,,cratylus    ,by ,plato    ,translated 
by ,benjamin ,jowett      ,contents     
,,introduction   ,,cratylus             
,,introduction      ,the ,cratylus has  
always been a source of perplexity to   
the student of  ,plato4 ,while in fancy 
and humour1 and perfection of style and 
metaphysical originality1 this dialogue 
may be ranked with the best of  the     
,platonic writings1 there has been an   
uncertainty about the motive  of the    
piece1 which interpreters have hitherto 
not succeeded in  dispelling4 ,we need  
not suppose that ,plato used words in   
order to  conceal his thoughts1 or that 
he would have been unintelligible to an 
educated contemporary4 ,in the ,phaedrus
 and ,euthydemus we also find a         
difficulty in determining the precise   
aim of the author4 ,plato wrote  satires
 in the form of dialogues1 and his      
meaning1 like that of other  satirical  
writers1 has often slept in the ear of  
posterity4 ,two causes  may be assigned 
for this obscurity3 #ast1 the subtlety  

and allusiveness  of this species of    
composition2 #bnd1 the difficulty of    
reproducing a  state of life and        
literature which has passed away4 ,a    
satire is  unmeaning unless we can place
 ourselves back among the persons and   
thoughts of the age in which it was     
written4 ,had the treatise of           
,antisthenes upon words1 or the         
speculations of ,cratylus1 or some other
  ,heracleitean of the fourth century   
,b4,c41 on the nature of language been  
preserved to us2 or if we had lived at  
the time1 and been 8rich enough  to     
attend the fifty-drachma course of      
,prodicus10 we should have  understood  
,plato better1 and many points which are
 now attributed to  the extravagance of 
,socrates' humour would have been found1
 like the  allusions of ,aristophanes in
 the ,clouds1 to have gone home to the  
sophists and grammarians of the day4    
,for the age was very busy with         
philological speculation2 and many      
questions were beginning to be asked    

about language which were parallel  to  
other questions about justice1 virtue1  
knowledge1 and were  illustrated in a   
similar manner by the analogy of the    
arts4 ,was there a  correctness in      
words1 and were they given by nature or 
convention8 ,in  the presocratic        
philosophy mankind had been striving to 
attain an  expression of their ideas1   
and now they were beginning to ask      
themselves whether the expression might 
not be distinguished from the  idea8    
,they were also seeking to distinguish  
the parts of speech and to  enquire into
 the relation of subject and predicate4 
,grammar and logic  were moving about   
somewhere in the depths of the human    
soul1 but they  were not yet awakened   
into consciousness and had not found    
names for  themselves1 or terms by which
 they might be expressed4 ,of these     
beginnings of the study of language we  
know little1 and there  necessarily     
arises an obscurity when the            
surroundings of such a work as  the     

,cratylus are taken away4 ,moreover1 in 
this1 as in most of the  dialogues of   
,plato1 allowance has to be made for the
 character of  ,socrates4 ,for the      
theory of language can only be          
propounded by him in a  manner which is 
consistent with his own profession of   
ignorance4 ,hence  his ridicule of the  
new school of etymology is interspersed 
with many  declarations 8that he knows  
nothing10 8that he has learned from     
,euthyphro10 and the like4 ,even the    
truest things which he says are         
depreciated by himself4 ,he professes to
 be guessing1 but the guesses of  ,plato
 are better than all the other theories 
of the ancients respecting  language put
 together4    ,the dialogue hardly      
derives any light from ,plato's other   
writings1 and  still less from          
,scholiasts and ,neoplatonist writers4  
,socrates must be  interpreted from     
himself1 and on first reading we        
certainly have a  difficulty in         
understanding his drift1 or his relation

 to the two other  interlocutors in the 
dialogue4 ,does he agree with ,cratylus 
or with  ,hermogenes1 and is he serious 
in those fanciful etymologies1 extending
  over more than half the dialogue1     
which he seems so greatly to relish8    
,or is he serious in part only2 and can 
we separate his jest from his           
earnest8--,sunt bona1 sunt quaedum      
mediocria1 sunt mala plura4 ,most of    
them are ridiculously bad1 and yet among
 them are found1 as if by  accident1    
principles of philology which are       
unsurpassed in any ancient  writer1 and 
even in advance of any philologer of the
 last century4 ,may  we suppose that    
,plato1 like ,lucian1 has been amusing  
his fancy by  writing a comedy in the   
form of a prose dialogue8 ,and what is  
the final  result of the enquiry8 ,is   
,plato an upholder of the conventional  
theory  of language1 which he           
acknowledges to be imperfect8 or does he
 mean to  imply that a perfect language 
can only be based on his own theory of  

ideas8 ,or if this latter explanation is
 refuted by his silence1 then in  what  
relation does his account of language   
stand to the rest of his  philosophy8   
,or may we be so bold as to deny the    
connexion between them8  7,for the      
allusion to the ideas at the end of the 
dialogue is merely  intended to show    
that we must not put words in the place 
of things or  realities1 which is a     
thesis strongly insisted on by ,plato in
 many  other passages7444,these are some
 of the first thoughts which arise in   
the mind of the reader of the ,cratylus4
 ,and the consideration of them  may    
form a convenient introduction to the   
general subject of the  dialogue4    ,we
 must not expect all the parts of a     
dialogue of ,plato to tend equally  to  
some clearly-defined end4 ,his idea of  
literary art is not the  absolute       
proportion of the whole1 such as we     
appear to find in a ,greek  temple or   
statue2 nor should his works be tried by
 any such standard4  ,they have often   

the beauty of poetry1 but they have also
 the freedom of  conversation4 8,words  
are more plastic than wax0 7,rep471 and 
may be  moulded into any form4 ,he      
wanders on from one topic to another1   
careless of the unity of his work1 not  
fearing any 8judge1 or  spectator1 who  
may recall him to the point0 7,theat471 
8whither the  argument blows we follow0 
7,rep474 ,to have determined beforehand1
 as in  a modern didactic treatise1 the 
nature and limits of the subject1 would 
have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry
 or discovery1 which is the  soul of the
 dialogue444,these remarks are          
applicable to nearly all the  works of  
,plato1 but to the ,cratylus and        
,phaedrus more than any others4  ,see   
,phaedrus1 ,introduction4    ,there is  
another aspect under which some of the  
dialogues of ,plato may  be more truly  
viewed3--they are dramatic sketches of  
an argument4 ,we  have found that in the
 ,lysis1 ,charmides1 ,laches1           
,protagoras1 ,meno1 we  arrived at no   

conclusion--the different sides of the  
argument were  personified in the       
different speakers2 but the victory was 
not  distinctly attributed to any of    
them1 nor the truth wholly the property 
of any4 ,and in the ,cratylus we have no
 reason to assume that ,socrates  is    
either wholly right or wholly wrong1 or 
that ,plato1 though he  evidently       
inclines to him1 had any other aim than 
that of personifying1  in the characters
 of ,hermogenes1 ,socrates1 and         
,cratylus1 the three  theories of       
language which are respectively         
maintained by them4    ,the two         
subordinate persons of the dialogue1    
,hermogenes and ,cratylus1  are at the  
opposite poles of the argument4 ,but    
after a while the  disciple of the      
,sophist and the follower of            
,heracleitus are found to be  not so far
 removed from one another as at first   
sight appeared2 and  both show an       
inclination to accept the third view    
which ,socrates  interposes between     

them4 ,first1 ,hermogenes1 the poor     
brother of the  rich ,callias1 expounds 
the doctrine that names are             
conventional2 like  the names of slaves1
 they may be given and altered at       
pleasure4 ,this is  one of those        
principles which1 whether applied to    
society or language1  explains          
everything and nothing4 ,for in all     
things there is an element  of          
convention2 but the admission of this   
does not help us to understand  the     
rational ground or basis in human nature
 on which the convention  proceeds4     
,socrates first of all intimates to     
,hermogenes that his view  of language  
is only a part of a sophistical whole1  
and ultimately tends  to abolish the    
distinction between truth and falsehood4
 ,hermogenes is  very ready to throw    
aside the sophistical tenet1 and listens
 with a  sort of half admiration1 half  
belief1 to the speculations of          
,socrates4    ,cratylus is of opinion   
that a name is either a true name or not

 a name  at all4 ,he is unable to       
conceive of degrees of imitation2 a word
 is  either the perfect expression of a 
thing1 or a mere inarticulate sound  7a 
fallacy which is still prevalent among  
theorizers about the origin  of         
language74 ,he is at once a philosopher 
and a sophist2 for while  wanting to    
rest language on an immutable basis1 he 
would deny the  possibility of          
falsehood4 ,he is inclined to derive all
 truth from  language1 and in language  
he sees reflected the philosophy of     
,heracleitus4 ,his views are not like   
those of ,hermogenes1 hastily taken  up1
 but are said to be the result of mature
 consideration1 although he  is         
described as still a young man4 ,with a 
tenacity characteristic of  the         
,heracleitean philosophers1 he clings to
 the doctrine of the flux4  7,compare   
,theaet47 ,of the real ,cratylus we know
 nothing1 except that he  is recorded by
 ,aristotle to have been the friend or  
teacher of ,plato2  nor have we any     

proof that he resembled the likeness of 
him in ,plato  any more than the        
,critias of ,plato is like the real     
,critias1 or the  ,euthyphro in this    
dialogue like the other ,euthyphro1 the 
diviner1 in  the dialogue which is      
called after him4    ,between these two 
extremes1 which have both of them a     
sophistical  character1 the view of     
,socrates is introduced1 which is in a  
manner the  union of the two4 ,language 
is conventional and also natural1 and   
the  true conventional-natural is the   
rational4 ,it is a work not of chance1  
but of art2 the dialectician is the     
artificer of words1 and the  legislator 
gives authority to them4 ,they are the  
expressions or  imitations in sound of  
things4 ,in a sense1 ,cratylus is right 
in saying  that things have by nature   
names2 for nature is not opposed either 
to  art or to law4 ,but vocal imitation1
 like any other copy1 may be            
imperfectly executed2 and in this way an
 element of chance or  convention enters

 in4 ,there is much which is accidental 
or exceptional  in language4 ,some words
 have had their original meaning so     
obscured1  that they require to be      
helped out by convention4 ,but still the
 true  name is that which has a natural 
meaning4 ,thus nature1 art1 chance1 all 
combine in the formation of language4   
,and the three views respectively       
propounded by ,hermogenes1 ,socrates1   
,cratylus1 may be described as the      
conventional1 the artificial or         
rational1 and the natural4 ,the view of 
,socrates is the meeting-point of the   
other two1 just as conceptualism  is the
 meeting-point of nominalism and        
realism4    ,we can hardly say that     
,plato was aware of the truth1 that     
8languages  are not made1 but grow40    
,but still1 when he says that 8the      
legislator  made language with the      
dialectician standing on his right      
hand10 we  need not infer from this that
 he conceived words1 like coins1 to be  
issued from the mint of the ,state4 ,the

 creator of laws and of social  life is 
naturally regarded as the creator of    
language1 according to  ,hellenic       
notions1 and the philosopher is his     
natural advisor4 ,we are  not to suppose
 that the legislator is performing any  
extraordinary  function2 he is merely   
the ,eponymus of the ,state1 who        
prescribes rules  for the dialectician  
and for all other artists4 ,according to
 a truly  ,platonic mode of approaching 
the subject1 language1 like virtue in   
the  ,republic1 is examined by the      
analogy of the arts4 ,words are works of
  art which may be equally made in      
different materials1 and are well made  
when they have a meaning4 ,of the       
process which he thus describes1 ,plato 
had probably no very definite notion4   
,but he means to express generally  that
 language is the product of             
intelligence1 and that languages belong 
to ,states and not to individuals4    ,a
 better conception of language could not
 have been formed in ,plato's  age1 than

 that which he attributes to ,socrates4 
,yet many persons have  thought that the
 mind of ,plato is more truly seen in   
the vague realism  of ,cratylus4 ,this  
misconception has probably arisen from  
two causes3  first1 the desire to bring 
,plato's theory of language into        
accordance  with the received doctrine  
of the ,platonic ideas2 secondly1 the   
impression created by ,socrates himself1
 that he is not in earnest1 and  is only
 indulging the fancy of the hour4    #a4
 ,we shall have occasion to show more at
 length1 in the ,introduction  to future
 dialogues1 that the so-called ,platonic
 ideas are only a  semi-mythical form1  
in which he attempts to realize         
abstractions1 and  that they are        
replaced in his later writings by a     
rational theory of  psychology4 7,see   
introductions to the ,meno and the      
,sophist47 ,and in the  ,cratylus he    
gives a general account of the nature   
and origin of  language1 in which ,adam 
,smith1 ,rousseau1 and other writers of 

the last  century1 would have           
substantially agreed4 ,at the end of the
 dialogue1  he speaks as in the         
,symposium and ,republic of absolute    
beauty and good2  but he never supposed 
that they were capable of being embodied
 in  words4 ,of the names of the ideas1 
he would have said1 as he says of the   
names of the ,gods1 that we know        
nothing4 ,even the realism of ,cratylus 
is not based upon the ideas of ,plato1  
but upon the flux of ,heracleitus4      
,here1 as in the ,sophist and           
,politicus1 ,plato expressly draws      
attention  to the want of agreement in  
words and things4 ,hence we are led to  
infer1 that the view of ,socrates is not
 the less ,plato's own1 because  not    
based upon the ideas2 #bnd1 that        
,plato's theory of language is not      
inconsistent with the rest of his       
philosophy4    #b4 ,we do not deny that 
,socrates is partly in jest and partly  
in  earnest4 ,he is discoursing in a    
high-flown vein1 which may be compared  

to the 8dithyrambics of the ,phaedrus40 
,they are mysteries of which he  is     
speaking1 and he professes a kind of    
ludicrous fear of his imaginary  wisdom4
 ,when he is arguing out of ,homer1     
about the names of ,hector's  son1 or   
when he describes himself as inspired or
 maddened by ,euthyphro1  with whom he  
has been sitting from the early dawn    
7compare ,phaedrus and  ,lysias2        
,phaedr47 and expresses his intention of
 yielding to the  illusion to-day1 and  
to-morrow he will go to a priest and be 
purified1  we easily see that his words 
are not to be taken seriously4 ,in this 
part of the dialogue his dread of       
committing impiety1 the pretended       
derivation of his wisdom from another1  
the extravagance of some of his         
etymologies1 and1 in general1 the manner
 in which the fun1 fast and  furious1   
vires acquirit eundo1 remind us strongly
 of the ,phaedrus4  ,the jest is a long 
one1 extending over more than half the  
dialogue4 ,but  then1 we remember that  

the ,euthydemus is a still longer jest1 
in which  the irony is preserved to the 
very end4 ,there he is parodying the    
ingenious follies of early logic2 in the
 ,cratylus he is ridiculing the  fancies
 of a new school of sophists and        
grammarians4 ,the fallacies of  the     
,euthydemus are still retained at the   
end of our logic books2 and  the        
etymologies of the ,cratylus have also  
found their way into later  writers4    
,some of these are not much worse than  
the conjectures of  ,hemsterhuis1 and   
other critics of the last century2 but  
this does not  prove that they are      
serious4 ,for ,plato is in advance of   
his age in his  conception of language1 
as much as he is in his conception of   
mythology4 7,compare ,phaedrus47        
,when the fervour of his etymological   
enthusiasm has abated1 ,socrates  ends1 
as he has begun1 with a rational        
explanation of language4 ,still  he     
preserves his 8know nothing0 disguise1  
and himself declares his  first notions 

about names to be reckless and          
ridiculous4 ,having  explained compound 
words by resolving them into their      
original  elements1 he now proceeds to  
analyse simple words into the letters of
  which they are composed4 ,the         
,socrates who 8knows nothing10 here     
passes  into the teacher1 the           
dialectician1 the arranger of species4  
,there is  nothing in this part of the  
dialogue which is either weak or        
extravagant4 ,plato is a supporter of   
the ,onomatopoetic theory of  language2 
that is to say1 he supposes words to be 
formed by the  imitation of ideas in    
sounds2 he also recognises the effect of
 time1  the influence of foreign        
languages1 the desire of euphony1 to be 
formative principles2 and he admits a   
certain element of chance4 ,but he      
gives no imitation in all this that he  
is preparing the way for the            
construction of an ideal language4 ,or  
that he has any ,eleatic  speculation to
 oppose to the ,heracleiteanism of      

,cratylus4    ,the theory of language   
which is propounded in the ,cratylus is 
in  accordance with the later phase of  
the philosophy of ,plato1 and would     
have been regarded by him as in the main
 true4 ,the dialogue is also a  satire  
on the philological fancies of the day4 
,socrates in pursuit of  his vocation as
 a detector of false knowledge1 lights  
by accident on  the truth4 ,he is       
guessing1 he is dreaming2 he has heard1 
as he says in  the ,phaedrus1 from      
another3 no one is more surprised than  
himself at  his own discoveries4 ,and   
yet some of his best remarks1 as for    
example  his view of the derivation of  
,greek words from other languages1 or of
  the permutations of letters1 or again1
 his observation that in speaking  of   
the ,gods we are only speaking of our   
names of them1 occur among  these       
flights of humour4    ,we can imagine a 
character having a profound insight into
 the nature of  men and things1 and yet 
hardly dwelling upon them seriously2    

blending  inextricably sense and        
nonsense2 sometimes enveloping in a     
blaze of  jests the most serious        
matters1 and then again allowing the    
truth to  peer through2 enjoying the    
flow of his own humour1 and puzzling    
mankind  by an ironical exaggeration of 
their absurdities4 ,such were           
,aristophanes and ,rabelais2 such1 in a 
different style1 were ,sterne1  ,jean   
,paul1 ,hamann1--writers who sometimes  
become unintelligible through  the      
extravagance of their fancies4 ,such is 
the character which ,plato  intends to  
depict in some of his dialogues as the  
,silenus ,socrates2 and  through this   
medium we have to receive our theory of 
language4    ,there remains a difficulty
 which seems to demand a more exact     
answer3  ,in what relation does the     
satirical or etymological portion of the
  dialogue stand to the serious8        
,granting all that can be said about the
  provoking irony of ,socrates1 about   
the parody of ,euthyphro1 or  ,prodicus1

 or ,antisthenes1 how does the long     
catalogue of etymologies  furnish any   
answer to the question of ,hermogenes1  
which is evidently  the main thesis of  
the dialogue3 ,what is the truth1 or    
correctness1 or  principle of names8    
,after illustrating the nature of       
correctness by the analogy of the  arts1
 and then1 as in the ,republic1         
ironically appealing to the  authority  
of the ,homeric poems1 ,socrates shows  
that the truth or  correctness of names 
can only be ascertained by an appeal to 
etymology4  ,the truth of names is to be
 found in the analysis of their         
elements4  ,but why does he admit       
etymologies which are absurd1 based on  
,heracleitean fancies1 fourfold         
interpretations of words1 impossible    
unions and separations of syllables and 
letters8    #a4 ,the answer to this     
difficulty has been already anticipated 
in part3  ,socrates is not a dogmatic   
teacher1 and therefore he puts on this  
wild  and fanciful disguise1 in order   

that the truth may be permitted to      
appear3 #b4 as ,benfey remarks1 an      
erroneous example may illustrate a      
principle of language as well as a true 
one3 #c4 many of these  etymologies1 as1
 for example1 that of dikaion1 are      
indicated1 by the  manner in which      
,socrates speaks of them1 to have been  
current in his  own age3 #d4 the        
philosophy of language had not made such
 progress as  would have justified      
,plato in propounding real derivations4 
,like his  master ,socrates1 he saw     
through the hollowness of the incipient 
sciences of the day1 and tries to move  
in a circle apart from them1  laying    
down the conditions under which they are
 to be pursued1 but1 as  in the         
,timaeus1 cautious and tentative1 when  
he is speaking of actual  phenomena4 ,to
 have made etymologies seriously1 would 
have seemed to him  like the            
interpretation of the myths in the      
,phaedrus1 the task 8of a  not very     
fortunate individual1 who had a great   

deal of time on his  hands40 ,the irony 
of ,socrates places him above and beyond
 the errors of  his contemporaries4     
,the ,cratylus is full of humour and    
satirical touches3 the inspiration      
which comes from ,euthyphro1 and his    
prancing steeds1 the light  admixture of
 quotations from ,homer1 and the        
spurious dialectic which is  applied to 
them2 the jest about the fifty-drachma  
course of ,prodicus1  which is declared 
on the best authority1 viz4 his own1 to 
be a complete  education in grammar and 
rhetoric2 the double explanation of the 
name  ,hermogenes1 either as 8not being 
in luck10 or 8being no speaker20 the    
dearly-bought wisdom of ,callias1 the   
,lacedaemonian whose name was  8,rush10 
and1 above all1 the pleasure which      
,socrates expresses in his  own         
dangerous discoveries1 which 8to-morrow 
he will purge away10 are  truly         
humorous4 ,while delivering a lecture on
 the philosophy of  language1 ,socrates 
is also satirizing the endless fertility

 of the  human mind in spinning         
arguments out of nothing1 and employing 
the most  trifling and fanciful         
analogies in support of a theory4       
,etymology in  ancient as in modern     
times was a favourite recreation2 and   
,socrates  makes merry at the expense of
 the etymologists4 ,the simplicity of   
,hermogenes1 who is ready to believe    
anything that he is told1 heightens  the
 effect4 ,socrates in his genial and    
ironical mood hits right and  left at   
his adversaries3 ,ouranos is so called  
apo tou oran ta ano1  which1 as some    
philosophers say1 is the way to have a  
pure mind2 the  sophists are by a       
fanciful explanation converted into     
heroes2 8the  givers of names were like 
some philosophers who fancy that the    
earth  goes round because their heads   
are always going round40 ,there is a    
great deal of 8mischief0 lurking in the 
following3 8,i found myself in  greater 
perplexity about justice than ,i was    
before ,i began to learn20  8,the rho in

 katoptron must be the addition of some 
one who cares  nothing about truth1 but 
thinks only of putting the mouth into   
shape20  8,tales and falsehoods have    
generally to do with the ,tragic and    
goatish  life1 and tragedy is the place 
of them40 ,several philosophers and     
sophists are mentioned by name3 first1  
,protagoras and ,euthydemus are         
assailed2 then the interpreters of      
,homer1 oi palaioi ,omerikoi 7compare   
,arist4 ,met47 and the ,orphic poets are
 alluded to by the way2 then he         
discovers a hive of wisdom in the       
philosophy of ,heracleitus2--the        
doctrine of the flux is contained in the
 word ousia 7 osia the pushing          
principle71 an anticipation of          
,anaxagoras is found in psuche and      
selene4 ,again1 he ridicules the        
arbitrary methods of pulling out and    
putting in letters which were in vogue  
among the philologers of his  time2 or  
slightly scoffs at contemporary         
religious beliefs4 ,lastly1 he  is      

impatient of hearing from the           
half-converted ,cratylus the doctrine   
that falsehood can neither be spoken1   
nor uttered1 nor addressed2 a  piece of 
sophistry attributed to ,gorgias1 which 
reappears in the  ,sophist4 ,and he     
proceeds to demolish1 with no less      
delight than he had  set up1 the        
,heracleitean theory of language4    ,in
 the latter part of the dialogue        
,socrates becomes more serious1  though 
he does not lay aside but rather        
aggravates his banter of the            
,heracleiteans1 whom here1 as in the    
,theaetetus1 he delights to  ridicule4  
,what was the origin of this enmity we  
can hardly  determine3--was it due to   
the natural dislike which may be        
supposed to  exist between the 8patrons 
of the flux0 and the 8friends of the    
ideas0  7,soph478 or is it to be        
attributed to the indignation which     
,plato felt  at having wasted his time  
upon 8,cratylus and the doctrines of    
,heracleitus0 in the days of his youth8 

,socrates1 touching on some of  the     
characteristic difficulties of early    
,greek philosophy1 endeavours  to show  
,cratylus that imitation may be partial 
or imperfect1 that a  knowledge of      
things is higher than a knowledge of    
names1 and that there  can be no        
knowledge if all things are in a state  
of transition4 ,but  ,cratylus1 who does
 not easily apprehend the argument from 
common sense1  remains unconvinced1 and 
on the whole inclines to his former     
opinion4  ,some profound philosophical  
remarks are scattered up and down1      
admitting of an application not only to 
language but to knowledge  generally2   
such as the assertion that 8consistency 
is no test of  truth30 or again1 8,if we
 are over-precise about words1 truth    
will say  #8too late' to us as to the   
belated traveller in ,aegina40    ,the  
place of the dialogue in the series     
cannot be determined with  certainty4   
,the style and subject1 and the         
treatment of the character of           

,socrates1 have a close resemblance to  
the earlier dialogues1 especially  to   
the ,phaedrus and ,euthydemus4 ,the     
manner in which the ideas are  spoken of
 at the end of the dialogue1 also       
indicates a comparatively  early date4  
,the imaginative element is still in    
full vigour2 the  ,socrates of the      
,cratylus is the ,socrates of the       
,apology and ,symposium1  not yet       
,platonized2 and he describes1 as in the
 ,theaetetus1 the  philosophy of        
,heracleitus by 8unsavoury0 similes--he 
cannot believe that  the world is like  
8a leaky vessel10 or 8a man who has a   
running at the  nose02 he attributes the
 flux of the world to the swimming in   
some  folks' heads4 ,on the other hand1 
the relation of thought to language is  
omitted here1 but is treated of in the  
,sophist4 ,these grounds are not        
sufficient to enable us to arrive at a  
precise conclusion4 ,but we shall  not  
be far wrong in placing the ,cratylus   
about the middle1 or at any  rate in the

 first half1 of the series4             
,cratylus1 the ,heracleitean            
philosopher1 and ,hermogenes1 the       
brother of  ,callias1 have been arguing 
about names2 the former maintaining that
  they are natural1 the latter that they
 are conventional4 ,cratylus  affirms   
that his own is a true name1 but will   
not allow that the name  of ,hermogenes 
is equally true4 ,hermogenes asks       
,socrates to explain to  him what       
,cratylus means2 or1 far rather1 he     
would like to know1 ,what  ,socrates    
himself thinks about the truth or       
correctness of names8  ,socrates        
replies1 that hard is knowledge1 and the
 nature of names is a  considerable part
 of knowledge3 he has never been to hear
 the  fifty-drachma course of ,prodicus2
 and having only attended the           
single-drachma course1 he is not        
competent to give an opinion on such    
matters4 ,when ,cratylus denies that    
,hermogenes is a true name1 he  supposes
 him to mean that he is not a true son  

of ,hermes1 because he is  never in     
luck4 ,but he would like to have an open
 council and to hear  both sides4       
,hermogenes is of opinion that there is 
no principle in names2 they may  be     
changed1 as we change the names of      
slaves1 whenever we please1 and  the    
altered name is as good as the original 
one4    ,you mean to say1 for instance1 
rejoins ,socrates1 that if ,i agree to  
call a man a horse1 then a man will be  
rightly called a horse by me1  and a man
 by the rest of the world8 ,but1 surely1
 there is in words a  true and a false1 
as there are true and false             
propositions4 ,if a whole  proposition  
be true or false1 then the parts of a   
proposition may be  true or false1 and  
the least parts as well as the greatest2
 and the  least parts are names1 and    
therefore names may be true or false4   
,would  ,hermogenes maintain that       
anybody may give a name to anything1 and
 as  many names as he pleases2 and would
 all these names be always true at  the 

time of giving them8 ,hermogenes replies
 that this is the only way  in which he 
can conceive that names are correct2 and
 he appeals to the  practice of         
different nations1 and of the different 
,hellenic tribes1 in  confirmation of   
his view4 ,socrates asks1 whether the   
things differ as  the words which       
represent them differ3--,are we to      
maintain with  ,protagoras1 that what   
appears is8 ,hermogenes has always been 
puzzled  about this1 but acknowledges1  
when he is pressed by ,socrates1 that   
there are a few very good men in the    
world1 and a great many very bad2  and  
the very good are the wise1 and the very
 bad are the foolish2 and  this is not  
mere appearance but reality4 ,nor is he 
disposed to say with  ,euthydemus1 that 
all things equally and always belong to 
all men2 in  that case1 again1 there    
would be no distinction between bad and 
good  men4 ,but then1 the only remaining
 possibility is1 that all things have   
their several distinct natures1 and are 

independent of our notions  about them4 
,and not only things1 but actions1 have 
distinct natures1  and are done by      
different processes4 ,there is a natural
 way of cutting  or burning1 and a      
natural instrument with which men cut or
 burn1 and  any other way will          
fail2--this is true of all actions4 ,and
 speaking is a  kind of action1 and     
naming is a kind of speaking1 and we    
must name  according to a natural       
process1 and with a proper instrument4  
,we cut  with a knife1 we pierce with an
 awl1 we weave with a shuttle1 we name  
with a name4 ,and as a shuttle separates
 the warp from the woof1 so a  name     
distinguishes the natures of things4    
,the weaver will use the  shuttle       
well1--that is1 like a weaver2 and the  
teacher will use the name  well1--that  
is1 like a teacher4 ,the shuttle will be
 made by the  carpenter2 the awl by the 
smith or skilled person4 ,but who makes 
a  name8 ,does not the law give names1  
and does not the teacher receive  them  

from the legislator8 ,he is the skilled 
person who makes them1 and  of all      
skilled workmen he is the rarest4 ,but  
how does the carpenter  make or repair  
the shuttle1 and to what will he look8  
,will he not look  at the ideal which he
 has in his mind8 ,and as the different 
kinds of  work differ1 so ought the     
instruments which make them to differ4  
,the  several kinds of shuttles ought to
 answer in material and form to the     
several kinds of webs4 ,and the         
legislator ought to know the different  
materials and forms of which names are  
made in ,hellas and other  countries4   
,but who is to be the judge of the      
proper form8 ,the judge of  shuttles is 
the weaver who uses them2 the judge of  
lyres is the player  of the lyre2 the   
judge of ships is the pilot4 ,and will  
not the judge  who is able to direct the
 legislator in his work of naming1 be he
 who  knows how to use the names--he who
 can ask and answer questions--in       
short1 the dialectician8 ,the pilot     

directs the carpenter how to make  the  
rudder1 and the dialectician directs the
 legislator how he is to  impose names2 
for to express the ideal forms of things
 in syllables and  letters is not the   
easy task1 ,hermogenes1 which you       
imagine4    8,i should be more readily  
persuaded1 if you would show me this    
natural  correctness of names40         
,indeed ,i cannot2 but ,i see that you  
have advanced2 for you now admit  that  
there is a correctness of names1 and    
that not every one can give a  name4    
,but what is the nature of this         
correctness or truth1 you must  learn   
from the ,sophists1 of whom your brother
 ,callias has bought his  reputation for
 wisdom rather dearly2 and since they   
require to be paid1  you1 having no     
money1 had better learn from him at     
second-hand4 8,well1  but ,i have just  
given up ,protagoras1 and ,i should be  
inconsistent in  going to learn of him40
 ,then if you reject him you may learn  
of the  poets1 and in particular of     

,homer1 who distinguishes the names     
given by  ,gods and men to the same     
things1 as in the verse about the river 
,god  who fought with ,hephaestus1 8whom
 the ,gods call ,xanthus1 and men call  
,scamander20 or in the lines in which he
 mentions the bird which the  ,gods call
 8,chalcis10 and men 8,cymindis20 or the
 hill which men call  8,batieia10 and   
the ,gods 8,myrinna's ,tomb40 ,here is  
an important lesson2  for the ,gods must
 of course be right in their use of     
names4 ,and this is  not the only truth 
about philology which may be learnt from
 ,homer4 ,does  he not say that         
,hector's son had two names--           
8,hector called him ,scamandrius1 but   
the others ,astyanax08    ,now1 if the  
men called him ,astyanax1 is it not     
probable that the other  name was       
conferred by the women8 ,and which are  
more likely to be  right--the wiser or  
the less wise1 the men or the women8    
,homer evidently  agreed with the men3  
and of the name given by them he offers 

an  explanation2--the boy was called    
,astyanax 78king of the city071 because 
his father saved the city4 ,the names   
,astyanax and ,hector1 moreover1 are    
really the same1--the one means a king1 
and the other is 8a holder or           
possessor40 ,for as the lion's whelp may
 be called a lion1 or the  horse's foal 
a foal1 so the son of a king may be     
called a king4 ,but if  the horse had   
produced a calf1 then that would be     
called a calf4  ,whether the syllables  
of a name are the same or not makes no  
difference1 provided the meaning is     
retained4 ,for example2 the names of    
letters1 whether vowels or consonants1  
do not correspond to their  sounds1 with
 the exception of epsilon1 upsilon1     
omicron1 omega4 ,the  name ,beta has    
three letters added to the sound--and   
yet this does not  alter the sense of   
the word1 or prevent the whole name     
having the value  which the legislator  
intended4 ,and the same may be said of a
 king and  the son of a king1 who like  

other animals resemble each other in the
  course of nature2 the words by which  
they are signified may be  disguised1   
and yet amid differences of sound the   
etymologist may  recognise the same     
notion1 just as the physician recognises
 the power  of the same drugs under     
different disguises of colour and smell4
 ,hector  and ,astyanax have only one   
letter alike1 but they have the same    
meaning2 and ,agis 7leader7 is          
altogether different in sound from      
,polemarchus 7chief in war71 or         
,eupolemus 7good warrior72 but the two  
words present the same idea of leader or
 general1 like the words  ,iatrocles and
 ,acesimbrotus1 which equally denote a  
physician4 ,the son  succeeds the father
 as the foal succeeds the horse1 but    
when1 out of  the course of nature1 a   
prodigy occurs1 and the offspring no    
longer  resembles the parent1 then the  
names no longer agree4 ,this may be     
illustrated by the case of ,agamemnon   
and his son ,orestes1 of whom the       

former has a name significant of his    
patience at the siege of ,troy2  while  
the name of the latter indicates his    
savage1 man-of-the-mountain  nature4    
,atreus again1 for his murder of        
,chrysippus1 and his cruelty to         
,thyestes1 is rightly named ,atreus1    
which1 to the eye of the  etymologist1  
is ateros 7destructive71 ateires        
7stubborn71 atreotos  7fearless72 and   
,pelops is o ta pelas oron 7he who sees 
what is near  only71 because in his     
eagerness to win ,hippodamia1 he was    
unconscious  of the remoter consequences
 which the murder of ,myrtilus would    
entail  upon his race4 ,the name        
,tantalus1 if slightly changed1 offers  
two  etymologies2 either apo tes tou    
lithou talanteias1 or apo tou           
talantaton einai1 signifying at once the
 hanging of the stone over his  head in 
the world below1 and the misery which he
 brought upon his  country4 ,and the    
name of his father1 ,zeus1 ,dios1       
,zenos1 has an  excellent meaning1      

though hard to be understood1 because   
really a  sentence which is divided into
 two parts 7,zeus1 ,dios74 ,for he1     
being  the lord and king of all1 is the 
author of our being1 and in him all     
live3 this is implied in the double     
form1 ,dios1 ,zenos1 which being put    
together and interpreted is di on ze    
panta4 ,there may1 at first sight1      
appear to be some irreverence in calling
 him the son of ,cronos1 who is  a      
proverb for stupidity2 but the meaning  
is that ,zeus himself is the  son of a  
mighty intellect2 ,kronos1 quasi koros1 
not in the sense of a  youth1 but quasi 
to katharon kai akeraton tou nou--the   
pure and  garnished mind1 which in turn 
is begotten of ,uranus1 who is so called
  apo tou oran ta ano1 from looking     
upwards2 which1 as philosophers say1  is
 the way to have a pure mind4 ,the      
earlier portion of ,hesiod's  genealogy 
has escaped my memory1 or ,i would try  
more conclusions of the  same sort4     
8,you talk like an oracle40 ,i caught   

the infection from  ,euthyphro1 who gave
 me a long lecture which began at dawn1 
and has not  only entered into my ears1 
but filled my soul1 and my intention is 
to  yield to the inspiration to-day2 and
 to-morrow ,i will be exorcised by  some
 priest or sophist4 8,go on2 ,i am      
anxious to hear the rest40 ,now  that we
 have a general notion1 how shall we    
proceed8 ,what names will  afford the   
most crucial test of natural fitness8   
,those of heroes and  ordinary men are  
often deceptive1 because they are       
patronymics or  expressions of a wish2  
let us try gods and demi-gods4 ,gods are
 so  called1 apo tou thein1 from the    
verb 8to run20 because the sun1 moon1   
and stars run about the heaven2 and they
 being the original gods of the         
,hellenes1 as they still are of the     
,barbarians1 their name is given to  all
 ,gods4 ,the demons are the golden race 
of ,hesiod1 and by golden he  means not 
literally golden1 but good2 and they are
 called demons1 quasi  daemones1 which  

in old ,attic was used for              
daimones--good men are well  said to    
become daimones when they die1 because  
they are knowing4 ,eros  7with an       
epsilon7 is the same word as eros 7with 
an eta73 8the sons of  ,god saw the     
daughters of men that they were fair20  
or perhaps they were  a species of      
sophists or rhetoricians1 and so called 
apo tou erotan1 or  eirein1 from their  
habit of spinning questions2 for eirein 
is  equivalent to legein4 ,i get all    
this from ,euthyphro2 and now a new and 
ingenious idea comes into my mind1 and1 
if ,i am not careful1 ,i shall be  wiser
 than ,i ought to be by to-morrow's     
dawn4 ,my idea is1 that we may  put in  
and pull out letters at pleasure and    
alter the accents 7as1 for  example1    
,dii philos may be turned into          
,diphilos71 and we may make words  into 
sentences and sentences into words4 ,the
 name anthrotos is a case  in point1 for
 a letter has been omitted and the      
accent changed2 the  original meaning   

being o anathron a opopen--he who looks 
up at what he  sees4 ,psuche may be     
thought to be the reviving1 or          
refreshing1 or  animating principle--e  
anapsuchousa to soma2 but ,i am afraid  
that  ,euthyphro and his disciples will 
scorn this derivation1 and ,i must find 
another3 shall we identify the soul with
 the 8ordering mind0 of  ,anaxagoras1   
and say that psuche1 quasi phuseche  e  
phusin echei or  ochei8--this might     
easily be refined into psyche4 8,that is
 a more  artistic etymology40    ,after 
psuche follows soma2 this1 by a slight  
permutation1 may be either   7#a7 the   
8grave0 of the soul1 or 7#b7 may mean   
8that by which the soul  signifies      
7semainei7 her wishes40 ,but more       
probably1 the word is  ,orphic1 and     
simply denotes that the body is the     
place of ward in which  the soul suffers
 the penalty of sin1--en o sozetai4 8,i 
should like to  hear some more          
explanations of the names of the ,gods1 
like that  excellent one of ,zeus40 ,the

 truest names of the ,gods are those    
which  they give themselves2 but these  
are unknown to us4 ,less true are those 
by which we propitiate them1 as men say 
in prayers1 8,may he graciously  receive
 any name by which ,i call him40 ,and to
 avoid offence1 ,i should  like to let  
them know beforehand that we are not    
presuming to enquire  about them1 but   
only about the names which they usually 
bear4 ,let us  begin with ,hestia4 ,what
 did he mean who gave the name ,hestia8 
8,that is  a very difficult question40  
,o1 my dear ,hermogenes1 ,i believe that
 there  was a power of philosophy and   
talk among the first inventors of names1
  both in our own and in other          
languages2 for even in foreign words a  
principle is discernible4 ,hestia is the
 same with esia1 which is an old  form  
of ousia1 and means the first principle 
of things3 this agrees  with the fact   
that to ,hestia the first sacrifices are
 offered4 ,there is  also another       
reading--osia1 which implies that       

