,,moral ,,science3 ,a ,,compendium ,,of ,,ethics by ,,alexander ,,bain1 ,m4,a41 ,author of ,mental ,science3 ,a ,compendium of ,psychology2 ,the ,senses and the ,intellect2 ,the ,emotions and the ,will2 ,a ,manual ooof ,rhetoric2 ,professor of ,logic in the ,university of ,aberdeen1 etc41 etc41 etc4 #ahfi ,,preface ,the present ,dissertation falls under two divisions4 ,the first division1 entitled ,the ,theory of ,ethics1 gives an account of the questions or points brought into discussion1 and handles at length the two of greatest prominence1 the ,ethical ,standard1 and the ,moral ,faculty4 ,the second division--on ,the ,ethical ,systems--is a full detail of all the systems1 ancient and modern1 by conjoined ,abstract and ,summary4 ,with few exceptions1 an abstract is made of each author's exposition of his own theory1 the fulness being measured by relative importance2 while1 for better comparing and remembering the several theories1 they are summarized at the end1 on a uniform plan4 ,the connection of ,ethics with ,psychology is necessarily intimate2 the leading ethical controversies involve a reference to mind1 and can be settled only by a more thorough understanding of mental processes4 ,although the present volume is properly a continuation of the ,manual of ,psychology and the ,history of ,philosophy1 recently published1 and contains occasional references to that treatise1 it may still be perused as an independent work on the ,ethical ,doctrines and ,systems4 ,a4,b4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,view ,,of ,,ethical ,,questions4 ,i4--,the ,,ethical ,,standard4 ,summary of views4 ,,ii4--,,psychological questions4 #a4 ,the ,moral ,faculty4 #b4 ,the ,freedom of the ,will2 the sources of ,disinterested conduct4 ,,iii4--,the ,,bonum1 ,,summum ,,bonum1 or ,happiness4 ,,iv4--,the ,,classification ,,of ,,duties1 and the ,moral ,code4 ,v4--,relationship of ,ethics to ,,politics4 ,,vi4--,relation to ,theology4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,standard4 #a4 ,ethics1 as a department of ,practice1 is defined by its ,end4 #b4 ,the ,ethical ,end is the welfare of society1 realized through rules of conduct duly enforced4 #c4 ,the ,rules of ,ethics are of two kinds4 ,the first are imposed under a penalty4 ,these are ,laws proper1 or ,obligatory ,morality4 #d4 ,the second are supported by ,rewards2 constituting ,optional ,morality1 ,merit1 ,virtue1 or ,nobleness4 #e4 ,the ,ethical ,end1 or ,morality1 as it has been1 is founded partly in ,utility1 and partly in ,sentiment4 #f4 ,the ,ethical ,end is limited1 according to the view taken of ,moral ,government1 or ,authority3--,distinction between ,security and ,improvement4 #g4 ,morality1 in its essential parts1 is ',eternal and ,immutable2' in other parts1 it varies with custom4 #h4 ,enquiry as to the kind1 of proof that an ,ethical ,standard is susceptible of4 ,the ultimate end of action must be referred to individual judgment4 #i4 ,the judgment of ,mankind is1 with some qualifications1 in favour of ,happiness as the supreme end of conduct4 #aj4 ,the ,ethical end that society is tending to1 is ,happiness1 or ,utility4 #aa4 ,objections against ,utility4 ,i4--,happiness is not the sole aim of human pursuit4 #ab4 ,,ii4--,the consequences of actions are beyond calculation4 #ac4 ,,iii4--,the principle of ,utility contains no motives to seek the happiness of others4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,moral ,,faculty4 #a4 ,question whether the ,moral ,faculty be simple or complex4 #b4 ,arguments in favour of its being simple and intuitive3--,first1 ,our moral judgments are immediate and instantaneous4 #c4 ,secondly1 ,it is a faculty common to all mankind4 #d4 ,thirdly1 ,it is different from any other mental phenomenon4 #e4 ,replies to these ,arguments1 and ,counter-arguments3---,first2 ,immediateness of operation is no proof of an innate origin4 #f4 ,secondly1 ,the alleged similarity of men's moral judgments holds only in a limited degree4 ,answers given by the advocates of an ,innate sentiment1 to the discrepancies4 #g4 ,thirdly1 ,moral right and wrong is not an indivisible property1 but an extensive ,code of regulations4 #h4 ,fourthly1 ,intuition is not sufficient to settle debated questions4 #i4 ,fifthly1 ,it is possible to analyze the ,moral ,faculty3--,estimate of the operation of 7#a7 ,prudence1 7#b7 ,sympathy1 and 7#c7 the ,emotions generally4 #aj4 ,the peculiar attribute of ,rightness arises from the institution of ,government or ,authority4 #aa4 ,the speciality of ,conscience1 or the ,moral ,sentiment1 is identified with our education under ,government1 or ,authority4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,systems4 ,,sokrates4 ,his subjects were ,men and ,society4 ,his ,ethical ,standard indistinctly expressed4 ,resolved ,virtue into ,knowledge4 ,ideal of pursuit--,well-doing4 ,inculcated self-denying ,precepts4 ,political ,theory4 ,connexion of ,ethics with ,theology slender4 ,,plato4 ,review of the ,dialogues containing portions of ,ethical ,theory3--,alkibiades ,i4 discusses ,just and ,unjust4 ,alkibiades ,,ii4 the knowledge of ,good or ,reason4 ,hippias ,minor identifies ,virtue with ,knowledge4 ,minos 7on ,law7 refers everything to the decision of an ,ideal ,wise man4 ,laekes resolves ,courage1 and ,charmides ,temperance1 into ,intelligence or the supreme science of good and evil4 ,lysis 7on ,friendship7 gives the ,idea of the good as the supreme object of affection4 ,menon enquires1 ,is virtue teachable8 and iterates the science of good and evil4 ,protagoras makes ,pleasure the only good1 and ,pain the only evil1 and defines the science of good and evil as the comparison of pleasures and pains4 ,gorgias contradicts ,protagoras1 and sets up ,order or ,discipline as a final end4 ,politikus 7on ,government7 repeats the ,sokratic ideal of the ,one ,wise man4 ,philebus makes ,good a compound of ,pleasure with ,intelligence1 the last predominating4 ,the ,republic assimilates ,society to an ,individual man1 and defines ,justice as the balance of the constituent parts of each4 ,timoeus repeats the doctrine that wickedness is disease1 and not voluntary4 ,the ,laws place all conduct under the prescription of the civil magistrate4 ,summary of ,plato's views4 ,,the ,,cynics ,,and ,,the ,,cyrenaics4 ,cynic succession4 ,the proper description of the tenets of both schools comes under the ,summum ,bonum4 ,the ,cynic ,ideal was the minimum of wants1 and their self-denial was compensated by exemption from fear1 and by pride of superiority4 ,the ,cyrenaic ,,aristippus3--,was the first to maintain that the summum bonum is ,pleasure and the absence of ,pain4 ,future ,pleasures and ,pains taken into the account4 ,his ,psychology of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,,aristotle4 ,abstract of the ,nicomachean ,ethics4 ,book ,first4 ,the ,chief ,good1 or ,highest ,end of human endeavours4 ,great differences of opinion as to the nature of ,happiness4 ,the ,platonic ,idea of the ,good criticised4 ,the ,highest ,end an end-in-itself4 ,virtue referable to the special work of man2 growing out of his mental capacity4 ,external conditions necessary to virtue and happiness4 ,the ,soul subdivided into parts1 each1 having its characteristic virtue or excellence4 ,book ,second4 ,definition and classification of the ,moral virtues4 ,virtue the result of ,habit4 ,doctrine of the ,,mean4 ,the test of virtue to feel no pain4 ,virtue defined 7genus7 an acquirement or a ,state1 7differentia7 a ,mean between extremes4 ,rules for hitting the ,mean4 ,book ,third4 ,the ,voluntary and ,involuntary4 ,deliberate ,preference4 ,virtue and vice are voluntary4 ,the virtues in detail3--,courage ,self-sacrifice implied in ,courage4 ,temperance4 ,book ,fourth4 ,liberality4 ,magnificence4 ,magnanimity4 ,mildness4 ,good-breeding4 ,modesty4 ,book ,fifth4 ,justice3--,universal ,justice includes all virtue4 ,particular ,justice is of two kinds1 ,distributive and ,corrective4 ,book ,sixth4 ,intellectual ,excellences1 or ,virtues of the ,intellect4 ,the ,rational part of the ,soul embraces the ,scientific and the ,deliberative functions4 ,science deals with the necessary4 ,prudence or the ,practical ,reason2 its aims and requisites4 ,in virtue1 good dispositions must be accompanied with ,prudence4 ,book ,seventh4 ,gradations of moral strength and moral weakness4 ,continence and ,incontinence4 ,books ,eighth and ,ninth4 ,friendship3--,grounds of ,friendship4 ,varieties of ,friendship1 corresponding to different objects of liking4 ,friendship between the virtuous is alone perfect4 ,a settled habit1 not a mere passion4 ,equality in friendship4 ,political friendships4 ,explanation of the family affections4 ,rule of reciprocity of services4 ,conflicting obligations4 ,cessation of friendships4 ,goodwill4 ,love felt by benefactors4 ,self-love4 ,does the happy man need friends8 ,book ,tenth4 ,pleasure3--,theories of ,pleasure--,eudoxus1 ,speusippus1 ,plato4 ,pleasure is not ,the ,good4 ,pleasure defined4 ,the pleasures of ,intellect4 ,nature of the ,good or ,happiness resumed4 ,perfect happiness found only in the philosophical life2 second to which is the active social life of the good citizen4 ,happiness of the gods4 ,transition from ,ethics to ,politics4 ,,the ,,stoics4 ,the succession of ,stoical philosophers4 ,theological ,doctrines of the ,stoics3--,the ,divine ,government2 human beings must rise to the comprehension of ,universal ,law2 the soul at death absorbed into the divine essence2 argument from ,design4 ,psychology3--,theory of ,pleasure and ,pain2 theory of the ,will4 ,doctrine of ,happiness or the ,good3--,pain no evil2 discipline of endurance--,apathy4 ,theory of ,virtue3--,subordination of self to the larger interests2 their view of active ,beneficence2 the ,stoical paradoxes2 the idea of ,duty2 consciousness of ,self-improvement4 ,,epicurus4 ,life and writings4 ,his successors4 ,virtue and vice referred by him to ,pleasures and ,pains calculated by ,reason4 ,freedom from ,pain the primary object4 ,regulation of desires4 ,pleasure good if not leading to pain4 ,bodily feeling the foundation of sensibility4 ,mental feelings contain memory and hope4 ,the greatest miseries are from the delusions of hope1 and from the torments of fear4 ,fear of ,death and ,fear of the ,gods4 ,relations with others2 ,justice and ,friendship--both based on reciprocity4 ,virtue and ,happiness inseparable4 ,epicureanism the type of all systems grounded on enlightened self-interest4 ,,the ,,neo-,,platonists4 ,the ,moral ,end to be attained through an intellectual regimen4 ,the soul being debased by its connection with matter1 the aim of human action is to regain the spiritual life4 ,the first step is the practice of the cardinal virtues3 the next the purifying virtues4 ,happiness is the undisturbed life of contemplation4 ,correspondence of the ,ethical1 with the ,metaphysical scheme4 ,,scholastic ,,ethics4 ,,abaelard3--,lays great stress on the subjective element in morality2 highest human good1 love to ,god2 actions judged by intention1 and intention by conscience4 ,,st4 ,,bernard3--,two degrees of virtue1 ,humility and ,love4 ,,john of ,,salisbury3--,combines philosophy and theology2 doctrine of ,happiness2 the lower and higher desires4 ,,alexander ,,of ,,hales4 ,,bonaventura4 ,,albertus ,,magnus4 ,,aquinas3--,aristotelian mode of enquiry as to the end2 ,god the highest good2 true happiness lies in the self-sufficing theoretic intelligence2 virtue2 division of the virtues4 ,,hobbes4 7,abstract of the ,ethical part of ,leviathan74 ,constituents of man's nature4 ,the ,good4 ,pleasure4 ,the simple passions4 ,theory of the ,will4 ,good and evil4 ,conscience4 ,virtue4 ,position of ,ethics in the ,sciences4 ,power1 ,worth1 ,dignity4 ,happiness a perpetual progress2 consequences of the restlessness of desire4 ,natural state of mankind2 a state of enmity and war4 ,necessity of articles of peace1 called ,laws of ,nature4 ,law defined4 ,rights2 ,renunciation of rights2 ,contract2 ,merit4 ,justice4 ,laws of ,gratitude1 ,complaisance1 ,pardon upon repentance4 ,laws against ,cruelty1 ,contumely1 ,pride1 ,arrogance4 ,laws of ,nature1 how far binding4 ,summary4 ,,cumberland4 ,standard of ,moral ,good summed up in ,benevolence4 ,the moral faculty is the ,reason1 apprehending the ,nature of ,things4 ,innate ,ideas an insufficient foundation4 ,will4 ,disinterested action4 ,happiness4 ,moral ,code1 the common good of all rational beings4 ,obligations in respect of giving and of receiving4 ,politics4 ,religion4 ,,cudworth4 ,moral ,good and ,evil cannot be arbitrary4 ,the mind has a power of ,intellection1 above ,sense1 for aiming at the eternal and immutable verities4 ,,clarke4 ,the eternal ,fitness and ,unfitness of ,things determine ,justice1 ,equity1 ,goodness and ,truth1 and lay corresponding obligations upon reasonable creatures4 ,the sanction of ,rewards and ,punishments secondary and additional4 ,our ,duties4 ,,wollaston4 ,resolves good and evil into ,truth and ,falsehood4 ,,locke4 ,arguments against ,innate ,practical ,principles4 ,freedom of the ,will4 ,moral ,rules grounded in law4 ,,butler4 ,characteristics of our ,moral ,perceptions4 ,disinterested ,benevolence a fact of our constitutions4 ,our passions and affections do not aim at self as their immediate end4 ,the ,supremacy of ,conscience established from our moral nature4 ,meanings of ,nature4 ,benevolence not ultimately at variance with ,self-,love4 ,,hutcheson4--,primary feelings of the mind4 ,finer perceptions--,beauty1 ,sympathy1 the ,moral ,sense1 ,social feelings2 the benevolent order of the world suggesting ,natural ,religion4 ,order or subordination of the feelings as ,motives2 position of ,benevolence4 ,the ,moral ,faculty distinct and independent4 ,confirmation of the doctrine from the ,sense of ,honour4 ,happiness4 ,the tempers and characters bearing on happiness4 ,duties to ,god4 ,circumstances affecting the moral good or evil of actions4 ,rights and ,laws4 ,,mandeville4 ,virtue supported solely by self-interest4 ,compassion resolvable into self4 ,pride an important source of moral virtue4 ,private vices1 public benefits4 ,origin of ,society4 ,,hume4 ,question whether ,reason or ,sentiment be the foundation of morals4 ,the esteem for ,benevolence shows that ,utility enters into virtue4 ,proofs that ,justice is founded solely on ,utility4 ,political ,society has utility for its end4 ,the ,laws4 ,why ,utility pleases4 ,qualities useful to ourselves4 ,qualities agreeable 7#a7 to ourselves1 and 7#b7 to others4 ,obligation4 ,the respective share of ,reason and of ,sentiment in moral approbation4 ,benevolence not resolvable into ,self-,love4 ,,price4 ,the distinctions of ,right and ,wrong are perceived by the ,understanding4 ,the ,beauty and ,deformity of ,actions4 ,the feelings have some part in our moral discrimination4 ,self-,love and ,benevolence4 ,good and ill ,desert4 ,obligation4 ,divisions of ,virtue4 ,intention as an element in virtuous action4 ,estimate of degrees of ,virtue and ,vice4 ,,adam ,,smith4 ,illustration of the workings of ,sympathy4 ,mutual sympathy4 ,the ,amiable and the ,respectable ,virtues4 ,how far the several passions are consistent with ,propriety4 ,influences of prosperity and adversity on moral judgments4 ,the ,sense of ,merit and ,demerit4 ,self-approbation4 ,love of ,praise and of ,praiseworthiness4 ,influence and authority of ,conscience4 ,self-partiality2 corrected by the use of ,general ,rules4 ,connexion of ,utility with ,moral ,approbation4 ,influence of ,custom on the ,moral ,sentiments4 ,character of ,virtue4 ,self-command4 ,opinion regarding the theory of the ,moral ,sense4 ,,hartley4 ,account of ,disinterestedness4 ,the ,moral ,sense a product of ,association4 ,,ferguson4 7,note7 ,,reid4 ,duty not to be resolved into ,interest4 ,conscience an original power of the mind4 ,axiomatic first principles of ,morals4 ,objections to the theory of ,utility4 ,,stewart4 ,the ,moral ,faculty an original power4 ,criticism of opposing views4 ,moral ,obligation3 connexion with ,religion4 ,duties4 ,happiness3 classification of pleasures4 ,,brown4 ,moral approbation a simple emotion of the mind4 ,universality of moral distinctions4 ,objections to the theory of ,utility4 ,disinterested sentiment4 ,,paley4 ,the ,moral ,sense not intuitive4 ,happiness4 ,virtue3 its definition4 ,moral ,obligation resolved into the command of ,god4 ,utility a criterion of the ,divine ,will4 ,utility requires us to consider general consequences4 ,rights4 ,duties4 ,,bentham4 ,utility the sole foundation of ,morals4 ,principles adverse to ,utility4 ,the ,four ,sanctions of ,right4 ,comparative estimate of ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,classification of ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,merit and ,demerit4 ,pleasures and pains viewed as ,motives3 some motives are ,social or tutelary1 others ,dissocial or ,self-regarding4 ,dispositions4 ,the consequences of a mischievous act4 ,punishment4 ,private ,ethics 7,prudence7 and ,legislation distinguished2 their respective spheres4 ,,mackintosh4 ,universality of ,moral ,distinctions4 ,antithesis or ,reason and ,passion4 ,it is not virtuous acts but virtuous dispositions that outweigh the pains of self-sacrifice4 ,the moral sentiments have for their objects ,dispositions4 ,utility4 ,development of ,conscience through ,association2 the constituents are ,gratitude1 ,sympathy1 ,resentment and ,shame1 together with ,education4 ,religion must presuppose ,morality4 ,objections to ,utility criticised4 ,duties to ourselves1 an improper expression4 ,reference of moral sentiments to the ,will4 ,,james ,,mill4 ,primary constituents of the ,moral ,faculty--pleasurable and painful sensations4 ,the ,causes of these sensations4 ,the ,ideas of them1 and of their causes4 ,hope1 ,fear2 ,love1 ,joy2 ,hatred1 ,aversion4 ,remote causes of pleasures and pains--,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity1 and their opposites4 ,affections towards our fellow-creatures--,friendship1 ,kindness1 c4 ,motives4 ,dispositions4 ,applications to the virtue of ,prudence4 ,justice--by what motives supported4 ,beneficence4 ,importance in moral training1 of ,praise and ,blame1 and their associations2 the ,moral ,sanction4 ,derivation of ,disinterested ,feelings4 ,,austin4 ,laws defined and classified4 ,the ,divine ,laws2 how are we to know the ,divine ,will8 ,utility the sole criterion4 ,objections to ,utility4 ,criticism of the theory of a ,moral ,sense4 ,prevailing misconceptions as to ,utility4 ,nature of ,law resumed and illustrated4 ,impropriety of the term 'law' as applied to the operations of ,nature4 ,,whewell4 ,opposing schemes of ,morality4 ,proposal to reconcile them4 ,there are some actions ,universally approved4 ,a ,supreme ,rule of ,right to be arrived at by combining partial rules3 these are obtained from the nature of our faculties4 ,the rule of ,speech is ,truth2 ,property supposes ,justice2 the ,affections indicate ,humanity4 ,it is a self-evident maxim that the ,lower parts of our nature are governed by the ,higher4 ,classification of ,springs of ,action4 ,disinterestedness4 ,classification of ,moral ,rules4 ,division of ,rights4 ,,ferrier4 ,question of the ,moral ,sense3 errors on both sides4 ,sympathy passes beyond feeling1 and takes in ,thought or self-consciousness4 ,happiness has two ends--the maintenance of man's ,rational nature1 and ,pleasure4 ,,mansel4 ,the conceptions of ,right and ,wrong are sui generis4 ,the moral law can have no authority unless emanating from a lawgiver4 ,the ,standard is the moral nature1 and not the arbitrary will1 of ,god4 ,,john ,,stuart ,,mill4 ,explanation of what ,utilitarianism consists in4 ,reply to objections against setting up ,happiness as the ,ethical end4 ,ultimate ,sanction of the principle of ,utility3 the ,external and ,internal sanctions2 ,conscience how made up4 ,the sort of ,proof that ,utility is susceptible of3--the evidence that happiness is desirable1 is that men desire it2 it is consistent with ,utility that virtue should be desired for itself4 ,connexion between ,justice and ,utility3--meanings of ,justice2 essentially grounded in ,law2 the sentiments that support ,justice1 are ,self-defence1 and ,sympathy2 ,justice owes its paramount character to the essential of ,security2 there are no immutable maxims of ,justice4 ,,bailey4 ,facts of the human constitution that give origin to moral phenomena3--susceptibility to pleasure and pain1 and to the causes of them2 reciprocation of these2 our expecting reciprocation from others2 sympathy4 ,consideration of our feelings in regard to actions done to us by others4 ,our feelings as spectators of actions done to others by others4 ,actions done to ourselves by others4 ,the different cases combine to modify each other4 ,explanation of the discrepancies of the moral sentiment in different communities4 ,the consequences of actions the only criterion for rectifying the diversities4 ,objections to the happiness-test4 ,the term ,utility unsuitable4 ,disputes as to the origin of moral sentiment in ,reason or in a ,moral ,sense4 ,,spencer4 ,happiness the ultimate1 but not the proximate1 end4 ,moral ,science a deduction from the laws of life and the conditions of existence4 ,there have been1 and still are1 developing in the race1 certain fundamental ,moral ,intuitions4 ,the ,expediency-,morality is transitional4 ,reference to the general theory of ,evolution4 ,,kant4 ,distinguishes between the empirical and the rational mode of treating ,ethics4 ,nothing properly good1 except ,will4 ,subjection of ,will to ,reason4 ,an action done from natural inclination is worthless morally4 ,duty is respect for ,law2 conformity to ,law is the one principle of volition4 ,moral ,law not ascertainable empirically1 it must originate a priori in pure 7practical7 ,reason4 ,the ,hypothetical and ,categorical ,imperatives4 ,imperative of ,prudence4 ,imperative of ,morality4 ,the formula of ,morality4 ,the ends of ,morality4 ,the ,rational nature of man is an end-in-itself4 ,the ,will the source of its own laws--the ,autonomy of the ,will4 ,the ,reason of ,ends4 ,morality alone has intrinsic ,worth or ,dignity4 ,principles founded on the ,heteronomy of the ,will--,happiness1 ,perfection4 ,duty legitimized by the conception of the ,freedom of the ,will1 properly understood4 ,postulates of the pure ,practical ,reason--,freedom1 ,immortality1 ,god4 ,summary4 ,,cousin4 ,analysis of the sentiments aroused in us by human actions4 ,the ,moral ,sentiment made up of a variety of moral judgments--,good and ,evil1 ,obligation1 ,liberty1 ,merit and ,demerit4 ,virtue brings ,happiness4 ,moral ,satisfaction and ,remorse4 ,the ,law of ,duty is conformity to ,reason4 ,the characteristic of ,reason is ,universality4 ,classification of ,duties3--,duties to ,self2 to ,others--,truth1 ,justice1 ,charity4 ,application to ,politics4 ,,jouffroy4 ,each creature has a special nature1 and a special end4 ,man has certain primary passions to be satisfied4 ,secondary passions--the ,useful1 the ,good1 ,happiness4 ,all the faculties controlled by the ,reason4 ,the ,end of ,interest4 ,end of ,universal ,order4 ,morality the expression of divine thought2 identified with the beautiful and the true4 ,the moral law and self-interest coincide4 ,boundaries of the three states--,passion1 ,egoism1 ,moral determination4 ,,ethics ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,view ,,of ,,ethical1 ,,questions4 ,as a preface to the account of the ,ethical ,systems1 and a principle of arrangement1 for the better comparing of them1 we shall review in order the questions that arise in the discussion4 ,i4 ,first of all is the question as to the ,,ethical ,,standard4 ,what1 in the last resort1 is the test1 criterion1 umpire1 appeal1 or ,standard1 in determining ,right and ,wrong8 ,in the concrete language of ,paley1 ,why am ,i obliged to keep my word8 ,the answer to this is the ,theory of ,right and ,wrong1 the essential part of every ,ethical ,system4 ,we may quote the leading answers1 as both explaining and summarizing the chief question of ,ethics1 and more especially of ,modern ,ethics4 #a4 ,it is alleged that the arbitrary ,will of the ,deity1 as expressed in the ,bible1 is the ultimate standard4 ,on this view anything thus commanded is right1 whatever be its consequences1 or however it may clash with our sentiments and reasonings4 #b4 ,it was maintained by ,hobbes1 that the ,sovereign1 acting under his responsibility to ,god1 is the sole arbiter of ,right and ,wrong4 ,as regards ,obligatory ,morality1 this seems at first sight an identical proposition2 morality is another name for law and sovereignty4 ,in the view of ,hobbes1 however1 the sovereign should be a single person1 of absolute authority1 humanly irresponsible1 and irremoveable2 a type of sovereignty repudiated by civilized nations4 #c4 ,it has been held1 in various phraseology1 that a certain fitness1 suitability1 or propriety in actions1 as determined by our ,understanding or ,reason1 is the ultimate test4 ,when a man keeps his word1 there is a certain congruity or consistency between the action and the occasion1 between the making of a promise and its fulfilment2 and wherever such congruity is discernible1 the action is right4 ,this is the view of ,cudworth1 ,clarke1 and ,price4 ,it may be called the ,intellectual or ,rational theory4 ,a special and more abstract form of the same theory is presented in the dictum of ,kant--'act in such a way that your conduct might be a law to all beings4' #d4 ,it is contended1 that the human mind possesses an intuition or instinct1 whereby we feel or discern at once the right from the wrong2 a view termed the doctrine of the ,moral ,sense1 or ,moral ,sentiment4 ,besides being supported by numerous theorizers in ,ethics1 this is the prevailing and popular doctrine2 it underlies most of the language of moral suasion4 ,the difficulties attending the stricter interpretation of it have led to various modes of qualifying and explaining it1 as will afterwards appear4 ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson are more especially identified with the enunciation of this doctrine in its modern aspect4 #e4 ,it was put forth by ,mandeville that ,self-interest is the only test of moral rightness4 ,self-preservation is the first law of being2 and even when we are labouring for the good of others1 we are still having regard to our own interest4 #f4 ,the theory called1 ,utility1 and ,utilitarianism1 supposes that the well-being or happiness of mankind is the sole end1 and ultimate standard of morality4 ,the agent takes account both of his own happiness and of the happiness of others1 subordinating1 on proper occasions1 the first to the second4 ,this theory is definite in its opposition to all the others1 but admits of considerable latitude of view within itself4 ,stoicism and ,epicureanism1 are both included in its compass4 ,the two last-named theories--,self-,interest1 and ,utility or the ,common ,well-,being1 have exclusive regard to the consequences of actions2 the others assign to consequences a subordinate position4 ,the terms ,external and ,dependent are also used to express the reference to ,happiness as the end3 ,internal and ,independent are the contrasting epithets4 ,,ii4 ,ethical ,theory embraces certain questions of pure ,,psychology4 #a4 ,the ,psychological nature of ,conscience1 the ,moral ,sense1 or by whatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and wrong1 together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew the other4 ,that such a faculty exists is admitted4 ,the question is1 what is its place and origin in the mind8 ,on the one side1 ,conscience is held to be a unique and ultimate power of the mind1 like the feeling of ,resistance1 the sense of ,taste1 or the consciousness of ,agreement4 ,on the other side1 ,conscience is viewed as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of the mind4 ,the ,theory of the ,standard 7#d7 called the doctrine of the ,moral ,sense1 proceeds upon the first view2 on that theory1 the ,standard and the ,faculty make properly but one question4 ,all other theories are more or less compatible with the composite or derivative nature of ,conscience2 the supporters of ,utility1 in particular1 adopt this alternative4 #b4 ,a second ,psychological question1 regarded by many 7notably by ,kant7 as vitally implicated in ,moral ,obligation1 is the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,the history of opinion on this subject has been in great part already given4 #c4 ,thirdly1 ,it has been debated1 on ,psychological grounds1 whether our ,benevolent actions 7which all admit7 are ultimately modes of self-regard1 or whether there be1 in the human mind1 a source of purely ,disinterested conduct4 ,the first view1 or the reference of benevolence to ,self1 admits of degrees and varieties of statement4 7#a7 ,it may be held that in performing good actions1 we expect and obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made4 ,occasionally we are rewarded in kind2 but the reward most usually forthcoming 7according to ,mandeville71 is praise or flattery1 to which the human mind is acutely sensitive4 7#b7 ,our constitution may be such that we are pained by the sight of an object in distress1 and give assistance1 to relieve ourselves of the pain4 ,this was the view of ,hobbes2 and it is also admitted by ,mandeville as a secondary motive4 7#c7 ,we may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of acts of kindness1 in the same immediate way that we are gratified by warmth1 flowers1 or music2 we should thus be moved to benevolence by an intrinsic pleasure1 and not by extraneous consequences4 ,bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of ,benevolence1 meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others1 and pain from the sight of pain in others4 7#d7 ,it may be affirmed that1 although we have not by nature any purely disinterested impulses1 these are generated in us by associations and habits1 in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends1 as in the case of money4 ,this is the view propounded by ,james ,mill1 and by ,mackintosh4 ,allowance being made for a certain amount of fact in these various modes of connecting ,benevolence with self1 it is still maintained in the present work1 as by ,butler1 ,hume1 ,adam ,smith1 and others1 that human beings are 7although very unequally7 endowed with a prompting to relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others1 irrespective of all self-regarding considerations2 and that such prompting is not a product of associations with self4 ,in the ancient world1 purely disinterested conduct was abundantly manifested in practice1 although not made prominent in ,ethical ,theory4 ,the enumeration of the ,cardinal ,virtues does not expressly contain ,benevolence2 but under ,courage1 ,self-sacrifice was implied4 ,patriotic ,self-devotion1 ,love1 and ,friendship were virtues highly cultivated4 ,in ,cicero1 ,seneca1 and ,marcus ,aurelius1 there is a recognition of general ,benevolence4 ,the two heads now sketched--,the ,standard and the ,psychology of our ,moral nature--almost entirely exhaust modern ,ethics4 ,smith1 ,stewart1 and ,mackintosh agree in laying down as the points in dispute these two3--,first1 ,what does virtue consist in8 ,secondly1 ,what is the power or faculty of the mind that discovers and enforces it8 ,these two positions1 however1 are inadequate as regards ,ancient ,ethics4 ,for remedying the deficiency1 and for bringing to light matters necessary to the completeness of an ,ethical survey1 we add the following heads3-- ,,iii4 ,the ,theory of what constitutes the ,supreme ,,end of ,life1 the ,,bonum or the ,,summum ,,bonum4 ,the question as to the highest ,end has divided the ,ethical ,schools1 both ancient and modern4 ,it was the point at issue between the ,stoics and the ,epicureans4 ,that ,happiness is not the highest end has been averred1 in modern times1 by ,butler and others3 the opposite position is held by the supporters of ,utility4 ,what may be called the severe and ascetic systems 7theoretically7 refuse to sanction any pursuit of happiness or pleasure1 except through virtue1 or duty to others4 ,the view practically proceeded upon1 now and in most ages1 is that virtue discharges a man's obligations to his fellows1 which being accomplished1 he is then at liberty to seek what pleases himself4 7,for the application of the laws of mind to the theory of ,,happiness1 see ,appendix ,c47 ,,iv4-,the ,,classification ,,of ,,duties is characteristic of different systems and different authors4 ,the oldest scheme is the ,four ,cardinal ,virtues--,prudence1 ,courage1 ,temperance1 ,justice4 ,the modern ,christian moralists usually adopt the division--,duties to ,god1 to ,others1 to ,self4 ,moreover1 there are differences in the substance of ,morality itself1 or the things actually imposed4 ,the code under ,christianity has varied both from ,judaism and from ,paganism4 ,v4-,the relationship of ,ethics to ,,politics is close1 while the points of difference of the two are also of great importance4 ,in ,plato the two subjects were inseparable2 and in ,aristotle1 they were blended to excess4 ,hobbes also joined ,ethics and ,politics in one system4 7,see ,chap1 ii41 #c47 ,,vi4-,the relation of ,ethics to ,,theology is variously represented in modern systems4 ,the ,fathers and the ,schoolmen accepted the authority of the ,bible chiefly on tradition1 and did not venture to sit in judgment on the substance of the revelation4 ,they1 therefore1 rested their ,ethics exclusively on the ,bible2 or1 at most1 ventured upon giving some mere supplement of its precepts4 ,others1 in more modern times1 have considered that the moral character of a revelation enters into the evidence in its favour2 whence1 morality must be considered as independent1 and exclusively human1 in its origin4 ,it would be reasoning in a circle to derive the moral law from the bible1 and then to prove the bible from the moral law4 ,religion superadds its own sanction to the moral duties1 so far as adopted by it2 laying especial stress upon select precepts4 ,it likewise calls into being a distinct code of duties1 the religious duties strictly so called2 which have no force except with believers4 ,the 'duties to ,god1' in the modern classification1 are religious1 as distinguished from moral duties4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,standard4 #a4 ,,ethics1 or ,morality1 is a department of ,practice2 and1 as with other practical departments1 is defined by its ,end4 ,ethics is not mere knowledge or speculation1 like the sciences of ,astronomy1 ,physiology1 or ,psychology2 it is knowledge applied to practice1 or useful ends1 like ,navigation1 ,medicine1 or ,politics4 ,every practical subject has some end to be served1 the statement of which is its definition in the first instance4 ,navigation is the applying of different kinds of knowledge1 and of a variety of devices1 to the end of sailing the seas4 #b4 ,the ,ethical ,end is a certain portion of the welfare of human beings living together in society1 realized through rules of conduct duly enforced4 ,the obvious intention of morality is the good of mankind4 ,the precepts--do not steal1 do not kill1 fulfil agreements1 speak truth--whatever other reasons may be assigned for them1 have a direct tendency to prevent great evils that might otherwise arise in the intercourse of human beings4 ,farther1 the good aimed at by ,ethics is attained by rules of acting1 on the part of one human being to another2 and1 inasmuch as these rules often run counter to the tendencies of the individual mind1 it is requisite to provide adequate inducements to comply with them4 ,the ,ethical ,end is what is otherwise called the ,,standard1 test1 or criterion1 of ,right and ,wrong4 ,the leading controversy of ,morals is centered in this point4 #c4 ,the ,rules of ,ethics1 termed also ,law1 ,laws1 the ,moral ,law1 are of two kinds3-- ,the first are rules imposed under a ,penalty for neglect1 or violation4 ,the penalty is termed ,punishment2 the imposing party is named ,government1 or ,authority2 and the rules so imposed and enforced1 are called ,laws proper1 ,morality proper1 ,obligatory ,morality1 ,duty4 #d4 ,the second are rules whose only external support is ,rewards2 constituting ,optional ,morality1 ,merit1 ,virtue1 or ,nobleness4 ,moral duties are a set of rules1 precepts1 or prescriptions1 for the direction of human conduct in a certain sphere or province4 ,these rules are enforced by two kinds of motives1 requiring to be kept distinct4 ,i4--,one class of rules are made compulsory by the infliction of pain1 in the case of violation or neglect4 ,the pain so inflicted is termed a ,penalty1 or ,punishment2 it is one of the most familiar experiences of all human beings living in society4 ,the ,institution that issues ,rules of this class1 and inflicts punishment when they are not complied with1 is termed ,government1 or ,authority2 all its rules are authoritative1 or obligatory2 they are ,laws strictly so called1 ,laws proper4 ,punishment1 ,government1 ,authority1 ,superiority1 ,obligation1 ,law1 ,duty1--define each other2 they are all different modes of regarding the same fact4 ,morality is thus in every respect analagous to ,civil ,government1 or the ,law of the ,land4 ,nay1 farther1 it squares1 to a very great extent1 with ,political ,authority4 ,the points where the two coincide1 and those where they do not coincide1 may be briefly stated3-- 7#a7 ,all the most essential parts of ,morality are adopted and carried out by the ,law of the ,land4 ,the rules for protecting person and property1 for fulfilling contracts1 for performing reciprocal duties1 are rules or laws of the ,state2 and are enforced by the ,state1 through its own machinery4 ,the penalties inflicted by public authority constitute what is called the ,political ,sanction2 they are the most severe1 and the most strictly and dispassionately administered1 of all penalties4 7#b7 ,there are certain ,moral duties enforced1 not by public and official authority1 but by the members of the community in their private capacity4 ,these are sometimes called the ,laws of ,honour1 because they are punished by withdrawing from the violator the honour or esteem of his fellow-citizens4 ,courage1 ,prudence as regards self1 ,chastity1 ,orthodoxy of opinion1 a certain conformity in ,tastes and ,usages1--are all prescribed by the mass of each community1 to a greater or less extent1 and are insisted on under penalty of social disgrace and excommunication4 ,this is the ,social or the ,popular ,sanction4 ,the department so marked out1 being distinct from the ,political sphere1 is called1 by ,austin1 ,positive ,morality1 or ,morality proper4 ,public opinion also chimes in with the ,law1 and adds its own sanction to the legal penalties for offences3 unless the law happens to be in conflict with the popular sentiment4 ,criminals1 condemned by the law1 are additionally punished by social disgrace4 7#c7 ,the ,law of the ,land contains many enactments1 besides the ,moral ,code and the machinery for executing it4 ,the ,province of government passes beyond the properly protective function1 and includes many institutions of public convenience1 which are not identified with right and wrong4 ,the defence from external enemies2 the erection of works of public utility2 the promotion of social improvements1--are all within the domain of the public authority4#a ,,ii4--,the second class of ,rules are supported1 not by penalties1 but by ,rewards4 ,society1 instead of punishing men for not being charitable or benevolent1 praises and otherwise rewards them1 when they are so4 ,hence1 although ,morality inculcates benevolence1 this is not a ,law proper1 it is not obligatory1 authoritative1 or binding2 it is purely voluntary1 and is termed merit1 virtuous and noble conduct4 ,in this department1 the members of the community1 in their unofficial capacity1 are the chief agents and administrators4 ,the ,law of the ,land occupies itself with the enforcement of its own obligatory rules1 having at its command a perfect machinery of punishment4 ,private individuals administer praise1 honour1 esteem1 approbation1 and reward4 ,in a few instances1 the ,government dispenses rewards1 as in the bestowal of office1 rank1 titles1 and pensions1 but this function is exceptional and limited4 ,the conduct rewarded by ,society is chiefly resolvable into ,beneficence4 ,whoever is moved to incur sacrifices1 or to go through labours1 for the good of others1 is the object1 not merely of gratitude from the persons benefited1 but of approbation from society at large4 ,any remarkable strictness or fidelity in the discharge of duties properly so called1 receives general esteem4 ,even in matters merely ceremonial1 if importance be attached to them1 sedulous and exact compliance1 being the distinction of the few1 will earn the approbation of the many4#b #e4 ,the ,ethical ,end1 or ,morality1 as it has been1 is founded partly on ,well-being1 or ,utility3 and partly on ,sentiment4 ,the portions of ,morality1 having in view the prevention of human misery and the promotion of human happiness1 are known and obvious4 ,they are not the whole of ,morality as it has been4 ,sentiment1 caprice1 arbitrary liking or disliking1 are names for states of feeling that do not necessarily arise from their objects1 but may be joined or disjoined by education1 custom1 or the power of the will4 ,the revulsion of mind1 on the part of the ,jews1 against eating the pig1 and on our own part1 as regards horse flesh1 is not a primitive or natural sensibility1 like the pain of hunger1 or of cold1 or of a musical discord2 it is purely artificial2 custom has made it1 and could unmake it4 ,the feeling of fatigue from overwork is natural2 the repugnance of caste to manual labour is factitious4 ,the dignity attached to the military profession1 and the indignity of the office of public executioner1 are capricious1 arbitrary1 and sentimental4 ,our prospective regard to the comforts of our declining years points to a real interest2 our feelings as to the disposal of the body after death are purely factitious and sentimental4 ,such feelings are of the things in our own power2 and the grand mistake of the ,stoics was their viewing all good and evil whatever in the same light4 ,it is an essential part of human liberty1 to permit each person to form and to indulge these sentiments or caprices2 although a good education should control them with a view to our happiness on the whole4 ,but1 when any individual liking or fancy of this description is imposed as a law upon the entire community1 it is a perversion and abuse of power1 a confounding of the ,ethical end by foreign admixtures4 ,thus1 to enjoin authoritatively one mode of sepulture1 punishing all deviations from that1 could have nothing to do with the preservation of the order of society4 ,in such a matter1 the interference of the state in modern times1 has regard to the detection of crime in the matter of life and death1 and to the evils arising from the putrescence of the dead4 #f4 ,the ,ethical ,end1 although properly confined to ,utility1 is subject to still farther limitations1 according to the view taken of the ,province of ,moral ,government1 or ,authority4 ,although nothing should be made morally obligatory but what is generally useful1 the converse does not hold2 many kinds of conduct are generally useful1 but not morally obligatory4 ,a certain amount of bodily exercise in the open air every day would be generally useful2 but neither the law of the land nor public opinion compels it4 ,good roads are works of great utility2 it is not every one's duty to make them4 ,the machinery of coercion is not brought to bear upon every conceivable utility4 ,it is principally reserved1 when not abused1 for a select class of utilities4 ,some utilities are indispensable to the very existence of men in society4 ,the primary moral duties must be observed to some degree1 if men are to live together as men1 and not to roam at large as beasts4 ,the interests of ,security are the first and most pressing concern of human society4 ,whatever relates to this has a surpassing importance4 ,security is contrasted with ,improvement2 what relates to ,security is declared to be ,right2 what relates to ,improvement is said to be ,expedient2 both are forms of ,utility1 but the one is pressing and indispensable1 the other is optional4 ,the same difference is expressed by the contrasts--,being and ,well-being2 ,existence and ,prosperous ,existence2 ,fundamentals or ,essentials and ,circumstantials4 ,that the highway robber should be punished is a part of ,being2 that the highways should be in good repair1 is a part of ,well-being4 ,that ,justice should be done is ,existence2 that farmers and traders should give in to government the statistics of their occupation1 is a means to ,prosperous ,existence4#c ,it is proper to advert to one specific influence in moral enactments1 serving to disguise the ,ethical end1 and to widen the distinction between morality as it has been1 and morality as it ought to be4 ,the enforcing of legal and moral enactments demands a power of coercion1 to be lodged in the hands of certain persons2 the possession of which is a temptation to exceed the strict exigencies of public safety1 or the common welfare4 ,probably many of the whims1 fancies1 ceremonies1 likings and antipathies1 that have found their way into the moral codes of nations1 have arisen from the arbitrary disposition of certain individuals happening to be in authority at particular junctures4 ,even the general community1 acting in a spontaneous manner1 imposes needless restraints upon itself1 delighting more in the exercise of power1 than in the freedom of individual action4 #g4 ,morality1 in its essential parts1 is ',eternal and ,immutable2' in other parts1 it varies with ,custom4 7#a7 ,the rules for protecting one man from another1 for enforcing justice1 and the observance of contracts1 are essential and fundamental1 and may be styled ',eternal and ,immutable4' ,the ends to be served require these rules2 no caprice of custom could change them without sacrificing these ends4 ,they are to society what food is to individual life1 of sexual intercourse and mother's care to the continuance of the race4 ,the primary moralities could not be exchanged for rules enacting murder1 pillage1 injustice1 unveracity1 repudiation of engagements2 because under these rules1 human society would fall to pieces4 7#b7 ,the manner of carrying into effect these primary regulations of society1 varies according to ,custom4 ,in some communities the machinery is rude and imperfect2 while others have greatly improved it4 ,the ,greeks took the lead in advancing judicial machinery1 the ,romans followed4 ,in the regulations not essential to ,being1 but important to ,well-being1 there has prevailed the widest discrepancy of usage4 ,the single department relating to the ,sexes is a sufficient testimony on this head4 ,no one form of the family is indispensable to the existence of society2 yet some forms are more favourable to general happiness than others4 ,but which form is on the whole the best1 has greatly divided opinion2 and legislation has varied accordingly4 ,the more advanced nations have adopted compulsory monogamy1 thereby giving the prestige of their authority in favour of that system4 ,but it cannot be affirmed that the joining of one man to one woman is a portion of ',eternal and ,immutable ,morality4' ,morality is an ,institution of society1 but not an arbitrary institution4 #h4 ,before adducing the proofs in support of the position above assumed1 namely1 that ,utility or ,human ,happiness1 with certain limitations1 is the proper criterion of ,morality1 it is proper to enquire1 what sort of evidence the ,ethical ,standard is susceptible of4 ,hitherto1 the doctrine of ,utility has been assumed1 in order to be fully stated4 ,we must next review the evidence in its favour1 and the objections urged against it4 ,it is desirable1 however1 to ask what kind of proof should be expected on such a question4 ,in the ,speculative or ,theoretical sciences1 we prove a doctrine by referring it to some other doctrine or doctrines1 until we come at last to some assumption that must be rested in as ultimate or final4 ,we can prove the propositions of ,euclid1 the law of gravitation1 the law of atomic proportions1 the law of association2 we cannot prove our present sensations1 nor can we demonstrate that what has been1 will be4 ,the ultimate data must be accepted as self-evident2 they have no higher authority than that mankind generally are disposed to accept them4 ,in the practical ,sciences1 the question is not as to a principle of the order of nature1 but as to an end of human action4 ,there may be derived ,ends1 which are susceptible of demonstrative proof2 but there must also be ultimate ,ends1 for which no proof can be offered2 they must be received as self-evident1 and their sole authority is the person receiving them4 ,in most of the practical sciences1 the ends are derived2 the end of ,medicine is ,health1 which is an end subsidiary to the final end of human happiness4 ,so it is with ,navigation1 with ,politics1 with ,education1 and others4 ,in all of them1 we recognize the bearing upon human welfare1 or happiness1 as a common1 comprehensive1 and crowning end4 ,on the theory of ,utility1 ,morals is also governed by this highest end4 ,now1 there can be no proof offered for the position that ,happiness is the proper end of all human pursuit1 the criterion of all right conduct4 ,it is an ultimate or final assumption1 to be tested by reference to the individual judgment of mankind4 ,if the assumption1 that misery1 and not happiness1 is the proper end of life1 found supporters1 no one could reply1 for want of a basis of argument--an assumption still more fundamental agreed upon by both sides4 ,it would probably be the case1 that the supporters of misery1 as an end1 would be at some point inconsistent with themselves2 which would lay them open to refutation4 ,but to any one consistently maintaining the position1 there is no possible reply1 because there is no medium of proof4 ,if then1 it appears1 on making the appeal to mankind1 that happiness is admitted to be the highest end of all action1 the theory of ,utility is proved4 #i4 ,the judgment of ,mankind is very generally in favour of ,happiness1 as the ,supreme end of human conduct1 ,morality included4 ,this decision1 however1 is not given without qualifications and reservations2 nor is there perfect unanimity regarding it4 ,the theory of ,motives to the ,will is the answer to the question as to the ends of human action4 ,according to the primary law of the ,will1 each one of us1 for ourselves1 seeks pleasure and avoids pain1 present or prospective4 ,the principle is interfered with by the operation of ,fixed ,ideas1 under the influence of the feelings2 whence we have the class of ,impassioned1 ,exaggerated1 ,irrational ,motives or ,ends4 ,of these influences1 one deserves to be signalized as a source of virtuous conduct1 and as approved of by mankind generally2 that is1 ,sympathy with others4 ,under the ,fixed ,idea1 may be ranked the acquired sense of ,dignity1 which induces us often to forfeit pleasure and incur pain4 ,we should not choose the life of ,plato's beatified oyster1 or 7to use ,aristotle's example7 be content with perpetual childhood1 with however great a share of childish happiness4 #aj4 ,the ,ethical end that men are tending to1 and may ultimately adopt without reservation1 is human ,welfare1 ,happiness1 or ,being and ,well-being combined1 that is1 ,utility4 ,the evidence consists of such facts as these3-- 7#a7 ,by far the greater part of the morality of every age and country has reference to the welfare of society4 ,even in the most superstitious1 sentimental1 and capricious despotisms1 a very large share of the enactments1 political and moral1 consist in protecting one man from another1 and in securing justice between man and man4 ,these objects may be badly carried out1 they may be accompanied with much oppression of the governed by the governing body1 but they are always aimed at1 and occasionally secured4 ,of the ,ten ,commandments1 four pertain to ,religious ,worship2 six are ,utilitarian1 that is1 have no end except to ward off evils1 and to further the good of mankind4 7#b7 ,the general welfare is at all times considered a strong and adequate justification of moral rules1 and is constantly adduced as a motive for obedience4 ,the commonplaces in support of law and morality represent1 that if murder and theft were to go unpunished1 neither life nor property would be safe2 men would be in eternal warfare2 industry would perish2 society must soon come to an end4 ,there is a strong disposition to support the more purely sentimental requirements1 and even the excesses of mere tyranny1 by utilitarian reasons4 ,the cumbersome ablutions of oriental nations are defended on the ground of cleanliness4 ,the divine sanctity of kings is held to be an aid to social obedience4 ,slavery is alleged to have been at one time necessary to break in mankind to industry4 ,indissoluble marriage arose from a sentiment rather than from utility2 but the arguments1 commonly urged in its favour1 are utilitarian4 7#c7 ,in new cases1 and in cases where no sentiment or passion is called into play1 ,utility alone is appealed to4 ,in any fresh enactment1 at the present day1 the good of the community is the only justification that would be listened to4 ,if it were proposed to forbid absolutely the eating of pork in ,christian countries1 some great public evils would have to be assigned as the motive4 ,were the fatalities attending the eating of pork1 on account of trichiniae1 to become numerous1 and unpreventible1 there would then be a reason1 such as a modern civilized community would consider sufficient1 for making the rearing of swine a crime and an immorality4 ,but no mere sentimental or capricious dislike to the pig1 on the part of any number of persons1 could now procure an enactment for disusing that animal4 7#d7 ,there is a gradual tendency to withdraw from the moral code1 observances originating purely in sentiment1 and having little or no connexion with human welfare4 ,we have abandoned the divine sacredness of kings4 ,we no longer consider ourselves morally bound to denounce and extirpate heretics and witches1 still less to observe fasts and sacred days4 ,even in regard to the ,christian ,sabbath1 the opinion is growing in favour of withdrawing both the legal and popular sanction formerly so stringent2 while the arguments for ,sabbath observance are more and more charged with considerations of secular utility4 ,should these considerations be held as adequate to support the proposition advanced1 they are decisive in favour of ,utility as the ,moral ,standard that ought to be4 ,any other standard that may be set up in competition with ,utility1 must ultimately ground itself on the very same appeal to the opinions and the practice of mankind4 #aa4 ,the chief objections urged against ,utility as the moral ,standard have been in great part anticipated4 ,still1 it is proper to advert to them in detail4 ,i4--,it is maintained that ,happiness is not1 either in fact or in right1 the sole aim of human pursuit2 that men actually1 deliberately1 and by conscientious preference1 seek other ends4 ,for example1 it is affirmed that ,virtue is an end in itself1 without regard to happiness4 ,on this argument it may be observed3-- 7#a7 ,it has been abundantly shown in this work1 that one part of the foregoing affirmation is strictly true4 ,men are not urged to action exclusively by their pleasures and their pains4 ,they are urged by other motives1 of the impassioned kind2 among which1 is to be signalized sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others4 ,if this had been the only instance of action at variance with the regular course of the will1 we should be able to maintain that the motive to act is still happiness1 but not always the agent's own happiness4 ,we have seen1 however1 that individuals1 not unfrequently1 act in opposition both to their own1 and to other people's happiness2 as when mastered by a panic1 and when worked up into a frenzy of anger or antipathy4 ,the sound and tenable position seems to be this3--,human beings1 in their best and soberest moods1 looking before and after1 weighing all the consequences of actions1 are generally disposed to regard ,happiness1 to some beings or others1 as the proper end of all endeavours4 ,the mother is not exclusively bent on her own happiness2 she is upon her child's4 ,howard abandoned the common pleasures of life for himself1 to diminish the misery of fellow creatures4 7#b7 ,it is true that human beings are apt to regard ,virtue as an end-in-itself1 and not merely as a means to happiness as the final end4 ,but the fact is fully accounted for on the general law of ,association by ,contiguity2 there being many other examples of the same kind1 as the love of money4 ,justice1 ,veracity1 and other virtues1 are requisite1 to some extent1 for the existence of society1 and1 to a still greater extent1 for prosperous existence4 ,under such circumstances1 it would certainly happen that the means would participate in the importance of the end1 and would even be regarded as an end in itself4 7#c7 ,the great leading duties may be shown to derive their estimation from their bearing upon human welfare4 ,take first1 ,veracity or ,truth4 ,of all the moral duties1 this has most the appearance of being an absolute and independent requirement4 ,yet mankind have always approved of deception practised upon an enemy in war1 a madman1 or a highway robber4 ,also1 secrecy or concealment1 even although misinterpreted1 is allowed1 when it does not cause pernicious results2 and is even enjoined and required in the intercourse of society1 in order to prevent serious evils4 ,but an absolute standard of truth is incompatible1 even with secrecy or disguise2 in departing from the course of perfect openness1 or absolute publicity of thought and action1 in every possible circumstance1 we renounce ideal truth in favour of a compromised or qualified veracity--a pursuit of truth in subordination to the general well-being of society4 ,still less is there any form of ,justice that does not have respect to ,utility4 ,if ,justice is defined as giving to every one their own1 the motive clearly is to prevent misery to individuals4 ,if there were a species of injustice that made no one unhappier1 we may be quite sure that tribunals would not be set up for enforcing and punishing it4 ,the idea of equality in ,justice is seemingly an absolute conception1 but1 in point of fact1 equality is a matter of institution4 ,the children of the same parent are1 in certain circumstances1 regarded as unequal by the law2 and justice consists in respecting this inequality4 ,the virtue of ,self-denial1 is one that receives the commendation of society1 and stands high in the morality of reward4 ,still1 it is a means to an end4 ,the operation of the associating principle tends to raise it above this point to the rank of a final end4 ,and there is an ascetic scheme of life that proceeds upon this supposition2 but the generality of mankind1 in practice1 if not always in theory1 disavow it4 7#d7 ,it is often affirmed by those that regard virtue1 and not happiness1 as the end1 that the two coincide in the long run4 ,now1 not to dwell upon the very serious doubts as to the matter of fact1 a universal coincidence without causal connexion is so rare as to be in the last degree improbable4 ,a fiction of this sort was contrived by ,leibnitz1 under the title of 'pre-established harmony2' but1 among the facts of the universe1 there are only one or two cases known to investigation4 #ab4 ,,ii4--,it is objected to ,utility as the ,standard1 that the bearings of conduct on general happiness are too numerous to be calculated2 and that even where the calculation is possible1 people have seldom time to make it4 7#a7 ,it is answered1 that the primary moral duties refer to conduct where the consequences are evident and sure4 ,the disregard of ,justice and ,truth would to an absolute certainty bring about a state of confusion and ruin2 their observance1 in any high degree1 contributes to raise the standard of well-being4 ,in other cases1 the calculation is not easy1 from the number of opposing considerations4 ,for example1 there are two sides to the question1 ,is dissent morally wrong8 in other words1 ,ought all opinions to be tolerated8 ,but if we venture to decide such a question1 without the balancing or calculating process1 we must follow blindfold the dictates of one or other of the two opposing sentiments1--,love of ,power and ,love of ,liberty4 ,it is not necessary that we should go through the process of calculation every time we have occasion to perform a moral act4 ,the calculations have already been performed for all the leading duties1 and we have only to apply the maxims to the cases as they arise4 #ac4 ,,iii4--,the principle of ,utility1 it is said1 contains no motives to seek the ,happiness of others2 it is essentially a form of ,self-,love4 ,the averment is that ,utility is a sufficient motive to pursue our own happiness1 and the happiness of others as a means to our own2 but it does not afford any purely disinterested impulses2 it is a ,selfish theory after all4 ,now1 as ,utility is1 by profession1 a benevolent and not a selfish theory1 either such profession is insincere1 or there must be an obstruction in carrying it out4 ,that the supporters of the theory are insincere1 no one has a right to affirm4 ,the only question then is1 what are the difficulties opposed by this theory1 and not present in other theories 7the ,moral ,sense1 for example7 to benevolent impulses on the part of individuals8 ,let us view the objection first as regards the ,morality of ,obligation1 or the duties that bind society together4 ,of these duties1 only a small number aim at positive beneficence2 they are either ,protective of one man against another1 or they enforce ,reciprocity1 which is another name for ,justice4 ,the chief exception is the requiring of a minimum of charity towards the needy4 ,this department of duty is maintained by the force of a certain mixture of prudential and of beneficent considerations1 on the part of the majority1 and by prudence 7as fear of punishment7 on the part of the minority4 ,but there does not appear to be anything in our professedly ,benevolent ,theory of ,morals to interfere with the small portion of disinterested impulse that is bound up-with prudential regards1 in the total of motives concerned in the morality of social order called the primary or obligatory morality4 ,let us1 in the next place1 view the objection as regards ,optional ,morality1 where positive beneficence has full play4 ,the principal motive in this department is ,reward1 in the shape either of benefits or of approbation4 ,now1 there is nothing to hinder the supporters of the standard of ,utility from joining in the rewards or commendations bestowed on works of charity and beneficence4 ,again1 there is1 in the constitution of the mind1 a motive superior to reward1 namely1 ,sympathy proper1 or the purely ,disinterested impulse to alleviate the pains and advance the pleasures of others4 ,this part of the mind is wholly unselfish2 it needs no other prompting than the fact that some one is in pain1 or may be made happier by something within the power of the agent4 ,the objectors need to be reminded that ,obligatory ,morality1 which works by punishment1 creates a purely selfish motive2 that ,optional ,morality1 in so far as stimulated by ,reward1 is also selfish2 and that the only source of purely disinterested impulses is in the unprompted ,sympathy of the individual mind4 ,if such sympathies exist1 and if nothing is done to uproot or paralyze them1 they will urge men to do good to others1 irrespective of all theories4 ,good done from any other source or motive is necessarily self-seeking4 ,it is a common remark1 with reference to the sanctions of a future life1 that they create purely self-regarding motives4 ,any proposal to increase disinterested action by moral obligation contains a self-contradiction2 it is suicidal4 ,the rich may be made to give half their wealth to the poor2 but in as far as they are made to do it1 they are not benevolent4 ,law distrusts generosity and supersedes it4 ,if a man is expected to regard the happiness of others as an end in itself1 and not as means to his own happiness1 he must be left to his own impulses3 'the quality of mercy is not strained' ,the advocates of ,utility may observe non-interference as well as others4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,moral ,,faculty4 #a4 ,the chief question in the ,psychology of ,ethics is whether the ,moral ,faculty1 or ,conscience1 be a simple or a complex fact of the mind4 ,practically1 it would seem of little importance in what way the moral faculty originated1 except with a view to teach us how it may be best strengthened when it happens to be weak4 ,still1 a very great importance has been attached to the view1 that it is simple and innate2 the supposition being that a higher authority thereby belongs to it4 ,if it arises from mere education1 it depends on the teacher for the time being2 if it exists prior to all education1 it seems to be the voice of universal nature or of ,god4 #b4 ,in favour of the simple and intuitive character of ,moral ,sentiment1 it is argued3-- ,first1 ,that our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and instantaneous4 ,on almost all occasions1 we are ready at once to pronounce an action right or wrong4 ,we do not need to deliberate or enquire1 or to canvass reasons and considerations for and against1 in order to declare a murder1 a theft1 or a lie to be wrong4 ,we are fully armed with the power of deciding all such questions2 we do not hesitate1 like a person that has to consult a variety of different faculties or interests4 ,just as we pronounce at once whether the day is light or dark1 hot or cold2 whether a weight is light or heavy2--we are able to say whether an action is morally right or the opposite4 #c4 ,secondly1 ,it is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind4 ,this was expressed by ,cicero1 in a famous passage1 often quoted with approbation1 by the supporters of innate moral distinctions4 ',there is one true and original law conformable to reason and to nature1 diffused over all1 invariable1 eternal1 which calls to duty and deters from injustice1 c4' #d4 ,thirdly1 ,moral ,sentiment is said to be radically different in its nature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind4 ,the peculiar state of discriminating right and wrong1 involving approbation and disapprobation1 is considered to be entirely unlike any other mental element2 and1 if so1 we are precluded from resolving or analyzing it into simpler modes of feeling1 willing1 or thinking4 ,we have many feelings that urge us to act and abstain from acting2 but the prompting of conscience has something peculiar to itself1 which has been expressed by the terms rightness1 authority1 supremacy4 ,other motives1--hunger1 curiosity1 benevolence1 and so on1--have might1 this has right4 ,so1 the ,intellect has many occasions for putting forth its aptitudes of discriminating1 identifying1 remembering2 but the operation of discerning right and wrong is supposed to be a unique employment of those functions4 #e4 ,in reply to these arguments1 and in support of the view that the ,moral ,faculty is complex and derived1 the following considerations are urged3-- ,first1 ,the ,immediateness of a judgment1 is no proof of its being innate2 long practice or familiarity has the same effect4 ,in proportion as we are habituated to any subject1 or any class of operations1 our decisions are rapid and independent of deliberation4 ,an expert geometer sees at a glance whether a demonstration is correct4 ,in extempore speech1 a person has to perform every moment a series of judgments as to the suitability of words to meaning1 to grammar1 to taste1 to effect upon an audience4 ,an old soldier knows in an instant1 without thought or deliberation1 whether a position is sufficiently guarded4 ,there is no greater rapidity in the judgments of right and wrong1 than in these acquired professional judgments4 ,moreover1 the decisions of conscience are quick only in the simpler cases4 ,it happens not unfrequently that difficult and protracted deliberations are necessary to a moral judgment4 #f4 ,secondly1 ,the alleged similarity of men's moral judgments in all countries and times holds only to a limited degree4 ,the very great differences among different nations1 as to what constitutes right and wrong1 are too numerous1 striking1 and serious1 not to have been often brought forward in ,ethical controversy4 ,robbery and murder are legalized in whole nations4 ,macaulay's picture of the ,highland ,chief of former days is not singular in the experience of mankind4 ',his own vassals1 indeed1 were few in number1 but he came of the best blood of the ,highlands4 ,he kept up a close connexion with his more powerful kinsmen2 nor did they like him the less because he was a robber2 for he never robbed them2 and that robbery1 merely as robbery1 was a wicked and disgraceful act1 had never entered into the mind of any ,celtic chief4' ,various answers have been given by the advocates of innate morality to these serious discrepancies4 7#a7 ,it is maintained that savage or uncultivated nations are not a fair criterion of mankind generally3 that as men become more civilized1 they approximate to unity of moral sentiment2 and what civilized men agree in1 is alone to be taken as the judgment of the race4 ,now1 this argument would have great weight1 in any discussion as to what is good1 useful1 expedient1 or what is in accordance with the cultivated reason or intelligence of mankind2 because civilization consists in the exercise of men's intellectual faculties to improve their condition4 ,but in a controversy as to what is given us by nature1--what we possess independently of intelligent search and experience1--the appeal to civilization does not apply4 ,what civilized men agree upon among themselves1 as opposed to savages1 is likely to be the reverse of a natural instinct2 in other words1 something suggested by reason and experience4 ,in the next place1 counting only civilized races1 that is1 including the chief ,european1 ,american1 and ,asiatic peoples of the present day1 and the ,greeks and ,romans of the ancient world1 we still find disparities on what are deemed by us fundamental points of moral right and wrong4 ,polygamy is regarded as right in ,turkey1 ,india1 and ,china1 and as wrong in ,england4 ,marriages that we pronounce incestuous were legitimate in ancient times4 ,the views entertained by ,plato and ,aristotle as to the intercourse of the sexes are now looked upon with abhorrence4 7#b7 ,it has been replied that1 although men differ greatly in what they consider right and wrong1 they all agree in possessing some notion of right and wrong4 ,no people are entirely devoid of moral judgments4 ,but this is to surrender the only position of any real importance4 ,the simple and underived character of the moral faculty is maintained because of the superior authority attached to what is natural1 as opposed to what is merely conventional4 ,but if nothing be natural but the mere fact of right and wrong1 while all the details1 which alone have any value1 are settled by convention and custom1 we are as much at sea on one system as on the other4 7#c7 ,it is fully admitted1 being1 indeed1 impossible to deny1 that education must concur with natural impulses in making up the moral sentiment4 ,no human being1 abandoned entirely to native promptings1 is ever found to manifest a sense of right and wrong4 ,as a general rule1 the strength of the conscience depends on the care bestowed on its cultivation4 ,although we have had to recognize primitive distinctions among men as to the readiness to take on moral training1 still1 the better the training1 the stronger will be the conscientious determinations4 ,but this admission has the effect of reducing the part performed by nature to a small and uncertain amount4 ,even if there were native preferences1 they might be completely overborne and reversed by an assiduous education4 ,the difference made by inculcation is so great1 that it practically amounts to everything4 ,a voice so feeble as to be overpowered by foreign elements would do no credit to nature4 #g4 ,thirdly1 ,moral right and wrong is not so much a simple1 indivisible property1 as an extensive ,code of regulations1 which cannot even be understood without a certain maturity of the intelligence4 ,if is not possible to sum up the whole field of moral right and wrong1 so as to bring it within the scope of a single limited perception1 like the perception of resistance1 or of colour4 ,in regard to some of the alleged intuitions at the foundation of our knowledge1 as for example time and space1 there is a comparative simplicity and unity1 rendering their innate origin less disputable4 ,no such simplicity can be assigned in the region of duty4 ,after the subject of morals has been studied in the detail1 it has1 indeed1 been found practicable to comprise the whole1 by a kind of generalization1 in one comprehensive recognition of regard to our fellows4 ,but1 in the first place1 this is far from a primitive or an intuitive suggestion of the mind4 ,it came at a late stage of human history1 and is even regarded as a part of ,revelation4 ,in the second place1 this high generality must be accompanied with detailed applications to particular cases and circumstances4 ,life is full of conflicting demands1 and there must be special rules to adjust these various demands4 ,we have to be told that country is greater than family2 that temporary interests are to succumb to more enduring1 and so on4 ,supposing the ,love of our ,neighbour to unfold in detail1 as it expresses in sum1 the whole of morality1 this is only another name for our ,sympathetic1 ,benevolent1 or ,disinterested regards1 into which therefore ,conscience would be resolved1 as it was by ,hume4 ,but ,morals is properly considered as a wide-ranging science1 having a variety of heads full of difficulty1 and demanding minute consideration4 ,the subject of ,justice1 has nothing simple but the abstract statement--giving each one their due2 before that can be applied1 we must ascertain what is each person's due1 which introduces complex questions of relative merit1 far transcending the sphere of intuition4 ,if any part of ,morals had the simplicity of an instinct1 it would be regard to ,truth4 ,the difference between truth and falsehood might almost be regarded as a primitive susceptibility1 like the difference between light and dark1 between resistance and non-resistance4 ,that each person should say what is1 instead of what is not1 may well seem a primitive and natural impulse4 ,in circumstances of perfect indifference1 this would be the obvious and usual course of conduct2 being1 like the straight line1 the shortest distance between two points4 ,let a motive arise1 however1 in favour of the lie1 and there is nothing to insure the truth4 ,reference must be made to other parts of the mind1 from which counter-motives may be furnished2 and the intuition in favour of ,truth1 not being able to support itself1 has to repose on the general foundation of all virtue1 the instituted recognition of the claims of others4 #h4 ,fourthly1 ,intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions of ,practical ,morality4 ,if we recall some of the great questions of practical life that have divided the opinions of mankind1 we shall find that mere ,intuition is helpless to decide them4 ,the toleration of heretical opinions has been a greatly contested point4 ,our feelings are arrayed on both sides2 and there is no prompting of nature to arbitrate between the opposing impulses4 ,if the advance of civilization has tended to liberty1 it has been owing partly to greater enlightenment1 and partly to the successful struggles of dissent in the war with established opinion4 ,the questions relating to marriage are wholly undecideable by intuition4 ,the natural impulses are for unlimited co-habitation4 ,the degree of restraint to be put upon this tendency is not indicated by any sentiment that can be discovered in the mind4 ,the case is very peculiar4 ,in thefts and murder1 the immediate consequences are injury to some one2 in sexual indulgence1 the immediate result is agreeable to all concerned4 ,the evils are traceable only in remote consequences1 which intuition can know nothing of4 ,it is not to be wondered1 therefore1 that nations1 even highly civilized1 have differed widely in their marriage institutions2 agreeing only in the propriety of adopting and enforcing some regulations4 ,so essentially has this matter been bound up with the moral code of every society1 that a proposed criterion of morality unable to grapple with it1 would be discarded as worthless4 ,yet there is no intuitive sentiment that can be of any avail in the question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister4 #i4 ,fifthly1 ,it is practicable to analyze or resolve the ,moral ,faculty2 and1 in so doing1 to explain1 both its peculiar property1 and the similarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men4 ,we begin1 by estimating the operation of 7#a7 ,prudence4 7#b7 ,sympathy1 and 7#c7 the ,emotions generally4 ,the inducements to perform a moral act1 as1 for example1 the fulfilling of a bargain1--are plainly seen to be of various kinds4 7#a7 ,prudence1 or ,self-interest1 has obviously much to do with the moral conduct4 ,postponing for the present the consideration of ,punishment1 which is one mode of appeal to the prudential regards1 we can trace the workings of self-interest on many occasions wherein men act right4 ,to fulfil a bargain is1 in the great majority of cases1 for the advantage of the agent2 if he fails to perform his part1 others may do the same to him4 ,our self-interest may look still farther4 ,we may readily discover that if we set an example of injustice1 it may be taken up and repeated to such a degree that we can count upon nothing2 social security comes to an end1 and individual existence1 even if possible1 would cease to be desirable4 ,a yet higher view of self-interest informs us1 that by performing all our obligations to our fellows1 we not only attain reciprocal performance1 but generate mutual affections and sympathies1 which greatly augment the happiness of life4 7#b7 ,sympathy1 or ,fellow-feeling1 the source of our disinterested actions1 must next be taken into the account4 ,it is a consequence of our sympathetic endowment that we revolt from inflicting pain on another1 and even forego a certain satisfaction to self rather than be the occasion of suffering to a fellow creature4 ,moved thus1 we perform many obligations on the ground of the misery 7not our own7 accruing from their neglect4 ,a considerable portion of human virtue springs directly from this source4 ,if purely disinterested tendencies were withdrawn from the breast1 the whole existence of humanity would be changed4 ,society might not be impossible2 there are races where mutual sympathy barely exists3 but the fulfilment of obligations1 if always dependent on a sense of self-interest1 would fail where that was not apparent4 ,on the other hand1 if we were on all occasions touched with the unhappiness to others immediately and remotely springing from our conduct--if sympathy were perfect and unfailing--we could hardly ever omit doing what was right4 7#c7 ,our several ,emotions or ,passions may co-operate with ,prudence and with ,sympathy in a way to make both the one and the other more efficacious4 ,prudence1 in the shape of aversion to pain1 is rendered more acute when the pain is accompanied with ,fear4 ,the perturbation of fear rises up as a deterring motive when dangers loom in the distance4 ,one powerful check to the commission of injury is the retaliation of the sufferer1 which is a danger of the vague and illimitable kind1 calculated to create alarm4 ,anger1 or ,resentment1 also enters1 in various ways1 into our moral impulses4 ,in one shape it has just been noticed4 ,in concurrence with ,self-interest and ,sympathy1 it heightens the feeling of reprobation against wrong-doers4 ,the ,tender ,emotion1 and the ,affections1 uphold us in the performance of our duties to others1 being an additional safeguard against injury to the objects of the feelings4 ,it has already been shown how these emotions1 while tending to coalesce with ,sympathy proper1 are yet distinguished from it4 ,the ,a,esthetic ,emotions have important bearings upon ,ethical ,sentiment4 ,as a whole1 they are favourable to human virtue1 being non-exclusive pleasures4 ,they1 however1 give a bias to the formation of moral rules1 and pervert the proper test of right and wrong in a manner to be afterwards explained4 #aj4 ,although ,prudence and ,sympathy1 and the various ,emotions named1 are powerful inducements to what is right in action1 and although1 without these1 right would not prevail among mankind1 yet they do not stamp the peculiar attribute of ,rightness4 ,for this1 we must refer to the institution of ,government1 or ,authority4 ,although the force of these various motives on the side of right is all-powerful and essential1 so much so1 that without them morality would be impossible1 they do not1 of themselves1 impart the character of a moral act4 ,we do not always feel that1 because we have neglected our interest or violated our sympathies1 we have on that account done wrong4 ,the criterion of rightness in particular cases is something different4 ,the reasons are apparent4 ,for although prudence1 as regards self1 and sympathy or fellow-feeling1 as regards others1 would comprehend all the interests of mankind--everything that morality can desire to accomplish--nevertheless1 the acting out of these impulses by each individual at random would not suffice for the exigencies of human life4 ,they must be regulated1 directed1 reconciled by society at large2 each person must be made to work upon the same plan as every other person4 ,this leads to the institution of ,government and ,authority1 with the correlatives of ,law1 ,obligation1 and ,punishment4 ,our natural impulses for good are now directed into an artificial channel1 and it is no longer optional whether they shall fall into that channel4 ,the nature of the case requires all to conform alike to the general arrangements1 and whoever is not sufficiently urged by the natural motives1 is brought under the spur of a new kind of prudential motive--,punishment4 ,government1 ,authority1 ,law1 ,obligation1 ,punishment1 are all implicated in the same great ,institution of ,society1 to which ,morality owes its chief foundation1 and the ,moral ,sentiment its special attribute4 ,morality is not ,prudence1 nor ,benevolence1 in their primitive or spontaneous manifestations2 it is the systematic codification of prudential and benevolent actions1 rendered obligatory by what is termed penalties or ,punishment2 an entirely distinct motive1 artificially framed by human society1 but made so familiar to every member of society as to be a second nature4 ,none are allowed to be prudential or sympathizing in their own way4 ,parents are compelled to nourish their own children2 servants to obey their own masters1 to the neglect of other regards2 all citizens have to abide by the awards of authority2 bargains are to be fulfilled according to a prescribed form and letter2 truth is to be spoken on certain definite occasions1 and not on others4 ,in a formed society1 the very best impulses of nature fail to guide the citizen's actions4 ,no doubt there ought to be a general coincidence between what ,prudence and ,sympathy would dictate1 and what ,law dictates2 but the precise adjustment is a matter of institution4 ,a moral act is not merely an act tending to reconcile the good of the agent with the good of the whole society2 it is an act1 prescribed by the social authority1 and rendered obligatory upon every citizen4 ,its morality is constituted by its authoritative prescription1 and not by its fulfilling the primary ends of the social institution4 ,a bad law is still a law2 an ill-judged moral precept is still a moral precept1 felt as such by every loyal citizen4 #aa4 ,it may be proved1 by such evidence as the case admits of1 that the peculiarity of the ,moral ,sentiment1 or ,conscience1 is identified with our education under government1 or ,authority4 ,conscience is described by such terms as moral approbation and disapprobation2 and involves1 when highly developed1 a peculiar and unmistakeable revulsion of mind at what is wrong1 and a strong resentment towards the wrong-doer1 which become ,remorse1 in the case of self4 ,it is capable of being proved1 that there is nothing natural or primitive in these feelings1 except in so far as the case happens to concur with the dictates of ,self-interest1 or ,sympathy1 aided by the ,emotions formerly specified4 ,any action that is hostile to our interest1 excites a form of disapprobation1 such as belongs to wounded self-interest2 and any action that puts another to pain may so affect our natural sympathy as to be disapproved1 and resented on that ground4 ,these natural or inborn feelings are always liable to coincide with moral right and wrong1 although they are not its criterion or measure in the mind of each individual4 ,but in those cases where an unusually strong feeling of moral disapprobation is awakened1 there is apt to be a concurrence of the primitive motives of self1 and of fellow-feeling2 and it is the ideal of good law1 and good morality to coincide with a certain well-proportioned adjustment of the ,prudential and the ,sympathetic regards of the individual4 ,the requisite allowance being made for the natural impulses1 we must now adduce the facts1 showing that the characteristic of the ,moral ,sense is an education under ,law1 or ,authority1 through the instrumentality of ,punishment4 7#a7 ,it is a fact that human beings living in society are placed under discipline1 accompanied by punishment4 ,certain actions are forbidden1 and the doers of them are subjected to some painful infliction2 which is increased in severity if they are persisted in4 ,now1 what would be the natural consequence of such a system1 under the known laws of feeling1 will1 and intellect8 ,would not an action that always brings down punishment be associated with the pain and the dread of punishment8 ,such an association is inevitably formed1 and becomes at least a part1 and a very important part1 of the sense of duty2 nay1 it would of itself1 after a certain amount of repetition1 be adequate to restrain for ever the performance of the action1 thus attaining the end of morality4 ,there may be various ways of evoking and forming the moral sentiment1 but the one way most commonly trusted to1 and never altogether dispensed with1 is the associating of pain1 that is1 punishment1 with the actions that are disallowed4 ,punishment is held out as the consequence of performing certain actions2 every individual is made to taste of it2 its infliction is one of the most familiar occurrences of every-day life4 ,consequently1 whatever else may be present in the moral sentiment1 this fact of the connexion of pain with forbidden actions must enter into it with an overpowering prominence4 ,any natural or primitive impulse in the direction of duty must be very marked and apparent1 in order to divide with this communicated bias the direction of our conduct4 ,it is for the supporters of innate distinctions to point out any concurring impetus 7apart from the ,prudential and ,sympathetic regards7 sufficiently important to cast these powerful associations into a secondary or subordinate position4 ,by a familiar effect of ,contiguous ,association1 the dread of punishment clothes the forbidden act with a feeling of aversion1 which in the end persists of its own accord1 and without reference to the punishment4 ,actions that have long been connected in the mind with pains and penalties1 come to be contemplated with a disinterested repugnance2 they seem to give pain on their own account4 ,this is a parallel1 from the side of pain1 of the acquired attachment to money4 ,now1 when1 by such transference1 a self-subsisting sentiment of aversion has been created1 the conscience seems to be detached from all external sanctions1 and to possess an isolated footing in the mind4 ,it has passed through the stage of reference to authority1 and has become a law to itself4 ,but no conscience ever arrives at the independent standing1 without first existing in the reflected and dependent stage4 ,we must never omit from the composition of the ,conscience the primary impulses of ,self-,interest and ,sympathy1 which in minds strongly alive to one or other1 always count for a powerful element in human conduct1 although for reasons already stated1 not the strictly moral element1 so far as the individual is concerned4 ,they are adopted1 more or less1 by the authority imposing the moral code2 and when the two sources coincide1 the stream is all the stronger4 7#b7 ,where moral training is omitted or greatly neglected1 there is an absence of security for virtuous conduct4 ,in no civilized community is moral discipline entirely wanting4 ,although children may be neglected by their parents1 they come at last under the discipline of the law and the public4 ,they cannot be exempted from the associations of punishment with wrong4 ,but when these associations have not been early and sedulously formed1 in the family1 in the school1 and in the workshop1 the moral sentiment is left in a feeble condition4 ,there still remain the force of the law and of public opinion1 the examples of public punishment1 and the reprobation of guilt4 ,every member of the community must witness daily the degraded condition of the viciously disposed1 and the prosperity following on respect for the law4 ,no human being escapes from thus contracting moral impressions to a very large amount4 7#c7 ,whenever an action is associated with ,disapprobation and ,punishment1 there grows up1 in reference to it1 a state of mind undistinguishable from ,moral ,sentiment4 ,there are many instances where individuals are enjoined to a course of conduct wholly indifferent with regard to universal morality1 as in the regulations of societies formed for special purposes4 ,each member of the society has to conform to these regulations1 under pain of forfeiting all the benefits of the society1 and of perhaps incurring positive evils4 ,the code of honour among gentlemen is an example of these artificial impositions4 ,it is not to be supposed that there should be an innate sentiment to perform actions having nothing to do-with moral right and wrong2 yet the disapprobation and the remorse following on a breach of the code of honour1 will often be greater than what follows a breach of the moral law4 ,the constant habit of regarding with dread the consequences of violating any of the rules1 simulates a moral sentiment1 on a subject unconnected with morality properly so called4 ,the arbitrary ceremonial customs of nations1 with reference to such points as ablutions1 clothing1 eating and abstinence from meats1--when rendered obligatory by the force of penalties1 occupy exactly the same place in the mind as the principles of moral right and wrong4 ,the same form of dread attaches to the consequences of neglect2 the same remorse is felt by the individual offender4 ,the exposure of the naked person is as much abhorred as telling a lie4 ,the ,turkish woman exposing her face1 is no less conscience-smitten than if she murdered her child4 ,there is no act1 however trivial1 that cannot be raised to the position of a moral act1 by the imperative of society4 ,still more striking is the growth of a moral sentiment in connexion with such usages as the ,hindoo suttee4 ,it is known that the ,hindoo widow1 if prevented from burning herself with her husband's corpse1 often feels all the pangs of remorse1 and leads a life of misery and self-humiliation4 ,the habitual inculcation of this duty by society1 the penalty of disgrace attached to its omission1 operate to implant a sentiment in every respect analogous to the strongest moral sentiment4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,systems4 ,the first important name in ,ancient ,ethical ,philosophy is ,,sokrates4 #dfi-cii ,b4,c4 ,for the views of ,sokrates1 as well as his method1#d we have first the ,,memorabilia of ,,xenophon1 and next such of the ,platonic ,compositions1 as are judged1 by comparison with the ,memorabilia1 to keep closest to the real ,sokrates4 ,of these1 the chief are the ,,apology ,,of ,,sokrates1 the ,,kriton and the ,,phaedon4 ,the ',memorabilia' was composed by ,xenophon1 expressly to vindicate ,sokrates against the accusations and unfavourable opinions that led to his execution4 ,the ',apology' is ,plato's account of his method1 and also sets forth his moral attitude4 ,the ',kriton' describes a conversation between him and his friend ,kriton1 in prison1 two days before his death1 wherein1 in reply to the entreaties of his friends generally that he should make his escape from prison1 he declares his determination to abide by the laws of the ,athenian ,state4 ,inasmuch as1 in the ,apology1 he had seemed to set his private convictions above the public authority1 he here presents another side of his character4 ,the ',phaedon' contains the conversation on 'the ,immortality of the ,soul' just before his execution4 ,the ,ethical bearings of the ,philosophical method1 the ,doctrines1 and the ,life of ,sokrates4 are these3-- ,the direction he gave to philosophical enquiry1 was expressed in the saying that he brought ',philosophy down from ,heaven to ,earth4' ,his subjects were ,man and ,society4 ,he entered a protest against the enquiries of the early philosophers as to the constitution of the ,kosmos1 the nature of the ,heavenly ,bodies1 the theory of ,winds and ,storms4 ,he called these ,divine things2 and in a great degree useless1 if understood4 ,the ,human relations of life1 the varieties of conduct of men towards each other in all capacities1 were alone within the compass of knowledge1 and capable of yielding fruit4 ,in short1 his turn of mind was thoroughly practical1 we might say utilitarian4 ,i4--,he gave a foundation and a shape to ,ethical ,science1 by insisting on its practical character1 and by showing that1 like the other arts of life1 it had an ,end1 and a ,theory from which flows the precepts or means4 ,the ,end1 which would be the ,,standard1 was not stated by him1 and hardly even by ,plato1 otherwise than in general language2 the ,summum ,bonum had not as yet become a matter of close debate4 ',the art of dealing with human beings1' 'the art of behaving in society1' 'the science of human happiness1' were various modes of expressing the final end of conduct4#e ,sokrates clearly indicated the difference between an unscientific and a scientific art2 the one is an incommunicable knack or dexterity1 the other is founded on theoretical principles4 ,,ii4--,notwithstanding his professing ignorance of what virtue is1 ,sokrates had a definite doctrine with reference to ,ethics1 which we may call his ,,psychology of the subject4 ,this was the doctrine that resolves ,virtue into ,knowledge1 ,vice into ,ignorance or ,folly4 ',to do right was the only way to impart happiness1 or the least degree of unhappiness compatible with any given situation3 now1 this was precisely what every one wished for and aimed at--only that many persons1 from ignorance1 took the wrong road2 and no man was wise enough always to take the right4 ,but as no man was willingly his own enemy1 so no man ever did wrong willingly2 it was because he was not fully or correctly informed of the consequences of his own actions2 so that the proper remedy to apply1 was enlarged teaching of consequences and improved judgment4 ,to make him willing to be taught1 the only condition required was to make him conscious of his own ignorance2 the want of which consciousness was the real cause both of indocility and of vice' 7,grote74 ,this doctrine grew out of his favourite analogy between social duty and a profession or trade4 ,when the artizan goes wrong1 it is usually from pure ignorance or incapacity2 he is willing to do good work if he is able4 ,,iii4--,the ,,summum ,,bonum with ,sokrates was ,well-doing4 ,he had no ideal of pursuit for man apart from virtue1 or what he esteemed virtue--the noble and the praiseworthy4 ,this was the elevated point of view maintained alike by him and by ,plato1 and common to them with the ideal of modern ages4 ,well-doing consisted in doing well whatever a man undertook4 ',the best man1' he said1 'and the most beloved by the gods1 is he that1 as a husbandman1 performs well the duties of husbandry2 as a surgeon1 the duties of the medical art2 in political life1 his duty towards the commonwealth4 ,the man that does nothing well is neither useful nor agreeable to the gods4' ,and as knowledge is essential to all undertakings1 knowledge is the one thing needful4 ,this exclusive regard to knowledge was his one-sidedness as a moral theorist2 but he did not consistently exclude all reference to the voluntary control of appetite and passion4 ,,iv4--,he inculcated ,practical ,precepts of a self-denying kind1 intended to curb the excesses of human desire and ambition4 ,he urged the pleasures of self-improvement and of duty against indulgences1 honours1 and worldly advancement4 ,in the ',apology1' he states it as the second aim of his life 7after imparting the shock of conscious ignorance7 to reproach men for pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue4 ,in ',kriton1' he lays it down that we are never to act wrongly or unjustly1 although others are unjust to us4 ,and1 in his own life1 he furnished an illustrious example of his teaching4 ,the same lofty strain was taken up by ,plato1 and repeated in most of the subsequent ,ethical schools4 ,v4--,his ,ethical ,theory extended itself to ,government1 where he applied his analogy of the special arts4 ,the legitimate ,king was he that knew how to govern well4 ,,vi4--,the connexion in the mind of ,sokrates between ,ethics and ,theology was very slender4 ,in the first place1 his distinction of ,divine and ,human things1 was an exclusion of the arbitrary will of the gods from human affairs1 or from those things that constituted the ethical end4 ,but in the next place1 he always preserved a pious and reverential tone of mind2 and considered that1 after patient study1 men should still consult the oracles1 by which the gods1 in cases of difficulty1 graciously signified their intentions1 and their beneficent care of the race4 ,then1 the practice of well-doing was prompted by reference to the satisfaction of the gods4 ,in so far as the gods administered the world in a right spirit1 they would show favour to the virtuous4 ,,plato4 #dbg-cdg ,b4,c4 ,the ,ethical ,doctrines of ,plato are scattered through his various ,dialogues2 and incorporated with his philosophical method1 with his theory of ,ideas1 and with his theories of man and of society4 ,from ,sokrates1 ,plato derived ,dialectics1 or the method of ,debate2 he embodied all his views in imaginary conversations1 or ,dialogues1 suggested by1 and resembling the real conversations of ,sokrates4 ,and farther1 in imitation of his master1 he carried on his search after truth under the guise of ascertaining the exact meaning or definition of leading terms2 as ,virtue1 ,courage1 ,holiness1 ,temperance1 ,justice1 ,law1 ,beauty1 ,knowledge1 ,rhetoric1 c4 ,we shall first pass in review the chief ,dialogues containing ,ethical doctrines4 ,the ,,apology1 ,,kriton1 and ,,euthyphron 7we follow ,mr4 ,grote's order7 may be passed by as belonging more to his master than to himself2 moreover1 everything contained in them will be found recurring in other dialogues4 ,the ,,alkibiades ,i4 is a good specimen of the ,sokratic manner4 ,it brings out the loose discordant notions of ,just and ,unjust prevailing in the community2 sets forth that the ,just is also honourable1 good1 and expedient--the cause of happiness to the just man2 urges the importance of ,self-knowledge2 and maintains that the conditions of happiness are not wealth and power1 but ,justice and ,temperance4 ,,alkibiades ,,ii4 brings out a ,platonic position as to the ,good4 ,there are a number of things that are good1 as health1 money1 family1 but there is farther required the skill to apply these in proper measure to the supreme end of life4 ,all knowledge is not valuable2 there may be cases where ignorance is better4 ,what we are principally interested in knowing is the ,good1 the ,best1 the ,profitable4 ,the man of much learning1 without this1 is like a vessel tossed on the sea without a pilot4#f ,in ,,hippias ,,minor1 appears an extreme statement of the doctrine1 common to ,sokrates and ,plato1 identifying virtue with knowledge1 or giving exclusive attention to the intellectual element of conduct4 ,it is urged that a mendacious person1 able to tell the truth if he chooses1 is better than one unable to tell it1 although wishing to do so2 the knowledge is of greater worth than the good disposition4 ,in ,,minos 7or the ,definition of ,law7 he refuses to accept the decree of the state as a law1 but postulates the decision of some ,ideal wise man4 ,this is a following out of the ,sokratic analogy of the professions1 to a purely ideal demand2 the wise man is never producible4 ,in many dialogues 7,kriton1 ,laches1 c47 the decision of some ,expert is sought1 as a physician is consulted in disease2 but the ,moral expert is unknown to any actual community4 ,in ,,laches1 the question 'what is ,virtue8' is put2 it is argued under the special virtue of ,courage4 ,in a truly ,sokratic dialogue1 ,sokrates is in search of a definition of ,courage2 as happens in the search dialogues1 there is no definite result1 but the drift of the discussion is to make courage a mode of intelligence1 and to resolve it into the grand desideratum of the knowledge of good and evil--belonging to the ,one ,wise ,man4 ,,charmides discusses ,temperance4 ,as usual with ,plato in discussing the virtues1 with a view to their ,logical definition1 he presupposes that this is something beneficial and good4 ,various definitions are given of ,temperance2 and all are rejected2 but the dialogue falls into the same track as the ,laches1 in putting forward the supreme science of good and evil4 ,it is a happy example of the ,sokratic manner and purpose1 of exposing the conceit of knowledge1 the fancy that people understand the meaning of the general terms habitually employed4 ,,lysis on ,friendship1 or ,love1 might be expected to furnish some ethical openings1 but it is rather a piece of dialectic1 without result1 farther than to impart the consciousness of ignorance4 ,if it suggests anything positive1 it is the ,idea of ,good1 as the ultimate end of affection4 ,the subject is one of special interest in ancient ,ethics1 as being one of the aspects of ,benevolent sentiment in the ,pagan world4 ,in ,aristotle we first find a definite handling of it4 ,,menon may be considered as pre-eminently ethical in its design4 ,it is expressly devoted to the question--,is ,virtue teachable8 ,sokrates as usual confesses that he does not know what virtue is4 ,he will not accept a catalogue of the admitted virtues as a definition of virtue1 and presses for some common1 or defining attribute4 ,he advances on his own side his usual doctrine that virtue is ,knowledge1 or a mode of ,knowledge1 and that it is good and profitable2 which is merely an iteration of the ,science of good and evil4 ,he distinguishes virtue from ,right ,opinion1 a sort of quasi-knowledge1 the knowledge of esteemed and useful citizens1 which cannot be the highest knowledge1 since these citizens fail to impart it even to their own sons4 ,in this dialogue1 we have ,plato's view of ,immortality1 which comprises both pre-existence and post-existence4 ,the pre-existence is used to explain the derivation of general notions1 or ,ideas1 which are antecedent to the perceptions of sense4 ,in ,,protagoras1 we find one of the most important of the ethical discussions of ,plato4 ,it proceeds from the same question--,is virtue teachable8--,sokrates as usual expressing his doubts on the point4 ,protagoras then delivers a splendid harangue1 showing how virtue is taught--namely1 by the practice of society in approving1 condemning1 rewarding1 punishing the actions of individuals4 ,from childhood upward1 every human being in society is a witness to the moral procedure of society1 and by degrees both knows1 and conforms to1 the maxims of virtue of the society4 ,protagoras himself as a professed teacher1 or sophist1 can improve but little upon1 this habitual inculcation4 ,sokrates1 at the end of the harangue1 puts in his usual questions tending to bring out the essence or definition of virtue1 and soon drives ,protagoras into a corner1 bringing him to admit a view nowhere else developed in ,plato1 that ,pleasure is the only good1 ,pain the only evil1 and that the science of ,good and ,evil consists in ,measuring1 and in choosing between conflicting pleasures and pains--preferring the greater pleasure to the less1 the less pain to the greater4 ,for example1 courage is a wise estimate of things terrible and things not terrible4 ,in consistency with the doctrine that ,knowledge is virtue1 it is maintained here as elsewhere1 that a man knowing good and evil must act upon that knowledge4 ,plato often repeats his theory of ,measurement1 but never again specifically intimates that the things to be measured are pleasures and pains4 ,and neither here nor elsewhere1 does he suppose the virtuous man taking directly into his calculation the pleasures and pains of other persons4 ,,gorgias1 one of the most renowned of the dialogues in point of composition1 is also ethical1 but at variance with the ,protagoras1 and more in accordance with ,plato's predominating views4 ,the professed subject is ,rhetoric1 which1 as an art1 ,sokrates professes to hold in contempt4 ,the dialogue begins with the position that men are prompted by the desire of good1 but proceeds to the great ,platonic paradox1 that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong4 ,the criminal labours under a mental distemper1 and the best thing that can happen to him1 is to be punished that so he may be cured4 ,the unpunished wrong-doer is more miserable than if he were punished4 ,sokrates in this dialogue maintains1 in opposition to the thesis of ,protagoras1 that pleasure is not the same as good1 that there are bad pleasures and good pains2 and a skilful adviser1 one versed in the science of good and evil1 must discriminate between them4 ,he does not mean that those pleasures only are bad that bring an overplus of future pains1 which would be in accordance with the previous dialogue4 ,the sentiment of the dialogue is ascetic and self-denying4#g ,order or ,discipline is inculcated1 not as a means to an end1 but as an end in itself4 ,the ,,politikus is on the ,art of ,government1 and gives the ,platonic beau idal of the ,one competent person1 governing absolutely1 by virtue of his scientific knowledge1 and aiming at the good and improvement of the governed4 ,this is merely another illustration of the ,sokratic ideal--a despotism1 anointed by supreme good intentions1 and by an ideal skill4 ,the ,republic is an enlargement of the lessons of the ,politikus without the dialectic discussion4 ,the postulate of the ,one ,wise man is repeated in ,,kratylus1 on the unpromising subject of ,language or the invention of ,names4 ,the ,,philebus has a decidedly ethical character4 ,it propounds for enquiry the ,good1 the ,summum ,bonum4 ,this is denied to be mere pleasure1 and the denial is enforced by ,sokrates challenging his opponent to choose the lot of an ecstatic oyster4 ,as usual1 good must be related to ,intelligence2 and the ,dialogue gives a long disquisition upon the ,one and the ,many1 the ,theory of ,ideas1 the ,determinate and the ,indeterminate4 ,good is a compound of ,pleasure and ,intelligence1 the last predominating4 ,pleasure is the ,indeterminate1 requiring the ,determinate 7,knowledge7 to regulate it4 ,this is merely another expression for the doctrine of ,measure1 and for the common saying1 that the ,passions must be controlled by ,reason4 ,there is1 also1 in the dialogue1 a good deal on the ,psychology of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,pleasure is the fundamental harmony of the system2 ,pain its disturbance4 ,bodily ,pleasure pre-supposes pain true only of some pleasures4 ,mental pleasures may be without previous pain1 and are therefore pure pleasures4 ,a life of ,intelligence is conceivable without either pain or pleasure2 this is the choice of the ,wise man1 and is the nature of the gods4 ,desire is a mixed state1 and comprehends body and mind4 ,much stress is laid on the moderate and tranquil pleasures2 the intense pleasures1 coveted by mankind1 belong to a distempered rather than a healthy state2 they are false and delusive4 ,pleasure is1 by its nature1 a change or transition1 and cannot be a supreme end4 ,the mixture of ,pleasure and ,intelligence is to be adjusted by the all-important principle of ,measure or ,proportion1 which connects the ,good with the ,beautiful4 ,a decided asceticism is the ethical tendency of this dialogue4 ,it is markedly opposed to the view of the ,protagoras4 ,still greater is the opposition between it and the two ,erotic dialogues1 ,phaedrus and ,symposium1 where ,bonum and ,pulchrum are attained in the pursuit of an ecstatic and overwhelming personal affection4 ,the ,,republic starts with the question--what is ,,justice8 and1 in answering it1 provides the scheme of a model ,republic4 ,book ,i4 is a ,sokratic colloquy1 where one speaker1 on being interrogated1 defines ,justice as 'rendering to every man his due1' and afterwards amends it to 'doing good to friends1 evil to enemies4' ,another gives 'the right of the strongest4' ,a third maintains that ,injustice by itself is profitable to the doer2 but1 as it is an evil to society in general1 men make laws against it and punish it2 in consequence of which1 ,justice is the more profitable4 ,sokrates1 in opposition1 undertakes to prove that ,justice is good in itself1 ensuring the happiness of the doer by its intrinsic effect on his mind2 and irrespective of exemption from the penalties of injustice4 ,he reaches this result by assimilating an individual to a state4 ,justice is shown to be good in the entire city1 and by analogy it is also good in the individual4 ,he accordingly proceeds to construct his ideal commonwealth4 ,in the course of this construction many ethical views crop out4 ,the state must prescribe the religious belief1 and allow no compositions at variance with it4 ,the gods must always be set forth as the causes of good2 they must never be represented as the authors of evil1 nor as practising deceit4 ,neither is it to be allowed to represent men as unjust1 yet happy2 or just1 and yet miserable4 ,the poetic representation of bad characters is also forbidden4 ,the musical training is to be adapted for disposing the mind to the perception of ,beauty1 whence it becomes qualified to recognize the other virtues4 ,useful fictions are to be diffused1 without regard to truth4 ,this pious fraud is openly recommended by ,plato4 ,the division of the human mind into 7#a7 ,,reason or ,intelligence2 7#b7 ,,energy1 ,courage1 ,spirit1 or the ,military ,virtue2 and 7#c7 ,many-headed ,,appetite1 all in mutual counter-play--is transferred to the ,state1 each of the three parts being represented by one of the political orders or divisions of the community4 ,the happiness of the man and the happiness of the commonwealth are attained in the same way1 namely1 by realizing the four virtues--,wisdom1 ,courage1 ,temperance1 ,justice2 with this condition1 that ,wisdom1 or ,reason1 is sought only in the ,ruling caste1 the ,elders2 ,courage1 or ,energy1 only in the second caste1 the ,soldiers or ,guardians2 while ,temperance and ,justice 7meaning almost the same thing7 must inhere alike in all the three classes1 and be the only thing expected in the third1 the ,working ,multitude4 ,if it be now asked1 what and where is ,justice8 the answer is--'every man to attend to his own business4' ,injustice occurs when any one abandons his post1 or meddles with what does not belong to him2 and more especially when any one of a lower division aspires to the function of a higher4 ,such is ,justice for the city1 and such is it in the individual2 the higher faculty--,reason1 must control the two lower--,courage and ,appetite4 ,justice is thus a sort of harmony or balance of the mental powers2 it is to the mind what health is to the body4 ,health is the greatest good1 sickness the greatest evil1 of the body2 so is ,justice of the mind4 ,it is an essential of the ,platonic ,republic that1 among the guardians at least1 the sexual arrangements should be under public regulation1 and the monopoly of one woman by one man forbidden3 a regard to the breed of the higher caste of citizens requires the magistrate to see that the best couples are brought together1 and to refuse to rear the inferior offspring of ill-assorted connexions4 ,the number of births is also to be regulated4 ,in carrying on war1 special maxims of clemency are to be observed towards ,hellenic enemies4 ,the education of the ,guardians must be philosophical2 it is for them to rise to the ,idea of the good1 to master the science of ,good and ,evil2 they must be emancipated from the notion that ,pleasure is the good4 ,to indicate the route to this attainment ,plato gives his theory of cognition generally--the theory of ,ideas2--and indicates 7darkly7 how these sublime generalities are to be reached4 ,the ,ideal ,commonwealth supposed established1 is doomed to degradation and decay2 passing through ,timocracy1 ,oligarchy1 ,democracy1 to ,despotism1 with a corresponding declension of happiness4 ,the same varieties may be traced in the ,individual2 the 'despotized' mind is the acme of ,injustice and consequent misery4 ,the comparative value of ,pleasures is discussed4 ,the pleasures of philosophy1 or wisdom 7those of ,reason71 are alone true and pure2 the pleasures corresponding to the two other parts of the mind are inferior2 ,love of ,honour 7from ,courage or ,energy71 and ,love of ,money 7,appetite74 ,the well-ordered mind--,justice--is above all things the source of happiness4 ,apart from all consequences of ,justice1 this is true2 the addition of the natural results only enhances the strength of the position4 ,in ,,timaeus1 ,plato repeats the doctrine that wickedness is to the mind what disease is to the body4 ,the soul suffers from two distempers1 madness and ignorance2 the man under passionate heat is not wicked voluntarily4 ,no man is bad willingly2 but only from some evil habit of body1 the effect of bad bringing-up very much the view of ,robert ,owen4 ,the long treatise called the ,,laws1 being a modified scheme of a ,republic1 goes over the same ground with more detail4 ,we give the chief ethical points4 ,it is the purpose of the lawgiver to bring about happiness1 and to provide all good things divine and human4 ,the divine things are the cardinal virtues--,wisdom1 ,justice1 ,temperance1 ,courage2 the human are the leading personal advantages--,health1 ,beauty1 ,strength1 ,activity1 ,wealth4 ,he requires the inculcation of self-command1 and a training in endurance4 ,the moral and religious feelings are to be guided in early youth1 by the influence of ,poetry and the other ,fine ,arts1 in which1 as before1 a stringent censorship is to be exercised2 the songs and dances are all to be publicly authorized4 ,the ethical doctrine that the just man is happy and the unjust miserable1 is to be preached2 and every one prohibited from contradicting it4 ,of all the titles to command in society1 ,wisdom is the highest1 although policy may require it to be conjoined with some of the others 7,birth1 ,age1 ,strength1 ,accident1 c474 ,it is to be a part of the constitution to provide public exhortations1 or sermons1 for inculcating virtue2 ,plato having now passed into an opposite phase as to the value of ,rhetoric1 or continuous address4 ,the family is to be allowed in its usual form1 but with restraints on the age of marriage1 on the choice of the parties1 and on the increase of the number of the population4 ,sexual intercourse is to be as far as possible confined to persons legally married2 those departing from this rule are1 at all events1 to observe secresy4 ,the slaves are not to be of the same race as the masters4 ,as regards punishment1 there is a great complication1 owing to the author's theory that wickedness is not properly voluntary4 ,much of the harm done by persons to others is unintentional or involuntary1 and is to be made good by reparation4 ,for the loss of balance or self-control1 making the essence of injustice1 there must be a penal and educational discipline1 suited to cure the moral distemper2 not for the sake of the past1 which cannot be recalled1 but of the future4 ,under cover of this theory1 the punishments are abundantly severe2 and the crimes include ,heresy1 for which there is a gradation of penalties terminating in death4 ,we may now summarize the ,ethics of ,plato1 under the general scheme as follows3-- ,i4--,the ,ethical ,standard1 or criterion of moral ,right and ,wrong4 ,this we have seen is1 ultimately1 the ,science of ,good and ,evil1 as determined by a ,scientific or ,wise man2 the ,idea of the ,good1 which only a philosopher can ascend to4 ,plato gave no credit to the maxims of the existing society2 these were wholly unscientific4 ,it is obvious that this vague and indeterminate standard would settle nothing practically2 no one can tell what it is4 ,it is only of value as belonging to a very exalted and poetic conception of virtue1 something that raises the imagination above common life into a sphere of transcendental existence4 ,,ii4--,the ,psychology of ,ethics4 #a4 ,as to the ,faculty of discerning ,right4 ,this is implied in the foregoing statement of the criterion4 ,it is the ,cognitive or ,intellectual power4 ,in the definite position taken up in ,protagoras1 it is the faculty of ,measuring pleasures against one another and against pains4 ,in other dialogues1 measure is still the important aspect of the process1 although the things to be measured are not given4 #b4 ,as regards the ,will4 ,the theory that vice1 if not the result of ignorance1 is a form of madness1 an uncontrollable fury1 a mental distemper1 gives a peculiar rendering of the nature of man's ,will4 ,it is a kind of ,necessity1 not exactly corresponding1 however1 with the modern doctrine of that name4 #c4 ,disinterested ,sentiment is not directly and plainly recognized by ,plato4 ,his highest virtue is self-regarding2 a concern for the ,health of the ,soul4 ,,iii4--,on the ,bonum1 or ,summum ,bonum1 ,plato is ascetic and self-denying4 #a4 ,we have seen that in ,philebus1 ,pleasure is not good1 unless united with ,knowledge or ,intelligence2 and the greater the ,intelligence1 the higher the pleasure4 ,that the highest happiness of man is the pursuit of truth or ,philosophy1 was common to ,plato and to ,aristotle4 #b4 ,happiness is attainable only through ,justice or ,virtue4 ,justice is declared to be happiness1 first1 in itself1 and secondly1 in its consequences4 ,such is the importance attached to this maxim as a safeguard of ,society1 that1 whether true or not1 it is to be maintained by state authority4 #c4 ,the ,psychology of ,pleasure and ,pain is given at length in the ,philebus4 ,,iv4--,with regard to the scheme of ,duty4 ,in ,plato1 we find the first statement of the four ,cardinal ,virtues4 ,as to the ,substance of the ,moral ,code1 the references above made to the ,republic and the ,laws will show in what points his views differed from modern ,ethics4 ,benevolence was not one of the ,cardinal ,virtues4 ,his notions even of ,reciprocity were rendered hazy and indistinct by his theory of ,justice as an end in itself4 ,the inducements1 means1 and stimulants to virtue1 in addition to penal discipline1 are training1 persuasion1 or hortatory discourse1 dialectic cognition of the ,ideas1 and1 above all1 that ideal aspiration towards the ,just1 the ,good1 around which he gathered all that was fascinating in poetry1 and all the associations of religion and divinity4 ,plato employed his powerful genius in working up a lofty spiritual reward1 an ideal intoxication1 for inciting men to the self-denying virtues4 ,he was the first and one of the greatest of preachers4 ,his theory of ,justice is suited to preaching1 and not to a scientific analysis of society4 ,v4--,the relation of ,ethics to ,politics is intimate1 and even inseparable4 ,the ,civil ,magistrate1 as in ,hobbes1 supplies the ,ethical sanction4 ,all virtue is an affair of the state1 a political institution4 ,this1 however1 is qualified by the demand for an ideal state1 and an ideal governor1 by whom alone anything like perfect virtue can be ascertained4 ,,vi4--,the relationship with ,theology is also close4 ,that is to say1 ,plato was not satisfied to construct a science of good and evil1 without conjoining the sentiments towards the ,gods4 ,his ,theology1 however1 was of his own invention1 and adapted to his ethical theory4 ,it was necessary to suppose that the gods were the authors of good1 in order to give countenance to virtue4 ,plato was the ally of the ,stoics1 as against the ,epicureans1 and of such modern theorists as ,butler1 who make virtue1 and not happiness1 the highest end of man4 ,with him1 discipline was an end in itself1 and not a means2 and he endeavoured to soften its rigour by his poetical and elevated ,idealism4 ,although he did not preach the good of mankind1 or direct beneficence1 he undoubtedly prepared the way for it1 by urging self-denial1 which has no issue or relevance1 except either by realizing greater happiness to ,self 7mere exalted ,prudence1 approved of by all sects71 or by promoting the welfare of others4 ,,the ,,cynics ,,and ,,the ,,cyrenaics4 ,these opposing sects sprang from ,sokrates1 and passed1 with little modification1 the one into the ,stoics1 the other into the ,epicureans4 ,both ,,antisthenes1 the founder of the ,cynics1 and ,,aristippus1 the founder of the ,cyrenaics1 were disciples of ,sokrates4 ,their doctrines chiefly referred to the ,summum ,bonum--the ,art of ,living1 or of ,happiness4 ,the ,,cynics were most closely allied to ,sokrates2 they1 in fact1 carried out to the full his chosen mode of life4 ,his favourite maxim--that the gods had no wants1 and that the most godlike man was he that approached to the same state--was the ,cynic ,ideal4 ,to subsist upon the narrowest means2 to acquire indifference to pain1 by a discipline of endurance2 to despise all the ordinary pursuits of wealth and pleasure1--were ,sokratic peculiarities1 and were the beau idal of ,cynicism4 ,the ,cynic succession of philosophers were1 7#a7 ,,antisthenes1 one of the most constant friends and companions of ,sokrates2 7#b7 ,,diogenes of ,sinope1 the pupil of ,antisthenes1 and the best known type of the sect4 7,his disciple ,krates1 a ,theban1 was the master of ,zeno1 the first ,stoic47 7#c7 ,,stilpon of ,megara1 7#d7 ,,menedemus of ,eretria1 7#e7 ,,monimus of ,syracuse1 7#f7 ,,krates4 ,the two first heads of the ,ethical scheme1 so meagrely filled up by the ancient systems generally1 are almost a total blank as regards both ,cynics and ,cyrenaics4 ,i4--,as regards a ,standard of right and wrong1 moral good or evil1 they recognized nothing but obedience to the laws and customs of society4 ,,ii4--,they had no ,psychology of a moral faculty1 of the will1 or of benevolent sentiment4 ,the ,cyrenaic ,aristippus had a ,psychology of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,the ,cynics1 instead of discussing ,will1 exercised it1 in one of its most prominent forms1--self-control and endurance4 ,disinterested conduct was no part of their scheme1 although the ascetic discipline necessarily promotes abstinence from sins against property1 and from all the vices of public ambition4 ,,iii4--,the proper description of both systems comes under the ,summum ,bonum1 or the ,art of ,living4 ,the ,cynic ,ideal was the minimum of wants1 the habituation to pain1 together with indifference to the common enjoyments4 ,the compensating reward was exemption from fear1 anxiety1 and disappointment2 also1 the pride of superiority to fellow-beings and of approximation to the gods4 ,looking at the great predominance of misery in human life1 they believed the problem of living to consist in a mastery over all the forms of pain2 until this was first secured1 there was to be a total sacrifice of pleasure4 ,the ,cynics were mostly1 like ,sokrates1 men of robust health1 and if they put their physical constitution to a severe test by poor living and exposure to wind and weather1 they also saved it from the wear and tear of steady industry and toil4 ,exercise of body and of mind1 with a view to strength and endurance1 was enjoined2 but it was the drill of the soldier rather than the drudgery of the artisan4 ,in the eyes of the public1 the prominent feature of the ,cynic was his contemptuous jeering1 and sarcastic abuse of everybody around4 ,the name 7,cynic1 dog-like7 denotes this peculiarity4 ,the anecdotes relating to ,diogenes illustrate his coarse denunciation of men in general and their luxurious ways4 ,he set at defiance all the conventions of courtesy and of decency2 spoke his mind on everything without fear or remorse2 and delighted in his antagonism to public opinion4 ,he followed the public and obtrusive life of ,sokrates1 but instead of dialectic skill1 his force lay in vituperation1 sarcasm1 and repartee4 ',to ,sokrates1' says ,epiktetus1 ',zeus assigned the cross-examining function2 to ,diogenes1 the magisterial and chastising function2 to ,zeno 7the ,stoic71 the didactic and dogmatical4' ,the ,cynics had thus in full measure one of the rewards of asceticism1 the pride of superiority and power4 ,they did not profess an end apart from their own happiness2 they believed and maintained that theirs was the only safe road to happiness4 ,they agreed with the ,cyrenaics as to the end2 they differed as to the means4 ,the founders of the sect1 being men of culture1 set great store by education1 from which1 however1 they excluded 7as it would appear7 both the ,artistic and the ,intellectual elements of the superior instruction of the time1 namely1 ,music1 and the ,sciences of ,geometry1 ,astronomy1 c4 ,plato's writings and teachings were held in low esteem4 ,physical training1 self-denial and endurance1 and literary or ,rhetorical cultivation1 comprise the items taught by ,diogenes when he became a slave1 and was made tutor to the sons of his master4 ,,iv4--,as to the ,moral ,code1 the ,cynics were dissenters from the received usages of society4 ,they disapproved of marriage laws1 and maintained the liberty of individual tastes in the intercourse of the sexes4 ,being free-thinkers in religion they had no respect for any of the customs founded on religion4 ,v4 ,the collateral relations of ,cynical ,ethics to ,politics and to ,theology afford no scope for additional observations4 ,the ,cynic and ,cyrenaic both stood aloof from the affairs of the state1 and were alike disbelievers in the gods4 ,the ,cynics appear to have been inclined to communism among themselves1 which was doubtless easy with their views as to the wants of life4 ,it is thought not unlikely that ,sokrates himself held views of communism both as to property and to wives2 being in this respect also the prompter of ,plato 7,grant's ,ethics of ,aristotle1 ,essay ii474 ,the ,,cyrenaic system originated with ,,aristippus of ,cyrene1 another hearer and companion of ,sokrates4 ,the temperament of ,aristippus was naturally inactive1 easy1 and luxurious2 nevertheless he set great value on mental cultivation and accomplishments4 ,his conversations with ,sokrates form one of the most interesting chapters of ,xenophon's ,memorabilia1 and are the key to the plan of life ultimately elaborated by him4 ,sokrates finding out his disposition1 repeats all the arguments in favour of the severe and ascetic system4 ,he urges the necessity of strength1 courage1 energy1 self-denial1 in order to attain the post of ruler over others2 which1 however1 ,aristippus fences by saying that he has no ambition to rule2 he prefers the middle course of a free man1 neither ruling nor ruled over4 ,next1 ,sokrates recalls the dangers and evil contingencies of subjection1 of being oppressed1 unjustly treated1 sold into slavery1 and the consequent wretchedness to one unhardened by an adequate discipline4 ,it is in this argument that he recites the well-known apologue called the choice of ,herakles2 in which1 ,virtue on the one hand1 and ,pleasure with attendant vice on the other1 with their respective consequences1 are set before a youth in his opening career4 ,the whole argument with ,aristippus was purely prudential2 but ,aristippus was not convinced nor brought over to the ,sokratic ideal4 ,he nevertheless adopted a no less prudential and self-denying plan of his own4 ,aristippus did not write an account of his system2 and the particulars of his life1 which would show how he acted it1 are but imperfectly preserved4 ,he was the first theorist to avow and maintain that ,pleasure1 and the absence of ,pain1 are the proper1 the direct1 the immediate1 the sole end of living2 not of course mere present pleasures and present relief from pain1 but present and future taken in one great total4 ,he would surrender present pleasure1 and incur present pain1 with a view to greater future good2 but he did not believe in the necessity of that extreme surrender and renunciation enjoined by the ,cynics4 ,he gratified all his appetites and cravings within the limits of safety4 ,he could sail close upon the island of ,calypso without surrendering himself to the sorceress4 ,instead of deadening the sexual appetite he gave it scope1 and yet resisted the dangerous consequences of associating with ,hetaerae4 ,in his enjoyments he was free from jealousies2 thinking it no derogation to his pleasure that others had the same pleasure4 ,having thus a fair share of natural indulgences1 he dispenses with the ,cynic pride of superiority and the luxury of contemning other men4 ,strength of will was required for this course no less than for the ,cynic life4 ,aristippus put forward strongly the impossibility of realizing all the ,happiness that might seem within one's reach2 such were the attendant and deterring evils1 that many pleasures had to be foregone by the wise man4 ,sometimes even the foolish person attained more pleasure than the wise2 such is the lottery of life2 but1 as a general rule1 the fact would be otherwise4 ,the wisest could not escape the natural evils1 pain and death2 but envy1 passionate love1 and superstition1 being the consequences of vain and mistaken opinion1 might be conquered by a knowledge of the real nature of ,good and ,evil4 ,as a proper appendage to such a system1 ,aristippus sketched a ,psychology of ,pleasure and ,pain1 which was important as a beginning1 and is believed to have brought the subject into prominence4 ,the soul comes under three conditions1--a gentle1 smooth1 equable motion1 corresponding to ,pleasure2 a rough1 violent motion1 which is ,pain2 and a calm1 quiescent state1 indifference or ,unconsciousness4 ,more remarkable is the farther assertion that ,pleasure is only present or realized consciousness2 the memory of pleasures past1 and the idea of pleasures to come1 are not to be counted2 the painful accompaniments of desire1 hope1 and fear1 are sufficient to neutralize any enjoyment that may arise from ideal bliss1 ,consequently1 the happiness of a life means the sum total of these moments of realized or present pleasure4 ,he recognized pleasures of the mind1 as well as of the body2 sympathy with the good fortunes of friends or country gives a thrill of genuine and lively joy4 ,still1 the pleasures and the pains of the body1 and of one's own self1 are more intense2 witness the bodily inflictions used in punishing offenders4 ,the ,cyrenaics denied that there is anything just1 or honourable1 or base1 by nature2 all depended on the laws and customs4 ,these laws and customs the wise man obeys1 to avoid punishment and discredit from the society where he lives2 doubtless1 also1 from higher motives1 if the political constitution1 and his fellow citizens generally1 can inspire him with respect4 ,neither the ,cynics nor the ,cyrenaics made any profession of generous or disinterested impulses4 ,,aristotle4 #chd-cbb ,b4,c4 ,three treatises on ,ethics have come down associated with the name of ,aristotle2 one large work1 the ,nicomachean ,ethics1 referred to by general consent as the chief and important source of ,aristotle's views2 and two smaller works1 the ,eudemian ,ethics1 and the ,magna ,moralia1 attributed by later critics to his disciples4 ,even of the large work1 which consists of ten books1 three books 7,v4 ,,vi4 ,,vii471 recurring in the ,eudemian ,ethics1 are considered by ,sir ,a4 ,grant1 though not by other critics1 to have been composed by ,eudemus1 the supposed author of this second treatise1 and a leading disciple of ,aristotle4 ,like many other ,aristotelian treatises1 the ,nicomachean ,ethics is deficient in method and consistency on any view of its composition4 ,but the profound and sagacious remarks scattered throughout give it a permanent interest1 as the work of a great mind4 ,there may be extracted from it certain leading doctrines1 whose point of departure was ,platonic1 although greatly modified and improved by the genius and personality of ,aristotle4 ,our purpose will be best served by a copious abstract of the ,nicomachean ,ethics4 ,book ,first discusses the ,chief ,good1 or the ,highest ,end of all human endeavours4 ,every exercise of the human powers aims at some good2 all the arts of life have their several ends--medicine1 ship-building1 generalship4 ,but the ends of these special arts are all subordinate to some higher end2 which end is the chief good1 and the subject of the highest art of all1 the ,political2 for as ,politics aims at the welfare of the state1 or aggregate of individuals1 it is identical with and comprehends the welfare of the individual 7,chaps4 ,i41 ,,ii474 ,as regards the method of the science1 the highest exactness is not attainable2 the political art studies what is just1 honourable1 and good2 and these are matters about which the utmost discrepancy of opinion prevails4 ,from such premises1 the conclusions which we draw can only be probabilities4 ,the man of experience and cultivation will expect nothing more4 ,youths1 who are inexperienced in the concerns of life1 and given to follow their impulses1 can hardly appreciate our reasoning1 and will derive no benefit from it3 but reasonable men will find the knowledge highly profitable 7,,iii474 ,resuming the main question--,what is the highest practical good--the aim of the all-comprehending political science8--we find an agreement among men as to the name happiness ,greek3 eudaimonia2 but great differences as to the nature of the thing4 ,the many regard it as made up of the tangible elements--pleasures1 wealth1 or honour2 while individuals vary in their estimate according to each man's state for the time being2 the sick placing it in health1 the poor in wealth1 the consciously ignorant in knowledge4 ,on the other hand1 certain philosophers in allusion to ,plato set up an absolute good1--an ,idea of the ,good1 apart from all the particulars1 yet imparting to each its property of being good 7,,iv474 ,referring to men's lives 7as a clue to their notions of the good71 we find three prominent varieties2 the life of pleasure or sensuality1--the political life1 aspiring to honour1--and the contemplative life4 ,the first is the life of the brutes1 although countenanced by men high in power4 ,the second is too precarious1 as depending on others1 and is besides only a means to an end--namely1 our consciousness of our own merits2 for the ambitious man seeks to be honoured for his virtue and by good judges--thus showing that he too regards virtue as the superior good4 ,yet neither will virtue satisfy all the conditions4 ,the virtuous man may slumber or pass his life in inactivity1 or may experience the maximum of calamity2 and such a man cannot be regarded as happy4 ,the money-lender is still less entitled1 for he is an unnatural character2 and money is obviously good as a means4 ,so that there remains only the life of contemplation2 respecting which more presently 7,v474 ,to a review of the ,platonic doctrine1 ,aristotle devotes a whole chapter4 ,he urges against it various objections1 very much of a piece with those brought against the theory of ,ideas generally4 ,if there be but one good1 there should be but one science2 the alleged ,idea is merely a repetition of the phenomena2 the recognized goods 7i4e41 varieties of good7 cannot be brought under one ,idea2 moreover1 even granting the reality of such an ,idea1 it is useless for all practical purposes4 ,what our science seeks is ,good1 human and attainable 7,,vi474 ,the ,supreme ,end is what is not only chosen as an ,end1 but is never chosen except as an ,end3 not chosen both for itself and with a view to something ulterior4 ,it must thus be--7#a7 ,an end-in-itself pursued for its own sake2 7#b7 it must farther be self-sufficing leaving no outstanding wants--man's sociability being taken into account and gratified4 ,happiness is such an end2 but we must state more clearly wherein happiness consists4 ,this will appear1 if we examine what is the work appropriate and peculiar to man4 ,every artist1 the sculptor1 carpenter1 currier 7so too the eye and the hand71 has his own peculiar work3 and good1 to him1 consists in his performing that work well4 ,man also has his appropriate and peculiar work3 not merely living--for that he has in common with vegetables2 nor the life of sensible perception--for that he has in common with other animals1 horses1 oxen1 c4 ,there remains the life of man as a rational being3 that is1 as a being possessing reason along with other mental elements1 which last are controllable or modifiable by reason4 ,this last life is the peculiar work or province of man4 ,for our purpose1 we must consider man1 not merely as possessing1 but as actually exercising and putting in action1 these mental capacities4 ,moreover1 when we talk generally of the work or province of an artist1 we always tacitly imply a complete and excellent artist in his own craft3 and so likewise when we speak of the work of a man1 we mean that work as performed by a complete and competent man4 ,since the work of man1 therefore1 consists in the active exercise of the mental capacities1 conformably to reason1 the supreme good of man will consist in performing this work with excellence or virtue4 ,herein he will obtain happiness1 if we assume continuance throughout a full period of life3 one day or a short time is not sufficient for happiness 7,,vii474 ,aristotle thus lays down the outline of man's supreme ,good or ,happiness3 which he declares to be the beginning or principle ,greek3 archae of his deductions1 and to be obtained in the best way that the subject admits4 ,he next proceeds to compare this outline with the various received opinions on the subject of happiness1 showing that it embraces much of what has been considered essential by former philosophers3 such as being 'a good of the mind1' and not a mere external good3 being equivalent to 'living well and doing well1' another definition2 consisting in virtue 7the ,cynics72 in practical wisdom--,greek3 phronaesis 7,sokrates72 in philosophy2 or in all these coupled with pleasure 7,plato1 in the ,philebus74 ,agreeing with those who insisted on virtue1 ,aristotle considers his own theory an improvement1 by requiring virtue in act1 and not simply in possession4 ,moreover1 he contends that to the virtuous man1 virtuous performance is in itself pleasurable2 so that no extraneous source of pleasure is needed4 ,such 7he says7 is the judgment of the truly excellent man2 which must be taken as conclusive respecting the happiness1 as well as the honourable pre-eminence of the best mental exercises4 ,nevertheless1 he admits 7so far complying with the ,cyrenaics7 that some extraneous conditions cannot be dispensed with2 the virtuous man can hardly exhibit his virtue in act1 without some aid from friends and property2 nor can he be happy if his person is disgusting to behold or his parentage vile 7,,viii474 ,this last admission opens the door to those that place good fortune in the same line with happiness1 and raises the question1 how happiness is attained4 ,by teaching8 ,by habitual exercise8 ,by divine grace8 ,by ,fortune8 ,if there be any gift vouchsafed by divine grace to man1 it ought to be this2 but whether such be the case or not1 it is at any rate the most divine and best of all acquisitions4 ,to ascribe such an acquisition as this to ,fortune would be absurd4 ,nature1 which always aims at the best1 provides that it shall be attained1 through a certain course of teaching and training1 by all who are not physically or mentally disqualified4 ,it thus falls within the scope of political science1 whose object is to impart the best character and active habits to the citizens4 ,it is with good reason that we never call a horse happy1 for he can never reach such an attainment2 nor indeed can a child be so called while yet a child1 for the same reason2 though in his case we may hope for the future1 presuming on a full term of life1 as was before postulated 7,,ix474 ,but-this long term allows room for extreme calamities and change in a man's lot4 ,are we then to say1 with ,solon1 that no one can be called happy so long as he lives8 or that the same man may often pass backwards and forwards from happiness to misery8 ,no2 this only shows the mistake of resting happiness upon so unsound a basis as external fortune4 ,the only true basis of it is the active manifestation of mental excellence1 which no ill fortune can efface from a man's mind 7,x474 ,such a man will bear calamity1 if it comes1 with dignity1 and can never be made thoroughly miserable4 ,if he be moderately supplied as to external circumstances1 he is to be styled happy2 that is1 happy as a man--as far as man can reasonably expect4 ,even after his decease he-will be affected1 yet only feebly affected1 by the good or ill fortune of his surviving children4 ,aristotle evidently assigns little or no value to presumed posthumous happiness 7,,xi474 ,in his love of subtle distinctions1 he asks1 ,is happiness a thing admirable in itself1 or a thing praiseworthy8 ,it is admirable in itself2 for what is praiseworthy has a relative character1 and is praised as conducive to some ulterior end2 while the chief good must be an ,end in itself1 for the sake of which everything else is done 7,,xii474 ,this is a defective recognition of ,relativity4 ,having assumed as one of the items of his definition1 that man's happiness must be in his special or characteristic work1 performed with perfect excellence1--,aristotle now proceeds to settle wherein that excellence consists4 ,this leads to a classification of the parts of the soul4 ,the first distribution is1 into ,rational and ,irrational2 whether these two are separable in fact1 or only logically separable 7like concave and convex71 is immaterial to the present enquiry4 ,of the irrational1 the lowest portion is the ,vegetative ,greek3 phytikon1 which seems most active in sleep2 a state where bad men and good are on a par1 and which is incapable of any human excellence4 ,the next portion is the ,appetitive ,greek3 epithymaetikon1 which is not thus incapable4 ,it partakes of reason1 yet it includes something conflicting with reason4 ,these conflicting tendencies are usually modifiable by reason1 and may become in the temperate man completely obedient to reason4 ,there remains ,reason--the highest and sovereign portion of the soul4 ,human excellence ,greek3 aretae or virtue1 is either of the ,appetitive part1--moral ,greek3 aethikae virtue2 or of the ,reason--intellectual ,greek3 dianoaetikae virtue4 ,liberality and temperance are ,moral virtues2 philosophy1 intelligence1 and wisdom1 ,intellectual 7,,xiii474 ,such is an outline of the ,first ,book1 having for its subject the ,chief ,good1 the ,supreme ,end of man4 ,book ,second embraces the consideration of points relative to the ,moral ,virtues2 it also commences ,aristotle's celebrated definition and classification of the virtues or excellencies4 ,whereas intellectual excellence is chiefly generated and improved by teaching1 moral excellence is a result of habit ,greek3 ethos2 whence its name 7,ethical74 ,hence we may see that moral excellence is no inherent part of our nature3 if it were1 it could not be reversed by habit--any more than a stone can acquire from any number of repetitions the habit of moving upward1 or fire the habit of moving downward4 ,these moral excellencies are neither a part of our nature1 nor yet contrary to our nature3 we are by nature fitted to take them on1 but they are brought to consummation through habit4 ,it is not with them1 as with our senses1 where nature first gives us the power to see and hear1 and where we afterwards exercise that power4 ,moral virtues are acquired only by practice4 ,we learn to build or to play the harp1 by building or playing the harp3 so too we become just or courageous1 by a course of just or courageous acts4 ,this is attested by all lawgivers in their respective cities2 all of them shape the characters of their respective citizens1 by enforcing habitual practice4 ,some do it well2 others ill2 according to the practice1 so will be the resulting character2 as he that is practised in building badly1 will be a bad builder in the end2 and he that begins on a bad habit of playing the harp1 becomes confirmed into a bad player4 ,hence the importance of making the young perform good actions habitually and from the beginning4 ,the permanent ethical acquirements are generated by uniform and persistent practice 7,i474 ,this is the earliest statement of the philosophy of habit4 ,everything thus turns upon practice3 and ,aristotle reminds us that his purpose here is1 not simply to teach what virtue is1 but to produce virtuous agents4 ,how are we to know what the practice should be8 ,it must be conformable to right reason3 every one admits this1 and we shall explain it further in a future book4 ,but let us proclaim at once1 that in regard to moral action1 as in regard to health1 no exact rules can be laid down4 ,amidst perpetual variability1 each agent must in the last resort be guided by the circumstances of the case4 ,still1 however1 something may be done to help him4 ,here ,aristotle proceeds to introduce the famous doctrine of the ,,mean4 ,we may err1 as regards health1 both by too much and by too little of exercise1 food1 or drink4 ,the same holds good in regard to temperance1 courage1 and the other excellences 7,,ii474 ,his next remark is another of his characteristic doctrines1 that the test of a formed habit of virtue1 is to feel no pain2 he that feels pain in brave acts is a coward4 ,whence he proceeds to illustrate the position1 that moral virtue ,greek3 aethikae aretae has to do with pleasures and pains4 ,a virtuous education consists in making us feel pleasure and pain at proper objects1 and on proper occasions4 ,punishment is a discipline of pain4 ,some philosophers 7the ,cynics7 have been led by this consideration to make virtue consist in apathy1 or insensibility2 but ,aristotle would regulate1 and not extirpate our sensibilities 7,,iii474 ,but does it not seem a paradox to say 7according to the doctrine of habit in ,i471 that a man becomes just1 by performing just actions2 since1 if he performs just actions1 he is already just8 ,the answer is given by a distinction drawn in a comparison with the training in the common arts of life4 ,that a man is a good writer or musician1 we see by his writing or his music2 we take no account of the state of his mind in other respects3 if he knows how to do this1 it is enough4 ,but in respect to moral excellence1 such knowledge is not enough3 a man may do just or temperate acts1 but he is not necessarily a just or temperate man1 unless he does them with right intention and on their own account4 ,this state of the internal mind1 which is requisite to constitute the just and temperate man1 follows upon the habitual practice of just and temperate acts1 and follows upon nothing else4 ,but most men are content to talk without any such practice4 ,they fancy erroneously that knowing1 without doing1 will make a good man4 ,we have here the reaction against the ,sokratic doctrine of virtue1 and also the statement of the necessity of a prosper motive1 in order to virtue4 ,aristotle now sets himself to find a definition of virtue1 per genus et differentiam4 ,there are three qualities in the ,soul--,passions ,greek3 pathae1 as ,desire1 ,anger1 ,fear1 c41 followed by pleasure or pain2 ,capacities or ,faculties ,greek3 dynameis1 as our capability of being angry1 afraid1 affected by pity1 c42 ,fixed tendencies1 acquirements1 or states ,greek3 hexeis4 ,to which of the three does virtue or excellence belong8 ,it cannot be a ,passion2 for passions are not in themselves good or evil1 and are not accompanied with deliberate choice ,greek3 prouiresis1 will1 or intention4 ,nor is it a ,faculty3 for we are not praised or blamed because we can have such or such emotions2 and moreover our faculties are innate1 which virtue is not4 ,accordingly1 virtue1 or excellence1 must be an acquirement ,greek3 hexis--a ,state 7,v474 ,this is the genus4 ,now1 as to the differentia1 which brings us to a more specific statement of the doctrine of the ,mean4 ,the specific excellence of virtue is to be got at from quantity in the abstract1 from which we derive the conceptions of more1 less1 and equal2 or excess1 defect1 and mean2 the equal being the mean between excess and defect4 ,but in the case of moral actions1 the arithmetical mean may not hold 7for example1 six between two and ten72 it must be a mean relative to the individual2 ,milo must have more food than a novice in the training school4 ,in the arts1 we call a work perfect1 when anything either added or taken away would spoil it4 ,now1 virtue1 which1 like ,nature1 is better and more exact than any art1 has for its subject-matter1 passions and actions2 all which are wrong either in defect or in excess4 ,virtue aims at the mean between them1 or the maximum of ,good3 which implies a correct estimation of all the circumstances of the act1--when we ought to do it--under what conditions--towards whom--for what purpose--in what manner1 c4 ,this is the praise-worthy mean1 which virtue aspires to4 ,we may err in many ways 7for evil1 as the ,pythagoreans said1 is of the nature of the ,infinite1 good of the ,finite71 but we can do right only in one way2 so much easier is the path of error4 ,combining then this differentia with the genus1 as above established1 the complete definition is given thus--',virtue is an acquirement or fixed state1 tending by deliberate purpose 7genus71 towards a mean relative to us 7difference74' ,to which is added the following all-important qualification1 'determined by reason ,greek3 logos1 and as the judicious man ,greek3 ho ,phronimos would determine4' ,such is the doctrine of the ,mean1 which combines the practical matter-of-fact quality of moderation1 recognized by all sages1 with a high and abstract conception1 starting from the ,pythagorean remark quoted by ,aristotle1 'the ,infinite1 or ,indefinite1 is evil1 the ,finite or the ,definite is good1' and re-appearing in ,plato as 'conformity to measure' ,greek3 metriotaes1 by which he 7,plato7 proposes to discriminate between good and evil4 ,the concluding qualification of virtue--'a rational determination1 according to the ideal judicious man'--is an attempt to assign a standard or authority for what is the proper ',mean2' an authority purely ideal or imaginary2 the actual authority being always1 rightly or wrongly1 the society of the time4 ,aristotle admits that his doctrine of ,virtue being a mean1 cannot have an application quite universal2 because there are some acts that in their very name connote badness1 which are wrong therefore1 not from excess or defect1 but in themselves 7,,vi474 ,he next proceeds to resolve his general doctrine into particulars2 enumerating the different virtues stated1 each as a mean1 between two extremes--,courage1 ,temperance1 ,liberality1 ,magnanimity1 ,magnificence1 ,meekness1 ,amiability or ,friendliness1 ,truthfulness1 ,justice 7,,vii474 ,they are described in detail in the two following books4 ,in chap4 ,,viii41 he qualifies his doctrine of ,mean and ,extremes1 by the remark that one ,extreme may be much farther removed from the ,mean than the other4 ,cowardice and ,rashness are the extremes of ,courage1 but ,cowardice is farthest removed from the ,mean4 ,the concluding chapter 7,,ix47 of the ,book reflects on the great difficulty of hitting the mean in all things1 and of correctly estimating all the requisite circumstances1 in each particular case4 ,he gives as practical rules3--,to avoid at all events the worst extreme2 to keep farthest from our natural bent2 to guard against the snare of pleasure4 ,slight mistakes on either side are little blamed1 but grave and conspicuous cases incur severe censure4 ,yet how far the censure ought to go1 is difficult to lay down beforehand in general terms4 ,there is the same difficulty in regard to all particular cases1 and all the facts of sense3 which must be left1 after all1 to the judgment of ,sensible ,perception ,greek3 aisthaesis4 ,book ,third takes up the consideration of the ,virtues in detail1 but prefaces them with a dissertation1 occupying five chapters1 on the ,voluntary and ,involuntary4 ,since praise and blame are bestowed only on voluntary actions1--the involuntary being pardoned1 and even pitied1--it is requisite to define ,voluntary and ,involuntary4 ,what is done under physical compulsion1 or through ignorance1 is clearly involuntary4 ,what is done under the fear of greater evils is partly voluntary1 and partly involuntary4 ,such actions are voluntary in the sense of being a man's own actions2 involuntary in that they are not chosen on their own account2 being praised or blamed according to the circumstances4 ,there are cases where it is difficult to say which of two conflicting pressures ought to preponderate1 and compulsion is an excuse often misapplied3 but compulsion1 in its strict sense1 is not strength of motive at all2 it is taking the action entirely out of our own hands4 ,as regards ,ignorance1 a difference is made4 ,ignorance of a general rule is matter for censure2 ignorance of particular circumstances may be excused4 ,this became the famous maxim of law1--',ignorantia facti excusat1 ignorantia juris non excusat4' ,if the agent1 when better informed1 repents of his act committed in ignorance1 he affords good proof that the act done was really involuntary4 ,acts done from anger or desire 7which are in the agent's self7 are not to be held as involuntary4 7#a7 ,if they were1 the actions of brutes and children would be involuntary4 7#b7 ,some of these acts are morally good and approved4 7#c7 ,obligation often attaches to these feelings4 7#d7 ,what is done from desire is pleasant2 the involuntary is painful4 7#e7 ,errors of passion are to be eschewed1 no less than those of reason 7,i474 ,the next point is the nature of ,purpose1 ,determination1 or ,deliberate ,preference ,greek3 proairesis1 which is in the closest kindred with moral excellence1 and is even more essential1 in the ethical estimate1 than acts themselves4 ,this is a part of the ,voluntary2 but not co-extensive therewith4 ,for it excludes sudden and unpremeditated acts2 and is not shared by irrational beings4 ,it is distinct from desire1 from anger1 from wish1 and from opinion2 with all which it is sometimes confounded4 ,desire is often opposed to it2 the incontinent man acts upon his desires1 but without any purpose1 or even against his purpose2 the continent man acts upon his purpose1 but against his desires4 ,purpose is still more distinct from anger1 and is even distinct 7though in a less degree7 from wish ,greek3 boulaesis1 which is choice of the ,end1 while ,purpose is of the ,means2 moreover1 we sometimes wish for impossibilities1 known as such1 but we never purpose them4 ,nor is purpose identical with opinion ,greek3 doxa1 which relates to truth and falsehood1 not to virtue and vice4 ,it is among our voluntary proceedings1 and includes intelligence2 but is it identical with predeliberated action and its results8 7,,ii47 ,to answer this query1 ,aristotle analyzes the process of ,deliberation1 as to its scope1 and its mode of operation4 ,we exclude from deliberation things ,eternal1 like the ,kosmos1 or the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square2 also things mutable1 that are regulated by necessity1 by nature1 or by chance2 things out of our power2 also final ends of action1 for we deliberate only about the means to ends4 ,the deliberative process is compared to the investigation of a geometrical problem4 ,we assume the end1 and enquire by what means it can be produced2 then again1 what will produce the means1 until we at last reach something that we ourselves can command4 ,if1 after such deliberation1 we see our way to execution1 we form a ,purpose1 or ,deliberate ,preference ,greek3 proairesis4 ,purpose is then definable as a deliberative appetency of things in our power 7,,iii474 ,next is started the important question as to the choice of the final ,end4 ,deliberation and ,purpose respect means2 our ,wish respects the ,end--but what is the ,end that we wish8 ,two opinions are noticed2 according to one 7,plato7 we are moved to the good2 according to the other1 to the apparent good4 ,both opinions are unsatisfactory2 the one would make out an incorrect choice to be no choice at all2 the other would take away all constancy from ends4 ,aristotle settles the point by distinguishing1 in this case as in others1 between what bears a given character simply and absolutely1 and what bears the same character relatively to this or that individual4 ,the object of ,wish1 simply1 truly1 and absolutely1 is the ,good2 while the object of ,wish1 to any given individual1 is what appears ,good to him4 ,but by the ,absolute here1 ,aristotle explains that he means what appears good to the virtuous and intelligent man2 who is is declared1 here as elsewhere1 to be the infallible standard2 while most men1 misled by pleasure1 choose what is not truly good4 ,in like manner1 ,aristotle affirms1 that those substances are truly and absolutely wholesome1 which are wholesome to the healthy and well-constituted man2 other substances may be wholesome to the sick or degenerate4 ,aristotle's ,absolute is thus a ,relative with its correlate chosen or imagined by himself4 ,he then proceeds to maintain that virtue and vice are voluntary1 and in our own power4 ,the arguments are these4 7#a7 ,if it be in our power to act right1 the contrary is equally in our own power2 hence vice is as much voluntary as virtue4 7#b7 ,man must be admitted to be the origin of his own actions4 7#c7 ,legislators and others punish men for wickedness1 and confer honour on good actions2 even culpable ignorance and negligence are punished4 7#d7 ,our character itself1 or our fixed acquirements1 are in our power1 being produced by our successive acts2 men become intemperate1 by acts of drunkenness4 7#e7 ,not only the defects of the mind1 but the infirmities of the body also1 are blamed1 when arising through our own neglect and want of training4 7#f7 ,even if it should be said that all men aim at the apparent good1 but cannot control their mode of conceiving ,greek3 phantasia the end2 still each person1 being by his acts the cause of his own fixed acquirements1 must be to a certain extent the cause of his own conceptions4 ,on this head1 too1 ,aristotle repeats the clenching argument1 that the supposed imbecility of conceiving would apply alike to virtue and to vice2 so that if virtuous action be regarded as voluntary1 vicious action must be so regarded likewise4 ,it must be remembered that a man's fixed acquirements or habits are not in his own power1 in the same sense and degree in which his separate acts are in his own power4 ,each act1 from first to last1 is alike in his power2 but in regard to the habit1 it is only the initiation thereof that is thoroughly in his power2 the habit1 like a distemper1 is taken on by imperceptible steps in advance 7,v474 ,in the foregoing account of the ,ethical questions connected with the ,will1 ,aristotle is happily unembroiled with the modern controversy4 ,the mal-apropos of ',freedom' had not been applied to voluntary action4 ,accordingly1 he treats the whole question from the inductive side1 distinguishing the cases where people are praised or blamed for their conduct1 from those where praise and blame are inapplicable as being powerless4 ,it would have been well if the method had never been departed from2 a sound ,psychology would have improved the induction1 but would never have introduced any question except as to the relative strength of the different feelings operating as motives to voluntary conduct4 ,in one part of his argument1 however1 where he maintains that vice must be voluntary1 because its opposite1 virtue1 is voluntary1 he is already touching on the magical island of the bad enchantress2 allowing a question of fact to be swayed by the notion of factitious dignity4 ,virtue is assumed to be voluntary1 not on the evidence of fact1 but because there would be an indignity cast on it1 to suppose otherwise4 ,now1 this consideration1 which ,aristotle gives way to on various occasions1 is the motive underlying the objectionable metaphor4 ,after the preceding digression on the ,voluntary and ,involuntary1 ,aristotle takes up the consideration of the ,virtues in order1 beginning with ,,courage1 which was one of the received cardinal virtues1 and a subject of frequent discussion4 7,plato1 ,laches1 ,protagoras1 ,republic1 c47 ,courage ,greek3 andreia1 the mean between timidity and foolhardiness1 has to do with evils4 ,all evils are objects of fear2 but there are some evils that even the brave man does right to fear--as disgrace4 ,poverty or disease he ought not to fear4 ,yet1 he will not acquire the reputation of courage from not fearing these1 nor will he acquire it if he be exempt from fear when about to be scourged4 ,again1 if a man be afraid of envy from others1 or of insults to his children or wife1 he will not for that reason be regarded as a coward4 ,it is by being superior to the fear of great evils1 that a man is extolled as courageous2 and the greatest of evils is death1 since it is a final close1 as well of good as of evil4 ,hence the dangers of war are the greatest occasion of courage4 ,but the cause must be honourable 7,,vi474 ,thus the key to true courage is the quality or merit of the action4 ,that man is brave1 who both fears1 and affronts without fear1 what he ought and when he ought3 who suffers and acts according to the value of the cause1 and according to a right judgment of it4 ,the opposites or extremes of courage include 7#a7 ,deficiency of fear2 7#b7 ,excess of fear1 cowardice2 7#c7 ,deficiency of daring1 another formula for cowardice2 7#d7 ,excess of daring1 ,rashness4 ,between these1 ,courage is the mean 7,,vii474 ,aristotle enumerates five analogous forms of quasi-courage1 approaching more or less to genuine courage4 7#a7 ,the first1 most like to the true1 is political courage1 which is moved to encounter danger by the ,punishments and the ,honours of society4 ,the desire of honour rises to virtue1 and is a noble spring of action4 7#b7 ,a second kind is the effect of ,experience1 which dispels seeming terrors1 and gives skill to meet real danger4 7#c7 ,anger1 ,spirit1 ,energy ,greek3 thymos is a species of courage1 founded on physical power and excitement1 but not under the guidance of high emotions4 7#d7 ,the ,sanguine temperament1 by overrating the chances of success1 gives courage4 7#e7 ,lastly1 ,ignorance of the danger may have the same effect as courage 7,,viii474 ,courage is mainly connected with pain and loss4 ,men are called brave for the endurance of pain1 even although it bring pleasure in the end1 as to the boxer who endures bruises from the hope of honour4 ,death is painful1 and most so to the man that by his virtue has made life valuable4 ,such a man is to be considered more courageous1 as a soldier1 than a mercenary with little to lose 7,,ix474 ,the account of ,courage thus given is remarkably exhaustive2 although the constituent parts might have been more carefully disentangled4 ,a clear line should be drawn between two aspects of courage4 ,the one is the resistance to ,fear properly so called2 that is1 to the perturbation that exaggerates coming evil3 a courageous man1 in this sense1 is one that possesses the true measure of impending danger1 and acts according to that1 and not according to an excessive measure4 ,the other aspect of ,courage1 is what gives it all its nobleness as a virtue1 namely1 ,self-sacrifice1 or the deliberate encountering of evil1 for some honourable or virtuous cause4 ,when a man knowingly risks his life in battle for his country1 he may be called courageous1 but he is still better described as a heroic and devoted man4 ,inasmuch as the leading form of heroic devotion1 in the ancient world1 was exposure of life in war1 ,self-sacrifice was presented under the guise of ,courage1 and had no independent standing as a cardinal virtue4 ,from this circumstance1 paganism is made to appear in a somewhat disadvantageous light1 as regards self-denying duties4 ,next in order among the excellences or virtues of the irrational department of mind is ,,temperance1 or ,moderation1 ,greek3 sophrosynae1 a mean or middle state in the enjoyment of pleasure4 ,pleasures are mental and bodily4 ,with the mental1 as love of learning or of honour1 temperance is not concerned4 ,nor with the bodily pleasures of muscular exercise1 of hearing and of smell1 but only with the animal pleasures of touch and taste3 in fact1 sensuality resides in touch2 the pleasure of eating being a mode of contact 7,x474 ,in the desires natural and common to men1 as eating and the nuptial couch1 men are given to err1 and error is usually on the side of excess4 ,but it is in the case of special tastes or preferences1 that people are most frequently intemperate4 ,temperance does not apply to enduring pains1 except those of abstinence from pleasures4 ,the extreme of insensibility to pleasure is rarely found1 and has no name4 ,the temperate man has the feelings of pleasure and pain1 but moderates his desires according to right reason 7,,xl474 ,he desires what he ought1 when he ought1 and as he ought3 correctly estimating each separate case 7,,xii474 ,the question is raised1 which is most voluntary1 ,cowardice or ,intemperance8 7#a7 ,intemperance is more voluntary than ,cowardice1 for the one consists in choosing pleasure1 while in the other there is a sort of compulsory avoidance of pain4 7#b7 ,temperance is easier to acquire as a habit than ,courage4 7#c7 ,in ,intemperance1 the particular acts are voluntary1 although not the habit2 in ,cowardice1 the first acts are involuntary1 while by habit1 it tends to become voluntary 7,,xii474 ,temperance is the virtue most suited to the formula of the ,mean1 although the settling of what is the mean depends after all upon a man's own judgment4 ,aristotle does not recognize asceticism as a thing existing4 ,his ,temperance is moderation in the sensual pleasures of eating and love4 ,book ,fourth proceeds with the examination of the ,virtues or ,ethical ,excellences4 ,,liberality ,greek3 eleutheristaes1 in the matter of property1 is the mean of ,prodigality and ,illiberality4 ,the right uses of money are spending and giving4 ,liberality consists in giving willingly1 from an honourable motive1 to proper persons1 in proper quantities1 and at proper times2 each individual case being measured by correct reason4 ,if such measure be not taken1 or if the gift be not made willingly1 it is not liberality4 ,the liberal man is often so free as to leave little to himself4 ,this virtue is one more frequent in the inheritors than in the makers of fortunes4 ,liberality beyond one's means is prodigality4 ,the liberal man will receive only from proper sources and in proper quantities4 ,of the extremes1 prodigality is more curable than illiberality4 ,the faults of prodigality are1 that it must derive supplies from improper sources2 that it gives to the wrong objects1 and is usually accompanied with intemperance4 ,illiberality is incurable3 it is confirmed by age1 and is more congenial to men generally than prodigality4 ,some of the illiberal fall short in giving--those called stingy1 close-fisted1 and so on2 but do not desire what belongs to other people4 ,others are excessive in receiving from all sources2 such are they that ply disreputable trades 7,i474 ,,magnificence ,greek3 megaloprepeia is a grander kind of ,liberality2 its characteristic is greatness of expenditure1 with suitableness to the person1 the circumstances1 and the purpose4 ,the magnificent man takes correct measure of each2 he is in his way a man of ,science ,greek3 ho de megaloprepaes epistaemoni eoike--,,ii4 ,the motive must be honourable1 the outlay unstinted1 and the effect artistically splendid4 ,the service of the gods1 hospitality to foreigners1 public works1 and gifts1 are proper occasions4 ,magnificence especially becomes the well-born and the illustrious4 ,the house of the magnificent man will be of suitable splendour2 everything that he does will show taste and propriety4 ,the extremes1 or corresponding defects of character1 are1 on the one side1 vulgar1 tasteless profusion1 and on the other1 meanness or pettiness1 which for some paltry saving will spoil the effect of a great outlay 7,,ii474 ,,magnanimity1 or ,,high-,,mindedness ,greek3 megalopsychia1 loftiness of spirit1 is the culmination of the virtues4 ,it is concerned with greatness4 ,the high-minded man is one that1 being worthy1 rates himself at his real worth1 and neither more 7which is vanity7 nor less 7which is littleness of mind74 ,now1 worth has reference to external goods1 of which the greatest is honour4 ,the high-minded man must be in the highest degree honourable1 for which he must be a good man2 honour being the prize of virtue4 ,he will accept honour only from the good1 and will despise dishonour1 knowing it to be undeserved4 ,in all good or bad fortune1 he will behave with moderation2 in not highly valuing even the highest thing of all1 honour itself1 he may seem to others supercilious4 ,wealth and fortune contribute to high-mindedness2 but most of all1 superior goodness2 for the character cannot exist without perfect virtue4 ,the high-minded man neither shuns nor courts danger2 nor is he indisposed to risk even his life4 ,he gives favours1 but does not accept them2 he is proud to the great1 but affable to the lowly4 ,he attempts only great and important matters2 is open in friendship and in hatred2 truthful in conduct1 with an ironical reserve4 ,he talks little1 either of himself or of others2 neither desiring his own praise1 nor caring to utter blame4 ,he wonders at nothing1 bears no malice1 is no gossip4 ,his movements are slow1 his voice deep1 his diction stately 7,,iii474 ,there is a nameless virtue1 a mean between the two extremes of too much and too little ambition1 or desire of honour2 the reference being to smaller matters and to ordinary men4 ,the fact that both extremes are made terms of reproach1 shows that there is a just mean2 while each extreme alternately claims to be the virtue1 as against the other1 since there is no term to express the mean 7,,iv474 ,,mildness ,greek3 praotaes is a mean state with reference to ,anger1 although inclining to the defective side4 ,the exact mean1 which has no current name1 is that state wherein the agent is free from perturbation ,greek3 atarachos1 is not impelled by passion1 but guided by reason2 is angry when he ought1 as he ought1 with whom1 and as long as1 he ought3 taking right measure of all the circumstances4 ,not to be angry on the proper provocation1 is folly1 insensibility1 slavish submission4 ,of those given to excess in anger1 some are quick1 impetuous1 and soon appeased2 others are sulky1 repressing and perpetuating their resentment4 ,it is not easy to define the exact mean2 each case must be left to individual perception 7,v474 ,the next virtue is ,good-breeding in society1 a balance between surliness on the one hand1 and weak assent or interested flattery on the other4 ,it is a nameless virtue1 resembling friendship without the special affection4 ,aristotle shows what he considers the bearing of the finished gentleman1 studying to give pleasure1 and yet expressing disapprobation when it would be wrong to do otherwise 7,,vi474 ,closely allied to the foregoing is the observance of a due mean1 in the matter of ,boastfulness4 ,the boastful lay claim to what they do not possess2 false modesty ,greek3 eironeia is denying or underrating one's own merits4 ,the balance of the two is the straightforward and truthful character2 asserting just what belongs to him1 neither more nor less4 ,this is a kind of truthfulness1--distinguished from 'truth' in its more serious aspect1 as discriminating between justice and injustice--and has a worth of its own2 for he that is truthful in little things will be so in more important affairs 7,,vii474 ,in the playful intercourse of society1 there is room for the virtue of ,wit1 a balance or mean between buffoonish excess1 and the clownish dulness that can neither make nor enjoy a joke4 ,here the man of refinement must be a law to himself 7,,viii474 ,,modesty ,greek3 aidos is briefly described1 without being put through the comparison with its extremes4 ,it is more a feeling than a state1 or settled habit4 ,it is the fear of ill-report2 and has the physical expression of fear under danger--the blushing and the pallor4 ,it befits youth as the age of passion and of errors4 ,in the old it is no virtue1 as they should do nothing to be ashamed of 7,,ix474 ,book ,fifth 7the first of the so-called ,eudemian books71 treats of ,justice1 the ,social virtue by pre-eminence4 ,justice as a virtue is defined1 the state of mind1 or moral disposition1 to do what is just4 ,the question then is--what is the just and the unjust in action8 ,the words seem to have more senses than one4 ,the just may be 7#a7 the ,lawful1 what is established by law2 which includes1 therefore1 all obedience1 and all moral virtue 7for every kind of conduct came under public regulation1 in the legislation of ,plato and ,aristotle74 ,or 7#b7 the just may be restricted to the fair and equitable as regards property4 ,in both senses1 however1 justice concerns our behaviour to some one else3 and it thus stands apart from the other virtues1 as 7essentially and in its first character7 seeking another's good--not the good of the agent himself 7,i474 ,the first kind of justice1 which includes all virtue1 called ,universal ,justice1 being set aside1 the enquiry is reduced to the ,particular ,justice1 or ,justice proper and distinctive4 ,of this there are two kinds1 ,distributive and ,corrective 7,,ii474 ,distributive ,justice is a kind of equality or proportion in the distribution of property1 honours1 c41 in the ,state1 according to the merits of each citizen2 the standard of worth or merit being settled by the constitution1 whether democratic1 oligarchic1 or aristocratic 7,,iii474 ,corrective1 or ,reparative ,justice takes no account of persons2 but1 looking at cases where unjust loss or gain has occurred1 aims to restore the balance1 by striking an arithmetical mean 7,,iv474 ,the ,pythagorean idea1 that ,justice is ,retaliation1 is inadequate2 proportion and other circumstances must be included4 ,proportionate ,retaliation1 or ,reciprocity of services1--as in the case of ,commercial ,exchange1 measured through the instrument of money1 with its definite value1--is set forth as the great bond of society4 ,just dealing is the mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice 7,v474 ,justice is definitely connected with ,law1 and exists only between citizens of the ,state1 and not between father and children1 master and slave1 between whom there is no law proper1 but only a sort of relation analogous to law 7,,vi474 ,civil ,justice is partly ,natural1 partly conventional4 ,the natural is what has the same force everywhere1 whether accepted or not2 the conventional varies with institutions1 acquiring all its force from adoption by law1 and being in itself a matter of indifference prior to such adoption4 ,some persons regard all ,justice as thus conventional4 ,they say--',what exists by nature is unchangeable1 and has everywhere the same power2 for example1 fire burns alike in ,persia and here2 but we see regulations of justice often varied--differing here and there4' ,this1 however1 is not exactly the fact1 though to a certain extent it is the fact4 ,among the gods indeed1 it perhaps is not the fact at all3 but among men1 it is true that there exists something by nature changeable1 though everything is not so4 ,nevertheless1 there are some things existing by nature1 other things not by nature4 ,and we can plainly see1 among those matters that admit of opposite arrangement1 which of them belong to nature and which to law and convention2 and the same distinction will fit in other cases also4 ,thus the right hand is by nature more powerful than the left2 yet it is possible that all men may become ambidextrous4 ,those regulations of justice that are not by nature1 but by human appointment1 are not the same everywhere2 nor is the political constitution everywhere the same2 yet there is one political constitution only that is by nature the best everywhere 7,,vii474 ,to constitute ,justice and ,injustice in acts1 the acts must be voluntary2 there being degrees of culpability in injustice according to the intention1 the premeditation1 the greater or less knowledge of circumstances4 ,the act that a person does may perhaps be unjust2 but he is not1 on that account1 always to be regarded as an unjust man 7,,viii474 ,here a question arises1 ,can one be injured voluntarily8 ,it seems not1 for what a man consents to is not injury4 ,nor can a person injure himself4 ,injury is a relationship between two parties 7,,ix474 ,equity does not contradict1 or set aside1 ,justice1 but is a higher and finer kind of justice1 coming in where the law is too rough and general4 ,book ,sixth treats of ,intellectual ,excellences1 or ,virtues of the ,intellect4 ,it thus follows out the large definition of virtue given at the outset1 and repeated in detail as concerns each of the ethical or moral virtues successively4 ,according to the views most received at present1 ,morality is an affair of conscience and sentiment2 little or nothing is said about estimating the full circumstances and consequences of each act1 except that there is no time to calculate correctly1 and that the attempt to do so is generally a pretence for evading the peremptory order of virtuous sentiment1 which1 if faithfully obeyed1 ensures virtuous action in each particular case4 ,if these views be adopted1 an investigation of our intellectual excellences would find no place in a treatise on ,ethics4 ,but the theory of ,aristotle is altogether different4 ,though he recognizes ,emotion and ,intellect as inseparably implicated in the mind of ,ethical agents1 yet the sovereign authority that he proclaims is not ,conscience or ,sentiment1 but ,reason4 ,the subordination of ,sentiment to ,reason is with him essential4 ,it is true that ,reason must be supplied with ,first ,principles1 whence to take its start2 and these ,first ,principles are here declared to be1 fixed emotional states or dispositions1 engendered in the mind of the agent by a succession of similar acts4 ,but even these dispositions themselves1 though not belonging to the department of ,reason1 are not exempt from the challenge and scrutiny of ,reason2 while the proper application of them in act to the complicated realities of life1 is the work of ,reason altogether4 ,such an ethical theory calls upon ,aristotle to indicate1 more or less fully1 those intellectual excellences1 whereby alone we are enabled to overcome the inherent difficulties of right ethical conduct2 and he indicates them in the present ,book1 comparing them with those other intellectual excellences which guide our theoretical investigations1 where conduct is not directly concerned4 ,in specifying the ethical excellences1 or excellences of disposition1 we explained that each of them aimed to realize a mean--and that this mean was to be determined by ,right ,reason4 ,to find the mean1 is thus an operation of the ,intellect2 and we have now to explain what the right performance of it is1--or to enter upon the ,excellences of the ,intellect4 ,the soul having been divided into ,irrational and ,rational1 the ,rational must farther be divided into two parts1--the ,scientific 7dealing with necessary matter71 the ,calculative1 or ,deliberative 7dealing with contingent matter74 ,we must touch1 upon the excellence or best condition of both of them 7,i74 ,there are three principal functions of the soul--,sensation1 ,reason1 and ,appetite or ,desire4 ,now1 ,sensation 7which beasts have as well as men7 is not a principle of moral action4 ,the ,reason regards truth and falsehood only2 it does not move to action1 it is not an end in itself4 ,appetite or ,desire1 which aims at an end1 introduces us to moral action4 ,truth and ,falsehood1 as regards ,reason1 correspond to ,good and ,evil as regards ,appetite3 ,affirmation and ,negation1 with the first1 are the analogues of ,pursuit and ,avoidance1 with the second4 ,in purpose1 which is the principle of moral action1 there is included deliberation or calculation4 ,reason and ,appetite are thus combined3 ,good ,purpose comprises both true affirmation and right pursuit3 you may call it either an ,intelligent ,appetite1 or an ,appetitive ,intelligence4 ,such is man1 as a principle of action hae toiautae archae anthropos4 ,science has to do with the necessary and the eternal2 it is teachable1 but teachable always from praecognita1 or principles1 obtained by induction2 from which principles1 conclusions are demonstrated by syllogism 7,,iii474 ,art1 or ,production1 is to be carefully distinguished from the action or agency that belongs to man as an ethical agent1 and that does not terminate in any separate assignable product4 ,but both the one and the other deal with contingent matters only4 ,art deals for the most part with the same matters as are subject to the intervention of ,fortune or ,chance 7,,iv474 ,prudence or ,judiciousness ,greek3 phronaesis1 the quality of ,greek3 ho phronimos1 the ,practical ,reason1 comes next4 ,we are told what are the matters wherewith it is1 and wherewith it is not1 conversant4 ,it does not deal with matters wherein there exist art1 or with rules of art4 ,it does not deal with necessary matters1 nor with matters not modifiable by human agency4 ,the prudent or judicious man is one who 7like ,pericles7 can accurately estimate and foresee matters 7apart from ,science and ,art7 such as are good or evil for himself and other human beings4 ,on these matters1 feelings of pleasure or pain are apt to bias the mind1 by insinuating wrong aims2 which they do not do in regard to the properties of a triangle and other scientific conclusions4 ,to guard against such bias1 the judicious man must be armed with the ethical excellence described above as ,temperance or ,moderation4 ,judiciousness is not an ,art1 admitting of better and worse2 there are not good judicious men1 and bad judicious men1 as there are good and bad artists4 ,judiciousness is itself an excellence 7i4e41 the term connotes excellence7--an excellence of the rational soul1 and of that branch of the rational soul which is calculating1 deliberative1 not scientific 7,v474 ,reason or ,intellect ,greek3 nous is the faculty for apprehending the first principles of demonstrative science4 ,it is among the infallible faculties of the mind1 together with ,judiciousness1 ,science1 and ,philosophy4 ,each of these terms connotes truth and accuracy 7,,vi474 ,wisdom in the arts is the privilege of the superlative artists1 such as ,phidias in sculpture4 ,but there are some men wise1 not in any special art1 but absolutely2 and this wisdom ,greek3 sophia is ,philosophy4 ,it embraces both principles of science 7which ,aristotle considers to come under the review of the ,first ,philosophy7 and deductions therefrom2 it is ,greek3 nous and ,greek3 epistaemae in one4 ,it is more venerable and dignified than ,prudence or ,judiciousness2 because its objects1 the ,kosmos and the celestial bodies1 are far more glorious than man1 with whose interests alone ,prudence is concerned2 and also because the celestial objects are eternal and unvarying2 while man and his affairs are transitory and ever fluctuating4 ,hence the great honour paid to ,thales1 ,anaxagoras1 and others1 who speculated on theories thus magnificent and superhuman1 though useless in respect to human good4 ,we have already said that ,prudence or ,judiciousness is good counsel on human interests1 with a view to action4 ,but we must also add that it comprises a knowledge not of universals merely1 but also of particulars2 and experienced men1 much conversant with particulars1 are often better qualified for action than inexperienced men of science 7,,vii474 ,prudence is the same in its intellectual basis as the political science or art--yet looked at in a different aspect4 ,both of them are practical and consultative1 respecting matters of human good and evil2 but prudence1 in the stricter sense of the word1 concerns more especially the individual self2 still1 the welfare of the individual is perhaps inseparable from household and state concerns4 ,prudence farther implies a large experience2 whence boys1 who can become good mathematicians1 cannot have practical judgment or prudence4 ,in consultation1 we are liable to error both in regard to universals1 and in regard to particulars2 it is the business of prudence1 as well as of the political science1 to guard against both4 ,that prudence is not identical with ,science1 is plain enough2 for ,science is the intermediate process between the first principles and the last conclusions2 whereas prudence consists chiefly in seizing these last1 which are the applications of reasoning1 and represent the particular acts to be done4 ,prudence is the counterpart of ,reason ,greek3 ,nous or ,intellect1 but at the opposite extremity of the mental process4 ,for ,intellect ,greek3 ,nous apprehends the extreme ,universals1--the first principles1--themselves not deducible1 but from which deduction starts2 while ,prudence fastens on the extreme particulars1 which are not known by ,science1 but by sensible ,perception4 ,we mean here by sensible ,perception1 not what is peculiar to any of the five senses1 but what is common to them all--whereby we perceive that the triangle before us is a geometrical ultimatum1 and that it is the final subject of application for all the properties previously demonstrated to belong to triangles generally4 ,the mind will stop here in the downward march towards practical application1 as it stopped at first principles in the upward march4 ,prudence becomes1 however1 confounded with sensible perception1 when we reach this stage4 ,the statement here given involves ,aristotle's distinction of the proper and the common ,sensibles2 a shadowing out of the muscular element in sensation 7,,viii474 ,good counsel ,greek3 euboulia is distinguished from various other qualities4 ,it is1 in substance1 choosing right means to a good end2 the end being determined by the great faculty--,prudence or ,judiciousness 7,,ix474 ,sagacity ,greek3 synesis is a just intellectual measure in regard to the business of life1 individual and social2 critical ability in appreciating and interpreting the phenomena of experience4 ,it is distinguished from ,prudence in this respect--that ,prudence carries inferences into ,practice 7,x474 ,considerateness ,greek3 gnomae is another intellectual virtue1 with a practical bearing4 ,it is that virtue whereby we discern the proper occasions for indulgent construction1 softening the rigour of logical consistency4 ,it is the source of equitable decisions4 ,the different intellectual excellences just named--,considerateness1 ,sagacity1 ,prudence ,greek3 phronaesis1 and ,intellect ,greek3 ,nous1 seem all to bear on the same result1 and are for the most part predicable of the same individuals4 ,all of them are concerned with the ultimate applications of principle to practice1 and with the actual moments for decision and action4 ,indeed1 ,intellect ,greek3 ,nous deals with the extremes at both ends of the scale3 with the highest and lowest terms4 ,in theoretical science1 it apprehends and sanctions the major propositions1 the first and highest principia of demonstrations3 in practical dealings1 it estimates the minor propositions of the syllogism1 the possibilities of the situation1 and the ultimate action required4 ,all these are the principia from whence arises the determining motive3 for the universal is always derived from particulars2 these we must know through sensible perception1 which is in this case the same thing as intellect ,greek3 ,nous4 ,intellect is in fact both the beginning and the end3 it cognizes both the first grounds of demonstration and the last applications of the results of demonstration4 ,a man cannot acquire science by nature1 or without teaching3 but he may acquire ,intellect and ,sagacity by nature1 simply through1 long life and abundant experience4 ,the affirmations and opinions of old men deserve attention1 hardly less than demonstrations3 they have acquired an eye from experience1 and can thus see the practical principles 7though they may not be able to lay out their reasons logically7 7,,xi474 ,but an objector may ask--,of what use are ,philosophy and ,prudence8 ,he may take such grounds as these4 7#a7 ,philosophy has no practical aim at all2 nor does it consider the means of happiness8 7#b7 ,prudence1 though bearing on practice1 is merely knowledge1 and does not ensure right action4 7#c7 ,even granting the knowledge to be of value as direction1 it might be obtained1 like medical knowledge1 from a professional adviser4 7#d7 ,if philosophy is better than prudence1 why does prudence control philosophy8 ,we have to answer these doubts4 ,the first is answered by asserting the independent value of philosophy and prudence1 as perfections of our nature1 and as sources of happiness in themselves4 ,the second and third doubts are set at rest1 by affirming prudence to have no existence apart from virtue4 ,without a virtuous aim1 there is no such thing as ,prudence3 there is nothing but cleverness degenerating into cunning2 while virtue without virtuous prudence is nothing better than a mere instinct1 liable to be misguided in every way 7,,xii474 ,there is one more difficulty to be cleared up respecting virtue4 ,all our dispositions2 and therefore all our ethical excellences1 come to us in a certain sense by nature2 that is1 we have from the moment of birth a certain aptitude for becoming temperate1 courageous1 just1 c4 ,but these natural aptitudes or possessions ,greek3 physikai hexeis are something altogether distinct from the ethical excellences proper1 though capable of being matured into them1 if intellect and prudence be superadded4 ,sokrates was mistaken in resolving all the virtues into prudence2 but he was right in saying that none of them can exist without prudence4 ,the virtues ought to be defined as1 not merely ethical dispositions according to right reason1 but ethical dispositions along with right reason or prudence 7i4e41 prudence is an ever present co-efficient74 ,it is thus abundantly evident that none but a prudent man can be good1 and none but a good man can be prudent4 ,the virtues are separable from each other1 so far as the natural aptitudes are concerned3 a man may have greater facility for acquiring one than another4 ,but so far as regards the finished acquirements of excellence1 in virtue of which a man is called good--no such separation is possible4 ,all of them alike need the companionship of ,prudence 7,,xiii474 ,book ,seventh has1 two ,parts4 ,part first discusses the grades of moral strength and moral weakness4 ,part second is a short dissertation on ,pleasure1 superseded by the superior handling of the subject in the ,tenth ,book4 ,with reference to moral power1 in self-restraint1 six grades are specified4 7#a7 ,god-like virtue1 or reason impelling as well as directing4 7#b7 ,the highest human virtue1 expressed by ,temperance ,greek3 sophrosynae--appetite and passion perfectly harmonized with reason4 7#c7 ,continence ,greek3 egkrateia or the mastery of reason1 after a struggle4 7#d7 ,incontinence1 the mastery of appetite or passion1 but not without a struggle4 7#e7 ,vice1 reason perverted so as to harmonize entirely with appetite or passion4 7#f7 ,bestiality1 naked appetite or passion1 without reason4 ,certain prevalent opinions are enumerated1 which are to form the subject of the discussions following--7#a7 ,continence and endurance are morally good4 7#b7 ,the ,continent man sticks to his opinion4 7#c7 ,the ,incontinent err knowingly4 7#d7 ,temperance and ,continence are the same4 7#e7 ,wise and clever men may be ,incontinent4 7#f7 ,incontinence applies to other things than ,pleasure1 as anger1 honour1 and gain 7,i474 ,the third point 7the ,incontinent sin knowingly7 is first mooted4 ,sokrates held the contrary2 he made vice and ignorance convertible4 ,others think that the knowledge possessed by the incontinent is mere opinion1 or a vague and weak conviction4 ,it is objected to ,no4 #d1 that continence implies evil desires to be controlled2 while temperance means the character fully harmonized4 ,as to ,no4 #b1 ,continence must often be bad1 if it consists in sticking to an opinion 7,,ii474 ,the third point1 the only question of real interest or difficulty1 is resumed at greater length4 ,the distinction between knowledge and opinion 7the higher and the lower kinds of knowledge7 does not settle the question1 for opinion may be as strong as knowledge4 ,the real point is1 what is meant by having knowledge8 ,a man's knowledge may be in abeyance1 as it is when he is asleep or intoxicated4 ,thus1 we may have in the mind two knowledges 7like two separate syllogisms71 one leading to continence1 the other to incontinence2 the first is not drawn out1 like the syllogism wanting a minor2 hence it may be said to be not present to the mind2 so that1 in a certain sense1 ,sokrates was right in denying that actual and present knowledge could be overborne4 ,vice is a form of oblivion 7,,iii474 ,the next question is1 what is the object-matter of incontinence2 whether there is any man incontinent simply and absolutely 7without any specification of wherein71 or whether all incontinent men are so in regard to this or that particular matter8 7,no4 #f74 ,the answer is1 that it applies directly to the bodily appetites and pleasures1 which are necessary up to a certain point 7the sphere of ,temperance71 and then he that commits unreasonable excess above this point is called ,incontinent simply4 ,but if he commits excess in regard to pleasures1 which1 though not necessary1 are natural and1 up to a certain point1 reasonable--such as victory1 wealth1 honour--we designate him as incontinent1 yet with a specification of the particular matter 7,,iv474 ,the modes of ,bestiality1 as cannibalism and unnatural passion1 are ascribed to morbid depravity of nature or of habits1 analogous to disease or madness 7,v474 ,incontinence in anger is not so bad as ,incontinence in lust1 because anger 7#a7 has more semblance of reason1 7#b7 is more a matter of constitution1 7#c7 has less of deliberate purpose--while lust is crafty1 7#d7 arises under pain2 and not from wantonness 7,,vi474 ,persons below the average in resisting pleasures are incontinent2 those below the average in resisting pains are soft or effeminate4 ,the mass of men incline to both weaknesses4 ,he that deliberately pursues excessive pleasures1 or other pleasures in an excessive way1 is said to be abandoned4 ,the intemperate are worse than the incontinent4 ,sport1 in its excess1 is effeminacy1 as being relaxation from toil4 ,there are two kinds of incontinence3 the one proceeding from precipitancy1 where a man acts without deliberating at all2 the other from feebleness1--where he deliberates1 but where the result of deliberation is too weak to countervail his appetite 7,,vii474 ,intemperance or profligacy is more vicious1 and less curable than ,incontinence4 ,the profligate man is one who has in him no principle 7archae7 of good or of right reason1 and who does wrong without afterwards repenting of it2 the incontinent man has the good principle in him1 but it is overcome when he does wrong1 and he afterwards repents 7,,viii474 ,here1 again1 ,aristotle denies that sticking to one's opinions is1 per se1 continence4 ,the opinion may be wrong2 in that case1 if a man sticks to it1 prompted by mere self-assertion and love of victory1 it is a species of incontinence4 ,one of the virtues of the continent man is to be open to persuasion1 and to desert one's resolutions for a noble end 7,,ix474 ,incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness as opposed to wakeful knowledge4 ,the incontinent man is like a state having good laws1 but not acting on them4 ,the incontinence of passion is more curable than that of weakness2 what proceeds from habit more than what is natural 7,x474 ,the ,eighth and ,ninth ,books contain the treatise on ,friendship4 ,the subject deserves a place in an ,ethical treatise1 because of its connexion with virtue and with happiness4 ,several questions have been debated concerning ,friendship1--,is it based on likeness or unlikeness8 ,can bad men be friends8 ,is there but one species of ,friendship1 or more than one8 7,i47 ,some progress towards a solution of these questions may be made by considering what are the objects of liking2 these are the good1 the pleasant1 the useful4 ,by the good is not meant the absolute good of ,plato1 but the apparent good4 ,inanimate things must be excluded1 as wanting reciprocation 7,,ii474 ,the varieties of friendship follow these three modes of the likeable4 ,the friendships for the useful and the pleasant1 are not disinterested1 but self-seeking2 they are therefore accidental and transitory2 they do not involve intimate and frequent association4 ,friendship for the good1 and between the virtuous1 is alone perfect2 it is formed slowly1 and has the requisites of permanence4 ,it occurs rarely 7,,iii474 ,as regards the useful and the pleasant1 the bad may be friends4 ,it may happen that two persons are mutually pleasant to each other1 as lover and beloved2 while this lasts1 there is friendship4 ,it is only as respects the good1 that there exists a permanent liking for the person4 ,such friendship is of an absolute nature2 the others are accidental 7,,iv474 ,friendship is in full exercise only during actual intercourse2 it may exist potentially at a distance2 but in long absence1 there is danger of its being dissolved4 ,friendship is a settled state or habit1 while fondness is a mere passion1 which does not imply our wishing to do good to the object of it1 as friendship does 7,v474 ,the perfect kind of friendship1 from its intensity1 cannot be exercised towards more than a small number4 ,in regard to the useful and the pleasant1 on the other hand1 there may be friendship with many2 as the friendship towards tradesmen and between the young4 ,the happy desire pleasant friends4 ,men in power have two classes of friends2 one for the useful1 the other for the pleasant4 ,both qualities are found in the good man2 but he will not be the friend of a superior1 unless he be surpassed 7by that superior7 in virtue also4 ,in all the kinds of friendship now specified there is equality 7,,vi474 ,there are friendships where one party is superior1 as father and son1 older and younger1 husband and wife1 governor and governed4 ,in such cases there should be a proportionably greater love on the part of the inferior4 ,when the love on each side is proportioned to the merit of the party beloved1 then we have a certain species of equality1 which is an ingredient in friendship4 ,but equality in matters of friendship1 is not quite the same as equality in matters of justice4 ,in matters of justice1 equality proportioned to merit stands first--equality between man and man 7no account being taken of comparative merit7 stands only second4 ,in friendship1 the case is the reverse2 the perfection of friendship is equal love between the friends towards each other2 to have greater love on one side1 by reason of and proportioned to superior merit1 is friendship only of the second grade4 ,this will be evident if we reflect that extreme inequality renders friendship impossible--as between private men and kings or gods4 ,hence the friend can scarcely wish for his friend the maximum of good1 to become a god2 such extreme elevation would terminate the friendship4 ,nor will he wish his friend to possess all the good2 for every one wishes most for good to self 7,,vii474 ,the essence of friendship is to love rather than to be loved1 as seen in mothers2 but the generality of persons desire rather to be loved1 which is akin to being honoured 7although honour is partly sought as a sign of future favours74 ,by means of love1 as already said1 unequal friendships may be equalized4 ,friendship with the good1 is based on equality and similarity1 neither party ever desiring base services4 ,friendships for the useful are based on the contrariety of fulness and defect1 as poor and rich1 ignorant and knowing 7,,viii474 ,friendship is an incident of political society2 men associating together for common ends1 become friends4 ,political justice becomes more binding when men are related by friendship4 ,the state itself is a community for the sake of advantage2 the expedient to all is the just4 ,in the large society of the state1 there are many inferior societies for business1 and for pleasure3 friendship starts up in all 7,,ix474 ,there are three forms of ,civil ,government1 with a characteristic declension or perversion of each3--,monarchy passing into ,despotism2 ,aristocracy into ,oligarchy2 ,timocracy 7based on wealth7 into ,democracy2 parent and child typifies the first2 husband and wife the second2 brothers the third 7,x474 ,the monarchial or paternal type has superiority on one side1 and demands honour as well as love on the other4 ,in aristocracy1 the relation is one of merit1 and the greater love is given to the better4 ,in timocracy1 and among brothers1 there is equality2 and hence the most frequent friendships4 ,there is no friendship towards a slave1 as a slave1 for1 as such he is a mere animate tool 7,,xl474 ,in the relations of the family1 friendship varies with the different situations4 ,parents love their children as a part of themselves1 and from the first2 children grow to love their parents4 ,brothers are affected by their community of origin1 as well as by common education and habits of intimacy4 ,husband and wife come together by a natural bond1 and as mutual helps2 their friendship contains the useful and the pleasant1 and1 with virtue1 the good4 ,their offspring strengthens the bond 7,,xii474 ,the friendships that give rise to complaints are confined to the ,useful4 ,such friendships involve a legal element of strict and measured reciprocity mere trade1 and a moral or unwritten understanding1 which is properly friendship4 ,each party is apt to give less and expect more than he gets2 and the rule must be for each to reciprocate liberally and fully1 in such manner and kind as they are able 7,,xiii474 ,in unequal friendships1 between a superior and inferior1 the inferior has the greater share of material assistance1 the superior should receive the greater honour 7,,xiv474 ,book ,ninth proceeds without any real break4 ,it may not be always easy to fix the return to be made for services received4 ,protagoras1 the sophist1 left it to his pupils to settle the amount of fee that he should receive4 ,when there is no agreement1 we must render what is in our power1 for example1 to the gods and to our parents 7,i474 ,cases may arise of conflicting obligation2 as1 shall we prefer a friend to a deserving man8 shall a person robbed reciprocate to robbers8 and others4 ,we have here the germs of ,casuistry4 7,,ii47 ,as to the termination of ,friendship2 in the case of the useful and the pleasant1 the connexion ceases with the motives4 ,in the case of the good1 it may happen that one party counterfeits the good1 but is really acting the useful or the pleasant2 or one party may turn out wicked1 and the only question is1 how far hopes of his improvement shall be entertained4 ,again1 one may continue the same1 while the other makes large advances in mental training2 how far shall present disparity operate against old associations8 7,,iii474 ,there is a sort of illustrative parallelism between the feelings and acts of friendship1 and the feelings and acts of self-love1 or of a good man to himself4 ,the virtuous man wishes what is good for himself1 especially for his highest part--the intellect or thinking part2 he desires to pass his life in the company of his own thoughts2 he sympathizes with his own sorrows4 ,on the other hand1 the bad choose the pleasant1 although it be hurtful2 they fly from themselves2 their own thoughts are unpleasant companions2 they are full of repentance 7,,iv474 ,good-will is different from friendship2 it is a sudden impulse of feeling towards some distinguished or likeable quality1 as in an antagonist4 ,it has not the test of longing in absence4 ,it may be the prelude to friendship 7,v474 ,unanimity1 or agreement of opinion1 is a part of friendship4 ,not as regards mere speculation1 as about the heavenly bodies2 but in practical matters1 where interests are at stake1 such as the politics of the day4 ,this unanimity cannot occur in the bad1 from their selfish and grasping disposition 7,,vi474 ,the position is next examined--that the love felt by benefactors is stronger than the love felt by those benefitted4 ,it is not a sufficient explanation to say1 the benefactor is a creditor1 who wishes the prosperity of his debtor4 ,benefactors are like workmen1 who love their own work1 and the exercise of their own powers4 ,they also have the feeling of nobleness on their side2 while the recipient has the less lovable idea of profit4 ,finally1 activity is more akin to love than recipiency 7,,vii474 ,another question raised for discussion is--',ought a man to love himself most1 or another8' ,on the one hand1 selfishness is usually condemned as the feature of bad men2 on the other hand1 the feelings towards self are made the standard of the feelings towards friends4 ,the solution is given thus4 ,there is a lower self 7predominant with most men7 that gratifies the appetites1 seeking wealth1 power1 c4 ,with the select few1 there is a higher self that seeks the honourable1 the noble1 intellectual excellence1 at any cost of pleasure1 wealth1 honour1 c4 ,these noble-minded men procure for themselves the greater good by sacrificing the less3 and their self-sacrifice is thus a mode of self4 ,it is the duty of the good man to love himself3 for his noble life is profitable1 both to himself1 and to others2 but the bad man ought not to love himself4 ,self-sacrifice1 formerly brought under ,courage1 is here depicted from another point of view 7,,viii474 ,by way of bringing out the advantages of friendship1 it is next asked1 ,does the happy man need friends8 ,to this1 it is answered1 7#a7 ,that happiness1 being the sum of all human good1 must suppose the possession of the greatest of external goods1 which is friendship4 7#b7 ,the happy man will require friends as recipients1 of his overflow of kindness4 7#c7 ,he cannot be expected either to be solitary1 or to live with strangers4 7#d7 ,the highest play of existence is to see the acts of another in harmony with self4 7#e7 ,sympathy supports and prolongs the glow of one's own emotions4 7#f7 ,a friend confirms us in the practice of virtue4 7#g7 ,the sense of existence in ourselves is enlarged by the consciousness of another's existence 7,,ix474 ,the number of friends is again considered1 and the same barriers stated--the impossibility of sharing among many the highest kind of affection1 or of keeping up close and harmonious intimacy4 ,the most renowned friendships are between pairs 7,x474 ,as to whether friends are most needed in adversity or in prosperity--in the one1 friendship is more necessary1 in the other more glorious 7,,xi474 ,the essential support and manifestation of friendship is ,intercourse4 ,whatever people's tastes are1 they desire the society of others in exercising them 7,,xii474 ,book ,tenth discusses ,pleasure1 and lays down as the highest and perfect pleasure1 the exercise of the ,intellect in ,philosophy4 ,pleasure is deserving of consideration1 from its close intimacy with the constitution of our race2 on which account1 in our training of youth1 we steer them by pleasure and pain2 and it is of the first importance that they should feel pleasure in what they ought1 and displeasure in what they ought1 as the groundwork 7or principium7 of good ethical dispositions4 ,such a topic can never be left unnoticed1 especially when we look at the great difference of opinion thereupon4 ,some affirm pleasure to be the chief good ,eudoxus4 ,others call it altogether vile and worthless party of ,speusippus4 ,of these last1 some perhaps really think so2 but the rest are actuated by the necessity of checking men's too great proneness to it1 and disparage