,,elements ,,of ,,military ,,art ,,and ,,science3 ,,or1 ,,course ,,of ,,instruction ,,in ,,strategy1 ,,fortification1 ,,tactics ,,of ,,battles1 c4 ,,embracing ,,the ,,duties ,,of ,,staff1 ,,infantry1 ,,cavalry1 ,,artillery1 ,,and ,,engineers4 ,,adapted ,,to ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,volunteers ,,and ,,militia4 ,,third ,,edition4 ,,with ,,critical ,,notes ,,on ,,the ,,mexican ,,and ,,crimean ,,wars4 ,,by ,h4 ,,wager ,,halleck1 ,a4,m41 ,,major ,,general1 ,u4,s4,a4 ,,new ,,york3 ,d4 ,,appleton ,,company1 #ddc #dde ,,broadway4 ,,london3 #af ,,little ,,britain #ahfb4 ,entered1 according to the ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahdf1 ,,by ,d4 ,,appleton ,,company1 ,in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,,contents ,,page ,,preface #e ,i4 ,,introduction4--,dr4 ,wayland's ,arguments on the ,justifiableness of ,war briefly examined4 #g ,,ii4 ,,strategy4--,general ,divisions of the ,art4--,rules for planning a ,campaign4--,analysis of the ,military ,operations of ,napoleon4 #ce ,,iii4 ,,fortifications4--,their importance in the ,defence of ,states proved by numerous ,historical ,examples4 #fa ,,iv4 ,,logistics4--,subsistence4--,forage4--, marches4--,convoys4-- ,castrametation4 #hh ,v4 ,,tactics4--,the ,twelve ,orders of ,battle1 with ,examples of each4--,different ,formations of ,infantry1 ,cavalry1 ,artillery1 and ,engineers on the ,field of ,battle1 with the ,modes of bringing ,troops into action4 #aad ,,vi4 ,,military ,,polity4--,the ,means of ,national ,defence best suited to the character and condition of a ,country1 with a brief ,account of those adopted by the several ,european ,powers4 #ace ,,vii4 ,,defence ,,of ,,our ,,sea-,,coast4--,brief ,description of our ,maritime ,fortifications1 with an ,examination of the several ,contests that have taken place between ,ships and ,forts1 including the ,attack on ,san ,juan d',ulloa1 and on ,st4 ,jean d',acre4 #aee ,,viii4 ,,our ,,northern ,,frontier ,,defences4--,brief ,description of the ,fortifications on the ,frontier1 and an analysis of our ,northern ,campaigns4 #baj ,,ix4 ,,army ,,organization4--,staff and ,administrative ,corps4--,their ,history1 ,duties1 ,numbers1 and ,organization4 #bce ,x4 ,,army ,,organization4--,infantry and ,cavalry4--,their ,history1 ,duties1 ,numbers1 and ,organization4 #bef ,,xi4 ,,army ,,organization4--,artillery4--,its ,history and ,organization1 with a ,brief ,notice of the different kinds of ,ordnance1 the ,manufacture of ,projectiles1 c4 #bge ,,xii4 ,,army ,,organization4--,engineers4--,their ,history1 ,duties1 and ,organization1--with a ,brief ,discussion1 showing their importance as a part of a modern ,army ,organization4 #cjj ,,xiii4 ,,permanent ,,fortifications4 ,historical ,notice of the progress of this ,art4--,description of the several parts of a ,fortress1 and the various ,methods of fortifying a ,position4 #cbg ,,xiv4 ,,field ,,engineering4--,field ,fortifications4--,military ,communications4--,military ,bridges4--,sapping1 ,mining1 and the ,attack and ,defence of a ,fortified ,place4 #cdb ,,xv4 ,,military ,,education4--,military ,schools of ,france1 ,prussia1 ,austria1 ,russia1 ,england1 c4--,washington's ,reasons for establishing the ,west ,point ,academy4--,rules of ,appointment and ,promotion in ,foreign ,services4--,absurdity and ,injustice of our own ,system4 #cgh ,,explanation ,,of ,,plates #dji ,,preface ,the following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures1 and delivered1 during1 the past winter1 before the ,lowell ,institute of ,boston4 ,they were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them2 but several officers of militia1 who heard them delivered1 or afterwards read them in manuscript1 desire their publication1 on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers now likely to be called into military service4 ,it is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer4 ,no pretension is made to originality in any part of the work2 the sole object having been to embody1 in a small compass1 well established military principles1 and to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history1 and the opinions and practice of the best generals4 ,small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared1 in articles furnished by the author to the ,new ,york and ,democratic ,reviews1 and in a ,report on the ,means of ,national ,defence1 published by order of ,congress4 ,h4,w4,h4 ,,may1 #ahdf4 ,,elements ,,of ,,military ,,art ,,and ,,science4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introduction4 ,our distance from the old world1 and the favorable circumstances in which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new world1 have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy1 that1 in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the acknowledgment of our national independence1 we have enjoyed more than fifty-eight of general peace2 our ,indian border wars have been too limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts of the country1 or to disturb the general conditions of peace4 ,this fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge1 promote commerce1 agriculture1 and manufactures2 in fine1 to increase the greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual4 ,under these circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions essentially pacific1 and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not soon be changed4 ,but in all communities opinions sometimes run into extremes2 and there are not a few among us who1 dazzled by the beneficial results of a long peace1 have adopted the opinion that war in any case is not only useless1 but actually immoral2 nay1 more1 that to engage in war is wicked in the highest degree1 and even brutish4 ,all modern ethical writers regard unjust war as not only immoral1 but as one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale4 ,such are all wars of mere ambition1 engaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or national sovereignty2 wars of plunder1 carried on from mercenary motives2 wars of propagandism1 undertaken for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions1 whether from the alleged motives of introducing a more orthodox religion1 or of extending the area of freedom4 ,such wars are held in just abhorrence by all moral and religious people3 and this is believed to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens4 ,but in addition to that respectable denomination of ,christians who deny our right to use arms under any circumstances1 there are many religious enthusiasts in other communions who1 from causes already noticed1 have adopted the same theory1 and hold all wars1 even those in self-defence1 as unlawful and immoral4 ,this opinion has been1 within the last few years1 pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence1 and many able pens have been enlisted in its cause4 ,one of the most popular1 and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science1 has adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of ,christian morality4 ,it has been deemed proper1 in commencing a course of lectures on war1 to make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its justifiableness4 ,we know of no better way of doing this than to give on the one side the objections to war as laid down in ,dr4 ,wayland's ,moral ,philosophy1 and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical writers have justified a resort to war4 ,we do not select ,dr4 ,wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author2 but because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these views1 and because the main arguments against war are here given in brief space1 and in more moderate and temperate language than that used by most of his followers4 ,i shall give his arguments in his own language4 ,i4 ,all wars are contrary to the revealed will of ,god4 ,it is said in reply1 that if the ,christian religion condemns all wars1 no matter how just the cause1 or how necessary for self-defence1 we must expect to find in the ,bible some direct prohibition of war1 or at least a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments4 ,but the ,bible nowhere prohibits war3 in the ,old ,testament we find war and even conquest positively commanded1 and although war was raging in the world in the time of ,christ and his apostles1 still they said not a word of its unlawfulness and immorality4 ,moreover1 the fathers of the church amply acknowledge the right of war1 and directly assert1 that when war is justly declared1 the ,christian may engage in it either by stratagem or open force4 ,if it be of that highly wicked and immoral character which some have recently attributed to it1 most assuredly it would be condemned in the ,bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal4 ,but it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or typically forbidden to the ,christian1 by such passages as ,thou shalt not kill1 7,deut4 v4 #ag17 ,i say unto you1 that ye resist not evil3 but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek1 turn to him the other also1 7,matt4 v4 #ci17 c4 ,if these passages are to be taken as literal commands1 as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe1 not only is war unlawful1 but also all our penal statutes1 the magistracy1 and all the institutions of the state for the defence of individual rights1 the protection of the innocent1 and the punishment of the guilty4 ,but if taken in conjunction with the whole ,bible1 we must infer that they are hyperbolical expressions1 used to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness1 and that1 so far as possible1 we over come evil with good4 ,can any sober-minded man suppose1 for a moment1 that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of the wicked1 by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the right1 and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong8 ,shall we invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations1 by literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat2 and the insolent and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime1 by going two miles with him if he bid us to go one8 ,again1 if the command1 ,thou shalt not kill1 is to be taken literally1 it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war1 and forbids the taking of human life by the state1 as a punishment for crime2 it also forbids1 says ,dr4 ,leiber1 our taking the life of any animal1 and even extends to the vegetable kingdom1--for undoubtedly plants have life1 and are liable to violent death--to be killed4 ,but ,dr4 ,wayland concedes to individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life1 and to society the right to punish murder by death4 ,this passage undoubtedly means1 thou shalt not unjustly kill1--thou shalt do no murder2 and so it is rendered in our prayer-books4 ,it cannot have reference to war1 for on almost the next page we find the ,israelites commanded to go forth and smite the heathen nations1--to cast them out of the land1--to utterly destroy them1--to show them no mercy1 c4 ,if these passages of the ,bible are to be taken literally1 there is no book which contains so many contradictions2 but if taken in connection with the spirit of other passages1 we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing or punishing crime1 whether in nations or in individuals2 but that we should combine love with justice1 and free our hearts from all evil motives4 ,,ii4 ,all wars are unjustifiable1 because ,god commands us to love every man1 alien or citizen1 ,samaritan or ,jew1 as ourselves2 and the act neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate this command4 ,it is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any command of ,god3 but is the above command to be taken literally1 and as forbidding us to engage in just war8 ,is it not rather intended to impress upon us1 in a forcible manner1 that mutual love is a great virtue2 that we should hate no one1 not even a stranger nor an enemy1 but should treat all with justice1 mercy1 and loving-kindness8 ,if the meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be the true one1 it is antagonistical not only to just war1 but to civil justice1 to patriotism1 and to the social and domestic affections4 ,but are we bound to love all human beings alike2 that is1 to the same degree8 ,does the ,bible1 as a whole1 inculcate such doctrine8 ,on the contrary1 ,christ himself had his beloved disciple1--one whom he loved pre-eminently1 and above all the others2 though he loved the others none the less on that account4 ,we are bound to love our parents1 our brothers1 our families first1 and above all other human beings2 but we do not1 for this reason1 love others any the less4 ,a man is not only permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family1 but if he neglect to do so1 he is worse than an infidel4 ,we are bound to protect our families against the attacks of others2 and1 if necessary for the defence of their lives1 we are permitted to take the life of the assailant2 nay more1 we are bound to do so4 ,but it does not follow that we hate him whom we thus destroy4 ,on the contrary1 we may feel compassion1 and even love for him4 ,the magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the penalty of the law2 and the sheriff carries the sentence into execution by taking1 in due form1 the life of the prisoner3 nevertheless1 both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life4 ,so it is in the external affairs of the state4 ,next to my kindred and my neighbors do ,i love my countrymen4 ,i love them more than ,i do foreigners1 because my interests1 my feelings1 my happiness1 my ties of friendship and affection1 bind me to them more intimately than to the foreigner4 ,i sympathize with the oppressed ,greek1 and the enslaved ,african1 and willingly contribute to their relief1 although their sufferings affect me very remotely2 but if my own countrymen become oppressed and enslaved1 nearer and dearer interests are affected1 and peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which ,god has formed4 ,if my countrymen be oppressed1 my neighbors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering2 this ,i am bound to take all proper measures in my power to prevent4 ,if the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument to desist from his wicked intentions1 ,i unite with my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his aggressions4 ,in doing this ,i am actuated by no feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces2 ,i have in my heart no malice1 no spirit of revenge2 ,i have no desire to harm individuals1 except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression4 ,but as instruments of evil1 ,i am bound to destroy their power to do harm4 ,i do not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge2 ,i fight against him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed4 ,i am prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty2 and after the battle1 or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless1 he is to be treated with kindness1 and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend4 ,all conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with disapprobation4 ,that war does not properly beget personal malignity but that1 on the contrary1 the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the battle-field1 frequently have a beneficial influence in the political events of after years1 may be shown by innumerable examples in all history4 ,soult and ,wellington were opposing generals in numerous battles2 but when the former visited ,england in #ahch1 he was received by ,wellington and the whole ,british nation with the highest marks of respect2 and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly relations between the two nations4 ,and a few years ago1 when we seemed brought1 by our civil authorities1 almost to the brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties1 the pacific arrangements concluded1 through the intervention of ,general ,scott1 between the ,governors of ,maine and ,new ,brunswick1 were mainly due to ancient friendships contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with ,great ,britain4 ,,iii4 ,it is granted that it would be better for man in general1 if wars were abolished1 and all means1 both of offence and defence1 abandoned4 ,now1 this seems to me to admit1 that this is the law under which ,god has created man4 ,but this being admitted1 the question seems to be at an end2 for ,god never places man under circumstances in which it is either wise1 or necessary1 or innocent1 to violate his laws4 ,is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves1 to steal2 or for one who lives among a community of liars1 to lie8 ,the fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects4 ,my living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing1 and certainly it would be no reason why ,i should neglect the security of my property4 ,my living among murderers would not justify me in committing murder1 and on the other hand it would be no reason why ,i should not fight in the defence of my family1 if the arm of the law were unable to protect them4 ,that other nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should do likewise1 nor is it of itself any reason why we should neglect the means of self-defence4 ,it may seem1 to us short-sighted mortals1 better that we were placed in a world where there were no wars1 or murders1 or thefts2 but ,god has seen fit to order it otherwise4 ,our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is1 and not such a world as we would make for ourselves4 ,we live among thieves3 we must therefore resort to force to protect our property--that is1 to locks1 and bars1 and bolts2 we build walls thick and high between the robber and our merchandise4 ,and more3 we enact laws for his punishment1 and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies4 ,we live among murderers3 if neither the law nor the ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of our innocent friends1 we forcibly resist the murderer1 even to his death1 if need be4 ,moreover1 to deter others from like crimes1 we inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life4 ,these relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of ,christian morality4 ,even ,dr4 ,wayland considers it not only the right1 but the duty of individuals and of society to resort to these means1 and to enact these laws for self-protection4 ,let us extend the same course of reasoning to the relations of different societies4 ,we live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars2 who1 disregarding the rights of others1 oppress and rob1 and even murder their citizens1 in order to reach some unrighteous end4 ,as individuals1 we build fences and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise2 so1 as a nation1 we build ships and forts to protect our commerce1 our harbors1 and our cities4 ,but the walls of our houses and stores are useless1 unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or scale them without great effort and personal danger2 so our national ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection1 unless fully armed and equipped4 ,further3 as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for the protection of our property and lives1 and1 when necessary1 arm them with the physical means of executing the laws1 even though the employment of these means should cost human life4 ,the prevention and punishment of crime causes much human suffering2 nevertheless the good of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished4 ,so1 as a nation1 we employ military officers to man our ships and forts1 to protect our property and our persons1 and to repel and punish those who seek to rob us of our life1 liberty1 and pursuit of happiness4 ,national aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual crime2 so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous1 and the employment of these means causes a far greater amount of human suffering4 ,this may be a good reason for greater caution in resorting to such means1 but assuredly it is no argument against the moral right to use them4 ,,iv4 ,war is unjustifiable because unnecessary3 #ast4 ,the very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures1 and the benevolence of its conduct1 would do more than any thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury4 ,the moral sentiment of every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just the kind1 and the merciful4 ,the moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals4 ,active benevolence and forbearance should be employed1 so far as may be proper2 but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue4 ,if we entirely forbear to punish the thief1 the robber1 and the murderer1 think you that crime will be diminished8 ,reason and experience prove the contrary4 ,active benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment1 but they were never designed to prohibit it4 ,the laws of ,god's universe are founded on justice as well as love4 ,the moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just1 the kind1 and the merciful2 but this fact does not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons1 and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished1 in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment4 #b;d4 ,but suppose the national injury to be done4 ,i reply1 the proper appeal for moral beings1 upon moral questions1 is not to physical force1 but to the consciences of men4 ,let the wrong be set forth1 but be set forth in the spirit of love2 and in this manner1 if in any1 will the consciences of men be aroused to justice4 ,argument1 and appeals to the consciences of men should always be resorted to in preference to physical force2 but when they fail to deter the wicked1 force must be employed4 ,i may reason with the robber and the murderer1 to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my house1 and murder my family2 but if he refuse to listen to moral appeals1 ,i employ physical force1--,i call in the strong arm of the law to assist me2 and if no other means can be found to save innocent life that is assailed1 the life of the assailant must be sacrificed4 ,if1 says ,puffendorf1 some one treads the laws of peace under his feet1 forming projects which tend to my ruin1 he could not1 without the highest degree of impudence1 7impudentissime17 pretend that after this ,i should consider him as a sacred person1 who ought not to be touched2 in other words1 that ,i should betray myself1 and abandon the care of my own preservation1 in order to give way to the malice of a criminal1 that he may act with impunity and with full liberty4 ,on the contrary1 since he shows himself unsociable towards me1 and since he has placed himself in a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace1 ,i have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me2 so that if ,i cannot do this without hurting him1 he has to accuse himself only1 since he has reduced me to this necessity4 ,de ,jure ,nat4 et ,gent1 lib4 ii41 ch4 v41 #a4 ,this same course of reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to war4 #c;d4 ,but suppose this method fail4 ,why1 then1 let us suffer the evil4 ,this principle1 if applied to its full extent1 would1 we believe1 be subversive of all right1 and soon place all power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men in the community4 ,reason with the nation that invades our soil1 and tramples under foot our rights and liberties1 and should it not desist1 why1 then1 suffer the evil6 ,reason with the murderer1 and if he do not desist1 why1 then1 suffer him to murder our wives and our children6 ,reason with the robber and the defaulter1 and if they will not listen1 why1 then1 let them take our property6 ,we cannot appeal to the courts1 for if their decisions be not respected1 they employ force to compel obedience to their mandates4 ,but ,dr4 ,wayland considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men4 ,he forgets this1 it is true1 in speaking of our duties towards our fellow-men of the same society1 and even allows us to punish the murderer with death2 but towards the foreigner he requires a greater forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor2 for if another nation send its armies to oppress1 and rob1 and murder us by the thousand1 we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or to punish them1 though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for an individual act of the same character4 ,the greater the scale of crime1 then1 the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent it6 #dth4 ,but it may be asked1 what is to prevent repeated and continued aggression8 ,i answer1 first1 not instruments of destruction1 but the moral principle which ,god has placed in the bosom of every man4 ,i think that obedience to the law of ,god1 on the part of the injured1 is the surest preventive against the repetition of injury4 ,i answer1 secondly1 suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not prevent the repetition of injury1 will acting on the principle of retaliation prevent it8 ,again2 ,i believe aggression from a foreign nation to be the intimation from ,god that we are disobeying the law of benevolence1 and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty1 in this respect1 to each other4 ,so that aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retaliation and injury1 but rather to call for special kindness and good-will4 ,this argument1 if such it can be called1 is equally applicable to individual aggressions4 ,we are bound to regard them as intimations of our want of benevolence1 and to reward the aggressors for the intimations6 ,is it true1 that in this world the wicked only are oppressed1 and that the good are always the prospered and happy8 ,even suppose this true1 and that ,i1 as a sinful man1 deserve ,god's anger1 is this any reason why ,i should not resist the assassin1 and seek to bring him to punishment8 ,the whole of this argument of ,dr4 ,wayland applies with much greater force to municipal courts than to war4 ,v4 ,let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of defence1 to lay aside all power of inflicting injury1 and to rely for self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct1 and the moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the consciences of men4 99 99 99 99 ,how would such a nation be protected from external attack1 and entire subjugation8 ,i answer1 by adopting the law of benevolence1 a nation would render such an event in the highest degree improbable4 ,the causes of national war are1 most commonly1 the love of plunder and the love of glory4 ,the first of these is rarely1 if ever1 sufficient to stimulate men to the ferocity necessary to war1 unless when assisted by the second4 ,and by adopting as the rule of our conduct the law of benevolence1 all motive arising from the second cause is taken away4 ,there is not a nation in ,europe that could be led on to war against a harmless1 just1 forgiving1 and defenceless people4 ,history teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or could not defend themselves4 ,did ,mr4 ,white1 of ,salem1 escape his murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless8 ,did the ,quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient ,new ,englanders any the more because of their non-resisting principles8 ,have the ,jews escaped persecutions throughout ,christendom any the more because of their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past8 ,poland was comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great ,european powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation1 dividing between themselves the ,polish territory1 and enslaving or driving into exile the ,polish people4 ,oh1 bloodiest picture in the book of time1 ,sarmatia fell1 unwept1 without a crime6 ,we need not multiply examples under this head2 all history is filled with them4 ,let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war1 disband our army and navy1 and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to our physical means of defence of every description2 let it be proclaimed to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations for justice1 and that we have no longer either the will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression4 ,think you that the ,african and ,asiatic pirates would refrain1 any the more1 from plundering our vessels trading to ,china1 because we had adopted the law of benevolence8 ,would ,england be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us1 or be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from searching our merchant-ships8 ,experience shows that an undefended state1 known to suffer every thing1 soon becomes the prey of all others1 and history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of ,washington--,,if ,,we ,,desire ,,to ,,secure ,,peace1 ,,it ,,must ,,be ,,known ,,that ,,we ,,are ,,at ,,all ,,times ,,ready ,,for ,,war4 ,but let us bring this case still nearer home4 ,let it be known to-morrow that the people of ,boston or ,new ,york have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle1 and that hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men for justice2 let it be proclaimed throughout the whole extent of our ,union1 and throughout the world1 that you have destroyed your jails and houses of correction1 abolished your police and executive law officers1 that courts may decide justice but will be allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions1 that you will no longer employ walls1 and bars1 and locks1 to secure your property and the virtue and lives of your children2 but that you will trust solely for protection to the law of active benevolence4 ,think you that the thieves1 and robbers1 and murderers of ,philadelphia1 and ,baltimore1 and ,new ,orleans1 and the cities of the old world1 will1 on this account1 refrain from molesting the peace of ,new ,york and ,boston1 and that the wicked and abandoned men now in these cities1 will be the more likely to turn from the evil of their ways8 ,assuredly1 if this law of active benevolence1 as ,dr4 ,wayland denominates the rule of non-resistance1 will prevent nations from attacking the harmless and defenceless1 it will be still more likely to prevent individuals from the like aggressions2 for the moral sense is less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual and direct4 ,throughout this argument ,dr4 ,wayland assumes that all wars are wars of aggression1 waged for plunder or glory1 or through hatred or revenge1 whereas such is far from being true4 ,he indeed sometimes speaks of war as being generally of this character2 at others he speaks of it as being always undertaken either from a spirit of aggression or retaliation4 ,take either form of his argument1 and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound3 viz41 ,all wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation2 ,aggression and retaliation are forbidden by ,god's laws2--therefore1 ,all wars are immoral and unjustifiable4 ,or1 ,wars are generally undertaken either for aggression or retaliation2 ,aggression and retaliation are forbidden by ,god's laws--therefore1 ,all wars are immoral and unjustifiable4 ,,vi4 ,let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure1 and the awful waste of human life1 which the wars of the last hundred years have occasioned1 and then we will ask him whether it be not evident1 that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering1 if employed in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better1 would1 long before this time1 have banished wars from the earth1 and rendered the civilized world like the garden of ,eden8 ,if this be true1 it will follow that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community1 inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil1 the corrupt passions of the human breast1 by the very manner in which it attempts to correct the evil itself4 ,much has been said to show that war begets immorality1 and that the cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on community4 ,and members of the clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far forgotten1 if not truth and fact1 at least the common courtesies and charities of life1 as to attribute to the military profession an unequal share of immorality and crime4 ,we are declared not only parasites on the body politic1 but professed violators of ,god's laws--men so degraded1 though unconsciously1 that in the pursuit of justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts2 it is said that murder1 robbery1 rape1 arson1 theft1 if only plaited with the soldier's garb1 go unwhipped of justice4#a ,it has never been the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other professions4 ,we prefer to leave them unanswered4 ,if demagogues on the stump1 or in the legislative halls1 or in their ,fourth of-,july addresses1 can find no fitter subjects to point a moral or adorn a tale1 we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse4 ,footnote #a3 ,sumner's ,oration4 ,unjust wars1 as well as unjust litigation1 are immoral in their effects and also in their cause4 ,but just wars and just litigation are not demoralizing4 ,suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be abolished1 and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment2 would not immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish8 ,few events rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much as a just and patriotic war4 ,it raises the tone of public morality1 and destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so often result from a long-protracted peace4 ,such was the ,dutch war of independence against the ,spaniards2 such the ,german war against the aggressions of ,louis ,,xiv41 and the ,french war against the coalition of #agib4 ,but without looking abroad for illustration1 we find ample proof in our own history4 ,can it be said that the wars of the ,american ,revolution and of #ahab1 were demoralizing in their effects8 ,whence do ,americans1 says ,dr4 ,lieber1 habitually take their best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriotism1 public spirit1 devotedness to common good1 purity of motive and action1 if not from the daring band of their patriots of the ,revolution8 ,the principal actors in the military events of the ,revolution and of #ahab1 held1 while living1 high political offices in the state1 and the moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the character stamped on their administration of the government4 ,these men have passed away1 and their places have1 for some time1 been filled by men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace4 ,to the true believer in the efficacy of non-resistance1 and in the demoralizing influence of all wars1 how striking the contrast between these different periods in our political history6 ,how infinitely inferior to the rulers in later times were those1 who1 in the blindness of their infatuation1 appealed to physical force1 rather than surrender their life1 liberty1 and pursuit of happiness6 ,let us trace out this contrast3-- ,in the earlier ages of our republic1 and under the rule of those whose moral character had been corrupted by war1 party spirit ran higher and was less pure than at later periods in our history4 ,the object of the principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the opinions of the opposite party odious3 now1 their only object is to sustain their own opinions by argument4 ,then1 each party claimed to itself an exclusive love of country1 and stigmatized the other as aliens and the natural enemies of the state3 now1 they both practise great forbearance1 love1 and charity1 towards political opponents4 ,then1 men obtained place through intrigue and corruption1 and a universal scramble for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side1 and a universal political proscription on the other1 were regarded as the natural results of an election3 now1 this disgusting strife for office has ceased2 men no longer seek place1 but wait1 like ,cincinnatus1 to be called from their ploughs2 and none are proscribed for opinion's sake4 ,then1 in electing men to office the most important social and constitutional principles were forgotten or violated3 now1 we have the august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict moral principle4 ,then1 the halls of congress were frequently filled with demagogues1 and tiplers1 and the small men of community3 now1 the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as representatives4 ,then1 the magnates of party were the mere timid1 temporizing slaves of expediency1 looking1 not to the justice and wisdom of their measures1 but to their probable popularity with then sneaking train of followers3 now1 they rely for respect and support upon the judgment of the honest and enlightened4 ,then1 the rank and file of party were mere political hirelings1 who sold their manhood for place1 who reviled and glorified1 and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies1 just as they were bidden2 they could fawn upon those who dispensed political patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of ,louis ,,xiv41 or the parasites and hirelings of ,walpole3 now1 all political partisans1 deriving their moral tone from the piping times of peace1 are pure1 disinterested patriots1 who1 like the ,roman farmer1 take office with great reluctance1 and resign it again as soon as the state can spare their services4 ,then1 prize-fighters1 and blacklegs1 and gamblers1 having formed themselves into political clubs1 were courted by men high in authority1 and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility3 now1 no man clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community by receiving such characters in the national councils1 or by bestowing public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society4 ,such1 the advocates of non resistance would persuade us1 are the legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a long-protracted peace on the other4 ,but there are men of less vivid imaginations1 and1 perhaps1 of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal1 who fail to perceive these results1 and who even think they see the reverse of all this4 ,these men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of ,washington1 ,hamilton1 and ,knox1 to show that they were the less virtuous because they had borne arms in their country's service3 they even fail to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military spirit on the military students of ,west ,point1 whose graduates1 they think1 will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of ,yale and ,cambridge4 ,nay1 more1 some even go so far as to say that our army1 as a body1 is no less moral than the corresponding classes in civil life2 that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots1 thefts1 robberies1 and murders1 as similarly educated men engaged in other pursuits2 that our military officers are not inferior in moral character to our civil officers1 and that1 as a class1 they will compare favorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers1 for example4 ,in justification of these opinions--which may1 perhaps1 be deemed singularly erroneous--they say1 that in the many millions of public money expended during the last forty years1 by military officers1 for the army1 for military defences1 and for internal improvements1 but a single graduate of ,west ,point has proved a defaulter1 even to the smallest sum1 and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the army brought into court for violating the laws4 ,but even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality through community1 is it not equally true that habitual submission to the injustice1 plunder1 and insult of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade and demoralize any people8 ,with regard to pecuniary expenditures required in military defence1 many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth4 ,with respect to our own country1 the entire amounts expended1 under the head of war department1 whether for ,indian pensions1 for the purchase of ,indian lands1 the construction of government roads1 the improvement of rivers and harbors1 the building of breakwaters and sea-walls1 for the preservation of property1 the surveying of public lands1 c41 c42 in fine1 every expenditure made by officers of the army1 under the war department1 is put down as expenses for military defence4 ,similar misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries3 for example1 the new fortifications of ,paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy-five millions of dollars1 and as much more is said to be required to complete them4 ,indeed1 we have seen the whole estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars1 or twelve hundred millions of francs6 ,the facts are these3 the works1 when done1 will have cost about twenty-eight millions4 ,we had the pleasure of examining them not long since1 in company with several of the engineer officers employed on the works4 ,they were then three-fourths done1 and had cost about twenty millions4 ,we were assured by these officers that the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the original estimate of twenty-eight millions4 ,had we time to enter into details1 other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given4 ,but it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence have cost vast amounts of money4 ,so also have litigation and the means deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals4 ,it has been estimated that we have in this country1 at the present time1 thirty thousand lawyers1 without including pettifoggers4 ,allowing each of these to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars1 and we have the annual cost to the country1 for lawyers1 thirty millions of dollars4 ,add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making laws2 of court-houses1 jails1 police offices1 judges of the different courts1 marshals1 sheriffs justices of the peace1 constables1 clerks1 witnesses1 c41 employed to apply and enforce the laws when made2 the personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants1 the individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation2 add all these together1 and ,i doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat astonish these modern economists4 ,but if all the expenditures of this nature that have been made for the last fifty years1 in this individual war of hate1 be added together1 we have no doubt a very fruitful text might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers6 ,but could any sane man be found to say that1 on account of the cost of maintaining them1 all laws and lawyers are useless and should be abolished8 ,if1 therefore1 these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure justice between individuals of the same nation1 can we expect that the means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures commensurate with the object in view8 ,if we cannot rely exclusively upon the law of active benevolence for maintaining justice between brothers of the same country1 can we hope that1 in the present state of the world1 strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its requisitions8 ,the length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in the further discussion of this subject4 ,it is objected to war1 that men being rational beings1 should contend with one another by argument1 and not by force1 as do the brutes4 ,to this it is answered1 that force properly begins only where argument ends4 ,if he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution1 ,i apply to the court1--that is1 to legal force1--to compel him to do me justice4 ,so nations ought to resort to military force only when all other means fail to prevent aggression and injury4 ,but war often fails to procure redress of grievances1 or to prevent repeated and continued aggression4 ,so does a resort to civil force2 but such a resort is none the less proper and just on that account4 ,but in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer1 while the guilty triumph4 ,so it often is in civil life3 ,god1 for some wise purpose1 sometimes permits the wicked to triumph for a season4 ,but in all wars one party must be in the wrong1 and frequently the war is unjust on both sides4 ,so in suits at law1 one party is necessarily wrong1 and frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends4 ,but nations do not resort to tribunals1 like individuals1 to settle their differences4 ,for the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a congress of nations1 as it has been called1--would be more productive of evil than of good4 ,by such an arrangement the old and powerful ,european monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs of the weaker powers4 ,we see the effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called ,holy ,alliance1 whose influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous than the ,holy ,inquisition4 ,moreover1 such a tribunal would not prevent war1 for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions4 ,for these and other reasons1 it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of ,international ,law4 ,under this system1 and in this country1 a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion1--a yielding to the mere bestial propensities of our nature2 it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative power1--of the representatives of the national mind1 convened as the high council of the people4 ,it is this power which must determine when all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national justice1 and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper4 ,if this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous1 such1 also1 should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same body1 and under the same circumstances4 ,a declaration of war1 in this country1 is a law of the land1 made by a deliberative body1 under the high sanction of the constitution4 ,it is true that such a law may be unjust and wrong1 but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be so4 ,the distinction between war1 as thus duly declared1 and international ,lynch-law is too evident to need comment4 ,but it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by the evils it entails1 and that1 most commonly1 the very means by which we repel a despotism from abroad1 only establishes over us a military despotism at home4 ,much has been said and written about military despotism2 but we think he who studies history thoroughly1 will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a despotism of mere politicians4 ,the governments of ,alexander and ,charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them2 and there is no one so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of ,napoleon was no better than that of ,robespierre1 ,danton1 and the other lawyers who preceded him1 or of the ,bourbons1 for whom he was dethroned4 ,csar1 says a distinguished senator of our own country1 was rightfully killed for conspiring against his country2 but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of ,rome4 ,that work was done by the profligate politicians without him1 and before his time2 and his death did not restore the republic4 ,there were no more elections3 rotten politicians had destroyed them2 and the nephew of ,csar1 as heir to his uncle1 succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary succession4 ,and here ,history appears in her grand and instructive character1 as ,philosophy teaching by example3 and let us not be senseless to her warning voice4 ,superficial readers believe it was the military men who destroyed the ,roman republic6 ,no such thing6 ,it was the politicians who did it6--factious1 corrupt1 intriguing politicians--destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by crime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were conducted4 ,from the time of the ,gracchi there were no elections that could bear the name4 ,confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship4 ,intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals4 ,fraud1 violence1 bribes1 terror1 and the plunder of the public treasury commanded votes4 ,the people had no choice2 and long before the time of ,csar1 nothing remained of republican government but the name and the abuse4 ,read ,plutarch4 ,in the ',life of ,csar1' and not three pages before the crossing of the ,rubicon1 he paints the ruined state of the elections1--shows that all elective government was gone1--that the hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the corrupt1--and that in choosing between ,pompey and ,csar1 many preferred ,pompey1 not because they thought him republican1 but because they thought he would make the milder king4 ,even arms were but a small part of ,csar's reliance1 when he crossed the ,rubicon4 ,gold1 still more than the sword1 was his dependence2 and he sent forward the accumulated treasures of plundered ,gaul1 to be poured into the laps of rotten politicians4 ,there was no longer a popular government2 and in taking all power himself1 he only took advantage of the state of things which profligate politicians had produced4 ,in this he was culpable1 and paid the forfeit with his life4 ,but in contemplating his fate1 let us never forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic1 before he came to seize and to master it4 ,we could point to numerous instances1 where the benefits of war have more than compensated for the evils which attended it2 benefits not only to the generations who engaged in it1 but also to their descendants for long ages4 ,had ,rome adopted the non-resistance principle when ,hannibal was at her gates1 we should now be in the night of ,african ignorance and barbarism1 instead of enjoying the benefits of ,roman learning and ,roman civilization4 ,had ,france adopted this principle when the allied armies invaded her territories in #agib1 her fate had followed that of ,poland4 ,had our ancestors adopted this principle in #aggf1 what now had been1 think you1 the character and condition of our country8 ,dr4 ,lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite4 ,the continued efforts1 says he1 requisite for a nation to protect themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe1 may be infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war1 which forever secures peace from that side4 ,nor will it be denied1 ,i suppose1 that ,niebuhr is right when he observes1 that the advantage to ,rome of having conquered ,sicily1 as to power and national vigor1 was undeniable4 ,but even if it were not so1 are there no other advantages to be secured8 ,no human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance1 nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively1 all the immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little ,greece over the rolling masses of servile ,asia1 which were nigh sweeping over ,europe like the high tides of a swollen sea1 carrying its choking sand over all the germs of civilization1 liberty1 and taste1 and nearly all that is good and noble4 ,think what we should have been had ,europe become an ,asiatic province1 and the ,eastern principles of power and stagnation should have become deeply infused into her population1 so that no process ever after could have thrown it out again6 ,has no advantage resulted from the ,hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust1 and ultimately annihilated1 at least mentally so1 by stifling servitude1 and the wars which followed their resolution8 ,the ,netherlands war of independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern history1 and1 in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty1 a highly advantageous one1 both directly and through ,great ,britain4 ,wars have frequently been1 in the hands of ,providence1 the means of disseminating civilization1 if carried on by a civilized people--as in the case of ,alexander1 whose wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into lethargy1 if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes4 ,frequently we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to recover as it were civilization1 already on the wane with a refined nation4 ,paradoxical as it may seem at first glance1 it is1 nevertheless1 amply proved by history1 that the closest contact and consequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge1 between two otherwise severed nations1 is frequently produced by war4 ,war is a struggle1 a state of suffering2 but as such1 at times1 only that struggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be obtained1 or1 as would be a better expression for many cases1 to the good that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the share of man4 ,suffering1 merely as suffering1 is not an evil4 ,our religion1 philosophy1 every day's experience1 prove it4 ,no maternal rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor4 ,one word more1 and we must leave this subject4 ,it has been said by some that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our ancestors2 that1 whatever may have been the practice in years that are past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their country's cause1 such a course being not only dishonorable1 but in the eye of the ,christian1 wicked1 and even infamous6 ,it is believed1 however1 that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the religious people of this country4 ,our forefathers lighted the fires of ,religion and ,patriotism at the same altar2 it is believed that their descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished1 but that both still burn1 and will continue to burn1 with a purer and brighter flame4 ,our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their ,god1 because they also faithfully served their country4 ,if we are called upon to excel them in works of charity1 of benevolence1 and of ,christian virtue1 let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of patriotism4#b ,footnote #b3 ,for further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to ,lieber's ,political ,ethics1 ,part ,,ii41 book vii4 chap4 #c2 ,paley's ,moral and ,political ,philosophy2 ,legare's ,report of ,june #ac1 #ahch1 in the ,house of ,representatives2 ,mackintosh's ,history of the ,revolution of #afhh1 chap4 x42 ,bynkershock2 ,vatel2 ,puffendorf2 ,clausewitz2 and most other writers on international law and the laws of war4 ,dr4 ,wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by ,dymond in his ,inquiry into the ,accordancy of ,war with the ,principles of ,christianity2 ,jay's ,peace and ,war2 ,judd's ,sermon on ,peace and ,war2 ,peabody's ,address1 c42 ,coue's ,tract on ,what is the ,use of the ,navy8 ,sumner's ,true ,grandeur of ,nations4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,strategy ,war has been defined1 ,a contest between nations and states carried on by force4 ,but this definition is by some considered defective1 inasmuch as it would exclude all civil wars4 ,when war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace1 it is called offensive1 and when undertaken to repel invasion1 or the attacks of an enemy1 it is called defensive4 ,a war may be essentially defensive even where we begin it1 if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under preparation4 ,besides this general division of war1 military writers have made numerous others1 such as-- ,wars of intervention1 in which one state interferes in favor of another4 ,this intervention may either have respect to the internal or to the external affairs of a nation4 ,the interference of ,russia in the affairs of ,poland1 of ,england in the government of ,india1 ,austria and the allied powers in the affairs of ,france during the ,revolution and under the empire1 are examples under the first head4 ,the intervention of the ,elector ,maurice of ,saxony against ,charles ,v41 of ,king ,william against ,louis ,,xiv41 in #afhh1 of ,russia and ,france in the seven years' war1 of ,russia again between ,france and ,austria1 in #ahje1 and between ,france and ,prussia1 in #ahjf1 are examples under the second head4 ,most liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible2 but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of ,europe4 ,wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty2 as was the case with the ,americans in #aggf1 and the modern ,greeks in #ahba4 ,wars of independence from foreign dictation and control as the wars of ,poland against ,russia1 of the ,netherlands against ,spain1 of ,france against the several coalitions of the allied powers1 of the ,spanish ,peninsula against ,france and of ,china and ,india against ,england4 ,the ,american war of #ahab partook largely of this character1 and some judicious historians have denominated it the war of ,independence1 as distinguished from the war of the ,revolution4 ,wars of opinion1 like those which the ,vendeans have sustained in support of the ,bourbons1 and those ,france has sustained against the allies1 as also those of propagandism1 waged against the smaller ,european states by the republican hordes of the ,french ,revolution4 ,to this class also belong-- ,religious wars1 like those of ,islamism1 of the crusades1 and of the ,reformation4 ,wars of conquest1 like those of the ,romans in ,gaul1 of the ,english in ,india1 of the ,french in ,egypt and ,africa1 and of the ,russians in ,circassia4 ,national wars1 in which the great body of the people of a state engage1 like those of the ,swiss against ,austria and the ,duke of ,burgundy1 of the ,catalans in #agab1 of the ,americans against ,england1 of the ,dutch against ,phillip ,,ii41 and of the ,poles and ,circassians against ,russia4 ,civil wars1 where one portion of the state fights against the other1 as the war of the ,roses in ,england1 of the league in ,france1 of the ,guelphs and ,ghibelines in ,italy1 and of the factions in ,mexico and ,south ,america4 ,it is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these different kinds of war1 but rather to consider the general subject1 and to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all wars4 ,war in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a science and an art4 ,it is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis of military operations2 and an art when considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns1 sieges1 battles1 c4 ,so is engineering a science so far as it investigates the general principles of fortification1 and also artillery1 in analyzing the principles of gunnery2 but both are arts when considered with reference to the practical rules for the construction1 attack1 and defence of forts1 or for the use of cannon4 ,this distinction has not always been observed by writers on this subject1 and some have asserted that strategy is the science1 and tactics the art of war4 ,this is evidently mistaking the general distinction between science1 which investigates principles1 and art1 which forms practical rules4 ,in popular language1 however1 it is usual to speak of the military art when we refer to the general subject of war1 and of the military sciences when we wish to call attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon which the art is founded4 ,we shall here consider the military art in this general sense1 as including the entire subject of war4 ,as thus defined1 the military art may be divided into four distinct branches1 viz43 #ast4 ,strategy2 #b;d4 ,fortification1 or ,engineering2 #c;d4 ,logistics2 #dth4 ,tactics4 ,several general treatises on this art add another branch1 called ,the ,policy of ,war1 or the relations of war with the affairs of state4 ,strategy is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points1 or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon4 ,engineering embraces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible2 and also the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material obstacles4 ,logistics embraces the practical details of moving and supplying armies4 ,tactics is the art of bringing troops into action1 or of moving them in the presence of an enemy1 that is1 within his view1 and within the reach of his artillery4 ,all these are most intimately connected4 ,a fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines2 the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no decisive results1 when the position1 or the direction of the operation is not strategic2 sometimes not only battles1 but entire campaigns1 are lost through neglect of the engineer's art1 or faults in his dispositions2 again1 armies would be of little use without the requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence4 #a4 ,strategy regards the theatre of war1 rather than the field of battle4 ,it selects the important points in this theatre1 and the lines of communication by which they may be reached2 it forms the plan and arranges the general operations of a campaign2 but it leaves it to the engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones2 it leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on the chosen lines2 and to tactics1 the particular dispositions for battle1 when the armies have reached the destined points4 ,it is well to keep in mind these distinctions1 which may be rendered still more obvious by a few illustrations4 ,the point where several lines of communications either intersect or meet1 and the centre of an arc which is occupied by the enemy1 are strategic points2 but tactics would reject a position equally accessible on all sides1 especially with its flanks exposed to attack4 ,sempronius at ,trebbia and ,varro at ,cannae1 so placed their armies that the ,carthagenians attacked them1 at the same time1 in front1 on the flanks1 and in rear2 the ,roman consuls were defeated3 but the central strategic position of ,napoleon at ,rivoli was eminently successful4 ,at the battle of ,austerlitz the allies had projected a strategic movement to their left1 in order to cut off ,napoleon's right from ,vienna2 ,weyrother afterwards changed his plans1 and executed a corresponding tactical movement4 ,by the former there had been some chance of success1 but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction4 ,the little fort of ,koenigsten1 from its advantageous position1 was more useful to the ,french1 in #ahac1 than the vast works of ,dresden4 ,the little fort of ,bard1 with its handful of men1 was near defeating the operations of ,napoleon in #ahjj1 by holding in check his entire army2 whereas1 on the other hand1 the ill-advised lines of ,ticino1 in #agjf1 caused an army of #gh1jjj ,french to be defeated by only #dj1jjj men under ,prince ,eugene of ,savoy4 ,war1 as has already been said1 may be either offensive or defensive4 ,if the attacking army be directed against an entire state1 it becomes a war of invasion4 ,if only a province1 or a military position1 or an army1 be attacked1 it is simply regarded as taking the initiative in offensive movements4 ,offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political influence4 ,it is waged on a foreign soil1 and therefore spares the country of the attacking force2 it augments its own resources at the same time that it diminishes those of the enemy2 it adds to the moral courage of its own army1 while it disheartens its opponents4 ,a war of invasion may1 however1 have also its disadvantages4 ,its lines of operation may become too deep1 which is always hazardous in an enemy's country4 ,all the natural and artificial obstacles1 such as mountains1 rivers1 defiles1 fortifications1 c41 are favorable for defence1 but difficult to be overcome by the invader4 ,the local authorities and inhabitants oppose1 instead of facilitating his operations2 and if patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of its threatened country1 the war may become long and bloody4 ,but if a political diversion be made in favor of the invading force1 and its operations be attended with success1 it strikes the enemy at the heart1 paralyzes all his military energies1 and deprives him of his military resources1 thus promptly terminating the contest4 ,regarded simply as the initiative of movements1 the offensive is almost always the preferable one1 as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and concentrating his masses on the decisive point4 ,the first and most important rule in offensive war is1 to keep your forces as much concentrated as possible4 ,this will not only prevent misfortune1 but secure victory1--since1 by its necessary operation1 you possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of your enemy's position4 ,to this general rule some writers have laid down the following exceptions3-- #ast4 ,when the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have been exhausted and destroyed1 and your magazines are1 from any cause1 unable to supply the deficiency1 one of two things must be done2 either you must go to places where these articles abound1 or you must draw from them your supplies by detachments4 ,the former is rarely compatible with your plan1 and necessarily retards its execution2 and hence the preference which is generally given to the latter4 #b;d4 ,when reinforcements are about to join you1 and this can only be effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile corps1 or liable to be so occupied1 you must again waive the general rule1 and risk one party for the security of the other2 or1 7which may be better17 make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish your object4 #c;d4 ,when you have complete evidence of the actual1 or probable insurrection in your favor1 of a town or province of your enemy1 or of a division of his army1 you must support this inclination by strong detachments1 or by movements of your main body4 ,napoleon's operations in ,italy1 in #agif-g1 furnish examples of what is here meant4 #dth4 ,when1 by dispatching a detachment1 you may be able to intercept a convoy1 or reinforcement1 coming to the aid of your enemy4 ,these are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of concentration4 ,this rule does not require that all the army should occupy the same position4 ,far from it4 ,concentration requires the main body to be in immediate and supporting reach3 small detachments1 for temporary and important objects1 like those mentioned1 are perfectly legitimate1 and in accordance with correct principles4 ,napoleon's position in ,spain will serve as an illustration4 ,a hand1 placed on the map of that country1 will represent the position of the invading forces4 ,when opened1 the fingers will represent the several detachments1 thrown out on important strategic lines1 and which could readily be drawn in1 as in closing the hand1 upon the principal and central mass1 preparatory to striking some important blow4 ,if1 as we have seen1 it be the first great rule for an army acting on the offensive principle1 to keep its forces concentrated1 it is1 no doubt1 the second1 to keep them fully employed4 ,is it your intention to seize a particular province of your enemy8 to penetrate to his capital8 or to cut him off from his supplies8 ,whatever measure be necessary to open your route to these objects must be promptly taken2 and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense1 your movements must be more rapid than his4 ,give him time to breathe1--and above all1 give him time to rest1 and your project is blasted2 his forages will be completed1 and his magazines filled and secured4 ,the roads of approach will be obstructed1 bridges destroyed1 and strong points everywhere taken and defended4 ,you will1 in fact1 like ,burgoyne1 in #aggg1 reduce yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step1 without equivalent or use4 ,such cannot be the fate of a commander who1 knowing all the value of acting on the offensive1 shakes1 by the vigor and address of his first movements1 the moral as well as physical force of his enemy1--who1 selecting his own time1 and place1 and mode of attack1 confounds his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected1--and who at last leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope1 or of flying without resistance4 ,the ,british army1 in the war of the ,american ,revolution1 must have been most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting offensive war4 ,instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive point1 and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and well-directed blows1 they scattered their forces over an immense extent of country1 and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any one point4 ,on the other hand1 this policy enabled us to call out and discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces4 ,the main object in defensive war is1 to protect the menaced territory1 to retard the enemy's progress1 to multiply obstacles in his way1 to guard the vital points of the country1 and--at the favorable moment1 when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments1 losses1 privations1 and fatigue--to assume the offensive1 and drive him from the country4 ,this combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages4 ,the enemy1 being forced to take the defensive in his turn1 loses much of the moral superiority due to successful offensive operations4 ,there are numerous instances of this kind of war1 the defensive-offensive1 as it is sometimes called1 to be found in history4 ,the last four campaigns of ,frederick the ,great of ,prussia1 are examples which may serve as models4 ,wellington played a similar part in the ,spanish peninsula4 ,to merely remain in a defensive attitude1 yielding gradually to the advances of the enemy1 without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into his power1 or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity2 such a system is always within the reach of ignorance1 stupidity1 and cowardice2 but such is far from being the true ,fabian system of defensive war4 ,instead of finding security only in flight2 instead of habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face2 instead of leaving his march undisturbed2 instead of abandoning1 without contest1 points strong by nature or by art2--instead of all this1 the true war of defence seeks every occasion to meet the enemy1 and loses none by which it can annoy or defeat him2 it is always awake2 it is constantly in motion1 and never unprepared for either attack or defence4 ,when not employed in efforts of courage or address1 it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and science4 ,in its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges2 while it erects or repairs those in its rear3 it forms abbatis1 raises batteries1 fortifies passes1 or intrenches encampments2 and to the system of deprivation adds all the activity1 stratagem1 and boldness of la petite guerre4 ,dividing itself into detachments1 it multiplies its own attacks and the alarms of the enemy4 ,collecting itself at a single point1 it obstructs his progress for days1 and sometimes for weeks together4 ,does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend8 ,it is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely1 by the attack of his hospitals1 magazines1 convoys1 or reinforcements4 ,in a word1 by adopting the maxim1 that the enemy must be made to pay for whatever he gains1 it disputes with him every inch of ground1 and if at last it yields to him a victory1 it is of that kind which calls forth only his sighs4 ,in discussing the subject of strategy1 certain technical terms are employed1 such as theatre of war2 theatre of operations2 base of operations1 or the line from which operations start2 objective points1 or points to which the operations are directed2 line of operations1 or the line along which an army moves2 key points1 or points which it is important for the defensive army to secure2 line of defence1 or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards3 and in general1 strategic points1 strategic lines1 strategic positions1 c4 ,as these terms are very generally used in military books1 it may be well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import4 ,after defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application1 it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and striking historical examples4 ,the theatre of a war embraces not only the territory of the two belligerent powers1 but also that of their allies1 and of such secondary powers as1 through fear or interest1 may be drawn into the contest4 ,with maritime nations it also embraces the seas1 and sometimes crosses to another continent4 ,some of the wars between ,france and ,england embraced the two hemispheres4 ,the theatre of operations1 however1 is of a more limited character1 and should not be confounded with the theatre of war4 ,in general1 it includes only the territory which an army seeks1 on the one hand1 to defend1 and on the other1 to invade4 ,if two or more armies be directed towards the same object1 though by different lines1 their combined operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts independently of the others1 and seeks distinct and separate objects1 each must have its own independent theatre of operations4 ,a war between ,france and ,austria may embrace all ,italy and ,germany1 but the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these countries4 ,should the ,oregon question lead to hostilities between the ,united ,states and ,england1 the theatre of war would embrace the greater part of ,north ,america and the two oceans1 but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to ,canada and our northern frontier1 with naval descents upon our maritime cities4 ,the first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to select a good base4 ,many circumstances influence this selection1 such as mountains1 rivers1 roads1 forests1 cities1 fortifications1 military dpts1 means of subsistence1 c4 ,if the frontier of a state contain strong natural or artificial barriers1 it may serve not only as a good base for offensive operations1 but also as an excellent line of defence against invasion4 ,a single frontier line may1 however1 be penetrated by the enemy1 and in that case a second or third base further in the interior becomes indispensable for a good defence4 ,a ,french army carrying on military operations against ,germany would make the ,rhine its first base2 but if driven from this it would form a second base on the ,meuse or ,moselle1 a third on the ,seine1 and a fourth on the ,loire2 or1 when driven from the first base1 it would take others perpendicular to the front of defence1 either to the right1 on ,bfort and ,besanon1 or to the left1 on ,mzires and ,sedan4 ,if acting offensively against ,prussia and ,russia1 the ,rhine and the ,main would form the first base the ,elbe and the ,oder the second1 the ,vistula the third1 the ,nieman the fourth1 and the ,dwina and the ,dnieper the fifth4 ,a ,french army operating against ,spain would have the ,pyrenees for its first base2 the line of the ,ebro for a second1 resting its wings on the gulf of ,gascony and the ,mediterranean4 ,if from this position it advance its left1 possessing itself of the kingdom of ,valencia1 the line of the ,sierra d',estellas becomes its third base of operations against the centre of ,spain4 ,a base may be parallel1 oblique1 or perpendicular to our line of operations1 or to the enemy's line of defence4 ,some prefer one plan and some another2 the best authorities1 however1 think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel2 but we are not often at liberty to choose between these1 for other considerations usually determine the selection4 ,in #ahjf1 the ,french forces first moved perpendicular to their base on the ,main1 but afterwards effected a change of front1 and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to this base4 ,they had pursued the same plan of operations in the ,seven ,years' ,war4 ,the ,russians1 in #ahab1 based perpendicularly on the ,oka and the ,kalouga1 and extended their flank march on ,wiozma and ,krasnoi2 in #ahac1 the allies1 based perpendicularly on ,bohemia1 succeeded in paralyzing ,napoleon's army on the ,elbe4 ,an ,american army moving by ,lake ,champlain1 would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between ,boston and ,buffalo2 if moving from the ,new ,england states on ,quebec and ,montreal1 the line of operations would be oblique2 and if moving from the ,niagara frontier by ,lake ,ontario and the ,st4 ,lawrence1 the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation1 under the circumstances1 exceedingly objectionable4 ,any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an advantage over his opponent1 is regarded as strategic4 ,their geographical position and political and military character1 give them a greater or less influence in directing the campaign4 ,these points are occupied by the defensive army1 and attacked by the offensive2 if on or near the base1 they become the key points for the former1 and the objective points for the latter4#c ,there are also between these two a greater or less number of strategic points1 which have an important though inferior influence upon the result of the war4 ,footnote #c3 ,it may be well to remark that a strategic point is not necessarily a geometrical point2 an entire province1 or a considerable portion of a geographical frontier1 is1 in military language1 sometimes denominated a point4 ,in the same way1 strategic lines1 instead of being mathematical lines1 are frequently many miles in width4 ,the first object of the ,french in attacking ,belgium1 is to gain possession of the ,meuse1 as this position would give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations4 ,in attacking southern ,germany1 the course of the ,danube offers a series of points which exercise an important influence on the war4 ,for northern ,germany1 ,leipsic and the country bordering on the ,saale and the ,elbe1 are objects often fiercely contested by the ,french and other belligerent powers4 ,in a war between this country and ,england1 ,montreal and the points on the ,st4 ,lawrence between ,montreal and ,quebec1 would become objects of the highest importance1 and their possession would probably determine the result of the war4 ,the capital of a state1 from its political importance as well as its military influence1 is almost always a decisive strategic point1 and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign4 ,the possession of ,genoa1 ,turin1 ,alexandria1 ,milan1 c41 in #agif1 both from their political and military importance1 had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states4 ,in the same way ,venice1 ,rome1 and ,naples1 in #agig1 ,vienna1 in the campaigns of #ahje and #ahji1 ,berlin1 in #ahjf1 ,madrid1 in #ahjh1 and ,paris1 in #ahad and #ahae4 ,if ,hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of ,cannae21 he would thus have destroyed the ,roman power4 ,the taking of ,washington1 in #ahad1 had little or no influence on the war1 for the place was then of no importance in itself1 and was a mere nominal capital4 ,it1 however1 greatly influenced our reputation abroad1 and required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon4 ,lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or temporary4 ,the great military frontiers of a state1 especially when strengthened by natural and artificial obstacles1 such as chains of mountains1 rivers1 lines of fortresses1 c41 are regarded as permanent lines of defence4 ,the ,alpine range between ,france and ,piedmont1 with its fortified passes2 the ,rhine1 the ,oder1 and the ,elbe1 with their strongly-fortified places2 the ,pyrenees1 with ,bayonne at one extremity and ,perpignon at the other2 the triple range of fortresses on the ,belgian frontier--are all permanent lines of defence4 ,the ,st4 ,lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for ,canada2 and the line of lake ,champlain1 the upper ,st4 ,lawrence1 and the lakes1 for the ,united ,states4 ,temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign4 ,napoleon's position in ,saxony1 in #ahac2 the line of the allies in ,belgium1 in #ahae2 the line of the ,marne1 in #ahad1 are examples of temporary lines of defence4 ,it will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not necessarily bases of operation4 ,strategic positions are such as are taken up during the operations of a war1 either by a corps d'arme or grand detachment1 for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force2 they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle4 ,the positions of ,napoleon at ,rivoli1 ,verona1 and ,legnano1 in #agif and #agig1 to watch the ,adige2 his positions on the ,passarge1 in #ahjg1 and in ,saxony and ,silesia in front of his line of defence1 in #ahac2 and ,massena's positions on the ,albis1 along the ,limmat and the ,aar1 in #agii1 are examples under this head4 ,before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams4 7,fig4 #a47 ,the army at ,a covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line ,,dc perpendicular to the line ,,ab1 the position of the enemy being at ,b4 7,fig4 #b47 ,,aj being equal to ,,bj1 ,a will still cover every thing in rear of ,,dc4 7,fig4 #c47 ,if the army ,a is obliged to cover the point a1 the army ,b will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is a ,b2 and of course ,a continues to cover the point a so long as it remains within this circle a ,b4 ,a line of operations embraces that portion of the theatre of war which an army or corps d'arme passes over in attaining its object2 the front of operations is the front formed by the army as it advances on this line4 ,when an army acts as a single mass1 without forming independent corps1 the line it follows is denominated a simple line of operations4 ,if two or more corps act in an isolated manner1 but against the same opposing force1 they are said to follow double or multiple lines4 ,the lines by which ,moreau and ,jourdan entered ,germany in #agif1 were double lines2 but ,napoleon's advance by ,bamberg and ,gera1 in #ahjf1 although moving in seven distinct corps d'arme1 formed but a single line of operations4 ,interior lines of operations are those followed by an army which operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be brought to its assistance4 ,for example1 ,napoleon's line of operations in #ahad1 between the ,marne and the ,seine1 where he manoeuvred with so much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the allies4 ,exterior lines present the opposite results2 they are those which an army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses4 ,for example1 the lines of the ,marne and the ,seine1 followed by the army of ,silesia and the grand ,austro-,russian army1 in the campaign of #ahad4 ,burgoyne's line of operations1 in #aggg1 was double and exterior4 ,concentric lines are such as start from distant points1 and are directed towards the same object1 either in the rear or in advance of their base4 ,if a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct corps1 taking divergent directions1 it is said to pursue eccentric lines4 ,lines are said to be deep1 when the end to be attained is very distant from the base4 ,the lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated secondary lines4 ,the lines pursued by the army of the ,sombre-et-,meuse in #agif1 and by ,bagration in #ahab1 were secondary lines1 as the former were merely secondary to the army of the ,rhine1 and the latter to that of ,barclay4 ,accidental lines are those which result from a change in the primitive plan of campaign1 which give a new direction to the operations4 ,these are of rare occurrence1 but they sometimes lead to important results4 ,the direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the geographical situation of the country1 but also on the positions occupied by the enemy4 ,the general plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to beginning operations1 but the choice of lines and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the war1 and be made by the general as these events occur4 ,as a general rule1 a line of operations should be directed upon the centre1 or one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence2 unless our forces be infinitely superior in number1 it would be absurd to act against the front and extremities at the same time4 ,if the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence1 this direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results4 7,fig4 #d47 ,in #ahjj the army of the ,rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of the ,black ,forest2 the army of reserve was directed by the ,st4 ,bernard and ,milan on the extreme right and rear of ,melas's line of defence3 both operations were most eminently successful4 7,fig4 #e47 ,it may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy1 for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him4 ,to avoid this danger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base4 ,thus1 if ,napoleon1 in #ahjj1 after crossing the ,alps1 had marched by ,turin on ,alexandria and received battle at ,marengo1 without having first secured ,lombardy and the left of the ,po1 his own line of retreat would have been completely cut off by ,melas2 whereas1 by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had1 in case of reverse1 every means for reaching either the ,var or the ,valois4 7,fig4 #f47 ,again1 in #ahjf1 if he had marched directly from ,gera to ,leipsic1 he would have been cut off from his base on the ,rhine2 whereas1 by turning from ,gera towards ,weimar1 he not only cut off the ,prussians from the ,elbe1 but at the same time secured to himself the roads of ,saalfield1 ,schleitz1 and ,hoff1 thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear4 7,fig4 #g47 ,we have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of the hostile forces may sometimes render it advisable to direct our line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence2 but1 as a general rule a central direction will lead to more important results4 ,this severs the enemy's means of resistance1 and enables the assailant to strike1 with the mass of his force1 upon the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of the hostile body4 7,fig4 #h47 ,such a plan of operations enabled ,napoleon1 in the ,italian campaigns of #agif and #agig1 to pierce and destroy1 with a small force1 the large and successive armies which ,austria sent against him4 ,in #ahje his operations were both interior and central3 in #ahjh they were most eminently central3 in #ahji1 by the central operations in the vicinity of ,ratisbonne1 he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the ,archduke ,charles3 in #ahad1 from his central position between the ,marne and ,seine1 with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than two hundred thousand1 he gained numerous victories1 and barely failed of complete success4 ,again in #ahae1 with an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thousand1 by his central advance on ,charleroi and ,ligny1 he gained a most decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of ,grouchy3 and even in #ahac1 his central position at ,dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages1 had not the faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of ,kulm and the ,katzbach4 ,for the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army2 grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with advantage1 but double or multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one simple line4 ,it may however sometimes occur that the position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation the preferable one4 ,in that case1 interior lines should always be adopted1 unless we have a vast superiority in number4 ,double exterior lines1 with corps several days' march asunder1 must be fatal1 if the enemy1 whether acting on single or double interior lines1 take advantage of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our isolated forces4 ,the ,roman armies under the consuls ,flaminius and ,servilius opposed ,hannibal on exterior lines1 the one by ,florence and ,arrezzio1 and the other by ,modena and ,ariminum4 ,hannibal turned the position of ,flaminius and attacked the ,roman armies separately1 gaining a complete and decisive victory4 ,such also was the character of the operations of the ,french in #agie1 under ,pichegru and ,jourdan2 they met with a bloody and decisive defeat4 ,again in #agif1 the ,french armies under ,jourdan and ,moreau1 pursued exterior lines2 the ,archduke ,charles1 from his interior position1 succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals1 and forcing them to retreat4 ,if the two armies united had pursued a single line1 the republican flag had been carried in triumph to ,vienna4 ,converging lines of operation are preferable1 under most circumstances1 to diverging lines4 ,care should be taken1 however1 that the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy1 and our own forces be destroyed in detail1 before they can effect a junction4 ,in #agig the main body of the ,austrians1 under ,alvinzi1 advanced against ,napoleon1 on three separate lines1 intending to concentrate at ,rivoli1 and then attack the ,french in mass2 but ,napoleon took his strategic position at ,rivoli1 and overthrew the enemy's corps as they successively appeared4 ,in the same way the ,archduke ,charles took an interior position1 between ,moreau and ,jourdan1 in #agif1 and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single point4 ,wurmser and ,quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the ,mincio1 by moving on the opposite shores of ,lake ,garda2 but ,napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them4 ,in #ahae ,blucher and ,wellington1 from their interior position1 prevented the junction of ,napoleon and ,grouchy4 ,diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre2 for by this means we separate the enemy's forces1 and disperse them2 and if occasion should require it1 may again concentrate our forces by converging lines4 ,such was the manoeuvre of ,frederick the ,great1 in #ageg1 which produced the battles of ,rosbach and ,leuthen2 such also was the manoeuvre of ,napoleon at ,donawert in #ahje1 at ,jena in #ahjf1 and at ,ratisbon in #ahji4 ,interior lines of operations1 when properly conducted1 have almost invariably led to success3 indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution1 or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign4 ,there may1 however1 be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank2 the geographical character of the theatre of war1 the position of other collateral forces1 c41 rendering such a direction necessary4 ,but as a general rule1 interior and central lines1 for an army of moderate forces1 will lead to decisive results4 ,napoleon's ,italian campaigns in #agif and #agig1 the campaign of the ,archduke ,charles in #agif1 ,napoleon's campaigns of #ahje and #ahji against ,austria1 and of #ahjf and #ahjg against ,prussia and ,russia1 of #ahjh in ,spain1 his manoeuvres in #ahad1 between the battle of ,brienne and that of ,paris1 and his operations previous to the ,battle of ,ligny in #ahae1 are all brilliant examples under this head4 ,to change the line of operations1 in the middle of a campaign1 and follow accidental lines1 is always a delicate affair1 and can only be resorted to by a general of great skill1 and with disciplined troops4 ,in such a case it may be attended with important results4 ,it was one of ,napoleon's maxims1 that a line of operations1 when once chosen1 should never be abandoned4 ,this maxim1 however1 must sometimes be disregarded by an army of undisciplined troops1 in order to avoid entire destruction2 but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always attended with great loss1 and should be regarded as a mere choice of evils4 ,a regular army can always avoid this result1 by changing the direction of its line2 thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new theatre of action4 ,if the plan of this change be the result of a good coup d'oeil1 and it be skilfully executed1 the rear of the operating army will be secure from the enemy2 and moreover1 he will be left in doubt respecting its weak points4 ,but such is the uncertainty of this manoeuvre1 that it is very rarely taken by the best troops1 unless actually forced upon them4 ,if the army be of incongruous materials1 generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to entirely abandon the line1 and save as many as possible of the troops for some new plan of operations4 7,maxim #bj47 ,if1 however1 the undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications1 it can take up the accidental line of operations in the same manner1 and with the same probability of success1 as is done by a regular force4 ,we have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of ,prussia1 after the battle of ,hohenkirchen1 and of ,washington1 in ,new-,jersey1 after the action of ,princeton4 ,this is one of the finest in military history4 ,napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations1 in case he lost the battle of ,austerlitz2 but victory rendered its execution unnecessary4 ,again in #ahad he had planned an entire change of operations2 but the want of co-operation of the forces under ,mortier and ,marmont forced him to abandon a plan which1 if properly executed1 had probably defeated the allies4 ,jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career4 ,having explained the principal terms used in strategy1 let us trace out the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations4 ,we will suppose war to be declared1 and the army to be just entering upon a campaign4 ,the political and military authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the war1 and select the theatre of its enterprises4 ,the chief selects certain points1 on or near the borders of the seat of war1 where his troops are to be assembled1 and his materiel collected4 ,these points1 together1 form his base of operations4 ,he now selects some point1 within the theatre of the war1 as the first object of his enterprises1 and chooses the line of operations most advantageous for reaching this objective point4 ,the temporary positions taken on this line become strategic positions1 and the line in his rear1 a line of defence4 ,when he arrives in the vicinity of his first object1 and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises1 he must force this enemy to retreat1 either by an attack or by manoeuvres4 ,for this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre1 which may deviate from his general line of operations4 ,the ulterior events of the campaign may possibly cause him to make these new1 or accidental lines1 his lines of operations4 ,the approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach secondary corps on secondary lines2 or to divide his army1 and pursue double or multiple lines4 ,the primitive object may also be relinquished1 and new ones proposed1 with new lines and new plans of operations4 ,as he advances far from his primitive base1 he forms new depots and lines of magazines4 ,he may encounter natural and artificial obstacles4 ,to cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous operation2 and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing bridges1 and securing a safe passage for his army4 ,if a fortified place is to be taken1 he will detach a siege corps1 and either continue his march with the main army1 or take a strategic position to cover this siege4 ,thus ,napoleon1 in #agif1 with an army of only #ej1jjj combatants1 could not venture to penetrate into ,austria1 with ,mantua and its garrison of #be1jjj men in his rear1 and an ,austrian force of #dj1jjj before him4 ,but in #ahjf the great superiority of his army enabled him to detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of ,silesia1 and still to continue his operations with his principal forces4 ,the chief of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel him to give battle4 ,if he should be victorious1 the enemy must be pursued and harassed to the uttermost4 ,if he should be defeated1 he must form the best plan1 and provide the best means of retreat4 ,if possible1 he must take shelter in some line of fortifications1 and prepare to resume the offensive4 ,lines of intrenchment and temporary works may sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection4 ,finally1 when the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations1 he will go into winter cantonments1 and prepare for a new campaign4 ,such are the ordinary operations of war3 its relations to strategy must be evident1 even to the most superficial reader4 ,not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic operations of an army1 than upon its victories gained in actual combat4 ,tactics1 or movements within the range of the enemy's cannon1 is therefore subordinate to the choice of positions3 if the field of battle be properly chosen1 success will be decisive1 and the loss of the battle not disastrous2 whereas1 if selected without reference to the principles of the science1 the victory1 if gained1 might be barren1 and defeat1 if suffered1 totally fatal3 thus demonstrating the truth of ,napoleon's maxim1 that success is oftener due to the genius of the general1 and to the nature of the theatre of war1 than to the number and bravery of the soldiers4 7,maxim #ag1 #ah47 ,we have a striking illustration of this in the ,french army of the ,danube1 which1 from the left wing of ,general ,kray1 marched rapidly through ,switzerland to the right extremity of the ,austrian line1 and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the ,rhine and ,danube without pulling a trigger4 ,again1 in #ahje1 the army of ,mack was completely paralyzed1 and the main body forced to surrender1 at ,ulm1 without a single important battle4 ,in #ahjf1 the ,prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of ,jena4 ,the operations about ,heilesberg1 in #ahjg1 the advance upon ,madrid1 in #ahjh1 the manoeuvres about ,ratisbon1 in #ahji1 the operations of the ,french in #ahad1 and the first part of the campaign of #ahae1 against vastly superior numbers1 are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim4 ,strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important1 though least understood1 of all the branches of the military art4#d ,footnote #d3 ,strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories4 ,there are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art4 ,the general treatises of the ,archduke ,charles1 and of ,general ,wagner1 in ,german1 7the former has been translated into ,french17 are considered as the best4 ,the discussions of ,jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art1 are exceedingly valuable2 also the writings of ,rocquancourt1 ,jacquinot de ,presle1 and ,gay de ,vernon4 ,the last of these has been translated into ,english1 but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate4 ,the military histories of ,lloyd1 ,templehoff1 ,jomini1 the ,archduke ,charles1 ,grimoard1 ,gravert1 ,souchet1 ,st4 ,cyr1 ,beauvais1 ,laverne1 ,stutterheim1 ,wagner1 ,kausler1 ,gourgaud and ,montholon1 ,foy1 ,mathieu ,dumas1 ,sgur1 ,pelet1 ,koch1 ,clausewitz1 and ,thiers1 may be read with great advantage4 ,napier's ,history of the ,peninsular ,war is the only ,english ,history that is of any value as a military work3 it is a most excellent book4 ,alison's great ,history of ,europe is utterly worthless to the military man2 the author is ignorant of the first principles of the military art1 and nearly every page is filled with the grossest blunders4 ,we subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy1 either directly or in connection with military history4 ,principes de la ,stratgie1 c41 par le ,prince ,charles1 traduit de l',allemand1 #c vols4 in #hvo4 ,this is a work of great merit4 ,the technical terms1 however1 are very loosely employed4 ,prcis de l',art de la ,guerre1 par le ,baron ,jomini4 ,his chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art4 ,grundstze der ,strategic1 ,von ,wagner4 ,cours ,elmentaire d',art et d',histoire ,militaire1 par ,rocquancourt4 ,this work contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war2 but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book4 ,cours d',art et d',histoire ,militaire1 par ,jacquinot de ,presle4 ,this work is especially designed for cavalry officers1 and the other branches of military service are but very briefly discussed4 ,de ,vernon's ,treatise on the ,science of ,war and ,fortification contains much valuable information2 but1 as an elementary book1 it has the same objections as that of ,rocquancourt4 ,history of the ,seven ,years' ,war1 by ,lloyd and ,templehoff4 ,the military writings of ,lloyd and ,templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy2 but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as erroneous4 ,mmoires de ,napolon4 ,the ,memoirs of ,napoleon1 as dictated by himself to ,gourgaud and ,montholon1 have been translated into ,english4 ,it is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science4 ,no military man should fail to study them thoroughly4 ,the matter is so condensed1 and important principles are embodied in so few words1 that they are not easily understood by the ordinary reader1 and probably will never be popular with the multitude4 ,essai gnral de ,tactique1 par ,guibert4 ,a work very popular in its day1 but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned4 ,ausfhrliche ,beschreibung der ,schlacht des ,pirmasens1 von ,gravert4 ,regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment4 ,mmoires sur les ,campagnes en ,espagne4 ,souchet4 ,mmoires de ,gouvion ,st4 ,cyr4 ,statistique de la ,guerre1 par ,reveroni ,st4 ,cyr4 ,premire ,campagnes de la ,revolution1 par ,grimoard4 ,victoires et ,conqutes4 ,beauvais4 ,campagnes de ,suwarrow4 ,laverne4 ,histoire de la ,guerre de la ,pninsule4 ,foy4 ,prcis des ,evnements ,militaires4 ,mathieu ,dumas4 ,histoire de ,napolon et de la ,grande ,arme en #ahab4 ,sgur ,mmoires sur la ,guerre de #ahji4 ,pelet4 ,la ,campagne de #ahad4 ,koch4 ,vom ,kriege--,die ,feldzgge1 c4 ,clausewitz4 ,la ,rvolution1 le ,consulat et l',empire4 ,thiers4 ,mmoires sur la ,guerre de #ahab--sur la ,campagne du ,vice roi en ,italie1 en #ahac et #ahad2 ,histoire de la ,guerre en ,allemagne en #ahad2 ,histoire des ,campagnes de #ahad et #ahae1 en ,france4 ,vaudoncourt4 ,essai sur l',art ,militaire1 c4 ,carion-,nisas4 ,histoire de l',expdition en ,russie en #ahab4 ,chambray4 ,war in ,spain1 ,portugal1 and the ,south of ,france4 ,john ,jones4 ,peninsular ,war4 ,napier4 ,notices of the ,war of #ahab4 ,armstrong ,all the above are works of merit2 but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of ,jomini and ,kausler1 with their splendid diagrams and maps4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,fortifications4 ,fortifications1 or engineering1 may be considered with reference to the defence of states and the grand operation of armies2 or with reference to the details of the construction1 and attack1 and defence of forts1 and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of armies4 ,it is proposed to speak here only of its general character1 as a branch of the military art1 without entering into any professional discussion of details4 ,the connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two distinct heads3 #ast1 the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for defence2 #b;d1 their influence in offensive operations1 and the determination of the question whether they can be passed with safety1 or whether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging them4 ,the centre and extremities of a base of operations should always be secured either by natural or artificial obstacles4 ,this base is generally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line4 ,but if a frontier1 like the side of ,france towards ,belgium1 be destitute of natural obstacles1 the artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased4 ,great care should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such places as may favor military operations4 ,if otherwise1 the troops detached from the active army for garrisoning them1 will only tend to weaken this force without any corresponding advantages4 ,in this way1 fortifications may become actually injurious to defence4 ,a number of the ,european fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was properly understood1 are now regarded as utterly useless1 from their ill-advised positions4 ,whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or observing it1 depends very much upon the nature of the war1 and the numbers and position of the defensive army4 ,the allies1 in #ahad1 invading ,france with a million of soldiers1 assisted by the political diversion of factions and ,bourbonists within the kingdom1 and treason in the frontier fortresses1 and even in the ranks of ,napoleon's army1 could conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that which would be adopted by either ,austria1 ,prussia1 ,russia1 ,england1 ,spain1 ,portugal1 ,holland1 ,italy1 and the ,german powers1 if singly waging war with the ,french4 ,napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre2 at others1 he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced4 ,an army1 says ,jomini1 may sometimes penetrate between places on an open frontier1 to attack the enemy's forces in the field1 taking care at the same time to observe these places2 but no invading army can cross a great river1 like the ,danube1 the ,rhine1 or the ,elbe1 without reducing at least one of the fortresses on that river1 so as to secure a line of retreat2 but being in possession of such a place1 it can continue the offensive1 while its matriel de sige successively reduces the other places4 ,in case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging corps1 it should take some central position1 where it can command all the avenues of approach1 and fall with vigor on the enemy1 should he attempt to raise the siege4 ,napoleon's operations before ,mantua1 in #agif1 offer the finest model for imitation4 ,the old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare4 ,in ancient times1 and more particularly in the middle ages1 too much importance was attached to tactical positions1 and not enough to strategic points and lines4 ,this gave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them4 ,from the middle ages down to the period of the ,french ,revolution1 wars were carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confining their operations to the security of certain important places1 while the other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these places4 ,but ,carnot and ,napoleon changed this system1 at the same time with the system of tactics1 or rather1 returned from it to the old and true system of strategic operations4 ,some men1 looking merely at the fact that a change was made1 but without examining the character of that change1 have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in war1 military success depending entirely upon a good system of marches4 ,on this subject1 ,general ,jomini1 the great military historian of the wars of the ,french ,revolution1 remarks that we should depend entirely upon neither organized masses1 nor upon material obstacles1 whether natural or artificial4 ,to follow exclusively either of these systems would be equally absurd4 ,the true science of war consists in choosing a just medium between the two extremes4 ,the wars of ,napoleon demonstrated the great truth1 that distance can protect no country from invasion1 but that a state1 to be secure1 must have a good system of fortresses1 and a good system of military reserves and military institutions4 ,in all military operations time is of vast importance4 ,if a single division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only1 it not unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign4 ,had the approach of ,blucher been delayed for a few hours1 ,napoleon must have been victorious at the battle of ,waterloo4 ,an equilibrium can seldom be sustained for more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle2 but in this instance1 the state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours2 thus enabling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save ,wellington4 ,many of ,napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point4 ,rivoli in #agif-g1 ,marengo in #ahjj1 ,ulm in #ahje1 ,jena in #ahjf1 ,ratisbon in #ahji1 ,brienne in #ahad1 and ,ligny in #ahae1 are familiar examples4 ,but this concentration of forces1 even with a regular army1 cannot be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty1 unless his communications are perfectly secure4 ,and this difficulty is very much increased where the troops are new and undisciplined4 ,when a country like ours is invaded1 large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field4 ,not knowing the designs of the invaders1 much time will be lost in marches and countermarches2 and if there be no safe places of resort the operations must be indecisive and insecure4 ,to a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose1 upon which the troops1 if beaten1 may fall back1 and shelter their sick and wounded1 collect their scattered forces1 repair their materials1 and draw together a new supply of stores and provisions2 and as rallying points1 where new troops may be assembled with safety1 and the army1 in a few days1 be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field4 ,without these defences1 undisciplined and inexperienced armies1 when once routed1 can seldom be rallied again1 except with great losses4 ,but when supported by forts1 they can select their opportunity for fighting1 and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success2 and1 having a safe place of retreat1 they are far less influenced by fear in the actual conflict4 ,the enemy1 on the other hand1 being compelled either to besiege or observe these works1 his army will be separated from its magazines1 its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments1 and his whole force exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare4 ,it has therefore been estimated by the best military writers1 that an army supported by a judicious system of fortifications1 can repel a land force six times as large as itself4 ,every government should prepare1 in time of peace1 its most prominent and durable means of defence4 ,by securing in a permanent manner its important points1 it will enable a small force to retain possession of these places against a greatly superior army1 for a considerable length of time4 ,this serves the same purpose as a battle gained2 for1 in the beginning of a war of invasion1 the economy of time is of the utmost importance to the defensive party1 enabling it to organize and prepare the great military resources of the state4 ,in all mountainous frontiers1 or sides of states bordering on large rivers1 or chains of lakes1 there will necessarily be but few points by which an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country4 ,let us suppose that1 for a frontier of moderate extent1 there are five passes1 or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior4 ,to effectually defend these approaches against the invading army will require1 for each1 an army of ten thousand men4 ,not being able to decide positively on the plans of the enemy1 all these communications must be defended at the same time4 ,this requires a defending army of fifty thousand men4 ,let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such a way1 that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in check1 and force him to resort to the operations of a siege2 or1 at least1 to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the interior1 and prepared to meet him in the field4 ,we here see that five thousand men1 by means of fortifications1 can accomplish the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of security4 ,but let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences1 and examine the character of the several systems which have been successively proposed or adopted4 ,frontiers are divided into four distinct classes1 according as the state may be open on one or more sides1 or bounded by mountains1 large rivers and lakes1 or by the sea4 ,an open frontier is the most difficult of defence2 and while there exists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a frontier1 there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the best manner of arranging these works4 ,we shall here mention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an open country1 each of which has been advocated at different times1 and afterwards received various modifications and additions4 ,these three systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much consideration4 ,they are3-- #ast4 ,the system of continuous lines1 proposed by ,montalembert4 #b;d4 ,a system of three lines of detached works1 strongly recommended by ,d',aron and others4 #c;d4 ,a system proposed by ,vauban1 and advocated by ,rogniat1 consisting of lines of very strong works1 placed at considerable distances from each other and covering large intrenched camps4 ,the first of these systems was proposed in #agij1 and for a time attracted considerable notice in ,france1 but has long since been discarded1 as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the military art4 ,a writer1 however1 of some pretensions in this country1 recommends its adoption for the defence of ,baltimore and the shores of the ,chesapeake4 ,the same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast1 and substitute in their place wooden ,martello towers6 ,this would be very much like building #abj gun ships at ,pittsburg and ,memphis1 for the defence of the ,ohio and the ,mississippi rivers1 and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the ,atlantic6 ,in the second system1 the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart1 and those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines1 and opposite the intervals4 ,in the third system1 first recommended by ,vauban and more recently by ,rogniat1 the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of ,d',aron1 but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles1 and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched camp4 ,either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an open frontier4 ,the former is applied to the side of ,france towards ,belgium1 and the latter1 with certain modifications1 to the defence of ,western ,germany4 ,the first line of fortifications on the northern frontier of ,france consists of ,dunkirk1 ,lille1 ,valenciennes1 ,cond1 ,quesnoy1 ,rocroi1 ,charlemont1 ,mzires1 and ,sedan2 the second line1 of ,calais1 ,andres1 ,st4 ,omer1 ,bthune1 ,arras1 ,douai1 ,chambrai1 ,landrecies1 and ,avesnes2 the third line1 of ,boulogne1 ,montreuil1 ,hesdin1 ,abbeville1 ,amiens1 ,bapaume1 ,peronne1 ,ham1 and ,laon4 ,for mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the important passes with small redoubts or military works1 and to defend with strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these communications are directed4 ,for a frontier of moderate extent there may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might penetrate2 but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on two or three points in the great valleys below4 ,take1 for example1 the frontier of ,france towards ,switzerland and ,italy4 ,the passes of the mountains are secured by the little works of ,fort ,l',ecluse1 ,fort ,pierre-chtel1 ,fort ,barraux1 ,brianon1 ,mont ,dauphin1 ,colmars1 ,entrevaux1 and ,antibes2 while ,besanon1 ,grenoble1 and ,toulon1 form a second line2 and ,lyons a grand central dpt4 ,where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state1 the system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier1 the works of the first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage2 those of the second line1 to cover the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse2 and those of the third line1 far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of the country4 ,let us take1 for example1 the side of ,france bordering on the ,rhine4 ,wissembourg and ,lauterbourg1 ,fort ,louis1 ,haguenau1 ,strasbourg1 ,schelstadt1 ,neuf-,brisach1 and ,huneguen1 cover the several passages of the river2 while ,bitche1 ,phalsbourg1 and ,bfort form a second line2 ,thionville1 ,metz1 and ,toul1 a third line2 and ,verdun a grand central dpt4 ,the following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast4 #ast4 ,to close all important harbors to an enemy1 and secure them to the navy of the country4 #b;d4 ,to prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores1 from which1 by his naval superiority1 he might destroy our commerce and keep the whole frontier in continual alarm4 #c;d4 ,to cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment4 #dth4 ,to cover our ship-yards and great naval depots4 #eth4 ,to prevent1 as much as possible1 the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into the ocean4 #fth4 ,to give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from the enemy's ships of war1 and our internal communications1 which lie near the coast1 from maritime descents4 ,let us notice how ,france has attempted to accomplish this object4 ,the ,mediterranean frontier has ,fort ,quarr1 ,fort ,st4 ,margurite1 ,st4 ,tropez1 ,briganon1 the forts of ,point ,man1 of l',ertissac1 and of ,langoustier1 ,toulon1 ,st4 ,nicholas1 ,castle of ,if1 ,marseilles1 ,tour de ,boue1 ,aigues-,montes1 ,fort ,st4 ,louis1 ,fort ,brescou1 ,narbonne1 ,chteau de ,salces1 ,perpignan1 ,collioure1 ,fort ,st4 ,elme1 and ,port ,vendre4 ,toulon is the great naval dpt for this frontier1 and ,marseilles the great commercial port4 ,both are well secured by strong fortifications4 ,the ,atlantic frontier has ,bayonne2 the forts of ,royan1 ,grave1 ,medoc1 ,pat1 c41 on the ,gironde2 ,rochefort1 with the forts of ,chapus1 ,lapin1 ,aix1 ,oleron1 c41 to cover the roadstead2 ,la ,rochelle1 with the forts of the ,isle of ,r2 ,sables1 with the forts of ,st4 ,nicholas1 and ,des ,moulines1 ,isle ,dieu1 ,belle ,isle1 ,fort du ,pilier1 ,mindin1 ,ville ,martin2 ,quiberon1 with ,fort ,penthivre2 ,l',orient1 with its harbor defences2 ,fort ,cigogne2 ,brest1 with its harbor defences2 ,st4 ,malo1 with ,forts ,czembre1 ,la ,canche1 ,l',anse du ,verger1 and ,des ,rimains2 ,cherbourg1 with its defensive forts and batteries2 ,havre1 ,dieppe1 ,boulogne1 ,calais1 and ,dunkirk4 ,cherbourg1 ,brest1 and ,rochefort1 are great naval dpts2 and ,havre1 ,nantes1 and ,bordeaux1 the principal commercial ports4 ,many of the works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their construction1 and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless1 they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval depots and commercial seaports of ,france against the superior naval forces of her neighbor4 ,omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences1 let us examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications on land frontiers4 ,all military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a great1 and frequently a decisive1 influence on the operations of a war4 ,those of ,france are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence4 ,but1 while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much in former times to the defence of states1 yet some have said that modern improvements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable than formerly4 ,such1 however1 is not the case4 ,improvements in the mode of attack have not kept pace with the facilities of locomotion2 and1 although fortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as many days as in former times1 still1 as compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in ancient and modern wars1 the proportional length of sieges is now even greater than formerly4 ,when the same is accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war of seven years1 it is not necessary that fortified places should hold out a very long time4 ,a place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns2 for by the end of that time the defensive army will either be destroyed1 or be able to come to its succor4 ,in either case a longer defence would not be required4 ,a reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will show that forts are1 on an average1 capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length of time4 ,lille1 in #agjh1 held the allies in check for a whole year2 and again1 in #agib1 compelled the ,austrians to raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days4 ,antwerp1 in #aehe1 sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly superior forces2 in #ahad ,carnot defended the citadel of this place for four months1 and until an armistice had been concluded between the contending parties2 in #ahcb1 it sustained1 with a garrison of only #d1ejj men and #ade pieces of ordnance1 a siege of twenty-five days1 against a force of #ee1jjj men and #bbc cannon4 ,namur1 near the end of the seventeenth century1 sustained a siege of ten weeks4 ,ismal1 in #agij1 sustained a siege of more than two months against the ,russians4 ,maestricht1 in #agic1 sustained a siege of nearly two weeks2 and again1 in #agid1 sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months4 ,magdeburg1 in the thirty years' war1 resisted the army of ,wallenstein for seven months2 and in #ahac-ad1 although garrisoned by only #d1jjj men1 it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies4 ,dantzic1 at the same time1 sustained a siege against superior forces for more than nine months4 ,landau1 in #agic1 sustained a siege of nine months4 ,valenciennes and ,mayence1 in #agic1 each sustained a siege of about three months4 ,charleroi1 ,fort ,vauban1 and ,l',ecluse1 in #agid1 each sustained a siege of about thirty days4 ,quesnoy1 in #agid1 sustained a siege of about three weeks4 ,rosas1 in #agie1 sustained a siege of some seventy days4 ,mantua1 in #agif-g1 protected from invasion1 for eight months1 the ,tyrol and the heart of the ,austrian monarchy4 ,kehl and ,huninguen1 in #agif1 sheltered ,moreau for three months against all the efforts of the ,archduke ,charles4 ,st4 ,jean d',acre1 in #agii1 sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench4 ,ulm1 in #ahjj1 held ,moreau in check for more than a month4 ,genoa1 in #ahjj1 sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days4 ,saragossa in #ahjh sustained a close siege of near two months2 and in #ahji it was again besieged for two months4 ,rosas in #ahjh sustained a siege of thirty days4 ,gerona in #ahji sustained a siege and blockade of seven months1 nearly four of them being of open trench4 ,mequinenza 7a very small work7 in #ahaj sustained a siege of more than two weeks4 ,astorga in #ahaj sustained a siege of thirty days2 twenty-four being of open trench4 ,lerida in #ahaj sustained a siege of thirty days1 two weeks being of open trench4 ,ciudad ,rodrigo in #ahaj sustained a siege of two months4 ,almeida in #ahaj sustained a siege of more than a month4 ,tortosa in #ahaj sustained a siege of six months4 ,tarragona in #ahaa sustained a siege of nearly two months4 ,badajos in #ahaa sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench4 ,lerida in #ahaa sustained a siege of two weeks open trench4 ,saguntum in #ahaa sustained a siege of a month4 ,valencia in #ahaa-ab sustained a siege of two months ,ciudad ,rodrigo in #ahab sustained a blockade of several months1 and a close siege of two weeks4 ,badajos in #ahab sustained twenty-one days of open trenches4 ,burgos in #ahab sustained thirty-three days of open trenches4 ,st4 ,sebastian in #ahac sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months1 with fifty-nine days of open trenches4 ,pampeluna in #ahac sustained a siege of more than four months4 ,monzon in #ahac-ad also sustained a siege of more than four months4 ,this list might be increased with numerous other examples1 to show that even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves1 on an average1 for more than a month4 ,these examples1 be it remembered1 are nearly all taken from a period of history since any material improvements have been made in the art of attack4 ,since the time of ,vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased means of defence4 ,moreover1 these examples are taken from the sieges of towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works1 and entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications1 with all the modern improvements4 ,the value of fortifications1 as land defences1 is sufficiently proved by showing their general capability of resisting an invader1 even for a limited period2 thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other means of security4 ,but it must not be inferred that forts besieged en rgle will necessarily fall after so many days4 ,such is far from being the case4 ,the besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers2 and unless the latter are vastly superior in number1 or the work is of a very inferior character1 or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack1 they will not be taken4 ,mezieres was not taken in #aebj2 nor ,marseilles in #aebd2 nor ,peronne in #aecf2 nor ,landrecies in #aedc2 nor ,metz in #aeeb2 nor ,montauban in #afba2 nor ,lerida in #afdg2 nor ,maestricht in #afgf2 nor ,vienna in #aebi1 and again in #afhc2 nor ,turin in #agjf2 nor ,conde in #agdd2 nor ,lille in #agib2 nor ,landau in #agic2 nor ,ulm in #ahjj2 nor ,saragossa in #ahjh2 nor ,burgos in #ahab4 ,this list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation4 ,but1 as has already been noticed1 some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance1 under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the ,french ,revolution4 ,on this subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the present century4 ,napoleon says of fortifications1 they are an excellent means of retarding1 fettering1 enfeebling1 and disquieting a conquering foe4 ,the possession of strategic points1 says the ,archduke ,charles1 is decisive in military operations2 and the most efficacious means should1 therefore1 be employed to defend points whose preservation is the country's safeguard4 ,this object is accomplished by fortifications1 inasmuch as they can resist1 for a given time1 with a small number of troops1 every effort of a much larger force2 fortifications should1 therefore1 be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence4 ,it should be a maxim of state policy in every country1 to fortify1 in time of peace1 all such points1 and to arrange them with great care1 so that they can be defended by a small number of troops4 ,for the enemy1 knowing the difficulty of getting possession of these works1 will look twice before he involves himself in a war4 ,establishments which can secure strategic advantages are not the works of a moment2 they require time and labor4 ,he who has the direction of the military forces of a state1 should1 in time of peace1 prepare for war4 ,the proper application or neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the state4 ,fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object1 and direct his movements on less important points2--he must either force these fortified lines1 or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer only disadvantages4 ,in fine1 a country secured by a system of defences truly strategic1 has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy2 for he can advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and ruinous efforts4 ,of course1 lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses2 but these reverses will not1 in this case1 be attended by total ruin2 for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for collecting new forces2 nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of submission or destruction4 ,fortifications1 says ,jomini1 fulfil two objects of capital importance1--#ast4 ,the protection of the frontiers2 and #b;d4 ,assisting the operations of the army in the field4 ,every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge1 secondary places1 and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of the armies4 ,cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of great utility in the interior of a country1 as places of deposit1 where stores1 magazines1 hospitals1 c41 may be sheltered from the incursions of the enemy's light troops4 ,these works are more especially valuable where such stores1 in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments1 are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces4 ,it is not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier2 but1 although they of themselves can rarely present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army1 yet it is indisputable that they straiten its movements1 change the direction of its marches1 and force it into detachments2 while1 on the contrary1 they afford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army2 they protect its marches1 favor its debouches1 cover its magazines1 its flanks1 and its movements1 and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of need4 ,these opinions were uttered1 be it remembered1 long since the period at which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as inland defences1 by men1 too1 who were not engineers1 and consequently had no professional predilections in favor of fortifications4 ,the ,archduke ,charles1 as a general1 knew no rival but ,napoleon1 and ,general ,jomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the age4 ,the truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully confirmed by the military histories of ,germany and ,france4 ,for a long period previous to the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 its strong castles and fortified cities secured the ,german empire from attacks from abroad1 except on its extensive frontier1 which was frequently assailed1 but no enemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among its own princes opened its strongholds to the ,swedish conqueror2 nor then1 did the cautious ,gustavus ,adolphus venture far into its territories till he had obtained possession of all the military works that might endanger his retreat4 ,again1 in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 when the ,french neglected to secure their foothold in ,germany1 by placing in a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their power1 the first defeat rendered their ground untenable1 and threw them from the ,elbe back upon the ,rhine and the ,mayne4 ,they afterwards took the precaution to fortify their positions1 and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places1 and1 consequently1 were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end of the war1 notwithstanding the inefficiency of their generals1 the great reverses they sustained in the field1 the skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with1 and the weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them4 ,but this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter part of the eighteenth century1 for at the beginning of the ,french ,revolution1 says ,jomini1 ,germany had too few fortifications2 they were generally of a poor character1 and improperly located4 ,france1 on the contrary1 was well fortified3 and although without armies1 and torn in pieces by domestic factions1 7we here use the language of the ,archduke17 she sustained herself against all ,europe2 and this was because her government1 since the reign of ,louis ,,xiii41 had continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles of strategy2 starting from such a system for a basis1 she subdued every country on the continent that was not thus fortified2 and this reason alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army1 and even an entire state1 merely by a strategic success4 ,this may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns4 ,in #agib1 when the ,duke of ,brunswick invaded ,france1 she had no armies competent to her defence4 ,their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable1 it is true1 but the license of the ,revolution had so loosened the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization4 ,it seemed1 at this period1 says the historian1 as if the operations of the ,french generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies3 the moment they appeared1 the operations were precipitately abandoned4 ,but ,france had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses1 although her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them4 ,the several works of the first and second lines fell1 one after another1 before the slow operations of a ,prussian siege1 and the ,duke of ,brunswick was already advancing upon the third1 when ,dumourier1 with only twenty-five thousand men1 threw himself into this line1 and by a well-conducted war of positions1 placing his raw and unsteady forces behind unassailable intrenchments1 succeeded in repelling a disciplined army nearly four times as numerous as his own4 ,had no other obstacle than the ,french troops been interposed between ,paris and the ,prussians1 all agree that ,france must have fallen4 ,in the campaign1 of #agic1 the ,french army in ,flanders were beaten in almost every engagement1 and their forces reduced to less than one half the number of the allies4 ,the ,french general turned traitor to his country1 and the ,national ,guards deserted their colors and returned to ,france4 ,the only hope of the ,republicans1 at this crisis1 was ,vauban's line of ,flemish fortresses4 ,these alone saved ,france4 ,the strongholds of ,lille1 ,cond1 ,valenciennes1 ,quesnoy1 ,landrecies1 c41 held the ,austrians in check till the ,french could raise new forces and reorganize their army4 ,the important breathing-time which the sieges of these fortresses1 says an ,english historian1 afforded to the ,french1 and the immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they received1 and fresh organization which they acquired during that important period1 is a signal proof of the vital importance of fortresses in contributing to national defence4 ,napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of ,france4 ,it is to be constantly recollected that the ,republican armies were then totally unable to keep the field2 that behind the frontier fortresses there was neither a defensive position1 nor a corps to reinforce them2 and that if driven from their vicinity1 the capital was taken and the war concluded4 ,in the following year1 #agid1 when ,france had completed her vast armaments1 and1 in her turn1 had become the invading power1 the enemy had no fortified towns to check the progress of the ,republican armies2 which1 based on strong works of defence1 in a few weeks overran ,flanders1 and drove the allies beyond the ,rhine4 ,in the campaign of #agif1 when the army of ,moreau had been forced into a precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the ,archduke ,charles1 the ,french forces owed their safety to the fortifications on the ,rhine4 ,these works arrested the enemy's pursuit and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges2 and the reduction of the ,french advanced posts alone1 ,kehl and ,huninguen1 poorly as they were defended1 employed all the resources of the ,austrian army1 and the skill of their engineers1 from early in ,october till late in ,february4 ,kehl was at first assaulted by a force four times as numerous as the garrison2 if the enemy had succeeded1 he would have cut off ,moreau's retreat1 and destroyed his army4 ,fortunately the place was strong enough to resist all assaults2 and ,moreau1 basing himself on the fortresses of ,alsace1 his right covered by ,huninguen1 ,neuf-,brisach1 and ,bfort1 and his left by the iron barrier of the ,netherlands1 effectually checked the waves of ,austrian success4 ,let us now turn to the campaigns of ,napoleon4 ,in his first campaign in ,italy1 #agif1 the general was directed to seize the forts of ,savona1 compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies1 and to surrender the keys of ,gavi1 a fortress perched on the rocky height commanding the pass of the ,bocchetta4 ,setting out from ,savona1 he crossed the mountains at a weak point between the ,alps and the ,apennines1 and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence4 ,the king of ,sardinia1 jealous of ,austrian influence1 had refused to permit the ,austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications4 ,napoleon1 profiting by his victorious attitude1 the mutual jealousy of ,austria and ,sardinia1 and the intrigues of his diplomatists1 soon gained possession of these important works4 ,these ,sardinian fortresses1 he wrote to the ,directory1 at once put the ,republicans in possession of the keys of the ,peninsula4 ,basing himself on ,coni1 ,mondovi1 ,ceva1 ,gavi1 and ,alessandria1 with ,tortosa as his dpt of magazines1 he advanced against ,lombardy4 ,now basing himself on the ,adda and ,po1 with the fortress of ,pizzighettone as the dpt of his magazines1 he advanced upon the line of the ,adige4 ,pechiera became his next dpt1 and he now had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dpt of magazines2 and1 after the fall of ,mantua1 basing himself on the ,po1 he advanced against the ,states of the ,church1 making ,ferrara and then ,ancona1 his places of dpt4 ,from the solid basis of the fortresses of ,piedmont and ,lombardy1 he was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the ,austrians1 and thus commence1 with some security1 that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions4 ,in this campaign of #agig1 after scouring his base1 he fortified ,palma-,nuova1 ,osapo1 c41 repaired the old fortifications of ,klagenfurth1 and1 as he advanced1 established1 to use his own words1 a good point d'appui at every five or six marches4 ,afterwards1 when the ,austrians had nearly wrested ,italy from the weak grasp of ,napoleon's successors1 the ,french saved their army in the fortress of ,genoa and behind the line of the ,var1 which had been fortified with care in #agid-e4 ,numerous attempts were made to force this line1 the advanced post of ,fort ,montauban being several times assaulted by numerous forces4 ,but the ,austrian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape and musketry1 which swept off great numbers at every discharge4 ,again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of numbers1 and again the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment2 and1 after sustaining a heavy loss1 they were compelled to abandon the enterprise4 ,while the forces on the ,var thus stayed the waves of ,austrian success1 ,massena1 in the fortifications of ,genoa1 sustained a blockade of sixty1 and a siege of forty days1 against an army five times as large as his own2 and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine1 he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty4 ,these two defences held in check the lite of the ,austrian forces1 while the ,french reserve crossed the ,alps1 seized the important points of the country1 and cut off the ,austrian line of retreat4 ,but even after the victory of ,marengo1 says ,napoleon1 ,i did not consider the whole of ,italy reconquered1 until all the fortified places between me and the ,mincio should be occupied by my troops4 ,i gave ,melas permission to return to ,mantua1 on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses4 ,he now directed ,chasseloup de ,laubat and his engineers to repair and remodel the fortifications of ,verona1 ,legnano1 ,pechiera1 ,mantua1 the line of the ,adda1 ,milan1 ,alessandria1#e ,roco d',aufo1 ,genoa1 and several smaller works2 thus forming a quadruple line of defence against ,austrian aggression in ,italy4 ,these works were of great service to the ,french in #ahje1 enabling ,massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the ,archduke ,charles with more than ninety thousand1 while ,napoleon's grand army1 starting from the solid base of the ,rhine1 traversed ,germany and seized upon the capital of ,austria4 ,footnote #e3 ,more than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this place alone4 ,the neglect of the ,prussians to place their country in a state of military defence1 previous to declaring war against ,napoleon in #ahjf1 had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign4 ,napoleon1 on the other hand1 occupied and secured all the important military positions which he had captured in the preceding campaign4 ,the ,prussians1 said he1 made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line1 not even those within a few marches of our cantonments4 ,while ,i was piling up bastion upon bastion at ,kehl1 ,cassel1 and ,wesel1 they did not plant a single palisade at ,magdeburg1 nor put in battery a single cannon at ,spandau4 ,the works on the three great lines of the ,oder1 the ,elbe1 and the ,weser1 had they been properly repaired1 garrisoned1 and defended1 were sufficient to have held in check the ,french1 even after the great victory of ,jena1 till the newly-organized forces1 acting in concert with the ,russian army1 could re-establish the ,prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness4 ,profiting by the neglect of the ,prussians1 ,napoleon seized upon the great defensive works of the country1 which1 to his great joy1 were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them2 and ,french garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of ,stettin1 ,custrin1 ,glogau1 ,magdeburg1 ,spandau1 ,hameln1 ,nieubourg1 c4 ,spandau1 said he in the #aith ,bulletin1 is an inestimable acquisition4 ,in our hands it could sustain two months of operations4 ,but such was the general confusion1 that the ,prussians had not even armed its batteries4 ,the possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at ,eylau4 ,all the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of ,friedland and ,tilsit4 ,these ,prussian fortresses were retained by ,napoleon at the treaty of ,tilsit4 ,the campaign of #ahji proved the wisdom of this policy1 as they effectually prevented ,prussia from joining ,austria in rekindling the flames of war4 ,and again in #ahac1 these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign1 had not the political perfidy of ,austria1 and the treason of the ,french generals1 prevented ,napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position4 ,the influence of the fortifications of ,spain upon the ,peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by historians4 ,those works which had been given up to ,napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities1 contributed very much to the success of his arms2 while those which had been retained by ,spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations4 ,some of these1 like ,saragossa1 ,tarragona1 ,gerona1 ,tortosa1 c4 c41 with their broken walls and defective armaments1 kept the enemy in check for months2 and1 by compelling the ,french to resort to the tedious operations of sieges1 did much to weaken the ,french power in the ,peninsula4 ,the influence of the fortifications of the ,french frontiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of ,napoleon into the enemy's territory1 has already been noticed4 ,if these fortresses of ,france1 after the disasters of #ahab and '#ac1 failed to save the nation1 the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself1 rather than any lack of military influence in the ,french defences4 ,as has been already remarked1 a million of disciplined men1 under consummate leaders1 were here assailing a single state1 impoverished by the fatal war in ,russia1--torn in pieces by political factions1--deserted by its sworn allies1--its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands1 and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies4 ,its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful2 and ,napoleon said at ,st4 ,helena1 that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses and retired to the ,rhine1 he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into ,paris4 ,but political considerations prevented the operation4 ,again in #ahae1 ,napoleon1 even after the defeat of ,waterloo1 possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion4 ,but again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at ,paris1 and the treason of his own generals1 forced his second abdication4 ,if he had retained the command of the army1 and the nation had seconded his efforts1 the allies would never have reached ,paris4 ,but the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the enemies of their country4 ,france1 said ,napoleon1 will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass under the ,caudine-forks1 by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory1 and by giving up to our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses4 ,history fully supports ,napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital1 even when that capital is without fortifications4 ,the fatal effects of such an advance1 without properly securing the means of retreat1 is exemplified by his own campaign of #ahab1 in ,russia4 ,if1 after the fall of ,smolensk1 he had fortified that place and ,vitepsk1 which by their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the ,dnieper and the ,dwina1 he might in all probability1 on the following spring1 have been able to seize upon ,moscow and ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,but leaving the hostile army of ,tschkokoff in his rear1 he pushed on to ,moscow1 and when the conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there1 and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision-trains1 retreat became impossible1 and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there is scarcely a parallel in history4 ,this point might be still further illustrated by the ,russian campaign of ,charles ,,xii41 in #agjh-i1 the fatal advance of the ,french army on ,lisbon1 in the ,peninsular war1 and other examples of the same character4 ,even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications1 and frustrate the operations of an entire army4 ,thus1 ,lille suspended for a whole year the operations of ,prince ,eugene and ,marlborough2 the siege of ,landrecies gave ,villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war2 ,pavia1 in #aebe1 lost ,france her monarch1 the flower of her nobility1 and her ,italian conquests2 ,metz1 in #aeeb1 arrested the entire power of ,charles ,v41 and saved ,france from destruction2 ,prague1 in #ageg1 brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin2 ,st4 ,jean d',acre1 in #agii1 stopped the successful career of ,napoleon2 ,burgos1 in #ahab1 saved the beaten army of ,portugal1 enabled them to collect their scattered forces1 and regain the ascendancy2 ,strasburg has often been1 the bulwark of the ,french against ,germany1 saving ,france from invasion1 and perhaps subjugation4 ,in nearly the language of ,napoleon1 7,memoirs1 vol4 ,,ix417 ,if ,vienna had been fortified in #ahje1 the battle of ,ulm would not have decided the fate of the war4 ,again1 in #ahji1 if this capital had been fortified1 it would have enabled the ,archduke ,charles1 after the disaster of ,eckmuhl1 by a forced retreat on the left of the ,danube1 to form a junction with the forces of ,general ,hiller and the ,archduke ,john4 ,if ,berlin had been fortified in #ahjf1 the army routed at ,jena would have rallied there and been joined by the ,russians4 ,if ,madrid had been strongly fortified in #ahjh1 the ,french army1 after the victories of ,espinosa1 ,tudela1 ,burgos1 and ,sommo-,sierra1 would not have marched towards that capital1 leaving in rear of ,salamanca and ,valladolid1 both the ,english army of ,general ,moore and the ,spanish army of ,romana4 ,if ,moscow had been fortified in #ahab1 its conflagration would have been avoided1 for1 with strong defensive works1 and the army of ,kutusoff encamped on its ramparts1 its capture would have been impossible4 ,had not ,constantinople been well fortified1 the empire of ,constantine must have terminated in the year #gjj1 whereas the standard of the ,prophet was not planted there until #addj4 ,this capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence4 ,during this period it was besieged fifty-three times1 but only one of these sieges was successful4 ,the ,french and ,venetians took it1 but not without a very severe contest4 ,paris has often owed its safety to its walls4 ,in #hhe the ,normans besieged it for two years without effect4 ,in #aceh the ,dauphin besieged it in vain4 ,in #acei ,edward1 king of ,england1 encamped at ,montrouge1 devastated the country to its walls1 but recoiled from before it1 and retired to ,chartres4 ,in #adbi it repulsed the attack of ,charles ,,vii4 ,in #adfd the ,count of ,charlerois surrounded the city1 but was unsuccessful in his attacks4 ,in #adgb it repulsed the army of the ,duke of ,bourgone1 who had already ravaged its precincts4 ,in #aecf1 when attacked by ,charles ,v41 it again owed its safety to its walls4 ,in #aehh and #aehi it repulsed the armies of ,henry ,,iii4 and ,henry ,,iv4 ,in #afcf and several succeeding years the inhabitants of ,paris owed their safety to its walls4 ,if this capital had been strongly fortified in #ahad and #ahae1 the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment4 ,but it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples2 the whole history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a means of national defence1 and as an auxiliary in offensive military operations4 ,our illustrations have been mostly drawn from ,european wars1 but our own brief history1 as will be shown hereafter1 is not without its proofs4 ,the use and importance of field-fortifications1 intrenched camps1 c41 as well as the class of military works called coast-defences1 will be discussed hereafter4#f ,footnote #f3 ,the use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by ,ternay1 ,vauban1 ,cormontaigne1 ,napoleon1 the ,archduke ,charles1 ,jomini1 ,fallot1 and1 incidentally1 by most of the military historians of the wars of the ,french ,revolution4 ,the names of such standard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will be mentioned hereafter4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,logistics4 ,,iii4 ,we have defined logistics to be that branch of the military art which embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies4 ,the term is derived from the title of a ,french general officer1 7major-gnral des logis17 who was formerly charged with directing the marches1 encampments1 and lodging of the troops4 ,it has been still further extended by recent military writers1 and many of them now regard logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art4 ,we shall here consider logistics as including the military duties ordinarily attributed to the pay1 subsistence1 clothing1 medical1 hospital1 and transportation departments2 in fine1 of all the civil and civico-military corps of the army4 ,we shall therefore discuss under this head1 the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion2 the regulating of marches1 convoys1 the means of transport for provisions1 hospitals1 munitions1 and supplies of all kinds2 the preparation and protection of magazines2 the laying out of camps and cantonments2 in fine1 every thing connected with preparing1 moving1 and guarding the impedimenta of an army4 ,the officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots1 magazines1 camps1 cantonments1 communications1 and the passage of rivers1 and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and defence of places3 but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they must receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the army1 who will have the general direction of every thing connected with logistics4 ,before commencing the operations of the campaign1 or beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters1 this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the various materials belonging to the different departments of the army2--the horses and horse equipments1 carriages1 caissons1 ponton and artillery equipages1 siege equipages1 moveable hospitals1 engineer and artillery utensils1 clothing1 and munitions of all kinds2 he must supply whatever may be wanting1 and provide means for the transportation of every thing4 ,subsistence4--,the art of subsisting troops during active operations in a hostile country1 is one of the most difficult subjects connected with war2 and it is a question well worthy of study1 both for the statesman and the warrior1 how ,darius and ,xerxes1 ,philip and ,alexander1 in ancient times--and the ,greek emperors and the barbarians--and1 later still1 the crusaders of the middle ages1 contrived to support the immense masses of men which they led to war4 ,csar has said that war should be made to support war2 and some modern generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting their armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over4 ,others have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular magazines4 ,louis ,,xiv4 and ,frederick ,,ii4 fought mostly on their own frontiers1 and followed the system of regular dpts and supplies4 ,but the revolutionary armies of ,france made war without magazines1 subsisting1 sometimes on the inhabitants1 sometimes by requisitions levied on the country passed over1 and at others by pillage and marauding4 ,napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men in ,italy1 ,suabia1 and on the rich borders of the ,rhine and the ,danube2 but in ,spain1 ,poland1 and ,russia1 the subject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment4 ,all depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated magazines2 these are divided into principal1 secondary1 and provisional4 ,the first are usually on the base of operations2 the second1 on the line of operations2 and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops1 and contain supplies for a few days only4 ,the system of magazines is objected to by some1 because it fetters the movements of an army1 and makes its military operations subordinate to the means of supply4 ,moreover1 as the movements of an army must be so arranged as to cover these magazines1 their establishment at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign4 ,on the other hand1 the system of requisitions1 either for immediate supplies or for secondary magazines1 gives far greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army2 and if it be so regulated as to repress pillage1 and be levied with uniformity and moderation1 it may be relied on with safety in well-cultivated countries2 but in more barren and less populous districts1 an army without magazines1 especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat1 will be exposed to great suffering and loss1 if not to total destruction4 ,before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted with all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine the amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him1 and the amount that can be obtained by requisitions2 these requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner1 and through the existing local authorities4 ,in great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable1 at least for a time1 to provide for the immense forces placed on foot1 by any regular system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions3 in such cases their subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves1 who levy contributions wherever they pass4 ,the inevitable consequences of this system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline2 the loss of private property and the violation of individual rights1 are followed by the massacre of all straggling parties1 and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies4 ,in this connection the war in the ,spanish peninsula is well worthy of study4 ,at the beginning of this war ,napoleon had to choose between methodical operations1 with provisions carried in the train of his army1 or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for2 and irregular warfare1 with forced requisitions--war being made to support war4 ,the question was thoroughly discussed4 ,on the one hand1 by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from the ,french treasury1 he would have been able to support his troops without requisitions1 would have maintained good order and discipline in his armies1 and by the distribution of this money among a people poor and interested1 he would have made many partisans4 ,he could then have offered them1 with a firm and just hand1 the olive or the sword4 ,but then the drafts upon the ,french treasury1 had the war been a protracted one1 would have been enormous for the support of an army of #bjj1jjj men in ,spain4 ,moreover1 the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible2 and the want of navigable rivers1 good roads1 and suitable transport1 rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country4 ,besides1 no great detachments could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces1 or to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains4 ,in fine1 by this system1 he would have effected a military occupation of ,spain without its subjugation4 ,on the other hand1 by marching rapidly against all organized masses1 living from day to day upon the local resources of the country1 as he had done in ,italy1 sparing his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces2 this mode promised more prompt and decisive results than the other4 ,napoleon1 therefore1 determined to adopt it for his active masses1 employing the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as practicable4 ,in favorable parts of the country1 ,soult and ,souchet1 with smaller armies1 succeeded in obtaining in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time1 but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required4 ,this sometimes gave place to great excesses1 but these were principally the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them1 rather than of ,napoleon1 who punished such breaches of discipline1 when they were known to him1 with great severity4 ,he afterwards declared that1 had he succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the ,spanish people for their losses1 by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy1 which would have rendered the church less powerful1 and caused a more just division of property2 thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy4 ,the following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best military writers3 #ast4 ,regular magazines should be formed1 so far as practicable1 for the supplies of an army2 the levying of requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of the war1 and the requisite rapidity of marches1 render these absolutely necessary to success4 #b;d4 ,dpts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art1 defended by small corps1 or garrisons1 and situated in positions least liable to attack4 #c;d4 ,all great dpts should be placed on navigable rivers1 canals1 railways1 or practical roads1 communicating with the line of operations1 so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity1 as the army advances on this line4 #dth4 ,an army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days1 otherwise the best chances of war may be lost1 and the army exposed to great inconveniences4 ,templehoff says that the great ,frederick1 in the campaign of #ageg1 always carried in the ,prussian provision-train bread for six1 and flour for nine days1 and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces1 in undertaking any sudden and decisive operation4 ,the ,roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fifteen days4 ,napoleon says1 ,experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions1 ten days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons2 so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be required for an army of forty thousand men2 two hundred and forty being regularly organized1 and two hundred and forty being obtained by requisition4 ,for this purpose there would be a battalion of three companies for the military stores of each division1 each company having its establishment for forty wagons1 twenty being furnished by the commissariat1 and twenty obtained by requisition4 ,this gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons1 and for each army1 four hundred and eighty4 ,each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred and ten men4 #eth4 ,an army1 while actually in motion1 can find temporary resources1 unless in a sterile country1 or one already ravaged by war1 or at the season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not ready for harvest2 but1 even supposing the army may in this way be partially or wholly supplied1 while in motion1 it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position1 7as the ,french at ,austerlitz and ,ulm27 a supply of hard bread for some ten days will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular commissariat can be established4 #fth4 ,supplies of bread and biscuit1 says ,napoleon1 are no more essential to modern armies than to the ,romans2 flour1 rice1 and pulse1 may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm4 ,it is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines2 it may be seen in ,caesar's ,commentaries1 how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns4 ,the ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies1 or to being obliged to depend on the purveyors2 but all the great captains well understood the art of subsistence4 ,forage is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or cattle1--as grass1 hay1 corn1 oats1 c42 and also to the operation of collecting such food4 ,forage is of two kinds1 green and dry2 the former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields1 and the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers1 or the storehouses of the dealers4 ,the animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular magazines1 by forced requisitions1 or by authorized foraging #g ,as has already been remarked1 it is not always politic1 or even possible1 to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign4 ,on account of the great expense and difficulty of transporting forage1 the general of an army is more frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions1 or forced contributions as they are called1 and to foraging1 for the subsistence of his animals1 than to provide food for his men4 ,nor are requisitions and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case1 being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the non-combatant inhabitants4 ,footnote #g3 ,this term is sometimes1 though improperly1 applied to the operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops4 ,the commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants1 or by requisitions on the local authorities2 and even where these means are impracticable1 the foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with uniformity and due moderation4 ,accurate accounts should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken1 so that it may be regularly distributed and accounted for4 ,under no circumstances should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than their pro rata allowance4 ,foraging parties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful manner1 by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate supplies4 ,even where no recompense is proposed1 it may be well to offer certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the use of the army4 ,these certificates1 even when of no value in themselves1 frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay insurrections4 ,in defensive war1 carried on in one's own country1 it is often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the public service3 in all such cases the certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of individual claims against the government4 ,no foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has been properly reconnoitred4 ,a good military escort and vanguard should always accompany and precede the foragers1 for protection against the enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia4 ,trustworthy troops must be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged1 in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and unauthorized pillage4 ,officers of the staff and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders1 and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops4 ,in case any corps engage in unauthorized pillage1 due restitution should be made to the inhabitants1 and the expense of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed4 ,a few examples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the army1 and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied4 ,experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain that may be taken from a given field3 the produce of an acre is1 of course1 very different for different soils and climates4 ,in distributing the burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying the forage to the army1 it is important for the foraging officers to know the relative weight and bulk of each article4 ,ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about 4 #ab lbs4 per cubic foot4 ,wheat 4 4 4 weighs4 4 #fj lbs4 per bushel4 ,rye 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ef ,maize or ,indian corn 4 #ef ,barley 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ej ,oats 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ce ,meal1 flour1 and ground feed of all kinds1 are purchased by the pound4 ,as it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train of the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging parties1 the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for this purpose4 ,troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and grain-fields for temporary subsistence3 in such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in the neighborhood1 and the grass and grain issued in regular rations1 immediately as taken from the field2 but in no case should the animals be turned out to pasture4 ,in a country like ours1 where large bodies of new and irregular forces are to be suddenly called into the field in case of war1 it is important to establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence2 otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great waste of public and private property1 the want of means of subsistence1 the consequent pillage of the inhabitants1 and a general relaxation of discipline4 ,regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than inexperienced and undisciplined forces4 ,marches4--,marches are of two kinds3 #ast4 ,route marches1--#b;d4 ,marches within reach of the enemy4 ,the former belong to the domain of strategy2 the latter to that of tactics2 both1 however1 are connected with logistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution4 ,when an army is moving on a line of operations1 it should be in as many columns as the facility of subsistence1 celerity of movement1 the nature of the roads1 c41 may require4 ,large columns cannot move with the same rapidity as smaller ones1 nor can they be so readily subsisted4 ,but when an army is within striking distance of the enemy1 concentration becomes more important than celerity1 and the forces must be kept in mass1 or at least within supporting distances of each other4 ,we find only two instances in the ,seven ,years' ,war1 in which ,frederick attempted attacks by several columns at considerable distances from each other2 and in both these instances 7at ,torgau and at ,namiest1 against ,laudon1 during the siege of ,olmutz7 he was unsuccessful4 ,his usual mode was to bring his columns near together as he approached the enemy1 and to form his troops into line at the moment of attack4 ,such was his order of march at ,prague1 ,kollin1 ,rosbach1 ,leuthen1 ,zornsdorf1 and ,kunersdorf4 ,the following is one of ,frederick's orders respecting marches1 7,october #b;d1 #agfj47 ,the army will1 as usual1 march in three columns by lines4 ,the first column will consist of the first line2 the second1 of the second line2 and the third1 of the reserve4 ,the wagons1 and hospital wagons1 of regiments1 will follow their corps4 ,the batteries of heavy calibre will follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned4 ,on passing woods1 the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps4 ,each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten squadrons of hussars or dragoons4 ,they will be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-bridges4 ,the rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges after the army has defiled over them4 ,the parks will be divided among the columns1 to avoid the embarrassment resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body4 ,if any thing should happen to the second and third columns1 the king will be instantly apprized of it2 he will be found at the head of the first column4 ,should any thing occur to the rear-guard1 the same will be instantly communicated to ,lieutenant-general ,zeithen1 who will be with the rear-guard of the first column4 ,the officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step1 and that they do not stray to the right or left1 and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and lose their distances4 ,when orders are given to form the line1 the wagons will file out of the columns to the left1 and will march to be parked1 c4 ,the position of the baggage1 when near the enemy1 will depend on the nature of the march4 ,if the march be to the front1 it will be in rear of the column2 if the march be by the flank1 and the enemy be on the outer flank1 the baggage will be on the inner one1 most remote from danger2 if the march be in retreat1 the baggage will be in advance of the army4 ,in either case it should be strongly guarded4 ,it was in direct violation of this rule that ,general ,hull1 in the campaign of #ahab1 on reaching the ,miami of the ,lake1 7,maumee17 embarked his baggage1 stores1 sick1 convalescent1 and even the instructions of his government and the returns of his army1 on board the ,cuyahoga packet1 and dispatched them for ,detroit1 while the army1 with the same destination1 resumed its march by land4 ,the result of thus sending his baggage1 stores1 official papers1 c41 without a guard1 and on the flank nearest the enemy1 was just what might have been anticipated3--in attempting to pass the ,british post of ,malden the whole detachment was attacked and captured1 by a subaltern and six men1 in a small and open boat4 ,to prevent a surprise1 detachments of light troops should be always thrown out in front1 on the flanks1 and in rear of the column1 denominated from their position1 ,advanced-,guard1 ,flankers1 and ,rear-,guard4 ,these scan the country which is to be passed over by the column1 watch the enemy's motions1 and give notice of his approach in time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle1 and to pass from the order of march to that of combat4 ,the strength and composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground1 and the character and position of the enemy4 ,in case of an attack they retire slowly1 and on joining the main body1 take their assigned position in the line of battle4 ,in an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty2 but in a broken country1 and especially in the vicinity of the enemy1 a march cannot be conducted with too many precautions4 ,before engaging in a defile it should be thoroughly examined1 and sufficient detachments sent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the passage4 ,a neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most terrible disasters4 ,in military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches4 ,the ,roman infantry1 in ,scipio's campaigns in ,africa1 frequently marched a distance of twenty miles in five hours1 each soldier carrying from fifty to eighty pounds of baggage4 ,septimius ,severus1 ,gibbon states1 marched from ,vienna to ,rome1 a distance of eight hundred miles1 in forty days4 ,csar marched from ,rome to the ,sierra-,morena1 in ,spain1 a distance of four hundred and fifty leagues1 in twenty-three days6 ,napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements4 ,others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the ,french1 but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modern history4 ,a few examples of the rapidity of their movements may not be without interest4 ,in #agig a part of ,napoleon's army left ,verona after having fought the battle of ,st4 ,michaels1 on the #acth of ,january1 then marched all night upon ,rivoli1 fought in the mountains on the #adth1 returned to ,mantua on the #aeth1 and defeated the army of ,provera on the morning of the #afth1--thus1 in less than four days1 having marched near fifty leagues1 fought three battles1 and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners6 ,well might he write to the ,directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of ,csar's legions4 ,in the campaign of #ahjj1 ,macdonald1 wishing to prevent the escape of ,loudon1 in a single day marched forty miles1 crossing rivers1 and climbing mountains and glaciers4 ,in #ahje the grand ,french army broke up their camp at ,boulogne1 in the early part of ,september1 and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the ,rhine1 averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles4 ,during the same campaign the ,french infantry1 pursuing the ,archduke ,ferdinand in his retreat from ,ulm1 marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather1 and over roads almost impassable for artillery4 ,again1 in the campaign of #ahjf1 the ,french infantry pursued the ,prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day4 ,in #ahjh the advanced posts of ,napoleon's army pursued ,sir ,john ,moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day1 in the midst of winter4 ,napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from ,madrid to ,astorga with nearly the same rapidity1 marching through deep snows1 across high mountains1 and rivers swollen by the winter rains4 ,the activity1 perseverance1 and endurance of his troops1 during these ten days' march1 are scarcely equalled in history4 ,in #ahab1 the activity of the ,french forces under ,clausel was truly extraordinary4 ,after almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of ,salamanca1 he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours6 ,in #ahad1 ,napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day1 besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours4 ,wishing to form a junction with other troops1 for the succor of ,paris1 he marched his army the distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours2 the cavalry marching night and day1 and the infantry travelling en poste4 ,on his return from ,elba1 in #ahae1 his guards marched fifty miles the first day after landing2 reached ,grenoble through a rough and mountainous country1 a distance of two hundred miles1 in six days1 and reached-,paris1 a distance of six hundred miles1 in less than twenty days6 ,the marches of the allied powers1 during the wars of the ,french ,revolution1 were much less rapid than those of the armies of ,napoleon4 ,nevertheless1 for a single day the ,english and ,spaniards have made some of the most extraordinary marches on record4 ,in #ahji1 on the day of the battle of ,talavera1 ,general ,crawford1 fearing that ,wellington was hard pressed1 made a forced march with three thousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours6 ,the ,spanish regiment of ,romana1 in their march from ,jutland to ,spain1 marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours4 ,cavalry1 for a single day1 will march a greater distance than infantry2 but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the most ground4 ,in the ,russian campaign of ,napoleon1 his cavalry failed to keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on ,moskwa4 ,but in the short campaigns of #ahje and #ahjf1 the cavalry of ,murat displayed the most wonderful activity1 and effected more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of modern ages4 ,the ,english cavalry1 however1 have made one or two short marches with a rapidity truly extraordinary4 ,in #ahjc ,wellington's cavalry in ,india marched the distance of sixty miles in thirty-two hours4 ,but the march of the ,english cavalry under ,lord ,lake1 before the battle of ,furruckabad1 is1 if we can trust the ,english accounts1 still more extraordinary than any thing recorded of the ,romans or the ,french--it is said that he marched seventy miles in twenty-four hours666 ,as a general rule1 troops marching for many days in succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day4 ,in forced marches1 or in pursuit of a flying enemy1 they will average from twenty to twenty-five miles per day4 ,and for only two or three days in succession1 with favorable roads1 thirty miles per day may be calculated on4 ,marches beyond this are unusual1 and1 when they do occur1 are the result of extraordinary circumstances4 ,convoy4--,a convoy consists of provisions1 military munitions1 c41 sent from one point to another1 under the charge of a detachment of troops1 called an escort4 ,when regular depots and magazines are established1 with proper relations to the line of operations1 convoys requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary1 because the position of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be moved4 ,but in the immediate vicinity of the enemy1 or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary1 precautions of this kind should always be resorted to4 ,the size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the danger4 ,the ground to be passed over should be previously reconnoitred1 and the line of march be taken up only after the most satisfactory reports4 ,when once put in motion1 the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers1 to give warning to the escort of the approach of the enemy4 ,small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides1 but particularly in advance4 ,the main body of the escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions4 ,in case of an attack by a large party1 the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work1 which1 with one or two pieces of light artillery1 can in this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy4 ,as a general rule1 it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive convoys than by periodical and large ones4 ,even should some of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt2 but a large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy1 and is so difficult to escort1 that he will venture much to destroy it1 and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an important military operation4 ,if the ,prussian army1 when besieging ,olmutz1 had observed this rule1 the capture of a convoy would not have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat4 ,napoleon estimates that an army of #ajj1jjj men in position will require the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions4 ,the difficulty of moving provisions1 baggage1 c41 in a retreat1 is always very great1 and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point4 ,indeed1 the best concerted measures will sometimes fail1 amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit4 ,in such a case1 the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most terrible disasters4 ,we will allude to two examples of this kind3 the retreat of the ,english from ,spain in #ahji1 and that of the ,french from ,russia in #ahab4 ,when ,sir ,john ,moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his army from entire destruction1 he directed all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear1 and every possible arrangement to be made for their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army4 ,but the want of discipline in his troops1 and more especially the want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for facilitating his own marches1 and impeding the enemy's pursuit1 prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution4 ,much suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops2 a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured1 and even the treasure of his army1 amounting to some #bjj1jjj dollars1 was abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer4 ,in ,napoleon's march into ,russia1 his plans had been so admirably combined1 that from ,mentz to ,moscow not a single estafette or convoy1 it is said1 was carried off in this campaign2 nor was there a day passed without his receiving intelligence from ,france4 ,when the retreat was begun1 7after the burning of ,moscow17 he had six lines of magazines in his rear2 the #ast1 at ,smolensk1 ten days' march from ,moscow2 those of the #b;d line at ,minsk and ,wilna1 eight marches from ,smolensk2 those of the #c;d line at ,kowno1 ,grodno1 and ,bialystok2 those of the #dth line at ,elbing1 ,marienwerder1 ,thorn1 ,plock1 ,modlin1 and ,warsaw2 those of the #eth line at ,dantzic1 ,bamberg1 and ,posen2 those of the #fth line at ,stettin1 ,custrin1 and ,glogau4 ,when the army left ,moscow it carried with it provisions sufficient for twenty days1 and an abundance of ammunition1 each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty rounds2 but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days1 thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation or suitable escorts for their protection3 the horrible sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description4 ,the officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great prudence1 activity1 and energy1 for frequently very much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which he may have in charge4 ,castrametation4--,castrametation is1 strictly speaking1 the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of an army4 ,the term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign1 and all the arrangements for cooking1 c41 either in the field or in winter quarters4 ,a camp1 whether composed of tents or barracks1 or merely places assigned for bivouacking1 must be divided and arranged in such a way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be drawn up in order of battle2 so that1 on any sudden alarm1 the troops can pass from it promptly1 and form their line of battle without confusion4 ,suitable places must also be assigned for cooking1 for baggage1 and for provisions1 military stores1 and ammunitions4 ,the extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of the ground and the means of defence1 but as a general rule1 it should never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of battle4 ,the different arms should be encamped in the same order as that of battle2 this order of course depending on the nature of the battle-ground4 ,a corps d'arme is composed of battalions of infantry1 squadrons of cavalry1 batteries of artillery1 and companies of engineer troops1 and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions4 ,the choice of ground for a camp must be governed1 #ast1 by the general rules respecting military positions1 and1 #b;d1 by other rules peculiar to themselves1 for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suitable on the same position4 ,that the ground be suitable for defence1 is the first and highest consideration4 ,it should also be commodious and dry3 moist ground in the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters1 would endanger the health of the army3 for the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy rains1 and the melting of snow4 ,the proximity of good roads1 canals1 or navigable streams1 is important for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life4 ,the proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood1 materials for huts1 for repairs of military equipments1 for works of defence1 c4 ,good water within a convenient distance1 is also an essential element in the choice of ground for a camp2 without this the soldiers' health is soon undermined4 ,the proximity of running streams is also important for the purposes of washing and bathing1 and for carrying off the filth of the camp4 ,the camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any point within long cannon range2 if bordering on a river or smaller stream1 there should be space enough between them to form in order of battle2 the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating in case of necessity1 but should not afford facilities to the enemy to make his attack on that side4 ,if the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time1 as for cantonments or winter-quarters1 the greater must be the care in selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers4 ,in the latter case1 7of winter-quarters17 the engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments1 lines of abattis1 inundations1 c41 to render the position as difficult of access to the enemy as possible4 ,a bivouac is the most simple kind of camp4 ,it consists merely of lines of fires1 and huts for the officers and soldiers4 ,these huts may be made of straw1 of wood obtained from the forest1 or by dismantling houses and other buildings in the vicinity of the camp1 and stripping them of their timbers1 doors1 floors1 c4 ,troops may be kept in bivouac for a few days1 when in the vicinity of the enemy1 but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs1 especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate1 is exceedingly destructive of human life1 and moreover leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied1 in the destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life4 ,if the position is to be occupied for any length of time1 the huts should be arranged like tents1 according to a regular system1 and made comfortable for the troops4 ,such should always be the system adopted in camps of practice or manoeuvre1 in cantonments1 winter-quarters1 or in intrenched positions4 ,we have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents4 ,these may do very well under the ordinary circumstances2 but in the active operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable1 as greatly encumbering the baggage-trains4 ,it would seem preferable to resort to bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night1 and to construct a regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length of time4 ,this may be regarded as a general rule1 but in certain countries and climates1 the tent becomes almost indispensable4 ,napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting1 if not decisive of the question3 ,tents1 says he1 are not wholesome4 ,it is better for the soldier to bivouac1 because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire2 he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards or a little straw4 ,the ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire4 ,tents are necessary for the superior officers1 who have occasion to read and consult maps1 and who ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse1 which has given rise to so many disasters4 ,all the ,european nations have so far followed the example of the ,french as to discard their tents2 and if they be still used in camps of mere parade1 it is because they are economical1 sparing woods1 thatched roofs1 and villages4 ,the shade of a tree1 against the heat of the sun1 and any sorry shelter whatever1 against the rain1 are preferable to tents4 ,the carriage of the tents for each battalion would load five horses1 who would be much better employed in carrying provisions4 ,tents are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and officers of the staff3 they give them an insight into your numbers1 and the position that you occupy2 and this inconvenience occurs every day1 and every instant in the day4 ,an army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke1 which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere4 ,it is impossible to count the number of fires2 it is easy1 however1 to count the number of tents1 and to trace out the position that they occupy4 ,the guarding of camps is a very important matter1 and requires much attention4 ,the camp-guard consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around the camp1 and relieved at regular intervals4 ,the number of rows of sentinels1 and the distance between each man1 will depend upon the character of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended4 ,detachments of infantry and cavalry1 denominated picquets1 are also thrown out in front and on the flanks1 which1 in connection with the camp-guards1 serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the camp1 to prevent desertions1 intercept reconnoitering parties1 and to give timely notice of the enemy's approach4 ,still larger detachments1 denominated grand-guards1 are posted in the surrounding villages1 farm-houses1 or small field-works1 which they occupy as outposts1 and from which they can watch the movements of the enemy1 and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp4 ,they detach patrols1 videttes1 and sentries1 to furnish timely notice of danger4 ,they should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case of sudden attack4 ,outposts1 when too far advanced1 are sometimes destroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach4 ,in encamping troops in winter-quarters1 it is sometimes necessary to scatter them over a considerable extent of ground1 in order to facilitate their subsistence4 ,in such a case1 the arrangement of guards requires the utmost care4 ,a chain of advanced posts should be placed several miles' distance from the line of camp2 these posts should be supported by other and larger detachments in their rear1 and concentrated on fewer points2 and the whole country around should be continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry4 ,the manner in which ,napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the ,passarge1 in #ahjf-g1 furnishes a useful lesson to military men1 both in the matters of encampment and subsistence4 ,an immense army of men were here quartered and subsisted1 in a most rigorous climate1 with a not over fertile soil1 in the midst of hostile nations1 and in the very face of a most powerful enemy4 ,a ,roman army invariably encamped in the same order1 its troops being always drawn up in the same battle array4 ,a ,roman staff-officer who marked out an encampment1 performed nothing more than a mechanical operation2 he had no occasion for much genius or experience4 ,the form of the camps was a square4 ,in later times1 they sometimes1 in imitation of the ,greeks1 made them circular1 or adapted them to the ground4 ,the camp was always surrounded with a ditch and rampart1 and divided into two parts by a broad street1 and into subdivisions by cross-streets and alleys4 ,each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty officer4 ,in the middle ages1 the form of the camp did not differ very essentially from that of the ,romans1 the variation consisting principally in the interior arrangements1 these arrangements being made to correspond to the existing mode of forming a line of battle4 ,the details of this system may be found in the military work of ,machiavelli4 ,the art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line of battle on the same position4 ,of all the projectile machines must be in play and favorably placed4 ,the position must neither be commanded1 out-fronted1 nor surrounded2 but on the contrary ought1 as far as possible1 to command and out-front the enemy's position4 ,but even in the same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment1 or of forming a line of battle1 and to select the best of these modes requires great experience1 coup d'oeil1 and genius4 ,in relation to this point ,napoleon makes the following remarks3-- ,ought an army to be confined to one single encampment1 or ought it to form as many as it has corps or divisions8 ,at what distance ought the vanguard and the flankers to be encamped8 ,what frontage and what depth ought to be given to the camp8 ,where should the cavalry1 the artillery1 and the carriages be distributed8 ,should the army be ranged in battle array1 in several lines8 ,and if it should1 what space should there be between those lines8 ,should the cavalry be in reserve behind the infantry1 or should it be placed upon the wings8 ,as every piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours1 should all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement1 or should half of it be kept in reserve8 ,the solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances3--#ast4 ,on the number of troops1 and the numbers of infantry1 artillery1 and cavalry1 of which the army is composed4 #b;d4 ,on the relation subsisting between the two armies4 #c;d4 ,on the quality of the troops4 #dth4 ,on the end in view4 #eth4 ,on the nature of the field4 ,and #fth4 ,on the position occupied by the enemy1 and on the character of the general who commands them4 ,nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this head4 ,in modern warfare there is no natural order of battle4 ,the duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in modern armies1 than it was in those of the ancients4 ,it is also certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles4 ,in the ancient armies the general-in-chief1 at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy1 was in no danger2 and yet he was conveniently placed1 so as to have an opportunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his forces4 ,in modern armies1 a general-in-chief1 though removed four or five hundred toises1 finds himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries1 and is very much exposed2 and still he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him4 ,in every engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach of small-arms4 ,the effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are placed4 ,a battery of guns1 with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy obliquely1 may be decisive of a victory4 ,modern fields of battle are much more extended than those of the ancients1 whence it becomes necessary to study operations on a large scale4 ,a much greater degree of experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army than was necessary for an ancient one4 ,figure #i represents a camp 7on favorable ground7 of a grand-division of an army1 composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry1 twelve squadrons of cavalry1 five batteries of artillery1 and three companies of engineers4 ,figure #aj represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry composed of eight companies4 ,figure #aa is the camp of a squadron of cavalry4 ,figure #ab is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery1 or two companies of foot engineers4 ,figure #ac is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery1 or two companies of mounted sappers and pontoniers4 ,on undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general camp1 as well as the details of the encampment of each arm1 would admit of much variation4#h ,footnote #h3 ,there are many valuable remarks on the various subjects comprised under the head of logistics1 in the works of ,jomini1 ,grimoard1 ,thiebault1 ,boutourlin1 ,guibert1 ,laroche ,amyon1 ,bousmard1 ,ternay1 ,vauchelle1 ,odier1 ,audouin1 ,bardin1 ,chemevrieres1 ,daznan1 ,ballyet1 ,dremaux1 ,dupre d',aulnay1 ,morin1 and in the published regulations and orders of the ,english army4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,tactics4 ,,iv4 ,tactics4--,we have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops into action1 or of moving them in the presence of the enemy2--that is1 within his view1 and within the reach of his artillery4 ,this branch of the military art has usually been divided into two parts3 #ast4 ,grand ,tactics1 or the tactics of battles2 and #b;d4 ,elementary ,tactics1 or tactics of instruction4#i ,footnote #i3 ,it does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of the merely mechanical part of the art2 because it must be taken for granted1 that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at least the alphabet of his trade4 ,if he does not1 7unless his enemy be as ignorant as himself17 defeat and infamy await him4 ,without understanding perfectly what are called the evolutions1 how is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be placed8 ,how know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against him8 and1 of course1 how decide on a counter-movement which may be necessary to secure victory or avoid defeat8 ,the man who shall take the command of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary branch1 is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach ,greek without knowing even his letters4 ,if we have such generals1 let them1 for their own sakes1 if not for their country's1 put themselves immediately to school4 ,a battle is a general action between armies4 ,if only a small portion of the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a combat1 an affair1 an action1 a skirmish1 c41 according to the character of the conflict4 ,the art of combining and conducting battles of all descriptions has been designated by the name of ,grand ,tactics4 ,battles may be arranged into three classes2 #ast4 ,defensive battles1 or those given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the enemy4 #b;d4 ,offensive battles1 or those made by an army which attacks the enemy in position4 #c;d4 ,the mixed or unforeseen battles1 given by two armies meeting while on the march4 ,i4 ,when an army awaits the attack1 it takes its position and forms its line of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed character and strength of the enemy's forces4 ,such is usually the case when an army wishes to cover a siege1 protect a capital1 guard dpts of provisions and military stores1 or some important strategic point4 ,the general relations of positions with strategy and engineering have already been considered2 we will now discuss merely their relations to battles4 ,the first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is1 that its debouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has approached to the desired point1 than those which the enemy can have for attacking our line of battle4 #b;d4 ,the artillery should have its full effect upon all the avenues of approach4 #c;d4 ,we should have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops unseen1 if possible1 by the enemy4 #dth4 ,we should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to the attack4 #eth4 ,we should have the flanks of our line well protected by natural or artificial obstacles4 #fth4 ,we should have some means of effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction4 ,it is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same time2 and sometimes the very means of satisfying one1 may be in direct violation of another4 ,a river1 a forest1 or a mountain1 which secures a flank of a line of battle1 may become an obstacle to a retreat1 should the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing4 ,again1 the position may be difficult of attack in front or on the wings1 and at the same time unfavorable for retreat4 ,such was ,wellington's position at ,waterloo4 ,the park of ,hougomont1 the hamlet of ,haye ,sainte1 and the marshy rivulet of ,papelotte1 were serious obstacles against the attacking force2 but the marshy forest of ,soignies in rear1 with but a single road1 cut off all hope of retreat4 ,,ii4 ,according to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a campaign1 will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy1 or to seek him out and attack him wherever he may be found4 ,we may sometimes be obliged to make the attack at all hazards1 for the purpose of preventing the junction of two corps1 or to cut off forces that may be separated from the main body by a river1 c4 ,as a general rule the attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive1 but this advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions4 ,the main thing in an offensive battle is to seize upon the decisive point of the field4 ,this point is determined by the configuration of the ground1 the position of the contending forces1 the strategic object of the battle2 or1 by a combination of these4 ,for example1 when one wing of the enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line1 this would seem the decisive point to be attacked1 for its occupation would secure the greatest advantages2 but this point may be so very difficult of access1 or be so related to the strategic object as to render its attack out of the question4 ,thus it was at the battle of ,bautzen3 the left of the allies rested on the mountains of ,bohemia1 which were difficult of attack1 but favorable for defence2 moreover1 their only line of retreat was on the right1 which thus became the point of attack for the ,french1 although the topographical and tactical key of the field was on the left4 ,,iii4 ,it frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from the meeting of armies in motion1 both parties acting on the offensive4 ,indeed1 an army that is occupying a defensive position may1 on the approach of the enemy1 advance to meet him while on the march4 ,battles of this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and defensive actions1 or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both armies4 ,to this class belong the battles of ,rosbach1 ,eylau1 ,lutzen1 ,luzzara1 ,abensberg1 c4 ,surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times1 for the noise of musketry and the roar of artillery1 belonging to the posts or wings assailed1 will prevent any general surprise of an army4 ,moreover1 the division into separate masses1 or corps d'arme1 will necessarily confine the surprise to a part1 at most1 of the forces employed4 ,nevertheless1 in the change given to military terms1 a surprise may now mean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack1 rather than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep4 ,in this sense ,marengo1 ,lutzen1 ,eylau1 c4 are numbered with surprises4 ,benningsen's attack on ,murat at ,zarantin in #ahab was a true surprise1 resulting from the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of ,naples4 ,an order of battle is the particular disposition given to the troops for a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle4 ,a line of battle is the general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of exercise1 without any determined manoeuvre2 it may apply to defensive positions1 or to offensive operations1 where no definitive object has been decided on4 ,military writers lay down twelve orders of battle1 viz43 #ast4 ,the simple parallel order2 #b;d4 ,the parallel order with a crotchet2 #c;d4 ,the parallel order reinforced on one or both wings2 #dth4 ,the parallel order reinforced on the centre2 #eth4 ,the simple oblique order2 #fth4 ,the oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing2 #gth4 ,the perpendicular order on one or both wings2 #hth4 ,the concave order2 #ith4 ,the convex order2 #ajth4 ,the order by echelon on one or both wings2 #aath4 ,the order by echelon on the centre2 #abth4 ,the combined orders of attack on the centre and one wing at the same time4 7,figure #ad47aj ,the simple parallel order is the worst possible disposition for a battle1 for the two parties here fight with equal chances1 and the combat must continue till accident1 superior numbers1 or mere physical strength decides the day2 skill can have little or no influence in such a contest4 ,footnote #aj3 ,in the plans1 ,b is the army in position1 and ,a the attacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle4 ,to simplify the drawings1 a single line represents the position of an army1 whereas1 in practice1 troops are usually drawn up in three lines4 ,each figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions4 7,figure #ae47 ,the parallel order with a crotchet on the flank1 is sometimes used in a defensive position1 and also in the offensive with the crotchet thrown forward4 ,malplaquet1 ,nordlingen1 ,prague1 and ,kolin1 are examples of this order4 ,wellington1 at ,waterloo1 formed the parallel order with the retired crotchet on the right flank4 7,figure #af47 ,a line of battle parallel to the enemy's1 if strongly reinforced on one point1 is according to correct principles1 and may in certain cases secure the victory2 but it has many inconveniences4 ,the weak part of the line being too near the enemy1 may1 notwithstanding its efforts to the contrary1 become engaged1 and run the risk of a defeat1 and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point4 ,moreover1 the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear1 without endangering its connection with the rest