8pushing0 7othoun7 is the  first        
principle of all things4 ,and here ,i   
seem to discover a delicate  allusion to
 the flux of ,heracleitus--that         
antediluvian philosopher who  cannot    
walk twice in the same stream2 and this 
flux of his may  accomplish yet greater 
marvels4 ,for the names ,cronos and     
,rhea cannot  have been accidental2 the 
giver of them must have known something 
about  the doctrine of ,heracleitus4    
,moreover1 there is a remarkable        
coincidence in the words of ,hesiod1    
when he speaks of ,oceanus1 8the  origin
 of ,gods20 and in the verse of         
,orpheus1 in which he describes         
,oceanus espousing his sister ,tethys4  
,tethys is nothing more than the  name  
of a spring--to diattomenon kai         
ethoumenon4 ,poseidon is posidesmos1    
the chain of the feet1 because you      
cannot walk on the sea--the epsilon  is 
inserted by way of ornament2 or perhaps 
the name may have been  originally      
polleidon1 meaning1 that the ,god knew  

many things 7polla  eidos73 he may also 
be the shaker1 apo tou seiein1--in this 
case1 pi and  delta have been added4    
,pluto is connected with ploutos1       
because wealth  comes out of the earth2 
or the word may be a euphemism for      
,hades1 which  is usually derived apo   
tou aeidous1 because the ,god is        
concerned with  the invisible4 ,but the 
name ,hades was really given him from   
his knowing  7eidenai7 all good things4 
,men in general are foolishly afraid of 
him1  and talk with horror of the world 
below from which no one may return4     
,the reason why his subjects never wish 
to come back1 even if they  could1 is   
that the ,god enchains them by the      
strongest of spells1 namely  by the     
desire of virtue1 which they hope to    
obtain by constant  association with    
him4 ,he is the perfect and accomplished
 ,sophist and  the great benefactor of  
the other world2 for he has much more   
than he  wants there1 and hence he is   
called ,pluto or the rich4 ,he will have

  nothing to do with the souls of men   
while in the body1 because he  cannot   
work his will with them so long as they 
are confused and  entangled by fleshly  
lusts4 ,demeter is the mother and giver 
of food--e  didousa meter tes edodes4   
,here is erate tis1 or perhaps the      
legislator  may have been thinking of   
the weather1 and has merely transposed  
the  letters of the word aer4           
,pherephatta1 that word of awe1 is      
pheretapha1  which is only an euphonious
 contraction of e tou pheromenou        
ephaptomene1--all things are in motion1 
and she in her wisdom moves with  them1 
and the wise ,god ,hades consorts with  
her--there is nothing very  terrible in 
this1 any more than in the her other    
appellation  ,persephone1 which is also 
significant of her wisdom 7sophe74      
,apollo is  another name1 which is      
supposed to have some dreadful meaning1 
but is  susceptible of at least four    
perfectly innocent explanations4 ,first1
 he  is the purifier or purger or       

absolver 7apolouon72 secondly1 he is the
  true diviner1 ,aplos1 as he is called 
in the ,thessalian dialect 7aplos       
aplous1 sincere72 thirdly1 he is the    
archer 7aei ballon71 always  shooting2  
or again1 supposing alpha to mean ama or
 omou1 ,apollo becomes  equivalent to   
ama polon1 which points to both his     
musical and his  heavenly attributes2   
for there is a 8moving together0 alike  
in music  and in the harmony of the     
spheres4 ,the second lambda is inserted 
in  order to avoid the ill-omened sound 
of destruction4 ,the ,muses are so      
called--apo tou mosthai4 ,the gentle    
,leto or ,letho is named from her       
willingness 7ethelemon71 or because she 
is ready to forgive and forget  7lethe74
 ,artemis is so called from her healthy 
well-balanced nature1  dia to artemes1  
or as aretes istor2 or as a lover of    
virginity1 aroton  misesasa4 ,one of    
these explanations is probably          
true1--perhaps all of  them4 ,dionysus  
is o didous ton oinon1 and oinos is     

quasi oionous  because wine makes those 
think 7oiesthai7 that they have a mind  
7nous7  who have none4 ,the established 
derivation of ,aphrodite dia ten tou    
athrou genesin may be accepted on the   
authority of ,hesiod4 ,again1 there  is 
the name of ,pallas1 or ,athene1 which  
we1 who are ,athenians1 must not        
forget4 ,pallas is derived from armed   
dances--apo tou pallein ta opla4  ,for  
,athene we must turn to the allegorical 
interpreters of ,homer1 who  make the   
name equivalent to theonoe1 or possibly 
the word was  originally ethonoe and    
signified moral intelligence 7en ethei  
noesis74  ,hephaestus1 again1 is the    
lord of light--o tou phaeos istor4 ,this
 is a  good notion2 and1 to prevent any 
other getting into our heads1 let us  go
 on to ,ares4 ,he is the manly one      
7arren71 or the unchangeable one        
7arratos74 ,enough of the ,gods2 for1 by
 the ,gods1 ,i am afraid of them2  but  
if you suggest other words1 you will see
 how the horses of  ,euthyphro prance4  

8,only one more ,god2 tell me about my  
godfather  ,hermes40 ,he is ermeneus1   
the messenger or cheater or thief or    
bargainer2 or o eirein momenos1 that is1
 eiremes or ermes--the speaker  or      
contriver of speeches4 8,well said      
,cratylus1 then1 that ,i am no son  of  
,hermes40 ,pan1 as the son of ,hermes1  
is speech or the brother of  speech1 and
 is called ,pan because speech indicates
 everything--o pan  menuon4 ,he has two 
forms1 a true and a false2 and is in the
 upper part  smooth1 and in the lower   
part shaggy4 ,he is the goat of         
,tragedy1 in  which there are plenty of 
falsehoods4    8,will you go on to the  
elements--sun1 moon1 stars1 earth1      
aether1 air1  fire1 water1 seasons1     
years80 ,very good3 and which shall ,i  
take first8  ,let us begin with elios1  
or the sun4 ,the ,doric form elios helps
 us to  see that he is so called because
 at his rising he gathers 7alizei7 men  
together1 or because he rolls about     
7eilei7 the earth1 or because he        

variegates 7aiolei  poikillei7 the      
earth4 ,selene is an anticipation of    
,anaxagoras1 being a contraction of     
selaenoneoaeia1 the light 7selas7  which
 is ever old and new1 and which1 as     
,anaxagoras says1 is borrowed  from the 
sun2 the name was harmonized into       
selanaia1 a form which is  still in use4
 8,that is a true dithyrambic name40    
,meis is so called apo  tou meiousthai1 
from suffering diminution1 and astron is
 from astrape  7lightning71 which is an 
improvement of anastrope1 that which    
turns the  eyes inside out4 8,how do you
 explain pur n udor80 ,i suspect that   
pur1  which1 like udor n kuon1 is found 
in ,phrygian1 is a foreign word2 for    
the ,hellenes have borrowed much from   
the barbarians1 and ,i always  resort to
 this theory of a foreign origin when ,i
 am at a loss4 ,aer may  be explained1  
oti airei ta apo tes ges2 or1 oti aei   
rei2 or1 oti pneuma  ex autou ginetai   
7compare the poetic word aetai74 ,so    
aither quasi  aeitheer oti aei thei peri

 ton aera3 ge1 gaia quasi genneteira    
7compare  the ,homeric form gegaasi72   
ora 7with an omega71 or1 according to   
the  old ,attic form ora 7with an       
omicron71 is derived apo tou orizein1   
because it divides the year2 eniautos   
and etos are the same thought--o  en    
eauto etazon1 cut into two parts1 en    
eauto and etazon1 like di on ze  into   
,dios and ,zenos4    8,you make         
surprising progress40 ,true2 ,i am run  
away with1 and am not  even yet at my   
utmost speed4 8,i should like very much 
to hear your  account of the virtues4   
,what principle of correctness is there 
in those  charming words1 wisdom1       
understanding1 justice1 and the rest80  
,to  explain all that will be a serious 
business2 still1 as ,i have put on  the 
lion's skin1 appearances must be        
maintained4 ,my opinion is1 that        
primitive men were like some modern     
philosophers1 who1 by always going      
round in their search after the nature  
of things1 become dizzy2 and  this      

phenomenon1 which was really in         
themselves1 they imagined to take  place
 in the external world4 ,you have no    
doubt remarked1 that the  doctrine of   
the universal flux1 or generation of    
things1 is indicated  in names4 8,no1 ,i
 never did40 ,phronesis is only phoras  
kai rou noesis1  or perhaps phoras      
onesis1 and in any case is connected    
with pheresthai2  gnome is gones skepsis
 kai nomesis2 noesis is neou or         
gignomenon esis2  the word neos implies 
that creation is always going on--the   
original  form was neoesis2 sophrosune  
is soteria phroneseos2 episteme is e    
epomene tois pragmasin--the faculty     
which keeps close1 neither  anticipating
 nor lagging behind2 sunesis is         
equivalent to sunienai1  sumporeuesthai 
ten psuche1 and is a kind of            
conclusion--sullogismos tis1  akin      
therefore in idea to episteme2 sophia is
 very difficult1 and has a  foreign     
look--the meaning is1 touching the      
motion or stream of things1  and may be 

illustrated by the poetical esuthe and  
the ,lacedaemonian  proper name ,sous1  
or ,rush2 agathon is ro agaston en te   
tachuteti1--for  all things are in      
motion1 and some are swifter than       
others3 dikaiosune  is clearly e tou    
dikaiou sunesis4 ,the word dikaion is   
more troublesome1  and appears to mean  
the subtle penetrating power which1 as  
the lovers  of motion say1 preserves all
 things1 and is the cause of all things1
  quasi diaion going through--the letter
 kappa being inserted for the sake  of  
euphony4 ,this is a great mystery which 
has been confided to me2 but  when ,i   
ask for an explanation ,i am thought    
obtrusive1 and another  derivation is   
proposed to me4 ,justice is said to be o
 kaion1 or the  sun2 and when ,i        
joyfully repeat this beautiful notion1  
,i am answered1  8,what1 is there no    
justice when the sun is down80 ,and when
 ,i entreat my  questioner to tell me   
his own opinion1 he replies1 that       
justice is fire  in the abstract1 or    

heat in the abstract2 which is not very 
intelligible4 ,others laugh at such     
notions1 and say with ,anaxagoras1  that
 justice is the ordering mind4 8,i think
 that some one must have  told you      
this40 ,and not the rest8 ,let me       
proceed then1 in the hope of  proving to
 you my originality4 ,andreia is quasi  
anpeia quasi e ano roe1  the stream     
which flows upwards1 and is opposed to  
injustice1 which  clearly hinders the   
principle of penetration2 arren and aner
 have a  similar derivation2 gune is the
 same as gone2 thelu is derived apo tes 
theles1 because the teat makes things   
flourish 7tethelenai71 and the  word    
thallein itself implies increase of     
youth1 which is swift and  sudden ever  
7thein and allesthai74 ,i am getting    
over the ground fast3  but much has     
still to be explained4 ,there is techne1
 for instance4  ,this1 by an aphaeresis 
of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in  
two  places1 may be identified with     
echonoe1 and signifies 8that which has  

mind40    8,a very poor etymology40     
,yes2 but you must remember that all    
language  is in process of change2      
letters are taken in and put out for the
 sake  of euphony1 and time is also a   
great alterer of words4 ,for example1   
what business has the letter rho in the 
word katoptron1 or the letter  sigma in 
the word sphigx8 ,the additions are     
often such that it is  impossible to    
make out the original word2 and yet1 if 
you may put in  and pull out1 as you    
like1 any name is equally good for any  
object4 ,the  fact is1 that great       
dictators of literature like yourself   
should  observe the rules of moderation4
 8,i will do my best40 ,but do not be   
too  much of a precisian1 or you will   
paralyze me4 ,if you will let me add    
mechane1 apo tou mekous1 which means    
polu1 and anein1 ,i shall be at the     
summit of my powers1 from which         
elevation ,i will examine the two words 
kakia and arete4 ,the first is easily   
explained in accordance with what  has  

preceded2 for all things being in a     
flux1 kakia is to kakos ion4  ,this     
derivation is illustrated by the word   
deilia1 which ought to have  come after 
andreia1 and may be regarded as o lian  
desmos tes psuches1  just as aporia     
signifies an impediment to motion 7from 
alpha not1 and  poreuesthai to go71 and 
arete is euporia1 which is the opposite 
of  this--the everflowing 7aei reousa or
 aeireite71 or the eligible1 quasi      
airete4 ,you will think that ,i am      
inventing1 but ,i say that if kakia is  
right1 then arete is also right4 ,but   
what is kakon8 ,that is a very  obscure 
word1 to which ,i can only apply my old 
notion and declare that  kakon is a     
foreign word4 ,next1 let us proceed to  
kalon1 aischron4 ,the  latter is        
doubtless contracted from aeischoroun1  
quasi aei ischon roun4  ,the inventor of
 words being a patron of the flux1 was a
 great enemy to  stagnation4 ,kalon is  
to kaloun ta pragmata--this is mind     
7nous or  dianoia72 which is also the   

principle of beauty2 and which doing the
  works of beauty1 is therefore rightly 
called the beautiful4 ,the meaning  of  
sumpheron is explained by previous      
examples2--like episteme1  signifying   
that the soul moves in harmony with the 
world 7sumphora1  sumpheronta74 ,kerdos 
is to pasi kerannumenon--that which     
mingles with  all things3 lusiteloun is 
equivalent to to tes phoras luon to     
telos1  and is not to be taken in the   
vulgar sense of gainful1 but rather in  
that of swift1 being the principle which
 makes motion immortal and  unceasing2  
ophelimon is apo tou ophellein--that    
which gives increase3  this word1 which 
is ,homeric1 is of foreign origin4      
,blaberon is to  blamton or boulomenon  
aptein tou rou--that which injures or   
seeks to  bind the stream4 ,the proper  
word would be boulapteroun1 but this is 
too  much of a mouthful--like a prelude 
on the flute in honour of ,athene4 ,the 
word zemiodes is difficult2 great       
changes1 as ,i was saying1 have been    

made in words1 and even a small change  
will alter their meaning very  much4    
,the word deon is one of these disguised
 words4 ,you know that  according to the
 old pronunciation1 which is especially 
affected by the  women1 who are great   
conservatives1 iota and delta were used 
where we  should now use eta and zeta3  
for example1 what we now call emera was 
formerly called imera2 and this shows   
the meaning of the word to have  been   
8the desired one coming after night10   
and not1 as is often  supposed1 8that   
which makes things gentle0 7emera74 ,so 
again1 zugon is  duogon1 quasi desis    
duein eis agogen--7the binding of two   
together for  the purpose of drawing47  
,deon1 as ordinarily written1 has an    
evil  sense1 signifying the chain       
7desmos7 or hindrance of motion2 but in 
its  ancient form dion is expressive of 
good1 quasi diion1 that which           
penetrates or goes through all4         
,zemiodes is really demiodes1 and means 
that which binds motion 7dounti to ion73

 edone is e pros ten onrsin  teinousa   
praxis--the delta is an insertion3 lupe 
is derived apo tes  dialuseos tou       
somatos3 ania is from alpha and ienai1  
to go3 algedon is  a foreign word1 and  
is so called apo tou algeinou3 odune is 
apo tes  enduseos tes lupes3 achthedon  
is in its very sound a burden3 chapa    
expresses the flow of soul3 terpsis is  
apo tou terpnou1 and terpnon is         
properly erpnon1 because the sensation  
of pleasure is likened to a  breath     
7pnoe7 which creeps 7erpei7 through the 
soul3 euphrosune is  named from         
pheresthai1 because the soul moves in   
harmony with nature3  epithumia is e epi
 ton thumon iousa dunamis3 thumos is apo
 tes thuseos  tes psuches3 imeros--oti  
eimenos pei e psuche3 pothos1 the desire
 which  is in another place1 allothi    
pou3 eros was anciently esros1 and so   
called because it flows into 7esrei7 the
 soul from without3 doxa is e  dioxis   
tou eidenai1 or expresses the shooting  
from a bow 7toxon74 ,the  latter        

etymology is confirmed by the words     
boulesthai1 boule1 aboulia1  which all  
have to do with shooting 7bole73 and    
similarly oiesis is  nothing but the    
movement 7oisis7 of the soul towards    
essence4 ,ekousion  is to eikon--the    
yielding--anagke is e an agke iousa1 the
 passage through  ravines which impede  
motion3 aletheia is theia ale1 divine   
motion4  ,pseudos is the opposite of    
this1 implying the principle of         
constraint  and forced repose1 which is 
expressed under the figure of sleep1 to 
eudon2 the psi is an addition4 ,onoma1 a
 name1 affirms the real  existence of   
that which is sought after--on ou masma 
estin4 ,on and ousia  are only ion with 
an iota broken off2 and ouk on is ouk   
ion4 8,and what  are ion1 reon1 doun80  
,one way of explaining them has been    
already  suggested--they may be of      
foreign origin2 and possibly this is the
 true  answer4 ,but mere antiquity may  
often prevent our recognizing words1    
after all the complications which they  

have undergone2 and we must  remember   
that however far we carry back our      
analysis some ultimate  elements or     
roots will remain which can be no       
further analyzed4 ,for  example2 the    
word agathos was supposed by us to be a 
compound of  agastos and thoos1 and     
probably thoos may be further           
resolvable4 ,but if  we take a word of  
which no further resolution seems       
attainable1 we may  fairly conclude that
 we have reached one of these original  
elements1  and the truth of such a word 
must be tested by some new method4 ,will
  you help me in the search8    ,all    
names1 whether primary or secondary1 are
 intended to show the  nature of things2
 and the secondary1 as ,i conceive1     
derive their  significance from the     
primary4 ,but then1 how do the primary  
names  indicate anything8 ,and let me   
ask another question1--,if we had no    
faculty of speech1 how should we        
communicate with one another8 ,should   
we not use signs1 like the deaf and     

dumb8 ,the elevation of our hands  would
 mean lightness--heaviness would be     
expressed by letting them drop4  ,the   
running of any animal would be described
 by a similar movement of  our own      
frames4 ,the body can only express      
anything by imitation2 and  the tongue  
or mouth can imitate as well as the rest
 of the body4 ,but  this imitation of   
the tongue or voice is not yet a name1  
because people  may imitate sheep or    
goats without naming them4 ,what1 then1 
is a name8  ,in the first place1 a name 
is not a musical1 or1 secondly1 a       
pictorial  imitation1 but an imitation  
of that kind which expresses the nature 
of  a thing2 and is the invention not of
 a musician1 or of a painter1 but  of a 
namer4    ,and now1 ,i think that we may
 consider the names about which you were
  asking4 ,the way to analyze them will 
be by going back to the letters1  or    
primary elements of which they are      
composed4 ,first1 we separate the       
alphabet into classes of letters1       

distinguishing the consonants1 mutes1   
vowels1 and semivowels2 and when we have
 learnt them singly1 we shall  learn to 
know them in their various combinations 
of two or more  letters2 just as the    
painter knows how to use either a single
 colour1  or a combination of colours4  
,and like the painter1 we may apply     
letters  to the expression of objects1  
and form them into syllables2 and these 
again into words1 until the picture or  
figure--that is1 language--is           
completed4 ,not that ,i am literally    
speaking of ourselves1 but ,i mean to   
say that this was the way in which the  
ancients framed language4 ,and  this    
leads me to consider whether the primary
 as well as the secondary  elements are 
rightly given4 ,i may remark1 as ,i was 
saying about the  ,gods1 that we can    
only attain to conjecture of them4 ,but 
still we  insist that ours is the true  
and only method of discovery2 otherwise 
we  must have recourse1 like the tragic 
poets1 to a ,deus ex machina1 and  say  

that ,god gave the first names1 and     
therefore they are right2 or  that the  
barbarians are older than we are1 and   
that we learnt of them2  or that        
antiquity has cast a veil over the      
truth4 ,yet all these are not  reasons2 
they are only ingenious excuses for     
having no reasons4    ,i will freely    
impart to you my own notions1 though    
they are somewhat  crude3--the letter   
rho appears to me to be the general     
instrument which  the legislator has    
employed to express all motion or       
kinesis4 7,i ought  to explain that     
kinesis is just iesis 7going71 for the  
letter eta was  unknown to the ancients2
 and the root1 kiein1 is a foreign form 
of  ienai3 of kinesis or eisis1 the     
opposite is stasis74 ,this use of rho is
  evident in the words tremble1 break1  
crush1 crumble1 and the like2 the       
imposer of names perceived that the     
tongue is most agitated in the          
pronunciation of this letter1 just as he
 used iota to express the  subtle power 

which penetrates through all things4    
,the letters phi1 psi1  sigma1 zeta1    
which require a great deal of wind1 are 
employed in the  imitation of such      
notions as shivering1 seething1 shaking1
 and in  general of what is windy4 ,the 
letters delta and tau convey the idea of
  binding and rest in a place3 the      
lambda denotes smoothness1 as in the    
words slip1 sleek1 sleep1 and the like4 
,but when the slipping tongue is        
detained by the heavier sound of gamma1 
then arises the notion of a  glutinous  
clammy nature3 nu is sounded from       
within1 and has a notion of  inwardness3
 alpha is the expression of size2 eta of
 length2 omicron of  roundness1 and     
therefore there is plenty of omicron in 
the word  goggulon4 ,that is my view1   
,hermogenes1 of the correctness of      
names2 and  ,i should like to hear what 
,cratylus would say4 8,but1 ,socrates1  
as ,i was  telling you1 ,cratylus       
mystifies me2 ,i should like to ask him1
 in your  presence1 what he means by the

 fitness of names80 ,to this appeal1    
,cratylus replies 8that he cannot       
explain so important a subject all in  a
 moment40 8,no1 but you may #8add little
 to little1' as ,hesiod says40          
,socrates here interposes his own       
request1 that ,cratylus will give some  
account of his theory4 ,hermogenes and  
himself are mere sciolists1 but         
,cratylus has reflected on these        
matters1 and has had teachers4 ,cratylus
  replies in the words of ,achilles3    
8#8,illustrious ,ajax1 you have spoken  
in all things much to my mind1' whether 
,euthyphro1 or some ,muse  inhabiting   
your own breast1 was the inspirer40     
,socrates replies1 that  he is afraid of
 being self-deceived1 and therefore he  
must 8look fore  and aft10 as ,homer    
remarks4 ,does not ,cratylus agree with 
him that names  teach us the nature of  
things8 8,yes40 ,and naming is an art1  
and the  artists are legislators1 and   
like artists in general1 some of them   
are  better and some of them are worse  

than others1 and give better or worse   
laws1 and make better or worse names4   
,cratylus cannot admit that one  name is
 better than another2 they are either   
true names1 or they are  not names at   
all2 and when he is asked about the name
 of ,hermogenes1  who is acknowledged to
 have no luck in him1 he affirms this to
 be the  name of somebody else4         
,socrates supposes him to mean that     
falsehood is  impossible1 to which his  
own answer would be1 that there has     
never been  a lack of liars4 ,cratylus  
presses him with the old sophistical    
argument1 that falsehood is saying that 
which is not1 and therefore  saying     
nothing2--you cannot utter the word     
which is not4 ,socrates  complains that 
this argument is too subtle for an old  
man to  understand3 ,suppose a person   
addressing ,cratylus were to say1 ,hail1
  ,athenian ,stranger1 ,hermogenes6     
would these words be true or false8 8,i 
should say that they would be mere      
unmeaning sounds1 like the hammering  of

 a brass pot40 ,but you would           
acknowledge that names1 as well as      
pictures1 are imitations1 and also that 
pictures may give a right or  wrong     
representation of a man or woman3--why  
may not names then equally  give a      
representation true and right or false  
and wrong8 ,cratylus  admits that       
pictures may give a true or false       
representation1 but  denies that names  
can4 ,socrates argues1 that he may go up
 to a man and  say 8this is year        
picture10 and again1 he may go and say  
to him 8this  is your name0--in the one 
case appealing to his sense of sight1   
and in  the other to his sense of       
hearing2--may he not8 8,yes40 ,then you 
will  admit that there is a right or a  
wrong assignment of names1 and if of    
names1 then of verbs and nouns2 and if  
of verbs and nouns1 then of the         
sentences which are made up of them2 and
 comparing nouns to pictures1  you may  
give them all the appropriate sounds1 or
 only some of them4 ,and  as he who     

gives all the colours makes a good      
picture1 and he who gives  only some of 
them1 a bad or imperfect one1 but still 
a picture2 so he  who gives all the     
sounds makes a good name1 and he who    
gives only some  of them1 a bad or      
imperfect one1 but a name still4 ,the   
artist of names1  that is1 the          
legislator1 may be a good or he may be a
 bad artist4 8,yes1  ,socrates1 but the 
cases are not parallel2 for if you      
subtract or  misplace a letter1 the name
 ceases to be a name40 ,socrates admits 
that  the number #aj1 if an unit is     
subtracted1 would cease to be #aj1 but  
denies that names are of this purely    
quantitative nature4 ,suppose that      
there are two objects--,cratylus and the
 image of ,cratylus2 and let us  imagine
 that some ,god makes them perfectly    
alike1 both in their outward  form and  
in their inner nature and qualities3    
then there will be two  ,cratyluses1 and
 not merely ,cratylus and the image of  
,cratylus4 ,but an  image in fact always

 falls short in some degree of the      
original1 and if  images are not exact  
counterparts1 why should names be8 if   
they were1  they would be the doubles of
 their originals1 and indistinguishable 
from them2 and how ridiculous would this
 be6 ,cratylus admits the truth  of     
,socrates' remark4 ,but then ,socrates  
rejoins1 he should have the  courage to 
acknowledge that letters may be wrongly 
inserted in a noun1  or a noun in a     
sentence2 and yet the noun or the       
sentence may retain a  meaning4 ,better 
to admit this1 that we may not be       
punished like the  traveller in ,egina  
who goes about at night1 and that ,truth
 herself may  not say to us1 8,too      
late40 ,and1 errors excepted1 we may    
still affirm  that a name to be correct 
must have proper letters1 which bear a  
resemblance to the thing signified4 ,i  
must remind you of what  ,hermogenes and
 ,i were saying about the letter rho    
accent1 which was  held to be expressive
 of motion and hardness1 as lambda is of

  smoothness2--and this you will admit  
to be their natural meaning4 ,but  then1
 why do the ,eritreans call that        
skleroter which we call sklerotes8  ,we 
can understand one another1 although the
 letter rho accent is not  equivalent to
 the letter s3 why is this8 ,you reply1 
because the two  letters are            
sufficiently alike for the purpose of   
expressing motion4  ,well1 then1 there  
is the letter lambda2 what business has 
this in a  word meaning hardness8 8,why1
 ,socrates1 ,i retort upon you1 that we 
put  in and pull out letters at         
pleasure40 ,and the explanation of this 
is  custom or agreement3 we have made a 
convention that the rho shall mean  s   
and a convention may indicate by the    
unlike as well as by the like4  ,how    
could there be names for all the numbers
 unless you allow that  convention is   
used8 ,imitation is a poor thing1 and   
has to be  supplemented by convention1  
which is another poor thing2 although ,i
  agree with you in thinking that the   

most perfect form of language is  found 
only where there is a perfect           
correspondence of sound and  meaning4   
,but let me ask you what is the use and 
force of names8 8,the  use of names1    
,socrates1 is to inform1 and he who     
knows names knows  things40 ,do you mean
 that the discovery of names is the same
 as the  discovery of things8 8,yes40   
,but do you not see that there is a     
degree  of deception about names8 ,he   
who first gave names1 gave them         
according  to his conception1 and that  
may have been erroneous4 8,but then1    
why1  ,socrates1 is language so         
consistent8 all words have the same     
laws40  ,mere consistency is no test of 
truth4 ,in geometrical problems1 for    
example1 there may be a flaw at the     
beginning1 and yet the conclusion  may  
follow consistently4 ,and1 therefore1 a 
wise man will take especial  care of    
first principles4 ,but are words really 
consistent2 are there  not as many terms
 of praise which signify rest as which  

signify motion8  ,there is episteme1    
which is connected with stasis1 as mneme
 is with  meno4 ,bebaion1 again1 is the 
expression of station and position2     
istoria is clearly descriptive of the   
stopping istanai of the stream2  piston 
indicates the cessation of motion2 and  
there are many words  having a bad      
sense1 which are connected with ideas of
 motion1 such as  sumphora1 amartia1    
etc43 amathia1 again1 might be          
explained1 as e ama  theo iontos poreia1
 and akolasia as e akolouthia tois      
pragmasin4 ,thus  the bad names are     
framed on the same principle as the     
good1 and other  examples might be      
given1 which would favour a theory of   
rest rather  than of motion4 8,yes2 but 
the greater number of words express     
motion40  ,are we to count them1        
,cratylus2 and is correctness of names  
to be  determined by the voice of a     
majority8    ,here is another point3 we 
were saying that the legislator gives   
names2  and therefore we must suppose   

that he knows the things which he names3
  but how can he have learnt things from
 names before there were any  names8 8,i
 believe1 ,socrates1 that some power    
more than human first gave  things their
 names1 and that these were necessarily 
true names40 ,then  how came the giver  
of names to contradict himself1 and to  
make some  names expressive of rest1 and
 others of motion8 8,i do not suppose   
that  he did make them both40 ,then     
which did he make--those which are      
expressive of rest1 or those which are  
expressive of motion8444,but if  some   
names are true and others false1 we can 
only decide between them1  not by       
counting words1 but by appealing to     
things4 ,and1 if so1 we must  allow that
 things may be known without names2 for 
names1 as we have  several times        
admitted1 are the images of things2 and 
the higher  knowledge is of things1 and 
is not to be derived from names2 and    
though  ,i do not doubt that the        
inventors of language gave names1 under 

the  idea that all things are in a state
 of motion and flux1 ,i believe that    
they were mistaken2 and that having     
fallen into a whirlpool themselves1     
they are trying to drag us after them4  
,for is there not a true beauty  and a  
true good1 which is always beautiful and
 always good8 ,can the  thing beauty be 
vanishing away from us while the words  
are yet in our  mouths8 ,and they could 
not be known by any one if they are     
always  passing away--for if they are   
always passing away1 the observer has no
  opportunity of observing their state4 
,whether the doctrine of the flux  or of
 the eternal nature be the truer1 is    
hard to determine4 ,but no man  of sense
 will put himself1 or the education of  
his mind1 in the power  of names3 he    
will not condemn himself to be an unreal
 thing1 nor will  he believe that       
everything is in a flux like the water  
in a leaky  vessel1 or that the world is
 a man who has a running at the nose4   
,this  doctrine may be true1 ,cratylus1 

but is also very likely to be untrue2   
and therefore ,i would have you reflect 
while you are young1 and find  out the  
truth1 and when you know come and tell  
me4 8,i have thought1  ,socrates1 and   
after a good deal of thinking ,i incline
 to ,heracleitus40  ,then another day1  
my friend1 you shall give me a lesson4  
8,very good1  ,socrates1 and ,i hope    
that you will continue to study these   
things  yourself40      ,we may now     
consider 7,i7 how far ,plato in the     
,cratylus has discovered  the true      
principles of language1 and then 7,,ii7 
proceed to compare  modern speculations 
respecting the origin and nature of     
language with  the anticipations of his 
genius4    ,i4 7#a7 ,plato is aware that
 language is not the work of chance2 nor
 does  he deny that there is a natural  
fitness in names4 ,he only insists that 
this natural fitness shall be           
intelligibly explained4 ,but he has no  
idea that language is a natural         
organism4 ,he would have heard with     

surprise that languages are the common  
work of whole nations in a  primitive or
 semi-barbarous age4 ,how1 he would     
probably have argued1  could men devoid 
of art have contrived a structure of    
such complexity8  ,no answer could have 
been given to this question1 either in  
ancient or  in modern times1 until the  
nature of primitive antiquity had been  
thoroughly studied1 and the instincts of
 man had been shown to exist in  greater
 force1 when his state approaches more  
nearly to that of  children or animals4 
,the philosophers of the last century1  
after their  manner1 would have vainly  
endeavoured to trace the process by     
which  proper names were converted into 
common1 and would have shown how the    
last effort of abstraction invented     
prepositions and auxiliaries4 ,the      
theologian would have proved that       
language must have had a divine  origin1
 because in childhood1 while the organs 
are pliable1 the  intelligence is       
wanting1 and when the intelligence is   

able to frame  conceptions1 the organs  
are no longer able to express them4 ,or1
 as  others have said3 ,man is man      
because he has the gift of speech2 and  
he  could not have invented that which  
he is4 ,but this would have been an     
8argument too subtle0 for ,socrates1 who
 rejects the theological account  of the
 origin of language 8as an excuse for   
not giving a reason10 which  he compares
 to the introduction of the 8,deus ex   
machina0 by the tragic  poets when they 
have to solve a difficulty2 thus        
anticipating many  modern controversies 
in which the primary agency of the      
divine ,being is  confused with the     
secondary cause2 and ,god is assumed to 
have worked a  miracle in order to fill 
up a lacuna in human knowledge4         
7,compare  ,timaeus47    ,neither is    
,plato wrong in supposing that an       
element of design and art  enters into  
language4 ,the creative power abating is
 supplemented by a  mechanical process4 
8,languages are not made but grow10 but 

they are  made as well as grow2 bursting
 into life like a plant or a flower1    
they  are also capable of being trained 
and improved and engrafted upon one     
another4 ,the change in them is effected
 in earlier ages by musical and         
euphonic improvements1 at a later stage 
by the influence of grammar and  logic1 
and by the poetical and literary use of 
words4 ,they develope  rapidly in       
childhood1 and when they are full grown 
and set they may  still put forth       
intellectual powers1 like the mind in   
the body1 or  rather we may say that the
 nobler use of language only begins when
 the  frame-work is complete4 ,the      
savage or primitive man1 in whom the    
natural instinct is strongest1 is also  
the greatest improver of the  forms of  
language4 ,he is the poet or maker of   
words1 as in civilised  ages the        
dialectician is the definer or          
distinguisher of them4 ,the  latter     
calls the second world of abstract terms
 into existence1 as the  former has     

created the picture sounds which        
represent natural objects  or processes4
 ,poetry and philosophy--these two1 are 
the two great  formative principles of  
language1 when they have passed their   
first  stage1 of which1 as of the first 
invention of the arts in general1 we    
only entertain conjecture4 ,and         
mythology is a link between them1       
connecting the visible and invisible1   
until at length the sensuous  exterior  
falls away1 and the severance of the    
inner and outer world1 of  the idea and 
the object of sense1 becomes complete4  
,at a later period1  logic and grammar1 
sister arts1 preserve and enlarge the   
decaying  instinct of language1 by rule 
and method1 which they gather from      
analysis and observation4    7#b7 ,there
 is no trace in any of ,plato's writings
 that he was acquainted  with any       
language but ,greek4 ,yet he has        
conceived very truly the  relation of   
,greek to foreign languages1 which he is
 led to consider1  because he finds that