it on that account4 ,this policy ,aristotle strongly censures1 and contends for the superior efficacy of truth 7,i474 ,the arguments urged by ,eudoxus as proving pleasure to be the chief good1 are1 7#a7 ,that all beings seek pleasure2 7#b7 and avoid its opposite1 pain2 7#c7 that they seek pleasure as an end-in-itself1 and not as a means to any farther end2 7#d7 that pleasure1 added to any other good1 such as justice or temperance1 increases the amount of good2 which could not be the case1 unless pleasure were itself good4 ,yet this last argument 7,aristotle urges7 proves pleasure to be a good1 but not to be the ,good2 indeed1 ,plato urged the same argument1 to show that pleasure could not be ,the ,good3 since ,the ,good 7the ,chief ,good7 must be something that does not admit of being enhanced or made more good4 ,the objection of ,speusippus1--that irrational creatures are not to be admitted as witnesses1--,aristotle disallows1 seeing that rational and irrational agree on the point2 and the thing that seems to all1 must be true4 ,another objection1 ,that the opposite of pain is not pleasure1 but a neutral state--is set aside as contradicted by the fact of human desire and aversion1 the two opposite states of feeling 7,,ii474 ,the arguments of the ,platonists1 to prove that pleasure is not good1 are next examined4 7#a7 ,pleasure1 they say1 is not a quality2 but neither 7replies ,aristotle7 are the exercises or actual manifestations of virtue or happiness4 7#b7 ,pleasure is not definite1 but unlimited1 or admitting of degrees1 while ,the ,good is a something definite1 and does not admit of degrees4 ,but if these reasoners speak about the pure pleasures1 they might take objection on similar grounds against virtue and justice also2 for these too admit of degrees1 and one man is more virtuous than another4 ,and if they speak of the mixed pleasures 7alloyed with pain71 their reasoning will not apply to the unmixed4 ,good health is acknowledged to be a good1 and to be a definite something2 yet there are nevertheless some men more healthy1 some less4 7#c7 ,the ,good is perfect or complete2 but objectors urge that no motion or generation is complete1 and pleasure is in one of these two categories4 ,this last assertion ,aristotle denies4 ,pleasure is not a motion2 for the attribute of velocity1 greater or less1 which is essential to all motion1 does not attach to pleasure4 ,a man may be quick in becoming pleased1 or in becoming angry2 but in the act of being pleased or angry1 he can neither be quick nor slow4 ,nor is it true that pleasure is a generation4 ,in all generation1 there is something assignable out of which generation takes place 7not any one thing out of any other71 and into which it reverts by destruction4 ,if pleasure be a generation1 pain must be the destruction of what is generated2 but this is not correct1 for pain does not re-establish the state antecedent to the pleasure4 ,accordingly1 it is not true that pleasure is a generation4 ,some talk of pain as a want of something required by nature1 and of pleasure as a filling up of that want4 ,but these are corporeal1 not mental facts1 and are applicable only to eating and drinking2 not applicable to many other pleasures1 such as those of sight1 hearing1 or learning4 7#d7 ,there are some disgraceful pleasures4 ,aristotle replies that these are not absolutely and properly pleasures1 but only to the depraved man2 just as things are not yellow1 which appear so to men in a jaundice4 ,pleasures differ from each other in species3 there are good pleasures1 i4e41 those arising from good sources2 and bad pleasures1 i4e41 from bad sources4 ,the pleasure per se is always desirable2 but not when it comes from objectionable acts4 ,the pleasures of each man will vary according to his character2 none but a musical man can enjoy the pleasures of music4 ,no one would consent to remain a child for life1 even though he were to have his fill of childish pleasure4 ,aristotle sums up the result thus4 ,pleasure is not ,the ,good4 ,not every mode of pleasure is to be chosen4 ,some pleasures1 distinguished from the rest specifically or according to their sources1 are to be chosen per se 7,,iii474 ,he then attempts to define pleasure4 ,it is something perfect and complete in itself1 at each successive moment of time2 hence it is not motion1 which is at every moment incomplete4 ,pleasure is like the act of vision1 or a point1 or a monad1 always complete in itself4 ,it accompanies every variety of sensible perception1 intelligence1 and theorizing contemplation4 ,in each of these faculties1 the act is more perfect1 according as the subjective element is most perfect1 and the object most grand and dignified4 ,when the act is most perfect1 the pleasure accompanying it is also the most perfect2 and this pleasure puts the finishing consummation to the act4 ,the pleasure is not a pre-existing acquirement now brought into exercise1 but an accessory end implicated with the act1 like the fresh look which belongs to the organism just matured4 ,it is a sure adjunct1 so long as subject and object are in good condition4 ,but continuity of pleasure1 as well as of the other exercises1 is impossible4 ,life is itself an exercise much diversified1 and each man follows the diversity that is suitable to his own inclination--music1 study1 c4 ,each has its accessory and consummating mode of pleasure2 and to say that all men desire pleasure1 is the same as saying that all men desire life4 ,it is no real question to ask--,do we choose life for the sake of pleasure1 or pleasure for the sake of life8 ,the truth is1 that the two are implicated and inseparable 7,,iv474 ,as our acts or exercises differ from each other specifically1 so also the pleasures that are accessory to them differ specifically4 ,exercises intellectual differ from exercises perceptive1 and under each head there are varieties differing from each other4 ,the pleasures accessory and consummating to each1 are diversified accordingly4 ,each pleasure contributes to invigorate and intensify the particular exercise that it is attached to2 the geometer who studies his science with pleasure becomes more acute and successful in prosecuting it4 ,on the other hand1 the pleasures attached to one exercise impede the mind in regard to other exercises2 thus men fond of the flute cannot listen to a speaker with attention1 if any one is playing the flute near them4 ,what we delight in doing1 we are more likely to do well2 what we feel pain in doing1 we are not likely to do well4 ,and thus each variety of exercise is alike impeded by the pains attached to itself1 and by the pleasures attached to other varieties4 ,among these exercises or acts1 some are morally good1 others morally bad2 the desires of the good are also praise-worthy1 the desires of the bad are blameable2 but if so1 much more are the pleasures attached to the good exercises1 good pleasures--and the pleasures attached to the bad exercises1 bad pleasures4 ,for the pleasures attached to an exercise are more intimately identified with that exercise than the desire of it can be4 ,the pleasure of the exercise1 and the exercise itself1 are indeed so closely identified one with the other1 that to many they appear the same4 ,sight1 hearing1 and smell1 differ in purity from touch and taste2 and the pleasures attached to each differ in like manner4 ,the pleasures of intellect differ from those of sense1 as these two exercises differ from one another4 ,every animal has its own peculiar pleasures1 as it has also its own peculiar manifestation and exercises4 ,among the human race1 the same things give pleasure to one individual and pain to another4 ,the things that appear sweet to the strong and healthy man1 do not appear sweet to one suffering from fever1 or weakly4 ,now1 amidst this discrepancy1 what appears to the virtuous and intelligent man1 really is4 ,his pleasures are the true and real pleasures4 ,excellence1 and the good man qutenus good1 are to be taken as the standard4 ,if what he abhors appears pleasurable to some persons1 we must not be surprised1 since there are many depravations of individuals1 in one way or another2 but these things are not pleasures really1 they are only pleasures to these depraved mortals 7,v474 ,so far the theory of ,pleasure4 ,aristotle now goes back to his starting point--the nature of the ,good1 and ,happiness4 ,he re-states his positions3 ,that ,happiness is an exercise or actuality ,greek3 energeia1 and not an acquirement or state 7hexis71 ,that it belongs to such exercises as are worthy of choice for their own sake1 and not to such as are worthy of choice for the sake of something else2 ,that it is perfect and self-sufficing1 seeking nothing beyond itself1 and leaving no wants unsupplied4 ,hence he had concluded that it consisted in acting according to virtue2 for the honourable and good are chosen for their own sake4 ,but amusements are also sought for their own sake2 ,are these also to be called happiness8 ,no4 ,it is true that they are much pursued by those whom the vulgar envy--men of wealth and despots--who patronize and reward the practitioners of amusement4 ,but this proves nothing1 for we cannot adopt the choice of these despots1 who have little virtue or intellect1 and have never known the taste of refined and liberal pleasure4 ,children and mature men1 bad men and virtuous1 have each their different pleasures2 the virtuous and intelligent man finds a life of excellence and the pleasures attached thereunto most worthy of his choice1 and such a man 7,aristotle has declared more than once7 is our standard4 ,it would indeed be childish to treat amusements as the main end of life2 they are the relaxation of the virtuous man1 who derives from them fresh vigour for the prosecution of the serious business of life1 which he cannot prosecute continuously4 ,the serious exercises of life are better than the comic1 because they proceed from the better part of man4 ,the slave may enjoy bodily pleasures to the full1 but a slave is not called happy 7,,vi474 ,we have thus shown that ,happiness consists in exercise or actual living according to excellence2 naturally1 therefore1 according to the highest excellence1 or the excellence of the best part of man4 ,this best part is the ,intellect 7,nous71 our most divine and commanding element2 in its exercise1 which is theoretical or speculative1 having respect to matters honourable1 divine1 and most worthy of study4 ,such philosophical exercise1 besides being the highest function of our nature1 is at the same time more susceptible than any mode of active effort1 of being prosecuted for a long continuance4 ,it affords the purest and most lasting pleasure2 it approaches most nearly to being self-sufficing1 since it postulates little more than the necessaries of life1 and is even independent of society1 though better with society4 ,perfect happiness would thus be the exercise of the theorizing intellect1 continued through a full period of life4 ,but this is more than we can expect4 ,still1 we ought to make every effort to live according to this best element of our nature2 for1 though small in bulk1 it stands exalted above the rest in power and dignity1 and1 being the sovereign element in man1 is really ,the ,man himself 7,,vii474 ,next1 yet only second1 come the other branches of excellence3 the active social life of a good citizen4 ,exercises according to this branch of virtue are the natural business of man1 for it is bound up with our whole nature1 including body as well as mind1 our appetites1 and our passions1 whereas the happiness of intellect is separate4 ,active social virtue postulates conditions of society and external aids in considerable measure2 but the life of intellect requires only the minimum of these1 and is even impeded by much of them4 ,that perfect happiness is to be found in the philosophical life only1 will appear farther when we recollect that the gods are blest and happy in the highest degree1 and that this is the only mode of life suitable to them4 ,with the gods there can be no scope for active social virtues2 for in what way can they be just1 courageous1 or temperate8 ,neither virtuous practice nor constructive art can be predicated of the gods2 what then remains1 since we all assume them to live1 and therefore to be in act or exercise of some kind2 for no one believes them to live in a state of sleep1 like ,endymion4 ,there remains nothing except philosophical contemplation4 ,this1 then1 must be the life of the gods1 the most blest of all2 and that mode of human life which approaches nearest to it will be the happiest4 ,no other animal can take part in this1 and therefore none can be happy4 ,in so far as the gods pay attention to human affairs1 they are likely to take pleasure in the philosopher1 who is most allied to themselves4 ,a moderate supply of good health1 food1 and social position1 must undoubtedly be ensured to the philosopher2 for1 without these1 human nature will not suffice for the business of contemplation4 ,but he will demand nothing more than a moderate supply1 and when thus equipped1 he will approach nearer to happiness than any one else4 ,aristotle declares this confidently1 citing ,solon1 ,anaxagoras1 and other sages1 as having said much the same before him 7,,viii474 ,in the concluding chapter1 ,aristotle gives the transition from ,ethics to ,politics4 ,treatises on virtue may inspire a few liberal minds2 but1 for the mass of men1 laws1 institutions1 and education are necessary4 ,the young ought to be trained1 not merely by paternal guidance directing in the earliest years their love and hatred1 but also by a scheme of public education1 prescribed and enforced by authority throughout the city4 ,right conduct will thus be rendered easier by habit2 but still1 throughout life1 the mature citizen must continue under the discipline of law1 which has force adequate to correction1 and1 being impersonal1 does not excite aversion and hatred4 ,hence the need for a system of good public training4 ,nowhere is this now established and enforced2 hardly anywhere1 except in ,sparta1 is it even attempted4 ,amid such public neglect1 it becomes the duty of an individual to contribute what he can to the improvement of those that he is concerned in1 and for that purpose to acquire the capacities qualifying him for becoming a lawgiver4 ,private admonition will compensate to a certain extent for the neglect of public interference1 and in particular cases may be even more discriminating4 ,bat how are such capacities to be acquired8 ,not from the ,sophists1 whose method is too empirical2 nor from practical politicians1 for they seem to have no power of imparting their skill4 ,perhaps it would be useful to make a collection of existing laws and constitutions4 ,aristotle concludes with sketching the plan of his own work on ,politics4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,aristotelian doctrines are generally summed up in such points as these3--,the theory of ,good2 ,pleasure2 the theory of ,virtue2 the doctrine of the ,will1 distinguishing voluntary from involuntary2 ,virtue a ,habit2 the doctrine of the ,,mean2 the distinction between the ,moral ,virtues and the ,intellectual ,virtues2 ,justice1 distributive1 and commutative2 ,friendship2 the ,contemplative ,life4 ,the following are the indications of his views1 according to the six leading subjects of ,ethics4 ,i4 and ,,ii4--,it is characteristic of ,aristotle 7as is fully stated in ,appendix ,b47 to make the judgment of the wisest and most cultivated minds1 the standard of appeal in moral questions4 ,he lays down certain general principles1 such as the doctrine of the ,mean1 but in the application of these 7which is everything71 he trusts to the most experienced and skilled advisers that the community can furnish4 ,,iii4--,on the theory of ,happiness1 or the ,summum ,bonum1 it is needless to repeat the abstract of the tenth book4 ,,iv4--,in laying down the ,moral ,code1 he was encumbered with the too wide view of ,virtue2 but made an advance in distinguishing virtue proper from excellence in general4 ,v4--,he made ,society tutelary to the individual in an excessive degree4 ,he had no clear conception of the province of authority or law2 and did not separate the morality of obligation from the morality of reward and nobleness4 ,,vi4--,his exclusion of ,theology from morality was total4 ,,the ,,stoics4 ,the ,stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy1 recognized and conspicuous at ,athens during the three centuries preceding the ,christian era1 and during the century or more following4 ,among these four sects1 the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between the ,stoics and the ,epicureans4 ,the ,stoical system dates from about #cjj ,b4,c42 it was derived from the system of the ,cynics4 ,the founder of the system was ,,zeno1 from ,citium in ,cyprus 7he lived from #cdj--bfj ,b4,c471 who derived his first impulse from ,krates the ,cynic4 ,he opened his school in a building or porch1 called the ,stoa ,poecile 7',painted ,portico'7 at ,athens1 whence the origin of the name of the sect4 ,zeno had for his disciple ,,cleanthes1 from ,assos in the ,troad 7#cjj--bbj ,b4,c471 whose ,hymn to ,jupiter is the only fragment of any length that has come down to us from the early ,stoics1 and is a remarkable production1 setting forth the unity of ,god1 his omnipotence1 and his moral government4 ,,chrysippus1 from ,soli in ,cilicia 7#bij--bjg ,b4,c471 followed ,cleanthes1 and1 in his voluminous writings1 both defended and modified the ,stoical creed4 ,these three represent the first period of the system4 ,the second period 7#bjj--ej ,b4,c47 embraces its general promulgation1 and its introduction to the ,romans4 ,chrysippus was succeeded by ,,zeno of ,sidon1 and ,,diogenes of ,babylon2 then followed ,,antipater1 of ,tarsus1 who taught ,,panaetius of ,rhodes 7d4 #aab ,b4,c471 who1 again1 taught ,,posidonius of ,apamea1 in ,syria4 7,two philosophers are mentioned from the native province of ,st4 ,paul1 besides ,chrysippus--,,athekodoeus1 from ,cana in ,cilicia2 and ,,archedemus1 from ,tarsus1 the apostle's birthplace4 ,it is remarked by ,sir ,a4 ,grant1 that almost all the first ,stoics were of ,asiatic birth2 and the system itself is undeniably more akin to the oriental mind than to the ,greek47 ,posidonius was acquainted with ,marius and ,pompey1 and gave lessons to ,cicero1 but the moral treatise of ,cicero1 ,de ,officiis1 is derived from a work of ,panaetius4 ,the third period of ,stoicism is ,roman4 ,in this period1 we have ,cato the ,younger1 who invited to his house the philosopher ,athenodorus2 and1 under the ,empire1 the three ,stoic philosophers1 whose writings have come down to us--,,seneca 7#f ,b4,c4-#fe ,a4,d471 ,,epictetus 7#fj-adj ,a4,d471 who began life as a slave1 and the ,emperor ,,marcus ,,aurelius ,,antoninus 7#aba-ahj ,a4,d474 ,stoicism prevailed widely in the ,roman world1 although not to the exclusion of ,epicurean views4 ,the leading ,stoical doctrines are given in certain phrases or expressions1 as ',life according to ,nature' 7although this phrase belongs also to the ,epicureans71 the ideal ',wise ,man1' ',apathy1' or equanimity of mind 7also an ,epicurean ideal71 the power of the ',will1' the worship of ',duty1' the constant ',advance' in virtue1 c4 ,but perspicuity will be best gained by considering the ,moral system under four heads--the ,theology2 the ,psychology or theory of mind2 the theory of the ,good or human happiness2 and the scheme of ,virtue or ,duty4 ,i4--,the ,,theological doctrines of the ,stoics comprehended their system of the ,universe1 and of man's position in it4 ,they held that the ,universe is governed by one good and wise ,god1 together with inferior or subordinate deities4 ,god exercises a moral government2 under it the good are happy1 while misfortunes happen to the wicked4 ,according to ,epictetus1 ,god is the father of men2 ,antoninus exults in the beautiful arrangement of all things4 ,the earlier ,stoics1 ,zeno and ,chrysippus1 entertained high reverence for the divination1 prophecy1 and omens that were generally current in the ancient world4 ,they considered that these were the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased to make known beforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes4 7,herein lay one among the marked points of contrast between ,stoics and ,epicureans47 ,they held this foreordination even to the length of fatalism1 and made the same replies1 as have been given in modern times1 to the difficulty of reconciling it with the existence of evil1 and with the apparent condition of the better and the worse individuals among mankind4 ,they offered explanations such as the following3 7#a7 ,god is the author of all things except wickedness2 7#b7 the very nature of good supposes its contrast evil1 and the two are inseparable1 like light and dark1 7which may be called the argument from ,relativity72 7#c7 in the enormous extent of the ,universe1 some things must be neglected2 7#d7 when evil happens to the good1 it is not as a punishment1 but as connected with a different dispensation2 7#e7 parts of the world may be presided over by evil demons2 7#f7 what we call evil may not be evil4 ,like most other ancient schools1 the ,stoics held ,god to be corporeal like man3--,body is the only substance2 nothing incorporeal could act on what is corporeal2 the ,first ,cause of all1 ,god or ,zeus1 is the primeval fire1 emanating from which is the soul of man in the form of a warm ether4 ,it is for human beings to recognize the ,universe as governed by universal ,law1 and not only to raise their minds to the comprehension of it1 but to enter into the views of the administering ,zeus or ,fate1 who must regard all interests equally2 we are to be1 as it were1 in harmony with him1 to merge self in universal ,order1 to think only of that and its welfare4 ,as two is greater than one1 the interests of the whole world are infinitely greater than the interests of any single being1 and no one should be satisfied with a regard to anything less than the whole4 ,by this elevation of view1 we are necessarily raised far above the consideration of the petty events befalling ourselves4 ,the grand effort of human reason is thus to rise to the abstraction or totality of entire ,nature2 'no ethical subject1' says ,chrysippus1 'could be rightly approached except from the pre-consideration of entire ,nature1 and the ordering of the whole4' ,as to ,immortality1 the ,stoics precluded themselves1 by holding the theory of the absorption of the individual soul at death into the divine essence2 but1 on the other hand1 their doctrine of advance and aspiration is what has in all times been the main natural argument for the immortality of the soul4 ,for the most part1 they kept themselves undecided as to this doctrine1 giving it as an alternative1 reasoning as to our conduct on either supposition1 and submitting to the pleasure of ,god in this as in all other things4 ,in arguing for the existence of ,divine power and government1 they employed what has been called the argument from ,design1 which is as old as ,sokrates4 ,man is conscious that he is in himself an intellectual or spiritual power1 from which1 by analogy1 he is led to believe that a greater power pervades the universe1 as intellect pervades the human system4 ,,ii4--,in the ,,psychology of the ,stoics1 two questions1 are of interest1 their theory of ,pleasure and ,pain1 and their views upon the ,freedom of the ,will4 #a4 ,the theory of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,the ,stoics agreed with the ,peripatetics 7anterior to ,epicurus1 not specially against him7 that the first principle of nature is 7not pleasure or relief from pain1 but7 self-preservation or self-love2 in other words1 the natural appetite or tendency of all creatures is1 to preserve their existing condition with its inherent capacities1 and to keep clear of destruction or disablement4 ,this appetite 7they said7 manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain is felt1 and is moreover a fundamental postulate1 pre-supposed in all desires of particular pleasures1 as well as in all aversions to particular pains4 ,we begin by loving our own vitality2 and we come1 by association1 to love what promotes or strengthens our vitality2 we hate destruction or disablement1 and come 7by secondary association7 to hate whatever produces that effect4#h ,the doctrine here laid down associated1 and brought under one view1 what was common to man1 not merely with the animal1 but also with the vegetable world2 a plant was declared to have an impulse or tendency to maintain itself1 even without feeling pain or pleasure4 ,aristotle 7in the tenth ,book of the ,ethics7 says1 that he will not determine whether we love life for the sake of pleasure1 or pleasure for the sake of life2 for he affirms the two to be essentially yoked together and inseparable2 pleasure is the consummation of our vital manifestations4 ,the ,peripatetics1 after him1 put pleasure down to a lower level1 as derivative and accidental2 the ,stoics went farther in the same direction--possibly from antithesis against the growing school of ,epicurus4 ,the primary officium 7in a larger sense than our word ,duty7 of man is 7they said7 to keep himself in the state of nature2 the second or derivative officium is to keep to such things as are according to nature1 and to avert those that are contrary to nature2 our gradually increasing experience enabled us to discriminate the two4 ,the youth learns1 as he grows up1 to value bodily accomplishments1 mental cognitions and judgments1 good conduct towards those around him1--as powerful aids towards keeping up the state of nature4 ,when his experience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and harmony of nature and human society1 and to impress upon him the comprehension of this great ideal1 his emotions as well as his reason become absorbed by it4 ,he recognizes this as the only true ,bonum or ,honestum1 to which all other desirable things are referable1--as the only thing desirable for itself and in its own nature4 ,he drops or dismisses all those prima naturae that he had begun by desiring4 ,he no longer considers any of them as worthy of being desired in itself1 or for its own sake4 ,while therefore 7according to ,peripatetics as well as ,stoics7 the love of self and of preserving one's own vitality and activity1 is the primary element1 intuitive and connate1 to which all rational preference 7officium7 was at first referred1--they thought it not the less true1 that in process of time1 by experience1 association1 and reflection1 there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment or notion1 a new and later light1 which extinguishes and puts out of sight the early beginning4 ,it was important to distinguish the feeble and obscure elements from the powerful and brilliant aftergrowth2 which indeed was fully realized only in chosen minds1 and in them1 hardly before old age4 ,this idea1 when once formed in the mind1 was ,the ,good--the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake4 ,the ,stoics called it the only ,good1 being sufficient in itself for happiness2 other things being not good1 nor necessary to happiness1 but simply preferable or advantageous when they could be had3 the ,peripatetics recognized it as the first and greatest good1 but said also that it was not sufficient in itself2 there were two other inferior varieties of good1 of which something must be had as complementary 7what the ,stoics called praeposita or sumenda74 ,thus the ,stoics said1 about the origin of the ,idea of ,bonum or ,honestum1 much the same as what ,aristotle says about ethical virtue4 ,it is not implanted in us by nature2 but we have at birth certain initial tendencies and capacities1 which1 if aided by association and training1 enable us 7and that not in all cases7 to acquire it4 #b4 ,the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,a distinction was taken by ,epictetus and other ,stoics between things in our power and things not in our power4 ,the things in our power are our opinions and notions about objects1 and all our affections1 desires1 and aversions2 the things not in our power are our bodies1 wealth1 honour1 rank1 authority1 c41 and their opposites4 ,the practical application is this3 wealth and high rank may not be in our power1 but we have the power to form an idea of these--namely1 that they are unimportant1 whence the want of them will not grieve us4 ,a still more pointed application is to death1 whose force is entirely in the idea4 ,with this distinction between things in our power and things not in our power1 we may connect the arguments between the ,stoics and their opponents as to what is now called the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,but we must first begin by distinguishing the two questions4 ,by things in our power1 the ,stoics meant1 things that we could do or acquire1 if we willed3 by things not in our power1 they meant1 things that we could not do or acquire if we willed4 ,in both cases1 the volition was assumed as a fact3 the question1 what determined it--or whether it was non-determined1 i4e4 self-determining--was not raised in the abovementioned antithesis4 ,but it was raised in other discussions between the ,stoic theorist ,chrysippus1 and various opponents4 ,these opponents denied that volition was determined by motives1 and cited the cases of equal conflicting motives 7what is known as the ass of ,buridan7 as proving that the soul includes in itself1 and exerts1 a special supervenient power of deciding action in one way or the other3 a power not determined by any causal antecedent1 but self-originating1 and belonging to the class of agency that ,aristotle recognizes under the denomination of automatic1 spontaneous 7or essentially irregular and unpredictable74 ,chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality of this supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul1 but also the reality of all that ,aristotle called automatic or spontaneous agency generally4 ,chrysippus said that every movement was determined by antecedent motives2 that1 in cases of equal conflict1 the exact equality did not long continue1 because some new but slight motive slipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the other4 7,see ,plutarch ,de ,stoicorum ,repugnantiis1 c4 #bc1 p4 #ajde47 ,here1 we see1 the question now known as the ,freedom of the ,will is discussed3 and ,chrysippus declares against it1 affirming that volition is always determined by motives4 ,but we also see that1 while declaring this opinion1 ,chrysippus does not employ the terms ,necessity or ,freedom of the ,will3 neither did his opponents1 so far as we can see3 they had a different and less misleading phrase4 ,by ,freedom1 ,chrysippus and the ,stoics meant the freedom of doing what a man willed1 if he willed it4 ,a man is free1 as to the thing that is in his power1 when he wills it3 he is not free1 as to what is not in his power1 under the same supposition4 ,the ,stoics laid great stress on this distinction4 ,they pointed out how much it is really in a man's power to transform or discipline his own mind3 in the way of controlling or suppressing some emotions1 generating or encouraging others1 forming new intellectual associations1 c41 how much a man could do in these ways1 if he willed it1 and if he went through the lessons1 habits of conduct1 meditations1 suitable to produce such an effect4 ,the ,stoics strove to create in a man's mind the volitions appropriate for such mental discipline1 by depicting the beneficial consequences resulting from it1 and the misfortune and shame inevitable1 if the mind were not so disciplined4 ,their purpose was to strengthen the governing reason of his mind1 and to enthrone it as a fixed habit and character1 which would control by counter suggestions the impulse arising at each special moment--particularly all disturbing terrors or allurements4 ,this1 in their view1 is a free mind2 not one wherein volition is independent of all motive1 but one wherein the susceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant reason1 so as to give predominance to the better motive against the worse4 ,one of the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce1 was the prudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony with the schemes of ,providence3 which 7they said7 were always arranged with a view to the happiness of the kosmos on the whole4 ,the bad man1 whose volitions conflict with these schemes1 is always baulked of his expectations1 and brought at last against his will to see things carried by an overruling force1 with aggravated pain and humiliation to himself3 while the good man1 who resigns himself to them from the first1 always escapes with less pain1 and often without any at all4 ,ducunt volentem fata1 nolentem trahunt4 ,we have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern times the ,freedom of the ,will 7i4e41 that volitions are self-originating and unpredictable71 the ,stoic theorists not only denied it1 but framed all their ,ethics upon the assumption of the contrary4 ,this same assumption of the contrary1 indeed1 was made also by ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 and ,epicurus3 in short1 by all the ethical teachers of antiquity4 ,all of them believed that volitions depended on causes3 that under the ordinary conditions of men's minds1 the causes that volitions generally depended upon are often misleading and sometimes ruinous3 but that by proper stimulation from without and meditation within1 the rational causes of volition might be made to overrule the impulsive4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,epicurus1 not less than the ,stoics1 wished to create new fixed habits and a new type of character4 ,they differed1 indeed1 on the question what the proper type of character was3 but each of them aimed at the same general end--a new type of character1 regulating the grades of susceptibility to different motives4 ,and the purpose of all and each of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will--i4e41 the theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable4 ,,iii4--,we must consider next the ,stoical theory of ,happiness1 or rather of the ,good1 which with them was proclaimed to be the sole1 indispensable1 and self-sufficing condition of ,happiness4 ,they declared that ,pleasure was no part of ,good1 and ,pain no part of ,evil2 therefore1 that even relief from pain was not necessary to ,good or ,happiness4 ,this1 however1 if followed out consistently1 would dispense with all morality and all human endeavour4 ,accordingly1 the ,stoics were obliged to let in some pleasures as an object of pursuit1 and some pains as an object of avoidance1 though not under the title of ,good and ,evil1 but with the inferior name of ,sumenda and ,rejicienda4#i ,substantially1 therefore1 they held that pains are an evil1 but1 by a proper discipline1 may be triumphed over4 ,they disallowed the direct and ostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end 7the point of view of ,epicurus71 but allured their followers partly by promising them the victory over pain1 and partly by certain enjoyments of an elevated cast that grew out of their plan of life4 ,pain of every kind1 whether from the casualties of existence1 or from1 the severity of the ,stoical virtues1 was to be met by a discipline of endurance1 a hardening process1 which1 if persisted in1 would succeed in reducing the mind to a state of ,apathy or indifference4 ,a great many reflections were suggested in aid of this education4 ,the influence of exercise and repetition in adapting the system to any new function1 was illustrated by the ,olympian combatants1 and by the ,lacedaemonian youth1 who endured scourging without complaint4 ,great stress was laid on the instability of pleasure1 and the constant liability to accidents2 whence we should always be anticipating and adapting ourselves to the worst that could happen1 so as never to be in a state where anything could ruffle the mind4 ,it was pointed out how much might still be made of the worst circumstances--poverty1 banishment1 public odium1 sickness1 old age--and every consideration was advanced that could 'arm the obdurate breast with stubborn patience1 as with triple steel4' ,it has often been remarked that such a discipline of endurance was peculiarly suited to the unsettled condition of the world at the time1 when any man1 in addition to the ordinary evils of life1 might in a moment be sent into exile1 or sold into slavery4 ,next to the discipline of endurance1 we must rank the complacent sentiment of ,pride1 which the ,stoic might justly feel in his conquest of himself1 and in his lofty independence and superiority to the casualties of life4#aj ,the pride of the ,cynic1 the ,stoic's predecessor1 was prominent and offensive1 showing itself in scurrility and contempt towards everybody else2 the ,stoical pride was a refinement upon this1 but was still a grateful sentiment of superiority1 which helped to make up for the surrender of indulgences4 ,it was usual to bestow the most extravagant laudation on the ',wise ,man1' and every ,stoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as approaching that great ideal4 ,the last and most elevated form of ,stoical happiness was the satisfaction of contemplating the ,universe and ,god4 ,epictetus says1 that we can accommodate ourselves cheerfully to the providence that rules the world1 if we possess two things--the power of seeing all that happens in the proper relation to its own purpose--and a grateful disposition4 ,the work of ,antoninus is full of studies of ,nature in the devout spirit of 'passing from ,nature up to ,nature's ,god2' he is never weary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural events1 and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything4 ,old age has its grace1 and death is the becoming termination4 ,this high strain of exulting contemplation reconciled him to that complete submission to whatever might befall1 which was the essential feature of the ',life according to ,nature1' as he conceived it4 ,,iv4--,the ,stoical theory of ,virtue is implicated in the ideas of the ,good1 now described4 ,the fountain of all virtue is manifestly the life according to nature2 as being the life of subordination of self to more general interests--to family1 country1 mankind1 the whole universe4 ,if a man is prepared to consider himself absolutely nothing in comparison with the universal interest1 and to regard it as the sole end of life1 he has embraced an ideal of virtue of the loftiest order4 ,accordingly1 the ,stoics were the first to preach what is called ',cosmopolitanism2' for although1 in their reference to the good of the whole1 they confounded together sentient life and inanimate objects--rocks1 plants1 c41 solicitude for which was misspent labour--yet they were thus enabled to reach the conception of the universal kindship of mankind1 and could not but include in their regards the brute creation4 ,they said3 ',there is no difference between the ,greeks and ,barbarians2 the world is our city4' ,seneca urges kindness to slaves1 for 'are they not men like ourselves1 breathing the same air1 living and dying like ourselves8' ,the ,epicureans declined1 as much as possible1 interference in public affairs1 but the ,stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active citizenship4 ,chrysippus even said that the life of philosophical contemplation 7such as ,aristotle preferred1 and accounted godlike7 was to be placed on the same level with the life of pleasure2 though ,plutarch observes that neither ,chrysippus nor ,zeno ever meddled personally with any public duty2 both of them passed their lives in lecturing and writing4 ,the truth is that both of them were foreigners residing at ,athens2 and at a time when ,athens was dependent on foreign princes4 ,accordingly1 neither ,zeno nor ,chrysippus had any sphere of political action open to them2 they were1 in this respect1 like ,epictetus afterwards--but in a position quite different from ,seneca1 the preceptor of ,nero1 who might hope to influence the great imperial power of ,rome1 and from ,marcus ,antoninus1 who held that imperial power in his own hands4 ,marcus ,antoninus--not only a powerful ,emperor1 but also the most gentle and amiable man of his day--talks of active beneficence both as a duty and a satisfaction4 ,but in the creed of the ,stoics generally1 active ,beneficence did not occupy a prominent place4 ,they adopted the four ,cardinal ,virtues--,wisdom1 or the ,knowledge of ,good and ,evil2 ,justice2 ,fortitude2 ,temperance--as part of their plan of the virtuous life1 the life according to ,nature4 ,justice1 as the social virtue1 was placed above all the rest4 ,but the ,stoics were not strenuous in requiring more than ,justice1 for the benefit of others beside the agent4 ,they even reckoned compassion for the sufferings of others as a weakness1 analogous to envy for the good fortune of others4 ,the ,stoic recognized the gods 7or ,universal ,nature1 equivalent expressions in his creed7 as managing the affairs of the world1 with a view to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole4 ,towards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from him2 but it was his duty and his strongest interest1 to resign himself to their plans1 and to abstain from all conduct tending to frustrate them4 ,such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested to him by the unreasonable appetites1 emotions1 fears1 antipathies1 c41 of daily life2 all claiming satisfaction at the expense of future mischief to himself and others4 ,to countervail these misleading forces1 by means of a fixed rational character built up through meditation and philosophical teaching1 was the grand purpose of the ,stoic ethical creed4 ,the emotional or appetitive self was to be starved or curbed1 and retained only as an appendage to the rational self2 an idea proclaimed before in general terms by ,plato1 but carried out into a system by the ,stoics1 and to a great extent even by the ,epicureans4 ,the ,stoic was taught to reflect how much that appears to be desirable1 terror-striking1 provocative1 c41 is not really so1 but is made to appear so by false and curable associations4 ,and while he thus discouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in hostility with others1 he learnt to respect the self of another man as well as his own4 ,epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that hurts us either by word or deed2 and advises it upon the following very remarkable ground4 ',recollect that in what he says or does1 he follows his own sense of propriety1 not yours4 ,he must do what appears to him right1 not what appears to you2 if he judges wrongly1 it is he that is hurt1 for he is the person deceived4 ,always repeat to yourself1 in such a case3 ,the man has acted on his own opinion4' ,the reason here given by ,epictetus is an instance1 memorable in ethical theory1 of respect for individual dissenting conviction1 even in an extreme case2 and it must be taken in conjunction with his other doctrine1 that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little or no damage1 except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by our irrational susceptibilities and associations4 ,we see that the ,stoic submerges1 as much as he can1 the pre-eminence of his own individual self1 and contemplates himself from the point of view of another1 only as one among many4 ,but he does not erect the happiness of others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit1 beyond the reciprocities of family1 citizenship1 and common humanity4 ,the ,stoic theorists agreed with ,epicurus in inculcating the reciprocities of justice between all fellow-citizens2 and they even went farther than he did1 by extending the sphere of such duties beyond the limits of city1 so as to comprehend all mankind4 ,but as to the reciprocities of individual friendship1 ,epicurus went beyond the ,stoics1 by the amount of self-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the benefit of a friend4 ,there is also in the ,stoical system a recognition of duties to ,god1 and of morality as based on piety4 ,not only are we all brethren1 but also the 'children of one ,father4' ,the extraordinary strain put upon human nature by the full ,stoic ideal of submerging self in the larger interests of being1 led to various compromises4 ,the rigid following out of the ideal issued in one of the paradoxes1 namely4--,that all the actions of the wise man are equally perfect1 and that1 short of the standard of perfection1 all faults and vices are equal2 that1 for example1 the man that killed a cock1 without good reason1 was as guilty as he that killed his father4 ,this has a meaning only when we draw a line between spirituality and morality1 and treat the last as worthless in comparison of the first4 ,the later ,stoics1 however1 in their exhortations to special branches of duty1 gave a positive value to practical virtue1 irrespective of the ideal4 ,the idea of ,duty was of ,stoical origin1 fostered and developed by the ,roman spirit and legislation4 ,the early ,stoics had two different words1--one for the 'suitable' ,greek3 kathaekon1 or incomplete propriety1 admitting of degrees1 and below the point of rectitude1 and another for the 'right' ,greek3 katorthoma1 or complete rectitude of action1 which none could achieve except the wise man4 ,it is a significant circumstance that the 'suitable' is the lineal ancestor of our word 'duty' 7through the ,latin officium74 ,it was a great point with the ,stoic to be conscious of 'advance' or improvement4#aa ,by self-examination1 he kept himself constantly acquainted with his moral state1 and it was both his duty and his satisfaction to be approaching to the ideal of the perfect man4 ,it is very illustrative of the unguarded points and contradictions of ,stoicism1 that contentment and apathy were not to permit grief even for the loss of friends4 ,seneca1 on one occasion1 admits that he was betrayed by human weakness on this point4 ,on strict ,stoical principles1 we ought to treat the afflictions and the death of others with the same frigid indifference as our own2 for why should a man feel for a second person more than he ought to feel for himself1 as a mere unit in the infinitude of the ,universe8 ,this is the contradiction inseparable from any system that begins by abjuring pleasure1 and relief or protection from pain1 as the ends of life4 ,even granting that we regard pleasure and relief from pain as of no importance in our own case1 yet if we apply the same measure to others we are bereft of all motives to benevolence2 and virtue1 instead of being set on a loftier pinnacle1 is left without any foundation4 ,,epicurus4 #caa--bgj ,b4,c4 ,epicurus was born #cda ,b4,c4 in the island of ,samos4 ,at the age of eighteen1 he repaired to ,athens1 where he is supposed to have enjoyed the teaching of ,xenocrates or ,theophrastus4 ,in #cjf ,b4,c41 he opened a school in a garden in ,athens1 whence his followers have sometimes been called the 'philosophers of the garden4' ,his life was simple1 chaste1 and temperate4 ,of the #cjj works he is said to have written1 nothing has come down to us except three letters1 giving a summary of his views for the use of his friends1 and a number of detached sayings1 preserved by ,diogenes ,laertius and others4 ,moreover1 some fragments of his work on ,nature have been found at ,herculaneum4 ,the additional sources of our knowledge of ,epicurus are the works of his opponents1 ,cicero1 ,seneca1 ,plutarch1 and of his follower ,lucretius4 ,our information from ,epicurean writers respecting the doctrines of their sect is much less copious than what we possess from ,stoic writers in regard to ,stoic opinions4 ,we have no ,epicurean writer on ,philosophy except ,inicretius2 whereas respecting the ,stoical creed under the ,roman ,empire1 the important writings of ,seneca1 ,epictetus1 and ,marcus ,antoninus1 afford most valuable evidence4 ,to ,epicurus succeeded1 in the leadership of his school1 ,hermachus1 ,polystratus1 ,dionysius1 ,basilides1 and others1 ten in number1 down to the age of ,augustus4 ,among ,roman ,epicureans1 ,lucretius 7#ie--ea ,b4,c47 is the most important1 his poem 7,de ,rerum ,natura71 being the completest account of the system that exists4 ,other distinguished followers were ,horace1 ,atticus1 and ,lacian4 ,in modern times1 ,pierre ,gassendi 7#aeib--afee7 revived the doctrines of ,epicurus1 and in #afdg published his ',syntagma ,philosophiae ,epicuri1' and a ,life of ,epicurus4 ,the reputation of ,gassendi1 in his life time1 rested chiefly upon his physical theories2 but his influence was much felt as a ,christian upholder of ,epicureanism4 ,gassendi was at one time in orders as a ,roman ,catholic1 and professor of theology and philosophy4 ,he established an ,epicurean school in ,france1 among the disciples of which were1 ,moliere1 ,saint ,evremond1 ,count de ,grammont1 the ,duke of ,rochefoncalt1 ,fontenelle1 and ,voltaire4 ,the standard of ,virtue and ,vice is referred by ,epicurus to pleasure and pain4 ,pain is the only evil1 ,pleasure is the only good4 ,virtue is no end in itself1 to be sought3 ,vice is no end in itself1 to be avoided4 ,the motive for cultivating ,virtue and banishing ,vice arises from the consequences of each1 as the means of multiplying pleasures and averting or lessening pains4 ,but to the attainment of this purpose1 the complete supremacy of ,reason is indispensable2 in order that we may take a right comparative measure of the varieties of pleasure and pain1 and pursue the course that promises the least amount of suffering4#ab ,in all ethical theories that make happiness the supreme object of pursuit1 the position of virtue depends entirely upon the theory of what constitutes happiness4 ,now1 ,epicurus 7herein differing from the ,stoics1 as well as ,aristotle71 did not recognize ,happiness as anything but freedom from pain and enjoyment of pleasure4 ,it is essential1 however1 to understand1 how ,epicurus conceived pleasure and pain1 and what is the ,epicurean scale of pleasures and pains1 graduated as objects of reasonable desire or aversion8 ,it is a great error to suppose that1 in making pleasure the standard of virtue1 ,epicurus had in view that elaborate and studied gratification of the sensual appetites that we associate with the word ,epicurean4 ,epicurus declares--',when we say that pleasure is the end of life1 we do not mean the pleasures of the debauchee or the sensualist1 as some from ignorance or from malignity represent1 but freedom of the body from pain1 and of the soul from anxiety4 ,for it is not continuous drinkings and revellings1 nor the society of women1 nor rare viands1 and other luxuries of the table1 that constitute a pleasant life1 but sober contemplation1 such as searches out the grounds of choice and avoidance1 and banishes those chimeras that harass the mind4 ,freedom from pain is thus made the primary element of happiness2 a one-sided view1 respected in the doctrine of ,locke1 that it is not the idea of future good1 but the present greatest uneasiness that most strongly affects the will4 ,a neutral state of feeling is necessarily imperilled by a greedy pursuit of pleasures2 hence the dictum1 to be content with little is a great good2 because little is most easily obtained4 ,the regulation of the desires is therefore of high moment4 ,according to ,epicurus1 desires fall into three grades4 ,some are natural and necessary1 such as desire of drink1 food1 or life1 and are easily gratified4 ,but when the uneasiness of a want is removed1 the bodily pleasures admit of no farther increase2 anything additional only varies the pleasure4 ,hence the luxuries which go beyond the relief of our wants are thoroughly superfluous2 and the desires arising from them 7forming the second grade7 though natural1 are not necessary4 ,a third class of desires is neither natural nor necessary1 but begotten of vain opinion2 such as the thirst for civic honours1 or for power over others2 those desires are the most difficult to gratify1 and even if gratified1 entail upon us trouble1 anxiety1 and peril4 ,this account of the desires1 following up the advice--,if you wish to be rich1 study not to increase your goods1 but to diminish your desires--is to a certain extent wise and even indispensable2 yet not adapted to all temperaments4 ,to those that enjoy pleasure very highly1 and are not sensitive in an equal degree to pain1 such a negative conception of happiness would be imperfect4 ,epicurus did not1 however1 deprecate positive pleasure4 ,if it could be reached without pain1 and did not result in pain1 it was a pure good2 and1 even if it could not be had without pain1 the question was still open1 whether it might not be well worth the price4 ,but in estimating the worth of pleasure1 the absence of any accompanying pain should weigh heavily in the balance4 ,at this point1 the ,epicurean theory connects itself most intimately with the conditions of virtue2 for virtue is more concerned with averting mischief and suffering1 than with multiplying positive enjoyments4 ,bodily feeling1 in the ,epicurean psychology1 is prior in order of time to the mental element2 the former was primordial1 while the latter was derivative from it by repeated processes of memory and association4 ,but though such was the order of sequence and generation1 yet when we compare the two as constituents of happiness to the formed man1 the mental element much outweighed the bodily1 both as pain and as pleasure4 ,bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the present2 when not felt1 it is nothing4 ,but mental feelings involve memory and hope--embrace the past as well as the future--endure for a long time1 and may be recalled or put out of sight1 to a great degree1 at our discretion4 ,this last point is one of the most remarkable features of the ,epicurean mental discipline4 ,epicurus deprecated the general habit of mankind in always hankering after some new satisfaction to come2 always discontented with the present1 and oblivious of past comforts as if they had never been4 ,these past comforts ought to be treasured up by memory and reflection1 so that they might become as it were matter for rumination1 and might serve1 in trying moments1 even to counterbalance extreme physical suffering4 ,the health of ,epicurus himself was very bad during the closing years of his life4 ,there remains a fragment of his last letter1 to an intimate friend and companion1 ,idomeneus--',i write this to you on the last day of my life1 which1 in spite of the severest internal bodily pains1 is still a happy day1 because ,i set against them in the balance all the mental pleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you4 ,take care of the children left by ,metrodorus1 in a manner worthy of your demeanour from boyhood towards me and towards philosophy4' ,bodily pain might thus be alleviated1 when it occurred2 it might be greatly lessened in occurrence1 by prudent and moderate habits2 lastly1 even at the worst1 if violent1 it never lasted long2 if not violent1 it might be patiently borne1 and was at any rate terminated1 or terminable at pleasure1 by death4 ,in the view of ,epicurus1 the chief miseries of life arose1 not from bodily pains1 but partly from delusions of hope1 and exaggerated aspirations for wealth1 honours1 power1 c41 in all which the objects appeared most seductive from a distance1 inciting man to lawless violence and treachery1 while in the reality they were always disappointments1 and generally something worse2 partly1 and still more1 from the delusions of fear4 ,of this last sort1 were the two greatest torments of human existence--fear of ,death1 and of eternal suffering after death1 as announced by prophets and poets1 and ,fear of the ,gods4 ,epicurus1 who did not believe in the continued existence of the soul separate from the body1 declared that there could never be any rational ground for fearing death1 since it was simply a permanent extinction of consciousness4#ac ,death was nothing to us 7he said72 when death comes1 we are no more1 either to suffer or to enjoy4 ,yet it was the groundless fear of this nothing that poisoned all the tranquillity of life1 and held men imprisoned even when existence was a torment4 ,whoever had surmounted that fear was armed at once against cruel tyranny and against all the gravest misfortunes4 ,next1 the fear of the gods was not less delusive1 and hardly less tormenting1 than the fear of death4 ,it was a capital error 7,epicurus declared7 to suppose that the gods employed themselves as agents in working or superintending the march of the ,cosmos2 or in conferring favour on some men1 and administering chastisement to others4 ,the vulgar religious tales1 which represented them in this character1 were untrue and insulting as regards the gods themselves1 and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the hopes and fears of mankind4 ,epicurus believed sincerely in the gods2 reverenced them as beings at once perfectly happy1 immortal1 and unchangeable2 and took delight in the public religious festivals and ceremonies4 ,but it was inconsistent with these attributes1 and repulsive to his feelings of reverence1 to conceive them as agents4 ,the idea of agency is derived from human experience2 we1 as agents1 act with a view to supply some want1 to fulfil some obligation1 to acquire some pleasure1 to accomplish some object desired but not yet attained--in short1 to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our imperfect happiness2 the gods already have all that agents strive to get1 and more than agents ever do get2 their condition is one not of agency1 but of tranquil1 self-sustaining1 fruition4 ,accordingly1 ,epicurus thought 7as ,aristotle#ad had thought before him7 that the perfect1 eternal1 and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the gods excluded the supposition of their being agents4 ,he looked upon them as types of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction which was what he understood by pleasure or happiness--as objects of reverential envy1 whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by assimilating his own temper and condition to theirs1 as far as human circumstances allowed4 ,these theological views were placed by ,epicurus in the foreground of his ethical philosophy1 as the only means of dispelling those fears of the gods that the current fables instilled into every one1 and that did so much to destroy human comfort and security4 ,he proclaimed that beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others--neither showed anger nor favour to particular persons4 ,the doctrine that they were the working managers in the affairs of the ,cosmos1 celestial and terrestrial1 human and extra-human1 he not only repudiated as incompatible with their attributes1 but declared to be impious1 considering the disorder1 sufferings1 and violence1 everywhere visible4 ,he disallowed all prophecy1 divination1 and oracular inspiration1 by which the public around him believed that the gods were perpetually communicating special revelations to individuals1 and for which ,sokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful4#ae ,it is remarkable that ,stoics and ,epicureans1 in spite of their marked opposition in dogma or theory1 agreed so far in practical results1 that both declared these two modes of uneasiness 7fear of the gods and fear of death7 to be the great torments of human existence1 and both strove to remove or counterbalance them4 ,so far1 the teaching of ,epicurus appears confined to the separate happiness of each individual1 as dependent upon his own prudence1 sobriety1 and correct views of ,nature4 ,but this is not the whole of the ,epicurean ,ethics4 ,the system also considered each man as in companionship with others2 ,the precepts were shaped accordingly1 first as to ,justice1 next as to ,friendship4 ,in both these1 the foundation whereon ,epicurus built was ,reciprocity3 not pure sacrifice to others1 but partnership with others1 beneficial to all4 ,he kept the ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one complex association3 he did not expel or degrade either1 in order to give exclusive ascendancy to the other4 ,the dictate of ,natural ,justice was that no man should hurt another3 each was bound to abstain from doing harm to others2 each1 on this condition1 was entitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others would do harm to him4 ,such double aspect1 or reciprocity1 was essential to social companionship3 those that could not1 or would not1 accept this covenant1 were unfit for society4 ,if a man does not behave justly towards others1 he cannot expect that they will behave justly towards him2 to live a life of injustice1 and expect that others will not find it out1 is idle4 ,the unjust man cannot enjoy a moment of security4 ,epicurus laid it down explicitly1 that just and righteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one's comfort1 and was the best means of attaining it4 ,the reciprocity of ,justice was valid towards all the world2 the reciprocity of friendship went much farther2 it involved indefinite and active beneficence1 but could reach only to a select few4 ,epicurus insisted emphatically on the value of friendship1 as a means of happiness to both the persons so united4 ,he declared that a good friend was another self1 and that friends ought to be prepared1 in case of need1 to die for each other4 ,yet he declined to recommend an established community of goods among the members of his fraternity1 as prevailed in the ,pythagorean brotherhood3 for such an institution 7he said7 implied mistrust4 ,he recommended efforts to please and to serve1 and a forwardness to give1 for the purpose of gaining and benefiting a friend1 and he even declared that there was more pleasure in conferring favours than in receiving them2 but he was no less strenuous in inculcating an intelligent gratitude on the receiver4 ,no one except a wise man 7he said7 knew how to return a favour properly4#af ,virtue and happiness1 in the theory of ,epicurus1 were thus inseparable4 ,a man could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and the fear of gods instilled by the current fables1 which disturbed all tranquillity of mind2 until he had banished those factitious desires that pushed him into contention for wealth1 power1 or celebrity2 nor unless he behaved with justice to all1 and with active devoted friendship towards a few4 ,such a mental condition1 which he thought it was in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and companionship1 constituted virtue2 and was the sure as well as the only precursor of genuine happiness4 ,a mind thus undisturbed and purified was sufficient to itself4 ,the mere satisfaction of the wants of life1 and the conversation of friends1 became then felt pleasures2 if more could be had without preponderant mischief1 so much the better2 but ,nature1 disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices1 required no more to be happy4 ,this at least was as much as the conditions of humanity admitted3 a tranquil1 undisturbed1 innocuous1 non-competitive fruition1 which approached most nearly to the perfect happiness of the ,gods4#ag ,the ,epicurean theory of virtue is the type of all those that make an enlightened self-interest the basis of right and wrong4 ,the four cardinal virtues were explained from the ,epicurean point of view4 ,prudence was the supreme rule of conduct4 ,it was a calculation and balancing of pleasures and pains4 ,its object was a judicious selection of pleasures to be sought4 ,it teaches men to forego idle wishes1 and to despise idle fears4 ,temperance is the management of sensual pleasures4 ,it seeks to avoid excess1 so as on the whole to extract as much pleasure as our bodily organs are capable of affording4 ,fortitude is a virtue1 because it overcomes fear and pain4 ,it consists in facing danger or enduring pain1 to avoid greater possible evils4 ,justice is of artificial origin4 ,it consists in a tacit agreement among mankind to abstain from injuring one another4 ,the security that every man has in his person and property1 is the great consideration urging to abstinence from injuring others4 ,but is it not possible to commit injustice with safety8 ,the answer was1 ',injustice is not an evil in itself1 but becomes so from the fear that haunts the injurer of not being able to escape the appointed avengers of such acts4' ,the ,physics of ,epicurus were borrowed in the main from the atomic theory of ,democritus1 but were modified by him in a manner subservient and contributory to his ethical scheme4 ,to that scheme it was essential that those celestial1 atmospheric1 or terrestrial phenomena that the public around him ascribed to the agency and purposes of the gods1 should be understood as being produced by physical causes4 ,an eclipse1 an earthquake1 a storm1 a shipwreck1 unusual rain or drought1 a good or a bad harvest--and not merely these1 but many other occurrences far smaller and more unimportant1 as we may see by the eighteenth chapter of the ,characters of ,theophrastus--were then regarded as visitations of the gods1 requiring to be interpreted by recognized prophets1 and to be appeased by ceremonial expiations4 ,when once a man became convinced that all these phenomena proceeded from physical agencies1 a host of terrors and anxieties would disappear from the mind2 and this ,epicurus asserted to be the beneficent effect and real recommendation of physical philosophy4 ,he took little or no thought for scientific curiosity as a motive per se1 which both ,democritus and ,aristotle put so much in the foreground4 ,epicurus adopted the atomistic scheme of ,democritus1 but with some important variations4 ,he conceived that the atoms all moved with equal velocity in the downward direction of gravity4 ,but it occurred to him that upon this hypothesis there could never occur any collisions or combinations of the atoms--nothing but continued and unchangeable parallel lines4 ,accordingly1 he modified it by saying that the line of descent was not exactly rectilinear1 but that each atom deflected a little from the straight line1 and each in its own direction and degree2 so that it became possible to assume collisions1 resiliences1 adhesions1 combinations1 among them1 as it had been possible under the variety of original movements ascribed to them by ,democritus4 ,the opponents of ,epicurus derided this auxiliary hypothesis2 they affirmed that he invented the individual deflection of each atom1 without assigning any cause1 and only because he was perplexed by the mystery of man's free-will4 ,but ,epicurus was not more open to attack on this ground than other physical philosophers4 ,most of them 7except perhaps the most consistent of the ,stoic fatalists7 believed that some among the phenomena of the universe occurred in regular and predictable sequence1 while others were essentially irregular and unpredictable2 each philosopher devised his hypothesis1 and recognized some fundamental principle1 to explain the first class of phenomena as well as the second4 ,plato admitted an invincible ,erratic necessity2 ,aristotle introduced ,chance and ,spontaneity2 ,democritus multiplied indefinitely the varieties of atomic movements4 ,the hypothetical deflexion alleged by ,epicurus was his way1 not more unwarranted than the others1 of providing a fundamental principle for the unpredictable phenomena of the universe4 ,among these are the mental 7including the volitional7 manifestations of men and animals2 but there are many others besides2 and there is no ground for believing that the mystery of free-will was peculiarly present to his mind4 ,the movements of a man or animal are not exclusively subject to gravitation and other general laws2 they are partly governed by mental impulses and by forces of the organism1 intrinsic and peculiar to himself1 unseen and unfelt by others4 ,for these1 in common with many other untraceable phenomena in the material world1 ,epicurus provides a principle in the supplementary hypothesis of deflexion4 ,he rejected the fatalism contained in the theories of some of the ,stoics1 and admitted a limited range of empire to chance1 or irregularity4 ,but he maintained that the will1 far from being among the phenomena essentially irregular1 is under the influence of motives2 for no man can insist more strenuously than he does 7see the ,letter to ,menoecens7 on the complete power of philosophy1--if the student could be made to feel its necessity and desire the attainment of it1 so as to meditate and engrain within himself sound views about the gods1 death1 and human life generally1--to mould our volitions and character in a manner conformable to the exigencies of virtue and happiness4 ,when we read the explanations given by ,epicurus and ,lucretius of what the ,epicurean theory really was1 and compare them with the numerous attacks made upon it by opponents1 we cannot but remark that the title or formula of the theory was ill chosen1 and was really a misnomer4 ,what ,epicurus meant by ,pleasure was1 not what most people meant by it1 but something very different--a tranquil and comfortable state of mind and body2 much the same as what ,democritus had expressed before him by the phrase ,greek3 euthymia4 ,this last phrase would have expressed what ,epicurus aimed at1 neither more nor less4 ,it would at least have preserved his theory from much misplaced sarcasm and aggressive rhetoric4 ,,the ,,neo-,,platonists4 ,,plotinus 7,a4,d4 #bje--gj71 ,,porphyry1 c4 ,constructed with reference to the broken-down state of ancient society1 and seeking its highest aim in a regeneration of humanity1 the philosophical system of ,neo-,platonism was throughout ethical or ethico-religious in spirit2 yet its ethics admits of no great development according to the usual topics4 ,a pervading ethical character is not incompatible with the absence of a regular ethical scheme2 and there was this peculiarity in the system1 that its end1 though professedly moral1 was to be attained by means of an intellectual regimen4 ,in setting up its ideal of human effort1 it was least of all careful about prescribing a definite course of external conduct4 ,the more strictly ethical views of ,,plotinus1 the chief representative of the school1 are found mainly in the first of the six ,enneads into which ,porphyry collected his master's essays4 ,but as they presuppose the cosmological and psychological doctrines1 their place in the works1 as now arranged1 is to be regarded as arbitrary4 ,the soul having fallen from its original condition1 and1 in consequence and as a penalty1 having become united with a material body1 the one true aim recognized for human action is1 to rise above the debasing connection with matter1 and again to lead the old spiritual life4 ,for those that have sunk so far as to be content with the world of sense1 wisdom consists in pursuing pleasure as good1 and shunning pain as evil3 but the others can partake of a better life1 in different degrees4 ,the first step in reformation is to practise virtue in the affairs of life1 which means to subject ,sense and the lower desires to ,reason4 ,this is done in the fourfold form of the common cardinal virtues1 called political by ,plotinus1 to mark the sphere of action where they can be exerted1 and is the virtue of a class of men capable of a certain elevation1 though ignorant of all the rest that lies above them4 ,a second step is made through the means of the ,greek3 katharseis or purifying virtues2 where it is sought to root out1 instead of merely moderating1 the sensual affections4 ,if the soul is thus altogether freed from the dominion of sense1 it becomes at once able to follow its natural bent towards good1 and enters into a permanent state of calm4 ,this is virtue in its true meaning--becoming like to the ,deity1 all that went before being merely a preparation4 ,the pure and perfect life of the soul may still be described as a field whereon the four virtues are exercised1 but they now assume a far higher meaning than as political virtues1 having relation solely to the contemplative life of the ,nous4 ,happiness is unknown to ,plotinus as distinct from perfection1 and perfection in the sense of having subdued all material cravings 7except as regards the bare necessities of life71 and entered upon the undisturbed life of contemplation4 ,if this recalls1 at least in name1 the ,aristotelian ideal1 there are points added that appear to be echoes of ,stoicism4 ,rapt in the contemplation of eternal verities1 the purified soul is indifferent to external circumstances3 pain and suffering are unheeded1 and the just man can feel happy even in the bull of ,phalaris4 ,but in one important respect the ,neo-,platonic teaching is at variance with ,stoical doctrine4 ,though its first and last precept is to rid the soul from the bondage of matter1 it warns against the attempt to sever body and soul by suicide4 ,by no forcible separation1 which would be followed by a new junction1 but only by prolonged internal effort is the soul so set free from the world of sense1 as to be able to have a vision of its ancient home while still in the body1 and to return to it at death4 ,small1 therefore1 as is the consideration bestowed by ,neo-,platonism on the affairs of practical life1 it has no disposition to shirk the burden of them4 ,one other peculiar aim1 the highest of all1 is proposed to the soul in the ,alexandrian philosophy4 ,it is peculiar1 because to be understood only in connexion with the metaphysics and cosmology of the system4 ,in the theory of ,emanation1 the primordial ,one or ,good emits the ,nous wherein the ,ideas are immanent2 the ,nous1 in turn1 sends forth the ,soul1 and the ,soul1 ,matter or nature2 the gradation applying to man as well as to the ,universe4 ,now1 to each of these principles1 there is a corresponding subjective state in the inner life of man4 ,the life of sense answers to nature or the material body2 the virtue that is founded upon free-will and reason1 to the soul2 the contemplative life1 as the result of complete purification from sense1 to the ,nous or ,sphere of ,ideas2 finally1 to the ,one or ,good1 supreme in the scale of existence1 corresponds the state of ,love1 or1 in its highest form1 ,ecstasy4 ,this peculiar elevation is something far above the highest intellectual contemplation1 and is not reached by thought4 ,it is not even a mere intuition of1 but a real union or contact with1 the ,good4 ,to attain it1 there must be a complete withdrawal into self from the external world1 and then the subject must wait quietly till perchance the state comes on4 ,it is one of ineffable bliss1 but1 from the nature of man1 transitory and rare4 ,,scholastic ,,ethics4 ,,abaelard 7#ajgi-aadb7 has a special treatise on the subject of ,ethics1 entitled ,scito te ipsum4 ,as the name implies1 it lays chief stress upon the ,subjective element in morality1 and1 in this aspect1 is considered to supply the idea that underlies a very large portion of modern ethical speculation4 ,by nature a notoriously independent thinker1 ,abaelard claimed for philosophy the right of discussing ethical questions and fixing a natural moral law1 though he allowed a corrective in the ,christian scheme4 ,having this position with reference to the church1 he was also much less under the yoke of philosophical authority than his successors1 from living at a time when ,aristotle was not yet supreme4 ,yet1 with ,aristotle1 he assigns the attainment of the highest good as the aim of all human effort1 ,ethics showing the way2 and1 with the schoolmen generally1 pronounces the highest good to be ,god4 ,if the highest good in itself is ,god1 the highest human good is love to ,god4 ,this is attained by way of virtue1 which is a good ,will consolidated into a habit4 ,on the influence of habit on action his view is ,aristotelian4 ,his own specialty lies in his judging actions solely with reference to the intention 7intentio7 of the agent1 and this intention with reference to conscience 7conscientia74 ,all actions1 he says1 are in themselves indifferent1 and not to be called good or evil except from the intention of the doer4 ,peccatum1 is properly only the action that is done with evil intent2 and where this is present1 where the mental consent 7consensus7 is clearly established1 there is peccatum1 though the action remains unexecuted4 ,when the consensus is absent1 as in original sin1 there is only vitium2 hence1 a life without peccata is not impossible to men in the exercise of their freedom1 however difficult it may be4 ,the supremacy assigned by him to the subjective element of conscience appears in such phrases as1 there is no sin except against conscience2 also in the opinion he pronounces1 that1 though in the case of a mistaken moral conviction1 an action is not to be called good1 yet it is not so bad as an action objectively right but done against conscience4 ,thus1 without allowing that conscientious persecutors of ,christians act rightly1 he is not afraid1 in the application of his principle1 to say that they would act still more wrongly if through not listening to their conscience1 they spared their victims4 ,but this means only that by following conscience we avoid sinning2 for virtue in the full sense1 it is necessary that the conscience should have judged rightly4 ,by what standard1 however1 this is to be ascertained1 he nowhere clearly says4 ,contemptus ,dei1 given by him as the real and only thing that constitutes an action bad1 is merely another subjective description4 ,,st4 ,,bernard of ,clairvaux 7#ajia-aaec71 the strenuous opponent of ,abaelard1 and the great upholder of mysticism against rationalism in the early scholastic period when the two were not yet reconciled1 gave utterance1 in the course of his mystical effusions1 to some special views of love and disinterestedness4 ,there are two degrees of ,christian virtue1 ,humility and ,charity or ,love4 ,when men look into themselves1 and behold the meanness that is found there1 the fitting state of mind is1 first1 humility2 but soon the sense of their very weakness begets in them charity and compassion towards others1 while the sense also of a certain human dignity raises within them feelings of love towards the author of their being4 ,the treatise ,de ,amore ,dei sets forth the nature of this love1 which is the highest exercise of human powers4 ,its fundamental characteristic is its disinterestedness4 ,it has its reward1 but from meriting1 not from seeking4 ,it is purely voluntary1 and1 as a free sentiment1 necessarily unbought2 it has ,god for its single object1 and would not be love to ,god1 if he were loved for the sake of something else4 ,he distinguishes various degrees of love4 ,there is1 first1 a natural love of self for the sake of self4 ,next1 a motion of love towards ,god amid earthly misfortunes1 which also is not disinterested4 ,the third degree is different1 being love to ,god for his own sake1 and to our neighbour for ,god's sake4 ,but the highest grade of all is not reached1 until men come to love even themselves only by relation to ,god2 at this point1 with the disappearance of all special and interested affection1 the mystic goal is attained4 ,,john of ,,salisbury 7d4 #aahj7 is the last name to be cited in the early scholastic period4 ,he professed to be a practical philosopher1 to be more concerned about the uses of knowledge than about knowledge itself1 and to subordinate everything to some purpose2 by way of protest against the theoretic hair-splitting and verbal subtleties of his predecessors4 ,even more than in ,ethics1 he found in ,politics his proper sphere4 ,he was the staunchest upholder of the ,papal ,supremacy1 which1 after long struggles1 was about to be established at its greatest height1 before presiding at the opening of the most brilliant period of scholasticism4 ,in the ,policraticus especially1 but also in his other works1 the foundations and provisions of his moral system are found4 ,he has no distinction to draw in ,ethics between theology and philosophy1 but uses ,scripture and observation alike1 though ,scripture always in the final appeal4 ,of philosophizing1 the one final aim1 as also of existence1 is ,happiness2 the question1 of questions1 how it is to be attained4 ,happiness is not pleasure1 nor possession1 nor honour1 but consists in following the path of virtue4 ,virtue is to be understood from the constitution of human nature4 ,in man1 there is a lower and a higher faculty of ,desire2 or1 otherwise expressed1 there are the various affections that have their roots in sense and centre in self-love or the desire of self-preservation1 and there is also a natural love of justice implanted from the beginning4 ,in proportion as the appetitus justi1 which consists in will1 gains upon the appetitus commodi1 men become more worthy of a larger happiness4 ,self-love rules in man1 so long as he is in the natural state of sin2 if1 amid great conflict and by divine help1 the higher affection gains the upper hand1 the state of true virtue1 which is identical with the theoretic state of belief1 and also of pure love to ,god and man1 is reached4 ,by the middle of the thirteenth century1 the schoolmen had before them the whole works of ,aristotle1 obtained from ,arabian and other sources4 ,whereas1 previous to this time1 they had comprehended nearly all the subjects of ,philosophy under the one name of ,dialectics or ,logic1 always reserving1 however1 ,ethics to ,theology1 they were now made aware of the ancient division of the sciences1 and of what had been accomplished in each4 ,the effect1 both in respect of form and of subject-matter1 was soon apparent in such compilations or more independent works as they were able to produce after their commentaries on the ,aristotelian text4 ,but in ,ethics1 the nature of the subject demanded of men in their position a less entire submission to the doctrines of the pagan philosopher2 and here accordingly they clung to the traditional theological treatment4 ,if they were commenting on the ,ethics of ,aristotle1 the ,bible was at hand to supply his omissions2 if they were setting up a complete moral system1 they took little more than the ground-work from him1 the rest being ,christian ideas and precepts1 or fragments borrowed from ,platonism and other ,greek systems1 nearly allied in spirit to their own faith4 ,this is especially true1 as will be seen1 of ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,his predecessors can be disposed of in a few words4 ,,alexander of ,,hales 7d4 #abde7 was almost purely theological4 ,,bonaventura 7#abba-gd7 in his double character of rigid ,franciscan and mystic1 was led far beyond the ,aristotelian ,ethics4 ,the mean between excess and defect is a very good rule for the affairs of life1 but the true ,christian is bound besides to works of supererogation3 first of all1 to take on the condition of poverty2 while the state of mystic contemplation remains as a still higher goal for the few4 ,,albert ,,the ,,great 7#aaic-abhj71 the most learned and complete commentator of ,aristotle that had yet appeared1 divide the whole subject of ,ethics into ,monastica1 ,oeconomica1 and ,politica4 ,in this division1 which is plainly suggested by the ,aristotelian division of ,politics in the large sense1 the term ,monastica not inaptly expresses the reference that ,ethics has to the conduct of men as individuals4 ,albert1 however1 in commenting on the ,nicomachean ,ethics1 adds exceedingly little to the results of his author beyond the incorporation of a few ,scriptural ideas4 ,to the cardinal virtues he appends the virtutes adjunctae1 ,faith1 ,hope1 and ,charity1 and again in his compendious work1 ,summa ,theologiae1 distinguishes them as infusae1 the cardinal being considered as acquisitae4 ,besides his commentaries on the ,aristotelian works 7the ,ethics included7 and many other writings1 ,,thomas ,,aquinas 7#abbf-gd7 left two large works1 the ,summa philosophica and the famous ,summa ,theologiae4 ,notwithstanding the prominence assigned to theological questions1 the first is a regular philosophical work2 the second1 though containing the exposition of philosophical opinions1 is a theological textbook4 ,now1 as it is in the ,summary for theological purposes that the whole practical philosophy of ,aquinas is contained1 it is to be inferred that he regarded the subject of ,ethics as not on the same level with other departments of philosophy4 ,moreover1 even when he is not appealing to ,scripture1 he is seen to display what is for him a most unusual tendency to desert ,aristotle1 at the really critical moments1 for ,plato or ,plotinus1 or any other authority of a more theological cast4 ,in the 7unfinished7 ,summa ,theologiae1 the ,ethical views and cognate questions occupy the two sections of the second part--the so-called prima and secunda secundae4 ,he begins1 in the ,aristotelian fashion1 by seeking an ultimate end of human action1 and finds it in the attainment of the highest good or happiness4 ,but as no created thing can answer to the idea of the highest good1 it must be placed in ,god4 ,god1 however1 as the highest good1 can only be the object1 in the search after human happiness1 for happiness in itself is a state of the mind or act of the soul4 ,the question then arises1 what sort of act8 ,does it fall under the ,will or under the ,intelligence8 ,the answer is1 ,not under the will1 because happiness is neither desire nor pleasure1 but consecutio1 that is1 a possessing4 ,desire precedes consecutio1 and pleasure follows upon it2 but the act of getting possession1 in which lies happiness1 is distinct from both4 ,this is illustrated by the case of the miser having his happiness in the mere possession of money2 and the position is essentially the same as ,butler's1 in regard to our appetites and desires1 that they blindly seek their objects with no regard to pleasure4 ,thomas concludes that the consecutio1 or happiness1 is an act of the intelligence2 what pleasure there is being a mere accidental accompaniment4 ,distinguishing between two phases of the intellect--the theoretic and the practical--in the one of which it is an end to itself1 but in the other subordinated to an external aim1 he places true happiness in acts of the self-sufficing theoretic intelligence4 ,in this life1 however1 such a constant exercise of the intellect is not possible1 and accordingly what happiness there is1 must be found1 in great measure1 in the exercise of the practical intellect1 directing and governing the lower desires and passions4 ,this twofold conception of happiness is ,aristotelian1 even as expressed by ,thomas under the distinction of perfect and imperfect happiness2 but when he goes on to associate perfect happiness with the future life only1 to found an argument for a future life from the desire of a happiness more perfect than can be found here1 and to make the pure contemplation1 in which consists highest bliss1 a vision of the divine essence face to face1 a direct cognition of ,deity far surpassing demonstrative knowledge or mortal faith--he is more theologian than philosopher1 or if a philosopher1 more ,platonist than ,aristotelian4 ,the condition of perfect happiness being a theoretic or intellectual state1 the visio1 and not the delectatio1 is consistently given as its central fact2 and when he proceeds to consider the other questions of ,ethics1 the same superiority is steadily ascribed to the intellectual function4 ,it is because we know a thing to be good that we wish it1 and knowing it1 we cannot help wishing4 ,conscience1 as the name implies1 is allied to knowledge4 ,reason gives the law to will4 ,after a long disquisition about the passions and the whole appetitive side of human nature1 over which ,reason is called to rule1 he is brought to the subject of virtue4 ,he is ,aristotelian enough to describe virtue as habitus--a disposition or quality 7like health7 whereby a subject is more or less well disposed with reference to itself or something else2 and he takes account of the acquisition of good moral habits 7virtutes acquisitae7 by practice4 ,but with this he couples1 or tends to substitute for it1 the definition of ,augustin that virtue is a good quality of mind1 quam ,deus in nobis sine nobis operatur1 as a ground for virtutes infusae1 conferred as gifts upon man1 or rather on certain men1 by free grace from on high4 ,he wavers greatly at this stage1 and in this respect his attitude is characteristic for all the schoolmen4 ,so again in passing from the general question of ,virtue to the virtues1 he puts several of the systems under contribution1 as if not prepared to leave the guidance of ,aristotle1 but feeling at the same time the necessity of bridging over the distance between his position and ,christian requirements4 ,understanding ,aristotle to make a co-ordinate division of virtues into ,moral and ,intellectual1 he gives reasons for such a step4 ,though virtue1 he says1 is not so much the perfecting of the operation of our faculties1 as their employment by the will for good ends1 it may be used in the first sense1 and thus the intellectual virtues will be the habits of intelligence that procure the truest knowledge4 ,the well-known division of the cardinal virtues is his next theme2 and it is established as complete and satisfactory by a twofold deduction4 ,but a still higher and more congenial view is immediately afterwards adopted from ,plotinus4 ,this is the ,neo-,platonic description of the four virtues as politicae1 purgatoriae1 and purgati animi1 according to the scale of elevation reached by the soul in its efforts to mount above sense4 ,they are called by ,thomas also exemplares1 when regarded at once as the essence of the ,deity1 and as the models of human perfections4 ,this mystical division1 not unsupported by philosophical authority1 smooths the way for his account of the highest or theological virtues4 ,these bear upon the vision of ,deity1 which was recognized above as the highest good of humanity1 and form an order apart4 ,they have ,god for their object1 are altogether inspired by ,god 7hence called infusae71 and are taught by revelation4 ,given in connection with the natural faculties of intellect and will1 they are exhibited in the attainment of the supernatural order of things4 ,with intellect goes ,faith1 as it were the intellect applied to things not intelligible2 with ,will go ,hope and ,charity or ,love3 ,hope being the ,will exercised upon things not naturally desired1 and ,love the union of ,will with what is not naturally brought near to us4 ,aquinas then passes to politics1 or at least the discussion of the political ideas of law1 right1 c4 ,coming now to modern thinkers1 we begin with ,,thomas ,,hobbes4 #aehh-afgi4 ,the circumstances of ,hobbes's life1 so powerful in determining the nature of his opinions1 had an equally marked effect on the order and number of expositions that he gave to the psychological and political parts of his system4 ,his ethical doctrines1 in as far as they can be dissociated from1 his politics1 may be studied in no less than three distinct forms2 either in the first part of the ,leviathian 7#afea72 or in the ,de ,cive 7#afdg71 taken along-with the ,de ,homine 7#afeh72 or in the ,treatise of ,human ,nature 7#afej1 but written ten years earlier71 coupled with the ,de ,corpore ,politico 7also #afej74 ,but the same result1 or with only unimportant variations1 being obtained from all1 we need not here go beyond the first-mentioned4 ,in the first part of the ,leviathan1 then1 bearing the title ,of ,man1 and designed to consider ,man as at once the matter and artificer of the ,commonwealth or ,state1 ,hobbes is led1 after discussing ,sense1 ,imagination1 ,train of ,imaginations1 ,speech1 ,reason and ,science1 to take up1 in chapter sixth1 the ,passions1 or1 as he calls them1 the ,interior beginnings of voluntary motions4 ,motions1 he says1 are either vital and animal1 or voluntary4 ,vital motions1 e4g41 circulation1 nutrition1 c41 need no help of imagination2 on the other hand1 voluntary motions1 as going and speaking--since they depend on a precedent thought of whither1 which way1 and what--have in the imagination their first beginning4 ,but imagination is only the relics of sense1 and sense1 as ,hobbes always declares1 is motion in the human organs communicated by objects without2 consequently1 visible voluntary motions begin in invisible internal motions1 whose nature is expressed by the word ,endeavour4 ,when the endeavour is towards something causing it1 there is ,appetite or ,desire2 endeavour 'fromward something' is ,aversion4 ,these very words1 and the corresponding terms in ,greek1 imply an actual1 not--as the schoolmen absurdly think--a metaphorical motion4 ,passing from the main question1 he describes ,love and ,hate as ,desire and ,aversion when the object is present4 ,of appetites1 some are born with us1 others proceed from experience1 being of particular things4 ,where we neither desire nor hate1 we contemn he means1 disregard4 ,appetites and aversions vary in the same person1 and much more in different persons4 ,then follows his definition of good1--the object of any man's appetite or desire1 as evil is the object of his hate and aversion4 ,good and evil are always merely relative1 either to the person of a man1 or in a commonwealth to the representative person1 or to an arbitrator if chosen to settle a dispute4 ,good in the promise is pulchrum1 for which there is no exact ,english term2 good in the effect1 as the end desired1 is delightful2 good as the means1 is useful or profitable4 ,there is the same variety of evil4 ,his next topic is ,pleasure4 ,as sense is1 in reality1 motion1 but1 in 'apparence1' light or sound or odour2 so appetite1 in reality a motion or endeavour effected in the heart by the action of objects through the organs of sense1 is1 in 'apparence1' delight or trouble of mind4 ,the emotion1 whose apparence 7i4e41 subjective side7 is pleasure or delight1 seems to be a corroboration of vital motion2 the contrary1 in the case of molestation4 ,pleasure is1 therefore1 the sense of good2 displeasure1 the sense of evil4 ,the one accompanies1 in greater or less degree1 all desire and love2 the other1 all aversion and hatred4 ,pleasures are either of sense2 or of the mind1 when arising-from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of the ends or consequence of things1 irrespective of their pleasing the senses or not4 ,for these mental pleasures1 there is the general name joy4 ,there is a corresponding division of displeasure into pain and grief4 ,all the other passions1 he now proceeds to show1 are these simple passions--appetite1 desire1 love1 aversion1 hate1 joy1 and grief1 diversified in name for divers considerations4 ,incidental remarks of ethical importance are these4 ,covetousness1 the desire of riches1 is a name signifying blame1 because men contending for them are displeased with others attaining them2 the desire itself1 however1 is to be blamed or allowed1 according to the means whereby the riches are sought4 ,curiosity is a lust of the mind1 that by a perseverance of delight in the continual generation of knowledge1 exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure4 ,pity is grief for the calamity of another1 arising from the imagination of the like calamity befalling one's self2 the best men have1 therefore1 least pity for calamity arising from great wickedness4 ,contempt1 or little sense of the calamity of others1 proceeds from security of one's own fortune2 'for that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms1 without other end of his own1 ,i do not conceive it possible4' ,having explained the various passions1 he then gives his theory of the ,will4 ,he supposes a liberty in man of doing or omitting1 according to appetite or aversion4 ,but to this liberty an end is put in the state of deliberation wherein there is kept up a constant succession of alternating desires and aversions1 hopes and fears1 regarding one and the same thing4 ,one of two results follows4 ,either the thing is judged impossible1 or it is done2 and this1 according as aversion or appetite triumphs at the last4 ,now1 the last aversion1 followed by omission1 or the last appetite1 followed by action1 is the act of ,willing4 ,will is1 therefore1 the last appetite 7taken to include aversion7 in deliberating4 ,so-called ,will1 that has been forborne1 was inclination merely2 but the last inclination with consequent action 7or omission7 is ,will1 or voluntary action4 ,after mentioning the forms of speech where the several passions and appetites are naturally expressed1 and remarking that the truest signs of passion are in the countenance1 motions of the body1 actions1 and ends or aims otherwise known to belong to a man1--he returns to the question of good and evil4 ,it is apparent good and evil1 come at by the best possible foresight of all the consequences of action1 that excite the appetites and aversions in deliberation4 ,felicity he defines continual success in obtaining the things from time to time desired2 perpetual tranquillity of mind being impossible in this life1 which is but motion1 and cannot be without desire and fear any more than without sense4 ,the happiness of the future life is at present unknown4 ,men1 he says at the close1 praise the goodness1 and magnify the greatness1 of a thing2 the ,greeks had also the word ,greek3 makarismos1 to express an opinion of a man's felicity4 ,in ,chapter ,,vii41 ,of the ,ends of ,discourse1 he is led to remark on the meaning of ,conscience1 in connection-with the word ,conscious4 ,two or more men1 he says1 are conscious of a thing when they know it together 7con-scire47 ,hence arises the proper meaning of conscience2 and the evil of speaking against one's conscience1 in this sense1 is to be allowed4 ,two other meanings are metaphorical3 when it is put for a man's knowledge of his own secret facts and thoughts2 and when men give their own new opinions1 however absurd1 the reverenced name of conscience1 as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them4 ,hobbes is not concerned to foster the moral independence of individuals4 ,he begins ,chapter ,,viii4 by defining ,virtue as something that is valued for eminence1 and that consists in comparison1 but proceeds to consider only the intellectual virtues--all that is summed up in the term of a good wit--and their opposites4 ,farther on1 he refers difference of wits--discretion1 prudence1 craft1 c4--to difference in the passions1 and this to difference in constitution of body and of education4 ,the passions chiefly concerned are the desires of power1 riches1 knowledge1 honour1 but all may be reduced to the single desire of power4 ,in ,chapter ,,ix4 is given his ,scheme of ,sciences4 ,the relation in his mind between ,ethics and ,politics is here seen4 ,science or ,philosophy is divided into ,natural or ,civil1 according as it is knowledge of consequences from the accidents of natural bodies or of politic bodies4 ,ethics is one of the ultimate divisions of ,natural ,philosophy1 dealing with consequences from the passions of men2 and because the passions are qualities of bodies1 it falls more immediately under the head of ,physics4 ,politics is the whole of the second main division1 and deals with consequences from the institution of commonwealths 7#a7 to the rights and duties of the ,sovereign1 and 7#b7 to the duty and right of the ,subject4 ,ethics1 accordingly1 in ,hobbes's eyes1 is part of the science of man 7as a natural body71 and it is always treated as such4 ,but subjecting1 as he does1 so much of the action of the individual to the action of the state1 he necessarily includes in his ,politics many questions that usually fall to ,ethics4 ,hence arises the necessity of studying for his ,ethics also part of the civil ,philosophy2 though it happens that1 in the ,leviathan1 this requisite part is incorporated with the ,section containing the ,science of ,man4 ,chapter ,x4 is on ,power1 ,worth1 ,dignity1 ,honour1 and ,worthiness4 ,a man's power being his present means to obtain some future apparent good1 he enumerates all the sources of original and acquired power4 ,the worth of a man is what would be given for the use of his power2 it is1 therefore1 never absolute1 but dependent on the need and judgment of another4 ,dignity is the value set on a man by the state4 ,honour and dishonour are the manifestation of value4 ,he goes through all the signs of honour and dishonour4 ,honourable is any possession1 action1 or quality that is the sign of power4 ,where there is the opinion of power1 the justice or injustice of an action does not affect the honour4 ,he clearly means a universally accepted opinion of power1 and cites the characters of the pagan deities4 ,so1 too1 before times of civil order1 it was held no dishonour to be a pirate1 and even still1 duels1 though unlawful1 are honourable1 and will be till there be honour ordained for them that refuse4 ,farther on1 he distinguishes ,worthiness1 7#a7 from worth1 and 7#b7 from merit1 or the possession of a particular ability or desert1 which1 as will be seen1 presupposes a right to a thing1 founded on a promise4 ,chapter ,,xi4 bears the title1 ,of the difference of ,manners2 by manners being meant1 not decency of behaviour and points of the 'small morals1' but the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity4 ,felicity of life1 as before1 he pronounces to be a continual progress of desire1 there being no finis ultimus nor summum bonum4 ,the aim of all men is1 therefore1 not only to enjoy once and for an instant1 but to assure for over the way of future desire4 ,men differ in their way of doing so1 from diversity of passion and their different degrees of knowledge4 ,one thing he notes as common to all1 a restless and perpetual desire of power after power1 because the present power of living well depends on the acquisition of more4 ,competition inclines to contention and war4 ,the desire of ease1 on the other hand1 and fear of death or wounds1 dispose to civil obedience4 ,so also does desire of knowledge1 implying1 as it does1 desire of leisure4 ,desire of praise and desire of fame after death dispose to laudable actions2 in such fame1 there is a present delight from foresight of it1 and of benefit redounding to posterity2 for pleasure to the sense is also pleasure in the imagination4 ,unrequitable benefits from an equal engender secret hatred1 but from a superior1 love2 the cheerful acceptation1 called gratitude1 requiting the giver with honour4 ,requitable benefits1 even from equals or inferiors1 dispose to love2 for hence arises emulation in benefiting--'the most noble and profitable contention possible1 wherein the victor is pleased with his victory1 and the other revenged by confessing it4' ,he passes under review other dispositions1 such as fear of oppression1 vain-glory1 ambition1 pusillanimity1 frugality1 c41 with reference to the course of conduct they prompt to4 ,then he comes to a favourite subject1 the mistaken courses whereinto men fall that are ignorant of natural causes and the proper signification of words4 ,the effect of ignorance of the causes of right1 equity1 law1 and justice1 is to make custom and example the rule of actions1 as with children1 or to induce the setting of custom against reason1 and reason against custom1 whereby the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed1 both by the pen1 and by the sword4 ,again1 taking up ignorance of the laws of nature1 he is led on to the subject of natural ,religion1 and devotes also the whole of ,chapter ,,xii4 to ,religion and kindred topics4 ,in ,chapter ,,xiii41 he deals with the natural condition of ,mankind1 as concerning their ,felicity and ,misery4 ,all men1 he says1 are by nature equal4 ,differences there are in the faculties of body and mind1 but1 when all is taken together1 not great enough to establish a steady superiority of one over another4 ,besides even more than in strength1 men are equal in prudence1 which is but experience that comes to all4 ,people indeed generally believe that others are not so wise as themselves1 but 'there is not ordinarily a greater sign of equal distribution of anything than that every person is contented with his share4' ,of this equality of ability1 the consequence is that two men desiring the exclusive possession of the same thing1 whether for their own conservation or for delectation1 will become enemies and seek to destroy each other4 ,in such a case1 it will be natural for any man to seek to secure himself by anticipating others in the use of force or wiles2 and1 because some will not be content with merely securing themselves1 others1 who would be content1 will be driven to take the offensive for mere self-conservation4 ,moreover1 men will be displeased at being valued by others less highly than by themselves1 and will use force to extort respect4 ,thus1 he finds three principal causes of quarrel in the nature of man--competition1 diffidence 7distrust71 and glory1 making men invade for gain1 for safety1 and for reputation4 ,men will accordingly1 in the absence of any power to keep them in awe1 be in a constant state of war2 