nikhilam anujachitta,m jnastrair        
naveryah   sajabhiva kusumn,m           
klandhhrair vidhatte_/   sa laghum api  
mamaita,m pr,achyavijnatantu,m          
upahrtamatibhakty modat,m mai grhtv_/_/ 
,may ,he1 who links the minds of all    
people1  through the apertures of time1 
with new threads  of knowledge like a   
garland of flowers1 be pleased  to      
accept this my thread of ,eastern       
thought1 offered1  though it be small1  
with the greatest devotion4        ,a   
,,history ,,of ,,indian ,,philosophy    
,,surendranath ,,dasgupta               
,,volume ,i    ,first ,edition3         
,cambridge1 #aibb        ,,dedication   
,the work and ambition of a life-time is
 herein humbly  dedicated with supreme  
reverence to the great sages  of ,india1
 who1 for the first time in history1    
formulated  the true principles of      
freedom and devoted themselves  to the  
holy quest of truth and the final       
assessment  and discovery of the        
ultimate spiritual essence of  man      

through their concrete lives1 critical  
thought1  dominant will and self-denial4
        ,,note ,,on ,,the               
,,pronunciation ,,of  ,,transliterated  
,,sanskrit  ,,and ,p,,li ,,words        
,the vowels are pronounced almost in the
 same way  as in ,italian1 except that  
the sound of a approaches  that of o in 
bond or u in but1 and  that of a as in  
army4  ,the consonants are as in        
,english1 except c1 ch in church2  t1 d1
 n are cerebrals1 to which ,english t1  
d1 n almost  correspond2 t1 d1 n are    
pure dentals2 kh1 gh1 ch1 jh1  th1 dh1  
th1 dh1 ph1 bh are the simple sounds    
plus an  aspiration2  is the ,french gn2
 r is usually pronounced  as ri1 and s'1
 s as sh4        ,,preface    ,the old  
civilisation of ,india was a concrete   
unity of many-sided  developments in    
art1 architecture1 literature1 religion1
 morals1 and  science so far as it was  
understood in those days4 ,but the most 
important  achievement of ,indian       
thought was philosophy4 ,it was regarded

 as the goal  of all the highest        
practical and theoretical activities1   
and it indicated  the point of unity    
amidst all the apparent diversities     
which the complex  growth of culture    
over a vast area inhabited by different 
peoples produced4    ,it is not in the  
history of foreign invasions1 in the    
rise of independent  kingdoms at        
different times1 in the empires of this 
or that great monarch  that the unity of
 ,india is to be sought4 ,it is         
essentially one of  spiritual           
aspirations and obedience to the law of 
the spirit1 which were  regarded as     
superior to everything else1 and it has 
outlived all the  political changes     
through which ,india passed4    ,the    
,greeks1 the ,huns1 the ,scythians1 the 
,pathans and the ,moguls who  occupied  
the land and controlled the political   
machinery never ruled  the minds of the 
people1 for these political events were 
like hurricanes  or the changes of      
season1 mere phenomena of a natural or  

physical order  which never affected the
 spiritual integrity of ,hindu culture4 
,if after  a passivity of some centuries
 ,india is again going to become        
creative it  is mainly on account of    
this fundamental unity of her progress  
and  civilisation and not for anything  
that she may borrow from other          
countries4 ,it is therefore             
indispensably necessary for all those   
who  wish to appreciate the significance
 and potentialities of ,indian culture  
that they should properly understand the
 history of ,indian philosophical       
thought which is the nucleus round which
 all that is best and highest in  ,india
 has grown4 ,much harm has already been 
done by the circulation of  opinions    
that the culture and philosophy of      
,india was dreamy and abstract4  ,it is 
therefore very necessary that ,indians  
as well as other peoples  should become 
more and more acquainted with the true  
characteristics  of the past history of 
,indian thought and form a correct      

estimate of its  special features4      
,but it is not only for the sake of the 
right understanding of ,india    viii   
that ,indian philosophy should be read1 
or only as a record of the past         
thoughts of ,india4 ,for most of the    
problems that are still debated in      
modern philosophical thought occurred in
 more or less divergent forms  to the   
philosophers of ,india4 ,their          
discussions1 difficulties and  solutions
 when properly grasped in connection    
with the problems of our  own times may 
throw light on the course of the process
 of the future  reconstruction of modern
 thought4 ,the discovery of the         
important features  of ,indian          
philosophical thought1 and a due        
appreciation of their full              
significance1 may turn out to be as     
important to modern philosophy as  the  
discovery of ,sanskrit has been to the  
investigation of modern  philological   
researches4 ,it is unfortunate that the 
task of  re-interpretation and          

re-valuation of ,indian thought has not 
yet been  undertaken on a comprehensive 
scale4 ,sanskritists also with very few 
exceptions have neglected this important
 field of study1 for most of  these     
scholars have been interested more in   
mythology1 philology1 and  history than 
in philosophy4 ,much work however has   
already been done in  the way of the    
publication of a large number of        
important texts1 and  translations of   
some of them have also been attempted4  
,but owing to the  presence of many     
technical terms in advanced ,sanskrit   
philosophical  literature1 the          
translations in most cases are hardly   
intelligible to  those who are not      
familiar with the texts themselves4     
,a work containing some general account 
of the mutual relations of the  chief   
systems is necessary for those who      
intend to pursue the study  of a        
particular school4 ,this is also        
necessary for lay readers interested  in
 philosophy and students of ,western    

philosophy who have no inclination  or  
time to specialise in any ,indian       
system1 but who are at the same time    
interested to know what they can about  
,indian philosophy4 ,in my two books    
,the ,study of ,patanjali and ,yoga     
,philosophy in relation to other ,indian
  ,systems of ,thought ,i have attempted
 to interpret the ,smkhya and ,yoga     
systems both from their inner point of  
view and from the point of view  of     
their relation to other ,indian systems4
 ,the present attempt deals with  the   
important features of these as also of  
all the other systems and seeks  to show
 some of their inner philosophical      
relations especially in regard  to the  
history of their development4 ,i have   
tried to be as faithful to  the original
 texts as ,i could and have always given
 the ,sanskrit or ,pli  technical terms 
for the help of those who want to make  
this book a guide    ix    for further  
study4 ,to understand something of these
 terms is indeed  essential for anyone  

who wishes to be sure that he is        
following the actual  course of the     
thoughts4    ,in ,sanskrit treatises the
 style of argument and methods of       
treating the  different topics are      
altogether different from what we find  
in any modern  work of philosophy4      
,materials had therefore to be collected
 from a large  number of works on each  
system and these have been knit together
 and  given a shape which is likely to  
be more intelligible to people          
unacquainted with ,sanskritic ways of   
thought4 ,but at the same time ,i       
considered it quite undesirable to put  
any pressure on ,indian thoughts  in    
order to make them appear as ,european4 
,this will explain much of what  might  
appear quaint to a ,european reader4    
,but while keeping all the  thoughts and
 expressions of the ,indian thinkers ,i 
have tried to arrange  them in a        
systematic whole in a manner which      
appeared to me strictly  faithful to    
their clear indications and suggestions4

 ,it is only in very  few places that ,i
 have translated some of the ,indian    
terms by terms of  ,english philosophy1 
and this ,i did because it appeared to  
me that those  were approximately the   
nearest approach to the ,indian sense of
 the term4  ,in all other places ,i have
 tried to choose words which have not   
been made  dangerous by the acquirement 
of technical senses4 ,this however is   
difficult1 for the words which are used 
in philosophy always acquire  some sort 
of technical sense4 ,i would therefore  
request my readers to  take those words 
in an unsophisticated sense and         
associate them with  such meanings as   
are justified by the passages and       
contexts in which  they are used4 ,some 
of what will appear as obscure in any   
system may ,i  hope be removed if it is 
re-read with care and attention1 for    
unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the   
way of right comprehension4 ,but  ,i may
 have also missed giving the proper     
suggestive links in many places  where  

condensation was inevitable and the     
systems themselves have also  sometimes 
insoluble difficulties1 for no system of
 philosophy is without  its dark and    
uncomfortable corners4    ,though ,i    
have begun my work from the ,vedic and  
,brhmanic stage1 my  treatment of this  
period has been very slight4 ,the       
beginnings of the  evolution of         
philosophical thought1 though they can  
be traced in the  later ,vedic hymns1   
are neither connected nor systematic4   
x      ,more is found in the ,brhmanas1 
but ,i do not think it worth while to   
elaborate the broken shreds of thought  
of this epoch4 ,i could have dealt  with
 the ,upanisad period more fully1 but   
many works on the subject have  already 
been published in ,europe and those who 
wish to go into details  will certainly 
go to them4 ,i have therefore limited   
myself to the dominant  current flowing 
through the earlier ,upanisads4 ,notices
 of other currents  of thought will be  
given in connection with the treatment  

of other systems  in the second volume  
with which they are more intimately     
connected4 ,it  will be noticed that my 
treatment of early ,buddhism is in some 
places of  an inconclusive character4   
,this is largely due to the inconclusive
  character of the texts which were put 
into writing long after ,buddha  in the 
form of dialogues and where the         
precision and directness required  in   
philosophy were not contemplated4 ,this 
has given rise to a number of  theories 
about the interpretations of the        
philosophical problems of early         
,buddhism among modern ,buddhist        
scholars and it is not always easy to   
decide one way or the other without     
running the risk of being dogmatic2  and
 the scope of my work was also too      
limited to allow me to indulge in  very 
elaborate discussions of textual        
difficulties4 ,but still ,i also  have  
in many places formed theories of my    
own1 whether they are right  or wrong it
 will be for scholars to judge4 ,i had  

no space for entering  into any polemic1
 but it will be found that my           
interpretations of the  systems are     
different in some cases from those      
offered by some ,european  scholars who 
have worked on them and ,i leave it to  
those who are  acquainted with the      
literature of the subject to decide     
which of us may  be in the right4 ,i    
have not dealt elaborately with the new 
school of  ,logic 7,navya-,nyya7 of     
,bengal1 for the simple reason that most
 of the  contributions of this school   
consist in the invention of technical   
expressions and the emphasis put on the 
necessity of strict exactitude  and     
absolute preciseness of logical         
definitions and discussions and these   
are almost untranslatable in            
intelligible ,english4 ,i have however  
incorporated what important differences 
of philosophical points of view  ,i     
could find in it4 ,discussions of a     
purely technical character could not  be
 very fruitful in a work like this4 ,the

 bibliography given of the  different   
,indian systems in the last six chapters
 is not exhaustive but  consists mostly 
of books which have been actually       
studied or consulted in  the writing of 
those chapters4 ,exact references to the
 pages of the    xi    texts have       
generally been given in footnotes in    
those cases where a  difference of      
interpretation was anticipated or where 
it was felt that  a reference to the    
text would make the matter clearer1 or  
where the  opinions of modern writers   
have been incorporated4    ,it gives me 
the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my 
deepest gratefulness  to the ,hon'ble   
,maharaja ,sir ,manindrachandra ,nundy1 
,k4,c4,i4,e4 ,kashimbazar1  ,bengal1 who
 has kindly promised to bear the entire 
expense of the  publication of both     
volumes of the present work4    ,the    
name of this noble man is almost a      
household word in ,bengal for  the      
magnanimous gifts that he has made to   
educational and other causes4  ,up till 

now he has made a total gift of about   
#cjj1jjj1 of which those  devoted to    
education come to about #bjj1jjj4 ,but  
the man himself is far  above the gifts 
he has made4 ,his sterling character1   
universal sympathy  and friendship1 his 
kindness and amiability make him a      
veritable  ,bodhisattva--one of the     
noblest of men that ,i have ever seen4  
,like many  other scholars of ,bengal1  
,i am deeply indebted to him for the    
encouragement that he has given me in   
the pursuit of my studies and           
researches1 and my feelings of          
attachment and gratefulness for him are 
too deep for utterance4    ,i am much   
indebted to my esteemed friends ,dr     
,e4,j4 ,thomas of the ,cambridge        
,university ,library and ,mr ,douglas   
,ainslie for their kindly revising the  
proofs of this work1 in the course of   
which they improved my ,english in  many
 places4 ,to the former ,i am also      
indebted for his attention to the       
transliteration of a large number of    

,sanskrit words1 and also for the       
whole-hearted sympathy and great        
friendliness with which he assisted me  
with his advice on many points of       
detail1 in particular the exposition  of
 the ,buddhist doctrine of the cause of 
rebirth owes something of its  treatment
 to repeated discussions with him4    ,i
 also wish to express my gratefulness to
 my friend ,mr ,n4,k4 ,siddhanta1       
,m4,a41 late of the ,scottish ,churches 
,college1 and ,mademoiselle ,paule      
,povie  for the kind assistance they    
have rendered in preparing the index4   
,my  obligations are also due to the    
,syndics of the ,cambridge ,university  
,press  for the honour they have done me
 in publishing this work4    ,to        
scholars of ,indian philosophy who may  
do me the honour of reading my  book and
 who may be impressed with its          
inevitable    xii    shortcomings and   
defects1 ,i can only pray in the words  
of ,hemacandra3                         
,pramnasiddhntaviruddham atra           

,yatkiciduktam matimndyadost            
,mtsaryyam utsryya tadryyacitth         
,prasdam dhya vis'odhayantu4 ,footnote  
ref #a      ,s4,d4    ,,trinity         
,,college1  ,,cambridge4    ,february1  
#aibb4        ,footnote #a3 ,may the    
noble-minded scholars instead of        
cherishing ill  feeling kindly correct  
whatever errors have been here committed
 through  the dullness of my intellect  
in the way of wrong interpretations and 
misstatements4      ,,contents          
,,chapter ,i                            
,,introductory44444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444444444#a           
,,chapter ,,ii    ,,the ,,vedas1        
,,br,,hma,,nas ,,and ,,their            
,,philosophy     #a ,the ,vedas and     
their                                   
antiquity4444444444444444444444444444444
44#aj   #b ,the place of the ,vedas in  
the ,hindu mind4444444444444444444444#aj
   #c ,classification of the ,vedic     
literature444444444444444444444444#aa   
#d ,the                                 

,samhits44444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#ab   #e ,the          
,brhmanas4444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#ac   #f ,the          
ranyakas44444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444#ad   #g ,the ,rg-,veda1
 its                                    
civilization4444444444444444444444444444
4444#ad   #h ,the ,vedic                
gods444444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444#af   #i ,polytheism1       
,henotheism1 and                        
,monotheism444444444444444444444444#ag  
#aj ,growth of a ,monotheistic tendency2
 ,prajpati1 ,vis'vakarma44444#ai  #aa   
,brahma444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#bj  #ab         
,sacrifice2 the ,first ,rudiments of the
 ,law of ,karma444444444444#ba  #ac     
,cosmogony--,mythological and           
,philosophical444444444444444444444#bc  
#ad ,eschatology2 the ,doctrine of      
tman4444444444444444444444444444#be  #ae
                                        
,conclusion44444444444444444444444444444

44444444444444444444444#bf    ,,chapter 
,,iii    ,,the ,,earlier ,,upani,,sads  
7#gjj ,b4,c4-#fjj ,b4,c47     #a ,the   
place of the ,upanisads in ,vedic       
literature444444444444444#bh   #b ,the  
names of the ,upanisads2 ,non-,brahmanic
 influence4444444444#cj   #c ,brhmanas  
and the ,early                          
,upanisads444444444444444444444444444#ca
   #d ,the meaning of the word          
,upanisad44444444444444444444444444444#c
h   #e ,the composition and growth of   
diverse ,upanisads44444444444444#ch   #f
 ,revival of ,upanisad studies in modern
 times444444444444444444#ci   #g ,the   
,upanisads and their                    
interpretations4444444444444444444444#da
   #h ,the quest after ,brahman3 the    
struggle and the failures44444444#db    
#i ,unknowability of ,brahman and the   
,negative ,method44444444444444#dd  #aj 
,the tman                               
doctrine44444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444#de  #aa ,place of ,brahman 
in the                                  

,upanisads4444444444444444444444444444#d
h  #ab ,the                             
,world4444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444444#ea  #ac ,the        
,world-,soul4444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444#eb  #ad ,the       
,theory of                              
,causation444444444444444444444444444444
444444444#eb  #ae ,doctrine of          
,transmigration4444444444444444444444444
44444444444#ec  #af                     
,emancipation444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#eh    ,,chapter 
,,iv    ,,general ,,observations ,,on   
,,the ,,systems ,,of ,,indian           
,,philosophy    #a ,in what sense is a  
,history of ,indian ,philosophy         
possible8444444#fb  #b ,growth of the   
,philosophic                            
,literature444444444444444444444444444#f
e  #c ,the ,indian systems of           
,philosophy44444444444444444444444444444
44#fg  #d ,some fundamental points of   
agreement444444444444444444444444444#ga 
#a ,the ,karma                          

theory4444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444#ga   #b ,the ,doctrine of       
,mukti4444444444444444444444444444444444
44#gd   #c ,the ,doctrine of            
,soul44444444444444444444444444444444444
44#ge  #e ,the ,pessimistic ,attitude   
towards the ,world and the ,optimistic  
,faith in the                           
end4444444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444#ge  #f ,unity in ,indian     
,sdhana 7philosophical1 religious and   
ethical                                 
endeavours744444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#gg    xiv       
,,chapter ,v    ,,buddhist ,,philosophy 
#a ,the ,state of ,philosophy in ,india 
before ,buddha44444444444444444#gh   #b 
,buddha3 his                            
,life44444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444#ha   #c ,early ,buddhist   
,literature44444444444444444444444444444
444444444#hb   #d ,the ,doctrine of     
,causal ,connection of early            
,buddhism444444444444#hd   #e ,the      
,khandhas4444444444444444444444444444444

44444444444444444444#ic   #f ,avijj and 
sava444444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#ii   #g ,sla and            
,samdhi444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444#ajj   #h                  
,kamma4444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#ajf   #i        
,upanisads and                          
,buddhism4444444444444444444444444444444
44444444#aji  #aj ,the ,schools of      
,theravda                               
,buddhism44444444444444444444444444444#a
ab  #aa                                 
,mahynism4444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444#abe  #ab ,the     
,tathat ,philosophy of ,as'vaghosa 7#hj 
,a4,d47444444444444444#abi  #ac ,the    
,mdhyamika or the ,snyavda              
school--,nihilism44444444444444#ach  #ad
 ,uncompromising ,idealism or the       
,school of ,vijnavda ,buddhism4#ade  #ae
 ,sautrntika theory of                  
,perception44444444444444444444444444444
4#aea  #af ,sautrntika theory of        
,inference444444444444444444444444444444

4#aee  #ag ,the ,doctrine of            
,momentariness44444444444444444444444444
4444444#aeh  #ah ,the ,doctrine of      
,momentariness and the ,doctrine of     
,causal   ,efficiency                   
7,arthakriykritva74444444444444444444444
444444444444#afc  #ai ,some ,ontological
 ,problems on which the ,different      
,indian ,systems                        
diverged44444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444444#afd  #bj ,brief
 ,survey of the ,evolution of ,buddhist 
,thought4444444444444#aff      ,,chapter
 ,,vi    ,,the ,,jaina ,,philosophy     
#a ,the ,origin of                      
,jainism44444444444444444444444444444444
444444444#afi   #b ,two ,sects of       
,jainism44444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444#agj   #c ,the ,canonical and 
other ,literature of the                
,jains444444444444444#aga   #d ,some    
,general ,characteristics of the        
,jains444444444444444444444#agb   #e    
,life of                                
,mahvra444444444444444444444444444444444

4444444444444#agc   #f ,the ,fundamental
 ,ideas of ,jaina                       
,ontology44444444444444444444444#agc    
#g ,the ,doctrine of ,relative          
,pluralism                              
7,anekntavda74444444444444#age   #h ,the
 ,doctrine of                           
,nyas44444444444444444444444444444444444
444444#agf   #i ,the ,doctrine of       
,sydvda444444444444444444444444444444444
44444#agi  #aj ,knowledge1 its value for
                                        
us44444444444444444444444444444444444#ah
a  #aa ,theory of                       
,perception44444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444#ahc  #ab ,non-,perceptual 
knowledge4444444444444444444444444444444
4444444#ahe  #ac ,knowledge as          
,revelation44444444444444444444444444444
4444444444#ahf  #ad ,the                
,jvas44444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444#ahh  #ae ,karma      
,theory444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#aij  #af ,karma1 srava
 and                                    

,nirjar444444444444444444444444444444444
4444#aib  #ag                           
,pudgala44444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#aie  #ah        
,dharma1 ,adharma1                      
ks'a444444444444444444444444444444444444
444#aig  #ai ,kla and                   
,samaya444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444#aih  #bj ,jaina          
,cosmography4444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#aii  #ba ,jaina       
,yoga44444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#aii  #bb ,jaina       
,atheism44444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#bjc  #bc ,moksa       
7emancipation744444444444444444444444444
444444444444444#bjg    xv      ,,chapter
 ,,vii    ,,the ,,kapila ,,and ,,the    
,p,,ta,,jala ,s,,mkhya 7,,yoga7     #a  
,a                                      
,review444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444#bjh   #b ,the     
,germs of ,smkhya in the                
,upanisads44444444444444444444444#baa   
#c ,smkhya and ,yoga                    

,literature44444444444444444444444444444
44444#bab   #d ,an ,early ,school of    
,smkhya444444444444444444444444444444444
44#bac   #e ,smkhya krik1 ,smkhya stra1 
,vcaspati ,mis'ra and ,vijna            
,bhiksu444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444444444444#bbb   #f ,yoga
 and                                    
,patajali4444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444#bbf   #g ,the ,smkhya and 
the ,yoga doctrine of ,soul or          
,purusa4444444444#bch   #h ,thought and 
,matter444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#bda   #i ,feelings1 the     
,ultimate                               
,substances44444444444444444444444444444
#bdb  #aj ,the                          
,gunas4444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444444#bdc  #aa ,prakrti   
and its                                 
evolution4444444444444444444444444444444
4444#bde  #ab ,pralaya and the          
disturbance of the ,prakrti             
,equilibrium4444444#bdg  #ac ,mahat and 
,ahamkra44444444444444444444444444444444

444444444444#bdh  #ad ,the ,tanmtras and
 the                                    
,paramus4444444444444444444444444444444#
bea  #ae ,principle of ,causation and   
,conservation of                        
,energy4444444444444#bed  #af ,change as
 the formation of new                   
collocations4444444444444444444#bee  #ag
 ,causation as ,satkryavda 7the theory  
that the effect   potentially exists    
before it is generated by the movement  
of the                                  
cause74444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444#beg  #ah ,smkhya      
,atheism and ,yoga                      
,theism444444444444444444444444444444#be
h  #ai ,buddhi and                      
,purusa444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444#bei  #bj ,the ,cognitive   
,process and some characteristics of    
,citta4444444#bfa  #ba ,sorrow and its  
,dissolution4444444444444444444444444444
44444444#bfd  #bb                       
,citta4444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#bfh  #bc ,yoga  

,purificatory ,practices                
7,parikarma744444444444444444444444#bgj 
#bd ,the ,yoga                          
,meditation44444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444#bga      ,,chapter ,,viii
    ,,the ,,ny,,ya-,,vaisesika          
,,philosophy    #a ,criticism of        
,buddhism and ,smkhya from the ,nyya    
standpoint444#bgd  #b ,nyya and         
,vais'esika                             
stras44444444444444444444444444444444444
#bgf  #c ,does ,vais'esika represent an 
old school of ,mmms84444444444#bhj  #d  
,philosophy in the ,vais'esika          
stras444444444444444444444444444#bhe  #e
 ,philosophy in the ,nyya               
stras444444444444444444444444444444444#b
id  #f ,philosophy of ,nyya stras and   
,vais'esika stras44444444444444#cja  #g 
,the ,vais'esika and ,nyya              
,literature444444444444444444444444444#c
je  #h ,the main doctrine of the        
,nyya-,vais'esika                       
,philosophy4444444444#caj  #i ,the six  
,padrthas3 ,dravya1 ,guna1 ,karma1      

,smnya1 ,vis'esa1                       
,samavya44444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444444#cac  #aj ,the  
,theory of                              
,causation444444444444444444444444444444
444444444#cai  #aa ,dissolution         
7,pralaya7 and ,creation                
7,srsti744444444444444444#cbc  #ab      
,proof of the ,existence of             
,is'vara44444444444444444444444444444#cb
e  #ac ,the ,nyya-,vais'esika           
,physics44444444444444444444444444444444
4#cbf  #ad ,the ,origin of ,knowledge   
7,pramna74444444444444444444444444444#cc
j  #ae ,the four ,pramnas of            
,nyya44444444444444444444444444444444444
#ccb  #af ,perception                   
7,pratyaksa74444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#ccc  #ag                    
,inference444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444444444444444#cdc  #ah ,upamna
 and                                    
,s'abda444444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#ced  #ai ,negation in       
,nyya-,vais'esika44444444444444444444444

4444444444#cee  #bj ,the necessity of   
the ,acquirement of debating devices for
   the seeker of                        
,salvation444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#cfj  #ba ,the ,doctrine of  
,soul44444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444#cfb  #bb s'vara and             
,salvation444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#cfc    xvi      ,,chapter   
,,ix    ,m,m,,ms ,,philosophy      #a ,a
 ,comparative                           
,review444444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444#cfg  #b ,the ,mmms           
,literature44444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#cfi  #c ,the ,paratah-prmnya
 doctrine of ,nyya and the              
,svatah-prmnya doctrine of              
,mmms44444444444444444444444444#cgb  #d 
,the place of ,sense-organs in          
,perception444444444444444444444444#cge 
#e ,indeterminate and ,determinate      
,perception44444444444444444444444#cgh  
#f ,some ,ontological ,problems         
connected with the ,doctrine of         
,perception44444444444444444444444444444

4444444444444444444444444#cgi  #g ,the  
,nature of                              
,knowledge444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444#chb  #h ,the ,psychology of  
,illusion4444444444444444444444444444444
444444#chd  #i                          
,inference444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444444#chg  #aj       
,upamna1                                
,arthpatti444444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444#cia  #aa                  
,s'abda-pramna44444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444#cid  #ab ,the     
,pramna of ,non-perception              
7anupalabdhi7444444444444444444#cig  #ac
 ,self1 ,salvation1 and                 
,god444444444444444444444444444444444444
44#cii  #ad ,mmms as ,philosophy and    
,mimms as ,ritualism44444444444444#djc  
,,chapter ,x    ,,the ,s',a,,nkara      
,,school ,,of ,,ved,,nta      #a        
,comprehension of the ,philosophical    
,issues more essential than   the       
,dialectic of                           
,controversy4444444444444444444444444444

44444444#djf  #b ,the philosophical     
situation3 a                            
,review44444444444444444444444444#djh   
#c ,vednta                              
,literature44444444444444444444444444444
4444444444444444#dah  #d ,vednta in     
,gaudapda4444444444444444444444444444444
44444444444#dbj  #e ,vednta and ,sankara
 7#ghh-hbj                              
,a4,d474444444444444444444444444444#dbi 
#f ,the main idea of the ,vednta        
philosophy444444444444444444444444#dci  
#g ,in what sense is the                
world-appearance                        
false84444444444444444444#ddc  #h ,the  
nature of the world-appearance1         
phenomena444444444444444444#dde  #i ,the
 ,definition of ,ajna                   
7nescience7444444444444444444444444444#d
eb  #aj ,ajna established by ,perception
 and ,inference4444444444444444#ded  #aa
 ,locus and ,object of ,ajna1 ,ahamkra  
and ,antahkarana4444444#deg  #ab        
,anirvcyavda and the ,vednta            
dialectic44444444444444444444444#dfa    

#ac ,the ,theory of                     
,causation444444444444444444444444444444
444444444#dfe  #ad ,vednta theory of    
,perception and                         
,inference44444444444444444444#dgj  #ae 
tman1 ,jva1 ,is'vara1 ,ekajvavda and    
,drstisrstivda4444#dgd  #af ,vednta     
theory of                               
,illusion4444444444444444444444444444444
44444#dhe  #ag ,vednta ,ethics and      
,vednta                                 
,emancipation44444444444444444444444#dhi
  #ah ,vednta and other ,indian         
systems444444444444444444444444444444#di
b                                       
,,index444444444444444444444444444444444
444444444444444444444444444#die    #a   
,,chapter ,i      ,,introductory    ,the
 achievements of the ancient ,indians in
 the field of philosophy are  but very  
imperfectly known to the world at large1
 and it is unfortunate  that the        
condition is no better even in ,india4  
,there is a small body  of ,hindu       
scholars and ascetics living a retired  

life in solitude1 who  are well         
acquainted with the subject1 but they do
 not know ,english and  are not used to 
modern ways of thinking1 and the idea   
that they ought  to write books in      
vernaculars in order to popularize the  
subject does  not appeal to them4       
,through the activity of various learned
 bodies and  private individuals both in
 ,europe and in ,india large numbers of 
philosophical works in ,sanskrit and    
,pli have been published1 as well as    
translations of a few of them1 but there
 has been as yet little  systematic     
attempt on the part of scholars to study
 them and judge their  value4 ,there are
 hundreds of ,sanskrit works on most of 
the systems of  ,indian thought and     
scarcely a hundredth part of them has   
been translated4  ,indian modes of      
expression1 entailing difficult         
technical philosophical  terms are so   
different from those of ,european       
thought1 that they can  hardly ever be  
accurately translated4 ,it is therefore 

very difficult  for a person            
unacquainted with ,sanskrit to          
understand ,indian philosophical        
thought in its true bearing from        
translations4 ,pli is a much easier     
language than ,sanskrit1 but a knowledge
 of ,pli is helpful in  understanding   
only the earliest school of ,buddhism1  
when it was in its  semi-philosophical  
stage4 ,sanskrit is generally regarded  
as a difficult  language4 ,but no one   
from an acquaintance with ,vedic or     
ordinary literary  ,sanskrit can have   
any idea of the difficulty of the       
logical and abstruse  parts of ,sanskrit
 philosophical literature4 ,a man who   
can easily  understand the ,vedas4 the  
,upanisads1 the ,purnas1 the ,law ,books
 and  the literary works1 and is also   
well acquainted with ,european          
philosophical thought1 may find it      
literally impossible to understand  even
 small portions of a work of advanced   
,indian logic1 or the  dialectical      
,vednta4 ,this is due to two reasons1   

the use of  technical terms and of great
 condensation in expression1 and  the   
hidden allusions to doctrines of other  
systems4 ,the    #b    tendency to      
conceiving philosophical problems in a  
clear and unambiguous  manner is an     
important feature of ,sanskrit thought1 
but from the ninth  century onwards1 the
 habit of using clear1 definite1 and    
precise  expressions1 began to develop  
in a very striking manner1 and as a     
result  of that a large number of       
technical terms began to be invented4   
,these  terms are seldom properly       
explained1 and it is presupposed that   
the reader  who wants to read the works 
should have a knowledge of them4 ,any   
one in  olden times who took to the     
study of any system of philosophy1 had  
to do  so with a teacher1 who explained 
those terms to him4 ,the teacher himself
  had got it from his teacher1 and he   
from his4 ,there was no tendency to     
popularize philosophy1 for the idea then
 prevalent was that only the  chosen few

 who had otherwise shown their fitness1 
deserved to become  fit students        
7adhikr7 of philosophy1 under the       
direction of a  teacher4 ,only those who
 had the grit and high moral strength to
 devote  their whole life to the true   
understanding of philosophy and the     
rebuilding of life in accordance with   
the high truths of philosophy  were     
allowed to study it4    ,another        
difficulty which a beginner will meet is
 this1 that sometimes  the same         
technical terms are used in extremely   
different senses in  different systems4 
,the student must know the meaning of   
each technical  term with reference to  
the system in which it occurs1 and no   
dictionary  will enlighten him much     
about the matter ,footnote ref #a4 ,he  
will have  to pick them up as he        
advances and finds them used4 ,allusions
 to the  doctrines of other systems and 
their refutations during the discussions
  of similar doctrines in any particular
 system of thought are often very       

puzzling even to a well-equipped reader2
 for he cannot be expected to  know all 
the doctrines of other systems without  
going through them1 and  so it often    
becomes difficult to follow the series  
of answers and  refutations which are   
poured forth in the course of these     
discussions4  ,there are two important  
compendiums in ,sanskrit giving a       
summary of some  of the principal       
systems of ,indian thought1 viz4 the    
,sarvadars'anasamgraha1 and the         
,saddars'anasamuccaya of  ,haribhadra   
with the commentary of ,gunaratna2 but  
the former is very  sketchy and can     
throw very little light on the          
understanding  of the ontological or    
epistemological doctrines of any of the 
systems4 ,it has been translated by     
,cowell and ,gough1 but ,i              
,footnote #a3 ,recently a very able     
,sanskrit dictionary of technical       
philosophical terms called ,nyyakos'a   
has been prepared by ,m4,m4  ,bhmcrya   
,jhalkikar1 ,bombay1 ,govt4 ,press4     

#c    am afraid the translation may not 
be found very intelligible4             
,gunaratna's commentary is excellent so 
far as ,jainism is concerned1  and it   
sometimes gives interesting information 
about other systems1  and also supplies 
us with some short bibliographical      
notices1 but it  seldom goes on to      
explain the epistemological or          
ontological doctrines  or discussions   
which are so necessary for the right    
understanding of any  of the advanced   
systems of ,indian thought4 ,thus in the
 absence of a book  which could give us 
in brief the main epistemological1      
ontological1 and  psychological         
positions of the ,indian thinkers1 it is
 difficult even for  a good ,sanskrit   
scholar to follow the advanced          
philosophical literature1  even though  
he may be acquainted with many of the   
technical philosophical  terms4 ,i have 
spoken enough about the difficulties of 
studying ,indian  philosophy1 but if    
once a person can get himself used to   

the technical  terms and the general    
positions of the different ,indian      
thinkers and their  modes of expression1
 he can master the whole by patient     
toil4 ,the  technical terms1 which are a
 source of difficulty at the beginning1 
are  of inestimable value in helping us 
to understand the precise and definite  
meaning of the writers who used them1   
and the chances of misinterpreting  or  
misunderstanding them are reduced to a  
minimum4 ,it is ,i think  well-known    
that avoidance of technical terms has   
often rendered  philosophical works     
unduly verbose1 and liable to           
misinterpretation4  ,the art of clear   
writing is indeed a rare virtue and     
every philosopher  cannot expect to have
 it4 ,but when technical expressions are
 properly  formed1 even a bad writer can
 make himself understood4 ,in the early 
days  of ,buddhist philosophy in the    
,pli literature1 this difficulty is     
greatly  felt4 ,there are some technical
 terms here which are still very elastic

 and  their repetition in different     
places in more or less different senses 
heighten the difficulty of understanding
 the real meaning intended to be        
conveyed4    ,but is it necessary that a
 history of ,indian philosophy should be
  written8 ,there are some people who   
think that the ,indians never rose      
beyond the stage of simple faith and    
that therefore they cannot have  any    
philosophy at all in the proper sense of
 the term4 ,thus ,professor  ,frank     
,thilly of the ,cornell ,university says
 in his ,history of ,philosophy         
,footnote ref #a1 ,a universal history  
of philosophy would include  the        
philosophies of all peoples4 ,not all   
peoples1 however        ,footnote #a3   
,new ,york1 #aiad1 p4 #c4    #d    have 
produced real systems of thought1 and   
the speculations of only a  few can be  
said to have had a history4 ,many do not
 rise beyond the  mythological stage4   
,even the theories of ,oriental peoples1
 the ,hindus1  ,egyptians1 ,chinese1    

consist1 in the main1 of mythological   
and ethical  doctrines1 and are not     
thoroughgoing systems of thought3 they  
are shot  through with poetry and faith4
 ,we shall1 therefore1 limit ourselves  
to  the study of the ,western countries1
 and begin with the philosophy of the   
ancient ,greeks1 on whose culture our   
own civilization in part1 rests4  ,there
 are doubtless many other people who    
hold such uninformed and  untrue        
beliefs1 which only show their ignorance
 of ,indian matters4  ,it is not        
necessary to say anything in order to   
refute these views1  for what follows   
will ,i hope show the falsity of their  
beliefs4 ,if  they are not satisfied1   
and want to know more definitely and    
elaborately  about the contents of the  
different systems1 ,i am afraid they    
will have  to go to the originals       
referred to in the bibliographical      
notices of  the chapters4    ,there is  
another opinion1 that the time has not  
yet come for an attempt  to write a     

history of ,indian philosophy4 ,two     
different reasons are given  from two   
different points of view4 ,it is said   
that the field of ,indian  philosophy is
 so vast1 and such a vast literature    
exists on each of the  systems1 that it 
is not possible for anyone to collect   
his materials  directly from the        
original sources1 before separate       
accounts are prepared  by specialists   
working in each of the particular       
systems4 ,there is some  truth in this  
objection1 but although in some of the  
important systems  the literature that  
exists is exceedingly vast1 yet many of 
them are more  or less repetitions of   
the same subjects1 and a judicious      
selection of  twenty or thirty important
 works on each of the systems could     
certainly  be made1 which would give a  
fairly correct exposition4 ,in my own   
undertaking in this direction ,i have   
always drawn directly from the  original
 texts1 and have always tried to collect
 my materials from those  sources in    

which they appear at their best4 ,my    
space has been very limited  and ,i have
 chosen the features which appeared to  
me to be the most  important4 ,i had to 
leave out many discussions of difficult 
problems  and diverse important bearings
 of each of the systems to many         
interesting aspects of philosophy4 ,this
 ,i hope may be excused  in a history of
 philosophy which does not aim at       
completeness4  ,there are indeed many   
defects and shortcomings1 and    #e     
these would have been much less in the  
case of a writer abler than the  present
 one4 ,at any rate it may be hoped that 
the imperfections of the  present       
attempt will be a stimulus to those     
whose better and more  competent efforts
 will supersede it4 ,no attempt ought to
 be called  impossible on account of its
 imperfections4    ,in the second place 
it is said that the ,indians had no     
proper and  accurate historical records 
and biographies and it is therefore     
impossible  to write a history of       

,indian philosophy4 ,this objection is  
also partially  valid4 ,but this defect 
does not affect us so much as one would 
at first  sight suppose2 for1 though the
 dates of the earlier beginnings are    
very  obscure1 yet1 in later times1 we  
are in a position to affirm some dates  
and to point out priority and           
posteriority in the case of other       
thinkers4  ,as most of the systems      
developed side by side through many     
centuries their  mutual relations also  
developed1 and these could be well      
observed4 ,the  special nature of this  
development has been touched on in the  
fourth  chapter4 ,most of the systems   
had very early beginnings and a         
continuous  course of development       
through the succeeding centuries1 and it
 is not  possible to take the state of  
the philosophy of a particular system at
  a particular time and contrast it with
 the state of that system at a  later   
time2 for the later state did not       
supersede the previous state1  but only 

showed a more coherent form of it1 which
 was generally true to  the original    
system but was more determinate4        
,evolution through history  has in      
,western countries often brought forth  
the development of more  coherent types 
of philosophic thought1 but in ,india1  
though the types  remained the same1    
their development through history made  
them more and  more coherent and        
determinate4 ,most of the parts were    
probably existent  in the earlier       
stages1 but they were in an             
undifferentiated state2 through  the    
criticism and conflict of the different 
schools existing side by side  the parts
 of each of the systems of thought      
became more and more  differentiated1   
determinate1 and coherent4 ,in some     
cases this development  has been almost 
imperceptible1 and in many cases the    
earlier forms have  been lost1 or so    
inadequately expressed that nothing     
definite could be  made out of them4    
,wherever such a differentiation could  

be made  in the interests of philosophy1
 ,i have tried to do it4 ,but ,i  have  
never considered it desirable that the  
philosophical interest  should be       
subordinated to the chronological4 ,it  
is no    #f    doubt true that more     
definite chronological information would
 be  a very desirable thing1 yet ,i am  
of opinion that the little              
chronological data we have give us a    
fair amount of help in forming  a       
general notion about the growth and     
development of the different  systems by
 mutual association and conflict4 ,if   
the condition of the  development of    
philosophy in ,india had been the same  
as in ,europe1  definite chronological  
knowledge would be considered much more 
indispensable4 ,for1 when one system    
supersedes another1 it is  indispensably
 necessary that we should know which    
preceded and which  succeeded4 ,but when
 the systems are developing side by     
side1 and when  we are getting them in  
their richer and better forms1 the      

interest with  regard to the conditions1
 nature and environment of their early  
origin  has rather a historical than a  
philosophical interest4 ,i have tried as
  best ,i could to form certain general 
notions as regards the earlier  stages  
of some of the systems1 but though the  
various features of  these systems at   
these stages in detail may not be       
ascertainable1  yet this1 ,i think1     
could never be considered as            
invalidating the  whole programme4      
,moreover1 even if we knew definitely   
the correct dates  of the thinkers of   
the same system we could not treat them 
separately1  as is done in ,european    
philosophy1 without unnecessarily       
repeating the  same thing twenty times  
over2 for they all dealt with the same  
system1  and tried to bring out the same
 type of thought in more and more       
determinate forms4    ,the earliest     
literature of ,india is the ,vedas4     
,these consist mostly of  hymns in      
praise of nature gods1 such as fire1    

wind1 etc4 ,excepting in  some of the   
hymns of the later parts of the work    
7probably about #ajjj  ,b4,c471 there is
 not much philosophy in them in our     
sense of the term4  ,it is here that we 
first find intensely interesting        
philosophical  questions of a more or   
less cosmological character expressed in
 terms  of poetry and imagination4 ,in  
the later ,vedic works called the       
,brhmafnas and the ranyakas written     
mostly in prose1 which followed  the    
,vedic hymns1 there are two tendencies1 
viz4 one that sought to  establish the  
magical forms of ritualistic worship1   
and the other which  indulged in        
speculative thinking through crude      
generalizations4 ,this  latter tendency 
was indeed much feebler than the former1
 and it might  appear that the          
ritualistic tendency had actually       
swallowed up what  little of philosophy 
the later parts of the ,vedic hymns were
 trying  to express1 but there are      
unmistakable marks that this tendency   

#g    existed and worked4 ,next to this 
come certain treatises written in prose 
and verse called the ,upanisads1 which  
contain various sorts of  philosophical 
thoughts mostly monistic or             
singularistic but also some  pluralistic
 and dualistic ones4 ,these are not     
reasoned statements1 but  utterances of 
truths intuitively perceived or felt as 
unquestionably real  and indubitable1   
and carrying great force1 vigour1 and   
persuasiveness with  them4 ,it is very  
probable that many of the earliest parts
 of this  literature are as old as #ejj 
,b4,c4 to #gjj ,b4,c4 ,buddhist         
philosophy began  with the ,buddha from 
some time about #ejj ,b4,c4 ,there is   
reason to believe  that ,buddhist       
philosophy continued to develop in      
,india in one or other of  its vigorous 
forms till some time about the tenth or 
eleventh century ,a4,d4  ,the earliest  
beginnings of the other ,indian systems 
of thought are also to  be sought       
chiefly between the age of the ,buddha  

to about #bjj ,b4,c4 ,jaina  philosophy 
was probably prior to the ,buddha4 ,but 
except in its earlier  days1 when it    
came in conflict with the doctrines of  
the ,buddha1 it  does not seem to me    
that the ,jaina thought came much in    
contact with  other systems of ,hindu   
thought4 ,excepting in some forms of    
,vaisnava  thought in later times1      
,jaina thought is seldom alluded to by  
the ,hindu  writers or later ,buddhists1
 though some ,jains like ,haribhadra and
  ,gunaratna tried to refute the ,hindu 
and ,buddhist systems4 ,the             
non-aggressive nature of their religion 
and ideal may to a certain  extent      
explain it1 but there may be other      
reasons too which it is  difficult for  
us to guess4 ,it is interesting to note 
that1 though there  have been some      
dissensions amongst the ,jains about    
dogmas and creeds1  ,jaina philosophy   
has not split into many schools of      
thought more or less  differing from one
 another as ,buddhist thought did4      

,the first volume of this work will     
contain ,buddhist and ,jaina philosophy 
and the six systems of ,hindu thought4  
,these six systems of orthodox  ,hindu  
thought are the ,smkhya1 the ,yoga1 the 
,nyya1 the ,vais'esika1  the ,mimms     
7generally known as ,prva ,mimms71 and  
the ,vednta 7known  also as ,uttara     
,mimms74 ,of these what is differently  
known as ,smkhya  and ,yoga are but     
different schools of one system4 ,the   
,vais'esika and  the ,nyya in later     
times became so mixed up that1 though in
 early times  the similarity of the     
former with ,mimms was greater than that
  with ,nyya1 they came to be regarded  
as fundamentally almost the  same       
systems4 ,nyya and ,vais'esika have     
therefore been treated    #h            
together4 ,in addition to these systems 
some theistic systems began  to grow    
prominent from the ninth century ,a4,d4 
,they also probably  had their early    
beginnings at the time of the           
,upanisads4 ,but at  that time their    

interest was probably concentrated on   
problems  of morality and religion4 ,it 
is not improbable that these were       
associated with certain metaphysical    
theories also1 but no works  treating   
them in a systematic way are now        
available4 ,one of their most  important
 early works is the ,bhagavadgt4 ,this  
book is rightly  regarded as one of the 
greatest masterpieces of ,hindu thought4
 ,it is  written in verse1 and deals    
with moral1 religious1 and metaphysical 
problems1 in a loose form4 ,it is its   
lack of system and method which  gives  
it its peculiar charm more akin to the  
poetry of the ,upanisads  than to the   
dialectical and systematic ,hindu       
thought4 ,from the ninth  century       
onwards attempts were made to supplement
 these loose theistic  ideas which were 
floating about and forming integral     
parts of religious  creeds1 by          
metaphysical theories4 ,theism is often 
dualistic and  pluralistic1 and so are  
all these systems1 which are known as   

different  schools of ,vaisnava         
philosophy4 ,most of the ,vaisnava      
thinkers wished  to show that their     
systems were taught in the ,upanisads1  
and thus  wrote commentaries thereon to 
prove their interpretations1 and also   
wrote  commentaries on the ,brahmastra1 
the classical exposition of the         
philosophy of the ,upanisads4 ,in       
addition to the works of these ,vaisnava
  thinkers there sprang up another class
 of theistic works which were of a  more
 eclectic nature4 ,these also had their 
beginnings in periods as old  as the    
,upanisads4 ,they are known as the      
,s'aiva and ,tantra thought1 and are    
dealt with in the second volume of this 
work4    ,we thus see that the earliest 
beginnings of most systems of ,hindu    
thought  can be traced to some time     
between #fjj ,b4,c4 to #ajj or #bjj     
,b4,c4 ,it is  extremely difficult to   
say anything about the relative priority
 of the  systems with any degree of     
certainty4 ,some conjectural attempts   

have  been made in this work with regard
 to some of the systems1 but how far    
they are correct1 it will be for our    
readers to judge4 ,moreover during  the 
earliest manifestation of a system some 
crude outlines only are  traceable4 ,as 
time went on the systems of thought     
began to develop  side by side4 ,most of
 them were taught from the time in which
 they  were first conceived to about the
 seventeenth century ,a4,d4 in an       
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils4  
,even now each system of  ,hindu thought
 has its own adherents1 though few      
people now    #i    care to write any   
new works upon them4 ,in the history of 
the growth of  any system of ,hindu     
thought we find that as time went on1   
and as new  problems were suggested1    
each system tried to answer them        
consistently  with its own doctrines4   
,the order in which we have taken the   
philosophical systems could not be      
strictly a chronological one4 ,thus     
though it is possible that the earliest 

speculations of some form of  ,smkhya1  
,yoga1 and ,mmms were prior to ,buddhism
 yet they have been  treated after      
,buddhism and ,jainism1 because the     
elaborate works of these  systems which 
we now possess are later than ,buddhism4
 ,in my opinion the  ,vais'esika system 
is also probably pre-,buddhistic1 but it
 has been  treated later1 partly on     
account of its association with ,nyya1  
and  partly on account of the fact that 
all its commentaries are of a much      
later date4 ,it seems to me almost      
certain that enormous quantities of  old
 philosophical literature have been     
lost1 which if found could have  been of
 use to us in showing the stages of the 
early growth of the systems  and their  
mutual relations4 ,but as they are not  
available we have to be  satisfied with 
what remains4 ,the original sources from
 which ,i have drawn  my materials have 
all been indicated in the brief accounts
 of the  literature of each system which
 ,i have put in before beginning the    

study  of any particular system of      
thought4    ,in my interpretations ,i   
have always tried to follow the original
 sources  as accurately as ,i could4    
,this has sometimes led to old and      
unfamiliar  modes of expression1 but    
this course seemed to me to be          
preferable to  the adoption of ,european
 modes of thought for the expression of 
,indian  ideas4 ,but even in spite of   
this striking similarities to many of   
the  modern philosophical doctrines and 
ideas will doubtless be noticed4  ,this 
only proves that the human mind follows 
more or less the same modes  of rational
 thought4 ,i have never tried to compare
 any phase of ,indian  thought with     
,european1 for this is beyond the scope 
of my present  attempt1 but if ,i may be
 allowed to express my own conviction1  
,i might  say that many of the          
philosophical doctrines of ,european    
philosophy are  essentially the same as 
those found in ,indian philosophy4 ,the 
main  difference is often the difference

 of the point of view from which the    
same problems appeared in such a variety
 of forms in the two countries4  ,my own
 view with regard to the net value of   
,indian philosophical  development will 
be expressed in the concluding chapter  
of the second  volume of the present    
work4    #aj          ,,chapter ,,ii    
,,the ,,vedas1 ,,br,,hmanas ,,and       
,,their ,,philosophy    ,the ,vedas and 
their antiquity4    ,the sacred books of
 ,india1 the ,vedas1 are generally      
believed to be the  earliest literary   
record of the ,indo-,european race4 ,it 
is indeed  difficult to say when the    
earliest portions of these compositions 
came  into existence4 ,many shrewd      
guesses have been offered1 but none of  
them  can be proved to be incontestably 
true4 ,max ,mller supposed the date to  
be #abjj ,b4,c41 ,haug #bdjj ,b4,c4 and 
,bl ,gangdhar ,tilak #djjj ,b4,c4 ,the  
ancient ,hindus seldom kept any         
historical record of their literary1    
religious or political achievements4    

,the ,vedas were handed down from  mouth
 to mouth from a period of unknown      
antiquity2 and the ,hindus  generally   
believed that they were never composed  
by men4 ,it was  therefore generally    
supposed that either they were taught by
 ,god to the  sages1 or that they were  
of themselves revealed to the sages who 
were the  seers 7mantradrast7 of the    
hymns4 ,thus we find that when some     
time had elapsed after the composition  
of the ,vedas1 people had come to  look 
upon them not only as very old1 but so  
old that they had1  theoretically at    
least1 no beginning in time1 though they
 were believed  to have been revealed at
 some unknown remote period at the      
beginning of  each creation4      ,the  
place of the ,vedas in the ,hindu mind4 
,when the ,vedas were composed1 there   
was probably no system of writing       
prevalent in ,india4 ,but such was the  
scrupulous zeal of the ,brahmins1  who  
got the whole ,vedic literature by heart
 by hearing it from their  preceptors1  

that it has been transmitted most       
faithfully to us through  the course of 
the last #cjjj years or more with little
 or no interpolations  at all4 ,the     
religious history of ,india had suffered
 considerable changes  in the latter    
periods1 since the time of the ,vedic   
civilization1 but such  was the         
reverence paid to the ,vedas that they  
had ever remained as  the highest       
religious authority for all sections of 
the ,hindus at  all times4 ,even at this
 day all the obligatory duties of the   
,hindus  at birth1 marriage1 death1     
etc41 are performed according to the old
    #aa    ,vedic ritual4 ,the prayers  
that a ,brahmin now says three times a  
day  are the same selections of ,vedic  
verses as were used as prayer verses    
two or three thousand years ago4 ,a     
little insight into the life of an      
ordinary ,hindu of the present day will 
show that the system of  image-worship  
is one that has been grafted upon his   
life1 the regular  obligatory duties of 

which are ordered according to the old  
,vedic rites4  ,thus an orthodox        
,brahmin can dispense with image-worship
 if he likes1  but not so with his daily
 ,vedic prayers or other obligatory     
ceremonies4  ,even at this day there are
 persons who bestow immense sums of     
money  for the performance and teaching 
of ,vedic sacrifices and rituals4  ,most
 of the ,sanskrit literatures that      
flourished after the ,vedas  base upon  
them their own validity1 and appeal to  
them as authority4  ,systems of ,hindu  
philosophy not only own their allegiance
 to the ,vedas1  but the adherents of   
each one of them would often quarrel    
with others  and maintain its           
superiority by trying to prove that it  
and it alone  was the faithful follower 
of the ,vedas and represented correctly 
their  views4 ,the laws which regulate  
the social1 legal1 domestic and         
religious  customs and rites of the     
,hindus even to the present day are said
 to be  but mere systematized memories  

of old ,vedic teachings1 and are held to
  be obligatory on their authority4     
,even under ,british administration1 in 
the inheritance of property1 adoption1  
and in such other legal  transactions1  
,hindu ,law is followed1 and this claims
 to draw its authority  from the ,vedas4
 ,to enter into details is unnecessary4 
,but suffice it to  say that the ,vedas1
 far from being regarded as a dead      
literature of the  past1 are still      
looked upon as the origin and source of 
almost all  literatures except purely   
secular poetry and drama4 ,thus in short
 we may  say that in spite of the many  
changes that time has wrought1 the      
orthodox  ,hindu life may still be      
regarded in the main as an adumbration  
of the  ,vedic life1 which had never    
ceased to shed its light all through the
 past4      ,classification of the      
,vedic literature4    ,a beginner who is
 introduced for the first time to the   
study  of later ,sanskrit literature is 
likely to appear somewhat confused  when

 he meets with authoritative texts of   
diverse purport and  subjects having the
 same generic name ,veda or ,s'ruti     
7from  s'ru to hear72 for ,veda in its  
wider sense is not the name of any      
#ab    particular book1 but of the      
literature of a particular epoch        
extending  over a long period1 say two  
thousand years or so4 ,as this          
literature  represents the total        
achievements of the ,indian people in   
different  directions for such a long   
period1 it must of necessity be of a    
diversified character4 ,if we roughly   
classify this huge literature from  the 
points of view of age1 language1 and    
subject matter1 we can point out  four  
different types1 namely the ,samhit or  
collection of verses 7sam  together1    
hita put71 ,brhmanas1 ranyakas 7forest  
treatises7  and the ,upanisads4 ,all    
these literatures1 both prose and verse1
  were looked upon as so holy that in   
early times it was thought  almost a    
sacrilege to write them2 they were      

therefore learnt by  heart by the       
,brahmins from the mouth of their       
preceptors and  were hence called s'ruti
 7literally anything heard7,footnote ref
 #a4      ,the ,samhits4    ,there are  
four collections or ,samhits1 namely    
,rg-,veda1 ,sma-,veda1  ,yajur-,veda and
 ,atharva-,veda4 ,of these the ,rg-,veda
 is probably the  earliest4 ,the        
,sma-,veda has practically no           
independent value1 for  it consists of  
stanzas taken 7excepting only #ge7      
entirely from the  ,rg-,veda1 which were
 meant to be sung to certain fixed      
melodies1 and  may thus be called the   
book of chants4 ,the ,yajur-,veda       
however contains  in addition to the    
verses taken from the ,rg-,veda many    
original prose  formulas4 ,the          
arrangement of the verses of the        
,sma-,veda is solely with  reference to 
their place and use in the ,soma        
sacrifice2 the contents  of the         
,yajur-,veda are arranged in the order  
in which the verses were  actually      

employed in the various religious       
sacrifices4 ,it is therefore  called the
 ,veda of ,yajus--sacrificial prayers4  
,these may be contrasted  with the      
arrangement in the ,rg-,veda in this1   
that there the verses are  generally    
arranged in accordance with the gods who
 are adored in them4  ,thus1 for        
example1 first we get all the poems     
addressed to ,agni or the  ,fire-god1   
then all those to the god ,indra and so 
on4 ,the fourth  collection1 the        
,atharva-,veda1 probably attained its   
present form  considerably later than   
the ,rg-,veda4 ,in spirit1 however1 as  
,professor  ,macdonell says1 ,it is not 
only entirely different from the        
,rigveda  but represents a much more    
primitive stage of thought4 ,while the  
,rigveda deals almost exclusively with  
the higher gods as conceived by a       
,footnote #a3 ,pnini1 ,,iii4 iii4 #id4  
#ac    comparatively advanced and       
refined sacerdotal class1 the           
,atharva-,veda  is1 in the main a book  

of spells and incantations appealing to 
the demon  world1 and teems with notions
 about witchcraft current among the     
lower  grades of the population1 and    
derived from an immemorial antiquity4   
,these  two1 thus complementary to each 
other in contents are obviously the most
  important of the four ,vedas ,footnote
 ref #a4      ,the ,brhmanas4 ,footnote 
ref #b    ,after the ,samhits there grew
 up the theological treatises called the
  ,brhmanas1 which were of a distinctly 
different literary type4 ,they  are     
written in prose1 and explain the sacred
 significance of the  different rituals 
to those who are not already familiar   
with them4  ,they reflect1 says         
,professor ,macdonell1 the spirit of an 
age in  which all intellectual activity 
is concentrated on the sacrifice1       
describing its ceremonies1 discussing   
its value1 speculating on its  origin   
and significance4 ,these works are full 
of dogmatic assertions1  fanciful       
symbolism and speculations of an        

unbounded imagination in the  field of  
sacrificial details4 ,the sacrificial   
ceremonials were probably  never so     
elaborate at the time when the early    
hymns were composed4  ,but when the     
collections of hymns were being handed  
down from generation  to generation the 
ceremonials became more and more        
complicated4 ,thus  there came about the
 necessity of the distribution of the   
different  sacrificial functions among  
several distinct classes of priests4 ,we
 may  assume that this was a period when
 the caste system was becoming          
established1 and when the only thing    
which could engage wise and religious   
minds was sacrifice and its elaborate   
rituals4 ,free speculative thinking  was
 thus subordinated to the service of the
 sacrifice1 and the result  was the     
production of the most fanciful         
sacramental and symbolic                
,footnote #a3 ,a4,a4 ,macdonell's       
,history of ,sanskrit ,literature1 p4   
#ca4    ,footnote #b3 ,weber 7,hist4    

,ind4 ,lit41 p4 #aa1 note7 says that the
 word  ,brhmana signifies that which    
relates to prayer brahman4 ,max ,muller 
7,s4,b4,e41 ,i4p4 lxvi7 says that       
,brhmana meant originally the sayings   
of ,brahmans1 whether in the general    
sense of priests1 or in the more        
special sense of ,brahman-priests4      
,eggeling 7,s4,b4,e4 ,,xii4 ,introd4 p4 
xxii7  says that the ,brhmanas were so  
called probably either because  they    
were intended for the instruction and   
guidance of priests 7brahman7           
generally2 or because they were1 for the
 most part1 the authoritative           
utterances of such as were thoroughly   
versed in ,vedic and sacrificial  lore  
and competent to act as ,brahmans or    
superintending priests4 ,but  in view of
 the fact that the ,brhmanas were also  
supposed to be as  much revealed as the 
,vedas1 the present writer thinks that  
,weber's view  is the correct one4      
#ad    system1 unparalleled anywhere but
 among the ,gnostics4 ,it is now        

generally believed that the close of the
 ,brhmana period was not later  than    
#ejj ,b4,c4      ,the ranyakas4    ,as a
 further development of the ,brhmanas   
however we get the ranyakas  or forest  
treatises4 ,these works were probably   
composed for old men who  had retired   
into the forest and were thus unable to 
perform elaborate  sacrifices requiring 
a multitude of accessories and articles 
which could  not be procured in forests4
 ,in these1 meditations on certain      
symbols  were supposed to be of great   
merit1 and they gradually began to      
supplant  the sacrifices as being of a  
superior order4 ,it is here that we find
  that amongst a certain section of     
intelligent people the ritualistic ideas
  began to give way1 and philosophic    
speculations about the nature of  truth 
became gradually substituted in their   
place4 ,to take an  illustration from   
the beginning of the ,brhadranyaka we   
find that  instead of the actual        
performance of the horse sacrifice      

7as'vamedha7  there are directions for  
meditating upon the dawn 7,usas7 as the 
head  of the horse1 the sun as the eye  
of the horse1 the air as its life1 and  
so on4 ,this is indeed a distinct       
advancement of the claims of speculation
  or meditation over the actual         
performance of the complicated          
ceremonials  of sacrifice4 ,the growth  
of the subjective speculation1 as being 
capable  of bringing the highest good1  
gradually resulted in the supersession  
of  ,vedic ritualism and the            
establishment of the claims of          
philosophic  meditation and             
self-knowledge as the highest goal of   
life4 ,thus  we find that the ranyaka   
age was a period during which free      
thinking  tried gradually to shake off  
the shackles of ritualism which had     
fettered  it for a long time4 ,it was   
thus that the ranyakas could pave the   
way  for the ,upanisads1 revive the     
germs of philosophic speculation in the 
,vedas1 and develop them in a manner    

which made the ,upanisads the source  of
 all philosophy that arose in the world 
of ,hindu thought4      ,the ,rg-,veda1 
its civilization4    ,the hymns of the  
,rg-,veda are neither the productions of
 a  single hand nor do they probably    
belong to any single age4 ,they  were   
composed probably at different periods  
by different sages1  and it is not      
improbable that some of them were       
composed    #ae    before the ,aryan    
people entered the plains of ,india4    
,they were handed  down from mouth to   
mouth and gradually swelled through the 
new additions  that were made by the    
poets of succeeding generations4 ,it was
 when the  collection had increased to a
 very considerable extent that it was   
probably arranged in the present form1  
or in some other previous forms  to     
which the present arrangement owes its  
origin4 ,they therefore reflect  the    
civilization of the ,aryan people at    
different periods of antiquity  before  
and after they had come to ,india4 ,this

 unique monument of a long  vanished age
 is of great aesthetic value1 and       
contains much that is  genuine poetry4  
,it enables us to get an estimate of the
 primitive  society which produced      
it--the oldest book of the ,aryan race4 
,the principal means of sustenance were 
cattle-keeping and the  cultivation of  
the soil with plough and harrow1 mattock
 and hoe1  and watering the ground when 
necessary with artificial canals4  ,the 
chief food consists1 as ,kaegi says1    
together with bread1  of various        
preparations of milk1 cakes of flour and
 butter1 many  sorts of vegetables and  
fruits2 meat cooked on the spits or in  
pots1  is little used1 and was probably 
eaten only at the great feasts and      
family gatherings4 ,drinking plays      
throughout a much more important  part  
than eating ,footnote ref #a4 ,the      
wood-worker built war-chariots  and     
wagons1 as also more delicate carved    
works and artistic cups4                
,metal-workers1 smiths and potters      

continued their trade4 ,the  women      
understood the plaiting of mats1 weaving
 and sewing2  they manufactured the wool
 of the sheep into clothing for men  and
 covering for animals4 ,the group of    
individuals forming a  tribe was the    
highest political unit2 each of the     
different families  forming a tribe was 
under the sway of the father or the head
 of  the family4 ,kingship was probably 
hereditary and in some cases  electoral4
 ,kingship was nowhere absolute1 but    
limited by the  will of the people4     
,most developed ideas of justice1 right 
and  law1 were present in the country4  
,thus ,kaegi says1 the hymns  strongly  
prove how deeply the prominent minds in 
the people  were persuaded that the     
eternal ordinances of the rulers of the 
world were as inviolable in mental and  
moral matters as in the  realm of       
nature1 and that every wrong act1 even  
the unconscious1  was punished and the  
sin expiated4,footnote ref #b ,thus it  
is only right  and proper to think that 

the ,aryans had attained a pretty high  
degree        ,footnote #a3 ,the        
,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 #ahhf edition1 p4  
#ac4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 p4 #ah4    
#af    of civilization1 but nowhere was 
the sincere spirit of the ,aryans  more 
manifested than in religion1 which was  
the most essential and  dominant feature
 of almost all the hymns1 except a few  
secular  ones4 ,thus ,kaegi says1 ,the  
whole significance of the ,rigveda  in  
reference to the general history of     
religion1 as has repeatedly  been       
pointed out in modern times1 rests upon 
this1 that it presents  to us the       
development of religious conceptions    
from the earliest  beginnings to the    
deepest apprehension of the godhead and 
its  relation to man ,footnote ref #a4  
,the ,vedic ,gods4    ,the hymns of the 
,rg-,veda were almost all composed in   
praise of the gods4 ,the social and     
other materials are of secondary        
importance1 as these references had only
 to be mentioned incidentally  in giving

 vent to their feelings of devotion to  
the god4  ,the gods here are however    
personalities presiding over the diverse
  powers of nature or forming their very
 essence4 ,they have  therefore no      
definite1 systematic and separate       
characters like the  ,greek gods or the 
gods of the later ,indian mythical      
works1 the  ,purnas4 ,the powers of     
nature such as the storm1 the rain1 the 
thunder1 are closely associated with one
 another1 and the gods  associated with 
them are also similar in character4 ,the
 same  epithets are attributed to       
different gods and it is only in a few  
specific qualities that they differ from
 one another4 ,in the later             
mythological compositions of the ,purnas
 the gods lost their  character as      
hypostatic powers of nature1 and thus   
became actual  personalities and        
characters having their tales of joy and
 sorrow  like the mortal here below4    
,the ,vedic gods may be contrasted  with
 them in this1 that they are of an      

impersonal nature1 as the  characters   
they display are mostly but expressions 
of the powers  of nature4 ,to take an   
example1 the fire or ,agni is described1
 as  ,kaegi has it1 as one that lies    
concealed in the softer wood1 as  in a  
chamber1 until1 called forth by the     
rubbing in the early  morning hour1 he  
suddenly springs forth in gleaming      
brightness4  ,the sacrificer takes and  
lays him on the wood4 ,when the priests 
pour melted butter upon him1 he leaps up
 crackling and neighing  like a         
horse--he whom men love to see          
increasing like their own  prosperity4  
,they wonder at him1 when1 decking      
himself with        ,footnote #a3 ,the  
,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 p4 #bf4    #ag     
changing colors like a suitor1 equally  
beautiful on all sides1 he  presents to 
all sides his front4                    
,all-searching is his beam1 the gleaming
 of his light1     ,his1 the            
all-beautiful1 of beauteous face and    
glance1     ,the changing shimmer like  

that floats upon the stream1     ,so    
,agni's rays gleam over bright and never
 cease4    ,footnote ref #a ,r4,v4,i4   
#adc4 #c4    ,they would describe the   
wind 7,vta7 and adore him and say       
,in what place was he born1 and from    
whence comes he8     ,the vital breath  
of gods1 the world's great offspring1   
,the ,god where'er he will moves at his 
pleasure3     ,his rushing sound we     
hear--what his appearance1 no one4      
,footnote ref #b ,r4,v4,x4 #afh4 #c1 #d4
    ,it was the forces of nature and her
 manifestations1 on earth  here1 the    
atmosphere around and above us1 or in   
the ,heaven  beyond the vault of the sky
 that excited the devotion and          
imagination of the ,vedic poets4 ,thus  
with the exception of a  few abstract   
gods of whom we shall presently speak   
and some  dual divinities1 the gods may 
be roughly classified as the            
terrestrial1 atmospheric1 and celestial4
      ,polytheism1 ,henotheism and      
,monotheism4    ,the plurality of the   

,vedic gods may lead a superficial      
enquirer  to think the faith of the     
,vedic people polytheistic4 ,but an     
intelligent  reader will find here      
neither polytheism nor monotheism but a 
simple  primitive stage of belief to    
which both of these may be said to owe  
their origin4 ,the gods here do not     
preserve their proper places as in  a   
polytheistic faith1 but each one of them
 shrinks into insignificance  or shines 
as supreme according as it is the object
 of adoration or not4  ,the ,vedic poets
 were the children of nature4 ,every    
natural phenomenon  excited their       
wonder1 admiration or veneration4 ,the  
poet is struck  with wonder that the    
rough red cow gives soft white milk4    
,the appearance  or the setting of the  
sun sends a thrill into the minds of the
 ,vedic  sage and with wonder-gazing    
eyes he exclaims3       ,undropped      
beneath1 not fastened firm1 how comes it
     ,that downward turned he falls not 
downward8     ,the guide of his         

ascending path1--who saw it8            
,footnote ,ref #a ,r4,v4 ,,iv4 #ac4 #e4 
,the sages wonder how the sparkling     
waters of all rivers flow  into one     
ocean without ever filling it4 ,the     
minds of the ,vedic        ,footnote #a3
 ,the ,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 p4 #ce4      
,footnote #b3 ,ibid1 p4 #ch4    #ah     
people as we find in the hymns were     
highly impressionable and  fresh4 ,at   
this stage the time was not ripe enough 
for them to  accord a consistent and    
well-defined existence to the multitude 
of gods nor to universalize them in a   
monotheistic creed4 ,they  hypostatized 
unconsciously any force of nature that  
overawed  them or filled them with      
gratefulness and joy by its beneficent  
or  aesthetic character1 and adored it4 
,the deity which moved the devotion  or 
admiration of their mind was the most   
supreme for the  time4 ,this peculiar   
trait of the ,vedic hymns ,max ,muller  
has called  ,henotheism or              
,kathenotheism3 a belief in single gods1

 each in turn  standing out as the      
highest4 ,and since the gods are thought
 of  as specially ruling in their own   
spheres1 the singers1 in their special  
concerns and desires1 call most of all  
on that god to whom they  ascribe the   
most power in the matter1--to whose     
department if ,i  may say so1 their wish
 belongs4 ,this god alone is present to 
the mind  of the suppliant2 with him for
 the time being is associated everything
  that can be said of a divine          
being2--he is the highest1 the only     
god1 before whom all others disappear1  
there being in this1 however1  no       
offence or depreciation of any other god
 ,footnote ref #a4 ,against  this theory
 it has been urged1 as ,macdonell       
rightly says in his ,vedic  ,mythology  
,footnote ref #b1 that ,vedic deities   
are not represented as  'independent of 
all the rest1' since no religion brings 
its gods into  more frequent and varied 
juxtaposition and combination1 and that 
even  the mightiest gods of the ,veda   

are made dependent on others4 ,thus     
,varuna and ,srya are subordinate to    
,indra 7,i4 #aja71 ,varuna and  the     
,as'vins submit to the power of ,visnu  
7,i4 #aef74444;,even when a  god is     
spoken of as unique or chief 7eka71 as  
is natural enough in  laudations1 such  
statements lose their temporarily       
monotheistic  force1 through the        
modifications or corrections supplied by
 the context  or even by the same verse 
,footnote ,ref #c4 ,henotheism is       
therefore an  appearance1 says          
,macdonell1 rather than a reality1 an   
appearance  produced by the             
indefiniteness due to undeveloped       
anthropomorphism1  by the lack of any   
,vedic god occupying the position of a  
,zeus as the  constant head of the      
pantheon1 by the natural tendency of the
 priest  or singer in extolling a       
particular god to exaggerate his        
greatness  and to ignore other gods1 and
 by the        ,footnote #a3 ,the       
,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 p4 #bg4            

,footnote #b3 ,see ,ibid4 p4 #cc4 ,see  
also ,arrowsmith's note on it for other 
references to ,henotheism4    ,footnote 
#c3 ,macdonell's ,vedic ,mythology1 pp4 
#af1 #ag4    #ai    growing belief in   
the unity of the gods 7cf4 the refrain  
of #c1 #ce7  each of whom might be      
regarded as a type of the divine        
,footnote ref #a4  ,but whether we call 
it ,henotheism or the mere temporary    
exaggeration  of the powers of the deity
 in question1 it is evident that this   
stage can neither be properly called    
polytheistic nor monotheistic1  but one 
which had a tendency towards them both1 
although it  was not sufficiently       
developed to be identified with either  
of them4  ,the tendency towards extreme 
exaggeration could be called a          
monotheistic bias in germ1 whereas the  
correlation of different  deities as    
independent of one another and yet      
existing side by side  was a tendency   
towards polytheism4    ,growth of a     
,monotheistic tendency2 ,prajpati1      

,vis'vakarma4    ,this tendency towards 
extolling a god as the greatest and     
highest gradually brought forth the     
conception of a supreme  ,lord of all   
beings 7,prajpati71 not by a process of 
conscious  generalization but as a      
necessary stage of development of the   
mind1  able to imagine a deity as the   
repository of the highest moral and     
physical power1 though its direct       
manifestation cannot be perceived4      
,thus the epithet ,prajpati or the ,lord
 of beings1 which  was originally an    
epithet for other deities1 came to be   
recognized  as a separate deity1 the    
highest and the greatest4 ,thus it is   
said  in ,r4,v4x4 #aba ,footnote ,ref   
#b3      ,in the beginning rose         
,hiranyagarbha1    ,born as the only    
lord of all existence4    ,this earth he
 settled firm and heaven established3   
,what god shall we adore with our       
oblations8    ,who gives us breath1 who 
gives us strength1 whose bidding    ,all
 creatures must obey1 the bright gods   

even2    ,whose shade is death1 whose   
shadow life immortal3    ,what god shall
 we adore with our oblations8    ,who by
 his might alone became the monarch     
,of all that breathes1 of all that wakes
 or slumbers1    ,of all1 both man and  
beast1 the lord eternal3    ,what god   
shall we adore with our oblations8      
,whose might and majesty these snowy    
mountains1    ,the ocean and the distant
 stream exhibit2    ,whose arms extended
 are these spreading regions3    ,what  
god shall we adore with our oblations8  
,who made the heavens bright1 the earth 
enduring1    ,who fixed the firmament1  
the heaven of heavens2    ,who measured 
out the air's extended spaces3    ,what 
god shall we adore with our oblations8  
,footnote #a3 ,macdonell's ,vedic       
,mythology1 p4 #ag4    ,footnote #b3    
,the ,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 pp4 #hh1 #hi4 
#bj    ,similar attributes are also     
ascribed to the deity ,vis'vakarma      
7,all-creator7 ,footnote ref #a4 ,he is 
said to be father and procreator of  all

 beings1 though himself uncreated4 ,he  
generated the primitive waters4  ,it is 
to him that the sage says1      ,who is 
our father1 our creator1 maker1    ,who 
every place doth know and every         
creature1    ,by whom alone to gods     
their names were given1    ,to him all  
other creatures go to ask him ,footnote 
ref #b                                  
,r4,v4x4#hb4c4      ,brahma4    ,the    
conception of ,brahman which has been   
the highest glory  for the ,vednta      
philosophy of later days had hardly     
emerged in  the ,rg-,veda from the      
associations of the sacrificial mind4   
,the  meanings that ,syana the          
celebrated commentator of the ,vedas    
gives of the word as collected by ,haug 
are3 7a7 food1 food offering1  7b7 the  
chant of the sma-singer1 7c7 magical    
formula or text1  7d7 duly completed    
ceremonies1 7e7 the chant and           
sacrificial gift  together1 7f7 the     
recitation of the hotr priest1 7g7      
great4 ,roth  says that it also means   

the devotion which manifests itself as  
longing and satisfaction of the soul and
 reaches forth to the  gods4 ,but it is 
only in the ,s'atapatha ,brhmana that   
the conception  of ,brahman has acquired
 a great significance as the  supreme   
principle which is the moving force     
behind the gods4  ,thus the ,s'atapatha 
says1 ,verily in the beginning this     
7universe7  was the ,brahman 7neut474   
,it created the gods2 and1 having       
created the gods1 it made them ascend   
these worlds3 ,agni this  7terrestrial7 
world1 ,vyu the air1 and ,srya the      
sky4444 ,then the  ,brahman itself went 
up to the sphere beyond4 ,having gone up
  to the sphere beyond1 it considered1  
',how can ,i descend again  into these  
worlds8' ,it then descended again by    
means of these  two1 ,form and ,name4   
,whatever has a name1 that is name2 and 
that again which has no name and which  
one knows by its form1  'this is 7of a  
certain7 form1' that is form3 as far as 
there are ,form  and ,name so far1      

indeed1 extends this 7universe74 ,these 
indeed  are the two great forces of     
,brahman2 and1 verily1 he who knows     
these two great forces of ,brahman      
becomes himself a great force ,footnote 
ref #c4 ,in another place ,brahman is   
said to be the ultimate thing in the    
,universe and is identified with        
,prajpati1 ,purusa and ,prna            
,footnote #a3 ,see ,the ,rigveda1 by    
,kaegi1 p4 #hi1 and also ,muir's        
,sanskrit  ,texts1 vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #e-aa4
    ,footnote #b3 ,kaegi's translation4 
,footnote #c3 ,see ,eggeling's          
translation of ,s'atapatha ,brhmana     
,s4,b4,e4  vol4 ,,xliv4 pp4 #bg1 #bh4   
#ba    7the vital air ,footnote ref #a74
 ,in another place ,brahman is described
 as  being the ,svayambh 7self-born7    
performing austerities1 who offered  his
 own self in the creatures and the      
creatures in his own self1  and thus    
compassed supremacy1 sovereignty and    
lordship over  all creatures ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,the conception of the supreme  

man 7,purusa7  in the ,rg-,veda also    
supposes that the supreme man pervades  
the  world with only a fourth part of   
,himself1 whereas the remaining  three  
parts transcend to a region beyond4 ,he 
is at once the  present1 past and future
 ,footnote ref #c4      ,sacrifice2 the 
,first ,rudiments of the ,law of ,karma4
    ,it will however be wrong to suppose
 that these monotheistic  tendencies    
were gradually supplanting the          
polytheistic sacrifices4  ,on the other 
hand1 the complications of ritualism    
were gradually  growing in their        
elaborate details4 ,the direct result of
 this growth  contributed however to    
relegate the gods to a relatively       
unimportant  position1 and to raise the 
dignity of the magical characteristics  
of the sacrifice as an institution which
 could give the  desired fruits of      
themselves4 ,the offerings at a         
sacrifice were not  dictated by a       
devotion with which we are familiar     
under ,christian  or ,vaisnava          

influence4 ,the sacrifice taken as a    
whole is conceived  as ,haug notes to be
 a kind of machinery in which every     
piece must tally with the other1 the    
slightest discrepancy in the            
performance of even a minute ritualistic
 detail1 say in the pouring  of the     
melted butter on the fire1 or the proper
 placing of utensils  employed in the   
sacrifice1 or even the misplacing of a  
mere straw  contrary to the injunctions 
was sufficient to spoil the whole       
sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it
 might be performed4  ,even if a word   
was mispronounced the most dreadful     
results  might follow4 ,thus when       
,tvastr performed a sacrifice for the   
production of a demon who would be able 
to kill his enemy  ,indra1 owing to the 
mistaken accent of a single word the    
object  was reversed and the demon      
produced was killed by ,indra4 ,but if  
the sacrifice could be duly performed   
down to the minutest  detail1 there was 
no power which could arrest or delay the

 fruition  of the object4 ,thus the     
objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled   
not  by the grace of the gods1 but as a 
natural result of the sacrifice4  ,the  
performance of the rituals invariably   
produced certain  mystic or magical     
results by virtue of which the object   
desired        ,footnote #a3 ,see       
,s4,b4,e4 ,,xliii4 pp4#ei1fj1djj and    
,,xliv4 p4#dji4    ,footnote #b3 ,see   
,ibid41 ,,xliv1 p4 #dah4    ,footnote   
#c3 ,r4,v4x4#ij1 ,purusa ,skta4    #bb  
by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due  
course like the fulfilment of  a natural
 law in the physical world4 ,the        
sacrifice was believed  to have existed 
from eternity like the ,vedas4 ,the     
creation of  the world itself was even  
regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice    
performed  by the supreme ,being4 ,it   
exists as ,haug says as an invisible    
thing at  all times and is like the     
latent power of electricity in an       
electrifying machine1 requiring only the
 operation of a suitable  apparatus in  

order to be elicited4 ,the sacrifice is 
not offered  to a god with a view to    
propitiate him or to obtain from him    
welfare  on earth or bliss in ,heaven2  
these rewards are directly produced by  
the sacrifice itself through the correct
 performance of complicated  and        
interconnected ceremonies which         
constitute the sacrifice4 ,though  in   
each sacrifice certain gods were invoked
 and received the offerings1  the gods  
themselves were but instruments in      
bringing about the sacrifice  or in     
completing the course of mystical       
ceremonies composing it4  ,sacrifice is 
thus regarded as possessing a mystical  
potency superior even  to the gods1 who 
it is sometimes stated attained to their
 divine rank  by means of sacrifice4    
,sacrifice was regarded as almost the   
only  kind of duty1 and it was also     
called karma or kriy 7action7 and  the  
unalterable law was1 that these mystical
 ceremonies for good  or for bad1 moral 
or immoral 7for there were many kinds of

  sacrifices which were performed for   
injuring one's enemies or  gaining      
worldly prosperity or supremacy at the  
cost of others7  were destined to       
produce their effects4 ,it is well to   
note here that  the first recognition of
 a cosmic order or law prevailing in    
nature  under the guardianship of the   
highest gods is to be found in the  use 
of the word ,rta 7literally the course  
of things74 ,this word  was also used1  
as ,macdonell observes1 to denote the   
'order'  in the moral world as truth and
 'right' and in the religious  world as 
sacrifice or 'rite',footnote ref #a and 
its unalterable law of  producing       
effects4 ,it is interesting to note in  
this connection that it  is here that we
 find the first germs of the law of     
karma1 which exercises  such a          
dominating control over ,indian thought 
up to the present  day4 ,thus we find   
the simple faith and devotion of the    
,vedic  hymns on one hand being         
supplanted by the growth of a complex   

system of sacrificial rites1 and on the 
other bending their course  towards a   
monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of
 the ultimate  reality of the universe4 
,footnote #a3 ,macdonell's ,vedic       
,mythology1 p4 #aa4    #bc              
,cosmogony--,mythological and           
philosophical4    ,the cosmogony of the 
,rg-,veda may be looked at from two     
aspects1 the mythological and the       
philosophical4 ,the mythological  aspect
 has in general two currents1 as        
,professor ,macdonell says1  ,the one   
regards the universe as the result of   
mechanical production1  the work of     
carpenter's and joiner's skill2 the     
other  represents it as the result of   
natural generation ,footnote ref4 #a4   
,thus in the ,rg-,veda we find that the 
poet in one place says1 what was  the   
wood and what was the tree out of which 
they built heaven  and earth ,footnote  
ref4 #b8 ,the answer given to this      
question in  ,taittirya-,brhmana is     
,brahman the wood and ,brahman the tree 

from  which the heaven and earth were   
made ,footnote ref #c4 ,heaven and      
,earth  are sometimes described as      
having been supported with posts        
,footnote  ref #d4 ,they are also       
sometimes spoken of as universal        
parents1 and  parentage is sometimes    
attributed to ,aditi and ,daksa4        
,under this philosophical aspect the    
semi-pantheistic ,man-hymn  ,footnote   
ref #e attracts our notice4 ,the supreme
 man as we have already  noticed above  
is there said to be the whole universe1 
whatever  has been and shall be2 he is  
the lord of immortality who has become  
diffused everywhere among things animate
 and inanimate1 and  all beings came out
 of him2 from his navel came the        
atmosphere2  from his head arose the    
sky2 from his feet came the earth2 from 
his ear the four quarters4 ,again there 
are other hymns in which  the ,sun is   
called the soul 7tman7 of all that is   
movable and  all that is immovable      
,footnote ref #f4 ,there are also       

statements to the  effect that the      
,being is one1 though it is called by   
many names by the  sages ,footnote ref  
#g4 ,the supreme being is sometimes     
extolled as the  supreme ,lord of the   
world called the golden egg             
7,hiranyagarbha ,footnote  ref #h74 ,in 
some passages it is said ,brahmanaspati 
blew forth these  births like a         
blacksmith4 ,in the earliest age of the 
gods1 the existent  sprang from the     
non-existent4 ,in the first age of the  
gods1 the  existent sprang from the     
non-existent3 thereafter the regions    
sprang1 thereafter1 from ,uttnapada     
,footnote ref #i4 ,the most remarkable  
and sublime hymn in which the first     
germs of philosophic speculation        
,footnote #a3 ,macdonell's ,vedic       
,mythology1 p4 #aa4    ,footnote #b3    
,r4,v4x4 #ha4 #d4    ,footnote #c3      
,taitt4 ,br4 ,,ii4 #h4 #i4 #f4          
,footnote #d3 ,macdonell's ,vedic       
,mythology1 p4 #aa2 also ,r4,v4 ,,ii4   
#ae and ,,iv4  #ef4    ,footnote #e3    

,r4,v4x4 #ij4    ,footnote #f3 ,r4,v4,i4
 #aae4    ,footnote #g3 ,r4,v4,i4 #afd4 
#df4    ,footnote #h3 ,r4,v4,x4 #aba4   
,footnote #i3 ,muir's translation of    
,r4,v4x4 #gb2 ,muir's ,sanskrit ,texts1 
vol4  v4p4 #dh4    #bd    with regard to
 the wonderful mystery of the origin of 
the world  are found is the #abith hymn 
of ,r4,v4x4    #a4 ,then there was      
neither being nor not-being4     ,the   
atmosphere was not1 nor sky above it4   
,what covered all8 and where8 by what   
protected8     ,was there the fathomless
 abyss of waters8    #b4 ,then neither  
death nor deathless existed2     ,of day
 and night there was yet no distinction4
     ,alone that one breathed calmly1   
self-supported1     ,other than ,it was 
none1 nor aught above ,it4    #c4       
,darkness there was at first in darkness
 hidden2     ,the universe was          
undistinguished water4     ,that which  
in void and emptiness lay hidden        
,alone by power of fervor was developed4
    #d4 ,then for the first time there  

arose desire1     ,which was the primal 
germ of mind1 within it4     ,and sages1
 searching in their heart1 discovered   
,in ,nothing the connecting bond of     
,being4    #f4 ,who is it knows8 ,who   
here can tell us surely     ,from what  
and how this universe has risen8        
,and whether not till after it the gods 
lived8     ,who then can know from what 
it has arisen8    #g4 ,the source from  
which this universe has risen1     ,and 
whether it was made1 or uncreated1      
,he only knows1 who from the highest    
heaven     ,rules1 the all-seeing       
lord--or does not ,he know ,footnote ref
 #a8    ,the earliest commentary on this
 is probably a passage in the           
,s'atapatha ,brhmana 7x4 #e4 #c4;,i7    
which says that in the beginning  this  
7universe7 was as it were neither       
non-existent nor existent2  in the      
beginning this 7universe7 was as it     
were1 existed and did  not exist3 there 
was then only that ,mind4 ,wherefore it 
has been  declared by the ,rishi        

7,rg-,veda ,x4 #abi4 ,i71 ',there was   
then neither  the non-existent nor the  
existent' for ,mind was1 as it were1    
neither  existent nor non-existent4     
,this ,mind when created1 wished to     
become manifest1--more defined1 more    
substantial3 it sought after  a self 7a 
body72 it practised austerity3 it       
acquired consistency ,footnote  ref #b4 
,in the ,atharva-,veda also we find it  
stated that all forms of  the universe  
were comprehended within the god        
,skambha ,footnote ref #c4    ,thus we  
find that even in the period of the     
,vedas there sprang  forth such a       
philosophic yearning1 at least among    
some who could        ,footnote #a3 ,the
 ,rigveda1 by ,kaegi1 p4 #ij4 ,r4,v4x4  
#abi4    ,footnote #b3 ,see ,eggeling's 
translation of ,s'4,b41 ,s4,b4,e4 vol4  
,,xliii4 pp4  #cgd1 #cge4    ,footnote  
#c3 ,a4,v4 x4 #g4 #aj4    #be           
question whether this universe was at   
all a creation or not1 which  could     
think of the origin of the world as     

being enveloped in the  mystery of a    
primal non-differentiation of being and 
non-being2  and which could think that  
it was the primal ,one which by its     
inherent fervour gave rise to the desire
 of a creation as the first             
manifestation of the germ of mind1 from 
which the universe sprang  forth through
 a series of mysterious gradual         
processes4 ,in the  ,brhmanas1 however1 
we find that the cosmogonic view        
generally  requires the agency of a     
creator1 who is not however always the  
starting point1 and we find that the    
theory of evolution is combined  with   
the theory of creation1 so that         
,prajpati is sometimes  spoken of as the
 creator while at other times the       
creator is said  to have floated in the 
primeval water as a cosmic golden egg4  
,eschatology2 the ,doctrine of tman4    
,there seems to be a belief in the      
,vedas that the soul could  be separated
 from the body in states of swoon1 and  
that it could  exist after death1 though

 we do not find there any trace of the  
doctrine of transmigration in a         
developed form4 ,in the ,s'atapatha     
,brhmana it is said that those who do   
not perform rites with  correct         
knowledge are born again after death and
 suffer death  again4 ,in a hymn of the 
,rg-,veda 7,x4 #eh7 the soul 7manas7 of 
a man  apparently unconscious is invited
 to come back to him from the  trees1   
herbs1 the sky1 the sun1 etc4 ,in many  
of the hymns there  is also the belief  
in the existence of another world1 where
 the  highest material joys are attained
 as a result of the performance  of the 
sacrifices and also in a hell of        
darkness underneath  where the          
evil-doers are punished4 ,in the        
,s'atapatha  ,brhmana we find that the  
dead pass between two fires which burn  
the  evil-doers1 but let the good go by 
,footnote ref #a2 it is also said  there
 that everyone is born again after      
death1 is weighed in a balance1  and    
receives reward or punishment according 

as his works are good or bad4  ,it is   
easy to see that scattered ideas like   
these with regard to  the destiny of the
 soul of man according to the sacrifice 
that he  performs or other good or bad  
deeds form the first rudiments of  the  
later doctrine of metempsychosis4 ,the  
idea that man enjoys  or suffers1 either
 in another world or by being born in   
this world  according to his good or bad
 deeds1 is the first beginning of the   
moral idea1 though in the ,brahmanic    
days the good deeds were                
,footnote #a3 ,see ,s4,b4 ,i4 #i4c1 and 
also ,macdonell's ,vedic ,mythology1    
pp4 #aff1 #afg4    #bf    more often of 
the nature of sacrificial duties than   
ordinary good  works4 ,these ideas of   
the possibilities of a necessary        
connection  of the enjoyments and       
sorrows of a man with his good and bad  
works when combined with the notion of  
an inviolable law or  order1 which we   
have already seen was gradually growing 
with  the conception of rta1 and the    

unalterable law which produces  the     
effects of sacrificial works1 led to the
 ,law of ,karma and the  doctrine of    
transmigration4 ,the words which denote 
soul in the  ,rg-,veda are manas1 tman  
and asu4 ,the word tman however  which  
became famous in later ,indian thought  
is generally used  to mean vital breath4
 ,manas is regarded as the seat of      
thought  and emotion1 and it seems to be
 regarded1 as ,macdonell says1 as       
dwelling in the heart,footnote ref #a4  
,it is however difficult to  understand 
how tman as vital breath1 or as a       
separable part of man  going out of the 
dead man came to be regarded as the     
ultimate essence  or reality in man and 
the universe4 ,there is however at least
 one  passage in the ,rg-,veda where the
 poet penetrating deeper and  deeper    
passes from the vital breath 7asu7 to   
the blood1 and thence  to tman as the   
inmost self of the world2 ,who has seen 
how  the first-born1 being the          
,bone-possessing 7the shaped world71 was

  born from the ,boneless 7the          
shapeless78 where was the vital  breath1
 the blood1 the ,self 7tman7 of the     
world8 ,who went to  ask him that knows 
it ,footnote ref #b8 ,in ,taittrya      
ranyaka ,i4 #bc1  however1 it is said   
that ,prajpati after having created his 
self 7as  the world7 with his own self  
entered into it4 ,in ,taittrya ,brhmana 
the tman is called omnipresent1 and it  
is said that he who knows  him is no    
more stained by evil deeds4 ,thus we    
find that in the  pre-,upanisad ,vedic  
literature tman probably was first used 
to  denote vital breath in man1 then the
 self of the world1 and then  the self  
in man4 ,it is from this last stage that
 we find the traces  of a growing       
tendency to looking at the self of man  
as the omnipresent  supreme principle of
 the universe1 the knowledge of which   
makes a man sinless and pure4           
,conclusion4    ,looking at the         
advancement of thought in the ,rg-,veda 
we  find first that a fabric of thought 

was gradually growing which  not only   
looked upon the universe as a           
correlation of parts or a               
,footnote #a3 ,macdonell's ,vedic       
,mythology1 p4#aff and ,r4,v4 viii4#hi4 
,footnote #b3 ,r4,v4i4 #afd4 #d and     
,deussen's article on tman in           
,encyclopaedia of ,religion and ,ethics4
    #bg    construction made of them1   
but sought to explain it as having      
emanated from one great being who is    
sometimes described as  one with the    
universe and surpassing it1 and at other
 times as  being separate from it2 the  
agnostic spirit which is the mother  of 
philosophic thought is seen at times to 
be so bold as to express  doubts even on
 the most fundamental questions of      
creation--,who  knows whether this world
 was ever created or not8 ,secondly  the
 growth of sacrifices has helped to     
establish the unalterable  nature of the
 law by which the 7sacrificial7 actions 
produced their  effects of themselves4  
,it also lessened the importance of     

deities  as being the supreme masters of
 the world and our fate1 and the        
tendency of henotheism gradually        
diminished their multiple  character and
 advanced the monotheistic tendency in  
some  quarters4 ,thirdly1 the soul of   
man is described as being separable     
from his body and subject to suffering  
and enjoyment in another  world         
according to his good or bad deeds2 the 
doctrine that the  soul of man could go 
to plants1 etc41 or that it could again 
be reborn  on earth1 is also hinted at  
in certain passages1 and this may  be   
regarded as sowing the first seeds of   
the later doctrine of  transmigration4  
,the self 7tman7 is spoken of in one    
place as the  essence of the world1 and 
when we trace the idea in the ,brhmanas 
and the ranyakas we see that tman has   
begun to mean the  supreme essence in   
man as well as in the universe1 and has 
thus  approached the great tman doctrine
 of the ,upanisads4          ,,chapter  
,,iii      ,,the ,,earlier ,,upani,,sads

 ,footnote ref #a4 7#gjj ,b4,c4-#fjj    
,b4,c47    ,the place of the ,upanisads 
in ,vedic literature4    ,though it is  
generally held that the ,upanisads are  
usually  attached as appendices to the  
ranyakas which are again attached  to   
the ,brhmanas1 yet it cannot be said    
that their distinction as  separate     
treatises is always observed4 ,thus we  
find in some cases  that subjects which 
we should expect to be discussed in a   
,brhmana  are introduced into the       
ranyakas and the ranyaka materials  are 
sometimes fused into the great bulk of  
,upanisad teaching4  ,this shows that   
these three literatures gradually grew  
up in one        ,footnote #a3 ,there   
are about #aab ,upanisads which have    
been published by  the ,nirnaya-,sgara  
,press1 ,bombay1 #aiag4 ,these are #a s1
 #b ,kena1  #c ,katha1 #d ,pras'na1 #e  
,mundaka1 #f ,mndukya1 #g ,taittirya1 #g
 ,aitareya1  #i ,chndogya1 #aj          
,brhadranyaka1 #aa ,s'vets'vatara1 #ab  
,kausitaki1  #ac ,maitrey1 #ad          

,kaivalya1 #ae ,jbla1 #af ,brahmabindu1 
#ag ,hamsa1  #ah runika1 #ai ,garbha1   
#bj ,nryana1 #ba ,nryana1 #bb           
,paramahamsa1  #bc ,brahma1 #bd         
,amrtanda1 #be ,atharvas'iras1 #bf      
,atharvas'ikh1  #bg ,maitryan1 #bh      
,brhajjbla1 #bi ,nrsimhaprvatpin1  #cj  
,nrsimhottaratpin1 #ca ,klgnirudra1 #cb 
,subla1 #cc ,ksurik1  #cd ,yantrik1 #ce 
,sarvasra1 #cf ,nirlamba1 #cg           
,s'ukarahasya1 #ch ,vajrascik1  #ci     
,tejobindu1 #dj ,ndabindu1 #da          
,dhynabindu1 #db ,brahmavidy1 #dc       
,yogatattva1  #dd ,atmabodha1 #de       
,nradaparivrjaka1 #df ,tris'ikhibrhmana1
 #dg ,st1  #dh ,yogacdamani1 #di        
,nirvna1 #ej ,mandalabrhmana1 #ea       
,daksinmrtti1  #eb ,s'arabha1 #ec       
,skanda1 #ed ,tripdvibhtimahnryana1 #ee 
,advayatraka1  #ef ,ramarahasya1 #eg    
,rmaprvatpin1 #eh ,rmottaratpin1 #ei    
,vsudeva1  #fj ,mudgala1 #fa ,sndilya1  
#fb ,paingala1 #fc ,bhiksuka1 ,mah1 #fe 
,s'rraka1  #ff ,yogas'ikh1 #fg          
,turiytta1 #fh ,samnysa1 #fi            

,paramahamsaparivrjaka1  #gj ,aksaml1   
#ga ,avyakta1 #gb ,ekksara1 #gc         
,annaprn1 #gd ,srya1 #ge ,aksi1  #gf    
,adhytma1 #gg ,kundika1 #gh ,svitr1 #gi 
tman1 #hj ,p'supatabrahma1  #ha         
,parabrahma1 #hb ,avadhta1 #hc          
,tripurrpini1 #hd ,dev1 #he ,tripur1    
#hf ,katharudra1 #hg ,bhvan1 #hh        
,rudrahrdaya1 #hi ,yogakundali1  #ij    
,bhasmajbla1 #ia ,rudrksajbla1 #ib      
,ganapati1 #ic ,jbladars'ana1  #id      
,tiasra1 #ie ,mahvakya1 #if             
,paficabrahma1 #ig ,prngnihotra1  #ih   
,goplaprvatpin1 #ii ,goplottaratpin1    
#ajj ,krsna1 #aja ,yjavalkya1  #ajb     
,varha1 #ajc ,s'thyyanya1 #ajd          
,hayagrva1 #aje ,datttreya1 #ajf        
,garuda1  #ajg ,kalisantarana1 #ajh     
,jbli1 #aji ,saubhgyalaksm1 #aaj        
,sarasvatrahasya1  #aaa ,bahvrca1 #aab  
,muktika4    ,the collection of         
,upanisads translated by ,dara shiko1   
,aurangzeb's brother1  contained #ej    
,upanisads4 ,the ,muktika ,upanisad     
gives a list of #ajh  ,upanisads4 ,with 

the exception of the first #ac          
,upanisads most of them are  of more or 
less later date4 ,the ,upanisads dealt  
with in this chapter are  the earlier   
ones4 ,amongst the later ones there are 
some which repeat the  purport of these1
 there are others which deal with the   
,s'aiva1 ,s'kta1  the ,yoga and the     
,vaisnava doctrines4 ,these will be     
referred to in  connection with the     
consideration of those systems in       
,volume ,,ii4 ,the  later ,upanisads    
which only repeat the purport of those  
dealt with in this  chapter do not      
require further mention4 ,some of the   
later ,upanisads were  composed even as 
late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth 
century4    #bi    process of           
development and they were probably      
regarded as parts  of one literature1 in
 spite of the differences in their      
subject-matter4  ,deussen supposes that 
the principle of this division was to be
  found in this1 that the ,brhmanas were
 intended for the householders1  the    

ranyakas for those who in their old age 
withdrew  into the solitude of the      
forests and the ,upanisads for those who
  renounced the world to attain ultimate
 salvation by meditation4  ,whatever    
might be said about these literary      
classifications the  ancient            
philosophers of ,india looked upon the  
,upanisads as being  of an entirely     
different type from the rest of the     
,vedic literature  as dictating the path
 of knowledge 7jna-mrga7 as opposed  to 
the path of works 7karma-mrga7 which    
forms the content  of the latter4 ,it is
 not out of place here to mention that  
the  orthodox ,hindu view holds that    
whatever may be written in the  ,veda is
 to be interpreted as commandments to   
perform certain  actions 7vidhi7 or     
prohibitions against committing certain 
others  7nisedha74 ,even the stories or 
episodes are to be so interpreted  that 
the real objects of their insertion     
might appear as only to  praise the     
performance of the commandments and to  

blame the  commission of the            
prohibitions4 ,no person has any right  
to argue  why any particular ,vedic     
commandment is to be followed1 for no   
reason can ever discover that1 and it is
 only because reason fails  to find out 
why a certain ,vedic act leads to a     
certain effect that  the ,vedas have    
been revealed as commandments and       
prohibitions  to show the true path of  
happiness4 ,the ,vedic teaching belongs 
therefore to that of the ,karma-mrga or 
the performance of ,vedic  duties of    
sacrifice1 etc4 ,the ,upanisads however 
do not require  the performance of any  
action1 but only reveal the ultimate    
truth  and reality1 a knowledge of which
 at once emancipates a man4  ,readers of
 ,hindu philosophy are aware that there 
is a very strong  controversy on this   
point between the adherents of the      
,vednta  7,upanisads7 and those of the  
,veda4 ,for the latter seek in analogy  
to the other parts of the ,vedic        
literature to establish the principle   

that the ,upanisads should not be       
regarded as an exception1 but  that they
 should also be so interpreted that they
 might also be  held out as commending  
the performance of duties2 but the      
former dissociate the ,upanisads from   
the rest of the ,vedic literature  and  
assert that they do not make the        
slightest reference to  any ,vedic      
duties1 but only delineate the ultimate 
reality which  reveals the highest      
knowledge in the minds of the deserving4
    #cj    ,s'ankara the most eminent   
exponent of the ,upanisads holds that   
they are meant for such superior men who
 are already above  worldly or heavenly 
prosperities1 and for whom the ,vedic   
duties  have ceased to have any         
attraction4 ,wheresoever there may be   
such a deserving person1 be he a        
student1 a householder or an  ascetic1  
for him the ,upanisads have been        
revealed for his ultimate  emancipation 
and the true knowledge4 ,those who      
perform the  ,vedic duties belong to a  

stage inferior to those who no longer   
care for the fruits of the ,vedic duties
 but are eager for final  emancipation1 
and it is the latter who alone are fit  
to hear the  ,upanisads ,footnote ref   
#a4    ,the names of the ,upanisads2    
,non-,brahmanic influence4    ,the      
,upanisads are also known by another    
name ,vednta1 as  they are believed to  
be the last portions of the ,vedas      
7veda-anta1  end72 it is by this name   
that the philosophy of the ,upanisads1  
the ,vednta philosophy1 is so familiar  
to us4 ,a modern student  knows that in 
language the ,upanisads approach the    
classical  ,sanskrit2 the ideas preached
 also show that they are the culmination
  of the intellectual achievement of a  
great epoch4 ,as they  thus formed the  
concluding parts of the ,vedas they     
retained their  ,vedic names which they 
took from the name of the different     
schools or branches 7s'kh7 among which  
the ,vedas were studied  ,footnote ref  
#b4 ,thus the ,upanisads attached to the

 ,brhmanas  of the ,aitareya and        
,kaustaki schools are called            
respectively  ,aitareya and ,kaustaki   
,upanisads4 ,those of the ,tndins and   
,talavakras of the ,sma-veda are called 
the ,chndogya and ,talavakra  7or ,kena7
 ,upanisads4 ,those of the ,taittirya   
school of the ,yajurveda                
,footnote #a3 ,this is what is called   
the difference of fitness               
7adhikribheda74 ,those who perform the  
sacrifices are not fit to  hear the     
,upanisads and those who are fit to hear
 the ,upanisads  have no longer any     
necessity to perform the sacrificial    
duties4    ,footnote #b3 ,when the      
,samhit texts had become substantially  
fixed1  they were committed to memory in
 different parts of the country and     
transmitted from teacher to pupil along 
with directions for the  practical      
performance of sacrificial duties4 ,the 
latter formed the  matter of prose      
compositions1 the ,brhmanas4 ,these     
however were  gradually liable to       

diverse kinds of modifications according
 to the  special tendencies and needs of
 the people among which they were       
recited4  ,thus after a time there      
occurred a great divergence in the      
readings of  the texts of the ,brhmanas 
even of the same ,veda among different  
people4  ,these different schools were  
known by the name of particular ,s'khs  
7e4g4 ,aitareya1 ,kaustaki7 with which  
the ,brhmanas were associated  or named4
 ,according to the divergence of the    
,brhmanas of the different  ,s'khs there
 occurred the divergences of content and
 the length of the  ,upanisads          
associated with them4    #ca    form the
 ,taittirya and ,mahnrayana1 of the     
,katha school  the ,kthaka1 of the      
,maitryan school the ,maitryan4 ,the    
,brhadranyaka ,upanisad forms part of   
the ,s'atapatha ,brhmana  of the        
,vjasaneyi schools4 ,the s' ,upanisad   
also belongs to the  latter school4 ,but
 the school to which the ,s'vets'vatara 
belongs  cannot be traced1 and has      

probably been lost4 ,the presumption    
with regard to these ,upanisads is that 
they represent the  enlightened views of
 the particular schools among which they
  flourished1 and under whose names they
 passed4 ,a large number  of ,upanisads 
of a comparatively later age were       
attached to the  ,atharva-,veda1 most of
 which were named not according to the  
,vedic schools but according to the     
subject-matter with which  they dealt   
,footnote ref #a4    ,it may not be out 
of place here to mention that from the  
frequent episodes in the ,upanisads in  
which the ,brahmins are  described as   
having gone to the ,ksattriyas for the  
highest knowledge  of philosophy1 as    
well as from the disparateness of the   
,upanisad teachings from that of the    
general doctrines of the  ,brhmanas and 
from the allusions to the existence of  
philosophical  speculations amongst the 
people in ,pli works1 it may be         
inferred that among the ,ksattriyas in  
general there existed earnest           

philosophic enquiries which must be     
regarded as having exerted  an important
 influence in the formation of the      
,upanisad doctrines4  ,there is thus    
some probability in the supposition that
 though the  ,upanisads are found       
directly incorporated with the ,brhmanas
  it was not the production of the      
growth of ,brahmanic dogmas  alone1 but 
that non-,brahmanic thought as well must
 have either  set the ,upanisad         
doctrines afoot1 or have rendered       
fruitful assistance  to their           
formulation and cultivation1 though they
 achieved  their culmination in the     
hands of the ,brahmins4      ,brhmanas  
and the ,early ,upanisads4    ,the      
passage of the ,indian mind from the    
,brhmanic to the  ,upanisad thought is  
probably the most remarkable event in   
the  history of philosophic thought4 ,we
 know that in the later ,vedic  hymns   
some monotheistic conceptions of great  
excellence were  developed1 but these   
differ in their nature from the         

absolutism of  the ,upanisads as much as
 the ,ptolemaic and the ,copernican     
,footnote #a3 ,garbha ,upanisad1 tman   
,upanisad1 ,pras'na ,upanisad1 etc4     
,there were however some exceptions such
 as the ,mndkya1 ,jbla1  ,paingala1     
,s'aunaka1 etc4    #cb    systems in    
astronomy4 ,the direct translation of   
,vis'vakarman or  ,hiranyagarbha into   
the tman and the ,brahman of the        
,upanisads  seems to me to be very      
improbable1 though ,i am quite willing  
to admit that these conceptions were    
swallowed up by the tman  doctrine when 
it had developed to a proper extent4    
,throughout  the earlier ,upanisads no  
mention is to be found of ,vis'vakarman1
  ,hiranyagarbha or ,brahmanaspati and  
no reference of such a  nature is to be 
found as can justify us in connecting   
the ,upanisad  ideas with those         
conceptions ,footnote ref l4 ,the word  
purusa no doubt  occurs frequently in   
the ,upanisads1 but the sense and the   
association  that come along with it are

 widely different from that of the      
purusa of the ,purusaskta of the        
,rg-,veda4    ,when the ,rg-,veda       
describes ,vis'vakarman it describes him
  as a creator from outside1 a          
controller of mundane events1  to whom  
they pray for worldly benefits4 ,what   
was the position1 which  and whence was 
the principle1 from which the all-seeing
 ,vis'vakarman  produced the earth1 and 
disclosed the sky by his might8 ,the    
one god1 who has on every side eyes1 on 
every side a face1 on every  side arms1 
on every side feet1 when producing the  
sky and earth1  shapes them with his    
arms and with his wings4444,do thou1    
,vis'vakarman1  grant to thy friends    
those thy abodes which are the highest1 
and the lowest1 and the middle444may a  
generous son remain here  to us         
,footnote ref #b2 again in ,r4,v4,x4 #hb
 we find ,vis'vakarman is  wise1        
energetic1 the creator1 the disposer1   
and the highest object of               
intuition4444,he who is our father1 our 

creator1 disposer1 who knows  all       
spheres and creatures1 who alone assigns
 to the gods their names1  to him the   
other creatures resort for instruction  
,footnote ref #c4  ,again about         
,hiranyagarbha we find in ,r4,v4,i4     
#aba1 ,hiranyagarbha arose  in the      
beginning2 born1 he was the one lord of 
things existing4 ,he  established the   
earth and this sky2 to what god shall we
 offer our  oblation8444 ,may he not    
injure us1 he who is the generator of   
the  earth1 who ruling by fixed         
ordinances1 produced the heavens1 who   
produced the great and brilliant        
waters6--to what god1 etc48 ,prajpati1  
no other than thou is lord over all     
these created things3 may we  obtain    
that1 through desire of which we have   
invoked thee2 may we  become masters of 
riches ,footnote ref #d4 ,speaking of   
the purusa the  ,rg-,veda               
,footnote #a3 ,the name ,vis'vakarma    
appears in ,s'vet4 ,,iv4 #ag4           
,hiranyagarbha appears in ,s'vet4 ,,iii4

 #d and ,,iv4 #ab1 but only as the      
first created being4 ,the phrase        
,sarvhammn ,hiranyagarbha which         
,deussen refers to occurs only in the   
later ,nrsimh4 #i4 ,the word            
,brahmanaspati does not occur at all in 
the ,upanisads4    ,footnote #b3 ,muir's
 ,sanskrit ,texts1 vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #f1   
#g4    ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 p1 #g4      
,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 pp4 #af1 #ag4      
#cc    says ,purusha has a thousand     
heads444a thousand eyes1 and a thousand 
feet4 ,on every side enveloping the     
earth he transcended it  by a space of  
ten fingers4444,he formed those aerial  
creatures1 and  the animals1 both wild  
and tame ,footnote ref #a1 etc4 ,even   
that  famous hymn 7,r4,v4x4 #abi7 which 
begins with ,there was then neither     
being nor non-being1 there was no air   
nor sky above ends with saying  ,from   
whence this creation came into being1   
whether it was  created or not--he who  
is in the highest sky1 its ruler1       
probably  knows or does not know4    ,in

 the ,upanisads however1 the position is
 entirely changed1  and the centre of   
interest there is not in a creator from 
outside  but in the self3 the natural   
development of the monotheistic position
  of the ,vedas could have grown into   
some form of developed  theism1 but not 
into the doctrine that the self was the 
only reality  and that everything else  
was far below it4 ,there is no relation 
here of the worshipper and the          
worshipped and no prayers are  offered  
to it1 but the whole quest is of the    
highest truth1 and the true  self of man
 is discovered as the greatest reality4 
,this change of  philosophical position 
seems to me to be a matter of great     
interest4  ,this change of the mind from
 the objective to the subjective does   
not carry with it in the ,upanisads any 
elaborate philosophical  discussions1 or
 subtle analysis of mind4 ,it comes     
there as a matter  of direct perception1
 and the conviction with which the truth
 has  been grasped cannot fail to       

impress the readers4 ,that out of the   
apparently meaningless speculations of  
the ,brhmanas this doctrine  could have 
developed1 might indeed appear to be too
 improbable  to be believed4    ,on the 
strength of the stories of ,blki        
,ga'rgya and ,ajtas'atru  7,brh4 ,,ii4  
i71 ,s'vetaketu and ,pravhana ,jaibali  
7,ch4 ,v4 #c and ,brh4  ,,vi4 #b7 and   
runi and ,as'vapati ,kaikeya 7,ch4 ,v4  
#aa7 ,garbe thinks  that it can be      
proven that the ,brahman's profoundest  
wisdom1 the  doctrine of ,all-one1 which
 has exercised an unmistakable influence
  on the intellectual life even of our  
time1 did not have its origin  in the   
circle of ,brahmans at all ,footnote ref
 #b and that it took  its rise in the   
ranks of the warrior caste ,footnote ref
 #c4 ,this  if true would of course lead
 the development of the ,upanisads away 
from the influence of the ,veda1        
,brhmanas and the ranyakas4 ,but do  the
 facts prove this8 ,let us briefly      
examine the evidences that ,garbe       

himself        ,footnote #a3 ,muir's    
,sanskrit ,texts1 vol4 v4 pp4 #cfh1     
#cga4    ,footnote #b3 ,garbe's article1
 ,hindu ,monism1 p4 #fh4    ,footnote   
#c3 ,ibid4 p4 #gh4    #cd    self has   
produced4 ,in the story of ,blki ,grgya 
and ,ajtas'atru  7,brh4 ,,ii4 #a7       
referred to by him1 ,blki ,grgya is a   
boastful man  who wants to teach the    
,ksattriya ,ajtas'atru the true         
,brahman1  but fails and then wants it  
to be taught by him4 ,to this           
,ajtas'atru replies 7following ,garbe's 
own translation7 it is  contrary to the 
natural order that a ,brahman receive   
instruction  from a warrior and expect  
the latter to declare the ,brahman to   
him ,footnote ref l4 ,does this not     
imply that in the natural order of      
things a ,brahmin always taught the     
knowledge of ,brahman to the            
,ksattriyas1 and that it was unusual to 
find a ,brahmin asking a  ,ksattriya    
about the true knowledge of ,brahman8   
,at the beginning  of the conversation1 

,ajtas'atru had promised to pay ,blki   
one  thousand coins if he could tell him
 about ,brahman1 since all people  used 
to run to ,janaka to speak about        
,brahman ,footnote ref #b4 ,the  second 
story of ,s'vetaketu and ,pravhana      
,jaibali seems to be fairly  conclusive 
with regard to the fact that the        
transmigration doctrines1  the way of   
the gods 7devayna7 and the way of the   
fathers  7pitryna7 had originated among 
the ,ksattriyas1 but it is without  any 
relevancy with regard to the origin of  
the superior knowledge  of ,brahman as  
the true self4    ,the third story of   
runi and ,as'vapati ,kaikeya 7,ch4 ,v4  
#aa7  is hardly more convincing1 for    
here five ,brahmins wishing to  know    
what the ,brahman and the self were1    
went to ,uddlaka  runi2 but as he did   
not know sufficiently about it he       
accompanied  them to the ,ksattriya king
 ,as'vapati ,kaikeya who was studying   
the subject4 ,but ,as'vapati ends the   
conversation by giving them  certain    

instructions about the fire doctrine    
7vaisvnara agni7 and  the import of its 
sacrifices4 ,he does not say anything   
about the  true self as ,brahman4 ,we   
ought also to consider that there are   
only the few exceptional cases where    
,ksattriya kings were instructing  the  
,brahmins4 ,but in all other cases the  
,brahmins were  discussing and          
instructing the tman knowledge4 ,i am   
thus led  to think that ,garbe owing to 
his bitterness of feeling against the   
,brahmins as expressed in the earlier   
part of the essay had been  too hasty in
 his judgment4 ,the opinion of ,garbe   
seems to have  been shared to some      
extent by ,winternitz also1 and the     
references  given by him to the         
,upanisad passages are also the same as 
we        ,footnote #a3 ,garbe's        
article1 ,hindu ,monism1 p4 #gd4        
,footnote #b3 ,brh4 ,,ii41 compare also 
,brh4 ,,iv4 #c1 how ,yjavalkya  speaks  
to ,janaka about the brahmavidy4    #ce 
just examined ,footnote ref #a4 ,the    

truth seems to me to be this1 that  the 
,ksattriyas and even some women took    
interest in the  religio-philosophical  
quest manifested in the ,upanisads4 ,the
 enquirers  were so eager that either in
 receiving the instruction of ,brahman  
or in imparting it to others1 they had  
no considerations of sex and  birth     
,footnote ref #b2 and there seems to be 
no definite evidence for  thinking that 
the ,upanisad philosophy originated     
among the ,ksattriyas  or that the germs
 of its growth could not be traced in   
the  ,brhmanas and the ranyakas which   
were the productions of  the ,brahmins4 
,the change of the ,brhmana into the    
ranyaka thought is  signified by a      
transference of values from the actual  
sacrifices to  their symbolic           
representations and meditations which   
were regarded  as being productive of   
various earthly benefits4 ,thus we  find
 in the ,brhadranyaka 7,i4#a7 that      
instead of a horse sacrifice  the       
visible universe is to be conceived as a

 horse and meditated  upon as such4 ,the
 dawn is the head of the horse1 the sun 
is the  eye1 wind is its life1 fire is  
its mouth and the year is its soul1  and
 so on4 ,what is the horse that grazes  
in the field and to what good  can its  
sacrifice lead8 ,this moving universe is
 the horse which is  most significant to
 the mind1 and the meditation of it as  
such is  the most suitable substitute of
 the sacrifice of the horse1 the mere   
animal4 ,thought-activity as meditation1
 is here taking the place  of an        
external worship in the form of         
sacrifices4 ,the material  substances   
and the most elaborate and accurate     
sacrificial rituals  lost their value   
and bare meditations took their place4  
,side  by side with the ritualistic     
sacrifices of the generality of the     
,brahmins1 was springing up a system    
where thinking and symbolic  meditations
 were taking the place of gross matter  
and  action involved in sacrifices4     
,these symbols were not only  chosen    

from the external world as the sun1 the 
wind1 etc41 from  the body of man1 his  
various vital functions and the senses1 
but  even arbitrary alphabets were taken
 up and it was believed that  the       
meditation of these as the highest and  
the greatest was productive  of great   
beneficial results4 ,sacrifice in itself
 was losing  value in the eyes of these 
men and diverse mystical significances  
and imports were beginning to be        
considered as their real truth          
,footnote ref #c4        ,footnote #a3  
,winternitz's ,geschichte der indischen 
,litteratur1 ,i4  pp4 #aig ff4          
,footnote #b3 ,the story of ,maitry and 
,yjavalikya 7,brh4 ,,ii4 #d7  and that  
of ,satyakma son of ,jabl and his       
teacher 7,ch4 ,,iv4 #d74    ,footnote   
#c3 ,ch4 ,v4 ,,ii4    #cf    ,the ,uktha
 7verse7 of ,rg-,veda was identified in 
the ,aitareya  ranyaka under several    
allegorical forms with the ,prna        
,footnote  ref #a1 the ,udgtha of the   
,smaveda was identified with ,om1 ,prna1

  sun and eye2 in ,chndogya ,,ii4 the   
,sman was identified with ,om1 rain1    
water1 seasons1 ,prna1 etc41 in         
,chndogya ,,iii4 #af-ag man was         
identified with sacrifice2 his hunger1  
thirst1 sorrow1 with initiation2        
laughing1 eating1 etc41 with the        
utterance of the ,mantras2  and         
asceticism1 gift1 sincerity1 restraint  
from injury1 truth1 with  sacrificial   
fees 7daksin74 ,the gifted mind of these
 cultured ,vedic  ,indians was anxious  
to come to some unity1 but logical      
precision  of thought had not developed1
 and as a result of that we find in the 
ranyakas the most grotesque and fanciful
 unifications of things  which to our   
eyes have little or no connection4 ,any 
kind of  instrumentality in producing an
 effect was often considered as pure    
identity4 ,thus in ,ait4 ran4 ,,ii4 #a4 
#c we find ,then comes the origin  of   
food4 ,the seed of ,prajpati are the    
gods4 ,the seed of the gods  is rain4   
,the seed of rain is herbs4 ,the seed of

 herbs is food4 ,the  seed of food is   
seed4 ,the seed of seed is creatures4   
,the seed of  creatures is the heart4   
,the seed of the heart is the mind4 ,the
 seed  of the mind is speech4 ,the seed 
of speech is action4 ,the act done  is  
this man the abode of ,brahman ,footnote
 ref #b4    ,the word ,brahman according
 to ,syana meant mantras  7magical      
verses71 the ceremonies1 the hotr       
priest1 the great4  ,hillebrandt points 
out that it is spoken of in ,r4,v4 as   
being new1  as not having hitherto      
existed1 and as coming into being from  
the fathers4 ,it originates from the    
seat of the ,rta1 springs forth  at the 
sound of the sacrifice1 begins really to
 exist when the soma  juice is pressed  
and the hymns are recited at the savana 
rite1  endures with the help of the gods
 even in battle1 and soma is its        
guardian 7,r4,v4 ,,viii4 #cg4 ,i1       
,,viii4 #fi4 #i1 ,,vi4 #bc4 #e1 #a4 #dg4
 #b1 ,,vii4 #bb4  #i1 ,,vi4 #eb4 #c1    
etc474 ,on the strength of these        

,hillebrandt justifies the  conjecture  
of ,haug that it signifies a mysterious 
power which can  be called forth by     
various ceremonies1 and his definition  
of it1 as  the magical force which is   
derived from the orderly cooperation of 
the hymns1 the chants and the           
sacrificial gifts ,footnote ref #c4 ,i  
am  disposed to think that this meaning 
is closely connected with the  meaning  
as we find it in many passages in the   
ranyakas and the  ,upanisads4 ,the      
meaning in many of these seems to be    
midway between        ,footnote #a3     
,ait4 ran4 ,,ii #a-c4    ,footnote #b3  
,keith's ,translation of ,aitareya      
ranyaka4    ,footnote #c3 ,hillebrandt's
 article on ,brahman1 ,e4,r4,e44    #cg 
magical force and great1 transition     
between which is  rather easy4 ,even    
when the sacrifices began to be replaced
 by  meditations1 the old belief in the 
power of the sacrifices still  remained1
 and as a result of that we find that in
 many passages  of the ,upanisads people

 are thinking of meditating upon this   
great force ,brahman as being identified
 with diverse symbols1  natural objects1
 parts and functions of the body4       
,when the main interest of sacrifice was
 transferred from its  actual           
performance in the external world to    
certain forms of  meditation1 we find   
that the understanding of particular    
allegories  of sacrifice having a       
relation to particular kinds of bodily  
functions  was regarded as ,brahman1    
without a knowledge of which nothing    
could be obtained4 ,the fact that these 
allegorical interpretations  of the     
,pacgnividy are so much referred to in  
the ,upanisads  as a secret doctrine1   
shows that some people came to think    
that  the real efficacy of sacrifices   
depended upon such meditations4  ,when  
the sages rose to the culminating       
conception1 that he is  really ignorant 
who thinks the gods to be different from
 him1 they  thought that as each man was
 nourished by many beasts1 so the  gods 

were nourished by each man1 and as it is
 unpleasant for a  man if any of his    
beasts are taken away1 so it is         
unpleasant for  the gods that men should
 know this great truth4 ,footnote ref   
#a4    ,in the ,kena we find it         
indicated that all the powers of  the   
gods such as that of ,agni 7fire7 to    
burn1 ,vyu 7wind7 to  blow1 depended    
upon ,brahman1 and that it is through   
,brahman  that all the gods and all the 
senses of man could work4 ,the  whole   
process of ,upanisad thought shows that 
the magic power  of sacrifices as       
associated with ,rta 7unalterable law7  
was being  abstracted from the          
sacrifices and conceived as the supreme 
power4  ,there are many stories in the  
,upanisads of the search after the      
nature of this great power the ,brahman1
 which was at first only  imperfectly   
realized4 ,they identified it with the  
dominating power  of the natural objects
 of wonder1 the sun1 the moon1 etc4 with
  bodily and mental functions and with  

various symbolical  representations1 and
 deluded themselves for a time with the 
idea  that these were satisfactory4 ,but
 as these were gradually found          
inadequate1 they came to the final      
solution1 and the doctrine of  the inner
 self of man as being the highest truth 
the ,brahman  originated4               
,footnote #a3 ,brh4 ,i4 #d4 #aj4    #ch 
,the meaning of the word ,upanisad4     
,the word ,upanisad is derived from the 
root sad with the prefix  ni 7to sit71  
and ,max ,muller says that the word     
originally meant the  act of sitting    
down near a teacher and of submissively 
listening to  him4 ,in his introduction 
to the ,upanisads he says1 ,the history 
and the genius of the ,sanskrit language
 leave little doubt that  ,upanisad     
meant originally session1 particularly a
 session consisting  of pupils1         
assembled at a respectful distance round
 their teacher  ,footnote ref #a4       
,deussen points out that the word means 
secret or  secret instruction1 and this 

is borne out by many of the passages of 
the ,upanisads themselves4 ,max ,muller 
also agrees that the word was used  in  
this sense in the ,upanisads ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,there we find that  great      
injunctions of secrecy are to be        
observed for the communication  of the  
doctrines1 and it is said that it should
 only be given to a  student or pupil   
who by his supreme moral restraint and  
noble desires  proves himself deserving 
to hear them4 ,s'ankara however1 the    
great ,indian exponent of the           
,upanisads1 derives the word from  the  
root sad to destroy and supposes that it
 is so called because it  destroys      
inborn ignorance and leads to salvation 
by revealing the  right knowledge4 ,but 
if we compare the many texts in which   
the  word ,upanisad occurs in the       
,upanisads themselves it seems that     
,deussen's meaning is fully justified   
,footnote ref #c4      ,the composition 
and growth of diverse ,upanisads4       
,the oldest ,upanisads are written in   

prose4 ,next to these we  have some in  
verses very similar to those that are to
 be found in  classical ,sanskrit4 ,as  
is easy to see1 the older the ,upanisad 
the  more archaic is it in its language4
 ,the earliest ,upanisads have  an      
almost mysterious forcefulness in their 
expressions at least to  ,indian ears4  
,they are simple1 pithy and penetrate to
 the heart4  ,we can read and read them 
over again without getting tired4  ,the 
lines are always as fresh as ever4 ,as  
such they have a charm  apart from the  
value of the ideas they intend to       
convey4 ,the word  ,upanisad was used1  
as we have seen1 in the sense of secret 
doctrine or instruction2 the ,upanisad  
teachings were also intended  to be     
conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest
 enquirers of  high morals and superior 
self-restraint for the purpose of       
achieving        ,footnote #a3 ,max     
,muller's ,translation of the           
,upanishads1 ,s4,b4,e4 vol4  ,i4p4      
lxxxi4    ,footnote #b3 ,s4 ,b4,e4 vol4 

,i1 p lxxxi4    ,footnote #c3 ,deussen's
 ,philosophy of the ,upanishads1 pp4    
#aj-ae4    #ci    emancipation4 ,it was 
thus that the ,upanisad style of        
expression1  when it once came into use1
 came to possess the greatest charm and 
attraction for earnest religious people2
 and as a result of that we  find that  
even when other forms of prose and verse
 had been  adapted for the ,sanskrit    
language1 the ,upanisad form of         
composition  had not stopped4 ,thus     
though the earliest ,upanisads  were    
compiled by #ejj ,b ,c41 they continued 
to be written even so  late as the      
spread of ,mahommedan influence in      
,india4 ,the  earliest and most         
important are probably those that have  
been  commented upon by ,s'ankara namely
 ,brhadranyaka1 ,chndogya1  ,aitareya1  
,taittiriya1 s'a1 ,kena1 ,katha1        
,pras'na1 ,mundaka and  ,mndkya         
,footnote ref #a4 ,it is important to   
note in this connection  that the       
separate ,upanisads differ much from one

 another with regard  to their content  
and methods of exposition4 ,thus while  
some of  them are busy laying great     
stress upon the monistic doctrine of    
the self as the only reality1 there are 
others which lay stress upon  the       
practice of ,yoga1 asceticism1 the cult 
of ,s'iva1 of ,visnu and  the philosophy
 or anatomy of the body1 and may thus be
  respectively called the ,yoga1        
,s'aiva1 ,visnu and ,s'rra ,upanisads4  
,these in all make up the number to one 
hundred and eight4      ,revival of     
,upanisad studies in modern times4      
,how the ,upanisads came to be          
introduced into ,europe is an           
interesting story ,dra ,shiko the eldest
 son of the ,emperor  ,shah ,jahan heard
 of the ,upanisads during his stay in   
,kashmir  in #afdj4 ,he invited several 
,pandits from ,benares to ,delhi1 who   
undertook the work of translating them  
into ,persian4 ,in #agge  ,anquetil     
,duperron1 the discoverer of the ,zend  
,avesta1 received  a manuscript of it   

presented to him by his friend ,le      
,gentil1 the  ,french resident in       
,faizabad at the court of               
,shuj-uddaulah4  ,anquetil translated it
 into ,latin which was published in     
#ahja-ahjb4  ,this translation though   
largely unintelligible was read by      
,schopenhauer with great enthusiasm4 ,it
 had1 as ,schopenhauer  himself admits1 
profoundly influenced his philosophy4   
,thus he        ,footnote #a3 ,deussen  
supposes that ,kaustaki is also one of  
the earliest4  ,max ,mller and          
,schroeder think that ,maitryan also    
belongs to the  earliest group1 whereas 
,deussen counts it as a comparatively   
later  production4 ,winternitz divides  
the ,upanisads into four periods4 ,in   
the first period he includes            
,brhadranyaka1 ,chndogya1 ,taittirya1   
,aitareya1 ,kaustaki and ,kena4 ,in that
 second he includes ,kthaka1 s'1        
,s'vets'vatara1 ,mundaka1 ,mahnryana1   
and in the third period he  includes    
,pras'na1 ,maitryan and ,mndkya4 ,the   

rest of the ,upanisads  he includes in  
the fourth period4    #dj    writes in  
the preface to his ,welt als ,wille und 
,vorstellung  ,footnote ref #a1 ,and if1
 indeed1 in addition to this he is a    
partaker  of the benefit conferred by   
the ,vedas1 the access to which1 opened 
to  us through the ,upanishads1 is in my
 eyes the greatest advantage which  this
 still young century enjoys over        
previous ones1 because ,i believe  that 
the influence of the ,sanskrit          
literature will penetrate not less      
deeply than did the revival of ,greek   
literature in the fifteenth  century3   
if1 ,i say1 the reader has also already 
received and  assimilated the sacred1   
primitive ,indian wisdom1 then is he    
best  of all prepared to hear what ,i   
have to say to him4444,i might express  
the opinion that each one of the        
individual and disconnected  aphorisms  
which make up the ,upanishads may be    
deduced as  a consequence from the      
thought ,i am going to impart1 though   

the converse1 that my thought is to be  
found in the ,upanishads  is by no means
 the case4 ,again1 ,how does every line 
display  its firm1 definite1 and        
throughout harmonious meaning6 ,from    
every  sentence deep1 original1 and     
sublime thoughts arise1 and the whole   
is pervaded by a high and holy and      
earnest spirit4444,in the whole  world  
there is no study1 except that of the   
originals1 so beneficial  and so        
elevating as that of the ,oupanikhat4   
,it has been the solace  of my life1 it 
will be the solace of my death6         
,footnote ref #b ,through  ,schopenhauer
 the study of the ,upanisads attracted  
much attention in  ,germany and with the
 growth of a general interest in the    
study  of ,sanskrit1 they found their   
way into other parts of ,europe as      
well4    ,the study of the ,upanisads   
has however gained a great  impetus by  
the earnest attempts of our ,ram ,mohan 
,roy who  not only translated them into 
,bengali1 ,hindi and ,english and       

published them at his own expense1 but  
founded the ,brahma  ,samaj in ,bengal1 
the main religious doctrines of which   
were  derived directly from the         
,upanisads4        ,footnote #a3        
,translation by ,haldane and ,kemp1 vol4
 ,i4 pp4 xii and xiii4    ,footnote #b3 
,max ,muller says in his introduction to
 the ,upanishada  7,s4,b4,e4 ,i p4 lxii2
 see also pp4 lx1 lxi7 that             
,schopenhauer should  have spoken of the
 ,upanishads as 'products of the highest
 wisdom'444that  he should have placed  
the pantheism there taught high above   
the  pantheism of ,bruno1 ,malebranche1 
,spinoza and ,scotus ,erigena1 as       
brought  to light again at ,oxford in   
#afha1 may perhaps secure a more        
considerate  reception for those relics 
of ancient wisdom than anything that ,i 
could  say in their favour4    #da      
,the ,upanisads and their               
interpretations4    ,before entering    
into the philosophy of the ,upanisads it
 may  be worth while to say a few words 

as to the reason why diverse  and even  
contradictory explanations as to the    
real import of the  ,upanisads had been 
offered by the great ,indian scholars of
 past  times4 ,the ,upanisads1 as we    
have seen1 formed the concluding        
portion of the revealed ,vedic          
literature1 and were thus called the    
,vednta4 ,it was almost universally     
believed by the ,hindus that  the       
highest truths could only be found in   
the revelation of the  ,vedas4 ,reason  
was regarded generally as occupying a   
comparatively  subservient place1 and   
its proper use was to be found in its   
judicious employment in getting out the 
real meaning of the  apparently         
conflicting ideas of the ,vedas4 ,the   
highest knowledge  of ultimate truth and
 reality was thus regarded as having    
been once for all declared in the       
,upanisads4 ,reason had only to  unravel
 it in the light of experience4 ,it is  
important that readers  of ,hindu       
philosophy should bear in mind the      

contrast that it  presents to the ruling
 idea of the modern world that new      
truths  are discovered by reason and    
experience every day1 and even in  those
 cases where the old truths remain1 they
 change their hue  and character every  
day1 and that in matters of ultimate    
truths no  finality can ever be         
achieved2 we are to be content only with
 as  much as comes before the purview of
 our reason and experience  at the time4
 ,it was therefore thought to be        
extremely audacious  that any person    
howsoever learned and brilliant he might
 be  should have any right to say       
anything regarding the highest  truths  
simply on the authority of his own      
opinion or the reasons  that he might   
offer4 ,in order to make himself heard  
it was necessary  for him to show from  
the texts of the ,upanisads that they   
supported him1 and that their purport   
was also the same4 ,thus  it was that   
most schools of ,hindu philosophy found 
it one of their  principal duties to    

interpret the ,upanisads in order to    
show that  they alone represented the   
true ,vednta doctrines4 ,any one  who   
should feel himself persuaded by the    
interpretations of any  particular      
school might say that in following that 
school he was  following the ,vednta4   
,the difficulty of assuring oneself that
 any interpretation is  absolutely the  
right one is enhanced by the fact that  
germs of  diverse kinds of thoughts are 
found scattered over the ,upanisads     
#db    which are not worked out in a    
systematic manner4 ,thus each           
interpreter in his turn made the texts  
favourable to his own  doctrines        
prominent and brought them to the       
forefront1 and tried  to repress others 
or explain them away4 ,but comparing the
  various systems of ,upanisad          
interpretation we find that the         
interpretation offered by ,s'ankara very
 largely represents the view  of the    
general body of the earlier ,upanisad   
doctrines1 though  there are some which 

distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of  
other  systems1 but in a crude and      
germinal form4 ,it is thus that ,vednta 
is generally associated with the        
interpretation of ,s'ankara and         
,s'ankara's system of thought is called 
the ,vednta system1 though  there are   
many other systems which put forth their
 claim as representing  the true ,vednta
 doctrines4    ,under these             
circumstances it is necessary that a    
modern interpreter  of the ,upanisads   
should turn a deaf ear to the absolute  
claims of these exponents1 and look upon
 the ,upanisads not as  a systematic    
treatise but as a repository of diverse 
currents of  thought--the melting pot in
 which all later philosophic ideas were 
still in a state of fusion1 though the  
monistic doctrine of ,s'ankara1  or     
rather an approach thereto1 may be      
regarded as the purport of  by far the  
largest majority of the texts4 ,it will 
be better that a  modern interpreter    
should not agree to the claims of the   

ancients  that all the ,upanisads       
represent a connected system1 but take  
the  texts independently and separately 
and determine their meanings1  though   
keeping an attentive eye on the context 
in which they  appear4 ,it is in this   
way alone that we can detect the germs  
of  the thoughts of other ,indian       
systems in the ,upanisads1 and thus     
find in them the earliest records of    
those tendencies of thoughts4      ,the 
quest after ,brahman3 the struggle and  
the failures4    ,the fundamental idea  
which runs through the early ,upanisads 
is that underlying the exterior world of
 change there is an unchangeable        
reality which is identical with that    
which underlies  the essence in man     
,footnote ref #a4 ,if we look at ,greek 
philosophy in  ,parmenides or ,plato or 
at modern philosophy in ,kant1 we find  
the  same tendency towards glorifying   
one unspeakable entity as the  reality  
or the essence4 ,i have said above that 
the ,upanisads are        ,footnote #a3 

,brh4 ,,iv4 #d4 #e4 #bb4    #dc    no   
systematic treatises of a single hand1  
but are rather collations  or           
compilations of floating monologues1    
dialogues or anecdotes4  ,there are no  
doubt here and there simple discussions 
but there  is no pedantry or gymnastics 
of logic4 ,even the most casual  reader 
cannot but be struck with the           
earnestness and enthusiasm  of the      
sages4 ,they run from place to place    
with great eagerness  in search of a    
teacher competent to instruct them about
 the nature  of ,brahman4 ,where is     
,brahman8 ,what is his nature8    ,we   
have noticed that during the closing    
period of the ,samhit  there were people
 who had risen to the conception of a   
single  creator and controller of the   
universe1 variously called ,prajpati1   
,vis'vakarman1 ,purusa1 ,brahmanaspati  
and ,brahman4 ,but this  divine         
controller was yet only a deity4 ,the   
search as to the  nature of this deity  
began in the ,upanisads4 ,many visible  

objects  of nature such as the sun or   
the wind on one hand and the various    
psychological functions in man were     
tried1 but none could render            
satisfaction to the great ideal that had
 been aroused4 ,the sages  in the       
,upanisad had already started with the  
idea that there was  a supreme          
controller or essence presiding over man
 and the  universe4 ,but what was its   
nature8 ,could it be identified with    
any of the deities of ,nature1 was it a 
new deity or was it no deity  at all8   
,the ,upanisads present to us the       
history of this quest and  the results  
that were achieved4    ,when we look    
merely to this quest we find that we    
have not  yet gone out of the ranyaka   
ideas and of symbolic 7pratka7  forms of
 worship4 ,prna 7vital breath7 was      
regarded as the most  essential function
 for the life of man1 and many anecdotes
 are  related to show that it is        
superior to the other organs1 such as   
the  eye or ear1 and that on it all     

other functions depend4 ,this           
recognition of the superiority of prna  
brings us to the meditations  on prna as
 ,brahman as leading to the most        
beneficial results4  ,so also we find   
that owing to the presence of the       
exalting  characters of omnipresence and
 eternality ks'a 7space7 is  meditated  
upon as ,brahman4 ,so also manas and    
ditya 7sun7  are meditated upon as      
,brahman4 ,again side by side with the  
visible material representation of      
,brahman as the pervading ,vyu1  or the 
sun and the immaterial representation as
 ks'a1 manas or  prna1 we find also the 
various kinds of meditations as         
substitutes  for actual sacrifice4 ,thus
 it is that there was an earnest quest  
after the discovery of ,brahman4 ,we    
find a stratum of thought    #dd        
which shows that the sages were still   
blinded by the old ritualistic          
associations1 and though meditation had 
taken the place of sacrifice  yet this  
was hardly adequate for the highest     

attainment of  ,brahman4    ,next to the
 failure of the meditations we have to  
notice the  history of the search after 
,brahman in which the sages sought to   
identify ,brahman with the presiding    
deity of the sun1 moon1  lightning1     
ether1 wind1 fire1 water1 etc41 and     
failed2 for none of  these could satisfy
 the ideal they cherished of ,brahman4  
,it is  indeed needless here to multiply
 these examples1 for they are  tiresome 
not only in this summary treatment but  
in the original  as well4 ,they are of  
value only in this that they indicate   
how  toilsome was the process by which  
the old ritualistic associations  could 
be got rid of2 what struggles and       
failures the sages had to  undergo      
before they reached a knowledge of the  
true nature of  ,brahman4               
,unknowability of ,brahman and the      
,negative ,method4    ,it is indeed true
 that the magical element involved in   
the  discharge of sacrificial duties    
lingered for a while in the symbolic    

worship of ,brahman in which ,he was    
conceived almost as a deity4  ,the minds
 of the ,vedic poets so long accustomed 
to worship  deities of visible          
manifestation could not easily dispense 
with the  idea of seeking after a       
positive and definite content of        
,brahman4  ,they tried some of the      
sublime powers of nature and also many  
symbols1 but these could not render     
ultimate satisfaction4 ,they  did not   
know what the ,brahman was like1 for    
they had only a  dim and dreamy vision  
of it in the deep craving of their souls
  which could not be translated into    
permanent terms4 ,but this  was enough  
to lead them on to the goal1 for they   
could not be  satisfied with anything   
short of the highest4    ,they found    
that by whatever means they tried to    
give a  positive and definite content of
 the ultimate reality1 the ,brahman1    
they failed4 ,positive definitions were 
impossible4 ,they could not  point out  
what the ,brahman was like in order to  

give an utterance  to that which was    
unutterable1 they could only say that it
 was not  like aught that we find in    
experience4 ,yjavalkya said ,he  the    
tman is not this1 nor this 7neti neti74 
,he is inconceivable1  for he cannot be 
conceived1 unchangeable1 for he is not  
changed1  untouched1 for nothing touches
 him2 he cannot suffer by a stroke      
#de    of the sword1 he cannot suffer   
any injury ,footnote ref #a4 ,he is     
asat1 non-being1 for the being which    
,brahman is1 is not to be  understood as
 such being as is known to us by        
experience2 yet he is  being1 for he    
alone is supremely real1 for the        
universe subsists by  him4 ,we ourselves
 are but he1 and yet we know not what he
 is4 ,whatever  we can experience1      
whatever we can express1 is limited1 but
 he is the  unlimited1 the basis of all4
 ,that which is inaudible1 intangible1  
invisible1 indestructible1 which cannot 
be tasted1 nor smelt1 eternal1  without 
beginning or end1 greater than the great

 7mahat71 the fixed4  ,he who knows it  
is released from the jaws of death      
,footnote ref #b4  ,space1 time and     
causality do not appertain to him1 for  
he at once forms  their essence and     
transcends them4 ,he is the infinite and
 the vast1 yet  the smallest of the     
small1 at once here as there1 there as  
here2 no  characterisation of him is    
possible1 otherwise than by the denial  
to him of all empirical attributes1     
relations and definitions4 ,he  is      
independent of all limitations of space1
 time1 and cause which  rules all that  
is objectively presented1 and therefore 
the empirical  universe4 ,when ,bhva was
 questioned by ,vaskali1 he expounded   
the nature of ,brahman to him by        
maintaining silence--,teach  me1 said   
,vaskali1 most reverent sir1 the nature 
of ,brahman4  ,bhva however remained    
silent4 ,but when the question was put  
forth a second or third time he         
answered1 ,i teach you indeed but  you  
do not understand2 the tman is silence  

,footnote ref #c4 ,the way  to indicate 
it is thus by neti neti1 it is not this1
 it is not this4  ,we cannot describe it
 by any positive content which is always
 limited  by conceptual thought4        
,the tman doctrine4    ,the sum and     
substance of the ,upanisad teaching is  
involved  in the equation tman,brahman4 
,we have already seen that the  word    
tman was used in the ,rg-,veda to denote
 on the one hand  the ultimate essence  
of the universe1 and on the other the   
vital  breath in man4 ,later on in the  
,upanisads we see that the word         
,brahman is generally used in the former
 sense1 while the word  tman is reserved
 to denote the inmost essence in man1   
and the        ,footnote #a3 ,brh4 ,,iv4
 #e4 #ae4 ,deussen1 ,max ,muller and    
,roer have all  misinterpreted this     
passage2 asito has been interpreted as  
an  adjective or participle1 though no  
evidence has ever been adduced2  it is  
evidently the ablative of asi1 a sword4 
,footnote #b3 ,katha ,,iii4 #ae4        

,footnote #c3 ,sankara on ,brahmastra1  
,,iii4 #b4 #ag1 and also ,deussen1      
,philosophy of the ,upanishads1 p4 #aef4
    #df    ,upanisads are emphatic in   
their declaration that the two are one  
and the same4 ,but what is the inmost   
essence of man8 ,the self  of man       
involves an ambiguity1 as it is used in 
a variety of senses4  ,thus so far as   
man consists of the essence of food     
7i4e4 the physical  parts of man7 he is 
called annamaya4 ,but behind the sheath 
of  this body there is the other self   
consisting of the vital breath  which is
 called the self as vital breath        
7prnamaya tman74  ,behind this again    
there is the other self consisting of   
will called  the manomaya tman4 ,this   
again contains within it the self       
consisting of consciousness called the  
vijnamaya tman4 ,but  behind it we come 
to the final essence the self as pure   
bliss 7the  nandamaya tman74 ,the texts 
say3 ,truly he is the rapture2  for     
whoever gets this rapture becomes       

blissful4 ,for who could  live1 who     
could breathe if this space 7ks'a7 was  
not bliss8 ,for  it is he who behaves as
 bliss4 ,for whoever in that ,invisible1
  ,self-surpassing1 ,unspeakable1       
,supportless finds fearless support1 he 
really becomes fearless4 ,but whoever   
finds even a slight difference1  between
 himself and this tman there is fear for
 him ,footnote ref #a4    ,again in     
another place we find that ,prajpati    
said3 ,the self  7tman7 which is free   
from sin1 free from old age1 from death 
and  grief1 from hunger and thirst1     
whose desires are true1 whose           
cogitations  are true1 that is to be    
searched for1 that is to be enquired2   
he gets all his desires and all worlds  
who knows that self ,footnote  ref #b4  
,the gods and the demons on hearing of  
this sent ,indra and  ,virocana         
respectively as their representatives to
 enquire of this self  from ,prajpati4  
,he agreed to teach them1 and asked them
 to look  into a vessel of water and    

tell him how much of self they could    
find4 ,they answered3 ,we see1 this our 
whole self1 even to the  hair1 and to   
the nails4 ,and he said1 ,well1 that is 
the self1 that  is the deathless and the
 fearless1 that is the ,brahman4 ,they  
went  away pleased1 but ,prajpati       
thought1 ,there they go away1  without  
having discovered1 without having       
realized the self4  ,virocana came away 
with the conviction that the body was   
the  self2 but ,indra did not return    
back to the gods1 he was afraid and     
pestered with doubts and came back to   
,prajpati and said1 just  as the self   
becomes decorated when the body is      
decorated1 well-dressed  when the body  
is well-dressed1 well-cleaned when the  
body is well-cleaned1 even so that image
 self will be blind when  the body is   
blind1 injured in one eye when the body 
is injured in  one eye1 and mutilated   
when the body is mutilated1 and it      
perishes        ,footnote #a3 ,taitt4   
,,ii4 #g4    ,footnote #b3 ,ch4 ,,viii4 

#g4 #a4    #dg    when the body         
perishes1 therefore ,i can see no good  
in this theory4  ,prajpati then gave him
 a higher instruction about the self1   
and  said1 ,he who goes about enjoying  
dreams1 he is the self1 this  is the    
deathless1 the fearless1 this is        
,brahman4 ,indra departed  but was again
 disturbed with doubts1 and was afraid  
and came  back and said that though the 
dream self does not become blind  when  
the body is blind1 or injured in one eye
 when the body is  so injured and is not
 affected by its defects1 and is not    
killed by  its destruction1 but yet it  
is as if it was overwhelmed1 as if it   
suffered and as if it wept--in this ,i  
see no good4 ,prajpati gave a  still    
higher instruction3 ,when a man1 fast   
asleep1 in total  contentment1 does not 
know any dreams1 this is the self1 this 
is the  deathless1 the fearless1 this is
 ,brahman4 ,indra departed but was      
again filled with doubts on the way1 and
 returned again and said the  self in   

deep sleep does not know himself1 that  
,i am this1 nor does  he know any other 
existing objects4 ,he is destroyed and  
lost4  ,i see no good in this4 ,and now 
,prajpati after having given a  course  
of successively higher instructions as  
self as the body1 as  the self in dreams
 and as the self in deep dreamless      
sleep1 and  having found that the       
enquirer in each case could find out    
that this  was not the ultimate truth   
about the self that he was seeking1     
ultimately gave him the ultimate and    
final instruction about the  full truth 
about the self1 and said this body is   
the support of the  deathless and the   
bodiless self4 ,the self as embodied is 
affected  by pleasure and pain1 the self
 when associated with the body cannot   
get rid of pleasure and pain1 but       
pleasure and pain do not  touch the     
bodiless self ,footnote ref #a4    ,as  
the anecdote shows1 they sought such a  
constant and unchangeable  essence in   
man as was beyond the limits of any     

change4  ,this inmost essence has       
sometimes been described as pure        
subject-object-less consciousness1 the  
reality1 and the bliss4 ,he is  the seer
 of all seeing1 the hearer of all       
hearing and the knower of all           
knowledge4 ,he sees but is not seen1    
hears but is not heard1 knows  but is   
not known4 ,he is the light of all      
lights4 ,he is like a lump  of salt1    
with no inner or outer1 which consists  
through and through  entirely of savour2
 as in truth this tman has no inner or  
outer1  but consists through and through
 entirely of knowledge4 ,bliss is  not  
an attribute of it but it is bliss      
itself4 ,the state of ,brahman  is thus 
likened unto the state of dreamless     
sleep4 ,and he who  has reached this    
bliss is beyond any fear4 ,it is dearer 
to us than        ,footnote #a3 ,ch4    
,,viii4 #g-ab4    #dh    son1 brother1  
wife1 or husband1 wealth or prosperity4 
,it is for it  and by it that things    
appear dear to us4 ,it is the dearest   

par  excellence1 our inmost tman4 ,all  
limitation is fraught with pain2  it is 
the infinite alone that is the highest  
bliss4 ,when a man  receives this       
rapture1 then is he full of bliss2 for  
who could breathe1  who live1 if that   
bliss had not filled this void 7ks'a78  
,it is he  who behaves as bliss4 ,for   
when a man finds his peace1 his fearless
  support in that invisible1            
supportless1 inexpressible1 unspeakable 
one1 then has he attained peace4        
,place of ,brahman in the ,upanisads4   
,there is the tman not in man alone but 
in all objects of the  universe1 the    
sun1 the moon1 the world2 and ,brahman  
is this tman4  ,there is nothing outside
 the tman1 and therefore there is no    
plurality at all4 ,as from a lump of    
clay all that is made of clay  is known1
 as from an ingot of black iron all that
 is made of  black iron is known1 so    
when this tman the ,brahman is known    
everything else is known4 ,the essence  
in man and the essence  of the universe 

are one and the same1 and it is         
,brahman4    ,now a question may arise  
as to what may be called the nature  of 
the phenomenal world of colour1 sound1  
taste1 and smell4 ,but  we must also    
remember that the ,upanisads do not     
represent so  much a conceptional system
 of philosophy as visions of the seers  
who are possessed by the spirit of this 
,brahman4 ,they do not  notice even the 
contradiction between the ,brahman as   
unity and  nature in its diversity4     
,when the empirical aspect of diversity 
attracts their notice1 they affirm it   
and yet declare that it is all          
,brahman4 ,from ,brahman it has come    
forth and to it will it  return4 ,he has
 himself created it out of himself and  
then entered  into it as its inner      
controller 7antarymin74 ,here is thus a 
glaring  dualistic trait of the world of
 matter and ,brahman as its controller1 
though in other places we find it       
asserted most emphatically that  these  
are but names and forms1 and when       

,brahman is known  everything else is   
known4 ,no attempts at reconciliation   
are made  for the sake of the           
consistency of conceptual utterance1 as 
,s'ankara the great professor of ,vednta
 does by explaining away  the dualistic 
texts4 ,the universe is said to be a    
reality1 but the  real in it is ,brahman
 alone4 ,it is on account of ,brahman   
that  the fire burns and the wind blows4
 ,he is the active principle in  the    
entire universe1 and yet the most       
passive and unmoved4 ,the    #di        
world is his body1 yet he is the soul   
within4 ,he creates all1  wills all1    
smells all1 tastes all1 he has pervaded 
all1 silent and  unaffected ,footnote   
ref #a4 ,he is below1 above1 in the     
back1 in front1  in the south and in the
 north1 he is all this ,footnote ref #b4
 ,these  rivers in the east and in the  
west originating from the ocean1 return 
back into it and become the ocean       
themselves1 though they do not know     
that they are so4 ,so also all these    

people coming into being from the       
,being do not know that they have come  
from the ,being444,that which  is the   
subtlest that is the self1 that is all  
this1 the truth1 that self  thou art ,o 
,s'vetaketu ,footnote ref #c4 ,brahman1 
as ,deussen points out1  was regarded as
 the cause antecedent in time1 and the  
universe  as the effect proceeding from 
it2 the inner dependence of the         
universe on ,brahman and its essential  
identity with him was  represented as a 
creation of the universe by and out of  
,brahman4  ,thus it is said in ,mund4   
,i4,i4 #g3      ,as a spider ejects and 
retracts 7the threads71    ,as the      
plants shoot forth on the earth1    ,as 
the hairs on the head and body of the   
living man1    ,so from the imperishable
 all that is here4    ,as the sparks    
from the well-kindled fire1    ,in      
nature akin to it1 spring forth in their
 thousands1    ,so1 my dear sir1 from   
the imperishable    ,living beings of   
many kinds go forth1    ,and again      

return into him ,footnote ref #d4       
,yet this world principle is the dearest
 to us and the highest  teaching of the 
,upanisads is ,that art thou4    ,again 
the growth of the doctrine that ,brahman
 is the inner  controller in all the    
parts and forces of nature and of       
mankind as  the tman thereof1 and that  
all the effects of the universe are the 
result of his commands which no one can 
outstep1 gave rise to a  theistic       
current of thought in which ,brahman is 
held as standing  aloof as ,god and     
controlling the world4 ,it is by his    
ordaining1 it  is said1 that the sun and
 moon are held together1 and the sky and
  earth stand held together ,footnote   
ref #e4 ,god and soul are distinguished 
again in the famous verse of            
,s'vets'vatara ,footnote ref #f3        
,two bright-feathered bosom friends     
,flit around one and the same tree2     
,one of them tastes the sweet berries1  
,the other without eating merely gazes  
down4        ,footnote #a3 ,ch4 ,,iii4  

#ad4 #d4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 ,,vii4 
#be4 i2 also ,mundaka ,,ii4 #b4 ii4     
,footnote #c3 ,ch4 ,,vi4 #aj4           
,footnote #d3 ,deussen's translation in 
,philosophy of the ,upanishads1 p4      
#afd4    ,footnote #e3 ,brh4 ,,iii4 #h4 
i4    ,footnote #f3 ,s'vets'vatara ,,iv4
 #f1 and ,mundaka ,,iii4 i1 #a1 also    
,deussen's  translation in ,philosophy  
of the ,upanishads1 p4 #agg4    #ej     
,but in spite of this apparent theistic 
tendency and the occasional  use of the 
word s'a or s'na1 there seems to be no  
doubt  that theism in its true sense was
 never prominent1 and this              
acknowledgement  of a supreme ,lord was 
also an offshoot of the exalted         
position of the tman as the supreme     
principle4 ,thus we read in  ,kaustaki  
,upanisad #c4 #i1 ,he is not great by   
good deeds nor low  by evil deeds1 but  
it is he makes one do good deeds whom he
  wants to raise1 and makes him commit  
bad deeds whom he wants  to lower down4 
,he is the protector of the universe1 he

 is the  master of the world and the    
lord of all2 he is my soul 7tman74      
,thus the lord in spite of his greatness
 is still my soul4 ,there are  again    
other passages which regard ,brahman as 
being at once  immanent and             
transcendent4 ,thus it is said that     
there is that  eternally existing tree  
whose roots grow upward and whose       
branches grow downward4 ,all the        
universes are supported in it  and no   
one can transcend it4 ,this is that1    
444from its fear the fire  burns1 the   
sun shines1 and from its fear ,indra1   
,vyu and ,death  the fifth 7with the    
other two7 run on ,footnote ref #a4     
,if we overlook the different shades in 
the development of the  conception of   
,brahman in the ,upanisads and look to  
the main  currents1 we find that the    
strongest current of thought which has  
found expression in the majority of the 
texts is this that the  tman or the     
,brahman is the only reality and that   
besides this  everything else is unreal4

 ,the other current of thought which is 
to be found in many of the texts is the 
pantheistic creed that  identifies the  
universe with the tman or ,brahman4 ,the
 third  current is that of theism which 
looks upon ,brahman as the ,lord        
controlling the world4 ,it is because   
these ideas were still in the  melting  
pot1 in which none of them were         
systematically worked  out1 that the    
later exponents of ,vednta1 ,s'ankara1  
,rmnuja1  and others quarrelled over the
 meanings of texts in order to  develop 
a consistent systematic philosophy out  
of them4 ,thus it  is that the doctrine 
of ,my which is slightly hinted at once 
in  ,brhadranyaka and thrice in         
,s'vets'vatara1 becomes the foundation  
of ,s'ankara's philosophy of the ,vednta
 in which ,brahman  alone is real and   
all else beside him is unreal ,footnote 
ref #b4        ,footnote #a3 ,katha     
,,ii4 #f4 #a and #c4    ,footnote #b3   
,brh4 ,,ii4 #e4 #ai1 ,s'vet4 ,i4 #aj1   
,,iv4 #i1 #aj4    #ea      ,the ,world4 

,we have already seen that the universe 
has come out of  ,brahman1 has its      
essence in ,brahman1 and will also      
return back  to it4 ,but in spite of its
 existence as ,brahman its character as 
represented to experience could not be  
denied4 ,s'ankara held  that the        
,upanisads referred to the external     
world and accorded  a reality to it     
consciously with the purpose of treating
 it as merely  relatively real1 which   
will eventually appear as unreal as soon
  as the ultimate truth1 the ,brahman1  
is known4 ,this however  remains to be  
modified to this extent that the sages  
had not  probably any conscious purpose 
of according a relative reality to  the 
phenomenal world1 but in spite of       
regarding ,brahman as the  highest      
reality they could not ignore the claims
 of the exterior  world1 and had to     
accord a reality to it4 ,the            
inconsistency of this  reality of the   
phenomenal world with the ultimate and  
only  reality of ,brahman was attempted 

to be reconciled by holding  that this  
world is not beside him but it has come 
out of him1 it  is maintained in him and
 it will return back to him4    ,the    
world is sometimes spoken of in its     
twofold aspect1 the  organic and the    
inorganic4 ,all organic things1 whether 
plants1  animals or men1 have souls     
,footnote ref #a4 ,brahman desiring to  
be many  created fire 7tejas71 water    
7ap7 and earth 7ksiti74 ,then the       
self-existent ,brahman entered into     
these three1 and it is by their         
combination that all other bodies are   
formed ,footnote ref #b4 ,so all  other 
things are produced as a result of an   
alloying or compounding  of the parts of
 these three together4 ,in this theory  
of the threefold  division of the       
primitive elements lies the earliest    
germ of the later  distinction          
7especially in the ,smkhya school7 of   
pure infinitesimal  substances 7tanmtra7
 and gross elements1 and the theory that
 each  gross substance is composed of   

the atoms of the primary elements4 ,and 
in ,pras'na ,,iv4 #h we find the gross  
elements distinguished from their       
subtler natures1 e4g4 earth 7prthiv71   
and the subtler state of earth          
7prthivmtra74 ,in the ,taittirya1 ,,ii4 
#a1 however1 ether 7ks'a7  is also      
described as proceeding from ,brahman1  
and the other elements1  air1 fire1     
water1 and earth1 are described as each 
proceeding  directly from the one which 
directly preceded it4        ,footnote  
#a3 ,ch4 ,,vi4#aa4    ,footnote #b3     
ibid4 ,,vi4#b1c1d4    #eb      ,the     
,world-,soul4    ,the conception of a   
world-soul related to the universe as   
the  soul of man to his body is found   
for the first time in ,r4,v4,x4 #aba4   
,i1  where he is said to have sprung    
forth as the firstborn of creation  from
 the primeval waters4 ,this being has   
twice been referred  to in the          
,s'vets'vatara1 in ,,iii4 #d and ,,iv4  
#ab4 ,it is indeed very strange  that   
this being is not referred to in any of 

the earlier ,upanisads4  ,in the two    
passages in which he has been spoken of1
 his mythical  character is apparent4   
,he is regarded as one of the earlier   
products in the process of cosmic       
creation1 but his importance  from the  
point of view of the development of the 
theory of  ,brahman or tman is almost   
nothing4 ,the fact that neither the     
,purusa1 nor the ,vis'vakarma1 nor the  
,hiranyagarbha played an  important part
 in the earlier development of the      
,upanisads  leads me to think that the  
,upanisad doctrines were not directly   
developed from the monotheistic         
tendencies of the later ,rg-,veda       
speculations4 ,the passages in          
,s'vets'vatara clearly show how from    
the supreme eminence that he had in     
,r4,v4,x4 #aba1 ,hiranyagarbha  had been
 brought to the level of one of the     
created beings4 ,deussen  in explaining 
the philosophical significance of the   
,hiranyagarbha  doctrine of the         
,upanisads says that the entire         

objective universe is  possible only in 
so far as it is sustained by a knowing  
subject4 ,this  subject as a sustainer  
of the objective universe is manifested 
in  all individual objects but is by no 
means identical with them4 ,for  the    
individual objects pass away but the    
objective universe continues  to exist  
without them2 there exists therefore the
 eternal  knowing subject also          
7hiranyagarbha7 by whom it is sustained4
  ,space and time are derived from this 
subject4 ,it is itself accordingly  not 
in space and does not belong to time1   
and therefore  from an empirical point  
of view it is in general non-existent2  
it  has no empirical but only a         
metaphysical reality ,footnote ref #a4  
,this  however seems to me to be wholly 
irrelevant1 since the ,hiranyagarbha    
doctrine cannot be supposed to have any 
philosophical importance  in the        
,upanisads4        ,the ,theory of      
,causation4    ,there was practically no
 systematic theory of causation in the  

,upanisads4 ,s'ankara1 the later        
exponent of ,vednta philosophy1  always 
tried to show that the ,upanisads looked
 upon the cause        ,footnote #a3    
,deussen's ,philosophy of the           
,upanishads1 p4 #bja4    #ec    as mere 
ground of change which though unchanged 
in itself in  reality had only an       
appearance of suffering change4 ,this he
 did  on the strength of a series of    
examples in the ,chndogya  ,upanisad    
7,,vi4 #a7 in which the material cause1 
e4g4 the clay1 is  spoken of as the only
 reality in all its transformations as  
the pot1  the jug or the plate4 ,it is  
said that though there are so many      
diversities of appearance that one is   
called the plate1 the other the  pot1   
and the other the jug1 yet these are    
only empty distinctions of  name and    
form1 for the only thing real in them is
 the earth which  in its essence remains
 ever the same whether you call it the  
pot1  plate1 or ,jug4 ,so it is that the
 ultimate cause1 the unchangeable       

