,,protagoras  ,by ,plato   ,translated  
by ,benjamin ,jowett     ,,introduction4
  ,the ,protagoras1 like several of the 
,dialogues of ,plato1 is put into the   
mouth of ,socrates1 who describes a     
conversation which had taken place      
between himself and the great ,sophist  
at the house of ,callias--'the man who  
had spent more upon the ,sophists than  
all the rest of the world'--and in which
 the learned ,hippias and the grammarian
 ,prodicus had also shared1 as well as  
,alcibiades and ,critias1 both of whom  
said a few words--in the presence of a  
distinguished company consisting of     
disciples of ,protagoras and of leading 
,athenians belonging to the ,socratic   
circle4 ,the dialogue commences with a  
request on the part of ,hippocrates that
 ,socrates would introduce him to the   
celebrated teacher4 ,he has come before 
the dawn had risen--so fervid is his    
zeal4 ,socrates moderates his excitement
 and advises him to find out 'what      
,protagoras will make of him1' before he

 becomes his pupil4  ,they go together  
to the house of ,callias2 and ,socrates1
 after explaining the purpose of their  
visit to ,protagoras1 asks the question1
 ',what he will make of ,hippocrates4'  
,protagoras answers1 ',that he will make
 him a better and a wiser man4' ',but in
 what will he be better8'--,socrates    
desires to have a more precise answer4  
,protagoras replies1 ',that he will     
teach him prudence in affairs private   
and public2 in short1 the science or    
knowledge of human life4'  ,this1 as    
,socrates admits1 is a noble profession2
 but he is or rather would have been    
doubtful1 whether such knowledge can be 
taught1 if ,protagoras had not assured  
him of the fact1 for two reasons3 7#a7  
,because the ,athenian people1 who      
recognize in their assemblies the       
distinction between the skilled and the 
unskilled in the arts1 do not           
distinguish between the trained         
politician and the untrained2 7#b7      
,because the wisest and best ,athenian  

citizens do not teach their sons        
political virtue4 ,will ,protagoras     
answer these objections8  ,protagoras   
explains his views in the form of an    
apologue1 in which1 after ,prometheus   
had given men the arts1 ,zeus is        
represented as sending ,hermes to them1 
bearing with him ,justice and           
,reverence4 ,these are not1 like the    
arts1 to be imparted to a few only1 but 
all men are to be partakers of them4    
,therefore the ,athenian people are     
right in distinguishing between the     
skilled and unskilled in the arts1 and  
not between skilled and unskilled       
politicians4 7#a7 ,for all men have the 
political virtues to a certain degree1  
and are obliged to say that they have   
them1 whether they have them or not4 ,a 
man would be thought a madman who       
professed an art which he did not know2 
but he would be equally thought a madman
 if he did not profess a virtue which he
 had not4 7#b7 ,and that the political  
virtues can be taught and acquired1 in  

the opinion of the ,athenians1 is proved
 by the fact that they punish           
evil-doers1 with a view to prevention1  
of course--mere retribution is for      
beasts1 and not for men4 7#c7 ,again1   
would parents who teach her sons lesser 
matters leave them ignorant of the      
common duty of citizens8 ,to the doubt  
of ,socrates the best answer is the     
fact1 that the education of youth in    
virtue begins almost as soon as they can
 speak1 and is continued by the state   
when they pass out of the parental      
control4 7#d7 ,nor need we wonder that  
wise and good fathers sometimes have    
foolish and worthless sons4 ,virtue1 as 
we were saying1 is not the private      
possession of any man1 but is shared by 
all1 only however to the extent of which
 each individual is by nature capable4  
,and1 as a matter of fact1 even the     
worst of civilized mankind will appear  
virtuous and just1 if we compare them   
with savages4 7#e7 ,the error of        
,socrates lies in supposing that there  

are no teachers of virtue1 whereas all  
men are teachers in a degree4 ,some1    
like ,protagoras1 are better than       
others1 and with this result we ought to
 be satisfied4  ,socrates is highly     
delighted with the explanation of       
,protagoras4 ,but he has still a doubt  
lingering in his mind4 ,protagoras has  
spoken of the virtues3 are they many1 or
 one8 are they parts of a whole1 or     
different names of the same thing8      
,protagoras replies that they are parts1
 like the parts of a face1 which have   
their several functions1 and no one part
 is like any other part4 ,this          
admission1 which has been somewhat      
hastily made1 is now taken up and       
cross-examined by ,socrates3--  ',is    
justice just1 and is holiness holy8 ,and
 are justice and holiness opposed to one
 another8'--',then justice is unholy4'  
,protagoras would rather say that       
justice is different from holiness1 and 
yet in a certain point of view nearly   
the same4 ,he does not1 however1 escape 

in this way from the cunning of         
,socrates1 who inveigles him into an    
admission that everything has but one   
opposite4 ,folly1 for example1 is       
opposed to wisdom2 and folly is also    
opposed to temperance2 and therefore    
temperance and wisdom are the same4 ,and
 holiness has been already admitted to  
be nearly the same as justice4          
,temperance1 therefore1 has now to be   
compared with justice4  ,protagoras1    
whose temper begins to get a little     
ruffled at the process to which he has  
been subjected1 is aware that he will   
soon be compelled by the dialectics of  
,socrates to admit that the temperate is
 the just4 ,he therefore defends himself
 with his favourite weapon2 that is to  
say1 he makes a long speech not much to 
the point1 which elicits the applause of
 the audience4  ,here occurs a sort of  
interlude1 which commences with a       
declaration on the part of ,socrates    
that he cannot follow a long speech1 and
 therefore he must beg ,protagoras to   

speak shorter4 ,as ,protagoras declines 
to accommodate him1 he rises to depart1 
but is detained by ,callias1 who thinks 
him unreasonable in not allowing        
,protagoras the liberty which he takes  
himself of speaking as he likes4 ,but   
,alcibiades answers that the two cases  
are not parallel4 ,for ,socrates admits 
his inability to speak long2 will       
,protagoras in like manner acknowledge  
his inability to speak short8  ,counsels
 of moderation are urged first in a few 
words by ,critias1 and then by ,prodicus
 in balanced and sententious language3  
and ,hippias proposes an umpire4 ,but   
who is to be the umpire8 rejoins        
,socrates2 he would rather suggest as a 
compromise that ,protagoras shall ask   
and he will answer1 and that when       
,protagoras is tired of asking he       
himself will ask and ,protagoras shall  
answer4 ,to this the latter yields a    
reluctant assent4  ,protagoras selects  
as his thesis a poem of ,simonides of   
,ceos1 in which he professes to find a  

contradiction4 ,first the poet says1    
',hard is it to become good1'  and then 
reproaches ,pittacus for having said1   
',hard is it to be good4' ,how is this  
to be reconciled8 ,socrates1 who is     
familiar with the poem1 is embarrassed  
at first1 and invokes the aid of        
,prodicus1 the countryman of ,simonides1
 but apparently only with the intention 
of flattering him into absurdities4     
,first a distinction is drawn between   
7,greek7 to be1 and 7,greek7 to become3 
to become good is difficult2 to be good 
is easy4 ,then the word difficult or    
hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the 
,cean dialect4 ,to all this ,prodicus   
assents2 but when ,protagoras reclaims1 
,socrates slily withdraws ,prodicus from
 the fray1 under the pretence that his  
assent was only intended to test the    
wits of his adversary4 ,he then proceeds
 to give another and more elaborate     
explanation of the whole passage4 ,the  
explanation is as follows3--  ,the      
,lacedaemonians are great philosophers  

7although this is a fact which is not   
generally known72 and the soul of their 
philosophy is brevity1 which was also   
the style of primitive antiquity and of 
the seven sages4 ,now ,pittacus had a   
saying1 ',hard is it to be good3' and   
,simonides1 who was jealous of the fame 
of this saying1 wrote a poem which was  
designed to controvert it4 ,no1 says he1
 ,pittacus2 not 'hard to be good1' but  
'hard to become good4' ,socrates        
proceeds to argue in a highly impressive
 manner that the whole composition is   
intended as an attack upon ,pittacus4   
,this1 though manifestly absurd1 is     
accepted by the company1 and meets with 
the special approval of ,hippias1 who   
has however a favourite interpretation  
of his own1 which he is requested by    
,alcibiades to defer4  ,the argument is 
now resumed1 not without some disdainful
 remarks of ,socrates on the practice of
 introducing the poets1 who ought not to
 be allowed1 any more than flute-girls1 
to come into good society4 ,men's own   

thoughts should supply them with the    
materials for discussion4 ,a few        
soothing flatteries are addressed to    
,protagoras by ,callias and ,socrates1  
and then the old question is repeated1  
',whether the virtues are one or many8' 
,to which ,protagoras is now disposed to
 reply1 that four out of the five       
virtues are in some degree similar2 but 
he still contends that the fifth1       
courage1 is unlike the rest4 ,socrates  
proceeds to undermine the last          
stronghold of the adversary1 first      
obtaining from him the admission that   
all virtue is in the highest degree     
good3--  ,the courageous are the        
confident2 and the confident are those  
who know their business or profession3  
those who have no such knowledge and are
 still confident are madmen4 ,this is   
admitted4 ,then1 says ,socrates1 courage
 is knowledge--an inference which       
,protagoras evades by drawing a futile  
distinction between the courageous and  
the confident in a fluent speech4       

,socrates renews the attack from another
 side3 he would like to know whether    
pleasure is not the only good1 and pain 
the only evil8 ,protagoras seems to     
doubt the morality or propriety of      
assenting to this2 he would rather say  
that 'some pleasures are good1 some     
pains are evil1' which is also the      
opinion of the generality of mankind4   
,what does he think of knowledge8 ,does 
he agree with the common opinion that   
knowledge is overcome by passion8 or    
does he hold that knowledge is power8   
,protagoras agrees that knowledge is    
certainly a governing power4  ,this1    
however1 is not the doctrine of men in  
general1 who maintain that many who know
 what is best1 act contrary to their    
knowledge under the influence of        
pleasure4 ,but this opposition of good  
and evil is really the opposition of a  
greater or lesser amount of pleasure4   
,pleasures are evils because they end in
 pain1 and pains are goods because they 
end in pleasures4 ,thus pleasure is seen

 to be the only good2 and the only evil 
is the preference of the lesser pleasure
 to the greater4 ,but then comes in the 
illusion of distance4 ,some art of      
mensuration is required in order to show
 us pleasures and pains in their true   
proportion4 ,this art of mensuration is 
a kind of knowledge1 and knowledge is   
thus proved once more to be the         
governing principle of human life1 and  
ignorance the origin of all evil3 for no
 one prefers the less pleasure to the   
greater1 or the greater pain to the     
less1 except from ignorance4 ,the       
argument is drawn out in an imaginary   
'dialogue within a dialogue1' conducted 
by ,socrates and ,protagoras on the one 
part1 and the rest of the world on the  
other4 ,hippias and ,prodicus1 as well  
as ,protagoras1 admit the soundness of  
the conclusion4  ,socrates then applies 
this new conclusion to the case of      
courage--the only virtue which still    
holds out against the assaults of the   
,socratic dialectic4 ,no one chooses the

 evil or refuses the good except through
 ignorance4 ,this explains why cowards  
refuse to go to war3--because they form 
a wrong estimate of good1 and honour1   
and pleasure4 ,and why are the          
courageous willing to go to             
war8--because they form a right estimate
 of pleasures and pains1 of things      
terrible and not terrible4 ,courage then
 is knowledge1 and cowardice is         
ignorance4 ,and the five virtues1 which 
were originally maintained to have five 
different natures1 after having been    
easily reduced to two only1 at last     
coalesce in one4 ,the assent of         
,protagoras to this last position is    
extracted with great difficulty4        
,socrates concludes by professing his   
disinterested love of the truth1 and    
remarks on the singular manner in which 
he and his adversary had changed sides4 
,protagoras began by asserting1 and     
,socrates by denying1 the teachableness 
of virtue1 and now the latter ends by   
affirming that virtue is knowledge1     

which is the most teachable of all      
things1 while ,protagoras has been      
striving to show that virtue is not     
knowledge1 and this is almost equivalent
 to saying that virtue cannot be taught4
 ,he is not satisfied with the result1  
and would like to renew the enquiry with
 the help of ,protagoras in a different 
order1 asking 7#a7 ,what virtue is1 and 
7#b7 ,whether virtue can be taught4     
,protagoras declines this offer1 but    
commends ,socrates' earnestness and his 
style of discussion4  ,the ,protagoras  
is often supposed to be full of         
difficulties4 ,these are partly         
imaginary and partly real4 ,the         
imaginary ones are 7#a7                 
,chronological1--which were pointed out 
in ancient times by ,athenaeus1 and are 
noticed by ,schleiermacher and others1  
and relate to the impossibility of all  
the persons in the ,dialogue meeting at 
any one time1 whether in the year #dbe  
,b4,c41 or in any other4 ,but ,plato1   
like all writers of fiction1 aims only  

at the probable1 and shows in many      
,dialogues 7e4g4 the ,symposium and     
,republic1 and already in the ,laches7  
an extreme disregard of the historical  
accuracy which is sometimes demanded of 
him4 7#b7 ,the exact place of the       
,protagoras among the ,dialogues1 and   
the date of composition1 have also been 
much disputed4 ,but there are no        
criteria which afford any real grounds  
for determining the date of composition2
 and the affinities of the ,dialogues1  
when they are not indicated by ,plato   
himself1 must always to a great extent  
remain uncertain4 7#c7 ,there is another
 class of difficulties1 which may be    
ascribed to preconceived notions of     
commentators1 who imagine that          
,protagoras the ,sophist ought always to
 be in the wrong1 and his adversary     
,socrates in the right2 or that in this 
or that passage--e4g4 in the explanation
 of good as pleasure--,plato is         
inconsistent with himself2 or that the  
,dialogue fails in unity1 and has not a 

proper beginning1 middle1 and ending4   
,they seem to forget that ,plato is a   
dramatic writer who throws his thoughts 
into both sides of the argument1 and    
certainly does not aim at any unity     
which is inconsistent with freedom1 and 
with a natural or even wild manner of   
treating his subject2 also that his mode
 of revealing the truth is by lights and
 shadows1 and far-off and opposing      
points of view1 and not by dogmatic     
statements or definite results4  ,the   
real difficulties arise out of the      
extreme subtlety of the work1 which1 as 
,socrates says of the poem of           
,simonides1 is a most perfect piece of  
art4 ,there are dramatic contrasts and  
interests1 threads of philosophy broken 
and resumed1 satirical reflections on   
mankind1 veils thrown over truths which 
are lightly suggested1 and all woven    
together in a single design1 and moving 
towards one end4  ,in the introductory  
scene ,plato raises the expectation that
 a 'great personage' is about to appear 

on the stage2 perhaps with a further    
view of showing that he is destined to  
be overthrown by a greater still1 who   
makes no pretensions4 ,before           
introducing ,hippocrates to him1        
,socrates thinks proper to warn the     
youth against the dangers of            
'influence1' of which the invidious     
nature is recognized by ,protagoras     
himself4 ,hippocrates readily adopts the
 suggestion of ,socrates that he shall  
learn of ,protagoras only the           
accomplishments which befit an ,athenian
 gentleman1 and let alone his           
'sophistry4' ,there is nothing however  
in the introduction which leads to the  
inference that ,plato intended to       
blacken the character of the ,sophists2 
he only makes a little merry at their   
expense4  ,the 'great personage' is     
somewhat ostentatious1 but frank and    
honest4 ,he is introduced on a stage    
which is worthy of him--at the house of 
the rich ,callias1 in which are         
congregated the noblest and wisest of   

the ,athenians4 ,he considers openness  
to be the best policy1 and particularly 
mentions his own liberal mode of dealing
 with his pupils1 as if in answer to the
 favourite accusation of the ,sophists  
that they received pay4 ,he is          
remarkable for the good temper which he 
exhibits throughout the discussion under
 the trying and often sophistical       
cross-examination of ,socrates4         
,although once or twice ruffled1 and    
reluctant to continue the discussion1 he
 parts company on perfectly good terms1 
and appears to be1 as he says of        
himself1 the 'least jealous of mankind4'
  ,nor is there anything in the         
sentiments of ,protagoras which impairs 
this pleasing impression of the grave   
and weighty old man4 ,his real defect is
 that he is inferior to ,socrates in    
dialectics4 ,the opposition between him 
and ,socrates is not the opposition of  
good and bad1 true and false1 but of the
 old art of rhetoric and the new science
 of interrogation and argument2 also of 

the irony of ,socrates and the          
self-assertion of the ,sophists4 ,there 
is quite as much truth on the side of   
,protagoras as of ,socrates2 but the    
truth of ,protagoras is based on common 
sense and common maxims of morality1    
while that of ,socrates is paradoxical  
or transcendental1 and though full of   
meaning and insight1 hardly intelligible
 to the rest of mankind4 ,here as       
elsewhere is the usual contrast between 
the ,sophists representing average      
public opinion and ,socrates seeking for
 increased clearness and unity of ideas4
 ,but to a great extent ,protagoras has 
the best of the argument and represents 
the better mind of man4  ,for example3  
7#a7 one of the noblest statements to be
 found in antiquity about the preventive
 nature of punishment is put into his   
mouth2 7#b7 he is clearly right also in 
maintaining that virtue can be taught   
7which ,socrates himself1 at the end of 
the ,dialogue1 is disposed to concede72 
and also 7#c7 in his explanation of the 

phenomenon that good fathers have bad   
sons2 7#d7 he is right also in observing
 that the virtues are not like the arts1
 gifts or attainments of special        
individuals1 but the common property of 
all3 this1 which in all ages has been   
the strength and weakness of ethics and 
politics1 is deeply seated in human     
nature2 7#e7 there is a sort of         
half-truth in the notion that all       
civilized men are teachers of virtue2   
and more than a half-truth 7#f7 in      
ascribing to man1 who in his outward    
conditions is more helpless than the    
other animals1 the power of             
self-improvement2 7#g7 the religious    
allegory should be noticed1 in which the
 arts are said to be given by           
,prometheus 7who stole them71 whereas   
justice and reverence and the political 
virtues could only be imparted by ,zeus2
 7#h7 in the latter part of the         
,dialogue1 when ,socrates is arguing    
that 'pleasure is the only good1'       
,protagoras deems it more in accordance 

with his character to maintain that     
'some pleasures only are good2' and     
admits that 'he1 above all other men1 is
 bound to say that wisdom and knowledge 
are the highest of human things4'       
,there is no reason to suppose that in  
all this ,plato is depicting an         
imaginary ,protagoras2 he seems to be   
showing us the teaching of the ,sophists
 under the milder aspect under which he 
once regarded them4 ,nor is there any   
reason to doubt that ,socrates is       
equally an historical character1        
paradoxical1 ironical1 tiresome1 but    
seeking for the unity of virtue and     
knowledge as for a precious treasure2   
willing to rest this even on a          
calculation of pleasure1 and            
irresistible here1 as everywhere in     
,plato1 in his intellectual superiority4
  ,the aim of ,socrates1 and of the     
,dialogue1 is to show the unity of      
virtue4 ,in the determination of this   
question the identity of virtue and     
knowledge is found to be involved4 ,but 