by which is meant1 not actual fighting1 but the known disposition thereto1 and no assurance to the contrary4 ,he proceeds to draw a very dismal picture of the results of this state of enmity of man against man--no industry1 no agriculture1 no arts1 no society1 and so forth1 but only fear and danger of violent death1 and life solitary1 poor1 nasty1 brutish1 and short4 ,to those that doubt the truth of such an 'inference made from the passions1' and desire the confirmation of experience1 he cites the wearing of arms and locking of doors1 c41 as actions that accuse mankind as much as any words of his4 ,besides1 it is not really to accuse man's nature2 for the desires and passions are in themselves no sin1 nor the actions proceeding from them1 until a law is made against them4 ,he seeks further evidence of an original condition of war1 in the actual state of ,american savages1 with no government at all1 but only a concord of small families1 depending on natural lust2 also in the known horrors of a civil war1 when there is no common power to fear3 and1 finally1 in the constant hostile attitude of different governments4 ,in the state of natural war1 the notions of right and wrong1 justice and injustice1 have no place1 there being no law2 and there is no law1 because there is no common power4 ,force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues4 ,justice is no faculty of body and mind like sense and passion1 but only a quality relating to men in society4 ,then adding a last touch to the description of the state of nature1--by saying of property1 that 'only that is every man's that he can get1 and for so long as he can keep it1'--he opens up1 at the close of the chapter1 a new prospect by allowing a possibility to come out of so evil a condition4 ,the possibility consists partly in the passions that incline to peace--viz41 fear of death1 desire of things necessary to commodious living1 and hope by industry to obtain them2 partly in reason1 which suggests convenient articles of peace and agreement1 otherwise called the ,laws of ,nature4 ,the first and second ,natural ,laws1 and the subject of contracts1 take up ,chap4 ,,xiv4 ,first comes a definition of ,jus ,naturale or ,right of ,nature--the liberty each man has of using his own power1 as he will himself1 for the preservation of his own nature or life4 ,liberty properly means the absence of external impediments2 now a man may externally be hindered from doing all he would1 but not from using what power is left him1 according to his best reason and judgment4 ,a ,law of ,nature1 lex naturalis is defined1 a general rule1 found out by reason1 forbidding a man to do what directly or indirectly is destructive of his life1 or to omit what he thinks may best preserve it4 ,right and ,law1 though generally confounded1 are exactly opposed1 ,right being liberty1 and ,law obligation4 ,in the natural state of war1 every man1 being governed by his own reason1 has a right to everything1 even to another's body4 ,but because thus no man's life is secure1 he finds the ,first and fundamental law of nature1 or general rule of reason1 to be to seek peace and follow it1 if possible3 failing which1 we may defend ourselves by all the means we can4 ,here the law being 'to endeavour peace1' from this follows the ,second law1 that a man be willing1 when others are so too1 as far forth as for peace and self-defence he shall think it necessary1 to lay down this right to all things2 and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself4 ,this is the same as the ,gospel precept1 ,do to others1 c4 ,laying down one's right to anything is divesting one's self of the liberty of hindering another in the exercise of his own original right to the same4 ,the right is renounced1 when a man cares not for whose benefit2 transferred1 when intended to benefit some certain person or persons4 ,in either case the man is obliged or bound not to hinder those1 in whose favour the right is abandoned1 from the benefit of it2 it is his duty not to make void his own voluntary act1 and if he does1 it is injustice or injury1 because he acts now sine ,jure4 ,such conduct ,hobbes likens to an intellectual absurdity or self-contradiction4 ,voluntary signs to be employed in abandoning a right1 are words and actions1 separately or together2 but in all bonds1 the strength comes not from their own nature1 but from the fear of evil resulting from their rupture4 ,he concludes that not all rights are alienable1 for the reason that the abandonment1 being a voluntary act1 must have for its object some good to the person that abandons his right4 ,a man1 for instance1 cannot lay down the right to defend his life2 to use words or other signs for that purpose1 would be to despoil himself of the end--security of life and person--for which those signs were intended4 ,contract is the mutual transferring of right1 and with this idea he connects a great deal4 ,first1 he distinguishes transference of right to a thing1 and transference of the thing itself4 ,a contract fulfilled by one party1 but left on trust to be fulfilled by the other1 is called the ,covenant of this other1 7a distinction he afterwards drops71 and leaves room for the keeping or violation of faith4 ,to contract he opposes gift1 free-gift1 or grace1 where there is no mutual transference of right1 but one party transfers in the hope of gaining friendship or service from another1 or the reputation of charity and magnanimity1 or deliverance from the merited pain of compassion1 or reward in heaven4 ,there follow remarks on signs of contract1 as either express or by inference1 and a distinction between free-gift as made by words of the present or past1 and contract as made by words past1 present1 or future2 wherefore1 in contracts like buying and selling1 a promise amounts to a covenant1 and is obligatory4 ,the idea of ,merit is thus explained4 ,of two contracting parties1 the one that has first performed merits what he is to receive by the other's performance1 or has it as due4 ,even the person that wins a prize1 offered by free-gift to many1 merits it4 ,but1 whereas1 in contract1 ,i merit by virtue of my own power and the other contractor's need1 in the case of the gift1 ,i merit only by the benignity of the giver1 and to the extent that1 when he has given it1 it shall be mine rather than another's4 ,this distinction he believes to coincide with the scholastic separation of merilum congrui and merilum condigni4 ,he adds many more particulars in regard to covenants made on mutual trust4 ,they are void in the state of nature1 upon any reasonable suspicion2 but when there is a common power to compel observance1 and thus no more room for fear1 they are valid4 ,even when fear makes them invalid it must have arisen after they were made1 else it should have kept them from being made4 ,transference of a right implies transference1 as far as may be1 of the means to its enjoyment4 ,with beasts there is no covenant1 because no proper mutual understanding4 ,with ,god also none1 except through special revelation1 or with his lieutenant in his name4 ,anything vowed contrary to the law of nature is vowed in vain2 if the thing vowed is commanded by the law of nature1 the law1 not the vow1 binds4 ,covenants are of things possible and future4 ,men are freed from them by performance1 or forgiveness1 which is restitution of liberty4 ,he pronounces covenants extorted by fear to be binding alike in the state of mere nature and in commonwealths1 if once entered into4 ,a former covenant makes void a later4 ,any covenant not to defend one's self from force by force is always void2 as said above1 there is no transference possible of right to defend one's self from death1 wounds1 imprisonment1 c4 ,so no man is obliged to accuse himself1 or generally to give testimony where from the nature of the case it may be presumed to be corrupted4 ,accusation upon torture is not to be reputed as testimony4 ,at the close he remarks upon oaths4 ,he finds in human nature two imaginable helps to strengthen the force of words1 otherwise too weak to insure the performance of covenants4 ,one of these--pride in appearing not to need to break one's word1 he supposes too rare to be presumed upon4 ,the other1 fear1 has reference either to power of spirits invisible1 or of men4 ,in the state of nature1 it is the first kind of fear--a man's religion--that keeps him to his promises4 ,an oath is therefore swearing to perform by the ,god a man fears4 ,but to the obligation itself it adds nothing4 ,of the other ,laws of ,nature1 treated in ,chap4 ,,xv41 the third1 that men perform their covenants made1 opens up the discussion of ,justice4 ,till rights have been transferred and covenants made there is no justice or injustice2 injustice is no other than the non-performance of covenants4 ,further1 justice 7and also property7 begins only where a regular coercive power is constituted1 because otherwise there is cause for fear1 and fear1 as has been seen1 makes covenants invalid4 ,even the scholastic definition of justice recognizes as much2 for there can be no constant will of giving to every man his own1 when1 as in the state of nature1 there is no own4 ,he argues at length against the idea that justice1 i4e41 the keeping of covenants1 is contrary to reason2 repelling three different arguments4 7#a7 ,he demonstrates that it cannot be reasonable to break or keep covenants according to benefit supposed to be gained in each case1 because this would be a subversion of the principles whereon society is founded1 and must end by depriving the individual of its benefits1 whereby he would be left perfectly helpless4 7#b7 ,he considers it frivolous to talk of securing the happiness of heaven by any kind of injustice1 when there is but one possible way of attaining it1 viz41 the keeping of covenants4 7#c7 ,he warns men 7he means his contemporaries7 against resorting to the mode of injustice known as rebellion to gain sovereignty1 from the hopelessness of gaining it and the uncertainty of keeping it4 ,hence he concludes that justice is a rule of reason1 the keeping of covenants being the surest way to preserve our life1 and therefore a law of nature4 ,he rejects the notion that laws of nature are to be supposed conducive1 not to the preservation of life on earth1 but to the attainment of eternal felicity2 whereto such breach of covenant as rebellion may sometimes be supposed a means4 ,for that1 the knowledge of the future life is too uncertain4 ,finally1 he consistently holds that faith is to be kept with heretics and with all that it has once been pledged to4 ,he goes on to distinguish between justice of men or manners1 and justice of actions2 whereby in the one case men are just or righteous1 and in the other1 guiltless4 ,after making the common observation that single inconsistent acts do not destroy a character for justice or injustice1 he has this3 ',that which gives to human actions the relish of justice1 is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage rarely found1 by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud1 or breach of promise4' ,then he shows the difference between injustice1 injury1 and damage2 asserts that nothing done to a mail with his consent can be injury2 and1 rejecting the common mode of distinguishing between commutative and distributive justice1 calls the first the justice of a contractor1 and the other an improper name for just distribution1 or the justice of an arbitrator1 i4e41 the act of defining what is just--equivalent to equity1 which is itself a law of nature4 ,the rest of the laws follow in swift succession4 ,the #dth recommends ,gratitude1 which depends on antecedent grace instead of covenant4 ,free-gift being voluntary1 i4e41 done with intention of good to one's self1 there will be an end to benevolence and mutual help1 unless gratitude is given as compensation4 ,the #eth enjoins ,complaisance2 a disposition in men not to seek superfluities that to others are necessaries4 ,such men are sociable4 ,the #fth enjoins ,pardon upon repentance1 with a view 7like the last7 to peace4 ,the #gth enjoins that punishment is to be only for correction of the offender and direction of others2 i4e41 for profit and example1 not for 'glorying in the hurt of another1 tending to no end4' ,against ,cruelty4 ,the #hth is against ,contumely1 as provocative of dispeace4 ,the #ith is against ,pride1 and enjoins the acknowledgment of the equality of all men by nature4 ,he is here very sarcastic against ,aristotle1 and asserts1 in opposition to him1 that all inequality of men arises from consent4 ,the #ajth is1 in like manner1 against ,arrogance1 and in favour of ,modesty4 ,men1 in entering into peace1 are to reserve no rights but such as they are willing shall be reserved by others4 ,the #aath enjoins ,equity2 the disposition1 in a man trusted to judge1 to distribute equally to each man what in reason belongs to him4 ,partiality 'deters men from the use of judges and arbitrators1' and is a cause of war4 ,the #abth enjoins the common1 or the proportionable1 use of things that cannot be distributed4 ,the #acth enjoins the resort to lot1 when separate or common enjoyment is not possible2 the #adth provides also for natural lot1 meaning first possession or primogeniture4 ,the #aeth demands safe conduct for mediators4 ,the #afth requires that parties at controversy shall submit their right to arbitration4 ,the #agth forbids a man to be his own judge2 the #ahth1 any interested person to be judge4 ,the #aith requires a resort to witnesses in a matter of fact1 as between two contending parties4 ,this list of the laws of nature is only slightly varied in the other works4 ,he enumerates none but those that concern the doctrine of ,civil ,society1 passing-over things like ,intemperance1 that are also forbidden by the law of nature because destructive of particular men4 ,all the laws are summed up in the one expression3 ,do not that to another1 which thou wouldest not have done to thyself4 ,the laws of nature he regards as always binding in foro interno1 to the extent of its being desired they should take place2 but in foro externo1 only when there is security4 ,as binding in foro interno1 they can be broken even by an act according with them1 if the purpose of it was against them4 ,they are immutable and eternal2 'injustice1 ingratitude1 c41 can never be made lawful1' for war cannot preserve life1 nor peace destroy it4 ,their fulfilment is easy1 as requiring only an unfeigned and constant endeavour4 ,of these laws the science is true moral philosophy1 i4e41 the science of good and evil in the society of mankind4 ,good and evil vary much from man to man1 and even in the same man2 but while private appetite is the measure of good and evil in the condition of nature1 all allow that peace is good1 and that justice1 gratitude1 c41 as the way or means to peace1 are also good1 that is to say1 moral virtues4 ,the true moral philosophy1 in regarding them as laws of nature1 places their goodness in their being the means of peaceable1 comfortable1 and sociable living2 not1 as is commonly done1 in a mediocrity of passions1 'as if not the cause1 but the degree of daring1 made fortitude4' ,his last remark is1 that these dictates of reason are improperly called laws1 because 'law1 properly1 is the word of him that by right hath command over others4' ,but when considered not as mere conclusions or theorems concerning the means of conservation and defence1 but as delivered in the word of ,god1 that by right commands all1 then they are properly called laws4 ,chapter ,,xvi41 closing the whole first part of the ,leviathan1 is of ,persons1 ,authors1 and ,things ,personated4 ,the definitions and distinctions contained in it add nothing of direct ethical importance to the foregoing1 though needed for the discussion of ',commonwealth1' to which he passes4 ,the chief points under this second great head are taken into the summary4 ,the views of ,hobbes can be only inadequately summarized4 ,i4--,the ,standard1 to men living in society1 is the ,law of the ,state4 ,this is ,self-interest or individual ,utility1 masked as regard for ,established ,order2 for1 as he holds1 under any kind of government there is more ,security and ,commodity of life than in the ,state of ,nature4 ,in the ,natural ,condition1 ,self-interest1 of course1 is the ,standard2 but not without responsibility to ,god1 in case it is not sought1 as far as other men will allow1 by the practice of the dictates of ,reason or laws of ,nature4 ,,ii4--,his ,psychology of ,ethics is to be studied in the detail4 ,whether in the natural or in the social state1 the ,moral ,faculty1 to correspond with the ,standard1 is the general power of ,reason1 comprehending the aims of the ,individual or ,society1 and attending to the laws of ,nature or the laws of the ,state1 in the one case or in the other respectively4 ,on the question of the ,will1 his views have been given at length4 ,disinterested ,sentiment is1 in origin1 self-regarding2 for1 pitying others1 we imagine the like calamity befalling ourselves4 ,in one place1 he seems to say1 that the ,sentiment of ,power is also involved4 ,it is the great defect of his system that he takes so little account of the ,social affections1 whether natural or acquired4 ,,iii4--,his ,theory of ,happiness1 or the ,summum ,bonum1 would follow from his analysis of the ,feelings and ,will4 ,but ,felicity being a continual progress in desire1 and consisting less in present enjoyment than in assuring the way of future desire1 the chief element in it is the ,sense of ,power4 ,,iv4--,a ,moral ,code is minutely detailed under the name of ,laws of ,nature1 in force in the ,natural ,state under ,divine ,sanction4 ,it inculcates all the common virtues1 and makes little or no departure from the usually received maxims4 ,v4--,the relation of ,ethics to ,politics is the closest imaginable4 ,not even ,society1 as commonly understood1 but only the established civil authority1 is the source of rules of conduct4 ,in the civil 7which to ,hobbes is the only meaning of the social7 state1 the laws of nature are superseded1 by being supposed taken up into1 the laws of the ,sovereign ,power4 ,,vi4--,as regards ,religion1 he affirms the coincidence of his reasoned deduction of the laws of ,nature with the precepts of ,revelation4 ,he makes a mild use of the sanctions of a ,future ,life to enforce the laws of ,nature1 and to give additional support to the commands of the sovereign that take the place of these in the social state4 ,among the numberless replies1 called forth by the bold speculations of ,hobbes1 were some works of independent ethical importance2 in particular1 the treatises of ,cumberland1 ,cudworth1 and ,clarke4 ,cumberland stands by himself2 ,cudworth and ,clarke1 agreeing in some respects1 are commonly called the ,rational moralists1 along with ,wollaston and ,price 7who fall to be noticed later74 ,,richard ,,cumberland4 #afcb-agah4 ,cumberland's' ,latin work1 ,de ,legibus ,naturae1 disquisitio philosophica contra ,hobbium instituta1 appeared in #afgb4 ,the book is important as a distinctly philosophical disquisition1 but its extraordinarily discursive character renders impossible anything like analysis4 ,his chief points will be presented in a fuller summary than usual4 ,i4--,the ,,standard of ,moral ,good is given in the laws of ,nature1 which may all be summed up in one great ,law--,benevolence to all rational agents or the endeavour to the utmost of our power to promote the common good of all4 ,his theory is hardly to be distinguished from the ,greatest ,happiness principle2 unless it might be represented as putting forward still more prominently the search for ,individual ,happiness1 with a fixed assumption that this is best secured through the promotion of the general good4 ,no action1 he declares1 can be called 'morally good that does not in its own nature contribute somewhat to the happiness of men4' ,the speciality of his view is his professing not to make an induction as regards the character of actions from the observation of their effects1 but to deduce the propriety of 7benevolent7 actions from1 the consideration of the character and position of rational agents in nature4 ,rules of conduct1 all directed to the promotion of the ,happiness of rational agents1 may thus be found in the form of propositions impressed upon the mind by the ,nature of ,things2 and these are then interpreted to be laws of ,nature 7summed up in the one great ,law71 promulgated by ,god with the natural effects of actions as ,sanctions of ,reward and ,punishment to enforce them4 ,,ii4--,his ,psychology of ,ethics may be reduced to the following heads4 #a4 ,the ,faculty is the ,reason1 apprehending the exact ,nature of ,things1 and determining accordingly the modes of action that are best suited to promote the happiness of rational agents4 #b4 ,of the ,faculty1 under the name of ,conscience1 he gives this description3 ',the mind is conscious to itself of all its own actions1 and both can1 and often does1 observe what counsels produced them2 it naturally sits a judge upon its own actions1 and thence procures to itself either tranquillity and joy1 or anxiety and sorrow4' ,the principal design of his whole book is to show 'how this power of the mind1 either by itself1 or excited by external objects1 forms certain universal practical propositions1 which give us a more distinct idea of the happiness of mankind1 and pronounces by what actions of ours1 in all variety of circumstances1 that happiness may most effectually be obtained4' ,conscience is thus only ,reason1 or the knowing faculty in general1 as specially concerned about actions in their effect upon happiness2 it rarely takes the place of the more general term4 #c4 ,he expressly leaves aside the supposition that we have innate ideas of the laws of ,nature whereby conduct is to be guided1 or of the matters that they are conversant about4 ,he has not1 he says1 been so happy as to learn the laws of ,nature by so short a way1 and thinks it ill-advised to build the doctrine of natural religion and morality upon a hypothesis that has been rejected by the generality of philosophers1 as well heathen as ,christian1 and can never be proved against the ,epicureans1 with whom lies his chief controversy4 ,yet he declines to oppose the doctrine of innate ideas1 because it looks with a friendly eye upon piety and morality2 and perhaps it may be the case1 that such ideas are both born with us and afterwards impressed upon us from without4 #d4 ,will1 he defines as 'the consent of the mind with the judgment of the understanding1 concerning things agreeing among themselves4' ,although1 therefore1 he supposes that nothing but ,good and ,evil can determine the will1 and that the will is even necessarily determined to seek the one and flee the other1 he escapes the conclusion that the will is moved only by private good1 by accepting the implication of private with common good as the fixed judgment of the understanding or right reason4 #e4 ,he argues against the resolution of all ,benevolence into self-seeking1 and thus claims for man a principle of disinterested action4 ,but what he is far more concerned to prove is1 that benevolence of all to all accords best with the whole frame of nature1 stands forth with perfect evidence1 upon a rational apprehension of the universe1 as the great ,law of ,nature1 and is the most effectual means of promoting the happiness of individuals1 viz41 through the happiness of all4 ,,iii4--,happiness is given as connected with the most full and constant exercise of all our powers1 about the best and greatest objects and effects that are adequate and proportional to them2 as consisting in the enlargement or perfection of the faculties of any one thing or several4 ,here1 and in his protest against ,hobbes's taking affection and desire1 instead of ,reason1 as the measure of the goodness of things1 may be seen in what way he passes from the conception of ,individual1 to the notion of ,common ,good1 as the end of action4 ,reason affirms the common good to be more essentially connected with the perfection of man than any pursuit of private advantage4 ,still there is no disposition in him to sacrifice private to the common good3 he declares that no man is called on to promote the common good beyond his ability1 and attaches no meaning to the general good beyond the special good of all the particular rational agents in their respective places1 from ,god 7to whom he ventures to ascribe a ,tranquillity1 ,joy1 or ,complacency7 downwards4 ,the happiness of men he considers as ,internal1 arising immediately from the vigorous exercise of the faculties about their proper and noblest objects2 and ,external1 the mediate advantages procurable from ,god and men by a course of benevolent action4 ,,iv4--,his ,moral ,code is arrived at by a somewhat elaborate deduction from the great ,law of ,nature enjoining ,benevolence or ,promotion of the ,common ,good of all rational beings4 ,this ,common ,good comprehends the ,honour of ,god1 and the ,good or ,happiness of ,men1 as ,nations1 ,families1 and ,individuals4 ,the actions that promote this ,common ,good1 are ,acts either of the understanding1 or of the will and affections1 or of the body as determined by the will4 ,from this he finds that ,prudence 7including ,constancy of ,mind and ,moderation7 is enjoined in the ,understanding1 and1 in the ,will1 ,universal ,benevolence 7making1 with ,prudence1 ,equity71 ,government of the ,passions1 and the ,special ,laws of ,nature--,innocence1 ,self-denial1 ,gratitude1 c4 ,this he gets from the consideration of what is contained in the general ,law of ,nature4 ,but the obligation to the various moral virtues does not appear1 until he has shown that the ,law of ,nature1 for procuring the ,common ,happiness of all1 suggests a natural law of ,universal ,justice1 commanding to make and preserve a division of ,rights1 i4e41 giving to particular persons ,property or ,dominion over things and persons necessary to their ,happiness4 ,there are thus ,rights of ,god 7to ,honour1 ,glory1 c47 and ,rights of ,men 7to have those advantages continued to them whereby they may preserve and perfect themselves1 and be useful to all others74 ,for the same reason that ,rights of particular persons are fixed and preserved1 viz41 that the common good of all should be promoted by every one1--two ,obligations are laid upon all4 7#a7 ,of ,,giving3 ,we are to contribute to others such a share of the things committed to our trust1 as may not destroy the part that is necessary to our own happiness4 ,hence are obligatory the virtues 7a7 in regard to ,gifts1 ,liberality1 ,generosity1 ,compassion1 c42 7b7 in regard to ,common ,conversation or ,intercourse1 ,gravity and ,courteousness1 ,veracity1 ,faith1 ,urbanity1 c4 7#b7 ,of ,,receiving3 ,we are to reserve to ourselves such use of our own1 as may be most advantageous to1 or at least consistent with1 the good of others4 ,hence the obligation or the virtues pertaining to the various branches of a limited ,self-,love1 7a7 with regard to our essential parts1 viz41 ,mind and ,body--,temperance in the natural desires concerned in the preservation of the individual and the species2 7b7 with regard to goods of fortune--,modesty1 ,humility1 and ,magnanimity4 ,v4--,he connects ,politics with ,ethics1 by finding1 in the establishment of civil government1 a more effectual means of promoting the common happiness according to the ,law of ,nature1 than in any equal division of things4 ,but the ,law of ,nature1 he declares1 being before the civil laws1 and containing the ground of their obligation1 can never be superseded by these4 ,practically1 however1 the difference between him and ,hobbes comes to very little2 he recognizes no kind of earthly check upon the action of the civil power4 ,,vi4--,with reference to ,religion1 he professes to abstain entirely from theological questions1 and does abstain from mixing up the doctrines of ,revelation4 ,but he attaches a distinctly divine authority to his moral rules1 and supplements earthly by supernatural sanctions4 ,,ralph ,,cudworth4 #afag-hh4 ,cudworth's ,treatise concerning ,eternal and ,immutable ,morality1 did not appear until #agca1 more than forty years after his death4 ,having in a former work 7',intellectual system of the ,universe'7 contended against the ',atheistical ,fate' of ,epicurus and others1 he here attacks the ',theologick ,fate' 7the arbitrarily omnipotent ,deity7 of ,hobbes1 charging him with reviving exploded opinions of ,protagoras and the ancient ,greeks1 that take away the essential and eternal discrimination of moral good and evil1 of just and unjust4 ,after piling up1 out of the store of his classical and scholastic erudition1 a great mass of testimony regarding all who had ever founded distinctions of ,right and ,wrong upon mere arbitrary disposition1 whether of ,god or the ,state of men in general1 he shadows forth his own view4 ,moral ,good and ,evil1 ,just and ,unjust1 ,honest and ,dishonest 7if they be not mere names without any signification1 or names for nothing else but ,willed or ,commanded1 but have a reality in respect of the persons obliged to do and to avoid them71 cannot possibly be arbitrary things1 made by ,will without nature2 because it is universally true that ,things are what they are not by ,will1 but by nature4 ,as it is the nature of a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles1 so it is the nature of 'good things' to have the nature of goodness1 and things just the nature of justice2 and ,omnipotence is no more able to make a thing good without the fixed nature of goodness1 than to make a triangular body without the properties of a triangle1 or two things like or equal1 without the natures of ,likeness and ,equality4 ,the ,will of ,god is the supreme efficient cause of all things1 but not the formal cause of anything besides itself4 ,nor is this to be understood as at all derogating from ,god's perfection2 to make natural justice and right independent of his will is merely to set his ,wisdom1 which is a rule or measure1 above his ,will1 which is something indeterminate1 but essentially regulable and measureable2 and if it be the case that above even his wisdom1 and determining it in turn1 stands his ,infinite ,goodness1 the greatest perfection of his will must lie in its being thus twice determined4 ,by far the largest part of ,cudworth's treatise consists of a general metaphysical argument to establish the independence of the mind's faculty of ,knowledge1 with reference to ,sense and ,experience4 ,in ,sense1 according to the doctrine of the old ',atomical philosophy' 7of ,democritus1 ,protagoras1 c4--but he thinks it must be referred back to ,moses himself671 he sees nothing but fancies excited in us by local motions in the organs1 taken on from 'the motion of particles' that constitute 'the whole world4' ,all the more1 therefore1 must there exist a superior power of ,intellection and ,knowledge of a different nature from sense1 a power not terminating in mere seeming and appearance only1 but in the reality of things1 and reaching to the comprehension of what really and absolutely is2 whose objects are the immutable and eternal essences and natures of things1 and their unchangeable relations to one another4 ,these ,rationes or ,verities of things are intelligible4 only2 are all comprehended in the eternal mind or intellect of the ,deity1 and from ,him derived to our 'particular intellects4' ,they are neither arbitrary nor phantastical--neither alterable by ,will nor changeable by ,opinion4 ,such eternal and immutable ,verities1 then1 the moral distinctions of ,good and ,evil are1 in the pauses of the general argument1 declared to be4 ,they1 'as they must have some certain natures which are the actions or souls of men1' are unalterable by ,will or ,opinion4 ',modifications of ,mind and ,intellect1' they are as much more real and substantial things than ,hard1 ,soft1 ,hot1 and ,cold1 modifications of mere senseless matter--and even so1 on the principles of the atomical philosophy1 dependent on the soul for their existence--as ,mind itself stands prior in the order of nature to ,matter4 ,in the mind they are as 'anticipations of morality' springing up1 not indeed 'from certain rules or propositions arbitrarily printed on the soul as on a book1' but from some more inward and vital ,principle in intellectual beings1 as such whereby these have within themselves a natural determination to do some things and to avoid others4 ,the only other ethical determinations made by ,cudworth may thus be summarized3--,things called naturally ,good and ,due are such as the intellectual nature obliges to immediately1 absolutely1 and perpetually1 and upon no condition of any voluntary action done or omitted intervening2 things positively ,good and ,due are such as are in themselves indifferent1 but the intellectual nature obliges to them accidentally or hypothetically1 upon condition1 in the case of a command1 of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful authority1 or of one's self1 in the case of a specific promise4 ,in a positive command 7as of the civil ruler71 what obliges is only the intellectual nature of him that is commanded1 in that he recognizes the lawful authority of him that commands1 and so far determines and modifies his general duty of obedience as to do an action immaterial in itself for the sake of the formality of yielding obedience to lawfully constituted authority4 ,so1 in like manner1 a specific promise1 in itself immaterial and not enjoined by natural justice1 is to be kept for the sake of the formality of keeping faith1 which is enjoined4 ,cudworth's work1 in which these are nearly all the ethical allusions1 gives no scope for a summary under the various topics4 ,i4--,specially excluding any such ,external ,standard of moral ,good as the arbitrary ,will1 either of ,god or the ,sovereign1 he views it as a simple ultimate natural quality of actions or dispositions1 as included among the verities of things1 by the side of which the phenomena of ,sense are unreal4 ,,ii4--,the general ,intellectual ,faculty cognizes the moral verities1 which it contains within itself and brings rather than finds4 ,,iii4--,he does not touch upon ,happiness2 probably he would lean to asceticism4 ,he sets up no moral code4 ,,iv4--,obligation to the ,positive ,civil ,laws in matters indifferent follows from the intellectual recognition of the established relation between ruler and subject4 ,v4--,morality is not dependent upon the ,deity in any other sense than the whole frame of things is4 ,,samuel ,,clarke4 #afge-agbi4 ,clarke put together his two series of ,boyle ,lectures 7preached #agjd and #agje7 as ',a ,discourse1 concerning the ,being and ,attributes of ,god1 the ,obligations of ,natural ,religion and the ,truth and ,certainty of the ,christian ,revelation1' in answer to ,hobbes1 ,spinoza1 c4 ,the burden of the ethical discussion falls under the head of the ,obligations of ,natural ,religion1 in the second series4 ,he enounces this all-comprehensive proposition3 ',the same necessary and eternal different ,relations that different ,things bear one to another1 and the same consequent ,fitness or ,unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another1 with regard to which the will of ,god always and necessarily does determine itself to choose to act only what is agreeable to ,justice1 ,equity1 ,goodness1 and ,truth1 in order to the welfare of the whole universe--ought likewise constantly to determine the ,wills of all subordinate rational beings1 to govern all their actions by the same rules1 for the good of the public1 in their respective stations4 ,that is1 these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act2 they cause it to be their duty1 or lay an obligation on them so to do2 even separate from the consideration of these ,rules being the positive ,will or ,command of ,god1 and also antecedent to any respect or regard1 expectation or apprehension of any particular private and personal ,advantage or ,disadvantage1 ,reward or ,punishment1 either present or future1 annexed either by natural consequence1 or by positive appointment1 to the practising or neglecting of these rules4 ,in the explication of this1 nearly his whole system is contained4 ,his first concern is to impress the fact that there are necessary and eternal differences of ail things1 and implied or consequent relations 7proportions or disproportions7 existing amongst them2 and to bring under this general head the special case of differences of ,persons 7e4g41 ,god and ,man1 ,man and ,fellow-man71 for the sake of the implication that to different persons there belong peculiar ,fitnesses and ,unfitnesses of circumstances2 or1 which is the same thing1 that there arises necessarily amongst them a suitableness or unsuitableness of certain manners of ,behaviour4 ,the counter-proposition that he contends against is1 that the relations among persons depend upon positive constitution of some kind1 instead of being founded unchangeably in the nature and reason of things4 ,next he shows how1 in the rational or intellectual recognition of naturally existent relations amongst things 7he always means persons chiefly71 there is contained an obligation4 ,when ,god1 in his ,omniscience and absolute freedom from error1 is found determining his ,will always according to this eternal reason of things1 it is very unreasonable and blameworthy in the intelligent creatures whom he has made so far like himself1 not to govern their actions by the same eternal rule of ,reason1 but to suffer themselves to depart from it through negligent misunderstanding or wilful passion4 ,herein lies obligation3 a man ought to act according to the ,law of ,reason1 because he can as little refrain from assenting to the reasonableness and fitness of guiding his actions by it1 as refuse his assent to a geometrical demonstration when he understands the terms4 ,the original obligation of all is the eternal ,reason of ,things2 the sanction of ,rewards and ,punishments 7though 'truly the most effectual means of keeping creatures in their duty'7 is only a secondary and additional obligation4 ,proof of his position he finds in men's judgment of their own actions1 better still in their judgments of others' actions1 best of all in their judgment of injuries inflicted on themselves4 ,nor does any objection hold from the ignorance of savages in matters of morality3 they are equally ignorant of the plainest mathematical truths2 the need of instruction does not take away the necessary difference of moral ,good and ,evil1 any more than it takes away the necessary proportions of numbers4 ,he1 then1 instead of deducing all our several duties as he might1 contents himself with mentioning the three great branches of them1 7a7 ,duties in respect of ,god1 consisting of sentiments and acts 7,veneration1 ,love1 ,worship1 c47 called forth by the consideration of his attributes1 and having a character of ,fitness far beyond any that is visible in applying equal geometrical figures to one another1 7b7 ,duties in respect of our ,fellow-creatures3 7#a7 ,justice and ,equity1 the doing as we would be done by4 ,iniquity is the very same in ,action1 as ,falsity or ,contradiction in ,theory2 what makes the one absurd makes the other unreasonable2 'it would be impossible for men not to be as much 767 ashamed of doing ,iniquity1 as they are of believing ,contradictions2' 7#b7 ,universal ,love or ,benevolence1 the promoting the welfare or happiness of all1 which is obligatory on various grounds3 the ,good being the fit and reasonable1 the greatest ,good is the most fit and reasonable2 by this ,god's action is determined1 and so ought ours2 no ,duty affords a more ample pleasure2 besides having a 'certain natural affection' for those most closely connected with us1 we desire to multiply affinities1 which means to found society1 for the sake of the more comfortable life that mutual good offices bring4 ,this is a very confused deduction of an obligation4' 7c7 ,duties in respect to our ,selves1 viz41 self-preservation1 temperance1 contentment1 c42 for not being authors of our being1 we have no just power or authority to take it away directly1 or1 by abuse of our faculties1 indirectly4 ,after expatiating in a rhetorical strain on the eternal1 universal1 and absolutely unchangeable character of the law of ,nature or ,right ,reason1 he specifies the sense wherein the eternal moral obligations are independent of the will of ,god himself2 it comes to this1 that1 although ,god makes all things and the relations between them1 nothing is holy and good because he commands it1 but he commands it because it is holy and good4 ,finally1 he expounds the relation of ,reward and ,punishment to the law of ,nature2 the obligation of it is before and distinct from these2 but1 while full of admiration for the ,stoical idea of the self-sufficiency of virtue1 he is constrained to add that 'men never will generally1 and indeed 'tis not very reasonably to be expected they should1 part with all the comforts of life1 and even life itself1 without any expectation of a future recompense4' ,the 'manifold absurdities' of ,hobbes being first exposed1 he accordingly returns1 in pursuance of the theological argument of his ,lectures1 to show that the eternal moral obligations1 founded on the natural differences of things1 are at the same time the express will and command of ,god to all rational creatures1 and must necessarily and certainly be attended with ,rewards and ,punishments in a future state4 ,the summary of ,clarke's views might stand thus3-- ,i4--,the ,,standard is a certain ,fitness of action between persons1 implicated in their nature as much as any fixed proportions between numbers or other relation among things4 ,except in such an expression as this1 moral good admits of no kind of external reference4 ,,ii4--,there is very little ,psychology involved4 ,the ,faculty is the ,reason2 its action a case of mere intellectual apprehension4 ,the element of ,feeling is nearly excluded4 ,disinterested sentiment is so minor a point as to call forth only the passing allusion to 'a certain natural affection4' ,,iii4--,happiness is not considered except in a vague reference to good public and private as involved with ,fit and ,unfit action4 ,,iv4--,his account of ,duties is remarkable only for the consistency of his attempt to find parallels for each amongst intellectual relations4 ,the climax intended in the assimilation of ,injustice to ,contradictions is a very anti-climax2 if people were only 'as much' ashamed of doing injustice as of believing contradictions1 the moral order of the world would be poorly provided for4 ,v4--,the relation of ,ethics to ,politics is hardly touched4 ,society is born of the desire to multiply affinities through mutual interchange of good offices4 ,,vi4--,his ,ethical disquisition is only part of a ,theological argument2 and this helps to explain his assertion of the ,independence as well as of the ,insufficiency of ,morality4 ,the final outcome of the discussion is that ,morality needs the support of ,revelation4 ,but1 to get from this an argument for the truth of ,revelation1 it is necessary that morality should have an independent foundation in the nature of things1 apart from any direct divine appointment4 ,,william ,,wollaston 7#afei-agbd71 author of the ',religion of ,nature ,delineated1' is usually put into the same class of moralists with ,clarke4 ,with him1 a bad action 7whether of commission or omission7 contains the denial of a true proposition4 ,truth can be denied by actions as well as by words4 ,thus1 the violation of a contract is the denial by an action that the contract has been concluded4 ,robbing a traveller is the denial that what you take from him is his4 ,an action that denies one or more true propositions cannot be good1 and is necessarily bad4 ,a good action is one whose omission would be bad or whose contrary is bad1 in the above sense4 ,an indifferent action is one that can be omitted or done without contradicting any truth4 ,reason1 the judge of what is true and false1 is the only faculty concerned2 but1 at the same time1 ,wollaston makes large reference to the subject of ,happiness1 finding it to consist in an excess of pleasures as compared with pains4 ,he holds that his doctrine is in conformity with all the facts4 ,it affirms a progressive morality1 that keeps pace with and depend upon the progress of ,science4 ,it can explain errors in morals as distinct from vice4 ,an error is the affirmation by an action of a false proposition1 thought to be true2 the action is bad1 but the agent is innocent4 ,,john ,,locke4 #afcb-agjd4 ,locke did not apply himself to the consecutive evolution of an ,ethical theory2 whence his views1 although on the whole sufficiently unmistakeable1 are not always reconcileable with one another4 ,in ,book ,i4 of the ',essay on the ,understanding' he devotes himself to the refutation of ,innate ,ideas1 whether ,speculative or ,practical4 ,chap4 ,,iii4 is on the alleged ,innate ,practical ,principles1 or rules of ,right and ,wrong4 ,the objections urged against these ,principles have scarcely been added to1 and have never been answered4 ,we shall endeavour to indicate the heads of the reasoning4 #a4 ,the ,innate ,practical ,principles are for the most part not self-evident2 they are1 in this respect1 not on an equal footing with the ,speculative ,principles whose innate origin is also disputed4 ,they require reasoning and explanation in order to be understood4 ,many men are ignorant of them1 while others assent to them slowly1 if they do assent to them2 all which is at variance with their being innate4 #b4 ,there is no ,practical ,principle universally received among mankind4 ,all that can be said of ,justice is that most men agree to recognize it4 ,it is vain to allege of confederacies of thieves1 that they keep faith with one another2 for this keeping of faith is merely for their own convenience4 ,we cannot call that a sense of ,justice which merely binds a man to a certain number of his fellow-criminals1 in order the more effectually to plunder and kill honest men4 ,instead of ,justice1 it is the essential condition of success in ,injustice4 ,if it be said in reply1 that these men tacitly assent in their minds to what their practice contradicts1 ,locke answers1 first1 that men's actions must be held as the best interpreters of their thoughts2 and if many men's practices1 and some men's open professions1 have been opposed to these principles1 we cannot conclude them to be ,innate4 ,secondly1 ,it is difficult for us to assent to ,innate ,practical ,principles1 ending only in contemplation4 ,such principles either influence our conduct1 or they are nothing4 ,there is no mistake as to the ,innate principles of the desire of happiness1 and aversion to misery2 these do not stop short in tacit assent1 but urge every man's conduct every hour of his life4 ,if there were anything corresponding to these in the sense of ,right and ,wrong1 we should have no dispute about them4 #c4 ,there is no ,moral rule1 that may not have a reason demanded for it2 which ought not to be the case with any innate principle4 ,that we should do as we would be done by1 is the foundation of all morality1 and yet1 if proposed to any one for the first time1 might not such an one1 without absurdity1 ask a reason why8 ,but this would imply that there is some deeper principle for it to repose upon1 capable of being assigned as its motive2 that it is not ultimate1 and therefore not innate4 ,that men should observe compacts is a great and undeniable rule1 yet1 in this1 a ,christian would give as reason the command of ,god2 a ,hobbist would say that the public requires it1 and would punish for disobeying it2 and an old heathen philosopher would have urged that it was opposed to human virtue and perfection4 ,bound up with this consideration1 is the circumstance that moral rules differ among men1 according to their views of happiness4 ,the existence of ,god1 and our obedience to him1 are manifest in many ways1 and are the true ground of morality1 seeing that only ,god can call to account every offender2 yet1 from the union of virtue and public happiness1 all men have recommended the practice of what is for their own obvious advantage4 ,there is quite enough in this self-interest to cause moral rules to be enforced by men that care neither for the supreme ,lawgiver1 nor for the ,hell ordained by him to punish transgressors4 ,after all1 these great principles of morality are more commended than practised4 ,as to ,conscience checking us in these breaches1 making them fewer than they would otherwise be1 men may arrive at such a conscience1 or self-restraining sentiment1 in other ways than by an innate endowment4 ,some men may come to assent to moral rules from a knowledge of their value as means to ends4 ,others may take up the same view as a part of their education4 ,however the persuasion is come by1 it will serve as a conscience2 which conscience is nothing else than our own opinion of the rectitude or pravity of our actions4 ,how could men with serenity and confidence transgress rules stamped upon their inmost soul8 ,look at the practices of nations civilized and uncivilized2 at the robberies1 murders1 rapes of an army sacking a town2 at the legalized usages of nations1 the destruction of infants and of aged parents for personal convenience2 cannibalism2 the most monstrous forms of unchastity2 the fashionable murder named ,duelling4 ,where are the innate principles of ,justice1 ,piety1 ,gratitude1 ,equity1 ,chastity8 ,if we read ,history1 and cast our glance over the world1 we shall scarcely find any rule of ,morality 7excepting such as are necessary to hold society together1 and these too with great limitations7 but what is somewhere or other set aside1 and an opposite established1 by whole societies of men4 ,men may break a law without disowning it2 but it is inconceivable that a whole nation should publicly reject and renounce what every one of them1 certainly and infallibly1 knows to be a law4 ,whatever practical principle is innate1 must be known to every one to be just and good4 ,the generally allowed breach of any rule anywhere must be held to prove that it is not innate4 ,if there be any rule having a fair claim to be imprinted by nature1 it is the rule that ,parents should preserve and cherish their children4 ,if such a principle be innate1 it must be found regulating practice everywhere2 or1 at the lowest1 it must be known and assented to4 ,but it is very far from having been uniformly practised1 even among enlightened nations4 ,and as to its being an innate truth1 known to all men1 that also is untrue4 ,indeed1 the terms of it are not intelligible without other knowledge4 ,the statement1 'it is the duty of parents to preserve their children1' cannot be understood without a ,law2 a ,law requires a ,lawmaker1 and ,reward or ,punishment4 ,and as punishment does not always follow in this life1 nothing less than a recognition of ,divine ,law will suffice2 in other words1 there must be intuitions of ,god1 ,law1 ,obligation1 ,punishment1 and a ,future ,life3 every one of which may be1 and is1 deemed to be innate4 ,it is incredible that men1 if all these things were stamped on their minds1 could deliberately offend against them2 still more1 that rulers should silently connive at such transgressions4 #d4 ,the supporters of innate principles are unable to point out distinctly what they are4#ah ,yet1 if these were imprinted on the mind1 there could be no more doubt about them than about the number of our fingers4 ,we well know that1 if men of different sects were to write out their respective lists1 they would set down exactly such as suited their several schools or churches4 ,there is1 ,locke remarks1 a ready1 but not very material1 answer to his objections1 namely1 that the innate principles may1 by ,education and ,custom1 be darkened and worn out of men's minds4 ,but this takes away at once the argument from universal consent1 and leaves nothing but what each party thinks should pass for universal consent1 namely1 their own private persuasion3 a method whereby a set of men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason1 put aside the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind4 ,thus1 notwithstanding the innate light1 we are as much in the dark as if it did not exist2 a rule that will warp any way is not to be distinguished amidst its contraries4 ,if these rules are so liable to vary1 through adventitious notions1 we should find them clearest in children and in persons wholly illiterate4 ,he grants that there are many opinions1 received by men of different countries1 educations1 and tempers1 and held as unquestionable first principles2 but then the absurdity of some1 and the mutual contradiction of others1 make it impossible that they should be all true4 ,yet it will often happen that these men will sooner part with their lives1 than suffer the truth of their opinions to be questioned4 ,we can see from our experience how the belief in principles grows up4 ,doctrines1 with no better original than the superstition of a nurse1 or the authority of an old woman1 may in course of time1 and by the concurrence of neighbours1 grow up to the dignity of first truths in ,religion and in ,morality4 ,persons matured under those influences1 and1 looking into their own minds1 find nothing anterior to the opinions taught them before they kept a record of themselves2 they1 therefore1 without scruple1 conclude that those propositions whose origin they cannot trace are the impress of ,god and nature upon their minds4 ,such a result is unavoidable in the circumstances of the bulk of mankind1 who require some foundation of principles to rest upon1 and have no means of obtaining them but on trust from others4 ,custom is it greater power than ,nature1 and1 while we are yet young1 seldom fails to make us worship as divine what she has inured us to2 nor is it to be wondered at1 that1 when we come to mature life1 and are engrossed with quite different matters1 we are indisposed to sit down and examine all our received tenets1 to find ourselves in the wrong1 to run counter to the opinions of our country or party1 and to be branded with such epithets as whimsical1 sceptical1 ,atheist4 ,it is inevitable that we should take up at first borrowed principles2 and unless we have all the faculties and the means of searching into their foundations1 we naturally go on to the end as we have begun4 ,in the following chapter 7,,iv471 he argues the general question of ,innate ,ideas in the case of the ,idea of ,god4 ,in ,book ,,ii41 ,chap4 ,,xxi41 ,locke discusses the freedom of the will1 with some allusions to the nature of happiness and the causes of wrong conduct4 ,happiness is the utmost pleasure we are capable of1 misery the utmost pain2 pleasure and pain define ,good and ,evil4 ,in practice1 we are chiefly occupied in getting rid of troubles2 absent good does not much move us4 ,all uneasiness being removed1 a moderate portion of good contents us2 and some few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments are enough to make happiness4 ,epicurus1 and others among the ancients1 said as much4 ,men have wrong desires1 and do wrong acts1 but it is from wrong judgments4 ,they never mistake a present pleasure or pain2 they always act correctly upon that4 ,they are the victims of deceitful appearances2 they make wrong judgments in comparing present with future pains1 such is the weakness of the mind's constitution in this department4 ,our wrong judgments proceed partly from ignorance and partly from inadvertence1 and our preference of vice to virtue is accounted for by these wrong judgments4 ,chap4 ,,xxviii4 discusses ,moral ,relations4 ,good and ,evil are nothing but ,pleasure and ,pain1 and what causes them4 ,moral ,good or ,evil is the conformity or unconformity of our voluntary actions to some ,law1 entailing upon us good or evil by the will and power of the ,law-giver1 to which good and evil we apply the names ,reward and ,punishment4 ,there are three sorts of ,moral ,rules3 #ast1 ,the ,divine ,law1 whether promulgated by the ,light of ,nature or by ,revelation1 and enforced by rewards and punishments in a future life4 ,this law1 when ascertained1 is the touchstone of moral rectitude4 #bnd1 ,the ,civil ,law1 or the ,law of the ,state1 supported by the penalties of the civil judge4 #crd1 ,the ,law of ,opinion or ,reputation4 ,even after resigning1 to public authority1 the disposal of the public force1 men still retain the power of privately approving or disapproving actions1 according to their views of virtue and vice4 ,the being commended or dispraised by our fellows may thus be called the sanction of ,reputation1 a power often surpassing in efficacy both the other sanctions4 ,morality is the reference of all actions to one or other of these three ,laws4 ,instead of applying innate notions of good and evil1 the mind1 having been taught the several rules enjoined by these authorities1 compares any given action with these rules1 and pronounces accordingly4 ,a rule is an aggregate of simple ,ideas2 so is an action2 and the conformity required is the ordering of the action so that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those required by the law4 ,thus1 all ,moral ,notions may be reduced to the simple ideas gained by the two leading sources--,sensation and ,reflection4 ,murder is an aggregate of simple ideas1 traceable in the detail to these sources4 ,the summary of ,locke's views is as follows3-- ,i4--,with reference to the ,standard of ,morality1 we have these two great positions-- ,first1 ,that the production of pleasure and pain to sentient beings is the ultimate foundation of moral good and evil4 ,secondly1 ,that morality is a system of ,law1 enacted by one or other of three different authorities4 ,,ii4--,in the ,psychology of ,ethics1 ,locke1 by implication1 holds-- ,first1 ,that there is no innate moral sentiment2 that our moral ideas are the generalities of moral actions4 ,that our faculties of moral discernment are--7#a7 those that discern the pleasures and pains of mankind2 and 7#b71 those that comprehend and interpret the laws of ,god1 the ,nation1 and ,public ,opinion4 ,and 7#c7 he counts that the largest share in the formation of our ,moral ,sentiments is due to ,education and ,custom4 ,we have seen his views on ,free-will1 p4 #dac4 ,as regards the nature of ,disinterested ,action1 he pronounces no definite opinion4 ,he makes few attempts to analyze the emotional and active part of our nature4 ,,iii4--,his ,summum ,bonum is stated generally as the procuring of ,pleasure and the avoiding of ,pain4 ,,iv4--,he has no peculiar views on the ,moral ,code1 or on the enforcements of ,morality4 ,v4--,the connexion of ,ethics with ,politics is1 in him1 the assimilating of ,morality to ,law4 ,,vi4--,with reference to ,theology1 he considers that1 by the exercise of the ,reason1 we may discover the existence and attributes of ,god1 and our duties to him2 his ascertained will is the highest moral rule1 the true touchstone of ,moral ,rectitude4 ,,joseph ,,butler4 #afib-ageb4 ,butler's ,ethical ,system may be found--,first1 in a short ,dissertation on ,virtue1 appended to the ,analogy2 secondly1 and chiefly1 in his first three ,sermons1 entitled ',human ,nature2' thirdly1 in other ,sermons1 as 7,v47 on ,compassion1 and 7,,xl7 on ,benevolence4 ,various illustrations of ,ethical doctrine are interspersed through the ,analogy1 as in ,part ,i41 ,chap4 #b1 entitled 'the government of ,god by rewards and punishments4' ,the ,dissertation on ,virtue is intended to vindicate1 in man1 the existence of a moral nature1 apart from both ,prudence and ,benevolence4 ,a moral government supposes a moral nature in man1 or a power of distinguishing right from wrong4 ,all men and all systems agree as to the fact of moral perceptions4 ,as characteristics of these moral perceptions1 it is to be noted--,first1 they refer to voluntary actions4 ,secondly1 they are accompanied with the feelings of good or of ill desert1 which good or ill desert is irrespective of the good of society4 ,thirdly1 the perception of ill desert has regard to the capacities of the agent4 ,fourthly1 ,prudence1 or regard to ourselves1 is a fair subject of moral approbation1 and imprudence of the contrary4 ,our own self-interest seems to require strengthening by other men's manifested pleasure and displeasure4 ,still1 this position is by no means indisputable1 and the author is willing to give up the words 'virtue' and 'vice1' as applicable to prudence and folly2 and to contend merely that our moral faculty is not indifferent to this class of actions4 ,fifthly1 ,virtue is not wholly resolvable into ,benevolence 7that is1 the general good1 or ,utility#ai74 ,this is shown by the fact that our approbation is not in proportion to the amount of happiness flowing from an action he means immediately flowing1 which does not decide the question4 ,we disapprove of falsehood1 injustice1 and unprovoked violence1 even although more happiness would result from them than from the contrary4 ,moreover1 we are not always judges of the whole consequences of acting4 ,undoubtedly1 however1 benevolence is our duty1 if there be no moral principle to oppose it4 ,the title ',human ,nature1' given to ,butler's chief ,ethical exposition1 indicates that he does not take an a priori view of the foundations of ,ethics1 like ,cudworth and ,clarke1 but makes them repose on the constitution of the human mind4 ,in ,sermon first1 he lays out the different parts of our ,emotional and ,active nature1 including ,benevolence1 ,self-love1 ,conscience4 ,the recognition of these three as distinct1 and mutually irresolvable1 is the ,psychological basis of his ,ethics4#bj ,the existence of pure or disinterested ,benevolence is proved by such facts1 as ,friendship1 ,compassion1 ,parental and ,filial affections1 ,benevolent impulses to mankind generally4 ,but although the object of benevolence is the public good1 and of self-love private good1 yet the two ultimately coincide4 ,this questionable assertion must trammel any proof that the author can give of our possessing purely disinterested impulses4 ,in a long note1 he impugns the theory of ,hobbes that ,benevolent affection and its pleasures are merely a form of the love of ,power4 ,he maintains1 and with reason1 that the love of power manifests its consequences quite as much in cruelty as in benevolence4 ,the second argument1 to show that ,benevolence is a fact of our constitution1 involves the greatest peculiarity of ,butler's ,psychology1 although he was not the first to announce it4 ,the scheme of the human feelings comprehends1 in addition to ,benevolence and ,self-,love1 a number of passions and affections tending to the same ends as these 7some to the good of our fellows1 others to our own good72 while in following them we are not conscious of seeking those ends1 but some different ends4 ,such are our various ,appetites and ,passions4 ,thus1 hunger promotes our private well-being1 but in obeying its dictates we are not thinking of that object1 but of the procuring of food4 ,curiosity promotes both public and private good1 but its direct and immediate object is knowledge4 ,this refined distinction appears first in ,aquinas2 there is in it a palpable confusion of ideas4 ,if we regard the final impulse of hunger1 it is not toward the food1 but towards the appeasing of a pain and the gaining of a pleasure1 which are certainly identical with self1 being the definition of self in the last resort4 ,we associate the food with the gratification of these demands1 and hence food becomes an end to us--one of the associated or intermediate ends4 ,so the desire of knowledge is the desire of the pleasure1 or of the relief from pain1 accruing from knowledge2 while1 as in the case of food1 knowledge is to a great degree only an instrument1 and therefore an intermediate and associated end4 ,so the desire of esteem is the desire of a pleasure1 or else of the instrument of pleasure4 ,in short1 ,butler tries1 without effect1 to evade the general principles of the will--our being moved exclusively by pleasure and pain4 ,abundant reference has been already made to the circumstances that modify in appearance1 or in reality1 the operation of this principle4 ,the distinction between self-love and the particular appetites1 passions1 and affections1 is mainly the distinction between a great aggregate of the reason 7the total interests of our being7 and the separate items that make it up4 ,the distinction is intended to prepare the way for the setting forth of ,conscience1#ba which is called a 'principle of reflection in men1 whereby they distinguish between1 approve and disapprove1 their own actions4' ,this principle has for its result the good of society2 still1 in following it1 we are not conscious of aiming at the good of society4 ,a father has an affection for his children2 this is one thing4 ,he has also a principle of reflection1 that urges him with added force and with more steady persistency than any affection1 which principle must therefore be different from mere affection4 ,butler's analysis of the human feelings is thus3 ,i4--,benevolence and ,self-love4 ,,ii4--,the particular ,appetites1 ,passions1 and ,affections1 operating in the same direction as ,benevolence and ,self-love1 but without intending it4 ,,iii4--,conscience1 of which the same is to be said4 ,his reply to the objection1--against our being made for ,benevolence1--founded on our mischievous propensities1 is1 that in the same way there are tendencies mischievous to ourselves1 and yet no one denies us the possession of self-love4 ,he remarks farther that these evil tendencies are the abuse of such as are right2 ungovernable passion1 reckless pursuit of our own good1 and not pure malevolence1 are the causes of injustice and the other vices4 ,in short1 we are made for pursuing both our own good and the good of others2 but present gratifications and passing inclinations interfere alike with both objects4 ,sermons ,,ii41 ,,iii41 are meant to establish1 from our moral nature1 the ,supremacy of ,conscience4 ,our moral duties may be deduced from the scheme of our nature1 which shows the design of the ,deity4 ,there may be some difficulties attending the deduction1 owing to the want of uniformity in the human constitution4 ,still1 the broad feelings of the mind1 and the purpose of them1 can no more be mistaken than the existence and the purpose of the eyes4 ,it can be made quite apparent that the single principle called conscience is intended to rule all the rest4 ,but1 as ,conscience is only one part of our nature1 there being two other parts1 namely1 7#a7 ,benevolence and ,self-love1 and 7#b7 the particular ,appetites and ,passions1 why are they not all equally natural1 and all equally to be followed8 ,this leads to an inquiry into the meanings of the word ,nature4 ,first1 ,nature may mean any prompting whatever2 anger and affection are equally natural1 as being equally part of us4 ,secondly1 it may mean our strongest passion1 what most frequently prevails with us and shows our individual characters4 ,in this sense1 vice may be natural4 ,but1 thirdly1 we may reclaim against those two meanings1 and that on the authority both of the ,apostle ,paul and of the ancient sages1 and declare that the proper meaning of following nature is following ,conscience1 or that superior principle in every man which bears testimony to its own supremacy4 ,it is by this faculty1 natural to a man1 that he is a moral agent1 a law to himself4 ,men may act according to their strongest principle1 and yet violate their nature1 as when a man1 urged by present gratification1 incurs certain ruin4 ,the violation of nature1 in this instance1 may be expressed as disproportion4 ,there is thus a difference in kind between passions2 self-love is superior to temporary appetite4 ,passion or ,appetite means a tendency towards certain objects with no regard to any other objects4 ,reflection or ,conscience steps in to protect the interests that these would lead us to sacrifice4 ,surely1 therefore1 this would be enough to constitute superiority4 ,any other passion taking the lead is a case of usurpation4 ,we can hardly form a notion of ,conscience without this idea of superiority4 ,had it might1 as it has right1 it would govern the world4 ,were there no such supremacy1 all actions would be on an equal footing4 ,impiety1 profaneness1 and blasphemy would be as suitable as reverence2 parricide would justify itself by the right of the strongest4 ,hence human nature is made up of a number of propensities in union with this ruling principle2 and as1 in civil government1 the constitution is infringed by strength prevailing over authority1 so the nature of man is violated when the lower faculties triumph over conscience4 ,man has a rule of right within1 if he will honestly attend to it4 ,out of this arrangement1 also1 springs ,obligation2 the law of conscience is the law of our nature4 ,it carries its authority with it2 it is the guide assigned by the ,author of our nature4 ,he then replies to the question1 ',why should we be concerned about anything out of or beyond ourselves8' ,supposing we do possess in our nature a regard to the well-being of others1 why may we not set that aside as being in our way to our own good4 ,the answer is1 ,we cannot obtain our own good without having regard to others1 and undergoing the restraints prescribed by morality4 ,there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and our interest4 ,self-love1 in the present world1 coincides with virtue4 ,if there are any exceptions1 all will be set right in the final distribution of things4 ,conscience and self-love1 if we understand our true happiness1 always lead us the same way4 ,such is a brief outline of the celebrated ',three ,sermons on ,human ,nature4' ,the radical defect of the whole scheme lies in its ,psychological basis4 ,because we have1 as mature human beings1 in civilized society1 a principle of action called ,conscience1 which we recognize as distinct from ,self-love and ,benevolence1 as well as from the ,appetites and ,passions1 ,butler would make us believe that this is1 from the first1 a distinct principle of our nature4 ,the proper reply is to analyze ,conscience2 showing at the same time1 from its very great discrepancies in different minds1 that it is a growth1 or product1 corresponding to the education and the circumstances of each1 although of course involving the common elements of the mind4 ,in his ,sermons on ,compassion 7,v41 ,,vi471 he treats this as one of the ,affections in his second group of the ,feelings 7,appetites1 ,passions1 and ,affections72 vindicates its existence against ,hobbes1 who treated it as an indirect mode of self-regard2 and shows its importance in human life1 as an adjunct to ,rational ,benevolence and ,conscience4 ,in discussing ,benevolence 7,sermon ,,xii47 ,butler's object is to show that it is not ultimately at variance with ,self-love4 ,in the introductory observations1 he adverts to the historical fact1 that vice and folly take different turns in different ages1 and that the peculiarity of his own age is 'to profess a contracted spirit1 and greater regards to self-interest' than formerly4 ,he accommodates his preaching of virtue to this characteristic of his time1 and promises that there shall be all possible concessions made to the favourite passion4 ,his mode of arguing is still the same as in the sermons on ,human ,nature4 ,self-love does not comprehend our whole being2 it is only one principle among many4 ,it is characterized by a subjective end1 the feeling of happiness2 but we have other ends of the objective kind1 the ends of our appetites1 passions1 and affections--food1 injury to another1 good to another1 c4 ,the total happiness of our being includes all our ends4 ,self-love attends only to one interest1 and if we are too engrossed with that1 we may sacrifice other interests1 and narrow the sphere of our happiness4 ,a certain disengagement of mind is necessary to enjoyment1 and the intensity of pursuit interferes with this4 ,this is a true remark1 but misapplied2 external pursuit may be so intense as nearly to do away with subjective consciousness1 and therefore with pleasure2 but this applies more to objective ends1--wealth1 the interest of others--than to self-love1 which is in its nature subjective4 ,now1 what applies to the ,appetites and ,affections applies to ,benevolence2 it is a distinct motive or urgency1 and should have its scope like every other propensity1 in order to happiness4 ,such is his reasoning1 grounded on his peculiar ,psychology4 ,he then adduces the ordinary arguments to show1 that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself1 and fraught with pleasure in its consequences4 ,in summary1 ,butler's views stand thus3-- ,i4--,his ,standard of ,right and ,wrong is the subjective ,faculty1 called by him ,reflection1 or ,conscience4 ,he assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings1 in regard to this ,faculty1 as to settle all questions that arise4 ,,ii4--,his ,psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out2 ,conscience being one division1 and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution4 ,he has no ,psychology of the ,will2 nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of ,liberty and ,necessity4 ,he maintains the existence of ,disinterested ,benevolence1 by saying that ,disinterested action1 as opposed to direct self-regard1 is a much wider fact of our mental system1 than the regard to the welfare of others4 ,we have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity1 and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being4 ,,iii4--,with regard to the ,summum ,bonum1 or the theory of ,happiness1 he holds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self2 but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well1 all under the guidance of conscience4 ,in short1 virtue is happiness1 even in this world2 and1 if there be any exception to the rule1 it will be rectified in another world4 ,this is in fact the ,platonic view4 ,men are not to pursue happiness2 that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love1 and would be a failure2 they are to pursue virtue1 including the good of others1 and the greatest happiness will ensue to each4 ,it is a remarkable indication of the spirit of ,butler's age1 or of his estimate of it1 that he would never venture to require of any one a single act of uncompensated self-sacrifice4 ,,iv4--,the substance of the ,moral ,code of ,butler is in no respect peculiar to him4 ,he gives no classification of our duties4 ,his means and inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon4 ,v4--,the relationship of ,ethics to ,politics and to ,theology needs no remark4 ,,francis ,,hutcheson4 #afid-agdg4 ,hutcheson's views are to be found in his ',inquiry into the ,ideas of ,beauty and ,virtue1' his ',treatise on the ,passions1' and his posthumous work1 ',a ,system of ,moral ,philosophy4' ,the last-mentioned1 as the completest exposition of his ,ethics1 ,speculative and ,practical1 is followed here4 ,there are three books2 the first treating of ,human ,nature and ,happiness2 the second1 of ,laws of ,nature and ,duties1 previous to ,civil ,government and other adventitious states2 the third1 of ,civil ,polity4 ,in ,book ,i41 ,chap4 ,i41 ,hutcheson states that the aim of ,moral ,philosophy is to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest happiness and perfection of men1 by the light of human nature and to the exclusion of revelation2 thus to indicate the rules of conduct that make up the ,law of ,nature4 ,happiness1 the end of this art1 being the state of the mind arising from its several grateful perceptions or modifications1 the natural course of the inquiry is to consider the various human powers1 perceptions1 and actions1 and then to compare them so as to find what really constitutes happiness1 and how it may be attained4 ,the principles that first display themselves in childhood are the external senses1 with some small powers of spontaneous motion1 introducing to the mind perceptions of pleasure and pain1 which becoming forthwith the object of desire and aversion1 are our first notions of natural good and evil4 ,next to ,ideas of ,sensation1 we acquire ,concomitant ideas of ,sensation from two or more senses together--number1 extension1 c4 ,ideas of consciousness or reflection1 which is another natural power of perception1 complete the list of the materials of knowledge2 to which1 when the powers of judging and reasoning are added1 all the main acts of the understanding are given4 ,there are still1 however1 some finer perceptions1 that may be left over until the will is disposed of4 ,under the head of ,will1 he notes first the facts of ,desire and ,aversion1 being new motions of the soul1 distinct from1 though arising out of1 sensations1 perceptions1 and judgments4 ,to these it is common to add ,joy and ,sorrow1 arising in connexion with desire1 though they partake more of sensations than of volitions4 ,acts of the will are selfish or benevolent1 according as one's own good1 or 7as often really in fact happens7 the good of others is pursued4 ,two calm natural determinations of the will are to be conceded2 the one an invariable constant impulse towards one's own highest perfection and happiness2 the other towards the universal happiness of others1 when the whole system of beings is regarded without prejudice1 and in the absence of the notion that their happiness interferes with our own4 ,there are also turbulent passions and appetites1 whose end is their simple gratification2 whereupon the violence and uneasiness cease4 ,some are selfish--hunger1 lust1 power1 fame2 some benevolent--pity1 gratitude1 parental affection1 c42 others may be of either kind--anger1 envy1 c4 ,in none of them is there any reference in the mind to the greatest happiness of self or others2 and that they stand so often in real opposition to the calm motions1 is sufficient proof of their distinct character1 e4g41 the opposition of lust and calm regard for one's highest interest4 ,in ,chapter ,,ii41 he takes up some finer powers of perception1 and some other natural determinations of the will4 ,bound up with seeing and hearing are certain other powers of perception or senses--,beauty1 ,imitation1 ,harmony1 ,design1 summed up by ,addison under the name of ,imagination1 and all natural sources of pleasure4 ,the two grateful perceptions of ,novelty and ,grandeur may be added to the list of natural determinations or senses of pleasure4 ,to attempt to reduce the natural sense of ,beauty to the discernment of real or apparent usefulness is hopeless4 ,the next sense of the soul noted is the ,sympathetic1 in its two ,phases of ,pity or ,compassion and ,congratulation4 ,this is fellow-feeling on apprehending the state of others1 and proneness to relieve1 without any thought of our own advantage1 as seen in children4 ,pity is stronger than congratulation1 because1 whether for ourselves or others1 the desire to repel evil is stronger than to pursue good4 ,sympathy extends to all the affections and passions2 it greatly subserves the grand determination of the soul towards universal happiness4 ,other finer senses have actions of men for their objects1 there being a general determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers1--a universal impulse to action1 bodily and intellectual4 ,in all such action there is real pleasure1 but the grand source of human happiness is the power of perceiving the moral notions of actions and characters4 ,this1 the ,moral ,sense1 falls to be fully discussed later4 ,distinct from our moral sense is the ,sense of ,honour or ,shame1 when we are praised or condemned by others4 ,the ,sense of ,decency or ,dignity1 when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental powers in ourselves or others1 is also natural1 and distinct from the moral sense4 ,some would allow a natural ,sense of the ,ridiculous in objects or events4 ,there follow some remarks on the tendency to associate perceptions4 ,in addition also to the natural propensity towards action1 there is a tendency in repeated action to become ,habit1 whereby our powers are greatly increased4 ,habit and ,customs can raise1 however1 no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the original actions4 ,sexual desire1 wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years1 does not1 in man1 end in mere sensual pleasure1 but involves a natural liking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners1 whereupon grow up esteem and love4 ,mankind have a universal desire of offspring1 and love for their young2 also an affection1 though weaker1 for all blood-relations4 ,they have1 further1 a natural impulse to society with their fellows1 as an immediate principle1 and are not driven to associate only by indigence4 ,all the other principles already mentioned1 having little or no exercise in solitude1 would bring them together1 even without family ties4 ,patriotism and love of country are acquired in the midst of social order4 ,natural ,religion inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of the benevolent order of the world1 and is soon diffused among all4 ,the principles now enumerated will be found1 though in varying proportions1 among all men not plainly monstrous by accident1 c4 ,chapter ,,iii4 treats of the ,ultimate ,determinations of the ,will and ,benevolent ,affections4 ,the question now is to find some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited1 and to discover the ultimate ends of action1 about which there is no reasoning4 ,he notices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading principle of action1 and specially the system that1 allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections1 puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments4 ,but1 he asks1 is there not also a calm determination towards the good of others1 without reference to private interest of any kind8 ,in the case of particular desires1 which all necessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified1 it is no proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy of success and stops uneasiness4 ,on the other hand1 to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue4 ,what we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others1 and constituted by nature 7either alone1 or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest7 'the immediate cause of moral approbation4' ,now1 anything to be had from men could not raise within us such affections1 or make us careful about anything beyond external deportment4 ,nor could rewards from ,god1 or the wish for self-approbation1 create such affections1 although1 on the supposition of their existence1 these may well help to foster them4 ,it is benevolent dispositions that we morally approve2 but dispositions are not to be raised by will4 ,moreover1 they are often found where there has been least thought of cultivating them2 and1 sometimes1 in the form of parental affection1 gratitude1 c41 they are followed so little for the sake of honour and reward1 that though their absence is condemned1 they are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all4 ,he then rebuts the idea that generous affections are selfish1 because by sympathy we make the pleasures and pains of others our own4 ,sympathy is a real fact1 but has regard only to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined in others1 whereas generous affection is varied toward different characters4 ,sympathy can never explain the immediate ardour of our good-will towards the morally excellent character1 or the eagerness of a dying man for the prosperity of his children and friends4 ,having thus accepted the existence of purely disinterested affections1 and divided them as before into calm and turbulent1 he puts the question1 ,whether is the selfish or benevolent principle to yield in case of opposition8 ,and although it appears that1 as a fact1 the universal happiness is preferred to the individual in the order of the world by the ,deity1 this is nothing1 unless by some determination of the soul we are made to comply with the ,divine intentions4 ,if by the desire of reward1 it is selfishness still2 if by the desire1 following upon the sight1 of moral excellence1 then there must necessarily exist as its object some determination of the will involving supreme moral excellence1 otherwise there will be no way of deciding between particular affections4 ,this leads on to the consideration of the ,moral ,faculty4 ,but1 in the beginning of ,chapter ,,iv41 he first rejects one by one these various accounts of the reason of our approbation of moral conduct3--pleasure by sympathy2 pleasure through the moral sense2 notion of advantage to the agent1 or to the approver1 and this direct or imagined2 tendency to procure honour2 conformity to law1 to truth1 fitness1 congruity1 c42 also education1 association1 c4 ,he then asserts a natural and immediate determination in man to approve certain affections and actions consequent on them2 or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them1 not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses1 or by reasoning4 ,it is a sense not dependent on bodily organs1 but a settled determination of the soul4 ,it is a sense1 in like manner as1 with every one of our powers--voice1 designing1 motion1 reasoning1 there is bound up a taste1 sense1 or relish1 discerning and recommending their proper exercise2 but superior to all these1 because the power of moral action is superior4 ,it can be trained like any other sense--hearing1 harmony1 c4--so as to be brought to approve finer objects1 for instance the general happiness rather than mere motions of pity4 ,that it is meant to control and regulate all the other powers is matter of immediate consciousness2 we must ever prefer moral good to the good apprehended by the other perceptive powers4 ,for while every other good is lessened by the sacrifices made to gain it1 moral good is thereby increased and relished the more4 ,the objects of moral approbation are primarily affections of the will1 but1 all experience shows1 only such as tend to the happiness of others1 and the moral perfection of the mind possessing them4 ,there are1 however1 many degrees of approbation2 and1 when we put aside qualities that approve themselves merely to the sense of decency or dignity1 and also the calm desire of private good1 which is indifferent1 being neither virtuous nor vicious1 the gradation of qualities morally approved may be given thus3 7#a7 ,dignified abilities 7pursuit of sciences1 c471 showing a taste above sensuality and selfishness4 7#b7 ,qualities immediately connected with virtuous affections--candour1 veracity1 fortitude1 sense of honour4 7#c7 ,the kind affections themselves1 and the more as they are fixed rather than passionate1 and extensive rather than narrow2 highest of all in the form of universal good-will to all4 7#d7 ,the disposition to desire and love moral excellence1 whether observed in ourselves or others--in short1 true piety towards ,god4 ,he goes on to give a similar scale of moral turpitude4 ,again1 putting aside the indifferent qualities1 and also those that merely make people despicable and prove them insensible1 he cites--7#a7 the gratification of a narrow kind of affection when the public good might have been served4 7#b7 ,acts detrimental to the public1 done under fear of personal ill1 or great temptation4 7#c7 ,sudden angry passions 7especially when grown into habits7 causing injury4 7#d7 ,injury caused by selfish and sensual passions4 7#e7 ,deliberate injury springing from calm selfishness4 7#f7 ,impiety towards the ,deity1 as known to be good4 ,the worst conceivable disposition1 a fixed1 unprovoked original malice is hardly found among men4 ,in the end of the chapter1 he re-asserts the supremacy of the moral faculty1 and of the principle of pure benevolence that it involves4 ,the inconsistency of the principles of self-love and benevolence when it arises1 is reduced in favour of the second by the intervention of the moral sense1 which does not hold out future rewards and pleasures of self-approbation1 but decides for the generous part by 'an immediate undefinable perception4' ,so at least1 if human nature were properly cultivated1 although it is true that in common life men are wont to follow their particular affections1 generous and selfish1 without thought of extensive benevolence or calm self-love2 and it is found necessary to counterbalance the advantage that the selfish principles gain in early life1 by propping up the moral faculty with considerations of the surest mode of attaining the highest private happiness1 and with views of the moral administration of the world by the ,deity4 ,but before passing to these subjects1 he devotes ,chapter ,v4 to the confirmation of the doctrine of the ,moral ,sense1 and first from the ,sense of ,honour4 ,this1 the grateful sensation when we are morally approved and praised1 with the reverse when we are censured1 he argues in his usual manner1 involves no thought of private interest4 ,however the facts may stand1 it is always under the impression of actions being moral or immoral1 that the sense of honour works4 ,in defence of the doctrine of a moral sense1 against the argument from the varying morality of different nations1 he says it would only prove the sense not uniform1 as the palate is not uniform in all men4 ,but the moral sense is really more uniform4 ,for1 in every nation1 it is the benevolent actions and affections that are approved1 and wherever there is an error of fact1 it is the reason1 not the moral sense1 that is at fault4 ,there are no cases of nations where moral approval is restricted to the pursuit of private interest4 ,the chief causes of variety of moral approbation are three3 7#a7 ,different notions of happiness and the means of promoting it1 whereby much that is peculiar in national customs1 c41 is explained1 without reflecting upon the moral sense4 7#b7 ,the larger or more confined field on which men consider the tendencies of their actions--sect1 party1 country1 c4 7#c7 ,different opinions about the divine commands1 which are allowed to over-ride the moral sense4 ,the moral sense does not imply innate complex ideas of the several actions and their tendencies1 which must be discovered by observation and reasoning2 it is concerned only about inward affections and dispositions1 of which the effects may be very various4 ,in closing this part of his subject1 he considers that all that is needed for the formation of morals1 has been given1 because from the moral faculty and benevolent affection all the special laws of nature can be deduced4 ,but because the moral faculty and benevolence have difficulty in making way against the selfish principles so early rooted in man1 it is needful to strengthen these foundations of morality by the consideration of the nature of the highest happiness4 ,with ,chapter ,,vi4 accordingly he enters on the discussion of ,happiness1 forming the second half of his first book4 ,the supreme happiness of any being is the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires or is capable of2 but1 in case of their being inconsistent1 the constant gratification of the higher1 intenser1 and more durable pleasures is to be preferred4 ,in ,chapter ,,vii41 he therefore directly compares the various kinds of enjoyment and misery1 in order to know what of the first must be surrendered1 and what of the second endured1 in aiming at highest attainable happiness4 ,pleasures the same in kind are preferable1 according as they are more intense and enduring2 of a different kind1 as they are more enduring and dignified1 a fact decided at once by our immediate sense of dignity or worth4 ,in the great diversity of tastes regarding pleasures1 he supposes the ultimate decision as to the value of pleasures to rest with the possessors of finer perceptive powers1 but adds1 that good men are the best judges1 because possessed of fuller experience than the vicious1 whose tastes1 senses1 and appetites have lost their natural vigour through one-sided indulgence4 ,he then goes through the various pleasures1 depreciating the pleasures of the palate on the positive side1 and sexual pleasure as transitory and enslaving when pursued for itself2 the sensual enjoyments are1 notwithstanding1 quite proper within due limits1 and then1 perhaps1 are at their highest4 ,the pleasures of the imagination1 knowledge1 c41 differ from the last in not being preceded by an uneasy sensation to be removed1 and are clearly more dignified and endurable1 being the proper exercise of the soul when it is not moved by the affections of social virtue1 or the offices of rational piety4 ,the sympathetic pleasures are very extensive1 very intense1 and may be of very long duration2 they are superior to all the foregoing1 if there is a hearty affection1 and are at their height along with the feeling of universal good will4 ,moral ,enjoyments1 from the consciousness of good affections and actions1 when by close reflexion we have attained just notions of virtue and merit1 rank highest of all1 as well in dignity as in duration4 ,the pleasures of honour1 when our conduct is approved1 are also among the highest1 and when1 as commonly happens1 they are conjoined with the last two classes1 it is the height of human bliss4 ,the pleasures of mirth1 such as they are1 fall in best with virtue1 and so1 too1 the pleasures of wealth and power1 in themselves unsatisfying4 ,anger1 malice1 revenge1 c41 are not without their uses1 and give momentary pleasure as removing an uneasiness from the subject of them2 but they are not to be compared with the sympathetic feelings1 because their effects cannot long be regarded with satisfaction4 ,his general conclusion is1 that as the highest personal satisfaction is had in the most benevolent dispositions1 the same course of conduct is recommended alike by the two great determinations of our nature1 towards our own good and the good of others4 ,he then compares the several sorts of pain1 which1 he says1 are not necessarily in the proportion of the corresponding pleasures4 ,allowing the great misery of bodily pain1 he yet argues that1 at the worst1 it is not to be compared for a moment to the pain of the worst wrong-doing4 ,the imagination1 great as are its pleasures1 cannot cause much pain4 ,the sympathetic and moral pains of remorse and infamy are the worst of all4 ,in ,chapter ,,viii4 the various ,tempers and ,characters are compared in point of happiness or misery4 ,even the private affections1 in due moderation1 promote the general good2 but that system is the best possible where1 along with this1 the generous affections also promote private good4 ,no natural affection is absolutely evil2 the evil of excess in narrow generous affection lies in the want of proportion2 in calm extensive good-will there can be no excess4 ,the social and moral enjoyments1 and those of honour1 being the highest1 the affections and actions that procure them are the chief means of happiness2 amid human mischances1 however1 they need support from a trust in ,providence4 ,the unkind affections and passions 7anger1 c47 are uneasy even when innocent1 and never were intended to become permanent dispositions4 ,the narrow kind of affections are all that can be expected from the majority of men1 and are very good1 if only they are not the occasion of unjust partiality to some1 or1 worse1 ill-grounded aversion to others4 ,the rest of the chapter is taken up in painting the misery of the selfish passions when in excess--love of life1 sensual pleasure1 desire of power1 glory1 and ease4 ,he has still one 'object of affection to every rational mind' that he must deal with before he is done with considering the question of highest happiness4 ,this is the ,deity1 or the ,mind that presides in the ,universe4 ,chapter ,,ix41 at great length1 discusses the first part of the subject--the framing of primary ideas regarding the ,divine ,nature4 ,he proves the existence of an original mind from design1 c41 in the world2 he then finds this mind to be benevolent1 on occasion of which he has to deal with the great question of ,evil1 giving reasons for its existence1 discovering its uses1 narrowing its range as compared with good1 and finally reducing it by the consideration and proof of immortality2 he ends by setting forth the other attributes of ,god--providence1 holiness1 justice1 c4 ,in ,chapter ,x41 he considers the ,affections1 ,duty1 and ,worship to be exercised towards ,god4 ,the moral sense quite specially enjoins worship of the ,deity1 internal and external2 internal by love and trust and gratitude1 c41 external by prayer1 praise1 c4 ,he seems to ascribe to prayer nothing beyond a subjective efficacy4 ,in the acknowledgment of ,god is highest happiness1 and the highest exercise of the moral faculty4 ,in ,chapter ,,xi41 he closes the whole book with remarks on the ,supreme ,happiness of our ,nature1 which he makes to consist in the perfect exercise of the nobler virtues1 especially love and resignation to ,god1 and of all the inferior virtues consistent with the superior2 also in external prosperity1 so far as virtue allows4 ,the moral sense1 and the truest regard for our own interest1 thus recommend the same course as the calm1 generous determination2 and this makes up the supreme cardinal virtue of ,justice1 which includes even our duties to ,god4 ,temperance in regard to sensual enjoyments1 ,fortitude as against evils1 and ,prudence1 or ,consideration1 in regard to everything that solicits our desires1 are the other virtues2 all subservient to ,justice4 ,in no station of life are men shut out from the enjoyment of the supreme good4 ,book ,,ii4 is a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life1 so far as they follow from the course of life shown above to be recommended by ,god and nature as most lovely and most advantageous2 all adventitious states or relations among men aside4 ,the three first chapters are of a general nature4 ,in ,chapter ,i41 he reviews the circumstances that increase the moral good or evil of actions4 ,virtue being primarily an affair of the will or affections1 there can be no imputation of virtue or vice in action1 unless a man is free and able to act2 the necessity and impossibility1 as grounds of non-imputation1 must1 however1 have been in no way brought about by the agent himself4 ,in like manner1 he considers what effects and consequents of his actions are imputable to the agent2 remarking1 by the way1 that the want of a proper degree of good affections and of solicitude for the public good is morally evil4 ,he then discusses the bearing of ignorance and error1 vincible and invincible1 and specially the case wherein an erroneous conscience extenuates4 ,the difficulty of such cases1 he says1 are due to ambiguity1 wherefore he distinguishes three meanings of ,conscience that are found1 7#a7 the moral faculty1 7#b7 the judgment of the understanding about the springs and effects of actions1 upon which the moral sense approves or condemns them1 7#c7 our judgments concerning actions compared with the law 7moral maxims1 divine laws1 c474 ,in ,chapter ,,ii41 he lays down general rules of judging about the morality of actions from the affections exciting to them or opposing them2 and first as to the degree of virtue or vice when the ability varies2 in other words1 morality as dependent on the strength of the affections4 ,next1 and at greater length1 morality as dependent on the kind of the affections4 ,here he attempts to fix1 in the first place1 the degree of benevolence1 as opposed to private interest1 that is necessary to render men virtuous1 or even innocent1 in accordance with his principle that there is implanted in us a very high standard of necessary goodness1 requiring us to do a public benefit1 when clear1 however burdensome or hurtful the act may be to ourselves2 in the second place1 the proportion that should be kept between the narrower and the more extensive generous affections1 where he does not forget to allow that1 in general1 a great part of human virtue must necessarily lie within the narrow range4 ,then he gives a number of special rules for appreciating conduct1 advising1 for the very sake of the good to others that will result therefrom1 that men should foster their benevolence by the thought of the advantage accruing to themselves here and hereafter from their virtuous actions2 and closes with the consideration of the cases wherein actions can be imputed to other than the agents4 ,in ,chapter ,,iii41 he enters into the general notion of ,rights and ,laws1 and their divisions4 ,from right use of such affection or actions as are approved by the moral faculty from their relation to the general good1 or the good of particular persons consistently with the general good1 he distinguishes the right of a man to do1 possess1 demand1 c41 which exists when his doing1 possessing1 c4 tend to the good of society1 or to his own1 consistent with the rights of others and the general good1 and when obstructing him would have the contrary tendency4 ,he proceeds to argue1 on utilitarian principles1 that the rights that seem to attend every natural desire are perfectly valid when not against the public interest1 but never valid when they are against it4 ,chapter ,,iv4 contains a discussion upon the state of ,nature1 maintaining that it is not a state of anarchy or war1 but full of rights and obligations4 ,he points out that independent states in their relation to one another are subject to no common authority1 and so are in a state of nature4 ,rights belong 7#a7 to individuals1 7#b7 to societies1 7#c7 to mankind at large4 ,they are also natural1 or adventitious1 and again perfect or imperfect4 ,chapter ,v4 ,natural rights are antecedent to society1 such as the right to life1 to liberty1 to private judgment1 to marriage1 c4 ,they are of two kinds--perfect and imperfect4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,adventitious rights are divided into ,real and ,personal 7a distinction chiefly of legal value47 ,he also examines into the nature and foundation of private property4 ,chapter ,,vii4 treats of the ,acquisition of property1 ,hutcheson1 as is usual with moralists1 taking the occupatio of the ,roman ,law as a basis of ownership4 ,property involves the right of 7#a7 use1 7#b7 exclusive use1 7#c7 alienation4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,rights drawn from property are such as mortgages1 servitudes1 c41 being rights of what may be called partial or imperfect ownership4 ,chapter ,,ix4 discusses the subject of contracts1 with the general conditions required for a valid contract4 ,chapter ,x4 ,of ,veracity4 ,like most writers on morals1 ,hutcheson breaks in upon the strict rule of veracity by various necessary1 but ill-defined1 exceptions4 ,expressions of courtesy and etiquette are exempted1 so also artifices in war1 answers extorted by unjust violence1 and some cases of peculiar necessity1 as when a man tells a lie to save thousands of lives4 ,chapter ,,xi4 ,oaths and ,vows4 ,chapter ,,xii4 belongs rather to ,political ,economy4 ,its subject is the values of goods in commerce1 and the nature of coin4 ,chapter ,,xiii4 enumerates the various classes of contracts1 following the ,roman ,law1 taking up ,mandatum1 ,depositum1 ,letting to ,hire1 ,sale1 c4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 adds the ,roman quasi-contracts4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,rights arising from injuries or wrongs 7torts74 ,he condemns duelling1 but admits that1 where it is established1 a man may1 in some cases1 be justified in sending or accepting a challenge4 ,chapter ,,xvi4 ,rights belonging to society as against the individual4 ,the perfect rights of society are such as the following3--7#a7 ,to prevent suicide2 7#b7 ,to require the producing and rearing of offspring1 at least so far as to tax and discourage bachelors2 7#c7 ,to compel men1 though not without compensation1 to divulge useful inventions2 7#d7 ,to compel to some industry1 c4 ,chapter ,,xvii4 takes up some cases where the ordinary rights of property or person are set aside by some overbearing necessity4 ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,the way of deciding controversies in a state of nature by arbitration4 ,book ,,iii4--,civil ,polity1 embracing ,domestic and ,civil ,rights4 ,chapter ,i4 ,marriage4 ,hutcheson considers that ,marriage should be a perpetual union upon equal terms1 'and not such a one wherein the one party stipulates to himself a right of governing in all domestic affairs1 and the other promises subjection4' ,he would allow divorce for adultery1 desertion1 or implacable enmity on either side4 ,upon defect of children1 some sort of concubinage would be preferable to divorce1 but leaving to the woman the option of divorce with compensation4 ,he notices the misrepresentations regarding ,plato's scheme of a community of wives2 ',never was there in any plan less provision made for sensual gratification4' ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,rights and ,duties of ,parents