_/ruti4--nanda ,giri comments on
 the passage from anubhavvasnam as      
follows3 brahmaskshtkrasya mokshopyatay 
prdhnyt tatra _/s_/abdd api             
parokshago_/k_/ard                      
aparokshrthasdharmyago_/k_/aras         
tarkosxntarangam iti tasyaiva balavatvam
 ity artha_/h_/4 ,aitihyamtre_/n_/a     
pravdapramparyamtre_/n_/a parokshatayeti
 yvat4 ,anubhavasya prdhnye             
tarkasyoktanyyena tasminn antarangatvd  

gamasya _/k_/a bahirangatvd             
antarangabahirangayor antaranga_/m_/    
balavad ity nyyd ukta_/m_/ tarkasya     
balavattvam4 ,anubhavaprdhnya_/m_/ tu   
ndypi siddham ity _/s_/ankyhnubhaveti4  
,nanu ,brahmaj_/_/dna_/m_/ vaidikatvd   
dharmavad ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/aphalam        
esh_/t_/avya_/m_/ tat                   
kutosxsynubhavvasnvidynivartakatva_/m_/ 
tatrha moksheti4                        
,adhish_/th_/naskshtkrasya              
_/s_/uktydj_/_/ne                       
tadavidytatkryanivartakatvad_/ri_/sh_/t_
/e_/h_/1 brahmaj_/_/nasypi tarkava_/s_/d
 asambhvandinirsadvr skshtkrvasyinas    
tadavidydinivartakatvenaiva             
muktihetuteti nd_/ri_/sh_/t_/aphalatety 
artha_/h_/4  ,footnote #bfe3            
,nirati_/s_/ay_/h_/1                    
upajanpyadharma_/s_/nyatva_/m_/         
nirati_/s_/ayatvam4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote  
#bff3 ,a sentence replying to the       
possible objection that the world1 as   
being the effect of the intelligent     
,brahman1 might itself be intelligent4  

,footnote #bfg3 ,in the case of things  
commonly considered non-intelligent1    
intelligence is not influenced by an    
internal organ1 and on that account     
remains unperceived2 samaste jagati     
satoszpi _/k_/aitanyasya tatra          
tatrnta_/h_/kara_/n_/apari_/n_/mnupargd 
anupalabdhir aviruddh4 n4 ,gi4          
,footnote #bfh3 ,on _/s_/vara in the    
above meaning1 compare ,deussen1 p4 #fi1
 note #da4  ,footnote #bfi3 ,the line   
'prak_/ri_/tibhya_/h_/ param1' c4 is    
wanting in all ,,mss4 ,i have consulted4
  ,footnote #bgj3 nanda ,giri on the    
above passage3 _/s_/rutyknkshita_/m_/   
tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udharati 
svapnnteti4 ,svapnajgaritayor           
mithovyabhi_/k_/rd tmana_/h_/ svabhvatas
 tadvattvbhvd avasth dvayena tasya      
svatosxsa_/m_/p_/ri_/ktatvam ato        
jvasyvasthvatvena nbrahmatvam ity       
artha_/h_/4 ,tathpi dehditdtmyentmano   
bhvn na ni_/h_/prapa_/k_/abrahmatety    
_/s_/ankyha sa_/m_/prasde _/k_/eti4 ,sat
 somya tad sa_/m_/panno bhavatti        

_/s_/rute_/h_/ sushupte                 
ni_/h_/prapa_/k_/asadtmatvvagamd tmanas 
tathvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity           
artha_/h_/4                             
,dvaitagrhipratyakshdivirodht katham    
tmanosxdvityabrahmatvam ity _/s_/ankya  
tajjatvdihetun                          
brahmtiriktavastvabhvasiddher           
adhyakshdnm atatvvedakaprm_/n_/yd       
avirodhd yuktam tmano xsvityabrahmatvam 
ity ha prapa_/k_/asyeti4  ,footnote     
#bga3 ,let us finally assume1 merely for
 argument's sake1 that a                
vailaksha_/n_/ya of cause and effect is 
not admissible1 and enquire whether that
 assumption can be reconciled more      
easily with an intelligent or a         
non-intelligent cause of the world4     
,footnote #bgb3 ,nanu pralayakle        
kryadharm_/s_/ _/k_/en nvatish_/th_/eran
 na tarhi kra_/n_/adharm api            
tish_/th_/eyus tayor abhedt             
tatrhnanyatveszpti4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote  
#bgc3 ,for if they are effects of the   
pradhna they must as such be reabsorbed 

into it at the time of general          
reabsorption4  ,footnote #bgd3 ,and that
 the ,vednta view is preferable because 
the nullity of the objections has       
already been demonstrated in its case4  
,footnote #bge3 ,the whole style of     
argumentation of the ,mm_/m_/s would be 
impossible1 if all reasoning were sound2
 for then no prvapaksha view could be   
maintained4  ,footnote #bgf3 ,the       
following arthavda-passage1 for         
instance1 'the sacrificial post is the  
sun1' is to be taken in a metaphorical  
sense2 because perception renders it    
impossible for us to take it in its     
literal meaning4  ,footnote #bgg3 ,which
 are to be known from the ,veda only4   
,footnote #bgh3 ,pari_/n_/mavdam        
avalambyptato virodha_/m_/ samadhya     
vivartavdam _/s_/ritya paramasamdhnam   
ha4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #bgi3 nanda ,giri
 construes differently3 etad uktam iti1 
paramrthato vij_/_/tam iti              
sambandha_/h_/4  ,footnote #bhj3        
,d_/ri_/sh_/t_/eti kad_/k_/id           

dr_/ri_/sh_/t_/a_/m_/ punar nash_/t_/am 
anityam iti                             
yvat4--,d_/ri_/sh_/t_/agraha_/n_/as_/k_/
ita_/m_/ prattiklesxpi sattrhitya_/m_/  
tatraiva hetvantaram ha svarpe_/n_/eti4 
n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #bha3 ,in the passage
 alluded to he is called so by          
implication1 being compared to the      
'false-minded' thief who1 knowing       
himself to be guilty1 undergoes the     
ordeal of the heated hatchet4  ,footnote
 #bhb3 ,i4e4 ordinary experience does   
not teach us that real effects spring   
from unreal causes4  ,footnote #bhc3    
,svapnajgraddehayor vyabhi_/k_/rezpi    
pratyabhij_/_/nt                        
tadanugattmaikyasiddhe_/s_/             
_/k_/aitanyasya _/k_/a dehadharmatve    
rtmano dehadvaytiredkasiddher           
dehtrtmavdo na yukta ity artha_/h_/4 n4 
,gi4  ,footnote #bhd3 ,as long as the   
'vyavahra' presents itself to our mind1 
we might feel inclined to assume in     
,brahman an element of manifoldness     
whereby to account for the vyavahra2 but

 as soon as we arrive at true knowledge1
 the vyavahra vanishes1 and there       
remains no longer any reason for        
qualifying in any way the absolute unity
 of ,brahman4  ,footnote #bhe3 ,tatreti1
 s_/ri_/sh_/t_/ydi_/s_/rutn_/m_/ svrthe 
phatavaikalye satti yvat4 n4 ,gi4       
,footnote #bhf3 ,a ,mm_/m_/s principle4 
,a sacrificial act1 for instance1 is    
independent when a special result is    
assigned to it by the sacred texts2 an  
act which is enjoined without such a    
specification is merely auxiliary to    
another act4  ,footnote #bhg3 ,according
 to the _/,s_/rut 'in whatever mode he  
worships him into that mode he passes   
himself4'  ,footnote #bhh3              
,tattvnyatvbhym iti1 na hsvaratvena te  
niru_/k_/yete ja_/d_/jadayor abhedyogt  
npi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata_/h_/ 
svtantrye_/n_/a sattsphrtyasambhavt na  
hi j_/ad_/am aga_/d_/napekshya_/m_/     
sattsphrtimad upalakshyate              
ja_/d_/atvabhangaprasangt tasmd         
avidytmake nmarpe ity artha_/h_/4 n4    

,gi4  ,footnote #bhi3 ,so that from the 
instance of the potter and the jar we   
cannot conclude that the relation of    
clay and the jar is only that of nimitta
 and naimittika1 not that of            
non-difference4  ,footnote #bij3 ,for   
instance1 smoke extending in a long line
 whose base is connected with some      
object on the surface of the earth4     
,footnote #bia3 ,i4e4 7as n4 ,gi4       
explains7 because we assume the relation
 of cause and effect not merely on the  
ground of the actual existence of one   
thing depending on that upon another1   
but on the additional ground of the     
mental existence1 the consciousness of  
the one not being possible without the  
consciousness of the                    
other4--,tadbhvnuvidhyibhvatvam         
tadbhnnuvidhyibhnatva_/m_/ _/k_/ kryasya
 kra_/n_/nanyatve hetur                 
dhmavi_/s_/eshasya                      
_/k_/gnibhvnuvidhyibhvatvesxpi na       
tadbhnnuvidhyibhnatvam agnibhnasya      
dhmabhndhnatvt4  ,footnote #bib3 ,for   

simplicity's sake1 asat will be         
translated henceforth by non-existing4  
,footnote #bic3 ,samavya1 commonly      
translated by inherence or intimate     
relation1 is1 according to the ,nyya1   
the relation connecting a whole and its 
parts1 substances1 and qualities1 c4    
,footnote #bid3 ,samavyasya             
svtantryapaksha_/m_/ dshayati           
anabhyupagamyamne_/k_/eti4 ,samavyasya  
samavyibhi_/h_/ sambandho neshyate      
ki_/m_/ tu svtantryam evety             
atrvayavvayavinor dravyagu_/n_/dn_/m_/  
_/k_/a4 viprakarsha_/h_/ syt            
sa_/m_/nidhyakbhvd ity artha_/h_/4 n4   
,gi4  ,footnote #bie3 ,a conclusion     
which is in conflict with the ,nyya     
tenet that sa_/m_/yoga1 conjunction1 as1
 for instance1 of the jar and the ground
 on which it stands1 is a quality       
7gu_/n_/a7 inherent in the two conjoined
 substances by means of the samavaya    
relation4  ,footnote #bif3 ,so that the 
whole can be apprehended by us as such  
if we apprehend a certain part only2    

analogously to our apprehending the     
whole thread on which a garland of      
flowers is strung as soon as we         
apprehend some few of the flowers4      
,footnote #big3 ,kalpntaram utthpayati  
atheti1 tath _/k_/a yathvayavai_/h_/    
stra_/m_/ kusumni vypnuvat              
katipayakusumagraha_/n_/expi            
g_/r_/ihyate tath                       
katipayavayavagraha_/n_/expi bhavaty    
avayavino graha_/n_/am ity artha_/h_/4  
,tatra kim rambhakvayavair eva teshv    
avayav vartteta ki_/m_/ v               
tadatiriklvayavair iti vikalpydyam      
pratyha tadpti4 ,yatra yad varttate tat 
tadatiriktvayavair eva tatra            
vartamna_/m_/ drish_/l_/am iti          
d_/ri_/sh_/t_/antagarbha_/m_/ hetum     
_/k_/ash_/l_/e ko_/s_/eti4 ,dvityam     
dshayati anavastheti4                   
,kalpitnantvayavavyavahitatay           
prak_/ri_/tvayavino draviprakarsht      
tantunish_/th_/atvam pa_/t_/asya na syd 
iti bhva_/h_/4 ,an4 ,gi4  ,footnote     
#bih3 ,i4e4 a something in which the    

action inheres2 not a causal agent4     
,footnote #bii3 ,every action1          
_/,s_/ankra says1 requires an agent1    
i4e4 a substrate in which the action    
takes place4 ,if we deny that the jar   
exists in the clay even before it is    
actually originated1 we lose the        
substrate for the action of origination1
 i4e4 entering into existence 7for the  
non-existing jar cannot be the          
substratum of any action71 and have to  
assume1 for that action1 other          
substrates1 such as the operative causes
 of the jar4  ,footnote #cjj3 ,which    
doctrine will be fully discussed in the 
second pda of this adhyya4  ,footnote   
#cja3 ,because it has been shown that   
cause and effect are identical2 hence if
 the cause is known1 the effect is known
 also4  ,footnote #cjb3 ,which          
arguments1 the commentators say1 are    
hinted at by the 'and' of the ,stra4    
,footnote #cjc3 ,the right reading      
appears to be 'svayam eva _/k_/etan' as 
found in some ,,mss4 ,other ,,mss4 read 

_/k_/etana_/h_/4  ,footnote #cjd3       
,prak_/ri_/tibhya iti1                  
pratyakshad_/ri_/sh_/t_/apadrthasvabhveb
hyo yat para_/m_/ vilaksha_/n_/am       
_/k_/rydyupade_/s_/agamya_/m_/ tad      
a_/k_/intyam ity arta_/h_/ n4 ,gi4      
,footnote #cje3 ,this is the way in     
which _/,s_/ankara divides the ,stra2 n4
 ,gi4 remarks to 'lokezspo1 c43 tmani   
_/k_/eti vykhyya vi_/k_/itr_/s_/ _/k_/a 
hti vy_/k_/ash_/t_/e4'  ,footnote #cjf3 
,so that if it undergoes modifications  
it must either change in its entirety1  
or else--against the assumption--consist
 of parts4  ,footnote #cjg3 ,the last   
clause precludes the justificatory      
remark that the stated difficulties can 
be avoided if we assume the three       
gu_/n_/as in combination only to undergo
 modification2 if this were so the      
inequality of the different effects     
could not be accounted for4  ,footnote  
#cjh3 ,as an atom has no parts it cannot
 enter into partial contact with        
another1 and the only way in which the  

two can combine is entire               
interpenetration2 in consequence of     
which the compound of two atoms would   
not occupy more space than one atom4    
,footnote #cji3 ,the ,stra is concerned 
with the body only as far as it is an   
instrument2 the case of extraneous      
instruments having already been disposed
 of in ,stra #bd4  ,footnote #caj3 ,the 
nature 7svabhva7 of the ,lord is1 the   
commentators say1 ,my joined with time  
and karman4  ,footnote #caa3 ,this      
clause is an answer to the objection    
that the ,lord might remain at rest     
instead of creating a world useless to  
himself and the cause of pain to others4
 ,for in consequence of his conjunction 
with ,my the creation is unavoidable4   
,go4 n4 ,avidy naturally tends towards  
effects1 without any purpose4 ,bh4  n4  
,gi4 remarks3 ,nanu lldv asmaddnm akasmd
 eva niv_/ri_/tter api darsand          
_/s_/varasypi mymayym llym tath-bhve    
vinpi sa_/my_/agj_/_/na_/m_/            
sa_/m_/srasamu_/kkh_/ittir ili tatrha na

 _/ke_/ti4 ,anirv_/ky_/ khalv avidy     
paras_/yes_/varasya _/k_/a4 svabhvo     
lleti _/kok_/yate tatra na              
prttikasvabhvym anupapattir avataratty  
artha_/h_/4  ,footnote #cab3 ,from this 
passage we must not--the commentators   
say--infer injustice on the part of the 
,lord2 for the previous merit or demerit
 of a being determines the specific     
quality of the actions which he performs
 in his present existence1 the ,lord    
acting as the common cause only 7as     
,parjanya does74  ,footnote #cac3       
,rgadveshamoh rgadayas le _/k_/a        
purusha_/m_/ dukhdibhi_/h_/             
kli_/s_/yantt kle_/s_/s tesb_/m_/       
kartneapia_/vi_/uyanugu_/rr_/s tbhir    
ksbipta_/m_/                            
dharmdilaksbilaksha_/n_/a_/m_/ kurma    
tadapekshvidy4 n4 ,gi4     ,,second     
,,pada4  ,,reverence ,,to ,,the         
,,highest ,,self6   #a4 ,that which is  
inferred 7by the ,snkhyas1 viz4 the     
pradhna7 cannot be the cause 7of the    
world71 on account of the orderly       

arrangement 7of the world7 being        
impossible 7on that hypothesis74        
,although it is the object of this      
system to define the true meaning of the
 ,vednta-texts and not1 like the science
 of ,logic1 to establish or refute some 
tenet by mere ratiocination1 still it is
 incumbent on thorough students of the  
,vednta to refute the ,snkhya and other 
systems which are obstacles in the way  
of perfect knowledge4 ,for this purpose 
a new chapter is begun4 7,nor must it be
 said that the refutation of the other  
systems ought to have preceded the      
establishment of the ,vednta position2  
for7 as the determination of the sense  
of the ,vednta-passages directly        
subserves perfect knowledge1 we have at 
first1 by means of such a determination1
 established our own position1 since    
this is a task more important than the  
refutation of the views entertained by  
others4  ,here an opponent might come   
forward and say that we are indeed      
entitled to establish our own position1 

so as to define perfect knowledge which 
is the means of release to those        
desirous of it1 but that no use is      
apparent of a refutation of other       
opinions1 a proceeding productive of    
nothing but hate and anger4--,there is a
 use1 we reply4 ,for there is some      
danger of men of inferior intelligence  
looking upon the ,snkhya and similar    
systems as requisite for perfect        
knowledge1 because those systems have a 
weighty appearance1 have been adopted by
 authoritative persons1 and profess to  
lead to perfect knowledge4 ,such people 
might therefore think that those systems
 with their abstruse arguments were     
propounded by omniscient sages1 and     
might on that account have faith in     
them4 ,for this reason we must endeavour
 to demonstrate their intrinsic         
worthlessness4  ,but1 it might be said1 
the ,snkhya and similar systems have    
already been impugned in several ,stras 
of the first adhyya 7,i1 #a1 #e1 #ah2   
,i1 #d1 #bh72 why1 then1 controvert them

 again8--,the task--we reply--which we  
are now about to undertake differs from 
what we have already accomplished4 ,as  
the ,snkhyas and other philosophers also
 quote1 in order to establish their own 
positions1 the ,vednta-passages and     
interpret them in such a manner as to   
make them agree with their own systems1 
we have hitherto endeavoured to show    
that their interpretations are          
altogether fallacious4 ,now1 however1 we
 are going to refute their arguments in 
an independent manner1 without any      
reference to the ,vednta-texts4  ,the   
,snkhyas1 to make a beginning with them1
 argue as follows4--,just as jars1      
dishes1 and other products which possess
 the common quality of consisting of    
clay are seen to have for their cause   
clay in general2 so we must suppose that
 all the outward and inward 7i4e4       
inanimate and animate7 effects which are
 endowed with the characteristics of    
pleasure1 pain1 and dulness#cad have for
 their causes pleasure1 pain1 and       

dulness in general4 ,pleasure1 pain1 and
 dulness in their generality together   
constitute the threefold pradhna4 ,this 
pradhna which is non-intelligent evolves
 itself spontaneously into multiform    
modifications#cae1 in order thus to     
effect the purposes 7i4e4 enjoyment1    
release1 and so on7 of the intelligent  
soul4--,the existence of the pradhna is 
to be inferred from other circumstances 
also1 such as the limitation of all     
effects and the like#caf4  ,against this
 doctrine we argue as follows4--,if you 
,snkhyas base your theory on parallel   
instances merely1 we point out that a   
non-intelligent thing which1 without    
being guided by an intelligent being1   
spontaneously produces effects capable  
of subserving the purposes of some      
particular person is nowhere observed in
 the world4 ,we rather observe that     
houses1 palaces1 couches1               
pleasure-grounds1 and the like--things  
which according to circumstances are    
conducive to the obtainment of pleasure 

or the avoidance of pain--are made by   
workmen endowed with intelligence4 ,now 
look at this entire world which appears1
 on the one hand1 as external 7i4e4     
inanimate7 in the form of earth and the 
other elements enabling 7the souls7 to  
enjoy the fruits of their various       
actions1 and1 on the other hand1 as     
animate1 in the form of bodies which    
belong to the different classes of      
beings1 possess a definite arrangement  
of organs1 and are therefore capable of 
constituting the abodes of fruition2    
look1 we say1 at this world1 of which   
the most ingenious workmen cannot even  
form a conception in their minds1 and   
then say if a non-intelligent principle 
like the pradhna is able to fashion it6 
,other non-intelligent things such as   
stones and clods of earth are certainly 
not seen to possess analogous powers4   
,we rather must assume that just as clay
 and similar substances are seen to     
fashion themselves into various forms1  
if worked upon by potters and the like1 

so the pradhna also 7when modifying     
itself into its effects7 is ruled by    
some intelligent principle4 ,when       
endeavouring to determine the nature of 
the primal cause 7of the world71 there  
is no need for us to take our stand on  
those attributes only which form part of
 the nature of material causes such as  
clay1 c41 and not on those also which   
belong to extraneous agents such as     
potters1 c4#cag ,nor 7if remembering    
this latter point7 do we enter into     
conflict with any means of right        
knowledge2 we1 on the contrary1 are in  
direct agreement with ,scripture which  
teaches that an intelligent cause       
exists4--,for the reason detailed in the
 above1 i4e4 on account of the          
impossibility of the 'orderly           
arrangement' 7of the world71 a          
non-intelligent cause of the world is   
not to be inferred4--,the word 'and' 7in
 the ,stra7 adds other reasons on       
account of which the pradhna cannot be  
inferred1 viz4 'on account of the       

non-possibility of endowment1' c4 ,for  
it cannot be maintained#cah that all    
outward and inward effects are 'endowed'
 with the nature of pleasure1 pain1 and 
dulness1 because pleasure1 c4 are known 
as inward 7mental7 states1 while sound1 
c4 7i4e4 the sense-objects7 are known as
 being of a different nature 7i4e4 as   
outward things71 and moreover as being  
the operative causes of pleasure1 c4#cai
 ,and1 further1 although the            
sense-object such as sound and so on is 
one1 yet we observe that owing to the   
difference of the mental impressions    
7produced by it7 differences exist in   
the effects it produces1 one person     
being affected by it pleasantly1 another
 painfully1 and so on#cbj4--7,turning to
 the next ,snkhya argument which infers 
the existence of the pradhna from the   
limitation of all effects71 we remark   
that he who concludes that all inward   
and outward effects depend on a         
conjunction of several things1 because  
they are limited 7a conclusion based on 

the observation that some limited       
effects such as roof and sprout1 c4     
depend on the conjunction of several    
things71 is driven to the conclusion    
that the three constituents of the      
pradhna1 viz4 ,goodness1 ,passion1 and  
,darkness1 likewise depend on the       
conjunction of several antecedents#cba2 
for they also are                       
limited#cbb4--;,further#cbc1 it is      
impossible to use the relation of cause 
and effect as a reason for assuming that
 all effects whatever have a            
non-intelligent principle for their     
antecedent2 for we have shown already   
that that relation exists in the case of
 couches and chairs also1 over whose    
production intelligence presides4  #b4  
,and on account of 7the impossibility   
of7 activity4  ,leaving the arrangement 
of the world1 we now pass on to the     
activity by which it is produced4--,the 
three gu_/n_/as1 passing out of the     
state of equipoise and entering into the
 condition of mutual subordination and  

superordination1 originate activities   
tending towards the production of       
particular effects4--,now these         
activities also cannot be ascribed to a 
non-intelligent pradhna left to itself1 
as no such activity is seen in clay and 
similar substances1 or in chariots and  
the like4 ,for we observe that clay and 
the like1 and chariots--which are in    
their own nature non-intelligent--enter 
on activities tending towards particular
 effects only when they are acted upon  
by intelligent beings such as potters1  
c4 in the one case1 and horses and the  
like in the other case4 ,from what is   
seen we determine what is not seen4     
,hence a non-intelligent cause of the   
world is not to be inferred because1 on 
that hypothesis1 the activity without   
which the world cannot be produced would
 be impossible4  ,but1 the ,snkhya      
rejoins1 we do likewise not observe     
activity on the part of mere intelligent
 beings4--,true2 we however see activity
 on the part of non-intelligent things  

