,attributed to ,matthew ,turner 7d4     
#aghh87 and ,william ,hammon4    ,,note3
 ,irregularities in orthography and     
punctuation have been reproduced without
 emendation from the first edition of   
#aghb4       ,,answer ,,to ,,dr4        
,,priestley',s ,,letters ,,to ,a        
,,philosophical ,,unbeliever4  ,,part   
,i4    ,,london4 ,,mdcclxxxii           
,,advertisement4   ,the ,editor of this 
publication has more in object to answer
 ,dr4 ,priestley than to deliver his own
 sentiments upon ,natural ,religion1    
which however he has no inclination to  
disguise3 but he does not mean to be    
answerable for them farther1 than as by 
reason and nature he is at present      
instructed4 ,the question here handled  
is not so much1 whether a ,deity and his
 attributed excellences exist1 as       
whether there is any ,natural or ,moral 
proof of his existence and of those     
attributes4 ,revealed knowledge is not  
descanted upon2 therefore ,christians at
 least need take no offence4 ,doubts    

upon ,natural ,religion have not        
hitherto been looked upon as attacks    
upon ,revelation1 but rather as         
corroborations of it4 ,what the ,editor 
believes as a ,christian 7if he is one  
is therefore another affair1 nor does he
 reckon himself so infallible or        
incapable of alteration in his          
sentiments1 as not at another time to   
adopt different ones upon more reflexion
 and better information2 therefore1     
though he has at present little or no   
doubt of what he asserts 7taken upon the
 principles laid down7 he shall hold    
himself totally freed from any necessity
 of defending the contents of this      
publication if brought into controversy2
 and as he has no desire of making      
converts1 hopes he shall not himself be 
marked out as an object of persecution4 
,speculative points have always been    
esteemed fair matters for a free        
discussion4 ,the religion established in
 this country is not the religion of    
,nature1 but the religion of ,moses and 

,jesus1 with whom the writer has nothing
 to do4 ,he trusts therefore he shall   
not be received as a malevolent         
disturber of such common opinions as are
 esteemed to keep in order a set of low 
wretches so inclinable to be lawless4   
,at least1 if he attempts to substitute 
better foundations for morality1        
malevolence can be no just charge4      
,truth is his aim2 and no professors of 
religion will allow their system to be  
false4 ,or if he should be thought too  
bold a speculator1 such of the          
ecclesiastics as will be his opponents  
may rather laugh at him than fear him4  
,they have a thousand ways of making    
their sentiments go down with the bulk  
of mankind1 to one this poor writer has4
 ,they are an army ready marshalled for 
the support of their own thesis2 they   
are in the habit of controversy2 pulpits
 are open to them as well as the press2 
and while the present author will be    
looked upon as a miracle of hardiness   
for daring to put his name to what he   

publishes1 they can without fear or     
imputation lift up their heads2 and     
should they even be known to transgress 
the bounds of good sense or politeness1 
they will only be esteemed as more      
zealous labourers in their own vocation4
      ,,prefatory ,,address4   ,dr4     
,priestley1  ,your ,letters addressed to
 a ,philosophical ,unbeliever ,i        
perused1 not because ,i was a           
,philosopher or an ,unbeliever2 it were 
presumption to give myself the former   
title1 and at that time ,i certainly did
 not deserve the latter2 but as ,i was  
acquainted with another1 who in reality1
 as far as ,i and others who know him   
can judge1 deserves the title of a      
,philosopher and is neither ashamed nor 
afraid of that of an ,unbeliever1 ,i    
conceived them apt to be sent to my     
friend1 and when ,i presented them to   
him1 he said he was the person whom he  
should suppose you meant to address1 if 
you had a particular person in view2 but
 he had too much understanding of the   

world1 though much abstracted from the  
dregs of it1 not to conceive it more    
probable that you meant your ,letters to
 be perused by thinking men in general1 
,believers and ,unbelievers1 to confirm 
the former in their creed1 and to       
convert the latter from their error4    
,you shall speedily know the effect they
 have had in both ways4 ,for myself ,i  
must inform you that ,i was brought up a
 ,believer from my infancy2 a ,theist1  
if a ,christian is such2 for ,i suppose 
the word will be allowed1 though the    
equivalent term of ,deist is so         
generally reprobated by ,christians2 ,i 
had before my eyes the example of a most
 amiable parent2 a moral man1 a         
,christian undoubtedly2 who1 when ,i    
have been attending upon him1 as much   
from affection as from duty upon a sick 
and nearly dying bed1 has prayed ,i     
might be stedfast in the faith he held1 
in accents still sounding in my         
intellectual ear2 a parent1 whom for his
 virtues and love of his offspring1 like

 a ,chinese1 ,i am tempted to worship1  
and ,i could exclaim with the first of  
poets1            ,erit ille mihi semper
 ,deus4  ,with such habits of education 
then1 such fervent advice and such      
reverence for my instructor1 what can   
have turned me from my belief2 for ,i   
confess ,i am turned8 ,immorallity it is
 not2 that ,i assert has not preceded my
 unbelief1 and ,i trust never will      
follow it2 there has not indeed yet been
 time for it to follow2 whether it is a 
probable consequence will presently be  
discussed2 but it is thought1 free      
thought upon the subject2 when ,i began 
freely to think ,i proceeded boldly to  
doubt2 your ,letters gave me the cause  
for thinking1 and my scepticism was     
exchanged for conviction2 not entirely  
by the perusal of your ,letters2 for ,i 
do not think they would quite have made 
me an ,atheist6 but by attention to that
 answer from my friend1 which ,i have   
his permission to subjoin4  ,in         
mentioning that doubts arose by reading 

your very ,letters1 which were written  
to eradicate all doubts1 let me not     
accuse you of being unequal to the task 
assumed4 ,i mean no such charge4 ,you   
have in my opinion been fully equal to  
the discussion1 and have bandied the    
argument ably1 pleasingly and politely4 
,i am certain from the extracts you have
 made from ,dr4 ,clarke1 the first of   
other ,divines1 ,i should have been     
converted from my superstition by his   
reasoning1 even without perusal of an   
answer3 ,i pay you however the          
compliment of having only brought me to 
doubt1 and ,i find ,i am not the only   
person who have been led to disbelieve  
by reading books expressly written to   
confirm the ,believer4 ,stackhouse's    
,comment upon the ,bible1 and ,leland's 
,view of ,deistical ,writers have       
perhaps made as many renegado's in this 
country as all the allurements of       
,mahometanism has in others4 ,what can  
be said to this8 ,they were both        
undoubtedly men of abilities1 and meant 

well to the cause they had to support4  
,all that ,i shall observe upon the     
matter is1 that what cannot bear        
discussion cannot be true4 ,reasoning in
 other sciences is the way to arrive at 
truth3 the learned for a while may      
differ1 but argument at last finds its  
force1 and the controversy usually ends 
in general conviction4 ,reasoning upon  
the science of divinity will equally    
have its weight1 and all men of letters 
would long ago have got rid of all      
superstitious notions of a ,deity1 but  
that men of letters are frequently men  
of weak nerves2 such as ,dr4 ,johnson is
 well known to be1 that great triumph to
 religionists2 it requires courage as   
well as sense to break the shackles of a
 pious education2 but if merely a       
resolve to reason upon their force can  
break them1 what can we observe in      
conclusion but            ,magnus est   
veritas et prevalebit4  ,that religion  
or belief of a ,deity cannot bear the   
force of argument is well known by      

,divines in general1 is manifest by     
their annexing an idea of reproach to   
the very term of arguing upon the       
subject4 ,these arguers they call       
,free-thinkers1 and this appellation has
 obtained1 in the understanding of pious
 believers1 the most odious disgrace4   
,yet we cannot argue without thinking2  
nor can we either think or argue to any 
purpose without freedom4 ,therefore     
free-thinking1 so far from being a      
disgrace1 is a virtue1 a most           
commendable quality4 ,how absurd1 and   
how cruel it is in the professors of    
divinity1 to address the understanding  
of men on the subject of their belief1  
and to upbraid those very men who shall 
exercise their understanding in         
attending to their arguments6 ,no       
tyranny is greater than that of         
ecclesiastics4 ,these chain down our    
very ideas1 other tyrants only confine  
our limbs4 ,they invite us to the       
argument1 yet damn us to eternal        
punishment for the use of reason on the 

subject4 ,they give to man an essence   
distinct from his corporeal appearance  
and this they call his soul1 a very ray 
and particle of the ,divine ,being2 the 
principal faculty of this soul they     
allow to be that of reasoning1 and yet  
they call reason a dark lanthorn1 an    
erroneous vapour1 a false medium1 and at
 last the very instrument of another    
fancied ,being of their own to lead men 
into their own destruction4 ,in the     
image of himself made he man4 ,a        
favourite text with theologians2 but    
surely they do not mean that this ,god  
,almighty of theirs has got a face and  
person like a man4 ,no2 that they       
exclaim against1 and1 when we push them 
for the resemblance1 they confess it is 
in the use of reason2 it is in the soul4
  ,i am aware that ,i am not here to mix
 questions of ,christianity with the    
general question of a ,divinity2        
subjects of a very distinct enquiry1 and
 which in the ,letters to a             
,philosophical ,unbeliever are very     

carefully separated4 ,the subject of    
revelation is indeed promised afterwards
 to be taken up1 provided the argument  
in favour of ,natural ,religion meets   
with a good reception4 ,how1 ,dr4       
,priestley1 you can judge of that       
reception ,i am at a loss to know1      
otherwise than by the number of editions
 you publish4 ,it is then in the sum    
total just as much as if you had said1  
provided this book sells well ,i will   
write another4 ,yet it may be sold to   
many such readers as ,i have been1      
though you will hardly call such        
reception good4 ,you that have wrote so 
much1 to whom it is so easy to write    
more1 who profess a belief of           
revelation1 such a laborious enquirer1  
and so great a master of the art of     
reasoning1 should rather have engaged at
 once to prove in a subsequent          
publication the truth of revealed       
religion in arguments1 as candid and as 
fairly drawn as those you have used in  
proof of a ,deity independent of        

revelation4 ,different as ,i am in      
qualifications from you1 not very       
learned1 far from industrious1 unused to
 publish1 ,i do now promise that when   
you shall have brought into light your  
intended letters in behalf of revelation
 ,i will answer them4 ,i hope you will  
take it as an encouragement to write    
that you are sure you shall have an     
answer4 ,i mean you should1 and ,i am   
sure ,i shall think myself greatly      
honoured if you will descend so far as  
to reply to my present answer4 ,i know  
you have been used in controversies to  
have the last word1 and in this ,i shall
 not baulk your ambition2 for           
notwithstanding any defect of my plea in
 favour of atheism ,i mean to join issue
 upon your replication1 and by no means1
 according to the practice and language 
of the lawyers1 to put in a rejoinder4  
,should your arguments be defectively   
answered by me1 should your learning and
 your reasoning be more conspicuous than
 mine1 ,i shall bear your triumph       

without repining4  ,i declare ,i am     
rather pleased there are so few atheists
 than at all anxious to make more4 ,i   
triumph in my superior light4 ,i am like
 the ,jew or the ,bramin who equally    
think themselves privileged in their    
superior knowledge of the ,deity4 ,with 
me and with my friend the comparison    
holds by way of contrast1 for we are so 
proud in our singularity of being       
atheists that we will hardly open our   
lips in company1 when the question is   
started for fear of making converts1 and
 so lessening our own enjoyment by a    
numerous division of our privilege with 
others4 ,it has indeed often been       
disputed1 whether there is or ever was  
such a character in the world as an     
atheist4 ,that it should be disputed is 
to me no wonder4 ,every thing may be1   
and almost every thing has been         
disputed4 ,there are few or none who    
will venture openly to acknowledge      
themselves to be atheists4 ,i know none 
among my acquaintance1 except that one  

friend1 to whom as a ,philosophical     
,unbeliever ,i presented your ,letters1 
and to whose answer ,i only mean this   
address as an introduction4 ,i shall    
therefore not enter here into the main  
argument of ,deity or no ,deity4 ,my    
address is only preliminary to the      
subject2 but ,i do not therefore think  
myself precluded from entering into some
 considerations that may be thought     
incidental to it4 ,i mean such          
considerations as whether immorality1   
unhappiness or timidity necessarily do  
or naturally ought to ensue from a      
system of atheism4 ,but as to the       
question whether there is such an       
existent ,being as an atheist1 to put   
that out of all manner of doubt1 ,i do  
declare upon my honour that ,i am one4  
,be it therefore for the future         
remembered1 that in ,london in the      
kingdom of ,england1 in the year of our 
,lord one thousand seven hundred and    
eighty-one1 a man has publickly declared
 himself an atheist4 ,when my friend    