 many ,greek words are incapable of     
explanation4  ,allowing a good deal for 
accident1 and also for the fancies of   
the  conditores linguae ,graecae1 there 
is an element of which he is unable  to 
give an account4 ,these unintelligible  
words he supposes to be of  foreign     
origin1 and to have been derived from a 
time when the ,greeks  were either      
barbarians1 or in close relations to the
 barbarians4  ,socrates is aware that   
this principle is liable to great abuse2
 and1  like the 8,deus ex machina10     
explains nothing4 ,hence he excuses     
himself  for the employment of such a   
device1 and remarks that in foreign     
words  there is still a principle of    
correctness1 which applies equally both 
to ,greeks and barbarians4    7#c7 ,but 
the greater number of primary words do  
not admit of derivation  from foreign   
languages2 they must be resolved into   
the letters out of  which they are      
composed1 and therefore the letters must
 have a meaning4  ,the framers of       

language were aware of this2 they       
observed that alpha  was adapted to     
express size2 eta length2 omicron       
roundness2 nu  inwardness2 rho accent   
rush or roar2 lambda liquidity2 gamma   
lambda the  detention of the liquid or  
slippery element2 delta and tau binding2
  phi1 psi1 sigma1 xi1 wind and cold1   
and so on4 ,plato's analysis of the     
letters of the alphabet shows a         
wonderful insight into the nature of    
language4 ,he does not expressively     
distinguish between mere imitation  and 
the symbolical use of sound to express  
thought1 but he recognises  in the      
examples which he gives both modes of   
imitation4 ,gesture is the  mode which a
 deaf and dumb person would take of     
indicating his meaning4  ,and language  
is the gesture of the tongue2 in the use
 of the letter rho  accent1 to express a
 rushing or roaring1 or of omicron to   
express  roundness1 there is a direct   
imitation2 while in the use of the      
letter  alpha to express size1 or of eta

 to express length1 the imitation is    
symbolical4 ,the use of analogous or    
similar sounds1 in order to express     
similar analogous ideas1 seems to have  
escaped him4    ,in passing from the    
gesture of the body to the movement of  
the tongue1  ,plato makes a great step  
in the physiology of language4 ,he was  
probably  the first who said that       
8language is imitative sound10 which is 
the  greatest and deepest truth of      
philology2 although he is not aware of  
the laws of euphony and association by  
which imitation must be  regulated4 ,he 
was probably also the first who made a  
distinction  between simple and compound
 words1 a truth second only in          
importance to  that which has just been 
mentioned4 ,his great insight in one    
direction  curiously contrasts with his 
blindness in another2 for he appears to 
be  wholly unaware 7compare his         
derivation of agathos from agastos and  
thoos7 of the difference between the    
root and termination4 ,but we must      

recollect that he was necessarily more  
ignorant than any schoolboy of  ,greek  
grammar1 and had no table of the        
inflexions of verbs and nouns  before   
his eyes1 which might have suggested to 
him the distinction4    7#d7 ,plato     
distinctly affirms that language is not 
truth1 or  8philosophie une langue bien 
faite40 ,at first1 ,socrates has        
delighted  himself with discovering the 
flux of ,heracleitus in language4 ,but  
he is  covertly satirising the pretence 
of that or any other age to find        
philosophy in words2 and he afterwards  
corrects any erroneous inference  which 
might be gathered from his experiment4  
,for he finds as many1 or  almost as    
many1 words expressive of rest1 as he   
had previously found  expressive of     
motion4 ,and even if this had been      
otherwise1 who would  learn of words    
when he might learn of things8 ,there is
 a great  controversy and high argument 
between ,heracleiteans and ,eleatics1   
but  no man of sense would commit his   

soul in such enquiries to the imposers  
of names444,in this and other passages  
,plato shows that he is as  completely  
emancipated from the influence of       
8,idols of the tribe0 as  ,bacon        
himself4    ,the lesson which may be    
gathered from words is not metaphysical 
or  moral1 but historical4 ,they teach  
us the affinity of races1 they tell  us 
something about the association of      
ideas1 they occasionally preserve  the  
memory of a disused custom2 but we      
cannot safely argue from them  about    
right and wrong1 matter and mind1       
freedom and necessity1 or the  other    
problems of moral and metaphysical      
philosophy4 ,for the use of  words on   
such subjects may often be metaphorical1
 accidental1 derived  from other        
languages1 and may have no relation to  
the contemporary  state of thought and  
feeling4 ,nor in any case is the        
invention of them  the result of        
philosophical reflection2 they have been
 commonly  transferred from matter to   

mind1 and their meaning is the very     
reverse  of their etymology4 ,because   
there is or is not a name for a thing1  
we  cannot argue that the thing has or  
has not an actual existence2 or that    
the antitheses1 parallels1 conjugates1  
correlatives of language have  anything 
corresponding to them in nature4 ,there 
are too many words as  well as too few2 
and they generalize the objects or ideas
 which they  represent4 ,the greatest   
lesson which the philosophical analysis 
of  language teaches us is1 that we     
should be above language1 making words  
our servants1 and not allowing them to  
be our masters4    ,plato does not add  
the further observation1 that the       
etymological  meaning of words is in    
process of being lost4 ,if at first     
framed on a  principle of               
intelligibility1 they would gradually   
cease to be  intelligible1 like those of
 a foreign language1 he is willing to   
admit  that they are subject to many    
changes1 and put on many disguises4 ,he 

acknowledges that the 8poor creature0   
imitation is supplemented by  another   
8poor creature10--convention4 ,but he   
does not see that 8habit  and repute10  
and their relation to other words1 are  
always exercising  an influence over    
them4 ,words appear to be isolated1 but 
they are  really the parts of an        
organism which is always being          
reproduced4 ,they  are refined by       
civilization1 harmonized by poetry1     
emphasized by  literature1 technically  
applied in philosophy and art2 they are 
used as  symbols on the border-ground of
 human knowledge2 they receive a fresh  
impress from individual genius1 and come
 with a new force and  association to   
every lively-minded person4 ,they are   
fixed by the  simultaneous utterance of 
millions1 and yet are always            
imperceptibly  changing2--not the       
inventors of language1 but writing and  
speaking1 and  particularly great       
writers1 or works which pass into the   
hearts of  nations1 ,homer1 ,shakespear1

 ,dante1 the ,german or ,english ,bible1
 ,kant  and ,hegel1 are the makers of   
them in later ages4 ,they carry with    
them  the faded recollection of their   
own past history2 the use of a word in  
a striking and familiar passage gives a 
complexion to its use  everywhere else1 
and the new use of an old and familiar  
phrase has also  a peculiar power over  
us4 ,but these and other subtleties of  
language  escaped the observation of    
,plato4 ,he is not aware that the       
languages of  the world are organic     
structures1 and that every word in them 
is  related to every other2 nor does he 
conceive of language as the joint  work 
of the speaker and the hearer1 requiring
 in man a faculty not only  of          
expressing his thoughts but of          
understanding those of others4    ,on   
the other hand1 he cannot be justly     
charged with a desire to frame  language
 on artificial principles4 ,philosophers
 have sometimes dreamed  of a technical 
or scientific language1 in words which  

should have fixed  meanings1 and stand  
in the same relation to one another as  
the  substances which they denote4 ,but 
there is no more trace of this in       
,plato than there is of a language      
corresponding to the ideas2 nor1        
indeed1 could the want of such a        
language be felt until the sciences     
were far more developed4 ,those who     
would extend the use of technical       
phraseology beyond the limits of science
 or of custom1 seem to forget  that     
freedom and suggestiveness and the play 
of association are  essential           
characteristics of language4 ,the great 
master has shown how  he regarded       
pedantic distinctions of words or       
attempts to confine their  meaning in   
the satire on ,prodicus in the          
,protagoras4    7#e7 ,in addition to    
these anticipations of the general      
principles of  philology1 we may note   
also a few curious observations on words
 and  sounds4 8,the ,eretrians say      
sklerotes for skleroter20 8the          

,thessalians  call ,apollo ,amlos20     
8,the ,phrygians have the words pur1    
udor1 kunes  slightly changed20 8there  
is an old ,homeric word emesato1 meaning
 #8he  contrived'20 8our forefathers1   
and especially the women1 who are most  
conservative of the ancient language1   
loved the letters iota and delta2  but  
now iota is changed into eta and        
epsilon1 and delta into zeta2 this  is  
supposed to increase the grandeur of the
 sound40 ,plato was very  willing to use
 inductive arguments1 so far as they    
were within his  reach2 but he would    
also have assigned a large influence to 
chance4 ,nor  indeed is induction       
applicable to philology in the same     
degree as to  most of the physical      
sciences4 ,for after we have pushed our 
researches  to the furthest point1 in   
language as in all the other creations  
of the  human mind1 there will always   
remain an element of exception or       
accident or free-will1 which cannot be  
eliminated4    ,the question1 8whether  

falsehood is impossible10 which         
,socrates  characteristically sets aside
 as too subtle for an old man 7compare  
,euthyd471 could only have arisen in an 
age of imperfect consciousness1  which  
had not yet learned to distinguish words
 from things4 ,socrates  replies in     
effect that words have an independent   
existence2 thus  anticipating the       
solution of the mediaeval controversy of
 ,nominalism  and ,realism4 ,he is aware
 too that languages exist in various    
degrees of  perfection1 and that the    
analysis of them can only be carried to 
a  certain point4 8,if we could always1 
or almost always1 use likenesses1  which
 are the appropriate expressions1 that  
would be the most perfect  state of     
language40 ,these words suggest a       
question of deeper interest  than the   
origin of language2 viz4 what is the    
ideal of language1 how  far by any      
correction of their usages existing     
languages might become  clearer and more
 expressive than they are1 more         

poetical1 and also more  logical2 or    
whether they are now finally fixed and  
have received their  last impress from  
time and authority4    ,on the whole1   
the ,cratylus seems to contain deeper   
truths about  language than any other   
ancient writing4 ,but feeling the       
uncertain  ground upon which he is      
walking1 and partly in order to preserve
 the  character of ,socrates1 ,plato    
envelopes the whole subject in a robe of
  fancy1 and allows his principles to   
drop out as if by accident4    ,,ii4    
,what is the result of recent           
speculations about the origin and       
nature of language8 ,like other modern  
metaphysical enquiries1 they end  at    
last in a statement of facts4 ,but1 in  
order to state or understand  the facts1
 a metaphysical insight seems to be     
required4 ,there are more  things in    
language than the human mind easily     
conceives4 ,and many  fallacies have to 
be dispelled1 as well as observations   
made4 ,the true  spirit of philosophy or

 metaphysics can alone charm away       
metaphysical  illusions1 which are      
always reappearing1 formerly in the     
fancies of  neoplatonist writers1 now in
 the disguise of experience and common  
sense4 ,an analogy1 a figure of speech1 
an intelligible theory1 a  superficial  
observation of the individual1 have     
often been mistaken for  a true account 
of the origin of language4    ,speaking 
is one of the simplest natural          
operations1 and also the most  complex4 
,nothing would seem to be easier or more
 trivial than a few  words uttered by a 
child in any language4 ,yet into the    
formation of  those words have entered  
causes which the human mind is not      
capable of  calculating4 ,they are a    
drop or two of the great stream or ocean
 of  speech which has been flowing in   
all ages4 ,they have been transmitted   
from one language to another2 like the  
child himself1 they go back to  the     
beginnings of the human race4 ,how they 
originated1 who can tell8  ,nevertheless

 we can imagine a stage of human society
 in which the  circle of men's minds was
 narrower and their sympathies and      
instincts  stronger2 in which their     
organs of speech were more flexible1 and
 the  sense of hearing finer and more   
discerning2 in which they lived more in 
company1 and after the manner of        
children were more given to express     
their feelings2 in which 8they moved all
 together10 like a herd of wild         
animals1 8when they moved at all40      
,among them1 as in every society1 a     
particular person would be more         
sensitive and intelligent than the      
rest4 ,suddenly1 on some occasion of    
interest 7at the approach of a wild     
beast1 shall we say871 he first1 they   
following him1 utter a cry which        
resounds through the forest4 ,the cry is
 almost or quite involuntary1  and may  
be an imitation of the roar of the      
animal4 ,thus far we have not  speech1  
but only the inarticulate expression of 
feeling or emotion in  no respect       

differing from the cries of animals2 for
 they too call to  one another and are  
answered4 ,but now suppose that some one
 at a  distance not only hears the      
sound1 but apprehends the meaning3 or we
  may imagine that the cry is repeated  
to a member of the society who had  been
 absent2 the others act the scene over  
again when he returns home  in the      
evening4 ,and so the cry becomes a word4
 ,the hearer in turn gives  back the    
word to the speaker1 who is now aware   
that he has acquired a  new power4 ,many
 thousand times he exercises this power2
 like a child  learning to talk1 he     
repeats the same cry again1 and again he
 is  answered2 he tries experiments with
 a like result1 and the speaker and  the
 hearer rejoice together in their       
newly-discovered faculty4 ,at first     
there would be few such cries1 and      
little danger of mistaking or  confusing
 them4 ,for the mind of primitive man   
had a narrow range of  perceptions and  
feelings2 his senses were microscopic2  

twenty or thirty  sounds or gestures    
would be enough for him1 nor would he   
have any  difficulty in finding them4   
,naturally he broke out into            
speech--like the  young infant he       
laughed and babbled2 but not until there
 were hearers  as well as speakers did  
language begin4 ,not the interjection or
 the  vocal imitation of the object1 but
 the interjection or the vocal          
imitation of the object understood1 is  
the first rudiment of human  speech4    
,after a while the word gathers         
associations1 and has an independent    
existence4 ,the imitation of the lion's 
roar calls up the fears and  hopes of   
the chase1 which are excited by his     
appearance4 ,in the moment  of hearing  
the sound1 without any appreciable      
interval1 these and other  latent       
experiences wake up in the mind of the  
hearer4 ,not only does he  receive an   
impression1 but he brings previous      
knowledge to bear upon  that impression4
 ,necessarily the pictorial image       

becomes less vivid1  while the          
association of the nature and habits of 
the animal is more  distinctly          
perceived4 ,the picture passes into a   
symbol1 for there would  be too many of 
them and they would crowd the mind2 the 
vocal imitation1  too1 is always in     
process of being lost and being renewed1
 just as the  picture is brought back   
again in the description of the poet4   
,words now  can be used more freely     
because there are more of them4 ,what   
was once  an involuntary expression     
becomes voluntary4 ,not only can men    
utter a  cry or call1 but they can      
communicate and converse2 they can not  
only  use words1 but they can even play 
with them4 ,the word is separated both  
from the object and from the mind2 and  
slowly nations and individuals  attain  
to a fuller consciousness of themselves4
    ,parallel with this mental process  
the articulation of sounds is  gradually
 becoming perfected4 ,the finer sense   
detects the differences  of them1 and   

begins1 first to agglomerate1 then to   
distinguish them4  ,times1 persons1     
places1 relations of all kinds1 are     
expressed by  modifications of them4    
,the earliest parts of speech1 as we may
 call  them by anticipation1 like the   
first utterances of children1 probably  
partook of the nature of interjections  
and nouns2 then came verbs2 at  length  
the whole sentence appeared1 and rhythm 
and metre followed4 ,each  stage in the 
progress of language was accompanied by 
some corresponding  stage in the mind   
and civilisation of man4 ,in time1 when 
the family  became a nation1 the wild   
growth of dialects passed into a        
language4  ,then arose poetry and       
literature4 ,we can hardly realize to   
ourselves  how much with each           
improvement of language the powers of   
the human mind  were enlarged2 how the  
inner world took the place of outer2 how
 the  pictorial or symbolical or        
analogical word was refined into a      
notion2  how language1 fair and large   

and free1 was at last complete4    ,so  
we may imagine the speech of man to have
 begun as with the cries of  animals1 or
 the stammering lips of children1 and to
 have attained by  degrees the          
perfection of ,homer and ,plato4 ,yet we
 are far from saying  that this or any  
other theory of language is proved by   
facts4 ,it is not  difficult to form an 
hypothesis which by a series of         
imaginary  transitions will bridge over 
the chasm which separates man from the  
animals4 ,differences of kind may often 
be thus resolved into  differences of   
degree4 ,but we must not assume that we 
have in this way  discovered the true   
account of them4 ,through what struggles
 the  harmonious use of the organs of   
speech was acquired2 to what extent the 
conditions of human life were different2
 how far the genius of  individuals may 
have contributed to the discovery of    
this as of the  other arts1 we cannot   
say3 ,only we seem to see that language 
is as much  the creation of the ear as  

of the tongue1 and the expression of a  
movement stirring the hearts not of one 
man only but of many1 8as the  trees of 
the wood are stirred by the wind40 ,the 
theory is consistent or  not            
inconsistent with our own mental        
experience1 and throws some degree  of  
light upon a dark corner of the human   
mind4    ,in the later analysis of      
language1 we trace the opposite and     
contrasted  elements of the individual  
and nation1 of the past and present1 of 
the  inward and outward1 of the subject 
and object1 of the notional and         
relational1 of the root or unchanging   
part of the word and of the  changing   
inflexion1 if such a distinction be     
admitted1 of the vowel and  the         
consonant1 of quantity and accent1 of   
speech and writing1 of poetry  and      
prose4 ,we observe also the reciprocal  
influence of sounds and  conceptions on 
each other1 like the connexion of body  
and mind2 and  further remark that      
although the names of objects were      

originally  proper names1 as the        
grammarian or logician might call them1 
yet at a  later stage they become       
universal notions1 which combine into   
particulars and individuals1 and are    
taken out of the first rude             
agglomeration of sounds that they may be
 replaced in a higher and more  logical 
order4 ,we see that in the simplest     
sentences are contained  grammar and    
logic--the parts of speech1 the ,eleatic
 philosophy and the  ,kantian           
categories4 ,so complex is language1 and
 so expressive not only  of the meanest 
wants of man1 but of his highest        
thoughts2 so various  are the aspects in
 which it is regarded by us4 ,then      
again1 when we  follow the history of   
languages1 we observe that they are     
always slowly  moving1 half dead1 half  
alive1 half solid1 half fluid2 the      
breath of a  moment1 yet like the air1  
continuous in all ages and              
countries1--like  the glacier1 too1     
containing within them a trickling      

stream which  deposits debris of the    
rocks over which it passes4 ,there were 
happy  moments1 as we may conjecture1 in
 the lives of nations1 at which they    
came to the birth--as in the golden age 
of literature1 the man and the  time    
seem to conspire2 the eloquence of the  
bard or chief1 as in later  times the   
creations of the great writer who is the
 expression of his  age1 became         
impressed on the minds of their         
countrymen1 perhaps in the  hour of some
 crisis of national development--a      
migration1 a conquest1 or  the like4    
,the picture of the word which was      
beginning to be lost1 is  now revived2  
the sound again echoes to the sense2 men
 find themselves  capable not only of   
expressing more feelings1 and describing
 more  objects1 but of expressing and   
describing them better4 ,the world      
before  the flood1 that is to say1 the  
world of ten1 twenty1 a hundred thousand
  years ago1 has passed away and left no
 sign4 ,but the best conception  that we

 can form of it1 though imperfect and   
uncertain1 is gained from  the analogy  
of causes still in action1 some powerful
 and sudden1 others  working slowly in  
the course of infinite ages4 ,something 
too may be  allowed to 8the persistency 
of the strongest10 to 8the survival of  
the  fittest10 in this as in the other  
realms of nature4    ,these are some of 
the reflections which the modern        
philosophy of  language suggests to us  
about the powers of the human mind and  
the  forces and influences by which the 
efforts of men to utter articulate      
sounds were inspired4 ,yet in making    
these and similar generalizations  we   
may note also dangers to which we are   
exposed4 7#a7 ,there is the  confusion  
of ideas with facts--of mere            
possibilities1 and generalities1  and   
modes of conception with actual and     
definite knowledge4 ,the words          
8evolution10 8birth10 8law10            
development10 8instinct10 8implicit10   
8explicit10 and the like1 have a false  

clearness or comprehensiveness1  which  
adds nothing to our knowledge4 ,the     
metaphor of a flower or a  tree1 or some
 other work of nature or art1 is often  
in like manner only  a pleasing picture4
 7#b7 ,there is the fallacy of resolving
 the languages  which we know into their
 parts1 and then imagining that we can  
discover  the nature of language by     
reconstructing them4 7#c7 ,there is the 
danger  of identifying language1 not    
with thoughts but with ideas4 7#d7      
,there is  the error of supposing that  
the analysis of grammar and logic has   
always existed1 or that their           
distinctions were familiar to ,socrates 
and ,plato4 7#e7 ,there is the fallacy  
of exaggerating1 and also of            
diminishing the interval which separates
 articulate from inarticulate           
language--the cries of animals from the 
speech of man--the instincts of  animals
 from the reason of man4 7#f7 ,there is 
the danger which besets  all enquiries  
into the early history of man--of       

interpreting the past by  the present1  
and of substituting the definite and    
intelligible for the  true but dim      
outline which is the horizon of human   
knowledge4    ,the greatest light is    
thrown upon the nature of language by   
analogy4 ,we  have the analogy of the   
cries of animals1 of the songs of birds 
78man1  like the nightingale1 is a      
singing bird1 but is ever binding up    
thoughts with musical notes071 of music1
 of children learning to speak1  of     
barbarous nations in which the          
linguistic instinct is still  undecayed1
 of ourselves learning to think and     
speak a new language1 of  the deaf and  
dumb who have words without sounds1 of  
the various  disorders of speech2 and we
 have the after-growth of mythology1    
which1  like language1 is an unconscious
 creation of the human mind4 ,we can    
observe the social and collective       
instincts of animals1 and may remark    
how1 when domesticated1 they have the   
power of understanding but not of       

speaking1 while on the other hand1 some 
birds which are comparatively  devoid of
 intelligence1 make a nearer approach to
 articulate speech4 ,we  may note how in
 the animals there is a want of that    
sympathy with one  another which appears
 to be the soul of language4 ,we can    
compare the  use of speech with other   
mental and bodily operations2 for speech
 too  is a kind of gesture1 and in the  
child or savage accompanied with        
gesture4 ,we may observe that the child 
learns to speak1 as he learns to  walk  
or to eat1 by a natural impulse2 yet in 
either case not without a  power of     
imitation which is also natural to      
him--he is taught to read1  but he      
breaks forth spontaneously in speech4   
,we can trace the impulse  to bind      
together the world in ideas beginning in
 the first efforts to  speak and        
culminating in philosophy4 ,but there   
remains an element which  cannot be     
explained1 or even adequately described4
 ,we can understand  how man creates or 

constructs consciously and by design2   
and see1 if we  do not understand1 how  
nature1 by a law1 calls into being an   
organised  structure4 ,but the          
intermediate organism which stands      
between man and  nature1 which is the   
work of mind yet unconscious1 and in    
which mind  and matter seem to meet1 and
 mind unperceived to herself is really  
limited by all other minds1 is neither  
understood nor seen by us1 and  is with 
reluctance admitted to be a fact4       
,language is an aspect of man1 of       
nature1 and of nations1 the             
transfiguration of the world in thought1
 the meeting-point of the  physical and 
mental sciences1 and also the mirror in 
which they are  reflected1 present at   
every moment to the individual1 and yet 
having a  sort of eternal or universal  
nature4 ,when we analyze our own mental 
processes1 we find words everywhere in  
every degree of clearness and           
consistency1 fading away in dreams and  
more like pictures1 rapidly  succeeding 

one another in our waking thoughts1     
attaining a greater  distinctness and   
consecutiveness in speech1 and a greater
 still in  writing1 taking the place of 
one another when we try to become       
emancipated from their influence4 ,for  
in all processes of the mind  which are 
conscious we are talking to ourselves2  
the attempt to think  without words is a
 mere illusion1--they are always        
reappearing when we  fix our thoughts4  
,and speech is not a separate faculty1  
but the  expression of all our          
faculties1 to which all our other powers
 of  expression1 signs1 looks1 gestures1
 lend their aid1 of which the           
instrument is not the tongue only1 but  
more than half the human frame4    ,the 
minds of men are sometimes carried on to
 think of their lives and  of their     
actions as links in a chain of causes   
and effects going back  to the beginning
 of time4 ,a few have seemed to lose the
 sense of their  own individuality in   
the universal cause or nature4 ,in like 

manner we  might think of the words     
which we daily use1 as derived from the 
first  speech of man1 and of all the    
languages in the world1 as the          
expressions or varieties of a single    
force or life of language of which  the 
thoughts of men are the accident4 ,such 
a conception enables us to  grasp the   
power and wonder of languages1 and is   
very natural to the  scientific         
philologist4 ,for he1 like the          
metaphysician1 believes in the  reality 
of that which absorbs his own mind4 ,nor
 do we deny the enormous  influence     
which language has exercised over       
thought4 ,fixed words1 like  fixed      
ideas1 have often governed the world4   
,but in such representations  we        
attribute to language too much the      
nature of a cause1 and too little  of an
 effect1--too much of an absolute1 too  
little of a relative  character1--too   
much of an ideal1 too little of a       
matter-of-fact  existence4    ,or again1
 we may frame a single abstract notion  

of language of which  all existent      
languages may be supposed to be the     
perversion4 ,but we  must not conceive  
that this logical figment had ever a    
real existence1  or is anything more    
than an effort of the mind to give unity
 to  infinitely various phenomena4      
,there is no abstract language 8in rerum
  natura10 any more than there is an    
abstract tree1 but only languages in    
various stages of growth1 maturity1 and 
decay4 ,nor do other logical            
distinctions or even grammatical exactly
 correspond to the facts of  language2  
for they too are attempts to give unity 
and regularity to a  subject which is   
partly irregular4    ,we find1 however1 
that there are distinctions of another  
kind by which  this vast field of       
language admits of being mapped out4    
,there is the  distinction between      
biliteral and triliteral roots1 and the 
various  inflexions which accompany     
them2 between the mere mechanical       
cohesion  of sounds or words1 and the   

8chemical0 combination of them into a   
new  word2 there is the distinction     
between languages which have had a free 
and full development of their organisms1
 and languages which have been  stunted 
in their growth1--lamed in their hands  
or feet1 and never able  to acquire     
afterwards the powers in which they are 
deficient2 there is  the distinction    
between synthetical languages like      
,greek and ,latin1  which have retained 
their inflexions1 and analytical        
languages like  ,english or ,french1    
which have lost them4 ,innumerable as   
are the  languages and dialects of      
mankind1 there are comparatively few    
classes  to which they can be referred4 
,another road through this chaos is     
provided by the physiology of  speech4  
,the organs of language are the same in 
all mankind1 and are  only capable of   
uttering a certain number of sounds4    
,every man has  tongue1 teeth1 lips1    
palate1 throat1 mouth1 which he may     
close or open1  and adapt in various    

ways2 making1 first1 vowels and         
consonants2 and  secondly1 other classes
 of letters4 ,the elements of all       
speech1 like  the elements of the       
musical scale1 are few and simple1      
though admitting  of infinite gradations
 and combinations4 ,whatever slight     
differences  exist in the use or        
formation of these organs1 owing to     
climate or the  sense of euphony or     
other causes1 they are as nothing       
compared with  their agreement4 ,here   
then is a real basis of unity in the    
study of  philology1 unlike that        
imaginary abstract unity of which we    
were just  now speaking4    ,whether we 
regard language from the psychological1 
or historical1 or  physiological point  
of view1 the materials of our knowledge 
are  inexhaustible4 ,the comparisons of 
children learning to speak1 of          
barbarous nations1 of musical notes1 of 
the cries of animals1 of the  song of   
birds1 increase our insight into the    
nature of human speech4  ,many          

observations which would otherwise have 
escaped us are suggested  by them4 ,but 
they do not explain why1 in man and in  
man only1 the  speaker met with a       
response from the hearer1 and the half  
articulate  sound gradually developed   
into ,sanscrit and ,greek4 ,they hardly 
enable  us to approach any nearer the   
secret of the origin of language1 which1
  like some of the other great secrets  
of nature1--the origin of birth and     
death1 or of animal life1--remains      
inviolable4 ,that problem is            
indissolubly bound up with the origin of
 man2 and if we ever know more  of the  
one1 we may expect to know more of the  
other4#a     #a ,compare ,w4 ,humboldt1 
,ueber die ,verschiedenheit des         
menschlichen   ,sprachbaues1 and ,m4    
,mller1 ,lectures on the ,science of    
,language4        ,it is more than      
sixteen years since the preceding       
remarks were written1  which with a few 
alterations have now been reprinted4    
,during the  interval the progress of   

philology has been very great4 ,more    
languages  have been compared2 the inner
 structure of language has been laid    
bare2  the relations of sounds have been
 more accurately discriminated2 the     
manner in which dialects affect or are  
affected by the literary or  principal  
form of a language is better understood4
 ,many merely verbal  questions have    
been eliminated2 the remains of the old 
traditional  methods have died away4    
,the study has passed from the          
metaphysical into  an historical stage4 
,grammar is no longer confused with     
language1 nor  the anatomy of words and 
sentences with their life and use4      
,figures of  speech1 by which the       
vagueness of theories is often          
concealed1 have  been stripped off2 and 
we see language more as it truly was4   
,the  immensity of the subject is       
gradually revealed to us1 and the reign 
of  law becomes apparent4 ,yet the law  
is but partially seen2 the traces of  it
 are often lost in the distance4 ,for   

languages have a natural but not  a     
perfect growth2 like other creations of 
nature into which the will of  man      
enters1 they are full of what we term   
accident and irregularity4  ,and the    
difficulties of the subject become not  
less1 but greater1 as we  proceed--it is
 one of those studies in which we seem  
to know less as we  know more2 partly   
because we are no longer satisfied with 
the vague and  superficial ideas of it  
which prevailed fifty years ago2 partly 
also  because the remains of the        
languages with which we are acquainted  
always were1 and if they are still      
living1 are1 in a state of  transition2 
and thirdly1 because there are lacunae  
in our knowledge of  them which can     
never be filled up4 ,not a tenth1 not a 
hundredth part of  them has been        
preserved4 ,yet the materials at our    
disposal are far  greater than any      
individual can use4 ,such are a few of  
the general  reflections which the      
present state of philology calls up4    

7#a7 ,language seems to be composite1   
but into its first elements the         
philologer has never been able to       
penetrate4 ,however far he goes back1   
he never arrives at the beginning2 or   
rather1 as in ,geology or in            
,astronomy1 there is no beginning4 ,he  
is too apt to suppose that by  breaking 
up the existing forms of language into  
their parts he will  arrive at a        
previous stage of it1 but he is merely  
analyzing what never  existed1 or is    
never known to have existed1 except in a
 composite form4  ,he may divide nouns  
and verbs into roots and inflexions1 but
 he has no  evidence which will show    
that the omega of tupto or the mu of    
tithemi1  though analogous to ego1 me1  
either became pronouns or were generated
  out of pronouns4 ,to say that         
8pronouns1 like ripe fruit1 dropped out 
of  verbs10 is a misleading figure of   
speech4 ,although all languages have    
some common principles1 there is no     
primitive form or forms of language     

known to us1 or to be reasonably        
imagined1 from which they are all       
descended4 ,no inference can be drawn   
from language1 either for or  against   
the unity of the human race4 ,nor is    
there any proof that words  were ever   
used without any relation to each other4
 ,whatever may be the  meaning of a     
sentence or a word when applied to      
primitive language1 it  is probable that
 the sentence is more akin to the       
original form than  the word1 and that  
the later stage of language is the      
result rather of  analysis than of      
synthesis1 or possibly is a combination 
of the two4  ,nor1 again1 are we sure   
that the original process of learning to
 speak  was the same in different places
 or among different races of men4 ,it   
may have been slower with some1 quicker 
with others4 ,some tribes may  have used
 shorter1 others longer words or cries3 
they may have been  more or less        
inclined to agglutinate or to decompose 
them3 they may  have modified them by   

the use of prefixes1 suffixes1 infixes2 
by the  lengthening and strengthening of
 vowels or by the shortening and        
weakening of them1 by the condensation  
or rarefaction of consonants4  ,but who 
gave to language these primeval laws2 or
 why one race has  triliteral1 another  
biliteral roots2 or why in some members 
of a group  of languages b becomes p1 or
 d1 t1 or ch1 k2 or why two languages   
resemble one another in certain parts of
 their structure and differ in  others2 
or why in one language there is a       
greater development of  vowels1 in      
another of consonants1 and the like--are
 questions of which  we only 8entertain 
conjecture40 ,we must remember the      
length of time  that has elapsed since  
man first walked upon the earth1 and    
that in  this vast but unknown period   
every variety of language may have been 
in  process of formation and decay1 many
 times over4    7,compare ,plato1       
,laws73--    8,,athenian ,,stranger3    
,and what then is to be regarded as the 

origin of  government8 ,will not a man  
be able to judge best from a point of   
view  in which he may behold the        
progress of states and their transitions
 to  good and evil8    ,,cleinias3 ,what
 do you mean8    ,,athenian ,,stranger3 
,i mean that he might watch them from   
the point of  view of time1 and observe 
the changes which take place in them    
during  infinite ages4    ,,cleinias3   
,how so8    ,,athenian ,,stranger3 ,why1
 do you think that you can reckon the   
time which  has elapsed since cities    
first existed and men were citizens of  
them8    ,,cleinias3 ,hardly4           
,,athenian ,,stranger3 ,but you are     
quite sure that it must be vast and     
incalculable8    ,,cleinias3 ,no doubt4 
,,athenian ,,stranger3 ,and have there  
not been thousands and thousands of     
cities which have come into being and   
perished during this period8 ,and  has  
not every place had endless forms of    
government1 and been sometimes  rising1 
and at other times falling1 and again   

improving or waning80    ,aristot4      
,metaph43--    8,and if a person should 
conceive the tales of mythology to mean 
only  that men thought the gods to be   
the first essences of things1 he would  
deem the reflection to have been        
inspired and would consider that1       
whereas probably every art and part of  
wisdom had been ,,discovered ,,and      
,,lost ,,many ,,times ,,over1 such      
notions were but a remnant of the past  
which  has survived to our day407    ,it
 can hardly be supposed that any traces 
of an original language still  survive1 
any more than of the first huts or      
buildings which were  constructed by    
man4 ,nor are we at all certain of the  
relation1 if any1  in which the greater 
families of languages stand to each     
other4 ,the  influence of individuals   
must always have been a disturbing      
element4  ,like great writers in later  
times1 there may have been many a       
barbaric  genius who taught the men of  
his tribe to sing or speak1 showing them

  by example how to continue or divide  
their words1 charming their souls  with 
rhythm and accent and intonation1       
finding in familiar objects the         
expression of their confused fancies--to
 whom the whole of language  might in   
truth be said to be a figure of speech4 
,one person may have  introduced a new  
custom into the formation or            
pronunciation of a word2  he may have   
been imitated by others1 and the custom1
 or form1 or  accent1 or quantity1 or   
rhyme which he introduced in a single   
word may  have become the type on which 
many other words or inflexions of words 
were framed1 and may have quickly ran   
through a whole language4 ,for  like the
 other gifts which nature has bestowed  
upon man1 that of speech  has been      
conveyed to him through the medium1 not 
of the many1 but of  the few1 who were  
his 8law-givers0--8the legislator with  
the  dialectician standing on his right 
hand10 in ,plato's striking image1  who 
formed the manners of men and gave them 

customs1 whose voice and  look and      
behaviour1 whose gesticulations and     
other peculiarities were  instinctively 
imitated by them1--the 8king of men0 who
 was their priest1  almost their        
,god444,but these are conjectures only3 
so little do we know  of the origin of  
language that the real scholar is       
indisposed to touch  the subject at all4
    7#b7 ,there are other errors besides
 the figment of a primitive or  original
 language which it is time to leave     
behind us4 ,we no longer  divide        
languages into synthetical and          
analytical1 or suppose similarity  of   
structure to be the safe or only guide  
to the affinities of them4 ,we  do not  
confuse the parts of speech with the    
categories of ,logic4 ,nor do  we       
conceive languages any more than        
civilisations to be in a state of       
dissolution2 they do not easily pass    
away1 but are far more tenacious  of    
life than the tribes by whom they are   
spoken4 8,where two or three  are       

gathered together10 they survive4 ,as in
 the human frame1 as in the  state1     
there is a principle of renovation as   
well as of decay which is  at work in   
all of them4 ,neither do we suppose them
 to be invented by  the wit of man4     
,with few exceptions1 e4g4 technical    
words or words  newly imported from a   
foreign language1 and the like1 in which
 art has  imitated nature1 8words are   
not made but grow40 ,nor do we attribute
 to  them a supernatural origin4 ,the   
law which regulates them is like the    
law which governs the circulation of the
 blood1 or the rising of the  sap in    
trees2 the action of it is uniform1 but 
the result1 which  appears in the       
superficial forms of men and animals or 
in the leaves of  trees1 is an endless  
profusion and variety4 ,the laws of     
vegetation are  invariable1 but no two  
plants1 no two leaves of the forest are 
precisely the same4 ,the laws of        
language are invariable1 but no two     
languages are alike1 no two words have  

exactly the same meaning4 ,no two       
sounds are exactly of the same quality1 
or give precisely the same  impression4 
,it would be well if there were a       
similar consensus about some other      
points which appear to be still in      
dispute4 ,is language conscious or      
unconscious8 ,in speaking or writing    
have we present to our minds the        
meaning or the sound or the construction
 of the words which we are  using8--,no 
more than the separate drops of water   
with which we quench  our thirst are    
present3 the whole draught may be       
conscious1 but not the  minute particles
 of which it is made up3 ,so the whole  
sentence may be  conscious1 but the     
several words1 syllables1 letters are   
not thought of  separately when we are  
uttering them4 ,like other natural      
operations1  the process of speech1 when
 most perfect1 is least observed by us4 
,we  do not pause at each mouthful to   
dwell upon the taste of it3 nor has  the
 speaker time to ask himself the        

comparative merits of different  modes  
of expression while he is uttering them4
 ,there are many things in  the use of  
language which may be observed from     
without1 but which  cannot be explained 
from within4 ,consciousness carries us  
but a little  way in the investigation  
of the mind2 it is not the faculty of   
internal  observation1 but only the dim 
light which makes such observation      
possible4 ,what is supposed to be our   
consciousness of language is  really    
only the analysis of it1 and this       
analysis admits of innumerable  degrees4
 ,but would it not be better if this    
term1 which is so  misleading1 and yet  
has played so great a part in mental    
science1 were  either banished or used  
only with the distinct meaning of       
8attention to  our own minds10 such as  
is called forth1 not by familiar mental 
processes1 but by the interruption of   
them8 ,now in this sense we may  truly  
say that we are not conscious of        
ordinary speech1 though we are  commonly

 roused to attention by the misuse or   
mispronunciation of a  word4 ,still     
less1 even in schools and academies1 do 
we ever attempt to  invent new words or 
to alter the meaning of old ones1 except
 in the  case1 mentioned above1 of      
technical or borrowed words which are   
artificially made or imported because a 
need of them is felt4 ,neither  in our  
own nor in any other age has the        
conscious effort of reflection  in man  
contributed in an appreciable degree to 
the formation of  language4 8,which of  
us by taking thought0 can make new words
 or  constructions8 ,reflection is the  
least of the causes by which language   
is affected1 and is likely to have the  
least power1 when the linguistic        
instinct is greatest1 as in young       
children and in the infancy of  nations4
    ,a kindred error is the separation  
of the phonetic from the mental  element
 of language2 they are really           
inseparable--no definite line can  be   
drawn between them1 any more than in any

 other common act of mind  and body4 ,it
 is true that within certain limits we  
possess the power of  varying sounds by 
opening and closing the mouth1 by       
touching the palate  or the teeth with  
the tongue1 by lengthening or shortening
 the vocal  instrument1 by greater or   
less stress1 by a higher or lower pitch 
of  the voice1 and we can substitute one
 note or accent for another4 ,but       
behind the organs of speech and their   
action there remains the  informing     
mind1 which sets them in motion and     
works together with them4  ,and behind  
the great structure of human speech and 
the lesser varieties  of language which 
arise out of the many degrees and kinds 
of human  intercourse1 there is also the
 unknown or over-ruling law of ,god or  
nature which gives order to it in its   
infinite greatness1 and variety  in its 
infinitesimal minuteness--both equally  
inscrutable to us4 ,we need  no longer  
discuss whether philology is to be      
classed with the ,natural  or the       

