,,lysis ,by ,plato ,translated by ,benjamin ,jowett ,,introduction4 ,no answer is given in the ,lysis to the question1 ',what is ,friendship8' any more than in the ,charmides to the question1 ',what is ,temperance8' ,there are several resemblances in the two ,dialogues3 the same youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them2 they are alike rich in the description of ,greek life4 ,the question is again raised of the relation of knowledge to virtue and good1 which also recurs in the ,laches2 and ,socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys1 ,lysis and ,menexenus4 ,in the ,charmides1 as also in the ,laches1 he is described as middle-aged2 in the ,lysis he is advanced in years4 ,the ,dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no relation to each other4 ,the first is a conversation between ,socrates and ,lysis1 who1 like ,charmides1 is an ,athenian youth of noble descent and of great beauty1 goodness1 and intelligence3 this is carried on in the absence of ,menexenus1 who is called away to take part in a sacrifice4 ,socrates asks ,lysis whether his father and mother do not love him very much8 ',to be sure they do4' ',then of course they allow him to do exactly as he likes4' ',of course not3 the very slaves have more liberty than he has4' ',but how is this8' ',the reason is that he is not old enough4' ',no2 the real reason is that he is not wise enough3 for are there not some things which he is allowed to do1 although he is not allowed to do others8' ',yes1 because he knows them1 and does not know the others4' ,this leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows1 but not in what he does not know2 for in such matters he will be unprofitable to them1 and do them no good4 ,and no one will love him1 if he does them no good2 and he can only do them good by knowledge2 and as he is still without knowledge1 he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge4 ,in this manner ,socrates reads a lesson to ,hippothales1 the foolish lover of ,lysis1 respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his beloved4 ,after the return of ,menexenus1 ,socrates1 at the request of ,lysis1 asks him a new question3 ',what is friendship8 ,you1 ,menexenus1 who have a friend already1 can tell me1 who am always longing to find one1 what is the secret of this great blessing4' ,when one man loves another1 which is the friend--he who loves1 or he who is loved8 ,or are both friends8 ,from the first of these suppositions they are driven to the second2 and from the second to the third2 and neither the two boys nor ,socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with all of them4 ,socrates turns to the poets1 who affirm that ,god brings like to like 7,homer71 and to philosophers 7,empedocles71 who also assert that like is the friend of like4 ,but the bad are not friends1 for they are not even like themselves1 and still less are they like one another4 ,and the good have no need of one another1 and therefore do not care about one another4 ,moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion1 and unlikeness of love and friendship2 and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines2 for ,hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter1 bard of bard2' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry1 hot of cold1' and the like4 ,but neither can their doctrine be maintained2 for then the just would be the friend of the unjust1 good of evil4 ,thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like1 nor unlike of unlike2 and therefore good is not the friend of good1 nor evil of evil1 nor good of evil1 nor evil of good4 ,what remains but that the indifferent1 which is neither good nor evil1 should be the friend 7not of the indifferent1 for that would be 'like the friend of like1' but7 of the good1 or rather of the beautiful8 ,but why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good8 ,there are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural4 ,suppose the indifferent1 say the human body1 to be desirous of getting rid of some evil1 such as disease1 which is not essential but only accidental to it 7for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be indifferent1 and would become evil7--in such a case the indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil4 ,in this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of wisdom stands3 he is not wise1 and yet not unwise1 but he has ignorance accidentally clinging to him1 and he yearns for wisdom as the cure of the evil4 7,symp47 ,after this explanation has been received with triumphant accord1 a fresh dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of ,socrates3 ,must not friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end8 and what can that final cause or end of friendship be1 other than the good8 ,but the good is desired by us only as the cure of evil2 and therefore if there were no evil there would be no friendship4 ,some other explanation then has to be devised4 ,may not desire be the source of friendship8 ,and desire is of what a man wants and of what is congenial to him4 ,but then the congenial cannot be the same as the like2 for like1 as has been already shown1 cannot be the friend of like4 ,nor can the congenial be the good2 for good is not the friend of good1 as has been also shown4 ,the problem is unsolved1 and the three friends1 ,socrates1 ,lysis1 and ,menexenus1 are still unable to find out what a friend is4 ,thus1 as in the ,charmides and ,laches1 and several of the other ,dialogues of ,plato 7compare especially the ,protagoras and ,theaetetus71 no conclusion is arrived at4 ,socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing2' but the boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them1 and they are free from the conceit of knowledge4 7,compare ,chrm47 ,the dialogue is what would be called in the language of ,thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive4 ,the subject is continued in the ,phaedrus and ,symposium1 and treated1 with a manifest reference to the ,lysis1 in the eighth and ninth books of the ,nicomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle4 ,as in other writings of ,plato 7for example1 the ,republic71 there is a progress from unconscious morality1 illustrated by the friendship of the two youths1 and also by the sayings of the poets 7'who are our fathers in wisdom1' and yet only tell us half the truth1 and in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the philosophers71 to a more comprehensive notion of friendship4 ,this1 however1 is far from being cleared of its perplexity4 ,two notions appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of ,socrates3--,first1 the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants2 ,secondly1 that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good4 ,that friends are not necessarily either like or unlike1 is also a truth confirmed by experience4 ,but the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is too strictly limited2 ,socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition of friendship would be able to stand4 ,in the course of the argument he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution to the science of logic4 ,some higher truths appear through the mist4 ,the manner in which the field of argument is widened1 as in the ,charmides and ,laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge1 so here by the introduction of the good1 is deserving of attention4 ,the sense of the inter-dependence of good and evil1 and the allusion to the possibility of the non-existence of evil1 are also very remarkable4 ,the dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments4 ,observe1 first1 the scene1 which is a ,greek ,palaestra1 at a time when a sacrifice is going on1 and the ,hermaea are in course of celebration2 secondly1 the 'accustomed irony' of ,socrates1 who declares1 as in the ,symposium1 that he is ignorant of all other things1 but claims to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love4 ,there are likewise several contrasts of character2 first of the dry1 caustic ,ctesippus1 of whom ,socrates professes a humorous sort of fear1 and ,hippothales the flighty