,,the ,,dialogues ,,of ,,plato          
,,charmides  ,by ,plato  ,translated    
into ,english with ,analyses and        
,introductions ,by ,b4 ,jowett1 ,m4,a4  
,master of ,balliol ,college            
,regius ,professor of ,greek in the     
,university of ,oxford      ,doctor in  
,theology of the ,university of ,leyden 
,,to ,,my ,,former ,,pupils  in ,balliol
 ,college and in the ,university of     
,oxford who during fifty years have been
 the best of friends to me these volumes
 are inscribed in grateful recognition  
of their never failing attachment4      
,the additions and alterations which    
have been made1 both in the             
,introductions and in the ,text of this 
,edition1 affect at least a third of the
 work4  ,having regard to the extent of 
these alterations1 and to the annoyance 
which is naturally felt by the owner of 
a book at the possession of it in an    
inferior form1 and still more keenly by 
the writer himself1 who must always     
desire to be read as he is at his best1 

,i have thought that the possessor of   
either of the former ,editions 7#ahgj   
and #ahgf7 might wish to exchange it for
 the present one4 ,i have therefore     
arranged that those who would like to   
make this exchange1 on depositing a     
perfect and undamaged copy of the first 
or second ,edition with any agent of the
 ,clarendon ,press1 shall be entitled to
 receive a copy of a new ,edition at    
half-price4     ,,preface ,,to ,,the    
,,first ,,edition4  ,the ,text which has
 been mostly followed in this           
,translation of ,plato is the latest    
#hvo4 edition of ,stallbaum2 the        
principal deviations are noted at the   
bottom of the page4  ,i have to         
acknowledge many obligations to old     
friends and pupils4 ,these are3--,mr4   
,john ,purves1 ,fellow of ,balliol      
,college1 with whom ,i have revised     
about half of the entire ,translation2  
the ,rev4 ,professor ,campbell1 of ,st4 
,andrews1 who has helped me in the      
revision of several parts of the work1  

especially of the ,theaetetus1 ,sophist1
 and ,politicus2 ,mr4 ,robinson ,ellis1 
,fellow of ,trinity ,college1 and ,mr4  
,alfred ,robinson1 ,fellow of ,new      
,college1 who read with me the ,cratylus
 and the ,gorgias2 ,mr4 ,paravicini1    
,student of ,christ ,church1 who        
assisted me in the ,symposium2 ,mr4     
,raper1 ,fellow of ,queen's ,college1   
,mr4 ,monro1 ,fellow of ,oriel ,college1
 and ,mr4 ,shadwell1 ,student of ,christ
 ,church1 who gave me similar assistance
 in the ,laws4 ,dr4 ,greenhill1 of      
,hastings1 has also kindly sent me      
remarks on the physiological part of the
 ,timaeus1 which ,i have inserted as    
corrections under the head of errata at 
the end of the ,introduction4 ,the      
degree of accuracy which ,i have been   
enabled to attain is in great measure   
due to these gentlemen1 and ,i heartily 
thank them for the pains and time which 
they have bestowed on my work4  ,i have 
further to explain how far ,i have      
received help from other labourers in   

the same field4 ,the books which ,i have
 found of most use are ,steinhart and   
,muller's ,german ,translation of ,plato
 with ,introductions2 ,zeller's         
',philosophie der ,griechen1' and       
',platonische ,studien2' ,susemihl's    
',genetische ,entwickelung der          
,paltonischen ,philosophie2' ,hermann's 
',geschichte der ,platonischen          
,philosophie2' ,bonitz1 ',platonische   
,studien2' ,stallbaum's ,notes and      
,introductions2 ,professor ,campbell's  
editions of the ',theaetetus1' the      
',sophist1' and the ',politicus2'       
,professor ,thompson's ',phaedrus2' ,th4
 ,martin's ',etudes sur le ,timee2' ,mr4
 ,poste's edition and translation of the
 ',philebus2' the ,translation of the   
',republic1' by ,messrs4 ,davies and    
,vaughan1 and the ,translation of the   
',gorgias1' by ,mr4 ,cope4  ,i have also
 derived much assistance from the great 
work of ,mr4 ,grote1 which contains     
excellent analyses of the ,dialogues1   
and is rich in original thoughts and    

observations4 ,i agree with him in      
rejecting as futile the attempt of      
,schleiermacher and others to arrange   
the ,dialogues of ,plato into a         
harmonious whole4 ,any such arrangement 
appears to me not only to be unsupported
 by evidence1 but to involve an         
anachronism in the history of           
philosophy4 ,there is a common spirit in
 the writings of ,plato1 but not a unity
 of design in the whole1 nor perhaps a  
perfect unity in any single ,dialogue4  
,the hypothesis of a general plan which 
is worked out in the successive         
,dialogues is an after-thought of the   
critics who have attributed a system to 
writings belonging to an age when system
 had not as yet taken possession of     
philosophy4  ,if ,mr4 ,grote should do  
me the honour to read any portion of    
this work he will probably remark that  
,i have endeavoured to approach ,plato  
from a point of view which is opposed to
 his own4 ,the aim of the ,introductions
 in these volumes has been to represent 

,plato as the father of ,idealism1 who  
is not to be measured by the standard of
 utilitarianism or any other modern     
philosophical system4 ,he is the poet or
 maker of ideas1 satisfying the wants of
 his own age1 providing the instruments 
of thought for future generations4 ,he  
is no dreamer1 but a great philosophical
 genius struggling with the unequal     
conditions of light and knowledge under 
which he is living4 ,he may be          
illustrated by the writings of moderns1 
but he must be interpreted by his own1  
and by his place in the history of      
philosophy4 ,we are not concerned to    
determine what is the residuum of truth 
which remains for ourselves4 ,his truth 
may not be our truth1 and nevertheless  
may have an extraordinary value and     
interest for us4  ,i cannot agree with  
,mr4 ,grote in admitting as genuine all 
the writings commonly attributed to     
,plato in antiquity1 any more than with 
,schaarschmidt and some other ,german   
critics who reject nearly half of them4 

,the ,german critics1 to whom ,i refer1 
proceed chiefly on grounds of internal  
evidence2 they appear to me to lay too  
much stress on the variety of doctrine  
and style1 which must be equally        
acknowledged as a fact1 even in the     
,dialogues regarded by ,schaarschmidt as
 genuine1 e4g4 in the ,phaedrus1 or     
,symposium1 when compared with the      
,laws4 ,he who admits works so different
 in style and matter to have been the   
composition of the same author1 need    
have no difficulty in admitting the     
,sophist or the ,politicus4 7,the       
negative argument adduced by the same   
school of critics1 which is based on the
 silence of ,aristotle1 is not worthy of
 much consideration4 ,for why should    
,aristotle1 because he has quoted       
several ,dialogues of ,plato1 have      
quoted them all8 ,something must be     
allowed to chance1 and to the nature of 
the subjects treated of in them47 ,on   
the other hand1 ,mr4 ,grote trusts      
mainly to the ,alexandrian ,canon4 ,but 

,i hardly think that we are justified in
 attributing much weight to the         
authority of the ,alexandrian librarians
 in an age when there was no regular    
publication of books1 and every         
temptation to forge them2 and in which  
the writings of a school were naturally 
attributed to the founder of the school4
 ,and even without intentional fraud1   
there was an inclination to believe     
rather than to enquire4 ,would ,mr4     
,grote accept as genuine all the        
writings which he finds in the lists of 
learned ancients attributed to          
,hippocrates1 to ,xenophon1 to          
,aristotle8 ,the ,alexandrian ,canon of 
the ,platonic writings is deprived of   
credit by the admission of the          
,epistles1 which are not only unworthy  
of ,plato1 and in several passages      
plagiarized from him1 but flagrantly at 
variance with historical fact4 ,it will 
be seen also that ,i do not agree with  
,mr4 ,grote's views about the ,sophists2
 nor with the low estimate which he has 

formed of ,plato's ,laws2 nor with his  
opinion respecting ,plato's doctrine of 
the rotation of the earth4 ,but ,i 'am  
not going to lay hands on my father     
,parmenides' 7,soph471 who will1 ,i     
hope1 forgive me for differing from him 
on these points4 ,i cannot close this   
,preface without expressing my deep     
respect for his noble and gentle        
character1 and the great services which 
he has rendered to ,greek ,literature4  
,balliol ,college1 ,january1 #ahga4     
,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,and     
,,third ,,editions4  ,in publishing a   
,second ,edition 7#ahge7 of the         
,dialogues of ,plato in ,english1 ,i had
 to acknowledge the assistance of       
several friends3 of the ,rev4 ,g4,g4    
,bradley1 ,master of ,university        
,college1 now ,dean of ,westminster1 who
 sent me some valuable remarks on the   
,phaedo2 of ,dr4 ,greenhill1 who had    
again revised a portion of the ,timaeus2
 of ,mr4 ,r4,l4 ,nettleship1 ,fellow and
 ,tutor of ,balliol ,college1 to whom ,i

 was indebted for an excellent criticism
 of the ,parmenides2 and1 above all1 of 
the ,rev4 ,professor ,campbell of ,st4  
,andrews1 and ,mr4 ,paravicini1 late    
,student of ,christ ,church and ,tutor  
of ,balliol ,college1 with whom ,i had  
read over the greater part of the       
translation4 ,i was also indebted to    
,mr4 ,evelyn ,abbott1 ,fellow and ,tutor
 of ,balliol ,college1 for a complete   
and accurate index4  ,in this1 the      
,third ,edition1 ,i am under very great 
obligations to ,mr4 ,matthew ,knight1   
who has not only favoured me with       
valuable suggestions throughout the     
work1 but has largely extended the      
,index 7from #fa to #age pages7 and     
translated the ,eryxias and ,second     
,alcibiades2 and to ,mr ,frank          
,fletcher1 of ,balliol ,college1 my     
,secretary4 ,i am also considerably     
indebted to ,mr4 ,j4,w4 ,mackail1 late  
,fellow of ,balliol ,college1 who read  
over the ,republic in the ,second       
,edition and noted several inaccuracies4

  ,in both editions the ,introductions  
to the ,dialogues have been enlarged1   
and essays on subjects having an        
affinity to the ,platonic ,dialogues    
have been introduced into several of    
them4 ,the analyses have been corrected1
 and innumerable alterations have been  
made in the ,text4 ,there have been     
added also1 in the ,third ,edition1     
headings to the pages and a marginal    
analysis to the text of each dialogue4  
,at the end of a long task1 the         
translator may without impropriety point
 out the difficulties which he has had  
to encounter4 ,these have been far      
greater than he would have anticipated2 
nor is he at all sanguine that he has   
succeeded in overcoming them4           
,experience has made him feel that a    
translation1 like a picture1 is         
dependent for its effect on very minute 
touches2 and that it is a work of       
infinite pains1 to be returned to in    
many moods and viewed in different      
lights4  ,i4 ,an ,english translation   

ought to be idiomatic and interesting1  
not only to the scholar1 but to the     
unlearned reader4 ,its object should not
 simply be to render the words of one   
language into the words of another or to
 preserve the construction and order of 
the original2--this is the ambition of a
 schoolboy1 who wishes to show that he  
has made a good use of his ,dictionary  
and ,grammar2 but is quite unworthy of  
the translator1 who seeks to produce on 
his reader an impression similar or     
nearly similar to that produced by the  
original4 ,to him the feeling should be 
more important than the exact word4 ,he 
should remember ,dryden's quaint        
admonition not to 'lacquey by the side  
of his author1 but to mount up behind   
him4' 7,dedication to the ,aeneis47 ,he 
must carry in his mind a comprehensive  
view of the whole work1 of what has     
preceded and of what is to follow1--as  
well as of the meaning of particular    
passages4 ,his version should be based1 
in the first instance1 on an intimate   

knowledge of the text2 but the precise  
order and arrangement of the words may  
be left to fade out of sight1 when the  
translation begins to take shape4 ,he   
must form a general idea of the two     
languages1 and reduce the one to the    
terms of the other4 ,his work should be 
rhythmical and varied1 the right        
admixture of words and syllables1 and   
even of letters1 should be carefully    
attended to2 above all1 it should be    
equable in style4 ,there must also be   
quantity1 which is necessary in prose as
 well as in verse3 clauses1 sentences1  
paragraphs1 must be in due proportion4  
,metre and even rhyme may be rarely     
admitted2 though neither is a legitimate
 element of prose writing1 they may help
 to lighten a cumbrous expression       
7,symp474 ,the translation should retain
 as far as possible the characteristic  
qualities of the ancient writer--his    
freedom1 grace1 simplicity1 stateliness1
 weight1 precision2 or the best part of 
him will be lost to the ,english reader4

 ,it should read as an original work1   
and should also be the most faithful    
transcript which can be made of the     
language from which the translation is  
taken1 consistently with the first      
requirement of all1 that it be ,english4
 ,further1 the translation being        
,english1 it should also be perfectly   
intelligible in itself without reference
 to the ,greek1 the ,english being      
really the more lucid and exact of the  
two languages4 ,in some respects it may 
be maintained that ordinary ,english    
writing1 such as the newspaper article1 
is superior to ,plato3 at any rate it is
 couched in language which is very      
rarely obscure4 ,on the other hand1 the 
greatest writers of ,greece1            
,thucydides1 ,plato1 ,aeschylus1        
,sophocles1 ,pindar1 ,demosthenes1 are  
generally those which are found to be   
most difficult and to diverge most      
widely from the ,english idiom4 ,the    
translator will often have to convert   
the more abstract ,greek into the more  

concrete ,english1 or vice versa1 and he
 ought not to force upon one language   
the character of another4 ,in some      
cases1 where the order is confused1 the 
expression feeble1 the emphasis         
misplaced1 or the sense somewhat faulty1
 he will not strive in his rendering to 
reproduce these characteristics1 but    
will re-write the passage as his author 
would have written it at first1 had he  
not been 'nodding'2 and he will not     
hesitate to supply anything which1 owing
 to the genius of the language or some  
accident of composition1 is omitted in  
the ,greek1 but is necessary to make the
 ,english clear and consecutive4  ,it is
 difficult to harmonize all these       
conflicting elements4 ,in a translation 
of ,plato what may be termed the        
interests of the ,greek and ,english are
 often at war with one another4 ,in     
framing the ,english sentence we are    
insensibly diverted from the exact      
meaning of the ,greek2 when we return to
 the ,greek we are apt to cramp and     

overlay the ,english4 ,we substitute1 we
 compromise1 we give and take1 we add a 
little here and leave out a little      
there4 ,the translator may sometimes be 
allowed to sacrifice minute accuracy for
 the sake of clearness and sense4 ,but  
he is not therefore at liberty to omit  
words and turns of expression which the 
,english language is quite capable of   
supplying4 ,he must be patient and      
self-controlled2 he must not be easily  
run away with4 ,let him never allow the 
attraction of a favourite expression1 or
 a sonorous cadence1 to overpower his   
better judgment1 or think much of an    
ornament which is out of keeping with   
the general character of his work4 ,he  
must ever be casting his eyes upwards   
from the copy to the original1 and down 
again from the original to the copy     
7,rep474 ,his calling is not held in    
much honour by the world of scholars2   
yet he himself may be excused for       
thinking it a kind of glory to have     
lived so many years in the companionship