,brahman1 remains ever constant1 though 
it may appear to suffer  change as the  
manifold world outside4 ,this world is  
thus only  an unsubstantial appearance1 
a mirage imposed upon ,brahman1  the    
real par excellence4    ,it seems       
however that though such a view may be  
regarded  as having been expounded in   
the ,upanisads in an imperfect  manner1 
there is also side by side the other    
view which looks  upon the effect as the
 product of a real change wrought in the
  cause itself through the action and   
combination of the elements  of         
diversity in it4 ,thus when the         
different objects of nature have  been  
spoken of in one place as the product of
 the combination  of the three elements 
fire1 water and earth1 the effect       
signifies a real  change produced by    
their compounding4 ,this is in germ 7as 
we  shall see hereafter7 the ,parinma   
theory of causation advocated  by the   
,smkhya school ,footnote ref #a4        
,doctrine of ,transmigration4    ,when  

the ,vedic people witnessed the burning 
of a dead body  they supposed that the  
eye of the man went to the sun1 his     
breath  to the wind1 his speech to the  
fire1 his limbs to the different parts  
of the universe4 ,they also believed as 
we have already seen in  the recompense 
of good and bad actions in worlds other 
than our  own1 and though we hear of    
such things as the passage of the  human
 soul into trees1 etc41 the tendency    
towards transmigration  had but little  
developed at the time4    ,in the       
,upanisads however we find a clear      
development in  the direction of        
transmigration in two distinct stages4  
,in the one  the ,vedic idea of a       
recompense in the other world is        
combined with        ,footnote #a3 ,ch4 
,,vi4 #b-d4    #ed    the doctrine of   
transmigration1 whereas in the other the
 doctrine  of transmigration comes to   
the forefront in supersession of the    
idea of a recompense in the other world4
 ,thus it is said that  those who       

performed charitable deeds or such      
public works as the  digging of wells1  
etc41 follow after death the way of the 
fathers  7pitryna71 in which the soul   
after death enters first into smoke1    
then into night1 the dark half of the   
month1 etc41 and at last reaches  the   
moon2 after a residence there as long as
 the remnant of his  good deeds remains 
he descends again through ether1 wind1  
smoke1  mist1 cloud1 rain1 herbage1 food
 and seed1 and through the assimilation 
of food by man he enters the womb of the
 mother and is  born again4 ,here we see
 that the soul had not only a recompense
  in the world of the moon1 but was     
re-born again in this world ,footnote   
ref #a4    ,the other way is the way of 
gods 7devayna71 meant for those  who    
cultivate faith and asceticism 7tapas74 
,these souls at death  enter            
successively into flame1 day1 bright    
half of the month1 bright  half of the  
year1 sun1 moon1 lightning1 and then    
finally into  ,brahman never to return4 

,deussen says that the meaning of  the  
whole is that the soul on the way of the
 gods reaches regions  of               
ever-increasing light1 in which is      
concentrated all that is bright  and    
radiant as stations on the way to       
,brahman the 'light of  lights' 7jyotism
 jyotih7 ,footnote ref #b4    ,the other
 line of thought is a direct reference  
to the doctrine  of transmigration      
unmixed with the idea of reaping the    
fruits of  his deeds 7karma7 by passing 
through the other worlds and without    
reference to the doctrine of the ways of
 the fathers and gods1  the ,ynas4 ,thus
 ,yjavalkya says1 when the soul becomes 
weak 7apparent weakness owing to the    
weakness of the body with  which it is  
associated7 and falls into a swoon as it
 were1 these senses  go towards it4 ,it 
7,soul7 takes these light particles     
within itself and  centres itself only  
in the heart4 ,thus when the person in  
the eye  turns back1 then the soul      
cannot know colour2 7the senses7 become 

one 7with him72 7people about him7 say  
he does not see2 7the senses7  become   
one 7with him71 he does not smell1 7the 
senses7 become  one 7with him71 he does 
not taste1 7the senses7 become one 7with
  him71 he does not speak1 7the senses7 
become one 7with him71 he  does not     
hear1 7the senses7 become one 7with     
him71 he does not  think1 7the senses7  
become one with him1 he does not touch1 
7the  senses7 become one with him1 he   
does not know1 they say4 ,the           
,footnote #a3 ,ch4 ,v4 #aj4    ,footnote
 #b3 ,deussen's ,philosophy of the      
,upanishads1 p4 #cce4    #ee    tip of  
his heart shines and by that shining    
this soul goes out4  ,when he goes out  
either through the eye1 the head1 or by 
any  other part of the body1 the vital  
function 7prna7 follows and all  the    
senses follow the vital function 7prna7 
in coming out4 ,he  is then with        
determinate consciousness and as such he
 comes  out4 ,knowledge1 the deeds as   
well as previous experience 7praj7      

accompany him4 ,just as a caterpillar   
going to the end of a blade  of grass1  
by undertaking a separate movement      
collects itself1 so  this self after    
destroying this body1 removing          
ignorance1 by a  separate movement      
collects itself4 ,just as a goldsmith   
taking a  small bit of gold1 gives to it
 a newer and fairer form1 so the soul   
after destroying this body and removing 
ignorance fashions a  newer and fairer  
form as of the ,pitrs1 the ,gandharvas1 
the gods1  of ,prajpati or ,brahma or of
 any other being4444,as he acts and     
behaves so he becomes1 good by good     
deeds1 bad by bad deeds1  virtuous by   
virtuous deeds and vicious by vice4 ,the
 man is full  of desires4 ,as he desires
 so he wills1 as he wills so he works1  
as  the work is done so it happens4     
,there is also a verse1 being  attached 
to that he wants to gain by karma that  
to which he  was attached4 ,having      
reaped the full fruit 7lit4 gone to the 
end7 of the karma that he does here1 he 

returns back to this  world for doing   
karma ,footnote ref #a4 ,so it is the   
case with those who  have desires4 ,he  
who has no desires1 who had no desires1 
who has  freed himself from all desires1
 is satisfied in his desires and in     
himself1 his senses do not go out4 ,he  
being ,brahma attains  ,brahmahood4     
,thus the verse says1 when all the      
desires that are  in his heart are got  
rid of1 the mortal becomes immortal and 
attains ,brahma here 7,brh4 ,,iv4 iv4   
#a-g74    ,a close consideration of the 
above passage shows that the  self      
itself destroyed the body and built up a
 newer and fairer  frame by its own     
activity when it reached the end of the 
present  life4 ,at the time of death1   
the self collected within itself all    
senses and faculties and after death all
 its previous knowledge1  work and      
experience accompanied him4 ,the falling
 off of the  body at the time of death  
is only for the building of a newer     
body either in this world or in the     

other worlds4 ,the self which  thus     
takes rebirth is regarded as an         
aggregation of diverse categories4      
,thus it is said that he is of the      
essence of understanding1               
,footnote #a3 ,it is possible that there
 is a vague and obscure reference  here 
to the doctrine that the fruits of our  
deeds are reaped in other  worlds4      
#ef    of the vital function1 of the    
visual sense1 of the auditory sense1 of 
the essence of the five elements 7which 
would make up the  physical body in     
accordance with its needs7 or the       
essence of desires1  of the essence of  
restraint of desires1 of the essence of 
anger1 of  the essence of turning off   
from all anger1 of the essence of       
dharma1  of the essence of adharma1 of  
the essence of all that is this         
7manifest7 and that is that 7unmanifest 
or latent7 7,brh4 ,,iv4 iv4 #e74  ,the  
self that undergoes rebirth is thus a   
unity not only of moral  and            
psychological tendencies1 but also of   

all the elements which  compose the     
physical world4 ,the whole process of   
his changes  follows from this nature of
 his2 for whatever he desires1 he wills 
and whatever he wills he acts1 and in   
accordance with his acts  the fruit     
happens4 ,the whole logic of the genesis
 of karma and  its fruits is held up    
within him1 for he is a unity of the    
moral  and psychological tendencies on  
the one hand and elements of  the       
physical world on the other4    ,the    
self that undergoes rebirth being a     
combination of diverse  psychological   
and moral tendencies and the physical   
elements  holds within itself the       
principle of all its transformations4   
,the  root of all this is the desire of 
the self and the consequent fruition  of
 it through will and act4 ,when the self
 continues to desire and  act1 it reaps 
the fruit and comes again to this world 
for performing  acts4 ,this world is    
generally regarded as the field for     
performing  karma1 whereas other worlds 

are regarded as places where the  fruits
 of karma are reaped by those born as   
celestial beings4 ,but  there is no     
emphasis in the ,upanisads on this      
point4 ,the ,pitryna  theory is not     
indeed given up1 but it seems only to   
form a part  in the larger scheme of    
rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in
  this world too4 ,all the course of    
these rebirths is effected by the  self 
itself by its own desires1 and if it    
ceases to desire1 it suffers no  rebirth
 and becomes immortal4 ,the most        
distinctive feature of  this doctrine is
 this1 that it refers to desires as the 
cause of rebirth  and not karma4 ,karma 
only comes as the connecting link       
between  desires and rebirth--for it is 
said that whatever a man desires he     
wills1 and whatever he wills he acts4   
,thus it is said in another place he who
 knowingly desires is  born by his      
desires in those places 7accordingly71  
but for him whose  desires have been    
fulfilled and who has realized himself1 

all his  desires vanish here 7,mund     
,,iii4 #b4 #b74 ,this destruction of    
desires  is effected by the right       
knowledge of the self4 ,he who knows    
#eg    his self as ',i am the person'   
for what wish and for what desire  will 
he trouble the body1444even being here  
if we know it1 well if  we do not1 what 
a great destruction 7,brh4 ,,iv4 iv4 #ab
 and #ad74 ,in  former times the wise   
men did not desire sons1 thinking what  
shall we do with sons since this our    
self is the universe 7,brh4 ,,iv4  iv4  
#bb74 ,none of the complexities of the  
karma doctrine which  we find later on  
in more recent developments of ,hindu   
thought  can be found in the ,upanisads4
 ,the whole scheme is worked  out on the
 principle of desire 7kma7 and karma    
only serves as  the link between it and 
the actual effects desired and willed by
  the person4    ,it is interesting to  
note in this connection that            
consistently  with the idea that desires
 7kma7 led to rebirth1 we find that  in 

some ,upanisads the discharge of the    
semen in the womb of a  woman as a      
result of desires is considered as the  
first birth of  man1 and the birth of   
the son as the second birth and the     
birth  elsewhere after death is regarded
 as the third birth4 ,thus it is  said1 
,it is in man that there comes first the
 embryo1 which is  but the semen which  
is produced as the essence of all parts 
of  his body and which holds itself     
within itself1 and when it is put  in a 
woman1 that is his first birth4 ,that   
embryo then becomes  part of the woman's
 self like any part of her body2 it     
therefore  does not hurt her2 she       
protects and develops the embryo within 
herself4 ,as she protects 7the embryo7  
so she also should be  protected4 ,it is
 the woman who bears the embryo 7before 
birth7  but when after birth the father 
takes care of the son always1 he  is    
taking care only of himself1 for it is  
through sons alone that  the continuity 
of the existence of people can be       

maintained4 ,this  is his second birth4 
,he makes this self of his a            
representative  for performing all the  
virtuous deeds4 ,the other self of his  
after  realizing himself and attaining  
age goes away and when going  away he is
 born again that is his third birth     
7,aitareya1 ,,ii4 #a-d7  ,footnote ref  
#a4 ,no special emphasis is given in the
 ,upanisads to  the sex-desire or the   
desire for a son2 for1 being called kma1
 whatever  was the desire for a son was 
the same as the desire for money and the
  desire for money was the same as any  
other worldly desire 7,brh4  ,,iv4 iv4  
#bb71 and hence sex-desires stand on the
 same plane as any  other desire4       
,footnote #a3 ,see also ,kaustaki1 ,,ii4
 #ae4    #eh      ,emancipation4    ,the
 doctrine which next attracts our       
attention in this connection  is that of
 emancipation 7mukti74 ,already we know 
that the  doctrine of ,devayna held that
 those who were faithful and performed  
asceticism 7tapas7 went by the way of   

the gods through  successive stages     
never to return to the world and suffer 
rebirth4  ,this could be contrasted with
 the way of the fathers 7pitryna7  where
 the dead were for a time recompensed in
 another world and  then had to suffer  
rebirth4 ,thus we find that those who   
are faithful  and perform s'raddh had a 
distinctly different type of goal from  
those who performed ordinary virtues1   
such as those of a general  altruistic  
nature4 ,this distinction attains its   
fullest development  in the doctrine of 
emancipation4 ,emancipation or ,mukti   
means  in the ,upanisads the state of   
infiniteness that a man attains  when he
 knows his own self and thus becomes    
,brahman4 ,the  ceaseless course of     
transmigration is only for those who are
  ignorant4 ,the wise man however who   
has divested himself of all  passions   
and knows himself to be ,brahman1 at    
once becomes  ,brahman and no bondage of
 any kind can ever affect him4      ,he 
who beholds that loftiest and deepest1  

,for him the fetters of the heart break 
asunder1    ,for him all doubts are     
solved1    ,and his works become        
nothingness ,footnote ref #a4    ,the   
knowledge of the self reveals the fact  
that all our passions  and antipathies1 
all our limitations of experience1 all  
that is  ignoble and small in us1 all   
that is transient and finite in us is   
false4 ,we do not know but are pure     
knowledge ourselves4  ,we are not       
limited by anything1 for we are the     
infinite2 we do  not suffer death1 for  
we are immortal4 ,emancipation thus is  
not  a new acquisition1 product1 an     
effect1 or result of any action1 but  it
 always exists as the ,truth of our     
nature4 ,we are always  emancipated and 
always free4 ,we do not seem to be so   
and  seem to suffer rebirth and         
thousands of other troubles only because
  we do not know the true nature of our 
self4 ,thus it is that the  true        
knowledge of self does not lead to      
emancipation but is  emancipation       

itself4 ,all sufferings and limitations 
are true only  so long as we do not know
 our self4 ,emancipation is the natural 
and only goal of man simply because it  
represents the true nature  and essence 
of man4 ,it is the realization of our   
own nature that        ,footnote #a3    
,deussen's ,philosophy of the           
,upanishads1 p4 #ceb4    #ei    is      
called emancipation4 ,since we are all  
already and always in  our own true     
nature and as such emancipated1 the only
 thing  necessary for us is to know that
 we are so4 ,self-knowledge is therefore
  the only desideratum which can wipe   
off all false knowledge1  all illusions 
of death and rebirth4 ,the story is told
 in the ,katha  ,upanisad that ,yama1   
the lord of death1 promised ,naciketas1 
the son of ,gautama1 to grant him three 
boons at his choice4  ,naciketas1       
knowing that his father ,gautama was    
offended with  him1 said1 ,o death let  
,gautama be pleased in mind and forget  
his anger against me4 ,this being       

granted ,naciketas asked the  second    
boon that the fire by which heaven is   
gained should be  made known to him4    
,this also being granted ,naciketas     
said1  ,there is this enquiry1 some say 
the soul exists after the death  of man2
 others say it does not exist4 ,this ,i 
should like to know  instructed by thee4
 ,this is my third boon4 ,yama said1 ,it
 was  inquired of old1 even by the gods2
 for it is not easy to understand  it4  
,subtle is its nature1 choose another   
boon4 ,do not  compel me to this4       
,naciketas said1 ,even by the gods was  
it  inquired before1 and even thou ,o   
,death sayest that it is not easy  to   
understand it1 but there is no other    
speaker to be found like  thee4 ,there  
is no other boon like this4 ,yama said1 
,choose sons  and grandsons who may live
 a hundred years1 choose herds of       
cattle2 choose elephants and gold and   
horses2 choose the wide  expanded earth1
 and live thyself as many years as thou 
wishest4  ,or if thou knowest a boon    

like this choose it together with wealth
  and far-extending life4 ,be a king on 
the wide earth4 ,i will make  thee the  
enjoyer of all desires4 ,all those      
desires that are difficult  to gain in  
the world of mortals1 all those ask thou
 at thy pleasure2  those fair nymphs    
with their chariots1 with their musical 
instruments2  the like of them are not  
to be gained by men4 ,i will give  them 
to thee1 but do not ask the question    
regarding death4  ,naciketas replied1   
,all those enjoyments are of to-morrow  
and  they only weaken the senses4 ,all  
life is short1 with thee the  dance and 
song4 ,man cannot be satisfied with     
wealth1 we could  obtain wealth1 as long
 as we did not reach you we live only as
  long as thou pleasest4 ,the boon which
 ,i choose ,i have said4  ,yama said1   
,one thing is good1 another is pleasant4
 ,blessed is  he who takes the good1 but
 he who chooses the pleasant loses  the 
object of man4 ,but thou considering the
 objects of desire1  hast abandoned     

them4 ,these two1 ignorance 7whose      
object is    #fj    what is pleasant7   
and knowledge 7whose object is what is  
good71  are known to be far asunder1 and
 to lead to different goals4  ,believing
 that this world exists and not the     
other1 the careless  youth is subject to
 my sway4 ,that knowledge which thou    
hast  asked is not to be obtained by    
argument4 ,i know worldly happiness  is 
transient for that firm one is not to be
 obtained by what  is not firm4 ,the    
wise by concentrating on the soul1      
knowing him  whom it is hard to behold1 
leaves both grief and joy4 ,thee  ,o    
,naciketas1 ,i believe to be like a     
house whose door is open to  ,brahman4  
,brahman is deathless1 whoever knows him
 obtains  whatever he wishes4 ,the wise 
man is not born2 he does not die2  he is
 not produced from anywhere4 ,unborn1   
eternal1 the soul is  not slain1 though 
the body is slain2 subtler than what is 
subtle1  greater than what is great1    
sitting it goes far1 lying it goes      

everywhere4  ,thinking the soul as      
unbodily among bodies1 firm among       
fleeting things1 the wise man casts off 
all grief4 ,the soul cannot  be gained  
by eloquence1 by understanding1 or by   
learning4 ,it  can be obtained by him   
alone whom it chooses4 ,to him it       
reveals  its own nature ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,so long as the ,self identifies    
itself  with its desires1 he wills and  
acts according to them and reaps the    
fruits in the present and in future     
lives4 ,but when he comes to know the   
highest truth about himself1 that he is 
the highest essence and principle  of   
the universe1 the immortal and the      
infinite1 he ceases to have  desires1   
and receding from all desires realizes  
the ultimate truth  of himself in his   
own infinitude4 ,man is as it were the  
epitome  of the universe and he holds   
within himself the fine constituents  of
 the gross body 7annamaya kosa71 the    
vital functions 7prnamaya  kosa7 of     
life1 the will and desire 7manomaya7 and

 the  thoughts and ideas 7vijnamaya71   
and so long as he keeps himself  in     
these spheres and passes through a      
series of experiences  in the present   
life and in other lives to come1 these  
experiences  are willed by him and in   
that sense created by him4 ,he suffers  
pleasures and pains1 disease and death4 
,but if he retires from  these into his 
true unchangeable being1 he is in a     
state where he  is one with his         
experience and there is no change and no
 movement4  ,what this state is cannot  
be explained by the use of  concepts4   
,one could only indicate it by pointing 
out that it is  not any of those        
concepts found in ordinary knowledge2 it
 is not        ,footnote #a3 ,katha     
,,ii4 ,the translation is not           
continuous4 ,there are some  parts in   
the extract which may be differently    
interpreted4    #fa    whatever one     
knows as this and this 7neti neti74 ,in 
this infinite  and true self there is no
 difference1 no diversity1 no meum and  

tuum4 ,it is like an ocean in which all 
our phenomenal existence  will dissolve 
like salt in water4 ,just as a lump of  
salt when put  in water will disappear  
in it and it cannot be taken out        
separately  but in whatever portion of  
water we taste we find the salt1 so1    
,maitrey1 does this great reality       
infinite and limitless consisting  only 
of pure intelligence manifesting itself 
in all these 7phenomenal  existences7   
vanish in them and there is then no     
phenomenal knowledge  7,brh4 ,,ii4 #d4  
#ab74 ,the true self manifests itself in
 all the  processes of our phenomenal   
existences1 but ultimately when it      
retires back to itself1 it can no longer
 be found in them4 ,it is a  state of   
absolute infinitude of pure             
intelligence1 pure being1 and  pure     
blessedness4    #fb        ,,chapter    
,,iv      ,,general ,,observations ,,on 
,,the ,,systems  ,,of ,,indian          
,,philosophy      ,in what ,sense is a  
,history of ,indian ,philosophy         

possible8    ,it is hardly possible to  
attempt a history of ,indian philosophy 
in the manner in which the histories of 
,european philosophy have  been written4
 ,in ,europe from the earliest times1   
thinkers came  one after another and    
offered their independent speculations  
on philosophy4 ,the work of a modern    
historian consists in  chronologically  
arranging these views and in commenting 
upon  the influence of one school upon  
another or upon the general  change from
 time to time in the tides and currents 
of philosophy4  ,here in ,india1        
however1 the principal systems of       
philosophy had  their beginning in times
 of which we have but scanty record1 and
  it is hardly possible to say correctly
 at what time they began1  or to compute
 the influence that led to the          
foundation of so many  divergent systems
 at so early a period1 for in all       
probability these  were formulated just 
after the earliest ,upanisads had been  
composed  or arranged4    ,the          

systematic treatises were written in    
short and pregnant  half-sentences      
7stras7 which did not elaborate the     
subject in  detail1 but served only to  
hold before the reader the lost threads 
of memory of elaborate disquisitions    
with which he was already  thoroughly   
acquainted4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that  
these pithy half-sentences  were like   
lecture hints1 intended for those who   
had had  direct elaborate oral          
instructions on the subject4 ,it is     
indeed  difficult to guess from the     
stras the extent of their significance1 
or how far the discussions which they   
gave rise to in later days were         
originally intended by them4 ,the stras 
of the ,vednta system1  known as the    
,s'rraka-stras or ,brahma-stras of      
,bdaryana  for example were of so       
ambiguous a nature that they gave rise  
to more than half a dozen divergent     
interpretations1 each one  of which     
claimed to be the only faithful one4    
,such was the high  esteem and respect  

in which these writers of the stras were
 held  by later writers that whenever   
they had any new speculations to    #fc 
offer1 these were reconciled with the   
doctrines of one or other of  the       
existing systems1 and put down as       
faithful interpretations of  the system 
in the form of commentaries4 ,such was  
the hold of  these systems upon scholars
 that all the orthodox teachers since   
the foundation of the systems of        
philosophy belonged to one or  other of 
these schools4 ,their pupils were thus  
naturally brought  up in accordance with
 the views of their teachers4 ,all the  
independence  of their thinking was     
limited and enchained by the faith of   
the school  to which they were attached4
 ,instead of producing a succession of  
free-lance thinkers having their own    
systems to propound and establish1      
,india had brought forth schools of     
pupils who carried the traditionary     
views of particular systems from        
generation to generation1 who explained 

and expounded them1 and defended them   
against the attacks of other  rival     
schools which they constantly attacked  
in order to establish  the superiority  
of the system to which they adhered4 ,to
 take an  example1 the ,nyya system of  
philosophy consisting of a number  of   
half-sentences or stras is attributed to
 ,gautama1 also called  ,aksapda4 ,the  
earliest commentary on these stras1     
called the  ,vtsyyana bhsya1 was written
 by ,vtsyyana4 ,this work was  sharply  
criticized by the ,buddhist ,dinnga1 and
 to answer these  criticisms ,udyotakara
 wrote a commentary on this commentary  
called the ,bhsyavttika ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,as time went on the original  force
 of this work was lost1 and it failed to
 maintain the old dignity of  the       
school4 ,at this ,vcaspati ,mis'ra wrote
 a commentary called  ,vrttika-ttparyatk
 on this second commentary1 where he    
tried  to refute all objections against 
the ,nyya system made by other  rival   
schools and particularly by the         

,buddhists4 ,this commentary1  called   
,nyya-ttparyatk1 had another commentary 
called  ,nyya-ttparyatk-paris'uddhi     
written by the great ,udayana4 ,this    
commentary had another commentary called
 ,nyya-nibandha-praks'a  written by     
,varddhamna the son of the illustrious  
,ganges'a4 ,this  again had another     
commentary called ,varddha-mnendu upon  
it by  ,padmanbha ,mis'ra1 and this     
again had another named                 
,nyya-ttparyamandana by ,s'ankara       
,mis'ra4 ,the names of  ,vtsyyana1      
,vcaspati1 and ,udayana are indeed very 
great1  but even they contented         
themselves by writing commentaries  on  
commentaries1 and did not try to        
formulate any        ,footnote #a3 ,i   
have preferred to spell ,dinnga after   
,vcaspati's  ,ttparyatk 7p4 ,i7 and not 
,dignnga as it is generally spelt4      
#fd    original system4 ,even ,s'ankara1
 probably the greatest man of  ,india   
after ,buddha1 spent his life in writing
 commentaries on the  ,brahma-stras1 the

 ,upanisads1 and the ,bhagavadgt4    ,as
 a system passed on it had to meet      
unexpected opponents  and troublesome   
criticisms for which it was not in the  
least prepared4  ,its adherents had     
therefore to use all their ingenuity and
  subtlety in support of their own      
positions1 and to discover the  defects 
of the rival schools that attacked them4
 ,a system as it was  originally        
formulated in the stras had probably but
 few problems  to solve1 but as it      
fought its way in the teeth of          
opposition of  other schools1 it had to 
offer consistent opinions on other      
problems  in which the original views   
were more or less involved but to  which
 no attention had been given before4    
,the contributions of the successive    
commentators served to  make each system
 more and more complete in all its      
parts1 and  stronger and stronger to    
enable it to hold its own successfully  
against the opposition and attacks of   
the rival schools4 ,a system  in the    

stras is weak and shapeless as a newborn
 babe1 but if  we take it along with its
 developments down to the beginning  of 
the seventeenth century it appears as a 
fully developed man  strong and         
harmonious in all its limbs4 ,it is     
therefore not possible  to write any    
history of successive philosophies of   
,india1 but it is  necessity that each  
system should be studied and interpreted
 in  all the growth it has acquired     
through the successive ages of  history 
from its conflicts with the rival       
systems as one whole ,footnote  ref #a4 
,in the history of ,indian philosophy we
 have no place for systems  which had   
their importance only so long as they   
lived and were  then forgotten or       
remembered only as targets of criticism4
 ,each  system grew and developed by the
 untiring energy of its adherents       
through all the successive ages of      
history1 and a history of this  growth  
is a history of its conflicts4 ,no study
 of any ,indian system  is therefore    

adequate unless it is taken throughout  
all the growth  it attained by the work 
of its champions1 the commentators whose
  selfless toil for it had kept it      
living through the ages of history4     
,footnote #a3 ,in the case of some      
systems it is indeed possible to suggest
  one or two earlier phases of the      
system1 but this principle cannot be    
carried all through1 for the            
supplementary information and arguments 
given by the later commentators often   
appear as harmonious elaborations  of   
the earlier writings and are very seldom
 in conflict with them4    #fe          
,growth of the ,philosophic ,literature4
    ,it is difficult to say how the     
systems were originally formulated1  and
 what were the influences that led to   
it4 ,we know that a  spirit of          
philosophic enquiry had already begun in
 the days of the  earliest ,upanisads4  
,the spirit of that enquiry was that the
 final  essence or truth was the tman1  
that a search after it was our  highest 

duty1 and that until we are ultimately  
merged in it we  can only feel this     
truth and remain uncontented with       
everything  else and say that it is not 
the truth we want1 it is not the truth  
we  want 7neti neti74 ,philosophical    
enquires were however continuing  in    
circles other than those of the         
,upanisads4 ,thus the ,buddha  who      
closely followed the early ,upanisad    
period1 spoke of and enumerated         
sixty-two kinds of heresies ,footnote   
ref #a1 and these can hardly be  traced 
in the ,upanisads4 ,the ,jaina          
activities were also probably  going on 
contemporaneously but in the ,upanisads 
no reference  to these can be found4 ,we
 may thus reasonably suppose that there 
were different forms of philosophic     
enquiry in spheres other than  those of 
the ,upanisad sages1 of which we have   
but scanty records4  ,it seems probable 
that the ,hindu systems of thought      
originated  among the sages who though  
attached chiefly to the ,upanisad       

circles used to take note of the        
discussions and views of the            
antagonistic  and heretical philosophic 
circles4 ,in the assemblies of these    
sages and their pupils1 the views of the
 heretical circles were probably        
discussed and refuted4 ,so it continued 
probably for some time  when some       
illustrious member of the assembly such 
as ,gautama  or ,kanada collected the   
purport of these discussions on various 
topics and problems1 filled up many of  
the missing links1 classified  and      
arranged these in the form of a system  
of philosophy and  recorded it in stras4
 ,these stras were intended probably for
  people who had attended the elaborate 
oral discussions and thus  could easily 
follow the meaning of the suggestive    
phrases contained  in the aphorisms4    
,the stras thus contain sometimes       
allusions to the views of the rival     
schools and indicate the way in  which  
they could be refuted4 ,the commentators
 were possessed  of the general drift of

 the different discussions alluded to   
and  conveyed from generation to        
generation through an unbroken  chain of
 succession of teachers and pupils4     
,they were however  free to supplement  
these traditionary explanations with    
their own        ,footnote #a3          
,brahmajla-sutta1 ,dgha1 #a4 p4 #ab ff4 
#ff    views or to modify and even      
suppress such of the traditionary  views
 with which they did not agree or which 
they found it difficult  to maintain4   
,brilliant oppositions from the opposing
 schools  often made it necessary for   
them to offer solutions to new problems 
unthought of before1 but put forward by 
some illustrious adherent  of a rival   
school4 ,in order to reconcile these new
 solutions with  the other parts of the 
system1 the commentators never hesitated
 to  offer such slight modifications of 
the doctrines as could harmonize  them  
into a complete whole4 ,these           
elaborations or modifications  generally
 developed the traditionary system1 but 

did not effect any  serious change in   
the system as expounded by the older    
teachers1  for the new exponents always 
bound themselves to the explanations  of
 the older teachers and never           
contradicted them4 ,they  would only    
interpret them to suit their own ideas1 
or say new things  only in those cases  
where the older teachers had remained   
silent4  ,it is not therefore possible  
to describe the growth of any system  by
 treating the contributions of the      
individual commentators separately4     
,this would only mean unnecessary       
repetition4 ,except  when there is a    
specially new development1 the system is
 to be  interpreted on the basis of the 
joint work of the commentators  treating
 their contributions as forming one     
whole4    ,the fact that each system had
 to contend with other rival  systems in
 order to hold its own has left its     
permanent mark  upon all the philosophic
 literatures of ,india which are always 
written in the form of disputes1 where  

the writer is supposed to  be always    
faced with objections from rival schools
 to whatever  he has got to say4 ,at    
each step he supposes certain objections
  put forth against him which he        
answers1 and points out the defects  of 
the objector or shows that the objection
 itself is ill founded4 ,it  is thus    
through interminable byways of          
objections1 counter-objections  and     
their answers that the writer can wend  
his way to his  destination4 ,most often
 the objections of the rival schools are
  referred to in so brief a manner that 
those only who know the  views can catch
 them4 ,to add to these difficulties the
 ,sanskrit  style of most of the        
commentaries is so condensed and        
different  from literary ,sanskrit1 and 
aims so much at precision and brevity1  
leading to the use of technical words   
current in the diverse systems1  that a 
study of these becomes often impossible 
without the aid  of an expert preceptor2
 it is difficult therefore for all who  

are not  widely read in all the         
different systems to follow any advanced
    #fg    work of any particular       
system1 as the deliberations of that    
particular  system are expressed in such
 close interconnection with  the views  
of other systems that these can hardly  
be understood  without them4 ,each      
system of ,india has grown 7at least in 
particular epochs7 in relation to and in
 opposition to the growth  of other     
systems of thought1 and to be a thorough
 student of ,indian  philosophy one     
should study all the systems in their   
mutual  opposition and relation from the
 earliest times to a period at  which   
they ceased to grow and came to a       
stop--a purpose for  which a work like  
the present one may only be regarded as 
forming a preliminary introduction4     
,besides the stras and their            
commentaries there are also independent 
treatises on the systems in verse called
 kriks1 which  try to summarize the     
important topics of any system in a     

succinct  manner2 the ,smkhya krik may  
be mentioned as a work of this  kind4   
,in addition to these there were also   
long dissertations1  commentaries1 or   
general observations on any system      
written in  verses called the vrttikas2 
the ,s'lokavrttika1 of ,kumarila or the 
,vrttika of ,sures'vara may be mentioned
 as examples4 ,all these  of course had 
their commentaries to explain them4 ,in 
addition  to these there were also      
advanced treatises on the systems in    
prose  in which the writers either      
nominally followed some selected  stras 
or proceeded independently of them4 ,of 
the former class  the ,nyyamajar of     
,jayanta may be mentioned as an example 
and of the latter the ,pras'astapda     
bhsya1 the ,advaitasiddhi of            
,madhusdana ,sarasvat or the            
,vednta-paribhs of ,dharmarjdhvarndra4  
,the more remarkable of these treatises 
were of a masterly nature in  which the 
writers represented the systems they    
adhered to in a highly  forcible and    

logical manner by dint of their own     
great mental powers  and genius4 ,these 
also had their commentaries to explain  
and elaborate  them4 ,the period of the 
growth of the philosophic literatures of
 ,india  begins from about #ejj ,b4,c4  
7about the time of the ,buddha7 and     
practically  ends in the later half of  
the seventeenth century1 though even now
 some  minor publications are seen to   
come out4      ,the ,indian ,systems of 
,philosophy4    ,the ,hindus classify   
the systems of philosophy into two      
classes1  namely1 the nstika and the    
stika4 ,the nstika 7na asti it is  not7 
views are those which neither regard the
 ,vedas as infallible    #fh    nor try 
to establish their own validity on their
 authority4 ,these are  principally     
three in number1 the ,buddhist1 ,jaina  
and the ,crvka4  ,the stika-mata or     
orthodox schools are six in number1     
,smkhya1  ,yoga1 ,vednta1 ,mmms1 ,nyya  
and ,vais'esika1 generally known  as the
 six systems 7saddars'ana ,footnote ref 

#a74    ,the ,smkhya is ascribed to a   
mythical ,kpila1 but the  earliest works
 on the subject are probably now lost4  
,the ,yoga  system is attributed to     
,patajali and the original stras are    
called  the ,ptajala ,yoga stras4 ,the  
general metaphysical position  of these 
two systems with regard to soul1 nature1
 cosmology and  the final goal is almost
 the same1 and the difference lies in   
this  that the ,yoga system acknowledges
 a god 7s'vara7 as distinct  from tman  
and lays much importance on certain     
mystical  practices 7commonly known as  
,yoga practices7 for the achievement  of
 liberation1 whereas the ,smkhya denies 
the existence of  s'vara and thinks that
 sincere philosophic thought and culture
  are sufficient to produce the true    
conviction of the truth and  thereby    
bring about liberation4 ,it is probable 
that the system  of ,smkhya associated  
with ,kpila and the ,yoga system        
associated with ,patajali are but two   
divergent modifications of  an original 

,smkhya school1 of which we now get only
 references  here and there4 ,these     
systems therefore though generally      
counted  as two should more properly be 
looked upon as two different  schools of
 the same ,smkhya system--one may be    
called the  ,kpila ,smkhya and the other
 ,ptajala ,smkhya4    ,the ,prva ,mmms  
7from the root man to think--rational   
conclusions7 cannot properly be spoken  
of as a system of philosophy4  ,it is a 
systematized code of principles in      
accordance with  which the ,vedic texts 
are to be interpreted for purposes of   
sacrifices4        ,footnote #a3 ,the   
word dars'ana in the sense of true      
philosophic  knowledge has its earliest 
use in the ,vais'esika stras of ,kanda  
7,,ix4 ii4 #ac7 which ,i consider as    
pre-,buddhistic4 ,the ,buddhist pitakas 
7#djj ,b4,c47 called the heretical      
opinions ditthi 7,sanskrit--drsti  from 
the same root drs' from which dars'ana  
is formed74 ,haribhadra  7fifth century 
,a4,d47 uses the word ,dars'ana in the  

sense of systems of  philosophy         
7sarvadars'anavcyo'                     
rthah--,saddars'anasamuccaya ,i474      
,ratnakrtti 7end of the tenth century   
,a4,d47 uses the word also in the  same 
sense 7,yadi nma dars'ane dars'ane      
nnprakram sattvatak-sanam  uktamasti4   
,ksanabhangasiddhi in ,six ,buddhist    
,nyya tracts1 p4#bj74  ,mdhava 7#acca   
,a4,d47 calls his ,compendium of all    
systems of philosophy1                  
,sarvadars'anasamgrana4 ,the word mata  
7opinion or view7 was also  freely used 
in quoting the views of other systems4  
,but there is no word  to denote        
'philosophers' in the technical sense4  
,the ,buddhists used to call  those who 
held heretical views tairthika4 ,the    
words siddha1  jnin1 etc4 do not denote 
philosophers1 in the modern sense1 they 
are  used rather in the sense of seers  
or perfects4    #fi    ,the ,vedic texts
 were used as mantras 7incantations7 for
 sacrifices1  and people often disputed 
as to the relation of words in a        

sentence or their mutual relative       
importance with reference to the        
general drift of the sentence4 ,there   
were also differences of view  with     
regard to the meaning of a sentence1 the
 use to which it may  be applied as a   
mantra1 its relative importance or the  
exact  nature of its connection with    
other similar sentences in a complex    
,vedic context4 ,the ,mmms formulated   
some principles according  to which one 
could arrive at rational and uniform    
solutions  for all these difficulties4  
,preliminary to these its main objects1 
it  indulges in speculations with regard
 to the external world1 soul1           
perception1 inference1 the validity of  
the ,vedas1 or the like1 for in  order  
that a man might perform sacrifices with
 mantras1 a definite  order of the      
universe and its relation to man or the 
position and  nature of the mantras of  
the ,veda must be demonstrated and      
established4 ,though its interest in    
such abstract speculations is  but      

secondary yet it briefly discusses these
 in order to prepare a  rational ground 
for its doctrine of the mantras and     
their practical  utility for man4 ,it is
 only so far as there are these         
preliminary  discussions in the ,mmms   
that it may be called a system of       
philosophy4 ,its principles and maxims  
for the interpretation of  the import of
 words and sentences have a legal value 
even to this  day4 ,the stras of ,mmms  
are attributed to ,jaimini1 and ,s'abara
  wrote a bhsya upon it4 ,the two great 
names in the history of  ,mmms          
literature after ,jaimini and ,s'abara  
are ,kumrila ,bhatta  and his pupil     
,prabhkara1 who criticized the opinions 
of his master  so much1 that the master 
used to call him guru 7master7 in       
sarcasm1  and to this day his opinions  
pass as guru-mata1 whereas the views  of
 ,kumrila ,bhatta pass as bhatta-mata   
,footnote ref #a4 ,it may not  be out of
 place to mention here that ,hindu ,law 
7smrti7 accepts without  any reservation

 the maxims and principles settled and  
formulated  by the ,mmms4               
,footnote #a3 ,there is a story that    
,kumrila could not understand the       
meaning of a ,sanskrit sentence ,atra   
tunoktam tatrpinoktam iti  paunaraktam  
7hence spoken twice74 ,tunoktam         
phonetically admits of  two             
combinations1 tu noktam 7but not said7  
and tunuktam 7said by  the particle tu7 
and tatrpi noktam as tatra api na uktam 
7not  said also there7 and tatra apin   
uktam 7said there by the particle  api74
 ,under the first interpretation the    
sentence would mean1 ,not  spoken here1 
not spoken there1 it is thus spoken     
twice4 ,this puzzled  ,kumrila1 when    
,prabhkara taking the second meaning    
pointed out to him  that the meaning was
 here it is indicated by tu and there by
 api1  and so it is indicated twice4    
,kumrila was so pleased that he called  
his pupil ,guru 7master7 at this4    #gj
      ,the ,vednta stras1 also called   
,uttara ,mmms1 written by  ,bdaryana1   

otherwise known as the ,brahma-stras1   
form the  original authoritative work of
 ,vednta4 ,the word ,vednta means  end  
of the ,veda1 i4e4 the ,upanisads1 and  
the ,vednta stras are  so called as they
 are but a summarized statement of the  
general  views of the ,upanisads4 ,this 
work is divided into four books or      
adhyyas and each adhyya is divided into 
four pdas or chapters4  ,the first four 
stras of the work commonly known as     
,catuhstr  are 7#a7 ,how to ask about   
,brahman1 7#b7 ,from whom proceed birth 
and decay1 7#c7 ,this is because from   
him the ,vedas have come forth1  7#d7   
,this is shown by the harmonious        
testimony of the ,upanisads4  ,the whole
 of the first chapter of the second book
 is devoted to  justifying the position 
of the ,vednta against the attacks of   
the  rival schools4 ,the second chapter 
of the second book is busy in  dealing  
blows at rival systems4 ,all the other  
parts of the book are  devoted to       
settling the disputed interpretations of

 a number of individual  ,upanisad      
texts4 ,the really philosophical portion
 of the work is thus  limited to the    
first four stras and the first and      
second chapters  of the second book4    
,the other portions are like            
commentaries  to the ,upanisads1 which  
however contain many theological  views 
of the system4 ,the first commentary of 
the ,brahma-stra  was probably written  
by ,baudhyana1 which however is not     
available now4 ,the earliest commentary 
that is now found is that  of the great 
,s'ankara4 ,his interpretations of the  
,brahma-stras  together with all the    
commentaries and other works that follow
  his views are popularly known as      
,vednta philosophy1 though  this        
philosophy ought more properly to be    
called ,vis'uddhdvaitavda  school of    
,vednta philosophy 7i4e4 the ,vednta    
philosophy  of the school of absolute   
monism74 ,variant forms of dualistic    
philosophy as represented by the        
,vaisnavas1 ,s'aivas1 ,rmyatas1  etc41  

also claim to express the original      
purport of the ,brahma  stras4 ,we thus 
find that apostles of dualistic creeds  
such as  ,rmnuja1 ,vallabha1 ,madhva1   
,s'rkantha1 ,baladeva1 etc41 have       
written independent commentaries on the 
,brahma-stra to show  that the          
philosophy as elaborated by themselves  
is the view of  the ,upanisads and as   
summarized in the ,brahma-stras4 ,these 
differed largely and often vehemently   
attacked ,s'ankara's interpretations  of
 the same stras4 ,these systems as      
expounded by them also pass by  the name
 of ,vednta as these are also claimed to
 be the real  interpretations intended  
by the ,vednta 7,upanisads7    #ga      
and the ,vednta stras4 ,of these the    
system of ,rmnuja has  great            
philosophical importance4    ,the ,nyya 
stras attributed to ,gautama1 called    
also ,aksapda1  and the ,vais'esika     
stras attributed to ,kanda1 called also 
,ulka1  represent the same system for   
all practical purposes4 ,they are  in   

later times considered to differ only in
 a few points of minor  importance4 ,so 
far as the stras are concerned the ,nyya
 stras  lay particular stress on the    
cultivation of logic as an art1 while   
the ,vais'esika stras deal mostly with  
metaphysics and physics4  ,in addition  
to these six systems1 the ,tantras had  
also philosophies  of their own1 which  
however may generally be looked upon    
largely as modifications of the ,smkhya 
and ,vednta systems1  though their own  
contributions are also noteworthy4      
,some fundamental ,points of ,agreement4
    ,i4 ,the ,karma ,theory4    ,it is1 
however1 remarkable that with the       
exception of the  ,crvka materialists   
all the other systems agree on some     
fundamental  points of importance4 ,the 
systems of philosophy in ,india  were   
not stirred up merely by the speculative
 demands of the  human mind which has a 
natural inclination for indulging in    
abstract thought1 but by a deep craving 
after the realization of  the religious 

purpose of life4 ,it is surprising to   
note that the  postulates1 aims and     
conditions for such a realization were  
found  to be identical in all the       
conflicting systems4 ,whatever may be   
their differences of opinion in other   
matters1 so far as the general          
postulates for the realization of the   
transcendent state1 the summum  bonum of
 life1 were concerned1 all the systems  
were practically in  thorough agreement4
 ,it may be worth while to note some of 
them  at this stage4    ,first1 the     
theory of ,karma and rebirth4 ,all the  
,indian systems  agree in believing that
 whatever action is done by an          
individual  leaves behind it some sort  
of potency which has the power to       
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the     
future according as it is good  or bad4 
,when the fruits of the actions are such
 that they cannot  be enjoyed in the    
present life or in a human life1 the    
individual  has to take another birth as
 a man or any other being in order to   

suffer them4    ,the ,vedic belief that 
the mantras uttered in the correct      
accent  at the sacrifices with the      
proper observance of all ritualistic    
#gb    details1 exactly according to the
 directions without the slightest  error
 even in the smallest trifle1 had       
something like a magical  virtue        
automatically to produce the desired    
object immediately  or after a lapse of 
time1 was probably the earliest form of 
the  ,karma doctrine4 ,it postulates a  
semi-conscious belief that certain      
mystical actions can produce at a       
distant time certain effects  without   
the ordinary process of the             
instrumentality of visible  agents of   
ordinary cause and effect4 ,when the    
sacrifice is performed1  the action     
leaves such an unseen magical virtue1   
called  the adrsta 7the unseen7 or the  
aprva 7new71 that by it the desired     
object will be achieved in a mysterious 
manner1 for the modus  operandi of the  
aprva is unknown4 ,there is also the    

notion  prevalent in the ,samhits1 as we
 have already noticed1 that he  who     
commits wicked deeds suffers in another 
world1 whereas he  who performs good    
deeds enjoys the highest material       
pleasures4  ,these were probably        
associated with the conception of rta1  
the  inviolable order of things4 ,thus  
these are probably the elements  which  
built up the ,karma theory which we find
 pretty well  established but not       
emphasized in the ,upanisads1 where it  
is said  that according to good or bad  
actions men will have good or bad       
births4    ,to notice other relevant    
points in connection with the ,karma    
doctrine as established in the stika    
systems we find that it was  believed   
that the unseen 7adrsta7 potency of the 
action generally  required some time    
before it could be fit for giving the   
doer the  merited punishment or         
enjoyment4 ,these would often accumulate
  and prepare the items of suffering and
 enjoyment for the doer in  his next    

life4 ,only the fruits of those actions 
which are extremely  wicked or          
particularly good could be reaped in    
this life4 ,the  nature of the next     
birth of a man is determined by the     
nature of  pleasurable or painful       
experiences that have been made ready   
for  him by his maturing actions of this
 life4 ,if the experiences determined   
for him by his action are such that they
 are possible to be  realized in the    
life of a goat1 the man will die and be 
born as a  goat4 ,as there is no        
ultimate beginning in time of this world
  process1 so there is no time at which 
any person first began his  actions or  
experiences4 ,man has had an infinite   
number of past  lives of the most varied
 nature1 and the instincts of each kind 
of  life exist dormant in the life of   
every individual1 and thus whenever  he 
has any particular birth as this or that
 animal or man1    #gc    the special   
instincts of that life 7technically     
called vsan7 come  forth4 ,in accordance

 with these vsans the person passes     
through  the painful or pleasurable     
experiences as determined for him by    
his action4 ,the length of life is also 
determined by the number  and duration  
of experiences as preordained by the    
fructifying  actions of his past life4  
,when once certain actions become fit   
for  giving certain experiences1 these  
cannot be avoided1 but those  actions   
which have not matured are uprooted once
 for all if the  person attains true    
knowledge as advocated by philosophy4   
,but  even such an emancipated 7mukta7  
person has to pass through  the         
pleasurable or painful experiences      
ordained for him by the  actions just   
ripened for giving their fruits4 ,there 
are four kinds  of actions1 white or    
virtuous 7s'ukla71 black or wicked      
7krsna71  white-black or partly virtuous
 and partly vicious 7s'ukla-krsna7 as   
most of our actions are1 neither black  
nor white 7as'uklkrsna71  i4e4 those    
acts of self-renunciation or meditation 

which are not  associated with any      
desires for the fruit4 ,it is only when 
a person  can so restrain himself as to 
perform only the last kind of action    
that he ceases to accumulate any new    
karma for giving fresh fruits4  ,he has 
thus only to enjoy the fruits of his    
previous karmas which  have ripened for 
giving fruits4 ,if in the meantime he   
attains true  knowledge1 all his past   
accumulated actions become destroyed1   
and as his acts are only of the         
as'uklkrsna type no fresh karma  for    
ripening is accumulated1 and thus he    
becomes divested of all  karma after    
enjoying the fruits of the ripened      
karmas alone4    ,the ,jains think that 
through the actions of body1 speech  and
 mind a kind of subtle matter           
technically called karma is produced4   
,the passions of a man act like a       
viscous substance that  attracts this   
karma matter1 which thus pours into the 
soul and  sticks to it4 ,the karma      
matter thus accumulated round the soul  

during the infinite number of past lives
 is technically called  krmas'arra1     
which encircles the soul as it passes on
 from birth  to birth4 ,this karma      
matter sticking to the soul gradually   
ripens  and exhausts itself in ordaining
 the sufferance of pains or the         
enjoyment  of pleasures for the         
individual4 ,while some karma matter is 
being  expended in this way1 other karma
 matters are accumulating by  his       
activities1 and thus keep him in a      
continuous process of  suffering and    
enjoyment4 ,the karma matter thus       
accumulated  in the soul produces a kind
 of coloration called les'y1 such as    
white1 black1 etc41 which marks the     
character of the soul4 ,the    #gd      
idea of the s'ukla and krsna karmas of  
the ,yoga system was probably  suggested
 by the ,jaina view4 ,but when a man is 
free from  passions1 and acts in strict 
compliance with the rules of conduct1   
his actions produce karma which lasts   
but for a moment and is  then           

annihilated4 ,every karma that the sage 
has previously  earned has its          
predestined limits within which it must 
take effect  and be purged away4 ,but   
when by contemplation and the strict    
adherence to the five great vows1 no new
 karma is generated1 and  when all the  
karmas are exhausted the worldly        
existence of the  person rapidly draws  
towards its end4 ,thus in the last stage
 of  contemplation1 all karma being     
annihilated1 and all activities  having 
ceased1 the soul leaves the body and    
goes up to the top  of the universe1    
where the liberated souls stay for ever4
    ,buddhism also contributes some new 
traits to the karma  theory which       
however being intimately connected with 
their  metaphysics will be treated later
 on4      #b4 ,the ,doctrine of ,mukti4 
,not only do the ,indian systems agree  
as to the cause of the  inequalities in 
the share of sufferings and enjoyments  
in the case  of different persons1 and  
the manner in which the cycle of births 

and rebirths has been kept going from   
beginningless time1 on the  basis of the
 mysterious connection of one's actions 
with the  happenings of the world1 but  
they also agree in believing that  this 
beginningless chain of karma and its    
fruits1 of births and rebirths1  this   
running on from beginningless time has  
somewhere  its end4 ,this end was not to
 be attained at some distant time or  in
 some distant kingdom1 but was to be    
sought within us4 ,karma  leads us to   
this endless cycle1 and if we could     
divest ourselves of  all such emotions1 
ideas or desires as lead us to action we
 should  find within us the actionless  
self which neither suffers nor enjoys1  
neither works nor undergoes rebirth4    
,when the ,indians1 wearied  by the     
endless bustle and turmoil of worldly   
events1 sought for and  believed that   
somewhere a peaceful goal could be      
found1 they  generally hit upon the self
 of man4 ,the belief that the soul could
  be realized in some stage as being    

permanently divested of all  action1    
feelings or ideas1 led logically to the 
conclusion that the  connection of the  
soul with these worldly elements was    
extraneous1  artificial or even         
illusory4 ,in its true nature the soul  
is untouched  by the impurities of our  
ordinary life1 and it is through        
ignorance    #ge    and passion as      
inherited from the cycle of karma from  
beginningless  time that we connect it  
with these4 ,the realization of this    
transcendent state is the goal and final
 achievement of this endless  cycle of  
births and rebirths through karma4 ,the 
,buddhists did  not admit the existence 
of soul1 but recognized that the final  
realization of the process of karma is  
to be found in the ultimate  dissolution
 called ,nirvna1 the nature of which we 
shall discuss  later on4      #c4 ,the  
,doctrine of ,soul4    ,all the ,indian 
systems except ,buddhism admit the      
existence  of a permanent entity        
variously called atman1 purusa or jva4  

,as to the exact nature of this soul    
there are indeed divergences  of view4  
,thus while the ,nyya calls it          
absolutely  qualityless and             
characterless1 indeterminate unconscious
 entity1  ,smkhya describes it as being 
of the nature of pure consciousness1    
the ,vednta says that it is that        
fundamental point of unity  implied in  
pure consciousness 7cit71 pure bliss    
7nanda71 and pure  being 7sat74 ,but all
 agree in holding that it is pure and   
unsullied  in its nature and that all   
impurities of action or passion do not  
form a real part of it4 ,the summum     
bonum of life is attained  when all     
impurities are removed and the pure     
nature of the self  is thoroughly and   
permanently apprehended and all other   
extraneous  connections with it are     
absolutely dissociated4      ,the       
,pessimistic ,attitude towards the      
,world and the  ,optimistic ,faith in   
the end4    ,though the belief that the 
world is full of sorrow has not been    

equally prominently emphasized in all   
systems1 yet it may be  considered as   
being shared by all of them4 ,it finds  
its strongest  utterance in ,smkhya1    
,yoga1 and ,buddhism4 ,this interminable
  chain of pleasurable and painful      
experiences was looked upon as  nearing 
no peaceful end but embroiling and      
entangling us in the  meshes of karma1  
rebirth1 and sorrow4 ,what appear as    
pleasures  are but a mere appearance for
 the attempt to keep them steady is     
painful1 there is pain when we lose the 
pleasures or when we are  anxious to    
have them4 ,when the pleasures are so   
much associated  with pains they are but
 pains themselves4 ,we are but duped    
when we seek pleasures1 for they are    
sure to lead us to pain4 ,all  our      
experiences are essentially sorrowful   
and ultimately sorrow-begetting4        
,sorrow is the ultimate truth of this   
process of the    #gf    world4 ,that   
which to an ordinary person seems       
pleasurable  appears to a wise person or

 to a yogin who has a clearer vision as 
painful4 ,the greater the knowledge the 
higher is the sensitiveness  to sorrow  
and dissatisfaction with world          
experiences4 ,the yogin  is like the    
pupil of the eye to which even the      
smallest grain of  disturbance is       
unbearable4 ,this sorrow of worldly     
experiences cannot  be removed by       
bringing in remedies for each sorrow as 
it comes1  for the moment it is remedied
 another sorrow comes in4 ,it cannot    
also be avoided by mere inaction or     
suicide1 for we are continually  being  
forced to action by our nature1 and     
suicide will but lead to  another life  
of sorrow and rebirth4 ,the only way to 
get rid of  it is by the culmination of 
moral greatness and true knowledge      
which uproot sorrow once for all4 ,it is
 our ignorance that the self  is        
intimately connected with the           
experiences of life or its pleasures1   
that leads us to action and arouses     
passion in us for the enjoyment  of     

pleasures and other emotions and        
activities4 ,through  the highest moral 
elevation a man may attain absolute     
dispassion  towards world-experiences   
and retire in body1 mind1 and speech    
from all worldly concerns4 ,when the    
mind is so purified1 the self  shines in
 its true light1 and its true nature is 
rightly conceived4  ,when this is once  
done the self can never again be        
associated  with passion or ignorance4  
,it becomes at this stage ultimately    
dissociated from citta which contains   
within it the root of all  emotions1    
ideas1 and actions4 ,thus emancipated   
the self for ever  conquers all sorrow4 
,it is important1 however1 to note in   
this  connection that emancipation is   
not based on a general aversion  to     
intercourse with the world or on such   
feelings as a disappointed  person may  
have1 but on the appreciation of the    
state of mukti  as the supremely blessed
 one4 ,the details of the pessimistic   
creed of each system have developed from

 the logical necessity  peculiar to each
 system4 ,there was never the slightest 
tendency  to shirk the duties of this   
life1 but to rise above them through    
right performance and right             
understanding4 ,it is only when a  man  
rises to the highest pinnacle of moral  
glory that he is fit for  aspiring to   
that realization of selfhood in         
comparison with which  all worldly      
things or even the joys of ,heaven would
 not only  shrink into insignificance1  
but appear in their true character as   
sorrowful and loathsome4 ,it is when his
 mind has thus turned from  all ordinary
 joys that he can strive towards his    
ideal of salvation4  ,in fact it seems  
to me that a sincere religious craving  
after some    #gg    ideal blessedness  
and quiet of self-realization is indeed 
the fundamental  fact from which not    
only her philosophy but many of the     
complex phenomena of the civilization of
 ,india can be logically  deduced4 ,the 
sorrow around us has no fear for us if  

we remember  that we are naturally      
sorrowless and blessed in ourselves4    
,the  pessimistic view loses all terror 
as it closes in absolute optimistic     
confidence in one's own self and the    
ultimate destiny and goal of            
emancipation4      ,unity in ,indian    
,sdhana 7philosophical1 religious  and  
ethical endeavours74    ,as might be    
expected the ,indian systems are all    
agreed upon  the general principles of  
ethical conduct which must be followed  
for the attainment of salvation4 ,that  
all passions are to be controlled1  no  
injury to life in any form should be    
done1 and that all  desire for pleasures
 should be checked1 are principles which
 are  almost universally acknowledged4  
,when a man attains a very  high degree 
of moral greatness he has to strengthen 
and prepare  his mind for further       
purifying and steadying it for the      
attainment  of his ideal2 and most of   
the ,indian systems are unanimous with  
regard to the means to be employed for  

the purpose4 ,there are  indeed         
divergences in certain details or       
technical names1 but the  means to be   
adopted for purification are almost     
everywhere essentially  the same as     
those advocated by the ,yoga system4 ,it
 is only  in later times that devotion  
7bhakti7 is seen to occupy a more       
prominent place specially in ,vaisnava  
schools of thought4 ,thus  it was that  
though there were many differences among
 the various  systems1 yet their goal of
 life1 their attitude towards the world 
and  the means fur the attainment of the
 goal 7sdhana7 being fundamentally  the 
same1 there was a unique unity in the   
practical sdhana  of almost all the     
,indian systems4 ,the religious craving 
has been  universal in ,india and this  
uniformity of sdhana has therefore      
secured for ,india a unity in all her   
aspirations and strivings4    #gh       
,,chapter ,v      ,,buddhist            
,,philosophy    ,many scholars are of   
opinion that the ,smkhya and the ,yoga  

represent the earliest systematic       
speculations of ,india4 ,it is also     
suggested that ,buddhism drew much of   
its inspiration from them4  ,it may be  
that there is some truth in such a view1
 but the  systematic ,smkhya and ,yoga  
treatises as we have them had  decidedly
 been written after ,buddhism4 ,moreover
 it is well-known  to every student of  
,hindu philosophy that a conflict with  
the  ,buddhists has largely stimulated  
philosophic enquiry in most of  the     
systems of ,hindu thought4 ,a knowledge 
of ,buddhism is  therefore indispensable
 for a right understanding of the       
different  systems in their mutual      
relation and opposition to ,buddhism4   
,it  seems desirable therefore that ,i  
should begin with ,buddhism  first4     
,the ,state of ,philosophy in ,india    
before the ,buddha4    ,it is indeed    
difficult to give a short sketch of the 
different  philosophical speculations   
that were prevalent in ,india before    
,buddhism4 ,the doctrines of the        

,upanisads are well known1 and  these   
have already been briefly described4    
,but these were not the  only ones4     
,even in the ,upanisads we find         
references to diverse  atheistical      
creeds ,footnote ref #a4 ,we find there 
that the origin of the  world and its   
processes were sometimes discussed1 and 
some thought  that time was the ultimate
 cause of all1 others that all these    
had sprung forth by their own nature    
7svabhva71 others that  everything had  
come forth in accordance with an        
inexorable  destiny or a fortuitous     
concourse of accidental happenings1 or  
through matter combinations in general4 
,references to diverse  kinds of        
heresies are found in ,buddhist         
literature also1 but no  detailed       
accounts of these views are known4 ,of  
the ,upanisad  type of materialists the 
two schools of ,crvkas 7,dhrtta  and    
,sus'iksita7 are referred to in later   
literature1  though the time in which   
these flourished cannot rightly  be     

discovered ,footnote ref #b4 ,but it    
seems        ,footnote #a3              
,s'vets'vatara1 ,i4 #b1 klah svabhbo    
niyatiryadrcch  bhutni yonih purusa iti 
cintyam4    ,footnote #b3 ,lokyata      
7literally1 that which is found among   
people in  general7 seems to have been  
the name by which all carvka doctrines  
were generally known4 ,see ,gunaratna on
 the ,lokyatas4    #gi    probable      
however that the allusion to the        
materialists contained  in the          
,upanisads refers to these or to similar
 schools4 ,the  ,crvkas did not believe 
in the authority of the ,vedas or any   
other holy scripture4 ,according to them
 there was no soul4 ,life  and          
consciousness were the products of the  
combination of matter1  just as red     
colour was the result of mixing up white
 with  yellow or as the power of        
intoxication was generated in molasses  
7madas'akti74 ,there is no after-life1  
and no reward of actions1 as  there is  
neither virtue nor vice4 ,life is only  

for enjoyment4 ,so  long as it lasts it 
is needless to think of anything else1  
as everything  will end with death1 for 
when at death the body is burnt  to     
ashes there cannot be any rebirth4 ,they
 do not believe in  the validity of     
inference4 ,nothing is trustworthy but  
what can  be directly perceived1 for it 
is impossible to determine that the     
distribution of the middle term 7hetu7  
has not depended upon  some extraneous  
condition1 the absence of which might   
destroy  the validity of any particular 
piece of inference4 ,if in any case  any
 inference comes to be true1 it is only 
an accidental fact and  there is no     
certitude about it4 ,they were called   
,crvka because  they would only eat but 
would not accept any other religious or 
moral responsibility4 ,the word comes   
from carv to eat4 ,the  ,dhrtta ,crvkas 
held that there was nothing but the four
  elements of earth1 water1 air and     
fire1 and that the body was but the     
result of atomic combination4 ,there was

 no self or soul1 no  virtue or vice4   
,the ,sus'iksita ,crvkas held that there
 was  a soul apart from the body but    
that it also was destroyed with  the    
destruction of the body4 ,the original  
work of the ,crvkas  was written in     
stras probably by ,brhaspati4 ,jayanta  
and ,gunaratna  quote two stras from it4
 ,short accounts of this school may be  
found in ,jayanta's ,nyyamajar1         
,mdhava's ,sarvadars'anasamgraha  and   
,gunaratna's ,tarkarahasyadpik4         
,mahbhrata gives  an account of a man   
called ,crvka meeting ,yudhisthira4     
,side by side with the doctrine of the  
,crvka materialists we  are reminded of 
the jvakas of which ,makkhali ,gosla1   
probably  a renegade disciple of the    
,jain saint ,mahvra and a contemporary  
of ,buddha and ,mahvra1 was the leader4 
,this was a thorough-going  determinism 
denying the free will of man and his    
moral  responsibility for any so-called 
good or evil4 ,the essence of           
,makkhali's system is this1 that there  

is no cause1 either proximate  or       
remote1 for the depravity of beings or  
for their purity4 ,they    #hj    become
 so without any cause4 ,nothing depends 
either on one's  own efforts or on the  
efforts of others1 in short nothing     
depends  on any human effort1 for there 
is no such thing as power or energy1  or
 human exertion4 ,the varying conditions
 at any time are due  to fate1 to their 
environment and their own nature        
,footnote ref #a4    ,another           
sophistical school led by ,ajita        
,kesakambali taught  that there was no  
fruit or result of good or evil deeds2  
there is no  other world1 nor was this  
one real2 nor had parents nor any       
former lives any efficacy with respect  
to this life4 ,nothing that  we can do  
prevents any of us alike from being     
wholly brought to  an end at death      
,footnote ref #b4    ,there were thus at
 least three currents of thought3       
firstly the  sacrificial ,karma by the  
force of the magical rites of which any 

person could attain anything he desired2
 secondly the ,upanisad  teaching that  
the ,brahman1 the self1 is the ultimate 
reality and  being1 and all else but    
name and form which pass away but do    
not abide4 ,that which permanently      
abides without change is the  real and  
true1 and this is self4 ,thirdly the    
nihilistic conceptions  that there is no
 law1 no abiding reality1 that          
everything comes  into being by a       
fortuitous concourse of circumstances or
 by some  unknown fate4 ,in each of     
these schools1 philosophy had probably  
come to a deadlock4 ,there were the     
,yoga practices prevalent in  the       
country and these were accepted partly  
on the strength of  traditional custom  
among certain sections1 and partly by   
virtue  of the great spiritual1         
intellectual and physical power which   
they  gave to those who performed them4 
,but these had no rational  basis behind
 them on which they could lean for      
support4 ,these  were probably then just

 tending towards being affiliated to the
  nebulous ,smkhya doctrines which had  
grown up among certain  sections4 ,it   
was at this juncture that we find       
,buddha erecting  a new superstructure  
of thought on altogether original lines 
which  thenceforth opened up a new      
avenue of philosophy for all posterity  
to come4 ,if the ,being of the          
,upanisads1 the superlatively           
motionless1  was the only real1 how     
could it offer scope for further new    
speculations1 as it had already         
discarded all other matters of          
interest8 ,if everything was due to a   
reasonless fortuitous concourse  of     
circumstances1 reason could not proceed 
further in the  direction to create any 
philosophy of the unreason4 ,the magical
        ,footnote #a3 ,smaaphala-sutta1 
,dgha1 ,,ii4 #bj4 ,hoernl's article on  
the jvakas1 ,e4,r4,e4    ,footnote #b3  
,smaaphala-sutta1 ,,ii4 #bc4    #ha     
force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or  
sacrifice had but little that  was      

inviting for philosophy to proceed on4  
,if we thus take into  account the state
 of ,indian philosophic culture before  
,buddha1  we shall be better able to    
understand the value of the ,buddhistic 
contribution to philosophy4             
,buddha3 his ,life4    ,gautama the     
,buddha was born in or about the year   
#efj ,b4,c4  in the ,lumbini ,grove near
 the ancient town of ,kapilavastu in    
the now dense terai region of ,nepal4   
,his father was ,suddhodana1  a prince  
of the ,skya clan1 and his mother ,queen
 ,mahmy4  ,according to the legends it  
was foretold of him that he would  enter
 upon the ascetic life when he should   
see ,a decrepit old  man1 a diseased    
man1 a dead man1 and a monk4 ,his father
 tried  his best to keep him away from  
these by marrying him and  surrounding  
him with luxuries4 ,but on successive   
occasions1  issuing from the palace1 he 
was confronted by those four  things1   
which filled him with amazement and     
distress1 and  realizing the            

impermanence of all earthly things      
determined to  forsake his home and try 
if he could to discover some means to   
immortality to remove the sufferings of 
men4 ,he made his ,great  ,renunciation 
when he was twenty-nine years old4 ,he  
travelled  on foot to ,rjagrha 7,rajgir7
 and thence to ,uruvel1 where in        
company with other five ascetics he     
entered upon a course of  extreme       
self-discipline1 carrying his           
austerities to such a length  that his  
body became utterly emaciated and he    
fell down senseless  and was believed to
 be dead4 ,after six years of this great
  struggle he was convinced that the    
truth was not to be won by  the way of  
extreme asceticism1 and resuming an     
ordinary course  of life at last        
attained absolute and supreme           
enlightenment4 ,thereafter  the ,buddha 
spent a life prolonged over forty-five  
years in  travelling from place to place
 and preaching the doctrine to  all who 
would listen4 ,at the age of over eighty

 years ,buddha  realized that the time  
drew near for him to die4 ,he then      
entered  into ,dhyana and passing       
through its successive stages attained  
nirvna ,footnote ref #a4 ,the vast      
developments which the system of this   
great teacher underwent in the          
succeeding centuries in ,india and in   
other countries have not been thoroughly
 studied1 and it will  probably take yet
 many years more before even the        
materials for        ,footnote #a3      
,mahparinibbnasuttanta1 ,dgha1 ,,xvi4   
#f1 #h1 #i4    #hb    such a study can  
be collected4 ,but from what we now     
possess  it is proved incontestably that
 it is one of the most wonderful and    
subtle productions of human wisdom4 ,it 
is impossible to overestimate  the debt 
that the philosophy1 culture and        
civilization  of ,india owe to it in all
 her developments for many succeeding   
centuries4      ,early ,buddhist        
,literature4    ,the ,buddhist ,pli     
,scriptures contain three different     

collections3  the ,sutta 7relating to   
the doctrines71 the ,vinaya 7relating to
 the  discipline of the monks7 and the  
,abhidhamma 7relating generally  to the 
same subjects as the suttas but dealing 
with them in a  scholastic and technical
 manner74 ,scholars of ,buddhistic      
religious  history of modern times have 
failed as yet to fix any definite dates 
for the collection or composition of the
 different parts of the  aforesaid      
canonical literature of the ,buddhists4 
,the suttas were  however composed      
before the ,abhidhamma and it is very   
probable that almost the whole of the   
canonical works were  completed before  
#bda ,b4,c41 the date of the third      
council during  the reign of ,king      
,asoka4 ,the suttas mainly deal with the
 doctrine  7,dhamma7 of the ,buddhistic 
faith whereas the ,vinaya deals  only   
with the regulations concerning the     
discipline of the monks4  ,the subject  
of the ,abhidhamma is mostly the same as
 that  of the suttas1 namely1 the       

interpretation of the ,dhamma4          
,buddhaghosa in his introduction to     
,atthaslin1 the commentary  on the      
,dhammasangani1 says that the           
,abhidhamma is so called  7abhi and     
dhamma7 because it describes the same   
,dhammas as are  related in the suttas  
in a more intensified 7dhammtireka7 and 
specialized 7dhammavisesatthena7 manner4
 ,the ,abhidhammas  do not give any new 
doctrines that are not in the suttas1   
but  they deal somewhat elaborately with
 those that are already found  in the   
suttas4 ,buddhaghosa in distinguishing  
the special features  of the suttas from
 the ,abhidhammas says that the         
acquirement  of the former leads one to 
attain meditation 7samdhi7 whereas  the 
latter leads one to attain wisdom       
7pasampadam74 ,the force  of this       
statement probably lies in this1 that   
the dialogues of the  suttas leave a    
chastening effect on the mind1 the like 
of which is  not to be found in the     
,abhidhammas1 which busy themselves in  

enumerating the ,buddhistic doctrines   
and defining them in a  technical       
manner1 which is more fitted to produce 
a reasoned    #he    insight into the   
doctrines than directly to generate a   
craving  for following the path of      
meditation for the extinction of sorrow4
  ,the ,abhidhamma known as the         
,kathvatthu differs from the  other     
,abhidhammas in this1 that it attempts  
to reduce the views  of the heterodox   
schools to absurdity4 ,the discussions  
proceed  in the form of questions and   
answers1 and the answers of the         
opponents are often shown to be based on
 contradictory  assumptions4    ,the    
suttas contain five groups of           
collections called the ,nikyas4  ,these 
are 7#a7 ,dgha ,nikya1 called so on     
account of the length  of the suttas    
contained in it2 7#b7 ,majjhima ,nikya  
7middling  ,nikya71 called so on account
 of the middling extent of the  suttas  
contained in it2 7#c7 ,samyutta ,nikya  
7,nikyas relating  to special meetings71

 called samyutta on account of their    
being  delivered owing to the meetings  
7samyoga7 of special persons which  were
 the occasions for them2 7#d7 ,anguttara
 ,nikya1 so called because  in each     
succeeding book of this work the topics 
of discussion  increase by one ,footnote
 ref #a2 7#e7 ,khuddaka ,nikya          
containing  ,khuddaka ptha1 ,dhammapada1
 ,udna1 ,itivuttaka1 ,sutta ,nipta1     
,vimna-vatthu1 ,petavatthu1 ,theragath1 
,thergath1 ,jtaka1 ,niddesa1            
,patisambhidmagga1 ,apadna1             
,buddhavamsa1 ,carypitaka4    ,the      
,abhidhammas are ,patthna1              
,dhammasangani1 ,dhtukath1              
,puggalapaatti1 ,vibhanga1 ,yamaka and  
,kathvatthu4  ,there exists also a large
 commentary literature on diverse parts 
of the above works known as atthakath4  
,the work known as  ,milinda ,paha      
7questions of ,king ,milinda71 of       
uncertain date1 is  of considerable     
philosophical value4    ,the doctrines  
and views incorporated in the above     

literature  is generally now known as   
,sthaviravda or ,theravda4 ,on the      
origin of the name ,theravda 7the       
doctrine of the elders7  ,dpavamsa says 
that since the ,theras 7elders7 met 7at 
the first council7  and collected the   
doctrines it was known as the ,thera    
,vda ,footnote ref  #b4 ,it does not    
appear that ,buddhism as it appears in  
this ,pli literature  developed much    
since the time of ,buddhaghosa 7#d,,oo  
,a4,d471 the  writer of ,visuddhimagga  
7a compendium of theravda doctrines7    
and the commentator of ,dghanikya1      
,dhammasangani1 etc4    ,hindu          
philosophy in later times seems to have 
been influenced  by the later offshoots 
of the different schools of ,buddhism1  
but  it does not appear that ,pli       
,buddhism had any share in it4 ,i       
,footnote #a3 ,see ,buddhaghosa's       
,atthaslini1 p4 #be4    ,footnote #b3   
,oldenberg's ,dpavamsa1 p4 #ca4    #hd  
have not been able to discover any old  
,hindu writer who could  be considered  

as being acquainted with ,pli4      ,the
 ,doctrine of ,causal ,connection of    
early ,buddhism ,footnote ref #a4       
,the word ,dhamma in the ,buddhist      
scriptures is used generally  in four   
senses3 7#a7 ,scriptural texts1 7#b7    
quality 7guna71 7#c7 cause  7hetu7 and  
7#d7 unsubstantial and soulless         
7nissatta nijjva ,footnote  ref #b74 ,of
 these it is the last meaning which is  
particularly important1  from the point 
of view of ,buddhist philosophy4 ,the   
early ,buddhist  philosophy did not     
accept any fixed entity as determining  
all  reality2 the only things with it   
were the unsubstantial phenomena  and   
these were called dhammas4 ,the question
 arises that  if there is no substance  
or reality how are we to account for the
  phenomena8 ,but the phenomena are     
happening and passing  away and the main
 point of interest with the ,buddha was 
to find  out ,what being what else is1  
,what happening what else  happens and  
,what not being what else is not4 ,the  

phenomena  are happening in a series and
 we see that there being  certain       
phenomena there become some others2 by  
the happening  of some events others    
also are produced4 ,this is called      
7paticca-samuppda7 dependent            
origination4 ,but it is difficult to    
understand what is the exact nature of  
this dependence4 ,the question as       
,samyutta ,nikya 7,,ii4 #e7 has it with 
which the ,buddha started  before       
attaining ,buddhahood was this3 in what 
miserable condition  are the people6    
they are born1 they decay1 they die1    
pass away  and are born again2 and they 
do not know the path of escape  from    
this decay1 death and misery4    ,how to
 know the ,way to escape from this      
misery of decay  and death4 ,then it    
occurred to him what being there1 are   
decay  and death1 depending on what do  
they come8 ,as he thought  deeply into  
the root of the matter1 it occurred to  
him that decay  and death can only occur
 when there is birth 7jti71 so they     

depend        ,footnote #a3 ,there are  
some differences of opinion as to       
whether one could  take the doctrine of 
the twelve links of causes as we find it
 in the  ,samyutta ,nikya as the        
earliest ,buddhist view1 as ,samyutta   
does not  represent the oldest part of  
the suttas4 ,but as this doctrine of the
  twelve causes became regarded as a    
fundamental ,buddhist doctrine and  as  
it gives us a start in philosophy ,i    
have not thought it fit to enter  into  
conjectural discussions as to the       
earliest form4 ,dr ,e4,j4 ,thomas drew  
my attention to this fact4    ,footnote 
#b3 ,atthastin1 p4 #ch4 ,there are also 
other senses in which  the word is used1
 as dhamma-desan where it means         
religious teaching4  ,the ,lankvatra    
described ,dharmma as gunadravyaprvak   
dharmm1 i4e4  ,dharmmas are those which 
are associated as attributes and        
substances4    #he    on birth4 ,what   
being there1 is there birth1 on what    
does birth  depend8 ,then it occurred to

 him that birth could only be if  there 
were previous existence 7bhava7         
,footnote ref #a4 ,but on what does     
this existence depend1 or what being    
there is there bhava4 ,then it  occurred
 to him that there could not be         
existence unless there  were holding    
fast 7updna7 ,footnote ref #b4 ,but on  
what did updna  depend8 ,it occurred to 
him that it was desire 7tanh7 on which  
updna  depended4 ,there can be updna if 
there is desire 7tanh7 ,footnote ref    
#c4 ,but what being there1 can there be 
desire8 ,to this question it  occurred  
to him that there must be feeling       
7vedan7 in order that  there may be     
desire4 ,but on what does vedan depend1 
or rather  what must be there1 that     
there may be feeling 7vedan78 ,to this  
it occurred to him that there must be a 
sense-contact 7phassa7  in order that   
there may be feeling ,footnote ref #d4  
,if there should be no  sense-contact   
there would be no feeling4 ,but on what 
does sense-contact  depend8 ,it occurred

 to him that as there are six           
sense-contacts1  there are the six      
fields of contact 7yatana7 ,footnote ref
 #e4 ,but on  what do the six yatanas   
depend8 ,it occurred to him that  there 
must be the mind and body 7nmarpa7 in   
order that there  may be the six fields 
of contact ,footnote ref #f2 but on what
 does  nmarpa depend8 ,it occurred to   
him that without consciousness  7vina7  
there could be no nmarpa ,footnote ref  
#h4  ,but what being there would there  
,footnote #a3 ,this word bhava is       
interpreted by ,candrakrtti in his      
,mdhyamka vrtti1 p4 #efe 7,la ,valle    
,poussin's edition7 as the deed  which  
brought about rebirth 7punarbhavajanakam
 karma samutthpayali  kyena vc manas    
ca74    ,footnote #b3 ,atthaslin1 p4    
#che1 updnantidalhagahanam4 ,candrakrtti
  in explaining updna says that whatever
 thing a man desires he holds fast  to  
the materials necessary for attaining it
 7yatra vastuni  satrsnastasya vastuno  
'rjanya vidhapanya updnamupdatte tatra  

tatra prrthayate74 ,mdhyamka vrtti1 p4  
#efe4    ,footnote #c3 ,candrakrtti     
describes trsn as                       
svadanbhinandandhyavasnasthndtmapriyarpa
irviyogo m bht1  nityamaparitygo        
bhavediti1 yeyam prrthan--the desire    
that there  may not ever be any         
separation from those pleasures1 etc41  
which  are dear to us4 ,ibid4 #efe4     
,footnote #d3 ,we read also of          
phassyatana and phassakya4 ,m4 ,n4 ,,ii4
 #bfa1  ,,iii4 #bhj1 etc4 ,candrakrtti  
says that sadbhiryatanadvraih           
krtyaprakriyh pravarttante prajyante4   
tannmarpapratyayam  sadyatanamucyate4   
sadbhyascyatanebhyah satsparsakyh       
pravarttante4 ,m4,v4 #efe4    ,footnote 
#e3 yatana means the six senses together
 with their objects4  yatana literally  
is ,field of operation4 ,salyatana means
 six senses  as six fields of operation4
 ,candrakrtti has yatanadvraih4         
,footnote #f3 ,i have followed the      
translation of ,aung in rendering nmarpa
  as mind and body1 ,compendium1 p4     

#bga4 ,this seems to me to be fairly    
correct4 ,the four skandhas are called  
nma in each birth4 ,these together  with
 rpa 7matter7 give us nmarpa 7mind and  
body7 which being developed  render the 
activities through the six sense-gates  
possible so that there  may be          
knowledge4 ,cf4 ,m4 ,v4 #efd4           
,govindnanda1 the commentator on        
,s'ankara's bhsya on the ,brahma stras  
7,,ii4 ii4 #ai71 gives a different      
interpretation of ,namarpa which may    
probably refer to the ,vijanavada  view 
though we have no means at hand to      
verify it4 ,he says--,to think  the     
momentary as the permanent is ,avidya2  
from there come the samskaras  of       
attachment1 antipathy or anger1 and     
infatuation2 from there the first       
vijana or thought of the foetus is      
produced1 from that alayavijnana1  and  
the four elements 7which are objects of 
name and are hence called nama7  are    
produced1 and from those are produced   
the white and black1 semen  and blood   

called rpa4 ,both ,vacaspati and        
,amalananda agree with  ,govindananda in
 holding that nama signifies the semen  
and the ovum  while rpa means the       
visible physical body built out of them4
 ,vijaa  entered the womb and on account
 of it namarupa were produced through   
the association of previous karma4 ,see 
,vedantakalpataru1 pp #bgd1  #bge4 ,on  
the doctrine of the entrance of vijaa   
into the womb compare  ,d ,n ,,ii4 #fc4 
#hf    be vina4 ,here it occurred to him
 that in order that there  might be vina
 there must be the conformations        
7sankhra7 ,footnote  ref #a4 ,but what  
being there are there the sankhras8     
,here it occurred  to him that the      
sankhras can only be if there is        
ignorance  7avijj74 ,if avijj could be  
stopped then the sankhras will be       
stopped1 and if the sankhras could be   
stopped vina could be  stopped and so on
 ,footnote ref #b4    ,it is indeed     
difficult to be definite as to what the 
,buddha  actually wished to mean by this

 cycle of dependence of existence       
sometimes called ,bhavacakra 7wheel of  
existence74 ,decay and  death           
7jarmarana7 could not have happened if  
there was no  birth ,footnote ref #c4   
,this seems to be clear4 ,but at this   
point the  difficulty begins4 ,we must  
remember that the theory of rebirth was 
,footnote #a3 ,it is difficult to say   
what is the exact sense of the word     
here4 ,the ,buddha was one of the first 
few earliest thinkers to introduce      
proper philosophical terms and          
phraseology with a distinct             
philosophical  method and he had often  
to use the same word in more or less    
different  senses4 ,some of the         
philosophical terms at least are        
therefore rather  elastic when compared 
with the terms of precise and definite  
meaning  which we find in later         
,sanskrit thought4 ,thus in ,s ,n ,,iii4
 p4 #hg1  ,sankhatam abdisankharonta1   
sankhara means that which synthesises   
the complexes4 ,in the ,compendium it is

 translated as will1 action4  ,mr4 ,aung
 thinks that it means the same as karma2
 it is here used  in a different sense  
from what we find in the word sankhta   
khandha  7viz mental states74 ,we get a 
list of #ea mental states forming       
sankhta  khandha in ,dhamma ,sangam1 p  
#ah1 and another different set of #dj   
mental  states in ,dharmasamgraha1 p4   
#f4 ,in addition to these forty         
cittasamprayuktasamskra1 it also counts 
thirteen  cittaviprayuktasamskara4      
,candrakirtti interprets it as meaning  
attachment1 antipathy and infatuation1 p
 #efc4 ,govindananda1 the  commentator  
on ,s'ankara's ,brahma sutra 7,,ii4 ii4 
#ai71 also interprets  the word in      
connection with the doctrine of         
,pratityasamutpada as  attachment1      
antipathy and infatuation4    ,footnote 
#b3 ,samyutta ,nikaya1 ,,ii4 #g-h4      
,footnote #c3 ,jara and marana bring in 
s'oka 7grief71 paridevan  7lamentation71
 duhkha 7suffering71 daurmanasya        
7feeling of wretchedness  and           

miserableness7 and upayasa 7feeling of  
extreme destitution7 at  the prospect of
 one's death or the death of other dear 
ones4 ,all  these make up suffering and 
are the results of jti 7birth74 ,m4 ,v4 
7,b4,t4,s4p4 #bjh74 ,s'ankara in his    
bhsya counted all the terms from  jar1  
separately4 ,the whole series is to be  
taken as representing  the entirety of  
duhkhaskandha4    #hg    enunciated in  
the ,upanisads4 ,the ,brhadranyaka says 
that just  as an insect going to the end
 of a leaf of grass by a new effort     
collects itself in another so does the  
soul coming to the end of  this life    
collect itself in another4 ,this life   
thus presupposes  another existence4 ,so
 far as ,i remember there has seldom    
been  before or after ,buddha any       
serious attempt to prove or disprove    
the doctrine of rebirth ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,all schools of philosophy  except  
the ,crvkas believed in it and so little
 is known to us of  the ,crvka stras    
that it is difficult to say what they   

did to  refute this doctrine4 ,the      
,buddha also accepts it as a fact and   
does  not criticize it4 ,this life      
therefore comes only as one which had an
  infinite number of lives before1 and  
which except in the case of  a few      
emancipated ones would have an infinite 
number of them  in the future4 ,it was  
strongly believed by all people1 and the
  ,buddha also1 when he came to think to
 what our present birth  might be due1  
had to fall back upon another existence 
7bhava74  ,if bhava means karma which   
brings rebirth as ,candrakrtti takes  it
 to mean1 then it would mean that the   
present birth could only  take place on 
account of the works of a previous      
existence which  determined it4 ,here   
also we are reminded of the ,upanisad   
note  as a man does so will he be born  
7,yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate1   
,brh ,,iv4 iv4 #e74 ,candrakrtti's      
interpretation of bhava  as ,karma      
7punarbhavajanakam karma7 seems to me to
 suit  better than existence4 ,the word 

was probably used rather  loosely for   
kammabhava4 ,the word bhava is not found
 in the  earlier ,upanisads and was used
 in the ,pli scriptures for the  first  
time as a philosophical term4 ,but on   
what does this  bhava depend8 ,there    
could not have been a previous existence
  if people had not betaken themselves  
to things or works they  desired4 ,this 
betaking oneself to actions or things in
 accordance  with desire is called      
updna4 ,in the ,upanisads we read1      
whatever one betakes himself to1 so does
 he work 7,yatkraturbhavati  tatkarmma  
kurute1 ,brh4 ,,iv4 iv4 #e74 ,as this   
betaking to  the thing depends upon     
desire trsn1 it is said that in order   
that there may be updna there must be   
tanh4 ,in the ,upanisads  also we read  
,whatever one desires so does he betake 
himself to 7sa yathkmo bhavati          
tatkraturbhavati74 ,neither  the word   
updna nor trsn 7the ,sanskrit word      
corresponding        ,footnote #a3 ,the 
attempts to prove the doctrine of       

rebirth in the ,hindu  philosophical    
works such as the ,nyya1 etc41 are      
slight and inadequate4    #hh    to     
tanh7 is found in the earlier           
,upanisads1 but the ideas contained  in 
them are similar to the words kratu and 
kma4 ,desire  7tanh7 is then said to    
depend on feeling or sense-contact4     
,sense-contact presupposes the six      
senses as fields of operation ,footnote 
ref #a4 ,these six senses or operating  
fields would again presuppose the  whole
 psychosis of the man 7the body and the 
mind together7  called nmarpa4 ,we are  
familiar with this word in the          
,upanisads  but there it is used in the 
sense of determinate forms and  names as
 distinguished from the indeterminate   
indefinable  reality ,footnote ref #b4  
,buddhaghosa in the ,visuddhimagga says 
that by  ,name are meant the three      
groups beginning with sensation  7i4e4  
sensation1 perception and the           
predisposition72 by ,form  the four     
elements and form derivative from the   

four elements ,footnote  ref #c4 ,he    
further says that name by itself can    
produce physical  changes1 such as      
eating1 drinking1 making movements or   
the like4 ,so  form also cannot produce 
any of those changes by itself4 ,but    
like  the cripple and the blind they    
mutually help one another and           
effectuate the changes ,footnote ref #d4
 ,but there exists no heap or           
collection of material for the          
production of ,name and ,form2 but just 
as when a lute is played upon1 there is 
no previous store of sound2  and when   
the sound comes into existence it does  
not come from  any such store2 and when 
it ceases1 it does not go to any of the 
cardinal or intermediate points of the  
compass2444in exactly the  same way all 
the elements of being both those with   
form and  those without1 come into      
existence after having previously been  
non-existent and having come into       
existence pass away ,footnote ref #e4   
,nmarpa taken in this sense will not    

mean the whole of mind and  body1 but   
only the sense functions and the body   
which are found  to operate in the six  
doors of sense 7salyatana74 ,if we take 
nmarpa in this sense1 we can see that it
 may be said to depend  upon the vina   
7consciousness74 ,consciousness has been
 compared  in the ,milinda ,paha with a 
watchman at the middle of               
,footnote #a3 ,the word yatana is found 
in many places in the earlier           
,upanisads in the sense of field or     
place1 ,ch4 ,i4 #e1 ,brh4 ,,iii4 #i4    
#aj1 but sadyatana does not occur4      
,footnote #b3 ,candrakrtti interprets   
nma as ,vedandayo'  rpinas'catvrah      
skandhstatra tatra bhave nmayantli nma4 
saha  rpaskandhena ca nma rpam ceti     
nmarpamucyate4 ,the four skandhas  in   
each specific birth act as name4 ,these 
together with rpa make  nmarpa4 ,m4 ,v4 
#efd4    ,footnote #c3 ,warren's        
,buddhism in ,translations1 p4 #ahd4    
,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 p4 #ahe1           
,visuddhimagga1 ,ch4 ,,xvii4            

,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 pp4 #ahe-ahf1      
,visuddhimagga1 ,ch4 ,,xvii4    #hi     
the cross-roads beholding all that come 
from any direction ,footnote ref  #a4   
,buddhaghosa in the ,atthaslin also says
 that consciousness means  that which   
thinks its object4 ,if we are to define 
its characteristics  we must say that it
 knows 7vijnana71 goes in advance       
7pubbangama71  connects 7sandhna71 and  
stands on nmarpa 7nmarpapadatthnam74    
,when the consciousness gets a door1 at 
a place the objects of sense  are       
discerned 7rammana-vibhvanatthne7 and it
 goes first as the  precursor4 ,when a  
visual object is seen by the eye it is  
known only  by the consciousness1 and   
when the dhammas are made the objects of
  7mind7 mano1 it is known only by the  
consciousness ,footnote ref #b4         
,buddhaghosa also refers here to the    
passage in the ,milinda ,paha  we have  
just referred to4 ,he further goes on to
 say that when states  of consciousness 
rise one after another1 they leave no   

gap between  the previous state and the 
later and consciousness therefore       
appears  as connected4 ,when there are  
the aggregates of the five khandhas it  
is lost2 but there are the four         
aggregates as nmarpa1 it stands on  nma 
and therefore it is said that it stands 
on nmarpa4 ,he further  asks1 ,is this  
consciousness the same as the previous  
consciousness or  different from it8 ,he
 answers that it is the same4 ,just so1 
the sun shows  itself with all its      
colours1 etc41 but he is not different  
from those  in truth2 and it is said    
that just when the sun rises1 its       
collected  heat and yellow colour also  
rise then1 but it does not mean that    
the sun is different from these4 ,so the
 citta or consciousness  takes the      
phenomena of contact1 etc41 and cognizes
 them4 ,so  though it is the same as    
they are yet in a sense it is different 
from them ,footnote ref #c4    ,to go   
back to the chain of twelve causes1 we  
find that jti 7birth7  is the cause of  

decay and death1 jarmarana1 etc4 ,jti is
 the  appearance of the body or the     
totality of the five skandhas ,footnote 
ref #d4 ,coming to bhava which          
determines jti1 ,i cannot think of any  
better rational explanation of bhava1   
than that ,i have already               
,footnote #a3 ,warren's ,buddhism in    
,translations1 p4 #ahb1 ,milinda ,paha  
7#fbh74    ,footnote #b3 ,atthaslin1 p4 
#aab444    ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 p4 #aac1
 ,yath hi rpdni updya paatt  suriydayo  
na atthato rpdhi ae honti ten' eva      
yasmin samaye  suriyo udeti tasmin      
samaye tassa tej-sankhtam rpam pti evam 
vuccamne pi na rpdihi ao suriyo nma     
atthi4 ,tath cittam  phassdayo dhamme   
updya paapiyati4 ,atthato pan' ettha    
tehi  aam eva4 ,tena yasmin samaye      
cittam uppannam hoti ekamsen eva  tasmin
 samaye phassdihi atthato aad eva hot   
ti4    ,footnote #d3 ,jtirdehajanma     
pacaskandhasamudyah1 ,govindnanda's     
,ratnaprabh on ,s'ankara's bhsya1 ,,ii4 
ii4 #ai4    #ij    suggested1 namely1   

the works 7karma7 which produce the     
birth ,footnote  ref #a4 ,updna is an   
advanced trsn leading to positive       
clinging  ,footnote ref #b4 ,it is      
produced by trsn 7desire7 which again is
  the result of vedan 7pleasure and     
pain74 ,but this vedan is of course     
vedan with ignorance 7avidy71 for an    
,arhat may have also vedan  but as he   
has no avidy1 the vedan cannot produce  
trsn in turn4 ,on  its development it   
immediately passes into updna4 ,vedan   
means  pleasurable1 painful or          
indifferent feeling4 ,on the one side it
 leads  to trsn 7desire7 and on the     
other it is produced by sense-contact   
7spars'a74 ,prof4 ,de la ,valle ,poussin
 says that ,s'rlbha distinguishes  three
 processes in the production of vedan4  
,thus first there is the  contact       
between the sense and the object2 then  
there is the knowledge  of the object1  
and then there is the vedan4 ,depending 
on ,majjhima  ,nikya1 iii4 #bdb1        
,poussin gives the other opinion that   

just as in  the case of two sticks heat 
takes place simultaneously with rubbing1
  so here also vedan takes place        
simultaneously with spars'a for they    
are produits par un mme complexe de     
causes 7smagr7 ,footnote  ref #c4       
,spars'a is produced by sadyatana1      
sadyatana by nmarpa1  and nmarpa by     
vijna1 and is said to descend in the    
womb  of the mother and produce the five
 skandhas as nmarpa1 out  of which the  
six senses are specialized4    ,vijna in
 this connection probably means the     
principle or  germ of consciousness in  
the womb of the mother upholding the    
five elements of the new body there4 ,it
 is the product of the  past karmas     
7sankhra7 of the dying man and of his   
past  consciousness too4    ,we         
sometimes find that the ,buddhists      
believed that the last  thoughts of the 
dying man determined the nature of his  
next        ,footnote #a3 ,govindananda 
in his ,ratnaprabh on ,s'ankara's bhsya1
 ,,ii4  ii4 #ai1 explains bhava as that 

from which anything becomes1 as merit   
and demerit 7dharmdi74 ,see also        
,vibhanga1 p4 #acg and ,warren's        
,buddhism in ,translations1 p4 #bja4 ,mr
 ,aung says in  ,abhidhammatthasangaha1 
p4 #ahi1 that bhavo includes kammabhavo 
7the  active side of an existence7 and  
upapattibhavo 7the passive side74  ,and 
the commentators say that bhava is a    
contraction of kammabhava  or           
,karma-becoming i4e4 karmic activity4   
,footnote #b3 ,prof4 ,de la ,valle      
,poussin in his ,thoric des ,douze      
,causes1  p4 #bf1 says that             
,s'listambhastra explains the word updna
 as  trsnvaipulya or hyper-trsn and     
,candrakrtti also gives the  same       
meaning1 ,m4 ,v4 7,b4,t4,s4p4 #baj74    
,govmdnanda explains updna  as pravrtti 
7movement7 generated by trsn 7desire71  
i4e4 the active  tendency in pursuance  
of desire4 ,but if updna means support  
it would  denote all the five skandhas4 
,thus ,madhyamaka vrtti says updnam     
pacaskandhalaksanam444pacopdnaskandhkhya

m updnam4 ,m4,v4 ,,xxvii4 #f4           
,footnote #c3 ,poussin's ,thorie des    
,douze ,causes1 p4 #bc4    #ia    birth 
,footnote ref #a4 ,the manner in which  
the vijna produced in the  womb is      
determined by the past vijna of the     
previous existence is  according to some
 authorities of the nature of a         
reflected image1  like the transmission 
of learning from the teacher to the     
disciple1  like the lighting of a lamp  
from another lamp or like the impress   
of a stamp on wax4 ,as all the skandhas 
are changing in life1  so death also is 
but a similar change2 there is no great 
break1  but the same uniform sort of    
destruction and coming into being4  ,new
 skandhas are produced as simultaneously
 as the two scale  pans of a balance    
rise up and fall1 in the same manner as 
a lamp  is lighted or an image is       
reflected4 ,at the death of the man the 
vijna resulting from his previous karmas
 and vijnas enters  into the womb of    
that mother 7animal1 man or the gods7 in

 which  the next skandhas are to be     
matured4 ,this vijna thus forms  the    
principle of the new life4 ,it is in    
this vijna that name  7nma7 and form    
7rpa7 become associated4    ,the vijna  
is indeed a direct product of the       
samskras and  the sort of birth in which
 vijna should bring down 7nmayati7  the 
new existence 7upapatti7 is determined  
by the samskras ,footnote  ref #b1 for  
in reality the happening of death       
7maranabhava7 and the  instillation of  
the vijna as the beginning of the new   
life  7upapattibhava7 cannot be         
simultaneous1 but the latter succeeds   
just  at the next moment1 and it is to  
signify this close succession that  they
 are said to be simultaneous4 ,if the   
vijna had not entered  the womb then no 
nmarpa could have appeared ,footnote ref
 #c4    ,this chain of twelve causes    
extends over three lives4 ,thus  avidy  
and samskra of the past life produce the
 vijna1 nmarupa1        ,footnote #a3   
,the deities of the gardens1 the woods1 

the trees and the  plants1 finding the  
master of the house1 ,citta1 ill said   
make your  resolution1 ',may ,i be a    
cakravartt king in a next existence1'   
,samyutta1 ,,iv4 #cjc4    ,footnote #b3 
sa cednandavijnam mtuhkuksim nvakrmeta1 
na tat  kalalam kalalatvya              
sannivartteta1 ,m4 ,v4 #eeb4 ,compare   
,caraka1  ,s'rra1 ,,iii4 #e-h1 where he 
speaks of a upapduka sattva which       
connects the soul with body and by the  
absence of which the character  is      
changed1 the senses become affected and 
life ceases1 when it is  in a pure      
condition one can remember even the     
previous births2  character1 purity1    
antipathy1 memory1 fear1 energy1 all    
mental  qualities are produced out of   
it4 ,just as a chariot is made by the   
combination of many elements1 so is the 
foetus4    ,footnote #c3 ,madhyamaka    
vriti 7,b4,t4,s4 #bjb-bjc74 ,poussin    
quotes from  ,dgha1 ,,ii4 #fc1 si le    
vijna ne descendait pas dans le sein    
maternel  la namarupa s'y               

constituerait-il8 ,govindnanda on       
,s'ankara's commentary  on the          
,brahma-stras 7,,ii4 ii4 #ai7 says that 
the first consciousness  7vijna7 of the 
foetus is produced by the samskras of   
the previous  birth1 and from that the  
four elements 7which he calls nma7 and  
from that  the white and red1 semen and 
ovum1 and the first stage of the foetus 
7kalala-budbudvasth is produced4    #ib 
sadyatana1 spars'a1 vedan1 trsn1 updna  
and the bhava  7leading to another life7
 of the present actual life4 ,this bhava
  produces the jti and jarmarana of the 
next life ,footnote ref l4    ,it is    
interesting to note that these twelve   
links in the chain  extending in three  
sections over three lives are all but   
the  manifestations of sorrow to the    
bringing in of which they naturally     
determine one another4 ,thus            
,abhidhammatthasangaha  says each of    
these twelve terms is a factor4 ,for the
 composite  term 'sorrow1' etc4 is only 
meant to show incidental consequences   

of birth4 ,again when 'ignorance' and   
'the actions of the  mind' have been    
taken into account1 craving 7trsn71     
grasping  7updna7 and 7karma7 becoming  
7bhava7 are implicitly accounted  for   
also4 ,in the same manner when craving1 
grasping  and 7karma7 becoming have been
 taken into account1 ignorance  and the 
actions of the mind are 7implicitly7    
accounted for1 also2  and when birth1   
decay1 and death are taken into account1
 even  the fivefold fruit1 to wit       
7rebirth71 consciousness1 and the rest  
are  accounted for4 ,and thus3    ,five 
causes in the ,past and ,now a fivefold 
'fruit4'    ,five causes ,now and yet to
 come a fivefold 'fruit' make up  the   
,twenty ,modes1 the ,three ,connections 
7#a4 sankhra and  vina1 #b4 vedan and   
tanh1 #c4 bhava and jti7 and the four   
groups 7one causal group in the ,past1  
one resultant group in the  ,present1   
one causal group in the ,present and one
 resultant  group in the ,future1 each  
group consisting of five modes7         

,footnote ref  #b4    ,these twelve     
interdependent links 7dvdas'nga7        
represent  the paticcasamuppda          
7prattyasamutpda7 doctrines 7dependent  
origination7 ,footnote ref #c which are 
themselves but sorrow and lead to       
cycles of sorrow4 ,the term             
paticcasamuppda or prattyasamutpda has  
been differently interpreted in later   
,buddhist literature ,footnote ref  #d4 
,footnote #a3 ,this explanation probably
 cannot be found in the early ,pli      
texts2 but ,buddhaghosa mentions it in  
,sumangalavilsin on ,mahnidna  suttanta4
 ,we find it also in                    
,abhidhammatthasangaha1 ,,viii4 #c4     
,ignorance  and the actions of the mind 
belong to the past2 birth1 decay and    
death  to the future2 the intermediate  
eight to the present4 ,it is styled as  
trikndaka 7having three branches7 in    
,abhidkarmakos'a1 ,,iii4 #bj-bd4  ,two  
in the past branch1 two in the future   
and eight in the middle sa              
prattyasamutpdo dvdas'ngastrikndakah    

prvparntayordve dve  madhyestau4        
,footnote #b3 ,aung and ,mrs ,rhys      
,davids' translation of                 
,abhidhammatthasangaha1 pp4 #ahi-aij4   
,footnote #c3 ,the twelve links are not 
always constant4 ,thus in the list      
given in the ,dialogues of the ,buddha1 
,,ii4 #bc f41 avijj and sankhra  have   
been omitted and the start has been made
 with consciousness1 and it  has been   
said that ,cognition turns back from    
name and form2 it goes  not beyond4     
,footnote #d3 ,m4 ,v4 p4 #e f4    #ic   
,samutpda means appearance or arising   
7prdurbhdva7 and prattya  means after   
getting 7pratiiya72 combining the two we
  find1 arising after getting           
7something74 ,the elements1 depending   
on which there is some kind of arising1 
are called hetu 7cause7 and  paccaya    
7ground74 ,these two words however are  
often used in  the same sense and are   
interchangeable4 ,but paccaya is also   
used in a specific sense4 ,thus when it 
is said that avijj is the  paccaya of   

sankhra it is meant that avijj is the   
ground 7thiti7  of the origin of the    
sankhras1 is the ground of their        
movement1  of the instrument through    
which they stand 7nimittatthiti71 of    
their ayuhana 7conglomeration71 of their
 interconnection1 of their              
intelligibility1 of their conjoint      
arising1 of their function as cause  and
 of their function as the ground with   
reference to those which  are determined
 by them4 ,avijj in all these nine ways 
is  the ground of sankhra both in the   
past and also in the future1  though    
avijj itself is determined in its turn  
by other grounds ,footnote  ref #a4     
,when we take the betu aspect of the    
causal chain1 we cannot  think of       
anything else but succession1 but when  
we take the  paccaya aspect we can have 
a better vision into the nature of the  
cause as ground4 ,thus when avijj is    
said to be the ground  of the sankhras  
in the nine ways mentioned above1 it    
seems  reasonable to think that the     

sankhras were in some sense  regarded as
 special manifestations of avijj        
,footnote ref #b4 ,but as this  point   
was not further developed in the early  
,buddhist texts it would  be unwise to  
proceed further with it4      ,the      
,khandhas4    ,the word khandha 7,skr4  
skandha7 means the trunk of a tree  and 
is generally used to mean group or      
aggregate ,footnote ref #c4 ,we  have   
seen that ,buddha said that there was no
 tman 7soul74 ,he said  that when people
 held that they found the much spoken of
 soul1  they really only found the five 
khandhas together or any one of  them4  
,the khandhas are aggregates of bodily  
and psychical  states which are         
immediate with us and are divided into  
five        ,footnote #a3 ,see          
,patisambhidmagga1 vol4 ,i4p4 #ej2 see  
also ,majjhima  ,nikya1 ,i4 #fg1        
sankhra444avijjnidn avijjsamuday        
avijjjtik  avijjpabhav4    ,footnote #b3
 ,in the ,yoga derivation of asmit      
7egoism71 rga 7attachment71  dvesa      

7antipathy7 and abhinives'a 7self love7 
from avidy we find also  that all the   
five are regarded as the five special   
stages of the growth  of avidy 7pacaparv
 avidy74    ,footnote #c3 ,the word     
skandha is used in ,chndogya1 ,,ii4 #bc 
7trayo  dharmaskandhh yajah adhyayanam  
dnam7 in the sense of branches  and in  
almost the same sense in ,maitr1 ,,vii4 
,,ii4    #id    classes3 7#a7 rpa 7four 
elements1 the body1 the senses71 sense  
data1 etc41 7#b7 vedan                  
7feeling--pleasurable1 painful and      
indifferent71  7#c7 sa 7conceptual      
knowledge71 7#d7 sankhra 7synthetic     
mental states and the synthetic         
functioning of compound                 
sense-affections1 compound feelings and 
compound concepts71  7#e7 vina          
7consciousness7 ,footnote ref #a4       
,all these states rise depending one    
upon the other 7paticcasamuppanna7  and 
when a man says that he perceives the   
self he only deludes himself1  for he   
only perceives one or more of these4    

,the word rpa in rpakhandha  stands for 
matter and material qualities1 the      
senses1 and the sense  data ,footnote   
ref #b4 ,but rpa is also used in the    
sense of pure  organic affections or    
states of mind as we find in the        
,khandha ,yamaka1  ,i4p4 #af1 and also  
in ,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,iii4 #hf4        
,rpaskandha according  to               
,dharmasamgraha means the aggregate of  
five senses1 the five  sensations1 and  
the implicatory communications          
associated in sense  perceptions        
vijapti74    ,the elaborate discussion  
of ,dhammasangani begins by defining    
rpa as cattro ca mahbht catunnaca       
mahbhntanam  updya rpam 7the four       
mahbhtas or elements and that           
proceeding from the grasping of that is 
called rpa7 ,footnote ref #c4           
,buddhaghosa explains it by saying that 
rpa means the four mahbhtas  and those  
which arise depending 7nissya7 on them  
as  a modification of them4 ,in the rpa 
the six senses including  their         

affections are also included4 ,in       
explaining why the four  elements are   
called mahbhtas1 ,buddhaghosa says3     
,just as a  magician 7mykra7 makes the  
water which is not hard appear  as hard1
 makes the stone which is not gold      
appear as gold2  just as he himself     
though not a ghost nor a bird makes     
himself  appear as a ghost or a bird1 so
 these elements though not themselves   
blue make themselves appear as blue     
7nlam upd rpam71  not yellow1 red1 or   
white make themselves appear as yellow1 
red  or white 7odtam updrpam71 so on    
account of their similarity  to the     
appearances created by the magician they
 are called  mahbhta ,footnote ref #d4  
,in the ,samyutta ,nikya we find that   
the ,buddha says1 ,o  ,bhikkhus it is   
called rpam because it manifests        
7rpyati72 how        ,footnote #a3      
,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,iii4 #hf1 etc4      
,footnote #b3 ,abhidhammatthasangaha1   
,j4,p4,t4,s4 #ahhd1 p4 #bg ff4          
,footnote #c3 ,dhammasangani1 pp4       

#abd-agi4    ,footnote #d3 ,atthaslin1  
p4 #bii4    #ie    does it manifest8 ,it
 manifests as cold1 and as heat1 as     
hunger and  as thirst1 it manifests as  
the touch of gnats1 mosquitos1 wind1 the
  sun and the snake2 it manifests1      
therefore it is called rpa  ,footnote   
ref #a4    ,if we take the somewhat     
conflicting passages referred to above  
for our consideration and try to combine
 them so as to understand  what is meant
 by rpa1 ,i think we find that that     
which manifested  itself to the senses  
and organs was called rpa4 ,no          
distinction  seems to have been made    
between the sense-data as colours1      
smells1  etc41 as existing in the       
physical world and their appearance as  
sensations4 ,they were only numerically 
different and the appearance  of the    
sensations was dependent upon the       
sense-data and the senses  but the      
sense-data and the sensations were rpa4 
,under certain  conditions the          
sense-data were followed by the         

sensations4 ,buddhism  did not probably 
start with the same kind of division of 
matter and  mind as we now do4 ,and it  
may not be out of place to mention that 
such an opposition and duality were     
found neither in the ,upanisads  nor in 
the ,smkhya system which is regarded by 
some as pre-,buddhistic4  ,the four     
elements manifested themselves in       
certain forms and  were therefore called
 rpa2 the forms of affection that       
appeared  were also called rpa2 many    
other mental states or features  which  
appeared with them were also called rpa 
,footnote ref #b4 ,the  yatanas or the  
senses were also called rpa ,footnote   
ref #c4 ,the  mahbhtas or four elements 
were themselves but changing            
manifestations1  and they together with 
all that appeared in association with   
them were  called rpa and formed the rpa
 khandha 7the classes of                
sense-materials1  sense-data1 senses and
 sensations74    ,in ,samyutta ,nikya   
7,,iii4 #aja7 it is said that the four  

mahbhtas were the hetu and the paccaya  
for the communication  of the           
rpakkhandha 7rpakkhandhassa papanya74   
,contact  7sense-contact1 phassa7 is the
 cause of the communication of  feelings
 7vedan72 sense-contact was also the    
hetu and paccaya  for the communication 
of the sakkhandha2 sense-contact is     
also the hetu and paccaya for the       
communication of the  sankhrakkhandha4  
,but nmarpa is the hetu and the paccaya 
for  the communication of the           
vinakkhandha4 ,thus not only feelings   
arise on account of the sense-contact   
but sa and sankhra  also arise          
therefrom4 ,sa is that where specific   
knowing or        ,footnote #a3         
,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,iii4 #hf4           
,footnote #b3 ,khandhayamaka4           
,footnote #c3 ,dhammasangani1 p4 #abd   
ff4    #if    conceiving takes place4   
,this is the stage where the specific   
distinctive  knowledge as the yellow or 
the red takes place4    ,mrs4 ,rhys     
,davids writing on sa says3 ,in editing 

the  second book of the ,abhidhamma     
pitaka ,i found a classification        
distinguishing between sa as cognitive  
assimilation on occasion  of sense1 and 
sa as cognitive assimilation of ideas by
 way of  naming4 ,the former is called  
perception of resistance1 or opposition 
7patigha-sa74 ,this1 writes             
,buddhaghosa1 is perception on  occasion
 of sight1 hearing1 etc41 when          
consciousness is aware of the  impact of
 impressions2 of external things as     
different1 we might  say4 ,the latter is
 called perception of the equivalent    
word or  name 7adhivachn-sa7 and is     
exercised by the sensus communis        
7mano71 when e4g4 'one is seated444and  
asks another who  is thoughtful3 ,what  
are you thinking of8 one perceives      
through  his speech4' ,thus there are   
two stages of sa-consciousness1  #a4    
contemplating sense-impressions1 #b4    
ability to know what they  are by naming
 ,footnote ref #a4    ,about sankhra we 
read in ,samyutta ,nikya 7,,iii4 #hg7   

that it  is called sankhra because it   
synthesises 7abhisankharonti71 it is    
that which conglomerated rpa as rpa1    
conglomerated sa  as sa1 sankhra as     
sankhra and consciousness 7vina7  as    
consciousness4 ,it is called sankhra    
because it synthesises  the             
conglomerated 7sankhatam                
abhisankharonti74 ,it is thus a         
synthetic function which synthesises the
 passive rpa1 sa1  sankhra and vina     
elements4 ,the fact that we hear of #eb 
sankhra states and also that the sankhra
 exercises its synthetic  activity on   
the conglomerated elements in it1 goes  
to show  that probably the word sankhra 
is used in two senses1 as mental  states
 and as synthetic activity4    ,vina or 
consciousness meant according to        
,buddhaghosa1  as we have already seen  
in the previous section1 both the stage 
at which the intellectual process       
started and also the final  resulting   
consciousness4    ,buddhaghosa in       
explaining the process of ,buddhist     

psychology  says that                   
consciousness7citta7first comes into    
touch 7phassa7 with  its object         
7rammana7 and thereafter feeling1       
conception 7sa7  and volition 7cetan7   
come in4 ,this contact is like the      
pillars of  a palace1 and the rest are  
but the superstructure built upon it    
7dabbasambhrasadis74 ,but it should not 
be thought that contact        ,footnote
 #a3 ,buddhist ,psychology1 pp4 #di1    
#ej4    #ig    is the beginning of the  
psychological processes1 for in one     
whole  consciousness 7ekacittasmim7 it  
cannot be said that this comes  first   
and that comes after1 so we can take    
contact in association  with feeling    
7vedan71 conceiving 7sa7 or volition    
7cetan72  it is itself an immaterial    
state but yet since it comprehends      
objects it is called contact4 ,there is 
no impinging on one side  of the object 
7as in physical contact71 nevertheless  
contact causes  consciousness and object
 to be in collision1 as visible object  

and  visual organs1 sound and hearing2  
thus impact is its function2 or  it has 
impact as its essential property in the 
sense of attainment1  owing to the      
impact of the physical basis with the   
mental object4  ,for it is said in the  
,commentary3--contact in the four planes
 of  existence is never without the     
characteristic of touch with the        
object2 but the function of impact takes
 place in the five doors4  ,for to      
sense1 or five-door contact1 is given   
the name 'having the  characteristic of 
touch' as well as 'having the function  
of impact4'  ,but to contact in the     
mind-door there is only the             
characteristic  of touch1 but not the   
function of impact4 ,and then this      
,sutta is  quoted ',as if1 sire1 two    
rams were to fight1 one ram to represent
  the eye1 the second the visible       
object1 and their collision contact4    
,and as if1 sire1 two cymbals were to   
strike against each other1 or  two hands
 were to clap against each other2 one   

hand would  represent the eye1 the      
second the visible object and their     
collision  contact4 ,thus contact has   
the characteristic of touch and the     
function of impact ,footnote ref #a'4   
,contact is the manifestation of the    
union of the three 7the object1 the     
consciousness and the sense7 and its    
effect is feeling 7vedan72 though it is 
generated by the objects  it is felt in 
the consciousness and its chief feature 
is experiencing  7anubhava7 the taste of
 the object4 ,as regards enjoying the   
taste  of an object1 the remaining      
associated states enjoy it only         
partially4 ,of contact there is 7the    
function of7 the mere touching1  of     
perception the mere noting or           
perceiving1 of volition the mere        
coordinating1 of consciousness the mere 
cognizing4 ,but feeling  alone1 through 
governance1 proficiency1 mastery1 enjoys
 the taste  of an object4 ,for feeling  
is like the king1 the remaining states  
are like the cook4 ,as the cook1 when he

 has prepared food of  diverse tastes1  
puts it in a basket1 seals it1 takes it 
to the king1  breaks the seal1 opens the
 basket1 takes the best of all the soup 
and curries1 puts them in a dish1       
swallows 7a portion7 to find out        
,footnote #a3 ,atthaslin1 p4 #ajh2      
translation1 pp4 #adc-add4    #ih       
whether they are faulty or not and      
afterwards offers the food of  various  
excellent tastes to the king1 and the   
king1 being lord1  expert1 and master1  
eats whatever he likes1 even so the mere
 tasting  of the food by the cook is    
like the partial enjoyment of the object
  by the remaining states1 and as the   
cook tastes a portion of the  food1 so  
the remaining states enjoy a portion of 
the object1 and  as the king1 being     
lord1 expert and master1 eats the meal  
according  to his pleasure so feeling   
being lord expert1 and master1 enjoys   
the taste of the object and therefore it
 is said that enjoyment or  experience  
is its function ,footnote ref #a4       

,the special feature of sa is said to be
 the recognizing  7paccabhi7 by means of
 a sign 7abhinena74 ,according to       
another explanation1 a recognition takes
 place by the inclusion  of the totality
 7of aspects7--sabbasangahikavasena4    
,the work of  volition 7cetan7 is said  
to be coordination or binding together  
7abhisandahana74 ,volition is           
exceedingly energetic and makes  a      
double effort1 a double exertion4 ,hence
 the ,ancients said  ',volition is like 
the nature of a landowner1 a cultivator 
who taking  fifty-five strong men1 went 
down to the fields to reap4 ,he was     
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly   
strenuous2 he doubled his  strength and 
said ,take your sickles and so forth1   
pointed out  the portion to be reaped1  
offered them drink1 food1 scent1        
flowers1  etc41 and took an equal share 
of the work4' ,the simile should be     
thus applied3 volition is like the      
cultivator1 the fifty-five moral  states
 which arise as factors of consciousness

 are like the fifty-five  strong men2   
like the time of doubling strength1     
doubling effort  by the cultivator is   
the doubled strength1 doubled effort of 
volition as regards activity in moral   
and immoral acts ,footnote ref #b4  ,it 
seems that probably the active side     
operating in sankhra was  separately    
designated as cetan 7volition74    ,when
 one says ',i1' what he does is that he 
refers either to  all the khandhas      
combined or any one of them and deludes 
himself  that that was ',i4' ,just as   
one could not say that the  fragrance of
 the lotus belonged to the petals1 the  
colour or the  pollen1 so one could not 
say that the rpa was ',i' or that the   
vedan was ',i' or any of the other      
khandhas was ',i4' ,there is  nowhere to
 be found in the khandhas ',i am        
,footnote ref #c'4        ,footnote #a3 
,atthaslin1 pp4 #aji-aaj2 translation1  
pp4 #ade-adf4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 p4
 #aaa2 translation1 pp4 #adg-adh4       
,footnote #c3 ,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,iii4  

#acj4    #ii      ,avijj and sava4      
,as to the question how the avijj       
7ignorance7 first started  there can be 
no answer1 for we could never say that  
either  ignorance or desire for         
existence ever has any beginning        
,footnote ref #a4  ,its fruition is seen
 in the cycle of existence and the      
sorrow that comes  in its train1 and it 
comes and goes with them all4 ,thus as  
we  can never say that it has any       
beginning1 it determines the elements   
which bring about cycles of existence   
and is itself determined by  certain    
others4 ,this mutual determination can  
only take place  in and through the     
changing series of dependent phenomena1 
for  there is nothing which can be said 
to have any absolute priority  in time  
or stability4 ,it is said that it is    
through the coming into  being of the   
savas or depravities that the avijj came
 into  being1 and that through the      
destruction of the depravities 7sava7   
the avijj was destroyed ,footnote ref   

#b4 ,these savas are classified in  the 
,dhammasangani as kmsava1 bhavsava1     
ditthsava and avijjsava4  ,kmsava means 
desire1 attachment1 pleasure1 and thirst
  after the qualities associated with   
the senses2 bhavsava means  desire1     
attachment and will for existence or    
birth2 ditthsava  means the holding of  
heretical views1 such as1 the world is  
eternal  or non-eternal1 or that the    
world will come to an end or will not   
come to an end1 or that the body and the
 soul are one or are  different2        
avijjsava means the ignorance of sorrow1
 its cause1 its  extinction and its     
means of extinction4 ,dhammasangani adds
  four more supplementary ones1 viz4    
ignorance about the nature of  anterior 
mental khandhas1 posterior mental       
khandhas1 anterior  and posterior       
together1 and their mutual dependence   
,footnote ref #c4  ,kmsava and bhavsava 
can as ,buddhaghosa says be counted as  
one1 for  they are both but depravities 
due to attachment ,footnote ref #d4     

,footnote #a3 ,warren's ,buddhism in    
,translations 7,visuddhimagga1 chap4    
,,xvii471 p4 #age4    ,footnote #b3 ,m4 
,n4 ,i4p4 #ed4 ,childers translates sava
 as depravities  and ,mrs ,rhys ,davids 
as intoxicants4 ,the word sava in ,skr4 
means  old wine4 ,it is derived from su 
to produce by ,buddhaghosa and the      
meaning that he gives to it is cira     
privsikatthena 7on account  of its being
 stored up for a long time like wine74  
,they work through the  eye and the mind
 and continue to produce all beings up  
to ,indra4  ,as those wines which are   
kept long are called savas so these are 
also  called savas for remaining a long 
time4 ,the other alternative that       
,buddhaghosa gives is that they are     
called sava on account of their         
producing samsradukkha 7sorrows of the  
world71 ,atthaslin1 p4 #dh4  ,contrast  
it with ,jaina srava 7flowing in of     
karma matter74 ,finding it  difficult to
 translate it in one word after         
,buddhaghosa1 ,i have  translated it as 

depravities1 after ,childers4           
,footnote #c3 ,see ,dhammasangani1 p4   
#aie4    ,footnote #d3 ,buddhaghosa's   
,atthaslin1 p4 #cga4    #ajj      ,the  
ditthsavas by clouding the mind with    
false metaphysical  views stand in the  
way of one's adopting the true          
,buddhistic doctrines4  ,the kmasvas    
stand in the way of one's entering into 
the way of ,nirvna 7angmimagga7 and the 
bhavsavas and  avijjsavas stand in the  
way of one's attaining arha or final    
emancipation4 ,when the ,majjhima ,nikya
 says that from the  rise of the savas  
avijj rises1 it evidently counts avijj  
there as  in some sense separate from   
the other savas1 such as those of       
attachment and desire of existence which
 veil the true knowledge  about sorrow4 
,the afflictions 7kilesas7 do not differ
 much from the savas  for they are but  
the specific passions in forms          
ordinarily familiar  to us1 such as     
covetousness 7lobha71 anger or hatred   
7dosa71  infatuation 7moha71 arrogance1 

pride or vanity 7mna71 heresy  7ditthi71
 doubt or uncertainty 7vicikicch71      
idleness 7thna71  boastfulness          
7udhacca71 shamelessness 7ahirika7 and  
hardness of heart  anottapa72 these     
kilesas proceed directly as a result of 
the savas4  ,in spite of these varieties
 they are often counted as three 7lobha1
  dosa1 moha7 and these together are    
called kilesa4 ,they are  associated    
with the vedankkhandha1 sakkhandha1     
sankhrakkhandha  and vinakkhandha4 ,from
 these arise the three kinds  of        
actions1 of speech1 of body1 and of mind
 ,footnote ref #a4      ,sla and        
,samdhi4    ,we are intertwined all     
through outside and inside by the       
tangles of desire 7tanh jat71 and the   
only way by which these  may be loosened
 is by the practice of right discipline 
7sla71  concentration 7samdhi7 and      
wisdom 7pa74 ,sla briefly means  the    
desisting from committing all sinful    
deeds 7sabbappassa  akaranam74 ,with sla
 therefore the first start has to be    

made1  for by it one ceases to do all   
actions prompted by bad desires  and    
thereby removes the inrush of dangers   
and disturbances4  ,this serves to      
remove the kilesas1 and therefore the   
proper performance  of the sla would    
lead one to the first two successive    
stages of sainthood1 viz4 the           
sotpannabhva 7the stage in which  one is
 put in the right current7 and the      
sakadgmibhva 7the  stage when one has   
only one more birth to undergo74 ,samdhi
  is a more advanced effort1 for by it  
all the old roots of the old  kilesas   
are destroyed and the tanh or desire is 
removed and        ,footnote #a3        
,dhammasangani1 p4 #ahj4    #aja    by  
it one is led to the more advanced      
states of a saint4 ,it  directly brings 
in pa 7true wisdom7 and by pa the saint 
achieves final emancipation and becomes 
what is called an  arhat ,footnote ref  
#a4 ,wisdom 7pa7 is right knowledge     
about the  four riya saccas1 viz4       
sorrow1 its cause1 its destruction and  

its cause  of destruction4    ,sla means
 those particular volitions and mental  
states1 etc4  by which a man who desists
 from committing sinful actions         
maintains himself on the right path4    
,sla thus means #a4 right  volition     
7cetan71 #b4 the associated mental      
states 7cetasika71  #c4 mental control  
7samvara7 and #d4 the actual            
non-transgression  7in body and speech7 
of the course of conduct already in the 
mind  by the preceding three slas called
 avtikkama4 ,samvara is  spoken of as   
being of five kinds1 #a4                
,ptimokkhasamvara 7the  control which   
saves him who abides by it71 #b4        
,satisamvara 7the  control of           
mindfulness71 #c4 nasamvara 7the control
 of knowledge71  #d4 ,khantisamvara 7the
 control of patience71 #e4              
,viriyasamvara  7the control of active  
self-restraint74 ,ptimokkhasamvara      
means all self-control in general4      
,satisamvara means  the mindfulness by  
which one can bring in the right and    

good  associations when using one's     
cognitive senses4 ,even when  looking at
 any tempting object he will by virtue  
of his mindfulness  7sati7 control      
himself from being tempted by avoiding  
to  think of its tempting side and by   
thinking on such aspects of it  as may  
lead in the right direction4            
,khantisamvara is that by  which one can
 remain unperturbed in heat and cold4   
,by the  proper adherence to sla all our
 bodily1 mental and vocal activities    
7kamma7 are duly systematized1          
organized1 stabilized 7samdhnam1        
upadhranam1 patitth7 ,footnote ref #b4  
,the sage who adopts the full course    
should also follow a  number of healthy 
monastic rules with reference to dress1 
sitting1  dining1 etc41 which are called
 the dhtangas or pure disciplinary      
parts ,footnote ref #c4 ,the practice of
 sla and the dhtangas help the  sage to 
adopt the course of samdhi4 ,samdhi as  
we have seen means  the concentration of
 the mind bent on right endeavours      

7kusalacittekaggat  samdhih7 together   
with its states upon one particular     
object 7ekrammana7 so that they may     
completely cease to  shift and change   
7samm ca avikkhipamn7 ,footnote ref #d4 
,footnote #a3 ,visuddhimagga            
,nidndikath4    ,footnote #b3           
,visuddhimagga-slaniddeso1 pp4 #g and   
#h4    ,footnote #c3 ,visuddhimagga1    
,,ii4    ,footnote #d3 ,visuddhimagga1  
pp4 #hd-he4    #ajb      ,the man who   
has practised sla must train his mind   
first  in particular ways1 so that it   
may be possible for him to acquire  the 
chief concentration of meditation called
 jhna 7fixed and  steady meditation74   
,these preliminary endeavours of the    
mind  for the acquirement of jhnasamdhi 
eventually lead to it  and are called   
upacra samdhi 7preliminary samdhi7 as   
distinguished  from the jhnasamdhi      
called the appansamdhi 7achieved samdhi7
  ,footnote ref #a4 ,thus as a          
preparatory measure1 firstly he  has to 
train his mind continually to view with 

disgust the appetitive  desires for     
eating and drinking 7hre patikklasa7 by 
emphasizing in the mind the various     
troubles that are associated  in seeking
 food and drink and their ultimate      
loathsome transformations  as various   
nauseating bodily elements4 ,when a man 
continually habituates himself to       
emphasize the disgusting  associations  
of food and drink1 he ceases to have any
 attachment  to them and simply takes   
them as an unavoidable evil1  only      
awaiting the day when the final         
dissolution of all sorrows  will come   
,footnote ref #b4 ,secondly he has to   
habituate his mind to the  idea that all
 the parts of our body are made up of   
the four elements1  ksiti 7earth71 ap   
7water71 tejas 7fire7 and wind 7air71   
like the carcase  of a cow at the       
butcher's shop4 ,this is technically    
called  catudhtuvavatthnabhvan 7the     
meditation of the body as being  made up
 of the four elements7 ,footnote ref #c4
 ,thirdly he has to  habituate his mind 

to think again and again 7anussati7     
about the  virtues or greatness of the  
,buddha1 the sangha 7the monks following
  the ,buddha71 the gods and the law    
7dhamma7 of the ,buddha1 about  the good
 effects of sla1 and the making of gifts
 7cgnussati71  about the nature of death
 7marannussati7 and about  the deep     
nature and qualities of the final       
extinction  of all phenomena            
7upasamnussati7 ,footnote ref #d4       
,footnote #a3 ,as it is not possible for
 me to enter into details1 ,i follow    
what appears to me to be the main line  
of division showing the  interconnection
 of jhna 7,skr4 dhyna7 with its         
accessory stages  called parikammas     
7,visuddhimagga1 pp4 #he f474           
,footnote #b3 ,visuddhimagga1 pp4       
#cda-cdg2 mark the intense pessimistic  
attitude1 ,ima ca pana hre patikulasam  
anuyuttassa bhikkhuno  rasatanhya cittam
 patilyati1 patikuttati1 pativattati2   
so1  kantranittharanatthiko viya        
puttamamsam vigatamado hram hreti  yvad 

eva dukkhassa nittharanatthya1 p4 #cdg4 
,the mind of him who  inspires himself  
with this supreme disgust to all food1  
becomes free from  all desires for      
palatable tastes1 and turns its back to 
them and flies off  from them4 ,as a    
means of getting rid of all sorrow he   
takes his food  without any attachment  
as one would eat the flesh of his own   
son to  sustain himself in crossing a   
forest4    ,footnote #c3 ,visuddhimagga1
 pp4 #cdg-cgj4    ,footnote #d3         
,visuddhimagga1 pp4 #aig-bid4    #ajc   
,advancing further from the preliminary 
meditations or preparations  called the 
upacra samdhi we come to those other    
sources of concentration and meditation 
called the appansamdhi  which directly  
lead to the achievement of the highest  
samdhi4  ,the processes of purification 
and strengthening of the mind  continue 
in this stage also1 but these represent 
the last attempts  which lead the mind  
to its final goal ,nibbna4 ,in the first
 part  of this stage the sage has to go 

to the cremation grounds and  notice the
 diverse horrifying changes of the human
 carcases and  think how nauseating1    
loathsome1 unsightly and impure they    
are1  and from this he will turn his    
mind to the living human bodies  and    
convince himself that they being in     
essence the same as the  dead carcases  
are as loathsome as they ,footnote      
ref4#a ,this is called  asubhakammatthna
 or the endeavour to perceive the       
impurity of our  bodies4 ,he should     
think of the anatomical parts and       
constituents of the  body as well as    
their processes1 and this will help him 
to enter  into the first jhna by leading
 his mind away from his body4  ,this is 
called the kayagatasati or the continual
 mindfulness  about the nature of the   
body ,footnote ref #b4 ,as an aid to    
concentration  the sage should sit in a 
quiet place and fix his mind on the     
inhaling  7passsa7 and the exhaling     
7sssa7 of his breath1 so that instead   
of breathing in a more or less          

unconscious manner he may be  aware     
whether he is breathing quickly or      
slowly2 he ought to  mark it definitely 
by counting numbers1 so that by fixing  
his  mind on the numbers counted he may 
fix his mind on the whole  process of   
inhalation and exhalation in all stages 
of its course4  ,this is called the     
anapnasati or the mindfulness of        
inhalation  and exhalation ,footnote ref
 #c    ,next to this we come to         
,brahmavihra1 the fourfold meditation   
of metta 7universal friendship71 karun  
7universal pity71  mudit 7happiness in  
the prosperity and happiness of all7 and
  upekkh 7indifference to any kind of   
preferment of oneself1 his  friend1     
enemy or a third party74 ,in order to   
habituate oneself to  the meditation on 
universal friendship1 one should start  
with thinking  how he should himself    
like to root out all misery and become  
happy1 how he should himself like to    
avoid death and live cheerfully1  and   
then pass over to the idea that other   

beings would also  have the same        
desires4 ,he should thus habituate      
himself to think  that his friends1 his 
enemies1 and all those with whom he is  
not        ,footnote #a3 ,visuddhimagga1
 ,,vi4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 pp4      
#bci-bff4    ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 pp4   
#bff-bib4    #ajd    connected might all
 live and become happy4 ,he should fix  
himself  to such an extent in this      
meditation that he would not find any   
difference between the happiness or     
safety of himself and of others4  ,he   
should never become angry with any      
person4 ,should he at any  time feel    
himself offended on account of the      
injuries inflicted on  him by his       
enemies1 he should think of the futility
 of doubling  his sadness by becoming   
sorry or vexed on that account4 ,he     
should think that if he should allow    
himself to be affected by  anger1 he    
would spoil all his sla which he was so 
carefully practising4  ,if anyone has   
done a vile action by inflicting injury1

  should he himself also do the same by 
being angry at it8 ,if he  were finding 
fault with others for being angry1 could
 he himself  indulge in anger8 ,moreover
 he should think that all the dhammas   
are momentary 7khanikatt72 that there no
 longer existed the  khandhas which had 
inflicted the injury1 and moreover the  
infliction  of any injury being only a  
joint product1 the man who was  injured 
was himself an indispensable element in 
the production  of the infliction as    
much as the man who inflicted the       
injury1 and  there could not thus be any
 special reason for making him          
responsible  and of being angry with    
him4 ,if even after thinking  in this   
way the anger does not subside1 he      
should think that by  indulging in anger
 he could only bring mischief on himself
 through  his bad deeds1 and he should  
further think that the other man  by    
being angry was only producing mischief 
to himself but not  to him4 ,by thinking
 in these ways the sage would be able to

  free his mind from anger against his  
enemies and establish himself  in an    
attitude of universal friendship        
,footnote ref #a4 ,this is called  the  
mett-bhvana4 ,in the meditation of      
universal pity 7karun7  also one should 
sympathize with the sorrows of his      
friends and  foes alike4 ,the sage being
 more keen-sighted will feel pity for   
those who are apparently leading a happy
 life1 but are neither  acquiring merits
 nor endeavouring to proceed on the way 
to  ,nibbna1 for they are to suffer     
innumerable lives of sorrow ,footnote   
ref #b4    ,we next come to the jhnas   
with the help of material things  as    
objects of concentration called the     
,kasinam4 ,these objects of             
concentration may either be earth1      
water1 fire1 wind1 blue colour1  yellow 
colour1 red colour1 white colour1 light 
or limited space  7parcchinnksa74 ,thus 
the sage may take a brown ball of earth 
and concentrate his mind upon it as an  
earth ball1 sometimes        ,footnote  

#a3 ,visuddhimagga1 pp4 #bie-cad4       
,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 pp4 #cad-cae4      
#aje    with eyes open and sometimes    
with eyes shut4 ,when he finds  that    
even in shutting his eyes he can        
visualize the object in his  mind1 he   
may leave off the object and retire to  
another place to  concentrate upon the  
image of the earth ball in his mind4    
,in the first stages of the first       
meditation 7pathamam jhnam7  the mind is
 concentrated on the object in the way  
of understanding  it with its form and  
name and of comprehending it with its   
diverse  relations4 ,this state of      
concentration is called vitakka         
7discursive  meditation74 ,the next     
stage of the first meditation is that in
  which the mind does not move in the   
object in relational terms  but becomes 
fixed and settled in it and penetrates  
into it without  any quivering4 ,this   
state is called vicra 7steadily moving74
 ,the  first stage vitakka has been     
compared in ,buddhaghosa's              

,visuddhimagga  to the flying of a kite 
with its wings flapping1 whereas  the   
second stage is compared to its flying  
in a sweep without the  least quiver of 
its wings4 ,these two stages are        
associated with  a buoyant exaltation   
7pti7 and a steady inward bliss called  
sukha  ,footnote ref #a instilling the  
mind4 ,the formation of this first  jhna
 roots out five ties of avijj1          
kamacchando 7dallying with  desires71   
vypdo 7hatred71 thinamiddham 7sloth and 
torpor71  uddhaccakukkuccam 7pride and  
restlessness71 and vicikicch 7doubt74   
,the five elements of which this jhna is
 constituted are vitakka1  vicra1 plti1 
sukham and ekaggata 7one pointedness74  
,when the sage masters the first jhna he
 finds it defective  and wants to enter 
into the second meditation 7dutiyam     
jhnam71  where there is neither any     
vitakka nor vicra of the first jhna1    
but the mind is in one unruffled state  
7ekodibhvam74 ,it is a  much steadier   
state and does not possess the movement 

which  characterized the vitakka and the
 vicra stages of the first jhna  and is 
therefore a very placid state           
7vitakka-vicrakkhobha-virahena  ativiya 
acalat suppasannat ca74 ,it is however  
associated  with pti1 sukha and ekaggat 
as the first jhna was4    ,when the     
second jhna is mastered the sage becomes
 disinclined  towards the enjoyment of  
the pti of that stage and becomes       
indifferent to them 7upekkhako74 ,a sage
 in this stage sees the  objects but is 
neither pleased nor displeased4 ,at this
 stage all  the savas of the sage become
 loosened 7khnsava74 ,the  enjoyment of 
sukha however still remains in the stage
 and the        ,footnote #a3 ,where    
there is pti there is sukha1 but where  
there is sukha  there may not           
necessarily be pti4 ,vsuddhimagga1 p4   
#ade4    #ajf    mind if not properly   
and carefully watched would like        
sometimes  to turn back to the enjoyment
 of pti again4 ,the two characteristics 
of this jhna are sukha and ekaggat4 ,it 

should however  be noted that though    
there is the feeling of highest sukha   
here1  the mind is not only not attached
 to it but is indifferent to it         
7atimadhhurasukhe sukhapramippatte pi   
tatiyajjhne upekkhako1  na tattha       
sukhbhisangena kaddhiyati7 ,footnote ref
 #a4 ,the earth  ball 7pathav7 is       
however still the object of the jhna4   
,in the fourth or the last jhna both the
 sukha 7happiness7 and  the dukkha      
7misery7 vanish away and all the roots  
of attachment  and antipathies are      
destroyed4 ,this state is characterized 
by  supreme and absolute indifference   
7upekkh7 which was slowly  growing in   
all the various stages of the jhnas4    
,the characteristics  of this jhna are  
therefore upekkh and ekaggat4 ,with the 
mastery of this jhna comes final        
perfection and total extinction  of the 
citta called cetovimutti1 and the sage  
becomes thereby an  arhat ,footnote ref 
#b4 ,there is no further production of  
the khandhas1  no rebirth1 and there is 

the absolute cessation of all sorrows   
and  sufferings--,nibbna4      ,kamma4  
,in the ,katha 7,,ii4 #f7 ,yama says    
that a fool who is blinded  with the    
infatuation of riches does not believe  
in a future life2 he  thinks that only  
this life exists and not any other1 and 
thus he  comes again and again within my
 grasp4 ,in the ,digha ,nikya  also we  
read how ,pysi was trying to give his   
reasons in support  of his belief that  
,neither is there any other world1 nor  
are there  beings1 reborn otherwise than
 from parents1 nor is there fruit or    
result of deeds well done or ill done   
,footnote ref #c4 ,some of his          
arguments were that neither the vicious 
nor the virtuous return to tell  us that
 they suffered or enjoyed happiness in  
the other world1 that  if the virtuous  
had a better life in store1 and if they 
believed  in it1 they would certainly   
commit suicide in order to get it at    
the earliest opportunity1 that in spite 
of taking the best precautions  we do   

not find at the time of the death of any
 person that  his soul goes out1 or that
 his body weighs less on account of  the
 departure of his soul1 and so on4      
,kassapa refutes his arguments  with apt
 illustrations4 ,but in spite of a few  
agnostics of        ,footnote #a3       
,visuddhimagga1 p4 #afc4    ,footnote   
#b3 ,majjhima ,nikya1 ,i4p4 #bif1 and   
,visuddhimagga1 pp4  #afg-afh4          
,footnote #c3 ,dialogues of the ,buddha1
 ,,ii4 p4 #cdi2 ,d4 ,n4 ,,ii4 pp4 #cag  
ff4    #ajg    ,pysi's type1 we have    
every reason to believe that the        
doctrine  of rebirth in other worlds and
 in this was often spoken of in the     
,upanisads and taken as an accepted fact
 by the ,buddha4 ,in  the ,milinda      
,paha1 we find ,ngasena saying it is    
through a  difference in their karma    
that men are not all alike1 but some    
long lived1 some short lived1 some      
healthy and some sickly1 some  handsome 
and some ugly1 some powerful and some   
weak1 some  rich and some poor1 some of 

high degree and some of low degree1     
some wise and some foolish ,footnote ref
 #a4 ,we have seen in  the third chapter
 that the same soil of views was        
enunciated by the  ,upanisad sages4     
,but karma could produce its effect in  
this life or any  other life only when  
there were covetousness1 antipathy and  
infatuation4  ,but when a man's deeds   
are performed without covetousness1     
arise  without covetousness and are     
occasioned without covetousness1 then   
inasmuch as covetousness is gone these  
deeds are abandoned1 uprooted1  pulled  
out of the ground like a palmyra tree   
and become non-existent  and not liable 
to spring up again in the future        
,footnote ref #b4  ,karma by itself     
without craving 7tanh7 is incapable of  
bearing good  or bad fruits4 ,thus we   
read in the ,mahsatipatthna sutta1 even 
this craving1 potent for rebirth1 that  
is accompanied by lust and              
self-indulgence1 seeking satisfaction   
now here1 now there1 to wit1  the       

craving for the life of sense1 the      
craving for becoming 7renewed  life7 and
 the craving for not becoming 7for no   
new rebirth7 ,footnote  ref #c4 ,craving
 for things visible1 craving for things 
audible1  craving for things that may be
 smelt1 tasted1 touched1 for things in  
memory recalled4 ,these are the things  
in this world that are dear1  that are  
pleasant4 ,there does craving take its  
rise1 there does it  dwell ,footnote ref
 #d4 ,pre-occupation and deliberation of
 sensual  gratification giving rise to  
craving is the reason why sorrow comes4 
,and this is the first rya satya 7noble 
truth74    ,the cessation of sorrow can 
only happen with the utter  cessation of
 and disenchantment about that very     
craving1 giving  it up1 renouncing it   
and emancipation from it ,footnote ref  
#e4    ,when the desire or craving      
7tanh7 has once ceased the  sage becomes
 an arhat1 and the deeds that he may do 
after  that will bear no fruit4 ,an     
arhat cannot have any good or bad       

,footnote #a3 ,warren's ,buddhism in    
,translations1 p4 #bae4    ,footnote #b3
 ,ibid4 pp4 #baf-bag4    ,footnote #c3  
,dialogues of the ,buddha1 ,,ii4 p4     
#cdj4    ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 p4 #cda4  
,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 p4 #cda4    #ajh   
fruits of whatever he does4 ,for it is  
through desire that karma  finds its    
scope of giving fruit4 ,with the        
cessation of desire all  ignorance1     
antipathy and grasping cease and        
consequently there  is nothing which can
 determine rebirth4 ,an arhat may suffer
 the  effects of the deeds done by him  
in some previous birth just as          
,moggallna did1 but in spite of the     
remnants of his past karma  an arhat was
 an emancipated man on account of the   
cessation of  his desire ,footnote ref  
#a4    ,kammas are said to be of three  
kinds1 of body1 speech and  mind 7kyika1
 vcika and mnasika74 ,the root of this  
kamma  is however volition 7cetan7 and  
the states associated with it  ,footnote
 ref #b4 ,if a man wishing to kill      

animals goes out into  the forest in    
search of them1 but cannot get any of   
them there  even after a long search1   
his misconduct is not a bodily one1 for 
he could not actually commit the deed   
with his body4 ,so if he gives  an order
 for committing a similar misdeed1 and  
if it is not actually  carried out with 
the body1 it would be a misdeed by      
speech 7vcika7  and not by the body4    
,but the merest bad thought or ill will 
alone whether  carried into effect or   
not would be a kamma of the mind        
7mnasika7  ,footnote ref #c4 ,but the   
mental kamma must be present as the root
 of  all bodily and vocal kammas1 for if
 this is absent1 as in the case  of an  
arhat1 there cannot be any kammas at all
 for him4    ,kammas are divided from   
the point of view of effects into  four 
classes1 viz4 7#a7 those which are bad  
and produce impurity1  7#b7 those which 
are good and productive of purity1 7#c7 
those  which are partly good and partly 
bad and thus productive of  both purity 

and impurity1 7#d7 those which are      
neither good nor  bad and productive    
neither of purity nor of impurity1 but  
which  contribute to the destruction of 
kammas ,footnote ref #d4    ,final      
extinction of sorrow 7nibbna7 takes     
place as the natural  result of the     
destruction of desires4 ,scholars of    
,buddhism have  tried to discover the   
meaning of this ultimate happening1 and 
various interpretations have been       
offered4 ,professor ,de la ,valle       
,poussin has pointed out that in the    
,pli texts ,nibbna has  sometimes been  
represented as a happy state1 as pure   
annihilation1  as an inconceivable      
existence or as a changeless state      
,footnote ref #e4        ,footnote #a3  
,see ,kathvatthu and ,warren's ,buddhism
 in ,translations1 pp1  #bba ff4        
,footnote #b3 ,atthaslin1 p4 #hh4       
,footnote #c3 ,see ,atthaslin1 p4 #ij4  
,footnote #d3 ,see ,atthaslin1 p4 #hi4  
,footnote #e3 ,prof4 ,de la ,valle      
,poussin's article in the ,e4 ,r4,e4 on 

,nirvna4 ,see also ,cullavagga1 ,,ix4 i4
 #d2 ,mrs ,rhys ,davids's ,psalms  of   
the early ,buddhists1 ,i4 and ,,ii41    
,introduction1 p4 xxxvii2 ,dgha1  ,,ii4 
#ae2 ,udna1 ,,viii42 ,samyutta1 ,,iii4  
#aji4    #aji    ,mr ,schrader1 in      
discussing ,nibbna in ,pali ,text       
,society ,journal1  #aije1 says that the
 ,buddha held that those who sought to  
become  identified after death with the 
soul of the world as infinite space     
7ksa7 or consciousness 7vina7 attained  
to a state in which  they had a         
corresponding feeling of infiniteness   
without having  really lost their       
individuality4 ,this latter             
interpretation of  ,nibbna seems to me  
to be very new and quite against the    
spirit  of the ,buddhistic texts4 ,it   
seems to me to be a hopeless task  to   
explain ,nibbna in terms of worldly     
experience1 and there  is no way in     
which we can better indicate it than by 
saying that  it is a cessation of all   
sorrow2 the stage at which all worldly  

experiences have ceased can hardly be   
described either as positive  or        
negative4 ,whether we exist in some form
 eternally or do not  exist is not a    
proper ,buddhistic question1 for it is a
 heresy to  think of a ,tathgata as     
existing eternally 7s's'vata7 or        
not-existing  7as's'vata7 or whether he 
is existing as well as not  existing or 
whether he is neither existing nor      
non-existing4 ,any  one who seeks to    
discuss whether ,nibbna is either a     
positive  and eternal state or a mere   
state of non-existence or annihilation1 
takes a view which has been discarded in
 ,buddhism as heretical4  ,it is true   
that we in modern times are not         
satisfied with it1 for  we want to know 
what it all means4 ,but it is not       
possible to  give any answer since      
,buddhism regarded all these questions  
as  illegitimate4    ,later ,buddhistic 
writers like ,ngrjuna and ,candrakrtti  
took advantage of this attitude of early
 ,buddhism and interpreted  it as       

meaning the non-essential character of  
all existence4  ,nothing existed1 and   
therefore any question regarding the    
existence  or non-existence of anything 
would be meaningless4 ,there  is no     
difference between the worldly stage    
7samsra7 and ,nibbna1  for as all       
appearances are non-essential1 they     
never existed during  the samsra so that
 they could not be annihilated in       
,nibbna4      ,upanisads and ,buddhism4 
,the ,upanisads had discovered that the 
true self was nanda  7bliss7 ,footnote  
ref #a4 ,we could suppose that early    
,buddhism tacitly  presupposes some such
 idea4 ,it was probably thought that if 
there was  the self 7att7 it must be    
bliss4 ,the ,upanisads had asserted that
  the self7tman7 was indestructible and 
eternal ,footnote ref #b4 ,if we  are   
allowed            ,footnote #a3 ,tait1 
,,ii4#e4    ,footnote #b3 ,brh4 ,,iv4   
#e4 #ad4 ,katha ,v4 #ac4    #aaj    to  
make explicit what was implicit in early
 ,buddhism we could  conceive it as     

holding that if there was the self it   
must be bliss1  because it was eternal4 
,this causal connection has not indeed  
been anywhere definitely pronounced in  
the ,upanisads1 but he  who carefully   
reads the ,upanisads cannot but think   
that the  reason why the ,upanisads     
speak of the self as bliss is that it is
  eternal4 ,but the converse statement  
that what was not eternal  was sorrow   
does not appear to be emphasized clearly
 in the  ,upanisads4 ,the important     
postulate of the ,buddha is that that   
which is changing is sorrow1 and        
whatever is sorrow is not self          
,footnote ref #a4 ,the point at which   
,buddhism parted from the  ,upanisads   
lies in the experiences of the self4    
,the ,upanisads  doubtless considered   
that there were many experiences which  
we often  identify with self1 but which 
are impermanent4 ,but the belief is     
found in the ,upanisads that there was  
associated with these a  permanent part 
as well1 and that it was this permanent 

essence  which was the true and         
unchangeable self1 the blissful4 ,they  
considered  that this permanent self as 
pure bliss could not be defined  as     
this1 but could only be indicated as not
 this1 not this 7neti  neti7 ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,but the early ,pali scriptures 
hold that we could  nowhere find out    
such a permanent essence1 any constant  
self1 in our  changing experiences4 ,all
 were but changing phenomena and        
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self1
 and what was non-self  was not mine1   
neither ,i belonged to it1 nor did it   
belong to me  as my self ,footnote ref  
#c4    ,the true self was with the      
,upanisads a matter of transcendental   
experience as it were1 for they said    
that it could not  be described in terms
 of anything1 but could only be pointed 
out  as there1 behind all the changing  
mental categories4 ,the  ,buddha looked 
into the mind and saw that it did not   
exist4 ,but  how was it that the        
existence of this self was so widely    

spoken  of as demonstrated in           
experience8 ,to this the reply of the   
,buddha was that what people perceived  
there when they said  that they         
perceived the self was but the mental   
experiences  either individually or     
together4 ,the ignorant ordinary man did
  not know the noble truths and was not 
trained in the way of wise  men1 and    
considered himself to be endowed with   
form 7rpa7  or found the forms in his   
self or the self in the forms4 ,he      
,footnote #a3 ,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,iii4  
pp4 #dd-de ff4    ,footnote #b3 ,see    
,brh4 ,,iv4 iv4 ,chndogya1 ,,viii4      
#g-ab4    ,footnote #c3 ,samyutta       
,nikaya1 ,,iii #de4    #aaa             
experienced the thought 7of the moment7 
as it were the self or  experienced     
himself as being endowed with thought1  
or the thought  in the self or the self 
in the thought4 ,it is these kinds of   
experiences that he considered as the   
perception of the self  ,footnote ref   
#a4    ,the ,upanisads did not try to   

establish any school of discipline  or  
systematic thought4 ,they revealed      
throughout the dawn of an  experience of
 an immutable ,reality as the self of   
man1 as the only  abiding truth behind  
all changes4 ,but ,buddhism holds that  
this  immutable self of man is a        
delusion and a false knowledge4  ,the   
first postulate of the system is that   
impermanence is sorrow4  ,ignorance     
about sorrow1 ignorance about the way it
 originates1  ignorance about the nature
 of the extinction of sorrow1 and       
ignorance  about the means of bringing  
about this extinction represent  the    
fourfold ignorance 7avijj7 ,footnote ref
 #b4 ,the avidy1 which  is equivalent to
 the ,pli word avijj1 occurs in the     
,upanisads also1  but there it means    
ignorance about the tman doctrine1 and  
it is  sometimes contrasted with vidy or
 true knowledge about the self  7tman7  
,footnote ref #c4 ,with the ,upanisads  
the highest truth  was the permanent    
self1 the bliss1 but with the ,buddha   

there was  nothing permanent2 and all   
was change2 and all change and          
impermanence  was sorrow ,footnote ref  
#d4 ,this is1 then1 the cardinal truth  
of  ,buddhism1 and ignorance concerning 
it in the above fourfold ways           
represented the fourfold ignorance which
 stood in the way of the  right         
comprehension of the fourfold cardinal  
truths 7riya  sacca7--sorrow1 cause of  
the origination of sorrow1 extinction of
  sorrow1 and the means thereto4        
,there is no ,brahman or supreme        
permanent reality and no  self1 and this
 ignorance does not belong to any ego or
 self as we  may ordinarily be led to   
suppose4    ,thus it is said in the     
,visuddhimagga inasmuch however  as     
ignorance is empty of stability from    
being subject to a coming  into         
existence and a disappearing from       
existence444and is empty  of a          
self-determining ,ego from being subject
 to dependence1--444or  in other words  
inasmuch as ignorance is not an ,ego1   

and  similarly with reference to ,karma 
and the rest--therefore is it  to be    
understood of the wheel of existence    
that it is empty with  a twelvefold     
emptiness ,footnote ref #e4             
,footnote #a3 ,samyutta ,nikya1 ,,ii4   
#df4    ,footnote #b3 ,majjhima ,nikya1 
,i4p4 #ed4    ,footnote #c3 ,ch4 ,i4i4  
#aj4 ,brh4 ,,iv4 #c4bj4 ,there are some 
passages where  vidy and avidy have been
 used in a different and rather obscure 
sense1  ,i's' #i-aa4    ,footnote #d3   
,ang4 ,nikya1 ,,iii4 #he4    ,footnote  
#e ,warren's ,buddhism in ,translations 
7,visuddhimagga1 chap4  ,,xvii471 p4    
#age4    #aab      ,the ,schools of     
,theravda ,buddhism4    ,there is reason
 to believe that the oral instructions  
of the  ,buddha were not collected until
 a few centuries after his death4       
,serious quarrels arose amongst his     
disciples or rather amongst  the        
successive generations of the disciples 
of his disciples about  his doctrines   
and other monastic rules which he had   

enjoined  upon his followers4 ,thus we  
find that when the council of ,vesli    
decided against the ,vrjin monks1 called
 also the ,vajjiputtakas1  they in their
 turn held another great meeting        
7,mahsangha7 and  came to their own     
decisions about certain monastic rules  
and thus  came to be called as the      
,mahsanghikas ,footnote ref #a4         
,according to  ,vasumitra as translated 
by ,vassilief1 the ,mahsanghikas seceded
 in  #djj ,b4,c4 and during the next one
 hundred years they gave rise  first to 
the three schools ,ekavyavahrikas1      
,lokottaravdins1 and  ,kukkulikas and   
after that the ,bahus'rutyas4 ,in the   
course of the  next one hundred years1  
other schools rose out of it namely the 
,prajaptivdins1 ,caittikas1             
,aparas'ailas and ,uttaras'ailas4 ,the  
,theravda or the ,sthaviravda school    
which had convened the  council of      
,vesli developed during the second and  
first century ,b4,c4  into a number of  
schools1 viz4 the ,haimavatas1          

,dharmaguptikas1  ,mahs'sakas1          
,ks'yapyas1 ,sankrntikas 7more well     
known as  ,sautrntikas7 and the         
,vtsiputtryas which latter was again    
split up  into the ,dharmottaryas1      
,bhadraynyas1 ,sammityas and            
,channgarikas4  ,the main branch of the 
,theravda school was from  the second   
century downwards known as the          
,hetuvdins or  ,sarvstivdins ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,the ,mahbodhivamsa identifies  
the  ,theravda school with the          
,vibhajjavdins4 ,the commentator of the 
,kathvatthu who probably lived according
 to ,mrs ,rhys ,davids sometime  in the 
fifth century ,a4,d4 mentions a few     
other schools of  ,buddhists4 ,but of   
all these ,buddhist schools we know very
 little4  ,vasumitra 7#ajj ,a4,d47 gives
 us some very meagre accounts of        
,footnote #a3 ,the ,mahvamsa differs    
from ,dpavamsa in holding that  the     
,vajjiputtakas did not develop into the 
,mahsanghikas1 but it was  the          
,mahsanghikas who first seceded while   

the ,vajjiputtakas seceded              
independently of them4 ,the             
,mahbodhivamsa1 which according to      
,professor ,geiger was composed #ige    
,a4,d4--#ajjj ,a4,d41 follows the       
,mahavamsa in holding the ,mahsanghikas 
to be the first seceders  and           
,vajjiputtakas to have seceded          
independently4    ,vasumitra confuses   
the council of ,vesali with the third   
council of  ,ptaliputra4 ,see           
introduction to translation of          
,kathvatthu by  ,mrs ,rhys ,davids4     
,footnote #b3 ,for other accounts of the
 schism see ,mr ,aung and ,mrs ,rhys    
,davids's translation of ,kathvatthu1   
pp4 xxxvi-xlv4    #aac    certain       
schools1 of the ,mahsanghikas1          
,lokottaravdins1  ,ekavyavahrikas1      
,kakkulikas1 ,prajaptivdins and         
,sarvstivdins1 but  these accounts deal 
more with subsidiary matters of little  
philosophical  importance4 ,some of the 
points of interest are 7#a7 that the    
,mahsanghikas were said to believe that 

the body was filled with  mind 7citta7  
which was represented as sitting1 7#b7  
that the  ,prajaptivdins held that there
 was no agent in man1 that there was  no
 untimely death1 for it was caused by   
the previous deeds of man1  7#c7 that   
the ,sarvstivdins believed that         
everything existed4 ,from  the          
discussions found in the ,kathvatthu    
also we may know the  views of some of  
the schools on some points which are not
 always  devoid of philosophical        
interest4 ,but there is nothing to be   
found  by which we can properly know the
 philosophy of these schools4 ,it  is   
quite possible however that these       
so-called schools of ,buddhism  were not
 so many different systems but only     
differed from one  another on some      
points of dogma or practice which were  
considered  as being of sufficient      
interest to them1 but which to us now   
appear to be quite trifling4 ,but as we 
do not know any of their  literatures1  
it is better not to make any            

unwarrantable surmises4  ,these schools 
are however not very important for a    
history of later  ,indian ,philosophy1  
for none of them are even referred to in
 any  of the systems of ,hindu thought4 
,the only schools of ,buddhism  with    
which other schools of philosophical    
thought came in direct  contact1 are the
 ,sarvstivdins including the            
,sautrntikas and  the ,vaibhsikas1 the  
,yogcra or the ,vijnavdins and the      
,mdhyamikas or the ,s'nyavdins4 ,we do  
not know which of the  diverse smaller  
schools were taken up into these four   
great schools1  the ,sautrntika1        
,vaibhsika1 ,yogcra and the ,mdhyamika  
schools4 ,but as these schools were most
 important in relation  to the          
development of the different systems in 
,hindu thought1  it is best that we     
should set ourselves to gather what we  
can  about these systems of ,buddhistic 
thought4    ,when the ,hindu writers    
refer to the ,buddhist doctrine in      
general terms such as the ,buddhists say

 without calling them  the ,vijnavdins  
or the ,yogcras and the ,s'nyavdins1    
they often refer to the ,sarvstivdins by
 which they mean  both the ,sautrntikas 
and the ,vaibhsikas1 ignoring the       
difference  that exists between these   
two schools4 ,it is well to  mention    
that there is hardly any evidence to    
prove that the  ,hindu writers were     
acquainted with the ,theravda doctrines 
#aad    as expressed in the ,pli works4 
,the ,vaibhsikas and the ,sautrntikas   
have been more or less associated with  
each other4 ,thus  the                  
,abhidharmakos'as'stra of ,vasubandhu   
who was a ,vaibhsika  was commented upon
 by ,yas'omitra who was a ,sautrntika4  
,the  difference between the ,vaibhsikas
 and the ,sautrntikas that  attracted   
the notice of the ,hindu writers was    
this1 that the former  believed that    
external objects were directly          
perceived1 whereas  the latter believed 
that the existence of the external      
objects could  only be inferred from our

 diversified knowledge ,footnote ref #a4
  ,gunaratna 7fourteenth century ,a4,d47
 in his commentary  ,tarkarahasyadpik on
 ,saddars'anasamuccaya says that the    
,vaibhsika  was but another name of the 
ryasammitya school4 ,according to       
,gunaratna the ,vaibhsikas held that    
things existed for four moments1  the   
moment of production1 the moment of     
existence1 the moment of  decay and the 
moment of annihilation4 ,it has been    
pointed out  in ,vastlbandhu's          
,abhidharmakos'a that the ,vaibhsikas   
believed  these to be four kinds of     
forces which by coming in combination   
with the permanent essence of an entity 
produced its impermanent  manifestations
 in life 7see ,prof4 ,stcherbatsky's    
translation  of ,yas'omitra on          
,abhidharmakos'a krik1 ,v4 #be74 ,the   
self called  pudgala also possessed     
those characteristics4 ,knowledge was   
formless and was produced along with its
 object by the very  same conditions    
7arthasahabhs ekasamgryadhnah74 ,the    

,sautrntikas  according to ,gunaratna   
held that there was no soul but  only   
the five skandhas4 ,these skandhas      
transmigrated4 ,the past1  the future1  
annihilation1 dependence on cause1 ks'a 
and pudgala  are but names 7samjmtram71 
mere assertions 7pratijmtram71  mere    
limitations 7samvrtamtram7 and mere     
phenomena 7vyavahramtram74  ,by pudgala 
they meant that which other people      
called eternal  and all pervasive soul4 
,external objects are never directly    
perceived but are only inferred as      
existing for explaining the  diversity  
of knowledge4 ,definite cognitions are  
valid2 all  compounded things are       
momentary 7ksanikh sarvasamskrh74       
,footnote #a3 ,mdhavcrya's              
,sarvadars'anasamgraha1 chapter ,,ii4   
,s'stradpik1 the discussions on         
,pratyaksa1 ,amalaanda's commentary  7on
 ,bhmat7 ,vedntakalpataru1 p #bhf4      
vaibhsikasya bhyo'rthah  pratyaksah1    
sautrntikasya jnagatkravaicitryen       
anumeyah4 ,the  nature of the inference 

of the ,sautrntikas is shown thus by    
,amalnanda 7#abdg-abfj ,a4,d47 ye yasmin
 satyapi kdcitkh te  tadatiriktpeksh    
7those i4e4 cognitions which in spite of
 certain  unvaried conditions are of    
unaccounted diversity must depend on    
other  things in addition to these1 i4e4
 the external objects7                  
,vedntakalpataru1 p4 #bhi4    #aae      
,the atoms of colour1 taste1 smell and  
touch1 and cognition are  being         
destroyed every moment4 ,the meanings of
 words always  imply the negations of   
all other things1 excepting that which  
is  intended to be signified by that    
word 7anypohah s'abdrthah74  ,salvation 
7moksa7 comes as the result of the      
destruction of the  process of knowledge
 through continual meditation that there
  is no soul ,footnote ref #a4    ,one  
of the main differences between the     
,vibhajjavdins1 ,sautrntikas  and the   
,vaibhsikas or the ,sarvstivdins appears
 to  refer to the notion of time which  
is a subject of great interest  with    