if virtue and knowledge are one1 then   
virtue can be taught2 the end of the    
,dialogue returns to the beginning4 ,had
 ,protagoras been allowed by ,plato to  
make the ,aristotelian distinction1 and 
say that virtue is not knowledge1 but is
 accompanied with knowledge2 or to point
 out with ,aristotle that the same      
quality may have more than one opposite2
 or with ,plato himself in the ,phaedo  
to deny that good is a mere exchange of 
a greater pleasure for a less--the unity
 of virtue and the identity of virtue   
and knowledge would have required to be 
proved by other arguments4  ,the victory
 of ,socrates over ,protagoras is in    
every way complete when their minds are 
fairly brought together4 ,protagoras    
falls before him after two or three     
blows4 ,socrates partially gains his    
object in the first part of the         
,dialogue1 and completely in the second4
 ,nor does he appear at any disadvantage
 when subjected to 'the question' by    
,protagoras4 ,he succeeds in making his 

two 'friends1' ,prodicus and ,hippias1  
ludicrous by the way2 he also makes a   
long speech in defence of the poem of   
,simonides1 after the manner of the     
,sophists1 showing1 as ,alcibiades says1
 that he is only pretending to have a   
bad memory1 and that he and not         
,protagoras is really a master in the   
two styles of speaking2 and that he can 
undertake1 not one side of the argument 
only1 but both1 when ,protagoras begins 
to break down4 ,against the authority of
 the poets with whom ,protagoras has    
ingeniously identified himself at the   
commencement of the ,dialogue1 ,socrates
 sets up the proverbial philosophers and
 those masters of brevity the           
,lacedaemonians4 ,the poets1 the        
,laconizers1 and ,protagoras are        
satirized at the same time4  ,not having
 the whole of this poem before us1 it is
 impossible for us to answer certainly  
the question of ,protagoras1 how the two
 passages of ,simonides are to be       
reconciled4 ,we can only follow the     

indications given by ,plato himself4    
,but it seems likely that the           
reconcilement offered by ,socrates is a 
caricature of the methods of            
interpretation which were practised by  
the ,sophists--for the following        
reasons3 7#a7 ,the transparent irony of 
the previous interpretations given by   
,socrates4 7#b7 ,the ludicrous opening  
of the speech in which the              
,lacedaemonians are described as the    
true philosophers1 and ,laconic brevity 
as the true form of philosophy1         
evidently with an allusion to           
,protagoras' long speeches4 7#c7 ,the   
manifest futility and absurdity of the  
explanation of 7,greek71 which is hardly
 consistent with the rational           
interpretation of the rest of the poem4 
,the opposition of 7,greek7 and 7,greek7
 seems also intended to express the     
rival doctrines of ,socrates and        
,protagoras1 and is a facetious         
commentary on their differences4 7#d7   
,the general treatment in ,plato both of

 the ,poets and the ,sophists1 who are  
their interpreters1 and whom he delights
 to identify with them4 7#e7 ,the       
depreciating spirit in which ,socrates  
speaks of the introduction of the poets 
as a substitute for original            
conversation1 which is intended to      
contrast with ,protagoras' exaltation of
 the study of them--this again is hardly
 consistent with the serious defence of 
,simonides4 7#f7 the marked approval of 
,hippias1 who is supposed at once to    
catch the familiar sound1 just as in the
 previous conversation ,prodicus is     
represented as ready to accept any      
distinctions of language however absurd4
 ,at the same time ,hippias is desirous 
of substituting a new interpretation of 
his own2 as if the words might really be
 made to mean anything1 and were only to
 be regarded as affording a field for   
the ingenuity of the interpreter4  ,this
 curious passage is1 therefore1 to be   
regarded as ,plato's satire on the      
tedious and hypercritical arts of       

interpretation which prevailed in his   
own day1 and may be compared with his   
condemnation of the same arts when      
applied to mythology in the ,phaedrus1  
and with his other parodies1 e4g4 with  
the two first speeches in the ,phaedrus 
and with the ,menexenus4 ,several lesser
 touches of satire may be observed1 such
 as the claim of philosophy advanced for
 the ,lacedaemonians1 which is a parody 
of the claims advanced for the ,poets by
 ,protagoras2 the mistake of the        
,laconizing set in supposing that the   
,lacedaemonians are a great nation      
because they bruise their ears2 the     
far-fetched notion1 which is 'really too
 bad1' that ,simonides uses the ,lesbian
 787 word1 7,greek71 because he is      
addressing a ,lesbian4 ,the whole may   
also be considered as a satire on those 
who spin pompous theories out of        
nothing4 ,as in the arguments of the    
,euthydemus and of the ,cratylus1 the   
veil of irony is never withdrawn2 and we
 are left in doubt at last how far in   

this interpretation of ,simonides       
,socrates is 'fooling1' how far he is in
 earnest4  ,all the interests and       
contrasts of character in a great       
dramatic work like the ,protagoras are  
not easily exhausted4 ,the              
impressiveness of the scene should not  
be lost upon us1 or the gradual         
substitution of ,socrates in the second 
part for ,protagoras in the first4 ,the 
characters to whom we are introduced at 
the beginning of the ,dialogue all play 
a part more or less conspicuous towards 
the end4 ,there is ,alcibiades1 who is  
compelled by the necessity of his nature
 to be a partisan1 lending effectual aid
 to ,socrates2 there is ,critias        
assuming the tone of impartiality2      
,callias1 here as always inclining to   
the ,sophists1 but eager for any        
intellectual repast2 ,prodicus1 who     
finds an opportunity for displaying his 
distinctions of language1 which are     
valueless and pedantic1 because they are
 not based on dialectic2 ,hippias1 who  

has previously exhibited his superficial
 knowledge of natural philosophy1 to    
which1 as in both the ,dialogues called 
by his name1 he now adds the profession 
of an interpreter of the ,poets4 ,the   
two latter personages have been already 
damaged by the mock heroic description  
of them in the introduction4 ,it may be 
remarked that ,protagoras is            
consistently presented to us throughout 
as the teacher of moral and political   
virtue2 there is no allusion to the     
theories of sensation which are         
attributed to him in the ,theaetetus and
 elsewhere1 or to his denial of the     
existence of the gods in a well-known   
fragment ascribed to him2 he is the     
religious rather than the irreligious   
teacher in this ,dialogue4 ,also it may 
be observed that ,socrates shows him as 
much respect as is consistent with his  
own ironical character2 he admits that  
the dialectic which has overthrown      
,protagoras has carried himself round to
 a conclusion opposed to his first      

thesis4 ,the force of argument1         
therefore1 and not ,socrates or         
,protagoras1 has won the day4  ,but is  
,socrates serious in maintaining 7#a7   
that virtue cannot be taught2 7#b7 that 
the virtues are one2 7#c7 that virtue is
 the knowledge of pleasures and pains   
present and future8 ,these propositions 
to us have an appearance of             
paradox--they are really moments or     
aspects of the truth by the help of     
which we pass from the old conventional 
morality to a higher conception of      
virtue and knowledge4 ,that virtue      
cannot be taught is a paradox of the    
same sort as the profession of ,socrates
 that he knew nothing4 ,plato means to  
say that virtue is not brought to a man1
 but must be drawn out of him2 and      
cannot be taught by rhetorical          
discourses or citations from the poets4 
,the second question1 whether the       
virtues are one or many1 though at first
 sight distinct1 is really a part of the
 same subject2 for if the virtues are to

 be taught1 they must be reducible to a 
common principle2 and this common       
principle is found to be knowledge4     
,here1 as ,aristotle remarks1 ,socrates 
and ,plato outstep the truth--they make 
a part of virtue into the whole4        
,further1 the nature of this knowledge1 
which is assumed to be a knowledge of   
pleasures and pains1 appears to us too  
superficial and at variance with the    
spirit of ,plato himself4 ,yet1 in this1
 ,plato is only following the historical
 ,socrates as he is depicted to us in   
,xenophon's ,memorabilia4 ,like         
,socrates1 he finds on the surface of   
human life one common bond by which the 
virtues are united1--their tendency to  
produce happiness1--though such a       
principle is afterwards repudiated by   
him4  ,it remains to be considered in   
what relation the ,protagoras stands to 
the other ,dialogues of ,plato4 ,that it
 is one of the earlier or purely        
,socratic works--perhaps the last1 as it
 is certainly the greatest of them--is  

indicated by the absence of any allusion
 to the doctrine of reminiscence2 and   
also by the different attitude assumed  
towards the teaching and persons of the 
,sophists in some of the later          
,dialogues4 ,the ,charmides1 ,laches1   
,lysis1 all touch on the question of the
 relation of knowledge to virtue1 and   
may be regarded1 if not as preliminary  
studies or sketches of the more         
important work1 at any rate as closely  
connected with it4 ,the ,io and the     
lesser ,hippias contain discussions of  
the ,poets1 which offer a parallel to   
the ironical criticism of ,simonides1   
and are conceived in a similar spirit4  
,the affinity of the ,protagoras to the 
,meno is more doubtful4 ,for there1     
although the same question is discussed1
 'whether virtue can be taught1' and the
 relation of ,meno to the ,sophists is  
much the same as that of ,hippocrates1  
the answer to the question is supplied  
out of the doctrine of ideas2 the real  
,socrates is already passing into the   

,platonic one4 ,at a later stage of the 
,platonic philosophy we shall find that 
both the paradox and the solution of it 
appear to have been retracted4 ,the     
,phaedo1 the ,gorgias1 and the ,philebus
 offer further corrections of the       
teaching of the ,protagoras2 in all of  
them the doctrine that virtue is        
pleasure1 or that pleasure is the chief 
or only good1 is distinctly renounced4  
,thus after many preparations and       
oppositions1 both of the characters of  
men and aspects of the truth1 especially
 of the popular and philosophical       
aspect2 and after many interruptions and
 detentions by the way1 which1 as       
,theodorus says in the ,theaetetus1 are 
quite as agreeable as the argument1 we  
arrive at the great ,socratic thesis    
that virtue is knowledge4 ,this is an   
aspect of the truth which was lost      
almost as soon as it was found2 and yet 
has to be recovered by every one for    
himself who would pass the limits of    
proverbial and popular philosophy4 ,the 

moral and intellectual are always       
dividing1 yet they must be reunited1 and
 in the highest conception of them are  
inseparable4 ,the thesis of ,socrates is
 not merely a hasty assumption1 but may 
be also deemed an anticipation of some  
'metaphysic of the future1' in which the
 divided elements of human nature are   
reconciled4     ,,protagoras   ,,persons
 ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue3 ,socrates1 who  
is the narrator of the ,dialogue to his 
,companion4 ,hippocrates1 ,alcibiades   
and ,critias4 ,protagoras1 ,hippias and 
,prodicus 7,sophists74 ,callias1 a      
wealthy ,athenian4  ,,scene3 ,the ,house
 of ,callias4   ,,companion3 ,where do  
you come from1 ,socrates8 ,and yet ,i   
need hardly ask the question1 for ,i    
know that you have been in chase of the 
fair ,alcibiades4 ,i saw him the day    
before yesterday2 and he had got a beard
 like a man1--and he is a man1 as ,i may
 tell you in your ear4 ,but ,i thought  
that he was still very charming4        
,,socrates3 ,what of his beard8 ,are you

 not of ,homer's opinion1 who says      
',youth is most charming when the beard 
first appears'8  ,and that is now the   
charm of ,alcibiades4  ,,companion3     
,well1 and how do matters proceed8 ,have
 you been visiting him1 and was he      
gracious to you8  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,i  
thought that he was very gracious2 and  
especially to-day1 for ,i have just come
 from him1 and he has been helping me in
 an argument4 ,but shall ,i tell you a  
strange thing8 ,i paid no attention to  
him1 and several times ,i quite forgot  
that he was present4  ,,companion3 ,what
 is the meaning of this8 ,has anything  
happened between you and him8 ,for      
surely you cannot have discovered a     
fairer love than he is2 certainly not in
 this city of ,athens4  ,,socrates3     
,yes1 much fairer4  ,,companion3 ,what  
do you mean--a citizen or a foreigner8  
,,socrates3 ,a foreigner4  ,,companion3 
,of what country8  ,,socrates3 ,of      
,abdera4  ,,companion3 ,and is this     
stranger really in your opinion a fairer

 love than the son of ,cleinias8        
,,socrates3 ,and is not the wiser always
 the fairer1 sweet friend8  ,,companion3
 ,but have you really met1 ,socrates1   
with some wise one8  ,,socrates3 ,say   
rather1 with the wisest of all living   
men1 if you are willing to accord that  
title to ,protagoras4  ,,companion3     
,what6 ,is ,protagoras in ,athens8      
,,socrates3 ,yes2 he has been here two  
days4  ,,companion3 ,and do you just    
come from an interview with him8        
,,socrates3 ,yes2 and ,i have heard and 
said many things4  ,,companion3 ,then1  
if you have no engagement1 suppose that 
you sit down and tell me what passed1   
and my attendant here shall give up his 
place to you4  ,,socrates3 ,to be sure2 
and ,i shall be grateful to you for     
listening4  ,,companion3 ,thank you1    
too1 for telling us4  ,,socrates3 ,that 
is thank you twice over4 ,listen then3--
  ,last night1 or rather very early this
 morning1 ,hippocrates1 the son of      
,apollodorus and the brother of ,phason1

 gave a tremendous thump with his staff 
at my door2 some one opened to him1 and 
he came rushing in and bawled out3      
,socrates1 are you awake or asleep8  ,i 
knew his voice1 and said3 ,hippocrates1 
is that you8 and do you bring any news8 
,good news1 he said2 nothing but good4  
,delightful1 ,i said2 but what is the   
news8 and why have you come hither at   
this unearthly hour8  ,he drew nearer to
 me and said3 ,protagoras is come4      
,yes1 ,i replied2 he came two days ago3 
have you only just heard of his arrival8
  ,yes1 by the gods1 he said2 but not   
until yesterday evening4  ,at the same  
time he felt for the truckle-bed1 and   
sat down at my feet1 and then he said3  
,yesterday quite late in the evening1 on
 my return from ,oenoe whither ,i had   
gone in pursuit of my runaway slave     
,satyrus1 as ,i meant to have told you1 
if some other matter had not come in the
 way2--on my return1 when we had done   
supper and were about to retire to rest1
 my brother said to me3 ,protagoras is  

come4 ,i was going to you at once1 and  
then ,i thought that the night was far  
spent4 ,but the moment sleep left me    
after my fatigue1 ,i got up and came    
hither direct4  ,i1 who knew the very   
courageous madness of the man1 said3    
,what is the matter8 ,has ,protagoras   
robbed you of anything8  ,he replied1   
laughing3 ,yes1 indeed he has1          
,socrates1 of the wisdom which he keeps 
from me4  ,but1 surely1 ,i said1 if you 
give him money1 and make friends with   
him1 he will make you as wise as he is  
himself4  ,would to heaven1 he replied1 
that this were the case6 ,he might take 
all that ,i have1 and all that my       
friends have1 if he pleased4 ,but that  
is why ,i have come to you now1 in order
 that you may speak to him on my behalf2
 for ,i am young1 and also ,i have never
 seen nor heard him2 7when he visited   
,athens before ,i was but a child27 and 
all men praise him1 ,socrates2 he is    
reputed to be the most accomplished of  
speakers4 ,there is no reason why we    

should not go to him at once1 and then  
we shall find him at home4 ,he lodges1  
as ,i hear1 with ,callias the son of    
,hipponicus3 let us start4  ,i replied3 
,not yet1 my good friend2 the hour is   
too early4 ,but let us rise and take a  
turn in the court and wait about there  
until day-break2 when the day breaks1   
then we will go4 ,for ,protagoras is    
generally at home1 and we shall be sure 
to find him2 never fear4  ,upon this we 
got up and walked about in the court1   
and ,i thought that ,i would make trial 
of the strength of his resolution4 ,so  
,i examined him and put questions to    
him4 ,tell me1 ,hippocrates1 ,i said1 as
 you are going to ,protagoras1 and will 
be paying your money to him1 what is he 
to whom you are going8 and what will he 
make of you8 ,if1 for example1 you had  
thought of going to ,hippocrates of     
,cos1 the ,asclepiad1 and were about to 
give him your money1 and some one had   
said to you3 ,you are paying money to   
your namesake ,hippocrates1 ,o          

,hippocrates2 tell me1 what is he that  
you give him money8 how would you have  
answered8  ,i should say1 he replied1   
that ,i gave money to him as a          
physician4  ,and what will he make of   
you8  ,a physician1 he said4  ,and if   
you were resolved to go to ,polycleitus 
the ,argive1 or ,pheidias the ,athenian1
 and were intending to give them money1 
and some one had asked you3 ,what are   
,polycleitus and ,pheidias8 and why do  
you give them this money8--how would you
 have answered8  ,i should have         
answered1 that they were statuaries4    
,and what will they make of you8  ,a    
statuary1 of course4  ,well now1 ,i     
said1 you and ,i are going to           
,protagoras1 and we are ready to pay him
 money on your behalf4 ,if our own means
 are sufficient1 and we can gain him    
with these1 we shall be only too glad2  
but if not1 then we are to spend the    
money of your friends as well4 ,now     
suppose1 that while we are thus         
enthusiastically pursuing our object    

some one were to say to us3 ,tell me1   
,socrates1 and you ,hippocrates1 what is
 ,protagoras1 and why are you going to  
pay him money1--how should we answer8 ,i
 know that ,pheidias is a sculptor1 and 
that ,homer is a poet2 but what         
appellation is given to ,protagoras8 how
 is he designated8  ,they call him a    
,sophist1 ,socrates1 he replied4  ,then 
we are going to pay our money to him in 
the character of a ,sophist8            
,certainly4  ,but suppose a person were 
to ask this further question3 ,and how  
about yourself8 ,what will ,protagoras  
make of you1 if you go to see him8  ,he 
answered1 with a blush upon his face    
7for the day was just beginning to dawn1
 so that ,i could see him73 ,unless this
 differs in some way from the former    
instances1 ,i suppose that he will make 
a ,sophist of me4  ,by the gods1 ,i     
said1 and are you not ashamed at having 
to appear before the ,hellenes in the   
character of a ,sophist8  ,indeed1      
,socrates1 to confess the truth1 ,i am4 