of the line4 7,figure #ag7 represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre4 ,the same remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding4 ,these two orders were frequently used by the ancients3 as at the battle of ,zama1 for example2 and sometimes by modern generals4 ,turenne employed one of them at ,ensheim4 7,figure #ah7 is the simple oblique order4 7,figure #ai7 is the oblique order1 with the attacking wing reinforced4 ,this last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior1 for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of the enemy's line1 while the weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack1 but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable point as occasion may require4 ,the most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of ,leuctra and ,mantinea1 under the celebrated ,epaminondas2 ,leuthen1 under ,frederick2 the ,pyramids1 ,marengo1 and ,jena1 under ,napoleon4 7,figure #bj47 ,an army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning of a battle1 as was the army of ,frederick at ,rosbach1 and the ,russian army at ,kunersdorff2 but this order must soon change to the oblique4 ,an attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is vastly superior4 ,at ,eylau1 ,napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre4 7,figure #ba47 ,the concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases1 and in particular localities4 ,hannibal employed it at the battle of ,cann1 the ,english at ,crecy and ,agincourt1 and the ,austrians at ,essling1 in #ahji4 7,figure #bb47 ,the convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile1 to attack a concave line1 or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river4 ,the ,romans formed this order at the battle of ,cosilinum2 the ,french at ,ramilies in #agjf1 at ,fleurus in #agid1 at ,essling in #ahji1 and at the second and third days of ,leipsic in #ahac1 and at ,brienne in #ahad4 7,figure #bc47 ,the order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage2 but if the echelon be made on both wings1 there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings4 ,at ,dresden1 ,napoleon attacked both wings at the same time2 this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack1 and this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of his troops4 7,figure #bd47 ,the echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle1 for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line4 ,the echelon order possesses in general very great advantages4 ,the several corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately1 and consequently with greater ease4 ,each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it2 and all may be combined towards a single object1 and extended with the necessary ensemble4 ,at the battle of the ,pyramids1 ,napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares4 ,portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles4 7,figure #be47 ,the combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time1 is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line4 ,napoleon employed this order at ,wagram1 ,ligny1 ,bautzen1 ,borodino1 and ,waterloo4 ,it is impossible to lay down1 as a general rule1 which of these orders of battle should be employed1 or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle4 ,the question must be decided by the general himself on the ground1 where all the circumstances may be duly weighed4 ,an order well suited to one position might be the worst possible in another4 ,tactics is in this respect the very reverse of strategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules4 ,but whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force1 it should seek to dislodge the enemy1 either by piercing or turning his line4 ,if it can conceal its real intentions1 and deceive him respecting the true point of attack1 success will be more certain and decisive4 ,a turning manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line4 ,the operations of ,davoust at ,wagram1 and ,richepanse at ,hohenlinden1 are good examples under this head4 ,the manoeuvre is1 however1 a difficult one1 and unless executed with skill1 may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the ,austrians at ,rivoli and ,austerlitz1 and of the ,french under ,jourdan at ,stackach1 and under ,marmont at ,salamanca4 ,we will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the line of battle1 or the manner of employing each arm1 without entering1 however1 much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction4 ,we shall begin with infantry1 as the most important arm on the battle-field4 ,there are four different ways of forming infantry for battle3 #ast1 as tirailleurs1 or light troops2 #b;d1 in deployed lines2 #c;d1 in lines of battalions1 ployed on the central division of each battalion1 or formed in squares2 #dth1 in deep masses4 ,these different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems3 #ast1 the thin formation of two deployed lines2 #b;d1 a line of battalions in columns of attack on the centre1 or in squares by battalions2 #c;d1 a combination of these two1 or the first line deployed1 and the second in columns of attack2 and #dth1 the deep formation of heavy columns of several battalions4 ,the tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main forces1 and are employed to fill up intervals1 to protect the march of the columns1 to annoy the enemy1 and to manoeuvre on the flanks4 #ast4 ,formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that of two deployed lines of troops1 as shown in ,fig4 #bf4 ,but reason and experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order1 can only move very slowly2 that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and exhibits great and dangerous undulations1 and would be easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order4 ,hence it is that the light formation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire1 and to remain almost stationary4 #b;d4 ,if the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be employed1 the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or habitual formation of this arm4 ,in our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies1 each formed in three ranks4 ,the two flank companies are designed for tirailleurs4 ,this would give a column of four divisions1 and consequently twelve files deep2 and as only two of these files could employ their fire1 there would be much too large a portion of non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery4 ,in practice1 however1 we employ the two-rank formation1 which1 if the flank companies be detached1 would give a column of attack eight files in depth1 which is not objectionable4 ,if however1 the flank companies should be present in the battalion1 the depth of the column would still be ten files4 ,in the ,french service1 each battalion is composed of four divisions1 formed in either two or three ranks4 ,the two-rank formation is the one habitually employed4 ,if all the companies be present1 and the formation in three ranks1 the depth of column will be twelve files2 if in two ranks the depth will be eight1 files4 ,if the flank companies be detached1 the depth of column will be1 for three ranks nine files1 and for two ranks six files4 7,figs4 #bg and #bh47 ,in the ,russian service each1 battalion has four divisions of three ranks each4 ,but the third rank is employed as tirailleurs1 which gives a depth of column of eight files4 ,the employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of rallying them on the column4 ,for this reason1 the best authorities prefer detaching an entire division of two companies4 ,the formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country1 and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry4 ,formerly very large squares were employed1 but they are now formed either by regiment or by battalion4 ,the former are deemed best for the defensive1 and the latter for offensive movements4 ,the manner of arranging these is shown in ,figure #bi4 #c;d4 ,the mixed system1 or the combination of the two preceding1 has sometimes been employed with success4 ,napoleon used this formation at ,tagliamento1 and the ,russians at ,eylau4 ,each regiment was composed of three battalions1 the first being deployed in line1 and the other two formed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities1 as shown in ,fig4 #cj4 ,it may in some cases be better to place the second and third battalions in line with the first1 and on the two extremities of this battalion1 in order to prolong the line of fire4 ,the centre of the line of each regiment would be less strong1 however1 than when the two battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is deployed4 ,this mixed system of formation has many advocates1 and in certain situations may be employed with great advantage4 #dth4 ,the deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is objectionable as an habitual formation for battle1 inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery1 and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its force4 ,macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of ,wagram with complete success1 although he experienced enormous losses4 ,but ,ney's heavy columns of attack at ,waterloo failed of success1 and suffered terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries4 ,whenever deep columns are employed1 ,jomini recommends that the grand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each flank1 7,fig4 #ca17 marching by files1 in order to protect its flanks from the enemy's attacks4 ,without this defence a column of twelve battalions deep becomes an inert mass1 greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder or broken1 as was the column of ,fontenoy1 and the ,macedonian phalanx by ,paulus ,emillus4 ,a grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by brigade1 as is represented in ,figure #cb4 ,these are less heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion1 but are subject to nearly the same objections4 ,all offensive operations on the field of battle require mobility1 solidity1 and impulsion2 while1 on the other hand1 all defensive operations should combine solidity with the greatest possible amount of fire4 ,troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms1 whatever may be their formation4 ,if in very large masses1 they move slower and are more exposed2 but the moral effect of these large moveable columns is such1 that they frequently carry positions without ever employing their fire4 ,the ,french columns usually succeeded against the ,austrian and ,prussian infantry1 but the ,english infantry could not so easily be driven from their ground2 hey also employed their fire to greater advantage1 as was shown at ,talavera1 ,busaco1 ,fuente de ,honore1 ,albuera and ,waterloo4 ,the smaller columns and the mixed formation were always most successful against such troops4 ,from these remarks we must conclude--#ast4 ,that the very thin as well as the very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances1 and can seldom be employed with safety4 #b;d4 ,that the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for carrying a position2 the column should1 however1 be diminished in depth as much as possible1 in order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy2 moreover1 it should be well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry4 #c;d4 ,that the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second in columns of battalion by division is the best for defence4 #dth4 ,that either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or defensive1 according to the nature of the ground1 the character of the general1 and the character and position of the troops4 ,squares are always good against cavalry4 ,troops should be habituated to all these formations1 and accustomed to pass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night4 ,none1 however1 but disciplined troops can do this3 hence the great superiority of regulars on the field of battle1 where skilful manoeuvres frequently effect more than the most undaunted courage4 ,the arm next in importance on the battle-field is cavalry4 ,the principal merit of this arm consists in its velocity and mobility4 ,cavalry has little solidity1 and cannot of itself defend any position against infantry2 but in connection with the other arms1 it is indispensable for beginning a battle1 for completing a victory1 and for reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe4 ,there are four different modes of forming cavalry1 the same as for infantry3 #ast in deployed lines2 #b;d1 a line of regiments in column of attack on the centre2 #c;d1 the mixed formation2 and #dth1 the deep formation of several columns4 #ast4 ,the thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry1 on account of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry4 ,the same objection does not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm2 but full lines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in echelon4 ,in either case the distance between the lines should be sufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the first1 in case the latter receives a slight check4 ,this distance need not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise1 as when they are full1 or in echelon4 #b;d4 ,the second system of formation1 that is1 a line of columns of attack on the central division for infantry1 is by battalion1 but for cavalry1 by regiment4 ,if the regiment is composed of eight squadrons1 the column will contain four lines1 two squadrons forming a division2 but if composed of only six squadrons1 the column will contain only three lines1 and consequently will be six files in depth4 ,in either case the distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron1 when the troops are drawn up in battle array2 but when charging1 the divisions may close to a less distance4 #c;d4 ,in forming a grand division of two brigades1 by the third or mixed system1 two regiments may be deployed in the first line1 and three formed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre1 as is shown in ,fig4 #cc1 the sixth being held in reserve4 ,this formation is deemed a good one4 #dth4 ,the fourth system1 of deep columns of cavalry1 is entirely unsuited for the charge1 and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve4 ,the flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed1 and squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left1 and a little in rear of the main body1 in order to protect the flanks from the attacks of the enemy's horse4 ,irregular cavalry is usually employed for this purpose4 ,in the formation of a grand division in line of battle1 care should be taken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of brigade4 ,if the formation be in two lines1 neither brigade should form an entire line1 but each should form a wing of the division1 two regiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other4 ,this rule is an important one1 and should never be neglected4 ,it may also be laid down as a maxim1 in the formation of cavalry on the battle-field1 that the first line after the charge1 even if most successful1 may require reforming in rear of the second line1 and that this last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first onset4 ,the success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged4 ,it is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on the battle-field1 its reforming for repeated charges1 that great bodies deployed in full lines are principally objected to4 ,they cannot be handled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by divisions4 ,the attack of ,nansouty's cavalry1 formed in this way1 on the ,prussian cavalry1 deployed in advance of ,chateau-,thierry1 in #ahad1 is a good proof of this4 ,cavalry may be brought to a charge--#ast1 in columns2 #b;d1 in line2 and #c;d1 in route1 or at random1 7 la dban-dade47 ,these may also be varied by charging either at a trot or a gallop4 ,all these modes have been employed with success4 ,in a regular charge in line the lance offers great advantages2 in the melee the sabre is the best weapon2 hence some military writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances1 and the second with sabres1 ,the pistol and the carabine are useless in the charge1 but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys1 outposts1 and light cavalry2 to fire the carabine with any effect1 the troop must be at a halt4 ,in all charges in line1 especially against cavalry1 the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop1 on account of the difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased4 ,lances are utterly useless in a mele1 and in employing troops armed in this way1 it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in line4 ,in charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may sometimes be employed1 for velocity here may be more important than force4 ,we will now consider the formation and use of artillery on the field of battle4 ,it may be laid down as a fundamental principle1 that the fire of artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which we design to pierce2 for this fire will not only weaken this point1 but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal efforts are directed towards the intended point4 ,in the defence1 the artillery is usually distributed throughout the whole line1 on ground favorable for its fire2 but the reserve should be so placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack4 ,artillery placed on a plain1 or with ground slightly inclined in front1 and using the point-blank or ricochet fire1 is the most effective2 very high points are unfavorable ,if possible1 the concentric fire should be employed against the enemy's columns of attack4 ,the position of the ,english artillery on the field of ,waterloo1 and the use of the concentric fire1 furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition of this arm to be found in modern military history4 ,the proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's infantry and cavalry1 consequently only a small part of it should be employed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries2 not more than one third at most can be spared for this object4 ,if possible1 batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's line in flank1 either by an oblique or enfilading fire4 ,a direct fire against columns of attack1 with a few light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time1 will always be advantageous4 ,a direct and flank fire was employed with success by ,kleist against the column of ,ney at the battle of ,bautzen2 the ,french marshal was forced to change his direction4 ,batteries should always be well secured on the flanks1 and constantly sustained by infantry or cavalry4 ,if attacked by cavalry1 the artillery should keep up its fire as long as possible1 first with ball1 and then with grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance4 ,the same rule will apply to attacks of infantry1 except that the fire of solid shot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted troops4 ,the engineer troops are employed on the field of battle principally by detachments1 acting as auxiliaries to the other arms4 ,each regiment of infantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers1 for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance4 ,these sappers are of the utmost importance1 for without them an entire column might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time4 ,detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry and artillery for the same purpose as above4 ,in establishing the batteries of artillery1 in opening roads for their manoeuvres1 and in arranging material obstacles for their defence1 the axes1 picks1 and shovels of the sappers are of infinite value4 ,fieldworks1 bridges1 and bridge-defences1 frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a battle1 but as these are usually arranged previous to the action1 they will be discussed in another place4 ,in the attack and defence of these field-works1 the engineer troops play a distinguished part4 ,the consideration of this part of the subject1 though perhaps properly belonging to the tactics of battles1 will also be postponed to another occasion4 ,we will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of battle4 ,before the ,french ,revolution1 all the infantry1 formed by regiments and brigades1 was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines4 ,the cavalry was placed on the two flanks1 and the artillery distributed along the entire line4 ,in moving by wings1 they formed four columns1 two of cavalry and two of infantry3 in moving by a flank1 they formed only two very long columns2 the cavalry1 however1 sometimes formed a third and separate column in flank movements1 but this disposition was rarely made4 ,the ,french ,revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed of the four arms combined2 each division moved separately and independently of the other4 ,in the wars of the ,empire1 ,napoleon united two or more of these divisions into a corps d'arme1 which formed a wing1 the centre1 or reserve of his grand army4 ,in addition to these divisions and corps d'arme1 he had large reserves of cavalry and artillery1 which were employed as distinct and separate arms4 ,if the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by corps d'arme1 each corps should have its own reserve1 independent of the general reserve of the army4 ,again1 if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only1 each division should then have its separate reserve4 ,an army1 whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions1 usually forms1 on the field of battle1 a centre1 two wings1 and a reserve4 ,each corps or division acts by itself1 with its infantry1 cavalry1 artillery1 and engineer troops4 ,the reserve of cavalry may be formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings4 ,in small forces of fifty or sixty thousand men1 the cavalry may act with advantage on the wings1 in the manner of the ancients4 ,if the reserve of this arm be large enough to form three separate bodies1 it may itself very properly be formed into a centre and wings4 ,if it be formed into two columns only1 they may be placed in rear of the openings between the centre and the wings of the main force4 ,the reserve of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or a wing1 and in the defensive is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle4 ,in offensive operations1 it may be well to concentrate as much fire as possible on the intended point of attack4 ,the mounted artillery either acts in concert with the cavalry1 of is used to reinforce that arm2 the light-foot acts with the infantry1 and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along the line1 or concentrated on some important point where their fire may be most effectual4 ,they reach the enemy's forces at a distance1 and arrest the impulsion of his attack4 ,they may also be employed to draw the fire of his artillery2 but their movements are too slow and difficult for a reserve4 ,the order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a battle1 depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental circumstances1 and cannot be determined by any fixed rules4 ,the following1 however1 is most frequently employed1 and in ordinary cases may be deemed good4 ,the attack is first opened by a cannonade2 light troops are sent forward to annoy the enemy1 and1 if possible1 to pick off his artillerists4 ,the main body then advances in two lines3 the first displays itself in line as it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot2 the second line remains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division1 at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's musketry1 but near enough to support the first line1 or to cover it1 if driven back4 ,the artillery1 in the mean time1 concentrates its fire on some weak point to open a way for the reserve1 which rushes into the opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear4 ,the cavalry charges at the opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in his line1 and cutting to pieces his staggered troops1 forces them into retreat1 and completes the victory4 ,during this time the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied1 so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point4 ,the following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage3--#ast4 ,general battles are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one of the following circumstances3 when you are1 from any cause1 decidedly superior to the enemy2 when he is on the point of receiving reinforcements1 which will materially effect your relative strength2 when1 if not beaten or checked1 he will deprive you of supplies or reinforcements1 necessary to the continuance or success of your operations2 and1 generally1 when the advantage of winning the battle will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it4 #b;d4 ,whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle1 you ought to regard as indispensable preliminaries1--a thorough knowledge of the ground on which you are to act2 an ample supply of ammunition2 the most perfect order in your fire-arms2 hospital dpts regularly established1 with surgeons1 nurses1 dressings1 c41 sufficient for the accommodation of the wounded2 points of rendezvous established and known to the commanders of corps2 and an entire possession of the passes in your own rear4 #c;d4 ,the battle being fought and won1 the victory must be followed up with as much alacrity and vigor1 as though nothing had been gained1--a maxim very difficult of observance1 7from the momentary disobedience which pervades all troops flushed with conquest17 but with which an able general will never dispense4 ,no one knew better the use of this maxim than ,napoleon1 and no one was a more strict and habitual observer of it4 #dth4 ,the battle being fought and lost1 it is your first duty to do away the moral effect of defeat1--the want of that self-respect and self-confidence1 which are its immediate followers1 and which1 so long as they last1 are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy4 ,it is scarcely necessary to remark that1 to effect this object1--to reinspire a beaten army with hope1 and to reassure it of victory1--we must not turn our backs on an enemy1 without sometimes presenting to him our front also2--we must not confide our safety to mere flight1 but adopt such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered1 we are neither disabled nor dismayed2 and that we still possess enough both of strength and spirit to punish his faults1 should he commit any4 ,do you operate in a covered or mountainous country8--avail yourself of its ridges and woods2 for by doing so you will best evade the pressure of his cavalry4 ,have you defiles or villages to pass8--seize the heads of these1 defend them obstinately1 and make a show of fighting another battle4 ,in a word1 let no error of your enemy1 nor any favorable incident of the ground1 escape your notice or your use4 ,it is by these means that your enemy is checked1 and your troops inspirited2 and it was by these that ,frederick balanced his surprise at ,hohenkirchen1 and the defeat of his plans before ,olmutz4 ,the movement of our own ,washington1 after losing the battle of ,brandywine1 was of this character4 ,he hastily recrossed the ,schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and renewing the combat1 which was apparently prevented only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain4 ,a rumor was now raised that the enemy1 while refusing his left wing1 was rapidly advancing upon his right1 to intercept our passage of the river1 and thus gain possession of ,philadelphia4 ,this report justified a retreat1 which drew from the ,general repeated assurances1 that in quitting his present position and giving to his march a retrograde direction1 it was not his object to avoid1 but to follow and to fight the enemy4 ,this movement1 though no battle ensued1 had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the people as of the army4#aa ,footnote #aa3 ,there are innumerable works in almost every language on elementary tactics2 very few persons1 however1 care to read any thing further than the manuals used in our own service4 ,our system of infantry1 cavalry1 and artillery tactics is generally taken from the ,french2 and also the course of engineer instruction1 so far as matured1 for sappers1 miners1 and pontoniers1 is based on the ,french manuals for the varied duties of this arm4 ,on ,grand ,tactics1 or ,tactics of ,battles1 the military and historical writings of ,general ,jomini abound in most valuable instructions4 ,napoleon's memoirs1 and the writings of ,rocquancourt1 ,hoyer1 ,decker1 ,okouneff1 ,roguiat1 ,jocquinot-de-,presle1 ,guibert1 ,duhesme1 ,gassendi1 ,warnery1 ,baron ,bohan1 ,lindneau1 ,maiseroy1 ,miller1 and ,ternay1 are considered as being among the best authorities4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,military ,,polity ,,and ,,the ,,means ,,of ,,national ,,defence4 ,military ,polity4--,in deciding upon a resort to arms1 statesmen are guided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of nations3 so also both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually engaged in military operations4 ,in all differences between nations1 each state has a right to decide for itself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received4 ,previous to declaring open and public war1 it may resort to some other forcible means of redress1 short of actual war4 ,these are3-- #ast4 ,laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation4 #b;d4 ,taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute4 #c;d4 ,resorting to some direct measure of retaliation4 #dth4 ,making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending nation4 ,it is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress1 nor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public war1 when actually declared2 it is intended to consider here merely such military combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation for defence1 or in carrying on the actual operations of a war4 ,in commencing hostilities against any other power1 we must evidently take into consideration all the political and physical circumstances of the people with whom we are to contend3 we must regard their general character for courage and love of country2 their attachment to their government and political institutions2 the character of their rulers and their generals2 the numbers1 organization1 and discipline of their armies2 and particularly the relations between the civil and military authorities in the state1 for if the latter be made entirely subordinate1 we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations4 ,we must also regard their passive means of resistance1 such as their system of fortifications1 their military materials and munitions1 their statistics of agriculture1 commerce1 and manufactures1 and especially the geographical position and physical features of their country4 ,no government can neglect1 with impunity1 these considerations in its preparations for war1 or in its manner of conducting military operations4 ,napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak1 effeminate1 and disorganized ,italians required many modifications when directed against the great military power of ,russia4 ,moreover1 the combinations of ,eylau and ,friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened guerrillas of ,minos1 animated by the combined passions of hatred1 patriotism1 and religious enthusiasm4 ,military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative3 the absolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and the extent of its revenues2 the relative force1 on its geographical and political position1 the character of its people1 and the nature of its government4 ,its military preparations should evidently be in proportion to its resources4 ,wealth constitutes both the apprehension and the incentive to invasion4 ,where two or more states have equal means of war1 with incentives very unequal1 an equilibrium cannot exist2 for danger and temptation are no longer opposed to each other4 ,the preparation of states may1 therefore1 be equal without being equivalent1 and the smaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of sustaining it4 ,the numerical relation between the entire population of a state1 and the armed forces which it can maintain1 must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of the people4 ,adam ,smith thinks that a country purely agricultural may1 at certain seasons1 furnish for war one-fifth1 or even in case of necessity one-fourth1 of its entire population4 ,a commercial or manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like so numerous a military force4 ,on this account small agricultural states are sometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than their more powerful neighbors4 ,during the ,seven ,years' ,war1 ,frederick supported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire ,prussian population1 and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field of battle4 ,but the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of great emergency is1 of course1 much greater than can be supported during a long war1 or as a part of a permanent military establishment4 ,montesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting1 without endangering their power1 a permanent military force of about one-hundredth part of their population4 ,this ratio differs but little from that of the present military establishments of the great ,european powers4 ,great ,britain1 with a population of about twenty-five millions1 and a general budget of #bej1jjj1jjj1 supports a military and naval force of about #aej1jjj effective and #ajj1jjj non-effective men1 #bej1jjj in all1 at an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars4 ,russia1 with a population of about seventy millions1 supports an active army of #fcb1jjj men1 with an immense reserve1 at an expense of about #fe1jjj1jjj1 out of a general budget of #ij1jjj1jjj2 that is1 the expense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as #g to #aj4 ,austria1 with a population of thirty-five millions1 has an organized peace establishment of #cgj1jjj1 7about #bej1jjj in active service17 and a reserve of #bfj1jjj1 at an expense of #cf1jjj1jjj1 out of a general budget of #ajj1jjj1jjj4 ,prussia1 with a population of about fifteen millions1 has from #ajj1jjj to #abj1jjj men in arms1 with a reserve of #bjj1jjj1 at an annual expense of more than #ah1jjj1jjj1 out of a general budget of about #ch1jjj1jjj4 ,france1 with a population of near thirty-five millions1 supports a permanent establishment of about #cej1jjj men1 at an expense of seventy or eighty millions of dollars1 out of a total budget of #bhj1jjj1jjj4 ,france has long supported a permanent military force of from one-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population1 at an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget4 ,the following table1 copied from the ,spectateur ,militaire1 shows the state of the army at six different periods between #aghh and #ahdb4 ,it omits1 of course1 the extraordinary levies of the wars of the ,revolution and of the ,empire4 ,table4 ,budget4 ,army4 ,dates4 ,population4 ,remarks4 ,of ,state4 ,of the ,army4 ,peace ,war ,estab4 ,estab4 ,livres4 ,livres4 ,men4 ,men4 #aghh #bd1jjj1jjj #ejj1jjj1jjj #ajj1jjj1jjj #ahj1jjj #cfj1jjj ,francs4 ,francs4 ,ordinance of #ahad #bh1jjj1jjj #hjj1jjj1jjj #ahj1jjj1jjj #bee1jjj #cdj1jjj #ahad ,report of #ahbc #ca1jjj1jjj #ijj1jjj1jjj #bjj1jjj1jjj #bhj1jjj #cij1jjj ,minister of ,war4 ,report of #ahcj #cb1jjj1jjj #a1jjj1jjj1jjj #bbj1jjj1jjj #cab1jjj #ejj1jjj ,minister of ,war4 #ahdj #cd1jjj1jjj #a1agj1jjj1jjj #bdb1jjj1jjj #cab 1#jjj - ,budget of #ahdj4 ,estimated #ahdb #ce1jjj1jjj #a1bjj1jjj1jjj #bhe1jjj1jjj #cgj1jjj #ebj1jjj ,expenses of #ahdb4 ,from these data we see that the great ,european powers at the present day maintain1 in time of peace1 military establishments equal to about one-hundredth part of their entire population4 ,the geographical position of a country also greatly influences the degree and character of its military preparation4 ,it may be bordered on one or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the probability of invasion2 or the whole frontier may be wide open to an attack3 the interior may be of such a nature as to furnish security to its own army1 and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupy it2 or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country4 ,it may be an island in the sea1 and consequently exposed only to maritime descents--events of rare occurrence in modern times4 ,again1 a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its security1 their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker neighbor4 ,on the other hand1 its political institutions may be such as to compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to secure themselves4 ,the republics of ,switzerland could remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies2 but revolutionary ,france brought upon herself the armies of all ,europe4 ,climate has also some influence upon military character1 but this influence is far less than that of education and discipline4 ,northern nations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates2 and yet the armies of ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,charles ,,xii41 and ,suwarrow1 have shown themselves sufficiently active and impetuous1 while the ,greeks1 ,romans1 and ,spaniards1 in the times of their glory1 were patient1 disciplined1 and indefatigable1 notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments4 ,for any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such time as they are actually required in defence1 is to waste the public money1 and endanger the public safety4 ,the closing of an avenue of approach1 the security of a single road or river1 or even the strategic movement of a small body of troops1 often effects1 in the beginning1 what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications1 and the most formidable armies4 ,had a small army in #ahab1 with a well-fortified depot on ,lake ,champlain1 penetrated into ,canada1 and cut off all reinforcements and supplies by way of ,quebec1 that country would inevitably have fallen into our possession4 ,in the winter of #ahjf-g1 ,napoleon crossed the ,vistula1 and advanced even to the walls of ,knigsberg1 with the ,austrians in his rear1 and the whole power of ,russia before him4 ,if ,austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand men from ,bohemia1 on the ,oder1 she would1 in all probability1 says the best of military judges1 ,jomini1 have struck a fatal blow to the operations of ,napoleon1 and his army must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain the ,rhine4 ,but ,austria preferred remaining neutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men4 ,she then took the offensive1 and was beaten2 whereas1 with one hundred thousand men brought into action at the favorable moment1 she might1 most probably1 have decided the fate of ,europe4 ,defensive war1 says ,napoleon1 does not preclude attack1 any more than offensive war is exclusive of defence1 for frequently the best way to counteract the enemy's operations1 and prevent his conquests1 is1 at the very outset of the war1 to invade and cripple him4 ,but this can never be attempted with raw troops1 ill supplied with the munitions of war1 and unsupported by fortifications4 ,such invasions must necessarily fail4 ,experience in the wars of the ,french revolution has demonstrated this2 and even our own short history is not without its proof4 ,in #ahab1 the conquest of ,canada was determined on some time before the declaration of war2 an undisciplined army1 without preparation or apparent plan1 was actually put in motion1 eighteen days previous to this declaration1 for the ,canadian peninsula4 ,with a disciplined army of the same numbers1 with an efficient and skilful leader1 directed against the vital point of the ,british possessions at a time when the whole military force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men1 how different had been the result6 ,while1 therefore1 the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate to its resources1 position1 and character1 they can in no case be dispensed with4 ,no matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be developed as necessity requires1 there must be some force kept in a constant state of efficiency1 in order to impart life and stability to the system4 ,the one can never properly replace the other2 for while the former constitutes the basis1 the latter must form the main body of the military edifice1 which1 by its strength and durability1 will offer shelter and protection to the nation2 or1 if the architecture and materials be defective1 crush and destroy it in its fall4 ,the permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations1 are-- #ast4 ,an army2 #b;d4 ,a navy2 #c;d4 ,fortifications4 ,the first two of these could hardly be called permanent1 if we were1 to regard their personnel2 but looking upon them as institutions or organizations1 they present all the characteristics of durability4 ,they are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes2 by the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation1 they may become overgrown and dangerous1 or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away4 ,but they will immediately spring up again in some form or other1 so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions4 ,its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's wants2 but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their character or endanger their organization4 ,a government1 says one of the best historians of the age1 which neglects its army1 under whatever pretext1 is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity1 for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country1 instead of laying the foundation for its glory4 ,one of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks1 that the history of our relations with the ,indian tribes from the beginning to the present hour1 is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in time of peace1 and that the treatment we received for a long series of years from ,european powers1 was a most humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with these means of defence4 ,twice1 says he1 we were compelled to maintain1 by open war1 our quarrel with the principal aggressors4 ,after many years of forbearance and negotiation1 our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled2 but in one of the most noted of these cases1 it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced4 ,no one acquainted with these portions of our history1 can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured1 to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force4 ,if1 said ,mr4 ,calhoun1 disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience1 we1 in peace1 neglect our military establishment1 we must1 with a powerful and skilful enemy1 be exposed to the most distressing calamities4 ,these remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military establishment1 in #ahba1 below the standard of thirteen thousand4 ,nevertheless1 the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand2 and we were soon made to feel the consequences4 ,it is stated1 in a report of high authority1 that if there had been two regiments available near ,st4 ,louis1 in #ahcb1 the war with ,black ,hawk would have been easily avoided2 and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare which overspread the ,floridas for nearly seven years would also have been avoided1 and some thirty millions have been saved the country1 if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,we may now add to these remarks1 that if our government had occupied the country between the ,nueces and the ,rio ,grande with a well-organized army of twelve thousand men1 war with ,mexico might have been avoided2 but to push forward upon ,matamoras a small force of only two thousand1 in the very face of a large ,mexican army was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us4 ,the temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful of men1 again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life4 ,we must1 in this country1 if we heed either the dictates of reason or experience1 maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval force1 capable of being greatly expanded1 in the event of danger1 by the addition of new troops4 ,much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by the addition of new forces4 ,the strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers4 ,but it must be remembered that these new elements are1 of themselves1 far inferior to the old ones in discipline1 steady courage1 and perseverance4 ,no general can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a campaign1 and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment on the field of battle4 ,the same holds true with respect to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war4 ,there is this difference1 however3 an army usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted with military life1 while a navy1 in case of sudden increase1 is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors1 who1 though unacquainted with the use of artillery1 c41 on ship-board1 are familiar with all the other duties of sea life1 and not unused to discipline4 ,moreover1 raw seamen and marines1 from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of action1 and without the possibility of escape1 fight much better than troops of the same character on land4 ,if years are requisite to make a good sailor1 surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier2 and no less skill1 practice1 and professional study are required for the proper direction of armies than for the management of fleets4 ,but some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval forces are entirely superfluous1 and that a brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced4 ,such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress1 and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples4 ,there are instances1 it is true1 where disorganized and frantic masses1 animated by patriotic enthusiasm1 have gained the most brilliant victories4 ,here1 however1 extraordinary circumstances supplied the place of order1 and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal2 but in almost every instance of this kind1 the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great1 human life being substituted for skill and order4 ,but victory1 even with such a drawback1 cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disorderly forces4 ,if the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing of navigation1 and had never been at sea1 and the engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession1 could we expect the ship to cross the ,atlantic in safety1 and reach her destined port8 ,would we trust our lives and the honor of our country to their care8 ,would we not say to them1 ,first make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your profession1 the use of the compass1 and the means of determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor8 ,war is not1 as some seem to suppose1 a mere game of chance4 ,its principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences2 and the general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules1 and possesses the means of carrying out its precepts1 may be morally certain of success4 ,history furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisciplined forces in the open field4 ,almost every page of ,napier's classic ,history of the ,peninsular ,war contains striking examples of the useless waste of human life and property by the ,spanish militia2 while1 with one quarter as many regulars1 at a small fractional part of the actual expense1 the ,french might have been expelled at the outset1 or have been driven1 at any time afterwards1 from the ,peninsula4 ,at the beginning of the ,french ,revolution the regular army was abolished1 and the citizen-soldiery1 who were established on the #adth of ,july1 #aghi1 relied on exclusively for the national defence4 ,but these three millions of national guards1 says ,jomini1 though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly1 were nevertheless useless for reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers1 and utterly incapable of defending their own firesides4 ,yet no one can question their individual bravery and patriotism2 for1 when reorganized1 disciplined1 and properly directed1 they put to flight the best troops in ,europe4 ,at the first outbreak of this revolution1 the privileged classes of other countries1 upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties1 rushed forth against the maddened hordes of ,french democracy4 ,the popular power1 springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was removed1 soon became too wild and reckless to establish itself on any sure basis1 or even to provide for its own protection4 ,if the attacks of the enervated enemies of ,france were weak1 so also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks4 ,the republican armies repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the ,duke of ,brunswick2 but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation1 system1 and skill2 enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline2 robbery produced military stores2 and the dead bodies of her citizens formed paulements against the enemy4 ,yet this was but the strength of weakness2 the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government2 and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the combined opposition of ,europe1 when the great genius of ,napoleon1 with a strong arm and iron rule1 seizing upon the scattered fragments1 and binding them together into one consolidated mass1 made ,france victorious1 and seated himself on the throne of empire4 ,no people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the ,americans during the war of our own ,revolution4 ,and yet our army received1 even at that time1 but little support from irregular and militia forces in the open field4 ,washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues1 who1 with boastful swaggers1 would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran troops of ,europe in the open field1 and who would hurry us1 without preparation1 into war with the strongest military powers of the world--so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of ,washington1 that it may be well for the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to the writings of ,washington4 ,the following brief extracts are from his letters to the ,president of ,congress1 ,december1 #aggf3 ,the saving in the article of clothing1 provisions1 and a thousand other things1 by having nothing to do with the militia1 unless in cases of extraordinary exigency1 and such as could not be expected in the common course of events1 would amply support a large army1 which1 well officered1 would be daily improving1 instead of continuing a destructive1 expensive1 and disorderly mob4 ,in my opinion1 if any dependence is placed on the militia another year1 ,congress will be deceived4 ,when danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all4 ,when it comes home to them1 the well-affected1 instead of flying to arms to defend themselves1 are busily employed in removing their families and effects2 while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission1 and spread terror and dismay all around1 to induce others to follow their example4 ,daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information4 ,short enlistments1 and a mistaken dependence upon our militia1 have been the origin of all our misfortunes1 and the great accumulation of our debt4 ,the militia come in1 you cannot tell how2 go1 you cannot tell when2 and act1 you cannot tell where2 consume your provisions1 exhaust your stores1 and leave you at last1 at a critical moment4 ,these remarks of ,washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at ,princeton1 ,savannah ,river1 ,camden1 ,guilford ,court-,house1 c41 in the war of the ,revolution2 the great cost of the war of #ahab as compared with its military results2 the refusal of the ,new ,england militia to march beyond the lines of their own states1 and of the ,new-,york militia to cross the ,niagara and secure a victory already won2 or the disgraceful flight of the ,southern militia from the field of ,bladensburg4 ,but there is another side to this picture4 ,if our militia have frequently failed to maintain their ground when drawn up in the open field1 we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of ,charleston1 ,mobile1 ,new ,orleans1 ,fort ,mc,henry1 ,stonington1 ,niagara1 ,plattsburg1 in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications4 ,these examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion1 and ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly useless4 ,in the open field militia cannot in general be manoeuvred to advantage2 whereas1 in the defence of fortified places their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them even more valuable than regulars4 ,and in reading the severe strictures of ,washington1 ,greene1 ,morgan1 and others1 upon our militia1 it must be remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important works of defence2 and the experience of all other nations1 as well as our own1 has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope1 in the open field1 with one subordinate and disciplined4 ,here science must determine the contest4 ,habits of strict obedience1 and of simultaneous and united action1 are indispensable to carry out what the higher principles of the military profession require4 ,new and undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions1 and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army1 and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves4 ,but1 when placed behind a breastwork1 they even overrate their security4 ,they can then coolly look upon the approaching columns1 and1 unmoved by glittering armor and bristling bayonets1 will exert all their skill in the use of their weapons4 ,the superior accuracy of aim which the ,american has obtained by practice from his early youth1 has enabled our militia to gain1 under the protection of military works1 victories as brilliant as the most veteran troops4 ,the moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a parapet1 is at least equal to that exerted in the open field1 where movements generally determine the victory4 ,to watch the approach of an enemy1 to see him move up and display his massive columns1 his long array of military equipments1 his fascines and scaling-ladders1 his instruments of attack1 and the professional skill with which he wields them1 to hear the thunder of his batteries1 spreading death all around1 and to repel1 hand to hand1 those tremendous assaults1 which stand out in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare1 requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits in the pitched battle4 ,but we must not forget that to call this force into the open field1--to take the mechanic from his shop1 the merchant from his counter1 the farmer from his plough1--will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life4 ,the lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones2 militia1 being unaccustomed to exposure1 and unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regularity1 contract diseases which occasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality4 ,there is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia forces4 ,the cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six months1 in this country1 has been estimated1 from data in the ,war-office1 at a hundred and fifty dollars per man2 while the cost of a militia force1 under the same circumstances1 making allowance for the difference in the expenses from sickness1 waste of camp-furniture1 equipments1 c41 will be two hundred and fifty dollars per man4 ,but in short campaigns1 and in irregular warfare1 like the expedition against ,black ,hawk and his ,indians in the ,northwest1 and during the hostilities in ,florida1 the expenses of the militia1 says ,mr4 ,secretary ,spencer1 in a report to congress in #ahdb1 invariably exceed those of regulars by at least three hundred per cent4 ,it is further stated that fifty-five thousand militia were called into service during the ,black ,hawk and ,florida wars1 and that thirty millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts6 ,when it is remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men1 it will not be difficult to perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive4 ,large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service4 ,again1 during our late war with ,great ,britain1 of less than three years' duration1 two hundred and eighty thousand muskets were lost1--the average cost of which is stated at twelve dollars1--making an aggregate loss1 in muskets alone1 of three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars1 during a service of about two years and a half2--resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced forces4 ,facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia4 ,general ,knox1 when ,secretary of ,war1 ,general ,harrison while in the senate1 and ,mr4 ,poinsett in #ahda1 each furnished plans for effecting this purpose1 but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect4 ,permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of national defence4 ,they are passive in their nature1 yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy1 and through these two contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign4 ,when once constructed they require but very little expenditure for their support4 ,in time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life4 ,of themselves they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals1 or dangerous to public liberty2 but as the means of preserving peace1 and as obstacles to an invader1 their influence and power are immense4 ,while contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment1 by furnishing drill-grounds1 parades1 quarters1 c42 and to its efficiency still more1 by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers2 they also serve as safe dpts of arms and the immense quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare4 ,these munitions usually require much time1 skill1 and expense in their construction1 and it is of vast importance that they should be preserved with the utmost care4 ,maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction4 ,here an enemy can approach by stealth1 striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual resistance can be organized4 ,but in addition to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the highest military value1 they also serve to protect the merchant shipping1 and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial people always collect at these points4 ,they furnish safe retreats1 and the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle1 or by storms1 and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea1 or the threats of hostile fleets4 ,moreover1 they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping2 and if he attempt a descent1 their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors1 and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position4 ,the three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned1 are1 of course1 intended to accomplish the same general object2 but each has its distinct and proper sphere of action1 and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the others4 ,any undue increase of one1 at the expense of the other two1 must necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength4 ,we must not infer1 however1 that all must be maintained upon the same footing4 ,the position of the country and the character of the people must determine this4 ,england1 from her insular position and the extent of her commerce1 must maintain a large navy2 a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions4 ,her men-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels1 and transport her troops in safety through all seas1 and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial territory4 ,the military forces of the ,british empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men1 and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war1#ac carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men4 ,france has less commerce1 and but few colonial possessions4 ,she has a great extent of sea-coast1 but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents2 her only accessible points are on the land frontiers4 ,her army and navy1 therefore1 constitute her principal means of defence4 ,her army numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men1 and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels1#ac carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men4 ,russia1 ,austria1 ,prussia1 ,sweden1 and other continental powers1 have but little commerce to be protected1 while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks3 their fortifications and armies1 therefore1 constitute their principal means of defence4 ,but for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their powerful maritime neighbor1 ,russia and ,austria support naval establishments of a limited extent4 ,russia has1 in all1 some one hundred and eighty vessels of war1 and ,austria not quite half that number4#ac ,footnote #ac3 ,these numbers include all vessels of war1 whether in commission1 building1 or in ordinary4 ,the ,united ,states possess no colonies2 but they have a sea-coast of more than three thousand miles1 with numerous bays1 estuaries1 and navigable rivers1 which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks4 ,the northern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent1 and in the west our territory borders upon the ,british and ,mexican possessions for many thousand miles more4 ,within these limits there are numerous tribes of ,indians1 who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at peace among themselves as well as with us4 ,our authorized military establishment amounts to #g1eij men1 and our naval establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels of all classes1 carrying #b1cde guns1 and #h1gbd men4#ad ,this is certainly a very small military and naval force for the defence of so extended and populous a country1 especially one whose political institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the distrust and jealousy of most other nations4 ,footnote #ad3 ,since these pages were put in the hands of the printer1 the above numbers have been nearly doubled1 this increase having been made with special reference to the present war with ,mexico4 ,the fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers will be discussed hereafter4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,jomini's work on the ,military ,art contains many valuable remarks on this subject of ,military ,polity3 also the writings of ,clausewitz1 ,dupin1 ,lloyd1 ,chambray1 ,tranchant de ,laverne1 and ,rudtorfer4 ,several of these questions are also discussed in ,rocquancourt1 ,carion-,nisas1 ,de ,vernon1 and other writers on military history4 ,the several ,european ,annuaires ,militaires1 or ,army ,registers1 and the ,french and ,german military periodicals1 contain much valuable matter connected with military statistics4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,sea-,,coast ,,defences4 ,the principal attacks which we have had to sustain1 either as colonies or states1 from civilized foes1 have come from ,canada4 ,as colonies we were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the ,french possessions4 ,in the war of the ,revolution1 it being one of national emancipation1 the military operations were more general throughout the several states2 but in the war of #ahab the attacks were confined to the northern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast4 ,in these two contests with ,great ,britain1 ,boston1 ,new ,york1 ,philadelphia1 ,baltimore1 ,washington1 ,charleston1 ,savannah1 ,mobile1 and ,new ,orleans1 being within reach of the ,british naval power1 and offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty1 have each been subjected to powerful assaults4 ,similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with ,england4 ,an attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on ,canada or a servile insurrection in the southern states4 ,the former project1 in a military point of view1 offers the greatest advantages1 but most probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion1 if nothing more4 ,but for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property1 our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded4 ,this mode of warfare1 barbarous though it be1 will certainly attend a conflict with any great maritime power4 ,how can we best prepare in time of peace to repel these attacks8 ,immediately after the war of #ahab a joint commission of our most distinguished military and naval officers was formed1 to devise a system of defensive works1 to be erected in time of peace for the security of the most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast4 ,it may be well here to point out1 in very general terms1 the positions and character of these works1 mentioning only such as have been completed1 or are now in course of construction1 and such as are intended to be built as soon as ,congress shall grant the requisite funds4 ,there are other works projected for some future period1 but as they do not belong to the class required for immediate1 use1 they will not be referred to4 ,,maine4 ,beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast1 we have1 for ,eastport and ,wiscasset1 projected works estimated to carry about fifty guns4 ,nothing has yet been done to these works4 ,next ,portland1 with works carrying about forty or fifty guns1 and ,fort ,penobscot and batteries1 carrying about one hundred and fifty guns4 ,these are only partly built4 ,,new ,,hampshire4 ,defences of ,portsmouth and the vicinity1 about two hundred guns4 ,these works are also only partly built4 ,,massachusetts4 ,projected works east of ,boston1 carrying about sixty guns4 ,these are not yet commenced4 ,works for defence of ,boston ,harbor carry about five hundred guns4 ,these are nearly three-quarters completed4 ,those of ,new ,bedford harbor carry fifty guns3 not yet begun4 ,,rhode ,,island4 ,newport harbor1--works carry about five hundred guns1 nearly completed4 ,,connecticut4 ,new ,london harbor1 ,new ,haven1 and the ,connecticut river4 ,the first of these nearly completed2 the two latter not yet begun4 ,,new ,,york4 ,the works projected for the defence of ,new ,york harbor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns4 ,these works are not yet one-half constructed4 ,,pennsylvania4 ,the works projected for the defence of the ,delaware ,bay and ,philadelphia will carry about one hundred and fifty guns4 ,they are not one-quarter built4 ,,maryland ,,and ,,virginia4 ,baltimore and ,annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred and fifty guns4 ,the works for the ,chesapeake ,bay will carry about six hundred guns2 and those for the ,potomac river about eighty guns4 ,these are more than one-half completed4 ,,north ,,carolina4 ,the works at ,beaufort and ,smithville carry about one hundred and fifty guns4 ,they are essentially completed4 ,,south ,,carolina4 ,the works for the defence of ,charleston carry some two hundred guns4 ,they are one-half constructed4 ,,georgia4 ,the defences of ,savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly three-quarters finished4 ,,florida4 ,the works projected for the defence of ,st4 ,augustine1 ,key ,west1 ,tortugas1 and ,pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns4 ,those at ,st4 ,augustine and ,pensacola are essentially completed1 but those at ,key ,west and ,tortugas are barely begun4 ,,alabama4 ,the works for the defence of ,mobile will carry about one hundred and sixty guns4 ,these are nearly constructed4 ,,louisiana4 ,the works for the defence of ,new ,orleans will carry some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns2 they are nearly completed4 ,the works north of the ,chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per gun2 those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun4 ,this difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which the fortifications are built1 and in part to the high prices paid in the south for materials and workmanship4 99 99 99 99 99 ,having pointed out the character and condition of our system of sea-coast defences1 let us briefly examine how far these works may be relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent4 ,to come to a proper conclusion on this subject1 let us first examine the three or four great maritime descents attempted by the ,english during the wars of the ,french ,revolution2 a period at which the great naval superiority of ,england over other nations1 gave her the title of mistress of the seas4 ,let us notice what have been the results of the several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions1 and the means by which such attacks have been repelled4 ,in #agie1 a maritime expedition was fitted out against ,quiberon1 at an expense of eight millions of dollars4 ,this port of the ,french coast had then a naval defence of near thirty sail1 carrying about sixteen hundred guns4 ,lord ,bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line1 five frigates1 and some smaller vessels1 about fifteen hundred guns in all1 captured a portion of the fleet1 and forced the remainder to take shelter under the guns of the fortifications of ,l',orient4 ,the ,french naval defence being destroyed1 the ,british now entered ,quiberon without opposition4 ,this bay is said by ,brenton1 in his ,british ,naval ,history1 to be the finest on the coast of ,france1 or perhaps in the world1 for landing an army4 ,besides these natural advantages in favor of the ,english1 the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open insurrection1 ready to receive the invaders with open arms4 ,a body of ten thousand troops were landed1 and clothing1 arms1 c41 furnished to as many more royalist troops2 but the combined forces failed in their attack upon ,st4 ,barbe1 and ,general ,hoche1 from his intrenchments1 with seven thousand men1 held in check a body of eighteen thousand1 penned up1 without defences1 in the narrow peninsula4 ,reinforced by a new debarkation1 the allies again attempted to advance1 but were soon defeated1 and ultimately almost entirely destroyed4 ,in #agii1 the ,english and ,russians made a descent upon ,holland with fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates1 carrying about eleven hundred guns and a great number of transports1 with an army of thirty-six thousand men4 ,the ,dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships of the line1 three fifty-four gun ships1 eight forty-eight gun ships and eight smaller frigates1 carrying in all about twelve hundred guns2 but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence1 and was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag4 ,the defensive army was at first only twelve thousand1 but the ,republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two thousand1 and finally to twenty-eight thousand men4 ,but notwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority1 and the co-operation of the ,orange party in assisting the landing of their troops1 the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place2 and after a loss of six thousand men1 were compelled to capitulate4 ,such1 says ,alison1 was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the ,british harbors during the war4 ,in #ahja1 ,nelson1 with three ships of the line1 two frigates1 and thirty-five smaller vessels1 made a desperate attack upon the harbor of ,boulogne1 but was repulsed with severe loss4 ,passing over some unimportant attacks1 we come to the descent upon the ,scheldt1 or as it is commonly called1 the ,walcheren expedition1 in #ahji4 ,this expedition1 though a failure1 has often been referred to as proving the expediency of maritime descents4 ,the following is a brief narrative of this expedition3-- ,napoleon had projected vast fortifications1 dock-yards1 and naval arsenals at ,flushing and ,antwerp for the protection of a maritime force in the ,scheldt4 ,but no sooner was the execution of this project begun1 than the ,english fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of the ,scheldt1 and capture or destroy the naval force4 ,flushing1 at the mouth of the river1 was but ill-secured1 and ,antwerp1 some sixty or seventy miles further up the river1 was entirely defenceless2 the rampart was unarmed with cannon1 dilapidated1 and tottering1 and its garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits4 ,napoleon's regular army was employed on the ,danube and in the ,peninsula4 ,the ,british attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line1 twenty-three frigates1 thirty-three sloops of war1 twenty-eight gun1 mortar1 and bomb vessels1 thirty-six smaller vessels1 eighty-two gunboats1 innumerable transports1 with over forty thousand troops1 and an immense artillery train2 making in all1 says the ,english historian1 an hundred thousand combatants4 ,a landing was made upon the island of ,walcheren1 and siege laid to ,flushing1 which place was not reduced till eighteen days after the landing2 the attack upon the water was made by seven or eight ships of the line1 and a large flotilla of bomb vessels1 but produced no effect4 ,the channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be defended by the works of ,flushing1 and the main portion of the fleet passed out of reach of the guns1 and ascended the ,scheldt part way up to ,antwerp4 ,but in the mean time1 the fortifications of that place had been repaired1 and1 after a fruitless operation of a whole month in the river1 the ,english were gradually forced to retreat to ,walcheren1 and finally to evacuate their entire conquest4 ,the cost of the expedition was immense1 both in treasure and in life4 ,it was certainly very poorly managed4 ,but we cannot help noticing the superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents4 ,they did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised4 ,the works of ,flushing were never intended to close up the ,scheldt1 and of course could not intercept the passage of shipping2 but they were not reduced by the ,english naval force1 as has sometimes been alleged4 ,col4 ,mitchel1 of the ,english service1 says that the fleet kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries1 that the ,french officers who had been present at ,austerlitz and ,jena declared that the cannonade in these battles had been a mere jeu d'enfans in comparison4 ,yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire1 so formidable1 to judge by the sound alone8 ,the writer can answer the question with some accuracy1 for he went along the entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation1 and found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence1 and only one solitary gun dismounted1 evidently by the bursting of a shell1 and which could not1 of course1 have been thrown from the line of battle ships1 but must have been thrown from the land batteries4#af ,footnote #af3 ,the batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars4 ,but it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast are almost always unsuccessful1 nevertheless a direct naval attack upon a single fortified position will be attended with more favorable results2 and that our seaport towns1 however fortified1 will be exposed to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets4 ,in other words1 that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at least an equal chance of success4 ,let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength4 ,the fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair2 its guns in a position to be used with effect2 its garrison skilful and efficient2 its commander capable and brave4 ,the ship is of the very best character1 and in perfect order2 the crew disciplined and courageous2 its commander skilful and adroit2 the wind1 and tide1 and sea--all as could be desired4#ag ,the numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than requisite1 with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the slain4 ,the issue of this contest1 unless attended with extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances1 would be a fair test of their relative strength4 ,footnote #ag3 ,these conditions for a battery are easily satisfied1 but for the ship1 are partly dependent on the elements1 and seldom to be wholly attained4 ,what result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending forces8 ,the ship1 under the circumstances we have supposed1 can choose her point of attack1 selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable2 but she herself is everywhere vulnerable2 her men and guns are much concentrated1 and consequently much exposed4 ,but in the fort the guns and men are more distributed1 a fort with an interior area of several acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun ship4 ,all parts of the vessel are liable to injury2 while the fort offers but a small mark1--the opening of the embrasures1 a small part of the carriage1 and now and then a head or arm raised above the parapet1--the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than twenty to one4 ,in the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck1 and the balls go at random2 in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable platform1 and the balls reach their object with unerring aim4 ,there is always more or less motion in the water1 so that the ship's guns1 though accurately pointed at one moment1 at the next will be thrown entirely away from the object1 even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise noticed2 whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are pointed2 and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few inches the spot in which the shot is received4 ,in the fort the men and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth2 in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks1 whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot4 ,the fort is incombustible2 while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary projectiles4 ,the ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points4 ,by losing her rudder1 or portions of her rigging1 or of her spars1 she may become unmanageable1 and unable to use her strength2 she may receive shots under water1 and be liable to sink2 she may receive hot shot1 and be set on fire3 these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers2 while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above--namely1 the risk that the gun1 the carriage1 or the men may be struck4 ,the opinions of military writers1 and the facts of history1 fully accord with these deductions of theory4 ,some few individuals mistaking1 or misstating1 the facts of a few recent trials1 assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence1 that a floating force is now abundantly able to cope1 upon equal terms1 with a land battery4 ,ignorant and superficial persons1 hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a naval force1 and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case1 have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science4 ,this conclusion1 however groundless and absurd1 has received credit merely from its novelty4 ,let us examine the several trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within the last fifty years1 and see what have been the results4 ,in #agib a considerable ,french squadron attacked ,cagliari1 whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak1 as scarcely to deserve the name of defences4 ,nevertheless1 the ,french fleet1 after a bombardment of three days1 was most signally defeated and obliged to retire4 ,in #agid two ,british ships1 the ,fortitude of seventy-four1 and the ,juno frigate of thirty-two guns1 attacked a small town in the bay of ,martello1 ,corsica1 which was armed with one gun in barbette1 and a garrison of thirty men4 ,after a bombardment of two and a half hours1 these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of life4 ,the little tower had received no injury1 and its garrison were unharmed4 ,here were one hundred and six guns afloat against one on shore2 and yet the latter was successful4 ,in #agig ,nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of ,santa ,crux1 in ,teneriffe1 with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns4 ,but notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers1 skill1 and bravery1 he was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men1 while the garrison received little or no damage4 ,a single ball from the land battery1 striking the side of one of his vessels1 instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and marines6 ,in #agih1 a ,french flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats1 manned with near seven thousand men1 attacked a little ,english redoubt on the island of ,marcou1 which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders1 two six-pounders1 four four-pounders1 and two carronades1 and garrisoned with two hundred and fifty men4 ,notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers1 the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and gunboats1 captured another1 and forced the remainder to retreat with great loss2 while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded4 ,in #ahja1 the ,french1 with three frigates and six thousand men1 attacked the poorly-constructed works of ,porto ,ferrairo1 whose defensive force was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred ,corsicans1 ,tuscans1 and ,english4 ,here the attacking force was four times as great as that of the garrison2 nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several bombardments and a siege of five months4 ,in ,july of the same year1 #ahja1 ,admiral ,saumarez1 with an ,english fleet of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels1 carrying in all five hundred and two guns1 attacked the ,spanish and ,french defences of ,algesiras4 ,supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be equal1 gun for gun1 7which is certainly a very fair estimate for the attacking force1 considering the circumstances of the case17 we have a ,french land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an ,english floating force of one hundred and ninety-six guns4 ,notwithstanding this inequality of nearly seventeen to one1 the little battery compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great loss4 ,shortly after this1 the ,french and ,spanish fleets attacked the same ,english squadron with a force of nearly three to one1 but met with a most signal defeat2 whereas with a land-battery of only one to seventeen1 the same party had been victorious4 ,what proof can be more decisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat6 ,in #ahjc the ,english garrison of ,diamond ,rock1 near ,port ,royal ,bay1 with only one hundred men and some fifteen guns1 repelled a ,french squadron of two seventy-four-gun ships1 a frigate1 and a brig1 assisted by a land attack of two hundred troops4 ,there was not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt1 while the ,french lost fifty men6 ,the place was afterwards reduced by famine4 ,in #ahjf a ,french battery on ,cape ,licosa1 of only two guns and a garrison of twenty-five men1 resisted the attacks of a ,british eighty-gun ship and two frigates4 ,the carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second shot1 so that1 in fact1 only one of them was available during the action4 ,here was a single piece of ordnance and a garrison of twenty-five men1 opposed to a naval force of over one hundred and fifty guns and about thirteen hundred men4 ,and what effects were produced by this strange combat8 ,the attacking force lost thirty-seven men killed and wounded1 the eighty-gun ship was much disabled1 while the fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed6 ,what could not be effected by force was afterwards obtained by negotiation4 ,in #ahjh a ,french land-battery of only three guns1 near ,fort ,trinidad1 drove off an ,english seventy-four-gun ship1 and a bomb-vessel4 ,in #ahac ,leghorn1 whose defences were of a very mediocre character1 and whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak1 was attacked by an ,english squadron of six ships1 carrying over three hundred guns1 and a land force of one thousand troops4 ,the whole attempt was a perfect failure4 ,in #ahad1 when the ,english advanced against ,antwerp1 says ,colonel ,mitchell1 an ,english historian1 ,fort ,frederick1 a small work of only two guns1 was established in a bend of the ,polder ,dyke1 at some distance below ,lillo4 ,the armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a half inch howitzer4 ,from this post the ,french determined to dislodge the ,english1 and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near the ,flanders shore1 about six hundred yards from the ,british battery4 ,by her position she was secured from the fire of the eighteen-pounder1 and exposed to that of the howitzer only4 ,as soon as every thing was made tight her broadside was opened2 and if noise and smoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war1 as so many of the moderns seem to think1 the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful1 for the thunder of the ,french artillery actually made the earth to shake again2 but though the earth shook1 the single ,british howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced2 and though the artillery-men could not1 perfectly exposed as they were1 stand to their gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around1 yet no sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their post1 ready to return at least one shot for eighty4 ,this extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon1 when the ,french ship1 having had forty-one men killed and wounded1 her commander being in the list of the latter1 and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging1 returned to ,antwerp without effecting any thing whatever4 ,the howitzer was not dismounted1 the fort was not injured1--there being in fact nothing to injure1--and the ,british had only one man killed and two wounded4 ,it is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the ,french ,revolution2 the whole history of these wars is one continued proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier defence4 ,the sea-coast of ,france is almost within stone's throw#ah of the principal ,british naval depots2 here were large towns and harbors1 filled with the rich commerce of the world1 offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty4 ,the ,french navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence2 while ,england supported a maritime force at an annual expense of near ninety millions of dollars4 ,her largest fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports1 and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping4 ,at this period1 says one of her naval historians1 the naval force of ,britain1 so multiplied and so expert from long practice1 had acquired an intimate knowledge of their 7the ,french7 harbors1 their bays and creeks2 her officers knew the depth of water1 and the resistance likely to be met with in every situation4 ,on the other hand1 these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars1 being left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia4 ,and yet1 notwithstanding all this1 they escaped unharmed during the entire contest4 ,they were frequently attacked1 and in some instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent lodgment2 but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed1 and no permanent hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of ,france or her allies4 ,this certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the ,british navy1 as the battles of ,aboukir and ,trafalgar1 and the almost total annihilation of the ,french marine1 have but too plainly proven4 ,why then did these places1 escape8 ,we know of no other reason1 than that they were fortified2 and that the ,french knew how to defend their fortifications4 ,the ,british maritime expeditions to ,quiberon1 ,holland1 ,boulogne1 the ,scheldt1 ,constantinople1 ,buenos ,ayres1 c41 sufficiently prove the ill-success1 and the waste of life and treasure with which they must always be attended4 ,but when her naval power was applied to the destruction of the enemy's marine1 and in transporting her land forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies1 in ,portugal and ,belgium1 the fall of ,napoleon crowned the glory of their achievements4 ,footnote #ah3 ,only eighteen and a half miles across the ,channel at the narrowest place4 ,let us now examine the several ,british naval attacks on our own forts1 in the wars of the ,revolution and of #ahab4 ,in #aggf ,sir ,peter ,parker1 with a ,british fleet of nine vessels1 carrying about two hundred and seventy#ai guns1 attacked ,fort ,moultrie1 in ,charleston harbor1 which was then armed with only twenty-six guns1 and garrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few militia4 ,in this contest the ,british were entirely defeated1 and lost1 in killed and wounded1 two hundred and five men1 while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort4 ,of this trial of strength1 which was certainly a fair one1 ,cooper in his ,naval ,history1 says3--,it goes fully to prove the important military position that ships cannot withstand forts1 when the latter are properly armed1 constructed1 and garrisoned4 ,general ,moultrie says only thirty rounds from the battery were fired1 and was of opinion that the want of powder alone prevented the ,americans from destroying the men-of-war4 ,footnote #ai3 ,these vessels rated two hundred and fifty-four guns1 but the number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy4 ,in #ahad a ,british fleet of four vessels1 carrying ninety-two guns1 attacked ,fort ,boyer1 a small redoubt1 located on a point of land commanding the passage from the ,gulf into the bay of ,mobile4 ,this redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants1 officers included2 and its armament was but twenty small pieces of cannon1 some of which were almost entirely useless1 and most of them poorly mounted in batteries hastily thrown up1 and leaving the gunners uncovered from the knee upward1 while the enemy's land force1 acting in concert with the ships1 consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery of two guns1 and seven hundred and thirty marines1 ,indians1 and negroes4 ,his ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all4 ,this immense disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the ,british military and naval commanders the slightest apprehension that four ,british ships1 carrying ninety-two guns1 and a land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants1 could fail in reducing a small work mounting only twenty short carronades1 and defended by a little more than a hundred men1 unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot1 or casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells4 ,nevertheless1 the enemy was completely repulsed2 one of his largest ships was entirely destroyed1 and #he men were killed and wounded on board the other2 while our loss was only eight or nine4 ,here a naval force of five to one was repelled by the land-battery4 ,again1 in #ahad1 a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two eighteen-pounder guns at ,stonington1 repelled a ,british fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns4 ,during the engagement the ,americans exhausted their ammunition1 and spiked their eighteen-pounders1 and only one of them was afterwards used4 ,two of the enemy's ships1 carrying one hundred and twelve guns1 were engaged during the whole time of attack1 and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of the land-battery4 ,they were entirely too far off for the four-pounder gun to be of any use4 ,supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole action1 and also all the guns of the fleet1 one eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to sixty-seven guns afloat1 for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw4 ,the ,british loss was twenty killed1 and more than fifty wounded4 ,ours was only two killed and six wounded4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,perkins says two killed and six wounded4 ,holmes says six wounded1 but makes no mention of any killed4 ,the fleet sent to the attack of ,baltimore1 in #ahad1 consisted of forty sail1 the largest of which were ships of the line1 carrying an army of over six thousand combatants4 ,the troops were landed at ,north ,point1 while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of ,fort ,mc,henry1 and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours4 ,during this attack1 the enemy threw fifteen hundred shells1 four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort1 but without making any impression on either the strength of the work or the garrison1 and the ,british were compelled to retire with much loss4 ,in #ahae1 a squadron of ,british ships1 stationed off the mouths of the ,mississippi1 for the purpose of a blockade1 ascended the river as high as ,fort ,st4 ,philip1 which is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all4 ,a heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and nights1 but making no impression either on the fort or garrison1 they retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river4 ,there is but a single instance in the war of #ahab1 where the enemy's vessels succeeded in reducing a fort2 and this has sometimes been alluded to1 by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case1 as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks4 ,even if it were a case of decided failure1 would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side8 ,we allude to the reduction of the so-called ,fort ,washington by the ,british fleet that ascended the ,potomac in #ahad1 to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation4 ,fort ,washington was a very small and inefficient work1 incorrectly planned by an incompetent ,french engineer2 only a small part of the fort was then built1 and it has not yet been completed4 ,the portion constructed was never1 until very recently1 properly prepared for receiving its armament1 and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time4 ,but no defence whatever was made4 ,capt4 ,gordon1 with a squadron of eight sail1 carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns1 under orders to ascend the river as high as ,fort ,washington1 and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment1 approached that fort1 and1 upon firing a single shell1 which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison1 the latter deserted the works1 and rapidly retreated4 ,the commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice4 ,an ,english naval officer1 who was one of the expedition1 in speaking of the retreat of the garrison1 says3 ,we were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step4 ,the position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men1 and more1 had it been properly defended2 besides1 an unfavorable wind and many other chances were in their favor1 c4 ,the fleet ascended the river to ,alexandria1 but learning soon afterwards that batteries were preparing at ,white ,house and ,indian ,head to cut off its retreat1 it retired1 in much haste1 but not without injury4 ,some have also pretended to find in modern ,european history a few examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and forts4 ,overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples1 where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets1 they would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have gained 7as was at first supposed7 a somewhat doubtful victory over forts4 ,but a careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases1 will show that even these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat4 ,the only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any note1 that ships have gained advantage1 are those of the attack on ,copenhagen in #ahja2 the passage of the ,dardanelles1 in #ahjg2 the attack on ,algiers1 in #ahaf2 the attack on ,san ,juan d',ulloa1 in #ahch2 and the attack on ,st4 ,jean d',acre1 in #ahdj4 ,let us examine these examples a little in detail3-- ,copenhagen4--,the ,british fleet sent to attack ,copenhagen1 in #ahja1 consisted of fifty-two sail1 eighteen of them being line-of-battle ships1 four frigates1 c4 ,they sailed from ,yarmouth roads on the #abth of ,march1 passed the ,sound on the #cjth1 and attacked and defeated the ,danish line on the #b;d of ,april4 ,the ,sound between ,cronenberg and the ,swedish coast is about two and a half miles wide1 7vide ,fig4 #cd47 ,the batteries of ,cronenberg and ,elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars2 but the ,swedish battery had been much neglected1 and then mounted only six guns4 ,nevertheless1 the ,british admiral1 to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel1 defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships1 preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the ,belt2 but after a few of his light vessels1 acting as scouts1 had run on rocks1 he returned to the ,sound4 ,he then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage1 threatening1 however1 a declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon4 ,it must be remembered that at this time ,england was at peace with both ,denmark and ,sweden1 and that no just cause of war existed4 ,hence1 the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as ,england1 by commencing hostilities1 when only a free passage was asked4 ,the ,danish commander replied1 that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post1 whose object and destination were unknown to him4 ,he fired upon them1 as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations1 and not as an act of hostility against the ,english4 ,the ,swedes1 on the contrary1 remained neutral1 and allowed the ,british vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them4 ,seeing this friendly disposition of the ,swedes1 the fleet neared their coast1 and passed out of the reach of the ,danish batteries1 which opened a fire of balls and shells2 but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet1 which escaped without the loss of a single man4 ,the ,swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been impossible to construct batteries at that season1 and that1 even had it been possible1 ,denmark would not have consented to their doing so1 for fear that ,sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich duties levied by ,denmark on all ships passing the strait4 ,there may have been some grounds for the last excuse2 but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with ,england4 ,napoleon says that1 even at that season1 a few days would have been sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery1 and that ,sweden had much more time than was requisite4 ,and with a hundred guns on each side of the channel1 served with skill and energy1 the fleet must necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack ,copenhagen4 ,on this passage1 we remark3-- #ast4 ,the whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the ,sound amounted to only one hundred and six1 while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns2 and yet1 with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one1 the ,british admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the ,belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries4 #b;d4 ,by negotiations1 and threatening the vengeance of ,england1 he persuaded the small ,swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore1 out of reach of ,cronenberg and ,elsinore4 #c;d4 ,it is the opinion of ,napoleon and the best ,english writers1 that if the ,swedish battery had been put in order1 and acted in concert with the ,danish works1 they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt on ,copenhagen4 ,we now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence of ,copenhagen itself4 ,the only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy shipping is the northern1 where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable distance1 leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city1 7,fig4 #ce7 ,on the most advanced part of this shoal are the ,crown-batteries1 carrying in all eighty-eight guns4#ba ,the entrance into the ,baltic between ,copenhagen and ,salthorn1 is divided into two channels by a bank1 called the ,middle ,ground1 which is situated directly opposite ,copenhagen4 ,to defend the entrance on the left of the ,crown-batteries1 they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line1 one frigate1 and two sloops1 carrying in all three hundred and fifty-eight guns4 ,to secure the port and city from bombardment from the ,king's ,channel1 7that between the ,middle ,ground and town17 a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the shoal1 and manned principally by volunteers4 ,this line consisted of old hulls of vessels1 block-ships1 prames1 rafts1 c41 carrying in all six hundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats1 7the purpose for which it was intended17 but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of war2 but these the ,danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation4 ,these difficulties were certainly very great2 and ,nelson said1 beforehand1 that the wind which might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship4 ,had the ,danes supposed it possible for ,nelson to approach