,buddhist philosophy4 ,thus             
,abhidharmakos'a 7v4 #bd4447  describes 
the ,sarvstivdins as those who maintain 
the universal  existence of everything  
past1 present and future4 ,the          
,vibhajjavdins  are those who maintain  
that the present elements and  those    
among the past that have not yet        
produced their fruition1  are existent1 
but they deny the existence of the      
future ones and  of those among the past
 that have already produced fruition4   
,there were four branches of this school
 represented by ,dharmatrta1  ,ghosa1   
,vasumitra and ,buddhadeva4 ,dharmatrta 
maintained  that when an element enters 
different times1 its existence  changes 
but not its essence1 just as when milk  
is changed into curd  or a golden vessel
 is broken1 the form of the existence   
changes  though the essence remains the 
same4 ,ghosa held that when  an element 
appears at different times1 the past one
 retains its  past aspects without being
 severed from its future and present    

aspects1 the present likewise retains   
its present aspect without  completely  
losing its past and future aspects1 just
 as a man in  passionate love with a    
woman does not lose his capacity to love
  other women though he is not actually 
in love with them4 ,vasumitra  held that
 an entity is called present1 past and  
future according  as it produces its    
efficiency1 ceases to produce after     
having  once produced it or has not yet 
begun to produce it4 ,buddhadeva        
maintained the view that just as the    
same woman may  be called mother1       
daughter1 wife1 so the same entity may  
be  called present1 past or future in   
accordance with its relation to the     
preceding or the succeeding moment4     
,all these schools are in some sense    
,sarvstivdins1 for they  maintain       
universal existence4 ,but the ,vaibhsika
 finds them all  defective excepting the
 view of ,vasumitra4 ,for ,dharmatrta's 
,footnote #a3 ,gunaratna's              
,tarkarahasyadpik1 pp4 #df-dg4    #aaf  

view is only a veiled ,smkhya doctrine2 
that of ,ghosa is  a confusion of the   
notion of time1 since it presupposes the
 coexistence  of all the aspects of an  
entity at the same time1 and  that of   
,buddhadeva is also an impossible       
situation1 since it would  suppose that 
all the three times were found together 
and included  in one of them4 ,the      
,vaibhsika finds himself in agreement   
with ,vasumitra's view and holds that   
the difference in time  depends upon the
 difference of the function of an       
entity2 at the  time when an entity does
 not actually produce its function it is
  future2 when it produces it1 it       
becomes present2 when after having      
produced it1 it stops1 it becomes past2 
there is a real existence  of the past  
and the future as much as of the        
present4 ,he thinks  that if the past   
did not exist and assert some efficiency
 it could  not have been the object of  
my knowledge1 and deeds done in  past   
times could not have produced its       

effects in the present  time4 ,the      
,sautrntika however thought that the    
,vaibhsika's  doctrine would imply the  
heretical doctrine of eternal existence1
  for according to them the stuff       
remained the same and the               
time-difference  appeared in it4 ,the   
true view according to him was1  that   
there was no difference between the     
efficiency of an entity1  the entity and
 the time of its appearance4 ,entities  
appeared  from non-existence1 existed   
for a moment and again ceased to  exist4
 ,he objected to the ,vaibhsika view    
that the past is to  be regarded as     
existent because it exerts efficiency in
 bringing  about the present on the     
ground that in that case there should   
be no difference between the past and   
the present1 since both  exerted        
efficiency4 ,if a distinction is made   
between past1 present  and future       
efficiency by a second grade of         
efficiencies1 then we  should have to   
continue it and thus have a vicious     

infinite4 ,we  can know non-existent    
entities as much as we can know existent
  ones1 and hence our knowledge of the  
past does not imply  that the past is   
exerting any efficiency4 ,if a          
distinction is  made between an         
efficiency and an entity1 then the      
reason why  efficiency started at any   
particular time and ceased at another   
would be inexplicable4 ,once you admit  
that there is no difference  between    
efficiency and the entity1 you at once  
find that  there is no time at all and  
the efficiency1 the entity and the      
moment are all one and the same4 ,when  
we remember a thing  of the past we do  
not know it as existing in the past1 but
 in the  same way in which we knew it   
when it was present4 ,we are    #aag    
never attracted to past passions as the 
,vaibhsika suggests1 but  past passions 
leave residues which become the causes  
of new  passions of the present moment  
,footnote ref4#a4    ,again we can have 
a glimpse of the respective positions of

  the ,vtsiputtryas and the             
,sarvstivdins as represented by         
,vasubandhu if we attend to the         
discussion on the subject of  the       
existence of soul in ,abhidharmakos'a4  
,the argument of  ,vasubandhu against   
the existence of soul is this1 that     
though  it is true that the sense organs
 may be regarded as a determining  cause
 of perception1 no such cause can be    
found which  may render the inference of
 the existence of soul necessary4  ,if  
soul actually exists1 it must have an   
essence of its own and  must be         
something different from the elements or
 entities of a  personal life4          
,moreover1 such an eternal1 uncaused and
 unchanging  being would be without any 
practical efficiency 7arthakriykritva7  
which alone determines or proves        
existence4 ,the  soul can thus be said  
to have a mere nominal existence as a   
mere object of current usage4 ,there is 
no soul1 but there are  only the        
elements of a personal life4 ,but the   

,vtsiputtrya  school held that just as  
fire could not be said to be either the 
same as the burning wood or as different
 from it1 and yet it is  separate from  
it1 so the soul is an individual        
7pudgala7 which has  a separate         
existence1 though we could not say that 
it was  altogether different from the   
elements of a personal life or the  same
 as these4 ,it exists as being          
conditioned by the elements  of personal
 life1 but it cannot further be defined4
 ,but its existence  cannot be denied1  
for wherever there is an activity1 there
 must  be an agent 7e4g4 ,devadatta     
walks74 ,to be conscious is likewise  an
 action1 hence the agent who is         
conscious must also exist4  ,to this    
,vasubandhu replies that ,devadatta 7the
 name of a  person7 does not represent  
an unity4 ,it is only an unbroken       
continuity of momentary forces 7flashing
 into existence71 which  simple people  
believe to be a unity and to which they 
give the  name ,devadatta4 ,their belief

 that ,devadatta moves is conditioned1  
and is based on an analogy with their   
own experience1  but their own          
continuity of life consists in          
constantly moving  from one place to    
another4 ,this movement1 though regarded
 as        ,footnote #a3 ,i am indebted 
for the above account to the unpublished
  translation from ,tibetan of a small  
portion of ,abhidharmakoia by  my       
esteemed friend ,prof4 ,th4             
,stcherbatsky of ,petrograd4 ,i am      
grateful  to him that he allowed me to  
utilize it4    #aah    belonging to a   
permanent entity1 is but a series of new
 productions  in different places1 just 
as the expressions 'fire moves1'  'sound
 spreads' have the meaning of           
continuities 7of new productions  in new
 places74 ,they likewise use the words  
',devadatta  cognises' in order to      
express the fact that a cognition 7takes
 place  in the present moment7 which has
 a cause 7in the former moments1  these 
former moments coming in close          

succession being called  ,devadatta74   
,the problem of memory also does not    
bring any difficulty1  for the stream of
 consciousness being one throughout1 it 
produces  its recollections when        
connected with a previous knowledge of  
the remembered object under certain     
conditions of attention1  etc41 and     
absence of distractive factors1 such as 
bodily pains or  violent emotions4 ,no  
agent is required in the phenomena of   
memory4 ,the cause of recollection is a 
suitable state of mind  and nothing     
else4 ,when the ,buddha told his birth  
stories saying  that he was such and    
such in such and such a life1 he only   
meant that his past and his present     
belonged to one and the  same lineage of
 momentary existences4 ,just as when we 
say  this same fire which had been      
consuming that has reached this  object1
 we know that the fire is not identical 
at any two  moments1 but yet we overlook
 the difference and say that it is  the 
same fire4 ,again1 what we call an      

individual can only be  known by        
descriptions such as this venerable man1
 having this  name1 of such a caste1 of 
such a family1 of such an age1 eating   
such food1 finding pleasure or          
displeasure in such things1 of such  an 
age1 the man who after a life of such   
length1 will pass away  having reached  
an age4 ,only so much description can be
  understood1 but we have never a direct
 acquaintance with the  individual2 all 
that is perceived are the momentary     
elements of  sensations1 images1        
feelings1 etc41 and these happening at  
the  former moments exert a pressure on 
the later ones4 ,the individual  is thus
 only a fiction1 a mere nominal         
existence1 a mere  thing of description 
and not of acquaintance2 it cannot be   
grasped either by the senses or by the  
action of pure intellect4  ,this becomes
 evident when we judge it by analogies  
from other  fields4 ,thus whenever we   
use any common noun1 e4g4 milk1 we      
sometimes falsely think that there is   

such an entity as milk1 but  what really
 exists is only certain momentary       
colours1 tastes1 etc41  fictitiously    
unified as milk2 and just as milk and   
water are    #aai    conventional names 
7for a set of independent elements7 for 
some  colour1 smell 7taste and touch7   
taken together1 so is the designation   
'individual' but a common name for the  
different elements  of which it is      
composed4    ,the reason why the ,buddha
 declined to decide the question        
whether the living being is identical   
with the body or not is  just because   
there did not exist any living being as 
individual1  as is generally supposed4  
,he did not declare that the living     
being did not exist1 because in that    
case the questioner would  have thought 
that the continuity of the elements of a
 life was  also denied4 ,in truth the   
living being is only a conventional     
name for a set of constantly changing   
elements ,footnote ref #a4    ,the only 
book of the ,sammityas known to us and  

that by  name only is the               
,sammityas'stra translated into ,chinese
 between  #cej ,a4,d4 to #dca ,a4,d42   
the original ,sanskrit works are however
  probably lost ,footnote ref #b4       
,the ,vaibhsikas are identified with the
 ,sarvstivdins who  according to        
,dpavamsa ,v4 #dg1 as pointed out by    
,takakusu1  branched off from the       
,mahs'sakas1 who in their turn had      
separated from the ,theravda school4    
,from the ,kathvatthu we know 7#a7 that 
the ,sabbatthivdins  believed that      
everything existed1 7#b7 that the dawn  
of right attainment  was not a momentary
 flash of insight but by a gradual      
process1 7#c7 that consciousness or even
 samdhi was nothing but        ,footnote
 #a3 ,this account is based on the      
translation of                          
,astamakos'asthnanibaddhah              
pudgolavinis'cayah1 a special appendix  
to the eighth chapter of                
,abhidharmakos'a1 by ,prof ,th4         
,stcherbatsky1  ,bulletin de l' ,acadmie

 des ,sciences de ,russie1 #aiai4       
,footnote #b3 ,professor ,de la ,valle  
,poussin has collected some of the      
points of this doctrine in an article on
 the ,sammityas in the ,e4 ,r4,e4  ,he  
there says that in the                  
,abhidharmakos'avykhy the ,sammityas    
have  been identified with the          
,vtsputtryas and that many of its texts 
were  admitted by the ,vaibhsikas of a  
later age4 ,some of their views are as  
follows3 7#a7 ,an arhat in possession of
 nirvna can fall away2 7#b7 there is  an
 intermediate state between death and   
rebirth called antarbhava2 7#c7  merit  
accrues not only by gift 7tyagnvaya7 but
 also by the fact of the  actual use and
 advantage reaped by the man to whom the
 thing was given  7paribhognvaya punya72
 7#d7 not only abstention from evil     
deeds but a  declaration of intention to
 that end produces merit by itself      
alone2 7#e7  they believe in a pudgala  
7soul7 as distinct from the skandhas    
from  which it can be said to be either 

different or non-different4 ,the pudgala
  cannot be said to be transitory       
7anitye7 like the skandhas since it     
transmigrates laying down the burden    
7skandhas7 shouldering a new burden2  it
 cannot be said to be permanent1 since  
it is made of transitory  constituents4 
,this pudgala doctrine of the ,sammityas
 as sketched by  ,professor ,de la      
,valle ,poussin is not in full agreement
 with the pudgala  doctrine of the      
,sammityas as sketched by ,gunaratna    
which we have  noticed above4    #abj   
a flux and 7#d7 that an arhat 7saint7   
may fall away ,footnote ref #a4  ,the   
,sabbatthivdins or ,sarvstivdins have a 
vast ,abhidharma literature  still      
existing in ,chinese translations which 
is different from the  ,abhidharma of   
the ,theravda school which we have      
already mentioned  ,footnote ref #b4    
,these are #a4 ,jnaprasthna ,s'stra of  
,ktyyanputtra which passed by the name  
of ,mah ,vibhs from which  the          
,sabbatthivdins who followed it are     

called ,vaibhsikas ,footnote ref  #c4   
,this work is said to have been given a 
literary form by ,as'vaghosa4  #b4      
,dharmaskandha by ,s'riputtra4 #c4      
,dhtukya by ,prna4  #d4 ,prajaptis'stra 
by ,maudgalyyana4 #e4 ,vijnakya by      
,devaksema4  #f4 ,sangtiparyyya by      
,sriputtra and ,prakaranapda by         
,vasumitra4  ,vasubandhu 7#dbj          
,a4,d4-#ejj ,a4,d47 wrote a work on the 
,vaibhsika ,footnote  ref #d system in  
verses 7krik7 known as the              
,abhidharmakos'a1  to which he appended 
a commentary of his own which passes by 
the name  ,abhidharma ,kos'abhsya in    
which he pointed out some of the defects
  of the ,vaibhsika school from the     
,sautrntika point of view ,footnote  ref
 #e4 ,this work was commented upon by   
,vasumitra and ,gunamati and  later on  
by ,yas'omitra who was himself a        
,sautrntika and called his  work        
,abhidharmakos'a vykhy2 ,sanghabhadra a 
contemporary of ,vasubandhu  wrote      
,samayapradipa and ,nyynusra 7,chinese  

translations of which  are available7 on
 strict ,vaibhsika lines4 ,we hear also 
of other  ,vaibhsika writers such as    
,dharmatrta1 ,ghosaka1 ,vasumitra and   
,bhadanta1 the writer of                
,samyuktbhidharmas'stra and ,mahvibhs4  
,dinnga7#dhj ,a4,d471 the celebrated    
logician1 a ,vaibhsika  or a ,sautrntika
 and reputed to be a pupil of           
,vasubandhu1  wrote his famous work     
,pramnasamuccaya in which he            
established ,buddhist logic and refuted 
many of the views of ,vtsyyana  the     
celebrated commentator of the ,nyya     
stras2 but we regret        ,footnote   
#a3 ,see ,mrs ,rhys ,davids's           
translation ,kathvatthu1 p4 xix1  and   
,sections ,i4#f1g2 ,,ii4 #i and ,,xi4   
#f4    ,footnote #b3 ,mahvyutpatti gives
 two names for ,sarvstivda1 viz4        
,mlasarvstivda and ryyasarvstivda4      
,itsing 7#fga-fie ,a4,d47 speaks  of    
ryyamlasarvstivda and ,mlasarvstivda4   
,in his time he found  it prevailing in 
,magadha1 ,guzrat1 ,sind1 ,s4 ,india1   

,e4 ,india4 ,takakusu  says 7,p4,t4,s4  
#aijd-aije7 that ,paramrtha1 in his life
 of ,vasubandhu1  says that it was      
propagated from ,kashmere to ,middle    
,india by ,vasubhadra1  who studied it  
there4    ,footnote #c3 ,takakusu says  
7,p4,t4,s4 #aijd-aije7 that             
,ktyyanputtra's work  was probably a    
compilation from other ,vibhss which    
existed before the  ,chinese            
translations and ,vibhs texts dated #chc
 ,a4,d4    ,footnote #d3 ,see           
,takakusu's article ,j4,r4,a4,s4 #aije4 
,footnote #e3 ,the ,sautrntikas did not 
regard the ,abhidharmas of the          
,vaibhsikas as authentic and laid stress
 on the suttanta doctrines  as given in 
the ,suttapitaka4    #aba    to say that
 none of the above works are available  
in ,sanskrit1  nor have they been       
retranslated from ,chinese or ,tibetan  
into  any of the modern ,european or    
,indian languages4    ,the ,japanese    
scholar ,mr ,yamakami ,sogen1 late      
lecturer at  ,calcutta ,university1     

describes the doctrine of the           
,sabbatthivdins  from the ,chinese      
versions of the ,abhidharmakos'a1       
,mahvibhss'stra1  etc41 rather          
elaborately ,footnote ref #a4 ,the      
following is a short sketch1  which is  
borrowed mainly from the accounts given 
by ,mr ,sogen4    ,the ,sabbatthivdins  
admitted the five skandhas1 twelve      
yatanas1 eighteen dhtus1 the three      
asamskrta dharmas of  pratisamkhynirodha
 apratisamkhynirodha and ks'a1 and the  
samskrta dharmas 7things composite and  
interdependent7 of rpa  7matter71 citta 
7mind71 caitta 7mental7 and             
cittaviprayukta 7non-mental7  ,footnote 
ref #b4 ,all effects are produced by the
 coming together  7samskrta7 of a number
 of causes4 ,the five skandhas1 and the 
rpa1 citta1 etc41 are thus called       
samskrta dharmas 7composite  things or  
collocations--sambhyakri74 ,the rpa     
dharmas are  eleven in number1 one citta
 dharma1 #df caitta dharmas and #ad     
cittaviprayukta samskra dharmas         

7non-mental composite things72  adding  
to these the three asamskrta dharmas we 
have the seventy-five  dharmas4 ,rpa is 
that which has the capacity to obstruct 
the  sense organs4 ,matter is regarded  
as the collective organism or           
collocation1 consisting of the fourfold 
substratum of colour1 smell1  taste and 
contact4 ,the unit possessing this      
fourfold substratum  is known as        
paramnu1 which is the minutest form of  
rpa4 ,it  cannot be pierced through or  
picked up or thrown away4 ,it is        
indivisible1 unanalysable1 invisible1   
inaudible1 untastable and intangible4   
,but yet it is not permanent1 but is    
like a momentary  flash into being4 ,the
 simple atoms are called dravyaparamnu  
and the compound ones samghtaparamnu4   
,in the words of  ,prof4 ,stcherbatsky  
the universal elements of matter are    
manifested  in their actions or         
functions4 ,they are consequently more  
energies than substances4 ,the organs of
 sense are also regarded  as            

modifications of atomic matter4 ,seven  
such paramnus combine  together to form 
an anu1 and it is in this combined form 
only that they become perceptible4 ,the 
combination takes  place in the form of 
a cluster having one atom at the centre 
and        ,footnote #a3 ,systems of    
,buddhistic ,thought1 published by the  
,calcutta  ,university4    ,footnote #b3
 ,s'ankara in his meagre sketch of the  
doctrine of the  ,sarvstivdins in his   
bhsya on the ,brahma-stras ,,ii4 #b     
notices some  of the categories         
mentioned by ,sogen4    #abb    others  
around it4 ,the point which must be     
remembered in connection  with the      
conception of matter is this1 that the  
qualities  of all the mahbhtas are      
inherent in the paramnus4 ,the special  
characteristics of roughness 7which     
naturally belongs to earth71            
viscousness 7which naturally belongs to 
water71 heat 7belonging  to fire71      
movableness 7belonging to wind71 combine
 together to  form each of the elements2

 the difference between the different   
elements consists only in this1 that in 
each of them its own special            
characteristics were predominant and    
active1 and other characteristics       
though present remained only in a       
potential form4 ,the  mutual resistance 
of material things is due to the quality
 of  earth or the solidness inherent in 
them2 the mutual attraction of  things  
is due to moisture or the quality of    
water1 and so forth4  ,the four elements
 are to be observed from three aspects1 
namely1  7#a7 as things1 7#b7 from the  
point of view of their natures 7such as 
activity1 moisture1 etc471 and 7#c7     
function 7such as dhrti or  attraction1 
samgraha or cohesion1 pakti or chemical 
heat1 and  vyhana or clustering and     
collecting74 ,these combine together    
naturally by other conditions or causes4
 ,the main point of distinction  between
 the ,vaibhsika ,sarvstivadins and other
 forms of ,buddhism  is this1 that here 
the five skandhas and matter are        

regarded  as permanent and eternal2 they
 are said to be momentary  only in the  
sense that they are changing their      
phases constantly1  owing to their      
constant change of combination4 ,avidy  
is not  regarded here as a link in the  
chain of the causal series of           
prattyasamutpda2 nor is it ignorance of 
any particular individual1  but is      
rather identical with moha or delusion  
and  represents the ultimate state of   
immaterial dharmas4 ,avidy1  which      
through samskra1 etc41 produces nmarpa  
in the case of  a particular individual1
 is not his avidy in the present        
existence  but the avidy of his past    
existence bearing fruit in the present  
life4    ,the cause never perishes but  
only changes its name1 when  it becomes 
an effect1 having changed its state4    
,for example1  clay becomes jar1 having 
changed its state2 and in this case the 
name clay is lost and the name jar      
arises ,footnote ref #a4 ,the           
,sarvstivdins allowed simultaneousness  

between cause and effect only in  the   
case of composite things 7samprayukta   
hetu7 and in the case of                
,footnote #a3 ,sogen's quotation from   
,kumrajva's ,chinese version of         
ryyadeva's commentary on the ,mdhyamika 
s'stra 7chapter ,,xx4 ,krik #i74    #abc
    the interaction of mental and       
material things4 ,the substratum  of    
vijna or consciousness is regarded as   
permanent and  the aggregate of the five
 senses 7indriyas7 is called the        
perceiver4  ,it must be remembered that 
the indriyas being material had a       
permanent substratum1 and their         
aggregate had therefore also a          
substratum formed of them4    ,the sense
 of sight grasps the four main colours  
of blue1 yellow1  red1 white1 and their 
combinations1 as also the visual forms  
of  appearance 7samsthna7 of long1      
short1 round1 square1 high1 low1        
straight1 and crooked4 ,the sense of    
touch 7kyendriya7 has for  its object   
the four elements and the qualities of  

smoothness1  roughness1 lightness1      
heaviness1 cold1 hunger and thirst4     
,these  qualities represent the feelings
 generated in sentient beings by  the   
objects of touch1 hunger1 thirst1 etc41 
and are also counted  under it1 as they 
are the organic effects produced by a   
touch  which excites the physical frame 
at a time when the energy of  wind      
becomes active in our body and          
predominates over other  energies2 so   
also the feeling of thirst is caused by 
a touch which  excites the physical     
frame when the energy of the element of 
fire  becomes active and predominates   
over the other energies4 ,the  indriyas 
7senses7 can after grasping the external
 objects arouse  thought 7vijna72 each  
of the five senses is an agent without  
which none of the five vijnas would     
become capable of perceiving  an        
external object4 ,the essence of the    
senses is entirely  material4 ,each     
sense has two subdivisions1 namely1 the 
principal  sense and the auxiliary      

sense4 ,the substratum of the principal 
senses consists of a combination of     
paramnus1 which are extremely  pure and 
minute1 while the substratum of the     
latter is  the flesh1 made of grosser   
materials4 ,the five senses differ from 
one another with respect to the manner  
and form of their respective  atomic    
combinations4 ,in all sense-acts1       
whenever an act is  performed and an    
idea is impressed1 a latent energy is   
impressed  on our person which is       
designated as avijapti rpa4 ,it is      
called  rpa because it is a result or   
effect of rpa-contact2 it is called     
avijapti because it is latent and       
unconscious2 this latent energy  is     
bound sooner or later to express itself 
in karma effects and is  the only bridge
 which connects the cause and the effect
 of karma  done by body or speech4      
,karma in this school is considered  as 
twofold1 namely1 that as thought 7cetana
 karma7 and that as  activity 7caitasika
 karma74 ,this last1 again1 is of two   

kinds1 viz4    #abd    that due to      
body-motion 7kyika karma7 and speech    
7vcika  karma74 ,both these may again be
 latent 7avijapti7 and patent           
7vijapti71 giving us the kyika-vijnpti  
karma1 kyikvijapti  karma1 vcika-vijapti
 karma and vcikvijapti karma4 ,avijapti 
rpa and avijapti karma are what we      
should call in modern  phraseology      
sub-conscious ideas1 feelings and       
activity4 ,corresponding  to each       
conscious sensation1 feeling1 thought or
 activity  there is another similar     
sub-conscious state which expresses     
itself  in future thoughts and actions2 
as these are not directly known but  are
 similar to those which are known1 they 
are called avijapti4    ,the mind1 says 
,vasubandhu1 is called cittam1 because  
it  wills 7cetati71 manas because it    
thinks 7manvate7 and vijna  because it  
discriminates 7nirdis'ati74 ,the        
discrimination may be  of three kinds3  
7#a7 svabhva nirdes'a 7natural          
perceptual discrimination71  7#b7       

prayoga nirdes'a 7actual discrimination 
as present1  past and future71 and 7#c7 
anusmrti nirdes'a 7reminiscent          
discrimination  referring only to the   
past74 ,the senses only possess the     
svabhva nirdes'a1 the other two belong  
exclusively to manovijna4  ,each of the 
vijnas as associated with its specific  
sense discriminates  its particular     
object and perceives its general        
characteristics2  the six vijnas combine
 to form what is known as the           
,vijnaskandha1 which is presided over by
 mind 7mano74 ,there  are forty-six     
caitta samskrta dharmas4 ,of the three  
asamskrta  dharmas ks'a 7ether7 is in   
essence the freedom from obstruction1   
establishing it as a permanent          
omnipresent immaterial substance        
7nrpkhya1 non-rpa74 ,the second         
asamskrta dharma1 apratisamkhy  nirodha1
 means the non-perception of dharmas    
caused  by the absence of pratyayas or  
conditions4 ,thus when ,i fix my        
attention on one thing1 other things are

 not seen then1 not because  they are   
non-existent but because the conditions 
which would  have made them visible were
 absent4 ,the third asamskrta  dharma1  
pratisamkhy nirodha1 is the final       
deliverance from  bondage4 ,its         
essential characteristic is             
everlastingness4 ,these  are called     
asamskrta because being of the nature of
 negation  they are non-collocative and 
hence have no production or dissolution4
  ,the eightfold noble path which leads 
to this state consists of right  views1 
right aspirations1 right speech1 right  
conduct1 right livelihood1  right       
effort1 right mindfulness1 right rapture
 ,footnote ref #a4        ,footnote #a3 
,mr ,sogen mentions the name of another 
,buddhist ,hnayna  thinker 7about #bej  
,a4,d471 ,harivarman1 who founded a     
school known as  ,satyasiddhi school1   
which propounded the same sort of       
doctrines as  those preached by         
,ngrjuna4 ,none of his works are        
available in ,sanskrit  and ,i have     

never come across any allusion to his   
name by ,sanskrit writers4    #abe      
,mahynism4    ,it is difficult to say   
precisely at what time ,mahynism took   
its rise4 ,but there is reason to think 
that as the ,mahsanghikas  separated    
themselves from the ,theravdins probably
 some time in  #djj ,b4,c4 and split    
themselves up into eight different      
schools1 those  elements of thoughts and
 ideas which in later days came to be   
labelled as ,mahyna were gradually on   
the way to taking their  first          
inception4 ,we hear in about #ajj ,a4,d4
 of a number of works  which are        
regarded as various ,mahyna stras1 some 
of which  are probably as old as at     
least #ajj ,b4,c4 7if not earlier7 and  
others  as late as #cjj or #djj         
,a4,d4,footnote ref #a4 ,these          
,mahynastras1 also  called the          
,vaipulyastras1 are generally all in the
 form of instructions  given by the     
,buddha4 ,nothing is known about their  
authors or  compilers1 but they are all 

written in some form of ,sanskrit and   
were probably written by those who      
seceded from the ,theravda  school4     
,the word ,hnayna refers to the schools 
of ,theravda1 and  as such it is        
contrasted with ,mahyna4 ,the words are 
generally  translated as small vehicle  
7hna  small1 yna  vehicle7 and great    
vehicle 7mah  great1 yna  vehicle74 ,but
 this translation by  no means expresses
 what is meant by ,mahyna and ,hnayna   
,footnote ref #b4 ,asanga 7#dhj ,a4,d47 
in his ,mahynastrlamkra gives           
,footnote #a3 ,quotations and references
 to many of these stras are found in    
,candrakrtti's commentary on the        
,mdhyamka kriks of ,ngrjuna2 some of    
these are the following3                
,astashasrikprajpramit 7translated into 
,chinese #afd ,a4,d4-#afg ,a4,d471      
,s'atashasrikprajpramit1 ,gaganagaja1   
,samdhistra1 ,tathgataguhyastra1        
,drdhdhys'ayasacodanstra1               
,dhyyitamustistra1 ,pitputrasamgamastra1
 ,mahynastra1  ,mradamanastra1          

,ratnaktastra1 ,ratnacdpariprcchstra1   
,ratnameghastra1 ,ratnarsistra1         
,ratnkarastra1  ,rstraplapariprcchstra1 
,lankvatrastra1 ,lalitavistarastra1     
,vajracchedikstra1                      
,vimalakrttinirdes'astra1               
,s'listambhastra1  ,samdhirajasutra1    
,sukhvatvyha1 ,suvarnaprabhsastra1      
,saddharmapundarika 7translated into    
,chinese ,a4,d4 #bee71                  
,amityurdhynastra1 ,hastikkhyastra1 etc4
    ,footnote #b3 ,the word ,yna is     
generally translated as vehicle1 but a  
consideration of numerous contexts in   
which the word occurs seems to  suggest 
that it means career or course or way1  
rather than vehicle  7,lalitavistara1   
pp4 #be1 #ch2 ,prajpramit1 pp4 #bd1     
#cai2  ,samdhirjastra1 p4 #a2           
,karunpundarka1 p4 #fg2 ,lankvatrastra1 
pp4 #fh1 #ajh1 #acb74 ,the word ,yna is 
as old as the ,upanisads where we read  
of ,devayna and ,pitryna4 ,there is no  
reason why this word should be  taken in
 a different sense4 ,we hear in         

,lankvatra of ,s'rvakayna  7career of   
the ,s'rvakas or the ,theravdin         
,buddhists71 ,pratyekabuddhayna  7the   
career of saints before the coming of   
the ,buddha71 ,buddha  yna 7career of   
the ,buddhas71 ,ekayna 7one career71    
,devayna 7career of  the gods71         
,brahmayna 7career of becoming a        
,brahm71 ,tathgatayna  7career of a     
,tathgata74 ,in one place ,lankvatra    
says that ordinarily  distinction is    
made between the three careers and one  
career and no career1  but these        
distinctions are only for the ignorant  
7,lankvatra1 p4 #fh74    #abf    us the 
reason why one school was called ,hnayna
 whereas the  other1 which he professed1
 was called ,mahyna4 ,he says that1     
considered from the point of view of the
 ultimate goal of religion1  the        
instructions1 attempts1 realization1 and
 time1 the ,hnayna  occupies a lower and
 smaller place than the other called    
,mah  7great7 ,yna1 and hence it is     
branded as ,hna 7small1 or low74  ,this 

brings us to one of the fundamental     
points of distinction  between ,hnayna  
and ,mahyna4 ,the ultimate good of an   
adherent of the ,hnayna is to attain his
 own nirvna or salvation1  whereas the  
ultimate goal of those who professed the
 ,mahyna  creed was not to seek their   
own salvation but to seek the  salvation
 of all beings4 ,so the ,hnayna goal was
 lower1 and in  consequence of that the 
instructions that its followers         
received1  the attempts they undertook1 
and the results they achieved were      
narrower than that of the ,mahyna       
adherents4 ,a ,hnayna man  had only a   
short business in attaining his own     
salvation1 and this  could be done in   
three lives1 whereas a ,mahyna adherent 
was  prepared to work for infinite time 
in helping all beings to attain         
salvation4 ,so the ,hnayana adherents   
required only a short period  of work   
and may from that point of view also be 
called hna1 or  lower4    ,this point1  
though important from the point of view 

of the  difference in the creed of the  
two schools1 is not so from the point   
of view of philosophy4 ,but there is    
another trait of the ,mahynists  which  
distinguishes them from the ,hnaynists  
from the  philosophical point of view4  
,the ,mahynists believed that all       
things were of a non-essential and      
indefinable character and  void at      
bottom1 whereas the ,hnaynists only     
believed in the  impermanence of all    
things1 but did not proceed further than
  that4    ,it is sometimes erroneously 
thought that ,ngrjuna first  preached   
the doctrine of ,s'nyavda               
7essencelessness or voidness  of all    
appearance71 but in reality almost all  
the ,mahyna stras  either definitely    
preach this doctrine or allude to it4   
,thus if we  take some of those stras   
which were in all probability earlier   
than  ,ngrjuna1 we find that the        
doctrine which ,ngrjuna expounded       
#abg    with all the rigour of his      
powerful dialectic was quietly accepted 

as an indisputable truth4 ,thus we find 
,subhti saying to  the ,buddha that     
vedan 7feeling71 samj 7concepts7 and the
  samskras 7conformations7 are all my   
7illusion7 ,footnote ref #a4 ,all  the  
skandhas1 dhtus 7elements7 and yatanas  
are void and absolute  cessation4 ,the  
highest knowledge of everything as pure 
void  is not different from the         
skandhas1 dhtus and yatanas1 and this   
absolute cessation of dharmas is        
regarded as the highest knowledge       
7prajpramit7 ,footnote ref #b4          
,everything being void there is in      
reality no process and no cessation4    
,the truth is neither eternal           
7s's'vata7 nor non-eternal 7as's'vata7  
but pure void4 ,it should  be the object
 of a saint's endeavour to put himself  
in the thatness  7tathat7 and consider  
all things as void4 ,the saint          
7bodhisattva7  has to establish himself 
in all the virtues 7pramit71 benevolence
  7dnapramit71 the virtue of character  
7s'lapramit71 the virtue  of forbearance

 7ksntipramit71 the virtue of tenacity  
and strength  7vryyapramit7 and the     
virtue of meditation 7dhynapramit74     
,the saint 7bodhisattva7 is firmly      
determined that he will  help an        
infinite number of souls to attain      
nirvna4 ,in reality1  however1 there are
 no beings1 there is no bondage1 no     
salvation2  and the saint knows it but  
too well1 yet he is not afraid  of this 
high truth1 but proceeds on his career  
of attaining for  all illusory beings   
illusory emancipation from illusory     
bondage4  ,the saint is actuated with   
that feeling and proceeds in his  work  
on the strength of his pramits1 though  
in reality there  is no one who is to   
attain salvation in reality and no one  
who  is to help him to attain it        
,footnote ref #c4 ,the true prajapramit 
is  the absolute cessation of all       
appearance 7yah anupalambhah            
sarvadharmnm sa prajpramit ityucyate7   
,footnote ref #d4    ,the ,mahyna       
doctrine has developed on two lines1    

viz4 that  of ,s'nyavda or the          
,mdhyamika doctrine and ,vijnavda4  ,the
 difference between ,s'nyavda and       
,vijnavda 7the theory  that there is    
only the appearance of phenomena of     
consciousness7  is not fundamental1 but 
is rather one of method4 ,both of them  
agree in holding that there is no truth 
in anything1 everything  is only passing
 appearance akin to dream or magic4 ,but
  while the ,s'nyavdins were more busy  
in showing this  indefinableness of all 
phenomena1 the ,vijnavdins1 tacitly     
accepting        ,footnote #a3          
,asteshasiihprajpramita1 p4 #af4        
,footnote #b3 ,ibid p4 #agg4            
,footnote #c3 ,ibid p4 #ba4    ,footnote
 #d3 ,ibid p4 #agg4    #abh    the truth
 preached by the ,s'nyavdins1 interested
 themselves in  explaining the phenomena
 of consciousness by their theory of    
beginningless illusory root-ideas or    
instincts of the mind 7vsan74           
,as'vaghosa 7#ajj ,a4,d47 seems to have 
been the greatest teacher  of a new type

 of idealism 7vijnavda7 known as the    
,tathat  philosophy4 ,trusting in       
,suzuki's identification of a quotation 
in  ,as'vaghosa's ,s'raddhotpdas'stra as
 being made from  ,lankvatrastra1 we    
should think of the ,lankvatrastra as   
being one of the early works of the     
,vijnavdins ,footnote ref #a4  ,the     
greatest later writer of the ,vijnavda  
school was ,asanga  7#djj ,a4,d471 to   
whom are attributed the ,saptadas'abhmi 
stra1  ,mahyna stra1 ,upades'a1         
,mahynasamparigraha s'stra1 ,yogcrabhmi 
s'stra and ,mahynastrlamkra4 ,none of   
these works excepting the  last one is  
available to readers who have no access 
to the  ,chinese and ,tibetan           
manuscripts1 as the ,sanskrit originals 
are  in all probability lost4 ,the      
,vijnavda school is known to  ,hindu    
writers by another name also1 viz4      
,yogcra1 and it does  not seem an       
improbable supposition that ,asanga's   
,yogcrabhmi  s'stra was responsible for 
the new name4 ,vasubandhu1  a younger   

brother of ,asanga1 was1 as ,paramrtha  
7#dii-efi7 tells  us1 at first a liberal
 ,sarvstivdin1 but was converted to     
,vijnavda1  late in his life1 by        
,asanga4 ,thus ,vasubandhu1 who  wrote  
in his early life the great standard    
work of the ,sarvstivdins1              
,abhidharmakos'a1 devoted himself in his
 later life to ,vijnavda  ,footnote ref 
#b4 ,he is said to have commented upon a
 number of  ,mahyna stras1 such as      
,avatamsaka1 ,nirvna1                   
,saddharmapundarka1  ,prajpramit1       
,vimalakrtti and ,s'rmlsimhanda1 and    
compiled some ,mahyna stras1 such as    
,vijnamtrasiddhi1  ,ratnatraya1 etc4    
,the school of ,vijnavda continued for  
at  least a century or two after        
,vasubandhu1 but we are not in          
possession of any work of great fame of 
this school after him4    ,we have      
already noticed that the ,s'nyavda      
formed the fundamental  principle of all
 schools of ,mahyna4 ,the most powerful 
exponent of this doctrine was ,ngrjuna  

7#a,,oo ,a4,d471 a brief account  of    
whose system will be given in its proper
 place4 ,ngrjuna's  kriks 7verses7 were 
commented upon by ryyadeva1 a disciple  
of his1 ,kumrajva 7#chc ,a4,d474        
,buddhaplita and ,candrakrtti  7#eej    
,a4,d474 ryyadeva in addition to this   
commentary wrote at        ,footnote #a3
 ,dr ,s4,c4 ,vidybhshana thinks that    
,lankvatna belongs to  about #cjj ,a4,d4
    ,footnote #b3 ,takakusu's ,a study  
of the ,paramrtha's life of ,vasubandhu1
  ,j4,r4,a4,s4 #aije4    #abi    least  
three other books1 viz4 ,catuhs'ataka1  
,hastablaprakaranavrtti  and            
,cittavisuddhiprakarana ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,in the small work called           
,hastablaprakaranavrtti ryyadeva says   
that whatever depends  for its existence
 on anything else may be proved to be   
illusory2  all our notions of external  
objects depend on space perceptions  and
 notions of part and whole and should   
therefore be regarded  as mere          
appearance4 ,knowing therefore that all 

that is dependent  on others for        
establishing itself is illusory1 no wise
 man  should feel attachment or         
antipathy towards these mere phenomenal 
appearances4 ,in his                    
,cittavis'uddhiprakarana he says  that  
just as a crystal appears to be         
coloured1 catching the reflection  of a 
coloured object1 even so the mind though
 in itself  colourless appears to show  
diverse colours by coloration of        
imagination  7vikalpa74 ,in reality the 
mind 7citta7 without a touch  of        
imagination 7kalpan7 in it is the pure  
reality4    ,it does not seem however   
that the ,s'nyavdins could produce  any 
great writers after ,candrakrtti4       
,references to ,s'nyavda  show that it  
was a living philosophy amongst the     
,hindu writers  until the time of the   
great ,mmms authority ,kumrila who      
flourished in the eighth century2 but in
 later times the ,s'nyavdins  were no   
longer occupying the position of strong 
and active disputants4      ,the        

,tathata ,philosophy of ,as'vaghosa 7#hj
 ,a4,d47 ,footnote ref #b4              
,as'vaghosa was the son of a ,brahmin   
named ,saimhaguhya  who spent his early 
days in travelling over the different   
parts of  ,india and defeating the      
,buddhists in open debates4 ,he was     
probably  converted to ,buddhism by     
,prsva who was an important  person in  
the third ,buddhist ,council promoted1  
according to some authorities1 by the   
,king of ,kashmere  and according to    
other authorities by ,punyayas'as       
,footnote ref #c4        ,footnote #a3  
ryyadeva's ,hastablaprakaranavrtti has  
been reclaimed by  ,dr4 ,f4,w4 ,thomas4 
,fragmentary portions of his            
,cittavis'uddhiprakarana  were published
 by ,mahmahopdhyya ,haraprasda s'str in 
the ,bengal  ,asiatic ,society's        
journal1 #ahih4    ,footnote #b3 ,the   
above section is based on the ,awakening
 of ,faith1 an  ,english translation by 
,suzuki of the ,chinese version of      
,s'raddhotpdasstra by ,as'vaghosa1 the  

,sanskrit original of which  appears to 
have been lost4 ,suzuki has brought     
forward a mass of evidence  to show that
 ,as'vaghosa was a contemporary of      
,kaniska4    ,footnote #c3 ,trantha says
 that he was converted by ,aryadeva1 a  
disciple  of ,ngrjuna1 ,geschichte des  
,buddhismus1 ,german translation by     
,schiefner1  pp4 #hd-he4 ,see ,suzuki's 
,awakening of ,faith1 pp4 #bd-cb4       
,as'vaghosa wrote  the                  
,buddhacaritakvya1 of great poetical    
excellence1 and the  ,mahlamkras'stra4  
,he was also a musician and had invented
 a musical  instrument called ,rstavara 
that he might by that means convert the 
people of the city4 ,its melody was     
classical1 mournful1 and melodious1     
inducing the audience to ponder on the  
misery1 emptiness1 and non-tmanness  of 
life4 ,suzuki1 p4 #ce4    #acj      ,he 
held that in the soul two aspects may be
 distinguished  --the aspect as thatness
 7bhtatathat7 and the aspect as the     
cycle  of birth and death 7samsra74 ,the

 soul as bhtatathat means  the oneness  
of the totality of all things           
7dharmadhtu74 ,its essential  nature is 
uncreate and external4 ,all things      
simply on account  of the beginningless 
traces of the incipient and unconscious 
memory of our past experiences of many  
previous lives 7smrti7  appear under the
 forms of individuation ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,if we could  overcome this smrti   
the signs of individuation would        
disappear and  there would be no trace  
of a world of objects4 ,all things in   
their  fundamental nature are not       
nameable or explicable4 ,they cannot  be
 adequately expressed in any form of    
language4 ,they  possess absolute       
sameness 7samat74 ,they are subject     
neither to  transformation nor to       
destruction4 ,they are nothing but one  
soul  --thatness 7bhtatathat74 ,this    
thatness has no attribute and  it can   
only be somehow pointed out in speech as
 thatness4  ,as soon as you understand  
that when the totality of existence is  

spoken of or thought of1 there is       
neither that which speaks nor  that     
which is spoken of1 there is neither    
that which thinks nor  that which is    
thought of1 this is the stage of        
thatness4 ,this  bhtatathat is neither  
that which is existence1 nor that which 
is  non-existence1 nor that which is at 
once existence and non-existence1  nor  
that which is not at once existence and 
non-existence2  it is neither that which
 is plurality1 nor that which is  at    
once unity and plurality1 nor that which
 is not at once unity  and plurality4   
,it is a negative concept in the sense  
that it is  beyond all that is          
conditional and yet it is a positive    
concept  in the sense that it holds all 
within it4 ,it cannot be comprehended   
by any kind of particularization or     
distinction4 ,it is  only by            
transcending the range of our           
intellectual categories of  the         
comprehension of the limited range of   
finite phenomena that  we can get a     

glimpse of it4 ,it cannot be            
comprehended by the  particularizing    
consciousness of all beings1 and we thus
 may call  it negation1 s'nyat1 in this 
sense4 ,the truth is that which         
,footnote #a3 ,i have ventured to       
translate smrti in the sense of vsan  in
 preference to ,suzuki's confused       
subjectivity because smrti in the  sense
 of vsan is not unfamiliar to the       
readers of such ,buddhist works  as     
,lankvatra4 ,the word subjectivity seems
 to be too ,european a  term to be used 
as a word to represent the ,buddhist    
sense4    #aca    subjectively does not 
exist by itself1 that the negation      
7s'nyat7 is  also void 7s'nya7 in its   
nature1 that neither that which is      
negated  nor that which negates is an   
independent entity4 ,it is the pure     
soul that manifests itself as eternal1  
permanent1 immutable1 and  completely   
holds all things within it4 ,on that    
account it may be  called affirmation4  
,but yet there is no trace of           

affirmation in it1  because it is not   
the product of the creative instinctive 
memory  7smrti7 of conceptual thought   
and the only way of grasping the        
truth--the thatness1 is by transcending 
all conceptual creations4    ,the soul  
as birth and death 7samsra7 comes forth 
from  the ,tathgata womb                
7tathgatagarbha71 the ultimate reality4 
,but the immortal and the mortal        
coincide with each other4  ,though they 
are not identical they are not duality  
either4 ,thus  when the absolute soul   
assumes a relative aspect by its        
self-affirmation  it is called the      
all-conserving mind 7layavijna74  ,it   
embraces two principles1 7#a7           
enlightenment1 7#b7 non-enlightenment4  
,enlightenment is the perfection of the 
mind when it is  free from the          
corruptions of the creative instinctive 
incipient  memory 7smrti74 ,it          
penetrates all and is the unity of all  
7dharmadhtu74 ,that is to say1 it is the
 universal dharmakya of all  ,tathgatas 

constituting the ultimate foundation of 
existence4    ,when it is said that all 
consciousness starts from this          
fundamental  truth1 it should not be    
thought that consciousness had any  real
 origin1 for it was merely phenomenal   
existence--a mere imaginary  creation of
 the perceivers under the influence of  
the  delusive smrti4 ,the multitude of  
people 7bahujana7 are said to be        
lacking in enlightenment1 because       
ignorance 7avidy7 prevails  there from  
all eternity1 because there is a        
constant succession of  smrti 7past     
confused memory working as instinct7    
from which  they have never been        
emancipated4 ,but when they are divested
  of this smrti they can then recognize 
that no states of mentation1  viz4 their
 appearance1 presence1 change and       
disappearance1 have  any reality4 ,they 
are neither in a temporal nor in a      
spatial relation  with the one soul1 for
 they are not self-existent4    ,this   
high enlightenment shows itself         

imperfectly in our corrupted  phenomenal
 experience as praj 7wisdom7 and karma  
7incomprehensible activity of life74 ,by
 pure wisdom we understand  that when   
one1 by virtue of the perfuming power of
 dharma1  disciplines himself truthfully
 7i4e4 according to the dharma71 and    
accomplishes meritorious deeds1 the mind
 7i4e4 the layavijna7    #acb    which  
implicates itself with birth and death  
will be broken down  and the modes of   
the evolving consciousness will be      
annulled1 and  the pure and the genuine 
wisdom of the ,dharmakya will manifest  
itself4 ,though all modes of            
consciousness and mentation are  mere   
products of ignorance1 ignorance in its 
ultimate nature is  identical and       
non-identical with enlightenment2 and   
therefore  ignorance is in one sense    
destructible1 though in another sense   
it is indestructible4 ,this may be      
illustrated by the simile of the  water 
and the waves which are stirred up in   
the ocean4 ,here  the water can be said 

to be both identical and non-identical  
with the waves4 ,the waves are stirred  
up by the wind1 but the  water remains  
the same4 ,when the wind ceases the     
motion of  the waves subsides1 but the  
water remains the same4 ,likewise  when 
the mind of all creatures1 which in its 
own nature is pure and  clean1 is       
stirred up by the wind of ignorance     
7avidy71 the waves  of mentality 7vijna7
 make their appearance4 ,these three    
7i4e4  the mind1 ignorance1 and         
mentality7 however have no existence1   
and they are neither unity nor          
plurality4 ,when the ignorance is       
annihilated1 the awakened mentality is  
tranquillized1 whilst the  essence of   
the wisdom remains unmolested4 ,the     
truth or the  enlightenment is          
absolutely unobtainable by any modes of 
relativity  or by any outward signs of  
enlightenment4 ,all events in  the      
phenomenal world are reflected in       
enlightenment1 so that they  neither    
pass out of it1 nor enter into it1 and  

they neither disappear  nor are         
destroyed4 ,it is for ever cut off from 
the hindrances both  affectional        
7kles'varana7 and intellectual          
7jeyvarana71 as well  as from the mind  
7i4e4 layavijna7 which implicates itself
 with  birth and death1 since it is in  
its true nature clean1 pure1 eternal1   
calm1 and immutable4 ,the truth again is
 such that it transforms  and unfolds   
itself wherever conditions are          
favourable in the form  of a tathgata or
 in some other forms1 in order that all 
beings  may be induced thereby to bring 
their virtue to maturity4               
,non-elightenment has no existence of   
its own aside from its  relation with   
enlightenment a priori4 ,but            
enlightenment a priori  is spoken of    
only in contrast to non-enlightenment1  
and as  non-enlightenment is a          
non-entity1 true enlightenment in turn  
loses  its significance too4 ,they are  
distinguished only in mutual relation   
as enlightenment or non-enlightenment4  

,the manifestations  of                 
non-enlightenment are made in three     
ways3 7#a7 as a disturbance  of the mind
 7layavijna71 by the avidykarma         
7ignorant    #acc    action71 producing 
misery 7duhkha72 7#b7 by the appearance 
of an  ego or of a perceiver2 and 7#c7  
by the creation of an external world    
which does not exist in itself1         
independent of the perceiver4           
,conditioned  by the unreal external    
world six kinds of phenomena  arise in  
succession4 ,the first phenomenon is    
intelligence 7sensation72  being        
affected by the external world the mind 
becomes  conscious of the difference    
between the agreeable and the           
disagreeable4  ,the second phenomenon is
 succession4 ,following upon            
intelligence1 memory retains the        
sensations1 agreeable as well  as       
disagreeable1 in a continuous succession
 of subjective states4  ,the third      
phenomenon is clinging4 ,through the    
retention and  succession of sensations1

 agreeable as well as disagreeable1     
there  arises the desire of clinging4   
,the fourth phenomenon is an attachment 
to names or ideas 7samj71 etc4 ,by      
clinging the mind  hypostatizes all     
names whereby to give definitions to all
 things4  ,the fifth phenomenon is the  
performance of deeds 7karma74 ,on       
account of attachment to names1 etc41   
there arise all the variations  of      
deeds1 productive of individuality4 ,the
 sixth phenomenon  is the suffering due 
to the fetter of deeds4 ,through deeds  
suffering  arises in which the mind     
finds itself entangled and curtailed of 
its freedom4 ,all these phenomena have  
thus sprung forth through  avidy4       
,the relation between this truth and    
avidy is in one sense  a mere identity  
and may be illustrated by the simile of 
all kinds  of pottery which though      
different are all made of the same clay 
,footnote ref #a4 ,likewise the         
undefiled 7ansrava7 and ignorance       
7avidy7 and their various transient     

forms all come from one and the  same   
entity4 ,therefore ,buddha teaches that 
all beings are from all  eternity       
abiding in ,nirvna4    ,it is by the    
touch of ignorance 7avidy7 that this    
truth assumes  all the phenomenal forms 
of existence4    ,in the all-conserving 
mind 7layavijna7 ignorance manifests    
itself2 and from non-enlightenment      
starts that which sees1 that  which     
represents1 that which apprehends an    
objective world1 and  that which        
constantly particularizes4 ,this is     
called ego 7manas74  ,five different    
names are given to the ego 7according to
 its different  modes of operation74    
,the first name is                      
activity-consciousness  7karmavijna7 in 
the sense that through the agency of    
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins  
to be disturbed 7or        ,footnote #a3
 ,compare ,chndogya1 ,,vi4 #a4 #d4      
#acd    awakened74 ,the second name is  
evolving-consciousness 7pravrttiivijna7 
in the sense that when the mind is      

disturbed1 there  evolves that which    
sees an external world4 ,the third name 
is  representation-consciousness in the 
sense that the ego 7manas  represents   
7or reflects7 an external world4 ,as a  
clean mirror  reflects the images of all
 description1 it is even so with the    
representation-consciousness4 ,when it  
is confronted1 for instance1  with the  
objects of the five senses1 it          
represents them instantaneously  and    
without effort4 ,the fourth is          
particularization-consciousness1  in the
 sense that it discriminates between    
different things defiled  as well as    
pure4 ,the fifth name is                
succession-consciousness1 in the  sense 
that continuously directed by the       
awakening consciousness  of attention   
7manaskra7 it 7manas7 retains all       
experiences and  never loses or suffers 
the destruction of any karma1 good as   
well  as evil1 which had been sown in   
the past1 and whose retribution1        
painful or agreeable1 it never fails to 

mature1 be it in the present  or in the 
future1 and also in the sense that it   
unconsciously  recollects things gone by
 and in imagination anticipates things  
to come4 ,therefore the three domains   
7kmaloka1 domain of  feeling--rpaloka1  
domain of bodily existence--arpaloka1   
domain  of incorporeality7 are nothing  
but the self manifestation of the  mind 
7i4e4 layavijna which is practically    
identical with  bhtatathat74 ,since all 
things1 owing the principle of their    
existence to the mind 7layavijna71 are  
produced by smrti1  all the modes of    
particularization are the               
self-particularizations  of the mind4   
,the mind in itself 7or the soul7 being 
however free from  all attributes is not
 differentiated4 ,therefore we come to  
the conclusion  that all things and     
conditions in the phenomenal world1     
hypostatized  and established only      
through ignorance 7avidy7 and memory    
7smrti71 have no more reality than the  
images in a mirror4 ,they  arise simply 

from the ideality of a particularizing  
mind4 ,when  the mind is disturbed1 the 
multiplicity of things is produced2 but 
when the mind is quieted1 the           
multiplicity of things disappears4  ,by 
ego-consciousness 7manovijna7 we mean   
the ignorant mind  which by its         
succession-consciousness clings to the  
conception of  ,i and ,not-,i and       
misapprehends the nature of the six     
objects of  sense4 ,the                 
ego-consciousness is also called        
separation-consciousness1  because it is
 nourished by the perfuming influence of
 the  prejudices 7srava71 intellectual  
as well as affectional4 ,thus believing 
in the external world produced by       
memory1 the mind becomes    #ace        
oblivious of the principle of sameness  
7samat7 that underlies all  things which
 are one and perfectly calm and tranquil
 and show no  sign of becoming4         
,non-enlightenment is the raison d'tre  
of samsra4 ,when  this is annihilated   
the conditions--the external world--are 

also  annihilated and with them the     
state of an interrelated mind is also   
annihilated4 ,but this annihilation does
 not mean the annihilation  of the mind 
but of its modes only4 ,it becomes calm 
like an unruffled  sea when all winds   
which were disturbing it and producing  
the waves have been annihilated4    ,in 
describing the relation of the          
interaction of avidy 7ignorance71       
karmavijna 7activity-consciousness--the 
subjective mind71  visaya 7external     
world--represented by the senses7 and   
the tathat  7suchness71 ,as'vaghosa says
 that there is an interperfuming of     
these elements4 ,thus ,as'vaghosa says1 
,by perfuming we mean  that while our   
worldly clothes 7viz4 those which we    
wear7 have no  odour of their own1      
neither offensive nor agreeable1 they   
can yet  acquire one or the other odour 
according to the nature of the substance
  with which they are perfumed4         
,suchness 7tathat7 is likewise  a pure  
dharma free from all defilements caused 

by the perfuming  power of ignorance4   
,on the other hand ignorance has nothing
 to  do with purity4 ,nevertheless we   
speak of its being able to do the  work 
of purity because it in its turn is     
perfumed by suchness4  ,determined by   
suchness ignorance becomes the raison   
d'tre of  all forms of defilement4 ,and 
this ignorance perfumes suchness  and   
produces smrti4 ,this smrti in its turn 
perfumes ignorance4  ,on account of this
 7reciprocal7 perfuming1 the truth is   
misunderstood4  ,on account of its being
 misunderstood an external world  of    
subjectivity appears4 ,further1 on      
account of the perfuming  power of      
memory1 various modes of individuation  
are produced4  ,and by clinging to them 
various deeds are done1 and we suffer   
as the result miseries mentally as well 
as bodily4 ,again suchness  perfumes    
ignorance1 and in consequence of this   
perfuming  the individual in            
subjectivity is caused to loathe the    
misery of  birth and death and to seek  

after the blessing of ,nirvna4 ,this    
longing and loathing on the part of the 
subjective mind in turn  perfumes       
suchness4 ,on account of this perfuming 
influence we  are enabled to believe    
that we are in possession within        
ourselves  of suchness whose essential  
nature is pure and immaculate2 and  we  
also recognize that all phenomena in the
 world are nothing    #acf    but the   
illusory manifestations of the mind     
7layavijna7 and  have no reality of     
their own4 ,since we thus rightly       
understand  the truth1 we can practise  
the means of liberation1 can perform    
those actions which are in accordance   
with the dharma4 ,we  should neither    
particularize1 nor cling to objects of  
desire4 ,by  virtue of this discipline  
and habituation during the lapse of     
innumerable  sankhyeyakalpas ,footnote  
ref #a we get ignorance annihilated4 ,as
  ignorance is thus annihilated1 the    
mind 7layavijna7 is no longer           
disturbed1 so as to be subject to       

individuation4 ,as the mind is no       
longer disturbed1 the particularization 
of the surrounding world  is            
annihilated4 ,when in this wise the     
principle and the condition  of         
defilement1 their products1 and the     
mental disturbances are all             
annihilated1 it is said that we attain  
,nirvna and that various  spontaneous   
displays of activity are accomplished4  
,the ,nirvna  of the tathat philosophy  
is not nothingness1 but tathat 7suchness
  or thatness7 in its purity            
unassociated with any kind of           
disturbance  which produces all the     
diversity of experience4    ,to the     
question that if all beings are         
uniformly in possession  of suchness and
 are therefore equally perfumed by it1  
how is it  that there are some who do   
not believe in it1 while others do1     
,as'vaghosa's reply is that though all  
beings are uniformly in  possession of  
suchness1 the intensity of ignorance and
 the principle  of individuation1 that  

work from all eternity1 vary in such    
manifold grades as to outnumber the     
sands of the ,ganges1 and  hence the    
difference4 ,there is an inherent       
perfuming principle  in one's own being 
which1 embraced and protected by the    
love  7maitr7 and compassion 7karun7 of 
all ,buddhas and ,bodhisattvas1  is     
caused to loathe the misery of birth and
 death1 to believe  in nirvna1 to       
cultivate the root of merit             
7kus'alamla71 to habituate  oneself to  
it and to bring it to maturity4 ,in     
consequence  of this1 one is enabled to 
see all ,buddhas and ,bodhisattvas and1 
receiving  instructions from them1 is   
benefited1 gladdened and induced  to    
practise good deeds1 etc41 till one can 
attain to ,buddhahood and  enter into   
,nirvna4 ,this implies that all beings  
have such perfuming  power in them that 
they may be affected by the good wishes 
of the ,buddhas and ,bodhisattvas for   
leading them to the path  of virtue1 and
 thus it is that sometimes hearing the  

,bodhisattvas  and sometimes seeing     
them1 all beings thereby acquire        
7spiritual7  benefits 7hitat7 and       
entering into the samdhi of purity1 they
        ,footnote #a3 ,technical name   
for a very vast period of time4    #acg 
destroy hindrances wherever they are met
 with and obtain all-penetrating        
insight that enables them to become     
conscious of the absolute oneness       
7samat7 of the universe 7sarvaloka7 and 
to see innumerable ,buddhas  and        
,bodhisattvas4    ,there is a difference
 between the perfuming which is not in  
unison with suchness1 as in the case of 
s'rvakas 7theravdin  monks71            
pratyekabuddhas and the novice          
bodhisattvas1 who only  continue their  
religious discipline but do not attain  
to the state  of non-particularization  
in unison with the essence of suchness4 
,but those bodhisattvas whose perfuming 
is already in unison with  suchness     
attain to the state of                  
non-particularization and allow         

themselves to be influenced only by the 
power of the dharma4  ,the incessant    
perfuming of the defiled dharma         
7ignorance from  all eternity7 works on1
 but when one attains to ,buddhahood one
  at once puts an end to it4 ,the       
perfuming of the pure dharma  7i4e4     
suchness7 however works on to eternity  
without any interruption4  ,for this    
suchness or thatness is the effulgence  
of great  wisdom1 the universal         
illumination of the dharmadhtu          
7universe71  the true and adequate      
knowledge1 the mind pure and clean in   
its  own nature1 the eternal1 the       
blessed1 the self-regulating and the    
pure1 the tranquil1 the inimitable and  
the free1 and this is called  the       
tathgatagarbha or the dharmakya4 ,it may
 be objected that  since thatness or    
suchness has been described as being    
without  characteristics1 it is now a   
contradiction to speak of it as         
embracing  all merits1 but it is held1  
that in spite of its embracing all      

merits1  it is free in its nature from  
all forms of distinction1 because all   
objects in the world are of one and the 
same taste2 and being  of one reality   
they have nothing to do with the modes  
of particularization  or of dualistic   
character4 ,though all things in their  
7metaphysical7 origin come from the soul
 alone and in truth are  free from      
particularization1 yet on account of    
non-enlightenment  there originates a   
subjective mind 7layavijna7 that becomes
  conscious of an external world4 ,this 
is called ignorance or  avidy4          
,nevertheless the pure essence of the   
mind is perfectly  pure and there is no 
awakening of ignorance in it4 ,hence we 
assign  to suchness this quality1 the   
effulgence of great wisdom4 ,it is      
called universal illumination1 because  
there is nothing for it to  illumine4   
,this perfuming of suchness therefore   
continues for ever1  though the stage of
 the perfuming of avidy comes to an end 
with  the ,buddhas when they attain to  

nirvna4 ,all ,buddhas while at    #ach  
the stage of discipline feel a deep     
compassion 7mahkarun7 for all  beings1  
practise all virtues 7pramits7 and many 
other meritorious  deeds1 treat others  
as their own selves1 and wish to work   
out a  universal salvation of mankind in
 ages to come1 through limitless        
numbers of kalpas1 recognize truthfully 
and adequately the  principle of        
equality 7samat7among people2 and do not
 cling  to the individual existence of a
 sentient being4 ,this is what is  meant
 by the activity of tathat4 ,the main   
idea of this tathat  philosophy seems to
 be this1 that this transcendent        
thatness is  at once the quintessence of
 all thought and activity2 as avidy     
veils  it or perfumes it1 the           
world-appearance springs forth1 but as  
the  pure thatness also perfumes the    
avidy there is a striving for the  good 
as well4 ,as the stage of avidy is      
passed its luminous  character shines   
forth1 for it is the ultimate truth     

which only  illusorily appeared as the  
many of the world4    ,this doctrine    
seems to be more in agreement with the  
view  of an absolute unchangeable       
reality as the ultimate truth than  that
 of the nihilistic idealism of          
,lankvatra4 ,considering the  fact that 
,as'vaghosa was a learned ,brahmin      
scholar in his early  life1 it is easy  
to guess that there was much ,upanisad  
influence in  this interpretation of    
,buddhism1 which compares so favourably 
with the ,vednta as interpreted by      
,s'ankara4 ,the ,lankvatra  admitted a  
reality only as a make-believe to       
attract the ,tairthikas  7heretics7 who 
had a prejudice in favour of an         
unchangeable self  7tman74 ,but         
,as'vaghosa plainly admitted an         
unspeakable reality  as the ultimate    
truth4 ,ngrjuna's ,mdhyamika doctrines  
which  eclipsed the profound philosophy 
of ,as'vaghosa seem to be more  faithful
 to the traditional ,buddhist creed and 
to the ,vijnavda  creed of ,buddhism as 

explained in the ,lankvatra ,footnote   
ref #a4      ,the ,mdhyamika or the     
,s'ntavda school4--,nihilism4           
,candrakrtti1 the commentator of        
,ngrjuna's verses known as  ,mdhyamika  
krik1 in explaining the doctrine of     
dependent  origination 7prattyasamutpda7
 as described by ,ngrjuna starts  with  
two interpretations of the word4        
,according to one the word              
prattyasamutpda means the origination   
7utpda7 of the nonexistent  7abhva7     
depending on 7prattya7 reasons and      
causes        ,footnote #a3 ,as ,i have 
no access to the ,chinese translation of
  ,as'vaghosa's ,s'raddhotpda ,s'stra1  
,i had to depend entirely on  ,suzuki's 
expressions as they appear in his       
translation4    #aci    7hetupratyaya74 
,according to the other interpretation  
prattya  means each and every           
destructible individual and             
prattyasamutpda  means the origination  
of each and every destructible          
individual4  ,but he disapproves of both

 these meanings4 ,the second meaning    
does  not suit the context in which the 
,pli ,scriptures generally speak  of    
prattyasamutpda 7e4g4 caksuh prattya    
rpni ca utpadyante  caksurvijnam7 for it
 does not mean the origination of each  
and  every destructible individual1 but 
the originating of specific  individual 
phenomena 7e4g4 perception of form by   
the operation in  connection with the   
eye7 depending upon certain specific    
conditions4    ,the first meaning also  
is equally unsuitable4 ,thus for example
  if we take the case of any            
origination1 e4g4 that of the visual    
percept1  we see that there cannot be   
any contact between visual  knowledge   
and physical sense1 the eye1 and so it  
would not be  intelligible that the     
former should depend upon the latter4   
,if we  interpret the maxim of          
prattyasamutpda as this happening that  
happens1 that would not explain any     
specific origination4 ,all  origination 
is false1 for a thing can neither       

originate by itself nor  by others1 nor 
by a co-operation of both nor without   
any reason4  ,for if a thing exists     
already it cannot originate again by    
itself4  ,to suppose that it is         
originated by others would also mean    
that the origination was of a thing     
already existing4 ,if again  without any
 further qualification it is said that  
depending on  one the other comes into  
being1 then depending on anything any   
other thing could come into being--from 
light we could have darkness6  ,since a 
thing could not originate from itself or
 by others1  it could not also be       
originated by a combination of both of  
them  together4 ,a thing also could not 
originate without any cause1  for then  
all things could come into being at all 
times4 ,it is therefore  to be          
acknowledged that wherever the ,buddha  
spoke of this  so-called dependent      
origination 7prattyasamutpda7 it was    
referred  to as illusory manifestations 
appearing to intellects and  senses     

stricken with ignorance4 ,this dependent
 origination is  not thus a real law1   
but only an appearance due to ignorance 
7avidy74 ,the only thing which is not   
lost 7amosadharma7 is  nirvna2 but all  
other forms of knowledge and phenomena  
7samskra7 are false and are lost with   
their appearances  7sarvasamskrs'ca     
mrsmosadharmnah74    ,it is sometimes   
objected to this doctrine that if all   
appearances    #adj    are false1 then  
they do not exist at all4 ,there are    
then no  good or bad works and no cycle 
of existence1 and if such is the  case1 
then it may be argued that no           
philosophical discussion  should be     
attempted4 ,but the reply to such an    
objection is that the  nihilistic       
doctrine is engaged in destroying the   
misplaced confidence  of the people that
 things are true4 ,those who are really 
wise do not find anything either false  
or true1 for to them clearly  they do   
not exist at all and they do not trouble
 themselves with  the question of their 

truth or falsehood4 ,for him who knows  
thus  there are neither works nor cycles
 of births 7samsra7 and also he  does   
not trouble himself about the existence 
or non-existence of  any of the         
appearances4 ,thus it is said in the    
,ratnaktastra that  howsoever carefully 
one may search one cannot discover      
consciousness  7citta72 what cannot be  
perceived cannot be said to exist1  and 
what does not exist is neither past1 nor
 future1 nor present1 and  as such it   
cannot be said to have any nature at    
all2 and that which  has no nature is   
subject neither to origination nor to   
extinction4  ,he who through his false  
knowledge 7viparyysa7 does not          
comprehend  the falsehood of all        
appearances1 but thinks them to be      
real1 works and suffers the cycles of   
rebirth 7samsra74 ,like all  illusions1 
though false these appearances can      
produce all the harm  of rebirth and    
sorrow4    ,it may again be objected    
that if there is nothing true  according

 to the nihilists 7s'nyavdins71 then    
their statement that  there is no       
origination or extinction is also not   
true4 ,candrakirtti  in replying to this
 says that with s'nyavdins the truth is 
absolute  silence4 ,when the ,s'nyavdin 
sages argue1 they only accept for  the  
moment what other people regard as      
reasons1 and deal with  them in their   
own manner to help them to come to a    
right  comprehension of all appearances4
 ,it is of no use to say1 in spite  of  
all arguments tending to show the       
falsehood of all appearances1  that they
 are testified by our experience1 for   
the whole thing that  we call our       
experience is but false illusion        
inasmuch as these  phenomena have no    
true essence4    ,when the doctrine of  
prattyasamutpda is described as this    
being that is1 what is really meant is  
that things can only be  indicated as   
mere appearances one after another1 for 
they have  no essence or true nature4   
,nihilism 7s'nyavda7 also means just    

this4 ,the true meaning of              
prattyasamutpda or s'nyavda is  this1   
that there is no truth1 no essence in   
all phenomena that    #ada    appear    
,footnote ref #a4 ,as the phenomena have
 no essence they are neither  produced  
nor destroyed2 they really neither come 
nor go4 ,they  are merely the appearance
 of maya or illusion4 ,the void 7s'nya7 
does not mean pure negation1 for that is
 relative to some kind of  position4 ,it
 simply means that none of the          
appearances have any  intrinsic nature  
of their own 7nihsvabhvatvam74    ,the  
,madhyamaka or ,s'nya system does not   
hold that anything  has any essence or  
nature 7svabhva7 of its own2 even  heat 
cannot be said to be the essence of     
fire2 for both the heat  and the fire   
are the result of the combination of    
many conditions1  and what depends on   
many conditions cannot be said to be the
  nature or essence of the thing4 ,that 
alone may be said to be the  true       
essence or nature of anything which does

 not depend on  anything else1 and since
 no such essence or nature can be       
pointed  out which stands independently 
by itself we cannot say that it  exists4
 ,if a thing has no essence or existence
 of its own1 we cannot  affirm the      
essence of other things to it           
7parabhva74 ,if we  cannot affirm       
anything of anything as positive1 we    
cannot consequently  assert anything of 
anything as negative4 ,if anyone first  
believes in things positive and         
afterwards discovers that they are  not 
so1 he no doubt thus takes his stand on 
a negation 7abhva71  but in reality     
since we cannot speak of anything       
positive1 we cannot  speak of anything  
negative either ,footnote ref #b4    ,it
 is again objected that we nevertheless 
perceive a process  going on4 ,to this  
the ,madhyamaka reply is that a process 
of  change could not be affirmed of     
things that are permanent4 ,but we  can 
hardly speak of a process with reference
 to momentary things2  for those which  

are momentary are destroyed the next    
moment  after they appear1 and so there 
is nothing which can continue to        
justify a process4 ,that which appears  
as being neither comes  from anywhere   
nor goes anywhere1 and that which       
appears as destroyed  also does not come
 from anywhere nor go anywhere1  and so 
a process 7samsra7 cannot be affirmed of
 them4 ,it cannot  be that when the     
second moment arose1 the first moment   
had  suffered a change in the process1  
for it was not the same as the  second1 
as there is no so-called cause-effect   
connection4 ,in fact  there being no    
relation between the two1 the temporal  
determination  as prior and later is    
wrong4 ,the supposition that there is a 
self which suffers changes is also not  
valid1 for howsoever we        ,footnote
 #a3 ,see ,mdhyamikavrtti 7,b4,t4,s471  
p4 #ej4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 pp4     
#ic-ajj4    #adb    may search we find  
the five skandhas but no self4 ,moreover
 if  the soul is a unity it cannot      

undergo any process or progression1  for
 that would presuppose that the soul    
abandons one character  and takes up    
another at the same identical moment    
which is  inconceivable ,footnote ref   
#a4    ,but then again the question     
arises that if there is no process1  and
 no cycle of worldly existence of       
thousands of afflictions1 what  is then 
the nirvna which is described as the    
final extinction of  all afflictions    
7kles'a78 ,to this the ,madhyamaka reply
 is that it does  not agree to such a   
definition of nirvna4 ,nirvna on the    
,madhyamaka  theory is the absence of   
the essence of all phenomena1 that      
which cannot be conceived either as     
anything which has ceased  or as        
anything which is produced 7aniruddham  
anntpannam4 ,in  nirvna all phenomena   
are lost2 we say that the phenomena     
cease  to exist in nirvna1 but like the 
illusory snake in the rope they  never  
existed ,footnote ref #b4 ,nirvna cannot
 be any positive thing or  any sort of  

state of being 7bhva71 for all positive 
states or things  are joint products of 
combined causes 7samskrta7 and are      
liable to  decay and destruction4       
,neither can it be a negative existence1
 for since  we cannot speak of any      
positive existence1 we cannot speak of a
  negative existence either4 ,the       
appearances or the phenomena are        
communicated as being in a state of     
change and process coming  one after    
another1 but beyond that no essence1    
existence1 or truth  can be affirmed of 
them4 ,phenomena sometimes appear to be 
produced and sometimes to be destroyed1 
but they cannot be  determined as       
existent or non-existent4 ,nirvna is    
merely the  cessation of the seeming    
phenomenal flow 7prapacapravrtti74 ,it  
cannot therefore be designated either as
 positive or as negative for  these     
conceptions belong to phenomena 7na     
cpravrttimatram  bhvbhveti parikalpitum 
pryyate evam na bhvbhvanirvnam1  ,m4,v4 
#aig74 ,in this state there is nothing  

which is known1  and even the knowledge 
that the phenomena have ceased to       
appear is not found4 ,even the ,buddha  
himself is a phenomenon1  a mirage or a 
dream1 and so are all his teachings     
,footnote ref #c4    ,it is easy to see 
that in this system there cannot exist  
any  bondage or emancipation2 all       
phenomena are like shadows1 like  the   
mirage1 the dream1 the my1 and the magic
 without any real  nature 7nihsvabhva74 
,it is mere false knowledge to suppose  
that        ,footnote #a3 ,see          
,madhyamikavrtti 7,b4,t4,s471 pp4       
#aja-ajb4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 p4    
#aid4    ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 pp4#afb   
and #bja4    #adc    one is trying to   
win a real nirvna ,footnote ref #a4 ,it 
is this false  egoism that is to be     
considered as avidy4 ,when considered   
deeply it is  found that there is not   
even the slightest trace of any positive
 existence4  ,thus it is seen that if   
there were no ignorance 7avidy71 there  
would have been no conformations        

7samskras71 and if there were  no       
conformations there would have been no  
consciousness1 and so  on2 but it cannot
 be said of the ignorance ,i am         
generating the  samskras1 and it can be 
said of the samskras we are being       
produced by the avidy4 ,but there being 
avidy1 there come the  samskars and so  
on with other categories too4 ,this     
character of  the prattyasamutpda is    
known as the coming of the consequent   
depending on an antecedent reason       
7hetpanibandha74    ,it can be viewed   
from another aspect1 namely that of     
dependence  on conglomeration or        
combination 7pratyayopanibandh74  ,it is
 by the combination 7samavya7 of the    
four elements1 space  7ks'a7 and        
consciousness 7vijna7 that a man is     
made4 ,it is  due to earth 7prthiv7 that
 the body becomes solid1 it is due to   
water that there is fat in the body1 it 
is due to fire that there is  digestion1
 it is due to wind that there is        
respiration2 it is due  to ks'a that    

there is porosity1 and it is due to     
vijna that  there is mind-consciousness4
 ,it is by their mutual combination     
that we find a man as he is4 ,but none  
of these elements think  that they have 
done any of the functions that are      
considered to be  allotted to them4     
,none of these are real substances or   
beings or  souls4 ,it is by ignorance   
that these are thought of as existents  
and  attachment is generated for them4  
,through ignorance thus come  the       
samskras1 consisting of attachment1     
antipathy and thoughtlessness  7rga1    
dvesa1 moha72 from these proceed the    
vijna and  the four skandhas4 ,these    
with the four elements bring about name 
and form 7nmarpa71 from these proceed   
the senses 7sadayatana71  from the      
coming together of those three comes    
contact 7spars'a72  from that feelings1 
from that comes desire 7trsn7 and so on4
  ,these flow on like the stream of a   
river1 but there is no essence  or truth
 behind them all or as the ground of    

them all ,footnote ref #b4  ,the        
phenomena therefore cannot be said to be
 either existent or  non-existent1 and  
no truth can be affirmed of either      
eternalism  7s's'vatavda7 or nihilism   
7ucchedavda71 and it is for this reason 
,footnote #a3 ,see ,mdhyamikavrtti      
7,b4,t4,s471 pp4 #aja-ajh4    ,footnote3
 ,ibid4 pp4 #bji-baa1 quoted from       
,slistambhastra4  ,vcaspatimis'ra also  
quotes this passage in his ,bhmat on    
,s'ankara's ,brahma-stra4    #add       
that this doctrine is called the middle 
doctrine 7madhyamaka7 ,footnote  ref #a4
 ,existence and non-existence have only 
a relative truth  7samvrtisatya7 in     
them1 as in all phenomena1 but there is 
no true  reality 7paramrthasatya7 in    
them or anything else4 ,morality  plays 
as high a part in this nihilistic system
 as it does in any  other ,indian       
system4 ,i quote below some stanzas from
 ,ngrjuna's  ,sukrllekha as translated  
by ,wenzel 7,p4,t4,s4 #ahhf7 from  the  
,tibetan translation4    #f4 ,knowing   

that riches are unstable and void 7asra7
 give according to  the moral precepts1 
to ,bhikshus1 ,brahmins1 the poor and   
friends for there  is no better friend  
than giving4    #g4 ,exhibit morality   
7s'la7 faultless and sublime1 unmixed   
and spotless1  for morality is the      
supporting ground of all eminence1 as   
the earth is of  the moving and         
immovable4    #h4 ,exercise the         
imponderable1 transcendental virtues of 
charity1 morality1  patience1 energy1   
meditation1 and likewise wisdom1 in     
order that1 having  reached the farther 
shore of the sea of existence1 you may  
become a ,jina  prince4    #i4 ,view as 
enemies1 avarice 7mtsaryya71 deceit     
7s'thya71 duplicity  7my71 lust1        
indolence 7kausdya71 pride 7mna71 greed 
7rga71  hatred 7dvesa7 and pride 7mada7 
concerning family1 figure1 glory1       
youth1 or power4    #ae4 ,since nothing 
is so difficult of attainment as        
patience1 open no door  for anger2 the  
,buddha has pronounced that he who      

renounces anger shall  attain the degree
 of an angmin 7a saint who never suffers
 rebirth74    #ba4 ,do not look after   
another's wife2 but if you see her1     
regard her1  according to age1 like your
 mother1 daughter or sister4    #bd4 ,of
 him who has conquered the unstable1    
ever moving objects of the  six senses  
and him who has overcome the mass of his
 enemies in battle1 the  wise praise the
 first as the greater hero4    #bi4     
,thou who knowest the world1 be         
equanimous against the eight worldly    
conditions1 gain and loss1 happiness and
 suffering1 fame and dishonour1  blame  
and praise1 for they are not objects for
 your thoughts4    #cg4 ,but one 7a     
woman7 that is gentle as a sister1      
winning as a friend1  careful of your   
well being as a mother1 obedient as a   
servant her 7you  must7 honour as the   
guardian god7dess7 of the family4       
#dj4 ,always perfectly meditate on 7turn
 your thoughts to7 kindness1 pity1  joy 
and indifference2 then if you do not    

obtain a higher degree you  7certainly7 
will obtain the happiness of ,brahman's 
world 7brahmavihra74    #da4 ,by the    
four dhynas completely abandoning desire
 7kma71 reflection  7vicra71 joy 7prti71
 and happiness and pain 7sukha1 duhkha7 
you  will obtain as fruit the lot of a  
,brahman4    #di4 ,if you say ,i am not 
the form1 you thereby will understand ,i
 am  not endowed with form1 ,i do not   
dwell in form1 the form does not dwell  
in  me2 and in like manner you will     
understand the voidness of the other    
four  aggregates4    #ej4 ,the          
aggregates do not arise from desire1 nor
 from time1 nor from        ,footnote   
#a3 ,see ,mdhyamikavrtti 7,b4,t4,s471 p4
 #afj4    #ade    nature 7prakrti71 not 
from themselves 7svabhvt71 nor from the 
,lord  7s'vara71 nor yet are they       
without cause2 know that they arise from
  ignorance 7avidy7 and desire 7trsn74  
#ea4 ,know that attachment to religious 
ceremonies 7s'labrataparmars'a71  wrong 
views 7mithydrsti7 and doubt 7vicikits7 

are the three  fetters4    #ec4         
,steadily instruct yourself 7more and   
more7 in the highest morality1  the     
highest wisdom and the highest thought1 
for the hundred and fifty one  rules 7of
 the prtimoksa7 are combined perfectly  
in these three4    #eh4 ,because thus   
7as demonstrated7 all this is unstable  
7anitya7 without  substance 7antma7     
without help 7as'arana7 without         
protector  7antha7 and without abode    
7asthna7 thou ,o ,lord of men must      
become  discontented with this worthless
 7asra7 kadali-tree of the orb4    #ajd4
 ,if a fire were to seize your head or  
your dress you would extinguish  and    
subdue it1 even then endeavour to       
annihilate desire1 for there is no      
other higher necessity than this4       
#aje4 ,by morality1 knowledge and       
contemplation1 attain the spotless      
dignity  of the quieting and the        
subduing nirvna not subject to age1     
death or  decay1 devoid of earth1 water1
 fire1 wind1 sun and moon4    #ajg4     

,where there is no wisdom 7praj7 there  
is also no contemplation  7dhyana71     
where there is no contemplation there is
 also no wisdom2 but  know that for him 
who possesses these two the sea of      
existence is like a  grove4             
,uncompromising ,idealism or the ,school
  of ,vijnavda ,buddhism4    ,the school
 of ,buddhist philosophy known as the   
,vijnavda  or ,yogcra has often been    
referred to by such prominent teachers  
of ,hindu thought as ,kumrila and       
,s'ankara4 ,it agrees to a great  extent
 with the ,s'nyavdins whom we have      
already described4  ,all the dharmas    
7qualities and substances7 are but      
imaginary  constructions of ignorant    
minds4 ,there is no movement in the     
so-called external world as we suppose1 
for it does not exist4 ,we  construct it
 ourselves and then are ourselves       
deluded that it exists  by itself       
7nirmmitapratimohi7 ,footnote ref #a4   
,there are two functions  involved in   
our consciousness1 viz4 that which holds

 the perceptions  7khyti vijna71 and    
that which orders them by imaginary     
constructions  7vastuprativikalpavijna74
 ,the two functions however mutually    
determine each other and cannot be      
separately distinguished                
7abhinnalaksane anyonyahetuke74 ,these  
functions are set to work  on account of
 the beginningless instinctive          
tendencies inherent  in them in relation
 to the world of appearance             
7andikla-prapaca-vsanahetukaca7         
,footnote ref #b4    ,all sense         
knowledge can be stopped only when the  
diverse        ,footnote #a3            
,lankvatrastra1 pp4 #ba-bb4    ,footnote
 #b ,ibid4 p4 #dd4    #adf              
unmanifested instincts of imagination   
are stopped                             
7abhta-parikalpa-vsan-vaicitra-nirodha7 
,footnote ref #a4 ,all our phenomenal   
knowledge  is without any essence or    
truth 7nihsvabhva7 and is but a         
creation of my1 a mirage or a dream4    
,there is nothing which  may be called  

external1 but all is the imaginary      
creation of the  mind 7svacitta71 which 
has been accustomed to create imaginary 
appearances from beginningless time4    
,this mind by whose movement  these     
creations take place as subject and     
object has no  appearance in itself and 
is thus without any origination1        
existence  and extinction               
7utpdasthitibhangavarjjam7 and is called
 the  layavijna4 ,the reason why this   
layavijna itself is said to be  without 
origination1 existence1 and extinction  
is probably this1  that it is always a  
hypothetical state which merely explains
 all  the phenomenal states that appear1
 and therefore it has no existence  in  
the sense in which the term is used and 
we could not  affirm any special essence
 of it4    ,we do not realize that all  
visible phenomena are of nothing        
external but of our own mind 7svacitta71
 and there is also the  beginningless   
tendency for believing and creating a   
phenomenal world  of appearance4 ,there 

is also the nature of knowledge 7which  
takes things as the perceiver and the   
perceived7 and there is also  the       
instinct in the mind to experience      
diverse forms4 ,on account  of these    
four reasons there are produced in the  
layavijna 7mind7  the ripples of our    
sense experiences 7pravrttivijana7 as in
 a lake1  and these are manifested as   
sense experiences4 ,all the five        
skandhas  called pachavijnakya thus     
appear in a proper synthetic  form4     
,none of the phenomenal knowledge that  
appears is either  identical or         
different from the layavijna just as the
 waves cannot  be said to be either     
identical or different from the ocean4  
,as  the ocean dances on in waves so the
 citta or the layavijna  is also dancing
 as it were in its diverse operations   
7vrtti74 ,as  citta it collects all     
movements 7karma7 within it1 as manas it
  synthesizes 7vidhyate7 and as vijna it
 constructs the fivefold  perceptions   
7vijnn vijnti drs'yam kalpate pacabhih7 

,footnote  ref #b4    ,it is only due to
 my 7illusion7 that the phenomena appear
 in their  twofold aspect as subject and
 object4 ,this must always be regarded  
as  an appearance 7samvrtisatyat7       
whereas in the real aspect we could     
never say whether they existed 7bhva7 or
 did not exist ,footnote ref #c4        
,footnote #a3 ,pacvatrastra1 p4 #dd4    
,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 pp4 #ej-ee4       
,footnote #c3 ,asanga's                 
,mahynastrlamkra1 pp4 #eh-ei4    #adg   
,all phenomena both being and non-being 
are illusory 7sadasantah  myopamh74     
,when we look deeply into them we find  
that  there is an absolute negation of  
all appearances1 including even  all    
negations1 for they are also            
appearances4 ,this would make the       
ultimate truth positive4 ,but this is   
not so1 for it is that in which  the    
positive and negative are one and the   
same 7bhvbhvasamnat7  ,footnote ref #a4 
,such a state which is complete in      
itself and has no  name and no substance

 had been described in the              
,lankvatrastra  as thatness 7tathat7    
,footnote ref #b4 ,this state is also   
described in  another place in the      
,lankvatra as voidness 7s'nyat7 which is
 one  and has no origination and no     
essence ,footnote ref #c4 ,in another   
place  it is also designated as         
tathgatagarbha ,footnote ref #d4    ,it 
may be supposed that this doctrine of an
 unqualified  ultimate truth comes near 
to the ,vedantic tman or ,brahman  like 
the tathat doctrine of ,as'vaghosa2 and 
we find in ,lankavatra  that ,rvana asks
 the ,buddha ,how can you say that  your
 doctrine of tathgatagarbha was not the 
same as the tman  doctrine of the other 
schools of philosophers1 for those      
heretics  also consider the tman as     
eternal1 agent1 unqualified1 all        
pervading  and unchanged8 ,to this the  
,buddha is found to reply  thus--,our   
doctrine is not the same as the doctrine
 of those  heretics2 it is in           
consideration of the fact that the      

instruction  of a philosophy which      
considered that there was no soul or    
substance  in anything 7nairatmya7 would
 frighten the disciples1 that  ,i say   
that all things are in reality the      
tathgatagarbha4 ,this  should not be    
regarded as tman4 ,just as a lump of    
clay is made  into various shapes1 so it
 is the non-essential nature  of all    
phenomena and their freedom from all    
characteristics                         
7sarvavikalpalaksanavinivrttam7 that is 
variously described as  the garbha or   
the nairtmya 7essencelessness74 ,this   
explanation of  tathgatagarbha as the   
ultimate truth and reality is given in  
order to  attract to our creed those    
heretics who are superstitiously        
inclined to believe in the tman doctrine
 ,footnote ref #e4    ,so far as the    
appearance of the phenomena was         
concerned1  the idealistic ,buddhists   
7vijnavdins7 agreed to the doctrine of  
prattyasamutpda with certain            
modifications4 ,there was with  them an 

external prattyasamutpda just as it     
appeared in the        ,footnote #a3    
,asanga's ,mahynastrlamkra1 p4 #fe4     
,footnote #b3 ,lankvatrastra1 p4 #gj4   
,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 p4 #gh4            
,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 p4 #hj4            
,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 pp4 #hj-ha4    #adh
    objective aspect and an internal    
prattyasamutpda4 ,the external          
prattyasamutpda 7dependent origination7 
is represented in the  way in which     
material things 7e4g4 a jug7 came into  
being by the  co-operation of diverse   
elements--the lump of clay1 the potter1 
the wheel1 etc4 ,the internal 7dhytmika7
 prattyasamutpda  was represented by    
avidy1 trsn1 karma1 the skandhas1 and   
the  yatanas produced out of them       
,footnote ref #a4    ,our understanding 
is composed of two categories called the
  pravichayabuddhi and the              
vikalpalaksanagrahbhinives'apratisthapik
buddhi4 ,the  pravicayabuddhi is that   
which always seeks to take things in    
either  of the following four ways1 that

 they are either this or the other      
7ekatvnyaiva72 either both or not both  
7ubhaynubhaya71 either  are or are not  
7astinsti71 either eternal or           
non-eternal 7nitynitya74  ,but in       
reality none of these can be affirmed of
 the phenomena4 ,the second  category   
consists of that habit of the mind by   
virtue of which it  constructs          
diversities and arranges them 7created  
in their turn by  its own constructive  
activity--parikalpa7 in a logical order 
of diverse  relations of subject and    
predicate1 causal and other relations4  
,he who  knows the nature of these two  
categories of the mind knows that there 
is no external world of matter and that 
they are all experienced only  in the   
mind4 ,there is no water1 but it is the 
sense construction of  smoothness       
7sneha7 that constructs the water as an 
external substance2  it is the sense    
construction of activity or energy that 
constructs the external substance of    
fire2 it is the sense construction  of  

movement that constructs the external   
substance of air4  ,in this way through 
the false habit of taking the unreal as 
the  real 7mithysatybhinives'a7 five    
skandhas appear4 ,if these were  to     
appear all together1 we could not speak 
of any kind of causal  relations1 and if
 they appeared in succession there could
 be  no connection between them1 as     
there is nothing to bind them  together4
 ,in reality there is nothing which is  
produced or  destroyed1 it is only our  
constructive imagination that builds up 
things as perceived with all their      
relations1 and ourselves as  perceivers4
 ,it is simply a convention 7vyavahra7  
to speak of things  as known ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,whatever we designate by speech
 is mere  speech-construction           
7vgvikalpa7 and unreal4 ,in speech one  
could not  speak of anything without    
relating things in some kind of causal  
,footnote #a3 ,lankvatrastra1 p4 #he4   
,footnote #b3 ,lankvatrastra1 p4 #hg1   
compare the term vyavahrika as  used of 

the phenomenal and the conventional     
world in almost the same  sense by      
,s'ankara4    #adi    relation1 but none
 of these characters may be said to be  
true2  the real truth 7paramartha7 can  
never be referred to by such            
speech-construction4    ,the nothingness
 7s'nyata7 of things may be viewed from 
seven aspects--7#a7 that they are always
 interdependent1 and hence  have no     
special characteristics by themselves1  
and as they cannot  be determined in    
themselves they cannot be determined in 
terms  of others1 for1 their own nature 
being undetermined1 a reference  to an  
other is also undetermined1 and hence   
they are all indefinable                
7laksanas'nyata72 7#b7 that they have no
 positive essence  7bhvasvabhvas'nyat71 
since they spring up from a natural     
non-existence 7svabhvbhvotpatti72 7#c7  
that they are of an unknown  type of    
non-existence 7apracaritas'nyat71 since 
all the skandhas  vanish in the nirvana2
 7#d7 that they appear phenomenally as  

connected  though non-existent          
7pracaritas'nyat71 for their skandhas   
have no reality in themselves nor are   
they related to others1 but  yet they   
appear to be somehow causally connected2
 7#e7 that none  of the things can be   
described as having any definite nature1
  they are all undemonstrable by        
language 7nirabhilapyas'nyat72  7#f7    
that there cannot be any knowledge about
 them except that  which is brought     
about by the long-standing defects of   
desires  which pollute all our vision2  
7#g7 that things are also non-existent  
in the sense that we affirm them to be  
in a particular place and  time in which
 they are not 7itaretaras'nyat74        
,there is thus only non-existence1 which
 again is neither eternal  nor          
destructible1 and the world is but a    
dream and a my2 the  two kinds of       
negation 7nirodha7 are ks'a 7space7 and 
nirvana2  things which are neither      
existent nor non-existent are only      
imagined to be existent by fools4       

,this view apparently comes into        
conflict with the doctrine of  this     
school1 that the reality is called the  
tathgatagarbha 7the  womb of all that is
 merged in thatness7 and all the        
phenomenal  appearances of the clusters 
7skandhas71 elements 7dhtus71 and       
fields of sense operation 7yatanas7 only
 serve to veil it with  impurities1 and 
this would bring it nearer to the       
assumption of a  universal soul as the  
reality4 ,but the ,lankvatra attempts to
  explain away this conflict by         
suggesting that the reference to  the   
tathgatagarbha as the reality is only a 
sort of  false bait to attract those who
 are afraid of listening  to the        
nairtmya 7non-soul doctrine7 ,footnote  
ref #a4        ,footnote #a3            
,lankvatrastra1 p4 #hj4    #aej         
,the ,bodhisattvas may attain their     
highest by the fourfold  knowledge of   
7#a7 svacittadrs'hyabhvan1 7#b7         
utpdasthitibhangavivarjjanat1  7#c7     
bhyabhvbhvopalaksanat and  7#d7         

svapratyryyajndhigambhinnalaksanat4 ,the
 first means  that all things are but   
creations of the imagination of one's   
mind4  ,the second means that as things 
have no essence there is no origination1
  existence or destruction4 ,the third  
means that one should  know the         
distinctive sense in which all external 
things are said  either to be existent  
or non-existent1 for their existence is 
merely  like the mirage which is        
produced by the beginningless desire    
7vsan7 of creating and perceiving the   
manifold4 ,this brings us  to the fourth
 one1 which means the right             
comprehension of the  nature of all     
things4    ,the four dhynas spoken of in
 the ,lankvatra seem to be  different   
from those which have been described in 
connection with  the ,theravda          
,buddhism4 ,these dhynas are called 7#a7
 blopacrika1  7#b7 arthapravichaya1 7#c7
 tathatlambana and 7#d7 tathgata4  ,the 
first one is said to be that practised  
by the s'rvakas  and the                

pratyekabuddhas4 ,it consists in        
concentrating upon the  doctrine that   
there is no soul 7pudgalanairtmya71 and 
that everything  is transitory1         
miserable and impure4 ,when considering 
all  things in this way from beginning  
to end the sage advances on  till all   
conceptual knowing ceases 7samjnirodht72
 we have  what is called the vlopacrika 
dhyna 7the meditation for beginners74   
,the second is the advanced state where 
not only there is  full consciousness   
that there is no self1 but there is also
 the  comprehension that neither these  
nor the doctrines of other heretics  may
 be said to exist1 and that there is    
none of the dharmas that  appears4 ,this
 is called the arthapravicayadhyna1 for 
the sage  concentrates here on the      
subject of thoroughly seeking out       
7pravichaya7 the nature of all things   
7artha74    ,the third dhyna1 that in   
which the mind realizes that the        
thought that there is no self nor that  
there are the appearances1  is itself   

the result of imagination and thus      
lapses into the thatness  7tathat74     
,this dhyna is called tathatlambana1    
because it has for  its object tathat or
 thatness4    ,the last or the fourth   
dhyna is that in which the lapse of  the
 mind into the state of thatness is such
 that the nothingness  and              
incomprehensibility of all phenomena is 
perfectly realized2    #aea    and      
nirvna is that in which all root desires
 7vsan7 manifesting  themselves in      
knowledge are destroyed and the mind    
with knowledge  and perceptions1 making 
false creations1 ceases to work4 ,this  
cannot be called death1 for it will not 
have any rebirth and it cannot  be      
called destruction1 for only compounded 
things 7samskrta7  suffer destruction1  
so that it is different from either     
death or  destruction4 ,this nirvna is  
different from that of the s'rvakas  and
 the pratyekabuddhas for they are       
satisfied to call that state  nirvna1 in
 which by the knowledge of the general  

characteristics  of all things          
7transitoriness and misery7 they are not
 attached to  things and cease to make  
erroneous judgments ,footnote ref #a4   
,thus we see that there is no cause 7in 
the sense of ground7  of all these      
phenomena as other heretics maintain4   
,when it is  said that the world is my  
or illusion1 what is meant to be        
emphasized is this1 that there is no    
cause1 no ground4 ,the phenomena  that  
seem to originate1 stay1 and be         
destroyed are mere  constructions of    
tainted imagination1 and the tathat or  
thatness  is nothing but the turning    
away of this constructive activity or   
nature of the imagination 7vikalpa7     
tainted with the associations  of       
beginningless root desires 7vsan7       
,footnote ref #b4 ,the tathat has  no   
separate reality from illusion1 but it  
is illusion itself when the  course of  
the construction of illusion has ceased4
 ,it is therefore  also spoken of as    
that which is cut off or detached from  

the mind  7cittavimukta71 for here there
 is no construction of imagination      
7sarvakalpanavirahitam7 ,footnote ref   
#c4      ,sautrntika ,theory of         
,perception4    ,dharmottara 7#hdg      
,a4,d471 a commentator of ,dharmakrtti's
 ,footnote ref #d  7about #fce ,a4,d47  
,nyyabindu1 a ,sautrantika logical and  
epistemological  work1 describes right  
knowledge 7samyagjna7 as an  invariable 
antecedent to the accomplishment of all 
that a man        ,footnote #a3         
,lankvatarastra1 p4 #ajj4    ,footnote  
#b3 ,ibid4 p4 #aji4    ,footnote #c3    
,this account of the ,vijanavada school 
is collected mainly  from               
,lankvatrastra1 as no other authentic   
work of the ,vijnavda  school is        
available4 ,hindu accounts and          
criticisms of this school may be  had in
 such books as ,kumarila's ,s'loka      
vrttika or ,s'ankara's bhasya1  ,,ii4   
ii1 etc4 ,asaknga's ,mahynastralamkra   
deals more with the duties  concerning  
the career of a saint 7,bodhisattva7    

than with the metaphysics  of the       
system4    ,footnote #d3 ,dharmakrtti   
calls himself an adherent of ,vijanavda 
in his  ,santnntarasiddhi1 a treatise on
 solipsism1 but his ,nyyabindu seems    
rightly to have been considered by the  
author of ,nyyabindutktippani  7p4 #ai7 
as being written from the ,sautrntika   
point of view4    #aeb    desires to    
have 7samyagjnaprvik                    
sarvapurusrthasiddhi7 ,footnote  ref #a4
 ,when on proceeding1 in accordance with
 the presentation of any  knowledge1 we 
get a thing as presented by it we call  
it right  knowledge4 ,right knowledge is
 thus the knowledge by which one  can   
practically acquire the thing he wants  
to acquire 7arthdhigati74  ,the process 
of knowledge1 therefore1 starts with the
 perceptual  presentation and ends with 
the attainment of the thing  represented
 by it and the fulfilment of the        
practical need by it  7arthdhigamt      
samptah pramnavyprah74 ,thus there are  
three moments in the perceptual         

acquirement of knowledge3  7#a7 the     
presentation1 7#b7 our prompting in     
accordance with it1  and 7#c7 the final 
realization of the object in accordance 
with  our endeavour following the       
direction of knowledge4 ,inference  is  
also to be called right knowledge1 as it
 also serves our practical  need by     
representing the presence of objects in 
certain connections  and helping us to  
realize them4 ,in perception this       
presentation  is direct1 while in       
inference this is brought about         
indirectly  through the linga 7reason74 
,knowledge is sought by men for the     
realization of their ends1 and the      
subject of knowledge is discussed  in   
philosophical works only because        
knowledge is sought  by men4 ,any       
knowledge1 therefore1 which will not    
lead us to  the realization of the      
object represented by it could not be   
called  right knowledge4 ,all illusory  
perceptions1 therefore1 such as the     
perception of a white conch-shell as    

yellow or dream perceptions1  are not   
right knowledge1 since they do not lead 
to the realization  of such objects as  
are presented by them4 ,it is true no   
doubt  that since all objects are       
momentary1 the object which was         
perceived  at the moment of perception  
was not the same as that  which was     
realized at a later moment4 ,but the    
series of existents  which started with 
the first perception of a blue object   
finds itself  realized by the           
realization of other existents of the   
same series  7nldau ya eva santnah      
paricchinno nilajnena sa eva tena       
prpitah tena nilajnam pramnam7 ,footnote
 ref #b4    ,when it is said that right 
knowledge is an invariable antecedent   
of the realization of any desirable     
thing or the retarding  of any          
undesirable thing1 it must be noted that
 it is not meant        ,footnote #a3   
,brief extracts from the opinions of two
 other commentators of  ,nyyaybindu1    
,vintadeva and ,s'antabhadra 7seventh   

century71 are found in                  
,nyyabindutktippan1 a commentary of     
,nyayabindutik of ,dharmmottara1  but   
their texts are not available to us4    
,footnote #b3 ,nyyabindutktippan1 p4    
#aa4    #aec    that right knowledge is 
directly the cause of it2 for1 with the 
rise  of any right perception1 there is 
a memory of past experiences1  desire is
 aroused1 through desire an endeavour in
 accordance with  it is launched1 and as
 a result of that there is realization  
of the  object of desire4 ,thus1 looked 
at from this point of view1 right       
knowledge is not directly the cause of  
the realization of the object4  ,right  
knowledge of course directly indicates  
the presentation1 the  object of desire1
 but so far as the object is a mere     
presentation it  is not a subject of    
enquiry4 ,it becomes a subject of       
enquiry only in  connection with our    
achieving the object presented by       
perception4    ,perception 7pratyaks'a7 
has been defined by ,dharmakrtti as  a  

presentation1 which is generated by the 
objects alone1 unassociated  by any     
names or relations 7kalpan7 and which is
 not erroneous  7kalpanpodhamabhrntam7  
,footnote ref #a4 ,this definition does 
not  indeed represent the actual nature 
7svarpa7 of perception1 but only  shows 
the condition which must be fulfilled in
 order that anything  may be valid      
perception4 ,what is meant by saying    
that a perception  is not erroneous is  
simply this1 that it will be such that  
if one engages himself in an endeavour  
in accordance with it1  he will not be  
baffled in the object which was         
presented to him  by his perception     
7tasmdgrhye arthe vasturpe              
yadaviparyastam  tadabhrntamiha         
veditavyam4 ,it is said that a right    
perception  could not be associated with
 names 7kalpan or abhilpa74 ,this       
qualification is added only with a view 
of leaving out all that is not  directly
 generated by the object4 ,a name is    
given to a thing  only when it is       

associated in the mind1 through memory1 
as being  the same as perceived before4 
,this cannot1 therefore1 be regarded  as
 being produced by the object of        
perception4 ,the senses present  the    
objects by coming in contact with them1 
and the objects also  must of necessity 
allow themselves to be presented as they
 are  when they are in contact with the 
proper senses4 ,but the work  of        
recognition or giving names is not what 
is directly produced  by the objects    
themselves1 for this involves the       
unification of  previous experiences1   
and this is certainly not what is       
presented        ,footnote #a3 ,the     
definition first given in the           
,pramnasamucaya 7not  available in      
,sanskrit7 of ,dinnga 7#ejj ,a4,d47 was 
,kalpanpodham4  ,according to           
,dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate   
knowledge 7nirvikalpa  jna7 consisting  
only of the copy of the object presented
 to the senses  that constitutes the    
valid element presented to perception4  

,the determinate  knowledge 7savikalpa  
jna71 as formed by the conceptual       
activity of  the mind identifying the   
object with what has been experienced   
before1  cannot be regarded as truly    
representing what is really presented to
  the senses4    #aed    to the sense   
7prvadrstparadrstacrthamekkurvadvijnamas
annihitavisayam                         
prvadrstasysannihitatvt74 ,in all       
illusory perceptions it is the  sense   
which is affected either by extraneous  
or by inherent physiological  causes4   
,if the senses are not perverted they   
are bound to present the  object        
correctly4 ,perception thus means the   
correct presentation through  the senses
 of an object in its own uniqueness as  
containing only those  features which   
are its and its alone 7svalaksanam74    
,the validity of  knowledge consists in 
the sameness that it has with the       
objects presented  by it 7arthena saha  
yatsrpyam sdrs'yamasya jnasya           
tatpramnamiha74  ,but the objection here

 is that if our percept is only  similar
 to the external object then this       
similarity is a thing which  is         
different from the presentation1 and    
thus perception becomes  invalid4 ,but  
the similarity is not different from the
 percept which  appears as being similar
 to the object4 ,it is by virtue of     
their  sameness that we refer to the    
object by the percept 7taditi srpyam    
tasya vas't7 and our perception of the  
object becomes possible4  ,it is because
 we have an awareness of blueness that  
we speak of  having perceived a blue    
object4 ,the relation1 however1 between 
the notion of similarity of the         
perception with the blue object and  the
 indefinite awareness of blue in        
perception is not one of  causation but 
of a determinant and a determinate      
7vyavasthpyavyavasthpakabhvena74 ,thus  
it is the same cognition  which in one  
form stands as signifying the similarity
 with the object  of perception and is  
in another indefinite form the awareness

 as the  percept 7tata ekasya vastunah  
kicidrpam pramnam kicitpramnaphalam  na 
virudhyate74 ,it is on account of this  
similarity  with the object that a      
cognition can be a determinant of the   
definite awareness 7vyavasthpanaheturhi 
srpyam71 so that by  the determinate we 
know the determinant and thus by the    
similarity of the sense-datum with the  
object pramna7 we come  to think that   
our awareness has this particular form  
as blue  7pramnaphala74 ,if this        
sameness between the knowledge and its  
object was not felt we could not have   
spoken of the object from  the awareness
 7srpyamanubhtam vyavasthpanahetuh74    
,the  object generates an awareness     
similar to itself1 and  it is this      
correspondence that can lead us to the  
realization  of the object so presented 
by right knowledge ,footnote ref l4     
,footnote #a3 ,see also pp4 #cdj and    
#dji4 ,it is unfortunate that1 excepting
  the ,nyyabindu1 ,nyyabindutk1         
,nyyabindutktippan 7,st ,petersburg1    

#aiji71 no other works dealing with this
 interesting doctrine of perception  are
 available to us4 ,nyyabindu is probably
 one of the earliest works in  which we 
hear of the doctrine of arthakriykritva 
7practical fulfilment  of our desire as 
a criterion of right knowledge74 ,later 
on it was regarded  as a criterion of   
existence1 as ,ratnakrtti's works and   
the profuse  references by ,hindu       
writers to the ,buddhistic doctrines    
prove4 ,the word  arthakriy is found in 
,candrakrtti's commentary on ,ngrjuna   
and also  in such early works as        
,lalitavistara 7pointed out to me by ,dr
 ,e4,j4  ,thomas of the ,cambridge      
,university ,library7 but the word has  
no  philosophical significance there4   
#aee      ,sautrntika theory of         
,inference ,footnote ref #a4            
,according to the ,sautrntika doctrine  
of ,buddhism as described  by           
,dharmakrtti and ,dharmmottara which is 
probably the  only account of systematic
 ,buddhist logic that is now available  

to  us in ,sanskrit1 inference 7anumna7 
is divided into two classes1  called    
svrthnumna 7inferential knowledge       
attained by a person  arguing in his own
 mind or judgments71 and parrthnumna    
7inference  through the help of         
articulated propositions for convincing 
others in a debate74 ,the validity of   
inference depended1 like the  validity  
of perception1 on copying the actually  
existing facts of  the external world4  
,inference copied external realities as 
much  as perception did2 just as the    
validity of the immediate perception  of
 blue depends upon its similarity to the
 external blue thing  perceived1 so the 
validity of the inference of a blue     
thing also1  so far as it is knowledge1 
depends upon its resemblance to the     
external fact thus inferred             
7srpyavas'ddhi tannlaprattirpam         
sidhyati74    ,the reason by which an   
inference is made should be such  that  
it may be present only in those cases   
where the thing to  be inferred exists1 

and absent in every case where it does  
not  exist4 ,it is only when the reason 
is tested by both these joint           
conditions that an unfailing connection 
7pratibandha7 between  the reason and   
the thing to be inferred can be         
established4 ,it is  not enough that the
 reason should be present in all cases  
where  the thing to be inferred exists  
and absent where it does not  exist1 but
 it is necessary that it should be      
present only in the  above case4 ,this  
law 7niyama7 is essential for           
establishing the  unfailing condition   
necessary for inference ,footnote ref   
#b4 ,this  unfailing natural connection 
7svabhvapratibandha7 is found in two    
types        ,footnote #a3 ,as the      
,pramnasamuccaya of ,dinga is not       
available in  ,sanskrit1 we can hardly  
know anything of developed ,buddhist    
logic except  what can be got from the  
,nyyabindutk of ,dharmmottara4          
,footnote #b3 tasmt                     
niyamavatorevnvayavyatirekayoh prayogah 

karttavyah  yena pratibandho gamyeta    
sdhanyasa sdhyena4 ,nyyabindutk1 p4 #bd4
    #aef    of cases4 ,the first is that
 where the nature of the reason is      
contained  in the thing to be inferred  
as a part of its nature1 i4e4 where  the
 reason stands for a species of which   
the thing to be inferred  is a genus2   
thus a stupid person living in a place  
full of tall pines  may come to think   
that pines are called trees because they
 are  tall and it may be useful to point
 out to him that even a small  pine     
plant is a tree because it is pine2 the 
quality of pineness  forms a part of the
 essence of treeness1 for the former    
being  a species is contained in the    
latter as a genus2 the nature of the    
species being identical with the nature 
of the genus1 one could  infer the      
latter from the former but not vice     
versa2 this is called  the unfailing    
natural connection of identity of nature
 7tdtmya74  ,the second is that where   
the cause is inferred from the effect   

which stands as the reason of the       
former4 ,thus from the smoke  the fire  
which has produced it may be inferred4  
,the ground of  these inferences is that
 reason is naturally indissolubly       
connected  with the thing to be         
inferred1 and unless this is the case1  
no  inference is warrantable4    ,this  
natural indissoluble connection         
7svabhvapratibandha71  be it of the     
nature of identity of essence of the    
species in the  genus or inseparable    
connection of the effect with the cause1
 is  the ground of all inference        
,footnote ref #a4 ,the                  
svabhvapratibandha  determines the      
inseparability of connection            
7avinbhvaniyama7 and  the inference is  
made not through a series of premisses1 
but  directly by the linga 7reason7     
which has the inseparable connection    
,footnote ref #b4    ,the second type of
 inference known as parrthnumna  agrees 
with svrthnumna in all essential        
characteristics2 the  main difference   

between the two is this1 that in the    
case of  parrthnumna1 the inferential   
process has to be put verbally in       
premisses4    ,pandit ,ratnkarasnti1    
probably of the ninth or the tenth      
century  ,a4,d41 wrote a paper named    
,antarvyptisamarthana in which          
,footnote #a3 na hi yo yatra svabhvena  
na pratibaddhah sa tam                  
apratibaddhavisayamavs'yameva na        
vyabhicaratti nsti                      
tayoravyabhicraniyama4 ,nyyabindutk1 p4 
#bi4    ,footnote #b3 ,the inseparable  
connection determining inference is only
  possible when the linga satisfies the 
three following conditions1  viz4 7#a7  
paksasattva 7existence of the linga in  
the paksa--the thing  about which       
something is inferred72 7#b7            
sapaksasattva 7existence of the  linga  
in those cases where the sdhya oc       
probandum existed71 and  7#c7           
vipakssattva 7its non-existence in all  
those places where the sdhya  did not   
exist74 ,the ,buddhists admitted three  

propositions in a syllogism1  e4g4 ,the 
hill has fire1 because it has smoke1    
like a kitchen but unlike  a lake4      
#aeg    he tried to show that the       
concomitance is not between those  cases
 which possess the linga or reason with 
the cases which  possess the sdhya      
7probandum7 but between that which has  
the  characteristics of the linga with  
that which has the characteristics  of  
the sdhya 7probandum72 or in other words
 the concomitance  is not between the   
places containing the smoke such as     
kitchen1  etc41 and the places          
containing fire but between that which  
has the  characteristic of the linga1   
viz4 the smoke1 and that which has the  
characteristic of the sdhya1 viz4 the   
fire4 ,this view of the nature  of      
concomitance is known as inner          
concomitance 7antarvypti71  whereas the 
former1 viz4 the concomitance between   
the thing  possessing linga and that    
possessing sdhya1 is known as outer     
concomitance 7bahirvypti7 and generally 

accepted by the ,nyya  school of        
thought4 ,this antarvypti doctrine of   
concomitance is  indeed a later         
,buddhist doctrine4    ,it may not be   
out of place here to remark that        
evidences of  some form of ,buddhist    
logic probably go back at least as early
  as the ,kathvatthu 7#bjj ,b4,c474     
,thus ,aung on the evidence of  the     
,yamaka points out that ,buddhist logic 
at the time of ,as'oka  was conversant  
with the distribution of terms and the  
process  of conversion4 ,he further     
points out that the logical premisses   
such as the udharana 7,yo yo aggim so so
 dhmav--whatever is  fiery is smoky71   
the upanayana 7ayam pabbato dhmav--this 
hill is smoky7 and the niggama          
7tasmdayam aggim--therefore  that is    
fiery7 were also known4 7,aung further  
sums up the  method of the arguments    
which are found in the ,kathvatthu as   
follows3    ,adherent4 ,is ,a ,b8       
7thpan74  ,opponent4 ,yes4    ,adherent4
 ,is ,c ,d8 7ppan74  ,opponent4 ,no4    

,adherent4 ,but if ,a be ,b then 7you   
should have said7 ,c is ,d4  ,that ,b   
can be affirmed of ,a but ,d of ,c is   
false4  ,hence your first answer is     
refuted47    ,the antecedent of the     
hypothetical major premiss is termed    
thpan1  because the opponent's position1
 ,a is ,b1 is conditionally  established
 for the purpose of refutation4    ,the 
consequent of the hypothetical major    
premiss is termed  ppan because it is   
got from the antecedent4 ,and the       
conclusion    #aeh    is termed ropana  
because the regulation is placed on the 
opponent4 ,next3      ,if ,d be derived 
of ,c4    ,then ,b should have been     
derived of ,a4    ,but you affirmed ,b  
of ,a4    7therefore7 ,that ,b can be   
affirmed of ,a but not of ,d or ,c is   
wrong4    ,this is the patiloma1 inverse
 or indirect method1 as contrasted  with
 the former or direct method1 anuloma4  
,in both methods the  consequent is     
derived4 ,but if we reverse the         
hypothetical major  in the latter method

 we get      ,if ,a is ,b ,c is ,d4     
,but ,a is ,b4    ,therefore ,c is ,d4  
,by this indirect method the opponent's 
second answer is reestablished          
,footnote ref #a4      ,the ,doctrine of
 ,momentariness4    ,ratnakrtti 7#iej   
,a4,d47 sought to prove the             
momentariness of  all existence         
7sattva71 first1 by the concomitance    
discovered by the  method of agreement  
in presence 7anvayavypti71 and then by  
the  method of difference by proving    
that the production of effects  could   
not be justified on the assumption of   
things being permanent  and hence       
accepting the doctrine of momentariness 
as the only alternative4 ,existence is  
defined as the capacity of  producing   
anything 7arthakriykritva74 ,the form of
 the first  type of argument by         
anvayavypti may be given thus3 ,whatever
  exists is momentary1 by virtue of its 
existence1 as for example  the jug2 all 
things about the momentariness of which 
we are discussing  are existents and are

 therefore momentary4 ,it cannot  be    
said that the jug which has been chosen 
as an example of an  existent is not    
momentary2 for the jug is producing     
certain  effects at the present moment2 
and it cannot be held that these  are   
all identical in the past and the future
 or that it is producing  no effect at  
all in the past and future1 for the     
first is impossible1  for those which   
are done now could not be done again in 
the  future2 the second is impossible1  
for if it has any capacity to           
,footnote3 #a3 ,see introduction to the 
translation of ,kathvatthu  7,points of 
,controversy7 by ,mrs ,rhys ,davids4    
#aei    produce effects it must not     
cease doing so1 as in that case one     
might as well expect that there should  
not be any effect even at  the present  
moment4 ,whatever has the capacity of   
producing  anything at any time must of 
necessity do it4 ,so if it does produce 
at one moment and does not produce at   
another1 this  contradiction will prove 

the supposition that the things were    
different at the different moments4 ,if 
it is held that the nature  of          
production varies at different moments1 
then also the thing at  those two       
moments must be different1 for a thing  
could not have  in it two contradictory 
capacities4    ,since the jug does not  
produce at the present moment the  work 
of the past and the future moments1 it  
cannot evidently do  so1 and hence is   
not identical with the jug in the past  
and in the  future1 for the fact that   
the jug has the capacity and has not the
  capacity as well1 proves that it is   
not the same jug at the two  moments    
7s'akts'aktasvabhavatay pratiksanam     
bhedah74 ,the  capacity of producing    
effects 7arthakriys'akti71 which is but 
the  other name of existence1 is        
universally concomitant with            
momentariness  7ksanikatvavypta74       
,the ,nyya school of philosophy objects 
to this view and says  that the capacity
 of anything cannot be known until the  

effect  produced is known1 and if       
capacity to produce effects be regarded 
as existence or being1 then the being or
 existence of the effect  cannot be     
known1 until that has produced another  
effect and  that another ad infinitum4  
,since there can be no being that has   
not capacity of producing effects1 and  
as this capacity can  demonstrate itself
 only in an infinite chain1 it will be  
impossible  to know any being or to     
affirm the capacity of producing effects
  as the definition of existence4       
,moreover if all things were  momentary 
there would be no permanent perceiver to
 observe  the change1 and there being   
nothing fixed there could hardly be  any
 means even of taking to any kind of    
inference4 ,to this  ,ratnakirtti       
replies that capacity 7samarthya7 cannot
 be denied1  for it is demonstrated even
 in making the denial4 ,the observation 
of any concomitance in agreement in     
presence1 or agreement in  absence1 does
 not require any permanent observer1 for

 under  certain conditions of agreement 
there is the knowledge of the           
concomitance of agreement in presence1  
and in other conditions  there is the   
knowledge of the concomitance in        
absence4 ,this  knowledge of            
concomitance at the succeeding moment   
holds within    #afj    itself the      
experience of the conditions of the     
preceding moment1  and this alone is    
what we find and not any permanent      
observer4    ,the ,buddhist definition  
of being or existence 7sattva7 is       
indeed capacity1 and we arrived at this 
when it was observed that  in all proved
 cases capacity was all that could be   
defined of  being2--seed was but the    
capacity of producing shoots1 and  even 
if this capacity should require further 
capacity to produce  effects1 the fact  
which has been perceived still remains1 
viz4 that  the existence of seeds is    
nothing but the capacity of producing   
the shoots and thus there is no vicious 
infinite ,footnote ref l4  ,though      

things are momentary1 yet we could have 
concomitance between  things only so    
long as their apparent forms are not    
different  7atadrpaparvrttayoreva       
sdhyasdhanayoh pratyaksena              
vyptigrahant74 ,the vypti or            
concomitance of any two things  7e4g4   
the fire and the smoke7 is based on     
extreme similarity and not  on identity4
    ,another objection raised against   
the doctrine of momentariness  is this1 
that a cause 7e4g4 seed7 must wait for a
 number of other  collocations of earth1
 water1 etc41 before it can produce the 
effect  7e4g4 the shoots7 and hence the 
doctrine must fail4 ,to this ,ratnakrtti
  replies that the seed does not exist  
before and produce the  effect when     
joined by other collocations1 but such  
is the special  effectiveness of a      
particular seed-moment1 that it produces
 both  the collocations or conditions as
 well as the effect1 the shoot4  ,how a 
special seed-moment became endowed with 
such special  effectiveness is to be    

sought in other causal moments which    
preceded it1 and on which it was        
dependent4 ,ratnakrtti wishes to  draw  
attention to the fact that as one       
perceptual moment reveals  a number of  
objects1 so one causal moment may       
produce a number  of effects4 ,thus he  
says that the inference that whatever   
has  being is momentary is valid and    
free from any fallacy4    ,it is not    
important to enlarge upon the second    
part of  ,ratnakrtti's arguments in     
which he tries to show that the         
production  of effects could not be     
explained if we did not suppose         
,footnote #a3 ,the distinction between  
vicious and harmless infinites  was     
known to the ,indians at least as early 
as the sixth or the seventh  century4   
,jayanta quotes a passage which         
differentiates the two clearly          
7,nyyamajar1 p4 #bb73                   
mlaksatikarmhuranavasthm hi dsanam4     
mlasiddhau tvarucypi nnavasth nivryate4 
,the infinite regress that has to be    

gone through in order to arrive  at the 
root matter awaiting to be solved       
destroys the root and is hence  vicious1
 whereas if the root is saved there is  
no harm in a regress  though one may not
 be willing to have it4    #afa    all  
things to be momentary1 for this is more
 an attempt to refute  the doctrines of 
,nyya than an elaboration of the        
,buddhist  principles4    ,the doctrine 
of momentariness ought to be a direct   
corollary  of the ,buddhist metaphysics4
 ,but it is curious that though all     
dharmas were regarded as changing1 the  
fact that they were all  strictly       
momentary 7ksanika--i4e4 existing only  
for one moment7  was not emphasized in  
early ,pli literature4 ,as'vaghosa in   
his  ,s'raddhotpdas'stra speaks of all  
skandhas as ksanika 7,suzuki's          
translation1 p4 #aje74 ,buddhaghosa also
 speaks of the meditation  of the       
khandhas as khanika in his              
,visuddhimagga4 ,but from the  seventh  
century ,a4,d4 till the tenth century   

this doctrine together  with the        
doctrine of arthakriykritva received    
great attention at  the hands of the    
,sautrntikas and the ,vaibhsikas4 ,all  
the  ,nyya and ,vednta literature of    
this period is full of refutations  and 
criticisms of these doctrines4 ,the only
 ,buddhist account  available of the    
doctrine of momentariness is from the   
pen of  ,ratnakrtti4 ,some of the       
general features of his argument in     
favour of the view have been given      
above4 ,elaborate accounts of it  may be
 found in any of the important ,nyya    
works of this period  such as           
,nynyamanjari1 ,ttparyyatk of ,vcaspati 
,mis'ra1 etc4    ,buddhism did not at   
any time believe anything to be         
permanent4  ,with the development of    
this doctrine they gave great  emphasis 
to this point4 ,things came to view at  
one moment and  the next moment they    
were destroyed4 ,whatever is existent is
  momentary4 ,it is said that our notion
 of permanence is derived  from the     

notion of permanence of ourselves1 but  
,buddhism denied  the existence of any  
such permanent selves4 ,what appears as 
self is but the bundle of ideas1        
emotions1 and active tendencies         
manifesting at any particular moment4   
,the next moment these  dissolve1 and   
new bundles determined by the preceding 
ones  appear and so on4 ,the present    
thought is thus the only thinker4       
,apart from the emotions1 ideas1 and    
active tendencies1 we cannot  discover  
any separate self or soul4 ,it is the   
combined product of  these ideas1       
emotions1 etc41 that yield the illusory 
appearance of  self at any moment4 ,the 
consciousness of self is the resultant  
product  as it were of the combination  
of ideas1 emotions1 etc41 at any        
particular moment4 ,as these ideas1     
emotions1 etc41 change every  moment    
there is no such thing as a permanent   
self4    ,the fact that ,i remember that
 ,i have been existing for    #afb    a 
long time past does not prove that a    

permanent self has been  existing for   
such a long period4 ,when ,i say this is
 that book1 ,i  perceive the book with  
my eye at the present moment1 but that  
this book is the same as that book 7i4e4
 the book arising in  memory71 cannot be
 perceived by the senses4 ,it is evident
  that the that book of memory refers to
 a book seen in the  past1 whereas this 
book refers to the book which is before 
my eyes4 ,the feeling of identity which 
is adduced to prove permanence  is thus 
due to a confusion between an object of 
memory  referring to a past and         
different object with the object as     
perceived  at the present moment by the 
senses ,footnote ref #a4 ,this is true  
not only  of all recognition of identity
 and permanence of external objects but 
also of the perception of the identity  
of self1 for the perception of          
self-identity results from the confusion
 of certain ideas or emotions  arising  
in memory with similar ideas of the     
present moment4 ,but  since memory      

points to an object of past perception1 
and the perception  to another object of
 the present moment1 identity cannot  be
 proved by a confusion of the two4      
,every moment all objects  of the world 
are suffering dissolution and           
destruction1 but yet  things appear to  
persist1 and destruction cannot often be
 noticed4  ,our hair and nails grow and 
are cut1 but yet we think that we  have 
the same hair and nail that we had      
before1 in place of old  hairs new ones 
similar to them have sprung forth1 and  
they leave  the impression as if the old
 ones were persisting4 ,so it is that   
though things are destroyed every       
moment1 others similar to  these often  
rise into being and are destroyed the   
next moment  and so on1 and these       
similar things succeeding in a series   
produce  the impression that it is one  
and the same thing which has been       
persisting through all the passing      
moments ,footnote ref #b4 ,just as the  
flame of a candle is changing every     

moment and yet it seems to us as  if we 
have been perceiving the same flame all 
the while1 so  all our bodies1 our      
ideas1 emotions1 etc41 all external     
objects  around us are being destroyed  
every moment1 and new ones are  being   
generated at every succeeding moment1   
but so long as the  objects of the      
succeeding moments are similar to those 
of the preceding moments1 it appears to 
us that things  have remained the same  
and no destruction has taken place4     
,footnote #a3 ,see pratyabhijnirsa of   
the ,buddhists1 ,nyyamajar1 ,v4,s4      
,series1 pp4 #ddi1 etc4    ,footnote #b3
 ,see ,tarkarahasyadpik of ,gunaratna1  
p4 #cj1 and also  ,nyyamajar1 ,v4,s4    
edition1 p4 #dej4    #afc      ,the     
,doctrine of ,momentariness and the     
,doctrine  of ,causal ,efficiency       
7,arthakriykritva74    ,it appears that 
a thing or a phenomenon may be defined  
from  the ,buddhist point of view as    
being the combination of diverse        
characteristics ,footnote ref #a4 ,what 

we call a thing is but a  conglomeration
 of diverse characteristics which are   
found to affect1  determine or influence
 other conglomerations appearing as     
sentient or  as inanimate bodies4 ,so   
long as the characteristics forming the 
elements of any conglomeration remain   
perfectly the same1 the  conglomeration 
may be said to be the same4 ,as soon as 
any of  these characteristics is        
supplanted by any other new             
characteristic1  the conglomeration is  
to be called a new one ,footnote ref #b4
 ,existence or  being of things means   
the work that any conglomeration does or
  the influence that it exerts on other 
conglomerations4 ,this in  ,sanskrit is 
called arthakriykritva which literally  
translated  means--the power of         
performing actions and purposes of some 
kind ,footnote ref #c4 ,the criterion of
 existence or being is the  performance 
of certain specific actions1 or rather  
existence means  that a certain effect  
has been produced in some way 7causal   

efficiency74  ,that which has produced  
such an effect is then called existent  
or sat4  ,any change in the effect thus 
produced means a corresponding  change  
of existence4 ,now1 that selfsame       
definite specific effect                
,footnote #a3 ,compare ,milindapaha1    
,,ii4 ,i4 #a--,the ,chariot ,simile4    
,footnote #b3 ,compare ,tarkarahasyadpik
 of ,gunaratna1 ,a4,s4's edition1  pp4  
#bd1 #bh and ,nyyamajar1 ,v4,s4 edition1
 pp4 #dde1 etc41 and also the  paper on 
,ksanabhangasiddhi by ,ratnakrtti in    
,six ,buddhist ,nyya  tracts4           
,footnote #c3 ,this meaning of the word 
arthakriykritva is different  from the  
meaning of the word as we found in the  
section sautrntika  theory of           
perception4 ,but we find the development
 of this meaning both  in ,ratnakrtti as
 well as in ,nyya writers who referred  
to this doctrine4  ,with ,vintadeva     
7seventh century ,a4,d47 the word       
arthakrysiddhi  meant the fulfilment of 
any need such as the cooking of rice by 

fire  7arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate   
purusasya praycjanam drupkdi  tasya     
siddhih nispattih--the word artha means 
need2 the need of  man such as cooking  
by logs1 etc42 siddhi of that1 means    
accomplishment74  ,with ,dharmottara who
 flourished about a century and a half  
later  arthasiddhi means action         
7anusthiti7 with reference to           
undesirable  and desirable objects      
7heyopdeyrthavisay74 ,but with          
,ratnakrtti  7#iej ,a4,d47 the word     
arthakriykritva has an entirely         
different sense4  ,it means with him    
efficiency of producing any action or   
event1 and as  such it is regarded as   
the characteristic definition of        
existence  sattva74 ,thus he says in his
 ,ksanabhangasiddhi1 pp4 #bj1 #ba1 that 
though in different philosophies there  
are different definitions of  existence 
or being1 he will open his argument with
 the universally accepted  definition of
 existence as arthakriykritva           
7efficiency of causing any  action or   

event74 ,whenever ,hindu writers after  
,ratnakrtti refer to the  ,buddhist     
doctrine of arthakriykritva they usually
 refer to this  doctrine in             
,ratnakrtti's sense4    #afd    which is
 produced now was never produced before1
 and cannot  be repeated in the future1 
for that identical effect which is once 
produced cannot be produced again4 ,so  
the effects produced in  us by objects  
at different moments of time may be     
similar but  cannot be identical4 ,each 
moment is associated with a new effect  
and each new effect thus produced means 
in each case the coming  into being of a
 correspondingly new existence of       
things4 ,if things  were permanent there
 would be no reason why they should be  
performing different effects at         
different points of time4 ,any          
difference in the effect produced1      
whether due to the thing itself  or its 
combination with other accessories1     
justifies us in asserting  that the     
thing has changed and a new one has come

 in its place4  ,the existence of a jug 
for example is known by the power it    
has of forcing itself upon our minds2 if
 it had no such power  then we could not
 have said that it existed4 ,we can have
 no  notion of the meaning of existence 
other than the impression  produced on  
us2 this impression is nothing else but 
the power  exerted by things on us1 for 
there is no reason why one should  hold 
that beyond such powers as are          
associated with the production  of      
impressions or effects there should be  
some other  permanent entity to which   
the power adhered1 and which existed    
even when the power was not exerted4 ,we
 perceive the power  of producing       
effects and define each unit of such    
power as  amounting to a unit of        
existence4 ,and as there would be       
different units of power at different   
moments1 there should also  be as many  
new existences1 i4e4 existents must be  
regarded as  momentary1 existing at each
 moment that exerts a new power4  ,this 

definition of existence naturally brings
 in the doctrine of  momentariness shown
 by ,ratnakrtti4      ,some ,ontological
 ,problems on which the ,different      
,indian ,systems ,diverged4    ,we      
cannot close our examination of         
,buddhist philosophy  without briefly   
referring to its views on some          
ontological problems  which were        
favourite subjects of discussion in     
almost all philosophical  circles of    
,india4 ,these are in brief3 7#a7 the   
relation of  cause and effect1 7#b7 the 
relation of the whole 7avayavi7 and the 
part 7avayava71 7#c7 the relation of    
generality 7samanya7 to the  specific   
individuals1 7#d7 the relation of       
attributes or qualities and  the        
substance and the problem of the        
relation of inherence1 7#e7 the         
#afe    relation of power 7s'akti7 to   
the power-possessor 7s'aktimn74 ,thus   
on the relation of cause and effect1    
,s'ankara held that cause alone  was    
permanent1 real1 and all effects as such

 were but impermanent  illusions due to 
ignorance1 ,smkhya held that there was  
no  difference between cause and effect1
 except that the former was  only the   
earlier stage which when transformed    
through certain  changes became the     
effect4 ,the history of any causal      
activity is  the history of the         
transformation of the cause into the    
effects4  ,buddhism holds everything to 
be momentary1 so neither cause nor      
effect can abide4 ,one is called the    
effect because its momentary  existence 
has been determined by the destruction  
of its momentary  antecedent called the 
cause4 ,there is no permanent reality   
which undergoes the change1 but one     
change is determined by  another and    
this determination is nothing more than 
that  happening1 this happened4 ,on the 
relation of parts to whole1  ,buddhism  
does not believe in the existence of    
wholes4 ,according  to it1 it is the    
parts which illusorily appear as the    
whole1 the  individual atoms rise into  

being and die the next moment and  thus 
there is no such thing as whole         
,footnote ref #a4 ,the ,buddhists  hold 
again that there are no universals1 for 
it is the individuals alone  which come 
and go4 ,there are my five fingers as   
individuals but there  is no such thing 
as fingerness 7angulitva7 as the        
abstract universal  of the fingers4 ,on 
the relation of attributes and substance
 we  know that the ,sautrntika          
,buddhists did not believe in the       
existence  of any substance apart from  
its attributes2 what we call a          
substance is but a unit capable of      
producing a unit of sensation4  ,in the 
external world there are as many        
individual simple units  7atoms7 as     
there are points of sensations4         
,corresponding to each  unit of         
sensation there is a separate simple    
unit in the objective  world4 ,our      
perception of a thing is thus the       
perception of the  assemblage of these  
sensations4 ,in the objective world also

 there  are no substances but atoms or  
reals1 each representing a unit of      
sensation1 force or attribute1 rising   
into being and dying the next  moment4  
,buddhism thus denies the existence of  
any such relation  as that of inherence 
7samavya7 in which relation the         
attributes  are said to exist in the    
substance1 for since there are no       
separate substances there is no         
necessity for admitting the relation  of
 inherence4 ,following the same logic   
,buddhism also does not    #aff         
believe in the existence of a           
power-possessor separate from the       
power4      ,brief survey of the        
evolution of ,buddhist ,thought4    ,in 
the earliest period of ,buddhism more   
attention was paid  to the four noble   
truths than to systematic metaphysics4  
,what  was sorrow1 what was the cause of
 sorrow1 what was the cessation  of     
sorrow and what could lead to it8 ,the  
doctrine of paticcasamuppda  was offered
 only to explain how sorrow came in and 

not with a view to the solving of a     
metaphysical problem4 ,the  discussion  
of ultimate metaphysical problems1 such 
as whether  the world was eternal or    
non-eternal1 or whether a ,tathgata     
existed after death or not1 were        
considered as heresies in early         
,buddhism4 ,great emphasis was laid on  
sla1 samdhi and pa  and the doctrine    
that there was no soul4 ,the            
,abhidhammas  hardly give us any new    
philosophy which was not contained in   
the ,suttas4 ,they only elaborated the  
materials of the suttas with            
enumerations and definitions4 ,with the 
evolution of ,mahyna  scriptures from   
some time about #bjj ,b4,c4 the doctrine
 of the  non-essentialness and voidness 
of all dhammas began to be preached4    
,this doctrine1 which was taken up and  
elaborated by ,nagrjuna1  ryyadeva1     
,kumrajva and ,candrakrtti1 is more or  
less a corollary  from the older        
doctrine of ,buddhism4 ,if one could not
  say whether the world was eternal or  

non-eternal1 or whether a  ,tathgata    
existed or did not exist after death1   
and if there was  no permanent soul and 
all the dhammas were changing1 the only 
legitimate way of thinking about all    
things appeared to be to  think of them 
as mere void and non-essential          
appearances4 ,these  appearances appear 
as being mutually related but apart from
  their appearance they have no other   
essence1 no being or reality4  ,the     
,tathat doctrine which was preached by  
,as'vaghosa oscillated  between the     
position of this absolute               
non-essentialness of all  dhammas and   
the ,brahminic idea that something      
existed as the  background of all these 
non-essential dhammas4 ,this he called  
tathat1 but he could not consistently   
say that any such permanent  entity     
could exist4 ,the ,vijnavda doctrine    
which also  took its rise at this time  
appears to me to be a mixture of the    
,s'nyavda doctrine and the ,tathat      
doctrine2 but when carefully  examined  

it seems to be nothing but ,s'nyavda1   
with an attempt  at explaining all the  
observed phenomena4 ,if everything was  
#afg    non-essential how did it        
originate8 ,vijnavda proposes to give an
  answer1 and says that these phenomena 
are all but ideas of the mind  generated
 by the beginningless vsan 7desire7 of  
the mind4 ,the  difficulty which is felt
 with regard to the ,tathat doctrine    
that  there must be some reality which  
is generating all these ideas  appearing
 as phenomena1 is the same as that in   
the ,vijnavda  doctrine4 ,the           
,vijnavdins could not admit the         
existence of such  a reality1 but yet   
their doctrines led them to it4 ,they   
could not  properly solve the           
difficulty1 and admitted that their     
doctrine was  some sort of a compromise 
with the ,brahminical doctrines of      
heresy1 but they said that this was a   
compromise to make the  doctrine        
intelligible to the heretics2 in truth  
however the reality  assumed in the     

doctrine was also non-essential4 ,the   
,vijnavda  literature that is available 
to us is very scanty and from that we   
are not in a position to judge what     
answers ,vijnavda could give  on the    
point4 ,these three doctrines developed 
almost about the  same time and the     
difficulty of conceiving s'nya 7void71  
tathat1  7thatness7 and the layavijna of
 ,vijnavda is more or less  the same4   
,the ,tathat doctrine of ,as'vaghosa    
practically ceased with  him4 ,but the  
,s'nyavda and the ,vijnavda doctrines   
which  originated probably about #bjj   
,b4,c4 continued to develop probably    
till the eighth century ,a4,d4 ,vigorous
 disputes with ,s'nyavda  doctrines are 
rarely made in any independent work of  
,hindu  philosophy1 after ,kumrila and  
,s'ankara4 ,from the third or  the      
fourth century ,a4,d4 some ,buddhists   
took to the study of  systematic logic  
and began to criticize the doctrine of  
the ,hindu  logicians4 ,dinnga the      
,buddhist logician 7#ejj ,a4,d47        

probably  started these hostile         
criticisms by trying to refute the      
doctrines  of the great ,hindu logician 
,vtsyyana1 in his ,pramnasamuccaya4  ,in
 association with this logical activity 
we find the  activity of two other      
schools of ,buddhism1 viz4 the          
,sarvstivdins  7known also as           
,vaibhsikas7 and the ,sautrntikas4 ,both
 the  ,vaibhsikas and the ,sautrntikas  
accepted the existence of the  external 
world1 and they were generally in       
conflict with the  ,hindu schools of    
thought ,nyya-,vais'esika and ,smkhya   
which  also admitted the existence of   
the external world4 ,vasubandhu         
7#dbj-ejj ,a4,d47 was one of the most   
illustrious names of this school4  ,we  
have from this time forth a number of   
great ,buddhist  thinkers such as       
,yas'omitra 7commentator of             
,vasubandhu's work71    #afh            
,dharmmakrtti 7writer of ,nyyabindu #fce
 ,a4,d471 ,vintadeva and  ,s'ntabhadra  
7commentators of ,nyyabindu71           

,dharmmottara  7commentator of          
,nyyabindu #hdg ,a4,d471 ,ratnakrtti    
7#iej ,a4,d471  ,pandita ,as'oka1 and   
,ratnkara ,s'nti1 some of whose         
contributions  have been published in   
the ,six ,buddhist ,nyya ,tracts1       
published  in ,calcutta in the          
,bibliotheca ,indica series4 ,these     
,buddhist  writers were mainly          
interested in discussions regarding the 
nature  of perception1 inference1 the   
doctrine of momentariness1 and  the     
doctrine of causal efficiency           
7arthakriykritva7 as demonstrating  the 
nature of existence4 ,on the negative   
side they were  interested in denying   
the ontological theories of ,nyya and   
,smkhya with regard to the nature of    
class-concepts1 negation1  relation of  
whole and part1 connotation of terms1   
etc4 ,these  problems hardly attracted  
any notice in the non-,sautrntika and   
non-,vaibhsika schools of ,buddhism of  
earlier times4 ,they of  course agreed  
with the earlier ,buddhists in denying  

the existence  of a permanent soul1 but 
this they did with the help of their    
doctrine of causal efficiency4 ,the     
points of disagreement between  ,hindu  
thought up to ,s'ankara 7#hjj ,a4,d47   
and ,buddhist thought  till the time of 
,s'ankara consisted mainly in the denial
 by the  ,buddhists of a permanent soul 
and the permanent external world4  ,for 
,hindu thought was more or less         
realistic1 and even the  ,vednta of     
,s'ankara admitted the existence of the 
permanent  external world in some sense4
 ,with ,s'ankara the forms of the       
external world were no doubt illusory1  
but they all had a permanent  background
 in the ,brahman1 which was the only    
reality  behind all mental and the      
physical phenomena4 ,the ,sautrntikas   
admitted the existence of the external  
world and so their quarrel  with ,nyya  
and ,smkhya was with regard to their    
doctrine  of momentariness2 their denial
 of soul and their views on the         
different ontological problems were in  

accordance with their  doctrine of      
momentariness4 ,after the twelfth       
century we do not  hear much of any new 
disputes with the ,buddhists4 ,from this
  time the disputes were mainly between 
the different systems of  ,hindu        
philosophers1 viz4 ,nyya1 the ,vednta of
 the school of  ,s'ankara and the       
,theistic ,vednta of ,rmnuja1 ,madhva1  
etc4    #afi          ,,chapter ,,vi    
,,the ,,jaina ,,philosophy      ,the    
,origin of ,jainism4    ,notwithstanding
 the radical differences in their       
philosophical  notions ,jainism and     
,buddhism1 which were originally both   
orders  of monks outside the pale of    
,brahmanism1 present some resemblance   
in outward appearance1 and some         
,european scholars  who became          
acquainted with ,jainism through        
inadequate samples  of ,jaina literature
 easily persuaded themselves that it was
 an offshoot  of ,buddhism1 and even    
,indians unacquainted with ,jaina       
literature are often found to commit the

 same mistake4 ,but it  has now been    
proved beyond doubt that this idea is   
wrong  and ,jainism is at least as old  
as ,buddhism4 ,the oldest ,buddhist     
works frequently mention the ,jains as a
 rival sect1 under their  old name      
,nigantha and their leader ,ntaputta    
,varddhamna  ,mahvra1 the last prophet  
of the ,jains4 ,the canonical books of  
the ,jains mention as contemporaries of 
,mahvra the same kings  as reigned      
during ,buddha's career4    ,thus       
,mahvra was a contemporary of ,buddha1  
but unlike  ,buddha he was neither the  
author of the religion nor the founder  
of the sect1 but a monk who having      
espoused the ,jaina creed  afterwards   
became the seer and the last prophet    
7,trthankara7 of  ,jainism,footnote ref 
#a4 ,his predecessor ,prs'va1 the last  
,trthankara but  one1 is said to have   
died #bej years before ,mahvra1 while   
,prs'va's  predecessor ,aristanemi is   
said to have died #hd1jjj years before  
,mahvra's ,nirvna4 ,the story in        

,uttardhyayanastra that a  disciple of  
,prs'va met a disciple of ,mahvra and   
brought about  the union of the old     
,jainism and that propounded by ,mahvra 
seems to suggest that this ,prs'va was  
probably a historical person4           
,according to the belief of the orthodox
 ,jains1 the ,jaina religion  is        
eternal1 and it has been revealed again 
and again in every one  of the endless  
succeeding periods of the world by      
innumerable  ,tirthankaras4 ,in the     
present period the first ,trthankara was
  ,rsabha and the last1 the #bdth1 was  
,vardhamna ,mahvra4 ,all                
,footnote #a3 ,see ,jacobi's article on 
,jainism1 ,e4 ,r4,e4    #agj            
,trthankaras have reached moksa at their
 death1 and they  neither care for nor  
have any influence on worldly affairs1  
but yet  they are regarded as ,gods by  
the ,jains and are worshipped ,footnote 
ref  #a4      ,two ,sects of ,jainism   
,footnote ref #b4    ,there are two main
 sects of ,jains1 ,s'vetmbaras 7wearers 

of  white cloths7 and ,digambaras 7the  
naked74 ,they are generally  agreed on  
all the fundamental principles of       
,jainism4 ,the tenets  peculiar to the  
,digambaras are firstly that perfect    
saints such as  the ,trthankaras live   
without food1 secondly that the embryo  
of  ,mahvra was not removed from the    
womb of ,devanand to that  of ,tris'al  
as the ,s'vetmbaras contend1 thirdly    
that a monk  who owns any property and  
wears clothes cannot reach ,moksa1      
fourthly that no woman can reach ,moksa 
,footnote ref #c4 ,the ,digambaras  deny
 the canonical works of the ,s'vetmbaras
 and assert that  these had been lost   
immediately after ,mahvra4 ,the origin  
of  the ,digambaras is attributed to    
,s'ivabhti 7,a4,d4 #hc7 by the          
,s'vetmbaras as due to a schism in the  
old ,s'vetmbara church1  of which there 
had already been previous to that seven 
other  schisms4 ,the ,digambaras in     
their turn deny this1 and say that  they
 themselves alone have preserved the    

original practices1 and  that under     
,bhadrabhu1 the eighth sage after       
,mahvra1 the last  ,trthankara1 there   
rose the sect of ,ardhaphlakas with     
laxer  principles1 from which developed 
the present sect of ,s'vetmbaras        
7,a4,d4 #hj74 ,the ,digambaras having   
separated in early times  from the      
,s'vetmbaras developed peculiar         
religious ceremonies of  their own1 and 
have a different ecclesiastical and     
literary history1  though there is      
practically no difference about the main
 creed4  ,it may not be out of place    
here to mention that the ,sanskrit      
works of the ,digambaras go back to a   
greater antiquity than  those of the    
,s'vetmbaras1 if we except the canonical
 books of  the latter4 ,it may be noted 
in this connection that there developed 
in later times about #hd different      
schools of ,jainism differing from  one 
another only in minute details of       
conduct4 ,these were called  gacchas1   
and the most important of these is the  

,kharatara ,gaccha1  which had split    
into many minor gacchas4 ,both sects of 
,jains have        ,footnote #a3 ,see   
,digumbara ,jain ,iconography 7#a4 ,a1  
xxxii #aijc p4 #dei  of ,j4 ,burgess1   
and ,bhler's ,specimens of ,jina        
sculptures from ,mathur1  in            
,epigraphica ,indica1 ,,ii4 pp4 #caa    
etc4 ,see also ,jacobi's article on     
,jainism1 ,e4,r4,e4    ,footnote #b3    
,see ,jacobi's article on ,jainism1     
,e4,r4,e4    ,footnote #c3 ,see         
,gunaratna's commentary on ,jainism in  
,saddars'anasamuccaya4    #aga          
preserved a list of the succession of   
their teachers from ,mahvra             
7sthavirvali1 pattvali1 gurvvali7 and   
also many legends about  them such as   
those in the ,kalpastra1 the            
,paris'ista-parvan of  ,hemacandra1 etc4
      ,the ,canonical and other         
,literature of the ,jains4    ,according
 to the ,jains there were originally two
 kinds of  sacred books1 the fourteen   
,prvas and the eleven ,angas4 ,the      

,prvas continued to be transmitted for  
some time but were  gradually lost4 ,the
 works known as the eleven ,angas are   
now  the oldest parts of the existing   
,jain canon4 ,the names of these  are   
cra1 ,strakrta1 ,sthna1 ,samavya        
,bhagavat1 ,jtadharmakaths1             
,upsakadas's1 ,antakrtadas's            
,anuttaraupaptikadas's1                 
,pras'navykarana1 ,vipka4 ,in addition  
to these there are the twelve  ,upngas  
,footnote ref #a1 the ten ,prakrnas     
,footnote ref #b1 six  ,chedastras      
,footnote ref #c1 ,nnd and ,anuyogadvra 
and four ,mlastras 7,uttardhyayana1     
vas'yaka1  ,das'avaiklika1 and          
,pindaniryukti74 ,the ,digambaras       
however  assert that these original     
works have all been lost1 and that the  
present works which pass by the old     
names are spurious4 ,the  original      
language of these according to the      
,jains was ,ardhamgadh1  but these      
suffered attempts at modernization and  
it is best  to call the language of the 

sacred texts ,jaina ,prkrit and that  of
 the later works ,jaina ,mahrstr4 ,a    
large literature of glosses  and        
commentaries has grown up round the     
sacred texts4 ,and  besides these1 the  
,jains possess separate works1 which    
contain  systematic expositions of their
 faith in ,prkrit and ,sanskrit4  ,many 
commentaries have also been written upon
 these independent  treatises4 ,one of  
the oldest of these treatises is        
,umsvti's  ,tattvrthdhigamastra7#a-he   
,a4,d474 ,some of the most important    
later ,jaina works on which this chapter
 is based are  ,vis'esvas'yakabhsya1    
,jaina ,tarkavrttika1 with the          
commentary  of ,s'ntycryya1             
,dravyasamgraha of ,nemicandra 7#aaej   
,a4,d471  ,sydvdamajar of ,mallisena    
7#abib ,a4,d471 ,nyyvatra of            
,siddhasena ,divkara 7#ecc ,a4,d471     
,parksmukhastralaghuvrtti of            
,anantavryya 7#ajci ,a4,d471            
,prameyakamalamrtanda of ,prabhcandra   
,footnote #a3 ,aupaptika1 ,rjapras'nya1 

,jvbhigama1 ,prajpan1                   
,jambudvpaprajapti1 ,candraprajapti1    
,sryaprajapti1 ,nirayvali1              
,kalpvatamsik1 ,puspik1 ,puspaclik1     
,vrsnidass4    ,footnote #b3            
,catuhs'arana1 ,samstra1 turapratykhyna1
 ,bhaktparij1  ,tandulavaiyl1 ,candvja1 
,devendrastava1 ,ganivja1               
,mahpratykhyna1  ,vrastava4    ,footnote
 #c3 ,nis'tha1 ,mahnis'tha1 ,vyavahra1  
,das'as'rutaskandha1  ,brhatkalpa1      
,pacakalpa4    #agb    7#hbe ,a4,d471   
,yogas'stra of ,hemacandra 7#ajhh-aagb  
,a4,d471 and  ,pramnanayatattvloklamkra 
of ,deva ,sri 7#ajhf-aafi ,a4,d474  ,i  
am indebted for these dates to          
,vidybhsana's ,indian ,logic4    ,it may
 here be mentioned that the ,jains also 
possess a secular  literature of their  
own in poetry and prose1 both ,sanskrit 
and  ,prkrit4 ,there are also many moral
 tales 7e4g4 ,samaricca-kah1            
,upamitabhavaprapaca-kath in ,prkrit1   
and the ,yas'astilaka of  ,somadeva and 
,dhanapla's ,tilakamajar72 ,jaina       

,sanskrit poems  both in the ,purna and 
,kvya style and hymns in ,prkrit and    
,sanskrit are also very numerous4 ,there
 are also many ,jaina  dramas4 ,the     
,jaina authors have also contributed    
many works1  original treatises as well 
as commentaries1 to the scientific      
literature  of ,india in its various    
branches3 grammar1 biography1 metrics1  
poetics1 philosophy1 etc4 ,the          
contributions of the ,jains to logic    
deserve special notice ,footnote ref #a4
      ,some ,general ,characteristics of
 the ,jains4    ,the ,jains exist only  
in ,india and their number is a little  
less  than a million and a half4 ,the   
,digambaras are found chiefly in        
,southern ,india but also in the ,north1
 in the ,north-western provinces1       
,eastern ,rjputna and the ,punjab4 ,the 
head-quarters of  the ,s'vetmbaras are  
in ,gujarat and ,western ,rjputna1 but  
they  are to be found also all over     
,northern and ,central ,india4    ,the  
outfit of a monk1 as ,jacobi describes  

it1 is restricted to  bare necessaries1 
and these he must beg--clothes1 a       
blanket1 an alms-bowl1  a stick1 a broom
 to sweep the ground1 a piece of cloth  
to cover  his mouth when speaking lest  
insects should enter it ,footnote ref   
#b4 ,the  outfit of nuns is the same    
except that they have additional        
clothes4 ,the  ,digambaras have a       
similar outfit1 but keep no clothes1 use
 brooms  of peacock's feathers or hairs 
of the tail of a cow 7cmara7 ,footnote  
ref #c4 ,the monks shave the head or    
remove the hair by plucking it out4     
,the latter method of getting rid of the
 hair is to be preferred1 and is        
regarded sometimes as an essential rite4
 ,the duties of monks  are very hard4   
,they should sleep only three hours and 
spend  the rest of the time in repenting
 of and expiating sins1 meditating1     
studying1 begging alms 7in the          
afternoon71 and careful inspection of   
their clothes and other things for the  
removal of insects4 ,the  laymen should 

try to approach the ideal of conduct of 
the monks        ,footnote #a3 ,see     
,jacobi's article on ,jainism4 ,e4,r4,e4
    ,footnote #b3 ,see ,jacobi1 loc4    
cat4    ,footnote #c3 ,see              
,saddars'anasamuccaya1 chapter ,,iv4    
#agc    by taking upon themselves       
particular vows1 and the monks are      
required to deliver sermons and explain 
the sacred texts in  the ups'rayas      
7separate buildings for monks like the  
,buddhist  vihras74 ,the principle of   
extreme carefulness not to destroy any  
living being has been in monastic life  
carried out to its very  last           
consequences1 and has shaped the conduct
 of the laity in a  great measure4 ,no  
layman will intentionally kill any      
living being1  not even an insect1      
however troublesome4 ,he will remove it 
carefully  without hurting it4 ,the     
principle of not hurting any living     
being thus bars them from many          
professions such as agriculture1  etc41 
and has thrust them into commerce       

,footnote ref #a4      ,life of ,mahvra4
    ,mahvra1 the last prophet of the    
,jains1 was a ,ksattriya of  the ,jta   
clan and a native of ,vais'li 7modern   
,besarh1 #bg miles  north of ,patna74   
,he was the second son of ,siddhrtha and
 ,trs'al4  ,the ,s'vetmbaras maintain   
that the embryo of the ,trthankara      
which first entered the womb of the     
,brahmin lady ,devanand  was then       
transferred to the womb of ,trs'al4     
,this story the  ,digambaras do not     
believe as we have already seen4 ,his   
parents  were the worshippers of ,prs'va
 and gave him the name ,varddhamna      
7,vra or ,mahvra74 ,he married ,yas'od  
and had a daughter  by her4 ,in his     
thirtieth year his parents died and with
 the permission  of his brother         
,nandivardhana he became a monk4 ,after 
twelve years of self-mortification and  
meditation he attained  omniscience     
7kevala1 cf4 bodhi of the ,buddhists74  
,he lived to  preach for forty-two years
 more1 and attained moksa 7emancipation7

  some years before ,buddha in about    
#dhj ,b4,c4 ,footnote ref #b4      ,the 
,fundamental ,ideas of ,jaina ,ontology4
    ,a thing 7such as clay7 is seen to  
assume various shapes and  to undergo   
diverse changes 7such as the form of a  
jug1 or  pan1 etc471 and we have seen   
that the ,chndogya ,upanisad held  that 
since in all changes the clay-matter    
remained permanent1  that alone was     
true1 whereas the changes of form and   
state  were but appearances1 the nature 
of which cannot be rationally           
,footnote #a3 ,see ,jacobi's article on 
,jainism1 ,e4 ,r4,e4    ,footnote #b3   
,see ,hoernl's translation of           
,uvsagadaso1 ,jacobi1 loc4  cit41 and   
,hoernl's article on the jvakas1 ,e4    
,r4,e4 ,the ,s'vetmbaras1  however1 say 
that this date was #ebg ,b4,c4 and the  
,digambaras place it  eighteen years    
later4    #agd    demonstrated or       
explained4 ,the unchangeable substance  
7e4g4  the clay-matter7 alone is true1  
and the changing forms are mere         

illusions of the senses1 mere objects of
 name 7nma-rpa7 ,footnote ref  #a4 ,what
 we call tangibility1 visibility1 or    
other sense-qualities1  have no real    
existence1 for they are always changing1
 and are like mere  phantoms of which no
 conception can be made by the light of 
reason4    ,the ,buddhists hold that    
changing qualities can alone be         
perceived  and that there is no         
unchanging substance behind them4  ,what
 we perceive as clay is but some        
specific quality1 what we  perceive as  
jug is also some quality4 ,apart from   
these qualities  we do not perceive any 
qualitiless substance1 which the        
,upanisads  regard as permanent and     
unchangeable4 ,the permanent  and       
unchangeable substance is thus a mere   
fiction of ignorance1  as there are only
 the passing collocations of qualities4 
,qualities  do not imply that there are 
substances to which they adhere1  for   
the so-called pure substance does not   
exist1 as it can neither  be perceived  

by the senses nor inferred4 ,there are  
only the  momentary passing qualities4  
,we should regard each change of        
quality as a new existence4    ,the     
,jains we know were the contemporaries  
of ,buddha and  possibly of some of the 
,upanisads too1 and they had also a     
solution  to offer4 ,they held that it  
was not true that substance  alone was  
true and qualities were mere false and  
illusory appearances4  ,further it was  
not true as the ,buddhists said that    
there was no permanent substance but    
merely the change of  passing qualities1
 for both these represent two extreme   
views  and are contrary to experience4  
,both of them1 however1 contain  some   
elements of truth but not the whole     
truth as given in  experience4          
,experience shows that in all changes   
there are  three elements3 7#a7 that    
some collocations of qualities appear   
to remain unchanged2 7#b7 that some new 
qualities are generated2  7#c7 that some
 old qualities are destroyed4 ,it is    

true that qualities  of things are      
changing every minute1 but all qualities
 are not  changing4 ,thus when a jug is 
made1 it means that the clay-lump  has  
been destroyed1 a jug has been generated
 and the clay is  permanent1 i4e4 all   
production means that some old qualities
 have  been lost1 some new ones brought 
in1 and there is some part in  it which 
is permanent ,the clay has become lost  
in some form1  has generated itself in  
another1 and remained permanent in still
        ,footnote #a3 ,see ,chndogya1   
,,vi4 #a4    #age    another form4 ,it  
is by virtue of these unchanged         
qualities that a  thing is said to be   
permanent though undergoing change4     
,thus  when a lump of gold is turned    
into a rod or a ring1 all the specific  
qualities which come under the          
connotation of the word gold  are seen  
to continue1 though the forms are       
successively changed1  and with each    
such change some of its qualities are   
lost and some  new ones are acquired4   

,such being the case1 the truth comes to
  this1 that there is always a permanent
 entity as represented by the           
permanence of such qualities as lead us 
to call it a substance in  spite of all 
its diverse changes4 ,the nature of     
being 7sat7 then is  neither the        
absolutely unchangeable1 nor the        
momentary changing  qualities or        
existences1 but involves them both4     
,being then1 as is  testified by        
experience1 is that which involves a    
permanent unit1  which is incessantly   
every moment losing some qualities and  
gaining new ones4 ,the notion of being  
involves a permanent  7dhruva7 accession
 of some new qualities 7utpda7 and loss 
of  some old qualities 7vyaya7 ,footnote
 ref4#a4 ,the solution of ,jainism is   
thus a reconciliation of the two        
extremes of ,vedantism and ,buddhism on 
grounds of common-sense experience4     
,the ,doctrine of ,relative ,pluralism  
7anekntavda74    ,this conception of    
being as the union of the permanent and 

change brings us naturally to the       
doctrine of ,anekntavda or  what we may 
call relative pluralism as against the  
extreme absolutism  of the ,upanisads   
and the pluralism of the ,buddhists4    
,the ,jains regarded all things as      
aneknta 7na-eknta71 or in  other words  
they held that nothing could be affirmed
 absolutely1  as all affirmations were  
true only under certain conditions and  
limitations4 ,thus speaking of a gold   
jug1 we see that its existence  as a    
substance 7dravya7 is of the nature of a
 collocation  of atoms and not as any   
other substance such as space 7ks'a71   
i4e4 a gold jug is a dravya only in one 
sense of the term and  not in every     
sense2 so it is a dravya in the sense   
that it is a  collocation of atoms and  
not a dravya in the sense of space or   
time 7kla74 ,it is thus both a dravya   
and not a dravya at one  and the same   
time4 ,again it is atomic in the sense  
that it is a  composite of earth-atoms  
and not atomic in the sense that it is  

,footnote3 #a3 ,see                     
,tattvrthdhigamastra1 and ,gunaratna's  
treatment of  ,jainism in               
,saddars'anasamuccaya4    #agf    not a 
composite of water-atoms4 ,again it is a
 composite of earth-atoms  only in the  
sense that gold is a metallic           
modification of  earth1 and not any     
other modification of earth as clay or  
stone4  ,its being constituted of       
metal-atoms is again true in the sense  
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not
 of iron-atoms4 ,it  is made up again of
 gold-atoms in the sense of melted and  
unsullied  gold and not as gold in the  
natural condition4 ,it is again  made up
 of such unsullied and melted gold as   
has been hammered  and shaped by the    
goldsmith ,devadatta and not by         
,yajadatta4  ,its being made up of atoms
 conditioned as above is again only     
true in the sense that the collocation  
has been shaped as a jug  and not as a  
pot and so on4 ,thus proceeding in a    
similar manner  the ,jains say that all 

affirmations are true of a thing only in
 a  certain limited sense4 ,all things  
7vastu7 thus possess an infinite  number
 of qualities 7anantadharmtmakam vastu71
 each of which  can only be affirmed in 
a particular sense4 ,such an ordinary   
thing  as a jug will be found to be the 
object of an infinite number of         
affirmations and the possessor of an    
infinite number of qualities  from      
infinite points of view1 which are all  
true in certain restricted  senses and  
not absolutely ,footnote ref l4 ,thus in
 the positive relation  riches cannot be
 affirmed of poverty but in the negative
 relation such  an affirmation is       
possible as when we say the poor man has
 no  riches4 ,the poor man possesses    
riches not in a positive but in  a      
negative way4 ,thus in some relation or 
other anything may be  affirmed of any  
other thing1 and again in other         
relations the very  same thing cannot be
 affirmed of it4 ,the different         
standpoints  from which things 7though  

possessed of infinite determinations7   
can be spoken of as possessing this or  
that quality or as appearing  in        
relation to this or that1 are           
technically called naya ,footnote ref   
#b4      ,the ,doctrine of ,nayas4      
,in framing judgments about things there
 are two ways open  to us1 firstly we   
may notice the manifold qualities and   
characteristics  of anything but view   
them as unified in the thing2 thus when 
we say this is a book we do not look at 
its characteristic  qualities as being  
different from it1 but rather the       
qualities or  characteristics are       
perceived as having no separate         
existence from        ,footnote #a3 ,see
 ,gunaratna on ,jainamata in            
,saddarsanasamuccaya1 pp4  #baa4 etc41  
and also ,tattvrthdhigamastra4          
,footnote #b3 ,see ,tattvrthdhigamastra1
 and ,vis'esvalyaka bhsya1  pp4         
#hie-ibc4    #agg    the thing4         
,secondly we may notice the qualities   
separately and  regard the thing as a   

mere non-existent fiction 7cf4 the      
,buddhist  view72 thus ,i may speak of  
the different qualities of the book     
separately and hold that the qualities  
of things are alone perceptible  and the
 book apart from these cannot be found4 
,these two  points of view are          
respectively called dravyanaya and      
paryyanaya  ,footnote ref #a4 ,the      
dravyanaya again shows itself in three  
forms1  and paryayanaya in four forms1  
of which the first form only is         
important  for our purposes1 the other  
three being important rather from the   
point of view of grammar and language   
had better be omitted  here4 ,the three 
nayas under dravyanaya are called       
naigama-naya1  samgraha-naya and        
vyavahra-naya4    ,when we speak of a   
thing from a purely common sense point  
of view1 we do not make our ideas clear 
or precise4 ,thus ,i may  hold a book in
 my hand and when asked whether my hands
 are  empty1 ,i may say1 no1 ,i have    
something in my hand1 or ,i may say1  ,i

 have a book in my hand4 ,it is evident 
that in the first answer  ,i looked at  
the book from the widest and most       
general point of  view as a thing1      
whereas in the second ,i looked at it in
 its  special existence as a book4      
,again ,i may be reading a page of  a   
book1 and ,i may say ,i am reading a    
book1 but in reality ,i was  reading    
only one of the pages of the book4 ,i   
may be scribbling  on loose sheets1 and 
may say this is my book on ,jaina       
philosophy1  whereas in reality there   
were no books but merely some loose     
sheets4 ,this looking at things from the
 loose common sense view1  in which we  
do not consider them from the point of  
view of their  most general             
characteristic as being or as any of    
their special  characteristics1 but     
simply as they appear at first sight1 is
 technically  called the naigama        
standpoint4 ,this empirical view        
probably  proceeds on the assumption    
that a thing possesses the most  general

 as well as the most special qualities1 
and hence we may  lay stress on any one 
of these at any time and ignore the     
other  ones4 ,this is the point of view 
from which according to the  ,jains the 
,nyya and ,vais'esika schools interpret 
experience4    ,samgraha-naya is the    
looking at things merely from the  most 
general point of view4 ,thus we may     
speak of all individual  things from    
their most general and fundamental      
aspect as being4  ,this according to the
 ,jains is the ,vednta way of looking at
 things4        ,footnote #a3           
,sydvdamanjar1 pp4 #aga-agc4    #agh    
,the vyavahra-naya standpoint holds that
 the real essence  of things is to be   
regarded from the point of view of      
actual practical  experience of the     
thing1 which unifies within it some     
general  as well as some special traits1
 which has been existing from past      
times and remain in the future1 but yet 
suffer trifling changes  all the while1 
changes which are serviceable to us in a

 thousand  ways4 ,thus a book has no    
doubt some general traits1 shared  by   
all books1 but it has some special      
traits as well4 ,its atoms are          
continually suffering some displacement 
and rearrangement1 but  yet it has been 
existing as a book for some time past   
and will  exist for some time in the    
future as well4 ,all these              
characteristics1  go to make up the     
essence of the book of our everyday     
experience1  and none of these can be   
separated and held up as being  the     
concept of a book4 ,this according to   
the ,jains is the  ,smkhya way of       
looking at things4    ,the first view of
 paryya-naya called rjustra is the      
,buddhist  view which does not believe  
in the existence of the thing in the    
past or in the future1 but holds that a 
thing is a mere conglomeration  of      
characteristics which may be said to    
produce effects at  any given moment4   
,at each new moment there are new       
collocations  of new qualities and it is

 these which may be regarded as  the    
true essence of our notion of things    
,footnote ref #a4    ,the nayas as we   
have already said are but points of     
view1 or  aspects of looking at things1 
and as such are infinite in number4     
,the above four represent only a broad  
classification of these4 ,the  ,jains   
hold that the ,nyya-,vais'esika1 the    
,vednta1 the ,smkhya1  and the          
,buddhist1 have each tried to interpret 
and systematize  experience from one of 
the above four points of view1 and each 
regards  the interpretation from his    
point of view as being absolutely  true 
to the exclusion of all other points of 
view4 ,this is their error  7naybhsa71  
for each standpoint represents only one 
of the many  points of view from which a
 thing can be looked at4 ,the           
affirmations  from any point of view are
 thus true in a limited sense and  under
 limited conditions4 ,infinite numbers  
of affirmations may  be made of things  
from infinite points of view4           