returned me your ,letters1 addressing me
 with a grave face he said1 ,i hope1 if 
you have any doubts1 these ,letters will
 have as good effect upon you as they   
have had upon me4 ,my countenance       
brightened up and ,i replied1 ,you are  
then1 my friend1 convinced 8 ,yes1 he   
said1 ,i am convinced2 that is1 ,i am   
most thoroughly convinced there is no   
such thing as a ,god4 ,behold then1 if  
we are to be believed1 two atheists     
instead of one4  ,another question has  
been raised whether a society of        
atheists can exist8 ,in other words     
whether honesty sufficient for the      
purposes of civil society can be insured
 by other motives than the belief of a  
,deity8 ,bayle has handled that question
 well4 ,footnote3 ,pensees sur la       
,comete4 ,few who know how to reason    
7and it is in vain to speak or think of 
those who lay reason out of the case7   
can fail to be convinced by the         
arguments of ,bayle4 ,i shall discuss   
the question no farther than as it is   

necessarily included in the discussion  
of some of those supposed results of    
atheism1 such as ,i have before         
mentioned in the instances of           
immorality1 unhappiness and timidity4   
,in my argument upon this subject ,i    
shall carefully avoid all abuse and     
ridicule4 ,controversies are apt to be  
acrimonious4 ,you1 ,sir1 have certainly 
shewn instances to the contrary4 ,you   
have charity beyond your fellows in the 
ecclesiastical line1 and your answerers 
seem not to me to have a right in fair  
argument to step out of the limits you  
have prescribed yourself4 ,to dispute   
with you is a pleasure equal almost to  
that of agreeing with another person4   
,you have candour enough to allow it    
possible that an atheist may be a moral 
man4 ,where is that other ecclesiastic  
who will allow the same8 ,your answerers
 ought also to hold themselves precluded
 from using ridicule in handling this   
subject4 ,i am no great supporter of    
,lord ,shaftesbury's doctrine that      

ridicule is the test of truth4 ,i own   
truth can never be ridiculous1 that is1 
it can never be worthy of laughter1 but 
still it may be laughed at4 ,to use the 
other term1 ,i may say1 truth can never 
be worthy of ridicule1 but still it may 
be ridiculed4 ,just ridicule is a       
sufficient test of truth2 but after all 
we should be driven to an inquiry1 upon 
the principles of reasoning1 whether the
 ridicule were just or not4 ,boldness1  
which is not incompatible with decency  
and candour1 ,i do hold to be an        
absolute requisite in all speech and    
argument1 where truth is the object of  
inquiry4 ,therefore when ,i am asked1   
whether there is a ,god or no ,god1 ,i  
do not mince the matter1 but ,i boldly  
answer there is none1 and give my reason
 for my disbelief2 for ,i adopt my      
friend's answer by the publication of   
it4  ,that mischief may ensue to society
 by such freedom of discussion is also  
another argument for me to consider2 ,i 
do not say to combat1 for though ,i were

 convinced or could not resist the      
argument that mischief would ensue to   
society by such a discussion1 yet ,i    
should think myself intitled to enter   
into it4 ,i have a right to truth1 and  
to publish truth1 let society suffer or 
not suffer by it4 ,that society which   
suffers by truth should be otherwise    
constituted2 and as ,i cannot well think
 that truth will hurt any society       
rightly constituted1 so ,i should rather
 be inclined to doubt the force of the  
argument in case atheism being found to 
be truth should apparently be proved    
prejudicial to such a society4  ,i come 
unprejudiced to the question1 and when  
,i have promised you an answer to your  
future ,letters in support of           
revelation1 ,i have neither anticipated 
your argument nor prejudged the cause4  
,i hold myself open to be convinced1 and
 if ,i am convinced ,i shall say so1    
which is equally answering as if ,i     
denied the force of your observations4  
,in that sense only ,i promise an       

answer4 ,if ,i believe ,i shall say1 ,i 
do2 but ,i shall not believe and        
tremble1 confident as ,i am1 that if ,i 
act an honest part in life1 whether     
there be a ,deity and a future existence
 or not1 whatever reason ,i may have to 
rejoice in case such ideas be realised1 
,i can upon such an issue have none to  
tremble4 ,i look upon myself to have    
more reason to be temporally afraid than
 eternally so4 ,dr4 ,priestley or any   
other ,doctor can put his name boldly to
 a book in favour of ,theism1 loudly    
call the supporters of a contrary       
doctrine to the argument1 and if no     
answer is produced1 assert their own    
reasoning to be unanswerable4 ,in that  
sense their sort of reasoning has been  
frequently unanswerable4 ,here however  
is an instance of a poor unknown        
individual1 making experience of the    
candour of the ecclesiastics and the    
equity of the laws of ,england1 for he  
ventures to subscribe his publication   
with his name as well as ,dr4 ,priestley

 does his ,letters1 to which this       
publication is an answer4 ,perhaps he   
may have cause to repent of his         
hardiness1 but if he has1 he is equally 
resolved to glory in his martyrdom1 as  
to suffer it4 ,whatever advantage       
religion has had in the enumeration of  
it's martyrs1 the cause of atheism may  
boast the same4 ,as to the instances of 
the professors of any particular form of
 religion1 or modification of that form1
 such as ,christians or sects of        
,christians1 suffering martyrdom for    
their belief1 ,i shall no more allow    
them to be martyrs for theism than      
,pagans similarly suffering for their   
belief1 shall ,i call martyrs for       
atheism4 ,theism very likely has had    
it's martyrs4 ,i can instance one ,i    
think in ,socrates1 and ,i shall mention
 ,vanini as a martyr for atheism4 ,the  
conduct of those two great men in their 
last moments may be worth attending to4 
,the variety of other poor heretical    
wretches1 who have been immolated at the

 shrine of absurdity for all the        
possible errors of human credence1 let  
them have their legendary fame4 ,i put  
them out of the scale in this important 
inquiry4  ,not that ,i really think the 
argument to be much advanced by naming  
the great supporters of one opinion or  
of another4 ,in mathematics1 mechanics1 
natural philosophy1 in literature1      
taste1 and politics the sentiments of   
great men of great genius are certainly 
of weight4 ,there are some subjects     
capable of demonstration1 many indeed   
which the ingenuity of one man can go   
farther to illustrate than that of      
another4 ,the force of high authority is
 greater in the three former sciences   
than in the latter4 ,theism and ,atheism
 ,i hold to be neither of them strictly 
demonstrable4 ,you1 ,dr4 ,priestley1    
agree with me in that4 ,still ,i hold   
the question capable of being           
illustrated by argument1 and ,i should  
hold the authority of great men's names 
to be of more weight in this subject1   

were ,i not necessarily forced to       
consider that all education is strongly 
calculated to support the idea of a     
,deity2 by this education prejudice is  
introduced1 and prejudice is nothing    
else than a corruption of the           
understanding4 ,certain principles1 call
 them1 if you please1 data1 must be     
agreed upon before any reasoning can    
take place4 ,disputants must at least   
agree in the ideas which they annex to  
the language they use4 ,but when        
prejudice has made a stand1             
argumentation is set at so wide a       
distance1 through a want of fixt data to
 proceed upon1 that attention is in vain
 applied to the dispute4 ,besides1 the  
nature of the subject upon which this   
prejudice takes place1 is such1 that the
 finest genius is nearly equally liable 
to an undue bias with the most vulgar4  
,to question with boldness and          
indifference1 whether an individual1    
all-forming1 all-seeing and             
all-governing ,being exists1 to whom1 if

 he exists1 we may possibly be          
responsible for our actions1 whose      
intelligence and power must be          
infinitely superior to our own1 requires
 a great conquest of former habitude1 a 
firmness of nerves1 as well as of       
understanding2 it will therefore be no  
great wonder1 if such men as ,locke and 
,newton can be named among the believers
 in a ,deity4 ,they were christians as  
well as theists1 so that their authority
 goes as far in one respect as in the   
other4 ,but if the opinions of men of   
great genius are to have weight1 what is
 to be said of modern men of genius8    
,you1 ,sir1 are of opinion that the     
world is getting wiser as well as       
better4 ,there is all the reason in the 
world it should get wiser at least1     
since wisdom is only a collection of    
experience1 and there must be more      
experience as the world is older4       
,modern ,philosophers are nearly all    
atheists4 ,i take the term atheist here 
in the popular sense4 ,hume1 ,helvetius1

 ,diderot1 ,d',alembert4 ,can they not  
weigh against ,locke and ,newton1 and   
even more than ,locke and ,newton1 since
 their store of knowledge and learning  
was at hand to be added to their own1   
and among them are those who singly     
possessed equal science in mathematics  
as in metaphysics8 ,it is not           
impossible1 perhaps not improbable1 from
 his course of learning and inquiries1  
that if ,dr4 ,priestley had not from his
 first initiation into science been     
dedicated for what is called the        
immediate service of ,god1 he himself   
might have been one of the greatest     
disprovers of his pretended divinity4   
,in ,england you think1 ,sir1 that      
atheism is not prevalent among men of   
free reasoning1 though you acknowledge  
it to be much so in other countries4 ,it
 is not the first time it has been      
observed that the greater the           
superstition of the common people the   
less is that of men of letters4 ,in the 
heart of the ,papal territories perhaps 

is the greatest number of atheists1 and 
in the reformed countries the greatest  
number of deists4 ,yet it is a common   
observation1 especially by divines1 that
 deism leads to atheism1 and ,i believe 
the observation is well founded4 ,i     
hardly need explain here1 that by deism 
in this sense is meant a belief in the  
existence of a ,deity from natural and  
philosophical principles1 and a         
disbelief in all immediate revelation by
 the ,deity of his own existence4 ,such 
is the force of habit1 that it is by    
degrees only1 that even men of sense and
 firmness shake off one prejudice after 
another4 ,they begin by getting rid of  
the absurdities of all popular          
religions4 ,this leaves them simple     
deists1 but the force of reasoning next 
carries them a step farther1 and whoever
 trusts to this reasoning1 devoid of all
 fear and prejudice1 is very likely to  
end at last in being an atheist4 ,nor do
 ,i admit it to be an argument either   
for ,revelation or ,natural ,religion1  

that the same turn for speculation that 
would convert a christian into a theist1
 will carry him on to be an atheist1    
though ,i know the argument has been    
often used4 ,if upon sick beds or in    
dying moments men revert to their old   
weakness and superstitions1 their       
falling off may afford triumph to       
religionists2 for my part ,i care not so
 much for the opinions of sick and dying
 men1 as of those who at the time are   
strong and healthy4 ,but in the opinion 
of the one or the other ,i put no great 
stress4 ,my faith is in reasoning1 for  
though ridicule is not a complete test  
of truth1 reasoning ,i hold certainly to
 be so4 ,i own belief may be imprest on 
the mind otherwise than by the force of 
reason4 ,the mind may be diseased4 ,all 
,i shall say is that though ,i have     
formerly believed many things without   
reason1 and even many against it1 as is 
very common1 ,i hope ,i shall never     
more4 ,my mind 7,i was going to say1    
thank ,god7 is sane at present1 and ,i  

intend to keep it so4 ,i am aware that  
at the expression just used some will   
exclaim in triumph1 that the poor wretch
 could not help thinking of his ,god at 
the same time he was denying him4 ,the  
observation would hold good1 if it were 
not that we often speak and write       
unpremeditately and though what is in   
this manner unpremeditately expressed   
upon a revision should be certainly     
expunged1 yet ,i chuse to leave the     
expression to shew the force of habit4  
,in fear lies the origin of all fancied 
deities1 whether sole or numberless4    
,primus in orbe ,deos fecit ,timor4     
,but the great debasement of the human  
mind is evidenced in the instance of    
attributing a merit to belief1 which has
 come at last to be stiled a virtue1 and
 is dignified by the name of faith1 that
 most pitiful of all human qualities4   
,when the apostle spoke of faith1 hope  
and charity1 he might as well have      
exclaimed the least of the three is     
faith1 as the greatest is charity4  ,one