such as chariots and the like when they 
are in conjunction with intelligent     
beings4--,but1 the ,snkhya again        
objects1 we never actually observe      
activity on the part of an intelligent  
being even when in conjunction with a   
non-intelligent thing4--,very well2 the 
question then arises3 ,does the activity
 belong to that in which it is actually 
observed 7as the ,snkhya says71 or to   
that on account of the conjunction with 
which it is observed 7as the ,vedntin   
avers78--,we must1 the ,snkhya replies1 
attribute activity to that in which it  
is actually seen1 since both 7i4e4 the  
activity and its abode7 are matter of   
observation4 ,a mere intelligent being1 
on the other hand1 is never observed as 
the abode of activity while a chariot   
is4 ,the#cbd existence of an intelligent
 ,self joined to a body and so on which 
are the abode of activity can be        
established 7by inference7 only2 the    
inference being based on the difference 
observed between living bodies and mere 

non-intelligent things1 such as chariots
 and the like4 ,for this very reason1   
viz4 that intelligence is observed only 
where a body is observed while it is    
never seen without a body1 the          
,materialists consider intelligence to  
be a mere attribute of the body4--,hence
 activity belongs only to what is       
non-intelligent4  ,to all this we--the  
,vedntins--make the following           
reply4--,we do not mean to say that     
activity does not belong to those       
non-intelligent things in which it is   
observed2 it does indeed belong to them2
 but it results from an intelligent     
principle1 because it exists when the   
latter is present and does not exist    
when the latter is absent4 ,just as the 
effects of burning and shining1 which   
have their abode in wood and similar    
material1 are indeed not observed when  
there is mere fire 7i4e4 are not due to 
mere fire2 as mere fire1 i4e4 fire      
without wood1 c41 does not exist71 but  
at the same time result from fire only  

as they are seen when fire is present   
and are not seen when fire is absent2   
so1 as the ,materialists also admit1    
only intelligent bodies are observed to 
be the movers of chariots and other     
non-intelligent things4 ,the motive     
power of intelligence is therefore      
incontrovertible4--,but--an objection   
will be raised--your ,self even if      
joined to a body is incapable of        
exercising moving power1 for motion     
cannot be effected by that the nature of
 which is pure intelligence4--,a thing1 
we reply1 which is itself devoid of     
motion may nevertheless move other      
things4 ,the magnet is itself devoid of 
motion1 and yet it moves iron2 and      
colours and the other objects of sense1 
although themselves devoid of motion1   
produce movements in the eyes and the   
other organs of sense4 ,so the ,lord    
also who is all-present1 the ,self of   
all1 all-knowing and all-powerful may1  
although himself unmoving1 move the     
universe4--,if it finally be objected   

that 7on the ,vednta doctrine7 there is 
no room for a moving power as in        
consequence of the oneness 7aduality7 of
 ,brahman no motion can take place2 we  
reply that such objections have         
repeatedly been refuted by our pointing 
to the fact of the ,lord being          
fictitiously connected with ,my1 which  
consists of name and form presented by  
,nescience4--,hence motion can be       
reconciled with the doctrine of an      
all-knowing first cause2 but not with   
the doctrine of a non-intelligent first 
cause4  #c4 ,if it be said 7that the    
pradhna moves7 like milk or water1 7we  
reply that7 there also 7the motion is   
due to intelligence74  ,well1 the       
,snkhya resumes1 listen then to the     
following instances4--,as non-sentient  
milk flows forth from its own nature    
merely for the nourishment of the young 
animal1 and as non-sentient water1 from 
its own nature1 flows along for the     
benefit of mankind1 so the pradhna also1
 although non-intelligent1 may be       

supposed to move from its own nature    
merely for the purpose of effecting the 
highest end of man4  ,this              
argumentation1 we reply1 is unsound     
again2 for as the adherents of both     
doctrines admit that motion is not      
observed in the case of merely          
non-intelligent things such as chariots1
 c41 we infer that water and milk also  
move only because they are directed by  
intelligent powers4 ,scriptural         
passages1 moreover 7such as ',he who    
dwells in the water and within the      
water1 who rules the water within1'     
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #d2 and1 ',by 
the command of that ,akshara1 ,o ,grg1  
some rivers flow to the ,east1' c41     
,b_/ri_/4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #i71 declare  
that everything in this world which     
flows is directed by the ,lord4 ,hence  
the instances of milk and water as      
belonging themselves to that class of   
cases which prove our general           
principle#cbe cannot be used to show    
that the latter is too wide4--,moreover1

 the cow1 which is an intelligent being 
and loves her calf1 makes her milk flow 
by her wish to do so1 and the milk is in
 addition drawn forth by the sucking of 
the calf4 ,nor does water move either   
with absolute independence--for its flow
 depends on the declivity of the soil   
and similar circumstances--or           
independently of an intelligent         
principle1 for we have shown that the   
latter is present in all cases4--,if1   
finally1 our opponent should point to   
,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #bd as contradicting the
 present ,stra1 we remark that there we 
have merely shown on the ground of      
ordinary experience that an effect may  
take place in itself independently of   
any external instrumental cause2 a      
conclusion which does not contradict the
 doctrine1 based on ,scripture1 that all
 effects depend on the ,lord4  #d4 ,and 
because 7the pradhna71 on account of    
there existing nothing beyond it1 stands
 in no relation2 7it cannot be active47 
,the three gu_/n_/as of the ,snkhyas    

when in a state of equipoise form the   
pradhna4 ,beyond the pradhna there      
exists no external principle which could
 either impel the pradhna to activity or
 restrain it from activity4 ,the soul   
7purusha71 as we know1 is indifferent1  
neither moves to--nor restrains         
from--action4 ,as therefore the pradhna 
stands in no relation1 it is impossible 
to see why it should sometimes modify   
itself into the great principle 7mahat7 
and sometimes not4 ,the activity and    
non-activity 7by turns7 of the ,lord1 on
 the other hand1 are not contrary to    
reason1 on account of his omniscience   
and omnipotence1 and his being connected
 with the power of illusion 7mya74  #e4 
,nor 7can it be said that the pradhna   
modifies itself spontaneously7 like     
grass1 c4 7which turn into milk72 for   
7milk7 does not exist elsewhere 7but in 
the female animal74  ,let this be 7the  
,snkhya resumes74 ,just as grass1 herbs1
 water1 c4 independently of any other   
instrumental cause transform themselves1

 by their own nature1 into milk2 so1 we 
assume1 the pradhna also transforms     
itself into the great principle1 and so 
on4 ,and1 if you ask how we know that   
grass transforms itself independently of
 any instrumental cause2 we reply1      
',because no such cause is observed4'   
,for if we did perceive some such cause1
 we certainly should apply it to grass1 
c4 according to our liking1 and thereby 
produce milk4 ,but as a matter of fact  
we do no such thing4 ,hence the         
transformation of grass and the like    
must be considered to be due to its own 
nature merely2 and we may infer         
therefrom that the transformation of the
 pradhna is of the same kind4  ,to this 
we make the following reply4--,the      
transformation of the pradhna might be  
ascribed to its own nature merely if we 
really could admit that grass modifies  
itself in the manner stated by you2 but 
we are unable to admit that1 since      
another instrumental cause is observed4 
,how8 ',because it does not exist       

elsewhere4' ,for grass becomes milk only
 when it is eaten by a cow or some other
 female animal1 not if it is left either
 uneaten or is eaten by a bull4 ,if the 
transformation had no special cause1    
grass would become milk even on other   
conditions than that of entering a cow's
 body4 ,nor would the circumstance of   
men not being able to produce milk      
according to their liking prove that    
there is no instrumental cause2 for     
while some effects can be produced by   
men1 others result from divine action   
only#cbf4 ,the fact1 however1 is that   
men also are able1 by applying a means  
in their power1 to produce milk from    
grass and herbs2 for when they wish to  
procure a more abundant supply of milk  
they feed the cow more plentifully and  
thus obtain more milk from her4--,for   
these reasons the spontaneous           
modification of the pradhna cannot be   
proved from the instance of grass and   
the like4  #f4 ,even if we admit 7the   
,snkhya position refuted in what        

precedes1 it is invalidated by other    
objections7 on account of the absence of
 a purpose 7on the part of the pradhna74
  ,even if we1 accommodating ourselves  
to your 7the ,snkhya's7 belief1 should  
admit what has been disproved in the    
preceding ,stra1 viz4 that the pradhna  
is spontaneously active1 still your     
opinion would lie open to an objection  
'on account of the absence of a         
purpose4' ,for if the spontaneous       
activity of the pradhna has1 as you say1
 no reference to anything else1 it will 
have no reference not only to any aiding
 principle1 but also to any purpose or  
motive1 and consequently your doctrine  
that the pradhna is active in order to  
effect the purpose of man will become   
untenable4 ,if you reply that the       
pradhna does not indeed regard any      
aiding principle1 but does regard a     
purpose1 we remark that in that case we 
must distinguish between the different  
possible purposes1 viz4 either enjoyment
 7on the part of the soul71 or final    

release1 or both4 ,if enjoyment1 what   
enjoyment1 we ask1 can belong to the    
soul which is naturally incapable of any
 accretion 7of pleasure or pain7#cbg8   
,moreover1 there would in that case be  
no opportunity for release#cbh4--;,if   
release1 then the activity of the       
pradhna would be purposeless1 as even   
antecedently to it the soul is in the   
state of release2 moreover1 there would 
then be no occasion for the perception  
of sounds1 c4#cbi--;,if both1 then1 on  
account of the infinite number of the   
objects of pradhna to be enjoyed 7by the
 soul7#ccj1 there would be no           
opportunity for final release4 ,nor can 
the satisfaction of a desire be         
considered as the purpose of the        
activity of the pradhna2 for neither the
 non-intelligent pradhna nor the        
essentially pure soul can feel any      
desire4--,if1 finally1 you should assume
 the pradhna to be active1 because      
otherwise the power of sight 7belonging 
to the soul on account of its           

intelligent nature7 and the creative    
power 7belonging to the pradhna7 would  
be purposeless2 it would follow that1 as
 the creative power of the pradhna does 
not cease at any time any more than the 
soul's power of sight does1 the apparent
 world would never come to an end1 so   
that no final release of the soul could 
take place#cca4--;,it is1 therefore1    
impossible to maintain that the pradhna 
enters on its activity for the purposes 
of the soul4  #g4 ,and if you say 7that 
the soul may move the pradhna7 as the   
7lame7 man 7moves the blind one7 or as  
the magnet 7moves the iron72 thus also  
7the difficulty is not overcome74  ,well
 then--the ,snkhya resumes1 endeavouring
 to defend his position by parallel     
instances--let us say that1 as some lame
 man devoid of the power of motion1 but 
possessing the power of sight1 having   
mounted the back of a blind man who is  
able to move but not to see1 makes the  
latter move2 or as the magnet not moving
 itself1 moves the iron1 so the soul    

moves the pradhna4--,thus also1 we      
reply1 you do not free your doctrine    
from all shortcomings2 for this your new
 position involves an abandonment of    
your old position1 according to which   
the pradhna is moving of itself1 and the
 7indifferent1 inactive7 soul possesses 
no moving power4 ,and how should the    
indifferent soul move the pradhna8 ,a   
man1 although lame1 may make a blind man
 move by means of words and the like2   
but the soul which is devoid of action  
and qualities cannot possibly put forth 
any moving energy4 ,nor can it be said  
that it moves the pradhna by its mere   
proximity as the magnet moves the iron2 
for from the permanency of proximity 7of
 soul and pradhna7 a permanency of      
motion would follow4 ,the proximity of  
the magnet1 on the other hand 7to the   
iron71 is not permanent1 but depends on 
a certain activity and the adjustment of
 the magnet in a certain position2 hence
 the 7lame7 man and the magnet do not   
supply really parallel instances4--,the 

pradhna then being non-intelligent and  
the soul indifferent1 and there being no
 third principle to connect them1 there 
can be no connexion of the two4 ,if we  
attempted to establish a connexion on   
the ground of capability 7of being seen 
on the part of the pradhna1 of seeing on
 the part of the soul71 the permanency  
of such capability would imply the      
impossibility of final                  
release4--,moreover1 here as well as    
before 7in the preceding ,stra7 the     
different alternatives connected with   
the absence of purpose 7on the pradhna's
 part7 have to be considered#ccb4--,the 
highest ,self1 on the other hand 7which 
is the cause of the world1 according to 
the ,vedntins71 is characterised by     
non-activity inherent in its own nature1
 and1 at the same time1 by moving power 
inherent in ,my and is thus superior 7to
 the soul of the ,snkhyas74  #h4 ,and1  
again1 7the pradhna cannot be active7   
because the relation of principal 7and  
subordinate matter7 is impossible       

7between the three gu_/n_/as74  ,for the
 following reason also activity on the  
part of the pradhna is not              
possible4--,the condition of the pradhna
 consists in the three gu_/n_/as1 viz4  
goodness1 passion1 and darkness1 abiding
 in themselves in a state of equipoise  
without standing to one another in the  
relation of mutual superiority or       
inferiority4 ,in that state the         
gu_/n_/as cannot possibly enter into the
 relation of mutual subserviency because
 thereby they would forfeit their       
essential characteristic1 viz4 absolute 
independence4 ,and as there exists no   
extraneous principle to stir up the     
gu_/n_/as1 the production of the great  
principle and the other effects--which  
would acquire for its operative cause a 
non-balanced state of the gu_/n_/as--is 
impossible4  #i4 ,and although another  
inference be made1 7the objections      
remain in force7 on account of the      
7pradhna7 being devoid of the power of  
intelligence4  ,but--the ,snkhya        

resumes--we draw another inference1 so  
as to leave no room for the objection   
just stated4 ,we do not acknowledge the 
gu_/n_/as to be characterised by        
absolute irrelativity and               
unchangeableness1 since there is no     
proof for such an assumption4 ,we rather
 infer the characteristics of the       
gu_/n_/as from those of their effects1  
presuming that their nature must be such
 as to render the production of the     
effects possible4 ,now the gu_/n_/as are
 admitted to be of an unsteady nature2  
hence the gu_/n_/as themselves are able 
to enter into the relation of mutual    
inequality1 even while they are in a    
state of equipoise4  ,even in that case1
 we reply1 the objections stated above  
which were founded on the impossibility 
of an orderly arrangement of the world1 
c41 remain in force on account of the   
pradhna being devoid of the power of    
intelligence4 ,and if 7to escape those  
objections7 the ,snkhya should infer    
7from the orderly arrangement of the    

world1 c471 that the primal cause is    
intelligent1 he would cease to be an    
antagonist1 since the doctrine that     
there is one intelligent cause of this  
multiform world would be nothing else   
but the ,vedntic doctrine of            
,brahman4--,moreover1 if the gu_/n_/as  
were capable of entering into the       
relation of mutual inequality even while
 in the state of equipoise1 one of two  
things would happen2 they would either  
not be in the condition of inequality on
 account of the absence of an operative 
cause2 or else1 if they were in that    
condition1 they would always remain in  
it2 the absence of an operative cause   
being a non-changing circumstance4 ,and 
thus the doctrine would again be open to
 the objection stated before#ccc4  #aj4 
,and moreover 7the ,snkhya doctrine7 is 
objectionable on account of its         
contradictions4  ,the doctrine of the   
,snkhyas1 moreover1 is full of          
contradictions4 ,sometimes they         
enumerate seven senses1 sometimes       

eleven#ccd4 ,in some places they teach  
that the subtle elements of material    
things proceed from the great principle1
 in other places again that they proceed
 from self-consciousness4 ,sometimes    
they speak of three internal organs1    
sometimes of one only#cce4 ,that their  
doctrine1 moreover1 contradicts         
_/,s_/ruti1 which teaches that the ,lord
 is the cause of the world1 and         
,sm_/ri_/ti1 based on _/,s_/ruti1 is    
well known4--,for these reasons also the
 ,snkhya system is objectionable4  ,here
 the ,snkhya again brings a             
countercharge--,the system of the       
,vedntins also1 he says1 must be        
declared to be objectionable2 for it    
does not admit that that which suffers  
and that which causes suffering#ccf are 
different classes of things 7and thereby
 renders futile the well-established    
distinction of causes of suffering and  
suffering beings74 ,for those who admit 
the one ,brahman to be the ,self of     
everything and the cause of the whole   

world1 have to admit also that the two  
attributes of being that which causes   
suffering and that which suffers belong 
to the one supreme ,self 7not to        
different classes of beings74 ,if1 then1
 these two attributes belong to one and 
the same ,self1 it never can divest     
itself of them1 and thus ,scripture1    
which teaches perfect knowledge for the 
purpose of the cessation of all         
suffering1 loses all its meaning4       
,for--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp 
as long as it subsists as such is never 
divested of the two qualities of giving 
heat and light4 ,and if the ,vedntin    
should adduce the case of water with its
 waves1 ripples1 foam1 c4#ccg1 we remark
 that there also the waves1 c4          
constitute attributes of the water which
 remain permanently1 although they by   
turns manifest themselves1 and again    
enter into the state of                 
non-manifestation2 hence the water is   
never really destitute of waves1 not any
 more than the lamp is ever destitute of

 heat and light4--,that that which      
causes suffering1 and that which suffers
 constitute different classes of things 
is1 moreover1 well known from ordinary  
experience4 ,for 7to consider the matter
 from a more general point of view7 the 
person desiring and the thing           
desired#cch are understood to be        
separate existences4 ,if the object of  
desire were not essentially different   
and separate from the person desiring1  
the state of being desirous could not be
 ascribed to the latter1 because the    
object with reference to which alone he 
can be called desiring would already    
essentially be established in him       
7belong to him74 ,the latter state of   
things exists in the case of a lamp and 
its light1 for instance4 ,light         
essentially belongs to the lamp1 and    
hence the latter never can stand in want
 of light2 for want or desire can exist 
only if the thing wanted or desired is  
not yet obtained4  7,and just as there  
could be no desiring person1 if the     

object of desire and the desiring person
 were not essentially separate71 so the 
object of desire also would cease to be 
an object for the desiring person1 and  
would be an object for itself only4 ,as 
a matter of fact1 however1 this is not  
the case2 for the two ideas 7and terms71
 'object of desire' and 'desiring       
person1' imply a relation 7are          
correlative71 and a relation exists in  
two things1 not in one only4 ,hence the 
desiring person and the object of desire
 are separate4--,the same holds good    
with regard to what is not desired      
7object of aversion2 anartha7 and the   
non-desiring person 7anarthin74  ,an    
object of desire is whatever is of      
advantage to the desiring person1 an    
object of aversion whatever is of       
disadvantage2 with both one person      
enters into relation by turns4 ,on      
account of the comparative paucity of   
the objects of desire1 and the          
comparative multitude of the objects of 
aversion1 both may be comprised under   

the general term1 'object of aversion4' 
,now1 these objects of aversion we mean 
when we use the term 'causes of         
suffering1' while by the term 'sufferer'
 we understand the soul which1 being    
one1 enters into successive relations   
with both 7i4e4 the objects of desire   
and the objects of aversion74 ,if1 then1
 the causes of suffering and the        
sufferer constitute one ,self 7as the   
,vednta teaches71 it follows that final 
release is impossible4--,but if1 on the 
other hand1 the two are assumed to      
constitute separate classes1 the        
possibility of release is not excluded1 
since the cause of the connexion of the 
two 7viz4 wrong knowledge7 may be       
removed4  ,all this reasoning--we1 the  
,vedntins1 reply--is futile1 because on 
account of the unity of the ,self the   
relation1 whose two terms are the causes
 of suffering1 and the sufferer cannot  
exist 7in the ,self74--,our doctrine    
would be liable to your objection if    
that which causes suffering and that    

which suffers did1 while belonging to   
one and the same ,self1 stand to each   
other in the relation of object and     
subject4 ,but they do not stand in that 
relation just because they are one4 ,if 
fire1 although it possesses different   
attributes1 such as heat and light1 and 
is capable of change1 does neither burn 
nor illumine itself since it is one     
only2 how can the one unchangeable      
,brahman enter with reference to itself 
into the relation of cause of suffering 
and sufferer8--,where then1 it may be   
asked1 does the relation discussed      
7which after all cannot be denied       
altogether7 exist8--,that1 we reply1 is 
not difficult to see#cci4 ,the living   
body which is the object of the action  
of burning is the sufferer2 the sun1 for
 instance1 is a cause of suffering      
7burning74--,but1 the opponent rejoins1 
burning is a pain1 and as such can      
affect an intelligent being only1 not   
the non-intelligent body2 for if it were
 an affection of the mere body1 it      

would1 on the destruction of the body1  
cease of itself1 so that it would be    
needless to seek for means to make it   
cease4--,but it is likewise not         
observed1 we reply1 that a mere         
intelligent being destitute of a body is
 burned and suffers pain4--,nor would   
you 7the ,snkhya7 also assume that the  
affection called burning belongs to a   
mere intelligent being4 ,nor can you    
admit#cdj a real connexion of the soul  
and the body1 because through such a    
connexion impurity and similar          
imperfections would attach to the       
soul#cda4 ,nor can suffering itself be  
said to suffer4 ,and how then1 we ask1  
can you explain the relation existing   
between a sufferer and the causes of    
suffering8 ,if 7as a last refuge7 you   
should maintain that the sattva-gu_/n_/a
 is that which suffers1 and the gu_/n_/a
 called passion that which causes       
suffering1 we again object1 because the 
intelligent principle 7the soul7 cannot 
be really connected with these two#cdb4 