,affirmations or  judgments according to
 any naya or standpoint cannot therefore
  be absolute1 for even contrary        
affirmations of the very selfsame       
,footnote #a3 ,the other standpoints of 
paryya-naya1 which represent            
grammatical and linguistic points of    
view1 are s'abda-naya1                  
samabhirdha-naya1 and evambhla-naya4    
,see ,vis'esvas'yaka  bhsya1 pp4        
#hie-ibc4    #agi    things may be held 
to be true from other points of view4   
,the  truth of each affirmation is thus 
only conditional1 and inconceivable     
from the absolute point of view4 ,to    
guarantee correctness  therefore each   
affirmation should be preceded by the   
phrase syt  7may be74 ,this will        
indicate that the affirmation is only   
relative1  made somehow1 from some point
 of view and under some reservations    
and not in any sense absolute4 ,there is
 no judgment  which is absolutely true1 
and no judgment which is absolutely     
false4 ,all judgments are true in some  

sense and false in another4  ,this      
brings us to the famous ,jaina doctrine 
of ,sydvda ,footnote ref #a4      ,the  
,doctrine of ,sydvda4    ,the doctrine  
of ,sydvda holds that since the most    
contrary  characteristics of infinite   
variety may be associated with a thing1 
affirmation made from whatever          
standpoint 7naya7 cannot be regarded  as
 absolute4 ,all affirmations are true   
7in some sydasti or  may be it is       
sense72 all affirmations are false in   
some sense2  all affirmations are       
indefinite or inconceivable in some     
sense  7sydavaktavya72 all affirmations 
are true as well as false in some  sense
 7sydasti synnsti72 all affirmations are
 true as well as  indefinite 7sydasti   
cvaktavyas'ca72 all affirmations are    
false as  well as indefinite2 all       
affirmations are true and false and     
indefinite  in some sense 7sydasti      
synnsti sydavaktavyas'ca74 ,thus we may 
say the jug is or the jug has being1 but
 it is more correct to  say explicitly  

that may be 7syt7 that the jug is1      
otherwise if  being here is taken       
absolutely of any and every kind of     
being1  it might also mean that there is
 a lump of clay or a pillar1 or a  cloth
 or any other thing4 ,the existence here
 is limited and defined  by the form of 
the jug4 ,the jug is does not mean      
absolute  existence but a limited kind  
of existence as determined by the  form 
of the jug1 ,the jug is thus means that 
a limited kind of  existence1 namely the
 jug-existence is affirmed and not      
existence  in general in the absolute or
 unlimited sense1 for then the sentence 
the jug is might as well mean the clay  
is1 the tree is1 the  cloth is1 etc4    
,again the existence of the jug is      
determined by the  negation of all other
 things in the world2 each quality or   
characteristic  7such as red colour7 of 
the jug is apprehended and defined  by  
the negation of all the infinite        
varieties 7such as black1 blue1         
golden71 etc41 of its class1 and it is  

by the combined negation of all         
,footnote #a3 ,see ,vis'esvas'yaka      
bhsya1 pp4 #hie1 etc41 and              
,sydvdamajar1 pp4 #agj1 etc4    #ahj    
the infinite number of characteristics  
or qualities other than those           
constituting the jug that a jug may be  
apprehended or defined4  ,what we call  
the being of the jug is thus the        
non-being of all the  rest except       
itself4 ,thus though looked at from one 
point of view  the judgment the jug is  
may mean affirmation of being1 looked   
at from another point of view it means  
an affirmation of non-being  7of all    
other objects74 ,thus of the judgment   
the jug is one may  say1 may be it is an
 affirmation of being 7sydasti71 may be 
it is a  negation of being 7synnsti72 or
 ,i may proceed in quite another  way   
and say that the jug is means this jug  
is here1 which  naturally indicates that
 this jug is not there and thus the     
judgment  the jug is 7i4e4 is here7 also
 means that the jug is not  there1 and  

so we see that the affirmation of the   
being of the jug  is true only of this  
place and false of another1 and this    
justifies us  in saying that may be that
 in some sense the jug is1 and may  be  
in some sense that the jug is not4      
,combining these two  aspects we may say
 that in some sense may be that the jug 
is1  and in some sense may be that the  
jug is not4 ,we understood  here that if
 we put emphasis on the side of the     
characteristics  constituting being1 we 
may say the jug is1 but if we put       
emphasis  on the other side1 we may as  
well say the jug is not4 ,both the      
affirmations hold good of the jug       
according as the emphasis is  put on    
either side4 ,but if without emphasis on
 either side we try  to comprehend the  
two opposite and contradictory judgments
  regarding the jug1 we see that the    
nature of the jug or of the existence   
of the jug is indefinite1 unspeakable   
and inconceivable--avaktavya1 for  how  
can we affirm both being and non-being  

of the same thing1 and yet  such is the 
nature of things that we cannot but do  
it4 ,thus all  affirmations are true1   
are not true1 are both true and untrue1 
and are  thus unspeakable1              
inconceivable1 and indefinite4          
,combining these four  again we derive  
another three1 7#a7 that in some sense  
it may be that  the jug is1 and 7#b7 is 
yet unspeakable1 or 7#c7 that the jug is
 not and  is unspeakable1 or finally    
that the jug is1 is not1 and is         
unspeakable4  ,thus the ,jains hold that
 no affirmation1 or judgment1 is        
absolute in its  nature1 each is true in
 its own limited sense only1 and for    
each one of  them any of the above seven
 alternatives 7technically called       
saptabhang  holds good ,footnote ref #a4
 ,the ,jains say that other ,indian     
systems each  from its own point of view
 asserts itself to be the absolute and  
the only        ,footnote #a3 ,see      
,sydvdamajar1 with ,hemacandra's        
commentary1 pp4 #aff1  etc4    #aha     

point of view4 ,they do not perceive    
that the nature of reality  is such that
 the truth of any assertion is merely   
conditional1  and holds good only in    
certain conditions1 circumstances1 or   
senses 7updhi74 ,it is thus impossible  
to make any affirmation  which is       
universally and absolutely valid4 ,for a
 contrary or  contradictory affirmation 
will always be found to hold good of    
any judgment in some sense or other4 ,as
 all reality is partly  permanent and   
partly exposed to change of the form of 
losing  and gaining old and new         
qualities1 and is thus relatively       
permanent  and changeful1 so all our    
affirmations regarding truth are also   
only relatively valid and invalid4      
,being1 non-being and indefinite1  the  
three categories of logic1 are all      
equally available in some sense  or     
other in all their permutations for any 
and every kind of  judgment4 ,there is  
no universal and absolute position or   
negation1  and all judgments are valid  

only conditionally4 ,the relation of    
the naya doctrine with the sydvda       
doctrine is therefore this1  that for   
any judgment according to any and every 
naya there are as  many alternatives as 
are indicated by sydvda4 ,the validity  
of  such a judgment is therefore only   
conditional4 ,if this is borne  in mind 
when making any judgment according to   
any naya1  the naya is rightly used4    
,if1 however1 the judgments are made    
absolutely  according to any particular 
naya without any reference to  other    
nayas as required by the sydvda doctrine
 the nayas are  wrongly used as in the  
case of other systems1 and then such    
judgments are false and should therefore
 be called false nayas  7naybhsa7       
,footnote ref #a4      ,knowledge1 its  
value for us4    ,the ,buddhist         
,dharmottara in his commentary on       
,nyyabindu  says that people who are    
anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in
  which they are interested1 value the  
knowledge which helps them  to attain   

that purpose4 ,it is because knowledge  
is thus found  to be useful and sought  
by men that philosophy takes upon it the
  task of examining the nature of true  
knowledge 7samyagjna or  pramna74 ,the  
main test of true knowledge is that it  
helps us  to attain our purpose4 ,the   
,jains also are in general agreement    
with the  above view of knowledge of the
 ,buddhists ,footnote ref #b4 ,they also
        ,footnote #a3 ,the earliest     
mention of the doctrine of sydvda and   
saptabhang probably occurs in           
,bhadrabhu's 7#dcc-ceg ,b4,c47          
commentary  ,strakrtnganiryukti4        
,footnote #b3 ,see                      
,pramna-naya-tattvloklamkra 7,benares71 
p4 #af2 also  ,parks-mukha-sira-vrtti   
7,asiatic ,society71 ch4 ,i4    #ahb    
say that knowledge is not to be valued  
for its own sake4 ,the  validity        
7prmnya7 of anything consists in this1  
that it directly  helps us to get what  
is good for us and to avoid what is bad 
for us4 ,knowledge alone has this       

capacity1 for by it we can  adapt       
ourselves to our environments and try to
 acquire what  is good for us and avoid 
what is bad ,footnote ref #a4 ,the      
conditions that  lead to the production 
of such knowledge 7such as the presence 
of full light and proximity to the eye  
in the case of seeing an  object by     
visual perception7 have but little      
relevancy in this connection4  ,for we  
are not concerned with how a cognition  
is  produced1 as it can be of no help to
 us in serving our purposes4  ,it is    
enough for us to know that external     
objects under certain  conditions assume
 such a special fitness 7yogyat7 that we
 can  have knowledge of them4 ,we have  
no guarantee that they  generate        
knowledge in us1 for we are only aware  
that under  certain conditions we know a
 thing1 whereas under other conditions  
we do not know it ,footnote ref #b4 ,the
 enquiry as to the nature of the        
special fitness of things which makes   
knowledge of them possible  does not    

concern us4 ,those conditions which     
confer such  a special fitness on things
 as to render them perceivable have but 
little to do with us2 for our purposes  
which consist only in the  acquirement  
of good and avoidance of evil1 can only 
be served by  knowledge and not by those
 conditions of external objects4        
,knowledge reveals our own self as a    
knowing subject as well  as the objects 
that are known by us4 ,we have no reason
 to  suppose 7like the ,buddhists7 that 
all knowledge by perception of  external
 objects is in the first instance       
indefinite and indeterminate1  and that 
all our determinate notions of form1    
colour1 size and other  characteristics 
of the thing are not directly given in  
our perceptual  experience1 but are     
derived only by imagination 7utpreks71  
and  that therefore true perceptual     
knowledge only certifies the validity   
of the indefinite and indeterminate     
crude sense data 7nirvikalpa  jna74     
,experience shows that true knowledge on

 the one hand  reveals us as subjects or
 knowers1 and on the other hand gives  a
 correct sketch of the external objects 
in all the diversity of  their          
characteristics4 ,it is for this reason 
that knowledge is our  immediate and    
most prominent means of serving our     
purposes4        ,footnote #a3          
,pramna-naya-tattvloklamkra1 p4 #bf4    
,footnote #b3 ,see ,parsa-mukha-stra1   
,,ii4 #i1 and its vrtti1 and also the   
concluding vrtti of ch4 ,,ii4    #ahc   
,of course knowledge cannot directly and
 immediately bring to  us the good we   
want1 but since it faithfully           
communicates to us  the nature of the   
objects around us1 it renders our       
actions for the  attainment of good and 
the avoidance of evil1 possible2 for if 
knowledge did not possess these         
functions1 this would have been         
impossible4 ,the validity of knowledge  
thus consists in this1 that  it is the  
most direct1 immediate1 and             
indispensable means for  serving our    

purposes4 ,so long as any knowledge is  
uncontradicted  it should be held as    
true4 ,false knowledge is that which    
represents  things in relations in which
 they do not exist4 ,when a rope in a   
badly lighted place gives rise to the   
illusion of a snake1 the illusion       
consists in taking the rope to be a     
snake1 i4e4 perceiving a snake  where it
 does not exist4 ,snakes exist and ropes
 also exist1 there is  no untruth in    
that ,footnote ref #a4 ,the error thus  
consists in this1  that the snake is    
perceived where the rope exists4 ,the   
perception of a  snake under relations  
and environments in which it was not    
then existing  is what is meant by error
 here4 ,what was at first perceived as a
 snake  was later on contradicted and   
thus found false4 ,falsehood therefore  
consists in the misrepresentation of    
objective facts in experience4 ,true    
knowledge therefore is that which gives 
such a correct and faithful             
representation of its object as is never

 afterwards found to be  contradicted4  
,thus knowledge when imparted directly  
in association  with the organs in      
sense-perception is very clear1 vivid1  
and  distinct1 and is called            
perceptional 7pratyaksa72 when attained 
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear 
and vivid and is then  called           
non-perceptional 7paroksa ,footnote ref 
#b74      ,theory of ,perception4       
,the main difference of the ,jains from 
the ,buddhists in the  theory of        
perception lies1 as we have already     
seen1 in this1 that the  ,jains think   
that perception 7pratyaksa7 reveals to  
us the external  objects just as they   
are with most of their diverse          
characteristics of  colour1 form1 etc41 
and also in this1 that knowledge arises 
in the soul        ,footnote #a3        
,illusion consists in attributing such  
spatial1 temporal or  other kinds of    
relations to the objects of our judgment
 as do not actually  exist1 but the     
objects themselves actually exist in    

other relations4 ,when  ,i mistake the  
rope for the snake1 the snake actually  
exists though its  relationing with the 
this as this is a snake does not exist1 
for the  snake is not the rope4 ,this   
illusion is thus called  satkhyti or    
misrelationing of existents 7sat74      
,footnote #b3 ,see ,jaina-tarka-vrttika 
of ,siddhasena1 ch4 ,i41 and vrtti  by  
,s'antycrya1 ,pramnanayatattvloklamkra1 
ch4 ,i41  ,parks-mukha-stra-vrtti1 ch4  
,i4    #ahd    from within it as if by  
removing a veil which had been covering 
it  before4 ,objects are also not mere  
forms of knowledge 7as the ,vijnavdin   
,buddhist thinks7 but are actually      
existing4 ,knowledge  of external       
objects by perception is gained through 
the senses4  ,the exterior physical     
sense such as the eye must be           
distinguished  from the invisible       
faculty or power of vision of the soul1 
which  alone deserves the name of sense4
 ,we have five such cognitive  senses4  
,but the ,jains think that since by our 

experience we are  only aware of five   
kinds of sense knowledge corresponding  
to the  five senses1 it is better to say
 that it is the self which gains  of    
itself those different kinds of         
sense-knowledge in association with     
those exterior senses as if by removal  
of a covering1 on account  of the       
existence of which the knowledge could  
not reveal itself  before4 ,the process 
of external perception does not thus    
involve  the exercise of any separate   
and distinct sense1 though the rise  of 
the sense-knowledge in the soul takes   
place in association with  the          
particular sense-organ such as eye1 etc4
 ,the soul is in touch  with all parts  
of the body1 and visual knowledge is    
that knowledge  which is generated in   
the soul through that part of it which  
is  associated with1 or is in touch with
 the eye4 ,to take an example1  ,i look 
before me and see a rose4 ,before       
looking at it the knowledge  of rose was
 in me1 but only in a covered condition1

 and  hence could not get itself        
manifested4 ,the act of looking at the  
rose means that such a fitness has come 
into the rose and into  myself that the 
rose is made visible1 and the veil over 
my knowledge  of rose is removed4 ,when 
visual knowledge arises1 this  happens  
in association with the eye2 ,i say that
 ,i see through  the visual sense1      
whereas in reality experience shows that
 ,i have  only a knowledge of the visual
 type 7associated with eye74 ,as        
experience does not reveal the separate 
senses1 it is unwarrantable  to assert  
that they have an existence apart from  
the self4 ,proceeding  in a similar way 
the ,jains discard the separate         
existence of manas  7mind-organ7 also1  
for manas also is not given in          
experience1 and the  hypothesis of its  
existence is unnecessary1 as self alone 
can serve  its purpose ,footnote ref #a4
 ,perception of an object means         
,footnote #a3 ,tanna indriyam bhautikam 
kim tu tm ca                            

indriyam444anupahatacaksurdides'esu eva 
tmanah                                  
karmaksayopas'amaslensthagitagavksatulyn
i caksurdni  upakaranni4                
,jaina-,vttika-,vrtti1 ,,ii4 p4 #ih4 ,in
 many places1  however1 the five senses1
 such as eye1 ear1 etc41 are mentioned  
as  senses1 and living beings are often 
classified according to the number  of  
senses they possess4 7,see ,pramnammms4 
,see also  ,tattvrth-dhigamastra1 ch4   
,,ii4 etc47 ,but this is with reference 
to  the sense organs4 ,the denial of    
separate senses is with reference to    
admitting them as entities or capacities
 having a distinct and separate         
category of existence from the soul4    
,the sense organs are like  windows for 
the soul to look out4 ,they cannot thus 
modify the  sense-knowledge which rises 
in the soul by inward determination2    
for it is already existent in it2 the   
perceptual process only means that  the 
veil which as observing it is removed4  
#ahe    that the veil of ignorance upon 

the self regarding the object has  been 
removed4 ,inwardly this removal is      
determined by the  karma of the         
individual1 outwardly it is determined  
by the presence  of the object of       
perception1 light1 the capacity of the  
sense  organs1 and such other           
conditions4 ,contrary to the ,buddhists 
and many other ,indian systems1 the     
,jains denied the existence  of any     
nirvikalpa 7indeterminate7 stage        
preceding the final savikalpa           
7determinate7 stage of perception4      
,there was a direct  revelation of      
objects from within and no indeterminate
 sense-materials  were necessary for the
 development of determinate             
perceptions4 ,we must contrast this with
 the ,buddhists who  regarded that the  
first stage consisting of the           
presentation of  indeterminate sense    
materials was the only valid part of    
perception4  ,the determinate stage with
 them is the result of the application  
of mental categories1 such as           

imagination1 memory1 etc41 and hence    
does not truly represent the            
presentative part ,footnote ref #a4     
,non-,perceptual ,knowledge4            
,non-perceptual knowledge 7paroksa7     
differs from pratyaksa  in this1 that it
 does not give us so vivid a picture of 
objects as the  latter4 ,since the      
,jains do not admit that the senses had 
any function  in determining the        
cognitions of the soul1 the only        
distinction  they could draw between    
perception and other forms of knowledge 
was that the knowledge of the former    
kind 7perception7 gave us  clearer      
features and characteristics of objects 
than the latter4  ,paroksa thus includes
 inference1 recognition1 implication1   
memory1  etc42 and this knowledge is    
decidedly less vivid than perception4   
,regarding inference1 the ,jains hold   
that it is unnecessary to  have five    
propositions1 such as3 7#a7 the hill is 
fiery1 7#b7 because  of smoke1 7#c7     
wherever there is smoke there is fire1  

such as the  kitchen1 7#d7 this hill is 
smoky1 7#e7 therefore it is fiery1      
called  respectively pratij1 hetu1      
drstnta1 upanaya and nigamana1 except   
for the purpose of explicitness4 ,it is 
only the first two  propositions which  
actually enter into the inferential     
process  7,prameyakamalamrtanda1 pp4    
#ajh1 #aji74 ,when we make an           
,footnote #a ,prameyakamalamrtanda1 pp4 
#h-aa4    #ahf    inference we do not   
proceed through the five propositions as
  above4 ,they who know that the reason 
is inseparably connected  with the      
probandum either as coexistence         
7sahabhva7 or as invariable  antecedence
 7kramabhva7 will from the mere         
statement  of the existence of the      
reason 7e4g4 smoke7 in the hill jump to 
the  conclusion that the hill has got   
fire4 ,a syllogism consisting of  five  
propositions is rather for explaining   
the matter to a child  than for         
representing the actual state of the    
mind in making an  inference ,footnote  

ref #a4    ,as regards proof by         
testimony the ,jains do not admit the   
authority of the ,vedas1 but believe    
that the ,jaina scriptures give  us     
right knowledge1 for these are the      
utterances of persons who  have lived a 
worldly life but afterwards by right    
actions and  right knowledge have       
conquered all passions and removed all  
ignorance ,footnote ref #b4             
,knowledge as ,revelation4    ,the      
,buddhists had affirmed that the proof  
of the existence of  anything depended  
upon the effect that it could produce on
 us4  ,that which could produce any     
effect on us was existent1 and that     
,footnote #a3 ,as regards concomitance  
7vypti7 some of the ,jaina logicians    
like the ,buddhists prefer antarvypti   
7between smoke and fire7 to  bahirvypt  
7the place containing smoke with the    
place containing fire74  ,they also     
divide inference into two classes1      
svrthnumna for one's own  self and      
parrthnumna for convincing others4 ,it  

may not be out of  place to note that   
the earliest ,jaina view as maintained  
by ,bhadrabhu  in his                   
,das'avaiklikaniryukti was in favour of 
ten propositions for  making an         
inference2 7#a7 ,pratij 7e4g4 non-injury
 to life is the  greatest virtue71 7#b7 
,pratijvibhakti 7non-injury to life is  
the  greatest virtue according to ,jaina
 scriptures71 7#c7 ,hetu 7because  those
 who adhere to non-injury are loved by  
gods and it is meritorious  to do them  
honour71 7#d7 ,hetu vibhakti 7those who 
do so are the only  persons who can live
 in the highest places of virtue71 7#e7 
,vipaksa  7but even by doing injury one 
may prosper and even by reviling ,jaina 
scriptures one may attain merit as is   
the case with ,brahmins71  7#f7 ,vipaksa
 pratisedha 7it is not so1 it is        
impossible that those  who despise      
,jaina scriptures should be loved by    
gods or should deserve  honour71 7#g7   
,drsnta 7the ,arhats take food from     
householders as  they do not like to    

cook themselves for fear of killing     
insects71  7#h7 s'ank 7but the sins of  
the householders should touch the       
arhats1  for they cook for them71 7#i7  
s'ankpratisedha 7this cannot be1  for   
the arhats go to certain houses         
unexpectedly1 so it could not be  said  
that the cooking was undertaken for     
them71 7#aj7 ,naigamana  7non-injury is 
therefore the greatest virtue7          
7,vidybhsana's ,indian  ,logic74 ,these 
are persuasive statements which are     
often actually  adopted in a discussion1
 but from a formal point of view many of
 these  are irrelevant4 ,when ,vtsyyana 
in his ,nyyastrabhsya1 ,i4 #a4 #cb1     
says that ,gautama introduced the       
doctrine of five propositions as        
against the doctrine of ten propositions
 as held by other logicians1 he         
probably had this ,jaina view in his    
mind4    ,footnote #b3 ,see             
,jainatarkavrttika1 and                 
,parksmukhastravrtti1 and               
,saddars'anasamuccaya with ,gunaratna on

 ,jainism4    #ahg    which could not   
non-existent4 ,in fact production of    
effect was  with them the only          
definition of existence 7being74        
,theoretically  each unit of effect     
being different from any other unit of  
effect  they supposed that there was a  
succession of different units of  effect
 or1 what is the same thing1            
acknowledged a succession of  new       
substances every moment4 ,all things    
were thus momentary4  ,the ,jains urged 
that the reason why the production of   
effect  may be regarded as the only     
proof of being is that we can assert    
only that thing the existence of which  
is indicated by a corresponding         
experience4 ,when we have a unit of     
experience we  suppose the existence of 
the object as its ground4 ,this being   
so1  the theoretical analysis of the    
,buddhists that each unit of effect     
produced in us is not exactly the same  
at each new point of time1  and that    
therefore all things are momentary1 is  

fallacious2 for experience  shows that  
not all of an object is found to be     
changing  every moment2 some part of it 
7e4g4 gold in a gold ornament7 is  found
 to remain permanent while other parts  
7e4g4 its form as earrings  or bangles7 
are seen to undergo change4 ,how in the 
face  of such an experience can we      
assert that the whole thing vanishes    
every moment and that new things are    
being renewed at each  succeeding       
moment8 ,hence leaving aside mere       
abstract and  unfounded speculations1 if
 we look to experience we find that the 
conception of being or existence        
involves a notion of permanence         
associated with change--paryya          
7acquirement of new qualities  and the  
loss of old ones74 ,the ,jains hold that
 the defects of other  systems lie in   
this1 that they interpret experience    
only from one  particular standpoint    
7naya7 whereas they alone carefully     
weigh  experience from all points of    
view and acquiesce in the truths        

indicated by it1 not absolutely but     
under proper reservations and           
limitations4 ,the ,jains hold that in   
formulating the doctrine of             
arthakriykritva the ,buddhists at first 
showed signs of starting  on their      
enquiry on the evidence of experience1  
but soon they  became one-sided in their
 analysis and indulged in unwarrantable 
abstract speculations which went        
directly against experience4  ,thus if  
we go by experience we can neither      
reject the self nor  the external world 
as some ,buddhists did4 ,knowledge which
  reveals to us the clear-cut features  
of the external world certifies  at the 
same time that such knowledge is part   
and parcel of myself  as the subject4   
,knowledge is thus felt to be an        
expression of my  own self4 ,we do not  
perceive in experience that knowledge   
#ahh    in us is generated by the       
external world1 but there is in us the  
rise of knowledge and of certain objects
 made known to us by it4  ,the rise of  

knowledge is thus only parallel to      
certain objective  collocations of      
things which somehow have the special   
fitness  that they and they alone are   
perceived at that particular moment4    
,looked at from this point of view all  
our experiences are centred  in         
ourselves1 for determined somehow1 our  
experiences come to us  as modifications
 of our own self4 ,knowledge being a    
character  of the self1 it shows itself 
as manifestations of the self           
independent  of the senses4 ,no         
distinction should be made between a    
conscious  and an unconscious element in
 knowledge as ,smkhya does4 ,nor  should
 knowledge be regarded as a copy of the 
objects which it  reveals1 as the       
,sautrntikas think1 for then by copying 
the materiality  of the object1         
knowledge would itself become material4 
,knowledge should thus be regarded as a 
formless quality of the  self revealing 
all objects by itself4 ,but the ,mmms   
view that the  validity 7prmnya7 of all 

knowledge is proved by knowledge itself 
svatahprmnya7 is wrong4 ,both logically 
and psychologically  the validity of    
knowledge depends upon outward          
correspondence  7samvda7 with facts4    
,but in those cases where by previous   
knowledge of correspondence a right     
belief has been produced  there may be a
 psychological ascertainment of validity
 without  reference to objective facts  
7prmnyamutpattau parata eva  japtau     
svakrye ca svatah paratas'ca4           
abhysnabhyspeksay7 ,footnote  ref #a4   
,the objective world exists as it is    
certified by experience4 ,but  that it  
generates knowledge in us is an         
unwarrantable hypothesis1  for knowledge
 appears as a revelation of our own     
self4 ,this  brings us to a             
consideration of ,jaina metaphysics4    
,the ,jvas4    ,the ,jains say that     
experience shows that all things may be 
divided into the living 7jva7 and the   
non-living 7ajva74 ,the  principle of   
life is entirely distinct from the body1

 and it is most  erroneous to think that
 life is either the product or the      
property  of the body ,footnote ref #b  
,it is on account of this life-principle
 that  the body appears to be living    
,this principle is the soul4 ,the soul  
is  directly perceived 7by              
introspection7 just as the external     
things  are4 ,it is not a mere          
symbolical object indicated by a phrase 
or        ,footnote #a3                 
,prameyakamalamrtanda1 pp4 #ch-dc4      
,footnote #b3 ,see ,jaina ,vrttika1 p4  
#fj4    #ahi    a description4 ,this is 
directly against the view of the great  
,mmmsa authority ,prabhkara ,footnote   
ref #a4 ,the soul in its pure state  is 
possessed of infinite perception        
7ananta-dars'ana71 infinite  knowledge  
7ananta-jna71 infinite bliss            
7ananta-sukha7 and infinite  power      
7ananta-vrya7 ,footnote ref #b4 ,it is  
all perfect4 ,ordinarily  however1 with 
the exception of a few released pure    
souls 7mukta-jva7  all the other jvas   

7samsrin7 have all their purity and     
power  covered with a thin veil of karma
 matter which has been accumulating  in 
them from beginningless time4 ,these    
souls are infinite in number4  ,they are
 substances and are eternal4 ,they in   
reality occupy innumerable  space-points
 in our mundane world 7lokksa71 have a  
limited  size 7madhyama-parimna7 and are
 neither all-pervasive 7vibhu7  nor     
atomic 7anu72 it is on account of this  
that jva is called  ,jivstikya4 ,the    
word astikya means anything that        
occupies  space or has some             
pervasiveness2 but these souls expand   
and  contract themselves according to   
the dimensions of the body  which they  
occupy at any time 7bigger in the       
elephant and  smaller in the ant life74 
,it is well to remember that according  
to  the ,jains the soul occupies the    
whole of the body in which it  lives1 so
 that from the tip of the hair to the   
nail of the foot1  wherever there may be
 any cause of sensation1 it can at once 

feel  it4 ,the manner in which the soul 
occupies the body is often explained  as
 being similar to the manner in which a 
lamp illumines  the whole room though   
remaining in one corner of the room4    
,the  ,jains divide the jvas according  
to the number of sense-organs  they     
possess4 ,the lowest class consists of  
plants1 which possess  only the         
sense-organ of touch4 ,the next higher  
class is that  of worms1 which possess  
two sense-organs of touch and taste4    
,next come the ants1 etc41 which possess
 touch1 taste1 and smell4  ,the next    
higher one that of bees1 etc41          
possessing vision in  addition to touch1
 taste1 and smell4 ,the vertebrates     
possess all  the five sense-organs4 ,the
 higher animals among these1 namely     
men1 denizens of hell1 and the gods     
possess in addition to these  an inner  
sense-organ namely manas by virtue of   
which they are        ,footnote #a3 ,see
 ,prameyakamalamrtanda1 p4 #cc4         
,footnote #b3 ,the ,jains distinguish   

between dars'ana and jna4  ,dars'ana is 
the knowledge of things without their   
details1 e4g4 ,i see  a cloth4 ,jna     
means the knowledge of details1 e4g4 ,i 
not only see the  cloth1 but know to    
whom it belongs1 of what quality it is1 
where it  was prepared1 etc4 ,in all    
cognition we have first dars'ana and    
then jna4 ,the pure souls possess       
infinite general perception of all      
things as well as infinite knowledge of 
all things in all their details4    #aij
    called rational 7samjin7 while the  
lower animals have no reason  and are   
called asamjnin4    ,proceeding towards 
the lowest animal we find that the      
,jains  regard all the four elements    
7earth1 water1 air1 fire7 as being      
animated  by souls4 ,thus particles of  
earth1 etc41 are the bodies of  souls1  
called earth-lives1 etc4 ,these we may  
call elementary lives2  they live and   
die and are born again in another       
elementary body4  ,these elementary     
lives are either gross or subtle2 in the

 latter case  they are invisible4 ,the  
last class of one-organ lives are       
plants4  ,of some plants each is the    
body of one soul only2 but of other     
plants1 each is an aggregation of       
embodied souls1 which have all  the     
functions of life such as respiration   
and nutrition in common4  ,plants in    
which only one soul is embodied are     
always gross2 they  exist in the        
habitable part of the world only4 ,but  
those plants  of which each is a colony 
of plant lives may also be subtle and   
invisible1 and in that case they are    
distributed all over the world4  ,the   
whole universe is full of minute beings 
called nigodas2 they  are groups of     
infinite number of souls forming very   
small clusters1  having respiration and 
nutrition in common and experiencing    
extreme  pains4 ,the whole space of the 
world is closely packed with  them like 
a box filled with powder4 ,the nigodas  
furnish the supply  of souls in place of
 those that have reached ,moksa4 ,but an

  infinitesimally small fraction of one 
single nigoda has sufficed to  replace  
the vacancy caused in the world by the  
,nirvana of all the  souls that have    
been liberated from beginningless past  
down to  the present4 ,thus it is       
evident the samsra will never be empty  
of living beings4 ,those of the nigodas 
who long for development  come out and  
continue their course of progress       
through successive  stages ,footnote ref
 #a4      ,karma ,theory4    ,it is on  
account of their merits or demerits that
 the jvas are  born as gods1 men1       
animals1 or denizens of hell4 ,we have  
already  noticed in ,chapter ,,iii that 
the cause of the embodiment of soul  is 
the presence in it of karma matter4 ,the
 natural perfections of  the pure soul  
are sullied by the different kinds of   
karma matter4  ,those which obscure     
right knowledge of details 7jna7 are    
called jnvaranya1 those which obscure   
right perception  7dars'ana7 as in sleep
 are called dars'anvaranya1 those which 

,footnote #a3 ,see ,jacobi's article on 
,jainism1 ,e4 ,r4,e41 and  ,lokapraks'a1
 ,,vi4 pp4 #ca ff4    #aia    obscure   
the bliss-nature of the soul and thus   
produce pleasure and  pain are vedanya1 
and those which obscure the right       
attitude of the  soul towards faith and 
right conduct mohanya ,footnote ref #a4 
,in  addition to these four kinds of    
karma there are other four kinds of     
karma  which determine 7#a7 the length  
of life in any birth1 7#b7 the peculiar 
body  with its general and special      
qualities and faculties1 7#c7 the       
nationality1  caste1 family1 social     
standing1 etc41 7#d7 the inborn energy  
of the  soul by the obstruction of which
 it prevents the doing of a good  action
 when there is a desire to do it4 ,these
 are respectively called  7#a7 yuska    
karma1 7#b7 nma karma1 7#c7 gotra karma1
 7#d7 antarya  karma4 ,by our actions of
 mind1 speech and body1 we are          
continually  producing certain subtle   
karma matter which in the first         

instance is called bhva karma1 which    
transforms itself into dravya  karma and
 pours itself into the soul and sticks  
there by coming  into contact with the  
passions 7kasya7 of the soul4 ,these act
 like  viscous substances in retaining  
the inpouring karma matter4 ,this       
matter acts in eight different ways and 
it is accordingly divided  into eight   
classes1 as we have already noticed4    
,this karma is the  cause of bondage and
 sorrow4 ,according as good or bad karma
  matter sticks to the soul it gets     
itself coloured respectively as  golden1
 lotus-pink1 white and black1 blue and  
grey and they are  called the les'ys4   
,the feelings generated by the          
accumulation of  the karma-matter are   
called bhva-les'y and the actual        
coloration  of the soul by it is called 
dravya-les'y4 ,according as any karma   
matter has been generated by good1 bad1 
or indifferent actions1 it  gives us    
pleasure1 pain1 or feeling of           
indifference4 ,even the knowledge  that 

we are constantly getting by perception1
 inference1 etc41  is but the result of 
the effect of karmas in accordance with 
which  the particular kind of veil which
 was obscuring any particular kind  of  
knowledge is removed at any time and we 
have a knowledge  of a corresponding    
nature4 ,by our own karmas the veils    
over our  knowledge1 feeling1 etc41 are 
so removed that we have just that  kind 
of knowledge and feeling that we        
deserved to have4 ,all  knowledge1      
feeling1 etc41 are thus in one sense    
generated from  within1 the external    
objects which are ordinarily said to be 
generating them all being but mere      
coexistent external conditions4         
,footnote #a3 ,the ,jains acknowledge   
five kinds of knowledge3 7#a7 matijna   
7ordinary cognition71 7#b7 s'ruti       
7testimony71 7#c7 avadhi 7supernatural  
cognition71 7#d7 manahparyya            
7thought-reading71 7#e7 kevala-jna      
7omniscience74    #aib      ,after the  
effect of a particular karma matter     

7karma-vargan7  is once produced1 it is 
discharged and purged from off the soul4
  ,this process of purging off the      
karmas is called nirjar4 ,if no  new    
karma matter should accumulate then1 the
 gradual purging  off of the karmas     
might make the soul free of karma       
matter1 but as  it is1 while some karma 
matter is being purged off1 other karma 
matter is continually pouring in1 and   
thus the purging and  binding processes 
continuing simultaneously force the soul
 to  continue its mundane cycle of      
existence1 transmigration1 and rebirth4 
,after the death of each individual his 
soul1 together with  its karmic body    
7krmanas'arra71 goes in a few moments to
 the  place of its new birth and there  
assumes a new body1 expanding  or       
contracting in accordance with the      
dimensions of the latter4    ,in the    
ordinary course karma takes effect and  
produces its  proper results1 and at    
such a stage the soul is said to be in  
the  audayika state4 ,by proper efforts 

karma may however be prevented  from    
taking effect1 though it still continues
 to exist1 and  this is said to be the  
aupas'amika state of the soul4 ,when    
karma  is not only prevented from       
operating but is annihilated1 the soul  
is said to be in the ksyika state1 and  
it is from this state that  ,moksa is   
attained4 ,there is1 however1 a fourth  
state of ordinary  good men with whom   
some karma is annihilated1 some         
neutralized1  and some active           
7ksyopas'amika7 ,footnote ref #a4       
,karma1 srava and ,nirjar4    ,it is on 
account of karma that the souls have to 
suffer all  the experiences of this     
world process1 including births and     
rebirths  in diverse spheres of life as 
gods1 men or animals1 or insects4  ,the 
karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic
 particles of matter  7karma-vargan4    
,the influx of these karma particles    
into the  soul is called srava in       
,jainism4 ,these karmas are produced by 
body1 mind1 and speech4 ,the sravas     

represent the channels or  modes through
 which the karmas enter the soul1 just  
like the  channels through which water  
enters into a pond4 ,but the ,jains     
distinguish between the channels and the
 karmas which actually        ,footnote 
#a3 ,the stages through which a         
developing soul passes are  technically 
called gunasthnas which are fourteen in 
number4 ,the  first three stages        
represent the growth of faith in        
,jainism1 the next  five stages are     
those in which all the passions are     
controlled1 in  the next four stages the
 ascetic practises yoga and destroys all
 his  karmas1 at the thirteenth stage he
 is divested of all karmas but he  still
 practises yoga and at the fourteenth   
stage he attains liberation  7see       
,dravyasamgrahavrtti1 #acth verse74     
#aic    enter through those channels4   
,thus they distinguish two kinds  of    
sravas1 bhvsrava and karmsrava4         
,bhvsrava means the  thought activities 
of the soul through which or on account 

of  which the karma particles enter the 
soul ,footnote ref #a4 ,thus ,nemicandra
  says that bhvsrava is that kind of    
change in the soul 7which  is the       
contrary to what can destroy the        
karmsrava71 by which  the karmas enter  
the soul ,footnote ref #b4 ,karmsrava1  
however1 means the  actual entrance of  
the karma matter into the soul4 ,these  
bhvsravas are in general of five kinds1 
namely delusion  7mithytva71 want of    
control 7avirati71 inadvertence         
7pramda71  the activities of body1 mind 
and speech 7yoga7 and the passions      
7kasyas74 ,delusion again is of five    
kinds1 namely eknta  7a false belief    
unknowingly accepted and uncritically   
followed71  viparta 7uncertainty as to  
the exact nature of truth71 vinaya      
7retention of a belief knowing it to be 
false1 due to old habit71  sams'aya     
7doubt as to right or wrong7 and ajna   
7want of any  belief due to the want of 
application of reasoning powers74       
,avirati is again of five kinds1 injury 

7hims71 falsehood 7anrta71  stealing    
7cauryya71 incontinence 7abrahma71 and  
desire to have  things which one does   
not already possess 7parigrahknks74     
,pramda or inadvertence is again of five
 kinds1 namely bad conversation         
7vikath71 passions 7kasya71 bad use of  
the five senses  7indriya71 sleep       
7nidr71 attachment 7rga7 ,footnote ref  
#c4    ,coming to dravysrava we find    
that it means that actual influx  of    
karma which affects the soul in eight   
different manners  in accordance with   
which these karmas are classed into     
eight  different kinds1 namely          
jnvaranya1 dars'anvaranya1 vedanya1     
mohanya1 yu1 nma1 gotra and antarya4    
,these actual  influxes take place only 
as a result of the bhvsrava or the      
reprehensible  thought activities1 or   
changes 7parinma7 of the soul4  ,the    
states of thought which condition the   
coming in of the karmas  is called      
bhvabandha and the actual bondage of the
 soul by the  actual impure connections 

of the karmas is technically called     
dravyabandha4 ,it is on account of      
bhvabandha that the actual  connection  
between the karmas and the soul can take
 place ,footnote ref #d4  ,the actual   
connections of the karmas with the soul 
are like the sticking        ,footnote  
#a3 ,dravyasamgraha1 ,s',i4 #bi4        
,footnote #b3 ,nemicandra's commentary  
on ,dravyasamgraha1 ,s',i4 #bi1 edited  
by ,s4,c4 ,ghoshal1 ,arrah1 #aiag4      
,footnote #c3 ,see ,nemicandra's        
commentary on ,s',i4 #cj4    ,footnote  
#d3 ,nemicandra on #ca1 and             
,vardhamnapurna ,,xvi4 #dd1 quoted by   
,ghoshal4    #aid    of dust on the body
 of a person who is besmeared all over  
with  oil4 ,thus ,gunaratna says ,the   
influx of karma means the  contact of   
the particles of karma matter1 in       
accordance with the  particular kind of 
karma1 with the soul just like the      
sticking of  dust on the body of a      
person besmeared with oil4 ,in all parts
 of  the soul there being infinite      

number of karma atoms it becomes  so    
completely covered with them that in    
some sense when looked  at from that    
point of view the soul is sometimes     
regarded as a  material body during its 
samsra stage ,footnote ref #a4 ,from one
  point of view the bondage of karma is 
only of pufnya and ppa  7good and bad   
karmas7 ,footnote ref #b4 ,from another 
this bondage is of  four kinds1         
according to the nature of karma        
7prakrti7 duration of  bondage 7sthiti71
 intensity 7anubhga7 and extension      
7prades'a74  ,the nature of karma refers
 to the eight classes of karma already  
mentioned1 namely the janavaraniya karma
 which obscures the  infinite knowledge 
of the soul of all things in detail1    
dars'anvaranya karma which obscures the 
infinite general knowledge  of the soul1
 vedanya karma which produces the       
feelings of  pleasure and pain in the   
soul1 mohanya karma1 which so infatuates
  souls that they fail to distinguish   
what is right from  what is wrong1 yu   

karma1 which determines the tenure of   
any  particular life1 nma karma which   
gives them personalities1 gotra  karma  
which brings about a particular kind of 
social surrounding  for the soul and    
antaraya karma which tends to oppose the
 performance  of right actions by the   
soul4 ,the duration of the stay  of any 
karma in the soul is called sthiti4     
,again a karma may be  intense1 middling
 or mild1 and this indicates the third  
principle  of division1 anubhga4        
,prades'a refers to the different parts 
of  the soul to which the karma         
particles attach themselves4 ,the       
duration of stay of any karma and its   
varying intensity are due  to the nature
 of the kasayas or passions of the soul1
 whereas the  different classification  
of karmas as jnvaranya1 etc41 are due to
  the nature of specific contact of the 
soul with karma matter ,footnote  ref   
#c4    ,corresponding to the two modes  
of inrush of karmas 7bhvsrava and       
dravysrava7 are two kinds of control    

opposing this inrush1  by actual thought
 modification of a contrary nature and  
by the  actual stoppage of the inrush of
 karma particles1 and these are         
respectively called bhvasamvara and     
dravyasamvara ,footnote ref #d4         
,footnote #a3 ,see ,gunaratna1 p4 #aha  
,footnote #b3 ,ibid4    ,footnote #c3   
,nemicandra1 #cc4    ,footnote #d3      
,varddhamna ,,xvi #fg-fh1 and           
,dravyasamgrahavrtti  ,s',i4 #ce4       
#aie      ,the bhvasamvaras are 7#a7 the
 vows of non-injury1 truthfulness1      
abstinence from stealing1 sex-control1  
and non-acceptance of objects  of       
desire1 7#b7 samitis consisting of the  
use of trodden tracks in order  to avoid
 injury to insects 7ry71 gentle and holy
 talk 7bhsa71  receiving proper alms    
7esan71 etc1 7#c7 guptis or restraints  
of  body1 speech and mind1 7#d7 dharmas 
consisting of habits of forgiveness1    
humility1 straightforwardness1 truth1   
cleanliness1 restraint1  penance1       
abandonment indifference to any kind of 

gain or loss1  and supreme sex-control  
,footnote ref #a1 7#e7 anupreks         
consisting of  meditation about the     
transient character of the world1 about 
our  helplessness without the truth1    
about the cycles of world-existence1    
about our own responsibilities for our  
good and bad actions1 about the         
difference between the soul and the     
non-soul1 about the uncleanliness  of   
our body and all that is associated with
 it1 about the influx  of karma and its 
stoppage and the destruction of those   
karmas which have already entered the   
soul1 about soul1 matter  and the       
substance of the universe1 about the    
difficulty of attaining  true knowledge1
 faith and conduct1 and about the       
essential principles  of the world      
,footnote ref #b1 7#f7 the parsahajaya  
consisting of the  conquering of all    
kinds of physical troubles of heat1     
cold1 etc1 and  of feelings of          
discomforts of various kinds1 7#g7      
critra or right  conduct4    ,next to   

this we come to nirjar or the purging   
off of the  karmas or rather their      
destruction4 ,this nirjar also is of two
  kinds bhvanirjar and dravyanirjar4    
,bhvanirjar means that  change in the   
soul by virtue of which the karma       
particles are  destroyed4 ,dravyanirjar 
means the actual destruction of these   
karma particles either by the reaping of
 their effects or by  penances before   
their time of fruition1 called savipka  
and avipka  nirjars respectively4 ,when 
all the karmas are destroyed moksa  or  
liberation is effected4      ,pudgala4  
,the ajva 7non-living7 is divided into  
pudgalstikya1 dharmastikya1             
adharmstikya1 ks'stikya1 kla1 punya1    
ppa4 ,the word pudgala  means matter    
,footnote ref #c1 and it is called      
astikya  in the sense that it occupies  
space4 ,pudgala is made up of atoms     
,footnote #a3 ,tattvrthdhigamastra4     
,footnote #b3 ,ibid4    ,footnote #c3   
,this is entirely different from the    
,buddhist sense4 ,with the  ,buddhists  

pudgala means an individual or a person4
    #aif    which are without size and  
eternal4 ,matter may exist in two       
states1 gross 7such as things we see    
around us71 and subtle 7such  as the    
karma matter which sullies the soul74   
,all material things  are ultimately    
produced by the combination of atoms4   
,the  smallest indivisible particle of  
matter is called an atom 7anu74  ,the   
atoms are all eternal and they all have 
touch1 taste1 smell1  and colour4 ,the  
formation of different substances is due
 to the  different geometrical1         
spherical or cubical modes of the       
combination  of the atoms1 to the       
diverse modes of their inner arrangement
  and to the existence of different     
degrees of inter-atomic  space          
7ghanapratarabhedena74 ,some            
combinations take place by  simple      
mutual contact at two points            
7yugmaprades'a7 whereas  in others the  
atoms are only held together by the     
points of attractive  force             

7ojahprades'a7 7,prajpanopngastra1 pp4  
#aj-ab74  ,two atoms form a compound    
7skandha71 when the one is viscous  and 
the other dry or both are of different  
degrees of viscosity or  dryness4 ,it   
must be noted that while the ,buddhists 
thought that  there was no actual       
contact between the atoms the ,jains    
regarded  the contact as essential and  
as testified by experience4 ,these      
compounds combine with other compounds  
and thus produce  the gross things of   
the world4 ,there are1 however1 liable  
to  constant change 7parinma7 by which  
they lose some of their  old qualities  
7gunas7 and acquire new ones4 ,there are
 four  elements1 earth1 water1 air1 and 
fire1 and the atoms of all these  are   
alike in character4 ,the perception of  
grossness however  is not an error which
 is imposed upon the perception of the  
atoms by our mind 7as the ,buddhists    
think7 nor is it due to the  perception 
of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise 
and breadthwise  7as the ,smkhya-,yoga  

supposes71 but it is due to the         
accession of  a similar property of     
grossness1 blueness or hardness in the  
combined  atoms1 so that such knowledge 
is generated in us as is given  in the  
perception of a gross1 blue1 or a hard  
thing4 ,when a thing  appears as blue1  
what happens is this1 that the atoms    
there have  all acquired the property of
 blueness and on the removal of the     
dars'anavaranya and jnavaranya veil1    
there arises in the soul  the perception
 and knowledge of that blue thing4 ,this
 sameness  7samna-rpat7 of the accession
 of a quality in an aggregate of  atoms 
by virtue of which it appears as one    
object 7e4g4 a cow7  is technically     
called tiryaksmnya4 ,this smnya or      
generality  is thus neither an          
imposition of the mind nor an abstract  
entity    #aig    7as maintained by the 
,naiyyikas7 but represents only the     
accession  of similar qualities by a    
similar development of qualities  of    
atoms forming an aggregate4 ,so long as 

this similarity of  qualities continues 
we perceive the thing to be the same and
  to continue for some length of time4  
,when we think of a thing  to be        
permanent1 we do so by referring to this
 sameness in the  developing tendencies 
of an aggregate of atoms resulting in   
the  relative permanence of similar     
qualities in them4 ,according to  the   
,jains things are not momentary and in  
spite of the loss of  some old qualities
 and the accession of other ones1 the   
thing as  a whole may remain more or    
less the same for some time4 ,this      
sameness of qualities in time is        
technically called rdhvasmnya  ,footnote
 ref #a4 ,if the atoms are looked at    
from the point of  view of the change   
and accession of new qualities1 they may
 be  regarded as liable to destruction1 
but if they are looked at from  the     
point of view of substance 7dravya7 they
 are eternal4      ,dharma1 ,adharma1   
ks'a4    ,the conception of dharma and  
adharma in ,jainism is  absolutely      

different from what they mean in other  
systems of  ,indian philosophy4 ,dharma 
is devoid of taste1 touch1 smell1  sound
 and colour2 it is conterminous with the
 mundane universe  7lokks'a7 and        
pervades every part of it4 ,the term    
astikya  is therefore applied to it4 ,it
 is the principle of motion1 the        
accompanying  circumstance or cause     
which makes motion possible1  like water
 to a moving fish4 ,the water is a      
passive condition  or circumstance of   
the movement of a fish1 i4e4 it is      
indifferent  or passive 7udsna7 and not 
an active or solicitous 7preraka7       
cause4 ,the water cannot compel a fish  
at rest to move2 but if  the fish wants 
to move1 water is then the necessary    
help to its  motion4 ,dharma cannot make
 the soul or matter move2 but  if they  
are to move1 they cannot do so without  
the presence of  dharma4 ,hence at the  
extremity of the mundane world 7loka7   
in the region of the liberated souls1   
there being no dharma1 the  liberated   

souls attain perfect rest4 ,they cannot 
move there  because there is not the    
necessary motion-element1 dharma        
,footnote ref #b4  ,adharma is also     
regarded as a similar pervasive entity  
which        ,footnote #a3 ,see         
,prameyakamalamrtanda1 pp4 #acf-adc2    
,jainatarkavrttika1 p4 #ajf4            
,footnote #b3 ,dravyasamgrahavrtti1     
#ag-bj4    #aih    helps jvas and       
pudgalas to keep themselves at rest4 ,no
 substance  could move if there were no 
dharma1 or could remain at rest if      
there were no adharma4 ,the necessity of
 admitting these two  categories seems  
probably to have been felt by the ,jains
 on  account of their notion that the   
inner activity of the jva or the  atoms 
required for its exterior realization   
the help of some other  extraneous      
entity1 without which this could not    
have been transformed  into actual      
exterior motion4 ,moreover since the    
jvas  were regarded as having activity  
inherent in them they would be  found to

 be moving even at the time of          
liberation 7moksa71 which  was          
undesirable2 thus it was conceived that 
actual motion required  for its         
fulfilment the help of an extraneous    
entity which was absent  in the region  
of the liberated souls4    ,the category
 of ks'a is that subtle entity which    
pervades  the mundane universe 7loka7   
and the transcendent region of          
liberated souls 7aloka7 which allows the
 subsistence of all other  substances   
such as dharma1 adharma1 jva1 pudgala4  
,it is not a  mere negation and absence 
of veil or obstruction1 or mere         
emptiness1  but a positive entity which 
helps other things to interpenetrate    
it4 ,on account of its pervasive        
character it is called  ks'stikya       
,footnote ref #a4      ,kla and ,samaya4
    ,time 7kla7 in reality consists of  
those innumerable particles  which never
 mix with one another1 but which help   
the happening  of the modification or   
accession of new qualities and the      

change  of qualities of the atoms4 ,kla 
does not bring about the changes  of    
qualities1 in things1 but just as kas'a 
helps interpenetration  and dharma      
motion1 so also kla helps the action of 
the transformation  of new qualities in 
things4 ,time perceived as moments1     
hours1 days1 etc41 is called samaya4    
,this is the appearance of the          
unchangeable kla in so many forms4 ,kla 
thus not only aids the  modifications of
 other things1 but also allows its own  
modifications as  moments1 hours1 etc4  
,it is thus a dravya 7substance71 and   
the moments1  hours1 etc41 are its      
paryyas4 ,the unit of samaya is the time
  required by an atom to traverse a unit
 of space by a slow movement4           
,footnote #a3 ,dravyasamgrahavrtti1 #ai4
    #aii      ,jaina ,cosmography4      
,according to the ,jains1 the world is  
eternal1 without beginning  or end4     
,loka is that place in which happiness  
and misery are experienced  as results  
of virtue and vice4 ,it is composed of  

three parts1  rdhva 7where the gods     
reside71 madhya 7this world of ours71   
and  adho 7where the denizens of hell   
reside74 ,the mundane universe          
7lokkas'a7 is pervaded with dharma which
 makes all movement  possible4 ,beyond  
the lokkas'a there is no dharma and     
therefore  no movement1 but only space  
7kas'a74 ,surrounding this lokaks'a  are
 three layers of air4 ,the perfected    
soul rising straight over  the rdhvaloka
 goes to the top of this lokaks'a and   
7there being  no dharma7 remains        
motionless there4      ,jaina ,yoga4    
,yoga according to ,jainism is the cause
 of moksa 7salvation74  ,this yoga      
consists of jana 7knowledge of reality  
as it is71 s'raddh  7faith in the       
teachings of the ,jinas71 and caritra   
7cessation from  doing all that is      
evil74 ,this caritra consists of ahims  
7not  taking any life even by mistake or
 unmindfulness71 snrta  7speaking in    
such a way as is true1 good and         
pleasing71 asteya  7not taking anything 

which has not been given71 brahmacaryya 
7abandoning lust foi all kinds of       
objects1 in mind1 speech and  body71 and
 aparigraha 7abandoning attachment for  
all things7 ,footnote  ref #a4    ,these
 strict rules of conduct only apply to  
ascetics who are bent  on attaining     
perfection4 ,the standard proposed for  
the ordinary  householders is fairly    
workable4 ,thus it is said by           
,hemacandra1  that ordinary householders
 should earn money honestly1 should     
follow the customs of good people1      
should marry a good girl from  a good   
family1 should follow the customs of the
 country and so  forth4 ,these are just 
what we should expect from any good and 
,footnote #a3 ,certain external rules of
 conduct are also called caritra4       
,these are3 ryy 7to go by the path      
already trodden by others and           
illuminated by the sun's rays1 so that  
proper precaution may be taken  while   
walking to prevent oneself from treading
 on insects1 etc41 which  may be lying  

on the way71 bhas 7to speak well and    
pleasantly to all  beings71 isana 7to   
beg alms in the proper monastic manner71
  dnasamiti 7to inspect carefully the   
seats avoiding all transgressions  when 
taking or giving anything71             
utsargasamiti 7to take care that bodily 
refuse may not be thrown in such a way  
as to injure any being71 manogupti  7to 
remove all false thoughts1 to remain    
satisfied within oneself1 and hold  all 
people to be the same in mind71 vggupti 
7absolute silence71 and  kyagupti       
7absolute steadiness and fixity of the  
body74 ,five other kinds  of caritra are
 counted in ,dravyasamgrahavrtti #ce4   
#bjj    honest householder of the       
present day4 ,great stress is laid upon 
the virtues of ahims1 snrta1 asteya and 
brahmacaryya1 but the  root of all these
 is ahims4 ,the virtues of snrta1 asteya
 and  brahmacaryya are made to follow   
directly as secondary corrollaries  of  
ahims4 ,ahims may thus be generalized as
 the fundamental  ethical virtue of     

,jainism2 judgment on all actions may be
  passed in accordance with the standard
 of ahims2 snrta1 asteya  and           
brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as 
their transgression  leads to hims      
7injury to beings74 ,a milder form of   
the practice  of these virtues is       
expected from ordinary householders and 
this  is called anubrata 7small vows74  
,but those who are struggling  for the  
attainment of emancipation must practise
 these virtues  according to the highest
 and strictest standard1 and this is    
called  mahbrata 7great vows74 ,thus for
 example brahmacaryya for a  householder
 according to the anubrata standard     
would be mere  cessation from adultery1 
whereas according to mahbrata it would  
be absolute abstention from             
sex-thoughts1 sex-words and sex-acts4   
,ahims according to a householder1      
according to anubrata1  would require   
abstinence from killing any animals1 but
 according  to mahavrata it would entail
 all the rigour and carefulness to      

prevent oneself from being the cause of 
any kind of injury to  any living being 
in any way4    ,many other minor duties 
are imposed upon householders1 all  of  
which are based upon the cardinal virtue
 of ahims4 ,these  are 7#a7 digvirati   
7to carry out activities within a       
restricted area  and thereby desist from
 injuring living beings in different    
places71  7#b7 bhogopabhogamna 7to      
desist from drinking liquors1 taking    
flesh1 butter1 honey1 figs1 certain     
other kinds of plants1 fruits1 and      
vegetables1 to observe certain other    
kinds of restrictions regarding  time   
and place of taking meals71 7#c7        
anarthadanda consisting of  7a7 apadhyna
 7cessation from inflicting any bodily  
injuries1  killing of one's enemies1    
etc471 7b7 ppopades'a 7desisting from   
advising people to take to agriculture  
which leads to the killing  of so many  
insects71 7c7 himsopakridna 7desisting  
from  giving implements of agriculture  
to people which will lead  to the injury

 of insects71 7d7 pramdacarana 7to      
desist  from attending musical parties1 
theatres1 or reading  sex-literature1   
gambling1 etc471 7#d7 s'ikspadabrata    
consisting of 7a7 smayikabrata 7to try  
to treat all beings  equally71 7b7      
des'vaks'ikabrata 7gradually to practise
  the digviratibrata more and more      
extensively71 7c7 posadhabrata    #bjj  
7certain other kinds of restriction71   
7d7 atithisamvibhgabrata 7to  make gifts
 to guests74 ,all transgressions of     
these virtues1 called  aticra1 should be
 carefully avoided4    ,all perception1 
wisdom1 and morals belong to the soul1  
and to  know the soul as possessing     
these is the right knowledge of the     
soul4 ,all sorrows proceeding out of    
want of self-knowledge can  be removed  
only by true self-knowledge4 ,the soul  
in itself is  pure intelligence1 and it 
becomes endowed with the body only on   
account of its karma4 ,when by          
meditation1 all the karmas are  burnt   
7dhyngnidagdhakarma7 the self becomes   

purified4 ,the  soul is itself the      
samsra 7the cycle of rebirths7 when it  
is  overpowered by the four kasyas      
7passions7 and the senses4 ,the four    
kasyas are krodha 7anger71 mna 7vanity  
and pride71 my  7insincerity and the    
tendency to dupe others71 and lobha     
7greed74  ,these kasyas cannot be       
removed except by a control of the      
senses2 and self-control alone leads to 
the purity of the mind  7manahs'uddhi74 
,without the control of the mind no one 
can  proceed in the path of yoga4 ,all  
our acts become controlled when  the    
mind is controlled1 so those who seek   
emancipation should  make every effort  
to control the mind4 ,no kind of        
asceticism  7tapas7 can be of any good  
until the mind is purified4 ,all        
attachment  and antipathy 7rgadvcsa7 can
 be removed only by the  purification of
 the mind4 ,it is by attachment and     
antipathy that  man loses his           
independence4 ,it is thus necessary for 
the yogin  7sage7 that he should be free

 from them and become independent  in   
the real sense of the term ,when a man  
learns to look upon  all beings with    
equality 7samatva7 he can effect such a 
conquest  over rga and dvesa as one     
could never do even by the strictest    
asceticism through millions of years4   
,in order to effect this  samatva       
towards all1 we should take to the      
following kinds of  meditation 7bhvan73 
,we should think of the transitoriness  
7anityat7 of all things1  that what a   
thing was in the morning1 it is not at  
mid-day1  what it was at mid-day it is  
not at night2 for all things are        
transitory and changing4 ,our body1 all 
our objects of pleasure1  wealth and    
youth all are fleeting like dreams1 or  
cotton particles  in a whirlwind4       
,all1 even the gods1 are subject to     
death4 ,all our relatives will  by their
 works fall a prey to death4 ,this world
 is thus full of  misery and there is   
nothing which can support us in it4     
,thus in    #bja    whatever way we look

 for anything1 on which we can depend1  
we  find that it fails us4 ,this is     
called as'aranabhvan 7the meditation  of
 helplessness74    ,some are born in    
this world1 some suffer1 some reap the  
fruits  of the karma done in another    
life4 ,we are all different from one    
another by our surroundings1 karma1 by  
our separate bodies and  by all other   
gifts which each of us severally enjoy4 
,to meditate  on these aspects is called
 ekatvabhvan and anyatvabhvan4    ,to   
think that the body is made up of       
defiled things1 the flesh1  blood1 and  
bones1 and is therefore impure is called
 as'ucibhvan  7meditation of the        
impurity of the body74    ,to think that
 if the mind is purified by the thoughts
 of universal  friendship and compassion
 and the passions are removed1  then    
only will good s'ubha7 accrue to me1 but
 if on the contrary  ,i commit sinful   
deeds and transgress the virtues1 then  
all evil  will befall me1 is called     
sravabhvan 7meditation of the befalling 

of evil74 ,by the control of the srava  
7inrush of karma7  comes the samvara    
7cessation of the influx of karma7 and  
the  destruction of the karmas already  
accumulated leads to nrjar  7decay and  
destruction of karma matter74    ,again 
one should think that the practice of   
the ten dharmas  7virtues7 of self      
control 7samyama71 truthfulness 7snrta71
 purity  7s'auca71 chastity 7brahma71   
absolute want of greed 7akicanat71      
asceticism 7tapas71 forbearance1        
patience 7ks'nti71 mildness  7mrdava71  
sincerity 7rjut71 and freedom or        
emancipation from  all sins 7mukti can  
alone help us in the achievement of the 
highest goal4 ,these are the only       
supports to which we can  look4 ,it is  
these which uphold the world-order4     
,this is called  dharmasvkhytatbhvan4   
,again one should think of the ,jaina   
cosmology and also  of the nature of the
 influence of karma in producing all the
  diverse conditions of men4 ,these two 
are called lokabhvan  and bodhibhvan4   

,when by the continual practice of the  
above thoughts man  becomes unattached  
to all things and adopts equality to all
 beings1  and becomes disinclined to all
 worldly enjoyments1 then with a  mind  
full of peace he gets rid of all        
passions1 and then he should  take to   
the performance of dhyna or meditation  
by deep concentration4  ,the samatva or 
perfect equality of the mind and dhyna  
are interdependent1 so that without     
dhyna there is no samatva    #bjc    and
 without samatva there is no dhyna4 ,in 
order to make the  mind steady by dhyna 
one should think of maitr 7universal    
friendship71 pramoda 7the habit of      
emphasizing the good sides of  men71    
karun 7universal compassion7 and        
mdhyastha 7indifference  to the         
wickedness of people1 i4e4 the habit of 
not taking any  note of sinners74 ,the  
,jaina dhyna consists in concentrating  
the mind on the syllables of the ,jaina 
prayer phrases4 ,the  dhyna however as  
we have seen is only practised as an aid

 to  making the mind steady and         
perfectly equal and undisturbed  towards
 all things4 ,emancipation comes only as
 the result of the  final extinction of 
the karma materials4 ,jaina yoga is thus
 a complete  course of moral discipline 
which leads to the purification  of the 
mind and is hence different from the    
traditional ,hindu  yoga of ,patajali or
 even of the ,buddhists ,footnote ref   
#a4      ,jaina ,atheism ,footnote ref  
#b4    ,the ,naiyyikas assert that as   
the world is of the nature of  an       
effect1 it must have been created by an 
intelligent agent and  this agent is    
s'vara 7,god74 ,to this the ,jain       
replies1 ,what does  the ,naiyyika mean 
when he says that the world is of the   
nature  of an effect8 ,does he mean by  
effect1 7#a7 that which is made  up of  
parts 7svayava71 or1 7#b7 the           
coinherence of the causes of a          
non-existent thing1 or1 7#c7 that which 
is regarded by anyone as  having been   
made1 or1 7#d7 that which is liable to  

change 7vikritvam74  ,again1 what is    
meant by being made up of parts8 ,if it 
means existence in parts1 then the      
class-concepts 7smnya7  existing in the 
parts should also be regarded as        
effects1 and hence  destructible1 but   
these the ,naiyyikas regard as being    
partless and  eternal4 ,if it means that
 which has parts1 then even space       
7ks'a7 has to be regarded as effect1 but
 the ,naiyyika regards  it as eternal4  
,again effect cannot mean coinherence of
 the causes of a  thing which were      
previously non-existent1 for in that    
case one  could not speak of the world  
as an effect1 for the atoms of the      
elements of earth1 etc41 are regarded as
 eternal4    ,again if effect means that
 which is regarded by anyone as         
,footnote #a3,yogas'stra1 by            
,hemacandra1 edited by ,windisch1 in    
,zeitschrift der ,deutschen ,morg4      
,gesellschaft1 ,leipsig1 #ahgd1  and    
,dravyasamgraha1 edited by ,ghoshal1    
#aiag4    ,footnote #b3 ,see            

,gunaratna's ,tarkarahasyadpik4    #bjd 
having been made1 then it would apply   
even to space1 for when  a man digs the 
ground he thinks that he has made new   
space in  the hollow which he dug4      
,if it means that which is liable to    
change1 then one could  suppose that    
,god was also liable to change and he   
would require  another creator to create
 him and he another1 and so on ad       
infinitum4 ,moreover1 if ,god creates he
 cannot but be liable to  change with   
reference to his creative activity4     
,moreover1 we know that those things    
which happen at some  time and do not   
happen at other times are regarded as   
effects4  ,but the world as a whole     
exists always4 ,if it is argued that    
things  contained within it such as     
trees1 plants1 etc41 are effects1 then  
that would apply even to this           
hypothetical ,god1 for1 his will and    
thought must be diversely operating at  
diverse times and these  are contained  
in him4 ,he also becomes a created being

 by virtue  of that4 ,and even atoms    
would be effects1 for they also undergo 
changes of colour by heat4    ,let us   
grant for the sake of argument that the 
world as a  whole is an effect4 ,and    
every effect has a cause1 and so the    
world as a whole has a cause4 ,but this 
does not mean that the  cause is an     
intelligent one1 as ,god is supposed to 
be4 ,if it is  argued that he is        
regarded as intelligent on the analogy  
of human  causation then he might also  
be regarded as imperfect as human       
beings4 ,if it is held that the world as
 a whole is not exactly  an effect of   
the type of effects produced by human   
beings  but is similar to those1 this   
will lead to no inference4 ,because     
water-vapour is similar to smoke1 nobody
 will be justified in  inferring fire   
from water-vapour1 as he would do from  
smoke4  ,if it is said that this is so  
different an effect that from it the    
inference is possible1 though nobody has
 ever been seen to produce  such an     

effect1 well then1 one could also infer 
on seeing  old houses ruined in course  
of time that these ruins were produced  
by intelligent agents4 ,for these are   
also effects of which  we do not know of
 any intelligent agent1 for both are    
effects1  and the invisibility of the   
agent is present in both cases4 ,if it  
is  said that the world is such that we 
have a sense that it has been  made by  
some one1 then the question will be1    
whether you infer  the agency of ,god   
from this sense or infer the sense of   
its having  been made from the fact of  
its being made by ,god1 and you have  a 
vicious circle 7anyonys'raya74    #bje  
,again1 even if we should grant that the
 world was created by  an agent1 then   
such an agent should have a body for we 
have  never seen any intelligent creator
 without a body4 ,if it is held  that we
 should consider the general condition  
of agency only1  namely1 that the agent 
is intelligent1 the objection will be   
that  this is impossible1 for agency is 

always associated with some kind  of    
body4 ,if you take the instances with   
some kind of effects such  as the shoots
 of corn growing in the fields1 it will 
be found that  these had no intelligent 
agents behind them to create them4 ,if  
it  is said that these are also made by 
,god1 then you have an  argument in a   
circle 7cakraka71 for this was the very 
matter which  you sought to prove4      
,let it be granted for the sake of      
argument that ,god exists4  ,does his   
mere abstract existence produce the     
world8 ,well1 in  that case1 the        
abstract existence of a potter may also 
create the  world1 for the abstract     
existence is the same in both cases4    
,does  he produce the world by knowledge
 and will8 ,well1 that is impossible1   
for there cannot be any knowledge and   
will without a  body4 ,does he produce  
the world by physical movement or any   
other kind of movement8 ,in any case    
that is impossible1 for there  cannot be
 any movement without a body4 ,if you   

suppose that  he is omniscient1 you may 
do so1 but that does not prove that  he 
can be all-creator4    ,let us again    
grant for the sake of argument that a   
bodiless  ,god can create the world by  
his will and activity4 ,did he take  to 
creation through a personal whim8 ,in   
that case there would  be no natural    
laws and order in the world4 ,did he    
take to it  in accordance with the moral
 and immoral actions of men8 ,then  he  
is guided by a moral order and is not   
independent4 ,is it  through mercy that 
he took to creation8 ,well then1 we     
suppose  there should have been only    
happiness in the world and nothing      
else4 ,if it is said that it is by the  
past actions of men that they  suffer   
pains and enjoy pleasure1 and if men are
 led to do vicious  actions by past     
deeds which work like blind destiny1    
then such  a blind destiny 7adrsta7     
might take the place of ,god4 ,if ,he   
took  to creation as mere play1 then he 
must be a child who did things  without 

a purpose4 ,if it was due to his desire 
of punishing certain  people and        
favouring others1 then he must harbour  
favouritism  on behalf of some and      
hatred against others4 ,if the creation 
took  place simply through his own      
nature1 then1 what is the good of       
#bjf    admitting him at all8 ,you may  
rather say that the world came  into    
being out of its own nature4    ,it is  
preposterous to suppose that one ,god   
without the help  of any instruments or 
other accessories of any kind1 could    
create  this world4 ,this is against all
 experience4    ,admitting for the sake 
of argument that such a ,god exists1    
you could never justify the adjectives  
with which you wish to  qualify him4    
,thus you say that he is eternal4 ,but  
since he has  no body1 he must be of the
 nature of intelligence and will4  ,but 
this nature must have changed in diverse
 forms for the production  of diverse   
kinds of worldly things1 which are of so
 varied  a nature4 ,if there were no    

change in his knowledge and will1 then  
there could not have been diverse kinds 
of creation and destruction4            
,destruction and creation cannot be the 
result of one  unchangeable will and    
knowledge4 ,moreover it is the character
  of knowledge to change1 if the word is
 used in the sense in which  knowledge  
is applied to human beings1 and surely  
we are not  aware of any other kind of  
knowledge4 ,you say that ,god is        
omniscient1 but it is difficult to      
suppose how he can have any  knowledge  
at all1 for as he has no organs he      
cannot have any  perception1 and since  
he cannot have any perception he cannot 
have any inference either4 ,if it is    
said that without the supposition  of a 
,god the variety of the world would be  
inexplicable1 this  also is not true1   
for this implication would only be      
justified if  there were no other       
hypothesis left4 ,but there are other   
suppositions  also4 ,even without an    
omniscient ,god you could explain  all  

things merely by the doctrine of moral  
order or the law of  karma4 ,if there   
were one ,god1 there could be a society 
of ,gods  too4 ,you say that if there   
were many ,gods1 then there would be    
quarrels and differences of opinion4    
,this is like the story of  a miser who 
for fear of incurring expenses left all 
his sons and  wife and retired into the 
forest4 ,when even ants and bees can    
co-operate together and act             
harmoniously1 the supposition that if   
there were many ,gods they would have   
fallen out1 would indicate  that in     
spite of all the virtues that you       
ascribe to ,god you think  his nature to
 be quite unreliable1 if not vicious4   
,thus in whichever  way one tries to    
justify the existence of ,god he finds  
that it  is absolutely a hopeless task4 
,the best way then is to dispense  with 
the supposition altogether ,footnote ref
 #a4        ,footnote #a3 ,see          
,saddars'anasamuccaya1 ,gunaratna on    
,jainism1 pp4  #aae-abd4    #bjg        

,moksa 7emancipation74    ,the motive   
which leads a man to strive for release 
7moksa7 is  the avoidance of pain and   
the attainment of happiness1 for the    
state of mukti is the state of the soul 
in pure happiness4 ,it is  also a state 
of pure and infinite knowledge          
7anantajna7 and infinite  perception    
7anantadars'ana74 ,in the samsra state  
on account  of the karma veils this     
purity is sullied1 and the veils are    
only worn  out imperfectly and thus     
reveal this and that object at this and 
that time as ordinary knowledge 7mati71 
testimony 7s'ruta71  supernatural       
cognition1 as in trance or hypnotism    
7avadhi71 and direct  knowledge of the  
thoughts of others or thought reading   
7manahparyya74  ,in the state of release
 however there is omniscience           
7kevala-jna7 and all things are         
simultaneously known to the  perfect    
7kevalin7 as they are4 ,in the samsra   
stage the soul always  acquires new     
qualities1 and thus suffers a continual 

change though  remaining the same in    
substance4 ,but in the emancipated stage
  the changes that a soul suffers are   
all exactly the same1 and thus  it is   
that at this stage the soul appears to  
be the same in substance  as well as in 
its qualities of infinite knowledge1    
etc41 the change  meaning in this state 
only the repetition of the same         
qualities4    ,it may not be out of     
place to mention here that though the   
karmas of man are constantly determining
 him in various ways  yet there is in   
him infinite capacity or power for right
 action  7anantavrya71 so that karma can
 never subdue this freedom and  infinite
 capacity1 though this may be suppressed
 from time to time  by the influence of 
karma4 ,it is thus that by an exercise  
of this  power man can overcome all     
karma and become finally liberated4  ,if
 man had not this anantavrya in him he  
might have been eternally  under the    
sway of the accumulated karma which     
secured  his bondage 7bandha74 ,but     

since man is the repository of this     
indomitable power the karmas can only   
throw obstacles and  produce sufferings1
 but can never prevent him from         
attaining his  highest good4    #bjh    
,,chapter ,,vii    ,,the ,,kapila ,,and 
,,the ,p,,ta,,jala ,,sa,,mkhya 7,,yoga7 
,footnote ref #a4      ,a ,review4      
,the examination of the two ancient     
,nstika schools of  ,buddhism and       
,jainism of two different types ought to
 convince  us that serious philosophical
 speculations were indulged in1 in      
circles other than those of the         
,upanisad sages4 ,that certain          
practices known as ,yoga were generally 
prevalent amongst the  wise seems very  
probable1 for these are not only alluded
 to in some  of the ,upanisads but were 
accepted by the two nstika schools  of  
,buddhism and ,jainism4 ,whether we look
 at them from the  point of view of     
ethics or metaphysics1 the two ,nstika  
schools  appear to have arisen out of a 
reaction against the sacrificial        

disciplines of the ,brahmanas4 ,both    
these systems originated with  the      
,ksattriyas and were marked by a strong 
aversion against the  taking of animal  
life1 and against the doctrine of       
offering animals  at the sacrifices4    
,the doctrine of the sacrifices supposed
 that a suitable combination  of rites1 
rituals1 and articles of sacrifice had  
the magical  power of producing the     
desired effect--a shower of rain1 the   
birth of a son1 the routing of a huge   
army1 etc4 ,the sacrifices  were        
enjoined generally not so much for any  
moral elevation1 as  for the achievement
 of objects of practical welfare4 ,the  
,vedas  were the eternal revelations    
which were competent so to dictate  a   
detailed procedure1 that we could by    
following it proceed on a  certain      
course of action and refrain from other 
injurious courses  in such a manner that
 we might obtain the objects we desired 
by the accurate performance of any      
sacrifice4 ,if we are to define  truth  

in accordance with the philosophy of    
such a ritualistic  culture we might say
 that1 that alone is true1 in accordance
 with  which we may realize our objects 
in the world about us2 the truth  of    
,vedic injunctions is shown by the      
practical attainment of our             
,footnote #a3 ,this chapter is based on 
my ,study of ,patanjali1 published  by  
the ,calcutta ,university1 and my ,yoga 
philosophy in relation to other  ,indian
 ,systems of thought1 awaiting          
publication with the same authority4    
,the system has been treated in detail  
in those two works4    #bji    objects4 
,truth cannot be determined a priori but
 depends upon  the test of experience   
,footnote ref l4    ,it is interesting  
to notice that ,buddhism and ,jainism   
though  probably born out of a          
reactionary movement against this       
artificial  creed1 yet could not but be 
influenced by some of its fundamental   
principles which1 whether distinctly    
formulated or not1 were at  least       

tacitly implied in all sacrificial      
performances4 ,thus we see  that        
,buddhism regarded all production and   
destruction as being  due to the        
assemblage of conditions1 and defined   
truth as that  which could produce any  
effect4 ,but to such a logical extreme  
did the ,buddhists carry these doctrines
 that they ended in  formulating the    
doctrine of absolute momentariness      
,footnote ref #b4  ,turning to the      
,jains we find that they also regarded  
the value of  knowledge as consisting in
 the help that it offers in securing    
what  is good for us and avoiding what  
is evil2 truth gives us such an  account
 of things that on proceeding according 
to its directions  we may verify it by  
actual experience4 ,proceeding on a     
correct  estimate of things we may      
easily avail ourselves of what is good  
and avoid what is bad4 ,the ,jains also 
believed that changes  were produced by 
the assemblage of conditions1 but they  
did not  carry this doctrine to its     

logical extreme4 ,there was change in   
the world as well as permanence4 ,the   
,buddhists had gone so  far that they   
had even denied the existence of any    
permanent  soul4 ,the ,jains said that  
no ultimate1 one-sided and absolute     
view of things could be taken1 and held 
that not only the happening  of events  
was conditional1 but even all our       
judgments1 are true  only in a limited  
sense4 ,this is indeed true for common  
sense1  which we acknowledge as superior
 to mere a priori abstractions1  which  
lead to absolute and one-sided          
conclusions4 ,by the  assemblage of     
conditions1 old qualities in things     
disappeared1 new  qualities came in1 and
 a part remained permanent4 ,but this   
common-sense view1 though in agreement  
with our ordinary  experience1 could not
 satisfy our inner a priori demands for 
finding out ultimate truth1 which was   
true not relatively but  absolutely4    
,when asked whether anything was true1  
,jainism        ,footnote #a3 ,the      

philosophy of the ,vedas as formulated  
by the ,mmms of  ,kumrila and ,prabhkara
 holds the opposite view4 ,truth        
according to them  is determined a      
priori while error is determined by     
experience4    ,footnote #b3            
,historically the doctrine of           
momentariness is probably prior  to the 
doctrine of arthakriykritva4 ,but the   
later ,buddhists sought  to prove that  
momentariness was the logical result of 
the doctrine of  arthakriykritva4       
#baj    would answer1 yes1 this is true 
from this point of view1 but  untrue    
from that point of view1 while that is  
also true from such  a point of view and
 untrue from another4 ,but such an      
answer  cannot satisfy the mind which   
seeks to reach a definite pronouncement1
  an absolute judgment4    ,the main    
departure of the systems of ,jainism and
 ,buddhism  from the sacrificial creed  
consisted in this1 that they tried to   
formulate a theory of the universe1 the 
reality and the position of  sentient   

beings and more particularly of man4    
,the sacrificial creed was  busy with   
individual rituals and sacrifices1 and  
cared for principles  or maxims only so 
far as they were of use for the actual  
performances  of sacrifices4 ,again     
action with the new systems did not mean
  sacrifice but any general action that 
we always perform4 ,actions  were here  
considered bad or good according as they
 brought  about our moral elevation or  
not4 ,the followers of the sacrificial  
creed refrained from untruth not so much
 from a sense of personal  degradation1 
but because the ,vedas had dictated that
 untruth  should not be spoken1 and the 
,vedas must be obeyed4 ,the  sacrificial
 creed wanted more and more happiness   
here or in the  other world4 ,the       
systems of ,buddhist and ,jain          
philosophy turned  their backs upon     
ordinary happiness and wanted an        
ultimate and  unchangeable state where  
all pains and sorrows were for ever     
dissolved 7,buddhism7 or where infinite 

happiness1 ever unshaken1  was realized4
 ,a course of right conduct to be       
followed merely for  the moral elevation
 of the person had no place in the      
sacrificial  creed1 for with it a course
 of right conduct could be followed     
only if it was so dictated in the       
,vedas1 ,karma and the fruit of  karma  
7karmaphala7 only meant the karma of    
sacrifice and its  fruits-temporary     
happiness1 such as was produced as the  
fruit  of sacrifices2 knowledge with    
them meant only the knowledge of        
sacrifice and of the dictates of the    
,vedas4 ,in the systems however1  karma1
 karmaphala1 happiness1 knowledge1 all  
these were  taken in their widest and   
most universal sense4 ,happiness or     
absolute extinction of sorrow was still 
the goal1 but this was no  narrow       
sacrificial happiness but infinite and  
unchangeable happiness  or destruction  
of sorrow2 karma was still the way1 but 
not  sacrificial karma1 for it meant all
 moral and immoral actions  performed by

 us2 knowledge here meant the knowledge 
of truth  or reality and not the        
knowledge of sacrifice4    ,such an     
advance had however already begun in the
 ,upanishads    #baa    which had       
anticipated the new systems in all these
  directions4 ,the pioneers of these new
 systems probably drew  their           
suggestions both from the sacrificial   
creed and from the  ,upanisads1 and     
built their systems independently by    
their own  rational thinking4 ,but if   
the suggestions of the ,upanisads were  
thus utilized by heretics who denied the
 authority of the ,vedas1  it was       
natural to expect that we should find in
 the ,hindu camp  such germs of rational
 thinking as might indicate an attempt  
to  harmonize the suggestions of the    
,upanisads and of the sacrificial  creed
 in such a manner as might lead to the  
construction of a consistent  and       
well-worked system of thought4 ,our     
expectations are  indeed fulfilled in   
the ,smkhya philosophy1 germs of which  

may  be discovered in the ,upanisads4   
,the ,germs of ,smkhya in the           
,upanisads4    ,it is indeed true that  
in the ,upanisads there is a large      
number  of texts that describe the      
ultimate reality as the ,brahman1 the   
infinite1 knowledge1 bliss1 and speak of
 all else as mere changing  forms and   
names4 ,the word ,brahman originally    
meant in the  earliest ,vedic           
literature1 mantra1 duly performed      
sacrifice1  and also the power of       
sacrifice which could bring about the   
desired result  ,footnote ref l4 ,in    
many passages of the ,upanisads this    
,brahman appears  as the universal and  
supreme principle from which all others 
derived  their powers4 ,such a ,brahman 
is sought for in many passages  for     
personal gain or welfare4 ,but through a
 gradual process of  development the    
conception of ,brahman reached a        
superior level  in which the reality and
 truth of the world are tacitly ignored1
  and the ,one1 the infinite1 knowledge1

 the real is regarded as the  only      
,truth4 ,this type of thought gradually 
developed into the  monistic ,vedanta as
 explained by ,s'ankara4 ,but there was 
another line of thought which was       
developing alongside of it1  which      
regarded the world as having a reality  
and as being made  up of water1 fire1   
and earth4 ,there are also passages in  
,s'vetas'vatara  and particularly in    
,maitryan from which it appears  that   
the ,smkhya line of thought had         
considerably developed1 and  many of its
 technical terms were already in use    
,footnote ref #b4 ,but the  date of     
,maitryan has not yet been definitely   
settled1 and the details                
,footnote #a3 ,see ,hillebrandt's       
article1 ,brahman 7,e4 ,r4,e474         
,footnote #b3 ,katha ,,iii4 #aj1 ,v4 #g4
 ,s'veta4 ,v4 #g1 #h1 #ab1 ,,iv4 #e1 ,i4
 #c4 ,this  has been dealt with in      
detail in my ,yoga ,philosophy in       
relation to other  ,indian ,systems of  
,thought1 in the first chapter4    #bab 

found there are also not such that we   
can form a distinct notion  of the      
,smkhya thought as it developed in the  
,upanisads4 ,it is  not improbable that 
at this stage of development it also    
gave  some suggestions to ,buddhism or  
,jainism1 but the ,smkhya-,yoga         
philosophy as we now get it is a system 
in which are found all  the results of  
,buddhism and ,jainism in such a manner 
that it  unites the doctrine of         
permanence of the ,upanisads with the   
doctrine of momentariness of the        
,buddhists and the doctrine of          
relativism of the ,jains4      ,smkhya  
and ,yoga ,literature4    ,the main     
exposition of the system of ,smkhya and 
,yoga in  this section has been based on
 the ,smkhya krik1 the ,smkhya  stras1  
and the ,yoga stras of ,patajali with   
their commentaries  and                 
sub-commentaries4 ,the ,smkhya krik     
7about  #bjj ,a4,d47 was written by     
s'varakrsna4 ,the account of ,smkhya    
given by ,caraka 7#gh ,a4,d47 represents

 probably an earlier school and  this   
has been treated separately4 ,vcaspati  
,mis'ra 7ninth century  ,a4,d47 wrote a 
commentary on it known as ,tattvakaumud4
 ,but  before him ,gaudapda and ,rj     
wrote commentaries on the  ,smkhya krik 
,footnote ref #a4 ,nryanatrtha wrote his
 ,candrik on  ,gaudapda's commentary4   
,the ,smkhya stras which have been      
commented  on by ,vijna ,bhiksu 7called 
,pravacanabhsya7 of the  sixteenth      
century seems to be a work of some      
unknown author  after the ninth century4
 ,aniruddha of the latter half of the   
fifteenth century was the first man to  
write a commentary on the  ,smkhya      
stras4 ,vijna ,bhiksu wrote also another
 elementary  work on ,smkhya known as   
,smkhyasra4 ,another short work  of late
 origin is ,tattvasamsa 7probably       
fourteenth century74 ,two  other works  
on ,smkhya1 viz ,smnanda's              
,smkhyatattvavivecana  and ,bhvganes'a's
 ,smkhyatattvaythrthyadpana 7both later 
than ,vijnabhiksu7 of real philosophical

 value have also been  freely consulted4
 ,patajali's ,yoga stra 7not earlier    
than #adg ,b4,c47  was commented on by  
,vysa 7#djj ,a4,d47 and ,vysa's bhsya   
commented on by ,vcaspati ,mis'ra is    
called ,tattvavais'rad1  by ,vijna      
,bhiksu ,yogavrttika1 by ,bhoja in the  
tenth century  ,bhojavrtti1 and by      
,nges'a 7seventeenth century7 ,chyvykhy4
        ,footnote #a3 ,i suppose that   
,rj's commentary on the ,krik was the   
same  as ,rjavrttika quoted by          
,vcaspati4 ,rj's commentary on the ,krik
  has been referred to by ,jayanta in   
his ,nyyamajar1 p4 #aji4 ,this book  is 
probably now lost4    #bac    ,amongst  
the modern works to which ,i owe an     
obligation ,i may  mention the two      
treatises ,mechanical1 physical and     
chemical theories  of the ,ancient      
,hindus and the ,positive ,sciences of  
the ,ancient ,hindus  by ,dr ,b4,n4     
,seal and my two works on ,yoga ,study  
of ,patanjali published  by the         
,calcutta ,university1 and ,yoga        

,philosophy in relation  to other       
,indian ,systems of ,thought which is   
shortly to be published1  and my        
,natural ,philosophy of the ,ancient    
,hindus1 awaiting publication  with the 
,calcutta ,university4    ,gunaratna    
mentions two other authoritative ,smkhya
 works1  viz4 ,mtharabhsya and          
treyatantra4 ,of these the second is    
probably the same as ,caraka's treatment
 of ,smkhya1 for we know  that the sage 
,atri is the speaker in ,caraka's work  
and for that it  was called treyasamhit 
or treyatantra4 ,nothing is known  of   
the ,mtharabhsya ,footnote ref #a4      
,an ,early ,school of ,smkhya4    ,it is
 important for the history of ,smkhya   
philosophy that  ,caraka's treatment of 
it1 which so far as ,i know has never   
been  dealt with in any of the modern   
studies of ,smkhya1 should  be brought  
before the notice of the students of    
this philosophy4  ,according to ,caraka 
there are six elements 7dhtus71 viz4 the
  five elements such as ks'a1 vyu etc4  

and cetan1 called also  purusa4 ,from   
other points of view1 the categories may
 be said to  be twenty-four only1 viz4  
the ten senses 7five cognitive and five 
conative71 manas1 the five objects of   
senses and the eightfold  prakrti       
7prakrti1 mahat1 ahamkra and the five   
elements7,footnote ref  #b4 ,the manas  
works through the senses4 ,it is atomic 
and its existence  is proved by the fact
 that in spite of the existence of the  
senses  there cannot be any knowledge   
unless manas is in touch with  them4    
,there are two movements of manas as    
indeterminate  sensing 7ha7 and         
conceiving 7vicra7 before definite      
understanding  7buddhi7 arises4 ,each of
 the five senses is the product of the  
combination of five elements but the    
auditory sense is made with  a          
preponderance of akasa1 the sense of    
touch with a preponderance              
,footnote #a3 ,readers unacquainted with
 ,smkhya-,yoga may omit the following   
three sections at the time of first     

reading4    ,footnote #b3 ,purua is here
 excluded from the list4 ,cakrapni1 the 
commentator1 says that the prakrti and  
purusa both being unmanifested1  the two
 together have been counted as one4     
,prakrtivyatiriktacodsnam               
purusamavyaktatvasdharmyt avyaktym      
prakrtveva praksipya                    
avyaktas'avbdenaiva grhnti4 ,harintha   
,vis'rada's edition of  ,caraka1 ,s'rra1
 p4 #d4    #bad    of air1 the visual   
sense with a preponderance of light1 the
 taste with  a preponderance of water   
and the sense of smell with a           
preponderance  of earth4 ,caraka does   
not mention the tanmtras at all         
,footnote ref #a4  ,the conglomeration  
of the sense-objects 7indriyrtha7 or    
gross matter1  the ten senses1 manas1   
the five subtle bhtas and prakrti1 mahat
  and ahamkra taking place through rajas
 make up what we call  man4 ,when the   
sattva is at its height this            
conglomeration ceases4  ,all karma1 the 
fruit of karma1 cognition1 pleasure1    

pain1 ignorance1  life and death belongs
 to this conglomeration4 ,but there is  
also  the purusa1 for had it not been so
 there would be no birth1 death1        
bondage1 or salvation4 ,if the tman were
 not regarded as cause1  all            
illuminations of cognition would be     
without any reason4 ,if a  permanent    
self were not recognized1 then for the  
work of one  others would be            
responsible4 ,this purusa1 called also  
paramtman1  is beginningless and it has 
no cause beyond itself4 ,the self is in 
itself without consciousness4           
,consciousness can only come to it      
through its connection with the sense   
organs and manas4 ,by  ignorance1 will1 
antipathy1 and work1 this conglomeration
 of purusa  and the other elements takes
 place4 ,knowledge1 feeling1 or action1 
cannot be produced without this         
combination4 ,all positive effects  are 
due to conglomerations of causes and not
 by a single cause1 but  all destruction
 comes naturally and without cause4     

,that which  is eternal is never the    
product of anything4 ,caraka identifies 
the  avyakta part of prakrti with purusa
 as forming one category4  ,the vikra or
 evolutionary products of prakrti are   
called ksetra1  whereas the avyakta part
 of prakrti is regarded as the ksetraja 
7avyaktamasya ksetrasya ksetrajamrsayo  
viduh74 ,this avyakta  and cetan are one
 and the same entity4 ,from this        
unmanifested  prakrti or cetan is       
derived the buddhi1 and from the buddhi 
is  derived the ego 7ahamkra7 and from  
the ahamkra the five  elements and the  
senses are produced1 and when this      
production  is complete1 we say that    
creation has taken place4 ,at the time  
of pralaya 7periodical cosmic           
dissolution7 all the evolutes return    
back to prakrti1 and thus become        
unmanifest with it1 whereas at the  time
 of a new creation from the purusa the  
unmanifest 7avyakta71  all the          
manifested forms--the evolutes of       
buddhi1 ahamkra1        ,footnote #a3   

,but some sort of subtle matter1        
different from gross matter1  is        
referred to as forming part of prakrti  
which is regarded as having  eight      
elements in it prakrtis'castadhtuki71   
viz4 avyakta1 mahat1  ahamkra1 and five 
other elements4 ,in addition to these   
elements forming  part of the prakrti we
 hear of indriyrth1 the five sense      
objects  which have evolved out of the  
prakrti4    #bae    etc4--appear        
,footnote ref #a4 ,this cycle of births 
or rebirths or of  dissolution and new  
creation acts through the influence of  
rajas and  tamas1 and so those who can  
get rid of these two will never again   
suffer  this revolution in a cycle4 ,the
 manas can only become active in        
association with the self1 which is the 
real agent4 ,this self of itself  takes 
rebirth in all kinds of lives according 
to its own wish1  undetermined by anyone
 else4 ,it works according to its own   
free will  and reaps the fruits of its  
karma4 ,though all the souls are        

pervasive1  yet they can only perceive  
in particular bodies where they are     
associated with their own specific      
senses4 ,all pleasures and pains  are   
felt by the conglomeration 7rs'i71 and  
not by the tman presiding  over it4     
,from the enjoyment and suffering of    
pleasure and  pain comes desire 7trsn7  
consisting of wish and antipathy1 and   
from desire again comes pleasure and    
pain4 ,moksa means complete  cessation  
of pleasure and pain1 arising through   
the association  of the self with the   
manas1 the sense1 and sense-objects4 ,if
 the  manas is settled steadily in the  
self1 it is the state of yoga when      
there is neither pleasure nor pain4     
,when true knowledge dawns  that all are
 produced by causes1 are transitory1    
rise of themselves1  but are not        
produced by the self and are sorrow1 and
 do  not belong to me the self1 the self
 transcends all4 ,this is the last      
renunciation when all affections and    
knowledge become finally  extinct4      

,there remains no indication of any     
positive existence  of the self at this 
time1 and the self can no longer be     
perceived ,footnote  ref #b4 ,it is the 
state of ,brahman4 ,those who know      
,brahman call this  state the ,brahman1 
which is eternal and absolutely devoid  
of any  characteristic4 ,this state is  
spoken of by the ,smkhyas as their      
goal1 and also that of the ,yogins4     
,when rajas and tamas are  rooted out   
and the karma of the past whose fruits  
have to be  enjoyed are exhausted1 and  
there is no new karma and new birth1    
,footnote #a3 ,this passage has been    
differently explained in a commentary   
previous to ,cakrapni as meaning that at
 the time of death these resolve  back  
into the prakrti--the purusa--and at the
 time of rebirth they  become manifest  
again4 ,see ,cakrapni on s'rra1 ,i4 #df4
    ,footnote #b3 ,though this state is 
called brahmabhta1 it is not in any     
sense like the ,brahman of ,vednta which
 is of the nature of pure being1  pure  

intelligence and pure bliss4 ,this      
indescribable state is more like        
absolute annihilation without any sign  
of existence 7alaksanam71  resembling   
,ngrjuna's ,nirvna4 ,thus ,caraka       
writes3--tasmims'caramasannyse          
samlhhsarvavedanh  asamjjnavijn nivrttim
 yntyas'esatah4 atahparam  brahmabhto   
bhttm nopalabhyate nihsrtah             
sarvabhvebhyah cihnam  yasya na vidyate4
 gatirbrahmavidm brahma                 
taccksaramalaksanam4 ,caraka1  ,s'rra   
#a4 #ih-ajj4    #baf    the state of    
moksa comes about4 ,various kinds of    
moral endeavours  in the shape of       
association with good people1 abandoning
  of desires1 determined attempts at    
discovering the truth with fixed        
attention1 are spoken of as             
indispensable means4 ,truth 7tattva7    
thus discovered should be recalled again
 and again ,footnote ref #a and  this   
will ultimately effect the disunion of  
the body with the self4  ,as the self is
 avyakta 7unmanifested7 and has no      

specific nature or  character1 this     
state can only be described as absolute 
cessation  7mokse nivrttirnihs'es74     
,the main features of the ,smkhya       
doctrine as given by ,caraka  are thus3 
#a4 ,purusa is the state of avyakta4 #b4
 ,by a conglomera  of this avyakta with 
its later products a conglomeration is  
formed  which generates the so-called   
living being4 #c4 ,the tanmtras are  not
 mentioned4 #d4 ,rajas and tamas        
represent the bad states of  the mind   
and sattva the good ones4 #e4 ,the      
ultimate state of  emancipation is      
either absolute annihilation or         
characterless absolute  existence and it
 is spoken of as the ,brahman state2    
there is  no consciousness in this      
state1 for consciousness is due to the  
conglomeration of the self with its     
evolutes1 buddhi1 ahamkra etc4  #f4 ,the
 senses are formed of matter 7bhautika74
    ,this account of ,smkhya agrees with
 the system of ,smkhya  propounded by   
,pacas'ikha 7who is said to be the      

direct pupil of  suri the pupil of      
,kapila1 the founder of the system7 in  
the  ,mahbhrata ,,xii4 #bai4 ,pacas'ikha
 of course does not describe  the system
 as elaborately as ,caraka does4 ,but   
even from what  little he says it may be
 supposed that the system of ,smkhya  he
 sketches is the same as that of ,caraka
 ,footnote ref #b4 ,pacas'ikha  speaks  
of the ultimate truth as being avyakta  
7a term applied in all  ,smkhya         
literature to prakrti7 in the state of  
purusa  7purusvasthamavyaktam74 ,if man 
is the product of a mere combination  of
 the different elements1 then one may   
assume that all ceases  with death4     
,caraka in answer to such an objection  
introduces a  discussion1 in which he   
tries to establish the existence of a   
self as  the postulate of all our duties
 and sense of moral responsibility4     
,the same discussion occurs in          
,pacas'ikha also1 and the proofs        
,footnote #a3 ,four causes are spoken of
 here as being causes of memory3  7#a7  

,thinking of the cause leads to the     
remembering of the effect1  7#b7 by     
similarity1 7#c7 by opposite things1 and
 7#d7 by acute attempt to  remember4    
,footnote #b3 ,some ,european scholars  
have experienced great difficulty  in   
accepting ,pacas'ikha's doctrine as a   
genuine ,smkhya doctrine4  ,this may    
probably be due to the fact that the    
,smkhya doctrines sketched  in ,caraka  
did not attract their notice4    #bag   
for the existence of the self are also  
the same4 ,like ,caraka again           
,pacas'ikha also says that all          
consciousness is due to the conditions  
of the conglomeration of our physical   
body mind1--and the  element of cetas4  
,they are mutually independent1 and by  
such  independence carry on the process 
of life and work4 ,none of the          
phenomena produced by such a            
conglomeration are self4 ,all our       
suffering comes in because we think     
these to be the self4 ,moksa  is        
realized when we can practise absolute  

renunciation of these  phenomena4 ,the  
gunas described by ,pacas'ikha are the  
different  kinds of good and bad        
qualities of the mind as ,caraka has it4
  ,the state of the conglomeration is   
spoken of as the ksetra1 as  ,caraka    
says1 and there is no annihilation or   
eternality2 and the  last state is      
described as being like that when all   
rivers lose  themselves in the ocean and
 it is called alinga 7without any       
characteristic7--a term reserved for    
prakrti in later ,smkhya4  ,this state  
is attainable by the doctrine of        
ultimate renunciation  which is also    
called the doctrine of complete         
destruction  7samyagbadha74             
,gunaratna 7fourteenth century ,a4,d471 
a commentator of  ,saddars'anasamuccaya1
 mentions two schools of ,smkhya1 the   
,maulikya 7original7 and the ,uttara or 
7later7 ,footnote ref #a4 ,of these  the
 doctrine of the ,maulikya ,smkhya is   
said to be that which  believed that    
there was a separate pradhna for each   

tman  7maulikyasmkhy hytmnamtmnam prati 
prthak pradhnam  vadanti74 ,this seems  
to be a reference to the ,smkhya        
doctrine  ,i have just sketched4 ,i am  
therefore disposed to think that this   
represents the earliest systematic      
doctrine of ,smkhya4    ,in ,mahbhrata  
,,xii4 #cah three schools of ,smkhya are
  mentioned1 viz4 those who admitted    
twenty-four categories 7the  school ,i  
have sketched above71 those who admitted
 twenty-five  7the well-known orthodox  
,smkhya system7 and those who  admitted 
twenty-six categories4 ,this last school
 admitted a  supreme being in addition  
to purusa and this was the twenty-sixth 
principle4 ,this agrees with the        
orthodox ,yoga system and the  form of  
,smkhya advocated in the ,mahbhrata4    
,the schools of  ,smkhya of twenty-four 
and twenty-five categories are here     
denounced as unsatisfactory4 ,doctrines 
similar to the school of  ,smkhya we    
have sketched above are referred to in  
some of the          ,footnote #a3      

,gunaratna's ,tarkarahasyadpik1 p4 #ii4 
#bah    other chapters of the ,mahbhrata
 7,,xii4 #bjc1 #bjd74 ,the self  apart  
from the body is described as the moon  
of the new moon  day2 it is said that as
 ,rhu 7the shadow on the sun during an  
eclipse7 cannot be seen apart from the  
sun1 so the self cannot be  seen apart  
from the body4 ,the selfs 7s'arrinah7   
are spoken of as  manifesting from      
prakrti4    ,we do not know anything    
about suri the direct disciple  of      
,kapila ,footnote ref #a4 ,but it seems 
probable that the system of  ,smkhya we 
have sketched here which appears in     
fundamentally the same  form in the     
,mahbhrata and has been attributed there
 to ,pacas'ikha  is probably the        
earliest form of ,smkhya available to us
  in a systematic form4 ,not only does  
,gunaratna's reference to the  school of
 ,maulikya ,smkhya justify it1 but the  
fact that ,caraka  7#gh ,a4,u47 does not
 refer to the ,smkhya as described by   
s'varakrsna  and referred to in other   

parts of ,mahbhrata is a definite  proof
 that s'varakrsna's ,smkhya is a later  
modification1 which  was either         
non-existent in ,caraka's time or was   
not regarded as  an authoritative old   
,smkhya view4    ,wassilief says quoting
 ,tibetan sources that ,vindhyavsin     
altered  the ,smkhya according to his   
own views ,footnote ref #b4 ,takakusu   
thinks  that ,vindhyavsin was a title of
 s'varakrsna ,footnote ref #c and ,garbe
  holds that the date of s'varakrsna was
 about #ajj ,a4,d4 ,it seems to be a    
very plausible view that s'varakrsna was
 indebted for his kriks to  another     
work1 which was probably written in a   
style different  from what he employs4  
,the seventh verse of his ,krik seems to
  be in purport the same as a passage   
which is found quoted in the            
,footnote #a3 ,a verse attributed to    
suri is quoted by ,gunaratna            
7,tarkarahasyadpik1 p4 #ajd74 ,the      
purport of this verse is that when      
buddhi is transformed in a particular   

manner1 it 7purusa7 has experience4  ,it
 is like the reflection of the moon in  
transparent water4    ,footnote #b3     
,vassilief's ,buddhismus1 p4 #bdj4      
,footnote #c3 ,takakusu's ,a study of   
,paramrtha's life of ,vasubandhu1 ,j4   
,r4,a4,s41 #aije4 ,this identification  
by ,takakusu1 however1 appears to be    
extremely doubtful1 for ,gunaratna      
mentions s'varakrsna and  ,vindhyavsin  
as two different authorities            
7,tarkarahasyadpik1  pp4 #ajb and #ajd74
 ,the verse quoted from ,vindhyavsin 7p4
 #ajd7 in  anustubh metre cannot be     
traced as belonging to s'varakrsn4 ,it  
appears that s'varakrsna wrote two      
books2 one is the ,smkhya  krik and     
another an independent work on ,smkhya1 
a line from which1  quoted by           
,gunaratna1 stands as follows3          
,pratiniyatdhyavasyah s'rotrdisamuttha  
adhyaksam 7p4 #ajh74    ,if ,vcaspati's 
interpretation of the classification of 
anumna in his  ,tattvakaumud be         
considered to be a correct explanation  

of ,smkhya  krik then s'varakrsna must  
be a different person from ,vindhyavsin 
whose views on anumna as referred to in 
,s'lokavrttika1 p4 #cic1 are  altogether
 different4 ,but ,vcaspati's own        
statement in the  ,ttparyyatk 7pp4 #aji 
and #aca7 shows that his treatment there
 was not  faithful4    #bai    ,mahbhsya
 of ,patajali the grammarian 7#adg      
,b4,c47 ,footnote ref #a4  ,the subject 
of the two passages are the enumeration 
of reasons which  frustrate visual      
perception4 ,this however is not a      
doctrine concerned  with the strictly   
technical part of ,smkhya1 and it is    
just possible  that the book from which 
,patajali quoted the passage1 and which 
was probably paraphrased in the ry metre
 by s'varakrsna  was not a ,smkhya book 
at all4 ,but though the subject of the  
verse is not one of the strictly        
technical parts of ,smkhya1 yet  since  
such an enumeration is not seen in any  
other system of  ,indian philosophy1 and
 as it has some special bearing as a    

safeguard  against certain objections   
against the ,smkhya doctrine of         
prakrti1 the natural and plausible      
supposition is that it was the  verse of
 a ,smkhya book which was paraphrased by
 s'varakrsna4    ,the earliest          
descriptions of a ,smkhya which agrees  
with  s'varakrsna's ,smkhya 7but with an
 addition of s'vara7 are to be  found in
 ,patajali's ,yoga stras and in the     
,mahbhrata2 but we  are pretty certain  
that the ,smkhya of ,caraka we have     
sketched  here was known to ,patajali1  
for in ,yoga stra ,i4 #ai a reference is
  made to a view of ,smkhya similar to  
this4    ,from the point of view of     
history of philosophy the ,smkhya  of   
,caraka and ,pacas'ikha is very         
important2 for it shows a  transitional 
stage of thought between the ,upanisad  
ideas and  the orthodox ,smkhya doctrine
 as represented by s'varakrsna4  ,on the
 one hand its doctrine that the senses  
are material1 and  that effects are     
produced only as a result of            

collocations1 and that  the purusa is   
unconscious1 brings it in close relation
 with ,nyya1  and on the other its      
connections with ,buddhism seem to be   
nearer  than the orthodox ,smkhya4      
,we hear of a ,sastitantras'stra as     
being one of the oldest ,smkhya  works4 
,this is described in the ,ahirbudhnya  
,samhit as  containing two books of     
thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters    
,footnote  ref #b4 ,a quotation from    
,rjavrttika 7a work about which there is
 no  definite information7 in ,vcaspati 
,mis'ra's commentary on the ,smkhya     
krika7#gb7 says that it was called the  
,sastitantra because  it dealt with the 
existence of prakrti1 its oneness1 its  
difference  from purusas1 its           
purposefulness for purusas1 the         
multiplicity of  purusas1 connection and
 separation from purusas1 the evolution 
of        ,footnote #a3 ,patajali's     
,mahbhsya1 ,,iv4 ,i4 #c4                
,atisannikarsdativiprakarst             
mrttyantaravyavadhnt  tamasvrtatvt      

indriyadaurvalydatipramdt1 etc4         
7,benares edition47    ,footnote #b3    
,ahirbudhnya ,samhit1 pp4 #ajh1 #aaj4   
#bbj    the categories1 the inactivity  
of the purusas and the five viparyyayas1
  nine tustis1 the defects of organs of 
twenty-eight kinds1 and the  eight      
siddhis ,footnote ref #a4    ,but the   
content of the ,sastitantra as given in 
,ahirbudhnya  ,samhit is different from 
it1 and it appears from it that the     
,smkhya  of the ,sastitantra referred to
 in the ,ahirbudhnya ,samhit was of  a  
theistic character resembling the       
doctrine of the ,pacartra  ,vaisnavas   
and the ,ahirbudhnya ,samhit says that  
,kapila's  theory of ,smkhya was a      
,vaisnava one4 ,vijna ,bhiksu1 the      
greatest expounder of ,smkhya1 says in  
many places of his work  ,vijnmrta      
,bhsya that ,smkhya was originally      
theistic1 and that  the atheistic       
,smkhya is only a praudhivda 7an        
exaggerated  attempt to show that no    
supposition of s'vara is necessary to   

explain the world process7 though the   
,mahbhrata points out  that the         
difference between ,smkhya and ,yoga is 
this1 that the  former is atheistic1    
while the latter is theistic4 ,the      
discrepancy  between the two accounts of
 ,sastitantra suggests that the original
  ,sastitantra as referred to in the    
,ahirbudhnya ,samhit was  subsequently  
revised and considerably changed4 ,this 
supposition is  corroborated by the fact
 that ,gunaratna does not mention among 
the important ,smkhya works ,sastitantra
 but ,sastitantroddhra        ,footnote 
#a3 ,the doctrine of the viparyyaya1    
tusti1 defects of organs1  and the      
siddhi are mentioned in the ,karik of   
,is'varakrsna1 but ,i  have omitted them
 in my account of ,smkhya as these have 
little  philosophical importance4 ,the  
viparyyaya 7false knowledge7 are five1  
viz4 avidy 7ignorance71 asmita 7egoism71
 raga 7attachment71 dvesa  7antipathy71 
abhimives'a 7self-love71 which are also 
called tamo1  moha1 mahmoha1 tamisr1 and

 andhatmisra4 ,these are of nine kinds  
of tusti1 such as the idea that no      
exertion is necessary1 since prakrti    
will herself bring our salvation        
7ambhas71 that it is not necessary  to  
meditate1 for it is enough if we        
renounce the householder's  life        
7salila71 that there is no hurry1       
salvation will come in time  7megha71   
that salvation will be worked out by    
fate 7bhgya71 and  the contentment      
leading to renunciation proceeding from 
five kinds of  causes1 e4g4 the troubles
 of earning 7para71 the troubles of     
protecting the earned money 7supara71   
the natural waste of things  earned by  
enjoyment 7parpara71 increase of desires
 leading to greater  disappointments    
7anuttammbhas71 all gain leads to the   
injury of others  7uttammbhas74 ,this   
renunciation proceeds from external     
considerations  with those who consider 
prakrti and its evolutes as the self4   
,the  siddhis or ways of success are    
eight in number1 viz4 7#a7 reading of   

scriptures 7tra71 7#b7 enquiry into     
their meaning 7sutra71  7#c7 proper     
reasoning 7tratra71 7#d7 corroborating  
one's own ideas  with the ideas of the  
teachers and other workers of the same  
field  7ramyaka71 7#e7 clearance of the 
mind by long-continued practice         
7sadmudita74 ,the three other siddhis   
called pramoda1 mudita1 and  modamna    
lead directly to the separation of the  
prakrti from the purus'a4  ,the         
twenty-eight sense defects are the      
eleven defects of the eleven senses  and
 seventeen kinds of defects of the      
understanding corresponding to the      
absence of siddhis and the presence of  
tustis4 ,the viparyyayas1 tustis  and   
the defects of the organs are hindrances
 in the way of the  achievement of the  
,smkhya goal4    #bba    7revised       
edition of ,sastitantra7 ,footnote ref  
#a4 ,probably the  earlier ,sastitantra 
was lost even before ,vcaspati's time4  
,if we believe the ,sastitantra referred
 to in the ,ahirbudhnya  ,samhit to be  

in all essential parts the same work    
which was  composed by ,kapila and based
 faithfully on his teachings1 then it   
has to be assumed that ,kapila's ,smkhya
 was theistic ,footnote ref #b4 ,it     
seems probable that his disciple suri   
tried to popularise it4 ,but it  seems  
that a great change occurred when       
,pacas'ikha the disciple of  suri came  
to deal with it4 ,for we know that his  
doctrine  differed from the traditional 
one in many important respects4 ,it  is 
said in ,smkhya krik 7#gj7 that the     
literature was divided by  him into many
 parts 7tena bahudhkrtam tantram74 ,the 
exact  meaning of this reference is     
difficult to guess4 ,it might mean that 
the original ,sastitantra was rewritten 
by him in various treatises4  ,it is a  
well-known fact that most of the schools
 of ,vaisnavas  accepted the form of    
cosmology which is the same in most     
essential  parts as the ,smkhya         
cosmology4 ,this justifies the          
assumption  that ,kapila's doctrine was 

probably theistic4 ,but there are  a few
 other points of difference between the 
,kapila and the  ,ptajala ,smkhya       
7,yoga74 ,the only supposition that may 
be ventured is that ,pacas'ikha probably
 modified ,kapila's  work in an         
atheistic way and passed it as ,kapila's
 work4 ,if this  supposition is held    
reasonable1 then we have three strata of
  ,smkhya1 first a theistic one1 the    
details of which are lost1 but  which is
 kept in a modified form by the ,ptajala
 school of ,smkhya1  second an atheistic
 one as represented by ,pacas'ikha1 and 
a third atheistic modification as the   
orthodox ,smkhya system4  ,an important 
change in the ,smkhya doctrine seems to 
have  been introduced by ,vijna ,bhiksu 
7sixteenth century ,a4,d47 by his       
treatment of gunas as types of reals4 ,i
 have myself accepted this              
interpretation of ,smkhya as the most   
rational and philosophical  one1 and    
have therefore followed it in giving a  
connected system  of the accepted       

,kapila and the ,ptajala school of      
,smkhya4 ,but  it must be pointed out   
that originally the notion of gunas was 
applied to different types of good and  
bad mental states1 and then  they were  
supposed in some mysterious way by      
mutual increase  and decrease to form   
the objective world on the one hand and 
the        ,footnote #a3                
,tarkarahasyadpik1 p4 #aji4    ,footnote
 #b3 evam sadvims'akam prhah s'arramth  
mnavh smkhyam  samkhytmakatvcca         
kapildibhirucyate4 ,matsyapurna1 ,,iv4  
#bh4    #bbb    totality of human       
psychosis on the other4 ,a systematic   
explanation  of the gunas was attempted 
in two different lines by ,vijna ,bhiksu
  and the ,vaisnava writer ,venkata     
,footnote ref l4 ,as the ,yoga          
philosophy compiled by ,patajali and    
commented on by ,vysa1  ,vcaspati and   
,vijana ,bhiksu1 agree with the ,smkhya 
doctrine  as explained by ,vcaspati and 
,vijana ,bhiksu in most points ,i  have 
preferred to call them the ,kapila and  

the ,ptajala schools  of ,smkhya and    
have treated them together--a principle 
which  was followed by ,haribhadra in   
his ,saddars'anasamuaccaya4    ,the     
other important ,smkhya teachers        
mentioned by ,gaudapda  are ,sanaka1    
,sananda1 ,santana and ,vodhu4 ,nothing 
is  known about their historicity or    
doctrines4      ,smkhya krik1 ,smkhya   
stra1 ,vcaspati ,mis'ra and  ,vijna     
,bhiksu4    ,a word of explanation is   
necessary as regards my interpretation  
of the ,smkhya-,yoga system4 ,the       
,smkhya krik is  the oldest ,smkhya text
 on which we have commentaries by  later
 writers4 ,the ,smkhya stra was not     
referred to by any  writer until it was 
commented upon by ,aniruddha 7fifteenth 
century ,a4,d474 ,even ,gunaratna of the
 fourteenth century ,a ,d4 who  made    
allusions to a number of ,smkhya works1 
did not make any  reference to the      
,smkhya stra1 and no other writer who is
 known  to have flourished before       
,gunaratna seems to have made any       

reference to the ,smkhya stra4 ,the     
natural conclusion therefore  is that   
these stras were probably written some  
time after  the fourteenth century4 ,but
 there is no positive evidence to  prove
 that it was so late a work as the      
fifteenth century4 ,it is  said at the  
end of the ,smkhya krik of s'varakrsna  
that the  kriks give an exposition of   
the ,smkhya doctrine excluding  the     
refutations of the doctrines of other   
people and excluding the  parables      
attached to the original ,smkhya        
works--the  ,sastitantras'stra4 ,the    
,smkhya stras contain refutations  of   
other doctrines and also a number of    
parables4 ,it is not improbable  that   
these were collected from some earlier  
,smkhya work which is  now lost to us4  
,it may be that it was done from some   
later edition  of the ,sastitantras'stra
 7,sastitantroddhra as mentioned by     
,footnote #a3 ,venkata's philosophy will
 be dealt with in the second volume  of 
the present work4    #bbc    ,gnaratna71

 but this is a mere conjecture4 ,there  
is no reason to  suppose that the       
,smkhya doctrine found in the stras     
differs in  any important way from the  
,smkhya doctrine as found in the        
,smkhya krik4 ,the only point of        
importance is this1 that the  ,smkhya   
stras hold that when the ,upanisads     
spoke of one absolute  pure intelligence
 they meant to speak of unity as        
involved  in the class of intelligent   
purusas as distinct from the class of   
the gunas4 ,as all purusas were of the  
nature of pure intelligence1  they were 
spoken of in the ,upanisads as one1 for 
they all form  the category or class of 
pure intelligence1 and hence may in some
  sense be regarded as one4 ,this       
compromise cannot be found in  the      
,smkhya krik4 ,this is1 however1 a case 
of omission and not  of difference4     
,vijna ,bhiksu1 the commentator of the  
,smkhya  stra1 was more inclined to     
theistic ,smkhya or ,yoga than  to      
atheistic ,smkhya4 ,this is proved by   

his own remarks in  his                 
,smkhyapravacanabhsya1 ,yogavrttika1 and
 ,vijnmrtabhasya  7an independent       
commentary on the ,brahmastras of       
,bdaryana on theistic ,smkhya lines74   
,vijna ,bhiksu's own  view could not    
properly be called a thorough ,yoga     
view1 for he  agreed more with the views
 of the ,smkhya doctrine of the         
,puranas1 where both the diverse purusas
 and the prakrti are said  to be merged 
in the end in s'vara1 by whose will the 
creative  process again began in the    
prakrti at the end of each pralaya4  ,he
 could not avoid the distinctively      
atheistic arguments of the  ,smkhya     
stras1 but he remarked that these were  
used only with  a view to showing that  
the ,smkhya system gave such a rational 
explanation that even without the       
intervention of an s'vara it could      
explain all facts4 ,vijna ,bhiksu in his
 interpretation of ,smkhya  differed on 
many points from those of ,vcaspati1 and
 it is difficult  to say who is right4  

,vijna ,bhiksu has this advantage that  
he has boldly tried to give             
interpretations on some difficult points
  on which ,vcaspati remained silent4 ,i
 refer principally to the  nature of the
 conception of the gunas1 which ,i      
believe is the most  important thing in 
,smkhya4 ,vijna ,bhiksu described the   
gunas as reals or super-subtle          
substances1 but ,vcaspati and  ,gaudapda
 7the other commentator of the ,smkhya  
krik7  remained silent on the point4    
,there is nothing1 however1 in their    
interpretations which would militate    
against the interpretation of  ,vijna   
,bhiksu1 but yet while they were silent 
as to any definite  explanations        
regarding the nature of the gunas1      
,bhiksu definitely    #bbd    came      
forward with a very satisfactory and    
rational interpretation  of their       
nature4    ,since no definite           
explanation of the gunas is found in any
  other work before ,bhiksu1 it is quite
 probable that this matter  may not have

 been definitely worked out before4     
,neither ,caraka  nor the ,mahbhrata    
explains the nature of the gunas4 ,but  
,bhiksu's interpretation suits          
exceedingly well all that is known  of  
the manifestations and the workings of  
the gunas in all early  documents4 ,i   
have therefore accepted the             
interpretation of ,bhiksu  in giving my 
account of the nature of the gunas4 ,the
 ,krik  speaks of the gunas as being of 
the nature of pleasure1 pain1 and       
dullness 7sattva1 rajas and tamas74 ,it 
also describes sattva as  being light   
and illuminating1 rajas as of the nature
 of energy and  causing motion1 and     
tamas as heavy and obstructing4         
,vcaspati  merely paraphrases this      
statement of the ,krik but does not     
enter  into any further explanations4   
,bhiksu's interpretation fits in well   
with all that is known of the gunas1    
though it is quite possible  that this  
view might not have been known before1  
and when the  original ,smkhya doctrine 

was formulated there was a real         
vagueness  as to the conception of the  
gunas4    ,there are some other points  
in which ,bhiksu's interpretation       
differs from that of ,vcaspati4 ,the    
most important of these may  be         
mentioned here4 ,the first is the nature
 of the connection of  the buddhi states
 with the purusa4 ,vcaspati holds that  
there is  no contact 7samyoga7 of any   
buddhi state with the purusa but that  a
 reflection of the purusa is caught in  
the state of buddhi by  virtue of which 
the buddhi state becomes intelligized   
and transformed  into consciousness4    
,but this view is open to the objection 
that it does not explain how the purusa 
can be said to be the  experiencer of   
the conscious states of the buddhi1 for 
its reflection  in the buddhi is merely 
an image1 and there cannot be an        
experience  7bhoga7 on the basis of that
 image alone without any  actual        
connection of the purusa with the       
buddhi4 ,the answer of  ,vcaspati       

,mis'ra is that there is no contact of  
the two in space  and time1 but that    
their proximity 7sannidhi7 means only a 
specific  kind of fitness 7yogyat7 by   
virtue of which the purusa1 though it   
remains aloof1 is yet felt to be united 
and identified in the buddhi1  and as a 
result of that the states of the buddhi 
appear as ascribed  to a person4 ,vijna 
,bhiksu differs from ,vcaspati and says 
that  if such a special kind of fitness 
be admitted1 then there is no    #bbe   
reason why purusa should be deprived of 
such a fitness at the time  of          
emancipation1 and thus there would be no
 emancipation at all1  for the fitness  
being in the purusa1 he could not be    
divested of it1  and he would continue  
to enjoy the experiences represented in 
the buddhi for ever4 ,vijana ,bhiksu    
thus holds that there is a  real contact
 of the purusa with the buddhi state in 
any cognitive  state4 ,such a contact of
 the purusa and the buddhi does not     
necessarily mean that the former will be

 liable to change on  account of it1 for
 contact and change are not synonymous4 
,change  means the rise of new          
qualities4 ,it is the buddhi which      
suffers  changes1 and when these changes
 are reflected in the purusa1 there  is 
the notion of a person or experiencer in
 the purusa1 and when  the purusa is    
reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi 
state appears  as a conscious state4    
,the second1 is the difference between  
,vcaspati and ,bhiksu as regards the    
nature of the perceptual  process4      
,bhiksu thinks that the senses can      
directly perceive the  determinate      
qualities of things without any         
intervention of manas1  whereas         
,vcaspati ascribes to manas the power of
 arranging the  sense-data in a definite
 order and of making the indeterminate  
sense-data determinate4 ,with him the   
first stage of cognition is  the stage  
when indeterminate sense materials are  
first presented1 at  the next stage     
there is assimilation1 differentiation1 

and association  by which the           
indeterminate materials are ordered and 
classified  by the activity of manas    
called samkalpa which coordinates the   
indeterminate sense materials into      
determinate perceptual and  conceptual  
forms as class notions with particular  
characteristics4  ,bhiksu who supposes  
that the determinate character of things
 is  directly perceived by the senses   
has necessarily to assign a subordinate 
position to manas as being only the     
faculty of desire1  doubt1 and          
imagination4    ,it may not be out of   
place to mention here that there are    
one or two passages in ,vcaspati's      
commentary on the ,smkhya  krik which   
seem to suggest that he considered the  
ego 7ahamkra7  as producing the         
subjective series of the senses and the 
objective series of the external world  
by a sort of desire or will1  but he did
 not work out this doctrine1 and it is  
therefore not  necessary to enlarge upon
 it4 ,there is also a difference of view

  with regard to the evolution of the   
tanmtras from the mahat2  for contrary  
to the view of ,vysabhsya and ,vijna    
,bhiksu etc4  ,vcaspati holds that from 
the mahat there was ahamkra and    #bbf 
from ahamkra the tanmtras ,footnote ref 
#a4 ,vijna ,bhiksu however  holds that  
both the separation of ahamkra and the  
evolution of the  tanmtras take place in
 the mahat1 and as this appeared to me  
to be more  reasonable1 ,i have followed
 this interpretation4 ,there are some   
other minor points of difference about  
the ,yoga doctrines between  ,vcaspati  
and ,bhiksu which are not of much       
philosophical  importance4      ,yoga   
and ,patajali4    ,the word yoga occurs 
in the ,rg-,veda in various senses such 
as yoking or harnessing1 achieving the  
unachieved1 connection1  and the like4  
,the sense of yoking is not so frequent 
as the  other senses2 but it is         
nevertheless true that the word was     
used in this sense in ,rg-,veda and in  
such later ,vedic works as  the         

,s'atapatha ,brhmana and the            
,brhadranyaka ,upanisad ,footnote ref   
#b4  ,the word has another derivative   
yugya in later ,sanskrit literature     
,footnote ref #c4    ,with the growth of
 religious and philosophical ideas in   
the  ,rg-,veda1 we find that the        
religious austerities were generally    
very  much valued4 ,tapas 7asceticism7  
and brahmacarya 7the holy vow  of       
celibacy and life-long study7 were      
regarded as greatest virtues  and       
considered as being productive of the   
highest power ,footnote ref #d4    ,as  
these ideas of asceticism and           
self-control grew the force  of the     
flying passions was felt to be as       
uncontrollable as that of  a spirited   
steed1 and thus the word yoga which was 
originally  applied to the control of   
steeds began to be applied to the       
control  of the senses ,footnote ref #e4
    ,in ,pnini's time the word yoga had 
attained its technical  meaning1 and he 
distinguished this root yuj samdhau 7yuj

  in the sense of concentration7 from   
yujir yoge 7root yujir in  the sense of 
connecting74 ,yuj in the first sense is 
seldom used as  a verb4 ,it is more or  
less an imaginary root for the          
etymological  derivation of the word    
yoga ,footnote ref #f4        ,footnote 
#a3 ,see my ,study of ,patanjali1 p4 #fj
 ff4    ,footnote #b3 ,compare ,r4,v4,i4
 #cd4 #i_/,,vii4 #fg4 #h_/;,,iii4 #bg4  
,,ii_/,x4 #cj4 ,,ii_/,x4 #aad4          
#i_/;,,iv4 #bd4 #d_/;,i4 #e4 #c_/;,i4   
#cj4 #g2 ,s'atapatha ,brahmana #ad4 #g4 
,i4 ,,ii4    ,footnote #c3 ,it is       
probably an old word of the ,aryan      
stock2 compare ,german  ,joch1 ,a4,s4   
geoc4 l atm jugum4    ,footnote #d3 ,see
 ,chandogya ,,iii4 #ag4 #d2 ,brh4 ,i4   
#b4 #f2 ,brh4 ,,iii4 #h4 #aj2  ,taitt4  
,i4 #i4 ,i_/,,iii4 #b4 ,i_/,,iii4 #c4   
,i2 ,taitt1 ,brh1 ,,ii4 #b4 #c4 #c2     
,r4,v4x4 #abi2  ,s'atap4 ,brh4 ,,xi4 #e4
 #h4 #a4    ,footnote #e3 ,katha ,,iii4 
#d1 indriyni haynhuh visaytesugocarn4   
,the senses are the horses and whatever 

they grasp are their objects4  ,maitr4  
#b4 #f4 ,karmendriynyasya hayh the      
conative senses are its  horses4        
,footnote #f3 ,yugyah is used from the  
root of yujir yoge and not from  yuja   
samdhau4 ,a consideration of ,panini's  
rule ,tadasya brahmacaryam1  ,v4i4 #id  
shows that not only different kinds of  
asceticism and rigour which  passed by  
the name of brahmacarya were prevalent  
in the country at the time  7,pnini as  
,goldstcker has proved is               
pre-buddhistic71 but associated with    
these had grown up a definite system of 
mental discipline which passed by  the  
name of ,yoga4    #bbg      ,in the     
,bhagavadgt1 we find that the word yoga 
has been  used not only in conformity   
with the root yuj-samdhau but  also with
 yujir yoge ,this has been the source of
 some confusion  to the readers of the  
,bhagavadgt4 ,yogin in the sense  of a  
person who has lost himself in          
meditation is there regarded  with      
extreme veneration4 ,one of the main    

features of the use of  this word lies  
in this that the ,bhagavadgt tried to   
mark out a  middle path between the     
austere discipline of meditative        
abstraction  on the one hand and the    
course of duties of sacrificial action  
of a ,vedic worshipper in the life of a 
new type of ,yogin 7evidently  from     
yujir yoge7 on the other1 who should    
combine in himself the  best parts of   
the two paths1 devote himself to his    
duties1 and yet  abstract himself from  
all selfish motives associated with     
desires4    ,kautilya in his            
,arthas'stra when enumerating the       
philosophic  sciences of study names    
,smkhya1 ,yoga1 and ,lokyata4 ,the      
oldest ,buddhist stras 7e4g4 the        
,satipatthna sutta7 are fully  familiar 
with the stages of ,yoga concentration4 
,we may thus  infer that                
self-concentration and ,yoga had        
developed as a technical  method of     
mystic absorption some time before the  
,buddha4    ,as regards the connection  

of ,yoga with ,smkhya1 as we find  it in
 the ,yoga stras of ,patajali1 it is    
indeed difficult to come to  any        
definite conclusion4 ,the science of    
breath had attracted  notice in many of 
the earlier ,upanisads1 though there had
 not  probably developed any systematic 
form of prnyma 7a system  of breath     
control7 of the ,yoga system4 ,it is    
only when we  come to ,maitryan that we 
find that the ,yoga method had attained 
a systematic development4 ,the other two
 ,upanisads in  which the ,yoga ideas   
can be traced are the ,s'vets'vatara and
  the ,katha4 ,it is indeed curious to  
notice that these three  ,upanisads of  
,krsna ,yajurveda1 where we find        
reference to ,yoga  methods1 are the    
only ones where we find clear references
 also to  the ,smkhya tenets1 though the
 ,smkhya and ,yoga ideas do not  appear 
there as related to each other or       
associated as parts of  the same system4
 ,but there is a remarkable passage in  
the  ,maitryan in the conversation      

between ,s'kyyana and ,brhad  ratha     
where we find that the ,smkhya          
metaphysics was offered    #bbh    in   
some quarters to explain the validity of
 the ,yoga processes1  and it seems     
therefore that the association and      
grafting of the  ,smkhya metaphysics on 
the ,yoga system as its basis1 was the  
work of the followers of this school of 
ideas which was subsequently            
systematized by ,patajali4 ,thus        
,s'kyyana says3 ,here some  say it is   
the guna which through the differences  
of nature goes  into bondage to the     
will1 and that deliverance takes place  
when  the fault of the will has been    
removed1 because he sees by the  mind2  
and all that we call desire1            
imagination1 doubt1 belief1 unbelief1   
certainty1 uncertainty1 shame1 thought1 
fear1 all that is but  mind4 ,carried   
along by the waves of the qualities     
darkened in  his imagination1 unstable1 
fickle1 crippled1 full of desires1      
vacillating  he enters into belief1     

believing ,i am he1 this is mine1 and   
he binds his self by his self as a bird 
with a net4 ,therefore1 a  man being    
possessed of will1 imagination and      
belief is a slave1  but he who is the   
opposite is free4 ,for this reason let a
 man  stand free from will1 imagination 
and belief--this is the sign of         
liberty1 this is the path that leads to 
,brahman1 this is the opening  of the   
door1 and through it he will go to the  
other shore of darkness4  ,all desires  
are there fulfilled4 ,and for this1 they
 quote a  verse3 ',when the five        
instruments of knowledge stand still    
together  with the mind1 and when the   
intellect does not move1 that is called 
the highest state ,footnote ref #a4'    
,an examination of such ,yoga ,upanisads
 as ,s'ndilya1 ,yogatattva1             
,dhynabindu1 ,hamsa1 ,amrtanda1 ,varha1 
,mandala  ,brhmana1 ,ndabindu1 and      
,yogakundal1 shows that the ,yoga       
practices had undergone diverse changes 
in diverse schools1 but  none of these  

show any predilection for the ,smkhya4  
,thus the  ,yoga practices grew in      
accordance with the doctrines of the    
,footnote #a3 ,vtsyyana1 however1 in his
 bhsya on ,nyya stra1 ,i4 i #bi1        
distinguishes ,smkhya from ,yoga in the 
following way3 ,the ,smkhya holds  that 
nothing can come into being nor be      
destroyed1 there cannot be any  change  
in the pure intelligence 7niratis'ayh   
cetanh74 ,all changes  are due to       
changes in the body1 the senses1 the    
manas and the objects4  ,yoga holds that
 all creation is due to the karma of the
 purusa4  ,dosas 7passions7 and the     
pravrtti 7action7 are the cause of      
karma4  ,the intelligences or souls     
7cetana7 are associated with qualities4 
,non  being can come into being and what
 is produced may be destroyed4 ,the last
  view is indeed quite different from   
the ,yoga of ,vysabhsya1 ,it is  closer 
to ,nyya in its doctrines4 ,if          
,vtsyyana's statement is correct1  it   
would appear that the doctrine of there 

being a moral purpose in  creation was  
borrowed by ,smkhya from ,yoga4         
,udyotakara's remarks on the  same stra 
do not indicate a difference but an     
agreement between ,smkhya  and ,yoga on 
the doctrine of the indriyas being      
abhautika4 ,curiously  enough ,vtsyyana 
quotes a passage from ,vysabhsya1 ,,iii4
 #ac1 in his  bhsya1 ,i4 ii4 #f1 and    
criticizes it as self-contradictory     
7viruddha74    #bbi    ,s'aivas and     
,s'aktas and assumed a peculiar form as 
the ,mantrayoga2  they grew in another  
direction as the ,hathayoga which  was  
supposed to produce mystic and magical  
feats through  constant practices of    
elaborate nervous exercises1 which were 
also  associated with healing and other 
supernatural powers4 ,the  ,yogatattva  
,upanisad says that there are four kinds
 of yoga1 the  ,mantra ,yoga1 ,laya     
,yoga1 ,hathayoga and ,rjayoga ,footnote
 ref #a4 ,in some  cases we find that   
there was a great attempt even to       
associate ,vedntism  with these mystic  

practices4 ,the influence of these      
practices in  the development of ,tantra
 and other modes of worship was also    
very great1 but we have to leave out    
these from our present  consideration as
 they have little philosophic importance
 and as  they are not connected with our
 present endeavour4    ,of the ,ptajala 
school of ,smkhya1 which forms the      
subject of  the ,yoga with which we are 
now dealing1 ,patajali was probably  the
 most notable person for he not only    
collected the different  forms of ,yoga 
practices1 and gleaned the diverse ideas
 which  were or could be associated with
 the ,yoga1 but grafted them all  on the
 ,smkhya metaphysics1 and gave them the 
form in which  they have been handed    
down to us4 ,vcaspati and ,vijna        
,bhiksu1 the two great commentators on  
the ,vysabhsya1 agree  with us in       
holding that ,patajali was not the      
founder of ,yoga1  but an editor4       
,analytic study of the stras brings the 
conviction  that the stras do not show  

any original attempt1 but a  masterly   
and systematic compilation which was    
also supplemented  by fitting           
contributions4 ,the systematic manner   
also  in which the first three chapters 
are written by way of definition  and   
classification shows that the materials 
were already in  existence and that     
,patajali systematized them4 ,there was 
no missionizing zeal1 no attempt to     
overthrow the doctrines of  other       
systems1 except as far as they might    
come in by way of  explaining the       
system4 ,patajal is not even anxious to 
establish  the system1 but he is only   
engaged in systematizing the facts  as  
he had them4 ,most of the criticism     
against the ,buddhists  occur in the    
last chapter4 ,the doctrines of the     
,yoga are  described in the first three 
chapters1 and this part is separated    
from the last chapter where the views of
 the ,buddhist are        ,footnote #a3 
,the ,yoga writer ,jaigsavya wrote      
,dhrans'stra which  dealt with ,yoga    

more in the fashion of ,tantra then that
 given by ,patajali4  ,he mentions      
different places in the body 7e4g4      
heart1 throat1 tip of the  nose1 palate1
 forehead1 centre of the brain7 which   
are centres of memory  where            
concentration is to be made4 ,see       
,vcaspati's ,ttparyatk or  ,vtsyyana's  
bhsya on ,nyya stra1 ,,iii4 ii4 #dc4    
#bcj    criticized2 the putting of an   
iti 7the word to denote the conclusion  
of any work7 at the end of the third    
chapter is evidently to  denote the     
conclusion of his ,yoga compilation4    
,there is of course  another iti at the 
end of the fourth chapter to denote the 
conclusion of the whole work4 ,the most 
legitimate hypothesis  seems to be that 
the last chapter is a subsequent        
addition by a  hand other than that of  
,patajali who was anxious to supply     
some new links of argument which were   
felt to be necessary for  the           
strengthening of the ,yoga position from
 an internal point of  view1 as well as 

for securing the strength of the ,yoga  
from the  supposed attacks of ,buddhist 
metaphysics4 ,there is also a  marked   
change 7due either to its supplementary 
character or  to the manipulation of a  
foreign hand7 in the style of the last  
chapter as compared with the style of   
the other three4    ,the stras1 #cj-cd1 
of the last chapter seem to repeat what 
has already been said in the second     
chapter and some of the  topics         
introduced are such that they could well
 have been  dealt with in a more        
relevant manner in connection with      
similar  discussions in the preceding   
chapters4 ,the extent of this chapter   
is also disproportionately small1 as it 
contains only #cd stras1  whereas the   
average number of stras in other        
chapters is between  #ea to #ee4    ,we 
have now to meet the vexed question of  
the probable date  of this famous ,yoga 
author ,patajali4 ,weber had tried to   
connect  him with ,kpya ,patamchala of  
,s'atapatha ,brhmana ,footnote ref l2 in

  ,ktyyana's ,varttika we get the name  
,patajali which is explained  by later  
commentators as patantah ajalayah yasmai
 7for  whom the hands are folded as a   
mark of reverence71 but it is indeed    
difficult to come to any conclusion     
merely from the similarity of  names4   
,there is however another theory which  
identifies the  writer of the great     
commentary on ,pnini called the         
,mahbhsya  with the ,patajali of the    
,yoga stra4 ,this theory has been       
accepted by many western scholars       
probably on the strength of  some       
,indian commentators who identified the 
two ,patajalis4  ,of these one is the   
writer of the ,patajalicarita           
7,rmabhadra  ,dksta7 who could not have 
flourished earlier than the eighteenth  
century4 ,the other is that cited in    
,s'ivarma's commentary on  ,vsavadatt   
which ,aufrecht assigns to the          
eighteenth century4  ,the other two are 
king ,bhoja of ,dhr and ,cakrapnidatta1 
,footnote #a3 ,weber's ,history of      

,indian ,literature1 p4 #bbc n4    #bca 
the commentator of ,caraka1 who belonged
 to the eleventh  century ,a4,d4 ,thus  
,cakrapni says that he adores the       
,ahipati  7mythical serpent chief7 who  
removed the defects of mind1 speech  and
 body by his ,ptajala mahbhsya and the  
revision of  ,caraka4 ,bhoja says3      
,victory be to the luminous words of    
that illustrious sovereign              
,ranaranigamalla who by composing his   
grammar1 by writing his commentary on   
the ,patajala and by  producing a       
treatise on medicine called ,rjamrgnka  
has like the  lord of the holder of     
serpents removed defilement from speech1
  mind and body4 ,the adoration hymn of 
,vysa 7which is considered  to be an    
interpolation even by orthodox scholars7
 is also  based upon the same tradition4
 ,it is not impossible therefore that   
the later ,indian commentators might    
have made some confusion  between the   
three ,patajalis1 the grammarian1 the   
,yoga editor1  and the medical writer to

 whom is ascribed the book known as     
,ptajalatantra1 and who has been quoted 
by ,s'ivadsa in his  commentary on      
,cakradatta in connection with the      
heating of  metals4    ,professor ,j4,h4
 ,woods of ,harvard ,university is      
therefore  in a way justified in his    
unwillingness to identify the grammarian
  and the ,yoga editor on the slender   
evidence of these  commentators4 ,it is 
indeed curious to notice that the great 
commentators of the grammar school such 
as ,bhartrhari1 ,kaiyyata1  ,vmana1     
,jayditya1 ,nges'a1 etc4 are silent on  
this point4  ,this is indeed a point    
against the identification of the two   
,patajalis by some ,yoga and medical    
commentators of a later  age4 ,and if   
other proofs are available which go     
against such  an identification1 we     
could not think the grammarian and the  
,yoga writer to be the same person4     
,let us now see if ,patajali's          
grammatical work contains anything      
which may lead us to think that he was  

not the same  person as the writer on   
,yoga4 ,professor ,woods supposes that  
the  philosophic concept of substance   
7dravya7 of the two ,patajalis  differs 
and therefore they cannot be identified4
 ,he holds that  dravya is described in 
,vysabhsya in one place as being the    
unity of species and qualities          
7smnyavis'estmaka71 whereas  the        
,mahbhsya holds that a dravya denotes a 
genus and also  specific qualities      
according as the emphasis or stress is  
laid on  either side4 ,i fail to see how
 these ideas are totally  antagonistic4 
,moreover1 we know that these two views 
were held by    #bcb    ,vydi and       
,vjapyyana 7,vydi holding that words    
denoted  qualities or dravya and        
,vjapyyana holding that words denoted   
species ,footnote ref #a74 ,even ,pnini 
had these two different ideas in        
jtykhyymekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasym  
and  sarpnamekas'esamekavibhaktau1 and  
,patajali the writer of  the ,mahbhsya  
only combined these two views4 ,this    

does not show  that he opposes the view 
of ,vysabhsya1 though we must remember  
that even if he did1 that would not     
prove anything with regard  to the      
writer of the stras4 ,moreover1 when we 
read that dravya  is spoken of in the   
,mahbhsya as that object which is the   
specific kind of the conglomeration of  
its parts1 just as a cow is  of its     
tail1 hoofs1 horns1 etc4--yat           
ssnlngulakakudakhuravisnyartharpam1 we  
are reminded of  its similarity with    
ayutasiddhvayavabhednugatah samhah      
dravyam  7a conglomeration of           
interrelated parts is called dravya7 in 
the  ,vysabhsya4 ,so far as ,i have     
examined the ,mahbhsya ,i have  not been
 able to discover anything there which  
can warrant us  in holding that the two 
,patajalis cannot be identified4 ,there 
are no doubt many apparent divergences  
of view1 but even  in these it is only  
the traditional views of the old        
grammarians  that are exposed and       
reconciled1 and it would be very        

unwarrantable  for us to judge anything 
about the personal views  of the        
grammarian from them4 ,i am also        
convinced that the  writer of the       
,mahbhsya knew most of the important    
points of  the ,smkhya-,yoga            
metaphysics2 as a few examples ,i may   
refer  to the guna theory 7#a4 #b4 #fd1 
#d4 #a4 #c71 the ,smkhya dictum of ex   
nihilo nihil fit 7#a4 #a4 #ef71 the     
ideas of time 7#b4 #b4 #e1 #c4 #b4      
#abc71 the  idea of the return of       
similars into similars 7#a4 #a4 #ej71   
the idea of  change vikra as production 
of new qualities gunntardhna  7#e4 #a4  
#b1 #e4 #a4 #c7 and the distinction of  
indriya and ,buddhi 7#c4 #c4 #acc74  ,we
 may add to it that the ,mahbhsya agrees
 with the ,yoga  view as regards the    
,sphotavda1 which is not held in common 
by any other school of ,indian          
philosophy4 ,there is also this         
external similarity1 that unlike any    
other work they both begin  their works 
in a similar manner 7atha yognus'sanam  

and  athas'bdnus'sanam7--now begins the 
compilation of the  instructions on     
,yoga 7,yoga str7--and now begins the   
compilation  of the instructions of     
words 7,mahbhsya74    ,it may further be
 noticed in this connection that the    
arguments        ,footnote #a3          
,patajali's ,mahbhsya1 #a4 #b4 #fd4     
#bcc    which ,professor ,woods has     
adduced to assign the date of the  ,yoga
 stra between #cjj and #ejj ,a4,d4 are  
not at all conclusive1  as they stand on
 a weak basis2 for firstly if the two   
,patajalis  cannot be identified1 it    
does not follow that the editor of the  
,yoga should necessarily be made later2 
secondly1 the supposed  ,buddhist       
,footnote ref #a reference is found in  
the fourth chapter which1  as ,i have   
shown above1 is a later interpolation2  
thirdly1 even if they  were written by  
,patajali it cannot be inferred that    
because  ,vcaspati describes the        
opposite school as being of the         
,vijna-vdi  type1 we are to infer that  

the stras refer to ,vasubandhu or  even 
to ,ngrjuna1 for such ideas as have been
 refuted in the stras  had been         
developing long before the time of      
,ngrjuna4    ,thus we see that though   
the tradition of later commentators  may
 not be accepted as a sufficient ground 
to identify the two  ,patajalis1 we     
cannot discover anything from a         
comparative  critical study of the ,yoga
 stras and the text of the ,mahbhsya1   
which can lead us to say that the writer
 of the ,yoga  stras flourished at a    
later date than the other ,patajali4    
,postponing our views about the time of 
,patajali the ,yoga  editor1 ,i regret  
,i have to increase the confusion by    
introducing  the other work ,kitb       
,ptanjal1 of which ,alberuni speaks1 for
  our consideration4 ,alberuni considers
 this work as a very famous  one and he 
translates it along with another book   
called ,snka  7,smkhya7 ascribed to     
,kapila4 ,this book was written in the  
form of dialogue between master and     

pupil1 and it is certain that  this book
 was not the present ,yoga stra of      
,patajali1 though it  had the same aim  
as the latter1 namely the search for    
liberation  and for the union of the    
soul with the object of its meditation4 
,the book was called by ,alberuni ,kitb 
,ptanjal1 which is to  be translated as 
the book of ,ptajala1 because in another
 place1  speaking of its author1 he puts
 in a ,persian phrase which when        
translated stands as the author of the  
book of ,ptanjal4 ,it  had also an      
elaborate commentary from which         
,alberuni quotes  many extracts1 though 
he does not tell us the author's name4  
,it  treats of ,god1 soul1 bondage1     
karma1 salvation1 etc41 as we find in   
the ,yoga stra1 but the manner in which 
these are described 7so        ,footnote
 #a3 ,it is important to notice that the
 most important ,buddhist  reference    
naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramnakam
 tad kim syt  7,,iv4 #af7 was probably a
 line of the ,vysabhsya1 as ,bhoja1 who 

had  consulted many commentaries as he  
says in the preface1 does not count  it 
as stra4    #bcd    far as can be judged
 from the copious extracts supplied by  
,alberuni7 shows that these ideas had   
undergone some change  from what we find
 in the ,yoga stra4 ,following the idea 
of ,god  in ,alberuni we find that he   
retains his character as a timeless     
emancipated being1 but he speaks1 hands 
over the ,vedas and  shows the way to   
,yoga and inspires men in such a way    
that they  could obtain by cogitation   
what he bestowed on them4 ,the name  of 
,god proves his existence1 for there    
cannot exist anything of  which the name
 existed1 but not the thing4 ,the soul  
perceives  him and thought comprehends  
his qualities4 ,meditation is identical 
with worshipping him exclusively1 and by
 practising it  uninterruptedly the     
individual comes into supreme absorption
  with him and beatitude is obtained    
,footnote ref #a4    ,the idea of soul  
is the same as we find in the ,yoga     

stra4  ,the idea of metempsychosis is   
also the same4 ,he speaks of the  eight 
siddhis 7miraculous powers7 at the first
 stage of meditation  on the unity of   
,god4 ,then follow the other four stages
 of meditation  corresponding to the    
four stages we have as in the ,yoga     
stra4 ,he gives four kinds of ways for  
the achievement of salvation1  of which 
the first is the abhysa 7habit7 of      
,patajali1 and the  object of this      
abhysa is unity with ,god ,footnote ref 
#b4 ,the second  stands for vairgya2 the
 third is the worship of ,god with a    
view to seek  his favour in the         
attainment of salvation 7cf4 ,yoga stra1
 ,i4 #bc and  ,i4 #bi74 ,the fourth is a
 new introduction1 namely that of       
rasyana  or alchemy4 ,as regards        
liberation the view is almost the  same 
as in the ,yoga stra1 ,,ii4 #be and     
,,iv4 #cd1 but the liberated  state is  
spoken of in one place as absorption in 
,god or being  one with him4 ,the       
,brahman is conceived as an urddhvamla  

avks'kha as'vattha 7a tree with roots   
upwards and branches  below71 after the 
,upanisad fashion1 the upper root is    
pure  ,brahman1 the trunk is ,veda1 the 
branches are the different  doctrines   
and schools1 its leaves are the         
different modes of  interpretation4 ,its
 nourishment comes from the three       
forces2 the        ,footnote #a3 ,cf4   
,yoga stra ,i4 #bc-bi and ,,ii4 #a1 #de4
 ,the ,yoga stras  speak of ,is'vra     
7,god7 as an eternally emancipated      
purusa1 omniscient1  and the teacher of 
all past teachers4 ,by meditating on him
 many of the  obstacles such as illness1
 etc41 which stand in the way of ,yoga  
practice  are removed4 ,he is regarded  
as one of the alternative objects of    
concentration4 ,the commentator ,vysa   
notes that he is the best object1  for  
being drawn towards the ,yogin by his   
concentration4 ,he so wills  that he can
 easily attain concentration and through
 it salvation4 ,no  argument is given in
 the ,yoga stras of the existence of    

,god4    ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 ,yoga ,,ii4 
#a4    #bce    object of the worshipper 
is to leave the tree and go back to the 
roots4    ,the difference of this system
 from that of the ,yoga stra is3  7#a7  
the conception of ,god has risen here to
 such an importance  that he has become 
the only object of meditation1 and      
absorption  in him is the goal2 7#b7 the
 importance of the yama ,footnote ref #a
 and  the niyama has been reduced to the
 minimum2 7#c7 the value of the  ,yoga  
discipline as a separate means of       
salvation apart from any  connection    
with ,god as we find in the ,yoga stra  
has been lost  sight of2 7#d7 liberation
 and ,yoga are defined as absorption in 
,god2 7#e7 the introduction of ,brahman2
 7#f7 the very significance  of ,yoga as
 control of mental states               
7cittarttinirodha7 is lost  sight of1   
and 7#g7 rasyana 7alchemy7 is introduced
 as one of the  means of salvation4     
,from this we can fairly assume that    
this was a new modification  of the     

,yoga doctrine on the basis of          
,patajali's ,yoga stra in  the direction
 of ,vednta and ,tantra1 and as such it 
probably stands as the transition link  
through which the ,yoga  doctrine of the
 stras entered into a new channel in    
such a way  that it could be easily     
assimilated from there by later         
developments  of ,vednta1 ,tantra and   
,s'aiva doctrines ,footnote ref #b4 ,as 
the author  mentions rasyana as a means 
of salvation1 it is very probable  that 
he flourished after ,ngarjuna and was   
probably the same  person who wrote     
,ptajala tantra1 who has been quoted by 
,s'ivadsa in connection with alchemical 
matters and spoken of  by ,nges'a as    
,carake ,patajalih4 ,we can also assume 
with some  degree of probability that it
 is with reference to this man that     
,cakrapani and ,bhoja made the confusion
 of identifying him with  the writer of 
the ,mahbhsya4 ,it is also very probable
 that ,cakrapni  by his line            
ptajalamahbhsyacarakapratisamskrtaih    

refers to this work which was called    
,ptajala4 ,the commentator  of this work
 gives some description of the lokas1   
dvpas and  the sgaras1 which runs       
counter to the descriptions given in the
  ,vysabhsya1 ,,iii4 #bf1 and from this 
we can infer that it was probably       
written at a time when the ,vysabhsya   
was not written  or had not attained any
 great sanctity or authority4 ,alberuni 
,footnote #a3 ,alberuni1 in his account 
of the book of ,smkhya1 gives  a list of
 commandments which practically is the  
same as yama and niyama1  but it is said
 that through them one cannot attain    
salvation4    ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 the    
account of ,ps'upatadars'ana in         
,sarvadas'anasamgraha4    #bcf    also  
described the book as being very famous 
at the time1 and  ,bhoja and ,cakrapni  
also probably confused him with         
,patajali  the grammarian2 from this we 
can fairly assume that this book  of    
,patajali was probably written by some  
other ,patajali within  the first #cjj  

or #djj years of the ,christian era2 and
 it may not  be improbable that when    
,vysabhsya quotes in ,,iii4 #dd as iti  
,patajalih1 he refers to this ,patajali4
    ,the conception of ,yoga as we meet 
it in the ,maitryana  ,upanisad         
consisted of six angas or accessories1  
namely prnyma1  pratyhra1 dhyna1 dharan1
 tarka and samdhi ,footnote ref #a4     
,comparing this list with that of the   
list in the ,yoga stras we find  that   
two new elements have been added1 and   
tarka has been  replaced by sana4 ,now  
from the account of the sixty-two       
heresies given in the ,brahmajla sutta  
we know that there were  people who     
either from meditation of three degrees 
or through  logic and reasoning had come
 to believe that both the external      
world as a whole and individual souls   
were eternal4 ,from the  association of 
this last mentioned logical school with 
the ,samdhi  or ,dhyna school as        
belonging to one class of thinkers      
called  s's'vatavda1 and from the       

inclusion of tarka as an anga in        
samdhi1 we can fairly assume that the   
last of the angas given in  ,maitryan   
,upanisad represents the oldest list of 
the ,yoga doctrine1  when the ,smkhya   
and the ,yoga were in a process of being
  grafted on each other1 and when the   
,samkhya method of discussion  did not  
stand as a method independent of the    
,yoga4 ,the  substitution of sana for   
tarka in the list of ,patajali shows    
that  the ,yoga had developed a method  
separate from the ,samkhya4  ,the       
introduction of ahims 7non-injury71     
satya 7truthfulness71  asteya 7want of  
stealing71 brahmacaryya 7sex-control71  
aparigraha  7want of greed7 as yama and 
s'auca 7purity71 santosa 7contentment7  
as niyama1 as a system of morality      
without which ,yoga is  deemed          
impossible 7for the first time in the   
stras71 probably  marks the period when 
the disputes between the ,hindus and the
  ,buddhists had not become so keen4    
,the introduction of maitr1  karun1     

mudit1 upeks is also equally            
significant1 as we do not  find them    
mentioned in such a prominent form in   
any other  literature of the ,hindus    
dealing with the subject of             
emancipation4  ,beginning from the      
crngastra1 ,uttardhyayanastra1          
,footnote #a3 prnymah pratyhrah dhynam  
dharan tarkah samdhih  sadanga ityucyate
 yoga 7,maitr4 #f #h74    #bcg    the   
,strakrtngastra1 etc41 and passing      
through ,umsvati's  ,tattvrthdhigamastra
 to ,hemacandra's ,yogas'stra we find   
that  the ,jains had been founding their
 ,yoga discipline mainly on the  basis  
of a system of morality indicated by the
 yamas1 and the  opinion expressed in   
,alberuni's ,ptanjal that these cannot  
give  salvation marks the divergence of 
the ,hindus in later days from  the     
,jains4 ,another important              
characteristic of ,yoga is its          
thoroughly pessimistic tone4 ,its       
treatment of sorrow in connection  with 
the statement of the scope and ideal of 

,yoga is the  same as that of the four  
sacred truths of the ,buddhists1 namely 
suffering1 origin of suffering1 the     
removal of suffering1 and of the  path  
to the removal of suffering ,footnote   
ref #a4 ,again1 the metaphysics  of the 
samsra 7rebirth7 cycle in connection    
with sorrow1 origination1  decease1     
rebirth1 etc4 is described with a       
remarkable degree of  similarity with   
the cycle of causes as described in     
early ,buddhism4  ,avidy is placed at   
the head of the group2 yet this avidy   
should  not be confused with the ,vednta
 avidy of ,s'ankara1 as it is an  avidy 
of the ,buddhist type2 it is not a      
cosmic power of illusion  nor anything  
like a mysterious original sin1 but it  
is within the  range of earthly tangible
 reality4 ,yoga avidy is the ignorance  
of the four sacred truths1 as we have in
 the stra  anitys'uciduhkhntmasu        
nityas'uciduhkhtmakhytiravidy 7,,ii4    
#e74    ,the ground of our existing is  
our will to live 7abhinives'a74  ,this  

is our besetting sin that we will to be1
 that we will to be  ourselves1 that we 
fondly will our being to blend with     
other kinds  of existence and extend4   
,the negation of the will to be1 cuts   
off being for us at least ,footnote ref 
#b4 ,this is true as much of  ,buddhism 
as of the ,yoga abhinives'a1 which is a 
term coined and used in  the ,yoga for  
the first time to suit the ,buddhist    
idea1 and which has  never been         
accepted1 so far as ,i know1 in any     
other ,hindu  literature in this sense4 
,my sole aim in pointing out these      
things  in this section is to show that 
the ,yoga stras proper 7first three     
chapters7 were composed at a time when  
the later forms of  ,buddhism had not   
developed1 and when the quarrels between
  the ,hindus and the ,buddhists and    
,jains had not reached such             
,footnote #a3 ,yoga stra1 ,,ii4 #ae1    
#af4 #ag4 ,yathcikitss'stram  caturvyham
 rogo rogahetuh rogyam bhais'ajyamiti   
evamidamapi  s'stram caturvyhameva2     

tadyath samsrah1 samsrahetuh moksah     
moksopyah2 duhkhabahulah samsro heyah1  
pradhnapurusayoh  samyogo heyahetuh1    
samyogasytyantik nivrttirhnam hanopyah  
samyagdarsanam1 ,vysabhsya1 ,,ii4 #ae   
,footnote #b3 ,oldenberg's ,buddhism    
,footnote ref #a4    #bch    a stage    
that they would not like to borrow from 
one another4  ,as this can only be held 
true of earlier ,buddhism ,i am disposed
  to think that the date of the first   
three chapters of the ,yoga  stras must 
be placed about the second century      
,b4,c4 ,since there  is no evidence     
which can stand in the way of           
identifying the  grammarian ,patajali   
with the ,yoga writer1 ,i believe we may
  take them as being identical ,footnote
 ref #a4      ,the ,smkhya and the ,yoga
 ,doctrine of ,soul or ,purusa4    ,the 
,smkhya philosophy as we have it now    
admits two principles1  souls and       
prakrti1 the root principle of matter4  
,souls are  many1 like the ,jaina souls1
 but they are without parts and         

qualities4  ,they do not contract or    
expand according as they occupy a       
smaller or a larger body1 but are always
 all-pervasive1 and are  not contained  
in the bodies in which they are         
manifested4 ,but  the relation between  
body or rather the mind associated with 
it  and soul is such that whatever      
mental phenomena happen in the  mind are
 interpreted as the experience of its   
soul4 ,the souls are  many1 and had it  
not been so 7the ,smkhya argues7 with   
the  birth of one all would have been   
born and with the death of one  all     
would have died ,footnote ref #b4       
,the exact nature of soul is however    
very difficult of comprehension1  and   
yet it is exactly this which one must   
thoroughly  grasp in order to understand
 the ,smkhya philosophy4 ,unlike  the   
,jaina soul possessing anantajna1       
anantadars'ana1 anantasukha1  and       
anantavryya1 the ,smkhya soul is        
described as being  devoid of any and   
every characteristic2 but its nature is 

absolute  pure consciousness 7cit74 ,the
 ,smkhya view differs from  the ,vednta1
 firstly in this that it does not       
consider the soul to  be of the nature  
of pure intelligence and bliss 7nanda7  
,footnote ref  #c4 ,bliss with ,smkhya  
is but another name for pleasure and as 
such it  belongs to prakrti and does not
 constitute the nature of soul2         
secondly1 according to ,vednta the      
individual souls 7,jva7 are             
,footnote #a3 ,see ,s4,n4 ,das ,gupta1  
,yoga ,philosophy in relation to other  
,indian systems of thought1 ch4 ,,ii4   
,the most important point in favour  of 
this identification seems to be that    
both the ,patajalis as against  the     
other ,indian systems admitted the      
doctrine of sphota which was  denied    
even by ,smkhya4 ,on the doctrine of    
,sphota see my ,study  of ,patanjali1   
,appendix ,i4    ,footnote #b3 ,krik1   
#ah4    ,footnote #c3 ,see ,citsukha's  
,tattvapradpik1 ,,iv4    #bci    but    
illusory manifestations of one soul or  

pure consciousness the  ,brahman1 but   
according to ,smkhya they are all real  
and many4    ,the most interesting      
feature of ,smkhya as of ,vednta is  the
 analysis of knowledge4 ,smkhya holds   
that our knowledge  of things are mere  
ideational pictures or images4 ,external
 things  are indeed material1 but the   
sense data and images of the mind1  the 
coming and going of which is called     
knowledge1 are also in  some sense      
matter-stuff1 since they are limited in 
their nature  like the external things4 
,the sense-data and images come and go1 
they are often the prototypes1 or       
photographs of external things1  and as 
such ought to be considered as in some  
sense material1  but the matter of which
 these are composed is the subtlest4    
,these images of the mind could not have
 appeared as conscious1  if there were  
no separate principles of consciousness 
in connection  with which the whole     
conscious plane could be interpreted  as
 the experience of a person ,footnote   

ref #a4 ,we know that the  ,upanisads   
consider the soul or atman as pure and  
infinite  consciousness1 distinct from  
the forms of knowledge1 the ideas1  and 
the images4 ,in our ordinary ways of    
mental analysis we do not  detect that  
beneath the forms of knowledge there is 
some other principle  which has no      
change1 no form1 but which is like a    
light which  illumines the mute1        
pictorial forms which the mind assumes4 
,the self is nothing but this light4 ,we
 all speak of our self  but we have no  
mental picture of the self as we have of
 other  things1 yet in all our knowledge
 we seem to know our self4 ,the  ,jains 
had said that the soul was veiled by    
karma matter1 and  every act of         
knowledge meant only the partial removal
 of the  veil4 ,smkhya says that the    
self cannot be found as an image  of    
knowledge1 but that is because it is a  
distinct1 transcendent  principle1 whose
 real nature as such is behind or beyond
 the subtle  matter of knowledge4 ,our  

cognitions1 so far as they are mere     
forms  or images1 are merely            
compositions or complexes of subtle     
mind-substance1  and thus are like a    
sheet of painted canvas immersed  in    
darkness2 as the canvas gets prints from
 outside and moves1  the pictures appear
 one by one before the light and arc    
illuminated4  ,so it is with our        
knowledge4 ,the special characteristic  
of self is that it is like a light1     
without which all knowledge would  be   
blind4 ,form and motion are the         
characteristics of matter1 and          
,footnote #a3 ,tattakaumud #e2          
,yogavrttika1 ,,iv4 #bb2                
,vijnmrtabhsya1 p4 #gd2 ,yogavrttika and
 ,tattvavais'rad1  ,i4 #d1 ,,ii4 #f1    
#ah1 #bj2 ,vysabhsya1 ,i4 #f1 #g4       
#bdj    so far as knowledge is mere     
limited form and movement it is the     
same as matter2 but there is some other 
principle which enlivens  these         
knowledge-forms1 by virtue of which they
 become conscious4  ,this principle of  

consciousness 7cit7 cannot indeed be    
separately perceived per se1 but the    
presence of this principle in  all our  
forms of knowledge is distinctly        
indicated by inference4  ,this principle
 of consciousness has no motion1 no     
form1 no quality1  no impurity ,footnote
 ref #a4 ,the movement of the           
knowledge-stuff takes  place in relation
 to it1 so that it is illuminated as    
consciousness by it1  and produces the  
appearance of itself as undergoing all  
changes  of knowledge and experiences of
 pleasure and pain4 ,each item  of      
knowledge so far as it is an image or a 
picture of some sort is  but a subtle   
knowledge-stuff which has been illumined
 by the  principle of consciousness1 but
 so far as each item of knowledge       
carries with it the awakening or the    
enlivening of consciousness1  it is the 
manifestation of the principle of       
consciousness4  ,knowledge-revelation is
 not just the unveiling or revelation of
 a  particular part of the self1 as the 