 enthusiast cries out un ,roi and       
another un ,dieu4 ,the reality of the   
king ,i admit1 because ,i feel his      
power4 ,against my feeling and my       
experience ,i cannot argue1 for upon    
these sensations is built all argument4 
,but not all the wondrous works of the  
creation1 as ,i hear the visible        
operations of nature called1 convince me
 in the least of the existence of a     
,deity4 ,by nature ,i mean to express   
the whole of what ,i see and feel1 that 
whole1 ,i call self-existent from all   
eternity2 ,i admit a principle of       
intelligence and design1 but ,i deny    
that principle to be extraneous from    
itself4 ,my creed in fine is the same   
with that of the ,roman poet2           
,deus est ubicunque movemur4  ,if then  
,i am admitted to explain my deity in   
this sense1 ,i am not an atheist1 nor   
can any one else in the world be such4  
,the vis naturae1 the perpetual         
industry1 intelligence and provision of 
nature must be apparent to all who see1 

feel or think4 ,i mean to distinguish   
this active1 intelligent and designing  
principle1 inherent as much in matter as
 the properties of gravity or any       
elastic1 attractive or repulsive power1 
from any extraneous foreign force and   
design in an invisible agent1 supreme   
though hidden lord and maker over all   
effects and appearances that present    
themselves to us in the course of       
nature4 ,the last supposition makes the 
universe and all other organised matter 
a machine made or contrived by the      
arbitrary will of another ,being1 which 
other ,being is called ,god2 and my     
theory makes a ,god of this universe1 or
 admits no other ,god or designing      
principle than matter itself and its    
various organisations4  ,the inquiry is 
said to be important4 ,but why is it so6
 ,all truth is important4 ,it is a      
question of little importance1 merely   
whether a man had a maker or no1        
although it is of great importance to   
disprove the existence of such a ,deity 

as theologians wish to establish1       
because appearances in the world go     
against it4 ,supposing however that it  
was granted1 that the question1 whether 
there is a ,deity or not1 was as little 
important as other truths1 yet the      
question becomes important with this    
reflexion1 that other events may follow 
as deductions2 such as a particular     
providence1 or a future state of rewards
 and punishments2 but whether such      
deductions or either of them necessarily
 follow may well be queried4 ,as to a   
particular providence you give up the   
reality of it1 and ,i give it up too4   
,but ,i cannot give up the argument1    
that if there were a ,god with all his  
allowed attributes of wisdom1 power and 
justice1 there ought to be a particular 
providence to counteract the general    
laws of nature1 in favour of those who  
defend the interposition4 ,though the   
,deity should not interfere unless there
 be a worthy cause1 agreeable to the    
,horation rule1            ,nec ,deus   

interfuit nisi vindice nodus2  ,yet     
surely from the same principles it      
should follow that the ,deity ought to  
interfere where there is a worthy cause4
 ,here however arises another dilemma1  
for if the ,deity has really those      
attributes of power and justice1 there  
would never have been occasion for such 
temperaneous interpositions4 ,a         
particular providence must indeed prove 
one of these two principles1 either that
 ,god was imperfect in his design1 or   
that inert matter is inimical to the    
properties of ,god4 ,if that wished for 
interposition of the ,deity is put off  
to a future existence1 ,i cannot help   
observing1 that future day has been     
already a long while waited for in vain1
 and any delay destroys some one        
attribute or other of the ,deity4 ,he   
wants justice1 or he wants the power1 or
 the will to do good and be just4 ,that 
a future state of rewards and           
punishments may however exist without a 
,deity1 you1 ,dr4 ,priestley1 allow to  

be no impossibility4 ,it may indeed be  
argued with apparent justness1 that a   
principle of reviviscence may as well be
 admitted as a principle of production  
in the first instance3 and as to rewards
 and punishments1 judgement may be      
rendered1 as well as now1 by ,beings    
less than ,deities4 ,for my part ,i     
firmly wish for such a future state1 and
 though ,i cannot firmly believe it1 ,i 
am resolved to live as if such a state  
were to ensue4 ,this seems1 ,i own1 like
 doubting1 and doubting may be said to  
be a miserable state of anxiety4 ,better
 be confident than unhinged2 better     
confide in ignorance than have no fixed 
system4 ,so it may be argued2 but ,i    
think the result will be as people feel4
 ,those who do not feel bold enough1 to 
be satisfied with their own thoughts1   
may abandon them and adopt the thoughts 
of others4 ,for my part ,i am content   
with my own2 and not the less so because
 they do not end in certainty upon      
matters1 from the nature of them1 beyond

 the complete reach of human            
intelligence4  ,there is nothing in fact
 important to human nature but          
happiness1 which is or ought to be the  
end or aim of our being4 ,i mean        
self-happiness2 but fortunately for     
mankind1 such is by nature our          
construction1 that we cannot            
individually be happy unless we join    
also in promoting the happiness of      
others4 ,should immorality1 timidity or 
other base principles arise from atheism
 it tends immediately1 ,i will own1 to  
the unhappiness of mankind4 ,if it is   
asked me1 why am ,i honest and          
honourable8 ,i answer1 because of the   
satisfaction ,i have in being so4 ,do   
all people receive that satisfaction8   
,no1 many who are ill educated1         
ill-exampled and perverted1 do not4 ,i  
do1 that is enough for me4 ,in short1 ,i
 am well constructed1 and ,i feel ,i can
 therefore act an honest and honourable 
part without any religious motive4 ,did 
,i perceive1 that belief in a ,deity    

produced morality or inspired courage1  
,i might be prompted to confess1 that   
the contrary would ensue from atheism4  
,but the bulk of the world has long     
believed1 or long pretended to believe  
in a ,deity1 yet morality and every     
commendable quality seem at a stand4    
,the believer and the unbeliever we     
often see equally base1 equally immoral4
 ,superstition is certainly only the    
excess of religion4 ,that evidently is  
attended often with immorality and      
cowardice4 ,i am tempted to say1 from   
observation1 that the belief of a ,deity
 is apt to drive mankind into vice and  
baseness2 but ,i check myself in the    
assertion1 upon considering that very   
few indeed are those who really believe 
in a ,deity out of such as pretend to do
 so4 ,it is impossible for an           
intellectual being to believe firmly in 
that of which he can give no account1 or
 of which he can form no conception4 ,i 
hold the ,deity1 the fancied ,deity1 at 
least1 of whom with all his attributes  

such pompous descriptions are set forth 
to the great terror of old women and the
 amusement of young children1 to be an  
object of which we form 7as appears when
 we scrutinise into our ideas7 no       
conception and therefore can give no    
account4 ,it is said1 after all this1   
that men do still believe in such a     
,deity1 ,i then do say in return1 they  
do not make use of their intellects4    
,the moment we go into a belief beyond  
what we feel1 see and understand1 we    
might as well believe in                
will-with-a-whisp as in ,god4 ,but ,i   
would fix morality upon a better basis  
than belief in a ,deity4 ,if it has     
indeed at present no other basis1 it is 
not morality1 it is selfishness1 it is  
timidity2 it is the hope of reward1 it  
is the dread of punishment4 ,for a great
 and good man1 shew me one who loves    
virtue because he finds a pleasure in   
it1 who has acquired a taste for that   
pleasure by considering what and where  
happiness is1 who is not such a fool as 

to seek misery in preference to         
happiness1 whose honour is his ,deity1  
whose conscience is his judge4 ,put such
 a man in combat against the            
superstitious son of ,spain or          
,portugal1 it were easy to say who would
 shew the truest courage4 ,the question 
might be more voluminously discussed1   
but ,i feel already proof of conviction2
 if you1 ,dr4 ,priestley1 do not1       
perhaps some other readers may4 ,i have 
nothing to do with men of low minds4    
,they will always have their religion or
 pretence of it1 but ,i am mistaken if  
it is not the gallows or the pillory    
that more govern their morals than the  
gospel or the pulpit4  ,after all1      
atheism may be a system only for the    
learned4 ,the ignorant of all ages have 
believed in ,god4 ,the answer of a      
,philosophical ,unbeliever though       
written in the vulgar tongue may        
probably not reach the vulgar4 ,if      
argument had prevailed they were long   
converted from their superstitious      

belief4 ,the sentiments of atheistical  
philosophers have long been published4  
,if mischief therefore could ensue to   
society from such free discussions1 that
 mischief society must long have felt4  
,i think truth should never be hid1 but 
few are those who mind it4 ,i will      
therefore take upon myself but little   
importance though ,i have presumed to   
preface an answer from a ,philosophical 
,unbeliever to ,letters which you1 ,dr4 
,priestley have written4 ,if you deem   
that answer detrimental to the interests
 of society1 you will recollect that you
 invite the proposal of objections and  
promise to answer all as well as you    
can4 ,if you should happen to be        
exasperated by the freedom of the       
language or the contrariety of the      
sentiment1 this answer will gain weight 
in proportion as you lose in the credit 
of a tolerant ,divine4 ,therefore if you
 reply at all1 reply with candour and   
with coolness2 heed the matter and not  
the man1 though ,i subscribe my name1   

and am       ,reverend ,sir1      ,your 
friend1 admirer1 and humble servant1    
,,william ,,hammon4  ,oxford-,street1   
,no4 #dah4 ,jan4 #a1 #aghb4             
,,answer ,,from ,a ,,philosophical      
,,unbeliever4   ,it is the general      
fashion to believe in a ,god1 the maker 
of all things1 or at least to pretend to
 such a belief1 to define the nature of 
this existing ,deity by the attributes  
which are given to him1 to place the    
foundation of morality on this belief1  
and in idea at least1 to connect the    
welfare of civil society with the       
acknowledgement of such a ,being4 ,few  
however are those1 who being questioned 
can give any tolerable grounds for their
 assertions upon this subject1 and      
hardly any two among the learned agree  
in their manner of proving what each    
will separately hold to be indisputably 
clear4 ,the attributes of a ,deity are  
more generally agreed upon1 though less 
the subject of proof1 than his          
existence4 ,as to morality1 those very  

people who are moral will not deny1 they
 would be so though there were not a    
,god1 and there never yet has been a    
civil lawgiver1 who left crimes to be   
punished by the author of the universe2 
not even the profanation of oaths upon  
the sacredness of which so much is built
 in society1 and which yet is said to be
 a more immediate offence against the   
,deity than any other that can be named4
  ,the method which ,dr4 ,priestley has 
taken to prove the existence of a ,god1 
is by arguing from effect to cause4 ,he 
explodes that other pretended proof a   
priori which has so much raised the fame
 of ,dr4 ,clarke among other            
theologians4 ,as to the attributes of   
the ,deity1 ,dr4 ,priestley is not quite
 so confident in his proofs there2 and  
the most amiable one1 the most by       
mortals to be wished for1 the           
benevolence of ,god he almost gives up1 
or owns at least there is not so much   
proof of it as of his other attributes4 
,his observations are divided into      

several ,letters1 this is one answer    
given to the whole2 for it would be to  
no purpose to reply to topics upon which
 the writers are agreed4 ,what therefore
 is not contradicted here1 ,dr4         
,priestley may in general take to be    
allowed2 but to obviate doubts and to   
allow his argument every force1 it may  
be fairer perhaps to recite at full     
length what in this answer is allowed to
 be true1 what is denied as false1 what 
meant to be exposed as absurd1 and what 
rejected as assertions without proof1   
inadmissible or inconclusive4 ,the      
conclusion will contain some            
observations upon the whole4            
,,truisms4      #a4 ,effects have their 
adequate causes4      #b4 ,nothing      
begins to exist without a cause foreign 
to itself4      #c4 ,no being could make
 himself1 for that would imply that he  
existed and did not exist at the same   
time4      #d4 ,if one horse1 or one    
tree1 had a cause1 all had4      #e4    
,something must have existed from all   

eternity4      #f4 ,atoms cannot be     
arranged1 in a manner expressive of the 
most     exquisite design1 without      
competent intelligence having existed   
somewhere4      #g4 ,the idea of a      
supreme author is more pleasing to a    
virtuous     mind1 than that of a blind 
fate and fatherless deserted world4     
#h4 ,the condition of mankind is in a   
state of melioration1 as far as         
misery arises from ignorance1 for as the
 world grows older it must     grow     
wiser1 if wisdom arises from experience4
      #i4 ,all moral virtue is only a   
modification of benevolence4      #aj4  
,virtue gives a better chance for       
happiness than vice4      #aa4 ,no      
instance of any revival4      #ab4      
,atheists are not to think themselves   
quite secure with respect     to a      
future life4      #ac4 ,thought might as
 well depend upon the construction of   
the     brain1 as upon any invisible    
substance extraneous to the brain4      
#ad4 ,if the works of ,god had a        