,and if you should say that the soul    
suffers as it were because it leans     
towards#cdc the sattva-gu_/n_/a1 we     
point out that the employment of the    
phrase1 'as it were1' shows that the    
soul does not really suffer4  ,if it is 
understood that its suffering is not    
real1 we do not object to the phrase 'as
 it were#cdd4' ,for the amphisbena also 
does not become venomous because it is  
'a serpent as it were' 7'like a         
serpent'71 nor does the serpent lose its
 venom because it is 'like an           
amphisbena4' ,you must therefore admit  
that the relation of causes of suffering
 and of sufferers is not real1 but the  
effect of ,nescience4 ,and if you admit1
 that1 then my 7the ,vedntic7 doctrine  
also is free from objections#cde4  ,but 
perhaps you 7the ,snkhya7 will say that1
 after all1 suffering 7on the part of   
the soul7 is real#cdf4 ,in that case1   
however1 the impossibility of release is
 all the more undeniable#cdg1 especially
 as the cause of suffering 7viz4 the    

pradhna7 is admitted to be              
eternal4--,and if 7to get out of this   
difficulty7 you maintain that1 although 
the potentialities of suffering 7on the 
part of the soul7 and of causing        
suffering 7on the part of the pradhna7  
are eternal1 yet suffering1 in order to 
become actual1 requires the conjunction 
of the two--which conjunction in its    
turn depends on a special reason1 viz4  
the non-discrimination of the pradhna by
 the soul--and that hence1 when that    
reason no longer exists1 the conjunction
 of the two comes to an absolute        
termination1 whereby the absolute       
release of the soul becomes possible2 we
 are again unable to accept your        
explanation1 because that on which the  
non-discrimination depends1 viz4 the    
gu_/n_/a1 called ,darkness1 is          
acknowledged by you to be eternal4  ,and
 as#cdh there is no fixed rule for the  
7successive7 rising and sinking of the  
influence of the particular gu_/n_/as1  
there is also no fixed rule for the     

termination of the cause which effects  
the conjunction of soul and pradhna     
7i4e4 non-discrimination72 hence the    
disjunction of the two is uncertain1 and
 so the ,snkhyas cannot escape the      
reproach of absence of final release    
resulting from their doctrine4 ,to the  
,vedntin1 on the other hand1 the idea of
 final release being impossible cannot  
occur in his dreams even2 for the ,self 
he acknowledges to be one only1 and one 
thing cannot enter into the relation of 
subject and object1 and ,scripture1     
moreover1 declares that the plurality of
 effects originates from speech only4   
,for the phenomenal world1 on the other 
hand1 we may admit the relation of      
sufferer and suffering just as it is    
observed1 and need neither object to it 
nor refute it4  ,herewith we have       
refuted the doctrine which holds the    
pradhna to be the cause of the world4   
,we have now to dispose of the atomic   
theory4  ,we begin by refuting an       
objection raised by the atomists against

 the upholders of ,brahman4--,the       
,vai_/s_/eshikas argue as follows3 ,the 
qualities which inhere in the substance 
constituting the cause originate        
qualities of the same kind in the       
substance constituting the effect2 we   
see1 for instance1 that from white      
threads white cloth is produced1 but do 
not observe what is contrary 7viz4 white
 threads resulting in a piece of cloth  
of a different colour74 ,hence1 if the  
intelligent ,brahman is assumed as the  
cause of the world1 we should expect to 
find intelligence inherent in the effect
 also1 viz4 the world4 ,but this is not 
the case1 and consequently the          
intelligent ,brahman cannot be the cause
 of the world4--,this reasoning the     
,strakra shows to be fallacious1 on the 
ground of the system of the             
,vai_/s_/eshikas themselves4  ,,ii4 ,or 
7the world may originate from ,brahman7 
as the great and the long originate from
 the short and the atomic4  ,the system 
of the ,vai_/s_/eshikas is the          

following3--,the atoms which possess1   
according to their special kind#cdi1 the
 qualities of colour1 c41 and which are 
of spherical form#cej1 subsist during a 
certain period#cea without producing any
 effects#ceb4 ,after that1 the unseen   
principle 7ad_/ri_/sh_/ta_/71 c4#cec1   
acting as operative causes and          
conjunction constituting the            
non-inherent cause#ced1 they produce the
 entire aggregate of effected things1   
beginning with binary atomic compounds4 
,at the same time the qualities of the  
causes 7i4e4 of the simple atoms7       
produce corresponding qualities in the  
effects4 ,thus1 when two atoms produce a
 binary atomic compound1 the special    
qualities belonging to the simple atoms1
 such as white colour1 c41 produce a    
corresponding white colour in the binary
 compound4 ,one special quality1        
however1 of the simple atoms1 viz4      
atomic sphericity1 does not produce     
corresponding sphericity in the binary  
compound2 for the forms of extension    

belonging to the latter are said to be  
minuteness 7a_/n_/utva7 and shortness4  
,and1 again1 when two binary compounds  
combining produce a quaternary atomic   
compound1 the qualities1 such as        
whiteness1 c41 inherent in the binary   
compounds produce corresponding         
qualities in the quaternary compounds2  
with the exception1 however1 of the two 
qualities of minuteness and shortness4  
,for it is admitted that the forms of   
extension belonging to quaternary       
compounds are not minuteness and        
shortness1 but bigness 7mahattva7 and   
length4 ,the same happens#cee when many 
simple atoms or many binary compounds or
 a simple atom and a binary compound    
combine to produce new effects4  ,well1 
then1 we say1 just as from spherical    
atoms binary compounds are produced1    
which are minute and short1 and ternary 
compounds which are big and long1 but   
not anything spherical2 or as from      
binary compounds1 which are minute and  
short1 ternary compounds1 c41 are       

produced which are big and long1 not    
minute and short2 so this               
non-intelligent world may spring from   
the intelligent ,brahman4 ,this is a    
doctrine to which you--the              
,vai_/s_/eshika--cannot1 on your own    
principles1 object4  ,here the          
,vai_/s_/eshika will perhaps come       
forward with the following              
argumentation#cef4 ,as effected         
substances1 such as binary compounds and
 so on1 are engrossed by forms of       
extension contrary to that of the causal
 substances1 the forms of extension     
belonging to the latter1 viz4 sphericity
 and so on1 cannot produce similar      
qualities in the effects4 ,the world1 on
 the other hand1 is not engrossed by any
 quality contrary to intelligence owing 
to which the intelligence inherent in   
the cause should not be able to         
originate a new intelligence in the     
effect4 ,for non-intelligence is not a  
quality contrary to intelligence1 but   
merely its negation4 ,as thus the case  

of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
 one1 intelligence may very well produce
 an effect similar to itself4  ,this    
argumentation1 we rejoin1 is not sound4 
,just as the qualities of sphericity and
 so on1 although existing in the cause1 
do not produce corresponding effects1 so
 it is with intelligence also2 so that  
the two cases are parallel so far4 ,nor 
can the circumstance of the effects     
being engrossed by a different form of  
extension be alleged as the reason of   
sphericity1 c4 not originating qualities
 similar to themselves2 for the power of
 originating effects belongs to         
sphericity1 c4 before another form of   
extension begins to exist4 ,for it is   
admitted that the substance produced    
remains for a moment devoid of          
qualities1 and that thereupon only 7i4e4
 after that moment7 its qualities begin 
to exist4 ,nor1 again1 can it be said   
that sphericity1 c4 concentrate their   
activity on originating other forms of  
extension#ceg1 and therefore do not     

originate forms of extension belonging  
to the same class as their own2 for it  
is admitted that the origin of other    
forms is due to other causes2 as the    
,stras of ,ka_/n_/abhuj 7,ka_/n_/da7    
themselves declare 7,vai_/s_/4 ,st4     
,,vii1 #a1 #i1 ',bigness is produced    
from plurality inherent in the causes1  
from bigness of the cause and from a    
kind of accumulation2' ,,vii1 #a1 #aj1  
',the contrary of this 7the big7 is the 
minute2' ,,vii1 #a1 #ag1 ',thereby      
length and shortness are                
explained#ceh'74--,nor1 again1 can it be
 said that plurality1 c4 inherent in the
 cause originate 7like effects7 in      
consequence of some peculiar proximity  
7in which they are supposed to stand to 
the effected substance71 while          
sphericity1 c4 7not standing in a like  
proximity7 do not2 for when a new       
substance or a new quality is           
originated1 all the qualities of the    
cause stand in the same relation of     
inherence to their abode 7i4e4 the      

causal substance in which they inhere74 
,for these reasons the fact of          
sphericity1 c4 not originating like     
effects can be explained from the       
essential nature of sphericity1 c4 only1
 and the same may therefore be          
maintained with regard to               
intelligence#cei4  ,moreover1 from that 
observed fact also1 that from           
conjunction 7sa_/m_/yoga7 there         
originate substances1 c4 belonging to a 
class different 7from that to which     
conjunction itself belongs71 it follows 
that the doctrine of effects belonging  
to the same class as the causes from    
which they spring is too wide4 ,if you  
remark against this last argument that1 
as we have to do at present with a      
substance 7viz4 ,brahman71 it is        
inappropriate to instance a quality     
7viz4 conjunction7 as a parallel case2  
we point out that at present we only    
wish to explain the origination of      
effects belonging to a different class  
in general4 ,nor is there any reason for

 the restriction that substances only   
are to be adduced as examples for       
substances1 and qualities only for      
qualities4 ,your own ,strakra adduces a 
quality as furnishing a parallel case   
for a substance 7,vai_/s_/4 ,st4 ,,iv1  
#b1 #b1 ',on account of the conjunction 
of things perceptible and things        
imperceptible being imperceptible the   
body is not composed of five elements'74
 ,just as the conjunction which inheres 
in the perceptible earth and the        
imperceptible ether is not perceptible1 
the body also1 if it had for its        
inherent cause the five elements which  
are part of them perceptible1 part of   
them imperceptible1 would itself be     
imperceptible2 but1 as a matter of fact1
 it is perceptible2 hence it is not     
composed of the five elements4 ,here    
conjunction is a quality and the body a 
substance4--,the origin of effects      
different in nature 7from the cause7    
has1 moreover1 been already treated of  
under ,,ii1 #a2 #f4--,well then1 this   

being so1 the matter has been settled   
there already 7why then is it again     
discussed here87-,because1 we reply1    
there we argued against the ,snkhya1 and
 at present we have to do with the      
,vai_/s_/eshika4--,but1 already once1   
before 7,,ii1 #a1 #c7 a line of argument
 equally applicable to a second case was
 simply declared to extend to the latter
 also2 7why then do you not simply state
 now that the arguments used to defeat  
the ,snkhya are equally valid against   
the ,vai_/s_/eshika87--,because here1 we
 reply1 at the beginning of the         
examination of the ,vai_/s_/eshika      
system we prefer to discuss the point   
with arguments specially adapted to the 
doctrine of the ,vai_/s_/eshikas4  #ab4 
,in both cases also 7in the cases of the
 ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a inhering either in the
 atoms or the soul7 action 7of the      
atoms7 is not 7possible72 hence absence 
of that 7viz4 creation and pralaya74    
,the ,strakra now proceeds to refute the
 doctrine of atoms being the cause of   

the world4--,this doctrine arises in the
 following manner4 ,we see that all     
ordinary substances which consist of    
parts as1 for instance1 pieces of cloth 
originate from the substances connected 
with them by the relation of inherence1 
as for instance threads1 conjunction    
co-operating 7with the parts to form the
 whole74 ,we thence draw the general    
conclusion that whatever consists of    
parts has originated from those         
substances with which it is connected by
 the relation of inherence1 conjunction 
cooperating4 ,that thing now at which   
the distinction of whole and parts stops
 and which marks the limit of division  
into minuter parts is the atom4--,this  
whole world1 with its mountains1 oceans1
 and so on1 is composed of parts2       
because it is composed of parts it has a
 beginning and an end#cfj2 an effect may
 not be assumed without a cause2        
therefore the atoms are the cause of the
 world4 ,such is ,ka_/n_/da's           
doctrine4--,as we observe four          

elementary substances consisting of     
parts1 viz4 earth1 water1 fire1 and air 
7wind71 we have to assume four different
 kinds of atoms4 ,these atoms marking   
the limit of subdivision into minuter   
parts cannot be divided themselves2     
hence when the elements are destroyed   
they can be divided down to atoms only2 
this state of atomic division of the    
elements constitutes the pralaya 7the   
periodical destruction of the world74   
,after that when the time for creation  
comes1 motion 7karman7 springs up in the
 aerial atoms4 ,this motion which is due
 to the unseen principle#cfa joins the  
atom in which it resides to another     
atom2 thus binary compounds1 c4 are     
produced1 and finally the element of    
air4 ,in a like manner are produced     
fire1 water1 earth1 the body with its   
organs4 ,thus the whole world originates
 from atoms4 ,from the qualities        
inhering in the atoms the qualities     
belonging to the binary compounds are   
produced1 just as the qualities of the  

cloth result from the qualities of the  
threads4--,such1 in short1 is the       
teaching of the followers of ,ka_/n_/da4
  ,this doctrine we controvert in the   
following manner4--,it must be admitted 
that the atoms when they are in a state 
of isolation require action 7motion7 to 
bring about their conjunction2 for we   
observe that the conjunction of threads 
and the like is effected by action4     
,action again1 which is itself an       
effect1 requires some operative cause by
 which it is brought about2 for unless  
some such cause exists1 no original     
motion can take place in the atoms4 ,if1
 then1 some operative cause is assumed1 
we may1 in the first place1 assume some 
cause analogous to seen causes1 such as 
endeavour or impact4 ,but in that case  
original motion could not occur at all  
in the atoms1 since causes of that kind 
are1 at the time1 impossible4 ,for in   
the pralaya state endeavour1 which is a 
quality of the soul1 cannot take place  
because no body exists then4 ,for the   

quality of the soul called endeavour    
originates when the soul is connected   
with the internal organ which abides in 
the body4 ,the same reason precludes the
 assumption of other seen causes such as
 impact and the like4 ,for they all are 
possible only after the creation of the 
world has taken place1 and cannot       
therefore be the causes of the original 
action 7by which the world is           
produced74--,if1 in the second place1   
the unseen principle is assumed as the  
cause of the original motion of the     
atoms1 we ask3 ,is this unseen principle
 to be considered as inhering in the    
soul or in the atom8 ,in both cases it  
cannot be the cause of motion in the    
atoms1 because it is non-intelligent4   
,for1 as we have shown above in our     
examination of the ,snkhya system1 a    
non-intelligent thing which is not      
directed by an intelligent principle    
cannot of itself either act or be the   
cause of action1 and the soul cannot be 
the guiding principle of the            

ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a because at the time of 
pralaya its intelligence has not yet    
arisen#cfb4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the 
unseen principle is supposed to inhere  
in the soul1 it cannot be the cause of  
motion in the atoms1 because there      
exists no connexion of it with the      
latter4 ,if you say that the soul in    
which the unseen principle inheres is   
connected with the atoms1 then there    
would result1 from the continuity of    
connexion#cfc1 continuity of action1 as 
there is no other restricting           
principle4--,hence1 there being no      
definite cause of action1 original      
action cannot take place in the atoms2  
there being no action1 conjunction of   
the atoms which depends on action cannot
 take place2 there being no conjunction1
 all the effects depending on it1 viz4  
the formation of binary atomic          
compounds1 c41 cannot originate4  ,how1 
moreover1 is the conjunction of one atom
 with another to be imagined8 ,is it to 
be total interpenetration of the two or 

partial conjunction8 ,if the former1    
then no increase of bulk could take     
place1 and consequently atomic size only
 would exist2 moreover1 it would be     
contrary to what is observed1 as we see 
that conjunction takes place between    
substances having parts 7prade_/s_/a74  
,if the latter1 it would follow that the
 atoms are composed of parts4--,let then
 the atoms be imagined to consist of    
parts4--,if so1 imagined things being   
unreal1 the conjunction also of the     
atoms would be unreal and thus could not
 be the non-inherent cause of real      
things4 ,and without non-inherent causes
 effected substances such as binary     
compounds1 c4 could not originate4 ,and 
just as at the time of the first        
creation motion of the atoms leading to 
their conjunction could not take place1 
there being no cause of such motion2    
thus at the time of a general pralaya   
also no action could take place leading 
to their separation1 since for that     
occurrence also no definite seen cause  

could be alleged4 ,nor could the unseen 
principle be adduced as the cause1 since
 its purport is to effect enjoyment 7of 
reward and punishment on the part of the
 soul71 not to bring about the pralaya4 
,there being then no possibility of     
action to effect either the conjunction 
or the separation of the atoms1 neither 
conjunction nor separation would        
actually take place1 and hence neither  
creation nor pralaya of the world4--,for
 these reasons the doctrine of the atoms
 being the cause of the world must be   
rejected4  #ac4 ,and because in         
consequence of samavya being admitted a 
regressus in infinitum results from     
parity of reasoning4  ,you 7the         
,vai_/s_/eshika7 admit that a binary    
compound which originates from two      
atoms1 while absolutely different from  
them1 is connected with them by the     
relation of inherence2 but on that      
assumption the doctrine of the atoms    
being the general cause cannot be       
established1 'because parity involves   

here a retrogressus ad infinitum4' ,for 
just as a binary compound which is      
absolutely different from the two       
constituent atoms is connected with them
 by means of the relation of inherence  
7samavya71 so the relation of inherence 
itself being absolutely different from  
the two things which it connects1       
requires another relation of inherence  
to connect it with them1 there being    
absolute difference in both cases4 ,for 
this second relation of inherence again1
 a third relation of inherence would    
have to be assumed and so on ad         
infinitum4--,but--the ,vai_/s_/eshika is
 supposed to reply--we are conscious of 
the so-called samavya relation as       
eternally connected with the things     
between which it exists1 not as either  
non-connected with them or as depending 
on another connexion2 we are therefore  
not obliged to assume another connexion1
 and again another1 and so on1 and thus 
to allow ourselves to be driven into a  
regressus in infinitum4--,your defence  

is unavailing1 we reply1 for it would   
involve the admission that conjunction  
7sa_/m_/yoga7 also as being eternally   
connected with the things which it joins
 does1 like samavya1 not require another
 connexion#cfd4 ,if you say that        
conjunction does require another        
connexion because it is a different     
thing#cfe we reply that then samavya    
also requires another connexion because 
it is likewise a different thing4 ,nor  
can you say that conjunction does       
require another connexion because it is 
a quality 7gu_/n_/a71 and samavya does  
not because it is not a quality2 for 7in
 spite of this difference7 the reason   
for another connexion being required is 
the same in both cases#cff1 and not that
 which is technically called 'quality'  
is the cause 7of another connexion being
 required7#cfg4--;,for these reasons    
those who acknowledge samavya to be a   
separate existence are driven into a    
regressus in infinitum1 in consequence  
of which1 the impossibility of one term 

involving the impossibility of the      
entire series1 not even the origination 
of a binary compound from two atoms can 
be accounted for4--,for this reason also
 the atomic doctrine is inadmissible4   
#ad4 ,and on account of the permanent   
existence 7of activity or non-activity74
  ,moreover1 the atoms would have to be 
assumed as either essentially active    
7moving7 or essentially non-active1 or  
both or neither2 there being no fifth   
alternative4 ,but none of the four      
alternatives stated is possible4 ,if    
they were essentially active1 their     
activity would be permanent so that no  
pralaya could take place4 ,if they were 
essentially non-active1 their           
non-activity would be permanent1 and no 
creation could take place4 ,their being 
both is impossible because              
self-contradictory4 ,if they were       
neither1 their activity and non-activity
 would have to depend on an operative   
cause1 and then the operative causes    
such as the ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a being in   

permanent proximity to the atoms1       
permanent activity would result2 or else
 the ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a and so on not     
being taken as operative causes1 the    
consequence would be permanent          
non-activity on the part of the         
atoms4--,for this reason also the atomic
 doctrine is untenable4  #ae4 ,and on   
account of the atoms having colour1 c41 
the reverse 7of the ,vai_/s_/eshika     
tenet would take place72 as thus it is  
observed4  ,let us suppose1 the         
,vai_/s_/eshikas say1 all substances    
composed of parts to be disintegrated   
into their parts2 a limit will finally  
be reached beyond which the process of  
disintegration cannot be continued4     
,what constitutes that limit are the    
atoms1 which are eternal 7permanent71   
belong to four different classes1       
possess the qualities of colour1 c41 and
 are the originating principles of this 
whole material world with its colour1   
form1 and other qualities4  ,this       
fundamental assumption of the           

,vai_/s_/eshikas we declare to be       
groundless because from the circumstance
 of the atoms having colour and other   
qualities there would follow the        
contrary of atomic minuteness and       
permanency1 i4e4 it would follow that1  
compared to the ultimate cause1 they are
 gross and non-permanent4 ,for ordinary 
experience teaches that whatever things 
possess colour and other qualities are1 
compared to their cause1 gross and      
non-permanent4 ,a piece of cloth1 for   
instance1 is gross compared to the      
threads of which it consists1 and non   
permanent2 and the threads again are    
non-permanent and gross compared to the 
filaments of which they are made up4    
,therefore the atoms also which the     
,vai_/s_/eshikas admit to have colour1  
c4 must have causes compared to which   
they are gross and non-permanent4 ,hence
 that reason also which ,ka_/n_/da gives
 for the permanence of the atoms 7,,iv1 
#a1 #a1 'that which exists without      
having a cause is permanent'7 does not  

apply at all to the atoms because1 as we
 have shown just now1 the atoms are to  
be considered as having a cause4--,the  
second reason also which ,ka_/n_/da     
brings forward for the permanency of the
 atoms1 viz4 in ,,iv1 #a1 #d1 'the      
special negation implied in the term    
non-eternal would not be possible#cfh'  
7if there did not exist something       
eternal1 viz4 the atoms71 does not      
necessarily prove the permanency of the 
atoms2 for supposing that there exists  
not any permanent thing1 the formation  
of a negative compound such as          
'non-eternal' is impossible4 ,nor does  
the existence of the word               
'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose   
the permanency of atoms2 for there      
exists 7as we ,vedntins maintain7       
another permanent ultimate ,cause1 viz4 
,brahman4 ,nor can the existence of     
anything be established merely on the   
ground of a word commonly being used in 
that sense1 since there is room for     
common use only if word and matter are  

well-established by some other means of 
right knowledge4--,the third reason also
 given in the ,vai_/s_/4 ,stras 7,,iv1  
#a1 #e7 for the permanency of the atoms 
7'and ,nescience'7 is unavailing4 ,for  
if we explain that ,stra to mean 'the   
non-perception of those actually        
existing causes whose effects are seen  
is ,nescience1' it would follow that the
 binary atomic compounds also are       
permanent#cfi4 ,and if we tried to      
escape from that difficulty by including
 7in the explanation of the ,stra as    
given above7 the qualification 'there   
being absence of 7originating7          
substances1' then nothing else but the  
absence of a cause would furnish the    
reason for the permanency of the atoms1 
and as that reason had already been     
mentioned before 7in ,,iv1 #a1 #a7 the  
,stra ,,iv1 #a1 #e would be a useless   
restatement4--,well1 then 7the          
,vai_/s_/eshika might say71 let us      
understand by ',nescience' 7in the      
,stra7 the impossibility of conceiving a

 third reason of the destruction 7of    
effects71 in addition to the division of
 the causal substance into its parts1   
and the destruction of the causal       
substance2 which impossibility involves 
the permanency of the atoms#cgj4--,there
 is no necessity1 we reply1 for assuming
 that a thing when perishing must perish
 on account of either of those two      
reasons4 ,that assumption would indeed  
have to be made if it were generally    
admitted that a new substance is        
produced only by the conjunction of     
several causal substances4 ,but if it is
 admitted that a causal substance may   
originate a new substance by passing    
over into a qualified state after having
 previously existed free from           
qualifications1 in its pure generality1 
it follows that the effected substance  
may be destroyed by its solidity being  
dissolved1 just as the hardness of ghee 
is dissolved by the action of           
fire#cga4--,thus there would result1    
from the circumstance of the atoms      

having colour1 c41 the opposite of what 
the ,vai_/s_/eshikas mean4 ,for this    
reason also the atomic doctrine cannot  
be maintained4  #af4 ,and as there are  
difficulties in both cases4  ,earth has 
the qualities of smell1 taste1 colour1  
and touch1 and is gross2 water has      
colour1 taste1 and touch1 and is fine2  
fire has colour and touch1 and is finer 
yet2 air is finest of all1 and has the  
quality of touch only4 ,the question now
 arises whether the atoms constituting  
the four elements are to be assumed to  
possess the same greater or smaller     
number of qualities as the respective   
elements4--,either assumption leads to  
unacceptable consequences4 ,for if we   
assume that some kinds of atoms have    
more numerous qualities1 it follows that
 their solid size 7mrti7 will be        
increased thereby1 and that implies     
their being atoms no longer4 ,that an   
increase of qualities cannot take place 
without a simultaneous increase of size 
we infer from our observations          

concerning effected material            
bodies4--,if1 on the other hand1 we     
assume1 in order to save the equality of
 atoms of all kinds1 that there is no   
difference in the number of their       
qualities1 we must either suppose that  
they have all one quality only2 but in  
that case we should not perceive touch  
in fire nor colour and touch in water1  
nor taste1 colour1 and touch in earth1  
since the qualities of the effects have 
for their antecedents the qualities of  
the causes4 ,or else we must suppose all
 atoms to have all the four qualities2  
but in that case we should necessarily  
perceive what we actually do not        
perceive1 viz4 smell in water1 smell and
 taste in fire1 smell1 taste1 and colour
 in air4--,hence on this account also   
the atomic doctrine shows itself to be  
unacceptable4  #ag4 ,and as the 7atomic 
theory7 is not accepted 7by any         
authoritative persons7 it is to be      
disregarded altogether4  ,while the     
theory of the pradhna being the cause of

 the world has been accepted by some    
adherents of the ,veda--as1 for         
instance1 ,manu--with a view to the     
doctrines of the effect existing in the 
cause already1 and so on1 the atomic    
doctrine has not been accepted by any   
persons of authority in any of its      
parts1 and therefore is to be           
disregarded entirely by all those who   
take their stand on the ,veda4  ,there  
are1 moreover1 other objections to the  
,vai_/s_/eshika doctrine4--,the         
,vai_/s_/eshikas assume six categories1 
which constitute the subject-matter of  
their system1 viz4 substance1 quality1  
action1 generality1 particularity1 and  
inherence4 ,these six categories they   
maintain to be absolutely different from
 each other1 and to have different      
characteristics2 just as a man1 a horse1
 a hare differ from one another4 ,side  
by side with this assumption they make  
another which contradicts the former    
one1 viz4 that quality1 action1 c4 have 
the attribute of depending on substance4