,jains supposed1 but it is a revelation 
of the self only so far as knowledge is 
pure awakening1 pure enlivening1  pure  
consciousness4 ,so far as the content of
 knowledge or the image is  concerned1  
it is not the revelation of self but is 
the blind  knowledge-stuff4    ,the     
,buddhists had analysed knowledge into  
its diverse constituent  parts1 and had 
held that the coming together of these  
brought about the conscious states4     
,this coming together was  to them the  
point of the illusory notion of self1   
since this unity  or coming together was
 not a permanent thing but a momentary  
collocation4 ,with ,smkhya however the  
self1 the pure cit1 is  neither illusory
 nor an abstraction2 it is concrete but 
transcendent4  ,coming into touch with  
it gives unity to all the movements  of 
the knowledge-composites of subtle      
stuff1 which would otherwise  have      
remained aimless and unintelligent4 ,it 
is by coming into  connection with this 
principle of intelligence that they are 

interpreted  as the systematic and      
coherent experience of a person1 and    
may thus be said to be intelligized4    
,intelligizing means the  expression and
 interpretation of the events or the    
happenings of        ,footnote #a3 ,it  
is important to note that ,smkhya has   
two terms to denote  the two aspects    
involved in knowledge1 viz4 the relating
 element of  awareness as such 7cit7 and
 the content 7buddhi7 which is the form 
of the mind-stuff representing the      
sense-data and the image4 ,cognition    
takes place by the reflection of the    
former in the latter4    #bda           
knowledge in connection with a person1  
so as to make them a  system of         
experience4 ,this principle of          
intelligence is called  purusa4 ,there  
is a separate purusa in ,smkhya for each
 individual1  and it is of the nature of
 pure intelligence4 ,the ,vednta  tman  
however is different from the ,smkhya   
purusa in this that  it is one and is of
 the nature of pure intelligence1 pure  

being1  and pure bliss4 ,it alone is the
 reality and by illusory my it  appears 
as many4      ,thought and ,matter4     
,a question naturally arises1 that if   
the knowledge forms are  made up of some
 sort of stuff as the objective forms of
 matter  are1 why then should the purusa
 illuminate it and not external         
material objects4 ,the answer that      
,smkhya gives is that the               
knowledge-complexes are certainly       
different from external objects  in     
this1 that they are far subtler and have
 a preponderance  of a special quality  
of plasticity and translucence 7sattva71
 which  resembles the light of purusa1  
and is thus fit for reflecting and      
absorbing the light of the purusa4 ,the 
two principal characteristics  of       
external gross matter are mass and      
energy4 ,but it  has also the other     
characteristic of allowing itself to be 
photographed  by our mind2 this         
thought-photograph of matter has  again 
the special privilege of being so       

translucent as to be able  to catch the 
reflection of the cit--the              
super-translucent transcendent          
principle of intelligence4 ,the         
fundamental characteristic  of external 
gross matter is its mass2 energy is     
common to  both gross matter and the    
subtle thought-stuff4 ,but mass is  at  
its lowest minimum in thought-stuff1    
whereas the capacity  of translucence1  
or what may be otherwise designated as  
the  intelligence-stuff1 is at its      
highest in thought-stuff4 ,but if the   
gross matter had none of the            
characteristics of translucence that    
thought possesses1 it could not have    
made itself an object of  thought2 for  
thought transforms itself into the      
shape1 colour1  and other               
characteristics of the thing which has  
been made its  object4 ,thought could   
not have copied the matter1 if the      
matter  did not possess some of the     
essential substances of which the  copy 
was made up4 ,but this plastic entity   

7sattva7 which is  so predominant in    
thought is at its lowest limit of       
subordination  in matter4 ,similarly    
mass is not noticed in thought1 but some
  such notions as are associated with   
mass may be discernible in    #bdb      
thought2 thus the images of thought are 
limited1 separate1 have  movement1 and  
have more or less clear cut forms4 ,the 
images  do not extend in space1 but they
 can represent space4 ,the translucent  
and plastic element of thought 7sattva7 
in association with  movement 7rajas7   
would have resulted in a simultaneous   
revelation  of all objects2 it is on    
account of mass or tendency of          
obstruction  7tamas7 that knowledge     
proceeds from image to image and        
discloses  things in a successive       
manner4 ,the buddhi 7thought-stuff7     
holds within it all knowledge immersed  
as it were in utter darkness1  and      
actual knowledge comes before our view  
as though  by the removal of the        
darkness or veil1 by the reflection of  

the  light of the purusa4 ,this         
characteristic of knowledge1 that all   
its  stores are hidden as if lost at any
 moment1 and only one picture  or idea  
comes at a time to the arena of         
revelation1 demonstrates  that in       
knowledge there is a factor of          
obstruction which manifests  itself in  
its full actuality in gross matter as   
mass4 ,thus both  thought and gross     
matter are made up of three elements1 a 
plasticity of intelligence-stuff        
7sattva71 energy-stuff 7rajas71 and     
mass-stuff 7tamas71 or the factor of    
obstruction4 ,of these the last  two are
 predominant in gross matter and the    
first two in thought4      ,feelings1   
the ,ultimate ,substances ,footnote ref 
#a4    ,another question that arises in 
this connection is the position  of     
feeling in such an analysis of thought  
and matter4 ,smkhya  holds that the     
three characteristic constituents that  
we have  analyzed just now are feeling  
substances4 ,feeling is the most        

interesting side of our consciousness4  
,it is in our feelings that  we think of
 our thoughts as being parts of         
ourselves4 ,if we  should analyze any   
percept into the crude and undeveloped  
sensations of which it is composed at   
the first moment of its  appearance1 it 
comes more as a shock than as an image1 
and  we find that it is felt more as a  
feeling mass than as an image4  ,even in
 our ordinary life the elements which   
precede an act of  knowledge are        
probably mere feelings4 ,as we go lower 
down  the scale of evolution the        
automatic actions and relations of      
matter are concomitant with crude       
manifestations of feeling  which never  
rise to the level of knowledge4 ,the    
lower the scale  of evolution the less  
is the keenness of feeling1 till at last
 there  comes a stage where             
matter-complexes do not give rise to    
feeling        ,footnote #a3 ,krik1 #ab1
 with ,gaudpda and ,nryanatrtha4    #bdc
    reactions but to mere physical      

reactions4 ,feelings thus mark  the     
earliest track of consciousness1 whether
 we look at it from the  point of view  
of evolution or of the genesis of       
consciousness in  ordinary life4 ,what  
we call matter complexes become at a    
certain  stage feeling-complexes and    
what we call feeling-complexes at  a    
certain stage of descent sink into mere 
matter-complexes with  matter reaction4 
,the feelings are therefore the         
things-in-themselves1  the ultimate     
substances of which consciousness and   
gross  matter are made up4 ,ordinarily a
 difficulty might be felt in  taking    
feelings to be the ultimate substances  
of which gross  matter and thought are  
made up2 for we are more accustomed  to 
take feelings as being merely           
subjective1 but if we remember  the     
,smkhya analysis1 we find that it holds 
that thought and  matter are but two    
different modifications of certain      
subtle substances  which are in essence 
but three types of feeling entities4    

,the three principal characteristics of 
thought and matter that we  have noticed
 in the preceding section are but the   
manifestations  of three types of       
feeling substances4 ,there is the class 
of feelings  that we call the sorrowful1
 there is another class of feelings that
  we call pleasurable1 and there is     
still another class which is neither    
sorrowful nor pleasurable1 but is one of
 ignorance1 depression  7visda7 or      
dullness4 ,thus corresponding to these  
three types of  manifestations as       
pleasure1 pain1 and dullness1 and       
materially as  shining 7praks'a71 energy
 7pravrtti71 obstruction 7niyama71 there
  are three types of feeling-substances 
which must be regarded as  the ultimate 
things which make up all the diverse    
kinds of gross  matter and thought by   
their varying modifications4      ,the  
,gunas ,footnote ref #a4    ,these three
 types of ultimate subtle entities are  
technically  called guna in ,smkhya     
philosophy4 ,guna in ,sanskrit has three

  meanings1 namely 7#a7 quality1 7#b7   
rope1 7#c7 not primary4 ,these          
entities1 however1 are substances and   
not mere qualities4 ,but it  may be     
mentioned in this connection that in    
,smkhya philosophy  there is no separate
 existence of qualities2 it holds that  
each  and every unit of quality is but a
 unit of substance4 ,what  we call      
quality is but a particular             
manifestation or appearance  of a subtle
 entity4 ,things do not possess quality1
 but quality        ,footnote #a3       
,yogavrttika1 ,,ii4 #ah2 ,bhvganes'a's  
,tattvaythrthyadpana1 pp4 #a-c2         
,vijnmrtabhsya1  p4 #ajj2 ,tattvakaumud1
 #ac2 also ,gaudapda and ,nryanatrtha1  
#ac4    #bdd    signifies merely the    
manner in which a substance reacts2 any 
object we see seems to possess many     
qualities1 but the ,smkhya  holds that  
corresponding to each and every new unit
 of quality1  however fine and subtle it
 may be1 there is a corresponding       
subtle entity1 the reaction of which is 

interpreted by us as a  quality4 ,this  
is true not only of qualities of        
external objects  but also of mental    
qualities as well4 ,these ultimate      
entities  were thus called gunas        
probably to suggest that they are the   
entities which by their various         
modifications manifest themselves  as   
gunas or qualities4 ,these subtle       
entities may also be  called gunas in   
the sense of ropes because they are like
 ropes  by which the soul is chained    
down as if it were to thought and       
matter4 ,these may also be called gunas 
as things of secondary  importance1     
because though permanent and            
indestructible1 they  continually suffer
 modifications and changes by their     
mutual  groupings and re-groupings1 and 
thus not primarily and unalterably      
constant like the souls 7purusa74       
,moreover the object of the  world      
process being the enjoyment and         
salvation of the purusas1  the          
matter-principle could not naturally be 

regarded as being of  primary           
importance4 ,but in whatever senses we  
may be inclined  to justify the name    
guna as applied to these subtle         
entities1 it  should be borne in mind   
that they are substantive entities or   
subtle substances and not abstract      
qualities4 ,these gunas are  infinite in
 number1 but in accordance with their   
three main characteristics  as described
 above they have been arranged in three 
classes or types  called sattva         
7intelligence-stuff71 rajas             
7energy-stuff7 and tamas  7mass-stuff74 
,an infinite number of subtle substances
 which agree in  certain characteristics
 of self-shining or plasticity are      
called the  sattva-gunas and those which
 behave as units of activity are called 
the rajo-gunas and those which behave as
 factors of obstruction1  mass or       
materiality are called tamo-gunas4      
,these subtle guna  substances are      
united in different proportions 7e4g4 a 
larger number  of sattva substances with

 a lesser number of rajas or tamas1 or a
  larger number of tamas substances with
 a smaller number of rajas and  sattva  
substances and so on in varying         
proportions71 and as a result  of this1 
different substances with different     
qualities come into being4  ,though     
attached to one another when united in  
different proportions1  they mutually   
act and react upon one another1 and thus
 by their combined  resultant produce   
new characters1 qualities and           
substances4 ,there is  however    #bde  
one and only one stage in which the     
gunas are not compounded  in varying    
proportions4 ,in this state each of the 
guna  substances is opposed by each of  
the other guna substances1 and  thus by 
their equal mutual opposition create an 
equilibrium1 in  which none of the      
characters of the gunas manifest        
themselves4  ,this is a state which is  
so absolutely devoid of all             
characteristics  that it is absolutely  
incoherent1 indeterminate1 and          

indefinite4 ,it  is a qualitiless simple
 homogeneity4 ,it is a state of being   
which  is as it were non-being4 ,this   
state of the mutual equilibrium  of the 
gunas is called prakrti ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,this is a state which  cannot be   
said either to exist or to non-exist for
 it serves no purpose1  but it is       
hypothetically the mother of all things4
 ,this is however the  earliest stage1  
by the breaking of which1 later on1 all 
modifications  take place4      ,prakrti
 and its ,evolution4    ,smkhya believes
 that before this world came into being 
there  was such a state of              
dissolution--a state in which the guna  
compounds  had disintegrated into a     
state of disunion and had by their      
mutual opposition produced an           
equilibrium the prakrti4 ,then  later on
 disturbance arose in the prakrti1 and  
as a result of that a  process of       
unequal aggregation of the gunas in     
varying proportions  took place1 which  
brought forth the creation of the       

manifold4  ,prakrti1 the state of       
perfect homogeneity and incoherence of  
the  gunas1 thus gradually evolved and  
became more and more determinate1       
differentiated1 heterogeneous1 and      
coherent4 ,the gunas are  always        
uniting1 separating1 and uniting again  
,footnote ref #b4 ,varying  qualities of
 essence1 energy1 and mass in varied    
groupings act on one  another and       
through their mutual interaction and    
interdependence evolve  from the        
indefinite or qualitatively             
indeterminate the definite or           
qualitatively determinate4 ,and though  
co-operating to produce  the world of   
effects1 these diverse moments with     
diverse tendencies  never coalesce4     
,thus in the phenomenal product whatever
 energy  there is is due to the element 
of rajas and rajas alone2 all matter1   
resistance1 stability1 is due to tamas1 
and all conscious manifestation  to     
sattva4 ,the particular guna which      
happens to be predominant  in any       

phenomenon becomes manifest in that     
phenomenon and  others become latent1   
though their presence is inferred by    
their        ,footnote #a3 ,yogavrttika1
 ,,ii4 #ai1 and ,pravacanabhsya1 ,i4    
#fa4    ,footnote #b3 ,kaumud #ac-af2   
,tattvavais'rad ,,ii4 #bj1 ,,iv4 #ac1   
#ad2 also  ,yogavrttika1 ,,iv4 #ac1ad4  
#bdf    effect4 ,thus1 for example1 in a
 body at rest mass is patent1 energy    
latent and potentiality of conscious    
manifestation sublatent4 ,in a  moving  
body1 the rajas is predominant 7kinetic7
 and the mass is  partially overcome4   
,all these transformations of the       
groupings of  the gunas in different    
proportions presuppose the state of     
prakrti  as the starting point4 ,it is  
at this stage that the tendencies to    
conscious manifestation1 as well as the 
powers of doing work1 are  exactly      
counterbalanced by the resistance of    
inertia or mass1  and the process of    
cosmic evolution is at rest4 ,when this 
equilibrium  is once destroyed1 it is   

supposed that out of a natural  affinity
 of all the sattva reals for themselves1
 of rajas reals for other  reals of     
their type1 of tamas reals for others of
 their type1 there  arises an unequal   
aggregation of sattva1 rajas1 or tamas  
at different  moments4 ,when one guna is
 preponderant in any particular         
collocation1 the others are co-operant4 
,this evolutionary series  beginning    
from the first disturbance of the       
prakrti to the final  transformation as 
the world-order1 is subject to a        
definite law  which it cannot overstep4 
,in the words of ,dr ,b4,n4,seal        
,footnote ref #a1  the process of       
evolution consists in the development of
 the differentiated  7vaisamya7 within  
the undifferentiated 7smyvasth7 of the  
determinate 7vies'a7 within the         
indeterminate 7avis'esa7 of the         
coherent 7yutasiddha7 within the        
incoherent 7ayutasiddha74 ,the  order of
 succession is neither from parts to    
whole nor from whole to the  parts1 but 

ever from a relatively less             
differentiated1 less determinate1  less 
coherent whole to a relatively more     
differentiated1  more determinate1 more 
coherent whole4 ,the meaning of such  an
 evolution is this1 that all the changes
 and modifications in  the shape of the 
evolving collocations of guna reals take
 place  within the body of the prakrti4 
,prakrti consisting of the infinite     
reals is infinite1 and that it has been 
disturbed does not  mean that the whole 
of it has been disturbed and upset1 or  
that the totality of the gunas in the   
prakrti has been unhinged  from a state 
of equilibrium4 ,it means rather that a 
very vast  number of gunas constituting 
the worlds of thought and matter  has   
been upset4 ,these gunas once thrown out
 of balance begin to  group themselves  
together first in one form1 then in     
another1 then  in another1 and so on4   
,but such a change in the formation of  
aggregates should not be thought to take
 place in such a way  that the later    

aggregates appear in supersession of the
 former ones1  so that when the former  
comes into being the latter ceases to   
exist4        ,footnote #a3 ,dr ,b4,n4  
,seal's ,positive ,sciences of the      
,ancient ,hindus1  #aiae1 p4#g4    #bdg 
,for the truth is that one stage is     
produced after another2 this  second    
stage is the result of a new aggregation
 of some of the  reals of the first     
stage4 ,this deficiency of the reals of 
the first  stage which had gone forth to
 form the new aggregate as the  second  
stage is made good by a refilling from  
the prakrti4 ,so also1  as the third    
stage of aggregation takes place from   
out of the reals  of the second stage1  
the deficiency of the reals of the      
second stage  is made good by a         
refilling from the first stage and that 
of the  first stage from the prakrti4   
,thus by a succession of refillings the 
process of evolution proceeds1 till we  
come to its last limit1 where  there is 
no real evolution of new substance1 but 

mere chemical  and physical changes of  
qualities in things which had already   
evolved4 ,evolution 7tattvntaraparinma7 
in ,smkhya means the  development of    
categories of existence and not mere    
changes of  qualities of substances     
7physical1 chemical1 biological or      
mental74  ,thus each of the stages of   
evolution remains as a permanent        
category of being1 and offers scope to  
the more and more differentiated  and   
coherent groupings of the succeeding    
stages4 ,thus  it is said that the      
evolutionary process is regarded as a   
differentiation  of new stages as       
integrated in previous stages           
7samsrstaviveka74      ,pralaya and the 
disturbance of the ,prakrti             
,equilibrium4    ,but how or rather why 
prakrti should be disturbed is the most 
knotty point in ,smkhya4 ,it is         
postulated that the prakrti or the      
sum-total of the gunas is so connected  
with the purusas1 and there  is such an 
inherent teleology or blind purpose in  

the lifeless prakrti1  that all its     
evolution and transformations tike place
 for the sake  of the diverse purusas1  
to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and 
sufferance of pain through experiences1 
and finally leading them  to absolute   
freedom or mukti4 ,a return of this     
manifold world  into the quiescent state
 7pralaya7 of prakrti takes place when  
the  karmas of all purusas collectively 
require that there should be  such a    
temporary cessation of all experience4  
,at such a moment  the guna compounds   
are gradually broken1 and there is a    
backward  movement 7pratisacara7 till   
everything is reduced1 to the gunas in  
their elementary disintegrated state    
when their mutual opposition  brings    
about their equilibrium4 ,this          
equilibrium however is not a  mere      
passive state1 but one of utmost        
tension2 there is intense  activity1 but
 the activity here does not lead to the 
generation of  new things and qualities 
7visadrs'a-parinma72 this course of new 

#bdh    production being suspended1 the 
activity here repeats the same  state   
7sadrs'a-parinma7 of equilibrium1 so    
that there is no change  or new         
production4 ,the state of pralaya thus  
is not a suspension  of the teleology or
 purpose of the gunas1 or an absolute   
break of  the course of guna evolution2 
for the state of pralaya1 since it  has 
been generated to fulfil the demands of 
the accumulated  karmas of purusas1 and 
since there is still the activity of the
  gunas in keeping themselves in a state
 of suspended production1  is also a    
stage of the samsra cycle4 ,the state of
 mukti 7liberation7  is of course quite 
different1 for in that stage the        
movement  of the gunas ceases forever   
with reference to the liberated soul4   
,but still the question remains1 what   
breaks the state of equilibrium8  ,the  
,smkhya answer is that it is due to the 
transcendental  7non-mechanical7        
influence of the purusa ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,this  influence of the purusa      

again1 if it means anything1 means that 
there  is inherent in the gunas a       
teleology that all their movements or   
modifications should take place in such 
a way that these may serve the  purposes
 of the purusas4 ,thus when the karmas  
of the purusas had demanded  that there 
should be a suspension of all           
experience1 for a period  there was a   
pralaya4 ,at the end of it1 it is the   
same inherent purpose  of the prakrti   
that wakes it up for the formation of a 
suitable  world for the experiences of  
the purusas by which its quiescent      
state is disturbed4 ,this is but another
 way of looking at the  inherent        
teleology of the prakrti1 which demands 
that a state of  pralaya should cease   
and a state of world-framing activity   
should  begin4 ,since there is a purpose
 in the gunas which brought  them to a  
state of equilibrium1 the state of      
equilibrium also presupposes  that it   
also may be broken up again when the    
purpose  so demands4 ,thus the inherent 

purpose of the prakrti brought  about   
the state of pralaya and then broke it  
up for the creative  work again1 and it 
is this natural change in the prakrti   
that may  be regarded from another point
 of view as the transcendental          
influence of the purusas4      ,mahat   
and ,ahamkra4    ,the first evolute of  
the prakrti is generated by a           
preponderance  of the sattva            
7intelligence-stuff74 ,this is indeed   
the earliest state  from which all the  
rest of the world has sprung forth2 and 
it is a  state in which the stuff of    
sattva predominates4 ,it thus holds     
,footnote #a3 ,the ,yoga answer is of   
course different4 ,it believes that the 
disturbance of the equilibrium of       
prakrti for new creation takes place by 
the will of s'vara 7,god74    #bdi      
within it the minds 7buddhi7 of all     
purusas which were lost in the  prakrti 
during the pralaya4 ,the very first work
 of the evolution  of prakrti to serve  
the purusas is thus manifested by the   

separating  out of the old buddhis or   
minds 7of the purusas7 which hold within
  themselves the old specific ignorance 
7avidy7 inherent in them  with reference
 to each purusa with which any          
particular buddhi  is associated from   
beginningless time before the pralaya4  
,this  state of evolution consisting of 
all the collected minds 7buddhi7  or all
 the purusas is therefore called        
buddhitattva4 ,it is a state  which     
holds or comprehends within it the      
buddhis of all individuals4  ,the       
individual buddhis of individual purusas
 are on one  hand integrated with the   
buddhitattva and on the other associated
  with their specific purusas4 ,when    
some buddhis once begin to  be separated
 from the prakrti1 other buddhi         
evolutions take  place4 ,in other words1
 we are to understand that once the     
transformation  of buddhis is effected  
for the service of the purusas1  all the
 other direct transformations that take 
place from the  prakrti take the same   

line1 i4e4 a preponderance of sattva    
being  once created by the bringing out 
of some buddhis1 other transformations  
of prakrti that follow them have also   
the sattva preponderance1  which thus   
have exactly the same composition as the
  first buddhis4 ,thus the first        
transformation from prakrti becomes     
buddhi-transformation4 ,this stage of   
buddhis may thus be regarded  as the    
most universal stage1 which comprehends 
within it  all the buddhis of           
individuals and potentially all the     
matter of  which the gross world is     
formed4 ,looked at from this point of   
view it has the widest and most         
universal existence comprising  all     
creation1 and is thus called mahat 7the 
great one74 ,it is called  linga 7sign71
 as the other later existences or       
evolutes give us the  ground of         
inferring its existence1 and as such    
must be distinguished  from the prakrti 
which is called alinga1 i4e4 of which no
  linga or characterise may be affirmed4

    ,this mahat-tatva being once        
produced1 further modifications  begin  
to take place in three lines by three   
different kinds of  undulations         
representing the sattva preponderance1  
rajas preponderance  and tama           
preponderance4 ,this state when the     
mahat  is disturbed by the three        
parallel tendencies of a preponderance  
of  tamas1 rajas and sattva's called    
ahamkra1 and the above three  tendencies
 are respectiviy called tmasika ahamkra 
or bhtdi1  rjasika or taijasa ahamra1   
and vaikrika ahamkra4 ,the rjasika      
ahamkra cannot make a new preponderance 
by itself2 it only    #bej    helps     
7sahakri7 the transformations of the    
sattva preponderance  and the tamas     
preponderance4 ,the development of the  
former  preponderance1 as is easy to    
see1 is only the assumption of a more   
and more determinate character of the   
buddhi1 for we remember  that buddhi    
itself has been the resulting           
transformation of a sattva              

preponderance4 ,further development with
 the help of rajas on  the line of      
sattva development could only take place
 when the  buddhi as mind determined    
itself in specific ways4 ,the first     
development of the buddhi on this line  
is called sttvika or vaikrika  ahamkra4 
,this ahamkra represents the development
  in buddhi to produce a                
consciousness-stuff as ,i or rather     
mine1  and must thus be distinguished   
from the first stage as buddhi the      
function of which is a mere             
understanding and general datun as      
thisness4    ,the ego or ahamkra        
7abhimna-dravya7 is the specific        
expression  of the general consciousness
 which takes experience as mine4  ,the  
function of the ego is therefore called 
abhimna 7self-assertion74  ,from this   
again come the five cognitive senses of 
vision1  touch1 smell1 taste1 and       
hearing1 the five cognitive senses of   
speech1  handling1 foot-movement1 the   
ejective sense and the generative       

sense2 the prnas 7bio-motor force7 which
 help both conation and  cognition are  
but aspects of buddhi-movement as life4 
,the individual  ahamkras and senses are
 related to the individual buddhis  by  
the developing sattva determinations    
from which they had come  into being4   
,each buddhi with its own group of      
akamkra 7ego7  and sense-evolutes thus  
forms a microcosm separate from similar 
other buddhis with their associated     
groups4 ,so far therefore as  knowledge 
is subject to sense-influence and the   
ego1 it is different  for each          
individual1 but so far as a general mind
 7krana buddhi7  apart from sense       
knowledge is concerned1 there is a      
community of  all buddhis in the        
buddhitattva4 ,even there however each  
buddhi  is separated from other buddhis 
by its own peculiarly associated        
ignorance 7avidy74 ,the buddhi and its  
sattva evolutes of ahamkra  and the     
senses are so related that though they  
are different  from buddhi in their     

functions1 they are all comprehended in 
the  buddhi1 and mark only its gradual  
differentiations and modes4 ,we  must   
again remember in this connection the   
doctrine of refilling1  for as buddhi   
exhausts its part in giving rise to     
ahamkra1 the deficiency  of buddhi is   
made good by prakrti2 again as ahamkra  
partially exhausts itself in generating 
sense-faculties1 the deficiency    #bea 
is made good by a refilling from the    
buddhi4 ,thus the  change and wastage of
 each of the stadia are always made good
  and kept constant by a constant       
refilling from each higher state  and   
finally from prakrti4      ,the         
,tanmtras and the ,paramnus ,footnote   
ref #a4    ,the other tendency1 namely  
that of tamas1 has to be helped  by the 
liberated rajas of ahamkra1 in order to 
make itself preponderant1  and this     
state in which the tamas succeeds in    
overcoming  the sattva side which was so
 preponderant in the buddhi1  is called 
bhtdi4 ,from this bhtdi with the help of

 rajas are  generated the tanmtras1 the 
immediately preceding causes of the     
gross elements4 ,the bhtdi thus         
represents only the intermediate  stage 
through which the differentiations and  
regroupings of tamas  reals in the mahat
 proceed for the generation of the      
tanmtras4  ,there has been some         
controversy between ,smkhya and ,yoga   
as to whether the tanmtras are generated
 from the mahat or from  ahamkra4 ,the  
situation becomes intelligible if we    
remember that  evolution here does not  
mean coming out or emanation1 but       
increasing  differentiation in          
integration within the evolving whole4  
,thus the regroupings of tamas reals    
marks the differentiation  which takes  
place within the mahat but through its  
stage as  bhtdi4 ,bhtdi is absolutely   
homogeneous and inert1 devoid  of all   
physical and chemical characters except 
quantum or mass4  ,the second stadium   
tanmtra represents subtle matter1       
vibratory1  impingent1 radiant1 instinct

 with potential energy4 ,these          
potentials  arise from the unequal      
aggregation of the original mass-units  
in different proportions and            
collocations with an unequal            
distribution  of the original energy    
7rajas74 ,the tanmtras possess something
  more than quantum of mass and energy2 
they possess  physical characters1 some 
of them penetrability1 others powers of 
impact or pressure1 others radiant heat1
 others again capability of  viscous and
 cohesive attraction ,footnote ref4 #b4 
,in intimate relation with those        
physical characters they also  possess  
the potentials of the energies          
represented by sound1 touch1  colour1   
taste1 and smell2 but1 being subtle     
matter1 they are devoid        ,footnote
 #a3 ,i have accepted in this section   
and in the next many of the             
translations of ,sanskrit terms and     
expressions of ,dr ,seal and am largely 
indebted to him for his illuminating    
exposition of this subject as given  in 

,ray's ,hindu ,chemistry4 ,the credit of
 explaining ,smkhya physics1  in the    
light of the text belongs entirely to   
him4    ,footnote #b3 ,dr ,seal's       
,positive ,sciences of the ,ancient     
,hindus4    #beb    of the peculiar     
forms which these potentials assume in  
particles  of gross matter like the     
atoms and their aggregates4 ,in other   
words1 the potentials lodged in subtle  
matter must undergo peculiar            
transformations by new groupings or     
collocations before they can  act as    
sensory stimuli as gross matter1 though 
in the minutest  particles thereof the  
sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible   
7atndriya  but not anudbhta7 ,footnote  
ref #a4    ,of the tanmatras the s'abda 
or ks'a tanmtra 7the sound-potential7   
is first generated directly from the    
bhtdi4 ,next  comes the spars'a or the  
vyu tanmtra 7touch-potential7 which is  
generated by the union of a unit of     
tamas from bhtdi with the  ks'a tanmtra4
 ,the rpa tanmtra 7colour-potential7 is 

generated  similarly by the accretion of
 a unit of tamas from bhtdi2 the  rasa  
tanmtra 7taste-potential7 or the ap     
tunmtra is also similarly  formed4 ,this
 ap tanmtra again by its union with a   
unit of tamas  from bhtdi produces the  
gndha tanmtra 7smell-potential7 or  the 
ksiti tanmtra ,footnote ref #b4 ,the    
difference of tanmtras or  infra-atomic 
units and atoms 7paramnu7 is this1 that 
the tanmtras  have only the potential   
power of affecting our senses1 which    
must be  grouped and regrouped in a     
particular form to constitute a new     
existence  as atoms before they can have
 the power of affecting our senses4  ,it
 is important in this connection to     
point out that the classification  of   
all gross objects as ksiti1 ap1 tejas1  
marut and vyoman is  not based upon a   
chemical analysis1 but from the points  
of view  of the five senses through     
which knowledge of them could be        
brought home to us4 ,each of our senses 
can only apprehend a  particular quality

 and thus five different ultimate       
substances are  said to exist           
corresponding to the five qualities     
which may be  grasped by the five       
senses4 ,in accordance with the         
existence of  these five elements1 the  
existence of the five potential states  
or  tanmtras was also conceived to exist
 as the ground of the five  gross forms4
    ,the five classes of atoms are      
generated from the tanmtras as  follows3
 the sound-potential1 with accretion of 
rudiment matter  from bhtdi generates   
the ksa-atom4 ,the touch-potentials     
combine  with the vibratory particles   
7sound-potential7 to generate the       
,footnote #a3 ,dr ,seal's ,positive     
,sciences of the ,ancient ,hindus4      
,footnote #b3 ,there were various ways  
in which the genesis of tanmtras and    
atoms were explained in literatures     
other than ,smkhya2 for some account  of
 it see ,dr ,seal's ,positive ,sciences 
of the ,ancient ,hindus4    #bec        
vyu-atom4 ,the light-and-heat potentials

 combine with touch-potentials  and     
sound-potentials to produce the         
tejas-atom4 ,the  taste-potentials      
combine with light-and-heat potentials1 
touch-potentials  and sound-potentials  
to generate the ap-atom and the         
smell-potentials combine with the       
preceding potentials to generate  the   
earth-atom4 ,the ks'a-atom possesses    
penetrability1 the vyu-atom  impact or  
mechanical pressure1 the tejas-atom     
radiant heat  and light1 the ap-atom    
viscous attraction and the earth-atom   
cohesive attraction4 ,the ksa we have   
seen forms the transition  link from the
 bhtdi to the tanmtra and from the      
tanmtra to  the atomic production2 it   
therefore deserves a special notice at  
this stage4 ,smkhya distinguishes       
between a krana-ks'a and  kryks'a4 ,the 
krana-ks'a 7non-atomic and              
all-pervasive7  is the formless         
tamas--the mass in prakrti or bhtdi2 it 
is  indeed all-pervasive1 and is not a  
mere negation1 a mere unoccupiedness    

7varanbhva7 or vacuum ,footnote ref #a4 
,when energy is first  associated with  
this tamas element it gives rise to the 
sound-potential2  the atomic ks'a is the
 result of the integration of the       
original mass-units from bhtdi with this
 sound-potential 7s'abda  tanmtra74     
,such an ks'a-atom is called the        
kryks'a2 it is  formed everywhere and   
held up in the original krana ks'a as   
the medium for the development of vyu   
atoms4 ,being atomic  it occupies       
limited space4    ,the ahamkra and the  
five tanmtras are technically called    
avis'esa or indeterminate1 for further  
determinations or  differentiations of  
them for the formation of newer         
categories of  existence are possible4  
,the eleven senses and the five atoms   
are called  vis'esa1 i4e4 determinate1  
for they cannot further be so determined
  as to form a new category of          
existence4 ,it is thus that the course  
of evolution which started in the       
prakrti reaches its furthest limit  in  

the production of the senses on the one 
side and the atoms  on the other4       
,changes no doubt take place in bodies  
having  atomic constitution1 but these  
changes are changes of quality due  to  
spatial changes in the position of the  
atoms or to the introduction  of new    
atoms and their re-arrangement4 ,but    
these are  not such that a newer        
category of existence could be formed by
  them which was substantially different
 from the combined atoms4               
,footnote #a3 ,dr ,b4,n4 ,seal in       
describing this ks'a says ks'a          
corresponds in some respects to the     
ether of the physicists and  in others  
to what may be called proto-atom        
7protyle74 ,ray's ,history  of ,hindu   
,chemistry1 p4 #hh4    #bed    ,the     
changes that take place in the atomic   
constitution of things  certainly       
deserve to be noticed4 ,but before we go
 on to this1 it  will be better to      
enquire about the principle of causation
 according  to which the ,smkhya-,yoga  

evolution should be comprehended  or    
interpreted4      ,principle of         
,causation and ,conservation of ,energy 
,footnote ref #a4    ,the question is   
raised1 how can the prakrti supply the  
deficiencies  made in its evolutes by   
the formation of other evolutes  from   
them8 ,when from mahat some tanmtras    
have evolved1 or  when from the tanmtras
 some atoms have evolved1 how can the   
deficiency in mahat and the tanmtras be 
made good by the  prakrti8    ,or again1
 what is the principle that guides the  
transformations  that take place in the 
atomic stage when one gross body1 say   
milk1  changes into curd1 and so on8    
,smkhya says that as the total  energy  
remains the same while the world is     
constantly evolving1  cause and effect  
are only more or less evolved forms of  
the same  ultimate ,energy4 ,the sum of 
effects exists in the sum of causes  in 
a potential form4 ,the grouping or      
collocation alone changes1  and this    
brings on the manifestation of the      

latent powers of the  gunas1 but without
 creation of anything new4 ,what is     
called the  7material7 cause is only the
 power which is efficient in the        
production  or rather the vehicle of the
 power4 ,this power is the  unmanifested
 7or potential7 form of the ,energy set 
free 7udbhta-vrtti7  in the effect4 ,but
 the concomitant conditions are         
necessary  to call forth the so-called  
material cause into activity ,footnote  
ref #b4  ,the appearance of an effect   
7such as the manifestation of the figure
  of the statue in the marble block by  
the causal efficiency of the  sculptor's
 art7 is only its passage from          
potentiality to actuality  and the      
concomitant conditions 7sahakri-s'akti7 
or efficient cause  7nimitta-krana1 such
 as the sculptor's art7 is a sort of    
mechanical  help or instrumental help to
 this passage or the transition         
,footnote ref  #c4 ,the refilling from  
prakrti thus means nothing more than    
this1 that  by the inherent teleology of

 the prakrti1 the reals there are so    
collocated as to be transformed into    
mahat as those of the mahat  have been  
collocated to form the bhtdi or the     
tanmtras4        ,footnote #a3          
,vysabhsya and ,yogavrttika1 ,,iv4 #c2  
,tattvavais'rad1  ,,iv4 #c4    ,footnote
 #b3 ,ray1 ,history of ,hindu           
,chemistry1 p4 #gb4    ,footnote #c3    
,ibid4 p4 #gc4    #bee      ,yoga       
however explains this more vividly on   
the basis of  transformation of the     
liberated potential energy4 ,the sum of 
material causes potentially contains the
 energy manifested in the  sum of       
effects4 ,when the effectuating         
condition is added to the  sum of       
material conditions in a given          
collocation1 all that happens  is that a
 stimulus is imparted which removes the 
arrest1 disturbs  the relatively stable 
equilibrium1 and brings on a liberation 
of  energy together with a fresh        
collocation7gunasannives'avis'esa74  ,as
 the owner of an adjacent field in      

transferring water from one  field to   
another of the same or lower level has  
only to remove  the obstructing mud     
barriers1 whereupon the water flows of  
itself  to the other field1 so when the 
efficient or instrumental causes  7such 
as the sculptor's art7 remove the       
barrier inherent in any  collocation    
against its transformation into any     
other collocation1  the energy from that
 collocation flows out in a             
corresponding  manner and determines the
 collocation4 ,thus for example the     
energy which collocated the milk-atoms  
to form milk was in a  state of arrest  
in the milk state4 ,if by heat or other 
causes this  barrier is removed1 the    
energy naturally changes direction in a 
corresponding manner and collocates the 
atoms accordingly for  the formation of 
curd4 ,so also as soon as the barriers  
are removed  from the prakrti1 guided by
 the constant will of s'vara1 the reals 
in equilibrium in the state of prakrti  
leave their state of arrest  and evolve 

themselves into mahat1 etc4      ,change
 as the formation of new collocations4  
,it is easy to see from what we have    
already said that any  collocation of   
atoms forming a thing could not change  
its form1  unless the barrier inherent  
or caused by the formation of the       
present collocation could be removed by 
some other extraneous  instrumental     
cause4 ,all gross things are formed by  
the collocation  of the five atoms of   
ksiti1 ap1 tejas1 marut1 and vyoman4    
,the  difference between one thing and  
another is simply this1 that its        
collocation of atoms or the arrangement 
or grouping of atoms  is different from 
that in another4 ,the formation of a    
collocation  has an inherent barrier    
against any change1 which keeps that    
collocation in a state of equilibrium1  
and it is easy to see that  these       
barriers exist in infinite directions in
 which all the other  infinite objects  
of the world exist4 ,from whichever side
 the barrier  is removed1 the energy    

flows in that direction and helps the   
#bef    formation of a corresponding    
object4 ,provided the suitable barriers 
could be removed1 anything could be     
changed into any other thing4  ,and it  
is believed that the ,yogins can acquire
 the powers by  which they can remove   
any barriers1 and thus make anything out
 of  any other thing4 ,but generally in 
the normal course of events the  line of
 evolution follows a definite law which 
cannot be overstepped                   
7parinmakramaniyama7 or in other words  
there are  some natural barriers which  
cannot be removed1 and thus the         
evolutionary course has to take a path  
to the exclusion of those  lines where  
the barriers could not be removed4 ,thus
 saffron grows  in countries like       
,kashmere and not in ,bengal1 this is   
limitation of  countries 7des'pabandha72
 certain kinds of paddy grow in the     
rainy  season only1 this is limitation  
of season or time 7klpabandha72  deer   
cannot beget men1 this is limitation by 

form 7krpabandha72  curd can come out of
 milk1 this is the limitation of causes 
7nimittpabandha74 ,the evolutionary     
course can thus follow only that  path  
which is not barricaded by any of these 
limitations or natural  obstructions    
,footnote ref #a4    ,change is taking  
place everywhere1 from the smallest and 
least  to the highest4 ,atoms and reals 
are continually vibrating and  changing 
places in any and every object4 ,at each
 moment the  whole universe is          
undergoing change1 and the collocation  
of atoms  at any moment is different    
from what it was at the previous        
moment4 ,when these changes are         
perceivable1 they are perceived  as     
dharmaparinma or changes of dharma or   
quality2 but perceived  or unperceived  
the changes are continually going on4   
,this  change of appearance may be      
viewed from another aspect by  virtue of
 which we may call it present or past1  
and old or new1  and these are          
respectively called the laksanaparinma  

and  avasthparinma4 ,at every moment    
every object of the world is  undergoing
 evolution or change1 change as past1   
present and future1  as new1 old or     
unborn4 ,when any change is in a        
potential state  we call it future1 when
 manifested present1 when it becomes    
sub-latent  again it is said to be past4
 ,thus it is that the potential1        
manifest1 and sub-latent changes of a   
thing are called future1  present and   
past ,footnote ref #b4        ,footnote 
#a3 ,vysabhsya1 ,tattvavais'rad and     
,yogavrttika1 ,,iii4 #ad4    ,footnote  
#b3 ,it is well to note in this         
connection that ,smkhya-yoga does  not  
admit the existence of time as an       
independent entity like the             
,nyya-,vais'esika4 ,time represents the 
order of moments in which the mind      
grasps the phenomenal changes4 ,it is   
hence a construction of the mind        
7buddhi-nirmna74 ,the time required by  
an atom to move its own measure  of     
space is called a moment 7ksana7 or one 

unit of time4 ,vijna  ,bhiksu regards   
one unit movement of the gunas or reals 
as a moment4 ,when  by true wisdom the  
gunas are perceived as they are both the
 illusory  notions of time and space    
vanish4 ,vysabhsya1 ,tattvavais'rad1 and
  ,yogavrttika1 ,,iii4 #eb and ,,iii4   
#ac4    #beg      ,causation as         
,satkryavda 7the theory that the effect 
potentially  exists before it is        
generated by the movement of the cause74
    ,the above consideration brings us  
to an important aspect of  the ,smkhya  
view of causation as satkryavda4 ,smkhya
 holds  that there can be no production 
of a thing previously non-existent2     
causation means the appearance or       
manifestation of a quality due  to      
certain changes of collocations in the  
causes which were already  held in them 
in a potential form4 ,production of     
effect only means  an internal change of
 the arrangement of atoms in the cause1 
and  this exists in it in a potential   
form1 and just a little loosening of    

the barrier which was standing in the   
way of the happening of  such a change  
of arrangement will produce the desired 
new collocation--the  effect4 ,this     
doctrine is called satkryavda1 i4e4     
that the krya or effect is sat or       
existent even before the causal         
operation to produce the effect was     
launched4 ,the oil exists in  the       
sesarnum1 the statue in the stone1 the  
curd in the milk1 ,the  causal operation
 7krakaiypra7 only renders that manifest
  7virbhta7 which was formerly in an    
unmanifested condition  7tirohita7      
,footnote ref #a4    ,the ,buddhists    
also believed in change1 as much as     
,smkhya  did1 but with them there was no
 background to the change2  every change
 was thus absolutely a new one1 and when
 it was  past1 the next moment the      
change was lost absolutely4 ,there  were
 only the passing dharmas or            
manifestations of forms and  qualities1 
but there was no permanent underlying   
dharma or substance4  ,smkhya also holds

 in the continual change of dharmas1    
but it also holds that these dharmas    
represent only the conditions  of the   
permanent reals4 ,the conditions and    
collocations of the reals  change       
constantly1 but the reals themselves are
 unchangeable4  ,the effect according to
 the ,buddhists was non-existent1 it    
came  into being for a moment and was   
lost4 ,on account of this theory  of    
causation and also on account of their  
doctrine of s'nya1 they  were called    
vains'ikas 7nihilists7 by the ,vedntins4
 ,this doctrine  is therefore contrasted
 to ,smkhya doctrine as asatkryavda4    
,footnote #a3 ,tattvakaumud1 #i4    #beh
    ,the jain view holds that both these
 views are relatively true and  that    
from one point of view satkryavda is    
true and from another  asatkryavda4 ,the
 ,smkhya view that the cause is         
continually  transforming itself into   
its effects is technically called       
parinmavda  as against the ,vednta view 
called the vivarttavda3 that  cause     

remains ever the same1 and what we call 
effects are but  illusory impositions of
 mere unreal appearance of name and     
form--mere  ,maya ,footnote ref4 #a4    
,smkhya ,atheism and ,yoga ,theism4     
,granted that the interchange of the    
positions of the infinite  number of    
reals produce all the world and its     
transformations2  whence comes this     
fixed order of the universe1 the fixed  
order of  cause and effect1 the fixed   
order of the so-called barriers which   
prevent the transformation of any cause 
into any effect or the  first           
disturbance of the equilibrium of the   
prakrti8 ,smkhya  denies the existence  
of s'vara 7,god7 or any other exterior  
influence1  and holds that there is an  
inherent tendency in these reals which  
guides all their movements4 ,this       
tendency or teleology demands  that the 
movements of the reals should be in such
 a manner that  they may render some    
service to the souls either in the      
direction  of enjoyment or salvation4   

,it is by the natural course of such a  
tendency that prakrti is disturbed1 and 
the gunas develop on two  lines--on the 
mental plane1 citta or mind comprising  
the sense  faculties1 and on the        
objective plane as material objects2 and
 it is  in fulfilment of the demands of 
this tendency that on the one  hand take
 place subjective experiences as the    
changes of the  buddhi and on the other 
the infinite modes of the changes of    
objective  things4 ,it is this tendency 
to be of service to the purusas         
7purusrthat7 that guides all the        
movements of the reals1 restrains  all  
disorder1 renders the world a fit object
 of experience1 and  finally rouses them
 to turn back from the world and seek to
 attain  liberation from the association
 of prakrti and its gratuitous service1 
which causes us all this trouble of     
samsra4    ,yoga here asks1 how the     
blind tendency of the non-intelligent   
,footnote #a3 ,both the ,vednta and the 
,smkhya theories of causation are       

sometimes loosely called satkryyavda4   
,but correctly speaking as some         
discerning commentators have pointed    
out1 the ,vednta theory of causation    
should be called satkranavda for        
according to it the krana 7cause7  alone
 exists 7sat7 and all kryyas1 7effects7 
are illusory appearances  of the krana2 
but according to ,smkhya the kryya      
exists in  a potential state in the     
krana and is hence always existing and  
real4    #bei    prakrti can bring forth
 this order and harmony of the universe1
  how can it determine what course of   
evolution will be of the best  service  
to the purusas1 how can it remove its   
own barriers and  lend itself to the    
evolutionary process from the state of  
prakrti  equilibrium8 ,how too can this 
blind tendency so regulate the          
evolutionary order that all men must    
suffer pains according to  their bad    
karmas1 and happiness according to their
 good ones8  ,there must be some        
intelligent ,being who should help the  

course  of evolution in such a way that 
this system of order and harmony  may be
 attained4 ,this ,being is s'vara4      
s'vara is a purusa who  had never been  
subject to ignorance1 afflictions1 or   
passions4 ,his  body is of pure sattva  
quality which can never be touched by   
ignorance4 ,he is all knowledge and all 
powerful4 ,he has a permanent  wish that
 those barriers in the course of the    
evolution of  the reals by which the    
evolution of the gunas may best serve   
the  double interest of the purusa's    
experience 7bhoga7 and liberation       
7apavarga7 should be removed4 ,it is    
according to this permanent  will of    
s'vara that the proper barriers are     
removed and the  gunas follow naturally 
an intelligent course of evolution for  
the  service of the best interests of   
the purusas4 s'vara has not created  the
 prakrti2 he only disturbs the          
equilibrium of the prakrti in its       
quiescent state1 and later on helps it  
to follow an intelligent order  by which

 the fruits of karma are properly       
distributed and the order  of the world 
is brought about4 ,this acknowledgement 
of s'vara  in ,yoga and its denial by   
,smkhya marks the main theoretic        
difference between the two according to 
which the ,yoga and  ,smkhya are        
distinguished as ,ses'vara ,smkhya      
7,smkhya with  s'vara7 and ,nirs'vara   
,smkhya 7,atheistic ,smkhya7 ,footnote  
ref #a4      ,buddhi and ,purusa4       
,the question again arises that though  
purusa is pure intelligence1  the gunas 
are non-intelligent subtle substances1  
how  can the latter come into touch with
 the former8 ,moreover1  the purusa is  
pure inactive intelligence without any  
touch of  impurity and what service or  
need can such a purusa have of  the     
gunas8 ,this difficulty is anticipated  
by ,smkhya1 which has  already made room
 for its answer by assuming that one    
class of  the gunas called sattva is    
such that it resembles the purity and   
the intelligence of the purusa to a very

 high degree1 so much so                
,footnote #a3 ,tattvavais'rad1 ,,iv4 #c2
 ,yogavrttika1 ,i4 #bd2 and             
,pravavanabhsya1 ,v4 #a-ab4    #bfj     
that it can reflect the intelligence of 
the purusa1 and thus render  its        
non-intelligent transformations to      
appear as if they were intelligent4     
,thus all our thoughts and other        
emotional or volitional  operations are 
really the non-intelligent              
transformations of the  buddhi or citta 
having a large sattva preponderance2 but
 by virtue  of the reflection of the    
purusa in the buddhi1 these appear as if
  they are intelligent4 ,the self       
7purusa7 according to ,smkhya-,yoga  is 
not directly demonstrated by            
self-consciousness4 ,its  existence is a
 matter of inference on teleological    
grounds and  grounds of moral           
responsibility4 ,the self cannot be     
directly  noticed as being separate from
 the buddhi modifications4 ,through     
beginningless ignorance there is a      

confusion and the changing  states of   
buddhi are regarded as conscious4 ,these
 buddhi changes  are further so         
associated with the reflection of the   
purusa in the  buddhi that they are     
interpreted as the experiences of the   
purusa4  ,this association of the buddhi
 with the reflection of the purusa  in  
the buddhi has such a special fitness   
7yogyat7 that it is interpreted  as the 
experience of the purusa4 ,this         
explanation of  ,vcaspati of the        
situation is objected to by ,vijna      
,bhiksu4  ,vijna ,bhiksu says that the  
association of the buddhi with the      
image of the purusa cannot give us the  
notion of a real person  who undergoes  
the experiences4 ,it is to be supposed  
therefore  that when the buddhi is      
intelligized by the reflection of the   
purusa1  it is then superimposed upon   
the purusa1 and we have the notion  of  
an abiding person who experiences       
,footnote ref #a4 ,whatever may be the  
explanation1 it seems that the union of 

the buddhi with the purusa  is somewhat 
mystical4 ,as a result of this          
reflection of cit on  buddhi and the    
superimposition of the buddhi the purusa
 cannot  realize that the               
transformations of the buddhi are not   
its own4  ,buddhi resembles purusa in   
transparency1 and the purusa fails to   
differentiate itself from the           
modifications of the buddhi1 and as  a  
result of this non-distinction the      
purusa becomes bound down  to the       
buddhi1 always failing to recognize the 
truth that the  buddhi and its          
transformations are wholly alien to it4 
,this non-distinction  of purusa from   
buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi 
is what is meant by avidy               
7non-knowledge7 in ,smkhya1 and is  the 
root of all experience and all misery   
,footnote ref #b4        ,footnote #a3  
,tattvavais'rad and ,yogavrttika1 ,i4   
#d4    ,footnote #b3 ,this indicates the
 nature of the analysis of illusion with
  ,smkhya4 ,it is the non-apprehension  

of the distinction of two things  7e4g4 
the snake and the rope7 that is the     
cause of illusion2 it is  therefore     
called the akhyti 7non-apprehension7    
theory of illusion  which must be       
distinguished from the anyathkhyti      
7misapprehension7  theory of illusion of
 ,yoga which consists in positively     
misapprehending  one 7e4g4 the rope7 for
 the other 7e4g4 snake74 ,yogavrttika1  
,i4 #h4    #bfa      ,yoga holds a      
slightly different view and supposes    
that the  purusa not only fails to      
distinguish the difference between      
itself  and the buddhi but positively   
takes the transformations of  buddhi as 
its own4 ,it is no non-perception of the
 difference  but positively false       
knowledge1 that we take the purusa to be
  that which it is not 7anyathkhyti74   
,it takes the changing1  impure1        
sorrowful1 and objective prakrti or     
buddhi to be the  changeless1 pure1     
happiness-begetting subject4 ,it wrongly
 thinks  buddhi to be the self and      

regards it as pure1 permanent and       
capable of giving us happiness4 ,this is
 the avidy of ,yoga4  ,a buddhi         
associated with a purusa is dominated by
 such an  avidy1 and when birth after   
birth the same buddhi is associated     
with the same purusa1 it cannot easily  
get rid of this avidy4  ,if in the      
meantime pralaya takes place1 the buddhi
 is submerged  in the prakrti1 and the  
avidy also sleeps with it4 ,when at the 
beginning of the next creation the      
individual buddhis associated  with the 
purusas emerge1 the old avidys also     
become manifest  by virtue of it and the
 buddhis associate themselves with the  
purusas to which they were attached     
before the pralaya4 ,thus  proceeds the 
course of samsra4 ,when the avidy of a  
person  is rooted out by the rise of    
true knowledge1 the buddhi fails to     
attach itself to the purusa and is      
forever dissociated from it1 and  this  
is the state of mukti4      ,the        
,cognitive ,process and some            

characteristics of ,citta4    ,it has   
been said that buddhi and the internal  
objects have  evolved in order to giving
 scope to the experience of the purusa4 
,what is the process of this experience8
 ,smkhya 7as explained  by ,vcaspati7   
holds that through the senses the buddhi
 comes  into touch with external        
objects4 ,at the first moment of this   
touch there is an indeterminate         
consciousness in which the particulars  
of the thing cannot be noticed4 ,this is
 called nirvikalpa  pratyaksa           
7indeterminate perception74 ,at the next
 moment by  the function of the samkalpa
 7synthesis7 and vikalpa 7abstraction   
or imagination7 of manas 7mind-organ7   
the thing is perceived in  all its      
determinate character2 the manas        
differentiates1 integrates1  and        
associates the sense-data received      
through the senses1 and    #bfb    thus 
generates the determinate perception1   
which when intelligized  by the purusa  
and associated with it becomes          

interpreted as the  experience of the   
person4 ,the action of the senses1      
ahamkra1  and buddhi1 may take place    
sometimes successively and at other     
times as in cases of sudden fear        
simultaneously4 ,vijna ,bhiksu  differs 
from this view of ,vcaspati1 and denies 
the synthetic  activity of the          
mind-organ 7manas71 and says that the   
buddhi  directly comes into touch with  
the objects through the senses4  ,at the
 first moment of touch the perception is
 indeterminate1  but at the second      
moment it becomes clear and determinate 
,footnote ref #a4  ,it is evident that  
on this view the importance of manas is 
reduced  to a minimum and it is regarded
 as being only the faculty of desire1   
doubt and imagination4    ,buddhi1      
including ahamkra and the senses1 often 
called citta  in ,yoga1 is always       
incessantly suffering changes like the  
flame  of a lamp1 it is made up of a    
large preponderance of the pure  sattva 
substances1 and is constantly moulding  

itself from one content  to another4    
,these images by the dual reflection of 
buddhi  and purusa are constantly       
becoming conscious1 and are being       
interpreted as the experiences of a     
person4 ,the existence of the  purusa is
 to be postulated for explaining the    
illumination of  consciousness and for  
explaining experience and moral         
endeavour4  ,the buddhi is spread all   
over the body1 as it were1 for it is by 
its  functions that the life of the body
 is kept up2 for the ,smkhya  does not  
admit any separate prana vyu 7vital     
breath7 to keep the  body living4 ,what 
are called vyus 7bio-motor force7 in    
,vednta  are but the different modes of 
operation of this category of  buddhi1  
which acts all through the body and by  
its diverse movements  performs the     
life-functions and sense-functions of   
the body4        ,footnote #a3 ,as the  
contact of the buddhi with the external 
objects takes  place through the senses1
 the sense data of colours1 etc41 are   

modified  by the senses if they are     
defective4 ,the spatial qualities of    
things are  however perceived by the    
senses directly1 but the time-order is a
 scheme  of the citta or the buddhi4    
,generally speaking ,yoga holds that the
 external  objects are faithfully copied
 by the buddhi in which they  are       
reflected1 like trees in a lake         
tasmims'ca darpane sphre samasta        
vastudrstayah    imsth pratibimbanti    
sarasiva tatadrumh ,yogavarttika1 ,i4   
#d4    ,the buddhi assumes the form of  
the object which is reflected on it by  
the senses1 or rather the mind flows out
 through the senses to the  external    
objects and assumes their forms3        
indriynyeva pranlik                     
cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya      
tadgola kadvr bhyavastusparaktasya      
cittasyendryasahityenaivrthakarah       
parinmo bhavati ,yogavrttika1 ,i4  ,,vi4
 #g4 ,contrast ,tattvakaumud1 #bg and   
#cj4    #bfc      ,apart from the       
perceptions and the life-functions1     

buddhi1 or  rather citta as ,yoga       
describes it1 contains within it the    
root impressions  7samskras7 and the    
tastes and instincts or tendencies  of  
all past lives 7vsan7 ,footnote ref #a4 
,these samskras are revived  under      
suitable associations4 ,every man had   
had infinite numbers of births  in their
 past lives as man and as some animal4  
,in all these lives the  same citta was 
always following him4 ,the citta has    
thus collected  within itself the       
instincts and tendencies of all those   
different  animal lives4 ,it is knotted 
with these vsans like a net4 ,if a man  
passes into a dog life by rebirth1 the  
vsans of a dog life1 which  the man must
 have had in some of his previous       
infinite number of  births1 are revived1
 and the man's tendencies become like   
those of  a dog4 ,he forgets the        
experiences of his previous life and    
becomes  attached to enjoyment in the   
manner of a dog4 ,it is by the revival  
of the vsan suitable to each particular 

birth that there cannot be  any         
collision such as might have occurred if
 the instincts and  tendencies of a     
previous dog-life were active when any  
one was  born as man4    ,the samskras  
represent the root impressions by which 
any  habit of life that man has lived   
through1 or any pleasure in  which he   
took delight for some time1 or any      
passions which were        ,footnote #a3
 ,the word samskra is used by ,pnini who
 probably preceded  ,buddha in three    
different senses 7#a7 improving a thing 
as distinguished  from generating a new 
quality 7,sata utkarsdhnam samskrah1    
,ks'ila  on ,pnini1 ,,vi4 ii4 #af71 7#b7
 conglomeration or aggregation1 and     
7#c7 adornment 7,pnini1 ,,vi4 i4 #acg1  
#ach74 ,in the ,pitakas the word        
sankhra is used in various senses such  
as constructing1 preparing1  perfecting1
 embellishing1 aggregation1 matter1     
karma1 the skandhas  7collected by      
,childers74 ,in fact sankhra stands for 
almost anything  of which impermanence  

could be predicated4 ,but in spite of so
 many  diversities of meaning ,i venture
 to suggest that the meaning of         
aggregation 7samavya of ,pnini7 is      
prominent4 ,the word samskaroti  is used
 in ,kaustaki1 ,,ii4 #f1 ,chndogya ,,iv4
 xvi4 #b1 #c1 #d1 viii4 #h1 #e1 and     
,brhadranyaka1 ,,vi4 iii4 #a1 in the    
sense of improving4 ,i have not yet     
come across any literary use of the     
second meaning in ,sanskrit4 ,the       
meaning of samskra in ,hindu philosophy 
is altogether different4 ,it means  the 
impressions 7which exist subconsciously 
in the mind7 of the objects             
experienced4 ,all our experiences       
whether cognitive1 emotional or conative
  exist in subconscious states and may  
under suitable conditions be  reproduced
 as memory 7smrti74 ,the word vsan      
7,yoga stra1 ,,iv4 #bd7  seems to be a  
later word4 ,the earlier ,upanissads do 
not mention it and  so far as ,i know it
 is not mentioned in the ,pli pitakas4  
,abhidhnappadpik of ,moggallna mentions 

it1 and it occurs in  the ,muktika      
,upanisad4 ,it comes from the root vas  
to stay4 ,it is  often loosely used in  
the sense of samskra1 and in ,vysabhsya 
they  are identified in ,,iv4 #i4 ,but  
vsan generally refers to the tendencies 
of  past lives most of which lie dormant
 in the mind4 ,only those appear which  
can find scope in this life4 ,but       
samskras are the sub-conscious states   
which are being constantly generated by 
experience4 ,vsans are innate  samskras 
not acquired in this life4 ,see         
,vysabhsya1 ,tattvvais'rad  and         
,yogavrttika1 ,,ii4 #ac4    #bfd        
engrossing to him1 tend to be revived1  
for though these might  not now be      
experienced1 yet the fact that they were
 experienced  before has so moulded and 
given shape to the citta that the  citta
 will try to reproduce them by its own  
nature even without  any such effort on 
our part4 ,to safeguard against the     
revival of  any undesirable idea or     
tendency it is therefore necessary that 

its  roots as already left in the citta 
in the form of samskras should  be      
eradicated completely by the formation  
of the habit of a contrary  tendency1   
which if made sufficiently strong will  
by its own  samskra naturally stop the  
revival of the previous undesirable     
samskras4    ,apart from these the citta
 possesses volitional activity 7cest7   
by which the conative senses are brought
 into relation to their  objects4 ,there
 is also the reserved potent power      
7s'akti7 of citta1  by which it can     
restrain itself and change its courses  
or continue  to persist in any one      
direction4 ,these characteristics are   
involved  in the very essence of citta1 
and form the groundwork of the ,yoga    
method of practice1 which consists in   
steadying a particular state  of mind to
 the exclusion of others4    ,merit or  
demerit 7punya1 ppa7 also is imbedded in
 the citta  as its tendencies1          
regulating the mode of its movements1   
and  giving pleasures and pains in      

accordance with it4      ,sorrow and its
 ,dissolution ,footnote ref #a4         
,smkhya and the ,yoga1 like the         
,buddhists1 hold that all  experience is
 sorrowful4 ,tamas1 we know1 represents 
the pain  substance4 ,as tamas must be  
present in some degree in all           
combinations1  all intellectual         
operations are fraught with some degree 
of painful feeling4 ,moreover even in   
states of temporary pleasure1  we had   
sorrow at the previous moment when we   
had solicited  it1 and we have sorrow   
even when we enjoy it1 for we have the  
fear that we may lose it4 ,the sum total
 of sorrows is thus much  greater than  
the pleasures1 and the pleasures only   
strengthen the  keenness of the sorrow4 
,the wiser the man the greater is his   
capacity of realizing that the world and
 our experiences are all full  of       
sorrow4 ,for unless a man is convinced  
of this great truth that  all is sorrow1
 and that temporary pleasures1 whether  
generated by  ordinary worldly          

experience or by enjoying heavenly      
experiences  through the performance of 
,vedic sacrifices1 are quite unable to  
,footnote #a3 ,tattavais'rad and        
,yogavrttika1 ,,ii4 #ae1 and            
,tattvakaumud1  ,i4    #bfe    eradicate
 the roots of sorrow1 he will not be    
anxious for mukti or  the final         
uprooting of pains4 ,a man must feel    
that all pleasures  lead to sorrow1 and 
that the ordinary ways of removing      
sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot     
remove them ultimately2  he must turn   
his back on the pleasures of the world  
and on the  pleasures of paradise4 ,the 
performances of sacrifices according  to
 the ,vedic rites may indeed give       
happiness1 but as these involve  the    
sacrifice of animals they must involve  
some sins and hence also  some pains4   
,thus the performance of these cannot be
 regarded  as desirable4 ,it is when a  
man ceases from seeking pleasures  that 
he thinks how best he can eradicate the 
roots of sorrow4  ,philosophy shows how 

extensive is sorrow1 why sorrow comes1  
what is the way to uproot it1 and what  
is the state when it is  uprooted4 ,the 
man who has resolved to uproot sorrow   
turns to  philosophy to find out the    
means of doing it4    ,the way of       
eradicating the root of sorrow is thus  
the practical  enquiry of the ,smkhya   
philosophy ,footnote ref #a4 ,all       
experiences are  sorrow4 ,therefore some
 means must be discovered by which all  
experiences  may be shut out for ever4  
,death cannot bring it1 for after  death
 we shall have rebirth4 ,so long as     
citta 7mind7 and purusa  are associated 
with each other1 the sufferings will    
continue4  ,citta must be dissociated   
from purusa4 ,citta or buddhi1 ,smkhya  
says1 is associated with purusa because 
of the non-distinction  of itself from  
buddhi ,footnote ref #b4 ,it is         
necessary therefore that in  buddhi we  
should be able to generate the true     
conception of the  nature of purusa2    
when this true conception of purusa     

arises in  the buddhi it feels itself to
 be different1 and distinct1 from  and  
quite unrelated to purusa1 and thus     
ignorance is destroyed4 ,as  a result of
 that1 buddhi turns its back on purusa  
and can no  longer bind it to its       
experiences1 which are all irrevocably  
connected  with sorrow1 and thus the    
purusa remains in its true  form4 ,this 
according to ,smkhya philosophy is alone
 adequate  to being about the liberation
 of the purusa4 ,prakrti which was      
leading us through cycles of experiences
 from birth to birth1 fulfils  its final
 purpose when this true knowledge arises
 differentiating        ,footnote #a3   
,yoga puts it in a slightly modified    
form4 ,its object is the  cessation of  
the rebirth-process which is so much    
associated with sorrow  duhkhabahlah    
samsrah heyah74    ,footnote #b3 ,the   
word citta is a ,yoga term4 ,it is so   
called because it is  the repository of 
all sub-conscious states4 ,smkhyn       
generally uses1 the  word buddhi4 ,both 

the words mean the same substance1 the  
mind1 but they  emphasize its two       
different functions4 ,buddhi means      
intellection4    #bff    purusa from    
prakrti4 ,this final purpose being      
attained the  prakrti can never again   
bind the purusa with reference to whom  
this right knowledge was generated2 for 
other purusas however  the bondage      
remains as before1 and they continue    
their experiences  from one birth to    
another in an endless cycle4    ,yoga1  
however1 thinks that mere philosophy is 
not sufficient4  ,in order to bring     
about liberation it is not enough that a
 true  knowledge differentiating purusa 
and buddhi should arise1 but it  is     
necessary that all the old habits of    
experience of buddhi1 all  its samskaras
 should be once for all destroyed never 
to be revived  again4 ,at this stage the
 buddhi is transformed into its purest  
state1 reflecting steadily the true     
nature of the purusa4 ,this is  the     
kevala 7oneness7 state of existence     

after which 7all samskras1  all avidy   
being altogether uprooted7 the citta is 
impotent any  longer to hold on to the  
purusa1 and like a stone hurled from a  
mountain top1 gravitates back into the  
prakrti ,footnote ref #a4 ,to  destroy  
the old samskras1 knowledge alone not   
being sufficient1 a  graduated course of
 practice is necessary4 ,this graduated 
practice should  be so arranged that by 
generating the practice of living higher
  and better modes of life1 and         
steadying the mind on its subtler       
states1 the habits of ordinary life may 
be removed4 ,as the yogin  advances he  
has to give up what he had adopted as   
good and  try for that which is still   
better4 ,continuing thus he reaches the 
state when the buddhi is in its ultimate
 perfection and purity4  ,at this stage 
the buddhi assumes the form of the      
purusa1 and  final liberation takes     
place4    ,karmas in ,yoga are divided  
into four classes3 7#a7 s'ukla or  white
 7punya1 those that produce happiness71 

7#b7 krsna or black  7ppa1 those that   
produce sorrow71 7#c7 s'ukla-krsna      
7punya-ppa1  most of our ordinary       
actions are partly virtuous and partly  
vicious  as they involve1 if not        
anything else1 at least the death of    
many  insects71 7#d7 as'uklkrsna 7those 
inner acts of self-abnegation1 and      
meditation which are devoid of any      
fruits as pleasures or pains74  ,all    
external actions involve some sins1 for 
it is difficult to work in the  world   
and avoid taking the lives of insects   
,footnote ref #b4 ,all karmas           
,footnote #a3 ,both ,smkhya and ,yoga   
speak of this emancipated state a       
,kaivalya 7alone-ness71 the former      
because all sorrows have been           
absolutely uprooted1 never to grow up   
again and the latter because at  this   
state purusa remains for ever alone     
without any association  with buddhi1   
see ,smkhya krik1 #fh and ,yoga stras1  
,,iv4 #cd4    ,footnote #b3 ,vysabhsya  
and ,tattvavais'rad1 ,,iv4 #g4    #bfg  

proceed from the five-fold afflictions  
7kles'as71 namely avidy1  asmit1 rga1   
dvesa and abhinives'a4    ,we have      
already noticed what was meant by avidy4
 ,it consists  generally in ascribing   
intelligence to buddhi1 in thinking it  
as permanent and leading to happiness4  
,this false knowledge  while remaining  
in this form further manifests itself in
 the other  four forms of asmit1 etc4   
,asmit means the thinking of worldly    
objects and our experiences as really   
belonging to us--the  sense of mine or  
,i to things that really are the        
qualities or  transformations of the    
gunas4 ,rga means the consequent        
attachment  to pleasures and things4    
,dvesa means aversion or antipathy  to  
unpleasant things4 ,abhinives'a is the  
desire for life or love of  life--the   
will to be4 ,we proceed to work because 
we think our  experiences to be our own1
 our body to be our own1 our family  to 
be our own1 our possessions to be our   
own2 because we are  attached to these2 

because we feel great antipathy against 
any  mischief that might befall them1   
and also because we love our  life and  
always try to preserve it against any   
mischief4 ,these all  proceed1 as is    
easy to see1 from their root avidy1     
which consists  in the false            
identification of buddhi with purusa4   
,these five1  avidy1 asmit1 rga1 dvesa  
and abhinives'a1 permeate our buddhi1   
and lead us to perform karma and to     
suffer4 ,these together  with the       
performed karmas which lie inherent in  
the buddhi as  a particular mode of it  
transmigrate with the buddhi from birth 
to birth1 and it is hard to get rid of  
them ,footnote ref #a4 ,the karma in    
the aspect in which it lies in the      
buddhi as a mode or modification of  it 
is called karms'aya4 7the bed of karma  
for the purusa to lie in74  ,we perform 
a karma actuated by the vicious         
tendencies 7kles'a7 of  the buddhi4 ,the
 karma when thus performed leaves its   
stain or  modification on the buddhi1   

and it is so ordained according to the  
teleology of the prakrti and the removal
 of obstacles in the course  of its     
evolution in accordance with it by the  
permanent will of  s'vara that each     
vicious action brings sufferance and a  
virtuous  one pleasure4    ,the karmas  
performed in the present life will      
generally accumulate1  and when the time
 for giving their fruits comes1 such  a 
life is ordained for the person1 such a 
body is made ready for  him according to
 the evolution of prakrti as shall make 
it possible  for him to suffer or enjoy 
the fruits thereof4 ,the karma of the   
,footnote #a3 ,vysabhsya and            
,tattvavais'rad1 ,,ii4 #c-i4    #bfh    
present life thus determines the        
particular kind of future birth  7as    
this or that animal or man71 the period 
of life 7yus7 and the  painful or       
pleasurable experiences 7bhoga7 destined
 for that life4  ,exceedingly good      
actions and extremely bad actions often 
produce  their effects in this life4 ,it

 may also happen that a man has  done   
certain bad actions1 for the realization
 of the fruits of which  he requires a  
dog-life and good actions for the fruits
 of which  he requires a man-life4 ,in  
such cases the good action may remain   
in abeyance and the man may suffer the  
pains of a dog-life first  and then be  
born again as a man to enjoy the fruits 
of his good  actions4 ,but if we can    
remove ignorance and the other          
afflictions1  all his previous          
unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and
 cannot  again be revived4 ,he has of   
course to suffer the fruits of those    
karmas which have already ripened4 ,this
 is the jvanmukti stage1  when the sage 
has attained true knowledge and is yet  
suffering  mundane life in order to     
experience the karmas that have already 
ripened 7tisthati samskravas't          
cakrabhramivaddhrtas'arrah74            
,citta4    ,the word ,yoga which was    
formerly used in ,vedic literature  in  
the sense of the restraint of the senses

 is used by ,patajali in  his ,yoga stra
 in the sense of the partial or full    
restraint or  steadying of the states of
 citta4 ,some sort of concentration may 
be brought about by violent passions1 as
 when fighting against  a mortal enemy1 
or even by an ignorant attachment or    
instinct4  ,the citta which has the     
concentration of the former type is     
called  ksipta 7wild7 and of the latter 
type pramdha 7ignorant74 ,there  is     
another kind of citta1 as with all      
ordinary people1 in which  concentration
 is only possible for a time1 the mind  
remaining  steady on one thing for a    
short time leaves that off and clings to
  another thing and so on4 ,this is     
called the viksipta 7unsteady7  stage of
 mind 7cittabhmi74 ,as distinguished    
from these there is  an advanced stage  
of citta in which it can concentrate    
steadily on  an object for a long time4 
,this is the ekgra 7one-pointed7 stage4 
,there is a still further advanced stage
 in which the citta processes  are      

absolutely stopped4 ,this happens       
immediately before mukti1  and is called
 the nirodha 7cessation7 state of citta4
 ,the purpose of  ,yoga is to achieve   
the conditions of the last two stages of
 citta4    ,the cittas have five        
processes 7vrtti71 7#a7 pramna ,footnote
 ref #a  7valid        ,footnote #a3    
,smkhya holds that both validity and    
invalidity of any  cognition depend upon
 the cognitive state itself and not on  
correspondence with external facts or   
objects 7svatah prmnyam  svatah         
aprmnyam74 ,the contribution of ,smkhya 
to the doctrine  of inference is not    
definitely known4 ,what little ,vcaspati
 says on the  subject has been borrowed 
from ,vtsyyana such as the prvavat1     
s'esavat  and smnyatodrsta types of     
inference1 and these may better be      
consulted in our chapter on ,nyya or in 
the ,ttparyatk of ,vcaspati4  ,smkhya   
inference was probably from particular  
to particular on the  ground of seven   
kinds of relations according to which   

they had seven kinds  of inference      
mtrnimittasamyogivirodhisahacribhih4    
,svasvmibadhyaghtdyaih smkhynm          
saptadhnum 7,ttparyatk1 p4  #aji74      
,smkhya definition of inference as given
 by ,udyotakara 7,i4,i4 ,v7 is          
sambandhdekasmt                         
pratyaksacchesasiddhiranumnam4    #bfi  
cognitive states such as are generated  
by perception1 inference  and scriptural
 testimony71 7#b7 viparyaya 7false      
knowledge1 illusion1  etc471 7#c7       
vikalpa 7abstraction1 construction and  
different kinds of  imagination71 7#d7  
nidr 7sleep1 is a vacant state of mind1 
in which  tamas tends to predominate71  
7#e7 smrti 7memory74    ,these states of
 mind 7vrtti7 comprise our inner        
experience4  ,when they lead us towards 
smsara into the course of passions  and 
their satisfactions1 they are said to be
 klista 7afflicted or  leading to       
affliction72 when they lead us towards  
liberation1 they  are called aklista    
7unafflicted74 ,to whichever side we go1

 towards  samsara or towards mukti1 we  
have to make use of our states of  mind2
 the states which are bad often         
alternate with good states1  and        
whichever state should tend towards our 
final good 7liberation7  must be        
regarded as good4    ,this draws        
attention to that important             
characteristic of citta1  that it       
sometimes tends towards good 7i4e4      
liberation7 and sometimes  towards bad  
7smsara74 ,it is like a river1 as the   
,vysabhsya  says1 which flows both ways1
 towards sin and towards the  good4 ,the
 teleology of prakrti requires that it  
should produce  in man the smsara as    
well as the liberation tendency4        
,thus in accordance with it in the midst
 of many bad thoughts  and bad habits   
there come good moral will and good     
thoughts1  and in the midst of good     
thoughts and habits come also bad       
thoughts and vicious tendencies4 ,the   
will to be good is therefore  never lost
 in man1 as it is an innate tendency in 

him which is  as strong as his desire to
 enjoy pleasures4 ,this point is rather 
remarkable1 for it gives us the key of  
,yoga ethics and shows  that our desire 
of liberation is not actuated by any    
hedonistic  attraction for happiness or 
even removal of pain1 but by an  innate 
tendency of the mind to follow the path 
of liberation  ,footnote ref #a4        
,removal of pains        ,footnote #a3  
,smkhya however makes the absolute and  
complete destruction  of three kinds of 
sorrows1 dhytmika 7generated internally 
by the  illness of the body or the      
unsatisfied passions of the mind71      
dhibhautika 7generated externally by the
 injuries inflicted by  other men1      
beasts1 etc47 and dhidaivika 7generated 
by the injuries  inflicted by demons and
 ghosts7 the object of all our          
endeavours  7purusrtha74    #bgj    is  
of course the concomitant effect of     
following such a course1 but  still the 
motive to follow this path is a natural 
and irresistible  tendency of the mind4 

,man has power 7s'akti7 stored up in his
  citta1 and he has to use it in such a 
way that this tendency may  gradually   
grow stronger and stronger and          
ultimately uproot the  other4 ,he must  
succeed in this1 since prakrti wants    
liberation for  her final realization   
,footnote ref #a4      ,yoga            
,purificatory ,practices 7,parikarma74  
,the purpose of ,yoga meditation is to  
steady the mind on  the gradually       
advancing stages of thoughts towards    
liberation1  so that vicious tendencies 
may gradually be more and more  weakened
 and at last disappear altogether4 ,but 
before the mind  can be fit for this    
lofty meditation1 it is necessary that  
it should  be purged of ordinary        
impurities4 ,thus the intending yogin   
should practise absolute non-injury to  
all living beings 7ahims71  absolute and
 strict truthfulness 7satya71           
non-stealing 7asteya71  absolute sexual 
restraint 7brahmacarya7 and the         
acceptance of  nothing but that which is

 absolutely necessary 7aparigraha74     
,these are collectively called yama4    
,again side by side with these          
abstinences one must also practise      
external cleanliness by ablutions  and  
inner cleanliness of the mind1          
contentment of mind1 the  habit of      
bearing all privations of heat and cold1
 or keeping the  body unmoved and       
remaining silent in speech 7tapas71 the 
study  of philosophy 7svdhyya7 and      
meditation on s'vara  7s'varapranidhna74
 ,these are collectively called niyamas4
  ,to these are also to be added certain
 other moral disciplines such as        
pratipaksa-bhvan1 maitr1 karun1 mudit   
and upeks4  ,pratipaksa-bhvan means that
 whenever a bad thought 7e4g4 selfish   
motive7 may come one should practise the
 opposite good thought                  
7self-sacrifice72 so that the bad       
thoughts may not find any scope4  ,most 
of our vices are originated by our      
unfriendly relations  with our          
fellow-beings4 ,to remove these the     

practice of mere  abstinence may not be 
sufficient1 and therefore one should    
habituate the mind to keep itself in    
positive good relations with  our       
fellow-beings4 ,the practice of maitr   
means to think of  all beings as        
friends4 ,if we continually habituate   
ourselves to  think this1 we can never  
be displeased with them4 ,so too one    
should practise karun or kindly feeling 
for sufferers1 mudit        ,footnote   
#a3 ,see my ,yoga ,psychology1 ,quest1  
,october1 #aiba4    #bga    or a feeling
 of happiness for the good of all       
beings1 and upeks  or a feeling of      
equanimity and indifference for the     
vices of others4  ,the last one         
indicates that the yogin should not take
 any note  of the vices of vicious men4 
,when the mind becomes disinclined to   
all worldly pleasures  7vairgya7 and to 
all such as are promised in heaven by   
the performances  of ,vedic sacrifices1 
and the mind purged of its dross  and   
made fit for the practice of ,yoga      

meditation1 the yogin may  attain       
liberation by a constant practice       
7abhysa7 attended with  faith1          
confidence 7s'raddh71 strength of       
purpose and execution  7vrya7 arid      
wisdom 7praj7 attained at each advance4 
,the ,yoga ,meditation4    ,when the    
mind has become pure the chances of its 
being  ruffled by external disturbances 
are greatly reduced4 ,at such  a stage  
the yogin takes a firm posture 7sana7   
and fixes his mind  on any object he    
chooses4 ,it is1 however1 preferable    
that he should  fix it on s'vara1 for in
 that case s'vara being pleased removes 
many of the obstacles in his path1 and  
it becomes easier for  him to attain    
success4 ,but of course he makes his own
 choice1  and can choose anything he    
likes for the unifying concentration    
7samdhi7 of his mind4 ,there are four   
states of this unifying  concentration  
namely vitarka1 vicra1 nanda and asmit4 
,of  these vitarka and vicra have each  
two varieties1 savitarka1 nirvitarka1   

savicra1 nirvicra ,footnote ref #a4     
,when the mind concentrates on  objects1
 remembering their names and qualities1 
it is called the savitarka  stage2 when 
on the five tanmtras with a remembrance 
of their  qualities it is called        
savicra1 and when it is one with the    
tanmtras  without any notion of their   
qualities it is called nirvicra4        
,higher than these are the nanda and the
 asmit states4 ,in the  nanda state the 
mind concentrates on the buddhi with its
 functions  of the senses causing       
pleasure4 ,in the asmit stage buddhi    
concentrates on pure substance as       
divested of all modifications4  ,in all 
these stages there are objects on which 
the mind  consciously concentrates1     
these are therefore called the samprajta
  7with knowledge of objects7 types of  
samdhi4 ,next to this comes  the last   
stage of samdhi called the asamprajta or
 nirodha  samdhi1 in which the mind is  
without any object4 ,by remaining       
,footnote #a3 ,vcaspati1 however1 thinks

 that nanda and asmit have also  two    
other varieties1 which is denied by     
,bhiksu4    #bgb    long in this stage  
the old potencies 7samskras7 or         
impressions  due to the continued       
experience of worldly events tending    
towards  the objective world or towards 
any process of experiencing inner       
thinking are destroyed by the production
 of a strong habit of the  nirodha      
state4 ,at this stage dawns the true    
knowledge1 when the  buddhi becomes as  
pure as the purusa1 and after that the  
citta not  being able to bind the purusa
 any longer returns back to prakrti4    
,in order to practise this concentration
 one has to see that  there may be no   
disturbance1 and the yogin should select
 a  quiet place on a hill or in a       
forest4 ,one of the main obstacles  is1 
however1 to be found in our constant    
respiratory action4 ,this  has to be    
stopped by the practice of prnyma4      
,prnyma  consists in taking in breath1  
keeping it for a while and then  giving 

it up4 ,with practice one may retain    
breath steadily for  hours1 days1 months
 and even years4 ,when there is no need 
of taking in breath or giving it out1   
and it can be retained  steady for a    
long time1 one of the main obstacles is 
removed4    ,the process of practising  
concentration is begun by sitting  in a 
steady posture1 holding the breath by   
prnyma1 excluding  all other thoughts1  
and fixing the mind on any object       
7dhran74  ,at first it is difficult to  
fix steadily on any object1 and the same
  thought has to be repeated constantly 
in the mind1 this is called  dhyna4     
,after sufficient practice in dhyna the 
mind attains the  power of making itself
 steady2 at this stage it becomes one   
with its object and there is no change  
or repetition4 ,there is  no            
consciousness of subject1 object or     
thinking1 but the mind  becomes steady  
and one with the object of thought4     
,this is called  samdhi ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,we have already described the six  

stages of  samdhi4 ,as the yogin        
acquires strength in one stage of       
samdhi1 he passes  on to a still higher 
stage and so on4 ,as he progresses      
onwards  he attains miraculous powers   
7vibhti7 and his faith and hope  in the 
practice increase4 ,miraculous powers   
bring with them  many temptations1 but  
the yogin is firm of purpose and even   
though the position of ,indra is offered
 to him he does not relax4  ,his wisdom 
7praj7 also increases at each step4     
,praj knowledge  is as clear as         
perception1 but while perception is     
limited to        ,footnote #a3 ,it     
should be noted that the word samdhi    
cannot properly be  translated either by
 concentration or by meditation4 ,it    
means that  peculiar kind of            
concentration in the ,yoga sense by     
which the mind becomes  one with its    
object and there is no movement of the  
mind into its passing  states4    #bgc  
certain gross things and certain gross  
qualities ,footnote ref #a praj  has no 

such limitations1 penetrating into the  
subtlest things1 the  tanmtras1 the     
gunas1 and perceiving clearly and       
vividly all their  subtle conditions and
 qualities ,footnote ref #b4 ,as the    
potencies  7samskra7 of the praj wisdom 
grow in strength the potencies of       
ordinary knowledge are rooted out1 and  
the yogin continues to remain  always in
 his praj wisdom4 ,it is a peculiarity  
of this praj that  it leads a man       
towards liberation and cannot bind him  
to samsra4  ,the final prajs which lead 
to liberation are of seven kinds1       
namely1 7#a7 ,i have known the world1   
the object of suffering and  misery1 ,i 
have nothing more to know of it4 7#b7   
,the grounds and  roots of samsra have  
been thoroughly uprooted1 nothing more  
of it remains to be uprooted4 7#c7      
,removal has become a fact of  direct   
cognition by inhibitive trance4 7#d7    
,the means of knowledge  in the shape of
 a discrimination of purusa from prakrti
 has been  understood4 ,the other three 

are not psychological but are rather    
metaphysical processes associated with  
the situation4 ,they are  as follows3   
7#e7 ,the double purpose of buddhi      
experience and  emancipation 7bhoga and 
apavarga7 has been realized4 7#f7 ,the  
strong gravitating tendency of the      
disintegrated gunas drives  them into   
prakrti like heavy stones dropped from  
high hill tops4  7#g7 ,the buddhi       
disintegrated into its constituents the 
gunas  become merged in the prakrti and 
remain there for ever4 ,the  purusa     
having passed beyond the bondage of the 
gunas shines  forth in its pure         
intelligence4 ,there is no bliss or     
happiness in  this ,smkhya-,yoga mukti1 
for all feeling belongs to prakrti4 ,it 
is thus a state of pure intelligence4   
,what the ,smkhya tries to  achieve     
through knowledge1 ,yoga achieves       
through the perfected  discipline of the
 will and psychological control of the  
mental states4        ,footnote #a3 ,the
 limitations which baffle perception are

 counted in the  ,krik as follows3      
,extreme remoteness 7e4g4 a lark high up
 in the sky71  extreme proximity 7e4g4  
collyrium inside the eye71 loss of      
sense-organ  7e4g4 a blind man71 want of
 attention1 extreme smallness of the    
object  7e4g4 atoms71 obstruction by    
other intervening objects 7e4g4 by      
walls71 presence of superior lights 7the
 star cannot be seen in daylight71      
being mixed up with other things of its 
own kind 7e4g4 water thrown  into a     
lake74    ,footnote #b3 ,though all     
things are but the modifications of     
gunas yet the  real nature of the gunas 
is never revealed by the sense          
knowledge4 ,what  appears to the senses 
are but illusory characteristics like   
those of magic  7my73      ,gunnm       
paramam rpam na drstipathamrcchati      
,yattu drstipatham prptam tanmyeva      
sutucchakam4      ,vysabhsya1 ,,iv4 #ac4
    ,the real nature of the gunas is    
thus revealed only by praj4    #bgd     
,,chapter ,,viii    ,,the               

,,ny,,ya-,,vais',e,,sika ,,philosophy   
,criticism of ,buddhism and ,smkhya from
 the  ,nyya standpoint4    ,the         
,buddhists had upset all common sense   
convictions of  substance and attribute1
 cause and effect1 and permanence of    
things1 on the ground that all          
collocations are momentary2  each group 
of collocations exhausts itself in      
giving rise to  another group and that  
to another and so on4 ,but if a         
collocation  representing milk generates
 the collocation of curd  it is said to 
be due to a joint action of the elements
 forming  the cause-collocation and the 
modus operandi is unintelligible2  the  
elements composing the cause-collocation
 cannot separately  generate the        
elements composing the                  
effect-collocation1 for on  such a      
supposition it becomes hard to maintain 
the doctrine  of momentariness as the   
individual and separate exercise of     
influence  on the part of the           
cause-elements and their coordination   

and manifestation as effect cannot but  
take more than one moment4  ,the        
supposition that the whole of the       
effect-collocation is the  result of the
 joint action of the elements of        
cause-collocation is  against our       
universal uncontradicted experience that
 specific  elements constituting the    
cause 7e4g4 the whiteness of milk7 are  
the cause of other corresponding        
elements of the effect 7e4g4 the        
whiteness of the curd72 and we could not
 say that the hardness1  blackness1 and 
other properties of the atoms of iron in
 a lump  state should not be regarded as
 the cause of similar qualities in  the 
iron ball1 for this is against the      
testimony of experience4  ,moreover     
there would be no difference between    
material 7updna1  e4g4 clay of the jug71
 instrumental and concomitant causes    
7nimitta  and sahakri1 such as the      
potter1 and the wheel1 the stick etc4 in
  forming the jug71 for the causes      
jointly produce the effect1 and  there  

was no room for distinguishing the      
material and the instrumental  causes1  
as such4    ,again at the very moment in
 which a cause-collocation is  brought  
into being1 it cannot exert its         
influence to produce its    #bge        
effect-collocation4 ,thus after coming  
into being it would take the            
cause-collocation at least another      
moment to exercise its influence  to    
produce the effect4 ,how can the thing  
which is destroyed the  moment after it 
is born produce any effect8 ,the truth  
is that  causal elements remain and when
 they are properly collocated  the      
effect is produced4 ,ordinary experience
 also shows that we  perceive things as 
existing from a past time4 ,the past    
time is  perceived by us as past1 the   
present as present and the future as    
future and things are perceived as      
existing from a past time onwards4      
,the ,smkhya assumption that effects are
 but the actualized  states of the      
potential cause1 and that the causal    

entity holds  within it all the future  
series of effects1 and that thus the    
effect is  already existent even before 
the causal movement for the production  
of the effect1 is also baseless4 ,smkhya
 says that the  oil was already existent
 in the sesamum and not in the stone1   
and  that it is thus that oil can be got
 from sesamum and not from the  stone4  
,the action of the instrumental cause   
with them consists  only in actualizing 
or manifesting what was already existent
 in  a potential form in the cause4     
,this is all nonsense4 ,a lump of  clay 
is called the cause and the jug the     
effect2 of what good is it  to say that 
the jug exists in the clay since with   
clay we can never  carry water8 ,a jug  
is made out of clay1 but clay is not a  
jug4  ,what is meant by saying that the 
jug was unmanifested or was  in a       
potential state before1 and that it has 
now become manifest  or actual8 ,what   
does potential state mean8 ,the         
potential state  of the jug is not the  

same as its actual state2 thus the      
actual state  of the jug must be        
admitted as non-existent before4 ,if it 
is  meant that the jug is made up of the
 same parts 7the atoms7 of  which the   
clay is made up1 of course we admit it1 
but this does  not mean that the jug was
 existent in the atoms of the lump  of  
clay4 ,the potency inherent in the clay 
by virtue of which it  can expose itself
 to the influence of other agents1 such 
as the  potter1 for being transformed   
into a jug is not the same as the       
effect1 the jug4 ,had it been so1 then  
we should rather have said  that the jug
 came out of the jug4 ,the assumption of
 ,smkhya  that the substance and        
attribute have the same reality is also 
against all experience1 for we all      
perceive that movement and  attribute   
belong to substance and not to          
attribute4 ,again  ,smkhya holds a      
preposterous doctrine that buddhi is    
different    #bgf    from intelligence4 
,it is absolutely unmeaning to call     

buddhi  non-intelligent4 ,again what is 
the good of all this fictitious fuss    
that the qualities of buddhi are        
reflected on purusa and then again on   
buddhi4 ,evidently in all our experience
 we find that the soul  7tman7 knows1   
feels and wills1 and it is difficult to 
understand why  ,smkhya does not accept 
this patent fact and declare that       
knowledge1  feeling1 and willing1 all   
belonged to buddhi4 ,then again in      
order to explain experience it brought  
forth a theory of double  reflection4   
,again ,smkhya prakrti is               
non-intelligent1 and where  is the      
guarantee that she 7prakrti7 will not   
bind the wise again  and will emancipate
 him once for all8 ,why did the purusa  
become  bound down8 ,prakrti is being   
utilized for enjoyment by  the infinite 
number of purusas1 and she is no        
delicate girl 7as  ,smkhya supposes7 who
 will leave the presence of the purusa  
ashamed as soon as her real nature is   
discovered4 ,again pleasure  7sukha71   

sorrow 7duhkha7 and a blinding feeling  
through ignorance  7moha7 are but the   
feeling-experiences of the soul1 and    
with what  impudence could ,smkhya think
 of these as material substances8       
,again their cosmology of a mahat1      
ahamkra1 the tanmtras1  is all a series 
of assumptions never testified by       
experience nor  by reason4 ,they are all
 a series of hopeless and foolish       
blunders4  ,the phenomena of experience 
thus call for a new careful             
reconstruction  in the light of reason  
and experience such as cannot be found  
in other  systems4 7,see ,nyyamajar1 pp4
 #deb-dff and #dij-dif47      ,nyya and 
,vais'esika stras4    ,it is very       
probable that the earliest beginnings of
 ,nyya are  to be found in the          
disputations and debates amongst        
scholars  trying to find out the right  
meanings of the ,vedic texts for use  in
 sacrifices and also in those           
disputations which took place between   
the adherents of different schools of   

thought trying to  defeat one another4  
,i suppose that such disputations       
occurred in  the days of the ,upanisads1
 and the art of disputation was regarded
  even then as a subject of study1 and  
it probably passed then by  the name    
vkovkya4 ,mr ,bodas has pointed out that
 pastamba  who according to ,bhler lived
 before the third century ,b4,c4 used   
the  word ,nyya in the sense of ,mmms   
,footnote ref #a4 ,the word ,nyya       
derived        ,footnote #a pastamba1   
trans4 by ,bhler1 ,introduction1 p4     
,,xxvii41 and  ,bodas's article on the  
,historical ,survey of ,indian ,logic in
 the ,bombay  ,branch of ,j4,r4,a4,s41  
vol4 ,,xix4    #bgg    from the root n  
is sometimes explained as that by which 
sentences  and words could be           
interpreted as having one particular    
meaning  and not another1 and on the    
strength of this even ,vedic accents of 
words 7which indicate the meaning of    
compound words by pointing  out the     
particular kind of compound in which the

 words entered  into combination7 were  
called ,nyya ,footnote ref #a4 ,prof4   
,jacobi on the  strength of ,kautilya's 
enumeration of the vidy 7sciences7 as   
nvksik  7the science of testing the     
perceptual and scriptural knowledge  by 
further scrutiny71 tray 7the three      
,vedas71 vrtt 7the sciences  of         
agriculture1 cattle keeping etc471 and  
dandanti 7polity71 and the  enumeration 
of the philosophies as ,smkhya1 ,yoga1  
,lokyata  and nvksik1 supposes that the 
,nyya stra was not in existence  in     
,kautilya's time #cjj ,b4,c47 ,footnote 
ref #b4 ,kautilya's reference to  ,nyya 
as nvksik only suggests that the word   
,nyya was not a familiar  name for      
nvksik in ,kautilya's time4 ,he seems to
 misunderstand  ,vtsyyana in thinking   
that ,vtsyyana distinguishes ,nyya  from
 the nvksik in holding that while the   
latter only means  the science of logic 
the former means logic as well as       
metaphysics4  ,what appears from        
,vtsyyana's statement in ,nyya stra     

,i4i4 #a  is this that he points out    
that the science which was known in his 
time as ,nyya was the same as was       
referred to as nvksik by  ,kautilya4 ,he
 distinctly identifies ,nyyavidy with   
nvksik1  but justifies the separate     
enumeration of certain logical          
categories  such as sams'aya 7doubt7    
etc41 though these were already         
contained  within the first two terms   
pramna 7means of cognition7 and  prameya
 7objects of cognition71 by holding that
 unless these its  special and separate 
branches 7prthakprasthna7 were treated1 
,nyyavidy would simply become           
metaphysics 7adhytmavidy7  like the     
,upanisads4 ,the old meaning of ,nyya as
 the means of determining  the right    
meaning or the right thing is also      
agreed upon  by ,vtsyyana and is        
sanctioned by ,vcaspati in his          
,nyyavrttikattparyatk ,i4i4 #a74 ,he    
compares the meaning of the  word ,nyya 
7pramnairarthaparksanam--to scrutinize  
an object by  means of logical proof7   

with the etymological meaning of the    
word  nvksik 7to scrutinize anything    
after it has been known by perception   
and scriptures74 ,vtsyyana of course    
points out that so far as  this logical 
side of ,nyya is concerned it has the   
widest scope for        ,footnote #a3   
,klidsa's ,kumrasambhava ,udghto        
pranavaysm  nyyaistribhirudranam1 also  
,mallintha's gloss on it4    ,footnote  
#b3 ,prof4 ,jacobi's ,the early history 
of ,indian ,philosophy1  ,indian        
,antiquary1 #aiah4    #bgh    itself as 
it includes all beings1 all their       
actions1 and all the sciences  ,footnote
 ref #a4 ,he quotes ,kautilya to show   
that in this capacity ,nyya  is like    
light illumining all sciences and is the
 means of all works4 ,in its  capacity  
as dealing with the truths of           
metaphysics it may show the  way to     
salvation4 ,i do not dispute ,prof4     
,jacobi's main point that  the          
metaphysical portion of the work was a  
later addition1 for this  seems to me to

 be a very probable view4 ,in fact      
,vtsyyana himself  designates the       
logical portion as a prthakprasthna     
7separate  branch74 ,but ,i do not find 
that any statement of ,vtsyyana or      
,kautilya can justify us in concluding  
that this addition was made  after      
,kautilya4 ,vtsyyana has no doubt put   
more stress on the  importance of the   
logical side of the work1 but the reason
 of that  seems to be quite obvious1 for
 the importance of metaphysics or       
adhytmavidy was acknowledged by all4    
,but the importance of  the mere logical
 side would not appeal to most people4  
,none of  the dharmas'stras 7religious  
scriptures7 or the ,vedas would lend    
any support to it1 and ,vtsyyana had to 
seek the support of  ,kautilya in the   
matter as the last resource4 ,the fact  
that ,kautilya  was not satisfied by    
counting nvksik as one of the four      
vidys but also named it as one of the   
philosophies side by side  with ,smkhya 
seems to lead to the presumption that   

probably  even in ,kautilya's time ,nyya
 was composed of two branches1  one as  
adhytmavidy and another as a science of 
logic or rather  of debate4 ,this       
combination is on the face of it loose  
and external1  and it is not improbable 
that the metaphysical portion was added 
to increase the popularity of the       
logical part1 which by itself might  not
 attract sufficient attention4          
,mahmahopdhyya ,haraprasda  ,s'str in an
 article in the ,journal of the ,bengal 
,asiatic ,society  #aije says that as   
,vcaspati made two attempts to collect  
the  ,nyya stras1 one as ,nyyasci and   
the other as ,nyyastroddhra1  it seems  
that even in ,vcaspati's time he was not
 certain as to  the authenticity of many
 of the ,nyya stras4 ,he further points 
out that there are unmistakable signs   
that many of the stras  were            
interpolated1 and relates the ,buddhist 
tradition from ,china  and ,japan that  
,mirok mingled ,nyya and ,yoga4 ,he also
        ,footnote #a3 ,yena prayuktah   

pravarttate tat prayojanam 7that by     
which  one is led to act is called      
prayojanam72 yamartham abhpsan jihsan  v
 karma rabhate tennena sarve prninah    
sarvni karmni sarvs'ca  vidyh vypth     
tads'rays'ca nyyah pravarttate 7all     
those which  one tries to have or to fly
 from are called prayojana1 therefore   
all  beings1 all their actions1 and all 
sciences1 are included within prayojana1
  and all these depend on ,nyya74       
,vtsyyana bhs'ya1 ,i4i4 #a4    #bgi     
thinks that the stras underwent two     
additions1 one at the hands  of some    
,buddhists and another at the hands of  
some ,hindu who  put in ,hindu arguments
 against the ,buddhist ones4 ,these     
suggestions of this learned scholar seem
 to be very probable1 but  we have no   
clue by which we can ascertain the time 
when such  additions were made4 ,the    
fact that there are unmistakable proofs 
of the interpolation of many of the     
stras makes the fixing of  the date of  
the original part of the ,nyya stras    

still more difficult1  for the ,buddhist
 references can hardly be of any help1  
and  ,prof4 ,jacobi's attempt to fix the
 date of the ,nyya stras on the  basis  
of references to ,s'nyavda naturally    
loses its value1 except  on the         
supposition that all references to      
,s'nyavda must be later  than ,ngrjuna1 
which is not correct1 since the ,mahyna 
stras  written before ,ngrjuna also held
 the ,s'nyavda doctrine4    ,the late   
,dr ,s4,c4 ,vidybhsana in ,j4,r4,a4,s4  
#aiah thinks  that the earlier part of  
,nyya was written by ,gautama about     
#eej ,b4,c4 whereas the ,nyya stras of  
,aksapda were written  about #aej ,a4,d4
 and says that the use of the word ,nyya
 in the  sense of logic in ,mahbhrata   
,i4,i4 #fg1 ,i4 #gj4 #db-ea1 must be    
regarded as interpolations4 ,he1        
however1 does not give any  reasons in  
support of his assumption4 ,it appears  
from his treatment  of the subject that 
the fixing of the date of ,aksapda was  
made  to fit in somehow with his idea   

that ,aksapda wrote his ,nyya  stras    
under the influence of ,aristotle--a    
supposition which does  not require     
serious refutation1 at least so far as  
,dr ,vidybhsana  has proved it4 ,thus   
after all this discussion we have not   
advanced  a step towards the            
ascertainment of the date of the        
original part  of the ,nyya4 ,goldstcker
 says that both ,patajali 7#adj ,b4,c47 
and ,ktyyana 7fourth century ,b4,c47    
knew the ,nyya stras ,footnote ref  #a4 
,we know that ,kautilya knew the ,nyya  
in some form as nvksik  in #cjj ,b4,c41 
and on the strength of this we may      
venture to say  that the ,nyya existed  
in some form as early as the fourth     
century ,b4,c4 ,but there are other     
reasons which lead me to think  that at 
least some of the present stras were    
written some time  in the second century
 ,a4,d4 ,bodas points out that          
,bdaryana's  stras make allusions to the
 ,vais'esika doctrines and not to ,nyya4
  ,on this ground he thinks that        

,vais'esika stras were written before   
,bdaryana's ,brahma-stras1 whereas the  
,nyya stras were  written later4        
,candraknta ,tarklamkra also contends in
 his        ,footnote #a3 ,goldstcker's 
,pnini1 p4 #aeg4    #bhj    edition of  
,vais'esika that the ,vais'esika stras  
were earlier than the  ,nyya4 ,it seems 
to me to be perfectly certain that the  
,vais'esika  stras were written before  
,caraka 7#hj ,a4,d472 for he not only   
quotes  one of the ,vais'esika stras1   
but the whole foundation of his medical 
physics is based on the ,vaisesika      
physics ,footnote ref #a4 ,the          
,lankvatra stra 7which as it was quoted 
by ,as'vaghosa is earlier  than #hj     
,a4,d47 also makes allusions to the     
atomic doctrine4 ,there are  other      
weightier grounds1 as we shall see later
 on1 for supposing  that the ,vais'esika
 stras are probably pre-,buddhistic     
,footnote ref #b4    ,it is certain that
 even the logical part of the present   
,nyya  stras was preceded by previous   

speculations on the subject by  thinkers
 of other schools4 ,thus in commenting  
on ,i4i4 #cb in which  the stra states  
that a syllogism consists of five       
premisses 7avayava7  ,vtsyyana says that
 this stra was written to refute the    
views  of those who held that there     
should be ten premisses ,footnote ref   
#c4 ,the  ,vais'esika stras also give us
 some of the earliest types of          
inference1  which do not show any       
acquaintance with the technic of the    
,nyya  doctrine of inference ,footnote  
ref #d4      ,does ,vais'esika represent
 an ,old ,school of ,mmms8    ,the      
,vais'esika is so much associated with  
,nyya by tradition  that it seems at    
first sight quite unlikely that it could
 be supposed  to represent an old school
 of ,mmms1 older than that represented  
in the ,mmms stras4 ,but a closer       
inspection of the ,vais'esika  stras    
seems to confirm such a supposition in a
 very remarkable  way4 ,we have seen in 
the previous section that ,caraka quotes

  a ,vais'esika stra4 ,an examination of
 ,caraka's ,strasthna 7,i4#ce-ch7       
leaves us convinced that the writer of  
the verses had some  compendium of      
,vais'esika such as that of the         
,bhspariccheda  before him4 ,caraka stra
 or krik 7,i4i4 #cf7 says that the gunas
  are those which have been enumerated  
such as heaviness1 etc41  cognition1 and
 those which begin with the guna para   
7universality7  and end with prayatna   
7effort7 together with the              
sense-qualities  7srth74 ,it seems that 
this is a reference to some well-known  
enumeration4 ,but this enumeration is   
not to be found  in the ,vais'esika stra
 7,i4i4 #f7 which leaves out the six    
gunas1        ,footnote #a3 ,caraka1    
,s'rra1 #ci4    ,footnote #b3 ,see the  
next section4    ,footnote #c3          
,vtsyyana's ,bhsya on the ,nyya stras1  
,i4i4#cb4 ,this is  undoubtedly a       
reference to the ,jaina view as found in
  ,das'avaiklikaniryukti as noted       
before4    ,footnote #d3 ,nyya stra     

,i4i4 #e1 and ,vais'esika stras ,,ix4   
ii4 #a-b1  #d-e1 and ,,iii4 i4 #h-ag4   
#bha    heaviness 7gurutva71 liquidity  
7dravatva71 oiliness7sneha71  elasticity
 7samskra71 merit 7dharma7 and demerit  
7adharma72  in one part of the stra the 
enumeration begins with para            
7universality7 and ends in prayatna1 but
 buddhi 7cognition7  comes within the   
enumeration beginning from para and     
ending in  prayatna1 whereas in ,caraka 
buddhi does not form part of the list   
and is separately enumerated4 ,this     
leads me to suppose that ,caraka's  stra
 was written at a time when the six     
gunas left out in the  ,vais'esika      
enumeration had come to be counted as   
gunas1 and  compendiums had been made in
 which these were enumerated4           
,bhspariccheda 7a later ,vais'esika     
compendium71 is a compilation  from some
 very old kriks which are referred to by
 ,vis'vantha  as being collected from   
atisamksiptacirantanoktibhih--7from     
very ancient aphorisms ,footnote ref    

#a72 ,caraka's definition of smnya  and 
vis'esa shows that they had not then    
been counted as separate  categories as 
in later ,nyya-,vais'esika doctrines2   
but though  slightly different it is    
quite in keeping with the sort of       
definition  one finds in the ,vais'esika
 stra that smnya 7generality7 and       
vi'sesa are relative to each other      
,footnote ref #b4 ,caraka's stras were  
therefore probably written at a time    
when the ,vais'esika doctrines were     
undergoing changes1 and well-known      
compendiums were beginning  to be       
written on them4    ,the ,vais'esika    
stras seem to be ignorant of the        
,buddhist  doctrines4 ,in their         
discussions on the existence of soul1   
there is  no reference to any view as to
 non-existence of soul1 but the         
argument turned on the point as to      
whether the self is to be an  object of 
inference or revealed to us by our      
notion of ,i4 ,there  is also no other  
reference to any other systems except to

 some  ,mmms doctrines and occasionally 
to ,smkhya4 ,there is no  reason to     
suppose that the ,mmms doctrines        
referred to allude  to the ,mmms stras  
of ,jaimini4 ,the manner in which the   
nature of inference has been treated    
shows that the ,nyya  phraseology of    
prvavat and s'esavat was not known4     
,vais'esika  stras in more than one     
place refer to time as the ultimate     
cause ,footnote ref #c4 ,we know that   
the ,s'vets'vatara ,upanisad refers to  
those who regard time as the cause of   
all things1 but in none of the          
,footnote #a3 ,professor ,vanaml        
,vedntatrtha's article in ,j4,a4,s4,b41 
#aijh4    ,footnote #b3 ,caraka 7,i4i4  
#cc7 says that smnya is that which      
produces  unity and vis'esa is that     
which separates4 ,v4,s4 ,,ii4 ii4 #g4   
,smnya and  vis'esa depend upon our mode
 of thinking 7as united or as separate74
    ,footnote #c3 ,vais'esika stra      
7,,ii4 ii4 #i and ,v4 ii4 #bf74    #bhb 
systems that we have can we trace any   

upholding of this ancient  view         
,footnote ref #a4 ,these considerations 
as well as the general style of  the    
work and the methods of discussion lead 
me to think that these  stras are       
probably the oldest that we have and in 
all probability  are pre-,buddhistic4   
,the ,vais'esika stra begins with the   
statement that its object  is to explain
 virtue1 dharma ,this is we know the    
manifest duty  of ,mmms and we know that
 unlike any other system ,jaimini       
begins his ,mmms stras by defining      
dharma4 ,this at first  seems irrelevant
 to the main purpose of ,vais'esika1    
viz1 the description  of the nature of  
padartha ,footnote ref #b4 ,he then     
defines dharma as  that which gives     
prosperity and ultimate good            
7nihsreyasa7 and  says that the ,veda   
must be regarded as valid1 since it can 
dictate  this4 ,he ends his book with   
the remarks that those injunctions  7of 
,vedic deeds7 which are performed for   
ordinary human motives  bestow          

prosperity even though their efficacy is
 not known to us  through our ordinary  
experience1 and in this matter the ,veda
 must  be regarded as the authority     
which dictates those acts ,footnote ref 
#c4  ,the fact that the ,vais'esika     
begins with a promise to describe dharma
  and after describing the nature of    
substances1 qualities and actions  and  
also the adrsta 7unknown virtue7 due to 
dharma 7merit  accruing from the        
performance of ,vedic deeds7 by which   
many  of our unexplained experiences may
 be explained1 ends his book  by saying 
that those ,vedic works which are not   
seen to produce  any direct effect1 will
 produce prosperity through adrsta1     
shows  that ,kanda's method of          
explaining dharma has been by showing   
that physical phenomena involving       
substances1 qualities1 and  actions can 
only be explained up to a certain extent
 while a  good number cannot be         
explained at all except on the          
assumption  of adrsta 7unseen virtue7   

produced by dharma4 ,the                
,footnote #a3 ,s'vets'vatara ,i4i4#b    
,footnote #b3 ,i remember a verse quoted
 in an old commentary of the ,kalpa     
,vykarana1 in which it is said that the 
description of the six categories  by   
,kanda in his ,vais'esika stras1 after  
having proposed to describe  the nature 
of dharma1 is as irrelevant as to       
proceed towards the sea while  intending
 to go to the mountain ,himavat         
7,himlaya74    ,dnarmam vykhytukmasya   
satpadrthopavarnanam ,himavadgantukmasya
  sgaragamanopamam4    ,footnote #c3    
,the sutra ,tadvacand mnyasya prmnyam   
7,i4i4#c and  ,x4ii4#i7 has been        
explained by ,upaskra as meaning ,the   
,veda being the  word of s'vara 7,god7  
must be regarded as valid1 but since    
there is no  mention of s'vara anywhere 
in the text this is simply reading the  
later  ,nyya ideas into the ,vais'esika4
 ,stra ,x4ii4#h is only a repetition of 
,,vi4ii4#a4    #bhc    description of   
the categories of substance is not      

irrelevant1 but  is the means of proving
 that our ordinary experience of these  
cannot explain many facts which are only
 to be explained on  the supposition of 
adrsta proceeding out of the performance
  of ,vedic deeds4 ,in ,v4i4 #ae the    
movement of needles towards  magnets1 in
 ,v4 ii4 #g the circulation of water in 
plant bodies1  ,v4 ii4 #ac and ,,iv4 ii4
 #g the upward motion of fire1 the side 
motion  of air1 the combining movement  
of atoms 7by which all combinations     
have taken place71 and the original     
movement of the  mind are said to be due
 to adrsta4 ,in ,v4 ii4 #ag the movement
  of the soul after death1 its taking   
hold of other bodies1 the  assimilation 
of food and drink and other kinds of    
contact 7the  movement and development  
of the foetus as enumerated in          
,upaskara7 are said to be due to adrsta4
 ,salvation 7moksa7 is  said to be      
produced by the annihilation of adrsta  
leading to the  annihilation of all     
contacts and non production of rebirths 

,vais'esika marks the distinction       
between the drsta 7experienced7  and the
 adrsta4 ,all the categories that he    
describes are founded  on drsta         
7experience7 and those unexplained by   
known experience  are due to adrsta     
,these are the acts on which depend all 
life-process of animals and plants1 the 
continuation of atoms or  the           
construction of the worlds1 natural     
motion of fire and air1  death and      
rebirth 7,,vi4 ii4 #ae7 and even the    
physical phenomena  by which our        
fortunes are affected in some way or    
other 7,v4 ii4 #b71  in fact all with   
which we are vitally interested in      
philosophy4  ,kanda's philosophy gives  
only some facts of experience regarding 
substances1 qualities and actions1      
leaving all the graver issues of        
metaphysics to adrsta ,but what leads to
 adrsta8 ,in answer to  this1 ,kanda    
does not speak of good or bad or        
virtuous or  sinful deeds1 but of ,vedic
 works1 such as holy ablutions 7snana71 

fasting1 holy student life              
7brahmacarya71 remaining at the house   
of the teacher 7gurukulavasa71 retired  
forest life 7vanaprastha71  sacrifice   
7yaja71 gifts 7dana71 certain kinds of  
sacrificial  sprinkling and rules of    
performing sacrificial works according  
to the  prescribed time of the stars1   
the prescribed hymns 7mantras7  7,,vi4  
ii4 #b74    ,he described what is pure  
and what is impure food1 pure  food     
being that which is sacrificially       
purified 7,,vi4 ii4 #e7 the contrary    
being impure1 and he says that the      
taking of pure food  leads to prosperity
 through adrsta4 ,he also described how 
#bhd    feelings of attachment to things
 are also generated by adrsta4          
,throughout almost the whole of ,,vi4 i 
,kanda is busy in showing  the special  
conditions of making gifts and receiving
 them4 ,a reference  to our chapter on  
,mmms will show that the later ,mmms    
writers agreed with the ,nyya-,vaisesika
 doctrines in most of their  views      

regarding substance1 qualities1 etc4    
,some of the main points  in which ,mmms
 differs from ,nyya-,vaisesika are 7#a7 
self-validity  of the ,vedas1 7#b7 the  
eternality of the ,vedas1 7#c7 disbelief
  in any creator or god1 7#d7 eternality
 of sound 7s'abda71 7#e7 7according  to 
,kumrila7 direct perception of self in  
the notion of the ego4  ,of these the   
first and the second points do not form 
any subject  of discussion in the       
,vais'esika4 ,but as no s'vara is       
mentioned1  and as all adrsta depends   
upon the authority of the ,vedas1 we    
may assume that ,vais'esika had no      
dispute with ,mmms4 ,the  fact that     
there is no reference to any dissension 
is probably due  to the fact that really
 none had taken place at the time of the
  ,vaisesika stras4 ,it is probable that
 ,kanda believed that the  ,vedas were  
written by some persons superior to us  
7,,ii4 i4 #ah1 ,,vi4 i4  #a-b74 ,but the
 fact that there is no reference to any 
conflict with  ,mmms suggests that the  

doctrine that the ,vedas were never     
written by anyone was formulated at a   
later period1 whereas in  the days of   
the ,vais'esika stras1 the view was     
probably what is  represented in the    
,vais'esika stras4 ,as there is no      
reference to  svara and as adrsta       
proceeding out of the performance of    
actions  in accordance with ,vedic      
injunctions is made the cause of all    
atomic movements1 we can very well      
assume that ,vais'esika was  as         
atheistic or non-theistic as the later  
,mmms philosophers4  ,as regards the    
eternality of sound1 which in later days
 was one  of the main points of quarrel 
between the ,nyya-,vais'esika and  the  
,mmms1 we find that in ,,ii4 ii4 #be-cb1
 ,kanda gives reasons  in favour of the 
non-eternality of sound1 but after that 
from ,,ii4 ii4 #cc  till the end of the 
chapter he closes the argument in favour
 of the  eternality of sound1 which is  
the distinctive ,mmms view as we know   
from the later ,mmms writers ,footnote  

ref #a4 ,next comes the question  of the
 proof of the existence of self4 ,the   
traditional ,nyya view is               
,footnote #a3 ,the last two concluding  
stras ,,ii4 ii4 #cf and #cg are in my   
opinion wrongly interpreted by ,s'ankara
 ,mis'ra in his ,upaskra 7,,ii4 ii4  #cf
 by adding an api to the stra and       
thereby changing the issue1 and  ,,ii4  
ii4 #cg by misreading the phonetic      
combination samkhyabhava as  smkhya and 
bhava instead of smkhya and abhava1     
which in my opinion  is the right       
combination here7 in favour of the      
non-eternality of sound  as we find in  
the later ,nyya ,vais'esika view4       
#bhe    that the self is supposed to    
exist because it must be inferred as the
  seat of the qualities of pleasure1    
pain1 cognition1 etc4 ,traditionally    
this is regarded as the ,vais'esika view
 as well4 ,but in ,vais'esika  ,,iii4   
ii4 #d the existence of soul is first   
inferred by reason of its  activity and 
the existence of pleasure1 pain1 etc41  

in ,,iii4 ii4 #f-g this  inference is   
challenged by saying that we do not     
perceive that the  activity1 etc4       
belongs to the soul and not to the body 
and so no  certainty can be arrived at  
by inference1 and in ,,iii4 ii4 #h it is
  suggested that therefore the existence
 of soul is to be accepted  on the      
authority of the scriptures 7gama74 ,to 
this the final  ,vais'esika conclusion  
is given that we can directly perceive  
the self  in our feeling as ,i 7aham71  
and we have therefore not to depend  on 
the scriptures for the proof of the     
existence of the self1 and thus  the    
inference of the existence of the self  
is only an additional  proof of what we 
already find in perception as ,i 7aham7 
7,,iii4 ii4  #aj-ah1 also ,,ix4 i4 #aa74
    ,these considerations lead me to    
think that the ,vais'esika  represented 
a school of ,mmms thought which         
supplemented  a metaphysics to          
strengthen the grounds of the ,vedas4   
,philosophy in the ,vais'esika stras4   

,the ,vais'esika stras begin with the   
ostensible purpose of explaining  virtue
 7dharma7 7,i4i4 #a7 and dharma         
according to it is  that by which       
prosperity 7abhyudaya7 and salvation    
7nihs'reyasa7  are attained4 ,then it   
goes on to say that the validity of the 
,vedas depends on the fact that it leads
 us to prosperity and  salvation4 ,then 
it turns back to the second stra and    
says that  salvation comes as the result
 of real knowledge1 produced by special 
excellence of dharma1 of the            
characteristic features of the          
categories of  substance 7dravya71      
quality 7guna71 class concept 7smdnya71 
particularity 7vis'esa71 and inherence  
7samavyay7 ,footnote ref #a4  ,the      
dravyas are earth1 water1 fire1 air1    
ether1 time1 space1 soul1 and  mind4    
,the gunas are colour1 taste1 odour1    
touch1 number1 measure1  separations1   
contact1 disjoining1 quality of         
belonging to high genus or to  species  
,footnote ref #b4 ,action 7karma7 means 

upward movement        ,footnote #a3    
,upaskra notes that vis'esa here refers 
to the ultimate  differences of things  
and not to species4 ,a special doctrine 
of this  system is this1 that each of   
the indivisible atoms of even the same  
element has specific features of        
difference4    ,footnote #b3 ,here the  
well known qualities of heaviness       
7gurutva71  liquidity 7dravatva71       
oiliness 7sneha71 elasticity 7samskra71 
merit 7dharma71 and demerit 7adharma7   
have been altogether omitted4  ,these   
are all counted in later ,vais'esika    
commentaries and compendiums4  ,it must 
be noted that guna in ,vas'esika means  
qualities and not  subtle reals or      
substances as in ,smkhya ,yoga4 ,guna in
 ,vas'esika would  be akin to what ,yoga
 would call dharma4    #bhf    downward 
movement1 contraction1 expansion and    
horizontal  movement4 ,the three common 
qualities of dravya1 guna and karma  are
 that they are existent1 non-eternal1   
substantive1 effect1 cause1  and possess

 generality and particularity4 ,dravya  
produces other  dravyas and the gunas   
other gunas4 ,but karma is not          
necessarily  produced by karma4 ,dravya 
does not destroy either its cause or    
its effect but the gunas are destroyed  
both by the cause and by  the effect4   
,karma is destroyed by karma4 ,dravya   
possesses  karma and guna and is        
regarded as the material 7samavayi7     
cause4  ,gunas inhere in dravya1 cannot 
possess further gunas1 and are  not by  
themselves the cause of contact or      
disjoining4 ,karma is  devoid of guna1  
cannot remain at one time in more than  
one  object1 inheres in dravya alone1   
and is an independent cause of  contact 
or disjoining4 ,dravya is the material  
cause 7samavayi7  of 7derivative7       
dravyas1 guna1 and karma1 guna is also  
the non-material  cause 7asamavayi7 of  
dravya1 guna and karma4 ,karma  is the  
general cause of contact1 disjoining1   
and inertia in motion  7vega74 ,karma is
 not the cause of dravya4 ,for dravya   

may be  produced even without karma     
,footnote ref #a4 ,dravya is the general
 effect  of dravya4 ,karma is dissimilar
 to guna in this that it does not       
produce  karma4 ,the numbers two1 three1
 etc1 separateness1 contact  and        
disjoining are effected by more than one
 dravya4 ,each karma  not being         
connected with more than one thing is   
not produced  by more than one thing    
,footnote ref #b4 ,a dravya is the      
result of many  contacts 7of the atoms74
 ,one colour may be the result of many  
colours4 ,upward movement is the result 
of heaviness1 effort and  contact4      
,contact and disjoining are also the    
result of karma4 ,in  denying the       
causality of karma it is meant that     
karma is not the  cause of dravya and   
karma ,footnote ref #c4    ,in the      
second chapter of the first book ,kanda 
first says that  if there is no cause1  
there is no effect1 but there may be the
 cause  even though there may not be the
 effect4 ,he next says that  genus      

7samanya7 and species 7visesa7 are      
relative to the understanding2          
,footnote #a3 ,it is only when the karya
 ceases that dravya is produced4 ,see   
,upaskara ,i4i4 #bb4    ,footnote #b3   
,if karma is related to more than one   
thing1 then with the  movement of one we
 should have felt that two or more      
things were moving4    ,footnote #c3 ,it
 must be noted that karma in this sense 
is quite different  from the more       
extensive use of karma as meritorious or
 vicious action  which is the cause of  
rebirth4    #bhg    being 7bhva7        
indicates continuity only and is hence  
only a genus4 ,the universals of        
substance1 quality and action  maybe    
both genus and species1 but visesa as   
constituting the ultimate  differences  
7of atoms7 exists 7independent of any   
percipient74  ,in connection with this  
he says that the ultimate genus is being
  7satt7 in virtue of which things      
appear as existent1 all other  genera   
may only relatively be regarded as      

relative genera or  species4 ,being must
 be regarded as a separate category1    
since it  is different from dravya1 guna
 and karma1 and yet exists in them1  and
 has no genus or species4 ,it gives us  
the notion that something  is and must  
be regarded as a category existing as   
one  identical entity in all dravya1    
guna1 and karma1 for in its universal   
nature as being it has no special       
characteristics in the  different       
objects in which it inheres4 ,the       
specific universals of  thingness       
7dravyatva7 qualitiness 7gunatva7 or    
actionness 7karmatva7  are also         
categories which are separate from      
universal being  7bhva or satt7 for they
 also have no separate genus or species 
and yet may be distinguished from one   
another1 but bhva or  being was the same
 in all4    ,in the first chapter of the
 second book ,kanda deals with          
substances4 ,earth possesses colour1    
taste1 smell1 and touch1 water1  colour1
 taste1 touch1 liquidity1 and smoothness

 7snigdha71 fire1  colour and touch1    
air1 touch1 but none of these qualities 
can be  found in ether 7ks'a74          
,liquidity is a special quality of water
  because butter1 lac1 wax1 lead1 iron1 
silver1 gold1 become liquids  only when 
they are heated1 while water is         
naturally liquid itself ,footnote  ref  
#a4 ,though air cannot be seen1 yet its 
existence can be inferred by  touch1    
just as the existence of the genus of   
cows may be inferred  from the          
characteristics of horns1 tails1 etc4   
,since this thing inferred  from touch  
possesses motion and quality1 and does  
not  itself inhere in any other         
substance1 it is a substance 7dravya7   
and is eternal ,footnote ref #b4 ,the   
inference of air is of the type of      
inference of imperceptible things from  
certain known characteristics  called   
smnyato drsta4 ,the name of air vyu is  
derived  from the scriptures4 ,the      
existence of others different from us   
has 7asmadvis'istnm7 to be admitted for 

accounting for the        ,footnote #a3 
,it should be noted that mercury is not 
mentioned4 ,this is  important for      
mercury was known at a time later than  
,caraka4    ,footnote #b3 ,substance is 
that which possesses quality and motion4
 ,it  should be noted that the word     
adravyatvena in ,,ii4 i4 #ac has been   
interpreted by me as adravyavattvena4   
#bhh    giving of names to things       
7samjkarma74 ,because we find  that the 
giving of names is already in usage 7and
 not invented  by us7 ,footnote ref #a4 
,on account of the fact that movements  
rest only in  one thing1 the phenomenon 
that a thing can enter into any         
unoccupied  space1 would not lead us to 
infer the existence of ks'a  7ether74   
ks'a has to be admitted as the          
hypothetical substance  in which the    
quality of sound inheres1 because1 since
 sound 7a  quality7 is not the          
characteristic of things which can be   
touched1  there must be some substance  
of which it is a quality4 ,and this     

substance is ks'a4 ,it is a substance   
and eternal like air4 ,as  being is one 
so ks'a is one ,footnote ref #b4    ,in 
the second chapter of the second book   
,kanda tries to  prove that smell is a  
special characteristic of earth1 heat of
 fire1  and coldness of water4 ,time is 
defined as that which gives the  notion 
of youth in the young1 simultaneity1 and
 quickness4 ,it is  one like being4     
,time is the cause of all non-eternal   
things1 because  the notion of time is  
absent in eternal things4 ,space        
supplies the notion that this is so far 
away from this or so much  nearer to    
this4 ,like being it is one4 ,one space 
appears to have  diverse inter-space    
relations in connection with the motion 
of the  sun4 ,as a preliminary to       
discussing the problem whether sound  is
 eternal or not1 he discusses the notion
 of doubt1 which arises  when a thing is
 seen in a general way1 but the         
particular features  coming under it are
 not seen1 either when these are only   

remembered1  or when some such attribute
 is seen which resembles some  other    
attribute seen before1 or when a thing  
is seen in one way  but appears in      
another1 or when what is seen is not    
definitely  grasped1 whether rightly    
seen or not4 ,he then discusses the     
question  whether sound is eternal or   
non-eternal and gives his reasons  to   
show that it is non-eternal1 but        
concludes the discussion with  a number 
of other reasons proving that it is     
eternal4    ,the first chapter of the   
third book is entirely devoted to the   
inference of the existence of soul from 
the fact that there must  be some       
substance in which knowledge produced by
 the contact  of the senses and their   
object inheres4    ,the knowledge of    
sense-objects 7indriyrtha7 is the reason
 by        ,footnote #a3 ,i have        
differed from ,upaskra in interpreting  
samjkarma in ,,ii4 i4 #ah1 #ai as a     
genitive compound while  ,upaskra makes 
it a dvandva compound4 ,upaskra's       

interpretation  seems to be far-fetched4
 ,he wants to twist it into an argument 
for  the existence of ,god4    ,footnote
 #b3 ,this interpretation is according  
to ,s'ankara ,mis'ra's  ,upaskra4       
#bhi    which we can infer the existence
 of something different from the  senses
 and the objects which appear in        
connection with them4 ,the  types of    
inferences referred to are 7#a7         
inference of non-existence of  some     
things from the existence of some       
things1 7#b7 of the existence  of some  
things from the non-existence of some   
things1 7#c7 of the  existence of some  
things from the existence of others4 ,in
 all  these cases inference is possible 
only when the two are known to  be      
connected with each other               
7prasiddhiprvakatvt apades'asya7        
,footnote  ref #a4 ,when such a         
connection does not exist or is         
doubtful1 we have  anapades'a           
7fallacious middle7 and sandigdha       
7doubtful middle72  thus1 it is a horse 

because it has a horn1 or it is a cow   
because it  has a horn are examples of  
fallacious reason4 ,the inference of    
soul from the cognition produced by the 
contact of soul1 senses  and objects is 
not fallacious in the above way4 ,the   
inference of  the existence of the soul 
in others may be made in a similar way  
in which the existence of one's own soul
 is inferred ,footnote ref #b1 i4e4  by 
virtue of the existence of movement and 
cessation of movement4 ,in  the second  
chapter it is said that the fact that   
there is cognition only  when there is  
contact between the self1 the senses and
 the objects  proves that there is manas
 7mind71 and this manas is a substance  
and eternal1 and this can be proved     
because there is no simultaneity  of    
production of efforts and various kinds 
of cognition2 it  may also be inferred  
that this manas is one 7with each       
person74    ,the soul may be inferred   
from inhalation1 exhalation1 twinkling  
of the eye1 life1 the movement of the   

mind1 the sense-affections  pleasure1   
pain1 will1 antipathy1 and effort4 ,that
 it is a substance  and eternal can be  
proved after the manner of vyu4 ,an     
objector  is supposed to say that since 
when ,i see a man ,i do not see his     
soul1 the inference of the soul is of   
the type of smnyatodrsta  inference1    
i4e41 from the perceived signs of       
pleasure1 pain1 cognition  to infer an  
unknown entity to which they belong1 but
  that this was the self could not be   
affirmed4 ,so the existence of  soul has
 to be admitted on the strength of the  
scriptures4 ,but  the ,vais'esika reply 
is that since there is nothing else but 
self to  which the expression ,i may be 
applied1 there is no need of  falling   
back on the scriptures for the existence
 of the soul4 ,but        ,footnote #a3 
,in connection with this there is a     
short reference to the  methods of      
fallacy in which ,gautama's terminology 
does not appear4  ,there is no          
generalised statement1 but specific     

types of inference  are only pointed out
 as the basis4    ,footnote #b3 ,the    
forms of inference used show that ,kanda
 was probably not  aware of ,gautama's  
terminology4    #bij    then it is said 
that if the self is directly perceived  
in such experiences  as ,i am ,yajadatta
 or ,i am ,devadatta1 what is the  good 
of turning to inference8 ,the reply to  
this is that inference  lending its aid 
to the same existence only strengthens  
the conviction4  ,when we say that      
,devadatta goes or ,yajadatta goes1     
there comes the doubt whether by        
,devadatta or ,yajadatta the  body alone
 is meant2 but the doubt is removed when
 we think  that the notion of ,i refers 
to the self and not to anything else4   
,as there is no difference regarding the
 production of pleasure1  pain1 and     
cognition1 the soul is one in all4 ,but 
yet it is many  by special limitations  
as individuals and this is also proved  
on  the strength of the scriptures      
,footnote ref #a4    ,in the first      

chapter of the fourth book it is said   
that that  which is existent1 but yet   
has no cause1 should be considered      
eternal 7nitya74 ,it can be inferred by 
its effect1 for the effect can  only    
take place because of the cause4 ,when  
we speak of anything  as non-eternal1 it
 is only a negation of the eternal1 so  
that  also proves that there is         
something eternal4 ,the non-eternal  is 
ignorance 7avidy7 ,footnote ref #b4     
,colour is visible in a thing  which is 
great 7mahat7 and compounded4 ,air 7vyu7
 is not perceived to  have colour1      
though it is great and made up of parts1
 because it has not  the actuality of   
colour 7rpasamskra--i4e4 in air there is
 only  colour in its unmanifested form7 
in it4 ,colour is thus visible only     
when there is colour with special       
qualifications and conditions ,footnote 
ref #c4 ,in this way the cognition of   
taste1 smell1 and touch is also         
explained4 ,number1 measure1            
separateness1 contact1 and disjoining1  

the  quality of belonging to a higher or
 lower class1 action1 all these as they 
abide in things possessing colour are   
visible to the eye4 ,the  number etc4 of
 those which have no colour are not     
perceived by the  eye4 ,but the notion  
of being and also of genus of quality   
7gunatva7        ,footnote #a3 ,i have  
differed here from the meaning given in 
,upaskra4 ,i  think the three stras     
,sukhaduhkhajananispattyavis'esadekatmya
m1  vyavasthato nana1 and               
vastrasmarthyat ca originally meant that
  the self was one1 though for the sake 
of many limitations1 and also  because  
of the need of the performance of acts  
enjoined by the scriptures1  they are   
regarded as many4    ,footnote #b3 ,i   
have differed here also in my meaning   
from the ,upaskra1  which regards this  
stra avidya to mean that we do not know 
of any  reasons which lead to the       
non-eternality of the atoms4            
,footnote #c3 ,this is what is meant in 
the later distinctions of               

udbhtarpavattva and anudbhtarpavattva4  
,the word samskra in  ,vais'esika has   
many senses4 ,it means inertia1         
elasticity1 collection  7samavaya71     
production 7udbhava7 and not being      
overcome  7anabhibhava74 ,for the last  
three senses see ,upaskra ,,iv4 i4 #g4  
#bia    are perceived by all the senses 
7just as colour1 taste1 smell1 touch1   
and sound are perceived by one sense1   
cognition1 pleasure1 pain1  etc4 by the 
manas and number etc4 by the visual and 
the tactile  sense7 ,footnote ref #a4   
,in the second chapter of the fourth    
book it is said that the  earth1 etc4   
exist in three forms1 body1 sense1 and  
objects4 ,there  cannot be any          
compounding of the five elements or even
 of the  three1 but the atoms of        
different elements may combine when one 
of them acts as the central radicle     
7upastambhaka74 ,bodies are of  two     
kinds1 those produced from ovaries and  
those which are otherwise  produced by  
the combination of the atoms in         

accordance  with special kinds of       
dharma4 ,all combinations of atoms are  
due  to special kinds of dharmas4 ,such 
super-mundane bodies are to  be admitted
 for explaining the fact that things    
must have been  given names by beings   
having such super-mundane bodies1 and   
also on account of the authority of the 
,vedas4    ,in the first chapter of the 
fifth book action 7karma7 is discussed4 
,taking the example of threshing the    
corn1 it is said  that the movement of  
the hand is due to its contact with the 
soul in a state of effort1 and the      
movement of the flail is due  to its    
contact with the hand4 ,but in the case 
of the uprising of  the flail in the    
threshing pot due to impact the movement
 is  not due to contact with the hands1 
and so the uplifting of the  hand in    
touch with the flail is not due to its  
contact with the  soul2 for it is due to
 the impact of the flail4 ,on account of
  heaviness 7gurutva7 the flail will    
fall when not held by the hand4  ,things

 may have an upward or side motion by   
specially directed  motions             
7nodanavis'esa7 which are generated by  
special kinds of  efforts4 ,even without
 effort the body may move during sleep4 
,the movement of needles towards magnets
 is due to an unknown  cause            
7adrstakranaka74 ,the arrow first       
acquires motion by  specially directed  
movement1 and then on account of its    
inertia  7vegasamskra7 keeps on moving  
and when that ceases it falls  down     
through heaviness4    ,the second       
chapter abounds with extremely crude    
explanations        ,footnote #a3 ,this 
portion has been taken from the ,upaskra
 of ,s'ankara  ,mis'ra on the           
,vais'esika stras of ,kanda4 ,it must be
 noted here  that the notion of number  
according to ,vais'esika is due to      
mental  relativity or oscillation       
7apeksabuddhijanya74 ,but this mental   
relativity can only start when the thing
 having number is either seen or        
touched2 and it is in this sense that   

notion of number is said to depend  on  
the visual or the tactual sense4    #bib
    of certain physical phenomena which 
have no philosophical  importance4 ,all 
the special phenomena of nature are     
explained  as being due to unknown cause
 7adrstakritam7 and no explanation  is  
given as to the nature of this unknown  
7adrsta74  ,it is however said that with
 the absence of adrsta there is no      
contact  of body with soul1 and thus    
there is no rebirth1 and therefore      
moksa 7salvation72 pleasure and pain are
 due to contact of the  self1 manas1    
senses and objects4 ,yoga is that in    
which the mind  is in contact with the  
self alone1 by which the former becomes 
steady and there is no pain in the body4
 ,time1 space1 ks'a are  regarded as    
inactive4    ,the whole of the sixth    
book is devoted to showing that gifts   
are made to proper persons not through  
sympathy but on account  of the         
injunction of the scriptures1 the       
enumeration of certain  ,vedic          

performances1 which brings in adrsta1   
purification and impurities  of things1 
how passions are often generated by     
adrsta1  how dharma and adharma lead to 
birth and death and how moksa  takes    
place as a result of the work of the    
soul4    ,in the seventh book it is said
 that the qualities in eternal  things  
are eternal and in non-eternal things   
non-eternal4 ,the  change of qualities  
produced by heat in earth has its       
beginning  in the cause 7the atoms74    
,atomic size is invisible while great   
size  is visible4 ,visibility is due to 
a thing's being made up of many  causes 
,footnote ref #a1 but the atom is       
therefore different from those  that    
have great size4 ,the same thing may be 
called great and small  relatively at   
the same time4 ,in accordance with      
anutva 7atomic7 and  mahattva 7great7   
there are also the notions of small and 
big4 ,the  eternal size of parimandala  
7round7 belongs to the atoms4 ks'a  and 
tman are called mahn or paramamahn 7the 

supremely  great or all-pervasive72     
since manas is not of the great measure 
it is of atomic size4 ,space and time   
are also considered as being  of the    
measure supremely great 7paramamahat71  
,atomic size  7parimandala7 belonging to
 the atoms and the mind 7manas7 and  the
 supremely great size belonging to      
space1 time1 soul and ether  7ks'a7 are 
regarded as eternal4    ,in the second  
chapter of the seventh book it is said  
that unity  and separateness are to be  
admitted as entities distinct from      
other qualities4 ,there is no number in 
movement and quality2  the appearance of
 number in them is false4 ,cause and    
effect are        ,footnote #a3 ,i have 
differed from the ,upaskra in the       
interpretation of  this stra4    #bic   
neither one1 nor have they distinctive  
separateness 7ekaprthaktva74  ,the      
notion of unity is the cause of the     
notion of duality1 etc4  ,contact may be
 due to the action of one or two things1
 or the  effect of another contact and  

so is disjoining4 ,there is neither     
contact nor disjoining in cause and     
effect since they do not exist          
independently 7yutasiddhyabhvt74 ,in the
 eighth book it is said  that soul and  
manas are not perceptible1 and that in  
the apprehension  of qualities1 action1 
generality1 and particularity           
perception is due to their contact with 
the thing4 ,earth is the  cause of      
perception of smell1 and water1 fire1   
and air are the  cause of taste1 colour 
and touch,footnote ref #a4 ,in the ninth
 book  negation is described2           
non-existence 7asat7 is defined as that 
to  which neither action nor quality can
 be attributed4 ,even existent things   
may become non-existent and that which  
is existent in one  way may be          
non-existent in another2 but there is   
another kind  of non-existence which is 
different from the above kinds of       
existence and non-existence ,footnote   
ref #b4 ,all negation can be directly   
perceived through the help of the memory

 which keeps before the  mind the thing 
to which the negation applies4 ,allusion
 is also  made in this connection to the
 special perceptual powers of the       
yogins 7sages attaining mystical powers 
through ,yoga practices74    ,in the    
second chapter the nature of hetu       
7reason7 or the  middle term is         
described4 ,it is said that anything    
connected  with any other thing1 as     
effect1 cause1 as in contact1 or as     
contrary  or as inseparably connected1  
will serve as linga 7reason74  ,the main
 point is the notion this is associated 
with this1 or  these two are related as 
cause and effect1 and since this may    
also be produced through premisses1     
there may be a formal syllogism  from   
propositions fulfilling the above       
condition4 ,verbal  cognition comes     
without inference4 ,false knowledge     
7avidy7 is  due to the defect of the    
senses or non-observation and           
mal-observation  due to wrong expectant 
impressions4 ,the opposite  of this is  

true knowledge 7vidy74 ,in the tenth it 
is said that  pleasure and pain are not 
cognitions1 since they are not related  
to  doubt and certainty4                
,footnote #a3 ,upaskra here explains    
that it is intended that the senses  are
 produced by those specific elements1   
but this cannot be found in the  stras4 
,footnote #b3 ,in the previous three    
kinds of non-existence1 prgabhva        
7negation before production71 dhvamsbhva
 7negation after destruction71  and     
anyonyabhava 7mutual negation of each   
other in each other71 have  been        
described4 ,the fourth one is smnybhva  
7general negation74    #bid      ,a     
dravya may be caused by the inhering of 
the effect in it1 for  because of its   
contact with another thing the effect is
 produced4  ,karma 7motion7 is also a   
cause since it inheres in the cause4    
,contact  is also a cause since it      
inheres in the cause4 ,a contact which  
inheres in the cause of the cause and   
thereby helps the production  of the    

effect is also a cause4 ,the special    
quality of the heat of  fire is also a  
cause4    ,works according to the       
injunctions of the scriptures since they
  have no visible effect are the cause  
of prosperity1 and because the  ,vedas  
direct them1 they have validity4        
,philosophy in the ,nyya stras ,footnote
 ref #a4    ,the ,nyya stras begin with 
an enumeration of the sixteen  subjects1
 viz4 means of right knowledge 7pramna71
 object of right  knowledge 7prameya71  
doubt 7sams'aya71 purpose 7prayojana71  
illustrative instances 7drstnta71       
accepted conclusions 7siddhnta71        
premisses 7avayava71 argumentation      
7tarka71 ascertainment 7nirnaya71       
debates 7vda71 disputations 7jalpa71    
destructive criticisms  7vitand71       
fallacy 7hetvbhsa71 quibble 7chala71    
refutations  7jti71 points of opponent's
 defeat 7nigrahasthna71 and hold that   
by a thorough knowledge of these the    
highest good 7nihs'reyasa71 is          
attained4 ,in the second stra it is said

 that salvation 7apavarga7  is attained 
by the successive disappearance of false
 knowledge  7mithyjna71 defects 7dosa71 
endeavours 7pravrtti1 birth  7janma71   
and ultimately of sorrow4 ,then the     
means of proof are said  to be of four  
kinds1 perception 7pratyaksa71 inference
 7anumna71  analogy 7upamana71 and      
testimony 7s'abda74 ,perception is      
defined  as uncontradicted determinate  
knowledge unassociated with names       
proceeding out of sense contact with    
objects4 ,inference is of three  kinds1 
from cause to effect 7prvavat71 effect  
to cause 7s'esavat71  and inference from
 common characteristics 7smnyato drsta74
  ,upamna is the knowing of anything by 
similarity with any well-known  thing4  
,s'abda is defined as the testimony of  
reliable authority 7pta7  ,footnote ref 
#b4        ,footnote #a3 ,this is a     
brief summary of the doctrines found in 
,nyya  stras1 supplemented here and     
there with the views of ,vtsyyana1 the  
commentator4 ,this follows the order of 

the stras1 and tries to present  their  
ideas with as little additions from     
those of later day ,nyya as  possible4  
,the general treatment of               
,nyya-,vais'esika expounds the two      
systems in the light of later writers   
and commentators4    ,footnote #b3 ,it  
is curious to notice that ,vtsyyana says
 that an rya1 a  rsi or a mleccha       
7foreigner71 may be an pta 7reliable    
authority74    #bie    ,such a testimony
 may tell us about things which may be  
experienced  and which are beyond       
experience4 ,objects of knowledge  are  
said to be self 7tman71 body1 senses1   
sense-objects1  understanding 7buddhi71 
mind 7manas1 endeavour 7pravrtti71      
rebirths1  enjoyment of pleasure and    
suffering of pain1 sorrow and           
salvation4 ,desire1 antipathy1 effort   
7prayatna71 pleasure1 pain1 and         
knowledge indicate the existence of the 
self4 ,body is that which  upholds      
movement1 the senses and the rise of    
pleasure and pain  as arising out of the

 contact of sense with sense-objects    
,footnote ref l2  the five senses are   
derived from the five elements1 such as 
prthivi1 ap1  tejas1 vyu and ks'a2      
smell1 taste1 colour1 touch1 and sound  
are  the qualities of the above five    
elements1 and these are also the        
objects of the senses4 ,the fact that   
many cognitions cannot  occur at any one
 moment indicates the existence of mind 
7manas74  ,endeavour means what is done 
by speech1 understanding1 and  body4    
,dosas 7attachment1 antipathy1 etc7 are 
those which lead  men to virtue and     
vice4 ,pain is that which causes        
suffering ,footnote ref  #b4 ,ultimate  
cessation from pain is called apavarga  
,footnote ref #c4  ,doubt arises when   
through confusion of similar qualities  
or conflicting  opinions etc41 one wants
 to settle one of the two alternatives4 
,that  for attaining which1 or for      
giving up which one sets himself to work
  is called prayojana4    ,illustrative 
example 7drstnta7 is that on which both 

the  common man and the expert          
7parksaka7 hold the same opinion4       
,established texts or conclusions       
7siddhnta7 are of four kinds1  viz 7#a7 
those which are accepted by all schools 
of thought called  the                  
sarvatantrasiddhnta2 7#b7 those which   
are held by one school  or similar      
schools but opposed by others called the
 pratitantrasiddhnta2  7#c7 those which 
being accepted other conclusions will   
also naturally  follow called           
adhikaranasiddhnta2 7#d7 those of the   
opponent's views  which are uncritically
 granted by a debater1 who proceeds then
 to refute  the consequences that follow
 and thereby show his own special skill 
and  bring the opponent's intellect to  
disrepute 7abhyupagamasiddhnta7         
,footnote ref #d4 ,the premisses are    
five3        ,footnote #a3 ,here ,i have
 followed ,vtsyyana's meaning4          
,footnote #b3 ,vtsyyana comments here   
that when one finds all things full  of 
misery1 he wishes to avoid misery1 and  

finding birth to be associated  with    
pain becomes unattached and thus is     
emancipated4    ,footnote #c3 ,vtsyyana 
wants to emphasise that there is no     
bliss in  salvation1 but only cessation 
from pain4    ,footnote #d3 ,i have     
followed ,vtsyyana's interpretation     
here4    #bif    7#a7 pratij 7the first 
enunciation of the thing to be proved72 
7#b7 hetu 7the reason which establishes 
the conclusion on the  strength of the  
similarity of the case in hand with     
known examples  or negative instances72 
7#c7 udharana 7positive or negative     
illustrative instances72 7#d7 upanaya   
7corroboration by the instance72  7#e7  
nigamana 7to reach the conclusion which 
has been proved74  ,then come the       
definitions of tarka1 nirnaya1 vda1     
jalpa1 vitand1  the fallacies           
7hetvbhsa71 chala1 jti1 and             
nigrahasthna1 which  have been          
enumerated in the first stra4    ,the   
second book deals with the refutations  
of objections  against the means of     

right knowledge 7pramna74 ,in refutation
  of certain objections against the     
possibility of the happening  of doubt1 
which held that doubt could not happen1 
since there  was always a difference    
between the two things regarding which  
doubt arose1 it is held that doubt      
arises when the special differentiating 
characteristics between the two things  
are not noted4  ,certain objectors1     
probably the ,buddhists1 are supposed to
 object  to the validity of the pramna  
in general and particularly of          
perceptions on the ground that if they  
were generated before  the sense-object 
contact1 they could not be due to the   
latter1  and if they are produced after 
the sense-object contact1 they  could   
not establish the nature of the objects1
 and if the two  happened together then 
there would be no notion of succession  
in our cognitions4 ,to this the ,nyya   
reply is that if there were  no means of
 right knowledge1 then there would be no
 means of  knowledge by means of which  

the objector would refute all  means of 
right knowledge2 if the objector        
presumes to have any  means of valid    
knowledge then he cannot say that there 
are no  means of valid knowledge at all4
 ,just as from the diverse kinds  of    
sounds of different musical instruments1
 one can infer the previous  existence  
of those different kinds of musical     
instruments1  so from our knowledge of  
objects we can infer the previous       
existence  of those objects of knowledge
 ,footnote ref #a4    ,the same things  
7e4g4 the senses1 etc47 which are       
regarded as  instruments of right       
knowledge with reference to the right   
cognition  of other things may          
themselves be the objects of right      
,footnote #a3 ,yathpas'ctsiddhena       
s'abdena prvasiddham todyamanumyate     
sdhyam ca todyam sdhanam ca s'abdah     
antarhite hytodye svanatah  anumnam     
bhavatti1 vn vdyate venuh pryyate iti   
svanavis'esena  todyavis'esam           
pratipadyate tath prvasiddham           

upalabdhivisayam  pas'ctsiddhena        
upalabdhihetun pratipadyate4 ,vtsyyana  
bhsya1 ,,ii4  i4 #ae4    #big           
knowledge4 ,there are no hard and fast  
limits that those which  are instruments
 of knowledge should always be treated  
as mere  instruments1 for they          
themselves may be objects of right      
knowledge4  ,the means of right         
knowledge 7pramna7 do not require  other
 sets of means for revealing them1 for  
they like the light of  a lamp in       
revealing the objects of right knowledge
 reveal themselves  as well4    ,coming 
to the question of the correctness of   
the definition  of perception1 it is    
held that the definition includes the   
contact  of the soul with the mind      
,footnote ref #a4 ,then it is said that 
though we  perceive only parts of       
things1 yet since there is a whole1 the 
perception  of the part will naturally  
refer to the whole4 ,since we  can pull 
and draw things wholes exist1 and the   
whole is not  merely the parts collected

 together1 for were it so one could  say
 that we perceived the ultimate parts or
 the atoms ,footnote ref #b4  ,some     
objectors hold that since there may be a
 plurality of causes it is  wrong to    
infer particular causes from particular 
effects4 ,to this  the ,nyya answer is  
that there is always such a difference  
in the  specific nature of each effect  
that if properly observed each          
particular  effect will lead us to a    
correct inference of its own particular 
cause ,footnote ref #c4 ,in refuting    
those who object to the existence of    
time on the ground of relativity1 it is 
said that if the present time  did not  
exist1 then no perception of it would   
have been possible4  ,the past and      
future also exist1 for otherwise we     
should not have  perceived things as    
being done in the past or as going to be
  done in the future4 ,the validity of  
analogy 7upamna7 as a  means of         
knowledge and the validity of the ,vedas
 is then proved4  ,the four pramnas of  

perception1 inference1 analogy1 and     
scripture        ,footnote #a3 ,here the
 stras1 ,,ii4 i4 #bj-bh1 are probably   
later  interpolations to answer         
criticisms1 not against the ,nyya       
doctrine  of perception1 but against the
 wording of the definition  of          
perception as given in the1,nyya stra1  
,,ii4 i4 #d4    ,footnote #b3 ,this is a
 refutation of the doctrines of the     
,buddhists1 who  rejected the existence 
of wholes 7avayav74 ,on this subject a  
later  ,buddhist monograph by ,pandita  
,as'oka 7#ith century ,a4,d471          
,avayavinirkarana in ,six ,buddhist     
,nyya ,tracts1 may be referred  to4     
,footnote #c3 ,prvodakavis'istam khalu  
varsodakan s'ghrataram srotas           
bahutaraphenaphalaparnaksthdivahanacopal
abhamnah prnatvena1  nadya upari vrsto  
deva ityanuminoti nodakabrddhimtrena4   
,vatsyyana  bhsya1 ,,ii4 i4 #ch4 ,the   
inference that there has been rain up   
the river  is not made merely from      
seeing the rise of water1 but from the  

rainwater  augmenting the previous water
 of the river and carrying with its     
current  large quantities of foam1      
fruits1 leaves1 wood1 etc4 ,these       
characteristics1  associated with the   
rise of water1 mark it as a special kind
 of rise of  water1 which can only be   
due to the happening of rain up the     
river4    #bih    are quite sufficient  
and it is needless to accept arthpatti  
7implication71  aitihya 7tradition71    
sambhava 7when a thing is understood  in
 terms of higher measure the lower      
measure contained in it is  also        
understood--if we know that there is a  
bushel of corn anywhere  we understand  
that the same contains eight gallons of 
corn as well7 and abhva 7non-existence7 
as separate pramnas  for the tradition  
is included in verbal testimony and     
arthpatti1  sambhava and abhva are      
included within inference4    ,the      
validity of these as pramnas is         
recognized1 but they are  said to be    
included in the four pramnas mentioned  

before4 ,the  theory of the eternity of 
sound is then refuted and the           
non-eternity  proved in great detail4   
,the meaning of words is said to  refer 
to class-notions 7jti71 individuals     
7vyakti71 and the specific  position of 
the limbs 7krti71 by which the class    
notion is manifested4  ,class 7jti is   
defined as that which produces the      
notion  of sameness 7samnaprasavtmik    
jtih74    ,the third book begins with   
the proofs for the existence of  the    
self or tman4 ,it is said that each of  
the senses is associated  with its own  
specific object1 but there must exist   
some other entity  in us which gathered 
together the different sense-cognitions 
and  produced the perception of the     
total object as distinguished from  the 
separate sense-perceptions4 ,if there   
were no self then there  would be no sin
 in injuring the bodies of men3 again if
 there  were no permanent self1 no one  
would be able to recognize  things as   
having seen them before2 the two images 

produced by  the eyes in visual         
perception could not also have been     
united  together as one visual          
perception of the things ,footnote ref  
#a2 moreover  if there were no permanent
 cognizer then by the sight of a sour   
fruit one could not be reminded of its  
sour taste4 ,if consciousness  belonged 
to the senses only1 then there would be 
no recognition1  for the experience of  
one could not be recognized by another4 
,if it is said that the unity of        
sensations could as well be effected  by
 manas 7mind71 then the manas would     
serve the same purpose  as self and it  
would only be a quarrel over a name1 for
 this  entity the knower would require  
some instrument by which it  would      
co-ordinate the sensations and cognize2 
unless manas is  admitted as a separate 
instrument of the soul1 then though the 
sense perceptions could be explained as 
being the work of the        ,footnote  
#a3 ,according to ,vtsyyana1 in the two 
eyes we have two different  senses4     

,udyotakara1 however1 thinks that there 
is one visual sense which  works in both
 eyes4    #bii    senses1 yet imagining1
 thinking1 etc41 could not be explained4
  ,another argument for the admission of
 soul is this1 that infants  show signs 
of pleasure and pain in quite early     
stages of infancy  and this could not be
 due to anything but similar experiences
 in  previous lives4 ,moreover every    
creature is born with some desires1  and
 no one is seen to be born without      
desires4 ,all attachments  and desires  
are due to previous experiences1 and    
therefore it is  argued that desires in 
infants are due to their experience in  
previous existences4    ,the body is    
made up of the ksiti element4 ,the      
visual sense  is material and so also   
are all other senses ,footnote ref l4   
,incidentally  the view held by some    
that the skin is the only organ of      
sensation  is also refuted4 ,the earth  
possesses four qualities1 water three1  
fire two1 air one1 and ether one1 but   

the sense of smell1 taste1 eye1  and    
touch which are made respectively by the
 four elements of  earth1 etc41 can only
 grasp the distinctive features of the  
elements  of which they are made4 ,thus 
though the organ of smell is made  by   
earth which contains four qualities1 it 
can only grasp the distinctive  quality 
of earth1 viz4 smell4    ,against the   
,smkhya distinction of buddhi           
7cognition7 and  cit 7pure intelligence7
 it is said that there is no difference 
between  the buddhi and cit4 ,we do not 
find in our consciousness two  elements 
of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal    
consciousness1  but only one1 by        
whichever name it may be called4 ,the   
,smkhya  epistemology that the          
antahkarana assumes diverse forms in    
cognitive acts is also denied1 and these
 are explained on the supposition  of   
contacts of manas with the senses1 tman 
and external  objects4 ,the ,buddhist   
objection against the ,smkhya           
explanation  that the antahkaranas catch

 reflection from the external  world    
just as a crystal does from the coloured
 objects that may  lie near it1 that    
there were really momentary productions 
of  crystals and no permanent crystal   
catching different reflections at       
different times is refuted by ,nyya2 for
 it says that it cannot be  said that   
all creations are momentary1 but it can 
only be agreed to  in those cases where 
momentariness was actually experienced4 
,in the case of the transformation of   
milk into curd there is no  coming in of
 new qualities and disappearance of old 
ones1 but        ,footnote #a3 ,it is   
well to remember that ,smkhya did not   
believe that the  senses were           
constituted of the gross elements4 ,but 
the ,smkhya-,yoga view  represented in  
treya-samhit 7,caraka7 regarded the     
senses as bhautika  or constituted of   
the gross elements4    #cjj    the old  
milk is destroyed and the curd          
originates anew4 ,the  contact of manas 
with soul 7tman7 takes place within the 

body  and not in that part of tman which
 is outside the body2 knowledge  belongs
 to the self and not to the senses or   
the object for  even when they are      
destroyed knowledge remains4 ,new       
cognitions  destroy the old ones4 ,no   
two recollections can be simultaneous4  
,desire and antipathy also belong to the
 soul4 ,none of  these can belong either
 to the body or to the mind 7manas74    
,manas cannot be conscious for it is    
dependent upon self4 ,again  if it was  
conscious then the actions done by it   
would have to be  borne by the self and 
one cannot reap the fruits of the       
actions of  another4 ,the causes of     
recollection on the part of self are    
given  as follows3 7#a7 attention1 7#b7 
context1 7#c7 repetition1 7#d7 sign1    
7#e7 association1 7#f7 likeness1 7#g7   
association of the possessor  and the   
possessed or master and servant1 or     
things which  are generally seen to     
follow each other1 7#h7 separation 7as  
of  husband and wife71 7#i7 simpler     

employment1 7#aj7 opposition1  7#aa7    
excess1 7#ab7 that from which anything  
can be got1 7#ac7 cover  and covered1   
7#ad7 pleasure and pain causing memory  
of that  which caused them1 7#ae7 fear1 
7#af7 entreaty1 7#ag7 action such  as   
that of the chariot reminding the       
charioteer1 7#ah7 affection1  7#ai7     
merit and demerit ,footnote ref #a4 ,it 
is said that knowledge does  not belong 
to body1 and then the question of the   
production of the body  as due to adrsta
 is described4 ,salvation 7apavarga7 is 
effected by  the manas being permanently
 separated from the soul 7tman7  through
 the destruction of karma4    ,in the   
fourth book in course of the examination
 of dosa  7defects71 it is said that    
moha 7ignorance71 is at the root of all 
other defects such as rga 7attachment7  
and dvesa 7antipathy74  ,as against the 
,buddhist view that a thing could be    
produced by  destruction1 it is said    
that destruction is only a stage in the 
process of origination4 s'vara is       

regarded as the cause of the  production
 of effects of deeds performed by men's 
efforts1 for  man is not always found to
 attain success according to his        
efforts4  ,a reference is made to the   
doctrine of those who say that all      
things have come into being by no-cause 
7animitta71 for then  no-cause would be 
the cause1 which is impossible4    ,the 
doctrine of some that all things are    
eternal is next refuted  on the ground  
that we always see things produced and  
destroyed4        ,footnote #a3 ,nyya   
stra ,,iii4 ii4 #dd4    #cja    ,the    
doctrine of the nihilistic ,buddhists   
7s'nyavdin ,bauddhas7  that all things  
are what they are by virtue of their    
relations to  other things1 and that of 
other ,buddhists who hold that there are
  merely the qualities and parts but no 
substances or wholes1 are  then refuted4
 ,the fruits of karmas are regarded as  
being like  the fruits of trees which   
take some time before they can ripen4   
,even though there may be pleasures here

 and there1 birth means  sorrow for men1
 for even the man who enjoys pleasure is
 tormented  by many sorrows1 and        
sometimes one mistakes pains for        
pleasures4 ,as there is no sorrow in the
 man who is in deep dreamless  sleep1 so
 there is no affliction 7kles'a7 in the 
man who attains  apavarga 7salvation7   
,footnote ref #a4 ,when once this state 
is attained all  efforts 7pravrtti7     
cease for ever1 for though efforts were 
beginningless  with us they were all due
 to attachment1 antipathy1 etc4 ,then   
there are short discussions regarding   
the way in which egoism  7ahamkra7      
ceases with the knowledge of the true   
causes of defects  7dosa72 about the    
nature of whole and parts and about the 
nature of atoms 7anus7 which cannot     
further be divided4 ,a discussion  is   
then introduced against the doctrine of 
the ,vijnavdins  that nothing can be    
regarded as having any reality when     
separated from thoughts4 ,incidentally  
,yoga is mentioned as  leading to right 

knowledge4    ,the whole of the fifth   
book which seems to be a later addition 
is devoted to the enumeration of        
different kinds of refutations          
7nigrahasthna7 and futilities 7jti74    
,caraka1 ,nyya stras and ,vais'esika    
stras4    ,when we compare the ,nyya    
stras with the ,vais'esika stras  we    
find that in the former two or three    
differentstreams of purposes  have met1 
whereas the latter is much more         
homogeneous4 ,the large  amount of      
materials relating to debates treated as
 a practical art  for defeating an      
opponent would lead one to suppose that 
it was  probably originally compiled    
from some other existing treatises      
which were used by ,hindus and          
,buddhists alike for rendering          
themselves fit to hold their own in     
debates with their  opponents ,footnote 
ref #b4 ,this assumption is justified   
when        ,footnote #a3 ,vtsyyana     
notes that this is the salvation of him 
who has  known ,brahman1 ,,iv4 i4 #fc4  