and ,children4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,rights and ,duties of ,masters and ,servants4 ,chapter ,,iv4 discusses the ,motives to constitute ,civil ,government4 ,if men were perfectly wise and upright1 there would be no need for government4 ,man is naturally sociable and political ,greek3 xon politikon4 ,chapter ,v4 shows that the natural method of constituting civil government is by consent or social compact4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,the ,forms of ,government1 with their respective advantages and disadvantages4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,how far the ,rights of ,governors extend4 ,their lives are more sacred than the lives of private persons2 but they may nevertheless be lawfully resisted1 and1 in certain cases1 put to death4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,the ways of acquiring supreme ,power4 ,that government has most divine right that is best adapted to the public good3 a divine right of succession to civil offices is ridiculous4 ,chapter ,,ix4 takes up the sphere of civil law4 7#a7 ,to enforce the laws of nature2 7#b7 ,to appoint the form c41 of contracts and dispositions1 with a view to prevent fraud2 7#c7 ,to require men to follow the most prudent methods of agriculture1 manufactures1 and commerce2 7#d7 ,to prescribe rules in matters morally indifferent1 where uniformity is advantageous4 ,opinions should be tolerated2 all except ,atheism1 and the denial of moral obligation4 ,chapter ,x4 ,the ,laws of ,peace and ,war1 belonging now to the subject of ,international ,law4 ,chapter ,,xi4 7concluding the work7 discusses some cases connected with the duration of the ',politick ,union4' ,this bare indication of topics will suffice to give an idea of the working out of ,hutcheson's system4 ,for summary3--,i4--,the ,standard1 according to ,hutcheson1 is identical with the ,moral ,faculty4 ,it is the ,sense of unique excellence in certain affections and in the actions consequent upon them4 ,the object of approval is1 in the main1 benevolence4 ,,ii4--,his division of the feelings is into calm and turbulent1 each of these being again divided into self-regarding and benevolent4 ,he affirms the existence of pure ,disinterestedness1 a calm regard for the most extended well-being4 ,there are also turbulent passions of a benevolent kind1 whose end is their simple gratification4 ,hutcheson has thus a higher and lower grade of ,benevolence2 the higher would correspond to the disinterestedness that arises from the operation of fixed ideas1 the lower to those affections that are generated in us by pleasing objects4 ,he has no discussion on the freedom of the will1 contenting himself with mere voluntariness as an element in moral approbation or censure4 ,,iii4--,the ,summum ,bonum is fully discussed4 ,he places the pleasures of sympathy and moral goodness 7also of piety7 in the highest rank1 the passive sensations in the lowest4 ,instead of making morality1 like health1 a neutral state 7though an indispensable condition of happiness71 he ascribes to it the highest positive gratification4 ,,iv4--,in proceeding upon ,rights1 instead of ,duties1 as a basis of classification1 ,hutcheson is following in the wake of the jurisconsults1 rather than of the moralists4 ,when he enters into the details of moral duties1 he throws aside his 'moral sense1' and draws his rules1 most of them from ,roman ,law1 the rest chiefly from manifest convenience4 ,v4 and ,,vi4--,hutcheson's relation to ,politics and ,theology requires no comment4 ,,bernard ,,de ,,mandeville4 #afgj-agcc4 ,,mandeville was author of ',the ,fable of the ,bees2 or1 ,private ,vices1 ,public ,benefits' 7#agad74 ,this work is a satire upon artificial society1 having for its chief aim to expose the hollowness of the so-called dignity of human nature4 ,dugald ,stewart considered it a recommendation to any theory of the mind that it exalted our conceptions of human nature4 ,shaftesbury's views were entitled to this advantage2 but1 observes ,mandeville1 'the ideas he had formed of the goodness and excellency of our nature1 were as romantic and chimerical1 as they are beautiful and amiable4' ,mandeville examined not what human nature ought to be1 but what it really is4 ,in contrast1 therefore1 to the moralists that distinguish between a higher and a lower in our nature1 attributing to the higher everything good and noble1 while the lower ought to be persecuted and despised1 ,mandeville declares the fancied higher parts to be the region of vanity and imposture1 while the renowned deeds of men1 and the greatness of kingdoms1 really arise from the passions usually reckoned base and sensual4 ,as his views are scattered through numerous dissertations1 it will be best to summarize them under a few heads4 #a4 ,virtue and ,vice4 ,morality is not natural to man2 it is the invention of wise men1 who have endeavoured to infuse the belief1 that it is best for everybody to prefer the public interest to their own4 ,as1 however1 they could bestow no real recompense for the thwarting of self-interest1 they contrived an imaginary one--honour4 ,upon this they proceeded to divide men into two classes1 the one abject and base1 incapable of self-denial2 the other noble1 because they suppressed their passions1 and acted for the public welfare4 ,man was thus won to virtue1 not by force1 but by flattery4 ,in regard to praiseworthiness1 ,shaftesbury1 according to ,mandeville1 was the first to affirm that virtue could exist without self-denial4 ,this was opposed to the prevailing opinion1 and to the view taken up and criticised by ,mandeville4 ,his own belief was different4 ',it is not in feeling the passions1 or in being affected with the frailties of nature1 that vice consists2 but in indulging and obeying the call of them1 contrary to the dictates of reason4' #b4 ,self-love4 ',it is an admirable saying of a worthy divine1 that though many discoveries have been made in the world of self-love1 there is yet abundance of terra incognita left behind4' ,there is nothing so sincere upon earth as the love that creatures bear to themselves4 ',man centres everything in himself1 and neither loves nor hates1 but for his own sake4' ,nay1 more1 we are naturally regardless of the effect of our conduct upon others2 we have no innate love for our fellows4 ,the highest virtue is not without reward2 it has a satisfaction of its own1 the pleasure of contemplating one's own worth4 ,but is there no genuine self-denial8 ,mandeville answers by a distinction3 mortifying one passion to gratify another is very common1 but this not self-denial2 self-inflicted pain without any recompense--where is that to be found8 ',charity is that virtue by which part of that sincere love we have for ourselves is transferred pure and unmixed to others 7not friends or relatives71 whom we have no obligation to1 nor hope or expect anything-from4' ,the counterfeit of true charity is pity or compassion1 which is a fellow-feeling for the sufferings of others4 ,pity is as much a frailty of our nature as anger1 pride1 or fear4 ,the weakest minds 7e4g41 women and children7 have generally the greatest share of it4 ,it is excited through the eye or the ear2 when the suffering does not strike our senses1 the feeling is weak1 and hardly more than an imitation of pity4 ,pity1 since it seeks rather our own relief from a painful sight1 than the good of others1 must be curbed and controlled in order to produce any benefit to society4 ,mandeville draws a nice distinction between self-love1 and1 what he calls1 self-liking4 ',to increase the care in creatures to preserve themselves1 ,mature has given them an instinct1 by which every individual values itself above its real worth4' ,the more mettlesome and spirited animals 7e4g41 horses7 are endowed with this instinct4 ,in us1 it is accompanied with an apprehension that we do overvalue ourselves2 hence our susceptibility to the confirmatory good opinion of others4 ,but if each were to display openly his own feeling of superiority1 quarrels would inevitably arise4 ,the grand discovery whereby the ill consequences of this passion are avoided is politeness4 ',good manners consists in flattering the pride of others1 and concealing our own4' ,the first step is to conceal our good opinion of ourselves2 the next is more impudent1 namely1 to pretend that we value others more highly than ourselves4 ,but it takes a long time to come to that pitch2 the ,romans were almost masters of the world before they learned politeness4 #c4 ,pride1 ,vanity1 ,honour4 ,pride is of great consequence in ,mandeville's system4 ',the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride4' ,man is naturally innocent1 timid1 and stupid2 destitute of strong passions or appetites1 he would remain in his primitive barbarism were it not for pride4 ,yet all moralists condemn pride1 as a vain notion of our own superiority4 ,it is a subtle passion1 not easy to trace4 ,it is often seen in the humility of the humble1 and the shamelessness of the shameless4 ,it simulates charity2 'pride and vanity have built more hospitals than all the virtues together4' ,it is the chief ingredient in the chastity of women1 and in the courage of men4 ,less cynical moralists than ,mandeville have looked with suspicion on posthumous fame2 'so silly a creature is man1 as that1 intoxicated with the fumes of vanity1 he can feast on the thought of the praises that shall be paid his memory in future ages1 with so much ecstasy as to neglect his present life1 nay court and covet death1 if he but imagines that it will add to the glory he had acquired before4' ,but the most notable institution of pride is the love of honour4 ,honour is a 'chimera1' having no reality in nature1 but a mere invention of moralists and politicians1 to keep men close to their engagements1 whatever they be4 ,in some families it is hereditary1 like the gout2 but1 luckily1 the vulgar are destitute of it4 ,in the time of chivalry1 honour was a very troublesome affair2 but in the beginning of the #agth century1 it was melted over again1 and brought to a new standard2 'they put in the same weight of courage1 half the quantity of honesty1 and a very little justice1 but not a scrap of any other virtue4' ,the worst thing about it is duelling2 but there are more suicides than duels1 so that at any rate men do not hate others more than themselves4 ,after a half-satirical apology for duelling1 he concludes with one insurmountable objection2 duelling is wholly repugnant to religion1 adding with the muffled scepticism characteristic of the #ahth century1 'how to reconcile them must be left to wiser heads than mine4' #d4 ,private vices1 public benefits4 ,mandeville ventures to compare society to a bowl of punch4 ,avarice is the souring1 and prodigality the sweetening of it4 ,the water is the ignorance and folly of the insipid multitude1 while honour and the noble qualities of man represent the brandy4 ,to each of these ingredients we may object in turn1 but experience teaches that1 when judiciously mixed1 they make an excellent liquor4 ,it is not the good1 but the evil qualities of men1 that lead to worldly greatness4 ,without luxury we should have no trade4 ,this doctrine is illustrated at great length1 and has been better remembered than anything else in the book2 but it may be dismissed with two remarks4 7#a7 ,it embodies an error in political economy1 namely1 that it is spending and not saving that gives employment to the poor4 ,if ,mandeville's aim had been less critical1 and had he been less delighted with his famous paradox1 we may infer from the acuteness of his reasoning on the subject1 that he would have anticipated the true doctrine of political economy1 as he saw through the fallacy of the mercantile theory4 7#b7 ,he employs the term1 luxury1 with great latitude1 as including whatever is not a bare necessary of existence4 ,according to the fashionable doctrine of his day1 all luxury was called an evil and a vice2 and in this sense1 doubtless1 vice is essential to the existence of a great nation4 #e4 ,the origin of society4 ,mandeville's remarks on this subject are the best he has written1 and come nearest to the accredited views of the present day4 ,he denies that we have any natural affection for one another1 or any natural aversion or hatred4 ,each seeks his own happiness1 and conflict arises from the opposition of men's desires4 ,to make a society out of the raw material of uncivilized men1 is a work of great difficulty1 requiring the concurrence of many favourable accidents1 and a long period of time4 ,for the qualities developed among civilized men no more belong to them in a savage state1 than the properties of wine exist in the grape4 ,society begins with families4 ,in the beginning1 the old savage has a great wish to rule his children1 but has no capacity for government4 ,he is inconstant and violent in his desires1 and incapable of any steady conduct4 ,what at first keeps men together is not so much reverence for the father1 as the common danger from wild beasts4 ,the traditions of antiquity are full of the prowess of heroes in killing dragons and monsters4 ,the second step to society is the danger men are in from one another4 ,to protect themselves1 several families would be compelled to accept the leadership of the strongest4 ,the leaders1 seeing the mischiefs of dissension1 would employ all their art to extirpate that evil4 ,thus they would forbid killing one another1 stealing one another's wives1 c4 ,the third and last step is the invention of letters2 this is essential to the growth of society1 and to the corresponding1 expansion of law4#bb ,i4--,mandeville's object being chiefly negative and dialectical1 he has left little of positive ethical theory4 ,virtue he regards as de facto an arbitrary institution of society2 what it ought to be1 he hardly says1 but the tendency of his writings is to make the good of the whole to be preferred to private interest4 ,,ii4--,he denies the existence of a moral sense and of disinterestedness4 ,the motive to observe moral rules is pride and vanity fomented by politicians4 ,he does not regard virtue as an independent end1 even by association1 but considers that pride in its naked form is the ever present incentive to good conduct4 ,v4--,the connexion of virtue with society is already fully indicated4 ,in ,france1 the name of ,,helvetius 7author of ,de l'esprit1 ,de l'homme1 c41 #agae-ga7 is identified with a serious 7in contrast to ,mandeville71 and perfectly consistent1 attempt to reduce all morality to direct ,self-interest4 ,though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the facts1 ,helvetius was by no means the 'low and loose moralist' that he has been described to be2 and1 in particular1 his own practice displayed a rare benevolence4 ,,david ,,hume4 #agaa-aggf4 ,the ,ethical views of ,hume are contained in ',an ,enquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals4' ,in an ,introductory ,section 7,i47 he treats of the ,,general ,,principles ,,of ,,morals4 ,after describing those that profess to deny the reality of the distinction of ,right and ,wrong1 as disingenuous disputants1 useless to reason with1--he states the great problem of ,morals to be1 whether the foundation is ,,reason or ,,sentiment2 whether our knowledge of moral distinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction1 or by an immediate feeling or finer internal sense4 ,specious arguments may be urged on both sides4 ,on the side of ,reason1 it may be contended1 that the justice and injustice of actions are often a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences2 whereas if they appealed at once to a sense1 they would be as unsusceptible of truth or falsehood as the harmony of verse1 the tenderness of passion1 or the brilliancy of wit4 ,in reply1 the supporters of ,sentiment may urge that the character of virtue is to be amiable1 and of vice to be odious1 which are not intellectual distinctions4 ,the end of moral distinctions is to influence the feelings and determine the will1 which no mere assent of the understanding can do4 ,extinguish our feelings towards virtue and vice1 and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives4 ,the arguments on both sides have so much force in them1 that we may reasonably suspect that ,reason and ,sentiment both concur in our moral determinations4 ,the final sentence upon actions1 whereby we pronounce them praiseworthy or blameable1 may depend on the feelings2 while a process of the understanding may be requisite to make nice distinctions1 examine complicated relations1 and ascertain matters of fact4 ,it is not the author's intention1 however1 to pursue the subject in the form of adjudicating between these two principles1 but to follow what he deems a simpler method--to analyze that complication of mental qualities1 called ,,personal ,,merit3 to ascertain the attributes or qualities that render a man an object of esteem and affection1 or of hatred and contempt4 ,this is a question of fact1 and not of abstract science2 and should be determined1 as similar questions are1 in the modern physics1 by following the experimental method1 and drawing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances4 ,section ,,ii4 is ,,of ,,benevolence4 ,his first remark on ,benevolence is1 that it is identified in all countries with the highest merits that human nature is capable of attaining to4 ,this prepares the way for the farther observation1 that in setting forth the praises of a humane1 beneficent man1 the one circumstance that never fails to be insisted on is the happiness to society arising through his good offices4 ,like the sun1 an inferior minister of providence1 he cheers1 invigorates1 and sustains the surrounding world4 ,may we not therefore conclude that the ,,utility resulting from social virtues1 forms1 at least1 a part of their merit1 and is one source of the approbation paid to them4 ,he illustrates this by a number of interesting examples1 and defers the enquiry--how large a part of the social virtues depend on utility1 and for what reason we are so much affected by it4 ,section ,,iii4 is on ,,justice4 ,that ,justice is useful to society1 and thence derives part of its merit1 would be superfluous to prove4 ,that public utility is the sole origin of ,justice1 and that the beneficial consequences are the sole foundation of its merit1 may seem more questionable1 but can in the author's opinion be maintained4 ,he puts the supposition1 that the human race were provided with such abundance of all external things1 that without industry1 care1 or anxiety1 every person found every want fully satisfied2 and remarks1 that while every other social virtue 7the affections1 c47 might flourish1 yet1 as property would be absent1 mine and thine unknown1 ,justice would be useless1 an idle ceremonial1 and could never come into the catalogue of the virtues4 ,in point of fact1 where any agent1 as air1 water1 or land1 is so abundant as to supply everybody1 questions of justice do not arise on that particular subject4 ,suppose again that in our present necessitous condition1 the mind of every man were so enlarged and so replete with generosity that each should feel as much for his fellows as for himself--the beau idal of communism--in this case ,justice would be in abeyance1 and its ends answered by ,benevolence4 ,this state is actually realized in well-cultivated families2 and communism has been attempted and maintained for a time in the ardour of new enthusiasms4 ,reverse the above suppositions1 and imagine a society in such want that the utmost care is unable to prevent the greater number from perishing1 and all from the extremes of misery1 as in a shipwreck of a siege2 in such circumstances1 justice is suspended in favour of self-preservation2 the possibility of good order is at an end1 and ,justice1 the means1 is discarded as useless4 ,or1 again1 suppose a virtuous man to fall into a society of ruffians on the road to swift destruction2 his sense of justice would be of no avail1 and consequently he would arm himself with the first weapon he could seize1 consulting self-preservation alone4 ,the ordinary punishment of criminals is1 as regards them1 a suspension of justice for the benefit of society4 ,a state of war is the remission of justice between the parties as of no use or application4 ,a civilized nation at war with barbarians must discard even the small relics of justice retained in war with other civilized nations4 ,thus the rules of equity and justice depend on the condition that men are placed in1 and are limited by their ,,utility in each separate state of things4 ,the common state of society is a medium between the extreme suppositions now made3 we have our self-partialities1 but have learnt the value of equity2 we have few enjoyments by nature1 but a considerable number by industry4 ,hence we have the ideas of ,property2 to these ,justice is essential1 and it thus derives its moral obligation4 ,the poetic fictions of the ,golden ,age1 and the philosophic fictions of a ,state of ,nature1 equally adopt the same fundamental assumption2 in the one1 justice was unnecessary1 in the other1 it was inadmissible4 ,so1 if there were a race of creatures so completely servile as never to contest any privilege with us1 nor resent any infliction1 which is very much our position with the lower animals1 justice would have no place in our dealings with them4 ,or1 suppose once more1 that each person possessed within himself every faculty for existence1 and were isolated from every other2 so solitary a being would be as incapable of justice as of speech4 ,the sphere of this duty begins with society2 and extends as society extends1 and as it contributes to the well-being of the individual members of society4 ,the author next examines the particular laws embodying justice and determining property4 ,he supposes a creature1 having reason1 but unskilled in human nature1 to deliberate with himself how to distribute property4 ,his most obvious thought would be to give the largest possessions to the most virtuous1 so as to give the power of doing good where there was the most inclination4 ,but so unpracticable is this design1 that although sometimes conceived1 it is never executed2 the civil magistrate knows that it would be utterly destructive of human society2 sublime as may be the ideal justice that it supposes1 he sets it aside on the calculation of its bad consequences4 ,seeing also that1 with nature's liberality1 were all her gifts equally distributed1 every one would have so good a share that no one would have a title to complain2 and seeing1 farther1 that this is the only type of perfect equality or ideal justice--there is no good ground for falling short of it but the knowledge that the attempt would be pernicious to society4 ,the writers on the ,law of ,nature1 whatever principles they begin with1 must assign as the ultimate reason of law the necessities and convenience of mankind4 ,uninstructed nature could never make the distinction between mine and yours2 it is a purely artificial product of society4 ,even when this distinction is established1 and justice requires it to be adhered to1 yet we do not scruple in extraordinary cases to violate justice in an individual case for the safety of the people at large4 ,when the interests of society require a rule of justice1 but do not indicate any rule in particular1 the resort is to some analogy with a rule already established on grounds of the general interest4 ,for determining what is a man's property1 there may be many statutes1 customs1 precedents1 analogies1 some constant and inflexible1 some variable and arbitrary1 but all professedly terminating in the interests of human society4 ,but for this1 the laws of property would be undistinguishable from the wildest superstitions4 ,such a reference1 instead of weakening the obligations of justice1 strengthens them4 ,what stronger foundations can there be for any duty than that1 without it1 human nature could not subsist2 and that1 according as it is observed1 the degrees of human happiness go on increasing8 ,either ,justice is evidently founded on ,utility1 or our regard for it is a simple instinct like hunger1 resentment1 or self-preservation4 ,but on this last supposition1 property1 the subject-matter1 must be also discerned by an instinct2 no such instinct1 however1 can be affirmed4 ,indeed1 no single instinct would suffice for the number of considerations entering into a fact so complex4 ,to define ,inheritance and ,contract1 a hundred volumes of laws are not enough2 how then can nature embrace such complications in the simplicity of an instinct4 ,for it is not laws alone that we must have1 but authorized interpreters4 ,have we original ideas of prtors1 and chancellors1 and juries8 ,instincts are uniform in their operation2 birds of a species build their nests alike4 ,the laws of states are uniform to about the same extent as houses1 which must have a roof and walls1 windows and chimneys1 because the end in view demands certain essentials2 but beyond these1 there is every conceivable diversity4 ,it is true that1 by education and custom1 we blame injustice without thinking of its ultimate consequences4 ,so universal are the rules of justice1 from the universality of its end1 that we approve of it mechanically4 ,still1 we have often to recur to the final end1 and to ask1 ,what must become of the world if such practices prevail8 ,how could society subsist under such disorders8 ,thus1 then1 ,hume considers that1 by an inductive determination1 on the strict ,newtonian basis1 he has proved that the ,,sole foundation of our regard to justice is the support and welfare of society3 and since no moral excellence is more esteemed1 we must have some strong disposition in favour of general usefulness4 ,such a disposition must be a part of the humane virtues1 as it is the ,,sole source of the moral approbation of fidelity1 justice1 veracity1 and integrity4 ,section ,,iv4 relates to ,,political ,,society1 and is intended to show that ,government1 ,allegiance1 and the ,laws of each ,state1 are justified solely by ,utility4 ,if men had sagacity to perceive1 and strength of mind to follow out1 distant and general interests1 there had been no such thing as government4 ,in other words1 if government were totally useless1 it would not be4 ,the duty of ,allegiance would be no duty1 but for the advantage of it1 in preserving peace and order among mankind4 ,hume is here supposing that men enter into society on equal terms2 he makes no allowance for the exercise of the right of the stronger in making compulsory social unions4 ,this1 however1 does not affect his reasoning as to the source of our approbation of social duty1 which is not usually extended to tyranny4 ,when political societies hold intercourse with one another1 certain regulations are made1 termed ,laws of ,nations1 which have no other end than the advantage of those concerned4 ,the virtue of ,chastity is subservient to the utility of rearing the young1 which requires the combination of both parents2 and that combination reposes on marital fidelity4 ,without such a utility1 the virtue would never have been thought of4 ,the reason why chastity is extended to cases where child-bearing does not enter1 is that general rules are often carried beyond their original occasion1 especially in matters of taste and sentiment4 ,the prohibition of marriage between near relations1 and the turpitude of incest1 have in view the preserving of purity of manners among persons much together4 ,the laws of good manners are a kind of lesser morality1 for the better securing of our pleasures in society4 ,even robbers and pirates must have their laws4 ,immoral gallantries1 where authorized1 are governed by a set of rules4 ,societies for play have laws for the conduct of the game4 ,war has its laws as well as peace4 ,the fights of boxers1 wrestlers1 and such like1 are subject to rules4 ,for all such cases1 the common interest and utility begets a standard of right and wrong in those concerned4 ,section ,v4 proceeds to argue ,,why ,,utility ,,pleases4 ,however powerful education may be in forming men's sentiments1 there must1 in such a matter as morality1 be some deep natural distinction to work upon4 ,now1 there are only two natural sentiments that ,utility can appeal to3 7#a7 ,self-,interest1 and 7#b7 ,generosity1 or the interests of others4 ,the deduction of morals from ,self-,love is obvious1 and no doubt explains much4 ,an appeal to experience1 however1 shows its defects4 ,we praise virtuous actions in remote ages and countries1 where our own interests are out of the question4 ,even when we have a private interest in some virtuous action1 our praise avoids that part of it1 and prefers to fasten on what we are not interested in4 ,when we hear of the details of a generous action1 we are moved by it1 before we know when or where it took place4 ,nor will the force of imagination account for the feeling in those cases2 if we have an eye solely to our own real interest1 it is not conceivable how we can be moved by a mere imaginary interest4 ,but another view may be taken4 ,some have maintained that the public interest is our own interest1 and is therefore promoted by our self-love4 ,the reply is that the two are often opposed to each other1 and still we approve of the preference of the public interest4 ,we are1 therefore1 driven to adopt a more public affection1 and to admit that the interests of society1 on their own1 account1 are not indifferent to us4 ,have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity or benevolence8 ,or to conceive that the very aspect of happiness1 joy1 prosperity1 gives pleasure2 while pain1 suffering1 sorrow1 communicate uneasiness8 ,here we have an unmistakeable1 powerful1 universal sentiment of human nature to build upon4 ,the author gives an expanded illustration of the workings of ,benevolence or ,sympathy1 which well deserves to be read for its merits of execution4 ,we must here content ourselves with stating that it is on this principle of disinterested action1 belonging to our nature1 that he founds the chief part of our sentiment of ,moral ,approbation4 ,section ,,vi4 takes into the account ,,qualities ,,useful ,,to ,,ourselves4 ,we praise in individuals the qualities useful to themselves1 and are pleased with the happiness flowing to individuals by their own conduct4 ,this can be no selfish motive on our part4 ,for example1 ,,discretion1 so necessary to the accomplishing of any useful enterprise1 is commended2 that measured union of enterprise and caution found in great commanders1 is a subject of highest admiration2 and why8 ,for the usefulness1 or the success that it brings4 ,what need is there to display the praises of ,,industry1 or of ,,frugality1 virtues useful to the possessor in the first instance8 ,then the qualities of ,,honesty1 ,,fidelity1 and ,,truth1 are praised1 in the first place1 for their tendency to the good of society2 and1 being established on that foundation1 they are also approved as advantageous to the individual's own self4 ,a part of our blame of ,,unchastity in a woman is attached to its imprudence with reference to the opinion regarding it4 ,,strength ,,of ,,mind being to resist present care1 and to maintain the search of distant profit and enjoyment1 is another quality of great value to the possessor4 ,the distinction between the ,fool and the ,wise man illustrates the same position4 ,in our approbation of all such qualities1 it is evident that the happiness and misery of others are not indifferent spectacles to us3 the one1 like sunshine1 or the prospect of well-cultivated plains1 imparts joy and satisfaction2 the other1 like a lowering cloud or a barren landscape1 throws a damp over the spirits4 ,he next considers the influence of bodily endowments and the goods of fortune as bearing upon the general question4 ,even in animals1 one great source of beauty is the suitability of their structure to their manner of life4 ,in times when bodily strength in men was more essential to a warrior than now1 it was held in so much more esteem4 ,impotence in both sexes1 and barrenness in women1 are generally contemned1 for the loss of human pleasure attending them4 ,as regards fortune1 how can we account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful1 but from the reflexion to the mind of prosperity1 happiness1 ease1 plenty1 authority1 and the gratification of every appetite4 ,rank and family1 although they may be detached from wealth and power1 had originally a reference to these4 ,in ,section ,,vii41 ,hume treats of ,,qualities ,,immediately ,,agreeable ,,to ,,ourselves4 ,under this head1 he dilates on the influence of ,,cheerfulness1 as a social quality3 on ,,greatness ,,of ,,mind1 or ,dignity of ,character2 on ,,courage2 on ,,tranquillity1 or equanimity of mind1 in the midst of pain1 sorrow1 and adverse fortune2 on ,,benevolence in the aspect of an agreeable spectacle2 and lastly1 on ,,delicacy of ,taste1 as a merit4 ,as manifested to a beholder1 all these qualities are engaging and admirable1 on account of the immediate pleasure that they communicate to the person possessed of them4 ,they are farther testimonies to the existence of social sympathy1 and to the connexion of that with our sentiment of approbation towards actions or persons4 ,section ,,viii4 brings forward the ,,qualities ,,immediately ,,agreeable ,,to ,,others4 ,these are ,,good ,,manners or ,,politeness2 the ,,wit or ,,ingenuity that enlivens social intercourse2 ,,modesty1 as opposed to impudence1 arrogance1 and vanity2 ,,cleanliness1 and ,,graceful ,,manner2 all which are obviously valued for the pleasures they communicate to people generally4 ,section ,,ix4 is the ,,conclusion4 ,whatever may have been maintained in systems of philosophy1 he contends that in common life the habitual motives of panegyric or censure are of the kind described by him4 ,he will not enter into the question as to the relative shares of benevolence and self-love in the human constitution4 ,let the generous sentiments be ever so weak1 they still direct a preference of what is serviceable to what is pernicious2 and on these preferences a moral distinction is founded4 ,in the notion of morals1 two things are implied2 a sentiment common to all mankind1 and a sentiment whose objects comprehend all mankind2 and these two requisites belong to the sentiment of humanity or benevolence4 ,another spring of our constitution1 that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment1 is ,love of ,fame4 ,the pursuit of a character1 name1 and reputation in the world1 leads to a habit of surveying our own actions1 begets a reverence for self as well as others1 and is thus the guardian of every virtue4 ,humanity and ,love of ,reputation combine to form the highest type of morality yet conceived4 ,the nature of moral approbation being thus solved1 there remains the nature of obligation2 by which the author means to enquire1 if a man having a view to his own welfare1 will not find his best account in the practice of every moral virtue4 ,he dwells upon the many advantages of social virtue1 of benevolence and friendship1 humanity and kindness1 of truth and honesty2 but confesses that the rule that 'honesty is the best policy' is liable to many exceptions4 ,he makes us acquainted with his own theory of ,happiness4 ,how little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature8 and what comparison is there between1 on the one hand1 the cheap pleasures of conversation1 society1 study1 even health1 and1 on the other1 the common beauties of nature1 with self-approbation2 and the feverish1 empty amusements of luxury and expense8 ,thus ends the main treatise2 but the author adds1 in an ,appendix1 four additional dissertations4 ,the first takes up the question started at the outset1 but postponed1 how far our moral approbation is a matter of reason1 and how far of sentiment4 ,his handling of this topic is luminous and decisive4 ,if the utility of actions be a foundation of our approval of them1 reason must have a share1 for no other faculty can trace the results of actions in their bearings upon human happiness4 ,in ,justice especially1 there are often numerous and complicated considerations2 such as to occupy the deliberations of politicians and the debates of lawyers4 ,on the other hand1 reason is insufficient of itself to constitute the feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation4 ,reason shows the means to an end2 but if we are otherwise indifferent to the end1 the reasonings fall inoperative on the mind4 ,here then a sentiment must display itself1 a delight in the happiness of men1 and a repugnance to what causes them misery4 ,reason teaches the consequences of actions2 ,humanity or ,benevolence is roused to make a distinction in favour of such as are beneficial4 ,he adduces a number of illustrations to show that reason alone is insufficient to make a moral sentiment4 ,he bids us examine ,ingratitude1 for instance2 good offices bestowed on one side1 ill-will on the other4 ,reason might say1 whether a certain action1 say the gift of money1 or an act of patronage1 was for the good of the party receiving it1 and whether the circumstances of the gift indicated a good intention on the part of the giver2 it might also say1 whether the actions of the person obliged were intentionally or consciously hurtful or wanting in esteem to the person obliging4 ,but when all this is made out by reason1 there remains the sentiment of abhorrence1 whose foundations must be in the emotional part of our nature1 in our delight in manifested goodness1 and our abhorrence of the opposite4 ,he refers to ,beauty or ,taste as a parallel case1 where there may be an operation of the intellect to compute proportions1 but where the elegance or beauty must arise in the region of feeling4 ,thus1 while reason conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood1 sentiment or emotion must give beauty and deformity1 vice and virtue4 ,appendix ,no4 ,,ii4 is a discussion of ,,self-,,love4 ,the author adverts first to the position that benevolence is a mere pretence1 a cheat1 a gloss of self-love1 and dismisses it with a burst of indignation4 ,he next considers the less offensive view1 that all benevolence and generosity are resolvable in the last resort into self-love4 ,he does not attribute to the holders of this opinion any laxity in their own practice of virtue1 as compared with other men4 ,epicurus and his followers were no strangers to probity2 ,atticus and ,horace were men of generous dispositions2 ,hobbes and ,locke were irreproachable in their lives4 ,these men all allowed that friendship exists without hypocrisy2 but considered that1 by a sort of mental chemistry1 it might be made out self-love1 twisted and moulded by a particular turn of the imagination4 ,but1 says ,hume1 as some men have not the turn of imagination1 and others have1 this alone is quite enough to make the widest difference of human characters1 and to stamp one man as virtuous and humane1 and another vicious and meanly interested4 ,the analysis in no way sets aside the reality of moral distinctions4 ,the question is1 therefore1 purely speculative4 ,as a speculation1 it is open to these objections4 7#a7 ,being contrary to the unprejudiced notions of mankind1 it demands some very powerful aid from philosophy4 ,on the face of things1 the selfish passions and the benevolent passions are widely distinguished1 and no hypothesis has ever yet so far overcome the disparity as to show that the one could grow out of the other2 we may discern in the attempts that love of simplicity1 which has done so much harm to philosophy4 ,the ,animals are susceptible of kindness2 shall we then attribute to them1 too1 a refinement of self-interest8 ,again1 what interest can a fond mother have in view who loses her health in attendance on a sick child1 and languishes and dies of grief when relieved from the slavery of that attendance8 7#b7 ,but farther1 the real simplicity lies on the side of independent and disinterested benevolence4 ,there are bodily appetites that carry us to their objects before sensual enjoyment2 hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end2 the gratification follows1 and becomes a secondary desire4 ,a very questionable analysis4 ,so there are mental passions1 as fame1 power1 vengeance1 that urge us to act1 in the first instance2 and when the end is attained1 the pleasure follows4 ,now1 as vengeance may be so pursued as to make us neglect ease1 interest1 and safety1 why may we not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges8 ,this is ,butler1 improved in the statement4 ,appendix ,,iii4 gives some farther considerations with regard to ,,justice4 ,the point of the discussion is to show that ,justice differs from ,generosity or ,beneficence in a regard to distant consequences1 and to ,general ,rules4 ,the theme is handled in the author's usual happy style1 but contains nothing special to him4 ,he omits to state what is also a prime attribute of ,justice1 its being indispensable to the very existence of society1 which cannot be said of generosity apart from its contributing to justice4 ,appendix ,,iv4 is on some ,,verbal ,,disputes4 ,he remarks that1 neither in ,english nor in any other modern tongue1 is the boundary fixed between virtues and talents1 vices and defects2 that praise is given to natural endowments1 as well as to voluntary exertions4 ,the epithets intellectual and moral do not precisely divide the virtues2 neither does the contrast of head and heart2 many virtuous qualities partake of both ingredients4 ,so the sentiment of conscious worth1 or of its opposite1 is affected by what is not in our power1 as well as by what is2 by the goodness or badness of our memory1 as well as by continence or dissoluteness of conduct4 ,without endowments of the understanding1 the best intentions will not procure esteem4 ,the ancient moralists included in the virtues what are obviously natural endowments4 ,prudence1 according to ,cicero1 involved sagacity or powers of judgment4 ,in ,aristotle1 we find1 among the virtues1 ,courage1 ,temperance1 ,magnanimity1 ,modesty1 ,prudence1 and manly ,openness1 as well as ,justice and ,friendship4 ,epictetus puts people on their guard against humanity and compassion4 ,in general1 the difference of voluntary and involuntary was little regarded in ancient ethics4 ,this is changed in modern times1 by the alliance of ,ethics with ,theology4 ,the divine has put all morality on the footing of the civil law1 and guarded it by the same sanctions of reward and punishment2 and consequently must make the distinction of voluntary and involuntary fundamental4 ,hume also composed a dialogue1 to illustrate1 in his light and easy style1 the great variety1 amounting almost to opposition1 of men's moral sentiments in different ages4 ,this may seem adverse to his principle of ,utility1 as it is to the doctrine of an ,intuitive ,sense of ,right and ,wrong4 ,he allows1 however1 for the different ways that people may view ,utility1 seeing that the consequences of acting are often difficult to estimate1 and people may agree in an end without agreeing in the means4 ,still1 he pays too little attention to the sentimental likings and dislikings that frequently overbear the sense of ,utility2 scarcely recognizing it1 except in one passage1 where he dwells on the superstitions that mingle with a regard to the consequences of actions in determining right4 ,we shall now repeat the leading points of ,hume's system1 in the usual order4 ,i4--,the ,standard of ,right and ,wrong is ,utility1 or a reference to the ,happiness of mankind4 ,this is the ground1 as wall as the motive1 of moral approbation4 ,,ii4--,as to the nature of the ,moral ,faculty1 he contends that it is a compound of ,reason1 and ,humane or ,generous ,sentiment4 ,he does not introduce the subject of ,free-will into ,morals4 ,he contends strongly for the existence of ,disinterested ,sentiment1 or ,benevolence2 but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and uncompensated self-sacrifice4 ,he does not seem to see that as far as the approbation of benevolent actions is concerned1 we are anything but disinterested parties4 ,the good done by one man is done to some others2 and the recipients are moved by their self-love to encourage beneficence4 ,the regard to our own benefactor makes all benefactors interesting4 ,,iii4--,he says little directly bearing on the constituents of ,human ,happiness2 but that little is all in favour of simplicity of life and cheap pleasures4 ,he does not reflect that the pleasures singled out by him are far from cheap2 'agreeable conversation1 society1 study1 health1 and the beauties of nature1' although not demanding extraordinary wealth1 cannot be secured without a larger share of worldly means than has ever fallen to the mass of men in any community4 ,,iv4--,as to the substance of the ,moral ,code1 he makes no innovations4 ,he talks somewhat more lightly of the evils of ,unchastity than is customary2 but regards the prevailing restraints as borne out by ,utility4 ,the inducements to virtue are1 in his view1 our humane sentiments1 on the one hand1 and our self-love1 or prudence1 on the other2 the two classes of motives conspiring to promote both our own good and the good of mankind4 ,v4--,the connexion of ,ethics with ,politics is not specially brought out4 ,the political virtues are moral virtues4 ,he does not dwell upon the sanctions of morality1 so as to distinguish the legal sanction from the popular sanction4 ,he draws no line between ,duty and ,merit4 ,,vi4--,he recognizes no relationship between ,ethics and ,theology4 ,the principle of ,benevolence in the human mind is1 he thinks1 an adequate source of moral approbation and disapprobation2 and he takes no note of what even sceptics 7,gibbon1 for example7 often dwell upon1 the aid of the ,theological sanction in enforcing duties imperfectly felt by the natural and unprompted sentiments of the mind4 ,,richard ,,price4 7#agbc-agia47 ,price's work is entitled1 ',a ,review of the principal questions in ,morals2 particularly those respecting the ,origin of our ,ideas of ,virtue1 its ,nature1 ,relation to the ,deity1 ,obligation1 ,subject-matter1 and ,sanctions4' ,in the third edition1 he added an ,appendix on 'the ,being and ,attributes of the ,deity4' ,the book is divided into ten chapters4 ,chapter ,i4 is on the origin of our ,ideas of ,right and ,wrong4 ,the actions of moral agents1 he says1 give rise in us to three different perceptions3 #ast1 ,right and ,wrong2 #bnd1 ,beauty and ,deformity2 #crd1 ,good or ,ill ,desert4 ,it is the first of these perceptions that he proposes mainly to consider4 ,he commences by quoting ,hutcheson's doctrine of a ,moral ,sense1 which he describes as an implanted and arbitrary principle1 imparting a relish or disrelish for actions1 like the sensibilities of the various senses4 ,on this doctrine1 he remarks1 the ,creator might have annexed the same sentiments to the opposite actions4 ,other schemes of morality1 such as ,self-love1 ,positive ,laws and ,compacts1 the ,will of the ,deity1 he dismisses as not meeting the true question4 ,the question1 as conceived by him1 is1 ',what is the power within us that perceives the distinctions of ,right and ,wrong8' ,the answer is1 ,the ,,understanding4 ,to establish this position1 he enters into an enquiry into the distinct provinces of ,sense and of ,understanding in the origin of our ideas4 ,it is plain1 he says1 that what judges concerning the perceptions of the senses1 and contradicts their decisions1 cannot itself be sense1 but must be some nobler faculty4 ,likewise1 the power that views and compares the objects of all the senses cannot be sense4 ,sense is a mere capacity of being passively impressed2 it presents particular forms to the mind1 and is incapable of discovering general truths4 ,it is the understanding that perceives order or proportion2 variety and regularity2 design1 connexion1 art1 and power2 aptitudes1 dependence1 correspondence1 and adjustment of parts to a whole or to an end4 ,he goes over our leading ideas in detail1 to show that mere sense cannot furnish them4 ,thus1 ,solidity1 or ,impenetrability1 needs an exertion of reason2 we must compare instances to know that two atoms of matter cannot occupy the same space4 ,vis ,inertic is a perception of the reason4 ,so ,substance1 ,duration1 ,space1 ,necessary ,existence1 ,power1 and ,causation involve the understanding4 ,likewise1 that all ,abstract ,ideas whatsoever require the understanding is superfluously proved4 ,the author wonders1 therefore1 that his position in this matter should not have been sooner arrived at4 ,the tracing of ,agreement and of ,disagreement1 which are functions of the ,understanding1 is really the source of simple ideas4 ,thus1 ,equality is a simple idea originating in this source2 so are ,proportion1 ,identity and ,diversity1 ,existence1 ,cause and ,effect1 ,power1 ,possibility and ,impossibility2 and 7as he means ultimately to show7 ,right and ,wrong4 ,although the author's exposition is not very lucid1 his main conclusion is a sound one4 ,sense1 in its narrowest acceptation1 gives particular impressions and experiences of ,colour1 ,sound1 ,touch1 ,taste1 ,odour1 c4 ,the ,intellectual functions of ,discrimination and ,agreement are necessary as a supplement to ,sense1 to recognize these impressions as differing and agreeing1 as ,equal or ,unequal2 ,proportionate or ,disproportionate2 ,harmonious or ,discordant4 ,and farther1 every abstract or general notion1--colours in the abstract1 sweetness1 pungency1 c4--supposes these1 powers of the understanding in addition to the recipiency of the senses4 ,to apply this to ,right and ,wrong1 the author begins by affirming what goes a good way towards begging the question that right and wrong are simple ideas1 and therefore the result of an immediate power of perception in the human mind4 ,beneficence and ,cruelty are indefinable1 and therefore ultimate4 ,there must be some actions that are in the last resort an end in themselves4 ,this being assumed1 the author contends that the power of immediately perceiving these ultimate ideas is the ,understanding4 ,shaftesbury had contended that1 because the perception of right and wrong was immediate1 therefore it must reside in a special ,sense4 ,the conclusion1 thinks ,price1 was1 to say the least of it1 hasty2 for it does not follow that every immediate perception should reside in a special sensibility or sense4 ,he puts it to each one's experience whether1 in conceiving ,gratitude or ,beneficence to be right1 one feels a sensation merely1 or performs an act of understanding4 ',would not a ,being purely intelligent1 having happiness within his reach1 approve of securing it for himself8 ,would he not think this right2 and would it not be right8 ,when we contemplate the happiness of a species1 or of a world1 and pronounce on the actions of reasonable beings which promote it1 that they are right1 is this judging erroneously8 ,or is it no determination of the judgment at all1 but a species of mental taste as ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson supposed8 ,as against a moral sense1 this reasoning may be effective2 but it obviously assumes an end of desire1--happiness for self1 or for others--and yet does not allow to that end any share in making up the sense of right and wrong4 ,every one1 the author goes on to say1 must desire happiness for himself2 and our rational nature thenceforth must approve of the actions for promoting happiness1 and disapprove of the contrary actions4 ,surely the understanding has some share in the revulsion that we feel when any one brings upon himself1 or upon others1 calamity and ruin4 ,a being flattered with hopes of bliss and then plunged into torments would complain justly2 he would consider that violence had been done to a perception of the human understanding4 ,he next brings out a metaphysical difficulty in applying right and wrong to actions1 on the supposition that they are mere effects of sensation4 ,all sensations1 as such1 are modes of consciousness1 or feelings1 of a sentient being1 and must be of a nature different from their causes4 ,colour is in the mind1 not an attribute of the object2 but right and wrong are qualities of actions1 of objects1 and therefore must be ideas1 not sensations4 ,then1 again1 there can be nothing true or untrue in a sensation2 all sensations are alike just2 while the moral rectitude of an action is something absolute and unvarying4 ,lastly1 all actions have a nature1 or character2 something truly belonging to them1 and truly affirmable of them4 ,if actions have no character1 then they are all indifferent2 but this no one can affirm2 we all strongly believe the contrary4 ,actions are not indifferent4 ,they are good or bad1 better or worse4 ,and if so1 they are declared such by an act of judgment1 a function of the understanding4 ,the author1 considering his thesis established1 deduces from it the corollary1 that morality is eternal and immutable4 ,as an object of the ,understanding1 it has an invariable essence4 ,no will1 not even ,omnipotence1 can make things other than they are4 ,right and wrong1 as far as they express the real characters of actions1 must immutably and necessarily belong to the actions4 ,by action1 is of course understood not a bare external effect1 but an effect taken along with its principle or rule1 the motives or reasons of the being that performs it4 ,the matter of an action being the same1 its morality reposes upon the end or motive of the agent4 ,nothing can be obligatory in us that was not so from eternity4 ,the will of ,god could not make a thing right that was not right in its own nature4 ,the author closes his first chapter with a criticism of the doctrine of ,protagoras--that man is the measure of all things--interpreting it as another phase of the view that he is combating4 ,although this chapter is but a small part of the work1 it completes the author's demonstration of his ethical theory4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is on 'our ,ideas of the ,beauty and ,deformity of ,actions4' ,by these are meant our pleasurable and painful sentiments1 arising from the consideration of moral right and wrong1 expressed by calling some actions amiable1 and others odious1 shocking1 vile4 ,although1 in this aspect of actions1 it would seem that the reference to a sense is the suitable explanation1 he still contends for the intervention of the ,understanding4 ,the character of the ,deity must appear more amiable the better it is known and understood4 ,a reasonable being1 without any special sensibilities1 but knowing what order and happiness are1 would receive pleasure from the contemplation of a universe where order prevailed1 and pain from a prospect of the contrary4 ,to behold virtue is to admire her2 to perceive vice is to be moved to condemnation4 ,there must always be a consideration of the circumstances of an action1 and this involves intellectual discernment4 ,the author now qualifies his doctrine by the remark1 that to some superior beings the intellectual discernment may explain the whole of the appearances1 but inferior natures1 such as the human1 are aided by instinctive determinations4 ,our appetites and passions are too strong for reason by itself1 especially in early years4 ,hence he is disposed to conclude that 'in contemplating the actions of moral agents1 we have both a perception of the understanding and a feeling of the heart2' but that this feeling of the heart1 while partly instinctive1 is mainly a sense of congruity and incongruity in actions4 ,the author therefore allows something to innate sense1 but differs from ,shaftesbury1 who makes the whole a matter of intuitive determination4 ,chapter ,,iii4 relates to the origin of our ,desires and ,affections1 by which he means more especially ,self-love and ,benevolence4 ,his position here is that ,self-love is the essence of a ,sensible being1 ,benevolence the essential of an ,intelligent being4 ,by the very nature of our sensitive constitution1 we cannot but choose happiness for self2 and it is only an act of intellectual consistency to extend the same measure to others4 ,the same qualification1 however1 is made as to the insufficiency of a mere intellectual impulse in this matter1 without constitutional tendencies4 ,these constitutional tendencies the author considers as made up of our ,appetites and ,passions1 while our ,affections are founded on our rational nature4 ,then follow a few observations in confirmation of ,butler's views as to the disinterested nature of our affections4 ,chapter ,,iv4 is on our ,ideas of good and ill ,desert4 ,these are only a variety of our ideas of right and wrong1 being the feelings excited towards the moral ,agent4 ,our reason determines1 with regard to a virtuous agent1 that he ought to be the better for his virtue4 ,the ground of such determination1 however1 is not solely that virtuous conduct promotes the happiness of mankind1 and vice detracts from it2 this counts for much1 but not for all4 ,virtue is in itself rewardable2 vice is of essential demerit4 ,our understanding recognizes the absolute and eternal rectitude1 the intrinsic fitness of the procedure in both aspects4 ,chapter ,v4 is entitled ',of the ,reference of ,morality to the ,divine ,nature2 the ,rectitude of our ,faculties2 and the ,grounds of ,belief4' ,the author means to reply to the objection that his system1 in setting up a criterion independent of ,god1 is derogatory to the ,divine nature4 ,he urges that there must be attributes of the ,deity1 independent of his will2 as his ,existence1 ,immensity1 ,power1 ,wisdom2 that ,mind supposes ,truth apart from itself2 that without moral distinctions there could be no ,moral ,attributes in the ,deity4 ,certain things are inherent in his ,nature1 and not dependent on his will4 ,there is a limit to the universe itself2 two infinities of space or of duration are not possible4 ,the necessary goodness of the divine nature is a part of necessary truth4 ,thus1 morality1 although not asserted to depend on the will of the ,deity1 is still resolvable into his nature4 ,in all this1 ,price avowedly follows ,cudworth4 ,he then starts another difficulty4 ,may not our faculties be mistaken1 or be so constituted as to deceive us8 ,to which he gives the reply1 made familiar to us by ,hamilton1 that the doubt is suicidal2 the faculty that doubts being itself under the same imputation4 ,nay1 more1 a being cannot be made such as to be imposed on by falsehood2 what is false is nothing4 ,as to the cases of actual mistake1 these refer to matters attended with some difficulty2 and it does not follow that we must be mistaken in cases that are clear4 ,he concludes with a statement of the ultimate grounds of our belief4 ,these are1 7#a7 ,consciousness or ,feeling1 as in regard to our own existence1 our sensations1 passions1 c42 7#b7 ,intuition1 comprising self-evident truths2 and 7#c7 ,deduction1 or ,argumentation4 ,he discusses under these the existence of a material world1 and affirms that we have an ,intuition that it is possible4 ,chapter ,,vi4 considers ,fitness and ,moral ,obligation1 and other prevailing forms of expression regarding morality4 ,fitness and ,unfitness denote ,congruity or ,incongruity1 and are necessarily a perception of the ,understanding4 ,the term ,obligation is more perplexing4 ,still1 it is but another name for ,rightness4 ,what is ,right is1 by that very fact1 obligatory4 ,obligation1 therefore1 cannot be the creature of law1 for law may command what is morally wrong4 ,the will of ,god enforced by rewards and punishments cannot make right2 it would only determine what is prudent4 ,rewards and punishments do not make obligation1 but suppose it4 ,rectitude is a ,,law1 the authoritative guide of a rational being4 ,it is ,supreme1 universal1 unalterable1 and indispensable4 ,self-valid and self-originated1 it stands on immovable foundations4 ,being the one authority in nature1 it is1 in short1 the ,divine authority4 ,even the obligations of religion are but branches of universal rectitude4 ,the ,sovereign ,authority is not the mere result of his ,almighty ,power1 but of this conjoined with his necessary perfections and infinite excellence4 ,he does not admit that obligation implies an obliger4 ,he takes notice of the objection that certain actions may be right1 and yet we are not bound to perform them2 such are acts of generosity and kindness4 ,but his answer throws no farther light on his main doctrine4 ,in noticing the theories of other writers in the same vein1 as ,wollaston1 he takes occasion to remark that1 together with the perception of conformity or fitness1 there is a simple immediate perception urging us to act according to that fitness1 for which no farther reason can be assigned4 ,when we compare innocence and eternal misery1 we are struck with the idea of unsuitableness1 and are inspired in consequence with intense repugnance4 ,chapter ,,vii4 discusses the ,heads or ,divisions of ,virtue2 under which he enquires first what are virtuous actions2 secondly1 what is the true principle or motive of a virtuous agent2 and thirdly1 the estimate of the degrees of virtue4 ,he first quotes ,butler to show that all virtue is not summed up in ,benevolence2 repeating that there is an intrinsic rectitude in keeping faith2 and giving the usual arguments against ,utility1 grounded on the supposed crimes that might be committed on this plea4 ,he is equally opposed to those that would deny disinterested benevolence1 or would resolve beneficence into veracity4 ,he urges against ,hutcheson1 that1 these being independent and distinct virtues1 a distinct sense would be necessary to each2 in other words1 we should1 for the whole of virtue1 need a plurality of moral senses4 ,his classification of ,virtue comprehends 7#a7 ,duty to ,god1 which he dilates upon at some length4 7#b7 ,duty to ,ourselves1 wherein he maintains that our sense of self-interest is not enough for us4 7#c7 ,beneficence1 the ,good of others4 7#d7 ,gratitude4 7#e7 ,veracity1 which he inculcates with great earnestness1 adverting especially to impartiality and honesty in our enquiries after truth4 7#f7 ,justice1 which he treats in its application to the ,rights of ,property4 ,he considers that the difficulties in practice arise partly from the conflict of the different heads1 and partly from the different modes of applying the same principles2 which he gives as an answer to the objection from the great differences of men's moral sentiments and practices4 ,he allows1 besides1 that custom1 education1 and example1 may blind and deprave our intellectual and moral powers2 but denies that the whole of our notions and sentiments could result from education4 ,no amount of depravity is able utterly to destroy our moral discernment4 ,chapter ,,viii4 treats of ,intention as an element in virtuous action4 ,he makes a distinction between ,virtue in the ,abstract and ,virtue in ,practice1 or with reference to all the circumstances of the agent4 ,a man may do abstract wrong1 through mistake1 while as he acts with his best judgment and with upright intentions1 he is practically right4 ,he grounds on this a powerful appeal against every attempt at dominion over conscience4 ,the requisites of ,practical ,morality are 7#a7 ,liberty1 or ,free-will1 on which he takes the side of free-agency4 7#b7 ,intelligence1 without which there can be no perception of good and evil1 and no moral agency4 7#c7 ,the ,consciousness of ,rectitude1 or ,righteous ,intention4 ,on this he dwells at some length4 ,no action is properly the action of a moral agent unless designed by him4 ,a virtuous motive is essential to virtue4 ,on the question--,is ,benevolence a virtuous motive8 he replies3 ,not the ,instinctive benevolence of the parent1 but only ,rational benevolence2 which he allows to coincide with rectitude4 ,reason presiding over ,self-love renders it a virtuous principle likewise4 ,the presence of ,reason in greater or less degree is the criterion of the greater or less virtue of any action4 ,chapter ,,ix4 is on the different ,degrees of ,virtue and ,vice1 and the modes of estimating them2 the ,difficulties attending the ,practice of ,virtue2 the use of ,trials1 and the essentials of a good or a bad ,character4 ,the considerations adduced are a number of perfectly well-known maxims on the practice of morality1 and scarcely add anything to the elucidation of the author's ,moral ,theory4 ,the concluding chapter1 on ,natural ,religion1 contains nothing original4 ,to sum up the views of ,price3-- ,i4--,as regards the ,moral ,standard1 he asserts that a perception of the ,reason or the ,understanding1--a sense of fitness or congruity between actions and the agents1 and all the circumstances attending them1--is what determines ,right and ,wrong4 ,he finds it impracticable to maintain his position without sundry qualifications1 as we have seen4 ,virtue is naturally adapted to please every observing mind2 vice the contrary4 ,right actions must be grateful1 wrong ungrateful to us4 ,to behold virtue is to admire her4 ,in contemplating the actions of moral agents1 we have both a perception of the understanding and a feeling of the heart4 ,he thus re-admits an element of feeling1 along with the intellect1 in some undefined degree2 contending only that all morality is not to be resolved into feeling or instinct4 ,we have also noticed another singular admission1 to the effect that only superior natures can discover virtue by the understanding4 ,reason alone1 did we possess it in a high degree1 would answer all the ends of the passions4 ,parental affection would be unnecessary1 if parents were sufficiently alive to the reasons of supporting the young1 and were virtuous enough to be always determined by them4 ,utility1 although not the sole ground of ,justice1 is yet admitted to be one important reason or ground of many of its maxims4 ,,ii4--,the nature of the ,moral ,faculty1 in ,price's theory1 is not a separate question from the standard1 but the same question4 ,his discussion takes the form of an enquiry into the ,faculty3--',what is the power within us that perceives the distinctions of ,right and ,wrong8' ,the two questions are mixed up throughout1 to the detriment of precision in the reasoning4 ,with his usual facility of making concessions to other principles1 he says it is not easy to determine how far our natural sentiments may be altered by custom1 education1 and example3 while it would be unreasonable to conclude that all is derived from these sources4 ,that part of our moral constitution depending on instinct is liable to be corrupted by custom and education to almost any length2 but the most depraved can never sink so low as to lose all moral discernment1 all ideas of just and unjust2 of which he offers the singular proof that men are never wanting in resentment when they are themselves the objects of ill-treatment4 ,as regards the ,psychology of ,disinterested ,action1 he provides nothing but a repetition of ,butler 7,chapter ,,iii47 and a vague assertion of the absurdity of denying disinterested benevolence4 ,,iii4--,on ,human ,happiness1 he has only a few general remarks4 ,happiness is an object of essential and eternal value4 ,happiness is the end1 and the only end1 conceivable by us1 of ,god's providence and government2 but ,he pursues this end in subordination to rectitude4 ,virtue tends to happiness1 but does not always secure it4 ,a person that sacrifices his life rather than violate his conscience1 or betray his country1 gives up all possibility of any present reward1 and loses the more in proportion as his virtue is more glorious4 ,neither on the ,moral ,code1 nor in the relations of ,ethics to ,politics and to ,theology1 are any further remarks on ,price called for4 ,,adam ,,smith4 #agbc-ij4 ,the ',theory of the ,moral ,sentiments' is a work of great extent and elaboration4 ,it is divided into five ,parts2 each part being again divided into ,sections1 and these subdivided into ,chapters4 ,,part ,i4 is entitled1 ,,of ,,the ,,propriety ,,of ,,action4 ,section ,i4 is1 ',of the ,sense of ,propriety4' ,propriety is his word for ,rectitude or ,right4 ,chapter ,i41 entitled1 ',of ,sympathy1' is a felicitous illustration of the general nature and workings of ,sympathy4 ,he calls in the experience of all mankind to attest the existence of our sympathetic impulses4 ,he shows through what medium sympathy operates2 namely1 by our placing ourselves in the situation of the other party1 and imagining what we should feel in that case4 ,he produces the most notable examples of the impressions made on us by our witnessing the actions1 the pleasurable and the painful expression of others2 effects extending even to fictitious representations4 ,he then remarks that1 although on some occasions1 we take on simply and purely the feelings manifested in our presence1--the grief or joy of another man1 yet this is far from the universal case3 a display of angry passion may produce in us hostility and disgust2 but this very result may be owing to our sympathy for the person likely to suffer from the anger4 ,so our sympathy for grief or for joy is imperfect until we know the cause1 and may be entirely suppressed4 ,we take the whole situation into view1 as well as the expression of the feeling4 ,hence we often feel for another person what that person does not feel for himself2 we act out our own view of the situation1 not his4 ,we feel for the insane what they do not feel2 we sympathize even with the dead4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is ',of the ,pleasure of ,mutual ,sympathy4' ,it contains illustrations of the delight that we experience in the sympathy of others2 we being thereby strengthened in our pleasures and relieved in our miseries4 ,he observes that we demand this sympathy more urgently for our painful emotions than for such as are pleasurable2 we are especially intolerant of the omission of our friends to join in our resentments4 ,on the other hand1 we feel pleasure in the act of sympathizing1 and find in that a compensation for the pain that the sight of pain gives us4 ,still1 this pleasure may be marred if the other party's own expression of grief or of joy is beyond what we think suitable to the situation4 ,chapter ,,iii4 considers 'the manner of our judging of the propriety of other men's affections by their consonance with our own1' ,the author illustrates the obvious remark1 that we approve of the passions of another1 if they are such as we ourselves should feel in the same situation4 ,we require that a man's expression and conduct should be suitable to the occasion1 according to our own standard of judging1 namely1 our own procedure in such cases4 ,chapter ,,iv4 continues the subject1 and draws a distinction between two cases2 the case where the objects of a feeling do not concern either ourselves or the person himself1 and the case where they do concern one or other4 ,the first case is shown in matters of taste and science1 where we derive pleasure from sympathy1 but yet can tolerate difference4 ,the other case is exemplified in our personal fortunes2 in these1 we cannot endure any one refusing us their sympathy4 ,still1 it is to be noted that the sympathizer does not fully attain the level of the sufferer2 hence the sufferer1 aware of this1 and desiring the satisfaction of a full accord with his friend1 tones down his own vehemence till it can be fully met by the other2 which very circumstance is eventually for his own good1 and adds to1 rather than detracts from1 the tranquillizing influence of a friendly presence4 ,we sober down our feelings still more before casual acquaintance and strangers2 and hence the greater equality of temper in the man of the world than in the recluse4 ,chapter ,v4 makes an application of these remarks to explain the difference between the ,amiable and the ,respectable ,virtues4 ,the soft1 the gentle1 and the amiable qualities are manifested when1 as sympathizers1 we enter fully into the expressed sentiments of another2 the great1 the awful and respectable virtues of self-denial1 are shown when the principal person concerned brings down his own case to the level that the most ordinary sympathy can easily attain to4 ,the one is the virtue of giving much1 the other of expecting little4 ,section ,,ii4 is ',of the ,degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety4' ,under this head he reviews the leading passions1 remarks how far1 and why1 we can sympathize with each4 ,chapter ,i4 is on the ,passions having their origin in the body4 ,we can sympathize with hunger to a certain limited extent1 and in certain circumstances2 but we can rarely tolerate any very prominent expression of it4 ,the same limitations apply to the passion of the sexes4 ,we partly sympathize with bodily pain1 but not with the violent expression of it4 ,these feelings are in marked contrast to the passions seated in the imagination3 wherein our appetite for sympathy is complete2 disappointed love or ambition1 loss of friends or of dignity1 are suitable to representation in art4 ,on the same principle1 we can sympathize with danger2 as regards our power of conceiving1 we are on a level with the sufferer4 ,from our inability to enter into bodily pain1 we the more admire the man that can bear it with firmness4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is on certain ,passions depending on a peculiar turn of the ,imagination4 ,under this he exemplifies chiefly the situation of two lovers1 with whose passion1 in its intensity1 a third person cannot sympathize1 although one may enter into the hopes of happiness1 and into the dangers and calamities often flowing from it4 ,chapter ,,iii4 is on the ,unsocial ,passions4 ,these necessarily divide our sympathy between him that feels them and him that is their object4 ,resentment is especially hard to sympathize with4 ,we may ourselves resent wrong done to another1 but the less so that the sufferer strongly resents it4 ,moreover1 there is in the passion itself an element of the disagreeable and repulsive2 its manifestation is naturally distasteful4 ,it may be useful and even necessary1 but so is a prison1 which is not on that account a pleasant object4 ,in order to make its gratification agreeable1 there must be many well known conditions and qualifications attending it4 ,chapter ,,iv4 gives the contrast of the ,social ,passions4 ,it is with the humane1 the benevolent sentiments1 that our sympathy is unrestricted and complete4 ,even in their excess1 they never inspire aversion4 ,chapter ,v4 is on the ,selfish ,passions4 ,he supposes these1 in regard to sympathy1 to hold a middle place between the social and the unsocial4 ,we sympathize with small joys and with great sorrows2 and not with great joys 7which dispense with our aid1 if they do not excite our envy7 or with small troubles4 ,section ,,iii4 considers the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgments of mankind regarding propriety of action4 ,chapter ,i4 puts forward the proposition that our sympathy with sorrow1 although more lively than our sympathy with joy1 falls short of the intensity of feeling in the person concerned4 ,it is agreeable to sympathize with joy1 and we do so with the heart2 the painfulness of entering into grief and misery holds us back4 ,hence1 as he remarked before1 the magnanimity and nobleness of the man that represses his woes1 and does not exact our compassionate participation4 ,chapter ,,ii4 inquires into the origin of ,ambition1 and of the distinction of ,ranks4 ,proceeding upon the principle just enounced1 that mankind sympathize with joy rather than with sorrow1 the author composes an exceedingly eloquent homily on the worship paid to rank and greatness4 ,chapter ,,iii41 in continuation of the same theme1 illustrates the corruption of our moral sentiments1 arising from this worship of the great4 ',we frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great1 than towards the wise and the virtuous4' ',the external graces1 the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of fashion1 are commonly more admired than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior1 a statesman1 a philosopher1 or a legislator4' ,,part ,,ii4 is ,,of ,,merit ,,and ,,demerit2 ,,or ,,of ,,the ,,objects ,,of ,,reward ,,and ,,punishment4 ,it consists of three ,sections4 ,section ,i4 is1 ,of the ,sense of ,merit and ,demerit4 ,chapter ,i4 maintains that whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude1 appears to deserve reward2 and that whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment1 appears to deserve punishment4 ,the author distinguishes between gratitude and mere love or liking2 and1 obversely1 between resentment and hatred4 ,love makes us pleased to see any one promoted2 but gratitude urges us to be ourselves the instrument of their promotion4 ,chapter ,,ii4 determines the proper objects of ,gratitude and ,resentment1 these being also the proper objects of ,reward and ,punishment respectively4 ',these1 as well as all the other passions of human nature1 seem proper1 and are approved of1 when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them1 when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into1 and goes along with them4' ,in short1 a good moral decision is obtained by the unanimous vote of all impartial persons4 ,this view is in accordance with the course taken by the mind in the two contrasting situations4 ,in sympathizing with the joy of a prosperous person1 we approve of his complacent and grateful sentiment towards the author of his prosperity2 we make his gratitude our own3 in sympathizing with sorrow1 we enter into1 and approve of1 the natural resentment towards the agent causing it4 ,chapter ,,iii4 remarks that where we do not approve of the conduct of the person conferring the benefit1 we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the receiver2 we do not care to enter into the gratitude of the favourites of profligate monarchs4 ,chapter ,,iv4 supposes the case of our approving strongly the conduct and the motives of a benefactor1 in which case we sympathize to a corresponding degree with the gratitude of the receiver4 ,chapter ,v4 sums up the analysis of the ,sense of ,merit and of ,demerit thus3--,the sense of ,merit is a compound sentiment1 made up of two distinct emotions2 a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent 7constituting the propriety of the action71 and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the recipient4 ,the sense of ,demerit includes a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the agent1 and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer4 ,section ,,ii4 is ,of ,justice and ,beneficence4 ,chapter ,i4 compares the two virtues4 ,actions of a beneficent tendency1 from proper motives1 seem alone to require a reward2 actions of a hurtful tendency1 from improper motives1 seem alone to deserve punishment4 ,it is the nature of ,beneficence to be free2 the mere absence of it does not expose to punishment4 ,of all the duties of beneficence1 the one most allied to perfect obligation is gratitude2 but although we talk of the debt of gratitude 7we do not say the debt of charity71 we do not punish ingratitude4 ,resentment1 the source of punishment1 is given for defence against positive evil2 we employ it not to extort benefits1 but to repel injuries4 ,now1 the injury is the violation of ,justice4 ,the sense of mankind goes along with the employment of violence to avenge the hurt done by injustice1 to prevent the injury1 and to restrain the offender4 ,beneficence1 then1 is the subject of reward2 and the want of it is not the subject of punishment4 ,there may be cases where a beneficent act is compelled by punishment1 as in obliging a father to support his family1 or in punishing a man for not interfering when another is in danger2 but these cases are immaterial exceptions to the broad definition4 ,he might have added1 that in cases where justice is performed under unusual difficulties1 and with unusual fidelity1 our disposition would be not merely to exempt from punishment1 but to reward4 ,chapter ,,ii4 considers the sense of ,justice1 ,remorse1 and the feeling of ,merit4 ,every man is recommended by nature to his own care1 being fitter to take care of himself than of another person4 ,we approve1 therefore1 of each one seeking their own good2 but then it must not be to the hurt of any other being4 ,the primary feeling of self-preservation would not of itself1 however1 be shocked at causing injury to our fellows4 ,it is when we pass out of this point of view1 and enter into the mental state of the spectator of our actions1 that we feel the sense of injustice and the sting of ,remorse4 ,though it may be true that every individual in his own breast prefers himself to mankind1 yet he dares not look mankind in the face1 and avow that he acts on this principle4 ,a man is approved when he outstrips his fellows in a fair race2 he is condemned when he jostles or trips up a competitor unfairly4 ,the actor takes home to himself this feeling2 a feeling known as ,shame1 ,dread of ,punishment1 and ,remorse4 ,so with the obverse4 ,he that performs a generous action can realize the sentiments of the by-stander1 and applaud himself by sympathy with the approbation of the supposed impartial judge4 ,this is the sense of ,merit4 ,chapter ,,iii4 gives reflections upon the utility of this constitution of our nature4 ,human beings are dependent upon one another for mutual assistance1 and are exposed to mutual injuries4 ,society might exist without love or beneficence1 but not without mutual abstinence from injury4 ,beneficence is the ornament that embellishes the building2 ,justice the main pillar that supports it4 ,it is for the observance of ,justice that we need that consciousness of ill-desert1 and those terrors of mental punishment1 growing out of our sympathy with the disapprobation of our fellows4 ,justice is necessary to the existence of society1 and we often defend its dictates on that ground2 but1 without looking to such a remote and comprehensive end1 we are plunged into remorse for its violation by the shorter process of referring to the censure of a supposed spectator in other words1 to the sanction of public opinion4 ,section ,,iii4--,of the influence of ,fortune upon the sentiments of mankind1 with regard to the ,merit and the ,demerit of actions4 ,every voluntary action consists of three parts3--7#a7 the ,intention or motive1 7#b7 the ,mechanism1 as when we lift the hand1 and give a blow1 and 7#c7 the ,consequences4 ,it is1 in principle1 admitted by all1 that only the first1 the ,intention1 can be the subject of blame4 ,the ,mechanism is in itself indifferent4 ,so the ,consequences cannot be properly imputed to the agent1 unless intended by him4 ,on this last point1 however1 mankind do not always adhere to their general maxim2 when they come to particular cases1 they are influenced1 in their estimate of merit and demerit1 by the actual consequences of the action4 ,chapter ,i4 considers the causes of this influence of ,fortune4 ,gratitude requires1 in the first instance1 that some pleasure should have been conferred2 ,resentment pre-supposes pain4 ,these passions require farther that the object of them should itself be susceptible of pleasure and pain2 they should be human beings or animals4 ,thirdly1 ,it is requisite that they should have produced the effects from a design to do so4 ,now1 the absence of the pleasurable consequences intended by a beneficent agent leaves out one of the exciting causes of gratitude1 although including another2 the absence of the painful consequences of a maleficent act leaves out one of the exciting causes of resentment2 hence less gratitude seems due in the one1 and less resentment in the other4 ,chapter ,,ii4 treats of the extent of this influence of ,fortune4 ,the effects of it are1 first1 to diminish1 in our eyes1 the merit of laudable1 and the demerit of blameable1 actions1 when they fail of their intended effects2 and1 secondly1 to increase the feelings of merit and of demerit beyond what is due to the motives1 when the actions chance to be followed by extraordinary pleasure or pain4 ,success enhances our estimate of all great enterprises2 failure takes off the edge of our resentment of great crimes4 ,the author thinks 7,chapter ,,iii47 that final causes can be assigned for this irregularity of ,sentiments4 ,in the first place1 it would be highly dangerous to seek out and to resent mere bad intentions4 ,in the next place1 it is desirable that beneficent wishes should be put to the proof by results4 ,and1 lastly1 as regards the tendency to resent evil1 although unintended1 it is good to a certain extent that men should be taught intense circumspection on the point of infringing one another's happiness4 ,,part ,,iii4 is entitled ,,of ,,the ,,foundation ,,of ,,our ,,judgments ,,concerning ,,our ,,own ,,sentiments ,,and ,,conduct1 ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,duty4 ,chapter ,i4 is ',of the ,principle of ,self-approbation and of ,self-disapprobation4' ,having previously assigned the origin of our judgments respecting others1 the author now proceeds to trace out our judgments respecting ourselves4 ,the explanation is still the same4 ,we approve or disapprove of our own conduct1 according as we feel that the impartial spectator would approve or disapprove of it4 ,to a solitary human being1 moral judgments would never exist4 ,a man would no more think of the merit and demerit of his sentiments than of the beauty or deformity of his own face4 ,such criticism is exercised first upon other beings2 but the critic cannot help seeing that he in his turn is criticised1 and he is thereby led to apply the common standard to his own actions2 to divide himself as it were into two persons--the examiner or judge1 and person examined into1 or judged of4 ,he knows what conduct of his will be approved of by others1 and what condemned1 according to the standard he himself employs upon others2 his concurrence in this approbation or disapprobation is self-approbation or self-disapprobation4 ,the happy consciousness of virtue is the consciousness of the favourable regards of other men4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is ',of the love of ,praise1 and of ,praise-worthiness2 the dread of ,blame1 and of ,blame-worthiness2' a long and important chapter4 ,the author endeavours to trace1 according to his principle of sympathy1 the desire of ,praise-worthiness1 as well as of ,praise4 ,we approve certain conduct in others1 and are thus disposed to approve the same conduct in ourselves3 what we praise as judges of our fellow-men1 we deem praise-worthy1 and aspire to realize in our own conduct4 ,some men may differ from us1 and may withhold that praise2 we may be pained at the circumstance1 but we adhere to our love of the praise-worthy1 even when it does not bring the praise4 ,when we obtain the praise we are pleased1 and strengthened in our estimate2 the approbation that we receive confirms our self-approbation1 but does not give birth to it4 ,in short1 there are two principles at work within us4 ,we are pleased with approbation1 and pained by reproach3 we are farther pleased if the approbation coincides with what we approve when we are ourselves acting as judges of other men4 ,the two dispositions vary in their strength in individuals1 confirming each other when in concert1 thwarting each other when opposed4 ,the author has painted a number of striking situations arising out of their conflict4 ,he enquires why we are more pained by unmerited reproach1 than lifted up by unmerited approbation2 and assigns as the reason that the painful state is more pungent than the corresponding pleasurable state4 ,he shows how those men whose productions are of uncertain merit1 as poets1 are more the slaves of approbation1 than the authors of unmistakeable discoveries in science4 ,in the extreme cases of unmerited reproach1 he points out the appeal to the all-seeing ,judge of the world1 and to a future state rightly conceived2 protesting1 however1 against the view that would reserve the celestial regions for monks and friars1 and condemn to the infernal1 all the heroes1 statesmen1 poets1 and philosophers of former ages2 all the inventors of the useful arts2 the protectors1 instructors1 and benefactors of mankind2 and all those to whom our natural sense of praise-worthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and most exalted virtue4 ,chapter ,,iii4 is ',on the influence and authority of ,conscience2' another long chapter1 occupied more with moral reflections of a practical kind than with the following out of the analysis of our moral sentiment4 ,conceding that the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator does not of itself always support a man1 he yet asserts its influence to be great1 and that by it alone we can see what relates to ourselves in the proper shape and dimensions4 ,it is only in this way that we can prefer the interest of many to the interest of one2 the interest of others to our own4 ,to fortify us in this hard lesson two different schemes have been proposed2 one to increase our feelings for others1 the other to diminish our feelings for ourselves4 ,the first is prescribed by the whining and melancholy moralists1 who will never allow us to be happy1 because at every moment many of our fellow-beings are in misery4 ,the second is the doctrine of the ,stoics1 who annihilate self-interest in favour of the vast commonwealth of nature2 on that the author bestows a lengthened comment and correction1 founded on his theory of regulating the manifestations of joy or grief by the light of the impartial judge4 ,he gives his own panacea for human misery1 namely1 the power of nature to accommodate men to their permanent situation1 and to restore tranquillity1 which is the one secret of happiness4 ,chapter ,,iv4 handles ,self-,deceit1 and the ,origin and ,use of ,general ,rules4 ,the interference of our passions is the great obstacle to our holding towards ourselves the position of an impartial spectator4 ,prom this notorious fact the author deduces an argument against a special moral faculty1 or moral sense2 he says that if we had such a faculty1 it would surely judge our own passions1 which are the most clearly laid open to it1 more correctly than the passions of others4 ,to correct our self-partiality and self-deceit is the use of general rules4 ,our repeated observations on the tendency of particular acts1 teach us what is fit to be done generally2 and our conviction of the propriety of the general rules is a powerful motive for applying them to our own case4 ,it is a mistake to suppose1 as some have done1 that rules precede experience2 on the contrary1 they are formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain kind1 in certain circumstances1 are approved of4 ,when established1 we appeal to them as standards of judgment in right and wrong1 but they are not the original judgments of mankind1 nor the ultimate foundations of moral sentiment4 ,chapter ,v4 continues the subject of the authority and influence of ,general ,rules1 maintaining that they are justly regarded as laws of the ,deity4 ,the grand advantage of general rules is to give steadiness to human conduct1 and to enable us to resist our temporary varieties of temper and disposition4 ,they are thus a grand security for human duties4 ,that the important rules of morality should be accounted laws of the ,deity is a natural sentiment4 ,men have always ascribed to their deities their own sentiments and passions2 the deities held by them in special reverence1 they have endowed with their highest ideal of excellence1 the love of virtue and beneficence1 and the abhorrence of vice and injustice4 ,the researches of philosophical inquiry confirmed mankind in the supposition that the moral faculties carry the badge of authority1 that they were intended as the governing principles of our nature1 acting as the vicegerents of the ,deity4 ,this inference is confirmed by the view that the happiness of men1 and of other rational creatures1 is the original design of the ,author of nature1 the only purpose reconcilable with the perfections we ascribe to him4 ,chapter ,,vi4 is on the cases where the ,sense of ,duty should be the sole motive of conduct2 and on those where it ought to join with other motives4 ,allowing the importance of religion among human motives1 he does not concur with the view that would make religious considerations the sole laudable motives of action4 ,the sense of duty is not the only principle of our conduct2 it is the ruling or governing one4 ,it may be a question1 however1 on what occasions we are to proceed strictly by the sense of duty1 and on what occasions give way to some other sentiment or affection4 ,the author answers that in the actions prompted by benevolent affections1 we are to follow out our sentiments as much as our sense of duty2 and the contrary with the malevolent passions4 ,as to the selfish passions1 we are to follow duty in small matters1 and self-interest in great4 ,but the rules of duty predominate most in cases where they are determined with exactness1 that is1 in the virtue of ,justice4 ,,part ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,effect ,,of ,,utility ,,upon ,,the ,,sentiment ,,of ,,approbation4 ,chapter ,i4 is on the ,beauty arising out of ,utility4 ,it is here that the author sets forth the dismal career of 'the poor man's son1 whom heaven in the hour of her anger has curst with ambition1' and enforces his favourite moral lesson of contentment and tranquillity4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is the connexion of ,utility with ,moral ,approbation4 ,there are many actions possessing the kind of beauty or charm arising from utility2 and hence1 it may be maintained 7as was done by ,hume7 that our whole approbation of virtue may be explained on this principle4 ,and it may be granted that there is a coincidence between our sentiments of approbation or disapprobation1 and the useful or hurtful qualities of actions4 ,still1 the author holds that this utility or hurtfulness is not the foremost or principal source of our approbation4 ,in the first place1 he thinks it incongruous that we should have no other reason1 for praising a man than for praising a chest of drawers4 ,in the next place1 he contends at length that the usefulness of a disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation4 ,take1 for example1 the qualities useful to ourselves--reason and self-command2 we approve the first as just and accurate1 before we are aware of its being useful2 and as to self-command1 we approve it quite as much for its propriety as for its utility2 it is the coincidence of our opinion with the opinion of the spectator1 and not an estimate of the comparative utility1 that affects us4 ,regarding the qualities useful to others--humanity1 generosity1 public spirit and justice--he merely repeats his own theory that they are approved by our entering into the view of the impartial spectator4 ,the examples cited only show that these virtues are not approved from self-interest2 as when the soldier throws away his life to gain something for his sovereign4 ,he also puts the case of a solitary human being1 who might see fitness in actions1 but could not feel moral approbation4 ,,part ,v4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,custom ,,on ,,the ,,moral ,,sentiments4 ,the first chapter is a pleasing essay on the influence of custom and fashion on manners1 dress1 and in ,fine ,art generally4 ,the second chapter makes the application to our moral sentiments4 ,although custom will never reconcile us to the conduct of a ,nero or a ,claudius1 it will heighten or blunt the delicacy of our sentiments on right and wrong4 ,the fashion of the times of ,charles ,,ii4 made dissoluteness reputable1 and discountenanced regularity of conduct4 ,there is a customary behaviour that we expect in the old and in the young1 in the clergyman and in the military man4 ,the situations of different ages and countries develop characteristic qualities--endurance in the savage1 humanity and softness in the civilized community4 ,but these are not the extreme instances of the principle4 ,we find particular usages1 where custom has rendered lawful and blameless actions1 that shock the plainest principles of right and wrong2 the most notorious and universal is infanticide4 ,,part ,,vi4 ,,the ,,character ,,of ,,virtue4 ,section ,i4 is on ,prudence1 and is an elegant essay on the beau idal of the prudential character4 ,section ,,ii4 considers character as affecting other people4 ,chapter ,i4 is a disquisition on the comparative priority of the objects of our regard4 ,after self1 which must ever have the first place1 the members of our own family are recommended to our consideration4 ,remoter connexions of blood are more or less regarded according to the customs of the country2 in pastoral countries clanship is manifested2 in commercial countries distant relationship becomes indifferent4 ,official and business connexions1 and the association of neighbourhood1 determine friendships4 ,special estimation is a still preferable tie4 ,favours received determine and require favours in return4 ,the distinction of ranks is so far founded in nature as to deserve our respect4 ,lastly1 the miserable are recommended to our compassion4 ,next1 as regards societies 7,chap4 ,,ii471 since our own country stands first in our regard1 the author dilates on the virtues of a good citizen4 ,finally1 although our effectual good offices may not extend beyond our country1 our good-will may embrace the whole universe4 ,this universal benevolence1 however1 the author thinks must repose on the belief in a benevolent and all-wise governor of the world1 as realized1 for example1 in the meditations of ,marcus ,antoninus4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of ,self-command4 ,on this topic the author produces a splendid moral essay1 in which he describes the various modes of our self-estimation1 and draws a contrast between pride and vanity4 ,in so far as concerns his ,ethical theory1 he has still the same criterion of the virtue1 the degree and mode commended by the impartial spectator4 ,,part ,,vii4 ,,of ,,systems ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy4 ,on this we need only to remark that it is an interesting and valuable contribution to the history and the criticism of the ,ethical systems4#bc ,the ,ethical theory of ,adam ,smith may be thus summed up3-- ,i4--,the ,ethical ,standard is the judgment of an impartial spectator or critic2 and our own judgments are derived by reference to what this spectator would approve or disapprove4 ,probably to no one has this ever appeared a sufficient account of ,right and ,wrong4 ,it provides against one defect1 the self-partiality of the agent2 but gives no account whatever of the grounds of the critic's own judgment1 and makes no provision against his fallibility4 ,it may be very well on points where men's moral sentiments are tolerably unanimous1 but it is valueless in all questions where there are fundamental differences of view4 ,,ii4--,in the ,psychology of ,ethics1 ,smith would consider the moral ,faculty as identical with the power of ,sympathy1 which he treats as the foundation of ,benevolence4 ,a man is a moral being in proportion as he can enter into1 and realize1 the feelings1 sentiments1 and opinions of others4 ,now1 as morality would never have existed but for the necessity of protecting one human being against another1 the power of the mind that adopts other people's interests and views must always be of vital moment as a spring of moral conduct2 and ,adam ,smith has done great service in developing the workings of the sympathetic impulse4 ,he does not discuss ,free-will4 ,on the question of ,disinterested ,conduct1 he gives no clear opinion4 ,while denying that our sympathetic impulses are a refinement of self-love1 he would seem to admit that they bring their own pleasure with them2 so that1 after all1 they do not detract from our happiness4 ,in other places1 he recognizes self-sacrifice1 but gives no analysis of the motives that lead to it2 and seems to think1 with many other moralists1 that it requires a compensation in the next world4 ,,iii4--,his theory of the constituents of ,happiness is simple1 primitive1 and crude1 but is given with earnest conviction4 ,ambition he laughs to scorn4 ',what1 he asks1 can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health1 out of debt1 and has a clear conscience8' ,again1 'the chief part of happiness consists in the consciousness of being beloved1 hence1 sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute to happiness4' ,but what he dwells upon most persistently1 as the prime condition of happiness1 is ,contentment1 and ,tranquillity4 ,,iv4--,on the ,moral ,code1 he has nothing peculiar4 ,as to the means and inducements to morality1 he does not avail himself of the fertility of his own principle of ,sympathy4 ,appeals to sympathy1 and the cultivation of the power of entering into the feelings of others1 could easily be shown to play a high part in efficacious moral suasion4 ,v4--,he affords little or no grounds for remarking on the connexion of ,morality with ,politics4 ,our duties as citizens are a part of ,morality1 and that is all4 ,,vi4--,he gives his views on the alliance of ,ethics with ,religion4 ,he does not admit that we should refer to the ,religious sanction on all occasions4 ,he assumes a benevolent and all-wise ,governor of the world1 who will ultimately redress all inequalities1 and remedy all outstanding injustice4 ,what this ,being approves1 however1 is to be inferred solely from the principles of benevolence4 ,our regard for him is to be shown1 not by frivolous observances1 sacrifices1 ceremonies1 and vain supplications1 but by just and beneficent actions4 ,the author studiously ignores a revelation1 and constructs for himself a ,natural ,religion1 grounded on a benevolent and just administration of the universe4 ,in ,smith's ,essay1 the purely scientific enquiry is overlaid by practical and hortatory dissertations1 and by eloquent delineations of character and of beau-ideals of virtuous conduct4 ,his style being thus pitched to the popular key1 he never pushes home a metaphysical analysis2 so that even his favourite theme1 ,sympathy1 is not philosophically sifted to the bottom4 ,,david ,,hartley4 #agje-ageg4 ,the ',observations on ,man' 7#agdi7 is the first systematic effort to explain the phenomena of mind by the ,law of ,association4 ,it contains also a philosophical hypothesis1 that mental states are produced by the vibration of infinitesimal particles of the nerves4 ,this analogy1 borrowed from the undulations of the hypothetical substance ther1 has been censured as crude1 and has been entirely superseded4 ,but1 although an imperfect analogy1 it nevertheless kept constantly before the mind of ,hartley the double aspect of all mental phenomena1 thus preventing erroneous explanations1 and often suggesting correct ones4 ,in this respect1 ,aristotle and ,hobbes are the only persons that can be named as equally fortunate4 ,the ethical remarks contained in the ',observations1' relate only to the second head of summary1 the ,psychology of ,ethics4 ,we shall take1 first1 the account of disinterestedness1 and1 next1 of the moral sense4 #a4 ,disinterestedness4 ,under the name ,sympathy1 ,hartley includes four kinds of feelings3--7#a7 ,rejoicing at the happiness of others--,sociality1 ,good-will1 ,generosity1 ,gratitude2 7#b7 ,grieving for the misery of others--,compassion1 ,mercy2 7#c7 ,rejoicing at the misery of others--,anger1 ,jealousy1 ,cruelty1 ,malice2 and 7#d7 ,grieving for the happiness of others--,emulation1 ,envy4 ,all these feelings may be shown to originate in association4 ,we select as examples of ,hartley's method1 ,benevolence and ,compassion4 ,benevolence is the pleasing affection that prompts us to act for the benefit of others4 ,it is not a primitive feeling2 but grows out of such circumstances as the following4 ,almost all the pleasures1 and few1 in comparison1 of the pains1 of children1 are caused by others2 who are thus1 in the course of time1 regarded with pleasure1 independently of their usefulness to us4 ,many of our pleasures are enjoyed along with1 and are enhanced by1 the presence of others4 ,this tends to make us more sociable4 ,moreover1 we are taught and required to put on the appearance of good-will1 and to do kindly actions1 and this may beget in us the proper feelings4 ,finally1 we must take into account the praise and rewards of benevolence1 together with the reciprocity of benefits that we may justly expect4 ,all those elements may be so mixed and blended as to produce a feeling that shall teach us to do good to others without any expectation of reward1 even that most refined recompense--the pleasure arising from a beneficent act4 ,thus ,hartley conceives that he both proves the existence of disinterested feeling1 and explains the manner of its developement4 ,his account of ,compassion is similar4 ,in the young1 the signs and appearances of distress excite a painful feeling1 by recalling their own experience of misery4 ,in the old1 the connexion between a feeling and its adjuncts has been weakened by experience4 ,also1 when children are brought up together1 they are often annoyed by the same things1 and this tends powerfully to create a fellow-feeling4 ,again1 when their parents are ill1 they are taught to cultivate pity1 and are also subjected to unusual restraints4 ,all those things conspire to make children desire to remove the sufferings of others4 ,various circumstances increase the feeling of pity1 as when the sufferers are beloved by us1 or are morally good4 ,it is confirmatory of this view1 that the most compassionate are those whose nerves are easily irritable1 or whose experience of affliction has been considerable4 #b4--,the ,moral ,sense4 ,hartley denies the existence of any moral instinct1 or any moral judgments1 proceeding upon the eternal relations of things4 ,if there be such1 let instances of them be produced prior to the influence of associations4 ,still1 our moral approbation or disapprobation is disinterested1 and has a factitious independence4 7#a7 ,children are taught what is right and wrong1 and thus the associations connected with the idea of praise and blame are transferred to the virtues inculcated and the vices condemned4 7#b7 ,many vices and virtues1 such as sensuality1 intemperance1 malice1 and the opposites1 produce immediate consequences of evil and good respectively4 7#c7 ,the benefits1 immediate or 7at least7 obvious1 flowing from the virtues of others1 kindle love towards them1 and thereafter to the virtues they exhibit4 7#d7 ,another consideration is the loveliness of virtue1 arising from the suitableness of the virtues to each other1 and to the beauty1 order1 and perfection of the world4 7#e7 ,the hopes and fears connected with a future life1 strengthen the feelings connected with virtue4 7#f7 ,meditation upon ,god and prayer have a like effect4 ',all the pleasures and pains of sensation1 imagination1 ambition 7pride and vanity71 self-interest1 sympathy1 and theopathy 7affection towards ,god71 as far as they are consistent with one another1 with the frame of our natures1 and with the course of the world1 beget in us a moral sense1 and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue1 and to the fear1 hatred1 and abhorrence of vice4 ,this moral sense1 therefore1 carries its own authority with it1 inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest1 and the ultimate result from them2 and employs the whole force and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular part of it that rebels against the determinations and commands of the conscience or moral judgment4' ,hartley's analysis of the moral sense is a great advance upon ,hobbes and ,mandeville1 who make self-love the immediate constituent1 instead of a remote cause1 of conscience4 ,our moral consciousness may thus be treated as peculiar and distinguishable from other mental states1 while at the same time it is denied to be unique and irresolvable4 ,,thomas ,,reid4#bd #agaj-if4 ,reid's ,ethical views are given in his ,essays on the ,active ,powers of the ,mind4 ,,essay ,,iii41 entitled ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,action1 contains 7,part ,,iii47 a disquisition on the ,rational ,principles of ,action as opposed to what ,reid calls respectively ,mechanical ,principles 7,instinct1 ,habit71 and ,animal ,principles 7,appetites1 ,desires1 ,affections74 ,the ,rational ,principles of ,action are ,prudence1 or regard to our own good on the whole1 and ,duty1 which1 however1 he does not define by the antithetical circumstance--the 'good of others4' ,the notion of ,duty1 he says1 is too simple for logical definition1 and can only be explained by synonymes--what we ought to do2 what is fair and honest2 what is approvable2 the professed rule of men's conduct2 what all men praise2 the laudable in itself1 though no man praise it4 ,duty1 he says1 cannot be resolved into ,interest4 ,the language of mankind makes the two distinct4 ,disregard of our interest is folly2 of honour1 baseness4 ,honour is more than mere reputation1 for it keeps us right when we are not seen4 ,this principle of ,honour 7so-called by men of rank7 is1 in vulgar phrase1 honesty1 probity1 virtue1 conscience2 in philosophical language1 the moral sense1 the moral faculty1 rectitude4 ,the principle is universal in men grown up to years of understanding4 ,such a testimony as ,hume's may be held decisive on the reality of moral distinctions4 ,the ancient world recognized it in the leading terms1 honestum and utile1 c4 ,the abstract notion of ,duty is a relation between the action and the agent4 ,it must be voluntary1 and within the power of the agent4 ,the opinion 7or intention7 of the agent gives the act its moral quality4 ,as to the ,sense of ,duty1 ,reid pronounces at once1 without hesitation1 and with very little examination1 in favour of an original power or faculty1 in other words1 a ,moral ,sense4 ,intellectual judgments are judgments of the external senses2 moral judgments result from an internal moral sense4 ,the external senses give us our intellectual first principles2 the moral sense our moral first principles4 ,he is at pains to exemplify the deductive process in morals4 ,it is a question of moral reasoning1 ,ought a man to have only one wife8 ,the reasons are1 the greater good of the family1 and of society in general2 but no reason can be given why we should prefer greater good2 it is an intuition of the moral sense4 ,he sums up the chapter thus3--',that1 by an original power of the mind1 which we call conscience1 or the moral faculty1 we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct1 of merit and demerit1 of duty and moral obligation1 and our other moral conceptions2 and that1 by the same faculty1 we perceive some things in human conduct to be right1 and others to be wrong2 that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty2 and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates1 as upon the determinations of our senses1 or of our other natural faculties4' ,hamilton remarks that this theory virtually founds morality on intelligence4 ,moral ,approbation is the affection and esteem accompanying our judgment of a right moral act4 ,this is in all cases pleasurable1 but most so1 when the act is our own4 ,so1 obversely1 for ,moral ,disapprobation4 ,regarding ,conscience1 ,reid remarks1 first1 that like all other powers it comes to maturity by insensible degrees1 and may be a subject of culture or education4 ,he takes no note of the difficulty of determining what is primitive and what is acquired4 ,secondly1 ,conscience is peculiar to man2 it is wanting in the brutes4 ,thirdly1 it is evidently intended to be the director of our conduct2 and fourthly1 it is an ,active power and an ,intellectual power combined4 ,,essay ,,iv4 is ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,moral ,,agents1 which we pass by1 having noticed it elsewhere4 ,,essay ,v4 is ,,of ,,morals4 ,chapter ,i4 professes to enumerate the axiomatic first principles of ,morals4 ,some of these relate 7,a7 to virtue in general3 as 7#a7 ,there are actions deserving of praise1 and others deserving blame2 7#b7 the involuntary is not an object of praise or blame2 7#c7 the unavoidable is not an object of praise or blame2 7#d7 omission may be culpable2 7#e7 we ought to inform ourselves as to duty2 7#f7 we should fortify ourselves against temptation4 ,other principles relate 7,b7 to particular virtues3 7#a7 ,we should prefer a greater good to a less2 7#b7 we should comply with the intention of nature1 apparent in our constitution2 7#c7 no man is born for himself alone2 7#d7 we should judge according to the rule1 ',do to others1' c42 7#e7 if we believe in ,god1 we should venerate and submit to him4 ,a third class of principles 7,c7 settle the preference among opposing virtues4 ,thus1 unmerited generosity should yield to gratitude1 and both to justice4 ,chapter ,,ii4 remarks upon the growth and peculiar advantages of ,systems of ,morals4 ,chapter ,,iii4 is on ,systems of ,natural ,jurisprudence4 ,the four subsequent chapters of the ,essay he states to have been composed in answer to the ,ethical doctrines of ,hume4 ,chapter ,,iv4 enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral purpose in the agent4 ,he decides in the affirmative1 replying to certain objections1 and more especially to the allegation of ,hume1 that justice is not a natural1 but an artificial virtue4 ,this last question is pursued at great length in ,chapter ,v41 and the author takes occasion to review the theory of ,utility or ,benevolence1 set up by ,hume as the basis of morals4 ,he gives ,hume the credit of having made an important step in advance of the ,epicurean1 or ,selfish1 system1 by including the good of others1 as well as our own good1 in moral acts4 ,still1 he demands why1 if ,utility and ,virtue are identical1 the same name should not express both4 ,it is true1 that virtue is both agreeable and useful in the highest degree2 but that circumstance does not prevent it from having a quality of its own1 not arising from its being useful and agreeable1 but arising from its being virtue4 ,the common good of society1 though a pleasing object to all men1 hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the great majority2 and1 if a regard to it were the sole motive of justice1 only a select number would ever be possessed of the virtue4 ,the notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a notion of moral obligation2 and no act can be called an act of justice unless prompted by the motive of justice4 ,then1 again1 good music and good cookery have the merit of utility1 in procuring what is agreeable both to ourselves and to society1 but they have never been denominated moral virtues2 so that1 if ,hume's system be true1 they have been very unfairly treated4 ,reid illustrates his positions against ,hume to a length unnecessary to follow4 ,the objections are exclusively and effectively aimed at the two unguarded points of the ,utility system as propounded by ,hume2 namely1 first1 the not recognizing moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority1 which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends2 and1 secondly1 the not distinguishing between obligatory1 and non-obligatory1 useful acts4 ,reid continues the controversy1 with reference to ,justice1 in ,chapter ,,vi41 on the ,nature and ,obligation of a ,contract2 and in ,chapter ,,vii4 maintains1 in opposition to ,hume1 that ,moral approbation implies a ,judgment of the intellect1 and is not a mere feeling1 as ,hume seems to think4 ,he allows the propriety of the phrase ',moral ,sentiment1' because ',sentiment' in ,english means judgment accompanied with feeling4 ,hamilton dissents1 and thinks that sentiment means the higher feelings4 ,he says1 if a moral judgment be no real judgment1 but only a feeling1 morals have no foundation but the arbitrary structure of the mind2 there are no immutable moral distinctions2 and no evidence for the moral character of the ,deity4 ,we shall find the views of ,reid substantially adopted1 and a little more closely and concisely argued1 by ,stewart4 ,,dugald ,,stewart4 #agec-ahbh4 ,in his ',essays on the ,active ,powers of the ,mind1' ,stewart introduces the ,moral ,faculty in the same way as ,reid4 ,,book ,,second is entitled ,,our ,,rational ,,and ,,governing ,,principles ,,of ,,action4 ,chapter ,i41 on ,prudence or ,self-love1 is unimportant for our present purpose1 consisting of some desultory remarks on the connexion of happiness with steadiness of purpose1 and on the meanings of the words 'self-love' and 'selfishness4' ,chapter ,,ii4 is on the ,moral ,faculty1 and is intended to show that it is an original principle of the mind4 ,he first replies to the theory that identifies ,morality with ,prudence1 or ,self-love4 ,his first argument is the existence in all languages of different words for duty and for interest4 ,secondly1 ,the emotions arising from1 the contemplation of right and wrong are different from those produced by a regard to our own happiness4 ,thirdly1 although in most instances a sense of duty1 and an enlightened regard to our own happiness1 would suggest to us the same line of conduct1 yet this truth is not obvious to mankind generally1 who are incapable of appreciating enlarged views and remote consequences4 ,he repeats the common remark1 that we secure our happiness best by not looking to it as tho one primary end4 ,fourthly1 moral judgments appear in children1 long before they can form the general notion of happiness4 ,his examples of this position1 however1 have exclusive reference to the sentiment of pity1 which all moralists regard as a primitive feeling1 while few admit it to be the same as the moral sense4 ,he then takes notice of the ,association ,theory of ,hartley1 ,paley1 and others1 which he admits to be a great refinement of the old selfish system1 and an answer to one of his arguments4 ,he maintains1 nevertheless1 that the others are untouched by it1 and more especially the third1 referring to the amount of experience and reflection necessary to discover the tendency of virtue to promote our happiness1 which is inconsistent with the early period when our moral judgments appear4 ,it is singular that he should not have remarked that the moral judgments of that early age1 if we except what springs from the impulses of pity1 are wholly communicated by others4 ,he quotes ,paley's reasoning against the ,moral ,sense1 and declares that he has as completely mis-stated the issue1 as if one were to contend that because we are not born with the knowledge of light and colours1 therefore the sense of seeing is not an original part of the frame4 ,it would be easy to retort that all that ,paley's case demanded was the same power of discrimination in moral judgments1 as the power of discriminating light and dark belonging to our sense of sight4 ,chapter ,,iii4 continues the subject1 and examines objections4 ,the first objection taken up is that derived from the influence of education1 with which he combines the farther objection 7of ,locke and his followers7 arising from the diversity of men's moral judgments in various nations4 ,with regard to education1 he contends that there are limits to its influence1 and that however it may modify1 it cannot create our judgments of right and wrong1 any more than our notions of beauty and deformity4 ,as to the historical facts relating to the diversity of moral judgments1 he considers it necessary to make full allowance for three circumstances--,i4--,difference of situation with regard to climate and civilization4 ,,ii4--,diversity of speculative opinions1 arising from difference of intellectual capacity2 and1 ,,iii4--,the different moral import of the same action under different systems of behaviour4 ,on the first head he explains the indifference to theft from there being little or no fixed property2 he adduces the variety of sentiments respecting ,usury1 as having reference1 to circumstances2 and alludes to the differences of men's views as to political assassination4 ,on the second head he remarks1 that men may agree on ends1 but may take different views as to means2 they may agree in recognizing obedience to the ,deity1 but differ in their interpretations of his will4 ,on the third point1 as regards the different moral import of the same action1 he suggests that ,locke's instance of the killing of aged parents is merely the recognized mode of filial affection2 he also quotes the exceeding variety of ceremonial observances4 ,chapter ,,iv4 comments farther on the objections to the reality and immutability of moral distinctions and to the universal diffusion of the moral faculty4 ,the reference is1 in the first instance1 to ,locke1 and then to what he terms1 after ,adam ,smith1 the licentious moralists--,la ,rochefoucauld and ,mandeville4 ,the replies to these writers contain nothing special to ,stewart4 ,chapter ,v4 is the ,analysis of our ,moral ,perceptions and ,emotions4 ,this is a somewhat singular phrase in an author recognizing a separate inborn faculty of ,right4 ,his analysis consists in a separation of the entire fact into three parts3--the perception of an action as right or wrong2 7#b7 an emotion of pleasure or pain1 varying according to the moral sensibility3 7#c7 a perception of the merit or demerit of the agent4 ,the first is of course the main question2 and the author gives a long review of the history of ,ethical doctrines from ,hobbes downwards1 interspersing reflections and criticisms1 all in favour of the intuitive origin of the sense4 ,as illustrative parallels1 he adduces ,personal ,identity1 ,causation1 and ,equality2 all which he considers to be judgments involving simple ideas1 and traceable only to some primitive power of the mind4 ,he could as easily conceive a rational being formed to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to one right angle1 as to believe that there would be no injustice in depriving a man of the fruits of his labours4 ,on the second point--the pleasure and pain accompanying right and wrong1 he remarks on the one-sidedness of systems that treat the sense of right and wrong as an intellectual judgment purely 7,clarke1 c471 or those that treat it as a feeling purely 7,shaftesbury1 ,hutcheson1 and ,hume74 ,his remarks on the sense of ,merit and ,demerit in the agent are trivial or commonplace4 ,chapter ,,vi4 is ',of ,moral ,obligation4' ,it is needless to follow him on this subject1 as his views are substantially a repetition of ,butler's ,supremacy of ,conscience4 ,at the same time1 it may be doubted whether ,butler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the command of the ,deity1 a point peculiarly insisted on by ,stewart4 ,his words are these3-- ',according to some systems1 moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of ,god4 ,but how2 it may be asked1 does this belief impose an obligation8 ,only one of two answers can be given4 ,either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the ,author and the ,governor of the universe2 or that a rational self-love should induce us1 from motives of prudence1 to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the ,almighty ,arbiter of happiness and misery4 ,on the first supposition ,we reason in a circle4 ,we resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion1 and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation4 ',the other system1 which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence1 although not so obviously unsatisfactory1 leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour4 ,among others it leads us to conclude1 #a4 ,that the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation1 excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest3 #b4 ,that a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes4 ',but farther1 the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong4 ,they are sanctions of virtue1 or additional motives to the practice of it1 but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation4 ',in the last place1 if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life1 how shall the existence of a future state be proved1 or even rendered probable by the light of nature8 or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the ,deity8 ,the truth is1 that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong2 of merit and demerit2 and from a comparison between1 these and the general course of human affairs4' ,in a chapter 7,,vii47 entitled 'certain principles co-operating with our moral powers1' he discusses 7#a7 a regard to character1 7#b7 ,sympathy1 7#c7 the ,sense of the ,ridiculous1 7#d7 ,taste4 ,the important topic is the second1 ,sympathy2 which1 psychologically1 he would appear to regard as determined by the pleasure that it gives4 ,under this head he introduces a criticism of the ,ethical theory of ,adam ,smith2 and1 adverting to the inadequacy of the theory to distinguish the right from the actual judgments of mankind1 he remarks on ,smith's ingenious fiction 'of an abstract man within the breast2' and states that ,smith laid much greater stress on this fiction in the last edition of the ,moral ,sentiments published before his death4 ,it is not without reason that ,stewart warns against grounding theories on metaphorical expressions1 such as this of ,smith1 or the ,platonic ,commonwealth of the ,soul4 ,in ,book ,,iv4 of the ,active ,powers1 ,stewart discusses our ,duties to ,men1--both our fellow-creatures and ourselves4 ,our duties to our fellows are summed up in ,benevolence1 ,justice1 and ,veracity4 ,he devotes a chapter to each4 ,in ,chapter ,i41 on ,benevolence1 he re-opens the consideration of the ,ethical systems founded on ,benevolence or ,utility1 and argues against them2 but merely repeats the common-place objections--the incompetency of individuals to judge of remote tendencies1 the pretext that would be afforded for the worst conduct1 and each one's consciousness that a sense of duty is different from enlightened benevolence4 ,chapter ,,ii4 is on ,justice2 defined as the disposition that leads a man1 where his own interests or passions are concerned1 to act according to the judgment he would form of another man's duty in his situation4 ,he introduces a criticism on ,adam ,smith1 and re-asserts the doctrine of an innate faculty1 explained as the power of forming moral ideas1 and not as the innate possession of ideas4 ,for the most part1 his exposition is didactic and desultory1 with occasional discussions of a critical and scientific nature2 as1 for example1 some remarks on ,hume's theory that ,justice is an artificial virtue1 an account of the basis of ,jurisprudence1 and a few observations on the ,right of ,property4 ,in ,chapter ,,iii41 on ,veracity1 he contends that considerations of utility do not account for the whole force of our approbation of this virtue4 ,so might any one say that considerations of what money can purchase do not account for the whole strength of avarice4 ,in ,chapter ,,iv4 he deals with ,duties to ourselves1 and occupies the chapter with a dissertation on ,happiness4 ,he first gives an account of the theories of the ,stoics and the ,epicureans1 which connect themselves most closely with the problem of ,happiness2 and next advances some observations of his own on the subject4 ,his first remark is on the influence of the ,temper1 by which he means the ,resentful or ,irascible passion1 on ,happiness4 ,as against a censorious disposition1 he sets up the pleasure of the benevolent sentiments2 he enjoins candour with respect to the motives of others1 and a devoted attachment to truth and virtue for their intrinsic excellence2 and warns us1 that the causes that alienate our affections from our fellow-creatures1 suggest gloomy and ,hamlet-like conceptions of the order of the universe4 ,he next adverts to the influence of the ,imagination on ,happiness4 ,on this1 he has in view the addition made to our enjoyments or our sufferings by the respective predominance of hope or of fear in the mind4 ,allowing for constitutional bias1 he recognizes1 as the two great sources of a desponding imagination1 ,superstition and ,scepticism1 whose evils he descants upon at length4 ,he also dwells on the influence of casual associations on happiness1 and commends this subject to the care of educators2 giving1 as an example1 the tendency of associations with ,greece and ,rome to add to the courage of the classically educated soldier4 ,his third position is the ,influence of our ,opinions on ,happiness4 ,he here quotes1 from ,ferguson1 examples of opinions unfavourable to ,happiness2 such as these3 'that happiness consists in having nothing to do1' 'that anything is preferable to happiness1' 'that anything can amuse us better than our duties4' ,he also puts forward as a happy opinion the ,stoical view1 ',i am in the station that ,god has assigned me4' ,it must be confessed1 however1 that these prescriptions savour of the ,platonic device of inculcating opinions1 not because of their truth1 but because of their supposed good consequences otherwise3 a proceeding scarcely compatible with an ,ethical system that proclaims veracity as superior to utility4 ,on such a system1 we are prohibited from looking to anything in an opinion but its truth2 we are to suffer for truth1 and not to cultivate opinions because of their happy results4 ,stewart remarks finally on the influence of the ,habits1 on which he notices the power of the mind to accommodate itself to circumstances1 and copies ,paley's observations on the setting of the habits4 ,in continuation of the subject of ,happiness1 he presents a classification of our most important pleasures4 ,we give the heads1 there being little to detain us in the author's brief illustration of them4 ,i4--,the pleasures of ,activity and ,repose2 ,,ii4--,the pleasures of ,sense2 ,,iii4--,the pleasures of the ,imagination2 ,,iv4--,the pleasures of the ,understanding2 and ,v4--,the pleasures of the ,heart1 or of the various benevolent affections4 ,he would have added ,taste1 or ,fine ,art1 but this is confined to a select few4 ,in a concluding chapter 7,v471 he sums up the general result of the ,ethical enquiry1 under the title1 'the ,nature and ,essence of ,virtue4' ,no observation of any novelty occurs in this chapter4 ,virtue is doing our duty2 the intentions of the agent are to be looked to2 the enlightened discharge of our duty often demands an exercise of the ,reason to adjudge between conflicting claims2 there is a close relationship1 not defined1 between ,ethics and ,politics4 ,the views of ,stewart represent1 in the chief points1 although not in all1 the ,ethical theory that has found the greatest number of supporters4 ,i4--,the ,standard is internal1 or intuitive--the judgments of a ,faculty1 called the ,moral ,faculty4 ,he does not approve of the phrase ',moral ,sense1' thinking the analogy of the senses incorrect4 ,,ii4--,as regards ,ethical ,psychology1 the first question is determined by the remarks on the ,standard4 ,on the second question1 ,free-will1 ,stewart maintains ,liberty4 ,on the third question1 he gives1 like many others1 an uncertain sound4 ,in his account of ,pity1 he recognizes three things1 7#a7 a painful feeling1 7#b7 a selfish desire to remove the cause of the uneasiness1 7#c7 a disposition grounded on benevolent concern about the sufferer4 ,this is at best vague4 ,equally so is what he states respecting the pleasures of sympathy and benevolence 7,book ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,vii474 ,there is1 he says1 a pleasure attached to fellow-feeling1 a disposition to accommodate our minds to others1 wherever there is a benevolent affection2 and1 in all probability1 the pleasure of sympathy is the pleasure of loving and of being beloved4 ,no definite proposition can be gathered from such loose allegations4 ,,iii4--,we have already abstracted his chapter on ,happiness4 ,,iv4--,on the ,moral ,code1 he has nothing peculiar4 ,v4--,on the connexion with ,religion1 we have seen that he is strenuous in his antagonism to the doctrine of the dependence of morality on the will of ,god4 ,but1 like other moralists of the same class1 he is careful to add3--',although religion can with no propriety be considered as the sole foundation of morality1 yet when we are convinced that ,god is infinitely good1 and that he is the friend and protector of virtue1 this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty4' ,he has 7,book ,,iii47 elaborately discussed the principles of ,natural ,religion1 but1 like ,adam ,smith1 makes no reference to the ,bible1 or to ,christianity4 ,he is disposed to assume the benevolence of the ,deity1 but considers that to affirm it positively is to go beyond our depth4 ,,thomas ,,brown4 #aggh-ahbj4 ,brown's ,ethical discussion commences in the #gcrd of his ,lectures4 ,he first criticises the multiplicity of expressions used in the statement of the fundamental question of morals--',what is it that constitutes the action virtuous8' ',what constitutes the moral obligation to perform certain actions8' ',what constitutes the merit of the agent8'--,these have been considered questions essentially distinct1 whereas they are the very same question4 ,there is at bottom but one emotion in the case1 the emotion of approbation1 or of disapprobation1 of an agent acting in a certain way4 ,in answer then to the question as thus simplified1 ',what is the ground of moral approbation and disapprobation8' ,brown answers--a simple emotion of the mind1 of which no farther explanation can be given than that we are so constituted4 ,thus1 without using the same term1 he sides with the doctrine of the ,innate ,moral ,sense4 ,he illustrates it by another elementary fact of the mind1 involved in the conception of cause and effect on his theory of that relation--the belief that the future will resemble the past4 ,excepting a teleogical reference to the ,supreme ,benevolence of the ,deity1 he admits no farther search into the nature of the moral sentiment4 ,he adduces1 as another illustration1 what he deems the kindred emotion of ,beauty4 ,our feeling of beauty is not the mere perception of forms and colours1 or the discovery of the uses of certain combinations of forms2 it is an emotion arising from these1 indeed1 bat distinct from them4 ,our feeling of moral excellence1 in like manner1 is not the mere perception of different actions1 or the discovery of the physical good that these may produce2 it is an emotion sui generis1 superadded to them4 ,he adverts1 in a strain of eloquent indignation1 to the objection grounded on differences of men's moral judgment4 ,there are philosophers1 he exclaims1 'that can turn away from the conspiring chorus of the millions of mankind1 in favour of the great truths of morals1 to seek in some savage island1 a few indistinct murmurs that may seem to be discordant with the total harmony of mankind4' ,he goes on to remark1 however1 that in our zeal for the immutability of moral distinctions1 we may weaken the case by contending for too much2 and proposes to consider the species of accordance that may be safely argued for4 ,he begins by purging away the realistic notion of ,virtue1 considered as a self-existing entity4 ,he defines it--a term expressing the relation of certain actions to certain emotions in the minds contemplating them2 its universality is merely co-extensive with these minds4 ,he then concedes that all mankind do not1 at every moment1 feel precisely the same emotions in contemplating the same actions1 and sets forth the limitations as follows2-- ,first1 ,in moments of violent passion1 the mind is incapacitated for perceiving moral differences2 we must1 in such cases appeal1 as it were1 from ,philip drunk to ,philip sober4 ,secondly1 ,still more important is the limitation arising from the complexity of many actions4 ,where good and evil results are so blended that we cannot easily assign the preponderance1 different men may form different conclusions4 ,partiality of views may arise from this cause1 not merely in individuals1 but in whole nations4 ,the legal permission of theft in ,sparta is a case in point4 ,theft1 as theft1 and without relation to the political object of inuring a warlike people1 would have been condemned in ,sparta1 as well as with us4 ,the retort of ,locke is not out of place here2 an innate moral sentiment that permits a fundamental virtue to be set aside on the ground of mere state convenience1 is of very little value4 ,he then goes on to ask whether men1 in approving these exceptions to morality1 approve them because they are immoral8 ,the opponents of a moral sense do not contend for an immoral sense4 ,suicide is not commended because it deprives society of useful members1 and gives sorrow to relations and friends2 the exposure of infants is not justified on the plea of adding to human suffering4 ,again1 the differences of cookery among nations are much wider than the differences of moral sentiment2 and yet no one denies a fundamental susceptibility to sweet and bitter4 ,it is not contended that we come into the world with a knowledge of actions1 but that we have certain susceptibilities of emotion1 in consequence of which1 it is impossible for us1 in after life1 unless from counteracting circumstances1 to be pleased with the contemplation of certain actions1 and disgusted with certain other actions4 ,when the doctrine is thus stated1 ,paley's objection1 that we should also receive from nature the notions of the actions themselves1 falls to the ground4 ,as well might we require an instinctive notion of all possible numbers1 to bear out our instinctive sense of proportion4 ,a third limitation must be added1 the influence of the principle of ,association4 ,one way that this operates is to transfer1 to a whole class of actions1 the feelings peculiar to certain marked individuals4 ,thus1 in a civilized country1 where property is largely possessed1 and under complicated tenures1 we become very sensitive to its violation1 and acquire a proportionably intense sentiment of ,justice4 ,again1 association operates in modifying our approval and disapproval of actions according to their attendant circumstances2 as when we extenuate misconduct in a beloved person4 ,the author contends that1 notwithstanding these limitations1 we still leave unimpaired the approbation of unmixed good as good1 and the disapprobation of unmixed evil as evil4 ,his further remarks1 however1 are mainly eloquent declamation on the universality of moral distinctions4 ,he proceeds to criticise the moral systems from ,hobbes downwards4 ,his remarks 7,lecture #gf7 on the province of ,reason in ,morality1 with reference to the systems of ,clarke and ,wollaston1 contain the gist of the matter well expressed4 ,he next considers the theory of ,utility4 ,that ,utility bears a certain relation to ,virtue is unquestionable4 ,benevolence means good to others1 and virtue is of course made up1 in great part1 of this4 ,but then1 if ,utility is held to be the measure of virtue1 standing in exact proportion to it1 the proposition is very far from true2 it is only a small portion of virtuous actions wherein the measure holds4 ,he does not doubt that virtuous actions do all tend1 in a greater or less degree1 to the advantage of the world4 ,but he considers the question to be1 whether what we have alone in view1 in approving certain actions1 be the amount of utility that they bring2 whether we have no other reason for commending a man than for praising a chest of drawers4 ,consider this question first from the point of view of the agent4 ,does the mother1 in watching her sick infant1 think of the good of mankind at that moment8 ,is the pity called forth by misery a sentiment of the general good8 ,look at it again from the point of view of the spectator4 ,is his admiration of a steam-engine1 and of an heroic human action1 the same sentiment8 ,why do we not worship the earth1 the source of all our utilities8 ,the ancient worshippers of nature always gave it a soul in the first instance4 ,when the supporter of ,utility arbitrarily confines his principles to the actions of living beings1 he concedes the point in dispute2 he admits an approvableness peculiar to living and voluntary agents1 a capacity of exciting moral emotions not commensurate with any utility4 ,hume says1 that the sentiments of utility connected with human beings are mixed with affection1 esteem1 and approbation1 which do not attach to the utility of inanimate things4 ,brown replies1 that these are the very sentiments to be accounted for1 the moral part of the case4 ,but another contrast may be made2 namely1 between the utility of virtue and the utility of talent or genius1 which we view with very different and unequal sentiments2 the inventors of the printing press do not rouse the same emotions as the charities of the ,man of ,ross4 ,still1 he contends1 like the other supporters of innate moral distinctions1 for a pre-established harmony between the two attributes4 ,utility and virtue are so intimately related1 that there is perhaps no action generally felt by us as virtuous1 but what is generally beneficial4 ,but this is only discovered by reflecting men2 it never enters the mind of the unthinking multitude4 ,nay1 more1 it is only the ,divine ,being that can fully master this relationship1 or so prescribe our duties that they shall ultimately coincide with the general happiness4 ,he allows that the immediate object of the legislator is the general good2 but then his relationship is to the community as a whole1 and not to any particular individual4 ,he admits1 farther1 that the good of the world at large1 if not the only moral object1 is a moral object1 in common with the good of parents1 friends1 and others related to us in private life4 ,farther1 it may be requisite for the moralist to correct our moral sentiments by requiring greater attention to public1 and less to private1 good2 but this does not alter the nature of our moral feelings2 it merely presents new objects to our moral discrimination4 ,it gives an exercise to our reason in disentangling the complicated results of our actions4 ,he makes it also an objection to ,utility1 that it does not explain why we feel approbation of the useful1 and disapprobation of the hurtful2 forgetting that ,benevolence is an admitted fact of our constitution1 and may fairly be assigned by the moralist as the source of the moral sentiment4 ,his next remarks are on the ,selfish ,systems1 his reply to which is the assertion of disinterested ,affections4 ,he distinguishes two modes of assigning self-interest as the sole motive of virtuous conduct4 ,first1 it may be said that in every so-called virtuous action1 we see some good to self1 near or remote4 ,secondly1 it may be maintained that we become at last disinterested by the associations of our own interest4 ,he calls in question this alleged process of association4 ,because a man's own cane is interesting to him1 it does not follow that every other man's cane is interesting4 ,he here commits a mistake of fact2 other men's walking canes are interesting to the interested owner of a cane4 ,it may not follow that this interest is enough to determine self-sacrifice4 ,it will be inferred that ,brown contends warmly for the existence of ,disinterested ,affection1 not merely as a present1 but as a primitive1 fact of our constitution4 ,he does not always keep this distinct from the ,moral ,sentiment2 he1 in fact1 mixes the two sentiments together in his language1 a thing almost inevitable1 but yet inconsistent with the advocacy of a distinct moral sentiment4 ,he includes among the ,selfish ,systems the ,ethical ,theory of ,paley1 which he reprobates in both its leading points--everlasting happiness as the motive1 and the will of ,god as the rule4 ,on the one point1 this theory is liable to all the objections against a purely selfish system2 and1 on the other point1 he makes the usual replies to the founding of morality on the absolute will of the ,deity4 ,brown next criticises the system of ,adam ,smith4 ,admitting that we have the sympathetic feeling that ,smith proceeds upon1 he questions its adequacy to constitute the moral sentiment1 on the ground that it is not a perpetual accompaniment of our actions4 ,there must be a certain vividness of feeling or of the display of feeling1 or at least a sufficient cause of vivid feeling1 to call the sympathy into action4 ,in the numerous petty actions of life1 there is an absence of any marked sympathy4 ,but the essential error of ,smith's system is1 that it assumes the very moral feelings that it is meant to explain4 ,if there were no antecedent moral feelings1 sympathy could not afford them2 it is only a mirror to reflect what is already in existence4 ,the feelings that we sympathize with1 are themselves moral feelings already2 if it were not so1 the reflexion of them from a thousand breasts would not give them a moral nature4 ,brown thinks that ,adam ,smith was to some extent misled by an ambiguity in the word sympathy2 a word applied not merely to the participation of other men's feelings1 but to the further and distinct fact of the approbation of those feeling's4 ,although siding in the main with ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson1 ,brown objects to their designation ,moral ,sense1 as expressing the innate power of moral approbation4 ,if ',sense' be interpreted merely as susceptibility1 he has nothing to say1 but if it mean a primary medium of perception1 like the eye or the ear1 he considers it a mistake4 ,it is1 in his view1 an emotion1 like hope1 jealousy1 or resentment1 rising up on the presentation of a certain class of objects4 ,he farther objects to the phrase 'moral ideas1' also used by ,hutcheson4 ,the moral emotions are more akin to love and hate1 than to perception or judgment4 ,brown gives an exposition of ,practical ,ethics under the usual heads3 ,duties to ,others1 to ,god1 to ,ourselves4 ,duties to others he classifies thus3--,i4--,negative1 or abstinence from injuring others in ,person1 ,property1 ,affections1 ,character or ,reputation1 ,knowledge 7veracity71 ,virtue1 and ,tranquillity2 ,,ii4 ,positive1 or ,benevolence2 and ,,iii4--,duties growing out of our peculiar ties--,affinity1 ,friendship1 ,good offices received1 ,contract1 and ,citizenship4 ,to sum up ,i4--,as regards the ,standard1 ,brown contends for an ,innate ,sentiment4 ,,ii4--,the ,faculty being thus determined1 along with the ,standard1 we have only to resume his views as to ,disinterested action4 ,for a full account of these1 we have to go beyond the strictly ,ethical lectures1 to his analysis of the ,emotions4 ,speaking of love1 he says that it includes a desire of doing good to the person loved2 that it is necessarily pleasurable because there must be some quality in the object that gives pleasure2 but it is not the mere pleasure of loving that makes us love4 ,the qualities are delightful to love1 and yet impossible not to love4 ,he is more explicit when he comes to the consideration of ,pity1 recognizing the existence of sympathy1 not only without liking for the object1 but with positive dislike4 ,in another place1 he remarks that we desire the happiness of our fellows simply as human beings4 ,he is opposed to the theory that would trace our disinterested affections to a selfish origin4 ,he makes some attempt to refer to the laws of ,association1 the taking in of other men's emotions1 but thinks that there is a reflex process besides4 ,although recognizing in a vague way the existence of genuine disinterested impulses1 he dilates eloquently1 and often1 on the deliciousness of benevolence1 and of all virtuous feelings and conduct4 ,,william ,,paley4 #agdc-ahje4 ,the ,first ,book of ,paley's ',moral and ,political ,philosophy' is entitled ',,preliminary ,,considerations' it is in fact an unmethodical account of various fundamental points of the subject4 ,he begins by defining ,moral ,philosophy as 'that science which teaches men their duty1 and the reasons of it4 ,the ordinary rules are defective and may mislead1 unless aided by a scientific investigation4 ,these ordinary rules are the ,law of ,honour1 the ,law of the ,land1 and the ,scriptures4 ,he commences with the ,law of ,honour1 which he views in its narrow sense1 as applied to people of rank and fashion4 ,this is of course a very limited code4 ,the ,law of the ,land also must omit many duties1 properly compulsory1 as piety1 benevolence1 c4 ,it must also leave unpunished many vices1 as luxury1 prodigality1 partiality4 ,it must confine itself to offences strictly definable4 ,the ,scriptures lay down general rules1 which have to be applied by the exercise of reason and judgment4 ,moreover1 they pre-suppose the principles of natural justice1 and supply new sanctions and greater certainty4 ,accordingly1 they do not dispense with a scientific view of morals4 ,the correct arrangement of the common rules would have been 7#a7 the ,law of the ,land1 7#b7 the ,laws of ,society generally1 and 7#c7 the ,scriptures4 ,the ,law of ,honour is merely one application of the comprehensive agency of society in punishing men1 by excommunication1 for what it prohibits4 ,then follows his famous chapter on the ,,moral ,,sense4 ,it is by way of giving an effective statement of the point in dispute that he quotes the anecdote of ,caius ,toranius1 as an extreme instance of filial ingratitude1 and supposes it to be put to the wild boy caught in the woods of ,hanover1 with the view of ascertaining whether he would feel the sentiment of disapprobation as we do4 ,those that affirm an innate moral sense1 must answer in the affirmative2 those that deny it1 in the negative4 ,he then recites the arguments on both sides4 ,for the moral sense1 it is contended1 that we approve examples of generosity1 gratitude1 fidelity1 c41 on the instant1 without deliberation and without being conscious of any assignable reason2 and that this approbation is uniform and universal1 the same sorts of conduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries2 which circumstances point to the operation of an instinct1 or a moral sense4 ,the answers to these allegations are-- ,first1 ,the ,uniformity spoken of is not admitted as a fact4 ,according to the authentic accounts of historians and travellers1 there is scarcely a single vice that1 in some age or country of the world1 has not been countenanced by public opinion4 ,the murder of aged parents1 theft1 suicide1 promiscuous intercourse of the sexes1 and unmentionable crimes have been tolerated and approved4 ,among ourselves1 ,duelling is viewed with the most opposite sentiments2 forgiveness of injuries is accounted by some people magnanimity1 and by others meanness4 ,in these1 and in many other instances1 moral approbation follows the fashions and institutions of the country1 which institutions have themselves grown out of local circumstances1 the arbitrary authority of some chieftain1 or the caprice of the multitude4 ,secondly1 ,that1 although1 after allowing for these exceptions1 it is admitted that some sorts of actions are more approved than others1 the approbation being general1 although not universal1 yet this may be accounted for1 without supposing a moral sense1 thus3-- ,having experienced a particular line of conduct as beneficial to ourselves1 for example1 telling the truth1 a sentiment of approbation grows up in consequence1 and this sentiment thereupon arises whenever the action is mentioned1 and without our thinking of the consequences in each instance4 ,the process is illustrated by the love of money1 which is strongest in the old1 who least of all think of applying it to its uses4 ,by such means1 the approval of certain actions is commenced2 and being once commenced1 the continuance of the feeling is accounted for by authority1 by imitation1 and by all the usages of good society4 ,as soon as an entire society is possessed of an ethical view1 the initiation of the new members is sure and irresistible4 ,the efficacy of ,imitation is shown in cases where there is no authority or express training employed1 as in the likings and dislikings1 or tastes and antipathies1 in mere matters of indifference4 ,so much in reply to the alleged uniformity4 ,next come the positive objections to a ,moral ,instinct4 ,in the first place1 moral rules are not absolutely and universally true2 they bend to circumstances4 ,veracity1 which is a natural duty1 if there be any such1 is dispensed with in case of an enemy1 a thief1 or a madman4 ,the obligation of promises is released under certain circumstances4 ,in the next place1 the ,instinct must bear with it the idea of the actions to be approved or disapproved2 but we are not born with any such ideas4 ,on the whole1 either there exist no moral instincts1 or they are undistinguishable from prejudices and habits1 and are not to be trusted in moral reasonings4 ,aristotle held it as self-evident that barbarians are meant to be slaves2 so do our modern slave-traders4 ,this instance is one of many to show that the convenience of the parties has much to do with the rise of a moral sentiment4 ,and every system built upon instincts is more likely to find excuses for existing opinions and practices than to reform either4 ,again3 supposing these ,instincts to exist1 what is their authority or power to punish8 ,is it the infliction of remorse8 ,that may be borne with for the pleasures and profits of wickedness4 ,if they are to be held as indications of the will of ,god1 and therefore as presages of his intentions1 that result may be arrived at by a surer road4 ,the next preliminary topic is ,,human ,,happiness4 ,happiness is defined as the excess of pleasure over pain4 ,pleasures are to be held as differing only in continuance1 and in intensity4 ,a computation made in respect of these two properties1 confirmed by the degrees of cheerfulness1 tranquillity1 and contentment observable among men1 is to decide all questions as to human happiness4 ,i4--,what ,human ,happiness does not consist in4 ,not in the pleasures of ,sense1 in whatever profusion or variety enjoyed2 in which are included sensual pleasures1 active sports1 and ,fine ,art4 #ast1 ,because they last for a short time4 ,surely they are good for the time they do last4 #bndly1 ,by repetition1 they lose their relish4 ,intermission and variety1 however1 are to be supposed4 #crdly1 ,the eagerness for high and intense delights takes away the relish from all others4 ,paley professes to have observed in the votaries of pleasure a restless craving for variety1 languor under enjoyment1 and misery in the want of it4 ,after all1 however1 these pleasures have their value1 and may be too much despised as well as too much followed4 ,next1 happiness does not consist in the exemption from pain 7871 from labour1 care1 business1 and outward evils2 such exemption leaving one a prey to morbid depression1 anxiety1 and hypochondria4 ,even a pain in moderation may be a refreshment1 from giving a stimulus to pursuit4 ,nor does it consist in greatness1 rank1 or station4 ,the reason here is derived1 as usual1 from the doctrine of ,relativity or ,comparison1 pushed beyond all just limits4 ,the illustration of the dependence of the pleasure of superiority on comparison is in ,paley's happiest style4 ,,ii4--,what happiness does consist in4 ,allowing for the great difficulties of this vital determination1 he proposes to be governed by a reference to the conditions of life where men appear most cheerful and contented4 ,it consists1 #ast1 ,in the exercise of the social affections4 #bndly1 ,the exercise of our faculties1 either of body or of mind1 in the pursuit of some engaging end4 ,this includes the two items of occupation and plot-interest4 #crdly1 ,upon the prudent constitution of the habits2 the prudent constitution being chiefly in moderation and simplicity of life1 or in demanding few stimulants2 and #dthly1 ,in ,health1 whose importance he values highly1 but not too highly4 ,the consideration of these negative and positive conditions1 he thinks1 justifies the two conclusions3 7#a7 ,that happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of society2 and 7#b7 ,that in respect of this world's happiness1 vice has no advantage over virtue4 ,the last subject of the ,first ,book is ,,virtue4 ,the definition of virtue is 'the doing good to mankind1 in obedience to the will of ,god1 and for the sake of everlasting happiness4' ,if this were strictly interpreted according to its form1 it would mean that three things go to constitute virtue1 any one of which being absent1 we should not have virtue4 ,doing good to mankind alone is not virtue1 unless coupled with a divine requirement2 and this addition would not suffice1 without the farther circumstance of everlasting happiness as the reward4 ,but such is not his meaning1 nor is it easy to fix the meaning4 ,he unites the two conditions--,human ,happiness and the ,will of the ,deity--and holds them to coincide and to explain one another4 ,either of the two would be a sufficient definition of virtue2 and he would add1 as an explanatory proposition and a guide to practice1 that the one may be taken as a clue to the other4 ,in a double criterion like this1 everything depends upon the manner of working it4 ,by running from one of the tests to another at discretion1 we may evade whatever is disagreeable to us in both4 ,book ,,ii41 entitled ,,moral ,,obligation1 is the full development of his views4 ,reciting various theories of moral right and wrong1 he remarks1 first1 that they all ultimately coincide2 in other words1 all the theorists agree upon the same rules of duty--a remark to be received with allowances2 and next1 that they all leave the matter short2 none provide an adequate motive or inducement4 ,he omits to mention the theory of the ,divine ,will1 which is partly his own theory4 ,in proceeding to supply this want1 he asks first 'what is meant by being obliged to do a thing2' and answers1 'a violent motive resulting from the command of another4' ,the motive must be violent1 or have some degree of force to overcome reluctance or opposing tendencies4 ,it must also result from the command of another2 not the mere offer of a gratuity by way of inducement4 ,such is the nature of ,law2 we should not obey the magistrate1 unless rewards or punishments depended on our obedience2 so neither should we1 without the same reason1 do what is right1 or obey ,god4 ,he then resumes the general question1 under a concrete case1 ',why am ,i obliged to keep my word8' ,the answer accords with the above explanation2--,because ,i am urged to do so by a violent motive 7namely1 the rewards and punishments of a future life71 resulting from the command of ,god4 ,private happiness is the motive1 the will of ,god the rule4 ,although not brought out in the present connexion1 it is implied that the will of ,god intends the happiness of mankind1 and is to be interpreted accordingly4 ,previously1 when reasoning on the means of human happiness1 he declared it to be an established conclusion1 that virtue leads to happiness1 even in this life2 now he bases his own theory on the uncertainty of that conclusion4 ,his words are1 ',they who would establish a system of morality1 independent of a future state1 must look out for some other idea of moral obligation1 unless they can show that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life1 or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour4' ,he does not make the obvious remark that human authority1 as far as it goes1 is also a source of obligation2 it works by the very same class of means as the divine authority4 ,he next proceeds to enquire into the means of determining the ,,will ,,of ,,god4 ,there are two sources--the express declarations of ,scripture1 when they are to be had2 and the design impressed on the world1 in other words1 the light of nature4 ,this last source requires him1 on his system1 to establish the ,divine ,benevolence2 and he arrives at the conclusion that ,god wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures1 and accordingly1 that the method of coming at his will concerning any action is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or to diminish the general happiness4 ,he then discusses ,,utility1 with a view of answering the objection that actions may be useful1 and yet such as no man will allow to be right4 ,this leads him to distinguish between the particular and the general consequences of actions1 and to enforce the necessity of ,,general ,,rules4 ,an assassin1 by knocking a rich villain on the head1 may do immediate and particular good2 but the liberty granted to individuals to kill whoever they should deem injurious to society1 would render human life unsafe1 and induce universal terror4 ',whatever is expedient is right1' but then it must be expedient on the whole1 in the long run1 in all its effects collateral and remote1 as well as immediate and direct4 ,when the honestum is opposed to the utile1 the honestum means the general and remote consequences1 the utile the particular and the near4 ,the concluding sections of ,book ,,ii4 are occupied with the consideration of ,,right and ,,rights4 ,a ,right is of course correlative with an ,obligation4 ,rights are ,natural or ,adventitious2 ,alienable or ,inalienable2 ,perfect or ,imperfect4 ,the only one of these distinctions having any ,ethical application is ,perfect and ,imperfect4 ,the ,perfect ,rights are1 the ,imperfect are not1 enforced by ,law4 ,under the 'general ,rights of mankind1' he has a discussion as to our right to the flesh of animals1 and contends that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments drawn from the light of nature1 and that it reposes on the text of ,genesis ix4 #a1 #b1 #c4 ,as regards the chief bulk of ,paley's-work1 it is necessary only to indicate his scheme of the ,duties1 and his manner of treating them4 ,book ,,iii4 considers ,,relative ,,duties4 ,there are three classes of these4 ,first1 ,relative ,duties that are ,determinate1 meaning all those that are strictly defined and enforced2 those growing out of ,promises1 ,contracts1 ,oaths1 and ,subscriptions to ,articles of ,religion4 ,secondly1 ,relative ,duties that are ,indeterminate1 as ,charity1 in its various aspects of treatment of dependents1 assistance to the needy1 c42 the checks on ,anger and ,revenge2 ,gratitude1 c4 ,thirdly1 the ,relative ,duties growing out of the ,sexes4 ,book ,,iv4 is ,,duties ,,to ,,ourselves1 and treats of ,self-defence1 ,drunkenness1 and ,suicide4 ,book ,v4 comprises ,,duties ,,towards ,,god4 ,book ,,vi4 is occupied with ,politics and ,political ,economy4 ,it discusses the ,origin of ,civil ,government1 the ,duty of ,submission to ,government1 ,liberty1 the ,forms of ,government1 the ,british ,constitution1 the ,administration of ,justice1 c4 ,the ,ethical ,theory of ,paley may be briefly resumed thus3-- ,i4--,the ,ethical ,standard with him is the conjoined reference to the ,will of the ,deity1 and to ,utility1 or ,human ,happiness4 ,he is unable to construct a scheme applicable to mankind generally1 until they are first converted to a belief in ,revelation4 ,,ii4--,the ,psychology implied in his system involves his most characteristic features4 #a4 ,he is unmistakeable in repudiating ,innate ,moral ,distinctions1 and on this point1 and on this only1 is he thoroughly at one with the ,utilitarians of the present day4 #b4 ,on the ,theory of ,will he has no remarks4 ,he has an utter distaste for anything metaphysical4 #c4 ,he does not discuss ,disinterested ,sentiment2 by implication1 he denies it4 ',without the expectation of a future existence1' he says1 'all reasoning upon moral questions is vain4' ,he cannot1 of course1 leave out all reference to generosity4 ,under ',pecuniary ,bounty' he makes this remark--',they who rank pity amongst the original impulses of our nature1 rightly contend1 that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery1 it indicates the ,divine intention and our duty4 ,whether it be an instinct or a habit 7871 it is1 in fact1 a property of our nature1 which ,god appointed1 c4' ,this is his first argument for charity2 the second is derived from the original title of mankind1 granted by the ,deity1 to hold the earth in common2 and the third is the strong injunctions of ,scripture on this head4 ,he cannot1 it seems1 trust human nature with a single charitable act apart from the intervention of the ,deity4 ,,iii4--,he has an explicit scheme of ,happiness4 ,,iv4--,the ,substance of his ,moral ,code is distinguished from1 the current opinions chiefly by his well-known views on ,subscription to ,articles4 ,he cannot conceive how1 looking to the incurable diversity of human opinion on all matters short of demonstration1 the legislature could expect the perpetual consent of a body of ten thousand men1 not to one controverted proposition1 but to many hundreds4 ,his inducements to the performance of duty are1 as we should expect1 a mixed reference to ,public ,utility and to ,scripture4 ,in the ,indeterminate ,duties1 where men are urged by moral considerations1 to the exclusion of legal compulsion1 he sometimes appeals directly to our generous sympathies1 as well as to self-interest1 but usually ends with the ,scripture authority4 ,v4--,the relation of ,ethics to ,politics is not a prominent feature in ,paley4 ,he makes moral rules repose finally1 not upon human1 but upon ,divine ,law4 ,hence 7,,vi47 the connexion of his system with ,theology is fundamental4 ,,jeremy ,,bentham4 #agdh-ahcb4 ,the ,ethical ,system of ,jeremy ,bentham is given in his work1 entitled ',an ,introduction to the ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1' first published in #aghi4 ,in a posthumous work1 entitled ,deontology1 his principles were farther illustrated1 chiefly with reference to the minor morals and amiable virtues4 ,it is the first-named work that we shall here chiefly notice4 ,in it1 the author has principally in view ,legislation2 but the same common basis1 ,utility1 serves1 in his judgment1 for ,ethics1 or ,morals4 ,the first chapter1 entitled ',,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility1' begins thus3--',nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters1 pain and pleasure4 ,it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do1 as well as to determine what we shall do4 ,on the one hand1 the standard of right and wrong2 on the other1 the chain of causes and effects1 are fastened to their throne4 ,they govern us in all we do1 in all we say1 in all we think2 every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it4 ,in words a man may pretend to abjure their empire1 but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while4 ,the principle of utility recognizes this subjection1 and assumes it for the foundation of that system1 the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hand of reason and of law4 ,systems which attempt to question it1 deal in sounds instead of sense1 in caprice instead of reason1 in darkness instead of light4' ,he defines ,utility in various phrases1 all coming to the same thing3--the tendency of actions to promote the happiness1 and to prevent the misery1 of the party under consideration1 which party is usually the community where one's lot is cast4 ,of this principle no proof can be offered2 it is the final axiom1 on which alone we can found all arguments of a moral kind4 ,he that attempts to combat it1 usually assumes it1 unawares4 ,an opponent is challenged1 to say--7#a7 if he discards it wholly2 7#b7 if he will act without any principle1 or if there is any other that he would judge by2 7#c7 if that other be really and distinctly separate from utility2 7#d7 if he is inclined to set up his own approbation or disapprobation as the rule2 and if so1 whether he will force that upon others1 or allow each person to do the same2 7#e7 in the first case1 if his principle is not despotical2 7#f7 in the second case1 whether it is not anarchical2 7#g7 supposing him to add the plea of reflection1 let him say if the basis of his reflections excludes utility2 7#h7 if he means to compound the matter1 and take utility for part2 and if so1 for what part2 7#i7 why he goes so far1 with ,utility1 and no farther2 7#aj7 on what other principle a meaning can be attached to the words 'motive and right4 ,in ,chapter ,,ii41 ,bentham discusses the ,,principles ,,adverse ,,to ,,utility4 ,he conceives two opposing grounds4 ,the first mode of opposition is direct and constant1 as exemplified in ,asceticism4 ,a second mode may be only occasional1 as in what he terms the principle of ,sympathy and ,antipathy 7,liking and ,disliking74 ,the principle of ,asceticism means the approval of an action according to its tendency to diminish happiness1 or obversely4 ,any one reprobating in any shape1 pleasure as such1 is a partisan of this principle4 ,asceticism has been adopted1 on the one hand1 by certain moralists1 from the spur of philosophic pride2 and on the other hand1 by certain religionists1 under the impulse of fear4 ,it has been much less admitted into ,legislation than into ,morals4 ,it may have originated1 in the first instance1 with hasty speculators1 looking at the pains attending certain pleasures in the long run1 and pushing the abstinence from such pleasures 7justified to a certain length on prudential grounds7 so far as to fall in love with pain4 ,the other principle1 ,sympathy and ,antipathy1 means the unreasoning approbation or disapprobation of the individual mind1 where fancy1 caprice1 accidental liking or disliking1 may mix with a regard to human happiness4 ,this is properly the negation of a principle4 ,what we expect to find in a principle is some external consideration1 warranting and guiding our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation2 a basis that all are agreed upon4 ,it is under this head that ,bentham rapidly surveys and dismisses all the current theories of ,right and ,wrong4 ,they consist all of them1 he says1 in so many contrivances for avoiding an appeal to any external standard1 and for requiring us to accept the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself4 ,the dictates of this principle1 however1 will often unintentionally coincide with utility2 for what more natural ground of hatred to a practice can there be than its mischievous tendency8 ,the things that men suffer by1 they will be disposed to hate4 ,still1 it is not constant in its operation2 for people may ascribe the suffering to the wrong cause4 ,the principle is most liable to err on the side of severity2 differences of taste and of opinion are sufficient grounds for quarrel and resentment4 ,it will err on the side of lenity1 when a mischief is remote and imperceptible4 ,the author reserves a distinct handling for the ,theological principle2 alleging that it falls under one or other of the three foregoing4 ,the ,will of ,god must mean his will as revealed in the sacred writings1 which1 as the labours of divines testify1 themselves stand in need of interpretation4 ,what is meant1 in fact1 is the presumptive will of ,god2 that is1 what is presumed to be his will on account of its conformity with another principle4 ,we are pretty sure that what is right is conformable to his will1 but then this requires us first to know what is right4 ,the usual mode of knowing ,god's pleasure 7he remarks7 is to observe what is our own pleasure1 and pronounce that to be his4 ,chapter ,,iii4--,,on ,,four ,,sanctions ,,or ,,sources ,,of ,,pain ,,and ,,pleasure whereby men are stimulated to act right2 they are termed1 physical1 political1 moral1 and religious4 ,these are the ,sanctions of ,right4 ,the physical sanction includes the pleasures and pains arising in the ordinary course of nature1 unmodified by the will of any human being1 or of any supernatural being4 ,the political sanction is what emanates from the sovereign or supreme ruling power of the state4 ,the punishments of the ,law come under this head4 ,the moral or popular sanction results from the action of the community1 or of the individuals that each person comes in contact with1 acting without any settled or concerted rule4 ,it corresponds to public opinion1 and extends in its operation beyond the sphere of the law4 ,the religious sanction proceeds from the immediate hand of a superior invisible being1 either in the present1 or in a future life4 ,the name ,punishment is applicable only to the three last4 ,the suffering that befalls a man in the course of nature is termed a calamity2 if it happen through imprudence on his part1 it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction4 ,chapter ,,iv4 is the ,,value ,,of ,a ,,lot ,,of ,,pleasure ,,or ,,pain1 ,,how ,,to ,,be ,,measured4 ,a pleasure or a pain is determined to be greater or less according to 7#a7 its intensity1 7#b7 its duration1 7#c7 its certainty or uncertainty1 7#d7 its propinquity or remoteness2 all which are obvious distinctions4 ,to these are to be added 7#e7 its fecundity1 or the chance it has of being followed by other sensations of its own kind2 that is pleasures if it be pleasure1 pains if it be pain4 ,finally 7#f7 its purity1 or the chance of its being unmixed with the opposite kind2 a pure pleasure has no mixture of pain4 ,all the six properties apply to the case of an individual person2 where a plurality are concerned1 a new item is present1 7#g7 the extent1 or the number of persons affected4 ,these properties exhaust the meaning of the terms expressing good and evil2 on the one side1 happiness1 convenience1 advantage1 benefit1 emolument1 profit1 c42 and1 on the other1 unhappiness1 inconvenience1 disadvantage1 loss1 mischief1 and the like4 ,next follows1 in ,chapter ,v41 a classified enumeration of ,,pleasures ,,and ,,pains4 ,in a system undertaking to base all ,moral and ,political action on the production of happiness1 such a classification is obviously required4 ,the author professes to have grounded it on an analysis of human nature1 which analysis itself1 however1 as being too metaphysical1 he withholds4 ,the simple pleasures are3--#a4 ,the pleasures of sense4 #b4 ,the pleasures of wealth4 #c4 ,the pleasures of skill4 #d4 ,the pleasures of amity4 #e4 ,the pleasures of a good name4 #f4 ,the pleasures of power4 #g4 ,the pleasures of piety4 #h4 ,the pleasures of benevolence4 #i4 ,the pleasures of malevolence4 #aj4 ,the pleasures of memory4 #aa4 ,the pleasures of imagination4 #ab4 ,the pleasures of expectation4 #ac4 ,the pleasures dependent on association4 #ad4 ,the pleasures of relief4 ,the simple pains are3--#a4 ,the pains of privation4 #b4 ,the pains of the senses4 #c4 ,the pains of awkwardness4 #d4 ,the pains of enmity4 #e4 ,the pains of an ill name4 #f4 ,the pains of piety4 #g4 ,the pains of benevolence4 #h4 ,the pains of malevolence4 #i4 ,the pains of the memory4 #aj4 ,the pains of the imagination4 #aa4 ,the pains of expectation4 #ab4 ,the pains dependent on association4 ,we need not quote his detailed subdivision and illustration of these4 ,at the close1 he marks the important difference between self-regarding and extra-regarding2 the last being those of benevolence and of malevolence4 ,in a long chapter 7,,vi471 he dwells on ,,circumstances ,,influencing ,,sensibility4 ,they are such as the following3--#a4 ,health4 #b4 ,strength4 #c4 ,hardiness4 #d4 ,bodily imperfection4 #e4 ,quantity and ,quality of knowledge4 #f4 ,strength of intellectual powers4 #g4 ,firmness of mind4 #h4 ,steadiness of mind4 #i4 ,bent of inclination4 #aj4 ,moral sensibility4 #aa4 ,moral biases4 #ab4 ,religious ,sensibility4 #ac4 ,religious biases4 #ad4 ,sympathetic ,sensibility4 #ae4 ,sympathetic biases4 #af4 ,antipathetic sensibility4 #ag4 ,antipathetic biases4 #ah4 ,insanity4 #ai4 ,habitual occupations4 #bj4 ,pecuniary circumstances4 #ba4 ,connexions in the way of sympathy4 #bb4 ,connexions in the way of antipathy4 #bc4 ,radical frame of body4 #bd4 ,radical frame of mind4 #be4 ,sex4 #bf4 ,age4 #bg4 ,rank4 #bh4 ,education4 #bi4 ,climate4 #cj4 ,lineage4 #ca4 ,government4 #cb4 ,religious profession4 ,chapter ,,vii4 proceeds to consider ,,human ,,actions ,,in ,,general4 ,right and wrong1 good and evil1 merit and demerit belong to actions4 ,these have to be divided and classified with a view to the ends of the moralist and the legislator4 ,throughout this1 and two other long chapters1 he discusses1 as necessary in apportioning punishment1 the act itself1 the circumstances1 the intention1 and the consciousness--or the knowledge of the tendencies of the act4 ,he introduces many subdivisions under each head1 and makes a number of remarks of importance as regards penal legislation4 ,in ,chapter ,x41 he regards pleasures and pains in the aspect of ,,motives4 ,since every pleasure and every pain1 as a part of their nature1 induce actions1 they are often designated with reference to that circumstance4 ,hunger1 thirst1 lust1 avarice1 curiosity1 ambition1 c41 are names of this class4 ,there is not a complete set of such designations2 hence the use of the circumlocutions1 appetite for1 love of1 desire of--sweet odours1 sounds1 sights1 ease1 reputation1 c4 ,of great importance is the ,order of pre-eminence among motives4 ,of all the varieties of motives1 ,good-will1 or ,benevolence1 taken in a general view1 is that whose dictates are surest to coincide with ,utility4 ,in this1 however1 it is taken for granted that the benevolence is not so confined in its sphere1 as to be contradicted by a more extensive1 or enlarged1 benevolence4 ,after good-will1 the motive that has the best chance of coinciding with ,utility is ,love of ,reputation4 ,the coincidence would be perfect1 if men's likings and dislikings were governed exclusively by the principle of ,utility1 and not1 as they often are1 by the hostile principles of ,asceticism1 and of ,sympathy and ,antipathy4 ,love of reputation is inferior as a motive to ,good-will1 in not governing the secret actions4 ,these last are affected1 only as they have a chance of becoming public1 or as men contract a habit of looking to public approbation in all they do4 ,the desire of ,amity1 or of close personal affections1 is placed next in order1 as a motive4 ,according as we extend the number of persons whose amity we desire1 this prompting approximates to the love of reputation4 ,after these three motives1 ,bentham places the ,dictates of ,religion1 which1 however1 are so various in their suggestions1 that he can hardly speak of them in common4 ,were the ,being1 who is the object of religion1 universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful1 and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the notions of his wisdom and power1 the dictates of religion would correspond1 in all cases1 with ,utility4 ,but while men call him benevolent in words1 they seldom mean that he is so in reality4 ,they do not mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent2 they do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that benevolence has a meaning4 ,the dictates of religion are in all countries intermixed1 more or less1 with dictates unconformable to utility1 deduced from texts1 well or ill interpreted1 of the writings held for sacred by each sect4 ,these dictates1 however1 gradually approach nearer to utility1 because the dictates of the moral sanction do so4 ,such are the four ,social or ,tutelary ,motives1 the antagonists of the ,dissocial and ,self-regarding motives1 which include the remainder of the catalogue4 ,chapter ,,xi4 is on ,,dispositions4 ,a man is said to be of a mischievous disposition1 when he is presumed to be apt to engage rather in actions of an apparently pernicious tendency1 than in such as are apparently beneficial4 ,the author lays down certain ,rules for indicating ,disposition4 ,thus1 ',the strength of the temptation being given1 the mischievousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise1 is as the apparent mischievousness of the act1' and others to a like effect4 ,chapter ,,xii4--,,of ,,the ,,consequences ,,of ,a ,,mischievous ,,act1 is meant as the concluding link of the whole previous chain of causes and effects4 ,he defines the shapes that bad consequences may assume4 ,the mischief may be primary1 as when sustained by a definite number of individuals2 or secondary1 by extending over a multitude of unassignable individuals4 ,the evil in this last case may be either actual pain1 or danger1 which is the chance of pain4 ,thus1 a successful robbery affects1 primarily1 a number of assignable persons1 and secondarily1 all persons in a like situation of risk4 ,he then proceeds to the theory of ,,punishment 7,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 ,,xv471 to the classification of ,,offences 7,,xvi471 and to the ,limits of the ,penal ,branch of ,jurisprudence 7,,xvii474 ,the two first subjects--,punishments and ,offences--are interesting chiefly in regard to ,legislation4 ,they have also a bearing on ,morals2 inasmuch as society1 in its private administration of punishments1 ought1 no less than the ,legislator1 to be guided by sound scientific principles4 ,as respects ,punishment1 he marks off 7#a7 cases where it is groundless2 7#b7 where it is inefficacious1 as in ,infancy1 ,insanity1 ,intoxication1 c42 7#c7 cases where it is unprofitable2 and 7#d7 cases where it is needless4 ,it is under this last herd that he excludes from punishment the dissemination of what may be deemed pernicious principles4 ,punishment is needless here1 because the end can be served by reply and exposure4 ,the first part of ,chapter ,,xvii4 is entitled the ',limits between ,private ,ethics and the ,art of ,legislation2' and a short account of it will complete the view of the author's ,ethical ,theory4 ,ethics at large1 is defined the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness1 on the part of those whose interest is in view1 ,now1 these actions may be a man's own actions1 in which case they are styled the art of self-government1 or private ethics4 ,or they may be the actions of other agents1 namely1 7#a7 ,other human beings1 and 7#b7 ,other ,animals1 whose interests ,bentham considers to have been disgracefully overlooked by jurists as well as by mankind generally4 ,in so far as a man's happiness depends on his own conduct1 he may be said to owe a duty to himself2 the quality manifested in discharge of this branch of duty 7if duty it is to be called7 is ,,prudence4 ,in so far as he affects by his conduct the interests of those about him1 he is under a duty to others4 ,the happiness of others may be consulted in two ways4 ,first1 negatively1 by forbearing to diminish it2 this is called ,,probity4 ,secondly1 in a positive way1 by studying to increase it2 which is expressed by ,,beneficence4 ,but now the question occurs1 how is it that under ,private ,ethics 7or apart from legislation and religion7 a man can be tinder a motive to consult other people's happiness8 ,by what obligations can he be bound to probity and beneficence8 ,a man can have no adequate motives for consulting any interests but his own4 ,still there are motives for making us consult the happiness of others1 namely1 the purely social motive of ,sympathy or ,benevolence1 and the semi-social motives of ,love of ,amity and ,love of ,reputation4 ,he does not say here whether ,sympathy is a motive grounded on the pleasure it brings1 or a motive irrespective of the pleasure2 although from other places we may infer that he inclines to the first view4 ,private ,ethics and ,legislation can have but the same end1 happiness4 ,their means1 the actions prompted1 must be nearly the same4 ,still they are different4 ,there is no case where a man ought not to be guided by his own1 or his fellow-creatures'1 happiness2 but there are many cases where the legislature should not compel a man to perform such actions4 ,the reason is that the ,legislature works solely by ,punishment 7reward is seldom applied1 and is not properly an act of legislation74 ,now1 there are cases where the punishment of the political sanction ought not to be used2 and if1 in any of these cases1 there is a propriety of using the punishments of private ethics 7the moral or social sanction71 this circumstance would indicate the line of division4 ,first1 then1 as to the cases where punishment would be groundless4 ,in such cases1 neither legislation nor private ethics should interfere4 ,secondly4 ,as to cases where it would be inefficacious1 where punishment has no deterring motive power1--as in ,infancy1 ,insanity1 overwhelming danger1 c41--the public and the private sanctions are also alike excluded4 ,thirdly4 ,it is in the cases where ,legislative punishment would be unprofitable1 that we have the great field of ,private ,ethics4 ,punishment is unprofitable in two ways4 ,first1 when the danger of detection is so small1 that nothing but enormous severity1 on detection1 would be of avail1 as in the illicit commerce of the sexes1 which has generally gone unpunished by law4 ,secondly1 when there is danger of involving the innocent with the guilty1 from inability to define the crime in precise language4 ,hence it is that rude behaviour1 treachery1 and ingratitude are not punished by law2 and that in countries where the voice of the people controls the hand of the legislature1 there is a great dread of making defamation1 especially of the government1 an offence at law4 ,private ,ethics is not liable to the same difficulties as ,legislation in dealing with such offences4 ,of the three departments of ,moral ,duty--,prudence1 ,probity1 and ,beneficence--the one that least requires and admits of being enforced by legislative punishment is the first--,prudence4 ,it can only be through some defect of the understanding1 if people are wanting in duty to themselves4 ,now1 although a man may know little of himself1 is it certain the legislator knows more8 ,would it be possible to extirpate drunkenness or fornication by legal punishment8 ,all that can be done in this field is to subject the offences1 in cases of notoriety1 to a slight censure1 so as to cover them with a slight shade of artificial disrepute1 and thus give strength and influence to the moral sanction4 ,legislators have1 in general1 carried their interference too far in this class of duties2 and the mischief has been most conspicuous in religion4 ,men1 it is supposed1 are liable to errors of judgment2 and for these it is the determination of a ,being of infinite benevolence to punish them with an infinity of torments4 ,the legislator1 having by his side men perfectly enlightened1 unfettered1 and unbiassed1 presumes that he has attained by their means the exact truth2 and so1 when he sees his people ready to plunge headlong into an abyss of fire1 shall he not stretch forth his hand to save them8 ,the second class of duties--the rules of ,probity1 stand most in need of the assistance of the legislator4 ,there are few cases where it would be expedient to punish a man for hurting himself1 and few where it would not be expedient to punish a man for hurting his neighbour4 ,as regards offences against property1 private ethics presupposes legislation1 which alone can determine what things are to be regarded as each man's property4 ,if private ethics takes a different view from the legislature1 it must of course act on its own views4 ,the third class of duties--,beneficence--must be abandoned to the jurisdiction of private ethics4 ,in many cases the beneficial quality of an act depends upon the disposition of the agent1 or the possession by him of the extra-regarding motives--sympathy1 amity1 and reputation2 whereas political action can work only through the self-regarding motives4 ,in a word these duties must be free or voluntary4 ,still1 the limits of law on this head might be somewhat extended2 in particular1 where a man's person is in danger1 it might be made the duty of every one to save him from mischief1 no less than to abstain from bringing it on him4 ,to resume the ,ethics of ,bentham4 ,i4--,the ,standard or ,end of ,morality is the production of ,happiness1 or ,utility4 ,bentham is thus at one in his first principle with ,hume and with ,paley2 his peculiarity is to make it fruitful in numerous applications both to legislation and to morals4 ,he carries out the principle with an unflinching rigour1 and a logical force peculiarly his own4 ,,ii4--,his ,psychological ,analysis is also studied and thorough-going4 ,he is the first person to provide a classification of pleasures and pains1 as an indispensable preliminary alike to morals and to legislation4 ,the ethical applications of these are of less importance than the legislative2 they have a direct and practical bearing upon the theory of ,punishment4 ,he lays down1 as the constituents of the ,moral ,faculty1 ,good-will or ,benevolence1 the love of ,amity1 the love of ,reputation1 and the dictates of ,religion--with a view to the ,happiness of others2 and ,prudence--with a view to our own happiness4 ,he gives no special account of the acquired sentiment of ,obligation or ,authority--the characteristic of ,conscience1 as distinguished from other impulses having a tendency to the good of others or of self4 ,and yet it is the peculiarity of his system to identify morality with law2 so that there is only one step to connecting conscience with our education under the different sanctions--legal and ethical4 ,he would of course give a large place to the ,intellect or ,reason in making up the ,moral ,faculty1 seeing that the consequences of actions have to be estimated or judged2 but he would regard this as merely co-operating with our sensibilities to pleasure and pain4 ,the ,disinterested ,sentiment is not regarded by ,bentham4 as arising from any disposition to pure self-sacrifice4 ,he recognizes ,pleasures of ,benevolence and ,pains of ,benevolence2 thus constituting a purely interested motive for doing good to others4 ,he describes certain pleasures of ,imagination or ,sympathy arising through ,association--the idea of plenty1 the idea of the happiness of animals1 the idea of health1 the idea of gratitude4 ,under the head of ,circumstances influencing ,sensibility1 he adverts to ,sympathetic ,sensibility1 as being the propensity to derive pleasure from the happiness1 and pain from the unhappiness1 of other sensitive beings4 ,it cannot but be admitted1 he says1 that the only interest that a man at all times1 and on all occasions1 is sure to find adequate motives for consulting1 is his own4 ,he has no metaphysics of the ,will4 ,he uses the terms free and voluntary only with reference to spontaneous beneficence1 as opposed to the compulsion of the law4 ,,iii4--,as regards ,happiness1 or the ,summum ,bonum1 he presents his scientific classification of ,pleasures and ,pains1 without1 however1 indicating any plan of life1 for attaining the one and avoiding the other in the best manner4 ,he makes no distinction among pleasures and pains excepting what strictly concerns their value as such--intensity1 duration1 certainty1 and nearness4 ,he makes happiness to mean only the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain4 ,the renunciation of pleasure for any other motive than to procure a greater pleasure1 or avoid a greater pain1 he1 disapprovingly1 terms asceticism4 ,,iv4--,it being the essence of his system to consider ,ethics as a ,code of ,laws directed by ,utility1 and he being himself a law reformer on the greatest scale1 we might expect from him suggestions for the improvement of ,ethics1 as well as for ,legislation and ,jurisprudence4 ,his inclusion of the interests of the lower animals has been mentioned4 ,he also contends for the partly legislative and partly ethical innovation of ,freedom of ,divorce4 ,the inducements to morality are the motives assigned as working in its favour4 ,v4--,the connexions of ,ethics with ,politics1 the points of agreement and the points of difference of the two departments1 are signified with unprecedented care and precision 7,chap4 ,,xvii47 ,,vi4--,as regards the connexions with ,theology1 he gives no uncertain sound4 ,it is on this point that he stands in marked contrast to ,paley1 who also professes ,utility as his ethical foundation4 ,he recognizes religion as furnishing one of the ,sanctions of morality1 although often perverted into the enemy of utility4 ,he considers that the state may regard as offences any acts that tend to diminish or misapply the influence of religion as a motive to civil obedience4 ,while ,paley makes a conjoined reference to ,scripture and to ,utility in ascertaining moral rules1 ,bentham insists on ,utility alone as the final appeal4 ,he does not doubt that if we had a clear unambiguous statement of the divine will1 we should have a revelation of what is for human happiness2 but he distrusts all interpretations of scripture1 unless they coincide with a perfectly independent scientific investigation of the consequences of actions4 ,,sir ,,james ,,mackintosh4 #agfe-ahcb4 ,in the ',dissertation on the progress of ,ethical ,philosophy chiefly during the ,seventeenth and ,eighteenth ,centuries1' ,mackintosh advocates a distinct ,ethical theory4 ,his views and arguments occur partly in the course of his criticism of the other moralists1 and partly in his concluding ,general ,remarks 7,section ,,vii474 ,in ,section ,i41 entitled ,,preliminary ,,observations1 he remarks on the universality of the distinction between ,right and ,wrong4 ,on no subject do men1 in all ages1 coincide on so many points as on the general rules of conduct1 and the estimable qualities of character4 ,even the grossest deviations may be explained by ignorance of facts1 by errors with respect to the consequences of actions1 or by inconsistency with admitted principles4 ,in tribes where new-born infants are exposed1 the abandonment of parents is condemned2 the betrayal and murder of strangers is condemned by the very rules of faith and humanity1 acknowledged in the case of countrymen4 ,he complains that1 in the enquiry as to the foundation of morals1 the two distinct questions--as to the ,standard and the ,faculty--have seldom been fully discriminated4 ,thus1 ,paley opposes ,utility to a ,moral ,sense1 not perceiving that the two terms relate to different subjects2 and ,bentham repeats the mistake4 ,it is possible to represent ,utility as the criterion of ,right1 and a ,moral ,sense as the faculty4 ,in another place1 he remarks that the schoolmen failed to draw the distinction4 ,in ,section ,v41 entitled ',controversies concerning the ,moral ,faculty and the ,social ,affections1' and including the ,ethical theories coming between ,hobbes and ,butler1 namely1 ,cumberland1 ,cudworth1 ,clarke1 c41 he gives his objections to the scheme that founds moral distinctions solely on the ,reason4 ,reason1 as such1 can never be a motive to action2 an argument to dissuade a man from drunkenness must appeal to the pains of ill-health1 poverty1 and infamy1 that is1 to ,feelings4 ,the influence of ,reason is indirect2 it is merely a channel whereby the objects of desire are brought into view1 so as to operate on the ,will4 ,the abused extension of the term ,reason to the moral faculties1 he ascribes to the obvious importance of ,reason in choosing the means of action1 as well as in balancing the ends1 during which operation the feelings are suspended1 delayed1 and poised in a way favourable to our lasting interests4 ,hence the antithesis of ,reason and ,passion4 ,in remarking upon ,leibnitz's view of ,disinterested ,sentiment1 and the coincidence of ,virtue with ,happiness1 he sketches his own opinion1 which is that although every virtuous act may not lead to the greater happiness of the agent1 yet the disposition to virtuous acts1 in its intrinsic pleasures1 far outweighs all the pains of self-sacrifice that it can ever occasion4 ',the whole sagacity and ingenuity of the world may be fairly challenged to point out a case in which virtuous dispositions1 habits1 and feelings are not conducive in the highest degree to the happiness of the individual2 or to maintain that he is not the happiest1 whose moral sentiments and affections are such as to prevent the possibility of any unlawful advantage being presented to his mind4' ,section ,,vi4 is entitled ',foundations of a more ,just ,theory of ,ethics1' and embraces a review of all the ,ethical writers1 from ,butler downwards4 ,the most palpable defect in ,butler's scheme1 is that it affords no answer to the question1 ',what is the distinguishing quality of right actions8' in other words1 ,what is the ,standard8 ,there is a vicious circle in answering that they are commanded by ,conscience1 for ,conscience itself can be no otherwise defined than as the faculty that approves and commands right actions4 ,still1 he gives warm commendation to ,butler generally2 in connexion with him he takes occasion to give some farther hints as to his own opinions4 ,two positions are here advanced3 #ast1 ,the moral sentiments1 in their mature state1 are a class of feelings with no other objects than the dispositions to voluntary actions1 and the actions flowing from these dispositions4 ,we approve some dispositions and actions1 and disapprove others2 we desire to cultivate them1 and we aim at them for something in themselves4 ,this position receives light from the doctrine above quoted as to the supreme happiness of virtuous dispositions4 ,his second position is that ,conscience is an acquired principle2 which he repeats and unfolds in subsequent places4 ,he finds fault with ,hume for ascribing ,virtue to qualities of the ,understanding1 and considers that this is to confound admiration with moral approbation4 ,hume's general ,ethical doctrine1 that ,utility is a uniform ground of moral distinction1 he says can never be impugned until some example be produced of a virtue generally pernicious1 or a vice generally beneficial4 ,but as to the theory of moral approbation1 or the nature of the ,faculty1 he considers that ,hume's doctrine of ,benevolence 7or1 still better1 ,sympathy7 does not account for our approbation of temperance and fortitude1 nor for the supremacy of the ,moral ,faculty over all other motives4 ,he objects to the theory of ,adam ,smith1 that no allowance is made in it for the transfer of our feelings1 and the disappearing of the original reference from the view4 ,granting that our approbation began in sympathy1 as ,smith says1 certain it is1 that the adult man approves actions and dispositions as right1 while he is distinctly aware that no process of sympathy intervenes between the approval and its object4 ,he repeats1 against ,smith1 the criticism on ,hume1 that the sympathies have no imperative character of supremacy4 ,he further remarks that the reference1 in our actions1 to the point of view of the spectator1 is rather an expedient for preserving our impartiality than a fundamental principle of ,ethics4 ,it nearly coincides with the ,christian precept of doing unto others as we would they should do unto us1--an admirable practical maxim1 but1 as ,leibnitz has said truly1 intended only as a correction of self-partiality4 ,lastly1 he objects to ,smith1 that his system renders all morality relative to the pleasure of our coinciding in feeling with others1 which is merely to decide on the ,faculty1 without considering the ,standard4 ,smith shrinks from ,utility as a standard1 or ascribes its power over our feelings to our sense of the adaptation of means to ends4 ,he commends ,smith for grounding ,benevolence on ,sympathy1 whereas ,butler1 ,hutcheson1 and ,hume had grounded ,sympathy on ,benevolence4 ,it is in reviewing ,hartley1 whose distinction it was to open up the wide capabilities of the principle of ,association1 that ,mackintosh develops at greatest length his theory of the derived nature of ,conscience4 ,adverting to the usual example of the love of money1 he remarks that the benevolent man might begin with an interested affection1 but might end with a disinterested delight in doing good4 ,self-love1 or the principle of permanent well-being1 is gradually formed from the separate appetites1 and is at last pursued without having them specially in view4 ,so ,sympathy may perhaps be the transfer1 first1 of our own personal feelings to other beings1 and next1 of their feelings to ourselves1 thereby engendering the social affections4 ,it is an ancient and obstinate error of philosophers to regard these two principles--,self-love and ,sympathy--as the source of the impelling passions and affections1 instead of being the last results of them4 ,the chief elementary feelings that go to constitute the moral sentiments appear to be ,gratitude1 ,pity1 ,resentment1 and ,shame4 ,to take the example of ,gratitude4 ,acts of beneficence to ourselves give us pleasure2 we associate this pleasure with the benefactor1 so as to regard him with a feeling of complacency2 and when we view other beneficent beings and acts there is awakened within us our own agreeable experience4 ,the process is seen in the child1 who contracts towards the nurse or mother all the feelings of complacency arising from repeated pleasures1 and extends these by similarity to other resembling persons4 ,as soon as complacency takes the form of action1 it becomes 7according to the author's theory1 connecting conscience with will71 a part of the ,conscience4 ,so much for the development of ,gratitude4 ,next as to ,pity4 ,the likeness of the outward signs of emotion makes us transfer to others our own feelings1 and thereby becomes1 even more than gratitude1 a source of benevolence2 being one of the first motives to impart the benefits connected with affection4 ,in our sympathy with the sufferer1 we cannot but approve the actions that relieve suffering1 and the dispositions that prompt them4 ,we also enter into his ,resentment1 or anger towards the causes of pain1 and the actions and dispositions corresponding2 and this sympathetic anger is at length detached from special cases and extended to all wrong-doers2 and is the root of the most indispensable compound of our moral faculties1 the ',sense of ,justice4' ,to these internal growths1 from ,gratitude1 ,pity1 and ,resentment1 must be added the education by means of well-framed penal laws1 which are the lasting declaration of the moral indignation of mankind4 ,these laws may be obeyed as mere compulsory duties2 but with the generous sentiments concurring1 men may rise above duty to virtue1 and may contract that excellence of nature whence acts of beneficence flow of their own accord4 ,he next explains the growth of ,remorse1 as another element of the ,moral ,sense4 ,the abhorrence that we feel for bad actions is extended to the agent2 and1 in spite of certain obstacles to its full manifestation1 that abhorrence is prompted when the agent is self4 ,the theory of derivation is bound to account for the fact1 recognized in the language of mankind1 that the ,moral ,faculty is ,,one4 ,the principle of association would account for the fusion of many different sentiments into one product1 wherein the component parts would cease to be discerned2 but this is not enough4 ,why do these particular sentiments and no others coalesce in the total--,conscience4 ,the answer is what was formerly given with reference to ,butler2 namely1 while all other feelings relate to outward objects1 the feelings brought together in conscience1 contemplate exclusively the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents4 ,conscience is thus an acquired faculty1 but one that is universally and necessarily acquired4 ,the derivation is farther exemplified by a comparison with the feelings of ,taste4 ,these may have an original reference to fitness--as in the beauty of a horse--but they do not attain their proper character until the consideration of fitness disappears4 ,so far they resemble the moral faculty4 ,they differ from it1 however1 in this1 that taste ends in passive contemplation or quiescent delight2 conscience looks solely to the acts and dispositions of voluntary agents4 ,this is the author's favourite way of expressing what is otherwise called the authority and supremacy of conscience4 ,to sum up3--the principal constituents of the moral sense are ,gratitude1 ,sympathy 7or ,pity71 ,resentment1 and ,shame2 the secondary and auxiliary causes are ,education1 ,imitation1 ,general ,opinion1 ,laws and ,government4 ,in criticising ,paley1 he illustrates forcibly the position1 that ,religion must pre-suppose morality4 ,his criticism of ,bentham gives him an opportunity of remarking on the modes of carrying into effect the principle of ,utility as the ,standard4 ,he repeats his favourite doctrine of the inherent pleasures of a virtuous disposition1 as the grand circumstance rendering virtue profitable and vice unprofitable4 ,he even uses the ,platonic figure1 and compares vice to mental distemper4 ,it is his complaint against ,bentham and the later supporters of ,utility1 that they have misplaced the application of the principle1 and have encouraged the too frequent appeal to calculation in the details of conduct4 ,hence arise sophistical evasions of moral rules2 men will slide from general to particular consequences2 apply the test of utility to actions and not to dispositions2 and1 in short1 take too much upon themselves in settling questions of moral right and wrong4 ,he might have remarked that the power of perverting the standard to individual interests is not confined to the followers of ,utility4 ,he introduces the saying attributed to ,andrew ,fletcher1 'that he would lose his life to serve his country1 but would not do a base thing to save it4' ,he farther remarks on the tendency of ,bentham and his followers to treat ,ethics too juridically4 ,he would probably admit that ,ethics is strictly speaking a code of laws1 but draws the line between it and the juridical code1 by the distinction of dispositions and actions4 ,we may have to approve the author of an injurious action1 because it is well-meant2 the law must nevertheless punish it4 ,herein ,ethics has its alliance with ,religion1 which looks at the disposition or the heart4 ,he is disappointed at finding that ,dugald ,stewart1 who made applications of the law of association and appreciated its powers1 held back from1 and discountenanced1 the attempt of ,hartley to resolve the ,moral ,sense1 styling it 'an ingenious refinement on the ,selfish system1' and representing those opposed to himself in ,ethics as deriving the affections from 'self-love4' ,he repeats that the derivation theory affirms the disinterestedness of human actions as strongly as ,butler himself2 while it gets over the objection from the multiplication of original principles2 and ascribes the result to the operation of a real agent4 ,in replying to ,brown's refusal to accept the derivation of ,conscience1 on the ground that the process belongs to a time beyond remembrance1 he affirms it to be a sufficient theory1 if the supposed action resembles what we know to be the operation of the principle where we have direct experience of it4 ,his concluding ,section1 ,,vii41 entitled ,general ,remarks1 gives some farther explanations of his characteristic views4 ,he takes up the principle of ,utility1 at the point where ,brown bogled at it2 quoting ,brown's concession1 that ,utility and virtue are so related1 that there is perhaps no action generally felt to be virtuous that is not beneficial1 and that every case of benefit willingly done excites approbation4 ,he strikes out ,brown's word 'perhaps1' as making the affirmation either conjectural or useless2 and contends that the two facts1--morality and the general benefit1--being co-extensive1 should be reciprocally tests of each other4 ,he qualifies1 as usual1 by not allowing utility to be1 on all occasions1 the immediate incentive of actions4 ,he holds1 however1 that the main doctrine is an essential corollary from the ,divine ,benevolence4 ,he then replies specifically to the question1 ',why is utility not to be the sole end present to the mind of the virtuous agent8' ,the answer is found in the limits of man's faculties4 ,every man is not always able1 on the spur of the moment1 to calculate all the consequences of our actions4 ,but it is not to be concluded from this1 that the calculation of consequences is impracticable in moral subjects4 ,to calculate the general tendency of every sort of human action is1 he contends1 a possible1 easy1 and common operation4 ,the general good effects of temperance1 prudence1 fortitude1 justice1 benevolence1 gratitude1 veracity1 fidelity1 domestic and patriotic affections1 may be pronounced with as little error1 as the best founded maxims of the ordinary business of life4 ,he vindicates the rules of sexual morality on the grounds of benevolence4 ,he then discusses the question1 7on which he had charged ,hume with mistake71 ',why is approbation confined to voluntary acts8' ,he thinks it but a partial solution to say that approbation and disapprobation are wasted on what is not in the power of the will4 ,the full solution he considers to be found in the mode of derivation of the moral sentiment2 which1 accordingly1 he re-discusses at some length4 ,he produces the analogies of chemistry to show that compounds may be totally different from their elements4 ,he insists on the fact that a derived pleasure is not the less a pleasure2 it may even survive the primary pleasure4 ,self-love 7improperly so called7 is intelligible if its origin be referred to ,association1 but not if it be considered as prior to the appetites and passions that furnish its materials4 ,and as the pleasure derived from low objects may be transferred to the most pure1 so ,disinterestedness may originate with self1 and yet become as entirely detached from that origin as if the two had never been connected4 ,he then repeats his doctrine1 that these social or disinterested sentiments prompt the will as the means of their gratification4 ,hence1 by a farther transfer of association1 the voluntary acts share in the delight felt in the affections that determine them4 ,we then desire to experience beneficent volitions1 and to cultivate the dispositions to these4 ,such dispositions are at last desired for their own sake2 and1 when so desired1 constitute the ,moral ,sense1 ,conscience1 or the ,moral ,sentiment1 in its consummated form4 ,thus1 by a fourth or fifth stage of derivation from the original pleasures and pains of our constitution1 we arrive at this highly complex product1 called our moral nature4 ,nor is this all4 ,we must not