with his large vessels1 the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer ,copenhagen1 the right supported by batteries raised on the isle of ,amack4 ,in that case1 says ,napoleon1 it is probable that ,nelson would have failed in his attack2 for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon4 ,as it was1 the line was too extended for strength1 and its right too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of ,amack4 ,a part of the fleet remained as a reserve1 under ,admiral ,parker1 while the others1 under ,nelson1 advanced to the ,king's ,channel4 ,this attacking force consisted of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels1 carrying in all eleven hundred guns1 7without including those in the six gun-brigs1 whose armament is not given47 ,one of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into action1 and two others grounded2 but1 ,lord ,nelson says1 although not in the situation assigned them1 yet they were so placed as to be of great service4 ,this force was concentrated upon a part of the ,danish line of floating defences1 the whole of which was not only inferior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns1 but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor1 and without a chance of escape4 ,the result was what might have been expected4 ,every vessel of the right and centre of this outer ,danish line was taken or destroyed1 except one or two small ones1 which cut and run under protection of the fortifications4 ,the left of the line1 being supported by the ,crown-battery1 remained unbroken4 ,a division of frigates1 in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries1 ventured to engage them1 but it suffered considerable loss1 and1 in spite of all its efforts1 was obliged to relinquish this enterprise1 and sheer off4 ,footnote #ba3 ,some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy2 but the ,english writers generally say eighty-eight4 ,a few1 7apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory17 make this number still greater4 ,the ,danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to the city1 were not attacked1 and took no material part in the contest4 ,they are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the ,british ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force4 ,nor was any use made of the guns on shore1 for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range4 ,the ,crown-battery was behind the ,danish line1 and mainly masked by it4 ,a part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line1 and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates1 which it did most effectually4 ,but we now come to a new feature in this battle4 ,as the ,danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the ,english1 the range of the ,crown-battery enlarged1 and its power was felt4 ,nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed1 and1 being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat1 made up his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement4 ,to retreat1 however1 from his present position1 was exceedingly difficult and dangerous4 ,he therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice1 and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent3 ,lord ,nelson has directions to spare ,denmark when no longer resisting2 but if the firing is continued on the part of ,denmark1 ,lord ,nelson must be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken1 without the power to save the brave ,danes who have defended them4 ,this produced an armistice1 and hostilities had hardly ceased1 when three of the ,english ships1 including that in which ,nelson himself was1 struck upon the bank4 ,they were in the jaws of destruction1 and would never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire4 ,they therefore owed their safety to this armistice4 ,a convention was soon signed1 by which every thing was left in statu quo1 and the fleet of ,admiral ,parker allowed to proceed into the ,baltic4 ,edward ,baines1 the able ,english historian of the wars of the ,french ,revolution1 in speaking of ,nelson's request for an armistice1 says3 ,this letter1 which exhibited a happy union of policy and courage1 was written at a moment when ,lord ,nelson perceived that1 in consequence of the unfavorable state of the wind1 the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise2 that the principal batteries of the enemy1 and the ships at the mouth of the harbor1 were yet untouched2 that two of his own division had grounded1 and others were likely to share the same fate4 ,campbell says these batteries and ships were still unconquered4 ,two of his ,nelson's own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire2 others1 if the battle continued1 might be exposed to a similar fate1 while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries4 ,with respect to the fortifications of the town1 a chronicler of the times says they were of no service while the action lasted4 ,they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships1 but it was at the same time the parley appeared4 ,the ,danish commander1 speaking of the general contest between the two lines1 says3 ,the ,crown-battery did not come at all into action4 ,an ,english writer says distinctly3 ,the works 7fortifications7 of ,copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the close of the action4 ,colonel ,mitchel1 the ,english historian1 says3 ,lord ,nelson never fired a shot at the town or fortifications of ,copenhagen2 he destroyed a line of block-ships1 prames1 and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the town2 and the ,crown ,prince1 seeing his capital exposed1 was willing to finish by armistice a war1 the object of which was neither very popular nor well understood4 ,what the result of the action between ,copenhagen and the ,british fleet might ultimately have been1 is therefore altogether uncertain4 ,,the ,,bombardment ,,of ,,copenhagen ,,by ,,nelson1 as it is generally styled1 is therefore1 like most other oracular phrases of the day1 a mere combination of words1 without the slightest meaning4 ,the ,british lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men2 and the loss of the ,danes1 according to their own account1 which is confirmed by the ,french1 was but very little higher4 ,the ,english1 however1 say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred2 but let the loss be what it may1 it was almost exclusively confined to the floating defences1 and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat4 ,the facts and testimony we have adduced1 prove incontestably-- #ast4 ,that of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent by the ,english to the attack upon ,copenhagen1 two ships carrying one hundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked2 seven ships of the line1 and thirty-six smaller vessels1 carrying over one thousand guns1 were actually brought into the action2 while the remainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity4 #b;d4 ,that the ,danish line of floating defences1 consisting mostly of hulls1 sloops1 rafts1 c41 carried only six hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions2 that the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most2 and that both these land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by volunteers4 #c;d4 ,that the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so completely masked1 or so far distant1 as to be useless during the contest between the fleet and floating force4 #dth4 ,that the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by the position of the floating defences1 repelled1 with little or no loss to themselves1 and some injury to the enemy1 a vastly superior force of frigates which attacked them4 #eth4 ,that the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed1 while the fixed batteries were uninjured4 #fth4 ,that the fortifications of the city and of ,amack island were not attacked1 and had no part in the contest4 #gth4 ,that1 as soon as the ,crown-batteries were unmasked and began to act1 ,nelson prepared to retreat1 but1 on account of the difficulty of doing so1 he opened a parley1 threatening1 with a cruelty unworthy of the most barbarous ages1 that1 unless the batteries ceased their fire upon his ships1 he would burn all the floating defences with the ,danish prisoners in his possession2 and that this armistice was concluded just in time to save his own ships from destruction4 #hth4 ,that1 consequently1 the battle of ,copenhagen cannot be regarded as a contest between ships and forts1 or a triumph of ships over forts3 that1 so far as the guns on shore were engaged1 they showed a vast superiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by the ,english themselves4 ,constantinople4--,the channel of the ,dardanelles is about twelve leagues long1 three miles wide at its entrance1 and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest point4 ,its principal defences are the outer and inner castles of ,europe and ,asia1 and the castles of ,sestos and ,abydos4 ,constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance into the ,sea of ,marmora1 and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea4 ,the defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay2 but few guns were mounted1 and the forts were but partially garrisoned4 ,in ,constantinople not a gun was mounted1 and no preparations for defence were made2 indeed1 previous to the approach of the fleet1 the ,turks had not determined whether to side with the ,english or the ,french1 and even then the ,french ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the demands of ,duckforth4 ,the ,british fleet consisted of six sail of the line1 two frigates1 two sloops1 and several bomb-vessels1 carrying eight hundred and eighteen guns1 7besides those in the bomb-ships47 ,admiral ,duckforth sailed through the ,dardanelles on the #aith of ,february1 #ahjg1 with little or no opposition4 ,this being a ,turkish festival day1 the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion1 and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defence4 ,but while the admiral was waiting on the ,sea of ,marmora for the result of negotiations1 or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon ,constantinople1 the fortifications of this city were put in order1 and the ,turks actively employed1 under ,french engineers and artillery officers1 in repairing the defences of the ,straits4 ,campbell1 in his ,naval ,history1 says3--,admiral ,duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed4 ,he might1 indeed1 succeed1 should the weather become favorable1 in bombarding ,constantinople2 but unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the ,turks to pacific terms1 the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain4 ,with this damaged and crippled fleet1 he must repass the ,dardanelles1 now rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them4 ,under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat2 and on the #c;d of ,april escaped through the ,dardanelles1 steering midway of the channel1 with a favorable and strong current4 ,this escape1 however1 says ,baines1 was only from destruction1 but by no means from serious loss and injury4 99 99 99 99 ,in what instance in the whole course of our naval warfare1 have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise8 ,in detailing the extent of this damage1 we will take the ships in the order they descended4 ,the first had her wheel carried away1 and her hull much damaged1 but escaped with the loss of only three men4 ,a stone shot penetrated the second1 between the poop and quarter deck1 badly injured the mizzen-mast1 carried away the wheel1 and did other serious damage1 killing and wounding twenty men4 ,two shot struck the third1 carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts2 loss in killed and wounded1 thirty4 ,the fourth had her mainmast destroyed1 with a loss of sixteen4 ,the fifth had a large shot1 six feet eight inches in circumference1 enter her lower deck2 loss fifty-five4 ,the sixth1 not injured4 ,the seventh1 a good deal damaged1 with a loss of seventeen4 ,the eighth had no loss4 ,the ninth was so much injured that1 had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack1 she must have gone down3 her loss was eight4 ,the tenth lost twelve4 ,the eleventh was much injured1 with a loss of eight--making a total loss in repassing the ,dardanelles1 of one hundred and sixty-seven2 and in the whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one1 exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning of the ,ajax4 ,such was the effect produced on the ,british fleet1 sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the ,dardanelles4 ,duckforth himself says1 that had he remained before ,constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completely put in order--no return would have been open to him1 and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence4 ,scarcely had the fleet cleared the ,straits1 before it 7the fleet7 was reinforced with eight sail of the line2 but1 even with this vast increase of strength1 the ,english did not venture to renew the contest4 ,they had effected a most fortunate escape4 ,general ,jomini says that if the defence had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people1 the expedition would have cost the ,english their whole squadron4 ,great as was the damage done to the fleet1 the forts themselves were uninjured4 ,the ,english say their own fire did no execution1 the shot in all probability not even striking their objects--the rapid change of position1 occasioned by a fair wind and current1 preventing the certainty of aim4 ,the state of the batteries when the fleet first passed1 is thus described in ,james's ,naval ,history3 ,some of them were dilapidated1 and others but partially mounted and poorly manned4 ,and ,alison says3 ,they had been allowed to fall into disrepair4 ,the castles of ,europe and ,asia1 indeed1 stood in frowning majesty1 to assert the dominion of the ,crescent at the narrowest part of the passage1 but their ramparts were antiquated1 their guns in part dismounted1 and such as remained1 though of enormous calibre1 little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an ,english broadside4 ,much has been said because the fortifications of the ,dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel1 7an object they were never expected to accomplish1 even had they been well armed and well served27 but it is forgotten1 or entirely overlooked1 that twelve ,turkish line-of-battle -ships1 two of them three-deckers1 with nine frigates1 were with their sails bent and in apparent readiness1 filled with troops1 and lying within the line of fortifications2 and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders4 ,it is scarcely ever mentioned1 being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence2 and yet the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support1 could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts1 some of which were as ancient as the reign of ,amurath6 ,algiers4--,the following narrative of the attack on ,algiers1 in #ahaf1 is drawn from the reports of the ,english and ,dutch admirals1 and other official and authentic ,english papers4 ,the attack was made by the combined fleets1 consisting of five sail of the line1 eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels1 besides five bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats1 carrying in all about one thousand guns4 ,the armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given1 but the guns of those whose armaments are known1 amount to over nine hundred4 ,the harbor and defences of ,algiers had been previously surveyed by ,captain ,warde1 royal navy1 under ,lord ,exmouth's direction2 and the number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information given in this survey--just so many ships1 and no more1 being taken1 as could be employed to advantage against the city1 without being needlessly exposed4 ,moreover1 the men and officers had been selected and exercised with reference to this particular attack4 ,from the survey of ,captain ,warde1 and the accompanying map1 it appears that the armament of all the fortifications of ,algiers and the vicinity1 counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore1 was only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions1 including mortars4 ,but not near all of these could act upon the fleet as it lay4 ,other ,english accounts state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty4 ,some of these were in small and distant batteries1 whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works4 7,fig4 #cf47 ,supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged1 the ratio of the forces1 as expressed by the number of guns1 must have been about as #e to #b4 ,this is a favorable supposition for the ships2 for we know that several of them1 from their position and a change of anchorage1 brought both broadsides to bear2 moreover1 at no one time could all the guns of the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships4 ,the ,algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable1 including several vessels of war1 but no use was made of them in defence1 and nearly all were burnt4 ,the attacking ships commanded some of the batteries1 and almost immediately dismounted their guns4 ,the walls of the casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down4 ,most of the ,algerine guns were badly mounted1 and many of them were useless after the first fire4 ,they had no furnaces for heating shot1 and1 as they loaded their guns with loose powder1 put in with a ladle1 they could not possibly have used hot shot1 even had they constructed furnaces4 ,the ships approached the forts1 and many of them anchored in their intended position1 without a shot being fired from the batteries4 ,the action commenced at a quarter before three1 and did not entirely cease till half-past eleven4 ,the ships then took advantage of the land breeze1 and1 by warping and towing off1 were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond reach of the land-batteries4 ,negotiations were again opened1 and the ,dey surrendered the ,christian slaves and yielded to the terms of the treaty4 ,during the contest1 the fleet fired nearly one hundred and eighteen tons of powder1 and fifty thousand shot1 7weighing more than five hundred tons of iron17 besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells1 7thrown by the bomb-vessels17 and the shells and rockets from the flotilla4 ,the vessels were considerably crippled1 and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and eighty-three4 ,the land batteries were much injured1 and a large part of their guns dismounted4 ,their loss is not known2 the ,english confess they could obtain no account of it1 but suppose it to have been very great4 ,this seems more than probable2 for1 besides those actually employed in the defence1 large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest4 ,so great was this curiosity1 that1 when the action commenced1 the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the manoeuvres of the ships4 ,to avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a slaughter1 ,lord ,exmouth 7showing a humanity that does him great credit7 motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of safety4 ,this loss of life in the batteries1 the burning of the buildings within the town and about the mole1 the entire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the harbor1 had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants1 and probably did more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion to the treaty4 ,we know very well that these batteries1 though much injured1 were not silenced when ,lord ,exmouth took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach4 ,the ships retired--#ast1 because they had become much injured1 and their ammunition nearly exhausted2 #b;d1 in order to escape from a position so hazardous in case of a storm2 and #c;d1 to get beyond the reach of the ,algerine batteries4 ,lord ,exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat1 and says1 the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow4 ,and ,vice-admiral ,von de ,capellan1 in his report of the battle1 gives the same opinion3 in this retreat says he1 which1 from want of wind and the damage suffered in the rigging1 was very slow1 the ships had still to suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's batteries2 at last1 the land breeze springing up1 c4 ,an ,english officer1 who took part in this affair1 says3 ,it was well for us that the land wind came off1 or we should never have got out2 and ,god knows what would have been our fate1 had we remained all night4 ,the motives of the retreat cannot1 therefore1 be doubted4 ,had the ,arabs set themselves zealously at work1 during the night1 to prepare for a new contest1 by remounting their guns1 and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries which had fallen1--in other words1 had the works now been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the ,english1 the contest would have been far from ended4 ,but 7to use the words of the ,board of ,defence7 ,lord ,exmouth relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade2 and the result proves that he was right4 ,his anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered1 which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city1 than to keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence4 ,what was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries8 ,the true solution of the question is1 then1 not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed4 ,all political agitation and popular clamor aside1 what would have been the result had the fight been continued1 or even had ,lord ,exmouth renewed it next morning8 ,these are questions that can be answered only on conjecture2 but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether1 had the subsequent demands of ,lord ,exmouth been rejected1 he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships2 whether1 indeed1 if he had renewed the fight1 he would not have been signally defeated4 ,on the whole1 we do not think that this battle1 although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over batteries1 presents an argument to shake the confidence which fortifications1 well situated1 well planned1 and well fought1 deserve1 as the defences of a seaboard4 ,we cannot help regarding these conclusions as just1 when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case4 ,the high character1 skill1 and bravery of the attacking force2 their immense superiority in number of guns1 with no surplus human life to be exposed2 the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence1 the entire want of skill of the ,algerine artillerists1 and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation2 the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's ships1--an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the ,french or ,dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of the same foe1--from these facts1 we must think that those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of defence against shipping1 know but little of the nature of the contest4 ,an ,english historian of some note1 in speaking of this attack1 says3--,it is but little to the purpose1 unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced1 placed1 and governed4 ,algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills1 sloping down towards the sea1 and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships4 ,but where is the capital exactly so situated that we are ever likely to attack8 ,and as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns1 even when practicable1 it is a mean1 unworthy species of warfare1 by which nothing was ever gained4 ,the severe loss sustained before ,algiers must also be taken into account1 because it was inflicted by mere ,algerine artillery1 and was much inferior to what may be expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science1 not only in working the guns1 but in the endless duty of detail necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of formidable efficiency4 ,san ,juan d',ulloa4--,the following facts1 relative to the attack on ,san ,juan d',ulloa by the ,french1 in #ahch1 are drawn principally from the report of a ,french engineer officer who was one of the expedition4 ,the ,french fleet consisted of four ships1 carrying one hundred and eighty-eight guns1 two armed steamboats1 and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars4 ,the whole number of guns1 of whatever description1 found in the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven2 a large portion of these1 however1 were for land defence4 7,fig4 #cg47 ,when the ,french vessels were towed into the position selected for the attack1 it was lucky for us1 says the ,french officer in his report1 that the ,mexicans did not disturb this operation1 which lasted nearly two hours1 and that they permitted us to commence the fire4 ,we were exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder1 five sixteen-pounders1 seven twelve-pounders1 one eight-pounder1 and five eighteen-pounder carronades--in all nineteen pieces only4 ,if these be converted into equivalent twenty-four-pounders1 in proportion to the weight of the balls1 the whole nineteen guns will be less than twelve twenty-four pounders4 ,this estimate is much too great1 for it allows three eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder1 and each of the eighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder2 whereas1 at the distance at which the parties were engaged1 these small pieces were nearly harmless4 ,two of the powder magazines1 from not being bomb-proof1 were blown up during the engagement1 by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted2 thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders4 ,the other sixteen guns were still effective when abandoned by the ,mexicans4 ,the cannonade and bombardment continued about six hours1 eight thousand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the ,french4 ,the principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the powder magazine4 ,but very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the ,french ships1 and only three of these on the water front4 ,the details of the condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the ,french officer1#bb but it is unnecessary to repeat them here4 ,footnote #bb3 ,vide also ,house ,doc4 ,no4 #bjf1 twenty-sixth ,congress1 first session ,in general terms1 it appears from the above-mentioned report1 that the number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force1 7counting only one broadside of the ship17 amounted to ninety-four guns1 besides four heavy sea-mortars2 that the whole number so employed in the fort was only nineteen1 including the smallest calibres2 that these guns were generally so small and inefficient1 that their balls would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates2 the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured2 that the castle1 though built of poor materials1 was but slightly injured by the ,french fire2 that the ,mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordinary means of defence1 and abandoned their works when only a few of their guns had been dismounted2 that notwithstanding all the circumstances in favor of the ,french1 their killed and wounded1 in proportion to the guns acting against them1 was upwards of four times as great as the loss of the ,english at the battle of ,trafalgar6 ,st4 ,jean d',acre4--,the narratives of the day contained most exaggerated accounts of the ,english attack on ,st4 ,jean d',acre2 now1 however1 the principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated4 ,for the amount of the fleet we quote from the ,british official papers1 and for that of the fort1 from the pamphlet of ,lieutenant-colonel ,matuszewiez4 ,these statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives1 more recently published1 of several ,english and ,french eye-witnesses4 ,the fortifications were built of poor materials1 antiquated in their plans1 and much decayed4 ,their entire armament amounted to only two hundred guns1 some of which were merely field-pieces4 ,the water fronts were armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars1 those of the smaller calibre included4 7,fig4 #ch47 ,when approached by the ,british fleet1 the works were undergoing repairs1 and1 says ,commodore ,napier1 were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack4 ,the ,british fleet consisted of eight ships of the line1 carrying six hundred and forty-six guns2 six frigates1 carrying two hundred and thirty-six guns2 four steamers1 carrying eighteen guns2 and two or three other vessels1 whose force is not given4 ,only a few guns1 says ,napier1 defended the approach from the northward1 and most of the ships came in from that direction4 ,the western front was armed with about forty cannon2 but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers1 carrying about five hundred guns4 ,their fire was tremendous during the engagement1 but no breach was made in the walls4 ,the south front was armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces4 ,this front was attacked by six ships and two steamers1 carrying over two hundred guns4 ,the eastern front was armed only with light artillery2 against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet1 carrying about two hundred and forty guns4 ,the guns of the works were so poorly mounted1 that but few could be used at all2 and these1 on account of the construction of the fort1 could not reach the ships1 though anchored close by the walls4 ,only five of their guns1 says ,napier1 placed in a flanking battery1 were well served1 and never missed2 but they were pointed too high1 and damaged our spars and rigging only4 ,the stone was of so poor a quality1 says the narrative of ,colonel ,matuszewiez1 that the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance1 but they were nowhere seriously injured4 ,in the words of ,napier1 they were not breached1 and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks1 or in the numerous casemates1 without suffering much loss4 ,the accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort1 containing six thousand casks of powder1 laid in ruins a space of sixty thousand square yards1 opened a large breach in the walls of the fortifications1 partially destroyed the prisons1 and killed and wounded a thousand men of the garrison4 ,this frightful disaster1 says the ,french account1 hastened the triumph of the fleet4 ,the prisoners and malefactors1 thus released from confinement1 rushed upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers1 who had besieged the place on the land side4 ,the uselessness of the artillery1 the breaches of the fort1 the attacks of the ,english1 all combined to force the retreat of the garrison1 in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders4 ,we will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the ,duke of ,wellington1 in the ,house of ,lords1 ,feb4 #d1 #ahda3 ,he had had1 he said1 a little experience in services of this nature2 and he thought it his duty to warn their lordships1 on this occasion1 that they must not always expect that ships1 however well commanded1 or however gallant their seamen might be1 were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls4 ,he had no recollection1 in all his experience1 except the recent instance on the coast of ,syria1 of any fort being taken by ships1 excepting two or three years ago1 when the fort of ,san ,juan d',ulloa was captured by the ,french fleet4 ,this was1 he thought1 the single instance that he recollected1 though he believed that something of the sort had occurred at the siege of ,havana1 in #agfc4 ,the present achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times4 ,this was his opinion1 and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed such a service4 ,it was1 altogether1 a most skilful proceeding4 ,he was greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the fleet2 and1 on inquiring how it happened1 he discovered that it was because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary distance4 ,the guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a greater distance2 and the consequence was1 that the shot went over the ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance4 ,by that means1 they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced4 ,not less than five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls1 and the precision with which the fire was kept up1 the position of the vessels1 and1 lastly1 the blowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this great victory in so short a time4 ,he had thought it right to say thus much1 because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every day4 ,he would repeat that this was a singular instance1 in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was manifested1 but which was also connected with peculiar circumstances1 which they could not hope always to occur4 ,it must not therefore be expected1 as a matter of course1 that all such attempts must necessarily succeed4 ,having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to cope1 gun for gun1 with a naval force1 let us consider1 for a few moments1 the objection which is sometimes made to the use of fortifications for the defence of the sea-coast1 viz43 that our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured by a home squadron4 ,we have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of defence for another4 ,the efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with artillery1 nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers1 and the attack and defence of forts1 render cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign4 ,to the navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high seas2 but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our harbors1 bays1 rivers1 arsenals1 and commercial towns4 ,let us take a case in point4 ,for the defence of ,new ,york city1 it is deemed highly important that the ,east ,river should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city1 so that an army landed there would have to cross the ,westchester creek1 the ,bronx1 ,harlem river1 and the defiles of ,harlem heights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence4 ,throg's ,neck is the position selected for this purpose2 cannon placed there not only command the channel1 but1 from the windings of the river1 sweep it for a great distance above and below4 ,no other position1 even in the channel itself1 possesses equal advantages4 ,hence1 if we had only naval means of defence1 it would be best1 were such a thing possible1 to place the floating defences themselves on this point4 ,leaving entirely out of consideration the question of relative power1 position alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort4 ,but there are other considerations no less important than that of position4 ,fort ,schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city4 ,on the other hand1 the crews of the floating defences must be seamen2 they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations4 ,moreover1 forts1 situated as this is1 can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion of the fort4 ,this result can be obtained with little difficulty in narrow channels1 as is done in most of the other works for the defence of ,new ,york1 the works for ,boston1 ,newport1 ,philadelphia1 ,baltimore1 ,charleston1 ,savannah1 ,new ,orleans1 c41 and an approximation to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries1 like the ,chesapeake4 ,but we will suppose that there are no such points of land1 in the inlets to our harbors1 and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively4 ,let us leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on the high seas1 and also the importance of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast1 in the absence of his fleet4 ,we take the single case of the attack being made on ,new ,york harbor1 and that our whole fleet is assembled there4 ,now1 if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy1 the chances of success may be regarded as equal2 if inferior1 the chances are against us--for an attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best materials4 ,but here the consequences of victory are very unequal3 the enemy can lose his squadron only1 while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend4 ,if we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy1 the defence of this harbor would in all respects be complete1 provided this force never left the harbor4 ,but1 then1 all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate2 and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe1 unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports1 and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there2 the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor4 ,these remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor of ,new ,york2 whereas ,portland1 ,portsmouth1 ,boston1 ,newport1 the ,delaware1 the ,chesapeake1 ,charleston1 ,savannah1 ,pensacola1 ,mobile1 ,new ,orleans1 and numerous other places1 are equally open to attack1 and therefore must be equally defended1 for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults4 ,if he come to one of these in the absence of our fleet1 his object is attained without resistance2 or1 if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended1 we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin4 ,could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises8 ,as it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast1 where is the prescience that can indicate the spot8 ,and if it cannot be foretold1 how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe8 ,suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it1 shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours8 ,must the ,gulf of ,mexico be swept1 as well as the ,atlantic2 or shall we give up the ,gulf to the enemy8 ,shall we cover the southern cities1 or give them up also8 ,we must unquestionably do one of two things--either relinquish a great extent of coast1 confining our cruisers to a small portion only1 or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question4 ,on the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it--or1 in other words1 the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations1 discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no tidings1 and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience4 ,the naval power of ,spain under ,philip ,,ii4 was almost unlimited4 ,with the treasures of ,india and ,america at his command1 the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail1 to invade another country1 was no very gigantic operation4 ,nevertheless1 this naval force was of but little avail as a coast defence4 ,its efficiency for this purpose was well tested in #aeif4 ,england and ,holland attacked ,cadiz with a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships1 which entered the ,bay of ,cadiz without1 on its approach to their coast1 being once seen by the ,spanish navy4 ,this same squadron1 on its return to ,england1 passed along a great portion of the ,spanish coast without ever meeting with the slightest opposition from the innumerable ,spanish floating defences4 ,in #agdd1 a ,french fleet of twenty ships1 and a land force of twenty-two thousand men1 sailed from ,brest to the ,english coast1 without meeting with any opposition from the superior ,british fleet which had been sent out1 under ,sir ,john ,norris1 on purpose to intercept them4 ,the landing of the troops was prevented by a storm1 which drove the fleet back upon the coast of ,france to seek shelter4 ,in #agee1 a ,french fleet of twenty-five sail of the line1 and many smaller vessels1 sailed from ,brest for ,america4 ,nine of these soon afterwards returned to ,france1 and the others proceeded to the gulf of ,st4 ,lawrence4 ,an ,english fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept them2 but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog1 and all the ,french vessels except two reached ,quebec in safety4 ,in #agei1 a ,french fleet1 blockaded in the port of ,dunkirk by a ,british force under ,commodore ,bogs1 seizing upon a favorable opportunity1 escaped from the enemy1 attacked the coast of ,scotland1 made a descent upon ,carrickfergus1 and cruised about till ,february1 #agfj1 without meeting a single ,british vessel1 although sixty-one ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of ,england and ,france1 and several of these were actually in pursuit4 ,in #agif1 when the ,french attempted to throw the army of ,hoche into ,ireland1 the most strenuous efforts were made by the ,british navy to intercept the ,french fleet in its passage4 ,the ,channel fleet1 of near thirty sail of the line1 under ,lord ,bridport1 was stationed at ,spithead2 ,sir ,roger ,curtis1 with a smaller force1 was cruising to the westward2 ,vice-admiral ,colpoys was stationed off ,brest1 with thirteen sail of the line2 and ,sir ,edward ,pellew 7afterwards ,lord ,exmouth7 watched the harbor1 with a small squadron of frigates4 ,notwithstanding this triple floating bulwark1 as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast1 a second in the ,downs1 and a third close on their own shores--the ,french fleet of forty-four vessels1 carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men1 reached ,bantry ,bay in safety6 ,this fleet was eight days on the passage1 and three more in landing the troops2 and most of the vessels might have returned to ,brest in safety1 had it not been for disasters by storms1 for only one of their whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force which ,england had assembled for that express object4 ,the result of this expedition1 says ,alison1 was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries4 ,to the ,french1 as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition1 in comparison with a land campaign2 the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet2 and the unforeseen disasters which frequently1 on that element1 defeat the best concerted enterprises4 ,to the ,english1 as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion2 that1 in the face of superior maritime forces1 her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy2 and that neither the skill of her sailors nor the valor of her armies1 but the fury of the elements1 saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions4 ,while these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion1 they are calculated1 at the same time1 to weaken an overweening confidence in naval superiority1 and to demonstrate that the only base upon which certain reliance can be placed1 even by an insular power1 is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects4 ,subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks4 ,in the following year1 a ,french squadron of two frigates and two sloops1 passed the ,british fleets with perfect impunity1 destroyed the shipping in the port of ,ilfracombe1 and safely landed their troops on the coast of ,wales4 ,again1 in #agih1 the immense ,british naval force failed to prevent the landing of ,general ,humbert's army in the bay of ,killala2 and1 in the latter part of the same year1 a ,french squadron of nine vessels and three thousand men escaped ,sir ,j4,b4 ,warren's squadron1 and safely reached the coast of ,ireland4 ,as a further illustration1 we quote from the report of the ,board of ,national ,defence in #ahci4 ,the ,toulon fleet1 in #agih1 consisting of about twenty sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels of war1 and numerous transports1 making in all1 three hundred sail and forty thousand troops1 slipped out of port and sailed to ,malta4 ,it was followed by ,nelson1 who1 thinking correctly that they were bound for ,egypt1 shaped his course direct for ,alexandria4 ,the ,french1 steering towards ,candia1 took the more circuitous passage2 so that ,nelson arrived at ,alexandria before them1 and1 not finding them there1 returned1 by way of ,caramania and ,candia1 to ,sicily1 missing his adversary in both passages4 ,sailing again for ,alexandria1 he found the ,french fleet at anchor in ,aboukir bay1 and1 attacking them there1 achieved the memorable victory of the ,nile4 ,when we consider the narrowness of the sea2 the numerous vessels in the ,french fleet2 the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night2 and that ,nelson1 notwithstanding1 could see nothing of the enemy himself1 and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels1 we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad ,atlantic4 ,the escape of another ,toulon fleet in #ahje2 the long search for them in the ,mediterranean by the same able officer2 the pursuit in the ,west ,indies2 their evasion of him among the islands2 the return to ,europe2 his vain efforts subsequently1 along the coast of ,portugal1 in the bay of ,biscay1 and off the ,english channel2 and the meeting at last at ,trafalgar1 brought about only because the combined fleets1 trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given1 were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances1 of the many that might be cited1 to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting1 and how little the most untiring zeal1 the most restless activity1 the most exalted professional skill and judgment1 can do to lessen the adverse chances4 ,for more than a year ,nelson most closely watched his enemy1 who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so1 and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron4 ,when out1 ,nelson1 perfectly in the dark as to the course ,villeneuve had taken1 sought for him in vain on the coast of ,egypt4 ,scattered by tempests1 the ,french fleet again took refuge in ,toulon2 whence it again put to sea1 when refitted and ready1 joining the ,spanish fleet at ,cadiz4 ,on the courage1 skill1 vigilance1 and judgment1 acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country1 this system of defence relies to accomplish1 against a string of chances1 objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible4 ,it demands of the navy to do perfectly1 and without fail1 that which1 to do at all1 seems impossible4 ,the navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy1 in spite of distance1 and the broken intercourse of a state of war1 even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them2 nay1 more1 before the purpose itself is formed4 ,on an element where man is but the sport of storms1 the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment1 in spite of weather and seasons2 to see him in spite of fogs and darkness4 ,finally1 after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished1 and all the difficulties subdued1 it submits to the issue of a single battle1 on equal terms1 the fate of the war1 having no hope or reserve beyond4 ,the proper duty of our navy is1 not coast or river defence2 it has a more glorious sphere--that of the offensive4 ,in our last war1 instead of lying in harbor1 and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea1 and our commerce without countenance or aid1 they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean1 penetrated to the most remote seas1 everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation4 ,and we believe1 moreover1 that in the amount of the enemy's property thus destroyed1 of ,american property protected or recovered1 and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels1 ships evaded if superior1 and beaten if equal--they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater1 to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation1 and the character they imparted to it1 than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors4 ,confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper1 we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on1 as it has been in the past2 and that the results1 as regards both honor and advantage1 will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement4 ,in order1 however1 that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment1 in offensive operations1 which is at the same time so consistent with its functions1 and so consonant with its spirit1 we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence4 ,a few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts1 and the economy of their support1 and we will close this discussion4 ,we do not regard this question1 however1 as a matter of any great importance1 for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence4 ,no matter what their relative cost may be1 the one cannot often be substituted for the other4 ,there are some few cases1 however1 where this might be taken into consideration1 and would be decisive4 ,let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning4 ,for the defence of ,new ,york city1 the ,narrows and ,east ,river must be secured by forts2 ships cannot1 in this case1 be substituted4 ,but let us suppose that the outer harbor of ,new ,york furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops1 or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them4 ,this outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms1 and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the ,narrows2 while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential1 though very important4 ,strong fortifications on ,sandy ,hook1 and one of the shoals1 might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor2 on the other hand1 a naval force stationed within the inner harbor1 and acting under the protection of forts at the ,narrows1 might also furnish a good1 though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead4 ,here1 then1 we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed fortifications1 and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object1 and to be kept continually at home for that special purpose4 ,if we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce1 its character and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost4 ,we can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must be made accordingly4 ,the average durability of ships of war in the ,british navy1 has been variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war1 and from ten to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace4 ,mr4 ,perring1 in his ,brief ,inquiry1 published in #ahab1 estimates the average durability at about eight years4 ,his calculations seem based upon authentic information4 ,a distinguished ,english writer has more recently arrived at the same result1 from estimates based upon the returns of the ,board of ,admiralty during the period of the wars of the ,french ,revolution4 ,the data in our own possession are less complete2 the appropriations for building and repairing having been so expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction4 ,but1 in the returns now before us1 there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the timbers used for these two purposes2 and consequently1 so far as this 7the main item of expense7 is concerned1 we may form pretty accurate comparisons4 ,according to ,edge1 7pp4 #bj1 #ba17 the average cost of timber1 for hulls1 masts1 and yards1 in building an ,english #gd gun ship1 is #fa1chb4 ,let us now compare this cost of timber for building1 with that of the same item for repairs1 for the following fifteen ships1 between #ahjj and #ahbj4 ,the list would have been still further enlarged1 but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect3 ,name of ,ship4 ,no4 of ,when ,repaired from ,cost4 ,guns4 built4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------- ,vengeance144444444444 #gd -- #ahjj to #ahjg #hd1gbj ,ildefonso144444444444 #gd -- #ahjg to #ahjh #he1aie ,scipio144444444444444 #gd -- #ahjg to #ahji #fj1ghe ,tremendous14444444444 #gd -- #ahjg to #ahaj #ace1cig ,elephant1444444444444 #gd -- #ahjh to #ahaa #fg1jjg ,spencer14444444444444 #gd #ahjj #ahji to #ahac #abd1ahf ,romulus14444444444444 #gd -- #ahaj to #ahab #gc1ada ,albion144444444444444 #gd #ahjb #ahaj to #ahac #ajb1bie ,donegal14444444444444 #gd -- #ahab to #ahae #aja1cfg ,implacable14444444444 #gd -- #ahac to #ahae #ei1hfe ,illustrious1444444444 #gd #ahjc #ahac to #ahaf #gd1ahd ,northumberland1444444 #gd -- #ahad to #ahae #ei1gie ,kent14444444444444444 #gd -- #ahad to #ahah #hh1ceg ,sultan144444444444444 #gd #ahjg #ahaf to #ahah #fa1eah ,sterling ,castle144444 #gd -- #ahaf to #ahah #fe1bhj ---------------------------------------- -------------------- ,this table1 although incomplete1 gives for the above fifteen ships1 during a period of less than twenty years1 the cost of timber alone used in their repair1 an average of about #djj1jjj each4 ,more timber than this was used1 in all probability1 upon the same vessels1 and paid for out of the funds appropriated for such as may be ordered in course of the year to be repaired4 ,but the amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fifteen ships1 would1 in every twelve or fifteen years1 equal the entire first cost of the same items4 ,if we add to this amount1 the cost of labor required in the application of timber to the operations of repair1 and take into consideration the expense of other materials and labor1 and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period1 we should not be surprised to find the whole sum expended under these heads to equal the first cost1 even within the minimum estimate of seven years4 ,the whole cost of timber used for hulls1 masts1 and yards1 in building between #ahjj and #ahbj1 was #ah1gbg1eea2 in repairs and ordinary wear and tear1 #ag1ddi1ghj2 making an annual average of #d1efj1aeh for building timber1 and #d1bgc1cga for that used in repairs4 ,a large portion of the vessels built were intended to replace others which had been lost1 or were so decayed as to be broken up4 ,but it may be well to add here1 the actual supplies voted for the sea-service1 and for wear and tear1 and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships from #ahjj to #ahae4 ,for the wear,ext4 ,expenses ,for entire ,year and tear of for building1 sea-service4 ,ships4 repairing1c4 ---------------------------------------- ----------- #ahjj #d1cej1jjj #ggb1adj #ac1fai1jgi #ahja #e1hej1jjj #icc1ijj #af1egg1jcg #ahjb #c1fhd1jjj #ggc1ejj #aa1hcc1ega #ahjc #c1abj1jjj #ija1adj #aj1baa1cgh #ahjd #c1ijj1jjj #idh1ebj #ab1cej1fjf #ahje #d1fhj1jjj #a1eec1fij #ae1jce1fcj #ahjf #d1fhj1jjj #a1ihj1hcj #ah1hfd1cda #ahjg #e1jgj1jjj #b1acd1ijc #ag1djj1ccg #ahjh #e1jgj1jjj #b1cea1ahh #ah1jhg1edd #ahji #c1bie1ejj #b1bif1jcj #ai1egh1dfg #ahaj #c1bie1ejj #a1hda1ajg #ah1ige1abj #ahaa #c1fge1gej #b1jdf1bjj #ai1hbb1jjj #ahab #c1fge1gej #a1fif1fba #ai1cje1gei #ahac #c1edi1jjj #b1hbb1jca #bj1jif1gji #ahad #c1bfh1jjj #b1jhf1bgd #ai1cab1jgj #ahae #b1chf1ejj #b1aaf1gaj #ai1jcb1gjj ---------------------------------------- ----------------------- ,it appears from this table that the appropriations for the service1 during the first fifteen years of the present century1 amounted to a little less than ninety millions of dollars per annum2 and for the wear and tear of ships1 and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing ships1 c41 the annual appropriations amounted to near thirty millions4 ,our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war4 ,the following table1 compiled from a report of the ,secretary of the ,navy1 in #ahda1 7,senate ,doc4 ,no4 #bbc1 #bfth ,congress17 will afford data for an approximate calculation3-- ,name of ,no4 ,total ,cost ,when ,cost of ,repaired ,ship4 of of building1 completed4 ,repairs1 between4 ,guns4 exclusive of exclusive armament1 of stores1 ordnance1 c4 c4 c4 c4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,delaware1 #gd #edc1cfh #jj #ahbj #ced1acb #ef #ahbg and #ahch ,n4 ,carolina1 #gd #dca1heb #jj #ahbe #cag1fbh #ib #ahbd and #ahcf ,constitution1 #dd #cjb1gah #hd #agig #bff1hgh #cd #ahcc and #ahci ,united ,states #dd #bii1ccf #ef #agig #ega1igb #gg #ahba and #ahda ,brandywine1 #dd #bcbii1bah #ab #ahbe #bccgg1ffe #ie #ahbf and #ahch ,potomac1 #dd #bcbca1jac #jb #ahbb #bc #hb1eig #jc #ahbi and #ahce ,concord1 #bj #aae1cbe #hj #ahbh #gb1gif #bb #ahcb and #ahdj ,falmouth1 #bj #id1jic #bg #ahbg #acj1jae #dc #ahbh and #ahcg ,john ,adams1 #bj #aaj1fgj #fi #ahbi #aai1fda #ic #ahcd and #ahcg ,boston1 #bj #ia1igc #ai #ahbe #ahi1bfd #cg #ahbf and #ahdj ,st4 ,louis1 #bj #ajb1dfa #ie #ahbh #ace1deh #ge #ahcd and #ahci ,vincennes1 #bj #aaa1eab #gi #ahbf #agh1jid #ha #ahcj and #ahch ,vandalia1 #bj #ij1igg #hh #ahbh #ei1aha #cd #ahcb and #ahcd ,lexington1 #bj8 #aad1fbb #ce #ahbf #hc1chf #eb #ahbg and #ahcg ,warren1 #bj8 #ii1daj #ja #ahbf #aeb1eif #jc #ahcj and #ahch ,fairfield1 #bj #ajj1dij #ce #ahbf #fe1iah #bf #ahca and #ahcg ,natches1#bd #bj8 #ajf1bcb #ai #ahbg #abi1ifi #hj #ahbi and #ahcf ,boxer1 #aj #cj1fig #hh #ahca #bh1ghj #dh #ahcd and #ahdj ,enterprise1 #aj #bg1ich #fc #ahca #bj1gaf #ei #ahcd and #ahdj ,grampus1 #aj #bc1fbg #db #ahba #if1jhf #cf #ahbe and #ahdj ,dolphin1 #aj #ch1ebb #fb #ahcf #ae1jac #ce #ahci and #ahdj ,shark1 #aj #bc1fbg #db #ahba #ic1cie #hd #ahbd and #ahci ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,footnote #bc3 ,returns incomplete4 ,footnote #bd3 ,broken up in #ahdj4 ,it appears from the above table1 that the cost of constructing ships of the line is about #f1fjj per gun2 of frigates1 #f1ejj per gun2 of smaller vessels of war1 a little less than #e1jjj per gun3 making an average cost of vessels of war to be more than six thousand dollars per gun4 ,and the expense of repairs for these vessels is more than seven per cent4 per annum on their first cost4 ,we have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers4 ,the ,fulton1 four guns1 built in #ahch-'ci1 cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents2 the ,mississippi and ,missouri1 ten guns each1 built in #ahda1 cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece2 making an average cost for war-steamers of over sixty thousand dollars per gun4 ,the cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for vessels of war2 but we have not yet had sufficient experience to determine the exact amount4 ,it has been estimated1 however1 by competent judges1 that when kept1 the expense of repairs will at least equal twelve per cent4 of the first cost4 ,the expense of keeping them in commission is enormously great4 ,their engines1 says the ,secretary of the ,navy1 in his annual report in #ahdb1 consume so much fuel as to add enormously to their expenses2 and the necessity that they should return to port1 after short intervals of time1 for fresh supplies1 renders it impossible to send them on any distant service4 ,they cannot be relied on as cruisers1 and are altogether too expensive for service in time of peace4 ,i have therefore determined to take them out of commission1 and substitute for them other and less expensive vessels4 ,the average cost of permanent fortifications is but little more than three thousand dollars per gun4 ,and it must be obvious1 from the nature of the materials of which they are constructed1 that the expense of their support must be inconsiderable4 ,it is true that for some years past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been under the head of repairs2 but much of this sum is for alterations and enlargements of temporary and inefficient works1 erected anterior to the war of #ahab4 ,some of it1 however1 has been for actual repairs of decayed or injured portions of the forts2 these injuries resulting from the nature of the climate1 the foundations1 the use of poor materials and poor workmanship1 and from neglect and abandonment4 ,but if we include the risk of abandonment at times1 it is estimated1 upon data drawn from past experience1 that one-third of one per cent4 per annum1 of the first cost1 will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been constructed since the last war4 ,but it is unnecessary to further discuss this question ,we repeat what has already been said1 no matter what may be the relative cost of ships and forts1 the one1 as a general thing1 cannot be substituted for the other4 ,each has its own sphere of action1 and each will contribute1 in its own way1 to the national defence2 and any undue increase of one1 at the expense of the other1 will be attended by a corresponding diminution of national power4#be ,footnote #be3 ,for further information concerning our system of sea-coast defences1 the reader is referred to ,house ,doc4 #bjf1 twenty-sixth ,congress1 second session2 ,senate ,doc4 #he1 twenty-eighth ,congress1 second session2 and to the annual reports of the ,chief ,engineer4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,our ,,northern ,,frontier ,,defences4 ,in discussing engineering as a branch of the military art1 we spoke of the use of fortifications on land frontiers1 and their influence on the strategic operations of a campaign4 ,a brief notice was also given of the different systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensive works4 ,let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier4 ,the principle laid down by ,napoleon and ,jomini1 that fortifications should always be constructed on important strategic points1 is undoubtedly the correct one3 but how to determine these points is a question that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engineer2 yet determine them he must1 or his fortifications will be worse than useless2 for a fort improperly located1 like a cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists1 will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect4 ,the selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier must have reference to three distinct classes of objects1 viz43 the security1 first1 of the large frontier towns1 where much public and private property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe1 made either on land or by water2 second1 of lake harbors1 important as places of refuge and security to our own ships1 or to the enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading army2 third1 of all strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or defensive operations4 ,these objects are distinct in their nature1 and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their accomplishment2 nevertheless1 it will generally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the others1 so intimately are they all connected4 ,to determine the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifications4 ,that such points of maximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of nations cannot be doubted4 ,the relative importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast4 ,the ever-changing system of internal improvements1 by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of manufacturers and agriculture1 either continually varies the relative standing of the seaports already opened1 or opens new ones for the exportation of these products1 and the importation of foreign articles received in exchange4 ,but these internal improvements are seldom carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries1 and consequently the principal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative importance1 no matter how often they may have declined during times of hostility1 or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which results from peace4 ,the principal ,european places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for ages1 and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present4 ,this stability of rank among border towns is not confined to commercial influence2 the same holds true with respect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character4 ,military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations1 and the fields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have been fought1 are nearly the same1 no matter how remote the periods of comparison4 ,these points and lines1 so important in commerce as well as in war1 result from the natural features of the ground1 and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden changes as the character of the earth itself4 ,from these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three distinct methods of determining the strategic points between this country and ,canada3 #ast1 by an examination of the topography of the two countries2 #b;d1 by tracing out the main channels of commercial intercourse2 #c;d1 by reviewing the lines of their military operations4 ,the last method is the least liable to error1 and perhaps is the most easily understood1 inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out the precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and the channels of commerce1 or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical features of the country4 ,in the present instance1 moreover1 this method furnishes ample data for the formation of our decision1 inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and ,canada have been neither few in number nor unimportant in their character and results4 ,in tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern frontier1 it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of country which is now possessed by the ,english1 was then occupied by the ,french1 and that the ,english possessions in ,north ,america included the present ,middle and ,northern ,states4 ,at the period of the ,american revolution the ,french and ,english had completely changed ground1 the armies of the former operating in the ,states1 while the ,english were in possession of ,canada4 ,the first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country1 was conducted by ,samuel ,argall1 who sailed from ,virginia in #afac1 with a fleet of eleven vessels1 attacked the ,french on the ,penobscot1 and afterwards the ,st4 ,croix4 ,in #afed1 ,sedgwick1 at the head of a small ,new ,england army1 attacked the ,french on the ,penobscot1 and overrun all ,arcadia4 ,in #afff1 during the contest between ,charles ,,ii4 and ,louis ,,xiv41 it was proposed to march the ,new ,england troops across the country by the ,kennebec or ,penobscot1 and attack ,quebec2 but the terrors and difficulties of crossing over rocky mountains and howling deserts were such as to deter them from undertaking the campaign4 ,in #afhi1 ,count ,frontenac1 governor of ,canada1 made a descent into ,new ,york to assist the ,french fleet in reducing that province4 ,his line of march was by the river ,sorrel and ,lake ,champlain4 ,an attack upon ,montreal by the ,iroquois soon forced him to return2 but in the following ,january a party of ,french and ,indians left ,montreal in the depth of a ,canadian winter1 and after wading for two and twenty days1 with provisions on their backs1 through snows and swamps and across a wide wilderness1 reached the unguarded village of ,schenectady4 ,here a midnight war-whoop was raised1 and the inhabitants either massacred or driven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring towns4 ,in #afij1 a congress of the colonies1 called to provide means for the general defence1 assembled at ,new ,york1 and resolved to carry war into ,canada3 an army was to attack ,montreal by way of ,lake ,champlain1 and a fleet to attempt ,quebec by the ,st4 ,lawrence4 ,the former advanced as far as the lake1 when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the objects of the expedition4 ,the ,massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels1 7the largest carrying forty-four guns each17 and two thousand men1 failed to reduce ,quebec1 though the defences of that place were then of the slightest character1 and armed with only twenty-three guns4 ,in #agjd1 and again in #agjg1 ,port ,royal was attacked by costly expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies2 and again1 in #agji1 a land force of fifteen hundred men advanced against ,montreal by ,lake ,champlain2 but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition4 ,in #agaa1 ,lord ,bolingbroke planned the conquest of ,canada4 ,the land forces1 numbering five thousand men in all1 were separated into two distinct armies1 the one sent against ,detroit1 and the other against ,montreal by ,lake ,champlain2 while a fleet of fifteen ships of war1 forty transports1 and six store-ships1 carrying a land force of six thousand five hundred men1 was to attack ,quebec4 ,the maritime expedition failed to reach its destination1 and after losing a part of the fleet and more than a thousand men in the ,st4 ,lawrence1 this part of the project was abandoned4 ,nor was any thing important accomplished by either division of the land forces4 ,the same plan of campaign was followed in #agab4 ,an army of four thousand men marched against ,montreal by ,lake ,champlain1 but on hearing of the failure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the ,french forces on the river ,sorel1 they retired towards ,albany4 ,the next expedition of any importance was the naval one of #agde against ,louisburg4 ,for the attack of this place the colonies raised about four thousand men1 and one hundred small vessels and transports1 carrying between one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns4 ,they were afterwards joined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns4 ,this attacking force now1 according to some of the ,english writers1 consisted of six thousand provincials1 and eight hundred seamen1 and a combined naval force of near seven hundred guns4 ,the troops landed1 and laid siege to the town4 ,the garrison of the fortifications of ,louisburg consisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand ,breton militia1 or1 according to some writers1 of only twelve hundred men in all4 ,the armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon1 seventy-six swivels1 and six mortars4 ,auxiliary to the main works were an island-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders1 and a battery on the main land armed with thirty large cannon4 ,frequent attempts were made to storm the place1 but the most persevering efforts were of no avail1 many of the ,new ,englanders being killed and wounded1 and their boats destroyed1 while the garrison remained unharmed4 ,at length1 after a siege of forty-nine days1 want of provisions and the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants1 caused the garrison to surrender4 ,when the ,new ,englanders saw the strength of the works1 and the slight impression which their efforts had produced1 they were not only elated but greatly astonished at their success4 ,it should be noticed1 that in the above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost three times as great as that of all the forts combined2 and yet the naval part of the attack was unsuccessful4 ,the besieging army was more than four times as great as all the garrisons combined2 and yet the place held out forty-nine days1 and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens4 ,this place was soon afterwards restored to the ,french4 ,we see that1 thus far in these wars1 the ,english were vastly superior in strength and numbers1 yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the ,french1 who not only retained their possessions in the ,north1 but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the ,mississippi1 and laid claim to the whole country west of the ,alleghany mountains4 ,this success must be attributed1 not to any superiority of the ,canadians in bravery1 but to the higher military character of their governors1 and more especially to their fortifications1 which were constructed in situations most judiciously selected1 to influence the ,indians and facilitate incursions into the ,english colonies4 ,the ,french pursued interior and central lines1 while the ,english followed exterior and divergent lines4 ,the disparity of numbers was always very great4 ,at the beginning of the eighteenth century1 the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one million of souls1 while that of both ,canada and ,louisiana did not exceed fifty-two thousand4 ,but the ,french possessions1 though situated at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness1 were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts1 strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought against them4 ,this fort-building propensity of the ,french became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies1 and in #agaj the legislature of ,new ,york especially protested against it in an address to the crown4 ,while the military art was stationary in ,england1 ,france had produced her four great engineers--,errard1 ,pagan1 ,vauban1 and ,cormontaigne2 and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the ,canadian colony1 when assailed by such vastly superior ,british forces4 ,still further accessions were now made to these ,english forces by large reinforcements from the mother country1 while the ,canadians received little or no assistance from ,france2 nevertheless they prolonged the war till #agfj1 forcing the ,english to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications4 ,this will be shown in the following outline of the several campaigns4 ,very early in #agee1 a considerable body of men was sent from ,great ,britain to reinforce their troops in this country4 ,these troops were again separated into four distinct armies4 ,the first1 consisting of near two thousand men1 marched to the attack of ,fort ,du ,quesne1 but was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of ,french and ,indians4 ,the second division1 of fifteen hundred1 proceeded to attack ,fort ,niagara by way of ,oswego1 but returned without success4 ,the third1 of three thousand seven hundred men1 met and defeated ,dieskau's army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred ,canadians and ,indians1 in the open field1 but did not attempt to drive him from his works at ,ticonderoga and ,crown ,point4 ,the fourth1 consisting of three thousand three hundred men and forty-one vessels1 laid waste a portion of ,nova ,scotia2 thus ending the campaign without a single important result4 ,it was commenced under favorable auspices1 with ample preparations1 and a vast superiority of force2 but this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the ,english1 and by the fortifications which the ,french had erected1 in such positions as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations4 ,washington early recommended the same system of defence for the ,english on the ,ohio2 and1 after ,braddock's defeat1 advised the erection of small fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in1 by which means the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage1 and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again4 ,but this advice of ,washington was unheeded1 and the campaign of #agef was based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one4 ,the first division1 of three thousand men1 was to operate against ,fort ,du ,quesne2 the second1 of six thousand men1 against ,niagara2 the third1 of ten thousand men1 against ,crown ,point2 and a fourth1 of two thousand men1 was to ascend the ,kennebec river1 destroy the settlements on the ,chaudiere1 and1 by alarming the country about ,quebec1 produce a diversion in favor of the third division1 which was regarded as the main army1 and was directed along the principal line of operations4 ,the entire ,french forces at this time consisted of only three thousand regulars and a body of ,canadian militia4 ,nevertheless1 the ,english1 with forces nearly six times as numerous1 closed the campaign without gaining a single advantage4 ,we here see that the ,french1 with very inferior forces1 still continued successful in every campaign1 uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy1 and gaining ground upon his colonies4 ,by the possession of ,forts ,william ,henry1 ,ticonderoga1 and ,crown ,point1 they completely commanded ,lake ,george and ,lake ,champlain1 which afforded the shortest and easiest line of communication between the ,british colonies and ,canada4 ,by means of their forts at ,montreal1 ,frontenac1 ,detroit1 c41 they had entire dominion of the lakes connecting the ,st4 ,lawrence with the ,mississippi1 and ,canada with ,louisiana2 moreover1 by means of ,fort ,du ,quesne and a line of auxiliary works1 their ascendency over the ,indians on the ,ohio was well secured4 ,but experience had at length taught the ,english wherein lay the great strength of their opponents1 and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the ,french from their fortresses1 or at least to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of troops4 ,in #ageg1 a ,british fleet of fifteen ships of the line1 eighteen frigates1 and many smaller vessels1 and a land force of twelve thousand effective men1 were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications of ,louisburg2 but they failed to effect their object4 ,in #ageh the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates1 with an army of fourteen thousand men4 ,the harbor was defended by only five ships of the line1 one fifty-gun ship1 and five frigates1 three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin4 ,the fortifications of the town had been much neglected1 and in general had fallen into ruins4 ,the garrison consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars1 and six hundred militia4 ,notwithstanding that the number of guns of the ,british fleet exceeded both the armaments of the ,french ships and of all the forts1 these ,british ships did not risk an attack1 but merely acted as transports and as a blockading squadron4 ,even the ,french naval defence1 and the outer works commanding the harbor1 were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which ,wolfe erected2 and the main work1 although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly five to one1 held out for two months1 and even then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatant inhabitants1 and not because it had received any material injury from the besiegers4 ,the defence1 however1 had been continued long enough to prevent1 for that campaign1 any further operations against ,canada4 ,the whole number of the ,english land forces in this campaign was computed at fifty thousand men1 of which more than forty thousand were in the field4 ,the first division1 of nine thousand men1 was directed against ,fort ,du ,quesne1 whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred4 ,the second division1 of sixteen thousand effective troops1 proceeded against ,ticonderoga and ,crown ,point2 while a detachment of three thousand men captured ,fort ,frontenac1 then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men4 ,the whole force of the ,french amounted to only five thousand2 the ,english attempted to drive them from their works by storm1 but were repulsed with a loss of near two thousand men1 while their opponents were scarcely injured4 ,the third division acted1 as has just been stated1 in concert with the naval force against ,louisburg4 ,in #agei1 the western division of the ,english army1 consisting of a strong body of ,indians1 and five thousand troops1 wasted the whole season in reducing ,fort ,niagara1 which was garrisoned by only six hundred men4 ,the central column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at ,crown ,point4 ,the eastern division of eight thousand men under ,wolfe ascended the ,st4 ,lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships1 thirteen frigates1 and fourteen sloops1 and smaller vessels1 carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns1 and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen4 ,the naval defence of ,quebec consisted of eight frigates1 carrying two hundred and ten guns2 the land forces numbered about nine thousand1 and the fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars1 only a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground4 ,several attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works1 but they proved equally unsuccessful4 ,although the ,english fleet carried twenty times as many guns as the forts1 their inability to reduce these works was acknowledged4 ,the siege had continued for two months1 and still the fortifications were uninjured4 ,general ,wolfe himself distinctly stated1 that1 in any further attempt to carry the place1 the guns of the shipping could not be of much use2 and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion1 that the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries1 without making the least impression upon them4 ,under these circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy ,montcalm from his works1 and make him risk a battle in the open field4 ,in an evil hour1 the ,french consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications1 and the contest was finally decided on the plains of ,abraham1 with forces nearly equal in number4 ,both ,wolfe and ,montcalm fell in this battle1 but the former on the field of victory2 and five days afterwards the inhabitants of ,quebec1 weakened and dispirited by their losses1 surrendered the town1 although its fortifications were still unharmed4 ,the ,french1 in this campaign1 had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in the open field1 and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the ,english till ,france could send troops to their relief2 but no such relief came1 and when the campaign of #agfj opened1 the little ,french army was concentrated at ,montreal4 ,as the ,english divisions advanced1 one by ,oswego1 one by ,lake ,champlain1 and the third by ,quebec1 they afforded to the ,french a fine opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against converging lines2 but the garrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction1 and therefore awaited the enemy within their works4 ,montreal1 being but slightly fortified1 was soon reduced1 and with it fell the ,french empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense4 ,at the first outbreak of the ,american ,revolution1 it was so obviously important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of ,lake ,champlain1 that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out by ,massachusetts and ,connecticut4 ,the garrisons of these works were taken by surprise4 ,this conquest1 says ,botta1 the able and elegant historian of the ,revolution1 was no doubt of high importance1 but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the whole war1 if these fortresses1 which are the bulwarks of the colonies1 had been defended in times following1 with the same prudence and valor with which they had been acquired4 ,in the campaign of #agge1 an army of two thousand seven hundred and eighty-four effective men1 with a reserve of one thousand at ,albany1 crossed the lake and approached the fortress of ,st4 ,john's about the #ast of ,september4 ,the work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred regulars1 and some two hundred militia4 ,this was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of ,canada2 to leave it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat4 ,allen had already made the rash and foolish attempt1 and his whole army had been destroyed1 and he himself made prisoner4 ,the reduction of this place was therefore deemed absolutely necessary1 but was not effected till the #c;d of ,november1 and after a long and tedious siege4 ,this delay decided the fate of the campaign2 for1 although ,montreal fell immediately afterwards1 the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our troops1 wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing1 now demanded their discharge4 ,the eastern division1 of one thousand men under ,arnold1 crossing the country by the ,kennebeck and ,chaudiere1 through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled1 arrived opposite ,quebec on the #ith of ,november4 ,the place was at this time almost without defence1 and1 had ,arnold possessed a suitable pontoon equipage1 it might easily have been taken by surprise4 ,but by the time that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared1 and a junction could be effected between the two ,american armies1 ,quebec was prepared to sustain their attack4 ,the result of that attack is too well known to require a repetition here4 ,early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the ,american army from ,canada4 ,this retreat of undisciplined troops1 in the presence of vastly superior numbers of the enemy1 would have been extremely hazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held by our own troops4 ,as it was we sustained no considerable loss4 ,carleton pursued on rapidly1 to co-operate with ,general ,howe1 who was now lying at ,new ,york with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand troops2 but he received a decided check from the guns of ,ticonderoga1 and retired again to ,canada4 ,by the ,british plan of campaign in #aggg1 the entire force of their northern army was to concentrate at ,albany4 ,one division of fifteen hundred men1 including ,indians1 advanced by ,oswego1 ,wood ,creek1 and the ,mohawk2 but ,fort ,stanwix1 with a garrison of only six hundred men1 arrested their progress and forced them to return4 ,another1 leaving ,new ,york1 ascended the ,hudson as far as ,esopus2 but its progress was so much retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river1 that it would have been too late to assist ,burgoyne1 even if it could possibly have reached ,albany4 ,the principal division of the enemy's army1 numbering about nine thousand men1 advanced by the ,champlain route4 ,little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress4 ,the works of ,ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the flanks4 ,its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental troops1 and about as many militia1 over whom the general had no control4 ,their supply of provisions was exhausted1 and only one man in ten of the militia had bayonets to their guns4 ,under these circumstances it was deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment4 ,burgoyne now advanced rapidly1 but with so little precaution as to leave his communications in rear entirely unprotected4 ,being repulsed by the ,american forces collected at ,saratoga1 his line of supplies cut off by our detached forts1 his provisions exhausted1 his troops dispirited1 and his ,indian allies having deserted him1 retreat became impossible1 and his whole army was forced to capitulate4 ,this campaign closed the military operations on our northern frontier during the war of the ,revolution4 ,we now come to the war of #ahab4 ,in the beginning of this war the number of ,british regulars in the ,canadas did not exceed three thousand men1 who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in extent4 ,in the whole of ,upper ,canada there were but seven hundred and twenty men1 and at ,montreal1 ,three ,rivers1 and on the whole line of the ,sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men1 and the garrison of ,quebec was so small1 that no detachment could be made without great inconvenience and danger4 ,the fortifications of ,isle aux ,noix1 then emphatically the key of central ,canada1 was without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign4 ,under these circumstances an ,american force of fifteen hundred or two thousand men marching rapidly from ,albany1 might readily have broken the enemy's line of defence1 and cut off all ,upper ,canada from supplies and reinforcements from ,england by way of ,quebec4 ,let us see what course was pursued4 ,on the #ast of ,june an army of two thousand men was collected at ,dayton1 in ,ohio1 placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the ,revolution1 and directed by ,detroit against the ,canadian ,peninsula4 ,the dilatory march1 absurd movements1 and traitorous surrender of ,hull's army to a ,british force of three hundred regulars and four hundred militia1 are but too well known4 ,another ,american army of about ten thousand men was afterwards raised in the west2 the main division of this army under ,harrison marched by three separate routes to invade ,canada by way of ,malden2 but they failed to reach their destination1 and wintered behind the river ,portage4 ,the ,eastern army was collected at ,albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of ,general ,dearborn1 another old officer of the ,revolution4 ,instead of pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of ,lake ,champlain1 the general was directed to divide it into three parts1 and to send one division against the ,niagara frontier1 a second against ,kingston1 and a third against ,montreal4 ,these orders were dispatched from ,washington the #bfth of ,june1 nearly a month after ,hull had begun his march from ,dayton4 ,dearborn's army1 on the first of ,september1 consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all3 six thousand three hundred for the ,niagara frontier1 two thousand two hundred at ,sacketts ,harbor1 and five thousand for ,lake ,champlain4 ,even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division of the forces1 we might have succeeded if the general had acted with energy1 so exceedingly weak were the ,canadian means of defence2 but instead of taking advantage of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time1 he entered into an armistice with the ,british general1 and his whole army of thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the #acth of ,october1 when the absurd project of crossing the ,niagara at ,lewiston failed1 because the ,new-,york militia had constitutional scruples against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side4 ,the ,lake ,champlain column1 consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand militia1 a considerable portion of which had been collected as early as the first of ,august1 had in four months advanced as far as ,la ,cole river1 a distance of about two hundred miles from ,albany4 ,the unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign1 and the army of the ,north returned to winter-quarters4 ,all the early part of the campaign of #ahac1 on the northern frontier1 was spent in a war of detachments1 in which our troops captured ,fort ,george and ,york1 and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy4 ,in these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy1 and the young officers who led them1 no little skill and military talent4 ,but nothing could have been more absurd than for a general1 with superior forces in the vicinity of an enemy1 to act only by detachments at a time when his opponents were daily increasing in number4 ,this useless war of outposts and detachments was continued till ,july1 when ,general ,dearborn was recalled1 and ,general ,wilkinson1 another old officer of the ,revolution1 put in his place4 ,it was now determined to make a push for ,montreal1 with the combined forces of the ,northern army4 ,wilkinson1 with #h1jjj men1 descended the ,st4 ,lawrence1 but did not reach ,prescott till the #fth of ,november1 thus affording to the ,english plenty of leisure to prepare for his reception4 ,hampton1 another old officer of the ,revolution1 ascended ,lake ,champlain with another column of #d1jjj men1 but refused to form any co-operation with ,wilkinson1 and after the unimportant combat of ,chrystler's ,field1 the whole army again retired to winter-quarters4 ,in the mean time the army of the ,west1 under ,harrison1 who was assisted by the military skill and science of ,mc,crea and ,wood1 and the bravery of ,croghan and ,johnson1 held in check the ,british and ,indians2 and the battle of the ,thames and the victory of ,lake ,erie formed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that quarter4 ,had such victories been gained on the ,montreal or eastern portion of the frontier1 they would have led to the most important results4 ,the plan of operations for the campaign of #ahad was of the same diverse and discordant character as before4 ,but the command of the troops had now fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers1 and ,brown1 assisted by such men as ,wood1 ,mc,crea1 ,scott1 ,ripley1 ,miller1 soon gained the victories of ,fort ,erie1 ,chippewa1 and ,lundy's ,lane2 while ,mc,comb and ,mc,donough drove back the enemy from the line of ,lake ,champlain4 ,with these operations terminated the ,northern campaign of #ahad1 the last which has been conducted on that frontier4 ,let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line4 ,the first works are at the ,falls of ,st4 ,mary1 on the western extremity of the line4 ,the second works are at ,mackinaw4 ,the third works are at the foot of ,lake ,huron4 ,the fourth works are near ,detroit4 ,the fifth works are near ,buffalo4 ,the sixth works are at the mouth of the ,niagara river4 ,the seventh works are at ,oswego4 ,the eighth works are at ,sacketts ,harbor4 ,the ninth works are below ,ogdensburg4 ,the tenth works are at ,rouse's ,point4 ,the eleventh works are near the head-waters of the ,kennebec or the ,penobscot4 ,the twelfth works are at ,calais1 on the ,st4 ,croix4 ,all these works are small1 and simple in their character1 well calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field1 but incapable of resisting a protracted siege4 ,they are entirely different in their character from those on the coast1 the latter being intended principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery1 in the defence of our seaport towns1 while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops4 ,this system of defence for our ,northern frontier has been much commented on by men professing some knowledge of the military art1 and various opinions have been advanced respecting its merits4 ,some have thought that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line2 others attach by far the greatest importance to the central or ,montreal portion of the frontier2 while others1 again1 attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line4 ,these last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the ,kennebec and the ,penobscot1 and then advance upon ,quebec1 a distance of some #bej miles1 along the isolated carriage-road1 through the valley of the ,chaudiere4 ,here is only a single road1 but little travelled1 and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness4 ,general ,jomini says emphatically1 that a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises1--an insuperable objection to the ,kennebec route1 except as a diversion to the main attack4 ,but there are still stronger objections to this route1 than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army2 for even should that army succeed in reaching ,quebec in safety1 the expedition would be entirely without military results1 unless that fortress could be immediately reduced1--a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable circumstances2 and even should we be ever so fortunate in our operations1 the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of time4 ,it would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations1 against the strongest point in the enemy's line of defence1 and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction1 in a few days1 of one of the strongest fortresses in the world4 ,what principle in military science would justify such a plan of campaign8 ,we are fully aware of the great advantages to be derived from the reduction of ,quebec2 and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object4 ,it may1 and probably will ere long1 be made to surrender to our arms2 but it would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege4 ,by advancing upon ,montreal by the ,lake ,champlain route1 we could cut off the ,canadian forces in the ,west from all reinforcements2 and then1 as circumstances might direct1 could besiege ,quebec1 or attack the enemy in the field1 or perhaps1 manoeuvring as the ,french did at the siege of ,mantua1 accomplish both objects at the same time4 ,we have seen that it was one of ,napoleon's maxims that an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations1 which should either pierce the enemy's line of defence1 or cut off his communications with his base4 ,it is the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the ,lake ,champlain line satisfies all these conditions at the same time2--that it is the most direct1 most feasible1 and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against ,canada2 and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well fortified in time of peace4 ,all agree that the ,st4 ,lawrence above ,quebec constitutes the key point of the enemy's defence1 and the objective point towards which all our operations should be directed4 ,to reach this point1 all our ,boards of ,engineers have deemed it best to collect our troops at ,albany and advance by ,lake ,champlain1 a distance of only two hundred miles4 ,besides the advantages of a good water communication the whole distance for the transportation of military stores1 there are several roads on each side1 all concentrating on this line within our own territory4 ,it has already been shown by the brief sketch of our northern wars1 that this line has been the field of strife and blood for fifteen campaigns4 ,nature has marked it out as our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with ,canada1 both in peace and war4 ,military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western extremities of this frontier1 and important secondary or auxiliary operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes2 but until we overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the ,romans1 revived by ,frederick and practised and improved by ,napoleon1 the central and interior line1 under all ordinary circumstances1 will furnish the greatest probabilities of success4 ,if the line of ,lake ,champlain is1 as we have endeavored to show1 the most important line in the north2 its security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest interest4 ,the works recommended by the ,board1 consist of a single fort1 costing #fjj1jjj1 at ,rouse's ,point1 on the extreme frontier1 and unfortified dpts at ,plattsburg and ,albany4 ,but is this sufficient to accomplish the object8 ,if the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier barrier1 what is to retard his advance1--what defensive works are to protect the dbouch of the ,northern canal1 or even to save the great central dpt8 ,we know of no foreign engineer who has recommended less than three lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier2 and ,napoleon1 the ,archduke ,charles1 and ,general ,jomini1 agree in recommending at least this number of lines4 ,there may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier2 but upon our main line of communication with ,canada1--a line of maximum importance both to us and to the enemy1 we know of no reason for violating the positive rules of the art1--rules which have been established for ages2 and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals of modern times4 ,ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion2 and we know of no change in the art of war1 or in the condition of the country1 that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an intermediate point of support between ,albany and the ,canadian lines4 ,indeed it would seem that the connection of the ,hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even increased the value of such a point4 ,it would seem1 moreover1 that the great value of a central dpt near ,albany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be afforded by defensive works4 ,here we already have one of our largest arsenals of construction2 here are to be located magazines for the collection and deposit1 in time of peace1 of gunpowder2 here1 in time of war1 is to be formed the grand military dpt for our whole northern armies2 and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication of our northern and eastern states1 and the great central rallying point where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern frontier1 or for offensive operations against ,canada4 ,such a place should never be exposed to the coup-de-main of an enemy4 ,the chance operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of so important a position4 ,we do not here pretend to say what its defences should be4 ,perhaps strong ttes-de-pont on the ,mohawk and ,hudson rivers1 and detached works on the several lines of communication1 may accomplish the desired object2 perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary4 ,but we insist on the importance of securing this position by some efficient means4 ,the remarks of ,napoleon1 7which have already been given17 on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a central place1 where the military wealth of a nation can be secured1 are strikingly applicable to this case4 ,but let us look for a moment at what is called the western plan of defence for our northern frontier4 ,certain writers and orators of the western states1 in their plans of military defence1 would have the principal fortifications of the northern frontier established on ,lake ,erie1 the ,detroit river1 the ,st4 ,clair1 and ,lake ,huron2 and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast works1 expended in establishing military and naval dpts at ,memphis and ,pittsburg1 and in the construction of a ship-canal from the lower ,illinois to ,lake ,michigan1--for the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern lakes4 ,it is said that ,british military and steam naval forces will ascend the ,st4 ,lawrence to ,lake ,ontario2 that to counteract these operations we must build an opposition steam-navy at ,pittsburg and ,memphis1 and collect out troops on the ,ohio and ,mississippi1 ascend the ,mississippi and ,illinois1 ,lake ,michigan1 ,lake ,huron1 and the ,georgian ,bay1 cross over to the ,ottawa by ,french river and ,lake ,nipissing1 or ,moon river and the ,muskago1 then descend the ,ottawa river to ,montreal4 ,but as there might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some twelve or fifteen portages between the ,georgian ,bay and the ,ottawa1 and as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft1 it has1 by some of the military writers before alluded to1 been deemed preferable to descend ,lake ,huron1 ,st4 ,clair river and lake1 run the gauntlet past the ,british forts on the ,detroit1 descend ,lake ,erie and the ,niagara#bf into ,lake ,ontario1 so as to meet the ,english as they come steaming up the ,st4 ,lawrence6 ,footnote #bf3 ,how they are to pass the ,falls was not determined either by ,harry ,bluff or the ,memphis ,convention4 ,it is agreed upon all sides that the ,british must first collect their forces at ,quebec1 and then pass along the line of the ,st4 ,lawrence and ,lake ,ontario to reach the ,niagara and ,detroit frontiers4 ,our boards of engineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the ,champlain line1 and1 by penetrating between ,montreal and ,quebec1 separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder of ,canada from supplies and reinforcements from ,england4 ,but it has been discovered by certain western men that to cut the trunk of a tree is not the proper method of felling it3 we must climb to the top and pinch the buds1 or1 at most1 cut off a few of the smaller limbs4 ,to blow up a house1 we should not place the mine under the foundation1 but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof6 ,we have already shown that troops collected at ,albany may reach the great strategic point on the ,st4 ,lawrence by an easy and direct route of two hundred miles2 but forces collected at ,pittsburg and ,memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route of two thousand miles4 ,our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war2 and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the enemy4 ,the only way1 therefore1 in which our ascendency on the lakes can be lost1 is by the introduction of steam craft from the ,atlantic4 ,the canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water4 ,how are we to prevent the introduction of these ,atlantic steamers into our lakes8 ,shall we1 at the first opening of hostilities1 march with armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of their ship-canals1 thus meeting the enemy's marine at the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas2 or shall we build opposition steam-navies at ,pittsburg and ,memphis1 some two thousand miles distant1 and then expend some forty or fifty millions#bg in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach ,lake ,ontario1 after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces8 ,very few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this question4#bh ,footnote #bg3 ,the construction of the ,illinois ship-canal1 for vessels of eight and a half feet draught1 is estimated at fifteen millions2 to give the same draught to the ,mississippi and lower ,illinois1 would require at least ten millions more2 a ship canal of the corresponding draught around ,niagara ,falls1 will cost1 say1 ten millions2 the navy yard at ,memphis1 with docks1 storehouses1 c41 will cost about two millions1 and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun4 ,on the other hand1 the military defences which it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the ,champlain frontier1 will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun2 the whole expenditure not exceeding1 at most1 two millions of dollars6 ,it is not to be denied that a water communication between the ,mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages1 and that1 in case of a protracted war1 auxiliary troops and military stores may be drawn from the valley of the ,mississippi to assist the ,north and ,east in preventing any great accessions to the ,british military forces in the ,canadas4 ,we speak only of the policy of expending vast sums of money on this military 787 project1 to the neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want4 ,we have nothing to say of its character as a commercial project1 or of the ultimate military advantages that might accrue from such a work4 ,we speak only of the present condition and wants of the country1 and not of what that condition and those wants may be generations hence6 ,footnote #bh3 ,there are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced in this chapter2 but the reader will find many remarks on the northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of #ahab1 in congressional reports1 7vide ,house ,doc4 #bjf1 ,x,x,v,ith ,congress1 #b;d session2 and ,senate ,doc41 ,no4 #he1 ,x,x,v,i,i,ith ,congress1 #b;d session17 and in numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the last few years4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,army ,,organization--,,staff ,,and ,,administrative ,,corps4 ,by the law of the #abth of ,december1 #agij1 on the organization of the public force of ,france1 the ,army was defined1 ,a standing force drawn from the public force1 and designed to act against external enemies4 ,une force habituelle extraite de la force publique1 et destine essentiellement agir contre les ennemis du dehors4 ,in time of peace1 the whole organized military force of the ,state is intended when we speak of the army2 but in time of war this force is broken up into two or more fractions1 each of which is called an army4 ,these armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be assigned to them--as1 army of invasion1 army of occupation1 army of observation1 army of reserve1 c42 or from the country or direction in which they operate--as1 army of the ,north1 of the ,south1 of ,mexico1 of ,canada1 of the ,rhine1 c42 or from the general who commands it--as1 the army of ,soult1 army of ,wellington1 army of ,blcher1 c4 ,all modern armies are organized on the same basis4 ,they are made up of a ,staff and ,administrative departments1 and four distinct arms--,infantry1 ,cavalry1 ,artillery1 and ,engineers2 each having distinct duties1 but all combining to form one and the same military body4 ,in the actual operations of a campaign1 these forces are formed into corps d'arme1 each corps d'arme being composed of two or more grand-divisions2 each grand-division1 of two or more brigades2 and each brigade1 of several companies1 squadrons1 or batteries4 ,in speaking of an army in the field1 it is sometimes supposed to be divided into two classes of men--the ,staff and the line4 ,we here include in the first class-- ,all officers1 of whatever arm1 above the rank of colonel2 ,all officers of the staff corps of whatever grade1 and ,all officers attached to the staff as aides1 c42 ,all officers of the administrative departments2 ,all officers of artillery and engineer staffs2 ,the corps of geographical or topographical engineers1 and ,the guards4 ,in the second class are included all troops1 of whatever arm1 which belong to the active army1 in infantry1 cavalry1 artillery1 and engineers4 ,all troops on detached service1 such as recruiting1 guarding posts and depots1 escorting convoys1 c41 as well as all sedentary corps1 garrisons of fortified places1 c41 are not regarded in this classification as composing any part of the line of the army4 ,troops of the line is a term applied only to such troops as form the principal line on the battle-field1 viz3--,the heavy infantry and heavy cavalry4 ,these are technically called infantry of the line1 and cavalry of the line4 ,in this sense of the term1 light infantry1 light cavalry or dragoons1 artillery1 and engineers1 are not classed as troops of the line4 ,but this distinction is now pretty much fallen into disuse1 and the division of an army into ,staff and ,administrative departments1 and four arms of service--,infantry1 ,cavalry1 ,artillery1 and ,engineers--is now regarded as the most convenient1 from being precise and definite in its meaning4 ,the general staff of an army includes all general officers of the army1 and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this general duty1 instead of serving with troops1 or on special administrative duty4 ,the general officers are--#ast1 the generalissimo1 or commander-in -chief2 #b;d1 generals1 or marshals1 as they are called in ,france1 or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry1 as they are called in ,england and the northern states of ,europe2 #c;d1 lieutenant-generals2 #dth1 generals of division1 or major-generals1 as they are called in ,england2 #eth1 generals of brigade1 or brigadier-generals1 as they are sometimes called2--colonels1 majors1 captains1 lieutenants1 ensigns1 and cornets or cadets1 are also either attached to the staff1 or form a part of the staff corps4 ,the titles of adjutant-general1 and of inspector-general1 are given to staff officers selected for these special services1 either in the general staff or in the several corps d'arme4 ,no special rank is attached to these offices themselves1 and the grade of those who hold them is fixed by some special rule1 or by their general rank in the army4 ,in the war of the ,revolution1 ,washington held the rank of ,general1 and in #agih the rank of ,lieutenant-general4 ,in the war of #ahab1 the highest grade held by any of our officers was that of ,general of ,division1 or ,major-general1 as it was called4 ,the highest grade in our army at the present time is called ,major-general--a title that properly belongs1 not to the general of an army1 but to the chief of staff4 ,hamilton had this title when chief of ,washington's staff2 ,berthier and ,soult when chief of ,napoleon's staff1 the former till the close of the campaign of #ahad1 and the latter in the ,waterloo campaign4 ,general ,jomini first greatly distinguished himself as chief of ,ney's staff1 and afterwards on the staff of the ,emperor of ,russia4 ,other generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs of their staff3--,pichegru to ,regnier1 ,moreau to ,dessoles1 ,kutusof to ,toll1 ,barclay to ,diebitsch1 and ,blcher to ,sharnharst and ,gneisenau4 ,the generalissimo or commander-in-chief of an army is the person designated by the law of the land to take charge of the organized military forces of the state4 ,in this country the ,president1 through his ,secretary of ,war1 exercises this general command4 ,in ,england1 ,wellington acts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the ,british military forces4 ,in ,france1 the ,minister of ,war1 under the king1 has this general direction4 ,in other ,european services1 some prince of the blood1 or distinguished general1 exercises the functions of generalissimo4 ,an active army in the field should be commanded by a general1 or1 as is done in some ,european countries1 by a marshal4 ,these may be regarded as of assimilated rank4 ,a corps d'arme should1 be commanded by a ,lieutenant-general4 ,this rule is almost universal in ,europe4 ,the number of marshals in ,france under ,napoleon was so great1 that officers of this grade were often assigned to corps d'arme4 ,a grand division of an army should be commanded by a ,general of ,division4 ,in ,england1 the assimilated grade is that of major-general1 and in ,france at the present time1 the younger lieutenant-generals1 or the marchaux-de-camp1 command divisions4 ,a brigade should be commanded by a ,brigadier-general4 ,at the present time in the ,french service1 marchaux-de-camp act as commanders of brigades4 ,the several corps d'arme are designated by numbers1 #ast1 #b;d1 #c;d1 c41 and in the same way the several divisions in each corps d'arme1 and the several brigades in each division4 ,when the number of troops are placed on a war footing1 each corps d'arme ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men4 ,the command of these several corps d'arme1 divisions1 and brigades1 is taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according to seniority of rank1 and without reference to arms1 unless otherwise directed by the generalissimo1 who should always have the power to designate officers for special commands4 ,the chief of staff of an army is usually selected from the grade next below that of the general commanding1 and receives the title1 for the time being1 which is used to designate this special rank4 ,in some ,european armies1 and formerly in our own service1 this officer was called major-general4 ,in ,france1 if the generalissimo commands in person1 a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of major-gnral2 but if a marshal commands the army1 a lieutenant -general or marchal-de-camp becomes chief of staff with the title of aide-major-gnral4 ,the chiefs of staff of corps d'arme and of divisions1 are selected in precisely the same way4 ,the position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his staff1 is denominated the ,general ,head-,quarter of the army2 that of a corps d'arme staff1 the ,head-,quarters of #ast or #b;d1 c4 corps d'arme2 that of a division1 the ,head-,quarters of #ast or #b;d1 c4 division1 #ast or #b;d1 c4 corps d'arme4 ,the petty staffs of regiments1 squadrons1 c41 consisting of an adjutant1 sergeant-major1 c41 are especially organized by the commandants of the regiments1 c41 and have no connection whatever with the general staff of an army4 ,of course1 then1 they are not embraced in the present discussion4 ,the subordinate officers of the staff of an army1 in time of war1 are charged with important and responsible duties connected with the execution of the orders of their respective chiefs4 ,but in time of peace1 they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the ,adjutant-general's department1 and mere military dandies1 employing their time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptible points of military etiquette1 or criticising the letters and dispatches of superior officers1 to see whether the wording of the report or the folding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to the case4 ,such was the character given to the first staff of ,wellington1 and a similar class of men composed the staff of the army of ,italy when it was abolished by ,napoleon and a new one formed in its place4 ,there are also some officers of this stamp in our own service1 but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt4 ,the staff of our army requires a new and different organization1 and should be considerably enlarged4 ,the following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff in the ,french service1 for an army of forty or fifty thousand men divided into two corps d'arme and a reserve4 #ast4 ,the marshal 7or general7 commanding-in-chief2 and one colonel or lieutenant-colonel1 one major1 three captains and three subalterns1 as aides-de-camp4 #b;d4 ,a lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff1 with the title of major-general1 assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel1 three majors1 five captains1 and one subaltern1 as aides-de-camp4 #c;d4 ,three lieutenant-generals1 commanding the corps d'arme and reserve4 ,each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the major-general1 and each will also have his regularly-organized staff of corps d'arme1 with a general of division or general of brigade as chief4 #dth4 ,six or nine generals commanding divisions1 each having his own distinct and separately organized staff4 ,in the ,french army1 the staff of an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel1 two majors1 three captains1 and six subalterns4 #eth4 ,twelve or more generals of brigade1 each having one captain1 and one subaltern for aides4 #fth4 ,there is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the army1 the commandants of artillery and engineers1 with several subordinates1 inspector-generals1 and the ranking officers of each of the administrative departments1 with their assistants4 ,the generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps1 or from either of the four arms of service4 ,the troops of these arms may be distributed as follows3 #eb battalions of infantry1 #ce1jjj men4 #db squadrons of horse1 4 4 #f1ejj #ac batteries of artillery1 7#d mounted and #i foot17 4 #b1ejj #e companies of sappers1 #b of pontoniers1#bi and #a of artificers1 4 4 4 4 4 #a1ejj ------ #de1ejj ,footnote #bi3 ,one bridge-equipage is required for each corps d'arme4 ,if we add to these the staff1 and the several officers and employs of the administrative departments1 we have an army of nearly fifty thousand men4 ,this1 it will be remembered1 is the organization of an army in the field2 in the entire military organization of a state1 the number of staff officers will be still higher4 ,in #aghh1 ,france1 with a military organization for about three hundred and twenty thousand men1 had eighteen marshals1 two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals1 five hundred and thirty-eight marchaux-de-camp1 and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers4 ,a similar organization of the general staff was maintained by ,napoleon4 ,at present the general staff of the ,french army consists of nine marshals1 7twelve in time of war27 eighty lieutenant-generals in active service1 fifty-two in reserve1 and sixty two en retraite--one hundred and ninety-four in all2 one hundred and sixty marchaux-de-camp in active service1 eighty-six in reserve1 and one hundred and ninety en retraite--four hundred and thirty-six in all4 ,the officers of the staff-corps are3 thirty colonels1 thirty lieutenant-colonels1 one hundred majors1 three hundred captains1 and one hundred lieutenants4 ,those of other ,european armies are organized on the same basis4 ,it will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own general staff is exceedingly defective1 and entirely unsuited to the object for which it is created4 ,we have two brigadier-generals for the command of two brigades1 and one general of division1 with the title of major-general1 who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding the army1 lieutenant-general1 general of division1 and chief of staff of the army4 ,but as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper organization1 the ,president 7with the advice and consent of the ,senate7 has1 from time to time1 increased this number to three major-generals1 and nine brigadier-generals1 and numerous officers of staff with lower grades4 ,nearly all these officers are detached from their several regiments and corps1 thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and companies2 and we have in our service1 by this absurd mode of supplying the defects of our system of organization by brevet rank1 the anomaly of officers being generals1 and at the same time not generals2 of holding certain ranks and grades1 and yet not holding these ranks and grades6 ,let ,congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system1 and establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff1 and restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general4 ,in the war of #ahab1 instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of the general staff was required1 we merely multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment1 or by conferring brevet rank4 ,it is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed during the war2 and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction1 driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments4 ,in the event of another war1 it is to be hoped that ,congress will not again resort to the ruinous system of #ahab4 ,possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of generals1 lieutenant-generals1 c41 that it increases the expense of the army and the number of its officers4 ,this need not be4 ,the number1 pay1 c41 may remain the same1 or nearly the same1 as at present4 ,but by increasing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank--the principal curses of our present system4 ,if we merely increase the number of each existing grade1 giving a part of these rank above their name and office1 we merely multiply evils4 ,but we will leave this subject for the present1 and recur to the general discussion of staff duties4 ,the following remarks of ,jomini on the importance of the staff of an army are worthy of attention4 ,a good staff1 says he1 is1 more than all1 indispensable to the constitution of an army2 for it must be regarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his principal supports--as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his own4 ,when harmony is wanting between the genius that commands1 and the talents of those who apply his conceptions1 success cannot be sure2 for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution4 ,moreover1 a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of any single man2 it not only remedies many evils1 but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards4 ,the petty interests of coteries1 narrow views1 and misplaced egotism1 oppose this last position3 nevertheless1 every military man of reflection1 and every enlightened statesman1 will regard its truth as beyond all dispute2 for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief1 even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself2 it prevents the commission of faults1 even though the commanding general be wanting in experience1 by furnishing him good councils4 ,how many mediocre men of both ancient and modern times1 have been rendered illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates6 ,reynier was the chief cause of the victories of ,pichegru1 in #agid2 and ,dessoles1 in like manner1 contributed to the glory of ,moreau4 ,is not ,general ,toll associated with the successes of ,kutusof8 ,diebitsch with those of ,barclay and ,witgenstein8 ,gneisenau and ,muffling with those of ,blcher8 ,numerous other instances might be cited in support of these assertions4 ,a well-established staff does not always result from a good system of education for the young aspirants2 for a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar1 without being a good warrior4 ,the staff should always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for by the officers of the several arms1 and to draw together1 in this way1 men who are already known by their aptitude for war4 ,engineer and artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff1 if they reflect that it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction1 and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding general1 and who are the most capable of directing the operations of war4 ,at the beginning of the wars of the ,revolution1 says this able historian elsewhere1 in the ,french army the general staff1 which is essential for directing the operations of war1 had neither instruction nor experience4 ,the several adjutant-generals attached to the army of ,italy were so utterly incompetent1 that ,napoleon became prejudiced against the existing staff-corps1 and virtually destroyed it1 drawing his staff-officers from the other corps of the army4 ,in his earlier wars1 a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers2 but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly required for the sieges carried on in ,germany and ,spain1 and considerable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for staff duty4 ,some of the defects of the first ,french staff-corps were remedied in the latter part of ,napoleon's career1 and in #ahah it was reorganized by ,marshal ,saint-,cyr1 and a special school established for its instruction4 ,some ,european nations have established regular staff-corps1 from which the vacancies in the general staff are filled2 others draw all their staff-officers from the corps of the army4 ,a combination of the two systems is preferred by the best judges4 ,jomini recommends a regular staff-corps1 with special schools for its instruction2 but thinks that its officers should be drawn1 at least in part1 from the other corps of the army3 the officers of engineers and artillery he deems1 from their instruction1 to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty4 ,the policy of holding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of the army1 as is done in our service1 is pronounced by all competent judges as ruinous to an army1 destroying at the same time the character of the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line4 ,the following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of an army1 made at the beginning of the war of #ahab1 are from the pen of one of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced3-- ,generals have been divided into three classes1--,theorists1 who by study and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art they profess2 ,martinets1 who have confined their attention merely to the mechanical part of the trade2 and ,practical men1 who have no other or better guide than their own experience1 in either branch of it4 ,this last description is in all services1 excepting our own1 the most numerous1 but with us gives place to a fourth class1 viz41 men destitute alike of theory and of experience4 ,self-respect is one thing1 and presumption another4 ,without the former1 no man ever became a good officer2 under the influence of the latter1 generals have committed great faults4 ,the former is the necessary result of knowledge2 the latter of ignorance4 ,a man acquainted with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new1 surprising1 or embarrassing2 a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to guess1 and not knowing how to be right by system1 will often be wrong by chance4 ,these remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to the science of war4 ,they apply to all other sciences2 but in these1 errors are comparatively harmless4 ,a naturalist may amuse himself and the public with false and fanciful theories of the earth2 and a metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter and spirit1 without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous4 ,their blunders but make us merry2 they neither pick pockets1 nor break legs1 nor destroy lives2 while those of a general bring after them evils the most compounded and mischievous1--the slaughter of an army--the devastation of a state--the ruin of an empire6 ,in proportion as ignorance may be calamitous1 the reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and strengthened4 ,are you an honest man8 ,you will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge of your duty4 ,are you a man of honor8 ,you will be careful to avoid self-reproach4 ,does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of patriotism8 ,you will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your country either insult or injury4 ,nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency4 ,has hunger made you a soldier8 ,will you not take care of your bread6 ,is vanity your principle of action8 ,will you not guard those mighty blessings1 your epaulets and feathers6 ,are you impelled by a love of glory or a love of power8 ,and can you forget that these coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct8 ,but the means of instruction1 say you1 where are they to be found8 ,our standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia1 and our militia not better than a mob4 ,nor have the defects in these been supplied by ,lyces1 ,prytanes1 and ,polytechnic schools4 ,the morbid patriotism of some1 and the false economy of others1 have nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge among us4 ,this1 reader1 is but one motive the more for reinstating it4 ,thanks to the noble art of printing6 you still have books which1 if studied1 will teach the art of war4 ,books6 ,and what are they but the dreams of pedants8 ,they may make a ,mack1 but have they ever made a ,xenophon1 a ,csar1 a ,saxe1 a ,frederick1 or a ,bonaparte8 ,who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of ,athens lecturing ,hannibal on the art of war8 ,true2 but as you are not ,hannibal1 listen to the cobbler4 ,xenophon1 ,csar1 ,saxe1 ,frederick1 and ,napoleon1 have all thought well of books1 and have even composed them4 ,nor is this extraordinary1 since they are but the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested1 and experience confirmed2 since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller1 and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own4 ,these teach most emphatically1 that the secret of successful war is not to be found in mere legs and arms1 but in the head that shall direct them4 ,if this be either ungifted by nature1 or uninstructed by study and reflection1 the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign avail nothing4 ,the two last centuries have presented many revolutions in military character1 all of which have turned on this principle4 ,it would be useless to enumerate these4 ,we shall quote only the greatest and the last--,the troops of ,frederick6 ,how illustrious under him6 ,how contemptible under his successors6 ,yet his system was there2 his double lines of march at full distance2 his oblique order of battle2 his simple lines of manoeuvre in the presence of an enemy2 his wise conformation of an tat-major2--all1 in short1 that distinguished his practice from that of ordinary men1 survived him2 but the head that truly comprehended and knew how to apply these1 died with ,frederick4 ,what an admonition does this fact present for self-instruction1--for unwearied diligence1--for study and reflection6 ,nor should the force of this be lessened by the consideration that1 after all1 unless nature should have done her part of the work1--unless to a soul not to be shaken by any changes of fortune--cool1 collected1 and strenuous--she adds a head fertile in expedients1 prompt in its decisions1 and sound in its judgments1 no man can ever merit the title of a general4 ,the celebrated ,marshal ,saxe has made the following remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good general4 ,the most indispensable one1 according to his idea1 is valor1 without which all the rest will prove nugatory4 ,the next is a sound understanding with some genius3 for he must not only be courageous1 but be extremely fertile in expedients4 ,the third is health and a robust constitution4 ,his mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources2 he must have an aptitude1 and a talent at discovering the designs of others1 without betraying the slightest trace of his own intentions2 he must be1 seemingly1 communicative1 in order to encourage others to unbosom1 but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army2 he must1 in a word1 possess activity with judgment1 be able to make a proper choice of his officers1 and never deviate from the strictest line of military justice4 ,old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions1 nor must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and regulations4 ,great abilities will justify exceptions2 but ignorance and inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession4 ,in his deportment he must be affable1 and always superior to peevishness or ill-humor2 he must not know1 or at least seem not to know1 what a spirit of resentment is2 and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military chastisement1 he must see the guilty punished without compromise or foolish humanity2 and if the delinquent be from among the number of his most intimate friends1 he must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man4 ,for it is better1 in instances of correction1 that one individual should be treated with rigor 7by orders of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence7 than that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being sacrificed to private sentiments4 ,a modern general should always have before him the example of ,manlius2 he must divest himself of personal sensations1 and not only be convinced himself1 but convince others1 that he is the organ of military justice1 and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed4 ,with these qualifications1 and by this line of conduct1 he will secure the affections of his followers1 instill into their minds all the impulses of deference and respect2 he will be feared1 and consequently obeyed4 ,the resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and checkered3 he must be perfectly master of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and situations2 how to apply its strength1 or be sparing of its energy and confidence2 how to post all its different component parts1 so as not to be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans4 ,when once engaged1 he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the relative points of disposition and arrangement1 to seize favorable moments for impression1 and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle2 on a ready possession of which its ultimate success depends4 ,these requisites are unquestionably manifold1 and grow out of the diversity of situations and the chance medley of events that produce their necessity4 ,a general to be in perfect possession of them1 must on the day of battle be divested of every thought1 and be inaccessible to every feeling1 but what immediately regards the business of the day2 he must reconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer1 whose eye collects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality1 and feels his ground as it were by instinct2 and in the disposition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession1 and make all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch4 ,his order of battle must be simple and unconfused1 and the execution of his plan be as quick as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command2 as1 the first line will attack6 the second will support it6 or1 such a battalion will advance and support the line4 ,the general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of their business indeed1 if1 upon the receipt of these orders1 they should be deficient in the immediate means of answering them1 by a prompt and ready co-operation4 ,so that the general has only to issue out directions according to the growth of circumstances1 and to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity to his intentions2 but if1 on the contrary1 he should so far forget his situation as to become a drill-sergeant in the heat of action1 he must find himself in the case of the fly in the fable1 which perched upon a wheel1 and foolishly imagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its situation4 ,a general1 therefore1 ought on the day of battle to be thoroughly master of himself1 and to have both his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of action4 ,he will by these means be enabled to see every thing2 his judgment will be unembarrassed1 and he will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy4 ,the instant a favorable opening offers1 by which the contest may be decided1 it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops1 and1 without any regard to personal safety1 to advance against the enemy's line4 ,by a ready conception of this sort1 joined to a great courage1 ,general ,dessaix determined the issue of the battle of ,marengo4 ,it is1 however1 impossible for any man to lay down rules1 or to specify with accuracy all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained4 ,every thing depends upon a variety of situations1 casualties of events1 and intermediate occurrences1 which no human foresight can positively ascertain1 but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye1 a ready conception1 and prompt execution4 ,prince ,eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications1 particularly with that sublime possession of the mind1 which constitutes the essence of a military character4 ,many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare1 that when events have brought the contest to issue1 and two rival armies have been drawn out for action1 their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment1 an equality of step1 or a regular distance in intervals of columns4 ,they have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp1 to send orders in various directions1 and to gallop themselves from one quarter to another1 without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day1 or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow4 ,they endeavor1 in fact1 to do every thing1 and thereby do nothing4 ,they appear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten track1 or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon exertions2 and from whence1 continues the same sensible writer1 do these contradictions arise8 from an ignorance of those high qualifications without which the mere routine of duty1 methodical arrangement1 and studied discipline must fall to the ground1 and defeat themselves4 ,many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments through a regular set of manoeuvres2 and having done so1 they vainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in that acquirement4 ,when1 in process of time1 the command of a large army falls to their lot1 they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking1 and1 from not knowing how to act as they ought1 they remain satisfied with doing what they have partially learned4 ,military knowledge1 as far as it regards a general or commander-in-chief1 may be divided into two parts1 one comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of rules into practice2 and the other originating a sublimity of conception that method may assist1 but cannot give4 ,if a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the situation of a general1 and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary casualties of war1 he will never rise beyond mediocrity4 ,it is1 in fact1 in war as it is in painting1 or in music4 ,perfection in either art grows out of innate talent1 but it never can be acquired without them4 ,study and perseverance may correct ideas1 but no application1 no assiduity will give the life and energy of action2 these are the works of nature4 ,it has been my fate 7observes the ,marshal7 to see several very excellent colonels become indifferent generals4 ,i have known others1 who have distinguished themselves at sieges1 and in the different evolutions of an army1 lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their profession1 the instant they were taken from that particular line1 and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse4 ,should a man of this cast be put at the head of an army1 he will confine himself to mere dispositions and manoeuvres2 to them he will look for safety2 and if once thwarted1 his defeat will be inevitable1 because his mind is not capable of other resources4 ,in order to obviate1 in the best possible manner1 the innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war1 and the greater uncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on1 some general rules ought to be laid down1 not only for the government of the troops1 but for the instruction of those who have the command of them4 ,the principles to be observed are3 that when the line or the columns advance1 their distances should be scrupulously observed2 that whenever a body of troops is ordered to charge1 every proportion of the line should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor2 that if openings are made in the first line1 it becomes the duty of the second instantly to fill up the chasms4 ,these instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature1 and do not require the least elucidation in writing ,they constitute the ,a1 ,b1 ,c of soldiers4 ,nothing can be more simple1 or more intelligible2 so much so1 that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minuti4 ,his functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind1 by which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy2 to observe his movements1 and to see with an eagle's or a king of ,prussia's eye1 all the relative directions that his opponents take4 ,it must be his business to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter1 while his real intention is to act against another2 to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans2 to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints have produced1 and when the contest is brought to issue1 to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest part1 and carrying the sword of death where its blow is certain of being mortal4 ,but to accomplish these important and indispensable points1 his judgment must be clear1 his mind collected1 his heart firm1 and his eyes incapable of being diverted1 even for a moment1 by the trifling occurrences of the day4 ,the administrative service of an army is usually divided into several distinct departments1 as-- ,pay department4 ,subsistence ,clothing ,medical ,these in our service are united4 ,hospital ,barrack ,these in our service are combined ,fuel in one1 called the ,quartermaster's ,transportation department ,recruiting ,military ,justice1 or ,court ,martial department4 ,it was intended to enter into the history1 organization1 and use of each of these civico-military departments of an army2 but our limits are such as to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a proper understanding of the subject4 ,we therefore pass from the staff directly to the line or rather the four principal arms of an army organization4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties1 those of ,grimoard1 ,thibault1 ,boutourlin1 ,labaume1 are esteemed among the best4 ,the writings of ,jomini1 ,napoleon1 ,rocquancourt1 ,vauchelle1 ,odier1 ,scharnhorst1 also contain much valuable information on this subject4 ,the following list of books may be referred to for further information on the subjects alluded to in this chapter3 ,aide-,mmoire des officiers gnraux et suprieurs et des capitaines4 ,prcis de l'art de la guerre4 ,jomini4 ,mmoires de ,napolon4 ,montholon et ,gourgaud4 ,cours lmentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires4 ,rocquancourt4 ,cours lmentaire d'administration militaire4 ,vauchelle4 ,droite lmentaire d'art militaire1 c4 ,gay de ,vernon4 ,annuaire militaire historique1 c4 ,sicard4 ,cours abrg d'administration militaire4 ,bernier4 ,cours d'administration militaire1 c4 ,odier4 ,de l'administration de l'arme d',espagne4 ,odier4 ,de l'organization de la force arme en ,france4 ,carion-,nisas4 ,elmens de l'art militaire1 c4 ,cugnot4 ,mmoires sur la guerre4 ,feuquires4 ,cours d'art militaire et d'histoire4 ,jacquinot de ,presle4 ,cours d'art militaire4 ,fallot4 ,thorie de l'officier suprieur4 ,lorier4 ,histoire de l'administration de la guerre4 ,audouin4 ,instructions diverses a l'usage de l'cole d'application du corps royal d'tat-major4 ,handbuch fr offiziere1 c4 ,scharnhorst4 ,having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the administrative service of an army organization1 it is not deemed necessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of pay1 courts-martial1 medicinal and hospital departments1 c41 c4 ,,chapter ,x ,,army ,,organization4#ca--;,,infantry ,,and ,,cavalry ,infantry4--,infantry constitutes1 in active service1 by far the most numerous portion of an army2 in time of peace its duties are simple1 and1 in most countries1 of little comparative importance2 but in our country the continually recurring difficulties on the ,indian frontiers1 render this arm peculiarly necessary and important1 even in time of general peace4 ,from the nature of infantry service--no peculiar technical knowledge 7we speak of the privates and officers of the lower grades7 being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms--the soldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties4 ,for this reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily much less than in active service1 this arm being always capable of great expansion when occasion requires4 ,footnote #ca3 ,in discussing our own organization1 it may be well to compare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of ,europe4 ,our limits will not allow us to go very much into details1 nor to make a comparison with more than a single ,european power4 ,we shall select ,france1 inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for the rest of ,europe1 and is still1 in some respects1 superior to most others4 ,in the early periods of society1 and in countries where horses abounded1 men have usually preferred fighting on horseback2 but civilization and a more thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance of infantry4 ,the ,hebrews1 and also the ,egyptians1 employed this arm almost exclusively4 ,the ,asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry1 but with the ,greeks the infantry was the favorite arm4 ,even their kings and generals usually fought on foot4 ,the ,romans conquered the world mainly with their infantry4 ,this arm was also considered of the greatest importance by the ancient ,germans and ,gauls2 but the migration of the ,huns and other ,mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses1 and the acquaintance formed by the ,franks of northern ,spain with the ,moors1 who were mounted on beautiful horses from ,arabia and the plateau of ,asia1 introduced a taste for cavalry in western ,europe4 ,this taste was still further cultivated under the feudal system1 for the knights preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot4 ,during the crusades the infantry fell into disrepute4 ,but the invention of gunpowder changed the whole system of warfare1 and restored to infantry its former importance4 ,the ,romans1 says ,napoleon in his ,memoirs1 had two infantries2 the first1 lightly armed1 was provided with a missile weapon2 the second1 heavily armed1 bore a short sword4 ,after the invention of powder two species of infantry were still continued3 the arquebusiers1 who were lightly armed1 and intended to observe and harass the enemy2 and the pikemen1 who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry4 ,during the hundred and fifty years which have elapsed since ,vauban banished lances and pikes from all the infantry of ,europe1 substituting for them the firelock and bayonet1 all the infantry has been lightly armed444444 ,there has been since that time1 properly speaking1 only one kind of infantry3 if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion1 it was by way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers2 the battalion being composed of nine companies1 one picked company did not appear sufficient4 ,if the ,emperor ,napoleon created companies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons1 it was to substitute them for those companies of chasseurs4 ,he composed them of men under five feet in height1 in order to bring into use that class of the conscription which measured from four feet ten inches to five feet2 and having been until that time exempt1 made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other classes4 ,this arrangement served to reward a great number of old soldiers1 who1 being under five feet in height1 could not enter into the companies of grenadiers1 who on account of their bravery1 deserved to enter into a picked company3 it was a powerful incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into competition4 ,had there been men of different colors in the armies of the emperor1 he would have composed companies of blacks and companies of whites3 in a country where there were cyclops or hunchbacks1 a good use might be made of companies of cyclops1 and others of hunchbacks4 ,in #aghi1 the ,french army as composed of regiments of the line and battalions of chasseurs2 the chasseurs of the ,cevennes1 the ,vivarais1 the ,alps1 of ,corsica1 and the ,pyrenees1 who at the ,revolution formed half brigades of light infantry2 but the object was not to have two different sorts of infantry1 for they were raised alike1 instructed alike1 drilled alike2 only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by the men of the mountainous districts1 or by the sons of the garde-chasse2 whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers of the ,alps and ,pyrenees2 and when they were in the armies of the ,north1 they were always detached1 in preference1 for climbing heights or scouring a forest2 when these men were placed in line1 in a battle1 they served very well as a battalion of the line1 because they had received the same instructions1 and were armed and disciplined in the same manner4 ,every power occasionally raises1 in war-time1 irregular corps1 under the title of free or legionary battalions1 consisting of foreign deserters1 or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction2 but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry4 ,there is and can be but one4 ,if the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the ,romans1 it is not light-armed troops that they ought to introduce1 but heavy-armed soldiers1 or battalions armed with swords2 for all the infantry of ,europe serve at times as light troops4 ,most ,european nations1 for reasons probably similar to those of ,napoleon1 keep up this nominal division of infantry of the line and light infantry2 but both are usually armed and equipped alike1 and both receive the same organization and instruction4 ,the light infantry are usually made up from the class of men1 or district of country1 which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters4 ,in ,france1 the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the ,ardennes1 the ,vosges1 and the ,jura districts2 in ,austria1 by the ,croates and ,tyrolese2 in ,prussia1 by the frsters1 or woodsmen2 and in ,russia1 by the ,cossacks4 ,our own western hunters1 with proper discipline1 make the best tirailleurs in the world4 ,light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main army1 to secure outposts1 to reconnoitre the ground1 secure avenues of approach1 deceive the enemy by demonstrations1 and secure the repose of the other troops by patrolling parties4 ,they usually begin a battle1 and afterwards take their places in the line1 either on the flanks1 or in the intervals between the larger bodies4 ,the battle of ,jena furnishes a good example of the use of ,french light infantry2 and at the battle of ,waterloo1 the ,prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in clearing the ground for the advance of ,blcher's heavy columns4 ,the attack of ,floh-hug by ,augereau1 of ,vierzehn ,heilegen by ,suchet1 of ,iserstaedt by ,desjardins1 are models well worthy of study4 ,the infantry of the line acts in masses1 and1 on the field of battle1 constitutes the principal fighting force4 ,its formations and the manner of engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics4 ,the importance of infantry is due1 in considerable part1 to the fact that it can be used everywhere--in mountains or on plains1 in woody or open countries1 in cities or in fields1 on rivers or at sea1 in the redoubt or in the attack of the breach2 the infantry depends only on itself1 whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree on the efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of brute force2 and when the snows of ,russia or the deserts of ,egypt deprive their animals of the means of sustenance1 they become perfectly useless4 ,foot-soldiers1 in olden times1 were armed with a spear and sometimes with a sword1 arrows1 lance1 and sling4 ,at present they are armed with a gun and bayonet1 and sometimes with a sword4 ,in some ,european services1 a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike4 ,some of the light troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle1 but this weapon is useless for the great body of infantry4 ,the short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting branches1 wood1 c41 than for actual fighting4 ,the infantry have no defensive covering1 or at least very little4 ,the helmet or cap serves to protect the head1 and the shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets4 ,it has often been proposed in modern times to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier2 but this would be worse than useless against fire-arms1 and moreover would destroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements4 ,the strength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline2 for if calm and firm1 a mass of infantry in column or in square is almost impenetrable4 ,the bayonet was introduced by ,vauban in the wars of ,louis ,,xiv41 and after the years #agjc and '#d1 the pike was totally suppressed in the ,french army4 ,this measure was warmly opposed by ,marshal ,montesquieu1 and the question was discussed by him and ,marshal ,vauban with an ability and learning worthy of these great men4 ,the arguments of ,vauban were deemed most conclusive1 and his project was adopted by the king4 ,this question has been agitated by military writers in more recent times1 ,puysgur advocating the musket1 and ,folard and ,lloyd contending in favor of restoring the pike4 ,even in our own service1 so late as the war of #ahab1 a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use of the pike1 and the fifteenth 7and perhaps another regiment7 was armed and equipped in part as pikemen2 but experience soon proved the absurdity of the project4 ,napoleon calls the infantry the arm of battles and the sinews of the army4 ,but if it be acknowledged1 that1 next to the talent of the general-in-chief1 the infantry is the first instrument of victory1 it must also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry1 artillery1 and engineers1 and that without these it would often be compromised1 and could gain but a half success4 ,the ,french infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three battalions each1 a battalion being composed of seven companies4 ,there are also several other battalions of chasseurs1 zuaves1 c41 being organized especially for service in ,africa1 and composed in part of native troops4 ,in our own army we have eight regiments of infantry1 each regiment forming a single battalion of ten companies4 ,the flank companies are intended for light infantry4 ,in all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field1 and from two-thirds to three-fourths1 say about seven-tenths of the entire military establishment4 ,in time of peace this proportion may be slightly diminished4 ,cavalry4--,the use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself4 ,the ,egyptians had cavalry before the time of ,moses1 and the ,israelites often encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors1 though they made no use of this arm themselves until the time of ,solomon4 ,the ,greeks borrowed their cavalry from the ,asiatics1 and especially from the ,persians1 who1 according to ,xenophon1 held this arm in great consideration4 ,after the battle of ,platea1 it was agreed by assembled ,greece that each power should furnish one horseman to every ten foot-soldiers4 ,in ,sparta the poorest were selected for this arm1 and the cavalry marched to combat without any previous training4 ,at ,athens the cavalry service was more popular1 and they formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred horsemen4 ,at ,thebes also this arm had consideration in the time of ,epaminondas4 ,but the cavalry of ,thessaly was the most renowned1 and both ,philip and ,alexander drew their mounted troops from that country4 ,the ,romans had made but little progress in this arm when they encountered the ,thessalians1 who fought in the army of ,pyrrhus4 ,they then increased their cavalry1 but it was not numerous till after their wars with the ,carthaginians4 ,scipio organized and disciplined the ,roman cavalry like that of the ,numidians4 ,this arm was supplied from the ranks of the richest citizens1 and afterwards formed an order intermediary between the ,senate and the people1 under the name of knights4 ,at a later period1 the cavalry of the ,gauls was particularly good4 ,the ,franks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into ,gaul4 ,under the reign of ,childeric ,i4 we see for the first time the cavaliers francs figure as a part of the national forces4 ,at the battle of ,tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of one to five1 and under ,pepin and ,charlemagne their numbers were nearly equal4 ,under ,charles the ,bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry1 and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service1 and fought only on horseback4 ,after the introduction of artillery1 cavalry was still employed1 though to little advantage4 ,gustavus ,adolphus was the first to perceive the real importance of this arm in modern warfare1 and he used it with great success4 ,but it was left for ,seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of ,frederick the ,great4 ,marshal ,saxe very justly remarked1 that cavalry is the arme du moment1 for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will gain the victory1 but if not made at the instant it may be too late4 ,the efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral impression which it makes on the enemy1 and is greater in proportion to the size of the mass1 and the rapidity of its motion4 ,this last quality enables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment1 when the enemy exposes a weak point1 or when disorder appears in his ranks4 ,but this requires a bold and active spirit1 which shrinks not from responsibility1 and is able to avail itself with quickness and decision of every opportunity4 ,if it be remembered that it is essential that this coup d'oeil1 so rare and so difficult to acquire1 be accompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake1 we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalry generals1 and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did under ,frederick and ,napoleon1 with ,seidlitz and ,murat as commanders4 ,the soldier gains great velocity by the use of the horse in war2 but in other respects he is the loser4 ,the great expense and care required of the cavalier to support his horse2 the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary obstacles1 and in using his fire-arms to advantage1 are all prejudicial to success4 ,the unequal size of the horse1 and the great diversity in his strength and breed1 have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into light and heavy cavalry1 and a mixed class called dragoons4 ,the heavy cavalry is commonly used in masses where force is mainly requisite2 the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments1 where rapidity of movement is most desired4 ,the heavy cavalry are divided into carabiniers1 cuirassiers1 and sometimes lancers4 ,the two latter are frequently united1 the cuirassiers being armed with the lance4 ,these troops are seldom used for scouts1 vanguards1 and convoys2 but are frequently employed to sustain the light cavalry4 ,their main duty is to appear on the field of battle and make the decisive charges4 ,the light cavalry is composed of chasseurs1 or troopers1 hussars1 and lancers4 ,the latter1 when composed of large men and mounted on heavy horses1 are attached to the heavy cavalry4 ,the dragoons were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot1 but it being found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one1 and the attempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either capacity1 the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the heavy and the light horse4 ,in more recent wars they have also been instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers1 till horses could be found in the enemy's country with which to mount them4 ,but we believe there is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been employed at the same time in both capacities4 ,this term is1 very improperly1 applied to all our cavalry2 and some of the congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our so-called regiments of dragoons1 by dismounting it one year1 selling its horses at auction1 and changing its arms and equipments1 and again1 the next year1 purchasing new horses1 arms1 and equipments for remounting it2 and all this for economy6 ,the ,roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet1 the rest of their body being nearly uncovered4 ,their arms were a sword and long thin javelin1 or lance1 with an iron head4 ,they afterwards reduced the shield to a much smaller size1 and made square1 and their lance was greatly increased in size and length1 and armed at both ends4 ,in other respects they were armed in the same way as infantry4 ,the use of the lance and the shield at the same time1 of course rendered both nearly worthless4 ,the ,roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies1 except1 perhaps1 the light cavalry of the ,parthians4 ,the heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients1 like the gens d'armes of the middle ages1 rendered them greatly inferior to infantry in a close engagement4 ,tigranes1 king of ,armenia1 brought an army of one hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field1 against the ,roman general ,lucullus1 who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot4 ,but the ,armenian cavalry1 called cataphratti were so overburdened with armor1 that when they fell from their horses they could scarcely move or make any use of their arms4 ,they were routed by a mere handful of ,roman infantry4 ,the modern cavalry is much lighter1 and1 by dispensing with armor1 shields1 c41 it can move with much greater rapidity4 ,a modern cavalry horse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds1 viz43 ,heavy ,light cavalry4 cavalry4 ,the rider1 4 4 4 4 #afj #adj lbs4 ,his arms and equipments1 4 4 4 #ee #dj ,his horse equipments1 4 4 4 #fj #de ,two days' rations of provisions and grain1 #be #be ----------------- #cjj #bej ,the horse moves per minute-- ,at a walk1 from #aaj yards to #abj ,at a trot1 #bbj #bdj ,at a gallop1 #ccj #cfj ,but on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads1 cavalry will walk about one hundred yards per minute1 and at an easy trot1 two hundred4 ,an ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles1 but on a forced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four hours4 ,a single horseman1 or a small detachment1 can easily exceed this distance4 ,light cavalry1 says ,napoleon1 in his ,memoirs1 ought to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy1 considerably in advance of the army2 it is not an appendage to the infantry3 it should be sustained and protected especially by the cavalry of the line4 ,rivalry and emulation have always existed between the infantry and cavalry3 light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard1 the rearguard1 and the wings of the army2 it1 therefore1 cannot properly be attached to1 and forced to follow the movements of any particular corps of infantry4 ,it would be more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line1 than to leave it in dependence upon the infantry1 with which it has no connection2 but it should be independent of both4 ,if the light cavalry is to form vanguards1 it must be organized into squadrons1 brigades1 and divisions1 for the purpose of manoeuvring2 for that is all vanguards and rearguards do3 they pursue or retreat by platoons1 form themselves into several lines1 or wheel into column1 or change their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a whole wing4 ,by a combination of such evolutions1 a vanguard1 of inferior numbers1 avoids brisk actions and general engagements1 and yet delays the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up1 for the infantry to deploy1 for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions1 and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations4 ,the art of a general of the vanguard1 or of the rear-guard1 is1 without hazarding a defeat1 to hold the enemy in check1 to impede him1 to compel him to spend three or four hours in moving a single league3 tactics point out the methods of effecting these important objects1 and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry1 and in the vanguard1 or the rear-guard1 than in any other position4 ,the ,hungarian ,insurgents1 whom we saw in #agig1 #ahje1 and #ahji1 were pitiful troops4 ,if the light troops of ,maria ,theresa's times became formidable1 it was by their excellent organization1 and1 above every thing1 by their numbers4 ,to imagine that such troops could be superior to ,wurmser's hussars1 or to the dragoons of ,latour1 or to the ,archduke ,john1 would be entertaining strange ideas of things2 but neither the ,hungarian ,insurgents1 nor the ,cossacks1 ever formed the vanguards of the ,austrian and ,russian armies2 because to speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard1 is to speak of troops which manoeuvre4 ,the ,russians considered a regiment of ,cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments untrained4 ,every thing about these troops is despicable1 except the ,cossack himself1 who is a man of fine person1 powerful1 adroit1 subtle1 a good horseman1 and indefatigable2 he is born on horseback1 and bred among civil wars2 he is in the field1 what the ,bedouin is in the desert1 or the ,barbet in the ,alps2 he never enters a house1 never lies in a bed2 and he always changes his bivouac at sunset1 that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly have observed him4 ,two ,mamelukes kept three ,frenchmen at bay1 because they were better armed1 better mounted1 and better exercised2 they had two pairs of pistols1 a tromblon1 a carbine1 a helmet with a visor1 a coat of mail1 several horses1 and several men on foot to attend them4 ,but a hundred ,french did not fear a hundred ,mamelukes2 three hundred were more than a match for an equal number2 and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred3 so powerful is the influence of tactics1 order1 and evolutions6 ,murat1 ,leclerc1 and ,lasalle1 cavalry generals1 presented themselves to the ,mamelukes in several lines3 when the latter were upon the point of outfronting the first line1 the second came to its assistance on the right and left2 the ,mamelukes then stopped1 and wheeled1 to turn the wings of this new line3 this was the moment seized for charging them2 they were always broken4 ,the duty of a vanguard1 or a rear-guard1 does not consist in advancing or retiring1 but in manoeuvring4 ,it should be composed of a good light cavalry1 supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line1 by excellent battalions of foot1 and strong batteries of artillery3 the troops must be well trained2 and the generals1 officers1 and soldiers1 should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics1 each according to his station4 ,an undisciplined troop would only embarrass the advanced guard4 ,it is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring1 the squadron should consist of one hundred men1 and that every three or four squadrons should have a superior officer4 ,it is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses3 dragoons1 mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height1 armed with straight sabres1 and without cuirasses1 should form a part of the heavy cavalry2 they should be furnished with infantry-muskets1 with bayonets3 should have the shakot of the infantry1 pantaloons covering the half-boot-buskin1 cloaks with sleeves1 and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot4 ,cavalry of all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms1 and should know how to manoeuvre on foot4 ,three thousand light cavalry1 or three thousand cuirassiers1 should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand infantry posted in a wood1 or on ground impracticable to cavalry2 and three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand infantry1 should the latter1 favored by their position1 attempt to stop them4 ,turenne1 ,prince ,eugene of ,savoy1 and ,vendome1 attached great importance to dragoons1 and used them successfully4 ,the dragoons gained great glory in ,italy1 in #agif and #agig4 ,in ,egypt and in ,spain1 during the campaigns of #ahjf and #ahjg1 a degree of prejudice sprung up against them4 ,the divisions of dragoons had been mustered at ,compiegne and ,amiens1 to be embarked without horses for the expedition of ,england1 in order to serve on foot until they should be mounted in that country4 ,general ,baraguay d',hilliers1 their first inspector1 commanded them2 he had them equipped with gaiters1 and incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits1 whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone4 ,these were no longer cavalry regiments3 they served in the campaign of #ahjf on foot1 until after the battle of ,jena1 when they were mounted on horses taken from the ,prussian cavalry1 three-fourths of which were unserviceable4 ,these combined circumstances injured the dragoons2 but in #ahac and #ahad their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers4 ,dragoons are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard1 the rear-guard1 and the wings of an army2 cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rearguards3 they should never be employed in this service but when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war4 ,napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two kinds1 chasseurs or troopers1 and light horse2 and the heavy to be composed of dragoons and cuirassiers2 the troopers to be mounted on horses of #d ft #f in42 light cavalry on horses of #d ft4 #g or #h in42 dragoons on horses of #d ft4 #i in42 and cuirassiers on horses of #d ft4 #aj or #aa in42 which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops4 ,all cavalry must receive the same instruction2 and all should be capable1 in case of need1 of performing any of the duties of mounted troops4 ,the shock is the principal effect produced by this arm2 therefore1 the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect1 provided the troops can be kept in mass4 ,but it is found1 by experience1 that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of their speed4 ,the best authorities therefore prefer1 as we have said elsewhere1 the charge at the trot1 or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy4 ,the charge of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one at a gallop4 ,on the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm of the shock1 to break through any corps that may be in opposition2 but it is unable of itself to resist a shock1 and therefore should on no account wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops4 ,it was on this account that ,frederick directed his cavalry officers1 under the severest penalties1 never to receive a charge1 but always to meet the attacking force half way4 ,this is the only mode of preventing defeat4 ,a good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of cavalry4 ,at the battle of ,auerstedt1 in #ahjf1 ,davoust ordered the divisions of ,gudin to form squares to resist the ,prussian cavalry1 which1 by means of a fog1 had gained a most advantageous position4 ,blcher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges1 but all was in vain2 the ,french infantry presented a front of iron4 ,at the combat of ,krasnoi1 in #ahab1 the cavalry of ,grouchy1 ,nansonty1 and ,bordesoult1 attacked and overthrew the dragoons of ,clarkof1 but the ,russian infantry under ,neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of vastly superior numbers of these ,french horse4 ,at the battle of ,molwitz1 the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry1 although the cavalry of the great ,frederick had already been completely overthrown4 ,but when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy1 the charges of cavalry are generally successful1 and sometimes decide the fate of the battle1 as was the case at ,rosbach1 ,zornsdorf1 ,wurtsburg1 ,marengo1 ,eylau1 ,borodino1 c4 ,cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather1 when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to advantage1 as was the case with the corps of ,augereau1 at ,eylau1 and with the ,austrian left1 at the battle of ,dresden4 ,again1 if the infantry be previously weakened1 or thrown into disorder by the fire of batteries4 ,the charge of the ,russian cavalry at ,hohenfriedberg1 in #agde1 is a remarkable example of this kind4 ,cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by infantry or other bodies of horse2 for as soon as the charge is made1 the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted1 and1 if immediately attacked1 defeat becomes inevitable4 ,the charge of the cavalry of ,ney on ,prince ,hohenlohe at the battle of ,jena1 and of the ,french horse on ,gossa at ,leipsic1 are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when properly sustained4 ,kunnersdorf and ,waterloo are examples of the disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support4 ,the choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry almost useless4 ,such was the case at the battle of ,cassano1 between the ,duke of ,vendome and the ,prince ,eugene4 ,the field was so cut up by the ,adda and the canals of ,rittorto and ,pendina1 that ,prince ,eugene could make no use of his horse4 ,if1 when master of the bridge of ,rittorto1 he had been able to charge the ,french with a body of cavalry1 there had been no doubt of his complete success4 ,after a battle1 and in the pursuit of a flying enemy1 cavalry is invaluable4 ,if ,napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted troops1 with an able commander1 at the battles of ,lutzen and ,ligny1 the results of these victories had been decisive2 whereas they were really without consequence4 ,on the other hand1 the ,prussian army in #ahjf1 after the battle of ,jena1 and ,napoleon's army in #ahae at ,waterloo1 were completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe4 ,the want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the ,american ,revolution4 ,had ,washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse1 his surprise and defeat in the lines of ,brooklyn1 and the consequent loss of ,new ,york1 had never taken place4 ,the efficient employment of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at ,bladensburg1 and the loss of the capitol1 in #ahad4 ,in a well-organized army1 the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry1 according to the nature of the war4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,to gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter1 the officer should make himself thoroughly acquainted with ,scott's ,system of ,infantry ,tactics1 for the ,united ,states' ,infantry1 or at least with ,major ,cooper's abridged edition of ,infantry ,tactics1 and with the system of ,cavalry ,tactics1 adopted in our army2 also with the directions for the use of these two arms in a campaign1 and their employment on the battle-field1 given in the writings of ,jomini1 ,decker1 ,okouneff1 ,rocquancourt1 and ,jacquinot de ,presle4 ,the following books may be referred to for further information respecting the history1 organization1 use1 and instruction of infantry and cavalry3-- ,essai gnral de tactique4 ,guibert4 ,considrations gnrales sur l'infanterie franaise1 par un gnral en rtraite4 ,a work of merit4 ,de l'infanterie1 par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expdition de ,russie4 ,histoire de la guerre de la peninsule4 ,foy4 ,this work contains many interesting and valuable remarks on the ,french and ,english systems of tactics1 and particularly on the tactics of ,infantry4 ,cours d'art et d'histoire militaires4 ,jacquinot de ,presle4 ,art de la guerre4 ,rogniat4 ,instruction destine aux troupes lgres1 c41 redige sur une instruction de ,frederick ,,ii4 ses officiers4 ,english ,infantry ,regulations4 ,ordonnance 7,french7 pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie1 par le commission de manoeuvres4 ,aide-mmoires des officiers gnraux et suprieurs1 et des capitaines4 ,essai sur l'histoire gnrale de l'art militaire4 ,carion-,nisas4 ,histoire de la milice franaise4 ,daniel4 ,cours lmentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires4 ,rocquancourt4 ,trait lmentaire d'art militaire1 c4 ,gay de ,vernon4 ,introduction l'tude de l'art de la guerre4 ,la ,roche-,amyou4 ,tactique des trois armes4 ,decker4 ,examen raisonn des trois armes1 c4 ,okouneff4 ,the last two are works of great merit4 ,the writings of ,okouneff1 however1 are very diffuse4 ,instruction pour le service de l'infanterie lgre4 ,guyard4 ,instruction de l'infanterie1 c4 ,schauenbourg4 ,trait de tactique4 ,ternay et ,koch4 ,mcanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise4 ,vroniecki4 ,trait sur l'infanterie lgre4 ,beurmann4 ,english ,cavalry ,regulations4 ,ordonnance 7,french7 sur l'exercice et les volutions de la cavalerie4 ,les troupes cheval de ,france1 c4 ,de ,bourge4 ,avant-postes de cavalerie lgre4 ,brack4 ,the author served with distinction under ,lassale1 ,colbert1 ,maison1 ,pujol1 and ,excelmans4 ,rflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie1 c4 ,caraman4 ,observations sur l'ordonnance1 c41 de la cavalerie4 ,dejean4 ,tactique de la cavalerie4 ,itier4 ,elments de tactique pour la cavalerie1 par ,mottin de la ,balme4 ,a work of rare merit4 ,de l'emploi de la cavalerie la guerre4 ,schauenbourg4 ,rmarques sur la cavalerie4 ,warnery4 ,this work has long enjoyed a high reputation among the cavalry officers of the ,european services4 ,the ,paris edition is enriched with notes by a ,french general officer4 ,nachrichten und ,betrachtungen ber die ,thaten und ,schicksale der ,reiterei1 c4 ,this work discusses the operations of cavalry in the campaigns of ,frederick the ,great and of ,napoleon1 down to the battle of ,lutzen in #ahac4 ,examen du livret provisoire1 c4 ,marbot4 ,le ,spectateur ,militaire1 contains many essays by cavalry officers on the various questions connected with the organization and use of this arm4 ,die ,gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen ,waffen-,kavallerie und reitenden ,artillerie4 ,decker4 ,manuel de l'officier4 ,ruhle de ,lilienstern4 ,aide-mmoire1 l'usage des officiers de cavalerie4 ,journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie4 ,trait de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie4 ,histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne4 ,coutz4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,army ,,organization4--,,artillery4 ,artillery4--,previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth century1 the machines of war were divided between two classes of military men1 the engineers 7engignours1 as they were called in the middle ages7 and the artillery1 7artilliers1 as they were formerly called17 the latter being particularly charged with the management of the lighter and more portable projectile machines1 such as the balistas and arco-balistas1 which were used for throwing different kinds of arrows--flches1 viretons1 carreaux1 matras1 c41 while the former managed the battering-rams1 cranes1 helipoles1 c4 ,and1 indeed1 for a long time after the discovery of gunpowder1 this distinction was kept up1 and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile machines1 while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence4 ,but the new artillery was gradually introduced1 without1 however1 immediately displacing the old1 and there were for a time1 if we may be allowed the expression1 two artilleries1 the one employing the old projectile machines1 and the other those of the new invention4 ,the latter were called canoniers1 to distinguish them from the former1 who still retained the name of artilliers4 ,the first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth century1 or1 perhaps1 among the ,arabs as early as the middle of the thirteenth century1 but they were not much known in ,europe till about #acej4 ,cannon are said to have been employed by the ,moors as early as #abdi1 and by the ,french in #acch4 ,the ,english used artillery at the battle of ,crecy in #acdf4 ,both cannon and the ancient projectile machines were employed at the siege of ,aiguillon in #acci1 at ,zara in #acde1 at ,rennes in #aceg1 and at ,naples in #achj4 ,at this last siege the ancient balista was employed to throw into the castle of ,naples barrels of infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war4 ,we read of the same thing being done in ,spain at a later period4 ,cannon in ,france were at first called bombards and couleuverines1 but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them1 such as serpentines1 basilisks1 scorpions1c4 ,in the infancy of the art they were made small1 weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds1 and were mounted on small moveable carriages4 ,this species of fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century4 ,they were followed by heavier pieces1 used in the attack and defence of towns4 ,this siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till1 towards the latter part of the fifteenth century1 they reached such an enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine4 ,louis ,,xi4 had an immense piece constructed at ,tours1 in #aggj1 which1 it was said1 carried a ball from the ,bastille to ,charenton1 7about six miles67 ,its caliber was that of five hundred pounds4 ,it was intended for experiment1 and burst on the second discharge4 ,the famous culverin of ,bolduc was said to carry a ball from that city to ,bommel4 ,the culverin of ,nancy1 made in #aeih1 was more than twenty-three feet in length4 ,there is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at ,metz of about this length1 which carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds4 ,cannon balls were found at ,paris as late as #agab1 weighing near two hundred pounds1 and from twelve to sixteen inches in diameter4 ,at the siege of ,constantinople in #adec1 there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an incredible size2 at the siege of ,bourges in #adab1 a cannon was used which1 it was said1 threw stone balls of the size of mill-stones4 ,the ,gantois1 under ,arteville1 made a bombard fifty feet in length1 whose report was heard at a distance of ten leagues6 ,the first cannon were made of wood1 and covered with sheet-iron1 or embraced by iron rings3 longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards substituted for the wooden form4 ,towards the end of the fourteenth century1 brass1 tin1 copper1 wrought and cast iron1 were successively used for this purpose4 ,the bores of the pieces were first made in a conical shape1 and it was not until a much later period that the cylindrical form was introduced4 ,in the wars between the ,spaniards and ,moors in the latter part of the fifteenth century1 very great use was made of artillery in sieges and battles4 ,ferdinand the ,catholic had at this time1 probably1 a larger artillery train than any other ,european power4 ,the ,spanish cannon1 generally very large1 were composed of iron bars about two inches in breadth1 held together by bolts and rings of the same metal4 ,the pieces were firmly attached to their carriages1 and incapable of either horizontal or vertical movement4 ,the balls thrown by them were usually of marble1 though sometimes of iron4 ,many of the pieces used at the siege of ,baza1 in #adhf1 are still to be seen in that city1 and also the cannon balls then in use4 ,some of the latter are fourteen inches in diameter1 and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds4 ,the length of the cannon was about twelve feet4 ,these dimensions are a proof of a slight improvement in this branch of military science1 which was1 nevertheless1 still in its infancy4 ,the awkwardness of artillery at this period may be judged of by its slowness of fire4 ,at the siege of ,zeteuel1 in #adjg1 five bombards1 as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then called1 were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a day2 and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of ,albahar1 that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four hours6 ,in the ,italian wars between ,france and ,spain1 in the beginning of the sixteenth century1 the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use was so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field4 ,at the battle of ,cerignola1 in #aejc1 the number of cannon in the ,french army was only thirteen4 ,indeed1 during the greater part of this century1 four or five pieces were considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field1 and many agreed to the doctrine of ,machiavelli1 that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack and defence of places4 ,but in the wars of ,henry ,,iv4 of ,france1 this arm of service was again increased1 and the troops which this king destined against the house of ,austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces4 ,great improvements were also made about this period in the manufacture of powder1 and all kinds of fire-arms4 ,sully gave greater development to this arm of service1 improving its materials1 and increasing its efficiency4 ,then1 as at most other periods1 the ,french were in advance of most other nations in artillery4 ,it was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century1 that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to give place to more wieldy and useful pieces4 ,a certain ,m4 de ,linar demonstrated1 in the latter part of the sixteenth century1 that cannon twelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeen feet in length1 the calibre being the same2 but some years elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery4 ,in #afbd1 ,gustavus ,adolphus caused experiments to be made to verify this point1 and1 on being convinced of its truth1 caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and lighter pieces4 ,this great king introduced1 about the same time1 a new and lighter kind of artillery1 made of sheet iron and leather4 ,each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings2 over these was placed a form of hardened leather1 which was again encircled with rings and held compactly together4 ,these pieces were mounted on light carriages1 so that two men could easily manoeuvre them4 ,it was said that they would fire from eight to ten rounds without requiring repairs4 ,gustavus made use of them in all his military operations from #afbh to the time of his death4 ,they did him excellent service on numerous occasions2 being so very light they could be easily transported1 and1 on the field of battle1 their movements could be made to conform to the movements of his troops4 ,as cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use1 various inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from time to time4 ,cannon were constructed with two or more barrels2 some were arranged for being loaded in the breech1 and others at the mouth of the piece2 two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers1 which revolved about a vertical axis1 so that the recoil of one piece would bring the other into battery2 and various other arrangements of this description1 which have recently been revived and some of them patented as new inventions4 ,the small arms employed at this period were much the same as those used at the present day1 except the matchlock1 which afterwards gave place to flint-locks4 ,arms of this description were sometimes made to be loaded at the breach1 and guns with two1 three1 and even as many as eight barrels1 were at one time in fashion4 ,in the ,muse de l',artillerie at ,paris may be found many arms of this kind1 which have been reproduced in this country and ,england as new inventions4 ,in this ,museum are two ancient pieces1 invented near the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century1 which very nearly correspond with ,colt's patent1 with the single exception of the lock6#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,it is not to be inferred that the modern improvements 7as they are called7 are copied from the more ancient inventions4 ,two men of different ages1 or even of the same age1 sometimes fall upon the same identical discovery1 without either's borrowing from the other4 ,the materiel of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into two general classes3 #ast4 ,siege ,artillery1 or such as is employed in the attack and defence of places4 #b;d4 ,field ,artillery1 or such as is used in battle1 or in the field-operations of an army4 #a4 ,siege ,artillery is composed of mortars1 large howitzers1 ,paixhan guns or ,columbiads1#cd and all cannon of a large calibre4 ,in our service this class of ordnance includes the twelve1 eighteen1 twenty-four1 thirty-two1 and forty-two-pounder guns1 the eight1 ten1 and thirteen-inch mortars1 the sixteen-inch stone mortar1 the twenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar1 the twenty-four-pounder carronade1 and the eight1 ten1 and twelve-inch howitzers4 ,footnote #cd3 ,these pieces were first invented by ,colonel ,bomford1 of the ,u4,s4 army1 and used in the war of #ahab4 ,the dimensions of these guns were first taken to ,europe by a young ,french officer1 and thus fell into the hands of ,general ,paixhan1 who immediately introduced them into the ,french service4 ,they were by this means first made known to the rest of ,europe1 and received the name of the person who introduced them into the ,european services1 rather than that of the original inventor4 ,all these facts are so fully susceptible of proof1 that ,europeans now acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the invention2 even ,general ,paixhan gives up all claim to originality in his gun1 and limits himself to certain improvements which he introduced4 ,the original gun1 which was invented by ,colonel ,bomford1 and whose dimensions were carried to ,general ,paixhan in ,france1 is now lying at the ordnance dpt1 in ,new ,york harbor4 ,all these1 except the smaller mortars1 are made of cast iron4 ,this substance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze1 and the cannon made of it are1 on this account1 much heavier than of the other materials2 but for the naval service1 and the attack and defence of fortifications1 the weight required to secure the necessary strength is not very objectionable4 ,wrought iron and bronze are much more expensive and less durable4 ,moreover1 the difficulty of forging wrought iron in masses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought into general use for artillery4 ,numerous attempts have been made1 at different periods1 to construct large guns of this material1 but none have yet been successful4 ,improvements which are now making in the manufacture of wrought iron1 may render this the preferable material for the smaller pieces of artillery2 but the best informed military men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon1 both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its manufacture4 ,even should the latter objection be removed1 its cost must prevent its general application to the construction of siege artillery4 ,charlatans in military science1 both in this country and in ,europe1 bring this subject up every fifteen or twenty years as a new invention1 and flaming notices of the improvement1 and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in the art of war1 are circulated in the newspapers to gull a credulous public2 and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have been squandered on some court-favorite1 the whole matter ends in the explosion of the improvement1 and probably the destruction of the inventor1 and perhaps also of his spectators4 ,let us be distinctly understood on this subject4 ,there may be inventions and improvements in the manufacture of wrought iron1 but there is nothing new in its application to the construction of cannon1 for it has been used for this purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art4 #b4 ,field ,artillery is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers4 ,in our service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder guns1 and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers4 ,all these are now made of bronze4 ,this material is more expensive than cast-iron1 but its superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight is objectionable4 ,improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces4 ,it is also possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough1 and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces4 ,it is here important to combine strength with lightness1 and additional expense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object4 ,the projectiles now in use are solid shot1 shells1 strap-shot1 case or canister-shot1 grape-shot1 light and fire-balls1 carcasses1 grenades1 and rockets4 ,solid shot are now almost invariably made of cast iron1#ce formed in moulds of sand or iron4 ,this projectile is used under almost every circumstance1 whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defence of places1 and is the only one that is effectual against the stone walls of forts4 ,hot shot are used against shipping and wooden structures of every description4 ,red-hot balls were first employed by the king of ,poland1 in #aege1 but1 on account of the difficulty of heating them with rapidity1 and the danger of loading the piece with them1 this kind of projectile was not in general use till a much later period4 ,it was at first supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great1 when heated to a red or white heat1 as to prevent the ball from entering the piece2 it is found1 however1 that the windage is still sufficient for loading with facility4 ,these red-hot balls are principally used to fire wooden buildings1 ships1 and other combustible matter4 ,they are therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence1 and all fortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces and grates1 arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity4 ,footnote #ce3 ,in ,mexico1 where iron is scarce1 copper is used for shot and shells2 but it is a poor substitute4 ,there are several kinds of hollow-shot and shells1 called bombs1 howitzes1 grenades1 c4 ,they are made of cast iron1 and usually in a spherical shape1 the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface4 ,the cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior1 under the belief that the heavier side would always strike first4 ,the rotary motion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of no use4 ,fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell by means of a fuse1 which is so regulated that the explosion shall take place at the desired moment4 ,hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary buildings1 ships1 earthwork1 and thin walls of masonry2 they1 however1 are of little avail in breaking the massive walls of well-constructed forts4 ,howitzes and grenades are particularly effective against cavalry and columns of infantry1 and are much employed on the battle-field2 they are also much used in the attack and defence of places4 ,we find that as early as #adhf the ,spaniards made use of a projectile similar to the modern bomb4 ,they threw from their engines large globular masses1 composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder1 which1 scattering long trains of light1 says an eye-witness1 in their passage through the air1 filled the beholders with dismay1 and descending on the roofs of edifices1 frequently occasioned extensive conflagration4 ,in the siege of ,constantinople by ,mahomet ,,ii41 shells were used1 and also mortars of enormous size4 ,in #aegb ,valturus proposed to throw1 with a kind of mortar1 globes of copper filled with powder4 ,in #aehh1 an artificer of ,venloo burned ,wachtendeck by throwing bombs into the place4 ,a similar attempt had just been made at ,berg-op-,zoom4 ,the use of this projectile became quite common in ,france under ,louis ,,xiii4 ,howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century4 ,they are of ,german origin1 and the howitzer first bore the name of hausmitz4 ,the strap-shot consists of a round ball attached to a sabot of the same calibre1 by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at right angles1 and fastened to a third1 which is soldered around the sabot4 ,one end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the cartridge1 the other being hollowed out to receive the shot4 ,the supposed advantages of this arrangement are1 #ast1 a diminution of the windage2 #b;d1 the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity2 and1 #c;d1 the cartridge is transported with greater safety4 ,the case or canister-shot is prepared by filling a tin canister with grape-shot or musket-balls1 and attaching it to the cartridge by means of a sabot4 ,there being two sizes of grape-shot1 and one of musket-balls1 we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances4 ,the three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in the same canister4 ,this projectile is particularly effective against lines of infantry and cavalry1 when the distance is short4 ,the grape-shot is composed of small balls arranged round an upright pin attached to a plate of wood or iron4 ,the concave cast-iron plate is preferable1 as it increases the range of the shot4 ,the balls are covered with canvass1 and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine4 ,this shot is used for the same purposes as the canister4 ,light and fire-balls are formed of an oval case of sacking1 filled with combustible matter1 and attached to a culot of cast-iron4 ,the whole is covered with a net of spun-yarn4 ,light-balls are used to light up our own works1 and are not armed2 fire-balls being employed to light up the works or approaches of an enemy1 it is necessary to arm them with pistol-barrels1 in order to prevent1 any one from extinguishing them4 ,when made of very combustible materials1 and used for setting fire to wooden structures1 they are denominated incendiary balls4 ,carcasses are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls2 they are of two kinds3 #ast1 the shell-carcass2 and1 #b;d1 the ribbed-carcass4 ,the first is composed of a spherical shell1 cast with five fuse-holes1 one being at the top1 and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and at right angles with each other2 the shell is filled with matter highly combustible4 ,the second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps1 and attached at the ends to culots of the same material1 the whole being filled with combustible composition4 ,this is more expensive than the shell carcass1 and cannot be fired with as great accuracy2 it is now seldom used4 ,carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls4 ,smoke and suffocating balls are used to drive an enemy from galleries and mines4 ,they are thrown by hand4 ,the personnel of the ,french artillery was for a long time retained1 together with the engineers1 under the general direction of the ,grand ,master of ,cross-bows4 ,in #adbj the master-general of artillery was made independent of the grand-master of cross-bows2 but previous to the reign of ,louis ,,xiv41 the artillery troops had no organization as a separate corps4 ,in #affh six companies of canoniers were created1 and soon after two companies of bombardiers4 ,in #afic the first regiment of fusiliers was changed into a royal regiment of artillery1 and both the canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it4 ,the staff of artillery1 towards the close of this reign1 was composed of one grand-master1 sixty lieutenants1 sixty commissaries1 and eighty officiers-pointeurs4 ,in #agba the artillery was divided into five battalions and stationed at ,metz1 ,strasbourg1 ,grenoble1 ,perpignan1 and ,la ,fre1 where they established schools of theory and practice4 ,in #agef the artillery was organized into seven regiments1 each regiment having its own separate school4 ,this organization continued without any remarkable change till the ,revolution4 ,during the earlier campaigns of the ,french ,revolution it is impossible to trace out the changes that took place in army organization1 every thing was then so irregular and confused1 the troops of different arms being frequently united together4 ,in the campaign of #agib there were some six or seven regiments of foot artillery1 and ten companies of horse4 ,this arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns1 and its organization was completely remodelled by ,napoleon on his elevation to the head of the government4 ,the personnel of the artillery was then composed of a general staff1 nine regiments of foot and six of horse4 ,in #ahae it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse4 ,the personnel of artillery in modern army organization is divided into four classes3 the staff1 guards1 artificers1 and troops4 ,i4 ,the ,staff1 or ,ordnance1 as it is called in our service1 is charged with the construction of all the materials of artillery1 and the collection of powder and military stores4 ,as the lives of persons using these materials1 and1 in a considerable degree1 the success of war1 depend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and collected1 it is obvious that the members of this branch of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications4 ,in the ,french army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and eighty-three officers of different grades3 also twenty-four officers of the general staff are attached to this service4 ,in our army the ordnance is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades4 ,,ii4 ,artillery-guards4--,these in our service are divided into two classes3 #ast4 ,military ,store-keepers4 #b;d4 ,ordnance ,sergeants4 ,both are alike charged with the care and preservation of the artillery property and stores at the several garrisons1 arsenals1 and magazines4 ,in our army we have fifty-eight of these guards1 viz3 fifteen commissioned military store-keepers1 and forty-three ordnance sergeants4 ,we seldom have more than this number of permanent posts2 each one can therefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery stores4 ,in the ,french service there are three hundred and fifteen of these artillery guards2 they are divided into three classes4 ,,iii4 ,artificers4--,this class of men are employed in the construction and repairs of military materials4 ,in most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen1 by the piece or contract4 ,nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of this description are found to be both useful and necessary4 ,we have three hundred and thirty of these in our army1 viz3 two hundred and fifty enlisted ordnance men1 and eighty artificers attached to the regiments4 ,in the ,french army they have for the service of the arsenals and establishments1 one hundred and forty-nine ouvriers1 and twelve artificers2 there are also three hundred and sixty ouvriers and seventeen armuriers attached to the corps of artillery1 making in all five hundred and thirty-eight4 ,,iv4 ,artillery ,troops4--,artillery1 as an arm of service1 is divided in the same manner as its materiel2 the field-artillery being intended for field service1 and the garrison or siege-artillery1 for the attack and defence of places4 ,the troops of the artillery corps of a modern army usually do duty either in the field1 or in sieges1 or garrison1 as occasion may require4 ,when employed in the service of a campaign1 artillery is usually divided into two classes3 #ast4 ,foot ,artillery2 and #b;d4 ,horse ,artillery4 ,in the early history of artillery1 as has already been shown1 but few pieces