beginning1 there must have been a       
time when he was inactive4      #ae4    
,where happiness is wanting in the      
creation ,i would rather     conclude   
the author had mist of his design than  
that he wanted     benevolence4         
,,false ,,assertions4      #a4 ,a cause 
needs not be prior to an effect4        
#b4 ,if the species of man had no       
beginning1 it would not follow that     
it had no cause4      #c4 ,a cause may  
be cotemporary with the effect4      #d4
 ,an atheist must believe he was        
introduced into the world without       
design4       ,,absurdities4      #a4 ,a
 general mass of sensation consisting of
 various elements     borrowed from the 
past and the future4      #b4 ,since    
sensation is made up of past1 present1  
and future1 the     infant feeling for  
the moment only1 the man recollecting   
what is     past and anticipating the   
future1 and as the present sensation    
must     therefore in time bear a less  
proportion to the general mass of       

sensation than it did1 so at last all   
temporary affections1 whether     of    
pain or pleasure become wholly          
inconsiderable4      #c4 ,the great book
 of nature and the book of revelation   
both lie     open before us4      #d4 ,a
 conclusion above our comprehension4    
#e4 ,a whole eternity already past4     
#f4 ,since a finite ,being cannot be    
infinitely happy1 because he must       
then be infinite in knowledge and power2
 and as all limitation of     happiness 
must consist in degree of happiness or  
mixture of misery1     the ,deity can   
alone determine which mode of limitation
 is best4      #g4 ,we have reason to be
 thankful for our pains and distress4   
#h4 ,if the divine ,being had made man  
at first as happy as he can be     after
 all the feelings and ideas of a painful
 and laborious life1 it     must have   
been in violation of all general laws   
and by a constant     and momentary     
interference of the ,deity4      #i4 ,it
 is better the divine agency should not 

be very conspicuous4      #aj4 ,if good 
prevails on the whole1 creation being   
infinite1     happiness must be         
infinite1 and ,god comprehending the    
whole1 will     only perceive the       
balance of good1 and that will be       
happiness     unmixed with misery4      
#aa4 ,if a man is happy in the whole he 
is infinitely happy in the     whole of 
his existence4      #ab4 ,although all  
things fall alike to all men and no     
distinction is     made between the     
righteous and the wicked1 and even      
though the     wicked derive an         
advantage from their vices1 yet this is 
consistent     with a state of moral    
government by a ,being of infinite      
wisdom and     power4      #ac4 ,as     
ploughing is the means of having a      
harvest1 though ,god has                
predetermined whether there should be a 
harvest or not1 so prayer is     the    
means of obtaining good from ,god1      
although that good is     predetermined 
upon2 it is therefore no more absurd to 

pray than to     plough4      #ad4      
,notwithstanding happiness is the       
necessary consequence of     health1 yet
 man's happiness is more from           
intellectual than corporeal             
feelings4      #ae4 ,evil is necessarily
 connected with and subservient to good1
     although in the next world there   
will be all good and no evil4      #af4 
,by reason we can discover the necessary
 existence of a ,deity1     yet to be a 
sceptic on that subject is the first    
step to be a     ,christian1 because    
reason not sufficiently proving it we   
fly to     revealed truth4      #ag4    
,the power1 which a man has by the      
comprehensiveness of his mind     to    
enjoy the future1 has no apparent       
limits4      #ah4 ,it is of no avail in 
the argument concerning the existence of
 a     ,deity1 that we have no          
conception of him1 since it does not    
imply     impossibility of his existence
 that we have no idea at all upon the   
subject4       ,,inadmissible ,,or      

,,inconclusive4      #a4 ,the question  
of the existence of a ,deity is         
important4      #b4 ,a ,theist has a    
higher sense of personal dignity than an
     atheist4      #c4 ,the conduct of  
an atheist must give concern to those   
who are not     so4      #d4 ,an atheist
 believes himself to be1 at his death1  
for ever     excluded from returning    
life4      #e4 ,there are more atheists 
than unbelievers in revelation4      #f4
 ,men of letters may have the same bias 
to incredulity as others     to         
credulity1 because they are subject to a
 wrong association of     ideas1 as well
 as other persons though in a less      
degree4      #g4 ,whoever first made a  
thing1 for example a chair or a table1  
must     have had an adequate idea of   
it's nature and use4      #h4 ,if a     
table had a designing cause1 the tree   
from whence the wood     came1 and the  
man who made the table must have had a  
designing     cause1 which comprehended 
all the powers and properties of trees  

and     men4      #i4 ,all the visible  
universe1 as far as we can judge1 bears 
the     marks of being one work1 and    
therefore must have had a cause of      
infinite power and intelligence4        
#aj4 ,we might as well say a table had  
no cause1 as that the world     had     
none4      #aa4 ,a ,being originally and
 necessarily capable of comprehending   
itself1 it is not improper to call      
infinite1 for we can have no idea     of
 any bounds to it's knowledge or power4 
#ab4 ,a series of finite causes cannot  
possibly be carried back     ad         
infinitum4      #ac4 ,our imagination   
revolts at the idea of an intellectual  
soul of     the universe1 that is1 of an
 intelligence resulting from            
arrangement4      #ad4 ,the actual      
existence of the universe compels us to 
come at last     to an originally       
existent and intellectual ,being1       
because if the     immediate maker of   
the universe has not existed from all   
eternity1     he must have derived his  

being and senses from one who has1 and  
that     being we call ,god4      #ae4  
,god must be present to all his works1  
if we admit no power can     act but    
where it is1 he must therefore exist    
every where1 because     his works are  
every where4      #af4 ,as no being can 
unmake or materially change himself 7at 
least     none can annihilate himself7  
so ,god is unchangeable1 for no ,being  
,god made can change him and no other   
,being can exist but what ,god     made4
      #ag4 ,two infinite intelligent    
beings of the same kind would           
coincide1 therefore there can only be   
one ,god4      #ah4 ,nothing can be more
 evident1 than that plants and animals  
could     not have proceeded from each  
other from all eternity4      #ai4 ,that
 happiness is the design of the creation
 because health is     designed and     
sickness is only an exception1 not a    
general rule is as     evident as that  
the design of the ,mill-wright must have
 been1 that     his machine should not  

be obstructed4      #bj4 ,as a state of 
sickness is comparatively rare with a   
state of     health1 happiness the      
result of health1 and the end of the    
creation     happiness1 so the end of   
the creation is already in a great      
measure     answered4      #ba4         
,pleasure tends to continue and         
propagate itself1 pain to check     and 
exterminate itself4      #bb4 ,as our   
knowledge and power in respect to       
shunning pains and     procuring        
pleasures advance with our experience1  
nothing is wanting     to enable us to  
exterminate all pains1 but a continuance
 of being4      #bc4 ,our enjoyments    
continually increase in real value from 
infancy     to old age4      #bd4 ,a    
future moral distribution is probable1  
because ,god is     infinitely powerful 
and wise4      #be4 ,since reverence1   
gratitude1 obedience1 confidence are    
duties to     men1 so they are to ,god2 
and as we pray to men1 so we should pray
 to     ,god4      #bf4 ,prescience1    

predetermination and infinite           
benevolence are no     argument against 
prayer to the ,deity4      #bg4 ,a wish 
produced by nature is evidence of the   
thing wished for1     but a future state
 is wished for1 therefore there is      
evidence of a     future state4         
#bh4 ,as we have no idea how we came    
originally to be produced1 for     what 
we know to the contrary our reproduction
 may be as much the     course of nature
 as our original production44      #bi4 
,a gloom and melancholy belong more to  
atheists than to devout     people4     
,,observations4   ,dr4 ,priestley will  
hardly doubt1 after this collection from
 his work that it has at least been read
 before it is attempted to be answered4 
,it is in the writer's power to quote   
the page and line for each assertion1   
but it would be stuffing this           
publication with unnecessary references4
 ,dr4 ,priestley will be able to know   
what are his own sentiments and what not
 without recurring to his printed       

,letters4 ,there has been also another  
difficulty in classing the several      
exceptions under the different heads2   
what is false1 what is absurd1 and what 
is inadmissible bordering so nearly on  
each other4 ,nice distinctions cannot in
 such respect be made1 but the whole    
together form the main argument which is
 to be answered4  ,the first and        
principal assertion is1 that effects    
have their adequate cause2 it is then   
added1 that the universe is an effect1  
that it therefore must have a cause1 and
 to this cause in the ,english language 
is given the name of ,god4 ,this        
proposition is true1 provided the       
universe is an effect1 but that is a    
postulatum without concession and       
without a proof4 ,this original ,being  
he advances in another place to be that 
only something which existed uncaused   
from all eternity1 and which could not  
have been a ,being1 like a man or a     
table1 incapable of comprehending1      
itself1 for such existences would       

require another superior ,being4 ,but if
 the universe is not adopted as an      
effect1 if it is taken as existing from 
all eternity1 the universe becomes an   
intelligent ,being1 and there or no     
where is the ,deity sought after4 ,such 
a ,being we may properly speak of and   
reason upon4 ,the whole is subjected to 
our sensations and our experience4 ,but 
of his own uncaused ,being ,dr4 ,p4 says
 we cannot properly speak4 ,is not that 
alone an argument of there being no such
 thing8 ,his friend ,dr4 ,clarke says1  
we cannot have an idea of an impossible 
thing4 ,now this discovered ,deity is   
allowed to be that of which we can have 
no idea4 ,so far at least it is allied  
to the impossible4  ,as to the argument 
of cause and effect1 the latter         
certainly implies the former2 but when  
we give the name of effect to any thing1
 we must be certain it is an effect1 for
 we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to
 call that an effect which is a cause1  
at least what is an effect to-day may be

 a cause to-morrow1 as in the instance  
of generation2 for though a son does not
 beget his father1 he too has his       
offspring in which he may be said to    
live over again1 and if we are to argue 
only from experience1 most probably that
 alone is the resurrection and the life 
to come4 ,but if it is contended that   
our experience relates only to finite   
causes1 or causes incapable of          
comprehending themselves1 it must at the
 same time be allowed1 that all our     
reasoning is founded only on experience4
 ,this ,dr4 ,p4 at least allows even    
while he keeps reasoning about a ,deity1
 which he calls an infinite cause       
capable of comprehending itself1 though 
nobody is capable of comprehending it1  
and of which we therefore can have no   
experience4 ,yet he will assert1 that   
thinking persons seldom are convinced by
 thinking4 ,this is odd language for a  
reasoner4 ,when another philosopher or  
divine attempts to prove a ,god in their
 own way1 ,dr4 ,priestley can readily   

see his fallacies and absurdities4 ,dr4 
,clarke1 the former great champion of   
,god ,almighty1 is made very light of4  
,he thought1 foolish man1 to prove the  
existence of a ,deity merely by our     
having an idea of that existence1 which 
would go to prove the truth of every    
unnatural conceit that ever entered into
 the heart of man2 and contended farther
 that it would be equally absurd to     
suppose no ,deity as two and two did not
 make four4 ,it would indeed be absurd1 
says ,dr4 ,priestley provided we agreed 
that the universe is a caused existence1
 for ,god is the name we give for the   
cause of the universe1 which in such    
case must exist4 ,it is only denying    
that the universe is a caused existence1
 and then the absurdity is taken away4  
,dr4 ,priestley1 for the sake of making 
,dr4 ,clarke absurd1 will readily allow 
the denial capable of being made2 and   
for the same purpose he seems gravely to
 have taken upon himself to prove that  
school-boy's difficulty1 that two and   

two do make four1 for he says1 that four
 is the term agreed upon in language to 
be given to the sum total of two and    
two1 and that to deny the ,deity is at  
least not so absurd as to say that two  
and two do not make four4  ,dr4         
,priestley says he finds no difficulty  
in excluding every thing from the mind  
except space and duration4 ,he allows   
then at least1 that there is no manifest
 absurdity in supposing there is no     
,deity1 for nothing can be proved by    
reasoning if the conclusion can be      
denied without absurdity1 nor can there 
be a manifest absurdity in denying the  
existence of what there is no difficulty
 in excluding from the mind4 ,yet after 
all he adds 7somewhat inconsistently7   
that we cannot exclude the idea of a    
,deity1 if we do not exclude an existent
 universe4 ,this ,deity he defines to be
 a most simple ,being2 simple and       
infinite2 terms which but ill agree     
together4  ,the infinite or boundless   
existence of this pretended ,deity is a 

property more insisted upon than any    
other1 and whatever other properties are
 given to him they are all in the       
infinite degree4 ,the properties        
alledged to be proved are1 eternity1    
infinite knowledge and power1           
unchangeableness1 unity1 omnipotence1   
action from all eternity1 and           
independence4 ,benevolence and moral    
government are also ascribed to him but 
confessedly with a less degree of       
certainty1 though the most desireable of
 all his given properties4 ,upon the    
subject of benevolence1 ,dr4 ,priestley 
only advances1 that where it is not     
proved by the happiness of his creatures
 to exist1 he would rather chuse to     
conclude he mist of his design1 that is1
 he wanted power or knowledge1 than that
 he wanted benevolence4 ,if he means to 
argue that it is more rational to       
conclude this ,deity wanted power and   
knowledge than that he wanted           
benevolence1 and because ,dr4 ,priestley
 fancies himself to have proved the     