,mental sciences1 if we frankly         
recognize that1 like all the  sciences  
which are concerned with man1 it has a  
double aspect1--inward  and outward2 and
 that the inward can only be known      
through the outward4  ,neither need we  
raise the question whether the laws of  
language1 like  the other laws of human 
action1 admit of exceptions4 ,the answer
 in all  cases is the same--that the    
laws of nature are uniform1 though the  
consistency or continuity of them is not
 always perceptible to us4 ,the         
superficial appearances of language1 as 
of nature1 are irregular1 but  we do not
 therefore deny their deeper uniformity4
 ,the comparison of the  growth of      
language in the individual and in the   
nation cannot be wholly  discarded1 for 
nations are made up of individuals4 ,but
 in this1 as in  the other political    
sciences1 we must distinguish between   
collective  and individual actions or   
processes1 and not attribute to the one 
what  belongs to the other4 ,again1 when

 we speak of the hereditary or          
paternity of a language1 we must        
remember that the parents are alive as  
well as the children1 and that all the  
preceding generations survive  7after a 
manner7 in the latest form of it4 ,and  
when1 for the purposes  of comparison1  
we form into groups the roots or        
terminations of words1  we should not   
forget how casual is the manner in which
 their  resemblances have arisen--they  
were not first written down by a        
grammarian in the paradigms of a grammar
 and learned out of a book1 but  were   
due to many chance attractions of sound 
or of meaning1 or of both  combined4 ,so
 many cautions have to be borne in mind1
 and so many first  thoughts to be      
dismissed1 before we can proceed safely 
in the path of  philological enquiry4   
,it might be well sometimes to lay aside
 figures  of speech1 such as the 8root0 
and the 8branches10 the 8stem10 the     
8strata0 of ,geology1 the 8compounds0 of
 ,chemistry1 8the ripe fruit of         

pronouns dropping from verbs0 7see      
above71 and the like1 which are  always 
interesting1 but are apt to be delusive4
 ,yet such figures of  speech are far   
nearer the truth than the theories which
 attribute the  invention and           
improvement of language to the conscious
 action of the  human mind444,lastly1 it
 is doubted by recent philologians      
whether  climate can be supposed to have
 exercised any influence worth speaking 
of on a language3 such a view is said to
 be unproven3 it had better  therefore  
not be silently assumed4    8,natural   
selection0 and the 8survival of the     
fittest0 have been applied  in the field
 of philology1 as well as in the other  
sciences which are  concerned with      
animal and vegetable life4 ,and a       
,darwinian school of  philologists has  
sprung up1 who are sometimes accused of 
putting words  in the place of things4  
,it seems to be true1 that whether      
applied to  language or to other        
branches of knowledge1 the ,darwinian   

theory1  unless very precisely defined1 
hardly escapes from being a truism4 ,if 
by 8the natural selection0 of words or  
meanings of words or by the             
8persistence and survival of the        
fittest0 the maintainer of the theory   
intends to affirm nothing more than     
this--that the word 8fittest to         
survive0 survives1 he adds not much to  
the knowledge of language4 ,but  if he  
means that the word or the meaning of   
the word or some portion of  the word   
which comes into use or drops out of use
 is selected or  rejected on the ground 
of economy or parsimony or ease to the  
speaker  or clearness or euphony or     
expressiveness1 or greater or less      
demand  for it1 or anything of this     
sort1 he is affirming a proposition     
which  has several senses1 and in none  
of these senses can be assisted to be   
uniformly true4 ,for the laws of        
language are precarious1 and can only   
act uniformly when there is such        
frequency of intercourse among          

neighbours as is sufficient to enforce  
them4 ,and there are many reasons  why a
 man should prefer his own way of       
speaking to that of others1  unless by  
so doing he becomes unintelligible4 ,the
 struggle for  existence among words is 
not of that fierce and irresistible kind
 in  which birds1 beasts and fishes     
devour one another1 but of a milder     
sort1 allowing one usage to be          
substituted for another1 not by force1  
but by the persuasion1 or rather by the 
prevailing habit1 of a  majority4 ,the  
favourite figure1 in this1 as in some   
other uses of it1  has tended rather to 
obscure than explain the subject to     
which it has  been applied4 ,nor in any 
case can the struggle for existence be  
deemed  to be the sole or principal     
cause of changes in language1 but only  
one  among many1 and one of which we    
cannot easily measure the importance4   
,there is a further objection which may 
be urged equally against all            
applications of the ,darwinian theory4  

,as in animal life and likewise in      
vegetable1 so in languages1 the process 
of change is said to be  insensible3    
sounds1 like animals1 are supposed to   
pass into one another  by imperceptible 
gradation4 ,but in both cases the       
newly-created forms  soon become fixed2 
there are few if any vestiges of the    
intermediate  links1 and so the better  
half of the evidence of the change is   
wanting4    7#c7 ,among the incumbrances
 or illusions of language may be        
reckoned  many of the rules and         
traditions of grammar1 whether ancient  
grammar or  the corrections of it which 
modern philology has introduced4        
,grammar1  like law1 delights in        
definition3 human speech1 like human    
action1  though very far from being a   
mere chaos1 is indefinite1 admits of    
degrees1 and is always in a state of    
change or transition4 ,grammar  gives an
 erroneous conception of language3 for  
it reduces to a system  that which is   
not a system4 ,its figures of speech1   

pleonasms1 ellipses1  anacolutha1 pros  
to semainomenon1 and the like have no   
reality2 they do  not either make       
conscious expressions more intelligible 
or show the way  in which they have     
arisen2 they are chiefly designed to    
bring an  earlier use of language into  
conformity with the later4 ,often they  
seem  intended only to remind us that   
great poets like ,aeschylus or          
,sophocles  or ,pindar or a great prose 
writer like ,thucydides are guilty of   
taking  unwarrantable liberties with    
grammatical rules2 it appears never to  
have occurred to the inventors of them  
that these real 8conditores  linguae    
,graecae0 lived in an age before        
grammar1 when 8,greece also was  living 
,greece40 ,it is the anatomy1 not the   
physiology of language1  which grammar  
seeks to describe3 into the idiom and   
higher life of  words it does not enter4
 ,the ordinary ,greek grammar gives a   
complete  paradigm of the verb1 without 
suggesting that the double or treble    

forms of ,perfects1 ,aorists1 etc4 are  
hardly ever contemporaneous4 ,it        
distinguishes ,moods and ,tenses1       
without observing how much of the       
nature of one passes into the other4 ,it
 makes three ,voices1 ,active1          
,passive1 and ,middle1 but takes no     
notice of the precarious existence  and 
uncertain character of the last of the  
three4 ,language is a thing  of degrees 
and relations and associations and      
exceptions3 grammar ties  it up in fixed
 rules4 ,language has many varieties of 
usage3 grammar  tries to reduce them to 
a single one4 ,grammar divides verbs    
into  regular and irregular3 it does not
 recognize that the irregular1  equally 
with the regular1 are subject to law1   
and that a language which  had no       
exceptions would not be a natural       
growth3 for it could not have  been     
subjected to the influences by which    
language is ordinarily  affected4 ,it is
 always wanting to describe ancient     
languages in the  terms of a modern one4

 ,it has a favourite fiction that one   
word is put  in the place of another2   
the truth is that no word is ever put   
for  another4 ,it has another fiction1  
that a word has been omitted3 words  are
 omitted because they are no longer     
needed2 and the omission has  ceased to 
be observed4 ,the common explanation of 
kata or some other  preposition 8being  
understood0 in a ,greek sentence is     
another fiction  of the same kind1 which
 tends to disguise the fact that under  
cases  were comprehended originally many
 more relations1 and that prepositions  
are used only to define the meaning of  
them with greater precision4  ,these    
instances are sufficient to show the    
sort of errors which grammar  introduces
 into language4 ,we are not considering 
the question of its  utility to the     
beginner in the study4 ,even to him the 
best grammar is  the shortest and that  
in which he will have least to unlearn4 
,it may be  said that the explanations  
here referred to are already out of     

date1  and that the study of ,greek     
grammar has received a new character    
from  comparative philology4 ,this is   
true2 but it is also true that the      
traditional grammar has still a great   
hold on the mind of the student4        
,metaphysics are even more troublesome  
than the figments of grammar1  because  
they wear the appearance of philosophy  
and there is no test to  which they can 
be subjected4 ,they are useful in so far
 as they give us  an insight into the   
history of the human mind and the modes 
of thought  which have existed in former
 ages2 or in so far as they furnish     
wider  conceptions of the different     
branches of knowledge and of their      
relation to one another4 ,but they are  
worse than useless when they  outrun    
experience and abstract the mind from   
the observation of facts1  only to      
envelope it in a mist of words4 ,some   
philologers1 like  ,schleicher1 have    
been greatly influenced by the          
philosophy of ,hegel2  nearly all of    

them to a certain extent have fallen    
under the dominion  of physical science4
 ,even ,kant himself thought that the   
first  principles of philosophy could be
 elicited from the analysis of the      
proposition1 in this respect falling    
short of ,plato4 ,westphal holds  that  
there are three stages of language3 7#a7
 in which things were  characterized    
independently1 7#b7 in which they were  
regarded in  relation to human thought1 
and 7#c7 in relation to one another4    
,but are  not such distinctions an      
anachronism8 for they imply a growth of 
abstract ideas which never existed in   
early times4 ,language cannot be        
explained by ,metaphysics2 for it is    
prior to them and much more nearly      
allied to sense4 ,it is not likely that 
the meaning of the cases is  ultimately 
resolvable into relations of space and  
time4 ,nor can we  suppose the          
conception of cause and effect or of the
 finite and  infinite or of the same and
 other to be latent in language at a    

time  when in their abstract form they  
had never entered into the mind of      
man444,if the science of ,comparative   
,philology had possessed 8enough of     
,metaphysics to get rid of              
,metaphysics10 it would have made far   
greater  progress4    7#d7 ,our         
knowledge of language is almost confined
 to languages which are  fully          
developed4 ,they are of several         
patterns2 and these become altered  by  
admixture in various degrees1--they may 
only borrow a few words from  one       
another and retain their life           
comparatively unaltered1 or they may    
meet in a struggle for existence until  
one of the two is overpowered  and      
retires from the field4 ,they attain the
 full rights and dignity of  language   
when they acquire the use of writing and
 have a literature of  their own2 they  
pass into dialects and grow out of them1
 in proportion  as men are isolated or  
united by locality or occupation4 ,the  
common  language sometimes reacts upon  

the dialects and imparts to them also a 
literary character4 ,the laws of        
language can be best discerned in the   
great crises of language1 especially in 
the transitions from ancient to  modern 
forms of them1 whether in ,europe or    
,asia4 ,such changes are the  silent    
notes of the world's history2 they mark 
periods of unknown  length in which war 
and conquest were running riot over     
whole  continents1 times of suffering   
too great to be endured by the human    
race1 in which the masters became       
subjects and the subject races  masters1
 in which driven by necessity or        
impelled by some instinct1  tribes or   
nations left their original homes and   
but slowly found a  resting-place4      
,language would be the greatest of all  
historical  monuments1 if it could only 
tell us the history of itself4    7#e7  
,there are many ways in which we may    
approach this study4 ,the  simplest of  
all is to observe our own use of        
language in conversation  or in writing1

 how we put words together1 how we      
construct and connect  sentences1 what  
are the rules of accent and rhythm in   
verse or prose1  the formation and      
composition of words1 the laws of       
euphony and sound1  the affinities of   
letters1 the mistakes to which we are   
ourselves most  liable of spelling or   
pronunciation4 ,we may compare with our 
own  language some other1 even when we  
have only a slight knowledge of it1     
such as ,french or ,german4 ,even a     
little ,latin will enable us to         
appreciate the grand difference between 
ancient and modern ,european  languages4
 ,in the child learning to speak we may 
note the inherent  strength of language1
 which like 8a mountain river0 is always
 forcing  its way out4 ,we may witness  
the delight in imitation and repetition1
  and some of the laws by which sounds  
pass into one another4 ,we may  learn   
something also from the falterings of   
old age1 the searching for  words1 and  
the confusion of them with one another1 

the forgetfulness of  proper names 7more
 commonly than of other words because   
they are more  isolated71 aphasia1 and  
the like4 ,there are philological       
lessons also  to be gathered from       
nicknames1 from provincialisms1 from the
 slang of  great cities1 from the argot 
of ,paris 7that language of suffering   
and  crime1 so pathetically described by
 ,victor ,hugo71 from the imperfect     
articulation of the deaf and dumb1 from 
the jabbering of animals1 from  the     
analysis of sounds in relation to the   
organs of speech4 ,the  phonograph      
affords a visible evidence of the nature
 and divisions of  sound2 we may be     
truly said to know what we can          
manufacture4 ,artificial  languages1    
such as that of ,bishop ,wilkins1 are   
chiefly useful in  showing what language
 is not4 ,the study of any foreign      
language may be  made also a study of   
,comparative ,philology4 ,there are     
several points1  such as the nature of  
irregular verbs1 of indeclinable parts  

of speech1  the influence of euphony1   
the decay or loss of inflections1 the   
elements of syntax1 which may be        
examined as well in the history of our  
own language as of any other4 ,a few    
well-selected questions may lead  the   
student at once into the heart of the   
mystery3 such as1 ,why are the  pronouns
 and the verb of existence generally    
more irregular than any  other parts of 
speech8 ,why is the number of words so  
small in which the  sound is an echo of 
the sense8 ,why does the meaning of     
words depart so  widely from their      
etymology8 ,why do substantives often   
differ in  meaning from the verbs to    
which they are related1 adverbs from    
adjectives8 ,why do words differing in  
origin coalesce in the same sound       
though retaining their differences of   
meaning8 ,why are some verbs            
impersonal8 ,why are there only so many 
parts of speech1 and on what  principle 
are they divided8 ,these are a few      
crucial questions which  give us an     

insight from different points of view   
into the true nature  of language4      
7#f7 ,thus far we have been endeavouring
 to strip off from language the  false  
appearances in which grammar and        
philology1 or the love of system        
generally1 have clothed it4 ,we have    
also sought to indicate the sources  of 
our knowledge of it and the spirit in   
which we should approach it1  we may now
 proceed to consider some of the        
principles or natural laws  which have  
created or modified it4    i4 ,the first
 and simplest of all the principles of  
language1 common  also to the animals1  
is imitation4 ,the lion roars1 the wolf 
howls in  the solitude of the forest3   
they are answered by similar cries heard
  from a distance4 ,the bird1 too1      
mimics the voice of man and makes       
answer to him4 ,man tells to man the    
secret place in which he is hiding      
himself2 he remembers and repeats the   
sound which he has heard4 ,the  love of 
imitation becomes a passion and an      

instinct to him4 ,primitive  men learnt 
to speak from one another1 like a child 
from its mother or  nurse4 ,they learnt 
of course a rudimentary1 half-articulate
 language1  the cry or song or speech   
which was the expression of what we now 
call  human thoughts and feelings4 ,we  
may still remark how much greater and   
more natural the exercise of the power  
is in the use of language than  in any  
other process or action of the human    
mind4    ii4 ,imitation provided the    
first material of language3 but it was  
8without form and void40 ,during how    
many years or hundreds or thousands  of 
years the imitative or half-articulate  
stage continued there is no  possibility
 of determining4 ,but we may reasonably 
conjecture that there  was a time when  
the vocal utterance of man was          
intermediate between  what we now call  
language and the cry of a bird or       
animal4 ,speech  before language was a  
rudis indigestaque materies1 not yet    
distributed  into words and sentences1  

in which the cry of fear or joy mingled 
with  more definite sounds recognized by
 custom as the expressions of things  or
 events4 ,it was the principle of       
analogy which introduced into this      
8indigesta moles0 order and measure4 ,it
 was ,anaxagoras' omou panta  chremata1 
eita nous elthon diekosmese3 the light  
of reason lighted up  all things and at 
once began to arrange them4 ,in every   
sentence1 in  every word and every      
termination of a word1 this power of    
forming  relations to one another was   
contained4 ,there was a proportion of   
sound  to sound1 of meaning to meaning1 
of meaning to sound4 ,the cases and     
numbers of nouns1 the persons1 tenses1  
numbers of verbs1 were generally  on the
 same or nearly the same pattern and had
 the same meaning4 ,the  sounds by which
 they were expressed were rough-hewn at 
first2 after a  while they grew more    
refined--the natural laws of euphony    
began to  affect them4 ,the rules of    
syntax are likewise based upon analogy4 

,time  has an analogy with space1       
arithmetic with geometry4 ,not only in  
musical notes1 but in the quantity1     
quality1 accent1 rhythm of human        
speech1 trivial or serious1 there is a  
law of proportion4 ,as in things  of    
beauty1 as in all nature1 in the        
composition as well as in the  motion of
 all things1 there is a similarity of   
relations by which they  are held       
together4    ,it would be a mistake to  
suppose that the analogies of language  
are  always uniform3 there may be often 
a choice between several1 and  sometimes
 one and sometimes another will prevail4
 ,in ,greek there are  three declensions
 of nouns2 the forms of cases in one of 
them may  intrude upon another4         
,similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota 
interchange forms of tenses1 and the    
completed paradigm of the verb is  often
 made up of both4 ,the same nouns may be
 partly declinable and  partly          
indeclinable1 and in some of their cases
 may have fallen out of  use4 ,here are 

rules with exceptions2 they are not     
however really  exceptions1 but contain 
in themselves indications of other      
rules4 ,many  of these interruptions or 
variations of analogy occur in pronouns 
or in  the verb of existence of which   
the forms were too common and therefore 
too deeply imbedded in language entirely
 to drop out4 ,the same verbs in  the   
same meaning may sometimes take one     
case1 sometimes another4 ,the           
participle may also have the character  
of an adjective1 the adverb  either of  
an adjective or of a preposition4 ,these
 exceptions are as  regular as the      
rules1 but the causes of them are seldom
 known to us4    ,language1 like the    
animal and vegetable worlds1 is         
everywhere  intersected by the lines of 
analogy4 ,like number from which it     
seems to  be derived1 the principle of  
analogy opens the eyes of men to discern
  the similarities and differences of   
things1 and their relations to one      
another4 ,at first these are such as lie

 on the surface only2 after a  time they
 are seen by men to reach farther down  
into the nature of  things4 ,gradually  
in language they arrange themselves into
 a sort of  imperfect system2 groups of 
personal and case endings are placed    
side  by side4 ,the fertility of        
language produces many more than are    
wanted2  and the superfluous ones are   
utilized by the assignment to them of   
new  meanings4 ,the vacuity and the     
superfluity are thus partially          
compensated by each other4 ,it must be  
remembered that in all the  languages   
which have a literature1 certainly in   
,sanskrit1 ,greek1 ,latin1  we are not  
at the beginning but almost at the end  
of the linguistic  process2 we have     
reached a time when the verb and the    
noun are nearly  perfected1 though in no
 language did they completely perfect   
themselves1 because for some unknown    
reason the motive powers of  languages  
seem to have ceased when they were on   
the eve of completion3  they became     

fixed or crystallized in an imperfect   
form either from the  influence of      
writing and literature1 or because no   
further  differentiation of them was    
required for the intelligibility of     
language4 ,so not without admixture and 
confusion and displacement and          
contamination of sounds and the meanings
 of words1 a lower stage of  language   
passes into a higher4 ,thus far we can  
see and no further4 ,when  we ask the   
reason why this principle of analogy    
prevails in all the  vast domain of     
language1 there is no answer to the     
question2 or no  other answer but this1 
that there are innumerable ways in      
which1 like  number1 analogy permeates1 
not only language1 but the whole world1 
both  visible and intellectual4 ,we know
 from experience that it does not 7a7   
arise from any conscious act of         
reflection that the accusative of a     
,latin noun in 8us0 should end in 8um20 
nor 7b7 from any necessity of  being    
understood1--much less articulation     

would suffice for this2 nor  7c7 from   
greater convenience or expressiveness of
 particular sounds4  ,such notions were 
certainly far enough away from the mind 
of primitive  man4 ,we may speak of a   
latent instinct1 of a survival of the   
fittest1  easiest1 most euphonic1 most  
economical of breath1 in the case of one
  of two competing sounds2 but these    
expressions do not add anything to  our 
knowledge4 ,we may try to grasp the     
infinity of language either  under the  
figure of a limitless plain divided into
 countries and  districts by natural    
boundaries1 or of a vast river eternally
 flowing  whose origin is concealed from
 us2 we may apprehend partially the laws
  by which speech is regulated3 but we  
do not know1 and we seem as if we       
should never know1 any more than in the 
parallel case of the origin of  species1
 how vocal sounds received life and     
grew1 and in the form of  languages came
 to be distributed over the earth4      
iii4 ,next in order to analogy in the   

formation of language or even  prior to 
it comes the principle of onomatopea1   
which is itself a kind  of analogy or   
similarity of sound and meaning4 ,in by 
far the greater  number of words it has 
become disguised and has disappeared2   
but in no  stage of language is it      
entirely lost4 ,it belongs chiefly to   
early  language1 in which words were    
few2 and its influence grew less and    
less  as time went on4 ,to the ear which
 had a sense of harmony it became a     
barbarism which disturbed the flow and  
equilibrium of discourse2 it was  an    
excrescence which had to be cut out1 a  
survival which needed to be  got rid of1
 because it was out of keeping with the 
rest4 ,it remained  for the most part   
only as a formative principle1 which    
used words and  letters not as crude    
imitations of other natural sounds1 but 
as symbols  of ideas which were         
naturally associated with them4 ,it     
received in  another way a new          
character2 it affected not so much      

single words1 as  larger portions of    
human speech4 ,it regulated the         
juxtaposition of  sounds and the cadence
 of sentences4 ,it was the music1 not of
 song1 but  of speech1 in prose as well 
as verse4 ,the old onomatopea of        
primitive  language was refined into an 
onomatopea of a higher kind1 in which it
  is no longer true to say that a       
particular sound corresponds to a       
motion or action of man or beast or     
movement of nature1 but that in all  the
 higher uses of language the sound is   
the echo of the sense1  especially in   
poetry1 in which beauty and             
expressiveness are given to  human      
thoughts by the harmonious composition  
of the words1 syllables1  letters1      
accents1 quantities1 rhythms1 rhymes1   
varieties and contrasts  of all sorts4  
,the poet with his 8,break1 break1      
break0 or his e pasin  nekuessi         
kataphthimenoisin anassein or his       
8longius ex altoque sinum  trahit10 can 
produce a far finer music than any crude

 imitations of  things or actions in    
sound1 although a letter or two having  
this  imitative power may be a lesser   
element of beauty in such passages4 ,the
  same subtle sensibility1 which adapts 
the word to the thing1 adapts the       
sentence or cadence to the general      
meaning or spirit of the passage4  ,this
 is the higher onomatopea which has     
banished the cruder sort as  unworthy to
 have a place in great languages and    
literatures4    ,we can see clearly     
enough that letters or collocations of  
letters do by  various degrees of       
strength or weakness1 length or         
shortness1 emphasis  or pitch1 become   
the natural expressions of the finer    
parts of human  feeling or thought4 ,and
 not only so1 but letters themselves    
have a  significance2 as ,plato observes
 that the letter rho accent is          
expressive of motion1 the letters delta 
and tau of binding and rest1  the letter
 lambda of smoothness1 nu of inwardness1
 the letter eta of  length1 the letter  

omicron of roundness4 ,these were often 
combined so  as to form composite       
notions1 as for example in tromos       
7trembling71  trachus 7rugged71 thrauein
 7crush71 krouein 7strike71 thruptein   
7break71 pumbein 7whirl71--in all which 
words we notice a parallel  composition 
of sounds in their ,english equivalents4
 ,plato also remarks1  as we remark1    
that the onomatopoetic principle is far 
from prevailing  uniformly1 and further 
that no explanation of language         
consistently  corresponds with any      
system of philosophy1 however great may 
be the  light which language throws upon
 the nature of the mind4 ,both in ,greek
  and ,english we find groups of words  
such as string1 swing1 sling1  spring1  
sting1 which are parallel to one another
 and may be said to  derive their vocal 
effect partly from contrast of letters1 
but in which  it is impossible to assign
 a precise amount of meaning to each of 
the  expressive and onomatopoetic       
letters4 ,a few of them are directly    

imitative1 as for example the omega in  
oon1 which represents the round  form of
 the egg by the figure of the mouth3 or 
bronte 7thunder71 in  which the fulness 
of the sound of the word corresponds to 
the thing  signified by it2 or bombos   
7buzzing71 of which the first syllable1 
as  in its ,english equivalent1 has the 
meaning of a deep sound4 ,we may        
observe also 7as we see in the case of  
the poor stammerer7 that speech  has the
 co-operation of the whole body and may 
be often assisted or  half expressed by 
gesticulation4 ,a sound or word is not  
the work of the  vocal organs only2     
nearly the whole of the upper part of   
the human  frame1 including head1 chest1
 lungs1 have a share in creating it2 and
  it may be accompanied by a movement of
 the eyes1 nose1 fingers1 hands1  feet  
which contributes to the effect of it4  
,the principle of onomatopea has fallen 
into discredit1 partly because  it has  
been supposed to imply an actual        
manufacture of words out of  syllables  

and letters1 like a piece of joiner's   
work1--a theory of  language which is   
more and more refuted by facts1 and more
 and more  going out of fashion with    
philologians2 and partly also because   
the  traces of onomatopea in separate   
words become almost obliterated in the  
course of ages4 ,the poet of language   
cannot put in and pull out  letters1 as 
a painter might insert or blot out a    
shade of colour to  give effect to his  
picture4 ,it would be ridiculous for him
 to alter any  received form of a word  
in order to render it more expressive of
 the  sense4 ,he can only select1       
perhaps out of some dialect1 the form   
which  is already best adapted to his   
purpose4 ,the true onomatopea is not a  
creative1 but a formative principle1    
which in the later stage of the  history
 of language ceases to act upon         
individual words2 but still  works      
through the collocation of them in the  
sentence or paragraph1 and  the         
adaptation of every word1 syllable1     

letter to one another and to  the rhythm
 of the whole passage4    iv4 ,next1    
under a distinct head1 although not     
separable from the  preceding1 may be   
considered the differentiation of       
languages1 i4e4 the  manner in which    
differences of meaning and form have    
arisen in them4  ,into their first      
creation we have ceased to enquire3 it  
is their  aftergrowth with which we are 
now concerned4 ,how did the roots or    
substantial portions of words become    
modified or inflected8 and how did  they
 receive separate meanings8 ,first we   
remark that words are  attracted by the 
sounds and senses of other words1 so    
that they form  groups of nouns and     
verbs analogous in sound and sense to   
one another1  each noun or verb putting 
forth inflexions1 generally of two or   
three  patterns1 and with exceptions4   
,we do not say that we know how sense   
became first allied to sound2 but we    
have no difficulty in ascertaining  how 
the sounds and meanings of words were in

 time parted off or  differentiated4    
7#a7 ,the chief causes which regulate   
the variations of  sound are 7a7 double 
or differing analogies1 which lead      
sometimes to  one form1 sometimes to    
another 7b7 euphony1 by which is meant  
chiefly  the greater pleasure to the ear
 and the greater facility to the organs 
of speech which is given by a new       
formation or pronunciation of a word    
7c7 the necessity of finding new        
expressions for new classes or          
processes of things4 ,we are told that  
changes of sound take place by          
innumerable gradations until a whole    
tribe or community or society find      
themselves acquiescing in a new         
pronunciation or use of language4 ,yet  
no one observes the change1 or is at all
 aware that in the course of a  lifetime
 he and his contemporaries have         
appreciably varied their  intonation or 
use of words4 ,on the other hand1 the   
necessities of  language seem to require
 that the intermediate sounds or        

meanings of  words should quickly become
 fixed or set and not continue in a     
state of  transition4 ,the process of   
settling down is aided by the organs of 
speech and by the use of writing and    
printing4 7#b7 ,the meaning of words    
varies because ideas vary or the number 
of things which is included  under them 
or with which they are associated is    
increased4 ,a single  word is thus made 
to do duty for many more things than    
were formerly  expressed by it2 and it  
parts into different senses when the    
classes of  things or ideas which are   
represented by it are themselves        
different  and distinct4 ,a figurative  
use of a word may easily pass into a new
  sense3 a new meaning caught up by     
association may become more important   
than all the rest4 ,the good or neutral 
sense of a word1 such as ,jesuit1       
,puritan1 ,methodist1 ,heretic1 has been
 often converted into a bad one by  the 
malevolence of party spirit4 ,double    
forms suggest different  meanings and   

are often used to express them2 and the 
form or accent of  a word has been not  
unfrequently altered when there is a    
difference of  meaning4 ,the difference 
of gender in nouns is utilized for the  
same  reason4 ,new meanings of words    
push themselves into the vacant spaces  
of  language and retire when they are no
 longer needed4 ,language equally       
abhors vacancy and superfluity4 ,but the
 remedial measures by which both  are   
eliminated are not due to any conscious 
action of the human mind2  nor is the   
force exerted by them constraining or   
necessary4    7#g7 ,we have shown that  
language1 although subject to laws1 is  
far from  being of an exact and uniform 
nature4 ,we may now speak briefly of the
  faults of language4 ,they may be      
compared to the faults of ,geology1 in  
which different strata cross one another
 or meet at an angle1 or mix  with one  
another either by slow transitions or by
 violent convulsions1  leaving many     
lacunae which can be no longer filled   

up1 and often  becoming so complex that 
no true explanation of them can be      
given4 ,so  in language there are the   
cross influences of meaning and sound1  
of  logic and grammar1 of differing     
analogies1 of words and the inflexions  
of words1 which often come into conflict
 with each other4 ,the  grammarian1 if  
he were to form new words1 would make   
them all of the  same pattern according 
to what he conceives to be the rule1    
that is1  the more common usage of      
language4 ,the subtlety of nature goes  
far  beyond art1 and it is complicated  
by irregularity1 so that often we can   
hardly say that there is a right or     
wrong in the formation of words4  ,for  
almost any formation which is not at    
variance with the first  principles of  
language is possible and may be         
defended4    ,the imperfection of       
language is really due to the formation 
and  correlation of words by accident1  
that is to say1 by principles which  are
 unknown to us4 ,hence we see why       