 of one of the greatest of human        
intelligences1 and in some degree1 more 
perhaps than others1 to have had the    
privilege of understanding him 7,sir    
,joshua ,reynolds' ,lectures3 ,disc4    
xv474  ,there are fundamental           
differences in ,greek and ,english1 of  
which some may be managed while others  
remain intractable4 7#a74 ,the structure
 of the ,greek language is partly       
adversative and alternative1 and partly 
inferential2 that is to say1 the members
 of a sentence are either opposed to one
 another1 or one of them expresses the  
cause or effect or condition or reason  
of another4 ,the two tendencies may be  
called the horizontal and perpendicular 
lines of the language2 and the          
opposition or inference is often much   
more one of words than of ideas4 ,but   
modern languages have rubbed off this   
adversative and inferential form3 they  
have fewer links of connection1 there is
 less mortar in the interstices1 and    
they are content to place sentences side

 by side1 leaving their relation to one 
another to be gathered from their       
position or from the context4 ,the      
difficulty of preserving the effect of  
the ,greek is increased by the want of  
adversative and inferential particles in
 ,english1 and by the nice sense of     
tautology which characterizes all modern
 languages4 ,we cannot have two 'buts'  
or two 'fors' in the same sentence where
 the ,greek repeats 7,greek74 ,there is 
a similar want of particles expressing  
the various gradations of objective and 
subjective thought--7,greek7 and the    
like1 which are so thickly scattered    
over the ,greek page4 ,further1 we can  
only realize to a very imperfect degree 
the common distinction between 7,greek71
 and the combination of the two suggests
 a subtle shade of negation which cannot
 be expressed in ,english4 ,and while   
,english is more dependent than ,greek  
upon the apposition of clauses and      
sentences1 yet there is a difficulty in 
using this form of construction owing to

 the want of case endings4 ,for the same
 reason there cannot be an equal variety
 in the order of words or an equal      
nicety of emphasis in ,english as in    
,greek4  7#b7 ,the formation of the     
sentence and of the paragraph greatly   
differs in ,greek and ,english4 ,the    
lines by which they are divided are     
generally much more marked in modern    
languages than in ancient4 ,both        
sentences and paragraphs are more       
precise and definite--they do not run   
into one another4 ,they are also more   
regularly developed from within4 ,the   
sentence marks another step in an       
argument or a narrative or a statement2 
in reading a paragraph we silently turn 
over the page and arrive at some new    
view or aspect of the subject4 ,whereas 
in ,plato we are not always certain     
where a sentence begins and ends2 and   
paragraphs are few and far between4 ,the
 language is distributed in a different 
way1 and less articulated than in       
,english4 ,for it was long before the   

true use of the period was attained by  
the classical writers both in poetry or 
prose2 it was 7,greek74 ,the balance of 
sentences and the introduction of       
paragraphs at suitable intervals must   
not be neglected if the harmony of the  
,english language is to be preserved4   
,and still a caution has to be added on 
the other side1 that we must avoid      
giving it a numerical or mechanical     
character4  7#c7 ,this1 however1 is not 
one of the greatest difficulties of the 
translator2 much greater is that which  
arises from the restriction of the use  
of the genders4 ,men and women in       
,english are masculine and feminine1 and
 there is a similar distinction of sex  
in the words denoting animals2 but all  
things else1 whether outward objects or 
abstract ideas1 are relegated to the    
class of neuters4 ,hardly in some flight
 of poetry do we ever endue any of them 
with the characteristics of a sentient  
being1 and then only by speaking of them
 in the feminine gender4 ,the virtues   

may be pictured in female forms1 but    
they are not so described in language2 a
 ship is humorously supposed to be the  
sailor's bride2 more doubtful are the   
personifications of church and country  
as females4 ,now the genius of the      
,greek language is the opposite of this4
 ,the same tendency to personification  
which is seen in the ,greek mythology is
 common also in the language2 and       
genders are attributed to things as well
 as persons according to their various  
degrees of strength and weakness2 or    
from fanciful resemblances to the male  
or female form1 or some analogy too     
subtle to be discovered4 ,when the      
gender of any object was once fixed1 a  
similar gender was naturally assigned to
 similar objects1 or to words of similar
 formation4 ,this use of genders in the 
denotation of objects or ideas not only 
affects the words to which genders are  
attributed1 but the words with which    
they are construed or connected1 and    
passes into the general character of the

 style4 ,hence arises a difficulty in   
translating ,greek into ,english which  
cannot altogether be overcome4 ,shall we
 speak of the soul and its qualities1 of
 virtue1 power1 wisdom1 and the like1 as
 feminine or neuter8 ,the usage of the  
,english language does not admit of the 
former1 and yet the life and beauty of  
the style are impaired by the latter4   
,often the translator will have recourse
 to the repetition of the word1 or to   
the ambiguous 'they1' 'their1' etc42 for
 fear of spoiling the effect of the     
sentence by introducing 'it4'           
,collective nouns in ,greek and ,english
 create a similar but lesser            
awkwardness4  7#d7 ,to use of relation  
is far more extended in ,greek than in  
,english4 ,partly the greater variety of
 genders and cases makes the connexion  
of relative and antecedent less         
ambiguous3 partly also the greater      
number of demonstrative and relative    
pronouns1 and the use of the article1   
make the correlation of ideas simpler   

and more natural4 ,the ,greek appears to
 have had an ear or intelligence for a  
long and complicated sentence which is  
rarely to be found in modern nations2   
and in order to bring the ,greek down to
 the level of the modern1 we must break 
up the long sentence into two or more   
short ones4 ,neither is the same        
precision required in ,greek as in      
,latin or ,english1 nor in earlier      
,greek as in later2 there was nothing   
shocking to the contemporary of         
,thucydides and ,plato in anacolutha and
 repetitions4 ,in such cases the genius 
of the ,english language requires that  
the translation should be more          
intelligible than the ,greek4 ,the want 
of more distinctions between the        
demonstrative pronouns is also greatly  
felt4 ,two genitives dependent on one   
another1 unless familiarised by idiom1  
have an awkward effect in ,english4     
,frequently the noun has to take the    
place of the pronoun4 ',this' and 'that'
 are found repeating themselves to      

weariness in the rough draft of a       
translation4 ,as in the previous case1  
while the feeling of the modern language
 is more opposed to tautology1 there is 
also a greater difficulty in avoiding   
it4  7#e7 ,though no precise rule can be
 laid down about the repetition of      
words1 there seems to be a kind of      
impertinence in presenting to the reader
 the same thought in the same words1    
repeated twice over in the same passage 
without any new aspect or modification  
of it4 ,and the evasion of              
tautology--that is1 the substitution of 
one word of precisely the same meaning  
for another--is resented by us equally  
with the repetition of words4 ,yet on   
the other hand the least difference of  
meaning or the least change of form from
 a substantive to an adjective1 or from 
a participle to a verb1 will often      
remedy the unpleasant effect4 ,rarely   
and only for the sake of emphasis or    
clearness can we allow an important word
 to be used twice over in two successive

 sentences or even in the same          
paragraph4 ,the particles and pronouns1 
as they are of most frequent occurrence1
 are also the most troublesome4         
,strictly speaking1 except a few of the 
commonest of them1 'and1' 'the1' etc41  
they ought not to occur twice in the    
same sentence4 ,but the ,greek has no   
such precise rules2 and hence any       
literal translation of a ,greek author  
is full of tautology4 ,the tendency of  
modern languages is to become more      
correct as well as more perspicuous than
 ancient4 ,and1 therefore1 while the    
,english translator is limited in the   
power of expressing relation or         
connexion1 by the law of his own        
language increased precision and also   
increased clearness are required of him4
 ,the familiar use of logic1 and the    
progress of science1 have in these two  
respects raised the standard4 ,but      
modern languages1 while they have become
 more exacting in their demands1 are in 
many ways not so well furnished with    

powers of expression as the ancient     
classical ones4  ,such are a few of the 
difficulties which have to be overcome  
in the work of translation2 and we are  
far from having exhausted the list4 7#f7
 ,the excellence of a translation will  
consist1 not merely in the faithful     
rendering of words1 or in the           
composition of a sentence only1 or yet  
of a single paragraph1 but in the colour
 and style of the whole work4           
,equability of tone is best attained by 
the exclusive use of familiar and       
idiomatic words4 ,but great care must be
 taken2 for an idiomatic phrase1 if an  
exception to the general style1 is of   
itself a disturbing element4 ,no word1  
however expressive and exact1 should be 
employed1 which makes the reader stop to
 think1 or unduly attracts attention by 
difficulty and peculiarity1 or disturbs 
the effect of the surrounding language4 
,in general the style of one author is  
not appropriate to another2 as in       
society1 so in letters1 we expect every 

man to have 'a good coat of his own1'   
and not to dress himself out in the rags
 of another4 7a7 ,archaic expressions   
are therefore to be avoided4            
,equivalents may be occasionally drawn  
from ,shakspere1 who is the common      
property of us all2 but they must be    
used sparingly4 ,for1 like some other   
men of genius of the ,elizabethan and   
,jacobean age1 he outdid the            
capabilities of the language1 and many  
of the expressions which he introduced  
have been laid aside and have dropped   
out of use4 7b7 ,a similar principle    
should be observed in the employment of 
,scripture4 ,having a greater force and 
beauty than other language1 and a       
religious association1 it disturbs the  
even flow of the style4 ,it may be used 
to reproduce in the translation the     
quaint effect of some antique phrase in 
the original1 but rarely2 and when      
adopted1 it should have a certain       
freshness and a suitable 'entourage4'   
,it is strange to observe that the most 

effective use of ,scripture phraseology 
arises out of the application of it in a
 sense not intended by the author4 7c7  
,another caution3 metaphors differ in   
different languages1 and the translator 
will often be compelled to substitute   
one for another1 or to paraphrase them1 
not giving word for word1 but diffusing 
over several words the more concentrated
 thought of the original4 ,the ,greek of
 ,plato often goes beyond the ,english  
in its imagery3 compare ,laws1 7,greek72
 ,rep42 etc4 ,or again the modern word1 
which in substance is the nearest       
equivalent to the ,greek1 may be found  
to include associations alien to ,greek 
life3 e4g4 7,greek71 'jurymen1'         
7,greek71 'the bourgeoisie4' 7d7 ,the   
translator has also to provide          
expressions for philosophical terms of  
very indefinite meaning in the more     
definite language of modern philosophy4 
,and he must not allow discordant       
elements to enter into the work4 ,for   
example1 in translating ,plato1 it would

 equally be an anachronism to intrude on
 him the feeling and spirit of the      
,jewish or ,christian ,scriptures or the
 technical terms of the ,hegelian or    
,darwinian philosophy4  7#g7 ,as no two 
words are precise equivalents 7just as  
no two leaves of the forest are exactly 
similar71 it is a mistaken attempt at   
precision always to translate the same  
,greek word by the same ,english word4  
,there is no reason why in the ,new     
,testament 7,greek7 should always be    
rendered 'righteousness1' or 7,greek7   
'covenant4' ,in such cases the          
translator may be allowed to employ two 
words--sometimes when the two meanings  
occur in the same passage1 varying them 
by an 'or'--e4g4 7,greek71 'science' or 
'knowledge1' 7,greek71 'idea' or        
'class1' 7,greek71 'temperance' or      
'prudence1'--at the point where the     
change of meaning occurs4 ,if           
translations are intended not for the   
,greek scholar but for the general      
reader1 their worst fault will be that  

they sacrifice the general effect and   
meaning to the over-precise rendering of
 words and forms of speech4  7#h7 ,there
 is no kind of literature in ,english   
which corresponds to the ,greek         
,dialogue2 nor is the ,english language 
easily adapted to it4 ,the rapidity and 
abruptness of question and answer1 the  
constant repetition of 7,greek71 etc41  
which ,cicero avoided in ,latin 7de     
,amicit71 the frequent occurrence of    
expletives1 would1 if reproduced in a   
translation1 give offence to the reader4
 ,greek has a freer and more frequent   
use of the ,interrogative1 and is of a  
more passionate and emotional character1
 and therefore lends itself with greater
 readiness to the dialogue form4 ,most  
of the so-called ,english ,dialogues are
 but poor imitations of ,plato1 which   
fall very far short of the original4    
,the breath of conversation1 the subtle 
adjustment of question and answer1 the  
lively play of fancy1 the power of      
drawing characters1 are wanting in them4

 ,but the ,platonic dialogue is a drama 
as well as a dialogue1 of which         
,socrates is the central figure1 and    
there are lesser performers as          
well3--the insolence of ,thrasymachus1  
the anger of ,callicles and ,anytus1 the
 patronizing style of ,protagoras1 the  
self-consciousness of ,prodicus and     
,hippias1 are all part of the           
entertainment4 ,to reproduce this living
 image the same sort of effort is       
required as in translating poetry4 ,the 
language1 too1 is of a finer quality2   
the mere prose ,english is slow in      
lending itself to the form of question  
and answer1 and so the ease of          
conversation is lost1 and at the same   
time the dialectical precision with     
which the steps of the argument are     
drawn out is apt to be impaired4  ,,ii4 
,in the ,introductions to the ,dialogues
 there have been added some essays on   
modern philosophy1 and on political and 
social life4 ,the chief subjects        
discussed in these are ,utility1        