lover1 who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved2 there is also a contrast between the false1 exaggerated1 sentimental love of ,hippothales towards ,lysis1 and the childlike and innocent friendship of the boys with one another4 ,some difference appears to be intended between the characters of the more talkative ,menexenus and the reserved and simple ,lysis4 ,socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony1 which is sometimes adopted in talking to children1 and consists in asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the question3 ',your father and mother of course allow you to drive the chariot8' ',no they do not4' ,when ,menexenus returns1 the serious dialectic begins4 ,he is described as 'very pugnacious1' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument4 ,but ,plato has not forgotten dramatic propriety1 and ,socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some older person4 ,,some ,,questions ,,relating ,,to ,,friendship4 ,the subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the ancient world1 partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love and marriage4 ,the very meaning of the word has become slighter and more superficial2 it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients1 and has nearly disappeared in modern treatises on ,moral ,philosophy4 ,the received examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the ,greeks and ,romans4 ,hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern times4 ,many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed in the ,lysis4 ,we may ask with ,socrates1 #a7 whether friendship is 'of similars or dissimilars1' or of both2 #b7 whether such a tie exists between the good only and for the sake of the good2 or #c7 whether there may not be some peculiar attraction1 which draws together 'the neither good nor evil' for the sake of the good and because of the evil2 #d7 whether friendship is always mutual1--may there not be a one-sided and unrequited friendship8 ,this question1 which1 like many others1 is only one of a laxer or stricter use of words1 seems to have greatly exercised the minds both of ,aristotle and ,plato4 #e7 ,can we expect friendship to be permanent1 or must we acknowledge with ,cicero1 ',nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae permanere'8 ,is not friendship1 even more than love1 liable to be swayed by the caprices of fancy8 ,the person who pleased us most at first sight or upon a slight acquaintance1 when we have seen him again1 and under different circumstances1 may make a much less favourable impression on our minds4 ,young people swear 'eternal friendships1' but at these innocent perjuries their elders laugh4 ,no one forms a friendship with the intention of renouncing it2 yet in the course of a varied life it is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling1 opinion1 locality1 occupation1 fortune1 which will divide us from some persons and unite us to others4 #f7 ,there is an ancient saying1 ,qui amicos amicum non habet4 ,but is not some less exclusive form of friendship better suited to the condition and nature of man8 ,and in those especially who have no family ties1 may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few1 and embrace all with whom we come into contact1 and1 perhaps in a few passionate and exalted natures1 all men everywhere8 #g7 ,the ancients had their three kinds of friendship1 'for the sake of the pleasant1 the useful1 and the good3' is the last to be resolved into the two first2 or are the two first to be included in the last8 ,the subject was puzzling to them3 they could not say that friendship was only a quality1 or a relation1 or a virtue1 or a kind of virtue2 and they had not in the age of ,plato reached the point of regarding it1 like justice1 as a form or attribute of virtue4 ,they had another perplexity3 #h7 ,how could one of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most detestable corruptions of it8 7,compare ,symposium2 ,laws74 ,leaving the ,greek or ancient point of view1 we may regard the question in a more general way4 ,friendship is the union of two persons in mutual affection and remembrance of one another4 ,the friend can do for his friend what he cannot do for himself4 ,he can give him counsel in time of difficulty2 he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'2 he can stand by him1 when all the world are against him2 he can gladden and enlighten him by his presence2 he 'can divide his sorrows1' he can 'double his joys2' he can anticipate his wants4 ,he will discover ways of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority2 he will find out his mental trials1 but only that he may minister to them4 ,among true friends jealousy has no place3 they do not complain of one another for making new friends1 or for not revealing some secret of their lives2 7in friendship too there must be reserves27 they do not intrude upon one another1 and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either of them1 though it may be to the loss of the other4 ,they may live apart and have little intercourse1 but when they meet1 the old tie is as strong as ever--according to the common saying1 they find one another always the same4 ,the greatest good of friendship is not daily intercourse1 for circumstances rarely admit of this2 but on the great occasions of life1 when the advice of a friend is needed1 then the word spoken in season about conduct1 about health1 about marriage1 about business1--the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value4 ,when the heart is failing and despair is setting in1 then to hear the voice or grasp the hand of a friend1 in a shipwreck1 in a defeat1 in some other failure or misfortune1 may restore the necessary courage and composure to the paralysed and disordered mind1 and convert the feeble person into a hero2 7compare ,symposium74 ,it is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing3 either we expect too much from them2 or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in repair2' or being admitted to intimacy with another1 we see his faults too clearly and lose our respect for him2 and he loses his affection for us4 ,friendships may be too violent2 and they may be too sensitive4 ,the egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the other4 ,the word of counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively1 at the wrong time1 or in the wrong manner2 or the need of it has not been perceived until too late4 ',oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of many a troubled soul4 ,and some things have to be indicated rather than spoken1 because the very mention of them tends to disturb the equability of friendship4 ,the alienation of friends1 like many other human evils1 is commonly due to a want of tact and insight4 ,there is not enough of the ,scimus et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim4 ,the sweet draught of sympathy is not inexhaustible2 and it tends to weaken the person who too freely partakes of it4 ,thus we see that there are many causes which impair the happiness of friends4 ,we may expect a friendship almost divine1 such as philosophers have sometimes dreamed of3 we find what is human4 ,the good of it is necessarily limited2 it does not take the place of marriage2 it affords rather a solace than an arm of support4 ,it had better not be based on pecuniary obligations2 these more often mar than make a friendship4 ,it is most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and independent1 or when they are engaged together in some common work or have some public interest in common4 ,it exists among the bad or inferior sort of men almost as much as among the good2 the bad and good1 and 'the neither bad nor good1' are drawn together in a strange manner by personal attachment4 ,the essence of it is loyalty1 without which it would cease to be friendship4 ,another question #i7 may be raised1 whether friendship can safely exist between young persons of different sexes1 not connected by ties of relationship1 and without the thought of love or marriage2 whether1 again1 a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend1 besides his