,but you should not assume1             
,hippocrates1 that the instruction of   
,protagoras is of this nature3 may you  
not learn of him in the same way that   
you learned the arts of the grammarian1 
or musician1 or trainer1 not with the   
view of making any of them a profession1
 but only as a part of education1 and   
because a private gentleman and freeman 
ought to know them8  ,just so1 he said2 
and that1 in my opinion1 is a far truer 
account of the teaching of ,protagoras4 
,i said3 ,i wonder whether you know what
 you are doing8  ,and what am ,i doing8 
,you are going to commit your soul to   
the care of a man whom you call a       
,sophist4 ,and yet ,i hardly think that 
you know what a ,sophist is2 and if not1
 then you do not even know to whom you  
are committing your soul and whether the
 thing to which you commit yourself be  
good or evil4  ,i certainly think that  
,i do know1 he replied4  ,then tell me1 
what do you imagine that he is8  ,i take
 him to be one who knows wise things1 he

 replied1 as his name implies4  ,and    
might you not1 ,i said1 affirm this of  
the painter and of the carpenter also3  
,do not they1 too1 know wise things8    
,but suppose a person were to ask us3   
,in what are the painters wise8 ,we     
should answer3 ,in what relates to the  
making of likenesses1 and similarly of  
other things4 ,and if he were further to
 ask3 ,what is the wisdom of the        
,sophist1 and what is the manufacture   
over which he presides8--how should we  
answer him8  ,how should we answer him1 
,socrates8 ,what other answer could     
there be but that he presides over the  
art which makes men eloquent8  ,yes1 ,i 
replied1 that is very likely true1 but  
not enough2 for in the answer a further 
question is involved3 ,of what does the 
,sophist make a man talk eloquently8    
,the player on the lyre may be supposed 
to make a man talk eloquently about that
 which he makes him understand1 that is 
about playing the lyre4 ,is not that    
true8  ,yes4  ,then about what does the 

,sophist make him eloquent8 ,must not he
 make him eloquent in that which he     
understands8  ,yes1 that may be assumed4
  ,and what is that which the ,sophist  
knows and makes his disciple know8      
,indeed1 he said1 ,i cannot tell4  ,then
 ,i proceeded to say3 ,well1 but are you
 aware of the danger which you are      
incurring8 ,if you were going to commit 
your body to some one1 who might do good
 or harm to it1 would you not carefully 
consider and ask the opinion of your    
friends and kindred1 and deliberate many
 days as to whether you should give him 
the care of your body8 ,but when the    
soul is in question1 which you hold to  
be of far more value than the body1 and 
upon the good or evil of which depends  
the well-being of your all1--about this 
you never consulted either with your    
father or with your brother or with any 
one of us who are your companions4 ,but 
no sooner does this foreigner appear1   
than you instantly commit your soul to  
his keeping4 ,in the evening1 as you    

say1 you hear of him1 and in the morning
 you go to him1 never deliberating or   
taking the opinion of any one as to     
whether you ought to intrust yourself to
 him or not2--you have quite made up    
your mind that you will at all hazards  
be a pupil of ,protagoras1 and are      
prepared to expend all the property of  
yourself and of your friends in carrying
 out at any price this determination1   
although1 as you admit1 you do not know 
him1 and have never spoken with him3 and
 you call him a ,sophist1 but are       
manifestly ignorant of what a ,sophist  
is2 and yet you are going to commit     
yourself to his keeping4  ,when he heard
 me say this1 he replied3 ,no other     
inference1 ,socrates1 can be drawn from 
your words4  ,i proceeded3 ,is not a    
,sophist1 ,hippocrates1 one who deals   
wholesale or retail in the food of the  
soul8 ,to me that appears to be his     
nature4  ,and what1 ,socrates1 is the   
food of the soul8  ,surely1 ,i said1    
knowledge is the food of the soul2 and  

we must take care1 my friend1 that the  
,sophist does not deceive us when he    
praises what he sells1 like the dealers 
wholesale or retail who sell the food of
 the body2 for they praise              
indiscriminately all their goods1       
without knowing what are really         
beneficial or hurtful3 neither do their 
customers know1 with the exception of   
any trainer or physician who may happen 
to buy of them4 ,in like manner those   
who carry about the wares of knowledge1 
and make the round of the cities1 and   
sell or retail them to any customer who 
is in want of them1 praise them all     
alike2 though ,i should not wonder1 ,o  
my friend1 if many of them were really  
ignorant of their effect upon the soul2 
and their customers equally ignorant1   
unless he who buys of them happens to be
 a physician of the soul4 ,if1          
therefore1 you have understanding of    
what is good and evil1 you may safely   
buy knowledge of ,protagoras or of any  
one2 but if not1 then1 ,o my friend1    

pause1 and do not hazard your dearest   
interests at a game of chance4 ,for     
there is far greater peril in buying    
knowledge than in buying meat and drink3
 the one you purchase of the wholesale  
or retail dealer1 and carry them away in
 other vessels1 and before you receive  
them into the body as food1 you may     
deposit them at home and call in any    
experienced friend who knows what is    
good to be eaten or drunken1 and what   
not1 and how much1 and when2 and then   
the danger of purchasing them is not so 
great4 ,but you cannot buy the wares of 
knowledge and carry them away in another
 vessel2 when you have paid for them you
 must receive them into the soul and go 
your way1 either greatly harmed or      
greatly benefited2 and therefore we     
should deliberate and take counsel with 
our elders2 for we are still young--too 
young to determine such a matter4 ,and  
now let us go1 as we were intending1 and
 hear ,protagoras2 and when we have     
heard what he has to say1 we may take   

counsel of others2 for not only is      
,protagoras at the house of ,callias1   
but there is ,hippias of ,elis1 and1 if 
,i am not mistaken1 ,prodicus of ,ceos1 
and several other wise men4  ,to this we
 agreed1 and proceeded on our way until 
we reached the vestibule of the house2  
and there we stopped in order to        
conclude a discussion which had arisen  
between us as we were going along2 and  
we stood talking in the vestibule until 
we had finished and come to an          
understanding4 ,and ,i think that the   
door-keeper1 who was a eunuch1 and who  
was probably annoyed at the great inroad
 of the ,sophists1 must have heard us   
talking4 ,at any rate1 when we knocked  
at the door1 and he opened and saw us1  
he grumbled3 ,they are ,sophists--he is 
not at home2 and instantly gave the door
 a hearty bang with both his hands4     
,again we knocked1 and he answered      
without opening3 ,did you not hear me   
say that he is not at home1 fellows8    
,but1 my friend1 ,i said1 you need not  

be alarmed2 for we are not ,sophists1   
and we are not come to see ,callias1 but
 we want to see ,protagoras2 and ,i must
 request you to announce us4 ,at last1  
after a good deal of difficulty1 the man
 was persuaded to open the door4  ,when 
we entered1 we found ,protagoras taking 
a walk in the cloister2 and next to him1
 on one side1 were walking ,callias1 the
 son of ,hipponicus1 and ,paralus1 the  
son of ,pericles1 who1 by the mother's  
side1 is his half-brother1 and          
,charmides1 the son of ,glaucon4 ,on the
 other side of him were ,xanthippus1 the
 other son of ,pericles1 ,philippides1  
the son of ,philomelus2 also ,antimoerus
 of ,mende1 who of all the disciples of 
,protagoras is the most famous1 and     
intends to make sophistry his           
profession4 ,a train of listeners       
followed him2 the greater part of them  
appeared to be foreigners1 whom         
,protagoras had brought with him out of 
the various cities visited by him in his
 journeys1 he1 like ,orpheus1 attracting

 them his voice1 and they following     
7,compare ,rep474 ,i should mention also
 that there were some ,athenians in the 
company4 ,nothing delighted me more than
 the precision of their movements3 they 
never got into his way at all2 but when 
he and those who were with him turned   
back1 then the band of listeners parted 
regularly on either side2 he was always 
in front1 and they wheeled round and    
took their places behind him in perfect 
order4  ,after him1 as ,homer says      
7,od471 ',i lifted up my eyes and saw'  
,hippias the ,elean sitting in the      
opposite cloister on a chair of state1  
and around him were seated on benches   
,eryximachus1 the son of ,acumenus1 and 
,phaedrus the ,myrrhinusian1 and ,andron
 the son of ,androtion1 and there were  
strangers whom he had brought with him  
from his native city of ,elis1 and some 
others3 they were putting to ,hippias   
certain physical and astronomical       
questions1 and he1 ex cathedra1 was     
determining their several questions to  

them1 and discoursing of them4  ,also1  
'my eyes beheld ,tantalus 7,od472' for  
,prodicus the ,cean was at ,athens3 he  
had been lodged in a room which1 in the 
days of ,hipponicus1 was a storehouse2  
but1 as the house was full1 ,callias had
 cleared this out and made the room into
 a guest-chamber4 ,now ,prodicus was    
still in bed1 wrapped up in sheepskins  
and bedclothes1 of which there seemed to
 be a great heap2 and there was sitting 
by him on the couches near1 ,pausanias  
of the deme of ,cerameis1 and with      
,pausanias was a youth quite young1 who 
is certainly remarkable for his good    
looks1 and1 if ,i am not mistaken1 is   
also of a fair and gentle nature4 ,i    
thought that ,i heard him called        
,agathon1 and my suspicion is that he is
 the beloved of ,pausanias4 ,there was  
this youth1 and also there were the two 
,adeimantuses1 one the son of ,cepis1   
and the other of ,leucolophides1 and    
some others4 ,i was very anxious to hear
 what ,prodicus was saying1 for he seems

 to me to be an all-wise and inspired   
man2 but ,i was not able to get into the
 inner circle1 and his fine deep voice  
made an echo in the room which rendered 
his words inaudible4  ,no sooner had we 
entered than there followed us          
,alcibiades the beautiful1 as you say1  
and ,i believe you2 and also ,critias   
the son of ,callaeschrus4  ,on entering 
we stopped a little1 in order to look   
about us1 and then walked up to         
,protagoras1 and ,i said3 ,protagoras1  
my friend ,hippocrates and ,i have come 
to see you4  ,do you wish1 he said1 to  
speak with me alone1 or in the presence 
of the company8  ,whichever you please1 
,i said2 you shall determine when you   
have heard the purpose of our visit4    
,and what is your purpose8 he said4  ,i 
must explain1 ,i said1 that my friend   
,hippocrates is a native ,athenian2 he  
is the son of ,apollodorus1 and of a    
great and prosperous house1 and he is   
himself in natural ability quite a match
 for anybody of his own age4 ,i believe 

that he aspires to political eminence2  
and this he thinks that conversation    
with you is most likely to procure for  
him4 ,and now you can determine whether 
you would wish to speak to him of your  
teaching alone or in the presence of the
 company4  ,thank you1 ,socrates1 for   
your consideration of me4 ,for certainly
 a stranger finding his way into great  
cities1 and persuading the flower of the
 youth in them to leave company of their
 kinsmen or any other acquaintances1 old
 or young1 and live with him1 under the 
idea that they will be improved by his  
conversation1 ought to be very cautious2
 great jealousies are aroused by his    
proceedings1 and he is the subject of   
many enmities and conspiracies4 ,now the
 art of the ,sophist is1 as ,i believe1 
of great antiquity2 but in ancient times
 those who practised it1 fearing this   
odium1 veiled and disguised themselves  
under various names1 some under that of 
poets1 as ,homer1 ,hesiod1 and          
,simonides1 some1 of hierophants and    

prophets1 as ,orpheus and ,musaeus1 and 
some1 as ,i observe1 even under the name
 of gymnastic-masters1 like ,iccus of   
,tarentum1 or the more recently         
celebrated ,herodicus1 now of ,selymbria
 and formerly of ,megara1 who is a      
first-rate ,sophist4 ,your own          
,agathocles pretended to be a musician1 
but was really an eminent ,sophist2 also
 ,pythocleides the ,cean2 and there were
 many others2 and all of them1 as ,i was
 saying1 adopted these arts as veils or 
disguises because they were afraid of   
the odium which they would incur4 ,but  
that is not my way1 for ,i do not       
believe that they effected their        
purpose1 which was to deceive the       
government1 who were not blinded by     
them2 and as to the people1 they have no
 understanding1 and only repeat what    
their rulers are pleased to tell them4  
,now to run away1 and to be caught in   
running away1 is the very height of     
folly1 and also greatly increases the   
exasperation of mankind2 for they regard

 him who runs away as a rogue1 in       
addition to any other objections which  
they have to him2 and therefore ,i take 
an entirely opposite course1 and        
acknowledge myself to be a ,sophist and 
instructor of mankind2 such an open     
acknowledgement appears to me to be a   
better sort of caution than concealment4
 ,nor do ,i neglect other precautions1  
and therefore ,i hope1 as ,i may say1 by
 the favour of heaven that no harm will 
come of the acknowledgment that ,i am a 
,sophist4 ,and ,i have been now many    
years in the profession--for all my     
years when added up are many3 there is  
no one here present of whom ,i might not
 be the father4 ,wherefore ,i should    
much prefer conversing with you1 if you 
want to speak with me1 in the presence  
of the company4  ,as ,i suspected that  
he would like to have a little display  
and glorification in the presence of    
,prodicus and ,hippias1 and would gladly
 show us to them in the light of his    
admirers1 ,i said3 ,but why should we   

not summon ,prodicus and ,hippias and   
their friends to hear us8  ,very good1  
he said4  ,suppose1 said ,callias1 that 
we hold a council in which you may sit  
and discuss4--,this was agreed upon1 and
 great delight was felt at the prospect 
of hearing wise men talk2 we ourselves  
took the chairs and benches1 and        
arranged them by ,hippias1 where the    
other benches had been already placed4  
,meanwhile ,callias and ,alcibiades got 
,prodicus out of bed and brought in him 
and his companions4  ,when we were all  
seated1 ,protagoras said3 ,now that the 
company are assembled1 ,socrates1 tell  
me about the young man of whom you were 
just now speaking4  ,i replied3 ,i will 
begin again at the same point1          
,protagoras1 and tell you once more the 
purport of my visit3 this is my friend  
,hippocrates1 who is desirous of making 
your acquaintance2 he would like to know
 what will happen to him if he          
associates with you4 ,i have no more to 
say4  ,protagoras answered3 ,young man1 

if you associate with me1 on the very   
first day you will return home a better 
man than you came1 and better on the    
second day than on the first1 and better
 every day than you were on the day     
before4  ,when ,i heard this1 ,i said3  
,protagoras1 ,i do not at all wonder at 
hearing you say this2 even at your age1 
and with all your wisdom1 if any one    
were to teach you what you did not know 
before1 you would become better no      
doubt3 but please to answer in a        
different way--,i will explain how by an
 example4 ,let me suppose that          
,hippocrates1 instead of desiring your  
acquaintance1 wished to become          
acquainted with the young man ,zeuxippus
 of ,heraclea1 who has lately been in   
,athens1 and he had come to him as he   
has come to you1 and had heard him say1 
as he has heard you say1 that every day 
he would grow and become better if he   
associated with him3 and then suppose   
that he were to ask him1 ',in what shall
 ,i become better1 and in what shall ,i 

grow8'--,zeuxippus would answer1 ',in   
painting4' ,and suppose that he went to 
,orthagoras the ,theban1 and heard him  
say the same thing1 and asked him1 ',in 
what shall ,i become better day by day8'
 he would reply1 ',in flute-playing4'   
,now ,i want you to make the same sort  
of answer to this young man and to me1  
who am asking questions on his account4 
,when you say that on the first day on  
which he associates with you he will    
return home a better man1 and on every  
day will grow in like manner1--in what1 
,protagoras1 will he be better8 and     
about what8  ,when ,protagoras heard me 
say this1 he replied3 ,you ask questions
 fairly1 and ,i like to answer a        
question which is fairly put4 ,if       
,hippocrates comes to me he will not    
experience the sort of drudgery with    
which other ,sophists are in the habit  
of insulting their pupils2 who1 when    
they have just escaped from the arts1   
are taken and driven back into them by  
these teachers1 and made to learn       

calculation1 and astronomy1 and         
geometry1 and music 7he gave a look at  
,hippias as he said this72 but if he    
comes to me1 he will learn that which he
 comes to learn4 ,and this is prudence  
in affairs private as well as public2 he
 will learn to order his own house in   
the best manner1 and he will be able to 
speak and act for the best in the       
affairs of the state4  ,do ,i understand
 you1 ,i said2 and is your meaning that 
you teach the art of politics1 and that 
you promise to make men good citizens8  
,that1 ,socrates1 is exactly the        
profession which ,i make4  ,then1 ,i    
said1 you do indeed possess a noble art1
 if there is no mistake about this2 for 
,i will freely confess to you1          
,protagoras1 that ,i have a doubt       
whether this art is capable of being    
taught1 and yet ,i know not how to      
disbelieve your assertion4 ,and ,i ought
 to tell you why ,i am of opinion that  
this art cannot be taught or            
communicated by man to man4 ,i say that 

the ,athenians are an understanding     
people1 and indeed they are esteemed to 
be such by the other ,hellenes4 ,now ,i 
observe that when we are met together in
 the assembly1 and the matter in hand   
relates to building1 the builders are   
summoned as advisers2 when the question 
is one of ship-building1 then the       
ship-wrights2 and the like of other arts
 which they think capable of being      
taught and learned4 ,and if some person 
offers to give them advice who is not   
supposed by them to have any skill in   
the art1 even though he be good-looking1
 and rich1 and noble1 they will not     
listen to him1 but laugh and hoot at    
him1 until either he is clamoured down  
and retires of himself2 or if he        
persist1 he is dragged away or put out  
by the constables at the command of the 
prytanes4 ,this is their way of behaving
 about professors of the arts4 ,but when
 the question is an affair of state1    
then everybody is free to have a        
say--carpenter1 tinker1 cobbler1 sailor1

 passenger2 rich and poor1 high and     
low--any one who likes gets up1 and no  
one reproaches him1 as in the former    
case1 with not having learned1 and      
having no teacher1 and yet giving       
advice2 evidently because they are under
 the impression that this sort of       
knowledge cannot be taught4 ,and not    
only is this true of the state1 but of  
individuals2 the best and wisest of our 
citizens are unable to impart their     
political wisdom to others3 as for      
example1 ,pericles1 the father of these 
young men1 who gave them excellent      
instruction in all that could be learned
 from masters1 in his own department of 
politics neither taught them1 nor gave  
them teachers2 but they were allowed to 
wander at their own free will in a sort 
of hope that they would light upon      
virtue of their own accord4 ,or take    
another example3 there was ,cleinias the
 younger brother of our friend          
,alcibiades1 of whom this very same     
,pericles was the guardian2 and he being

 in fact under the apprehension that    
,cleinias would be corrupted by         
,alcibiades1 took him away1 and placed  
him in the house of ,ariphron to be     
educated2 but before six months had     
elapsed1 ,ariphron sent him back1 not   
knowing what to do with him4 ,and ,i    
could mention numberless other instances
 of persons who were good themselves1   
and never yet made any one else good1   
whether friend or stranger4 ,now ,i1    
,protagoras1 having these examples      
before me1 am inclined to think that    
virtue cannot be taught4 ,but then      
again1 when ,i listen to your words1 ,i 
waver2 and am disposed to think that    
there must be something in what you say1
 because ,i know that you have great    
experience1 and learning1 and invention4
 ,and ,i wish that you would1 if        
possible1 show me a little more clearly 
that virtue can be taught4 ,will you be 
so good8  ,that ,i will1 ,socrates1 and 
gladly4 ,but what would you like8 ,shall
 ,i1 as an elder1 speak to you as       