,plato1 like ourselves unable to        
comprehend the whole of language1 was   
constrained to 8supplement the  poor    
creature imitation by another poor      
creature convention40 ,but the  poor    
creature convention in the end proves   
too much for all the rest3  for we do   
not ask what is the origin of words or  
whether they are  formed according to a 
correct analogy1 but what is the usage  
of them2  and we are compelled to admit 
with ,hermogenes in ,plato and with     
,horace  that usage is the ruling       
principle1 8quem penes arbitrium est1 et
 jus  et norma loquendi40    7#h7 ,there
 are two ways in which a language may   
attain permanence or  fixity4 ,first1 it
 may have been embodied in poems or     
hymns or laws1  which may be repeated   
for hundreds1 perhaps for thousands of  
years with  a religious accuracy1 so    
that to the priests or rhapsodists of a 
nation  the whole or the greater part of
 a language is literally preserved2     
secondly1 it may be written down and in 

a written form distributed more  or less
 widely among the whole nation4 ,in     
either case the language  which is      
familiarly spoken may have grown up     
wholly or in a great  measure           
independently of them4 7#a7 ,the first  
of these processes has  been sometimes  
attended by the result that the sound of
 the words has  been carefully preserved
 and that the meaning of them has either
  perished wholly1 or is only doubtfully
 recovered by the efforts of  modern    
philology4 ,the verses have been        
repeated as a chant or part of a        
ritual1 but they have had no relation to
 ordinary life or speech4 7#b7  ,the    
invention of writing again is commonly  
attributed to a particular  epoch1 and  
we are apt to think that such an        
inestimable gift would have  immediately
 been diffused over a whole country4    
,but it may have taken a  long time to  
perfect the art of writing1 and another 
long period may  have elapsed before it 
came into common use4 ,its influence on 

language  has been increased ten1 twenty
 or one hundred fold by the invention of
  printing4    ,before the growth of    
poetry or the invention of writing1     
languages were  only dialects4 ,so they 
continued to be in parts of the country 
in which  writing was not used or in    
which there was no diffusion of         
literature4  ,in most of the counties of
 ,england there is still a provincial   
style1  which has been sometimes made by
 a great poet the vehicle of his        
fancies4 ,when a book sinks into the    
mind of a nation1 such as ,luther's     
,bible or the ,authorized ,english      
,translation of the ,bible1 or again    
great classical works like ,shakspere or
 ,milton1 not only have new  powers of  
expression been diffused through a whole
 nation1 but a great  step towards      
uniformity has been made4 ,the instinct 
of language demands  regular grammar and
 correct spelling3 these are imprinted  
deeply on the  tablets of a nation's    
memory by a common use of classical and 

popular  writers4 ,in our own day we    
have attained to a point at which nearly
  every printed book is spelt correctly 
and written grammatically4    7#i7      
,proceeding further to trace the        
influence of literature on language  we 
note some other causes which have       
affected the higher use of it3  such as 
7#a7 the necessity of clearness and     
connexion2 7#b7 the fear of  tautology2 
7#c7 the influence of metre1 rhythm1    
rhyme1 and of the  language of prose and
 verse upon one another2 7#d7 the power 
of idiom  and quotation2 7#e7 the       
relativeness of words to one another4   
,it has been usual to depreciate modern 
languages when compared with  ancient4  
,the latter are regarded as furnishing a
 type of excellence to  which the former
 cannot attain4 ,but the truth seems to 
be that modern  languages1 if through   
the loss of inflections and genders they
 lack  some power or beauty or          
expressiveness or precision which is    
possessed  by the ancient1 are in many  

other respects superior to them3 the    
thought is generally clearer1 the       
connexion closer1 the sentence and      
paragraph are better distributed4 ,the  
best modern languages1 for  example     
,english or ,french1 possess as great a 
power of self-improvement  as the       
,latin1 if not as the ,greek4 ,nor does 
there seem to be any reason  why they   
should ever decline or decay4 ,it is a  
popular remark that our  great writers  
are beginning to disappear3 it may also 
be remarked that  whenever a great      
writer appears in the future he will    
find the ,english  language as perfect  
and as ready for use as in the days of  
,shakspere or  ,milton4 ,there is no    
reason to suppose that ,english or      
,french will ever  be reduced to the low
 level of ,modern ,greek or of          
,mediaeval ,latin4 ,the  wide diffusion 
of great authors would make such a      
decline impossible4  ,nor will modern   
languages be easily broken up by        
amalgamation with each  other4 ,the     

distance between them is too wide to be 
spanned1 the  differences are too great 
to be overcome1 and the use of printing 
makes  it impossible that one of them   
should ever be lost in another4    ,the 
structure of the ,english language      
differs greatly from that of  either    
,latin or ,greek4 ,in the two latter1   
especially in ,greek1  sentences are    
joined together by connecting particles4
 ,they are  distributed on the right    
hand and on the left by men1 de1 alla1  
kaitoi1  kai de and the like1 or deduced
 from one another by ara1 de1 oun1      
toinun and the like4 ,in ,english the   
majority of sentences are  independent  
and in apposition to one another2 they  
are laid side by  side or slightly      
connected by the copula4 ,but within the
 sentence the  expression of the logical
 relations of the clauses is closer and 
more  exact3 there is less of apposition
 and participial structure4 ,the        
sentences thus laid side by side are    
also constructed into paragraphs2  these

 again are less distinctly marked in    
,greek and ,latin than in  ,english4    
,generally ,french1 ,german1 and        
,english have an advantage over  the    
classical languages in point of         
accuracy4 ,the three concords are  more 
accurately observed in ,english than in 
either ,greek or ,latin4 ,on  the other 
hand1 the extension of the familiar use 
of the masculine and  feminine gender to
 objects of sense and abstract ideas as 
well as to  men and animals no doubt    
lends a nameless grace to style which we
 have  a difficulty in appreciating1 and
 the possible variety in the order of   
words gives more flexibility and also a 
kind of dignity to the period4  ,of the 
comparative effect of accent and        
quantity and of the relation  between   
them in ancient and modern languages we 
are not able to judge4    ,another      
quality in which modern are superior to 
ancient languages is  freedom from      
tautology4 ,no ,english style is thought
 tolerable in which1  except for the    

sake of emphasis1 the same words are    
repeated at short  intervals4 ,of course
 the length of the interval must depend 
on the  character of the word4 ,striking
 words and expressions cannot be allowed
  to reappear1 if at all1 except at the 
distance of a page or more4  ,pronouns1 
prepositions1 conjunctions may or rather
 must recur in  successive lines4 ,it   
seems to be a kind of impertinence to   
the reader  and strikes unpleasantly    
both on the mind and on the ear that the
 same  sounds should be used twice over1
 when another word or turn of           
expression would have given a new shade 
of meaning to the thought and  would    
have added a pleasing variety to the    
sound4 ,and the mind equally  rejects   
the repetition of the word and the use  
of a mere synonym for  it1--e4g4        
felicity and happiness4 ,the cultivated 
mind desires something  more1 which a   
skilful writer is easily able to supply 
out of his  treasure-house4    ,the fear
 of tautology has doubtless led to the  

multiplications of words  and the       
meanings of words1 and generally to an  
enlargement of the  vocabulary4 ,it is a
 very early instinct of language2 for   
ancient poetry  is almost as free from  
tautology as the best modern writings4  
,the  speech of young children1 except  
in so far as they are compelled to      
repeat themselves by the fewness of     
their words1 also escapes from it4      
,when they grow up and have ideas which 
are beyond their powers of  expression1 
especially in writing1 tautology begins 
to appear4 ,in like  manner when        
language is 8contaminated0 by philosophy
 it is apt to  become awkward1 to       
stammer and repeat itself1 to lose its  
flow and  freedom4 ,no philosophical    
writer with the exception of ,plato1 who
 is  himself not free from tautology1   
and perhaps ,bacon1 has attained to any 
high degree of literary excellence4     
,to poetry the form and polish of       
language is chiefly to be attributed2   
and the most critical period in the     

history of language is the  transition  
from verse to prose4 ,at first mankind  
were contented to  express their        
thoughts in a set form of words having a
 kind of rhythm2  to which regularity   
was given by accent and quantity4 ,but  
after a time  they demanded a greater   
degree of freedom1 and to those who had 
all  their life been hearing poetry the 
first introduction of prose had the     
charm of novelty4 ,the prose romances   
into which the ,homeric ,poems were     
converted1 for a while probably gave    
more delight to the hearers or  readers 
of them than the ,poems themselves1 and 
in time the relation of  the two was    
reversed3 the poems which had once been 
a necessity of the  human mind became a 
luxury3 they were now superseded by     
prose1 which in  all succeeding ages    
became the natural vehicle of expression
 to all  mankind4 ,henceforward prose   
and poetry formed each other4 ,a        
comparatively slender link between them 
was also furnished by proverbs4  ,we may

 trace in poetry how the simple         
succession of lines1 not without        
monotony1 has passed into a complicated 
period1 and how in prose1  rhythm and   
accent and the order of words and the   
balance of clauses1  sometimes not      
without a slight admixture of rhyme1    
make up a new kind  of harmony1 swelling
 into strains not less majestic than    
those of  ,homer1 ,virgil1 or ,dante4   
,one of the most curious and            
characteristic features of language1    
affecting both syntax and style1 is     
idiom4 ,the meaning of the word  8idiom0
 is that which is peculiar1 that which  
is familiar1 the word or  expression    
which strikes us or comes home to us1   
which is more readily  understood or    
more easily remembered4 ,it is a quality
 which really  exists in infinite       
degrees1 which we turn into differences 
of kind by  applying the term only to   
conspicuous and striking examples of    
words or  phrases which have this       
quality4 ,it often supersedes the laws  

of  language or the rules of grammar1 or
 rather is to be regarded as  another   
law of language which is natural and    
necessary4 ,the word or  phrase which   
has been repeated many times over is    
more intelligible and  familiar to us   
than one which is rare1 and our         
familiarity with it more  than          
compensates for incorrectness or        
inaccuracy in the use of it4  ,striking 
expressions also which have moved the   
hearts of nations or are  the precious  
stones and jewels of great authors      
partake of the nature  of idioms3 they  
are taken out of the sphere of grammar  
and are exempt  from the proprieties of 
language4 ,every one knows that we often
 put  words together in a manner which  
would be intolerable if it were not     
idiomatic4 ,we cannot argue either about
 the meaning of words or the use  of    
constructions that because they are used
 in one connexion they will  be         
legitimate in another1 unless we allow  
for this principle4 ,we can  bear to    

have words and sentences used in new    
senses or in a new order  or even a     
little perverted in meaning when we are 
quite familiar with  them4 ,quotations  
are as often applied in a sense which   
the author did  not intend as in that   
which he did4 ,the parody of the words  
of  ,shakspere or of the ,bible1 which  
has in it something of the nature of a  
lie1 is far from unpleasing to us4 ,the 
better known words1 even if  their      
meaning be perverted1 are more agreeable
 to us and have a greater  power over   
us4 ,most of us have experienced a sort 
of delight and  feeling of curiosity    
when we first came across or when we    
first used  for ourselves a new word or 
phrase or figure of speech4    ,there   
are associations of sound and of sense  
by which every word is  linked to every 
other4 ,one letter harmonizes with      
another2 every verb  or noun derives its
 meaning1 not only from itself1 but from
 the words  with which it is associated4
 ,some reflection of them near or       

distant is  embodied in it4 ,in any new 
use of a word all the existing uses of  
it  have to be considered4 ,upon these  
depends the question whether it will    
bear the proposed extension of meaning  
or not4 ,according to the famous        
expression of ,luther1 8,words are      
living creatures1 having hands and      
feet40 ,when they cease to retain this  
living power of adaptation1 when  they  
are only put together like the parts of 
a piece of furniture1  language becomes 
unpoetical1 inexpressive1 dead4         
,grammars would lead us to suppose that 
words have a fixed form and  sound4     
,lexicons assign to each word a definite
 meaning or meanings4  ,they both tend  
to obscure the fact that the sentence   
precedes the word  and that all language
 is relative4 7#a7 ,it is relative to   
its own  context4 ,its meaning is       
modified by what has been said before   
and after  in the same or in some other 
passage3 without comparing the context  
we  are not sure whether it is used in  

the same sense even in two  successive  
sentences4 7#b7 ,it is relative to      
facts1 to time1 place1 and  occasion3   
when they are already known to the      
hearer or reader1 they may  be          
presupposed2 there is no need to allude 
to them further4 7#c7 ,it is  relative  
to the knowledge of the writer and      
reader or of the speaker  and hearer4   
,except for the sake of order and       
consecutiveness nothing  ought to be    
expressed which is already commonly or  
universally known4 ,a  word or two may  
be sufficient to give an intimation to a
 friend2 a long  or elaborate speech or 
composition is required to explain some 
new idea  to a popular audience or to   
the ordinary reader or to a young pupil4
  ,grammars and dictionaries are not to 
be despised2 for in teaching we  need   
clearness rather than subtlety4 ,but we 
must not therefore forget  that there is
 also a higher ideal of language in     
which all is  relative--sounds to       
sounds1 words to words1 the parts to the

 whole--in  which besides the lesser    
context of the book or speech1 there is 
also  the larger context of history and 
circumstances4    ,the study of         
,comparative ,philology has introduced  
into the world a new  science which more
 than any other binds up man with       
nature1 and distant  ages and countries 
with one another4 ,it may be said to    
have thrown a  light upon all other     
sciences and upon the nature of the     
human mind  itself4 ,the true conception
 of it dispels many errors1 not only of 
metaphysics and theology1 but also of   
natural knowledge4 ,yet it is far  from 
certain that this newly-found science   
will continue to progress in  the same  
surprising manner as heretofore2 or that
 even if our materials  are largely     
increased1 we shall arrive at much more 
definite  conclusions than at present4  
,like some other branches of knowledge1 
it  may be approaching a point at which 
it can no longer be profitably  studied4
 ,but at any rate it has brought back   

the philosophy of language  from theory 
to fact2 it has passed out of the region
 of guesses and  hypotheses1 and has    
attained the dignity of an ,inductive   
,science4 ,and  it is not without       
practical and political importance4 ,it 
gives a new  interest to distant and    
subject countries2 it brings back the   
dawning  light from one end of the earth
 to the other4 ,nations1 like           
individuals1 are better understood by us
 when we know something of  their early 
life2 and when they are better          
understood by us1 we feel  more kindly  
towards them4 ,lastly1 we may remember  
that all knowledge is  valuable for its 
own sake2 and we may also hope that a   
deeper insight  into the nature of human
 speech will give us a greater command  
of it  and enable us to make a nobler   
use of it4#b     #b ,compare again ,w4  
,humboldt1 ,ueber die ,verschiedenheit  
des   menschlichen ,sprachbaues2 ,m4    
,mller1 ,lectures on the ,science of    
,language2 ,steinthal1 ,einleitung in   

die ,psychologie und                    
,sprachwissenschaft3 and for the latter 
part of the ,essay1 ,delbruck1   ,study 
of ,language2 ,paul's ,principles of the
 ,history of ,language3   to the latter 
work the author of this ,essay is       
largely indebted4          ,,cratylus   
,by ,plato    ,translated by ,benjamin  
,jowett      ,,persons ,,of ,,the       
,,dialogue3 ,socrates1 ,hermogenes1     
,cratylus4      ,,hermogenes3 ,suppose  
that we make ,socrates a party to the   
argument8    ,,cratylus3 ,if you please4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,i should explain to  
you1 ,socrates1 that our friend         
,cratylus  has been arguing about names2
 he says that they are natural and not  
conventional2 not a portion of the human
 voice which men agree to use2  but that
 there is a truth or correctness in     
them1 which is the same for  ,hellenes  
as for barbarians4 ,whereupon ,i ask    
him1 whether his own name  of ,cratylus 
is a true name or not1 and he answers   
8,yes40 ,and ,socrates8  8,yes40 ,then  

every man's name1 as ,i tell him1 is    
that which he is  called4 ,to this he   
replies--8,if all the world were to call
 you  ,hermogenes1 that would not be    
your name40 ,and when ,i am anxious to  
have  a further explanation he is       
ironical and mysterious1 and seems to   
imply  that he has a notion of his own  
about the matter1 if he would only      
tell1 and could entirely convince me1 if
 he chose to be intelligible4  ,tell me1
 ,socrates1 what this oracle means2 or  
rather tell me1 if you  will be so good1
 what is your own view of the truth or  
correctness of  names1 which ,i would   
far sooner hear4    ,,socrates3 ,son of 
,hipponicus1 there is an ancient saying1
 that 8hard is  the knowledge of the    
good40 ,and the knowledge of names is a 
great part  of knowledge4 ,if ,i had not
 been poor1 ,i might have heard the     
fifty-drachma course of the great       
,prodicus1 which is a complete          
education in grammar and language--these
 are his own words--and then ,i  should 

have been at once able to answer your   
question about the  correctness of      
names4 ,but1 indeed1 ,i have only heard 
the single-drachma  course1 and         
therefore1 ,i do not know the truth     
about such matters2 ,i  will1 however1  
gladly assist you and ,cratylus in the  
investigation of  them4 ,when he        
declares that your name is not really   
,hermogenes1 ,i  suspect that he is only
 making fun of you2--he means to say    
that you are  no true son of ,hermes1   
because you are always looking after a  
fortune  and never in luck4 ,but1 as ,i 
was saying1 there is a good deal of     
difficulty in this sort of knowledge1   
and therefore we had better leave  the  
question open until we have heard both  
sides4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i have often   
talked over this matter1 both with      
,cratylus  and others1 and cannot       
convince myself that there is any       
principle of  correctness in names other
 than convention and agreement2 any name
  which you give1 in my opinion1 is the 

right one1 and if you change that  and  
give another1 the new name is as correct
 as the old--we frequently  change the  
names of our slaves1 and the            
newly-imposed name is as good  as the   
old3 for there is no name given to      
anything by nature2 all is  convention  
and habit of the users2--such is my     
view4 ,but if ,i am  mistaken ,i shall  
be happy to hear and learn of ,cratylus1
 or of any one  else4    ,,socrates3 ,i 
dare say that you may be right1         
,hermogenes3 let us  see2--,your meaning
 is1 that the name of each thing is only
 that which  anybody agrees to call it8 
,,hermogenes3 ,that is my notion4       
,,socrates3 ,whether the giver of the   
name be an individual or a city8        
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3      
,well1 now1 let me take an              
instance2--suppose that ,i call a man  a
 horse or a horse a man1 you mean to say
 that a man will be rightly  called a   
horse by me individually1 and rightly   
called a man by the rest  of the world2 

and a horse again would be rightly      
called a man by me and  a horse by the  
world3--that is your meaning8           
,,hermogenes3 ,he would1 according to my
 view4    ,,socrates3 ,but how about    
truth1 then8 you would acknowledge that 
there  is in words a true and a false8  
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3
 ,and there are true and false          
propositions8    ,,hermogenes3 ,to be   
sure4    ,,socrates3 ,and a true        
proposition says that which is1 and a   
false  proposition says that which is   
not8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes2 what other  
answer is possible8    ,,socrates3 ,then
 in a proposition there is a true and   
false8    ,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,but is a proposition true  
as a whole only1 and are the parts      
untrue8    ,,hermogenes3 ,no2 the parts 
are true as well as the whole4          
,,socrates3 ,would you say the large    
parts and not the smaller ones1 or      
every part8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i should  
say that every part is true4            

,,socrates3 ,is a proposition resolvable
 into any part smaller than a  name8    
,,hermogenes3 ,no2 that is the smallest4
    ,,socrates3 ,then the name is a part
 of the true proposition8               
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,yes1
 and a true part1 as you say4           
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
is not the part of a falsehood also a   
falsehood8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4       
,,socrates3 ,then1 if propositions may  
be true and false1 names may be  true   
and false8    ,,hermogenes3 ,so we must 
infer4    ,,socrates3 ,and the name of  
anything is that which any one affirms  
to be  the name8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and will there be so many  
names of each thing as everybody  says  
that there are8 and will they be true   
names at the time of  uttering them8    
,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i can   
conceive no correctness of names other  
than this2 you give one name1 and ,i    
another2 and in different cities  and   
countries there are different names for 

the same things2 ,hellenes  differ from 
barbarians in their use of names1 and   
the several ,hellenic  tribes from one  
another4    ,,socrates3 ,but would you  
say1 ,hermogenes1 that the things differ
 as the  names differ8 and are they     
relative to individuals1 as ,protagoras 
tells  us8 ,for he says that man is the 
measure of all things1 and that things  
are to me as they appear to me1 and that
 they are to you as they appear  to you4
 ,do you agree with him1 or would you   
say that things have a  permanent       
essence of their own8    ,,hermogenes3  
,there have been times1 ,socrates1 when 
,i have been driven in  my perplexity to
 take refuge with ,protagoras2 not that 
,i agree with him  at all4              
,,socrates3 ,what6 have you ever been   
driven to admit that there was no  such 
thing as a bad man8    ,,hermogenes3    
,no1 indeed2 but ,i have often had      
reason to think that there  are very bad
 men1 and a good many of them4          
,,socrates3 ,well1 and have you ever    

found any very good ones8               
,,hermogenes3 ,not many4    ,,socrates3 
,still you have found them8             
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
would you hold that the very good were  
the very wise1 and  the very evil very  
foolish8 ,would that be your view8      
,,hermogenes3 ,it would4    ,,socrates3 
,but if ,protagoras is right1 and the   
truth is that things are  as they appear
 to any one1 how can some of us be wise 
and some of us  foolish8                
,,hermogenes3 ,impossible4              
,,socrates3 ,and if1 on the other hand1 
wisdom and folly are really             
distinguishable1 you will allow1 ,i     
think1 that the assertion of            
,protagoras can hardly be correct4 ,for 
if what appears to each man is  true to 
him1 one man cannot in reality be wiser 
than another4    ,,hermogenes3 ,he      
cannot4    ,,socrates3 ,nor will you be 
disposed to say with ,euthydemus1 that  
all  things equally belong to all men at
 the same moment and always2 for        

neither on his view can there be some   
good and others bad1 if virtue  and vice
 are always equally to be attributed to 
all4    ,,hermogenes3 ,there cannot4    
,,socrates3 ,but if neither is right1   
and things are not relative to          
individuals1 and all things do not      
equally belong to all at the same       
moment and always1 they must be supposed
 to have their own proper and  permanent
 essence3 they are not in relation to   
us1 or influenced by us1  fluctuating   
according to our fancy1 but they are    
independent1 and  maintain to their own 
essence the relation prescribed by      
nature4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i think1      
,socrates1 that you have said the truth4
    ,,socrates3 ,does what ,i am saying 
apply only to the things themselves1 or 
equally to the actions which proceed    
from them8 ,are not actions also a      
class of being8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes1  
the actions are real as well as the     
things4    ,,socrates3 ,then the actions
 also are done according to their proper

  nature1 and not according to our      
opinion of them8 ,in cutting1 for       
example1 we do not cut as we please1 and
 with any chance instrument2  but we cut
 with the proper instrument only1 and   
according to the  natural process of    
cutting2 and the natural process is     
right and will  succeed1 but any other  
will fail and be of no use at all4      
,,hermogenes3 ,i should say that the    
natural way is the right way4           
,,socrates3 ,again1 in burning1 not     
every way is the right way2 but the     
right way is the natural way1 and the   
right instrument the natural            
instrument4    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4     
,,socrates3 ,and this holds good of all 
actions8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4         
,,socrates3 ,and speech is a kind of    
action8    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4         
,,socrates3 ,and will a man speak       
correctly who speaks as he pleases8     
,will  not the successful speaker rather
 be he who speaks in the natural way  of
 speaking1 and as things ought to be    

spoken1 and with the natural            
instrument8 ,any other mode of speaking 
will result in error and  failure4      
,,hermogenes3 ,i quite agree with you4  
,,socrates3 ,and is not naming a part of
 speaking8 for in giving names men      
speak4    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is true4  
,,socrates3 ,and if speaking is a sort  
of action and has a relation to  acts1  
is not naming also a sort of action8    
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 we saw that actions were not relative  
to ourselves1 but  had a special nature 
of their own8    ,,hermogenes3          
,precisely4    ,,socrates3 ,then the    
argument would lead us to infer that    
names ought to  be given according to a 
natural process1 and with a proper      
instrument1  and not at our pleasure3 in
 this and no other way shall we name    
with  success4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i      
agree4    ,,socrates3 ,but again1 that  
which has to be cut has to be cut with  
something8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4       
,,socrates3 ,and that which has to be   

woven or pierced has to be woven or     
pierced with something8    ,,hermogenes3
 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and that   
which has to be named has to be named   
with  something8    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4
    ,,socrates3 ,what is that with which
 we pierce8    ,,hermogenes3 ,an awl4   
,,socrates3 ,and with which we weave8   
,,hermogenes3 ,a shuttle4    ,,socrates3
 ,and with which we name8               
,,hermogenes3 ,a name4    ,,socrates3   
,very good3 then a name is an           
instrument8    ,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4
    ,,socrates3 ,suppose that ,i ask1   
8,what sort of instrument is a shuttle80
  ,and you answer1 8,a weaving          
instrument40    ,,hermogenes3 ,well4    
,,socrates3 ,and ,i ask again1 8,what do
 we do when we weave80--,the answer  is1
 that we separate or disengage the warp 
from the woof4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very   
true4    ,,socrates3 ,and may not a     
similar description be given of an awl1 
and of  instruments in general8         
,,hermogenes3 ,to be sure4              

,,socrates3 ,and now suppose that ,i ask
 a similar question about names3  will  
you answer me8 ,regarding the name as an
 instrument1 what do we do  when we     
name8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i cannot say4   
,,socrates3 ,do we not give information 
to one another1 and distinguish  things 
according to their natures8             
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly we do4         
,,socrates3 ,then a name is an          
instrument of teaching and of           
distinguishing natures1 as the shuttle  
is of distinguishing the threads  of the
 web4    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4            
,,socrates3 ,and the shuttle is the     
instrument of the weaver8               
,,hermogenes3 ,assuredly4    ,,socrates3
 ,then the weaver will use the shuttle  
well--and well means like  a weaver8 and
 the teacher will use the name well--and
 well means like a  teacher8            
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
when the weaver uses the shuttle1 whose 
work will he be  using well8            
,,hermogenes3 ,that of the carpenter4   

,,socrates3 ,and is every man a         
carpenter1 or the skilled only8         
,,hermogenes3 ,only the skilled4        
,,socrates3 ,and when the piercer uses  
the awl1 whose work will he be  using   
well8    ,,hermogenes3 ,that of the     
smith4    ,,socrates3 ,and is every man 
a smith1 or only the skilled8           
,,hermogenes3 ,the skilled only4        
,,socrates3 ,and when the teacher uses  
the name1 whose work will he be  using8 
,,hermogenes3 ,there again ,i am        
puzzled4    ,,socrates3 ,cannot you at  
least say who gives us the names which  
we use8    ,,hermogenes3 ,indeed ,i     
cannot4    ,,socrates3 ,does not the law
 seem to you to give us them8           
,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 ,i suppose so4      
,,socrates3 ,then the teacher1 when he  
gives us a name1 uses the work of  the  
legislator8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i agree4  
,,socrates3 ,and is every man a         
legislator1 or the skilled only8        
,,hermogenes3 ,the skilled only4        
,,socrates3 ,then1 ,hermogenes1 not     

every man is able to give a name1 but   
only a maker of names2 and this is the  
legislator1 who of all skilled  artisans
 in the world is the rarest4            
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 how does the legislator make names8 and
 to what does he  look8 ,consider this  
in the light of the previous instances3 
to what  does the carpenter look in     
making the shuttle8 ,does he not look to
 that  which is naturally fitted to act 
as a shuttle8    ,,hermogenes3          
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and suppose 
the shuttle to be broken in making1 will
 he make  another1 looking to the broken
 one8 or will he look to the form       
according to which he made the other8   
,,hermogenes3 ,to the latter1 ,i should 
imagine4    ,,socrates3 ,might not that 
be justly called the true or ideal      
shuttle8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i think so4  
,,socrates3 ,and whatever shuttles are  
wanted1 for the manufacture of          
garments1 thin or thick1 of flaxen1     
woollen1 or other material1 ought  all  

of them to have the true form of the    
shuttle2 and whatever is the  shuttle   
best adapted to each kind of work1 that 
ought to be the form  which the maker   
produces in each case4    ,,hermogenes3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and the same holds
 of other instruments3 when a man has   
discovered the instrument which is      
naturally adapted to each work1 he  must
 express this natural form1 and not     
others which he fancies1 in the         
material1 whatever it may be1 which he  
employs2 for example1 he ought  to know 
how to put into iron the forms of awls  
adapted by nature to  their several     
uses8    ,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4      
,,socrates3 ,and how to put into wood   
forms of shuttles adapted by nature  to 
their uses8    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4     
,,socrates3 ,for the several forms of   
shuttles naturally answer to the        
several kinds of webs2 and this is true 
of instruments in general4              
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3      
,then1 as to names3 ought not our       

legislator also to know how  to put the 
true natural name of each thing into    
sounds and syllables1  and to make and  
give all names with a view to the ideal 
name1 if he is  to be a namer in any    
true sense8 ,and we must remember that  
different  legislators will not use the 
same syllables4 ,for neither does every 
smith1 although he may be making the    
same instrument for the same  purpose1  
make them all of the same iron4 ,the    
form must be the same1 but  the material
 may vary1 and still the instrument may 
be equally good of  whatever iron made1 
whether in ,hellas or in a foreign      
country2--there is  no difference4      
,,hermogenes3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3
 ,and the legislator1 whether he be     
,hellene or barbarian1 is  not therefore
 to be deemed by you a worse legislator1
 provided he gives  the true and proper 
form of the name in whatever syllables2 
this or  that country makes no matter4  
,,hermogenes3 ,quite true4              
,,socrates3 ,but who then is to         

determine whether the proper form is    
given  to the shuttle1 whatever sort of 
wood may be used8 the carpenter who     
makes1 or the weaver who is to use them8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,i should say1 he who 
is to use them1 ,socrates4              
,,socrates3 ,and who uses the work of   
the lyre-maker8 ,will not he be the  man
 who knows how to direct what is being  
done1 and who will know also  whether   
the work is being well done or not8     
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3
 ,and who is he8    ,,hermogenes3 ,the  
player of the lyre4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
who will direct the shipwright8         
,,hermogenes3 ,the pilot4    ,,socrates3
 ,and who will be best able to direct   
the legislator in his  work1 and will   
know whether the work is well done1 in  
this or any other  country8 ,will not   
the user be the man8    ,,hermogenes3   
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and this is he who
 knows how to ask questions8            
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
how to answer them8    ,,hermogenes3    

,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and him who knows 
how to ask and answer you would call a  
dialectician8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes2    
that would be his name4    ,,socrates3  
,then the work of the carpenter is to   
make a rudder1 and the  pilot has to    
direct him1 if the rudder is to be well 
made4    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4           
,,socrates3 ,and the work of the        
legislator is to give names1 and the    
dialectician must be his director if the
 names are to be rightly given8         
,,hermogenes3 ,that is true4            
,,socrates3 ,then1 ,hermogenes1 ,i      
should say that this giving of names can
  be no such light matter as you fancy1 
or the work of light or chance  persons2
 and ,cratylus is right in saying that  
things have names by  nature1 and that  
not every man is an artificer of names1 
but he only  who looks to the name which
 each thing by nature has1 and is able  
to  express the true forms of things in 
letters and syllables4    ,,hermogenes3 
,i cannot answer you1 ,socrates2 but ,i 

find a difficulty in  changing my       
opinion all in a moment1 and ,i think   
that ,i should be more  readily         
persuaded1 if you would show me what    
this is which you term the  natural     
fitness of names4    ,,socrates3 ,my    
good ,hermogenes1 ,i have none to show4 
,was ,i not telling  you just now 7but  
you have forgotten71 that ,i knew       
nothing1 and  proposing to share the    
enquiry with you8 ,but now that you and 
,i have  talked over the matter1 a step 
has been gained2 for we have discovered 
that names have by nature a truth1 and  
that not every man knows how to  give a 
thing a name4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very    
good4    ,,socrates3 ,and what is the   
nature of this truth or correctness of  
names8  ,that1 if you care to know1 is  
the next question4    ,,hermogenes3     
,certainly1 ,i care to know4            
,,socrates3 ,then reflect4              
,,hermogenes3 ,how shall ,i reflect8    
,,socrates3 ,the true way is to have the
 assistance of those who know1 and  you 

must pay them well both in money and in 
thanks2 these are the  ,sophists1 of    
whom your brother1 ,callias1 has--rather
 dearly--bought the  reputation of      
wisdom4 ,but you have not yet come into 
your inheritance1  and therefore you had
 better go to him1 and beg and entreat  
him to tell  you what he has learnt from
 ,protagoras about the fitness of names4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,but how inconsistent 
should ,i be1 if1 whilst repudiating    
,protagoras and his truth 78,truth0 was 
the title of the book of  ,protagoras2  
compare ,theaet471 ,i were to attach any
 value to what he and  his book affirm6 
,,socrates3 ,then if you despise him1   
you must learn of ,homer and the  poets4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,and where does ,homer
 say anything about names1 and what     
does he say8    ,,socrates3 ,he often   
speaks of them2 notably and nobly in the
 places  where he distinguishes the     
different names which ,gods and men give
 to  the same things4 ,does he not in   
these passages make a remarkable        

statement about the correctness of      
names8 ,for the ,gods must clearly be   
supposed to call things by their right  
and natural names2 do you not  think so8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,why1 of course they  
call them rightly1 if they call them at 
all4 ,but to what are you referring8    
,,socrates3 ,do you not know what he    
says about the river in ,troy who had  a
 single combat with ,hephaestus8        
8,whom10 as he says1 8the ,gods call    
,xanthus1 and men call ,scamander40     
,,hermogenes3 ,i remember4              
,,socrates3 ,well1 and about this       
river--to know that he ought to be      
called  ,xanthus and not ,scamander--is 
not that a solemn lesson8 ,or about the 
bird which1 as he says1    8,the ,gods  
call ,chalcis1 and men ,cymindis30    to
 be taught how much more correct the    
name ,chalcis is than the name          
,cymindis--do you deem that a light     
matter8 ,or about ,batieia and ,myrina8 
7,compare ,il4 8,the hill which men call
 ,batieia and the immortals the  tomb of

 the sportive ,myrina407 ,and there are 
many other observations of  the same    
kind in ,homer and other poets4 ,now1 ,i
 think that this is  beyond the         
understanding of you and me2 but the    
names of ,scamandrius  and ,astyanax1   
which he affirms to have been the names 
of ,hector's son1  are more within the  
range of human faculties1 as ,i am      
disposed to  think2 and what the poet   
means by correctness may be more readily
  apprehended in that instance3 you will
 remember ,i dare say the lines to      
which ,i refer8 7,il47    ,,hermogenes3 
,i do4    ,,socrates3 ,let me ask you1  
then1 which did ,homer think the more   
correct  of the names given to ,hector's
 son--,astyanax or ,scamandrius8        
,,hermogenes3 ,i do not know4           
,,socrates3 ,how would you answer1 if   
you were asked whether the wise or  the 
unwise are more likely to give correct  
names8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i should say   
the wise1 of course4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 are the men or the women of a city1    

taken as a class1 the  wiser8           
,,hermogenes3 ,i should say1 the men4   
,,socrates3 ,and ,homer1 as you know1   
says that the ,trojan men called him    
,astyanax 7king of the city72 but if the
 men called him ,astyanax1 the  other   
name of ,scamandrius could only have    
been given to him by the  women4        
,,hermogenes3 ,that may be inferred4    
,,socrates3 ,and must not ,homer have   
imagined the ,trojans to be wiser than  
their wives8    ,,hermogenes3 ,to be    
sure4    ,,socrates3 ,then he must have 
thought ,astyanax to be a more correct  
name  for the boy than ,scamandrius8    
,,hermogenes3 ,clearly4    ,,socrates3  
,and what is the reason of this8 ,let us
 consider3--does he not  himself suggest
 a very good reason1 when he says1      
8,for he alone defended their city and  
long walls08    ,this appears to be a   
good reason for calling the son of the  
saviour  king of the city which his     
father was saving1 as ,homer observes4  
,,hermogenes3 ,i see4    ,,socrates3    