or her partner in marriage4 ,the answer to this latter question is rather perplexing1 and would probably be different in different countries 7compare ,sympos474 ,while we do not deny that great good may result from such attachments1 for the mind may be drawn out and the character enlarged by them2 yet we feel also that they are attended with many dangers1 and that this ,romance of ,heavenly ,love requires a strength1 a freedom from passion1 a self-control1 which1 in youth especially1 are rarely to be found4 ,the propriety of such friendships must be estimated a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them2 they must be reconciled with the ordinary duties of life2 and they must be justified by the result4 ,yet another question1 #aj74 ,admitting that friendships cannot be always permanent1 we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be dissolved4 ,it would be futile to retain the name when the reality has ceased to be4 ,that two friends should part company whenever the relation between them begins to drag may be better for both of them4 ,but then arises the consideration1 how should these friends in youth or friends of the past regard or be regarded by one another8 ,they are parted1 but there still remain duties mutually owing by them4 ,they will not admit the world to share in their difference any more than in their friendship2 the memory of an old attachment1 like the memory of the dead1 has a kind of sacredness for them on which they will not allow others to intrude4 ,neither1 if they were ever worthy to bear the name of friends1 will either of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the other who was once so much to him4 ,neither will he by 'shadowed hint reveal' the secrets great or small which an unfortunate mistake has placed within his reach4 ,he who is of a noble mind will dwell upon his own faults rather than those of another1 and will be ready to take upon himself the blame of their separation4 ,he will feel pain at the loss of a friend2 and he will remember with gratitude his ancient kindness4 ,but he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been lightly broken444,these are a few of the ,problems of ,friendship1 some of them suggested by the ,lysis1 others by modern life1 which he who wishes to make or keep a friend may profitably study4 7,compare ,bacon1 ,essay on ,friendship2 ,cic4 de ,amicitia47 ,,lysis1 ,,or ,,friendship ,,persons ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue3 ,socrates1 who is the narrator1 ,menexenus1 ,hippothales1 ,lysis1 ,ctesippus4 ,,scene3 ,a newly-erected ,palaestra outside the walls of ,athens4 ,i was going from the ,academy straight to the ,lyceum1 intending to take the outer road1 which is close under the wall4 ,when ,i came to the postern gate of the city1 which is by the fountain of ,panops1 ,i fell in with ,hippothales1 the son of ,hieronymus1 and ,ctesippus the ,paeanian1 and a company of young men who were standing with them4 ,hippothales1 seeing me approach1 asked whence ,i came and whither ,i was going4 ,i am going1 ,i replied1 from the ,academy straight to the ,lyceum4 ,then come straight to us1 he said1 and put in here2 you may as well4 ,who are you1 ,i said2 and where am ,i to come8 ,he showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall4 ,and there1 he said1 is the building at which we all meet3 and a goodly company we are4 ,and what is this building1 ,i asked2 and what sort of entertainment have you8 ,the building1 he replied1 is a newly erected ,palaestra2 and the entertainment is generally conversation1 to which you are welcome4 ,thank you1 ,i said2 and is there any teacher there8 ,yes1 he said1 your old friend and admirer1 ,miccus4 ,indeed1 ,i replied2 he is a very eminent professor4 ,are you disposed1 he said1 to go with me and see them8 ,yes1 ,i said2 but ,i should like to know first1 what is expected of me1 and who is the favourite among you8 ,some persons have one favourite1 ,socrates1 and some another1 he said4 ,and who is yours8 ,i asked3 tell me that1 ,hippothales4 ,at this he blushed2 and ,i said to him1 ,o ,hippothales1 thou son of ,hieronymus6 do not say that you are1 or that you are not1 in love2 the confession is too late2 for ,i see that you are not only in love1 but are already far gone in your love4 ,simple and foolish as ,i am1 the ,gods have given me the power of understanding affections of this kind4 ,whereupon he blushed more and more4 ,ctesippus said3 ,i like to see you blushing1 ,hippothales1 and hesitating to tell ,socrates the name2 when1 if he were with you but for a very short time1 you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else4 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 he has literally deafened us1 and stopped our ears with the praises of ,lysis2 and if he is a little intoxicated1 there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of ,lysis4 ,his performances in prose are bad enough1 but nothing at all in comparison with his verse2 and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions1 it is really too bad2 and worse still is his manner of singing them to his love2 he has a voice which is truly appalling1 and we cannot help hearing him3 and now having a question put to him by you1 behold he is blushing4 ,who is ,lysis8 ,i said3 ,i suppose that he must be young2 for the name does not recall any one to me4 ,why1 he said1 his father being a very well-known man1 he retains his patronymic1 and is not as yet commonly called by his own name2 but1 although you do not know his name1 ,i am sure that you must know his face1 for that is quite enough to distinguish him4 ,but tell me whose son he is1 ,i said4 ,he is the eldest son of ,democrates1 of the deme of ,aexone4 ,ah1 ,hippothales1 ,i said2 what a noble and really perfect love you have found6 ,i wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company1 and then ,i shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love1 either to the youth himself1 or to others4 ,nay1 ,socrates1 he said2 you surely do not attach any importance to what he is saying4 ,do you mean1 ,i said1 that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love8 ,no2 but ,i deny that ,i make verses or address compositions to him4 ,he is not in his right mind1 said ,ctesippus2 he is talking nonsense1 and is stark mad4 ,o ,hippothales1 ,i said1 if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour of your favourite1 ,i do not want to hear them2 but ,i want to know the purport of them1 that ,i may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one4 ,ctesippus will be able to tell you1 he said2 for if1 as he avers1 the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears1 he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them4 ,yes1 indeed1 said ,ctesippus2 ,i know only too well2 and very ridiculous the tale is3 for although he is a lover1 and very devotedly in love1 he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say4 ,now is not that ridiculous8 ,he can only speak of the wealth of ,democrates1 which the whole city celebrates1 and grandfather ,lysis1 and the other ancestors of the youth1 and their stud of horses1 and their victory at the ,pythian games1 and at the ,isthmus1 and at ,nemea with four horses and single horses--these are the tales which he composes and repeats4 ,and there is greater twaddle still4 ,only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of ,heracles1 who was a connexion of the family1 setting forth how in virtue of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of ,lysis2 this ancestor was himself begotten of ,zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme4 ,and these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us1 and we are obliged to listen to him4 ,when ,i heard this1 ,i said3 ,o ridiculous ,hippothales6 how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won8 ,but my songs and verses1 he said1 are not in honour of myself1 ,socrates4 ,you think not8 ,i said4 ,nay1 but what do you think8 he replied4 ,most assuredly1 ,i said1 those songs are all in your own honour2 for if you win your beautiful love1 your discourses and songs will be a glory to you1 and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who