,footnote #b3 ,a reference to the       
,suvarnaprabhsa stra shows that the     
,buddhist missionaries used to get      
certain preparations for improving      
their voice in order to be able to argue
 with force1 and they took to  the      
worship of ,sarasvat 7goddess of        
learning71 who they supposed would  help
 them in bringing readily before their  
mind all the information  and ideas of  
which they stood so much in need at the 
time of debates4    #cjb    we compare  
the futilities 7jti7 quibbles 7chala71  
etc41 relating to  disputations as found
 in the ,nyya stra with those that are  
found in the medical work of ,caraka    
7#gh ,a4,d471 ,,iii4 viii4 ,there  are  
no other works in early ,sanskrit       
literature1 excepting the  ,nyya stra   
and ,caraka-samhit which have treated of
 these  matters4 ,caraka's description  
of some of the categories 7e4g4         
drstnta1 prayojana1 pratij and vitand7  
follows very closely  the definitions   
given of those in the ,nyya stras4      

,there are  others such as the          
definitions of jalpa1 chala1            
nigrahasthna1 etc41  where the          
definitions of two authorities differ   
more4 ,there are  some other logical    
categories mentioned in ,caraka 7e4g4   
pratisthpan1  jijs1 vyavasya1 vkyadosa1 
vkyapras'ams1 upalambha1  parihra1      
abhyanuj1 etc47 which are not found in  
the  ,nyya stra ,footnote ref #a4       
,again1 the various types of futilities 
7jti7 and points of opponent's          
refutation 7nigrahasthna7 mentioned in  
the ,nyya stra are not found in ,caraka4
 ,there are some terms which  are found 
in slightly variant forms in the two    
works1 e4g4 aupamya in  ,caraka1 upamna 
in ,nyya stra1 arthpatti in ,nyya stra  
and  arthaprpti in ,caraka4 ,caraka does
 not seem to know anything  about the   
,nyya work on this subject1 and it is   
plain that the  treatment of these terms
 of disputations in the ,caraka is much 
simpler and less technical than what we 
find in the ,nyya stras4  ,if we leave  

out the varieties of jti and            
nigrahasthna of the  fifth book1 there  
is on the whole a great agreement       
between the  treatment of ,caraka and   
that of the ,nyya stras4 ,it seems      
therefore  in a high degree probable    
that both ,caraka and the ,nyya  stras  
were indebted for their treatment of    
these terms of disputation  to some     
other earlier work4 ,of these1 ,caraka's
 compilation  was earlier1 whereas the  
compilation of the ,nyya stras          
represents  a later work when a hotter  
atmosphere of disputations had          
necessitated the use of more technical  
terms which are embodied  in this work1 
but which were not contained in the     
earlier work4  ,it does not seem        
therefore that this part of the work    
could have  been earlier than the second
 century ,a4,d4 ,another stream flowing 
through the ,nyya stras is that of a    
polemic against the doctrines  which    
could be attributed to the ,sautrntika  
,buddhists1 the  ,vijnavda ,buddhists1  

the nihilists1 the ,smkhya1 the ,crvka1 
and some other unknown schools of       
thought to which we find no             
,footnote #a3 ,like ,vais'esika1 ,caraka
 does not know the threefold division   
of inference 7anumna7 as prvavat1       
s'esavat and smnyatodrsta4    #cjc      
further allusion elsewhere4 ,the        
,vais'esika stras as we have already    
seen had argued only against the ,mmms1 
and ultimately agreed  with them on most
 points4 ,the dispute with ,mmms in the 
,nyya stras is the same as in the       
,vais'esika over the question  of the   
doctrine of the eternality of sound4    
,the question of the  self-validity of  
knowledge 7svatah prmnyavda7and the     
akhyti  doctrine of illusion of the     
,mmmsists1 which form the two chief     
points of discussion between later ,mmms
 and later ,nyya1  are never alluded to 
in the ,nyya stras4 ,the advocacy of    
,yoga  methods 7,nyya stras1            
,,iv4ii4#ch-db and #df7 seems also to be
  an alien element2 these are not found 

in ,vais'esika and are not in  keeping  
with the general tendency of the ,nyya  
stras1 and the  ,japanese tradition that
 ,mirok added them later on as          
,mahmahopdhyya  ,haraprasda ,s'astri has
 pointed out ,footnote ref l is not     
improbable4    ,the ,vais'esika stras1  
,,iii4i4#ah and ,,iii4ii4#a1 describe   
perceptional  knowledge as produced by  
the close proximity of the  self 7tman71
 the senses and the objects of sense1   
and they  also adhere to the doctrine1  
that colour can only be perceived  under
 special conditions of samskra          
7conglomeration etc474  ,the reason for 
inferring the existence of manas from   
the non-simultaneity  7ayaugapadya7 of  
knowledge and efforts is almost  the    
same with ,vais'esika as with ,nyya4    
,the ,nyya stras  give a more technical 
definition of perception1 but do not    
bring  in the questions of samskra or   
udbhtarpavattva which ,vais'esika  does4
 ,on the question of inference ,nyya    
gives three  classifications as prvavat1

 s'esavat and samnyatodrsta1 but no     
definition4 ,the ,vais'esika stras do   
not know of these classifications1  and 
give only particular types or instances 
of inference  7,v4,s4 ,,iii4 i4 #g-ag1  
,,ix4 ii4 #a-b1 #d-e74 ,inference is    
said to be made  when a thing is in     
contact with another1 or when it is in a
 relation  of inherence in it1 or when  
it inheres in a third thing2 one kind   
of effect may lead to the inference of  
another kind of effect1 and  so on4     
,these are but mere collections of      
specific instances of inference  without
 reaching a general theory4 ,the        
doctrine of vypti  7concomitance of hetu
 7reason7 and sdhya 7probandum77 which  
became  so important in later ,nyya has 
never been properly formulated  either  
in the ,nyya stras or in the            
,vais'esika4 ,vais'esika  sutra1 ,,iii4 
i4 #bd1 no doubt assumes the knowledge  
of concomitance  between hetu and sadhya
 7prasiddhiprvakatvt apades'asya71      
,footnote #a3 ,j4,a4,s4,b4 #aije4       

#cjd    but the technical vypti is not  
known1 and the connotation of  the term 
prasiddhiprvakatva of ,vais'esika seems 
to be more  loose than the term vypti as
 we know it in the later ,nyya4 ,the    
,vais'esika stras do not count          
scriptures 7s'abda7 as a separate       
pramna1 but they tacitly admit the great
 validity of the ,vedas4  ,with ,nyya   
stras s'abda as a pramna applies not    
only to the  ,vedas1 but to the         
testimony of any trustworthy person1 and
  ,vtsyyana says that trustworthy       
persons may be of three  kinds rsi1 rya 
and mleccha 7foreigners74 ,upamna which 
is  regarded as a means of right        
cognition in ,nyya is not even  referred
 to in the ,vais'esika stras4 ,the ,nyya
 stras know of  other pramnas1 such as  
arthpatti1 sambhava and aitihya1 but    
include them within the pramnas admitted
 by them1 but the  ,vais'esika stras do 
not seem to know them at all ,footnote  
ref #a4 ,the  ,vais'esika stras believe 
in the perception of negation 7abhva7   

through  the perception of the locus to 
which such negation refers 7,,ix4 i4    
#a-aj74 ,the ,nyya stras 7,,ii4 ii4 #a1 
#b1 #g-ab7 consider that abhva as       
non-existence or negation can be        
perceived2 when one asks another  to    
bring the clothes which are not marked1 
he finds that marks  are absent in some 
clothes and brings them2 so it is argued
 that  absence or non-existence can be  
directly perceived ,footnote ref #b4    
,though  there is thus an agreement     
between the ,nyya and the ,vais'esika   
stras about the acceptance of abhva as  
being due to perception1  yet their     
method of handling the matter is        
different4 ,the ,nyya  stras say nothing
 about the categories of dravya1 guna1  
karma1  vis'esa and samavya which form  
the main subjects of ,vais'eska         
discussions ,footnote ref #c4 ,the ,nyya
 stras take much pains to prove  the    
materiality of the senses4 ,but this    
question does not seem to have  been    
important with ,vais'esika4 ,the slight 

reference to this  question in ,,viii4  
ii4 #e-f can hardly be regarded as      
sufficient4  ,the ,vais'esika stras do  
not mention the name of s'vara1 whereas 
the ,nyya stras try to prove his        
existence on eschatological  grounds4   
,the reasons given in support of the    
existence of self  in the ,nyya stras   
are mainly on the ground of the unity of
  sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of
 recognition1 whereas the               
,footnote #a3 ,the only old authority   
which knows these pramnas is ,caraka4   
,but he also gives an interpretation of 
sambhava which is different from  ,nyya 
and calls arthpatti arthaprpti 7,caraka 
,,iii4 viii474    ,footnote #b3 ,the    
details of this example are taken from  
,vtsyyana's  commentary4    ,footnote   
#c3 ,the ,nyya stra no doubt            
incidentally gives a definition of  jti 
as samnaprasavtmik jtih 7,,ii4 ii4 #ga74
    #cje    ,vaisesika lays its main    
emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact
  of knowledge4 ,both the ,nyya and the 

,vais'esika stras admit  the existence  
of atoms1 but all the details of the    
doctrine of  atomic structure in later  
,nyya-,vais'esika are absent there4 ,the
  ,vai'sesika calls salvation           
nihs'reyasa or moksa and the ,nyya      
apavarga4 ,moksa with ,vais'esika is the
 permanent cessation of  connection with
 body2 the apavarga with ,nyya is       
cessation of  pain ,footnote ref l4 ,in 
later times the main points of          
difference between  the ,vais'esika and 
,nyya are said to lie with regard to    
theory of the  notion of number1 changes
 of colour in the molecules by heat1    
etc4  ,thus the former admitted a       
special procedure of the mind by which  
cognitions of number arose in the mind  
7e4g4 at the first moment  there is the 
sense contact with an object1 then the  
notion of oneness1  then from a sense of
 relativeness--apeksbuddhi--notion  of  
two1 then a notion of two-ness1 and then
 the notion of two  things72 again1 the 
doctrine of pilupka 7changes of         

qualities by  heat are produced in atoms
 and not in molecules as ,nyya held7    
was held by ,vais'esika1 which the      
,naiyyikas did not admit ,footnote ref  
#b4 ,but as the ,nyya stras are silent  
on these points1 it is not  possible to 
say that such were really the           
differences between early  ,nyya and    
early ,vaisesika4 ,these differences may
 be said to hold between  the later     
interpreters of ,vais'esika and the     
later interpreters of  ,nyya4 ,the      
,vais'esika as we find it in the        
commentary of  ,pras'astapda 7probably  
sixth century ,a4,d471 and the ,nyya    
from  the time of ,udyotakara have come 
to be treated as almost  the same system
 with slight variations only4 ,i have   
therefore  preferred to treat them      
together4 ,the main presentation of the 
,nyya-,vais'esika philosophy in this    
chapter is that which is found  from the
 sixth century onwards4      ,the       
,vais'esika and ,nyya ,literature4      
,it is difficult to ascertain definitely

 the date of the ,vais'esika  stras by  
,kanda1 also called ,aulkya the son of  
,ulka1 though  there is every reason to 
suppose it to be pre-,buddhistic4 ,it   
,footnote #a3 ,professor ,vanaml        
,vedntatrtha quotes a passage from      
,samksepas'ankarajaya1 ,,xvi4 #fh-fi in 
,j4,a4,s4,b41 #aije1 and another        
passage from a ,nyya writer ,bhsarvaja1 
pp4 #ci-da1 in ,j4,a4,s4,b41 #aiad1  to 
show that the old ,naiyyikas considered 
that there was an element  of happiness 
7sukha7 in the state of mukti           
7salvation7 which the  ,vais'esikas     
denied4 ,no evidence in support of this 
opinion is found  in the ,nyya or the   
,vais'esika stras1 unless the cessation 
of pain  with ,nyya is interpreted as   
meaning the resence of some sort of     
bliss  or happiness4    ,footnote #b3   
,see ,mdhava's                          
,sarvadars'anasamgraha-,aulkyadars'ana4 
#cjf    appears from the ,vyu purna that
 he was born in ,prabhsa near  ,dvrak1  
and was the disciple of ,somas'arm4 ,the

 time of  ,pras'astapda who wrote a     
bhsya 7commentary7 of the ,vais'esika   
stras cannot also unfortunately be      
ascertained4 ,the peculiarity  of       
,pras'astapda's bhsya is this that      
unlike other bhsyas  7which first give  
brief explanations of the text of the   
stras and  then continue to elaborate   
independent explanations by explaining  
the first brief comments71 it does not  
follow the stras but  is an independent 
dissertation based on their main        
contents ,footnote  ref #a4 ,there were 
two other bhsyas on the ,vais'esika     
stras1  namely ,rvana-bhsya and         
,bhardvja-vrtti1 but these are now      
probably lost4 ,references to the former
 are found in  ,kiranvalbhskara of      
,padmanbha ,mis'ra and also in          
,ratnaprabh  #b4 #b4 ,,ii4 ,four        
commentaries were written on this bhsya1
 namely  ,vyomavat by ,vyomas'ekharcrya1
 ,nyyakandal by ,s'ridhara1  ,kiranval  
by ,udayana 7#ihd ,a4,d47 and ,llvat    
,s'rvatscrya4  ,in addition to these    

,jagads'a ,bhattcrya of ,navadvpa and   
,s'ankara  ,mis'ra wrote two other      
commentaries on the ,pras'astapda-bhsya1
  namely ,bhsyaskti and ,kanda-rahasya4 
,s'ankara ,mis'ra 7#adbe  ,a4,d47 also  
wrote a commentary on the ,vais'esika   
stras called the  ,upaskra4 ,of these   
,nyya-kandal of ,s'rdhara on account of 
its  simplicity of style and elaborate  
nature of exposition is probably  the   
best for a modern student of            
,vais'esika4 ,its author was a  native  
of the village of ,bhrisrsti in ,bengal 
7,rdha74 ,his father's  name was        
,baladeva and mother's name was ,acchok 
and he  wrote his work in #iac ,s'aka   
era 7#iij ,a4,d47 as he himself writes  
at the end of his work4    ,the ,nyya   
stra was written by ,aksapda or         
,gautama1 and  the earliest commentary  
on it written by ,vtsyyana is known  as 
the ,vtsyyana-bhsya4 ,the date of       
,vtsyyana has not        ,footnote #a3  
,the bhsya of ,pras'astapda can hardly  
he called a  bhsya 7elaborate           

commentary74 ,he himself makes no such  
claim and  calls his work a compendium  
of the properties of the categories     
7,padrthadharmasamgraha74 ,he takes the 
categories of dravya1  guna1 karma1     
smnya1 vis'esa and samavya in order and 
without  raising any discussions plainly
 narrates what he has got to say on     
them4 ,some of the doctrines which are  
important in later  ,nyya-,vais'esika   
discussions1 such as the doctrine of    
creation and  dissolution1 doctrine of  
number1 the theory that the number of   
atoms  contributes to the atomic measure
 of the molecules1 the doctrine of      
pilupka in connection with the          
transformation of colours by heat  occur
 in his narration for the first time as 
the ,vais'esika stras  are silent on    
these points4 ,it is difficult to       
ascertain his date  definitely2 he is   
the earliest writer on ,vais'esika      
available to us  after ,kanda and it is 
not improbable that he lived in the #eth
 or #fth  century ,a4,d4    #cjg    been

 definitely settled1 but there is reason
 to believe that he  lived some time in 
the beginning of the fourth century     
,a4,d4 ,jacobi  places him in #cjj      
,a4,d4 ,udyotakara 7about #fce ,a4,d47  
wrote a  ,vrttika on ,vtsyyana's bhsya  
to establish the ,nyya views  and to    
refute the criticisms of the ,buddhist  
logician ,dinnga  7about #ejj ,a4,d47 in
 his ,pramnasamuccaya4 ,vcaspatimis'ra  
7#hdj ,a4,d47 wrote a sub-commentary on 
the ,nyyavrttika of  ,udyotakara called 
,nyyavrttikattparyatk in order to make  
clear the right meanings of             
,udyotakara's ,vrttika which was sinking
  in the mud as it were through numerous
 other bad writings                     
7dustarakunibandhapankamagnnm74 ,udayana
 7#ihd ,a4,d47 wrote  a sub-commentary  
on the ,ttparyatk called                
,ttparyatkparis'uddhi4 ,varddhamna      
7#abbe ,a4,d47 wrote a  sub-commentary  
on that called the ,nyyanibandhapraks'a4
 ,padmanbha  wrote a sub-commentary on  
that called ,varddhamnendu and ,s'ankara

  ,mis'ra 7#adbe ,a4,d47 wrote a        
sub-commentary on that called the       
,nyyattparyamandana4 ,in the seventeenth
 century ,vis'vantha  wrote an          
independent short commentary known as   
,vis'vanthavrtti1  on the ,nyya stra1   
and ,rdhmohana wrote a separate         
commentary on the ,nyya stras known as  
,nyyastravivarana4  ,in addition to     
these works on the ,nyya stras many     
other  independent works of great       
philosophical value have been written   
on the ,nyya system4 ,the most important
 of these in medieval  times is the     
,nyyamajari of ,jayanta 7#hhj ,a4,d471  
who flourished  shortly after           
,vcaspatimis'ra4 ,jayanta chooses some  
of the ,nyya  stras for interpretation1 
but he discusses the ,nyya views quite  
independently1 and criticizes the views 
of other systems of ,indian  thought of 
his time4 ,it is far more comprehensive 
than ,vcaspati's  ,ttparyatk1 and its   
style is most delightfully lucid4       
,another  important work is ,udayana's  

,kusumjali in which he tries to  prove  
the existence of s'vara 7,god74 ,this   
work ought to be read  with its         
commentary ,praks'a by ,varddhamna      
7#abbe ,a4,d47 and its  sub-commentary  
,makaranda by ,rucidatta 7#abge ,a4,d474
 ,udayana's  tmatattvaviveka is a       
polemical work against the ,buddhists1  
in  which he tries to establish the     
,nyya doctrine of soul4 ,in addition  to
 these we have a number of useful works 
on ,nyya in later  times4 ,of these the 
following deserve special mention in    
connection  with the present work4      
,bhspariccheda by ,vis'vantha with  its 
commentaries ,muktval1 ,dinakar and     
,rmarudr1 ,tarkasamgraha  with          
,nyyanirnaya1 ,tarkabks of ,kes'ava     
,mis'ra with    #cjh    the commentary  
,nyyapradpa1 ,saptapadrth of ,s'ivditya1
  ,trkikaraks of ,varadarja with the    
commentary ,niskantaka  of ,mallintha1  
,nyyasra of ,mdhava ,deva of the city of
 ,dhra and  ,nyyasiddhntamajar of       
,jnakintha ,bhattcarya with the         

,nyyamanjarisara by ,ydavcrya1 and      
,nyyasiddhntadpa of  ,s'asadhara with   
,prabh by ,s'esnantcrya4    ,the new    
school of ,nyya philosophy known as     
,navya-,nyya  began with ,ganges'a      
,updhyya of ,mithil1 about  #abjj ,a4,d4
 ,ganges'a wrote only on the four       
pramnas admitted by the  ,nyya1 viz4    
pratyaksa1 anumna1 upamna1 and s'abda1  
and not on any of  the topics of ,nyya  
metaphysics4 ,but it so happened that   
his  discussions on anumna 7inference7  
attracted unusually great attention  in 
,navadvpa 7,bengal71 and large numbers  
of commentaries and  commentaries of    
commentaries were written on the anumna 
portion of his work ,tattvacintmani1 and
 many independent  treatises on sabda   
and anumna were also written by the     
scholars  of ,bengal1 which became      
thenceforth for some centuries the home 
of ,nyya studies4 ,the commentaries of  
,raghuntha ,s'iromani  7#aejj ,a4,d471  
,mathur ,bhattcrya 7#aehj ,a4,d471      
,gaddhara ,bhattcrya  7#afej ,a4,d47 and

 ,jagadsa ,bhattcrya 7#aeij ,a4,d471    
commentaries  on ,s'iromani's commentary
 on ,tattvacintmani1 had been  very     
widely read in ,bengal4 ,the new school 
of ,nyya became the  most important     
study in ,navadvpa and there appeared a 
series  of thinkers who produced an     
extensive literature on the subject     
,footnote ref l4,the contribution was   
not in the direction of  metaphysics1   
theology1 ethics1 or religion1 but      
consisted mainly  in developing a system
 of linguistic notations to specify     
accurately  and precisely any concept or
 its relation with other concepts       
,footnote  ref #b4 ,thus for example    
when they wished to define precisely the
  nature of the concomitance of one     
concept with another 7e4g4 smoke  and   
fire71 they would so specify the        
relation that the exact nature  of the  
concomitance should be clearly          
expressed1 and that there  should be no 
confusion or ambiguity4 ,close subtle   
analytic  thinking and the development  

of a system of highly technical         
,footnote #a3 ,from the latter half of  
the twelfth century to the third        
quarter of the sixteenth century the new
 school of ,nyya was started  in ,mithil
 7,behar72 but from the fifteenth to the
 seventeenth century  ,bengal became    
pre-eminently the home of ,nyya studies4
 ,see ,mr  ,cakravartt's paper1 ,j4     
,a4,s4,b4 #aiae4 ,i am indebted to it   
for some  of the dates mentioned in this
 section4    ,footnote #b3 s'varnumna of
 ,raghunatha as well as his             
,padrthatattvanirpana are1 however1     
notable exceptions4    #cji             
expressions mark the development of this
 literature4 ,the technical  expressions
 invented by this school were thus      
generally accepted  even by other       
systems of thought1 wherever the need of
 accurate  and subtle thinking was felt4
 ,but from the time that ,sanskrit      
ceased to be the vehicle of             
philosophical thinking in ,india the    
importance of this literature has       

gradually lost ground1 and it  can      
hardly be hoped that it will ever regain
 its old position by  attracting        
enthusiastic students in large numbers4 
,i cannot close this chapter without    
mentioning the fact that  so far as the 
logical portion of the ,nyya system is  
concerned1  though ,aksapda was the     
first to write a comprehensive account  
of it1 the ,jains and ,buddhists in     
medieval times had independently  worked
 at this subject and had criticized the 
,nyya account  of logic and made        
valuable contributions4 ,in ,jaina logic
  ,das'avaiklikaniryukti of ,bhadrabhu  
7#ceg ,b4,c471 ,umsvti's                
,tattvrthdhigama stra1 ,nyyvatra of     
,siddhasena ,divkara  7#ecc ,a4,d47     
,mnikya ,nandi's 7#hjj ,a4,d47          
,parksmukha stra1 and                   
,pramnanayatattvloklamkra of ,deva ,sri 
7#aaei ,a4,d47 and                      
,prameyakamalamrtanda of ,prabhcandra   
deserve special notice4                 
,pramnasamuccaya and ,nyyapraves'a of   

,dinnga 7#ejj ,a4,d471  ,pramnayrttika  
krik and ,nyyabindu of ,dharmakrtti     
7#fej ,a4,d47 with the commentary of    
,dharmottara are the most  interesting  
of the ,buddhist works on systematic    
logic ,footnote ref l4  ,the diverse    
points of difference between the ,hindu1
 ,jain and  ,buddhist logic require to  
be dealt with in a separate work on     
,indian logic and can hardly be treated 
within the compass of the  present      
volume4    ,it is interesting to notice 
that between the ,vtsyyana  bhsya and   
the ,udyotakara's ,vrttika no ,hindu    
work on logic  of importance seems to   
have been written3 it appears that the  
science of logic in this period was in  
the hands of the ,jains and  the        
,buddhists2 and it was ,dinnga's        
criticism of ,hindu ,nyya  that roused  
,udyotakara to write the ,vrttika4 ,the 
,buddhist and  the ,jain method of      
treating logic separately from          
metaphysics  as an independent study was
 not accepted by the ,hindus till we    

come to ,ganges'a1 and there is probably
 only one ,hindu work of  importance on 
,nyya in the ,buddhist style namely     
,nyyasra  of ,bhsarvaja4 ,other older   
,hindu works generally treated of       
,footnote #a3 ,see ,indian ,logic       
,medieval ,school1 by ,dr ,s4,c4        
,vidybhsana1  for a bibliography of     
,jain and ,buddhist ,logic4    #caj     
inference only along with metaphysical  
and other points of ,nyya  interest     
,footnote ref #a4      ,the main        
doctrine of the ,nyya-,vais'esika       
,philosophy ,footnote ref #b4    ,the   
,nyya-,vais'esika having dismissed the  
doctrine of momentariness  took a       
common-sense view of things1 and held   
that  things remain permanent until     
suitable collocations so arrange        
themselves that the thing can be        
destroyed4 ,thus the jug continues  to  
remain a jug unless or until it is      
broken to pieces by  the stroke of a    
stick4 ,things exist not because they   
can produce  an impression on us1 or    

serve my purposes either directly or    
through knowledge1 as the ,buddhists    
suppose1 but because existence  is one  
of their characteristics4 ,if ,i or you 
or any other perceiver  did not exist1  
the things would continue to exist all  
the same4  ,whether they produce any    
effect on us or on their surrounding    
environments is immaterial4 ,existence  
is the most general  characteristic of  
things1 and it is on account of this    
that things  are testified by experience
 to be existing4    ,as the             
,nyya-,vais'esikas depended solely on   
experience and  on valid reasons1 they  
dismissed the ,smkhya cosmology1 but    
accepted the atomic doctrine of the four
 elements 7bhtas71 earth  7ksiti71 water
 7ap71 fire 7tejas71 and air 7marut74   
,these atoms  are eternal2 the fifth    
substance 7ks'a7 is all pervasive and   
eternal4  ,it is regarded as the cause  
of propagating sound2 though            
all-pervading  and thus in touch with   
the ears of all persons1 it manifests   

sound only in the ear-drum1 as it is    
only there that it shows  itself as a   
sense-organ and manifests such sounds as
 the man deserves  to hear by reason of 
his merit and demerit4 ,thus a deaf  man
 though he has the ks'a as his sense of 
hearing1 cannot hear  on account of his 
demerit which impedes the faculty of    
that sense  organ ,footnote ref #c4 ,in 
addition to these they admitted the     
existence  of time 7kla7 as extending   
from the past through the present to the
        ,footnote #a3 ,almost all the   
books on ,nyya and ,vais'esika referred 
to  have been consulted in the writing  
of this chapter4 ,those who want to be  
acquainted with a fuller bibliography of
 the new school of logic should  refer  
to the paper called ,the ,history of    
,navya ,nyya in ,bengal1 by ,mr4        
,cakravartt in ,j4,a4,s4,b4 #aiae4      
,footnote #b3 ,i have treated ,nyya and 
,vais'esika as the same system4         
,whatever may have been their original  
differences1 they are regarded  since   

about #fjj ,a4,d4 as being in complete  
agreement except in some  minor points4 
,the views of one system are often      
supplemented by those  of the other4    
,the original character of the two      
systems has already  been treated4      
,footnote #c3 ,see ,nyyakandal1 pp4     
#ei-fd4    #caa    endless futurity     
before us4 ,had there been no time we   
could  have no knowledge of it and there
 would be nothing to account  for our   
time-notions associated with all        
changes4 ,the ,smkhya  did not admit the
 existence of any real time2 to them the
 unit  of kla is regarded as the time   
taken by an atom to traverse its  own   
unit of space4 ,it has no existence     
separate from the atoms  and their      
movements4 ,the appearance of kla as a  
separate entity  is a creation of our   
buddhi 7buddhinirmna7 as it represents  
the  order or mode in which the buddhi  
records its perceptions4 ,but  kla in   
,nyya-,vais'esika is regarded as a      
substance existing by  itself4 ,in      

accordance with the changes of things it
 reveals itself  as past1 present1 and  
future4 ,smkhya regarded it as past1    
present1  and future1 as being the modes
 of the constitution of the things  in  
its different manifesting stages of     
evolution 7adhvan74 ,the  astronomers   
regarded it as being clue to the motion 
of the planets4  ,these must all be     
contrasted with the ,nyya-,vais'esika   
conception  of kala which is regarded as
 an all-pervading1 partless  substance  
which appears as many in association    
with the changes  related to it         
,footnote ref l4    ,the seventh        
substance is relative space 7dik74 ,it  
is that substance  by virtue of which   
things are perceived as being on the    
right1 left1 east1 west1 upwards and    
downwards2 kla like dik is  also one4   
,but yet tradition has given us         
varieties of it in the eight  directions
 and in the upper and lower ,footnote   
ref #b4 ,the eighth  substance is the   
soul 7tman7 which is all-pervading4     

,there are  separate tmans for each     
person2 the qualities of knowledge1     
feelings  of pleasure and pain1 desire1 
etc4 belong to tman4 ,manas 7mind7 is   
the ninth substance4 ,it is atomic in   
size and the vehicle of memory2  all    
affections of the soul such as knowing1 
feeling1 and willing1 are  generated by 
the connection of manas with soul1 the  
senses and the  objects4 ,it is the     
intermediate link which connects the    
soul with  the senses1 and thereby      
produces the affections of knowledge1   
feeling1  or willing4 ,with each single 
connection of soul with manas we have  a
 separate affection of the soul1 and    
thus our intellectual experience  is    
conducted in a series1 one coming after 
another and not  simultaneously4 ,over  
and above all these we have ,isvara4    
,the definition        ,footnote #a3    
,see ,nyyakandal1 pp4 #fd-ff1 and       
,nyyamajar1 pp4  #acf-aci4 ,the         
,vais'esika stras regarded time as the  
cause of things  which suffer change but

 denied it of things which are eternal4 
,footnote #b3 ,see ,nyyakandal1 pp4     
#ff-fi1 and ,nyayamajar1 p4 #adj4       
#cab    of substance consists in this1  
that it is independent by itself1       
whereas  the other things such as       
quality 7guna71 action 7karma71 sameness
  or generality 7smnya71 speciality or  
specific individuality  7vis'esa7 and   
the relation of inherence 7samavya7     
cannot show  themselves without the help
 of substance 7dravya74 ,dravya is thus 
the  place of rest 7s'ray7 on which all 
the others depend 7s'rta74  ,dravya1    
guna1 karma1 smnya1 vis'esa1 and samavya
 are the six original  entities of which
 all things in the world are made up    
,footnote ref #a4  ,when a man through  
some special merit1 by the cultivation  
of reason and  a thorough knowledge of  
the fallacies and pitfalls in the way   
of right thinking1 comes to know the    
respective characteristics  and         
differences of the above entities1 he   
ceases to have any  passions and to work

 in accordance with their promptings and
  attains a conviction of the nature of 
self1 and is liberated ,footnote ref    
#b4 ,the ,nyya-,vais'esika is a         
pluralistic system which neither tries  
to  reduce the diversity of experience  
to any universal principle1 nor         
dismisses patent facts of experience on 
the strength of the demands  of the     
logical coherence of mere abstract      
thought4 ,the  entities it admits are   
taken directly from experience4 ,the    
underlying  principle is that at the    
root of each kind of perception there   
must be something to which the          
perception is due4 ,it classified the   
percepts and concepts of experience into
 several ultimate types  or categories  
7padrtha71 and held that the notion of  
each type  was due to the presence of   
that entity4 ,these types are six in    
number--dravya1 guna1 etc4 ,if we take a
 percept ,i see a red  book1 the book   
appears to be an independent entity on  
which  rests the concept of redness and 

oneness1 and we thus call the  book a   
substance 7dravya72 dravya is thus      
defined as that which  has the          
characteristic of a dravya 7dravyatva74 
,so also guna and  karma4 ,in the       
subdivision of different kinds of dravya
 also the  same principle of            
classification is followed4 ,in         
contrasting it with  ,smkhya or         
,buddhism we see that for each unit of  
sensation 7say        ,footnote #a3     
,abhva 7negation7 as dependent on bhva  
7position7 is  mentioned in the         
,vais'esika stras4 ,later ,nyya writers 
such as  ,udayana include abhva as a    
separate category1 but ,s'rdhara a      
contemporary of ,udayana rightly remarks
 that abhva was not  counted by         
,pras'astapda as it was dependent on    
bhva--abhvasya  prthaganupades'ah       
bhvapratantryt na tvabhvt4 ,nyyakandal1 
p4 #f1 and ,laksanval1 p4 #b4           
,footnote #b3 ,tattvato jtesu           
bhydhytmikesu visayesu  dosadars'ant    
viraktasya samhnivrttau tmajasya        

tadarthni  karmnyakurvatah              
tatparitygasdhanni s'rutismrtyuditni    
asankalpitaphalni updadnasya            
tmajnamabhyasyatah                      
prakrstanivarttakadharmopacaye sati     
paripakvtmajnasytyantikas'arraviyogasya 
bhvt4 ,ibid4 p4 #g4    #cac             
whiteness7 the latter would admit a     
corresponding real1 but                 
,nyya-,vais'esika would collect all     
whiteness under the name  of the quality
 of white colour which the atom         
possessed ,footnote ref l4  ,they only  
regarded as a separate entity what      
represented an ultimate  mode of        
thought4 ,they did not enquire whether  
such notions  could be regarded as the  
modification of some other notion or    
not2 but whenever they found that there 
were some experiences  which were       
similar and universal1 they classed them
 as separate  entities or categories4   
,the six ,padrthas3 ,dravya1 ,guna1     
,karma1 ,smnya1  ,vis'esa1 ,samavya4    
,of the six classes of entities or      

categories 7padrtha7 we have  already   
given some account of dravya ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,let us now turn to  the others4
 ,of the qualities 7guna7 the first one 
called rpa  7colour7 is that which can  
be apprehended by the eye alone  and not
 by any other sense4 ,the colours are   
white1 blue1  yellow1 red1 green1 brown 
and variegated 7citra74 ,colours are    
found only in ksiti1 ap and tejas4 ,the 
colours of ap and tejas are  permanent  
7nitya1 but the colour of ksiti changes 
when heat  is applied1 and this1        
,s'rdhara holds1 is due to the fact that
  heat changes the atomic structure of  
ksiti 7earth7 and thus the  old         
constitution of the substance being     
destroyed1 its old colour  is also      
destroyed1 and a new one is generated4  
,rpa is the general  name for the       
specific individual colours4 ,there is  
the genus rpatva  7colourness71 and the 
rpa guna 7quality7 is that on which     
rests this genus2 rpa is not itself a   
genus and can be apprehended  by the    

eye4    ,the second is rasa 7taste71    
that quality of things which can be     
apprehended only by the tongue2 these   
are sweet1 sour1 pungent  7katu71       
astringent 7kasya7 and bitter 7tikta74  
,only ksiti and ap  have taste4 ,the    
natural taste of ap is sweetness4 ,rasa 
like  rpa also denotes the genus        
rasatva1 and rasa as quality must  be   
distinguished from rasa as genus1 though
 both of them are  apprehended by the   
tongue4    ,the third is gandha 7odour71
 that quality which can be  apprehended 
by the nose alone4 ,it belongs to ksiti 
alone4 ,water        ,footnote #a3 ,the 
reference is to ,sautrntika ,buddhism1  
yo yo  vruddhdhysavn nsvekah4 ,see      
,pandits'oka's ,avayavinirkarana1  ,six 
,buddhist ,nyya tracts4    ,footnote #b3
 ,the word padrtha literally means      
denotations of words4    #cad    or air 
is apprehended as having odour on       
account of the presence  of earth       
materials4    ,the fourth is spars'a    
7touch71 that quality which can be      

apprehended  only by the skin4 ,there   
are three kinds of touch1 cold1  hot1   
neither hot nor cold4 ,spars'a belongs  
to ksiti2 ap1 tejas1 and  vyu4 ,the     
fifth s'abda 7sound7 is an attribute of 
ks'a4 ,had there  been no ks'a there    
would have been no sound4    ,the sixth 
is samkhy 7number71 that entity of      
quality belonging  to things by virtue  
of which we can count them as one1 two1 
three1  etc4 ,the conception of numbers 
two1 three1 etc4 is due to a relative   
oscillatory state of the mind           
7apeksbuddhi72 thus when there are  two 
jugs before my eyes1 ,i have the        
notion--,this is one jug and  that is   
another jug4 ,this is called            
apeksbuddhi2 then in the  two jugs there
 arises the quality of twoness 7dvitva7 
and then an  indeterminate perception   
7nirvikalpa-dvitva-guna7 of dvitva in us
  and then the determinate perceptions  
that there are the two jugs4  ,the      
conceptions of other numbers as well as 
of many arise in a  similar manner      

,footnote ref #a4    ,the seventh is    
parimiti 7measure71 that entity of      
quality in  things by virtue of which we
 perceive them as great or small and    
speak of them as such4 ,the measure of  
the partless atoms is  called           
parimandala parimna2 it is eternal1 and 
it cannot generate  the measure of any  
other thing4 ,its measure is its own    
absolutely2  when two atoms generate a  
dyad 7dvyanuka7 it is not  the measure  
of the atom that generates the anu      
7atomic7 and  the hrasva 7small7 measure
 of the dyad molecule 7dvyanuka71  for  
then the size 7parimna7 of it would have
 been still smaller  than the measure of
 the atom 7parimandala71 whereas the    
measure of the dyanuka is of a different
 kind1 namely the  small 7hrasva7       
,footnote ref #b4 ,of course two atoms  
generate a dyad1 but  then the number   
7samkhy7 of the atom should be regarded 
as  bringing forth a new kind of        
measure1 namely the small 7hrasva7      
measure in the dyads4 ,so again when    

three dyads 7dyanuka7  compose a        
tryanuka the number and not the measure 
small        ,footnote #a3 ,this is     
distinctively a ,vais'esika view        
introduced by  ,pras'astapda4 ,nyya     
seems to be silent on this matter4 ,see 
,s'ankara  ,mis'ra's ,upaskra1 ,,vii4   
ii4 #h4    ,footnote #b ,it should be   
noted that the atomic measure appears in
 two forms  as eternal as in paramnus   
and non-eternal as in the dvyanuka4 ,the
  parimandala parimna is thus a variety 
of anuparimna4 ,the  anuparimna and the 
hrasvaparimna represent the two         
dimensions of  the measure of dvyanukas 
as mahat and drgha are with reference   
to tryanukas4 ,see ,nyyakandal1 p4 #acc4
    #cae    7hrasva7 of the dyad is the 
cause of the measure great 7mahat7  of  
the tryanuka4 ,but when we come to the  
region of these gross  tryanukas we find
 that the great measure of the tryanukas
 is  the cause of the measure of other  
grosser bodies composed by  them4 ,for  
as many tryanukas constitute a gross    

body1 so much  bigger does the thing    
become4 ,thus the cumulation of the     
tryanukas  of mahat parimna makes things
 of still more mahat parimna4  ,the     
measure of tryanukas is not only        
regarded as mahat  but also as drgha    
7long7 and this drgha parimna has to be 
admitted  as coexisting with mahat      
parimna but not identical1 for  things  
not only appear as great but also as    
long 7drgha74 ,here  we find that the   
accumulation of tryanukas means the     
accumulation  of great 7mahat7 and long 
7drgha7 parimna1 and hence  the thing   
generated happens to possess a measure  
which is greater  and longer than the   
individual atoms which composed them4   
,now the hrasva parimna of the dyads is 
not regarded as having  a lower degree  
of greatness or length but as a separate
 and distinct  type of measure which is 
called small 7hrasva74 ,as accumulation 
of grossness1 greatness or length1      
generates still more greatness1         
grossness and length in its effect1 so  

an accumulation of the  hrasva 7small7  
parimana ought to generate still more   
hrasva  parimana1 and we should expect  
that if the hrasva measure of  the dyads
 was the cause of the measure of the    
tryanukas1 the  tryanukas should be even
 smaller than the dyanukas4 ,so also if 
the atomic and circular 7parimandala7   
size of the atoms is regarded  as       
generating by their measure the measure 
of the dyanukas1  then the measure of   
the dyanukas ought to be more atomic    
than the atoms4 ,the atomic1 small1 and 
great measures should  not be regarded  
as representing successively bigger     
measures produced  by the mere          
cumulation of measures1 but each should 
be  regarded as a measure absolutely    
distinct1 different from or foreign  to 
the other measure4 ,it is therefore held
 that if grossness in the  cause        
generates still more greatness in the   
effect1 the smallness  and the          
parimandala measure of the dyads and    
atoms ought to  generate still more     

smallness and subtleness in their       
effect4  ,but since the dyads and the   
tryanuka molecules are seen to  be      
constituted of atoms and dyads          
respectively1 and yet are  not found to 
share the measure of their causes1 it is
 to be argued  that the measures of the 
atoms and dyads do not generate the     
measure of their effects1 but it is     
their number which is the cause    #caf 
of the measure of the latter4 ,this     
explains anuparimna1 hrasva  parimna1   
mahat parimna1 and drgha parimna4 ,the  
parimna  of ks'a1 kla1 dik and tman     
which are regarded as all-pervasive1  is
 said to be paramamahat 7absolutely     
large74 ,the parimnas  of the atoms1    
ks'a1 kla1 dik1 manas1 and tman are     
regarded  as eternal 7nitya74 ,all other
 kinds of parimnas as belonging to      
non-eternal things are regarded as      
non-eternal4    ,the eighth is prthaktva
 7mutual difference or separateness of  
things71 that entity or quality in      
things by virtue of which things  appear

 as different 7e4g4 this is different   
from that74 ,difference is  perceived by
 us as a positive notion and not as a   
mere negation  such as this jug is not  
this pot4    ,the ninth is samyoga      
7connection71 that entity of guna by    
virtue of which things appear to us as  
connected4    ,the tenth is vibhga      
7separation71 that entity of guna which 
destroys the connection or contact of   
things4    ,the eleventh and twelfth    
gunas1 paratva and aparatva1 give  rise 
in us to the perceptions of long time   
and short time1 remote  and near4       
,the other gunas such as                
buddhi7knowledge71sukha 7happiness71    
duhkha 7sorrow71 icch 7will71 dvesa     
7antipathy or hatred7 and  yatna        
7effort7 can occur only with reference  
to soul4    ,the characteristic of      
gurutva 7heaviness7 is that by virtue of
  which things fall to the ground4 ,the 
guna of sneha 7oiliness7  belongs to    
water4 ,the guna of samskra is of three 
kinds1 7i7 vega  7velocity7 which keeps 

a thing moving in different directions1 
7#b7 sthiti-sthpaka 7elasticity7 on     
account of which a gross thing  tries to
 get back its old state even though     
disturbed1 7#c7 bhvan  is that quality  
of tman by which things are constantly  
practised or by  which things           
experienced are remembered and          
recognized ,footnote ref l4  ,dharma is 
the quality the presence of which       
enables the soul to enjoy  happiness or 
to attain salvation ,footnote ref #b4   
,adharma is        ,footnote #a3        
,pras'astapda says that bhvan is a      
special characteristic  of the soul1    
contrary to intoxication1 sorrow and    
knowledge1 by which  things seen1 heard 
and felt are remembered and recognized4 
,through  unexpectedness 7as the sight  
of a camel for a man of ,south ,india71 
repetition 7as in studies1 art etc47 and
 intensity of interest1 the  samskra    
becomes particularly strong4 ,see       
,nyyakandal1 p4 #afg4  ,kanda however is
 silent on these points4 ,he only says  

that by a  special kind of contact of   
the mind with soul and also by the      
samskra1  memory 7smrti7 is produced    
7ix4 #b4 #f74    ,footnote #b3          
,pras'astapda speaks of dharma 7merit7  
as being a quality  of the soul4        
,thereupon ,s'ridhara points out that   
this view does not admit  that dharma is
 a power of karma 7nakarmasmarthyam74   
,sacrifice etc4  cannot be dharma for   
these actions being momentary they      
cannot generate  the effects which are  
only to be reaped at a future time4 ,if 
the action  is destroyed its power      
7smarthya7 cannot last4 ,so dharma is to
 be  admitted as a quality generated in 
the self by certain courses of conduct  
which produce happiness for him when    
helped by certain other conditions  of  
time1 place1 etc4 ,faith 7s'raddh71     
non-injury1 doing good to all  beings1  
truthfulness1 non-stealing1 sex-control1
 sincerity1 control of  anger1          
ablutions1 taking of pure food1 devotion
 to particular gods1  fasting1 strict   

adherence to scriptural duties1 and the 
performance of  duties assigned to each 
caste and stage of life1 are enumerated 
by  ,pras'astapda as producing dharma4  
,the person who strictly adheres to     
these duties and the yamas and niyamas  
7cf4 ,patajali's ,yoga7 and  attains    
,yoga by a meditation on the six        
padrthas attains a dharma  which brings 
liberation 7moksa74 ,s'rdhara refers to 
the ,smkhya-,yoga  account of the method
 of attaining salvation 7,nyyakandal1   
pp4 #bgb-bhj74  ,see also ,vallabha's   
,nyyalilvat1 pp4 #gd-ge4 7,bombay1      
#aiae47    #cag    the opposite quality1
 the presence of which in the soul leads
 a  man to suffer4 ,adrsta or destiny is
 that unknown quality of  things and of 
the soul which brings about the cosmic  
order1 and  arranges it for the         
experience of the souls in accordance   
with  their merits or demerits4         
,karma means movement2 it is the third  
thing which must  be held to be as      
irreducible a reality as dravya or guna4

 ,there  are five kinds of movement1    
7#a7 upward1 7#b7 downward1 7#c7        
contraction1  7#d7 expansion1 7#e7      
movement in general4 ,all kinds of      
karmas rest on substances just1 as the  
gunas do1 and cause the  things to which
 they belong to move4    ,smnya is the  
fourth category4 ,it means the genus1 or
 aspect  of generality or sameness that 
we notice in things4 ,thus in spite  of 
the difference of colour between one cow
 and another1 both of  them are found to
 have such a sameness that we call them 
cows4  ,in spite of all diversity in all
 objects around us1 they are all        
perceived as sat or existing4 ,this sat 
or existence is thus a sameness1  which 
is found to exist in all the three      
things1 dravya1 guna1  and karma4 ,this 
sameness is called smnya or jti1 and it 
is  regarded as a separate thing which  
rests on dravya1 guna1 or  karma4 ,this 
highest genus satt 7being7 is called    
parajti 7highest  universal71 the other 
intermediate jtis are called aparajti   

7lower  universals71 such as the genus  
of dravya1 of karma1 or of guna1 or     
still more intermediate jtis such as    
gotvjti 7the genus cow71  nlatvajti 7the
 genus blue74 ,the intermediate jtis or 
genera  sometimes appear to have a      
special aspect as a species1 such as    
pas'utva 7animal jti7 and gotva 7the cow
 jti72 here however  gotva appears as a 
species1 yet it is in reality nothing   
but a jti4  ,the aspect as species has  
no separate existence4 ,it is jti which 
from one aspect appears as genus and    
from another as species4    #cah        
,this jti or smnya thus must be regarded
 as having a separate  independent      
reality though it is existent in dravya1
 guna and  karma4 ,the ,buddhists denied
 the existence of any independent       
reality of smnya1 but said that the     
sameness as cow  was really but the     
negation of all non-cows 7apoha74 ,the  
perception  of cow realizes the negation
 of all non-cows and this  is           
represented in consciousness as the     

sameness as cow4 ,he who  should regard 
this sameness to be a separate and      
independent  reality perceived in       
experience might also discover two horns
  on his own head ,footnote ref #a4 ,the
 ,nyya-,vais'esika said that negation   
of non-cows is a negative perception1   
whereas the sameness perceived  as cow  
is a positive perception1 which cannot  
be explained  by the aforesaid negation 
theory of the ,buddhists4 ,smnya has    
thus to be admitted to have a separate  
reality4 ,all perception as  sameness of
 a thing is due to the presence of this 
thing in that  object ,footnote ref l4  
,this jti is eternal or                 
non-destructible1 for even  with the    
destruction of individuals comprehended 
within the jti1 the  latter is not      
destroyed ,footnote ref #b4    ,through 
vis'esa things are perceived as diverse4
 ,no single  sensation that we receive  
from the external world probably agrees 
with any other sensation1 and this      
difference must be due to the  existence

 of some specific differences amongst   
the atoms themselves4  ,the1 specific   
difference existing in the atoms1       
emancipated  souls and minds must be    
regarded as eternally existing1 and it  
,footnote #a3 ,the ,buddhist            
,pandits'oka says that there is no      
single thing  running through different 
individuals 7e4g4 cooks7 by virtue of   
which the  smnya could be established1  
for if it did exist then we could have  
known it simply by seeing any cook      
without any reference to his action  of 
cooking by virtue of which the notion of
 generality is formed4 ,if  there is a  
similarity between the action of cooks  
that cannot establish  jti in the cooks1
 for the similarity applies to other    
things1 viz4 the  action of the cooks4  
,if the specific individualities of a   
cow should  require one common factor to
 hold them together1 then these should  
require another and that another1 and we
 have a regressus ad infinitum4         
,whatever being perceptible is not      

perceived is non-existent               
7yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam          
sannopalabhyate tattadasat74 ,smnya is  
such1 therefore smnya is non existent4  
,no smnya can be admitted to  exist as  
an entity4 ,but it is only as a result  
of the impressions of past  experiences 
of existence and non existence that this
 notion is formed and  transferred      
erroneously to external objects4 ,apart 
from this no smnya  can be pointed out  
as being externally perceptible         
--,smnyadsanadikprasarit--in ,six       
,buddhist ,nyya ,tracts4 ,the ,vedanta  
also does not think that either by      
perception or by inference we can know  
jti as a separate substance4 ,so it     
discards jti4 ,see ,vedntaparibhs1      
,sikhamani and ,mamprabh1 pp4 #fi-ga4   
,see also ,sriharsa's                   
,khandanakhandakhadya1 pp #ajgi-ajhf4   
,footnote #b3 ,similarity 7sdrs'ya7 is  
not regarded as a separate category1    
for it is defined as identity in        
difference 7tadbhinnatve sati           

tadgatabhyodharmavattvam74    #cai    is
 on account of its presence that atoms  
appear as different to the  yogins who  
can perceive them4    ,samavya1 the     
inseparable relation of inherence1 is a 
relation  by virtue of which two        
different things such as substance and  
attribute1 substance and karma1         
substance and smnya1 karana  7cause7 and
 krya 7effect71 atoms and vis'esa1      
appear so unified  that they represent  
one whole1 or one identical inseparable 
reality4  ,this peculiar relation of    
inseparable inherence is the cause why  
substance1 action1 and attribute1 cause 
and effect1 and jti in substance  and   
attribute appear as indissolubly        
connected as if they  are one and the   
same thing ,samyoga or contact may take 
place  between two things of the same   
nature which exist as disconnected  and 
may later on be connected 7yutasiddha71 
such as when ,i put  my pen on the      
table4 ,the pen and the table are both  
substances  and were disconnected1 the  

samynga relation is the guna by  virtue 
of which they appear to be connected for
 a while4 ,samavya  however makes       
absolutely difficient things such as    
dravya and  guna and karma or karana and
 karya 7clay and jug7 appear as  one    
inseparable whole 7ayutasiddha74 ,this  
relation is thus a  separate and        
independent category4 ,this is not      
regarded as  many like samyogas         
7contact7 but as one and eternal because
  it has no cause4 ,this or that object 
7eg4 jug7 may be destroyed  but the     
samavya relation which was never brought
 into being  by anybody always remains  
,footnote ref #a4    ,these six things  
are called the six padrthas or          
independent  realities experienced in   
perception and expressed in language4   
,the ,theory of ,causation4    ,the     
,nyya-,vais'esika in most of its        
speculations took that  view of things  
which finds expression in our language1 
and which  we tacitly assume as true in 
all our ordinary experience4 ,thus      

,footnote #a3 ,the ,vednta does not     
admit the existence of the relation of  
samavya as subsisting between two       
different entities 7e4g4 substance  and 
qualities74 ,thus ,s'ankara says        
7,brahma-strabhsya ,,ii4 ii4 #ac7  that 
if a samavya relation is to be admitted 
to connect two different  things1 then  
another samavya would be necessary to   
connect it with  either of the two      
entities that it intended to connect1   
and that  another1 and so there will be 
a vicious infinite 7anavasth74  ,nyya1  
however1 would not regard it as vicious 
at all4 ,it is well to  remember that   
the ,indian systems acknowledge two     
kinds of  anavasth--prmnik 7valid       
infinite1 as in case of the question  of
 the seed and the tree1 or of the avidy 
and the passions71 and another  aprmnik 
anavasth 7vicious infinite7 as when the 
admission of  anything invokes an       
infinite chain before it can be         
completed4    #cbj    they admitted     
dravya1 guna1 karma and smnya1 ,vis'esa 

they  had to admit as the ultimate      
peculiarities of atoms1 for they did    
not admit that things were continually  
changing their qualities1  and that     
everything could be produced out of     
everything by a  change of the          
collocation or arrangement of the       
constituting atoms4  ,in the production 
of the effect too they did not admit    
that the  effect was potentially        
pre-existent in the cause4 ,they held   
that  the material cause 7e4g4 clay7 had
 some power within it1 and the          
accessory and other instrumental causes 
7such as the stick1 the  wheel etc47 had
 other powers2 the collocation of these 
two destroyed  the cause1 and produced  
the effect which was not existent       
before but was newly produced4 ,this is 
what is called the  doctrine of         
asatkryavda4 ,this is just the opposite 
of the  ,smkhya axiom1 that what is     
existent cannot be destroyed nbhvo      
vidyate satah7 and that the non-existent
 could never be  produced 7nsato vidyate

 bhvah74 ,the objection to this view is 
that if what is non-existent is         
produced1 then even such impossible     
things as the hare's horn could also be 
produced4 ,the  ,nyya-,vais'esika answer
 is that the view is not that anything  
that is non-existent can be produced1   
but that which is produced  was         
non-existent ,footnote ref #a4    ,it is
 held by ,mmms that an unseen power     
resides in the  cause which produces the
 effect4 ,to this ,nyya objects that    
this  is neither a matter of observation
 nor of legitimate hypothesis1 for      
there is no reason to suppose that there
 is any transcendental  operation in    
causal movement as this can be          
satisfactorily explained  by molecular  
movement 7parispanda74 ,there is nothing
  except the invariable time relation   
7antecedence and sequence7  between the 
cause and the effect1 but the mere      
invariableness of  an antecedent does   
not suffice to make it the cause of what
  succeeds2 it must be an unconditional 

antecedent as well                      
7anyathsiddhis'nyasya niyatprvavarttit74
 ,unconditionality  and invariability   
are indispensable for kryakrana-bhva or 
cause and effect relation4 ,for example1
 the non-essential or  adventitious     
accompaniments of an invariable         
antecedent may also  be invariable      
antecedents2 but they are not           
unconditional1 only  collateral or      
indirect4 ,in other words their         
antecedence is conditional  upon        
something else 7na svtantryena74 ,the   
potter's stick is an  unconditional     
invariable antecedent of the jar2 but   
the colour        ,footnote #a3         
,nyyamujari1 p4 #did4    #cba    of a   
stick or its texture or size1 or any    
other accompaniment  or accident which  
does not contribute to the work done1 is
  not an unconditional antecedent1 and  
must not therefore be  regarded as a    
cause4 ,similarly the co-effects of the 
invariable  antecedents or what enters  
into the production of their  co-effects

 may themselves be invariable           
antecedents2 but they  are not          
unconditional1 being themselves         
conditioned by those  of the antecedents
 of which they are effects4 ,for        
example1 the  sound produced by the     
stick or by the potter's wheel          
invariably  precedes the jar but it is a
 co-effect2 and ks'a 7ether7 as the     
substrate and vyu 7air7 as the vehicle  
of the sound enter into  the production 
of this co-effect1 but these are no     
unconditional  antecedents1 and must    
therefore be rejected in an enumeration 
of conditions or causes of the jar4 ,the
 conditions of the  conditions should   
also be rejected2 the invariable        
antecedent  of the potter 7who is an    
invariable antecedent of the jar71  the 
potter's father1 does not stand in a    
causal relation to the  potter's        
handiwork4 ,in fact the antecedence must
 not only be  unconditionally           
invariable1 but must also be immediate4 
,finally  all seemingly invariable      

antecedents which may be dispensed with 
or left out are not unconditional and   
cannot therefore be regarded  as causal 
conditions4 ,thus ,dr4 ,seal in         
describing it rightly  remarks1 ,in the 
end1 the discrimination of what is      
necessary to  complete the sum of causes
 from what is dependent1 collateral1    
secondary1 superfluous1 or inert 7i4e4  
of the relevant from the  irrelevant    
factors71 must depend on the test of    
expenditure of  energy4 ,this test the  
,nyya would accept only in the sense of 
an operation analysable into molar or   
molecular motion 7parispanda  eva       
bhautiko vyprah karotyarthah atndriyastu
 vyparo  nsti4 ,jayanta's ,majari hnika 
,i71 but would emphatically  reject1 if 
it is advanced in support of the notion 
of a mysterious  causal power or        
efficiency 7s'akti7 ,footnote ref #a4   
,with ,nyya all  energy is necessarily  
kinetic4 ,this is a peculiarity of      
,nyya--its  insisting that the effect is
 only the sum or resultant of the       

operations  of the different causal     
conditions--that these operations are of
  the nature of motion or kinetic1 in   
other words it firmly holds  to the view
 that causation is a case of expenditure
 of energy1  i4e4 a redistribution of   
motion1 but at the same time absolutely 
repudiates the ,smkhya conception of    
power or productive        ,footnote #a3
 ,dr ,p4,c4 ,ray's ,hindu ,chemistry1   
#aiji1 pp4 #bdi-bej4    #cbb            
efficiency as metaphysical or           
transcendental 7atndriya7 and finds     
nothing in the cause other than         
unconditional invariable complements  of
 operative conditions 7krana-smagr71 and
 nothing  in the effect other than the  
consequent phenomenon which results     
from the joint operations of the        
antecedent conditions ,footnote ref #a4 
,certain general conditions such as     
relative space 7dik71 time  7kla71 the  
will of s'vara1 destiny 7adrsta7 are    
regarded  as the common cause of all    
effects 7kryatva-prayojaka74 ,those are 

called sdhrana-krana 7common cause7 as  
distinguished from the  specific causes 
which determine the specific effects    
which are called  sdhrana krana4 ,it may
 not be out of place here to notice that
  ,nyya while repudiating transcendental
 power 7s'akti7 in the mechanism  of    
nature and natural causation1 does not  
deny the existence of  metaphysical     
conditions like merit 7dharma71 which   
constitutes a  system of moral ends that
 fulfil themselves through the          
mechanical  systems and order of nature4
    ,the causal relation then like the  
relation of genus to species1  is a     
natural relation of concomitance1 which 
can be ascertained  only by the uniform 
and uninterrupted experience of         
agreement in  presence and agreement in 
absence1 and not by a deduction from  a 
certain a priori principle like that of 
causality or identity of  essence       
,footnote ref #b4    ,the material cause
 such as the clay is technically called 
the  samavyi-krana of the jug4 ,samavya 

means as we have seen  an intimate1     
inseparable relation of inherence4 ,a   
krana is called  samavyi when its       
materials are found inseparably         
connected  with the materials of the    
effect4 ,asamavyi-krana is that which   
produces its characteristics in the     
effect through the medium of  the       
samavyi or material cause1 e4g4 the clay
 is not the cause of  the colour of the 
jug but the colour of the clay is the   
cause of the  colour of the jug4 ,the   
colour of the clay which exists in the  
clay  in inseparable relation is the    
cause of the colour of the jug4 ,this   
colour of the clay is thus called the   
asamavyi cause of the jug4  ,any quality
 7guna7 or movement which existing in   
the samavya  cause in the samavya       
relation determines the characteristics 
of  the effect is called the            
asamavyi-krana4 ,the instrumental       
,footnote #a3 ,dr ,p4,c4 ,ray's ,hindu  
,chemistry1 #aiji1 pp4 #bdi-bej4        
,footnote #b3 ,see for this portion ,dr 

,b4,n4 ,seal's ,positive ,sciences of   
the  ,ancient ,hindus1 pp4 #bfc-bff4    
,sarvadars'anasamgraha on ,buddhism4    
,nyyamajar ,bhs-pariccheda1 with        
,muktval and ,dinakar1 and              
,tarkasmgraha4 ,the doctrine of         
,anyathsiddhi was systematically        
developed from the time of ,ganges'a4   
#cbc    nimitta and accessory 7sahakri7 
causes are those which help the         
material cause to produce the effect4   
,thus the potter1 the wheel  and the    
stick may be regarded as the nimitta and
 the sahakri  causes of the effect4     
,we know that the ,nyya-,vais'esika     
regards the effect as nonexistent1      
before the operation of the cause in    
producing it1 but it  holds that the    
gunas in the cause are the causes of the
 gunas in  the effect1 e4g4 the black   
colour of the clay is the cause of the  
black colour of the effect1 except in   
cases where heat comes as an  extraneous
 cause to generate other qualities2 thus
 when a clay  jug is burnt1 on account  

of the heat we get red colour1 though   
the  colour of the original clay and the
 jug was black4 ,another important      
exception is to be found in the case of 
the production of  the parimnas of      
dvyanukas and trasarenus which are not  
produced  by the parimnas of an anu or a
 dyanuka1 but by their  number as we    
have already seen4      ,dissolution    
7,pralaya7 and ,creation 7,srsti74      
,the doctrine of pralaya is accepted by 
all the ,hindu systems  except the ,mmms
 ,footnote ref #a4 ,according to the    
,nyya-,vais'esika  view s'vara wishing  
to give some respite or rest to all     
living beings  desires to bring about   
dissolution 7samhreccho bhavati74       
,simultaneously  with it the adrsta     
force residing in all the souls and     
forming bodies1 senses1 and the gross   
elements1 ceases to act                 
7s'akti-pratibandha74 ,as a result of   
this no further bodies1 senses1  or     
other products come into being4 ,then   
for the bringing about  of the          

dissolution of all produced things 7by  
the desire of s'vara7  the separation of
 the atoms commences and thus all       
combinations  as bodies or senses are   
disintegrated2 so all earth is reduced  
to  the disintegrated atomic state1 then
 all ap1 then all tejas and then  all   
vyu4 ,these disintegrated atoms and the 
souls associated  with dharma1 adharma  
and past impressions 7samskra7 remain   
suspended in their own inanimate        
condition4 ,for we know that  souls in  
their natural condition are lifeless and
 knowledgeless1  non-intelligent        
entities4 ,it is only when these are    
connected  with bodies that they possess
 knowledge through the activity of      
manas4 ,in the state of pralaya owing to
 the adrsta of souls the                
,footnote #a3 ,the doctrine of pralaya  
and srsti is found only in later        
,nyya-,vais'esika works1 but the stras  
of both the systems seem to be  silent  
on the matter4    #cbd    atoms do not  
conglomerate4 ,it is not an act of      

cruelty on the  part of s'vara that he  
brings about dissolution1 for he does it
 to  give some rest to the sufferings of
 the living beings4    ,at the time of  
creation1 s'vara wishes to create and   
this desire  of s'vara works in all the 
souls as adrsta4 ,this one eternal      
desire of s'vara under certain          
conditions of time 7e4g4 of pralaya7  as
 accessory causes 7sahakri7 helps the   
disintegration of atoms  and at other   
times 7e4g4 that of creation7 the       
constructive process  of integration and
 unification of atoms for the           
world-creation4  ,when it acts in a     
specific capacity in the diverse souls  
it is called  adrsta4 ,at the time of   
dissolution the creative function of    
this  adrsta is suspended and at the    
time of creation it finds full play4    
,at the time of creation action first   
begins in the vyu atoms by  the kinetic 
function of this adrsta1 by the contact 
of the souls  with the atoms4 ,by such  
action the air atoms come in contact    

with one another and the dvyanukas are  
formed and then in a  similar way the   
tryanukas are formed1 and thus vyu      
originates4  ,after vyu1 the ap is      
formed by the conglomeration of water   
atoms1 and then the tejas atoms         
conglomerate and then the earth  atoms4 
,when the four elements are thus        
conglomerated in the  gross form1 the   
god ,brahm and all the worlds are       
created by  s'vara and ,brahm is        
directed by s'vara to do the rest of the
  work4 ,brahm thus arranges for the    
enjoyment and suffering of  the fruits  
of diverse kinds of karma1 good or bad4 
s'vara brings  about this creation not  
for any selfish purpose but for the good
  of all beings4 ,even here sorrows have
 their place that they  may lead men to 
turn from worldly attachment and try for
  the attainment of the highest good1   
mukti4 ,moreover s'vara  arranges for   
the enjoyment of pleasures and the      
suffering of  pains according to the    
merits and demerits of men1 just as in  

our ordinary experience we find that a  
master awards prizes  or punishments    
according to good or bad deeds ,footnote
 ref #a4 ,many ,nyya  books do not speak
 of the appointment of a ,brahm as      
deputy  for supervision of the due      
disposal of the fruits of karma         
according to merit or demerit4 ,it is   
also held that pralaya and  creation    
were brought about in accordance with   
the karma of  men1 or that it may be due
 to a mere play 7ll7 of s'vara4  s'vara 
is one1 for if there were many s'varas  
they might quarrel4  ,the will of s'vara
 not only brings about dissolution and  
creation1        ,footnote #a3 ,see     
,nyyakandal1 pp4 #dh-ed4    #cbe    but 
also acts always among us in a general  
way1 for without it  our karmas could   
not ripen1 and the consequent disposal  
of  pleasures and sorrows to us and a   
corresponding change in the  exterior   
world in the form of order or harmony   
could not happen4  ,the exterior world  
is in perfect harmony with men's        

actions4  ,their merits and demerits and
 all its changes and modifications  take
 place in accordance with merits and    
demerits4 ,this desire  7icch7 of s'vara
 may thus be compared with the icch of  
s'vara  as we find it in the ,yoga      
system4      ,proof of the ,existence of
 s'vara4    ,smkhya asserts that the    
teleology of the prakrti is sufficient  
to explain all order and arrangement of 
the cosmos4 ,the  ,mmmsakas1 the        
,crvkas1 the ,buddhists and the ,jains  
all  deny the existence of s'vara       
7,god74 ,nyya believes that s'vara  has 
fashioned this universe by his will out 
of the ever-existing  atoms4 ,for every 
effect 7e4g4 a jug7 must have its cause4
 ,if  this be so1 then this world with  
all its order and arrangement  must also
 be due to the agency of some cause1 and
 this cause is  s'vara4 ,this world is  
not momentary as the ,buddhists suppose1
  but is permanent as atoms1 is also an 
effect so far as it is a  collocation of
 atoms and is made up of parts like all 

other individual  objects 7e4g4 jug1    
etc471 which we call effects4 ,the world
  being an effect like any other effect 
must have a cause like any  other       
effect4 ,the objection made against this
 view is that such  effects as we       
ordinarily perceive may be said to have 
agents  as their causes but this        
manifest world with mountains1 rivers1  
oceans etc4 is so utterly different in  
form from ordinary effects  that we     
notice every day1 that the law that     
every effect must have  a cause cannot  
be said to hold good in the present     
case4 ,the  answer that ,nyya gives is  
that the concomitance between two       
things must be taken in its general     
aspect neglecting the specific          
peculiarities of each case of observed  
concomitance4 ,thus ,i had  seen many   
cases of the concomitance of smoke with 
fire1 and had  thence formed the notion 
that wherever there is smoke there is   
fire2 but if ,i had only observed small 
puffs of smoke and small  fires1 could  

,i say that only small quantities of    
smoke could lead  us to the inference of
 fire1 and could ,i hold that therefore 
large  volumes of smoke from the burning
 of a forest should not be  sufficient  
reason for us to infer the existence of 
fire in the forest8    #cbf    ,thus our
 conclusion should not be that only     
smaller effects  are preceded by their  
causes1 but that all effects are        
invariably  and unconditionally preceded
 by causes4 ,this world therefore  being
 an effect must be preceded by a cause1 
and this cause is  s'vara4 ,this cause  
we cannot see1 because s'vara has no    
visible  body1 not because he does not  
exist4 ,it is sometimes said that  we   
see every day that shoots come out of   
seeds and they are  not produced by any 
agent4 ,to such an objection the ,nyya  
answer is that even they are created by 
,god1 for they are also  effects4 ,that 
we do not see any one to fashion them is
 not  because there is no maker of them1
 but because the creator cannot  be     

seen4 ,if the objector could distinctly 
prove that there was  no invisible maker
 shaping these shoots1 then only could  
he point  to it as a case of            
contradiction4 ,but so long as this is  
not done  it is still only a doubtful   
case of enquiry and it is therefore     
legitimate  for us to infer that since  
all effects have a cause1 the shoots  as
 well as the manifest world being       
effects must have a cause4  ,this cause 
is s'vara4 ,he has infinite knowledge   
and is all merciful4  ,at the beginning 
of creation ,he created the ,vedas4 ,he 
is like our  father who is always       
engaged in doing us good ,footnote ref  
#a4      ,tht ,nyya-,vais'esika         
,physics4    ,the four kinds of atoms   
are earth1 water1 fire1 and air atoms4  
,these have mass1 number1 weight1       
fluidity 7or hardness71 viscosity  7or  
its opposite71 velocity1 characteristic 
potential colour1  taste1 smell1 or     
touch1 not produced by the chemical     
operation of  heat4 ks'a 7space7 is     

absolutely inert and structure-less     
being  only as the substratum of sound1 
which is supposed to travel  wave-like  
in the manifesting medium of air4       
,atomic combination  is only possible   
with the four elements4 ,atoms cannot   
exist in an uncombined condition in the 
creation stage2 atmospheric  air however
 consists of atoms in an uncombined     
state4    ,two atoms combine to form a  
binary molecule 7dvyanuka74 ,two1       
three1 four1 or five dvyanukas form     
themselves into grosser molecules  of   
tryanuka1 caturanuka1 etc4 ,footnote ref
 #b4 ,though this was the  generally    
current view1 there was also another    
view as has been pointed  out by ,dr    
,b4,n4 ,seal in his ,positive ,sciences 
of the ,ancient ,hindus1 that  the atoms
 have also an inherent tendency to      
unite1 and that        ,footnote #a3    
,see ,jayanta's ,nyyamajar1 pp4         
#aij-bjd1 and ,udayana's  ,kusumjali    
with ,praks'a and s'varnumna of         
,raghuntha4    ,footnote #b3 ,kadcit    

tribhirrabhyate iti tryanukamityucyate1 
kadcit  caturbhirrabhyate kadcit        
pacabhiriti yathestam kalpan4           
,nyyakandal1 p4 #cb4    #cbg    they do 
so in twos1 threes1 or fours1 either by 
the atoms falling into  groups of       
threes1 fours1 etc41 directly1 or by the
 successive addition  of one atom to    
each preceding aggregate ,footnote ref  
l4 ,of course the  atoms are regarded as
 possessed of an incessant vibratory    
motion4 ,it  must however be noted in   
this connection that behind this        
physical explanation of the union of    
atoms there is the adrsta1 the  will of 
s'vara1 which gives the direction of all
 such unions in harmony  with the       
principle of a moral government of the  
universe1  so that only such things are 
produced as can be arranged for the  due
 disposal of the effects of karma4 ,an  
elementary substance  thus produced by  
primary atomic combination may however  
suffer  qualitative changes under the   
influence of heat 7pkajotpatti7  ,the   

impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a  
dvyanuka into the  atoms and transforms 
the characters of the atoms determining 
them all in the same way4 ,the heat     
particles continuing to impinge  reunite
 the atoms so transformed to form binary
 or other  molecules in different orders
 or arrangements1 which account for  the
 specific characters or qualities       
finally produced4 ,the ,vais'esika      
holds that there is first a             
disintegration into simple atoms1 then  
change of atomic qualities1 and then the
 final re-combination1  under the       
influence of heat4 ,this doctrine is    
called the doctrine  of plupka 7heating 
of atoms74 ,nyya on the other hand      
thinks  that no disintegration into     
atoms is necessary for change of        
qualities1  but it is the molecules     
which assume new characters under the   
influence of heat4 ,heat thus according 
to ,nyya directly affects  the          
characters of the molecules and changes 
their qualities without  effecting a    

change in the atoms4 ,nyya holds that   
the  heat-corpuscles penetrate into the 
porous body of the object and  thereby  
produce the change of colour4 ,the      
object as a whole is  not disintegrated 
into atoms and then reconstituted again1
 for  such a procedure is never         
experienced by observation4 ,this is    
called the doctrine of pitharapka       
7heating of molecules74 ,this  is one of
 the few points of difference between   
the later ,nyya  and ,vais'esika systems
 ,footnote ref #b4    ,chemical         
compounds of atoms may take place       
between the        ,footnote #a3        
,utpala's commentary on ,brhatsamhit ,i4
 #g4    ,footnote #b3 ,see ,dr ,b4,n4   
,seal in ,p4,c4 ,ray's ,hindu           
,chemistry1 pp4 #aij-aia1  ,nyyamajar1 p
 #dch1 and ,udyotakara's ,vrttika4      
,there is very little  indication in the
 ,nyya and ,vais'esika stras that they  
had any of  those differences indicated 
here4 ,though there are slight          
indications of  these matters in the    

,vais'esika stras 7,,vii4 #a71 the ,nyya
 stras are  almost silent upon the      
matter4 ,a systematic development of the
 theory  of creation and atomic         
combinations appear to have taken place 
after  ,vtsyyana4    #cbh    atoms of   
the same bhta or of many bhtas4         
,according to the  ,nyya view there are 
no differences in the atoms of the same 
bhta1 and all differences of quality and
 characteristics of the  compound of the
 same bhta are due only to diverse      
collocations  of those atoms4 ,thus     
,udyotakara says 7,,iii4 i4 #d7 that    
there is no  difference between the atom
 of a barley seed and paddy seed1  since
 these are all but atoms of earth4      
,under the continued impact  of heat    
particles the atoms take new characters4
 ,it is heat and  heat alone that can   
cause the transformations of colours1   
tastes  etc4 in the original bhta atoms4
 ,the change of these physical          
characters depends on the colours etc4  
of the constituent substances  in       

contact1 on the intensity or degree of  
heat and also on the  species of tejas  
corpuscles that impinge on the atoms4   
,heat breaks  bodies in contact into    
atoms1 transforms their qualities1 and  
forms  separate bodies with them4       
,pras'astapda 7the commentator of       
,vais'esika7 holds that in  the higher  
compounds of the same bhta the          
transformation takes  place 7under      
internal heat7 in the constituent atoms 
of the compound  molecules1 atoms       
specially determined as the compound    
and not in the original atoms of the    
bhta entering into the composition  of  
the compound4 ,thus when milk is turned 
into curd1  the transformation as curd  
takes place in the atoms determined  as 
milk in the milk molecule1 and it is not
 necessary that the  milk molecule      
should be disintegrated into the atoms  
of the  original bhta of which the milk 
is a modification4 ,the change  as curd 
thus takes place in the milk atom1 and  
the milk molecule  has not to be        

disintegrated into ksiti or ap atoms4   
,so again in  the fertilized ovum1 the  
germ and the ovum substances1 which in  
the ,vais'esika view are both isomeric  
modes of earth 7with accompaniments  of 
other bhtas7 are broken up into         
homogeneous earth  atoms1 and it is     
these that chemically combine under the 
animal  heat and biomotor force vyu to  
form the germ 7kalala74 ,but  when the  
germ plasm develops1 deriving its       
nutrition from the  blood of the mother1
 the animal heat breaks up the molecules
 of  the germ plasm into its constituent
 atoms1 i4e4 atoms specifically         
determined which by their grouping      
formed the germ plasm4  ,these          
germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with
 the atoms of  the food constituents and
 thus produce cells and tissues         
,footnote ref #a4  ,this atomic contact 
is called rambhaka-samyoga4             
,footnote #a3 ,see ,dr ,b4,n4 ,seal's   
,positive ,sciences1 pp4 #ajd-ajh1 and  
,nyyakandal1 pp4 #cc-cd1 ,s'arrrambhe   

paramnava eva kranam na                 
s'ukra-s'onitasanniptah                 
kriyvibhgdinyyena tayorvins'e sati      
utpannapkajaih paramnubhirrambht1 na ca 
s'ukras'onitaparamnnm  kas'cidvis'esah  
prthivatvvis'est4444,pituh s'ukram mtuh 
s'onitam  tayos sanniptnantaram         
jatharnalasambandht                     
s'ukra-s'onitrambhakesu  paramnusu      
prvarpdivins'e samnagunntarotpattau     
dvyanukdikramena kalalas'arirotpattih   
tatrntahkaranapraves'o444tatra          
mturhraraso mtray samkrmate1            
adrstavas'ttatra                        
punarjatharnalasambandht                
kalalrambhakaparamnusu                  
kriyvibhgadinyyena kalalas'arre naste   
samutpannapkajaih                       
kalalrambhakaparamnubhiradrstavas'd     
upajtakriyairhraparamnitbhih saha       
sambhya  s'arrntaramrakkyate44    #cbi  
,in the case of poly-bhautik or         
bi-bhautik compounds there is  another  
kind of contact called upastambha4 ,thus
 in the case of  such compounds as oils1

 fats1 and fruit juices1 the earth atoms
  cannot combine with one another unless
 they are surrounded by  the water atoms
 which congregate round the former1 and 
by the  infra-atomic forces thus set up 
the earth atoms take peculiar  qualities
 under the impact of heat corpuscles4   
,other compounds  are also possible     
where the ap1 tejas1 or the vyu atoms   
form the  inner radicle and earth atoms 
dynamically surround them 7e4g4  gold1  
which is the tejas atom with the earth  
atoms as the surrounding  upastambhaka74
 ,solutions 7of earth substances in ap7 
are regarded as physical mixtures4      
,udayana points out that the solar heat 
is the source of all the  stores of heat
 required for chemical change4 ,but     
there are  differences in the modes of  
the action of heat2 and the kind of     
contact with heat-corpuscles1 or the    
kind of heat with chemical  action which
 transforms colours1 is supposed to     
differ from what  transforms flavour or 
taste4    ,heat and light rays are      

supposed to consist of indefinitely     
small particles which dart forth or     
radiate in all directions rectilineally 
with inconceivable velocity4 ,heat may  
penetrate through  the interatomic space
 as in the case of the conduction of    
heat1 as  when water boils in a pot put 
on the fire2 in cases of transparency   
light rays penetrate through the        
inter-atomic spaces with parispanda  of 
the nature of deflection or refraction  
7tiryag-gamana74  ,in other cases heat  
rays may impinge on the atoms and       
rebound  back--which explains           
reflection4 ,lastly heat may strike the 
atoms in a peculiar way1 so as to break 
up their grouping1 transform  the       
physico-chemical characters of the      
atoms1 and again recombine  them1 all by
 means of continual impact with         
inconceivable  velocity1 an operation   
which explains all cases of chemical    
combination ,footnote ref l4 ,govardhana
 a later ,nyya writer says that  pka    
means the combination of different kinds

 of heat4 ,the heat that                
,footnote #a3 ,see ,dr ,seal's ,positive
 ,sciences of the ,hindus4    #ccj      
changes the colour of a fruit is        
different from that which generates  or 
changes the taste4 ,even when the colour
 and taste remain the  same a particular
 kind of heat may change the smell4     
,when  grass eaten by cows is broken up 
into atoms special kinds of  heat-light 
rays change its old taste1 colour1 touch
 and smell into  such forms as those    
that belong to milk ,footnote ref #a4   
,in the ,nyya-,vaisesika system all     
action of matter on matter  is thus     
resolved into motion4 ,conscious        
activity 7prayatna7 is  distinguished   
from all forms of motion as against the 
,smkhya  doctrine which considered      
everything other than purusa            
7intelligence7  to arise in the course  
of cosmic evolution and therefore  to be
 subject to vibratory motion4      ,the 
,origin of ,knowledge 7,pramna74    ,the
 manner in which knowledge originates is

 one of the  most favourite topics of   
discussion in ,indian philosophy4 ,we   
have already seen that ,smkhya-,yoga    
explained it by supposing  that the     
buddhi 7place of consciousness7 assumed 
the form of the  object of perception1  
and that the buddhi so transformed was  
then intelligized by the reflection of  
the pure intelligence or purusa4  ,the  
,jains regarded the origin of any       
knowledge as being due to  a withdrawal 
of a veil of karma which was covering   
the all-intelligence  of the self4      
,nyya-,vaisesika regarded all effects as
 being due to the assemblage  of certain
 collocations which unconditionally1    
invariably1  and immediately preceded   
these effects4 ,that collocation 7smagr7
  which produced knowledge involved     
certain non-intelligent as well  as     
intelligent elements and through their  
conjoint action uncontradicted  and     
determinate knowledge was produced1 and 
this collocation is thus  called pramna 
or the determining cause of the origin  

of knowledge  ,footnote ref #b4 ,none of
 the separate elements composing        
,footnote #a3 ,govardhana's ,nyyabodhin 
on ,tarkasamgraha1 pp4 #i1 #aj4         
,footnote #b3                           
,avyabhicrinmasandigdhrthopalabdhim     
vidadhat  bodhbodhasvabhv smagr pramnam4
 ,nyyamajar1 p4 #ab4  ,udyotakara       
however defined pramna as upalabdhihetu 
7cause of  knowledge74 ,this view does  
not go against ,jayanta's view which ,i 
have  followed1 but it emphasizes the   
side of vypra or movement of  the       
senses1 etc4 by virtue of which the     
objects come in contact with  them and  
knowledge is produced4 ,thus ,vcaspati  
says3 siddhamindriydi1  asiddhaca       
tatsannikarsdi vyprayannutpdayan karana 
eva caritrthah  karnam tvindriydi       
tatsannikarsdi v nnyatra caritarthamiti 
sksdupalabdhveva phale vypryate4        
,ttparyatk1 p4 #ae4 ,thus it  is the    
action of the senses as pramna which is 
the direct cause of  the production of  
knowledge1 but as this production could 

not have taken  place without the       
subject and the object1 they also are to
 be regarded as  causes in some sense4  
,pramtrprameyayoh4 pramne               
caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya
 tasmat tadeva phalahetuh4              
,pramtrprameye tu phaloddes'ena pravrtte
 iti taddhet kathacit4  ,ibid4 p4 #af4  
#cca    the causal collocation can be   
called the primary cause2 it is only    
their joint collocation that can be said
 to determine the effect1 for  sometimes
 the absence of a single element        
composing the causal  collocation is    
sufficient to stop the production of the
 effect4 ,of  course the collocation or 
combination is not an entity separated  
from the collocated or combined things4 
,but in any case it is the  preceding   
collocations that combine to produce the
 effect jointly4  ,these involve not    
only intellectual elements 7e4g4        
indeterminate  cognition as             
qualification 7vis'esana7 in determinate
 perceptions1  the knowledge of linga in

 inference1 the seeing of similar things
 in  upamna1 the hearing of sound in    
s'abda7 but also the assemblage  of such
 physical things 7e4g4 proximity of the 
object of perception1  capacity of the  
sense1 light1 etc471 which are all      
indispensable for  the origin of        
knowledge4 ,the cognitive and physical  
elements  all co-operate in the same    
plane1 combine together and produce     
further determinate knowledge4 ,it is   
this capacity of the collocations  that 
is called pramna4    ,nyya argues that  
in the ,smkhya view knowledge originates
  by the transcendent influence of      
purusa on a particular  state of buddhi2
 this is quite unintelligible1 for      
knowledge does  not belong to buddhi as 
it is non-intelligent1 though it        
contains  within it the content and the 
form of the concept or the percept      
7knowledge74 ,the purusa to whom the    
knowledge belongs1 however1  neither    
knows1 nor feels1 neither conceives nor 
perceives1 as  it always remains in its 

own transcendental purity4 ,if the      
transcendental  contact of the purusa   
with buddhi is but a mere semblance  or 
appearance or illusion1 then the ,smkhya
 has to admit  that there is no real    
knowledge according to them4 ,all       
knowledge  is false4 ,and since all     
knowledge is false1 the ,smkhyists have 
precious little wherewith to explain the
 origin of right knowledge4    ,there   
are again some ,buddhists who advocate  
the doctrine  that simultaneously with  
the generation of an object there is the
  knowledge corresponding to it1 and    
that corresponding to the  rise of any  
knowledge there is the rise of the      
object of it4 ,neither  is the knowledge
 generated by the object nor the object 
by the  knowledge2 but there is a sort  
of simultaneous parallelism4 ,it is     
evident that this view does not explain 
why knowledge should    #ccb    express 
or manifest its object4 ,if knowledge   
and the object are  both but            
corresponding points in a parallel      

series1 whence comes  this              
correspondence8 ,why should knowledge   
illuminate the  object4 ,the doctrine of
 the ,vijna vdins1 that it is knowledge 
alone that shows itself both as         
knowledge and as its object1 is also    
irrational1 for how can knowledge divide
 itself as subject and object  in such a
 manner that knowledge as object should 
require  the knowledge as subject to    
illuminate it8 ,if this be the case we  
might again expect that knowledge as    
knowledge should also  require another  
knowledge to manifest it and this       
another1 and so on  ad infinitum4 ,again
 if pramna be defined as prpana         
7capacity  of being realized7 then also 
it would not hold1 for all things being 
momentary according to the ,buddhists1  
the thing known cannot  be realized1 so 
there would be nothing which could be   
called  pramna4 ,these views moreover do
 not explain the origin of  knowledge4  
,knowledge is thus to be regarded as an 
effect like  any other effect1 and its  

origin or production occurs in the same 
way as any other effect1 namely by the  
joint collocation of causes             
intellectual and physical ,footnote ref 
#a4 ,there is no transcendent  element  
involved in the production of knowledge1
 but it is a production  on the same    
plane as that in which many physical    
phenomena  are produced ,footnote ref   
#b4      ,the four ,pramnas of ,nyya4   
,we know that the ,carvkas admitted     
perception 7pratyaksa7  alone as the    
valid source of knowledge4 ,the         
,buddhists and the  ,vais'esika admitted
 two sources1 pratyaksa and inference   
7anumna72  ,smkhya added s'abda         
7testimony7 as the third source2        
,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajar1 pp4      
#ab-bf4    ,footnote #b3 ,discussing the
 question of the validity of knowledge  
,gages'a1  a later naiyyika of great    
fame1 says that it is derived as a      
result of  our inference from the       
correspondence of the perception of a   
thing with  the activity which prompted 

us to realize it4 ,that which leads us  
to  successful activity is valid and the
 opposite invalid4 ,when ,i am sure     
that if ,i work in accordance with the  
perception of an object ,i shall be     
successful1 ,i call it valid knowledge4 
,tattvacintmani1 ,k4  ,tarkavgs'a's     
edition1 ,prmnyavda4    ,the ,vais'esika
 stras tacitly admit the ,vedas as a    
pramna4 ,the view  that ,vais'esika only
 admitted two pramnas1 perception and   
inference1 is  traditionally accepted1  
pratyaksamekamcrvkh kandasugatau punah  
anumnaca taccpi1 etc4 ,pras'astapda     
divides all cognition 7buddhi7  as vidy 
7right knowledge7 and avidy 7ignorance74
 ,under avidy he  counts sams'aya 7doubt
 or uncertainty71 viparyaya 7illusion or
  error71 anadhyavasya 7want of definite
 knowledge1 thus when a man who  had    
never seen a mango1 sees it for the     
first time1 he wonders what it  may be7 
and svapna 7dream74 ,right knowledge    
7vidy7 is of four kinds1  perception1   
inference1 memory and the supernatural  

knowledge of the sages  7rsa74          
,interpreting the ,vais'esika stras     
,i4i4 #c1 ,,vi4 i4 #a1 and ,,vi4  i4 #c1
 to mean that the validity of the ,vedas
 depends upon the trustworthy  character
 of their author1 he does not consider  
scriptures as valid in  themselves4     
,their validity is only derived by      
inference from the  trustworthy         
character of their author4 ,arthpatti   
7implication7 and  anupalabdhi          
7non-perception7 are also classed as    
inference and upamna  7analogy7 and     
aitihya 7tradition7 are regarded as     
being the same as  faith in trustworthy 
persons and hence cases of inference4   
#ccc    ,nyya adds a fourth1 upamna     
7analogy74 ,the principle on which  the 
four-fold division of pramnas depends is
 that the causal  collocation which     
generates the knowledge as well as the  
nature  or characteristic kind of       
knowledge in each of the four cases is  
different4 ,the same thing which appears
 to us as the object of  our perception1

 may become the object of inference or  
s'abda  7testimony71 but the manner or  
mode of manifestation of knowledge      
being different in each case1 and the   
manner or conditions  producing         
knowledge being different in each case1 
it is to be  admitted that inference and
 s'abda are different pramnas1 though   
they point to the same object indicated 
by the perception4 ,nyya  thus objects  
to the incorporation of s'abda          
7testimony7 or upamna  within inference1
 on the ground that since the mode of   
production  of knowledge is different1  
these are to be held as different       
pramnas ,footnote ref #a4               
,perception 7,pratyaksa74    ,the       
naiyyikas admitted only the five        
cognitive senses which  they believed to
 be composed of one or other of the five
 elements4  ,these senses could each    
come in contact with the special        
characteristic  of that element of which
 they were composed4 ,thus the  ear     
could perceive sound1 because sound was 

the attribute of  ks'a1 of which the    
auditory sense1 the ear1 was made up4   
,the  eye could send forth rays to      
receive the colour1 etc41 of things4    
,thus the cognitive senses can only     
manifest their specific objects  by     
going over to them and thereby coming in
 contact with them4  ,the cognitive     
senses 7vk1 pni1 pda1 pyu1 and upastha7 
recognized  in ,smkhya as separate      
senses are not recognized here as such  
for the functions of these so-called    
senses are discharged by the  general   
motor functions of the body4            
,perception is defined as that right    
knowledge generated by the  contact of  
the senses with the object1 devoid of   
doubt and error  not associated with any
 other simultaneous sound cognition     
7such        ,footnote #a3              
,smagrbhedi phalabhedcca pramnabhedah   
,anye eva hi smagrphale                 
pratyaksalingayoh    ,anye eva ca       
smagrphale s'abdopamnayoh4              
,nyyamajari1 p4 #cc4    #ccd    as the  

name of the object as heard from a      
person uttering it1 just  at the time   
when the object is seen7 or name        
association1 and determinate  ,footnote 
ref #a4 ,if when we see a cow1 a man    
says here is a cow1  the knowledge of   
the sound as associated with the percept
 cannot be  counted as perception but as
 sound-knowledge 7s'abda-pramna74  ,that
 right knowledge which is generated     
directly by the contact  of the senses  
with the object is said to be the       
product of  the perceptual process4     
,perception may be divided as           
indeterminate  7nirvikalpa7 and         
7savikalpa7 determinate4 ,indeterminate 
perception  is that in which the thing  
is taken at the very first moment of    
perception in which it appears without  
any association with name4  ,determinate
 perception takes place after the       
indeterminate stage  is just passed2 it 
reveals things as being endowed with all
 characteristics  and qualities and     
names just as we find in all our        

concrete  experience4 ,indeterminate    
perception reveals the things with their
  characteristics and universals1 but at
 this stage there being no  association 
of name it is more or less indistinct4  
,when once the  names are connected with
 the percept it forms the determinate   
perception of a thing called            
savikalpa-pratyaksa4 ,if at the time  of
 having the perception of a thing of    
which the name is not known  to me      
anybody utters its name then the hearing
 of that should  be regarded as a       
separate auditory name perception4 ,only
 that  product is said to constitute    
nirvikalpa perception which results     
from the perceiving process of the      
contact of the senses with  the object4 
,of this nirvikalpa 7indeterminate7     
perception it is  held by the later     
naiyyikas that we are not conscious of  
it  directly1 but yet it has to be      
admitted as a necessary first  stage    
without which the determinate           
consciousness could not  arise4 ,the    

indeterminate perception is regarded as 
the first stage  in the process of      
perception4 ,at the second stage it     
joins the  other conditions of          
perception in producing the determinate 
perception4  ,the contact of the sense  
with the object is regarded  as being of
 six kinds3 7#a7 contact with the dravya
 7thing7 called  samyoga1 7#b7 contact  
with the gunas 7qualities7 through the  
thing  7samyukta-samavya7 in which they 
inhere in samavya 7inseparable7         
relation1 7#c7 contact with the gunas   
7such as colour etc47 in  the generic   
character as universals of those        
qualities1 e4g4 colourness  7rpatva71   
which inhere in the gunas in the samavya
 relation4        ,footnote #a3         
,gages'a1 a later naiyyika of great     
reputation1 describes  perception as    
immediate awareness 7pratyaksasya       
skstkritvam  laksanam74    #cce    ,this
 species of contact is called           
samyukta-samaveta-samavya1  for the eye 
is in contact with the thing1 in the    

thing the colour  is in samavya         
relation1 and in the specific colour    
there is the  colour universal or the   
generic character of colour in samavya  
relation4 7#d7 ,there is another kind of
 contact called samavya  by which sounds
 are said to be perceived by the ear4   
,the auditory  sense is ks'a and the    
sound exists in ks'a in the samavya     
relation1 and thus the auditory sense   
can perceive sound in a peculiar  kind  
of contact called samaveta-samavya4 7#e7
 ,the generic  character of sound as the
 universal of sound 7s'abdatva7 is      
perceived  by the kind of contact known 
as samaveta-samavya4 7#f7 ,there is     
another kind of contact by which        
negation 7abhva7 is perceived1  namely  
samyukta vis'esana 7as qualifying       
contact74 ,this is so  called because   
the eye perceives only the empty space  
which is  qualified by the absence of an
 object and through it the negation4    
,thus ,i see that there is no jug here  
on the ground4 ,my eye in  this case is 

in touch with the ground and the absence
 of the jug  is only a kind of quality  
of the ground which is perceived along  
with the perception of the empty ground4
 ,it will thus be seen  that ,nyya      
admits not only the substances and      
qualities but all  kinds of relations as
 real and existing and as being directly
  apprehended by perception 7so far as  
they are directly presented74    ,the   
most important thing about the          
,nyya-,vais'esika theory  of perception 
is this that the whole process beginning
 from the  contact of the sense with the
 object to the distinct and clear       
perception  of the thing1 sometimes     
involving the appreciation of its       
usefulness or harmfulness1 is regarded  
as the process of perception  and its   
result perception4 ,the self1 the mind1 
the senses and  the objects are the main
 factors by the particular kinds of     
contact  between which perceptual       
knowledge is produced4 ,all knowledge   
is indeed arthapraks'a1 revelation of   

objects1 and it is called  perception   
when the sense factors are the          
instruments of its  production and the  
knowledge produced is of the objects    
with  which the senses are in contact4  
,the contact of the senses with  the    
objects is not in any sense metaphorical
 but actual4 ,not  only in the case of  
touch and taste are the senses in       
contact with  the objects1 but in the   
cases of sight1 hearing and smell as    
well4  ,the senses according to         
,nyya-,vaisesika are material and we    
have  seen that the system does not     
admit of any other kind of              
transcendental  7atndriya7 power        
7s'akti7 than that of actual vibratory  
#ccf    movement which is within the    
purview of sense-cognition ,footnote ref
 #a4  ,the production of knowledge is   
thus no transcendental occurrence1  but 
is one which is similar to the effects  
produced by  the conglomeration and     
movements of physical causes4 ,when  ,i 
perceive an orange1 my visual or the    

tactual sense is in touch  not only with
 its specific colour1 or hardness1 but  
also with the  universals associated    
with them in a relation of inherence and
 also  with the object itself of which  
the colour etc4 are predicated4 ,the    
result of this sense-contact at the     
first stage is called locanajna         
7sense-cognition7 and as a result of    
that there is roused the  memory of its 
previous taste and a sense of           
pleasurable character                   
7sukhasdhanatvasmrti7 and as a result of
 that ,i perceive the  orange before me 
to have a certain pleasure-giving       
character ,footnote ref  #b4 ,it is     
urged that this appreciation of the     
orange as a pleasurable  object should  
also be regarded as a direct result of  
perception  through the action of the   
memory operating as a concomitant  cause
 7sahakri74 ,i perceive the orange with 
the eye and understand  the pleasure it 
will give1 by the mind1 and thereupon   
understand by the mind that it is a     

pleasurable object4 ,so though  this    
perception results immediately by the   
operation of the mind1  yet since it    
could only happen in association with   
sense-contact1  it must be considered as
 a subsidiary effect of sense-contact   
and  hence regarded as visual           
perception4 ,whatever may be the        
successive  intermediary processes1 if  
the knowledge is a result of            
sense-contact  and if it appertains to  
the object with which the sense is  in  
contact1 we should regard it as a result
 of the perceptual process4             
,sense-contact with the object is thus  
the primary and indispensable  condition
 of all perceptions and not only can the
 senses  be in contact with the objects1
 their qualities1 and the universals    
associated with them but also with      
negation4 ,a perception is  erroneous   
when it presents an object in a         
character which it does  not possess    
7atasmimstaditi7 and right knowledge    
7pram7 is that  which presents an object

 with a character which it really has   
,footnote #a3      ,na khalvatndriy     
s'aktirasmbhirupagamyate    yay saha na 
kryyasya sambandhajnasambhavah4         
,nyyamajar1 p4 #fi4    ,footnote #b3    
,sukhdi manas buddhv kapitthdi ca caksus
    tasya karanat tatra                 
manasaivvagamyate444                    
444,sambandhagrahanakle                 
yattatkapitthdivisayamaksajam    jnam   
tadupdeydijnaphalamiti bhsyakrtas'cetasi
 sthitam                                
sukhasdhanatvajnamupdeyajnam4           
,nyyamajar1 pp4 #fi-gj2 see also pp4    
#ff-ga4    #ccg    7tadvati             
tatprakraknubhava7 ,footnote ref #a4 ,in
 all cases of  perceptual illusion the  
sense is in real contact with the right 
object1  but it is only on account of   
the presence of certain other conditions
  that it is associated with wrong      
characteristics or misapprehended as  a 
different object4 ,thus when the sun's  
rays are perceived in a  desert and     
misapprehended as a stream1 at the first

 indeterminate  stage the visual sense  
is in real contact with the rays and    
thus  far there is no illusion so far as
 the contact with a real object is      
concerned1 but at the second determinate
 stage it is owing to the  similarity of
 certain of its characteristics with    
those of a stream  that it is           
misapprehended as a stream ,footnote ref
 #b4 ,jayanta observes  that on account 
of the presence of the defect of the    
organs or the rousing  of the memory of 
similar objects1 the object with which  
the sense  is in contact hides its own  
characteristics and appears with the    
characteristics of other objects and    
this is what is meant by  illusion      
,footnote ref #c4 ,in the case of mental
 delusions however there is  no         
sense-contact with any object and the   
rousing of irrelevant  memories is      
sufficient to produce illusory notions  
,footnote ref #d4 ,this  doctrine of    
illusion is known as vipartakhyti or    
anyathkhyti4 ,what  existed in the mind 

appeared as the object before us 7hrdaye
  parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhsanam7 
,footnote ref #e4 ,later ,vais'esika  as
 interpreted by ,pras'astapda and       
,s'rdhara is in full agreement  with    
,nyya in this doctrine of illusion      
7bhrama or as ,vais'esika  calls it     
viparyaya7 that the object of illusion  
is always the right  thing with which   
the sense is in contact and that the    
illusion  consists in the imposition of 
wrong characteristics ,footnote ref #f4 
,i have pointed out above that ,nyya    
divided perception into  two classes as 
nirvikalpa 7indeterminate7 and savikalpa
 7determinate7  according as it is an   
earlier or a later stage4 ,vcaspati     
says1 that at the first stage perception
 reveals an object as a  particular2 the
 perception of an orange at this        
avikalpika or  nirvikalpika stage gives 
us indeed all its colour1 form1 and also
 the  universal of orangeness associated
 with it1 but it does not reveal        
,footnote #a3 ,see ,udyotakara's        

,nyyavrttika1 p4 #cg1 and ,ganges'a's   
,tattvacintmani1 p4 #dja1 ,bibliotheca  
,indica4    ,footnote #b3 ,indriyenlocya
 marcn uccvacamuccalato nirvikalpena    
grhtv pas'cttatropaghtadost viparyyeti1 
savikalpako'sya pratyayo  bhrnto jyate  
tasmdvijnasya uvabhicro nrthasya1       
,vcaspati's  ,ttparyatk1 p4 #hg4        
,footnote #c3 ,nyyamajar1 p4 #hh4       
,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 pp4 #hi and #ahd4  
,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 p4 #ahd4           
,footnote #f3 ,nyyakandal1 pp4 #agg-aha1
 ,s'uktisamyuktenendriyena  dosasahakrin
 rajatasamskrasacivena                  
sdrs'yamanurundhat  s'uktikvisayo       
rajatdhyavasyah krtah4    #cch    it in 
a subject-predicate relation as when ,i 
say this is an orange4  ,the avikalpika 
stage thus reveals the universal        
associated with  the particular1 but as 
there is no association of name at this 
stage1  the universal and the particular
 are taken in one sweep and not  as     
terms of relation as subject and        
predicate or substance and  attribute   

7jtydisvarpvaghi na tu jtydnm mitho     
vis'esanavis'esyabhvvaghti yvat7        
,footnote ref #a4 ,he thinks  that such 
a stage1 when the object is only seen   
but not associated  with name or a      
subject-predicate relation1 can be      
distinguished in  perception not only in
 the case of infants or dumb persons    
that do  not know the names of things1  
but also in the case of all ordinary    
persons1 for the association of the     
names and relations could be            
distinguished as occurring at a         
succeeding stage ,footnote ref #b4      
,s'rdhara1 in explaining the ,vais'esika
 view1 seems to be largely  in agreement
 with the above view of ,vcaspati4 ,thus
 ,s'rdhara says  that in the nirvikalpa 
stage not only the universals were      
perceived  but the differences as well4 
,but as at this stage there is no memory
  of other things1 there is no manifest 
differentiation and unification  such as
 can only result by comparison4 ,but the
 differences and the  universals as they

 are in the thing are perceived1 only   
they are not  consciously ordered as    
different from this or similar to this1 
which can only take place at the        
savikalpa stage ,footnote ref #c4       
,vcaspati did not bring in the question 
of comparison with others1  but had only
 spoken of the determinate notion of the
 thing in definite  subject-predicate   
relation in association with names4 ,the
 later ,nyya  writers however1 following
 ,ganges'a1 hold an altogether different
  opinion on the subject4 ,with them    
nirvikalpa knowledge  means the         
knowledge of mere predication without   
any association  with the subject or the
 thing to which the predicate refers4   
,but such a knowledge is never testified
 by experience4 ,the nirvikalpa  stage  
is thus a logical stage in the          
development of perceptual  cognition and
 not a psychological stage4 ,they would 
,footnote #a3 ,ttparyatik1 p4 #ha1 also 
ibid4 p4 #ia1  prathamamlocito'rthah    
smnyavis'esavn4    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 

p4#hd1 tasmdvyutpannasypi               
nmadheyasmaranya  prvamesitavyo vinaiva 
nmadheyamarthapratyayah4    ,footnote   
#c3 ,nyyakandal1p4 #ahi ff41 atah       
savikalpakamicchat                      
nirvikalpakamapyesitavyam1 tacca na     
smnyamtram grhnti bhedasypi  pratibhsant
 npi svalaksanamtram smnykrasypi        
samvedant  vyaktyantaradars'ane         
pratisandhncca1 kintu smnyam            
vis'esacobhayamapi grhnti yadi paramidam
 smnyamayam vis'esah  ityevam vivicya na
 pratyeti vastvantarnusandhnaviraht1    
pindntarnuvrttigrahanddhi smnyam        
vivicyate1  vyvrttigrahandvis'esoyamiti 
vivekah4    #cci    not like to dispense
 with it for they think that it is      
impossible  to have the knowledge of a  
thing as qualified by a predicate or a  
quality1 without previously knowing the 
quality or the predicate                
7vis'istavais'istyajnam prati hi        
vis'esanatvacchedakaprakram  jnam       
kranam7 ,footnote ref #a4 ,so1 before   
any determinate knowledge  such as ,i   

see a cow1 this is a cow or a cow can   
arise it must  be preceded by an        
indeterminate stage presenting only the 
indeterminate1 unrelated1 predicative   
quality as nirvikalpa1 unconnected  with
 universality or any other relations    
7jtydiyojanrahitam  vais'istynavaghi    
nisprakrakam nirvikalpakam7 ,footnote   
ref #b4  ,but this stage is never       
psychologically experienced 7atndriya7  
and it is only a logical necessity      
arising out of their synthetic          
conception of a proposition as being the
 relationing of a predicate  with a     
subject4 ,thus ,vis'vantha says in his  
,siddhntamuktval1  the cognition which  
does not involve relationing  cannot be 
perceptual for the perception is of the 
form ',i know  the jug'2 here the       
knowledge is related to the self1 the   
knower1  the jug again is related to    
knowledge and the definite content of   
jugness is related to the jug4 ,it is   
this content which forms the            
predicative quality                     

7vis'esanatvacchedaka7 of the predicate 
'jug'  which is related to knowledge4   
,we cannot therefore have the  knowledge
 of the jug without having the knowledge
 of the predicative  quality1 the       
content ,footnote ref #c4 ,but in order 
that the knowledge  of the jug could be 
rendered possible1 there must be a stage
 at  which the universal or the pure    
predication should be known  and this is
 the nirvikalpa stage1 the admission of 
which though  not testified by          
experience is after all logically       
indispensably  necessary4 ,in the       
proposition ,it is a cow1 the cow is an 
universal1 and this must be intuited    
directly before it could be  related to 
the particular with which it is         
associated4    ,but both the old and the
 new schools of ,nyya and ,vais'esika   
admitted the validity of the savikalpa  
perception which  the ,buddhists denied4
 ,things are not of the nature of       
momentary  particulars1 but they are    
endowed with class-characters or        

universals  and thus our knowledge of   
universals as revealed by the           
perception of objects is not erroneous  
and is directly produced  by objects4   
,the ,buddhists hold that the error of  
savikalpa perception  consists in the   
attribution of jti 7universal71 guna    
7quality71        ,footnote #a3         
,tattvacintmani p4 #hab4    ,footnote   
#b3 ,ibid4 p4 #hji4    ,footnote #c3    
,siddhntamuktval on ,bhspariccheda krik1
 #eh4    #cdj    kriy 7action71 nma     
7name71 and dravya 7substance7 to things
 ,footnote ref  #a4 ,the universal and  
that of which the universal is          
predicated are  not different but are   
the same identical entity4 ,thus the    
predication  of an universal in the     
savikalpa perception involves the  false
 creation of a difference where there   
was none4 ,so also the  quality is not  
different from the substance and to     
speak of a  thing as qualified is thus  
an error similar to the former4 ,the    
same remark applies to action1 for      

motion is not something different  from 
that which moves4 ,but name is          
completely different  from the thing and
 yet the name and the thing are         
identified1  and again the percept man  
with a stick is regarded as if it  was a
 single thing or substance1 though man  
and stick are  altogether different and 
there is no unity between them4 ,now  as
 regards the first three objections it  
is a question of the difference  of the 
,nyya ontological position with that of 
the ,buddhists1  for we know that ,nyya 
and ,vais'esika believe jti1 guna  and  
kriy to be different from substance and 
therefore the predicating  of them of   
substance as different categories       
related to it  at the determinate stage 
of perception cannot be regarded as     
erroneous4 ,as to the fourth objection  
,vcaspati replies that the  memory of   
the name of the thing roused by its     
sight cannot make  the perception       
erroneous4 ,the fact that memory        
operates cannot  in any way vitiate     

perception4 ,the fact that name is not  
associated  until the second stage      
through the joint action of memory  is  
easily explained1 for the operation of  
memory was necessary in  order to bring 
about the association4 ,but so long as  
it is borne in  mind that the name is   
not identical with the thing but is only
 associated  with it as being the same  
as was previously acquired1 there       
cannot be any objection to the          
association of the name4 ,but the       
,buddhists further object that there is 
no reason why one should  identify a    
thing seen at the present moment as     
being that which  was seen before1 for  
this identity is never the object of    
visual  perception4 ,to this ,vcaspati  
says that through the help of  memory or
 past impressions 7samskra7 this can be 
considered  as being directly the object
 of perception1 for whatever may be  the
 concomitant causes when the main cause 
of sense-contact is        ,footnote #a3
 ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #ic-ajj1 ,paca caite   

kalpan bhavanti  jtikalpan1 gunakalpan1 
kriykalpan1 nmakalpan dravyakalpan ceti1
  ts'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpant    
kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpant  kalpan  
ucyante4 ,see ,dharmakrtti's theory of  
,perception1 pp4 #aea-d4  ,see also pp4 
#dji-daj of this book4    #cda          
present1 this perception of identity    
should be regarded as an  effect of it4 
,but the ,buddhists still emphasize the 
point that an  object of past experience
 refers to a past time and place and  is
 not experienced now and cannot         
therefore be identified with  an object 
which is experienced at the present     
moment4 ,it  has to be admitted that    
,vcaspati's answer is not very          
satisfactory  for it leads ultimately to
 the testimony of direct perception     
which was challenged by the ,buddhists  
,footnote ref #a4 ,it is easy to see    
that early ,nyya-,vais'esika could not  
dismiss the savikalpa perception  as    
invalid for it was the same as the      
nirvikalpa and  differed from it only in

 this1 that a name was associated with  
the thing of perception at this stage4  
,as it admits a gradual  development of 
perception as the progressive effects of
 causal  operations continued through   
the contacts of the mind with the  self 
and the object under the influence of   
various intellectual  7e4g4 memory7 and 
physical 7e4g4 light rays7 concomitant  
causes1  it does not1 like ,vednta1     
require that right perception should    
only  give knowledge which was not      
previously acquired4 ,the variation  as 
well as production of knowledge in the  
soul depends upon  the variety of causal
 collocations4    ,mind according to    
,nyya is regarded as a separate sense   
and can come in contact with pleasure1  
pain1 desire1 antipathy  and will4 ,the 
later ,nyya writers speak of three other
 kinds  of contact of a transcendental  
nature called smnyalaksana1  jnalaksana 
and yogaja 7miraculous74 ,the contact   
smnyalaksana  is that by virtue of which
 by coming in contact with a  particular

 we are transcendentally 7alaukika7 in  
contact with all  the particulars 7in a 
general way7 of which the corresponding 
universal may be predicated4 ,thus when 
,i see smoke and  through it my sense is
 in contact with the universal          
associated  with smoke my visual sense  
is in transcendental contact with all   
smoke in general4 ,jnalaksana contact is
 that by virtue of which  we can        
associate the perceptions of other      
senses when perceiving  by any one      
sense4 ,thus when we are looking at a   
piece of  sandal wood our visual sense  
is in touch with its colour only1  but  
still we perceive it to be fragrant     
without any direct contact  of the      
object with the organ of smell4 ,the    
sort of transcendental  contact         
7alaukika sannikarsa7 by virtue of which
 this is rendered        ,footnote #a3  
,ttparyatk1 pp4 #hh-ie4    #cdb         
possible is called jnalaksana4 ,but the 
knowledge acquired by  these two        
contacts is not counted as perception   

,footnote ref l4    ,pleasures and pains
 7sukha and duhkha7 are held by ,nyya   
to be different from knowledge 7jna74   
,for knowledge interprets1  conceives or
 illumines things1 but sukha etc4 are   
never found to  appear as behaving in   
that character4 ,on the other hand we   
feel  that we grasp them after having   
some knowledge4 ,they cannot  be        
self-revealing1 for even knowledge is   
not so2 if it were so1 then  that       
experience which generates sukha in one 
should have generated  the same kind of 
feeling in others1 or in other words it 
should  have manifested its nature as   
sukha to all2 and this does not  happen1
 for the same thing which generates     
sukha in one might  not do so in others4
 ,moreover even admitting for argument's
  sake that it is knowledge itself that 
appears as pleasure and pain1  it is    
evident that there must be some         
differences between the  pleasurable and
 painful experiences that make them so  
different1  and this difference is due  

to the fact that knowledge in one case  
was associated with sukha and in another
 case with duhkha1  ,this shows that    
sukha and duhkha are not themselves     
knowledge4  ,such is the course of      
things that sukha and duhkha are        
generated  by the collocation of certain
 conditions1 and are manifested through 
or in association with other objects    
either in direct perception or  in      
memory4 ,they are thus the qualities    
which are generated in  the self as a   
result of causal operation4 ,it should  
however be  remembered that merit and   
demerit act as concomitant causes  in   
their production4    ,the yogins are    
believed to have the pratyaksa of the   
most  distant things beyond our senses2 
they can acquire this power  by         
gradually increasing their powers of    
concentration and perceive  the subtlest
 and most distant objects directly by   
their  mind4 ,even we ourselves may at  
some time have the notions  of future   
events which come to be true1 e4g4      

sometimes ,i may  have the intuition    
that ,to-morrow my brother will come1   
,footnote #a3,siddhntamuktval on ,krik  
#fc and #fd4 ,we must remember  that    
,ganges'a discarded the definition of   
perception as given in the  ,nyya stra  
which we have discussed above1 and held 
that perception  should be defined as   
that cognition which has the special    
class-character  of direct apprehension4
 ,he thinks that the old definition of  
perception  as the cognition generated  
by sense-contact involves a vicious     
circle  7,tattvacintmani1 pp4 #ech-edf74
 ,sense-contact is still regarded by him
  as the cause of perception1 but it    
should not be included in the           
definition4 ,he agrees to the six kinds 
of contact described first by           
,udyotakara as mentioned above4    #cdc 
and this may happen to be true4 ,this is
 called pratibhnajna1  which is also to 
be regarded as a pratyaksa directly  by 
the mind4 ,this is of course different  
from the other form  of perception      

called mnasa-pratyaksa1 by which        
memories of  past perceptions by other  
senses are associated with a percept    
visualized at the present moment2 thus  
we see a rose and perceive  that it is  
fragrant2 the fragrance is not perceived
 by the  eye1 but the manas perceives it
 directly and associates the visual     
percept with it4 ,according to ,vednta  
this acquired perception  is only a case
 of inference4 ,the prtibha-pratyaksa   
however is  that which is with reference
 to the happening of a future event4    
,when a cognition is produced1 it is    
produced only as an objective           
cognition1 e4g4 ,this is a pot1 but     
after this it is again related to  the  
self by the mind as ,i know this pot4   
,this is effected by  the mind again    
coming in contact for reperception of   
the cognition  which had already been   
generated in the soul4 ,this second     
reperception is called anuvyavasya1 and 
all practical work can  proceed as a    
result of this anuvyavasya ,footnote    

ref4 l4      ,inference4    ,inference  
7anumna7 is the second means of proof   
7prmna7  and the most valuable          
contribution that ,nyya has made has    
been on this subject4 ,it consists in   
making an assertion about a  thing on   
the strength of the mark or liga which  
is associated  with it1 as when finding 
smoke rising from a hill we remember    
that since smoke cannot be without fire1
 there must also be fire  in yonder     
hill4 ,in an example like this smoke is 
technically  called liga1 or hetu4 ,that
 about which the assertion has been     
made 7the hill in this example7 is      
called paksa1 and the term  fire is     
called sdhya4 ,to make a correct        
inference it is  necessary that the hetu
 or liga must be present in the paksa1  
,footnote #a3 ,this later ,nyya doctrine
 that the cognition of self in          
association with cognition is produced  
at a later moment must be  contrasted   
with the triputpratyaksa doctrine of    
,prabhkara1 which  holds that the       

object1 knower and knowledge are all    
given simultaneously  in knowledge4     
,vyavasya 7determinate cognition71      
according to ,ganges'a1  gives us only  
the cognition of the object1 but the    
cognition that ,i am  aware of this     
object or cognition is a different      
functioning succeeding  the former one  
and is called anu 7after7 vyavasya      
7cognition71 idamaham  jnmti vyavasye na
 bhsate taddhakendriyasannikarsbhvt     
kintvidamvisayakajnatvavis'istasya      
jnasya vais'istyamtmani  bhsate2 na ca  
svapraks'e vyavasya tdrs'am svasya      
vais'istyam  bhsitumarhati1 prvam       
vis'esanasya tasyjnt1 tasmdidamaham     
jnmiti na vyavasyah kintu anuvyavasyah4 
,tattvacintmani1 p4 #gie4    #cdd    and
 in all other known objects similar to  
the paksa in having the  sdhya in it    
7sapaksa-satt71 i4e41 which are known to
 possess the  sdhya 7possessing fire in 
the present example74 ,the liga must    
not be present in any such object as    
does not possess the  sdhya             

7vipaksa-vyvrtti absent from vipaksa or 
that which does  not possess the sdhya74
 ,the inferred assertion should not be  
such that it is invalidated by direct   
perception pratyaksa7 or  the testimony 
of the s'stra 7abdhita-visayatva74 ,the 
liga  should not be such that by it an  
inference in the opposite way  could    
also be possible 7asat-pratipaksa74 ,the
 violation of any  one of these         
conditions would spoil the certitude of 
the hetu  as determining the inference1 
and thus would only make the  hetu      
fallacious1 or what is technically      
called hetvbhsa or  seeming hetu by     
which no correct inference could be     
made4  ,thus the inference that sound is
 eternal because it is visible  is      
fallacious1 for visibility is a quality 
which sound 7here the  paksa7 does not  
possess ,footnote ref l4 ,this hetvbhsa 
is technically  called asiddha-hetu4    
,again1 hetvbhsa of the second type1    
technically called viruddha-hetu1 may be
 exemplified in the case  that sound is 

eternal1 since it is created2 the hetu  
being  created is present in the        
opposite of sdhya vipaksa71 namely      
non-eternality1 for we know that        
non-eternality is a quality  which      
belongs to all created things4 ,a       
fallacy of the third type1  technically 
called anaikntika-hetu1 is found in the 
case that  sound is eternal1 since it is
 an object of knowledge4 ,now being  an 
object of knowledge 7prameyatva7 is here
 the hetu1 but it is  present in things 
eternal 7i4e4 things possessing sdhya71 
as well  as in things that are not      
eternal 7i4e4 which do not possess the  
sdhya71 and therefore the concomitance  
of the hetu with the  sdhya is not      
absolute 7anaikntika74 ,a fallacy of the
 fourth  type1 technically called       
kltyaypadista1 may be found in the      
example--fire is not hot1 since it is   
created like a jug1 etc4  ,here         
pratyaksa shows that fire is hot1 and   
hence the hetu is  fallacious4 ,the     
fifth fallacy1 called prakaranasama1 is 

to be  found in cases where opposite    
hetus are available at the same  time   
for opposite conclusions1 e4g4 sound    
like a jug is non-eternal1              
,footnote #a3 ,it should be borne in    
mind that ,nyya did not believe in the  
doctrine of the eternality of sound1    
which the ,mmms did4 ,eternality  of    
sound meant with ,mmms the theory that  
sounds existed as eternal               
indestructible entities1 and they were  
only manifested in our ears under       
certain conditions1 e4g4 the stroke of a
 drum or a particular kind of  movement 
of the vocal muscles4    #cde    since  
no eternal qualities are found in it1   
and sound like  ks'a is eternal1 since  
no non-eternal qualities are found in   
it4    ,the ,buddhists held in answer to
 the objections raised against          
inference by the ,crvkas1 that          
inferential arguments are  valid1       
because they are arguments on the       
principle of the uniformity  of nature  
in two relations1 viz4 tdtmya 7essential

  identity7 and tadutpatti 7succession  
in a relation of cause and  effect74    
,tdtmya is a relation of genus and      
species and not  of causation2 thus we  
know that all pines are trees1 and infer
  that this is a tree since it is a     
pine2 tree and pine are related  to each
 other as genus and species1 and the    
co-inherence of  the generic qualities  
of a tree with the specific characters  
of a  pine tree may be viewed as a      
relation of essential identity          
7tdtmya74 ,the relation of tadutpatti is
 that of uniformity of  succession of   
cause and effect1 e4g4 of smoke to fire4
    ,nyya holds that inference is made  
because of the invariable  association  
7niyama7 of the linga or hetu 7the      
concomitance of  which with the sdhya   
has been safeguarded by the five        
conditions  noted above7 with the sdhya1
 and not because of such specific       
relations as tdtmya or tadutpatti4 ,if  
it is held that the  inference that it  
is a tree because it is a pine is due to

 the  essential identity of tree and    
pine1 then the opposite argument  that  
it is a pine because it is a tree ought 
to be valid as well2  for if it were a  
case of identity it ought to be the same
 both  ways4 ,if in answer to this it is
 said that the characteristics of a     
pine are associated with those of a tree
 and not those of a tree with  those of 
a pine1 then certainly the argument is  
not due to essential  identity1 but to  
the invariable association of the linga 
7mark7  with the lingin 7the possessor  
of linga71 otherwise called niyama4     
,the argument from tadutpatti           
7association as cause and effect7  is   
also really due to invariable           
association1 for it explains the  case  
of the inference of the type of cause   
and effect as well as of  other types of
 inference1 where the association as    
cause and  effect is not available 7e4g4
 from sunset the rise of stars is       
inferred74 ,thus it is that the         
invariable concomitance of the  linga   

with the lingin1 as safeguarded by the  
conditions noted  above1 is what leads  
us to make a valid inference ,footnote  
ref l4    ,we perceived in many cases   
that a linga 7e4g4 smoke7 was           
associated with a lingin 7fire71 and had
 thence formed the notion               
,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajari on       
anumna4    #cdf    that wherever there  
was smoke there was fire4 ,now when we  
perceived that there was smoke in yonder
 hill1 we remembered  the concomitance  
7vypti7 of smoke and fire which we had  
observed before1 and then since there   
was smoke in the hill1  which was known 
to us to be inseparably connected with  
fire1 we  concluded that there was fire 
in the hill4 ,the discovery of the      
linga 7smoke7 in the hill as associated 
with the memory of its  concomitance    
with fire 7trtya-linga-parmars'a7 is    
thus the cause  7anumitikarana or       
anumna7 of the inference 7anumiti74 ,the
  concomitance of smoke with fire is    
technically called vypti4 ,when  this   

refers to the concomitance of cases     
containing smoke with  those having     
fire1 it is called bahirvypti2 and when 
it refers to the  conviction of the     
concomitance of smoke with fire1 without
 any  relation to the circumstances     
under which the concomitance was        
observed1 it is called antarvypti4 ,the 
,buddhists since they did  not admit the
 notions of generality1 etc4 preferred  
antarvypti  view of concomitance to     
bahirvypti as a means of inference      
,footnote ref  #a4    ,now the question 
arises that since the validity of an    
inference  will depend mainly on the    
validity of the concomitance of sign    
7hetu7 with the signate 7sdhya71 how are
 we to assure ourselves in  each case   
that the process of ascertaining the    
concomitance 7vyptigraha7  had been     
correct1 and the observation of         
concomitance  had been valid4 ,the ,mmms
 school held1 as we shall see in  the   
next chapter1 that if we had no         
knowledge of any such case  in which    

there was smoke but no fire1 and if in  
all the cases  ,i knew ,i had perceived 
that wherever there was smoke there  was
 fire1 ,i could enunciate the           
concomitance of smoke with fire4  ,but  
,nyya holds that it is not enough that  
in all cases where  there is smoke there
 should be fire1 but it is necessary    
that in  all those cases where there is 
no fire there should not be any  smoke1 
i4e4 not only every case of the         
existence of smoke should  be a case of 
the existence of fire1 but every case of
 absence of fire  should be a case of   
absence of smoke4 ,the former is        
technically  called anvayavypti and the 
latter vyatirekavypti4 ,but even this   
is not enough4 ,thus there may have been
 an ass sitting1 in a  hundred cases    
where ,i had seen smoke1 and there might
 have  been a hundred cases where there 
was neither ass nor smoke1 but  it      
cannot be asserted from it that there is
 any relation of concomitance1          
,footnote #a3 ,see                      

,antarvyptisamarthana1 by ,ratnkaras'nti
 in the ,six  ,buddhist ,nyya ,tracts1  
,bibliotheca ,indica1 #aiaj4    #cdg    
or of cause and effect between the ass  
and the smoke4 ,it  may be that one     
might never have observed smoke without 
an  antecedent ass1 or an ass without   
the smoke following it1 but even  that  
is not enough4 ,if it were such that we 
had so experienced in  a very large     
number of cases that the introduction of
 the ass  produced the smoke1 and that  
even when all the antecedents remained  
the same1 the disappearance of the ass  
was immediately  followed by the        
disappearance of smoke 7yasmin sati     
bhavanam  yato vin na bhavanam iti      
bhuyodars'anam1 ,nyyamajar1  p4 #abb71  
then only could we say that there was   
any relation of  concomitance 7vypti    
between the ass and the smoke ,footnote 
ref #a4 ,but  of course it might be that
 what we concluded to be the hetu by the
  above observations of anvaya-vyatireka
 might not be a real hetu1  and there   

might be some other condition 7updhi7   
associated  with the hetu which was the 
real hetu4 ,thus we know that fire  in  
green wood 7rdrendhana7 produced smoke1 
but one might  doubt that it was not the
 fire in the green wood that produced   
smoke1 but there was some hidden demon  
who did it4  ,but there would be no end 
of such doubts1 and if we indulged  in  
them1 all our work endeavour and        
practical activities would  have to be  
dispensed with 7vyghta74 ,thus such     
doubts as  lead us to the suspension of 
all work should not disturb or  unsettle
 the notion of vypti or concomitance at 
which we  had arrived by careful        
observation and consideration ,footnote 
ref #b4 ,the  ,buddhists and the        
naiyyikas generally agreed as to the    
method  of forming the notion of        
concomitance or vypti 7vyptigraha71  but
 the former tried to assert that the    
validity of such a concomitance  always 
depended on a relation of cause and     
effect  or of identity of essence1      

whereas ,nyya held that neither the     
relations of cause and effect1 nor that 
of essential identity of  genus and     
species1 exhausted the field of         
inference1 and there was  quite a number
 of other types of inference which could
 not be  brought under either of them   
7e4g4 the rise of the moon and the  tide
 of the ocean74 ,a natural fixed order  
that certain things happening  other    
things would happen could certainly     
exist1 even  without the supposition of 
an identity of essence4    ,but         
sometimes it happens that different     
kinds of causes often  have the same    
kind of effect1 and in such cases it is 
difficult to        ,footnote #a3 ,see  
,ttparyatk on anumna and vyptigraha4    
,footnote #b3 ,ttparyatk on vyptigraha1 
and ,tattvacintmani of  ,ganges'a on    
vyptigraha4    #cdh    infer the        
particular cause from the effect4 ,nyya 
holds however  that though different    
causes are often found to produce  the  
same effect1 yet there must be some     

difference between one  effect and      
another4 ,if each effect is taken by    
itself with its  other attendant        
circumstances and peculiarities1 it will
 be found  that it may then be possible 
to distinguish it from similar other    
effects4 ,thus a flood in the street may
 be due either to a heavy  downpour of  
rain immediately before1 or to the rise 
in the water  of the river close by1 but
 if observed carefully the flooding of  
the street due to rain will be found to 
have such special traits  that it could 
be distinguished from a similar flooding
 due to the  rise of water in the river4
 ,thus from the flooding of the street  
of a special type1 as demonstrated by   
its other attendant circumstances1  the 
special manner in which the water flows 
by small  rivulets or in sheets1 will   
enable us to infer that the flood was   
due to rains and not to the rise of     
water in the river4 ,thus we  see that  
,nyya relied on empirical induction     
based on uniform  and uninterrupted     

agreement in nature1 whereas the        
,buddhists  assumed a priori principles 
of causality or identity of essence4    
,it may not be out of place here to     
mention that in later ,nyya  works great
 emphasis is laid on the necessity of   
getting ourselves  assured that there   
was no such updhi 7condition7 associated
 with  the hetu on account of which the 
concomitance happened1 but  that the    
hetu was unconditionally associated with
 the sdhya in  a relation of inseparable
 concomitance4 ,thus all fire does not  
produce  smoke2 fire must be associated 
with green wood in order to  produce    
smoke4 ,green wood is thus the necessary
 condition  7updhi7 without which1 no   
smoke could be produced4 ,it is on      
account of this condition that fire is  
associated with smoke2 and  so we cannot
 say that there is smoke because there  
is fire4 ,but in  the concomitance of   
smoke with fire there is no condition1  
and so  in every case of smoke there is 
fire4 ,in order to be assured of the    

validity of vypti1 it is necessary that 
we must be assured that  there should be
 nothing associated with the hetu which 
conditioned  the concomitance1 and this 
must be settled by wide  experience     
7bhyodars'ana74    ,pras'astapda in     
defining inference as the knowledge of  
that  7e4g4 fire7 associated with the   
reason 7e4g4 smoke7 by the sight of  the
 reason described a valid reason 7linga7
 as that which is connected  with the   
object of inference 7anumeya7 and which 
exists  wherever the object of inference
 exists and is absent in all cases      
#cdi    where it does not exist4 ,this  
is indeed the same as the ,nyya         
qualifications of paksasattva1          
sapaksasattva and vipakssattva of  a    
valid reason 7hetu74 ,pras'astapda      
further quotes a verse to say  that this
 is the same as what ,ks'yapa 7believed 
to be the family  name of ,kanda7 said4 
,kanda says that we can infer a cause   
from the effect1 the effect from the    
cause1 or we can infer one  thing by    

another when they are mutually          
connected1 or in opposition  or in a    
relation of inherence 7,,ix4 ii4 #a and 
,,iii4 i4 #i74 ,we  can infer by a      
reason because it is duly associated    
7prasiddhiprvakatva7 with the object of 
inference4 ,what this  association was  
according to ,kanda can also be         
understood for  he tells us 7,,iii4 i4  
#ae7 that where there is no proper      
association1  the reason 7hetu7 is      
either non-existent in the object to be 
inferred  or it has no concomitance with
 it 7aprasiddha7 or it has a doubtful   
existence sandigdha74 ,thus if ,i say   
this ass is a horse because it has      
horns it is fallacious1 for neither the 
horse nor the ass has horns4  ,again if 
,i say it is a cow because it has horns1
 it is fallacious1 for  there is no     
concomitance between horns and a cow1   
and though  a cow may have a horn1 all  
that have horns are not cows4 ,the      
first fallacy is a combination of       
pakssattva and sapakssattva1  for not   

only the present paksa 7the ass7 had no 
horns1 but no  horses had any horns1 and
 the second is a case of vipaksasattva1 
for those which are not cows 7e4g4      
buffaloes7 have also horns4 ,thus1  it  
seems that when ,pras'astapda says that 
he is giving us the view  of ,kanda he  
is faithful to it4 ,pras'astapda says   
that wherever  there is smoke there is  
fire1 if there is no fire there is no   
smoke4  ,when one knows this            
concomitance and unerringly perceives   
the  smoke1 he remembers the            
concomitance and feels certain that     
there is fire4 ,but with regard to      
,kanda's enumeration of types of        
inference such as a cause is inferred   
from its effect1 or an effect  from the 
cause1 etc41 ,pras'astapda holds that   
these are not the  only types of        
inference1 but are only some examples   
for showing  the general nature of      
inference4 ,inference merely shows a    
connection  such that from this that can
 be inferred4 ,he then divides          

inference into two classes1 drsta 7from 
the experienced characteristics  of one 
member of a class to another member of  
the same  class71 and smnyato drsta4    
,drsta 7perceived resemblance7 is  that 
where the previously known case and the 
inferred case is  exactly of the same   
class4 ,thus as an example of it we can 
point  out that by perceiving that only 
a cow has a hanging mass of  flesh on   
its neck 7ssn71 ,i can whenever ,i see  
the same hanging    #cej    mass of     
flesh at the neck of an animal infer    
that it is a cow4 ,but  when on the     
strength of a common quality the        
inference is extended  to a different   
class of objects1 it is called smnyato  
drsta4  ,thus on perceiving that the    
work of the peasants is rewarded  with a
 good harvest ,i may infer that the work
 of the priests1  namely the performance
 of sacrifices1 will also be rewarded   
with  the objects for which they are    
performed 7i4e4 the attainment of       
heaven74 ,when the conclusion1 to which 

one has arrived 7svanis'citrtha7  is    
expressed in five premisses for         
convincing others  who are either in    
doubt1 or in error or are simply        
ignorant1 then  the inference is called 
parrthnumna4 ,we know that the          
distinction  of svrthnumna 7inference   
for oneself7 and parrthnumna  7inference
 for others7 was made by the ,jains and 
,buddhists4  ,pras'astapda does not make
 a sharp distinction of two classes  of 
inference1 but he seems to mean that    
what one infers1 it can be  conveyed to 
others by means of five premisses in    
which case it is  called parrthnumna4   
,but this need not be considered as an  
entirely new innovation of              
,pras'astapda1 for in ,,ix4 #b1 ,kanda  
himself definitely alludes to this      
distinction 7asyedam                    
kryyakranasambandhas'cvayavdbhavati74   
,the five premisses which are  called in
 ,nyya pratij1 hetu drstnta1 upanaya1   
and nigamana  are called in ,vais'esika 
pratij1 apades'a1 nidars'ana1           

anusandhna1  and pratymnya4 ,kanda      
however does not mention the name  of   
any of these premisses excepting the    
second apades'a4 ,pratij is  of course  
the same as we have in ,nyya1 and the   
term nidars'ana is  very similar to     
,nyya drstnta1 but the last two are     
entirely  different4 ,nidars'ana may be 
of two kinds1 7#a7 agreement in presence
  7e4g4 that which has motion is a      
substance as is seen in the case of  an 
arrow71 7#b7 agreement in absence 7e4g4 
what is not a substance has  no motion  
as is seen in the case of the universal 
being ,footnote ref l74  ,he also points
 out cases of the fallacy of the example
        ,footnote #a3 ,dr ,vidybhsana   
says that ,an example before the time of
  ,dignga served as a mere familiar case
 which was cited to help the            
understanding of the listener1 e4g4 ,the
 hill is fiery2 because it has  smoke2  
like a kitchen 7example74 ,asanga made  
the example more serviceable  to        
reasoning1 but ,dignga converted it into

 a universal proposition1 that  is a    
proposition expressive of the universal 
or inseparable connection  between the  
middle term and the major term1 e4g4    
,the hill is fiery2 because  it has     
smoke2 all that has smoke is fiery as a 
kitchen 7,indian ,logic1  pp4 #ie1 #if74
 ,it is of course true that ,vtsyyana   
had an imperfect example  as like a     
kitchen 7s'abdah                        
utpatvidharmakatvdanuyah sthlydivat1    
,i4i4 #cf71 but ,pras'astapda has it in 
the proper form4 ,whether  ,pras'astapda
 borrowed it from ,dignnga or ,dignnga  
from ,pras'astapda  cannot be easily    
settled4    #cea    7nidars'anbhsa74    
,pras'astapda's contribution thus seems 
to consist  of the enumeration of the   
five premisses and the fallacy of  the  
nidars'ana1 but the names of the last   
two premisses are so  different from    
what are current in other systems that  
it is reasonable  to suppose that he    
collected them from some other          
traditional  ,vais'esika work which is  

now lost to us4 ,it however definitely  
indicates that the study of the problem 
of inference was being  pursued in      
,vais'esika circles independently of    
,nyya4 ,there is  no reason however to  
suppose that ,pras'astapda borrowed     
anything  from ,dinnga as ,professor    
,stcherbatsky or ,keith supposes1  for1 
as ,i have shown above1 most of         
,pras'astapda's apparent innovations    
are all definitely alluded to by ,kanda 
himself1 and  ,professor ,keith has not 
discussed this alternative4 ,on the     
question of the fallacies of nidars'ana1
 unless it is definitely proved  that   
,dinnga preceded ,pras'astapda1 there is
 no reason whatever  to suppose that the
 latter borrowed it from the former     
,footnote ref #a4    ,the nature and    
ascertainment of concomitance is the    
most  important part of inference4      
,vtsyyana says that an inference  can be
 made by the sight of the linga 7reason 
or middle7 through  the memory of the   
connection between the middle and the   

major  previously perceived4 ,udyotakara
 raises the question whether it  is the 
present perception of the middle or the 
memory of the  connection of the middle 
with the major that should be regarded  
as leading to inference4 ,his answer is 
that both these lead to  inference1 but 
that which immediately leads to         
inference is  lingaparmars'a1 i4e4 the  
present perception of the middle in the 
minor associated with the memory of its 
connection with the major1  for         
inference does not immediately follow   
the memory of the connection1  but the  
present perception of the middle        
associated with  the memory of the      
connection 7smrtyanugrhto               
lingaparmars'o74  ,but he is silent with
 regard to the nature of concomitance4  
,udyotakara's criticisms of ,dinnga as  
shown by ,vcaspati have  no reference to
 this point ,the doctrine of tdtmya and 
tadutpatti  was therefore in all        
probability a new contribution to       
,buddhist logic by ,dharmakrtti4        

,dharmakrtti's contention was  that the 
root principle of the connection between
 the middle and  the major was that the 
former was either identical in essence  
with the latter or its effect and that  
unless this was grasped a  mere         
collection of positive or negative      
instances will not give us              
,footnote #a3 ,pras'astapda's bhsya with
 ,nyyakandal1 pp4 #bjj-bee4    #ceb     
the desired connection ,footnote ref #a4
 ,vcaspati in his refutation of  this   
view says that the cause-effect relation
 cannot be determined as a  separate    
relation4 ,if causality means invariable
 immediate antecedence  such that there 
being fire there is smoke and there     
being  no fire there is no smoke1 then  
it cannot be ascertained with  perfect  
satisfaction1 for there is no proof that
 in each case the  smoke was caused by  
fire and not by an invisible demon4     
,unless  it can be ascertained that     
there was no invisible element          
associated1  it cannot be said that the 

smoke was immediately  preceded by fire 
and fire alone4 ,again accepting for the
 sake of  argument that causality can be
 determined1 then also cause is  known  
to precede the effect and therefore the 
perception of smoke  can only lead us to
 infer the presence of fire at a        
preceding time  and not                 
contemporaneously with it4 ,moreover    
there are many  cases where inference is
 possible1 but there is no relation of  
cause  and effect or of identity of     
essence 7e4g4 the sunrise of this       
morning by the sunrise of yesterday     
morning74 ,in the case of  identity of  
essence 7tdtmya as in the case of the   
pine and the  tree7 also there cannot be
 any inference1 for one thing has to be 
inferred by another1 but if they are    
identical there cannot be any           
inference4 ,the nature of concomitance  
therefore cannot be described  in either
 of these ways4 ,some things 7e4g4      
smoke7 are  naturally connected with    
some other things 7e4g4 fire7 and when  

such is the case1 though we may not know
 any further about the  nature of this  
connection1 we may infer the latter from
 the former  and not vice versa1 for    
fire is connected with smoke only under 
certain conditions 7e4g4 green wood74   
,it may be argued that there  may always
 be certain unknown conditions which may
 vitiate  the validity of inference4 ,to
 this ,vcaspati's answer is that if     
even after observing a large number of  
cases and careful search  such          
conditions 7updhi7 cannot be discovered1
 we have to take  it for granted that   
they do not exist and that there is a   
natural  connection between the middle  
and the major4 ,the later  ,buddhists   
introduced the method of ,pacakran in   
order to  determine effectively the     
causal relation4 ,these five conditions 
determining the causal relation are 7#a7
 neither the cause nor the  effect is   
perceived1 7#b7 the cause is perceived1 
7#c7 in immediate  succession the effect
 is perceived1 7#d7 the cause           

disappears1 7#e7 in        ,footnote #a3
 ,kryyakranubhvdv svabhvdva niymakt     
avinbhvaniyamo'  dars'annna na dars'ant4
 ,ttparyatk1 p4 #aje4    #cec           
immediate succession the effect         
disappears4 ,but this method  cannot    
guarantee the infallibility of the      
determination of cause  and effect      
relation2 and if by the assumption of a 
cause-effect  relation no higher degree 
of certainty is available1 it is better 
to accept a natural relation without    
limiting it to a cause-effect  relation 
,footnote ref #a4    ,in early ,nyya    
books three kinds of inference are      
described1  namely prvavat1 s'esavat1   
and smnyato-drsta4 ,prvavat is the      
inference of effects from causes1 e4g4  
that of impending rain from  heavy dark 
clouds2 s'esavat is the inference of    
causes from effects1  e4g4 that of rain 
from the rise of water in the river2    
smnyato-drsta  refers to the inference  
in all cases other than those of  cause 
and effect1 e4g4 the inference of the   

sour taste of the  tamarind from its    
form and colour4 ,nyyamajar mentions    
another form of anumna1 namely          
paris'esamna 7reductio ad  absurdum71   
which consists in asserting anything    
7e4g4 consciousness7  of any other thing
 7e4g4 tman71 because it was already    
definitely found out that consciousness 
was not produced in any  other part of  
man4 ,since consciousness could not     
belong to  anything else1 it must belong
 to soul of necessity4 ,in spite of     
these variant forms they are all however
 of one kind1 namely  that of the       
inference of the probandum 7sdhya7 by   
virtue of the  unconditional and        
invariable concomitance of the hetu1    
called  the vypti-niyama4 ,in the new   
school of ,nyya 7,navya-,nyya7  a formal
 distinction of three kinds of inference
 occupies an  important place1 namely   
anvayavyatireki1 kevalnvayi1 and        
kevalavyatireki4 ,anvayavyatireki is    
that inference where the  vypti has been
 observed by a combination of a large   

number of  instances of agreement in    
presence and agreement in absence1  as  
in the case of the concomitance of smoke
 and fire 7wherever  there is smoke     
there is fire 7anvaya71 and where there 
is no fire1  there is no smoke          
7vyatireka774 ,an inference could be for
 one's  own self 7svrthnumna7 or for the
 sake of convincing others              
7parrthnumna74 ,in the latter case1 when
 it was necessary that  an inference    
should be put explicitly in an          
unambiguous manner1  live propositions  
7avayavas7 were regarded as necessary1  
namely  pratija 7e4g4 the hill is       
fiery71 hetu 7since it has smoke71      
udharana  7where there is smoke there is
 fire1 as in the kitchen71  upanaya     
7this hill has smoke71 nigamana         
7therefore it has got        ,footnote  
#a3 ,vtsyyana's bhsya1 ,udyotakara's    
,vrttika and  ,ttparyyatk1 ,i4i4 #e4    
#ced    fire74 ,kevalnvayi is that type 
of inference1 the vypti of which  could 
not be based on any negative instance1  

as in the case  this object has a name1 
since it is an object of knowledge      
7idam1 vcyam prameyatvt74 ,now no such  
case is known which  is not an object of
 knowledge2 we cannot therefore know of 
any  case where there was no object of  
knowledge 7prameyatva7 and  no name     
7vcyatva72 the vypti here has therefore 
to be based  necessarily on cases of    
agreement--wherever there is prameyatva 
or an object of knowledge1 there is     
vcyatva or name4  ,the third form of    
kevalavyatireki is that where positive  
instances  in agreement cannot be found1
 such as in the case of the  inference  
that earth differs from other elements  
in possessing  the specific quality of  
smell1 since all that does not differ   
from  other elements is not earth1 such 
as water2 here it is evident  that there
 cannot be any positive instance of     
agreement and the  concomitance has to  
be taken from negative instances4 ,there
  is only one instance1 which is exactly
 the proposition of our                 

inference--earth differs from other     
elements1 since it has the  special     
qualities of earth4 ,this inference     
could be of use only in  those cases    
where we had to infer anything by reason
 of such  special traits of it as was   
possessed by it and it alone4           
,upamna and ,s'abda4    ,the third      
pramna1 which is admitted by ,nyya and  
not by  ,vais'esika1 is upamna1 and     
consists in associating a thing unknown 
before with its name by virtue of its   
similarity with some  other known thing4
 ,thus a man of the city who has never  
seen a wild ox 7gavaya7 goes to the     
forest1 asks a forester--what  is       
gavaya8 and the forester replies--oh1   
you do not  know it1 it is just like a  
cow2 after hearing this from the        
forester he travels on1 and on seeing a 
gavaya and finding it to  be similar to 
a cow he forms the opinion that this is 
a gavaya4  ,this knowing an hitherto    
unknown thing by virtue of its          
similarity to a known thing is called   

upamna4 ,if some forester  had pointed  
out a gavaya to a man of the city and   
had told him  that it was called a      
gavaya1 then also the man would have    
known the animal by the name gavaya1 but
 then this would  have been due to      
testimony 7s'abda-pramana74 ,the        
knowledge is  said to be generated by   
the upamna process when the association 
of the unknown animal with its name is  
made by the observer    #cee    on the  
strength of the experience of the       
similarity of the unknown  animal to a  
known one4 ,the naiyyikas are thorough  
realists1 and as such they do not regard
 the observation of  similarity as being
 due to any subjective process of the   
mind4  ,similarity is indeed perceived  
by the visual sense but yet the         
association of the name in accordance   
with the perception of  similarity and  
the instruction received is a separate  
act and is  called upamna ,footnote ref 
#a4    ,s'abda-pramna or testimony is   
the right knowledge which  we derive    

from the utterances of infallible and   
absolutely truthful  persons4 ,all      
knowledge derived from the ,vedas is    
valid1 for the  ,vedas were uttered by  
s'vara himself4 ,the ,vedas give us     
right knowledge not of itself1 but      
because they came out as the  utterances
 of the infallible s'vara4 ,the         
,vais'esikas did not admit  s'abda as a 
separate pramna1 but they sought to     
establish the  validity of testimony    
7s'abda7 on the strength of inference   
7anumiti7  on the ground of its being   
the utterance of an infallible  person4 
,but as ,i have said before1 this       
explanation is hardly  corroborated by  
the ,vais'esika stras1 which tacitly    
admit the  validity of the scriptures on
 its own authority4 ,but anyhow this    
was how ,vais'esika was interpreted in  
later times4      ,negation in          
,nyya-,vais'esika4    ,the problem of   
negation or non-existence 7abhva7 is of 
great interest  in ,indian philosophy4  
,in this section we can describe its    

nature only  from the point of view of  
perceptibility4 ,kumrila ,footnote ref  
#b        ,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajar 
on upamna4 ,the oldest ,nyya view was   
that  the instruction given by the      
forester by virtue of which the         
association  of the name wild ox to the 
strange animal was possible was itself  
upamna4 ,when ,pras'astapda held that   
upamna should be treated as a  case of  
testimony 7ptavacana71 he had probably  
this interpretation  in view4 ,but      
,udyotakara and ,vcaspati hold that it  
was not by the  instruction alone of the
 forester that the association of the   
name  wild ox was made1 but there was   
the perception of similarity1 and  the  
memory of the instruction of the        
forester too4 ,so it is the  perception 
of similarity with the other two factors
 as accessories  that lead us to this   
association called upamna4 ,what        
,vtsyyana  meant is not very clear1 but 
,dinnga supposes that according to  him 
the result of upamna was the knowledge  

of similarity or the  knowledge of a    
thing having similarity4 ,vcaspati of   
course holds that  he has correctly     
interpreted ,vtsyyana's intention4 ,it  
is however  definite that upamna means  
the associating of a name to a new      
object                                  
7samkhysambandhapratipattirupamnrthah1  
,vtsyyana74 ,jayanta  points out that it
 is the preception of similarity which  
directly  leads to the association of   
the name and hence the instruction of   
the forester cannot be regarded as the  
direct cause and consequently  it cannot
 be classed under testimony 7s'abda74   
,see ,pras'astapda  and ,nyyakandal1 pp4
 #bbj-bb1 ,vtsyyana1 ,udyotakara1       
,vcaspati and  ,jayanta on ,upamna4     
,footnote #b3 ,see ,kumrila's treatment 
of abhva in the ,s'lokavrttika1  pp4    
#dgc-dib4    #cef    and his followers1 
whose philosophy we shall deal with in  
the  next chapter1 hold that negation   
7abhva7 appears as an intuition  7mnam7 
with reference to the object negated    

where there are no  means of ordinary   
cognition 7pramna7 leading to prove the 
existence  7satparicchedakam7 of that   
thing4 ,they held that the notion  it is
 not existent cannot be due to          
perception1 for there is no  contact    
here with sense and object4 ,it is true 
indeed that when  we turn our eyes 7e4g4
 in the case of the perception of the   
non-existence  of a jug7 to the ground1 
we see both the ground and  the         
non-existence of a jug1 and when we shut
 them we can see  neither the jug nor   
the ground1 and therefore it could be   
urged  that if we called the ground     
visually perceptible1 we could say  the 
same with regard to the non-existence of
 the jug4 ,but even  then since in the  
case of the perception of the jug there 
is sense-contact1  which is absent in   
the other case1 we could never say  that
 both are grasped by perception4 ,we see
 the ground and  remember the jug 7which
 is absent7 and thus in the mind rises  
the notion of non-existence which has no

 reference at all to visual  perception4
 ,a man may be sitting in a place where 
there were  no tigers1 but he might not 
then be aware of their non-existence  at
 the time1 since he did not think of    
them1 but when later on he  is asked in 
the evening if there were any tigers at 
the place where  he was sitting in the  
morning1 he then thinks and becomes     
aware  of the non-existence of tigers   
there in the morning1 even  without     
perceiving the place and without any    
operation of the  memory of the         
non-existence of tigers4 ,there is no   
question of  there being any inference  
in the rise of our notion of            
non-existence1  for it is not preceded  
by any notion of concomitance of any    
kind1  and neither the ground nor the   
non-perception of the jug could  be     
regarded as a reason 7linga71 for the   
non-perception of the jug  is related to
 the jug and not to the negation of the 
jug1 and no  concomitance is known      
between the non-perception of the jug   

and  its non-existence1 and when the    
question of the concomitance of         
non-perception with non-existence is    
brought in1 the same difficulty  about  
the notion of non-existence 7abhva7     
which was sought  to be explained will  
recur again4 ,negation is therefore to  
be  admitted as cognized by a separate  
and independent process  of knowledge4  
,nyya however says that the perception  
of  non-existence 7e4g4 there is no jug 
here7 is a unitary perception  of one   
whole1 just as any perception of        
positive existence 7e4g4    #ceg        
there is a jug on the ground7 is4 ,both 
the knowledge of the  ground as well as 
the knowledge of the non-existence of   
the jug  arise there by the same kind of
 action of the visual organ1 and  there 
is therefore no reason why the knowledge
 of the ground  should be said to be due
 to perception1 whereas the knowledge of
  the negation of the jug on the ground 
should be said to be due  to a separate 
process of knowledge4 ,the non-existence

 of the jug  is taken in the same act as
 the ground is perceived4 ,the principle
  that in order to perceive a thing one 
should have sense-contact  with it1     
applies only to positive existents and  
not to negation or  non-existence4      
,negation or non-existence can be       
cognized even  without any              
sense-contact4 ,non-existence is not a  
positive substance1  and hence there    
cannot be any question here of          
sense-contact4  ,it may be urged that if
 no sense-contact is required  in       
apprehending negation1 one could as well
 apprehend negation  or non-existence of
 other places which are far away from   
him4  ,to this the reply is that to     
apprehend negation it is necessary  that
 the place where it exists must be      
perceived4 ,we know a  thing and its    
quality to be different1 and yet the    
quality can only  be taken in           
association with the thing and it is so 
in this case as  well4 ,we can apprehend
 non-existence only through the         

apprehension  of its locus4 ,in the case
 when non-existence is said to  be      
apprehended later on it is really no    
later apprehension of non-existence  but
 a memory of non-existence 7e4g4 of jug7
 perceived  before along with the       
perception of the locus of non-existence
  7e4g4 ground74 ,negation or           
non-existence 7abhva7 can thus1         
according  to ,nyya1 generate its       
cognition just as any positive          
existence can do4 ,negation is not mere 
negativity or mere  vacuous absence1 but
 is what generates the cognition is not1
  as position 7bhva7 is what generates  
the cognition it is4    ,the ,buddhists 
deny the existence of negation4 ,they   
hold  that when a negation is           
apprehended1 it is apprehended with     
specific time and space conditions 7e4g4
 this is not here now72  but in spite of
 such an apprehension1 we could never   
think  that negation could thus be      
associated with them in any  relation4  
,there is also no relation between the  

negation and its  pratiyogi 7thing      
negated--e4g4 jug in the negation of    
jug71 for  when there is the pratiyogi  
there is no negation1 and when there  is
 the negation there is no pratiyogi4    
,there is not even the  relation of     
opposition 7virodha71 for we could have 
admitted it1 if    #ceh    the negation 
of the jug existed before and opposed   
the jug1  for how can the negation of   
the jug oppose the jug1 without         
effecting anything at all8 ,again1 it   
may be asked whether negation  is to be 
regarded as a positive being or becoming
 or of the  nature of not becoming or   
non-being4 ,in the first alternative it 
will be like any other positive         
existents1 and in the second case it    
will be permanent and eternal1 and it   
cannot be related to this or  that      
particular negation4 ,there are however 
many kinds of non-perception1  e4g4 7#a7
 svabhvnupalabdhi 7natural              
non-perception--there  is no jug because
 none is perceived72 7#b7 krannupalabdhi

  7non-perception of cause--there is no 
smoke here1 since there is  no fire72   
7#c7 vypaknupalabdhi 7non-perception of 
the species--there  is no pine here1    
since there is no tree72 7#d7           
krynupalabdhi  7non-perception of       
effects--there are not the causes of    
smoke here1  since there is no smoke72  
7#e7 svabhvaviruddhopalabdhi 7perception
  of contradictory natures--there is no 
cold touch here because  of fire72 7#f7 
viruddhakryopalabdhi 7perception of     
contradictory  effects--there is no cold
 touch here because of smoke72 7#g7     
virudhavyptopalabdhi 7opposite          
concomitance--past is not of necessity  
destructible1 since it depends on other 
causes72 7#h7 kryyaviruddhopalabdhi     
7opposition of effects--there is not    
here the causes  which can give cold    
since there is fire72 7#i7              
vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi  7opposite      
concomitants--there is no touch of snow 
here1  because of fire72 7#aj7          
kranaviruddhopalabdhi 7opposite         

causes--there  is no shivering through  
cold here1 since he is near the fire72  
7#aa7 kranaviruddhakryyopalabdhi        
7effects of opposite causes--this  place
 is not occupied by men of shivering    
sensations for it  is full of smoke     
,footnote ref #a74    ,there is no doubt
 that in the above ways we speak of     
negation1  but that does not prove that 
there is any reason for the  cognition  
of negation 7heturnbhvasamvidah74 ,all  
that we can  say is this that there are 
certain situations which justify the use
  7yogyat7 of negative appellations4    
,but this situation or yogyat  is       
positive in character4 ,what we all     
speak of in ordinary usage  as          
non-perception is of the nature of      
perception of some sort4  ,perception of
 negation thus does not prove the       
existence of  negation1 but only shows  
that there are certain positive         
perceptions  which are only interpreted 
in that way4 ,it is the positive        
perception of the ground where the      

visible jug is absent that              
,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyabindu1 p4 #aa1  
and ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #ec-g4    #cei      
leads us to speak of having perceived   
the negation of the jug  7anupalambhah  
abhvam vyavahrayati7 ,footnote ref #a4  
,the ,nyya reply against this is that   
the perception of positive  existents is
 as much a fact as the perception of    
negation1 and we  have no right to say  
that the former alone is valid4 ,it is  
said  that the non-perception of jug on 
the ground is but the perception  of the
 ground without the jug4 ,but is this   
being without  the jug identical with   
the ground or different8 ,if identical  
then  it is the same as the ground1 and 
we shall expect to have it even  when   
the jug is there4 ,if different then the
 quarrel is only over  the name1 for    
whatever you may call it1 it is admitted
 to be a  distinct category4 ,if some   
difference is noted between the ground  
with the jug1 and the ground without it1
 then call it ground1  without the      

jugness or the negation of jug1 it does 
not matter  much1 for a distinct        
category has anyhow been admitted4      
,negation  is apprehended by perception 
as much as any positive  existent is2   
the nature of the objects of perception 
only are different2  just as even in the
 perception of positive sense-objects   
there are such diversities as colour1   
taste1 etc4 ,the relation of  negation  
with space and time with which it       
appears associated is  the relation that
 subsists between the qualified and the 
quality  7vis'esya vis'esana74 ,the     
relation between the negation and its   
pratiyogi is one of opposition1 in the  
sense that where the one is  the other  
is not4 ,the ,vais'esika stra 7,,ix4 i4 
#f7 seems to take abhva  in a similar   
way as ,kumrila the ,mimamsist does1    
though the  commentators have tried to  
explain it away ,footnote ref #b4 ,in   
,vais'esika  the four kinds of negation 
are enumerated as 7#a7 prgabhva 7the    
negation preceding the production of an 

object--e4g4 of the jug  before it is   
made by the potter72 7#b7 dhvamsbhva    
7the negation  following the destruction
 of an object--as of the jug after it is
  destroyed by the stroke of a stick72  
7#c7 anyonybhva 7mutual  negation--e4g4 
in the cow there is the negation of the 
horse and        ,footnote #a3 ,see     
,nyyabindutk1 pp4 #cd ff41 and also     
,nyyamajar1  pp4 #dh-fc4    ,footnote #b
 ,pras'astapda says that as the         
production of an effect is the  sign of 
the existence of the cause1 so the      
non-production of it is the sign  of its
 non-existence1 ,s'rdbara in commenting 
upon it says that the  non-preception of
 a sensible object is the sign 7linga7  
of its  non-existence4 ,but evidently he
 is not satisfied with the view for  he 
says that non-existence is also directly
 perceived by the senses  7bhvavad      
abhvo'pndriyagrahanayogyah7 and that    
there is an actual  sense-contact with  
non-existence which is the collocating  
cause of the  preception of             

non-existence 7abhvendriyasannikarso'pi 
abhvagrahanasmagr71 ,nyyakandal1 pp4    
#bbe-cj4    #cfj    in the horse that of
 the cow72 7#d7 atyantbhva 7a negation  
which  always exists--e4g4 even when    
there is a jug here1 its negation in    
other places is not destroyed7 ,footnote
 ref #a4      ,the necessity of the     
,acquirement of debating devices  for   
the seeker of ,salvation4    ,it is     
probable that the ,nyya philosophy arose
 in an atmosphere  of continued disputes
 and debates2 as a consequence  of this 
we find here many terms related to      
debates which we do  not notice in any  
other system of ,indian philosophy4     
,these are  tarka1 nirnaya1 vda1 jalpa1 
vitand1 hetvbhsa1 chala1  jti and       
nigrahasthna4    ,tarka means           
deliberation on an unknown thing to     
discern  its real nature2 it thus       
consists of seeking reasons in favour of
  some supposition to the exclusion of  
other suppositions2 it is not           
inference1 but merely an oscillation of 

the mind to come to a right  conclusion4
 ,when there is doubt 7sams'aya7 about  
the specific  nature of anything we have
 to take to tarka4 ,nirnaya means the   
conclusion to which we arrive as a      
result of tarka4 ,when two  opposite    
parties dispute over their respective   
theses1 such as the  doctrines that     
there is or is not an tman1 in which    
each of them  tries to prove his own    
thesis with reasons1 each of the theses 
is  called a vda4 ,jalpa means a dispute
 in which the disputants  give wrangling
 rejoinders in order to defeat their    
respective opponents4  ,a jalpa is      
called a vitand when it is only a       
destructive  criticism which seeks to   
refute the opponent's doctrine without  
seeking to establish or formulate any   
new doctrine4 ,hetvbhsas  are those     
which appear as hetus but are really not
 so4 ,nyya  stras enumerate five        
fallacies 7hetvbhsas7 of the middle     
7hetu73  savyabhicra 7erratic71 viruddha
 7contradictory71 prakaranasama         