younger men in an apologue or myth1 or  
shall ,i argue out the question8  ,to   
this several of the company answered    
that he should choose for himself4      
,well1 then1 he said1 ,i think that the 
myth will be more interesting4  ,once   
upon a time there were gods only1 and no
 mortal creatures4 ,but when the time   
came that these also should be created1 
the gods fashioned them out of earth and
 fire and various mixtures of both      
elements in the interior of the earth2  
and when they were about to bring them  
into the light of day1 they ordered     
,prometheus and ,epimetheus to equip    
them1 and to distribute to them         
severally their proper qualities4       
,epimetheus said to ,prometheus3 ',let  
me distribute1 and do you inspect4'     
,this was agreed1 and ,epimetheus made  
the distribution4 ,there were some to   
whom he gave strength without swiftness1
 while he equipped the weaker with      
swiftness2 some he armed1 and others he 
left unarmed2 and devised for the latter

 some other means of preservation1      
making some large1 and having their size
 as a protection1 and others small1     
whose nature was to fly in the air or   
burrow in the ground2 this was to be    
their way of escape4 ,thus did he       
compensate them with the view of        
preventing any race from becoming       
extinct4 ,and when he had provided      
against their destruction by one        
another1 he contrived also a means of   
protecting them against the seasons of  
heaven2 clothing them with close hair   
and thick skins sufficient to defend    
them against the winter cold and able to
 resist the summer heat1 so that they   
might have a natural bed of their own   
when they wanted to rest2 also he       
furnished them with hoofs and hair and  
hard and callous skins under their feet4
 ,then he gave them varieties of        
food1--herb of the soil to some1 to     
others fruits of trees1 and to others   
roots1 and to some again he gave other  
animals as food4 ,and some he made to   

have few young ones1 while those who    
were their prey were very prolific2 and 
in this manner the race was preserved4  
,thus did ,epimetheus1 who1 not being   
very wise1 forgot that he had           
distributed among the brute animals all 
the qualities which he had to give1--and
 when he came to man1 who was still     
unprovided1 he was terribly perplexed4  
,now while he was in this perplexity1   
,prometheus came to inspect the         
distribution1 and he found that the     
other animals were suitably furnished1  
but that man alone was naked and        
shoeless1 and had neither bed nor arms  
of defence4 ,the appointed hour was     
approaching when man in his turn was to 
go forth into the light of day2 and     
,prometheus1 not knowing how he could   
devise his salvation1 stole the         
mechanical arts of ,hephaestus and      
,athene1 and fire with them 7they could 
neither have been acquired nor used     
without fire71 and gave them to man4    
,thus man had the wisdom necessary to   

the support of life1 but political      
wisdom he had not2 for that was in the  
keeping of ,zeus1 and the power of      
,prometheus did not extend to entering  
into the citadel of heaven1 where ,zeus 
dwelt1 who moreover had terrible        
sentinels2 but he did enter by stealth  
into the common workshop of ,athene and 
,hephaestus1 in which they used to      
practise their favourite arts1 and      
carried off ,hephaestus' art of working 
by fire1 and also the art of ,athene1   
and gave them to man4 ,and in this way  
man was supplied with the means of life4
 ,but ,prometheus is said to have been  
afterwards prosecuted for theft1 owing  
to the blunder of ,epimetheus4  ,now    
man1 having a share of the divine       
attributes1 was at first the only one of
 the animals who had any gods1 because  
he alone was of their kindred2 and he   
would raise altars and images of them4  
,he was not long in inventing articulate
 speech and names2 and he also          
constructed houses and clothes and shoes

 and beds1 and drew sustenance from the 
earth4 ,thus provided1 mankind at first 
lived dispersed1 and there were no      
cities4 ,but the consequence was that   
they were destroyed by the wild beasts1 
for they were utterly weak in comparison
 of them1 and their art was only        
sufficient to provide them with the     
means of life1 and did not enable them  
to carry on war against the animals3    
food they had1 but not as yet the art of
 government1 of which the art of war is 
a part4 ,after a while the desire of    
self-preservation gathered them into    
cities2 but when they were gathered     
together1 having no art of government1  
they evil intreated one another1 and    
were again in process of dispersion and 
destruction4 ,zeus feared that the      
entire race would be exterminated1 and  
so he sent ,hermes to them1 bearing     
reverence and justice to be the ordering
 principles of cities and the bonds of  
friendship and conciliation4 ,hermes    
asked ,zeus how he should impart justice

 and reverence among men3--,should he   
distribute them as the arts are         
distributed2 that is to say1 to a       
favoured few only1 one skilled          
individual having enough of medicine or 
of any other art for many unskilled     
ones8 ',shall this be the manner in     
which ,i am to distribute justice and   
reverence among men1 or shall ,i give   
them to all8' ',to all1' said ,zeus2 ',i
 should like them all to have a share2  
for cities cannot exist1 if a few only  
share in the virtues1 as in the arts4   
,and further1 make a law by my order1   
that he who has no part in reverence and
 justice shall be put to death1 for he  
is a plague of the state4'  ,and this is
 the reason1 ,socrates1 why the         
,athenians and mankind in general1 when 
the question relates to carpentering or 
any other mechanical art1 allow but a   
few to share in their deliberations2 and
 when any one else interferes1 then1 as 
you say1 they object1 if he be not of   
the favoured few2 which1 as ,i reply1 is

 very natural4 ,but when they meet to   
deliberate about political virtue1 which
 proceeds only by way of justice and    
wisdom1 they are patient enough of any  
man who speaks of them1 as is also      
natural1 because they think that every  
man ought to share in this sort of      
virtue1 and that states could not exist 
if this were otherwise4 ,i have         
explained to you1 ,socrates1 the reason 
of this phenomenon4  ,and that you may  
not suppose yourself to be deceived in  
thinking that all men regard every man  
as having a share of justice or honesty 
and of every other political virtue1 let
 me give you a further proof1 which is  
this4 ,in other cases1 as you are aware1
 if a man says that he is a good        
flute-player1 or skilful in any other   
art in which he has no skill1 people    
either laugh at him or are angry with   
him1 and his relations think that he is 
mad and go and admonish him2 but when   
honesty is in question1 or some other   
political virtue1 even if they know that

 he is dishonest1 yet1 if the man comes 
publicly forward and tells the truth    
about his dishonesty1 then1 what in the 
other case was held by them to be good  
sense1 they now deem to be madness4     
,they say that all men ought to profess 
honesty whether they are honest or not1 
and that a man is out of his mind who   
says anything else4 ,their notion is1   
that a man must have some degree of     
honesty2 and that if he has none at all 
he ought not to be in the world4  ,i    
have been showing that they are right in
 admitting every man as a counsellor    
about this sort of virtue1 as they are  
of opinion that every man is a partaker 
of it4 ,and ,i will now endeavour to    
show further that they do not conceive  
this virtue to be given by nature1 or to
 grow spontaneously1 but to be a thing  
which may be taught2 and which comes to 
a man by taking pains4 ,no one would    
instruct1 no one would rebuke1 or be    
angry with those whose calamities they  
suppose to be due to nature or chance2  

they do not try to punish or to prevent 
them from being what they are2 they do  
but pity them4 ,who is so foolish as to 
chastise or instruct the ugly1 or the   
diminutive1 or the feeble8 ,and for this
 reason4 ,because he knows that good and
 evil of this kind is the work of nature
 and of chance2 whereas if a man is     
wanting in those good qualities which   
are attained by study and exercise and  
teaching1 and has only the contrary evil
 qualities1 other men are angry with    
him1 and punish and reprove him--of     
these evil qualities one is impiety1    
another injustice1 and they may be      
described generally as the very opposite
 of political virtue4 ,in such cases any
 man will be angry with another1 and    
reprimand him1--clearly because he      
thinks that by study and learning1 the  
virtue in which the other is deficient  
may be acquired4 ,if you will think1    
,socrates1 of the nature of punishment1 
you will see at once that in the opinion
 of mankind virtue may be acquired2 no  

one punishes the evil-doer under the    
notion1 or for the reason1 that he has  
done wrong1--only the unreasonable fury 
of a beast acts in that manner4 ,but he 
who desires to inflict rational         
punishment does not retaliate for a past
 wrong which cannot be undone2 he has   
regard to the future1 and is desirous   
that the man who is punished1 and he who
 sees him punished1 may be deterred from
 doing wrong again4 ,he punishes for the
 sake of prevention1 thereby clearly    
implying that virtue is capable of being
 taught4 ,this is the notion of all who 
retaliate upon others either privately  
or publicly4 ,and the ,athenians1 too1  
your own citizens1 like other men1      
punish and take vengeance on all whom   
they regard as evil doers2 and hence1 we
 may infer them to be of the number of  
those who think that virtue may be      
acquired and taught4 ,thus far1         
,socrates1 ,i have shown you clearly    
enough1 if ,i am not mistaken1 that your
 countrymen are right in admitting the  

tinker and the cobbler to advise about  
politics1 and also that they deem virtue
 to be capable of being taught and      
acquired4  ,there yet remains one       
difficulty which has been raised by you 
about the sons of good men4 ,what is the
 reason why good men teach their sons   
the knowledge which is gained from      
teachers1 and make them wise in that1   
but do nothing towards improving them in
 the virtues which distinguish          
themselves8 ,and here1 ,socrates1 ,i    
will leave the apologue and resume the  
argument4 ,please to consider3 ,is there
 or is there not some one quality of    
which all the citizens must be          
partakers1 if there is to be a city at  
all8 ,in the answer to this question is 
contained the only solution of your     
difficulty2 there is no other4 ,for if  
there be any such quality1 and this     
quality or unity is not the art of the  
carpenter1 or the smith1 or the potter1 
but justice and temperance and holiness 
and1 in a word1 manly virtue--if this is

 the quality of which all men must be   
partakers1 and which is the very        
condition of their learning or doing    
anything else1 and if he who is wanting 
in this1 whether he be a child only or a
 grown-up man or woman1 must be taught  
and punished1 until by punishment he    
becomes better1 and he who rebels       
against instruction and punishment is   
either exiled or condemned to death     
under the idea that he is incurable--if 
what ,i am saying be true1 good men have
 their sons taught other things and not 
this1 do consider how extraordinary     
their conduct would appear to be4 ,for  
we have shown that they think virtue    
capable of being taught and cultivated  
both in private and public2 and1        
notwithstanding1 they have their sons   
taught lesser matters1 ignorance of     
which does not involve the punishment of
 death3 but greater things1 of which the
 ignorance may cause death and exile to 
those who have no training or knowledge 
of them--aye1 and confiscation as well  

as death1 and1 in a word1 may be the    
ruin of families--those things1 ,i say1 
they are supposed not to teach          
them1--not to take the utmost care that 
they should learn4 ,how improbable is   
this1 ,socrates6  ,education and        
admonition commence in the first years  
of childhood1 and last to the very end  
of life4 ,mother and nurse and father   
and tutor are vying with one another    
about the improvement of the child as   
soon as ever he is able to understand   
what is being said to him3 he cannot say
 or do anything without their setting   
forth to him that this is just and that 
is unjust2 this is honourable1 that is  
dishonourable2 this is holy1 that is    
unholy2 do this and abstain from that4  
,and if he obeys1 well and good2 if not1
 he is straightened by threats and      
blows1 like a piece of bent or warped   
wood4 ,at a later stage they send him to
 teachers1 and enjoin them to see to his
 manners even more than to his reading  
and music2 and the teachers do as they  

are desired4 ,and when the boy has      
learned his letters and is beginning to 
understand what is written1 as before he
 understood only what was spoken1 they  
put into his hands the works of great   
poets1 which he reads sitting on a bench
 at school2 in these are contained many 
admonitions1 and many tales1 and        
praises1 and encomia of ancient famous  
men1 which he is required to learn by   
heart1 in order that he may imitate or  
emulate them and desire to become like  
them4 ,then1 again1 the teachers of the 
lyre take similar care that their young 
disciple is temperate and gets into no  
mischief2 and when they have taught him 
the use of the lyre1 they introduce him 
to the poems of other excellent poets1  
who are the lyric poets2 and these they 
set to music1 and make their harmonies  
and rhythms quite familiar to the       
children's souls1 in order that they may
 learn to be more gentle1 and           
harmonious1 and rhythmical1 and so more 
fitted for speech and action2 for the   

life of man in every part has need of   
harmony and rhythm4 ,then they send them
 to the master of gymnastic1 in order   
that their bodies may better minister to
 the virtuous mind1 and that they may   
not be compelled through bodily weakness
 to play the coward in war or on any    
other occasion4 ,this is what is done by
 those who have the means1 and those who
 have the means are the rich2 their     
children begin to go to school soonest  
and leave off latest4 ,when they have   
done with masters1 the state again      
compels them to learn the laws1 and live
 after the pattern which they furnish1  
and not after their own fancies2 and    
just as in learning to write1 the       
writing-master first draws lines with a 
style for the use of the young beginner1
 and gives him the tablet and makes him 
follow the lines1 so the city draws the 
laws1 which were the invention of good  
lawgivers living in the olden time2     
these are given to the young man1 in    
order to guide him in his conduct       

whether he is commanding or obeying2 and
 he who transgresses them is to be      
corrected1 or1 in other words1 called to
 account1 which is a term used not only 
in your country1 but also in many       
others1 seeing that justice calls men to
 account4 ,now when there is all this   
care about virtue private and public1   
why1 ,socrates1 do you still wonder and 
doubt whether virtue can be taught8     
,cease to wonder1 for the opposite would
 be far more surprising4  ,but why then 
do the sons of good fathers often turn  
out ill8 ,there is nothing very         
wonderful in this2 for1 as ,i have been 
saying1 the existence of a state implies
 that virtue is not any man's private   
possession4 ,if so--and nothing can be  
truer--then ,i will further ask you to  
imagine1 as an illustration1 some other 
pursuit or branch of knowledge which may
 be assumed equally to be the condition 
of the existence of a state4 ,suppose   
that there could be no state unless we  
were all flute-players1 as far as each  

had the capacity1 and everybody was     
freely teaching everybody the art1 both 
in private and public1 and reproving the
 bad player as freely and openly as     
every man now teaches justice and the   
laws1 not concealing them as he would   
conceal the other arts1 but imparting   
them--for all of us have a mutual       
interest in the justice and virtue of   
one another1 and this is the reason why 
every one is so ready to teach justice  
and the laws2--suppose1 ,i say1 that    
there were the same readiness and       
liberality among us in teaching one     
another flute-playing1 do you imagine1  
,socrates1 that the sons of good        
flute-players would be more likely to be
 good than the sons of bad ones8 ,i     
think not4 ,would not their sons grow up
 to be distinguished or undistinguished 
according to their own natural          
capacities as flute-players1 and the son
 of a good player would often turn out  
to be a bad one1 and the son of a bad   
player to be a good one1 all            

flute-players would be good enough in   
comparison of those who were ignorant   
and unacquainted with the art of        
flute-playing8 ,in like manner ,i would 
have you consider that he who appears to
 you to be the worst of those who have  
been brought up in laws and humanities1 
would appear to be a just man and a     
master of justice if he were to be      
compared with men who had no education1 
or courts of justice1 or laws1 or any   
restraints upon them which compelled    
them to practise virtue--with the       
savages1 for example1 whom the poet     
,pherecrates exhibited on the stage at  
the last year's ,lenaean festival4 ,if  
you were living among men such as the   
man-haters in his ,chorus1 you would be 
only too glad to meet with ,eurybates   
and ,phrynondas1 and you would          
sorrowfully long to revisit the         
rascality of this part of the world4    
,you1 ,socrates1 are discontented1 and  
why8 ,because all men are teachers of   
virtue1 each one according to his       

ability2 and you say ,where are the     
teachers8 ,you might as well ask1 ,who  
teaches ,greek8 ,for of that too there  
will not be any teachers found4 ,or you 
might ask1 ,who is to teach the sons of 
our artisans this same art which they   
have learned of their fathers8 ,he and  
his fellow-workmen have taught them to  
the best of their ability1--but who will
 carry them further in their arts8 ,and 
you would certainly have a difficulty1  
,socrates1 in finding a teacher of them2
 but there would be no difficulty in    
finding a teacher of those who are      
wholly ignorant4 ,and this is true of   
virtue or of anything else2 if a man is 
better able than we are to promote      
virtue ever so little1 we must be       
content with the result4 ,a teacher of  
this sort ,i believe myself to be1 and  
above all other men to have the         
knowledge which makes a man noble and   
good2 and ,i give my pupils their       
money's-worth1 and even more1 as they   
themselves confess4 ,and therefore ,i   

have introduced the following mode of   
payment3--,when a man has been my pupil1
 if he likes he pays my price1 but there
 is no compulsion2 and if he does not   
like1 he has only to go into a temple   
and take an oath of the value of the    
instructions1 and he pays no more than  
he declares to be their value4  ,such is
 my ,apologue1 ,socrates1 and such is   
the argument by which ,i endeavour to   
show that virtue may be taught1 and that
 this is the opinion of the ,athenians4 
,and ,i have also attempted to show that
 you are not to wonder at good fathers  
having bad sons1 or at good sons having 
bad fathers1 of which the sons of       
,polycleitus afford an example1 who are 
the companions of our friends here1     
,paralus and ,xanthippus1 but are       
nothing in comparison with their father2
 and this is true of the sons of many   
other artists4 ,as yet ,i ought not to  
say the same of ,paralus and ,xanthippus
 themselves1 for they are young and     
there is still hope of them4            