,communism1 the ,kantian and ,hegelian  
philosophies1 ,psychology1 and the      
,origin of ,language4 7,there have been 
added also in the ,third ,edition       
remarks on other subjects4 ,a list of   
the most important of these additions is
 given at the end of this ,preface47    
,ancient and modern philosophy throw a  
light upon one another3 but they should 
be compared1 not confounded4 ,although  
the connexion between them is sometimes 
accidental1 it is often real4 ,the same 
questions are discussed by them under   
different conditions of language and    
civilization2 but in some cases a mere  
word has survived1 while nothing or     
hardly anything of the pre-,socratic1   
,platonic1 or ,aristotelian meaning is  
retained4 ,there are other questions    
familiar to the moderns1 which have no  
place in ancient philosophy4 ,the world 
has grown older in two thousand years1  
and has enlarged its stock of ideas and 
methods of reasoning4 ,yet the germ of  
modern thought is found in ancient1 and 

we may claim to have inherited1         
notwithstanding many accidents of time  
and place1 the spirit of ,greek         
philosophy4 ,there is1 however1 no      
continuous growth of the one into the   
other1 but a new beginning1 partly      
artificial1 partly arising out of the   
questionings of the mind itself1 and    
also receiving a stimulus from the study
 of ancient writings4  ,considering the 
great and fundamental differences which 
exist in ancient and modern philosophy1 
it seems best that we should at first   
study them separately1 and seek for the 
interpretation of either1 especially of 
the ancient1 from itself only1 comparing
 the same author with himself and with  
his contemporaries1 and with the general
 state of thought and feeling prevalent 
in his age4 ,afterwards comes the       
remoter light which they cast on one    
another4 ,we begin to feel that the     
ancients had the same thoughts as       
ourselves1 the same difficulties which  
characterize all periods of transition1 

almost the same opposition between      
science and religion4 ,although we      
cannot maintain that ancient and modern 
philosophy are one and continuous 7as   
has been affirmed with more truth       
respecting ancient and modern history71 
for they are separated by an interval of
 a thousand years1 yet they seem to     
recur in a sort of cycle1 and we are    
surprised to find that the new is ever  
old1 and that the teaching of the past  
has still a meaning for us4  ,,iii4 ,in 
the preface to the first edition ,i     
expressed a strong opinion at variance  
with ,mr4 ,grote's1 that the so-called  
,epistles of ,plato were spurious4 ,his 
friend and editor1 ,professor ,bain1    
thinks that ,i ought to give the reasons
 why ,i differ from so eminent an       
authority4 ,reserving the fuller        
discussion of the question for another  
place1 ,i will shortly defend my opinion
 by the following arguments3--  7a7     
,because almost all epistles purporting 
to be of the classical age of ,greek    

literature are forgeries4 7,compare     
,bentley's ,works 7,dyce's ,edition747  
,of all documents this class are the    
least likely to be preserved and the    
most likely to be invented4 ,the ancient
 world swarmed with them2 the great     
libraries stimulated the demand for     
them2 and at a time when there was no   
regular publication of books1 they      
easily crept into the world4  7b7 ,when 
one epistle out of a number is spurious1
 the remainder of the series cannot be  
admitted to be genuine1 unless there be 
some independent ground for thinking    
them so3 when all but one are spurious1 
overwhelming evidence is required of the
 genuineness of the one3 when they are  
all similar in style or motive1 like    
witnesses who agree in the same tale1   
they stand or fall together4 ,but no    
one1 not even ,mr4 ,grote1 would        
maintain that all the ,epistles of      
,plato are genuine1 and very few critics
 think that more than one of them is so4
 ,and they are clearly all written from 

the same motive1 whether serious or only
 literary4 ,nor is there an example in  
,greek antiquity of a series of         
,epistles1 continuous and yet coinciding
 with a succession of events extending  
over a great number of years4  ,the     
external probability therefore against  
them is enormous1 and the internal      
probability is not less3 for they are   
trivial and unmeaning1 devoid of        
delicacy and subtlety1 wanting in a     
single fine expression4 ,and even if    
this be matter of dispute1 there can be 
no dispute that there are found in them 
many plagiarisms1 inappropriately       
borrowed1 which is a common note of     
forgery4 ,they imitate ,plato1 who never
 imitates either himself or any one     
else2 reminiscences of the ,republic and
 the ,laws are continually recurring in 
them2 they are too like him and also too
 unlike him1 to be genuine 7see         
especially ,karsten1 ,commentio ,critica
 de ,platonis quae feruntur ,epistolis74
 ,they are full of egotism1             

self-assertion1 affectation1 faults     
which of all writers ,plato was most    
careful to avoid1 and into which he was 
least likely to fall4 ,they abound in   
obscurities1 irrelevancies1 solecisms1  
pleonasms1 inconsistencies1             
awkwardnesses of construction1 wrong    
uses of words4 ,they also contain       
historical blunders1 such as the        
statement respecting ,hipparinus and    
,nysaeus1 the nephews of ,dion1 who are 
said to 'have been well inclined to     
philosophy1 and well able to dispose the
 mind of their brother ,dionysius in the
 same course1' at a time when they could
 not have been more than six or seven   
years of age--also foolish allusions1   
such as the comparison of the ,athenian 
empire to the empire of ,darius1 which  
show a spirit very different from that  
of ,plato2 and mistakes of fact1 as e4g4
 about the ,thirty ,tyrants1 whom the   
writer of the letters seems to have     
confused with certain inferior          
magistrates1 making them in all         

fifty-one4 ,these palpable errors and   
absurdities are absolutely              
irreconcilable with their genuineness4  
,and as they appear to have a common    
parentage1 the more they are studied1   
the more they will be found to furnish  
evidence against themselves4 ,the       
,seventh1 which is thought to be the    
most important of these ,epistles1 has  
affinities with the ,third and the      
,eighth1 and is quite as impossible and 
inconsistent as the rest4 ,it is        
therefore involved in the same          
condemnation4--,the final conclusion is 
that neither the ,seventh nor any other 
of them1 when carefully analyzed1 can be
 imagined to have proceeded from the    
hand or mind of ,plato4 ,the other      
testimonies to the voyages of ,plato to 
,sicily and the court of ,dionysius are 
all of them later by several centuries  
than the events to which they refer4 ,no
 extant writer mentions them older than 
,cicero and ,cornelius ,nepos4 ,it does 
not seem impossible that so attractive a

 theme as the meeting of a philosopher  
and a tyrant1 once imagined by the      
genius of a ,sophist1 may have passed   
into a romance which became famous in   
,hellas and the world4 ,it may have     
created one of the mists of history1    
like the ,trojan war or the legend of   
,arthur1 which we are unable to         
penetrate4 ,in the age of ,cicero1 and  
still more in that of ,diogenes         
,laertius and ,appuleius1 many other    
legends had gathered around the         
personality of ,plato1--more voyages1   
more journeys to visit tyrants and      
,pythagorean philosophers4 ,but if1 as  
we agree with ,karsten in supposing1    
they are the forgery of some rhetorician
 or sophist1 we cannot agree with him in
 also supposing that they are of any    
historical value1 the rather as there is
 no early independent testimony by which
 they are supported or with which they  
can be compared4  ,,iv4 ,there is       
another subject to which ,i must briefly
 call attention1 lest ,i should seem to 

have overlooked it4 ,dr4 ,henry         
,jackson1 of ,trinity ,college1         
,cambridge1 in a series of articles     
which he has contributed to the ,journal
 of ,philology1 has put forward an      
entirely new explanation of the         
,platonic ',ideas4' ,he supposes that in
 the mind of ,plato they took1 at       
different times in his life1 two        
essentially different forms3--an earlier
 one which is found chiefly in the      
,republic and the ,phaedo1 and a later1 
which appears in the ,theaetetus1       
,philebus1 ,sophist1 ,politicus1        
,parmenides1 ,timaeus4 ,in the first    
stage of his philosophy ,plato          
attributed ,ideas to all things1 at any 
rate to all things which have classes or
 common notions3 these he supposed to   
exist only by participation in them4 ,in
 the later ,dialogues he no longer      
included in them manufactured articles  
and ideas of relation1 but restricted   
them to 'types of nature1' and having   
become convinced that the many cannot be

 parts of the one1 for the idea of      
participation in them he substituted    
imitation of them4 ,to quote ,dr4       
,jackson's own expressions1--'whereas in
 the period of the ,republic and the    
,phaedo1 it was proposed to pass through
 ontology to the sciences1 in the period
 of the ,parmenides and the ,philebus1  
it is proposed to pass through the      
sciences to ontology'3 or1 as he repeats
 in nearly the same words1--'whereas in 
the ,republic and in the ,phaedo he had 
dreamt of passing through ontology to   
the sciences1 he is now content to pass 
through the sciences to ontology4'      
,this theory is supposed to be based on 
,aristotle's ,metaphysics1 a passage    
containing an account of the ideas1     
which hitherto scholars have found      
impossible to reconcile with the        
statements of ,plato himself4 ,the      
preparations for the new departure are  
discovered in the ,parmenides and in the
 ,theaetetus2 and it is said to be      
expressed under a different form by the 

7,greek7 and the 7,greek7 of the        
,philebus4 ,the 7,greek7 of the         
,philebus is the principle which gives  
form and measure to the 7,greek72 and in
 the ',later ,theory' is held to be the 
7,greek7 or 7,greek7 which converts the 
,infinite or ,indefinite into ideas4    
,they are neither 7,greek7 nor 7,greek71
 but belong to the 7,greek7 which       
partakes of both4  ,with great respect  
for the learning and ability of ,dr4    
,jackson1 ,i find myself unable to agree
 in this newly fashioned doctrine of the
 ,ideas1 which he ascribes to ,plato4 ,i
 have not the space to go into the      
question fully2 but ,i will briefly     
state some objections which are1 ,i     
think1 fatal to it4  7#a7 ,first1 the   
foundation of his argument is laid in   
the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle4 ,but we 
cannot argue1 either from the           
,metaphysics1 or from any other of the  
philosophical treatises of ,aristotle1  
to the dialogues of ,plato until we have
 ascertained the relation in which his  

so-called works stand to the philosopher
 himself4 ,there is of course no doubt  
of the great influence exercised upon   
,greece and upon the world by ,aristotle
 and his philosophy4 ,but on the other  
hand almost every one who is capable of 
understanding the subject acknowledges  
that his writings have not come down to 
us in an authentic form like most of the
 dialogues of ,plato4 ,how much of them 
is to be ascribed to ,aristotle's own   
hand1 how much is due to his successors 
in the ,peripatetic ,school1 is a       
question which has never been           
determined1 and probably never can be1  
because the solution of it depends upon 
internal evidence only4 ,to 'the height 
of this great argument' ,i do not       
propose to ascend4 ,but one little fact1
 not irrelevant to the present          
discussion1 will show how hopeless is   
the attempt to explain ,plato out of the
 writings of ,aristotle4 ,in the chapter
 of the ,metaphysics quoted by ,dr4     
,jackson1 about two octavo pages in     

length1 there occur no less than seven  
or eight references to ,plato1 although 
nothing really corresponding to them can
 be found in his extant writings3--a    
small matter truly2 but what a light    
does it throw on the character of the   
entire book in which they occur6 ,we can
 hardly escape from the conclusion that 
they are not statements of ,aristotle   
respecting ,plato1 but of a later       
generation of ,aristotelians respecting 
a later generation of ,platonists4      
7,compare the striking remark of the    
great ,scaliger respecting the ,magna   
,moralia3--,haec non sunt ,aristotelis1 
tamen utitur auctor ,aristotelis nomine 
tanquam suo47  7#b7 ,there is no hint in
 ,plato's own writings that he was      
conscious of having made any change in  
the ,doctrine of ,ideas such as ,dr4    
,jackson attributes to him1 although in 
the ,republic the platonic ,socrates    
speaks of 'a longer and a shorter way'1 
and of a way in which his disciple      
,glaucon 'will be unable to follow him'2

 also of a way of ,ideas1 to which he   
still holds fast1 although it has often 
deserted him 7,philebus1 ,phaedo71 and  
although in the later dialogues and in  
the ,laws the reference to ,ideas       
disappears1 and ,mind claims her own    
7,phil42 ,laws74 ,no hint is given of   
what ,plato meant by the 'longer way'   
7,rep471 or 'the way in which ,glaucon  
was unable to follow'2 or of the        
relation of ,mind to the ,ideas4 ,it    
might be said with truth that the       
conception of the ,idea predominates in 
the first half of the ,dialogues1 which1
 according to the order adopted in this 
work1 ends with the ,republic1 the      
'conception of ,mind' and a way of      
speaking more in agreement with modern  
terminology1 in the latter half4 ,but   
there is no reason to suppose that      
,plato's theory1 or1 rather1 his various
 theories1 of the ,ideas underwent any  
definite change during his period of    
authorship4 ,they are substantially the 
same in the twelfth ,book of the ,laws  

as in the ,meno and ,phaedo2 and since  
the ,laws were written in the last      
decade of his life1 there is no time to 
which this change of opinions can be    
ascribed4 ,it is true that the theory of
 ,ideas takes several different forms1  
not merely an earlier and a later one1  
in the various ,dialogues4 ,they are    
personal and impersonal1 ideals and     
ideas1 existing by participation or by  
imitation1 one and many1 in different   
parts of his writings or even in the    
same passage4 ,they are the universal   
definitions of ,socrates1 and at the    
same time 'of more than mortal          
knowledge' 7,rep474 ,but they are always
 the negations of sense1 of matter1 of  
generation1 of the particular3 they are 
always the subjects of knowledge and not
 of opinion2 and they tend1 not to      
diversity1 but to unity4 ,other entities
 or intelligences are akin to them1 but 
not the same with them1 such as mind1   
measure1 limit1 eternity1 essence       
7,philebus2 ,timaeus73 these and similar

 terms appear to express the same truths
 from a different point of view1 and to 
belong to the same sphere with them4    
,but we are not justified1 therefore1 in
 attempting to identify them1 any more  
than in wholly opposing them4 ,the great
 oppositions of the sensible and        
intellectual1 the unchangeable and the  
transient1 in whatever form of words    
expressed1 are always maintained in     
,plato4 ,but the lesser logical         
distinctions1 as we should call them1   
whether of ontology or predication1     
which troubled the pre-,socratic        
philosophy and came to the front in     
,aristotle1 are variously discussed and 
explained4 ,thus far we admit           
inconsistency in ,plato1 but no further4
 ,he lived in an age before logic and   
system had wholly permeated language1   
and therefore we must not always expect 
to find in him systematic arrangement or
 logical precision3--'poema magis       
putandum4' ,but he is always true to his
 own context1 the careful study of which

 is of more value to the interpreter    
than all the commentators and scholiasts
 put together4  7#c7 ,the conclusions at
 which ,dr4 ,jackson has arrived are    
such as might be expected to follow from
 his method of procedure4 ,for he takes 
words without regard to their           
connection1 and pieces together         
different parts of dialogues in a purely
 arbitrary manner1 although there is no 
indication that the author intended the 
two passages to be so combined1 or that 
when he appears to be experimenting on  
the different points of view from which 
a subject of philosophy may be regarded1
 he is secretly elaborating a system4   
,by such a use of language any premises 
may be made to lead to any conclusion4  
,i am not one of those who believe      
,plato to have been a mystic or to have 
had hidden meanings2 nor do ,i agree    
with ,dr4 ,jackson in thinking that     
'when he is precise and dogmatic1 he    
generally contrives to introduce an     
element of obscurity into the expostion'

 7,j4 of ,philol474 ,the great master of
 language wrote as clearly as he could  
in an age when the minds of men were    
clouded by controversy1 and             
philosophical terms had not yet acquired
 a fixed meaning4 ,i have just said that
 ,plato is to be interpreted by his     
context2 and ,i do not deny that in some
 passages1 especially in the ,republic  
and ,laws1 the context is at a greater  
distance than would be allowable in a   
modern writer4 ,but we are not therefore
 justified in connecting passages from  
different parts of his writings1 or even
 from the same work1 which he has not   
himself joined4 ,we cannot argue from   
the ,parmenides to the ,philebus1 or    
from either to the ,sophist1 or assume  
that the ,parmenides1 the ,philebus1 and
 the ,timaeus were 'written             
simultaneously1' or 'were intended to be
 studied in the order in which they are 
here named 7,j4 of ,philol47 ,we have no
 right to connect statements which are  
only accidentally similar4 ,nor is it   

safe for the author of a theory about   
ancient philosophy to argue from what   
will happen if his statements are       
rejected4 ,for those consequences may   
never have entered into the mind of the 
ancient writer himself2 and they are    
very likely to be modern consequences   
which would not have been understood by 
him4 ',i cannot think1' says ,dr4       
,jackson1 'that ,plato would have       
changed his opinions1 but have nowhere  
explained the nature of the change4'    
,but is it not much more improbable that
 he should have changed his opinions1   
and not stated in an unmistakable manner
 that the most essential principle of   
his philosophy had been reversed8 ,it is
 true that a few of the dialogues1 such 
as the ,republic and the ,timaeus1 or   
the ,theaetetus and the ,sophist1 or the
 ,meno and the ,apology1 contain        
allusions to one another4 ,but these    
allusions are superficial and1 except in
 the case of the ,republic and the      
,laws1 have no philosophical importance4