 ,but that is altogether inappropriate2 
for just as ordinary things1 such as    
animals1 grass1 trees1 and the like1    
being absolutely different from each    
other do not depend on each other1 so   
the qualities1 c4 also being absolutely 
different from substance1 cannot depend 
on the latter4 ,or else let the         
qualities1 c4 depend on substance2 then 
it follows that1 as they are present    
where substance is present1 and absent  
where it is absent1 substance only      
exists1 and1 according to its various   
forms1 becomes the object of different  
terms and conceptions 7such as quality1 
action1 c472 just as ,devadatta1 for    
instance1 according to the conditions in
 which he finds himself is the object of
 various conceptions and names4 ,but    
this latter alternative would involve   
the acceptation of the ,snkhya          
doctrine#cgb and the abandonment of the 
,vai_/s_/eshika standpoint4--,but 7the  
,vai_/s_/eshika may say7 smoke also is  
different from fire and yet it is       

dependent on it4--,true1 we reply2 but  
we ascertain the difference of smoke and
 fire from the fact of their being      
apperceived in separation4 ,substance   
and quality1 on the other hand1 are not 
so apperceived2 for when we are         
conscious of a white blanket1 or a red  
cow1 or a blue lotus1 the substance is  
in each case cognised by means of the   
quality2 the latter therefore has its   
,self in the substance4 ,the same       
reasoning applies to action1 generality1
 particularity1 and inherence4  ,if you 
7the ,vai_/s_/eshika7 say that          
qualities1 actions1 c4 7although not    
non-different from substances7 may yet  
depend on the latter because substances 
and qualities stand in the relation of  
one not being able to exist without the 
other 7ayutasiddhi#cgc72 we point out   
that things which are ayutasiddha must  
either be non-separate in place1 or     
non-separate in time1 or non-separate in
 nature1 and that none of these         
alternatives agrees with ,vai_/s_/eshika

 principles4 ,for the first alternative 
contradicts your own assumptions        
according to which the cloth originating
 from the threads occupies the place of 
the threads only1 not that of the cloth1
 while the qualities of the cloth1 such 
as its white colour1 occupy the place of
 the cloth only1 not that of the        
threads4 ,so the ,vai_/s_/eshika-stras  
say 7,i1 #a1 #aj71 ',substances         
originate another substance and         
qualities another quality4' ,the threads
 which constitute the causal substance  
originate the effected substance1 viz4  
the cloth1 and the qualities of the     
threads1 such as white colour1 c41      
produce in the cloth new corresponding  
qualities4 ,but this doctrine is clearly
 contradicted by the assumption of      
substance and quality being non-separate
 in place4--,if1 in the second place1   
you explain ayutasiddhatva as           
non-separation in time1 it follows also 
that1 for instance1 the right and the   
left horn of a cow would be             

ayutasiddha4--,and if1 finally1 you     
explain it to mean 'non-separation in   
character1' it is impossible to make any
 further distinction between the        
substance and the quality1 as then      
quality is conceived as being identical 
with substance4  ,moreover1 the         
distinction which the ,vai_/s_/eshikas  
make between conjunction 7sa_/m_/yoga7  
as being the connexion of things which  
can exist separately1 and inherence     
7samavya7 as being the connexion of     
things which are incapable of separate  
existence is futile1 since the cause    
which exists before the effect#cgd      
cannot be said to be incapable of       
separate existence4 ,perhaps the        
,vai_/s_/eshika will say that his       
definition refers to one of the two     
terms only1 so that samavya is the      
connexion1 with the cause1 of the effect
 which is incapable of separate         
existence4 ,but this also is of no      
avail2 for as a connexion requires two  
terms1 the effect as long as it has not 

yet entered into being cannot be        
connected with the cause4 ,and it would 
be equally unavailing to say that the   
effect enters into the connexion after  
it has begun to exist2 for if the       
,vai_/s_/eshika admits that the effect  
may exist previous to its connexion with
 the cause1 it is no longer ayutasiddha 
7incapable of separate existence71 and  
thereby the principle that between      
effect and cause conjunction and        
disjunction do not take place is        
violated4#cge ,and#cgf just as          
conjunction1 and not samavya1 is the    
connexion in which every effected       
substance as soon as it has been        
produced stands with the all-pervading  
substances as ether1 c4--although no    
motion has taken place on the part of   
the effected substance--so also the     
connexion of the effect with the cause  
will be conjunction merely1 not samavya4
  ,nor is there any proof for the       
existence of any connexion1 samavya or  
sa_/m_/yoga1 apart from the things which

 it connects4 ,if it should be          
maintained that sa_/m_/yoga and samavya 
have such an existence because we       
observe that there are names and ideas  
of them in addition to the names and    
ideas of the things connected1 we point 
out that one and the same thing may be  
the subject of several names and ideas  
if it is considered in its relations to 
what lies without it4 ,devadatta        
although being one only forms the object
 of many different names and notions    
according as he is considered in himself
 or in his relations to others2 thus he 
is thought and spoken of as man1        
,brhma_/n_/a learned in the ,veda1      
generous1 boy1 young man1 father1       
grandson1 brother1 son-in-law1 c4 ,so1  
again1 one and the same stroke is1      
according to the place it is connected  
with1 spoken of and conceived as meaning
 either ten1 or hundred1 or thousand1 c4
 ,analogously1 two connected things are 
not only conceived and denoted as       
connected things1 but in addition       

constitute the object of the ideas and  
terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which
 however do not prove themselves to be  
separate entities4--,things standing    
thus1 the non-existence of separate     
entities 7conjunction1 c471 which       
entities would have to be established on
 the ground of perception1 follows from 
the fact of their non-perception4--,nor1
 again#cgg1 does the circumstance of the
 word and idea of connexion having for  
its object the things connected involve 
the connexion's permanent existence1    
since we have already shown above that  
one thing may1 on account of its        
relations to other things1 be conceived 
and denoted in different ways4          
,further#cgh1 conjunction cannot take   
place between the atoms1 the soul1 and  
the internal organ1 because they have no
 parts2 for we observe that conjunction 
takes place only of such substances as  
consist of parts4 ,if the               
,vai_/s_/eshika should say that parts of
 the atoms1 soul and mind may be assumed

 7in order to explain their alleged     
conjunction71 we remark that the        
assumption of actually non-existing     
things would involve the result that    
anything might be established2 for there
 is no restrictive rule that only such  
and such non-existing things--whether   
contradictory to reason or not--should  
be assumed and not any other1 and       
assumptions depend on one's choice only 
and may be carried to any extent4 ,if we
 once allow assumptions1 there is no    
reason why there should not be assumed a
 further hundred or thousand things1 in 
addition to the six categories assumed  
by the ,vai_/s_/eshikas4 ,anybody might 
then assume anything1 and we could      
neither stop a compassionate man from   
assuming that this transmigratory world 
which is the cause of so much misery to 
living beings is not to be1 nor a       
malicious man from assuming that even   
the released souls are to enter on a new
 cycle of existences4  ,further1 it is  
not possible that a binary atomic       

compound1 which consists of parts1      
should be connected with the simple     
indivisible atoms by an intimate        
connexion 7sa_/ms_/lesha7 any more than 
they can thus be connected with ether2  
for between ether and earth1 c4 there   
does not exist that kind of intimate    
connexion which exists1 for instance1   
between wood and varnish#cgi4  ,let it  
then be said 7the ,vai_/s_/eshika       
resumes7 that the samavya relation must 
be assumed1 because otherwise the       
relation of that which abides and that  
which forms the abode--which relation   
actually exists between the effected    
substance and the causal substance--is  
not possible4--,that would1 we reply1   
involve the vice of mutual dependence2  
for only when the separateness of cause 
and effect is established1 the relation 
of the abode and that which abides can  
be established2 and only when the latter
 relation is established1 the relation  
of separateness can be established4 ,for
 the ,vedntins acknowledge neither the  

separateness of cause and effect1 nor   
their standing to each other in the     
relation of abode and thing abiding1    
since according to their doctrine the   
effect is only a certain state of the   
cause#chj4--,moreover1 as the atoms are 
limited 7not of infinite extension71    
they must in reality consist of as many 
parts as we acknowledge regions of      
space#cha1 whether those be six or eight
 or ten1 and consequently they cannot be
 permanent2 conclusions contrary to the 
,vai_/s_/eshika doctrine of the         
indivisibility and permanency of the    
atoms4--,if the ,vai_/s_/eshika replies 
that those very parts which are owing to
 the existence of the different regions 
of space are his 7indestructible7 atoms2
 we deny that because all things        
whatever1 forming a series of substances
 of ever-increasing minuteness1 are     
capable of dissolution1 until the       
highest cause 7,brahman7 is reached4    
,earth--which is1 in comparison with a  
binary compound1 the grossest thing of  

all--undergoes decomposition2 so do the 
substances following next which belong  
to the same class as earth2 so does the 
binary compound2 and so does1 finally1  
the atom which 7although the minutest   
thing of all7 still belongs to the same 
general class 7i4e4 matter7 with earth1 
c4 ,the objection 7which the            
,vai_/s_/eshika might possibly raise    
here again7 that things can be          
decomposed only by the separation of    
their parts#chb1 we have already        
disposed of above1 where we pointed out 
that decomposition may take place in a  
manner analogous to the melting of ghee4
 ,just as the hardness of ghee1 gold1   
and the like1 is destroyed in           
consequence of those substances being   
rendered liquid by their contact with   
fire1 no separation of the parts taking 
place all the while2 so the solid shape 
of the atoms also may be decomposed by  
their passing back into the             
indifferenced condition of the highest  
cause4 ,in the same way the origination 

of effects also is brought about not    
merely in the way of conjunction of     
parts2 for we see that milk1 for        
instance1 and water originate effects   
such as sour milk and ice without there 
taking place any conjunction of parts4  
,it thus appears that the atomic        
doctrine is supported by very weak      
arguments only1 is opposed to those     
scriptural passages which declare the   
,lord to be the general cause1 and is   
not accepted by any of the authorities  
taking their stand on ,scripture1 such  
as ,manu and others4 ,hence it is to be 
altogether disregarded by highminded men
 who have a regard for their own        
spiritual welfare4  #ah4 7,if there be  
assumed7 the 7dyad of7 aggregates with  
its two causes1 7there takes place7     
non-establishment of those 7two         
aggregates74  ,the reasons on account of
 which the doctrine of the              
,vai_/s_/eshikas cannot be accepted have
 been stated above4 ,that doctrine may  
be called semi-destructive 7or          

semi-nihilistic#chc74 ,that the more    
thorough doctrine which teaches         
universal non-permanency is even less   
worthy of being taken into              
consideration1 we now proceed to show4  
,that doctrine is presented in a variety
 of forms1 due either to the difference 
of the views 7maintained by ,buddha at  
different times71 or else to the        
difference of capacity on the part of   
the disciples 7of ,buddha74 ,three      
principal opinions may1 however1 be     
distinguished2 the opinion of those who 
maintain the reality of everything      
7,realists1 sarvstitvavdin72 the opinion
 of those who maintain that thought only
 is real 7,idealists1 vij_/_/navdin72   
and the opinion of those who maintain   
that everything is void 7unreal2        
,nihilists1 _/s_/nyavdin#chd74--,we     
first controvert those who maintain that
 everything1 external as well as        
internal1 is real4 ,what is external is 
either element 7bhta7 or elementary     
7bhautika72 what is internal is either  

mind 7_/k_/itta7 or mental 7_/k_/aitta74
 ,the elements are earth1 water1 and so 
on2 elemental are colour1 c4 on the one 
hand1 and the eye and the other         
sense-organs on the other hand4 ,earth  
and the other three elements arise from 
the aggregation of the four different   
kinds of atoms2 the atoms of earth being
 hard1 those of water viscid1 those of  
fire hot1 those of air mobile43--,the   
inward world consists of the five       
so-called 'groups' 7skandha71 the group 
of sensation 7rpaskandha71 the group of 
knowledge 7vij_/_/naskandha71 the group 
of feeling 7vedanskandha71 the group of 
verbal knowledge 7samj_/_/skandha71 and 
the group of impressions                
7sa_/m_/skraskandha7#che2 which taken   
together constitute the basis of all    
personal existence#chf4  ,with reference
 to this doctrine we make the following 
remarks4--,those two aggregates1        
constituting two different classes1 and 
having two different causes which the   
,bauddhas assume1 viz4 the aggregate of 

the elements and elementary things whose
 cause the atoms are1 and the aggregate 
of the five skandhas whose cause the    
skandhas are1 cannot1 on ,bauddha       
principles1 be established1 i4e4 it     
cannot be explained how the aggregates  
are brought about4 ,for the parts       
constituting the 7material7 aggregates  
are devoid of intelligence1 and the     
kindling 7abhijvalana7 of intelligence  
depends on an aggregate of atoms having 
been brought about previously#chg4 ,and 
the ,bauddhas do not admit any other    
permanent intelligent being1 such as    
either an enjoying soul or a ruling     
,lord1 which could effect the           
aggregation of the atoms4 ,nor can the  
atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter  
on activity on their own account2 for   
that would imply their never ceasing to 
be active#chh4 ,nor can the cause of    
aggregation be looked for in the        
so-called abode 7i4e4 the               
layavij_/_/na-pravha1 the train of      
self-cognitions72 for the latter must be

 described either as different from the 
single cognitions or as not different   
from them4 7,in the former case it is   
either permanent1 and then it is nothing
 else but the permanent soul of the     
,vedntins2 or non-permanent27 then being
 admitted to be momentary merely1 it    
cannot exercise any influence and cannot
 therefore be the cause of the motion of
 the atoms#chi4 7,and in the latter case
 we are not further advanced than       
before47--,for all these reasons the    
formation of aggregates cannot be       
accounted for4 ,but without aggregates  
there would be an end of the stream of  
mundane existence which presupposes     
those aggregates4  #ai4 ,if it be said  
that 7the formation of aggregates may be
 explained7 through 7,nescience1 c47    
standing in the relation of mutual      
causality2 we say ',no1' because they   
merely are the efficient causes of the  
origin 7of the immediately subsequent   
links74  ,although there exists no      
permanent intelligent principle of the  

nature either of a ruling ,lord or an   
enjoying soul1 under whose influence the
 formation of aggregates could take     
place1 yet the course of mundane        
existence is rendered possible through  
the mutual causality#cij of ,nescience  
and so on1 so that we need not look for 
any other combining principle4  ,the    
series beginning with ,nescience        
comprises the following members3        
,nescience1 impression1 knowledge1 name 
and form1 the abode of the six1 touch1  
feeling1 desire1 activity1 birth1       
species1 decay1 death1 grief1           
lamentation1 pain1 mental affliction1   
and the like#cia4 ,all these terms      
constitute a chain of causes and are as 
such spoken of in the ,bauddha system1  
sometimes cursorily1 sometimes at       
length4 ,they are1 moreover1 all        
acknowledged as existing1 not by the    
,bauddhas only1 but by the followers of 
all systems4 ,and as the cycles of      
,nescience1 c4 forming uninterrupted    
chains of causes and effects revolve    

unceasingly like water-wheels1 the      
existence of the aggregates 7which      
constitute bodies and minds7 must needs 
be assumed1 as without such ,nescience  
and so on could not take place4  ,this  
argumentation of the ,bauddha we are    
unable to accept1 because it merely     
assigns efficient causes for the        
origination of the members of the       
series1 but does not intimate an        
efficient cause for the formation of the
 aggregates4 ,if the ,bauddha reminds us
 of the statement made above that the   
existence of aggregates must needs be   
inferred from the existence of          
,nescience and so on1 we point out that1
 if he means thereby that ,nescience and
 so on cannot exist without aggregates  
and hence require the existence of such1
 it remains to assign an efficient cause
 for the formation of the aggregates4   
,but1 as we have already shown--when    
examining the ,vaijeshika doctrine--that
 the formation of aggregates cannot be  
accounted for even on the assumption of 

permanent atoms and individual souls in 
which the ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a abides#cib2  
how much less then are aggregates       
possible if there exist only momentary  
atoms not connected with enjoying souls 
and devoid of abodes 7i4e4 souls71 and  
that which abides in them 7the          
ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/a74--,let us then assume 
7the ,bauddha says7 that ,nescience1 c4 
themselves are the efficient cause of   
the aggregate4--,but how--we ask--can   
they be the cause of that without       
which--as their abode--they themselves  
are not capable of existence8 ,perhaps  
you will say that in the eternal        
sa_/m_/sra the aggregates succeed one   
another in an unbroken chain1 and hence 
also ,nescience1 and so on1 which abide 
in those aggregates4 ,but in that case  
you will have to assume either that each
 aggregate necessarily produces another 
aggregate of the same kind1 or that1    
without any settled rule1 it may produce
 either a like or an unlike one4 ,in the
 former case a human body could never   

pass over into that of a god or an      
animal or a being of the infernal       
regions2 in the latter case a man might 
in an instant be turned into an elephant
 or a god and again become a man2 either
 of which consequences would be contrary
 to your system4--,moreover1 that for   
the purpose of whose enjoyment the      
aggregate is formed is1 according to    
your doctrine1 not a permanent enjoying 
soul1 so that enjoyment subserves itself
 merely and cannot be desired by        
anything else2 hence final release also 
must1 according to you1 be considered as
 subserving itself only1 and no being   
desirous of release can be assumed4 ,if 
a being desirous of both were assumed1  
it would have to be conceived as        
permanently existing up to the time of  
enjoyment and release1 and that would be
 contrary to your doctrine of general   
impermanency4--,there may therefore     
exist a causal relation between the     
members of the series consisting of     
,nescience1 c41 but1 in the absence of a

 permanent enjoying soul1 it is         
impossible to establish on that ground  
the existence of aggregates4  #bj4 7,nor
 can there be a causal relation between 
,nescience1 c471 because on the         
origination of the subsequent 7moment7  
the preceding one ceases to be4  ,we    
have hitherto argued that ,nescience1   
and so on1 stand in a causal relation to
 each other merely1 so that they cannot 
be made to account for the existence of 
aggregates2 we are now going to prove   
that they cannot even be considered as  
efficient causes of the subsequent      
members of the series to which they     
belong4  ,those who maintain that       
everything has a momentary existence    
only admit that when the thing existing 
in the second moment#cic enters into    
being the thing existing in the first   
moment ceases to be4 ,on this admission 
it is impossible to establish between   
the two things the relation of cause and
 effect1 since the former momentary     
existence which ceases or has ceased to 

be1 and so has entered into the state of
 non-existence1 cannot be the cause of  
the later momentary existence4--,let it 
then be said that the former momentary  
existence when it has reached its full  
development becomes the cause of the    
later momentary existence4--,that also  
is impossible2 for the assumption that a
 fully developed existence exerts a     
further energy1 involves the conclusion 
that it is connected with a second      
moment 7which contradicts the doctrine  
of universal momentariness74--,then let 
the mere existence of the antecedent    
entity constitute its causal            
energy4--,that assumption also is       
fruitless1 because we cannot conceive   
the origination of an effect which is   
not imbued with the nature of the cause 
7i4e4 in which the nature of the cause  
does not continue to exist74 ,and to    
assume that the nature of the cause does
 continue to exist in the effect is     
impossible 7on the ,bauddha doctrine71  
as that would involve the permanency of 

the cause1 and thus necessitate the     
abandonment of the doctrine of general  
non-permanency4--,nor can it be admitted
 that the relation of cause and effect  
holds good without the cause somehow    
giving its colouring to the effect2 for 
that doctrine might unduly be extended  
to all cases#cid4--,moreover1 the       
origination and cessation of things of  
which the ,bauddha speaks must either   
constitute a thing's own form or another
 state of it1 or an altogether different
 thing4 ,but none of these alternatives 
agrees with the general ,bauddha        
principles4 ,if1 in the first place1    
origination and cessation constituted   
the form of a thing1 it would follow    
that the word 'thing' and the words     
'origination' and 'cessation' are       
interchangeable 7which is not the       
case74--,let then1 secondly1 the        
,bauddha says1 a certain difference be  
assumed1 in consequence of which the    
terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may 
denote the initial and final states of  

that which in the intermediate state is 
called thing4--,in that case1 we reply1 
the thing will be connected with three  
moments1 viz4 the initial1 the          
intermediate1 and the final one1 so that
 the doctrine of general momentariness  
will have to be abandoned4--,let then1  
as the third alternative1 origination   
and cessation be altogether different   
from the thing1 as much as a buffalo is 
from a horse4--,that too cannot be1 we  
reply2 for it would lead to the         
conclusion that the thing1 because      
altogether disconnected with origination
 and cessation1 is everlasting4 ,and the
 same conclusion would be led up to1 if 
we understood by the origination and    
cessation of a thing merely its         
perception and non-perception2 for the  
latter are attributes of the percipient 
mind only1 not of the thing             
itself4--,hence we have again to declare
 the ,bauddha doctrine to be untenable4 
#ba4 ,on the supposition of there being 
no 7cause3 while yet the effect takes   

place71 there results contradiction of  
the admitted principle2 otherwise       
simultaneousness 7of cause and effect74 
,it has been shown that on the doctrine 
of general non-permanency1 the former   
momentary existence1 as having already  
been merged in non-existence1 cannot be 
the cause of the later one4--,perhaps   
now the ,bauddha will say that an effect
 may arise even when there is no        
cause4--,that1 we reply1 implies the    
abandonment of a principle admitted by  
yourself1 viz4 that the mind and the    
mental modifications originate when in  
conjunction with four kinds of          
causes#cie4 ,moreover1 if anything could
 originate without a cause1 there would 
be nothing to prevent that anything     
might originate at any time4--,if1 on   
the other hand1 you should say that we  
may assume the antecedent momentary     
existence to last until the succeeding  
one has been produced1 we point out that
 that would imply the simultaneousness  
of cause and effect1 and so run counter 