,deity cannot want the two former1 he   
concludes the ,deity cannot want the    
latter1 as the less probable for him to 
be deficient in1 his argument is no more
 a truism4 ,as a wish1 that the ,deity  
may not want benevolence1 in that sense 
let him take it as agreed upon4 ,he     
allows that misery in the human species 
proves malevolence in the ,deity1 and   
happiness the contrary4 ,all the proof  
adduced in favour of benevolence is in  
asserting that throughout the universe1 
good is more predominant than evil4 ,the
 infinite extent of benevolence he will 
allow incapable of proof2 but then it is
 said that the evils which mankind      
endure are not so great as might be     
inflicted upon them2 that virtue to     
vice1 happiness to misery1 health to    
sickness bear at least equal            
proportions4 ,that lesser evils exist   
instead of greater is indeed but a poor 
proof in the favour of the benevolence  
of an all-powerful ,being4 ,or grant1   
that good is more predominant than evil1

 this surely is no proof neither of the 
benevolence of a kind and all-powerful  
,being4 ,yet ,dr4 ,priestley adds that  
the general benevolence of the ,deity is
 unquestionable4 ,how unquestionable8   
,it is questioned by the author himself1
 and he declares he cannot prove it4    
,after this he asks1 who will pretend to
 dictate to such a ,being8 ,he might in 
the same stile conclude that no         
objection deserved a reply4 ,the whole  
of this is absurd2 but when the ,doctor 
begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the
 rest of the ecclesiastical arguers4    
,they reason themselves into imaginary  
,beings with more imaginary properties  
and then fall down and worship them4    
,god is said to have made man in the    
image of himself4 ,if he has done so1   
man is up with him1 for he in return    
makes ,god in his own image4 ,much as   
the imagination of one man differs from 
another1 so differs the ,god of each    
devotee4 ,they are all idolaters or     
anthropomorphites to a man2 there is    

none but an atheist that is not the one 
or the other4  ,the admission of evil   
into the world is an argument so        
exceedingly conclusive against at least 
a good ,deity1 that it is curious to see
 how ,dr4 ,priestley studies to get rid 
of that difficulty4 ,he partly denies   
the fact1 at least he says there is more
 good than evil in the world4 ,at last  
he even turns evil into good1 or what   
ought to be the effects of one1 into    
what ought to be the effects of the     
other1 as he says pain is necessary for 
happiness4 ,but if pain is1 as he says1 
in this world necessary for happiness1  
why will it not still be necessary      
hereafter8 ,he answers1 because by that 
time we shall have experienced pain     
enough for a future supply of happiness4
 ,if it is objected1 why have we not had
 pain enough by the time each of us are 
twenty or thirty years of age1 instead  
of waiting 'till our deaths at so many  
different ages8 ,he can only finish his 
argument by allowing that the ways of   

,god are inscrutable to man1 that every 
thing is for the best and refer us to   
,candide for the rest of his philosophy2
 nor will he ever resolve the question1 
if evil and pain are good and necessary 
now1 why will they not always be so8    
,take a view of human existence1 and who
 can even allow1 that there is more     
happiness than misery in the world8 ,dr4
 ,priestley thinks to give the turn of  
the scale to happiness1 by making it    
depend intirely upon health1            
notwithstanding he says in another place
 that human sensations are a mass       
collected from the past1 present and    
future1 and as a man grows up the       
present goes on to bear a less          
proportion to the other two4 ,it would  
indeed be a short but lame way of       
proving that happiness is the design of 
the creation because health is designed1
 and sickness is only an exception1 not 
a general rule4 ,many a healthy man has 
certainly been unhappy1 or else had a   
man better study health than virtue4 ,if

 the mill-wright make a poor machine he 
is a poor workman2 ,god in like manner  
designing health and introducing        
sickness is but a poor physician4 ,in   
another place ,dr4 ,priestley having    
considered1 that he had asserted that   
human sensations arise from ideas of the
 past and future as well as the present1
 finds himself obliged to alter his     
notions of happiness1 so far as to say  
that happiness is more intellectual than
 corporeal4 ,but it is rather           
extraordinary to assert at the same     
time1 that happiness is the necessary   
consequence of health1 and that         
happiness is more from intellectual than
 corporeal feelings4 ,surely health1 if 
any thing1 is corporeal4 ,another       
curious fancy about pain and happiness  
is1 that our finite nature not admitting
 infinite or unlimited happiness we must
 leave it to the wisdom of the ,deity to
 determine which is best for us 7since  
happiness must be diminished7 a little  
pain to be added to it or somewhat of   

happiness to be taken away4 ,it hardly  
requires the skill of a benevolent      
,deity to determine which is best for   
the creatures he has made 7and whom he  
wishes to be as happy as their finite   
nature will admit7 to lessen their      
degree of happiness or mix therein a    
proportion of misery4 ,to conclude he   
asks1 how it is possible to teach       
children caution1 but by feeling pain8  
,it is easy to allow in answer1 that it 
might not perhaps be possible in us4    
,but he is arguing about the benevolence
 of a ,deity4 ,it was possible1 he will 
allow1 in him to have given these       
children knowledge without pain1 at     
least if he continues to him the        
attribute he allows of omnipotence4     
,next he observes that parents suspend  
at times their benefits to their        
offspring1 when persuaded they are not  
for their good2 so does the ,deity4 ,but
 before this argument holds he must     
therefore say1 it is not for the good of
 man to be made happy now1 and that the 

,deity can be infinitely benevolent     
without willing either infinite or      
universal happiness4 ,take the argument 
any way1 it must go against his         
benevolence or his power2 and the same  
observations hold as to his love of     
justice1 whilst he is so tardy in       
punishing offenders4  ,after observing  
that things are in an improving state1  
,dr4 ,priestley allows1 that the moral  
government of the universe is not       
perfect4 ,from thence he proceeds to    
assert1 that atheists may believe it    
within the course of nature1 that men as
 moral agents may after death be        
re-produced1 and therefore that there   
may be a future state though there be no
 ,god1 because he reasons it may be in  
the course of nature4 ,this allows that 
the course of nature may be as it is    
without a ,god1 and that there is       
therefore no natural proof of a ,deity4 
,his farther argument on this head is1  
that things usually happen in a state of
 nature that are proper4 ,a future state

 is proper4 7,to carry on the supposed  
state of melioration and complete the   
moral government of the universe47 ,it  
is therefore probable4 ,this is an      
argument perhaps more of wish than      
probability1 but let it have such force 
as belongs to it4 ,it is not the wish of
 the answerer by supporting atheism to  
give encouragement to immorality1 but   
should he unwarily or with weak minds do
 so1 the argument of the ,deity's       
existence is independent of such        
considerations4 ,it were better to seek 
another support for morality than a     
belief in ,god2 for the moral purpose in
 believing a ,deity 7an invisible       
,being1 maker of all1 our moral         
governor1 who will hereafter take       
cognizance of our conduct17 is not a    
little checked by considering1 that he  
leaves the proof of his very existence  
so ambiguous1 that even men with a habit
 of piety upon them cannot but have     
their doubts1 whilst on this existence  
so much of the moral purpose depends4   

,if this is not an argument against the 
morality of a ,deity1 it is at all      
events one against his infinite morality
 though moral is an attribute to be     
given to him in the infinite degree as  
much as any other4  ,it is said1        
infinite intelligence must have procured
 a necessary fitness of things1 and that
 this forms morality4 ,his will could   
not be biassed by other influence2      
therefore he must have willed morality1 
because necessarily fit4 ,then comes    
infinite power1 and yet no morality in  
the world or a very small portion of it4
 ,we cannot to any purpose1 do what we  
will1 argue against experience4 ,that it
 must be1 yet that it is not4 ,what must
 be1 will be4 ,if it is not1 there is no
 must in the case4  ,it is next said1   
that virtue gives a better chance for   
happiness than vice4 ,this also is but a
 weak argument for the moral government 
of the universe1 unless it be for a     
moral government by chance4 ,virtue     
ought to be the certain and immediate   

parent of happiness1 if a moral governor
 existed with an uncontrouled dominion4 
,if virtue tends to happiness1 or has   
only a better chance of doing so1 it is 
allowed1 that a sensible atheist should 
hold it right to be virtuous4 ,the      
latter end of a righteous man is        
certainly more likely to be happy than  
that of an unrighteous one4 ,but let an 
atheist be righteous1 and he can be as  
certain of happiness in his latter end  
as any other4 ,let another life be      
desirable1 as it certainly is1 his      
doubts upon it will not prevent it4 ,who
 could wish an end better or more happy 
than that of ,mr4 ,hume1 who most       
indubitably was an atheist4 ,but if an  
atheist be not so good as a ,theist1    
,dr4 ,priestley perhaps1 will allow him 
to be better than a sceptic1 as any     
principles for systematising nature are 
better than none at all4 ,a ,theist is  
not without his doubts as well as the   
sceptic2 an atheist1 once firmly        
becoming so1 will never doubt more2 for 

we may venture to say no miracles or new
 appearances will present themselves to 
him to draw his belief aside4  ,still   
every thing is as ,god intended it--so  
asserts ,dr4 ,priestley2 and therefore  
it cannot by him be denied that crimes  
and vices1 are of his intention4 ,the   
,theist exclaims in triumph1 ,he that   
made the eye1 must he not see8 ,but who 
made the eye8 ,or grant that ,god made  
the eye1 which can only see in the      
light1 must he necessarily see in the   
dark8 ,it is again asserted1 the power  
which formed an eye had something in    
view as certainly as he that constructed
 a telescope4 ,if any ,being formed any 
eye1 grant it4 ,but if the eye exists   
necessarily as a part of nature2 as much
 as any other matter1 or combination of 
matter1 necessarily existed1 the result 
of the argument is intirely different4  
,it is far from being a necessary part  
of the atheist's creed to exclude design
 from the universe4 ,he places that     
design in the energy of nature1 which   