were ever brought upon the battle-field4 ,charles ,,viii4 crossed the ,alps with a pretty large train2 but a part of these were hand-guns1 and but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle2 indeed1 it was then thought that this arm would be of little use except in sieges4 ,at the battle of ,gravelines the army of ,philip ,,ii4 had only seventeen pieces of artillery2 and at the battle of ,ivry the ,french had only four pieces of cannon1 and two culverins3 the army of the ,league had also only four pieces4 ,at the battle of ,moncontour the opposing armies had but eight pieces each4 ,gustavus ,adolphus of ,sweden not only improved the character of artillery1 but also gave to it great development as an arm of service4 ,at the battle of ,bretenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery1 great and small1 and at the camp of ,nuremberg he numbered about three hundred4 ,this king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done by his predecessors2 his system was nevertheless very imperfect4 ,in the disposition of this arm on the field of battle1 a vast improvement was made by ,cond1 ,turenne1 and ,prince ,eugene of ,savoy4 ,frederick the ,great also made great use of this arm1 and was the first to introduce horse artillery4 ,this mode of using field-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render it an invaluable arm4 ,the promptness and rapidity of its movements enable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them4 ,the ,french soon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king of ,prussia1 and in #agfc the celebrated ,gribeauval appeared4 ,he improved the form of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery1 giving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since his time4 ,the successive improvements in artillery have for a long time constituted a prominent feature in war4 ,the power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great distance1 and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles1 renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field1 and a strong barrier and safeguard of states4 ,it is an essential element in all army organization4 ,in our army we have four regiments of artillery1 forming the basis of forty batteries4 ,in the ,french service there are fourteen regiments1 forming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries4 ,the term battery1 when applied to artillery as an arm of service1 refers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon1 with the men and other accessaries required to serve them4 ,this is the unit of force in this arm4 ,the regimental organization is a mere nominal arrangement1 for in actual service artillery acts by batteries1 and never by regiments4 ,its strength is therefore invariably estimated by the number of its batteries4 ,a battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces1 two of them being howitzers4 ,the lighter batteries would1 in our service1 be formed of six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers2 and the heavier of twelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers4 ,these heavy batteries would usually form the reserve4 ,each piece being attended by its caisson1 this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery1 six for the guns and six for the caissons4 ,the extra caissons form a part of the reserve1 and move with the train4 ,in some foreign services a battery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons4 ,this arm admits of three formations--in column1 in battle1 and in battery4 ,in column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces1 each piece being followed or preceded by its caisson4 ,columns of half-batteries are sometimes formed1 and also columns of single pieces2 but the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity in passing a narrow defile1 and at a distance from the enemy4 ,in order of battle1 the pieces are drawn up in line1 their caissons forming a second line1 at the distance of a few paces4 ,when in order of battery1 the pieces are formed in the same way as for battle1 except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared for firing4 ,the movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of infantry1 and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry1 a battery being regarded as a battalion or squadron1 of which the pieces form the platoons4 ,mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the trot1 except in cases of emergency1 and even then the gallop can be kept up only for a very short time2 but this is of no great importance1 as the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge4 ,the ,french and ,german writers discuss artillery as employed in battle1 under two distinct heads--#ast1 as an arm of preparation1 and #b;d1 as an arm of succor4 ,i4 ,as an arm of preparation it serves1 #ast1 to protect the deploying of the other troops2 #b;d1 to disorganize the enemy's masses1 and to facilitate the action of infantry and cavalry1 by weakening the intended points of attack2 #c;d1 to force an enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself2 #dth1 to keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike the decisive blow4 ,the force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its fire2 rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than skill1 patience1 and cool courage4 ,artillery always acts at a distance1 and in mass2 single pieces are seldom employed1 except to cover reconnoitring parties1 or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish4 ,mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry2 but this is only done with a strong support of other troops1 and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry4 ,the batteries do not accompany the charge1 but they should always follow up and complete the success2 mounted batteries are particularly useful in pursuit4 ,if ,murat1 in #ahab1 had accompanied his attacks upon ,neveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three batteries of mounted artillery1 the whole column must have been captured or destroyed4 ,artillery1 on the field of battle1 is very liable to allow its fire to be drawn1 and its projectiles wasted1 while the enemy is at too great a distance to be reached4 ,it is a very common thing in a battle1 to employ two or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight1 in order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before the proper time4 ,the waste of material is not the only loss attending this error2 the troops are fatigued and disheartened1 while the courage and confidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate fire4 ,to avoid such an error the commanding officer of a battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effective ranges of his pieces1 and accustomed to form a correct estimate of distances4 ,for this purpose the eye should be frequently practised in time of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres4 ,the effective range of a #ab-pounder field-piece is about 4 4 4 4 4 4 #ajjj yds4 #f #hjj #bd howitzer1 #fjj #ab #ejj grape and case shot is from 4 4 4 4 4 4 #cjj to #ejj ,even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large portion of the projectiles are lost4 ,in the attack on ,spires1 a whole column of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of #ijj yards from the enemy1 who1 of course1 received little or no injury4 ,in firing from fortifications1 the aim is far more accurate1 and the artillery may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within the longest range4 ,,ii4 ,as an arm of succor1 the artillery serves1 #ast1 to give impulsive force to the attacking columns2 #b;d1 to assist in arresting1 or at least in retarding1 the offensive movements of an enemy2 #c;d1 to protect the avenues of approach1 and to defend obstacles that cover a position2 and1 #dth1 to cover a retrograde movement4 ,mounted artillery is1 like cavalry1 much the most effective in attack2 but batteries of foot are better calculated for defence4 ,the cannoniers are so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the last extremity2 they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns of infantry4 ,as to pretending to rush upon the guns1 says ,napoleon1 and carry them by the bayonet1 or to pick off the gunners by musketry1 these are chimerical ideas4 ,such things do sometimes happen2 but have we not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a coup de main8 ,as a general rule1 there is no infantry1 however intrepid it may be1 that can1 without artillery1 march with impunity the distance of five or six hundred toises1 against two well-placed batteries 7#af pieces7 of cannon1 served by good gunners2 before they could pass over two-thirds of the way1 the men would be killed1 wounded1 or dispersed4 99 99 99 99 ,a good infantry forms1 no doubt1 the sinews of an army2 but if it were required to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery1 its good quality would be exhausted1 and its efficiency destroyed4 ,in the first campaigns of the wars of the ,revolution1 what ,france had in the greatest perfection was artillery2 we know not a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon1 judiciously placed1 and in battery1 were ever carried by the bayonet4 ,in the affair at ,valmy1 at the battles of ,jemmapes1 ,nordlingen1 and ,fleurus1 the ,french had an artillery superior to that of the enemy1 although they had often only two guns to one thousand men2 but that was because their armies were very numerous4 ,it may happen that a general1 more skilful in manoeuvring1 more expert than his adversary1 and commanding a better infantry1 may obtain successes during a part of a campaign1 although his artillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent2 but on the critical day of a general engagement1 his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt4 ,history furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in protecting avenues of approach3--such as the defile of ,kesen at the battle of ,auerstedt2 the avenues between the redoubts of ,pultowa1 c41 c4 ,when an army is forced to retreat1 it covers its rear by that portion of its cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the battle4 ,by placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries in echelon1 the retiring column may be well protected4 ,the artillery1 by using the prolonge1 may also continue its retreat while in battery and firing4 ,it was in this way that at the battle of ,albuera1 in #ahaa1 the ,french artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of the ,anglo-,spaniards till the army effected its retreat2 the artillery then retired in echelons1 by batteries and fractions of batteries1 under the protection of the cavalry4 ,we have already discussed1 under the general head of tactics1 the position and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional remarks must suffice4 ,as a general rule1 batteries should be placed in positions from which they can employ their fire to advantage1 and also be free to move in any direction that the progress of the battle may require4 ,advantage should always be taken of natural or artificial obstacles1 such as hedges1 clumps of trees1 logs1 mounds of earth1 c41 to cover and conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire4 ,elevated positions are1 contrary to the common opinion1 generally unfavorable1 for artillery cannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression4 ,the slopes in front should be of considerable length1 otherwise the balls would do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack which occupied the valley4 ,the ground should also be smooth1 for if rough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth1 or ricochet at a high angle of deflection1 thus destroying a considerable part of the effect of the fire4 ,the counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable for artillery1 as they enable it to see1 with an enfilading fire1 the slopes of the principal range4 ,batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire over other troops1 for they will not only be intimidated by this fire1 but also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery4 ,a large number of pieces should never be crowded into the same place1 but an interval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet1 according to the locality4 ,the most favorable position for this arm in ordinary ground1 is in the intervals between the regiments or brigades of the line1 and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the other troops the fire of the enemy's artillery4 ,the flanks of the line are also favorable for the action of this arm4 ,sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle2 but such instances are exceptions1 and can never be comprised in general rules4 ,whenever this disposition has been made1 it has resulted from the defective character of the other arms1 or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics4 ,such was the case with ,napoleon at ,wagram4 ,in ,saxony1 in #ahac1 he was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms4 ,in the defence and attack of field-works1 and in the passage of rivers1 artillery plays an important and indispensable part2 but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers1 or at least acts in concert with that arm4 ,the troops of artillery1 in all well-regulated army organizations1 should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry1 or one-seventh of the infantry4#cf ,footnote #cf3 ,to qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of service1 the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted with--4 ,the ,instruction for ,united ,states ,field ,artillery1 horse and foot2 ,capt4 ,anderson's ,instruction for ,garrison ,artillery2 ,kinsley's ,notes on ,pyrotechny2 ,knowlton's ,notes on ,gunpowder1c42 and ,the writings of ,thiroux and ,piobert on theoretical and practical instruction1 and the writings of ,jomini1 ,decker1 and ,okotmeff1 on the use of this arm on the field of battle4 ,the following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of artillery4 ,histoire gnral de l'artillerie4 ,brunet4 ,l'artillerie cheval dans les combats de cavalerie4 ,par un officier de l'artillerie ,prussienne4 ,considrations et experiences sur le tir des obus bulles4 ,bormann4 ,essai sur les obusiers4 ,dusaert4 ,essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie4 ,le ,bourg4 ,trait sur l'artillerie1 7traduit de l',allemand47 ,rouvroy4 ,bombardier ,franais4 ,blidor4 ,mmoires d'artillerie4 ,st4 ,rmy4 ,essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle de sige4 ,dupuget4 ,mmoires sur les nouveaux systmes d'artillerie4 ,st4 ,aubin4 ,treatise on ,artillery4 ,mller4 ,artificial ,fire-,works4 ,jones4 ,table de tir les canons et obusiers4 ,lombard4 ,on ,gunpowder4 ,antoni4 ,recherches sur l'artillerie en gnral4 ,texier de ,norbec4 ,dscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons4 ,monge4 ,procds de la fabrication des armes blanches4 ,vandermonde4 ,manuel de l'artilleur4 ,durtubie4 ,trait du mouvement des projectiles4 ,lombard4 ,treatise on ,artillery4 ,scheel4 7,translated from the ,german47 ,trait pratique des feux d'artifice4 ,morel4 ,manuel du canonnier marin4 ,cornibert4 ,new ,principles of ,gunnery4 ,robins4 ,mmoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives4 ,cotty4 ,recherches sur la poudre4 ,cossigny4 ,supplement4 ,cossigny4 ,fabrication de la poudre4 ,renaud4 ,american ,artillerist's ,companion4 ,toussard4 ,tables des portes des canons et canonades de la marine4 ,cornilwert4 ,trait d'artifices de guerre4 ,bigot4 ,trait lmentaire de la fabrication des bouches feu4 ,dartein4 ,trait de l'art de fabriquer la poudre canon4 ,botte et ,riffault4 ,l'art du salptrier4 ,botte et ,riffault4 ,dictionary of ,artillery4 ,hoyer4 7,german47 ,new ,experiments on ,gunnery4 ,hutton--7,hutton's ,tracts47 ,des bois propres au service des ,arsenaux4 ,herbin de ,halles4 ,instruction sur le service de l'artillerie4 ,hulot4 ,manoeuvres de force4 ,bigot4 ,balistique4 ,obenheim4 ,treatise on ,artillery4 ,german4 ,scharnhorst4 7,translated into ,french1 #ahdj47 ,essai sur l'art de pointer4 ,poumet4 ,rflexions sur la fabrication des bouches feu4 ,lamartillire4 ,mmoire sur la planchette du canonnier4 ,obenheim4 ,aide-,mmoire4 ,gassendi4 ,observations on the use of ,artillery at the sieges of ,badajos1 ,st4 ,sebastian1 c4 ,treatise on ,artillery4 ,lallemand4 ,elmens de pyrotechnie4 ,ruggieri4 ,nouvelle force maritime4 ,paixhans4 ,dictionnaire d'artillerie4 ,cotty4 ,recherches balistiques4 ,coste4 ,poudres fulminantes4 ,vergnaud4 ,manuel de la mtallurgie du fer4 ,culman4 ,pyrotechnic militaire1 7traduit de l',allemand1 par ,r4 de ,peretsdorff47 ,journal des ,sciences ,militaires4 ,pyrotechny4 ,cutbush4 ,trait lmentaire d'artillerie4 ,decker4 ,fuses de guerre4 ,montgery4 ,documens sur la matire canons4 ,herv4 ,observations sur le nouveau systme d'artillerie4 ,allix4 ,systme d'artillerie de campagne4 ,allix4 ,pocket ,gunner4 ,adye4 ,on the ,rocket ,system4 ,congreve4 ,essai sur l'art des fontes4 ,serres4 ,receuil de ,mmoires sur la poudre canon4 ,proust4 ,mmorial de l'artilleur marin4 ,michel4 ,observations sur le nouveau systme de l'artillerie4 ,poumet4 ,mmorial d'artillerie4 ,british ,gunner4 ,spearman4 ,rgles de pointage bord des vaisseaux4 ,montgery4 ,manuel du matre de forges4 ,landrin4 ,naval ,gunnery4 ,douglass4 ,mtallurgie du fer 7traduit de l',allemand1 par ,culman47 ,karsten4 ,aide-,mmoire l'usage des officers d'artillerie4 7,strasbourg47 ,trait de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie1 7traduit de l',allemand par ,peretsdorff47 ,grewenitz4 ,supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie4 ,cotty4 ,memoir on ,gunpowder4 ,braddock4 ,manuel de l'armurier4 ,paulin-,desormeaux4 ,journal des armes spciales4 ,cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies4 ,serres4 ,expriences sur la fabrication et la dure des bouches feu en fer et bronze1 7traduit de l',allemand par ,peretsdorff47 ,meyer4 ,applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie4 ,thierry4 ,aide-,mmoire d'art militaire4 ,lebas4 ,mmorial l'usage de l'arme ,belge4 ,instructions and ,regulations for the service and management of heavy ordnance in the ,british service4 ,experiences sur les principes du tir1 faites ,metz1 en #ahcd4 ,trait d'artillerie thorique et pratique4 ,piobert4 ,aide-,mmoire l'usage des officiers d'artillerie1 7avec approbation du comit d'artillerie47 ,manuel d'artillerie l'usage des officiers de la ,rpublique ,helvtique4 ,bonaparte1 7,napoleon ,louis47 ,expriences comparatives entre des bouches feu en fonte de fer1 d'origine ,franzaise1 ,anglaise et ,sudoise1 faites ,gavres1 en #ahcf4 ,expriences faites ,brest en #ahca1 sur les canons4 ,paixhans4 ,essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie4 ,le ,bourg4 ,expriences sur des projectiles creux1 faites en #ahbi1 '#cj1 '#ca4 ,instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles1 7traduit de l',allemand par ,peretsdorff47 ,decker4 ,effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war4 ,simmons4 ,expriences sur les poudres de guerre1 faites ,esquerdes1 en #ahcb1 '#cc1 '#cd1 and '#ce4 ,maguin4 ,cours d'artillerie l'usage des sous-officiers4 ,de ,crpy4 ,instruction thorique et pratique d'artillerie1 l'usage des lves de ,st4 ,cyr4 ,thiroux4 ,cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges4 ,manuel historique de la technologie des armes feu1 7traduit de l',allemand par ,m4 ,rieffel47 ,meyer4 ,formules rlatives aux effets du tir sur afft4 ,poisson4 ,manuel de l'artificer4 ,vergnaud4 ,etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de l',europe1 7traduit par ,maz2 ,ire partie1 ,artillerie ,anglaise47 ,jacobi4 7,six other parts have been published in ,german1 containing descriptions of the ,french1 ,belgian1 ,hessian1 ,wirtemburg1 ,nassau1 and ,swedish systems47 ,introduction l'tude de l'artillerie4 ,madelaine4 ,cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies4 ,description de la fabrication des bouches feu la fonderie royale de ,lige4 ,huguenin4 ,poudre canon4 ,timmerhans4 ,procds de fabrication dans les forges1 7extrait du cours sur le service des officiers dans les forges47 ,renseignements sur le matriel de l'artillerie navale de la ,grande ,bretagne4 ,zeni et des ,hays4 ,thorie des affts et des voitures de l'artillerie4 ,migout et ,bergery ,artillerist's ,manual4 ,griffith4 ,handbuch fr die ,k4,k4 ,oesterreichische ,artillerie ,offiziere1 7manual for the ,austrian artillery officers47 ,sammlung von ,steindruckzeichnungen der ,preussischen ,artillerie1 mit ,erluterungen1 7collection of plates of the ,prussian artillery1 with explanatory text47 ,histoire des fuses de guerre4 ,ordnance ,manual1 for the use of the officers of the ,united ,states ,army4 ,experiments on ,gunpowder4 ,capt4 ,mordecai4 ,pyrotechny1 for the use of the ,cadets at the ,united ,states ,military ,academy4 ,kinsley4 ,notes on ,gunpowder1 ,percussion ,powder1 ,cannon1 and ,projectiles4 ,lt4 ,knowlton4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,army ,,organization--,,engineers4 ,engineers4--,the term engineer is derived from the unclassical ,latin word ingenium1 which was applied both to a machine and the mind or skill of the person who devised or constructed it4 ,it was ,philip ,augustus1 say the ,french writers1 who first introduced engineers 7engigneurs1 or engignours1 as they were called7 into ,france1 and restored the art of sieges4 ,the engineers of that age were seldom charged with the construction of works of military defence1 but1 like ,archimedes at ,syracuse1 and ,longinus at ,palmyra1 they directed their attention principally to devising implements of war and the most effective manner of using them4 ,engines of war were at that time divided between the engigneurs and the artilliers2 the former being charged with the heavier machines1 and the latter with the smaller weapons used for throwing projectiles4 ,after the invention of gunpowder1 the old battering-rams1 cranes1 helipoles1 c41 disappeared1 and with them the engigneurs1 or masters of engines4 ,the new inventions were united with the few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery1 and the engineers were for a time left almost without employment4 ,the revival of the art of fortification was very slow1 and the modern system scarcely began to be developed till near the sixteenth century4 ,we must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of military engineering1 and pass to the troops of this arm1 as constituting an essential element of an army organization4 ,the subject of fortification1 and the history of its various changes1 will be examined in the next chapter4 ,the engineers1 in modern army organization1 constitute the fourth arm of service1 as1 compared with artillery1 their relative numbers are about as two to three4 ,they are divided in the same manner as the artillery1 viz43--#ast1 the staff2 #b;d1 guards1 or fort-keepers2 #c;d1 artificers2 and #dth1 the troops4 ,i4 ,the officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time of peace with planning1 constructing1 and repairing all fortifications and other defensive works2 the construction and preparation of all military materials1 and stores connected with this arm2 and 7in our service7 with the disbursements of money connected with these operations3 in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence of military works1 the laying out and construction of field defences1 redoubts1 intrenchments1 roads1 c42 in the attack they form a part of the vanguard1 to remove obstructions2 and in retreat they form a part of the rear-guard1 to erect obstacles1 destroy roads1 bridges1 c41 so as to retard an enemy's pursuit4 ,from the important character of these duties as connected with the means essential to a national defence1 and the vast amount of money expended in these operations1 it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a military engineer4 ,this officer requires a knowledge of chemistry1 to guide his choice of materials for mortars1 cements1 and mastics2 of mineralogy and geology1 for selecting stone2 of botany1 for timber and the means of preventing its decay2 of mathematics1 in laying out his work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls1 embankments1 c42 of mechanical philosophy1 in constructing his machinery2 of military engineering1 in his plans of fortifications2 and of all the higher branches of military science1 in selecting positions for these works1 such that they shall have the proper relations to the means of national defence1 and to the grand operations of armies in the field4 ,the avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded1 in most ,european armies1 with special care1 to prevent the influence of money1 politics1 or family connections2 and in our own army it is now specified by law of ,congress1 that the vacancies shall be filled only from the most distinguished graduates of the military academy4 ,formerly our service suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent persons1 introduced through political influence from civil life1 and foreign charlatans1 the refuse of ,european armies4 ,many of our earlier military works 7as will be mentioned hereafter7 were modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the profession in ,europe1 and even some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years are made of such wretched materials and workmanship1 that they are already crumbling into ruins4 ,while the existing laws and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and errors1 it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm of our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite degree of efficiency1 and to economize the public expenditures4 ,the wars of ,louis ,,xiv4 first led to a regular military organization1 and a regular system of defence4 ,in these wars the engineers received great development1 and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army organization4 ,we therefore find in all the great sieges and battles of this era a large and continually increasing number of engineers and engineer troops1 this force being gradually augmented as the true principles of war became better understood1 and as the wants of the service required4 ,even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part4 ,in the war of #afhh1 twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of ,philipsbourg1 eighteen at ,namur1 eight at ,huy1 ten at ,charleroi1 eight at ,ath1 thirty at ,barcelona1 c4 ,such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers1 and before this war was closed1 their number was increased to six hundred2 and in #agjf the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners4 ,the engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the ,french ,revolution1 great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror4 ,energy and activity1 combined with republican zeal1 could supply the place of skill in the other arms1 but the science of the engineer could not be acquired in a day4 ,in #agii1 the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers1 without including the general officers1 commanding departments1 or those connected with the engineer troops4 ,the same organization was continued in #ahjd4 ,the engineer staff of the ,french army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers4 ,we have in our service forty-three engineer officers1 for staff duty1 who are now engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications1 and other works of a civil and military character4 ,,ii4 ,engineer ,guards1 or ,fort-,keepers1 are a class of men charged with the general care of forts1 and all public property deposited in the several engineer dpts and garrisons1 and in the public works during their construction4 ,there are five hundred and fifty of these gardes du ,genie in the ,french army1 who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers1 and are assimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals1 marches1 c4 ,in our service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers4 ,this defect in our organization has been the cause of serious inconvenience1 and the consequent waste of public property4 ,the expense of hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain the good order and efficiency of our forts1 in the absence of engineer officers1 and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and stores connected with this department of the army4 ,it has already been shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service1 and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers1 with a much greater amount of public property in their charge1 are allowed no assistants of this kind4 ,,iii4 ,engineer artificers are a class of men employed in the practical operations of constructing forts and other military defences1 and in making and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in the operations of sapping and mining1 in crossing rivers1 in constructing field-defences1 and in the attack and defence of fieldworks4 ,as very few new fortifications are now required in ,france1 the services of engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our service1 where large sums of money are annually expended upon military defences1 ,there are1 however1 in the ,french army a corps of engineer artificers1 consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four non-commissioned officers1 with a variable number of privates1 organized into two companies4 ,but in our army we have no regular engineer artificers6 ,in our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlisted artillery artificers4 ,if these are useful and necessary to the artillery service1 which no one doubts1 for still stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications2 for the annual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the corresponding branch of the artillery service4 ,,iv4 ,engineer troops are divided into three classes--#ast1 sappers and pioneers2 #b;d1 miners2 and #c;d1 pontoniers4 ,in the ,french army of #agii1 there were four battalions of sappers1 consisting of #abj officers and #g1jib men4 ,in #ahjd1 ,napoleon organized five battalions of these troops1 consisting of #afe officers and #h1hfe men4 ,even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in ,germany and ,spain1 and he was obliged to organize an additional number of sappers from the ,italian and ,french auxiliaries4 ,the pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of the service4 ,there is1 at present1 in the ,french army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for the service of the infantry regiments1 three companies of sapeurs-conducteurs1 and forty-two companies of sapeurs4 ,in the ,french army of #agii1 there were six companies of miners1 consisting of #bd officers and #egf men4 ,in #ahjd1 ,napoleon increased these troops to nine companies1 containing #cf officers and #hfd men4 ,the present ,french peace establishment contains six companies of miners1 organized much the same as under ,napoleon4 ,in the ,french army of #agii there were two regiments of pontoniers1 of #ch officers and #ifj men4 ,but this number was found too small in the remaining campaigns1 and the deficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties4 ,in the present ,french army organization1 there are eleven companies of pontoniers1 forming a regiment of sixty-three officers4 ,we have in our service no sappers1 miners1 or pontoniers1 and1 in case of war1 would be found without the means of executing any military works1 or performing any military operation which would require engineer troops4 ,in the preliminary stages of army organization under ,louis ,,xiv41 infantry troops were detailed as sappers1 and instructed in these duties by the engineers4 ,this irregularity of service soon caused difficulties and losses1 and the evils springing from it were so great1 that ,vauban urged the propriety of a separate organization4 ,in #afgj he officially recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred sappers and ouvriers1 and in a subsequent report on the value of these troops1 used the following language3 ,they would be useful in peace as well as in war1 and would be the means of saving much in all fortifications where they should be employed4 ,in fact1 ,i have not the least doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than their pay4 ,i assert all ,i have said on this subject with as much confidence as if ,i had seen the result2 and ,i can1 with the same certainty1 add1 that this small troop will be the means of saving large numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers1 from the stern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing1 almost always1 the laborers and those who support them2 which necessity would not arise had we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well instructed4 ,to such a degree have ,i felt the necessity of sappers1 at every siege at which ,i have been present1 that ,i have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this company4 ,such are the views of the greatest of military engineers1 a man who fought one hundred and forty battles1 conducted fifty-eight sieges1 and built or repaired three hundred fortifications4 ,his anticipations of the usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized1 and they have ever since received the most careful attention1 and now form1 as has just been shown1 one of the most important and efficient arms in the ,french service4 ,the fortifications constructed by the engineers1 as organized by ,vauban1 have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of the ,french military power4 ,in the wars of ,napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops2 and1 on the other hand1 the advantages resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed4 ,we have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the ,french exerted on the results of these wars1 and the fatal consequences to the ,allies of neglecting these works of national defence4 ,every student of military history will immediately call to mind the influence of ,savona1 ,coni1 ,mondovi1 ,ceva1 ,govi1 ,alessandria1 ,tortona1 ,pizzighitone1 ,peschiera1 ,mantua1 ,palma-,nuova1 ,osopo1 ,klagenfurth1 c41 in the campaigns of #agif-g2 of ,genoa1 ,port ,bard1 the fortifications of the ,var1 ,ulm1 ,ingoldstadt1 c41 in #ahjj2 of ,milan1 ,turin1 ,mantua1 ,roco d',aufo1 ,genoa1 ,alessandria1 c41 in #ahje2 the importance of ,kehl1 ,cassel1 ,wesel1 c41 to the ,french in #ahjf1 and the fatal consequences to the ,prussians in that campaign1 of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications4 ,all military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the ,peninsular campaigns3 those which had been given up to ,napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities1 contributed very much to the success of his arms1 while those which were retained by ,spain and her allies1 contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations4 ,some of these1 like ,saragossa and ,tarragona1 with their broken walls and defective armaments1 kept the enemy in check some sixty days each1 and did much to weaken the ,french power in the ,peninsula4 ,temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here4 ,the lines of ,torres-,vedras1 the field-works of ,ronda1 the intrenched camps of the ,pyrenees1 ,bayonne1 ,toulouse1 c41 are examples under this head4 ,in fact1 field-works played a most important part in all of ,napoleon's wars4 ,we might mention the redoubt of ,montenotte1 the intrenchments at ,milesimo1 the batteries of ,lobau1 the field-defences of ,hougomont1 ,la ,haye-,sainte1 and ,papelotte at ,waterloo1 and numerous other cases equally striking4 ,just before the battle of ,waterloo1 ,wellington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses1 under the direction of ,british officers of engineers4 ,in speaking of these defences1 ,colonel ,pasley says3 ,it may be easily conceived that to have directed such a great body of workmen to proper advantage1 by means of a few officers of engineers1 would have been impossible1 but for the system adopted of subdividing the various works among the non-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops1 each of whom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion1 and for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men1 or even more1 according to circumstances4 ,but to return to the ,peninsular war4 ,these campaigns exhibit in strong colors the advantages derived1 on the one side1 from a well-organized engineer corps1 and the losses1 delays1 and defects suffered on the other1 until the defects of the organization were remedied4 ,napoleon entered ,spain with a well-appointed army1 and soon1 through strategy and well-directed force1 gained possession of the important fortresses of the ,peninsula2 seizing in this way the strategic routes and important geographical points1 he was enabled to retain possession of the country for eight years1 in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him1 the absence of himself and his best generals in ,germany1 and the great inefficiency of ,joseph and of many of his generals4 ,these fortifications were old1 and of strength inferior to modern works of defence1 but it required years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to expel from the country those who had possession of them4 ,for the first five years of this war the ,english struggled with a most imperfect army organization4#cg ,when the first serious siege1 says ,napier1 was undertaken by the ,british army1 to the discredit of the ,english government1 no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such an enterprise4 ,the engineer officers were exceedingly zealous2 and many of them were well versed in the theory of their business4 ,but the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service4 ,without a corps of sappers and miners1 without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire1 they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike1 practised1 and scientific troops of the age4 ,footnote #cg3 ,in a letter dated ,february #aath1 #ahab1 ,wellington wrote to the ,secretary of ,state as follows3--,i would beg leave to suggest to your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners4 ,it is inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this description4 ,there is no ,french corps d'arme which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners2 but we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line2 and although the men are brave and willing1 they want the knowledge and training which are necessary4 ,many casualties among them consequently occur1 and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege4 ,the best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner1 to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government1 always ready to plunge the nation into war1 without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success4 ,the sieges carried on by the ,british in ,spain were a succession of butcheries2 because the commonest materials1 and the means necessary to their art1 were denied the engineers4 ,colonel ,j4,t4 ,jones writes in nearly the same terms of the early sieges in the ,peninsula1 and with respect to the siege of ,badajos1 adds in express terms1 that a body of sappers and miners1 and the necessary fascines and gabions1 would have rendered the reduction of the work certain4#ch ,soon after this siege a body of engineer troops arrived from ,england1 but their number was insufficient1 and ,wellington1 having learned by sad experience the importance of engineer troops1 ordered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached from the line1 and daily instructed in the practice of sapping1 making and laying fascines and gabions1 and the construction of batteries1 c4 ,the siege of ,ciudad ,rodrigo1 which immediately followed this organization1 was conducted with greater skill and success than any other till nearly the close of the war2 and all military writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force engaged in the siege4 ,this arm was now gradually increased1 and the last year of the war the engineer force with the ,english army in the field consisted of seventy-seven officers1 seven assistant-engineers and surveyors1 four surgeons and assistants1 one thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers1 miners1 artificers1 c41 one thousand three hundred and forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages4 ,footnote #ch3 ,colonel ,pasley states that only one and a half yards of excavation1 per man1 was executed in a whole night1 by the untrained troops in the ,peninsular war2 whereas an instructed sapper can easily accomplish this in twenty minutes1 and that it has been done by one of his most skilful sappers1 at ,chatham1 in seven minutes6 ,during all this time the ,french furnished their armies in ,spain with well-organized engineer forces4 ,we have endeavored to form a comparison of the number of ,french engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular sieges4 ,but from the loose manner in which these details are usually given by historians1 it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two4 ,both are not unfrequently given under the same head1 and when a distinction is apparently kept up1 only the engineer staff is mentioned under the head of engineers--the sappers1 miners1 artificers1 the train1 c41 all being put down as artillery4 ,in the following table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own army4 ,the trains of both arms are left out1 for frequently that of one arm performed the duties of the other4 ,moreover1 in our service a portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed by the quartermaster's department4 ,for those who wish to know the exact organization of the ,french engineer train1 we give it as it existed in #ahaa1 viz43--seven troops1 each troop consisting of three officers1 one hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates1 two hundred and fifty horses1 and fifty wagons1 conveying five thousand two hundred and seventy intrenching tools1 one thousand seven hundred cutting tools1 one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools1 two hundred and fifty-three miners' tools1 and eight thousand three hundred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores1 each article being made to a particular pattern4 ,the pioneers in ,spain acted sometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other1 and we have assigned them accordingly in the table4 ,the pontoniers1 however1 in our service are included with the engineers2 we have therefore put them1 in our table1 in the same column with the engineers4 ,engineer ,artillery staff1 ,total ,total of staff1 sappers1 horse and foot of artillery miners1 artillery1 engineers1 staff1 horse pontoniers1 ouvriers1 and sappers1 and foot and pioneers4 pioneers4 miners1 artillery1 ,name of ,siege4 pontoniers1ouvriers1 and and ,offic4 ,men4 ,offic4 ,men4 pioneers4 pioneers4 ,saragossa1 #hf #aahi #ij #abgf #abge #acfj ,rosas1 #ba #baa -- -- #bcb #dfa ,girona1 #ed #fjc #fb #abii #feg #acfa ,astorga1 #g #ia #ag #dbg #ih #ddd ,lerida1 #ae #caf #aa #bjh #cca #bai ,meguinenza1 #ca #bgh -- -- #cab #acf #ast ,ciudad ,rodrigo1 #cd #dda -- -- #dge #ajai ,almeida1 #cd #dhi -- -- #ebc #ajai ,tortosa1 #dc #dbi #cb #cha #dgb #dac ,tarragona1 #ej #fha #df #gja #gca #gdg ,olivensa1 #aj #ajf -- -- #aaf #ahf #ast ,badajos1 #be #gjg #da #fii #gcb #gdj ,tarifa1 #ab #bce #ag #adh #bdg #afe ,peniscola1 #ac #ach #i #ahc #aea #aib #b;d ,ciudad ,rodrigo1 #c #ab #h #afj #ae #afh #b;d ,badajos1 #i #bef -- -- #bfe #bfh ,burgos1 #d #abd #c #abf #abh #abi ,castio ,udiales1 #e #fh #h #aig #gc #bje ,st4 ,sebastian1 #ac #bdh #g #aff #bfa #agc ,from this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these sieges1 making the comparison on the basis of our own organization1 is about the same as for the present ,french army in ,algeria1 or a little more than five of engineers to six of artillery4 ,thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in connection with fortifications1 alluding only incidentally to the use of military bridges and the passage of rivers4 ,in the early wars of the ,french ,revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt1 and from the deficiency of this branch of service1 the operations of the ,french generals were on several occasions very much restricted4 ,the evil was afterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of several battalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization4 ,on many occasions1 during his wars1 did ,napoleon feel and acknowledge the importance of these troops2 but on none1 perhaps1 was this importance more clearly shown than in the passage of the ,beresina during his retreat from ,moscow with the wreck of his army4 ,the ,russians had cut the bridge of ,borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bank of the river1 both at this point and below2 the ,french1 wearied with long and difficult marches1 destitute of artillery1 provisions1 and military stores1 with a wide and deep river in front1 and a powerful enemy on their flank and rear1 benumbed by the rigors of a merciless climate1 and dispirited by defeat--every thing seemed to promise their total destruction4 ,general ,ebl1 says an ,english general officer1 in his remarks on this retreat1 who1 from the beginning of the campaign1 had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of military bridges1 was specially charged with the important duty of providing for the passage of this river2 and he discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly ,napoleon owed his escape and the wreck of his army its safety4 ,general ,ebl had begun to prepare1 at ,smolensko1 for the difficulties which he foresaw in this operation4 ,he formed1 with every care1 a train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores that might be required2 and1 further to provide against casualties and accidents1 every man belonging to the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from ,smolensko a tool or implement of some kind1 and a proportion of nails3 and fortunate was it for the army that he did so2 for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages containing stores1 that only two forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved4 ,to these the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march4 ,much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings1 but1 as ,segur observes1 that exertion 'sauva l'arme4' ,but it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most likely to appreciate its utility2 the evils and inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession4 ,a few examples of this nature1 drawn from military history1 may be instructive4 ,we need not go back to the disastrous passage of the ,vistula by ,charles ,,xii41 the failure of ,marlborough to pass the ,dyle1 and ,eugene to cross the ,adda in #agje1 nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of ,charles of ,lorraine to cross the ,rhine in #agdc4 ,the wars following the ,french ,revolution are sufficiently replete with useful instruction on this subject4#ci ,footnote #ci3 ,before recurring to these1 it might be useful to give one example1 as it is often referred to1 in the campaign of #agjb4 ,it was deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the ,prince of ,baden in his camp at ,friedlingen4 ,accordingly1 a bridge was thrown across the ,rhine at ,huningen1 the passage effected1 and the victory gained4 ,but ,villars was several times on the point of losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage4 ,having but a single bridge1 the passage was necessarily slow2 the artillery and stores were frequently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle2 disorder ensued1 and the whole movement was retarded2 ,villars could bring only a small part of his artillery into action1 and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition3 moreover1 the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge1 but the skill of the ,french pontoniers saved it4 ,we here remark1 #ast1 the passage secured to ,villars an important victory2 #b;d1 from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in great peril1 and the operation had nearly failed2 #c;d1 if the ,prince of ,baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of ,villars1 this single bridge would have been destroyed1 and the army cut to pieces2 #dth1 the skill of the little corps of ,french pontoniers saved the bridge1 and of consequence1 the army4 ,in #agid so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs1 that the boats of the bridges across the ,wahal and the ,rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes2 and in the beginning of #agie1 says ,jomini1 the conquerors of ,belgium and ,holland had not even a bridge equipage1 at a time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river4 ,a few boats were procured from the ,wahal and the ,meuse1 and others manufactured in the forests of the ,moselle2 but these operations consumed precious time1 and four months thus passed away in preparations4 ,even after other things were all ready1 the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges2 during this delay the ,austrians strengthened their position1 and with very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage4 ,in #agif1 profiting by the errors of the former campaigns1 the ,french collected more suitable bridge equipages1 and the two armies passed the ,rhine at ,neuweid and ,kehl without loss or delay4 ,the latter of these passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations1 and certainly does credit to the general who directed it4 ,but ,moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign1 his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing a new one1 and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach2 but the difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river4 ,the necessity of co-operating with ,hoche admitted of no further delay1 and he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day1 and in face of the enemy4 ,undertaken under such circumstances1 the enterprise was extremely sanguinary1 and at one time very doubtful2 and had it failed1 ,moreau's army would have been ruined for the campaign4 ,napoleon's celebrated passage of the ,po1 at ,placentia1 shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers4 ,i felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it4 ,but the ,po1 which is a river as wide and deep as the ,rhine1 is a barrier difficult to be overcome4 ,we had no means of constructing a bridge1 and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at ,placentia and its environs4 ,lannes1 chief of brigade1 crossed in the first boats1 with the advanced guard4 ,the ,austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side1 and these were easily overcome4 ,the passage was now continued without interruption1 but very slowly4 ,if ,i had had a good ponton-equipage1 the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed2 but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it4 ,in the campaign of #agii1 the ,archduke attempted to pass the ,aar1 and attacked the ,french on the opposite side1 but for want of suitable equipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to intercept the passage2 he was now obliged to enter into a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities1 and to withdraw his bridges4 ,the operations of the ,french in the campaign of #ahjj1 led to the most glorious results1 but their execution was attended with the greatest difficulties4 ,the passage of the ,alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief engineer1 ,marescot1 and the skill of the troops under his command2 and the facility of passing rivers afforded ,napoleon by his pontoniers1 had an important influence upon the success of the campaign4 ,the army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and sappers2 the pontons of course could not be taken across the ,st4 ,bernard1 but the pontoniers soon found materials on the ,po and ,tesin for constructing bridge equipages4 ,moreau's army in the same year profited well by his pontoniers1 in the passages of the ,inn1 the ,salza1 the ,traun1 the ,alza1 c41 and in the pursuit of the ,austrian army--a pursuit that has but a single parallel example in modern history4 ,the facility with which ,napoleon crossed rivers1 made forced marches1 constructed redoubts1 fortified depots1 and grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the campaign of #ahje1 resulted from the skilful organization of his army1 and the efficiency given to the forces employed in these important operations4 ,the engineer staff of the ,french army at this period1 consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers1 and there were four battalions of sappers1 of one hundred and twenty officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men2 six companies of miners1 of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men2 and two regiments of pontoniers1 of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and sixty men4 ,on the contrary1 the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most striking of the many faults of the war1 and his ill-directed efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the ,danube1 and the successful operations of the ,french sappers in securing it1 formed one of the principal turning points in the campaign4 ,the same organization enabled the ,french to perform their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the ,prussian campaign of #ahjf1 and the northern operations of #ahjg4 ,in #ahji1 ,napoleon's army crossed1 with the most wonderful rapidity1 the ,inn1 the ,salza1 the ,traun1 and other rivers emptying into the ,danube1 and reached ,vienna before the wonder-stricken ,austrians could prepare for its defence4 ,it was then necessary for the ,french to effect a passage of the ,danube1 which was much swollen by recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains4 ,considering the depth and width of the river1 the positions of the enemy1 and his preparations to oppose a passage1 with the disastrous consequences that would result to the ,french from any failure in its execution2 taking all these things into consideration1 ,jomini pronounced it one of the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of ,war4 ,here the fate of the army depended1 apparently1 upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers1 and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them4 ,when the pontons failed1 tressel-bridges were substituted1 and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition4 ,so skilfully were these operations conducted1 that ,napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety1 directly in the face of a superior enemy1 and the same day fought the memorable battle of ,esling4 ,forced to retire before numbers vastly superior to his own1 ,napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of ,lobau1 and intrenched his position4 ,surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the ,danube1 and watched by numerous and skilful enemies1 it required the most constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage4 ,here the skill and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously2 a number of bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the ,austrians1 and against obstacles almost insurmountable2 the whole ,french army passed in safety1 and soon put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign4 ,so high an estimate did ,napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges1 that1 when the passage was completed1 he offered to place ,bertrand1 the constructing engineer1 though of comparatively low rank1 at the head of the ,french corps du genie4 ,on many occasions during the retreat in #ahab-ac1 from the ,beresina to the left of the ,rhine1 across the ,niemen1 the ,vistula1 the ,oder1 the ,elbe1 and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country1 the ,french derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers1 several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their pursuers4 ,when1 however1 the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army1 and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience1 they sustained many severe1 and1 in other circumstances1 unnecessary losses4 ,of this character we may mention the passage of the ,elster by the bridge of ,lindnau1 where1 through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged with the mines1 and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements1 thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river4 ,so sensibly did ,napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages1 in the winter of #ahac-ad1 that he addressed to his minister of war1 on this subject1 the following remarkable words3 ,if ,i had had pontons1 ,i should have already annihilated the army of ,schwartzenberg1 and closed the war2 ,i should have taken from him eight or ten thousand wagons1 and his entire army in detail2 but for want of the proper means ,i could not pass the ,seine4 ,again1 on the #b;d of ,march he wrote3 ,if ,i had had a bridge equipage this morning1 ,blcher's army had been lost4 ,whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign1 will be convinced of the full force of these remarks4 ,in ,spain in #ahjh1 ,sir ,john ,moore1 in order to assist the native forces1 had penetrated so near the army of ,napoleon1 that retreat became exceedingly difficult1 and he was several times on the point of being lost4 ,the ,english army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops1 and ,moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges1 and pontoniers to construct new ones4 ,in order to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the ,french1 the commander-in-chief1 says ,napier1 directed several bridges to be destroyed1 but the engineers for want of miners and miner's tools failed of success in every attempt4 ,in ,soult's retreat1 in #ahji1 he crossed the ,duero at ,oporto1 and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of ,wellington4 ,but while ,soult1 deceived by treachery in his own corps1 neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance1 ,wellington collected boats at different points1 crossed over his army1 surprised the ,french1 and1 had it not been for the singular delay and indecision of ,general ,murray1 would most certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate2 as it was1 his operation produced a decided influence on the campaign1 and effected the safety of ,beresford's corps4 ,soult destroyed his artillery and baggage1 and hastily retreated through the mountain passes2 but his army was again arrested at the river ,cavado1 and placed on the very brink of destruction1 when the brave and skilful ,dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the ,ponte ,nova2 the same daring officer opened1 on the same day1 a way for the further escape of the ,french across the ,misarella by the ,saltador4 ,in the pursuit of ,massena1 in #ahaj1 it was important to the ,english to cross the ,guadiana1 and attack the ,french before ,badajos could be put in a state of defence4 ,beresford was directed by ,wellington to pass this river at ,jerumina1 where the ,portuguese had promised to furnish pontons2 but they neglected to fulfil their engagement1 and the army had to wait till ,capt4 ,squire1 an able and efficient officer of engineers1 could construct other means for effecting a passage4 ,every thing was done that genius could devise and industry execute2 nevertheless1 the operations of the army were greatly delayed--a delay1 says the historian1 that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained ,lord ,wellington more than a year on the frontiers of ,portugal4 ,we might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the ,ceira and ,alva1 and their influence on the pursuit of ,massena2 ,wellington's passage of the ,tagus1 and his retreat from ,burgos in #ahab2 the passage of the ,adour and ,garonne in #ahad2 and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of ,saltador1 ,alcantara1 c42 but a sufficient number of examples1 it is believed1 has already been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers1 miners1 and pontoniers1 and the fatal results attending the want of such troops1 as a component part of an army organization4 ,it has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always form the basis of the apportionment2 and by the general rule laid down by military writers1 the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry1 according to the character of the war2 the artillery about two-thirds of the cavalry1 or one-seventh of the infantry2 and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery1--say about two-thirds4 ,the staff and administrative corps must vary according to the nature of the organization1 and the character of the theatre of war4 ,the former ought to be from two to five in a thousand1 and the latter from twenty-five to seventy-five1#dj as a general rule4 ,these ratios would give for a good army organization2 ,staff1 about 44444444444444444444444444444444444 #e ,administrative service--pay1 medical1 commissary1 quarter-master1 c4 44444444444444444444444444444#fe ,infantry1 44444444444444444444444444444444444444#f ej ,cavalry1 444444444444444444444444444444444444444# acj ,artillery1 44444444444444444444444444444444444444#i j ,engineers1 44444444444444444444444444444444444444#f j ----- ,total1 4444444444444444444#a1jjj ,in a broken country1 and against savage and undisciplined foes1 like the ,indians in this country1 the natives opposed to the ,english in ,india1 to the ,french in ,algeria1 or to the ,russians in ,circassia1 the cavalry1 artillery1 and engineers would be diminished1 and the infantry and administrative corps proportionably increased2 the former because light troops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe1 and the latter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new and uncultivated countries4 ,the ,french forces in ,algeria1 in #ahdd1 amounted to about sixty thousand men1 in the following proportion3-- ,staff1 44444444444444444444444444444444444#d4g ,administrative1 c41 4444444444444444444#aab4c ,infantry1 444444444444444444444444444444#fhg4c ,cavalry1 44444444444444444444444444444444#hf4f ,artillery1 444444444444444444444444444444#fa4b ,engineers1 444444444444444444444444444444#dg4i --------- #ajjj men4 ,footnote #dj3 ,this supposes the teamsters1 wagon-masters1 hospital-servants1 c41 to be enlisted men1 and not persons hired for the occasion as is done in our army4 ,in small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and cavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field1 because troops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of emergency1 than for those which require more scientific information1 and technical skill and instruction4 ,the staff and engineers are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of war1 and next to these the artillery and administrative corps4 ,in this country we can maintain1 in time of peace1 only the framework of an army1 looking to our citizen soldiery to form1 in case of need1 the great mass of our military force4 ,this is the starting point in our military system1 and the basis of our army organization4 ,let us see whether this principle is carried out in practice4 ,for every thousand men in our present organization#da we have1 ,for the staff1 #b ,administrative1 #bjdb ,infantry1 #eac ,cavalry1 #aej ,artillery1 #caj ,engineers1 #e ---- #ajjj ,footnote #da3 ,these numbers are the real rather than the nominal proportions1 many of our officers being called staff1 who properly belong to one of the other classes4 ,footnote #db3 ,much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unenlisted men1 or by soldiers detached from their companies4 ,where such is the case1 the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no higher than is represented above4 ,we see from this table1 that while our artillery is nearly six times as numerous as in ordinary armies1 our staff is less by one-half1 and our engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment4 ,to this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our army in time of peace there is no objection1 inasmuch as the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery4 ,but for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be proportionally increased1 instead of being vastly diminished1 as is actually the case4 ,experience in the first campaigns of the ,american ,revolution strongly impressed on the mind of ,washington the absolute necessity of forming a regular and systematic army organization4 ,but so difficult was it to obtain properly instructed engineers1 that he was obliged to seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers1 and to make drafts from the other arms of service1 and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engineer troops1 and commanded by the officers of this corps4 ,an order1 in his own handwriting1 giving the details of this temporary arrangement1 is dated ,march #cjth1 #aggi4 ,until men are enlisted for the purpose1 companies of sappers and miners shall be formed by drafts from the line4 ,the duties of the companies of sappers and miners1 he continues1 shall be under the direction of the engineers1 to construct field-works of every kind1 and all works necessary for the attack or defence of places1 as circumstances may require4 ,on a march in the vicinity of an enemy1 a detachment of the companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the column1 directly after the vanguard1 for the purpose of opening and mending the roads1 and removing obstructions1 c4 c4 ,the great difficulties encountered by ,washington in instructing his inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art1 made him the more earnest1 in after years1 to impress on us how important it was for us ,in peace to prepare for war4 ,the preparation here meant is not the keeping up1 in time of peace1 of a large standing army1 ever ready to take the field2 but rather the formation of a small body1 educated and practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the profession2 a body which shall serve as the cadre or framework of a large army1 capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by practice4 ,how far have we accomplished this object1 and what will be the probable operations in case of another contest with a ,european power8 ,new and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a veteran and disciplined army4 ,from these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love of liberty4 ,but we cannot here expect much discipline1 military skill1 or knowledge of the several branches of the military art4 ,the peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of the military character4 ,how1 then1 are we to oppose the hostile force8 ,must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation1 and dead bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the enemy8 ,to some extent1 we fear it must be the case2 but not entirely so1 for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such an event4 ,fortifications have been planned or erected on the most important and exposed positions2 military materials and munitions have been collected in the public arsenals2 a military school has been organized to instruct in the military sciences2 there are regularly kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry1 weak in numbers1 but capable of soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in the use of the musket and the horse2 an artillery force1 proportionally much larger1 is also regularly maintained1 with a sufficient number of men and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted with the use of the cannon4 ,but an acquaintance with infantry1 cavalry1 and artillery duties is not the only practical knowledge requisite in war4 ,in the practical operations of an army in the field1 rivers are to be crossed1 bridges suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed1 fieldworks constructed and defended1 batteries captured and destroyed2 fortifications are to be put in order and defended1 or to be besieged and recaptured2 trenches must be opened1 mines sprung1 batteries established1 breaches made and stormed2 trous-de-loup1 abattis1 palisades1 gabions1 fascines1 and numerous other military implements and machinery are to be constructed4 ,have our citizens a knowledge of these things1 or have we provided in our military establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in this branch of the military art1 and capable of imparting to an army the necessary efficiency for this service8 ,unfortunately this question must be answered in the negative2 and it is greatly to be feared that the future historian will have to say of us1 as ,napier has said of the ,english3--,the best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner1 to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war1 without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success4 ,their sieges were a succession of butcheries2 because the commonest materials1 and the means necessary to their art1 were denied the engineers4#dc ,footnote #dc3 ,the subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most authors on ,military ,organization and ,military ,history1 and by the several writers on ,military ,engineering4 ,allent1 ,vauban1 ,cormontaigne1 ,rocquancourt1 ,pasley1 ,douglas1 ,jones1 ,belmas1 ,napier1 ,gay de ,vernon1 may be referred to with advantage4 ,pasley1 ,douglas1 ,jones1 and ,napier1 speak in the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the active operations of a war1 and of the absolute necessity of organizing this force in time of peace4 ,a list of books of reference on ,military ,engineering will be given at the close of the following chapters4 ,while these pages are passing through the press1 ,congress has authorized the ,president to raise one company of engineer troops6 ,this number is altogether too small to be of any use in time of war4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,permanent ,,fortifications4 ,fortification is defined1--the art of disposing the ground in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the longest time possible4 ,if the work be placed in a position of much importance1 and its materials be of a durable character1 it is called permanent2 if otherwise1 it receives the appellation of field1 or temporary4 ,fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a single campaign1 and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period4 ,generally these works are of earth1 thrown up by the troops in a single day4 ,they are intimately connected with a system of permanent fortifications1 but from the facility of their construction1 no provision need be made for them before the actual breaking out of war4 ,indeed1 they could not well be built before hostilities commenced1 as their locality in each case must be determined by the position of the hostile forces4 ,having already described the general influence of permanent fortifications as a means of national defence1 we shall here speak merely of the principles of their construction4 ,it is not proposed to enter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong to the instruction of the engineer1 but merely to give the nomenclature and use of the more important parts of a military work2 in a word1 such general information as should belong to officers of every grade and corps of an army4 ,the first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very simple1 consisting merely of an earthen mound1 or palisades4 ,a wall was afterwards used1 and a ditch was then added to the wall4 ,it was found that a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's battering-rams2 to remedy this evil1 towers were built at short intervals from each other1 forming a broken line of salient and re-entering parts4 ,these towers or salient points gradually assumed a shape approximating to the modern bastion4 ,after the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the attack and defence of places1 it became necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works1 for the reception of the new artillery4 ,moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to resist the missiles of the besiegers1 and it became necessary to replace them by parapets of earth4 ,in order to cover the retaining walls of these parapets from the besieging batteries1 it was also found to be necessary to lower these walls as much as possible1 and to raise the counterscarps4 ,the traces or plans of the works1 however1 received no material change till about the close of the fifteenth century4 ,it is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions4 ,some attribute it to an ,italian1 and with considerable show of reason1 for a bastion was built at ,turin as early as #adfa4 ,achmet ,pacha1 it is said1 fortified ,otranto in this way1 in #adhj1 but whether the system was previously known among the ,turks cannot be determined4 ,others attribute the invention to ,ziska1 the celebrated leader of the ,hussites4 ,it is most probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a very gradual one1 and that the change was perfected in several countries at about the same time4 ,fortifications1 like other arts and sciences1 greatly flourished in ,italy under the ,medicis1 and that country furnished ,europe with its most skilful engineers4 ,catharine of ,medicis introduced into ,france many of her countrymen1 distinguished in this profession2 among these may be named ,bellamat1 ,bephano1 ,costritio1 ,relogio1 ,vorganno1 the two ,marini1 ,campi1 and ,hieronimo1 who built several important places and directed the sieges of others4 ,these able foreigners were rivalled by some distinguished ,french engineers1 who laid the foundation of the corps du ,genie which has since become a school of military instruction for the world4 ,among the early ,french engineers may be distinguished ,lafontaine ,de ,serr1 ,feuquires1 and ,st4 ,remy4 ,pedro ,navarro had been appointed a member of this corps1 but his attention was more specially directed to mining1 and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in the construction of any fortification4 ,in ,germany1 in the beginning of the sixteenth century1 ,albert ,durer distinguished himself as a writer on fortification2 his book is remarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which were made by those who followed him4 ,this is the more to be wondered at as he was not a professed engineer4 ,after him followed ,spekel1 a native of ,strasburg1 who died in #aehi4 ,his writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at that time1 and the changes which he himself introduced4 ,he was an engineer of much practical knowledge and experience1 having assisted at the sieges of ,malta1 ,golletta1 ,vienna1 ,jula1 ,nicosia1 ,famagusta1 c4 ,the first ,french engineer who wrote on fortification was ,errard de ,bar-le-,duc1 who published near the close of the sixteenth century4 ,as an engineer1 he was rivalled by ,chatillon1 a man of distinguished merit4 ,errard fortified ,amiens1 built a part of the castle of ,sedan1 and a portion of the defences of ,calais4 ,under the reign of ,louis ,,xiii41 ,desnoyers1 ,deville1 ,pagan1 and ,fabre were greatly distinguished4 ,deville published in #afbh4 ,he was a man of much learning and experience2 but he is said to have adopted1 both in his theory and practice1 the principles of the ,italian school1 with most of its errors4 ,pagan began his military career while young1 and became marchal de champ at the age of #ch1 when1 having the misfortune to become blind1 he was compelled to relinquish his brilliant hopes4 ,he was the ablest engineer of his age1 and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science4 ,in his plans he inclined to the ,dutch rather than the ,italian school of fortification4 ,he published in #afde4 ,at the close of the sixteenth century1 the ,dutch had been forced to resort to military defences to protect themselves against the aggressions of the ,spaniards4 ,as the ,dutch were inferior in other military means1 fortification became one of the vital resources of the country4 ,their works1 however1 thrown up in much haste1 were in many respects defective1 although well adapted to the exigencies of the time4 ,freytag1 their principal engineer1 wrote in #afcj4 ,some of his improvements were introduced into ,france by ,pagan4 ,he was preceded by ,marolois1 7a cotemporary of ,pagan17 who published in #afac4 ,in ,germany1 ,rimpler1 a ,saxon1 wrote on fortification in #afga4 ,he was a man of great experience1 having served at the sieges of ,candia1 ,phillipsburg1 ,bonn1 ,riga1 ,bremen1 ,dansburg1 ,bommeln1 c4 ,he fell at the siege of ,vienna in #afhc4 ,his writings are said to contain the groundwork of ,montalembert's system4 ,in ,italy1 after the time of ,tartaglia1 ,marchi1 ,campi1 c41 we find no great improvement in this art4 ,several ,italians1 however1 distinguished themselves as engineers under the ,spaniards4 ,the fortifications of ,badajos are a good example of the state of the art in ,italy and ,spain a that epoch4 ,the citadel of ,antwerp1 built by two ,italian engineers1 ,pacciotti and ,cerbelloni1 in #aefh1 has become celebrated for the siege it sustained in #ahcb4 ,the age of ,louis ,,xiv4 effected a great revolution in the art of fortification1 and carried it to such a degree of perfection1 that it has since received but slight improvement4 ,the years #afcc and #afcd are interesting dates in the history of this art1 as having given birth respectively to ,vauban and ,coehorn4 ,the former was chief engineer of ,france under ,louis ,,xiv41 and the latter held a corresponding position under the ,dutch republic4 ,coehorn's ideas upon fortification are conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country1 and1 although well suited to the object in view1 are consequently of less general application than those of his more distinguished cotemporary and rival4 ,the best specimens of his mode of construction that exist at the present day1 are the fortresses of ,manheim1 ,bergen-op-,zoom1 ,nimiguen1 and ,breda4 ,coehorn was followed in ,holland by ,landsberg1 an able and practical engineer1 who to much reading added extensive experience1 having himself served at sixteen sieges4 ,his system was in many respects peculiar1 both in trace and relief2 it dispensed with the glacis1 and all revertments of masonry4 ,his plans could be applied only to marshy soils4 ,the first edition of his work was published in #afhe4 ,but the career of ,vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the history of fortification2 it constitutes the connecting link between the rude sketches of the earlier engineers1 and the well-established form which the art has since assumed4 ,in his earlier works we find many of the errors of his predecessors2 but a gradual change seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and experience1 and these faults were soon remedied and a new and distinct system developed4 ,vauban has left no treatise upon his favorite art1 and his ideas upon fortification have been deduced from his constructions1 and from detached memoirs left among his papers4 ,the nature of his labors1 and the extent of his activity and industry1 may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred and forty battles1 conducted fifty-eight sieges1 and built or repaired three hundred fortifications4 ,his memoirs1 found among his manuscript papers1 on various military and political subjects1 are numerous1 and highly praised even at the present day4 ,but his beautiful and numerous constructions1 both of a civil and military character1 are real monuments to his genius4 ,the best illustrations of his principles of fortification occur at ,lille1 ,strasbourg1 ,landau1 ,givet1 and ,neuf-,brisack4 ,his writings on mines1 and the attack and defence of places1 are1 by the profession1 regarded as classic4 ,his improvements in the existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of his countrymen1 and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rival ,coehorn1 in his own works4 ,he died in #agjg1 and was soon succeeded by ,cormontaigne4 ,the latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system1 but limited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious predecessors4 ,his improvements1 however1 were both extensive and judicious1 and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as one of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced4 ,his works on the subject of fortification1 besides being elegantly written1 contain the most valuable information of any works we have4 ,his most admired constructions are to be found at ,metz1 ,thionville1 and ,bitche4 ,the beautiful crown works of ,billecroix1 at ,metz1 are perfect models of their kind4 ,cormontaigne died in #agej4 ,cotemporary with him were ,sturin and ,glasser4 ,the former deviated but slightly from the systems of his predecessors1 but the latter invented several ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation4 ,next follows ,rosard1 a ,bavarian engineer2 and ,frederick ,augustus1 king of ,poland1 who devoted himself particularly to this art4 ,the former casemated only the flanks of his works1 but the latter introduced casemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him4 ,in ,france1 ,belidor and ,de ,filey published about the middle of the last century4 ,they were both able engineers but their systems were inferior to that of ,cormontaigne4 ,in #agfg ,de la ,chiche introduced a system of fortification in many respects original4 ,he raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his masonry1 and casemated a great portion of his enceinte4 ,for exterior defence1 he employed direct fire from his barbettes1 and curvated fire from his casemates2 the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches4 ,next to ,de la ,chiche follows ,montalembert1 who published in #aggf4 ,he was a man of much experience and considerable originality1 but of no great ability as an engineer4 ,most of his ideas were derived from ,de la ,chiche and the ,german school of ,rimpler4 ,his plans have generally been rejected by his own countrymen1 but they still have advocates among the ,germans4 ,general ,virgin1 a distinguished ,swedish engineer1 wrote in #agha4 ,his idea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect of the larger cities1 constitutes one of the principal novelties in his system4 ,in #agid1 ,reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of ,montalembert were employed1 but his guns were so arranged as to be employed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance1 and afterwards to be used for casemated fire4 ,the casemate gun-carriage1 which formed a part of his invention1 was ingenious1 but never much employed in practice4 ,bousmard1 a ,french emigrant1 published in #agij4 ,he adopted the general trace of ,vauban1 but introduced modifications in the details essentially different from those of ,cormontaigne4 ,some of these modifications are very valuable improvements1 while others are of a more doubtful character4 ,bousmard is1 on the whole1 a very able writer1 and his works should be found in the library of every military engineer4 ,carnot's celebrated treatise was published in #ahaj4 ,he was evidently a man of genius1 and during his career at the head of the ,war ,department of ,france1 numerous and very important improvements were made in the several branches of the military art1 and especially in strategy4 ,his work on fortification exhibits much originality and genius1 but it is doubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of this art4 ,his ideas have been very severely1 and rather unfairly criticised by the ,english1 and particularly by ,sir ,howard ,douglas4 ,chasseloup de ,laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much capacity and talent4 ,he followed ,napoleon in nearly all his campaigns1 and conducted many of his sieges4 ,he remodelled the fortifications of ,northern ,italy and of the ,lower ,rhine4 ,he published in #ahaa4 ,the improvements which he introduced are numerous and valuable1 and he probably contributed more to advance his art1 and to restore the equilibrium between attack and defence1 than any other engineer since ,cormontaigne4 ,after the fall of ,napoleon and the partition of his empire1 the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of ,chasseloup1 so that1 it is believed1 no perfect specimen of his system remains4 ,the cotemporaries of ,chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field service and sieges1 and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote themselves to improvements in permanent fortification4 ,choumara published in #ahbg4 ,his system contains much originality1 and his writings give proof of talent and genius4 ,he has very evidently more originality than judgment1 and it is hardly probable that his system will ever be generally adopted in practice4 ,the ,metz system1 as arranged by ,noizet1 as a theoretical study1 is undoubtedly the very best that is now known4 ,it1 however1 requires great modifications to suit it to different localities4 ,for a horizontal site1 it is probably the most perfect system ever devised4 ,it is based on the system of ,vauban as improved by ,cormontaigne1 and contains several of the modifications suggested by modern engineers4 ,it is applied in a modified form to the new fortifications of ,paris4 ,baron ,rohault de ,fleury has introduced many modifications of the ordinary ,french system in his new defences of ,lyons4 ,we have seen no written account of these works1 but from a hasty examination in #ahdd1 they struck us as being too complicated and expensive4 ,the new fortifications of ,western ,germany are modifications of ,rempler's system1 as improved by ,de la ,chiche and ,montalembert4 ,it is said that ,general ,aster1 the directing engineer1 has also introduced some of the leading principles of ,chasseloup and ,carnot4 ,the ,english engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the track of their continental neighbors1 and can offer no claims to originality4 ,of the system of fortification now followed in our service we must decline expressing any opinion2 the time has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism4 ,but of the system pursued previous to #ahbj1 we may say1 without much fear of contradiction1 that a worse one could scarcely have been devised4 ,instead of men of talent and attainments in military science1 most of our engineers were then either foreigners1 or civilians who owed their commissions to mere political influence4 ,the qualifications of the former were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visit to two or three of the old ,european fortresses2 and the latter probably derived all their military science from some old military book1 which1 having become useless in ,europe1 had found its way into this country1 and which they had read without understanding1 and probably without even looking at its date4 ,the result was what might have been anticipated--a total waste of the public money4 ,we might illustrate this by numerous examples4 ,a single one1 however1 must suffice4 ,about the period of the last war1 eight new forts were constructed for the defence of ,new ,york harbor1 at an expense of some two millions of dollars4 ,six of these were circular1 and the other two were star forts--systems which had been discarded in ,europe for nearly two thousand years6 ,three of these works are now entirely abandoned1 two others are useless1 and large sums of money have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt to remedy their faults1 and render them susceptible of a good defence4 ,moreover1 a number of the works which were constructed by our engineers before that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific education introduced through the medium of the ,military ,academy--we say1 a considerable number of our fortifications1 constructed by engineers who owed their appointment to political influence1 are not only wrong in their plans1 but have been made of such wretched materials and workmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins4 ,a fortification1 in its most simple form1 consists of a mound of earth1 termed1 the rampart1 which encloses the space fortified2 a parapet1 surmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles2 a scarp wall1 which sustains the pressure of the earth of the rampart and parapet1 and presents an insurmountable obstacle to an assault by storm2 a wide and deep ditch1 which prevents the enemy from approaching near the body of the place2 a counterscarp wall1 which sustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch2 a covered way1 which occupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called a glacis1 thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose of covering the scarp of the main work4 ,the work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped1 is called the enceinte1 or body of the place4 ,other works are usually added to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of the fortification1 or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gain possession of them before he can breach the body of the place3 these are termed outworks1 when enveloped by the covered way1 and advanced works1 when placed exterior to the covered way1 but in some way connected with the main work2 but if entirely beyond the glacis1 and not within supporting distance of the fortress1 they are called detached works4 ,in a bastioned front the principal outwork is the demi-lune1 which is placed in front of the curtain2 it serves to cover the main entrance to the work1 and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings4 ,the tenaille is a small low work placed in the ditch1 to cover the scarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the crest of the glacis4 ,the places of arms1 are points where troops are assembled in order to act on the exterior of the work4 ,the re-entering places of arms1 are small redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and demi-lune4 ,the salient places of arms are the parts of the covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune4 ,small permanent works1 termed redoubts1 are placed within the demi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works4 ,works of this character constructed within the bastion are termed interior retrenchments2 when sufficiently elevated to command the exterior ground1 they are called cavaliers4 ,caponniers are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune1 and also from the demi-lune to the covered way1 by which communication may be maintained between the enceinte and outworks4 ,posterns are underground communications made through the body of the place or some of the outworks4 ,sortie-passages are narrow openings made through the crest of the glacis1 which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way1 by means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior4 ,these passages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of the enemy4 ,the other communications above ground are called ramps1 stairs1 c4 ,traverses are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the fire of the besieger's batteries4 ,scarp and counterscarp galleries are sometimes constructed for the defence of the ditch4 ,they are arranged with loop-holes1 through which the troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch1 without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the enemy4 ,in sea-coast defences1 and sometimes in a land front for the defence of the ditch1 embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of artillery2 the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head3 this arrangement is termed a casemate4 ,sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed1 so that the interior one shall fire over the more advanced2 the latter in this case is called a faussebraie4 ,if the inner work be separated from the other it is called a retrenchment#dd and if in addition it has a commanding fire1 it is termed1 as was just remarked1 a cavalier4 ,footnote #dd3 ,the term retrenchment implies an interior work1 which is constructed within or in rear of another1 for the purpose of strengthening it2 the term intrenchment1 on the contrary1 implies an independent work1 constructed in the open field1 without reference to any other adjoining work4 ,the capital of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle4 ,all the works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is termed a front3 it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification4 ,fig4 #ci represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front1 of a regular and simple form1 on a horizontal site4 ,a1 ,a1 ,a--,is the enceinte1 or body of the place4 ,b--,the bastions4 ,c--,the main ditch4 ,d--,the covered ways4 ,e--,the re-entering places of arms4 ,f--,the salient places of arms4 ,g--,the demi-lune4 ,h--,the demi-lune ditch4 ,j--,the demi-lune redoubt4 ,l--,the ditch of the demi-lune redoubt4 ,m--,the redoubt of the re-entering places of arms4 ,n--,the ditches of the redoubts4 ,o--,the tenaille4 ,p--,the double caponier4 a--,the traverses4 b--,the sortie-passages4 c--,stairs4 d--,cut in the demi-lune to flank the redoubt of the re-entering place of arms4 ,fig4 #dj represents a section through the line mn' of the preceding figure4 ,a--,is the rampart4 ,b--,the parapet4 ,c--,the ditch4 ,d--,the scarp wall4 ,e--,the counterscarp wall4 ,f--,the glacis4 ,g--,the covered way4 ,h--,the terre-plain4 ,j--,the parade4 ,sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort1 so as to sink the gun below the crest1 and thus more effectually cover the men from the enemy's fire4 ,but guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when mounted in barbette2 moreover1 the embrasures present openings through which an enemy may penetrate in an assault4 ,owing to these objections1 they are employed only for the protection of particular points2 that is1 where it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire1 or where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch1 or to enfilade a road1 c4 ,the bottom of the embrasure is called the sole1 the sides are called cheeks1 and the mass of earth between two embrasures1 the merlon4 ,embrasures may be made either direct or oblique1 according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or oblique to the parapet4 ,a coverport is a small outwork of any convenient form1 erected immediately in front of a gateway1 to screen it from the enemy's fire4 ,a counterguard is a more extensive work1 constructed in front of a part of the fortress itself1 or of some other outwork of greater importance1 which it is intended to cover4 ,these are sometimes called coverfaces1 from their situation and object2 but the former term is most commonly used4 ,sometimes outworks1 called tenaillons1 consisting of one long and one short face1 are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of fortification1 for the purpose of prolonging the siege4 7,fig4 #da47 ,small1 or demi-tenaillons1 are frequently so arranged as to cover only one-half of the demi-lune1 and then a bonnet constructed in front of the salient of the demi-lune4 7,fig4#db47 ,in this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons2 these short faces are themselves flanked by the demi-lune1 while the bastions flank the long faces4 ,a horn-work consists of a front of fortification1 and two wings resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress4 ,it sometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet1 as in the case of demi-tenaillons4 7,fig4 #dc47 ,a crown-work consists of two fronts of fortification1 and two wings4 7,fig4 #dd47 ,it is sometimes made double1 and even triple4 ,these works are also employed as advanced works1 and placed entirely in front of the glacis4 ,they have generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not included within the limits of the main work4 ,they may be constructed with covered ways1 and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments4 ,a detached work may be made in any form deemed best suited to the site4 ,being but remotely connected with the fortress1 the latter will exercise but slight influence on the character of its plan or construction4 ,they are usually of limited extent and slight relief1 partaking much of the nature of field-works4#de ,footnote #de3 ,the general principles of permanent fortification may be best learned from the writings of ,cormontaigne1 ,st4 ,paul de ,noizet1 and ,laurillard-,fallot4 ,a list of valuable books of reference on the several branches of military engineering will be given at the close of the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,field-,,engineering4 ,field-,engineering includes the making of military reconnaissances1 temporary fortifications1 and military roads2 the planning and construction of military bridges2 the attack and defence of military works2--in fine1 all the various duties of engineer troops1 either in the operations of a campaign1 or in the dispositions on the battle-field4 ,military reconnaissance4--,by this term is meant an examination of a portion of the theatre of war1 to ascertain its military character and resources4 ,if the examination be made of a large district of country1 and for an entire campaign1 the reconnaissance is general2 if made for collecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march1 the passage of a river1 the position of an enemy1 c41 it is termed special4 ,in making a general reconnaissance1 great care should be taken to collect accurate information respecting the general topography of the country2 the character of the mountains1 forests1 and water-courses2 the nature of the roads1 canals1 and railways2 the quality of the soil1 and the amount of provisions and forage it produces2 the population and character of the cities1 towns1 and villages1 the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part of the country1 and the means of transportation to be found in each district4 ,the plan of military operations will be based on the information thus obtained1 and any serious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the campaign1 and even the fate of the war4 ,in a special reconnaissance1 not only accurate but minute information will be required3 the character of the roads must be given in detail2 the nature of the water-courses1 their depth and velocity2 the position and character of bridges1 and fords2--in fine1 a full description of all obstacles to be encountered1 and the means that can be made available for overcoming these obstacles4 ,a reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information from the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined2 additional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen1 hunters1 and fishermen2 and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the district4 ,but the officer should always verify this information1 so far as practical1 by personal examination4 ,in making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of an enemy1 he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted troops1 and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be requisite to ensure success4 ,some simple instrument1 such as a pocket sextant1 or compass1 will be sufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure1 with considerable accuracy1 the height of mountains1 the width of streams1 c41 and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make a suitable military sketch4 ,temporary ,fortification4--,it has been stated in the preceding chapter that temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of a single campaign1 and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period2 and that they are usually made of earth1 thrown up by the troops in a single day4 ,temporary fortifications1 as a part of field-engineering1 may therefore be regarded rather as an arm than an art4 ,the principles of their construction are derived1 of course1 from the theory of permanent fortification1 but in applying these principles to practice in the field1 much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works4 ,the purpose of field-works 7or intrenchments1 as they are commonly called7 is to arrest1 or at least to impede1 the march of the attacking foe2 to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of the assailants1 and to detain them in a position where they will be exposed to the fire of the defensive force4 ,the numerical and positive strength of the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant1 and yet an equilibrium exist2 the material obstacles compensating for the difference in numbers4 ,intrenchments1 though inert masses1 must therefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the defence of a position4 ,intrenchments consist either of lines of works made to cover extended positions1 or of detached works designed simply to defend the ground they occupy4 ,the former generally present a front against the enemy in but one direction1 while the latter are usually closed on all their sides4 ,the following figures have been employed for the plan of simple intrenchments1 viz43 the polygon1 redan1 lunette1 mitre1 star-fort1 and bastion4 ,square or polygonal redoubts are the most common forms given to field-works1 on account of the ease of their construction4 ,but they have many defects4 ,there is a sector without fire in front of each salient1 and the ditches are without protection4 ,the latter objection also holds good against all circular works4 ,the redan 7,fig4 #de7 is frequently used to cover a point in rear1 as a bridge1 a ford1 or a defile4 ,when used alone1 its gorge should be closed by palisades4 ,its ditches are unprotected4 ,the lunette 7,fig4 #df7 has nearly the same defects as the redan4 ,the mitre1 or priest-cap1 7,fig4 #dg17 may be employed with advantage when a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work4 ,the star-fort has all the defects1 without the merit of simplicity1 which belong to the polygonal redoubt4 ,the bastion-fort 7,fig4 #dh7 more fully satisfies the conditions of a good defence than any other plan2 but it is less simple and easy of execution4 ,it is usually composed of four or five fronts1 but it may be applied to a polygon of any number of sides4 ,for the details of the construction