to an accepted ,bauddha tenet1 viz4 that
 all things#cif are momentary merely4   
#bb4 ,cessation dependent on a sublative
 act of the mind1 and cessation not so  
dependent cannot be established1 there  
being no 7complete7 interruption4  ,the 
,bauddhas who maintain that universal   
destruction is going on constantly1     
assume that 'whatever forms an object of
 knowledge and is different from the    
triad is produced 7sa_/m_/sk_/ri_/ta7   
and momentary4' ,to the triad there     
mentioned they give the names 'cessation
 dependent on a sublative act of the    
mind1' 'cessation not dependent on such 
an act1' and 'space4' ,this triad they  
hold to be non-substantial1 of a merely 
negative character 7abhvamtra71 devoid  
of all positive characteristics4 ,by    
'cessation dependent on a sublative act 
of the mind1' we have to understand such
 destruction of entities as is preceded 
by an act of thought#cig2 by 'cessation 
not so dependent' is meant destruction  
of the opposite kind#cih2 by 'space' is 

meant absence in general of something   
covering 7or occupying space74 ,out of  
these three non-existences 'space' will 
be refuted later on 7,stra #bd71 the two
 other ones are refuted in the present  
,stra4  ,cessation which is dependent on
 a sublative act of the mind1 and       
cessation which is not so dependent are 
both impossible1 'on account of the     
absence of interruption4' ,for both     
kinds of cessation must have reference  
either to the series 7of momentary      
existences7 or to the single members    
constituting the series4--,the former   
alternative is impossible1 because in   
all series 7of momentary existences7 the
 members of the series stand in an      
unbroken relation of cause and effect so
 that the series cannot be              
interrupted#cii4--,the latter           
alternative is likewise inadmissible1   
for it is impossible to maintain that   
any momentary existence should undergo  
complete annihilation entirely          
undefinable and disconnected 7with the  

previous state of existence71 since we  
observe that a thing is recognised in   
the various states through which it may 
pass and thus has a connected           
existence#djj4 ,and in those cases also 
where a thing is not clearly recognised 
7after having undergone a change7 we yet
 infer1 on the ground of actual         
observations made in other cases1 that  
one and the same thing continues to     
exist without any interruption4--,for   
these reasons the two kinds of cessation
 which the ,bauddhas assume cannot be   
proved4  #bc4 ,and on account of the    
objections presenting themselves in     
either case4  ,the cessation of         
,nescience1 c4 which1 on the assumption 
of the ,bauddhas1 is included in the two
 kinds of cessation discussed hitherto1 
must take place either in consequence of
 perfect knowledge together with its    
auxiliaries1 or else of its own accord4 
,but the former alternative would imply 
the abandonment of the ,bauddha doctrine
 that destruction takes place without a 

cause1 and the latter alternative would 
involve the uselessness of the ,bauddha 
instruction as to the 'path'#dja4 ,as   
therefore both alternatives are open to 
objections1 the ,bauddha doctrine must  
be declared unsatisfactory4  #bd4 ,and  
in the case of space also 7the doctrine 
of its being a non-entity is untenable7 
on account of its not differing 7from   
the two other kinds of non-entity74  ,we
 have shown so far that of the triad    
declared by the ,bauddhas to be devoid  
of all positive characteristics1 and    
therefore non-definable1 two 7viz4      
prati-sa_/m_/khyvirodha and aprati7     
cannot be shown to be such2 we now      
proceed to show the same with regard to 
space 7ether1 k_/s_/a74  ,with regard to
 space also it cannot be maintained that
 it is non-definable1 since             
substantiality can be established in the
 case of space no less than in the case 
of the two so-called non-entities       
treated of in the preceding ,stras4     
,that space is a real thing follows in  

the first place from certain scriptural 
passages1 such as 'space sprang from the
 ,self4'--,to those1 again1 who 7like   
the ,bauddhas7 disagree with us as to   
the authoritativeness of ,scripture we  
point out that the real existence of    
space is to be inferred from the quality
 of sound1 since we observe that earth  
and other real things are the abodes of 
smell and the other                     
qualities4--,moreover1 if you declare   
that space is nothing but the absence in
 general of any covering 7occupying7    
body1 it would follow that while one    
bird is flying--whereby space is        
occupied--there would be no room for a  
second bird wanting to fly at the same  
time4 ,and if you should reply that the 
second bird may fly there where there is
 absence of a covering body1 we point   
out that that something by which the    
absence of covering bodies is           
distinguished must be a positive entity1
 viz4 space in our sense1 and not the   
mere non-existence of covering          

bodies#djb4--,moreover1 the ,bauddha    
places himself1 by his view of space1 in
 opposition to other parts of his       
system4 ,for we find1 in the ,bauddha   
,scriptures1 a series of questions and  
answers 7beginning1 ',on what1 ,o       
reverend ,sir1 is the earth founded8'71 
in which the following question occurs1 
',on what is the air founded8' to which 
it is replied that the air is founded on
 space 7ether74 ,now it is clear that   
this statement is appropriate only on   
the supposition of space being a        
positive entity1 not a mere             
negation4--,further1 there is a         
self-contradiction in the ,bauddha      
statements regarding all the three kinds
 of negative entities1 it being said1 on
 the one hand1 that they are not        
positively definable1 and1 on the other 
hand1 that they are eternal4 ,of what is
 not real neither eternity nor          
non-eternity can be predicated1 since   
the distinction of subjects and         
predicates of attribution is founded    

entirely on real things4 ,anything with 
regard to which that distinction holds  
good we conclude to be a real thing1    
such as jars and the like are1 not a    
mere undefinable negation4  #be4 ,and on
 account of remembrance4  ,the          
philosopher who maintains that all      
things are momentary only would have to 
extend that doctrine to the perceiving  
person 7upalabdh_/ri_/7 also2 that is1  
however1 not possible1 on account of the
 remembrance which is consequent on the 
original perception4 ,that remembrance  
can take place only if it belongs to the
 same person who previously made the    
perception2 for we observe that what one
 man has experienced is not remembered  
by another man4 ,how1 indeed1 could     
there arise the conscious state         
expressed in the sentences1 ',i saw that
 thing1 and now ,i see this thing1' if  
the seeing person were not in both cases
 the same8 ,that the consciousness of   
recognition takes place only in the case
 of the observing and remembering       

subject being one1 is a matter known to 
every one2 for if there were1 in the two
 cases1 different subjects1 the state of
 consciousness arising in the mind of   
the remembering person would be1 ',i    
remember2 another person made the       
observation4' ,but no such state of     
consciousness does arise4--,when1 on the
 other hand1 such a state of            
consciousness does arise1 then everybody
 knows that the person who made the     
original observation1 and the person who
 remembers1 are different persons1 and  
then the state of consciousness is      
expressed as follows1 ',i remember that 
that other person saw that and          
that4'--,in the case under discussion1  
however1 the ,vain_/s_/ika              
himself--whose state of consciousness   
is1 ',i saw that and that'--knows that  
there is one thinking subject only to   
which the original perception as well as
 the remembrance belongs1 and does not  
think of denying that the past          
perception belonged to himself1 not any 

more than he denies that fire is hot and
 gives light4  ,as thus one agent is    
connected with the two moments of       
perception and subsequent remembrance1  
the ,vain_/s_/ika has necessarily to    
abandon the doctrine of universal       
momentariness4 ,and if he further       
recognises all his subsequent successive
 cognitions1 up to his last breath1 to  
belong to one and the same subject1 and 
in addition cannot but attribute all his
 past cognitions1 from the moment of his
 birth1 to the same ,self1 how can he   
maintain1 without being ashamed of      
himself1 that everything has a momentary
 existence only8 ,should he maintain    
that the recognition 7of the subject as 
one and the same7 takes place on account
 of the similarity 7of the different    
self-cognitions2 each1 however1 being   
momentary only71 we reply that the      
cognition of similarity is based on two 
things1 and that for that reason the    
advocate of universal momentariness who 
denies the existence of one 7permanent7 

subject able mentally to grasp the two  
similar things simply talks deceitful   
nonsense when asserting that recognition
 is founded on similarity4 ,should he   
admit1 on the other hand1 that there is 
one mind grasping the similarity of two 
successive momentary existences1 he     
would thereby admit that one entity     
endures for two moments and thus        
contradict the tenet of universal       
momentariness4--,should it be said that 
the cognition 'this is similar to that' 
is a different 7new7 cognition1 not     
dependent on the apperception of the    
earlier and later momentary existences1 
we refute this by the remark that the   
fact of different terms--viz4 'this' and
 'that'--being used points to the       
existence of different things 7which the
 mind grasps in a judgment of           
similarity74 ,if the mental act of which
 similarity is the object were an       
altogether new act 7not concerned with  
the two separate similar entities71 the 
expression 'this is similar to that'    

would be devoid of meaning2 we should in
 that case rather speak of 'similarity' 
only4--,whenever 7to add a general      
reflexion7 something perfectly well     
known from ordinary experience is not   
admitted by philosophers1 they may      
indeed establish their own view and     
demolish the contrary opinion by means  
of words1 but they thereby neither      
convince others nor even themselves4    
,whatever has been ascertained to be    
such and such must also be represented  
as such and such2 attempts to represent 
it as something else prove nothing but  
the vain talkativeness of those who make
 those attempts4 ,nor can the hypothesis
 of mere similarity being cognised      
account for ordinary empirical life and 
thought2 for 7in recognising a thing7 we
 are conscious of it being that which we
 were formerly conscious of1 not of it  
being merely similar to that4 ,we admit 
that sometimes with regard to an        
external thing a doubt may arise whether
 it is that or merely is similar to     

that2 for mistakes may be made          
concerning what lies outside our minds4 
,but the conscious subject never has any
 doubt whether it is itself or only     
similar to itself2 it rather is         
distinctly conscious that it is one and 
the same subject which yesterday had a  
certain sensation and to-day remembers  
that sensation4--,for this reason also  
the doctrine of the ,nihilists is to be 
rejected4  #bf4 7,entity7 does not      
spring from non-entity on account of    
that not being observed4  ,the system of
 the ,vain_/s_/ikas is objectionable for
 this reason also that those who deny   
the existence of permanent stable causes
 are driven to maintain that entity     
springs from non-entity4 ,this latter   
tenet is expressly enunciated by the    
,bauddhas where they say1 ',on account  
of the manifestation 7of effects7 not   
without previous destruction 7of the    
cause74' ,for1 they say1 from the       
decomposed seed only the young plant    
springs1 spoilt milk only turns into    

curds1 and the lump of clay has ceased  
to be a lump when it becomes a jar4 ,if 
effects did spring from the unchanged   
causes1 all effects would originate from
 all causes at once1 as then no         
specification would be required#djc4    
,hence1 as we see that young plants1 c4 
spring from seeds1 c4 only after the    
latter have been merged in              
non-existence1 we hold that entity      
springs from non-entity4  ,to this      
,bauddha tenet we reply1 '7,entity does7
 not 7spring7 from non-entity1 on       
account of that not being observed4' ,if
 entity did spring from non-entity1 the 
assumption of special causes would be   
purportless1 since non-entity is in all 
cases one and the same4 ,for the        
non-existence of seeds and the like     
after they have been destroyed is of the
 same kind as the non-existence of horns
 of hares and the like1 i4e4            
non-existence is in all cases nothing   
else but the absence of all character of
 reality1 and hence there would be no   

sense 7on the doctrine of origination   
from non-existence7 in assuming that    
sprouts are produced from seeds only1   
curds from milk only1 and so on4 ,and if
 non-distinguished non-existence were   
admitted to have causal efficiency1 we  
should also have to assume that sprouts1
 c4 originate from the horns of hares1  
c4--a thing certainly not actually      
observed4--,if1 again1 it should be     
assumed that there are different kinds  
of non-existence having special         
distinctions--just as1 for instance1    
blueness and the like are special       
qualities of lotuses and so on--we point
 out that in that case the fact of there
 being such special distinctions would  
turn the non-entities into entities no  
less real than lotuses and the like4 ,in
 no case non-existence would possess    
causal efficiency1 simply because1 like 
the horn of a hare1 it is non-existence 
merely4--,further1 if existence sprang  
from non-existence1 all effects would be
 affected with non-existence2 while as a

 matter of fact they are observed to be 
merely positive entities distinguished  
by their various special                
characteristics4 ,nor#djd does any one  
think that things of the nature of clay1
 such as pots and the like1 are the     
effects of threads and the like2 but    
everybody knows that things of the      
nature of clay are the effects of clay  
only4--,the ,bauddha's tenet that       
nothing can become a cause as long as it
 remains unchanged1 but has to that end 
to undergo destruction1 and that thus   
existence springs from non-existence    
only is false2 for it is observed that  
only things of permanent nature which   
are always recognised as what they are1 
such as gold1 c41 are the causes of     
effects such as golden ornaments1 and so
 on4 ,in those cases where a destruction
 of the peculiar nature of the cause is 
observed to take place1 as in the case  
of seeds1 for instance1 we have to      
acknowledge as the cause of the         
subsequent condition 7i4e4 the sprout7  

not the earlier condition in so far as  
it is destroyed1 but rather those       
permanent particles of the seed which   
are not destroyed 7when the seed as a   
whole undergoes decomposition74--,hence 
as we see on the one hand that no       
entities ever originate from nonentities
 such as the horns of a hare1 and on the
 other hand that entities do originate  
from entities such as gold and the like 
the whole ,bauddha doctrine of existence
 springing from non-existence has to be 
rejected4--,we finally point out that1  
according to the ,bauddhas1 all mind and
 all mental modifications spring from   
the four skandhas discussed above and   
all material aggregates from the atoms2 
why then do they stultify this their own
 doctrine by the fanciful assumption of 
entity springing from non-entity and    
thus needlessly perplex the mind of     
every one8  #bg4 ,and thus 7on that     
doctrine7 there would be an             
accomplishment 7of ends7 in the case of 
non-active people also4  ,if it were    

admitted that entity issues from        
non-entity1 lazy inactive people also   
would obtain their purposes1 since      
'non-existence' is a thing to be had    
without much trouble4 ,rice would grow  
for the husbandman even if he did not   
cultivate his field2 vessels would shape
 themselves even if the potter did not  
fashion the clay2 and the weaver too    
lazy to weave the threads into a whole1 
would nevertheless have in the end      
finished pieces of cloth just as if he  
had been weaving4 ,and nobody would have
 to exert himself in the least either   
for going to the heavenly world or for  
obtaining final release4 ,all which of  
course is absurd and not maintained by  
anybody4--,thus the doctrine of the     
origination of entity from non-entity   
again shows itself to be futile4  #bh4  
,the non-existence 7of external things7 
cannot be maintained1 on account of     
7our7 consciousness 7of them74  ,there  
having been brought forward1 in what    
precedes1 the various objections which  

lie against the doctrine of the reality 
of the external world 7in the ,bauddha  
sense71 such as the impossibility of    
accounting for the existence of         
aggregates1 c41 we are now confronted by
 those ,bauddhas who maintain that only 
cognitions 7or ideas1 vij_/_/na7        
exist4--,the doctrine of the reality of 
the external world was indeed propounded
 by ,buddha conforming himself to the   
mental state of some of his disciples   
whom he perceived to be attached to     
external things2 but it does not        
represent his own true view according to
 which cognitions alone are real4       
,according to this latter doctrine the  
process1 whose constituting members are 
the act of knowledge1 the object of     
knowledge1 and the result of            
knowledge#dje1 is an altogether internal
 one1 existing in so far only as it is  
connected with the mind 7buddhi74 ,even 
if external things existed1 that process
 could not take place but in connexion  
with the mind4 ,if1 the ,bauddhas say1  

you ask how it is known that that entire
 process is internal and that no outward
 things exist apart from consciousness1 
we reply that we base our doctrine on   
the impossibility of external things4   
,for if external things are admitted1   
they must be either atoms or aggregates 
of atoms such as posts and the like4    
,but atoms cannot be comprehended under 
the ideas of posts and the like1 it     
being impossible for cognition to       
represent 7things as minute as7 atoms4  
,nor1 again1 can the outward things be  
aggregates of atoms such as pillars and 
the like1 because those aggregates can  
neither be defined as different nor as  
non-different from the atoms#djf4--;,in 
the same way we can show that the       
external things are not universals and  
so on#djg4  ,moreover1 the              
cognitions--which are of a uniform      
nature only in so far as they are states
 of consciousness--undergo1 according to
 their objects1 successive              
modifications1 so that there is         

presented to the mind now the idea of a 
post1 now the idea of a wall1 now the   
idea of a jar1 and so on4 ,now this is  
not possible without some distinction on
 the part of the ideas themselves1 and  
hence we must necessarily admit that the
 ideas have the same forms as their     
objects4 ,but if we make this admission1
 from which it follows that the form of 
the objects is determined by the ideas1 
the hypothesis of the existence of      
external things becomes altogether      
gratuitous4 ,from the fact1 moreover1 of
 our always being conscious of the act  
of knowledge and the object of knowledge
 simultaneously it follows that the two 
are in reality identical4 ,when we are  
conscious of the one we are conscious of
 the other also2 and that would not     
happen if the two were essentially      
distinct1 as in that case there would be
 nothing to prevent our being conscious 
of one apart from the other4 ,for this  
reason also we maintain that there are  
no outward things4--  ,perception is to 

be considered as similar to a dream and 
the like4 ,the ideas present to our     
minds during a dream1 a magical         
illusion1 a mirage and so on1 appear in 
the twofold form of subject and object1 
although there is all the while no      
external object2 hence we conclude that 
the ideas of posts and the like which   
occur in our waking state are likewise  
independent of external objects2 for    
they also are simply ideas4--,if we be  
asked how1 in the absence of external   
things1 we account for the actual       
variety of ideas1 we reply that that    
variety is to be explained from the     
impressions left by previous ideas#djh4 
,in the beginningless sa_/m_/sra ideas  
and mental impressions succeed each     
other as causes and effects1 just as the
 plant springs from the seed and seeds  
are again produced from the plant1 and  
there exists therefore a sufficient     
reason for the variety of ideas actually
 experienced4 ,that the variety of ideas
 is solely due to the impressions left  

on the mind by past ideas follows1      
moreover1 from the following affirmative
 and negative judgments3 we both 7the   
,vedntins as well as the ,bauddhas7     
admit that in dreams1 c4 there presents 
itself a variety of ideas which arise   
from mental impressions1 without any    
external object2 we 7the ,bauddhas7 do  
not admit that any variety of ideas can 
arise from external objects1 without    
mental impressions4--,thus we are again 
led to conclude that no outward things  
exist4  ,to all this we 7the ,vedntins7 
make the following reply4--,the         
non-existence of external things cannot 
be maintained because we are conscious  
of external things4 ,in every act of    
perception we are conscious of some     
external thing corresponding to the     
idea1 whether it be a post or a wall or 
a piece of cloth or a jar1 and that of  
which we are conscious cannot but exist4
 ,why should we pay attention to the    
words of a man who1 while conscious of  
an outward thing through its            

approximation to his senses1 affirms    
that he is conscious of no outward      
thing1 and that no such thing exists1   
any more than we listen to a man who    
while he is eating and experiencing the 
feeling of satisfaction avers that he   
does not eat and does not feel          
satisfied8--,if the ,bauddha should     
reply that he does not affirm that he is
 conscious of no object but only that he
 is conscious of no object apart from   
the act of consciousness1 we answer that
 he may indeed make any arbitrary       
statement he likes1 but that he has no  
arguments to prove what he says4 ,that  
the outward thing exists apart from     
consciousness1 has necessarily to be    
accepted on the ground of the nature of 
consciousness itself4 ,nobody when      
perceiving a post or a wall is conscious
 of his perception only1 but all men are
 conscious of posts and walls and the   
like as objects of their perceptions4   
,that such is the consciousness of all  
men1 appears also from the fact that    

even those who contest the existence of 
external things bear witness to their   
existence when they say that what is an 
internal object of cognition appears    
like something external4 ,for they      
practically accept the general          
consciousness1 which testifies to the   
existence of an external world1 and     
being at the same time anxious to refute
 it they speak of the external things as
 'like something external4' ,if they did
 not themselves at the bottom           
acknowledge the existence of the        
external world1 how could they use the  
expression 'like something external8'   
,no one says1 ',vish_/n_/umitra appears 
like the son of a barren mother4' ,if we
 accept the truth as it is given to us  
in our consciousness1 we must admit that
 the object of perception appears to us 
as something external1 not like         
something external4--,but--the ,bauddha 
may reply--we conclude that the object  
of perception is only like something    
external because external things are    

impossible4--,this conclusion we rejoin 
is improper1 since the possibility or   
impossibility of things is to be        
determined only on the ground of the    
operation or non-operation of the means 
of right knowledge2 while on the other  
hand1 the operation and non-operation of
 the means of right knowledge are not to
 be made dependent on preconceived      
possibilities or impossibilities4       
,possible is whatever is apprehended by 
perception or some other means of proof2
 impossible is what is not so           
apprehended4 ,now the external things   
are1 according to their nature1         
apprehended by all the instruments of   
knowledge2 how then can you maintain    
that they are not possible1 on the      
ground of such idle dilemmas as that    
about their difference or non-difference
 from atoms8--,nor1 again1 does the     
non-existence of objects follow from the
 fact of the ideas having the same form 
as the objects2 for if there were no    
objects the ideas could not have the    

forms of the objects1 and the objects   
are actually apprehended as             
external4--,for the same reason 7i4e4   
because the distinction of thing and    
idea is given in consciousness7 the     
invariable concomitance of idea and     
thing has to be considered as proving   
only that the thing constitutes the     
means of the idea1 not that the two are 
identical4 ,moreover1 when we are       
conscious first of a pot and then of a  
piece of cloth1 consciousness remains   
the same in the two acts while what     
varies are merely the distinctive       
attributes of consciousness2 just as    
when we see at first a black and then a 
white cow1 the distinction of the two   
perceptions is due to the varying       
blackness and whiteness while the       
generic character of the cow remains the
 same4 ,the difference of the one       
permanent factor 7from the two--or      
more--varying factors7 is proved        
throughout by the two varying factors1  
and vice vers the difference of the     

latter 7from the permanent factor7 by   
the presence of the one 7permanent      
factor74 ,therefore thing and idea are  
distinct4 ,the same view is to be held  
with regard to the perception and the   
remembrance of a jar2 there also the    
perception and the remembrance only are 
distinct while the jar is one and the   
same2 in the same way as when conscious 
of the smell of milk and the taste of   
milk we are conscious of the smell and  
taste as different things but of the    
milk itself as one only4  ,further1 two 
ideas which occupy different moments of 
time and pass away as soon as they have 
become objects of consciousness cannot  
apprehend--or be apprehended by--each   
other4 ,from this it follows that       
certain doctrines forming part of the   
,bauddha system cannot be upheld2 so the
 doctrine that ideas are different from 
each other2 the doctrine that everything
 is momentary1 void1 c42 the doctrine of
 the distinction of individuals and     
classes2 the doctrine that a former idea

 leaves an impression giving rise to a  
later idea2 the doctrine of the         
distinction1 owing to the influence of  
,nescience1 of the attributes of        
existence and non-existence2 the        
doctrine of bondage and release         
7depending on absence and presence of   
right knowledge7#dji4  ,further1 if you 
say that we are conscious of the idea1  
you must admit that we are also         
conscious of the external thing4 ,and if
 you rejoin that we are conscious of the
 idea on its own account because it is  
of a luminous nature like a lamp1 while 
the external thing is not so2 we reply  
that by maintaining the idea to be      
illuminated by itself you make yourself 
guilty of an absurdity no less than if  
you said that fire burns itself4 ,and at
 the same time you refuse to accept the 
common and altogether rational opinion  
that we are conscious of the external   
thing by means of the idea different    
from the thing6 ,indeed a proof of      
extraordinary philosophic insight6--,it 