,dr4 ,priestley gives to some other     
extraneous ,being4 ,it is rather        
inconsistent also in him to say1 that an
 atheist rightly judging of his own     
situation upon his own principles1 ought
 not to hold himself quite secure from a
 future state of responsibility and     
existences1 and yet to say he must in   
his own ideas hold himself soon to be   
excluded for ever from life4  ,as to the
 immutability of the ,deity1 it is      
difficult to guess how that is proved1  
except by the argument of ,lucus a non  
lucendo1 because every thing is changing
 here2 therefore the ,deity never       
changes2 which is neither an argument a 
priori nor posteriore1 but sui generis1 
merely applicable to the ,deity4  ,from 
the imperial infinite intelligence of   
the ,deity an argument is formed of his 
unity4 ,dr4 ,priestley says1 that two   
infinite intelligent ,beings would      
coincide1 and therefore that there can  
only be one such ,being4 ,two parallels 
will never coincide4 ,that is one of the

 first axioms of ,euclid1 in whom ,dr4  
,priestley believes as much as in his   
bible4 ,if the ,beings are infinite in  
extent and magnitude they must certainly
 coincide1 but if they are only infinite
 in intelligence1 it does not seem to be
 necessary that they should4  ,the      
ubiquity of ,god is proved in this short
 way3 ,god made every thing1 ,god       
controuls every thing4 ,no power can act
 but where it is4 ,therefore ,god is    
present every where4 ,the workman must  
certainly be present at his work1 but   
when the work is done he may go about   
other business4 ,if all the properties  
of matter1 such as gravity1 elasticity  
and other such existed only by the      
perpetual leave and agency of the       
,deity1 it may be argued he is in all   
places where matter is4 ,space1 empty   
space will still exist without him4 ,in 
this mode of proof ,dr4 ,priestley must1
 contrary to the ,newtonian system argue
 for a ,plenum1 before he proves the    
ubiquity4 ,he cannot exclude space from 

his mind1 nor can he exclude gravity    
from matter4 ,yet can he admit matter as
 well as space to be eternal1 because he
 will not allow the inactivity of ,god4 
,if ,god's works had a beginning he must
 have been for a whole eternity         
inactive4 ,he seems to have an odd      
notion of eternity1 for he there allows 
it could have an end4 ,the argument     
would be fairer in concluding he must   
have been inactive or doing something   
else4  ,the ,deity set up1 if not the   
creator of matter1 is at least the      
matter of it1 nor will his advocates by 
any means allow him to be material      
himself4 ,they see some incongruity in  
admitting one piece of matter to be so  
complete a master of another4 ,however  
,dr4 ,priestley and other arguers for a 
,deity would do well to consider1 that  
whatever is not matter1 is a space that 
matter may occupy4 ,therefore if ,god is
 not matter1 and also is not space1 he  
is nothing4 ,dr4 ,priestley allows      
matter eternal1 and its properties of   

gravity1 elasticity1 electricity and    
others equally eternal4 ,he says        
directly1 that matter cannot exist      
without it's perpetually corresponding  
powers4 ,the adjustment of those powers 
he places in the ,deity4 ,but as we     
never see matter without the adjustment 
of those properties as well as the      
existence of them1 this drives him at   
last to say1 the ,deity must also have  
created matter1 according to his system 
eternally created it1 cotemporarily with
 himself4 ,ideas absurd and             
irreconcileable6  ,discoursing upon the 
hypothesis of a fortuitous concourse of 
atoms ,dr4 ,priestley asks1 what reason 
we have to think that small masses of   
matter can have power without           
communication ab extra8 ,let this       
question be returned1 have we not reason
 to think so from attraction the most   
common property in matter4 ,to get rid  
of this difficulty he will not allow an 
atom of matter to be possessed          
originally of the most simple powers1   

though he is ready to allow matter to   
have been eternal4 ,a magnet according  
to this system must sometime have       
existed without its magnetic power4 ,he 
concludes there must be some original   
existent ,being4 ,he shall be allowed   
many original existent ,beings if it    
pleases him4 ,a man may be an originally
 existent being1 as well as any other4  
,he is superior to other animals in this
 world4 ,in like manner there may be    
allowed superior ,beings to man 7as most
 probably there are7 and yet those      
superior ,beings not have made man4     
,dr4 ,priestley will have it1 that all  
bodies are moved by external force4     
,that does not seem quite necessary4    
,motion may as well be asserted to be   
originally a property of matter1 or its 
true natural state and rest a           
deprivation of that property1 as that   
rest should be its natural state4 ,hume 
thought so and ,hume was no great fool1 
notwithstanding ,dr4 ,priestley makes so
 light of him4 ,in fact matter never is1

 and therefore most probably never was  
found to be in a state of rest4 ,nor has
 ,dr4 ,priestley any reason to suppose  
gravity1 elasticity and electricity to  
have been imprest on bodies by a        
superior ,being1 and not originally     
inherent in matter1 unless to favour his
 own hypothesis of a ,deity4 ,he        
absolutely says matter could not have   
had those powers without a communication
 from a superior and intelligent ,being4
 ,if matter is perceived in regulated   
motion1 it is added bluntly1 that it    
must be by a mover possessed of a       
competent intelligence1 and that a      
,being therefore of such power and      
intelligence must exist4 ,whoever finds 
no difficulty in believing the contrary 
will find as little difficulty in ,mr4  
,hume's hypothesis1 that motion might as
 well as other powers and properties    
have been originally inherent in matter1
 or at least have been a necessary      
result of some matter acting upon       
another4  ,it has always been a doubt   

with ,theists1 whether they can better  
prove their ,god's existence by moral or
 physical considerations4 ,dr4          
,priestley seems to think the forte of  
the argument lies in the latter proof1  
and lays particular stress upon his     
observation respecting cause and effect1
 which therefore cannot here be so      
readily dismissed4 ,he makes great      
reference to the works of art4 ,theists 
are always for turning their ,god into  
an overgrown man4 ,anthropomorphites has
 long been a term applied to them4 ,they
 give him hands and eyes nor can they   
conceive him otherwise than as a        
corporeal ,being4 ,in which1 as before  
has been said1 they are very right1 for 
there can only be in the world body and 
the space which bodies occupy4 ,but     
granting this great workman to have done
 so much1 is it not quite an            
incontrovertible proposition1 that      
whoever first made a thing1 as1 for     
example1 a chair or a table1 must have  
had an adequate idea of it's nature and 

use4 ,dr4 ,priestley speaks more        
correctly in another part1 by saying1 he
 must have been capable of comprehending
 it4 ,the nature and use of things are  
often found out after they are made and 
by different persons than the makers of 
them4 ,neither is there any analogy     
between the works of art1 as a table or 
house1 and of nature1 as a man or tree4 
,therefore there can be no arguing from 
one to another by analogy4 ,hume        
observes that the former works are done 
by reason and design1 and the latter by 
generation and vegetation1 and therefore
 arguing from effect to causes1 it is   
probable1 that the universe is generated
 or vegetated4 ,at least after all the  
observations about a table1 it may be   
modestly asked1 whether there is not    
some difference between a table and the 
world8 ,the ,doctor will also find some 
difficulty in explaining the propriety  
of any argument of analogy between men  
and metals1 which he does not at other  
times scruple to make8  ,a gratis       

assertion is first made1 that all things
 we see are effects2 then because we see
 one thing caused1 every thing must have
 been caused4 ,his conclusion of the    
argument is still more curious1 because 
every thing was caused there must have  
been something that was not caused4 ,the
 cause ought to be proportioned to the  
effect4 ,the effect is not infinite4    
,why then attribute infinity to the     
cause8 ,this is ,hume's argument4       
,priestley calls it shortly unworthy of 
a philosopher4 ,let others judge6 ,but  
surely1 with all this infinity it may be
 asked1 why may not there have been an  
infinity of causes8  ,another argument  
is1 that being unable to account1 for   
what is1 by any thing visible1 we must  
have recourse to something invisible1   
and that invisible power is what he     
calls ,god4 ,apply this argument to     
gravity1 and the external force that is 
said to cause every stone to fall is    
,god4 ,but if nothing visible can to us 
account for the operations of nature1   

why must we have recourse to what is    
invisible8 ,why necessary to account at 
all for them8 ,or why may not visible   
things account for them1 although this  
person or another cannot tell which8    
,if nothing can begin to exist of itself
 or by the energy of material nature1 it
 is more consistent to allow a plurality
 of ,deities1 than one immediate ,deity4
 ,an equality in a plurality of ,deities
 might be objectionable4 ,but that is   
not at all necessary1 rather the        
contrary2 and so was the ,pagan theory1 
which is not so absurd as the modern    
one4 ,this universe or mundane system   
may be the work of one hand1 another of 
another1 and so on4 ,where is the       
absurdity of that8 ,if the universe is  
applied to the solar system1 there is an
 appearance of its being formed by one  
design1 and in that stile it might be   
said to be the work of one hand4 ,but   
this ,deity is asserted to be infinite1 
and to have made all other worlds and   
universes1 though it does not appear by 

any unity of design that all other      
worlds and universes are one work with  
this4  ,dr4 ,priestley himself allows   
that reason would drive us to require a 
cause of the ,deity4 ,he is himself     
obliged to conclude1 after all his      
reasoning1 that we must acquiesce in our
 inability of having any idea on the    
subject2 that is1 how ,god could exist  
without a prior cause4 ,at the same time
 he says the ,deity cannot have a cause1
 and therefore we cannot reason about   
him4 ,why then all his own reasoning8   
,we make a ,deity ourselves1 fall down  
and worship him4 ,it is the molten calf 
over again4 ,idolatry is still          
practised4 ,the only difference is that 
now we worship idols of our imagination2
 before of our hands4 ,still we must    
necessarily rest at a ,being that is    
infinite2 that is1 when our reason      
drives us to the admission of an        
infinite cause we must necessarily stop 
finitely in our career4 ,not content    
with this conclusion he adds1 that we   

cannot help perceiving the existence of 
this cause1 though he owns that it is   
not an object of our conceptions4 ,but  
even the ,theist's argument does not    
necessarily drive us to the admission of
 an infinite cause4 ,the argument is1   
because there is a man1 and man has     
intelligence1 we must necessarily admit 
of a ,being of infinitely superior      
intelligence4 ,would it not be nearly as
 well to argue1 because there is a      
goose1 therefore there must be a man4   
,what is there more which hinders a     
series of finite causes to be carried   
back ad infinitum1 than that the        
reasoner or contemplator of the course  
of nature is tired4 ,if this eternal    
series could not exist1 a ,deity might  
with some propriety be said to follow4  
,put the argument into a syslogistic    
form4  ,the universe shews design2  ,it 
is absurd to suppose an infinite        
succession of finite causes2  ,therefore
 there is an uncaused intelligent cause 
of this universe4  ,deny the second     

assertion and the problem is destroyed4 
,so far from its being difficult to     
suppose an eternity1 it is the most     
difficult thing in the world to suppose 
any thing but an eternity4 ,a mind1 not 
afraid to think1 will find it the most  
easy contemplation in the world to dwell
 upon4 ,it is at least a bold assertion1
 that nothing can be more evident than  
that plants and animals could not have  
proceeded from each other by succession 
from all eternity4 ,surely to this may  
be answered1 that it is more evident    
that two and two make four4 ,but ,dr4   
,priestley goes on to say1 that the     
primary cause of a man cannot be a man1 
any more than the cause of a sound can  
be a sound4 ,experience shews us all    
sound is an effect of a cause4 ,does    
experience shew us more of a man than   
that he came from a man and a woman8 ,to
 allow therefore that all men must have 
come from a man and a woman is as far as
 we can argue upon the subject1 whilst  
in reasoning we trust to experience4 ,an

 argument is well built upon similarity1
 therefore it is probable if one horse  
had a cause all horses had4 ,but will   
not the argument be more consonant to   
itself1 in supposing all horses had the 
same cause1 and as one is seen to be    
generated from a horse and a mare so all
 were from all eternity4 ,it were a     
better argument in favour of a ,deity or
 some invisible agent to shew that a new
 animal came every now and then into    
life1 without any body's knowing how or 
where4  ,it is allowed by ,priestley and
 all other reasoners1 that the most     
capital argument that can be formed in  
support of any thesis is to be built    
upon experience1 or analogy to          
experience4 ,yet will many of these     
reasoners1 ,dr4 ,priestley at least for 
one1 contend at the same time for the   
probability of a future life1 when no   
instance can be given of any revival    
whatsoever4 ,the same will contend1 that
 their ,deity can at pleasure form new  
species of animals1 though in fact we   

never do see new beings come into       
existence4 ,we ought only to argue from 
experience2 and experience would teach  
us1 that the species of all animals has 
eternally existed4 ,grant that we do not
 know1 whether man has been eternal1 or 
from a time1 is it therefore because we 
do not know1 that we must say he came   
from ,god8 ,that unknown ,being1 as he  
is sometimes pompously and ridiculously 
called6 ,the ,devil is equally an       
unknown ,being4 ,the admission of evil  
under a good ,deity opens a ready door  
to the manichean system1 which seems    
much more rational than simple ,deism4  
,the following chain of reasoning1 as   
used by ,dr4 ,priestley1 is well linked 
together to prove the weight and force  
of experience in reasoning1 but it      
proves nothing more4 ,chairs and tables 
are made by men or beings of similar    
powers1 because we see them made by men2
 and we cannot suppose them made by a   
tree or come into being of themselves1  
because that is against experience4 ,no 

one will say one table might make       
another1 or that one man might make     
another4 ,we see nothing come into being
 without an adequate cause4 ,yet for    
this adequate cause we are at the same  
time referred to a belief in a causeless
 secret invisible agent1 and to our own 
experience1 for a proof of his nature4  
,dr4 ,priestley allows1 that what is    
visible in man may be the feat of all   
his powers1 for it is 7as he says17 a   
rule in philosophy not to multiply      
causes without necessity4 ,but he       
affirms that what is visible in the     
universe cannot be the feat of          
intelligence4 ,this is breaking the very
 rule of reasoning which he himself has 
chosen to adopt2 and he gives no other  
reason for it1 than because we do not   
see the universe think as we do man4    
,sensible of this dilemma1 soon         
afterwards he inclines to allow         
principle of thought to the universe1   
for he adds1 that if we allow it1 yet   
the universe has so much the appearance 