have conquered and won such a love2 but if he slips away from you1 the more you have praised him1 the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings2 and therefore the wise lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him1 because he is afraid of accidents4 ,there is also another danger2 the fair1 when any one praises or magnifies them1 are filled with the spirit of pride and vain-glory4 ,do you not agree with me8 ,yes1 he said4 ,and the more vain-glorious they are1 the more difficult is the capture of them8 ,i believe you4 ,what should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey1 and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult8 ,he would be a bad hunter1 undoubtedly4 ,yes2 and if1 instead of soothing them1 he were to infuriate them with words and songs1 that would show a great want of wit3 do you not agree4 ,yes4 ,and now reflect1 ,hippothales1 and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry4 ,for ,i can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry4 ,assuredly not1 he said2 such a poet would be a fool4 ,and this is the reason why ,i take you into my counsels1 ,socrates1 and ,i shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer4 ,will you tell me by what words or actions ,i may become endeared to my love8 ,that is not easy to determine1 ,i said2 but if you will bring your love to me1 and will let me talk with him1 ,i may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him1 instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused4 ,there will be no difficulty in bringing him1 he replied2 if you will only go with ,ctesippus into the ,palaestra1 and sit down and talk1 ,i believe that he will come of his own accord2 for he is fond of listening1 ,socrates4 ,and as this is the festival of the ,hermaea1 the young men and boys are all together1 and there is no separation between them4 ,he will be sure to come3 but if he does not1 ,ctesippus with whom he is familiar1 and whose relation ,menexenus is his great friend1 shall call him4 ,that will be the way1 ,i said4 ,thereupon ,i led ,ctesippus into the ,palaestra1 and the rest followed4 ,upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing2 and this part of the festival was nearly at an end4 ,they were all in their white array1 and games at dice were going on among them4 ,most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves2 but some were in a corner of the ,apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice1 which they took out of little wicker baskets4 ,there was also a circle of lookers-on2 among them was ,lysis4 ,he was standing with the other boys and youths1 having a crown upon his head1 like a fair vision1 and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty4 ,we left them1 and went over to the opposite side of the room1 where1 finding a quiet place1 we sat down2 and then we began to talk4 ,this attracted ,lysis1 who was constantly turning round to look at us--he was evidently wanting to come to us4 ,for a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone2 but first of all1 his friend ,menexenus1 leaving his play1 entered the ,palaestra from the court1 and when he saw ,ctesippus and myself1 was going to take a seat by us2 and then ,lysis1 seeing him1 followed1 and sat down by his side2 and the other boys joined4 ,i should observe that ,hippothales1 when he saw the crowd1 got behind them1 where he thought that he would be out of sight of ,lysis1 lest he should anger him2 and there he stood and listened4 ,i turned to ,menexenus1 and said3 ,son of ,demophon1 which of you two youths is the elder8 ,that is a matter of dispute between us1 he said4 ,and which is the nobler8 ,is that also a matter of dispute8 ,yes1 certainly4 ,and another disputed point is1 which is the fairer8 ,the two boys laughed4 ,i shall not ask which is the richer of the two1 ,i said2 for you are friends1 are you not8 ,certainly1 they replied4 ,and friends have all things in common1 so that one of you can be no richer than the other1 if you say truly that you are friends4 ,they assented4 ,i was about to ask which was the juster of the two1 and which was the wiser of the two2 but at this moment ,menexenus was called away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him4 ,i supposed that he had to offer sacrifice4 ,so he went away1 and ,i asked ,lysis some more questions4 ,i dare say1 ,lysis1 ,i said1 that your father and mother love you very much4 ,certainly1 he said4 ,and they would wish you to be perfectly happy4 ,yes4 ,but do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave1 and who cannot do what he likes8 ,i should think not indeed1 he said4 ,and if your father and mother love you1 and desire that you should be happy1 no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness4 ,certainly1 he replied4 ,and do they then permit you to do what you like1 and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire8 ,yes1 indeed1 ,socrates2 there are a great many things which they hinder me from doing4 ,what do you mean8 ,i said4 ,do they want you to be happy1 and yet hinder you from doing what you like8 for example1 if you want to mount one of your father's chariots1 and take the reins at a race1 they will not allow you to do so--they will prevent you8 ,certainly1 he said1 they will not allow me to do so4 ,whom then will they allow8 ,there is a charioteer1 whom my father pays for driving4 ,and do they trust a hireling more than you8 and may he do what he likes with the horses8 and do they pay him for this8 ,they do4 ,but ,i dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like2--they will permit that8 ,permit me6 indeed they will not4 ,then1 ,i said1 may no one use the whip to the mules8 ,yes1 he said1 the muleteer4 ,and is he a slave or a free man8 ,a slave1 he said4 ,and do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son8 ,and do they entrust their property to him rather than to you8 and allow him to do what he likes1 when they prohibit you8 ,answer me now3 ,are you your own master1 or do they not even allow that8 ,nay1 he said2 of course they do not allow it4 ,then you have a master8 ,yes1 my tutor2 there he is4 ,and is he a slave8 ,to be sure2 he is our slave1 he replied4 ,surely1 ,i said1 this is a strange thing1 that a free man should be governed by a slave4 ,and what does he do with you8 ,he takes me to my teachers4 ,you do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you8 ,of course they do4 ,then ,i must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you4 ,but at any rate when you go home to your mother1 she will let you have your own way1 and will not interfere with your happiness2 her wool1 or the piece of cloth which she is weaving1 are at your disposal3 ,i am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spathe1 or her comb1 or any other of her spinning implements4 ,nay1 ,socrates1 he replied1 laughing2 not only does she hinder me1 but ,i should be beaten if ,i were to touch one of them4 ,well1 ,i said1 this is amazing4 ,and did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother8 ,no1 indeed1 he replied4 ,but why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy1 and doing as you like8--keeping you all day long in subjection to another1 and1 in a word1 doing nothing which you desire2 so that you have no good1 as would appear1 out of their great possessions1 which are under the control of anybody rather than of you1 and have no use of your own fair person1 which is tended and taken care of by another2 while you1 ,lysis1 are master of nobody1 and can do nothing8 ,why1 he said1 ,socrates1 the reason is that ,i am not of age4 ,i doubt whether that is the real reason1 ,i said2 for ,i should imagine that your father ,democrates1 and your mother1 do permit you to do many things already1 and do not wait until you are of age3 for example1 if they want anything read or written1 you1 ,i presume1 would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them4 ,very true4 ,and you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please1 or to take up the lyre and tune the notes1 and play with the fingers1 or strike with the plectrum1 exactly as you please1 and neither