,why1 ,hermogenes1 ,i do not as yet see 
myself2 and do you8    ,,hermogenes3    
,no1 indeed2 not ,i4    ,,socrates3 ,but
 tell me1 friend1 did not ,homer himself
 also give ,hector  his name8           
,,hermogenes3 ,what of that8            
,,socrates3 ,the name appears to me to  
be very nearly the same as the name  of 
,astyanax--both are ,hellenic2 and a    
king 7anax7 and a holder 7ektor7  have  
nearly the same meaning1 and are both   
descriptive of a king2 for a  man is    
clearly the holder of that of which he  
is king2 he rules1 and  owns1 and holds 
it4 ,but1 perhaps1 you may think that ,i
 am talking  nonsense2 and indeed ,i    
believe that ,i myself did not know what
 ,i meant  when ,i imagined that ,i had 
found some indication of the opinion of 
,homer about the correctness of names4  
,,hermogenes3 ,i assure you that ,i     
think otherwise1 and ,i believe you to  
be on the right track4    ,,socrates3   
,there is reason1 ,i think1 in calling  
the lion's whelp a lion1  and the foal  

of a horse a horse2 ,i am speaking only 
of the ordinary  course of nature1 when 
an animal produces after his kind1 and  
not of  extraordinary births2--if       
contrary to nature a horse have a calf1 
then ,i  should not call that a foal but
 a calf2 nor do ,i call any inhuman     
birth  a man1 but only a natural birth4 
,and the same may be said of trees and  
other things4 ,do you agree with me8    
,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 ,i agree4           
,,socrates3 ,very good4 ,but you had    
better watch me and see that ,i do not  
play tricks with you4 ,for on the same  
principle the son of a king is to  be   
called a king4 ,and whether the         
syllables of the name are the same or   
not the same1 makes no difference1      
provided the meaning is retained2  nor  
does the addition or subtraction of a   
letter make any difference so  long as  
the essence of the thing remains in     
possession of the name and  appears in  
it4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what do you mean8 
,,socrates3 ,a very simple matter4 ,i   

may illustrate my meaning by the  names 
of letters1 which you know are not the  
same as the letters  themselves with the
 exception of the four epsilon1 upsilon1
 omicron1  omega2 the names of the rest1
 whether vowels or consonants1 are made 
up  of other letters which we add to    
them2 but so long as we introduce the   
meaning1 and there can be no mistake1   
the name of the letter is quite         
correct4 ,take1 for example1 the letter 
beta--the addition of eta1 tau1  alpha1 
gives no offence1 and does not prevent  
the whole name from  having the value   
which the legislator intended--so well  
did he know how  to give the letters    
names4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i believe you  
are right4    ,,socrates3 ,and may not  
the same be said of a king8 a king will 
often be  the son of a king1 the good   
son or the noble son of a good or noble 
sire2 and similarly the offspring of    
every kind1 in the regular course  of   
nature1 is like the parent1 and         
therefore has the same name4 ,yet the   

syllables may be disguised until they   
appear different to the ignorant        
person1 and he may not recognize them1  
although they are the same1 just  as any
 one of us would not recognize the same 
drugs under different  disguises of     
colour and smell1 although to the       
physician1 who regards  the power of    
them1 they are the same1 and he is not  
put out by the  addition2 and in like   
manner the etymologist is not put out by
 the  addition or transposition or      
subtraction of a letter or two1 or      
indeed  by the change of all the        
letters1 for this need not interfere    
with the  meaning4 ,as was just now     
said1 the names of ,hector and ,astyanax
 have  only one letter alike1 which is  
tau1 and yet they have the same         
meaning4 ,and how little in common with 
the letters of their names has          
,archepolis 7ruler of the city7--and yet
 the meaning is the same4 ,and  there   
are many other names which just mean    
8king40 ,again1 there are  several names

 for a general1 as1 for example1 ,agis  
7leader7 and  ,polemarchus 7chief in    
war7 and ,eupolemus 7good warrior72 and 
others  which denote a physician1 as    
,iatrocles 7famous healer7 and          
,acesimbrotus  7curer of mortals72 and  
there are many others which might be    
cited1  differing in their syllables and
 letters1 but having the same meaning4  
,would you not say so8    ,,hermogenes3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,the same names1   
then1 ought to be assigned to those who 
follow in the course of nature8         
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
what of those who follow out of the     
course of nature1 and  are prodigies8   
for example1 when a good and religious  
man has an  irreligious son1 he ought to
 bear the name not of his father1 but of
  the class to which he belongs1 just as
 in the case which was before  supposed 
of a horse foaling a calf4              
,,hermogenes3 ,quite true4              
,,socrates3 ,then the irreligious son of
 a religious father should be  called   

irreligious8    ,,hermogenes3           
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,he should   
not be called ,theophilus 7beloved of   
,god7 or  ,mnesitheus 7mindful of ,god71
 or any of these names3 if names are    
correctly given1 his should have an     
opposite meaning4    ,,hermogenes3      
,certainly1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3   
,again1 ,hermogenes1 there is ,orestes  
7the man of the  mountains7 who appears 
to be rightly called2 whether chance    
gave the  name1 or perhaps some poet who
 meant to express the brutality and     
fierceness and mountain wildness of his 
hero's nature4    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is
 very likely1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3 
,and his father's name is also according
 to nature4    ,,hermogenes3 ,clearly4  
,,socrates3 ,yes1 for as his name1 so   
also is his nature2 ,agamemnon          
7admirable for remaining7 is one who is 
patient and persevering in the          
accomplishment of his resolves1 and by  
his virtue crowns them2 and his         
continuance at ,troy with all the vast  

army is a proof of that admirable       
endurance in him which is signified by  
the name ,agamemnon4 ,i also think  that
 ,atreus is rightly called2 for his     
murder of ,chrysippus and his  exceeding
 cruelty to ,thyestes are damaging and  
destructive to his  reputation--the name
 is a little altered and disguised so as
 not to be  intelligible to every one1  
but to the etymologist there is no      
difficulty in seeing the meaning1 for   
whether you think of him as  ateires the
 stubborn1 or as atrestos the fearless1 
or as ateros the  destructive one1 the  
name is perfectly correct in every point
 of view4  ,and ,i think that ,pelops is
 also named appropriately2 for1 as the  
name  implies1 he is rightly called     
,pelops who sees what is near only 7o ta
  pelas oron74    ,,hermogenes3 ,how so8
    ,,socrates3 ,because1 according to  
the tradition1 he had no forethought or 
foresight of all the evil which the     
murder of ,myrtilus would entail  upon  
his whole race in remote ages2 he saw   

only what was at hand and               
immediate1--or in other words1 pelas    
7near71 in his eagerness to win         
,hippodamia by all means for his bride4 
,every one would agree that the  name of
 ,tantalus is rightly given and in      
accordance with nature1 if the          
traditions about him are true4          
,,hermogenes3 ,and what are the         
traditions8    ,,socrates3 ,many        
terrible misfortunes are said to have   
happened to him in  his life--last of   
all1 came the utter ruin of his country2
 and after his  death he had the stone  
suspended 7talanteia7 over his head in  
the world  below--all this agrees       
wonderfully well with his name4 ,you    
might imagine  that some person who     
wanted to call him ,talantatos 7the most
 weighted  down by misfortune71         
disguised the name by altering it into  
,tantalus2  and into this form1 by some 
accident of tradition1 it has actually  
been  transmuted4 ,the name of ,zeus1   
who is his alleged father1 has also an  

excellent meaning1 although hard to be  
understood1 because really like  a      
sentence1 which is divided into two     
parts1 for some call him ,zena1  and use
 the one half1 and others who use the   
other half call him ,dia2  the two      
together signify the nature of the ,god1
 and the business of a  name1 as we were
 saying1 is to express the nature4 ,for 
there is none  who is more the author of
 life to us and to all1 than the lord   
and king  of all4 ,wherefore we are     
right in calling him ,zena and ,dia1    
which are  one name1 although divided1  
meaning the ,god through whom all       
creatures  always have life 7di on zen  
aei pasi tois zosin uparchei74 ,there is
 an  irreverence1 at first sight1 in    
calling him son of ,cronos 7who is a    
proverb for stupidity71 and we might    
rather expect ,zeus to be the child  of 
a mighty intellect4 ,which is the fact2 
for this is the meaning of  his father's
 name3 ,kronos quasi ,koros 7,choreo1 to
 sweep71 not in the  sense of a youth1  

but signifying to chatharon chai        
acheraton tou nou1  the pure and        
garnished mind 7sc4 apo tou chorein74   
,he1 as we are  informed by tradition1  
was begotten of ,uranus1 rightly so     
called 7apo  tou oran ta ano7 from      
looking upwards2 which1 as philosophers 
tell us1  is the way to have a pure     
mind1 and the name ,uranus is therefore 
correct4 ,if ,i could remember the      
genealogy of ,hesiod1 ,i would have gone
  on and tried more conclusions of the  
same sort on the remoter ancestors  of  
the ,gods1--then ,i might have seen     
whether this wisdom1 which has come  to 
me all in an instant1 ,i know not       
whence1 will or will not hold good  to  
the end4    ,,hermogenes3 ,you seem to  
me1 ,socrates1 to be quite like a       
prophet newly  inspired1 and to be      
uttering oracles4    ,,socrates3 ,yes1  
,hermogenes1 and ,i believe that ,i     
caught the inspiration  from the great  
,euthyphro of the ,prospaltian deme1 who
 gave me a long  lecture which commenced

 at dawn3 he talked and ,i listened1 and
 his  wisdom and enchanting ravishment  
has not only filled my ears but taken   
possession of my soul1 and to-day ,i    
shall let his superhuman power work  and
 finish the investigation of names--that
 will be the way2 but  to-morrow1 if you
 are so disposed1 we will conjure him   
away1 and make a  purgation of him1 if  
we can only find some priest or sophist 
who is  skilled in purifications of this
 sort4    ,,hermogenes3 ,with all my    
heart2 for am very curious to hear the  
rest of  the enquiry about names4       
,,socrates3 ,then let us proceed2 and   
where would you have us begin1 now  that
 we have got a sort of outline of the   
enquiry8 ,are there any names  which    
witness of themselves that they are not 
given arbitrarily1 but  have a natural  
fitness8 ,the names of heroes and of men
 in general are  apt to be deceptive    
because they are often called after     
ancestors with  whose names1 as we were 
saying1 they may have no business2 or   

they are  the expression of a wish like 
,eutychides 7the son of good fortune71  
or  ,sosias 7the ,saviour71 or          
,theophilus 7the beloved of ,god71 and  
others4  ,but ,i think that we had      
better leave these1 for there will be   
more  chance of finding correctness in  
the names of immutable essences2--there 
ought to have been more care taken about
 them when they were named1 and  perhaps
 there may have been some more than     
human power at work  occasionally in    
giving them names4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i  
think so1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3     
,ought we not to begin with the         
consideration of the ,gods1 and  show   
that they are rightly named ,gods8      
,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 that will be well4  
,,socrates3 ,my notion would be         
something of this sort3--,i suspect that
 the  sun1 moon1 earth1 stars1 and      
heaven1 which are still the ,gods of    
many  barbarians1 were the only ,gods   
known to the aboriginal ,hellenes4      
,seeing  that they were always moving   

and running1 from their running nature  
they were called ,gods or runners       
7,theous1 ,theontas72 and when men      
became acquainted with the other ,gods1 
they proceeded to apply the same  name  
to them all4 ,do you think that likely8 
,,hermogenes3 ,i think it very likely   
indeed4    ,,socrates3 ,what shall      
follow the ,gods8    ,,hermogenes3 ,must
 not demons and heroes and men come     
next8    ,,socrates3 ,demons6 ,and what 
do you consider to be the meaning of    
this  word8 ,tell me if my view is      
right4    ,,hermogenes3 ,let me hear4   
,,socrates3 ,you know how ,hesiod uses  
the word8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i do not4   
,,socrates3 ,do you not remember that he
 speaks of a golden race of men  who    
came first8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 ,i   
do4    ,,socrates3 ,he says of them--   
8,but now that fate has closed over this
 race ,they are holy demons upon  the   
earth1 ,beneficent1 averters of ills1   
guardians of mortal men40  7,hesiod1    
,works and ,days47    ,,hermogenes3     

,what is the inference8    ,,socrates3  
,what is the inference6 ,why1 ,i suppose
 that he means by the  golden men1 not  
men literally made of gold1 but good and
 noble2 and ,i  am convinced of this1   
because he further says that we are the 
iron  race4    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is   
true4    ,,socrates3 ,and do you not    
suppose that good men of our own day    
would by  him be said to be of golden   
race8    ,,hermogenes3 ,very likely4    
,,socrates3 ,and are not the good wise8 
,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 they are wise4      
,,socrates3 ,and therefore ,i have the  
most entire conviction that he  called  
them demons1 because they were daemones 
7knowing or wise71 and  in our older    
,attic dialect the word itself occurs4  
,now he and other  poets say truly1 that
 when a good man dies he has honour and 
a mighty  portion among the dead1 and   
becomes a demon2 which is a name given  
to  him signifying wisdom4 ,and ,i say  
too1 that every wise man who happens  to
 be a good man is more than human       

7daimonion7 both in life and death1  and
 is rightly called a demon4             
,,hermogenes3 ,then ,i rather think that
 ,i am of one mind with you2 but  what  
is the meaning of the word 8hero08      
7,eros with an eta1 in the old  writing 
eros with an epsilon47    ,,socrates3 ,i
 think that there is no difficulty in   
explaining1 for the  name is not much   
altered1 and signifies that they were   
born of love4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what do 
you mean8    ,,socrates3 ,do you not    
know that the heroes are demigods8      
,,hermogenes3 ,what then8    ,,socrates3
 ,all of them sprang either from the    
love of a ,god for a mortal  woman1 or  
of a mortal man for a ,goddess2 think of
 the word in the old  ,attic1 and you   
will see better that the name heros is  
only a slight  alteration of ,eros1 from
 whom the heroes sprang3 either this is 
the  meaning1 or1 if not this1 then they
 must have been skilful as  rhetoricians
 and dialecticians1 and able to put the 
question 7erotan71  for eirein is       

equivalent to legein4 ,and therefore1 as
 ,i was saying1 in  the ,attic dialect  
the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians  
and  questioners4 ,all this is easy     
enough2 the noble breed of heroes are a 
tribe of sophists and rhetors4 ,but can 
you tell me why men are called          
anthropoi8--that is more difficult4     
,,hermogenes3 ,no1 ,i cannot2 and ,i    
would not try even if ,i could1 because 
,i think that you are the more likely to
 succeed4    ,,socrates3 ,that is to    
say1 you trust to the inspiration of    
,euthyphro4    ,,hermogenes3 ,of course4
    ,,socrates3 ,your faith is not vain2
 for at this very moment a new and      
ingenious thought strikes me1 and1 if ,i
 am not careful1 before  to-morrow's    
dawn ,i shall be wiser than ,i ought to 
be4 ,now1 attend to  me2 and first1     
remember that we often put in and pull  
out letters in  words1 and give names as
 we please and change the accents4      
,take1 for  example1 the word ,dii      
,philos2 in order to convert this from a

 sentence  into a noun1 we omit one of  
the iotas and sound the middle syllable 
grave instead of acute2 as1 on the other
 hand1 letters are sometimes  inserted  
in words instead of being omitted1 and  
the acute takes the  place of the grave4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is true4        
,,socrates3 ,the name anthropos1 which  
was once a sentence1 and is now a  noun1
 appears to be a case just of this sort1
 for one letter1 which is  the alpha1   
has been omitted1 and the acute on the  
last syllable has  been changed to a    
grave4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what do you    
mean8    ,,socrates3 ,i mean to say that
 the word 8man0 implies that other      
animals  never examine1 or consider1 or 
look up at what they see1 but that man  
not only sees 7opope7 but considers and 
looks up at that which he sees1  and    
hence he alone of all animals is rightly
 anthropos1 meaning  anathron a opopen4 
,,hermogenes3 ,may ,i ask you to examine
 another word about which ,i am         
curious8    ,,socrates3 ,certainly4     

,,hermogenes3 ,i will take that which   
appears to me to follow next in  order4 
,you know the distinction of soul and   
body8    ,,socrates3 ,of course4        
,,hermogenes3 ,let us endeavour to      
analyze them like the previous words4   
,,socrates3 ,you want me first of all to
 examine the natural fitness of  the    
word psuche 7soul71 and then of the word
 soma 7body78    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,if ,i am to say what occurs
 to me at the moment1 ,i should  imagine
 that those who first used the name     
psuche meant to express that  the soul  
when in the body is the source of life1 
and gives the power of  breath and      
revival 7anapsuchon71 and when this     
reviving power fails  then the body     
perishes and dies1 and this1 if ,i am   
not mistaken1 they  called psyche4 ,but 
please stay a moment2 ,i fancy that ,i  
can discover  something which will be   
more acceptable to the disciples of     
,euthyphro1  for ,i am afraid that they 
will scorn this explanation4 ,what do   

you say  to another8    ,,hermogenes3   
,let me hear4    ,,socrates3 ,what is   
that which holds and carries and gives  
life and  motion to the entire nature of
 the body8 ,what else but the soul8     
,,hermogenes3 ,just that4    ,,socrates3
 ,and do you not believe with           
,anaxagoras1 that mind or soul is  the  
ordering and containing principle of all
 things8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes2 ,i do4  
,,socrates3 ,then you may well call that
 power phuseche which carries and  holds
 nature 7e phusin okei1 kai ekei71 and  
this may be refined away  into psuche4  
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly2 and this      
derivation is1 ,i think1 more scientific
  than the other4    ,,socrates3 ,it is 
so2 but ,i cannot help laughing1 if ,i  
am to suppose that  this was the true   
meaning of the name4    ,,hermogenes3   
,but what shall we say of the next word8
    ,,socrates3 ,you mean soma 7the     
body74    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,that may be variously      
interpreted2 and yet more variously if  

a little permutation is allowed4 ,for   
some say that the body is the  grave    
7sema7 of the soul which may be thought 
to be buried in our  present life2 or   
again the index of the soul1 because the
 soul gives  indications to 7semainei7  
the body2 probably the ,orphic poets    
were the  inventors of the name1 and    
they were under the impression that the 
soul  is suffering the punishment of    
sin1 and that the body is an enclosure  
or prison in which the soul is          
incarcerated1 kept safe 7soma1 sozetai71
  as the name soma implies1 until the   
penalty is paid2 according to this      
view1 not even a letter of the word need
 be changed4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i think1 
,socrates1 that we have said enough of  
this class  of words4 ,but have we any  
more explanations of the names of the   
,gods1  like that which you were giving 
of ,zeus8 ,i should like to know whether
  any similar principle of correctness  
is to be applied to them4    ,,socrates3
 ,yes1 indeed1 ,hermogenes2 and there is

 one excellent principle  which1 as men 
of sense1 we must acknowledge1--that of 
the ,gods we know  nothing1 either of   
their natures or of the names which they
 give  themselves2 but we are sure that 
the names by which they call            
themselves1 whatever they may be1 are   
true4 ,and this is the best of all      
principles2 and the next best is to say1
 as in prayers1 that we will  call them 
by any sort or kind of names or         
patronymics which they like1  because we
 do not know of any other4 ,that also1  
,i think1 is a very good  custom1 and   
one which ,i should much wish to        
observe4 ,let us1 then1 if  you please1 
in the first place announce to them that
 we are not  enquiring about them2 we do
 not presume that we are able to do so2 
but  we are enquiring about the meaning 
of men in giving them these  names1--in 
this there can be small blame4          
,,hermogenes3 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that 
you are quite right1 and ,i would  like 
to do as you say4    ,,socrates3 ,shall 

we begin1 then1 with ,hestia1 according 
to custom8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes1 that  
will be very proper4    ,,socrates3     
,what may we suppose him to have meant  
who gave the name  ,hestia8             
,,hermogenes3 ,that is another and      
certainly a most difficult question4    
,,socrates3 ,my dear ,hermogenes1 the   
first imposers of names must surely     
have been considerable persons2 they    
were philosophers1 and had a good  deal 
to say4    ,,hermogenes3 ,well1 and what
 of them8    ,,socrates3 ,they are the  
men to whom ,i should attribute the     
imposition of  names4 ,even in foreign  
names1 if you analyze them1 a meaning is
 still  discernible4 ,for example1 that 
which we term ousia is by some called   
esia1 and by others again osia4 ,now    
that the essence of things should  be   
called estia1 which is akin to the first
 of these 7esia  estia71 is  rational   
enough4 ,and there is reason in the     
,athenians calling that  estia which    
participates in ousia4 ,for in ancient  

times we too seem to  have said esia for
 ousia1 and this you may note to have   
been the idea  of those who appointed   
that sacrifices should be first offered 
to  estia1 which was natural enough if  
they meant that estia was the  essence  
of things4 ,those again who read osia   
seem to have inclined to  the opinion of
 ,heracleitus1 that all things flow and 
nothing stands2  with them the pushing  
principle 7othoun7 is the cause and     
ruling power  of all things1 and is     
therefore rightly called osia4 ,enough  
of this1  which is all that we who know 
nothing can affirm4 ,next in order after
  ,hestia we ought to consider ,rhea and
 ,cronos1 although the name of  ,cronos 
has been already discussed4 ,but ,i dare
 say that ,i am talking  great nonsense4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,why1 ,socrates8      
,,socrates3 ,my good friend1 ,i have    
discovered a hive of wisdom4            
,,hermogenes3 ,of what nature8          
,,socrates3 ,well1 rather ridiculous1   
and yet plausible4    ,,hermogenes3 ,how

 plausible8    ,,socrates3 ,i fancy to  
myself ,heracleitus repeating wise      
traditions of  antiquity as old as the  
days of ,cronos and ,rhea1 and of which 
,homer  also spoke4    ,,hermogenes3    
,how do you mean8    ,,socrates3        
,heracleitus is supposed to say that all
 things are in motion  and nothing at   
rest2 he compares them to the stream of 
a river1 and  says that you cannot go   
into the same water twice4              
,,hermogenes3 ,that is true4            
,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 how can we     
avoid inferring that he who gave the    
names of ,cronos and ,rhea to the       
ancestors of the ,gods1 agreed pretty   
much in the doctrine of ,heracleitus8   
,is the giving of the names of  streams 
to both of them purely accidental8      
,compare the line in which  ,homer1 and1
 as ,i believe1 ,hesiod also1 tells of  
8,ocean1 the origin of ,gods1 and mother
 ,tethys 7,il4--the line is not  found  
in the extant works of ,hesiod4740      
,and again1 ,orpheus says1 that    8,the

 fair river of ,ocean was the first to  
marry1 and he espoused his  sister      
,tethys1 who was his mother's daughter40
    ,you see that this is a remarkable  
coincidence1 and all in the direction   
of ,heracleitus4    ,,hermogenes3 ,i    
think that there is something in what   
you say1 ,socrates2  but ,i do not      
understand the meaning of the name      
,tethys4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 that is  
almost self-explained1 being only the   
name of a  spring1 a little disguised2  
for that which is strained and filtered 
7diattomenon1 ethoumenon7 may be likened
 to a spring1 and the name  ,tethys is  
made up of these two words4             
,,hermogenes3 ,the idea is ingenious1   
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,to be sure4  
,but what comes next8--of ,zeus we have 
spoken4    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,then let us next take his  
two brothers1 ,poseidon and ,pluto1     
whether the latter is called by that or 
by his other name4    ,,hermogenes3 ,by 
all means4    ,,socrates3 ,poseidon is  

,posidesmos1 the chain of the feet2 the 
original  inventor of the name had been 
stopped by the watery element in his    
walks1 and not allowed to go on1 and    
therefore he called the ruler of  this  
element ,poseidon2 the epsilon was      
probably inserted as an  ornament4 ,yet1
 perhaps1 not so2 but the name may have 
been originally  written with a double  
lamda and not with a sigma1 meaning that
 the ,god  knew many things 7,polla     
eidos74 ,and perhaps also he being the  
shaker of  the earth1 has been named    
from shaking 7seiein71 and then pi and  
delta  have been added4 ,pluto gives    
wealth 7,ploutos71 and his name means   
the  giver of wealth1 which comes out of
 the earth beneath4 ,people in  general 
appear to imagine that the term ,hades  
is connected with the  invisible        
7aeides7 and so they are led by their   
fears to call the ,god  ,pluto instead4 
,,hermogenes3 ,and what is the true     
derivation8    ,,socrates3 ,in spite of 
the mistakes which are made about the   

power of  this deity1 and the foolish   
fears which people have of him1 such as 
the  fear of always being with him after
 death1 and of the soul denuded of  the 
body going to him 7compare ,rep471 my   
belief is that all is quite  consistent1
 and that the office and name of the    
,god really correspond4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,why1 how is that8    ,,socrates3 ,i   
will tell you my own opinion2 but first1
 ,i should like to  ask you which chain 
does any animal feel to be the stronger8
 and which  confines him more to the    
same spot1--desire or necessity8        
,,hermogenes3 ,desire1 ,socrates1 is    
stronger far4    ,,socrates3 ,and do you
 not think that many a one would escape 
from ,hades1  if he did not bind those  
who depart to him by the strongest of   
chains8    ,,hermogenes3 ,assuredly they
 would4    ,,socrates3 ,and if by the   
greatest of chains1 then by some desire1
 as ,i  should certainly infer1 and not 
by necessity8    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is 
clear4    ,,socrates3 ,and there are    

many desires8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,and therefore by the       
greatest desire1 if the chain is to be  
the greatest8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,and is any desire stronger 
than the thought that you will be  made 
better by associating with another8     
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly not4           
,,socrates3 ,and is not that the reason1
 ,hermogenes1 why no one1 who has  been 
to him1 is willing to come back to us8  
,even the ,sirens1 like all  the rest of
 the world1 have been laid under his    
spells4 ,such a charm1  as ,i imagine1  
is the ,god able to infuse into his     
words4 ,and1 according  to this view1 he
 is the perfect and accomplished        
,sophist1 and the great  benefactor of  
the inhabitants of the other world2 and 
even to us who  are upon earth he sends 
from below exceeding blessings4 ,for he 
has much  more than he wants down there2
 wherefore he is called ,pluto 7or the  
rich74 ,note also1 that he will have    
nothing to do with men while they  are  

in the body1 but only when the soul is  
liberated from the desires  and evils of
 the body4 ,now there is a great deal of
 philosophy and  reflection in that2 for
 in their liberated state he can bind   
them with  the desire of virtue1 but    
while they are flustered and maddened by
 the  body1 not even father ,cronos     
himself would suffice to keep them with 
him in his own far-famed chains4        
,,hermogenes3 ,there is a deal of truth 
in what you say4    ,,socrates3 ,yes1   
,hermogenes1 and the legislator called  
him ,hades1 not  from the unseen        
7aeides7--far otherwise1 but from his   
knowledge  7eidenai7 of all noble       
things4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very good2 and
 what do we say of ,demeter1 and ,here1 
and  ,apollo1 and ,athene1 and          
,hephaestus1 and ,ares1 and the other   
deities8    ,,socrates3 ,demeter is e   
didousa meter1 who gives food like a    
mother2  ,here is the lovely one        
7erate7--for ,zeus1 according to        
tradition1 loved  and married her2      

possibly also the name may have been    
given when the  legislator was thinking 
of the heavens1 and may be only a       
disguise of  the air 7aer71 putting the 
end in the place of the beginning4 ,you 
will  recognize the truth of this if you
 repeat the letters of ,here several    
times over4 ,people dread the name of   
,pherephatta as they dread the name  of 
,apollo1--and with as little reason2 the
 fear1 if ,i am not mistaken1  only     
arises from their ignorance of the      
nature of names4 ,but they go  changing 
the name into ,phersephone1 and they are
 terrified at this2  whereas the new    
name means only that the ,goddess is    
wise 7sophe72 for  seeing that all      
things in the world are in motion       
7pheromenon71 that  principle which     
embraces and touches and is able to     
follow them1 is  wisdom4 ,and therefore 
the ,goddess may be truly called        
,pherepaphe  7,pherepapha71 or some name
 like it1 because she touches that which
 is  in motion 7tou pheromenon          

ephaptomene71 herein showing her wisdom4
 ,and  ,hades1 who is wise1 consorts    
with her1 because she is wise4 ,they    
alter  her name into ,pherephatta       
now-a-days1 because the present         
generation  care for euphony more than  
truth4 ,there is the other name1        
,apollo1  which1 as ,i was saying1 is   
generally supposed to have some terrible
  signification4 ,have you remarked this
 fact8    ,,hermogenes3 ,to be sure ,i  
have1 and what you say is true4         
,,socrates3 ,but the name1 in my        
opinion1 is really most expressive of   
the  power of the ,god4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,how so8    ,,socrates3 ,i will        
endeavour to explain1 for ,i do not     
believe that any  single name could have
 been better adapted to express the     
attributes of  the ,god1 embracing and  
in a manner signifying all four of      
them1--music1  and prophecy1 and        
medicine1 and archery4    ,,hermogenes3 
,that must be a strange name1 and ,i    
should like to hear the  explanation4   

,,socrates3 ,say rather an harmonious   
name1 as beseems the ,god of ,harmony4  
,in the first place1 the purgations and 
purifications which doctors and         
diviners use1 and their fumigations with
 drugs magical or medicinal1 as  well as
 their washings and lustral sprinklings1
 have all one and the  same object1     
which is to make a man pure both in body
 and soul4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very true4 
,,socrates3 ,and is not ,apollo the     
purifier1 and the washer1 and the       
absolver from all impurities8           
,,hermogenes3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3
 ,then in reference to his ablutions and
 absolutions1 as being  the physician   
who orders them1 he may be rightly      
called ,apolouon  7purifier72 or in     
respect of his powers of divination1 and
 his truth  and sincerity1 which is the 
same as truth1 he may be most fitly     
called  ,aplos1 from aplous 7sincere71  
as in the ,thessalian dialect1 for all  
the  ,thessalians call him ,aplos2 also 
he is aei ,ballon 7always shooting71    

because he is a master archer who never 
misses2 or again1 the name may  refer to
 his musical attributes1 and then1 as in
 akolouthos1 and  akoitis1 and in many  
other words the alpha is supposed to    
mean  8together10 so the meaning of the 
name ,apollo will be 8moving  together10
 whether in the poles of heaven as they 
are called1 or in the  harmony of song1 
which is termed concord1 because he     
moves all together  by an harmonious    
power1 as astronomers and musicians     
ingeniously  declare4 ,and he is the    
,god who presides over harmony1 and     
makes all  things move together1 both   
among ,gods and among men4 ,and as in   
the  words akolouthos and akoitis the   
alpha is substituted for an omicron1  so
 the name ,apollon is equivalent to     
omopolon2 only the second lambda  is    
added in order to avoid the ill-omened  
sound of destruction  7apolon74 ,now the
 suspicion of this destructive power    
still haunts the  minds of some who do  
not consider the true value of the name1

 which1 as  ,i was saying just now1 has 
reference to all the powers of the ,god1
 who  is the single one1 the            
everdarting1 the purifier1 the mover    
together  7aplous1 aei ,ballon1         
apolouon1 omopolon74 ,the name of the   
,muses and of  music would seem to be   
derived from their making philosophical 
enquiries 7mosthai72 and ,leto is called
 by this name1 because she is  such a   
gentle ,goddess1 and so willing         
7ethelemon7 to grant our  requests2 or  
her name may be ,letho1 as she is often 
called by  strangers--they seem to imply
 by it her amiability1 and her smooth   
and  easy-going way of behaving4        
,artemis is named from her healthy      
7artemes71 well-ordered nature1 and     
because of her love of virginity1       
perhaps because she is a proficient in  
virtue 7arete71 and perhaps also  as    
hating intercourse of the sexes 7ton    
aroton misesasa74 ,he who gave  the     
,goddess her name may have had any or   
all of these reasons4    ,,hermogenes3  

,what is the meaning of ,dionysus and   
,aphrodite8    ,,socrates3 ,son of      
,hipponicus1 you ask a solemn question2 
there is a  serious and also a facetious
 explanation of both these names2 the   
serious explanation is not to be had    
from me1 but there is no objection  to  
your hearing the facetious one2 for the 
,gods too love a joke4  ,dionusos is    
simply didous oinon 7giver of wine71    
,didoinusos1 as he  might be called in  
fun1--and oinos is properly oionous1    
because wine  makes those who drink1    
think 7oiesthai7 that they have a mind  
7noun7  when they have none4 ,the       
derivation of ,aphrodite1 born of the   
foam  7aphros71 may be fairly accepted  
on the authority of ,hesiod4            
,,hermogenes3 ,still there remains      
,athene1 whom you1 ,socrates1 as an     
,athenian1 will surely not forget2 there
 are also ,hephaestus and ,ares4        
,,socrates3 ,i am not likely to forget  
them4    ,,hermogenes3 ,no1 indeed4     
,,socrates3 ,there is no difficulty in  

explaining the other appellation of     
,athene4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what other   
appellation8    ,,socrates3 ,we call her
 ,pallas4    ,,hermogenes3 ,to be sure4 
,,socrates3 ,and we cannot be wrong in  
supposing that this is derived from     
armed dances4 ,for the elevation of     
oneself or anything else above the      
earth1 or by the use of the hands1 we   
call shaking 7pallein71 or  dancing4    
,,hermogenes3 ,that is quite true4      
,,socrates3 ,then that is the           
explanation of the name ,pallas8        
,,hermogenes3 ,yes2 but what do you say 
of the other name8    ,,socrates3       
,athene8    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes4         
,,socrates3 ,that is a graver matter1   
and there1 my friend1 the modern        
interpreters of ,homer may1 ,i think1   
assist in explaining the view of  the   
ancients4 ,for most of these in their   
explanations of the poet1  assert that  
he meant by ,athene 8mind0 7nous7 and   
8intelligence0  7dianoia71 and the maker
 of names appears to have had a singular

 notion  about her2 and indeed calls her
 by a still higher title1 8divine       
intelligence0 7,thou noesis71 as though 
he would say3 ,this is she who  has the 
mind of ,god 7,theonoa72--using alpha as
 a dialectical variety for  eta1 and    
taking away iota and sigma 7,there seems
 to be some error in  the ,,mss4 ,the   
meaning is that the word theonoa        
theounoa is a curtailed  form of theou  
noesis1 but the omitted letters do not  
agree474 ,perhaps1  however1 the name   
,theonoe may mean 8she who knows divine 
things0 7,theia  noousa7 better than    
others4 ,nor shall we be far wrong in   
supposing that  the author of it wished 
to identify this ,goddess with moral    
intelligence 7en ethei noesin71 and     
therefore gave her the name  ethonoe2   
which1 however1 either he or his        
successors have altered into  what they 
thought a nicer form1 and called her    
,athene4    ,,hermogenes3 ,but what do  
you say of ,hephaestus8    ,,socrates3  
,speak you of the princely lord of light

 7,phaeos istora78    ,,hermogenes3     
,surely4    ,,socrates3 ,ephaistos is   
,phaistos1 and has added the eta by     
attraction2  that is obvious to anybody4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is very         
probable1 until some more probable      
notion gets  into your head4            
,,socrates3 ,to prevent that1 you had   
better ask what is the derivation of    
,ares4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what is ,ares8 
,,socrates3 ,ares may be called1 if you 
will1 from his manhood 7arren7 and      
manliness1 or if you please1 from his   
hard and unchangeable nature1  which is 
the meaning of arratos3 the latter is a 
derivation in every  way appropriate to 
the ,god of war4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very 
true4    ,,socrates3 ,and now1 by the   
,gods1 let us have no more of the ,gods1
 for ,i  am afraid of them2 ask about   
anything but them1 and thou shalt see   
how  the steeds of ,euthyphro can       
prance4    ,,hermogenes3 ,only one more 
,god6 ,i should like to know about      
,hermes1 of  whom ,i am said not to be a

 true son4 ,let us make him out1 and    
then ,i  shall know whether there is any
 meaning in what ,cratylus says4        
,,socrates3 ,i should imagine that the  
name ,hermes has to do with speech1  and
 signifies that he is the interpreter   
7ermeneus71 or messenger1 or  thief1 or 
liar1 or bargainer2 all that sort of    
thing has a great deal  to do with      
language2 as ,i was telling you1 the    
word eirein is  expressive of the use of
 speech1 and there is an often-recurring
  ,homeric word emesato1 which means 8he
 contrived0--out of these two  words1   
eirein and mesasthai1 the legislator    
formed the name of the ,god  who        
invented language and speech2 and we may
 imagine him dictating to  us the use of
 this name3 8,o my friends10 says he to 
us1 8seeing that he  is the contriver of
 tales or speeches1 you may rightly call
 him  ,eirhemes40 ,and this has been    
improved by us1 as we think1 into       
,hermes4  ,iris also appears to have    
been called from the verb 8to tell0     

7eirein71  because she was a messenger4 
,,hermogenes3 ,then ,i am very sure that
 ,cratylus was quite right in saying    
that ,i was no true son of ,hermes      
7,ermogenes71 for ,i am not a good hand 
at speeches4    ,,socrates3 ,there is   
also reason1 my friend1 in ,pan being   
the  double-formed son of ,hermes4      
,,hermogenes3 ,how do you make that out8
    ,,socrates3 ,you are aware that     
speech signifies all things 7pan71 and  
is  always turning them round and round1
 and has two forms1 true and false8     
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3
 ,is not the truth that is in him the   
smooth or sacred form  which dwells     
above among the ,gods1 whereas falsehood
 dwells among men  below1 and is rough  
like the goat of tragedy2 for tales and 
falsehoods  have generally to do with   
the tragic or goatish life1 and tragedy 
is  the place of them8    ,,hermogenes3 
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,then surely 
,pan1 who is the declarer of all things 
7pan7 and  the perpetual mover 7aei     

polon7 of all things1 is rightly called 
aipolos 7goat-herd71 he being the       
two-formed son of ,hermes1 smooth in    
his upper part1 and rough and goatlike  
in his lower regions4 ,and1 as  the son 
of ,hermes1 he is speech or the brother 
of speech1 and that  brother should be  
like brother is no marvel4 ,but1 as ,i  
was saying1 my  dear ,hermogenes1 let us
 get away from the ,gods4               
,,hermogenes3 ,from these sort of ,gods1
 by all means1 ,socrates4 ,but why      
should we not discuss another kind of   
,gods--the sun1 moon1 stars1 earth1     
aether1 air1 fire1 water1 the seasons1  
and the year8    ,,socrates3 ,you impose
 a great many tasks upon me4 ,still1 if 
you wish1 ,i  will not refuse4          
,,hermogenes3 ,you will oblige me4      
,,socrates3 ,how would you have me      
begin8 ,shall ,i take first of all him  
whom you mentioned first--the sun8      
,,hermogenes3 ,very good4    ,,socrates3
 ,the origin of the sun will probably be
 clearer in the ,doric  form1 for the   