cannot1 moreover1 be asserted in any way
 that the idea apart from the thing is  
the object of our consciousness2 for it 
is absurd to speak of a thing as the    
object of its own activity4 ,possibly   
you 7the ,bauddha7 will rejoin that1 if 
the idea is to be apprehended by        
something different from it1 that       
something also must be apprehended by   
something different and so on ad        
infinitum4 ,and1 moreover1 you will     
perhaps object that as each cognition is
 of an essentially illuminating nature  
like a lamp1 the assumption of a further
 cognition is uncalled for2 for as they 
are both equally illuminating the one   
cannot give light to the other4--,but   
both these objections are unfounded4 ,as
 the idea only is apprehended1 and there
 is consequently no necessity to assume 
something to apprehend the ,self which  
witnesses the idea 7is conscious of the 
idea71 there results no regressus ad    
infinitum4 ,and the witnessing ,self and
 the idea are of an essentially         

different nature1 and may therefore     
stand to each other in the relation of  
knowing subject and object known4 ,the  
existence of the witnessing ,self is    
self-proved and cannot therefore be     
denied4--,moreover1 if you maintain that
 the idea1 lamplike1 manifests itself   
without standing in need of a further   
principle to illuminate it1 you maintain
 thereby that ideas exist which are not 
apprehended by any of the means of      
knowledge1 and which are without a      
knowing being2 which is no better than  
to assert that a thousand lamps burning 
inside some impenetrable mass of rocks  
manifest themselves4 ,and if you should 
maintain that thereby we admit your     
doctrine1 since it follows from what we 
have said that the idea itself implies  
consciousness2 we reply that1 as        
observation shows1 the lamp in order to 
become manifest requires some other     
intellectual agent furnished with       
instruments such as the eye1 and that   
therefore the idea also1 as equally     

being a thing to be illuminated1 becomes
 manifest only through an ulterior      
intelligent principle4 ,and if you      
finally object that we1 when advancing  
the witnessing ,self as self-proved1    
merely express in other words the       
,bauddha tenet that the idea is         
self-manifested1 we refute you by       
remarking that your ideas have the      
attributes of originating1 passing away1
 being manifold1 and so on 7while our   
,self is one and permanent74--,we thus  
have proved that an idea1 like a lamp1  
requires an ulterior intelligent        
principle to render it manifest4  #bi4  
,and on account of their difference of  
nature 7the ideas of the waking state7  
are not like those of a dream4  ,we now 
apply ourselves to the refutation of the
 averment made by the ,bauddha1 that the
 ideas of posts1 and so on1 of which we 
are conscious in the waking state1 may  
arise in the absence of external        
objects1 just as the ideas of a dream1  
both being ideas alike4--,the two sets  

of ideas1 we maintain1 cannot be treated
 on the same footing1 on account of the 
difference of their character4 ,they    
differ as follows4--,the things of which
 we are conscious in a dream are negated
 by our waking consciousness4 ',i       
wrongly thought that ,i had a meeting   
with a great man2 no such meeting took  
place1 but my mind was dulled by        
slumber1 and so the false idea arose4'  
,in an analogous manner the things of   
which we are conscious when under the   
influence of a magic illusion1 and the  
like1 are negated by our ordinary       
consciousness4 ,those things1 on the    
other hand1 of which we are conscious in
 our waking state1 such as posts and the
 like1 are never negated in any         
state4--,moreover1 the visions of a     
dream are acts of remembrance1 while the
 visions of the waking state are acts of
 immediate consciousness2 and the       
distinction between remembrance and     
immediate consciousness is directly     
cognised by every one as being founded  

on the absence or presence of the       
object4 ,when1 for instance1 a man      
remembers his absent son1 he does not   
directly perceive him1 but merely wishes
 so to perceive him4 ,as thus the       
distinction between the two states is   
evident to every one1 it is impossible  
to formulate the inference that waking  
consciousness is false because it is    
mere consciousness1 such as dreaming    
consciousness2 for we certainly cannot  
allow would-be philosophers to deny the 
truth of what is directly evident to    
themselves4 ,just because they feel the 
absurdity of denying what is evident to 
themselves1 and are consequently unable 
to demonstrate the baselessness of the  
ideas of the waking state from those    
ideas themselves1 they attempt to       
demonstrate it from their having certain
 attributes in common with the ideas of 
the dreaming state4 ,but if some        
attribute cannot belong to a thing on   
account of the latter's own nature1 it  
cannot belong to it on account of the   

thing having certain attributes in      
common with some other thing4 ,fire1    
which is felt to be hot1 cannot be      
demonstrated to be cold1 on the ground  
of its having attributes in common with 
water4 ,and the difference of nature    
between the waking and the sleeping     
state we have already shown4  #cj4 ,the 
existence 7of mental impressions7 is not
 possible on the ,bauddha view1 on      
account of the absence of perception 7of
 external things74  ,we now proceed to  
that theory of yours1 according to which
 the variety of ideas can be explained  
from the variety of mental impressions1 
without any reference to external       
things1 and remark that on your doctrine
 the existence of mental impressions is 
impossible1 as you do not admit the     
perception of external things4 ,for the 
variety of mental impressions is caused 
altogether by the variety of the things 
perceived4 ,how1 indeed1 could various  
impressions originate if no external    
things were perceived8 ,the hypothesis  

of a beginningless series of mental     
impressions would lead only to a        
baseless regressus ad infinitum1        
sublative of the entire phenomenal      
world1 and would in no way establish    
your position4--,the same argument1 i4e4
 the one founded on the impossibility of
 mental impressions which are not caused
 by external things1 refutes also the   
positive and negative judgments1 on the 
ground of which the denier of an        
external world above attempted to show  
that ideas are caused by mental         
impressions1 not by external things4 ,we
 rather have on our side a positive and 
a negative judgment whereby to establish
 our doctrine of the existence of       
external things1 viz4 'the perception of
 external things is admitted to take    
place also without mental impressions1' 
and 'mental impressions are not admitted
 to originate independently of the      
perception of external                  
things4'--,moreover1 an impression is a 
kind of modification1 and modifications 

cannot1 as experience teaches1 take     
place unless there is some substratum   
which is modified4 ,but1 according to   
your doctrine1 such a substratum of     
impressions does not exist1 since you   
say that it cannot be cognised through  
any means of knowledge4  #ca4 ,and on   
account of the momentariness 7of the    
layavij_/_/na1 it cannot be the abode of
 mental impressions74  ,if you maintain 
that the so-called internal cognition   
7layavij_/_/na#daj7 assumed by you may  
constitute the abode of the mental      
impressions1 we deny that1 because that 
cognition also being admittedly         
momentary1 and hence non-permanent1     
cannot be the abode of impressions any  
more than the quasi-external cognitions 
7prav_/ri_/ttivij_/_/na74 ,for unless   
there exists one continuous principle   
equally connected with the past1 the    
present1 and the future#daa1 or an      
absolutely unchangeable 7,self7 which   
cognises everything1 we are unable to   
account for remembrance1 recognition1   

and so on1 which are subject to mental  
impressions dependent on place1 time1   
and cause4 ,if1 on the other hand1 you  
declare your layavij_/_/na to be        
something permanent1 you thereby abandon
 your tenet of the layavij_/_/na as well
 as everything else being               
momentary4--,or 7to explain the ,stra in
 a different way7 as the tenet of       
general momentariness is characteristic 
of the systems of the idealistic as well
 as the realistic ,bauddhas1 we may     
bring forward against the doctrines of  
the former all those arguments dependent
 on the principle of general            
momentariness which we have above urged 
against the latter4  ,we have thus      
refuted both nihilistic doctrines1 viz4 
the doctrine which maintains the        
7momentary7 reality of the external     
world1 and the doctrine which asserts   
that ideas only exist4 ,the third       
variety of ,bauddha doctrine1 viz4 that 
everything is empty 7i4e4 that          
absolutely nothing exists71 is          

contradicted by all means of right      
knowledge1 and therefore requires no    
special refutation4 ,for this apparent  
world1 whose existence is guaranteed by 
all the means of knowledge1 cannot be   
denied1 unless some one should find out 
some new truth 7based on which he could 
impugn its existence7--for a general    
principle is proved by the absence of   
contrary instances4  #cb4 ,and on       
account of its general deficiency in    
probability4  ,no further special       
discussion is in fact required4 ,from   
whatever new points of view the ,bauddha
 system is tested with reference to its 
probability1 it gives way on all sides1 
like the walls of a well dug in sandy   
soil4 ,it has1 in fact1 no foundation   
whatever to rest upon1 and hence the    
attempts to use it as a guide in the    
practical concerns of life are mere     
folly4--,moreover1 ,buddha by           
propounding the three mutually          
contradictory systems1 teaching         
respectively the reality of the external

 world1 the reality of ideas only1 and  
general nothingness1 has himself made it
 clear either that he was a man given to
 make incoherent assertions1 or else    
that hatred of all beings induced him to
 propound absurd doctrines by accepting 
which they would become thoroughly      
confused4--,so that--and this the ,stra 
means to indicate--,buddha's doctrine   
has to be entirely disregarded by all   
those who have a regard for their own   
happiness4  #cc4 ,on account of the     
impossibility 7of contradictory         
attributes7 in one thing1 7the ,jaina   
doctrine is7 not 7to be accepted74      
,having disposed of the ,bauddha        
doctrine we now turn to the system of   
the ,gymnosophists 7,jainas74  ,the     
,jainas acknowledge seven categories    
7tattvas71 viz4 soul 7jva71 non-soul    
7ajva71 the issuing outward 7srava71    
restraint 7sa_/m_/vara71 destruction    
7nirjara71 bondage 7bandha71 and release
 7moksha7#dab4 ,shortly it may be said  
that they acknowledge two categories1   

viz4 soul and non-soul1 since the five  
other categories may be subsumed under  
these two4--,they also set forth a set  
of categories different from the two    
mentioned4 ,they teach that there are   
five so-called astikyas 7'existing      
bodies1' i4e4 categories71 viz4 the     
categories of soul 7jva71 body          
7pudgala71 merit 7dharma71 demerit      
7adharma71 and space 7k_/s_/a74 ,all    
these categories they again subdivide in
 various fanciful ways#dac4--,to all    
things they apply the following method  
of reasoning1 which they call the       
saptabhangnaya3 somehow it is2 somehow  
it is not2 somehow it is and is not2    
somehow it is indescribable2 somehow it 
is and is indescribable2 somehow it is  
not and is indescribable2 somehow it is 
and is not and is indescribable4  ,to   
this unsettling style of reasoning they 
submit even such conceptions as that of 
unity and eternity#dad4  ,this doctrine 
we meet as follows4--,your reasoning1 we
 say1 is inadmissible 'on account of the

 impossibility in one thing4' ,that is  
to say1 it is impossible that           
contradictory attributes such as being  
and non-being should at the same time   
belong to one and the same thing2 just  
as observation teaches us that a thing  
cannot be hot and cold at the same      
moment4 ,the seven categories asserted  
by you must either be so many and such  
or not be so many and such2 the third   
alternative expressed in the words 'they
 either are such or not such' results in
 a cognition of indefinite nature which 
is no more a source of true knowledge   
than doubt is4 ,if you should plead that
 the cognition that a thing is of more  
than one nature is definite and         
therefore a source of true knowledge1 we
 deny this4 ,for the unlimited assertion
 that all things are of a non-exclusive 
nature is itself something1 falls as    
such under the alternative predications 
'somehow it is1' 'somehow it is not1'   
and so ceases to be a definite          
assertion4 ,the same happens to the     

person making the assertion and to the  
result of the assertion2 partly they    
are1 partly they are not4 ,as thus the  
means of knowledge1 the object of       
knowledge1 the knowing subject1 and the 
act of knowledge are all alike          
indefinite1 how can the ,trthakara      
7,jina7 teach with any claim to         
authority1 and how can his followers act
 on a doctrine the matter of which is   
altogether indeterminate8 ,observation  
shows that only when a course of action 
is known to have a definite result      
people set about it without hesitation4 
,hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of
 altogether indefinite contents does not
 deserve to be listened to any more than
 a drunken man or a madman4--,again1 if 
we apply the ,jaina reasoning to their  
doctrine of the five categories1 we have
 to say that on one view of the matter  
they are five and on another view they  
are not five2 from which latter point of
 view it follows that they are either   
fewer or more than five4 ,nor is it     

logical to declare the categories to be 
indescribable4 ,for if they are so1 they
 cannot be described2 but1 as a matter  
of fact1 they are described so that to  
call them indescribable involves a      
contradiction4 ,and if you go on to say 
that the categories on being described  
are ascertained to be such and such1 and
 at the same time are not ascertained to
 be such and such1 and that the result  
of their being ascertained is perfect   
knowledge or is not perfect knowledge1  
and that imperfect knowledge is the     
opposite of perfect knowledge or is not 
the opposite2 you certainly talk more   
like a drunken or insane man than like a
 sober1 trustworthy person4--,if you    
further maintain that the heavenly world
 and final release exist or do not exist
 and are eternal or non-eternal1 the    
absence of all determinate knowledge    
which is implied in such statements will
 result in nobody's acting for the      
purpose of gaining the heavenly world   
and final release4 ,and1 moreover1 it   

follows from your doctrine that soul1   
non-soul1 and so on1 whose nature you   
claim to have ascertained1 and which you
 describe as having existed from all    
eternity1 relapse all at once into the  
condition of absolute                   
indetermination4--,as therefore the two 
contradictory attributes of being and   
non-being cannot belong to any of the   
categories--being excluding non-being   
and vice vers non-being excluding       
being--the doctrine of the rhat must be 
rejected4--,the above remarks dispose   
likewise of the assertions made by the  
,jainas as to the impossibility of      
deciding whether of one thing there is  
to be predicated oneness or plurality1  
permanency or non-permanency1           
separateness or norn-separateness1 and  
so on4--,the ,jaina doctrine that       
aggregates are formed from the atoms--by
 them called pudgalas--we do not        
undertake to refute separately as its   
refutation is already comprised in that 
of the atomistic doctrine given in a    

previous part of this work4  #cd4 ,and  
likewise 7there results from the ,jaina1
 doctrine7 non-universality of the      
,self4  ,we have hitherto urged against 
the ,jaina doctrine an objection        
resulting from the sydvda1 viz4 that one
 thing cannot have contradictory        
attributes4 ,we now turn to the         
objection that from their doctrine it   
would follow that the individual ,self  
is not universal1 i4e4 not              
omnipresent4--,the ,jainas are of       
opinion that the soul has the same size 
as the body4 ,from this it would follow 
that the soul is not of infinite        
extension1 but limited1 and hence       
non-eternal like jars and similar       
things4 ,further1 as the bodies of      
different classes of creatures are of   
different size1 it might happen that the
 soul of a man--which is of the size of 
the human body--when entering1 in       
consequence of its former deeds1 on a   
new state of existence in the body of an
 elephant would not be able to fill the 

whole of it2 or else that a human soul  
being relegated to the body of an ant   
would not be able to find sufficient    
room in it4 ,the same difficulty would1 
moreover1 arise with regard to the      
successive stages of one state of       
existence1 infancy1 youth1 and old      
age4--,but why1 the ,jaina may ask1     
should we not look upon the soul as     
consisting of an infinite number of     
parts capable of undergoing compression 
in a small body and dilatation in a big 
one8--,do you1 we ask in return1 admit  
or not admit that those countless       
particles of the soul may occupy the    
same place or not8--,if you do not admit
 it1 it follows that the infinite number
 of particles cannot be contained in a  
body of limited dimensions4--,if you do 
admit it1 it follows that1 as then the  
space occupied by all the particles may 
be the space of one particle only1 the  
extension of all the particles together 
will remain inconsiderable1 and hence   
the soul be of minute size 7not of the  

size of the body74 ,you have1 moreover1 
no right to assume that a body of       
limited size contains an infinite number
 of soul particles4  ,well the1 the     
,jaina may reply1 let us assume that by 
turns whenever the soul enters a big    
body some particles accede to it while  
some withdraw from it whenever it enters
 a small body4--,to this hypothesis the 
next ,stra furnishes a reply4  #ce4 ,nor
 is non-contradiction to be derived from
 the succession 7of parts acceding to   
and departing from the soul71 on account
 of the change1 c4 7of the soul74  ,nor 
can the doctrine of the soul having the 
same size as the body be satisfactorily 
established by means of the hypothesis  
of the successive accession and         
withdrawal of particles4 ,for this      
hypothesis would involve the soul's     
undergoing changes and the like4 ,if the
 soul is continually being repleted and 
depleted by the successive addition and 
withdrawal of parts1 it of course       
follows that it undergoes change1 and if

 it is liable to change it follows that 
it is non-permanent1 like the skin and  
similar substances4 ,from that1 again1  
it follows that the ,jaina doctrine of  
bondage and release is untenable2       
according to which doctrine 'the soul1  
which in the state of bondage is        
encompassed by the ogdoad of works and  
sunk in the ocean of sa_/m_/sra1 rises  
when its bonds are sundered1 as the     
gourd rises to the surface of the water 
when it is freed from the encumbering   
clay#dae4'--,moreover1 those particles  
which in turns come and depart have the 
attributes of coming and going1 and     
cannot1 on that account1 be of the      
nature of the ,self any more than the   
body is4 ,and if it be said that the    
,self consists of some permanently      
remaining parts1 we remark that it would
 be impossible to determine which are   
the permanent and which the temporary   
parts4--,we have further to ask from    
whence those particles originate when   
they accede to the soul1 and into what  

they are merged when they detach        
themselves from it4 ,they cannot spring 
from the material elements and re-enter 
the elements2 for the soul is           
immaterial4 ,nor have we any means to   
prove the existence of some other1      
general or special1 reservoir of        
soul-particles4--,moreover1 on the      
hypothesis under discussion the soul    
would be of indefinite nature1 as the   
size of the particles acceding and      
departing is itself indefinite4--,on    
account of all these and similar        
difficulties it cannot be maintained    
that certain particles by turns attach  
themselves to1 and detach themselves    
from1 the soul4  ,the ,stra may be taken
 in a different sense also4 ,the        
preceding ,stra has proved that the soul
 if of the same size as the body cannot 
be permanent1 as its entering into      
bigger and smaller bodies involves its  
limitation4 ,to this the ,gymnosophist  
may be supposed to rejoin that although 
the soul's size successively changes it 

may yet be permanent1 just as the stream
 of water is permanent 7although the    
water continually changes74 ,an         
analogous instance would be supplied by 
the permanency of the stream of ideas   
while the individual ideas1 as that of a
 red cloth and so on1 are               
non-permanent4--,to this rejoinder our  
,stra replies that if the stream is not 
real we are led back to the doctrine of 
a general void1 and that1 if it is      
something real1 the difficulties        
connected with the soul's changing1 c4  
present themselves and render the ,jaina
 view impossible4  #cf4 ,and on account 
of the permanency of the final 7size of 
the soul7 and the resulting permanency  
of the two 7preceding sizes7 there is no
 difference 7of size1 at any time74     
,moreover1 the ,jainas themselves admit 
the permanency of the final size of the 
soul which it has in the state of       
release4 ,from this it follows also that
 its initial size and its intervening   
sizes must be permanent#daf1 and that   

hence there is no difference between the
 three sizes4 ,but this would involve   
the conclusion that the different bodies
 of the soul have one and the same size1
 and that the soul cannot enter into    
bigger and smaller bodies4--,or else 7to
 explain the ,stra in a somewhat        
different way7 from the fact that the   
final size of the soul is permanent1 it 
follows that its size in the two        
previous conditions also is permanent4  
,hence the soul must be considered as   
being always of the same size--whether  
minute or infinite--and not of the      
varying size of its bodies4--,for this  
reason also the doctrine of the ,arhat  
has to be set aside as not in any way   
more rational than the doctrine of      
,buddha4  #cg4 ,the ,lord 7cannot be the
 cause of the world71 on account of the 
inappropriateness 7of that doctrine74   
,the ,strakra now applies himself to the
 refutation of that doctrine1 according 
to which the ,lord is the cause of the  
world only in so far as he is the       

general ruler4--,but how do you know    
that that is the purport of the ,stra   
7which speaks of the ,lord 'without any 
qualification'78--,from the             
circumstance1 we reply1 that the teacher
 himself has proved1 in the previous    
sections of the work1 that the ,lord is 
the material cause as well as the ruler 
of the world4 ,hence1 if the present    
,stra were meant to impugn the doctrine 
of the ,lord in general1 the earlier and
 later parts of the work would be       
mutually contradictory1 and the ,strakra
 would thus be in conflict with himself4
 ,we therefore must assume that the     
purport of the present ,stra is to make 
an energetic attack on the doctrine of  
those who maintain that the ,lord is not
 the material cause1 but merely the     
ruler1 i4e4 the operative cause of the  
world2 a doctrine entirely opposed to   
the ,vedntic tenet of the unity of      
,brahman4  ,the theories about the ,lord
 which are independent of the ,vednta   
are of various nature4 ,some taking     

their stand on the ,snkhya and ,yoga    
systems assume that the ,lord acts as a 
mere operative cause1 as the ruler of   
the pradhna and of the souls1 and that  
pradhna1 soul1 and ,lord are of mutually
 different nature4--,the ,mhe_/s_/varas 
7_/,s_/aivas7 maintain that the five    
categories1 viz4 effect1 cause1 union1  
ritual1 the end of pain1 were taught by 
the ,lord ,pa_/s_/upati 7_/,s_/iva7 to  
the end of breaking the bonds of the    
animal 7i4e4 the soul72 ,pa_/s_/upati   
is1 according to them1 the ,lord1 the   
operative cause4--,similarly1 the       
,vai_/s_/eshikas and others also teach1 
according to their various systems1 that
 the ,lord is somehow the operative     
cause of the world4  ,against all these 
opinions the ,stra remarks 'the ,lord1  
on account of the inappropriateness4'   
,i4e4 it is not possible that the ,lord 
as the ruler of the pradhna and the soul
 should be the cause of the world1 on   
account of the inappropriateness of that
 doctrine4 ,for if the ,lord is supposed

 to assign to the various classes of    
animate creatures low1 intermediate1 and
 high positions1 according to his       
liking1 it follows that he is animated  
by hatred1 passion1 and so on1 is hence 
like one of us1 and is no real ,lord4   
,nor can we get over this difficulty by 
assuming that he makes his dispositions 
with a view to the merit and demerit of 
the living beings2 for that assumption  
would lead us to a logical see-saw1 the 
,lord as well as the works of living    
beings having to be considered in turns 
both as acting and as acted upon4 ,this 
difficulty is not removed by the        
consideration that the works of living  
beings and the resulting dispositions   
made by the ,lord form a chain which has
 no beginning2 for in past time as well 
as in the present mutual interdependence
 of the two took place1 so that the     
beginningless series is like an endless 
chain of blind men leading other blind  
men4 ,it is1 moreover1 a tenet set forth
 by the ,naiyyikas themselves that      