look at the side of indignation to the wrong-doer4 ,we are angry at those who disappoint our wish for the happiness of others2 we make their resentment our own4 ,we hence approve of the actions and dispositions for punishing such offenders2 while we so far sympathize with the culprit as to disapprove of excess of punishment4 ,such moderated anger is the sense of ,justice1 and is a new element of ,conscience4 ,of all the virtues1 this is the one most directly aided by a conviction of general interest or utility4 ,all laws profess it as their end4 ,hence the importance of good criminal laws to the moral education of mankind4 ,among contributary streams to the moral faculty1 he enumerates courage1 energy1 and decision1 properly directed4 ,he recognizes 'duties to ourselves1' although condemning the expression as absurd4 ,intemperance1 improvidence1 timidity are morally wrong4 ,still1 as in other cases1 a man is not truly virtuous on such points1 till he loves them for their own sake1 and even performs them without an effort4 ,these prudential qualities having an influence on the will1 resemble in that the other constituents of ,conscience4 ,as a final result1 all those sentiments whose object is a state of the will become intimately and inseparably blended in the unity of ,conscience1 the arbiter and judge of human actions1 the lawful authority over every motive to conduct4 ,in this grand coalition of the public and the private feelings1 he sees a decisive illustration of the reference of moral sentiments to the ,will4 ,he farther recognizes in it a solution of the great problem of the relation of virtue to private interest4 ,qualities useful to ourselves are raised to the rank of virtues2 and qualities useful to others are converted into pleasures4 ,in moral reasonings1 we are enabled to bring home virtuous inducements by the medium of self-interest2 we can assure a man that by cultivating the disposition towards other men's happiness he gains a source of happiness to himself4 ,the question1 ,why we do not morally approve involuntary actions1 is now answered4 ,conscience is associated exclusively with the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents4 ,conscience and ,will are co-extensive4 ,a difficulty remains4 ',if moral approbation involve no perception of beneficial tendency1 how do we make out the coincidence of the two8' ,it might seem that the foundation of morals is thus made to rest on a coincidence that is mysterious and fantastic4 ,according to the author1 the conclusive answer is this4 ,although ,conscience rarely contemplates anything so distant as the welfare of all sentient beings1 yet in detail it obviously points to the production of happiness4 ,the social affections all promote happiness4 ,every one must observe the tendency of justice to the welfare of society4 ,the angry passions1 as ministers of morality1 remove hindrances to human welfare4 ,the private desires have respect to our own happiness4 ,every element of conscience has thus some portion of happiness for its object4 ,all the affections contribute to the general well-being1 although it is not necessary1 nor would it be fit1 that the agent should be distracted by the contemplation of that vast and remote object4 ,to sum up ,mackintosh3-- ,i4--,on the ,standard1 he pronounces for ,utility1 with certain modifications and explanations4 ,the ,utility is the remote and final justification of all actions accounted right1 but not the immediate motive in the mind of the agent4 ,it may justly be feared1 that1 by placing so much stress on the delights attendant on virtuous action1 he gives an opening for the admission of sentiment into the consideration of ,utility4 ,,ii4--,in the ,psychology of ,ethics1 he regards the ,conscience as a derived or generated faculty1 the result of a series of associations4 ,he assigns the primary feelings that enter into it1 and traces the different stages of the growth4 ,the distinctive feature of ,conscience is its close relation to the ,will4 ,he does not consider the problem of ,liberty and ,necessity4 ,he makes ,disinterested ,sentiment a secondary or derived feeling--a stage on the road to ,conscience4 ,while maintaining strongly the disinterested character of the sentiment1 he considers that it may be fully accounted for by derivation from our primitive self-regarding feelings1 and denies1 as against ,stewart and ,brown1 that this gives it a selfish character4 ,he carries the process of associative growth a step farther1 and maintains that we re-convert disinterestedness into a lofty delight--the delight in goodness for its own sake2 to attain this characteristic is the highest mark of a virtuous character4 ,,iii4---,his ,summum ,bonum1 or ,theory of ,happiness1 is contained in his much iterated doctrine of the deliciousness of virtuous conduct1 by which he proposes to effect the reconciliation of our own good with the good of others--prudence with virtue4 ,virtue is 'an inward fountain of pure delight2' the pleasure of benevolence1 'if it could become lasting and intense1 would convert the heart into a heaven2' they alone are happy1 or truly virtuous1 that do not need the motive of a regard to outward consequences4 ,his chief ,ethical precursor in this vein is ,shaftesbury2 but he is easily able to produce from ,theologians abundant iterations of it4 ,,iv4--,he has no special views as to the ,moral ,code4 ,with reference to the inducements to virtue1 he thinks he has a powerful lever in the delights that the virtuous disposition confers on its owner4 ,v4--,his theory of the connexion of ,ethics and ,politics is stated in his account of ,bentham1 whom he charges with making morality too judicial4 ,,vi4--,the relations of ,morality to ,religion are a matter of frequent and special consideration in ,mackintosh4 ,,james ,,mill4 #aghc-ahcf4 ,the work of ,james ,mill1 entitled the ',analysis of the ,human ,mind1' is distinguished1 in the first glace1 by the studied precision of its definitions of all leading terms1 giving it a permanent value as a logical discipline2 and in the second place1 by the successful carrying out of the principle of ,association in explaining the powers of the mind4 ,the author endeavours to show that the moral feelings are a complex product or growth1 of which the ultimate constituents are our pleasurable and painful sensations4 ,we shall present a brief abstract of the course of his exposition1 as given in ,chapters ,,xvii4--,,xxiii4 of the ,analysis4 ,the pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed1 it is important to take notice of their ,causes1 both immediate and remote1 by whose means they can be secured or avoided4 ,we contract a habit of passing rapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause2 and1 as in the typical case of money1 these causes are apt to rank higher in importance1 to take a greater hold on the mind1 than the sensations themselves4 ,the mind is not much interested in attending to the sensation2 that can provide for itself4 ,the mind is deeply interested in attending to the cause4 ,the author next 7,,xix47 considers the ,ideas of the pleasurable sensations1 and of the causes of them4 ,the ,idea of a pain is not the same as the pain2 it is a complex state1 containing1 no doubt1 an element of pain2 and the name for it is ,aversion4 ,so the name for an idea of pleasure is ,desire4 ,now1 these states extend to the causes of pains and pleasures1 though in other respects indifferent2 we have an aversion for a certain drug1 but there is in this a transition highly illustrative of the force of the associating principle2 our real aversion being to a bitter sensation1 and not to the visible appearance of the drug4 ,alluding 7,,xx47 to the important difference between past and future time in our ideas of pleasure and pain1 he defines ,hope and ,fear as the contemplation of a pleasurable or of a painful sensation1 as future1 but not certain4 ,when the immediate causes of pleasurable and painful sensations are viewed as past or future1 we have a new series of states4 ,in the past1 they are called ,love and ,hatred1 or ,aversion2 in the future1 the idea of a pleasure1 as certain in its arrival1 is ,joy--as probable1 ,hope2 the idea of future pain 7certain7 is not marked otherwise than by the names ,hatred1 ,aversion1 ,horror2 the idea of the pain as probable is some form of dread4 ,the remote causes of our pleasures and pains are more interesting than the immediate causes4 ,the reason is their wide command4 ,thus1 ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity are causes cf a great range of pleasures3 ,poverty1 ,impotence1 and ,contemptibility1 of a wide range of pains4 ,for one thing1 the first are the means of procuring the services of our fellow-creatures2 this fact is of the highest consequence in morals1 as showing how deeply our happiness is entwined with the actions of other beings4 ,the author illustrates at length the influence of these remote and comprehensive agencies2 and as it is an influence entirely the result of association1 it attests the magnitude of that power of the mind4 ,but our fellow-creatures are the subjects of affections1 not merely as the instrumentality set in motion by ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 but in their proper personality4 ,this leads the author to the consideration of the pleasurable affections of ,friendship1 ,kindness1 ,family1 ,country1 ,party1 ,mankind4 ,he resolves them all into associations with our primitive pleasures4 ,thus1 to take the example of ,kindness1 which will show how he deals with the disinterested affection2--,the idea of a man enjoying a train of pleasures1 or happiness1 is felt by everybody to be a pleasurable idea2 this can arise from nothing but the association of our own pleasures with the idea of his pleasures4 ,the pleasurable association composed of the ideas of a man and of his pleasures1 and the painful association composed of the idea of a man and of his pains1 are both ,affections included under one name ,kindness2 although in the second case it has the more specific name ,compassion4 ,under the other heads1 the author's elucidation is fuller1 but his principle is the same4 ,he next goes on 7,,xxii47 to ,,motives4 ,when the idea of a ,pleasure is associated with an action of our own as the cause1 that peculiar state of mind is generated1 called a motive4 ,the idea of the pleasure1 without the idea of an action for gaining it1 does not amount to a motive4 ,every pleasure may become a motive1 but every motive does not end in action1 because there may be counter-motives2 and the strength attained by motives depends greatly on education4 ,the facility of being acted on by motives of a particular kind is a ,,disposition4 ,we have1 in connexion with all our leading pleasures and pains1 names indicating their motive efficacy4 ,gluttony is both motive and disposition2 so ,lust and ,drunkenness2 with the added sense of reprobation in all the three4 ,friendship is a name for ,affection1 ,motive1 and ,disposition4 ,in ,chapter ,,xxiii41 the author makes the application of his principles to ,ethics4 ,the actions emanating from ourselves1 combined with those emanating from our fellow-creatures1 exceed all other ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,consequently such actions are objects of intense affections or regards4 ,the actions whence advantages accrue are classed under the four titles1 ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 ,benevolence4 ,the two first--,prudence and ,fortitude in fact1 ,prudence--express acts useful to ourselves in the first instance1 to others in the second instance4 ,justice and ,benevolence express acts useful to others in the first instance1 to ourselves in the second instance4 ,we have two sets of association with all these acts1 one set with them as our own1 another set with them as other people's4 ,with ,prudence 7and ,fortitude7 as our own acts1 we associate good to ourselves1 either in the shape of positive pleasure1 or as warding off pain4 ,thus ,labour is raised to importance by numerous associations of both classes4 ,farther1 ,prudence1 involving the foresight of a train of consequences1 requires a large measure of knowledge of things animate and inanimate4 ,courage is defined by the author1 incurring the chance of ,evil1 that is danger1 for the sake of a preponderant good2 which1 too1 stands in need of knowledge4 ,now1 when the ideas of acts of ,prudence and acts of ,courage have been associated sufficiently often with beneficial consequences1 they become pleasurable ideas1 or ,affections1 and they have also1 from the nature of the case1 the character of ,motives4 ,in short1 there is nothing in prudential conduct that may not be explained by a series of associations1 grounded on our pleasurable and painful sensations1 on the ideas of them1 and on the ideas of their causes4 ,the real difficulty attaches to ,justice and to ,beneficence4 ,as to ,justice4 ,men1 in society1 have found it essential for mutual benefit1 that the powers of ,individuals over the general causes of good should be fixed by certain rules1 that is1 ,laws4 ,acts done in accordance with these rules are ,just ,acts2 although1 when duly considered1 they are seen to include the main fact of beneficence1 the good of others4 ,to the performance of a certain class of just acts1 our ,fellow-creatures annex penalties2 these1 therefore1 are determined partly by ,prudence2 others remain to be performed voluntarily1 and for them the motive is ,beneficence4 ,what then is the source of the motives towards ,beneficence8 ,how do the ideas of acts1 having the good of our fellows for their end1 become ,affections and ,motives8 ,in the first place1 we have associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of fellow-creatures1 and hence1 with such acts of ours as yield them pleasure4 ,in the second place1 those are the acts for procuring to ourselves the favourable ,disposition of our ,fellow-men1 so that we have farther associations of the pleasures flowing from such favourable dispositions4 ,thus1 by the union of two sets of influences--two streams of association--the ,idea of our beneficent acts becomes a pleasurable idea1 that is1 an ,affection1 and1 being connected with actions of ours1 is also a ,motive4 ,such is the genesis of ,beneficent or ,disinterested impulses4 ,we have next a class of associations with other men's performance of the several virtues4 ,the ,prudence and the ,fortitude of others are directly beneficial to them1 and indirectly beneficial to us2 and with both these consequences we have necessarily agreeable associations4 ,the ,justice and the ,beneficence of other men are so directly beneficial to the objects of them1 that it is impossible for us not to have pleasurable associations with acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 first as concerns ourselves in particular1 and next as concerns the acts generally4 ,hence1 therefore1 the rise of ,affections and ,motives in favour of these two virtues4 ,as there is nothing so deeply interesting to me as that the acts of men1 regarding myself immediately1 should be acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 and the acts regarding themselves immediately1 acts of ,prudence and ,fortitude2 it follows that ,i have an interest in all such acts of my own as operate to cause those acts in others4 ,by similar acts of our own1 by the manifestation of dispositions to perform those acts1 we obtain their reciprocal performance by others4 ,there is thus a highly complex1 concurring stimulus to acts of virtue1--a large aggregate of influences of association1 the power at bottom being still our own pleasurable and painful sensations4 ,we must add the ascription of ,praise1 an influence remarkable for its wide propagation and great efficacy over men's minds1 and no less remarkable as a proof of the range of the associating principle1 especially in its character of ,fame1 which1 in the case of future fame1 is a purely ideal or associated delight4 ,equally1 if not more1 striking are the illustrations from ,dispraise4 ,the associations of ,disgrace1 even when not sufficient to restrain the performance of acts abhorred by mankind1 are able to produce the horrors of ,remorse1 the most intense of human sufferings4 ,the love of praise leads by one step to the love of ,praiseworthiness2 the dread of blame1 to the dread of ,blameworthiness4 ,of these various ,motives1 the most constant in operation1 and the most in use in moral training1 are ,praise and ,blame4 ,it is the sensibility to ,praise and ,blame--the joyful feelings associated with the one1 and the dread associated with the other--that gives effect to ,,popular ,,opinion1 or the ,,popular ,,sanction1 and1 with reference to men generally1 the ,,moral ,,sanction4 ,the other motives to virtue1 namely1 the association of our own acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 as cause1 with other men's as effects1 are subject to strong counteraction1 for we can rarely perform such acts without sacrifice to ourselves4 ,still1 there is in all men a certain surplus of motive from this cause1 just as there is a surplus from the association of acts of ours1 hostile to other men1 with a return of hostility on their part4 ,the best names for the aggregate ,affection1 ,motive1 and ,disposition in this important region of conduct1 are ,moral ,approbation and ,disapprobation4 ,the terms ,moral ,sense1 ,sense of ,right and ,wrong1 ,love of ,virtue and ,hatred of ,vice1 are not equally appropriate4 ,virtue and ,morality are other synonyms4 ,in the work entitled1 ',a ,fragment on ,mackintosh1' there are afforded farther illustrations of the author's derivation of the ,moral ,sentiment1 together with an exposition and defence of ,utility as the standard1 in which his views are substantially at one with ,bentham4 ,two or three references will be sufficient4 ,in the statement of the questions in dispute in ,morals1 he objects to the words 'test' and 'criterion1' as expressing the standard4 ,he considers it a mistake to designate as a 'test' what is the thing itself2 the test of ,morality is ,morality4 ,properly1 the thing testing is one thing2 the thing tested another thing4 ,the same objection would apply to the use of the word ,standard2 so that the only form of the first question of ,ethics would be1 ,what is morality8 ,what does it consist in8 ,the remark is just1 but somewhat hypercritical4 ,the illustration from ,chemical testing is not true in fact2 the test of gold is some essential attribute of gold1 as its weight4 ,and when we wish to determine as to a certain act1 whether it is a moral act1 we compare it with what we deem the essential quality of moral acts--,utility1 our ,moral ,instinct1 c4--and the operation is not improperly called testing the act4 ,since1 therefore1 whatever we agree upon as the essence of morality1 must be practically used by us as a test1 criterion1 or standard1 there cannot be much harm in calling this essential quality the standard1 although the designation is to a certain extent figurative4 ,the author has some additional remarks on the derivation of our ,disinterested feelings3 he reiterates the position expressed in the ',analysis1' that although we have feelings directly tending to the good of others1 they are nevertheless the growth of feelings that are rooted in self4 ,that feelings should be detached from their original root is a well known phenomenon of the mind4 ,his illustrations of ,utility are a valuable contribution to the defence of that doctrine4 ,he replies to most of the common objections4 ,mackintosh had urged that the reference to ,utility would be made a dangerous pretext for allowing exceptions to common rules4 ,mill expounds at length 7p4 #bdf7 the formation of moral rules1 and retorts that there are rules expressly formed to make exceptions to other rules1 as justice before generosity1 charity begins at home1 c4 ,he animadverts with great severity on ,mackintosh's doctrines1 as to the delight of virtue for its own sake1 and the special contact of moral feelings with the will4 ,allowance being made for the great difference in the way that the two writers express themselves1 they are at one in maintaining ,utility to be the ultimate standard1 and in regarding ,conscience as a derived faculty of the mind4 ,the author's handling of ,ethics does not extend beyond the first and second topics--the ,,standard and the ,,faculty4 ,his ,standard is ,utility4 ,the ,faculty is based on our ,pleasures and ,pains1 with which there are multiplied associations4 ,disinterested ,sentiment is a real fact1 but has its origin in our own proper pleasures and pains4 ,mill considers that the existing moral rules are all based on our estimate1 correct or incorrect1 of ,utility4 ,,john ,,austin4 #agij-ahei4 ,austin1 in his ,lectures on ',the ,province of ,jurisprudence determined1' has discussed the leading questions of ,ethics4 ,we give an abstract of the ,ethical part4 ,,lecture ,i4 ,law1 in its largest meaning1 and omitting metaphorical applications1 embraces ,laws set by ,god to his creatures1 and ,laws set by man to man4 ,of the laws set by man to man1 some are established by political superiors1 or by persons exercising government in nations or political societies4 ,this is law in the usual sense of the word1 forming the subject of ,jurisprudence4 ,the author terms it ,positive ,law4 ,there is another class of laws not set by political superiors in that capacity4 ,yet some of these are properly termed laws1 although others are only so by a close ,analogy4 ,there is no name for the laws proper1 but to the others are applied such names as 'moral rules1' 'the moral law1' 'general or public opinion1' 'the law of honour or of fashion4' ,the author proposes for these laws the name positive morality4 ,the laws now enumerated differ in many important respects1 but agree in this--that all of them are set by intelligent and rational beings to intelligent and rational beings4 ,there is a figurative application of the word 'law1' to the uniformities of the natural world1 through which1 the field of jurisprudence and morals has been deluged with muddy speculation4 ,laws properly so called are commands4 ,a command is the signification of a desire or wish1 accompanied with the power and the purpose to inflict evil if that desire is not complied with4 ,the person so desired is bound or obliged1 or placed under a duty1 to obey4 ,refusal is disobedience1 or violation of duty4 ,the evil to be inflicted is called a sanction1 or an enforcement of obedience2 the term punishment expresses one class of sanctions4 ,the term sanction is improperly applied to a ,reward4 ,we cannot say that an action is commanded1 or that obedience is constrained or enforced by the offer of a reward4 ,again1 when a reward is offered1 a right and not an obligation is created3 the imperative function passes to the party receiving the reward4 ,in short1 it is only by conditional evil1 that duties are sanctioned or enforced4 ,the correct meaning of superior and inferior is determined by command and obedience4 ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,the ,divine ,laws are the known commands of the ,deity1 enforced by the evils that we may suffer here or hereafter for breaking them4 ,some of these laws are revealed1 others unrevealed4 ,paley and others have proved that it was not the purpose of ,revelation to disclose the whole of our duties2 the ,light of ,nature is an additional source4 ,but how are we to interpret this ,light of ,nature8 ,the various hypotheses for resolving this question may be reduced to two3 7#a7 an ,innate ,sentiment1 called a ,moral ,sense1 ,common ,sense1 ,practical ,reason1 c42 and 7#b7 the ,theory of ,utility4 ,the author avows his adherence to the theory of ,utility1 which he connects with the ,divine ,benevolence in the manner of ,bentham4 ,god designs the happiness of sentient beings4 ,some actions forward that purpose1 others frustrate it4 ,the first1 ,god has enjoined2 the second1 ,he has forbidden4 ,knowing1 therefore1 the tendency of any action1 we know the ,divine command with respect to it4 ,the tendency of an action is all its consequences near and remote1 certain and probable1 direct and collateral4 ,a petty theft1 or the evasion of a trifling tax1 may be insignificant1 or even good1 in the direct and immediate consequences2 but before the full tendency can be weighed1 we must resolve the question3--,what would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good1 if similar acts1 or omissions1 were general or frequent8 ,when the theory of ,utility is correctly stated1 the current objections are easily refuted4 ,as viewed by the author1 ,utility is not the fountain or source of our duties2 this must be commands and sanctions4 ,but it is the index of the will of the law-giver1 who is presumed to have for his chief end the happiness or good of mankind4 ,the most specious objection to ,utility is the supposed necessity of going through a calculation of the consequences of every act that we have to perform1 an operation often beyond our power1 and likely to be abused to forward our private wishes4 ,to this1 the author replies first1 that supposing utility our only index1 we must make the best of it4 ,of course1 if we were endowed with a moral sense1 a special organ for ascertaining our duties1 the attempt to displace that invincible consciousness1 and to thrust the principle of utility into the vacant seat1 would be impossible and absurd4 ,according to the theory of ,utility1 our conduct would conform to rules inferred from the tendencies of actions1 but would not be determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility4 ,utility would be the ultimate1 not the immediate test4 ,to preface each act or forbearance by a conjecture and comparison of consequences were both superfluous and mischievous3--superfluous1 inasmuch as the result is already embodied in a known rule2 and mischievous1 inasmuch as the process1 if performed on the spur of the occasion1 would probably be faulty4 ,with the rules are associated sentiments1 the result of the ,divine1 or other1 command to obey the rules4 ,it is a gross and flagrant error to talk of substituting calculation for sentiment2 this is to oppose the rudder to the sail4 ,sentiment without calculation were capricious2 calculation without sentiment is inert4 ,there are cases where the specific consequences of an action are so momentous as to overbear the rule2 for example1 resistance to a bad government1 which the author calls an anomalous question1 to be tried not by the rule1 but by a direct resort to the ultimate or presiding-principle1 and by a separate calculation of good and evil4 ,such was the political emergency of the ,commonwealth1 and the ,american revolution4 ,it would have been well1 the author thinks1 if utility had been the sole guide in both cases4 ,there is a second objection to ,utility1 more perplexing to deal with4 ,how can we know fully and correctly all the consequences of actions8 ,the answer is that ,ethics1 as a science of observation and induction1 has been formed1 through a long succession of ages1 by many and separate contributions from many and separate discoverers4 ,like all other sciences1 it is progressive1 although unfortunately1 subject to special drawbacks4 ,the men that have enquired1 or affected to enquire1 into ,ethics1 have rarely been impartial2 they have laboured under prejudices or sinister interests2 and have been the advocates of foregone conclusions4 ,there is not on this subject a concurrence or agreement of numerous and impartial enquirers4 ,indeed1 many of the legal and moral rules of the most civilized communities arose in the infancy of the human mind1 partly from caprices of the fancy 7nearly omnipotent with barbarians71 and partly from an imperfect apprehension of general utility1 the result of a narrow experience4 ,thus the diffusion and the advancement of ethical truth encounter great and peculiar obstacles1 only to be removed by a better general education extended to the mass of the people4 ,it is desirable that the community should be indoctrinated with sound views of property1 and with the dependence of wealth1 upon the true principle of population1 discovered by ,malthus1 all which they are competent to understand4 ,the author refers to ,paley's ,moral ,philosophy as an example of the perverting tendency of narrow and domineering interests in the domain of ethics4 ,with many commendable points1 there is1 in that work1 much ignoble truckling to the dominant and influential few1 and a deal of shabby sophistry in defending abuses that the few were interested in upholding4 ,as a farther answer to the second objection1 he remarks1 that it applies to every theory of ethics that supposes our duties to be set by the ,deity4 ,christianity itself is defective1 considered as a system of rules for tho guidance of human conduct4 ,he then turns to the alternative of a ,moral ,sense4 ,this involves two assumptions4 ,first1 ,certain sentiments1 or feelings of approbation or disapprobation1 accompany our conceptions of certain human actions4 ,these feelings are neither the result of our reflection on the tendencies of actions1 nor the result of education2 the sentiments would follow the conception1 although we had neither adverted to the good or evil tendency of the actions1 nor become aware of the opinions of others regarding them4 ,this theory denies that the sentiments known to exist can be produced by education4 ,we approve and disapprove of actions we know not why4 ,the author adapts ,paley's supposition of the savage1 in order to express strongly what the moral sense implies4 ,but we will confine ourselves to his reasonings4 ,is there1 he asks1 any evidence of our being gifted with such feelings8 ,the very putting of such a question would seem a sufficient proof that we are not so endowed4 ,there ought to be no more doubt about them1 than about hunger or thirst4 ,it is alleged in their favour that our judgments of rectitude and depravity are immediate and voluntary4 ,the reply is that sentiments begotten by association are no less prompt and involuntary than our instincts4 ,our response to a money gain1 or a money loss1 is as prompt as our compliance with the primitive appetites of the system4 ,we begin by loving knowledge as a means to ends2 but1 in time1 the end is inseparably associated with the instrument4 ,so a moral sentiment dictated by utility1 if often exercised1 would be rapid and direct in its operation4 ,it is farther alleged1 as a proof of the innate character of the moral judgments1 that the moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike4 ,the argument may be put thus3--,no opinion or sentiment resulting from observation and induction is held or felt by all mankind3 ,observation and induction1 as applied to the same subject1 lead different men to different conclusions4 ,now1 the judgments passed internally on the rectitude or pravity of actions1 or the moral sentiments1 are precisely alike with all men4 ,therefore1 our moral sentiments are not the result of our inductions of the tendencies of actions2 nor were they derived from others1 and impressed by authority and example4 ,consequently1 the moral sentiments are instinctive1 or ultimate and inscrutable facts4 ,to refute such an argument is superfluous2 it is based on a groundless assertion4 ,the moral sentiments of men have differed to infinity4 ,with regard to a few classes of actions1 the moral judgments of most1 though not of all1 men have been alike4 ,with regard to others1 they have differed1 through every shade or degree1 from slight diversity to direct opposition4 ,but this is exactly what we should expect on the principle of utility4 ,with regard to some actions1 the dictates of utility are the same at all times and places1 and are so obvious as hardly to admit of mistake or doubt4 ,on the other hand1 men's positions in different ages and nations are in many respects widely different2 so that what was useful there and then is useless or pernicious here and now4 ,moreover1 since human tastes are various1 and human reason is fallible1 men's moral sentiments often widely differ in the same positions4 ,he next alludes to some prevailing misconceptions in regard to utility4 ,one is the confusion of the test with the motive4 ,the general good is the test1 or rather the index to the ultimate measure or test1 the ,divine commands2 but it is not in all1 or even in most cases1 the motive or inducement4 ,the principle of utility does not demand that we shall always or habitually attend to the general good2 although it does demand that we shall not pursue our own particular good by means that are inconsistent with that paramount object4 ,it permits the pursuit of our own pleasures as pleasure4 ,even as regards the good of others1 it commonly requires us to be governed by partial1 rather than by general benevolence2 by the narrower circle of family and friends rather than by the larger humanity that embraces mankind4 ,it requires us to act where we act with the utmost effect2 that is1 within the sphere best known to us4 ,the limitations to this principle1 the adjustment of the selfish to the social motives1 of partial sympathy to general benevolence1 belong to the detail of ethics4 ,the second misconception of ,utility is to confound it with a particular hypothesis concerning the ,origin of ,benevolence1 commonly styled the selfish system4 ,hartley and some others having affirmed that benevolence is not an ultimate fact1 but an emanation from self-love1 through the association of ideas1 it has been fancied that these writers dispute the existence of disinterested benevolence or sympathy4 ,now1 the selfish system1 in its literal import1 is flatly inconsistent with obvious facts1 but this is not the system contended for by the writers in question4 ,still1 this distortion has been laid hold of by the opponents of utility1 and maintained to be a necessary part of that system2 hence the supporters of utility are styled 'selfish1 sordid1 and cold-blooded calculators4' ,but1 as already said1 the theory of utility is not a theory of motives2 it holds equally good whether benevolence be what it is called1 or merely a provident regard to self3 whether it be a simple fact1 or engendered by association on self-regard4 ,paley mixed up ,utility with self-regarding motives2 but his theory of these is miserably shallow and defective1 and amounted to a denial of genuine benevolence or sympathy4 ,austin's ,fifth ,,lecture is devoted to a full elucidation of the meanings of ,law4 ,he had1 at the outset1 made the distinction between ,laws properly so called1 and ,laws improperly so called4 ,of the second class1 some are closely allied to ,laws proper1 possessing in fact their main or essential attributes2 others are laws only by metaphor4 ,laws proper1 and those closely allied to them among laws proper1 are divisible into three classes4 ,the first are the ,divine ,law or ,laws4 ,the second is named ,positive ,law or ,positive ,laws2 and corresponds with ,legislation4 ,the third he calls ,positive ,morality1 or positive moral rules2 it is the same as ,morals or ,ethics4 ,reverting to the definition of ,law1 he gives the following three essentials3--#a4 ,every law is a command1 and emanates from a determinate source or another4 #b4 ,every sanction is an eventual evil annexed to a command4 #c4 ,every duty supposes a command whereby it is created4 ,now1 tried by these tests1 the laws of ,god are laws proper2 so are positive laws1 by which are meant laws established by monarchs as supreme political superiors1 by subordinate political superiors1 and by subjects1 as private persons1 in pursuance of legal rights4 ,but as regards ,positive ,morality1 or moral rules1 some have so far the essentials of an imperative law or rule1 that they are rules set by men to men4 ,but they are not set by men as political superiors1 nor by men as private persons1 in pursuance of legal rights2 in this respect they differ from positive laws1 they are not clothed with legal sanctions4 ,the most important department of positive morality includes the laws set or imposed by general opinion1 as for example the laws of honour1 and of fashion4 ,now these are not laws in the strict meaning of the word1 because the authors are an indeterminate or uncertain aggregate of persons4 ,still1 they have the closest alliance with ,laws proper1 seeing that being armed with a sanction1 they impose a duty4 ,the persons obnoxious to the sanction generally do or forbear the acts enjoined or forbidden2 which is all that can happen under the highest type of law4 ,the author then refers to ,locke's division of law1 which1 although faulty in the analysis1 and inaptly expressed1 tallies in the main with what he has laid down4 ,of ,metaphorical or figurative laws1 the most usual is that suggested by the fact of uniformity1 which is one of the ordinary consequences of a law proper4 ,such are the laws of nature1 or the uniformities of co-existence and succession in natural phenomena4 ,another metaphorical extension is to a model or pattern1 because a law presents something as a guide to human conduct4 ,in this sense1 a man may set a law to himself1 meaning a plan or model1 and not a law in the proper sense of a command4 ,so a rule of art is devoid of a sanction1 and therefore of the idea of duty4 ,a confusion of ideas also exists as to the meaning of a sanction4 ,bentham styles the evils arising in the course of nature physical sanctions1 as if the omission to guard against fire were a sin or an immorality1 punished by the destruction of one's house4 ,but although this is an evil happening to a rational being1 and brought on by a voluntary act or omission1 it is not the result of a law in the proper sense of the term4 ,what is produced naturally1 says ,locke1 is produced without the intervention of a law4 ,austin is thus seen to be one of the most strenuous advocates of ,utility as the ,standard1 and is distinguished for the lucidity of his exposition1 and the force of his replies to the objections made against it4 ,he is also the best expounder of the relationship of ,morality to ,law4 ,,william ,,whewell4 #agid-ahff4 ,dr4 ,whewell's chief ,ethical works are1 ',elements of ,morality1 including ,polity1' and ',lectures on the ,history of ,moral ,philosophy in ,england4' ,we may refer for his views to either work4 ,the following abstract is taken from the latest 7#dth7 edition of his ,elements 7#ahfd74 ,in the ,preface he indicates the general scope of the work4 ,morality has its root in the ,common ,nature of ,man2 a scheme of ,morality must conform to the ,common ,sense of mankind1 in so far as that is consistent with itself4 ,now1 this ,common ,sense of ,mankind has in every age led to two seemingly opposite schemes of ,morality1 the one making ,virtue1 and the other making ,pleasure1 the rule of action4 ,on the one side1 men urge the claims of ,rectitude1 ,duty1 ,conscience1 the ,moral ,faculty2 on the other1 they declare ,utility1 ,expediency1 ,interest1 ,enjoyment1 to be the proper guides4 ,both systems are liable to objections4 ,against the scheme of ,pleasure1 it is urged that we never1 in fact1 identify virtue as merely useful4 ,against the scheme of ,virtue1 it is maintained that virtue is a matter of opinion1 and that ,conscience varies in different ages1 countries1 and persons4 ,it is necessary that a scheme of ,morality should surmount both classes of objections2 and the author therefore attempts a reconciliation of the two opposing theories4 ,he prepares the way by asking1 whether there are any actions1 or qualities of actions1 universally approved2 and whether there are any moral rules accepted by the ,common ,sense of mankind as universally valid8 ,the reply is that there are such1 as1 for example1 the virtues termed ,veracity1 ,justice1 ,benevolence4 ,he does not enquire why these are approved2 he accepts the fact of the approval1 and considers that here we have the basis of a ,moral ,system1 not liable to either of the opposing objections above recited4 ,he supposes1 however1 that the alleged agreement may be challenged1 first1 as not existing2 and next1 as insufficient to reason from4 #a4 ,it may be maintained that the excellence of the three virtues named is not universally assented to2 departures from them being allowed both in practice and in theory4 ,the answer is1 that the principles may be admitted1 although the interpretation varies4 ,men allow ,fidelity and ,kindness to be virtues1 although in an early stage of moral progress they do not make the application beyond their own friends2 it is only at an advanced stage that they include enemies4 ,the ,romans at first held stranger and enemy to be synonymous2 but afterwards they applauded the sentiment of the poet1 homo sum1 c4 ,moral principles must be what we approve of1 when we speak in the name of the whole human species4 #b4 ,it may be said that such principles are too vague and loose to reason from4 ,a verbal agreement in employing the terms truthful1 just1 humane1 does not prove a real agreement as to the actions2 and the particulars must be held as explaining the generalities4 ,the author holds this objection to be erroneous2 and the scheme of his work is intended to meet it4 ,he proceeds as follows3-- ,he allows that we must fix what is meant by right1 which carries with it the meaning of ,virtue and of ,duty4 ,now1 in saying an action is right1 there is this idea conveyed1 namely1 that we render such a reason for it1 as shall be paramount to all other considerations4 ,right must be the ,supreme ,rule4 ,how then are we to arrive at this rule8 ,the supreme rule is the authority over all the faculties and impulses2 and is made up of the partial rules according to the separate faculties1 powers1 and impulses4 ,we are to look1 in the first instance1 to the several faculties or departments of the mind2 for1 in connexion with each of these1 we shall find an irresistible propriety inherent in the very nature of the faculty4 ,for example1 man lives in the society of fellow-men2 his actions derive their meaning from this position4 ,he has the faculty of ,speech1 whereby his actions are connected with other men4 ,now1 as man is under a supreme moral rule1 this the author appears to assume in the very act of proving it1 there must be a rule of right as regards the use of ,speech2 which rule can be no other than truth and falsehood4 ,in other words1 veracity is a virtue4 ,again1 man1 as a social being1 has to divide with others the possession of the world1 in other words1 to possess ,property2 whence there must be a rule of ,property1 that is1 each man is to have his own4 ,whence ,justice is seen to be a virtue4 ,the author thinks himself at one with the common notions of mankind in pronouncing that the ,faculty of ,speech1 the ,desire of ,possessions1 and the ,affections1 are properly regulated1 not by any extraneous purposes or ends to be served by them1 but by ,veracity1 ,justice1 and ,humanity1 respectively4 ,he explains his position farther1 by professing to follow ,butler in the doctrine that1 through the mere contemplation of our human faculties and springs of action1 we can discern certain relations which must exist among them by the necessity of man's moral being4 ,butler maintains that1 by merely comparing appetite with conscience as springs of action1 we see conscience is superior and ought to rule2 and ,whewell conceives this to be self-evident1 and expresses it by stating that the ,lower parts of our nature are to be governed by the ,higher4 ,men being considered as social beings1 capable of mutual understanding through speech1 it is self-evident that their rule must include veracity4 ,in like manner1 it is self-evident from the same consideration of social relationship1 that each man should abstain from violence and anger towards others1 that is1 love his fellow men4 ,remarking on the plea of the utilitarian1 that truth may be justified by the intolerable consequences of its habitual violation1 he urges that this is no reason against its being intuitively perceived2 just as the axioms of geometry1 although intuitively felt1 are confirmed by showing the incongruities following on their denial4 ,he repeats the common allegation in favour of priori principles generally1 that no consideration of evil consequences would give the sense of universality of obligation attaching to the fundamental moral maxims2 and endeavours to show that his favourite antithesis of ,idea and ,fact conciliates the internal essence and the external conditions of morality4 ,the ,idea is invariable and universal2 the ,fact1 or outward circumstances1 may vary historically and geographically4 ,morality must in some measure be dependent on ,law1 but yet there is an ,idea of ,justice above law4 ,it very naturally occurred to many readers of ,whewell's scheme1 that in so far as he endeavours to give any reason for the foundations of morality1 he runs in a vicious circle4 ,he proposes to establish his supreme universal rule1 by showing it to be only a summing up of certain rules swaying the several portions or departments of our nature--,veracity1 ,justice1 c41 while1 in considering the obligation of these rules1 he assumes that man is a moral being1 which is another way of saying that he is to be under a supreme moral rule4 ,in his latest edition1 the author has replied to this charge1 but so briefly as to cast no new light on his position4 ,he only repeats that the ,supreme rule of ,human ,action is given by the constitution and conditions of human nature4 ,his ethical principle may be not unfairly expressed by saying1 that he recognizes a certain intrinsic fitness in exercising the organ of speech according to its social uses1 that is1 in promoting a right understanding among men2 and so with ,justice1 as the fitness of property1 and ,humanity1 as the fitness of the ,affections4 ,this fitness is intuitively felt4 ,human happiness is admitted to be a consequence of these rules2 but happiness is not a sufficient end in itself2 morality is also an end in itself4 ,human happiness is not to be conceived or admitted1 except as containing a moral element2 in addition to the direct gratifications of human life1 we must include the delight of virtue4 ,how men can be compelled to postpone their pleasurable sense of the good things of life1 till they have contracted a delight in virtue for its own sake1 the author does not say4 ,it has been the great object of moralists in all ages1 to impart by education such a state of mind as to spoil the common gratifications1 if they are viciously procured2 the comparatively little success of the endeavour1 shows that nature has done little to favour it4 ,the foregoing is an abstract of the ,introduction to the #dth ,edition of the ,elements of ,morality4 ,we shall present the author's views respecting the other questions of ,morality in the form of the usual summary4 ,i4--,as regards the ,standard1 enough has been already indicated4 ,,ii4--,the ,psychology of the ,moral ,faculty is given by ,whewell as part of a classification of our ,active ,powers1 or1 as he calls them1 ,springs of ,action4 ,these are3 ,i4--,the ,appetites or ,bodily ,desires1 as ,hunger and ,thirst1 and the desires of whatever things have been found to gratify the senses4 ,,ii4--,the ,affections1 which are directed to persons2 they fall under the two heads ,love and ,anger4 ,,iii4--,the ,mental ,desires1 having for their objects certain abstractions4 ,they are the desire of ,safety1 including ,security and ,liberty2 the desire of ,having1 or ,property2 the desire of ,society in all its forms--,family ,society and ,civil ,society1 under which is included the need of ,mutual ,understanding2 the desire of ,superiority2 and the ,desire of ,knowledge4 ,,iv4--,the ,moral ,sentiments4 ,our judgment of actions as right or wrong is accompanied by certain ,affections or ,sentiments1 named ,approbation and ,disapprobation1 ,indignation and ,esteem2 these are the ,moral ,sentiments4 ,v4--,the ,reflex ,sentiments1 namely1 the desires of being ,loved1 of ,esteem or ,admiration1 of our own ,approval2 and generally all springs of action designated by the word self--for example1 self-love4 ,with regard to the ,moral ,sentiment1 or ,conscience1 in particular1 the author's resolution of ,morality into ,moral ,rules1 necessarily supposes an exercise of the ,reason1 together with the ,affections above described4 ,he expressly mentions 'the ,practical ,reason1 which guides us in applying ,rules to our actions1 and in discerning the consequences of actions4' ,he does not allow ,individual ,conscience as an ultimate or supreme authority1 but requires it to be conformed to the ,supreme ,moral ,rules1 arrived at in the manner above described4 ,on the subject of ,disinterestedness1 he maintains a modification of ,paley's selfish theory4 ,he allows that some persons are so far disinterested as to be capable of benevolence and self-sacrifice1 without any motive of reward or punishment2 but 'to require that all persons should be such1 would be not only to require what we certainly shall not find1 but to put the requirements of our ,morality in a shape in which it cannot convince men4' ,accordingly1 like ,paley1 he places the doctrine that 'to promote the happiness of others will lead to our own happiness1' exclusively on the ground of ,religion4 ,he honours the principle that 'virtue is happiness1' but prefers for mankind generally the form1 'virtue is the way to happiness4' ,in short1 he places no reliance on the purely ,disinterested impulses of mankind1 although he admits the existence of such4 ,,iii4--,he discusses the ,summum ,bonum1 or ,happiness1 only with reference to his ,ethical theory4 ,the attaining of the objects of our desires yields ,enjoyment or ,pleasure1 which cannot be the supreme end of life1 being distinguished from1 and opposed to1 ,duty4 ,happiness is ,pleasure and ,duty combined and harmonized by ,wisdom4 ',as moral beings1 our ,happiness must be found in our ,moral ,progress1 and in the consequences of our ,moral ,progress2 we must be happy by being virtuous4' ,he complains of the moralists that reduce virtue to ,happiness 7in the sense of human pleasure71 that they fail to provide a measure of happiness1 or to resolve it into definite elements2 and again urges the impossibility of calculating the whole consequences of an action upon human happiness4 ,,iv4--,with respect to the ,moral ,code1 ,whewell's arrangement is interwoven with his derivation of moral rules4 ,he enumerates five ,cardinal ,virtues as the substance of morality3--,,benevolence1 which gives expansion to our ,love2 ,,justice1 as prescribing the measure of our ,mental ,desires2 ,,truth1 the law of ,speech in connexion with its purpose2 ,,purity1 the control of the ,bodily ,appetites2 and ,,order 7obedience to the ,laws71 which engages the ,reason in the consideration of ,rules and ,laws for defining ,virtue and ,vice4 ,thus the five leading branches of virtue have a certain parallelism to the five chief classes of motives--,bodily ,appetites1 ,mental ,desires1 ,love and its opposite1 the need of a ,mutual ,understanding1 and ,reason4 ,as already seen1 he considers it possible to derive every one of these virtues from the consideration of man's situation with reference to each3--,benevolence1 or ,humanity1 from our social relationship2 ,justice1 from the nature of ,property2 ,truth1 from1 the employment of ,language for mutual ,understanding2 ,purity1 from considering the lower parts of our nature 7the ,appetites7 as governed by the higher2 and ,order1 from the relation of ,governor and ,governed4 ,by a self-evident1 intuitive1 irresistible consideration of the circumstances of the case1 we are led to these several virtues in the detail1 and their sum is the ,supreme ,rule of ,life4 ,not content with these five express moral principles1 he considers that the ,supreme ,law requires1 as adjuncts1 two other virtues2 to these he gives the names ,,earnestness1 or ,zeal1 and ,,moral ,,purpose1 meaning that everything whatsoever should be done for moral ends4 ,v4--,the relation of ,ethics to ,politics in ,whewell's system is one of intimacy1 and yet of independence4 ,the ,laws of ,states supply the materials of human action1 by defining property1 c41 for the time being2 to which definitions morality must correspond4 ,on the other hand1 morality supplies the ,idea1 or ideal1 of ,justice1 to which the ,laws of ,society should progressively conform themselves4 ,the ,legislator and the ,jurist must adapt their legislation to the point of view of the ,moralist2 and the moralist1 while enjoining obedience to their dictates1 should endeavour to correct the inequalities produced by laws1 and should urge the improvement of ,law1 to make it conformable to morality4 ,the ,moral is in this way contrasted with the ,jural1 a useful word of the author's coining4 ,he devotes a separate ,book1 entitled ',rights and ,obligations1' to the foundations of ,jurisprudence4 ,he makes a five-fold division of ,rights1 grounded on his classification of the ,springs of ,human ,action2 ,rights of ,personal ,security1 ,property1 ,contract1 ,marriage1 ,government2 and justifies this division as against others proposed by jurists4 ,,vi4--,he introduces the ,morality of ,religion as a supplement to the ,morality of ,reason4 ,the separation of the two1 he remarks1 'enables us to trace the results of the moral guidance of human ,reason consistently and continuously1 while we still retain a due sense of the superior authority of ,religion4' ,as regards the foundations of ,natural and ,revealed ,religion1 he adopts the line of argument most usual with ,english ,theologians4 ,,james ,,frederick ,,ferrier4 #ahjh-fd4 ,in his ',lectures on ,greek ,philosophy' 7,remains1 ,vol4 ,i471 ,ferrier has indicated his views on the leading ,ethical controversies4 ,these will appear1 if we select his conclusions1 on the three following points3--,the ,moral ,sense1 the nature of ,sympathy1 and the ,summum ,bonum4 #a4 ,he considers that the ,sophists first distinctly broached the question--,what is man by nature1 and what is he by convention or fashion8 ',this prime question of moral philosophy1 as ,i have called it1 is no easy one to answer1 for it is no easy matter to effect the discrimination out of which the answer must proceed4 ,it is a question1 perhaps1 to which no complete1 but only an approximate1 answer can be returned4 ,one common mistake is to ascribe more to the natural man than properly belongs to him1 to ascribe to him attributes and endowments which belong only to the social and artificial man4 ,some writers--,hutcheson1 for example1 and he is followed by many others--are of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which discriminates between right and wrong1 just as he has naturally a sense of taste1 which distinguishes between sweet and bitter1 and a sense of sight1 which discriminates between red and blue1 or a sentient organism1 which distinguishes between pleasure and pain4 ,that man has by nature1 and from the first1 the possibility of attaining to a conscience is not to be denied4 ,that lie has within him by birthright something out of which conscience is developed1 ,i firmly believe2 and what this is ,i shall endeavour by-and-by to show when ,i come to speak of ,sokrates and his philosophy as opposed to the doctrines of the ,sophists4 ,but that the man is furnished by nature with a conscience ready-made1 just as he is furnished with a ready-made sensational apparatus1 this is a doctrine in which ,i have no faith1 and which ,i regard as altogether erroneous4 ,it arises out of the disposition to attribute more to the natural man than properly belongs to him4 ,the other error into which inquirers are apt to fall in making a discrimination between what man is by nature1 and what he is by convention1 is the opposite of the one just mentioned4 ,they sometimes attribute to the natural man less than properly belongs to him4 ,and this1 ,i think1 was the error into which the ,sophists were betrayed4 ,they fall into it inadvertently1 and not with any design of embracing or promulgating erroneous opinions4' #b4 ,with reference to ,,sympathy1 he differs from ,adam ,smith's view1 that it is a native and original affection of the heart1 like hunger and thirst4 ,mere feeling1 he contends1 can never take a man out of self4 ,it is thought that overleaps this boundary2 not the feeling of sensation1 but the thought of one's self and one's sensations1 gives the ground and the condition of sympathy4 ,sympathy has self-consciousness for its foundation4 ,very young children have little sympathy1 because in them the idea of self is but feebly developed4 #c4 ,in his chapter on the ,cynic and ,cyrenaic schools1 he discusses at length the summum bonum1 or ,happiness1 and1 by implication1 the ,ethical end1 or ,standard4 ,he considers that men have to keep in view two ends2 the one the maintenance of their own nature1 as rational and thinking beings2 the other their happiness or pleasure4 ,he will not allow that we are to do right at all hazards1 irrespective of utility2 yet he considers that there is something defective in the scheme that sets aside virtue as the good1 and enthrones happiness in its place4 ,he sums up as follows3-- ',we thus see that a complete body of ethics should embrace two codes1 two systems of rules1 the one of which we may call the fundamental or antecedent1 or under-ground ethics1 as underlying the other2 and the other of which we may call the upper or subsequent1 or above-ground ethics1 as resting on1 and modified by the former4 ,the under-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being what he truly is1 namely1 a creature of reason and of thought2 in short1 the necessity of being a man1 and of preserving to himself this status4 ,here the end is virtue1 that is1 the life and health of the soul1 and nothing but this4 ,the above-ground ethics would inculcate on man the necessity of being a happy man4 ,it is not enough for man to be2 he must1 moreover1 if possible1 be happy4 ,the fundamental ethics look merely to his being1 i4e41 his being rational2 the upper ethics look principally to his being happy1 but they are bound to take care that in all his happiness he does nothing to violate his rationality1 the health and virtue of the soul4' ,,henry ,,longueville_/,,mansel4 ,mr4 ,mansel1 in his ',metaphysics1' has examined the question of a moral standard1 and the nature of the moral faculty1 accepting1 with slight and unimportant modifications1 the current theory of a moral sense4 #a4 ,the ,moral ,faculty4 ,that the conceptions of right and wrong are sui generis1 is proved 7#a7 by the fact that in all languages there are distinct terms for 'right' and 'agreeable2' 7#b7 by the testimony of consciousness2 and 7#c7 by the mutual inconsistencies of the antagonists of a moral sense4 ,the moral faculty is not identical with ,reason2 for the understanding contributes to truth only one of its elements1 namely1 the concept2 in addition1 the concept must agree with the fact as presented in intuition4 ,the moral sense is usually supposed to involve the perception of qualities only in so far as they are pleasing or displeasing4 ,to this representation ,mr4 ,mansel objects4 ,in an act of moral consciousness two things are involved3 a perception or judgment1 and a sentiment or feeling4 ,but the judgment itself may be farther divided into two parts3 'the one1 an individual fact1 presented now and here2 the other1 a general law1 valid always and everywhere4' ,this is the distinction between presentative and representative ,knowledge4 ,in every act of consciousness there is some individual fact presented1 and an operation of the understanding4 ',a conscious act of pure moral sense1 like a conscious act of pure physical sense1 if it ever takes place at all1 takes place at a time of which we have no remembrance1 and of which we can give no account4' ,the intuitive element may be called conscience2 the representing element is the understanding4 ,on another point he differs from the ordinary theory4 ,it is commonly said that we immediately perceive the moral character of acts1 whether by ourselves or by others4 ,but this would implicate two facts1 neither of which we can be conscious of3 7#a7 a law binding on a certain person1 and 7#b7 his conduct as agreeing or disagreeing with that law4 ,now1 ,i can infer the existence of such a law only by representing his mind as constituted like my own4 ,we can1 in fact1 immediately perceive moral qualities only in our own actions4 #b4 ,the ,moral ,standard4 ,this is treated as a branch of ,ontology1 and designated the ',real in morality1' ,he declares that ,kant's notion of an absolute moral law1 binding by its inherent power over the mind1 is a mere fiction4 ,the difference between inclination and the moral imperative is merely a difference between lower and higher pleasure4 ,the moral law can have no authority unless imposed by a superior1 as a law emanating from a lawgiver4 ,if man is not accountable to some higher being1 there is no distinction between duty and pleasure4 ,the standard of right and wrong is the moral nature 7not the arbitrary will7 of ,god4#be ,now1 as we cannot know ,god--an infinite being1--so we have but a relative conception of morality4 ,we may have lower and higher ideas of duty4 ,morality therefore admits of progress4 ,but no advance in morality contradicts the principles previously acknowledged1 however it may vary the acts whereby those principles are carried out4 ,and each advance takes its place in the mind1 not as a question to be supported by argument1 but as an axiom to be intuitively admitted4 ,each principle appears true and irreversible so far as it goes1 but it is liable to be merged in a more comprehensive formula4 ,it is an error of philosophers to imagine that they have an absolute standard of morals1 and thereupon to set out priori the criterion of a possibly true revelation4 ,kant said that the revealed commands of ,god could have no religious value1 unless approved by the moral reason2 and ,fichte held that no true revelation could contain any intimation of future rewards and punishments1 or any moral rule not deducible from the principles of the practical reason4 ,but revelation has enlightened the practical reason1 as by the maxim--to love ,god with all thy heart1 and thy neighbour as thyself--a maxim1 says ,mr4 ,mansel1 that philosophy in vain toiled after1 and subsequently borrowed without acknowledgment4 ,,john ,,stuart ,,mill4 ,mr4 ,j4,s4 ,mill examines the basis of ,ethics in a small work entitled ,utilitarianism4 ,after a chapter of ,general ,remarks1 he proposes 7,chapter ,,ii47 to enquire1 ,what ,utilitarianism is8 ,this creed holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness1 wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness4 ,by happiness is intended pleasure1 and the absence of pain2 by unhappiness1 pain1 and the privation of pleasure4 ,the things included under pleasure and pain may require farther explanation2 but this does not affect the general theory4 ,to the accusation that pleasure is a mean and grovelling object of pursuit1 the answer is1 that human beings are capable of pleasures that are not grovelling4 ,it is compatible with utility to recognize some kinds of pleasure as more valuable than others4 ,there are pleasures that1 irrespective of amount1 are held by all persons that have experienced them to be preferable to others4 ,few human beings would consent to become beasts1 or fools1 or base1 in consideration of a greater allowance of pleasure4 ,inseparable from the estimate of pleasure is a sense of dignity1 which determines a preference among enjoyments4 ,but this distinction in kind is not essential to the justification of the standard of ,utility4 ,that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness1 but the greatest amount of happiness altogether4 ,however little the higher virtues might contribute to one's own happiness1 there can be no doubt that the world in general gains by them4 ,another objection to the doctrine is1 that happiness is a thing unattainable1 and that no one has a right to it4 ,not only can men do without happiness1 but renunciation is the first condition of all nobleness of character4 ,in reply1 the author remarks that1 supposing happiness impossible1 the prevention of unhappiness might still be an object1 which is a mode of ,utility4 ,but the alleged impossibility of happiness is either a verbal quibble or an exaggeration4 ,no one contends for a life of sustained rapture2 occasional moments of such1 in an existence of few and transitory pains1 many and various pleasures1 with a predominance of the active over the passive1 and moderate expectations on the whole1 constitute a life worthy to be called happiness4 ,numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less4 ,there are two great factors of enjoyment--tranquillity and excitement4 ,with the one1 little pleasure will suffice2 with the other1 considerable pain can be endured4 ,it does not appear impossible to secure both in alternation4 ,the principal defect in persons of fortunate lot is to care for nobody but themselves2 this curtails the excitements of life1 and makes everything dwindle as the end approaches4 ,another circumstance rendering life unsatisfactory is the want of mental cultivation1 by which men are deprived of the inexhaustible pleasures of knowledge1 not merely in the shape of science1 but as practice and fine art4 ,it is not at all difficult to indicate sources of happiness2 the main stress of the problem lies in the contest with the positive evils of life1 the great sources of physical and of mental suffering--indigence1 disease1 and the unkindness1 worthlessness1 or premature loss of objects of affection4 ,poverty and ,disease may be contracted in dimensions2 and even vicissitudes of fortune are not wholly beyond control4 ,it is unquestionably possible to do without happiness4 ,this is the lot of the greater part of mankind1 and is often voluntarily chosen by the hero or the martyr4 ,but self-sacrifice is not its own end2 it must be made to earn for others immunity from sacrifice4 ,it must be a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that requires any one to serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of their own2 yet undoubtedly while the world is in that imperfect state1 the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue that can be found in man4 ,nay1 farther1 the conscious ability to do without happiness1 in such a condition of the world1 is the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable4 ,meanwhile1 self-devotion belongs as much to the ,utilitarian as to the ,stoic or the ,transcendentalist2 with the reservation that a sacrifice not tending to increase the sum of happiness is to be held as wasted4 ,the golden rule1 do as you would be done by1 is the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality4 ,the means of approaching this ideal are1 first1 that laws and society should endeavour to place the interest of the individual in harmony with the interest of the whole2 and1 secondly1 that education and opinion should establish in the mind of each individual an indissoluble association between his own good and the good of the whole4 ,the system of ,utility is objected to1 on another side1 as being too high for humanity2 men cannot be perpetually acting with a view to the general interests of society4 ,but this is to mistake the meaning of a standard1 and to confound the rule of action with the motive4 ,ethics tells us what are our duties1 or by what test we are to know them2 but no system of ethics requires that the motive of every action should be a feeling of duty2 our actions are rightly done provided only duty does not condemn them4 ,the great majority of actions have nothing to do with the good of the world--they end with the individual2 it happens to few persons1 and that rarely1 to be public benefactors4 ,private utility is in the mass of cases all that we have to attend to4 ,as regards abstinences1 indeed1 it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be aware that the action is one that1 if practised generally1 would be generally injurious1 and to not feel a sense of obligation on that ground2 but such an amount of regard for the general interest is required under every system of morals4 ,it is farther alleged against ,utility1 that it renders men cold and unsympathizing1 chills the moral feelings towards individuals1 and regards only the dry consequences of actions1 without reference to the moral qualities of the agent4 ,the author replies that ,utility1 like any other system1 admits that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character4 ,still1 he contends1 in the long run1 the best proof of a good character is good actions4 ,if the objection means that utilitarians do not lay sufficient stress on the beauties of character1 he replies that this is the accident of persons cultivating their moral feelings more than their sympathies and artistic perceptions1 and may occur under every view of the foundation of morals4 ,the next objection considered is that ,utility is a godless doctrine4 ,the answer is1 that whoever believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of ,god1 necessarily believes that whatever he has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree4 ,again1 ,utility is stigmatized as an immoral doctrine1 by carrying out ,expediency in opposition to ,principle4 ,but the ,expedient in this sense means what is expedient for the agent himself1 and1 instead of being the same thing with the useful1 is a branch of the hurtful4 ,it would often be expedient to tell a lie1 but so momentous and so widely extended are the utilities of truth1 that veracity is a rule of transcendent expediency4 ,yet all moralists admit exceptions to it1 solely on account of the manifest inexpediency of observing it on certain occasions4 ,the author does not omit to notice the usual charge that it is impossible to make a calculation of consequences previous to every action1 which is as much as to say that no one can be under the guidance of ,christianity1 because there is not time1 on the occasion of doing anything1 to read through the ,old and ,new ,testaments4 ,the real answer is 7substantially the same as ,austin's7 that there has been ample time during the past duration of the species4 ,mankind have all that time been learning by experience the consequences of actions2 on that experience they have founded both their prudence and their morality4 ,it is an inference from the principle of utility1 which regards morals as a practical art1 that moral rules are improvable2 but there exists under the ultimate principle a number of intermediate generalizations1 applicable at once to the emergencies of human conduct4 ,nobody argues that navigation is not founded on astronomy1 because sailors cannot wait to calculate the ,nautical ,almanack4 ,as to the stock argument1 that people will pervert utility for their private ends1 ,mr4 ,mill challenges the production of any ethical creed where this may not happen4 ,the fault is due1 not to the origin of the rules1 but to the complicated nature of human affairs1 and the necessity of allowing a certain latitude1 under the moral responsibility of the agent1 for accommodation to circumstances4 ,and in cases of conflict1 utility is a better guide than anything found in systems whose moral laws claim independent authority4 ,chapter ,,iii4 considers the ,,ultimate ,,sanction ,,of ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility4 ,it is a proper question with regard to a supposed moral standard1--,what is its sanction8 what is the source of its obligation8 wherein lies its binding force8 ,the customary morality is consecrated by education and opinion1 and seems to be obligatory in itself2 but to present1 as the source of obligation1 some general principle1 not surrounded by the halo of consecration1 seems a paradox2 the superstructure seems to stand better without such a foundation4 ,this difficulty belongs to every attempt to reduce morality to first principles1 unless it should happen that the principle chosen has as much sacredness as any of its applications4 ,utility has1 or might have1 all the sanctions attaching to any other system of morals4 ,those sanctions are either ,external or ,internal4 ,the ,external are the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure 7#a7 from our fellow-creatures1 or 7#b7 from the ,ruler of the ,universe1 along with any sympathy or affection for them1 or love and awe of ,him1 inclining us apart from selfish motives4 ,there is no reason why these motives should not attach themselves to utilitarian morality4 ,the ,internal ,sanction1 under every standard of duty1 is of one uniform character--a feeling in our own mind2 a pain1 more or less intense1 attendant on violation of duty1 which in properly cultivated moral natures rises1 in the more serious cases1 into shrinking from it as an impossibility4 ,this feeling1 when disinterested1 and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty1 is the essence of ,conscience2 a complex phenomenon1 involving associations from sympathy1 from love1 and still more from fear2 from the recollections of childhood1 and of all our past life2 from self-esteem1 desire of the esteem of others1 and occasionally even self-abasement4 ,this extreme complication is an obstacle to our supposing that it can attach to other objects than what are found at present to excite it4 ,the binding force1 however1 is the mass of feeling to be broken through in order to violate our standard of right1 and which1 if we do violate that standard1 will have to be afterwards encountered as remorse4 ,thus1 apart from external sanctions1 the ultimate sanction1 under ,utility1 is the same as for other standards1 namely1 the conscientious feelings of mankind4 ,if there be anything innate in conscience1 there is nothing more likely than that it should be a regard to the pleasures and pains of others4 ,if so1 the intuitive ethics would be the same as the utilitarian2 and it is admitted on all hands that a large portion of morality turns upon what is due to the interests of fellow-creatures4 ,on the other hand1 if1 as the author believes1 the moral feelings are not innate1 they are not for that reason less natural4 ,it is natural to man to speak1 to reason1 to cultivate the ground1 to build cities1 though these are acquired faculties4 ,so the moral faculty1 if not a part of our nature1 is a natural outgrowth of it2 capable1 in a certain small degree1 of springing up spontaneously1 and of being brought to a high pitch by means of cultivation4 ,it is also susceptible1 by the use of the external sanctions and the force of early impressions1 of being cultivated in almost any direction1 and of being perverted to absurdity and mischief4 ,the basis of natural sentiment capable of supporting the utilitarian morality is to be found in the social feelings of mankind4 ,the social state is so natural1 so necessary1 and so habitual to man1 that he can hardly conceive himself otherwise than as a member of society2 and as civilization advances1 this association becomes more firmly riveted4 ,all strengthening of social ties1 and all healthy growth of society1 give to each individual a stronger personal interest in consulting the welfare of others4 ,each comes1 as though instinctively1 to be conscious of himself as a being that of course pays regard to others4 ,there is the strongest motive in each person to manifest this sentiment1 and1 even if he should not feel it strongly himself1 to cherish it in everybody else4 ,the smallest germs of the feeling are thus laid hold of1 and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education2 and by the powerful agency of the external sanctions there is woven around it a complete web of corroborative association4 ,in an improving state of society1 the influences are on the increase that generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest2 which1 if perfect1 would make him never think of anything for self1 if they also were not included4 ,suppose1 now1 that this feeling of unity were taught as a religion1 and that the whole force of education1 of institutions1 and of opinion1 were directed to make every person grow up surrounded with the profession and the practice of it2 can there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the ,happiness morality8 ,even in our present low state of advancement1 the deeply-rooted conception that each individual has of himself as a social being tends to make him wish to be in harmony with his fellow-creatures4 ,the feeling may be1 in most persons1 inferior in strength to the selfish feelings1 and may be altogether wanting2 but to such as possess it1 it has all the characters of a natural feeling1 and one that they would not desire to be without4 ,chapter ,,iv4 is ,,of ,,what ,,sort ,,of ,,proof ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility is susceptible4 ,questions about ends are questions as to what things are desirable4 ,according to the theory of ,utility1 happiness is desirable as an end2 all other things are desirable as means4 ,what is the proof of this doctrine8 ,as the proof1 that the sun is visible1 is that people actually see it1 so the proof that happiness is desirable1 is that people do actually desire it4 ,no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable1 beyond the fact that each one desires their own happiness4 ,but granting that people desire happiness as one of their ends of conduct1 do they never desire anything else8 ,to all appearance they do2 they desire virtue1 and the absence of vice1 no less surely than pleasure and the absence of pain4 ,hence the opponents of utility consider themselves entitled to infer that happiness is not the standard of moral approbation and disapprobation4 ,but the utilitarians do not deny that virtue is a thing to be desired4 ,the very reverse4 ,they maintain that it is to be desired1 and that for itself4 ,although considering that what makes virtue is the tendency to promote happiness1 yet they hold that the mind is not in a right state1 not in a state conformable to ,utility1 not in the state conducive to the general happiness1 unless it has adopted this essential instrumentality so warmly as to love it for its own sake4 ,it is necessary to the carrying out of utility that certain things1 originally of the nature of means1 should come by association to be a part of the final end4 ,thus health is but a means1 and yet we cherish it as strongly as we do any of the ultimate pleasures and pains4 ,so virtue is not originally an end1 but it is capable of becoming so2 it is to be desired and cherished not solely as a means to happiness1 but as a part of happiness4 ,the notorious instance of money exemplifies this operation4 ,the same may be said of power and fame2 although these are ends as well as means4 ,we should be but ill provided with happiness1 were it not for this provision of nature1 whereby1 things1 originally indifferent1 but conducive to the satisfaction of our primitive desires1 become in themselves sources of pleasure1 of even greater value than the primitive pleasures1 both in permanency and in the extent of their occupation of our life4 ,virtue is originally valuable as bringing pleasure and avoiding pain2 but by association it may be felt as a good in itself1 and be desired as intensely as any other good2 with this superiority over money1 power1 or fame1 that it makes the individual a blessing to society1 while these others may make him a curse4 ,with the allowance thus made for the effect of association1 the author considers it proved that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness4 ,whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself1 and ultimately to happiness1 is not desired for itself till it has become such4 ,human nature is so constituted1 he thinks1 that we desire nothing but what is either a part of happiness or a means of happiness2 and no other proof is required that these are the only things desirable4 ,whether this psychological assertion be correct1 must be determined by the self-consciousness and observation of the most practised observers of human nature4 ,it may be alleged that1 although desire always tends to happiness1 yet ,will1 as shown by actual conduct1 is different from desire4 ,we persist in a course of action long after the original desire has faded4 ,but this is merely an instance of that familiar fact1 the power of habit1 and is nowise confined to the virtuous actions4 ,will is amenable to habit2 we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself1 or desire only because we will it4 ,but the will is the child of desire1 and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under the sway of habit4 ,what is the result of habit may not be intrinsically good2 we might think it better for virtue that habit did not come in1 were it not that the other influences are not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy1 until they have acquired this farther support4 ,chapter ,v4 is ,,on ,,the ,,connexion ,,between ,,justice ,,and ,,utility4 ,the strongest obstacle to the doctrine of ,utility has been drawn from the ,idea of ,justice4 ,the rapid perception and the powerful sentiment connected with the ,just1 seem to show it as generically distinct from every variety of the ,expedient4 ,to see whether the sense of justice can be explained on grounds of ,utility1 the author begins by surveying in the concrete the things usually denominated just4 ,in the first place1 it is commonly considered unjust to deprive any one of their personal liberty1 or property1 or anything secured to them by law3 in other words1 it is unjust to violate any one's legal rights4 ,secondly1 ,the legal rights of a man may be such as ought not to have belonged to him2 that is1 the law conferring those rights may be a bad law4 ,when a law is bad1 opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it2 some think that no law should be disobeyed by the individual citizen2 others hold that it is just to resist unjust laws4 ,it is thus admitted by all that there is such a thing as moral right1 the refusal of which is injustice4 ,thirdly1 it is considered just that each person should receive what he deserves 7whether good or evil74 ,and a person is understood to deserve good if he does right1 evil if he does wrong2 and in particular to deserve good in return for good1 and evil in return for evil4 ,fourthly1 it is unjust to break faith1 to violate an engagement1 or disappoint expectations knowingly and voluntarily raised4 ,like other obligations1 this is not absolute1 but may be overruled by some still stronger demand of justice on the other side4 ,fifthly1 it is inconsistent with justice to be partial2 to show favour or preference in matters where favour does not apply4 ,we are expected in certain cases to prefer our friends to strangers2 but a tribunal is bound to the strictest impartiality2 rewards and punishments should be administered impartially2 so likewise the patronage of important public offices4 ,nearly allied to impartiality is the idea of equality4 ,the justice of giving equal protection to the rights of all is maintained even when the rights themselves are very unequal1 as in slavery and in the system of ranks or castes4 ,there are the greatest differences as to what is equality in the distribution of the produce of labour2 some thinking that all should receive alike2 others that the neediest should receive most2 others that the distribution should be according to labour or services4 ,to get a clue to the common idea running through all these meanings1 the author refers to the etymology of the word1 which1 in most languages1 points to something ordained by law4 ,even although there be many things considered just1 that we do not usually enforce by law1 yet in these cases it would give us pleasure if law could be brought to bear upon offenders4 ,when we think a person bound in justice to do a thing1 we should like to see him punished for not doing it2 we lament the obstacles that may be in the way1 and strive to make amends by a strong expression of our own opinion4 ,the idea of legal constraint is thus the generating idea of justice throughout all its transformations4 ,the real turning point between morality and simple expediency is contained in the penal sanction4 ,duty is what we may exact of a person2 there may be reasons why we do not exact it1 but the person himself would not be entitled to complain if we did so4 ,expediency1 on the other hand1 points to things that we may wish people to do1 may praise them for doing1 and despise them for not doing1 while we do not consider it proper to bring in the aid of punishment4 ,there enters farther into the idea of ,justice what has been expressed by the ill-chosen phrase1 'perfect obligation1' meaning that the duty involves a moral right on the part of some definite person1 as in the case of a debt2 an imperfect obligation is exemplified by charity1 which gives no legal claim to any one recipient4 ,every such right is a case of ,justice1 and not of ,beneficence4 ,the ,idea of ,justice is thus shown to be grounded in ,law2 and the next question is1 does the strong feeling or sentiment of ,justice grow out of considerations of utility8 ,mr4 ,mill conceives that though the notion of expediency or utility does not give birth to the sentiment1 it gives birth to what is moral in it4 ,the two essentials of justice are 7#a7 the desire to punish some one1 and 7#b7 the notion or belief that harm has been done to some definite individual or individuals4 ,now1 it appears to the author that the desire to punish is a spontaneous outgrowth of two sentiments1 both natural1 and1 it may be1 instinctive2 the impulse of self-defence1 and the feeling of sympathy4 ,we naturally resent1 repel1 and retaliate1 any harm done to ourselves and to any one that engages our sympathies4 ,there is nothing moral in mere resentment2 the moral part is the subordination of it to our social regards4 ,we are moral beings1 in proportion as we restrain our private resentment whenever it conflicts with the interests of society4 ,all moralists agree with ,kant in saying that no act is right that could not be adopted as a law by all rational beings 7that is1 consistently with the well-being of society74 ,there is in ,justice a rule of conduct1 and a right on the part of some one1 which right ought to be enforced by society4 ,if it is asked why society ought to enforce the right1 there is no answer but the general utility4 ,if that expression seem feeble and inadequate to account for the energy of retaliation inspired by injustice1 the author asks us to advert to the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility that is concerned4 ,the interest involved is security1 to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests4 ,all other earthly benefits needed by one person are not needed by another2 and many of them can1 if necessary1 be cheerfully foregone1 or replaced by something else2 but security no human being can possibly do without2 on it we depend for all our immunity from evil1 and for the whole value of all and every good1 beyond the passing moment4 ,now1 this most indispensable of all necessaries1 after physical nutriment1 cannot be had unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play4 ,our notion1 therefore1 of the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence1 gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility1 that the difference in degree 7as is often the case in psychology7 becomes a real difference in kind4 ,the claim assumes that character of absoluteness1 that apparent infinity1 and incommensurability with all other considerations1 which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong1 and that of ordinary expediency and inexpediency4 ,having presented his own analysis of the sentiment of ,justice1 the author proceeds to examine the intuitive theory4 ,the charge is constantly brought against ,utility1 that it is an uncertain standard1 differently interpreted by each person4 ,the only safety1 it is pretended1 is found in the immutable1 ineffaceable1 and unmistakeable dictates of ,justice1 carrying their evidence in themselves1 and independent of the fluctuations of opinions4 ,but so far is this from being the fact1 that there is as much difference of opinion1 and as much discussion1 about what is just1 as about what is useful to society4 ,to take a few instances4 ,on the question of ,punishment1 some hold it unjust to punish any one by way of example1 or for any end but the good of the sufferer4 ,others maintain that the good of the society is the only admissible end of punishment4 ,robert ,owen affirms that punishment altogether is unjust1 and that we should deal with crime only through education4 ,now1 without an appeal to expediency1 it is impossible to arbitrate among these conflicting views2 each one has a maxim of justice on its side4 ,then as to the apportioning of punishments to offences4 ,the rule that recommends itself to the primitive sentiment of justice is an eye for an eye1 a tooth for a tooth2 a rule formally abandoned in ,european countries1 although not without its hold upon the popular mind4 ,with many1 the test of justice1 in penal infliction1 is that it should be proportioned to the offence2 while others maintain that it is just to inflict only such an amount of punishment as will deter from the commission of the offence4 ,besides the differences of opinion already alluded to1 as to the payment of labour1 how many1 and irreconcileable1 are the standards of justice appealed to on the matter of taxation8 ,one opinion is1 that taxes should be in proportion to pecuniary means2 others think the wealthy should pay a higher proportion4 ,in point of natural justice1 a case might be made out for disregarding means1 and taking the same sum from each1 as the privileges are equally bestowed3 yet from feelings of humanity and social expediency no one advocates that view4 ,so that there is no mode of extricating the question but the utilitarian4 ,to sum up4 ,the great distinction between1 the ,just and the ,expedient is the distinction between the essentials of well-being--the moral rules forbidding mankind to hurt one another--and the rules that only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs4 ,it is in the higher moralities of protection from harm that each individual has the greatest stake2 and they are the moralities that compose the obligations of justice4 ,it is on account of these that punishment1 or retribution of evil for evil1 is universally included in the idea4 ,for the carrying out of the process of retaliation1 certain maxims are necessary as instruments or as checks to abuse2 as that involuntary acts are not punishable2 that no one shall be condemned unheard2 that punishment should be proportioned to the offence4 ,impartiality1 the first of judicial virtues1 is necessary to the fulfilment of the other conditions of justice3 while from the highest form of doing to each according to their deserts1 it is the abstract standard of social and distributive justice2 and is in this sense a direct emanation from the first principle of morals1 the principle of the greatest ,happiness4 ,all social inequalities that have ceased to be considered as expedient1 assume the character1 not of simple inexpediency1 but of injustice4 ,besides the ',utilitarianism1' ,mr4 ,mill's chief ,ethical dissertations are his review of ,whewell's ,moral ,treatises 7,dissertations and ,discussions1 ,vol4 ,,ii471 and parts of his ,essay on ,liberty4 ,by collecting his views generally under the usual heads1 we shall find a place for some points additional to what are given in the foregoing abstract4 ,i4--,enough has been stated as to his ,ethical ,standard1 the ,principle of ,utility4 ,,ii4--,we have seen his ,psychological explanation of the ,moral ,faculty1 as a growth from certain elementary feelings of the mind4 ,he has also discussed extensively the ,freedom of the ,will1 maintaining the strict causation of human actions1 and refuting the supposed fatalistic tendency of the doctrine4 ,he believes1 as we have seen1 in ,disinterested impulses1 but traces them to a purely self-regarding origin4 ,,iii4--,he does not give any formal dissertation on ,human ,happiness1 but indicates many of its important conditions1 as in the remarks cited above1 p4 #gjb4 ,in the chapter of the work on ',liberty1' entitled ,individuality1 he illustrates the great importance of special tastes1 and urges the full right of each person to the indulgence of these in every case where they do not directly injure others4 ,he reclaims against the social tyranny prevailing on such points as dress1 personal habits1 and eccentricities4 ,,iv4--,as regards the ,moral ,code1 he would repeal the legal and moral rule that makes marriage irrevocable4 ,he would also abolish all restraints on freedom of thought1 and on ,individuality of conduct1 qualified as above stated4 ,he would impose two new moral restraints4 ,he considers that every parent should be bound to provide a suitable education for his own children4 ,farther1 for any one to bring into the world human beings without the means of supporting them1 or1 in an over-peopled country1 to produce children in such number as to depress the reward of labour by competition1 he regards as serious offences4 ,,samuel ,,bailey4 ,mr4 ,samuel ,bailey devotes the last four in his ,third ,series of ',letters on the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1' to the subject of the ,moral ,sentiments1 or the feelings inspired in us by human conduct4 ,he first sets down five facts in the human constitution1 in which moral phenomena originate-- #a4 ,man is susceptible of pleasure and pain of various kinds and degrees4 #b4 ,he likes and dislikes respectively the causes of them4 #c4 ,he desires to reciprocate pleasure and pain received1 when intentionally given by other sentient beings4 #d4 ,he himself expects such reciprocation from his fellows1 coveting it in the one case1 and shunning it in the other4 #e4 ,he feels1 under certain circumstances1 more or less sympathy with the pleasures and pains given to others1 accompanied by a proportionate desire that those affections should be reciprocated to the givers4 ,these rudimentary affections1 states and operations of consciousness he is careful to note that1 besides feelings1 intellectual conditions and processes are involved in them are found more or less developed in all1 or nearly all the human race4 ,in support of the limitation now made1 he adduces what are given as authentic accounts of savages devoid of all gratitude and fellow-feeling2 and then goes on to trace the nature and development of moral sentiment from the rudimentary powers and susceptibilities mentioned1 in those that do possess them4 ,in doing so1 he follows the convenient mode of speech that takes actions for the objects that excite the susceptibilities1 although1 in reality1 the objects are no other than human beings acting in particular ways4 ,the feelings he supposes to be modified in manner or degree1 according as actions are 7#a7 done by ourselves to others1 or 7#b7 done to others by others1 or 7#c7 done to others by ourselves2 i4e41 according as we ourselves are the subjects1 the spectators1 or doers of them4 ,first1 then1 he considers our feelings in regard to actions done to us by others1 and the more carefully1 because these lie at the foundation of the rest4 ,when a fellow-creature intentionally contributes to our pleasure1 we feel the pleasure2 we feel a liking to the person intentionally conferring it1 and we feel an inclination to give him pleasure in return4 ,the two last feelings--liking and inclination to reciprocate1 constitute the simplest form of moral approbation2 in the contrary case1 dislike and resentment give the rudimentary form of moral disapprobation4 ,it is enough to excite the feelings1 that the actions are merely thought to be done by the person4 ,they are moral sentiments1 even although it could be supposed that there were no other kinds of actions in the world except actions done to ourselves2 but they are moral sentiments in the purely selfish form4 ,that1 for moral sentiment1 mere liking and disliking must be combined with the desire to reciprocate good and evil1 appears on a comparison of our different feelings towards animate and inanimate causes of pleasure and pain2 there being towards inanimate objects no desire of reciprocation4 ,to a first objection1 that the violent sentiments1 arising upon actions done to ourselves1 should not get the temperate designation of moral approbation and disapprobation1 he replies1 that such extremes as the passions of gratitude and resentment must yet be identified in their origin with our cooler feelings1 when we are mere spectators or actors4 ,a second objection1 that the epithet moral is inapplicable to sentiments involving purely personal feeling1 and destitute of sympathy1 he answers1 by remarking that the word moral1 in philosophy1 should not eulogistically be opposed to immoral1 but should be held as neutral1 and to mean 'relating to conduct1 whatever that conduct may be4' ,he closes the first head with the observation1 that in savage life the violent desire of reciprocation is best seen2 generally1 however1 as he gives instances to show1 in the form of revenge and reciprocation of evil4 ,in the second place1 he considers our feelings when we are spectators of actions done to others by others4 ,these form the largest class of actions1 but to us they have a meaning1 for the most part at least1 only as they have an analogy to actions done to ourselves4 ,the variety of the resulting feelings1 generally less intense than when we are the subjects of the actions1 is illustrated first by supposing the persons affected to be those we love2 in this case1 the feelings are analogous to those already mentioned1 and they may be even more intense than when we ourselves are personally affected4 ,if those affected are indifferent to us1 our feelings are less intense1 but we are still led to feel as before1 from a natural sympathy with other men's pains and pleasures--always supposing the sympathy is not 7as often happens7 otherwise counteracted or superseded2 and also from the influence of association1 if that1 too1 happen not to be countervailed4 ,of sympathy for human beings in general1 he remarks that a certain measure of civilization seems required to bring it properly out1 and he cites instances to prove how much it is wanting in savages4 ,in a third case1 where the persons affected are supposed to be those we hate1 we are displeased when they are made to rejoice1 and pleased when they suffer1 unless we are overcome by our habitual associations with good and evil actions4 ,such associations weigh least with rude and savage peoples1 but even the most civilized nations disregard them in times of war4 ,he takes up1 in the third place1 actions done by ourselves to others4 ,here1 when the action is beneficent1 the peculiarity is that an expectation of receiving good in return from our neighbours takes the place of a desire to reciprocate2 we consider ourselves the proper object of grateful thoughts1 c41 on the part both of receiver and of spectators4 ,we are affected with the gratification of a benevolent desire1 with self-complacency1 and with undefined hopes4 ,when we have inflicted injury1 there is the expectation of evil1 and a combination of feelings summed up in the word ,remorse4 ,but ,remorse1 like other sentiments1 may fail in the absence of cultivation of mind or under special circumstances4 ,having considered the three different kinds of actions separately1 he next remarks that the sentiment prevailing in each case must be liable to a reflex influence from the other cases1 whereby it will be strengthened or intensified2 thus we come to associate certain intensities of moral sentiment with certain kinds of action1 by whomsoever or to whomsoever performed4 ,he also notes1 that in the first and third cases1 as well as in the second1 there is a variation of the sentiment1 according as the parties affected are friends1 neutrals1 or enemies4 ,finally1 a peculiar and important modification of the sentiments results from the outward manifestations of them called forth from the persons directly or indirectly affected by actions4 ,such are looks1 gestures1 tones1 words1 or actions1 being all efforts to gratify the natural desire of reciprocating pleasure or pain4 ,of these the most notable are the verbal manifestations1 as they are mostly irrepressible1 and can alone always be resorted to4 ,while relieving the feelings1 they can also become a most powerful1 as they are often the only1 instrument of reward and punishment4 ,their power of giving to moral sentiments greater precision1 and of acting upon conduct like authoritative precepts1 is seen in greatest force when they proceed from1 bodies of men1 whether they are regarded as signs of material consequences or not4 ,he ends this part of the subject by defending1 with ,butler1 the place of resentment in the moral constitution4 ,he proceeds to inquire how it is that not only the perfection of moral sentiment that would apportion more approbation and disapprobation according to the real tendencies of actions1 is not attained1 but men's moral feelings are not seldom in extreme contrariety with the real effects of human conduct4 ,first1 he finds that men1 from partial views1 or momentarily1 or from caprice1 may bestow their sentiments altogether at variance with the real consequences of actions4 ,next there is the difficulty1 or even impossibility1 of calculating all the consequences far and near2 whence human conduct is liable to be appreciated on whimsical grounds or on no discernible grounds at all1 and errors in moral sentiment arise1 which it takes increased knowledge to get rid of4 ,in the third place1 it is a fact that our moral sentiments are to a very great extent derived from tradition1 while the approbation and disapprobation may have originally been wrongly applied4 ,the force of tradition he illustrates by supposing the case of a patriarchal family1 and he cannot too strongly represent its strength in overcoming or at least struggling against natural feeling4 ,the authoritative precept of a superior may also make actions be approved or disapproved1 not because they are directly perceived or even traditionally held to be beneficial or injurious1 but solely because they are commanded or prohibited4 ,lastly1 he dwells upon the influence of superstition in perverting moral sentiment1 finding1 however1 that it operates most strongly in the way of creating false virtues and false vices and crimes4 ,these circumstances1 explaining the want of conformity in our moral sentiments to the real tendencies of actions1 he next employs to account for discrepancies in moral sentiment between different communities4 ,having given examples of such discrepancies1 he supposes the case of two families1 endowed with the rudimentary qualities mentioned at the beginning1 but placed in different circumstances4 ,under the influence of dissimilar physical conditions1 and owing to the dissimilar personal idiosyncracies of the families1 and especially of their chiefs1 there will be left few points of complete analogy between them in the first generation1 and in course of time they will become two races exceedingly unlike in moral sentiment1 as in other respects4 ,he warns strongly against making moral generalizations except under analogous circumstances of knowledge and civilization4 ,most men have the rudimentary feelings1 but there is no end to the variety of their intensity and direction4 ,as a highest instance of discrepant moral sentiment1 he cites the fact that1 in our own country1 a moral stigma is still attached to intellectual error by many people1 and even by men of cultivation4 ,he now comes to the important question of the test or criterion that is to determine which of these diverse sentiments are right and which wrong1 since they cannot all be right from the mere fact of their existence1 or because they are felt by the subjects of them to be right1 or believed to be in consonance with the injunctions of superiors1 or to be held also by other people4 ,the foregoing review of the genesis of moral sentiments suggests a direct and simple answer4 ,as they arise from likings and dislikings of actions that cause1 or tend to cause1 pleasure and pain1 the first thing is to see that the likings and dislikings are well founded4 ,where this does not at once appear1 examination of the real effects of actions must be resorted to2 and1 in dubious cases1 men in general1 when unprejudiced1 allow this to be the natural test for applying moral approbation and disapprobation4 ,if1 indeed1 the end of moral sentiment is to promote or to prevent the actions1 there can be no better way of attaining that end4 ,and1 as a fact1 almost all moralists virtually adopt it on occasion1 though often unconsciously2 the greatest happiness--principle is denounced by its opponents as a mischievous doctrine4 ,the objection that