,protagoras ended1 and in my ear  ',so  
charming left his voice1 that ,i the    
while ,thought him still speaking2 still
 stood fixed to hear 7,borrowed by      
,milton1 ,paradise ,lost474'  ,at       
length1 when the truth dawned upon me1  
that he had really finished1 not without
 difficulty ,i began to collect myself1 
and looking at ,hippocrates1 ,i said to 
him3 ,o son of ,apollodorus1 how deeply 
grateful ,i am to you for having brought
 me hither2 ,i would not have missed the
 speech of ,protagoras for a great deal4
 ,for ,i used to imagine that no human  
care could make men good2 but ,i know   
better now4 ,yet ,i have still one very 
small difficulty which ,i am sure that  
,protagoras will easily explain1 as he  
has already explained so much4 ,if a man
 were to go and consult ,pericles or any
 of our great speakers about these      
matters1 he might perhaps hear as fine a
 discourse2 but then when one has a     
question to ask of any of them1 like    
books1 they can neither answer nor ask2 

and if any one challenges the least     
particular of their speech1 they go     
ringing on in a long harangue1 like     
brazen pots1 which when they are struck 
continue to sound unless some one puts  
his hand upon them2 whereas our friend  
,protagoras can not only make a good    
speech1 as he has already shown1 but    
when he is asked a question he can      
answer briefly2 and when he asks he will
 wait and hear the answer2 and this is a
 very rare gift4 ,now ,i1 ,protagoras1  
want to ask of you a little question1   
which if you will only answer1 ,i shall 
be quite satisfied4 ,you were saying    
that virtue can be taught2--that ,i will
 take upon your authority1 and there is 
no one to whom ,i am more ready to      
trust4 ,but ,i marvel at one thing about
 which ,i should like to have my mind   
set at rest4 ,you were speaking of ,zeus
 sending justice and reverence to men2  
and several times while you were        
speaking1 justice1 and temperance1 and  
holiness1 and all these qualities1 were 

described by you as if together they    
made up virtue4 ,now ,i want you to tell
 me truly whether virtue is one whole1  
of which justice and temperance and     
holiness are parts2 or whether all these
 are only the names of one and the same 
thing3 that is the doubt which still    
lingers in my mind4  ,there is no       
difficulty1 ,socrates1 in answering that
 the qualities of which you are speaking
 are the parts of virtue which is one4  
,and are they parts1 ,i said1 in the    
same sense in which mouth1 nose1 and    
eyes1 and ears1 are the parts of a face2
 or are they like the parts of gold1    
which differ from the whole and from one
 another only in being larger or        
smaller8  ,i should say that they       
differed1 ,socrates1 in the first way2  
they are related to one another as the  
parts of a face are related to the whole
 face4  ,and do men have some one part  
and some another part of virtue8 ,or if 
a man has one part1 must he also have   
all the others8  ,by no means1 he said2 

for many a man is brave and not just1 or
 just and not wise4  ,you would not     
deny1 then1 that courage and wisdom are 
also parts of virtue8  ,most undoubtedly
 they are1 he answered2 and wisdom is   
the noblest of the parts4  ,and they are
 all different from one another8 ,i     
said4  ,yes4  ,and has each of them a   
distinct function like the parts of the 
face2--the eye1 for example1 is not like
 the ear1 and has not the same          
functions2 and the other parts are none 
of them like one another1 either in     
their functions1 or in any other way8 ,i
 want to know whether the comparison    
holds concerning the parts of virtue4   
,do they also differ from one another in
 themselves and in their functions8 ,for
 that is clearly what the simile would  
imply4  ,yes1 ,socrates1 you are right  
in supposing that they differ4  ,then1  
,i said1 no other part of virtue is like
 knowledge1 or like justice1 or like    
courage1 or like temperance1 or like    
holiness8  ,no1 he answered4  ,well     

then1 ,i said1 suppose that you and ,i  
enquire into their natures4 ,and first1 
you would agree with me that justice is 
of the nature of a thing1 would you not8
 ,that is my opinion3 would it not be   
yours also8  ,mine also1 he said4  ,and 
suppose that some one were to ask us1   
saying1 ',o ,protagoras1 and you1       
,socrates1 what about this thing which  
you were calling justice1 is it just or 
unjust8'--and ,i were to answer1 just3  
would you vote with me or against me8   
,with you1 he said4  ,thereupon ,i      
should answer to him who asked me1 that 
justice is of the nature of the just3   
would not you8  ,yes1 he said4  ,and    
suppose that he went on to say3 ',well  
now1 is there also such a thing as      
holiness8'--we should answer1 ',yes1' if
 ,i am not mistaken8  ,yes1 he said4    
,which you would also acknowledge to be 
a thing--should we not say so8  ,he     
assented4  ',and is this a sort of thing
 which is of the nature of the holy1 or 
of the nature of the unholy8' ,i should 

be angry at his putting such a question1
 and should say1 ',peace1 man2 nothing  
can be holy if holiness is not holy4'   
,what would you say8 ,would you not     
answer in the same way8  ,certainly1 he 
said4  ,and then after this suppose that
 he came and asked us1 ',what were you  
saying just now8 ,perhaps ,i may not    
have heard you rightly1 but you seemed  
to me to be saying that the parts of    
virtue were not the same as one         
another4' ,i should reply1 ',you        
certainly heard that said1 but not1 as  
you imagine1 by me2 for ,i only asked   
the question2 ,protagoras gave the      
answer4' ,and suppose that he turned to 
you and said1 ',is this true1           
,protagoras8 and do you maintain that   
one part of virtue is unlike another1   
and is this your position8'--how would  
you answer him8  ,i could not help      
acknowledging the truth of what he said1
 ,socrates4  ,well then1 ,protagoras1 we
 will assume this2 and now supposing    
that he proceeded to say further1 ',then

 holiness is not of the nature of       
justice1 nor justice of the nature of   
holiness1 but of the nature of          
unholiness2 and holiness is of the      
nature of the not just1 and therefore of
 the unjust1 and the unjust is the      
unholy'3 how shall we answer him8 ,i    
should certainly answer him on my own   
behalf that justice is holy1 and that   
holiness is just2 and ,i would say in   
like manner on your behalf also1 if you 
would allow me1 that justice is either  
the same with holiness1 or very nearly  
the same2 and above all ,i would assert 
that justice is like holiness and       
holiness is like justice2 and ,i wish   
that you would tell me whether ,i may be
 permitted to give this answer on your  
behalf1 and whether you would agree with
 me4  ,he replied1 ,i cannot simply     
agree1 ,socrates1 to the proposition    
that justice is holy and that holiness  
is just1 for there appears to me to be a
 difference between them4 ,but what     
matter8 if you please ,i please2 and let

 us assume1 if you will ,i1 that justice
 is holy1 and that holiness is just4    
,pardon me1 ,i replied2 ,i do not want  
this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' sort
 of conclusion to be proven1 but ,i want
 you and me to be proven3 ,i mean to say
 that the conclusion will be best proven
 if there be no 'if4'  ,well1 he said1  
,i admit that justice bears a           
resemblance to holiness1 for there is   
always some point of view in which      
everything is like every other thing2   
white is in a certain way like black1   
and hard is like soft1 and the most     
extreme opposites have some qualities in
 common2 even the parts of the face     
which1 as we were saying before1 are    
distinct and have different functions1  
are still in a certain point of view    
similar1 and one of them is like another
 of them4 ,and you may prove that they  
are like one another on the same        
principle that all things are like one  
another2 and yet things which are like  
in some particular ought not to be      

called alike1 nor things which are      
unlike in some particular1 however      
slight1 unlike4  ,and do you think1 ,i  
said in a tone of surprise1 that justice
 and holiness have but a small degree of
 likeness8  ,certainly not2 any more    
than ,i agree with what ,i understand to
 be your view4  ,well1 ,i said1 as you  
appear to have a difficulty about this1 
let us take another of the examples     
which you mentioned instead4 ,do you    
admit the existence of folly8  ,i do4   
,and is not wisdom the very opposite of 
folly8  ,that is true1 he said4  ,and   
when men act rightly and advantageously 
they seem to you to be temperate8  ,yes1
 he said4  ,and temperance makes them   
temperate8  ,certainly4  ,and they who  
do not act rightly act foolishly1 and in
 acting thus are not temperate8  ,i     
agree1 he said4  ,then to act foolishly 
is the opposite of acting temperately8  
,he assented4  ,and foolish actions are 
done by folly1 and temperate actions by 
temperance8  ,he agreed4  ,and that is  

done strongly which is done by strength1
 and that which is weakly done1 by      
weakness8  ,he assented4  ,and that     
which is done with swiftness is done    
swiftly1 and that which is done with    
slowness1 slowly8  ,he assented again4  
,and that which is done in the same     
manner1 is done by the same2 and that   
which is done in an opposite manner by  
the opposite8  ,he agreed4  ,once more1 
,i said1 is there anything beautiful8   
,yes4  ,to which the only opposite is   
the ugly8  ,there is no other4  ,and is 
there anything good8  ,there is4  ,to   
which the only opposite is the evil8    
,there is no other4  ,and there is the  
acute in sound8  ,true4  ,to which the  
only opposite is the grave8  ,there is  
no other1 he said1 but that4  ,then     
every opposite has one opposite only and
 no more8  ,he assented4  ,then now1 ,i 
said1 let us recapitulate our           
admissions4 ,first of all we admitted   
that everything has one opposite and not
 more than one8  ,we did so4  ,and we   

admitted also that what was done in     
opposite ways was done by opposites8    
,yes4  ,and that which was done         
foolishly1 as we further admitted1 was  
done in the opposite way to that which  
was done temperately8  ,yes4  ,and that 
which was done temperately was done by  
temperance1 and that which was done     
foolishly by folly8  ,he agreed4  ,and  
that which is done in opposite ways is  
done by opposites8  ,yes4  ,and one     
thing is done by temperance1 and quite  
another thing by folly8  ,yes4  ,and in 
opposite ways8  ,certainly4  ,and       
therefore by opposites3--then folly is  
the opposite of temperance8  ,clearly4  
,and do you remember that folly has     
already been acknowledged by us to be   
the opposite of wisdom8  ,he assented4  
,and we said that everything has only   
one opposite8  ,yes4  ,then1            
,protagoras1 which of the two assertions
 shall we renounce8 ,one says that      
everything has but one opposite2 the    
other that wisdom is distinct from      

temperance1 and that both of them are   
parts of virtue2 and that they are not  
only distinct1 but dissimilar1 both in  
themselves and in their functions1 like 
the parts of a face4 ,which of these two
 assertions shall we renounce8 ,for both
 of them together are certainly not in  
harmony2 they do not accord or agree3   
for how can they be said to agree if    
everything is assumed to have only one  
opposite and not more than one1 and yet 
folly1 which is one1 has clearly the two
 opposites--wisdom and temperance8 ,is  
not that true1 ,protagoras8 ,what else  
would you say8  ,he assented1 but with  
great reluctance4  ,then temperance and 
wisdom are the same1 as before justice  
and holiness appeared to us to be nearly
 the same4 ,and now1 ,protagoras1 ,i    
said1 we must finish the enquiry1 and   
not faint4 ,do you think that an unjust 
man can be temperate in his injustice8  
,i should be ashamed1 ,socrates1 he     
said1 to acknowledge this1 which        
nevertheless many may be found to       

assert4  ,and shall ,i argue with them  
or with you8 ,i replied4  ,i would      
rather1 he said1 that you should argue  
with the many first1 if you will4       
,whichever you please1 if you will only 
answer me and say whether you are of    
their opinion or not4 ,my object is to  
test the validity of the argument2 and  
yet the result may be that ,i who ask   
and you who answer may both be put on   
our trial4  ,protagoras at first made a 
show of refusing1 as he said that the   
argument was not encouraging2 at length1
 he consented to answer4  ,now then1 ,i 
said1 begin at the beginning and answer 
me4 ,you think that some men are        
temperate1 and yet unjust8  ,yes1 he    
said2 let that be admitted4  ,and       
temperance is good sense8  ,yes4  ,and  
good sense is good counsel in doing     
injustice8  ,granted4  ,if they succeed1
 ,i said1 or if they do not succeed8    
,if they succeed4  ,and you would admit 
the existence of goods8  ,yes4  ,and is 
the good that which is expedient for    

man8  ,yes1 indeed1 he said3 and there  
are some things which may be            
inexpedient1 and yet ,i call them good4 
,i thought that ,protagoras was getting 
ruffled and excited2 he seemed to be    
setting himself in an attitude of war4  
,seeing this1 ,i minded my business1 and
 gently said3--  ,when you say1         
,protagoras1 that things inexpedient are
 good1 do you mean inexpedient for man  
only1 or inexpedient altogether8 and do 
you call the latter good8  ,certainly   
not the last1 he replied2 for ,i know of
 many things--meats1 drinks1 medicines1 
and ten thousand other things1 which are
 inexpedient for man1 and some which are
 expedient2 and some which are neither  
expedient nor inexpedient for man1 but  
only for horses2 and some for oxen only1
 and some for dogs2 and some for no     
animals1 but only for trees2 and some   
for the roots of trees and not for their
 branches1 as for example1 manure1 which
 is a good thing when laid about the    
roots of a tree1 but utterly destructive

 if thrown upon the shoots and young    
branches2 or ,i may instance olive oil1 
which is mischievous to all plants1 and 
generally most injurious to the hair of 
every animal with the exception of man1 
but beneficial to human hair and to the 
human body generally2 and even in this  
application 7so various and changeable  
is the nature of the benefit71 that     
which is the greatest good to the       
outward parts of a man1 is a very great 
evil to his inward parts3 and for this  
reason physicians always forbid their   
patients the use of oil in their food1  
except in very small quantities1 just   
enough to extinguish the disagreeable   
sensation of smell in meats and sauces4 
,when he had given this answer1 the     
company cheered him4 ,and ,i said3      
,protagoras1 ,i have a wretched memory1 
and when any one makes a long speech to 
me ,i never remember what he is talking 
about4 ,as then1 if ,i had been deaf1   
and you were going to converse with me1 
you would have had to raise your voice2 

so now1 having such a bad memory1 ,i    
will ask you to cut your answers        
shorter1 if you would take me with you4 
,what do you mean8 he said3 how am ,i to
 shorten my answers8 shall ,i make them 
too short8  ,certainly not1 ,i said4    
,but short enough8  ,yes1 ,i said4      
,shall ,i answer what appears to me to  
be short enough1 or what appears to you 
to be short enough8  ,i have heard1 ,i  
said1 that you can speak and teach      
others to speak about the same things at
 such length that words never seemed to 
fail1 or with such brevity that no one  
could use fewer of them4 ,please        
therefore1 if you talk with me1 to adopt
 the latter or more compendious method4 
,socrates1 he replied1 many a battle of 
words have ,i fought1 and if ,i had     
followed the method of disputation which
 my adversaries desired1 as you want me 
to do1 ,i should have been no better    
than another1 and the name of           
,protagoras would have been nowhere4  ,i
 saw that he was not satisfied with his 

previous answers1 and that he would not 
play the part of answerer any more if he
 could help2 and ,i considered that     
there was no call upon me to continue   
the conversation2 so ,i said3           
,protagoras1 ,i do not wish to force the
 conversation upon you if you had rather
 not1 but when you are willing to argue 
with me in such a way that ,i can follow
 you1 then ,i will argue with you4 ,now 
you1 as is said of you by others and as 
you say of yourself1 are able to have   
discussions in shorter forms of speech  
as well as in longer1 for you are a     
master of wisdom2 but ,i cannot manage  
these long speeches3 ,i only wish that  
,i could4 ,you1 on the other hand1 who  
are capable of either1 ought to speak   
shorter as ,i beg you1 and then we might
 converse4 ,but ,i see that you are     
disinclined1 and as ,i have an          
engagement which will prevent my staying
 to hear you at greater length 7for ,i  
have to be in another place71 ,i will   
depart2 although ,i should have liked to

 have heard you4  ,thus ,i spoke1 and   
was rising from my seat1 when ,callias  
seized me by the right hand1 and in his 
left hand caught hold of this old cloak 
of mine4 ,he said3 ,we cannot let you   
go1 ,socrates1 for if you leave us there
 will be an end of our discussions3 ,i  
must therefore beg you to remain1 as    
there is nothing in the world that ,i   
should like better than to hear you and 
,protagoras discourse4 ,do not deny the 
company this pleasure4  ,now ,i had got 
up1 and was in the act of departure4    
,son of ,hipponicus1 ,i replied1 ,i have
 always admired1 and do now heartily    
applaud and love your philosophical     
spirit1 and ,i would gladly comply with 
your request1 if ,i could4 ,but the     
truth is that ,i cannot4 ,and what you  
ask is as great an impossibility to me1 
as if you bade me run a race with       
,crison of ,himera1 when in his prime1  
or with some one of the long or day     
course runners4 ,to such a request ,i   
should reply that ,i would fain ask the 

same of my own legs2 but they refuse to 
comply4 ,and therefore if you want to   
see ,crison and me in the same stadium1 
you must bid him slacken his speed to   
mine1 for ,i cannot run quickly1 and he 
can run slowly4 ,and in like manner if  
you want to hear me and ,protagoras     
discoursing1 you must ask him to shorten
 his answers1 and keep to the point1 as 
he did at first2 if not1 how can there  
be any discussion8 ,for discussion is   
one thing1 and making an oration is     
quite another1 in my humble opinion4    
,but you see1 ,socrates1 said ,callias1 
that ,protagoras may fairly claim to    
speak in his own way1 just as you claim 
to speak in yours4  ,here ,alcibiades   
interposed1 and said3 ,that1 ,callias1  
is not a true statement of the case4    
,for our friend ,socrates admits that he
 cannot make a speech--in this he yields
 the palm to ,protagoras3 but ,i should 
be greatly surprised if he yielded to   
any living man in the power of holding  
and apprehending an argument4 ,now if   

,protagoras will make a similar         
admission1 and confess that he is       
inferior to ,socrates in argumentative  
skill1 that is enough for ,socrates2 but
 if he claims a superiority in argument 
as well1 let him ask and answer--not1   
when a question is asked1 slipping away 
from the point1 and instead of          
answering1 making a speech at such      
length that most of his hearers forget  
the question at issue 7not that         
,socrates is likely to forget--,i will  
be bound for that1 although he may      
pretend in fun that he has a bad        
memory74 ,and ,socrates appears to me to
 be more in the right than ,protagoras2 
that is my view1 and every man ought to 
say what he thinks4  ,when ,alcibiades  
had done speaking1 some one--,critias1  
,i believe--went on to say3 ,o ,prodicus
 and ,hippias1 ,callias appears to me to
 be a partisan of ,protagoras3 and this 
led ,alcibiades1 who loves opposition1  
to take the other side4 ,but we should  
not be partisans either of ,socrates or 

of ,protagoras2 let us rather unite in  
entreating both of them not to break up 
the discussion4  ,prodicus added3 ,that1
 ,critias1 seems to me to be well said1 
for those who are present at such       
discussions ought to be impartial       
hearers of both the speakers2           
remembering1 however1 that impartiality 
is not the same as equality1 for both   
sides should be impartially heard1 and  
yet an equal meed should not be assigned
 to both of them2 but to the wiser a    
higher meed should be given1 and a lower
 to the less wise4 ,and ,i as well as   
,critias would beg you1 ,protagoras and 
,socrates1 to grant our request1 which  
is1 that you will argue with one another
 and not wrangle2 for friends argue with
 friends out of good-will1 but only     
adversaries and enemies wrangle4 ,and   
then our meeting will be delightful2 for
 in this way you1 who are the speakers1 
will be most likely to win esteem1 and  
not praise only1 among us who are your  
audience2 for esteem is a sincere       

conviction of the hearers' souls1 but   
praise is often an insincere expression 
of men uttering falsehoods contrary to  
their conviction4 ,and thus we who are  
the hearers will be gratified and not   
pleased2 for gratification is of the    
mind when receiving wisdom and          
knowledge1 but pleasure is of the body  
when eating or experiencing some other  
bodily delight4 ,thus spoke ,prodicus1  
and many of the company applauded his   
words4  ,hippias the sage spoke next4   
,he said3 ,all of you who are here      
present ,i reckon to be kinsmen and     
friends and fellow-citizens1 by nature  
and not by law2 for by nature like is   
akin to like1 whereas law is the tyrant 
of mankind1 and often compels us to do  
many things which are against nature4   
,how great would be the disgrace then1  
if we1 who know the nature of things1   
and are the wisest of the ,hellenes1 and
 as such are met together in this city1 
which is the metropolis of wisdom1 and  
in the greatest and most glorious house 

of this city1 should have nothing to    
show worthy of this height of dignity1  
but should only quarrel with one another
 like the meanest of mankind6 ,i do pray
 and advise you1 ,protagoras1 and you1  
,socrates1 to agree upon a compromise4  
,let us be your peacemakers4 ,and do not
 you1 ,socrates1 aim at this precise and
 extreme brevity in discourse1 if       
,protagoras objects1 but loosen and let 
go the reins of speech1 that your words 
may be grander and more becoming to you4
 ,neither do you1 ,protagoras1 go forth 
on the gale with every sail set out of  
sight of land into an ocean of words1   
but let there be a mean observed by both
 of you4 ,do as ,i say4 ,and let me also
 persuade you to choose an arbiter or   
overseer or president2 he will keep     
watch over your words and will prescribe
 their proper length4  ,this proposal   
was received by the company with        
universal approval2 ,callias said that  
he would not let me off1 and they begged
 me to choose an arbiter4 ,but ,i said  

that to choose an umpire of discourse   
would be unseemly2 for if the person    
chosen was inferior1 then the inferior  
or worse ought not to preside over the  
better2 or if he was equal1 neither     
would that be well2 for he who is our   
equal will do as we do1 and what will be
 the use of choosing him8 ,and if you   
say1 ',let us have a better then1'--to  
that ,i answer that you cannot have any 
one who is wiser than ,protagoras4 ,and 
if you choose another who is not really 
better1 and whom you only say is better1
 to put another over him as though he   
were an inferior person would be an     
unworthy reflection on him2 not that1 as
 far as ,i am concerned1 any reflection 
is of much consequence to me4 ,let me   
tell you then what ,i will do in order  
that the conversation and discussion may
 go on as you desire4 ,if ,protagoras is
 not disposed to answer1 let him ask and
 ,i will answer2 and ,i will endeavour  
to show at the same time how1 as ,i     
maintain1 he ought to answer3 and when  