 ,they do not affect the substance of   
the work4 ,it may be remarked further   
that several of the dialogues1 such as  
the ,phaedrus1 the ,sophist1 and the    
,parmenides1 have more than one subject4
 ,but it does not therefore follow that 
,plato intended one dialogue to succeed 
another1 or that he begins anew in one  
dialogue a subject which he has left    
unfinished in another1 or that even in  
the same dialogue he always intended the
 two parts to be connected with each    
other4 ,we cannot argue from a casual   
statement found in the ,parmenides to   
other statements which occur in the     
,philebus4 ,much more truly is his own  
manner described by himself when he says
 that 'words are more plastic than wax' 
7,rep471 and 'whither the wind blows1   
the argument follows'4 ,the dialogues of
 ,plato are like poems1 isolated and    
separate works1 except where they are   
indicated by the author himself to have 
an intentional sequence4  ,it is this   
method of taking passages out of their  

context and placing them in a new       
connexion when they seem to confirm a   
preconceived theory1 which is the defect
 of ,dr4 ,jackson's procedure4 ,it may  
be compared1 though not wholly the same 
with it1 to that method which the       
,fathers practised1 sometimes called    
'the mystical interpretation of         
,scripture1' in which isolated words are
 separated from their context1 and      
receive any sense which the fancy of the
 interpreter may suggest4 ,it is akin to
 the method employed by ,schleiermacher 
of arranging the dialogues of ,plato in 
chronological order according to what he
 deems the true arrangement of the ideas
 contained in them4 7,dr4 ,jackson is   
also inclined1 having constructed a     
theory1 to make the chronology of       
,plato's writings dependent upon it     
7,see ,j4 of ,philol4 and elsewhere47   
,it may likewise be illustrated by the  
ingenuity of those who employ symbols to
 find in ,shakespeare a hidden meaning4 
,in the three cases the error is nearly 

the same3--words are taken out of their 
natural context1 and thus become        
destitute of any real meaning4  7#d7    
,according to ,dr4 ,jackson's ',later   
,theory1' ,plato's ,ideas1 which were   
once regarded as the summa genera of all
 things1 are now to be explained as     
,forms or ,types of some things         
only1--that is to say1 of natural       
objects3 these we conceive imperfectly1 
but are always seeking in vain to have a
 more perfect notion of them4 ,he says  
7,j4 of ,philol47 that ',plato hoped by 
the study of a series of hypothetical or
 provisional classifications to arrive  
at one in which nature's distribution of
 kinds is approximately represented1 and
 so to attain approximately to the      
knowledge of the ideas4 ,but whereas in 
the ,republic1 and even in the ,phaedo1 
though less hopefully1 he had sought to 
convert his provisional definitions into
 final ones by tracing their connexion  
with the summum genus1 the 7,greek71 in 
the ,parmenides his aspirations are less

 ambitious1' and so on4 ,but where does 
,dr4 ,jackson find any such notion as   
this in ,plato or anywhere in ancient   
philosophy8 ,is it not an anachronism1  
gracious to the modern physical         
philosopher1 and the more acceptable    
because it seems to form a link between 
ancient and modern philosophy1 and      
between physical and metaphysical       
science2 but really unmeaning8  7#e7 ,to
 this ',later ,theory' of ,plato's      
,ideas ,i oppose the authority of       
,professor ,zeller1 who affirms that    
none of the passages to which ,dr4      
,jackson appeals 7,theaet42 ,phil42     
,tim42 ,parm47 'in the smallest degree  
prove his point'2 and that in the second
 class of dialogues1 in which the       
',later ,theory of ,ideas' is supposed  
to be found1 quite as clearly as in the 
first1 are admitted ,ideas1 not only of 
natural objects1 but of properties1     
relations1 works of art1 negative       
notions 7,theaet42 ,parm42 ,soph472 and 
that what ,dr4 ,jackson distinguishes as

 the first class of dialogues from the  
second equally assert or imply that the 
relation of things to the ,ideas1 is one
 of participation in them as well as of 
imitation of them 7,prof4 ,zeller's     
summary of his own review of ,dr4       
,jackson1 ,archiv fur ,geschichte der   
,philosophie47  ,in conclusion ,i may   
remark that in ,plato's writings there  
is both unity1 and also growth and      
development2 but that we must not       
intrude upon him either a system or a   
technical language4  ,balliol ,college1 
,october1 #ahia4     ,,note  ,the chief 
additions to the ,introductions in the  
,third ,edition consist of ,essays on   
the following subjects3--  #a4          
,language4  #b4 ,the decline of ,greek  
,literature4  #c4 ,the ',ideas' of      
,plato and ,modern ,philosophy4  #d4    
,the myths of ,plato4  #e4 ,the relation
 of the ,republic1 ,statesman and ,laws4
  #f4 ,the legend of ,atlantis4  #g4    
,psychology4  #h4 ,comparison of the    
,laws of ,plato with ,spartan and       

,athenian ,laws and ,institutions4      
,,charmides4  ,,introduction4  ,the     
subject of the ,charmides is ,temperance
 or 7,greek71 a peculiarly ,greek       
notion1 which may also be rendered      
,moderation 7,compare ,cic4 ,tusc4      
'7,greek71 quam soleo equidem tum       
temperantiam1 tum moderationem          
appellare1 nonnunquam etiam             
modestiam4'71 ,modesty1 ,discretion1    
,wisdom1 without completely exhausting  
by all these terms the various          
associations of the word4 ,it may be    
described as 'mens sana in corpore      
sano1' the harmony or due proportion of 
the higher and lower elements of human  
nature which 'makes a man his own       
master1' according to the definition of 
the ,republic4 ,in the accompanying     
translation the word has been rendered  
in different places either ,temperance  
or ,wisdom1 as the connection seemed to 
require3 for in the philosophy of ,plato
 7,greek7 still retains an intellectual 
element 7as ,socrates is also said to   

have identified 7,greek7 with 7,greek73 
,xen4 ,mem47 and is not yet relegated to
 the sphere of moral virtue1 as in the  
,nicomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle4     
,the beautiful youth1 ,charmides1 who is
 also the most temperate of human       
beings1 is asked by ,socrates1 ',what is
 ,temperance8' ,he answers              
characteristically1 7#a7 ',quietness4'  
',but ,temperance is a fine and noble   
thing2 and quietness in many or most    
cases is not so fine a thing as         
quickness4' ,he tries again and says    
7#b7 that temperance is modesty4 ,but   
this again is set aside by a sophistical
 application of ,homer3 for temperance  
is good as well as noble1 and ,homer has
 declared that 'modesty is not good for 
a needy man4' 7#c7 ,once more ,charmides
 makes the attempt4 ,this time he gives 
a definition which he has heard1 and of 
which ,socrates conjectures that        
,critias must be the author3            
',temperance is doing one's own         
business4' ,but the artisan who makes   

another man's shoes may be temperate1   
and yet he is not doing his own         
business2 and temperance defined thus   
would be opposed to the division of     
labour which exists in every temperate  
or well-ordered state4 ,how is this     
riddle to be explained8  ,critias1 who  
takes the place of ,charmides1          
distinguishes in his answer between     
'making' and 'doing1' and with the help 
of a misapplied quotation from ,hesiod  
assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' 
an exclusively good sense3 ,temperance  
is doing one's own business2--7#d7 is   
doing good4  ,still an element of       
knowledge is wanting which ,critias is  
readily induced to admit at the         
suggestion of ,socrates2 and1 in the    
spirit of ,socrates and of ,greek life  
generally1 proposes as a fifth          
definition1 7#e7 ,temperance is         
self-knowledge4 ,but all sciences have a
 subject3 number is the subject of      
arithmetic1 health of medicine--what is 
the subject of temperance or wisdom8    

,the answer is that 7#f7 ,temperance is 
the knowledge of what a man knows and of
 what he does not know4 ,but this is    
contrary to analogy2 there is no vision 
of vision1 but only of visible things2  
no love of loves1 but only of beautiful 
things2 how then can there be a         
knowledge of knowledge8 ,that which is  
older1 heavier1 lighter1 is older1      
heavier1 and lighter than something     
else1 not than itself1 and this seems to
 be true of all relative notions--the   
object of relation is outside of them2  
at any rate they can only have relation 
to themselves in the form of that       
object4 ,whether there are any such     
cases of reflex relation or not1 and    
whether that sort of knowledge which we 
term ,temperance is of this reflex      
nature1 has yet to be determined by the 
great metaphysician4 ,but even if       
knowledge can know itself1 how does the 
knowledge of what we know imply the     
knowledge of what we do not know8       
,besides1 knowledge is an abstraction   

only1 and will not inform us of any     
particular subject1 such as medicine1   
building1 and the like4 ,it may tell us 
that we or other men know something1 but
 can never tell us what we know4        
,admitting that there is a knowledge of 
what we know and of what we do not know1
 which would supply a rule and measure  
of all things1 still there would be no  
good in this2 and the knowledge which   
temperance gives must be of a kind which
 will do us good2 for temperance is a   
good4 ,but this universal knowledge does
 not tend to our happiness and good3 the
 only kind of knowledge which brings    
happiness is the knowledge of good and  
evil4 ,to this ,critias replies that the
 science or knowledge of good and evil1 
and all the other sciences1 are         
regulated by the higher science or      
knowledge of knowledge4 ,socrates       
replies by again dividing the abstract  
from the concrete1 and asks how this    
knowledge conduces to happiness in the  
same definite way in which medicine     

conduces to health4  ,and now1 after    
making all these concessions1 which are 
really inadmissible1 we are still as far
 as ever from ascertaining the nature of
 temperance1 which ,charmides has       
already discovered1 and had therefore   
better rest in the knowledge that the   
more temperate he is the happier he will
 be1 and not trouble himself with the   
speculations of ,socrates4  ,in this    
,dialogue may be noted 7#a7 ,the ,greek 
ideal of beauty and goodness1 the vision
 of the fair soul in the fair body1     
realised in the beautiful ,charmides2   
7#b7 ,the true conception of medicine as
 a science of the whole as well as the  
parts1 and of the mind as well as the   
body1 which is playfully intimated in   
the story of the ,thracian2 7#c7 ,the   
tendency of the age to verbal           
distinctions1 which here1 as in the     
,protagoras and ,cratylus1 are ascribed 
to the ingenuity of ,prodicus2 and to   
interpretations or rather parodies of   
,homer or ,hesiod1 which are eminently  

characteristic of ,plato and his        
contemporaries2 7#d7 ,the germ of an    
ethical principle contained in the      
notion that temperance is 'doing one's  
own business1' which in the ,republic   
7such is the shifting character of the  
,platonic philosophy7 is given as the   
definition1 not of temperance1 but of   
justice2 7#e7 ,the impatience which is  
exhibited by ,socrates of any definition
 of temperance in which an element of   
science or knowledge is not included2   
7#f7 ,the beginning of metaphysics and  
logic implied in the two questions3     
whether there can be a science of       
science1 and whether the knowledge of   
what you know is the same as the        
knowledge of what you do not know2 and  
also in the distinction between 'what   
you know' and 'that you know1' 7,greek27
 here too is the first conception of an 
absolute self-determined science 7the   
claims of which1 however1 are disputed  
by ,socrates1 who asks cui bono87 as    
well as the first suggestion of the     

difficulty of the abstract and concrete1
 and one of the earliest anticipations  
of the relation of subject and object1  
and of the subjective element in        
knowledge--a 'rich banquet' of          
metaphysical questions in which we      
'taste of many things4' 7#g7 ,and still 
the mind of ,plato1 having snatched for 
a moment at these shadows of the future1
 quickly rejects them3 thus early has he
 reached the conclusion that there can  
be no science which is a 'science of    
nothing' 7,parmen474 7#h7 ,the          
conception of a science of good and evil
 also first occurs here1 an anticipation
 of the ,philebus and ,republic as well 
as of moral philosophy in later ages4   
,the dramatic interest of the ,dialogue 
chiefly centres in the youth ,charmides1
 with whom ,socrates talks in the kindly
 spirit of an elder4 ,his childlike     
simplicity and ingenuousness are        
contrasted with the dialectical and     
rhetorical arts of ,critias1 who is the 
grown-up man of the world1 having a     

tincture of philosophy4 ,no hint is     
given1 either here or in the ,timaeus1  
of the infamy which attaches to the name
 of the latter in ,athenian history4 ,he
 is simply a cultivated person who1 like
 his kinsman ,plato1 is ennobled by the 
connection of his family with ,solon    
7,tim471 and had been the follower1 if  
not the disciple1 both of ,socrates and 
of the ,sophists4 ,in the argument he is
 not unfair1 if allowance is made for a 
slight rhetorical tendency1 and for a   
natural desire to save his reputation   
with the company2 he is sometimes nearer
 the truth than ,socrates4 ,nothing in  
his language or behaviour is unbecoming 
the guardian of the beautiful           
,charmides4 ,his love of reputation is  
characteristically ,greek1 and contrasts
 with the humility of ,socrates4 ,nor in
 ,charmides himself do we find any      
resemblance to the ,charmides of        
history1 except1 perhaps1 the modest and
 retiring nature which1 according to    
,xenophon1 at one time of his life      

prevented him from speaking in the      
,assembly 7,mem472 and we are surprised 
to hear that1 like ,critias1 he         
afterwards became one of the thirty     
tyrants4 ,in the ,dialogue he is a      
pattern of virtue1 and is therefore in  
no need of the charm which ,socrates is 
unable to apply4 ,with youthful naivete1
 keeping his secret and entering into   
the spirit of ,socrates1 he enjoys the  
detection of his elder and guardian     
,critias1 who is easily seen to be the  
author of the definition which he has so
 great an interest in maintaining4 ,the 
preceding definition1 ',temperance is   
doing one's own business1' is assumed to
 have been borrowed by ,charmides from  
another2 and when the enquiry becomes   
more abstract he is superseded by       
,critias 7,theaet42 ,euthyd474 ,socrates
 preserves his accustomed irony to the  
end2 he is in the neighbourhood of      
several great truths1 which he views in 
various lights1 but always either by    
bringing them to the test of common     

sense1 or by demanding too great        
exactness in the use of words1 turns    
aside from them and comes at last to no 
conclusion4  ,the definitions of        
temperance proceed in regular order from
 the popular to the philosophical4 ,the 
first two are simple enough and         
partially true1 like the first thoughts 
of an intelligent youth2 the third1     
which is a real contribution to ethical 
philosophy1 is perverted by the         
ingenuity of ,socrates1 and hardly      
rescued by an equal perversion on the   
part of ,critias4 ,the remaining        
definitions have a higher aim1 which is 
to introduce the element of knowledge1  
and at last to unite good and truth in a
 single science4 ,but the time has not  
yet arrived for the realization of this 
vision of metaphysical philosophy2 and  
such a science when brought nearer to us
 in the ,philebus and the ,republic will
 not be called by the name of 7,greek74 
,hence we see with surprise that ,plato1
 who in his other writings identifies   