of these several works1 we must refer to the special treatises on field-fortification4 ,lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals4 ,in adopting either plan1 the engineer should avail himself of all the natural obstacles presented by the position1 so as to diminish the labor of erecting artificial means of defence4 ,the simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the cremaillire or indented line4 ,when applied to an irregular site1 or used to connect together distant and detached works1 the indented line may be regarded as a good disposition4 ,mitres and redans1 connected by straight curtains1 are sometimes employed1 as also a combination of large and small redans1 forming alternate salient and re-entering angles4 ,a continuous line of bastions is preferable to any other arrangement1 when there is plenty of time for their construction4 ,lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and square redoubts4 ,other detached works may be employed in the same way4 ,this manner of intrenching a position has several advantages1 with disciplined troops4 ,the first shock of the assailant is sustained by the detached works1 and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals1 his flanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire4 ,these intervals also allow the assailed to act on the offensive1 by charging the enemy at the opportune moment4 ,but with raw and militia forces it will be safer to resort to continuous lines4 ,if cavalry form any part of the defensive force1 it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which these troops may charge4 ,a vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form2 the dimensions will1 of course1 vary with the nature of the soil1 and the time and means employed in their construction4 ,the minimum dimensions that can be used with any considerable advantage are given in ,fig4 #di4 ,in laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available artificial obstacles1 such as hedges1 walls1 houses1 outbuildings1 c4 ,a thickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet of earth4 ,stone fences may be employed in the same way4 ,walls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one or two tiers of fire4 ,the walls of houses are pierced in the same manner1 and a projecting wooden structure1 termed a machicoulis gallery1 is sometimes made from the floor of the second story1 to enable the assailed to fire down upon their opponents4 ,this arrangement is frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage foe2 but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery4 ,some have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works of masonry1 but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion4 ,in addition to the parapet of an intrenchment1 a good engineer will always find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles1 such as trous-de-loup1 abattis1 palisades1 stockades1 fraises1 chevaux-de-frise1 crows'-feet1 mines1 c4 ,trous-de-loup are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted truncated cone1 some six feet in diameter1 and about the same number of feet in depth4 ,they are usually placed a few yards in front of the ditch1 and concealed by some slight covering4 ,abattis are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of a work2 the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened4 ,palisades are stakes some eight or ten feet long1 with one end fastened in the ground and the other made sharp4 ,they are placed in juxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces4 ,this arrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp4 ,when the timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primary defence1 it is called a stockade2 when the stakes are placed at the foot of the scarp1 either horizontally or inclined1 they receive the name of fraises4 ,a cheval-de-frise consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with wooden or iron lances1 which project some eight or ten feet4 ,it is much employed against cavalry1 and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades4 ,crows'-feet are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes4 ,they are thrown1 with their points upward1 on ground which is to be passed over by cavalry4 ,mines are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments1 but more commonly in the attack and defence of permanent works4 ,they will be noticed further on4 ,fieldworks which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time will usually have their steeper slopes revetted1 and be arranged with scarp and counterscarp1 galleries1 traverses1 blindages1 c4 ,such works hold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification4 ,as examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner of organizing them1 the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of ,fontenoy1 in #agde1 where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of ,marshal ,saxe enabled the ,french to repel1 with immense destruction1 the attacks of greatly superior numbers2 to the battle of ,fleurus1 in #afij1 where the ,prince of ,waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat by neglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable precautions2 to the battle of ,malplaquet1 in #agji1 where ,marshal ,villars1 by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the passage between the woods of ,sars and ,lanire1 exposed himself to a disastrous defeat2 to the operations of #agib1 where ,general ,custine1 by neglecting to intrench the heights that covered ,bingen1 as the engineers had recommended1 exposed himself to those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipitate retreat2 to the works of ,wervike1 which1 by a vigorous resistance on the #ajth of ,september1 #agic1 saved the ,dutch army from total destruction2 to the intrenched camp of ,ulm1 in #ahjj1 which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of ,moreau2 to the intrenched lines of ,torres ,vedras1 in #ahaj1 which saved from destruction the ,english army of ,wellington2 to the field-defences of ,hougomont1 which contributed so much to the victory of ,waterloo1 c4 ,military communications4--,the movements of armies are always much embarrassed by forests1 marshes1 and water-courses1 and nothing contributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the means of opening practical and easy communication through these various obstacles4 ,it is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the manner of constructing military communications through forests or marshes4 ,in a new country like ours1 where almost every one has had some experience in road-making1 no very great technical knowledge is required for the construction of temporary works of this character2 but much professional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineers who make the preliminary reconnaissances1 and fix the location of these roads4 ,water-courses may be crossed by means of fords1 on the ice1 or by ferries and bridges4 ,when temporary bridges or ferries are constructed by the army in the field1 they are classed under the general head of military bridges1 or more properly1 pontoniering4 ,where the depth of the stream is not great1 the current slight1 and the bottom smooth and hard1 the passage may be effected by fording4 ,if the bottom be of mud1 or large stones1 the passage will be difficult and dangerous1 even where the depth and current are favorable4 ,under favorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth is not greater than four feet2 cavalry to a depth of four or five feet2 but artillery1 and engineer trains1 cannot go to a depth of more than two and a half feet1 without greatly exposing their ammunition and military stores ,the fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is attempted1 and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream1 or cavalry and small boats stationed below1 to prevent the loss of life4 ,ice may be crossed by infantry1 in small detachments4 ,its strength may be increased by covering it with boards1 or straw1 so as to distribute the weight over a greater surface4 ,by sprinkling water over the straw1 and allowing it to freeze1 the mass may be made still more compact4 ,but large bodies of cavalry1 and heavy artillery1 cannot venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and strength4 ,an army can never trust1 for any length of time1 to either fords or ice2 if it did a freshet or a thaw would place it in a most critical state4 ,military bridges will1 therefore1 become its only safe reliance for keeping open its communications4 ,military bridges are made with trestles1 rafts1 boats1 and other floating bodies4 ,rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops for passing rivers4 ,trestle bridges are principally used for crossing small streams not more than seven or eight feet in depth3 they also serve to connect floating bridges with the shore1 in shallow water4 ,the form of the trestle is much the same as that of an ordinary carpenter's horse1 i4e41 a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs4 ,these trestles are placed in the stream1 from twelve to twenty feet apart1 and connected by string-pieces1 7or balks as they are termed in technical language17 which are covered over with plank4 ,the action of the current against the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables1 or by means of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles1 and filled with stones4 ,a more substantial form may be given to the bridge by substituting for the trestles1 piles1 or the ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer parts of our country4 ,for examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to ,caesar's celebrated bridge across the ,rhine2 the passage of the ,scheldt in #aehh by the ,spaniards2 the passage of the ,lech in #afca by ,gustavus ,adolphus2 the passage of the ,danube in #agdj by ,marshal ,saxe2 the great bridge across the ,var during ,napoleon's ,italian campaigns2 the passage of the ,lech in #ahjj by ,lecourbe2 the bridges across the ,piava1 the ,isonso1 c41 in the subsequent operations of the army in ,italy2 the celebrated passage of the ,danube at the island of ,lobau in #ahji2 the passage of the ,agueda in #ahaa by the ,english2 the passages of the ,dwina1 the ,moscowa1 the ,dneiper1 the ,beresina1 c41 in the campaign of #ahab2 the repairing of the bridge near ,dresden1 and the passage of the ,elbe in #ahac1 c4 ,rafts formed of timbers1 casks1 barrels1 c41 are frequently used as military bridges4 ,they may be made to bear almost any weight1 and will answer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width1 provided the current be not rapid4 ,where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers1 these timbers should be first placed in the water1 to ascertain their natural position of stability1 and then the larger ends cut away on the under side1 so as to present the least possible resistance to the action of the current4 ,they are afterwards lashed together by strong rope or withe lashing1 or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers1 and held firm by bolts1 or wooden pins4 ,these rafts are kept in place by anchors and cables placed up and down stream4 ,the roadway is formed in nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles4 ,empty casks1 and other floating bodies1 may be substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts4 ,for examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military bridges1 we would refer to the passage of the ,seine in #adfe by ,count ,charolais2 the passage of the ,meuse in #aegi1 by ,alexander ,farnse2 the passage of the ,vistula in #agjd1 the ,borysthenese in #agji1 and the ,sound in #agah1 by ,charles ,,xii42 the passage of the ,adige in #agif2 the passage of the ,po in #ahjg2 and the subsequent military operations in the ,spanish ,peninsula4 ,military bridges are frequently made of boats1 and the ordinary river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage4 ,flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable for this purpose1 but if these cannot be obtained1 keel boats will serve as a substitute4 ,when these water-craft are of very unequal sizes1 7as is frequently the case17 two smaller ones may be lashed together to form a single support2 they can be brought to the same level by means of stone ballast4 ,the gunwales must be suitably arranged for supporting the balks1 or else frameworks should be erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat4 ,the arrangement of the roadway1 anchors1 c41 is the same as before4 ,a bridge-equipage made to follow an army in its movements in the field1 is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux1 and the necessary timbers1 planks1 anchors1 c41 for forming the roadway1 and keeping the bridge in its position4 ,all these articles are constructed especially for this purpose4 ,all the wood-work should be of tough and well-seasoned timber1 so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagon trains4 ,the bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials4 ,for convenience in transportation1 these boats are sometimes made with hinges so as to fold up4 ,the ribs are usually of oak1 and the sides and bottom of pine4 ,instead of plank1 a covering of tin1 copper1 ,india-rubber1 c41 has sometimes been substituted4 ,floating supports of this character are often made in compartments1 so as to prevent their sinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles4 ,indian-rubber pontons may be folded up into a small space1 and their slight weight renders them convenient for transportation4 ,on navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux should be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place1 forming a draw for the passage of river-craft4 ,indeed1 it would be well1 even where the river is not navigable1 to form a draw for the passage of trees1 and other floating bodies1 sent down by the enemy against the bridge4 ,an ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux1 or light pontons1 for crossing a river of from three to four hundred yards in width1 and of moderate current1 will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons4#df ,under favorable circumstances1 and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers1 the bridge may be thrown across the river1 and prepared for the passage of an army in a few hours at most4#dg ,after the troops have passed over1 the bridge may be taken up1 and replaced on the wagons in from a quarter to half an hour4 ,footnote #df3 ,the number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished if it be found that ,indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the bridge4 ,the engineer department of our army are making experiments to determine this point4 ,footnote #dg3 ,in #agdf1 three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the ,po1 near ,placentia1 each fifteen hundred feet in length1 and entirely completed in eight hours4 ,in #ageg1 two bridges of bateaux were thrown across the ,rhine1 at ,wesel1 in half an hour2 again1 in the same year1 a third bridge was thrown across this river near ,dusseldorf1 in six hours4 ,in #ahda1 ,col4 ,birago1 of the ,austrian army1 arrived on the bank of the ,weisgerben arm of the ,danube1 with his bridge-equipage1 at a round trot1 and immediately began the construction of his bridge1 without any previous preparation or examination4 ,in less than three-quarters of an hour the bridge was completed1 and three loaded four-horse wagons passed over on a trot1 followed by a column of infantry4 ,the following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different kinds of boat-bridges in military operations3--the passage of the ,rhine1 in #agjb1 by ,villars2 the passage of the ,dnieper and the ,bog1 in #agci1 by the ,russians2 the passage of the ,danube1 in #agdj1 by ,marshal ,saxe2 the passage of the ,rhine1 near ,cologne1 in #ageh1 by the ,prince of ,clermont2 the passage of the ,rhine1 in #agie1 by ,jourdan2 the passage of the ,rhine1 at ,kehl1 in #agif1 by ,moreau2 and again the same year1 at ,weissenthurn1 and at ,neuwied1 by ,jourdan2 the bridges across the ,rhine1 at the sieges of ,kehl and ,huninguen1 in #agig2 the passage of the ,limmat1 in #agii1 by ,massena2 the passages of the ,mincio1 the ,adige1 the ,brenta1 the ,piava1 c41 in #ahjj2 the passages of these rivers again in #ahje2 the passages of the ,narew1 in #ahjg1 by the ,russians2 the several passages of the ,danube1 in #ahji1 by the ,french and ,austrian armies2 the passages of the ,tagus and ,douro1 in #ahaj1 by the ,english2 the passages of the ,niemen1 the ,dwina1 the ,moskwa1 and the ,beresina1 in #ahab1 by the ,french2 and of the great rivers of ,germany and ,france1 in #ahac and #ahad4 ,a floating body1 propelled from one bank to the other by the current of the stream1 is termed a flying-bridge4 ,the usual mode of establishing a ferry of this kind1 is to attach the head of the boat by means of a cable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream4 ,by steering obliquely to the current1 the boat may be made to cross and recross at the same point4 ,a single passage may be made in the same way1 by the action of the current without the cable and anchor1 but the boat in this case will be carried some distance down the stream4 ,rowboats are employed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations2 but this process is too slow for the passage of a large force2 it may very well be resorted to as auxiliary to other means4 ,steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams1 that an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of this means of passing the larger rivers4 ,but1 in a hostile country1 or in one already passed over by the enemy1 it will not be safe to rely with confidence upon obtaining craft of this character4 ,a well-organized army will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line of march4 ,flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the ,dwina1 in #agja1 by the ,swedes2 the passage of the ,po1 in #agja1 by ,prince ,eugene2 the passage of the ,rhine1 at ,huninguen1 in #agjd2 ,jourdan's passage of the ,rhine in #agie2 ,moreau's passage in #agif2 the sieges of ,kehl and ,huninguen in #agig2 ,massena's passage of the ,limmat1 and ,soult's passage of the ,linth1 in #agii2 the passage of the ,rhine1 at ,lucisteig in #ahjj2 the passage of the ,po1 by the ,french1 just before the battle of ,marengo2 and others in ,italy1 ,germany1 and ,spain1 in the subsequent campaigns of ,napoleon4 ,military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes1 cables stretched across the stream1 and firmly attached at each end to trees1 or posts let into the earth4 ,if the shore is of rock1 rings with staples let into the stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes4 ,plank are laid on these cables to form the roadway4 ,the ropes forming the side-rail of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore1 and then fastened as before4 ,short vertical ropes attach the main supports to these side ropes1 in order that they may sustain a part of the weight passing over the bridge4 ,constructions of this character are fully described in ,douglas's ,essay on ,military ,bridges4 ,for example1 see the passage of the ,po1 near ,casal1 in #aeae1 by the ,swiss2 the bridge thrown over the ,clain by ,admiral ,coligni1 at the siege of ,poitiers1 in #aefi2 the operations of the ,prince of ,orange against ,ghent and ,bruges1 in #afca2 the passage of the ,tagus1 at ,alcantara1 in #ahaj1 by the ,english2 the bridge constructed across the ,zezere1 by the ,french1 in #ahaj2 the bridge thrown across the ,scarpe1 near ,douai1 in #ahbj2 the experiments made at ,fre in #ahbc1 c4 ,the passage of a river in the presence of an enemy1 whether acting offensively or in retreat1 is an operation of great delicacy and danger4 ,in either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and most determined courage1 for its success will depend on its maintaining the strictest discipline and good order4 ,in the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field intrenchments1 called a tte de pont1 and defended by a strong guard4 ,if the river be of moderate width1 the enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy batteries on the opposite shore4 ,as soon as the passage is effected by the main body1 the bridge1 if permanent1 will be blown up1 or otherwise destroyed by the miners1 and if floating1 will be swung round to the other shore4 ,the rear-guard will pass over in rowboats1 or the end pontons detached for that purpose4 ,an army retreating in the face of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge1 no matter what may be its character3 for the slightest accident happening to it might expose the whole army to inevitable destruction4 ,the passage of a river by main force1 against an enterprising and active enemy on the opposite shore1 is always an operation of the greatest difficulty1 and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody results4 ,the most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem4 ,demonstrations are made at several points at the same time3 bodies of troops are thrown across1 after nightfall1 in rowboats or by flying-bridges1 to get possession of the opposite bank4 ,the vanguard of light cavalry may cross by swimming4 ,the pontoniers should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage1 so that it can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity1 while the advanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance4 ,under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness for the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon the threatened point4 ,cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying an enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach4 ,when this cannot be done1 we must resort to fire-boats1 floating rafts1 c41 to accomplish our object4 ,operations of this kind carried on in the night1 are most likely to succeed4 ,to protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies1 stockades1 or floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some distance above the bridge2 strong cables1 or chains stretched directly across the river1 or with an angle up stream1 may be used in place of stockades1 or in conjunction with them4 ,guards should be stationed above the bridge1 with boats1 ropes1 grapnels1 c41 for the purpose of arresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore1 or directing them safely through the draw in the bridge arrangement4 ,the troops especially charged with the construction and management of the various kinds of military bridges1 are denominated pontoniers4 ,the duties of these troops are arduous and important1 and1 in a country like ours1 intersected by numerous water-courses1 the success of a campaign will often depend upon their skill and efficiency4 ,sapping4--,this is a general term applied to the operations of forming trenches1 along which troops may approach a work without being exposed to the fire of the besieged4 ,in addition to the ordinary sapping-tools1 such as shovels1 picks1 gabion-forks1 c41 used in constructing trenches1 there will also be required a considerable amount of sapping materials1 such as gabions1 fascines1 sap-fagots1 sandbags1 c4 ,the gabion is a cylindrical basket of twigs1 about two feet in diameter1 and some three feet in length1 and without a bottom4 ,it is made by driving into the ground1 in a circular form1 a number of small pickets about an inch in diameter1 and of the length required for the gabion4 ,twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work1 and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread4 ,gabions are used in forming saps1 batteries1 blindages1 powder-magazines1 and in revetting the steep slopes of field-works4 ,the fascine is a bundle of twigs closely bound up1 from nine to twelve inches in diameter1 and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length4 ,the largest are sometimes called saucissons4 ,in making a fascine1 straight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side1 and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attached to the extremities of two levers4 ,while held in this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs or cords4 ,fascines are used in constructing trenches1 batteries1 c41 and for filling up wet ditches4 ,the sap-fagot is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two feet in length1 with a picket inserted through the middle4 ,it is used in the double sap in connection with gabions4 ,sand-bags are usually made of coarse canvass4 ,when filled with earth they are some six or eight inches in diameter1 and from eighteen inches to two feet in length4 ,from their perishable nature1 they are used only when other materials cannot be procured1 and where it is important to place the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire4 ,bales of wool1 cotton1 hay1 straw1 c41 may be employed in sapping for the same purposes as the above materials1 when they can be procured in sufficient quantity4 ,pork and flour barrels1 which are usually in abundance in a camp1 are frequently filled with sand and used for forming magazines1 blindages1 c41 in field-works4 ,a trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's grape1 is called a simple sap1 or ordinary trench4 ,the earth is thrown up on the side towards the place besieged1 so as to form a kind of parapet to cover the men in the trench4 ,the labor is here executed under the supervision of engineer soldiers1 by working parties detached from the other arms4 ,fig4 #ej represents a vertical section of a simple sap4 ,when within range of the enemy's grape1 the flying sap is resorted to in order to place the workmen speedily under cover4 ,in this operation1 gabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged work1 and filled with all possible speed by the workmen4 ,three rows of fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase the height4 ,the most difficult part of the flying sap is executed by engineer troops1 and the trench is completed by the ordinary working parties4 ,fig4 #ea represents a section of this sap4 ,the full-sap is employed when the works of the besiegers are within range of musketry1 or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap can no longer be used4 ,this is a difficult operation1 and unless executed with great care and by well-instructed engineer troops1 the construction of the trench will be attended with an immense loss of life4 ,the work must be executed under cover of a sap-roller1 which is a cylindrical mass of fascines1 wool1 or cotton1 some two feet in diameter4 ,on very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels might be used as a substitute4 ,the sap-roller being placed along the line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front1 who is armed with a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass1 this sapper commences the sap by placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it with earth1 working on his hands and knees4 ,having filled the first gabion1 he pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first1 stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot4 ,the second gabion being filled in the same manner as the first1 others are successively established4 ,when the first sapper has advanced a few feet1 he is followed by a second1 also in defensive armor1 who increases the excavation and embankment2 this sapper is then followed in the same way by a third and a fourth1 after which the trench will be sufficiently advanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen4 ,the sap-fagots may be removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape4 ,fig4 #eb represents a plan and section of a full-sap4 ,when the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on both sides1 it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the right and left4 ,this operation is called the double sap1 and is executed by two parties of sappers1 working side by side4 ,in this sap it will be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench1 or to throw up traverses1 in order to cover the men at a distance from the sap-roller4 ,wing-traverses1 on the side of the trench which is least exposed1 some times serve the same purpose as a double sap4 ,mines4--,by mining1 as a military term1 we understand the operations resorted to for the demolition1 with powder1 of a military structure of any description4 ,the term mine is applied both to the excavation charged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion1 and to the communications which lead to this excavation4 ,the place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the chamber1 the communication by which this place is reached the gallery1 and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the crater4 ,the form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is assumed to be a truncated cone1 the diameter1 c d1 7,fig4 #ec17 of the lower circle being one-half the diameter1 a b1 of the upper circle4 ,this form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct1 but the theoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this figure have been fully verified in practice4 ,the radius1 p b1 of the upper circle is termed the crater radius2 the line o p1 drawn from the centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the explosion takes place1 is termed the line of least resistance2 the line o b1 drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in the circumference of the upper circle1 is termed the radius of explosion4 ,when the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance1 the mine is termed common2 when this radius is greater than the line of least resistance1 the mine is termed overcharged2 and when the radius is less1 undercharged4 ,a mine of small dimensions1 formed by sinking a shaft in the ground1 is termed a fougasse4 ,the term camouflet is applied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner1 without producing an explosion4 ,small mines made in rock or masonry1 merely for the purpose of excavation1 without any considerable external explosion1 are called blasts4 ,from experiments made on common mines1 whose line of least resistance did not exceed fifteen feet1 it has been ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the crater radius1 and that empty galleries would be broken in at once and a half that distance4 ,it has also been proved by experiment1 that the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to six times the line of least resistance1 but not much beyond this2 that within this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the ratio of the square roots of the charge2 and that empty galleries may be destroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of least resistance4 ,by means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory1 and the results of experiments1 rules have been determined by which the miner can calculate1 with much accuracy1 the charge necessary to produce a required result in any given soil4 ,in the earlier stages of the history of this art1 mines were only used to open breaches and demolish masses of masonry2 but in later times they have been employed as important elements in the attack and defence of places4 ,an isolated wall1 only two or three feet thick1 may readily be demolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact with its base4 ,if the wall be five or six feet thick1 the charges should be placed under the foundation4 ,for walls of still greater thickness it will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall1 a foot or two above its base1 and place the powder in chambers thus excavated4 ,revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back of the wall1 about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base4 ,if placed too near the base1 a breach will be made in the wall without overturning it4 ,to demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers excavated in the centre of the piers4 ,when there is not time for excavating these chambers in the piers1 a trench may be cut over the key of the arch1 in which the powder is placed and exploded2 or1 the casks of powder may be suspended immediately under the arch1 with the same results4 ,where a saving of powder is of consequence1 small chambers may be excavated in the haunches of the arch1 and the mine carefully tamped before firing it4 ,bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the principal timbers1 or attaching them to the supports4 ,palisading1 gates1 doors1 c41 may be destroyed in the same way1 by suspending casks or bags of powder against their sides2 or still more effectually1 by burying the charges just beneath their base4 ,to demolish a tower1 magazine1 or house1 of masonry1 place charges of powder under the piers and principal walls of the building4 ,in wooden structures the powder should be placed under1 or attached to the principal supports4 ,where time is wanting to effect these arrangements1 a building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in the interior4 ,the powder may be economized1 in this case1 by putting it in a strong case1 which should be connected with the walls of the building on all sides by wooden props4 ,special treatises on military mining contain full instructions for regulating the size and position of the charge for the various cases that may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering4 ,as applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place1 mines are divided into two general classes--offensive and defensive mines4 ,the former are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the place1 to demolish barriers1 palisades1 walls1 and other temporary means of defence1 and to destroy the mines of the besieged4 ,the latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack1 and to defend the passage of ditches against an assault4 ,small mines called fougasses may be employed for the last named object4 ,the shell-fougasse is composed of a wooden box filled with one or more tiers of shells1 and buried just below the surface of the earth4 ,sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells1 so as to project them into the air previous to their explosion4 ,the stone fougasse is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation1 some five or six feet deep1 and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed in a box1 and covered with a strong wooden shield2 several cubic yards of pebbles1 broken stone1 or brickbats1 are placed against the shield1 and earth well rammed round1 to prevent the explosion from taking place in the wrong direction4 ,these mines are fired by means of powder hose1 or by wires connected with a galvanic battery4 ,the defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works1 are generally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet4 ,all the main galleries and principal branches of mines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same time with the other portions of the work1 leaving only the secondary branches1 chambers1 c41 to be made during the siege4 ,for the general arrangement of these galleries1 and the precautions necessary for their protection from the operations of the besiegers1 reference must be made to treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject4 ,mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief1 and liable to an assault4 ,but if judiciously arranged in the plan of their construction1 and well managed during the operations of the siege1 they contribute very materially to the length of the defence4 ,attack and defence4--,this subject admits of two natural divisions3 #ast1 of intrenchments1 and #b;d1 of permanent works4 ,i4 ,intrenchments maybe attacked either by surprise1 or by open force4 ,in either case the operations should be based on exact information of the strength of the works and the number and character of the garrison--information that can be obtained from spies1 deserters1 and prisoners1 and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made by officers of engineers4 ,by these means a pretty accurate knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works2 their weak and strong points2 and their interior arrangements for defence4 ,in an attack by surprise1 the troops should consist of a storming party and a reserve of picked men4 ,the attacking column is preceded by a company of sappers armed with axes1 shovels1 picks1 crowbars1 c42 bags of powder are also used for blowing down gates1 palisades1 c4 ,all the operations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch4 ,the time most favorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day1 as at this moment the sentinels are generally less vigilant1 and the garrison in a profound sleep2 moreover1 the subsequent operations1 after the first surprise1 will be facilitated by the approach of day4 ,under certain circumstances1 it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same time with the true one1 in order to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point of danger4 ,but false attacks have1 in general1 the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as well as of the assailed4 ,in all attacks by surprise1 secrecy is the soul of the enterprise4 ,in an open assault1 if artillery be employed1 the troops should be drawn up in a sheltered position1 until the fire of the works is silenced1 and breaches effected in the parapet4 ,but if the bayonet alone be resorted to1 the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the assault4 ,the attack is begun by a storming party of picked men3 they are preceded1 as before1 by a body of sappers1 provided with necessary means for removing obstacles1 and followed by a second detachment of engineers1 who will widen the passages1 and render them more accessible to the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of the storming party4 ,if the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp by obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be made1 the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon the assailed1 in order to divert their fire from the sappers4 ,a few pieces of light artillery1 on the flanks of the column1 may sometimes be employed for this purpose with great advantage4 ,the storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders1 planks1 fascines1 c41 for crossing the ditch1 and mounting the scarp4 ,if the counterscarp be revetted with masonry1 the troops must either descend by ladders1 or fill up the ditch with fascines1 bales of straw1 bundles of wool1 c43 if not revetted1 a passage for the troops into the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers4 ,when the ditch is gained1 shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are prepared for mounting the scarp1 and storming the work4 ,if the scarp be of earth only1 the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade2 but if revetted with masonry1 the walls must be breached with hollow shot1 or scaled by means of ladders4 ,in the defence1 the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted to guard against a surprise3 sentinels are posted on all the most commanding points of the work2 all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded2 and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in all directions4 ,at night all these precautions are redoubled4 ,light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground1 and discover the movements and approach of the enemy4 ,each man should have his particular post assigned to him1 and be thoroughly instructed in the duties he will have to perform4 ,all auxiliary arrangements1 such as palisades1 abattis1 c41 should be defended with the utmost obstinacy2 the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles1 the longer will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work4 ,when he assaults the parapet1 he will be opposed by the bayonet in front and a well-aimed fire in flank4 ,while in the ditch1 or as he mounts the scarp1 hollow projectiles1 incendiary preparations1 stones1 logs1 c41 will be rolled down upon his head4 ,but when the assaulting column has gained the top of the scarp1 the bayonet forms the most effective means of resistance4 ,the measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class of field-works1 will necessarily partake much of the nature of the operations employed in the attack and defence of permanent fortifications4 ,,ii4 ,the attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a regular siege1 or by irregular operations and an assault4 ,the latter plan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weak and improperly defended2 where the time and means were wanting for conducting a regular siege2 or where the assailants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress4 ,such operations1 however1 are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of human life1 and the general who neglects to employ all the resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege1 is justly chargeable with the lives of his men4 ,in the siege of ,cambrai1 ,louis ,,xiv41 on the solicitation of ,du ,metz1 but contrary to the advice of ,vauban1 ordered the demi-lune to be taken by assault1 instead of waiting for the result of a regular siege4 ,the assault was made1 but it was unsuccessful1 and the ,french sustained great losses4 ,the king now directed ,vauban to take the demi-lune by regular approaches1 which was done in a very short time1 and with a loss of only five men6 ,again1 at the siege of ,ypres1 the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready4 ,you will gain a day by the assault1 said ,vauban1 but you will lose a thousand men4 ,the king directed the regular works to be continued1 and the next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers4 ,but a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to resort to all the works of attack which would be required for the reduction of a regular bastioned fort1 on a horizontal site4 ,for example3 the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops to approach to the foot of the glacis1 without erecting any works whatever2 of course1 all the works up to the third parallel may in this case be dispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege4 ,again1 the point of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not flank the works of approach2 here a single line of boyaux and short parallels may be all-sufficient4 ,but for the purpose of discussion1 we will here suppose the place besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site1 7,fig4 #ed47 ,the operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods4 #ast4 ,the preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to the opening of the trenches4 #b;d4 ,the operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches to the establishment of the third parallel4 #c;d4 ,from the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the place4 ,first period4 ,the object of the investment of the place is to cut off all communication between the work and the exterior1 thus preventing it from receiving succors1 provisions1 and military munitions1 and also to facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers1 who should always accompany the investing corps1 and pursue their labors under its protection4 ,this corps should be composed chiefly of light troops--cavalry1 light infantry1 horse artillery1 brigades of engineers and mounted sappers1--who march in advance of the besieging army1 and1 by a sudden movement1 surround the work1 seize upon all the avenues of approach1 and carry off every thing without the work that can be of service either to the garrison or to the besiegers4 ,to effect this object1 the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch4 ,the investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most favorable positions for cutting off all access to it1 and also to prevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from the garrison1 and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging corps4 ,these posts and sentinels1 called the daily cordon1 are placed some mile or mile and a half from the work1 and beyond the reach of the guns4 ,but in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish their object1 and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of musketry4 ,this arrangement constitutes the nightly cordon4 ,by the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the general the outline of his plan of attack1 so as to establish the position of his depots and camp4 ,these will be placed some two miles from the work1 according to the nature of the ground4 ,as they occupy a considerable extent of ground around the work1 it will generally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors of troops1 provisions1 c41 from being thrown into the place1 and also to restrain the excursions of the garrison4 ,the works thrown up between the camp and besieged place are termed the line of countervallation1 and those on the exterior side of the camp form the line of circumvallation4 ,these lines are generally about six hundred yards apart4 ,it is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines of circumvallation1 7except a few detached works for covering the parks of the engineers and artillery17 and to hold the succoring army in check by means of an opposing force1 called the army of observation4 ,the measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will1 of course1 be subordinate1 in some degree1 to those of attack4 ,as soon as any danger of an investment is apprehended1 the commanding general should collect into the place all the necessary provisions1 forage1 military munitions1 c41 to be found in the surrounding country2 all useless persons should be expelled from the garrison2 a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and artillery1 fascines1 gabions1 palisades1 c41 prepared2 all ground within cannon range around the work levelled2 hedges and trees cut down2 holes filled up2 temporary buildings demolished or burnt2 and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interrupting the fire of the work1 removed4 ,during this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from the other arms will be most actively employed4 ,as soon as the investing corps makes its appearance1 bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off reconnoitring parties1 and1 if possible1 to draw the enemy into ambush4 ,to facilitate these exterior operations1 and to prevent a surprise1 several guns of long range are placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes1 and others1 loaded with grape1 in the embrasures of the flanks1 so as to sweep the ditches4 ,about one-third of the garrison may be employed in exterior operations1 and the other two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior4 ,second period4--,as soon as the engineers have completed their reconnaissances and determined on the front of attack1 and all the other preparations are made1 the general will direct the opening of the trenches4 ,the ground being previously marked out1 battalions of light troops1 termed guards of the trenches1 as soon as it is dark1 are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel1 7,a4 ,fig4 #ed17 with smaller sections1 and sentinels about the same distance further in advance4 ,these guards lie down1 or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of the work4 ,the engineer troops and detachments of workmen being first marched to the dpts and supplied with all the necessary tools for carrying on the work1 now commence their labors under the protection of these guards4 ,by daybreak the construction of the first parallel1 and the trenches connecting it with the dpts1 will be sufficiently advanced to cover the men from the fire of the place2 the guards will therefore be withdrawn1 and the workmen continue their labors during the day to give the trenches the proper size and form4 ,the parallels are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged work1 and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the besiegers1 and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison2 they are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire4 ,the boyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of the front of attack1 and are intended exclusively for the circulation of the troops2 they have no banquettes4 ,the first parallel is about six hundred yards from the place1 and consequently beyond the reach of grape4 ,it is constructed by the simple sap4 ,after the first night1 the guards1 instead of advancing in front of the work1 are placed in the trenches4 ,the second parallel 7,b7 is made some three hundred or three hundred and fifty yards from the place1 and being much exposed to grape1 the flying-sap is employed in its construction4 ,batteries 7,h7 are established between the first and second parallels to silence the fire of the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions1 and others 7,i7 near the second parallel1 to enfilade the faces of the front of attack4 ,these are armed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces4 ,the works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel1 7,c71 which is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place4 ,as the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire1 the trenches are constructed by the full-sap4 ,the third parallel1 having to contain the guards of the trenches1 and being of less development than the two preceding1 is made much wider4 ,the second parallel now contains the reserve1 and the first parallel becomes the dpt of materials4 ,demi-parallels 7,g7 are frequently established between the second and third1 to be occupied by detachments of guards4 ,the operations of defence during this period are so directed as to harass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works of attack4 ,garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought forward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack1 so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must be pushed3 light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark1 to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers1 thus exposing them to the fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties4 ,these parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel the workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence4 ,they are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel1 as the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to protect the workmen4 ,when the sortie detachment has driven these workmen from the trenches1 instead of pursuing them into the first parallel1 it will display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops1 7who should always accompany the detachment in this enterprise17 while they fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers4 ,when the guards of the trenches appear in force1 the detachment will retire in such a way1 if possible1 as to draw the enemy within range of the grape and musketry of the collateral works4 ,these sorties1 if successful1 may be frequently repeated1 for they tend very much to prolong the siege4 ,the best time for making them is an hour or two before day1 when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of the night4 ,while the besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries1 a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated on the points selected for their construction4 ,the garrison will also labor during this period to put the work into a complete state of defence3 constructing all necessary palisadings1 traverses1 blindages1 barriers2 and strengthening1 if necessary1 the covering of the magazines4 ,third period4--,after the completion of the third parallel1 the crowning of the covered way may be effected by storm1 by regular approaches1 or 7if the work is secured by defensive mines7 by a subterranean warfare4 ,in the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the third parallel1 which1 on a given signal1 will open their fire in concert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries4 ,when this fire has produced its effect in clearing the outworks1 picked troops will sally forth and carry the covered way with the bayonet1 sheltering themselves behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis1 high enough to protect the troops from the fire of the besieged4 ,it may afterwards be connected with the third parallel by boyaux4 ,when the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches1 a double sap is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the covered way2 the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty yards to the right or left1 and the earth thrown up high enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into the covered way1 and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it4 ,this mound of earth is termed a trench cavalier1 7,o74 ,boyaux are now pushed forward to the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breach batteries1 7,j74 ,descents are then constructed into the ditches1 and as soon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the bastions and outworks1 the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in the breaches4 ,the demi-lune is first carried2 next the demi-lune redoubt and bastion2 and lastly1 the interior retrenchments and citadel4 ,in some cases the breaches are carried by assault1 but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming of the covered way2 time is gained1 but at an immense expense of human life4 ,if the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the besiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the slow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare4 ,in this case a fourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel2 shafts are sunk in this1 about six yards apart1 for establishing overcharged mines2 as soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion of these mines1 the covered way is attacked by storm2 other mines are established on the terre-plain of the covered way to destroy the entrance to the galleries1 and thus deprive the besieged of the use of their entire system of mines4 ,the measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing calculated to retard the works of the besiegers4 ,this may be most effectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the heads of the sap1 and throwing grenades1 shells1 c41 into the trenches1 to harass and destroy the workmen4 ,as the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artillerists at the guns1 strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouths of the embrasures when the guns are not in battery1 and also sloping blindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces4 ,the possession of the outworks should be disputed inch by inch1 and when the besiegers have reached the ditch of the body of the place1 sorties1 and every species of projectile1 should be employed to drive off the sappers1 and to retard the construction of their works4 ,in fine1 all the resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of the breach1 and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by the bayonet1 and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works4 ,with respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be well to remark1 that if the fortress is properly constructed the garrison will be able to resist a besieging army six times as numerous as itself4 ,such is the estimate of the best engineers4#dh ,footnote #dh3 ,a good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter may be derived from the writings of ,vauban1 ,cormontaigne1 and ,noizet de ,st4 ,paul1 on the attack and defence of places and field fortification2 the several manuels used in the ,french service on sapping1 mining1 and pontoniering2 ,col4 ,pasley's experiments on the operations of a siege1 sapping1 mining1 c42 ,douglas's work on military bridges2 ,macauley's work on field fortification2 and ,professor ,mahan's ,treatise on ,field ,fortification4 ,this last is undoubtedly the very best work that has ever been written on field fortification1 and every officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy4 ,the following are recommended as books of reference on subjects discussed in the three preceding chapters4 ,mmorial pour la fortification permanente et passagre4 ,cormontaigne4 ,dfense des places4 ,cormontaigne4 ,attaque des places4 ,cormontaigne4 ,attaque des places4 ,vauban4 ,trait des mines4 ,vauban4 ,mmorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagre4 ,lafitte-,clav4 ,exercice sur les fortifications4 ,davigneau4 ,mmorial de l'officier du genie4 ,a periodical of rare merit1 containing most valuable military and scientific matter4 ,it is conducted by officers of the ,french corps of engineers4 ,it has already reached its fourteenth number1 each number forming a volume4 ,trait complet de fortification4 ,noizet de ,st4 ,paul4 ,trait d'art militaire et de la fortification4 ,gay de ,vernon4 ,art de la guerre4 ,rogniat4 ,essai gnral de fortification1 c4 ,bousmard4 ,aide-mmoire portatif l'usage des officiers du gnie4 ,laisn4 ,a very valuable and useful book4 ,aide-mmoire de l'ingnieur militaire4 ,grivet4 ,cours d'art militaire4 ,laurillard ,fallot4 ,cours de fortification1 c4 ,lavart4 ,le livre de la guerre4 ,perrot4 ,journaux des siges dans la pninsule4 ,belmas4 ,journal of ,sieges in ,spain4 ,john ,jones4 ,both of the above are works of great value4 ,cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire4 ,franois4 ,architettura militare4 ,marchi4 ,essai sur la fortification4 ,baltard4 ,la fortification4 ,bar-le-,duc4 ,elmens de fortification4 ,bellaire4 ,la science des ingnieurs4 ,blidor4 ,l'art universel des fortifications4 ,bitainvieu4 ,nouvelle manire de fortifier les places4 ,blondel4 ,les sept siges de ,lille4 ,brun ,lavaine4 ,dfense des places fortes4 ,carnot4 ,mmoire sur la fortification4 ,carnot4 ,dfense de ,saragosse4 ,cavallero4 ,mmoires sur la fortification4 ,choumara4 ,nouvelle fortification4 ,coehorn4 ,thorie de la fortification4 ,cugnot4 ,des fortifications1 c4 c4 ,daron4 ,relation de la defense de ,dantzik4 ,d',artois4 ,les fortifications4 ,deville4 ,pribologie4 ,dilich4 ,de la fortification permanente4 ,dufour4 ,a work of merit4 ,essai sur la dfense des tats par les fortifications4 ,duviviet4 ,attaque et dfense des places du camp de ,st4 ,omer4 ,l'cole de la fortification4 ,fallois4 ,introduction la fortification4 ,de ,fer4 ,prcis de la dfense de ,valenciennes4 ,ferrand4 ,trait thorique1 c4 ,foissac-,latour4 ,examen detaill1 c4 ,foissac-,latour4 ,les ouvrages militaires de ,fosse4 ,instruction sur la fortification1 c4 ,gaillard4 ,mmoires pour l'attaque et dfense d'une place4 ,goulon4 ,sige of ,peschiera4 ,henin4 ,journal du sige de ,philisbourg4 ,prcis du sige de ,dantzick4 ,kirgener4 ,deuxime dfense de ,badajos4 ,lamare4 ,fortification1 et l'attaque et dfense des places4 ,lebloud4 ,o,euvres de ,lefebvre4 ,l'architecture des forteresses4 ,mandar4 ,trait sur l'art des siges4 ,mazeroy4 ,la sret des tats par le moyen des forteresses4 ,maigret4 ,dfense d',ancone4 ,mangourit4 ,fortification4 ,marolois4 ,siege de ,turin4 ,mengin4 ,recherches sur l'art dfensif1 c4 ,michaloz4 ,la fortification de campagne1 c4 ,miller4 ,l'art dfensif1 c4 ,montalembert4 ,journaux des siges de ,flandre4 ,relations des siges en ,europe1 c1 ,musset-,fathay4 ,a very valuable and interesting work4 ,relation du sige de ,metz4 ,relation du sige d',anvers4 ,les siges de ,jaffa et de ,st4 ,jean d',acre4 ,les siges de ,saragosse et de ,tortose4 ,rogniat4 ,sige de ,dantzick4 ,sainte-,susanne4 ,mmoire sur la fortification permanente4--,sa4 ,le sige de ,constantine4 ,elmens de fortification4 ,trincano4 ,des places fortes4 ,valaz4 ,essay on ,military ,bridges4,douglas4 ,a valuable work4 ,guide du pontonier4 ,drieu4 ,mmoire sur la guerre souterraine4 ,contle4 ,trait des mines4 ,etienne4 ,trait de l'art du mineur4 ,geuss4 ,trait de fortification souterraine4 ,gillot4 ,trait pratique et thorique des mines4 ,lebrun4 ,nouveau trait des mines1 c4 ,prudhomme4 ,manuel du sapeur4 ,used in the ,french service4 ,manuel du mineur4 ,manuel du pontonier4 ,essay on ,field ,fortifications4 ,pleydell4 ,elements of ,field ,fortifications4 ,lochee4 ,rlation du sige de ,grave et ,mayence4 ,siges de ,gnes4 ,thibault4 ,trait de fortification souterraine4 ,mouze4 ,militairische ,mittheilungen4 ,xilander4 ,die ,befestigung der ,statten4 ,hauser4 ,abhandlung ber die ,befestigungskunst1c4 ,hauser ,versuch ber die ,verschanzungskunst4 ,muller4 ,course of ,elementary ,fortification4 ,pasley4 ,this is a work of much detail--useful1 no doubt1 to an uneducated engineer soldier1 but to an officer at all acquainted with his profession1 it must seem ridiculously minute4 ,to the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of the engineer's art called constructions2 but as this part of the profession is1 in some degree1 common both to the civil and military engineer1 it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character in a list of books strictly military4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,military ,,education ,,appointment ,,and ,,promotion4 ,with the ,romans1 six years' instruction was required to make a soldier2 and so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach to military education and discipline1 that the very name of their army was derived from the verb to practise4 ,modern nations1 learning from experience that military success depends more upon skill and discipline than upon numbers1 have generally adopted the same rule as the ,romans2 and nearly all of the ,european powers have established military schools for the education of their officers and the instruction of their soldiers4 ,france1 which has long taken the lead in military science1 has six military schools for the instruction of officers1 containing in all more than one thousand pupils1 and numerous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers and soldiers4 ,prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education1 which contain about three thousand pupils1 and also numerous division1 brigade1 garrison1 and company schools for practical instruction4 ,austria has some fifty military schools1 which contain in all about four thousand pupils4 ,russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools1 with about two thousand pupils2 twenty-five military schools for the noblesse1 containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils2 corps d'armee schools1 with several thousand pupils2 regimental schools1 with eleven thousand pupils2 and brigade-schools1 with upwards of one hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars2--making in all about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools6 ,england has five military schools of instruction for officers1 number of pupils not known2 a military orphan school1 with about twelve thousand pupils2 and numerous dpt and regimental schools of practice4 ,the smaller ,european powers--,belgium1 ,sardinia1 ,naples1 ,spain1 ,portugal1 ,denmark1 ,sweden1 ,wurtemberg1 ,bavaria1 ,baden1 have each several military schools1 with a large number of pupils4 ,it is seen from these statistics1 that the ,european powers are not so negligent in educating their officers1 and in instructing and disciplining their soldiers1 as some in this country would have us believe4 ,washington1 ,hamilton1 ,knox1 ,pickering1 and others1 learning1 by their own experience in the war of the ,american revolution1 the great necessity of military education1 urged upon our government1 as early as #aghc1 the importance of establishing a military academy in this country1 but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till #ahjb4 ,in #agid1 the subaltern grade of cadet was created by an act of ,congress1 the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments1 and furnished at the public expense with the necessary books1 instruments1 and apparatus for their instruction4 ,but this plan of educating young officers at their posts was found impracticable1 and in his last annual message1 ,dec4 #gth1 #agif1 ,washington urged again1 in strong language1 the establishment of a military academy1 where a regular course of military instruction could be given4 ,whatever argument1 said he1 may be drawn from particular examples1 superficially viewed1 a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated2 that it demands much previous study2 and that the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation4 ,the subject was however postponed from time to time1 till ,march1 #ahjb1 when a bill was passed establishing the ,military ,academy4 ,it was at first on a small scale1 and its course of instruction meager and deficient4 ,it gradually became enlarged1 but lingered along1 with no great improvement1 till #ahag1 when ,capt4 ,patridge was dismissed from the superintendency1 and ,col4 ,thayer put in charge4 ,from this period we date the commencement of the success and reputation which the ,military ,academy has since enjoyed4 ,this institution1 as now organized1 consists of one cadet from each congressional district1 and a few at large1 making an average of two hundred and thirty-seven4 ,the course of instruction is four years1 after which time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps1 with higher rank if there are vacancies1 but if there are no vacancies1 he goes as a cadet1 with the brevet rank of the next higher grade4 ,the examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one1 being confined to the elementary branches of an ,english education4 ,the annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods1 the first extending from ,june till ,september1 and the second from ,september to the following ,june4 ,during the first period1 the cadets leave their barracks and encamp in tents1 and are made subject to the police and discipline of an army in time of war4 ,in addition to the thorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in the different arms during these three summer months of each year1 they are made to perform the same tours of guard-duty1 night and day1 as is required of the common soldier in time of actual war4 ,this continues till the first of ,september of each year1 when the cadets return to their barracks1 and for the remaining nine months devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific and military studies1 intermixed with military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory and on the field4 ,to test the progress of the cadets in their studies1 there are held semi-annual public examinations4 ,these examinations are strict and severe1 and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw from the institution1 to allow some one else from the same district to make the trial4 ,during their course of studies the cadets1 as warrant-officers of the army1 draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses4 ,the allowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month1 but none of this is paid to the cadet1 but is applied to the purchase of books1 fuel1 lights1 clothing1 board1 c4 ,this institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern officers1 thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical duties of their profession4 ,after completing this course1 the cadet is usually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a commissioned officer1 and is immediately put on duty with his regiment or corps4 ,this system of appointment to the army has produced the most satisfactory results1 and has received the commendation of our best military men1 and the approbation of all our presidents and most able statesmen4 ,nevertheless1 it has occasionally met with strong opposition2 this opposition springing in part from a want of proper information respecting the character and working of the system1 and in part from the combined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failed to pass their examinations for promotion1 and of those who1 from a conscious want of qualifications or merit1 feel assured that they cannot obtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit1 as fixed by examination1 shall exist4 ,hence the effort to destroy the ,military ,academy and to throw the army entirely open to political appointment4 ,several legislative bodies1 acting under these combined influences1 have passed resolutions1 giving various objections to the ,military ,academy1 and recommending that it be abolished4 ,the objections made by the legislatures of ,tennessee1 ,ohio1 ,connecticut1 ,new ,hampshire1 and ,maine1 are mostly founded on false information1 and may be readily answered by reference to the official records of the ,war-office4 ,but it is not the present object to enter into a general discussion of the charges against that institution1 except so far as they are connected with the importance of military education1 and the rules of military appointment and promotion4 ,it has been alleged by many of the opponents of the ,west ,point ,academy1 that military instruction is of little or no advantage to a general2--that in the wars of ,napoleon1 and in the ,american ,revolution1 and the ,american war of #ahab1 armies were generally led to victory by men without a military education1 and unacquainted with military science2--and that in the event of another war in this country1 we must seek our generals in the ranks of civil life1 rather than among the graduates of our ,military ,academy4 ,the objection here made to military education will hold with equal force against education in any other profession4 ,we sometimes find men who have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar1 or in medicine and the sciences1 without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an education in academic or collegiate halls1 and perhaps even without that preliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professional pursuits4 ,shall we therefore abolish all our colleges1 theological seminaries1 schools of law and medicine1 our academies and primary schools1 and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the ignorant8 ,if professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals1 why not also in our lawyers and our surgeons8 ,if we deem professional instruction requisite for the care of our individual property and health1 shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of our country1 the reputation of our arms1 and the lives of thousands of our citizens8 ,but in reality1 were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in their several professions in spite of1 rather than by means of their want of a professional education8 ,and have not such men1 feeling the disadvantages under which they were forced to labor1 been almost without exception the advocates of education in others8 ,but is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more recent wars were men destitute of military education1--men who rose from the ranks to the pinnacle of military glory1 through the combined influence of ignorance of military science and contempt for military instruction8 ,let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of the generals of the ,french ,revolution1 for these are the men to whom reference is continually made to prove that the ,military ,academy is an unnecessary and useless institution1 the best generals being invariably found in the ranks of an army1 and not in the ranks of military schools4 ,facts may serve to convince1 where reasoning is of no avail4 ,napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of ,brienne and ,paris1 and had all the advantages of the best military and scientific instruction given in ,france4 ,dessaix was a pupil of the military school of ,effiat1 with all the advantages which wealth and nobility could procure4 ,davoust was a pupil of the military school of ,auxerre1 and a fellow-pupil with ,napoleon in the military school of ,paris4 ,kleber was educated at the military school of ,bavaria4 ,eugene ,beauharnais was a pupil of ,st4 ,germain-en-,loye1 and had for his military instructor the great captain of the age4 ,his whole life was devoted to the military art4 ,berthier and ,marmont were both sons of officers1 and1 being early intended for the army1 they received military educations4 ,lecourbe had also the advantages of a military education before entering the army4 ,pichegru and ,duroc were pupils of the military school of ,brienne4 ,drouet was a pupil of the artillery school4 ,foy was first educated in the college of ,soissons1 and afterwards in the military schools of ,la ,fre and ,chalons4 ,carnot1 called the ,organizer of ,french victory1 received a good early education1 and was also a pupil of the engineer school of ,mzires4 ,several of the distinguished ,french generals at first received good scientific and literary educations in the colleges of ,france1 and then acquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of the army2 and by this means1 before their promotion to responsible offices1 acquired a thorough practical instruction1 founded on a basis of a thorough preliminary education4 ,such was ,suchet1 a pupil of the college of ,lisle-,barbe2 ,lannes1 a pupil of the college of ,lectoure2 and ,mortier1 who was most carefully educated at ,cambrai2 ,lefebvr and ,murat were both educated for the church1 though the latter profited but little by his instruction2 ,moreau and ,joubert were educated for the bar2 ,massena was not a college graduate1 but he received a good preliminary education1 and for several years before he entered the army as an officer1 he had enjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent circumstances2 ,ney1 though poor1 received a good preliminary education1 and entered a notary's office to study a profession4 ,hoche was destitute of the advantages of early education1 but1 anxious to supply this deficiency1 he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books1 and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies4 ,by several years devoted in this way to professional studies and the practical duties of a subordinate grade in the army1 ,hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the ,french ,revolution4 ,soult and ,gouvion-,saint-,cyr1 being of parents in limited circumstances1 had not the advantages of extensive education1 but close and diligent application1 an ardent ambition1 and strong and powerful intellect1 combined with long years of service in the practical operations of the field1 at length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles1 and force their way to the higher walks of their professions4 ,but both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction1 and the importance of professional education in the army1 and they have consequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military schools of ,france4 ,the ,polytechnic ,school was established too late to furnish officers for any of the earlier wars of ,napoleon2 but in his last campaigns he began to reap the advantages of an institution which had been under his fostering care1 and ,bertrand1 ,dode1 ,duponthon1 ,haxo1 ,rogniat1 ,fleury1 ,valaz1 ,gourgaud1 ,chamberry1 and a host of other distinguished young generals1 fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his poulet aux oeufs d'or--the hen that laid him golden eggs6 ,in our own revolutionary war1 ,generals ,washington1 ,hamilton1 ,gates1 ,schuyler1 ,knox1 ,alexander1 7,lord ,stirling17 the two ,clintons1 the ,lees1 and others1 were men of fine education1 and a part of them of high literary and scientific attainments2 ,washington1 ,gates1 ,charles ,lee1 the ,clintons1 and some others1 had considerable military experience even before the war3 nevertheless1 so destitute was the army1 generally1 of military science1 that the government was under the necessity of seeking it in foreigners--in the ,la ,fayettes1 the ,kosciuskos1 the ,steubens1 the ,de ,kalbs1 the ,pulaskis1 the ,duportails--who were immediately promoted to the highest ranks in our army4 ,in fact the officers of our scientific corps were then nearly all foreigners4 ,but1 say the opponents of the ,academy1 military knowledge and education are not the only requisites for military success2 youthful enterprise and efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance with military science and the military art3 long service in garrison1 combined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a peace-establishment1 so deadens the enterprise of the older officers of the army1 that it must inevitably result1 in case of war1 that military energy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life4 ,we are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the commander of an army1 and we readily admit that while seeking to secure to our service a due degree of military knowledge1 we should also be very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with the dead weights of effete seniority4 ,but we do question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency4 ,minds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge1 and the rich lore of past history2 judgments ripened by long study and experience2 with passions extinguished1 or at least softened by the mellowing influence of age--these may be best suited for judges and statesmen1 for here there is time for deliberation1 for the slow and mature judgment of years4 ,but for a general in the field1 other qualities are also required4 ,not only is military knowledge requisite for directing the blow1 but he must also have the military energy necessary for striking that blow1 and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy4 ,a rapid coup d'oeil prompt decision1 active movements1 are as indispensable as sound judgment2 for the general must see1 and decide1 and act1 all in the same instant4 ,accordingly we find that most great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their laurels while still young4 ,philip of ,macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two1 and soon distinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states4 ,at the age of forty-five he had conquered all ,greece4 ,he died at forty-seven4 ,alexander the ,great had defeated the celebrated ,theban band at the battle of ,cheronea1 and gained a military reputation at the age of eighteen4 ,he ascended the throne of his father ,philip before twenty1 and at twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory1 having already conquered the world4 ,he died before the age of thirty-two4 ,julius ,caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade ,mitylene1 where he greatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two4 ,he soon after held the important offices of tribune1 qustor1 and edile4 ,he had completed his first war in ,spain1 and was made consul at ,rome before the age of forty4 ,he twice crossed the ,rhine1 and conquered all ,gaul1 and had twice passed over to ,britain1 before the age of forty-five2 at fifty-two he had won the field of ,pharsalia1 and attained the supreme power4 ,he died in the fifty-sixth year of his age1 the victor of five hundred battles1 and the conqueror of a thousand cities4 ,hannibal joined the ,carthaginian army in ,spain at twenty-two1 and was made commander-in-chief at twenty-six4 ,victorious in ,spain and ,france1 he crossed the ,alps and won the battle of ,cann before the age of thirty-one4 ,scipio ,africanus1 7the elder17 at the age of sixteen distinguished himself at the battle of ,ticinus2 at twenty was made edile1 and soon after pro-consul in ,spain2 at twenty-nine he won the great battle of ,zama1 and closed his military career4 ,scipio ,africanus 7the younger7 also distinguished himself in early life2 at the age of thirty six he had conquered the ,carthaginian armies and completed the destruction of ,carthage4 ,gengis-,khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of thirteen1 and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men1 with which he defeated a numerous force of rebels1 who had thought to take advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion4 ,he soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests1 and before the age of forty had made himself emperor of ,mogul4 ,charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six1 conquered ,aquitania at twenty-eight1 made himself master of ,france and the greater part of ,germany at twenty-nine1 placed on his brows the iron crown of ,italy at thirty-two1 and conquered ,spain at thirty-six4 ,gonsalvo de ,cordova1 the great captain1 entered the army at fifteen1 and before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military reputation1 and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle2 at forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made commander-in-chief of the army in ,italy4 ,henry ,,iv4 of ,france was placed at the head of the ,huguenot army at the age of sixteen1 at nineteen he became king of ,navarre2 at forty he had overthrown all his enemies1 placed himself on the throne of ,france1 and become the founder of a new dynasty4 ,montecuculi1 at the age of thirty-one1 with two thousand horse1 attacked ten thousand ,swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery2 at thirty-two he gained the victory of ,triebel1 at forty-nine defeated the ,swedes and saved ,denmark1 and at fifty-three defeated the ,turks at the great battle of ,st4 ,gothard4 ,in his campaigns against the ,french at a later age1 he made it his chief merit1 not that he conquered1 but that he was not conquered4 ,saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve1 and soon obtained the command of a regiment of horse2 at twenty-four he became marchal-de-camp1 at forty-four marshal of ,france1 and at forty-nine gained the celebrated victory of ,fontenoy4 ,he died at the age of fifty-four4 ,vauban entered the army of ,cond as a cadet at the age of seventeen1 at twenty was made a lieutenant1 at twenty-four he commanded two companies1 at forty-one was a brigadier1 at forty-three a marchal-de-camp1 and at forty-five commissaire-gnral of all the fortifications of ,france4 ,at the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges1 and had assisted at many others4 ,turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen2 he served one year as a volunteer1 four years as a captain1 four years as a colonel1 three years as a major-general1 five years as a lieutenant-general1 and became a marshal of ,france at thirty-two4 ,he had won all his military reputation by the age of forty4 ,prince ,maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen1 and acquired his military reputation in very early life4 ,he died at fifty-eight4 ,the great ,cond immortalized his name at the battle of ,rocroi1 in which1 at the age of twenty-two1 he defeated the ,spaniards4 ,he had won all his great military fame before the age of twenty-five4 ,prince ,eugene of ,savoy was a colonel at twenty-one1 a lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four1 and soon after1 a general-field-marshal4 ,he gained the battle of ,zenta at thirty-four1 and of ,blenheim at forty-one4 ,at the opening of the war of #agcc1 he again appeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine1 but having lost the vigor and fire of youth1 he effected nothing of importance4 ,peter the ,great of ,russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age2 at twenty he organized a large army and built several ships2 at twenty-four he fought the ,turks and captured ,asoph2 at twenty-eight he made war with ,sweden2 at thirty he entered ,moscow in triumph after the victory of ,embach1 and the capture of ,noteburg and ,marienburg2 at thirty-one he began the city of ,st4 ,petersburg2 at thirty-nine he was defeated by the ,turks and forced to ransom himself and army4 ,his latter years were mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs4 ,he died at the age of fifty-five4 ,charles the ,,xii4 of ,sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen1 completed his first successful campaign against ,denmark at eighteen1 overthrew eighty thousand ,russians at ,narva before nineteen1 conquered ,poland and ,saxony at twenty-four1 and died at thirty-six4 ,frederick the ,great of ,prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight1 and almost immediately entered on that career of military glory which has immortalized his name4 ,he established his reputation in the first ,silesian war1 which he terminated at the age of thirty4 ,the second ,silesian war was terminated at thirty-three2 and at forty-three1 with a population of five millions1 he successfully opposed a league of more than one hundred millions of people4 ,prince ,henry of ,prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a regiment at sixteen2 at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of ,prague1 and the same year was promoted to the command of a separate army4 ,the military reputation he acquired in the ,seven ,years' ,war was second only to that of ,frederick4 ,cortes had effected the conquest of ,mexico1 and completed his military career1 at the age of thirty-six4 ,sandoval1 the most eminent of his great captains1 died at the age of thirty-one4 ,he had earned his great renown1 and closed his military achievements1 before the age of twenty-five4 ,pizarro completed the conquest of ,peru at thirty-five1 and died about forty4 ,lord ,clive began his military career at twenty-two1 and had reached the zenith of his military fame at thirty-five2 he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six1 and died at fifty4 ,hastings began his military service at about twenty-five1 and became governor of ,bengal at forty4 ,napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen1 a captain at twenty1 chef-de-bataillon at twenty-four1 general of brigade at twenty-five1 and commander-in-chief of the army of ,italy at twenty-six4 ,all his most distinguished generals were1 like him1 young men1 and they seconded him in his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthful valor and enthusiasm4 ,dessaix entered the army at fifteen2 at the opening of the war he quickly passed through the lower grades1 and became a general of brigade before the age of twenty-five1 and a general of division at twenty-six2 he died before the age of thirty-two1 with a reputation second only to that of ,napoleon4 ,kleber did not enter the army till later in life1 but he quickly passed through the subordinate grades1 and was made a general of brigade at thirty-eight1 a general of division at forty1 and general-in-chief of an army at forty-one3 he died at forty-six4 ,on his death1 and in ,napoleon's absence1 ,mnau1 aged and inefficient1 succeeded by right of seniority to the command of the army of ,egypt4 ,its utter ruin was the almost immediate consequence4 ,massena first entered the army at seventeen1 but soon married a rich wife1 and retired to civil life4 ,he returned to the army at the opening of the revolution1 and in two years1 before the age of thirty-five1 was promoted to the rank of general of division4 ,he immediately acquired that high reputation which he sustained through a long career of military glory4 ,soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two1 a captain at twenty-four2 the following year he passed through the several grades of chef-de-bataillon1 colonel1 and general of brigade1 and became general of division at twenty-nine4 ,davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen1 a general of brigade at twenty-three1 and general of division at twenty-five4 ,eugene ,beauharnais entered the army at a very early age4 ,he became chef-de-bataillon at nineteen1 colonel at twenty-one1 general of brigade at twenty-three1 and ,viceroy of ,italy at twenty-five4 ,he soon proved himself one of ,napoleon's ablest generals4 ,at twenty-eight he commanded the army of ,italy1 and at thirty-one gained great glory in the ,russian campaign1 at the head of the fourth corps d'arme4 ,gouvion-,saint-,cyr enured the army at the beginning of the ,revolution1 and passing rapidly through the lower grades1 became a general of brigade at twenty-nine1 and a general of division at thirty4 ,suchet became a chef-de-bataillon at twenty1 general of brigade at twenty-five1 major-general of ,brune's army at twenty-seven1 and general of division and of a corps d'arme at twenty-eight4 ,oudinot became a captain at twenty-three1 chef-de-bataillon at twenty-four1 general of brigade at twenty-five1 and general of division at twenty-eight4 ,ney was a captain at twenty-three1 adjutant-general at twenty-six1 general of brigade at twenty-seven1 and general of division at twenty-nine4 ,lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven1 general of brigade at twenty-eight1 and very soon after general of division4 ,joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five1 general of brigade at twenty-six1 general of division at twenty-eight1 and general-in-chief of the army of ,italy at twenty-nine4 ,he died at thirty4 ,victor was a chef-de-bataillon at twenty-seven1 general of brigade at twenty-nine1 and general of division at thirty-two4 ,murat was a lieutenant at twenty1 and passing rapidly through the lower grades1 he became a general of brigade at twenty-five1 and a general of division at twenty-seven4 ,mortier was a captain at twenty-three1 adjutant-general at twenty-five1 general of brigade at thirty1 and general of division at thirty-one4 ,macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven1 a general of brigade at twenty-seven1 and a general of division at thirty4 ,marmont was a captain at twenty-one1 chef-de-bataillon at twenty-two1 general of brigade at twenty-four1 inspector general at twenty-seven1 and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two4 ,bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight1 general of brigade at twenty-nine1 and general of division at thirty4 ,lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in #agic2 he became a general of brigade at thirty-eight1 and general of division at thirty-nine4 ,bessires entered the army at twenty-six1 became a colonel at thirty1 general of brigade at thirty-two1 and general of division at thirty-four4 ,he died at forty-seven4 ,duroc was a captain at twenty-three1 chef-de-bataillon at twenty-six1 colonel and chef-de-brigade at twenty-seven1 and general of division at thirty4 ,he died at forty-one4 ,this list might be still further extended with the same results1 but names enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted ,napoleon in his immortal campaigns were all1 with scarcely an exception1 young men1 still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusiasm4 ,the grade of marshal was not created till after ,napoleon became emperor4 ,on ascending the throne of the empire1 he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of ,france4 ,some of these were generals of the earlier wars of the ,revolution1 and had never served under him4 ,others were younger men1 several being only thirty-four1 thirty-five1 and thirty-six years of age4 ,the mean age of all was forty-four4 ,he afterwards made seven more marshals1 whose mean age was forty-three4 ,these appointments1 however1 were regarded as rewards for past services1 rather than as a grade from which service was expected1 for several of the older marshals were never called into the field after their promotion4 ,having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the armies of ,napoleon1 let us look for a moment at those who opposed him4 ,in the campaign of #agif the enemy's forces were directed by ,beaulieu1 then nearly eighty years of age2 ,wurmser1 also an octogenarian1 and ,alvinzi1 then over seventy3 these had all three distinguished themselves in earlier life1 but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so essential for a military commander4 ,in the campaign of #ahjj the general-in-chief of the ,austrian forces was ,melas1 an old general1 who had served some fifty years in the army2 he had distinguished himself so long ago as the ,seven ,years' ,war1 but he had now become timid and inefficient1 age having destroyed his energy4 ,in the campaign of #ahje the ,french were opposed by ,kutusof1 then sixty1 and ,mack1 then fifty-three2 the plan of operations was drawn up by still more aged generals of the ,aulic council4 ,in the campaign of #ahjf the ,french were opposed by the ,duke of ,brunswick1 then seventy-one1 ,hohenlohe1 then sixty1 and ,mollendorf1 ,kleist1 and ,massenbach1 old generals1 who had served under the great ,frederick1--men1 says ,jomini1 exhumed from the ,seven ,years' ,war1--whose faculties were frozen by age1--who had been buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep4 ,in the campaign of #ahjg the ,french were opposed by ,kamenski1 then eighty years of age1 ,benningsen1 then sixty1 and ,buxhowden1 then fifty-six4 ,the ,allies now began to profit by their experience1 and in #ahji the ,austrian army was led by the young1 active1 skilful1 and energetic ,archduke ,charles2 and this campaign1 although the commander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the ,aulic council1 and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother1 was nevertheless the most glorious in the ,austrian annals of the wars of the ,revolution4 ,at the opening of the campaign of #ahab the ,emperor ,alexander1 young1 7only thirty-five17 active1 intelligent1 and ambitious1 had remodelled his army1 and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of glory4 ,he was himself at its head1 and directed its operations4 ,kutusof was for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief1 and exhibited an activity unusual at his age1 but he was surrounded by younger generals--,barclay-de-,tolley1 and ,miloradowich1 then forty-nine1 ,wintzengerode1 then forty-three1 ,schouvalof1 then thirty-five1 and the ,archduke ,constantine1 then thirty-three1--generals who1 at the heads of their corps1 and under the young emperor and his able staff of young officers1 in the two succeeding campaigns1 rolled back the waves of ,french conquest1 and finally overthrew the ,french empire4 ,wellington1 who led the ,english in these campaigns1 was of the same age as ,napoleon1 and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools of ,france4 ,the ,austrians were led by ,schwartzenburg1 then only about thirty1 and the ,prussians by ,yorck1 ,bulow1 and ,blcher4 ,the last of these was then well advanced in life1 but all his movements being directed by younger men1--,scharnhorst and ,gneisenau1--his operations partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff4 ,in the campaign of #ahae1 ,napoleon was opposed by the combinations of ,wellington and ,gneisenau1 both younger men than most of his own generals1 who1 it is well known1 exhibited1 in this campaign1 less than in former ones1 the ardent energy and restless activity which had characterized their younger days4 ,never were ,napoleon's1 plans better conceived1 never did his troops fight with greater bravery2 but the dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for their destruction4 ,in the ,american war of #ahab1 we pursued the same course as ,austria1 ,prussia1 and ,russia1 in their earlier contests with ,napoleon1 i4e41 to supply our armies with generals1 we dug up the ,beaulieus1 the ,wurmsers1 the ,alvinzis1 the ,melases1 the ,macks1 the ,brunswicks1 and the ,kamenskis of our revolutionary war2 but after we had suffered sufficiently from the ,hulls1 the ,armstrongs1 the ,winchesters1 the ,dearborns1 the ,wilkinsons1 the ,hamptons1 and other veterans of the ,revolution1 we also changed our policy1 and permitted younger men--the ,jacksons1 the ,harrisons1 the ,browns1 the ,mc,reas1 the ,scotts1#di the ,ripleys1 the ,woods1 the ,mc,combs1 the ,wools1 and the ,millers--to lead our forces to victory and to glory4 ,in the event of another war1 with any nation capable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance1 shall we again exhume the veterans of former days1 and again place at the head of our armies respectable and aged inefficiency2 or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and instruction8 ,the results of the war1 the honor of the country1 the glory of our arms1 depend1 in a great measure1 upon the answer that will be given to this question4 ,footnote #di3 ,scott had acquired his military reputation1 and attained the rank of major-general at twenty-eight4 ,but it may be asked1 how are we to secure this combination of military instruction and military energy2 how are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young and active men possessing due military instruction and talent8 ,the question is not a difficult one1 and our government can easily attain the desired object1 if it will only set at work honestly1 disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own members and advisers4 ,other governments have pointed out to us the way4 ,it is this3 let merit be the main test for all appointments and promotions in the army4 ,let one or more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country1 without distinction as to birth1 or wealth1 or politics2 let them be kept on probation in this subordinate grade1 and be thoroughly instructed in all that relates to the military profession2 after strict examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of those grades1 merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests4 ,the first part of this rule is already accomplished by the ,military ,academy4 ,one young man is selected from each congressional district1 on an average1 once in about two years1 the selection being made by the representative of the district2 these young men are made warrant officers in the army1 and sent to a military post for instruction2 frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their capacity and fitness for military service2 after a probation of a certain length of time1 the best are selected for commission in the army1 relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with reference to merit2 birth1 wealth1 influence of political friends--all extraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration4 ,what can be more truly and thoroughly democratic than this8 ,what scheme can be better devised to supply our army with good officers1 and to exclude from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party politics1 and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to the sons of wealthy and influential men1 to the almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less influential men1 regardless alike of qualifications and of merit8 ,unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here1 and all further advancement is made by mere seniority1 or by executive favoritism1 the claims of merit having but little or no further influence4 ,indeed1 executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to encroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment1 and to place relatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life1 regardless alike of qualifications and of merit1 while numbers of sons of the poor and less influential men1 who have served a probation of four or five years in military studies and exercises1 and have proved themselves1 in some thirty examinations made by competent boards of military officers1 to be most eminently qualified for commissions1 are passed by in utter neglect6 ,our army is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality1 than that of almost any of the governments of ,europe1 which we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit4 ,in the ,prussian service1 in time of peace1 the government can appoint no one1 even to the subordinate grade of ensign1 till he has followed the courses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm1 and has passed a satisfactory examination4 ,and1 no ensign can be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the superior board or commission of examiners at ,berlin1 and his name has been placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements 7connaissances7 render them qualified 7aptes7 for the responsible duties of their profession4 ,the nomination to the grade of second-lieutenant is not1 even after all these conditions are fulfilled1 left to the choice of the government4 ,when a vacancy occurs in this grade1 the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment a list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study2 the commandant1 after taking the advice of the superior officers of the regiment1 nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king1 who makes the appointment4 ,the government can appoint to the engineers and artillery only those who have been instructed as lves in the ,berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers1 and these appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed their final examination4 ,in these corps the lieutenants and second captains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a satisfactory examination4 ,no political influence1 nor even royal partiality1 can interfere with this rule4 ,even in the arbitrary monarchies of ,austria and ,russia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appointments and promotions1 in the peace establishments1 to certain fixed rules4 ,in the ,austrian army all sub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools1 or the specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards2 from this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers4 ,above the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by the ,aulic ,council1 in the order of seniority of rank1 except the claims of superior merit interfere4 ,in the ,russian army1 says ,haillot1 no one1 not even a prince of the imperial family1 can reach the grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several examinations1 or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are subjected4 ,promotion below the grade of colonel is made partly by seniority1 and partly by merit2 above that grade1 by selection alone4 ,in the ,british service1 rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase1 and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise2 but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man1 who is without the means of purchasing rank4 ,in some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism1 but far more objectionable than that based on merit4 ,wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army1 by preventing young men from reaching the higher grades4 ,at first1 says an officer of some distinction in the ,british navy1 in speaking of promotions in that arm of service1 it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes2 yet there