of other works of design that we must   
look out for its author as much as that 
of a man2 and it is allowed that most   
probably it had the same author4  ,every
 difficulty vanishes with the energy of 
nature1 or at least is as well accounted
 for as from an independent ,deity4 ,it 
is an usual question to those           
philosophers1 who maintain that the     
present existence of things is the      
result of the force and energy of nature
 acting upon herself1 why this force    
does not perpetually operate and produce
 new appearances8 ,besides that this    
question may be retorted upon the       
supporters of a ,deity1 ,i am thoroughly
 persuaded1 that this force is          
constantly in action1 and that every    
change which animals and vegetables     
undergo1 whether of dissolution or      
renovation1 is a manifest and undeniable
 proof of it4 ,man1 and the other       
,beings which occupy this terrestrial   
globe1 are evidently suited to its      
present state1 and an alteration in     

their habitation1 such as that of       
extreme or excessive heat1 would        
inevitably destroy them4 ,this is so    
certain1 that bones of animals have been
 dug up which appertain to no species   
now existing1 and which must have       
perished from an alteration in the      
system of things taking place too       
considerable for it to endure4 ,whenever
 the globe shall come to that           
temperament fit for the life of that    
lost species1 whatever energy in nature 
produced it originally1 if even it had a
 beginning1 will most probably be       
sufficient to produce it again4 ,is not 
the reparation of vegitable life the    
spring equally wonderful now as its     
first production8 ,yet this is a plain  
effect of the influence of the sun1     
whose absence would occasion death by a 
perpetual winter4 ,so far this question 
from containing1 in my opinion1 a       
formidable difficulty to the ,epicurean 
system1 ,i cannot help judging the      
continual mutability of things as an    

irrefragable proof of this eternal      
energy of nature4 ,those who ask1 why   
the great changes in the state of things
 are not more frequent1 would absurdly  
require them to ensue within the short  
space of their existence1 forgetting    
that millions of ages are of no         
importance to the whole mass of matter1 
though ,beings of some particular forms 
may find a wish and an advantage to     
prolong the term of their duration under
 that form4  ,if it is said1 ,nature or 
the energy of nature is another name for
 the ,deity1 then may ,dr4 ,priestley   
and his answerer shake hands2 the one is
 no more an atheist than the other4 ,and
 if it is observed that the ,energy of  
,nature having produced men may be      
capable of re-producing them1 so that an
 atheist is not sure to escape          
punishment for his crimes1 it is easy to
 say in return1 neither is a ,deist     
sure4 ,a good atheist has no more reason
 to be afraid to be re-produced than a  
good ,deist or a ,christian4 ,it may be 

useful for both of them to be good4 ,if 
necessary let it again be repeated1 that
 it is not at all meant in this answer  
to make atheism a plea or protection for
 immorality4 ,that is a charge long and 
most unjustly put upon the poor         
undefended atheist4 ,the knowledge of a 
,god and even the belief of a providence
 are found but too slight a barrier     
against human passions1 which are apt to
 fly out as licentiously as they would  
otherwise have done4 ,all1 which this   
creed can in reality produce1 scarce    
goes beyond some exterior exercises1    
which are vainly thought to reconcile   
man to ,god4 ,it may make men build     
temples1 sacrifice victims1 offer up    
prayers1 or perform something of the    
like nature2 but never break a criminal 
intrigue1 restore an ill gotten wealth1 
or mortify the lust of man4 ,lust being 
the source of every crime1 it is evident
 7since it reigns as much among         
idolaters and anthropomorphites1 as     
among atheists7 idolaters and           

anthropomorphites must be as susceptible
 of all of crimes as atheists1 and      
neither the one set nor the other could 
form societies1 did not a curb1 stronger
 then that of religion1 namely human    
laws1 repress their perverseness4 ,if no
 other remedy were applied to vice than 
the remonstrances of divines1 a great   
city such as ,london1 would in a        
fortnight's time1 fall into the most    
horrid disorders4 ,whatever may be the  
difference of faith1 vice predominates  
alike with the ,christian and the ,jew1 
with the ,deist and the atheist4 ,so    
like are they in their actions1 that one
 would think they copied one another4   
,religion may make men follow           
ceremonies2 little is the inconvenience 
found in them4 ,a great triumph truly   
for religion to make men baptise or     
fast8 ,when did it make men do virtuous 
actions for virtue's sake1 or practise  
fewer inventions to get rich1 where     
riches could not be acquired without    
poverty to others8 ,the true principle  

most commonly seen in human actions1 and
 which philosophy will cure sooner than 
religion1 is the natural inclination of 
man for pleasure1 or a taste contracted 
for certain objects by prejudice and    
habit4 ,these prevail in whatsoever     
faith a man is educated1 or with        
whatever knowledge he may store his     
mind4  ,but it will be said1 those who  
commit crimes are atheists at the time  
at least they do so4 ,but an atheist    
cannot be superstitious1 and criminals  
are often so at the very moment of their
 crimes4 ,religious persuasion men are  
not doubted to have when they vent their
 rage upon others of a different way of 
thinking1 when they express a dread of  
danger or a zeal for ceremonies4 ,these 
at least are not virtues2 and few indeed
 must be those1 who at any time are     
really ,theists1 if their faith is lost 
or forgotten every time they have a mind
 to indulge a vitious passion4 ,to      
support still the efficacy of religion  
in making men virtuous is to oppose     

metaphysical reasoning to the truth of  
fact2 it is like the philosopher denying
 motion1 and being refuted by one of his
 scholars walking across the room4 ,if  
then it is true1 as history and the     
whole course of human life shew it is1  
that men can still plunge themselves    
into all sorts of crimes1 though they   
are persuaded of the truth of religion1 
which is made to inform them that ,god  
punishes sin and rewards good actions1  
it cannot but be suspected that religion
 even encourages crimes1 by the hopes it
 gives of pardon through the efficacy of
 prayer2 at all events it must be       
granted1 that those who hold up a belief
 in ,god as a sufficient proof and      
character of a good life are most       
egregiously mistaken4  ,some ,theists   
may have lighter sense of personal      
dignity than some atheists4 ,if the     
,theist thinks himself allied to and    
connected with the ,deity he may plume  
himself upon his station2 but how apt   
are those worshipers of a ,god1 instead 

of having a high sense of personal      
dignity1 to debase themselves into the  
most abject beings1 dreading even the   
shadow of their own phantom4 ,an atheist
 feeling himself to be a link in the    
grand chain of ,nature1 feels his       
relative importance and dreads no       
imaginary ,being4 ,an atheist1 who is so
 from inattention and without           
intelligence1 may indeed feel himself as
 much debased as the meanest and most   
humble ,theist4  ,another argument      
against atheists is1 that where men are 
atheists it is generally found that     
their usual turn of thinking and habits 
of life have inclined to make them so4  
,is not this to be turned upon ,theists8
 ,but granting that the idea of a       
supreme author is more pleasing1 and    
that the argument with respect to the   
existence or non-existence of a ,god was
 in equilibrio1 it is not therefore     
right to conclude that the mind ought to
 be determined by this or any other     
bias4 ,nor is it quite clear if there is

 no ,god 7by which term let it again be 
noticed1 is meant a ,being of supreme   
intelligence1 the contriver of the      
material universe and yet no part of the
 material system7 that the world in     
which man inhabits is either fatherless 
or deserted4 ,the wisdom of nature      
supplies in reality what is only hoped  
for from the protection of the ,deity4  
,if the world has so good a mother1 a   
father may well be spared especially    
such a haughty jealous1 and vindictive  
one as ,god is most generally           
represented to be4 ,dr4 ,priestley being
 clear in his opinion2 that the being of
 a ,god is capable of being proved by   
reason1 is not so weak as some of his   
fellow-labourers1 who hold the powers of
 reason in so low estimation as to be   
incapable of themselves to arrive at    
almost any truth4 ,he must however      
allow1 if reason proves a ,deity and his
 attributes there was less use of       
revelation to prove them4 ,but the      
learned advocates of a ,deity differ    

greatly among themselves1 whether his   
existence is capable of being           
ascertained by fixt principles of       
reason4 ,after such a difference and the
 instance of so many great men in all   
ages1 from ,democritus downward1 who    
have confidently denied the being of a  
,god1 whose arguments the learned ,dr4  
,cudworth1 in the last century1 only by 
fully and fairly stating1 with all the  
answers in his power to give 7though his
 zeal in religion was never doubted7 was
 thought by other divines to have given 
a weight to atheism not well to be      
overturned1 it is surprising that it    
should be the common belief of this day1
 that an argument in support of atheism 
cannot stand a moment1 and that even no 
man in his senses can ever hold such a  
doctrine4 ,all that ,epicurus and       
,lucretius have so greatly and          
convincingly said is swept away in a    
moment by these better reasoners1 who   
yet scruple not to declare1 with ,dr4   
,priestley1 that what they reason about 

is not the subject of human             
understanding4 ,but let it be asked1 is 
it not absurd to reason with a man about
 that of which that same man asserts we 
have no idea at all8 ,yet will ,dr4     
,priestley argue1 and say it is of no   
importance1 whether the person with whom
 he argues has a conception or not of   
the subject4 ,having no ideas includes  
no impossibility1 therefore he goes on  
with his career of words to argue about 
an unseen being with another whom he    
will allow to have no idea of the       
subject and yet it shall be of no avail 
in the dispute1 whether he has or no1 or
 whether he is capable or incapable of  
having any4 ,reason failing1 the        
passions are called upon1 and the       
imagined ,god is represented at one     
time1 with all the terrors of a         
revengeful tyrant1 at another with all  
the tenderness of an affectionate       
parent4 ,shall then such a tremendous   
,being with such a care for the         
creatures he has made1 suffer his own   

existence to be a perpetual doubt8 ,if  
the course of nature does not give      
sufficient proof1 why does not the hand 
divine shew itself by an extraordinary  
interposition of power8 ,it is allowed  
miracles ought not to be cheap or       
plenty4 ,one or two at least every      
thousand years might be admitted4 ,but  
this is a perpetual standing miracle1   
that such a ,being as the depicted ,god1
 the author of nature and all its works1
 should exist and yet his existence be  
perpetually in doubt1 or require a      
,jesus1 a ,mahomet or a ,priestley to   
reveal it4 ,is not the writing of this  
very answer to the last of those three  
great luminaries of religion a proof1   
that no ,god1 or no such ,god at least1 
exists4 ,hear the admirable words of the
 author of ,the ,system of ,nature2     
,comment permet il qu'un mortel comme   
moi ose attaquer ses droits1 ses titres1
 son existence meme8  ,dr4 ,clarke1 ,mr4
 ,hume and ,helvetius1 are writers whose
 arguments for and against a ,godhead   

,dr4 ,priestley has much noted4 ,the    
former says1 the ,deity must have been  
infinite1 if self-existent1 because all 
things in the universe are made by him4 
,are all things in the universe         
infinite8 ,why an infinite maker of a   
finite work8 ,it is juster to argue1    
that whatever is self-existent must have
 been eternal4 ,nor is there any great  
objection to the converse of the        
proposition properly taken1 that        
whatever is not self-existent must have 
been created and therefore cannot have  
been eternal4 ,if this is fair arguing1 
matter cannot according to ,dr4         
,priestley's system have been created   
and be eternal also4 ,but ,dr4          
,priestley has no inclination to        
reconcile his opinions with those of    
,dr4 ,clarke4 ,he has chosen a fairer   
method1 and that is1 to refute the      
arguments of former asserters of a      
,deity as well as to establish his own4 
,dr4 ,clarke he most effectually exposes
 where he enters upon the subject of    

space4 ,it seems as if ,dr4 ,clarke1    
having asserted that the ,deity         
necessarily existed1 had a mind that    
nothing else should necessarily exist   
but the ,deity2 and conscious that space
 at least also necessarily existed1 he  
makes universal space an attribute of   
the ,deity4 ,with this reverie in his   
head he raises a syllogism of complete  
nonsense 7vide ,priestley's ,letters1   
,p4 #agj47 where he supposes space to be
 nothing though he also supposes it to  
be an attribute of the ,deity4 ,making  
it therefore an attribute of the ,deity 
and knowing that space is eternal and   
unmeasurable he takes upon himself      
thereby also clearly to have proved that
 the ,deity is so4 ,exclude the ,deity1 
space will still exist and still be     
eternal and immense4 ,dr4 ,priestley    
knew well that ,dr4 ,clarke's argument  
in this respect was all a fallacy1 and  
therefore he shews his sense in not     
adopting it4 ,it is in fact an abuse of 
terms unworthy of a scientific reasoner4