,i have answered as many questions as he
 likes to ask1 let him in like manner   
answer me2 and if he seems to be not    
very ready at answering the precise     
question asked of him1 you and ,i will  
unite in entreating him1 as you         
entreated me1 not to spoil the          
discussion4 ,and this will require no   
special arbiter--all of you shall be    
arbiters4  ,this was generally approved1
 and ,protagoras1 though very much      
against his will1 was obliged to agree  
that he would ask questions2 and when he
 had put a sufficient number of them1   
that he would answer in his turn those  
which he was asked in short replies4 ,he
 began to put his questions as          
follows3--  ,i am of opinion1 ,socrates1
 he said1 that skill in poetry is the   
principal part of education2 and this ,i
 conceive to be the power of knowing    
what compositions of the poets are      
correct1 and what are not1 and how they 
are to be distinguished1 and of         
explaining when asked the reason of the 

difference4 ,and ,i propose to transfer 
the question which you and ,i have been 
discussing to the domain of poetry2 we  
will speak as before of virtue1 but in  
reference to a passage of a poet4 ,now  
,simonides says to ,scopas the son of   
,creon the ,thessalian3  ',hardly on the
 one hand can a man become truly good1  
built four-square in hands and feet and 
mind1 a work without a flaw4'  ,do you  
know the poem8 or shall ,i repeat the   
whole8  ,there is no need1 ,i said2 for 
,i am perfectly well acquainted with the
 ode1--,i have made a careful study of  
it4  ,very well1 he said4 ,and do you   
think that the ode is a good            
composition1 and true8  ,yes1 ,i said1  
both good and true4  ,but if there is a 
contradiction1 can the composition be   
good or true8  ,no1 not in that case1 ,i
 replied4  ,and is there not a          
contradiction8 he asked4 ,reflect4      
,well1 my friend1 ,i have reflected4    
,and does not the poet proceed to say1  
',i do not agree with the word of       

,pittacus1 albeit the utterance of a    
wise man3 ,hardly can a man be good'8   
,now you will observe that this is said 
by the same poet4  ,i know it4  ,and do 
you think1 he said1 that the two sayings
 are consistent8  ,yes1 ,i said1 ,i     
think so 7at the same time ,i could not 
help fearing that there might be        
something in what he said74 ,and you    
think otherwise8  ,why1 he said1 how can
 he be consistent in both8 ,first of    
all1 premising as his own thought1      
',hardly can a man become truly good'2  
and then a little further on in the     
poem1 forgetting1 and blaming ,pittacus 
and refusing to agree with him1 when he 
says1 ',hardly can a man be good1' which
 is the very same thing4 ,and yet when  
he blames him who says the same with    
himself1 he blames himself2 so that he  
must be wrong either in his first or his
 second assertion4  ,many of the        
audience cheered and applauded this4    
,and ,i felt at first giddy and faint1  
as if ,i had received a blow from the   

hand of an expert boxer1 when ,i heard  
his words and the sound of the cheering2
 and to confess the truth1 ,i wanted to 
get time to think what the meaning of   
the poet really was4 ,so ,i turned to   
,prodicus and called him4 ,prodicus1 ,i 
said1 ,simonides is a countryman of     
yours1 and you ought to come to his aid4
 ,i must appeal to you1 like the river  
,scamander in ,homer1 who1 when         
beleaguered by ,achilles1 summons the   
,simois to aid him1 saying3  ',brother  
dear1 let us both together stay the     
force of the hero 7,il474'  ,and ,i     
summon you1 for ,i am afraid that       
,protagoras will make an end of         
,simonides4 ,now is the time to         
rehabilitate ,simonides1 by the         
application of your philosophy of       
synonyms1 which enables you to          
distinguish 'will' and 'wish1' and make 
other charming distinctions like those  
which you drew just now4 ,and ,i should 
like to know whether you would agree    
with me2 for ,i am of opinion that there

 is no contradiction in the words of    
,simonides4 ,and first of all ,i wish   
that you would say whether1 in your     
opinion1 ,prodicus1 'being' is the same 
as 'becoming4'  ,not the same1          
certainly1 replied ,prodicus4  ,did not 
,simonides first set forth1 as his own  
view1 that ',hardly can a man become    
truly good'8  ,quite right1 said        
,prodicus4  ,and then he blames         
,pittacus1 not1 as ,protagoras imagines1
 for repeating that which he says       
himself1 but for saying something       
different from himself4 ,pittacus does  
not say as ,simonides says1 that hardly 
can a man become good1 but hardly can a 
man be good3 and our friend ,prodicus   
would maintain that being1 ,protagoras1 
is not the same as becoming2 and if they
 are not the same1 then ,simonides is   
not inconsistent with himself4 ,i dare  
say that ,prodicus and many others would
 say1 as ,hesiod says1       ',on the   
one hand1 hardly can a man become good1 
,for the gods have made virtue the      

reward of toil1      ,but on the other  
hand1 when you have climbed the height1 
,then1 to retain virtue1 however        
difficult the acquisition1 is easy      
--7,works and ,days74'  ,prodicus heard 
and approved2 but ,protagoras said3     
,your correction1 ,socrates1 involves a 
greater error than is contained in the  
sentence which you are correcting4      
,alas6 ,i said1 ,protagoras2 then ,i am 
a sorry physician1 and do but aggravate 
a disorder which ,i am seeking to cure4 
,such is the fact1 he said4  ,how so8 ,i
 asked4  ,the poet1 he replied1 could   
never have made such a mistake as to say
 that virtue1 which in the opinion of   
all men is the hardest of all things1   
can be easily retained4  ,well1 ,i said1
 and how fortunate are we in having     
,prodicus among us1 at the right moment2
 for he has a wisdom1 ,protagoras1      
which1 as ,i imagine1 is more than human
 and of very ancient date1 and may be as
 old as ,simonides or even older4       
,learned as you are in many things1 you 

appear to know nothing of this2 but ,i  
know1 for ,i am a disciple of his4 ,and 
now1 if ,i am not mistaken1 you do not  
understand the word 'hard' 7chalepon7 in
 the sense which ,simonides intended2   
and ,i must correct you1 as ,prodicus   
corrects me when ,i use the word 'awful'
 7deinon7 as a term of praise4 ,if ,i   
say that ,protagoras or any one else is 
an 'awfully' wise man1 he asks me if ,i 
am not ashamed of calling that which is 
good 'awful'2 and then he explains to me
 that the term 'awful' is always taken  
in a bad sense1 and that no one speaks  
of being 'awfully' healthy or wealthy1  
or of 'awful' peace1 but of 'awful'     
disease1 'awful' war1 'awful' poverty1  
meaning by the term 'awful1' evil4 ,and 
,i think that ,simonides and his        
countrymen the ,ceans1 when they spoke  
of 'hard' meant 'evil1' or something    
which you do not understand4 ,let us ask
 ,prodicus1 for he ought to be able to  
answer questions about the dialect of   
,simonides4 ,what did he mean1          

,prodicus1 by the term 'hard'8  ,evil1  
said ,prodicus4  ,and therefore1 ,i     
said1 ,prodicus1 he blames ,pittacus for
 saying1 ',hard is the good1' just as if
 that were equivalent to saying1 ,evil  
is the good4  ,yes1 he said1 that was   
certainly his meaning2 and he is        
twitting ,pittacus with ignorance of the
 use of terms1 which in a ,lesbian1 who 
has been accustomed to speak a barbarous
 language1 is natural4  ,do you hear1   
,protagoras1 ,i asked1 what our friend  
,prodicus is saying8 ,and have you an   
answer for him8  ,you are entirely      
mistaken1 ,prodicus1 said ,protagoras2  
and ,i know very well that ,simonides in
 using the word 'hard' meant what all of
 us mean1 not evil1 but that which is   
not easy--that which takes a great deal 
of trouble3 of this ,i am positive4  ,i 
said3 ,i also incline to believe1       
,protagoras1 that this was the meaning  
of ,simonides1 of which our friend      
,prodicus was very well aware1 but he   
thought that he would make fun1 and try 

if you could maintain your thesis2 for  
that ,simonides could never have meant  
the other is clearly proved by the      
context1 in which he says that ,god only
 has this gift4 ,now he cannot surely   
mean to say that to be good is evil1    
when he afterwards proceeds to say that 
,god only has this gift1 and that this  
is the attribute of him and of no other4
 ,for if this be his meaning1 ,prodicus 
would impute to ,simonides a character  
of recklessness which is very unlike his
 countrymen4 ,and ,i should like to tell
 you1 ,i said1 what ,i imagine to be the
 real meaning of ,simonides in this     
poem1 if you will test what1 in your way
 of speaking1 would be called my skill  
in poetry2 or if you would rather1 ,i   
will be the listener4  ,to this proposal
 ,protagoras replied3 ,as you           
please2--and ,hippias1 ,prodicus1 and   
the others told me by all means to do as
 ,i proposed4  ,then now1 ,i said1 ,i   
will endeavour to explain to you my     
opinion about this poem of ,simonides4  

,there is a very ancient philosophy     
which is more cultivated in ,crete and  
,lacedaemon than in any other part of   
,hellas1 and there are more philosophers
 in those countries than anywhere else  
in the world4 ,this1 however1 is a      
secret which the ,lacedaemonians deny2  
and they pretend to be ignorant1 just   
because they do not wish to have it     
thought that they rule the world by     
wisdom1 like the ,sophists of whom      
,protagoras was speaking1 and not by    
valour of arms2 considering that if the 
reason of their superiority were        
disclosed1 all men would be practising  
their wisdom4 ,and this secret of theirs
 has never been discovered by the       
imitators of ,lacedaemonian fashions in 
other cities1 who go about with their   
ears bruised in imitation of them1 and  
have the caestus bound on their arms1   
and are always in training1 and wear    
short cloaks2 for they imagine that     
these are the practices which have      
enabled the ,lacedaemonians to conquer  

the other ,hellenes4 ,now when the      
,lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold 
free conversation with their wise men1  
and are no longer satisfied with mere   
secret intercourse1 they drive out all  
these laconizers1 and any other         
foreigners who may happen to be in their
 country1 and they hold a philosophical 
seance unknown to strangers2 and they   
themselves forbid their young men to go 
out into other cities--in this they are 
like the ,cretans--in order that they   
may not unlearn the lessons which they  
have taught them4 ,and in ,lacedaemon   
and ,crete not only men but also women  
have a pride in their high cultivation4 
,and hereby you may know that ,i am     
right in attributing to the             
,lacedaemonians this excellence in      
philosophy and speculation3 ,if a man   
converses with the most ordinary        
,lacedaemonian1 he will find him seldom 
good for much in general conversation1  
but at any point in the discourse he    
will be darting out some notable saying1

 terse and full of meaning1 with        
unerring aim2 and the person with whom  
he is talking seems to be like a child  
in his hands4 ,and many of our own age  
and of former ages have noted that the  
true ,lacedaemonian type of character   
has the love of philosophy even stronger
 than the love of gymnastics2 they are  
conscious that only a perfectly educated
 man is capable of uttering such        
expressions4 ,such were ,thales of      
,miletus1 and ,pittacus of ,mitylene1   
and ,bias of ,priene1 and our own       
,solon1 and ,cleobulus the ,lindian1 and
 ,myson the ,chenian2 and seventh in the
 catalogue of wise men was the          
,lacedaemonian ,chilo4 ,all these were  
lovers and emulators and disciples of   
the culture of the ,lacedaemonians1 and 
any one may perceive that their wisdom  
was of this character2 consisting of    
short memorable sentences1 which they   
severally uttered4 ,and they met        
together and dedicated in the temple of 
,apollo at ,delphi1 as the first-fruits 

of their wisdom1 the far-famed          
inscriptions1 which are in all men's    
mouths--',know thyself1' and ',nothing  
too much4'  ,why do ,i say all this8 ,i 
am explaining that this ,lacedaemonian  
brevity was the style of primitive      
philosophy4 ,now there was a saying of  
,pittacus which was privately circulated
 and received the approbation of the    
wise1 ',hard is it to be good4' ,and    
,simonides1 who was ambitious of the    
fame of wisdom1 was aware that if he    
could overthrow this saying1 then1 as if
 he had won a victory over some famous  
athlete1 he would carry off the palm    
among his contemporaries4 ,and if ,i am 
not mistaken1 he composed the entire    
poem with the secret intention of       
damaging ,pittacus and his saying4  ,let
 us all unite in examining his words1   
and see whether ,i am speaking the      
truth4 ,simonides must have been a      
lunatic1 if1 in the very first words of 
the poem1 wanting to say only that to   
become good is hard1 he inserted        

7,greek7 'on the one hand' 7'on the one 
hand to become good is hard'72 there    
would be no reason for the introduction 
of 7,greek71 unless you suppose him to  
speak with a hostile reference to the   
words of ,pittacus4 ,pittacus is saying 
',hard is it to be good1' and he1 in    
refutation of this thesis1 rejoins that 
the truly hard thing1 ,pittacus1 is to  
become good1 not joining 'truly' with   
'good1' but with 'hard4' ,not1 that the 
hard thing is to be truly good1 as      
though there were some truly good men1  
and there were others who were good but 
not truly good 7this would be a very    
simple observation1 and quite unworthy  
of ,simonides72 but you must suppose him
 to make a trajection of the word       
'truly' 7,greek71 construing the saying 
of ,pittacus thus 7and let us imagine   
,pittacus to be speaking and ,simonides 
answering him73 ',o my friends1' says   
,pittacus1 'hard is it to be good1' and 
,simonides answers1 ',in that1          
,pittacus1 you are mistaken2 the        

difficulty is not to be good1 but on the
 one hand1 to become good1 four-square  
in hands and feet and mind1 without a   
flaw--that is hard truly4' ,this way of 
reading the passage accounts for the    
insertion of 7,greek7 'on the one hand1'
 and for the position at the end of the 
clause of the word 'truly1' and all that
 follows shows this to be the meaning4  
,a great deal might be said in praise of
 the details of the poem1 which is a    
charming piece of workmanship1 and very 
finished1 but such minutiae would be    
tedious4 ,i should like1 however1 to    
point out the general intention of the  
poem1 which is certainly designed in    
every part to be a refutation of the    
saying of ,pittacus4 ,for he speaks in  
what follows a little further on as if  
he meant to argue that although there is
 a difficulty in becoming good1 yet this
 is possible for a time1 and only for a 
time4 ,but having become good1 to remain
 in a good state and be good1 as you1   
,pittacus1 affirm1 is not possible1 and 

is not granted to man2 ,god only has    
this blessing2 'but man cannot help     
being bad when the force of             
circumstances overpowers him4' ,now whom
 does the force of circumstance         
overpower in the command of a           
vessel8--not the private individual1 for
 he is always overpowered2 and as one   
who is already prostrate cannot be      
overthrown1 and only he who is standing 
upright but not he who is prostrate can 
be laid prostrate1 so the force of      
circumstances can only overpower him    
who1 at some time or other1 has         
resources1 and not him who is at all    
times helpless4 ,the descent of a great 
storm may make the pilot helpless1 or   
the severity of the season the          
husbandman or the physician2 for the    
good may become bad1 as another poet    
witnesses3--  ',the good are sometimes  
good and sometimes bad4'  ,but the bad  
does not become bad2 he is always bad4  
,so that when the force of circumstances
 overpowers the man of resources and    

skill and virtue1 then he cannot help   
being bad4 ,and you1 ,pittacus1 are     
saying1 ',hard is it to be good4' ,now  
there is a difficulty in becoming good2 
and yet this is possible3 but to be good
 is an impossibility--  ',for he who    
does well is the good man1 and he who   
does ill is the bad4'  ,but what sort of
 doing is good in letters8 and what sort
 of doing makes a man good in letters8  
,clearly the knowing of them4 ,and what 
sort of well-doing makes a man a good   
physician8 ,clearly the knowledge of the
 art of healing the sick4 ',but he who  
does ill is the bad4' ,now who becomes a
 bad physician8 ,clearly he who is in   
the first place a physician1 and in the 
second place a good physician2 for he   
may become a bad one also3 but none of  
us unskilled individuals can by any     
amount of doing ill become physicians1  
any more than we can become carpenters  
or anything of that sort2 and he who by 
doing ill cannot become a physician at  
all1 clearly cannot become a bad        

physician4 ,in like manner the good may 
become deteriorated by time1 or toil1 or
 disease1 or other accident 7the only   
real doing ill is to be deprived of     
knowledge71 but the bad man will never  
become bad1 for he is always bad2 and if
 he were to become bad1 he must         
previously have been good4 ,thus the    
words of the poem tend to show that on  
the one hand a man cannot be            
continuously good1 but that he may      
become good and may also become bad2 and
 again that  ',they are the best for the
 longest time whom the gods love4'  ,all
 this relates to ,pittacus1 as is       
further proved by the sequel4 ,for he   
adds3--  ',therefore ,i will not throw  
away my span of life to no purpose in   
searching after the impossible1 hoping  
in vain to find a perfectly faultless   
man among those who partake of the fruit
 of the broad-bosomed earth3 if ,i find 
him1 ,i will send you word4'  7this is  
the vehement way in which he pursues his
 attack upon ,pittacus throughout the   

whole poem73  ',but him who does no     
evil1 voluntarily ,i praise and         
love2--not even the gods war against    
necessity4'  ,all this has a similar    
drift1 for ,simonides was not so        
ignorant as to say that he praised those
 who did no evil voluntarily1 as though 
there were some who did evil            
voluntarily4 ,for no wise man1 as ,i    
believe1 will allow that any human being
 errs voluntarily1 or voluntarily does  
evil and dishonourable actions2 but they
 are very well aware that all who do    
evil and dishonourable things do them   
against their will4 ,and ,simonides     
never says that he praises him who does 
no evil voluntarily2 the word           
'voluntarily' applies to himself4 ,for  
he was under the impression that a good 
man might often compel himself to love  
and praise another1 and to be the friend
 and approver of another2 and that there
 might be an involuntary love1 such as a
 man might feel to an unnatural father  
or mother1 or country1 or the like4 ,now

 bad men1 when their parents or country 
have any defects1 look on them with     
malignant joy1 and find fault with them 
and expose and denounce them to others1 
under the idea that the rest of mankind 
will be less likely to take themselves  
to task and accuse them of neglect2 and 
they blame their defects far more than  
they deserve1 in order that the odium   
which is necessarily incurred by them   
may be increased3 but the good man      
dissembles his feelings1 and constrains 
himself to praise them2 and if they have
 wronged him and he is angry1 he        
pacifies his anger and is reconciled1   
and compels himself to love and praise  
his own flesh and blood4 ,and           
,simonides1 as is probable1 considered  
that he himself had often had to praise 
and magnify a tyrant or the like1 much  
against his will1 and he also wishes to 
imply to ,pittacus that he does not     
censure him because he is censorious4   
',for ,i am satisfied' he says1 'when a 
man is neither bad nor very stupid2 and 

when he knows justice 7which is the     
health of states71 and is of sound mind1
 ,i will find no fault with him1 for ,i 
am not given to finding fault1 and there
 are innumerable fools'  7implying that 
if he delighted in censure he might have
 abundant opportunity of finding fault74
  ',all things are good with which evil 
is unmingled4'  ,in these latter words  
he does not mean to say that all things 
are good which have no evil in them1 as 
you might say ',all things are white    
which have no black in them1' for that  
would be ridiculous2 but he means to say
 that he accepts and finds no fault with
 the moderate or intermediate state4    
7',i do not hope' he says1 'to find a   
perfectly blameless man among those who 
partake of the fruits of the            
broad-bosomed earth 7if ,i find him1 ,i 
will send you word72 in this sense ,i   
praise no man4 ,but he who is moderately
 good1 and does no evil1 is good enough 
for me1 who love and approve every one'7
  7and here observe that he uses a      