can be little doubt that the navy1 and1 of course1 the country at large1 are essentially better served by the present system of employing active1 young1 and cheerful-minded officers1 than they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority4 ,it must not be forgotten1 indeed1 that at a certain stage of the profession1 the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule1 and has long been so3 but1 by a wise regulation1 it does not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained4 ,antecedent to this point1 there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons1 who1 if the rule of mere seniority were adopted1 would exceedingly embarrass the navy list4 ,we fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of exclusive seniority1 but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils4 ,in ,england1 where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state1 they may very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political influence2 but in this country we are taught to consider merit as a claim much higher than wealth1 or rank1 or privilege4 ,the various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the ,french service1 and the various results of these changes1 both on the character of the army and the welfare of the state1 are so instructive that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them4 ,we can give only a very brief outline4 ,previous to the ,revolution1 military appointment and promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility1 certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain grades of the noblesse2 merit and service being excluded from consideration4 ,but the constituent assembly changed this order of things1 and established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection1 after a concours1 and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers1 alternately by seniority and selection1 without concours2 the captains and lieutenants by seniority2 the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection2 marchaux-de-camp and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection4 ,in #agic the grades were still further opened to selection1 and in the turbulent times that followed1 a part of them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers4 ,but in #agie the combined system of merit and seniority1 with certain improvements1 was restored4 ,in #agif and the wars that followed1 merit was the only qualification required1 and ,bonaparte1 ,moreau1 and other young generals were actually placed in command of their seniors in rank4 ,military talent and military services1 not rank1 were the recognised claims for promotion1 the baptism of blood1 as it was called1 having equalized all grades4 ,bonaparte1 in leaving ,egypt1 paid no attention to seniority of rank1 but gave the command to ,kleber1 who was then only a general of brigade1 while ,menou was a general of division4 ,everybody knows that on the death of ,kleber1 ,general ,menou succeeded in the command2 and that ,egypt1 saved by the selection of ,kleber1 was lost by the seniority of ,menou4 ,napoleon formed rules for promotion1 both for peace and war1 based on merit4 ,his peace regulations were much the same as the system of #agie2 his field regulations1 however1 from the circumstances of the times1 were almost the only ones used4 ,the following extract from the ,reglement de ,campagne of #ahji1 7title ,,xx417 gives the spirit of this system3--,the next day after an action the generals of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have distinguished themselves in a particular manner2 the generals of division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief1 and also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure success1 so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty4 ,on the restoration of the ,bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the maison militaire du roi1 and court favoritism was substituted for merit and service4 ,but the revolution of #ahcj produced a different order of things4 ,the laws now regulate military promotion2 the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions2 and even in the exercise of this prerogative1 he is wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules1 which protect him from intrigues1 and from the obsessions of persons of influence1 and of party politicians4 ,would that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions in the army4 ,the existing laws and regulations of the ,french service differ slightly for different corps1 but the general rule is as follows3 ,no one can be appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools1 or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a corps d'arme4 ,in time of peace1 no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant1 captain1 or major1 7chef-d'escadron and chef-de-bataillon17 till he has served two years in the next lower grade2 no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years1 nor be made colonel till he has served three years1 in the next lower grade2 no one can be made marchal-de-camp1 lieutenant-general1 or marshal of ,france1 till he has served two years in the next lower grade4 ,these numbers are all diminished one half in time of war4 ,for the grades of first-lieutenant and captain1 two-thirds of the promotions are by seniority1 and one-third by selection2 for the chef-de-bataillon and chef-d'escadron1 one-half by seniority and one-half by selection2 for all the other grades by selection only4 ,in time of war1 one-half of the promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection1 and all the promotions to other grades in this way4 ,for promotion by selection1 a list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors1 and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc1 and the name1 qualifications1 and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the concours4 ,the recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably followed by the government in its selections4 ,this combined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all1 and at the same time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while still young and efficient4 ,merit need not1 therefore1 always linger in the subaltern grades1 and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity1 merely because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority4 ,moreover1 government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades1 and placing them over the heads of abler and better men4 ,if such a system of appointment were introduced into our army1 and fixed by legal enactments1 and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had either distinguished himself in the field1 or had passed an examination before a board of competent officers1 we are confident that better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years by the present system of political influence4 ,it would scarcely be possible to make worse selections4#ej ,and if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service1 it certainly would produce less injustice1 and give greater efficiency to the army1 than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank1 obtained through intrigue and political influence1 or high military appointments bestowed as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services4 ,as a military maxim1 secure efficiency1 by limiting the privileges of rank2 exclude favoritism1 by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers1 totally independent of party politics4 ,such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army2 it has produced the most satisfactory results2 stupidity1 ignorance1 and aged inefficiency have been overslaughed1 and will soon entirely disappear from that corps2 they have been replaced by young men of activity1 talent1 character1 intelligence1 and great professional skill4 ,is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands1 the honor of our flag1 the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct1 than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded8 ,footnote #ej3 ,to show the working of this system of political appointments1 we would call attention to a single fact4 ,on the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons in #ahcf1 thirty of its officers were appointed from civil life1 and only four from the graduates of the ,military ,academy4 ,of those appointed to that regiment from civil life1 twenty-two have already been dismissed or resigned1 7most of the latter to save themselves from being dismissed17 and only eight of the whole thirty political appointments are now left1 their places having been mainly supplied by graduates of the ,military ,academy4 ,in case of another increase of our military establishment1 what course will our government pursue8 ,will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our army1--graduates of the ,military ,academy1--who have spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their profession1 and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men totally ignorant of military duties1 mere pothouse politicians1 and the base hirelings of party1--those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures1 and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends8--and by thus devoting the army1 like the custom-house and post-office1 to political purposes1 will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual morality1 and destroying the national character8 ,should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course1 it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard4 ,we wish to call particular attention to this subject4 ,it deserves attention at all times1 but at the present moment it more especially demands a close and candid consideration4 ,the higher grades of our peace establishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that1 in case of an increase of the army1 many of them must undoubtedly be either passed over1 or put on a retired list4 ,sooner or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be made4 ,it is demanded by the good of service1 even in time of peace2 and in time of war1 it will be absolutely necessary to the success of our arms4#ea ,but the great danger is that the change may be made for the worse--that all the appointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through political influence1 thus converting the army and navy into political engines4 ,let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result2 let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws1 like those in ,france and ,prussia2 and let military merit and services1 as determined by boards of competent military officers1 be the only recognised claims to appointment and promotion1 thus giving to the poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the base hireling of party4 ,in actual service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist2 it would deaden and paralyze all our energies4 ,taking advantage of this1 politicians will drive us to the opposite extreme1 unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws1 based on the just principles of merit and service4 ,footnote #ea3 ,even at the present moment1 in ordering troops to ,texas1 where immediate and active service is anticipated1 it is found necessary to break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers into the field1 leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere nominal commands4 ,very many of the officers now in ,texas are acting in capacities far above their nominal grades1 but without receiving the rank1 pay1 and emoluments due to their services4 ,but the importance of maintaining in our military organization a suitable system of military instruction is not confined to the exigencies of our actual condition4 ,it mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devote themselves to the cultivation of military science1 so as to be able to compete with the military science of the transatlantic powers4 ,it is not to be expected that our citizen soldiery1 however intelligent1 patriotic1 and brave they may be1 can make any very great progress in military studies4 ,they have neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits1 and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance with elementary tactics--the mere alphabet of the military art--it is as much as can reasonably be expected of them4 ,as a general rule1 the militia are individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose a regular army4 ,but they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional knowledge4 ,technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life4 ,it is possible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a knowledge of law1 but he will probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts4 ,the unlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment1 but his progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himself familiar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors4 ,learning1 when applied to agriculture1 raises it from a mere mechanical drudgery to the dignity of a science4 ,by analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate1 we learn its capacity for improvement1 and gain the power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production4 ,how different the results attending the labors of the intelligent agriculturist1 guided by the lamp of learning1 from those of the ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts6 ,as applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts1 learning develops new powers of labor1 and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment4 ,personal comforts of every kind are greatly increased1 and placed within the reach of the humbler classes2 while at the same time the appliances of art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste1 and a higher moral culture4 ,as applied to commerce1 it not only greatly increases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization and knowledge1 but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the conflicting interests of nations4 ,nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when applied to the military art4 ,during the dark ages which followed the wreck of the ,roman power1 the military science by which that power had been reared1 was lost with other branches of learning4 ,when learning revived1 the military art revived with it1 and contributed not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force4 ,then1 too1 every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting influence4 ,the effects of the invention of gunpowder are a familiar proof of this remark2 and the same principle applies to the discoveries of modern times4 ,by perfecting ourselves in military science1 paradoxical as it may seem1 we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace1 and hastening on the approach of that period when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks4 ,,appendix4 ,since the first edition of this work was published1 two important wars have been commenced and terminated--that between the ,united ,states and the ,republic of ,mexico1 and that between ,russia and the ,western ,powers of ,europe--and another is now being waged between ,france and ,austria1 upon the old battle fields of ,northern ,italy4 ,in issuing a new edition of these ,elements of ,military ,art and ,science1 it is deemed proper to refer to these wars1 and to apply the principles here discussed to the military operations carried on in ,mexico and in the ,crimea4 ,it is proposed to do this in the form of ,notes to the several ,chapters4 ,the war in ,italy being still undetermined1 and the details of the several battles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known1 it is obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character or tactical arrangement4 ,h4,w4,h4 ,,new ,,york1 ,july1 #ahei4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,strategy4 ,in the invasion of ,mexico1 the ,united ,states formed four separate armies1 moving on four distinct lines of operation3 #ast4 ,the ,army of the ,west1 under ,general ,kearny1 moving from ,st4 ,louis on ,new ,mexico and ,california2 #b;d4 ,the ,army of the ,centre1 under ,general ,wool1 moving from ,san ,antonio de ,bexar on ,chihuahua2 #c;d4 ,the ,army of ,occupation1 on the ,rio ,grande1 under ,general ,taylor1 moving from ,corpus ,christi on ,matamoras1 ,monterey1 and ,saltillo2 and #dth4 ,the ,main ,army1 under ,general ,scott1 moving from ,vera ,cruz on the capital of ,mexico4 ,the ,army of the ,west1 under ,general ,kearny1 moved upon a separate and distinct line of operations1 having no strategic relations to the other three2 its objects were the conquest and occupation of ,new ,mexico and ,upper ,california4 ,the first was readily accomplished2 but the general then detached so large a force to operate on ,chihuahua after the diversion of ,wool's column1 that his expedition to ,california must have utterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in the ,pacific4 ,the lines of ,taylor and ,wool were evidently ill chosen1 being so distant as to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between them4 ,fortunately ,wool proceeded no further than ,monclova1 and then turned off to occupy ,parras1 thus coming under the immediate command of ,general ,taylor4 ,the latter fought the battles of ,palo ,alto and ,resaca de la ,palma1 and sustained the siege of ,fort ,brown2 then crossing the ,rio ,grande at ,matamoras1 he captured ,monterey1 and1 forming a junction with ,wool1 defeated the army of ,santa ,anna at ,buena ,vista4 ,this battle ended the campaign1 which1 however brilliantly conducted1 was entirely without strategic results4 ,scott landed his army near the ,island of ,sacrificios without opposition1 and immediately invested ,vera ,cruz1 which surrendered after a short siege and bombardment4 ,having thus secured his base1 he immediately advanced to the city of ,puebla1 meeting and defeating the army of ,santa ,anna at ,cerro ,gordo4 ,remaining some time at ,puebla to reinforce his army1 he advanced into the valley of ,mexico1 and after the brilliant victories of ,contreras1 ,churubusco1 ,molino del ,rey1 and ,chapultepec1 captured the city and terminated the war4 ,with respect to the double line of operations of ,taylor and ,scott it may be sufficient to remark1 that ,santa ,anna1 from his central position1 fought1 with the same troops1 the battles of ,buena ,vista and ,cerro ,gordo4 ,it should also be remarked1 that the line of operations of the army of the ,rio ,grande was not approved by either ,scott or ,taylor1 nor1 it is believed1 by any other officer of our army4 ,scott's line of operations1 however1 was truly strategic1 and in turning the ,mexican flank by ,lake ,chalco and the ,pedregal1 he exhibited the skill of a great general4 ,the war in the ,crimea1 from the limited extent of the theatre of operations1 afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic skill on either side4 ,nevertheless1 the movements of both parties1 prior to the investment and siege of ,sebastopol1 are fair subjects for military criticism with respect to the plans of operation4 ,when the allies landed their troops at the ,old ,fort1 three plans were open for the consideration of the ,russian general3 #ast4 ,to destroy or close the harbors of ,balaklava1 ,kamiesch1 ,kazatch and ,strelitzka1 and1 garrisoning ,sebastopol with a strong force1 to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the city1 and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north4 #b;d4 ,having closed the harbors on the south1 and secured ,sebastopol from being carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies1 to operate on their left flank1 annoying and harassing them with his ,cossacks1 and thus delay them many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have occupied4 #c;d4 ,to advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the ,alma4 ,the last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted1 and as the garrison of ,sebastopol1 during the battle1 consisted of only four battalions and the sailors of the fleet1 it might1 considering the weakness of its works1 have been easily carried by a detachment of the allied forces4 ,for the allies at the ,alma two plans presented themselves3 #ast4 ,to turn the ,russian left1 cut him off from ,sebastopol1 and occupy that city in force4 #b;d4 ,to turn the ,russian right1 and1 throwing him back upon ,sebastopol1 cut him off from all external succor4 ,neither plan was fully carried out4 ,the column of ,general ,bosquet turned the ,russian left and decided his retreat2 but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory4 ,the battle was fought on the #bjth of ,september1 and by noon of the #bfth the allies had only advanced to the ,balbeck1 a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days6 ,on the #bgth they regained their communication with the fleet at ,balaklava1 without attempting to occupy ,sebastopol1 and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march4 ,fortunately for the allies1 the ,russians failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded4 ,the fleet having entered the open harbor of ,balaklava1 the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches1 while the ,russians prepared their fortifications on the south of ,sebastopol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,iii4--,,fortifications4 ,in the war between the ,united ,states and ,mexico1 the latter had no fortifications on her land frontiers1 and1 with the single exception of ,vera ,cruz1 her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works4 ,the ,americans1 therefore1 had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation2 and1 when ,scott had reduced ,vera ,cruz1 his line of march was open to the capital4 ,moreover1 nearly every seaport on the ,gulf and ,pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow4 ,had the landing of ,scott been properly opposed1 and ,vera ,cruz been strongly fortified and well defended1 it would have been taken only after a long and difficult siege4 ,moreover1 had the invading army encountered strong and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to ,mexico1 the war would1 necessarily1 have been prolonged1 and possibly with a different result4 ,the ,russian fortifications in the ,baltic prevented the allies from attempting any serious operations in that quarter1 and those in the ,black ,sea confined the war to a single point of the ,heracleidan ,chersonese4 ,had ,russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a maritime descent1 and left ,sebastopol entirely undefended by fortifications1 how different had been the result of the ,crimean war4 ,this subject will be alluded to again in the ,notes on ,sea-coast ,defences1 and ,permanent ,fortifications4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,iv4--,,logistics4 ,the war in ,mexico exhibited1 in a striking manner1 our superiority over the enemy in this branch of the military art4 ,no army was better supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence1 clothing1 medical and hospital stores1 and in means of transportation4 ,two points1 however1 are worthy of remark in this connection3 #ast4 ,the great waste of material1 which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short enlistments1 and commanded by officers appointed from civil life1 who were without experience and destitute of military instruction2 and1 #b;d4 ,the immense expense of transportation1 which was due in part to the above cause and in part to the employment1 in the administrative departments1 of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and routine of military service4 ,this war was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army1 or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for1 forced requisitions being seldom resorted to1 and then in very moderate quantities4 ,the wisdom of this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our troops1 and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied by the army4 ,the war in the ,crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of the ,french administrative system over that of the ,english--of the military over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an army4 ,the ,french troops before ,sebastopol were regularly1 cheaply1 and abundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions1 clothing1 munitions1 medical stores1 military utensils1 and hospital and camp equipages2 while the ,english army1 notwithstanding an immense expenditure of money1 was often paralyzed in its operations by the want of proper military material1 and not unfrequently was destitute of even the necessaries of life4 ,instead of profiting by this lesson1 the recent tendency of our own government has been 7especially in supplying the army in ,utah7 to imitate the sad example of the ,english1 and to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party purposes4 ,if fully carried out1 it must necessarily result in the ruin of the army1 the robbery of the treasury1 and the utter corruption of the government4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,v4--,,tactics4 ,the war in ,mexico1 from the small number of troops engaged1 and the peculiar character of the ground in most cases1 afforded but few opportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battle which has so often determined the victory upon the great fields of ,europe4 ,nevertheless1 the history of that war is not without useful lessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attack and defence of positions4 ,the limit assigned to these ,notes will admit of only a few brief remarks upon these battles4 ,the affairs of ,palo ,alto and ,resaca de la ,palma properly constitute only a single battle4 ,in the first1 which was virtually a cannonade1 the lines were nearly parallel1 and ,arista's change of front to an oblique position during the engagement1 was followed by a corresponding movement on the part of ,general ,taylor4 ,being made sensible of the superiority of the ,american artillery1 the ,mexican general fell back upon the ,ravine of ,resaca de la ,palma1 drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit the physical character of the ground4 ,the ,americans attacked the whole line with skirmishers1 and with dragoons supported by light artillery1 and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory4 ,general ,taylor's operations at ,monterey partook more of the nature of an attack upon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field4 ,no doubt ,worth's movement to the right had an important influence in deciding the contest1 but the separation of his column from the main body1 by a distance of some five miles1 was1 to say the least1 a most hazardous operation4 ,the ,mexicans1 however1 took no advantage of the opening to operate between the separate masses into which the ,american army was divided4 ,the loss which the ,mexicans inflicted upon us resulted more from the strength of their position than from any skilful use of their defensive works4 ,in the battle of ,buena ,vista1 the efforts of ,santa ,anna were principally directed to turning the ,american left4 ,if he had concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau1 the success gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been decisive4 ,the ,american right at ,la ,angostura was made almost inaccessible by the deep ravines in its front1 and the skilful use made of the artillery from this point enabled ,general ,taylor to gain the victory1 even after his left had been completely turned1 and a portion of the volunteers had actually fled from the field4 ,the manner in which ,scott handled his troops in the various battles on his line of march from ,vera ,cruz to the capital1 proved him to be one of the best generals of the age4 ,at ,cerro ,gordo he so completely turned ,santa ,anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat1 and nearly destroyed his army1 the general himself barely escaping capture4 ,the turning of ,valencia's position by the village of ,san ,geronimo1 at the battle of ,contreras1 and the charge by ,riley's columns of infantry1 were movements well planned and admirably executed1 as were also the rapid pursuit of ,santa ,anna to ,churubusco1 and the flank and rear attacks by the brigades of ,pierce and ,shields4 ,the victory of ,molino del ,rey was mostly won with the musket1 without very material assistance from heavy artillery1 and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought achievements of the war4 ,the assault upon ,chapultepec was preceded by a long and heavy cannonade1 which produced a decided moral effect upon the enemy and greatly facilitated the assault4 ,with respect to the battles of the ,crimean war1 only that of the ,alma is subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles2 those of ,balaklava1 ,inkerman1 and the ,tchernaya1 were of the nature of sorties made to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence1 and to prolong the operations of the siege4 ,they must therefore be judged as such1 and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in the open field4 ,at the battle of the ,alma the ,russians were attacked in position1 the two lines of battle being nearly parallel4 ,according to the original plan of attack1 the ,turks and ,bosquet's division was to turn the ,russian left1 while the main attack was made upon the centre4 ,but1 on account of the division of command in the allied army1 there was no concert of action4 ,the heavy column of ,bosquet probably decided the victory1 although the battle was general throughout the whole line4 ,the ,english army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances1 its right connected with the ,french1 and its left protected by a line of skirmishers1 of cavalry and horse artillery4 ,with respect to the formation and use of troops in the other battles1 it may be remarked that the charge of the ,english light cavalry at ,balaklava was apparently without necessity or object1 and led to its inevitable destruction4 ,in the battle of ,inkerman the ,russians directed their main attack upon the ,english right and centre1 with false attacks upon the ,french left and towards ,balaklava4 ,but these false attacks1 as is usual in such cases1 were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision1 and ,bosquet was thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the ,english portion of the line and move to its assistance4 ,moreover1 the main body of the ,russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses1 which exposed them to terrible losses1 and rendered impossible a rapid and effective deployment of their numerical force4 ,the same criticism is applicable to their formation at the battle of the ,tehernaya4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,vi4--,,means ,,of ,,national ,,defence4 ,on the invasion of ,mexico by the ,united ,states1 the former republic had a large army of tolerably good troops1 though badly officered1 still worse equipped1 and almost destitute of proper military stores2 but she was entirely wanting in two important elements of national defence--fortifications and a navy4 ,her weakness was shown by the rapid and easy conquest of almost the entire country4 ,we have already remarked that the fortifications of ,russia confined the theatre of war to a single point of the ,crimea1 and limited the military operations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successful siege of ,sebastopol4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,vii4--,,sea-,,coast ,,defences4 ,allusion has already been made to the weakness of ,mexico1 resulting from her want of sea-coast defences1 as shown by the war between that republic and the ,united ,states4 ,this would have been still more manifest had she possessed any thing like a commercial marine1 exposed to capture by our naval forces4 ,as it was1 the ,mexican war afforded not a single contest between ships and forts1 no opposition being made to the occupation of ,mexican ports by our naval force4 ,the only coast defence1 the castle of ,san ,juan d',ulica was not attacked1 but after the bombardment and capture of ,vera ,cruz1 it surrendered without a blow4 ,the ,crimean war1 on the contrary1 exhibited in a most marked degree the importance of a well-fortified sea-coast4 ,notwithstanding the immense force of the combined fleets of ,england and ,france1 no naval attack was made upon either ,cronstadt or ,sebastopol1 and the large naval force of ,russia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent4 ,there was1 indeed1 a simulachre of a naval cannonade on the latter place on the #agth of ,october1 #ahed1 intended as a diversion of the attention and strength of the garrison from the land side1 where the real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the besiegers4 ,the inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no serious naval attack was undertaken1 notwithstanding that the allies were ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed ,russian works the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen4 ,the results of this simulachre of a naval cannonade1 as it has been called1 is worthy of note4 ,the details are taken from ,major ,barnard's able pamphlet on ,the ,dangers and ,defences of ,new ,york1 and ,commander ,dahlgren's interesting and valuable work on ,shells and ,shell ,guns4 ,the allied fleet consisted of #ad ,french1 #aj ,british1 and #b ,turkish ships-of-the-line 7some few of which had auxiliary steam power71 and a number of side-wheel steamers to tow these2 and carried in all about #b1ejj guns4 ,it was opposed by about #bhj guns from the works4 ,the fleet kept itself 7in general7 at a respectable distance 7from #aejj to #bjjj yards72 too far to inflict any material injury with its armament 7#cb-pounders1 with a moderate proportion of #h-;inch shell-guns7 upon the works2--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the ,russian works4 ,the only exception to this remark applies to the detached ,english squadron under ,sir ,edmund ,lyons1 consisting of the ,agamemnon1 ,sanspareil1 ,london1 ,arethusa1 and ,albion1 the first-named of which vessels took a position at #gej or #hjj yards from ,fort ,constantine1 while the others stretched along at about the same distance from ,fort ,constantine1 the ',wasp ,tower1' and ',telegraph ,battery4' ,dahlgren describes the result as follows3-- ,the ,agamemnon was very seriously maltreated1 though not to such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine4 ,she was on fire several times2 was struck by #bdj shot or shells2 and1 singular to say1 only lost #bi1 while her second1 just by1 lost #gj men4 ,the ,albion suffered still more1 and in an hour was towed out crippled1 and on fire in more than one place1 with a loss of #ha men4 ,the crews of the ,london and ,arethusa1 fared rather better1 but the ships nearly as ill2 and they too remained in station but a little time after the ,albion4 ,the ,queen was driven off soon after she got into her new position1 in great danger2 and the ,rodney had the bare satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after experiencing some damage4 ,the value of the small works on the cape and bluffs1 was clearly defined in these results2 being above the dense cloud of smoke that enveloped the ships and the lower forts1 their aim was not embarrassed1 while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing1 with an inconvenient elevation1 at objects that they saw but seldom1 and then but dimly and briefly4 ,as a consequence1 three line-of-battle ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril1 and a fourth badly cut up2 while the ,agamemnon lay opposed to one of the heaviest sea-forts with two tiers of casemates1 and at the end of five-hours came off with comparatively little loss4 ,whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have had 7and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by the vessels71 it evidently was not for want of being hit often enough 7smoke or no smoke71 that the ,agamemnon escaped with so little injury4 ,she 'was struck by #bdj shot and shells2' and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck1 that she was not destroyed4 ,with respect to the damages received by ,fort ,constantine1 ,dahlgren says3-- ,the distance of the ,agamemnon and ,sanspareil from ,fort ,constantine 7#agth ,october1 #ahed71 was assumed to be about #hjj yards2 ,lord ,raglan states it to have been rather less4 ,these two ships could bring to bear about #hg guns1 and the firing from them probably lasted some four hours4 ,there can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage1 for the ,russian ,commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report2 but not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry1 and far short of effecting a breach in it4 ,at ,bomarsund1 the results were rather different3--,three #cb-pounders of #db cwt4 7guns of inferior weight71 were landed from a ship's spar deck1 and placed in battery at #iej yards from the ,north ,tower--the masonry of good quality and #f-a_/b feet thick4 ,in eight hours1 the wall between two embrasures was cut through from top to bottom1 offering a practicable breach1 to effect which #dhg shot and #de shells were fired1 being at the rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute2 or1 from each gun1 one in #b-c_/d minutes4 ,the ,tower surrendered4 ,it seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do1 the distances from the object being alike--particularly when it is considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre1 and most of them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar4 ,the guns of the ship1 if fired at the same rate as those of the battery1 which was not unusually rapid 7one round in two and three-fourth minutes71 would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and shells in the course of the four hours1 supposing no interruption2 a number which1 if properly applied1 would appear1 from the results of three guns1 to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in fourteen places2 whereas they did not effect a single breach1 which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy4 ,they must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort1 or else missed it altogether1 and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was attained by the battery4 ,the constantly preferred complaint of motion in the ships was not to be urged1 because on the day of cannonading ,sebastopol1 there was scarcely a breath of wind1 and the ships were too large to be easily moved by the swell1 unless very considerable4 ,that the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them1 proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed1 and the calibres too low4 ,it is said that the ,agamemnon was struck in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells1 which must have been but a small portion of what was fired1 though sufficient to be decisive1 if1 as already observed1 the calibre had been heavier4 ,here1 then1 a number of projectiles thrown from the ships1 which were sufficient1 had they been thrown from a land battery1 according to the result at ,bomarsund1 to produce fourteen practicable breaches1 failed not only to produce a single breach1 but even to impair the strength of the masonry4 ,the reason of this is obvious4 ,that degree of precision of fire by which a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a floating structure1 for the motion of the water1 even in the calmest days1 is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a distance1 as in this case1 of seven and eight hundred yards4 ,with respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the ,agamemnon1 it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries against ships of war4 ,the ,russians had some of them in their fleet1 and at ,sinope1 with their shell-guns1 they blew up two ,turkish frigates in fifteen minutes4 ,it does not appear that in the ,crimean war they had yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments1 for where shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries1 they were in every instance of inferior calibre4 ,with respect to the naval attack upon ,kinburn1 which has been referred to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to ships in reducing harbor defences1 we have no official reports of the ,russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of the works attacked4 ,dahlgren1 drawing his information from the official accounts of the ,english and ,french admirals1 describes the works and their location is follows3-- ,the ,boug and the ,dnieper issue into a large basin1 formed partly by the projection of the main shore1 partly by a long narrow strip of ,sand-beach1 which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction until it passes the promontory of ,otchakov1 where it terminates1 and from which it is separated by the channel1 whereby the waters of the estuary empty into the ,black ,sea4 ,the distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the ,point of ,otchakov1 or the main shore opposite1 is about two miles2 but the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war1 except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern shore4 ,here1 therefore1 are placed the works designed to command the entrance4 ,they are three in number4 ,near the extreme point of the spit is a covered battery built of logs1 which are filled in and overlaid with sand1--pierced for eighteen guns1 but mounting only ten4 ,advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt1 connected with the spit battery by a covered way4 ,this work1 built of stone1 and riveted with turf1 is open1 and said to be the most substantial of the three2 it has eleven cannon1 and within is a furnace for heating shot4 ,further on1 and where the beach has widened considerably1 is ,fort ,kinburn1 a square bastioned work1 extending to the sea on the south1 and to the waters of the estuary on the north4 ,it is casemated in part1 though but few of these embrasures were armed1--its chief force being in the pieces en barbette1 and some nine or ten mortars4 ,the masonry1 though solid1 is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof1 and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the interstices1 leaving the stone to disintegrate4 ,the interior space was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings1 slightly constructed and plastered over4 ,this fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces4 ,the ,english admiral states1 that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars4 ,the calibres are not given officially1 but stated in private letters to be #ah-pounders and #cb-pounders4 ,the above description will quite justify the further remark as to these works3-- ,they were inferior in every respect1 and manifestly incapable of withstanding any serious operation by sea or land4 ,the main fort was particularly weak in design1 and dilapidated2 all of them were indifferently armed and garrisoned4 ,so much for the works4 ,as to the character of the armament brought to the assault1 the same authority says3-- ,the allied force was admirably adapted to the operation1 embracing every description of vessel1 from the largest to the smallest1 and all propelled by steam4 ,there were screw-liners1 and like vessels of inferior class1 side-wheel steamers1 screw gunboats1 floating-batteries1 mortar-vessels1 etc41 each armed in what was considered the most approved manner4 ,and this truly formidable naval force carried besides 'some thousand troops' on board1 all designed to attack these 'dilapidated' works of ,kinburn4 ,without going into the particulars1 we simply give ,dahlgren's account of the affair3-- ,the ,french floating-batteries 7,devastation1 ,lave1 and ,tonnante7 steamed in to make their first essay1 anchoring some six or seven hundred yards off the ,s4,e4 bastion of ,fort ,kinburn1 and at #i4bj opened fire1 supported by the mortar-vessels1 of which six were ,english1 by the gunboats1 five ,french and six ,english1 and by the steamer ,odin1 #af4 ,the heavy metal of the floating-batteries 7said to be twelve #ej-pounders on the broadside of each7 soon told on the walls of the fort2 and the vertical fire was so good that the ,french admiral attributed to it1 in great part1 the speedy surrender of the place4 ,the gunboats also made good ricochet practice1 which was noticed to be severe on the barbette batteries4 ,the ,russian gunners1 in nowise daunted by this varied fire1 plied their guns rapidly in return1 directing their attention chiefly to the floating-batteries1 which were nearest4 ,exactly at noon1 the admirals steamed in with the ,royal ,albert 1 #aba1 ,algiers1 #ia1 ,agamemnon1 #ij1 and ,princess ,royal1 #ij1 with the four ,french liners in close order1 taking position in line1 ranging ,n4,w4 and ,s4,e41 about one mile from the fort1 in twenty-eight feet water4 ,at the same time1 a squadron of steam-frigates1 under ,rear-,admirals ,stewart and ,pellion1 dashed in through the passage to the basin1 opening fire on the spit and central batteries in passing1 and anchoring well inside of ,fort ,nicholaiev and ,otchakov4 ,the attack seaward was completed by the ,acre1 #ajj1 ,curaoa1 #cj1 ,tribune1 #cj1 and ,sphynx1 #f1 opening on the central battery2 while the ,hannibal1 #ia1 ,dauntless1 #bd1 and ,terrible1 #ba1 assailed that on the spit4 ,to this storm of shot and shells1 the ,russians could not reply long4 ,in the spit battery1 the sand falling through between the logs1 displaced by shot and shells1 choked the embrasures1 and blocked up the guns4 ,in the fort1 the light wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour2 then the walls began to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter1 front1 flank1 and rear2 and as the guns were disabled successively1 the return became feeble1 until few were in condition to be fired1 the central redoubt alone discharging single guns at long intervals4 ,the ,russian commander1 however1 made no sign of surrender2 but the admirals1 seeing that his fire had ceased1 and further defence was unavailing1 hoisted the white flag at #a4ce ,p4,m41 upon which the works were given up on honorable terms4 ,the garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men2 their loss is differently stated1--the ,french admiral says eighty wounded1--another1 forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded4 ,the ,english suffered the least1 having but two men wounded2 besides two killed and two wounded in the ,arrow1 by the bursting of her two #fh-pounder ,lancaster guns4 ,the superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of ordnance was very decided2 they must have had at least six hundred and fifty pieces in play1 chiefly #cb-pounders1 and #h-;inch shell guns1 with a fair proportion of #fh-pounders and mortars1 besides the #ej-pounders of the ,french floating batteries4 ,to which the ,russians could only reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars1 and no guns of heavier calibre than #cb-pounders1 while many were lower4 ,the great disparity in offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding position1 the ,russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level with the ships' batteries1 and also very deficient in proper strength4 ,on the other hand1 the depth of water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile2 and thus their fire was by no means so intense as it would have been at shorter range4 ,this was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an opportunity of proving their endurance2 which was the question of most importance1 as no one could doubt the effect of long #ej-pounders1 or #fh-pounders1 when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry1 and able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire4 ,no siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power1 for though the ,english had employed long #fh-pounders at ,sebastopol1 yet the distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards2 and the concentration of fire1 so far as any opinion can be formed from the published statements1 was far inferior to that of the thirty-six #ej-pounders1 in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close order4 ,they were hulled repeatedly by shot2 one of them 7the ,devastation71 it is said1 sixty-seven times1 without any other effect on the stout iron plates than to dint them1 at the most1 one and a half inches1--still1 there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the ports1--and the majority of damage to the ,french personnel 7twenty-seven men7 occurred in the three floating-batteries4 ,major ,barnard1 in commenting upon this affair1 says that it proves nothing1 unless it be1 that dilapidated1 and ill-designed1 and ill-constructed works1 armed with inferior calibres1 cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed4 99 99 99 ,the ,fort of ,kinburn surrendered1 not because it was breached--not because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be unable to protract the contest1--but simply because the guns and gunners1 exposed in all possible ways1 were put hors-du-combat1 and the calibres 7of the guns in ,kinburn7 were incapable of doing any great damage to the vessels1 at the distance they were stationed4 ,the guns in the low open batteries were exposed to a ricochet and vertical fire1 to which latter the ,french admiral attributed1 in good part1 the surrender of the place4 ,the buildings behind the batteries1 built of wood1 slightly constructed and plastered over1 were set on fire1 and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns almost impracticable4 ,nevertheless1 out of a garrison of #a1djj1 only #aeg were killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances4 ,if the works had been well-constructed casemates1 covering the men from the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who invested the land fronts1 the loss of the garrison would have been still less2 and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles1 much greater damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force4 ,with respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case1 ,commander ,dahlgren very judiciously remarks3-- ,the use that can be made of floating-batteries1 as auxiliaries in attacking shore-works1 must depend on further confirmation of their asserted invulnerability4 ,it may be that the performance at ,kinburn answered the expectation of the ,french emperor as regards offensive power1 for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the heaviest calibres1 which is undoubted2 but the main issue1 which concerns their endurance1 cannot be settled by the impact of #cb-pounder shot1 fired at #fjj and #gjj yards4 ,far heavier projectiles will in future be found on all seaboard fortifications2 and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at ,kinburn4 ,still1 it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in assailing forts1 even if its endurance falls short of absolute invulnerability2 and the defence will do well to provide against its employment4 ,the works at ,bomarsund were taken by means of land-batteries1 which breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works4 ,an auxiliary fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet1 but it produced very little effect4 ,but after the work had been reduced1 an experimental firing was made by the ,edinburgh1 armed with the largest and most powerful guns in the ,british navy4 ,in speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of ,bomarsund1 and the experimental fire of the ,edinburgh1 ,sir ,howard ,douglas remarks3-- ,this successful operation 7of the land batteries7 is very generally1 but erroneously1 stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships1 and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do1 and ought to attempt elsewhere4 ,but the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the fort1 which1 unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack was absolutely harmless1 must have been somewhat damaged1 and moreover shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions1 do not warrant this conclusion1 even should the attacking ships be permitted1 like the ,edinburgh1 to take up1 quietly and coolly1 positions within #ejj yards1 and then deliberately commence and continue their firing1 without being fired at6 ,the firing of the ,edinburgh1 at #a1jfj yards1 was unsatisfactory4 #cij shot and shells were fired1 from the largest and most powerful guns in the ,british navy 7viz41 from the ,lancaster gun of #ie cwt41 with an elongated shell of #ajj lbs42--from #fh-pounders of #ie cwt41 and #cb-pounders of #ef cwt41 solid shot guns2--from #aj-;inch shell guns of #hd cwt41 with hollow shot of #hd lbs42--from #h-;inch shell guns of #fe and #fj cwt41 with hollow shot of #ef lbs471 and did but little injury to the work4 ,at #dhj yards1 #bej shot1 shells1 and hollow shot were fired4 ,a small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall1 of extremely bad masonry1 and considerable damage done to the embrasures and other portions of the wall2 but no decisive result was obtained--no practicable breach formed1 by which the work might be assaulted1 taken1 and effectually destroyed1 although #fdj shot and shells 7#dj1jjj lbs4 of metal7 were fired into the place1 first at #a1jfj1 and then at #dhj yards4 ,surely1 this naval attack1 taken in connection with the true facts of the capture of ,kinburn1 the abortive attempt of the ,british fleet in the ,pacific upon the ,russian works of ,petropauloski1 is not calculated to affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks4 ,few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat2 but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating-batteries1 and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets1 with guns in barbette4 ,this conclusion they form from the results of the maritime attack on ,kinburn1 and of the land-batteries on ,bomarsund4 ,major ,barnard1 in his valuable work on ,the ,dangers and ,defences of ,new ,york1 draws a very different conclusion from these attacks1 and contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries1 if the latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts2 moreover1 that they proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries1 with guns in barbette1 in covering the garrison from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire4 ,unquestionably the masonry at ,bomarsund was poorly constructed2 nevertheless1 the fire of the shipping produced very little effect upon it4 ,it is also equally certain that ,kinburn ,was taken1 not by a breaching fire1 but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires4 ,with respect to our own system of sea-coast defences1 it may be remarked1 that1 since this chapter was written1 the works mentioned therein as having been commenced1 have been gradually advanced towards completion1 and that the acquisition of ,texas and ,california1 and the settlement of ,oregon and ,washington ,territory1 by greatly extending our line of maritime defence1 have rendered necessary the fortification of other points4 ,it should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted1 and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved1 many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks1 and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions1 like that upon ,sebastopol1 render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of ,new ,york and ,san ,francisco--one the key point of the ,atlantic1 and the other of the ,pacific coast4 ,perhaps the system adopted by our ,boards of ,engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted too many points of defence1 without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports1 which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence4 ,however this may have been at the time the system was adopted1 there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to the present relative importance of the places to be defended1 and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack4 ,on this subject we quote from the work of ,major ,barnard3-- ,while the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive system was planned1 and our country has so increased in population1 wealth and military resources1 that no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of our territory1--our great maritime places like ,new ,york1 have1 on the other hand1 increased in even greater proportion1 in every thing that could make them objects of attack4 ,the works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of ,new ,york could not1 therefore1 in the nature of things1 be adequate at the present day4 ,the recent war of ,england and ,france against ,russia may illustrate my meaning2 for it has taught us what to expect were either of these nations to wage war against the ,united ,states4 ,no invasion of territory1 no attempt at territorial conquest was made1 or thought of2 for it was well foreseen that no decisive results would flow from such means4 ,the war consisted exclusively in attacks upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval power4 ,such places1 by their vast importance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them1 and by their exposure to maritime attack1 offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive results may be produced4 ,cronstadt1 ,sebastopol1 ,sweaborg1 ,kinburn1 ,odessa1 ,kertch1 ,petropauloski1 and other places of less note1 were in succession or simultaneously objects of attack2 while such as the first named became1 indeed1 the true seats of war4 ,around ,sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources1 and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have turned the issue of the war4 ,had it not been so decided there1 ,cronstadt would have been the next field of combat1--for which1 indeed1 the allies had made the most enormous preparations4 ,is it not certain that in future all war of maritime powers against the ,united ,states1 will take a similar course8 ,all territorial invasion being out of the question1 it is against our great seaports and strategic points of coast defence--such as ,new ,york1 ,new ,orleans1 and ,san ,francisco--pre-eminently ,new ,york1--that an enemy will concentrate his efforts4 ,against these he will prepare such immense armaments1 --against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack1 which 7unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system7 shall insure success4 ,the mere defense of the city against ordinary fleets1 is no longer the question2 but through the defensive works to be here erected1 the nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power1 aided by all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack1 can bring against them2 in short1 in fortifying ,new ,york1 we are really preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be decided4 ,a few1 however1 object to the system at present adopted1 on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries1 and that earthen works1 covering a greater area1 will accomplish that object much more effectually1 while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege4 ,it cannot be doubted that earthen batteries1 with guns in barbette1 can1 as a general rule1 be more easily taken by assault1 that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet firing1 and more expose their gunners to be picked off by sharpshooters4 ,moreover1 they give but a very limited fire upon the most desirable point1 as the entrance to a harbor4 ,on the other hand1 it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works1 when properly constructed and properly armed1 will not effectually resist a naval cannonade1 whether from ships or floating-batteries4 ,the results of recent wars1 and of the ,west ,point experiments by ,general ,totten1 would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this4 ,against such proofs the mere ad captandum assertion of their incapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justify the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities of this country and ,europe1 and sanctioned by long experience4 ,major ,barnard1 in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to resist the fire of a hostile armament1 and of the propriety of abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of ,coast ,defences1 uses the following forcible language3--,when we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries1' of whatever description1 will themselves be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries1--that when they choose to come to 'close quarters1' to attempt to breach1 their 'embrasures' present openings through which deluges of grape1 canister1 and musket balls can be poured upon the gunners2 and consider what experience has so far shown1 and reason has taught us1 with regard to the casemate1--we need not be under apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down2 nor doubt that they will1 as they did in ,russia1 answer the important purposes for which they were designed4 ,it only remains to show the necessity of such works4 ,it1 in general1 costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet1 than to build a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches1 in which to mount it4 ,all authorities agree that an open barbette battery 7,grivel's very forcible admission has been quoted71 on a low site1 and to which vessels can approach within #cjj or #djj yards1 is utterly inadmissible4 ,it may safely be said1 that in nine cases out of ten1 the sites which furnish the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels1 are exactly of this character2 and indeed it very often happens that there are no others4 ,when such sites are found1 it rarely happens that they afford room for sufficient number of guns in open batteries4 ,hence the necessity of putting them tier above tier1 which involves1 of course1 the casemated structure4 ,such works1 furnishing from their lower tier a low1 raking fire1 and 7if of several tiers7 a plunging fire from their barbettes1 offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived1 and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as can be given to men thus engaged4 ,on subjects which have a mere speculative importance1 there is no danger in giving rein to speculation2 but on those of such real and intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression of the great city and port of ,new ,york1 it is not admissible to set aside the experience of the past1 or the opinions of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects4 ,a means of defence1 sanctioned by its being confided in to protect the great ports of ,europe--which has protected the great ports of ,russia against the most formidable naval armament that ever floated on the ocean1 has a claim upon our confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish2 and a claim to be adhered to in place of all new 'systems1' until time and trial shall have necessitated 7not merely justified7 the change4 ,if1 then1 we refer to the practice of other nations1 to find what has been judged necessary for the defence of important ports1--to experience1 to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of actual trial1--we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now required to defend ,new ,york4 ,we shall find at ,sebastopol--a narrow harbor1 which owed its importance to its being the great naval dpt of ,russia on the ,black ,sea--an array of #gjj guns1 about #ejj of which were placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works 7several of them of great size71 and the remainder in open batteries4 ,these defensive works fulfilled their object1 and sustained the attack of the allied fleet1 on the #agth of ,october1 #ahed1 without sensible damage4 ,the facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormous preparations required--the great risks encountered in landing a besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy 7while1 for protection against the former species of attack1 costly works are necessary1 and against the latter1 field works and men can1 in emergency1 afford protection71 naturally caused the ,russians to make these water defences their first object4 ,yet1 though almost unprotected on the land side1 ,sebastopol resisted1 for a whole year1 an attack on that quarter2 and illustrated how1 with plenty of men and material1 an energetic and effectual land defence may be improvised1 where the sea defence is provided for1 as thoroughly as it was at that place4 ,let ,cronstadt be another example4 ,great as was the importance of its defence to ,russia1 it was not greater1--it was by no means as great1 as that of ,new ,york to our own country4 ,this port1 and military and naval dpt1 was defended 7in its main approach7 by upwards of #fjj guns1 #ejj of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works2 the remainder in an open barbette battery1 which enfiladed the main channel4 ,this number is formidable in itself2 yet the same number mounted in ,new ,york harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as was found at ,cronstadt1 owing to its great area1 and long line of approach1 compared with the latter4 ,these works fulfilled their object4 ,they protected the great port and dpt of ,cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion4 ,for two successive years did the mighty armaments of ,france and ,england threaten2 but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated castles' which presented itself1 and declined the contest4 ,let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dpt of ,france4 ,after the almost incredible expenditure lavished here1 in creating a harbor facing the shores of her great rival1 ,england1 and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dpt1 we may suppose that the best means1 without regard to cost1 which the science of man could devise1 would be employed here to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant4 ,the means there employed are 7so far as regards mere harbor defence7 precisely the same 7viz41 casemated works in several tiers1 combined with open batteries where the locations are favorable72 and the application of means is the same as we have found so successful in ,russia1--the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of ,new ,york4 ,captain ,mc,clelland1 in his official report to the ,war ,department1 on the siege of ,sebastopol1 uses language equally strong and pertinent3-- ,the permanent defences of ,sebastopol against an attack by water1 although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works1 proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended4 ,indeed1 the occurrences on the ,pacific1 the ,baltic1 and the ,black ,sea1 all seem to establish beyond controversy1 the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men1 that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleet4 ,it is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points3 #ast4 ,that our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one1 which ought to be completed and armed with the least possible delay4 #b;d4 ,that mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us1 were we involved in an ,european war1 but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline1 and directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be acquired by a course of education1 instituted for the special purpose1 and by long habit4 ,in the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of ,sebastopol would have been impossible4 ,it is evident that the ,russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers1 and were unprepared to sustain a siege4 ,this same power of steam would enable ,european nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around ,sebastopol4 ,to resist such an attack1 should it ever be made1 our cities and harbors must be fortified1 and those fortifications must be provided with guns1 ammunition1 and instructed artillerists4 ,to repel the advance of such an army into the interior1 it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it4 ,an invading army of #ae1jjj or #bj1jjj men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers2 but when it comes to the case of more than #ajj1jjj disciplined veterans1 the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction2 because1 if without discipline and instruction1 they cannot be handled1 and are in their own way4 ,we cannot afford a ,moscow campaign4 ,our regular army never can1 and1 perhaps1 never ought to be1 large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise1 but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify2 the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large1 to provide for a sudden increase2 and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops4 ,the militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis2 instructors furnished them from the regular army1 and all possible means taken to spread sound military information among them4 ,in the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications1 it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery1 detailing officers of the regular artillery for instructors4 ,on this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast batteries1 we add the following quotation from ,major ,barnard's pamphlet3-- ,one of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries1 which has given color to the idea that they may be passed1 or even attacked with impunity1 ,i conceive to be the want of skill and care in the use of the guns4 ,the result is a prodigious smoke1 and a prodigious throwing away of balls1 and very little damage done4 ,this has been1 however1 by no means a peculiarity of coast defences4 ,the same system of random firing has hitherto prevailed1 both in the use of small arms in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles2 nor has it occurred apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war1 to ask why1 for one man wounded1 or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull1 so many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air4 ,but this question is now asked1 both in the use of the soldier's rifled musket1 and in the management of ships' guns1 as well as of artillery of all kinds4 ,it is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim1 than to perform certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton4 ,the same idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval science1 and is a necessary result of the recent great improvements in the construction of arms4 ,in short1 the truth has at last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing1 though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at ,balaklava1 'bien magnifique1 n'est pas la guerre4' ,it is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle to the management of our sea-coast batteries1 and give it a practical effect4 ,the volunteers of our cities will constitute mainly1 in time of war1 the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns4 ,in time of war1 they will probably be exercised in these duties4 ,but it is most desirable that we should have at all times a body of gunners1 practised in these exercises4 ,the result would be1 not only to give to our citizens1 as well as citizen-soldiers1 confidence in the defences provided for their security1 but it would disseminate military knowledge1 and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the different defensive works4 ,to carry out this idea1 it would be desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town1 a sufficient garrison of artillery troops to aid in the instruction of the volunteers4 ,in the present condition of the army this cannot be hoped2 but perhaps it might1 at least1 be found practicable to detail an artillery officer or two for the purpose4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,viii4--,,our ,,northern ,,frontier ,,defences4 ,the author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic importance of the line of ,lake ,champlain1 both as a line of military operations1 and as a line of defence4 ,the mutual commercial interests of the ,united ,states and the ,canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than formerly2 nevertheless1 such an event is by no means impossible1 and common prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapters ,,ix41 ,x41 ,,xi4 ,,and ,,xii4--,,army ,,organization4 ,since these chapters were written1 several important changes have been made in our army organization4 ,the rank of ,lieutenant-,general 7at least1 by brevet7 has been revived1 the staff1 administrative corps1 infantry and cavalry have been increased1 and a company of engineer troops organized4 ,but this company is mainly employed at ,west ,point for instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering1 and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system of education at the ,military ,academy4 ,the want1 however1 of troops of this arm for the construction1 care1 and preservation of our permanent fortifications1 and for the general duties of field engineering1 still remains to be supplied4 ,of all the arms of military organization1 this one most requires instruction in time of peace2 it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared4 ,in speaking of our present army organization1 as compared with those of the different ,european powers which he was sent to examine and report upon1 ,captain ,mc,clelland says3-- ,our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of service1 while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and shamefully small2 it is1 therefore1 more than probable that in any future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own batteries1 while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the construction of the other works of attack2 we have now1 at last1 the germ of an artillery school of practice2 ,i would then suggest1 for the consideration of the ,secretary1 the propriety of causing the artillery to construct their own batteries4 ,the position and armament of siege batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and the artillery1 the former having the preponderating voice1 in order to secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the works of attack4 ,this change1 he says1 will require to be introduced into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in relation to the preparation of the fascines1 gabions1 platforms1 and magazines1 the dimensions of batteries1 manner of arranging1 working parties1 etc4 ,with regard to the suggestion of ,captain ,mc,clellan1 it is sufficient to remark1 that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable4 ,the defect in our present army organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which1 from the very nature of military service1 naturally and properly belong to it2 and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm4 ,as well might it be said1 if our artillery force were ridiculously and shamefully small in proportion to the infantry and cavalry1 that the field batteries should be permanently transferred to those arms1 and that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals4 ,there are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army organization1 and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service4 ,suppose our medical corps were ridiculously and shamefully small in proportion to our pay department1 shall our paymasters perform the duties of surgery1 and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments6 ,this is1 perhaps1 an extreme case1 but it serves to illustrate the principle4 ,the defect referred to by ,captain ,mc,clelland1 and which has so often been pointed out by our best military men1 cannot be obviated by any transfer or assignment1 whether temporary or permanent1 of the appropriate duties of one corps to another4 ,indeed1 such a measure would only tend to make this defect permanent1 and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil4 ,it can readily be remedied by legislative action1 but in no other way4 ,the executive action suggested would be deprecated by all4 ,moreover1 the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted1 that there can be little doubt that ,congress will soon perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,xiii4--,,permanent ,,fortifications4 ,although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent fortification1 as established by the great masters of this branch of military science1 remain the same2 nevertheless1 the vast improvements which have1 within the last few years1 been made in projectiles1 require some changes in the details of defensive works of this character4 ,these changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines1 in the arrangement of embrasures1 and in protecting the garrison from an enemy's sharpshooters4 ,the introduction of heavier siege guns1 and of heavier ordnance on ships of war1 and especially on those propelled by steam1 require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors4 ,in the ,russian war1 ,sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which left her fortifications intact4 ,these modifications in the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack4 ,they can very easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the works1 and they are really so very essential that1 without them1 a fort constructed #be or #cj years ago1 and well suited to the then existing state of the military art1 will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries or well organized maritime attacks4 ,some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles1 and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used1 and that the increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front1 with lines more extended4 ,with respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms1 it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work2 but a close study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion4 ,such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers of ,europe4 ,the lines of the bastioned front now generally in use1 were really too long for a good defence with the arms in use at the time it was adopted2 and1 in theory1 the rampart gun was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points4 ,but this weapon is no longer in use2 its place1 however1 is better supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle4 ,the latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent work4 ,with respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries1 it has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works4 ,the neglect of this rule caused the fall of ,bomarsund4 ,those who so readily draw1 from the results of that siege1 the inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned1 exhibit their ignorance of military engineering4 ,the facts do not justify their conclusions4 ,with respect to sea fronts1 which can be reached only by guns afloat1 the case is very different4 ,they are usually casemates of masonry1 not masked by earthen works4 ,whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications1 is a question well worthy of discussion4 ,this subject has already been alluded to in the ,note on ,sea-coast ,defences1 and it is there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change in our present system4 ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,xiv4--,,field ,,engineering4 ,as ,mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged1 the war in that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works1 particularly sapping and mining4 ,the only operation resembling a siege was the investment and bombardment of ,vera ,cruz1 and it is worthy of remark that if ,general ,scott had stormed that place1 weak as it was1 he must have lost a large number of his men1 while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life4 ,nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and defence of positions4 ,nevertheless1 no one can read the history of the war without appreciating the important influence which ,fort ,brown had upon ,general ,taylor's defence of the left bank of the ,rio ,grande4 ,again if we compare our loss in other ,mexican battles with that which the ,americans sustained in their attacks upon ,monterey1 ,churubusco1 ,molino del ,key1 and ,chapultepec1--places partially secured by field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions1 although it was manifest that the ,mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how to defend them4 ,nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges1 for1 with the exception of the ,rio ,grande1 our armies had no important rivers to cross4 ,we must not1 however1 omit to note the important fact that ,general ,taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of ,palo ,alto and ,resacade ,la ,palma to pursue and destroy the army of ,arista1 because he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow them across the ,rio ,grande4 ,it should also be remarked that even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing other streams and ravines during the operations of this war4 ,one of our cavalry officers writes3-- ,on our march from ,matamaras to ,victoria and ,tampico1 in #ahdf and #ahdg1 we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams 7there being no suitable timber71 and in crossing ravines with vertical banks2 a few ways of the ,birago trestles would have saved us many days and a vast amount of labor4 ,in the operations in the valley of ,mexico1 our movements1 checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches and sometimes by dry ravines1 would have been rendered so much more free and rapid by the use of the ,birago trestles1 that our successes could have been gained at far less cost1 and probably with more rapidity than they were4 ,with regard to military reconnaissance1 the splendid achievements of ,lee and others connected with the operations of ,general ,scott1 proved the value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering4 ,but field engineering1 as a branch or arm of the military service1 received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the ,crimean war1 particularly in the siege of ,sebastopol1 and the measures resorted to by ,general ,todtleben to defend that place against the attack of superior forces4 ,a brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the reader3-- ,when the allies reached ,balaklava1 ,sebastopol was defended on the south side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick1 and from eighteen to twenty feet high1 and a semicircular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes1 and five guns in barbette4 ,these works would have afforded some protection against a coup-de-main by infantry and cavalry1 but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a combined attack of these arms with artillery4 ,the ,russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault1 and generally closed at the gorge4 ,these works were afterwards connected by re-entering lines of a weaker profile1 which served to enfilade the ravines and to flank the advanced works4 ,the old wall was strengthened with earth1 and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a considerable distance in front4 ,the most important points of the main line of defence were3 #ast4 ,the ,flag-staff ,bastion4 #b;d4 ,the ,central ,bastion4 #c;d4 ,the ,malakoff4 #dth4 ,the ,redan4 #eth4 ,the little ,redan4 ,the command of the first was about fifteen feet1 its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep4 ,a portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high4 ,the construction of the ,central ,bastion was similar to that of the ,flag-staff1 but weaker in profile4 ,the relief of the other works was still less4 ,the command of the ,malakoff was about fourteen feet1 its ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep4 ,the thickness of parapet in these works was generally about eighteen feet1 and the bombproofs were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth4 ,the loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart and parapet1 or entirely replaced by a simple parapet4 ,many of the embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks filled with earth4 ,the same material was sometimes used for traverses4 ,rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from rifle balls and small grape4 ,great attention was given to the construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing4 ,these were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence 7where there was one71 often under special traverses1 or entirely under ground1 and occasionally excavated in the solid rock4 ,some had fireplaces and chimneys1 and were well ventilated4 ,interior slopes were revetted with gabions1 crowned by fascines and sand bags4 ,gabions were also employed to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery4 ,abattis1 military pits1 caltrops and spikes1 stuck through planks1 and explosive machines were employed in front of different parts of the defences4 ,mines were resorted to in front of the ,flag-staff ,bastion to retard the ,french approaches4 ,they were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to fifteen feet deep4 ,the ,russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches1 united by a simple trench4 ,captain ,mc,clelland1 one of our officers sent to the ,crimea1 from whose valuable ,report most of the foregoing details are gathered1 adds the following remarks upon these works of defence3-- ,from the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences of ,sebastopol1 it will appear how little foundation there was for the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the works1 and of new systems of fortifications brought into play4 ,the plain truth is1 that these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than usual1 and that not a single new principle of engineering was developed4 ,it is true1 that there were several novel minor details1 such as the rope mantelets1 the use of iron tanks1 etc41 but the whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case4 ,neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various works were perfect4 ,on the contrary1 there is no impropriety in believing that if ,todtleben were called upon to do the same work over again1 he would probably introduce better close flanking arrangements4 ,these remarks are not intended to1 nor can they1 detract from the reputation of the ,russian engineer4 ,his labors and their results will be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument of the value of fortifications1 and his name must ever be placed in the first rank of military engineers4 ,but1 in our admiration of the talent and energy of the engineer1 it must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them4 ,much stronger places than ,sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected4 ,there can be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of ,sebastopol called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred4 ,we will now pass to the works of attack4 ,when the allies decided that the works of ,sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and assault1 but must be reduced by a regular siege1 the first thing to be considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army4 ,the field works planned for this purpose were not of any great strength1 and many of them were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity4 ,the ,french line of defence consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts1 connected by an infantry parapet4 ,the ,english seemed to attach but little importance to field works for the defence of their position2 the terrible slaughter at ,inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect4 ,in describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege4 ,captain ,mc,clelland says3-- ,in regard to the detailed execution of the ,french attacks1 little or nothing novel is to be observed4 ,even when coolly examining the direction of their trenches1 after the close of the siege1 it was very rare that a faulty direction could be detected2 they always afforded excellent cover1 and were well defiladed2 in some cases the excavation of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet in the solid rock6 ,the execution of many of the saps and batteries was worthy of a school of practice4 ,in the parallels1 bombproofs were provided as temporary hospitals1 offices for the generals on duty1 etc4 ,they did not use the sapper armor4 ,the use of the sap-roller was often attempted1 but it could be employed only during the latter part of the attack upon the ,malakoff1 when the fire of the ,russian artillery was nearly extinguished by the mortars2 before that1 as soon as a sap-roller was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear upon it1 the result being its immediate destruction4 ,it may justly be said of the ,french approaches1 that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping4 ,the technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches1 under a most deadly fire1 is worthy of all commendation1 and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers4 ,with regard to the ,english1 the case was different2 it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at ,chatham4 ,whenever the ground was difficult1 their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter2 a shallow excavation in the rock1 and a few stones thrown up in front1 appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases4 ,they were often faulty in direction as well as in profile1 being not unfrequently badly defiladed1 or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped2 nor were they pushed as close to the ,redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault4 ,in too many cases the expression 'ttonnement of the ,french would seem to convey the best idea of their operations4 ,their batteries1 however1 were very well constructed4 ,the magazines1 platforms1 etc41 were usually similar to those adopted at ,chatham1 although unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of4 ,they employed neither armor nor the full sap1 sometimes the half-full1 but generally the flying-sap were employed4 ,it may also be added1 that1 at the time of the assault1 the ,french approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the ,malakoff1 while the ,english had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the ,redan4 ,this description of the operations of the ,english at the siege of ,sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the ,spanish ,peninsula4 ,it certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should1 after such experience1 have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops1 well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm4 ,what excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege1 when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace1 and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization6 ,while every one admits that the siege of ,sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks1 some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments1 and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores4 ,we quote the remarks of ,captain ,mc,clelland on this point1 and also make a short extract from the recently published ,journal of the siege of ,sebastopol by ,general ,niel4 ,captain ,mc,clelland says3-- ,this would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy1 which1 for a time at least1 gained extensive credence4 ,it was1 that the siege of ,sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary 7earthen7 fortifications over those of a permanent nature4 ,it is easy to show that it proved nothing of the kind2 but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed4 ,they were attacked as field works never were before1 and were defended as field works never had been defended4 ,the main difference between properly constructed permanent fortifications 7intended to resist a siege7 and temporary works1 is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against assault1 while the former always do4 ,in addition1 permanent works have a better command over the adjacent country1 and are more carefully and perfectly planned4 ,the masonry walls1 which render an assault impossible1 cannot be seen from the distance1 and can be destroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis1 or the edge of the ditch2 the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that point1 they may1 until the besiegers arrive there1 be regarded in the same light as field works1 with the difference that the garrison are not harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault4 ,now1 in the siege of ,sebastopol1 the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch2 so that1 had the fortification been a permanent one1 the most difficult1 slow1 and dangerous part of the siege remained to be undertaken1 viz41 the crowning of the covered way1 the establishment of the breach batteries1 the descent and passage of the ditch1 and the assault of the breach2 in other words1 at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal1 the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play4 ,assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was under existing circumstances1 the besiegers1 on the #hth of ,september1 would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way1 the siege would certainly have extended into the winter2 and it may even be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen1 until the allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the southside4 ,general ,neil remarks3-- ,struck by the length of the siege of ,sebastopol1 certain foreign officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not of incontestable utility in fortified places4 ,sebastopol1 a vast retrenched camp1 defended by field fortifications of strong profile1 derived its principal strength from an armament such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal1 and from a large army which always preserved its free communications with the interior of ,russia4 ,if the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps2 if it had been necessary to breach these1 and subsequently have been compelled to penetrate through difficult passages1 in rear of which the heads of our columns would have met an army1 ,sebastopol would have been an impregnable fortress4 ,when we compare1 in effect1 the works of attack at ,sebastopol with those of an ordinary siege1 we will see that on the #hth of ,september1 #ahee1 the day of the last assault1 we had only executed1 after the greatest effort1 the besieging works which precede the crowning of the covered way2 we had not then1 as yet1 entered upon that period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most murderous2 and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them1 since the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable1 as the sequel has proved4 ,the difficulty consisted in conquering the ,russian army upon a position prepared long beforehand for its defence1 quite as much as in surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification4 ,our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the besieged works1 we were able to choose our own time for action1 and to throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our artillery had forced him to shelter himself1 up to the last minute1 behind his numerous blindages2 to have gone further would have been inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the ,russian army4 ,the absence of scarp walls1 which would have secured the place from escalade1 did not exercise a less influence upon the defence2 for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges of the works1 strong reserves1 in readiness to repulse the assault1 which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of the siege4 ,finally1 it can be remarked1 that these reserves1 which were decimated night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries1 were able to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches1 without having to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges of revetted places2 they were1 then1 a permanent threat for the besiegers1 who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly invaded by the greater part of the ,russian army4 ,neither side1 consequently1 was in a position analogous to that which is presented in the siege of a fortified place1 protected from insult by good masonry scarps4' 7,note to page #ddc47 ,and again1 page #dbc1 the same authority remarks3 ,now1 it 7the ,russian army7 is no longer able to escape from the concentric fires of our batteries2 for1 not being protected by masonry scarps1 it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves1 in order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced' ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,xv4--,,military ,,education1 ,c4 ,with regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will1 perhaps1 be sufficient to remark that the ,mexican war incontestably proved the value of the ,west ,point ,military ,academy2 for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to practice1 fully satisfied the country of the importance of that institution1 and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be convinced4 ,the recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a retired list1 has1 it is feared1 destroyed for a time all hopes of introducing this very necessary measure into our military service2 although it is very certain that without this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis1 which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit1 while it prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism4 ,the ,mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the system of military appointment were well founded1 and it is hoped that the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the necessity of a change2 for if military office continue to be conferred for partisan services1 it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the efficiency of our army4 ,,explanation ,,of ,,plates ,figs4 #a1 #b1 #c4--,used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies ,a and ,b4 ,fig4 #d4--,line of operations directed against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence1 as was done by ,napoleon in the ,marengo campaign4 ,fig4 #e4--,napoleon's plan of campaign in #ahjj1 for the army of the ,rhine1 and the army of reserve4 ,fig4 #f shows the plan adopted by ,napoleon in the campaign of #ahjj1 to preserve his communications4 ,fig4 #g illustrates the same thing in the campaign of #ahjf4 ,fig4 #h4--;,interior and central line of operations4 ,fig4 #i represents a camp of a grand division of an army4 ,the distance from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from #cej to #djj feet2 thence to the line of posts1 from #aej to #bjj feet2 thence to the line of sentinels1 from #ajj to #bjj feet4 ,in many cases1 the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed with4 ,the distance between battalions will be from #ej to #ajj feet2 and the same between squadrons and batteries4 ,fig4 #aj4--;,details of encampment for a battalion of infantry4 ,the width of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company1 and will be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion1 when drawn up in line of battle4 ,this width will be from #ej to #ajj feet4 ,the distance between the tents of each row will be #b or #c feet2 the distance between the tents of one company and those of another1 from #d to #f feet4 ,fig4 #aa is the camp of a squadron of cavalry4 ,a single company encamping alone1 would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron4 ,the horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents1 and at a distance from them of about #ab feet4 ,the forage is placed between the tents4 ,a squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about #ahj feet4 ,the fires1 or company kitchens1 should be #ej or #fj feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents4 ,fig #ab is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery1 or two companies of foot engineers4 ,the plan of encampment for artillery1 as given in the ,instruction of ,u4,s4 ,field ,artillery1 horse and foot1 may be employed where a single battery encamps by itself1 or where only the skeleton of companies is maintained2 but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient1 where a full battery1 with a large train1 encamps on the same line with other troops4 ,the plan we have given is that which is employed in most ,european services4 ,fig4 #ac4--;,in this plan for mounted artillery and engineers1 the fires are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the sparks from the kitchens4 ,fig4 #ad4--,simple parallel order of battle4 #ae4--,parallel order1 with a crochet on the flank4 #af4--,parallel order1 reinforced on a wing4 #ag4--,parallel order1 reinforced on the centre4 #ah4--,simple oblique order4 #ai4--,oblique order1 reinforced on the assailing wing4 #bj4--,perpendicular order4 #ba4--;,concave order4 #bb4--;,convex order4 #bc4--,order by echelon on a wing4 #bd4--,order by echelon on the centre4 #be4--;,combined order of attack4 #bf4--;,formation of infantry by two deployed lines4 #bg1 #bh4--- ,arrangements corresponding to depth of column4 #bi4--;,formation by squares4 #cj4--,mixed formation of three battalions4 #ca4--;,deep formation of heavy columns4 #cb4--;,formation in columns by brigade4 #cc4--;,formation of two brigades of cavalry1 by the mixed system4 #cd4--,passage of the ,sound by the ,british fleet1 in #ahjg4 #ce4--;,attack on ,copenhagen4 #cf4--;,attack on ,algiers4 #cg4--;,attack on ,san ,juan d',ulloa4 #ch4--;,attack on ,st4 ,jean d',acre4 #ci4--,plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification4 #dj4--,section of do4 do4 #da4--,tenaillons4 ,fig4 #db4--;,demi-tenaillons1 with a bonnet4 #dc4--;,a horn-work4 #dd4--;,a crown-work4 #de4--;,a redan4 #df4--;,a lunette4 #dg4--;,a mitre or priest-cap4 #dh4--;,a bastioned fort4 #di4--,vertical section of a field intrenchment4 #ej4--,simple sap4 #ea4--;,flying sap4 #eb4--;,full sap4 #ec4--;,crater of a military mine4 #ed4--,plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work4 ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration ,illustration