'imperfections have the characteristic  
of being the causes of action' 7,nyya   
,stra ,i1 #a1 #ah74 ,experience shows   
that all agents1 whether they be active 
for their own purposes or for the       
purposes of something else1 are impelled
 to action by some imperfection4 ,and   
even if it is admitted that an agent    
even when acting for some extrinsic     
purpose is impelled by an intrinsic     
motive1 your doctrine remains faulty all
 the same2 for the ,lord is no longer a 
,lord1 even if he is actuated by        
intrinsic motives only 7such as the     
desire of removing the painful feeling  
connected with pity74--,your doctrine is
 finally inappropriate for that reason  
also that you maintain the ,lord to be a
 special kind of soul2 for from that it 
follows that he must be devoid of all   
activity4  #ch4 ,and on account of the  
impossibility of the connexion 7of the  
,lord with the souls and the pradhna74  
,against the doctrine which we are at   
present discussing there lies the       

further objection that a ,lord distinct 
from the pradhna and the souls cannot be
 the ruler of the latter without being  
connected with them in a certain way4   
,but of what nature is that connexion to
 be8 ,it cannot be conjunction          
7sa_/m_/yoga71 because the ,lord1 as    
well as the pradhna and the souls1 is of
 infinite extent and devoid of parts4   
,nor can it be inherence1 since it would
 be impossible to define who should be  
the abode and who the abiding thing4    
,nor is it possible to assume some other
 connexion1 the special nature of which 
would have to be inferred from the      
effect1 because the relation of cause   
and effect is just what is not settled  
as yet#dag4--;,how1 then1 it may be     
asked1 do you--the ,vedntins--establish 
the relation of cause and effect        
7between the ,lord and the              
world78--,there is1 we reply1 no        
difficulty in our case1 as the connexion
 we assume is that of identity 7tdtmya74
 ,the adherent of ,brahman1 moreover1   

defines the nature of the cause1 and so 
on1 on the basis of ,scripture1 and is  
therefore not obliged to render his     
tenets throughout conformable to        
observation4 ,our adversary1 on the     
other hand1 who defines the nature of   
the cause and the like according to     
instances furnished by experience1 may  
be expected to maintain only such       
doctrines as agree with experience4 ,nor
 can he put forward the claim that      
,scripture1 because it is the production
 of the omniscient ,lord1 may be used to
 confirm his doctrine as well as that of
 the ,vedntin2 for that would involve   
him in a logical see-saw1 the           
omniscience of the ,lord being          
established on the doctrine of          
,scripture1 and the authority of        
,scripture again being established on   
the omniscience of the ,lord4--,for all 
these reasons the ,snkhya-yoga          
hypothesis about the ,lord is devoid of 
foundation4 ,other similar hypotheses   
which likewise are not based on the     

,veda are to be refuted by corresponding
 arguments4  #ci4 ,and on account of the
 impossibility of rulership 7on the part
 of the ,lord74  ,the ,lord of the      
argumentative philosophers is an        
untenable hypothesis1 for the following 
reason also4--,those philosophers are   
obliged to assume that by his influence 
the ,lord produces action in the        
pradhna1 c4 just as the potter produces 
motion in the clay1 c4 ,but this cannot 
be admitted2 for the pradhna1 which is  
devoid of colour and other qualities1   
and therefore not an object of          
perception1 is on that account of an    
altogether different nature from clay   
and the like1 and hence cannot be looked
 upon as the object of the ,lord's      
action4  #dj4 ,if you say that as the   
organs 7are ruled by the soul so the    
pradhna is ruled by the ,lord71 we deny 
that on account of the enjoyment1 c4    
,well1 the opponent might reply1 let us 
suppose that the ,lord rules the pradhna
 in the same way as the soul rules the  

organ of sight and the other organs     
which are devoid of colour1 and so on1  
and hence not objects of perception4    
,this analogy also1 we reply1 proves    
nothing4 ,for we infer that the organs  
are ruled by the soul1 from the observed
 fact that the soul feels pleasure1     
pain1 and the like 7which affect the    
soul through the organs74 ,but we do not
 observe that the ,lord experiences     
pleasure1 pain1 c4 caused by the        
pradhna4 ,if the analogy between the    
pradhna and the bodily organs were a    
complete one1 it would follow that the  
,lord is affected by pleasure and pain  
no less than the transmigrating souls   
are4  ,or else the two preceding ,stras 
may be explained in a different way4    
,ordinary experience teaches us that    
kings1 who are the rulers of countries1 
are never without some material abode1  
i4e4 a body2 hence1 if we wish to infer 
the existence of a general ,lord from   
the analogy of earthly rulers1 we must  
ascribe to him also some kind of body to

 serve as the substratum of his organs4 
,but such a body cannot be ascribed to  
the ,lord1 since all bodies exist only  
subsequently to the creation1 not       
previously to it4 ,the ,lord1 therefore1
 is not able to act because devoid of a 
material substratum2 for experience     
teaches us that action requires a       
material substrate4--,let us then       
arbitrarily assume that the ,lord       
possesses some kind of body serving as a
 substratum for his organs 7even        
previously to creation74--,this         
assumption also will not do2 for if the 
,lord has a body he is subject to the   
sensations of ordinary transmigratory   
souls1 and thus no longer is the ,lord4 
#da4 ,and 7there would follow from that 
doctrine7 either finite duration or     
absence of omniscience 7on the ,lord's  
part74  ,the hypothesis of the          
argumentative philosophers is invalid1  
for the following reason also4--,they   
teach that the ,lord is omniscient and  
of infinite duration1 and likewise that 

the pradhna1 as well as the individual  
souls1 is of infinite duration4 ,now1   
the omniscient ,lord either defines the 
measure of the pradhna1 the souls1 and  
himself1 or does not define it4 ,both   
alternatives subvert the doctrine under 
discussion4 ,for1 on the former         
alternative1 the pradhna1 the souls1 and
 the ,lord1 being all of them of        
definite measure1 must necessarily be of
 finite duration2 since ordinary        
experience teaches that all things of   
definite extent1 such as jars and the   
like1 at some time cease to exist4 ,the 
numerical measure of pradhna1 souls1 and
 ,lord is defined by their constituting 
a triad1 and the individual measure of  
each of them must likewise be considered
 as defined by the ,lord 7because he is 
omniscient74 ,the number of the souls is
 a high one#dah4 ,from among this       
limited number of souls some obtain     
release from the sa_/m_/sra1 that means 
their sa_/m_/sra comes to an end1 and   
their subjection to the samsra comes to 

an end4 ,gradually all souls obtain     
release1 and so there will finally be an
 end of the entire sa_/m_/sra and the   
sa_/m_/sra state of all souls4 ,but the 
pradhna which is ruled by the ,lord and 
which modifies itself for the purposes  
of the soul is what is meant by         
sa_/m_/sra4 ,hence1 when the latter no  
longer exists1 nothing is left for the  
,lord to rule1 and his omniscience and  
ruling power have no longer any objects4
 ,but if the pradhna1 the souls1 and the
 ,lord1 all have an end1 it follows that
 they also have a beginning1 and if they
 have a beginning as well as an end1 we 
are driven to the doctrine of a general 
void4--,let us then1 in order to avoid  
these untoward conclusions1 maintain the
 second alternative1 i4e4 that the      
measure of the ,lord himself1 the       
pradhna1 and the souls1 is not defined  
by the ,lord4--,but that also is        
impossible1 because it would compel us  
to abandon a tenet granted at the       
outset1 viz4 that the ,lord is          

omniscient4  ,for all these reasons the 
doctrine of the argumentative           
philosophers1 according to which the    
,lord is the operative cause of the     
world1 appears unacceptable4  #db4 ,on  
account of the impossibility of the     
origination 7of the individual soul from
 the highest ,lord1 the doctrine of the 
,bhgavatas cannot be accepted74  ,we    
have1 in what precedes1 refuted the     
opinion of those who think that the     
,lord is not the material cause but only
 the ruler1 the operative cause of the  
world4 ,we are now going to refute the  
doctrine of those according to whom he  
is the material as well as the operative
 cause4--,but1 it may be objected1 in   
the previous portions of the present    
work a ,lord of exactly the same nature1
 i4e4 a ,lord who is the material1 as   
well as the operative1 cause of the     
world1 has been ascertained on the basis
 of ,scripture1 and it is a recognised  
principle that ,sm_/ri_/ti1 in so far as
 it agrees with ,scripture1 is          

authoritative2 why then should we aim at
 controverting the doctrine stated8--,it
 is true1 we reply1 that a part of the  
system which we are going to discuss    
agrees with the ,vednta system1 and     
hence affords no matter for controversy2
 another part of the system1 however1 is
 open to objection1 and that part we    
intend to attack4  ,the so-called       
,bhgavatas are of opinion that the one  
holy 7bhagavat7 ,vsudeva1 whose nature  
is pure knowledge1 is what really       
exists1 and that he1 dividing himself   
fourfold1 appears in four forms 7vyha71 
as ,vsudeva1 ,sankarsha_/n_/a1          
,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha4 ,vsudeva    
denotes the highest ,self1              
,sankarsha_/n_/a the individual soul1   
,pradyumna the mind 7manas71 ,aniruddha 
the principle of egoity 7ahankra74 ,of  
these four ,vsudeva constitutes the     
ultimate causal essence1 of which the   
three others are the effects4--,the     
believer after having worshipped        
,vsudeva for a hundred years by means of

 approach to the temple 7abhigamana71   
procuring of things to be offered       
7updna71 oblation 7jy71 recitation of   
prayers1 c4 7svdhyya71 and devout       
meditation 7yoga71 passes beyond all    
affliction and reaches the highest      
,being4  ,concerning this system we     
remark that we do not intend to         
controvert the doctrine that            
,nrya_/n_/a1 who is higher than the     
,undeveloped1 who is the highest ,self1 
and the ,self of all1 reveals himself by
 dividing himself in multiple ways2 for 
various scriptural passages1 such as    
',he is onefold1 he is threefold' 7,ch4 
,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b71 teach us that the 
highest ,self appears in manifold forms4
 ,nor do we mean to object to the       
inculcation of unceasing concentration  
of mind on the highest ,being which     
appears in the ,bhgavata doctrine under 
the forms of reverential approach1 c42  
for that we are to meditate on the ,lord
 we know full well from ,sm_/ri_/ti and 
,scripture4 ,we1 however1 must take     

exception to the doctrine that          
,sankarsha_/n_/a springs from ,vsudeva1 
,pradyumna from ,sankarsha_/n_/a1       
,aniruddha from ,pradyumna4 ,it is not  
possible that from ,vsudeva1 i4e4 the   
highest ,self1 there should originate   
,sankarsha_/n_/a1 i4e4 the individual   
soul2 for if such were the case1 there  
would attach to the soul non-permanency1
 and all the other imperfections which  
belong to things originated4 ,and thence
 release1 which consists in reaching the
 highest ,being1 could not take place2  
for the effect is absorbed only by      
entering into its cause4--,that the soul
 is not an originated thing1 the teacher
 will prove later on 7,,ii1 #c1 #ag74   
,for this reason the ,bhgavata          
hypothesis is unacceptable4  #dc4 ,and  
7it is7 not 7observed that7 the         
instrument is produced from the agent4  
,the ,bhgavata hypothesis is to be      
rejected for that reason also1 that     
observation never shows us an           
instrument1 such as a hatchet and the   

like1 to spring from an agent such as   
,devadatta1 or any other workman4 ,but  
the ,bhgavatas teach that from an agent1
 viz4 the individual soul termed        
,sankarsha_/n_/a1 there springs its     
instrument1 viz4 the internal organ     
termed ,pradyumna1 and again from this  
offspring of the agent another          
instrument1 viz4 the ahankra termed     
,aniruddha4 ,such doctrines cannot be   
settled without observed instances4 ,and
 we do not meet with any scriptural     
passage in their favour4  #dd4 ,or 7if7 
in consequence of the existence of      
knowledge1 c4 7,vsudeva1 c4 be taken as 
,lords71 yet there is non-exclusion of  
that 7i4e4 the objection raised in ,stra
 #db74  ,let us then--the ,bhgavatas may
 say--understand by ,sankarsha_/n_/a1   
and so on1 not the individual soul1 the 
mind1 c41 but rather ,lords1 i4e4       
powerful beings distinguished by all the
 qualities characteristic of rulers1    
such as pre-eminence of knowledge and   
ruling capacity1 strength1 valour1      

glory4 ,all these are ,vsudevas free    
from faults1 without a substratum 7not  
sprung from pradhna71 without any       
imperfections4 ,hence the objection     
urged in ,stra #db does not apply4      
,even on this interpretation of your    
doctrine1 we reply1 the 'non-exclusion  
of that1' i4e4 the non-exclusion of the 
impossibility of origination1 can be    
established4--,do you1 in the first     
place1 mean to say that the four        
individual ,lords1 ,vsudeva1 and so on1 
have the same attributes1 but do not    
constitute one and the same ,self8--,if 
so1 you commit the fault of uselessly   
assuming more than one ,lord1 while all 
the work of the ,lord can be done by    
one4 ,moreover1 you offend thereby      
against your own principle1 according to
 which there is only one real essence1  
viz4 the holy ,vsudeva4--,or do you     
perhaps mean to say that from the one   
highest ,being there spring those four  
forms possessing equal attributes8--,in 
that case the objection urged in ,stra  

#db remains valid4 ,for ,sankarsha_/n_/a
 cannot be produced from ,vsudeva1 nor  
,pradyumna from ,sankarsha_/n_/a1 nor   
,aniruddha from ,pradyumna1 since 7the  
attributes of all of them being the     
same7 there is no supereminence of any  
one of them4 ,observation shows that the
 relation of cause and effect requires  
some superiority on the part of the     
cause--as1 for instance1 in the case of 
the clay and the jar 7where the cause is
 more extensive than the effect7--and   
that without such superiority the       
relation is simply impossible4 ,but the 
followers of the ,p_/k_/artra do not    
acknowledge any difference founded on   
superiority of knowledge1 power1 c4     
between ,vsudeva and the other ,lords1  
but simply say that they all are forms  
of ,vsudeva1 without any special        
distinctions4 ,the forms of ,vsudeva    
cannot properly be limited to four1 as  
the whole world1 from ,brahman down to a
 blade of grass1 is understood to be a  
manifestation of the supreme ,being4    

#de4 ,and on account of contradictions4 
,moreover1 manifold contradictions are  
met with in the ,bhgavata system1 with  
reference to the assumption of qualities
 and their bearers4 ,eminence of        
knowledge and ruling capacity1 strength1
 valour1 and glory are enumerated as    
qualities1 and then they are in some    
other place spoken of as ,selfs1 holy   
,vsudevas1 and so on4--,moreover1 we    
meet with passages contradictory of the 
,veda4 ,the following passage1 for      
instance1 blames the ,veda1 ',not having
 found the highest bliss in the ,vedas  
_/,s_/_/nd_/ilya studied this           
_/s_/stra4'--,for this reason also the  
,bhgavata doctrine cannot be accepted4  
,notes3  ,footnote #cad3 ,the           
characteristics of ,goodness1 ,passion1 
and ,darkness1 the three constituent    
elements 7gu_/n_/a7 of the pradhna4 ,s4 
,k4 #ab1 #ac4  ,footnote #cae3 ,viz4 the
 great principle 7mahat74 ahanka a1 c4  
,s4 ,k4 #c4  ,footnote #caf3 ,the       
arguments here referred to are          

enumerated in the ,s4 ,k4 #ae3 ,s4      
,stras ,i1 #ahi ff4  ,footnote #cag3 ,if
 we attempt to infer the nature of the  
universal cause from its effects on the 
ground of parallel instances1 as1 for   
instance1 that of an earthen jar whose  
material cause is clay1 we must remember
 that the jar has sprung from clay not  
without the co-operation of an          
intelligent being1 viz4 the potter4     
,footnote #cah3 ,as had been asserted   
above for the purpose of inferring      
therefrom1 according to the principle of
 the equality of cause and effect1 the  
existence of the three constituents of  
the pradhna4  ,footnote #cai3 ,and a    
thing cannot consist of that of which it
 is the cause4  ,footnote #cbj3 ,which  
differences cannot be reconciled with   
the ,snkhya hypothesis of the object    
itself consisting of either pleasure or 
pain1 c4--',if things consisted in      
themselves of pleasure1 pain1 c41 then  
sandal ointment 7which is cooling1 and  
on that account pleasant in summer7     

would be pleasant in winter also2 for   
sandal never is anything but            
sandal4--,and as thistles never are     
anything but thistles they ought1 on the
 ,snkhya hypothesis1 to be eaten with   
enjoyment not only by camels but by men 
also4' ,bh4  ,footnote #cba3            
,sa_/m_/sargaprvakatvaprasanga iti      
gu_/n_/n_/m_/                           
sa_/m_/s_/ri_/sh_/t_/nekavastuprak_/ri_/
tikatvaprasaktir ity artha_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4
  ,footnote #cbb3 ,for they limit one   
another4  ,footnote #cbc3 ,to proceed to
 the argument 'from the separateness of 
cause and effect' 7,s4 ,k4 #ae74        
,footnote #cbd3 ,the next sentences     
furnish the answer to the question how  
the intelligent ,self is known at all if
 it is not the object of                
perception4--,pratyakshatvbhve katham   
tmasiddhir ity sankya anumnd ity ha1    
prav_/ri_/ttti4 ,anumnasiddhasya        
_/k_/etanasya na                        
pravr_/i_/tty_/s_/rayateti              
dar_/s_/ayitum evakra_/h_/4 ,katham     

anumnam ity apekshy_/m_/ tatprakra_/m_/2
 s_/k_/ayati kevaleti4                  
,vailaksha_/n_/ya_/m_/ pr_/n_/dimattvam4
 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #cbe3 ,viz4 that    
whatever moves or acts does so under the
 influence of                           
intelligence4--,sdhyapakshanikshiptatva_
/m_/ sdhyavati pakshe pravish_/t_/atvam 
eva ta_/k_/ _/k_/a                      
sapakshanizkshiptatvasypy               
upalaksha_/n_/am1 anpanyso na           
vyabhi_/k_/rabhmin ity artha_/h_/4 n4   
,gi4  ,footnote #cbf3 ,it might be held 
that for the transformation of grass    
into milk no other cause is required    
than the digestive heat of the cow's    
body2 but a reflecting person will      
acknowledge that there also the         
omniscient ,lord is active4 ,bh4        
,footnote #cbg3 ,andheyti_/s_/ayasya    
sukhadukhaprptiparihrarpti_/s_/aya_/s_/n
yasyety artha_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote  
#cbh3 ,for the soul as being of an      
entirely inactive nature cannot of      
itself aim at release1 and the pradhna  

aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's  
undergoing varied experience4  ,footnote
 #cbi3 ,i4e4 for the various items      
constituting enjoyment or experience4   
,footnote #ccj3 ,t_/ri_/tyes'pi         
katipaya_/s_/abddyupalabdhir v          
samastatadupalabdhir v bhoga iti        
vikalpydye sarveshm ekadaiva mukti_/h_/ 
syd iti manvno dvitya_/m_/ pratyha      
ubhayrthateti4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote #cca3 
,the ,,mss4 of nanda ,giri omit         
sa_/m_/srnu_/kkh_/edt2 the ,bhmat's     
reading is3                             
,sarga_/s_/aktyanu_/kkh_/edavad         
d_/ri_/k_/s_/aktyanu_/kkh_/edt4         
,footnote #ccb3 ,on the theory that the 
soul is the cause of the pradhna's      
activity we again have to ask whether   
the pradhna acts for the soul's         
enjoyment or for its release1 c4        
,footnote #ccc3 ,anantaro dosho         
mahaddikryotpdyoga_/h_/4 n4 ,gi4        
,footnote #ccd3 ,in the former case the 
five intellectual senses are looked upon
 as mere modifications of the sense of  

touch4  ,footnote #cce3 ,buddhi in the  
latter case being the generic name for  
buddhi1 ahankra1 and manas4  ,footnote  
#ccf3 ,lit4 that which burns and that   
which is burned1 which literal rendering
 would perhaps be preferable throughout4
 ,as it is1 the context has necessitated
 its retention in some places4--,the    
sufferers are the individual souls1 the 
cause of suffering the world in which   
the souls live4  ,footnote #ccg3 ,in the
 case of the lamp1 light and heat are   
admittedly essential2 hence the ,vedntin
 is supposed to bring forward the sea   
with its waves1 and so on1 as furnishing
 a case where attributes pass away while
 the substance remains4  ,footnote #cch3
 ',artha1' a useful or beneficial thing1
 an object of desire4  ,footnote #cci3  
,in reality neither suffering nor       
sufferers exist1 as the ,vedntin had    
pointed out in the first sentences of   
his reply2 but there can of course be no
 doubt as to who suffers and what causes
 suffering in the vyavahrika-state1 i4e4

 the phenomenal world4  ,footnote #cdj3 
,in order to explain thereby how the    
soul can experience pain4  ,footnote    
#cda3 ,and that would be against the    
,snkhya dogma of the soul's essential   
purity4  ,footnote #cdb3 ,so that the   
fact of suffering which cannot take     
place apart from an intelligent         
principle again remains unexplained4    
,footnote #cdc3 tmanas tapte sattve     
pratibmitatvd yukt taptir iti           
_/s_/ankate sattveti4 ,an4 ,gi4         
,footnote #cdd3 ,for it then indicates  
no more than a fictitious resemblance4  
,footnote #cde3 ,the ,snkhya            
,prvapakshin had objected to the ,vednta
 doctrine that1 on the latter1 we cannot
 account for the fact known from        
ordinary experience that there are      
beings suffering pain and things causing
 suffering4--,the ,vedntin in his turn  
endeavours to show that on the ,snkhya  
doctrine also the fact of suffering     
remains inexplicable1 and is therefore  
to be considered not real1 but          

fictitious merely1 the product of       
,nescience4  ,footnote #cdf3 ,not only  
'suffering as it were1' as it had been  
called above4  ,footnote #cdg3 ,for real
 suffering cannot be removed by mere    
distinctive knowledge on                
which--according to the ,snkhya         
also--release depends4  ,footnote #cdh3 
,this in answer to the remark that      
possibly the conjunction of soul and    
pradhna may come to an end when the     
influence of ,darkness declines1 it     
being overpowered by the knowledge of   
,truth4  ,footnote #cdi3 ,i4e4 according
 as they are atoms of earth1 water1     
fire1 or air4  ,footnote #cej3          
,parima_/nd_/ala1 spherical is the      
technical term for the specific form of 
extension of the atoms1 and1            
secondarily1 for the atoms themselves4  
,the latter must apparently be imagined 
as infinitely small spheres4 ,cp4       
,vi_/s_/4 ,st4 ,,vii1 #a1 #bj4          
,footnote #cea3 ,viz4 during the period 
of each pralaya4 ,at that time all the  

atoms are isolated and motionless4      
,footnote #ceb3 ,when the time for a new
 creation has come4  ,footnote #cec3    
,the c4 implies the activity of the     
,lord4  ,footnote #ced3 ,the inherent   
7material7 cause of an atomic compound  
are the constituent atoms1 the          
non-inheient cause the conjunction of   
those atoms1 the operative causes the   
ad_/ri_/sh_/ta_/ and the ,lord's        
activity which make them enter into     
conjunction4  ,footnote #cee3 ,i4e4 in  
all cases the special form of extension 
of the effect depends not on the special
 extension of the cause1 but on the     
number of atoms composing the cause 7and
 thereby the effect74  ,footnote #cef3  
,in order to escape the conclusion that 
the non-acceptance of the doctrine of   
,brahman involves the abandonment of a  
fundamental ,vai_/s_/eshika principle4  
,footnote #ceg3 ,i4e4 forms of extension
 different from sphericity1 c4          
,footnote #ceh3 ,the first of the three 
,stras quoted comprises1 in the present 