,lesbian word1 epainemi 7approve71      
because he is addressing ,pittacus1     
',who love and ,,approve every one      
,,voluntarily1 who does no evil3'  and  
that the stop should be put after       
'voluntarily'72 'but there are some whom
 ,i involuntarily praise and love4 ,and 
you1 ,pittacus1 ,i would never have     
blamed1 if you had spoken what was      
moderately good and true2 but ,i do     
blame you because1 putting on the       
appearance of truth1 you are speaking   
falsely about the highest               
matters4'--,and this1 ,i said1 ,prodicus
 and ,protagoras1 ,i take to be the     
meaning of ,simonides in this poem4     
,hippias said3 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that
 you have given a very good explanation 
of the poem2 but ,i have also an        
excellent interpretation of my own which
 ,i will propound to you1 if you will   
allow me4  ,nay1 ,hippias1 said         
,alcibiades2 not now1 but at some other 
time4 ,at present we must abide by the  
compact which was made between ,socrates

 and ,protagoras1 to the effect that as 
long as ,protagoras is willing to ask1  
,socrates should answer2 or that if he  
would rather answer1 then that ,socrates
 should ask4  ,i said3 ,i wish          
,protagoras either to ask or answer as  
he is inclined2 but ,i would rather have
 done with poems and odes1 if he does   
not object1 and come back to the        
question about which ,i was asking you  
at first1 ,protagoras1 and by your help 
make an end of that4 ,the talk about the
 poets seems to me like a commonplace   
entertainment to which a vulgar company 
have recourse2 who1 because they are not
 able to converse or amuse one another1 
while they are drinking1 with the sound 
of their own voices and conversation1 by
 reason of their stupidity1 raise the   
price of flute-girls in the market1     
hiring for a great sum the voice of a   
flute instead of their own breath1 to be
 the medium of intercourse among them3  
but where the company are real gentlemen
 and men of education1 you will see no  

flute-girls1 nor dancing-girls1 nor     
harp-girls2 and they have no nonsense or
 games1 but are contented with one      
another's conversation1 of which their  
own voices are the medium1 and which    
they carry on by turns and in an orderly
 manner1 even though they are very      
liberal in their potations4 ,and a      
company like this of ours1 and men such 
as we profess to be1 do not require the 
help of another's voice1 or of the poets
 whom you cannot interrogate about the  
meaning of what they are saying2 people 
who cite them declaring1 some that the  
poet has one meaning1 and others that he
 has another1 and the point which is in 
dispute can never be decided4 ,this sort
 of entertainment they decline1 and     
prefer to talk with one another1 and put
 one another to the proof in            
conversation4 ,and these are the models 
which ,i desire that you and ,i should  
imitate4 ,leaving the poets1 and keeping
 to ourselves1 let us try the mettle of 
one another and make proof of the truth 

in conversation4 ,if you have a mind to 
ask1 ,i am ready to answer2 or if you   
would rather1 do you answer1 and give me
 the opportunity of resuming and        
completing our unfinished argument4  ,i 
made these and some similar             
observations2 but ,protagoras would not 
distinctly say which he would do4       
,thereupon ,alcibiades turned to        
,callias1 and said3--,do you think1     
,callias1 that ,protagoras is fair in   
refusing to say whether he will or will 
not answer8 for ,i certainly think that 
he is unfair2 he ought either to proceed
 with the argument1 or distinctly refuse
 to proceed1 that we may know his       
intention2 and then ,socrates will be   
able to discourse with some one else1   
and the rest of the company will be free
 to talk with one another4  ,i think    
that ,protagoras was really made ashamed
 by these words of ,alcibiades1 and when
 the prayers of ,callias and the company
 were superadded1 he was at last induced
 to argue1 and said that ,i might ask   

and he would answer4  ,so ,i said3 ,do  
not imagine1 ,protagoras1 that ,i have  
any other interest in asking questions  
of you but that of clearing up my own   
difficulties4 ,for ,i think that ,homer 
was very right in saying that           
',when two go together1 one sees before 
the other 7,il471'  for all men who have
 a companion are readier in deed1 word1 
or thought2 but if a man       ',sees a 
thing when he is alone1'  he goes about 
straightway seeking until he finds some 
one to whom he may show his discoveries1
 and who may confirm him in them4 ,and  
,i would rather hold discourse with you 
than with any one1 because ,i think that
 no man has a better understanding of   
most things which a good man may be     
expected to understand1 and in          
particular of virtue4 ,for who is there1
 but you8--who not only claim to be a   
good man and a gentleman1 for many are  
this1 and yet have not the power of     
making others good--whereas you are not 
only good yourself1 but also the cause  

of goodness in others4 ,moreover such   
confidence have you in yourself1 that   
although other ,sophists conceal their  
profession1 you proclaim in the face of 
,hellas that you are a ,sophist or      
teacher of virtue and education1 and are
 the first who demanded pay in return4  
,how then can ,i do otherwise than      
invite you to the examination of these  
subjects1 and ask questions and consult 
with you8 ,i must1 indeed4 ,and ,i      
should like once more to have my memory 
refreshed by you about the questions    
which ,i was asking you at first1 and   
also to have your help in considering   
them4 ,if ,i am not mistaken the        
question was this3 ,are wisdom and      
temperance and courage and justice and  
holiness five names of the same thing8  
or has each of the names a separate     
underlying essence and corresponding    
thing having a peculiar function1 no one
 of them being like any other of them8  
,and you replied that the five names    
were not the names of the same thing1   

but that each of them had a separate    
object1 and that all these objects were 
parts of virtue1 not in the same way    
that the parts of gold are like each    
other and the whole of which they are   
parts1 but as the parts of the face are 
unlike the whole of which they are parts
 and one another1 and have each of them 
a distinct function4 ,i should like to  
know whether this is still your opinion2
 or if not1 ,i will ask you to define   
your meaning1 and ,i shall not take you 
to task if you now make a different     
statement4 ,for ,i dare say that you may
 have said what you did only in order to
 make trial of me4  ,i answer1          
,socrates1 he said1 that all these      
qualities are parts of virtue1 and that 
four out of the five are to some extent 
similar1 and that the fifth of them1    
which is courage1 is very different from
 the other four1 as ,i prove in this    
way3 ,you may observe that many men are 
utterly unrighteous1 unholy1            
intemperate1 ignorant1 who are          

nevertheless remarkable for their       
courage4  ,stop1 ,i said2 ,i should like
 to think about that4 ,when you speak of
 brave men1 do you mean the confident1  
or another sort of nature8  ,yes1 he    
said2 ,i mean the impetuous1 ready to go
 at that which others are afraid to     
approach4  ,in the next place1 you would
 affirm virtue to be a good thing1 of   
which good thing you assert yourself to 
be a teacher4  ,yes1 he said2 ,i should 
say the best of all things1 if ,i am in 
my right mind4  ,and is it partly good  
and partly bad1 ,i said1 or wholly good8
  ,wholly good1 and in the highest      
degree4  ,tell me then2 who are they who
 have confidence when diving into a     
well8  ,i should say1 the divers4  ,and 
the reason of this is that they have    
knowledge8  ,yes1 that is the reason4   
,and who have confidence when fighting  
on horseback--the skilled horseman or   
the unskilled8  ,the skilled4  ,and who 
when fighting with light shields--the   
peltasts or the nonpeltasts8  ,the      

peltasts4 ,and that is true of all other
 things1 he said1 if that is your point3
 those who have knowledge are more      
confident than those who have no        
knowledge1 and they are more confident  
after they have learned than before4    
,and have you not seen persons utterly  
ignorant1 ,i said1 of these things1 and 
yet confident about them8  ,yes1 he     
said1 ,i have seen such persons far too 
confident4  ,and are not these confident
 persons also courageous8  ,in that     
case1 he replied1 courage would be a    
base thing1 for the men of whom we are  
speaking are surely madmen4  ,then who  
are the courageous8 ,are they not the   
confident8  ,yes1 he said2 to that      
statement ,i adhere4  ,and those1 ,i    
said1 who are thus confident without    
knowledge are really not courageous1 but
 mad2 and in that case the wisest are   
also the most confident1 and being the  
most confident are also the bravest1 and
 upon that view again wisdom will be    
courage4  ,nay1 ,socrates1 he replied1  

you are mistaken in your remembrance of 
what was said by me4 ,when you asked me1
 ,i certainly did say that the          
courageous are the confident2 but ,i was
 never asked whether the confident are  
the courageous2 if you had asked me1 ,i 
should have answered ',not all of them'3
 and what ,i did answer you have not    
proved to be false1 although you        
proceeded to show that those who have   
knowledge are more courageous than they 
were before they had knowledge1 and more
 courageous than others who have no     
knowledge1 and were then led on to think
 that courage is the same as wisdom4    
,but in this way of arguing you might   
come to imagine that strength is wisdom4
 ,you might begin by asking whether the 
strong are able1 and ,i should say      
',yes'2 and then whether those who know 
how to wrestle are not more able to     
wrestle than those who do not know how  
to wrestle1 and more able after than    
before they had learned1 and ,i should  
assent4 ,and when ,i had admitted this1 

you might use my admissions in such a   
way as to prove that upon my view wisdom
 is strength2 whereas in that case ,i   
should not have admitted1 any more than 
in the other1 that the able are strong1 
although ,i have admitted that the      
strong are able4 ,for there is a        
difference between ability and strength2
 the former is given by knowledge as    
well as by madness or rage1 but strength
 comes from nature and a healthy state  
of the body4 ,and in like manner ,i say 
of confidence and courage1 that they are
 not the same2 and ,i argue that the    
courageous are confident1 but not all   
the confident courageous4 ,for          
confidence may be given to men by art1  
and also1 like ability1 by madness and  
rage2 but courage comes to them from    
nature and the healthy state of the     
soul4  ,i said3 ,you would admit1       
,protagoras1 that some men live well and
 others ill8  ,he assented4  ,and do you
 think that a man lives well who lives  
in pain and grief8  ,he does not4  ,but 

if he lives pleasantly to the end of his
 life1 will he not in that case have    
lived well8  ,he will4  ,then to live   
pleasantly is a good1 and to live       
unpleasantly an evil8  ,yes1 he said1 if
 the pleasure be good and honourable4   
,and do you1 ,protagoras1 like the rest 
of the world1 call some pleasant things 
evil and some painful things good8--for 
,i am rather disposed to say that things
 are good in as far as they are         
pleasant1 if they have no consequences  
of another sort1 and in as far as they  
are painful they are bad4  ,i do not    
know1 ,socrates1 he said1 whether ,i can
 venture to assert in that unqualified  
manner that the pleasant is the good and
 the painful the evil4 ,having regard   
not only to my present answer1 but also 
to the whole of my life1 ,i shall be    
safer1 if ,i am not mistaken1 in saying 
that there are some pleasant things     
which are not good1 and that there are  
some painful things which are good1 and 
some which are not good1 and that there 

are some which are neither good nor     
evil4  ,and you would call pleasant1 ,i 
said1 the things which participate in   
pleasure or create pleasure8            
,certainly1 he said4  ,then my meaning  
is1 that in as far as they are pleasant 
they are good2 and my question would    
imply that pleasure is a good in itself4
  ,according to your favourite mode of  
speech1 ,socrates1 ',let us reflect     
about this1' he said2 and if the        
reflection is to the point1 and the     
result proves that pleasure and good are
 really the same1 then we will agree2   
but if not1 then we will argue4  ,and   
would you wish to begin the enquiry8 ,i 
said2 or shall ,i begin8  ,you ought to 
take the lead1 he said2 for you are the 
author of the discussion4  ,may ,i      
employ an illustration8 ,i said4        
,suppose some one who is enquiring into 
the health or some other bodily quality 
of another3--he looks at his face and at
 the tips of his fingers1 and then he   
says1 ,uncover your chest and back to me

 that ,i may have a better view3--that  
is the sort of thing which ,i desire in 
this speculation4 ,having seen what your
 opinion is about good and pleasure1 ,i 
am minded to say to you3 ,uncover your  
mind to me1 ,protagoras1 and reveal your
 opinion about knowledge1 that ,i may   
know whether you agree with the rest of 
the world4 ,now the rest of the world   
are of opinion that knowledge is a      
principle not of strength1 or of rule1  
or of command3 their notion is that a   
man may have knowledge1 and yet that the
 knowledge which is in him may be       
overmastered by anger1 or pleasure1 or  
pain1 or love1 or perhaps by fear1--just
 as if knowledge were a slave1 and might
 be dragged about anyhow4 ,now is that  
your view8 or do you think that         
knowledge is a noble and commanding     
thing1 which cannot be overcome1 and    
will not allow a man1 if he only knows  
the difference of good and evil1 to do  
anything which is contrary to knowledge1
 but that wisdom will have strength to  

help him8  ,i agree with you1 ,socrates1
 said ,protagoras2 and not only so1 but 
,i1 above all other men1 am bound to say
 that wisdom and knowledge are the      
highest of human things4  ,good1 ,i     
said1 and true4 ,but are you aware that 
the majority of the world are of another
 mind2 and that men are commonly        
supposed to know the things which are   
best1 and not to do them when they      
might8 ,and most persons whom ,i have   
asked the reason of this have said that 
when men act contrary to knowledge they 
are overcome by pain1 or pleasure1 or   
some of those affections which ,i was   
just now mentioning4  ,yes1 ,socrates1  
he replied2 and that is not the only    
point about which mankind are in error4 
,suppose1 then1 that you and ,i         
endeavour to instruct and inform them   
what is the nature of this affection    
which they call 'being overcome by      
pleasure1' and which they affirm to be  
the reason why they do not always do    
what is best4 ,when we say to them3     

,friends1 you are mistaken1 and are     
saying what is not true1 they would     
probably reply3 ,socrates and           
,protagoras1 if this affection of the   
soul is not to be called 'being overcome
 by pleasure1' pray1 what is it1 and by 
what name would you describe it8  ,but  
why1 ,socrates1 should we trouble       
ourselves about the opinion of the many1
 who just say anything that happens to  
occur to them8  ,i believe1 ,i said1    
that they may be of use in helping us to
 discover how courage is related to the 
other parts of virtue4 ,if you are      
disposed to abide by our agreement1 that
 ,i should show the way in which1 as ,i 
think1 our recent difficulty is most    
likely to be cleared up1 do you follow2 
but if not1 never mind4  ,you are quite 
right1 he said2 and ,i would have you   
proceed as you have begun4  ,well then1 
,i said1 let me suppose that they repeat
 their question1 ,what account do you   
give of that which1 in our way of       
speaking1 is termed being overcome by   

pleasure8 ,i should answer thus3        
,listen1 and ,protagoras and ,i will    
endeavour to show you4 ,when men are    
overcome by eating and drinking and     
other sensual desires which are         
pleasant1 and they1 knowing them to be  
evil1 nevertheless indulge in them1     
would you not say that they were        
overcome by pleasure8 ,they will not    
deny this4 ,and suppose that you and ,i 
were to go on and ask them again3 ',in  
what way do you say that they are       
evil1--in that they are pleasant and    
give pleasure at the moment1 or because 
they cause disease and poverty and other
 like evils in the future8 ,would they  
still be evil1 if they had no attendant 
evil consequences1 simply because they  
give the consciousness of pleasure of   
whatever nature8'--,would they not      
answer that they are not evil on account
 of the pleasure which is immediately   
given by them1 but on account of the    
after consequences--diseases and the    
like8  ,i believe1 said ,protagoras1    

that the world in general would answer  
as you do4  ,and in causing diseases do 
they not cause pain8 and in causing     
poverty do they not cause pain2--they   
would agree to that also1 if ,i am not  
mistaken8  ,protagoras assented4  ,then 
,i should say to them1 in my name and   
yours3 ,do you think them evil for any  
other reason1 except because they end in
 pain and rob us of other               
pleasures3--there again they would      
agree8  ,we both of us thought that they
 would4  ,and then ,i should take the   
question from the opposite point of     
view1 and say3 ',friends1 when you speak
 of goods being painful1 do you not mean
 remedial goods1 such as gymnastic      
exercises1 and military service1 and the
 physician's use of burning1 cutting1   
drugging1 and starving8 ,are these the  
things which are good but               
painful8'--they would assent to me8  ,he
 agreed4  ',and do you call them good   
because they occasion the greatest      
immediate suffering and pain2 or        

because1 afterwards1 they bring health  
and improvement of the bodily condition 
and the salvation of states and power   
over others and wealth8'--they would    
agree to the latter alternative1 if ,i  
am not mistaken8  ,he assented4  ',are  
these things good for any other reason  
except that they end in pleasure1 and   
get rid of and avert pain8 ,are you     
looking to any other standard but       
pleasure and pain when you call them    
good8'--they would acknowledge that they
 were not8  ,i think so1 said           
,protagoras4  ',and do you not pursue   
after pleasure as a good1 and avoid pain
 as an evil8'  ,he assented4  ',then you
 think that pain is an evil and pleasure
 is a good3 and even pleasure you deem  
an evil1 when it robs you of greater    
pleasures than it gives1 or causes pains
 greater than the pleasure4 ,if1        
however1 you call pleasure an evil in   
relation to some other end or standard1 
you will be able to show us that        
standard4 ,but you have none to show4'  