father nor mother would interfere with you4 ,that is true1 he said4 ,then what can be the reason1 ,lysis1 ,i said1 why they allow you to do the one and not the other8 ,i suppose1 he said1 because ,i understand the one1 and not the other4 ,yes1 my dear youth1 ,i said1 the reason is not any deficiency of years1 but a deficiency of knowledge2 and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he is1 he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you4 ,i think so4 ,aye1 ,i said2 and about your neighbour1 too1 does not the same rule hold as about your father8 ,if he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does1 will he continue to administer his affairs himself1 or will he commit them to you8 ,i think that he will commit them to me4 ,will not the ,athenian people1 too1 entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them8 ,yes4 ,and oh6 let me put another case1 ,i said3 ,there is the great king1 and he has an eldest son1 who is the ,prince of ,asia2--suppose that you and ,i go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son1 will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup1 and putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling1 rather than to the ,prince of ,asia1 who is his son8 ,to us1 clearly4 ,and we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls1 whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers8 ,of course4 ,or suppose again that the son has bad eyes1 will he allow him1 or will he not allow him1 to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine8 ,he will not allow him4 ,whereas1 if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine1 he will allow us to do what we like with him--even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them1 because he supposes that we know what is best8 ,that is true4 ,and everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us8 ,that is very true1 ,socrates1 he replied4 ,then now1 my dear ,lysis1 ,i said1 you perceive that in things which we know every one will trust us1--,hellenes and barbarians1 men and women1--and we may do as we please about them1 and no one will like to interfere with us2 we shall be free1 and masters of others2 and these things will be really ours1 for we shall be benefited by them4 ,but in things of which we have no understanding1 no one will trust us to do as seems good to us--they will hinder us as far as they can2 and not only strangers1 but father and mother1 and the friend1 if there be one1 who is dearer still1 will also hinder us2 and we shall be subject to others2 and these things will not be ours1 for we shall not be benefited by them4 ,do you agree8 ,he assented4 ,and shall we be friends to others1 and will any others love us1 in as far as we are useless to them8 ,certainly not4 ,neither can your father or mother love you1 nor can anybody love anybody else1 in so far as they are useless to them8 ,no4 ,and therefore1 my boy1 if you are wise1 all men will be your friends and kindred1 for you will be useful and good2 but if you are not wise1 neither father1 nor mother1 nor kindred1 nor any one else1 will be your friends4 ,and in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge1 can you have any conceit of knowledge8 ,that is impossible1 he replied4 ,and you1 ,lysis1 if you require a teacher1 have not yet attained to wisdom4 ,true4 ,and therefore you are not conceited1 having nothing of which to be conceited4 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i think not4 ,when ,i heard him say this1 ,i turned to ,hippothales1 and was very nearly making a blunder1 for ,i was going to say to him3 ,that is the way1 ,hippothales1 in which you should talk to your beloved1 humbling and lowering him1 and not as you do1 puffing him up and spoiling him4 ,but ,i saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said1 and ,i remembered that1 although he was in the neighbourhood1 he did not want to be seen by ,lysis2 so upon second thoughts ,i refrained4 ,in the meantime ,menexenus came back and sat down in his place by ,lysis2 and ,lysis1 in a childish and affectionate manner1 whispered privately in my ear1 so that ,menexenus should not hear3 ,do1 ,socrates1 tell ,menexenus what you have been telling me4 ,suppose that you tell him yourself1 ,lysis1 ,i replied2 for ,i am sure that you were attending4 ,certainly1 he replied4 ,try1 then1 to remember the words1 and be as exact as you can in repeating them to him1 and if you have forgotten anything1 ask me again the next time that you see me4 ,i will be sure to do so1 ,socrates2 but go on telling him something new1 and let me hear1 as long as ,i am allowed to stay4 ,i certainly cannot refuse1 ,i said1 since you ask me2 but then1 as you know1 ,menexenus is very pugnacious1 and therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me4 ,yes1 indeed1 he said2 he is very pugnacious1 and that is the reason why ,i want you to argue with him4 ,that ,i may make a fool of myself8 ,no1 indeed1 he said2 but ,i want you to put him down4 ,that is no easy matter1 ,i replied2 for he is a terrible fellow--a pupil of ,ctesippus4 ,and there is ,ctesippus himself3 do you see him8 ,never mind1 ,socrates1 you shall argue with him4 ,well1 ,i suppose that ,i must1 ,i replied4 ,hereupon ,ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret1 and keeping the feast to ourselves4 ,i shall be happy1 ,i said1 to let you have a share4 ,here is ,lysis1 who does not understand something that ,i was saying1 and wants me to ask ,menexenus1 who1 as he thinks1 is likely to know4 ,and why do you not ask him8 he said4 ,very well1 ,i said1 ,i will2 and do you1 ,menexenus1 answer4 ,but first ,i must tell you that ,i am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing4 ,all people have their fancies2 some desire horses1 and others dogs2 and some are fond of gold1 and others of honour4 ,now1 ,i have no violent desire of any of these things2 but ,i have a passion for friends2 and ,i would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world3 ,i would even go further1 and say the best horse or dog4 ,yea1 by the dog of ,egypt1 ,i should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of ,darius1 or even to ,darius himself3 ,i am such a lover of friends as that4 ,and when ,i see you and ,lysis1 at your early age1 so easily possessed of this treasure1 and so soon1 he of you1 and you of him1 ,i am amazed and delighted1 seeing that ,i myself1 although ,i am now advanced in years1 am so far from having made a similar acquisition1 that ,i do not even know in what way a friend is acquired4 ,but ,i want to ask you a question about this1 for you have experience3 tell me then1 when one loves another1 is the lover or the beloved the friend2 or may either be the friend8 ,either may1 ,i should think1 be the friend of either4 ,do you mean1 ,i said1 that if only one of them loves the other1 they are mutual friends8 ,yes1 he said2 that is my meaning4 ,but what if the lover is not loved in return8 which is a very possible case4 ,yes4 ,or is1 perhaps1 even hated8 which is a fancy which sometimes is entertained by lovers respecting their beloved4 ,nothing can exceed their love2 and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return1 or that they are hated4 ,is not that true8 ,yes1 he said1 quite true4 ,in that case1 the one loves1 and the other is loved8 ,yes4 ,then which is the friend of which8 ,is the lover the friend of the beloved1 whether he be loved in return1 or hated2 or is the beloved the friend2 or is there no friendship at all on either side1 unless they both love one another8 ,there would seem to be none at all4 ,then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one4 ,we were saying that both were friends1 if one only loved2 but now1 unless they both love1 neither is a friend4 ,that appears to be true4 ,then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover8 ,i think not4 ,then they are not lovers of horses1 whom the horses do not love in return2 nor lovers of quails1 nor of dogs1 nor of wine1 nor of gymnastic exercises1 who have no return of love2 no1 nor of wisdom1 unless wisdom loves them in return4 ,or shall we say that they do love them1 although they are not beloved by