text of the ,vai_/s_/eshika-stras1 only 
the following words1                    
',kra_/n_/abahutv_/k_/ _/k_/a2' the     
_/k_/a of the ,stra implying1 according 
to the commentators1 mahattva and       
pra_/k_/aya4--,according to the         
,vai_/s_/eshikas the form of extension  
called a_/n_/u1 minute1 has for its     
cause the dvitva inherent in the        
material causes1 i4e4 the two atoms from
 which the minute binary atomic compound
 originates4--,the form of extension    
called mahat1 big1 has different causes1
 among them bahutva1 i4e4 the plurality 
residing in the material causes of the  
resulting 'big' thing2 the cause of the 
mahattva of a ternary atomic compound1  
for instance1 is the tritva inherent in 
the three constituent atoms4 ,in other  
cases mahattva is due to antecedent     
mahattva1 in others to pra_/k_/aya1 i4e4
 accumulation4 ,see the ,upaskra on     
,vai_/s_/4 ,st4 ,,vii1 #a1 #i2 #aj4     
,footnote #cei3 ,i4e4 if the            
,vai_/s_/eshikas have to admit that it  

is the nature of sphericity1 c4 not to  
produce like effects1 the ,vedntin also 
may maintain that ,brahman produces an  
unlike effect1 viz4 the non-intelligent 
world4  ,footnote #cfj3 ,like other     
things1 let us say a piece of cloth1    
which consists of parts4  ,footnote     
#cfa3 ,or1 more particularly1 to the    
conjunction of the atoms with the souls 
to which merit and demerit              
belong4--,ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/peksham        
ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/avatkshetraj_/_/asa_/my_/
ogpeksham iti yvat4 n4 ,gi4  ,footnote  
#cfb3 ,according to the ,vai_/s_/eshikas
 intelligence is not essential to the   
soul1 but a mere adventitious quality   
arising only when the soul is joined to 
an internal organ4  ,footnote #cfc3 ,the
 soul being all-pervading4  ,footnote   
#cfd3 ,which is inadmissible on         
,vai_/s_/eshika principles1 because     
sa_/m_/yoga as being a quality is       
connected with the things it joins by   
samavya4  ,footnote #cfe3 ,viz4 from    
those things which are united by        

conjunction4 ,the argument is that      
conjunction as an independent third     
entity requires another connexion to    
connect it with the two things related  
to each other in the way of conjunction4
  ,footnote #cff3 ,viz4 the absolute    
difference of samavya and sa_/m_/yoga   
from the terms which they connect4      
,footnote #cfg3 ,action 7karman71 c4    
also standing in the samavya relation to
 their substrates4  ,footnote #cfh3 ,our
 ,vai_/s_/eshika-stras read             
'pratishedhabhva_/h_/2' but as all      
,,mss4 of ,sankara have                 
'pratishedhbhva_/h_/' ,i have kept the  
latter reading and translated according 
to nandagiri's explanation3 ,kryam      
anityam iti krye vireshato              
nityatvanishedho na syd yadi            
kra_/n_/eszpy anityatvam                
atozs_/n_/n_/m_/ kra_/n_/n_/m_/         
nityateti strrtha_/h_/4  ,footnote #cfi3
 ,because they also are not perceptible2
 the ternary aggregates1 the so-called  
trasare_/n_/us1 constituting the minima 

perceptibilia4  ,footnote #cgj3 ,as they
 have no cause which could either be    
disintegrated or destroyed4  ,footnote  
#cga3 ,this according to the ,vednta    
view4 ,if atoms existed they might have 
originated from avidy by a mere         
pari_/n_/ma and might again be dissolved
 into avidy1 without either             
disintegration or destruction of their  
cause taking place4  ,footnote #cgb3    
,the ,snkhyas looking on everything     
7except the soul7 as being the pradhna  
in various forms4--,there is no need of 
assuming with ,govindnanda that by the  
,snkhya of the text we have to          
understand the ,vednta4  ,footnote #cgc3
 ,yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina_/s_/yad
 apar_/s_/ritam evvatish_/th_/ate tv    
ayutasiddhau yathvayavvayavinau4        
,footnote #cgd3 ,the connexion of cause 
and effect is of course samavya4        
,footnote #cge3 ,if the effect can exist
 before having entered into connexion   
with the cause1 the subsequent connexion
 of the two is no longer samavya but    

sa_/m_/yoga2 and that contradicts a     
fundamental ,vai_/s_/eshika principle4  
,footnote #cgf3 ,this clause replies to 
the objection that only those connexions
 which have been produced by previous   
motion are to be considered             
conjunctions4  ,footnote #cgg3 ,a clause
 meant to preclude the assumption that  
the permanent existence of the things   
connected involves the permanent        
existence of the connexion4  ,footnote  
#cgh3 ,it having been shown above that  
atoms cannot enter into sa_/m_/yoga with
 each other1 it is shown now that       
sa_/m_/yoga of the soul with the atoms  
cannot be the cause of the motion of the
 latter1 and that sa_/m_/yoga of soul   
and manas cannot be the cause of        
cognition4  ,footnote #cgi3             
,ekasambandhykarsha_/n_/e yatra         
sambandhyantarkarsha_/n_/a_/m_/ tatra   
sa_/m_/slesha_/h_/1 sa tu svayavn_/m_/  
jatuksh_/th_/dn_/m_/ d_/ri_/sh_/t_/o na 
tu niravayavai_/h_/ svayvnm1 ato        
dvya_/n_/ukasya svayavasya niravayavena 

param_/n_/un sa nopapadyate4            
,brahmavidybh4  ,footnote #chj3 ,in     
answer to the question how1 in that     
case1 the practically recognised        
relation of abode1 c4 existing between  
the cause and the effect is accounted   
for4  ,footnote #cha3 ,for they must in 
that case have a northern end1 an       
eastern end1 c4  ,footnote #chb3 ,and   
that on that account the atoms which he 
considers as the ultimate simple        
constituents of matter cannot be        
decomposed4  ,footnote #chc3 ,because   
according to their opinion difference of
 size constitutes difference of         
substance1 so that the continuous change
 of size in animal bodies1 for instance1
 involves the continual perishing of old
 and the continual origination of new   
substances4  ,footnote #chd3 ,the       
following notes on ,bauddha doctrines   
are taken exclusively from the          
commentaries on the _/,s_/ankarabhshya1 
and no attempt has been made to contrast
 or reconcile the ,brahminical accounts 

of ,bauddha psychology with the teaching
 of genuine ,bauddha books4 ,cp4 on the 
chief sects of the ,buddhistic          
philosophers the ,bauddha chapter of the
                                        
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha4--,the
 ,nihilists are the ,mdhyamikas2 the    
,idealists are the ,yog_/k_/ras2 the    
,sautrntikas and the ,vaibhshikas       
together constitute the class of the    
,realists4--,i subjoin the account given
 of those sects in the                  
,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a4--,buddhasya hi  
mdhyamika-yog_/k_/ra-sautrntika-vaibhshi
kasamj_/_/aks _/k_/atvra_/h_/           
_/s_/ishy_/h_/4 ,tatra buddhena         
prathama_/m_/ yn prati sarva_/m_/       
_/s_/nyam ity upadish_/t_/a_/m_/ te     
mdhyamiks te hi guru_/n_/ yathokta_/m_/ 
tathaiva _/s_/raddhay g_/ri_/htavanta   
iti k_/ri_/tv npak_/ri_/sh_/t_/_/h_/    
puna_/s_/ _/k_/a taduktasyrthasya       
buddhyanusre_/n_/kshepasyk_/ri_/tatvn   
notk_/ri_/sh_/t_/abuddhaya iti          
mdhyamik_/h_/4 ,anyais tu _/s_/ishyair  

guru_/n_/ sarva_/s_/nyatva upadish_/t_/e
 j_/_/ntiriktasya sarvasya _/s_/nyatvam 
astu nmeti gurktir yoga iti bauddai_/h_/
 paribhshitopet_/h_/ tad upari _/k_/a   
j_/_/nasya tu _/s_/nyatva_/m_/ na       
sa_/m_/bhavati tathtve                  
jagadndhyaprasangt snyasiddher apy      
asa_/m_/bhav_/k_/ _/k_/eti buddhamate   
_/k_/ratvena paribhshita kshepos'pi     
k_/ri_/ta iti yog_/k_/r_/h_/            
vij_/_/namtrstitvavdina_/h_/4           
,tadanataram anyai_/h_/ _/s_/ishyai_/h_/
 prattisiddhasya katha_/m_/             
_/s_/nyatva_/m_/ vaktu_/m_/ _/s_/akyam  
ato j_/_/navad vhyrthos'pi satya ity    
ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu1 para_/m_/  
tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte
 tathngk_/ri_/tyaiva_/m_/               
_/s_/ishyamatim anus_/ri_/tya           
kiyatparyanta_/m_/ stra_/m_/            
bhavishyatti tai_/h_/ p_/ri_/sh_/t_/am  
atas te sautrntik_/h_/4 ,anye punar yady
 aya_/m_/ gha_/t_/a iti prattibald      
vhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasy eva       
pratter aparokshatvt sa katha_/m_/      

parokshos'to vhyos'rtho na pratyaksha   
iti bhsh viruddhety kshipann atas te    
vaibhshik_/h_/4  ,footnote #che3 ,the   
rpaskandha comprises the senses and     
their objects1 colour1 c42 the          
sense-organs were above called bhautika1
 they here re-appear as _/k_/aittika on 
account of their connexion with thought4
 ,their objects likewise are classed as 
_/k_/aittika in so far as they are      
perceived by the senses4--,the          
vij_/_/naskandha comprises the series of
 self-cognitions 7ahamaham ity          
layavj_/_/napravha_/h_/71 according to  
all commentators2 and in addition1      
according to the ,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a1
 the knowledge1 determinate and         
indeterminate1 of external things       
7savikalpaka_/m_/ nirvikalpaka_/m_/     
_/k_/a                                  
prav_/ri_/ttivij_/_/nasamj_/_/itam74--  
,the vedanskandha comprises pleasure1   
pain1 c4--,the samj_/_/skandha comprises
 the cognition of things by their names 
7gaur a_/s_/va                          

itydi_/s_/abdasamjalpitapratyaya_/h_/1  
n4 ,gi42 gaur a_/s_/va ityeva_/m_/      
nmavi_/s_/ish_/t_/asavikalpaka_/h_/     
pratyaya_/h_/1 ,go4 n42 sa_/m_/j_/_/    
yaj_/_/adattdipadatadullekh             
savikalpapratyayo v1 dvityapakshe       
vij_/_/napadena savikalpapratyayo na    
grhy_/h_/1 ,brahmavidybh474 ,the        
sa_/m_/skraskandha comprises passion1   
aversion1 c41 dharma and                
adharma4--,compare also the             
,bhmat4--,the vij_/_/naskandha is       
_/k_/itta1 the other skandhas           
_/k_/aitta4  ,footnote #chf3 ,it has to 
be kept in view that the sarvstitvavdins
 as well as the other ,bauddha sects    
teach the momentariness                 
7ksha_/n_/ikatva71 the eternal flux of  
everything that exists1 and are on that 
ground controverted by the upholders of 
the permanent ,brahman4  ,footnote #chg3
 ,mind1 on the ,bauddha doctrine1       
presupposes the existence of an         
aggregate of atoms1 viz4 the body4      
,footnote #chh3 ,in consequence of which

 no release could take place4  ,footnote
 #chi3 ,the ,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a      
explains the last clause--from          
ksha_/n_/ikatv_/k_/ _/k_/a--somewhat    
differently3 ,api _/k_/a param_/n_/nm   
api ksha_/n_/ikatvbhyupagamn melana_/m_/
 na sambhavati1 param_/n_/n_/m_/        
melana_/m_/ param_/n_/ukriydhnam1 tath  
_/k_/a svakriy_/m_/ prati               
param_/n_/n_/m_/ kra_/n_/atvt           
kriypraksha_/n_/e param_/n_/ubhir bhvyam
 kriy _/s_/rayatay kriyksha_/n_/eszpi   
teshm avasthnam apekshitam eva_/m_/     
melanakshaneszpi1 nahi                  
melan_/s_/rayasybhve melanarp           
prav_/ri_/ttir upapadyate1 tath _/k_/a  
sthiraparam_/n_/usdhy melanarp          
prav_/ri_/tti_/h_/ katha_/m_/ teshm     
ksha_/n_/ikatve bhavet4--nanda ,giri    
also divides and translates differently 
from the translation in the text4       
,footnote #cij3 ,the kra_/n_/atvt of    
_/,s_/ankara explains the pratyayatvt of
 the ,stra2 krya_/m_/ praty ayate       
janakatvena ga_/kkh_/ati4  ,footnote    

#cia3 ,the commentators agree on the    
whole in their explanations of the terms
 of this series4--,the following is the 
substance of the comment of the         
,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a3 ,nescience is   
the error of considering that which is  
momentary1 impure1 c4 to be permanent1  
pure1 c4--,impression 7affection1       
sa_/m_/skra7 comprises desire1 aversion1
 c41 and the activity caused by         
them4--,knowledge 7vij_/_/na7 is the    
self-consciousness 7aham ity            
layavij_/_/nasya v_/ri_/ttilbha_/h_/7   
springing up in the embryo4--,name and  
form is the rudimentary flake--or       
bubble-like condition of the            
embryo4--,the abode of the six          
7sha_/d_/yatana7 is the further         
developed stage of the embryo in which  
the latter is the abode of the six      
senses4--,touch 7spar_/s_/a7 is the     
sensations of cold1 warmth1 c4 on the   
embryo's part4--,feeling 7vedan7 the    
sensations of pleasure and pain         
resulting therefrom4--,desire           

7t_/ri_/sh_/n_/7 is the wish to enjoy   
the pleasurable sensations and to shun  
the painful ones4--,activity 7updna7 is 
the effort resulting from               
desire1--,birth is the passing out from 
the uterus4--,species 7jti7 is the class
 of beings to which the new-born        
creature belongs4--,decay 7jar74--,death
 7mara_/n_/am7 is explained as the      
condition of the creature when about to 
die 7mumrsh74--,grief 7_/s_/oka7 the    
frustration of wishes connected         
therewith4--,lament 7paridevanam7 the   
lamentations on that account4--,pain    
7du_/h_/kha7 is such pain as caused by  
the five senses4--,durmanas is mental   
affliction4--,the 'and the like' implies
 death1 the departure to another world  
and the subsequent return from there4   
,footnote #cib3 nanda ,giri and ,go4    
nanda explain3 _/s_/rya_/s_/rayibhteshv 
iti bhokt_/ri_/vi_/s_/esha_/n_/am       
ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/_/s_/rayeshv ity         
artha_/h_/4--,the                       
,brahrma-vidybhara_/n_/a says3 ,nityeshv

 _/s_/rya_/s_/rayibhteshv a_/n_/ushv    
abhyupagamyamneshu bhokt_/ri_/shu _/k_/a
 satsv ity anvaya_/h_/4                 
_/s_/rya_/s_/rayibhteshv ity            
asyopakryopakrakabhvaprpteshv ity       
artha_/h_/4--,and with regard to the    
subsequent _/s_/ray_/s_/rayi_/s_/nyeshu3
 _/s_/ray_/s_/rayitva_/s_/nyeshu1       
aya_/m_/ bhva_/h_/1 sthireshu           
param_/n_/ushu yadanvaye                
param_/n_/n_/m_/ sa_/m_/ghtpatti_/h_/   
yadvyatireke _/k_/a na tad upakrakam    
upakry_/h_/ param_/n_/ava_/h_/ yena     
tatk_/ri_/to bhoga_/h_/ prrthyate sa    
tatra karteti grahtu_/m_/ _/s_/akyate1  
ksha_/n_/ikeshu tu param_/n_/ushu       
anvayavyatirekagrahasynekaksha_/n_/asdhy
asysa_/m_/bhavn nopakryopakrakabhvo     
nirdhrayitu_/m_/                        
_/s_/akya_/h_/4--,ananda ,giri remarks  
on the latter3                          
,ad_/ri_/sh_/t_/_/s_/rayakrt_/ri_/rhitya
m h_/s_/rayeti4 ,another reading appears
 to be _/s_/ay_/s_/raya_/s_/nyeshu4     
,footnote #cic3 ,bauddhn_/m_/           

ksha_/n_/apadena gha_/t_/dir eva padrtho
 vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta_/h_/     
ka_/sk_/it ksha_/n_/o nma hlosti4       
,brahmvidybh4  ,footnote #cid3 ,and     
whereupon then could be established the 
difference of mere efficient causes such
 as the potter's staff1 c41 and material
 causes such as clay1 c48  ,footnote    
#cie3 ,these four causes are the        
so-called defining cause                
7adhipati-pratyaya71 the auxiliary cause
 7sahakripratyaya71 the immediate cause 
7samanantarapratyaya71 and the          
substantial cause 7lambanapratyaya74--,i
 extract the explanation from the       
,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a3 ,adhipatir      
indriya_/m_/ tad dhi _/k_/akshurdirpam  
utpannasya j_/_/nasya rpdivishayat_/m_/ 
niya_/kkh_/ati niymaka_/s_/ _/k_/a      
lokedhipatir ity u_/k_/yate4 ,sahakr    
loka_/h_/4                              
,samanantarapratyaya_/h_/prvaj_/_/nam1  
bauddhamate hi                          
ksha_/n_/ikaj_/_/anasa_/m_/tatau        
prvaj_/_/nam uttaraj_/_/sya krana_/m_/  

tad eva _/k_/a mana ity u_/k_/yate4     
lambana_/m_/ gha_/t_/di_/h_/4 ,etn hetn 
pratya prpya _/k_/akshurdijanyam ity di4
  ,footnote #cif3 ,sa_/m_/skra iti1     
tanmate prvaksha_/n_/a eva hetubhta_/h_/
 sa_/m_/skro vsaneti _/k_/a vyavahriyate
 krya_/m_/ tu tadvishayatay             
karmavyutpatty sa_/m_/skra_/h_/1 tath   
_/k_/a kryakra_/n_/tmaka_/m_/ sarva_/m_/
 bhvarpa_/m_/ ksha_/n_/ikam iti         
pratij_/_/rtha_/h_/4                    
,brahmavidybhara_/n_/a4  ,footnote #cig3
 ,as when a man smashes a jar having    
previously formed the intention of doing
 so4  ,footnote #cih3 ,i4e4 the         
insensible continual decay of           
things4--,viparta iti                   
pratiksha_/n_/a_/m_/ gha_/t_/dn_/m_/    
yukty sdhyamnoku_/s_/alair avagantum    
a_/s_/akya_/h_/ skshmo                  
vin_/s_/opratisa_/m_/khynirodha_/h_/4   
,brahmv4  ,footnote #cii3 ,a series of  
momentary existences constituting a     
chain of causes and effects can never be
 entirely stopped2 for the last         

momentary existence must be supposed    
either to produce its effect or not to  
produce it4 ,in the former case the     
series is continued2 the latter         
alternative would imply that the last   
link does not really exist1 since the   
,bauddhas define the satt of a thing as 
its causal efficiency 7cp4              
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha74 ,and
 the non-existence of the last link     
would retrogressively lead to the       
non-existence of the whole series4      
,footnote #djj3 ,thus clay is recognised
 as such whether it appears in the form 
of a jar1 or of the potsherds into which
 the jar is broken1 or of the powder    
into which the potsherds are            
ground4--,analogously we infer that even
 things which seem to vanish altogether1
 such as a drop of water which has      
fallen on heated iron1 yet continue to  
exist in some form4  ,footnote #dja3    
,the knowledge that everything is       
transitory1 pain1 c4  ,footnote #djb3   
,what does enable us to declare that    

there is vara_/n_/bhva in one place and 
not in another8 ,space2 which therefore 
is something real4  ,footnote #djc3 ,if 
the cause were able1 without having     
undergone any change1 to produce        
effects1 it would at the same moment    
produce all the effects of which it is  
capable4--,cp4 on this point the        
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha4      
,footnote #djd3 ,this is added to       
obviate the remark that it is not a     
general rule that effects are of the    
same nature as their causes1 and that   
therefore1 after all1 existent things   
may spring from non-existence4          
,footnote #dje3 ,according to the       
vij_/_/navdin the cognition specialised 
by its various contents1 such as1 for   
instance1 the idea of blue colour is the
 object of knowledge2 the cognition in  
so far as it is consciousness 7avabhsa7 
is the result of knowledge2 the         
cognition in so far as it is power is   
mna1 knowledge2 in so far as it is the  
abode of that power it is pramt_/ri_/1  

knowing subject4  ,footnote #djf3 ,if   
they are said to be different from the  
atoms they can no longer be considered  
as composed of atoms2 if they are       
non-different from atoms they cannot be 
the cause of the mental representations 
of gross non-atomic bodies4  ,footnote  
#djg3 ,avayavvayavirpo vhyosrtho nsti   
_/k_/en m bhd jtivyaktydirpas tu syd ity
 _/s_/rankyha evam iti4 ,jtydn_/m_/     
vyaktydnm _/k_/tyantabhinnatve          
svtantryaprasangd atyantbhinnatve       
tadvadevtadbhvd bhinnbhinnatvasya       
viruddhatvd avayavvayavibhedavaj        
gtivyaktydibhedosxpi nstty artha_/h_/4  
,footnote #djh3 ,vsan1 above translated 
by mental impression1 strictly means any
 member of the infinite series of ideas 
which precedes the present actual idea4 
,footnote #dji3 ,for all these doctrines
 depend on the comparison of ideas which
 is not possible unless there be a      
permanent knowing subject in addition to
 the transitory ideas4  ,footnote #daj3 
,the vij_/_/naskandha comprises         

vij_/_/nas of two different kinds1 the  
layavij_/_/na and the                   
prav_/ri_/ttivij_/_/na4 ,the            
layavij_/_/na comprises the series of   
cognitions or ideas which refer to the  
ego2 the prav_/ri_/ttivij_/_/na         
comprises those ideas which refer to    
apparently external objects1 such as    
colour and the like4 ,the ideas of the  
latter class are due to the mental      
impressions left by the antecedent ideas
 of the former class4  ,footnote #daa3  
,viz4 in the present case the principle 
that what presents itself to            
consciousness is not non-existent4      
,footnote #dab3 ,soul and non-soul are  
the enjoying souls and the objects of   
their enjoyment2 srava is the forward   
movement of the senses towards their    
objects2 sa_/m_/vara is the restraint of
 the activity of the senses2 nirjara is 
self-mortification by which sin is      
destroyed2 the works constitute bondage2
 and release is the ascending of the    
soul1 after bondage has ceased1 to the  

highest regions4--,for the details1 see 
,professor ,cowell's translation of the 
rhata chapter of the                    
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha4      
,footnote #dac3 ,cp4 translation of     
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha1 p4   
#ei4  ,footnote #dad3 ,and so impugn the
 doctrine of the one eternal ,brahman4  
,footnote #dae3 ,cp4                    
,sarvadar_/s_/a_/n_/asa_/m_/graha       
translation1 p4 #eh4  ,footnote #daf3   
,the inference being that the initial   
and intervening sizes of the soul must  
be permanent because they are sizes of  
the soul1 like its final size4          
,footnote #dag3 ,the special nature of  
the connexion between the ,lord and the 
pradhna and the souls cannot be         
ascertained from the world considered as
 the effect of the pradhna acted upon by
 the ,lord2 for that the world is the   
effect of the pradhna is a point which  
the ,vedntins do not accept as proved4  
,footnote #dah3 ,i4e4 a high one1 but   
not an indefinite one2 since the        

omniscient ,lord knows its measure4