,i do not think that they have1 said    
,protagoras4  ',and have you not a      
similar way of speaking about pain8 ,you
 call pain a good when it takes away    
greater pains than those which it has1  
or gives pleasures greater than the     
pains3 then if you have some standard   
other than pleasure and pain to which   
you refer when you call actual pain a   
good1 you can show what that is4 ,but   
you cannot4'  ,true1 said ,protagoras4  
,suppose again1 ,i said1 that the world 
says to me3 ',why do you spend many     
words and speak in many ways on this    
subject8' ,excuse me1 friends1 ,i should
 reply2 but in the first place there is 
a difficulty in explaining the meaning  
of the expression 'overcome by          
pleasure'2 and the whole argument turns 
upon this4 ,and even now1 if you see any
 possible way in which evil can be      
explained as other than pain1 or good as
 other than pleasure1 you may still     
retract4 ,are you satisfied1 then1 at   
having a life of pleasure which is      

without pain8 ,if you are1 and if you   
are unable to show any good or evil     
which does not end in pleasure and pain1
 hear the consequences3--,if what you   
say is true1 then the argument is absurd
 which affirms that a man often does    
evil knowingly1 when he might abstain1  
because he is seduced and overpowered by
 pleasure2 or again1 when you say that a
 man knowingly refuses to do what is    
good because he is overcome at the      
moment by pleasure4 ,and that this is   
ridiculous will be evident if only we   
give up the use of various names1 such  
as pleasant and painful1 and good and   
evil4 ,as there are two things1 let us  
call them by two names--first1 good and 
evil1 and then pleasant and painful4    
,assuming this1 let us go on to say that
 a man does evil knowing that he does   
evil4 ,but some one will ask1 ,why8     
,because he is overcome1 is the first   
answer4 ,and by what is he overcome8 the
 enquirer will proceed to ask4 ,and we  
shall not be able to reply ',by         

pleasure1' for the name of pleasure has 
been exchanged for that of good4 ,in our
 answer1 then1 we shall only say that he
 is overcome4 ',by what8' he will       
reiterate4 ,by the good1 we shall have  
to reply2 indeed we shall4 ,nay1 but our
 questioner will rejoin with a laugh1 if
 he be one of the swaggering sort1      
',that is too ridiculous1 that a man    
should do what he knows to be evil when 
he ought not1 because he is overcome by 
good4 ,is that1 he will ask1 because the
 good was worthy or not worthy of       
conquering the evil'8 ,and in answer to 
that we shall clearly reply1 ,because it
 was not worthy2 for if it had been     
worthy1 then he who1 as we say1 was     
overcome by pleasure1 would not have    
been wrong4 ',but how1' he will reply1  
'can the good be unworthy of the evil1  
or the evil of the good'8 ,is not the   
real explanation that they are out of   
proportion to one another1 either as    
greater and smaller1 or more and fewer8 
,this we cannot deny4 ,and when you     

speak of being overcome--'what do you   
mean1' he will say1 'but that you choose
 the greater evil in exchange for the   
lesser good8' ,admitted4 ,and now       
substitute the names of pleasure and    
pain for good and evil1 and say1 not as 
before1 that a man does what is evil    
knowingly1 but that he does what is     
painful knowingly1 and because he is    
overcome by pleasure1 which is unworthy 
to overcome4 ,what measure is there of  
the relations of pleasure to pain other 
than excess and defect1 which means that
 they become greater and smaller1 and   
more and fewer1 and differ in degree8   
,for if any one says3 ',yes1 ,socrates1 
but immediate pleasure differs widely   
from future pleasure and pain'--,to that
 ,i should reply3 ,and do they differ in
 anything but in pleasure and pain8     
,there can be no other measure of them4 
,and do you1 like a skilful weigher1 put
 into the balance the pleasures and the 
pains1 and their nearness and distance1 
and weigh them1 and then say which      

outweighs the other4 ,if you weigh      
pleasures against pleasures1 you of     
course take the more and greater2 or if 
you weigh pains against pains1 you take 
the fewer and the less2 or if pleasures 
against pains1 then you choose that     
course of action in which the painful is
 exceeded by the pleasant1 whether the  
distant by the near or the near by the  
distant2 and you avoid that course of   
action in which the pleasant is exceeded
 by the painful4 ,would you not admit1  
my friends1 that this is true8 ,i am    
confident that they cannot deny this4   
,he agreed with me4  ,well then1 ,i     
shall say1 if you agree so far1 be so   
good as to answer me a question3 ,do not
 the same magnitudes appear larger to   
your sight when near1 and smaller when  
at a distance8 ,they will acknowledge   
that4 ,and the same holds of thickness  
and number2 also sounds1 which are in   
themselves equal1 are greater when near1
 and lesser when at a distance4 ,they   
will grant that also4 ,now suppose      

happiness to consist in doing or        
choosing the greater1 and in not doing  
or in avoiding the less1 what would be  
the saving principle of human life8     
,would not the art of measuring be the  
saving principle2 or would the power of 
appearance8 ,is not the latter that     
deceiving art which makes us wander up  
and down and take the things at one time
 of which we repent at another1 both in 
our actions and in our choice of things 
great and small8 ,but the art of        
measurement would do away with the      
effect of appearances1 and1 showing the 
truth1 would fain teach the soul at last
 to find rest in the truth1 and would   
thus save our life4 ,would not mankind  
generally acknowledge that the art which
 accomplishes this result is the art of 
measurement8  ,yes1 he said1 the art of 
measurement4  ,suppose1 again1 the      
salvation of human life to depend on the
 choice of odd and even1 and on the     
knowledge of when a man ought to choose 
the greater or less1 either in reference

 to themselves or to each other1 and    
whether near or at a distance2 what     
would be the saving principle of our    
lives8 ,would not knowledge8--a         
knowledge of measuring1 when the        
question is one of excess and defect1   
and a knowledge of number1 when the     
question is of odd and even8 ,the world 
will assent1 will they not8  ,protagoras
 himself thought that they would4  ,well
 then1 my friends1 ,i say to them2      
seeing that the salvation of human life 
has been found to consist in the right  
choice of pleasures and pains1--in the  
choice of the more and the fewer1 and   
the greater and the less1 and the nearer
 and remoter1 must not this measuring be
 a consideration of their excess and    
defect and equality in relation to each 
other8  ,this is undeniably true4  ,and 
this1 as possessing measure1 must       
undeniably also be an art and science8  
,they will agree1 he said4  ,the nature 
of that art or science will be a matter 
of future consideration2 but the        

existence of such a science furnishes a 
demonstrative answer to the question    
which you asked of me and ,protagoras4  
,at the time when you asked the         
question1 if you remember1 both of us   
were agreeing that there was nothing    
mightier than knowledge1 and that       
knowledge1 in whatever existing1 must   
have the advantage over pleasure and all
 other things2 and then you said that   
pleasure often got the advantage even   
over a man who has knowledge2 and we    
refused to allow this1 and you rejoined3
 ,o ,protagoras and ,socrates1 what is  
the meaning of being overcome by        
pleasure if not this8--tell us what you 
call such a state3--if we had           
immediately and at the time answered    
',ignorance1' you would have laughed at 
us4 ,but now1 in laughing at us1 you    
will be laughing at yourselves3 for you 
also admitted that men err in their     
choice of pleasures and pains2 that is1 
in their choice of good and evil1 from  
defect of knowledge2 and you admitted   

further1 that they err1 not only from   
defect of knowledge in general1 but of  
that particular knowledge which is      
called measuring4 ,and you are also     
aware that the erring act which is done 
without knowledge is done in ignorance4 
,this1 therefore1 is the meaning of     
being overcome by pleasure2--ignorance1 
and that the greatest4 ,and our friends 
,protagoras and ,prodicus and ,hippias  
declare that they are the physicians of 
ignorance2 but you1 who are under the   
mistaken impression that ignorance is   
not the cause1 and that the art of which
 ,i am speaking cannot be taught1       
neither go yourselves1 nor send your    
children1 to the ,sophists1 who are the 
teachers of these things--you take care 
of your money and give them none2 and   
the result is1 that you are the worse   
off both in public and private          
life3--,let us suppose this to be our   
answer to the world in general3 ,and now
 ,i should like to ask you1 ,hippias1   
and you1 ,prodicus1 as well as          

,protagoras 7for the argument is to be  
yours as well as ours71 whether you     
think that ,i am speaking the truth or  
not8  ,they all thought that what ,i    
said was entirely true4  ,then you      
agree1 ,i said1 that the pleasant is the
 good1 and the painful evil4 ,and here  
,i would beg my friend ,prodicus not to 
introduce his distinction of names1     
whether he is disposed to say           
pleasurable1 delightful1 joyful4        
,however1 by whatever name he prefers to
 call them1 ,i will ask you1 most       
excellent ,prodicus1 to answer in my    
sense of the words4  ,prodicus laughed  
and assented1 as did the others4  ,then1
 my friends1 what do you say to this8   
,are not all actions honourable and     
useful1 of which the tendency is to make
 life painless and pleasant8 ,the       
honourable work is also useful and good8
  ,this was admitted4  ,then1 ,i said1  
if the pleasant is the good1 nobody does
 anything under the idea or conviction  
that some other thing would be better   

and is also attainable1 when he might do
 the better4 ,and this inferiority of a 
man to himself is merely ignorance1 as  
the superiority of a man to himself is  
wisdom4  ,they all assented4  ,and is   
not ignorance the having a false opinion
 and being deceived about important     
matters8  ,to this also they unanimously
 assented4  ,then1 ,i said1 no man      
voluntarily pursues evil1 or that which 
he thinks to be evil4 ,to prefer evil to
 good is not in human nature2 and when a
 man is compelled to choose one of two  
evils1 no one will choose the greater   
when he may have the less4  ,all of us  
agreed to every word of this4  ,well1 ,i
 said1 there is a certain thing called  
fear or terror2 and here1 ,prodicus1 ,i 
should particularly like to know whether
 you would agree with me in defining    
this fear or terror as expectation of   
evil4  ,protagoras and ,hippias agreed1 
but ,prodicus said that this was fear   
and not terror4  ,never mind1 ,prodicus1
 ,i said2 but let me ask whether1 if our

 former assertions are true1 a man will 
pursue that which he fears when he is   
not compelled8 ,would not this be in    
flat contradiction to the admission     
which has been already made1 that he    
thinks the things which he fears to be  
evil2 and no one will pursue or         
voluntarily accept that which he thinks 
to be evil8  ,that also was universally 
admitted4  ,then1 ,i said1 these1       
,hippias and ,prodicus1 are our         
premisses2 and ,i would beg ,protagoras 
to explain to us how he can be right in 
what he said at first4 ,i do not mean in
 what he said quite at first1 for his   
first statement1 as you may remember1   
was that whereas there were five parts  
of virtue none of them was like any     
other of them2 each of them had a       
separate function4 ,to this1 however1 ,i
 am not referring1 but to the assertion 
which he afterwards made that of the    
five virtues four were nearly akin to   
each other1 but that the fifth1 which   
was courage1 differed greatly from the  

others4 ,and of this he gave me the     
following proof4 ,he said3 ,you will    
find1 ,socrates1 that some of the most  
impious1 and unrighteous1 and           
intemperate1 and ignorant of men are    
among the most courageous2 which proves 
that courage is very different from the 
other parts of virtue4 ,i was surprised 
at his saying this at the time1 and ,i  
am still more surprised now that ,i have
 discussed the matter with you4 ,so ,i  
asked him whether by the brave he meant 
the confident4 ,yes1 he replied1 and the
 impetuous or goers4 7,you may remember1
 ,protagoras1 that this was your        
answer47  ,he assented4  ,well then1 ,i 
said1 tell us against what are the      
courageous ready to go--against the same
 dangers as the cowards8  ,no1 he       
answered4  ,then against something      
different8  ,yes1 he said4  ,then do    
cowards go where there is safety1 and   
the courageous where there is danger8   
,yes1 ,socrates1 so men say4  ,very     
true1 ,i said4 ,but ,i want to know     

against what do you say that the        
courageous are ready to go--against     
dangers1 believing them to be dangers1  
or not against dangers8  ,no1 said he2  
the former case has been proved by you  
in the previous argument to be          
impossible4  ,that1 again1 ,i replied1  
is quite true4 ,and if this has been    
rightly proven1 then no one goes to meet
 what he thinks to be dangers1 since the
 want of self-control1 which makes men  
rush into dangers1 has been shown to be 
ignorance4  ,he assented4  ,and yet the 
courageous man and the coward alike go  
to meet that about which they are       
confident2 so that1 in this point of    
view1 the cowardly and the courageous go
 to meet the same things4  ,and yet1    
,socrates1 said ,protagoras1 that to    
which the coward goes is the opposite of
 that to which the courageous goes2 the 
one1 for example1 is ready to go to     
battle1 and the other is not ready4     
,and is going to battle honourable or   
disgraceful8 ,i said4  ,honourable1 he  

replied4  ,and if honourable1 then      
already admitted by us to be good2 for  
all honourable actions we have admitted 
to be good4  ,that is true2 and to that 
opinion ,i shall always adhere4  ,true1 
,i said4 ,but which of the two are they 
who1 as you say1 are unwilling to go to 
war1 which is a good and honourable     
thing8  ,the cowards1 he replied4  ,and 
what is good and honourable1 ,i said1 is
 also pleasant8  ,it has certainly been 
acknowledged to be so1 he replied4  ,and
 do the cowards knowingly refuse to go  
to the nobler1 and pleasanter1 and      
better8  ,the admission of that1 he     
replied1 would belie our former         
admissions4  ,but does not the          
courageous man also go to meet the      
better1 and pleasanter1 and nobler8     
,that must be admitted4  ,and the       
courageous man has no base fear or base 
confidence8  ,true1 he replied4  ,and if
 not base1 then honourable8  ,he        
admitted this4  ,and if honourable1 then
 good8  ,yes4  ,but the fear and        

confidence of the coward or foolhardy or
 madman1 on the contrary1 are base8  ,he
 assented4  ,and these base fears and   
confidences originate in ignorance and  
uninstructedness8  ,true1 he said4      
,then as to the motive from which the   
cowards act1 do you call it cowardice or
 courage8  ,i should say cowardice1 he  
replied4  ,and have they not been shown 
to be cowards through their ignorance of
 dangers8  ,assuredly1 he said4  ,and   
because of that ignorance they are      
cowards8  ,he assented4  ,and the reason
 why they are cowards is admitted by you
 to be cowardice8  ,he again assented4  
,then the ignorance of what is and is   
not dangerous is cowardice8  ,he nodded 
assent4  ,but surely courage1 ,i said1  
is opposed to cowardice8  ,yes4  ,then  
the wisdom which knows what are and are 
not dangers is opposed to the ignorance 
of them8  ,to that again he nodded      
assent4  ,and the ignorance of them is  
cowardice8  ,to that he very reluctantly
 nodded assent4  ,and the knowledge of  

that which is and is not dangerous is   
courage1 and is opposed to the ignorance
 of these things8  ,at this point he    
would no longer nod assent1 but was     
silent4  ,and why1 ,i said1 do you      
neither assent nor dissent1 ,protagoras8
  ,finish the argument by yourself1 he  
said4  ,i only want to ask one more     
question1 ,i said4 ,i want to know      
whether you still think that there are  
men who are most ignorant and yet most  
courageous8  ,you seem to have a great  
ambition to make me answer1 ,socrates1  
and therefore ,i will gratify you1 and  
say1 that this appears to me to be      
impossible consistently with the        
argument4  ,my only object1 ,i said1 in 
continuing the discussion1 has been the 
desire to ascertain the nature and      
relations of virtue2 for if this were   
clear1 ,i am very sure that the other   
controversy which has been carried on at
 great length by both of us--you        
affirming and ,i denying that virtue can
 be taught--would also become clear4    

,the result of our discussion appears to
 me to be singular4 ,for if the argument
 had a human voice1 that voice would be 
heard laughing at us and saying3        
',protagoras and ,socrates1 you are     
strange beings2 there are you1          
,socrates1 who were saying that virtue  
cannot be taught1 contradicting yourself
 now by your attempt to prove that all  
things are knowledge1 including justice1
 and temperance1 and courage1--which    
tends to show that virtue can certainly 
be taught2 for if virtue were other than
 knowledge1 as ,protagoras attempted to 
prove1 then clearly virtue cannot be    
taught2 but if virtue is entirely       
knowledge1 as you are seeking to show1  
then ,i cannot but suppose that virtue  
is capable of being taught4 ,protagoras1
 on the other hand1 who started by      
saying that it might be taught1 is now  
eager to prove it to be anything rather 
than knowledge2 and if this is true1 it 
must be quite incapable of being        
taught4' ,now ,i1 ,protagoras1          

perceiving this terrible confusion of   
our ideas1 have a great desire that they
 should be cleared up4 ,and ,i should   
like to carry on the discussion until we
 ascertain what virtue is1 whether      
capable of being taught or not1 lest    
haply ,epimetheus should trip us up and 
deceive us in the argument1 as he forgot
 us in the story2 ,i prefer your        
,prometheus to your ,epimetheus1 for of 
him ,i make use1 whenever ,i am busy    
about these questions1 in ,promethean   
care of my own life4 ,and if you have no
 objection1 as ,i said at first1 ,i     
should like to have your help in the    
enquiry4  ,protagoras replied3          
,socrates1 ,i am not of a base nature1  
and ,i am the last man in the world to  
be envious4 ,i cannot but applaud your  
energy and your conduct of an argument4 
,as ,i have often said1 ,i admire you   
above all men whom ,i know1 and far     
above all men of your age2 and ,i       
believe that you will become very       
eminent in philosophy4 ,let us come back

 to the subject at some future time2 at 
present we had better turn to something 
else4  ,by all means1 ,i said1 if that  
is your wish2 for ,i too ought long     
since to have kept the engagement of    
which ,i spoke before1 and only tarried 
because ,i could not refuse the request 
of the noble ,callias4 ,so the          
conversation ended1 and we went our way4