7tautology71 sddhyasama 7unproved       
reason7 and kltta 7inopportune74        
,savyabhicra is that where the same     
reason may prove  opposite conclusions  
7e4g4 sound is eternal because it is    
intangible  like the atoms which are    
eternal1 and sound is non-eternal       
because  it is intangible like          
cognitions which are non-eternal72      
viruddha  is that where the reason      
opposes the premiss to be proved 7e4g4 a
  jug is eternal1 because it is         
produced72 prakaranasama is that        
,footnote #a3 ,the doctrine of negation1
 its function and value with  reference 
to diverse logical problems1 have many  
diverse aspects1  and it is impossible  
to do them justice in a small section   
like this4    #cfa    where the reason  
repeats the thesis to be proved in      
another form  7e4g4 sound is non-eternal
 because it has not the quality of      
eternality72 sdhyasama is that where the
 reason itself requires  to be proved   
7e4g4 shadow is a substance because it  

has motion1  but it remains to be proved
 whether shadows have motion or not72   
kltta is a false analogy where the      
reason fails because it does not  tally 
with the example in point of time4 ,thus
 one may argue that  sound is eternal   
because it is the result of contact     
7stick and the  drum7 like colour which 
is also a result of contact of light and
  the object and is eternal4 ,here the  
fallacy lies in this1 that colour  is   
simultaneous with the contact of light  
which shows what was  already there and 
only manifested by the light1 whereas in
 the  case of sound it is produced      
immediately after the contact of the    
stick and drum and is hence a product   
and hence non-eternal4  ,the later ,nyya
 works divide savyabhicra into three    
classes1  7#a7 sdhrana or common 7e4g4  
the mountain is fiery because it is  an 
object of knowledge1 but even a lake    
which is opposed to fire  is also an    
object of knowledge71 7#b7 asdhrana or  
too restricted  7e4g4 sound is eternal  

because it has the nature of sound2 this
  cannot be a reason for the nature of  
sound exists only in the  sound and     
nowhere else71 and 7#c7 anupasamhrin or 
unsubsuming  7e4g4 everything is        
non-eternal1 because they are all       
objects of  knowledge2 here the fallacy 
lies in this1 that no instance can be   
found which is not an object of         
knowledge and an opposite conclusion    
may also be drawn74 ,the fallacy        
satpratipaksa is that in  which there is
 a contrary reason which may prove the  
opposite  conclusion 7e4g4 sound is     
eternal because it is audible1 sound is 
non-eternal because it is an effect74   
,the fallacy asiddha 7unreal7  is of    
three kinds 7i7 s'raysiddha 7the lotus  
of the sky is fragrant  because it is   
like other lotuses2 now there cannot be 
any lotus in  the sky71 7#b7 svarpsiddha
 7sound is a quality because it is      
visible2 but sound has no visibility71  
7#c7 vypyatvsiddha is that  where the   
concomitance between the middle and the 

consequence  is not invariable and      
inevitable2 there is smoke in the hill  
because  there is fire2 but there may be
 fire without the smoke as in a red  hot
 iron ball1 it is only green-wood fire  
that is invariably associated  with     
smoke4 ,the fallacy bdhita is that which
 pretends to prove  a thesis which is   
against direct experience1 e4g4 fire is 
not hot  because it is a substance4 ,we 
have already enumerated the  fallacies  
counted by ,vais'esika4 ,contrary to    
,nyya practice    #cfb    ,pras'astapda 
counts the fallacies of the example4    
,dinnga also  counted fallacies of      
example 7e4g4 sound is eternal1 because 
it is  incorporeal1 that which is       
incorporeal is eternal as the atoms2    
but atoms are not incorporeal7 and      
,dharmakrtti counted also the  fallacies
 of the paksa 7minor72 but ,nyya rightly
 considers that  the fallacies of the   
middle if avoided will completely       
safeguard  inference and that these are 
mere repetitions4 ,chala means the      

intentional misinterpretation of the    
opponent's arguments for the  purpose of
 defeating him4 ,jti consists in the    
drawing of contradictory  conclusions1  
the raising of false issues or the like 
with  the deliberate intention of       
defeating an opponent4 ,nigrahasthna    
means the exposure of the opponent's    
argument as involving                   
self-contradiction1 inconsistency or the
 like1 by which his defeat is           
conclusively proved before the people to
 the glory of the victorious  opponent4 
,as to the utility of the description of
 so many debating  tricks by which an   
opponent might be defeated in a         
metaphysical  work1 the aim of which    
ought to be to direct the ways that lead
 to  emancipation1 it is said by        
,jayanta in his ,nyyamajar that these   
had to be resorted to as a protective   
measure against arrogant  disputants who
 often tried to humiliate a teacher     
before his pupils4  ,if the teacher     
could not silence the opponent1 the     

faith of the  pupils in him would be    
shaken and great disorder would follow1 
and it was therefore deemed necessary   
that he who was plodding  onward for the
 attainment of moksa should acquire     
these devices  for the protection of his
 own faith and that of his pupils4 ,a   
knowledge  of these has therefore been  
enjoined in the ,nyya stra as  being    
necessary for the attainment of         
salvation ,footnote ref l4      ,the    
doctrine of ,soul4    ,dhrtta ,crvkas   
denied the existence of soul and        
regarded  consciousness and life as     
products of bodily changes2 there were  
other ,crvkas called ,sus'iksita ,crvkas
 who admitted the  existence of soul but
 thought that it was destroyed at death4
  ,the ,buddhists also denied the       
existence of any permanent self4  ,the  
naiyyikas ascertained all the categories
 of metaphysics  mainly by such         
inference as was corroborated by        
experience4  ,they argued that since    
consciousness1 pleasures1 pains1        

willing1  etc4 could not belong to our  
body or the senses1 there must be       
,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajar1 pp4      
#ehf-fei1 and ,trkikaraks of  ,varadarja
 and ,niskantaka of ,mallintha1 pp4 #ahe
 ff4    #cfc    some entity to which    
they belonged2 the existence of the self
  is not proved according to ,nyya      
merely by the notion of our             
self-consciousness1 as in the case of   
,mmms1 for ,nyya holds  that we cannot  
depend upon such a perception1 for it   
may  be erroneous4 ,it often happens    
that ,i say that ,i am white or  ,i am  
black1 but it is evident that such a    
perception cannot  be relied upon1 for  
the self cannot have any colour4 ,so we 
cannot safely depend on our             
self-consciousness as upon the          
inference that the self has to be       
admitted as that entity to  which       
consciousness1 emotion1 etc4 adhere when
 they are produced  as a result of      
collocations4 ,never has the production 
of  tman been experienced1 nor has it   

been found to suffer any  destruction   
like the body1 so the soul must be      
eternal4 ,it is not  located in any part
 of the body1 but is all-pervading1 i4e4
 exists at  the same time in all places 
7vibhu71 and does not travel with  the  
body but exists everywhere at the same  
time4 ,but though  tman is thus         
disconnected from the body1 yet its     
actions are  seen in the body because it
 is with the help of the collocation  of
 bodily limbs1 etc4 that action in the  
self can be manifested  or produced4 ,it
 is unconscious in itself and acquires  
consciousness  as a result of suitable  
collocations ,footnote ref l4    ,even  
at birth children show signs of pleasure
 by their different  facial features1   
and this could not be due to anything   
else than  the memory of the past       
experiences in past lives of pleasures  
and  pains4 ,moreover the inequalities  
in the distribution of pleasures  and   
pains and of successes and failures     
prove that these must be  due to the    

different kinds of good and bad action  
that men performed  in their past lives4
 ,since the inequality of the world     
must have some reasons behind it1 it is 
better to admit karma as  the           
determining factor than to leave it to  
irresponsible chance4      s'vara and   
,salvation4    ,nyya seeks to establish 
the existence of s'vara on the basis of 
inference4 ,we know that the ,jains1 the
 ,smkhya and the ,buddhists did  not    
believe in the existence of s'vara and  
offered many antitheistic  arguments4   
,nyya wanted to refute these and prove  
the existence  of ,is'vara by an        
inference of the smnyato-drsta type4    
,footnote                               
#a3;,jnasamavyanibandhanamevtmanas'cetay
itrtvam1 c4 ,see  ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #dcb  
ff4    #cfd      ,the ,jains and other  
atheists held that though things in the 
world have production and decay1 the    
world as a whole was never  produced1   
and it was never therefore an effect4   
,in contrast to  this view the ,nyya    

holds that the world as a whole is also 
an  effect like any other effect4 ,many 
geological changes and landslips  occur1
 and from these destructive operations  
proceeding in  nature it may be assumed 
that this world is not eternal but a    
result of production4 ,but even if this 
is not admitted by the  atheists they   
can in no way deny the arrangement and  
order of  the universe4 ,but they would 
argue that there was certainly a        
difference between the order and        
arrangement of human productions  7e4g4 
a jug7 and the order and arrangement of 
the universe2  and therefore from the   
order and                               
arrangement7sannives'a-vis'istat7  of   
the universe it could not be argued that
 the universe was  produced by a        
creator2 for1 it is from the sort of    
order and  arrangement that is found in 
human productions that a creator  or    
producer could be inferred4 ,to this1   
,nyya answers that the  concomitance is 
to be taken between the order and       

arrangement  in a general sense and the 
existence of a creator and not with     
specific cases of order and arrangement1
 for each specific case  may have some  
such peculiarity in which it differs    
from similar  other specific cases2 thus
 the fire in the kitchen is not the same
  kind of fire as we find in a forest   
fire1 but yet we are to disregard  the  
specific individual peculiarities of    
fire in each case and consider  the     
concomitance of fire in general with    
smoke in general4  ,so here1 we have to 
consider the concomitance of order and  
arrangement in general with the         
existence of a creator1 and  thus though
 the order and arrangement of the world 
may be  different from the order and    
arrangement of things produced by  man1 
yet an inference from it for the        
existence of a creator would  not be    
inadmissible4 ,the objection that even  
now we see many  effects 7e4g4 trees7   
which are daily shooting forth from the 
ground  without any creator being found 

to produce them1 does not hold1  for it 
can never be proved that the plants are 
not actually created  by a creator4 ,the
 inference therefore stands that the    
world has  a creator1 since it is an    
effect and has order and arrangement in 
its construction4 ,everything that is an
 effect and has an order  and           
arrangement has a creator1 like the jug4
 ,the world is an  effect and has order 
and arrangement and has therefore a     
creator4  ,just as the potter knows all 
the purposes of the jug that he makes1  
#cfe    so s'vara knows all the purposes
 of this wide universe and is thus      
omniscient4 ,he knows all things always 
and therefore does not  require memory2 
all things are perceived by him directly
 without  any intervention of any       
internal sense such as manas1 etc4 ,he  
is  always happy4 ,his will is eternal1 
and in accordance with the  karma of men
 the same will produces dissolution1    
creates1 or  protects the world1 in the 
order by which each man reaps the       

results of his own deeds4 ,as our self  
which is in itself bodiless  can by its 
will produce changes in our body and    
through it in  the external world1 so   
s'vara also can by his will create the  
universe though he has no body4 ,some1  
however1 say that if any  association of
 body with s'vara is indispensable for  
our conception  of him1 the atoms may as
 well be regarded as his body1  so that 
just as by the will of our self changes 
and movement of  our body take place1 so
 also by his will changes and movements 
are produced in the atoms ,footnote ref 
l4    ,the naiyyikas in common with most
 other systems of ,indian  philosophy   
believed that the world was full of     
sorrow and that  the small bits of      
pleasure only served to intensify the   
force of  sorrow4 ,to a wise person     
therefore everything is sorrow 7sarvam  
duhkham vivekinah72 the wise therefore  
is never attached to the  so-called     
pleasures of life which only lead us to 
further sorrows4    ,the bondage of the 

world is due to false knowledge         
7mithyjna7  which consists in thinking  
as my own self that which  is not my    
self1 namely body1 senses1 manas1       
feelings and knowledge2  when once the  
true knowledge of the six padrthas and  
as ,nyya says1 of the proofs 7pramna71  
the objects of knowledge  7prameya71 and
 of the other logical categories of     
inference is  attained1 false knowledge 
is destroyed4 ,false knowledge can  be  
removed by constant thinking of its     
opposite 7pratipaksabhvan71  namely the 
true estimates of things4 ,thus when any
  pleasure attracts us1 we are to think 
that this is in reality but  pain1 and  
thus the right knowledge about it will  
dawn and it  will never attract us      
again4 ,thus it is that with the        
destruction  of false knowledge our     
attachment or antipathy to things and   
ignorance about them 7collectively      
called dosa1 cf4 the kles'a of          
,patajali7 are also destroyed4    ,with 
the destruction of attachment actions   

7pravrtti7 for the        ,footnote3#a3 
,see ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #aij-bjd1          
s'varnumna of ,raghuntha  ,s'iromani and
 ,udayana's ,kusumjal4    #cff          
fulfilment of desires cease and with it 
rebirth ceases and with  it sorrow      
ceases4 ,without false knowledge and    
attachment1  actions cannot produce the 
bondage of karma that leads to the      
production of body and its experiences4 
,with the cessation of  sorrow there is 
emancipation in which the self is       
divested of all  its qualities          
7consciousness1 feeling1 willing1 etc47 
and remains  in its own inert state4    
,the state of mukti according to        
,nyya-,vais'esika  is neither a state of
 pure knowledge nor of bliss but a      
state of perfect qualitilessness1 in    
which the self remains in itself in  its
 own purity4 ,it is the negative state  
of absolute painlessness  in mukti that 
is sometimes spoken of as being a state 
of absolute  happiness 7nanda71 though  
really speaking the state of mukti  can 

never be a state of happiness4 ,it is a 
passive state of self in  its original  
and natural purity unassociated with    
pleasure1 pain1  knowledge1 willing1    
etc4 ,footnote ref #a4        ,footnote 
#a3 ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #dii-ecc4           
,,chapter ,,ix    ,m,m,,ms ,,philosophy 
,footnote ref #a      ,a ,comparative   
,review4    ,the ,nyya-,vais'esika      
philosophy looked at experience from  a 
purely common sense point of view and   
did not work with any  such monistic    
tendency that the ultimate conceptions  
of our  common sense experience should  
be considered as coming out of  an      
original universal 7e4g4 prakrti of the 
,smkhya74 ,space1 time1  the four       
elements1 soul1 etc4 convey the         
impression that they are  substantive   
entities or substances4 ,what is        
perceived of the material  things as    
qualities such as colour1 taste1 etc4 is
 regarded as so many  entities which    
have distinct and separate existence but
 which  manifest themselves in          

connection with the substances4 ,so also
  karma or action is supposed to be a   
separate entity1 and even  the class    
notions are perceived as separate       
entities inhering in  substances4       
,knowledge 7jna7 which illuminates all  
things is  regarded only as a quality   
belonging to soul1 just as there are    
other qualities of material objects4    
,causation is viewed merely  as the     
collocation of conditions4 ,the genesis 
of knowledge is  also viewed as similar 
in nature to the production of any other
  physical event4 ,thus just as by the  
collocation of certain physical         
circumstances a jug and its qualities   
are produced1 so by the  combination and
 respective contacts of the soul1 mind1 
sense1 and  the objects of sense1       
knowledge 7jna7 is produced4 ,soul with 
,nyya is an inert unconscious entity in 
which knowledge1 etc4  inhere4 ,the     
relation between a substance and its    
quality1 action1  class notion1 etc4 has
 also to be admitted as a separate      

entity1 as  without it the different    
entities being without any principle of 
relation would naturally fail to give us
 a philosophic construction4    ,smkhya 
had conceived of a principle which      
consisted of an  infinite number of     
reals of three different types1 which by
 their  combination were conceived to be
 able to produce all substances1        
qualities1 actions1 etc4 ,no difference 
was acknowledged to exist  between      
substances1 qualities and actions1 and  
it was conceived        ,footnote #a3   
,on the meanirg of the word ,mmms see   
,chapter ,,iv4    #cfh    that these    
were but so many aspects of a           
combination of the three  types of reals
 in different proportions4 ,the reals   
contained within  them the rudiments of 
all developments of matter1 knowledge1  
willing1 feelings1 etc4 ,as combinations
 of reals changed incessantly  and new  
phenomena of matter and mind were       
manifested1 collocations  did not bring 
about any new thing but brought about a 

phenomenon which was already there in   
its causes in another  form4 ,what we   
call knowledge or thought ordinarily1 is
 with them  merely a form of subtle     
illuminating matter stuff4 ,smkhya holds
  however that there is a transcendent  
entity as pure consciousness  and that  
by some kind of transcendent reflection 
or contact  this pure consciousness     
transforms the bare translucent         
thought-matter  into conscious thought  
or experience of a person4    ,but this 
hypothesis of a pure self1 as           
essentially distinct and  separate from 
knowledge as ordinarily understood1 can 
hardly  be demonstrated in our common   
sense experience2 and this has  been    
pointed out by the ,nyya school in a    
very strong and  emphatic manner4 ,even 
,smkhya did not try to prove that the   
existence of its transcendent purusa    
could be demonstrated in  experience1   
and it had to attempt to support its    
hypothesis of the  existence of a       
transcendent self on the ground of the  

need of  a permanent entity as a fixed  
object1 to which the passing states  of 
knowledge could cling1 and on grounds of
 moral struggle  towards virtue and     
emancipation4 ,smkhya had first supposed
  knowledge to be merely a combination  
of changing reals1 and  then had as a   
matter of necessity to admit a fixed    
principle as  purusa 7pure transcendent 
consciousness74 ,the self is thus here  
in some sense an object of inference to 
fill up the gap left by  the inadequate 
analysis of consciousness 7buddhi7 as   
being  non-intelligent and incessantly  
changing4    ,nyya fared no better1 for 
it also had to demonstrate self  on the 
ground that since knowledge existed it  
was a quality1  and therefore must      
inhere in some substance4 ,this         
hypothesis  is again based upon another 
uncritical assumption that substances   
and attributes were entirely separate1  
and that it was the nature  of the      
latter to inhere in the former1 and also
 that knowledge was  a quality requiring

 7similarly with other attributes7 a    
substance  in which to inhere4 ,none of 
them could take their stand upon  the   
self-conscious nature of our ordinary   
thought and draw their  conclusions on  
the strength of the direct evidence of  
this self-conscious    #cfi    thought4 
,of course it is true that ,smkhya had  
approached  nearer to this view than    
,nyya1 but it had separated  the content
 of knowledge and its essence so        
irrevocably that it  threatened to break
 the integrity of thought in a manner   
quite  unwarranted by common sense      
experience1 which does not seem  to     
reveal this dual element in thought4    
,anyhow the unification  of the content 
of thought and its essence had to be    
made1 and this  could not be done except
 by what may be regarded as a           
makeshift--a  transcendent illusion     
running on from beginningless  time4    
,these difficulties occurred because    
,smkhya soared to a  region which was   
not directly illuminated by the light of

 common  sense experience4 ,the ,nyya   
position is of course much worse  as a  
metaphysical solution1 for it did not   
indeed try to solve anything1  but only 
gave us a schedule of inferential       
results which could  not be tested by   
experience1 and which were based        
ultimately on  a one-sided and          
uncritical assumption4 ,it is an        
uncritical common  sense experience that
 substances are different from qualities
 and  actions1 and that the latter      
inhere in the former4 ,to base the      
whole of metaphysics on such a tender   
and fragile experience is1  to say the  
least1 building on a weak foundation4   
,it was necessary  that the importance  
of the self-revealing thought must be   
brought  to the forefront1 its evidence 
should be collected and trusted1 and  an
 account of experience should be given  
according to its verdict4  ,no          
construction of metaphysics can ever    
satisfy us which ignores  the direct    
immediate convictions of self-conscious 

thought4 ,it is  a relief to find that a
 movement of philosophy in this         
direction  is ushered in by the ,mmms   
system4 ,the ,mmms stras  were written  
by ,jaimini and the commentary 7bhsya7  
on it was  written by ,s'abara4 ,but the
 systematic elaboration of it was made  
by ,kumrila1 who preceded the great     
,s'ankarcrya1 and a disciple  of        
,kumrila1 ,prabhkara4      ,the ,mmms   
,literature4    ,it is difficult to say 
how the sacrificial system of worship   
grew  in ,india in the ,brhmanas4 ,this 
system once set up gradually  began to  
develop into a net-work of elaborate    
rituals1 the details  of which were     
probably taken note of by the priests4  
,as some  generations passed and the    
sacrifices spread over larger tracts of 
,india and grew up into more and more   
elaborate details1 the old  rules and   
regulations began to be collected       
probably as tradition    #cgj    had it1
 and this it seems gave rise to the     
smrti literature4 ,discussions  and     

doubts became more common about the many
  intricacies of the sacrificial        
rituals1 and regular rational enquiries 
into them were begun in different       
circles by different scholars and       
priests4 ,these represent the beginnings
 of ,mmms 7lit4 attempts  at rational   
enquiry71 and it is probable that there 
were  different schools of this thought4
 ,that ,jaimini's ,mmms stras  7which   
are with us the foundations of ,mmms7   
are only a comprehensive  and systematic
 compilation of one school is evident   
from  the references he gives to the    
views in different matters of other     
preceding writers who dealt with the    
subject4 ,these works are not  available
 now1 and we cannot say how much of what
 ,jaimini has  written is his original  
work and how much of it borrowed4 ,but  
it  may be said with some degree of     
confidence that it was deemed so        
masterly a work at least of one school  
that it has survived all other  attempts
 that were made before him4 ,jaimini's  

,mmms stras  were probably written about
 #bjj ,b4,c4 and are now the ground work
  of the ,mmms system4 ,commentaries    
were written on it by  various persons  
such as ,bhartrmitra 7alluded to in     
,nyyaratnkara  verse #aj of             
,s'lokavrttika71 ,bhavadsa ,pratijastra 
#fc1 ,hari and  ,upavarsa 7mentioned in 
,s'stradpik74 ,it is probable that at   
least  some of these preceded ,s'abara1 
the writer of the famous commentary     
known as the ,s'abara-bhsya4 ,it is     
difficult to say anything  about the    
time in which he flourished4 ,dr        
,gangntha  ,jh would have him about #eg 
,b4,c4 on the evidence of a current     
verse which speaks of ,king ,vikramditya
 as being the son  of ,s'abarasvmin by a
 ,ksattriya wife4 ,this bhsya of        
,s'abara  is the basis of the later     
,mmms works4 ,it was commented  upon by 
an unknown person alluded to as         
,vrttikakra by  ,prabhkara and merely   
referred to as yathhuh 7as they say7  by
 ,kumrila4 ,dr ,gangantha ,jh says that 

,prabhkara's commentary  ,brhat on the  
,s'abara-bhsya was based upon the work  
of this ,vrttikakra4 ,this ,brhat of    
,prabhkara had another  commentary on   
it--,rjuviml by ,s'alikantha ,mis'ra1   
who also  wrote a compendium on the     
,prabhkara interpretation of ,mmms      
called ,prakaranapacik4 ,tradition says 
that ,prabhkara  7often referred to as  
,nibandhakra71 whose views are  often   
alluded to as gurumata1 was a pupil of  
,kumrila4 ,kumrila  ,bhatta1 who is     
traditionally believed to be the senior 
contemporary  of ,s'ankara 7#ghh        
,a4,d471 wrote his celebrated           
independent    #cga    exposition of    
,s'abara's bhsya in three parts known as
 ,s'lokavrttika  7dealing only with the 
philosophical portion of ,s'abara's     
work as contained in the first chapter  
of the first book known as  ,tarkapda71 
,tantravrttika 7dealing with the        
remaining three  chapters of the first  
book1 the second and the third book7 and
  ,tuptk 7containing brief notes on the 

remaining nine books7  ,footnote ref #a4
 ,kumrila is referred to by his later   
followers  as ,bhatta1 ,bhattapda1 and  
,vrttikakra4 ,the next great ,mmms      
scholar and follower of ,kumrila was    
,mandana ,mis'ra1 the author of         
,vidhiviveka1 ,mmmsnukraman and the     
commentator of ,tantravrttika1  who     
became later on converted by ,s'ankara  
to ,vedantism4 ,prthasrathi  ,mis'ra    
7about ninth century ,a4,d47 wrote his  
,s'stradpik1  ,tantraratna1 and         
,nyyaratnaml following the footprints   
of ,kumrila4 ,amongst the numerous other
 followers of ,kumrila1  the names of   
,sucarita ,mis'ra the author of ,ks'ik  
and ,somes'vara  the author of ,nyyasudh
 deserve special notice4 ,rmakrsna      
,bhatta wrote an excellent commentary on
 the ,tarkapda of  ,s'stradpik called   
the ,yuktisnehapran-siddhnta-candrik and
  ,somantha wrote his ,maykhamlik on the
 remaining chapters  of ,s'stradpik4    
,other important current ,mmms works    
which  deserve notice are such as       

,nyyamlvistara of ,mdhava1 ,subodhin1   
,mmmsblapraks'a of ,s'ankara ,bhatta1   
,nyyakanik of  ,vcaspati ,mis'ra1       
,mmmsparibhsa by ,krsnayajvan1          
,mmmsnyyapraks'a by ,anantadeva1 ,gg    
,bhatta's  ,bhattacintmani1 etc4 ,most  
of the books mentioned here have been   
consulted in the writing of this        
chapter4 ,the importance of the  ,mmms  
literature for a ,hindu is indeed great4
 ,for not only are all  ,vedic duties to
 be performed according to its maxims1  
but even the  smrti literatures which   
regulate the daily duties1 ceremonials  
and rituals  of ,hindus even at the     
present day are all guided and explained
  by them4 ,the legal side of the smrtis
 consisting of inheritance1  proprietory
 rights1 adoption1 etc4 which guide     
,hindu civil life even  under the       
,british administration is explained    
according to the  ,mmms maxims4 ,its    
relations to the ,vednta philosophy will
  be briefly indicated in the next      
chapter4 ,its relations with            

,nyya-,vais'esika have also been pointed
 out in various places of this  chapter4
 ,the views of the two schools of ,mmms 
as propounded  by ,prabhkara and        
,kumrila on all the important topics    
have        ,footnote #a3               
,mahmahopadhyya ,haraprasda ,s'str says1
 in his  introduction to ,six ,buddhist 
,nyya ,tracts1 that ,kumrila preceded   
,sankara by two generations4    #cgb    
also been pointed out4 ,prabhkara's     
views however could not  win many       
followers in later times1 but while     
living it is said that  he was regarded 
by ,kumrila as a very strong rival      
,footnote ref #a4 ,hardly  any new      
contribution has been made to the ,mmms 
philosophy  after ,kumrila and          
,prabhkara4 ,the ,mmms stras deal mostly
  with the principles of the            
interpretation of the ,vedic texts in   
connection with sacrifices1 and very    
little of philosophy can be  gleaned out
 of them4 ,s'abara's contributions are  
also slight and  vague4 ,vrttikakra's   

views also can only be gathered from the
  references to them by ,kumrila and    
,prabhkara4 ,what we know  of ,mmms     
philosophy consists of their views and  
theirs alone4  ,it did not develop any  
further after them4 ,works written on   
the  subject in later times were but of 
a purely expository nature4 ,i do  not  
know of any work on ,mmms written in    
,english except  the excellent one by   
,dr ,gangntha ,jh on the ,prabhkara     
,mmms to which ,i have frequently       
referred4      ,the ,paratah-prmnya     
doctrine of ,nyya and the               
,svatah-prmnya doctrine of ,mmms4       
,the doctrine of the self-validity of   
knowledge  7svatah-prmnya7 forms the    
cornerstone on which the whole structure
  of the ,mmms philosophy is based4     
,validity means the certitude  of truth4
 ,the ,mmms philosophy asserts that all 
knowledge  excepting the action of      
remembering 7smrti7 or memory is  valid 
in itself1 for it itself certifies its  
own truth1 and neither  depends on any  

other extraneous condition nor on any   
other  knowledge for its validity4 ,but 
,nyya holds that this self-validity  of 
knowledge is a question which requires  
an explanation4  ,it is true that under 
certain conditions a piece of knowledge 
is produced in us1 but what is meant by 
saying that this  knowledge is a proof  
of its own truth8 ,when we perceive     
anything as blue1 it is the direct      
result of visual contact1 and this      
visual contact cannot certify that the  
knowledge generated is  true1 as the    
visual contact is not in any touch with 
the knowledge        ,footnote #a3      
,there is a story that ,kumrila1 not    
being able to convert  ,prabhkara1 his  
own pupil1 to his views1 attempted a    
trick and pretended  that he was dead4  
,his disciples then asked ,prabhkara    
whether his burial  rites should be     
performed according to ,kumrila's views 
or ,prabhkara's4  ,prabhkara said that  
his own views were erroneous1 but these 
were held by  him only to rouse up      

,kumrila's pointed attacks1 whereas     
,kumrila's views  were the right ones4  
,kumrila then rose up and said that     
,prabhkara  was defeated1 but the latter
 said he was not defeated so long as he 
was  alive4 ,but this has of course no  
historic value4    #cgc    it has       
conditioned4 ,moreover1 knowledge is a  
mental affair and  how can it certify   
the objective truth of its              
representation8 ,in  other words1 how   
can my perception a blue thing guarantee
  that what is subjectively perceived as
 blue is really so objectively  as well8
 ,after my perception of anything as    
blue we do not  have any such perception
 that what ,i have perceived as blue  is
 really so4 ,so this so-called          
self-validity of knowledge cannot  be   
testified or justified by any           
perception4 ,we can only be certain     
that knowledge has been produced by the 
perceptual act1 but  there is nothing in
 this knowledge or its revelation of its
 object  from which we can infer that   

the perception is also objectively      
valid or true4 ,if the production of any
 knowledge should certify  its validity 
then there would be no invalidity1 no   
illusory knowledge1  and following our  
perception of even a mirage we should   
never come to grief4 ,but we are        
disappointed often in our perceptions1  
and this proves that when we practically
 follow the  directions of our          
perception we are undecided as to its   
validity1  which can only be ascertained
 by the correspondence of the perception
  with what we find later on in         
practical experience4 ,again1  every    
piece of knowledge is the result of     
certain causal collocations1  and as    
such depends upon them for its          
production1 and  hence cannot be said to
 rise without depending on anything     
else4  ,it is meaningless to speak of   
the validity of knowledge1 for  validity
 always refers to objective realization 
of our desires and  attempts proceeding 
in accordance with our knowledge4       

,people  only declare their knowledge   
invalid when proceeding practically  in 
accordance with it they are             
disappointed4 ,the perception of  a     
mirage is called invalid when proceeding
 in accordance with  our perception we  
do not find anything that can serve the 
purposes  of water 7e4g4 drinking1      
bathing74 ,the validity or truth of     
knowledge is thus the attainment by     
practical experience of the  object and 
the fulfilment of all our purposes from 
it 7arthakriyjna  or phalajna7 just as  
perception or knowledge represented     
them to the perceiver4 ,there is thus no
 self-validity of  knowledge            
7svatah-prmnya71 but validity is        
ascertained by  samvda or agreement with
 the objective facts of experience      
,footnote  ref l4    ,it is easy to see 
that this ,nyya objection is based on   
the  supposition that knowledge is      
generated by certain objective          
collocations of conditions1 and that    
knowledge so produced can               

,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajar1 pp4      
#afj-agc4    #cgd    only be tested by  
its agreement with objective facts4 ,but
 this  theory of knowledge is merely an 
hypothesis2 for it can never be         
experienced that knowledge is the       
product of any collocations2  we have a 
perception and immediately we become    
aware of certain  objective things2     
knowledge reveals to us the facts of the
  objective world and this is           
experienced by us always4 ,but that  the
 objective world generates knowledge in 
us is only an hypothesis  which can     
hardly be demonstrated by experience4   
,it is the supreme  prerogative of      
knowledge that it reveals all other     
things4 ,it is not a  phenomenon like   
any other phenomenon of the world4 ,when
 we  say that knowledge has been        
produced in us by the external          
collocations1 we just take a perverse   
point of view which is unwarranted  by  
experience2 knowledge only photographs  
the  objective phenomena for us2 but    

there is nothing to show that  knowledge
 has been generated by these phenomena4 
,this is  only a theory which applies   
the ordinary conceptions of causation   
to knowledge and this is evidently      
unwarrantable4 ,knowledge is  not like  
any other phenomena for it stands above 
them and  interprets or illumines them  
all4 ,there can be no validity in       
things1 for truth applies to knowledge  
and knowledge alone4 ,what  we call     
agreement with facts by practical       
experience is but the  agreement of     
previous knowledge with later knowledge2
 for objective  facts never come to us  
directly1 they are always taken  on the 
evidence of knowledge1 and they have no 
other certainty  than what is bestowed  
on them by knowledge4 ,there arise      
indeed  different kinds of knowledge    
revealing different things1 but  these  
latter do not on that account generate  
the former1 for this  is never          
experienced2 we are never aware of any  
objective fact  before it is revealed by

 knowledge4 ,why knowledge makes        
different kinds of revelations is indeed
 more than we can say1 for  experience  
only shows that knowledge reveals       
objective facts and  not why it does so4
 ,the rise of knowledge is never        
perceived by  us to be dependent on any 
objective fact1 for all objective facts 
are dependent on it for its revelation  
or illumination4 ,this is  what is said 
to be the self-validity 7svatah-prmya7  
of knowledge  in its production         
7utpatti74 ,as soon as knowledge is     
produced1  objects are revealed to us2  
there is no intermediate link  between  
the rise of knowledge and the revelation
 of objects on  which knowledge depends 
for producing its action of revealing   
or illuminating them4 ,thus knowledge is
 not only independent    #cge    of     
anything else in its own rise but in its
 own action as well  7svakryakarane     
svatah prmnyam jnasya74 ,whenever there 
is any knowledge it carries with it the 
impression that it is  certain and      

valid1 and we are naturally thus        
prompted to work  7pravrtti according to
 its direction4 ,there is no indecision 
in  our mind at the time of the rise of 
knowledge as to the correctness  of     
knowledge2 but just as knowledge rises1 
it carries with  it the certainty of its
 revelation1 presence1 or action4 ,but  
in cases  of illusory perception other  
perceptions or cognitions dawn which    
carry with them the notion that our     
original knowledge was not  valid4 ,thus
 though the invalidity of any knowledge 
may appear  to us by later experience1  
and in accordance with which we  reject 
our former knowledge1 yet when the      
knowledge first revealed  itself to us  
it carried with it the conviction of    
certainty which  goaded us on to work   
according to its indication4 ,whenever a
 man  works according to his knowledge1 
he does so with the conviction  that his
 knowledge is valid1 and not in a       
passive or uncertain temper  of mind4   
,this is what ,mmmsa means when it says 

that the  validity of knowledge appears 
immediately with its rise1 though  its  
invalidity may be derived from later    
experience or some other  data 7jnasya  
prmnyam svatah aprmnyam paratah74       
,knowledge  attained is proved invalid  
when later on a contradictory           
experience 7bdhakajna7 comes in or when 
our organs etc4 are  known to be faulty 
and defective 7karanadosajna74 ,it is   
from  these that knowledge appearing as 
valid is invalidated2 when  we take all 
necessary care to look for these and yet
 find them  not1 we must think that they
 do not exist4 ,thus the validity of    
knowledge certified at the moment of its
 production need not  be doubted        
unnecessarily when even after enquiry we
 do not find  any defect in sense or any
 contradiction in later experience4 ,all
  knowledge except memory is thus       
regarded as valid independently  by     
itself as a general rule1 unless it is  
invalidated later on4 ,memory  is       
excluded because the phenomenon of      

memory depends upon  a previous         
experience1 and its existing latent     
impressions1 and  cannot thus be        
regarded as arising independently by    
itself4      ,the place of sense organs 
in perception4    ,we have just said    
that knowledge arises by itself and that
 it  could not have been generated by   
sense-contact4 ,if this be so1  the     
diversity of perceptions is however left
 unexplained4 ,but in    #cgf    face of
 the ,nyya philosophy explaining all    
perceptions on the  ground of diverse   
sense-contact the ,mmms probably could  
not  afford to remain silent on such an 
important point4 ,it therefore  accepted
 the ,nyya view of sense-contact as a   
condition of knowledge  with slight     
modifications1 and yet held their       
doctrine of  svatah-prmnya4 ,it does not
 appear to have been conscious of  a    
conflict between these two different    
principles of the production  of        
knowledge4 ,evidently the point of view 
from which it looked  at it was that the

 fact that there were the senses and    
contacts  of them with the objects1 or  
such special capacities in them by      
virtue of which the things could be     
perceived1 was with us a  matter of     
inference4 ,their actions in producing  
the knowledge  are never experienced at 
the time of the rise of knowledge1 but  
when the knowledge arises we argue that 
such and such senses  must have acted4  
,the only case where knowledge is found 
to  be dependent on anything else seems 
to be the case where one  knowledge is  
found to depend on a previous experience
 or knowledge  as in the case of memory4
 ,in other cases the dependence  of the 
rise of knowledge on anything else      
cannot be felt1 for the  physical       
collocations conditioning knowledge are 
not felt to be  operating before the    
rise of knowledge1 and these are only   
inferred  later on in accordance with   
the nature and characteristic  of       
knowledge4 ,we always have our first    
start in knowledge  which is directly   

experienced from which we may proceed   
later  on to the operation and nature of
 objective facts in relation to it4     
,thus it is that though contact of the  
senses with the objects  may later on be
 imagined to be the conditioning factor1
 yet the  rise of knowledge as well as  
our notion of its validity strikes us   
as original1 underived1 immediate1 and  
first-hand4    ,prabhkara gives us a    
sketch as to how the existence of  the  
senses may be inferred4 ,thus our       
cognitions of objects are  phenomena    
which are not all the same1 and do not  
happen always  in the same manner1 for  
these vary differently at different     
moments2  the cognitions of course take 
place in the soul which may thus  be    
regarded as the material cause          
7samavyikrana72 but there  must be some 
such movements or other specific        
associations  7asamavyikrana7 which     
render the production of this or  that  
specific cognition possible4 ,the       
immaterial causes subsist  either in the

 cause of the material cause 7e4g4 in   
the case of the  colouring of a white   
piece of cloth1 the colour of the yarns 
which    #cgg    is the cause of the    
colour in the cloth subsists in the     
yarns which  form the material cause of 
the cloth7 or in the material cause     
itself  7e4g4 in the case of a new form 
of smell being produced in a  substance 
by fire-contact1 this contact1 which is 
the immaterial  cause of the smell1     
subsists in that substance itself which 
is put  in the fire and in which the    
smell is produced74 ,the soul is        
eternal and has no other cause1 and it  
has to be assumed that  the immaterial  
cause required for the rise of a        
cognition must  inhere in the soul1 and 
hence must be a quality4 ,then again    
accepting the ,nyya conclusions we know 
that the rise of qualities  in an       
eternal thing can only take place by    
contact with some  other substances4    
,now cognition being a quality which the
 soul  acquires would naturally require 

the contact of such substances4  ,since 
there is nothing to show that such      
substances inhere in  other substances  
they are also to be taken as eternal4   
,there are  three eternal substances1   
time1 space1 and atoms4 ,but time and   
space being all-pervasive the soul is   
always in contact with them4  ,contact  
with these therefore cannot explain the 
occasional rise  of different           
cognitions4 ,this contact must then be  
of some kind  of atom which resides in  
the body ensouled by the cognizing soul4
  ,this atom may be called manas 7mind74
 ,this manas alone by  itself brings    
about cognitions1 pleasure1 pain1       
desire1 aversion1  effort1 etc4 ,the    
manas however by itself is found to be  
devoid  of any such qualities as colour1
 smell1 etc41 and as such cannot  lead  
the soul to experience or cognize these 
qualities2 hence  it stands in need of  
such other organs as may be             
characterized  by these qualities2 for  
the cognition of colour1 the mind will  

need the aid of an organ of which colour
 is the characteristic  quality2 for the
 cognition of smell1 an organ having the
 odorous  characteristic and so on with 
touch1 taste1 vision4 ,now we know  that
 the organ which has colour for its     
distinctive feature must  be one        
composed of tejas or light1 as colour is
 a feature of light1  and this proves   
the existence of the organ1 the eye--for
 the cognition  of colour2 in a similar 
manner the existence of the earthly     
organ 7organ of smell71 the aqueous     
organ 7organ of taste71 the  ks'ic organ
 7organ of sound7 and the airy organ    
7organ of  touch7 may be demonstrated4  
,but without manas none of these  organs
 is found to be effective4 ,four        
necessary contacts have  to be admitted1
 7#a7 of the sense organs with the      
object1 7#b7 of the  sense organs with  
the qualities of the object1 7#c7 of the
 manas    #cgh    with the sense organs1
 and 7#d7 of the manas with the soul4   
,the  objects of perception are of three

 kinds17#a7 substances1 7#b7 qualities1 
7#c7 jti or class4 ,the material        
substances are tangible objects of      
earth1 fire1 water1 air in large        
dimensions 7for in their fine atomic    
states they cannot be perceived74 ,the  
qualities are colour1 taste1  smell1    
touch1 number1 dimension1 separateness1 
conjunction1 disjunction1  priority1    
posteriority1 pleasure1 pain1 desire1   
aversion1 and  effort ,footnote ref l4  
,it may not be out of place here to     
mention in conclusion that  ,kumrila    
,bhatta was rather undecided as to the  
nature of the  senses or of their       
contact with the objects4 ,thus he says 
that  the senses may be conceived either
 as certain functions or  activities1 or
 as entities having the capacity of     
revealing things  without coming into   
actual contact with them1 or that they  
might  be entities which actually come  
in contact with their objects ,footnote 
ref  #b1 and he prefers this last view  
as being more satisfactory4             

,indeterminate and determinate          
perception4    ,there are two kinds of  
perception in two stages1 the first     
stage is called nirvikalpa              
7indeterminate7 and the second savikalpa
  7determinate74 ,the nirvikalpa        
perception of a thing is its perception 
at the first moment of the association  
of the senses and  their objects4 ,thus 
,kumrila says that the cognition that   
appears  first is a mere locana or      
simple perception1 called               
non-determinate  pertaining to the      
object itself pure and simple1 and      
resembling  the cognitions that the     
new-born infant has of things around    
himself4 ,in this cognition neither the 
genus nor the differentia is  presented 
to consciousness2 all that is present   
there is the  individual wherein these  
two subsist4 ,this view of indeterminate
  perception may seem in some sense to  
resemble the ,buddhist  view which      
defines it as being merely the specific 
individuality  7svalaksana and regards  

it as being the only valid element in   
perception1 whereas all the rest are    
conceived as being imaginary            
,footnote #a3 ,see ,prakaranapacik1 pp4 
#ec etc41 and ,dr ,gangntha ,jh's       
,prabhkaramimms1 pp4 #ce etc4           
,footnote #b3 ,s'lokavrttika1 see       
,pratyaksastra1 #dj etc41 and           
,nyyaratnkara on it4 ,it may be noted in
 this connection that  ,smkhya-,yoga did
 not think like ,nyya that the senses   
actually went  out to meet the objects  
7prpyakritva7 but held that there was  a
 special kind of functioning 7vrtti7 by 
virtue of which the  senses could grasp 
even such distant objects as the sun and
 the stars4  ,it is the functioning of  
the sense that reached the objects4 ,the
 nature  of the vrtti is not further    
clearly explained and ,prthasrathi      
objects  to it as being almost a        
different category 7tattvntara74    #cgi
    impositions4 ,but both ,kumrila and 
,prabhkara think that both  the genus   
and the differentia are perceived in the

 indeterminate  stage1 but these do not 
manifest themselves to us only because  
we do not remember the other things in  
relation to which1 or in  contrast to   
which1 the percept has to show its      
character as genus or  differentia2 a   
thing can be cognized as an individual  
only in  comparison with other things   
from which it differs in certain        
well-defined  characters2 and it can be 
apprehended as belonging to a  class    
only when it is found to possess certain
 characteristic features  in common with
 some other things2 so we see that as   
other things  are not presented to      
consciousness through memory1 the       
percept  at the indeterminate stage     
cannot be fully apprehended as an       
individual belonging to a class1 though 
the data constituting the               
characteristic of the thing as a genus  
and its differentia are perceived  at   
the indeterminate stage ,footnote ref   
#a4 ,so long as other things are  not   
remembered these data cannot manifest   

themselves properly1 and  hence the     
perception of the thing remains         
indeterminate at the first  stage of    
perception4 ,at the second stage the    
self by its past impressions  brings the
 present perception in relation to past 
ones  and realizes its character as     
involving universal and particular4 ,it 
is thus apparent that the difference    
between the indeterminate  and the      
determinate perception is this1 that in 
the latter case  memory of other things 
creeps in1 but this association of      
memory  in the determinate perception   
refers to those other objects of  memory
 and not to the percept4 ,it is also    
held that though the  determinate       
perception is based upon the            
indeterminate one1 yet  since the former
 also apprehends certain such factors as
 did not  enter into the indeterminate  
perception1 it is to be regarded as  a  
valid cognition4 ,kumrila also agrees   
with ,prabhkara in  holding both the    
indeterminate and the determinate       

perception  valid ,footnote ref #b4     
,some ,ontological ,problems connected  
with the  ,doctrine of ,perception4     
,the perception of the class 7jti7 of a 
percept in relation to  other things may
 thus be regarded in the main as a      
difference  between determinate and     
indeterminate perceptions4 ,the problems
  of jti and avayavvayav 7part and whole
 notion7 were        ,footnote #a3      
,compare this with the ,vais'esika view 
as interpreted by  ,s'rdhara4           
,footnote #b3 ,see ,prakaranapacik and  
,s'stradpik4    #chj    the subjects of 
hot dispute in ,indian philosophy4      
,before entering  into discussion about 
jti1 ,prabhkara first introduced the    
problem of avayava 7part7 and avayav    
7whole74 ,he argues as  an exponent of  
svatah-prmnyavda that the proof of the  
true  existence of anything must        
ultimately rest on our own              
consciousness1  and what is distinctly  
recognized in consciousness  must be    
admitted to have its existence          

established4 ,following  this canon     
,prabhkara says that gross objects as a 
whole exist1  since they are so         
perceived4 ,the subtle atoms are the    
material  cause and their connection    
7samyoga7 is the immaterial cause       
7asamavyikrana71 and it is the latter   
which renders the whole  altogether     
different from the parts of which it is 
composed2 and  it is not necessary that 
all the parts should be perceived before
 the  whole is perceived4 ,kumrila holds
 that it is due to the point of  view   
from which we look at a thing that we   
call it a separate  whole or only a     
conglomeration of parts4 ,in reality    
they are identical1  but when we lay    
stress on the notion of parts1 the thing
  appears to be a conglomeration of     
them1 and when we look at it  from the  
point of view of the unity appearing as 
a whole1 the thing  appears to be a     
whole of which there are parts 7see     
,s'lokavrttika1  ,vanavda7 ,footnote ref
 #a4    ,jti1 though incorporating the  

idea of having many units within one1 is
  different from the conception of whole
 in this1 that it resides in its        
entirety in each individual constituting
 that jti 7vys'ajyavrtti71              
,footnote #a3 ,according to             
,smkhya-,yoga a thing is regarded as the
 unity  of the universal and the        
particular 7smnyavis'esasamudyo dravyam1
  ,vysabhsya1 ,,iii4 #dd71 for there is 
no other separate entity which is       
different from them both in which they  
would inhere as ,nyaya holds4           
,conglomerations can be of two kinds1   
namely those in which the parts  exist  
at a distance from one another 7e4g4 a  
forest71 and those in which  they exist 
close together 7mrantar hi tadavayavh71 
and it is this  latter combination      
7ayutasiddhvayava7 which is called a    
dravya1 but  here also there is no      
separate whole distinct from the parts2 
it is the  parts connected in a         
particular way and having no perceptible
 space  between them that is called a   

thing or a whole4 ,the ,buddhists as    
,pandits'oka has shown did not believe  
in any whole 7avayavi71 it  is the atoms
 which in connection with one another   
appeared as a whole  occupying space    
7paramnava eva hi                       
pararpades'aparihrenotpannh             
parasparasahit avabhsamn desavitnavanto 
bhavanti74 ,the whole  is thus a mere   
appearance and not a reality 7see       
,avayavinirkarana1 ,six  ,buddhist ,nyya
 ,tracts74 ,nyaya however held that the 
atoms were partless  7niravayava and    
hence it would be wrong to say that when
 we see an  object we see the atoms4    
,the existence of a whole as different  
from the  parts which belong to it is   
directly experienced and there is no    
valid  reason against it3               
adustakaranodbhtamanvirbhtabdhakam      
asandigdaca vijnam katham mithyeti      
kathyate4    ,nyyamajar1 pp4 #eej ff4   
#cha    but the establishment of the    
existence of wholes refutes the         
argument that jti should be denied1     

because it involves the conception  of a
 whole 7class7 consisting of many parts 
7individuals74 ,the  class character or 
jti exists because it is distinctly     
perceived by  us in the individuals     
included in any particular class4 ,it is
 eternal  in the sense that it continues
 to exist in other individuals1 even    
when one of the individuals ceases to   
exist4 ,when a new individual  of that  
class 7e g4 cow class7 comes into being1
 a new  relation of inherence is        
generated by which the individual is    
brought into relation with the          
class-character existing in other       
individuals1 for inherence 7samavya7    
according to ,prabhkara  is not an      
eternal entity but an entity which is   
both produced  and not produced         
according as the thing in which it      
exists is  non-eternal or eternal1 and  
it is not regarded as one as ,nyya      
holds1 but as many1 according as there  
is the infinite number of  things in    
which it exists4 ,when any individual is

 destroyed1 the  class-character does   
not go elsewhere1 nor subsist in that   
individual1  nor is itself destroyed1   
but it is only the inherence of         
class-character with that individual    
that ceases to exist4 ,with  the        
destruction of an individual or its     
production it is a new  relation of     
inherence that is destroyed or produced4
 ,but the  class-character or jti has no
 separate existence apart from the      
individuals as ,nyya supposes4          
,apprehension of jti is essentially  the
 apprehension of the class-character of 
a thing in relation to  other similar   
things of that class by the perception  
of the common  characteristics4 ,but    
,prabhkara would not admit the existence
 of  a highest genus satt 7being7 as    
acknowledged by ,nyya4 ,he  argues that 
the existence of class-character is     
apprehended because  we find that the   
individuals of a class possess some     
common  characteristic possessed by all 
the heterogeneous and disparate  things 

of the world as can give rise to the    
conception of a separate  jti as satt1  
as demanded by the naiyyikas4 ,that all 
things are  said to be sat 7existing7 is
 more or less a word or a name without  
the corresponding apprehension of a     
common quality4 ,our experience  always 
gives us concrete existing individuals1 
but we  can never experience such a     
highest genus as pure existence or      
being1 as it has no concrete form which 
may be perceived4 ,when  we speak of a  
thing as sat1 we do not mean that it is 
possessed  of any such class-characters 
as satt 7being72 what we mean  is simply
 that the individual has its specific   
existence or svarpasatt4    #chb        
,thus the ,nyya view of perception as   
taking only the  thing in its pure being
 apart from qualities1 etc1             
7sanmtra-visayam  pratyaksam7 is made   
untenable by ,prabhkara1 as according to
  him the thing is perceived direct with
 all its qualities4 ,according  to      
,kumrila however jti is not something   

different from the  individuals         
comprehended by it and it is directly   
perceived4  ,kumrila's view of jti is   
thus similar to that held by ,smkhya1   
namely that when we look at an          
individual from one point of  view 7jti 
as identical with the individual71 it is
 the individual that  lays its stress   
upon our consciousness and the notion of
 jti becomes  latent1 but when we look  
at it from another point of view  7the  
individual as identical with jti7 it is 
the jti which presents  itself to       
consciousness1 and the aspect as        
individual becomes latent4  ,the        
apprehension as jti or as individual is 
thus only a matter  of different points 
of view or angles of vision from which  
we look  at a thing4 ,quite in harmony  
with the conception of jti1 ,kumrila    
holds that the relation of inherence is 
not anything which is distinct  from the
 things themselves in which it is       
supposed to exist1  but only a          
particular aspect or phase of the things

 themselves  7,s'lokavrttika1           
,pratyaksastra1 #adi1 #aej1 abhedt      
samavyo'stu  svarpam dharmadharminoh71  
,kumrila agrees with ,prabhkara  that   
jti is perceived by the senses          
7tatraikabuddhinirgrhy                  
jtirindriyagocar74    ,it is not out of 
place to mention that on the evidence of
  ,prabhkara we find that the category  
of vis'esa admitted by the  ,kanda      
school is not accepted as a separate    
category by the  ,mmms on the ground    
that the differentiation of eternal     
things from one another1 for which the  
category of vis'esa is  admitted1 may   
very well be effected on the basis of   
the ordinary  qualities of these things4
 ,the quality of prthaktva or specific  
differences in atoms1 as inferred by the
 difference of things they  constitute1 
can very well serve the purposes of     
vis'esa4      ,the nature of knowledge4 
,all knowledge involves the knower1 the 
known object1 and the  knowledge at the 
same identical moment4 ,all knowledge   

whether  perceptual1 inferential or of  
any other kind must necessarily reveal  
the self or the knower directly4 ,thus  
as in all knowledge the self  is        
directly and immediately perceived1 all 
knowledge may be regarded  as perception
 from the point of view of self4 ,the   
division    #chc    of the pramnas as   
pratyaksa 7perception71 anumna          
7inference71  etc4 is from the point of 
view of the objects of knowledge with   
reference to the varying modes in which 
they are brought within  the purview of 
knowledge4 ,the self itself however has 
no illumining  or revealing powers1 for 
then even in deep sleep we could have   
knowledge1 for the self is present even 
then1 as is proved by the  remembrance  
of dreams4 ,it is knowledge 7samvid7    
that reveals  by its very appearance    
both the self1 the knower1 and the      
objects4  ,it is generally argued       
against the self-illuminative character 
of  knowledge that all cognitions are of
 the forms of the objects they  are said

 to reveal2 and if they have the same   
form we may rather  say that they have  
the same identical reality too4 ,the    
,mmms  answer to these objections is    
this1 that if the cognition and the     
cognized were not different from one    
another1 they could not  have been felt 
as such1 and we could not have felt that
 it is  by cognition that we apprehend  
the cognized objects4 ,the  cognition   
7samvedana7 of a person simply means    
that such a  special kind of quality    
7dharma7 has been manifested in the     
self by virtue of which his active      
operation with reference to  a certain  
object is favoured or determined1 and   
the object of cognition  is that with   
reference to which the active operation 
of the  self has been induced4          
,cognitions are not indeed absolutely   
formless1  for they have the cognitional
 character by which things are          
illumined and manifested4 ,cognition has
 no other character than  this1 that it 
illumines and reveals objects4 ,the     

things only are  believed to have forms 
and only such forms as knowledge reveal 
to us about them4 ,even the dream       
cognition is with reference to  objects 
that were perceived previously1 and of  
which the impressions  were left in the 
mind and were aroused by the unseen     
agency  7adrsta74 ,dream cognition is   
thus only a kind of remembrance  of that
 which was previously experienced4 ,only
 such of the impressions  of cognized   
objects are roused in dreams as can     
beget just that  amount of pleasurable  
or painful experience1 in accordance    
with the  operation of adrsta1 as the   
person deserves to have in accordance   
with his previous merit or demerit4     
,the ,prabhkara ,mmms1 in refuting the  
arguments of those  who hold that our   
cognitions of objects are themselves    
cognized  by some other cognition1 says 
that this is not possible1 since we  do 
not experience any such double cognition
 and also because it  would lead us to a
 regressus ad infinitum1 for if a second

 cognition    #chd    is necessary to   
interpret the first1 then that would    
require a third  and so on4 ,if a       
cognition could be the object of another
 cognition1  then it could not be       
self-valid4 ,the cognition is not of    
course unknown  to us1 but that is of   
course because it is self-cognized1 and 
reveals itself to us the moment it      
reveals its objects4 ,from the          
illumination of objects also we can     
infer the presence of this              
self-cognizing knowledge4 ,but it is    
only its presence that is inferred  and 
not the cognition itself1 for inference 
can only indicate the  presence of an   
object and not in the form in which it  
can be  apprehended by perception       
7pratyaksa74 ,prabhkara draws a  subtle 
distinction between perceptuality       
7samvedyatva7 and being  object of      
knowledge 7prameyatva74 ,a thing can    
only be apprehended  7samvedyate7 by    
perception1 whereas inference can only  
indicate the presence of an object      

without apprehending the  object itself4
 ,our cognition cannot be apprehended by
 any other  cognition4 ,inference can   
only indicate the presence or existence 
of knowledge but cannot apprehend the   
cognition itself ,footnote ref #a4      
,kumrila also agrees with ,prabhkara in 
holding that perception  is never the   
object of another perception and that it
 ends  in the direct apprehensibility of
 the object of perception4 ,but he  says
 that every perception involves a       
relationship between the  perceiver and 
the perceived1 wherein the perceiver    
behaves as  the agent whose activity in 
grasping the object is known as         
cognition4  ,this is indeed different   
from the ,prabhkara view1 that  in one  
manifestation of knowledge the knower1  
the known1 and  the knowledge1 are      
simultaneously illuminated 7the doctrine
 of  triputpratyaksa7 ,footnote ref #b4 
,the ,psychology of ,illusion4    ,the  
question however arises that if all     
apprehensions are  valid1 how are we to 

account for illusory perceptions which  
cannot  be regarded as valid8 ,the      
problem of illusory perception and  its 
psychology is a very favourite topic of 
discussion in ,indian  philosophy4      
,omitting the theory of illusion of the 
,jains called  satkhyti which we have   
described before1 and of the ,vedntists1
  which we shall describe in the next   
chapter1 there are three  different     
theories of illusion1 viz4 7#a7         
tmakhyti1 7#b7 vipartakhyt  or          
anyathkhyti1 and 7#c7 akhyti of the     
,mmms school4 ,the        ,footnote #a3 
,see ,prabhkarammms1 by ,dr ,gangantha  
,jh4    ,footnote #b3 loc4 cit4 pp4     
#bf-bh4    #che    vipartkhyti or       
anyathkhyti theory of illusion is       
accepted by  the ,nyya1 ,vais'esika and 
the ,yoga1 the khyti theory by  ,mmms   
and ,smkhya and the tmakhyti by the     
,buddhists4    ,the commonest example of
 illusion in ,indian philosophy is  the 
illusory appearance of a piece of broken
 conch-shell as a piece  of silver4     

,that such an illusion occurs is a fact 
which is experienced  by all and agreed 
to by all4 ,the differences of view are 
with regard  to its cause or its        
psychology4 ,the idealistic ,buddhists  
who deny  the existence of the external 
world and think that there are only  the
 forms of knowledge1 generated by the   
accumulated karma of  past lives1 hold  
that just as in the case of a correct   
perception1 so  also in the case of     
illusory perception it is the flow of   
knowledge  which must be held           
responsible4 ,the flow of knowledge on  
account  of the peculiarities of its own
 collocating conditions generates       
sometimes what we call right perception 
and sometimes wrong  perception or      
illusion4 ,on this view nothing depends 
upon the so-called  external data4 ,for 
they do not exist1 and even if they did 
exist1 why should the same data         
sometimes bring about the right         
perception and sometimes the illusion8  
,the flow of knowledge  creates both the

 percept and the perceiver and unites   
them4 ,this  is true both in the case of
 correct perception and illusory        
perception4  ,nyya objects to the above 
view1 and says that1 if  knowledge      
irrespective of any external condition  
imposes upon  itself the knower and the 
illusory percept1 then the perception   
ought to be of the form ,i am silver and
 not this is silver4  ,moreover this    
theory stands refuted1 as it is based   
upon a false  hypothesis that it is the 
inner knowledge which appears as coming 
from outside and that the external as   
such does not exist4    ,the            
vipartakhyti or the anyathkhyti theory  
supposes that  the illusion takes place 
because on account of malobservation we 
do not note the peculiar traits of the  
conch-shell as distinguished  from the  
silver1 and at the same time by the glow
 etc4 of the  conch-shell unconsciously 
the silver which ,i had seen elsewhere  
is remembered and the object before me  
is taken as silver4 ,in  illusion the   

object before us with which our eye is  
associated is  not conch-shell1 for the 
traits peculiar to it not being grasped1
 it  is merely an object4 ,the silver is
 not utterly non-existent1 for it       
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of
 it as experienced before  that creates 
confusion and leads us to think of the  
conch-shell as  silver4 ,this school    
agrees with the akhyti school that the  
fact    #chf    that ,i remember silver 
is not taken note of at the time of     
illusion4 ,but it holds that the mere   
non-distinction is not enough  to       
account for the phenomenon of illusion1 
for there is a definite  positive aspect
 associated with it1 viz4 the false     
identification of  silver 7seen         
elsewhere7 with the conch-shell before  
us4    ,the khyti theory of ,mmms holds 
that since the special  peculiarities of
 the conch-shell are not noticed1 it is 
erroneous  to say that we identify or   
cognize positively the conch-shell as   
the silver 7perceived elsewhere71 for   

the conch-shell is not cognized  at all4
 ,what happens here is simply this1 that
 only the  features common to           
conch-shell and silver being noticed1   
the perceiver  fails to apprehend the   
difference between these two things1    
and this gives rise to the cognition of 
silver4 ,owing to a certain  weakness of
 the mind the remembrance of silver     
roused by the  common features of the   
conch-shell and silver is not           
apprehended1  and the fact that it is   
only a memory of silver seen in some    
past  time that has appeared before him 
is not perceived2 and it is as  a result
 of this non-apprehension of the        
difference between the  silver          
remembered and the present conch-shell  
that the illusion  takes place4 ,thus1  
though the illusory perception partakes 
of a  dual character of remembrance and 
apprehension1 and as such is  different 
from the ordinary valid perception      
7which is wholly a  matter of direct    
apprehension7 of real silver before us1 

yet as the  difference between the      
remembrance of silver and the sight of  
the present object is not apprehended1  
the illusory perception  appears at the 
moment of its production to be as valid 
as a real  valid perception4 ,both give 
rise to the same kind of activity on    
the part of the agent1 for in illusory  
perception the perceiver  would be as   
eager to stoop and pick up the thing as 
in the case  of a real perception4      
,kumrila agrees with this view as       
expounded  by ,prabhkara1 and further   
says that the illusory judgment is as   
valid to the cognizor at the time that  
he has the cognition as any  real       
judgment could be4 ,if subsequent       
experience rejects it1 that  does not   
matter1 for it is admitted in ,mmms that
 when later  experience finds out the   
defects of any perception it can        
invalidate  the original perception     
which was self-valid at the time of its 
production ,footnote ,ref4 #a4 ,it is   
easy to see that the ,mmms had to  adopt

 this view of illusion to maintain the  
doctrine that all cognition  at the     
moment of its production is valid4 ,the 
khyti theory        ,footnote #a3 ,see  
,prakaranapacik1 ,s'stradpik1 and       
,s'lokavrttika1  stra #b4    #chg       
tries to establish the view that the    
illusion is not due to any  positive    
wrong knowledge1 but to a mere negative 
factor of non-apprehension  due to      
certain weakness of mind4 ,so it is that
  though illusion is the result1 yet the
 cognition so far as it is cognition1   
is made up of two elements1 the present 
perception and  memory1 both of which   
are true so far as they are individually
  present to us1 and the cognition      
itself has all the characteristics of   
any other valid knowledge1 for the mark 
of the validity of a cognition  is its  
power to prompt us to action4 ,in       
doubtful cognitions also1  as in the    
case ,is this a post or a man8 what is  
actually perceived  is some tall object 
and thus far it is valid too4 ,but when 

this  perception gives rise to two      
different kinds of remembrance 7of  the 
pillar and the man71 doubt comes in4 ,so
 the element of apprehension  involved  
in doubtful cognitions should be        
regarded  as self-valid as any other    
cognition4      ,inference4    ,s'abara 
says that when a certain fixed or       
permanent relation  has been known to   
exist between two things1 we can have   
the  idea of one thing when the other   
one is perceived1 and this kind  of     
knowledge is called inference4 ,kumrila 
on the basis of this  tries to show that
 inference is only possible when we     
notice  that in a large number of cases 
two things 7e4g4 smoke and fire7        
subsist together in a third thing 7e4g4 
kitchen1 etc47 in some independent      
relation1 i4e4 when their coexistence   
does not depend  upon any other         
eliminable condition or factor4 ,it is  
also necessary  that the two things     
7smoke and fire7 coexisting in a third  
thing should be so experienced that all 

cases of the existence of  one thing    
should also be cases involving the      
existence of the  other1 but the cases  
of the existence of one thing 7e4g4     
fire71  though including all the cases  
of the existence of the other  7smoke71 
may have yet a more extensive sphere    
where the latter  7smoke7 may not exist4
 ,when once a permanent relation1       
whether  it be a case of coexistence 7as
 in the case of the contiguity of  the  
constellation of ,krttik with ,rohin1   
where1 by the rise of the  former the   
early rise of the latter may be         
inferred71 or a case of  identity 7as in
 the relation between a genus and its   
species71 or  a case of cause and effect
 or otherwise between two things and  a 
third thing which had been apprehended  
in a large number of  cases1 is         
perceived1 they fuse together in the    
mind as forming    #chh    one whole1   
and as a result of that when the        
existence of the  one 7e4g4 smoke7 in a 
thing 7hill7 is noticed1 we can infer   

the  existence of the thing 7hill7 with 
its counterpart 7fire74 ,in all  such   
cases the thing 7e4g4 fire7 which has a 
sphere extending  beyond that in which  
the other 7e4g4 smoke7 can exist is     
called  gamya or vypaka and the other   
7e4g4 smoke7 vypya or gamaka  and it is 
only by the presence of gamaka in a     
thing 7e4g4 hill1  the paksa7 that the  
other counterpart the gamya 7fire7 may  
be  inferred4 ,the general proposition1 
universal coexistence of the  gamaka    
with the gamya 7e4g4 wherever there is  
smoke there is  fire7 cannot be the     
cause of inference1 for it is itself a  
case  of inference4 ,inference involves 
the memory of a permanent  relation     
subsisting between two things 7e4g4     
smoke and fire7 in a  third thing 7e g4 
kitchen72 but the third thing is        
remembered only  in a general way that  
the coexisting things must have a place 
where they are found associated4 ,it is 
by virtue of such a memory  that the    
direct perception of a basis 7e4g4 hill7

 with the gamaka  thing 7e4g4 smoke7 in 
it would naturally bring to my mind that
  the same basis 7hill7 must contain the
 gamya 7i4e4 fire7 also4  ,every case of
 inference thus proceeds directly from a
 perception  and not from any universal 
general proposition4 ,kumrila holds     
that the inference gives us the minor as
 associated with the major  and not of  
the major alone1 i4e4 of the fiery      
mountain and not of  fire4 ,thus        
inference gives us a new knowledge1 for 
though it was  known in a general way   
that the possessor of smoke is the      
possessor  of fire1 yet the case of the 
mountain was not anticipated  and the   
inference of the fiery mountain is thus 
a distinctly new  knowledge             
7des'akldhikydyuktamagrhtagrhitvam      
anumnasya1  ,nyyaratnkara1 p4 #cfc7     
,footnote ref #a4 ,it should also be    
noted that in  forming the notion of the
 permanent relation between two things1 
a third thing in which these two subsist
 is always remembered  and for the      

conception of this permanent relation it
 is enough  that in the large number of 
cases where the concomitance was  noted 
there was no knowledge of any case where
 the concomitance  failed1 and it is not
 indispensable that the negative        
instances  in which the absence of the  
gamya or vypaka was marked by an        
,footnote #a3 ,it is important to note  
that it is not unlikely that ,kumrila   
was indebted to ,dinnga for this2 for   
,dinnga's main contention is that  it is
 not fire1 nor the connection between it
 and the hill1 but it is  the fiery hill
 that is inferred for otherwise         
inference would give us  no new         
knowledge see ,vidybhsana's ,indian     
,logic1 p4 #hg and  ,ttparyatik1 p4     
#abj4    #chi    absence of the gamaka  
or vypya1 should also be noted1 for a   
knowledge of such a negative relation is
 not indispensable for  the forming of  
the notion of the permanent relation    
,footnote ref #a4 ,the  experience of a 
large number of particular cases in     

which any two  things were found to     
coexist together in another thing in    
some  relation associated with the      
non-perception of any case of failure   
creates an expectancy in us of inferring
 the presence of the  gamya in that     
thing in which the gamaka is perceived  
to exist  in exactly the same relation  
,footnote ref #b4 ,in those cases where 
the  circle of the existence of the     
gamya coincides with the circle of the  
existence of the gamaka1 each of them   
becomes a gamaka for the other4  ,it is 
clear that this form of inference not   
only includes all cases  of cause and   
effect1 of genus and species but also   
all cases of  coexistence as well4      
,the question arises that if no         
inference is possible without  a memory 
of the permanent relation1 is not the   
self-validity  of inference destroyed on
 that account1 for memory is not        
regarded  as self-valid4 ,to this       
,kumrila's answer is that memory  is not
 invalid1 but it has not the status of  

pramna1 as it does  not bring to us a   
new knowledge4 ,but inference involves  
the  acquirement of a new knowledge in  
this1 that though the coexistence  of   
two things in another was known in a    
number of cases1  yet in the present    
case a new case of the existence of the 
gamya  in a thing is known from the     
perception of the existence of the      
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a
 means which is not  perception1 for it 
is only the gamaka that is seen and not 
the  gamya4 ,if the gamya is also seen  
it is no inference at all4    ,as       
regards the number of propositions      
necessary for the explicit  statement of
 the process of inference for convincing
 others  7prrthnumna7 both ,kumrila and 
,prabhkara hold that three  premisses   
are quite sufficient for inference4     
,thus the first three  premisses pratij1
 hetu and drstnta may quite serve the   
purpose  of an anumna4    ,there are two
 kinds of anumna according to ,kumrila  
viz4 pratyaksatodrstasambandha and      

smnyatodrstasambandha4  ,the former is  
that kind of inference where the        
permanent        ,footnote #a3 ,kumrila 
strongly opposes a ,buddhist view that  
concomitance  7vypti7 is ascertained    
only by the negative instances and not  
by the  positive ones4    ,footnote #b3 
tasmdanavagate'pi sarvatrnvaye          
sarvatas'ca vyatireke  bahus'ah         
shityvagamamtrdeva                      
vyabhicrdars'anasanthdanumnotpattirangka
rtavyah4  ,nyyaratnkara1 p4 #bhh4       
#cij    relation between two concrete   
things1 as in the case of smoke and     
fire1 has been noticed4 ,the latter is  
that kind of inference where  the       
permanent relation is observed not      
between two concrete  things but between
 two general notions1 as in the case of 
movement  and change of place1 e4g4 the 
perceived cases where there is  change  
of place there is also motion involved  
with it2 so from the  change of place of
 the sun its motion is inferred and it  
is held  that this general notion is    

directly perceived like all universals  
,footnote ref #a4    ,prabhkara         
recognizes the need of forming the      
notion of the  permanent relation1 but  
he does not lay any stress on the fact  
that this permanent relation between two
 things 7fire and smoke7  is taken in   
connection with a third thing in which  
they both  subsist4 ,he says that the   
notion of the permanent relation between
  two things is the main point1 whereas 
in all other associations  of time and  
place the things in which these two     
subsist  together are taken only as     
adjuncts to qualify the two things      
7e4g4 fire and smoke74 ,it is also      
necessary to recognize the fact that    
though the concomitance of smoke in fire
 is only conditional1 the  concomitance 
of the fire in smoke is unconditional   
and absolute ,footnote  ref #b4 ,when   
such a conviction is firmly rooted in   
the mind that  the concept of the       
presence of smoke involves the concept  
of the  presence of fire1 the inference 

of fire is made as soon as any  smoke is
 seen4 ,prabhkara counts separately the 
fallacies of the  minor 7paksbhsa71 of  
the enunciation 7pratijbhsa7 and of  the
 example 7drstntbhsa7 along with the    
fallacies of the middle  and this seems 
to indicate that the ,mmms logic was not
 altogether  free from ,buddhist        
influence4 ,the cognition of smoke      
includes within itself the cognition of 
fire also1 and thus there  would be     
nothing left unknown to be cognized by  
the inferential  cognition4 ,but this   
objection has little force with         
,prabhkara1  for he does not admit that 
a pramna should necessarily bring  us   
any new knowledge1 for pramna is simply 
defined as apprehension4  ,so though the
 inferential cognition always pertains  
to  things already known it is yet      
regarded by him as a pramna1  since it  
is in any case no doubt an apprehension4
        ,footnote #a3 ,see              
,s'lokavrttika1 ,nyyaratnkara1          
,s'stradpik1  ,yuktisnehapran1          

,siddhntacandrik on anumna4    ,footnote
 #b3 ,on the subject of the means of    
assuring oneself that there is  no      
condition 7updhi7 which may vitiate the 
inference1 ,prabhkara has  nothing new  
to tell us4 ,he says that where even    
after careful enquiry in  a large number
 of cases the condition cannot be       
discovered we must say  that it does not
 exist 7prayatnennvisyamne              
aupdhikatvnavagamt1  see                
,prakaranapacik1 p4 #ga74    #cia       
,upamna1 ,arthpatti4    ,analogy        
7upamna7 is accepted by ,mmms in a sense
 which  is different from that in which 
,nyya took it4 ,the man who  has seen a 
cow 7go7 goes to the forest and sees a  
wild ox  7gavaya71 and apprehends the   
similarity of the gavaya with  the go1  
and then cognizes the similarity of the 
go 7which is not  within the limits of  
his perception then7 with the gavaya4   
,the  cognition of this similarity of   
the gavaya in the go1 as it follows     
directly from the perception of the     

similarity of the go in the  gavaya1 is 
called upamna 7analogy74 ,it is regarded
 as a separate  pramna1 because by it we
 can apprehend the similarity  existing 
in a thing which is not perceived at the
 moment4 ,it is  not mere remembrance1  
for at the time the go was seen the     
gavaya was not seen1 and hence the      
similarity also was not seen1  and what 
was not seen could not be remembered4   
,the difference  of ,prabhkara and      
,kumrila on this point is that while the
  latter regards similarity as only a   
quality consisting in the fact  of more 
than one object having the same set of  
qualities1 the  former regards it as a  
distinct category4    ,arthpatti        
7implication7 is a new pramna which is  
admitted  by the ,mmms4 ,thus when we   
know that a person ,devadatta  is alive 
and perceive that he is not in the      
house1 we cannot reconcile  these two   
facts1 viz4 his remaining alive and his 
not being  in the house without         
presuming his existence somewhere       

outside  the house1 and this method of  
cognizing the existence of ,devadatta   
outside the house is called arthpatti   
7presumption or  implication74    ,the  
exact psychological analysis of the mind
 in this arthpatti  cognition is a      
matter on which ,prabhkara and ,kumrila 
disagree4 ,prabhkara holds that when a  
man knows that ,devadatta  habitually   
resides in his house but yet does not   
find him  there1 his knowledge that     
,devadatta is living 7though acquired   
previously by some other means of proof7
 is made doubtful1 and  the cause of    
this doubt is that he does not find     
,devadatta at his  house4 ,the absence  
of ,devadatta from the house is not the 
cause  of implication1 but it throws    
into doubt the very existence of        
,devadatta1  and thus forces us to      
imagine that ,devadatta must remain     
somewhere outside4 ,that can only be    
found by implication1  without the      
hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be 
removed4  ,the mere absence of          

,devadatta from the house is not enough 
for    #cib    making the presumption   
that he is outside the house1 for he    
might also be dead4 ,but ,i know that   
,devadatta was living and  also that he 
was not at home2 this perception of his 
absence from  home creates a doubt as   
regards my first knowledge that he is   
living1 and it is for the removal of    
this doubt that there creeps in  the    
presumption that he must be living      
somewhere else4 ,the  perception of the 
absence of ,devadatta through the       
intermediate  link of a doubt passes    
into the notion of a presumption that he
  must then remain somewhere else4 ,in  
inference there is no element  of doubt1
 for it is only when the smoke is       
perceived to exist  beyond the least    
element of doubt that the inference of  
the fire  is possible1 but in           
presumption the perceived non-existence 
in the  house leads to the presumption  
of an external existence only  when it  
has thrown the fact of the man's being  

alive into doubt  and uncertainty       
,footnote ref #a4    ,kumrila however   
objects to this explanation of          
,prabhkara1  and says that if the fact  
that ,devadatta is living is made       
doubtful  by the absence of ,devadatta  
at his house1 then the doubt  may as    
well be removed by the supposition that 
,devadatta is  dead1 for it does not    
follow that the doubt with regard to the
 life  of ,devadatta should necessarily 
be resolved by the supposition  of his  
being outside the house4 ,doubt can only
 be removed  when the cause or the root 
of doubt is removed1 and it does not    
follow that because ,devadatta is not in
 the house therefore he is  living4 ,if 
it was already known that ,devadatta was
 living and his  absence from the house 
creates the doubt1 how then can the very
  fact which created the doubt remove   
the doubt8 ,the cause of  doubt cannot  
be the cause of its removal too4 ,the   
real procedure  of the presumption is   
quite the other way4 ,the doubt about   

the life of ,devadatta being removed by 
previous knowledge or  by some other    
means1 we may presume that he must be   
outside  the house when he is found     
absent from the house4 ,so there cannot 
be any doubt about the life of          
,devadatta4 ,it is the certainty  of his
 life associated with the perception of 
his absence from the  house that leads  
us to the presumption of his external   
existence4  ,there is an opposition     
between the life of ,devadatta and his  
absence from the house1 and the mind    
cannot come to rest without  the        
presumption of his external existence4  
,the mind oscillates  between two       
contradictory poles both of which it    
accepts but        ,footnote #a3 ,see   
,prakaranapacik1 pp4 #aac-aae4    #cic  
cannot reconcile1 and as a result of    
that finds an outlet and a              
reconciliation in the presumption that  
the existence of ,devadatta  must be    
found outside the house4    ,well then1 
if that be so1 inference may as well be 

interpreted  as presumption4 ,for if we 
say that we know that wherever there  is
 smoke there is fire1 and then perceive 
that there is smoke  in the hill1 but no
 fire1 then the existence of the smoke  
becomes  irreconcilable1 or the         
universal proposition of the            
concomitance  of smoke with fire becomes
 false1 and hence the presumption  that 
there is fire in the hill4 ,this would  
have been all right if  the universal   
concomitance of smoke with fire could be
 known  otherwise than by inference4    
,but this is not so1 for the            
concomitance  was seen only in          
individual cases1 and from that came the
  inference that wherever there is smoke
 there is fire4 ,it cannot  be said that
 the concomitance perceived in          
individual cases suffered  any          
contradiction without the presumption of
 the universal  proposition 7wherever   
there is smoke there is fire72 thus     
arthpatti  is of no avail here and      
inference has to be accepted4 ,now  when

 it is proved that there are cases where
 the purpose of inference  cannot be    
served by arthpatti1 the validity of    
inference  as a means of proof becomes  
established4 ,that being done we  admit 
that the knowledge of the fire in the   
hill may come to us  either by inference
 or by arthpatti4    ,so inference also 
cannot serve the purpose of arthpatti1  
for  in inference also it is the hetu   
7reason7 which is known first1 and      
later on from that the sdhya 7what is to
 be proved72 both of  them however      
cannot be apprehended at the same       
moment1 and  it is exactly this that    
distinguishes arthpatti from anumna4    
,for arthpatti takes place where1       
without the presumption of  ,devadatta's
 external existence1 the absence from   
the house of  ,devadatta who is living  
cannot be comprehended4 ,if ,devadatta  
is  living he must exist inside or      
outside the house4 ,the mind cannot     
swallow a contradiction1 and hence      
without presuming the external          

existence of ,devadatta even the        
perceived non-existence cannot  be      
comprehended4 ,it is thus that the      
contradiction is resolved by  presuming 
his existence outside the house4        
,arthpatti is thus  the result of       
arthnupapatti or the contradiction of   
the present  perception with a          
previously acquired certain knowledge4  
,it is by this arthpattipramna that we  
have to admit that  there is a special  
potency in seeds by which they produce  
the    #cid    shoots1 and that a       
special potency is believed to exist in 
sacrifices  by which these can lead the 
sacrificer to ,heaven or some such      
beneficent state of existence4          
,s'abda pramna4    ,s'abda or word is   
regarded as a separate means of proof by
  most of the recognized ,indian systems
 of thought excepting the  ,jaina1      
,buddhist1 ,crvka and ,vaisesika4 ,a    
discussion on this  topic however has   
but little philosophical value and ,i   
have therefore  omitted to give any     

attention to it in connection with the  
,nyya1 and the ,smkhya-,yoga systems4   
,the validity and authority  of the     
,vedas were acknowledged by all ,hindu  
writers and  they had wordy battles over
 it with the ,buddhists who denied  it4 
,some sought to establish this authority
 on the supposition  that they were the 
word of ,god1 while others1 particularly
 the  ,mmmsists strove to prove that    
they were not written by anyone1  and   
had no beginning in time nor end and    
were eternal4  ,their authority was not 
derived from the authority of any       
trustworthy person or ,god4 ,their words
 are valid in themselves4  ,evidently a 
discussion on these matters has but     
little value with  us1 though it was a  
very favourite theme of debate in the   
old  days of ,india4 ,it was in fact the
 most important subject for  ,mmms1 for 
the ,mmms stras were written for the    
purpose  of laying down canons for a    
right interpretation of the ,vedas4     
,the slight extent to which it has dealt

 with its own epistemological  doctrines
 has been due solely to their laying the
 foundation  of its structure of        
interpretative maxims1 and not to       
writing philosophy for its own sake4 ,it
 does not dwell so much  upon salvation 
as other systems do1 but seeks to serve 
as a  rational compendium of maxims with
 the help of which the  ,vedas may be   
rightly understood and the sacrifices   
rightly performed4  ,but a brief        
examination of the doctrine of word     
7s'abda7  as a means of proof cannot be 
dispensed with in connection with  ,mmms
 as it is its very soul4    ,s'abda     
7word7 as a pramna means the knowledge  
that we  get about things 7not within   
the purview of our perception7 from     
relevant sentences by understanding the 
meaning of the words of  which they are 
made up4 ,these sentences may be of two 
kinds1  viz4 those uttered by men and   
those which belong to the ,vedas4  ,the 
first becomes a valid means of knowledge
 when it is not    #cie    uttered by   

untrustworthy persons and the second is 
valid in  itself4 ,the meanings of words
 are of course known to us  before1 and 
cannot therefore be counted as a means  
of proof2  but the meanings of sentences
 involving a knowledge of the  relations
 of words cannot be known by any other  
acknowledged  means of proof1 and it is 
for this that we have to accept sabda   
as a separate means of proof4 ,even if  
it is admitted that the  validity of any
 sentence may be inferred on the ground 
of its  being uttered by a trustworthy  
person1 yet that would not  explain how 
we understand the meanings of sentences1
 for when  even the name or person of a 
writer or speaker is not known1  we have
 no difficulty in understanding the     
meaning of any  sentence4    ,prabhkara 
thinks that all sounds are in the form  
of letters1  or are understandable as   
combinations of letters4 ,the           
constituent  letters of a word however  
cannot yield any meaning1 and are  thus 
to be regarded as elements of auditory  

perception which  serve as a means for  
understanding the meaning of a word4    
,the  reason of our apprehension of the 
meaning of any word is to be  found in a
 separate potency existing in the       
letters by which the  denotation of the 
word may be comprehended4 ,the          
perception  of each letter-sound        
vanishes the moment it is uttered1 but  
leaves behind an impression which       
combines with the impressions  of the   
successively dying perceptions of       
letters1 and this brings  about the     
whole word which contains the potency of
 bringing  about the comprehension of a 
certain meaning4 ,if even on hearing  a 
word the meaning cannot be comprehended1
 it has to be admitted  that the hearer 
lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for 
the  purpose4 ,as the potency of the    
word originates from the separate       
potencies of the letters1 it has to be  
admitted that the latter is  the direct 
cause of verbal cognition4 ,both        
,prabhkara and  ,kumrila agree on this  

point4    ,another peculiar doctrine    
expounded here is that all words  have  
natural denotative powers by which they 
themselves out of  their own nature     
refer to certain objects irrespective of
 their  comprehension or                
non-comprehension by the hearer4 ,the   
hearer will  not understand the meaning 
unless it is known to him that the  word
 in question is expressive of such and  
such a meaning1  but the word was all   
along competent to denote that meaning  
and it is the hearer's knowledge of that
 fact that helps him to    #cif         
understand the meaning of a word4 ,mmms 
does not think  that the association of 
a particular meaning with a word is due 
to conventions among people who         
introduce and give meanings  to the     
words ,footnote ref #a4 ,words are thus 
acknowledged to be denotative  of       
themselves4 ,it is only about proper    
names that convention  is admitted to be
 the cause of denotation4 ,it is easy to
 see  the bearing of this doctrine on   

the self-validity of the ,vedic         
commandments1 by the performance of     
which such results would  arise as could
 not have been predicted by any other   
person4  ,again all words are believed  
to be eternally existent2 but though    
they are ever present some manifestive  
agency is required by  which they are   
manifested to us4 ,this manifestive     
agency consists  of the effort put forth
 by the man who pronounces the  word4   
,nyya thinks that this effort of        
pronouncing is the cause  that produces 
the word while ,mmms thinks that it only
 manifests  to the hearer the           
ever-existing word4    ,the process by  
which according to ,prabhkara the       
meanings  of words are acquired maybe   
exemplified thus3 a senior commands  a  
junior to bring a cow and to bind a     
horse1 and the  child on noticing the   
action of the junior in obedience to the
  senior's commands comes to understand 
the meaning of cow  and horse4 ,thus    
according to him the meanings of words  

can  only be known from words occurring 
in injunctive sentences2 he  deduces    
from this the conclusion that words must
 denote things  only as related to the  
other factors of the injunction         
7anvitbhidhna  vda71 and no word can be 
comprehended as having any  denotation  
when taken apart from such a sentence4  
,this doctrine  holds that each word    
yields its meaning only as being        
generally  related to other factors or  
only as a part of an injunctive         
sentence1  thus the word gm accusative  
case of go 7cow7 means that it is       
intended that something is to be done   
with the cow or the bovine  genus1 and  
it appears only as connected with a     
specific kind of  action1 viz4 bringing 
in the sentence gm naya--bring the cow4 
,kumrila however thinks that words      
independently express  separate meanings
 which are subsequently combined into a 
sentence  expressing one connected idea 
7abhihitnvayavda74 ,thus  in gm naya1   
according to ,kumrila1 gm means the     

bovine  class in the accusative         
character and naya independently means  
,footnote #a3 ,according to ,nyya ,god  
created all words and associated them   
with their meanings4    #cig    bring2  
these two are then combined into the    
meaning bring the  cow4 ,but on the     
former theory the word gm means that it 
is  connected with some kind of action1 
and the particular sentence  only shows 
what the special kind of action is1 as  
in the above  sentence it appears as    
associated with bringing1 but it cannot 
have any meaning separately by itself4  
,this theory of ,kumrila  which is also 
the ,nyya theory is called              
abhihitnvayavda ,footnote ref  #a4      
,lastly according to ,prabhkara it is   
only the ,veda that can  be called      
s'abda-pramna1 and only those sentences 
of it which  contain injunctions 7such  
as1 perform this sacrifice in this way  
with these things74 ,in all other cases 
the validity of words is  only inferred 
on the ground of the trustworthy        

character of the  speaker4 ,but ,kumrila
 considers the words of all trustworthy 
persons as s'abda-pramna4      ,the     
,pramna of ,non-perception              
7anupalabdhi74    ,in addition to the   
above pramnas ,kumrila admits a fifth   
kind of pramna1 viz4 anupalabdhi for the
 perception of the  non-existence of a  
thing4 ,kumrila argues that the         
non-existence of  a thing 7e4g4 there is
 no jug in this room7 cannot be         
perceived  by the senses1 for there is  
nothing with which the senses could     
come into contact in order to perceive  
the non-existence4 ,some  people prefer 
to explain this non-perception as a case
 of anumna4  ,they say that wherever    
there is the existence of a visible     
object  there is the vision of it by a  
perceiver4 ,when there is no vision  of 
a visible object1 there is no existence 
of it also4 ,but it is easy  to see that
 such an inference presupposes the      
perception of want  of vision and want  
of existence1 but how these             

non-perceptions  are to be accounted for
 is exactly the point to be solved4 ,how
  can the perception of want of vision  
or want of existence be grasped8  ,it is
 for this that we have to admit a       
separate mode of pramna  namely         
anupalabdhi4    ,all things exist in    
places either in a positive 7sadrpa7 or 
in  a negative relation 7asadrpa71 and  
it is only in the former case           
,footnote #a3 ,see ,prabhkarammms by ,dr
 ,gangntha ,jh and ,s4,n4  ,dasgupta's  
,study of ,patanjali1 appendix4 ,it may 
be noted in this  connection that ,mmms 
did not favour the ,sphota doctrine of  
sound  which consists in the belief that
 apart from the momentary sounds of     
letters composing a word1 there was a   
complete word form which was  manifested
 7sphota7 but not created by the passing
 sounds of the  syllables4 ,the work of 
the syllable sounds is only to project  
this  word manifestation4 ,see          
,vcaspati's ,tattvabindu1 ,s'lokavrttika
  and ,prakaranapacik4 ,for the doctrine

 of anvitbhidhna see  ,shkantha's       
,vkyrthamtrkvrtt4    #cih    that they  
come within the purview of the senses1  
while in the  latter case the perception
 of the negative existence can only be  
had by a separate mode of the movement  
of the mind which we  designate as a    
separate pramna as anupalabdhi4         
,prabhkara  holds that non-perception of
 a visible object in a place is only the
  perception of the empty place1 and    
that therefore there is no need  of     
admitting a separate pramna as          
anupalabdhi4 ,for what is  meant by     
empty space8 ,if it is necessary that   
for the perception  of the non-existence
 of jug there should be absolutely empty
  space before us1 then if the place be 
occupied by a stone we ought  not to    
perceive the non-existence of the jug1  
inasmuch as the  place is not absolutely
 empty4 ,if empty space is defined as   
that  which is not associated with the  
jug1 then the category of negation  is  
practically admitted as a separate      

entity4 ,if the perception of  empty    
space is defined as the perception of   
space at the moment  which we associated
 with a want of knowledge about the jug1
 then  also want of knowledge as a      
separate entity has to be accepted1     
which amounts to the same thing as the  
admission of the want or  negation of   
the jug4 ,whatever attempt may be made  
to explain  the notion of negation by   
any positive conception1 it will at best
  be an attempt to shift negation from  
the objective field to knowledge1  or in
 other words to substitute for the place
 of the external  absence of a thing an 
associated want of knowledge about the  
thing 7in spite of its being a visible  
object7 and this naturally ends  in     
failure1 for negation as a separate     
category has to be admitted  either in  
the field of knowledge or in the        
external world4 ,negation  or abhva as a
 separate category has anyhow to be     
admitted4  ,it is said that at the first
 moment only the ground is seen without 

any knowledge of the jug or its         
negation1 and then at the next  moment  
comes the comprehension of the          
non-existence of the jug4  ,but this    
also means that the moment of the       
perception of the  ground is associated 
with the want of knowledge of the jug or
  its negation4 ,but this comes to the  
same thing as the admission  of negation
 as a separate category1 for what other 
meaning can  there be in the perception 
of only the ground if it is not meant   
that it 7the perception of the ground7  
is associated with or qualified  by the 
want of knowledge of the jug8 ,for the  
perception of  the ground cannot        
generate the notion of the non-existence
 of  the jug1 since even where there is 
a jug the ground is perceived4  ,the    
qualifying phrase that only the ground  
is perceived becomes    #cii            
meaningless1 if things whose presence is
 excluded are not  specified as negative
 conditions qualifying the perception of
 the  ground4 ,and this would require   

that we had already the notion  of      
negation in us1 which appeared to us of 
itself in a special  manner             
unaccountable by other means of proof4  
,it should also  be noted that          
non-perception of a sensible object     
generates the  notion of negation       
immediately and not through other       
negations1  and this is true not only of
 things of the present moment but also  
of the memory of past perceptions of    
non-existence1 as when we  remember that
 there was no jug here4 ,anupalabdhi is 
thus a  separate pramna by which the    
absence or want of a sensible           
object--the negation of a thing--can be 
comprehended4      ,self1 ,salvation1   
,god4    ,mmms has to accept the        
existence of soul1 for without it  who  
would perform the ,vedic commandments1  
and what would  be the meaning of those 
,vedic texts which speak of men as      
performing  sacrifices and going to     
,heaven thereby8 ,the soul is  thus     
regarded as something entirely distinct 

from the body1 the  sense organs1 and   
buddhi2 it is eternal1 omnipresent1 and 
many1  one in each body4 ,prabhkara     
thinks that it is manifested to us in   
all cognitions4 ,indeed he makes this   
also a proof for the existence  of self 
as a separate entity from the body1 for 
had it not been so1  why should we have 
the notion of self-persistence in all   
our  cognitions--even in those where    
there is no perception of the body8     
,kumrila however differs from ,prabhkara
 about this analysis of  the            
consciousness of self in our cognitions1
 and says that even  though we may not  
have any notion of the parts of our body
 or  their specific combination1 yet the
 notion of ourselves as embodied  beings
 always appears in all our cognitions4  
,moreover in our  cognitions of external
 objects we are not always conscious of 
the  self as the knower2 so it is not   
correct to say that self is different   
from the body on the ground that the    
consciousness of self is  present in all

 our cognitions1 and that the body is   
not cognized in  many of our cognitions4
 ,but the true reason for admitting that
  the self is different from the body is
 this1 that movement or  willing1       
knowledge1 pleasure1 pain1 etc41 cannot 
be attributed to  the body1 for though  
the body exists at death these cannot   
then be  found4 ,so it has to be        
admitted that they must belong to some  
other entity owing to the association   
with which the body appears    #djj     
to be endowed with movement etc4        
,moreover knowledge1  feeling1 etc4     
though apparent to the perceiver1 are   
not yet perceived  by others as other   
qualities of the body1 as colour etc41  
are perceived by other men4 ,it is a    
general law of causation  that the      
qualities of the constituent elements   
7in the cause7 impart  themselves to the
 effect1 but the earth atoms of which   
the body  is made up do not contain the 
qualities of knowledge etc41 and  this  
also corroborates the inference of a    

separate entity as the  vehicle of      
knowledge etc4 ,the objection is        
sometimes raised that  if the soul is   
omnipresent how can it be called an     
agent or a  mover8 ,but ,mmms does not  
admit that movement means  atomic       
motion1 for the principle of movement is
 the energy which  moves the atoms1 and 
this is possessed by the omnipresent    
soul4  ,it is by the energy imparted by 
it to the body that the latter  moves4  
,so it is that though the soul does not 
move it is called an  agent on account  
of the fact that it causes the movement 
of  the body4 ,the self must also be    
understood as being different  from the 
senses1 for even when one loses some of 
the senses  he continues to perceive his
 self all the same as persisting all    
through4    ,the question now arises1   
how is self cognized8 ,prabhkara  holds 
that the self as cognizor is never      
cognized apart from the  cognized       
object1 nor is the object ever cognized 
without the cognizor  entering into the 

cognition as a necessary factor4 ,both  
the  self and the object shine forth in 
the self-luminous knowledge in  what we 
have already described as               
triputi-pratyksa 7perception  as        
three-together74 ,it is not the soul    
which is self-illumined but  knowledge2 
so it is knowledge which illumines both 
the self and  the object in one         
operation4 ,but just as in the case of a
 man  who walks1 the action of walking  
rests upon the walker1 yet he is        
regarded as the agent of the work and   
not as the object1 so in the  case of   
the operation of knowledge1 though it   
affects the self1 yet  it appears as the
 agent and not as the object4 ,cognition
 is not  soul1 but the soul is          
manifested in cognition as its          
substratum1  and appears in it as the   
cognitive element ,i which is           
inseparable  from all cognitions4 ,in   
deep sleep therefore when no object is  
cognized the self also is not cognized4 
,kumrila however thinks that the soul   

which is distinct from  the body is     
perceived by a mental perception        
7mnasa-pratyaksa  as the substratum of  
the notion of ,i1 or in other words the 
self  perceives itself by mental        
perception1 and the perception of its   
#dja    own nature shines forth in      
consciousness as the ,i4 ,the objection 
that the self cannot itself be both     
subject and object to its  own operation
 does not hold1 for it applies equally  
to ,prabhkara's  theory in which        
knowledge reveals the self as its object
 and yet  considers it as the subject of
 the operation4 ,the analogy of         
linguistic usage that though the walking
 affects the walker yet  he is the      
agent1 cannot be regarded as an escape  
from this charge1  for the usage of     
language is not philosophical analysis4 
,though  at the time of the cognition of
 objects the self is cognized1 yet it   
does not appear as the knower of the    
knowledge of objects1 but  reveals      
itself as an object of a separate mental

 perception which  is distinct from the 
knowledge of objects4 ,the self is no   
doubt  known as the substratum of ,i1   
but the knowledge of this self  does not
 reveal itself necessarily with the     
cognition of objects1  nor does the self
 show itself as the knower of all       
knowledge of  objects1 but the self is  
apprehended by a separate mental        
intuition  which we represent as the ,i4
 ,the self does not reveal itself as    
the knower but as an object of a        
separate intuitive process of the  mind4
 ,this is indeed different from         
,prabhkara's analysis1 who  regarded the
 cognition of self as inseparable from  
the object-cognition1  both being the   
result of the illumination of knowledge4
  ,kumrila agrees with ,prabhkara       
however in holding that soul  is not    
self-illuminating 7svayampraks'a71 for  
then even in deep  sleep the soul should
 have manifested itself2 but there is no
 such  manifestation then1 and the state
 of deep sleep appears as an            

unconscious state4 ,there is also no    
bliss in deep sleep1 for had  it been so
 people would not have regretted that   
they had missed  sensual enjoyments by  
untimely sleep4 ,the expression that  ,i
 slept in bliss signifies only that no  
misery was felt4 ,moreover  the opposite
 representation of the deep sleep state 
is also found  when a man on rising from
 sleep says ,i slept so long without    
knowing anything not even my own self4  
,the self is not  atomic1 since we can  
simultaneously feel a sensation in the  
head  as well as in the leg4 ,the ,jaina
 theory that it is of the size of  the  
body which contracts and expands        
according to the body it  occupies is   
unacceptable4 ,it is better therefore   
that the soul should  be regarded as    
all-pervading as described in the       
,vedas4 ,this  self must also be        
different in different persons for      
otherwise their  individual experiences 
of objects and of pleasure and pain     
cannot  be explained ,footnote ref #a4  

,footnote #a3 ,see ,s'lokavrttika1      
tmavda ,s'stra-dpik1 tmavda and         
moksavda4    #djb      ,kumrila         
considered the self to be merely the    
potency of  knowledge 7jnas'akti7       
,footnote ref #a4 ,cognitions of things 
were  generated by the activity of the  
manas and the other senses4 ,this self  
itself can only be cognized by mental   
perception1 ,or at the  time of         
salvation there being none of the senses
 nor the manas  the self remains in pure
 existence as the potency of knowledge  
without any actual expression or        
manifestation4 ,so the state of         
salvation is the state in which the self
 remains devoid of any  of its          
characteristic qualities such as        
pleasure1 pain1 knowledge1  willing1    
etc41 for the self itself is not        
knowledge nor is it bliss  or nanda as  
,vednta supposes2 but these are         
generated in it by  its energy and the  
operation of the senses4 ,the self being
 divested  of all its senses at that    

time1 remains as a mere potency of the  
energy of knowledge1 a mere existence4  
,this view of salvation  is accepted in 
the main by ,prabhkara also4            
,salvation is brought about when a man  
enjoys and suffers  the fruits of his   
good and bad actions and thereby        
exhausts them  and stops the further    
generation of new effects by refraining 
from  the performance of kmya-karmas    
7sacrifices etc4 performed for  the     
attainment of certain beneficent        
results7 and guarantees  himself against
 the evil effects of sin by assiduously 
performing  the nitya-karmas 7such as   
the sandhy prayers etc41 by the         
performance  of which there is no       
benefit but the non-performance  of     
which produces sins74 ,this state is    
characterized by the  dissolution of the
 body and the non-production of any     
further  body or rebirth4    ,mmms does 
not admit the existence of any ,god as  
the  creator and destroyer of the       
universe4 ,though the universe is  made 

up of parts1 yet there is no reason to  
suppose that the  universe had ever any 
beginning in time1 or that any ,god     
created  it4 ,every day animals and men 
are coming into being by the  action of 
the parents without the operation of any
 ,god4 ,neither  is it necessary as     
,nyya supposes that dharma and adharma  
should have a supervisor1 for these     
belong to the performer and             
,footnote #a3 ,it may be mentioned in   
this connection that unlike ,nyya  ,mmms
 did not consider all activity as being 
only of the nature of  molecular        
vibration 7parispanda74 ,it admitted the
 existence of energy  7s'akti7 as a     
separate category which manifested      
itself in actual  movements4 ,the self  
being considered as a s'akti can move   
the body and  yet remain unmoved itself4
 ,manifestation of action only means the
  relationing of the energy with a      
thing4 ,nyya strongly opposes this      
doctrine of a non-sensible 7atndriya7   
energy and seeks to explain all  action 

by actual molecular motion4    #djc     
no one can have any knowledge of them4  
,moreover there cannot  be any contact  
7samyoga7 or inherence 7samavya7 of     
dharma  and adharma with ,god that he   
might supervise them2 he cannot  have   
any tools or body wherewith to fashion  
the world like  the carpenter4 ,moreover
 he could have no motive to create the  
world either as a merciful or as a cruel
 act4 ,for when in the  beginning there 
were no beings towards whom should he be
  actuated with a feeling of mercy8     
,moreover he would himself  require a   
creator to create him4 ,so there is no  
,god1 no creator1  no creation1 no      
dissolution or pralaya4 ,the world has  
ever been  running the same1 without any
 new creation or dissolution1 srsti  or 
pralaya4      ,mmms as philosophy and   
,mmms as ritualism4    ,from what we    
have said before it will be easy to see 
that  ,mmms agrees in the main with     
,vais'esika about the existence  of the 
categories of things such as the five   

elements1 the qualities1  rpa1 rasa1    
etc4 ,kumrila's differences on the      
points of jti1  samavya1 etc4 and       
,prabhkara's peculiarities have also    
been  mentioned before4 ,on some of     
these points it appears that  ,kumrila  
was influenced by ,smkhya thought rather
 than by  ,nyya4 ,smkhya and ,vais'esika
 are the only ,hindu systems which  have
 tried to construct a physics as a part 
of their metaphysics2  other systems    
have generally followed them or have    
differed from  them only on minor       
matters4 ,the physics of ,prabhkara and 
,kumrila have thus but little           
importance1 as they agree in  general   
with the ,vais'esika view4 ,in fact they
 were justified in not  laying any      
special stress on this part1 because for
 the performance  of sacrifices the     
common-sense view of ,nyya-,vais'esika  
about  the world was most suitable4     
,the main difference of ,mmms with ,nyya
 consists of the  theory of knowledge4  
,the former was required to prove that  

the  ,veda was self-valid and that it   
did not derive its validity from  ,god1 
and also that it was not necessary to   
test its validity by any  other means4  
,to do this it began by trying to       
establish the self-validity  of all     
knowledge4 ,this would secure for the   
,veda the  advantage that as soon as its
 orders or injunctions were communicated
  to us they would appear to us as valid
 knowledge1 and  there being nothing to 
contradict them later on there would be 
nothing in the world which could render 
the ,vedic injunctions    #djd          
invalid4 ,the other pramnas such as     
perception1 inference1 etc4  were       
described1 firstly to indicate that they
 could not show to us  how dharma could 
be acquired1 for dharma was not an      
existing  thing which could be perceived
 by the other pramnas1 but  a thing     
which could only be produced by acting  
according to  the injunctions of the    
,vedas4 ,for the knowledge of dharma    
and adharma therefore the s'abdapramna  

of the ,veda was our  only source4      
,secondly it was necessary that we      
should have a  knowledge of the         
different means of cognition1 as without
 them  it would be difficult to discuss 
and verify the meanings of debatable    
,vedic sentences4 ,the doctrine of      
creation and dissolution  which is      
recognized by all other ,hindu systems  
could not be  acknowledged by the ,mmms 
as it would have endangered the         
eternality of the ,vedas4 ,even ,god had
 to be dispensed with on  that account4 
,the ,veda is defined as the collection 
of ,mantras and ,brhmanas  7also called 
the vidhis or injunctive sentences74    
,there are  three classes of injunctions
 7#a7 aprva-vidhi1 7#b7 niyama-vidhi1   
and  7#c7 parisankhy-vidhi4 ,aprva-vidhi
 is an order which enjoins  something   
not otherwise known1 e4g4 the grains    
should be washed  7we could not know    
that this part of the duty was necessary
 for the  sacrifice except by the above 
injunction74 ,niyama-vidhi is that      

where when a thing could have been done 
in a number of ways1  an order is made  
by the ,veda which restricts us to      
following  some definite alternative    
7e4g4 though the chaff from the corn    
could be separated even by the nails1   
the order that corn should  be threshed 
restricts us to the alternative of      
threshing as the  only course acceptable
 for the sacrifice74 ,in the            
niyama-vidhi  that which is ordered is  
already known as possible but only as   
an alternative1 and the vidhi insists   
upon one of these methods as  the only  
one4 ,in aprva-vidhi the thing to be    
done would have  remained undone and    
unknown had it not been for the vidhi4  
,in parisankhy-vidhi all that is        
enjoined is already known but  not      
necessarily as possible alternatives4 ,a
 certain mantra ,i take  up the rein    
7imm agrbhnm ras'anm7 which could be    
used in  a number of cases should not   
however be used at the time of  holding 
the reins of an ass4    ,there are three

 main principles of interpreting the    
,vedic  sentences4 7#a7 ,when some      
sentences are such that connectively    
they yield a meaning but not            
individually1 then they should be       
#dje    taken together connectively as a
 whole4 7#b7 ,if the separate sentences 
can however yield meanings separately by
 themselves they  should not be         
connected together4 7#c7 ,in the case of
 certain  sentences which are incomplete
 suitable words from the context  of    
immediately preceding sentences are to  
be supplied4    ,the vidhis properly    
interpreted are the main source of      
dharma4  ,the mantras which are         
generally hymns in praise of some       
deities  or powers are to be taken as   
being for the specification of the      
deity to whom the libation is to be     
offered4 ,it should be remembered  that 
as dharma can only be acquired by       
following  the injunctions of the ,vedas
 they should all be interpreted as      
giving us injunctions4 ,anything        

therefore found in the ,vedas  which    
cannot be connected with the injunctive 
orders as forming  part of them is to be
 regarded as untrustworthy or at best   
inexpressive4  ,thus it is that those   
sentences in the ,vedas which  describe 
existing things merely or praise some   
deed of injunction  7called the         
arthavdas7 should be interpreted as     
forming part  of a vidhi-vkya           
7injunction7 or be rejected altogether4 
,even  those expressions which give     
reasons for the performance of  certain 
actions are to be treated as mere       
arthavdas and interpreted  as praising  
injunctions4 ,for ,vedas have value only
 as  mandates by the performance of     
which dharma may be acquired4    ,when a
 sacrifice is performed according to the
 injunctions of  the ,vedas1 a capacity 
which did not exist before and whose    
existence  is proved by the authority of
 the scriptures is generated  either in 
the action or in the agent4 ,this       
capacity or positive  force called aprva

 produces in time the beneficent results
 of the  sacrifice 7e4g4 leads the      
performer to ,heaven74 ,this aprva is   
like  a potency or faculty in the agent 
which abides in him until the  desired  
results follow ,footnote ref #a4    ,it 
is needless to dilate upon these1 for   
the voluminous works  of ,s'abara and   
,kumrila make an elaborate research into
 the  nature of sacrifices1 rituals1 and
 other relevant matters in great        
detail1 which anyhow can have but little
 interest for a student  of philosophy4 
,footnote #a3 ,see ,dr ,gangntha ,jh's  
,prabhkarammms and ,mdhava's            
,nyyamlvistara4    #djf        ,,chapter
 ,x    ,,the ,s',a,,nkara ,,school ,,of 
,,ved,,nta      ,comprehension of the   
philosophical ,issues more essential    
than the ,dialectic of controversy4     
,pramna in ,sanskrit signifies the means
 and the movement  by which knowledge is
 acquired1 pramt means the subject or   
the knower who cognizes1 pram the result
 of pramna--right  knowledge1 prameya   

the object of knowledge1 and prmnya the 
validity of knowledge acquired4 ,the    
validity of knowledge is  sometimes used
 in the sense of the faithfulness of    
knowledge to  its object1 and sometimes 
in the sense of an inner notion of      
validity in the mind of the subject--the
 knower 7that his perceptions  are      
true71 which moves him to work in       
accordance with  his perceptions to     
adapt himself to his environment for the
  attainment of pleasurable and the     
avoidance of painful things4  ,the      
question wherein consists the prmnya of 
knowledge has  not only an              
epistemological and psychological       
bearing but a  metaphysical one also4   
,it contains on one side a theory of    
knowledge  based on an analysis of      
psychological experience1 and on  the   
other indicates a metaphysical situation
 consistent with the  theory of         
knowledge4 ,all the different schools   
tried to justify  a theory of knowledge 
by an appeal to the analysis and        

interpretation  of experience which the 
others sometimes ignored or  sometimes  
regarded as unimportant4 ,the thinkers  
of different  schools were accustomed   
often to meet together and defeat one   
another in actual debates1 and the      
result of these debates was frequently  
very important in determining the       
prestige of any school  of thought4 ,if 
a ,buddhist for example could defeat a  
great ,nyya  or ,mmms thinker in a great
 public debate attended by many  learned
 scholars from different parts of the   
country1 his fame at  once spread all   
over the country and he could probably  
secure a  large number of followers on  
the spot4 ,extensive tours of           
disputation  were often undertaken by   
great masters all over the country  for 
the purpose of defeating the teachers of
 the opposite schools  and of securing  
adherents to their own4 ,these debates  
were therefore  not generally conducted 
merely in a passionless philosophical   
#djg    mood with the object of arriving

 at the truth but in order to  inflict a
 defeat on opponents and to establish   
the ascendency of  some particular      
school of thought4 ,it was often a sense
 of personal  victory and of the victory
 of the school of thought to which the  
debater adhered that led him to pursue  
the debate4 ,advanced  ,sanskrit        
philosophical works give us a picture of
 the attitude  of mind of these debaters
 and we find that most of these  debates
 attempt to criticize the different     
schools of thinkers by  exposing their  
inconsistencies and self-contradictions 
by close  dialectical reasoning1        
anticipating the answers of the         
opponent1  asking him to define his     
statements1 and ultimately proving that 
his theory was inconsistent1 led to     
contradictions1 and was opposed  to the 
testimony of experience4 ,in reading an 
advanced work on  ,indian philosophy in 
the original1 a student has to pass     
through an  interminable series of      
dialectic arguments1 and negative       

criticisms  7to thwart opponents7       
sometimes called vitand1 before he can  
come to the root of the quarrel1 the    
real philosophical divergence4  ,all the
 resources of the arts of controversy   
find full play  for silencing the       
opponent before the final philosophical 
answer  is given4 ,but to a modern      
student of philosophy1 who belongs to   
no party and is consequently indifferent
 to the respective victory  of either   
side1 the most important thing is the   
comprehension of  the different aspects 
from which the problem of the theory of 
knowledge and its associated            
metaphysical theory was looked at  by   
the philosophers1 and also a clear      
understanding of the deficiency  of each
 view1 the value of the mutual          
criticisms1 the speculations  on the    
experience of each school1 their        
analysis1 and their  net contribution to
 philosophy4 ,with ,vednta we come to an
  end of the present volume1 and it may 
not be out of place here  to make a     

brief survey of the main conflicting    
theories from the  point of view of the 
theory of knowledge1 in order to        
indicate the  position of the ,vednta of
 the ,s'ankara school in the field of   
,indian philosophy so far as we have    
traversed it4 ,i shall therefore  now   
try to lay before my readers the        
solution of the theory  of knowledge    
7pramnavda7 reached by some of the main 
schools of thought4 ,their relations to 
the solution offered by  the ,s'ankara  
,vednta will also be dealt with1 as we  
shall attempt  to sketch the views of   
the ,vedanta later on in this chapter4  
#djh      ,the philosophical situation4 
,a ,review4    ,before dealing with the 
,vednta system it seems advisable  to   
review the general attitude of the      
schools already discussed to  the main  
philosophical and epistemological       
questions which determine  the position 
of the ,vednta as taught by ,s'ankara   
and  his school4    ,the ,sautrntika    
,buddhist says that in all his affairs  

man is  concerned with the fulfilment of
 his ends and desires 7purusdrtka74     
,this however cannot be done without    
right knowledge 7samyagjna7  which      
rightly represents things to men4       
,knowledge is said  to be right when we 
can get things just as we perceived     
them4  ,so far as mere representation or
 illumination of objects is concerned1  
it is a patent fact that we all have    
knowledge1 and therefore  this does not 
deserve criticism or examination4 ,our  
enquiry about  knowledge is thus        
restricted to its aspect of later       
verification or  contradiction in       
experience1 for we are all concerned to 
know how  far our perceptions of things 
which invariably precede all our        
actions can be trusted as rightly       
indicating what we want to get  in our  
practical experience 7arthaprdpakatva74 
,the perception is  right 7abhrnta      
non-illusory7 when following its        
representation we  can get in the       
external world such things as were      

represented by  it 7samvdakatva74 ,that 
perception alone can be right which is  
generated by the object and not merely  
supplied by our imagination4  ,when ,i  
say this is the cow ,i had seen1 what ,i
 see is the  object with the brown      
colour1 horns1 feet1 etc41 but the fact 
that  this is called cow1 or that this  
is existing from a past time1 is  not   
perceived by the visual sense1 as this  
is not generated by  the visual object4 
,for all things are momentary1 and that 
which  ,i see now never existed before  
so as to be invested with this  or that 
permanent name4 ,this association of    
name and permanence  to objects         
perceived is called kaipan or abhilpa4  
,our perception is correct only so far  
as it is without the abhilpa            
association 7kalpanpodha71 for though   
this is taken as a part of  our         
perceptual experience it is not derived 
from the object1 and  hence its         
association with the object is an       
evident error4 ,the  object as          

unassociated with name--the             
nirvikalpa--is thus what  is perceived4 
,as a result of the pratyaksa the       
manovijna or  thought and mental        
perception of pleasure and pain is also 
determined4 ,at one moment perception   
reveals the object as an    #dji        
object of knowledge 7grhya71 and by the 
fact of the rise  of such a percept1 at 
another moment it appears as a thing    
realizable or attainable in the external
 world4 ,the special  features of the   
object undefinable in themselves as     
being  what they are in themselves      
7svalaksana7 are what is  actually      
perceived 7pratyaksavisaya7 ,footnote   
ref #a4  ,the pramnaphala 7result of    
perception7 is the        ,footnote #a3 
,there is a difference of opinion about 
the meaning of the word  svalaksana of  
,dharmakrtti between ray esteemed friend
 ,professor  ,stcherbatsky of ,petrograd
 and myself4 ,he maintains that         
,dharmakrtti held  that the content of  
the presentative element at the moment  

of perception  was almost totally empty4
 ,thus he writes to me1 ,according to   
your  interpretation svalaksana         
mean1--the object 7or idea with         
,vijnavdin7  from which everything past 
and everything future has been          
eliminated1  this ,i do not deny at all4
 ,but ,i maintain that if everything    
past and  future has been taken away1   
what remains8 ,the present and the      
present  is a ksana i4e4 nothing4444    
,the reverse of ksana is a ksanasamtna  
or simply samtna and in every samtna    
there is a synthesis ekbhva  of moments 
past and future1 produced by the        
intellect 7buddhi  nis'caya   kalpana   
adhyavasya7444,there is in the          
perception of a jug something  7a ksana 
of sense knowledge7 which we must       
distinguish from the idea of  a jug     
7which is always a samtna1 always       
vikalpita71 and if you take  the idea   
away in a strict unconditional sense1 no
 knowledge remains3  ksanasya jnena     
prpayitumas'akyatvt4 ,this is absolutely

 the ,kantian  teaching about ,synthesis
 of ,apprehension4 ,accordingly         
pratyaksa is a  transcendental source of
 knowledge1 because practically speaking
 it  gives no knowledge at all4 ,this   
pramna is asatkalpa4 ,kant says  that   
without the elements of intuition 7     
sense-knowledge  pratyaksa              
kalpanpodha7 our cognitions would be    
empty and without the elements of       
intellect 7kalpan  buddhi  synthesis    
ekbhva7 they would be blind4            
,empirically both are always combined4  
,this is exactly the theory of          
,dharmakrtti4 ,he is a ,vijnavd as ,i   
understand1 because he maintains  the   
cognizability of ideas 7vijna7 alone1   
but the reality is an  incognizable     
foundation of our knowledge2 he admits1 
it is bhya1 it is  artha1 it is         
arthakriyksana  svalaksana2 that is the 
reason for  which he sometimes is called
 ,sautrntika and this school is         
sometimes  called ,sautranta-vijnavda1  
as opposed to the ,vijnavda of          

,as'vaghosa  and rysanga1 which had no  
elaborate theory of cognition4 ,if the  
jug as  it exists in our representation 
were the svalaksana and paramrthasat1   
what would remain of ,vijnavda8 ,but    
there is the perception of the jug  as  
opposed to the pure idea of a jug       
7s'uddh kalpan71 an element of  reality1
 the sensational ksana1 which is        
communicated to us by sense  knowledge4 
,kant's 'thing in itself' is also a     
ksana and also an element  of sense     
knowledge of pure sense as opposed to   
pure reason1 ,dharmakrtti  has also     
s'uddh kalpan and s'uddham pratyaksam4  
444,and very  interesting is the        
opposition between pratyaksa and anumna1
 the first  moves from ksana to samtna  
and the second from samtna to ksana1    
that is the reason that although bhrnta 
the anumna is nevertheless  pramna      
because through it we indirectly also   
reach ksana1 the  arthakriyksana4 ,it is
 bhrnta directly and pramna indirectly2 
pratyaksa is pramna directly and bhrnta 

7asatkalpa7 indirectly444 4  ,so far as 
the passages to which ,professor        
,stcherbatsky refers are  concerned1 ,i 
am in full agreement with him4 ,but ,i  
think that he pushes  the interpretation
 too far on ,kantian lines4 ,when ,i    
perceive this is  blue1 the perception  
consists of two parts1 the actual       
presentative  element of sense-knowledge
 7svalaksana7 and the affirmation       
7nis'caya74 ,so far we are in complete  
agreement4 ,but ,professor              
,stcherbatsky says that this            
sense-knowledge is a ksana 7moment7  and
 is nothing4 ,i also hold that it is a  
ksana1 but it is nothing  only in the   
sense that it is not the same as the    
notion involving  affirmation such as   
this is blue4 ,the affirmative process  
occurring at the succeeding moments is  
determined by the presentative  element 
of the first moment 7pratyaksabalotpanna
 ,n4,t41 p4 #bj7 but  this presentative 
element divested from the product of the
 affirmative  process of the succeeding 

moments is not characterless1 though we 
cannot  express its character2 as soon  
as we try to express it1 names and other
  ideas consisting of affirmation are   
associated and these did not form  a    
part of the presentative element4 ,its  
own character is said to be its  own    
specific nature 7svalaksana74 ,but what 
is this specific nature8  ,dharmakrtti's
 answer on this point is that by        
specific nature he means  those specific
 characteristics of the object which    
appear clear when  the object is near   
and hazy when it is at a distance       
7yasyrthasya  sannidhnsannidhnbkym      
jnapratibhsabhedastat svalaksanam ,n41  
p4 #a and ,n4,t41 p4 #af74              
,sense-knowledge thus gives us the      
specific  characteristics of the object1
 and this has the same form as the      
object itself2 it is the appearance of  
the blue in its specific  character in  
the mind and when this is associated by 
the affirmative  or ideational process1 
the result is the concept or idea this  

is blue  7nlasarpam                     
pratyaksamanubhyamnam                   
nlabodharpamavasthpyate 444             
nlasrpyamasya pramnam nlavikalpanarpam  
tvasya pramnaphalam1  ,n4,t4p4 #bb74 ,at
 the first moment there is the          
appearance of the blue  7nlanirbhsam hi 
vijnam1 ,n4,t4 #ai7 and this is direct  
acquaintance  7yatkicit arthasya        
skstkrijnam tatpratyaksamucyate1 ,n4,t4 
#g7 and  this is real 7paramrthasat7 and
 valid4 ,this blue sensation is         
different from the idea this is blue    
7nlabodha1 ,n4,t4 #bb7 which is  the    
result of the former 7pramnaphala7      
through the association of  the         
affirmative process 7adhyavasya7 and is 
regarded as invalid for  it contains    
elements other than what were presented 
to the sense and is  a vikalpapratyaya4 
,in my opinion svalaksana therefore     
means pure  sensation of the moment     
presenting the specific features of the 
object  and with ,dharmakrtti this is   
the only thing which is valid in        

perception  and vikalpapratyaya or      
pramnaphala is the idea or concept which
 follows  it4 ,but though the latter is 
a product of the former1 yet1 being the 
construction of succeeding moments1 it  
cannot give us the pure stage  of the   
first moment of sensation-presentation  
7ksanasya  prpayitumas'akyatvt1 ,n4,t4  
#af74 ,n4,t4  ,nyyabindutk1  ,n         
,nyyabindu 7,peterson's edition74       
#daj    ideational concept and power    
that such knowledge has of showing  the 
means which being followed the thing can
 be got 7yena krtena  arthah prpito     
bhavati74 ,pramna then is the similarity
 of the  knowledge with the object by   
which it is generated1 by which we      
assure ourselves that this is our       
knowledge of the object as it is        
perceived1 and are thus led to attain it
 by practical experience4  ,yet this    
later stage is pramnaphala and not      
pramna which  consists merely in the    
vision of the thing 7devoid of other    
associations71  and which determines the

 attitude of the perceiver towards  the 
perceived object4 ,the pramna therefore 
only refers  to the newly-acquired      
knowledge 7anadhigatdhigantr7 as this is
  of use to the perceiver in determining
 his relations with the objective       
world4 ,this account of perception      
leaves out the real  epistemological    
question as to how the knowledge is     
generated  by the external world1 or    
what it is in itself4 ,it only looks to 
the correctness or faithfulness of the  
perception to the object and  its value 
for us in the practical realization of  
our ends4 ,the  question of the relation
 of the external world with knowledge as
  determining the latter is regarded as 
unimportant4    #daa      ,the ,yogcras 
or idealistic ,buddhists take their cue 
from  the above-mentioned ,sautrntika   
,buddhists1 and say that since  we can  
come into touch with knowledge and      
knowledge alone1  what is the use of    
admitting an external world of objects  
as the  data of sensation determining   

our knowledge8 ,you say that  sensations
 are copies of the external world1 but  
why should you  say that they copy1 and 
not that they alone exist8 ,we never    
come  into touch with objects in        
themselves2 these can only be grasped   
by us simultaneously with knowledge of  
them1 they must therefore  be the same  
as knowledge 7sahopalambhaniyamt abhedo 
nlataddhiyoh72 for it is in and through 
knowledge that external  objects can    
appear to us1 and without knowledge we  
are not in touch with the so-called     
external objects4 ,so it is  knowledge  
which is self-apparent in itself1 that  
projects itself in  such a manner as to 
appear as referring to other external   
objects4  ,we all acknowledge that in   
dreams there are no external  objects1  
but even there we have knowledge4 ,the  
question  why then if there are no      
external objects1 there should be so    
much diversity in the forms of          
knowledge1 is not better solved  by the 
assumption of an external world2 for in 

such an assumption1  the external       
objects have to be admitted as          
possessing the  infinitely diverse      
powers of diversely affecting and       
determining  our knowledge2 that being  
so1 it may rather be said that in  the  
beginningless series of flowing         
knowledge1 preceding knowledge-moments  
by virtue of their inherent specific    
qualities determine  the succeeding     
knowledge-moments4 ,thus knowledge      
alone exists2 the projection of an      
external word is an illusion of         
knowledge brought about by beginningless
 potencies of desire  7vsan7 associated 
with it4 ,the preceding knowledge       
determines  the succeeding one and that 
another and so on4 ,knowledge1          
pleasure1 pain1 etc4 are not qualities  
requiring a permanent entity  as soul in
 which they may inhere1 but are the     
various forms  in which knowledge       
appears4 ,even the cognition1 ,i        
perceive a  blue thing1 is but a form of
 knowledge1 and this is often           

erroneously  interpreted as referring to
 a permanent knower4 ,though  the       
cognitions are all passing and          
momentary1 yet so long as  the series   
continues to be the same1 as in the case
 of one person1  say ,devadatta1 the    
phenomena of memory1 recognition1 etc4  
can  happen in the succeeding moments1  
for these are evidently illusory        
cognitions1 so far as they refer to the 
permanence of the objects    #dab       
believed to have been perceived before1 
for things or knowledge-moments1        
whatever they may be1 are destroyed the 
next  moment after their birth4 ,there  
is no permanent entity as perceiver  or 
knower1 but the knowledge-moments are at
 once the  knowledge1 the knower and the
 known4 ,this thoroughgoing  idealism   
brushes off all references to an        
objective field of experience1          
interprets the verdict of knowledge as  
involving a knower  and the known as    
mere illusory appearance1 and considers 
the  flow of knowledge as a             

self-determining series in successive   
objective forms as the only truth4 ,the 
,hindu schools of thought1  ,nyya1      
,smkhya1 and the ,mmms1 accept the      
duality of soul  and matter1 and attempt
 to explain the relation between the    
two4 ,with the ,hindu writers it was not
 the practical utility of  knowledge    
that was the only important thing1 but  
the nature of  knowledge and the manner 
in which it came into being were also   
enquired after and considered important4
    ,pramna is defined by ,nyya as the  
collocation of instruments  by which    
unerring and indubitable knowledge comes
 into being4  ,the collocation of       
instruments which brings about definite 
knowledge  consists partly of           
consciousness 7bodha7 and partly of     
material  factors 7bodhbodhasvabhva74   
,thus in perception the  proper contact 
of the visual sense with the object     
7e4g4 jug7 first  brings about a        
non-intelligent1 non-apprehensible      
indeterminate  consciousness            

7nirvikalpa7 as the jugness 7ghatatva7  
and this later  on combining with the   
remaining other collocations of         
sense-contact  etc4 produces the        
determinate consciousness3 this is a    
jug4  ,the existence of this            
indeterminate state of consciousness as 
a  factor in bringing about the         
determinate consciousness1 cannot of    
course be perceived1 but its existence  
can be inferred from the  fact that if  
the perceiver were not already in       
possession of the  qualifying factor    
7vis'esanajna as jugness7 he could not  
have  comprehended the qualified object 
7vis'istabuddhi the jug 7i4e4  the      
object which possesses jugness74 ,in    
inference 7anumna7  knowledge of the    
linga takes part1 and in upamna the     
sight  of similarity with other material
 conglomerations4 ,in the case  of the  
,buddhists knowledge itself was regarded
 as pramna2  even by those who admitted 
the existence of the objective world1   
right knowledge was called pramna1      

because it was of the same  form as the 
external objects it represented1 and it 
was by the form  of the knowledge 7e4g4 
blue7 that we could apprehend that the  
#dac    external object was also blue4  
,knowledge does not determine the       
external world but simply enforces our  
convictions about the external  world4  
,so far as knowledge leads us to form   
our convictions  of the external world  
it is pramna1 and so far as it          
determines our  attitude towards the    
external world it is pramnaphala4 ,the  
question how knowledge is generated had 
little importance with  them1 but how   
with knowledge we could form convictions
 of  the external world was the most    
important thing4 ,knowledge  was called 
pramna1 because it was the means by     
which we  could form convictions        
7adhyavasya7 about the external world4  
,nyya sought to answer the question how 
knowledge was  generated in us1 but     
could not understand that knowledge was 
not  a mere phenomenon like any other   

objective phenomenon1 but  thought that 
though as a guna 7quality7 it was       
external like other  gunas1 yet it was  
associated with our self as a result of 
collocations  like any other happening  
in the material world4 ,pramna  does not
 necessarily bring to us new knowledge  
7anadhigatdhi-gantr7  as the ,buddhists 
demanded1 but whensoever there were     
collocations of pramna1 knowledge was   
produced1 no matter  whether the object 
was previously unknown or known4 ,even  
the  knowledge of known things may be   
repeated if there be suitable           
collocations4 ,knowledge like any other 
physical effect is produced  whenever   
the cause of it namely the pramna       
collocation  is present4 ,categories    
which are merely mental such as class   
7smnya71 inherence 7samavya71 etc41 were
 considered as having  as much          
independent existence as the atoms of   
the four elements4  ,the phenomenon of  
the rise of knowledge in the soul was   
thus  conceived to be as much a         

phenomenon as the turning of the  colour
 of the jug by fire from black to red4  
,the element of  indeterminate          
consciousness was believed to be        
combining with  the sense contact1 the  
object1 etc4 to produce the determinate 
consciousness4 ,there was no other      
subtler form of movement than  the      
molecular4 ,such a movement brought     
about by a certain  collocation of      
things ended in a certain result        
7phala74 ,jna  7knowledge7 was thus the 
result of certain united collocations   
7smagr7 and their movements 7e4g4       
contact of manas with soul1  of manas   
with the senses1 of the senses with the 
object1 etc474 ,this  confusion renders 
it impossible to understand the real    
philosophical  distinction between      
knowledge and an external event  of the 
objective world4 ,nyya thus fails to    
explain the cause    #dad    of the     
origin of knowledge1 and its true       
relations with the objective  world4    
,pleasure1 pain1 willing1 etc4 were     

regarded as qualities  which belonged to
 the soul1 and the soul itself was      
regarded  as a qualitiless entity which 
could not be apprehended directly  but  
was inferred as that in which the       
qualities of jna1 sukha  7pleasure71    
etc4 inhered4 ,qualities had independent
 existence  as much as substances1 but  
when any new substances were  produced1 
the qualities rushed forward and inhered
 in them4 ,it  is very probable that in 
,nyya the cultivation of the art of     
inference  was originally pre-eminent   
and metaphysics was deduced  later by an
 application of the inferential method  
which gave  the introspective method but
 little scope for its application1  so  
that inference came in to explain even  
perception 7e4g4 this is  a jug since it
 has jugness7 and the testimony of      
personal psychological  experience was  
taken only as a supplement to           
corroborate  the results arrived at by  
inference and was not used to criticize 
it  ,footnote ref #a4    ,smkhya        

understood the difference between       
knowledge and  material events4 ,but so 
far as knowledge consisted in being the 
copy of external things1 it could not be
 absolutely different from  the objects 
themselves2 it was even then an         
invisible translucent  sort of thing1   
devoid of weight and grossness such as  
the external  objects possessed4 ,but   
the fact that it copies those gross     
objects  makes it evident that knowledge
 had essentially the same substances    
though in a subtler form as that of     
which the objects were  made4 ,but      
though the matter of knowledge1 which   
assumed the  form of the objects with   
which it came in touch1 was probably    
thus a subtler combination of the same  
elementary substances  of which matter  
was made up1 yet there was in it another
 element1  viz4 intelligence1 which at  
once distinguished it as utterly        
different from material combinations4   
,this element of intelligence  is indeed
 different from the substances or       

content of  the knowledge itself1 for   
the element of intelligence is like a   
stationary light1 the self1 which       
illuminates the crowding1  bustling     
knowledge which is incessantly changing 
its form in  accordance with the objects
 with which it comes in touch4 ,this    
light of intelligence is the same that  
finds its manifestation in              
consciousness as the ,i1 the changeless 
entity amidst all the  fluctuations of  
the changeful procession of knowledge4  
,how this  element of light which is    
foreign to the substance of knowledge   
,footnote #a3 ,see ,nyyamajar on pramna4
    #dae    relates itself to knowledge1
 and how knowledge itself takes it up   
into itself and appears as conscious1 is
 the most difficult point  of the       
,smkhya epistemology and metaphysics4   
,the substance  of knowledge copies the 
external world1 and this copy-shape of  
knowledge is again intelligized by the  
pure intelligence 7purusa7  when it     
appears as conscious4 ,the forming of   

the buddhi-shape  of knowledge is thus  
the pramna 7instrument and process of   
knowledge7 and the validity or          
invalidity of any of these shapes  is   
criticized by the later shapes of       
knowledge and not by the  external      
objects 7svatah-prmnya and              
svatah-aprmnya74 ,the  pramna however   
can lead to a pram or right knowledge   
only  when it is intelligized by the    
purusa4 ,the purusa comes in touch  with
 buddhi not by the ordinary means of    
physical contact but  by what may be    
called an inexplicable transcendental   
contact4  ,it is the transcendental     
influence of purusa that sets in motion 
the original prakrti in ,smkhya         
metaphysics1 and it is the same         
transcendent touch 7call it yogyat      
according to ,vcaspati or  samyoga      
according to ,bhiksu7 of the            
transcendent entity of  purusa that     
transforms the non-intelligent states of
 buddhi into  consciousness4 ,the       
,vijnavdin ,buddhist did not make any   

distinction between the pure            
consciousness and its forms 7kra7  and  
did not therefore agree that the kra of 
knowledge was  due to its copying the   
objects4 ,smkhya was however a realist  
who admitted the external world and     
regarded the forms as  all due to       
copying1 all stamped as such upon a     
translucent substance  7sattva7 which   
could assume the shape of the objects4  
,but ,smkhya was also transcendentalist 
in this1 that it did not  think like    
,nyya that the kra of knowledge was all 
that knowledge  had to show2 it held    
that there was a transcendent element   
which shone forth in knowledge and made 
it conscious4 ,with  ,nyya there was no 
distinction between the shaped buddhi   
and  the intelligence1 and that being so
 consciousness was almost like  a       
physical event4 ,with ,smkhya however so
 far as the content  and the shape      
manifested in consciousness were        
concerned it was  indeed a physical     
event1 but so far as the pure           

intelligizing element  of consciousness 
was concerned it was a wholly           
transcendent  affair beyond the scope   
and province of physics4 ,the rise of   
consciousness was thus at once both     
transcendent and physical4    ,the      
,mmmsist ,prabhkara agreed with ,nyya in
 general  as regards the way in which   
the objective world and sense contact   
#daf    induced knowledge in us4 ,but it
 regarded knowledge as a  unique        
phenomenon which at once revealed       
itself1 the knower  and the known4 ,we  
are not concerned with physical         
collocations1  for whatever these may be
 it is knowledge which reveals          
things--the direct apprehension that    
should be called the pramna4  ,pramna in
 this sense is the same as pramiti or   
pram1  the phenomenon of apprehension4  
,pramna may also indeed  mean the       
collocations so far as they induce the  
pram4 ,for  pram or right knowledge is  
never produced1 it always exists1  but  
it manifests itself differently under   

different circumstances4  ,the validity 
of knowledge means the conviction or the
 specific  attitude that is generated in
 us with reference to the objective     
world4 ,this validity is manifested with
 the rise of knowledge1  and it does not
 await the verdict of any later         
experience in the  objective field      
7samvdin74 ,knowledge as nirvikalpa     
7indeterminate7  means the whole        
knowledge of the object and not merely  
a non-sensible hypothetical             
indeterminate class-notion as ,nyya     
holds4 ,the savikalpa 7determinate7     
knowledge only re-establishes  the      
knowledge thus formed by relating it    
with other objects as  represented by   
memory ,footnote ref #a4    ,prabhkara  
rejected the ,smkhya conception of a    
dual element  in consciousness as       
involving a transcendent intelligence   
7cit7 and  a material part1 the buddhi2 
but it regarded consciousness as an     
unique thing which by itself in one     
flash represented both the  knower and  

the known4 ,the validity of knowledge   
did not depend  upon its faithfulness in
 reproducing or indicating              
7pradars'akatva7  external objects1 but 
upon the force that all direct          
apprehension  7anubhti7 has of prompting
 us to action in the external world2    
knowledge is thus a complete and        
independent unit in all its             
self-revealing aspects4 ,but what the   
knowledge was in itself apart  from its 
self-revealing character ,prabhkara did 
not enquire4    ,kumrila declared that  
jna 7knowledge7 was a movement  brought 
about by the activity of the self which 
resulted in producing  consciousness    
7jtat7 of objective things4 ,jna itself 
cannot be perceived1 but can only be    
inferred as the movement  necessary for 
producing the jtat or consciousness of  
things4  ,movement with ,kumrila was not
 a mere atomic vibration1 but  was a    
non-sensuous transcendent operation of  
which vibration        ,footnote #a3    
,smkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim

 knowledge of the  first moment of      
consciousness1 which1 when it became    
clear at the next  moment1 was called   
savikalpa4    #dag    was sometimes the 
result4 ,jna was a movement and not the 
result of causal operation as ,nyya     
supposed4 ,nyya would  not also admit   
any movement on the part of the self1   
but it  would hold that when the self is
 possessed of certain qualities1  such  
as desire1 etc41 it becomes an          
instrument for the accomplishment  of a 
physical movement4 ,kumrila accords the 
same  self-validity to knowledge that   
,prabhkara gives4 ,later knowledge  by  
experience is not endowed with any      
special quality  which should decide as 
to the validity of the knowledge of the 
previous movement4 ,for what is called  
samvdi or later testimony  of experience
 is but later knowledge and nothing more
 ,footnote ref #a4 ,the  self is not    
revealed in the knowledge of external   
objects1 but we  can know it by a mental
 perception of self-consciousness4 ,it  

is  the movement of this self in        
presence of certain collocating         
circumstances  leading to cognition of  
things that is called jna ,footnote ref 
#b4  ,here ,kumrila distinguishes       
knowledge as movement from knowledge  as
 objective consciousness4 ,knowledge as 
movement was  beyond sense perception   
and could only be inferred4    ,the     
idealistic tendency of ,vijnavda        
,buddhism1 ,smkhya1  and ,mmms was      
manifest in its attempt at establishing 
the unique  character of knowledge as   
being that with which alone we are in   
touch4 ,but ,vijnavda denied the        
external world1 and thereby  did        
violence to the testimony of knowledge4 
,smkhya admitted  the external world but
 created a gulf between the content of  
knowledge  and pure intelligence2       
,prabhkara ignored this difference1  and
 was satisfied with the introspective   
assertion that knowledge  was such a    
unique thing that it revealed with      
itself1 the knower and  the known1      

,kumrila however admitted a transcendent
 element  of movement as being the cause
 of our objective consciousness1  but   
regarded this as being separate from    
self4 ,but the question  remained       
unsolved as to why1 in spite of the     
unique character of  knowledge1         
knowledge could relate itself to the    
world of objects1  how far the world of 
external objects or of knowledge could  
be  regarded as absolutely true4        
,hitherto judgments were only relative1 
either referring to one's being prompted
 to the objective  world1 to the        
faithfulness of the representation of   
objects1 the  suitability of fulfilling 
our requirements1 or to verification by 
later        ,footnote #a3 ,see         
,nyyaratnamla1 svatah-prmnya-nirnaya4   
,footnote #b3 ,see ,nyyamajari on       
,pramna1 ,s'lokavrttika on  ,pratyaksa1 
and ,gg ,bhatta's ,bhattcintamani on    
,pratyaksa4    #dah    uncontradicted   
experience4 ,but no enquiry was made    
whether  any absolute judgments about   

the ultimate truth of knowledge  and    
matter could be made at all4 ,that which
 appeared was regarded  as the real4    
,but the question was not asked1 whether
  there was anything which could be     
regarded as absolute truth1  the basis  
of all appearance1 and the unchangeable1
 reality4 ,this  philosophical enquiry  
had the most wonderful charm for the    
,hindu mind4      ,vednta ,literature4  
,it is difficult to ascertain the time  
when the ,brahma-stras  were written1   
but since they contain a refutation of  
almost all the  other ,indian systems1  
even of the ,s'nyavda ,buddhism 7of     
course  according to ,s'ankara's        
interpretation71 they cannot have been  
written very early4 ,i think it may not 
be far from the truth in  supposing that
 they were written some time in the     
second century  ,b4,c4 ,about the period
 #ghj ,a4,d4 ,gaudapda revived the      
monistic  teaching of the ,upanisads by 
his commentary on the ,mndkya  ,upanisad
 in verse called ,mndkyakrik4 ,his      

disciple ,govinda  was the teacher of   
,s'ankara 7#ghh--hbj ,a4,d474           
,s'ankara's commentary  on the          
,brahma-stras is the root from which    
sprang  forth a host of commentaries and
 studies on ,vedntism of great          
originality1 vigour1 and philosophic    
insight4 ,thus nandagiri1 a  disciple of
 ,s'ankara1 wrote a commentary called   
,nyyanirnaya1  and ,govindnanda wrote   
another commentary named ,ratna-prabh4  
,vcaspati ,mis'ra1 who flourished about 
#hda ,a4,d41 wrote  another commentary  
on it called the ,bhmati4 ,amalnanda    
7#abdg--abfj ,a4,d47 wrote his          
,kalpataru on it1 and ,apyayadiksita    
7#aeej ,a4,d47 son of ,rangarjadhvarndra
 of ,kc wrote his  ,kalpataruparimala on
 the ,kalpataru4 ,another disciple of   
,s'ankara1  ,padmapda1 also called      
,sanandana1 wrote a commentary on it    
known as ,pacapdik4 ,from the manner in 
which the book is  begun one would      
expect that it was to be a running      
commentary  on the whole of ,s'ankara's 

bhsya1 but it ends abruptly at the  end 
of the fourth stra4 ,mdhava 7#acej71 in 
his ,s'ankaravijaya1  recites an        
interesting story about it4 ,he says    
that ,sures'vara received  ,s'ankara's  
permission to write a vrttika on the    
bhsya4  ,but other pupils objected to   
,s'ankara that since ,sures'vara was    
formerly a great ,mmmsist 7,mandana     
,misra was called ,sures'vara  after his
 conversion to ,vedntism7 he was not    
competent to write    #dai    a good    
vrttika on the bhsya4 ,sures'vara1      
disappointed1 wrote  a treatise called  
,naiskarmyasiddhi4 ,padmapda wrote a tk 
but this was burnt in his uncle's house4
 ,s'ankara1 who had once  seen it1      
recited it from memory and ,padmapda    
wrote it down4  ,praks'tman 7#abjj7     
wrote a commentary on ,padmapda's       
,pacapdik  known as ,pacapdikvivarana4  
,akhandnanda wrote  his ,tattvadpana1   
and the famous ,nrsimhs'rama ,muni      
7#aejj7  wrote his ,vivaranabhvapraks'ik
 on it4 ,amalnanda and  ,vidyasgara also

 wrote commentaries on ,pacapdik1 named 
,pacapdikdarpana and ,pacapdiktk        
respectively1 but  the ,pacapdikvivarana
 had by far the greatest reputation4    
,vidyranya who is generally identified  
by some with ,mdhava  7#acej7 wrote his 
famous work ,vivaranaprameyasamgraha    
,footnote ref #a1  elaborating the ideas
 of ,pacapdikvivarana2 ,vidyranya  wrote
 also another excellent work named      
,jvanmuktiviveka on  the ,vednta        
doctrine of emancipation4 ,sures'vara's 
7#hjj ,a4,d47  excellent work           
,naiskarmyasiddhi is probably the       
earliest independent  treatise on       
,s'ankara's philosophy as expressed in  
his  bhsya4 ,it has been commented upon 
by ,jnottama ,mis'ra4  ,vidyranya also  
wrote another work of great merit known 
as  ,pacadas'1 which is a very popular  
and illuminating treatise in  verse on  
,vednta4 ,another important work written
 in verse on  the main teachings of     
,s'ankara's bhsya is ,samksepas'arraka1 
written by ,sarvajtma ,muni 7#ijj       

,a4,d474 ,this has also been  commented 
upon by ,rmatrtha4 ,s'rharsa 7#aaij     
,a4,d47 wrote  his ,khandanakhandakhdya1
 the most celebrated work on the        
,vednta dialectic4 ,citsukha1 who       
probably flourished shortly  after      
,s'rharsa1 wrote a commentary on it1 and
 also wrote an  independent work on     
,vednta dialectic known as ,tattvadpik  
which has also a commentary called      
,nayanaprasdin written  by ,pratyagrpa4 
,s'ankara ,mis'ra and ,raghuntha also   
wrote  commentaries on                  
,khandanakhandakhdya4 ,a work on ,vednta
  epistemology and the principal topics 
of ,vednta of  great originality and    
merit known as ,vedntaparibhs was       
written by ,dharmarjdhvarndra 7about    
#aee,,oa4,d474 ,his son  ,rmakrsndhvarin
 wrote his ,s'ikhmani on it and         
,amaradsa his  ,maniprabh4 ,the         
,vedntaparibhs with these two           
commentaries  forms an excellent        
exposition of some of the fundamental   
principles of ,vednta4 ,another work of 

supreme importance        ,footnote #a3 
,see ,narasimhcrya's article in the     
,indian ,antiquary1  #aiaf4    #dbj     
7though probably the last great work on 
,vednta7 is the  ,advaitasiddhi of      
,madhusdana ,sarasvat who followed      
,dharmarjdhvarndra4  ,this has three    
commentaries known as ,gaudabrahmnand1  
,vitthales'opadhyy and ,siddhivykhy4    
,sadnanda  ,vysa wrote also a summary of
 it known as ,advaitasiddhisiddhntasra4 
,sadnanda wrote also an excellent       
elementary work  named ,vedntasra which 
has also two commentaries ,subodhin  and
 ,vidvanmanorajin4 ,the                 
,advaitabrahmasiddhi of ,sadnanda  ,yati
 though much inferior to ,advaitasiddhi 
is important1 as it  touches on many    
points of ,vednta interest which are not
 dealt  with in other ,vednta works4    
,the ,nyyamakaranda of nandabodha       
,bhattrakcryya treats of the doctrines  
of illusion very  well1 as also some    
other important points of ,vednta       
interest4  ,vedntasiddhntamuktval of    

,praks'nanda discusses many of  the     
subtle points regarding the nature of   
ajna and its relations  to cit1 the     
doctrine of drstisrstivda1 etc41 with   
great clearness4  ,siddhntales'a by     
,apyayadksita is very important as a    
summary  of the divergent views of      
different writers on many points of     
interest4 ,vedntatattvadpik and         
,siddhntatattva are also good  as well  
as deep in their general summary of the 
,vednta system4  ,bhedadhikkra of       
,nrsimhs'rama ,muni also is to be       
regarded as  an important work on the   
,vednta dialectic4    ,the above is only
 a list of some of the most important   
,vednta  works on which the present     
chapter has been based4        ,vednta  
in ,gaudapda4    ,it is useless ,i think
 to attempt to bring out the meaning of 
the ,vednta thought as contained in the 
,brahma-stras without  making any       
reference to the commentary of ,s'ankara
 or any  other commentator4 ,there is   
reason to believe that the ,brahma-stras

  were first commented upon by some     
,vaisnava writers who  held some form of
 modified dualism ,footnote ref #a4     
,there have been more  than a half dozen
 ,vaisnava commentators of the          
,brahma-stras  who not only differed    
from ,s'ankara's interpretation1 but    
also  differed largely amongst          
themselves in accordance with the       
different degrees of stress they laid on
 the different aspects of  their        
dualistic creeds4 ,every one of them    
claimed that his interpretation  was the
 only one that was faithful to the stras
 and to        ,footnote #a3 ,this point
 will be dealt with in the #bnd volume1 
when ,i shall  deal with the systems    
expounded by the ,vaisnava commentators 
of the  ,brahma-stras4    #dba    the   
,upanisads4 ,should ,i attempt to give  
an interpretation  myself and claim that
 to be the right one1 it would be only  
just one additional view4 ,but however  
that may be1 ,i am  myself inclined to  
believe that the dualistic              

interpretations of the  ,brahma-stras   
were probably more faithful to the stras
 than the  interpretations of ,s'akara4 
,the ,s'rmadbhagavadgt1 which itself was
 a work of the  ,eknti 7singularistic7  
,vaisnavas1 mentions the ,brahma-stras  
as  having the same purport as its own1 
giving cogent reasons ,footnote ref #a4 
,professor ,jacobi in discussing the    
date of the philosophical  stras of the 
,hindus has shown that the references to
 ,buddhism  found in the ,brahma-stras  
are not with regard to the ,vijna-vada  
of ,vasubandhu1 but with regard to the  
,s'nyavda1 but he regards  the          
composition of the ,brahma-stras to be  
later than ,ngrjuna4  ,i agree with the 
late ,dr ,s4,c4 ,vidybhshana in holding 
that  both the ,yogcra system and the   
system of ,ngrjuna evolved  from the    
,prajpramit ,footnote ref #b4 ,ngrjuna's
 merit  consisted in the dialectical    
form of his arguments in support  of    
,s'unyavda2 but so far as the essentials
 of ,s'unyavda are  concerned ,i believe

 that the ,tathat philosophy of         
,as'vaghosa  and the philosophy of the  
,prajpramit contained no less4  ,there  
is no reason to suppose that the works  
of ,ngrjuna were  better known to the   
,hindu writers than the ,mahyna stras4  
,even in such later times as that of    
,vcaspati ,mis'ra1 we find  him quoting 
a passage of the ,s'listambha stra to   
give an account  of the ,buddhist       
doctrine of prattyasamutpda ,footnote   
ref #c4  ,we could interpret any        
reference to ,s'nyavda as pointing to   
,ngrjuna only if his special phraseology
 or dialectical methods  were referred  
to in any way4 ,on the other hand1 the  
reference in  the ,bhagavadgt to the    
,brahma-stras clearly points out a date 
prior to that of ,ngrjuna2 though we may
 be slow to believe such  an early date 
as has been assigned to the ,bhagavadgt 
by ,telang1  yet ,i suppose that its    
date could safely be placed so far back 
as the first half of the first century  
,b4,c4 or the last part  of the second  

century ,b4,c4 ,the ,brahma-stras could 
thus be  placed slightly earlier than   
the date of the ,bhagavadgt4            
,footnote #a3 ,brahmastrapadais'caiva   
hetumadbhirvinis'citah  ,bhagavadgt4    
,the proofs in support of the view that 
the  ,bhagavadgt is a ,vaisnava work    
will be discussed in the #bnd  volume of
 the present work in the section on     
,bhagavadgt and  its philosophy4        
,footnote #b3 ,indian ,antiquary1 #aiae4
    ,footnote #c3 ,see ,vcaspati        
,mis'ra's ,bhmat on ,s'ankara's bhsya on
  ,brahma-stra1 ,,ii4 ii4    #dbb    ,i 
do not know of any evidence that would  
come in conflict with  this supposition4
 ,the fact that we do not know of any   
,hindu  writer who held such monistic   
views as ,gaudapda or ,s'ankara1  and   
who interpreted the ,brahma-stras in    
accordance with those  monistic ideas1  
when combined with the fact that the    
dualists  had been writing commentaries 
on the ,brahma-stras1 goes to  show that
 the ,brahma-stras were originally      

regarded as an  authoritative work of   
the dualists4 ,this also explains the   
fact that  the ,bhagavadgt1 the         
canonical work of the ,eknti ,vaisnavas1
  should refer to it4 ,i do not know of 
any ,hindu writer previous  to ,gaudapda
 who attempted to give an exposition of 
the  monistic doctrine 7apart from the  
,upanisads71 either by writing  a       
commentary as did ,s'ankara1 or by      
writing an independent  work as did     
,gaudapda4 ,i am inclined to think      
therefore that  as the pure monism of   
the ,upanisads was not worked out in a  
coherent manner for the formation of a  
monistic system1 it  was dealt with by  
people who had sympathies with some form
  of dualism which was already          
developing in the later days of  the    
,upanisads1 as evidenced by the         
dualistic tendencies of such  ,upanisads
 as the ,s'vets'vatara1 and the like4   
,the epic ,s'amkhya  was also the result
 of this dualistic development4    ,it  
seems that ,bdaryana1 the writer of the 

,brahma-stras1  was probably more a     
theist1 than an absolutist like his     
commentator  ,s'ankara4 ,gaudapda seems 
to be the most important  man1 after the
 ,upanisad sages1 who revived the       
monistic tendencies  of the ,upanisads  
in a bold and clear form and tried to   
formulate them in a systematic manner4  
,it seems very significant  that no     
other kriks on the ,upanisads were      
interpreted1  except the ,mndkyakrik by 
,gaudapda1 who did not himself  make any
 reference to any other writer of the   
monistic  school1 not even ,bdaryana4   
,s'ankara himself makes the confession  
that the absolutist 7advaita7 creed was 
recovered from  the ,vedas by ,gaudapda4
 ,thus at the conclusion of his         
commentary  on ,gaudapda's krik1 he says
 that he adores by  falling at the feet 
of that great guru 7teacher7 the adored 
of his  adored1 who on finding all the  
people sinking in the ocean made        
dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth1  
out of kindness for all  people1 by     

churning the great ocean of the ,veda by
 his great  churning rod of wisdom      
recovered what lay deep in the heart  of
 the ,veda1 and is hardly attainable    
even by the immortal    #dbc    gods    
,footnote ref l4 ,it seems particularly 
significant that ,s'ankara  should      
credit ,gaudapda and not ,bdaryana with 
recovering the  ,upanisad creed4        
,gaudapda was the teacher of ,govinda1  
the  teacher of ,s'ankara2 but he was   
probably living when ,s'ankara  was a   
student1 for ,s'ankara says that he was 
directly influenced by  his great       
wisdom1 and also speaks of the learning1
 self-control  and modesty of the other 
pupils of ,gaudapda ,footnote ref #b4   
,there is  some dispute about the date  
of ,s'ankara1 but accepting the date    
proposed  by ,bhandarkar1 ,pathak and   
,deussen1 we may consider  it to be #ghh
 ,a4,d4 ,footnote ref #c1 and suppose   
that in order to be able to  teach      
,s'ankara1 ,gaudapda must have been     
living till at least #hjj ,a4,d4        

,gaudapda thus flourished after all the 
great ,buddhist  teachers ,as'vaghosa1  
,ngrjuna1 ,asanga and ,vasubandhu2 and  
,i believe that there is sufficient     
evidence in his kriks for thinking  that
 he was possibly himself a ,buddhist1   
and considered that  the teachings of   
the ,upanisads tallied with those of    
,buddha4  ,thus at the beginning of the 
fourth chapter of his kriks he  says    
that he adores that great man 7dvipadm  
varam7 who by knowledge  as wide as the 
sky realized 7sambuddha7 that all       
appearances  7dharma7 were like the     
vacuous sky 7gaganopamam ,footnote ref  
#d4 ,he  then goes on to say that he    
adores him who has dictated 7des'ita7   
that the touch of untouch               
7aspars'ayoga--probably referring to    
,nirvna7 was the good that produced     
happiness to all beings1  and that he   
was neither in disagreement with this   
doctrine nor  found any contradiction in
 it 7avivdah aviruddhas'ca74  ,some     
disputants hold that coming into being  

is of existents1  whereas others        
quarrelling with them hold that being   
7jta7  is of non-existents 7abhtasya72  
there are others who quarrel  with them 
and say that neither the existents nor  
non-existents  are liable to being and  
there is one non-coming-into-being      
7advayamajtim74 ,he agrees with those   
who hold that there  is no coming into  
being ,footnote ref #e4 ,in ,,iv4 #ai of
 his  krik he again says that the       
,buddhas have shown that there was  no  
coming into being in any way 7sarvath   
,buddhairajtih paridpitah74             
,footnote #a3 ,s'ankara's bhsya on      
,gaudapda's krik1 ,anands'rama  edition1
 p4 #bad4    ,footnote #b3 ,anands'rama 
edition of ,s'ankara's bhsya on         
,gaudapda's  krik1 p4 #ba4    ,footnote 
#c3 ,telang wishes to put ,s'ankara's   
date somewhere in the #hth  century1 and
 ,venkates'vara would have him in #hje  
,a4,d4-#hig ,a4,d41 as he  did not      
believe that ,s'ankara could have lived 
only for #cb years4  ,j4,r4,a4,s4 #aiaf4

    ,footnote #d3 ,compare ,lankvatra1  
p4 #bi1 ,katham ca gaganopamam4         
,footnote #e3 ,gaudapda's krik1 ,,iv4   
#b1 #d4    #dbd      ,again1 in ,,iv4   
#db he says that it was for those       
realists 7vastuvdi71  who since they    
found things and could deal with them   
and  were afraid of non-being1 that the 
,buddhas had spoken of  origination     
7jti74 ,in ,,iv4 #ij he refers to       
agrayna which we  know to be a name of  
,mahyna4 ,again1 in ,,iv4 #ih and #ii   
he says that all appearances are pure   
and vacuous by nature4  ,these the      
,buddhas1 the emancipated one 7mukta7   
and the leaders  know first4 ,it was not
 said by the ,buddha that all           
appearances  7dharma7 were knowledge4   
,he then closes the kriks with an       
adoration which in all probability also 
refers to the ,buddha ,footnote ref  #a4
    ,gaudapda's work is divided into    
four chapters3 7i7 gama  7scripture71   
7#b7 ,vaitathya 7unreality71 7#c7       
,advaita 7unity71 7#d7  ,altas'nti 7the 

extinction of the burning coal74 ,the   
first chapter is  more in the way of    
explaining the ,mndkya ,upanisad by     
virtue of which the entire work is known
 as ,mndkyakrik4  ,the second1 third1   
and fourth chapters are the constructive
 parts  of ,gaudapda's work1 not        
particularly connected with the ,mndkya 
,upanisad4    ,in the first chapter     
,gaudapda begins with the three apparent
  manifestations of the self3 7#a7 as   
the experiencer of the  external world  
while we are awake 7vis'va or vais'vnara
 tm71  7#b7 as the experiencer in the   
dream state 7taijasa tm71 7#c7 as the   
experiencer in deep sleep 7susupti71    
called the prja when there  is no       
determinate knowledge1 but pure         
consciousness and pure  bliss 7nanda74  
,he who knows these three as one is     
never  attached to his experiences4     
,gaudapda then enumerates some  theories
 of creation3 some think that the world 
has proceeded  as a creation from the   
prna 7vital activity71 others  consider 

creation as an expansion 7vibhti7 of    
that cause  from which it has proceeded2
 others imagine that creation is  like  
dream 7svapna7 and magic 7my72 others1  
that creation  proceeds simply by the   
will of the ,lord2 others that it       
proceeds  from time2 others that it is  
for the enjoyment of the ,lord          
7bhogrtham7 or for his play only        
7kridrtham71 for such  is the nature    
7svabhva7 of the ,lord1 that he creates1
 but he  cannot have any longing1 as all
 his desires are in a state of          
fulfilment4        ,footnote #a3        
,gaudapda's krik ,,iv4 #ajj4 ,in my     
translation ,i have not  followed       
,s'ankara1 for he has ,i think tried his
 level best to explain  away even the   
most obvious references to ,buddha and  
,buddhism in  ,gaudapda's krik4 ,i have1
 therefore1 drawn my meaning directly as
  ,gaudapda's kriks seemed to indicate4 
,i have followed the  same principle in 
giving the short exposition of          
,gaudapda's  philosophy below4    #dbe  

,gaudapda does not indicate his         
preference one way or the  other1 but   
describes the fourth state of the self  
as unseen 7adrsta71  unrelationable     
7avyavahryam71 ungraspable 7agrhyam71   
indefinable  7alaksana71 unthinkable    
7acintyam71 unspeakable 7avyapades'ya71 
the essence as oneness with the self    
7ektmapratyayasra71  as the extinction  
of the appearance 7prapacopas'ama71  the
 quiescent 7s'ntam71 the good 7s'ivam71 
the one 7advaita7  ,footnote ref #a4    
,the world-appearance 7prapaca7 would   
have ceased  if it had existed1 but all 
this duality is mere my 7magic or       
illusion71  the one is the ultimately   
real 7paramrthatah74 ,in the second     
chapter  ,gaudapda says that what is    
meant by calling the world a  dream is  
that all existence is unreal4 ,that     
which neither exists  in the beginning  
nor in the end cannot be said to exist  
in the  present4 ,being like unreal it  
appears as real4 ,the appearance  has a 
beginning and an end and is therefore   

false4 ,in dreams  things are imagined  
internally1 and in the experience that  
we  have when we are awake things are   
imagined as if existing outside1  but   
both of them are but illusory creations 
of the self4  ,what is perceived in the 
mind is perceived as existing at the    
moment of perception only2 external     
objects are supposed to  have two       
moments of existence 7namely before they
 are perceived1  and when they begin to 
be perceived71 but this is all mere     
imagination4 ,that which is unmanifested
 in the mind and that  which appears as 
distinct and manifest outside are all   
imaginary  productions in association   
with the sense faculties4 ,there is     
first  the imagination of a perceiver or
 soul 7jva7 and then along with  it the 
imaginary creations of diverse inner    
states and the external  world4 ,just as
 in darkness the rope is imagined to be 
a snake1  so the self is also imagined  
by its own illusion in diverse forms4   
,there is neither any production nor any

 destruction 7na nirodho1  na           
cotpattih71 there is no one who is      
enchained1 no one who is  striving1 no  
one who wants to be released ,footnote  
ref #b4 ,imagination  finds itself      
realized in the non-existent existents  
and also in the sense        ,footnote  
#a3 ,compare in ,ngrjuna's first krik   
the idea of  prapacopas'amam s'ivam4    
,anirodhamanutpdamanucchedamas's'vatam  
anekrthamannrthamangamamanirgamam yah   
prattyasamutpdam  prapacopas'amam s'ivam
 des'aymva sambuddhastam vande          
vadatmvaram4  ,compare also ,ngrjuna's  
,chapter on ,nirvnaparks1               
,prvopalambhopas'amah prapacopas'amah   
s'ivah na kvacit kasyacit  kas'cit      
dharmmo buddhenades'itah4 ,so far as ,i 
know the ,buddhists  were the first to  
use the words prapacopas'aman s'ivam4   
,footnote #b3 ,compare ,ngrjuna's karik1
 anirodhamanutpdam in  ,mdhyamikavrtti1 
,b4,t4,s41 p4 #c4    #dbf    of unity2  
all imagination either as the many or   
the one 7advaya7  is false2 it is only  

the oneness 7advayat7 that is good4     
,there  is no many1 nor are things      
different or non-different 7na nnedam   
444na prthag nprthak7 ,footnote ref #a4 
,the sages who have transcended         
attachment1 fear1 and anger and have    
gone beyond the depths of the  ,vedas   
have perceived it as the imaginationless
 cessation of all  appearance           
7nirvikalpah prapacopas'amah71 the one  
,footnote ref #b4    ,in the third      
chapter ,gaudapda says that truth is    
like the  void7ks'a7 which is falsely   
concieved as taking part in birth  and  
death1 coming and going and as existing 
in all bodies2 but  howsoever it be     
conceived1 it is all the while not      
different from  ks'a4 ,all things that  
appear as compounded are but dreams     
7svapna7 and my 7magic74 ,duality is a  
distinction imposed  upon the one       
7advaita7 by my4 ,the truth is immortal1
 it cannot  therefore by its own nature 
suffer change4 ,it has no birth4 ,all   
birth and death1 all this manifold is   

but the result of an imposition  of my  
upon it ,footnote ref #c4 ,one mind     
appears as many in the dream1  as also  
in the waking state one appears as many1
 but when the  mind activity of the     
,togins 7sages7 is stopped arises this  
fearless  state1 the extinction of all  
sorrow1 final ceasation4 ,thinking      
everything  to be misery 7duhkham sarvam
 anusmrtya7 one should stop  all desires
 and enjoyments1 and thinking that      
nothing has any  birth he should not see
 any production at all4 ,he should      
awaken  the mind 7citta7 into its final 
dissolution 7laya7 and pacify it  when  
distracted2 he should not move it       
towards diverse objects  when it stops4 
,he should not taste any pleasure       
7sukham7 and by  wisdom remain          
unattached1 by strong effort making it  
motionless  and still4 ,when he neither 
passes into dissolution nor into        
distraction2  when there is no sign1 no 
appearance that is the perfect          
,brahman4 ,when there is no object of   

knowledge to come into  being1 the      
unproduced is then called the omniscent 
7sarvaja74    ,in the fourth chapter1   
called the ,alats'nti1 ,gaudapda further
        ,footnote #a3 ,compare          
,mdhyamikakrik1 ,b4,t4,s41 p4#c         
anekrtham  annrtham1 etc4    ,footnote  
#b3 ,compare ,lankvatrastra1 p4#gh1     
,advaysamsraparinirvnvatsarvadharmh     
tasmt tarhi mahmate                     
,s'unyatnutpddvayanihsvabhvalaksane     
yogah karaniyah2  also #h1df1 ,yaduta   
svacittavisayavikalpadrstynavabodhant   
vijnnm  svacittadrstyamtrnavatrena      
mahmate vlaprthagjanh                   
bhvbhvasvabhvaparamrthadrstidvayvdino   
bhavanti4    ,footnote #c3 ,compare     
,ngrjuna's krik1 ,b4,t4,s4 p4 #aif1     
ks'am  s'as'as'rngaca bandhyyh putra eva
 ca asantas'cbhivyajyante  tathbhvena   
kalpan1 with ,gaudapda's krik1 ,,iii4   
#bh1 ,asato  myay janma tatvato naiva   
jyate bandhyputro na tattvena myya  vpi 
jyate4    #dbg    describes this final  
state ,footnote ref l4 ,all the dharmas 