  ,the only argument attempted by ,dr4  
,clarke1 why the ,deity must have had no
 cause1 is1 because it is necessary he  
should have none4 ,dr4 ,clarke says     
roundly that necessity is the cause of  
the existence of the ,deity4 ,this is   
very near the language of the ancients1 
who held that ,fate controuled the      
,gods4 ,necessity is therefore the first
 ,god4 ,why then any other ,god than    
,necessity8 ,what more has ,helvetius   
said than that8  ,it is an old and      
unanswerable argument that1 granting a  
,god and his power infinite1 whatever he
 wills is executed2 but man and other   
animals are unhappy1 therefore he does  
not will they should be happy4 ,or take 
the argument the other way and it will  
equally conclude against his power4     
,with regard to ,mr4 ,hume's famous     
observations upon the evidence of       
miracles1 ,dr4 ,priestley thinks to make
 a short havock of them by observing    
that new1 and therefore miraculous      
appearances1 are continually presenting 

themselves2 but although such new       
appearances may be instanced1 they are  
not contrary to former experience1 only 
in addition to it4 ,with this allusion  
to ,natural ,philosophy1 ,dr4 ,priestley
 thinks himself in one short sentence to
 have discussed all ,mr4 ,hume's        
observations upon miracles4 ,which is   
more likely1 that the relater of a      
miracle should have lied or been        
deceived1 or that the thing related     
should have existed contrary to         
experience prior and subsequent8 ,let   
the force of this observation be        
considered and believe in the history of
 miracles who can6 ,to give a finishing 
stroke to poor ,mr4 ,hume1 ,dr4         
,priestley observes that literary fame  
was ,hume's only motive and consolation1
 as he said himself1 in all his         
laborious enquiries and enlightened     
writings4 ,at this he exclaims1 ,what   
gloomy prospect and poor comfort he must
 have had at his death6 ,if so1 how much
 was he the greater man so well to have 

gone through that last scene6  ,the     
honour which ,dr4 ,priestley gives to   
,helvetius1 the author of that ingenious
 and satisfactory work intitled ,the    
,system of ,nature1 does credit to his  
own candour4 ,he applauds him for       
speaking out1 he ought therefore to     
applaud this answer for the same reason4
 ,it is true he seems to have discovered
 one incongruity in the reasoning of    
,helvetius4 ,the words he imputes to him
 are1 that nature has no object1 because
 nature acts necessarily2 man has an    
object2 yet man also acts necessarily4  
,in the same way nature might have an   
object though it acted necessarily4 ,but
 ,helvetius adds1 that the object which 
man has is a necessary object4 ,the best
 defence of ,helvetius 7not in behalf of
 that passage1 but of his general       
system7 is to let him speak at large for
 himself2 and the following quotation   
,dr4 ,priestley and the reader may      
accept as a specimen of the strength and
 justice of his argument1 and as the    

conclusion of this answer4  ,theologians
 tell us1 that the disorder and evil1   
which is seen in the world1 is not      
absolute and real1 but relatively and   
apparently such1 and does not disprove  
the divine wisdom and goodness4 ,but may
 not one reply1 that the goodness and   
wonderful order which they so much      
extol1 and on which they found their    
notions of those qualities in ,god1 are 
in a similar way only relative and      
apparent4 ,if it be only our            
co-existence with the causes which      
surround us1 and our manner of          
perceiving them1 that constitute the    
order of nature for us1 and authorise us
 to attribute wisdom and goodness to the
 maker of what surround us1 should not  
also our mode of existence and          
perception authorise us to call what is 
hurtful to us disorder1 and to attribute
 impotence1 ignorance1 or malice1 to    
that ,being which we would suppose to   
actuate nature4  ,some pretend that the 
supremely wise ,god can derive goodness 

and happiness to us from the midst of   
those ills which he permits us to       
undergo in this world4 ,are these men   
privy counsellors of the ,divinity1 or  
on what do they found their romantic    
hopes8 ,they will doubtless say1 that   
they judge of ,god's conduct by analogy1
 and that from the present appearance of
 his wisdom and goodness1 they have a   
right to infer his future wisdom and    
goodness4 ,but do not the present       
appearances of his want of wisdom or    
goodness justify us in concluding1 that 
he will always want them8 ,if they are  
so often manifestly deficient in this   
world1 what can assure us that they will
 abound more in the next8 ,this kind of 
language therefore rests upon no other  
basis than a prejudiced imagination1 and
 signifies1 that some men1 having       
without examination1 adopted an opinion 
that ,god is good1 cannot admit that he 
will consent to let his creatures remain
 constantly unhappy4 ,yet this grand    
hypothesis1 of the unalterable felicity 

of mankind hereafter1 is insufficient to
 justify the ,divinity in permitting the
 present sleeting and transitory marks  
of injustice and disorder4 ,if ,god can 
have been unjust for a moment1 he has   
derogated1 during that moment at least1 
from his divine perfection1 and is not  
unchangeably good2 his justice then is  
liable to temporary alteration1 and1 if 
this be the case1 who can give security 
for his justice and goodness continuing 
unalterable in a future life1 the notion
 of which is set up only to exculpate   
his deviation from those qualities in   
this8  ,in spite of the experience1     
which every instant gives the lie to    
that beneficence which men suppose in   
,god1 they continue to call him good4   
,when we bewail the miserable victims of
 those disorders and calamities that so 
often overwhelm our species1 we are     
confidently told that these ills are but
 apparent1 and that if our short-sighted
 mind could fathom the depths of divine 
wisdom1 we should always behold the     

greatest blessings result from what we  
denominate evil4 ,how despicable is so  
frivolous an answer6 ,if we can find no 
good but in such things as affect us in 
a manner which is agreeable and pleasing
 to our actual existence1 we shall be   
obliged to confess that those things    
which affect us1 even but for a time1 in
 a painful manner1 are as certainly evil
 to us4 ,to vindicate ,god's visiting   
mankind with these evils some tell us1  
that he is just1 and that they are      
chastisements inflicted on mankind to   
punish the wrongs he has received from  
men4 ,thus a feeble mortal has the power
 to irritate and injure the almighty and
 eternal ,being who created this world4 
,to offend any one is1 to afflict him1  
to diminish in some degree his          
happiness1 to make him feel a painful   
sensation4 ,how can man possibly disturb
 the felicity of the all-powerful       
sovereign of nature6 ,how can a frail   
creature1 who has received from ,god his
 being and his temper1 act against the  

inclinations of an irresistable force   
which never consents to sin and         
disorder8 ,besides justice1 according to
 the only ideas which we can have of it1
 supposes a fixt desire to render every 
one his due4 ,but theologians constantly
 preach that ,god owes us nothing1 that 
the good things he affords are the      
voluntary effects of his beneficence1   
and that without any violence of his    
equity he can dispose of his creatures  
as his choice or caprice may impel him4 
,in this doctrine ,i see not the        
smallest shadow of justice1 but the most
 hideous tyranny and shocking abuse of  
power4 ,in fact do we not see virtue and
 innocence plunged into an abyss of     
misery1 while wickedness rears its      
triumphant head under the empire of this
 ,god whose justice is so much extalled8
 ,this misery1 say you1 is but for a    
time4 ,very well1 ,sirs1 but your ,god  
is unjust for a time4 ,he chastises whom
 he loves 7you will say7 for their own  
benefit4 ,but if he is perfectly good1  

why will he let them suffer at all8 ,he 
does it1 perhaps to try them ,but1 if he
 knows all things1 what occasion is     
there for him to try any8 ,if he is     
omnipotent1 why need he vex himself     
about the vain design any one may form  
against him8 ,omnipotence ought to be   
exempt from any such passions1 as having
 neither equals nor rivals4 ,but if this
 ,god is jealous of his glory1 his      
titles and prerogative1 why does he     
permit such numbers of men to offend    
him8 ,why are any found daring enough to
 refuse the incense which his pride     
expects8 ,why am ,i a feeble mortal     
permitted to attack his titles1 his     
attributes1 and even his existence8 ,is 
this permission of punishment on me for 
the abuse of his grace and favour8 ,he  
should never have permitted me to abuse 
them4 ,or the grace he bestowed should  
have been efficacious and have directed 
my steps according to his liking4 ,but1 
say you1 he makes man free4 ,alas8 why  
did he present him with a gift of which 

he must have foreseen the abuse8 ,is    
this faculty of free agency1 which      
enables me to resist his power1 to      
corrupt and rob him of his worshippers1 
and in fine to bring eternal misery on  
myself1 a present worthy of his infinite
 goodness8 ,in consequence of the       
pretended abuse of this fatal present1  
which an omniscient and good ,god ought 
not to have bestowed on ,beings capable 
of abusing it1 everlasting1             
inexpressible torments are reserved for 
the transitory crimes of a ,being made  
liable to commit them4 ,would that      
father be called good1 reasonable1 just 
and kind1 who put a sharp-edged and     
dangerous knife into the hand of a      
playful1 and imprudent child1 whom he   
before knew to be imprudent1 and        
punished him during the remainder of his
 life for cutting himself with it8      
,would that prince be called just and   
merciful1 who1 not regarding any        
proportion between the offence and the  
punishment1 should perpetually exercise 

his power of vengeance1 over one of his 
subjects who1 being drunk1 had rashly   
offended against his vanity1 without    
causing any real harm to him1           
especially1 when the prince had taken   
pains to make him drunk8 ,should we     
consider as almighty a monarch1 whose   
dominions were in such confusion and    
disorder1 that1 except a small number   
obedient servants1 all his subjects were
 every instant despising his laws1      
defeating his will and insulting his    
person8 ,let ecclesiastics then         
acknowledge1 that their ,god is an      
assemblage of incompatible qualities1 as
 incomprehensible to their understanding
 as to mine4 ,no3 they say1 in reply to 
these difficulties1 that wisdom and     
justice in ,god1 are qualities so much  
above or so unlike those qualities in   
us1 that they bear no relation or       
affinity towards human wisdom and       
justice4 ,but1 pray how am ,i to form to
 myself an idea of the divine           
perfection1 unless it has some          

resemblance to those virtues which ,i   
observe in my fellow creatures and feel 
in myself8 ,if the justice of ,god is   
not the same with human justice1 why    
lastly do any men pretend to announce   
it1 comprehend and explain it to others8
       ,,postscript4   ,previous to this
 publication the editor sent the        
following ,letter to ,dr4 ,priestley4   
,reverend ,sir1  ,had you thought it    
impossible for man to hold different    
sentiments respecting ,natural religion 
and the proof of the existence of a ,god
 than you do1 the ,letters to a         
,philosophical ,unbeliever would not    
have appeared1 much less would you have 
invited an answer by promising a reply  
to every objection4 ,differing from you 
in sentiment ,i am the man who enter    
with you in the lists2 but ,i find      
myself upon consultation with my friends
 under more difficulties than you were1 
and more to stand in need of courage in 
taking up the glove1 than you needed to 
have in throwing it down4 ,for this     

dispute is not like others in           
philosophy1 where the vanquished can    
only dread ridicule1 contempt and       
disappointment2 here1 whether victor or 
vanquished1 your opponent has to dread1 
beside ecclesiastical censure1 the      
scourges1 chains and pillories of the   
courts of ,law4  ,i accuse you not of   
laying a trap for an unguarded author1  
but ,i ask your friendly opinion1       
whether ,i can1 with temporal safety at 
least1 maintain the contrary of your    
arguments in proof of a ,deity and his  
attributes4 ,if ,i cannot1 no wonder the
 ,theist cries ,victoria6 but then it is
 a little ungenerous to ask for         
objections4 ,of you1 ,i may certainly   
expect1 that you will promise to use    
your influence1 as well with lawyers as 
ecclesiastics1 not to stir up a         
persecution against a poor atheist in   
case there should be one found in the   
kingdom1 which people in general will   
not admit to be possible2 or1 if a      
persecution could ensue1 that you and   

your friends1 favourers of free enquiry1
 will at least bear the expences of it4 
,i am1      ,reverend ,sir1      ,your  
most humble obedient servant1           
,,william ,,hammon4  ,oct4 #bc4 #agha4  
,to the ,reverend ,dr4 ,priestley4   ,to
 this letter ,dr4 ,priestley sent no    
answer2 or no answer ever came to hand4 
,,the ,,end4