the criterion of consequences is difficult of application1 and thus devoid of practical utility1 he rebuts by asserting that the difficulty is not greater than in other cases4 ,we have simply to follow effects as far as we can2 and it is by its ascertainable1 not by its unascertainable1 consequences1 that we pronounce an action1 as we pronounce an article of food or a statute1 to be good or bad4 ,the main effects of most actions are already very well ascertained1 and the consequences to human happiness1 when unascertainable1 are of no value4 ,if the test were honestly applied1 ethical discrepancies would tend gradually to disappear4 ,he starts another objection3--,the happiness-test is good as far as it goes1 but we also approve and disapprove of actions as they are just or generous1 or the contrary1 and with no reference to happiness or unhappiness4 ,in answering this argument1 he confines himself to the case of ,justice4 ,to be morally approved1 a just action must in itself be peculiarly pleasant or agreeable1 irrespective of its other effects1 which are left out3 for on no theory can pleasantness or agreeableness be dissociated from moral approbation4 ,now1 as ,happiness is but a general appellation for all the agreeable affections of our nature1 and unable to exist except in the shape of some agreeable emotion or combinations of agreeable emotions2 the just action that is morally commendable1 as giving naturally and directly a peculiar kind of pleasure independent of any other consequences1 only produces one species of those pleasant states of mind that are ranged under the genus happiness4 ,the test of justice therefore coincides with the happiness-test4 ,but he does not mean that we are actually affected thus1 in doing just actions1 nor refuse to accept justice as a criterion of actions2 only in the one case he maintains that1 whatever association may have effected1 the just act must originally have been approved for the sake of its consequences1 and1 in the other1 that justice is a criterion1 because proved over and over again to be a most beneficial principle4 ,after remarking that the ,moral ,sentiments of praise and blame may enter into accidental connection with1 other feelings of a distinct character1 like pity1 wonder1 c41 he criticises the use of the word ,utility in ,morals4 ,he avoids the term as objectionable1 because the useful in common language does not mean what is directly productive of happiness1 but only what is instrumental in its production1 and in most cases customarily or recurrently instrumental4 ,a blanket is of continual utility to a poor wretch through a severe winter1 but the benevolent act of the donor is not termed useful1 because it confers the benefit and ceases4 ,utility is too narrow to comprehend all the actions that deserve approbation4 ,we want an uncompounded substantive expressing the two attributes of conferring and conducing to happiness2 as a descriptive phrase1 producing happiness is as succinct as any4 ,the term useful is1 besides1 associated with the notion of what is serviceable in the affairs and objects of common life1 whence the philosophical doctrine that erects utility as its banner is apt to be deemed1 by the unthinking1 low1 mean1 and derogatory to human nature and aspirations1 although its real import is wholly free from such a reproach4 ,notwithstanding1 therefore1 the convenience of the term1 and because the associations connected with it are not easily eradicated1 whilst most of the trite objections to the true doctrine of morals turn upon its narrow meanings1 he thinks it should be as much as possible disused4 ,mr4 ,bailey ends by remarking of the common question1 whether our moral sentiments have their origin in ,reason1 or in a separate power called the ,moral ,sense1 that in his view of man's sensitive and intellectual nature it is easily settled4 ,he recognizes the feelings that have been enumerated1 and1 in connexion with them1 intellectual processes of discerning and inferring2 for which1 if the ,moral ,sense and ,reason are meant as anything more than unnecessary general expressions1 they are merely fictitious entities4 ,so1 too1 ,conscience1 whether as identified with the moral sense1 or put for sensibility in regard to the moral qualities of one's own mind1 is a mere personification of certain mental states4 ,the summary of ,bailey's doctrine falls within the two first heads4 ,i4--,the ,standard is the production of ,happiness4 ,it should be remarked1 however1 that happiness is a wider aim than morality2 although all virtue tends to produce happiness1 very much that produces happiness is not virtue4 ,,ii4--,the ,moral ,faculty1 while involving processes of discernment and inference1 is mainly composed of certain sentiments1 the chief being ,reciprocity and ,sympathy4 ,these are undoubtedly the largest ingredients in a mature1 self-acting conscience2 and the way that they contribute to the production of moral sentiment deserved to be1 as it has been1 well handled4 ,the great omission in ,mr4 ,bailey's account is the absence of the element of authority1 which is the main instrument in imparting to us the sense of obligation4 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,mr4 ,spencer's ethical doctrines are1 as yet1 nowhere fully expressed4 ,they form part of the more general doctrine of ,evolution which he is engaged in working out2 and they are at present to be gathered only from scattered passages4 ,it is true that1 in his first work1 ,social ,statics he presented what he then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one division of ,morals4 ,but without abandoning this view1 he now regards it as inadequate--more especially in respect of its basis4 ,mr4 ,spencer's conception of ,morality as a science1 is conveyed in the following passages in a letter written by him to ,mr4 ,mill2 repudiating the title anti-utilitarian1 which ,mr4 ,mill had applied to him3-- ',the note in question greatly startled me by implicitly classing me with ,anti-utilitarians4 ,i have never regarded myself as an ,anti-utilitarian4 ,my dissent from the doctrine of ,utility as commonly understood1 concerns not the object to be reached by men1 but the method of reaching it4 ,while ,i admit that happiness is the ultimate end to be contemplated1 ,i do not admit that it should be the proximate end4 ,the ,expediency-,philosophy having concluded that happiness is a thing to be achieved1 assumes that ,morality has no other business than empirically to generalize the results of conduct1 and to supply for the guidance of conduct nothing more than its empirical generalizations4 ,but the view for which ,i contend is1 that ,morality properly so called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental1 and certain other modes beneficial4 ,these good and bad results cannot be accidental1 but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things2 and ,i conceive it to be the business of ,moral ,science to deduce1 from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness4 ,having done this1 its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct2 and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery4 ',perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning4 ,during its early stages1 planetary ,astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and planets2 from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be empirically predicted1 with an approach to truth1 that certain of the heavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times4 ,but the modern science of planetary ,astronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation--deductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain times4 ,now1 the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient and modern ,astronomy1 is analogous to the kind of relation which1 ,i conceive1 exists between the ,expediency-,morality1 and ,moral ,science properly so-called4 ,and the objection which ,i have to the current ,utilitarianism1 is1 that it recognizes no more developed form of morality--does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of ,moral ,science4 ',to make my position fully understood1 it seems needful to add that1 corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed ,moral ,science1 there have been1 and still are1 developing in the race1 certain fundamental moral intuitions2 and that1 though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of ,utility1 gradually organized and inherited1 they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience4 ,just in the same way that ,i believe the intuition of space1 possessed by any living individual1 to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developed nervous organizations--just as ,i believe that this intuition1 requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences1 has practically become a form of thought1 apparently quite independent of experience2 so do ,i believe that the experiences of utility organised and consolidated through all past generations of the human race1 have been producing corresponding nervous modifications1 which1 by continued transmission and accumulation1 have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition--certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct1 which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility4 ,i also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of ,geometry1 and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them2 so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of ,moral ,science1 and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them4' ,the relations between the ,expediency-,morality1 and ,moral ,science1 conceived by ,mr4 ,spencer to be1 the one transitional1 and the other ultimate1 are further explained in the following passage from his essay on ',prison-,ethics'3-- ',progressing civilization1 which is of necessity a succession of compromises between old and new1 requires a perpetual re-adjustment of the compromise between the ideal and the practicable in social arrangements3 to which end both elements of the compromise must be kept in view4 ,if it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things far too good for men as they are2 it is not less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any better than that which exists4 ,while absolute morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into utopian absurdities2 expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all stimulus to improvement4 ,granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is relatively right2 it still follows that we must first consider what is absolutely right2 since the one conception presupposes the other4 ,that is to say1 though we must ever aim to do what is best for the present times1 yet we must ever bear in mind what is abstractedly best2 so that the changes we make may be towards it1 and not away from it4' ,by the word absolute as thus applied1 ,mr4 ,spencer does not mean to imply a right and wrong existing apart from ,humanity and its relations4 ,agreeing with ,utilitarians in the belief that happiness is the end1 and that the conduct called moral is simply the best means of attaining it1 he of course does not assert that there is a morality which is absolute in the sense of being true out of relation to human existence4 ,by absolute morality as distinguished from relative1 he here means the mode of conduct which1 under the conditions arising from social union1 must be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all4 ,he holds1 that the laws of ,life1 physiologically considered1 being fixed1 it necessarily follows that when a number of individuals have to live in social union1 which necessarily involves fixity of conditions in the shape of mutual interferences and limitations1 there result certain fixed principles by which conduct must be restricted1 before the greatest sum of happiness can be achieved4 ,these principles constitute what ,mr4 ,spencer distinguishes as absolute ,morality2 and the absolutely moral man is the man who conforms to these principles1 not by external coercion nor self-coercion1 but who acts them out spontaneously4 ,to be fully understood1 this conception must be taken along with the general theory of ,evolution4 ,mr4 ,spencer argues that all things whatever are inevitably tending towards equilibrium2 and that consequently the progress of mankind cannot cease until there is equilibrium between the human constitution and the conditions of human existence4 ,or1 as he argues in ,first ,principles 7,second ,edition1 p4 #eab71 ',the adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter4 ,and the establishment of this equilibrium1 is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization1 such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action1 while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects4 ,the progressive extension of the liberty of citizens1 and the reciprocal removal of political restrictions1 are the steps by which we advance towards this state4 ,and the ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each1 save those imposed by the like freedom of all1 must1 result from the complete equilibration between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions4' ,the conduct proper to such a state1 which ,mr4 ,spencer thus conceives to be the subject-matter of ,moral ,science1 truly so-called1 he proposes1 in the ,prospectus to his ,system of ,philosophy1 to treat under the following heads4 ,,personal ,,morals4--,the principles of private conduct--physical1 intellectual1 moral1 and religious--that follow from the conditions to complete individual life2 or1 what is the same thing1 those modes of private action which must result from the eventual equilibration of internal desires and external needs4 ,,justice4--,the mutual limitation of men's actions necessitated by their co-existence as units of a society--limitations1 the perfect observance of which constitutes that state of equilibrium forming the goal of political progress4 ,,negative ,,beneficence4--,those secondary limitations1 similarly necessitated1 which1 though less important and not cognizable by law1 are yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness in various indirect ways3 in other words--those minor self-restraints dictated by what may be called passive sympathy4 ,,positive ,,beneficence4--,comprehending all modes of conduct1 dictated by active sympathy1 which imply pleasure in giving pleasure--modes of conduct that social adaptation has induced and must render ever more general2 and which1 in becoming universal1 must fill to the full the possible measure of human happiness4 99 99 99 99 99 ,this completes the long succession of ,british moralists during the three last centuries4 ,it has been possible1 and even necessary1 to present them thus in an unbroken line1 because the insular movement in ethical philosophy has been hardly1 if at all1 affected by anything done abroad4 ,in the earlier part of the modern period1 little of any kind was done in ethics by the great continental thinkers4 ,descartes has only a few allusions to the subject2 the ',ethica' of ,spinoza is chiefly a work of speculative philosophy2 ,leibnitz has no systematic treatment of moral questions4 ,the case is very different2 in the new ,german philosophy since the time of ,kant2 besides ,kant himself1 ,fichte1 ,hegel1 ,schleiermacher1 and many later and contemporary thinkers having devoted a large amount of attention to practical philosophy4 ,but unless it be ,kant--and he not to any great extent--none of these has influenced the later attempts at ethical speculation amongst ourselves3 nor1 again with the exception of ,kant1 are we as yet in a position properly to deal with them4 ,one reason1 for proceeding to expound the ethical system of the founder of the later ,german philosophy1 without regard to his successors1 lies in the fact that he stood1 on the practical side1 in as definite a relation to the ,english moralists of last century1 as1 in his speculative philosophy1 to ,locke and ,hume4 ,,immanuel1 ,,kant4 #agbd-ahjd4 ,the ethical writings of ,kant1 in the order of their appearance1 are--,foundation for the ,metaphysic of ,morals 7#aghe72 ,critique of the ,practical ,reason 7#aghh72 ,metaphysic of ,morals 7#agig1 in two parts--7#a7 ,doctrine of ,right or ,jurisprudence1 7#b7 ,doctrine of ,virtue or ,ethics proper74 ,the third work contains the details of his system2 the general theory is presented in the two others4 ,of these we select for analysis the earlier1 containing1 as it does1 in less artificial form1 an ampler discussion of the fundamental questions of morals2 but towards the end it must be supplemented1 in regard to certain characteristic doctrines1 from the second1 in some respects more developed1 work4#bf ,in the introduction to the ,metaphysic of ,morals1 ,kant distinguishes between the empirical and the rational mode of treating ,ethics4 ,he announces his intention to depart from the common plan of mixing up the two together1 and to attempt for once to set forth the pure moral philosophy that is implied even in the vulgar ideas of duty and moral law4 ,because a moral law means an absolute necessity laid on all rational beings whatever1 its foundation is to be sought1 not in human nature or circumstances1 but priori in the conception of pure reason4 ,the most universal precept founded on mere experience is only a practical rule1 and never a moral law4 ,a purely rational moral philosophy1 or ,metaphysic of ,morals1 will serve the double end of meeting a speculative requirement1 and of furnishing the only true norm of practice4 ,it investigates the idea and principles of a potentially pure ,will1 instead of the acts and conditions of human volition as known from psychology4 ,not a complete ,metaphysic of ,morals1 however1 7which would be a ,critique of the pure ,practical ,reason71 but merely a foundation for such will be given4 ,the supreme principle of morality is to be established1 apart from detailed application4 ,first1 common notions will be analyzed in order to get at this highest principle2 and then1 when the principle has been sought out1 they will be returned upon by way of synthesis4 ,in the first of the three main sections of the work1 he makes the passage from ,common ,rational ,knowledge of ,morals to ,philosophical4 ,nothing in the world1 he begins1 can without qualification be called good1 except ,will4 ,qualities of temperament1 like courage1 c41 gifts of fortune1 like wealth and power1 are good only with reference to a good will4 ,as to a good will1 when it is really such1 the circumstance that it can1 or cannot1 be executed does not matter2 its value is independent of the utility or fruitlessness of it4 ,this idea of the absolute worth of mere ,will1 though it is allowed even by the vulgar understanding1 he seeks to establish beyond dispute1 by an argument from the natural subjection of ,will to ,reason4 ,in a being well-organized1 if ,conservation or ,happiness were the grand aim1 such subjection would be a great mistake4 ,when ,instinct could do the work far better and more surely1 ,reason should have been deprived of all practical function4 ,discontent1 in fact1 rather than happiness comes of pursuit of mere enjoyment by rational calculation2 and to make light of the part contributed by ,reason to happiness1 is really to make out that it exists for a nobler purpose4 ,but now1 since ,reason is a practical faculty and governs the will1 its function can only be to produce a ,will good in itself4 ,such a ,will1 if not the only good1 is certainly the highest2 and happiness1 unattainable by ,reason as a primary aim1 and subject in this life altogether to much limitation1 is to be sought only in the contentment that arises from the attainment by ,reason of its true aim1 at the sacrifice often of many a natural inclination4 ,he proceeds to develop this conception of a ,will in itself good and estimable1 by dealing with the commonly received ideas of ,duty4 ,leaving aside profitable actions that are plain violations of duty1 and also actions conformed to duty1 but1 while not prompted directly by nature1 done from some special inclination--in which case it is easy to distinguish whether the action is done from duty or from self-interest2 he considers those more difficult cases where the same action is at once duty1 and prompted by direct natural inclination4 ,in all such1 whether it be duty of self-preservation1 of benevolence1 of securing one's own happiness 7this last a duty1 because discontent and the pressure of care may easily lead to the transgression of other duties71 he lays it down that the action is not allowed to have true moral value1 unless done in the abeyance or absence of the natural inclination prompting to it4 ,a second position is1 that the moral value of an action done from duty lies not in the intention of it1 but in the maxim that determines it2 not in the object1 but in the principle of ,volition4 ,that is to say1 in action done out of regard to duty1 the will must be determined by its formal priori principle1 not being determined by any material posteriori motive4 ,a third position follows then from the other two2 ,duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for ,law4 ,towards an object there may be inclination1 and this inclination may be matter for approval or liking2 but it is ,law only--the ground and not the effect of ,volition1 bearing down inclination rather than serving it--that can inspire ,respect4 ,when inclination and motives are both excluded1 nothing remains to determine ,will1 except ,law objectively2 and1 subjectively1 pure respect for a law of practice--i4e41 the maxim to follow such a law1 even at the sacrifice of every inclination4 ,the conception of ,law-in-itself alone determining the will1 is1 then1 the surpassing good that is called moral1 which exists already in a man before his action has any result4 ,conformity to ,law in general1 all special motive to follow any single law being excluded1 remains as the one principle of ,volition3 ,i am never to act otherwise1 than so as to be able also to wish that my maxim 7i4e41 my subjective principle of volition7 should become a universal law4 ,this is what he finds implied in the common notions of ,duty4 ,having illustrated at length this reading1 in regard to the duty of keeping a promise1 he contrasts1 at the close of the section1 the all but infallibility of common human reason in practice with its helplessness in speculation4 ,notwithstanding1 it finds itself unable to settle the contending claims of ,reason and ,inclination1 and so is driven to devise a practical philosophy1 owing to the rise of a ',natural ,dialectic' or tendency to refine upon the strict laws of duty in order to make them more pleasant4 ,but1 as in the speculative region1 the ,dialectic cannot be properly got rid of without a complete ,critique of ,reason4 ,in ,section ,,ii4 the passage is made from the popular moral philosophy thus arising to the metaphysic of morals4 ,he denies that the notion of duty that has been taken above from common sage is empirical4 ,it is proved not to be such from the very assertions of philosophers that men always act from more or less refined self-love2 assertions that are founded upon the difficulty of proving that acts most apparently conformed to duty are really such4 ,the fact is1 no act can be proved by experience to be absolutely moral1 i4e41 done solely from regard to duty1 to the exclusion of all inclination2 and therefore to concede that morality and duty are ideas to be had from experience1 is the surest way to get rid of them altogether4 ,duty1 and respect for its law1 are not to be preserved at all1 unless ,reason is allowed to lay absolute injunctions on the will1 whatever experience says of their non-execution4 ,how1 indeed1 is experience to disclose a moral law1 that1 in applying to all rational beings as well as men1 and to men only as rational1 must originate priori in pure 7practical7 ,reason8 ,instead of yielding the principles of morality1 empirical examples of moral conduct have rather to be judged by these4 ,all supreme principles of morality1 that are genuine1 must rest on pure ,reason solely2 and the mistake of the popular practical philosophies in vogue1 one and all--whether advancing as their principle a special determination of human nature1 or ,perfection1 or ,happiness1 or ,moral ,feeling1 or ,fear of ,god1 or a little of this and a little of that--is that there has been no previous consideration whether the principles of morality are to be sought for in our empirical knowledge of human nature at all4 ,such consideration would have shown them to be altogether priori1 and would have appeared as a pure practical philosophy or metaphysic of morals 7upon the completion of which any popularizing might have waited71 kept free from admixture of ,anthropology1 ,theology1 ,physics1 ,hyperphysics1 c41 and setting forth the conception of ,duty as purely rational1 without the confusion of empirical motives4 ,to a metaphysic of this kind1 ,kant is now to ascend from the popular philosophy1 with its stock-in-trade of single instances1 following out the practical faculty of ,reason from the general rules determining it1 to the point where the conception of ,duty emerges4 ,while things in nature work according to laws1 rational beings alone can act according to a conceived idea of laws1 i4e41 to principles4 ,this is to have a ,will1 or1 what is the same1 ,practical ,reason1 reason being required in deducing actions from laws4 ,if the ,will follows ,reason exactly and without fail1 actions objectively necessary are necessary also subjectively2 if1 through subjective conditions 7inclinations1 c471 the ,will does not follow ,reason inevitably1 objectively necessary actions become subjectively contingent1 and towards the objective laws the attitude of the will is no longer unfailing choice1 but constraint4 ,a constraining objective principle mentally represented1 is a command2 its formula is called ,imperative1 for which the expression is ,ought4 ,a will perfectly good--i4e41 subjectively determined to follow the objective laws of good as soon as conceived--knows no ,ought4 ,imperatives are only for an imperfect1 such as is the human1 will4 ,hypothetical ,imperatives represent the practical necessity of an action as a means to an end1 being problematical or assertory principles1 according as the end is possible or real4 ,categorical ,imperatives represent an action as objectively necessary for itself1 and count as apodeictical principles4 ,to the endless number of possible aims of human action correspond as many ,imperatives1 directing merely how they are to be attained1 without any question of their value2 these are ,imperatives of ,fitness4 ,to one real aim1 existing necessarily for all rational beings1 viz41 ,happiness1 corresponds the ,imperative of ,prudence 7in the narrow sense71 being assertory while hypothetical4 ,the categorical ,imperative1 enjoining a mode of action for itself1 and concerned about the form and principle of it1 not its nature and result1 is the ,imperative of ,morality4 ,these various kinds of ,imperatives1 as influencing the will1 may be distinguished as ,rules 7of fitness71 ,counsels 7of prudence71 ,commands or ,laws 7of morality72 also as technical1 pragmatical1 moral4 ,now1 as to the question of the possibility of these different ,imperatives--how they can be supposed able to influence or act upon the ,will--there is in the first case no difficulty2 in wishing an end it is necessarily implied that we wish the indispensable means1 when this is in our power4 ,in like manner1 the ,imperatives of ,prudence are also analytical in character 7i4e41 given by implication71 if only it were possible to have a definite idea of the end sought1 viz41 happiness4 ,but1 in fact1 with the elements of happiness to be got from experience at the same time that the idea requires an absolute whole1 or maximum1 of satisfaction now and at every future moment1 no finite being can know precisely what he wants1 or what may be the effect of any of his wishes4 ,action1 on fixed principles1 with a view to happiness1 is1 therefore1 not possible2 and one can only follow empirical directions1 about ,diet1 ,frugality1 ,politeness1 c41 seen on the whole to promote it4 ,although1 however1 there is no certainty of causing happiness1 and the ,imperatives with reference thereto are mere counsels1 they retain their character of analytical propositions1 and their action on the will is not less possible than in the former case4 ,to prove the possibility of the ,imperative of morality is more difficult4 ,as categorical1 it presupposes nothing else to rest its necessity upon2 while by way of experience1 it can never be made out to be more than a prudential precept--i4e41 a pragmatic or hypothetic principle4 ,its possibility must therefore be established priori4 ,but the difficulty will then appear no matter of wonder1 when it is remembered 7from the ,critique of ,pure ,reason7 how hard it is to establish synthetic propositions priori4 ,the question of the possibility1 however1 meanwhile postponed1 the mere conception of a categorical ,imperative is found to yield the one formula that can express it1 from its not being dependent1 like a hypothetical ,imperative1 on any external condition4 ,besides the ,law 7or objective principle of conduct71 the only thing implied in the ,imperative being the necessity laid upon the ,maxim 7or subjective principle7 to conform to the law--a law limited by no condition2 there is nothing for the maxim to be conformed to but the universality of a law in general1 and it is the conformity alone that properly constitutes the ,imperative necessary4 ,the ,imperative is thus single1 and runs3 ,act according to that maxim only which you can wish at the same time to become a universal law4 ,or1 since universality of law as determining effects is what we understand by nature3 ,act as if the maxim of your action ought by your will to become the universal law of nature4 ,taking cases of duties according to the common divisions of duties to ourselves and to others1 perfect and imperfect1 he proceeds to show that they may be all deduced from the single ,imperative2 the question of the reality of duty1 which is the same as the establishment of the possibility of the ,imperative as a synthetic practical proposition priori1 at present altogether apart4 ,suppose a man tempted to commit suicide1 with the view of bettering his evil condition2 but it is contradictory that the very principle of self-conservation should lead to self-destruction1 and such a maxim of conduct cannot therefore become a universal law of nature4 ,next1 the case of a man borrowing without meaning to repay1 has only to be turned into a universal law1 and the thing becomes impossible2 nobody would lend4 ,again1 to neglect a talent that is generally useful for mere ease and self-gratification1 can indeed be supposed a universal practice1 but can never be wished to be4 ,finally1 to refuse help to others universally might not ruin the race1 but can be wished by no one that knows how soon he must himself need assistance4 ,now1 the rule was1 that a maxim of conduct should be wished to become the universal law4 ,in the last two cases1 it cannot be wished2 in the others1 the maxim cannot even be conceived in universal form4 ,thus1 two grades of duty1 one admitting of merit1 the other so strict as to be irremissible1 are established on the general principle4 ,the principle is moreover confirmed in the case of transgression of duty3 the transgressor by no means wishes to have his act turned into a general rule1 but only seeks special and temporary exemption from a law allowed by himself to be universal4 ,notwithstanding this force and ease of application1 a categorical ,imperative has not yet been proved priori actually existent2 and it was allowed that it could not be proved empirically1 elements of inclination1 interest1 c41 being inconsistent with morality4 ,the real question is this3 ,is it a necessary law that all rational beings should act on maxims that they can wish1 to become universal laws8 ,if so1 this must be bound up with the very notion of the will of a rational being2 the relation of the will to itself being to be determined priori by pure ,reason4 ,the ,will is considered as a power of self-determination to act according to certain laws as represented to the mind1 existing only in rational beings4 ,and1 if the objective ground of self-determination1 or ,end1 is supplied by mere ,reason1 it must be the same for all rational beings4 ,ends may be divided into ,subjective1 resting upon individual ,impulses or subjective grounds of desire2 and ,objective1 depending on ,motives or objective grounds of ,volition valid for all rational beings4 ,the principles of action are1 in the one case1 ,material1 and1 in the other1 ,formal1 i4e41 abstracted from all subjective ends4 ,material ends1 as relative1 beget only hypothetical ,imperatives4 ,but1 supposed some thing1 the presence of which in itself has an absolute value1 and which1 as ,end-in-self1 can be a ground of fixed laws2 there1 and there only1 can be the ground of a possible categorical ,imperative1 or ,law of ,practice4 ,now1 such an ,end-in-self 7not a thing with merely conditional value1--a means to be used arbitrarily7 is ,man and every rational being1 as ,person4 ,there is no other objective end with absolute value that can supply to the ,reason the supreme practical principle requisite for turning subjective principles of action into objective principles of volition4 ,rational ,nature as ,end-in-self is a subjective principle to a man having this conception of his own being1 but becomes objective when every rational being has the same from the same ground in ,reason4 ,hence a new form 7the second7 to the practical ,imperative3 ,act so as to use ,humanity 7,human ,nature7 as well in your own person1 as in the person of another1 ever as end also1 and never merely as means4 ,to this new formula1 the old examples are easily squared4 ,suicide is using one's person as a mere means to a tolerable existence2 breaking faith to others is using them as means1 not as ends-in-self2 neglect of self-cultivation is the not furthering human nature as end-in-self in one's own person2 withholding help is refusing to further ,humanity as end-in-self through the medium of the aims of others4 ,in a note he denies that 'the trivial1 ,do to others as you would1' c41 is a full expression of the law of duty3 it contains the ground1 neither of duties to self2 nor of duties of benevolence to others1 for many would forego receiving good on conditions of not conferring it2 nor of the duty of retribution1 for the malefactor could turn it against his judge1 c4 ,the universality of this principle of ,human and ,rational ,nature as ,end-in-self1 as also its character of objective end limiting merely subjective ends1 prove that its source is in pure ,reason4 ,objectively1 the ground of all practical legislation is ,rule and the ,form of ,universality that enables rule to be ,law 7of ,nature71 according to principle first 7in its double form72 subjectively1 it is ,end1 the subject of all ends being every rational being as ,end-in-self1 according to principle second4 ,hence follows the third practical principle of the ,will1 as supreme condition of its agreement with universal practical ,reason--the idea of the ,will of every rational being as a ,will that legislates universally4 ,the ,will1 if subject to law1 has first itself imposed it4 ,this new idea--of the ,will of every rational being as universally legislative--is what1 in the implication of the ,categorical ,imperative1 specifically marks it off from any ,hypothetical3 ,interest is seen to be quite incompatible with ,duty1 if ,duty is ,volition of this kind4 ,a will merely subject to laws can be bound to them by interest2 not so a will itself legislating supremely1 for that would imply another law to keep the interest of self-love from trenching upon the validity of the universal law4 ,illustration is not needed to prove that a ,categorical ,imperative1 or law for the will of every rational being1 if it exist at all1 cannot exclude ,interest and be unconditional1 except as enjoining everything to be done from the maxim of a will that in legislating universally can have itself for object4 ,this is the point that has been always missed1 that the laws of duty shall be at once self-imposed and yet universal4 ,subjection to a law not springing from one's own will implies interest or constraint1 and constitutes a certain necessity of action1 but never makes ,duty4 ,be the interest one's own or another's1 the ,imperative is conditional only4 ,kant's principle is the ,autonomy of the ,will2 every other its ,heteronomy4 ,the new point of view opens up the very fruitful conception of an ,empire or ,realm of ,ends4 ,as a ,realm is the systematic union of rational beings by means of common laws1 so the ends determined by the laws may1 abstractly viewed1 be taken to form a systematic whole4 ,rational beings1 as subject to a law requiring them to treat themselves and others as ends and never merely as means1 enter into a systematic union by means of common objective laws1 i4e4 into an 7ideal7 ,empire or ,realm of ,ends1 from the laws being concerned about the mutual relations of rational beings as ,ends and ,means4 ,in this ,realm1 a rational being is either ,head or ,member3 ,head1 if legislating universally and with complete independence2 ,member1 if also universally1 but at the same time subject to the laws4 ,when now the maxim of the will does not by nature accord necessarily with the demand of the objective principle--that the will through its maxim be able to regard itself at the same time as legislating2 universally--a practical constraint is exerted by the principle1 which is ,duty1 lying on every ,member in the ,realm of ,ends 7not on the ,head7 alike4 ,this necessity of practice reposes1 not on feeling1 impulse1 or inclination1 but on the relation between rational beings arising from the fact that each1 as ,end-in-self1 legislates universally4 ,the ,reason gives a universal application to every maxim of the ,will2 not from any motive of interest1 but from the idea of the ,dignity of a rational being that follows no law that it does not itself at the same time give4 ,everything in the ,realm of ,ends has either a ,price or a ,dignity4 ,skill1 ,diligence1 c41 bearing on human likings and needs1 have a ,market-price2 ,qualities like ,wit1 ,fancy1 c41 appealing to ,taste or ,emotional ,satisfaction1 have an ,affection-price4 ,but ,morality1 the only way of being ,end-in-self1 and legislating member in the ,realm of ,ends1 has an intrinsic ,worth or ,dignity1 calculable in nothing else4 ,its worth is not in results1 but in dispositions of ,will2 its actions need neither recommendation from a subjective disposition or taste1 nor prompting from immediate tendency or feeling4 ,being laid on the ,will by ,reason1 they make the ,will1 in the execution1 the object of an immediate ,respect1 testifying to a ,dignity beyond all price4 ,the grounds of these lofty claims in moral goodness and virtue are the participation by a rational being in the universal legislation1 fitness to be a member in a possible ,realm of ,ends1 subjection only to self-imposed laws4 ,nothing having value but as the law confers it1 an unconditional1 incomparable worth attaches to the giving of the law1 and ,respect is the only word that expresses a rational being's appreciation of that4 ,autonomy is thus the foundation of the dignity of human and of all rational nature4 ,the three different expressions that have been given to the one general principle of morality imply each the others1 and differ merely in their mode of presenting one idea of the ,reason to the mind4 ,universal application of the ,maxim of ,conduct1 as if it were a law of nature1 is the formula of the ,will as absolutely good2 universal prohibition against the use of rational beings ever as means only1 has reference to the fact that a good will in a rational being is an altogether independent and ultimate ,end1 an ,end-in-self in all2 universal legislation of each for all recognizes the prerogative or special dignity of rational beings1 that they necessarily take their maxims from the point of view of all1 and must regard themselves1 being ,ends-in-self1 as members in a ,realm of ,ends 7analogous to the ,realm1 or ,kingdom of ,nature71 which1 though merely an ideal and possible conception1 none the less really imposes an imperative upon action4 ,morality1 he concludes1 is the relation of actions to the ,autonomy of the ,will1 i4e41 to possible universal legislation through its maxims4 ,actions that can co-exist with this autonomy are allowed2 all others are not4 ,a will1 whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws of ,autonomy1 is holy1 or absolutely good2 the dependence of a will not thus absolutely good is ,obligation4 ,the objective necessity of an action from obligation is ,duty4 ,subjection to law is not the only element in duty2 the fact of the law being self-imposed gives ,dignity4 ,the ,autonomy of the will is its being a law to itself1 without respect to the objects of volition2 the principle of autonomy is to choose only in such a way as that the maxims of choice are conceived at the same time as a universal law4 ,this rule cannot be proved analytically to be an ,imperative1 absolutely binding on every will2 as a synthetic proposition it requires1 besides a knowledge of the objects1 a critique of the subject1 i4e41 pure practical ,reason1 before1 in its apodeictic character1 it can be proved completely priori4 ,still the mere analysis of moral conceptions has sufficed to prove it the sole principle of morals1 because this principle is seen to be a categorical ,imperative1 and a categorical ,imperative enjoins neither more nor less than this ,autonomy4 ,if1 then1 ,autonomy of ,will is the supreme principle1 ,heteronomy is the source of all ungenuine principles1 of ,morality4 ,heteronomy is whenever the ,will does not give itself laws1 but some object1 in relation to the ,will1 gives them4 ,there is then never more than a hypothetical ,imperative3 ,i am to do something because ,i wish something else4 ,there follows a division and criticism of the various possible principles of morality that can be set up on the assumption of ,heteronomy1 and that have been put forward by human ,reason in default of the required ,critique of its pure use4 ,such1 are either ,empirical or ,rational4 ,the ,empirical1 embodying the principle of ,happiness1 are founded on 7#a7 physical or 7#b7 moral feeling2 the ,rational1 embodying the principle of perfection1 on 7#a7 the rational conception of it as a possible result1 or 7#b7 the conception of an independent perfection 7the ,will of ,god71 as the determining cause of the will4 ,the ,empirical principles are altogether to be rejected1 because they can give no universal law for all rational beings2 of the ,rational principles1 the first1 though setting up an empty and indefinite conception1 has the merit of at least making an appeal from sense to pure reason4 ,but the fatal objection to all four is their implying ,heteronomy2 no imperative founded on them can utter moral1 i4e41 categorical commands4 ,that the absolutely good ,will must be autonomous--i4e41 without any kind of motive or interest1 lay ,commands on itself that are at the same time fit to be laws for all rational beings1 appears1 then1 from a deeper consideration of even the popular conceptions of morality4 ,but now the question can no longer be put off3 ,is ,morality1 of which this is the only conception1 a reality or a phantom8 ,all the different expressions given to the ,categorical ,imperatives are synthetic practical propositions a priori2 they postulate a possible synthetic use of the pure practical reason4 ,is there1 and how is there1 such a possible synthetic use8 ,this is the question 7the same as the other7 that ,kant proceeds to answer in the ,third ,section1 by giving1 in default of a complete ,critique of the faculty1 as much as is necessary for the purpose4 ,but here1 since he afterwards undertook the full ,critique1 it is better to stop the analysis of the earlier work1 and summarily draw upon both for the remainder of the argument1 and the rather because some important points have to be added that occur only in the later treatise4 ,the foregoing is a sufficient example of his method of treatment4 ,the synthetic use of the pure practical reason1 in the ,categorical ,imperative1 is legitimized2 ,autonomy of the ,will is explained2 ,duty is shown to be no phantom--through the conception of ,freedom of ,will1 properly understood4 ,theoretically 7speculatively71 ,freedom is undemonstrable2 being eternally met1 in one of the 7cosmological7 ,antinomies of the ,pure ,reason1 by the counter-assertion that everything in the universe takes place according to unchanging laws of nature4 ,even theoretically1 however1 ,freedom is not inconceivable1 and morally we become certain of it2 for we are conscious of the 'ought' of duty1 and with the 'ought' there must go a 'can4' ,it is not1 however1 as ,phenomenon or ,sensible ,ens that a man 'can1' is free1 has an absolute initiative2 all phenomena or ,sensible ,entia1 being in space and time1 are subject to the ,natural ,law of ,causality4 ,but man is also ,noumenon1 ,thing-in-self1 ,intelligible ,ens2 and as such1 being free from conditions of time and space1 stands outside of the sequence of ,nature4 ,now1 the ,noumenon or ,ens of the ,reason 7he assumes7 stands higher than1 or has a value above1 the ,phenomenon or ,sensible ,ens 7as much as ,reason stands higher than ,sense and ,inclination72 accordingly1 while it is only man as ,noumenon that 'can1' it is to man as ,phenomenon that the 'ought' is properly addressed2 it is upon man as ,phenomenon that the law of ,duty1 prescribed1 with perfect freedom from motive1 by ,man as ,noumenon1 is laid4 ,freedom of ,will in ,man as ,rational ,end or ,thing-in-self is thus the great ,postulate of the pure ,practical ,reason2 we can be sure of the fact 7although it must always remain speculatively undemonstrable71 because else there could be no explanation of the ,categorical ,imperative of ,duty4 ,but inasmuch as the ,practical ,reason1 besides enjoining a law of ,duty1 must provide also a final end of action in the idea of an unconditioned ,supreme ,good1 it contains also two other ,postulates3 ,man being a sentient as well as a rational being1 ,happiness as well as ,perfect ,virtue or ,moral ,perfection must enter into the ,summum ,bonum 7not1 one of them to the exclusion of the other1 as the ,stoics and ,epicureans1 in different senses1 declared74 ,now1 since there is no such necessary conjunction of the two in nature1 it must be sought otherwise4 ,it is found in postulating ,immortality and ,god4 ,immortality is required to render possible the attainment of moral perfection4 ,virtue out of respect for law1 with a constant tendency to fall away1 is all that is attainable in life4 ,the ,holiness1 or complete accommodation of the will to the ,moral ,law1 implied in the ,summum ,bonum1 can be attained to only in the course of an infinite progression2 which means personal ,immortality4 ,as in the former case1 the speculative impossibility of proving the immateriality1 c41 of the supernatural soul is not here overcome2 but ,immortality is morally certain1 being demanded by the ,practical ,reason4 ,moral perfection thus provided for1 ,god must be postulated in order to find the ground of the required conjunction of ,felicity4 ,happiness is the condition of the rational being in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will2 and this is not the condition of man1 for in him observance of the moral law is not conjoined with power of disposal over the laws of nature4 ,but1 as ,practical ,reason demands the conjunction1 it is to be found only in a being who is the author at once of ,nature and of the ,moral ,law2 and this is ,god4 ,the same remark once more applies1 that here what is obtained is a moral certainty of the existence of the ,deity3 the negative result of the ,critique of the ,pure 7speculative7 ,reason abides what it was4 ,we may now attempt to summarize this abstruse ,ethical theory of ,kant4 ,i---,the ,,standard of morally good action 7or rather ,will71 as expressed in the different forms of the ,categorical ,imperative1 is the possibility of its being universally extended as a law for all rational beings4 ,his meaning comes out still better in the obverse statement3 ,the action is bad that cannot be1 or at least cannot be wished to lie1 turned unto a universal law4 ,,ii4--,kant would expressly demur to being questioned as to his ,,psychology of ,ethics2 since he puts his own theory in express opposition to every other founded upon any empirical view of the mental constitution4 ,nevertheless1 we may extract some kind of answers to the usual queries4 ,the ,faculty is the 7pure ,practical7 ,reason4 ,the apprehension of what is morally right is entirely an affair of ,reason2 the only element of ,feeling is an added ,sentiment of ,awe or ,respect for the law that ,reason imposes1 this being a law1 not only for me who impose it on myself1 but at the same time for every rational agent4 ,the ,pure ,reason1 which means with ,kant the ,faculty of ,principles1 is ,speculative or ,practical4 ,as ,speculative1 it requires us to bring our knowledge 7of the understanding7 to certain higher unconditioned unities 7,soul1 ,cosmos1 ,god72 but there is error if these are themselves regarded as facts of knowledge4 ,as ,practical1 it sets up an unconditional law of ,duty in ,action 7unconditioned by motives72 and in this and in the related conception of the ,summum ,bonum is contained a moral certainty of the ,immortality 7of the soul71 ,freedom 7in the midst of ,natural ,necessity71 and of ,god as existent4 ,as to the point of ,free-will1 nothing more need be said4 ,disinterested ,sentiment1 as sentiment1 is very little regarded3 disinterested action is required with such rigour that every act or disposition is made to lose its character as moral1 according as any element of interested feeling of any kind enters into it4 ,kant obliterates the line between ,duty and ,virtue1 by making a duty of every virtue2 at least he conceives clearly that there is no ,virtue in doing what we are strongly prompted to by inclination--that virtue must involve self-sacrifice4 ,,iii4--,his position with respect to ,happiness is peculiar4 ,happiness is not the end of action3 the end of action is rather the self-assertion of the rational faculty over the lower man4 ,if the constituents of ,happiness could be known--and they cannot be--there would be no morality1 but only prudence in the pursuit of them4 ,to promote our own happiness is indeed a duty1 but in order to keep us from neglecting our other duties4 ,nevertheless1 he conceives it necessary that there should be an ultimate equation of ,virtue and ,happiness2 and the need of ,happiness he then expressly connects with the sensuous side of our being4 ,,iv4--,his ,,moral ,,code may here be shortly presented from the second part of his latest work1 where it is fully given4 ,distinguishing ,moral ,duties or 7as he calls them7 ',virtue-duties1' left to be enforced internally by ,conscience1 from ,legal ,duties 7,rechtspflichten71 externally enforced1 he divides them into two classes--7,a7 ,duties to ,self2 7,b7 ,duties to ,others4 7,a7 ,duties to ,self4 ,these have regard to the one private ,aim or ,end that a man can make a duty of1 viz41 his own ,perfection2 for his own ,happiness1 being provided for by a natural propensity or inclination1 is to himself no duty4 ,they are 7a7 perfect 7negative or restrictive7 as directed to mere ,self-,conservation2 7b7 imperfect 7positive or extensive7 as directed to the ,advancement or ,perfecting of one's being4 ,the perfect are concerned about ,self 7a71 as an ,animal creature1 and then are directed against--7#a7 ,self-destruction1 7#b7 ,sexual ,excess1 7#c7 ,intemperance in ,eating and ,drinking2 7,b7 as a ,moral creature1 and then are directed against--7#a7 ,lying1 7#b7 ,avarice1 7#c7 ,servility4 ,the imperfect have reference to 7a7 physical1 7,b7 moral advancement or perfection 7subjectively4 ,purity or ,holiness74 7,b7 ,duties to ,others4 ,these have regard to the only ,aim or ,end of others that a man can make a duty of1 viz41 their ,happiness2 for their ,perfection can be promoted only by themselves4 ,duties to others as men are metaphysically deducible2 and application to special conditions of men is to be made empirically4 ,they include 7a7 ,duties of ,,love1 involving ,merit or ,desert 7i4e41 return from the objects of them7 in the performance3 7#a7 ,beneficence1 7#b7 ,gratitude1 7#c7 ,fellow-feeling2 7b7 ,duties of ,,respect1 absolutely due to others as men2 the opposites are the vices3 7#a7 ,haughtiness1 7#b7 ,slander1 7#c7 ,scornfulness4 ,in ,friendship1 ,love and ,respect are combined in the highest degree4 ,lastly1 he notes ,social duties in human intercourse 7,affability1 c47--these being outworks of morality4 ,he allows no special ,duties to ,god1 or ,inferior ,creatures1 beyond what is contained in ,moral ,perfection as ,duty to ,self4 ,v4--,the conception of ,law enters largely into ,kant's theory of morals1 but in a sense purely transcendental1 and not as subjecting or assimilating morality to positive political institution4 ,the ,legality of external actions1 as well as the ,morality of internal dispositions1 is determined by reference to the one universal moral ,imperative4 ,the principle underlying all legal or jural 7as opposed to moral or ethical7 provisions1 is the necessity of uniting in a universal law of freedom the spontaneity of each with the spontaneity of all the others3 individual freedom and freedom of all must be made to subsist together in a universal law4 ,,vi4--,with ,kant1 ,religion and ,morality are very closely connected1 or1 in a sense1 even identified2 but the alliance is not at the expense of ,morality4 ,so far from making this dependent on ,religion1 he can find nothing but the moral conviction whereon to establish the religious doctrines of ,immortality and the ,existence of ,god2 while1 in a special work1 he declares further that ,religion consists merely in the practice of ,morality as a system of divine commands1 and claims to judge of all religious institutions and dogmas by the moral consciousness4 ,besides1 the ,postulates themselves1 in which the passage to ,religion is made1 are not all equally imperative1--,freedom1 as the ground of the fact of ,duty1 being more urgently demanded than others2 and he even goes so far as to make the allowance1 that whoever has sufficient moral strength to fulfil the ,law of ,reason without them1 is not required to subscribe to them4 ,the modern ,french school1 that has arisen in this century under the combined influence of the ,scotch and the ,german philosophy1 has bestowed some attention on ,ethics4 ,we end by noticing under it ,cousin and ,jouffroy4 ,,victor ,,cousin4 #agib-ahfg4 ,the analysis of ,cousin's ethical views is made upon his historical lectures ,sur les ,idees du ,vrai1 du ,beau et du ,bien1 as delivered in #ahag-ah4 ,they contain a dogmatic exposition of his own opinions1 beginning at the #bjth lecture2 the three preceding lectures1 in the section of the whole course devoted to the ,good1 being taken up with the preliminary review of other opinions required for his eclectical purpose4 ,he determines to consider1 by way of psychological analysis1 the ideas and sentiments of every kind called up by the spectacle of human actions2 and first he notes actions that please and displease the senses1 or in some way affect our interest3 those that are agreeable and useful we naturally choose1 avoiding the opposites1 and in this we are prudent4 ,but there is another set of actions1 having no reference to our own personal interest1 which yet we qualify as good or bad4 ,when an armed robber kills and spoils a defenceless man1 we1 though beholding the sight in safety1 are at once stirred up to disinterested horror and indignation4 ,this is no mere passing sentiment1 but includes a two-fold judgment1 pronounced then and ever after2 that the action is in itself bad1 and that it ought not to be committed4 ,still farther1 our anger implies that the object of it is conscious of the evil and the obligation1 and is therefore responsible2 wherein again is implied that he is a free agent4 ,and1 finally1 demanding as we do that he should be punished1 we pass what has been called a judgment of merit and demerit1 which is built upon an idea in our minds of a supreme law1 joining happiness to virtue and misfortune to crime4 ,the analysis thus far he claims to be strictly scientific2 he now proceeds to vary the case1 taking actions of our own4 ,i am supposed entrusted by a dying friend with a deposit for another1 and a struggle ensues between interest and probity as to whether ,i should pay it4 ,if interest conquers1 remorse ensues4 ,he paints the state of remorse1 and analyzes it into the same elements as before1 the idea of good and evil1 of an obligatory law1 of liberty1 of merit and demerit2 it thus includes the whole phenomenon of morality4 ,the exactly opposite state that follows upon the victory of probity1 is proved to imply the same facts4 ,the ,moral ,sentiment1 so striking in its character1 has by some been supposed the foundation of all morality1 but in point of fact it is itself constituted by these various judgments4 ,now that they are known to stand as its elements1 he goes on to subject each to a stricter analysis1 taking first the judgment of good and evil1 which is at the bottom of all the rest4 ,it lies in the original constitution of human nature1 being simple and indecomposable1 like the judgment of the ,true and the ,beautiful4 ,it is absolute1 and cannot be withheld in presence of certain acts2 but it only declares1 and does not constitute1 good and evil1 these being real and independent qualities of actions4 ,applied at first to special cases1 the judgment of good gives birth to general principles that become rules for judging other actions4 ,like other sciences1 morality has its axioms1 justly called moral truths2 if it is good to keep an oath1 it is also true1 the oath being made with no other purpose than to be kept4 ,faithful guarding as much belongs to the idea of a deposit1 as the equality between its three angles and two right angles to the idea of a triangle4 ,by no caprice or effort of will can a moral verity be made in the smallest degree other than it is4 ,but1 he goes on1 a moral verity is not simply to be believed2 it must also be practised1 and this is obligation1 the second of the elements of moral sentiment4 ,obligation1 like moral truth1 on which it rests1 is absolute1 immutable1 universal4 ,kant even went so far as to make it the principle of our morality2 but this was subjectivizing good1 as he had subjectivized truth4 ,before there is an obligation to act1 there must be an intrinsic goodness in the action2 the real first truth of morality is justics1 i4e41 the essential distinction of good and evil4 ,it is justice1 therefore1 and not duty1 that strictly deserves the name of a principle4 ,the next element is liberty4 ,obligation implies the faculty of resisting desire1 passion1 c41 else there would be a contradiction in human nature4 ,but the truest proof of liberty is to be sought in the constant testimony of consciousness1 that1 in wishing this or that1 ,i am equally able to will the contrary4 ,he distinguishes between the power of willing and the power of executing2 also between will and desire1 or passion4 ,in the conflict between will and the tyranny of desire lies liberty2 and the aim of the conflict is the fulfilment of duty4 ,for the will is never so free1 never so much itself1 as when yielding to the law of duty4 ,persons are distinguished from ,things in having responsibility1 dignity1 intrinsic value4 ,because there is in me a being worthy of respect1 ,i am bound in duty to respect myself1 and ,i have the right to be respected by you4 ,my duty 7he means1 of course1 what ,i owe to self7 is the exact measure of my right4 ,the character of being a person is inviolable1 is the foundation of property1 is inalienable by self or others1 and so forth4 ,he passes to the last element of the phenomenon of morality1 the judgement of merit and demerit4 ,the judgement follows1 as the agent is supposed free1 and it is not affected by lapse of time4 ,it depends also essentially on the idea that the agent knows good from evil4 ,upon itself follow the notions of reward and punishment4 ,merit is the natural right to be rewarded2 demerit1 paradox as it may appear1 is the right to be punished4 ,a criminal would claim to be punished1 if he could comprehend the absolute necessity of expiation2 and are there not real cases of such criminals8 ,but as there can be merit without actual reward1 so to be rewarded does not constitute merit4 ,if good1 he continues1 is good in itself1 and ought to be done without regard to consequences1 it is no less true that the consequences of good cannot fail to be happy4 ,virtue without happiness and crime without misfortune are a contradiction1 a disorder2 which are hardly met with in the world1 even as it is1 or1 where in a few cases they are found1 are sure to be righted in the end by eternal justice4 ,the sacrifice supposed in virtue1 if generously accepted and courageously undergone1 has to be recompensed in respect of the amount of happiness sacrificed4 ,once more1 he takes up the ,sentiment1 which is the general echo of all the elements of the phenomenon4 ,its end is to make the mind sensible of the bond between virtue and happiness2 it is the direct and vivid application of the law of merit4 ,again1 he touches the states of moral satisfaction and remorse1 speaks of our sympathy with the moral goodness of others and our benevolent feeling that arises towards them--emotions all1 but covering up judgments2 and this is the end of his detailed analysis of the actual facts of the case4 ,but he still goes on to sum up in exact expressions the foregoing results1 and he claims especially to have overlooked neither the part played by ,reason1 nor the function of ,sentiment4 ,the rational character of the idea of good gives morality its firm foundation2 the lively sentiment helps to lighten the often heavy burden of duty1 and stirs up to the most heroic deeds4 ,self-interest too is not denied its place4 ,in this connexion1 led again to allude to the happiness appointed to virtue here or at least hereafter1 he allows that ,god may be regarded as the fountain of morality1 but only in the sense that his will is the expression of his eternal wisdom and justice4 ,religion crowns morality1 but morality is based upon itself4 ,the rest of the lecture is in praise of ,eclecticism1 and advocates consideration of all the facts involved in morality1 as against exclusive theories founded upon only some of the facts4 ,lectures #bast and #bbnd1 compressed into one 7,ed4 #ahdf7 contain the application of the foregoing principles1 and the answer to the question1 what our duties are4 ,duty being absolute1 truth becomes obligatory1 and absolute truth being known by the reason only1 to obey the law of duty is to obey reason4 ,but what actions are conformable to reason8 ,the characteristic of reason he takes to be ,universality1 and this will appear in the motives of actions1 since it is these that confer on actions their morality4 ,accordingly1 the sign whereby to discover whether an action is duty1 is1 if its motive when generalized appear to the reason to be a maxim of universal legislation for all free and intelligent beings4 ,this1 the norm set up by ,kant1 as certainly discovers what is and is not duty1 as the syllogism detects the error and truth of an argument4 ,to obey reason is1 then1 the first duty1 at the root of all others1 and itself resting directly upon the relation between liberty and reason2 in a sense1 to remain reasonable is the sole duty4 ,but it assumes special forms amid the diversity of human relations4 ,he first considers the relations wherein we stand to ourselves and the corresponding duties4 ,that there should be any such duties is at first sight strange1 seeing we belong to ourselves2 but this is not the same as having complete power over ourselves4 ,possessing liberty1 we must not abdicate it by yielding to passions1 and treat ourselves as if there were nothing in us that merits respect4 ,we are to distinguish between what is peculiar to each of us1 and what we share with humanity4 ,individual peculiarities are things indifferent1 but the liberty and intelligence that constitute us persons1 rather than individuals1 demand to be respected even by ourselves4 ,there is an obligation of self-respect imposed upon us as moral persons that was not established1 and is not to be destroyed1 by us4 ,as special cases of this respect of the moral person in us1 he cites 7#a7 the duty of self-control against anger or melancholy1 not for their pernicious consequences1 but as trenching upon the moral dignity of liberty and intelligence2 7#b7 the duty of prudence1 meaning providence in all things1 which regulates courage1 enjoins temperance1 is1 as the ancients said1 the mother of all the virtues1--in short1 the government of liberty by reason2 7#c7 veracity2 7#d7 duty towards the body2 7#e7 duty of perfecting 7and not merely keeping intact7 the intelligence1 liberty1 and sensibility that constitute us moral beings4 ,but the same liberty and intelligence that constitute me a moral person1 and need thus to be respected even by myself1 exist also in others1 conferring rights on them1 and imposing new duties of respect on me relatively to them4 ,to their intelligence ,i owe ,truth2 their liberty ,i am bound to respect1 sometimes even to the extent of not hindering them from making a wrong use of it4 ,i must respect also their affections 7family1 c47 which form part of themselves2 their bodies2 their goods1 whether acquired by labour or heritage4 ,all these duties are summed up in the one great duty of ,justice or respect for the rights of others2 of which the greatest violation is slavery4 ,the whole of duty towards others is not however comprehended in justice4 ,conscience complains1 if we have only not done injustice to one in suffering4 ,there is a new class of duties--consolation1 charity1 sacrifice--to which indeed correspond no rights1 and which therefore are not so obligatory as justice1 but which cannot be said not to be obligatory4 ,from their nature1 they cannot be reduced to an exact formula2 their beauty lies in liberty4 ,but in charity1 he adds1 there is also a danger1 from its effacing1 to a certain extent1 the moral personality of the object of it4 ,in acting upon others1 we risk interfering with their natural rights2 charity is therefore to be proportioned to the liberty and reason of the person benefited1 and is never to be made the means of usurping power over another4 ,justice and ,charity are the two elements composing social morality4 ,but what is social8 and on what is ,society founded1 existing as it does everywhere1 and making man to be what he is8 ,into the hopeless question of its origin he refuses to enter2 its present state is to be studied by the light of the knowledge of human nature4 ,its invariable foundations are 7#a7 the need we have of each other1 and our social instincts1 7#b7 the lasting and indestructible idea and sentiment of right and justice4 ,the need and instinct1 of which he finds many proofs1 begin society2 justice crowns the work4 ,the least consideration of the relations of man to man1 suggest the essential principles of ,society--justice1 liberty1 equality1 government1 punishment4 ,into each of these he enters4 ,liberty is made out to be assured and developed in society1 instead of diminished4 ,equality is established upon the character of moral personality1 which admits of no degree4 ,the need of some repression upon liberty1 where the liberty of others is trenched upon1 conducts to the idea of ,government--a disinterested third party armed with the necessary power to assure and defend the liberty of all4 ,to government is to be ascribed1 first its inseparable function of protecting the common liberty 7without unnecessary repression71 and next1 beneficent action1 corresponding to the duty of charity4 ,it requires1 for its guidance1 a rule superior to itself1 i4e41 law1 the expression of universal and absolute justice4 ,here follows the usual distinction of positive and natural law4 ,the sanction of law is punishment2 the right of punishing1 as was seen1 depending on the idea of demerit4 ,punishment is not mere vengeance1 but the expiation by the criminal of violated justice2 it is to be measured therefore chiefly by the demerit and not by the injury only4 ,whether1 in punishing1 allowance should be made for correction and amelioration1 is to put the same case over again of charity coming in after justice4 ,here the philosopher stops on the threshold of the special science of politics4 ,but already the fixed and invariable principles of society and government have been given1 and1 even in the relative sphere of politics1 the rule still holds that all forms and institutions are to be moulded as far as possible on the eternal principles supplied by philosophy4 ,the following is a summary of ,cousin's views3-- ,i4--,the ,standard is the judgment of good or evil in actions4 ,cousin holds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our judgment1 and having a sort of objective existence4 ,,ii4--,the ,moral ,faculty he analyzes into four judgments3 7#a7 good and evil2 7#b7 obligation2 7#c7 freedom of the will2 and 7#d7 merit and demerit4 ,the moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those judgments1 and chiefly the feeling connected with the idea of merit4 ,this analysis is obviously redundant4 ',good' and 'evil' apply to many things outside ethics1 and to be at all appropriate1 they must be qualified as moral 7i4e41 obligatory7 good and evil4 ,the connexion between obligation and demerit has been previously explained4 ,,iii4--,in regard to the ,summum ,bonum1 ,cousin considers that virtue must bring happiness here or hereafter1 and vice1 misery4 ,,iv4--,he accepts the criterion of duties set forth by ,kant4 ,he argues for the existence of duties towards ourselves4 ,v4 and ,,vi4 require no remark4 ,,th,,odore ,,simon ,,jouffroy4 #agif-ahdb4 ,in the ,second ,lecture of his unfinished ,cours de ,droit ,naturel1 ,jouffroy gives a condensed exposition of the ,moral ,facts of human nature from his own point of view4 ,what distinguishes1 he says1 one being from another1 is its ,organization2 and as having a special nature1 every creature has a special end4 ,its end or destination is its good1 or its good consists in the accomplishment of its end4 ,further1 to have an end implies the possession of faculties wherewith to attain it2 and all this is applicable also to man4 ,in man1 as in other creatures1 from the very first1 his nature tends to its end1 by means of purely instinctive movements1 which may be called primitive and instinctive tendencies of human nature2 later they are called passions4 ,along with these tendencies1 and under their influence1 the intellectual faculties also awake and seek to procure for them satisfaction4 ,the faculties work1 however1 at first1 in an indeterminate fashion1 and only by meeting obstacles are driven to the concentration necessary to attain the ends4 ,he illustrates this by the case of the intellectual faculty seeking to satisfy the desire of knowledge1 and not succeeding until it concentrates on a single point its scattered energies4 ,this spontaneous concentration is the first manifestation of ,will1 but is proved to be not natural from the feeling of constraint always experienced1 and the glad rebound1 after effort1 to tho indeterminate condition4 ,one fact1 too1 remains even after every thing possible has been done1 viz41 that the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies is never quite complete4 ,when1 however1 such satisfaction as may be1 has been attained1 there arises pleasure2 and pain1 when our faculties fail to attain the good or end they sought4 ,there could be action1 successful and unsuccessful1 and so good and evil1 without any sensibility1 wherefore good and evil are not to be confounded with pain and pleasure2 but constituted as we are1 there is a sensible echo that varies according as the result of action is attained or not4 ,pleasure is1 then1 the consequence1 and1 as it were1 the sign of the realization of good1 and pain of its privation4 ,he next distinguishes ,secondary passions from the great primary tendencies and passions4 ,these arise apropos of external objects1 as they are found to further or oppose the satisfaction of the fundamental tendencies4 ,such objects are then called useful or pernicious4 ,finally1 he completes his account of the infantile or primitive condition of man1 by remarking that some of our natural tendencies1 like ,sympathy1 are entirely disinterested in seeking the good of others4 ,the main feature of the whole primitive state is the exclusive domination of passion4 ,the will already exists1 but there is no liberty2 the present passion triumphs over the future1 the stronger over the weaker4 ,he now passes to consider the double transformation of this original state1 that takes place when reason appears4 ,reason is the faculty of comprehending1 which is different from knowing1 and is peculiar to man4 ,as soon as it awakes in man1 it comprehends1 and penetrates to the meaning of1 the whole spectacle of human activity4 ,it first forms the general idea of ,good as the resultant of the satisfaction of all the primary tendencies1 and as the true ,end of man4 ,then1 comprehending the actual situation of man1 it resolves this idea into the idea of the greatest possible good4 ,all that conduces to the attainment of this good1 it includes under the general idea of the ,useful2 and finally1 it constructs the general idea of ,happiness out of all that is common to the agreeable sensations that follow upon the satisfaction of the primary tendencies4 ,but besides forming these three perfectly distinct ideas1 and exploring the secret of what has been passing within1 the reason also comprehends the necessity of subjecting to control the faculties and forces that are the condition of the greatest satisfaction of human nature4 ,in the place of the merely mechanical impulsion of passion1 which is coupled with grave disadvantages1 it puts forward1 as a new principle of action1 the rational calculation of interest4 ,the faculties are brought into the service of this idea of the reason1 by the same process of concentration as was needful in satisfying the passions2 only now voluntarily instead of spontaneously4 ,being an idea instead of a passion1 the new principle supplies a real motive1 under whose guidance our natural power over our faculties is developed and strengthened4 ,all partial ends are merged in the one great ,end of ,interest1 to which the means is self-control4 ,the first great change thus wrought by reason is1 that it takes the direction of the human forces into its own hand1 and although1 even when by a natural transformation the new system of conduct acquires all the force of a passion1 it is not able steadily to procure for the idea of interest the victory over the single passions1 the change nevertheless abides4 ,to the state of ,passion has succeeded the state of ,egoism4 ,reason must1 however1 he thinks1 make another discovery before there is a truly moral state--must from general ideas rise to ideas that are universal and absolute4 ,there is no real equation1 he holds1 between ,good and the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies1 which is the good of egoism4 ,not till the special ends of all creatures are regarded as elements of one great ,end of creation1 of ,universal ,order1 do we obtain an idea whose equivalence to the idea of the ,good requires no proof4 ,the special ends are good1 because1 through their realization1 the end of creation1 which is the absolute ,good1 is realized2 hence they acquire the sacred character that it has in the eye of reason4 ,no sooner is the idea of ,universal ,order present to the reason1 than it is recognized as an absolute law2 and1 in consequence1 the special end of our being1 by participation in its character of goodness and sacredness1 is henceforth pursued as a duty1 and its satisfaction claimed as a right4 ,also every creature assumes the same position1 and we no longer merely concede that others have tendencies to be satisfied1 and consent from ,sympathy or ,egoism to promote their good2 but the idea of ,universal ,order makes it as much our duty to respect and contribute to the accomplishment of their good as to accomplish our own4 ,from the idea of good-in-itself1 i4e41 ,order1 flow all duty1 right1 obligation1 morality1 and natural legislation4 ,he carries the idea of ,order still farther back to the ,deity1 making it the expression of the divine thought1 and opening up the religious side of morality2 but he does not mean that its obligatoriness as regards the reason is thereby increased4 ,he also identifies it1 in the last resort1 with the ideas of the ,beautiful and the ,true4 ,we have now reached the truly moral condition1 a state perfectly distinct from either of the foregoing4 ,even when the egoistic and the moral determination prescribe the same conduct1 the one only counsels1 while the other obliges4 ,the one1 having in view only the greatest satisfaction of our nature1 is personal even when counselling benefits to others2 the other regarding only the law of ,order1 something distinct from self1 is impersonal1 even when prescribing our own good4 ,hence there is in the latter case dvouement of self to something else1 and it is exactly the dvouement to a something that is not self1 but is regarded as good1 that gets the name of virtue or moral good4 ,moral good is voluntary and intelligent obedience to the law that is the rule of our conduct4 ,as an additional distinction between the egoistic and the moral determination1 he mentions the judgment of merit or demerit that ensues upon actions when1 and only when1 they have a moral character4 ,no remorse follows an act of mere imprudence involving no violation of universal order4 ,he denies that there is any real contradiction among the three different determinations4 ,nothing is prescribed in the moral law that is not also in accordance with some primitive tendency1 and with self-interest rightly understood2 if it were not so1 it would go hard with virtue4 ,on the other hand1 if everything not done from regard to duty were opposed to moral law and order1 society could not only not subsist1 but would never have been formed4 ,when a struggle does ensue between passion and self-interest1 passion is blind2 when between egoism and the moral determination1 egoism is at fault4 ,it is in the true interest of ,passion to be sacrificed to ,egoism1 and of ,egoism to be sacrificed to ,order4 ,he closes the review of the various moral facts by explaining in what sense the succession of the three states is to be understood4 ,the state of ,passion is historically first1 but the ,egoistic and the ,moral states are not so sharply defined4 ,as soon as reason dawns it introduces the moral motive as well as the egoistic1 and to this extent the two states are contemporaneous4 ,only1 so far is the moral law from being at this stage fully conceived1 that1 in the majority of men1 it is never conceived in its full clearness at all4 ,their confused idea of moral law is the so-called moral conscience1 which works more like a sense or an instinct1 and is inferior to the clear rational conception in everything except that it conveys the full force of obligation4 ,in its grades of guilt human justice rightly makes allowance for different degrees of intelligence4 ,the ,egoistic determination and the ,moral state1 such as it is1 once developed1 passion is not to be supposed abolished1 but henceforth what really takes place in all is a perpetual alternation of the various states4 ,yet though no man is able exclusively to follow the moral determination1 and no man will constantly be under the influence of any one of the motives1 there is one motive commonly uppermost whereby each can be characterized4 ,thus men1 according to their habitual conduct1 are known as passionate1 egoistic1 or virtuous4 ,we now summarize the opinions of ,jouffroy3-- ,i4--,the ,standard is the ,idea of ,absolute ,good or ,universal ,order in the sense explained by the author4 ,like ,cousin1 he identifies the 'good' with the 'true4' ,what1 then1 is the criterion that distinguishes moral from other truths8 ,if obligation be selected as the differentia1 it is in effect to give up the attempt to determine what truths are obligatory4 ,the idea of 'good' is obviously too vague to be a differentia4 ,how far the idea of ',universal ,order' gets us out of the difficulty may be doubted1 especially after the candid admission of the author1 that it is an idea of which the majority of men have never any very clear notions4 ,,ii4--,the moral faculty is ,reason2 ,conscience is hardly more than a confused feeling of obligatoriness4 ,sympathy is one of the primitive tendencies of our nature4 ,jouffroy's opinion on the subject is open to the objections urged against ,butler's psychology4 ,he upholds the freedom of the ,will1 but embarrasses his argument by admitting1 like ,reid1 that there is a stage in our existence when we are ruled by the passions1 and are destitute of liberty4 ,,iii4--,the ,summum ,bonum is the end of every creature2 the passions ought to be subordinated to self-interest1 and self-interest to morality4 ,in regard to the other points1 it is unnecessary to continue the summary4 ,,notes ,footnote #a3 ,duties strictly so called1 the department of obligatory morality1 enforced by punishment1 may be exemplified in the following classified summary3-- ,under the ,legal ,sanction1 are included2 7,a7 ,forbearance from 7specified7 injuries2 as 7a7 ,intentional injury--crimes1 7b7 ,injury not intentional--wrongs1 repaired by ,damages or ,compensation4 7,b7 ,the rendering of services2 7a7 ,fulfilling contracts or agreements2 7b7 ,reciprocating anterior services rendered1 though1 not requested1 as in filial duty2 7c7 ,cases of extreme or superior need1 as parental duty1 relief of destitution4 ,under the ,popular ,sanction are created duties on such points as the following3--7#a7 ,the ,etiquette of small societies or coteries4 7#b7 ,religious orthodoxy2 ,sabbath observance4 7#c7 ,unchastity2 violations of the etiquette of the sexes1 ,immodesty1 and whatever endangers chastity1 especially in women4 7#d7 ,duties of parents to children1 and of children to parents1 beyond the requirements of the law4 7#e7 ,suicide3 when only attempted1 the individual is punished1 when carried out1 the relatives4 7#f7 ,drunkenness1 and neglect of the means of self-support4 7#g7 ,gross ,inhumanity4 ,in all these cases the sanction1 or punishment1 is social2 and is either mere disapprobation or dislike1 not issuing in overt acts1 or exclusion from fellowship and the good offices consequent thereon4 ,footnote #b3 ,optional ,morality1 the ,morality of ,reward1 is exemplified as follows3-- 7,a7 ,a liberal performance of duties properly so called4 7a7 ,the support of aged parents2 this1 though to a certain extent a legal duty1 is still more a virtue1 being stimulated by the approbation of one's fellows4 ,the performance of the family duties generally is the subject of commendation4 7b7 ,the payment of debts that cannot be legally recovered1 as in the case of bankrupts after receiving their discharge4 ,these examples typify cases 7#a7 where no definite law is laid down1 or where the law is content with a minimum2 and 7#b7 where the law is restrained by its rules of evidence or procedure4 ,society1 in such cases1 steps in and supplies a motive in the shape of reward4 7,b7 ,pure ,virtue1 or ,beneficence2 all actions for the benefit of others without stipulation1 and without reward2 relief of distress1 promotion of the good of individuals or of society at large4 ,the highest honours of society are called into exercise by the highest services4 ,bentham's principle of the claims of superior need cannot be fully carried out1 7although he conceives it might1 in some cases71 by either the legal or the popular sanction4 ,thus1 the act of the good ,samaritan1 the rescue of a ship's crew from drowning1 could not be exacted2 the law cannot require heroism4 ,it is of importance to remark1 that although ,duty and ,nobleness1 ,punishment and ,reward1 are in their extremes unmistakably contrasted1 yet there may be a margin of doubt or ambiguity 7like the passing of day into night74 ,thus1 expressed approbation1 generally speaking1 belongs to ,reward2 yet1 if it has become a thing of course1 the withholding of it operates as a ,punishment or a ,penalty4 ,footnote #c3 ,the conditions that regulate the authoritative enforcement of actions1 are exhaustively given in works on ,jurisprudence1 but they do not all concern ,ethical ,theory4 ,the expedience of imposing a rule depends on the importance of the object compared with the cost of the machinery4 ,a certain line of conduct may be highly beneficial1 but may not be a fit case for coercion4 ,for example1 the law can enforce only a minimum of service3 now1 if the case be such1 that a minimum is useless1 as in helping a ship in distress1 or in supporting aged parents1 it is much1 better to leave the case to voluntary impulses1 seconded by approbation or reward4 ,again1 an offence punished by law must be1 in its nature1 definable2 which1 makes a difficulty in such cases as insult1 and defamation1 and many species of fraud4 ,farther1 the offence must be easy of detection1 so that the vast majority of offenders may not escape4 ,this limits the action of the law in unchastity4 ,footnote #d3 ,see1 on the method of ,sokrates1 ,appendix ,a4 ,footnote #e3 ,in setting forth1 the ,ethical ,end1 the language of ,sokrates was not always consistent4 ,he sometimes stated it1 as if it included an independent reference to the happiness of others2 at other times1 he speaks as if the end was the agent's own happiness1 to which1 the happiness of others was the greatest and most essential means4 ,the first view1 although not always adhered to1 prevails in ,xenophon2 the second appears most in ,plato4 ,footnote #f3 ',what ,plato here calls the ,knowledge of ,good1 or ,reason1--the just discrimination and comparative appreciation1 of ,ends and ,means--appears in the ,politikus and the ,euthydmus1 under the title of the ,regal or ,political ,art1 as employing or directing the results of all other arts1 which are considered as subordinate3 in the ,protagoras1 under the title of art of calculation or mensuration3 in the ,philbus1 as measure and proportion3 in the ,phaedrus 7in regard to rhetoric7 as the art of turning to account1 for the main purpose of persuasion1 all the special processes1 stratagems1 decorations1 c41 imparted by professional masters4 ,in the ,republic1 it is personified in the few venerable ,elders who constitute the ,reason of the society1 and whose directions all the rest 7,guardians and ,producers7 arc bound implicitly to follow3 the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience4 ,in the ,leges1 it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind1 of pleasures and pains to right ,reason1 without which1 no special aptitudes are worth1 having4 ,in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 it stands as a ,sokratic authority under the title of ,sophrosyn or ,temperance3 and the ,profitable is declared identical with1 the ,good1 as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings4' 7,grote's ,plato1 ,i41 #cfb47 ,footnote #g3 ',indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the ,gorgias1 than the manner in which4 ,sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured1 exorbitant1 maleficent desires1 but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts1 including music and poetry1 tragic as well as dithyrambic--all provision for the most essential wants1 all protection against particular sufferings and dangers1 even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue--all the effective maintenance of public organized force1 such as ships1 docks1 walls1 arms1 c4 ,immediate satisfaction1 or relief1 and those who confer it1 are treated with contempt1 and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure4 ,and it is in this point of view1 that various ,platonic commentators extol in an especial manner the ,gorgias3 as recognizing an ,idea of ,good superhuman and supernatural1 radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being1 and incommensurable with1 them2 an ,universal ,idea1 which1 though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its particulars1 is separated from them by an incalculable space1 and is discernible only by the ,platonic telescope4' 7,grote1 ,gorgias7 ,footnote #h3 ,there is some analogy between the above doctrine and the great law of ,self-conservation1 as expounded in this volume 7p4 #ge74 ,footnote #i3 ,aristotle and the ,peripatetics held that there were tria genera bonorum3 7#a7 ,those of the mind 7mens sana71 7#b7 those of the body1 and 7#c7 external advantages4 ,the ,stoics altered this theory by saying that only the first of the three was bonum2 the others were merely praeposita or sumenda4 ,the opponents of the ,stoics contended that this was an alteration in words rather than in substance4 ,footnote #aj3 ,this also might truly be said of the ,epicureans2 though with them it is not so much pride1 as a quiet self-satisfaction in escaping pains and disappointments that they saw others enduring4 ,see the beginning of ,lucretius' second book1 and the last epistle of ,epicurus to ,idomeneus4 ,footnote #aa3 ,this was a later development of ,stoicism3 the earlier theorists laid it down that there were no graduating marks below the level of wisdom2 all shortcomings were on a par4 ,good was a point1 ,evil was a point2 there were gradations in the praeposita or sumenda 7none of which were good71 and in the rejecta or rejicienda 7none of which were evil71 but there was no more or less good4 ,the idea of advance by steps towards virtue or wisdom1 was probably familiar to ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 and ,epicurus2 the ,stoic theories1 on the other hand1 tended to throw it out of sight1 though they insisted strenuously on the necessity of mental training and meditation4 ,footnote #ab3 ,this theory 7taken in its most general sense1 and apart from differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains71 had been proclaimed long before the time of ,epicurus4 ,it is one of the various theories of ,plato3 for in his dialogue called ,protagoras 7though in other dialogues he reasons differently7 we find it explicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal spokesman1 ,sokrates1 against the ,sophist ,protagoras4 ,it was also held by ,aristippus 7companion of ,sokrates along with ,plato7 and by his followers after him1 called the ,cyrenaics4 ,lastly1 it was maintained by ,eudoxus1 one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with ,aristotle4 ,epicurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory3 but he had his own way of conceiving it--his own body of doctrine physical1 cosmological1 and theological1 with which it was implicated--and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains4 ,footnote #ac3 ,the soul1 according to ,epicurus1 was a subtle but energetic compound 7of air1 vapour1 heat1 and another nameless ingredient71 with its best parts concentrated in the chest1 yet pervading and sustaining the whole body2 still1 however1 depending for its support on the body1 and incapable of separate or disembodied continuance4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,de ,coelo4 ,,ii4a4#ab1 p4 #bib1 #bb1 #f1 #e4 ,in the ,ethics1 ,aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the gods1 as the only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme felicity4 ,footnote #ae3 ,xenophon ,memor4 ,i4 #a--aj2 ,,iv4 #c--ab4 ,footnote #af3 ,these exhortations to active friendship were not unfruitful4 ,we know1 even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the ,epicurean doctrines1 that the harmony among the members of the sect1 with common veneration for the founder1 was more marked and more enduring than that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects4 ,epicurus himself was a man of amiable personal qualities3 his testament1 still remaining1 shows an affectionate regard1 both for his surviving friends1 and for the permanent attachment of each1 to the others1 as well as of all to the school4 ,diogenes ,laertius tells us--nearly #bjj years after ,christ1 and #dej years after the death of ,epicurus--that the ,epicurean sect still continued its numbers and dignity1 having outlasted its contemporaries and rivals4 ,the harmony among the ,epicureans may be explained1 not merely from the temper of the master1 but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he recommended4 ,ambition and love of power were discouraged3 rivalry among the members for success1 either political or rhetorical1 was at any rate a rare exception3 all were taught to confine themselves to that privacy of life and love of philosophical communion1 which alike required and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood4 ,footnote #ag3 ,consistently with this view of happiness1 ,epicurus advised1 in regard to politics1 quiet submission1 to established authority1 without active meddling beyond what necessity required4 ,footnote #ah3 ,locke examines the ,innate ,principles put forth1 by ,lord ,herbert in his book ,de ,veritate1 #ast1 ,there is a supreme governor of the world2 #bnd1 ,worship is due to him2 #crd1 ,virtue1 joined with ,piety1 is the best ,worship2 #dth1 ,men must repent of their sins2 #eth1 ,there will be a future life of rewards and punishments4 ,locke admits these to be such truths as a rational creature1 after due explanation given them1 can hardly avoid attending to2 but he will not allow them to be innate4 ,for1 ,first1 ,there are other propositions with1 as good a claim as these to be of the number imprinted by nature on the mind4 ,secondly1 ,the marks assigned are not found in all the propositions4 ,many men1 and even whole nations1 disbelieve some of them4 ,then1 as to the third principle1--virtue1 joined with piety1 is the best worship of ,god2 he cannot see how it can be innate1 seeing that it contains a name1 virtue1 of the greatest possible uncertainty of meaning4 ,for1 if virtue be taken1 as commonly it is1 to denote the actions accounted laudable in particular countries1 then the proposition will be untrue4 ,or1 if it is taken to mean accordance with ,god's will1 it will then be true1 but unmeaning2 that ,god will be pleased with what he commands is an identical assertion1 of no use to any one4 ,so the fourth proposition1--men must repent of their sins1--is open to the same remark4 ,it is not possible that ,god should engrave on men's minds principles couched on such uncertain words as ,virtue and ,sin4 ,nay more1 as a general word is nothing in itself1 but only report as to particular facts1 the knowledge of rules is a knowledge of a sufficient number of actions to determine the rule4 ,innate principles are not compatible with ,nominalism4 ,according to ,lord ,herbert1 the standard of virtue is the common notions in which1 all men agree4 ,they are such1 as the following1--to avoid evil1 to be temperate1 in doubtful cases to choose the safer course1 not to do to others what you would not wish done to yourself1 to be grateful to benefactors1 c4 ,conscience is what teaches us to carry out those principles in practice4 ,it excites joy over good actions1 and produces abhorrence and repentance for bad4 ,upon it1 our repentance of mind and eternal welfare depend4 7,for an account of ,lord ,herbert's common notions1 see ,appendix ,b41 ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury47 ,footnote #ai3 ,in this respect1 ,butler differs from both ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson4 ,with ,shaftesbury1 the main function of the moral sense is to smile approval on benevolent affections1 by which an additional pleasure is thrown into the scale against the selfish affections4 ,the superiority of the 'natural affections' thus depends on a double pleasure1 their intrinsically pleasureable character1 and the superadded pleasure of reflection4 ,the tendency of ,shaftesbury is here to make benevolence and virtue identical1 and at the same time to impair the disinterested character of benevolence4 ,footnote #bj3 ,with this view1 we may compare the psychology of ,shaftesbury1 set forth in his ',characteristics of ,men1 ,manners1 and ,times4' ,the soul has two kinds of affections--7#a7 ,self-affection1 leading to the 'good of the private1' such as love of life1 revenge1 pleasure or aptitude towards nourishment and the means of generation1 emulation or love of praise1 indolence2 and 7#b7 ,natural affections1 leading to the good of the public4 ,the natural or spontaneous predominance of benevolence is goodness2 the subjection of the selfish by effort and training is virtue4 ,virtue consists generally in the proper exercise of the several affections4 ,footnote #ba3 ,butler's definition of conscience1 and his whole treatment of it1 have created a great puzzle of classification1 as to whether he is to be placed along with the upholders of a 'moral sense4' ,shaftesbury is more explicit3 ',no sooner does the eye open upon figures1 the ear to sounds1 than straight the ,beautiful results1 and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged4 ,no sooner are actions viewed1 no sooner the human affections discerned 7and they are1 most of them1 as soon discerned as felt71 than straight an inward eye distinguishes the fair and shapely1 the amiable and admirable1 apart from the deformed1 the foul1 the odious1 or the despicable' ',in a creature capable of forming general notions of things1 not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense1 are the objects of the affections1 but the very actions themselves1 and the affections of pity1 kindness1 and gratitude1 and their contraries1 being brought into the mind by reflection1 become objects4 ,so that1 by means of this reflected sense1 there arises another kind of affection towards these affections themselves1 which have been already felt1 and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike4' ,what this 'moral sense' approves is benevolence1 and when its approval has been acted upon1 by subjecting the selfish affections1 'virtue' is attained4 ,footnote #bb3 ,it is instructive to compare ,mandeville's a priori guesses with1 the results of ,mr4 ,maine's historical investigation into the condition of early societies4 ,the evidence shows that society originated in the family system4 ,mandeville conjectured that solitary families would never attain to government2 but ,mr4 ,maine considers that there was a complete despotic government in single families4 ',they have neither assemblies for consultation nor themistes1 but every one exercises jurisdiction over his wives and children1 and they pay no regard to one another4' ,the next stage is the rise of gentes and tribes1 which took place probably when a family held together instead of separating on the death of the patriarch4 ,the features of this state were chieftainship and themistes1 that is1 government not by laws1 but by ex post facto decisions upon cases as they arose4 ,this gradually developed into customary law1 which was in its turn superseded1 on the invention of writing1 by written codes4 ,maine's ,ancient ,law1 ,chap4 ,v4 ,footnote #bc3 ,it is perhaps worth while to quote a sentence or two1 giving the author's opinion on the theory of the ,moral ,sense4 ',against every account of the principle of approbation1 which makes it depend upon a peculiar sentiment1 distinct from every other1 ,i would object1 that it is strange that this sentiment1 which ,providence undoubtedly intended to be the governing principle of human nature1 should1 hitherto have been so little taken notice of1 as not to have got a name in any language4 ,the word ,moral ,sense is of very late formation1 and cannot yet be considered as making part of the ,english tongue4 ,the word approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote peculiarly anything of this kind4 ,in propriety of language we approve of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction--of the form of a building1 of the contrivance of a machine1 of the flavour of a dish of meat4 ,the word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove4 ,conscience supposes1 indeed1 the existence of some such faculty1 and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions4 ,when love1 hatred1 joy1 sorrow1 gratitude1 resentment1 with so many other passions which are all supposed to be the subjects of this principle1 have made themselves considerable enough to get titles to know them by1 is it not surprising that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little heeded2 that1 a few philosophers excepted1 nobody has yet thought it worth while to bestow a name upon it8' ,footnote #bd3 ,,adam ,,ferguson 7#agbd-ahaf71 is not of sufficient importance in purely ,ethical theory to demand a full abstract4 ,the following remark on his views is made by ,professor ,veitch3--',ferguson1 while holding-with ,reid that the notion of ,rightness is not resolvable into utility1 or to be derived from sympathy or a moral sense1 goes a step beyond both4 ,reid and ,stewart in the inquiry which he raises regarding the definite nature and ground of ,rightness itself4' ,the following is his definition of ,moral ,good3--',moral good is the specific excellence and felicity of human nature1 and moral depravity its specific defect and wretchedness4' ,the 'excellence' of human nature consists in four things1 drawn out after the analogy of the cardinal virtues3 7#a7 ,skill 7,wisdom72 7#b7 ,benevolence1 the principal excellence of a creature destined to perform a part in social life 7,justice72 7#c7 ,application of mind 7,temperance72 7#d7 ,force1 or energy to overcome obstacles 7,fortitude74 ,regarding the motives to virtue1 either virtue is its own reward1 or divine rewards and punishments constitute a sanction2 but1 in any case1 the motive is our own happiness4 ,all the virtues enumerated are themselves useful or pleasant1 but1 over and above1 they give rise to an additional pleasure1 when they are made the subject of reflection4 ,footnote #be3 ',the theory which1 places the standard of morality in the ,divine nature must not be confounded with that which1 places it in the arbitrary will of ,god4 ,god did not create morality by his will2 it is inherent in his nature1 and co-eternal with himself2 nor can he be conceived as capable of reversing it4' ,the distinction here drawn does not avoid the fatal objection to the simpler theory1 namely1 that it takes away the moral character of ,god4 ,the acts of a sovereign cannot1 with1 any propriety1 as ,austin has shown1 be termed either legal or illegal2 in like manner1 if ,god is a moral lawgiver1 if 'he is accountable to no one1' then 'his duty and his pleasure are undistinguishable from each other1' and he cannot without self-contradiction be called a moral being4 ,even upon ,mr4 ,mansel's own theory1 it is hardly correct to say that ',god did not create morality by his will4' ,morality involves two elements--one1 rules of conduct1 the other1 an obligation to observe them4 ,now1 the authority or obligatoriness of moral laws has been made to depend upon the will of ,god1 so that1 prior to that will1 morality could not exist4 ,hence the only part of morality that can be co-eternal with ,god1 is simply the rules of morality1 without their obligatoriness1 the salt without its savour4 ,the closing assertion that ,god cannot reverse morality1 may mean either that it would be inconsistent with his immutability to reverse the laws he had himself established1 or that he is compelled by his nature to impose certain rules1 and no others4 ,the first supposition is a truism2 the second is not proved4 ,for1 since ,mr4 ,mansel has discarded as a fiction any 'absolute law of duty1' it is hard to conjecture whence he could derive any compulsory choice of rules4 ,why ,god commands some things in preference to others--whether from a regard to the happiness of all his creatures1 or of some only2 whether with1 a view to his own glory1 or from conformity with some abstract notion--has been much disputed1 and it is quite conceivable that he may not adopt any of those objects4 ,footnote #bf3 ,for help in understanding ,kant's peculiar phraseology and general point of view1 the reader is referred to the short exposition of his ,speculative ,philosophy in ,appendix ,b4