7appearances7 are without death or decay
 ,footnote3 ref #b4  ,gaudapda then     
follows a dialectical form of argument  
which  reminds us of ,ngrjuna4 ,gaudapda
 continues thus3 ,those who  regard     
krana 7cause7 as the kryya 7effect in a 
potential form7  cannot consider the    
cause as truly unproduced 7aja71 for it 
suffers production2 how can it be called
 eternal and yet changing8  ,if it is   
said that things come into being from   
that which has no  production1 there is 
no example with which such a case may be
  illustrated4 ,nor can we consider that
 anything is born from that  which has  
itself suffered production4 ,how again  
can one come to a  right conclusion     
about the regressus ad infinitum of     
cause and  effect 7hetu and phala78     
,without reference to the effect there  
is no cause1 and without reference to   
cause there is no effect4  ,nothing is  
born either by itself or through others2
 call it either  being1 non-being1 or   
being-non-being1 nothing suffers any    

birth1  neither the cause nor the effect
 is produced out of its own nature      
7svabhvatah71 and thus that which has no
 beginning anywhere cannot  be said to  
have a production4 ,all experience      
7prajapti7 is  dependent on reasons1 for
 otherwise both would vanish1 and there 
would be none of the afflictions        
7samkles'a7 that we suffer4 ,when  we   
look at all things in a connected manner
 they seem to be  dependent1 but when we
 look at them from the point of view of 
reality or truth the reasons cease to be
 reasons4 ,the mind 7citta7  does not   
come in touch with objects and thereby  
manifest  them1 for since things do not 
exist they are not different from  their
 manifestations in knowledge4 ,it is not
 in any particular  case that the mind  
produces the manifestations of objects  
while  they do not exist so that it     
could be said to be an error1 for in    
present1 past1 and future the mind never
 comes in touch with  objects which only
 appear by reason of their diverse      

manifestations4  ,therefore neither the 
mind nor the objects seen by it are     
ever produced4 ,those who perceive them 
to suffer production are  really        
traversing the reason of vacuity 7khe71 
for all production  is but false        
imposition on the vacuity4 ,since the   
unborn is  perceived as being born1 the 
essence then is the absence of          
,footnote #a3 ,the very name ,altasnti  
is absolutely ,buddhistic4 ,compare     
,ngrjuna's krik1 ,b4,t4,s41 p4 #bjf1    
where he quotes a verse from the        
,s'ataka4    ,footnote #b3 ,the use of  
the word dharma in the sense of         
appearance or  entity is peculiarly     
,buddhistic4 ,the ,hindu sense is that  
given by ,jaimini1  ,codanlaksanah      
arthah1 dharmah4 ,dharma is determined  
by the injunctions  of the ,vedas4      
#dbh    production1 for it being of the 
nature of absence of production it      
could never change its nature4          
,everything has a beginning and  an end 
and is therefore false4 ,the existence  

of all things is like  a magical or     
illusory elephant 7myhast7 and exists   
only as far  as it merely appears or is 
related to experience4 ,there is thus   
the appearance of production1 movement  
and things1 but the one  knowledge      
7vijna7 is the unborn1 unmoved1 the     
unthingness  7avastutva71 the cessation 
7s'ntam74 ,as the movement of  burning  
charcoal is perceived as straight or    
curved1 so it is the  movement          
7spandita7 of consciousness that appears
 as the perceiving  and the perceived4  
,all the attributes 7e4g4 straight or   
curved7 are imposed upon the charcoal   
fire1 though in reality it  does not    
possess them2 so also all the           
appearances are imposed  upon           
consciousness1 though in reality they do
 not possess  them4 ,we could never     
indicate any kind of causal relation    
between the consciousness and its       
appearance1 which are therefore  to be  
demonstrated as unthinkable 7acintya74  
,a thing  7dravya7 is the cause of a    

thing 7dravya71 and that which is not  a
 thing may be the cause of that which is
 not a thing1 but all  the appearances  
are neither things nor those which are  
not  things1 so neither are appearances 
produced from the mind  7citta7 nor is  
the mind produced by appearances4 ,so   
long as  one thinks of cause and effect 
he has to suffer the cycle of  existence
 7samsra71 but when that notion ceases  
there is no  samsra4 ,all things are    
regarded as being produced from a       
relative point of view only 7samvrti71  
there is therefore nothing  permanent   
7s's'vata74 ,again1 no existent things  
are produced1  hence there cannot be any
 destruction 7uccheda74 ,appearances    
7dharma7 are produced only apparently1  
not in reality2 their  coming into being
 is like my1 and that my again does not 
exist4 ,all appearances are like shoots 
of magic coming out of  seeds of magic  
and are not therefore neither eternal   
nor destructible4  ,as in dreams1 or in 
magic1 men are born and die1 so are all 

appearances4 ,that which appears as     
existing from an  imaginary relative    
point of view 7kalpita samvrti7 is not  
so in reality 7para-mrtha71 for the     
existence depending on  others1 as shown
 in all relative appearance1 is after   
all not  a real existence4 ,that things 
exist1 do not exist1 do exist  and not  
exist1 and neither exist nor not exist2 
that they are moving or  steady1 or none
 of those1 are but thoughts with which  
fools are deluded4    #dbi      ,it is  
so obvious that these doctrines are     
borrowed from the  ,mdhyamika doctrines1
 as found in the ,ngrjuna's kriks and   
the ,vijnavda doctrines1 as found in    
,lankvatra1 that it is  needless to     
attempt to prove it1 ,gaudapda          
assimilated all the  ,buddhist ,s'nyavda
 and ,vijnavda teachings1 and thought   
that  these held good of the ultimate   
truth preached by the ,upanisads4  ,it  
is immaterial whether he was a ,hindu or
 a ,buddhist1 so long  as we are sure   
that he had the highest respect for the 

,buddha and  for the teachings which he 
believed to be his4 ,gaudapda took  the 
smallest ,upanisads to comment upon1    
probably because he  wished to give his 
opinions unrestricted by the textual    
limitations  of the bigger ones4 ,his   
main emphasis is on the truth  that he  
realized to be perfect4 ,he only        
incidentally suggested  that the great  
,buddhist truth of indefinable and      
unspeakable  vijna or vacuity would hold
 good of the highest tman of the        
,upanisads1 and thus laid the foundation
 of a revival of the  ,upanisad studies 
on ,buddhist lines4 ,how far the        
,upanisads  guaranteed in detail the    
truth of ,gaudapda's views it was left  
for his disciple1 the great ,s'ankara1  
to examine and explain4      ,vednta and
 ,sankara 7#ghh-hbj ,a4,d474    ,vednta 
philosophy is the philosophy which      
claims to be  the exposition of the     
philosophy taught in the ,upanisads and 
summarized in the ,brahma-stras of      
,bdaryana4 ,the ,upanisads  form the    

last part of the ,veda literature1 and  
its philosophy is  therefore also called
 sometimes the ,uttara-,mmms or the     
,mmms 7decision7 of the later part of   
the ,vedas as distinguished  from the   
,mmms of the previous part of the ,vedas
 and the  ,brhmanas as incorporated in  
the ,prvammms stras of  ,jaimini4       
,though these ,brahma-stras were        
differently interpreted  by different   
exponents1 the views expressed in the   
earliest commentary  on them now        
available1 written by ,s'ankarcrya1 have
  attained wonderful celebrity1 both on 
account of the subtle and  deep ideas it
 contains1 and also on account of the   
association of the  illustrious         
personality of ,s'ankara4 ,so great is  
the influence of the  philosophy        
propounded by ,sankara and elaborated by
 his illustrious  followers1 that       
whenever we speak of the ,vednta        
philosophy  we mean the philosophy that 
was propounded by ,s'ankara4 ,if  other 
expositions are intended the names of   

the exponents have  to be mentioned     
7e4g4 ,rmnuja-mata1 ,vallabha-mata1     
etc471 ,in this    #dcj    chapter we   
shall limit ourselves to the exposition 
of the ,vednta  philosophy as elaborated
 by ,s'ankara and his followers4 ,in    
,s'ankara's  work 7the commentaries on  
the ,brahma-stra and the ten            
,upanisads7 many ideas have been briefly
 incorporated which as  found in        
,s'ankara do not appear to be           
sufficiently clear1 but are  more       
intelligible as elaborated by his       
followers4 ,it is therefore  better to  
take up the ,vednta system1 not as we   
find it in ,s'ankara1  but as elaborated
 by his followers1 all of whom openly   
declare  that they are true to their    
master's philosophy4    ,for the other  
,hindu systems of thought1 the stras    
7,jaimini  stra1 ,nyya stra1 etc47 are  
the only original treatises1 and no     
foundation other than these is          
available4 ,in the case of the  ,vednta 
however the original source is the      

,upanisads1 and  the stras are but an   
extremely condensed summary in a        
systematic form4 ,s'ankara did not claim
 to be the inventor or  expounder of an 
original system1 but interpreted the    
stras  and the ,upanisads in order to   
show that there existed a connected  and
 systematic philosophy in the ,upanisads
 which was also  enunciated in the stras
 of ,bdaryana4 ,the ,upanisads were a   
part of the ,vedas and were thus        
regarded as infallible by the  ,hindus4 
,if ,s'ankara could only show that his  
exposition of them  was the right one1  
then his philosophy being founded upon  
the  highest authority would be accepted
 by all ,hindus4 ,the most  formidable  
opponents in the way of accomplishing   
his task were  the ,mmamsists1 who held 
that the ,vedas did not preach any      
philosophy1 for whatever there was in   
the ,vedas was to be  interpreted as    
issuing commands to us for performing   
this or  that action4 ,they held that if
 the ,upanisads spoke of ,brahman  and  

demonstrated the nature of its pure     
essence1 these were mere  exaggerations 
intended to put the commandment of      
performing  some kind of worship of     
,brahman into a more attractive form4   
,s'ankara could not deny that the       
purport of the ,vedas as found  in the  
,brhmanas was explicitly of a mandatory 
nature as declared  by the ,mmms1 but he
 sought to prove that such could  not be
 the purport of the ,upanisads1 which   
spoke of the truest  and the highest    
knowledge of the ,absolute by which the 
wise  could attain salvation4 ,he said  
that in the karmaknda--the  7sacrificial
 injunctions7 ,brhmanas of the          
,vedas--the purport of  the ,vedas was  
certainly of a mandatory nature1 as it  
was intended  for ordinary people who   
were anxious for this or that pleasure1 
#dca    and were never actuated by any  
desire of knowing the absolute  truth1  
but the ,upanisads1 which were intended 
for the wise who  had controlled their  
senses and become disinclined to all    

earthly  joys1 demonstrated the one     
,absolute1 ,unchangeable1 ,brahman  as  
the only ,truth of the universe4 ,the   
two parts of the ,vedas  were intended  
for two classes of persons4 ,s'ankara   
thus did not  begin by formulating a    
philosophy of his own by logical and    
psychological analysis1 induction1 and  
deduction4 ,he tried to show  by textual
 comparison of the different ,upanisads1
 and by reference  to the content of    
passages in the ,upanisads1 that they   
were concerned in demonstrating the     
nature of ,brahman 7as he  understood   
it7 as their ultimate end4 ,he had thus 
to show that  the uncontradicted        
testimony of all the ,upanisads was in  
favour  of the view which he held4 ,he  
had to explain all doubtful and         
apparently conflicting texts1 and also  
to show that none of the  texts referred
 to the doctrines of mahat1 prakrti1    
etc4 of the  ,smkhya4 ,he had also to   
interpret the few scattered ideas  about
 physics1 cosmology1 eschatology1 etc4  

that are found in the  ,upanisads       
consistently with the ,brahman          
philosophy4 ,in order  to show that the 
philosophy of the ,upanisads as he      
expounded it  was a consistent system1  
he had to remove all the objections that
  his opponents could make regarding the
 ,brahman philosophy1 to  criticize the 
philosophies of all other schools1 to   
prove them to  be self-contradictory1   
and to show that any interpretation of  
the  ,upanisads1 other than that which  
he gave1 was inconsistent and  wrong4   
,this he did not only in his bhsya on   
the ,brahma-stras  but also in his      
commentaries on the ,upanisads4 ,logic  
with him  had a subordinate place1 as   
its main value for us was the aid  which
 it lent to consistent interpretations  
of the purport of the  ,upanisad texts1 
and to persuading the mind to accept the
 uncontradicted  testimony of the       
,upanisads as the absolute truth4  ,his 
disciples followed him in all1 and      
moreover showed in great  detail that   

the ,brahman philosophy was never       
contradicted  either in perceptual      
experience or in rational thought1 and  
that  all the realistic categories which
 ,nyya and other systems  had put forth 
were self-contradictory and erroneous4  
,they also  supplemented his philosophy 
by constructing a ,vednta epistemology1 
and by rethinking elaborately the       
relation of the my1  the ,brahman1 and  
the world of appearance and other       
relevant  topics4 ,many problems of     
great philosophical interest which      
#dcb    had been left out or slightly   
touched by ,s'ankara were discussed     
fully by his followers4 ,but it should  
always be remembered that  philosophical
 reasonings and criticisms are always to
 be taken  as but aids for convincing   
our intellect and strengthening our     
faith in the truth revealed in the      
,upanisads4 ,the true work of  logic is 
to adapt the mind to accept them4 ,logic
 used for upsetting  the instructions of
 the ,upanisads is logic gone astray4   

,many  lives of ,s'ankarcrya were       
written in ,sanskrit such as the        
,s'ankaradigvijaya1                     
,s'ankara-vijaya-vilsa1 ,s'ankara-jaya1 
etc4 ,it is regarded as almost certain  
that he was born between #gjj  and #hjj 
,a4,d4 in the ,malabar country in the   
,deccan4 ,his father ,s'ivaguru  was a  
,yajurvedi ,brhmin of the ,taittirya    
branch4 ,many miracles  are related of  
,s'ankara1 and he is believed to have   
been the  incarnation of ,s'iva4 ,he    
turned ascetic in his eighth year and   
became the disciple of ,govinda1 a      
renowned sage then residing in  a       
mountain cell on the banks of the       
,narbuda4 ,he then came over  to        
,benares and thence went to             
,badariks'rama4 ,it is said that  he    
wrote his illustrious bhsya on the      
,brahma-stra in his twelfth  year4      
,later on he also wrote his commentaries
 on ten ,upanisads4  ,he returned to    
,benares1 and from this time forth he   
decided to  travel all over ,india in   

order to defeat the adherents of other  
schools of thought in open debate4 ,it  
is said that he first went to  meet     
,kumrila1 but ,kumrila was then at the  
point of death1 and  he advised him to  
meet ,kumrila's disciple4 ,he defeated  
,mandana  and converted him into an     
ascetic follower of his own4 ,he then   
travelled in various places1 and        
defeating his opponents everywhere  he  
established his ,vednta philosophy1     
which from that time forth  acquired a  
dominant influence in moulding the      
religious life of  ,india4    ,s'ankara 
carried on the work of his teacher      
,gaudapda and  by writing commentaries  
on the ten ,upanisads and the           
,brahma-stras  tried to prove1 that the 
absolutist creed was the one which  was 
intended to be preached in the          
,upanisads and the ,brahma-stras        
,footnote3 #a4 ,throughout his          
commentary on the ,brahma-stras1  there 
is ample evidence that he was contending
 against some  other rival              

interpretations of a dualistic tendency 
which held  that the ,upanisads partly  
favoured the ,smkhya cosmology          
,footnote #a3 ,the main works of        
,s'ankara are his commentaries 7bhsya7  
on  the ten ,upanisads 7s'a1 ,kena1     
,katha1 ,pras'na1 ,mundaka1 ,mndkya1    
,aitareya1 ,taittirya1 ,brhadranyaka1   
and ,chndogya71 and on the              
,brahma-stra4    #dcc    of the         
existence of prakrti4 ,that these were  
actual textual  interpretations of the  
,brahma-stras is proved by the fact that
  ,s'ankara in some places tries to show
 that these textual constructions  were 
faulty ,footnote ref #a4 ,in one place  
he says that others 7referring          
according to ,vcaspati to the ,mmms7 and
 some of  us 7referring probably to     
those who interpreted the stras and  the
 ,upanisads from the ,vednta point of   
view7 think that the  soul is permanent4
 ,it is to refute all those who were    
opposed  to the right doctrine of       
perceiving everything as the unity  of  

the self 7tmaikatva7 that this ,s'rraka 
commentary of  mine is being attempted  
,footnote ref #b4 ,rmnuja1 in the       
introductory  portion of his bhsya on   
the ,brahma-stra1 says that the views of
  ,bodhyana who wrote an elaborate      
commentary on the ,brahma-stra  were    
summarized by previous teachers1 and    
that he was  following this ,bodhyana   
bhsya in writing his commentary4 ,in    
the ,vedrthasamgraha of ,rmnuja mention 
is made of ,bodhyana1  ,tanka1          
,guhadeva1 ,kapardin1 ,bhruci as        
,vedntic authorities1  and ,dravidcryya 
is referred to as the bhsyakra          
commentator4  ,in ,chndogya ,,iii4 x4   
#d1 where the ,upanisad cosmology       
appeared to be different from the       
,visnupurana cosmology1 ,s'ankara       
refers to an explanation offered on the 
point by one whom  he calls cryya       
7atroktah parihrah cryyaih7 and         
nandagiri  says that cryya there refers 
to ,dravidcryya4 ,this ,dravidcryya  is 
known to us from ,rmnuja's statement as 

being a  commentator of the dualistic   
school1 and we have evidence here  that 
he had written a commentary on the      
,chndogya ,upanisad4    ,a study of the 
extant commentaries on the ,brahma-stras
 of  ,bdaryana by the adherents of      
different schools of thought  leaves us 
convinced that these stras were regarded
 by all as  condensations of the        
teachings of the ,upanisads4 ,the       
differences  of opinion were with regard
 to the meaning of these stras and  the 
,upanisad texts to which references were
 made by them  in each particular case4 
,the ,brahma-stra is divided into four  
adhyyas or books1 and each of these is  
divided into four chapters  or pdas4    
,each of these contains a number of     
topics of discussion  7adhikarana7 which
 are composed of a number of stras1     
which  raise the point at issue1 the    
points that lead to doubt and           
uncertainty1 and the considerations that
 should lead one to favour              
,footnote #a3 ,see note on p4 #dcb4     

,footnote #b3 ,s'ankara's bhsya on the  
,brahma-stras1 ,i4 iii4 #ai4    #dcd    
a particular conclusion4 ,as explained  
by ,s'ankara1 most of these  stras      
except the first four and the first two 
chapters of the  second book are devoted
 to the textual interpretations of the  
,upanisad passages4 ,s'ankara's method  
of explaining the absolutist  ,vednta   
creed does not consist in proving the   
,vednta to  be a consistent system of   
metaphysics1 complete in all parts1 but 
in so interpreting the ,upanisad texts  
as to show that they all agree  in      
holding the ,brahman to be the self and 
that alone to be the  only truth4 ,in   
,chapter ,i of ,book ,,ii ,s'ankara     
tries to answer  some of the objections 
that may be made from the ,smkhya  point
 of view against his absolutist creed   
and to show that some  apparent         
difficulties of the absolutist doctrine 
did not present  any real difficulty4   
,in ,chapter ,,ii of ,book ,,ii he tries
 to refute  the ,smkhya1 ,yoga1         

,nyya-,vais'esika1 the ,buddhist1       
,jaina1 ,bhgavata  and ,s'aiva systems  
of thought4 ,these two chapters and  his
 commentaries on the first four stras   
contain the main points  of his system4 
,the rest of the work is mainly occupied
 in showing  that the conclusion of the 
stras was always in strict agreement    
with the ,upanisad doctrines4 ,reason   
with ,s'ankara never  occupied the      
premier position2 its value was         
considered only  secondary1 only so far 
as it helped one to the right           
understanding  of the revealed          
scriptures1 the ,upanisads4 ,the        
ultimate truth cannot  be known by      
reason alone4 ,what one debater shows to
 be  reasonable a more expert debater   
shows to be false1 and what he  shows to
 be right is again proved to be false by
 another debater4  ,so there is no final
 certainty to which we can arrive by    
logic  and argument alone4 ,the ultimate
 truth can thus only be found  in the   
,upanisads2 reason1 discrimination and  

judgment are all to  be used only with a
 view to the discovery of the real      
purport  of the ,upanisads4 ,from his   
own position ,s'ankara was not thus     
bound to vindicate the position of the  
,vednta as a thoroughly  rational system
 of metaphysics4 ,for its truth did not 
depend on  its rationality but on the   
authority of the ,upanisads4 ,but what  
was true could not contradict           
experience4 ,if therefore ,s'ankara's   
interpretation of the ,upanisads was    
true1 then it would not contradict      
experience4 ,s'ankara was therefore     
bound to show that  his interpretation  
was rational and did not contradict     
experience4  ,if he could show that his 
interpretation was the only             
interpretation  that was faithful to the
 ,upanisads1 and that its apparent      
contradictions with experience could in 
some way be explained1    #dce    he    
considered that he had nothing more to  
do4 ,he was not writing  a philosophy in
 the modern sense of the term1 but      

giving us the  whole truth as taught and
 revealed in the ,upanisads and not     
simply a system spun by a clever        
thinker1 which may erroneously  appear  
to be quite reasonable1 ,ultimate       
validity does not belong  to reason but 
to the scriptures4    ,he started with  
the premise that whatever may be the    
reason  it is a fact that all experience
 starts and moves in an error which     
identifies the self with the body1 the  
senses1 or the objects of the  senses4  
,all cognitive acts presuppose this     
illusory identification1  for without it
 the pure self can never behave as a    
phenomenal  knower or perceiver1 and    
without such a perceiver there would  be
 no cognitive act4 ,s'ankara does not   
try to prove philosophically  the       
existence of the pure self as distinct  
from all other  things1 for he is       
satisfied in showing that the ,upanisads
 describe  the pure self unattached to  
any kind of impurity as the ultimate    
truth4 ,this with him is a matter to    

which no exception can be  taken1 for it
 is so revealed in the ,upanisads4 ,this
 point being  granted1 the next point is
 that our experience is always based    
upon an identification of the self with 
the body1 the senses1 etc4 and  the     
imposition of all phenomenal qualities  
of pleasure1 pain1 etc4  upon the self2 
and this with ,s'ankara is a            
beginningless illusion4  ,all this had  
been said by ,gaudapda4 ,s'ankara       
accepted ,gaudapda's  conclusions1 but  
did not develop his dialectic for a     
positive  proof of his thesis4 ,he made 
use of the dialectic only for the       
refutation of other systems of thought4 
,this being done he  thought that he had
 nothing more to do than to show that   
his  idea was in agreement with the     
teachings of the ,upanisads4 ,he  showed
 that the ,upanisads held that the pure 
self as pure being1  pure intelligence  
and pure bliss was the ultimate truth4  
,this  being accepted the world as it   
appears could not be real4 ,it must  be 

a mere magic show of illusion or my4    
,s'ankara never tries  to prove that the
 world is my1 but accepts it as         
indisputable4  ,for1 if the self is what
 is ultimately real1 the necessary      
conclusion  is that all else is mere    
illusion or my4 ,he had thus to  quarrel
 on one side with the ,mmms realists and
 on the other  with the ,smkhya         
realists1 both of whom accepted the     
validity  of the scriptures1 but        
interpreted them in their own way4 ,the 
,mmmsists held that everything that is  
said in the ,vedas is to be  interpreted
 as requiring us to perform particular  
kinds of action1    #dcf    or to desist
 from doing certain other kinds4 ,this  
would mean that  the ,upanisads being a 
part of the ,veda should also be        
interpreted  as containing injunctions  
for the performance of certain kinds of 
actions4 ,the description of ,brahman in
 the ,upanisads does not  therefore     
represent a simple statement of the     
nature of ,brahman1  but it implies that

 the ,brahman should be meditated upon  
as  possessing the particular nature    
described there1 i4e4 ,brahman  should  
be meditated upon as being an entity    
which possesses a  nature which is      
identical with our self2 such a         
procedure would  then lead to beneficial
 results to the man who so meditates4   
,s'ankara could not agree to such a     
view4 ,for his main point was  that the 
,upanisads revealed the highest truth as
 the ,brahman4  ,no meditation or       
worship or action of any kind was       
required2  but one reached absolute     
wisdom and emancipation when  the truth 
dawned on him that the ,brahman or self 
was the  ultimate reality4 ,the         
teachings of the other parts of the     
,vedas1  the karmaknda 7those dealing   
with the injunctions relating  to the   
performance of duties and actions71 were
 intended for inferior  types of        
aspirants1 whereas the teachings of the 
,upanisads1  the jnaknda 7those which   
declare the nature of ultimate  truth   

and reality71 were intended only for    
superior aspirants who  had transcended 
the limits of sacrificial duties and    
actions1 and  who had no desire for any 
earthly blessing or for any heavenly    
joy4 ,throughout his commentary on the  
,bhagavadgt ,s'ankara  tried to         
demonstrate that those who should follow
 the injunctions  of the ,veda and      
perform ,vedic deeds1 such as           
sacrifices1  etc41 belonged to a lower  
order4 ,so long as they remained in     
that order they had no right to follow  
the higher teachings of  the ,upanisads4
 ,they were but karmins 7performers of  
scriptural  duties74 ,when they         
succeeded in purging their minds of all 
desires which led them to the           
performance of the ,vedic injunctions1  
the field of karmamrga 7the path of     
duties71 and wanted  to know the truth  
alone1 they entered the jnamrga 7the way
  of wisdom7 and had no duties to       
perform4 ,the study of ,vednta  was thus
 reserved for advanced persons who were 

no longer  inclined to the ordinary joys
 of life but wanted complete            
emancipation4 ,the qualifications       
necessary for a man intending  to study 
the ,vednta are 7#a7 discerning         
knowledge about what is  eternal and    
what is transitory                      
7nitynityavastuviveka71 7#b7            
disinclination to the enjoyment of the  
pleasures of this world or of    #dcg   
the after world                         
7ihmutraphalabhogavirga71 7#c7          
attainment of  peace1 self-restraint1   
renunciation1 patience1 deep            
concentration  and faith                
7s'amadamdisdhanasampat7 and desire for 
salvation  7mumuksutva74 ,the person who
 had these qualifications should  study 
the ,upanisads1 and as soon as he became
 convinced of the  truth about the      
identity of the self and the ,brahman he
 attained  emancipation4 ,when once a   
man realized that the self alone  was   
the reality and all else was my1 all    
injunctions ceased to  have any force   

with him4 ,thus1 the path of duties     
7karma7 and  the path of wisdom 7jna7   
were intended for different classes of  
persons or adhikrins4 ,there could be no
 joint performance of  ,vedic duties and
 the seeking of the highest truth as    
taught in  the ,upanisads               
7jna-karma-samuccaybhvah74 ,as against  
the  dualists he tried to show that the 
,upanisads never favoured any  kind of  
dualistic interpretations4 ,the main    
difference between  the ,vednta as      
expounded by ,gaudapda and as explained 
by  ,s'ankara consists in this1 that    
,s'ankara tried as best he could to     
dissociate the distinctive ,buddhist    
traits found in the exposition  of the  
former and to formulate the philosophy  
as a direct  interpretation of the older
 ,upanisad texts4 ,in this he achieved  
remarkable success4 ,he was no doubt    
regarded by some as a  hidden ,buddhist 
7pracchanna ,bauddha71 but his influence
 on  ,hindu thought and religion became 
so great that he was regarded  in later 

times as being almost a divine person or
 an  incarnation4 ,his immediate        
disciples1 the disciples of his         
disciples1  and those who adhered to his
 doctrine in the succeeding             
generations1 tried to build a rational  
basis for his system in a  much stronger
 way than ,s'ankara did4 ,our treatment 
of ,s'ankara's  philosophy has been     
based on the interpretations of ,vednta 
thought1 as offered by these followers  
of ,s'ankara4 ,these interpretations    
are nowhere in conflict with ,s'ankara's
 doctrines1 but  the questions and      
problems which ,s'ankara did not raise  
have  been raised and discussed by his  
followers1 and without these one  could 
not treat ,vednta as a complete and     
coherent system of  metaphysics4 ,as    
these will be discussed in the later    
sections1  we may close this with a     
short description of some of the main   
features of the ,vednta thought as      
explained by ,s'ankara4    ,brahman     
according to ,s'ankara is the cause from

 which  7proceeds7 the origin or        
subsistence and dissolution of this     
world  which is extended in names and   
forms1 which includes many    #dch      
agents and enjoyers1 which contains the 
fruit of works specially  determined    
according to space1 time1 and cause1 a  
world which is  formed after an         
arrangement inconceivable even by the   
7imagination  of the7 mind ,footnote ref
 #a4 ,the reasons that ,s'ankara adduces
 for the  existence of ,brahman may be  
considered to be threefold3 7#a7 ,the   
world must have been produced as the    
modification of something1  but in the  
,upanisads all other things have been   
spoken of  as having been originated    
from something other than ,brahman1  so 
,brahman is the cause from which the    
world has sprung into  being1 but we    
could not think that ,brahman itself    
originated from  something else1 for    
then we should have a regressus ad      
infinitum  7anavasth74 7#b7 ,the world  
is so orderly that it could not have    

come forth from a non-intelligent       
source4 ,the intelligent source  then   
from which this world has come into     
being is ,brahman4  7#c7 ,this ,brahman 
is the immediate consciousness 7sksi7   
which  shines as the self1 as well as   
through the objects of cognition  which 
the self knows4 ,it is thus the essence 
of us all1 the self1  and hence it      
remains undenied even when one tries to 
deny it1  for even in the denial it     
shows itself forth4 ,it is the self of  
us all  and is hence ever present to us 
in all our cognitions4    ,brahman      
according to ,s'ankara is the identity  
of pure intelligence1  pure being1 and  
pure blessedness4 ,brahman is the self  
of  us all4 ,so long as we are in our   
ordinary waking life1 we are            
identifying the self with thousands of  
illusory things1 with all that  we call 
,i or mine1 but when in dreamless sleep 
we are absolutely  without any touch of 
these phenomenal notions the nature of  
our  true state as pure blessedness is  

partially realized4 ,the individual     
self as it appears is but an appearance 
only1 while the real truth  is the true 
self which is one for all1 as pure      
intelligence1 pure  blessedness1 and    
pure being4    ,all creation is illusory
 my4 ,but accepting it as my1 it  may be
 conceived that ,god 7s'vara7 created   
the world as a mere  sport2 from the    
true point of view there is no s'vara   
who creates  the world1 but in the sense
 in which the world exists1 and we all  
exist as separate individuals1 we can   
affirm the existence of  s'vara1 as     
engaged in creating and maintaining the 
world4 ,in  reality all creation is     
illusory and so the creator also is     
illusory4  ,brahman1 the self1 is at    
once the material cause 7updna-krana7   
as well as the efficient cause          
7nimitta-krana7 of the world4           
,footnote #a3 ,s'ankara's commentary1   
,i4i4 #b4 ,see also ,deussen's ,system  
of  the ,vednta4    #dci    ,there is no
 difference between the cause and the   

effect1 and the  effect is but an       
illusory imposition on the cause--a mere
 illusion  of name and form4 ,we may    
mould clay into plates and jugs and     
call them by so many different names1   
but it cannot be admitted  that they are
 by that fact anything more than clay2  
their transformations  as plates and    
jugs are only appearances of name and   
form 7nmarpa74 ,this world1 inasmuch as 
it is but an effect  imposed upon the   
,brahman1 is only phenomenally existent 
7vyavahrika7 as mere objects of name and
 form 7nmarpa71 but  the cause1 the     
,brahman1 is alone the true             
reality7pramrthika7  ,footnote ref #a4  
,the main idea of the ,vednta           
philosophy4    ,the main idea of the    
advaita 7non-dualistic7 ,vednta         
philosophy  as taught by the ,s'akara   
school is this1 that the ultimate  and  
absolute truth is the self1 which is    
one1 though appearing as  many in       
different individuals4 ,the world also  
as apart from  us the individuals has no

 reality and has no other truth  to show
 than this self4 ,all other events1     
mental or physical1  are but passing    
appearances1 while the only absolute and
 unchangeable  truth underlying them all
 is the self4 ,while other  systems     
investigated the pramanas only to       
examine how far  they could determine   
the objective truth of things or our    
attitude  in practical life towards     
them1 ,vednta sought to reach  beneath  
the surface of appearances1 and enquired
 after the final  and ultimate truth    
underlying the microcosm and the        
macrocosm1  the subject and the object4 
,the famous instruction of  ,s'vetaketu1
 the most important ,vednta text        
7mahvkya7 says1  ,that art thou1 ,o     
,s'vetaketu4 ,this comprehension of my  
self  as the ultimate truth is the      
highest knowledge1 for when this        
knowledge is once produced1 our         
cognition of world-appearances  will    
automatically cease4 ,unless the mind is
 chastened and purged  of all passions  

and desires1 the soul cannot comprehend 
this  truth2 but when this is once done1
 and the soul is anxious for  salvation 
by a knowledge of the highest truth1 the
 preceptor  instructs him1 ,that art    
thou4 ,at once he becomes the truth     
itself1 which is at once identical with 
pure bliss and pure intelligence2  all  
ordinary notions and cognitions of      
diversity and of the        ,footnote   
#a3 ,all that is important in           
,s'ankara's commentary of the           
,brahma-stras has been excellently      
systematized by ,deussen in his  ,system
 of the ,vedanta2 it is therefore       
unnecessary for me to give any  long    
account of this part4 ,most of what     
follows has been taken from  the        
writings of his followers4    #ddj      
many cease2 there is no duality1 no     
notion of mine and thane2 the  vast     
illusion of this world process is       
extinct in him1 and he shines  forth as 
the one1 the truth1 the ,brahman4 ,all  
,hindu systems believed  that when man  

attained salvation1 he became divested  
of all  world-consciousness1 or of all  
consciousness of himself and his        
interests1  and was thus reduced to his 
own original purity untouched  by all   
sensations1 perceptions1 feelings and   
willing1 but there the  idea was this   
that when man had no bonds of karma and 
no desire  and attachment with the world
 and had known the nature of  his self  
as absolutely free and unattached to the
 world and his  own psychosis1 he became
 emancipated from the world and all  his
 connections with the world ceased1     
though the world continued  as ever the 
same with others4 ,the external world   
was a reality  with them2 the unreality 
or illusion consisted in want of true   
knowledge about the real nature of the  
self1 on account of which  the self     
foolishly identified itself with        
world-experiences1 worldly  joys and    
world-events1 and performed good and bad
 works accordingly4  ,the force of      
accumulated karmas led him to undergo   

the experiences brought about by them4  
,while reaping the fruits  of past      
karmas he1 as ignorant as ever of his   
own self1 worked  again under the       
delusion of a false relationship between
 himself  and the world1 and so the     
world process ran on4 ,mufti 7salvation7
  meant the dissociation of the self    
from the subjective psychosis  and the  
world4 ,this condition of the pure state
 of self was regarded  as an unconscious
 one by ,nyya-,vais'esika and ,mmams1   
and as a state of pure intelligence by  
,smkhya and ,yoga4 ,but  with ,vednta   
the case is different1 for it held that 
the world as  such has no real existence
 at all1 but is only an illusory        
imagination  which lasts till the moment
 when true knowledge is acquired4  ,as  
soon as we come to know that the one    
truth is the self1 the  ,brahman1 all   
our illusory perceptions representing   
the world as  a field of experience     
cease4 ,this happens not because the    
connections  of the self with the world 

cease1 but because the appearance  of   
the world process does not represent the
 ultimate and  highest truth about it4  
,all our notions about the abiding      
diversified world 7lasting though they  
may be from beginningless  time7 are    
false in the sense that they do not     
represent the real  truth about it4 ,we 
not only do not know what we ourselves  
really are1 but do not also know what   
the world about us is4  ,we take our    
ordinary experiences of the world as    
representing    #dda    it correctly1   
and proceed on our career of daily      
activity4 ,it is no  doubt true that    
these experiences show us an established
 order  having its own laws1 but this   
does not represent the real truth4      
,they are true only in a relative sense1
 so long as they appear to  be so2 for  
the moment the real truth about them and
 the self is  comprehended all          
world-appearances become unreal1 and    
that one  truth1 the ,brahman1 pure     
being1 bliss1 intelligence1 shines forth

 as  the absolute--the only truth in    
world and man4 ,the world-appearance  as
 experienced by us is thus often likened
 to the  illusory perception of silver  
in a conch-shell2 for the moment  the   
perception appears to be true and the   
man runs to pick  it up1 as if the      
conch-shell were a real piece of silver2
 but  as soon as he finds out the truth 
that this is only a piece of            
conch-shell1 he turns his back on it and
 is no longer deluded  by the appearance
 or again attracted towards it4 ,the    
illusion  of silver is inexplicable in  
itself1 for it was true for all purposes
  so long as it persisted1 but when true
 knowledge was  acquired1 it forthwith  
vanished4 ,this world-appearance will   
also  vanish when the true knowledge of 
reality dawns4 ,when false  knowledge is
 once found to be false it cannot return
 again4  ,the ,upanisads tell us that he
 who sees the many here is  doomed4 ,the
 one1 the ,brahman1 alone is true2 all  
else is but  delusion of name and form4 

,other systems believed that even  after
 emancipation1 the world would continue 
as it is1 that  there was nothing       
illusory in it1 but ,i could not have   
any  knowledge of it because of the     
absence of the instruments by  the      
processes of which knowledge was        
generated4 ,the ,smkhya  purusa cannot  
know the world when the buddhi-stuff  is
 dissociated from it and merged in the  
prakrti1 the ,mmms  and the ,nyya soul  
is also incapable of knowing the world  
after emancipation1 as it is then       
dissociated from manas4 ,but  the       
,vednta position is quite distinct here4
 ,we cannot know  the world1 for when   
the right knowledge dawns1 the          
perception  of this world-appearance    
proves itself to be false to the  person
 who has witnessed the truth1 the       
,brahman4 ,an illusion  cannot last when
 the truth is known2 what is truth is   
known to  us1 but what is illusion is   
undemonstrable1 unspeakable1 and        
indefinite4 ,the illusion runs on from  

beginningless time2 we do  not know how 
it is related to truth1 the ,brahman1   
but we know  that when the truth is once
 known the false knowledge of this      
#ddb    world-appearance disappears once
 for all4 ,no intermediate link  is     
necessary to effect it1 no mechanical   
dissociation of buddhi or  manas1 but   
just as by finding out the glittering   
piece to be a conch-shell  the illusory 
perception of silver is destroyed1 so   
this illusory  perception of            
world-appearance is also destroyed by a 
true  knowledge of the reality1 the     
,brahman4 ,the ,upanisads held  that    
reality or truth was one1 and there was 
no many anywhere1  and ,s'akara         
explained it by adding that the many was
 merely  an illusion1 and hence did not 
exist in reality and was bound  to      
disappear when the truth was known4 ,the
 world-appearance  is my 7illusion74    
,this is what ,s'akara emphasizes in    
expounding  his constructive system of  
the ,upanisad doctrine4  ,the question  

is sometimes asked1 how the my becomes  
associated  with ,brahman4 ,but ,vednta 
thinks this question illegitimate1  for 
this association did not begin in time  
either with  reference to the cosmos or 
with reference to individual persons4   
,in fact there is no real association1  
for the creation of illusion  does not  
affect the unchangeable truth4 ,my or   
illusion is no  real entity1 it is only 
false knowledge 7avidy7 that makes the  
appearance1 which vanishes when the     
reality is grasped and found4  ,my or   
avidy has an apparent existence only so 
long as it  lasts1 but the moment the   
truth is known it is dissolved4 ,it is  
not a real entity in association with   
which a real world-appearance  has been 
brought into permanent existence1 for it
 only has  existence so long as we are  
deluded by it 7prttika-satt74  ,my      
therefore is a category which baffles   
the ordinary logical  division of       
existence and non-existence and the     
principle of excluded  middle4 ,for the 

my can neither be said to be is nor  is 
not 7tattvnyatvbhym anirvacany74 ,it    
cannot be said that  such a logical     
category does not exist1 for all our    
dream and  illusory cognitions          
demonstrate it to us4 ,they exist as    
they are  perceived1 but they do not    
exist since they have no other          
independent  existence than the fact of 
their perception4 ,if it has  any       
creative function1 that function is as  
illusive as its  own nature1 for the    
creation only lasts so long as the error
 lasts4  ,brahman1 the truth1 is not in 
any way sullied or affected by          
association  with my1 for there can be  
no association of the real with the     
empty1  the my1 the illusory4 ,it is no 
real association but a mere appearance4 
#ddc      ,in what sense is the         
world-appearance false8    ,the world is
 said to be false--a mere product of my4
 ,the  falsehood of this                
world-appearance has been explained as  
involved  in the category of the        

indefinite which is neither sat is  nor 
asat is not4 ,here the opposition of the
 is and is not  is solved by the        
category of time4 ,the world-appearance 
is is  not1 since it does not continue  
to manifest itself in all times1 and    
has its manifestation up to the moment  
that the right knowledge  dawns4 ,it is 
not therefore is not in the sense that a
 castle in  the air or a hare's horn is 
is not1 for these are called tuccha1    
the absolutely non-existent4 ,the       
world-appearance is said to be  is or   
existing1 since it appears to be so for 
the time the state of  ignorance        
persists in us4 ,since it exists for a  
time it is sat 7is71  but since it does 
not exist for all times it is asat 7is  
not74 ,this  is the appearance1 the     
falsehood of the world-appearance       
7jagat-prapaca7  that it is neither sat 
nor asat in an absolute sense4 ,or      
rather it may also be said in another   
way that the falsehood of  the          
world-appearance consists in this1 that 

though it appears to  be the reality or 
an expression or manifestation of the   
reality1 the  being1 sat1 yet when the  
reality is once rightly comprehended1 it
  will be manifest that the world never 
existed1 does not exist1  and will never
 exist again4 ,this is just what we find
 in an illusory  perception2 when once  
the truth is found out that it is a     
conch-shell1  we say that the silver1   
though it appeared at the time of       
illusory perception to be what we saw   
before us as this 7this  is silver71 yet
 it never existed before1 does not now  
exist1 and  will never exist again4 ,in 
the case of the illusory perception of  
silver1 the this 7pointing to a thing   
before me7 appeared as  silver2 in the  
case of the world-appearance1 it is the 
being 7sat71  the ,brahman1 that appears
 as the world2 but as in the case when  
the this before us is found to be a     
piece of conch-shell1 the  silver is at 
once dismissed as having had no         
existence in the this  before us1 so    

when the ,brahman1 the being1 the       
reality1 is once  directly realized1 the
 conviction comes that the world never  
existed4 ,the negation of the           
world-appearance however has no         
separate existence other than the       
comprehension of the identity  of the   
real4 ,the fact that the real is        
realized is the same as that  the       
world-appearance is negated4 ,the       
negation here involved  refers both to  
the thing negated 7the world-appearance7
 and the    #ddd    negation itself1 and
 hence it cannot be contended that when 
the  conviction of the negation of the  
world is also regarded as false  7for if
 the negation is not false then it      
remains as an entity different  from    
,brahman and hence the unqualified      
monism fails71 then this  reinstates the
 reality of the world-appearance2 for   
negation of the  world-appearance is as 
much false as the world-appearance      
itself1  and hence on the realization of
 the truth the negative thesis1  that   

the world-appearance does not exist1    
includes the negation  also as a        
manifestation of world-appearance1 and  
hence the only  thing left is the       
realized identity of the truth1 the     
being4 ,the  peculiarity of this        
illusion of world-appearance is this1   
that it  appears as consistent with or  
inlaid in the being 7sat7 though it  is 
not there4 ,this of course is dissolved 
when right knowledge  dawns4 ,this      
indeed brings home to us the truth that 
the world-appearance  is an appearance  
which is different from what we  know as
 real 7sadvilaksana72 for the real is   
known to us as  that which is proved by 
the pramanas1 and which will never      
again be falsified by later experience  
or other means of proof4  ,a thing is   
said to be true only so long as it is   
not contradicted2  but since at the dawn
 of right knowledge this                
world-appearance  will be found to be   
false and non-existing1 it cannot be    
regarded  as real ,footnote ref l4 ,thus

 ,brahman alone is true1 and the        
world-appearance is false2 falsehood and
 truth are not contrary entities  such  
that the negation or the falsehood of   
falsehood will mean truth4  ,the        
world-appearance is a whole and in      
referring to it the  negation refers    
also to itself as a part of the         
world-appearance  and hence not only is 
the positive world-appearance false1 but
  the falsehood itself is also false2   
when the world-appearance is            
contradicted at the dawn of right       
knowledge1 the falsehood itself  is also
 contradicted4    ,brahman differs from 
all other things in this that it is     
self-luminous  7svapraks'a7 and has no  
form2 it cannot therefore be the  object
 of any other consciousness that grasps 
it4 ,all other things1  ideas1 emotions1
 etc41 in contrast to it are called     
drs'ya 7objects of  consciousness71     
while it is the drast 7the pure         
consciousness  comprehending all        
objects74 ,as soon as anything is       

comprehended as  an expression of a     
mental state 7vrtti71 it is said to have
 a form and  it becomes drs'ya1 and this
 is the characteristic of all objects of
  consciousness that they cannot reveal 
themselves apart from being  manifested 
as objects of consciousness through a   
mental state4        ,footnote #a3 ,see 
,advaitasiddhi1 ,mithytvanirukti4       
#dde    ,brahman also1 so long as it is 
understood as a meaning of the          
,upanisad text1 is not in its true      
nature2 it is only when it shines  forth
 as apart from the associations of any  
form that it is svapraks'a  and drast4  
,the knowledge of the pure ,brahman is  
devoid of any  form or mode4 ,the notion
 of drs'yatva 7objectivity7 carries with
  it also the notion of jadatva         
7materiality7 or its nature as          
non-consciousness 7ajnatva7 and         
non-selfness 7antmatva7 which  consists 
in the want of self-luminosity of       
objects of consciousness4  ,the relation
 of consciousness 7jna7 to its objects  

cannot be  regarded as real but as mere 
illusory impositions1 for as we shall   
see later1 it is not possible to        
determine the relation between          
knowledge and its forms4 ,just as the   
silver-appearance of the  conch-shell is
 not its own natural appearance1 so the 
forms in  which consciousness shows     
itself are not its own natural essence4 
,in the state of emancipation when      
supreme bliss 7nanda7 shines  forth1 the
 nanda is not an object or form of the  
illuminating  consciousness1 but it is  
the illumination itself4 ,whenever there
  is a form associated with             
consciousness1 it is an extraneous      
illusory  imposition on the pure        
consciousness4 ,these forms are         
different  from the essence of          
consciousness1 not only in this that    
they  depend on consciousness for their 
expression and are themselves  but      
objects of consciousness1 but also in   
this that they are all  finite          
determinations 7paricchinna71 whereas   

consciousness1 the  abiding essence1 is 
everywhere present without any limit    
whatsoever4  ,the forms of the object   
such as cow1 jug1 etc4 are limited  in  
themselves in what they are1 but through
 them all the pure  being runs by virtue
 of which we say that the cow is1 the   
jug is1  the pot is4 ,apart from this   
pure being running through all the      
individual appearances1 there is no     
other class 7jti7 such as  cowness or   
jugness1 but it is on this pure being   
that different  individual forms are    
illusorily imposed 7ghatdkam            
sadarthekalpitam1  pratyekam            
tadanubiddhatvena pratyamnatvt74 ,so    
this world-appearance which is          
essentially different from the          
,brahman1 the being which forms the     
material cause on which it  is imposed1 
is false                                
7updnanisthiyanibhvapratiyogitvalaksanam
ithytvasiddhih  --as ,citsukha has it74 
,the nature of the world-appearance1    
phenomena4    ,the world-appearance is  

not however so illusory as the          
perception  of silver in the            
conch-shell1 for the latter type of     
worldly  illusions is called prtibhsika1
 as they are contradicted by other      
#ddf    later experiences1 whereas the  
illusion of world-appearance is never   
contradicted in this worldly stage and  
is thus called vyavahrika  7from        
vyavahra1 practice1 i4e4 that on which  
is based all our  practical movements74 
,so long as the right knowledge of the  
,brahman as the only reality does not   
dawn1 the world-appearance  runs on in  
an orderly manner uncontradicted by the 
accumulated  experience of all men1 and 
as such it must be held to be true4  ,it
 is only because there comes such a     
stage in which the world-appearance     
ceases to manifest itself that we have  
to say that from  the ultimate and      
absolute point of view the              
world-appearance is  false and unreal4  
,as against this doctrine of the ,vednta
 it is  sometimes asked how1 as we see  

the reality 7sattva7 before us1  we can 
deny that it has truth4 ,to this the    
,vednta answers  that the notion of     
reality cannot be derived from the      
senses1 nor  can it be defined as that  
which is the content of right knowledge1
  for we cannot have any conception of  
right knowledge without  a conception of
 reality1 and no conception of reality  
without a  conception of right          
knowledge4 ,the conception of reality   
comprehends  within it the notions of   
unalterability1 absoluteness1 and       
independence1 which cannot be had       
directly from experience1  as this gives
 only an appearance but cannot certify  
its truth4  ,judged from this point of  
view it will be evident that the true   
reality in all our experience is the one
 self-luminous flash of  consciousness  
which is all through identical with     
itself in all its  manifestations of    
appearance4 ,our present experience of  
the  world-appearance cannot in any way 
guarantee that it will not  be          

contradicted at some later stage4 ,what 
really persists in all  experience is   
the being 7sat7 and not its forms4 ,this
 being that  is associated with all our 
experience is not a universal genus nor 
merely the individual appearance of the 
moment1 but it is the  being1 the truth 
which forms the substratum of all       
objective events  and appearances       
7ekenaiva sarvnugatena sarvatra         
satprattih74  ,things are not existent  
because they possess the genus of being 
7sat7 as ,nyya supposes1 but they are so
 because they are themselves  but       
appearance imposed on one identical     
being as the basis  and ground of all   
experience4 ,being is thus said to be   
the basis  7adhisthna7 on which the     
illusions appear4 ,this being is not    
different with different things but one 
in all appearances4 ,our  perceptions of
 the world-appearance could have been   
taken as a  guarantee of their reality1 
if the reality which is supposed of them
    #ddg    could be perceived by the   

senses1 and if inference and s'ruti     
7scriptures7  did not point the other   
way4 ,perception can of course          
invalidate  inference1 but it can do so 
only when its own validity  has been    
ascertained in an undoubted and         
uncontested manner4  ,but this is not   
the case with our perceptions of the    
world-appearance1  for our present      
perceptions cannot prove that these     
will never be contradicted in future1   
and inference and s'ruti are  also      
against it4 ,the mere fact that ,i      
perceive the world-appearance  cannot   
prove that what ,i perceive is true or  
real1 if it is contradicted  by         
inference4 ,we all perceive the sun to  
be small1 but our perception  in this   
case is contradicted by inference and we
 have  hence to admit that our          
perceptions are erroneous4 ,we depend   
7upajvya7 indeed for all our            
transactions on perception1 but such    
dependence cannot prove that that on    
which we depend is absolutely  valid4   

,validity or reality can only be        
ascertained by  proper examination and  
enquiry 7parks71 which may convince  us 
that there is no error in it4 ,true it  
is that by the universal  testimony of  
our contemporaries and by the practical 
fruition and  realization of our        
endeavours in the external world1 it is 
proved  beyond doubt that the           
world-appearance before us is a reality4
  ,but this sort of examination and     
enquiry cannot prove to us with  any    
degree of satisfaction that the         
world-appearance will never  be         
contradicted at any time or at any      
stage4 ,the ,vednta also  admits that   
our examination and enquiry prove to us 
that the  world-appearance now exists as
 it appears2 it only denies that it     
cannot continue to exist for all times1 
and a time will come when  to the       
emancipated person the world-appearance 
will cease to  exist4 ,the experience1  
observation1 and practical utility of   
the  objects as perceived by us cannot  

prove to us that these will  never be   
contradicted at any future time4 ,our   
perception of the  world-appearance     
cannot therefore disprove the ,vednta   
inference  that the world-appearance is 
false1 and it will demonstrate itself   
to be so at the time when the right     
knowledge of ,brahman as  one dawns in  
us4 ,the testimony of the ,upanisads    
also contradicts  the perception which  
grasps the world-appearance in its      
manifold  aspect4    ,moreover we are   
led to think that the world-appearance  
is  false1 for it is not possible for us
 to discover any true relation  between 
the consciousness 7drk7 and the objects 
of consciousness  7drs'ya74             
,consciousness must be admitted to have 
some kind of    #ddh    connection with 
the objects which it illumines1 for had 
it not been  so there could be any      
knowledge at any time irrespective of   
its  connections with the objects4 ,but 
it is not possible to imagine  any kind 
of connection between consciousness and 

its objects1 for  it can neither be     
contact 7samyoga7 nor inherence         
7samavya72  and apart from these two    
kinds of connections we know of no      
other4 ,we say that things are the      
objects of our consciousness1  but what 
is meant by it is indeed difficult to   
define4 ,it cannot  be that objectivity 
of consciousness means that a special   
effect  like the jtat of ,mmms is       
produced upon the object1 for such  an  
effect is not admissible or perceivable 
in any way2 nor can  objectivity also   
mean any practical purpose 7of being    
useful to us7  associated with the      
object as ,prabhakra thinks1 for there  
are  many things which are the objects  
of our consciousness but not  considered
 as useful 7e4g4 the sky74 ,objectivity 
also cannot mean  that the thing is the 
object of the thought-movement          
7jna-krana7  involved in knowledge1 for 
this can only be with reference  to     
objects present to the perceiver1 and   
cannot apply to objects  of past time   

about which one may be conscious1 for if
 the thing is  not present how can it be
 made an object of thought-movement8    
,objectivity further cannot mean that   
the things project their own  forms on  
the knowledge and are hence called      
objects1 for though  this may apply in  
the case of perception1 it cannot be    
true of  inference1 where the object of 
consciousness is far away and does  not 
mould consciousness after its own form4 
,thus in whatever  way we may try to    
conceive manifold things existing       
separately  and becoming objects of     
consciousness we fail4 ,we have also    
seen that it is difficult to conceive of
 any kind of relation subsisting        
between objects and consciousness1 and  
hence it has to be  admitted that the   
imposition of the world-appearance is   
after all  nothing but illusory4    ,now
 though all things are but illusory     
impositions on consciousness  yet for   
the illumination of specific objects it 
is admitted  even by ,vednta that this  

can only take place through specific    
sense-contact and particular mental     
states 7vrtti7 or modes2 but  if that be
 so why not rather admit that this can  
take place  even on the assumption of   
the absolute reality of the manifold    
external world without8 ,the answer that
 the ,vednta gives to  such a question  
is this1 that the phenomenon of         
illumination has  not to undergo any    
gradual process1 for it is the work of  
one    #ddi    flash like the work of   
the light of a lamp in removing         
darkness2  so it is not possible that   
the external reality should have to     
pass through any process before         
consciousness could arise2 what  happens
 is simply this1 that the reality 7sat7 
which subsists in all  things as the    
same identical one reveals the object as
 soon as its  veil is removed by        
association with the vrtti 7mental mould
 or  state74 ,it is like a light which  
directly and immediately illuminates    
everything with which it comes into     

relation4 ,such an illumination  of     
objects by its underlying reality would 
have been continuous  if there were no  
veils or covers1 but that is not so as  
the  reality is hidden by the veil of   
ajna 7nescience74 ,this veil is  removed
 as soon as the light of consciousness  
shines through a  mental mould or vrtti1
 and as soon as it is removed the thing 
shines forth4 ,even before the formation
 of the vrtti the illusory  impositions 
on the reality had still been continuing
 objectively1  but it could not be      
revealed as it was hidden by ajna which 
is  removed by the action of the        
corresponding vrtti2 and as soon as  the
 veil is removed the thing shines forth 
in its true light4 ,the  action of the  
senses1 eye1 etc4 serves but to modify  
the vrtti of the  mind1 and the vrtti of
 the mind once formed1 the corresponding
  ajna veil which was covering the      
corresponding specific part of  the     
world-appearance is removed1 and the    
illumination of the  object which was   

already present1 being divested of the  
veil1 shows  itself forth4 ,the illusory
 creations were there1 but they could   
not  be manifested on account of the    
veil of nescience4 ,as soon as the  veil
 is removed by the action of the vrtti  
the light of reality shows  the         
corresponding illusory creations4 ,so   
consciousness in itself  is the         
ever-shining light of reality which is  
never generated but  ever exists2 errors
 of perception 7e4g4 silver in the      
conch-shell7  take place not because the
 dosa consisting of the defect of the   
eye1 the glaze of the object and such   
other elements that contributed  to the 
illusion1 generated the knowledge1 but  
because it  generated a wrong vrtti4 ,it
 is because of the generation of the    
wrong vrtti that the manifestation is   
illusory4 ,in the illusion  this is     
silver as when we mistake the           
conch-shell for the silver1  it is the  
cit1 consciousness or reality as        
underlying the object  represented to us

 by this or idam that is the basis      
7adhisthna7  of the illusion of silver4 
,the cause of error is our nescience or 
non-cognition 7ajna7 of it in the form  
of the conch-shell1 whereas  the right  
knowledge is the cognition of it as     
conch-shell4 ,the    #dej    basis is   
not in the content of my knowledge as   
manifested in my  mental state 7vrtti71 
so that the illusion is not of the form 
that the knowledge is silver but of this
 is silver4 ,objective  phenomena as    
such have reality as their basis1       
whereas the expression  of illumination 
of them as states of knowledge is made  
through the cit being manifested through
 the mental mould or  states4 ,without  
the vrtti there is no illuminating      
knowledge4  ,phenomenal creations are   
there in the world moving about as      
shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis 
of one cit or reality1  but this basis1 
this light of reality1 can only manifest
 these forms  when the veil of nescience
 covering them is temporarily removed   

by their coming in touch with a mental  
mould or mind-modification  7vrtti74 ,it
 is sometimes said that since all       
illumination of  knowledge must be      
through the mental states there is no   
other  entity of pure consciousness     
apart from what is manifested  through  
the states4 ,this ,vednta does not      
admit1 for it holds  that it is         
necessary that before the operation of  
the mental  states can begin to         
interpret reality1 reality must already 
be  there and this reality is nothing   
but pure consciousness4 ,had  there been
 no reality apart from the manifesting  
states of knowledge1  the validity of   
knowledge would also cease2 so it has to
  be admitted that there is the one     
eternal self-luminous reality  untouched
 by the characteristics of the mental   
states1 which are  material and suffer  
origination and destruction4 ,it is this
 self-luminous  consciousness that seems
 to assume diverse forms  in connection 
with diverse kinds of associations or   

limitations  7updhi74 ,it manifests ajna
 7nescience7 and hence does not by      
itself remove the ajna1 except when it  
is reflected through any  specific kind 
of vrtti4 ,there is of course no        
difference1 no inner  and outer         
varieties between the reality1 the pure 
consciousness  which is the essence1 the
 basis and the ground of all phenomenal 
appearances of the objective world1 and 
the consciousness that  manifests itself
 through the mental states4 ,there is   
only one  identical pure consciousness  
or reality1 which is at once the basis  
of the phenomena as well1 is their      
interpreter by a reflection  through the
 mental states or vrttis4    ,the       
phenomena or objects called the drs'ya  
can only be determined  in their various
 forms and manifestations but not as  to
 their ultimate reality2 there is no    
existence as an entity of  any relation 
such as samyoga 7contact7 or samavya    
7inherence7    #dea    between them and 
the pure consciousness called the drk2  

for the  truth is this1 that the drk    
7perceiver7 and the drs'ya 7perceived7  
have one identical reality2 the forms of
 phenomena are but  illusory creations  
on it4    ,it is sometimes objected that
 in the ordinary psychological  illusion
 such as this is silver1 the knowledge  
of this as a thing  is only of a general
 and indefinite nature1 for it is       
perceived  as a thing but its special   
characteristics as a conch-shell are not
  noticed1 and thus the illusion is     
possible4 ,but in ,brahman or pure      
consciousness there are neither definite
 nor indefinite characteristics  of any 
kind1 and hence it cannot be the ground 
of any  illusion as the piece of        
conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a 
mere  this can be4 ,the answer of       
,vednta is that when the ,brahman       
stands as the ground 7adhisthna7 of the 
world-appearance its  characteristic as 
sat or real only is manifested1 whereas 
its special  character as pure and      
infinite bliss is never noticed2 or     

rather it  may be said that the illusion
 of world-appearance is possible        
because the ,brahman in its true and    
correct nature is never revealed  to us 
in our objective consciousness2 when ,i 
say the jug is1  the isness1 or being1  
does not shine in its purity1 but only  
as  a characteristic of the jug-form1   
and this is the root of the illusion4   
,in all our experiences only the aspect 
of ,brahman as real shines  forth in    
association with the manifold objects1  
and therefore the  ,brahman in its true 
nature being unknown the illusion is    
made  possible4 ,it is again objected   
that since the world-appearance  can    
serve all practical purposes1 it must be
 considered as real and  not illusory4  
,but the ,vednta points out that even by
 illusory  perceptions practical effects
 are seen to take place2 the illusory   
perception of a snake in a rope causes  
all the fear that a real snake  could   
do2 even in dreams we feel happy and    
sad1 and dreams  may be so bad as to    

affect or incapacitate the actual       
physical  functions and organs of a man4
 ,so it is that the past impressions    
imbedded in us continuing from          
beginningless time are sufficient  to   
account for our illusory notions1 just  
as the impressions produced  in actual  
waking life account for the dream       
creations4  ,according to the good or   
bad deeds that a man has done in        
previous lives and according to the     
impressions or potencies  7samskra7 of  
his past lives each man has a particular
 kind of  world-experience for himself  
and the impressions of one cannot       
affect the formation of the illusory    
experience of the other4 ,but    #deb   
the experience of the world-appearance  
is not wholly a subjective  creation for
 each individual1 for even before his   
cognition the  phenomena of             
world-appearance were running in some   
unknowable  state of existence 7svena   
adhyastasya samskrasya                  
viyaddyadhysajanakatvopapatteh          

tatprattyabhvepi tadadhysasya  prvam    
sattvt krtsnasypi vyavahrikapadrthasya  
ajtasattvbhyupagamt74 ,it is again      
sometimes objected that illusion  is    
produced by malobserved similarity      
between the ground 7adhisthna7  and the 
illusory notion as silver in this is    
silver1 but  no such similarity is found
 between the ,brahman and the           
world-appearance4  ,to this ,vednta says
 that similarity is not an indispensable
  factor in the production of an        
illusion 7e4g4 when a  white conch is   
perceived as yellow owing to the defect 
of the eye  through the influence of    
bile or pitta74 ,similarity helps the   
production  of illusion by rousing up   
the potencies of past impressions  or   
memories2 but this rousing of past      
memories may as well be  done by        
adrsta--the unseen power of our past    
good or bad deeds4  ,in ordinary        
illusion some defect is necessary but   
the illusion of  this world-appearance  
is beginningless1 and hence it awaits no

  other dosa 7defect7 than the avidy    
7nescience7 which constitutes  the      
appearance4 ,here avidy is the only dosa
 and ,brahman is the  only adhisthna or 
ground4 ,had there not been the         
,brahman1 the  self-luminous as the     
adhisthna1 the illusory creations could 
not  have been manifested at all ,the   
cause of the direct perception  of      
illusion is the direct but indefinite   
perception of the adhisthna4  ,hence    
where the adhisthna is hidden by the    
veil of avidy1 the  association with    
mental states becomes necessary for     
removing  the veil and manifesting      
thereby the self-luminous adhisthna4    
,as soon as the adhisthna1 the ground1  
the reality1 the blissful  self-luminous
 ,brahman is completely realized the    
illusions disappear4  ,the disappearance
 of the phenomena means nothing  more   
than the realization of the             
self-luminous ,brahman4      ,the       
,definition of ,ajna 7nescience74       
,ajna the cause of all illusions is     

defined as that which is  beginningless1
 yet positive and removable by knowledge
 7andibhvarupatve  sati                 
jnanivartyatvam74 ,though it manifests  
itself  in all ordinary things 7veiled  
by it before they become objects of     
perception7 which have a beginning in   
time1 yet it itself has no  beginning1  
for it is associated with the pure      
consciousness which    #dec    is       
beginningless4 ,again though it has been
 described as positive  7bhvarpa7 it can
 very well constitute the essence of    
negation  7abhva7 too1 for the          
positivity 7bhvatva7 does not mean here 
the  opposite of abhva 7negation7 but   
notes merely its difference from  abhva 
7abhva-vilaksanatvamtram vivaksitam74   
,ajna is not  a positive entity 7bhva7  
like any other positive entity1 but it  
is  called positive simply because it is
 not a mere negation 7abhva74  ,it is a 
category which is believed neither to be
 positive in the  ordinary sense nor    
negative1 but a third one which is      

different  both from position as well as
 from negation4 ,it is sometimes        
objected that ajna is a mere illusory   
imagination of the moment  caused by    
defect 7dosa7 and hence it cannot be    
beginningless  7andi72 but ,vednta holds
 that the fact that it is an imagination
  or rather imposition1 does not        
necessarily mean that it is merely  a   
temporary notion produced by the        
defects2 for it could have  been said to
 be a temporary product of the moment if
 the ground  as well as the illusory    
creation associated with it came into   
being  for the moment1 but this is not  
the case here1 as the cit1 the  ground  
of illusion1 is ever-present and the    
ajna therefore being  ever associated   
with it is also beginningless4 ,the ajna
 is the  indefinite which is veiling    
everything1 and as such is different    
from the definite or the positive and   
the negative4 ,though it is             
beginningless yet it can be removed by  
knowledge1 for to have  a beginning or  

not to have it does not in any way      
determine  whether the thing is subject 
to dissolution or not for the           
dissolution  of a thing depends upon the
 presence of the thing which  can cause 
it2 and it is a fact that when knowledge
 comes the  illusion is destroyed2 it   
does not matter whether the cause which 
produced the illusion was beginningless 
or not4 ,some ,vedntists  however define
 ajna as the substance constituting     
illusion1 and  say that though it is not
 a positive entity yet it may be        
regarded  as forming the substance of   
the illusion2 it is not necessary that  
only a positive entity should be the    
matter of any thing1 for what  is       
necessary for the notion of a material  
cause 7updna7 is this1  that it should  
continue or persist as the same in all  
changes of  effects4 ,it is not true    
that only what is positive can persist  
in  and through the effects which are   
produced in the time process4  ,illusion
 is unreal and it is not unnatural that 

the ajna which  also is unreal should be
 the cause of it4    #ded      ,ajna    
established by ,perception and          
,inference4    ,ajna defined as the     
indefinite which is neither positive nor
  negative is also directly experienced 
by us in such perceptions  as ,i do not 
know1 or ,i do not know myself or       
anybody else1  or ,i do not know what   
you say1 or more particularly ,i had    
been sleeping so long happily and did   
not know anything4 ,such  perceptions   
point to an object which has no definite
 characteristics1  and which cannot     
properly be said to be either positive  
or negative4  ,it may be objected that  
the perception ,i do not know is not    
the perception of the indefinite1 the   
ajna1 but merely the negation  of       
knowledge4 ,to this ,vednta says that   
had it been the  perception of a        
negation merely1 then the negation must 
have  been associated with the specific 
object to which it applied4  ,a negation
 must imply the thing negatived2 in fact

 negation  generally appears as a       
substantive with the object of negation 
as a qualifying character specifying the
 nature of the negation4  ,but the      
perception ,i do not know or ,i had no  
knowledge does  not involve the negation
 of any particular knowledge of any     
specific object1 but the knowledge of an
 indefinite objectless  ignorance4 ,such
 an indefinite ajna is positive in the  
sense that  it is certainly not         
negative1 but this positive indefinite  
is not positive  in the same sense in   
which other definite entities are called
 positive1  for it is merely the        
characterless1 passive indefinite       
showing itself  in our experience4 ,if  
negation meant only a general negation1 
and if the perception of negation meant 
in each case the perception  of a       
general negation1 then even where there 
is a jug on  the ground1 one should     
perceive the negation of the jug on the 
ground1 for the general negation in     
relation to other things is there4      

,thus negation of a thing cannot mean   
the general notion of the  negation of  
all specific things2 similarly a general
 negation without  any specific object  
to which it might apply cannot manifest 
itself to consciousness2 the notion of a
 general negation of knowledge  is thus 
opposed to any and every knowledge1 so  
that if the  latter is present the      
former cannot be1 but the perception ,i 
do  not know can persist1 even though   
many individual objects be  known to us4
 ,thus instead of saying that the       
perception of ,i do  not know is the    
perception of a special kind of         
negation1 it is  rather better to say   
that it is the perception of a different
 category  namely the indefinite1 the   
ajna4 ,it is our common experience      
#dee    that after experiencing the     
indefinite 7ajna7 of a specific type  we
 launch forth in our endeavours to      
remove it4 ,so it has to be  admitted   
that the perception of the indefinite is
 different from the  perception of mere 

negation4 ,the character of our         
perceiving  consciousness 7sksi7 is such
 that both the root ajna as well  as its
 diverse forms with reference to        
particular objects as represented  in   
mental states 7vrtti-jna71 are          
comprehended by it4  ,of course when the
 vrttijna about a thing as in ordinary  
perceptions of objects comes in1 the    
ajna with regard to it is  temporarily  
removed1 for the vrttijna is opposed to 
the ajna4  ,but so far as our own       
perceiving consciousness 7sksi-caitanya7
  is conceived it can comprehend both   
the ajna and the jna  7knowledge7 of    
things4 ,it is thus often said that all 
things show  themselves to the          
perceiving consciousness either as known
 or  as unknown4 ,thus the perceiving   
consciousness comprehends all  positives
 either as indefinite ajna or as states 
of knowledge  or as specific kinds of   
ajna or ignorance1 but it is unable to  
comprehend a negation1 for negation     
7abhva7 is not a perception1  but merely

 the absence of perception              
7anupalabdhi74 ,thus when  ,i say ,i do 
not know this1 ,i perceive the          
indefinite in consciousness  with       
reference to that thing1 and this is not
 the perception of a  negation of the   
thing4 ,an objection is sometimes raised
 from  the ,nyya point of view that     
since without the knowledge of a        
qualification 7vis'esana7 the qualified 
thing 7vis'ista7 cannot be  known1 the  
indefinite about an object cannot be    
present in consciousness  without the   
object being known first4 ,to this      
,vednta  replies that the maxim that the
 qualification must be known  before the
 qualified thing is known is groundless1
 for we can as  well perceive the thing 
first and then its qualification4 ,it is
 not  out of place here to say that     
negation is not a separate entity1  but 
is only a peculiar mode of the          
manifestation of the positive4  ,even   
the naiyyikas would agree that in the   
expression there  is no negation of a   

jug here1 no separate negation can be   
accepted1  for the jug is already       
present before us4 ,as there are        
distinctions  and differences in        
positive entities by illusory           
impositions1 so  negations are also     
distinguished by similar illusory       
impositions  and appear as the negation 
of jug1 negation of cloth1 etc42 so all 
distinctions between negations are      
unnecessary1 and it may be  accepted    
that negation like position is one which
 appears as many  on account of illusory
 distinctions and impositions4 ,thus the
    #def    content of negation being   
itself positive1 there is no reason to  
object that such perceptions as ,i do   
not know refer to the  perception of an 
indefinite ajna in consciousness4 ,so   
also the  perception ,i do not know what
 you say is not the perception  of      
negation1 for this would require that   
the hearer should know  first what was  
said by the speaker1 and if this is so  
then it is  impossible to say ,i do not 

know what you say4    ,so also the      
cognition ,i was sleeping long and did  
not  know anything has to be admitted as
 referring to the perception  of the    
indefinite during sleep4 ,it is not true
 as some say that  during sleep there is
 no perception1 but what appears to the 
awakened man as ,i did not know anything
 so long is only an  inference2 for1 it 
is not possible to infer from the       
pleasant and  active state of the senses
 in the awakened state that the activity
  had ceased in the sleep state and that
 since he had no object of  knowledge   
then1 he could not know anything2 for   
there is no  invariable concomitance    
between the pleasant and active state of
  the senses and the absence of objects 
of knowledge in the immediately         
preceding state4 ,during sleep there is 
a mental state  of the form of the      
indefinite1 and during the awakened     
state it is  by the impression 7samskra7
 of the aforesaid mental state of  ajna 
that one remembers that state and says  

that ,i did not  perceive anything so   
long4 ,the indefinite 7ajna7 perceived  
in  consciousness is more fundamental   
and general than the mere  negation of  
knowledge 7jnbhva7 and the two are so   
connected  that though the latter may   
not be felt1 yet it can be inferred from
  the perception of the indefinite4 ,the
 indefinite though not definite  is thus
 a positive content different from      
negation and is perceived as  such in   
direct and immediate consciousness both 
in the awakened  state as well as in the
 sleeping state4    ,the presence of    
this ajna may also be inferred from the 
manner in which knowledge of objects is 
revealed in consciousness1  as this     
always takes place in bringing a thing  
into consciousness  which was not known 
or rather known as indefinite before we 
say ,i did not know it before1 but ,i   
know it now4 ,my present  knowledge of  
the thing thus involves the removal of  
an indefinite  which was veiling it     
before and positing it in consciousness1

 just  as the first streak of light in  
utter darkness manifests itself by      
removing the darkness,footnote ref #a4  
,apart from such an inference its       
existence        ,footnote #a3 ,see     
,pacapdikvivarana1 ,tattvadpana1 and    
,advaitasiddhi4    #deg    is also      
indicated by the fact that the infinite 
bliss of ,brahman  does not show itself 
in its complete and limitless aspect4   
,if there  was no ajna to obstruct1 it  
would surely have manifested itself  in 
its fullness4 ,again had it not been for
 this ajna there would  have been no    
illusion4 ,it is the ajna that          
constitutes the substance  of the       
illusion2 for there is nothing else that
 can be regarded  as constituting its   
substance2 certainly ,brahman could not1
 as it  is unchangeable4 ,this ajna is  
manifested by the perceiving            
consciousness 7sksi7 and not by the pure
 consciousness4 ,the  perceiving        
consciousness is nothing but pure       
intelligence which  reflects itself in  

the states of avidy 7ignorance74        
,locus and ,object of ,ajna1 ,ahamkra1  
and ,antahkarana4    ,this ajna rests on
 the pure cit or intelligence4 ,this cit
 or  ,brahman is of the nature of pure  
illumination1 but yet it is not  opposed
 to the ajna or the indefinite4 ,the cit
 becomes opposed  to the ajna and       
destroys it only when it is reflected   
through the  mental states 7vrtti74 ,the
 ajna thus rests on the pure cit and not
  on the cit as associated with such    
illusory impositions as go to  produce  
the notion of ego aham or the individual
 soul4 ,vcaspati  ,mis'ra however holds 
that the ajna does not rest on the pure 
cit  but on the jva 7individual soul74  
,mdhava reconciles this view of         
,vcaspati with the above view1 and says 
that the ajna may be  regarded as       
resting on the jva or individual soul   
from this point of  view that the       
obstruction of the pure cit is with     
reference to the jva  7,cinmtrs'ritam   
ajnam jvapaksaptitvt jvs'ritam ucyate   

,vivaranaprameya1 p4 #dh74 ,the feeling 
,i do not know seems  however to        
indicate that the ajna is with reference
 to the perceiving  self in association 
with its feeling as ego or ,i2 but this 
is not so2 such an appearance however is
 caused on account of  the close        
association of ajna with antahkarana    
7mind7 both of  which are in essence the
 same 7see ,vivaranaprarneyasamgraha1   
p4 #dh74    ,the ajna however does not  
only rest on the cit1 but it has  the   
cit as its visaya or object too1 i4e4   
its manifestations are  with reference  
to the self-luminous cit4 ,the          
self-luminous cit is  thus the entity on
 which the veiling action of the ajna is
 noticed2  the veiling action is        
manifested not by destroying the        
self-luminous  character1 nor by        
stopping a future course of luminous    
career on  the part of the cit1 nor by  
stopping its relations with the visaya1 
#deh    but by causing such an          
appearance that the self-luminous cit   

seems so to behave that we seem to think
 that it is not or it does  not shine   
7nsti na praks'ate iti vyavahrah7 or    
rather there is no  appearance of its   
shining or luminosity4 ,to say that     
,brahman is  hidden by the ajna means   
nothing more than this1 that it is  such
 tadyogyat7 that the ajna can so relate 
itself with it that  it appears to be   
hidden as in the state of deep sleep and
 other  states of ajna-consciousness in 
experience4 ,ajna is thus  considered to
 have both its locus and object in the  
pure cit4 ,it  is opposed to the states 
of consciousness1 for these at once     
dispel  it4 ,the action of this ajana is
 thus on the light of the reality  which
 it obstructs for us1 so long as the    
obstruction is not dissolved  by the    
states of consciousness4 ,this          
obstruction of the cit is not  only with
 regard to its character as pure        
limitless consciousness  but also with  
regard to its character as pure and     
infinite bliss2  so it is that though we

 do not experience the indefinite in our
  pleasurable feelings1 yet its presence
 as obstructing the pure cit  is        
indicated by the fact that the full     
infinite bliss constituting the  essence
 of ,brahman is obstructed2 and as a    
result of that there  is only an        
incomplete manifestation of the bliss in
 our phenomenal  experiences of         
pleasure4 ,the ajna is one1 but it seems
 to obstruct  the pure cit in various   
aspects or modes1 with regard to which  
it  may be said that the ajna has many  
states as constituting the  individual  
experiences of the indefinite with      
reference to the  diverse individual    
objects of experience4 ,these states of 
ajna  are technically called tuljna or  
avasthjna4 ,any state of  consciousness 
7vrttijna7 removes a manifestation of   
the ajna  as tuljna and reveals itself  
as the knowledge of an object4    ,the  
most important action of this ajna as   
obstructing the  pure cit1 and as       
creating an illusory phenomenon is      

demonstrated  in the notion of the ego  
or ahamkra4 ,this notion of ahamkra  is 
a union of the true self1 the pure      
consciousness and other  associations1  
such as the body1 the continued past    
experiences1 etc42  it is the           
self-luminous characterless ,brahman    
that is found obstructed  in the notion 
of the ego as the repository of a       
thousand  limitations1 characters1 and  
associations4 ,this illusory creation of
  the notion of the ego runs on from    
beginningless time1 each set  of        
previous false impositions determining  
the succeeding set of  impositions and  
so on4 ,this blending of the unreal     
associations  held up in the mind       
7antahkarana7 with the real1 the false  
with    #dei    the true1 that is at the
 root of illusion4 ,it is the           
antahkarana taken  as the self-luminous 
self that reflects itself in the cit as 
the notion  of the ego4 ,just as when we
 say that the iron ball 7red hot7 burns1
  there are two entities of the ball and

 the fire fused into one1  so1 here also
 when ,i say ,i perceive1 there are two 
distinct elements  of the self1 as      
consciousness and the mind or           
antahkarana fused  into one4 ,the part  
or aspect associated with sorrow1       
materiality1  and changefulness         
represents the antahkarana1 whereas that
 which  appears as the unchangeable     
perceiving consciousness is the self4   
,thus the notion of ego contains two    
parts1 one real and other  unreal4      
,we remember that this is distinctly    
that which ,prabhkara  sought to        
repudiate4 ,prabhkara did not consider  
the self to be  self-luminous1 and held 
that such is the threefold nature of    
thought  7triputi71 that it at once     
reveals the knowledge1 the  object of   
knowledge1 and the self4 ,he further    
said1 that the  analogy of the red-hot  
iron ball did not hold1 for the iron    
ball  and the fire are separately       
experienced1 but the self and the       
antahkarana are never separately        

experienced1 and we can  never say that 
these two are really different1 and only
 have an  illusory appearance of a      
seeming unity4 ,perception 7anubhava7   
is like a light which illuminates both  
the object and the self1 and  like it   
does not require the assistance of      
anything else for the  fulfilment of its
 purpose4 ,but the ,vednta objects to   
this saying  that according to          
,prabhakara's supposition1 it is        
impossible to  discover any relation    
between the self and the knowledge4 ,if 
knowledge can be regarded as revealing  
itself1 the self may as  well be held to
 be self-luminous2 the self and the     
knowledge  are indeed one and the same4 
,kumrila thinks this thought            
7anubhava71 to be a movement1 ,nyya and 
,prabhkara as a  quality of the self    
,footnote ref #a4 ,but if it was a      
movement like other  movements1 it could
 not affect itself as illumination4 ,if 
it were a  substance and atomic in size1
 it would only manifest a small portion 

of  a thing1 if all pervasive1 then it  
would illuminate everything1  if of     
medium size1 it would depend on its     
parts for its own        ,footnote #a3  
,according to ,nyya the tman is         
conscious only through  association with
 consciousness1 but it is not           
consciousness7cit74  ,consciousness is  
associated with it only as a result of  
suitable  collocations4 ,thus1          
,nyyamajar in refuting the doctrine of  
self-luminosity svapraks'a7 says        
7p4#dcb7     sacetanas'cit yogttadyogena
 vin jadah   nrthvabhsadanyaddhi        
caitanyam nma manmahe4    #dfj          
constitution and not on the self4 ,if it
 is regarded as a quality  of the self  
as the light is of the lamp1 then also  
it has necessarily  to be supposed that 
it was produced by the self1 for from   
what  else could it be produced8 ,thus  
it is to be admitted that the  self1 the
 tman1 is the self-luminous entity4 ,no 
one doubts any  of his knowledge1       
whether it is he who sees or anybody    

else4  ,the self is thus the same as    
vijna1 the pure consciousness1  which is
 always of itself self-luminous         
,footnote ref #a4    ,again1 though     
consciousness is continuous in all      
stages1  waking or sleeping1 yet ahamkra
 is absent during deep sleep4  ,it is   
true that on waking from deep sleep one 
feels ,i slept  happily and did not know
 anything2 yet what happens is this1    
that during deep sleep the antahkarana  
and the ahamkra are  altogether         
submerged in the ajna1 and there are    
only the  ajna and the self2 on waking1 
this ahamkra as a state of  antahkarna  
is again generated1 and then it         
associates the perception  of the ajna  
in the sleep and originates the         
perception  ,i did not know anything4   
,this ahamkra which is a mode  7vrtti7  
of the antahkarana is thus constituted  
by avidy1 and is  manifested as         
jnas'akti 7power of knowledge7 and      
kriys'akti  7power of work74 ,this      
kriys'akti of the ahamkra is illusorily 

imposed upon the self1 and as a result  
of that the self appears to  be an      
active agent in knowing and willing4    
,the ahamkra  itself is regarded1 as we 
have already seen1 as a mode or vrtti of
  the antahkarana1 and as such the      
ahamkra of a past period can  now be    
associated2 but even then the vrtti of  
antahkarana1  ahamkra1 may be regarded  
as only the active side or aspect of    
the antahkarana4 ,the same antahkarana  
is called manas in its  capacity as     
doubt buddhi in its capacity as         
achieving certainty of  knowledge1 and  
citta in its capacity as remembering    
,footnote ref #b4 ,when  the pure cit   
shines forth in association with this   
antahkarana1 it is  called a jva4 ,it is
 clear from the above account that the  
ajna  is not a mere nothing1 but is the 
principle of the phenomena4 ,but  it    
cannot stand alone1 without the         
principle of the real to support  it    
7s'raya72 its own nature as the ajna or 
indefinite is perceived  directly by the

 pure consciousness2 its movements as   
originating  the phenomena remain       
indefinite in themselves1 the real as   
underlying        ,footnote #a3 ,see    
,nyyamakaranda1 pp4 #acj-adj1 ,citshkha 
and  ,vivaranaprameyasamgraha1 pp4      
#ec-eh4    ,footnote #b3 ,see           
,vednta-paribhs1 p4 #hh1 ,bombay        
edition4    #dfa    these phenomenal    
movements can only manifest itself      
through these which hide it1 when       
corresponding states arise in  the      
antahkarana1 and the light of the real  
shines forth through  these states4 ,the
 antahkarana of which ahamkra is a      
moment1  is itself a beginningless      
system of ajna-phenomena containing     
within it the associations and          
impressions of past phenomena as  merit1
 demerit1 instincts1 etc4 from a        
beginningless time when the  jva or     
individual soul began his career4       
,anirvcyavda and the ,vednta ,dialectic4
    ,we have already seen that the      
indefinite ajna could be  experienced in

 direct perception and according to     
,vednta there  are only two categories4 
,the category of the real1 the          
self-luminous  ,brahman1 and the        
category of the indefinite4 ,the latter 
has for its ground the world-appearance1
 and is the principle by  which the one 
unchangeable ,brahman is falsely        
manifested in all  the diversity of the 
manifold world4 ,but this indefinite    
which is  different from the category of
 the positive and the negative1 has     
only a relative existence and will      
ultimately vanish1 when the  true       
knowledge of the ,brahman dawns4        
,nothing however can  be known about the
 nature of this indefinite except its   
character  as indefinite4 ,that all the 
phenomena of the world1 the fixed  order
 of events1 the infinite variety of     
world-forms and names1  all these are   
originated by this avidy1 ajna or my is 
indeed  hardly comprehensible4 ,if it is
 indefinite nescience1 how can all      
these well-defined forms of             

world-existence come out of it8 ,it is  
said to exist only relatively1 and to   
have only a temporary existence  beside 
the permanent infinite reality4 ,to take
 such a principle  and to derive from it
 the mind1 matter1 and indeed everything
  else except the pure self-luminous    
,brahman1 would hardly  appeal to our   
reason4 ,if this system of world-order  
were only  seeming appearance1 with no  
other element of truth in it except     
pure being1 then it would be            
indefensible in the light of reason4    
,it has been proved that whatever       
notions we have about the  objective    
world are all self-contradictory1 and   
thus groundless and  false4 ,if they    
have all proceeded from the indefinite  
they must  show this character when     
exposed to discerning criticism4 ,all   
categories have to be shown to be so    
hopelessly confused and to  be without  
any conceivable notion that though      
apparent before  us yet they crumble    
into indefiniteness as soon as they are 

#dfb    examined1 and one cannot make   
such assertion about them as  that they 
are or that they are not4 ,such negative
 criticisms of our  fundamental notions 
about the world-order were undertaken by
  ,s'rharsa and his commentator and     
follower ,citsukha4 ,it is impossible   
within the limits of this chapter1 to   
give a complete  account of their       
criticisms of our various notions of    
reality4  ,i shall give here1 only one  
example4    ,let us take the examination
 of the notion of difference            
7bheda7from ,khandanakhandakhdya4 ,four 
explanations are  possible about the    
notion of difference3 7#a7 the          
difference may be  perceived as         
appearing in its own characteristics in 
our experience  7svarpa-bheda7 as       
,prabhkara thinks2 7#b7 the difference  
between two things is nothing but the   
absence of one in the other             
7anyonybhva71 as some ,naiyyikas and    
,bhttas think2 7#c7 difference  means   
divergence of characteristics           

7vaidharmya7 as the  ,vais'esikas speak 
of it2 7#d7 difference may be a separate
 quality  in itself like the prthaktva  
quality of ,nyya4 ,taking the first     
alternative1 we see that it is said that
 the jug and the cloth  represent in    
themselves1 by their very form and      
existence1 their  mutual difference from
 each other4 ,but if by perceiving the  
cloth we only perceive its difference   
from the jug as the characteristic  of  
the cloth1 then the jug also must have  
penetrated  into the form of the cloth1 
otherwise how could we perceive  in the 
cloth its characteristics as the        
difference from the jug8  i4e4 if       
difference is a thing which can be      
directly perceived by  the senses1 then 
as difference would naturally mean      
difference  from something else1 it is  
expected that something else such  as   
jug1 etc4 from which the difference is  
perceived1 must also  be perceived      
directly in the perception of the cloth4
 ,but if  the perception of difference  

between two things has penetrated       
together in the same identical          
perception1 then the self-contradiction 
becomes apparent4 ,difference as an     
entity is not what  we perceive in the  
cloth1 for difference means difference  
from  something else1 and if that thing 
from which the difference is  perceived 
is not perceived1 then how can the      
difference as an  entity be perceived8  
,if it is said that the cloth itself    
represents  its difference from the jug1
 and that this is indicated by the jug1 
then we may ask1 what is the nature of  
the jug8 ,if the difference  from the   
cloth is the very nature of the jug1    
then the cloth  itself is also involved 
in the nature of the jug4 ,if it is said
 that    #dfc    the jug only indicates 
a term from which difference  is        
intended to be conveyed1 then that also 
becomes impossible1  for how can we     
imagine that there is a term which is   
independent  of any association of its  
difference from other things1  and is   

yet a term which establishes the notion 
of difference8 ,if  it is a term of     
difference1 it cannot be independent of 
its relation  to other things from which
 it is differentiated4 ,if its          
difference  from the cloth is a quality 
of the jug1 then also the old difficulty
  comes in1 for its difference from the 
cloth would involve the  cloth also in  
itself2 and if the cloth is involved in 
the nature of  the jug as its quality1  
then by the same manner the jug would   
also be the character of the cloth1 and 
hence not difference but  identity      
results4 ,moreover1 if a cloth is       
perceived as a character  of the jug1   
the two will appear to be hanging one   
over the other1  but this is never so   
experienced by us4 ,moreover1 it is     
difficult to  ascertain if qualities    
have any relation with things2 if they  
have  not1 then absence of relation     
being the same everywhere1 everything   
might be the quality of everything4 ,if 
there is a relation  between these two1 

then that relation would require another
  relation to relate itself with that   
relation1 and that would again  require 
another relation and that another1 and  
so on4 ,again1 it  may be said that when
 the jug1 etc4 are seen without         
reference  to other things1 they appear 
as jug1 etc41 but when they are  viewed 
with reference to cloth1 etc4 they      
appear as difference4  ,but this cannot 
be so1 for the perception as jug is     
entirely  different from the perception 
of difference4 ,it should also be  noted
 that the notion of difference is also  
different from the  notions of both the 
jug and the cloth4 ,it is one thing to  
say  that there are jug and cloth1 and  
quite another thing to say  that the jug
 is different from the cloth4 ,thus a   
jug cannot appear  as difference1 though
 it may be viewed with reference to     
cloth4  ,the notion of a jug does not   
require the notions of other things  for
 its manifestation4 ,moreover1 when ,i  
say the jug is different  from the      

cloth1 ,i never mean that difference is 
an entity which is  the same as the jug 
or the cloth2 what ,i mean is that the  
difference of the cloth from the jug has
 its limits in the jug1 and  not merely 
that the notion of cloth has a reference
 to jug4 ,this  shows that difference   
cannot be the characteristic nature of  
the  thing perceived4    ,again1 in the 
second alternative where difference of  
two    #dfc    things is defined as the 
absence of each thing in the other1 we  
find that if difference in jug and cloth
 means that the jug is not  in the cloth
 or that cloth is not in jug1 then also 
the same  difficulty arises2 for when ,i
 say that the absence or negation of    
jug in the cloth is its difference from 
the jug1 then also the  residence of the
 absence of jug in the cloth would      
require  that the jug also resides in   
the cloth1 and this would reduce        
difference to identity4 ,if it is said  
that the absence of jug in the  cloth is
 not a separate thing1 but is rather the

 identical cloth  itself1 then also     
their difference as mutual exclusion    
cannot be  explained4 ,if this mutual   
negation 7anyonyabhva7 is explained  as 
the mere absence of jugness in the cloth
 and of clothness in  the jug1 then also
 a difficulty arises2 for there is no   
such quality  in jugness or clothness   
that they may be mutually excluded2  and
 there is no such quality in them that  
they can be treated as  identical1 and  
so when it is said that there is no     
jugness in cloth  we might as well say  
that there is no clothness in cloth1 for
  clothness and jugness are one and the 
same1 and hence absence  of jugness in  
the cloth would amount to the absence of
 clothness  in the cloth which is       
self-contradictory4 ,taking again the   
third  alternative we see that if       
difference means divergence of          
characteristics  7vaidharmya71 then the 
question arises whether the  vaidharmya 
or divergence as existing in jug has    
such a divergence  as can distinguish it

 from the divergence existing in the    
cloth2 if  the answer is in the         
affirmative then we require a series of 
endless  vaidharmyas progressing ad     
infinitum4 ,if the answer is in the     
negative then there being no divergence 
between the two divergences  they become
 identical1 and hence divergence of     
characteristics  as such ceases to      
exist4 ,if it is said that the natural  
forms of  things are difference in      
themselves1 for each of them excludes   
the  other1 then apart from the         
differences--the natural forms--the     
things are reduced to formlessness      
7nihsvarpat74 ,if natural forms         
7svarpa7 mean special natural forms     
7svarpa-vis'esa7 then as the  special   
natural forms or characteristics only   
represent difference1  the natural forms
 of the things as apart from the special
 ones  would appear to be identical4 ,so
 also it may be proved that there  is no
 such quality as prthaktva              
7separateness7 which can explain        

differences of things1 for there also   
the questions would arise as  to whether
 separateness exists in different things
 or similar ones  or whether            
separateness is identical with the thing
 in which it  exists or not1 and so     
forth4    #dfe      ,the earliest       
beginnings of this method of subtle     
analysis and  dialectic in ,indian      
philosophy are found in the opening     
chapters  of ,kathvatthu4 ,in the great 
,mahbhasya on ,pnini by ,patajali  also 
we find some traces of it4 ,but ,ngrjuna
 was the man who  took it up in right   
earnest and systematically cultivated it
 in all  its subtle and abstruse issues 
and counter-issues in order to prove    
that everything that appeared as a fixed
 order or system was  non-existent1 for 
all were unspeakable1 indescribable and 
self-contradictory1 and thus everything 
being discarded there was  only the void
 7s'nya74 ,s'ankara partially utilized  
this method in  his refutations of ,nyya
 and the ,buddhist systems2 but         

,s'rharsa  again revived and developed  
it in a striking manner1 and after      
having criticized the most important    
notions and concepts of our  everyday   
life1 which are often backed by the     
,nyya system1 sought  to prove that     
nothing in the world can be defined1 and
 that we  cannot ascertain whether a    
thing is or is not4 ,the refutations of 
all possible definitions that the ,nyya 
could give necessarily led  to the      
conclusion that the things sought to be 
defined did not  exist though they      
appeared to do so2 the ,vedntic         
contention  was that this is exactly as 
it should be1 for the indefinite ajna   
produces only appearances which when    
exposed to reason show  that no         
consistent notions of them can be       
formed1 or in other  words the          
world-appearance1 the phenomena of my or
 ajna1  are indefinable or anirvacanya4 
,this great work of ,s'rharsa  was      
followed by ,tattvadpik of ,citsukha1 in
 which he generally  followed ,s'rharsa 

and sometimes supplemented him with the 
addition of criticisms of certain new   
concepts4 ,the method of  ,vednta thus  
followed on one side the method of      
,s'nyavda in  annulling all the concepts
 of world-appearance and on the other   
,vijnavda ,buddhism in proving the      
self-illuminating character  of         
knowledge and ultimately established the
 self as the only self-luminous         
ultimate reality4      ,the ,theory of  
,causation4    ,the ,vednta philosophy  
looked at the constantly changing       
phenomena of the world-appearance and   
sought to discover the  root whence     
proceeded the endless series of events  
and effects4  ,the theory that effects  
were altogether new productions caused  
by the invariable unconditional and     
immediately preceding antecedents1  as  
well as the theory that it was the cause
 which evolved    #dff    and by its    
transformations produced the effect1 are
 considered  insufficient to explain the
 problem which the ,vednta had before   

it4 ,certain collocations invariably and
 unconditionally preceded  certain      
effects1 but this cannot explain how the
 previous set of  phenomena could be    
regarded as producing the succeeding    
set4  ,in fact the concept of causation 
and production had in it  something     
quite undefinable and inexplicable4 ,our
 enquiry  after the cause is an enquiry 
after a more fundamental and  primary   
form of the truth of a thing than what  
appears at the  present moment when we  
wished to know what was the cause of    
the jug1 what we sought was a simpler   
form of which the effect  was only a    
more complex form of manifestation1 what
 is the  ground1 the root1 out of which 
the effect has come forth8 ,if  apart   
from such an enquiry we take the        
pictorial representation  of the causal 
phenomena in which some collocations    
being invariably  present at an         
antecedent point of time1 the effect    
springs  forth into being1 we find that 
we are just where we were before1  and  

are unable to penetrate into the logic  
of the affair4 ,the  ,nyya definition of
 cause and effect may be of use to us in
 a  general way in associating certain  
groups of things of a particular  kind  
with certain other phenomena happening  
at a succeeding  moment as being        
relevant pairs of which one being       
present the  other also has a           
probability of being present1 but can do
 nothing  more than this4 ,it does not  
answer our question as to the nature  of
 cause4 ,antecedence in time is regarded
 in this view as an indispensable       
condition for the cause4 ,but time1     
according to ,nyya1  is one continuous  
entity2 succession of time can only be  
conceived  as antecedence and           
consequence of phenomena1 and these     
again involve succession2 thus the      
notions of succession of time  and of   
the antecedence and consequence of time 
being mutually  dependent upon each     
other 7anyonys'raya7 neither of these   
can  be conceived independently4        

,another important condition is         
invariability4 ,but what does that mean8
 ,if it means invariable  antecedence1  
then even an ass which is invariably    
present as  an antecedent to the smoke  
rising from the washerman's  house1 must
 be regarded as the cause of the smoke  
,footnote ref #a4 ,if it  means such an 
antecedence as contributes to the       
happening of the effect1  it becomes    
again difficult to understand anything  
about its contributing        ,footnote 
#a3 ,asses are used in carrying soiled  
linen in ,india4 ,asses are  always     
present when water is boiled for washing
 in the laundry4    #dfg    to the      
effect1 for the only intelligible thing 
is the antecedence  and nothing more4   
,if invariability means the existence of
  that at the presence of which the     
effect comes into being1 then also  it  
fails1 for there may be the seed but no 
shoot1 for the mere presence  of the    
seed will not suffice to produce the    
effect1 the shoot4 ,if it  is said that 

a cause can produce an effect only when 
it is associated  with its accessory    
factors1 then also the question remains 
the same1 for we have not understood    
what is meant by cause4  ,again when the
 same effect is often seen to be        
produced by a  plurality of causes1 the 
cause cannot be defined as that which   
happening the effect happens and failing
 the effect fails4 ,it cannot  also be  
said that in spite of the plurality of  
causes1 each particular  cause is so    
associated with its own particular kind 
of effect that  from a special kind of  
cause we can without fail get a special 
kind of effect 7cf4 ,vtsyyana and       
,nyyamajar71 for out of the  same clay  
different effects come forth namely the 
jug1 the plate1  etc4 ,again if cause is
 defined as the collocation of factors1 
then  the question arises as to what is 
meant by this collocation2 does  it mean
 the factors themselves or something    
else above them8 ,on  the former        
supposition the scattered factors being 

always present  in the universe there   
should always be the effect2 if it means
  something else above the specific     
factors1 then that something always     
existing1 there should always be the    
effect4 ,nor can collocation  7smagr7 be
 defined as the last movement of the    
causes  immediately succeeding which the
 effect comes into being1 for the       
relation of movement with the           
collocating cause is incomprehensible4  
,moreover if movement is defined as that
 which produces  the effect1 the very   
conception of causation which was       
required  to be proved is taken for     
granted4 ,the idea of necessity involved
  in the causal conception that a cause 
is that which must produce  its effect  
is also equally undefinable1            
inexplicable1 and logically             
inconceivable4 ,thus in whatsoever way  
we may seek to find out  the real nature
 of the causal principle from the       
interminable  series of cause-effect    
phenomena we fail4 ,all the             

characteristics  of the effects are     
indescribable and indefinable ajna of   
my1  and in whatever way we may try to  
conceive these phenomena in  themselves 
or in relation to one another we fail1  
for they are all  carved out of the     
indefinite and are illogical and        
illusory1 and  some day will vanish for 
ever4 ,the true cause is thus the pure  
being1 the reality which is unshakable  
in itself1 the ground upon    #dfh      
which all appearances being imposed they
 appear as real4 ,the  true cause is    
thus the unchangeable being which       
persists through  all experience1 and   
the effect-phenomena are but impositions
 upon  it of ajna or avidy4 ,it is thus 
the clay1 the permanent1 that  is       
regarded as the cause of all            
clay-phenomena as jug1 plates1  etc4    
,all the various modes in which the clay
 appears are mere  appearances1 unreal1 
indefinable and so illusory4 ,the one   
truth  is the clay4 ,so in all          
world-phenomena the one truth is  being1

 the ,brahman1 and all the phenomena    
that are being  imposed on it are but   
illusory forms and names4 ,this is what 
is called the satkryavda or more        
properly the satkranavda  of the        
,vednta1 that the cause alone is true   
and ever existing1  and phenomena in    
themselves are false4 ,there is only    
this  much truth in them1 that all are  
imposed on the reality or being  which  
alone is true4 ,this appearance of the  
one cause the  being1 as the unreal many
 of the phenomena is what is called  the
 vivarttavda as distinguished from the  
smkhyayogaparinmavda1  in which the     
effect is regarded as the real          
development  of the cause in its        
potential state4 ,when the effect has a 
different kind of being from the cause  
it is called vivartta but  when the     
effect has the same kind of being as the
 cause it is called  parinma            
7kranasvalaksannyathbhvah parinmah      
tadvilaksano  vivarttah or              
vastunastatsamattko'nyathbhvah parinmah 

tadvisamasattkah vivarttah74 ,vednta has
 as much to object  against the ,nyya as
 against the parinma theory of causation
  of the ,smkhya2 for movement1         
development1 form1 potentiality1  and   
actuality--all these are indefinable and
 inconceivable in the  light of reason2 
they cannot explain causation but only  
restate  things and phenomena as they   
appear in the world4 ,in reality        
however though phenomena are not        
identical with the cause1  they can     
never be defined except in terms of the 
cause 7,tadabhedam  vinaiva             
tadvyatirekena durvacam kryyam          
vivarttah74    ,this being the relation 
of cause and effect or ,brahman and the 
world1 the different followers of       
,s'ankara ,vednta in explaining  the    
cause of the world-appearance sometimes 
lay stress on the  my1 ajna or avidy1   
sometimes on the ,brahman1 and sometimes
  on them both4 ,thus ,sarvajntmamuni1  
the writer of  ,sanksepa-s'rraka and his
 followers think that the pure ,brahman 

should be regarded as the causal        
substance 7updna7 of the                
world-appearance1 whereas ,praks'tman   
,akhandnanda1 and    #dfi    ,mdhava    
hold that ,brahman in association with  
my1 i4e4 the  my-reflected form of      
,brahman as s'vara should be regarded   
as the cause of the world-appearance4   
,the world-appearance  is an evolution  
or parinma of the my as located in      
s'vara1  whereas s'vara 7,god7 is the   
vivartta causal matter4 ,others  however
 make a distinction between my as the   
cosmical factor  of illusion and avidy  
as the manifestation of the same entity 
in the individual or jva4 ,they hold    
that though the world-appearance  may be
 said to be produced by the my yet the  
mind etc4 associated with the individual
 are produced by the  avidy with the jva
 or the individual as the causal matter 
7updna74 ,others hold that since it is  
the individual to whom  both s'vara and 
the world-appearance are manifested1 it 
is better  rather to think that these   

are all manifestations of the jva in    
association with his avidy or ajna4     
,others however hold that  since in the 
world-appearance we find in one aspect  
pure being  and in another materiality  
etc41 both ,brahman and my are to  be   
regarded as the cause1 ,brahman as the  
permanent causal  matter1 updna and my  
as the entity evolving in parinma4      
,vcaspati ,mis'ra thinks that ,brahman  
is the permanent cause of  the          
world-appearance through my as          
associated with jva4  ,my is thus only a
 sahakri or instrument as it were1 by   
which  the one ,brahman appears in the  
eye of the jva as the manifold  world of
 appearance4 ,praks'nanda holds however 
in his ,siddhnta  ,muktval that ,brahman
 itself is pure and absolutely          
unaffected  even as illusory appearance1
 and is not even the causal  matter of  
the world-appearance4 ,everything that  
we see in the  phenomenal world1 the    
whole field of world-appearance1 is the 
product of my1 which is both the        

instrumental and the updna  7causal     
matter7 of the world-illusion4 ,but     
whatever these divergences  of view may 
be1 it is clear that they do not in any 
way affect  the principal ,vednta text  
that the only unchangeable cause is  the
 ,brahman1 whereas all else1 the        
effect-phenomena1 have only  a temporary
 existence as indefinable illusion4 ,the
 word my  was used in the ,rg-,veda in  
the sense of supernatural power and     
wonderful skill1 and the idea of an     
inherent mystery underlying  it was     
gradually emphasized in the ,atharva    
,veda1 and it began  to be used in the  
sense of magic or illusion4 ,in the     
,brhadranyaka1  ,pras'na1 and           
,svets'vatara ,upanisads the word means 
magic4 ,it  is not out of place here to 
mention that in the older ,upanisads    
#dgj    the word my occurs only once in 
the ,brhadranyaka and once  only in the 
,pras'na4 ,in early ,pli ,buddhist      
writings it occurs  only in the sense of
 deception or deceitful conduct4        

,buddhaghosa  uses it in the sense of   
magical power4 ,in ,ngrjuna and the     
,lankvatra  it has acquired the sense of
 illusion4 ,in ,s'ankara the  word my is
 used in the sense of illusion1 both as 
a principle  of creation as a s'akti    
7power7 or accessory cause1 and as the  
phenomenal creation itself1 as the      
illusion of world-appearance4    ,it may
 also be mentioned here that ,gaudapda  
the teacher  of ,s'ankara's teacher     
,govinda worked out a system with the   
help  of the my doctrine4 ,the          
,upanisads are permeated with the       
spirit of an earnest enquiry after      
absolute truth4 ,they do not  pay any   
attention towards explaining the        
world-appearance or  enquiring into its 
relations with absolute truth4 ,gaudapda
 asserts  clearly and probably for the  
first time among ,hindu thinkers1 that  
the world does not exist in reality1    
that it is my1 and not reality4  ,when  
the highest truth is realized my is not 
removed1 for it is  not a thing1 but the

 whole world-illusion is dissolved into 
its own  airy nothing never to recur    
again4 ,it was ,gaudapda who compared   
the world-appearance with dream         
appearances1 and held that objects  seen
 in the waking world are unreal1 because
 they are capable  of being seen like   
objects seen in a dream1 which are false
 and  unreal4 ,the tman says ,gaudapda  
is at once the cognizer and  the        
cognized1 the world subsists in the tman
 through my4  ,as tman alone is real and
 all duality an illusion1 it necessarily
  follows that all experience is also   
illusory4 ,s'ankara expounded  this     
doctrine in his elaborate commentaries  
on the ,upanisads  and the ,brahma-stra1
 but he seems to me to have done little 
more than making explicit the doctrine  
of my4 ,some of his  followers however  
examined and thought over the concept of
  my and brought out in bold relief its 
character as the indefinable  thereby   
substantially contributing to the       
development of  the ,vednta philosophy4 

,vednta theory of ,perception and       
,inference ,footnote ref #a4    ,pramna 
is the means that leads to right        
knowledge4 ,if  memory is intended to be
 excluded from the definition then      
,footnote #a3 ,dharmarjdhvarndra and his
 son ,rmakrsna worked out a  complete   
scheme of the theory of ,vedntic        
perception and inference4  ,this is in  
complete agreement with the general     
,vednta metaphysics4  ,the early        
,vedntists were more interested in      
demonstrating the illusory  nature of   
the world of appearance1 and did not    
work out a logical theory4  ,it may be  
incidentally mentioned that in the      
theory of inference as  worked out by   
,dharmarjdhvarndra he was largely       
indebted to the ,mmms  school of        
thought4 ,in recognizing arthapatti1    
upamna s'abda and  anupalabdhi also     
,dharmarjdhvarndra accepted the ,mmms   
view4 ,the  ,vedantins1 previous to     
,dharmarjdhvarndra1 had also tacitly    
followed  the ,mmms in these matters4   

#dga    pramna is to be defined as the  
means that leads to such right          
knowledge as has not already been       
acquired4 ,right knowledge  7pram7 in   
,vednta is the knowledge of an object   
which has not  been found contradicted  
7abdhitrthavisayajnatva74 ,except  when 
specially expressed otherwise1 pram is  
generally considered  as being excludent
 of memory and applies to previously    
unacquired  7anadhigata7 and            
uncontradicted knowledge4 ,objections   
are sometimes raised that when we are   
looking at a thing for a  few minutes1  
the perception of the thing in all the  
successive  moments after the first     
refers to the image of the thing        
acquired  in the previous moments4 ,to  
this the reply is that the ,vednta      
considers that so long as a different   
mental state does not arise1  any mental
 state is not to be considered as       
momentary but as  remaining ever the    
same4 ,so long as we continue to        
perceive  one thing there is no reason  

to suppose that there has been a  series
 of mental states4 ,so there is no      
question as to the knowledge  of the    
succeeding moments being referred to the
 knowledge  of the preceding moments1   
for so long as any mental  state has any
 one thing for its object it is to be   
considered as  having remained unchanged
 all through the series of moments4     
,there is of course this difference     
between the same percept of a  previous 
and a later moment following in         
succession1 that fresh  elements of time
 are being perceived as prior and later1
 though  the content of the mental state
 so far as the object is concerned      
remains unchanged4 ,this time element is
 perceived by the senses  though the    
content of the mental state may remain  
undisturbed4  ,when ,i see the same book
 for two seconds1 my mental state       
representing the book is not changed    
every second1 and hence  there can be no
 such supposition that ,i am having     
separate mental  states in succession   

each of which is a repetition of the    
previous  one1 for so long as the       
general content of the mental state     
remains  the same there is no reason for
 supposing that there has been any      
change in the mental state4 ,the mental 
state thus remains the  same so long as 
the content is not changed1 but though  
it remains  the same it can note the    
change in the time elements as          
extraneous    #dgb    addition4 ,all our
 uncontradicted knowledge of the objects
 of the  external world should be       
regarded as right knowledge until the   
absolute is realized4    ,when the      
antahkarana 7mind7 comes in contact with
 the  external objects through the      
senses and becomes transformed as  it   
were into their forms1 it is said that  
the antahkarana has  been transformed   
into a state 7vrtti7 ,footnote #a4 ,as  
soon as the  antahkarana has assumed the
 shape or form of the object of its     
knowledge1 the ignorance 7ajna7 with    
reference to that object is  removed1   

and thereupon the steady light of the   
pure consciousness  7cit7 shows the     
object which was so long hidden by      
ignorance4 ,the appearance or the       
perception of an object  is thus the    
self-shining of the cit through a vrtti 
of a form  resembling an object of      
knowledge4 ,this therefore pre-supposes 
that by the action of ajna1 pure        
consciousness or being  is in a state of
 diverse kinds of modifications4 ,in    
spite of  the cit underlying all this   
diversified objective world which is    
but the transformation of ignorance     
7ajna71 the former cannot  manifest     
itself by itself1 for the creations     
being of ignorance  they are but        
sustained by modifications of ignorance4
 ,the  diversified objects of the world 
are but transformations of  the         
principle of ajna which is neither real 
nor unreal4 ,it  is the nature of ajna  
that it veils its own creations4 ,thus  
on each of the objects created by the   
ajna by its creating  7viksepa7 capacity

 there is a veil by its veiling 7varana7
 capacity4  ,but when any object comes  
in direct touch with antahkarana        
through the senses the antahkarana      
becomes transformed into  the form of   
the object1 and this leads to the       
removal of the veil  on that particular 
ajna form--the object1 and as the       
self-shining  cit is shining through the
 particular ajna state1 we  have what is
 called the perception of the thing4    
,though there is  in reality no such    
distinction as the inner and the outer  
yet the  ajna has created such illusory 
distinctions as individual souls  and   
the external world of objects the       
distinctions of time1 space1            
,footnote #a3 ,vednta does not regard   
manas 7mind7 as a sense 7indriya74 ,the 
same antahkarana1 according to its      
diverse functions1 is called mns1       
buddhi1 ahamkra1 and citta4 ,in its     
functions as doubt it is called  mns1 as
 originating definite cognitions it is  
called buddhi4 ,as  presenting the      

notion of an ego in consciousness       
ahamkra1 and as  producing memory citta4
 ,these four represent the different    
modifications  or states 7vrtti7 of the 
same entity 7which in itself is but a   
special  kind of modification of ajna as
 antahkarana74    #dgc    etc4 and      
veiled these forms4 ,perception leads to
 the temporary  and the partial breaking
 of the veil over specific ajna forms   
so that there is a temporary union of   
the cit as underlying the  subject and  
the object through the broken veil4     
,perception on  the subjective side is  
thus defined as the union or            
undifferentiation  7abheda7 of the      
subjective consciousness with the       
objective  consciousness comprehending  
the sensible objects through the        
specific mental states                  
7tattadindriyayogyavisayvacchinnacaitany
bhinnatvam                              
tattadkravisayvacchinnajnasya           
tattadams'e pratyaksatvam74  ,this union
 in perception means that the objective 

has at that  moment no separate         
existence from the subjective           
consciousness of  the perceiver4 ,the   
consciousness manifesting through the   
antahkarana  is called jvasksi4         
,inference 7anumna71 according to       
,vednta1 is made by our  notion of      
concomitance 7vyptijna7 between two     
things1 acting  through specific past   
impressions 7samskra74 ,thus when ,i see
  smoke on a hill1 my previous notion of
 the concomitance of smoke  with fire   
becomes roused as a subconscious        
impression1 and ,i  infer that there is 
fire on the hill4 ,my knowledge of the  
hill and  the smoke is by direct        
perception4 ,the notion of concomitance 
revived in the subconscious only        
establishes the connection between  the 
smoke and the fire4 ,the notion of      
concomitance is  generated by the       
perception of two things together1 when 
no  case of the failure of concomitance 
is known 7vyabhicrjna7  regarding the   
subject4 ,the notion of concomitance    

being altogether  subjective1 the       
,vedntist does not emphasize the        
necessity  of perceiving the            
concomitance in a large number of cases 
7bhyodars'anam  sakrddars'anam veti     
vis'eso ndaranyah74 ,vednta is  not     
anxious to establish any material       
validity for the inference1  but only   
subjective and formal validity4 ,a      
single perception of  concomitance may  
in certain cases generate the notion of 
the  concomitance of one thing with     
another when no contradictory  instance 
is known4 ,it is immaterial with the    
,vednta whether this  concomitance is   
experienced in one case or in hundreds  
of cases4  ,the method of agreement in  
presence is the only form of            
concomitance  7anvayavypti7 that the    
,vednta allows4 ,so the  ,vednta        
discards all the other kinds of         
inference that ,nyya  supported1 viz4   
anvayavyatireki 7by joining agreement in
 presence  with agreement in absence71  
kevalnvayi 7by universal agreement      

where no test could be applied of       
agreement in absence7 and    #dgd       
kevalavyatireki 7by universal agreement 
in absence74 ,vednta  advocates three   
premisses1 viz4 7#a7 pratija 7the hill  
is fiery72  7#b7 hetu 7because it has   
smoke7 and 7#c7 drstnta 7as in the      
kitchen7 instead of the five            
propositions that ,nyya maintained      
,footnote  ref #a4 ,since one case of   
concomitance is regarded by ,vednta as  
being sufficient for making an inference
 it holds that seeing the  one case of  
appearance 7silver in the conch-shell7  
to be false1  we can infer that all     
things 7except ,brahman7 are false      
7,brahmabhinnam  sarvam mithy           
,brahmabhinnatvt yedevam tadevam yath   
s'uktirpyam74  ,first premiss 7pratij7  
all else excepting ,brahman is false2   
second  premiss 7hetu7 since all is     
different from ,brahman2 third premiss  
7drstnta7 whatever is so is so as the   
silver in the conch ,footnote  ref #b4  
tman1 ,jva1 s'vara1 ,ekajvavda and      

,drstisrstivda4    ,we have many times  
spoken of truth or reality as           
self-luminous  7svayampraks'a74 ,but    
what does this mean8 ,vednta  defines it
 as that which is never the object of a 
knowing act but  is yet immediate and   
direct with us 7avedyatve sati          
aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam74            
,self-luminosity thus means the         
capacity of being ever present in all   
our acts of consciousness  without in   
any way being an object of              
consciousness4 ,whenever  anything is   
described as an object of consciousness1
 its character  as constituting its     
knowability is a quality1 which may or  
may not  be present in it1 or may be    
present at one time and absent at       
another4  ,this makes it dependent on   
some other such entity which can        
produce it or manifest it4 ,pure        
consciousness differs from all its      
objects in this that it is never        
dependent on anything else for  its     
manifestation1 but manifests all other  

objects such as the jug1  the cloth1    
etc4 ,if consciousness should require   
another consciousness  to manifest it1  
then that might again require another1  
and  that another1 and so on ad         
infinitum 7anavasth74 ,if consciousness 
did not manifest itself at the time of  
the object-manifestation1  then even on 
seeing or knowing a thing one might     
doubt if he  had seen or known it4 ,it  
is thus to be admitted that             
consciousness  7anubhti7 manifests      
itself and thereby maintains the        
appearance        ,footnote #a3 ,vedanta
 would have either pratij1 hetu and     
udharana1 or  udharana1 upanaya and     
nigamana1 and not all the five of ,nyya1
 viz4  pratija1 hetu1 udharana1 upanaya 
and nigamana4    ,footnote #b3 ,vedntic 
notions of the pramna of upamana1       
arthapatti1  s'abda and anupalabdhi1    
being similar to the mmms view1 do not  
require to be treated here separately4  
#dge    of all our world experience4    
,this goes directly against  the jtat   

theory of ,kumrila that consciousness   
was not immediate  but was only         
inferable from the manifesting quality  
7jtat7 of objects when they are known in
 consciousness4    ,now ,vednta says    
that this self-luminous pure            
consciousness  is the same as the self4 
,for it is only self which is not the   
object  of any knowledge and is yet     
immediate and ever present in           
consciousness4 ,no one doubts about his 
own self1 because it  is of itself      
manifested along with all states of     
knowledge4 ,the  self itself is the     
revealer of all objects of knowledge1   
but is  never itself the object of      
knowledge1 for what appears as the      
perceiving of self as object of         
knowledge is but association            
comprehended under the term ahamkra     
7ego74 ,the real self is  identical with
 the pure manifesting unity of all      
consciousness4  ,this real self called  
the tman is not the same as the jva or  
individual soul1 which passes through   

the diverse experiences  of worldly     
life4 s'vara also must be distinguished 
from this  highest tman or ,brahman4 ,we
 have already seen that many  ,vedntists
 draw a distinction between my and      
avidy4 ,my  is that aspect of ajna by   
which only the best attributes  are     
projected1 whereas avidy is that aspect 
by which impure  qualities are          
projected4 ,in the former aspect the    
functions are  more of a creative1      
generative 7viksepa7 type1 whereas in   
the latter  veiling 7varana7            
characteristics are most prominent4 ,the
 relation  of the cit or pure           
intelligence1 the highest self1 with my 
and  avidy 7also called ajna7 was       
believed respectively to explain the    
phenomenal s'vara and the phenomenal jva
 or individual4 ,this  relation is      
conceived in two ways1 namely as updhi  
or pratibimba1  and avaccheda4 ,the     
conception of pratibimba or reflection  
is  like the reflection of the sun in   
the water where the image1  though it   

has the same brilliance as the sun1 yet 
undergoes  the effect of the impurity   
and movements of the water4 ,the  sun   
remains ever the same in its purity     
untouched by the  impurities from which 
the image sun suffers4 ,the sun may  be 
the same but it may be reflected in     
different kinds of  water and yield     
different kinds of images possessing    
different  characteristics and changes  
which though unreal yet phenomenally    
have all the appearance of reality4 ,the
 other conception  of the relation is   
that when we speak of ks'a 7space7 in   
the jug  or of ks'a in the room4 ,the   
ks'a in reality does not suffer    #dgf 
any modification in being within the jug
 or within the room4 ,in  reality it is 
all-pervasive and is neither limited    
7avachinna7  within the jug or the room1
 but is yet conceived as being limited  
by the jug or by the room4 ,so long as  
the jug remains1 the  ks'a limited      
within it will remain as separate from  
the ks'a  limited within the room4      

,of the ,vedntists who accept the       
reflection analogy the followers  of    
,nrsimhs'rama think that when the pure  
cit is reflected  in the my1 s'vara is  
phenomenally produced1 and when in the  
avidy the individual or jva4 ,sarvajtm  
however does not  distinguish between   
the my and the avidy1 and thinks that   
when the cit is reflected in the avidy  
in its total aspect as cause1  we get   
s'vara1 and when reflected in the       
antahkarana--a product  of the avidy--we
 have jva or individual soul4    ,jva or
 individual means the self in           
association with the ego  and other     
personal experiences1 i4e4 phenomenal   
self1 which feels1  suffers and is      
affected by world-experiences4 ,in jva  
also three  stages are distinguished2   
thus when during deep sleep the         
antahkarana  is submerged1 the self     
perceives merely the ajna and the  jva  
in this state is called prja or         
nandamaya4 ,in the dream-state  the self
 is in association with a subtle body   

and is called  taijasa4 ,in the awakened
 state the self as associated with a    
subtle and gross body is called vis'va4 
,so also the self in its pure  state is 
called ,brahman1 when associated with my
 it is called  s'vara1 when associated  
with the fine subtle element of matter  
as  controlling them1 it is called      
hiranyagarbha2 when with the gross      
elements as the ruler or controller of  
them it is called virt  purusa4    ,the 
jva in itself as limited by its avidy is
 often spoken of  as pramarthika 7real71
 when manifested through the sense and  
the ego in the waking states as         
vyavahrika 7phenomenal71 and  when in   
the dream states as dream-self1         
prtibhsika 7illusory74    ,praks'tm and 
his followers think that since ajna is  
one  there cannot be two separate       
reflections such as jva and s'vara2  but
 it is better to admit that jva is the  
image of s'vara in the  ajna4 ,the      
totality of ,brahma-cit in association  
with my is  s'vara1 and this when again 

reflected through the ajna gives  us the
 jva4 ,the manifestation of the jva is  
in the antahkarana  as states of        
knowledge4 ,the jva thus in reality is  
s'vara and  apart from jva and s'vara   
there is no other separate existence of 
#dgg    ,brahma-caitanya4 ,jva being the
 image of s'vara is thus dependent  on  
him1 but when the limitations of jva are
 removed  by right knowledge1 the jva is
 the same ,brahman it always was4       
,those who prefer to conceive the       
relation as being of the  avaccheda type
 hold that reflection 7pratibimba7 is   
only possible  of things which have     
colour1 and therefore jva is cit limited
 7avacchinna7  by the antahkarana       
7mind74 s'vara is that which is beyond  
it2 the diversity of antahkaranas       
accounts for the diversity  of the jvas4
 ,it is easy however to see that these  
discussions are  not of much fruit from 
the point of view of philosophy in      
determining  or comprehending the       
relation of s'vara and jva4 ,in the     

,vednta system s'vara has but little    
importance1 for he is but a  phenomenal 
being2 he may be better1 purer1 and much
 more  powerful than we1 but yet he is  
as much phenomenal as any of  us4 ,the  
highest truth is the self1 the reality1 
the ,brahman1 and  both jva and s'vara  
are but illusory impositions on it4     
,some  ,vedntists hold that there is but
 one jva and one body1 and  that all the
 world as well as all the jvas in it are
 merely his  imaginings4 ,these dream   
jvas and the dream world will  continue 
so long as that super-jva continues to  
undergo his  experiences2 the           
world-appearance and all of us imaginary
  individuals1 run our course and       
salvation is as much imaginary          
salvation as our world-experience is an 
imaginary experience of  the imaginary  
jvas4 ,the cosmic jva is alone the      
awakened jva  and all the rest are but  
his imaginings4 ,this is known as the   
doctrine of ekajva 7one-soul74    ,the  
opposite of this doctrine is the theory 

held by some  ,vedntists that there are 
many individuals and the                
world-appearance  has no permanent      
illusion for all people1 but each person
  creates for himself his own illusion1 
and there is no objective  datum which  
forms the common ground for the illusory
 perception  of all people2 just as when
 ten persons see in the darkness a  rope
 and having the illusion of a snake     
there1 run away1 and  agree in their    
individual perceptions that they have   
all seen  the same snake1 though each   
really had his own illusion and  there  
was no snake at all4 ,according to this 
view the illusory  perception of each   
happens for him subjectively and has no 
corresponding objective phenomena as its
 ground4 ,this must  be distinguished   
from the normal ,vednta view which holds
  that objectively phenomena are also   
happening1 but that these    #dgh    are
 illusory only in the sense that they   
will not last permanently  and have thus
 only a temporary and relative existence

 in comparison  with the truth or       
reality which is ever the same constant 
and unchangeable entity in all our      
perceptions and in all world-appearance4
  ,according to the other view phenomena
 are not  objectively existent but are  
only subjectively imagined2 so that  the
 jug ,i see had no existence before ,i  
happened to have the  perception that   
there was the jug2 as soon as the jug   
illusion  occurred to me ,i said that   
there was the jug1 but it did not exist 
before4 ,as soon as ,i had the          
perception there was the illusion1  and 
there was no other reality apart from   
the illusion4 ,it is therefore  called  
the theory of drstisrstivda1 i4e4 the   
theory that the  subjective perception  
is the creating of the objects and that 
there  are no other objective phenomena 
apart from subjective perceptions4  ,in 
the normal ,vednta view however the     
objects of  the world are existent as   
phenomena by the sense-contact with     
which the subjective perceptions are    

created4 ,the objective  phenomena in   
themselves are of course but            
modifications of ajna1  but still these 
phenomena of the ajna are there as the  
common  ground for the experience of    
all4 ,this therefore has an objective   
epistemology whereas the drstisrstivda  
has no proper  epistemology1 for the    
experiences of each person are          
determined  by his own subjective avidy 
and previous impressions as             
modifications  of the avidy4 ,the       
drstisrstivda theory approaches  nearest
 to the ,vijnavda ,buddhism1 only with  
this difference  that while ,buddhism   
does not admit of any permanent being   
,vednta admits the ,brahman1 the        
permanent unchangeable  reality as the  
only truth1 whereas the illusory and    
momentary  perceptions are but          
impositions on it4    ,the mental and   
physical phenomena are alike in this1   
that  both are modifications of ajna4   
,it is indeed difficult to  comprehend  
the nature of ajna1 though its presence 

in consciousness  can be perceived1 and 
though by dialectic criticism  all our  
most well-founded notions seem to vanish
 away and  become self-contradictory and
 indefinable4 ,vednta explains  the     
reason of this difficulty as due to the 
fact that all these  indefinable forms  
and names can only be experienced as    
modes  of the real1 the self-luminous4  
,our innate error which we continue     
from beginningless time consists in     
this1 that the real in  its full        
complete light is ever hidden from us1  
and the glimpse    #dgi    that we get  
of it is always through manifestations  
of forms  and names2 these phenomenal   
forms and names are undefinable1        
incomprehensible1 and unknowable in     
themselves1 but under  certain          
conditions they are manifested by the   
self-luminous real1  and at the time    
they are so manifested they seem to have
 a  positive being which is undeniable4 
,this positive being is only  the       
highest being1 the real which appears as

 the being of those forms  and names4 ,a
 lump of clay may be moulded into a     
plate or a  cup1 but the plate-form or  
the cup-form has no existence or being  
apart from the being of the clay2 it is 
the being of the clay that  is imposed  
on the diverse forms which also then    
seem to have  being in themselves4 ,our 
illusion thus consists in mutually      
misattributing  the characteristics of  
the unreal forms--the modes of  ajna and
 the real being4 ,as this illusion is   
the mode of all our  experience and its 
very essence1 it is indeed difficult for
 us to  conceive of the ,brahman as     
apart from the modes of ajna4  ,moreover
 such is the nature of ajnas that they  
are knowable  only by a false           
identification of them with the         
self-luminous  ,brahman or tman4 ,being 
as such is the highest truth1 the       
,brahman4 ,the ajna states are not      
non-being in the sense of  nothing of   
pure negation 7abhva71 but in the sense 
that they are  not being4 ,being that is

 the self-luminous illuminates          
non-being1  the ajna1 and this          
illumination means nothing more than a  
false identification of being with      
non-being4 ,the forms of ajna  if they  
are to be known must be associated with 
pure consciousness1  and this           
association means an illusion1          
superimposition1 and  mutual            
misattribution4 ,but apart from pure    
consciousness these  cannot be          
manifested or known1 for it is pure     
consciousness alone  that is            
self-luminous4 ,thus when we try to know
 the ajna  states in themselves as apart
 from the tman we fail in a dilemma1    
for knowledge means illusory            
superimposition or illusion1 and  when  
it is not knowledge they evidently      
cannot be known4 ,thus  apart from its  
being a factor in our illusory          
experience no other  kind of its        
existence is known to us4 ,if ajna had  
been a non-entity  altogether it could  
never come at all1 if it were a positive

  entity then it would never cease to   
be2 the ajna thus is a  mysterious      
category midway between being and       
non-being and  undefinable in every way2
 and it is on account of this that it is
  called tattvnyatvbhym anirvcya or     
undefinable and undeterminable  either  
as real or unreal4 ,it is real in the   
sense that it is    #dhj    a necessary 
postulate of our phenomenal experience  
and unreal  in its own nature1 for apart
 from its connection with consciousness 
it is incomprehensible and undefinable4 
,its forms even while they  are         
manifested in consciousness are         
self-contradictory and incomprehensible 
as to their real nature or mutual       
relation1 and  comprehensible only so   
far as they are manifested in           
consciousness1  but apart from these no 
rational conception of them can be      
formed4 ,thus it is impossible to say   
anything about the ajna  7for no        
knowledge of it is possible7 save so far
 as manifested in  consciousness and    

depending on this the ,drstisrstivdins  
asserted  that our experience was       
inexplicably produced under the         
influence  of avidy and that beyond that
 no objective common ground  could be   
admitted4 ,but though this has the      
general assent of  ,vednta and is       
irrefutable in itself1 still for the    
sake of explaining  our common sense    
view 7pratikarmavyavasath7 we may  think
 that we have an objective world before 
us as the common  field of experience4  
,we can also imagine a scheme of things 
and  operations by which the phenomenon 
of our experience may be  interpreted in
 the light of the ,vednta metaphysics4  
,the subject can be conceived in three  
forms3 firstly as the  tman1 the one    
highest reality1 secondly as jva or the 
tman as  limited by its psychosis1 when 
the psychosis is not differentiated     
from the tman1 but tman is regarded as  
identical with the psychosis  thus      
appearing as a living and knowing being1
 as jvasksi or  perceiving              

consciousness1 or the aspect in which   
the jva comprehends1  knows1 or         
experiences2 thirdly the antahkarana    
psychosis or  mind which is an inner    
centre or bundle of avidy               
manifestations1  just as the outer world
 objects are exterior centres of  avidy 
phenomena or objective entities4 ,the   
antahkarana is not  only the avidy      
capable of supplying all forms to our   
present experiences1  but it also       
contains all the tendencies and modes of
  past impressions of experience in this
 life or in past lives4 ,the            
antahkarana is always turning the       
various avidy modes of it into  the     
jvasksi 7jva in its aspect as           
illuminating mental states71 and  these 
are also immediately manifested1 made   
known1 and transformed  into experience4
 ,these avidy states of the antahkarana 
are called its vrttis or states4 ,the   
specific peculiarity of the  vrttiajnas 
is this that only in these forms can    
they be superimposed  upon pure         

consciousness1 and thus be interpreted  
as states of consciousness  and have    
their indefiniteness or cover removed4  
,the    #dha    forms of ajna remain as 
indefinite and hidden or veiled only  so
 long as they do not come into relation 
to these vrttis of  antahkarana1 for the
 ajna can be destroyed by the cit only  
in the  form of a vrtti1 while in all   
other forms the ajna veils the cit  from
 manifestation4 ,the removal of         
ajna-vrttis of the antahkarana  or the  
manifestation of vrtti-jna is nothing   
but this1 that  the antahkarana states  
of avidy are the only states of ajna    
which can be superimposed upon the      
self-luminous tman  7adhysa1 false      
attribution74 ,the objective world      
consists of the  avidy phenomena with   
the self as its background4 ,its        
objectivity  consists in this that avidy
 in this form cannot be superimposed  on
 the self-luminous cit but exists only  
as veiling the cit4 ,these  avidy       
phenomena may be regarded as many and   

diverse1 but in  all these forms they   
serve only to veil the cit and are      
beyond  consciousness4 ,it is only when 
they come in contact with the avidy     
phenomena as antahkarana states that    
they coalesce with the  avidy states and
 render themselves objects of           
consciousness or  have their veil of    
varana removed4 ,it is thus assumed that
 in  ordinary perceptions of objects    
such as jug1 etc4 the antahkarana  goes 
out of the man's body 7s'arramadhyt7 and
 coming in  touch with the jug becomes  
transformed into the same form1  and as 
soon as this transformation takes place 
the cit which  is always steadily       
shining illuminates the jug-form or the 
jug4  ,the jug phenomena in the         
objective world could not be manifested 
7though these were taking place on the  
background of  the same self-luminous   
,brahman or tman as forms of the highest
  truth of my subjective consciousness7 
because the ajna phenomena  in these    
forms serve to veil their illuminator1  

the self-luminous4  ,it was only by     
coming into contact with these phenomena
  that the antahkarana could be         
transformed into corresponding  states  
and that the illumination dawned which  
at once revealed  the antahkarana states
 and the objects with which these states
 or  vrttis had coalesced4 ,the         
consciousness manifested through the    
vrttis alone has the power of removing  
the ajna veiling the  cit4 ,of course   
there are no actual distinctions of     
inner or outer1  or the cit within me   
and the cit without me4 ,these are only 
of  appearance and due to avidy4 ,and it
 is only from the point of  view of     
appearance that we suppose that         
knowledge of objects  can only dawn when
 the inner cit and the outer cit unite  
together  through the antahkaranavrtti1 
which makes the external objects    #dhb
    translucent as it were by its own   
translucence1 removes the ajna  which   
was veiling the external self-luminous  
cit and reveals the  object phenomena by

 the very union of the cit as reflected 
through it and the cit as underlying the
 object phenomena4 ,the  pratyaksa-pram 
or right knowledge by perception is the 
cit1 the  pure consciousness1 reflected 
through the vrtti and identical with    
the cit as the background of the object 
phenomena revealed by  it4 ,from the    
relative point of view we may thus      
distinguish three  consciousnesses3 7#a7
 consciousness as the background of     
objective  phenomena1 7#b7 consciousness
 as the background of the jva  or pramt1
 the individual1 7#c7 consciousness     
reflected in the vrtti  of the          
antahkarana2 when these three unite     
perception is effected4    ,pram or     
right knowledge means in ,vednta the    
acquirement  of such new knowledge as   
has not been contradicted by  experience
 7abdhita74 ,there is thus no absolute  
definition of  truth4 ,a knowledge      
acquired can be said to be true only so 
long  as it is not contradicted4 ,thus  
the world appearance though it  is very 

true now1 may be rendered false1 when   
this is contradicted  by right knowledge
 of ,brahman as the one reality4 ,thus  
the  knowledge of the world appearance  
is true now1 but not true  absolutely4  
,the only absolute truth is the pure    
consciousness  which is never           
contradicted in any experience at any   
time4 ,the  truth of our world-knowledge
 is thus to be tested by finding out    
whether it will be contradicted at any  
stage of world experience  or not4 ,that
 which is not contradicted by later     
experience is to  be regarded as true1  
for all world knowledge as a whole will 
be  contradicted when ,brahma-knowledge 
is realized4    ,the inner experiences  
of pleasure and pain also are generated 
by a false identification of antahkarana
 transformations as  pleasure or pain   
with the self1 by virtue of which are   
generated  the perceptions1 ,i am happy1
 or ,i am sorry4 ,in continuous         
perception of anything for a certain    
time as an object  or as pleasure1 etc4 

the mental state or vrtti is said to    
last in the  same way all the while so  
long as any other new form is not  taken
 up by the antahkarana for the          
acquirement of any new  knowledge4 ,in  
such case when ,i infer that there is   
fire on the  hill that ,i see1 the hill 
is an object of perception1 for the     
antahkarana  vrtti is one with it1 but  
that there is fire in it is a matter  of
 inference1 for the antahkarana vrtti   
cannot be in touch with the  fire2 so in
 the same experience there may be two   
modes of    #dhc    mental modification1
 as perception in seeing the hill1 and  
as  inference in inferring the fire in  
the hill4 ,in cases of acquired         
perception1 as when on seeing sandal    
wood ,i think that it is  odoriferous   
sandal wood1 it is pure perception so   
far as the sandal  wood is concerned1 it
 is inference or memory so far as ,i    
assert it  to be odoriferous4 ,vednta   
does not admit the existence of the     
relation called samavya 7inherence7 or  

jti 7class notion72 and  so does not    
distinguish perception as a class as    
distinct from the  other class called   
inference1 and holds that both          
perception and  inference are but       
different modes of the transformations  
of the  antahkarana reflecting the cit  
in the corresponding vrttis4 ,the       
perception is thus nothing but the cit  
manifestation in the antahkarana  vrtti 
transformed into the form of an object  
with which it is  in contact4           
,perception in its objective aspect is  
the identity of  the cit underlying the 
object with the subject1 and perception 
in  the subjective aspect is regarded as
 the identity of the subjective  cit    
with the objective cit4 ,this identity  
of course means that  through the vrtti 
the same reality subsisting in the      
object and  the subject is realized1    
whereas in inference the thing to be    
inferred1  being away from contact with 
antahkarana1 has apparently  a different
 reality from that manifested in the    

states of consciousness4  ,thus         
perception is regarded as the mental    
state representing  the same identical  
reality in the object and the subject by
  antahkarana contact1 and it is held   
that the knowledge produced  by words   
7e4g4 this is the same ,devadatta7      
referring identically  to the same thing
 which is seen 7e4g4 when ,i see        
,devadatta  before me another man says  
this is ,devadatta1 and the knowledge   
produced by this is ,devadatta though a 
verbal 7s'bda7  knowledge is to be      
regarded as perception1 for the         
antahkarana  vrtti is the same7 is to be
 regarded as perception or pratyaksa4   
,the content of these words 7this is    
,devadatta7 being the same  as the      
perception1 and there being no new      
relationing knowledge as  represented in
 the proposition this is ,devadatta     
involving the  unity of two terms this  
and ,devadatta with a copula1 but  only 
the indication of one whole as          
,devadatta under visual perception      

already experienced1 the knowledge      
proceeding from  this is ,devadatta is  
regarded as an example of nirvikalpa    
knowledge4 ,so on the occasion of the   
rise of ,brahma-consciousness  when the 
preceptor instructs thou art ,brahman   
the  knowledge proceeding from the      
sentence is not savikalpa1 for    #dhd  
though grammatically there are two ideas
 and a copula1 yet  from the point of   
view of intrinsic significance 7ttparya7
 one  identical reality only is         
indicated4 ,vednta does not distinguish 
nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual      
perception1 but only in s'bda           
perception as in cases referred to      
above4 ,in all such cases the  condition
 for nirvikalpa is that the notion      
conveyed by the  sentence should be one 
whole or one identical reality1 whereas 
in savikalpa perception we have a       
combination of different  ideas as in   
the sentence1 the king's man is coming  
7rjapurusa  gacchat74 ,here no identical
 reality is signified1 but what is      

signified is the combination of two or  
three different concepts ,footnote  ref 
#a4    ,it is not out of place to       
mention in this connection that  ,vednta
 admits all the six pramnas of ,kumrila 
and considers  like ,mmms that all      
knowledge is self-valid 7svatah-pramna74
  ,but pram has not the same meaning in 
,vednta  as in ,mmms4 ,there as we      
remember pram meant the  knowledge which
 goaded one to practical action and as  
such  all knowledge was pram1 until     
practical experience showed the  course 
of action in accordance with which it   
was found to be  contradicted4 ,in      
,vednta however there is no reference to
 action1  but pram means only           
uncontradicted cognition4 ,to the       
definition  of self-validity as given by
 ,mmms ,vednta adds another  objective  
qualification1 that such knowledge can  
have svatah-prmnya  as is not vitiated  
by the presence of any dosa 7cause  of  
error1 such as defect of senses or the  
like74 ,vednta of course  does not think

 like ,nyya that positive conditions    
7e4g4 correspondence1  etc47 are        
necessary for the validity of knowledge1
  nor does it divest knowledge of all   
qualifications like the  ,mmmsists1 for 
whom all knowledge is self-valid as     
such4 ,it  adopts a middle course and   
holds that absence of dosa is a         
necessary  condition for the            
self-validity of knowledge4 ,it is clear
 that  this is a compromise1 for        
whenever an external condition has to   
be admitted1 the knowledge cannot be    
regarded as self-valid1  but ,vednta    
says that as it requires only a negative
 condition  for the absence of dosa1 the
 objection does not apply to it1 and it 
holds that if it depended on the        
presence of any positive condition  for 
proving the validity of knowledge like  
the ,nyya1  then only its theory of     
self-validity would have been damaged4  
,but since it wants only a negative     
condition1 no blame can be              
,footnote #a3 ,see ,vedntaparibhs and   

,s'ikhmani4    #dhe    attributed to its
 theory of self-validity4 ,vednta was   
bound to  follow this slippery middle   
course1 for it could not say that the   
pure cit reflected in consciousness     
could require anything else  for        
establishing its validity1 nor could it 
say that all phenomenal  forms of       
knowledge were also all valid1 for then 
the world-appearance  would come to be  
valid2 so it held that knowledge  could 
be regarded as valid only when there was
 no dosa  present2 thus from the        
absolute point of view all              
world-knowledge  was false and had no   
validity1 because there was the         
avidy-dosa1 and in the ordinary sphere  
also that knowledge was  valid in which 
there was no dosa4 ,validity 7prmnya7   
with  ,mmms meant the capacity that     
knowledge has to goad us to  practical  
action in accordance with it1 but with  
,vednta it meant  correctness to facts  
and want of contradiction4 ,the absence 
of  dosa being guaranteed there is      

nothing which can vitiate the           
correctness of knowledge ,footnote ref  
#a4      ,vednta ,theory of ,illusion4  
,we have already seen that the ,mmmsists
 had asserted that  all knowledge was   
true simply because it was knowledge    
7yathrthh  sarve vivdaspadbhth pratyayh 
pratyayatvt74 ,even  illusions were     
explained by them as being              
non-perception of the  distinction      
between the thing perceived 7e4g4 the   
conch-shell71 and  the thing remembered 
7e4g4 silver74 ,but ,vednta objects to  
this1  and asks how there can be        
non-distinction between a thing which   
is clearly perceived and a thing which  
is remembered8 ,if it is  said that it  
is merely a non-perception of the       
non-association 7i4e4  non-perception of
 the fact that this is not connected    
with silver71  then also it cannot be1  
for then it is on either side mere      
negation1  and negation with ,mmms is   
nothing but the bare presence of the    
locus of negation 7e4g4 negation of jug 

on the ground is nothing but  the bare  
presence of the ground71 or in other    
words non-perception  of the            
non-association of silver and this means
 barely  and merely the silver and this4
 ,even admitting for argument's  sake   
that the distinction between two things 
or two ideas  is not perceived1 yet     
merely from such a negative aspect no   
one  could be tempted to move forward to
 action 7such as stooping  down to pick 
up a piece of illusory silver74 ,it is  
positive        ,footnote #a3 ,see      
,vedntaparibhs1 ,s'ikhmani1 ,maniprabh  
and ,citsukha  on svatahprmanya4    #dhf
    conviction or perception that can   
lead a man to actual practical          
movement4 ,if again it is said that it  
is the general and imperfect  perception
 of a thing 7which has not been properly
 differentiated  and comprehended7      
before me1 which by the memory of silver
  appears to be like true silver before 
me and this generates the  movement for 
picking it up1 then this also is        

objectionable4 ,for  the appearance of  
the similarity with real silver cannot  
lead us  to behave with the thing before
 me as if it were real silver4 ,thus  ,i
 may perceive that gavaya 7wild ox7 is  
similar to cow1 but despite  this       
similarity ,i am not tempted to behave  
with the gavaya as  if it were a cow4   
,thus in whatever way the ,mmams        
position  may be defined it fails       
,footnote ref l4 ,vednta thinks that the
 illusion  is not merely subjective1 but
 that there is actually a phenomenon  of
 illusion as there are phenomena of     
actual external objects2  the difference
 in the two cases consists in this1 that
 the illusion  is generated by the dosa 
or defect of the senses etc41 whereas   
the  phenomena of external objects are  
not due to such specific dosas4  ,the   
process of illusory perception in       
,vedanta may be described  thus4 ,first 
by the contact of the senses vitiated by
 dosas a  mental state as thisness with 
reference to the thing before me  is    

generated2 then in the thing as this and
 in the mental state  of the form of    
that this the cit is reflected4 ,then   
the avidy  7nescience7 associated with  
the cit is disturbed by the presence  of
 the dosa1 and this disturbance along   
with the impression of  silver          
remembered through similarity is        
transformed into the  appearance of     
silver4 ,there is thus an objective     
illusory silver  appearance1 as well as 
a similar transformation of the mental  
state  generated by its contact with the
 illusory silver4 ,these two            
transformations1 the silver state of the
 mind and external phenomenal  illusory 
silver state1 are manifested by the     
perceiving consciousness                
7sksicaitanya74 ,there are thus here two
 phenomenal transformations1  one in the
 avidy states forming the illusory      
objective silver  phenomenon1 and       
another in the antahkarana-vrtti or mind
 state4  ,but in spite of there being   
two distinct and separate phenomena1    

their object being the same as the this 
in perception1 we have  one knowledge of
 illusion4 ,the special feature of this 
theory of  illusion is that an          
indefinable 7anirvacanya-khyti7 illusory
 silver  is created in every case where 
an illusory perception of silver        
occurs4 ,there are three orders of      
reality in ,vednta1 namely the          
,footnote #a3 ,see                      
,vivarana-prameya-samgraha and          
,nyyamakaranda on  akhyti refutation4   
#dhg    pramrthika or absolute1         
vyavahrika or practical ordinary        
experience1 and prtibhsika1 illusory4   
,the first one represents  the absolute 
truth2 the other two are false          
impressions due  to dosa4 ,the          
difference between vyavahrika and       
prtibhsika  is that the dosa of the     
vyavahrika perception is neither        
discovered  nor removed until salvation1
 whereas the dosa of the  prtibhsika    
reality which occurs in many extraneous 
forms 7such  as defect of the senses1   

sleep1 etc47 is perceived in the world  
of  our ordinary experience1 and thus   
the prtibhsika experience  lasts for a  
much shorter period than the vyavahrika4
 ,but just  as the vyavahrika world is  
regarded as phenomenal modifications  of
 the ajna1 as apart from our subjective 
experience and  even before it1 so the  
illusion 7e4g4 of silver in the         
conch-shell7 is  also regarded as a     
modification of avidy1 an undefinable   
creation  of the object of illusion1 by 
the agency of the dosa4 ,thus in the    
case of the illusion of silver in the   
conch-shell1 indefinable silver  is     
created by the dosa in association with 
the senses1 which is  called the        
creation of an indefinable 7anirvacanya7
 silver of illusion4  ,here the cit     
underlying the conch-shell remains the  
same  but the avidy of antahkarana      
suffers modifications 7parinma7  on     
account of dosa1 and thus gives rise to 
the illusory creation4  ,the illusory   
silver is thus vivartta 7appearance7    

from the point  of view of the cit and  
parinma from the point of view of       
avidy1 for the difference between       
vivartta and parinma is1 that  in the   
former the transformations have a       
different reality from  the cause 7cit  
is different from the appearance imposed
 on it71  while in the latter case the  
transformations have the same reality   
as the transforming entity 7appearance  
of silver has the same  stuff as the    
avidy whose transformations it is74 ,but
 now a  difficulty arises that if the   
illusory perception of silver is due to 
a coalescing of the cit underlying the  
antahkarana-vrtti as modified  by dosa  
and the object--cit as underlying the   
this before  me 7in the illusion of this
 is silver71 then ,i ought to have the  
experience that ,i am silver like ,i am 
happy and not that  this is silver2 the 
answer is1 that as the coalescing takes 
place  in connection with my previous   
notion as this1 the form of  the        
knowledge also is this is silver1       

whereas in the notion  ,i am happy1 the 
notion of happiness takes place in      
connection  with a previous vrtti of ,i4
 ,thus though the coalescing  of the two
 cits is the same in both cases1 yet in 
one case the    #dhh    knowledge takes 
the form of ,i am1 and in another as    
this is  according as the previous      
impression is ,i or this4 ,in dreams    
also the dream perceptions are the same 
as the illusory perception  of silver in
 the conch-shell4 ,there the illusory   
creations are  generated through the    
defects of sleep1 and these creations   
are  imposed upon the cit4 ,the dream   
experiences cannot be regarded  merely  
as memory-products1 for the perception  
in dream is in the  form that ,i see    
that ,i ride in the air on chariots1    
etc4 and not  that ,i remember the      
chariots4 ,in the dream state all the   
senses  are inactive1 and therefore     
there is no separate objective cit      
there1  but the whole dream experience  
with all characteristics of space1      

time1 objects1 etc4 is imposed upon the 
cit4 ,the objection that  since the     
imposition is on the pure cit the       
imposition ought to  last even in waking
 stages1 and that the dream experiences 
ought  to continue even in waking life1 
does not hold2 for in the waking  stages
 the antahkarana is being constantly    
transformed into different  states on   
the expiry of the defects of sleep1     
etc41 which were  causing the dream     
cognitions4 ,this is called nivrtti     
7negation7  as distinguished from bdha  
7cessation74 ,the illusory creation of  
dream experiences may still be there on 
the pure cit1 but these  cannot be      
experienced any longer1 for there being 
no dosa of  sleep the antahkarana is    
active and suffering modifications in   
accordance with the objects presented   
before us4 ,this is what is  called     
nivrtti1 for though the illusion is     
there ,i cannot experience  it1 whereas 
bdha or cessation occurs when the       
illusory creation  ceases1 as when on   

finding out the real nature of the      
conch-shell  the illusion of silver     
ceases1 and we feel that this is not    
silver1 this  was not and will not be   
silver4 ,when the conch-shell is        
perceived  as silver1 the silver is felt
 as a reality1 but this feeling of      
reality  was not an illusory creation1  
though the silver was an objective      
illusory creation2 for the reality in   
the s'ukti 7conch-shell7 is  transferred
 and felt as belonging to the illusion  
of silver imposed upon  it4 ,here we see
 that the illusion of silver has two    
different kinds  of illusion            
comprehended in it4 ,one is the creation
 of an indefinable  silver              
7anirvacanya-rajatotpatti7 and the other
 is the attribution  of the reality     
belonging to the conch-shell to the     
illusory  silver imposed upon it1 by    
which we feel at the time of the        
illusion  that it is a reality4 ,this is
 no doubt the anyathkhyti  form of      
illusion as advocated by ,nyya4 ,vednta 

admits that  when two things 7e4g4 red  
flower and crystal7 are both present    
#dhi    before my senses1 and ,i        
attribute the quality of one to the     
other  by illusion 7e4g4 the illusion   
that the crystal is red71 then the      
illusion  is of the form of anyathkhyti2
 but if one of the things is not        
present before my senses and the other  
is1 then the illusion is not  of the    
anyathkhyti type1 but of the            
anirvacanyakhyti type4  ,vednta could   
not avoid the former type of illusion1  
for it believed  that all appearance of 
reality in the world-appearance  was    
really derived from the reality of      
,brahman1 which was self-luminous  in   
all our experiences4 ,the world         
appearance is an  illusory creation1 but
 the sense of reality that it carries   
with it  is a misattribution            
7anyathkhyti7 of the characteristic of  
the  ,brahman to it1 for ,brahman alone 
is the true and the real1 which         
manifests itself as the reality of all  

our illusory world-experience1  just as 
it is the reality of s'ukti that gives  
to the appearance of  silver its        
reality4        ,vednta ,ethics and     
,vednta ,emancipation4    ,vednta says  
that when a duly qualified man takes to 
the  study of ,vednta and is instructed 
by the preceptor--,thou  art that       
7,brahman71 he attains the emancipating 
knowledge1  and the world-appearance    
becomes for him false and illusory4     
,the qualifications necessary for the   
study of ,vednta are 7#a7  that the     
person having studied all the ,vedas    
with the proper  accessories1 such as   
grammar1 lexicon etc4 is in full        
possession of  the knowledge of the     
,vedas1 7#b7 that either in this life or
 in another1  he must have performed    
only the obligatory ,vedic duties 7such 
as daily prayer1 etc4 called            
nitya-karma7 and occasionally obligatory
  duty 7such as the birth ceremony at   
the birth of a son1  called             
naimittika-karma7 and must have avoided 

all actions for  the fulfilment of      
selfish desires 7kmya-karmas1 such as   
the  performance of sacrifices for going
 to ,heaven7 and all prohibited  actions
 7e4g4 murder1 etc4 nisiddha-karma7 in  
such a  way that his mind is purged of  
all good and bad actions 7no  karma is  
generated by the nitya and              
naimittika-karma1 and as  he has not    
performed the kmya and prohibited       
karmas1 he has  acquired no new karma74 
,when he has thus properly purified  his
 mind and is in possession of the four  
virtues or means of  fitting the mind   
for ,vednta instruction 7called sdhana7 
he  can regard himself as properly      
qualified for the ,vednta instruction4  
,these virtues are 7#a7 knowledge of    
what is eternal    #dij    and what is  
transient1 7#b7 disinclination to       
enjoyments of this  life and of the     
heavenly life after death1 7#c7 extreme 
distaste for  all enjoyments1 and       
anxiety for attaining the means of right
 knowledge1  7#d7 control over the      

senses by which these are restrained    
from everything but that which aids the 
attainment of right  knowledge 7dama71  
7a7 having restrained them1 the         
attainment  of such power that these    
senses may not again be tempted towards 
worldly enjoyments 7uparati71 7b7 power 
of bearing extremes  of heat1 cold1     
etc41 7c7 employment of mind towards the
 attainment  of right knowledge1 7d7    
faith in the instructor and  ,upanisads2
 7#e7 strong desire to attain salvation4
 ,a man possessing  the above qualities 
should try to understand correctly  the 
true purport of the ,upanisads 7called  
s'ravana71 and by  arguments in favour  
of the purport of the ,upanisads to     
strengthen his conviction as stated in  
the ,upanisads 7called  manana7 and then
 by nididhysana 7meditation7 which      
includes  all the ,yoga processes of    
concentration1 try to realize the truth 
as one4 ,vednta therefore in ethics     
covers the ground of  ,yoga2 but while  
for ,yoga emancipation proceeds from    

understanding  the difference between   
purusa and prakrti1 with ,vednta        
salvation comes by the dawn of right    
knowledge that ,brahman  alone is the   
true reality1 his own self ,footnote ref
 #a4 ,mmms asserts  that the ,vedas do  
not declare the knowledge of one        
,brahman to be the  supreme goal1 but   
holds that all persons should act in    
accordance  with the ,vedic injunctions 
for the attainment of good  and the     
removal of evil4 ,but ,vednta holds that
 though the  purport of the earlier     
,vedas is as ,mmms has it1 yet this  is 
meant only for ordinary people1 whereas 
for the elect the  goal is clearly as   
the ,upanisads indicate it1 namely the  
attainment  of the highest knowledge4   
,the performance of ,vedic  duties is   
intended only for ordinary men1 but yet 
it was  believed by many 7e4g4 ,vcaspati
 ,mis'ra and his followers7 that  due   
performance of ,vedic duties helped a   
man to acquire a  great keenness for the
 attainment of right knowledge2 others  

believed 7e4g4 ,praks'tm and his        
followers7 that it served to  bring     
about suitable opportunities by securing
 good preceptors1  etc4 and to remove   
many obstacles from the way so that it  
became  easier for a person to attain   
the desired right knowledge4  ,in the   
acquirement of ordinary knowledge the   
ajnas removed        ,footnote #a3 ,see 
,vedntasra and ,advaitabrahmasiddhi4    
#dia    are only smaller states of ajna1
 whereas when the  ,brahma-knowledge    
dawns the ajna as a whole is removed4   
,brahma-knowledge at the stage of its   
first rise is itself also a  state of   
knowledge1 but such is its special      
strength that when  this knowledge once 
dawns1 even the state of knowledge which
  at first reflects it 7and which being 
a state is itself ajna  modification7 is
 destroyed by it4 ,the state itself     
being destroyed1  only the pure infinite
 and unlimited ,brahman shines forth in 
its  own true light4 ,thus it is said   
that just as fire riding on a piece  of 

wood would burn the whole city and after
 that would burn  the very same wood1 so
 in the last state of mind the          
,brahma-knowledge  would destroy all the
 illusory world-appearance and  at last 
destroy even that final state ,footnote 
ref l4    ,the mukti stage is one in    
which the pure light of ,brahman  as the
 identity of pure intelligence1 being   
and complete bliss  shines forth in its 
unique glory1 and all the rest vanishes 
as  illusory nothing4 ,as all being of  
the world-appearance is but  limited    
manifestations of that one being1 so all
 pleasures also  are but limited        
manifestations of that supreme bliss1 a 
taste  of which we all can get in deep  
dreamless sleep4 ,the being  of ,brahman
 however is not an abstraction from all 
existent  beings as the satt 7being as  
class notion7 of the naiyyika1 but  the 
concrete1 the real1 which in its aspect 
as pure consciousness  and pure bliss is
 always identical with itself4 ,being   
7sat7 is pure  bliss and pure           

consciousness4 ,what becomes of the     
avidy during  mukti 7emancipation7 is as
 difficult for one to answer as the     
question1 how the avidy came forth and  
stayed during the world-appearance4  ,it
 is best to remember that the category  
of the  indefinite avidy is indefinite  
as regards its origin1 manifestation    
and destruction4 ,vednta however        
believes that even when the  true       
knowledge has once been attained1 the   
body may last for a  while1 if the      
individual's previously ripened karmas  
demand it4  ,thus the emancipated person
 may walk about and behave like  an     
ordinary sage1 but yet he is emancipated
 and can no longer  acquire any new     
karma4 ,as soon as the fruits due to his
 ripe  karmas are enjoyed and exhausted1
 the sage loses his body and  there will
 never be any other birth for him1 for  
the dawn of  perfect knowledge has burnt
 up for him all budding karmas of       
beginningless previous lives1 and he is 
no longer subject to any                

,footnote #a3,siddhntales'a4    #dib    
of the illusions subjective or objective
 which could make any  knowledge1       
action1 or feeling possible for him4    
,such a man is  called jvanmukta1 i4e4  
emancipated while living4 ,for him all  
world-appearance has ceased4 ,he is the 
one light burning alone  in himself     
where everything else has vanished for  
ever from the  stage ,footnote ref #a4  
,vednta and other ,indian ,systems4     
,vednta is distinctly antagonistic to   
,nyya1 and most of  its powerful        
dialectic criticism is generally        
directed against it4  ,s'ankara himself 
had begun it by showing contradictions  
and  inconsistencies in many of the     
,nyya conceptions1 such as the  theory  
of causation1 conception of the atom1   
the relation of samavya1  the conception
 of jti1 etc ,footnote ref #b4 ,his     
followers carried it to  still greater  
lengths as is fully demonstrated by the 
labours of  ,s'rharsa1 ,citsukha1       
,madhusdana1 etc4 ,it was opposed to    

,mmms so  far as this admitted the      
,nyya-,vais'esika categories1 but agreed
  with it generally as regards the      
pramnas of anumna1 upamiti1  arthpatti1 
s'abda1 and anupalabdhi4 ,it also found 
a great supporter  in ,mmms with its    
doctrine of the self-validity and       
self-manifesting  power of knowledge4   
,but it differed from ,mmms  in the     
field of practical duties and entered   
into many elaborate  discussions to     
prove that the duties of the ,vedas     
referred only to  ordinary men1 whereas 
men of higher order had no ,vedic duties
  to perform but were to rise above them
 and attain the highest  knowledge1 and 
that a man should perform the ,vedic    
duties  only so long as he was not fit  
for ,vednta instruction and  studies4   
,with ,smkhya and ,yoga the relation of 
,vednta seems to  be very close4 ,we    
have already seen that ,vednta had      
accepted  all the special means of      
self-purification1 meditation1 etc41    
that  were advocated by ,yoga4 ,the main

 difference between ,vednta  and ,smkhya
 was this that ,smkhya believed1 that   
the stuff of  which the world consisted 
was a reality side by side with the     
purusas4 ,in later times ,vednta had    
compromised so far with  ,smkhya that it
 also sometimes described my as being   
made  up of sattva1 rajas1 and tamas4   
,vednta also held that according  to    
these three characteristics were formed 
diverse modifications        ,footnote  
#a3 ,see ,pacadas'4    ,footnote #b3    
,see ,s'ankara's refutation of ,nyya1   
,s'ankara-bhsya1 ,,ii4  ii4    #dic     
of the my4 ,thus s'vara is believed to  
possess a mind of pure  sattva alone4   
,but sattva1 rajas and tamas were       
accepted in  ,vednta in the sense of    
tendencies and not as reals as ,smkhya  
held it4 ,moreover1 in spite of all     
modifications that my was  believed to  
pass through as the stuff of the        
world-appearance1 it  was indefinable   
and indefinite1 and in its nature       
different from  what we understand as   

positive or negative4 ,it was an        
unsubstantial  nothing1 a magic entity  
which had its being only so long  as it 
appeared4 ,prakrti also was indefinable 
or rather undemonstrable  as regards its
 own essential nature apart from its    
manifestation1  but even then it was    
believed to be a combination of         
positive reals4 ,it was undefinable     
because so long as the reals  composing 
it did not combine1 no demonstrable     
qualities belonged  to it with which it 
could be defined4 ,my however was       
undemonstrable1  indefinite1 and        
indefinable in all forms2 it was a      
separate category of the indefinite4    
,smkhya believed in the  personal       
individuality of souls1 while for       
,vednta there was only  one soul or     
self1 which appeared as many by virtue  
of the my  transformations4 ,there was  
an adhysa or illusion in ,smkhya  as    
well as in ,vednta2 but in the former   
the illusion was due  to a mere         
non-distinction between prakrti and     

purusa or mere  misattribution of       
characters or identities1 but in ,vednta
 there  was not only misattribution1 but
 a false and altogether indefinable     
creation4 ,causation with ,smkhya meant 
real transformation1  but with ,vednta  
all transformation was mere appearance4 
,though there were so many differences1 
it is however easy to  see that probably
 at the time of the origin of the two   
systems  during the ,upanisad period    
each was built up from very similar     
ideas which differed only in tendencies 
that gradually manifested  themselves   
into the present divergences of the two 
systems4  ,though ,s'ankara laboured    
hard to prove that the ,smkhya  view    
could not be found in the ,upanisads1 we
 can hardly be  convinced by his        
interpretations and arguments4 ,the more
  he argues1 the more we are led to     
suspect that the ,smkhya  thought had   
its origin in the ,upanisads4 ,s'ankara 
and his  followers borrowed much of     
their dialectic form of criticism from  

the ,buddhists4 ,his ,brahman was very  
much like the s'nya  of ,ngrjuna4 ,it is
 difficult indeed to distinguish between
  pure being and pure non-being as a    
category4 ,the debts of  ,sankara to the
 self-luminosity of the ,vijnavda       
,buddhism    #did    can hardly be      
overestimated4 ,there seems to be much  
truth  in the accusations against       
,s'ankara by ,vijna ,bhiksu and  others 
that he was a hidden ,buddhist himself4 
,i am led to  think that ,s'ankara's    
philosophy is largely a compound of     
,vijnavda and ,s'nyavda ,buddhism with  
the ,upanisad  notion of the permanence 
of self superadded4