,dorians call him alios1 and this name  
is given to him  because when he rises  
he gathers 7alizoi7 men together or     
because he is  always rolling in his    
course 7aei eilein ion7 about the earth2
 or from  aiolein1 of which the meaning 
is the same as poikillein 7to           
variegate71  because he variegates the  
productions of the earth4               
,,hermogenes3 ,but what is selene 7the  
moon78    ,,socrates3 ,that name is     
rather unfortunate for ,anaxagoras4     
,,hermogenes3 ,how so8    ,,socrates3   
,the word seems to forestall his recent 
discovery1 that the  moon receives her  
light from the sun4    ,,hermogenes3    
,why do you say so8    ,,socrates3 ,the 
two words selas 7brightness7 and phos   
7light7 have much  the same meaning8    
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,this
 light about the moon is always new     
7neon7 and always old  7enon71 if the   
disciples of ,anaxagoras say truly4 ,for
 the sun in his  revolution always adds 
new light1 and there is the old light of

 the  previous month4    ,,hermogenes3  
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,the moon is 
not unfrequently called selanaia4       
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 as she has a light which is always old 
and always new  7enon neon aei7 she may 
very properly have the name             
selaenoneoaeia2 and  this when hammered 
into shape becomes selanaia4            
,,hermogenes3 ,a real dithyrambic sort  
of name that1 ,socrates4 ,but what do   
you say of the month and the stars8     
,,socrates3 ,meis 7month7 is called from
 meiousthai 7to lessen71 because        
suffering diminution2 the name of astra 
7stars7 seems to be derived  from       
astrape1 which is an improvement on     
anastrope1 signifying the  upsetting of 
the eyes 7anastrephein opa74            
,,hermogenes3 ,what do you say of pur   
7fire7 and udor 7water78    ,,socrates3 
,i am at a loss how to explain pur2     
either the muse of  ,euthyphro has      
deserted me1 or there is some very great
 difficulty in  the word4 ,please1      

however1 to note the contrivance which  
,i adopt  whenever ,i am in a difficulty
 of this sort4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what is
 it8    ,,socrates3 ,i will tell you2   
but ,i should like to know first whether
 you  can tell me what is the meaning of
 the pur8    ,,hermogenes3 ,indeed ,i   
cannot4    ,,socrates3 ,shall ,i tell   
you what ,i suspect to be the true      
explanation of  this and several other  
words8--,my belief is that they are of  
foreign  origin4 ,for the ,hellenes1    
especially those who were under the     
dominion  of the barbarians1 often      
borrowed from them4    ,,hermogenes3    
,what is the inference8    ,,socrates3  
,why1 you know that any one who seeks to
 demonstrate the  fitness of these names
 according to the ,hellenic language1   
and not  according to the language from 
which the words are derived1 is rather  
likely to be at fault4    ,,hermogenes3 
,yes1 certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,well   
then1 consider whether this pur is not  
foreign2 for the  word is not easily    

brought into relation with the ,hellenic
 tongue1 and  the ,phrygians may be     
observed to have the same word slightly 
changed1  just as they have udor 7water7
 and kunes 7dogs71 and many other words4
    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is true4        
,,socrates3 ,any violent interpretations
 of the words should be avoided2  for   
something to say about them may easily  
be found4 ,and thus ,i get rid  of pur  
and udor4 ,aer 7air71 ,hermogenes1 may  
be explained as the element  which      
raises 7airei7 things from the earth1 or
 as ever flowing 7aei  rei71 or because 
the flux of the air is wind1 and the    
poets call the  winds 8air-blasts10     
7aetai72 he who uses the term may mean1 
so to  speak1 air-flux 7aetorroun71 in  
the sense of wind-flux 7pneumatorroun72 
and because this moving wind may be     
expressed by either term he employs  the
 word air 7aer  aetes rheo74 ,aither    
7aether7 ,i should interpret as         
aeitheer2 this may be correctly said1   
because this element is always  running 

in a flux about the air 7aei thei peri  
tou aera reon74 ,the  meaning of the    
word ge 7earth7 comes out better when in
 the form of  gaia1 for the earth may be
 truly called 8mother0 7gaia1           
genneteira71 as  in the language of     
,homer 7,od47 gegaasi means             
gegennesthai4    ,,hermogenes3 ,good4   
,,socrates3 ,what shall we take next8   
,,hermogenes3 ,there are orai 7the      
seasons71 and the two names of the      
year1 eniautos and etos4    ,,socrates3 
,the orai should be spelt in the old    
,attic way1 if you desire  to know the  
probable truth about them2 they are     
rightly called the orai  because they   
divide 7orizousin7 the summers and      
winters and winds and  the fruits of the
 earth4 ,the words eniautos and etos    
appear to be the  same1--8that which    
brings to light the plants and growths  
of the earth  in their turn1 and passes 
them in review within itself 7en eauto  
exetazei703 this is broken up into two  
words1 eniautos from en eauto1  and etos

 from etazei1 just as the original name 
of ,zeus was divided  into ,zena and    
,dia2 and the whole proposition means   
that his power of  reviewing from within
 is one1 but has two names1 two words   
etos and  eniautos being thus formed out
 of a single proposition4               
,,hermogenes3 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 you   
make surprising progress4    ,,socrates3
 ,i am run away with4    ,,hermogenes3  
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,but am not  
yet at my utmost speed4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,i should like very much to know1 in   
the next place1 how you  would explain  
the virtues4 ,what principle of         
correctness is there in  those charming 
words--wisdom1 understanding1 justice1  
and the rest of  them8    ,,socrates3   
,that is a tremendous class of names    
which you are  disinterring2 still1 as  
,i have put on the lion's skin1 ,i must 
not be  faint of heart2 and ,i suppose  
that ,i must consider the meaning of    
wisdom 7phronesis7 and understanding    
7sunesis71 and judgment 7gnome71  and   

knowledge 7episteme71 and all those     
other charming words1 as you  call them8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,surely1 we must not  
leave off until we find out their       
meaning4    ,,socrates3 ,by the dog of  
,egypt ,i have a not bad notion which   
came into  my head only this moment3 ,i 
believe that the primeval givers of     
names  were undoubtedly like too many of
 our modern philosophers1 who1 in  their
 search after the nature of things1 are 
always getting dizzy from  constantly   
going round and round1 and then they    
imagine that the world  is going round  
and round and moving in all directions2 
and this  appearance1 which arises out  
of their own internal condition1 they   
suppose to be a reality of nature2 they 
think that there is nothing  stable or  
permanent1 but only flux and motion1 and
 that the world is  always full of every
 sort of motion and change4 ,the        
consideration of  the names which ,i    
mentioned has led me into making this   
reflection4    ,,hermogenes3 ,how is    

that1 ,socrates8    ,,socrates3 ,perhaps
 you did not observe that in the names  
which have been  just cited1 the motion 
or flux or generation of things is most 
surely  indicated4    ,,hermogenes3 ,no1
 indeed1 ,i never thought of it4        
,,socrates3 ,take the first of those    
which you mentioned2 clearly that is  a 
name indicative of motion4              
,,hermogenes3 ,what was the name8       
,,socrates3 ,phronesis 7wisdom71 which  
may signify phoras kai rhou noesis      
7perception of motion and flux71 or     
perhaps phoras onesis 7the blessing  of 
motion71 but is at any rate connected   
with pheresthai 7motion72  gnome        
7judgment71 again1 certainly implies the
 ponderation or  consideration 7nomesis7
 of generation1 for to ponder is the    
same as to  consider2 or1 if you would  
rather1 here is noesis1 the very word   
just  now mentioned1 which is neou esis 
7the desire of the new72 the word  neos 
implies that the world is always in     
process of creation4 ,the giver  of the 

name wanted to express this longing of  
the soul1 for the  original name was    
neoesis1 and not noesis2 but eta took   
the place of a  double epsilon4 ,the    
word sophrosune is the salvation        
7soteria7 of that  wisdom 7phronesis7   
which we were just now considering4     
,epioteme  7knowledge7 is akin to this1 
and indicates that the soul which is    
good  for anything follows 7epetai7 the 
motion of things1 neither  anticipating 
them nor falling behind them2 wherefore 
the word should  rather be read as      
epistemene1 inserting epsilon nu4       
,sunesis  7understanding7 may be        
regarded in like manner as a kind of    
conclusion2  the word is derived from   
sunienai 7to go along with71 and1 like  
epistasthai 7to know71 implies the      
progression of the soul in company  with
 the nature of things4 ,sophia 7wisdom7 
is very dark1 and appears  not to be of 
native growth2 the meaning is1 touching 
the motion or  stream of things4 ,you   
must remember that the poets1 when they 

speak of  the commencement of any rapid 
motion1 often use the word esuthe 7he   
rushed72 and there was a famous         
,lacedaemonian who was named ,sous      
7,rush71 for by this word the           
,lacedaemonians signify rapid motion1   
and  the touching 7epaphe7 of motion is 
expressed by sophia1 for all things  are
 supposed to be in motion4 ,good        
7agathon7 is the name which is given  to
 the admirable 7agasto7 in nature2 for1 
although all things move1  still there  
are degrees of motion2 some are swifter1
 some slower2 but  there are some things
 which are admirable for their          
swiftness1 and this  admirable part of  
nature is called agathon4 ,dikaiosune   
7justice7 is  clearly dikaiou sunesis   
7understanding of the just72 but the    
actual  word dikaion is more difficult3 
men are only agreed to a certain extent 
about justice1 and then they begin to   
disagree4 ,for those who suppose  all   
things to be in motion conceive the     
greater part of nature to be a  mere    

receptacle2 and they say that there is a
 penetrating power which  passes through
 all this1 and is the instrument of     
creation in all1 and  is the subtlest   
and swiftest element2 for if it were not
 the subtlest1  and a power which none  
can keep out1 and also the swiftest1    
passing by  other things as if they were
 standing still1 it could not penetrate 
through the moving universe4 ,and this  
element1 which superintends all  things 
and pierces 7diaion7 all1 is rightly    
called dikaion2 the letter  k is only   
added for the sake of euphony4 ,thus    
far1 as ,i was saying1  there is a      
general agreement about the nature of   
justice2 but ,i1  ,hermogenes1 being an 
enthusiastic disciple1 have been told in
 a mystery  that the justice of which ,i
 am speaking is also the cause of the   
world3  now a cause is that because of  
which anything is created2 and some one 
comes and whispers in my ear that       
justice is rightly so called because    
partaking of the nature of the cause1   

and ,i begin1 after hearing what  he has
 said1 to interrogate him gently3       
8,well1 my excellent friend10  say ,i1  
8but if all this be true1 ,i still want 
to know what is justice40  ,thereupon   
they think that ,i ask tiresome         
questions1 and am leaping over  the     
barriers1 and have been already         
sufficiently answered1 and they try  to 
satisfy me with one derivation after    
another1 and at length they  quarrel4   
,for one of them says that justice is   
the sun1 and that he only  is the       
piercing 7diaionta7 and burning 7kaonta7
 element which is the  guardian of      
nature4 ,and when ,i joyfully repeat    
this beautiful notion1 ,i  am answered  
by the satirical remark1 8,what1 is     
there no justice in the  world when the 
sun is down80 ,and when ,i earnestly beg
 my questioner to  tell me his own      
honest opinion1 he says1 8,fire in the  
abstract02 but  this is not very        
intelligible4 ,another says1 8,no1 not  
fire in the  abstract1 but the          

abstraction of heat in the fire40       
,another man  professes to laugh at all 
this1 and says1 as ,anaxagoras says1    
that  justice is mind1 for mind1 as they
 say1 has absolute power1 and mixes     
with nothing1 and orders all things1 and
 passes through all things4 ,at  last1  
my friend1 ,i find myself in far greater
 perplexity about the  nature of justice
 than ,i was before ,i began to learn4  
,but still ,i am of  opinion that the   
name1 which has led me into this        
digression1 was given  to justice for   
the reasons which ,i have mentioned4    
,,hermogenes3 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that 
you are not improvising now2 you  must  
have heard this from some one else4     
,,socrates3 ,and not the rest8          
,,hermogenes3 ,hardly4    ,,socrates3   
,well1 then1 let me go on in the hope of
 making you believe in  the originality 
of the rest4 ,what remains after        
justice8 ,i do not think  that we have  
as yet discussed courage                
7andreia71--injustice 7adikia71  which  

is obviously nothing more than a        
hindrance to the penetrating  principle 
7diaiontos71 need not be considered4    
,well1 then1 the name of  andreia seems 
to imply a battle2--this battle is in   
the world of  existence1 and according  
to the doctrine of flux is only the     
counterflux 7enantia rhon73 if you      
extract the delta from andreia1 the     
name at once signifies the thing1 and   
you may clearly understand that  andreia
 is not the stream opposed to every     
stream1 but only to that  which is      
contrary to justice1 for otherwise      
courage would not have been  praised4   
,the words arren 7male7 and aner 7man7  
also contain a similar  allusion to the 
same principle of the upward flux 7te   
ano rhon74 ,gune  7woman7 ,i suspect to 
be the same word as goun 7birth73 thelu 
7female7  appears to be partly derived  
from thele 7the teat71 because the teat 
is  like rain1 and makes things flourish
 7tethelenai74    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is
 surely probable4    ,,socrates3 ,yes2  

and the very word thallein 7to flourish7
 seems to figure  the growth of youth1  
which is swift and sudden ever4 ,and    
this is  expressed by the legislator in 
the name1 which is a compound of thein  
7running71 and allesthai 7leaping74     
,pray observe how ,i gallop away when   
,i get on smooth ground4 ,there are a   
good many names generally thought  to be
 of importance1 which have still to be  
explained4    ,,hermogenes3 ,true4      
,,socrates3 ,there is the meaning of the
 word techne 7art71 for example4        
,,hermogenes3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3
 ,that may be identified with echonoe1  
and expresses the  possession of mind3  
you have only to take away the tau and  
insert two  omichrons1 one between the  
chi and nu1 and another between the nu  
and  eta4    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is a   
very shabby etymology4    ,,socrates3   
,yes1 my dear friend2 but then you know 
that the original  names have been long 
ago buried and disguised by people      
sticking on and  stripping off letters  

for the sake of euphony1 and twisting   
and  bedizening them in all sorts of    
ways3 and time too may have had a share 
in the change4 ,take1 for example1 the  
word katoptron2 why is the letter  rho  
inserted8 ,this must surely be the      
addition of some one who cares  nothing 
about the truth1 but thinks only of     
putting the mouth into  shape4 ,and the 
additions are often such that at last no
 human being can  possibly make out the 
original meaning of the word4 ,another  
example is  the word sphigx1 sphiggos1  
which ought properly to be phigx1       
phiggos1  and there are other examples4 
,,hermogenes3 ,that is quite true1      
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,and yet1 if  
you are permitted to put in and pull out
 any  letters which you please1 names   
will be too easily made1 and any name   
may be adapted to any object4           
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3     
,yes1 that is true4 ,and therefore a    
wise dictator1 like  yourself1 should   
observe the laws of moderation and      

probability4    ,,hermogenes3 ,such is  
my desire4    ,,socrates3 ,and mine1    
too1 ,hermogenes4 ,but do not be too    
much of a  precisian1 or 8you will      
unnerve me of my strength 7,iliad4740   
,when you  have allowed me to add       
mechane 7contrivance7 to techne 7art7 ,i
 shall be  at the top of my bent1 for ,i
 conceive mechane to be a sign of great 
accomplishment--anein2 for mekos has the
 meaning of greatness1 and these  two1  
mekos and anein1 make up the word       
mechane4 ,but1 as ,i was saying1  being 
now at the top of my bent1 ,i should    
like to consider the meaning  of the two
 words arete 7virtue7 and kakia 7vice72 
arete ,i do not as yet  understand1 but 
kakia is transparent1 and agrees with   
the principles  which preceded1 for all 
things being in a flux 7ionton71 kakia  
is kakos  ion 7going badly72 and this   
evil motion when existing in the soul   
has  the general name of kakia1 or vice1
 specially appropriated to it4 ,the     
meaning of kakos ienai may be further   

illustrated by the use of deilia        
7cowardice71 which ought to have come   
after andreia1 but was forgotten1  and1 
as ,i fear1 is not the only word which  
has been passed over4 ,deilia  signifies
 that the soul is bound with a strong   
chain 7desmos71 for lian  means         
strength1 and therefore deilia expresses
 the greatest and  strongest bond of the
 soul2 and aporia 7difficulty7 is an    
evil of the  same nature 7from a 7alpha7
 not1 and poreuesthai to go71 like      
anything  else which is an impediment to
 motion and movement4 ,then the word    
kakia  appears to mean kakos ienai1 or  
going badly1 or limping and halting2 of 
which the consequence is1 that the soul 
becomes filled with vice4 ,and  if kakia
 is the name of this sort of thing1     
arete will be the opposite  of it1      
signifying in the first place ease of   
motion1 then that the  stream of the    
good soul is unimpeded1 and has         
therefore the attribute  of ever flowing
 without let or hindrance1 and is       

therefore called  arete1 or1 more       
correctly1 aeireite 7ever-flowing71 and 
may perhaps  have had another form1     
airete 7eligible71 indicating that      
nothing is  more eligible than virtue1  
and this has been hammered into arete4  
,i  daresay that you will deem this to  
be another invention of mine1 but ,i    
think that if the previous word kakia   
was right1 then arete is also  right4   
,,hermogenes3 ,but what is the meaning  
of kakon1 which has played so great  a  
part in your previous discourse8        
,,socrates3 ,that is a very singular    
word about which ,i can hardly form an  
opinion1 and therefore ,i must have     
recourse to my ingenious device4        
,,hermogenes3 ,what device8             
,,socrates3 ,the device of a foreign    
origin1 which ,i shall give to this     
word also4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very likely
 you are right2 but suppose that we     
leave these  words and endeavour to see 
the rationale of kalon and aischron4    
,,socrates3 ,the meaning of aischron is 

evident1 being only aei ischon  roes    
7always preventing from flowing71 and   
this is in accordance with  our former  
derivations4 ,for the name-giver was a  
great enemy to  stagnation of all sorts1
 and hence he gave the name aeischoroun 
to that  which hindered the flux 7aei   
ischon roun71 and that is now beaten    
together into aischron4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,but what do you say of kalon8         
,,socrates3 ,that is more obscure2 yet  
the form is only due to the  quantity1  
and has been changed by altering omicron
 upsilon into  omicron4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,what do you mean8    ,,socrates3 ,this
 name appears to denote mind4           
,,hermogenes3 ,how so8    ,,socrates3   
,let me ask you what is the cause why   
anything has a name2 is  not the        
principle which imposes the name the    
cause8    ,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,and must not this be the   
mind of ,gods1 or of men1 or of both8   
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,is  
not mind that which called 7kalesan7    

things by their  names1 and is not mind 
the beautiful 7kalon78    ,,hermogenes3 
,that is evident4    ,,socrates3 ,and   
are not the works of intelligence and   
mind worthy of  praise1 and are not     
other works worthy of blame8            
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3
 ,physic does the work of a physician1  
and carpentering does  the works of a   
carpenter8    ,,hermogenes3 ,exactly4   
,,socrates3 ,and the principle of beauty
 does the works of beauty8              
,,hermogenes3 ,of course4    ,,socrates3
 ,and that principle we affirm to be    
mind8    ,,hermogenes3 ,very true4      
,,socrates3 ,then mind is rightly called
 beauty because she does the works      
which we recognize and speak of as the  
beautiful8    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is    
evident4    ,,socrates3 ,what more names
 remain to us8    ,,hermogenes3 ,there  
are the words which are connected with  
agathon and  kalon1 such as sumpheron   
and lusiteloun1 ophelimon1 kerdaleon1   
and  their opposites4    ,,socrates3    

,the meaning of sumpheron 7expedient7 ,i
 think that you may  discover for       
yourself by the light of the previous   
examples1--for it is  a sister word to  
episteme1 meaning just the motion 7pora7
 of the soul  accompanying the world1   
and things which are done upon this     
principle  are called sumphora or       
sumpheronta1 because they are carried   
round with  the world4    ,,hermogenes3 
,that is probable4    ,,socrates3       
,again1 cherdaleon 7gainful7 is called  
from cherdos 7gain71  but you must alter
 the delta into nu if you want to get at
 the meaning2  for this word also       
signifies good1 but in another way2 he  
who gave the  name intended to express  
the power of admixture 7kerannumenon7   
and  universal penetration in the good2 
in forming the word1 however1 he        
inserted a delta instead of a nu1 and so
 made kerdos4    ,,hermogenes3 ,well1   
but what is lusiteloun 7profitable78    
,,socrates3 ,i suppose1 ,hermogenes1    
that people do not mean by the          

profitable the gainful or that which    
pays 7luei7 the retailer1 but they  use 
the word in the sense of swift4 ,you    
regard the profitable  7lusiteloun71 as 
that which being the swiftest thing in  
existence1  allows of no stay in things 
and no pause or end of motion1 but      
always1  if there begins to be any end1 
lets things go again 7luei71 and makes  
motion immortal and unceasing3 and in   
this point of view1 as appears to  me1  
the good is happily denominated         
lusiteloun--being that which looses     
7luon7 the end 7telos7 of motion4       
,ophelimon 7the advantageous7 is        
derived from ophellein1 meaning that    
which creates and increases2 this       
latter is a common ,homeric word1 and   
has a foreign character4                
,,hermogenes3 ,and what do you say of   
their opposites8    ,,socrates3 ,of such
 as are mere negatives ,i hardly think  
that ,i need  speak4    ,,hermogenes3   
,which are they8    ,,socrates3 ,the    
words axumphoron 7inexpedient71         

anopheles 7unprofitable71  alusiteles   
7unadvantageous71 akerdes 7ungainful74  
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,i  
would rather take the words blaberon    
7harmful71 zemiodes  7hurtful74         
,,hermogenes3 ,good4    ,,socrates3 ,the
 word blaberon is that which is said to 
hinder or harm  7blaptein7 the stream   
7roun72 blapton is boulomenon aptein    
7seeking to  hold or bind72 for aptein  
is the same as dein1 and dein is always 
a  term of censure2 boulomenon aptein   
roun 7wanting to bind the stream7  would
 properly be boulapteroun1 and this1 as 
,i imagine1 is improved  into blaberon4 
,,hermogenes3 ,you bring out curious    
results1 ,socrates1 in the use of       
names2 and when ,i hear the word        
boulapteroun ,i cannot help imagining   
that you are making your mouth into a   
flute1 and puffing away at some  prelude
 to ,athene4    ,,socrates3 ,that is the
 fault of the makers of the name1       
,hermogenes2 not  mine4    ,,hermogenes3
 ,very true2 but what is the derivation 

of zemiodes8    ,,socrates3 ,what is the
 meaning of zemiodes8--let me remark1   
,hermogenes1  how right ,i was in saying
 that great changes are made in the     
meaning of  words by putting in and     
pulling out letters2 even a very slight 
permutation will sometimes give an      
entirely opposite sense2 ,i may         
instance the word deon1 which occurs to 
me at the moment1 and reminds  me of    
what ,i was going to say to you1 that   
the fine fashionable  language of modern
 times has twisted and disguised and    
entirely altered  the original meaning  
both of deon1 and also of zemiodes1     
which in the  old language is clearly   
indicated4    ,,hermogenes3 ,what do you
 mean8    ,,socrates3 ,i will try to    
explain4 ,you are aware that our        
forefathers  loved the sounds iota and  
delta1 especially the women1 who are    
most  conservative of the ancient       
language1 but now they change iota into 
eta  or epsilon1 and delta into zeta2   
this is supposed to increase the        

grandeur of the sound4    ,,hermogenes3 
,how do you mean8    ,,socrates3 ,for   
example1 in very ancient times they     
called the day either  imera or emera   
7short e71 which is called by us emera  
7long e74    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is     
true4    ,,socrates3 ,do you observe    
that only the ancient form shows the    
intention  of the giver of the name8 of 
which the reason is1 that men long for  
7imeirousi7 and love the light which    
comes after the darkness1 and is        
therefore called imera1 from imeros1    
desire4    ,,hermogenes3 ,clearly4      
,,socrates3 ,but now the name is so     
travestied that you cannot tell the     
meaning1 although there are some who    
imagine the day to be called emera      
because it makes things gentle 7emera   
different accents74    ,,hermogenes3    
,such is my view4    ,,socrates3 ,and do
 you know that the ancients said duogon 
and not zugon8    ,,hermogenes3 ,they   
did so4    ,,socrates3 ,and zugon 7yoke7
 has no meaning1--it ought to be duogon1

 which  word expresses the binding of   
two together 7duein agoge7 for the      
purpose of drawing2--this has been      
changed into zugon1 and there are  many 
other examples of similar changes4      
,,hermogenes3 ,there are4    ,,socrates3
 ,proceeding in the same train of       
thought ,i may remark that the  word    
deon 7obligation7 has a meaning which is
 the opposite of all the  other         
appellations of good2 for deon is here a
 species of good1 and is1  nevertheless1
 the chain 7desmos7 or hinderer of      
motion1 and therefore  own brother of   
blaberon4    ,,hermogenes3 ,yes1        
,socrates2 that is quite plain4         
,,socrates3 ,not if you restore the     
ancient form1 which is more likely to   
be the correct one1 and read dion       
instead of deon2 if you convert the     
epsilon into an iota after the old      
fashion1 this word will then agree  with
 other words meaning good2 for dion1 not
 deon1 signifies the good1  and is a    
term of praise2 and the author of names 

has not contradicted  himself1 but in   
all these various appellations1 deon    
7obligatory71  ophelimon 7advantageous71
 lusiteloun 7profitable71 kerdaleon     
7gainful71  agathon 7good71 sumpheron   
7expedient71 euporon 7plenteous71 the   
same  conception is implied of the      
ordering or all-pervading principle     
which  is praised1 and the restraining  
and binding principle which is          
censured4 ,and this is further          
illustrated by the word zemiodes        
7hurtful71 which if the zeta is only    
changed into delta as in the  ancient   
language1 becomes demiodes2 and this    
name1 as you will  perceive1 is given to
 that which binds motion 7dounti ion74  
,,hermogenes3 ,what do you say of edone 
7pleasure71 lupe 7pain71 epithumia      
7desire71 and the like1 ,socrates8      
,,socrates3 ,i do not think1            
,hermogenes1 that there is any great    
difficulty about them--edone is e 7eta7 
onesis1 the action which tends  to      
advantage2 and the original form may be 

supposed to have been eone1  but this   
has been altered by the insertion of the
 delta4 ,lupe appears  to be derived    
from the relaxation 7luein7 which the   
body feels when in  sorrow2 ania        
7trouble7 is the hindrance of motion    
7alpha and ienai72  algedon 7distress71 
if ,i am not mistaken1 is a foreign     
word1 which is  derived from aleinos    
7grievous72 odune 7grief7 is called from
 the  putting on 7endusis7 sorrow2 in   
achthedon 7vexation7 8the word too      
labours10 as any one may see2 chara     
7joy7 is the very expression of the     
fluency and diffusion of the soul       
7cheo72 terpsis 7delight7 is so  called 
from the pleasure creeping 7erpon7      
through the soul1 which may  be likened 
to a breath 7pnoe7 and is properly      
erpnoun1 but has been  altered by time  
into terpnon2 eupherosune 7cheerfulness7
 and epithumia  explain themselves2 the 
former1 which ought to be eupherosune   
and has  been changed euphrosune1 is    
named1 as every one may see1 from the   

soul  moving 7pheresthai7 in harmony    
with nature2 epithumia is really e epi  
ton thumon iousa dunamis1 the power     
which enters into the soul2 thumos      
7passion7 is called from the rushing    
7thuseos7 and boiling of the soul2      
imeros 7desire7 denotes the stream      
7rous7 which most draws the soul dia    
ten esin tes roes--because flowing with 
desire 7iemenos71 and expresses  a      
longing after things and violent        
attraction of the soul to them1 and  is 
termed imeros from possessing this      
power2 pothos 7longing7 is  expressive  
of the desire of that which is not      
present but absent1 and  in another     
place 7pou72 this is the reason why the 
name pothos is  applied to things       
absent1 as imeros is to things present2 
eros 7love7  is so called because       
flowing in 7esron7 from without2 the    
stream is not  inherent1 but is an      
influence introduced through the eyes1  
and from  flowing in was called esros   
7influx7 in the old time when they used 

omicron for omega1 and is called eros1  
now that omega is substituted  for      
omicron4 ,but why do you not give me    
another word8    ,,hermogenes3 ,what do 
you think of doxa 7opinion71 and that   
class of  words8    ,,socrates3 ,doxa is
 either derived from dioxis 7pursuit71  
and expresses  the march of the soul in 
the pursuit of knowledge1 or from the   
shooting  of a bow 7toxon72 the latter  
is more likely1 and is confirmed by     
oiesis  7thinking71 which is only oisis 
7moving71 and implies the movement of   
the soul to the essential nature of each
 thing--just as boule 7counsel7  has to 
do with shooting 7bole72 and boulesthai 
7to wish7 combines the  notion of aiming
 and deliberating--all these words seem 
to follow doxa1  and all involve the    
idea of shooting1 just as aboulia1      
absence of  counsel1 on the other hand1 
is a mishap1 or missing1 or mistaking of
  the mark1 or aim1 or proposal1 or     
object4    ,,hermogenes3 ,you are       
quickening your pace now1 ,socrates4    

,,socrates3 ,why yes1 the end ,i now    
dedicate to ,god1 not1 however1 until ,i
  have explained anagke 7necessity71    
which ought to come next1 and  ekousion 
7the voluntary74 ,ekousion is certainly 
the yielding 7eikon7  and               
unresisting--the notion implied is      
yielding and not opposing1  yielding1 as
 ,i was just now saying1 to that motion 
which is in  accordance with our will2  
but the necessary and resistant being   
contrary to our will1 implies error and 
ignorance2 the idea is taken  from      
walking through a ravine which is       
impassable1 and rugged1 and  overgrown1 
and impedes motion--and this is the     
derivation of the word  anagkaion       
7necessary7 an agke ion1 going through a
 ravine4 ,but while my  strength lasts  
let us persevere1 and ,i hope that you  
will persevere  with your questions4    
,,hermogenes3 ,well1 then1 let me ask   
about the greatest and noblest1 such  as
 aletheia 7truth7 and pseudos           
7falsehood7 and on 7being71 not         

forgetting to enquire why the word onoma
 7name71 which is the theme of  our     
discussion1 has this name of onoma4     
,,socrates3 ,you know the word maiesthai
 7to seek78    ,,hermogenes3            
,yes2--meaning the same as zetein 7to   
enquire74    ,,socrates3 ,the word onoma
 seems to be a compressed sentence1     
signifying  on ou zetema 7being for     
which there is a search72 as is still   
more  obvious in onomaston 7notable71   
which states in so many words that real 
existence is that for which there is a  
seeking 7on ou masma72 aletheia  is also
 an agglomeration of theia ale 7divine  
wandering71 implying the  divine motion 
of existence2 pseudos 7falsehood7 is the
 opposite of  motion2 here is another   
ill name given by the legislator to     
stagnation  and forced inaction1 which  
he compares to sleep 7eudein72 but the  
original meaning of the word is         
disguised by the addition of psi2 on    
and ousia are ion with an iota broken   
off2 this agrees with the true          

principle1 for being 7on7 is also moving
 7ion71 and the same may be  said of not
 being1 which is likewise called not    
going 7oukion or ouki  on  ouk ion74    
,,hermogenes3 ,you have hammered away at
 them manfully2 but suppose that  some  
one were to say to you1 what is the word
 ion1 and what are reon  and doun8--show
 me their fitness4    ,,socrates3 ,you  
mean to say1 how should ,i answer him8  
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,one 
way of giving the appearance of an      
answer has been  already suggested4     
,,hermogenes3 ,what way8    ,,socrates3 
,to say that names which we do not      
understand are of foreign  origin2 and  
this is very likely the right answer1   
and something of this  kind may be true 
of them2 but also the original forms of 
words may have  been lost in the lapse  
of ages2 names have been so twisted in  
all  manner of ways1 that ,i should not 
be surprised if the old language when   
compared with that now in use would     
appear to us to be a barbarous  tongue4 

,,hermogenes3 ,very likely4             
,,socrates3 ,yes1 very likely4 ,but     
still the enquiry demands our earnest   
attention and we must not flinch4 ,for  
we should remember1 that if a  person go
 on analysing names into words1 and     
enquiring also into the  elements out of
 which the words are formed1 and keeps  
on always  repeating this process1 he   
who has to answer him must at last give 
up  the enquiry in despair4             
,,hermogenes3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3
 ,and at what point ought he to lose    
heart and give up the  enquiry8 ,must he
 not stop when he comes to the names    
which are the  elements of all other    
names and sentences2 for these cannot be
 supposed  to be made up of other names8
 ,the word agathon 7good71 for example1 
is1  as we were saying1 a compound of   
agastos 7admirable7 and thoos 7swift74  
,and probably thoos is made up of other 
elements1 and these again of  others4   
,but if we take a word which is         
incapable of further resolution1  then  

we shall be right in saying that we have
 at last reached a primary  element1    
which need not be resolved any further4 
,,hermogenes3 ,i believe you to be in   
the right4    ,,socrates3 ,and suppose  
the names about which you are now asking
 should  turn out to be primary         
elements1 must not their truth or law be
  examined according to some new method8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,very likely4         
,,socrates3 ,quite so1 ,hermogenes2 all 
that has preceded would lead to  this   
conclusion4 ,and if1 as ,i think1 the   
conclusion is true1 then ,i  shall again
 say to you1 come and help me1 that ,i  
may not fall into some  absurdity in    
stating the principle of primary names4 
,,hermogenes3 ,let me hear1 and ,i will 
do my best to assist you4    ,,socrates3
 ,i think that you will acknowledge with
 me1 that one principle  is applicable  
to all names1 primary as well as        
secondary--when they are  regarded      
simply as names1 there is no difference 
in them4    ,,hermogenes3 ,certainly    

not4    ,,socrates3 ,all the names that 
we have been explaining were intended to
  indicate the nature of things4        
,,hermogenes3 ,of course4    ,,socrates3
 ,and that this is true of the primary  
quite as much as of the  secondary      
names1 is implied in their being names4 
,,hermogenes3 ,surely4    ,,socrates3   
,but the secondary1 as ,i conceive1     
derive their significance  from the     
primary4    ,,hermogenes3 ,that is      
evident4    ,,socrates3 ,very good2 but 
then how do the primary names which     
precede  analysis show the natures of   
things1 as far as they can be shown2    
which  they must do1 if they are to be  
real names8 ,and here ,i will ask you a 
question3 ,suppose that we had no voice 
or tongue1 and wanted to  communicate   
with one another1 should we not1 like   
the deaf and dumb1  make signs with the 
hands and head and the rest of the body8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,there would be no    
choice1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,we   
should imitate the nature of the thing2 

the elevation of  our hands to heaven   
would mean lightness and upwardness2    
heaviness and  downwardness would be    
expressed by letting them drop to the   
ground2 if  we were describing the      
running of a horse1 or any other animal1
 we  should make our bodies and their   
gestures as like as we could to them4   
,,hermogenes3 ,i do not see that we     
could do anything else4    ,,socrates3  
,we could not2 for by bodily imitation  
only can the body ever  express         
anything4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very true4  
,,socrates3 ,and when we want to express
 ourselves1 either with the voice1  or  
tongue1 or mouth1 the expression is     
simply their imitation of that  which we
 want to express4    ,,hermogenes3 ,it  
must be so1 ,i think4    ,,socrates3    
,then a name is a vocal imitation of    
that which the vocal  imitator names or 
imitates8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i think so4 
,,socrates3 ,nay1 my friend1 ,i am      
disposed to think that we have not      
reached the truth as yet4               

,,hermogenes3 ,why not8    ,,socrates3  
,because if we have we shall be obliged 
to admit that the  people who imitate   
sheep1 or cocks1 or other animals1 name 
that which  they imitate4               
,,hermogenes3 ,quite true4              
,,socrates3 ,then could ,i have been    
right in what ,i was saying8            
,,hermogenes3 ,in my opinion1 no4 ,but  
,i wish that you would tell me1         
,socrates1 what sort of an imitation is 
a name8    ,,socrates3 ,in the first    
place1 ,i should reply1 not a musical   
imitation1  although that is also vocal2
 nor1 again1 an imitation of what music 
imitates2 these1 in my judgment1 would  
not be naming4 ,let me put the  matter  
as follows3 ,all objects have sound and 
figure1 and many have  colour8          
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3
 ,but the art of naming appears not to  
be concerned with  imitations of this   
kind2 the arts which have to do with    
them are music  and drawing8            
,,hermogenes3 ,true4    ,,socrates3     

,again1 is there not an essence of each 
thing1 just as there  is a colour1 or   
sound8 ,and is there not an essence of  
colour and sound  as well as of anything
 else which may be said to have an      
essence8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i should     
think so4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 and if  
any one could express the essence of    
each thing  in letters and syllables1   
would he not express the nature of each 
thing8    ,,hermogenes3 ,quite so4      
,,socrates3 ,the musician and the       
painter were the two names which you    
gave to the two other imitators4 ,what  
will this imitator be called8           
,,hermogenes3 ,i imagine1 ,socrates1    
that he must be the namer1 or           
name-giver1 of whom we are in search4   
,,socrates3 ,if this is true1 then ,i   
think that we are in a condition to     
consider the names ron 7stream71 ienai  
7to go71 schesis 7retention71  about    
which you were asking2 and we may see   
whether the namer has  grasped the      
nature of them in letters and syllables 

in such a manner as  to imitate the     
essence or not4    ,,hermogenes3 ,very  
good4    ,,socrates3 ,but are these the 
only primary names1 or are there others8
    ,,hermogenes3 ,there must be others4
    ,,socrates3 ,so ,i should expect4   
,but how shall we further analyse them1 
and where does the imitator begin8      
,imitation of the essence is made by    
syllables and letters2 ought we not1    
therefore1 first to separate the        
letters1 just as those who are beginning
 rhythm first distinguish the  powers of
 elementary1 and then of compound       
sounds1 and when they have  done so1 but
 not before1 they proceed to the        
consideration of rhythms8               
,,hermogenes3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,must
 we not begin in the same way with      
letters2 first  separating the vowels1  
and then the consonants and mutes       
7letters which  are neither vowels nor  
semivowels71 into classes1 according to 
the  received distinctions of the       
learned2 also the semivowels1 which are 

neither vowels1 nor yet mutes2 and      
distinguishing into classes the  vowels 
themselves8 ,and when we have perfected 
the classification of  things1 we shall 
give them names1 and see whether1 as in 
the case of  letters1 there are any     
classes to which they may be all        
referred 7cf4  ,phaedrus72 and hence we 
shall see their natures1 and see1 too1  
whether  they have in them classes as   
there are in the letters2 and when we   
have  well considered all this1 we shall
 know how to apply them to what they    
resemble--whether one letter is used to 
denote one thing1 or whether  there is  
to be an admixture of several of them2  
just1 as in painting1  the painter who  
wants to depict anything sometimes uses 
purple only1 or  any other colour1 and  
sometimes mixes up several colours1 as  
his method  is when he has to paint     
flesh colour or anything of that        
kind--he uses  his colours as his       
figures appear to require them2 and so1 
too1 we  shall apply letters to the     

expression of objects1 either single    
letters  when required1 or several      
letters2 and so we shall form syllables1
 as  they are called1 and from syllables
 make nouns and verbs2 and thus1 at     
last1 from the combinations of nouns and
 verbs arrive at language1  large and   
fair and whole2 and as the painter made 
a figure1 even so  shall we make speech 
by the art of the namer or the          
rhetorician1 or by  some other art4 ,not
 that ,i am literally speaking of       
ourselves1 but ,i  was carried          
away--meaning to say that this was the  
way in which 7not we  but7 the ancients 
formed language1 and what they put      
together we must  take to pieces in like
 manner1 if we are to attain a          
scientific view of  the whole subject1  
and we must see whether the primary1 and
 also  whether the secondary elements   
are rightly given or not1 for if they   
are not1 the composition of them1 my    
dear ,hermogenes1 will be a sorry  piece
 of work1 and in the wrong direction4   