good and knowledge1 here opposes them1  
and asks1 almost in the spirit of       
,aristotle1 how can there be a knowledge
 of knowledge1 and even if attainable1  
how can such a knowledge be of any use8 
,the difficulty of the ,charmides arises
 chiefly from the two senses of the word
 7,greek71 or temperance4 ,from the     
ethical notion of temperance1 which is  
variously defined to be quietness1      
modesty1 doing our own business1 the    
doing of good actions1 the dialogue     
passes onto the intellectual conception 
of 7,greek71 which is declared also to  
be the science of self-knowledge1 or of 
the knowledge of what we know and do not
 know1 or of the knowledge of good and  
evil4 ,the dialogue represents a stage  
in the history of philosophy in which   
knowledge and action were not yet       
distinguished4 ,hence the confusion     
between them1 and the easy transition   
from one to the other4 ,the definitions 
which are offered are all rejected1 but 
it is to be observed that they all tend 

to throw a light on the nature of       
temperance1 and that1 unlike the        
distinction of ,critias between         
7,greek71 none of them are merely verbal
 quibbles1 it is implied that this      
question1 although it has not yet       
received a solution in theory1 has been 
already answered by ,charmides himself1 
who has learned to practise the virtue  
of self-knowledge which philosophers are
 vainly trying to define in words4 ,in a
 similar spirit we might say to a young 
man who is disturbed by theological     
difficulties1 ',do not trouble yourself 
about such matters1 but only lead a good
 life2' and yet in either case it is not
 to be denied that right ideas of truth 
may contribute greatly to the           
improvement of character4  ,the reasons 
why the ,charmides1 ,lysis1 ,laches have
 been placed together and first in the  
series of ,platonic dialogues1 are3 7i7 
,their shortness and simplicity4 ,the   
,charmides and the ,lysis1 if not the   
,laches1 are of the same 'quality' as   

the ,phaedrus and ,symposium3 and it is 
probable1 though far from certain1 that 
the slighter effort preceded the greater
 one4 7ii7 ,their eristic1 or rather    
,socratic character2 they belong to the 
class called dialogues of search        
7,greek71 which have no conclusion4     
7iii7 ,the absence in them of certain   
favourite notions of ,plato1 such as the
 doctrine of recollection and of the    
,platonic ideas2 the questions1 whether 
virtue can be taught2 whether the       
virtues are one or many4 7iv7 ,they have
 a want of depth1 when compared with the
 dialogues of the middle and later      
period2 and a youthful beauty and grace 
which is wanting in the later ones4 7v7 
,their resemblance to one another2 in   
all the three boyhood has a great part4 
,these reasons have various degrees of  
weight in determining their place in the
 catalogue of the ,platonic writings1   
though they are not conclusive4 ,no     
arrangement of the ,platonic dialogues  
can be strictly chronological4 ,the     

order which has been adopted is intended
 mainly for the convenience of the      
reader2 at the same time1 indications of
 the date supplied either by ,plato     
himself or allusions found in the       
dialogues have not been lost sight of4  
,much may be said about this subject1   
but the results can only be probable2   
there are no materials which would      
enable us to attain to anything like    
certainty4  ,the relations of knowledge 
and virtue are again brought forward in 
the companion dialogues of the ,lysis   
and ,laches2 and also in the ,protagoras
 and ,euthydemus4 ,the opposition of    
abstract and particular knowledge in    
this dialogue may be compared with a    
similar opposition of ideas and         
phenomena which occurs in the ,prologues
 to the ,parmenides1 but seems rather to
 belong to a later stage of the         
philosophy of ,plato4     ,,charmides1  
,,or ,,temperance   ,,persons ,,of ,,the
 ,,dialogue3 ,socrates1 who is the      
narrator1 ,charmides1 ,chaerephon1      

,critias4  ,,scene3 ,the ,palaestra of  
,taureas1 which is near the ,porch of   
the ,king ,archon4   ,yesterday evening 
,i returned from the army at ,potidaea1 
and having been a good while away1 ,i   
thought that ,i should like to go and   
look at my old haunts4 ,so ,i went into 
the palaestra of ,taureas1 which is over
 against the temple adjoining the porch 
of the ,king ,archon1 and there ,i found
 a number of persons1 most of whom ,i   
knew1 but not all4 ,my visit was        
unexpected1 and no sooner did they see  
me entering than they saluted me from   
afar on all sides2 and ,chaerephon1 who 
is a kind of madman1 started up and ran 
to me1 seizing my hand1 and saying1 ,how
 did you escape1 ,socrates8--7,i should 
explain that an engagement had taken    
place at ,potidaea not long before we   
came away1 of which the news had only   
just reached ,athens47  ,you see1 ,i    
replied1 that here ,i am4  ,there was a 
report1 he said1 that the engagement was
 very severe1 and that many of our      

acquaintance had fallen4  ,that1 ,i     
replied1 was not far from the truth4  ,i
 suppose1 he said1 that you were        
present4  ,i was4  ,then sit down1 and  
tell us the whole story1 which as yet we
 have only heard imperfectly4  ,i took  
the place which he assigned to me1 by   
the side of ,critias the son of         
,callaeschrus1 and when ,i had saluted  
him and the rest of the company1 ,i told
 them the news from the army1 and       
answered their several enquiries4       
,then1 when there had been enough of    
this1 ,i1 in my turn1 began to make     
enquiries about matters at home--about  
the present state of philosophy1 and    
about the youth4 ,i asked whether any of
 them were remarkable for wisdom or     
beauty1 or both4 ,critias1 glancing at  
the door1 invited my attention to some  
youths who were coming in1 and talking  
noisily to one another1 followed by a   
crowd4 ,of the beauties1 ,socrates1 he  
said1 ,i fancy that you will soon be    
able to form a judgment4 ,for those who 

are just entering are the advanced guard
 of the great beauty1 as he is thought  
to be1 of the day1 and he is likely to  
be not far off himself4  ,who is he1 ,i 
said2 and who is his father8            
,charmides1 he replied1 is his name2 he 
is my cousin1 and the son of my uncle   
,glaucon3 ,i rather think that you know 
him too1 although he was not grown up at
 the time of your departure4            
,certainly1 ,i know him1 ,i said1 for he
 was remarkable even then when he was   
still a child1 and ,i should imagine    
that by this time he must be almost a   
young man4  ,you will see1 he said1 in a
 moment what progress he has made and   
what he is like4 ,he had scarcely said  
the word1 when ,charmides entered4  ,now
 you know1 my friend1 that ,i cannot    
measure anything1 and of the beautiful1 
,i am simply such a measure as a white  
line is of chalk2 for almost all young  
persons appear to be beautiful in my    
eyes4 ,but at that moment1 when ,i saw  
him coming in1 ,i confess that ,i was   

quite astonished at his beauty and      
stature2 all the world seemed to be     
enamoured of him2 amazement and         
confusion reigned when he entered2 and a
 troop of lovers followed him4 ,that    
grown-up men like ourselves should have 
been affected in this way was not       
surprising1 but ,i observed that there  
was the same feeling among the boys2 all
 of them1 down to the very least child1 
turned and looked at him1 as if he had  
been a statue4  ,chaerephon called me   
and said3 ,what do you think of him1    
,socrates8 ,has he not a beautiful face8
  ,most beautiful1 ,i said4  ,but you   
would think nothing of his face1 he     
replied1 if you could see his naked     
form3 he is absolutely perfect4  ,and to
 this they all agreed4  ,by ,heracles1  
,i said1 there never was such a paragon1
 if he has only one other slight        
addition4  ,what is that8 said ,critias4
  ,if he has a noble soul2 and being of 
your house1 ,critias1 he may be expected
 to have this4  ,he is as fair and good 

within1 as he is without1 replied       
,critias4  ,then1 before we see his     
body1 should we not ask him to show us  
his soul1 naked and undisguised8 he is  
just of an age at which he will like to 
talk4  ,that he will1 said ,critias1 and
 ,i can tell you that he is a           
philosopher already1 and also a         
considerable poet1 not in his own       
opinion only1 but in that of others4    
,that1 my dear ,critias1 ,i replied1 is 
a distinction which has long been in    
your family1 and is inherited by you    
from ,solon4 ,but why do you not call   
him1 and show him to us8 for even if he 
were younger than he is1 there could be 
no impropriety in his talking to us in  
the presence of you1 who are his        
guardian and cousin4  ,very well1 he    
said2 then ,i will call him2 and turning
 to the attendant1 he said1 ,call       
,charmides1 and tell him that ,i want   
him to come and see a physician about   
the illness of which he spoke to me the 
day before yesterday4 ,then again       

addressing me1 he added3 ,he has been   
complaining lately of having a headache 
when he rises in the morning3 now why   
should you not make him believe that you
 know a cure for the headache8  ,why    
not1 ,i said2 but will he come8  ,he    
will be sure to come1 he replied4  ,he  
came as he was bidden1 and sat down     
between ,critias and me4 ,great         
amusement was occasioned by every one   
pushing with might and main at his      
neighbour in order to make a place for  
him next to themselves1 until at the two
 ends of the row one had to get up and  
the other was rolled over sideways4 ,now
 ,i1 my friend1 was beginning to feel   
awkward2 my former bold belief in my    
powers of conversing with him had       
vanished4 ,and when ,critias told him   
that ,i was the person who had the cure1
 he looked at me in such an             
indescribable manner1 and was just going
 to ask a question4 ,and at that moment 
all the people in the palaestra crowded 
about us1 and1 ,o rare6 ,i caught a     

sight of the inwards of his garment1 and
 took the flame4 ,then ,i could no      
longer contain myself4 ,i thought how   
well ,cydias understood the nature of   
love1 when1 in speaking of a fair youth1
 he warns some one 'not to bring the    
fawn in the sight of the lion to be     
devoured by him1' for ,i felt that ,i   
had been overcome by a sort of          
wild-beast appetite4 ,but ,i controlled 
myself1 and when he asked me if ,i knew 
the cure of the headache1 ,i answered1  
but with an effort1 that ,i did know4   
,and what is it8 he said4  ,i replied   
that it was a kind of leaf1 which       
required to be accompanied by a charm1  
and if a person would repeat the charm  
at the same time that he used the cure1 
he would be made whole2 but that without
 the charm the leaf would be of no      
avail4  ,then ,i will write out the     
charm from your dictation1 he said4     
,with my consent8 ,i said1 or without my
 consent8  ,with your consent1          
,socrates1 he said1 laughing4  ,very    

good1 ,i said2 and are you quite sure   
that you know my name8  ,i ought to know
 you1 he replied1 for there is a great  
deal said about you among my companions2
 and ,i remember when ,i was a child    
seeing you in company with my cousin    
,critias4  ,i am glad to find that you  
remember me1 ,i said2 for ,i shall now  
be more at home with you and shall be   
better able to explain the nature of the
 charm1 about which ,i felt a difficulty
 before4 ,for the charm will do more1   
,charmides1 than only cure the headache4
 ,i dare say that you have heard eminent
 physicians say to a patient who comes  
to them with bad eyes1 that they cannot 
cure his eyes by themselves1 but that if
 his eyes are to be cured1 his head must
 be treated2 and then again they say    
that to think of curing the head alone1 
and not the rest of the body also1 is   
the height of folly4 ,and arguing in    
this way they apply their methods to the
 whole body1 and try to treat and heal  
the whole and the part together4 ,did   

you ever observe that this is what they 
say8  ,yes1 he said4  ,and they are     
right1 and you would agree with them8   
,yes1 he said1 certainly ,i should4     
,his approving answers reassured me1 and
 ,i began by degrees to regain          
confidence1 and the vital heat returned4
 ,such1 ,charmides1 ,i said1 is the     
nature of the charm1 which ,i learned   
when serving with the army from one of  
the physicians of the ,thracian king    
,zamolxis1 who are said to be so skilful
 that they can even give immortality4   
,this ,thracian told me that in these   
notions of theirs1 which ,i was just now
 mentioning1 the ,greek physicians are  
quite right as far as they go2 but      
,zamolxis1 he added1 our king1 who is   
also a god1 says further1 'that as you  
ought not to attempt to cure the eyes   
without the head1 or the head without   
the body1 so neither ought you to       
attempt to cure the body without the    
soul2 and this1' he said1 'is the reason
 why the cure of many diseases is       

unknown to the physicians of ,hellas1   
because they are ignorant of the whole1 
which ought to be studied also2 for the 
part can never be well unless the whole 
is well4' ,for all good and evil1       
whether in the body or in human nature1 
originates1 as he declared1 in the soul1
 and overflows from thence1 as if from  
the head into the eyes4 ,and therefore  
if the head and body are to be well1 you
 must begin by curing the soul2 that is 
the first thing4 ,and the cure1 my dear 
youth1 has to be effected by the use of 
certain charms1 and these charms are    
fair words2 and by them temperance is   
implanted in the soul1 and where        
temperance is1 there health is speedily 
imparted1 not only to the head1 but to  
the whole body4 ,and he who taught me   
the cure and the charm at the same time 
added a special direction3 ',let no     
one1' he said1 'persuade you to cure the
 head1 until he has first given you his 
soul to be cured by the charm4 ,for     
this1' he said1 'is the great error of  

our day in the treatment of the human   
body1 that physicians separate the soul 
from the body4' ,and he added with      
emphasis1 at the same time making me    
swear to his words1 ',let no one1       
however rich1 or noble1 or fair1        
persuade you to give him the cure1      
without the charm4' ,now ,i have sworn1 
and ,i must keep my oath1 and therefore 
if you will allow me to apply the       
,thracian charm first to your soul1 as  
the stranger directed1 ,i will          
afterwards proceed to apply the cure to 
your head4 ,but if not1 ,i do not know  
what ,i am to do with you1 my dear      
,charmides4  ,critias1 when he heard    
this1 said3 ,the headache will be an    
unexpected gain to my young relation1 if
 the pain in his head compels him to    
improve his mind3 and ,i can tell you1  
,socrates1 that ,charmides is not only  
pre-eminent in beauty among his equals1 
but also in that quality which is given 
by the charm2 and this1 as you say1 is  
temperance8  ,yes1 ,i said4  ,then let  

me tell you that he is the most         
temperate of human beings1 and for his  
age inferior to none in any quality4    
,yes1 ,i said1 ,charmides2 and indeed ,i
 think that you ought to excel others in
 all good qualities2 for if ,i am not   
mistaken there is no one present who    
could easily point out two ,athenian    
houses1 whose union would be likely to  
produce a better or nobler scion than   
the two from which you are sprung4      
,there is your father's house1 which is 
descended from ,critias the son of      
,dropidas1 whose family has been        
commemorated in the panegyrical verses  
of ,anacreon1 ,solon1 and many other    
poets1 as famous for beauty and virtue  
and all other high fortune3 and your    
mother's house is equally distinguished2
 for your maternal uncle1 ,pyrilampes1  
is reputed never to have found his      
equal1 in ,persia at the court of the   
great king1 or on the continent of      
,asia1 in all the places to which he    
went as ambassador1 for stature and     

beauty2 that whole family is not a whit 
inferior to the other4 ,having such     
ancestors you ought to be first in all  
things1 and1 sweet son of ,glaucon1 your
 outward form is no dishonour to any of 
them4 ,if to beauty you add temperance1 
and if in other respects you are what   
,critias declares you to be1 then1 dear 
,charmides1 blessed art thou1 in being  
the son of thy mother4 ,and here lies   
the point2 for if1 as he declares1 you  
have this gift of temperance already1   
and are temperate enough1 in that case  
you have no need of any charms1 whether 
of ,zamolxis or of ,abaris the          
,hyperborean1 and ,i may as well let you
 have the cure of the head at once2 but 
if you have not yet acquired this       
quality1 ,i must use the charm before ,i
 give you the medicine4 ,please1        
therefore1 to inform me whether you     
admit the truth of what ,critias has    
been saying2--have you or have you not  
this quality of temperance8  ,charmides 
blushed1 and the blush heightened his   

beauty1 for modesty is becoming in      
youth2 he then said very ingenuously1   
that he really could not at once answer1
 either yes1 or no1 to the question     
which ,i had asked3 ,for1 said he1 if ,i
 affirm that ,i am not temperate1 that  
would be a strange thing for me to say  
of myself1 and also ,i should give the  
lie to ,critias1 and many others who    
think as he tells you1 that ,i am       
temperate3 but1 on the other hand1 if ,i
 say that ,i am1 ,i shall have to praise
 myself1 which would be ill manners2 and
 therefore ,i do not know how to answer 
you4  ,i said to him3 ,that is a natural
 reply1 ,charmides1 and ,i think that   
you and ,i ought together to enquire    
whether you have this quality about     
which ,i am asking or not2 and then you 
will not be compelled to say what you do
 not like2 neither shall ,i be a rash   
practitioner of medicine3 therefore1 if 
you please1 ,i will share the enquiry   
with you1 but ,i will not press you if  
you would rather not4  ,there is nothing

 which ,i should like better1 he said2  
and as far as ,i am concerned you may   
proceed in the way which you think best4
  ,i think1 ,i said1 that ,i had better 
begin by asking you a question2 for if  
temperance abides in you1 you must have 
an opinion about her2 she must give some
 intimation of her nature and qualities1
 which may enable you to form a notion  
of her4 ,is not that true8  ,yes1 he    
said1 that ,i think is true4  ,you know 
your native language1 ,i said1 and      
therefore you must be able to tell what 
you feel about this4  ,certainly1 he    
said4  ,in order1 then1 that ,i may form
 a conjecture whether you have          
temperance abiding in you or not1 tell  
me1 ,i said1 what1 in your opinion1 is  
,temperance8  ,at first he hesitated1   
and was very unwilling to answer3 then  
he said that he thought temperance was  
doing things orderly and quietly1 such  
things for example as walking in the    
streets1 and talking1 or anything else  
of that nature4 ,in a word1 he said1 ,i 

should answer that1 in my opinion1      
temperance is quietness4  ,are you      
right1 ,charmides8 ,i said4 ,no doubt   
some would affirm that the quiet are the
 temperate2 but let us see whether these
 words have any meaning2 and first tell 
me whether you would not acknowledge    
temperance to be of the class of the    
noble and good8  ,yes4  ,but which is   
best when you are at the                
writing-master's1 to write the same     
letters quickly or quietly8  ,quickly4  
,and to read quickly or slowly8         
,quickly again4  ,and in playing the    
lyre1 or wrestling1 quickness or        
sharpness are far better than quietness 
and slowness8  ,yes4  ,and the same     
holds in boxing and in the pancratium8  
,certainly4  ,and in leaping and running
 and in bodily exercises generally1     
quickness and agility are good2         
slowness1 and inactivity1 and quietness1
 are bad8  ,that is evident4  ,then1 ,i 
said1 in all bodily actions1 not        
quietness1 but the greatest agility and 

quickness1 is noblest and best8  ,yes1  
certainly4  ,and is temperance a good8  
,yes4  ,then1 in reference to the body1 
not quietness1 but quickness will be the
 higher degree of temperance1 if        
temperance is a good8  ,true1 he said4  
,and which1 ,i said1 is better--facility
 in learning1 or difficulty in learning8
  ,facility4  ,yes1 ,i said2 and        
facility in learning is learning        
quickly1 and difficulty in learning is  
learning quietly and slowly8  ,true4    
,and is it not better to teach another  
quickly and energetically1 rather than  
quietly and slowly8  ,yes4  ,and which  
is better1 to call to mind1 and to      
remember1 quickly and readily1 or       
quietly and slowly8  ,the former4  ,and 
is not shrewdness a quickness or        
cleverness of the soul1 and not a       
quietness8  ,true4  ,and is it not best 
to understand what is said1 whether at  
the writing-master's or the             
music-master's1 or anywhere else1 not as
 quietly as possible1 but as quickly as 

possible8  ,yes4  ,and in the searchings
 or deliberations of the soul1 not the  
quietest1 as ,i imagine1 and he who with
 difficulty deliberates and discovers1  
is thought worthy of praise1 but he who 
does so most easily and quickly8  ,quite
 true1 he said4  ,and in all that       
concerns either body or soul1 swiftness 
and activity are clearly better than    
slowness and quietness8  ,clearly they  
are4  ,then temperance is not quietness1
 nor is the temperate life              
quiet1--certainly not upon this view2   
for the life which is temperate is      
supposed to be the good4 ,and of two    
things1 one is true1--either never1 or  
very seldom1 do the quiet actions in    
life appear to be better than the quick 
and energetic ones2 or supposing that of
 the nobler actions1 there are as many  
quiet1 as quick and vehement3 still1    
even if we grant this1 temperance will  
not be acting quietly any more than     
acting quickly and energetically1 either
 in walking or talking or in anything   

else2 nor will the quiet life be more   
temperate than the unquiet1 seeing that 
temperance is admitted by us to be a    
good and noble thing1 and the quick have
 been shown to be as good as the quiet4 
,i think1 he said1 ,socrates1 that you  
are right4  ,then once more1 ,charmides1
 ,i said1 fix your attention1 and look  
within2 consider the effect which       
temperance has upon yourself1 and the   
nature of that which has the effect4    
,think over all this1 and1 like a brave 
youth1 tell me--,what is temperance8    
,after a moment's pause1 in which he    
made a real manly effort to think1 he   
said3 ,my opinion is1 ,socrates1 that   
temperance makes a man ashamed or       
modest1 and that temperance is the same 
as modesty4  ,very good1 ,i said2 and   
did you not admit1 just now1 that       
temperance is noble8  ,yes1 certainly1  
he said4  ,and the temperate are also   
good8  ,yes4  ,and can that be good     
which does not make men good8           
,certainly not4  ,and you would infer   

that temperance is not only noble1 but  
also good8  ,that is my opinion4  ,well1
 ,i said2 but surely you would agree    
with ,homer when he says1  ',modesty is 
not good for a needy man'8  ,yes1 he    
said2 ,i agree4  ,then ,i suppose that  
modesty is and is not good8  ,clearly4  
,but temperance1 whose presence makes   
men only good1 and not bad1 is always   
good8  ,that appears to me to be as you 
say4  ,and the inference is that        
temperance cannot be modesty--if        
temperance is a good1 and if modesty is 
as much an evil as a good8  ,all that1  
,socrates1 appears to me to be true2 but
 ,i should like to know what you think  
about another definition of temperance1 
which ,i just now remember to have heard
 from some one1 who said1 ',that        
temperance is doing our own business4'  
,was he right who affirmed that8  ,you  
monster6 ,i said2 this is what ,critias1
 or some philosopher has told you4      
,some one else1 then1 said ,critias2 for
 certainly ,i have not4  ,but what      

matter1 said ,charmides1 from whom ,i   
heard this8  ,no matter at all1 ,i      
replied2 for the point is not who said  
the words1 but whether they are true or 
not4  ,there you are in the right1      
,socrates1 he replied4  ,to be sure1 ,i 
said2 yet ,i doubt whether we shall ever
 be able to discover their truth or     
falsehood2 for they are a kind of       
riddle4  ,what makes you think so8 he   
said4  ,because1 ,i said1 he who uttered
 them seems to me to have meant one     
thing1 and said another4 ,is the scribe1
 for example1 to be regarded as doing   
nothing when he reads or writes8  ,i    
should rather think that he was doing   
something4  ,and does the scribe write  
or read1 or teach you boys to write or  
read1 your own names only1 or did you   
write your enemies' names as well as    
your own and your friends'8  ,as much   
one as the other4  ,and was there       
anything meddling or intemperate in     
this8  ,certainly not4  ,and yet if     
reading and writing are the same as     

doing1 you were doing what was not your 
own business8  ,but they are the same as
 doing4  ,and the healing art1 my       
friend1 and building1 and weaving1 and  
doing anything whatever which is done by
 art1--these all clearly come under the 
head of doing8  ,certainly4  ,and do you
 think that a state would be well       
ordered by a law which compelled every  
man to weave and wash his own coat1 and 
make his own shoes1 and his own flask   
and strigil1 and other implements1 on   
this principle of every one doing and   
performing his own1 and abstaining from 
what is not his own8  ,i think not1 he  
said4  ,but1 ,i said1 a temperate state 
will be a well-ordered state4  ,of      
course1 he replied4  ,then temperance1  
,i said1 will not be doing one's own    
business2 not at least in this way1 or  
doing things of this sort8  ,clearly    
not4  ,then1 as ,i was just now saying1 
he who declared that temperance is a man
 doing his own business had another and 
a hidden meaning2 for ,i do not think   

that he could have been such a fool as  
to mean this4 ,was he a fool who told   
you1 ,charmides8  ,nay1 he replied1 ,i  
certainly thought him a very wise man4  
,then ,i am quite certain that he put   
forth his definition as a riddle1       
thinking that no one would know the     
meaning of the words 'doing his own     
business4'  ,i dare say1 he replied4    
,and what is the meaning of a man doing 
his own business8 ,can you tell me8     
,indeed1 ,i cannot2 and ,i should not   
wonder if the man himself who used this 
phrase did not understand what he was   
saying4 ,whereupon he laughed slyly1 and
 looked at ,critias4  ,critias had long 
been showing uneasiness1 for he felt    
that he had a reputation to maintain    
with ,charmides and the rest of the     
company4 ,he had1 however1 hitherto     
managed to restrain himself2 but now he 
could no longer forbear1 and ,i am      
convinced of the truth of the suspicion 
which ,i entertained at the time1 that  
,charmides had heard this answer about  

temperance from ,critias4 ,and          
,charmides1 who did not want to answer  
himself1 but to make ,critias answer1   
tried to stir him up4 ,he went on       
pointing out that he had been refuted1  
at which ,critias grew angry1 and       
appeared1 as ,i thought1 inclined to    
quarrel with him2 just as a poet might  
quarrel with an actor who spoiled his   
poems in repeating them2 so he looked   
hard at him and said--  ,do you imagine1
 ,charmides1 that the author of this    
definition of temperance did not        
understand the meaning of his own words1
 because you do not understand them8    
,why1 at his age1 ,i said1 most         
excellent ,critias1 he can hardly be    
expected to understand2 but you1 who are
 older1 and have studied1 may well be   
assumed to know the meaning of them2 and
 therefore1 if you agree with him1 and  
accept his definition of temperance1 ,i 
would much rather argue with you than   
with him about the truth or falsehood of
 the definition4  ,i entirely agree1    

said ,critias1 and accept the           
definition4  ,very good1 ,i said2 and   
now let me repeat my question--,do you  
admit1 as ,i was just now saying1 that  
all craftsmen make or do something8  ,i 
do4  ,and do they make or do their own  
business only1 or that of others also8  
,they make or do that of others also4   
,and are they temperate1 seeing that    
they make not for themselves or their   
own business only8  ,why not8 he said4  
,no objection on my part1 ,i said1 but  
there may be a difficulty on his who    
proposes as a definition of temperance1 
'doing one's own business1' and then    
says that there is no reason why those  
who do the business of others should not
 be temperate4  ,nay 7,the ,english     
reader has to observe that the word     
'make' 7,greek71 in ,greek1 has also the
 sense of 'do' 7,greek7471 said he2 did 
,i ever acknowledge that those who do   
the business of others are temperate8 ,i
 said1 those who make1 not those who do4
  ,what6 ,i asked2 do you mean to say   

that doing and making are not the same8 
,no more1 he replied1 than making or    
working are the same2 thus much ,i have 
learned from ,hesiod1 who says that     
'work is no disgrace4' ,now do you      
imagine that if he had meant by working 
and doing such things as you were       
describing1 he would have said that     
there was no disgrace in them--for      
example1 in the manufacture of shoes1 or
 in selling pickles1 or sitting for hire
 in a house of ill-fame8 ,that1         
,socrates1 is not to be supposed3 but ,i
 conceive him to have distinguished     
making from doing and work2 and1 while  
admitting that the making anything might
 sometimes become a disgrace1 when the  
employment was not honourable1 to have  
thought that work was never any disgrace
 at all4 ,for things nobly and usefully 
made he called works2 and such makings  
he called workings1 and doings2 and he  
must be supposed to have called such    
things only man's proper business1 and  
what is hurtful1 not his business3 and  

in that sense ,hesiod1 and any other    
wise man1 may be reasonably supposed to 
call him wise who does his own work4  ,o
 ,critias1 ,i said1 no sooner had you   
opened your mouth1 than ,i pretty well  
knew that you would call that which is  
proper to a man1 and that which is his  
own1 good2 and that the makings 7,greek7
 of the good you would call doings      
7,greek71 for ,i am no stranger to the  
endless distinctions which ,prodicus    
draws about names4 ,now ,i have no      
objection to your giving names any      
signification which you please1 if you  
will only tell me what you mean by them4
 ,please then to begin again1 and be a  
little plainer4 ,do you mean that this  
doing or making1 or whatever is the word
 which you would use1 of good actions1  
is temperance8  ,i do1 he said4  ,then  
not he who does evil1 but he who does   
good1 is temperate8  ,yes1 he said2 and 
you1 friend1 would agree4  ,no matter   
whether ,i should or not2 just now1 not 
what ,i think1 but what you are saying1 

is the point at issue4  ,well1 he       
answered2 ,i mean to say1 that he who   
does evil1 and not good1 is not         
temperate2 and that he is temperate who 
does good1 and not evil3 for temperance 
,i define in plain words to be the doing
 of good actions4  ,and you may be very 
likely right in what you are saying2 but
 ,i am curious to know whether you      
imagine that temperate men are ignorant 
of their own temperance8  ,i do not     
think so1 he said4  ,and yet were you   
not saying1 just now1 that craftsmen    
might be temperate in doing another's   
work1 as well as in doing their own8  ,i
 was1 he replied2 but what is your      
drift8  ,i have no particular drift1 but
 ,i wish that you would tell me whether 
a physician who cures a patient may do  
good to himself and good to another     
also8  ,i think that he may4  ,and he   
who does so does his duty8  ,yes4  ,and 
does not he who does his duty act       
temperately or wisely8  ,yes1 he acts   
wisely4  ,but must the physician        

necessarily know when his treatment is  
likely to prove beneficial1 and when    
not8 or must the craftsman necessarily  
know when he is likely to be benefited1 
and when not to be benefited1 by the    
work which he is doing8  ,i suppose not4
  ,then1 ,i said1 he may sometimes do   
good or harm1 and not know what he is   
himself doing1 and yet1 in doing good1  
as you say1 he has done temperately or  
wisely4 ,was not that your statement8   
,yes4  ,then1 as would seem1 in doing   
good1 he may act wisely or temperately1 
and be wise or temperate1 but not know  
his own wisdom or temperance8  ,but     
that1 ,socrates1 he said1 is impossible2
 and therefore if this is1 as you imply1
 the necessary consequence of any of my 
previous admissions1 ,i will withdraw   
them1 rather than admit that a man can  
be temperate or wise who does not know  
himself2 and ,i am not ashamed to       
confess that ,i was in error4 ,for      
self-knowledge would certainly be       
maintained by me to be the very essence 

of knowledge1 and in this ,i agree with 
him who dedicated the inscription1      
',know thyself6' at ,delphi4 ,that word1
 if ,i am not mistaken1 is put there as 
a sort of salutation which the god      
addresses to those who enter the temple2
 as much as to say that the ordinary    
salutation of ',hail6' is not right1 and
 that the exhortation ',be temperate6'  
would be a far better way of saluting   
one another4 ,the notion of him who     
dedicated the inscription was1 as ,i    
believe1 that the god speaks to those   
who enter his temple1 not as men speak2 
but1 when a worshipper enters1 the first
 word which he hears is ',be temperate6'
 ,this1 however1 like a prophet he      
expresses in a sort of riddle1 for      
',know thyself6' and ',be temperate6'   
are the same1 as ,i maintain1 and as the
 letters imply 7,greek71 and yet they   
may be easily misunderstood2 and        
succeeding sages who added ',never too  
much1' or1 ',give a pledge1 and evil is 
nigh at hand1' would appear to have so  

misunderstood them2 for they imagined   
that ',know thyself6' was a piece of    
advice which the god gave1 and not his  
salutation of the worshippers at their  
first coming in2 and they dedicated     
their own inscription under the idea    
that they too would give equally useful 
pieces of advice4 ,shall ,i tell you1   
,socrates1 why ,i say all this8 ,my     
object is to leave the previous         
discussion 7in which ,i know not whether
 you or ,i are more right1 but1 at any  
rate1 no clear result was attained71 and
 to raise a new one in which ,i will    
attempt to prove1 if you deny1 that     
temperance is self-knowledge4  ,yes1 ,i 
said1 ,critias2 but you come to me as   
though ,i professed to know about the   
questions which ,i ask1 and as though ,i
 could1 if ,i only would1 agree with    
you4 ,whereas the fact is that ,i       
enquire with you into the truth of that 
which is advanced from time to time1    
just because ,i do not know2 and when ,i
 have enquired1 ,i will say whether ,i  

agree with you or not4 ,please then to  
allow me time to reflect4  ,reflect1 he 
said4  ,i am reflecting1 ,i replied1 and
 discover that temperance1 or wisdom1 if
 implying a knowledge of anything1 must 
be a science1 and a science of          
something4  ,yes1 he said2 the science  
of itself4  ,is not medicine1 ,i said1  
the science of health8  ,true4  ,and    
suppose1 ,i said1 that ,i were asked by 
you what is the use or effect of        
medicine1 which is this science of      
health1 ,i should answer that medicine  
is of very great use in producing       
health1 which1 as you will admit1 is an 
excellent effect4  ,granted4  ,and if   
you were to ask me1 what is the result  
or effect of architecture1 which is the 
science of building1 ,i should say      
houses1 and so of other arts1 which all 
have their different results4 ,now ,i   
want you1 ,critias1 to answer a similar 
question about temperance1 or wisdom1   
which1 according to you1 is the science 
of itself4 ,admitting this view1 ,i ask 

of you1 what good work1 worthy of the   
name wise1 does temperance or wisdom1   
which is the science of itself1 effect8 
,answer me4  ,that is not the true way  
of pursuing the enquiry1 ,socrates1 he  
said2 for wisdom is not like the other  
sciences1 any more than they are like   
one another3 but you proceed as if they 
were alike4 ,for tell me1 he said1 what 
result is there of computation or       
geometry1 in the same sense as a house  
is the result of building1 or a garment 
of weaving1 or any other work of any    
other art8 ,can you show me any such    
result of them8 ,you cannot4  ,that is  
true1 ,i said2 but still each of these  
sciences has a subject which is         
different from the science4 ,i can show 
you that the art of computation has to  
do with odd and even numbers in their   
numerical relations to themselves and to
 each other4 ,is not that true8  ,yes1  
he said4  ,and the odd and even numbers 
are not the same with the art of        
computation8  ,they are not4  ,the art  

of weighing1 again1 has to do with      
lighter and heavier2 but the art of     
weighing is one thing1 and the heavy and
 the light another4 ,do you admit that8 
,yes4  ,now1 ,i want to know1 what is   
that which is not wisdom1 and of which  
wisdom is the science8  ,you are just   
falling into the old error1 ,socrates1  
he said4 ,you come asking in what wisdom
 or temperance differs from the other   
sciences1 and then you try to discover  
some respect in which they are alike2   
but they are not1 for all the other     
sciences are of something else1 and not 
of themselves2 wisdom alone is a science
 of other sciences1 and of itself4 ,and 
of this1 as ,i believe1 you are very    
well aware3 and that you are only doing 
what you denied that you were doing just
 now1 trying to refute me1 instead of   
pursuing the argument4  ,and what if ,i 
am8 ,how can you think that ,i have any 
other motive in refuting you but what ,i
 should have in examining into myself8  
which motive would be just a fear of my 

unconsciously fancying that ,i knew     
something of which ,i was ignorant4 ,and
 at this moment ,i pursue the argument  
chiefly for my own sake1 and perhaps in 
some degree also for the sake of my     
other friends4 ,for is not the discovery
 of things as they truly are1 a good    
common to all mankind8  ,yes1 certainly1
 ,socrates1 he said4  ,then1 ,i said1 be
 cheerful1 sweet sir1 and give your     
opinion in answer to the question which 
,i asked1 never minding whether ,critias
 or ,socrates is the person refuted2    
attend only to the argument1 and see    
what will come of the refutation4  ,i   
think that you are right1 he replied2   
and ,i will do as you say4  ,tell me1   
then1 ,i said1 what you mean to affirm  
about wisdom4  ,i mean to say that      
wisdom is the only science which is the 
science of itself as well as of the     
other sciences4  ,but the science of    
science1 ,i said1 will also be the      
science of the absence of science4      
,very true1 he said4  ,then the wise or 

temperate man1 and he only1 will know   
himself1 and be able to examine what he 
knows or does not know1 and to see what 
others know and think that they know and
 do really know2 and what they do not   
know1 and fancy that they know1 when    
they do not4 ,no other person will be   
able to do this4 ,and this is wisdom and
 temperance and self-knowledge--for a   
man to know what he knows1 and what he  
does not know4 ,that is your meaning8   
,yes1 he said4  ,now then1 ,i said1     
making an offering of the third or last 
argument to ,zeus the ,saviour1 let us  
begin again1 and ask1 in the first      
place1 whether it is or is not possible 
for a person to know that he knows and  
does not know what he knows and does not
 know2 and in the second place1 whether1
 if perfectly possible1 such knowledge  
is of any use4  ,that is what we have to
 consider1 he said4  ,and here1         
,critias1 ,i said1 ,i hope that you will
 find a way out of a difficulty into    
which ,i have got myself4 ,shall ,i tell

 you the nature of the difficulty8  ,by 
all means1 he replied4  ,does not what  
you have been saying1 if true1 amount to
 this3 that there must be a single      
science which is wholly a science of    
itself and of other sciences1 and that  
the same is also the science of the     
absence of science8  ,yes4  ,but        
consider how monstrous this proposition 
is1 my friend3 in any parallel case1 the
 impossibility will be transparent to   
you4  ,how is that8 and in what cases do
 you mean8  ,in such cases as this3     
,suppose that there is a kind of vision 
which is not like ordinary vision1 but a
 vision of itself and of other sorts of 
vision1 and of the defect of them1 which
 in seeing sees no colour1 but only     
itself and other sorts of vision3 ,do   
you think that there is such a kind of  
vision8  ,certainly not4  ,or is there a
 kind of hearing which hears no sound at
 all1 but only itself and other sorts of
 hearing1 or the defects of them8       
,there is not4  ,or take all the senses3

 can you imagine that there is any sense
 of itself and of other senses1 but     
which is incapable of perceiving the    
objects of the senses8  ,i think not4   
,could there be any desire which is not 
the desire of any pleasure1 but of      
itself1 and of all other desires8       
,certainly not4  ,or can you imagine a  
wish which wishes for no good1 but only 
for itself and all other wishes8  ,i    
should answer1 ,no4  ,or would you say  
that there is a love which is not the   
love of beauty1 but of itself and of    
other loves8  ,i should not4  ,or did   
you ever know of a fear which fears     
itself or other fears1 but has no object
 of fear8  ,i never did1 he said4  ,or  
of an opinion which is an opinion of    
itself and of other opinions1 and which 
has no opinion on the subjects of       
opinion in general8  ,certainly not4    
,but surely we are assuming a science of
 this kind1 which1 having no            
subject-matter1 is a science of itself  
and of the other sciences8  ,yes1 that  

is what is affirmed4  ,but how strange  
is this1 if it be indeed true3 we must  
not however as yet absolutely deny the  
possibility of such a science2 let us   
rather consider the matter4  ,you are   
quite right4  ,well then1 this science  
of which we are speaking is a science of
 something1 and is of a nature to be a  
science of something8  ,yes4  ,just as  
that which is greater is of a nature to 
be greater than something else8         
7,socrates is intending to show that    
science differs from the object of      
science1 as any other relative differs  
from the object of relation4 ,but where 
there is comparison--greater1 less1     
heavier1 lighter1 and the like--a       
relation to self as well as to other    
things involves an absolute             
contradiction2 and in other cases1 as in
 the case of the senses1 is hardly      
conceivable4 ,the use of the genitive   
after the comparative in ,greek1        
7,greek71 creates an unavoidable        
obscurity in the translation47  ,yes4   

,which is less1 if the other is         
conceived to be greater8  ,to be sure4  
,and if we could find something which is
 at once greater than itself1 and       
greater than other great things1 but not
 greater than those things in comparison
 of which the others are greater1 then  
that thing would have the property of   
being greater and also less than itself8
  ,that1 ,socrates1 he said1 is the     
inevitable inference4  ,or if there be a
 double which is double of itself and of
 other doubles1 these will be halves2   
for the double is relative to the half8 
,that is true4  ,and that which is      
greater than itself will also be less1  
and that which is heavier will also be  
lighter1 and that which is older will   
also be younger3 and the same of other  
things2 that which has a nature relative
 to self will retain also the nature of 
its object3 ,i mean to say1 for example1
 that hearing is1 as we say1 of sound or
 voice4 ,is that true8  ,yes4  ,then if 
hearing hears itself1 it must hear a    

voice2 for there is no other way of     
hearing4  ,certainly4  ,and sight also1 
my excellent friend1 if it sees itself  
must see a colour1 for sight cannot see 
that which has no colour4  ,no4  ,do you
 remark1 ,critias1 that in several of   
the examples which have been recited the
 notion of a relation to self is        
altogether inadmissible1 and in other   
cases hardly credible--inadmissible1 for
 example1 in the case of magnitudes1    
numbers1 and the like8  ,very true4     
,but in the case of hearing and sight1  
or in the power of self-motion1 and the 
power of heat to burn1 this relation to 
self will be regarded as incredible by  
some1 but perhaps not by others4 ,and   
some great man1 my friend1 is wanted1   
who will satisfactorily determine for   
us1 whether there is nothing which has  
an inherent property of relation to     
self1 or some things only and not       
others2 and whether in this class of    
self-related things1 if there be such a 
class1 that science which is called     

wisdom or temperance is included4 ,i    
altogether distrust my own power of     
determining these matters3 ,i am not    
certain whether there is such a science 
of science at all2 and even if there be1
 ,i should not acknowledge this to be   
wisdom or temperance1 until ,i can also 
see whether such a science would or     
would not do us any good2 for ,i have an
 impression that temperance is a benefit
 and a good4 ,and therefore1 ,o son of  
,callaeschrus1 as you maintain that     
temperance or wisdom is a science of    
science1 and also of the absence of     
science1 ,i will request you to show in 
the first place1 as ,i was saying       
before1 the possibility1 and in the     
second place1 the advantage1 of such a  
science2 and then perhaps you may       
satisfy me that you are right in your   
view of temperance4  ,critias heard me  
say this1 and saw that ,i was in a      
difficulty2 and as one person when      
another yawns in his presence catches   
the infection of yawning from him1 so   

did he seem to be driven into a         
difficulty by my difficulty4 ,but as he 
had a reputation to maintain1 he was    
ashamed to admit before the company that
 he could not answer my challenge or    
determine the question at issue2 and he 
made an unintelligible attempt to hide  
his perplexity4 ,in order that the      
argument might proceed1 ,i said to him1 
,well then ,critias1 if you like1 let us
 assume that there is this science of   
science2 whether the assumption is right
 or wrong may hereafter be investigated4
 ,admitting the existence of it1 will   
you tell me how such a science enables  
us to distinguish what we know or do not
 know1 which1 as we were saying1 is     
self-knowledge or wisdom3 so we were    
saying8  ,yes1 ,socrates1 he said2 and  
that ,i think is certainly true3 for he 
who has this science or knowledge which 
knows itself will become like the       
knowledge which he has1 in the same way 
that he who has swiftness will be swift1
 and he who has beauty will be          

beautiful1 and he who has knowledge will
 know4 ,in the same way he who has that 
knowledge which is self-knowing1 will   
know himself4  ,i do not doubt1 ,i said1
 that a man will know himself1 when he  
possesses that which has self-knowledge3
 but what necessity is there that1      
having this1 he should know what he     
knows and what he does not know8        
,because1 ,socrates1 they are the same4 
,very likely1 ,i said2 but ,i remain as 
stupid as ever2 for still ,i fail to    
comprehend how this knowing what you    
know and do not know is the same as the 
knowledge of self4  ,what do you mean8  
he said4  ,this is what ,i mean1 ,i     
replied3 ,i will admit that there is a  
science of science2--can this do more   
than determine that of two things one is
 and the other is not science or        
knowledge8  ,no1 just that4  ,but is    
knowledge or want of knowledge of health
 the same as knowledge or want of       
knowledge of justice8  ,certainly not4  
,the one is medicine1 and the other is  

politics2 whereas that of which we are  
speaking is knowledge pure and simple4  
,very true4  ,and if a man knows only1  
and has only knowledge of knowledge1 and
 has no further knowledge of health and 
justice1 the probability is that he will
 only know that he knows something1 and 
has a certain knowledge1 whether        
concerning himself or other men4  ,true4
  ,then how will this knowledge or      
science teach him to know what he knows8
 ,say that he knows health2--not wisdom 
or temperance1 but the art of medicine  
has taught it to him2--and he has       
learned harmony from the art of music1  
and building from the art of            
building1--neither1 from wisdom or      
temperance3 and the same of other       
things4  ,that is evident4  ,how will   
wisdom1 regarded only as a knowledge of 
knowledge or science of science1 ever   
teach him that he knows health1 or that 
he knows building8  ,it is impossible4  
,then he who is ignorant of these things
 will only know that he knows1 but not  

what he knows8  ,true4  ,then wisdom or 
being wise appears to be not the        
knowledge of the things which we do or  
do not know1 but only the knowledge that
 we know or do not know8  ,that is the  
inference4  ,then he who has this       
knowledge will not be able to examine   
whether a pretender knows or does not   
know that which he says that he knows3  
he will only know that he has a         
knowledge of some kind2 but wisdom will 
not show him of what the knowledge is8  
,plainly not4  ,neither will he be able 
to distinguish the pretender in medicine
 from the true physician1 nor between   
any other true and false professor of   
knowledge4 ,let us consider the matter  
in this way3 ,if the wise man or any    
other man wants to distinguish the true 
physician from the false1 how will he   
proceed8 ,he will not talk to him about 
medicine2 and that1 as we were saying1  
is the only thing which the physician   
understands4  ,true4  ,and1 on the other
 hand1 the physician knows nothing of   

science1 for this has been assumed to be
 the province of wisdom4  ,true4  ,and  
further1 since medicine is science1 we  
must infer that he does not know        
anything of medicine4  ,exactly4  ,then 
the wise man may indeed know that the   
physician has some kind of science or   
knowledge2 but when he wants to discover
 the nature of this he will ask1 ,what  
is the subject-matter8 ,for the several 
sciences are distinguished not by the   
mere fact that they are sciences1 but by
 the nature of their subjects4 ,is not  
that true8  ,quite true4  ,and medicine 
is distinguished from other sciences as 
having the subject-matter of health and 
disease8  ,yes4  ,and he who would      
enquire into the nature of medicine must
 pursue the enquiry into health and     
disease1 and not into what is           
extraneous8  ,true4  ,and he who judges 
rightly will judge of the physician as a
 physician in what relates to these8    
,he will4  ,he will consider whether    
what he says is true1 and whether what  

he does is right1 in relation to health 
and disease8  ,he will4  ,but can any   
one attain the knowledge of either      
unless he have a knowledge of medicine8 
,he cannot4  ,no one at all1 it would   
seem1 except the physician can have this
 knowledge2 and therefore not the wise  
man2 he would have to be a physician as 
well as a wise man4  ,very true4  ,then1
 assuredly1 wisdom or temperance1 if    
only a science of science1 and of the   
absence of science or knowledge1 will   
not be able to distinguish the physician
 who knows from one who does not know   
but pretends or thinks that he knows1 or
 any other professor of anything at all2
 like any other artist1 he will only    
know his fellow in art or wisdom1 and no
 one else4  ,that is evident1 he said4  
,but then what profit1 ,critias1 ,i     
said1 is there any longer in wisdom or  
temperance which yet remains1 if this is
 wisdom8 ,if1 indeed1 as we were        
supposing at first1 the wise man had    
been able to distinguish what he knew   

and did not know1 and that he knew the  
one and did not know the other1 and to  
recognize a similar faculty of          
discernment in others1 there would      
certainly have been a great advantage in
 being wise2 for then we should never   
have made a mistake1 but have passed    
through life the unerring guides of     
ourselves and of those who are under us2
 and we should not have attempted to do 
what we did not know1 but we should have
 found out those who knew1 and have     
handed the business over to them and    
trusted in them2 nor should we have     
allowed those who were under us to do   
anything which they were not likely to  
do well2 and they would be likely to do 
well just that of which they had        
knowledge2 and the house or state which 
was ordered or administered under the   
guidance of wisdom1 and everything else 
of which wisdom was the lord1 would have
 been well ordered2 for truth guiding1  
and error having been eliminated1 in all
 their doings1 men would have done well1

 and would have been happy4 ,was not    
this1 ,critias1 what we spoke of as the 
great advantage of wisdom--to know what 
is known and what is unknown to us8     
,very true1 he said4  ,and now you      
perceive1 ,i said1 that no such science 
is to be found anywhere4  ,i perceive1  
he said4  ,may we assume then1 ,i said1 
that wisdom1 viewed in this new light   
merely as a knowledge of knowledge and  
ignorance1 has this advantage3--that he 
who possesses such knowledge will more  
easily learn anything which he learns2  
and that everything will be clearer to  
him1 because1 in addition to the        
knowledge of individuals1 he sees the   
science1 and this also will better      
enable him to test the knowledge which  
others have of what he knows himself2   
whereas the enquirer who is without this
 knowledge may be supposed to have a    
feebler and weaker insight8 ,are not    
these1 my friend1 the real advantages   
which are to be gained from wisdom8 ,and
 are not we looking and seeking after   

something more than is to be found in   
her8  ,that is very likely1 he said4    
,that is very likely1 ,i said2 and very 
likely1 too1 we have been enquiring to  
no purpose2 as ,i am led to infer1      
because ,i observe that if this is      
wisdom1 some strange consequences would 
follow4 ,let us1 if you please1 assume  
the possibility of this science of      
sciences1 and further admit and allow1  
as was originally suggested1 that wisdom
 is the knowledge of what we know and do
 not know4 ,assuming all this1 still1   
upon further consideration1 ,i am       
doubtful1 ,critias1 whether wisdom1 such
 as this1 would do us much good4 ,for we
 were wrong1 ,i think1 in supposing1 as 
we were saying just now1 that such      
wisdom ordering the government of house 
or state would be a great benefit4  ,how
 so8 he said4  ,why1 ,i said1 we were   
far too ready to admit the great        
benefits which mankind would obtain from
 their severally doing the things which 
they knew1 and committing the things of 

which they are ignorant to those who    
were better acquainted with them4  ,were
 we not right in making that admission8 
,i think not4  ,how very strange1       
,socrates6  ,by the dog of ,egypt1 ,i   
said1 there ,i agree with you2 and ,i   
was thinking as much just now when ,i   
said that strange consequences would    
follow1 and that ,i was afraid we were  
on the wrong track2 for however ready we
 may be to admit that this is wisdom1 ,i
 certainly cannot make out what good    
this sort of thing does to us4  ,what do
 you mean8 he said2 ,i wish that you    
could make me understand what you mean4 
,i dare say that what ,i am saying is   
nonsense1 ,i replied2 and yet if a man  
has any feeling of what is due to       
himself1 he cannot let the thought which
 comes into his mind pass away unheeded 
and unexamined4  ,i like that1 he said4 
,hear1 then1 ,i said1 my own dream2     
whether coming through the horn or the  
ivory gate1 ,i cannot tell4 ,the dream  
is this3 ,let us suppose that wisdom is 

such as we are now defining1 and that   
she has absolute sway over us2 then each
 action will be done according to the   
arts or sciences1 and no one professing 
to be a pilot when he is not1 or any    
physician or general1 or any one else   
pretending to know matters of which he  
is ignorant1 will deceive or elude us2  
our health will be improved2 our safety 
at sea1 and also in battle1 will be     
assured2 our coats and shoes1 and all   
other instruments and implements will be
 skilfully made1 because the workmen    
will be good and true4 ,aye1 and if you 
please1 you may suppose that prophecy1  
which is the knowledge of the future1   
will be under the control of wisdom1 and
 that she will deter deceivers and set  
up the true prophets in their place as  
the revealers of the future4 ,now ,i    
quite agree that mankind1 thus provided1
 would live and act according to        
knowledge1 for wisdom would watch and   
prevent ignorance from intruding on us4 
,but whether by acting according to     

knowledge we shall act well and be      
happy1 my dear ,critias1--this is a     
point which we have not yet been able to
 determine4  ,yet ,i think1 he replied1 
that if you discard knowledge1 you will 
hardly find the crown of happiness in   
anything else4  ,but of what is this    
knowledge8 ,i said4 ,just answer me that
 small question4 ,do you mean a         
knowledge of shoemaking8  ,god forbid4  
,or of working in brass8  ,certainly    
not4  ,or in wool1 or wood1 or anything 
of that sort8  ,no1 ,i do not4  ,then1  
,i said1 we are giving up the doctrine  
that he who lives according to knowledge
 is happy1 for these live according to  
knowledge1 and yet they are not allowed 
by you to be happy2 but ,i think that   
you mean to confine happiness to        
particular individuals who live         
according to knowledge1 such for example
 as the prophet1 who1 as ,i was saying1 
knows the future4 ,is it of him you are 
speaking or of some one else8  ,yes1 ,i 
mean him1 but there are others as well4 

,yes1 ,i said1 some one who knows the   
past and present as well as the future1 
and is ignorant of nothing4 ,let us     
suppose that there is such a person1 and
 if there is1 you will allow that he is 
the most knowing of all living men4     
,certainly he is4  ,yet ,i should like  
to know one thing more3 which of the    
different kinds of knowledge makes him  
happy8 or do all equally make him happy8
  ,not all equally1 he replied4  ,but   
which most tends to make him happy8 the 
knowledge of what past1 present1 or     
future thing8 ,may ,i infer this to be  
the knowledge of the game of draughts8  
,nonsense about the game of draughts4   
,or of computation8  ,no4  ,or of       
health8  ,that is nearer the truth1 he  
said4  ,and that knowledge which is     
nearest of all1 ,i said1 is the         
knowledge of what8  ,the knowledge with 
which he discerns good and evil4        
,monster6 ,i said2 you have been        
carrying me round in a circle1 and all  
this time hiding from me the fact that  

the life according to knowledge is not  
that which makes men act rightly and be 
happy1 not even if knowledge include all
 the sciences1 but one science only1    
that of good and evil4 ,for1 let me ask 
you1 ,critias1 whether1 if you take away
 this1 medicine will not equally give   
health1 and shoemaking equally produce  
shoes1 and the art of the weaver        
clothes8--whether the art of the pilot  
will not equally save our lives at sea1 
and the art of the general in war8      
,quite so4  ,and yet1 my dear ,critias1 
none of these things will be well or    
beneficially done1 if the science of the
 good be wanting4  ,true4  ,but that    
science is not wisdom or temperance1 but
 a science of human advantage2 not a    
science of other sciences1 or of        
ignorance1 but of good and evil3 and if 
this be of use1 then wisdom or          
temperance will not be of use4  ,and    
why1 he replied1 will not wisdom be of  
use8 ,for1 however much we assume that  
wisdom is a science of sciences1 and has

 a sway over other sciences1 surely she 
will have this particular science of the
 good under her control1 and in this way
 will benefit us4  ,and will wisdom give
 health8 ,i said2 is not this rather the
 effect of medicine8 ,or does wisdom do 
the work of any of the other arts1--do  
they not each of them do their own work8
 ,have we not long ago asseverated that 
wisdom is only the knowledge of         
knowledge and of ignorance1 and of      
nothing else8  ,that is obvious4  ,then 
wisdom will not be the producer of      
health4  ,certainly not4  ,the art of   
health is different4  ,yes1 different4  
,nor does wisdom give advantage1 my good
 friend2 for that again we have just now
 been attributing to another art4  ,very
 true4  ,how then can wisdom be         
advantageous1 when giving no advantage8 
,that1 ,socrates1 is certainly          
inconceivable4  ,you see then1 ,critias1
 that ,i was not far wrong in fearing   
that ,i could have no sound notion about
 wisdom2 ,i was quite right in          

depreciating myself2 for that which is  
admitted to be the best of all things   
would never have seemed to us useless1  
if ,i had been good for anything at an  
enquiry4 ,but now ,i have been utterly  
defeated1 and have failed to discover   
what that is to which the imposer of    
names gave this name of temperance or   
wisdom4 ,and yet many more admissions   
were made by us than could be fairly    
granted2 for we admitted that there was 
a science of science1 although the      
argument said ,no1 and protested against
 us2 and we admitted further1 that this 
science knew the works of the other     
sciences 7although this too was denied  
by the argument71 because we wanted to  
show that the wise man had knowledge of 
what he knew and did not know2 also we  
nobly disregarded1 and never even       
considered1 the impossibility of a man  
knowing in a sort of way that which he  
does not know at all2 for our assumption
 was1 that he knows that which he does  
not know2 than which nothing1 as ,i     

think1 can be more irrational4 ,and yet1
 after finding us so easy and           
good-natured1 the enquiry is still      
unable to discover the truth2 but mocks 
us to a degree1 and has gone out of its 
way to prove the inutility of that which
 we admitted only by a sort of          
supposition and fiction to be the true  
definition of temperance or wisdom3     
which result1 as far as ,i am concerned1
 is not so much to be lamented1 ,i said4
 ,but for your sake1 ,charmides1 ,i am  
very sorry--that you1 having such beauty
 and such wisdom and temperance of soul1
 should have no profit or good in life  
from your wisdom and temperance4 ,and   
still more am ,i grieved about the charm
 which ,i learned with so much pain1 and
 to so little profit1 from the          
,thracian1 for the sake of a thing which
 is nothing worth4 ,i think indeed that 
there is a mistake1 and that ,i must be 
a bad enquirer1 for wisdom or temperance
 ,i believe to be really a great good2  
and happy are you1 ,charmides1 if you   

certainly possess it4 ,wherefore examine
 yourself1 and see whether you have this
 gift and can do without the charm2 for 
if you can1 ,i would rather advise you  
to regard me simply as a fool who is    
never able to reason out anything2 and  
to rest assured that the more wise and  
temperate you are1 the happier you will 
be4  ,charmides said3 ,i am sure that ,i
 do not know1 ,socrates1 whether ,i have
 or have not this gift of wisdom and    
temperance2 for how can ,i know whether 
,i have a thing1 of which even you and  
,critias are1 as you say1 unable to     
discover the nature8--7not that ,i      
believe you47 ,and further1 ,i am sure1 
,socrates1 that ,i do need the charm1   
and as far as ,i am concerned1 ,i shall 
be willing to be charmed by you daily1  
until you say that ,i have had enough4  
,very good1 ,charmides1 said ,critias2  
if you do this ,i shall have a proof of 
your temperance1 that is1 if you allow  
yourself to be charmed by ,socrates1 and
 never desert him at all4  ,you may     

depend on my following and not deserting
 him1 said ,charmides3 if you who are my
 guardian command me1 ,i should be very 
wrong not to obey you4  ,and ,i do      
command you1 he said4  ,then ,i will do 
as you say1 and begin this very day4    
,you sirs1 ,i said1 what are you        
conspiring about8  ,we are not          
conspiring1 said ,charmides1 we have    
conspired already4  ,and are you about  
to use violence1 without even going     
through the forms of justice8  ,yes1 ,i 
shall use violence1 he replied1 since he
 orders me2 and therefore you had better
 consider well4  ,but the time for      
consideration has passed1 ,i said1 when 
violence is employed2 and you1 when you 
are determined on anything1 and in the  
mood of violence1 are irresistible4  ,do
 not you resist me then1 he said4  ,i   
will not resist you1 ,i replied4