them2 and that the poet was wrong who sings-- ',happy the man to whom his children are dear1 and steeds having single hoofs1 and dogs of chase1 and the stranger of another land'8 ,i do not think that he was wrong4 ,you think that he is right8 ,yes4 ,then1 ,menexenus1 the conclusion is1 that what is beloved1 whether loving or hating1 may be dear to the lover of it3 for example1 very young children1 too young to love1 or even hating their father or mother when they are punished by them1 are never dearer to them than at the time when they are being hated by them4 ,i think that what you say is true4 ,and1 if so1 not the lover1 but the beloved1 is the friend or dear one8 ,yes4 ,and the hated one1 and not the hater1 is the enemy8 ,clearly4 ,then many men are loved by their enemies1 and hated by their friends1 and are the friends of their enemies1 and the enemies of their friends4 ,yet how absurd1 my dear friend1 or indeed impossible is this paradox of a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy4 ,i quite agree1 ,socrates1 in what you say4 ,but if this cannot be1 the lover will be the friend of that which is loved8 ,true4 ,and the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated8 ,certainly4 ,yet we must acknowledge in this1 as in the preceding instance1 that a man may be the friend of one who is not his friend1 or who may be his enemy1 when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates him4 ,and he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy1 and is even his friend3 for example1 when he hates that which does not hate him1 or which even loves him4 ,that appears to be true4 ,but if the lover is not a friend1 nor the beloved a friend1 nor both together1 what are we to say8 ,whom are we to call friends to one another8 ,do any remain8 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i cannot find any4 ,but1 ,o ,menexenus6 ,i said1 may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions8 ,i am sure that we have been wrong1 ,socrates1 said ,lysis4 ,and he blushed as he spoke1 the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily1 because his whole mind was taken up with the argument2 there was no mistaking his attentive look while he was listening4 ,i was pleased at the interest which was shown by ,lysis1 and ,i wanted to give ,menexenus a rest1 so ,i turned to him and said1 ,i think1 ,lysis1 that what you say is true1 and that1 if we had been right1 we should never have gone so far wrong2 let us proceed no further in this direction 7for the road seems to be getting troublesome71 but take the other path into which we turned1 and see what the poets have to say2 for they are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom1 and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner1 but ,god himself1 as they say1 makes them and draws them to one another2 and this they express1 if ,i am not mistaken1 in the following words3-- ',god is ever drawing like towards like1 and making them acquainted4' ,i dare say that you have heard those words4 ,yes1 he said2 ,i have4 ,and have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like8 they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe4 ,very true1 he replied4 ,and are they right in saying this8 ,they may be4 ,perhaps1 ,i said1 about half1 or possibly1 altogether1 right1 if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us4 ,for the more a bad man has to do with a bad man1 and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him1 the more he will be likely to hate him1 for he injures him2 and injurer and injured cannot be friends4 ,is not that true8 ,yes1 he said4 ,then one half of the saying is untrue1 if the wicked are like one another8 ,that is true4 ,but the real meaning of the saying1 as ,i imagine1 is1 that the good are like one another1 and friends to one another2 and that the bad1 as is often said of them1 are never at unity with one another or with themselves2 for they are passionate and restless1 and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing4 ,do you not agree8 ,yes1 ,i do4 ,then1 my friend1 those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate1 if ,i rightly apprehend them1 that the good only is the friend of the good1 and of him only2 but that the evil never attains to any real friendship1 either with good or evil4 ,do you agree8 ,he nodded assent4 ,then now we know how to answer the question ',who are friends8' for the argument declares ',that the good are friends4' ,yes1 he said1 that is true4 ,yes1 ,i replied2 and yet ,i am not quite satisfied with this answer4 ,by heaven1 and shall ,i tell you what ,i suspect8 ,i will4 ,assuming that like1 inasmuch as he is like1 is the friend of like1 and useful to him--or rather let me try another way of putting the matter3 ,can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself1 or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself8 ,and if neither can be of any use to the other1 how can they be loved by one another8 ,can they now8 ,they cannot4 ,and can he who is not loved be a friend8 ,certainly not4 ,but say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like2 still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good8 ,true4 ,but then again1 will not the good1 in so far as he is good1 be sufficient for himself8 ,certainly he will4 ,and he who is sufficient wants nothing--that is implied in the word sufficient4 ,of course not4 ,and he who wants nothing will desire nothing8 ,he will not4 ,neither can he love that which he does not desire8 ,he cannot4 ,and he who loves not is not a lover or friend8 ,clearly not4 ,what place then is there for friendship1 if1 when absent1 good men have no need of one another 7for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves71 and when present have no use of one another8 ,how can such persons ever be induced to value one another8 ,they cannot4 ,and friends they cannot be1 unless they value one another8 ,very true4 ,but see now1 ,lysis1 whether we are not being deceived in all this--are we not indeed entirely wrong8 ,how so8 he replied4 ,have ,i not heard some one say1 as ,i just now recollect1 that the like is the greatest enemy of the like1 the good of the good8--,yes1 and he quoted the authority of ,hesiod1 who says3 ',potter quarrels with potter1 bard with bard1 ,beggar with beggar2' and of all other things he affirmed1 in like manner1 ',that of necessity the most like are most full of envy1 strife1 and hatred of one another1 and the most unlike1 of friendship4 ,for the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich1 and the weak requires the aid of the strong1 and the sick man of the physician2 and every one who is ignorant1 has to love and court him who knows4' ,and indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language1 that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth1 but the very reverse of the truth1 and that the most opposed are the most friendly2 for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike3 for example1 the dry desires the moist1 the cold the hot1 the bitter the sweet1 the sharp the blunt1 the void the full1 the full the void1 and so of all other things2 for the opposite is the food of the opposite1 whereas like receives nothing from like4 ,and ,i thought that he who said this was a charming man1 and that he spoke well4 ,what do the rest of you say8 ,i should say1 at first hearing1 that he is right1 said ,menexenus4 ,then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites8 ,exactly4 ,yes1 ,menexenus2 but will not that be a monstrous answer8 and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph1 and ask1 fairly enough1 whether love is not the very opposite of hate2 and what answer shall we make to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth8 ,we must4 ,they will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend1 or the friend the friend of the enemy8 ,neither1 he replied4 ,well1 but is a just man the friend of the unjust1 or the temperate of the intemperate1 or the good of the bad8 ,i do not see how that is possible4 ,and yet1 ,i said1 if friendship goes by contraries1 the contraries must be friends4 ,they must4 ,then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends4 ,i suppose not4 ,and yet there is a further consideration3 may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous8 but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good8 ,how do you mean8 he said4 ,why really1 ,i said1 the truth is that ,i do not know2 but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument1 and therefore ,i hazard the conjecture1 that 'the beautiful is the friend1' as the old proverb says4 ,beauty is certainly a soft1 smooth1 slippery thing1 and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls4 ,for ,i affirm that the good is the beautiful4 ,you will agree to that8 ,yes4 ,this ,i say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good1 and ,i will tell you why ,i am inclined to think so3 ,i assume that there are three principles--the good1 the bad1 and that which is neither good nor bad4 ,you would agree--would you not8 ,i agree4 ,and neither is the good the friend of the good1 nor the evil of the evil1 nor the good of the evil2--these alternatives are excluded by the previous argument2 and therefore1 if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all1 we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend1 either of the good1 or of that which is neither good nor evil1 for nothing can be the friend of the bad4 ,true4 ,but neither can like be the friend of like1 as we were just now saying4 ,true4 ,and if so1 that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil4 ,clearly not4 ,then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil4 ,that may be assumed to be certain4 ,and does not this seem to put us in the right way8 ,just remark1 that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid1 but is well enough2 and the healthy man has no love of the physician1 because he is in health4 ,he has none4 ,but the sick loves him1 because he is sick8 ,certainly4 ,and sickness is an evil1 and the art of medicine a good and useful thing8 ,yes4 ,but the human body1 regarded as a body1 is neither good nor evil8 ,true4 ,and the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine8 ,yes4 ,then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good1 by reason of the presence of evil8 ,so we may infer4 ,and clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil--if itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good2 for1 as we were saying1 the evil cannot be the friend of the good4 ,impossible4 ,further1 ,i must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them2 and there are some which are not assimilated3 take1 for example1 the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another substance4 ,very good4 ,in such a case1 is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment8 ,what do you mean8 he said4 ,this is what ,i mean3 ,suppose that ,i were to cover your auburn locks with white lead1 would they be really white1 or would they only appear to be white8 ,they would only appear to be white1 he replied4 ,and yet whiteness would be present in them8 ,true4 ,but that would not make them at all the more white1 notwithstanding the presence of white in them--they would not be white any more than black8 ,no4 ,but when old age infuses whiteness into them1 then they become assimilated1 and are white by the presence of white4 ,certainly4 ,now ,i want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance2 or must the presence be after a peculiar sort8 ,the latter1 he said4 ,then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil1 but not as yet evil1 and that has happened before now8 ,yes4 ,and when anything is in the presence of evil1 not being as yet evil1 the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing2 but the presence of evil1 which makes a thing evil1 takes away the desire and friendship of the good2 for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only1 and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil8 ,none4 ,and therefore we say that those who are already wise1 whether ,gods or men1 are no longer lovers of wisdom2 nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil1 for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom4 ,there remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant1 but are not yet hardened in their ignorance1 or void of understanding1 and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know3 and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad4 ,but the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good2 for1 as we have already seen1 neither is unlike the friend of unlike1 nor like of like4 ,you remember that8 ,yes1 they both said4 ,and so1 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 we have discovered the nature of friendship--there can be no doubt of it3 ,friendship is the love which by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good1 either in the soul1 or in the body1 or anywhere4 ,they both agreed and entirely assented1 and for a moment ,i rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey4 ,but then a most unaccountable suspicion came across me1 and ,i felt that the conclusion was untrue4 ,i was pained1 and said1 ,alas6 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 ,i am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only4 ,why do you say so8 said ,menexenus4 ,i am afraid1 ,i said1 that the argument about friendship is false3 arguments1 like men1 are often pretenders4 ,how do you mean8 he asked4 ,well1 ,i said2 look at the matter in this way3 a friend is the friend of some one2 is he not8 ,certainly he is4 ,and has he a motive and object in being a friend1 or has he no motive and object8 ,he has a motive and object4 ,and is the object which makes him a friend1 dear to him1 or neither dear nor hateful to him8 ,i do not quite follow you1 he said4 ,i do not wonder at that1 ,i said4 ,but perhaps1 if ,i put the matter in another way1 you will be able to follow me1 and my own meaning will be clearer to myself4 ,the sick man1 as ,i was just now saying1 is the friend of the physician--is he not8 ,yes4 ,and he is the friend of the physician because of disease1 and for the sake of health8 ,yes4 ,and disease is an evil8 ,certainly4 ,and what of health8 ,i said4 ,is that good or evil1 or neither8 ,good1 he replied4 ,and we were saying1 ,i believe1 that the body being neither good nor evil1 because of disease1 that is to say because of evil1 is the friend of medicine1 and medicine is a good3 and medicine has entered into this friendship for the sake of health1 and health is a good4 ,true4 ,and is health a friend1 or not a friend8 ,a friend4 ,and disease is an enemy8 ,yes4 ,then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful1 and for the sake of the good and the friend8 ,clearly4 ,then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend1 and because of the enemy8 ,that is to be inferred4 ,then at this point1 my boys1 let us take heed1 and be on our guard against deceptions4 ,i will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the friend1 and the like of the like1 which has been declared by us to be an impossibility2 but1 in order that this new statement may not delude us1 let us attentively examine another point1 which ,i will proceed to explain3 ,medicine1 as we were saying1 is a friend1 or dear to us for the sake of health8 ,yes4 ,and health is also dear8 ,certainly4 ,and if dear1 then dear for the sake of something8 ,yes4 ,and surely this object must also be dear1 as is implied in our previous admissions8 ,yes4 ,and that something dear involves something else dear8 ,yes4 ,but then1 proceeding in this way1 shall we not arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other1 for the sake of which1 as we maintain1 all other things are dear1 and1 having there arrived1 we shall stop8 ,true4 ,my fear is that all those other things1 which1 as we say1 are dear for the sake of another1 are illusions and deceptions only1 but where that first principle is1 there is the true ideal of friendship4 ,let me put the matter thus3 ,suppose the case of a great treasure 7this may be a son1 who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures72 would not the father1 who values his son above all things1 value other things also for