,,hermogenes3 ,that1 ,socrates1 ,i can  
quite believe4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 but
 do you suppose that you will be able to
 analyse  them in this way8 for ,i am   
certain that ,i should not4             
,,hermogenes3 ,much less am ,i likely to
 be able4    ,,socrates3 ,shall we leave
 them1 then8 or shall we seek to        
discover1 if  we can1 something about   
them1 according to the measure of our   
ability1  saying by way of preface1 as  
,i said before of the ,gods1 that of the
  truth about them we know nothing1 and 
do but entertain human notions of  them4
 ,and in this present enquiry1 let us   
say to ourselves1 before we  proceed1   
that the higher method is the one which 
we or others who would  analyse language
 to any good purpose must follow2 but   
under the  circumstances1 as men say1 we
 must do as well as we can4 ,what do you
  think8    ,,hermogenes3 ,i very much  
approve4    ,,socrates3 ,that objects   
should be imitated in letters and       
syllables1 and  so find expression1 may 

appear ridiculous1 ,hermogenes1 but it  
cannot be  avoided--there is no better  
principle to which we can look for the  
truth  of first names4 ,deprived of     
this1 we must have recourse to divine   
help1  like the tragic poets1 who in any
 perplexity have their gods waiting in  
the air2 and must get out of our        
difficulty in like fashion1 by saying   
that 8the ,gods gave the first names1   
and therefore they are right40  ,this   
will be the best contrivance1 or perhaps
 that other notion may be  even better  
still1 of deriving them from some       
barbarous people1 for the  barbarians   
are older than we are2 or we may say    
that antiquity has cast  a veil over    
them1 which is the same sort of excuse  
as the last2 for all  these are not     
reasons but only ingenious excuses for  
having no reasons  concerning the truth 
of words4 ,and yet any sort of ignorance
 of first  or primitive names involves  
an ignorance of secondary words2 for    
they  can only be explained by the      

primary4 ,clearly then the professor of 
languages should be able to give a very 
lucid explanation of first  names1 or   
let him be assured he will only talk    
nonsense about the rest4  ,do you not   
suppose this to be true8                
,,hermogenes3 ,certainly1 ,socrates4    
,,socrates3 ,my first notions of        
original names are truly wild and       
ridiculous1 though ,i have no objection 
to impart them to you if you  desire1   
and ,i hope that you will communicate to
 me in return anything  better which you
 may have4    ,,hermogenes3 ,fear not2  
,i will do my best4    ,,socrates3 ,in  
the first place1 the letter rho appears 
to me to be the  general instrument     
expressing all motion 7kinesis74 ,but ,i
 have not yet  explained the meaning of 
this latter word1 which is just iesis   
7going72  for the letter eta was not in 
use among the ancients1 who only        
employed  epsilon2 and the root is      
kiein1 which is a foreign form1 the same
 as  ienai4 ,and the old word kinesis   

will be correctly given as iesis in     
corresponding modern letters4 ,assuming 
this foreign root kiein1 and  allowing  
for the change of the eta and the       
insertion of the nu1 we have  kinesis1  
which should have been kieinsis or      
eisis2 and stasis is the  negative of   
ienai 7or eisis71 and has been improved 
into stasis4 ,now  the letter rho1 as ,i
 was saying1 appeared to the imposer of 
names an  excellent instrument for the  
expression of motion2 and he frequently 
uses the letter for this purpose3 for   
example1 in the actual words rein  and  
roe he represents motion by rho2 also in
 the words tromos  7trembling71 trachus 
7rugged72 and again1 in words such as   
krouein  7strike71 thrauein 7crush71    
ereikein 7bruise71 thruptein 7break71   
kermatixein 7crumble71 rumbein 7whirl73 
of all these sorts of movements  he     
generally finds an expression in the    
letter ,r1 because1 as ,i  imagine1 he  
had observed that the tongue was most   
agitated and least at  rest in the      

pronunciation of this letter1 which he  
therefore used in  order to express     
motion1 just as by the letter iota he   
expresses the  subtle elements which    
pass through all things4 ,this is why he
 uses the  letter iota as imitative of  
motion1 ienai1 iesthai4 ,and there is   
another class of letters1 phi1 psi1     
sigma1 and xi1 of which the             
pronunciation is accompanied by great   
expenditure of breath2 these are  used  
in the imitation of such notions as     
psuchron 7shivering71 xeon  7seething71 
seiesthai1 7to be shaken71 seismos      
7shock71 and are always  introduced by  
the giver of names when he wants to     
imitate what is  phusodes 7windy74 ,he  
seems to have thought that the closing  
and  pressure of the tongue in the      
utterance of delta and tau was          
expressive  of binding and rest in a    
place3 he further observed the liquid   
movement  of lambda1 in the             
pronunciation of which the tongue slips1
 and in this  he found the expression of

 smoothness1 as in leios 7level71 and in
 the  word oliothanein 7to slip7 itself1
 liparon 7sleek71 in the word  kollodes 
7gluey71 and the like3 the heavier sound
 of gamma detained the  slipping tongue1
 and the union of the two gave the      
notion of a  glutinous clammy nature1 as
 in glischros1 glukus1 gloiodes4 ,the nu
 he  observed to be sounded from within1
 and therefore to have a notion of      
inwardness2 hence he introduced the     
sound in endos and entos3 alpha he      
assigned to the expression of size1 and 
nu of length1 because they are  great   
letters3 omicron was the sign of        
roundness1 and therefore there  is      
plenty of omicron mixed up in the word  
goggulon 7round74 ,thus did  the        
legislator1 reducing all things into    
letters and syllables1 and  impressing  
on them names and signs1 and out of them
 by imitation  compounding other signs4 
,that is my view1 ,hermogenes1 of the   
truth of  names2 but ,i should like to  
hear what ,cratylus has more to say4    

,,hermogenes3 ,but1 ,socrates1 as ,i was
 telling you before1 ,cratylus          
mystifies me2 he says that there is a   
fitness of names1 but he never  explains
 what is this fitness1 so that ,i cannot
 tell whether his  obscurity is intended
 or not4 ,tell me now1 ,cratylus1 here  
in the  presence of ,socrates1 do you   
agree in what ,socrates has been saying 
about names1 or have you something      
better of your own8 and if you have1    
tell me what your view is1 and then you 
will either learn of ,socrates1  or     
,socrates and ,i will learn of you4     
,,cratylus3 ,well1 but surely1          
,hermogenes1 you do not suppose that you
 can  learn1 or ,i explain1 any subject 
of importance all in a moment2 at any   
rate1 not such a subject as language1   
which is1 perhaps1 the very  greatest of
 all4    ,,hermogenes3 ,no1 indeed2 but1
 as ,hesiod says1 and ,i agree with him1
 8to  add little to little0 is worth    
while4 ,and1 therefore1 if you think    
that  you can add anything at all1      

however small1 to our knowledge1 take a 
little trouble and oblige ,socrates1 and
 me too1 who certainly have a  claim    
upon you4    ,,socrates3 ,i am by no    
means positive1 ,cratylus1 in the view  
which  ,hermogenes and myself have      
worked out2 and therefore do not        
hesitate to  say what you think1 which  
if it be better than my own view ,i     
shall  gladly accept4 ,and ,i should not
 be at all surprized to find that you   
have found some better notion4 ,for you 
have evidently reflected on  these      
matters and have had teachers1 and if   
you have really a better  theory of the 
truth of names1 you may count me in the 
number of your  disciples4              
,,cratylus3 ,you are right1 ,socrates1  
in saying that ,i have made a study  of 
these matters1 and ,i might possibly    
convert you into a disciple4 ,but  ,i   
fear that the opposite is more probable1
 and ,i already find myself  moved to   
say to you what ,achilles in the        
8,prayers0 says to ,ajax1--             

8,illustrious ,ajax1 son of ,telamon1   
lord of the people1 ,you appear to  have
 spoken in all things much to my mind40 
,and you1 ,socrates1 appear to me to be 
an oracle1 and to give answers  much to 
my mind1 whether you are inspired by    
,euthyphro1 or whether some  ,muse may  
have long been an inhabitant of your    
breast1 unconsciously to  yourself4     
,,socrates3 ,excellent ,cratylus1 ,i    
have long been wondering at my own      
wisdom2 ,i cannot trust myself4 ,and ,i 
think that ,i ought to stop and ask     
myself ,what am ,i saying8 for there is 
nothing worse than  self-deception--when
 the deceiver is always at home and     
always with  you--it is quite terrible1 
and therefore ,i ought often to retrace 
my  steps and endeavour to 8look fore   
and aft10 in the words of the  aforesaid
 ,homer4 ,and now let me see2 where are 
we8 ,have we not been  saying that the  
correct name indicates the nature of the
 thing3--has  this proposition been     
sufficiently proven8    ,,cratylus3     

,yes1 ,socrates1 what you say1 as ,i am 
disposed to think1 is  quite true4      
,,socrates3 ,names1 then1 are given in  
order to instruct8    ,,cratylus3       
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and naming  
is an art1 and has artificers8          
,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and   
who are they8    ,,cratylus3 ,the       
legislators1 of whom you spoke at first4
    ,,socrates3 ,and does this art grow 
up among men like other arts8 ,let me   
explain what ,i mean3 of painters1 some 
are better and some worse8              
,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,the   
better painters execute their works1 ,i 
mean their  figures1 better1 and the    
worse execute them worse2 and of        
builders  also1 the better sort build   
fairer houses1 and the worse build them 
worse4    ,,cratylus3 ,true4            
,,socrates3 ,and among legislators1     
there are some who do their work  better
 and some worse8    ,,cratylus3 ,no2    
there ,i do not agree with you4         
,,socrates3 ,then you do not think that 

some laws are better and others  worse8 
,,cratylus3 ,no1 indeed4    ,,socrates3 
,or that one name is better than        
another8    ,,cratylus3 ,certainly not4 
,,socrates3 ,then all names are rightly 
imposed8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes1 if they   
are names at all4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 
what do you say to the name of our      
friend ,hermogenes1  which was mentioned
 before3--assuming that he has nothing  
of the nature  of ,hermes in him1 shall 
we say that this is a wrong name1 or not
 his  name at all8    ,,cratylus3 ,i    
should reply that ,hermogenes is not his
 name at all1 but  only appears to be   
his1 and is really the name of somebody 
else1 who  has the nature which         
corresponds to it4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
if a man were to call him ,hermogenes1  
would he not be  even speaking falsely8 
,for there may be a doubt whether you   
can call  him ,hermogenes1 if he is not4
    ,,cratylus3 ,what do you mean8      
,,socrates3 ,are you maintaining that   
falsehood is impossible8 ,for if this   

is your meaning ,i should answer1 that  
there have been plenty of liars  in all 
ages4    ,,cratylus3 ,why1 ,socrates1   
how can a man say that which is         
not8--say  something and yet say        
nothing8 ,for is not falsehood saying   
the thing  which is not8    ,,socrates3 
,your argument1 friend1 is too subtle   
for a man of my age4 ,but  ,i should    
like to know whether you are one of     
those philosophers who  think that      
falsehood may be spoken but not said8   
,,cratylus3 ,neither spoken nor said4   
,,socrates3 ,nor uttered nor addressed8 
,for example3 ,if a person1 saluting    
you in a foreign country1 were to take  
your hand and say3 8,hail1  ,athenian   
stranger1 ,hermogenes1 son of           
,smicrion0--these words1 whether        
spoken1 said1 uttered1 or addressed1    
would have no application to you  but   
only to our friend ,hermogenes1 or      
perhaps to nobody at all8    ,,cratylus3
 ,in my opinion1 ,socrates1 the speaker 
would only be talking  nonsense4        

,,socrates3 ,well1 but that will be     
quite enough for me1 if you will tell   
me whether the nonsense would be true or
 false1 or partly true and  partly      
false3--which is all that ,i want to    
know4    ,,cratylus3 ,i should say that 
he would be putting himself in motion to
 no  purpose2 and that his words would  
be an unmeaning sound like the noise  of
 hammering at a brazen pot4             
,,socrates3 ,but let us see1 ,cratylus1 
whether we cannot find a  meeting-point1
 for you would admit that the name is   
not the same with  the thing named8     
,,cratylus3 ,i should4    ,,socrates3   
,and would you further acknowledge that 
the name is an  imitation of the thing8 
,,cratylus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3  
,and you would say that pictures are    
also imitations of  things1 but in      
another way8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes4       
,,socrates3 ,i believe you may be right1
 but ,i do not rightly understand  you4 
,please to say1 then1 whether both sorts
 of imitation 7,i mean both  pictures or

 words7 are not equally attributable and
 applicable to the  things of which they
 are the imitation4    ,,cratylus3 ,they
 are4    ,,socrates3 ,first look at the 
matter thus3 you may attribute the      
likeness  of the man to the man1 and of 
the woman to the woman2 and so on8      
,,cratylus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3  
,and conversely you may attribute the   
likeness of the man to  the woman1 and  
of the woman to the man8    ,,cratylus3 
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,and are both
 modes of assigning them right1 or only 
the  first8    ,,cratylus3 ,only the    
first4    ,,socrates3 ,that is to say1  
the mode of assignment which attributes 
to  each that which belongs to them and 
is like them8    ,,cratylus3 ,that is my
 view4    ,,socrates3 ,now then1 as ,i  
am desirous that we being friends should
 have  a good understanding about the   
argument1 let me state my view to you3  
the first mode of assignment1 whether   
applied to figures or to names1 ,i  call
 right1 and when applied to names only1 

true as well as right2 and  the other   
mode of giving and assigning the name   
which is unlike1 ,i call  wrong1 and in 
the case of names1 false as well as     
wrong4    ,,cratylus3 ,that may be true1
 ,socrates1 in the case of pictures2    
they may  be wrongly assigned2 but not  
in the case of names--they must be      
always  right4    ,,socrates3 ,why1 what
 is the difference8 ,may ,i not go to a 
man and say to  him1 8,this is your     
picture10 showing him his own likeness1 
or perhaps  the likeness of a woman2 and
 when ,i say 8show10 ,i mean bring      
before the  sense of sight4             
,,cratylus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3  
,and may ,i not go to him again1 and    
say1 8,this is your  name08--for the    
name1 like the picture1 is an imitation4
 ,may ,i not say  to him--8,this is your
 name08 and may ,i not then bring to his
 sense of  hearing the imitation of     
himself1 when ,i say1 8,this is a man02 
or of a  female of the human species1   
when ,i say1 8,this is a woman10 as the 

case  may be8 ,is not all that quite    
possible8    ,,cratylus3 ,i would fain  
agree with you1 ,socrates2 and therefore
 ,i say1  ,granted4    ,,socrates3 ,that
 is very good of you1 if ,i am right1   
which need hardly be  disputed at       
present4 ,but if ,i can assign names as 
well as pictures to  objects1 the right 
assignment of them we may call truth1   
and the wrong  assignment of them       
falsehood4 ,now if there be such a wrong
 assignment  of names1 there may also be
 a wrong or inappropriate assignment of 
verbs2 and if of names and verbs then of
 the sentences1 which are made  up of   
them4 ,what do you say1 ,cratylus8      
,,cratylus3 ,i agree2 and think that    
what you say is very true4              
,,socrates3 ,and further1 primitive     
nouns may be compared to pictures1 and  
in pictures you may either give all the 
appropriate colours and  figures1 or you
 may not give them all--some may be     
wanting2 or there may  be too many or   
too much of them--may there not8        

,,cratylus3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3  
,and he who gives all gives a perfect   
picture or figure2 and  he who takes    
away or adds also gives a picture or    
figure1 but not a  good one4            
,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,in    
like manner1 he who by syllables and    
letters imitates the  nature of things1 
if he gives all that is appropriate will
 produce a  good image1 or in other     
words a name2 but if he subtracts or    
perhaps  adds a little1 he will make an 
image but not a good one2 whence ,i     
infer  that some names are well and     
others ill made4    ,,cratylus3 ,that is
 true4    ,,socrates3 ,then the artist  
of names may be sometimes good1 or he   
may be  bad8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes4       
,,socrates3 ,and this artist of names is
 called the legislator8    ,,cratylus3  
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then like other   
artists the legislator may be good or he
 may  be bad2 it must surely be so if   
our former admissions hold good8        
,,cratylus3 ,very true1 ,socrates2 but  

the case of language1 you see1 is       
different2 for when by the help of      
grammar we assign the letters alpha  or 
beta1 or any other letters to a certain 
name1 then1 if we add1 or  subtract1 or 
misplace a letter1 the name which is    
written is not only  written wrongly1   
but not written at all2 and in any of   
these cases  becomes other than a name4 
,,socrates3 ,but ,i doubt whether your  
view is altogether correct1  ,cratylus4 
,,cratylus3 ,how so8    ,,socrates3 ,i  
believe that what you say may be true   
about numbers1 which  must be just what 
they are1 or not be at all2 for example1
 the number  ten at once becomes other  
than ten if a unit be added or          
subtracted1  and so of any other number3
 but this does not apply to that which  
is  qualitative or to anything which is 
represented under an image4 ,i  should  
say rather that the image1 if expressing
 in every point the  entire reality1    
would no longer be an image4 ,let us    
suppose the  existence of two objects3  

one of them shall be ,cratylus1 and the 
other  the image of ,cratylus2 and we   
will suppose1 further1 that some ,god   
makes not only a representation such as 
a painter would make of your  outward   
form and colour1 but also creates an    
inward organization like  yours1 having 
the same warmth and softness2 and into  
this infuses  motion1 and soul1 and     
mind1 such as you have1 and in a word   
copies all  your qualities1 and places  
them by you in another form2 would you  
say  that this was ,cratylus and the    
image of ,cratylus1 or that there were  
two ,cratyluses8    ,,cratylus3 ,i      
should say that there were two          
,cratyluses4    ,,socrates3 ,then you   
see1 my friend1 that we must find some  
other  principle of truth in images1 and
 also in names2 and not insist that an  
image is no longer an image when        
something is added or subtracted4 ,do   
you not perceive that images are very   
far from having qualities which  are the
 exact counterpart of the realities     

which they represent8    ,,cratylus3    
,yes1 ,i see4    ,,socrates3 ,but then  
how ridiculous would be the effect of   
names on  things1 if they were exactly  
the same with them6 ,for they would be  
the  doubles of them1 and no one would  
be able to determine which were the     
names and which were the realities4     
,,cratylus3 ,quite true4    ,,socrates3 
,then fear not1 but have the courage to 
admit that one name  may be correctly   
and another incorrectly given2 and do   
not insist that  the name shall be      
exactly the same with the thing2 but    
allow the  occasional substitution of a 
wrong letter1 and if of a letter also of
 a  noun in a sentence1 and if of a noun
 in a sentence also of a sentence  which
 is not appropriate to the matter1 and  
acknowledge that the thing  may be      
named1 and described1 so long as the    
general character of the  thing which   
you are describing is retained2 and     
this1 as you will  remember1 was        
remarked by ,hermogenes and myself in   

the particular  instance of the names of
 the letters4    ,,cratylus3 ,yes1 ,i   
remember4    ,,socrates3 ,good2 and when
 the general character is preserved1    
even if  some of the proper letters are 
wanting1 still the thing is             
signified2--well1 if all the letters are
 given2 not well1 when only a  few of   
them are given4 ,i think that we had    
better admit this1 lest we  be punished 
like travellers in ,aegina who wander   
about the street late  at night3 and be 
likewise told by truth herself that we  
have arrived  too late2 or if not1 you  
must find out some new notion of        
correctness  of names1 and no longer    
maintain that a name is the expression  
of a  thing in letters or syllables2 for
 if you say both1 you will be           
inconsistent with yourself4             
,,cratylus3 ,i quite acknowledge1       
,socrates1 what you say to be very      
reasonable4    ,,socrates3 ,then as we  
are agreed thus far1 let us ask         
ourselves whether  a name rightly       

imposed ought not to have the proper    
letters4    ,,cratylus3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,and the proper letters are 
those which are like the things8        
,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,enough
 then of names which are rightly given4 
,and in names  which are incorrectly    
given1 the greater part may be supposed 
to be  made up of proper and similar    
letters1 or there would be no likeness2 
but there will be likewise a part which 
is improper and spoils the  beauty and  
formation of the word3 you would admit  
that8    ,,cratylus3 ,there would be no 
use1 ,socrates1 in my quarrelling with  
you1  since ,i cannot be satisfied that 
a name which is incorrectly given is a  
name at all4    ,,socrates3 ,do you     
admit a name to be the representation of
 a thing8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes1 ,i do4   
,,socrates3 ,but do you not allow that  
some nouns are primitive1 and some      
derived8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes1 ,i do4    
,,socrates3 ,then if you admit that     
primitive or first nouns are            

representations of things1 is there any 
better way of framing  representations  
than by assimilating them to the objects
 as much as you  can2 or do you prefer  
the notion of ,hermogenes and of many   
others1 who  say that names are         
conventional1 and have a meaning to     
those who have  agreed about them1 and  
who have previous knowledge of the      
things  intended by them1 and that      
convention is the only principle2 and   
whether you abide by our present        
convention1 or make a new and opposite  
one1 according to which you call small  
great and great small--that1 they  would
 say1 makes no difference1 if you are   
only agreed4 ,which of these  two       
notions do you prefer8    ,,cratylus3   
,representation by likeness1 ,socrates1 
is infinitely better  than              
representation by any chance sign4      
,,socrates3 ,very good3 but if the name 
is to be like the thing1 the  letters   
out of which the first names are        
composed must also be like  things4     

,returning to the image of the picture1 
,i would ask1 ,how could  any one ever  
compose a picture which would be like   
anything at all1 if  there were not     
pigments in nature which resembled the  
things imitated1  and out of which the  
picture is composed8    ,,cratylus3     
,impossible4    ,,socrates3 ,no more    
could names ever resemble any actually  
existing  thing1 unless the original    
elements of which they are compounded   
bore  some degree of resemblance to the 
objects of which the names are the      
imitation3 ,and the original elements   
are letters8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes4       
,,socrates3 ,let me now invite you to   
consider what ,hermogenes and ,i were   
saying about sounds4 ,do you agree with 
me that the letter rho is  expressive of
 rapidity1 motion1 and hardness8 ,were  
we right or wrong in  saying so8        
,,cratylus3 ,i should say that you were 
right4    ,,socrates3 ,and that lamda   
was expressive of smoothness1 and       
softness1  and the like8    ,,cratylus3 

,there again you were right4            
,,socrates3 ,and yet1 as you are aware1 
that which is called by us  sklerotes1  
is by the ,eretrians called skleroter4  
,,cratylus3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3  
,but are the letters rho and sigma      
equivalents2 and is there  the same     
significance to them in the termination 
rho1 which there is to  us in sigma1 or 
is there no significance to one of us8  
,,cratylus3 ,nay1 surely there is a     
significance to both of us4             
,,socrates3 ,in as far as they are like1
 or in as far as they are unlike8       
,,cratylus3 ,in as far as they are like4
    ,,socrates3 ,are they altogether    
alike8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes2 for the     
purpose of expressing motion4           
,,socrates3 ,and what do you say of the 
insertion of the lamda8 for that  is    
expressive not of hardness but of       
softness4    ,,cratylus3 ,why1 perhaps  
the letter lamda is wrongly inserted1   
,socrates1  and should be altered into  
rho1 as you were saying to ,hermogenes  

and in  my opinion rightly1 when you    
spoke of adding and subtracting letters 
upon occasion4    ,,socrates3 ,good4    
,but still the word is intelligible to  
both of us2 when  ,i say skleros 7hard71
 you know what ,i mean4    ,,cratylus3  
,yes1 my dear friend1 and the           
explanation of that is custom4          
,,socrates3 ,and what is custom but     
convention8 ,i utter a sound which ,i   
understand1 and you know that ,i        
understand the meaning of the sound3    
this is what you are saying8            
,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and if
 when ,i speak you know my meaning1     
there is an  indication given by me to  
you8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3
 ,this indication of my meaning may     
proceed from unlike as well  as from    
like1 for example in the lamda of       
sklerotes4 ,but if this is  true1 then  
you have made a convention with         
yourself1 and the  correctness of a name
 turns out to be convention1 since      
letters which  are unlike are indicative

 equally with those which are like1 if  
they  are sanctioned by custom and      
convention4 ,and even supposing that you
  distinguish custom from convention    
ever so much1 still you must say  that  
the signification of words is given by  
custom and not by likeness1  for custom 
may indicate by the unlike as well as by
 the like4 ,but as we  are agreed thus  
far1 ,cratylus 7for ,i shall assume that
 your silence  gives consent71 then     
custom and convention must be supposed  
to  contribute to the indication of our 
thoughts2 for suppose we take the       
instance of number1 how can you ever    
imagine1 my good friend1 that you  will 
find names resembling every individual  
number1 unless you allow  that which you
 term convention and agreement to have  
authority in  determining the           
correctness of names8 ,i quite agree    
with you that words  should as far as   
possible resemble things2 but ,i fear   
that this  dragging in of resemblance1  
as ,hermogenes says1 is a shabby thing1 

which has to be supplemented by the     
mechanical aid of convention with a     
view to correctness2 for ,i believe that
 if we could always1 or almost  always1 
use likenesses1 which are perfectly     
appropriate1 this would be  the most    
perfect state of language2 as the       
opposite is the most  imperfect4 ,but   
let me ask you1 what is the force of    
names1 and what is  the use of them8    
,,cratylus3 ,the use of names1          
,socrates1 as ,i should imagine1 is to  
inform3 the simple truth is1 that he who
 knows names knows also the  things     
which are expressed by them4            
,,socrates3 ,i suppose you mean to say1 
,cratylus1 that as the name is1 so  also
 is the thing2 and that he who knows the
 one will also know the  other1 because 
they are similars1 and all similars fall
 under the same  art or science2 and    
therefore you would say that he who     
knows names  will also know things4     
,,cratylus3 ,that is precisely what ,i  
mean4    ,,socrates3 ,but let us        

consider what is the nature of this     
information  about things which1        
according to you1 is given us by names4 
,is it the  best sort of information8 or
 is there any other8 ,what do you say8  
,,cratylus3 ,i believe that to be both  
the only and the best sort of           
information about them2 there can be no 
other4    ,,socrates3 ,but do you       
believe that in the discovery of them1  
he who  discovers the names discovers   
also the things2 or is this only the    
method of instruction1 and is there some
 other method of enquiry and  discovery4
    ,,cratylus3 ,i certainly believe    
that the methods of enquiry and         
discovery  are of the same nature as    
instruction4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 but  
do you not see1 ,cratylus1 that he who  
follows names  in the search after      
things1 and analyses their meaning1 is  
in great  danger of being deceived8     
,,cratylus3 ,how so8    ,,socrates3 ,why
 clearly he who first gave names gave   
them according to  his conception of the

 things which they signified--did he    
not8    ,,cratylus3 ,true4              
,,socrates3 ,and if his conception was  
erroneous1 and he gave names  according 
to his conception1 in what position     
shall we who are his  followers find    
ourselves8 ,shall we not be deceived by 
him8    ,,cratylus3 ,but1 ,socrates1 am 
,i not right in thinking that he must   
surely  have known2 or else1 as ,i was  
saying1 his names would not be names at 
all8 ,and you have a clear proof that he
 has not missed the truth1 and  the     
proof is--that he is perfectly          
consistent4 ,did you ever observe in    
speaking that all the words which you   
utter have a common character and       
purpose8    ,,socrates3 ,but that1      
friend ,cratylus1 is no answer4 ,for if 
he did begin  in error1 he may have     
forced the remainder into agreement with
 the  original error and with himself2  
there would be nothing strange in  this1
 any more than in geometrical diagrams1 
which have often a slight  and invisible

 flaw in the first part of the process1 
and are  consistently mistaken in the   
long deductions which follow4 ,and this 
is  the reason why every man should     
expend his chief thought and attention  
on the consideration of his first       
principles3--are they or are they not   
rightly laid down8 and when he has duly 
sifted them1 all the rest will  follow4 
,now ,i should be astonished to find    
that names are really  consistent4 ,and 
here let us revert to our former        
discussion3 ,were we  not saying that   
all things are in motion and progress   
and flux1 and  that this idea of motion 
is expressed by names8 ,do you not      
conceive  that to be the meaning of     
them8    ,,cratylus3 ,yes2 that is      
assuredly their meaning1 and the true   
meaning4    ,,socrates3 ,let us revert  
to episteme 7knowledge7 and observe how 
ambiguous this word is1 seeming rather  
to signify stopping the soul at  things 
than going round with them2 and         
therefore we should leave the  beginning

 as at present1 and not reject the      
epsilon1 but make an  insertion of an   
iota instead of an epsilon 7not pioteme1
 but  epiisteme74 ,take another example3
 bebaion 7sure7 is clearly the          
expression of station and position1 and 
not of motion4 ,again1 the word  istoria
 7enquiry7 bears upon the face of it the
 stopping 7istanai7 of  the stream2 and 
the word piston 7faithful7 certainly    
indicates  cessation of motion2 then1   
again1 mneme 7memory71 as any one may   
see1  expresses rest in the soul1 and   
not motion4 ,moreover1 words such as    
amartia and sumphora1 which have a bad  
sense1 viewed in the light of  their    
etymologies will be the same as sunesis 
and episteme and other  words which have
 a good sense 7compare omartein1        
sunienai1 epesthai1  sumpheresthai72 and
 much the same may be said of amathia   
and akolasia1  for amathia may be       
explained as e ama theo iontos poreia1  
and akolasia  as e akolouthia tois      
pragmasin4 ,thus the names which in     

these instances  we find to have the    
worst sense1 will turn out to be framed 
on the same  principle as those which   
have the best4 ,and any one ,i believe  
who would  take the trouble might find  
many other examples in which the giver  
of  names indicates1 not that things are
 in motion or progress1 but that  they  
are at rest2 which is the opposite of   
motion4    ,,cratylus3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 
but observe2 the greater number express 
motion4    ,,socrates3 ,what of that1   
,cratylus8 ,are we to count them like   
votes8 and  is correctness of names the 
voice of the majority8 ,are we to say of
  whichever sort there are most1 those  
are the true ones8    ,,cratylus3 ,no2  
that is not reasonable4    ,,socrates3  
,certainly not4 ,but let us have done   
with this question and  proceed to      
another1 about which ,i should like to  
know whether you think  with me4 ,were  
we not lately acknowledging that the    
first givers of  names in states1 both  
,hellenic and barbarous1 were the       

legislators1 and  that the art which    
gave names was the art of the           
legislator8    ,,cratylus3 ,quite true4 
,,socrates3 ,tell me1 then1 did the     
first legislators1 who were the givers  
of the first names1 know or not know the
 things which they named8    ,,cratylus3
 ,they must have known1 ,socrates4      
,,socrates3 ,why1 yes1 friend ,cratylus1
 they could hardly have been  ignorant4 
,,cratylus3 ,i should say not4          
,,socrates3 ,let us return to the point 
from which we digressed4 ,you were      
saying1 if you remember1 that he who    
gave names must have known the  things  
which he named2 are you still of that   
opinion8    ,,cratylus3 ,i am4          
,,socrates3 ,and would you say that the 
giver of the first names had also  a    
knowledge of the things which he named8 
,,cratylus3 ,i should4    ,,socrates3   
,but how could he have learned or       
discovered things from names  if the    
primitive names were not yet given8     
,for1 if we are correct in  our view1   

the only way of learning and discovering
 things1 is either to  discover names   
for ourselves or to learn them from     
others4    ,,cratylus3 ,i think that    
there is a good deal in what you say1   
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,but if things
 are only to be known through names1 how
 can we  suppose that the givers of     
names had knowledge1 or were legislators
  before there were names at all1 and   
therefore before they could have  known 
them8    ,,cratylus3 ,i believe1        
,socrates1 the true account of the      
matter to be1  that a power more than   
human gave things their first names1 and
 that  the names which are thus given   
are necessarily their true names4       
,,socrates3 ,then how came the giver of 
the names1 if he was an inspired  being 
or ,god1 to contradict himself8 ,for    
were we not saying just now  that he    
made some names expressive of rest and  
others of motion8 ,were  we mistaken8   
,,cratylus3 ,but ,i suppose one of the  
two not to be names at all4             

,,socrates3 ,and which1 then1 did he    
make1 my good friend2 those which are   
expressive of rest1 or those which are  
expressive of motion8 ,this is a  point 
which1 as ,i said before1 cannot be     
determined by counting them4            
,,cratylus3 ,no2 not in that way1       
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,but if this  
is a battle of names1 some of them      
asserting that  they are like the truth1
 others contending that ,,they are1 how 
or by  what criterion are we to decide  
between them8 ,for there are no other   
names to which appeal can be made1 but  
obviously recourse must be had  to      
another standard which1 without         
employing names1 will make clear  which 
of the two are right2 and this must be a
 standard which shows the  truth of     
things4    ,,cratylus3 ,i agree4        
,,socrates3 ,but if that is true1       
,cratylus1 then ,i suppose that things  
may  be known without names8            
,,cratylus3 ,clearly4    ,,socrates3    
,but how would you expect to know them8 

,what other way can  there be of knowing
 them1 except the true and natural way1 
through  their affinities1 when they are
 akin to each other1 and through        
themselves8 ,for that which is other and
 different from them must  signify      
something other and different from them4
    ,,cratylus3 ,what you are saying is1
 ,i think1 true4    ,,socrates3 ,well1  
but reflect2 have we not several times  
acknowledged  that names rightly given  
are the likenesses and images of the    
things  which they name8    ,,cratylus3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,let us suppose    
that to any extent you please you can   
learn  things through the medium of     
names1 and suppose also that you can    
learn  them from the things             
themselves--which is likely to be the   
nobler and  clearer way2 to learn of the
 image1 whether the image and the truth 
of  which the image is the expression   
have been rightly conceived1 or to      
learn of the truth whether the truth and
 the image of it have been duly         

executed8    ,,cratylus3 ,i should say  
that we must learn of the truth4        
,,socrates3 ,how real existence is to be
 studied or discovered is1 ,i  suspect1 
beyond you and me4 ,but we may admit so 
much1 that the  knowledge of things is  
not to be derived from names4 ,no2 they 
must be  studied and investigated in    
themselves4    ,,cratylus3 ,clearly1    
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,there is     
another point4 ,i should not like us to 
be imposed  upon by the appearance of   
such a multitude of names1 all tending  
in the  same direction4 ,i myself do not
 deny that the givers of names did      
really give them under the idea that all
 things were in motion and  flux2 which 
was their sincere but1 ,i think1        
mistaken opinion4 ,and  having fallen   
into a kind of whirlpool themselves1    
they are carried  round1 and want to    
drag us in after them4 ,there is a      
matter1 master  ,cratylus1 about which  
,i often dream1 and should like to ask  
your  opinion3 ,tell me1 whether there  

is or is not any absolute beauty or     
good1 or any other absolute existence8  
,,cratylus3 ,certainly1 ,socrates1 ,i   
think so4    ,,socrates3 ,then let us   
seek the true beauty3 not asking whether
 a face  is fair1 or anything of that   
sort1 for all such things appear to be  
in  a flux2 but let us ask whether the  
true beauty is not always beautiful4    
,,cratylus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3  
,and can we rightly speak of a beauty   
which is always passing  away1 and is   
first this and then that2 must not the  
same thing be born  and retire and      
vanish while the word is in our mouths8 
,,cratylus3 ,undoubtedly4    ,,socrates3
 ,then how can that be a real thing     
which is never in the same  state8 for  
obviously things which are the same     
cannot change while they  remain the    
same2 and if they are always the same   
and in the same state1  and never depart
 from their original form1 they can     
never change or be  moved4              
,,cratylus3 ,certainly they cannot4     

,,socrates3 ,nor yet can they be known  
by any one2 for at the moment that  the 
observer approaches1 then they become   
other and of another nature1  so that   
you cannot get any further in knowing   
their nature or state1  for you cannot  
know that which has no state4           
,,cratylus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,nor  
can we reasonably say1 ,cratylus1 that  
there is knowledge  at all1 if          
everything is in a state of transition  
and there is nothing  abiding2 for      
knowledge too cannot continue to be     
knowledge unless  continuing always to  
abide and exist4 ,but if the very nature
 of  knowledge changes1 at the time when
 the change occurs there will be no     
knowledge2 and if the transition is     
always going on1 there will always  be  
no knowledge1 and1 according to this    
view1 there will be no one to  know and 
nothing to be known3 but if that which  
knows and that which is  known exists   
ever1 and the beautiful and the good and
 every other thing  also exist1 then ,i 

do not think that they can resemble a   
process or  flux1 as we were just now   
supposing4 ,whether there is this       
eternal  nature in things1 or whether   
the truth is what ,heracleitus and his  
followers and many others say1 is a     
question hard to determine2 and no  man 
of sense will like to put himself or the
 education of his mind in  the power of 
names3 neither will he so far trust     
names or the givers of  names as to be  
confident in any knowledge which        
condemns himself and  other existences  
to an unhealthy state of unreality2 he  
will not  believe that all things leak  
like a pot1 or imagine that the world is
 a  man who has a running at the nose4  
,this may be true1 ,cratylus1 but is    
also very likely to be untrue2 and      
therefore ,i would not have you be  too 
easily persuaded of it4 ,reflect well   
and like a man1 and do not  easily      
accept such a doctrine2 for you are     
young and of an age to  learn4 ,and when
 you have found the truth1 come and tell

 me4    ,,cratylus3 ,i will do as you   
say1 though ,i can assure you1          
,socrates1 that  ,i have been           
considering the matter already1 and the 
result of a great  deal of trouble and  
consideration is that ,i incline to     
,heracleitus4    ,,socrates3 ,then1     
another day1 my friend1 when you come   
back1 you shall  give me a lesson2 but  
at present1 go into the country1 as you 
are  intending1 and ,hermogenes shall   
set you on your way4    ,,cratylus3     
,very good1 ,socrates2 ,i hope1 however1
 that you will continue  to think about 
these things yourself4