the sake of his son8 ,i mean1 for instance1 if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock1 and the father thought that wine would save him1 he would value the wine8 ,he would4 ,and also the vessel which contains the wine8 ,certainly4 ,but does he therefore value the three measures of wine1 or the earthen vessel which contains them1 equally with his son8 ,is not this rather the true state of the case8 ,all his anxiety has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake of an object1 but to the object for the sake of which they are provided4 ,and although we may often say that gold and silver are highly valued by us1 that is not the truth2 for there is a further object1 whatever it may be1 which we value most of all1 and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us4 ,am ,i not right8 ,yes1 certainly4 ,and may not the same be said of the friend8 ,that which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear1 but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate4 ,that1 he said1 appears to be true4 ,and the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear4 ,true4 ,then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object4 ,may we then infer that the good is the friend8 ,i think so4 ,and the good is loved for the sake of the evil8 ,let me put the case in this way3 ,suppose that of the three principles1 good1 evil1 and that which is neither good nor evil1 there remained only the good and the neutral1 and that evil went far away1 and in no way affected soul or body1 nor ever at all that class of things which1 as we say1 are neither good nor evil in themselves2--would the good be of any use1 or other than useless to us8 ,for if there were nothing to hurt us any longer1 we should have no need of anything that would do us good4 ,then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil1 and as the remedy of the evil1 which was the disease2 but if there had been no disease1 there would have been no need of a remedy4 ,is not this the nature of the good--to be loved by us who are placed between the two1 because of the evil8 but there is no use in the good for its own sake4 ,i suppose not4 ,then the final principle of friendship1 in which all other friendships terminated1 those1 ,i mean1 which are relatively dear and for the sake of something else1 is of another and a different nature from them4 ,for they are called dear because of another dear or friend4 ,but with the true friend or dear1 the case is quite the reverse2 for that is proved to be dear because of the hated1 and if the hated were away it would be no longer dear4 ,very true1 he replied3 at any rate not if our present view holds good4 ,but1 oh6 will you tell me1 ,i said1 whether if evil were to perish1 we should hunger any more1 or thirst any more1 or have any similar desire8 ,or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain1 but not so as to be hurtful8 ,and the same of thirst and the other desires1--that they will remain1 but will not be evil because evil has perished8 ,or rather shall ,i say1 that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous1 for who knows8 ,this we do know1 that in our present condition hunger may injure us1 and may also benefit us3--,is not that true8 ,yes4 ,and in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us1 and sometimes neither one nor the other8 ,to be sure4 ,but is there any reason why1 because evil perishes1 that which is not evil should perish with it8 ,none4 ,then1 even if evil perishes1 the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain8 ,clearly they will4 ,and must not a man love that which he desires and affects8 ,he must4 ,then1 even if evil perishes1 there may still remain some elements of love or friendship8 ,yes4 ,but not if evil is the cause of friendship3 for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil2 for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed4 ,true4 ,and have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason8 and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil8 ,very true4 ,but now our view is changed1 and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship8 ,i suppose so4 ,may not the truth be rather1 as we were saying just now1 that desire is the cause of friendship2 for that which desires is dear to that which is desired at the time of desiring it8 and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing8 ,likely enough4 ,but surely1 ,i said1 he who desires1 desires that of which he is in want8 ,yes4 ,and that of which he is in want is dear to him8 ,true4 ,and he is in want of that of which he is deprived8 ,certainly4 ,then love1 and desire1 and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial4 ,such1 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 is the inference4 ,they assented4 ,then if you are friends1 you must have natures which are congenial to one another8 ,certainly1 they both said4 ,and ,i say1 my boys1 that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or affected him1 if he had not been in some way congenial to him1 either in his soul1 or in his character1 or in his manners1 or in his form4 ,yes1 yes1 said ,menexenus4 ,but ,lysis was silent4 ,then1 ,i said1 the conclusion is1 that what is of a congenial nature must be loved4 ,it follows1 he said4 ,then the lover1 who is true and no counterfeit1 must of necessity be loved by his love4 ,lysis and ,menexenus gave a faint assent to this2 and ,hippothales changed into all manner of colours with delight4 ,here1 intending to revise the argument1 ,i said3 ,can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like8 ,for if that is possible1 then ,i think1 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 there may be some sense in our argument about friendship4 ,but if the congenial is only the like1 how will you get rid of the other argument1 of the uselessness of like to like in as far as they are like2 for to say that what is useless is dear1 would be absurd8 ,suppose1 then1 that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the like--in the intoxication of argument1 that may perhaps be allowed4 ,very true4 ,and shall we further say that the good is congenial1 and the evil uncongenial to every one8 ,or again that the evil is congenial to the evil1 and the good to the good2 and that which is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil8 ,they agreed to the latter alternative4 ,then1 my boys1 we have again fallen into the old discarded error2 for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust1 and the bad of the bad1 as well as the good of the good4 ,that appears to be the result4 ,but again1 if we say that the congenial is the same as the good1 in that case the good and he only will be the friend of the good4 ,true4 ,but that too was a position of ours which1 as you will remember1 has been already refuted by ourselves4 ,we remember4 ,then what is to be done8 ,or rather is there anything to be done8 ,i can only1 like the wise men who argue in courts1 sum up the arguments3--,if neither the beloved1 nor the lover1 nor the like1 nor the unlike1 nor the good1 nor the congenial1 nor any other of whom we spoke--for there were such a number of them that ,i cannot remember all--if none of these are friends1 ,i know not what remains to be said4 ,here ,i was going to invite the opinion of some older person1 when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of ,lysis and ,menexenus1 who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers1 and bade them go home1 as it was getting late4 ,at first1 we and the by-standers drove them off2 but afterwards1 as they would not mind1 and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect1 and got angry1 and kept calling the boys--they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the ,hermaea1 which made them difficult to manage--we fairly gave way and broke up the company4 ,i said1 however1 a few words to the boys at parting3 ,o ,menexenus and ,lysis1 how ridiculous that you two boys1 and ,i1 an old boy1 who would fain be one of you1 should imagine ourselves to be friends--this is what the by-standers will go away and say--and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend6