,emphasis italics have a 99 mark4 footnotes moved to ,e,o,paragraphs but not renumbered4 ,german spelling of words need to checked particularly6 ,scanned by ,charles ,keller with ,omni,page ,professional ,,ocr software ,,the ,,riddle ,,of ,,the ,,rhine ,,chemical ,,strategy ,,in ,,peace ,,and ,,war ,an account of the critical struggle for power and for the decisive war initiative4 ,the campaign fostered by the great ,rhine factories1 and the pressing problems which they represent4 ,a matter of pre-eminent public interest concerning the sincerity of disarmament1 the future of warfare1 and the stability of peace4 ,,by ,,victor ,,lefebure ,officer of the ,order of the ,british ,empire 7,mil47 ,chevalier de la ,legion d',honneur1 ,officer of the ,crown of ,italy ,fellow of the ,chemical ,society1 etc4 ,,with ,a ,,preface ,,by ,,marshal ,,foch ,,and ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,,field-,,marshal ,,sir ,,henry ,,wilson1 ,,bart4 ,chief of the ,imperial ,general ,staff ,,the ,,chemical ,,foundation1 ,,inc4 #ha ,,fulton ,,street ,,new ,,york ,,city ,published1 #aibc1 ,by ,,the ,,chemical ,,foundation1 ,,inc4 ---- ,all ,rights ,reserved ,printed in the ,united ,states of ,america ,,preface ,my motives in writing this book are sufficiently explained in the first chapter4 ,the silence surrounding the true facts of the chemical campaign1 the tardy realisation of the real forces behind it in ,germany1 and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter in the ,treaty1 all pointed to the need for an early statement4 ,more recently1 this need has been emphasised by inaccurate public utterances on the matter1 and by its vital importance for the full and fair treatment of certain legislative measures before ,allied countries4 ,a unique experience of chemical warfare in all its aspects1 first with a combatant gas unit on the ,british front in ,france1 then as ,liaison ,officer with ,france and other ,allies on all ,chemical ,warfare and allied questions1 has afforded me an exceptionally complete survey of the subject4 ,later post-armistice experience in ,paris1 and the occupied territories1 assisting ,lord ,moulton on various chemical questions in connection with the ,treaty1 and surveying the great chemical munition factories of the ,rhine1 has provided a central view of the whole matter which can have been the privilege and opportunity of very few4 ,further1 my association with the dye industry1 since commencing this book1 leaves me with a deep conviction of the critical importance for disarmament1 of a world redistribution of organic chemical production4 ,it is inevitable that such a step should benefit the growing organic chemical industries of countries other than ,germany1 but this issue need not be shirked4 ,the importance of the matter is so vital that it eclipses all reproach that the disarmament argument for the maintenance of the dye industry is used on selfish grounds4 ,such reproach cannot1 in fairness1 be heard unless it destroys the case which we have established4 ,we are faced with the following alternatives4 ,safety demands strong organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical warfare establishments4 ,the stability of future peace depends upon the former1 and the extent to which we must establish1 or can abandon1 the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose special duty it is to organise against war4 ,a recent visit to ,america revealed the considerable publicity and public interest surrounding chemical warfare1 strengthening my conviction that the facts1 now noised abroad1 should be presented in their proper setting4 ,they are supremely significant at the present time and for the future1 hence the chapters which follow4 ,v4 ,,lefebure4 ,,hampstead1 ,october #ab1 #aibj4 ,,preface ,,by ,,field ,,marshal ,,foch ,in #aiah1 chemical warfare had developed considerably in our army4 ,before #aiad ,germany possessed chemical factories which permitted her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front1 and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting4 ,the ,allies1 to retaliate1 had to experiment and organise important centres for production4 ,only in this way1 though starting late1 were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing necessities of their armies4 ,to-day1 the ability for aviation to carry increasing weight furnishes a new method for abundantly spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and stronger bombs1 and to reach armies1 the centres of population in the rear1 or to render regions uninhabitable4 ,chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to produce more formidable results over more extended areas4 ,it is incontestable on the other hand that this growth will find an easy realisation in one country1 ,germany1 addicted in times of peace1 to wholesale manufacture of chemical products1 which a simple modification in reactions can transform into war products4 ,this country1 deprived1 partially at least1 of its former methods of fighting1 and its numerous forces of specially trained soldiers1 regularly organised and strongly armed1 will be more drawn toward the new systems of attack-- that of chemical warfare4 ,chemical warfare must therefore enter into our future provisions and preparations1 if we do not wish to experience some terrible surprises4 ,the work of ,major ,lefebure gives an exact idea of the possibilities he finds to-day in ,germany1 and through them the dangers with which she threatens us4 ,in this form it constitutes a warning2 and information of the highest order1 for the minds who remain anxious for the fate of their country confronted by the inefficience of the old fighting methods which the progress of industry out of date renders daily4 ,by sounding the alarm in both our countries1 ,i find myself in company with my faithful friend ,field ,marshal ,sir ,henry ,wilson4 ,this is an old habit1 contracted by both of us1 many years ago1 which we still maintain at the present time to insure for ourselves once again1 peace in the future4 ,together1 we say1 read this work of ,major ,lefebure4 ,f4 ,,foch4 ,,contents ,,page ,,chapter ,i-,,explanatory ,the ,riddle of the ,rhine-,a ,critical ,point in ,disarmament-,need for a ,balanced ,view of ,chemical ,warfare-,some ,preliminary ,explanation--,poison ,gas a ,misleading ,term-,the ,french ,physiological ,classification-,asphyxiating ,substances-,toxic ,substances-,lachrymators-,vesicant or ,blistering ,compounds-,sneezing or ,sternutatory ,substances-,the ,tactical ,classification-,persistent ,substances-,non-persistent ,substances-,penetrants-,special ,gas ,weapons and ,appliances-,gas ,shell4 #ag ,,chapter ,,ii-,,the ,,german ,,surprise ,the ,first ,cloud ,gas ,attack-,the ,element of ,surprise -,lord ,kitchener's ,protest-,german ,preparations-- ,research-,production-,field ,preparations-,german ,opinion of ,results-,germany ,prompted by ,production ,monopoly-,standard ,uses for ,gas-,gas ,shell-,further ,german ,cloud ,attacks-,hill #fj-,origin of ,german ,gas ,shell-,early ,german ,gas ,shell-,a ,successful ,experiment-,lachrymators at ,loos1 #aiae-,the ,flammenwerfer-,german ,phosgene ,clouds-,gas and the ,eastern ,theatre-,conclusion4 #ca ,,chapter ,,iii-,,the ,,allied ,,reaction ,the ,need of ,retaliation-,first ,signs-,the ,loos ,attack1 ,september1 #aiae-,the ,somme ,battle1 #aiaf--,reasons for ,british ,cloud ,gas ,success-,our ,casualties-,exhausting ,preparations for ,cloud ,attack-,the ,livens ,projector-,british ,gas ,shell-,german ,gas ,shell ,development1 #aiaf-,main ,features of the ,period4 #dh ,,chapter ,,iv-,,intensive ,,chemical ,,warfare ,the ,mustard ,gas ,surprise-,blue ,cross-,german ,emphasis on ,gas ,shell-,the ,german ,projector-,german ,projector ,improvements-,dyes in ,gas ,shell--,german ,flame ,projectors-,their ,origin-,further ,flame ,development-,the #aiah ,offensive-,ludendorff's ,testimony-,preparations for ,assault-,gas ,defensive ,flank at ,armentieres-,fixed ,gas ,barrage at ,kemmel-,percentage of ,chemical ,shell-,gas ,re-,contents ,,page treat ,tactics-,general ,hartley's ,analysis-,percentage of ,german ,gas ,shell in ,enemy ,dumps-,forced ,exhaustion of ,stocks-,yperite1 ,french ,mustard ,gas-,effect on ,german ,gas ,discipline-,allied ,gas ,statistics-,critical ,importance of ,rapid ,german ,production4 #ff ,,chapter ,v-,,chemical ,,warfare ,,organisations ,german ,research-,leverkusen-,hochst-,ludwigsha ven-,early ,formulation of ,policy-,movements of ,personnel-,german ,simplicity of ,organisation-,german ,organisation at the ,front-,the ,gas ,regiment--,early ,german ,gas ,school-,new ,gas ,regiments-,gas ,shell ,experts-,inspection of ,protective ,masks and ,method-,british ,field ,organisation-- ,breach ,organisations-,central ,laboratory-,new ,type of ,casualty,directorate of ,gas ,services-,british ,home ,organisations-,the ,royal ,society-,royal ,society ,chemical ,sub-,committee-,the ,trench ,warfare ,department-,scientific ,advisory ,committee -,commercial ,advisory ,committee-,split ,between ,research and ,supply-,munitions ,inventions ,department-,imperial ,college of ,science-,the ,chemical ,warfare ,department-,the ,anti-,gas ,department -,designs ,committee ,french ,organisation-,italian ,developments-,supply ,organisations-,british ,supply ,organisation-,allied ,handicaps-,the ,german ,solution--,departmental ,difficulties-- ,allied ,success ,against ,odds-,allied ,lack of ,vision in ,production-,british ,lag in ,organisation-,french and ,american ,characteristics-,inter-,allied ,chemical ,warfare ,liaison-,inter-,allied ,supply-,nature of ,chemical ,warfare ,research-,discovery of ,new ,substances-,technical ,method of ,preparation-,filling ,problem-,protection-,half ,scale ,investigation-,two ,classes of ,research-,conclusion-,the ,outer and ,inner ,lines4 #he ,,chapter ,,vi-,,the ,,struggle ,,for ,,the ,,initiative ,meaning of the ,chemical ,initiative-,controlling ,factors--,rapid ,manufacture ,rapid ,identification ,essential-,propaganda and ,morale-,peculiar ,peace-time ,danger-,war ,fluctuations of ,initiative-,the ,tense ,protective ,struggle-,the ,german ,mask-,enforced ,german ,modifications-,shortage of ,rubber-,gas ,discipline-,summary-,new ,german ,attempts-,yellow and ,blue ,cross-,yellow ,cross-,blue ,cross-,particulate ,clouds-,potential ,production and ,peace4 lit ,contents ,,page ,,chapter ,,vii-,,review ,,of ,,production ,critical ,importance of ,production-,significance of the ,german ,dye ,industry--,the ,interessen ,gemeinschaft-,war ,production by the ,i4,g4-,allied ,difficulties-,conclusion4 #adc ,,chapter ,,viii-,,american ,,developments ,special ,attention justified-,special ,value of ,american ,opinion-,early ,american ,activities-,field ,activities -,special ,difficulties-,edgewood ,arsenal-,research--,production-,post-,a rmistice ,developments-,views of ,general ,fries-,the ,gas ,cloud ,inescapable-,importance of ,smoke-,casualty ,percent ages-,short ,range ,projectors-,vast ,expansion in ,personnel4 #agc ,,chapter ,,ix-,,german ,,chemical ,,policy ,origin of ,german ,chemical ,monopolies-,german ,chemical ,commercial ,policy-,evidence of the ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 ,alien ,property ,custodian-,pre-war ,american ,situation--,german ,price ,cutting--,salicylic ,acid-- ,full ,line ,forcing--,bribery and ,corruption--,german ,patent ,policy--,propaganda and ,information--,espionage-,activities of the ,dye ,agencies-,manoeuvring ,raw ,materials-,chemical ,exchange ,association -,doctor ,albert's ,letter-,dye ,agency ,information ,system-,dr4 ,albert on ,chemical ,warfare-,the ,moral ,aspect-,report of the ,new ,york ,world-,german ,policy ,regarding ,dye ,supplies to the ,u4 ,s4 ,a4--,professor ,stieglitz's ,evidence ,ehrlich's ,discovery--,drugs and ,medicinal ,products-,the ,german ,monopoly-,national ,health ,insurance ,commission-,the ,royal ,society--,novocain--,beta-,eucaine--,ph otographic ,chemicals-,war ,activities of the ,i4,g4-,the ,rhine ,factories and the ,armistice-,war ,mentality of the ,i4,g4-,german ,attitude towards ,inspection-,the ,rhine and ,chaulny ,contrast-,german ,revolution and the ,industrial ,leaders-,the ,german ,peace ,delegation -,recent ,signs of ,government ,interest-,nitrogen ,fixation-,the ,german ,nitrogen ,syndicate-,haber ,process ,prominent-,the ,new ,german ,dye ,combine -,aggressive ,nationalist ,policy4 #ahf ,,chapter ,x-,,lines ,,of ,,future ,,development ,the ,element of ,speculation-,chemical ,tactics and ,strategy-,new ,war ,chemicals--,camouflage ,chemicals-,functions ,hitherto ,immune-,chemical ,constitution and ,physiological ,action-,unsolved ,prob- ,contents ,,page lems of ,mustard ,gas-,a ,new ,type of ,obstacle-- ,the ,persistent ,lethal ,substance-,the ,critical ,range-,the ,new ,no-,man's-,land-,the ,alert ,gas ,zone--,gas and ,aircraft-,protective ,development -,individual ,protection-,collective ,protection-,conclusion4 #bae ,,chapter ,,xi-,,humane ,,or ,,inhumane8 ,nature of ,gas ,casualties-,sargent's ,picture-,need for ,safeguards4 #bch ,,chapter ,,xii-,,chemical ,,warfare ,,and ,,disarmament ,the ,treaty of ,versailles-,german ,information-,limitation of ,armament-,report of the ,hartley ,mission -,new ,conceptions in ,chemical ,disarmament-,limitation ,mechanical and ,chemical-,tank ,disarmament -,chemical ,limitation-,research-,production-,mecha nical and ,chemical ,preparations for ,war-,recent ,disarmament ,proposals-,the ,covenant of the ,league ,need for ,guarantees-,viscount ,grey1 ,germany must disarm first'-- ,suggested ,methods--,vested ,interests--,handing ,over ,inventions-,neglect of ,chemical ,disarmament in the ,treaty4 #bdb ,,conclusion-,,the ,,treaty ,,of ,,the ,,future4 #bfd ,,illustrations ,,the ,,livens ,,projector-,i4 ,frontispiece ,a completed battery of projectors in the foreground1 with a battery on the left rear1 half dug in4 ,suitably camouflaged with brush1 the batteries are not observable by aircraft1 and1 being in ,no-,man's-,land1 neither party can detect them by day4 ,,facing ,,page ,,typical ,,gas ,,shell ,,bursting4 #cj ,,the ,,livens ,,projector-,,ii #fa ,a working party fitting electric leads and adjusting bombs prior to discharge4 ,this work occurs at night4 ,,the ,,livens ,,projector-,,iii4 #acc ,explosion of ,livens bombs on the objective4 ,,smoke ,,barrage4 #aha ,note the sharp curtain which is formed1 behind which the infantry advance4 ,,introduction ,no one who has the welfare of the country at heart can fail to share ,major ,lefebure's anxiety that a clear1 accurate1 and unbiased account of chemical warfare should be presented to the public1 so that the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard to poison gas and its uses may be dispelled4 ,the whole subject of chemical warfare is at present sub judice1 and there is great danger that the future safety of this country may be jeopardised by the almost universal ignorance of the peculiarities and potentialities of this class of warfare4 ,recent publications in the ,press have shown a tendency to deal with the subject on purely sentimental grounds1 and attempts have been made to declare this form of warfare illegitimate without full and careful consideration of all the facts and their significance for the future4 ,major ,lefebure has therefore attempted in his book to make it quite clear that no convention1 guarantee1 or disarmament safeguard will prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison gas1 especially if that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent1 or possesses1 as ,germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry1 a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically a moment's notice2 further1 that the safety of this country makes it imperative that the study and investigation of the subject should be continued and that our chemical and dye industry should be developed1 so that when an emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities for supply ready to hand4 ,it is not for me to express any opinion here either as to the desirability of using gas as a weapon or as to the possibility of preventing an enemy from using it4 ,but ,i am convinced that a decision come to without full knowledge of the facts may involve grave danger and heavy preventable loss of life4 ,i am further convinced that ,major ,lefebure1 by his special knowledge and long experience as chemical liaison officer during the war1 is well qualified to speak1 and that his opinion is entitled to full consideration4 ,for these reasons ,i think that his book will do a much needed public service4 ,i wish it every success1 and the greatest possible number of readers4 ,,henry ,,wilson1 ,f4,m4 ,,chapter #a ,,explanatory ,the ,riddle of the ,rhine4--,the ,great ,war challenged our very existence4 ,but with the tension released1 and the ,allies victorious1 the check to the ,german menace appears crushing and complete4 ,few realise that one formidable challenge has not been answered4 ,silently menacing1 the chemical threat remains unrecognised4 ,how1 asks the reader1 can this be8 ,are we not aware of the poison gas campaign8 ,indeed1 we have not yet grasped the simple technical facts of the case1 and these are merely the outward signs of a deep-rooted menace whose nature1 activities1 and potentialities are doubly important because so utterly unsuspected by those whom they most threaten4 ,how many of us1 for example1 realise that the ,germans relied mainly on gas for success in the great ,march assault of #aiah1 which threatened to influence the destinies of the world4 ,yet ,ludendorff goes out of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it4 ,how many understand that the #aiah hostilities were no longer a war of explosives4 ,german guns were firing more than fifty per cent4 of gas and war chemical4 ,but a deep study of such war facts reveals a much more significant matter4 ,all are aware of the enormous national enterprises built to fulfil our explosives programme4 ,with mushroom-like growth chemical establishments of a magnitude hitherto unknown in ,england arose to meet our crying needs4 ,what was the ,german equivalent1 and where were the huge reservoirs of gas and war chemical which filled those countless shells8 ,krupp1 of ,essen1 loomed large in the mind of every ,allied citizen and soldier4 ,there lay the sinews of war in the making4 ,but the guns were useless without their message4 ,who provided it8 ,a satisfactory answer to this question demands an examination of the great ,german ,i4,g41 the ,interessen ,gemeinschaft1 the world power in organic chemical enterprise1 whose monopoly existence threatened to turn the tide of war against us4 ,this organisation emerges from the war with renewed and greater strength4 ,our splendid but improvised factories drained the vital forces of the nation1 and now lie idle1 while ,german war chemical production fed new life blood and grafted new tissue to the great pre-war factories of the ,i4,g41 which1 if she will1 she can use against us in the future4 ,i do not claim that this ,german combine has at present any direct economic or military policy against world peace4 ,in any case1 the facts must speak for themselves4 ,but the following pages will prove that the mere existence of the complete ,german monopoly1 represented by the forces of the ,i4,g41 however free from suspicion might be the mentality and morals of those directing its activities1 constitutes1 in itself1 a serious menace4 ,it is1 if you will1 a monster camouflaged floating mine in the troubled sea of world peace1 which the forces of reconstruction have left unswept4 ,the existence of this giant monopoly raises vital military and economic questions1 which are1 indeed1 ,the ,riddle of the ,rhine4 ,impersonal ,examination of ,fact4--,in a sound examination of the subject it becomes necessary to examine the activities of our former enemies very closely4 ,even adopting a mild view of the case1 their reputation has not been unattacked1 and is not left untarnished4 ,we1 however1 have no desire to renew such attacks1 but we wish our statement to be coldly reliable4 ,national and international issues are at stake which require a background unprejudiced by war emotion4 ,placed in a similar predicament1 in reporting to his ,government of the methods of ,german economic aggression in the ,united ,states of ,america1 ,mr4 ,mitchell ,palmer1 the ,alien ,property ,custodian1 expressed himself as follows3 ,i do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit of revenge or in retaliation for injuries done to the ,united ,states4 ,i do not want to continue the war after the war4 ,i am for peace4 ,i believe that the great overshadowing result which has come from this war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the peoples of the earth4 ,i would help to make that an absolute certainty by refusing to permit ,germany to prosecute a war after the war4 ,the military arm of her war machine has been palsied by the tremendous hammering of the allied powers4 ,but her territory was not invaded1 and if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact1 rebuild a stable government1 and still have her foreign markets subject to her exploitation1 by means no less foul and unfair than those which she has employed on the field of battle1 we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods1 but with the same purpose that moved her on that fateful day in ,july when she set out to conquer the world4 ,ours is a fair standpoint4 ,let us know the facts of the chemical war into which ,germany impelled us4 ,let us examine its mainsprings1 in conception and action1 see how far they can be explained in terms of pre-war ,germany1 and how far they remain ready to function in the much desired peace which they threaten4 ,if the result be unpleasant1 let us not hide our heads in the sand1 but exercise a wise vigilance1 choose what precautions are available and consistent with our plans for world peace4 ,a ,critical ,point in ,disarmament4--,probably never before in the history of man has ,disarmament figured as such a vitally urgent national and international measure4 ,discussions and official utterances reveal a very disquieting tendency4 ,when compared with the methods1 armament and materials of the war in #aiad1 those of #aiah reveal basic changes which a hundred years of former peace could not have brought about4 ,these developments are not merely of fact1 but they represent the opening of new fields1 visions of possibilities previously undreamed of by the practical soldier4 ,by the concentrated application of electricity1 chemistry1 and other sciences to war two dominating factors have emerged1 whose importance to war1 and danger for world peace1 can only gain momentum with time4 ,the scientific or technical initiative1 the invention of a deadly new chemical1 wireless-directed aeroplane1 or other war appliance and their incidence on war through large scale production in the convertible industries of peace constitute a challenge which1 if unanswered by practical schemes for world disarmament1 will render the latter worse than useless1 by aggravating the danger of sudden decisive attack in an otherwise disarmed world4 ,there is a tendency to ignore this aspect of disarmament4 ,we appear to be thinking in terms of a world still organised for war on #aiad lines4 ,the disbanding of the ,german army and semi-military organisations1 and the reduction of her artillery and small arms seem to occupy all our attention4 ,such1 it might be urged1 is the immediate need2 we can leave the future to find answers to the other problems4 ,this answer is dangerous1 for it ignores the disarmament aspect of what is perhaps the most important development in the modern offensive campaign4 ,we refer to poison gas or chemical warfare4 ,this1 the crux of all disarmament1 is dealt with at some length in the chapters which follow4 ,a curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in certain quarters4 ,there is a tendency among strong adherents to the ideal of world peace to regard themselves as its sole possessors4 ,every thinking civilian and soldier must adhere to such an ideal2 the only point at issue is the method of approaching it4 ,the mere fact that a ,league of ,nations is called into being to attain world peace implies recognition of the fact that a definite mechanism and definite measures are required for the purpose2 this is self-evident4 ,there are those who1 having established their ,league of ,nations1 feel that they can attain chemical peace by merely prohibiting chemical war1 in other words1 they expect their mechanism to achieve its object without functioning1 to attain peace by its mere existence4 ,just as special measures are required to control disarmament in the older branches of warfare1 in the same way special measures1 but not the same measures1 are required to control the chemical peace4 ,chemical peace guaranteed by a mere signature is no peace at all4 ,in a recent ,press utterance we find an appeal to prohibit chemical warfare and to trust the general sentiment of the civilised world to say that the lesson has been learnt in that sense4 ,there is the ,league of ,nations to furnish that sentiment with a mouthpiece and a sanction4 ,we agree1 but to stop there is dangerous1 the most important thing which it must furnish is a mechanism of control1 a check1 or guarantee4 ,this question is one of the most important which confronts us for world peace4 ,it merits the most careful consideration4 ,even responsible and relevant officials who admit that their ,league must do more than issue edicts1 that their mechanism must function1 are ignoring the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose use we wish to limit4 ,this matter will receive later attention4 ,the following pages1 therefore1 are an attempt to represent the salient points in the development of chemical warfare1 its causes1 results1 and future4 ,such an attempt cannot limit itself to merely ,british developments1 and this is not a final detailed memoir of ,british chemical warfare4 ,further1 in considering the future1 we examine another aspect of chemical warfare4 ,facts lead us to believe that it was purely the most open and obvious activity in a whole campaign of chemical aggression which had effective unity of conception and direction long before the war started4 ,need for a ,balanced ,view of ,chemical ,warfare4--,the facts of chemical warfare have probably been less ventilated than those of any other important war development4 ,yet no subject has aroused more general and intense feeling4 ,tanks1 aircraft1 the different campaigns1 enemy memoirs1 and a variety of war subjects1 have received a considerable measure of publicity1 some more than full measure4 ,grave questions are pending in which the chemical aspect of national defence is a prominent factor4 ,however willing the individual concerned1 he cannot make a sound judgment on the brief technical or popular garbled versions which have appeared4 ,one searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements on the question4 ,this may be due in no way to lack of intention1 but to lack of opportunity4 ,therefore1 no excuse is needed for this contribution1 but rather an apology for the obscurity which has so far surrounded the subject4 ,what is the cause of this emotional or almost hysterical background from which a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning to emerge8 ,circumstances are to blame2 the first open act of chemical warfare decided the matter4 ,this event1 the first ,german cloud gas attack at ,ypres1 arriving at the peak of allied indignation against a series of ,german abuses1 in particular with regard to the treatment of prisoners1 left the world aghast at the new atrocity4 ,further1 its use against entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolting4 ,the fact that such a cloud of chlorine would have passed the #aiah armies untouched behind their modern respirators1 could not be known to1 nor appreciated by the relatives of the #aiae casualties4 ,but the emotion and indignation called forth by the first use of gas has survived a period of years1 at the end of which the technical facts would no longer1 of themselves1 justify such feeling4 ,we would hesitate to do anything which might dispel this emotional momentum were we not convinced that1 unaccompanied by knowledge1 it becomes a very grave danger4 ,if we felt that the announcement of an edict was sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an edict4 ,but therein lies the danger4 ,owing to certain technical peculiarities1 which can be clearly revealed by examination of the facts1 it is impossible to suppress chemical warfare in this way4 ,as well try to suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence4 ,but we can take precaution against disease1 and the following examination will show clearly that we can take similar precautions against the otherwise permanent menace of chemical war4 ,further1 backed by such precautions1 a powerful international edict has value4 ,it is1 therefore1 our intention to present a reasoned account of the development of poison gas1 or chemical warfare1 during the recent war4 ,but to leave the matter there would be misleading and culpable1 for1 however interesting the simple facts of the chemical campaign1 they owed their being to a combination of forces1 whose nature and significance for the future are infinitely more important4 ,the chief cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dangerous world distribution of industrial organic chemical forces4 ,unless some readjustment occurs1 this will remain the point faible in world disarmament4 ,we1 therefore1 propose to examine the relationships between chemical industry1 war1 and disarmament4 ,some ,preliminary ,explanation4--,the chemistry of war1 developed under the stress of the poison gas campaign1 is of absorbing chemical and technical interest1 but it has none the less a general appeal4 ,when its apparently disconnected and formidable facts are revealed as an essential part of a tense struggle in which move and counter-move followed swiftly one upon the other1 its appeal becomes much wider4 ,therefore1 in order not to confuse the main issue in the following chapters by entering upon tiresome definitions1 it is proposed to conclude the present chapter by explaining1 simply1 a number of chemical warfare conceptions with which the expert is probably well acquainted4 ,poison ,gas a ,misleading ,term--,poison gas is a misleading term1 and4 our subject is much better described as chemical1 warfare4 ,let us substantiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals which were used4 ,in the first place they were not all gases2 the tendency during the war was towards the use of liquids and solids4 ,even the chemicals which appeared as gases on the field of battle were transported and projected as liquids1 produced by compression4 ,as the poison war developed1 a large number of different chemicals became available for use by the opposing armies4 ,these can he classified1 either according to their tactical use1 or according to their physiological effects on man4 ,the ,british1 ,french1 ,american1 and ,german armies all tended to the final adoption of a tactical classification1 but the ,french emphasised the physiological side4 ,let us use their classification as a basis for a review of the chief chemicals concerned4 ,the ,french ,physiological ,classification2--,asphyxiating ,substances2-- ,toxic ,substances2--,chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating1 toxic1 lachrymatory1 vesicant1 or sternutatory4 ,it is perfectly true that the asphyxiating and toxic substances1 used during the war1 produced a higher percentage of deaths than the other three classes1 but the latter were responsible for many more casualties4 ,the so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect by producing lesions and congestion in the pulmonary system1 causing death by suffocation4 ,the best known substances of this type was chlorine1 employed in the liquid state in cylinders on the occasion of the first ,german gas attack1 but the most formidable were phosgene 7an important substance required in the manufacture of dyes71 diphosgene1 chlor-picrin1 made from bleaching powder and picric acid1 brom-acetone1 which was also a powerful lachrymator1 and diphenylchlorarsine1 known as sneezing gas1 the first sternutatory or sneezing compound to appear on the front in large quantities4 ,the toxic compounds were so called because of their specific effect upon particular parts of the organism such as1 for example1 the nervous system4 ,the chief example1 with regard to the military value of which there has been much dispute1 was prussic1 or hydrocyanic1 acid4 ,the ,french had definite evidence of the mortal effect of this compound upon ,german gunners1 but it was doubted by other ,allies whether ,french gas shell produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of military value4 ,it was a kill or cure compound1 for recovery was rapid from any concentration which did not produce death4 ,a prominent ,cambridge physiologist1 in the heat of the controversy on this matter1 made a very brave and self-sacrificing experiment4 ,he entered a chamber of prussic acid which was sufficiently concentrated to cause the death of other animals which were present4 ,they were removed in time1 and he escaped because the concentration was not a mortal one for man4 ,this was1 in a sense1 an experimentum crucis and1 although it did not disprove the extreme danger of prussic acid1 if employed in high concentrations1 it showed1 on the other hand1 that it was difficult to gauge the military value by field experiments2 battle results were necessary4 ,the ,germans' disappointment with the use of arsenic compounds confirms this need for battle evidence4 ,lachrymators4--,there is hardly need to dwell on the next class1 the lachrymator4 ,these compounds were employed on a large scale to produce temporary blindness by lachrymation1 or weeping4 ,we give later some interesting examples of their use on the front4 ,it is an arresting thought that even as early as #ahhg ,professor ,baeyer1 the renowned organic chemist of ,munich1 in his lectures to advanced students1 included a reference to the military value of these compounds4 ,vesicant or ,blistering ,compounds4--,it was the introduction of the fourth1 the vesicant class1 which revealed1 more than any other enemy move1 the great possibilities inherent in chemical warfare4 ,these compounds1 the chief of which was mustard gas1 produced vesicant1 or skin burning1 effects1 which1 although rarely mortal1 were sufficient to put a man out of action for a number of months4 ,mustard gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early as #ahfj4 ,victor ,meyer1 the famous ,german chemist1 described the substance in #ahhd1 indicating its skin-blistering effects4 ,there is evidence of further investigation in ,german laboratories a year before the outbreak of war1 and whatever the motive for this work1 we know that mustard gas must have received the early attention of the ,german ,war ,office1 for it was approved and in production early in #aiag4 ,although the ,medecin aide-major ,chevalier of the ,french services drew attention to its importance in #aiaf1 the ,french had no serious thought of using mustard gas1 and did not realise its possibilities until the ,german battle experiment of ,july1 #aiag4 ,it is not generally known1 however1 that other vesicant compounds were employed1 notably some of the arsenic compounds1 and the ,germans were researching on substances of this nature which gave great promise of success4 ,mustard gas provides a striking example of the organic way in which chemical warfare is bound up with the dye industry4 ,the compounds required for its manufacture were those which had been made on a large scale by the ,i4,g4 for the production of indigo4 ,world indigo monopoly meant possession of a potential mustard gas surprise on the outbreak of war4 ,sneezing or ,sternutatory ,substances4--,the last class1 the sternutatory substances1 produced the familiar sneezing effect which was accompanied by intense pain and irritation of the nose1 throat1 and respiratory channels4 ,they were mostly arsenic compounds and were not only sternutatory but also toxic1 producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning4 ,the ,tactical ,classification4--,from the point of view of our account of chemical warfare1 however1 the physiological classification of these substances is not so important as the tactical and1 indeed1 once this grouping of the substances is understood1 a profound knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary4 ,persistent ,substances4--,two main classes exist from the tactical ,point of view4 ,there are those persistent substances which remain for a long time on the soil or on the object on which they are sprayed by shell1 while retaining their dangerous effect4 ,mustard gas was the chief example1 but some of the lachrymators were just as persistent4 ,by their use it is possible to render ground uninhabitable or ineffective for military movement4 ,the combination of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard gas rendered it a powerful military factor4 ,non-,persistent ,substances4--,on the other hand1 there are the relatively volatile substances1 such as phosgene1 which can be used immediately before an attack4 ,the chief sternutatory compound1 diphenylchlorarsine1 although not volatile1 could also be used in this way1 for1 being a solid and in a very finely pulverised state1 its presence on the ground was not a distinct danger1 and it invited chemical decomposition4 ,penetrants4--,the ,germans introduced an additional tactical group4 ,this comprised pulverised substances able to penetrate the mask on account of their existence as minute particles4 ,the ,germans expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell markings4 ,the familiar ,green ,cross represented the slightly persistent1 volatile1 lethal compounds1 such as phosgene and diphosgene4 ,the ,german gunner had no need to know the content of his gas shell so long as he could identify the cross4 ,yellow ,cross1 representing mustard gas1 was the most highly persistent type4 ,it is interesting to speculate whether a new persistent compound1 whose military value was due to some other property than the blistering1 would have been grouped under ,yellow ,cross4 ,logically1 this should have been done4 ,blue ,cross covered the arsenic group of compounds1 which were non-persistent and were expected to penetrate the mask4 ,so strong was this tactical conception that the ,allies were on the verge of adopting a uniform shell marking based on this principle throughout their armies4 ,special ,gas ,weapons and ,appliances4--,it is a popular misconception that gas was only discharged from cylinders in huge clouds1 or used as artillery shell4 ,a number of special weapons developed1 which were particularly adapted for gas4 ,thus1 the ,livens projector1 which was a great ,allied advance1 produced a gas cloud a long distance from the point of discharge1 while the ,stokes and other short range guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of gas shell4 ,the primary conceptions with regard to protection have been brought home to so many1 through the fact that the mask was a part of the equipment of every soldier1 that we need not dwell on them here4 ,it is not generally realised1 however1 that every modification introduced by either side was a vital and direct counter to some enemy move planned to render the protection of the opponent ineffective4 ,gas ,shell4--,a word is necessary to define the use of gas shell4 ,the point which must be realised is that gas1 and in particular gas shell1 fulfilled a special purpose in warfare1 from which it was much more suitable than explosives4 ,the use for neutralising batteries1 cross roads1 and rendering whole areas uninhabitable1 is developed fully in our reference to the great ,german attacks in #aiah4 ,with this brief sketch to clear the ground1 we can embark more freely upon the account of chemical warfare which follows4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,german ,,surprise ,ypres1 ,april1 #aiae1 to the ,somme1 ,august1 #aiaf4 ,the ,first ,cloud ,gas ,attack4--,the critical factor of surprise in war was never nearer decisive success than on ,april #bbnd1 #aiae4 ,of this1 the occasion of the first ,german gas attack at ,ypres1 ,field-,marshal ,sir ,j4 ,d4 ,p4 ,french ,stated3 ,following a heavy bombardment1 the enemy attacked the ,french ,division at about #e p4m41 using asphyxiating gases for the first time4 ,aircraft reported that at about #e p4m4 thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the ,german trenches between ,langemarck and ,bixschoote4 ,what follows almost defies description4 ,the effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the ,french ,division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all4 ,it was at first impossible for any one to realise what had actually happened4 ,the smoke and fumes hid everything from sight1 and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition1 and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned1 together with about fifty guns4 ,i wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the ,french ,division for this unfortunate incident4 ,the ,element of ,surprise4--,the enemy just missed colossal success rendered possible by the use of an entirely new war method2 one contrary to engagements entered into by them at the ,hague ,convention4 ,there were elements in this first gas attack which were absent even from the situation created by our first use of tanks4 ,unfamiliarity amongst the troops1 or the staff1 for that matter1 created an atmosphere of unparalleled confusion4 ,men attempted to protect themselves by burying their mouths and nostrils in the loose earth4 ,those chemists1 on the spot1 not immediately struck down1 made frantic efforts to bring up supplies of any suitable and available chemical or material which might assist resistance and movement in the affected zone4 ,paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and brave actions which characterised the ,allied resistance1 we cannot ignore the fact that morale must have been very severely shaken locally1 and that a general disquiet and uneasiness must have permeated the whole front until measures were known to be effectively in progress1 not only for protection1 but for retaliation4 ,the enemy had but to exploit the attack fully to break through to the channel ports1 but failed to do so4 ,the master mind behind this new and deadly attack was not1 let us remember1 that of a soldier4 ,it was very strongly rumoured that this monstrous conception and its execution were due to one or1 at the most1 two renowned ,german ,professors4 ,the first hammer blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two-party conspiracy1 led by world-famous scientists and the powerful ,i4,g4 with the ,german army unconvinced but expectant1 little more than a willing dupe4 ,lord ,kitchener's ,protest4--,in his spirited protest in the ,house of ,lords1 ,lord ,kitchener stated3 ,the ,germans have1 in the last week1 introduced a method of placing their opponents hors de combat by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases1 and they employ these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack1 according to the rules of war1 might have otherwise failed4 ,on this subject ,i would remind your ,lordships that ,germany was a signatory to the following article in the ,hague ,convention3 ,the ,contracting ,powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases4' ,this protest circulated amongst neutrals prompted numerous attempts at vindication in the ,german ,press4 ,in several cases we find important newspapers arguing that the ,german attack was not contrary to the ,hague ,convention1 while others admitted the breach1 but claimed that the ,germans merely followed ,allied example4 ,the main technical excuse was that the effect of the ,german gas was merely stupefying 7,colniche ,zeitung1 ,june1 #aiae74 ,it is incredible that the ,german nation was1 or could allow itself to be1 so hoodwinked4 ,scientific ,germany was certainly aware of the true nature of the gases used4 ,even scientific neutrals in ,berlin at the outbreak of war1 and during the ensuing winter1 were aware of the ,german poison gas work1 which commenced1 in an organised way1 almost as soon as war broke out4 ,the ,germans have argued that they only entertained the idea of gas after ,allied use4 ,the facts revealed below are a sufficient answer4 ,whatever legal arguments may be involved1 there is no doubt as to ,german intention4 ,we do not wish to enter into a comprehensive examination of the legal aspect of the first use of cloud and shell gas by ,germany4 ,whatever complicated arguments may turn upon the strict reading of a phrase in the records of the ,hague ,convention1 we have no doubt whatever as to the desires and intentions of the ,assembly1 and we regard ,germany 7and the ,allies7 as morally engaged not to venture upon the series of chemical enterprises which she openly commenced with the ,ypres cloud attack4 ,the ,versailles ,treaty also renders fruitless any such discussion4 ,article #aga1 accepted by ,germany1 is deliberately based on her breach of ,international ,convention4 ,german ,preparations4--,a significant phrase occurs in the ,field-,marshal's despatch4 ,the brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the ,germans must have harboured these designs for a long time4 ,this is a most important point4 ,it was argued by many generous and fairminded people in ,april1 #aiae1 that the ,german use of gas was the result of a sudden decision1 only arrived at in a desperate effort to terminate the war4 ,this point of view would give us maximum hope for the future4 ,but the actual truth8 ,what do we know about ,german preparations1 and how far back do they date8 ,any preparations which occurred must have covered research on the compounds to be employed and on the protection required for the ,german troops1 their training for the cloud attack1 and the design and production of the special appliances to be used4 ,finally1 the production of the chemicals themselves had to be faced4 ,research4--,we have obtained an insight into the ,german research preparations1 which leaves no doubt as to their intention4 ,there is evidence that the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,institute and the physico-chemical institute near by were employed for this purpose as early as ,august1 #aiad4 ,reliable authority exists for the statement that soon after this date they were working with cacodyl oxide and phosgene1 both well known before the war for their very poisonous nature1 for use1 it was believed1 in hand grenades4 ,our quotations are from a statement by a neutral then working at the ,institute4 ,we could hear the tests that ,professor ,haber was carrying out at the back of the ,institute1 with the military authorities1 who in their steel-grey cars came to ,haber's ,institute every morning4 ,the work was pushed day and night1 and many times ,i saw activity in the building at eleven o'clock in the evening4 ,it was common knowledge that ,haber was pushing these men as hard as he could4 ,sachur was ,professor ,haber's assistant4 ,one morning there was a violent explosion in the room in which most of this war work was carried out4 ,the room was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic oxide4 ,the janitors began to clear the room by a hose and discovered ,professor ,sachur4 ,he was very badly hurt and died soon after4 ,after that accident ,i believe the work on cacodyl oxide and phosgene was suspended and ,i believe that work was carried out on chlorine or chlorine compounds4 ,there were seven or eight men working in the ,institute on these problems1 but we heard nothing more until ,haber went to the ,battle of ,ypres4 ,rumours to this effect circulated in #aiae4 ,production4--,preparations1 for production can easily be imagined4 ,the ,germans first used chlorine for cloud gas1 and certain lachrymators for shell4 ,the chlorine was readily available4 ,at about this time ,british liquid chlorine capacity had a maximum daily output of about one ton1 while along the ,rhine alone the production was more than forty times greater4 ,the question of ,german chlorine production was1 therefore1 already solved4 ,the lachrymators were mainly raw materials and intermediates of the dye industry submitted to a process1 the technique of which the ,german dye factories readily mastered4 ,here1 again1 production presented no real difficulties4 ,cylinders were also probably available from the industry4 ,field ,preparations4--,there remains the last question of gas attack technique and personnel4 ,those of us who remember the difficulties involved in creating our own organisation in the summer of #aiae have no illusions on the question of ,german preparation4 ,giving the ,germans every credit for their technical and military efficiency1 some months must have been occupied in establishing and training the special companies required1 and in arriving at a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances4 ,schwarte's book1 ,die ,technik ,im ,weltkriege1#a tells us specially organised and trained troops were required for the purpose4 ,prisoners taken later revealed the ,german methods4 ,gas officers and ,n4,c4,o4's1 after making a careful survey of the front line trench1 organised the digging of deep narrow trenches at suitable places below the surface of the main trench1 just underneath the parapet4 ,the heavy gas cylinders1 weighing as much as ninety pounds1 were carried to the front line by the unfortunate infantry4 ,the discharge valves were carefully protected by domes which screwed on to the cylinder4 ,the latter were introduced into the holes1 tops flush with the trench bottom1 and covered by a board on which reposed the ,salzdecke1 a kind of long bag stuffed with some such material as peat moss and soaked in potash solution to absorb any slight gas leakages4 ,three layers of sandbags were built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder from shell fragments and to form a firestep for the infantry4 ,this concealed the cylinders so efficiently that1 in our own trenches1 ,i have often found the new occupants of a sector ignorant of the presence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps4 ,on the favourable night the dome was removed and a lead pipe was connected to the cylinder and directed over the parapet into ,no ,man's ,land1 with the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag4 ,the pioneers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket signal1 at which the infantry retired to leave the front line free for the pioneers1 who not only ran the risk of gassing from defective appliances but were subjected to almost immediate violent bombardment from the opposing artillery4 ,when surprise was complete artillery retaliation was very late in developing4 ,this gives a faint idea of the elaborate preparations required4 ,they must have been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first occasion of cloud gas attack4 #a ,die ,technik ,im ,weltkriegre4 ,publisher3 ,mittler1 ,berlin1 #aibj4 ,german ,opinion of ,results4--,we can now regard the chlorine attack of ,april #bb1 #aiae1 as the first and successful result of a huge ,german experiment on a new method of war1 the pioneer work of which actually began at 7if not before7 the outbreak of war4 ,quoting again from ,schwarte3 ,g4,h4,q4 considered the attack near ,ypres to he a successful experiment4 ,the impression created was colossal and the result not inconsiderable1 although it was not fully utilised from the tactical point of view4 ,it was obvious that we had gained a great advantage2 the enemy was not sufficiently prepared with defensive measures against gas4 ,indeed1 we were absolutely unprepared1 so much so1 that after the ,german attack nearly every household in ,england contributed to our first inefficient and improvised mask4 ,is not this suggestion of our preparation a deliberate attempt to deceive the ,german public8 ,they seem to have been as easily hoodwinked on gas questions as on many others4 ,germany ,prompted by ,production ,monopoly4--,an important point arises4 ,the ,germans failed to exploit their initial success4 ,this is not very surprising4 ,whatever the opinion of the chemists behind the movement1 the ,german ,general ,staff must have retained the elements of precaution in its opinion4 ,it could not have taken for granted the formidable success which the chemists proved justified in prophesying4 ,this being so1 we can fairly assume that had there been very serious difficulties in carrying out this huge war experiment it might never have materialised4 ,such difficulties might have been found in production4 ,but as we have seen1 the question of production was the most easily forged link in the chain of events which led to the use of poison gas by ,germany4 ,in other words1 this monopoly in ease of production was an inducement to the ,germans to proceed with their experiment4 ,the earliest ,german cloud gas attacks established beyond a doubt the enormous value of gas against unprotected troops1 in other words1 its value as a complete surprise4 ,these conditions were again approached in the first ,german use of mustard gas4 ,the most telling examples will probably be found in the future1 unless the correct precautions are taken4 ,the whole history of chemical warfare during the war was a struggle for this initiative1 a struggle between gas protection and aggression4 ,standard ,uses for ,gas2--,gas ,shell4--,but gas found an important use besides that of strategic surprise4 ,it became a standard weapon for certain clear and definite tactical purposes4 7,for some of these1 indeed1 the factor of local surprise was important47 ,we refer to the specific use of gas shell for the neutralisation of batteries1 roads1 and areas1 and to the use of cloud gas1 prior to offensives for the production of casualties1 and wearing down of reserves4 ,the ,ypres attack had not by any means established the use of gas for such purposes4 ,there is no doubt that1 from this point of view1 the experimental period carried on for many months4 ,naturally1 in some respects1 there was always an experimental element in the use of gas4 ,further ,german ,cloud ,attacks4--,two days after the first cloud gas attack the ,germans launched a second against the ,canadians1 with similar results4 ,quoting from official despatches3 ,on the early morning of the #bdth a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell fire1 and a most determined attack was delivered against our position east of ,ypres4 ,the real attack commenced at #b4de a4m4 ,a large proportion of the men were asleep1 and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators4 ,these latter were hurriedly improvised after the first ,ypres attack4 ,hill #fj4--;,four more attacks occurred in ,may1 notably in the region of ,hill #fj4 ,on ,may #ast another attempt to recapture ,hill #fj was supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused nearly all the men along a front of about #djj yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes4 ,a second and more severe gas attack under much more favourable weather conditions enabled the enemy to recapture this position on ,may #eth4 ,the enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use of asphyxiating gas4 ,it was only a few days later that the means which have since proved so effective of counteracting these methods of making war were put into practice4 7,official despatches1 #aiae47 ,the despatch further described how violent bombardments1 the confusion and demoralisation from the first great gas surprise1 and subsequent almost daily gas attacks1 prevented the proper reorganisation of the line in question4 ,origin of ,german ,gas ,shell4--,after ,may a long period elapsed during which the ,germans confined their war chemical activities on the front to the use of gas shell4 ,schwarte's book describes their origin as follows3--,the main idea which influenced the ,,first construction of a ,german projectile containing chemicals 7,october1 #aiad7 was that of adding to the charge an irritant substance1 which would be pulverised by the explosion of the projectile1 and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud of dust4 ,this cloud would hover in the air and have such an effect upon the mucous membranes that1 for the time being1 the enemy would be unable to fight in such an atmosphere4 ,by altering the construction of the #aj4e c4m4 universal shell for light field howitzers1 the ,n4i' projectile was created in the form of #aj4e c4m4 shrapnel1 the bullets of which were embedded in a sternutatory powder 7double salts of dianisidine7 well stamped down1 instead of an explosive4 ,by means of the propelling charge and the grinding effect of the bullets1 this powder was pulverised on explosion4 ,the irritation caused was not very intense1 lasted only a short1 time and affected only a limited area and therefore it was of no importance in the field1 but the initial step had been taken4 ,liquid irritants soon came to the front--xylyl bromide and xylylene dibromide--a mixture used later under the name of ,t4 stuff1 bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone1 later introduced under the name of ,b4 stuff and ,bn4 stuff4 ,during experiments they gave such improved results in intensity1 in power of lasting and of affecting an increased area1 that practical results in the field were ensured4 ,the use of these liquids in projectiles1 however1 was contrary to the accepted idea with regard to artillery1 according to which liquid materials should not be used for ballistic reasons4 ,specially arranged shoots were required to prove that the projectiles in use in the ,german ,army could also be used from the ballistic point of view when filled with liquids4 ,in this way the first effective ,german gas projectile1 the ,t4 shell for heavy field howitzers1 was evolved 7,january1 #aiae74 ,early ,german ,gas ,shell4--,the first important use of ,german gas in shell was that of brominated and chlorinated organic compounds1 ,t4 and ,k4 stuffs4 ,schwarte's book tells us the use of these projectiles was continually hampered by lack of understanding on the part of the troops which it was difficult to overcome4 ,in the summer of #aiae it was practically in the ,argonne alone that any considerable results were attained by the new projectiles4 ,and he describes how the first elements of the new gas tactics were developed there4 ,a ,successful ,experiment4--,the development of the gas shell1 the use of which1 generally speaking1 is independent of1 but co-ordinated with1 wind direction1 may have received stimulus from the fact that the prevailing wind1 so important for cloud gas1 favoured the ,allies4 ,it is clear that this period was an experimental one1 but we know that by ,august1 #aiae1 ,german military opinion had crystallised out to the extent of formulating certain rules1 issued as ,falkenhayn's orders for the employment of gas shell4 ,these early orders defined two types of shell1 one persistent1 for harassing purposes1 and the other non-persistent1 to be used immediately before an attack4 ,they specified the number of shell to be used for a given task4 ,but in this they were unsound and it is clear that the ,germans had an exaggerated opinion of what could be achieved with a small number of shell4 ,they adhered too closely to high explosive practice4 ,various documents reveal the fact that the ,germans were much more satisfied with their gas tactics than they would have been had they possessed information with regard to our losses from their shell4 ,they attached insufficient importance to the value of surprise and highly concentrated shoots1 and had a mistaken idea of the actual specific aggressive value of their early types4 ,lachrymators at ,loos1 #aiae4--;,germany commenced the manufacture of lachrymators1 crude brominated xylene or brominated ketones1 early in1 or perhaps before #aiae4 ,these substances caused great inconvenience through temporary blindness by lachrymation1 but were not highly toxic4 ,in ,june1 #aiae1 however1 they began to produce lethal gas for shell4 ,falkenhayn's orders for the use of gas shell1 mentioned above1 although they represent by no means the best final practice1 were definite evidence that gas had come to stay with the ,germans4 ,the writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachrymators in the ,loos ,battle4 ,batteries in the open1 under the crest near the ,lens road1 were in position so that the wind direction practically enfiladed them1 sweeping along from the direction of ,le ,rutoire farm4 ,gas from ,german shell1 borne on the wind1 was continually enveloping the line of batteries1 but they remained in action4 ,it was on this occasion while watching the bursting gas shells from the outskirts of the mining village of ,philosophe that ,major-,general ,wing was killed outright by a high explosive shell4 ,these gas shells certainly did not achieve the results which the ,germans expected1 although they were not without effect4 ,demolished villages1 the only shelter for troops in a desolate area1 have been rendered uninhabitable for days by a concentrated lachrymator enemy shoot of less than one hour4 ,again1 walking into gas pockets up a trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow across the eyes1 the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and sudden4 ,the great inconvenience which was occasioned to parties engaged in the routine of trench warfare1 on ration or engineering duties1 and the effect on movement in the rear after an assault1 taken cumulatively1 represented a big military factor4 ,the ,flammenwerfer4--,there can be no doubt that this period marks increasing ,german willingness to live up to their blood and iron theories of war1 and1 in ,july1 #aiae1 another device with a considerable surprise value was used against us3 the flame projector1 or the ,german flammenwerfer4 ,field-,marshal ,sir ,john ,french signalled the entry of this new weapon as follows3 ,since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet4 ,thus supported1 an attack was made on the trenches of the ,second ,army at ,hooge1 on the ,menin ,road1 early on #cjth ,july4 ,most of the infantry occupying these trenches were driven back1 but their retirement was due far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning liquid than to the actual damage inflicted4 ,gallant endeavours were made by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches4 ,these1 however1 proving unsuccessful and costly1 a new line of trenches was consolidated a short distance farther back4 ,although this weapon continued to be used right through the campaign1 it did not exert that influence which first acquaintance with it might have led one to conclude4 ,at the same time1 there exists a mistaken notion that the flame projector was a negligible quantity4 ,this may be fairly true of the huge non-portable types1 but it is certainly not true of the very efficient portable flame projector which was the form officially adopted by the ,german1 and later by the ,french1 armies4 ,on a number of occasions ,germany gained local successes purely owing to the momentary surprise effect of the flame projector1 and the ,french made some use of it for clearing out captured trench systems over which successful waves of assault had passed4 ,further1 the idea of flame projection is not without certain possibilities for war4 ,german ,phosgene ,clouds4--,germany had by no means abandoned cloud gas1 however4 ,she had merely been planning to regain what the ,ypres attacks had lost for her1 the cloud gas initiative4 ,we have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention of the ,german research organisation in the first months of the war4 ,once alive to its great importance1 they must have strained all efforts to obtain an efficient method of using it at the front4 ,phosgene was remarkable for its peculiar delayed effect4 ,relatively small quantities1 inhaled and followed by vigorous or even normal exercise1 led to sudden collapse and fatal effects sometimes more than twenty-four hours after the attack4 ,the case of a ,german prisoner in a ,first ,army raid after a ,british gas attack was often quoted on the front4 ,he passed through the various ,intelligence headquarters as far as the ,army1 explaining the feeble effect of the ,british gas and his own complete recovery4 ,but he died from delayed action within twenty-four hours of his last interrogation4 ,this effect imposed strict conditions of discipline1 and men merely suspected of exposure to phosgene were compelled to report as serious casualties and carried as such even from the front line4 ,the successful development of the phosgene cloud probably arrived too late for the ,ypres attacks1 and a variety of reasons must have led to the postponement of its use until such time as it might once again give ,germany the real initiative4 ,accordingly1 on ,december #ai1 #aiae1 a formidable cloud gas attack was made on the north-east of the ,ypres salient1 using a mixture of phosgene and chlorine in a very high concentration4 ,fortunately1 by this time we had established an anti-gas organisation1 which had forestalled the production of cloud phosgene by special modifications in the ,british respirator4 ,the conditions were similar to those of ,april #bbnd1 #aiae4 ,instead of the first use of cloud gas1 we had the first use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud4 ,in both cases the ,germans reckoned on our lack of protection1 correctly in the first case1 but incorrectly in the second4 ,in both cases they were sure that great difficulties in production would meet our attempts at retaliation4 ,in general this proved true1 but in this case and increasingly throughout the war1 they reckoned without ,allied adaptability4 ,the ,french development of phosgene manufacture was indeed remarkable4 ,very interesting light is thrown on this attack by ,major ,barley1 ,d4,s4,o41 ,chemical ,adviser to the ,british ,second ,army4 ,it appears that in ,november1 #aiae1 the ,french captured a prisoner who had attended a gas school in one of the factories of the ,i4,g4 ,here lecturers explained that a new gas was to be used against the ,british forces1 many thousands of casualties were expected1 and an attack would follow1 which1 correcting the errors of the effort at ,ypres1 would lead to the capture of the ,channel ports4 ,efforts were at once made to obtain information on gas preparation by the ,germans in front of the ,british sectors4 ,in this way a sergeant-major was captured on the morning of ,december #afth1 and he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders were installed4 ,about #ce1jjj ,british troops were found to be in the direct line of the gas1 but owing to the timely warning and to the protection which had recently been adopted1 we experienced very few casualties4 ,the ,germans had prepared a huge infantry attack1 and used a new type of gas shell on this occasion4 ,german troops massing must have received huge casualties owing to our preparation and the failure of their gas attack4 ,the last ,german cloud attack on the ,british front occurred on ,august #h1 #aiaf4 ,there were later attacks against the ,french1 but the ,germans were replacing the cloud method by other methods which they considered more suitable4 ,these will be discussed later on1 when considering our own reaction against the chemical offensive4 ,gas and the ,eastern ,theatre4--,the ,german surprise was not limited to activities on the ,western front4 ,in fact1 apart from the first ,ypres attack1 cloud gas probably reaped more casualties in the ,east against ,russia4 ,we learn from ,schwarte's book3 ,from reliable descriptions we know that our gas troops caused an unusual amount of damage to the enemy--especially in the ,east-- with very little expenditure of effort4 ,the special battalion formed by ,austria-,hungary was1 unfortunately1 of no special importance for various reasons4 ,had the nature of the ,russian campaign been different1 with a smaller front1 and nearer critical objectives to the front of attack1 we have no doubt that gas would have assumed enormous importance in the ,east4 ,russia1 even more feebly organised for production than ourselves1 would have been at a tremendous disadvantage1 both from the point of view of protection and of the retention of satisfactory morale by retaliation4 ,conclusion4--,this1 then1 was the period of the ,german surprise1 during which the first big shock occurred1 and which promised most success for further attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive protection by the ,allies4 ,looking at the matter in a very broad way1 ignoring the moral and legal aspects of the case1 we can describe this period as an example of brilliant chemical opportunism4 ,according to plan or otherwise1 conditions for this experiment were ripe in ,germany as in no other country4 ,overcoming whatever prejudices may have existed1 the ,german authorities realised this1 seized the opportunity1 and very nearly succeeded4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,allied ,,reaction ,loos1 ,september1 #aiae1 to ,ypres1 ,july1 #aiag4 ,the ,need of ,retaliation4--,the conclusive sign of the ,allied reaction to the ,german poison gas attack appeared at the battle of ,loos4 ,owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating gas in their attacks on our positions1 says ,field-,marshal ,french in his despatch of ,october #ae1 #aiae1 ,i have been compelled to resort to similar methods1 and a detachment was organised for this purpose1 which took part in the operations commencing on the #beth ,september for the first time4 ,five months thus elapsed before retaliation4 ,from a military point of view their can be no doubt as to the wisdom1 in fact the absolute necessity1 of using gas in order to reply to the many ,german attacks of this nature4 ,the question of morale was bound up in this retaliation4 ,had the ,germans continued their chemical attacks in variety and extent as they did1 and had it been realised that for some reason or other we were not able to retaliate in kind1 none but the gravest consequences could have resulted with regard to morale4 ,it must be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and shell gas by the ,germans was of local incidence1 when compared with its tremendous use along the whole of the front in the later stages of the war4 ,first ,signs4--,our preparatory period was one of feverish1 if somewhat unco-ordinated1 activity4 ,the production of a protective appliance1 the gas mask1 was vital4 ,this development will be considered later4 ,allied chemical warfare organisations arose1 to become an important factor in the later stages of the war4 ,the history of ,allied gas organisation is one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare represented a new weapon with new possibilities1 new specific uses1 and new requirements from the rear4 ,its beginnings are seen in the ,english and ,french ,scientific ,advisory ,committees appointed to examine the new ,german method4 ,one could always trace an element of reluctance1 however1 in ,allied development1 signs that each move was forced upon us by some new ,german surprise4 ,we find the other extreme1 the logical outcome of war experience1 in the completely independent ,chemical ,warfare ,service now actually adopted in the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,this is dealt with in a separate chapter4 ,the decision to retaliate once made1 our difficulties commenced4 ,we required gas1 weapons1 and methods for its use1 trained personnel1 and the association of certain scientific with military standards without losing the field efficiency of the latter4 ,the ,german staff found this in their co-operation with eminent scientists1 notably ,professor ,haber4 ,without drawing invidious distinctions between pre-war military and public appreciation of chemical science in ,england and ,germany1 it would be merely untrue to state that the ,germans were not in a position of advantage in this respect4 ,however1 chemical mobilisation and co-operation proceeded sufficiently rapidly to provide us with personnel and material for the ,loos attack4 ,the assembly and organisation of personnel occurred in three directions4 ,in the first place the ,royal ,society had already begun to mobilise prominent scientists for other war purposes4 ,in the second place1 different formations in the field1 realising the need for specialist treatment of the gas question1 after the first ,german attack1 created staff appointments for certain chemists chosen from infantry regiments and other formations on the front4 ,thirdly1 men were collected at a depot in ,france to form the nucleus of the offensive gas troops4 ,for this purpose chemists were specially enrolled and chosen men from infantry and other front line units were added4 ,early gas attacks and gas organisation did not appear to justify the immobilisation of so much chemical talent in the offensive gas troops1 when chemists were needed all over ,england for munition production so vital to war4 ,but later events justified the mobilisation and military training of these specialists4 ,the expansion of the advisory and offensive organisations at the front necessitated a large number of officers1 whose chemical training was of great value4 ,it is difficult to see where they would have been found had they not been mobilised with the ,special ,companies4 ,moreover1 their offensive and battle experience gained with the latter was of great value4 ,six or seven weeks' training witnessed the conversion of a few hundred men of the above type into one or two so called ,special ,companies4 ,the spirit and work of these men in the ,loos attack cannot be spoken of too highly4 ,the ,loos ,attack1 ,september1 #aiae4--,the ,field-,marshal bears testimony to its success as follows3 ,although the enemy was known to have been prepared for such reprisals1 our gas attack met with marked success1 and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units1 of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches4 ,the men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness2 and ,i feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare4 ,there is evidence1 however1 that this early attack1 inefficient as it appeared to be to participants1 met with considerable success4 ,schwarte's book tells us3 ,the ,english succeeded in releasing gas clouds on a large scale4 ,their success on this occasion was due to the fact that they took us by surprise4 ,our troops refused to believe in the danger and were not sufficiently adept in the use of defensive measures as prescribed by ,g4,h4,q4 ,on the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks later1 at the storming of the ,hohenzollern redoubt1 ,sergeant-,major ,dawson1 in charge of a sector of gas emplacements in the front line trench1 won the ,victoria ,cross4 ,the ,german reply to our bombardment was very severe and under stress of it a battery of our cylinders1 either through a direct hit or faulty connections1 began to pour gas into our own trenches4 ,in order to prevent panic and casualties among our own troops at this critical time1 a few minutes before zero1 the moment of assault1 ,sergeant-,major ,dawson climbed on to the parapet under a hail of shell1 rifle1 and machine-gun fire1 and1 hauling up the cylinders in question1 carried them to a safe distance into the poisoned atmosphere of ,no ,man's ,land and ensured their complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bullet4 ,in addition to the ,hohenzollern attack cloud gas was used in ,december1 #aiae1 in the region of ,givenchy4 ,the ,somme ,battle1 #aiaf4--,my impression as an eyewitness and participator1 however1 was that the real ,british gas offensive began after1 and as a result of1 the ,loos experience4 ,material1 organisation1 and numbers of personnel1 both at the front and at home1 co-operation with staffs and tactical conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute largely to the efficiency of preparations for the ,somme offensive in ,july1 #aiaf4 ,during the early months of #aiaf1 a ,special ,brigade was created by expanding the four ,special ,companies1 and the #d-;inch ,stokes mortar was adopted1 training being vigorously pursued4 ,as many as #aaj cloud gas discharges1 mainly of a phosgene mixture1 occurred during the ,somme battle1 and evidence of their success is seen in ,german reports4 ,these successes were due not only to the magnitude of our operations1 but to the carefully developed cloud attack tactics which aimed at obtaining maximum results from the gas employed4 ,the factor of surprise governed all other considerations4 ,attacks occurred at night and depended for success upon the concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the given sector for a short1 sharp discharge under the best wind conditions4 ,there is abundant evidence of our success in these attacks4 ,probably the most marked feature of the captured documents or of prisoners' statements during the later stages of the ,somme battle was the continual reference to the deadly effect of ,british cloud gas4 ,the captured letter of a ,german soldier writing home stated3 ,since the beginning of ,july an unparalleled slaughter has been going on4 ,not a day passes but the ,english let off their gas waves at one place or another4 ,i will give you only one instance of this gas2 men #g and #h kilometres behind the front line became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud1 and its effects are felt #ab kilometres behind the front4 ,it is deadly stuff4 ,the accuracy of this reference to the long range effect of our gas clouds is borne out in a number of other statements4 ,for example1 we learnt from a prisoner examined by the ,french3 ,the men were thrown into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated4 ,many fell in running to the rear2 a number did not become ill until the next day4 ,vegetation was burnt up to a depth of #h kilometres4 ,again1 prisoners taken at ,maurepas stated that one of the ,english gas attacks was effective #aj kilometres back4 ,there are also marked references to the surprise nature of our gas attacks1 which are an unconscious tribute to the successful tactical developments which have already been referred to1 and also numerous other references to the delayed action of phosgene4 ,the prisoner mentioned above1 taken at ,maurepas1 gave testimony that some were only taken ill after several days1 and one died suddenly two days after1 whilst writing a letter4 ,one prisoner1 pointing to ,les ,ayettes on the map1 stated that about the beginning of ,september when gas came over suddenly in the late evening1 they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden4 ,no one was expecting gas and very few were carrying their masks4 ,another one stated3 ,the attack was a surprise and the cloud came over and passed fairly quickly4 ,the whole thing did not occupy more than ten minutes4 ,more than thirty per cent4 of the battalion was put out of action4 ,finally1 to show what a serious imposition this constant cloud gas attack was upon the ,german ,army1 we will quote from the ,special ,correspondent of the ,vossiches ,zeitung4 ,he said3 ,i devote a special chapter to this plague of our ,somme warriors4 ,it is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they have to struggle with this devilish and intangible foe4 ,he refers to the use of gas shell1 and says3 ,this invisible and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait on all roads leading to the front4 ,in a despatch dated ,december #bcrd1 #aiaf1 from ,field-,marshal ,sir ,douglas ,haig1 ,g4,c4,b41 the situation is ably summarised3 ,the employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction4 ,great fertility of invention has been shown1 and very great credit is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success with which these new arms have been developed and perfected1 and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed in a difficult and dangerous service4 ,the army owes its thanks to the chemists1 physiologists1 and physicists of the highest rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world by surprise4 ,our own experience of the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used1 of the preparations which had to be made for their manufacture1 and of the special training required for the personnel employed1 shows that the employment of such methods by the ,germans was not the result of a desperate decision1 but had been prepared for deliberately4 ,since we have been compelled1 in self-defence1 to use similar methods1 it is satisfactory to be able to record1 on the evidence of prisoners1 of documents captured1 and of our own observation1 that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks1 while the means of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective4 ,one of the causes which leads to a lack of understanding of the chemical weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not1 like those of a huge assault1 obvious to the mere visual observer4 ,a period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate effect of a gas attack was known4 ,it was inspiring to witness the assault of the #ahth ,division near ,montauban on ,july #ast1 #aiaf4 ,but few realised the part played by the preparatory gas attacks in that and other sectors of the line1 in weakening the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves4 ,it is1 therefore1 of great interest to follow up a particular case and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated with some particular attack4 ,the early stages of the ,somme battle were characterised by a number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose of a feint1 and reducing the strength of available reserves4 ,these attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north of the ,somme battle zone1 and they extended as far as the sea4 ,one of them occurred on the #cjth ,august1 #aiaf1 at ,monchy1 between ,arras and ,bapaume4 ,about one thousand cylinders were discharged during the night4 ,the usual careful organisation preceded the attack and it is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common to a large number of these attacks4 ,three ,german regiments were holding the line directly in front of the ,british sector concerned4 ,before ,december1 #aiaf1 the following reliable information was collected from prisoners and confirmed by cross-examination4 ,one ,company of the #bcrd regiment1 was in training and had no gas masks with it4 ,the gas came along quickly and about half the ,company were killed4 ,after that there were more stringent rules about carrying masks4 ,they had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded4 ,another man said that in his ,company no special drill or training was being done1 and a large number of men were put out of action through not being able to adjust their respirators in time4 ,there was no warning1 although after this gas alarms were given by ringing church bells4 ,other prisoners1 from the #fcrd1 regiment1 had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said3 ,the effects of the ,english gas are said to be appalling4 ,collecting information from prisoners belonging to this or that ,company1 and carefully checking by cross-examination1 it is clear that this attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties4 ,reasons for ,british ,cloud ,gas ,success4--,the fact that the ,british persisted with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the ,germans1 after the first surprise1 was due to a curious combination of causes1 quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind4 ,our ,casualties4--,in the first place1 we knew from bitter experience the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack4 ,we knew1 for example1 that in the first attack at ,ypres there were more than #ejjj dead with many more times that number of casualties4 ,on the other hand1 the ,germans1 left to speculate on our casualties1 retained the conviction1 from apparent non-success1 that cloud gas was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop big infantry attacks4 ,quoting from ,schwarte3 ,large gains of ground could hardly be attained by means of an attack which followed the use of gas clouds1 therefore such clouds were soon merely employed as a means of injuring the enemy1 and were not followed up by an attack4 ,this represented ,german policy1 and it lacked vision4 ,they did not realise that their difficulty was the method of forming the cloud1 and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation materialised1 with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction1 the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again be within their reach4 ,exhausting ,preparations for ,cloud ,attack4--,the second reason accounting for the relatively early cessation of ,german cloud attacks is one constantly referred to in the ,german war memoirs4 ,it was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing for such an attack4 ,few people realise what hours of agonised effort were involved in preparing and executing a cloud gas attack4 ,the cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen emplacements in the front line within certain time limits4 ,the carrying in could not be spread over an indefinite period and usually took from two to six nights1 according to the magnitude of the attack and the local difficulties4 ,naturally1 all the work occurred in the dark4 ,picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install #bjjj cylinders on1 say1 a two mile front4 ,these cylinders would have to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line where the roads met the communication trenches4 ,no horse or lorry transport could assemble at such points before dark1 nor be left standing there after dawn4 ,to carry this number of cylinders more than fifty lorries would be required or1 say1 perhaps1 go ,g4,s4 wagons4 ,all the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire4 ,these points would be normally in use for the unloading of rations and trench engineering materials1 etc41 with which cylinder transport would have to be co-ordinated4 ,once arrived at the unloading points1 parties had to be provided for unloading the lorries and for conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench4 ,in a normally difficult trench system1 for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half of communication trench1 at least four men per cylinder are required to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs1 etc4 ,this implies the organisation of more than #hjjj officers and men for the installation1 with a fundamental condition that only small groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time4 ,the installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other activities in the trench system1 and no enemy to harass the work4 ,but to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities was a task which tried the patience1 not only of the ,special ,companies1 who organised1 guided1 and controlled these operations1 but much more so of the ,infantry ,brigades and ,divisions whose dispositions were interfered with1 and who had to provide the men for the work4 ,add to this even more acute difficulties4 ,the front line trench is nothing but a series of traverses1 thus to avoid the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire4 ,a straight trench is a death-trap4 ,but to carry hundreds of pole-slung cylinders1 already weighing as lead1 round traverses on a dark night1 is a feat requiring superhuman endurance4 ,therefore many carries finished with a hundred yards over the top through the parados wire1 to the near locality of the appropriate emplacement in the front line4 ,this last carry was critical2 a false step1 the clatter of falling metal1 meant drawing the fire of some curious and alert ,german machine gunner4 ,the sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy ,very lights imposed instantaneous immobility4 ,yet all the time tired men were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire4 ,but the spirit of the infantry in this work1 as in all they undertook1 is to their everlasting credit4 ,these tasks were an enemy challenge and they accepted it successfully1 albeit with much cursing4 ,the work was indeed beyond description and the country1 colonial1 and ,london troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically in their own peculiar way4 ,think again of the need of systematic wind observation along the whole front of attack1 the disorganisation and gas alert conditions imposed on the favourable night1 the possibility of postponement1 and we can only draw one conclusion4 ,there must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance4 ,there is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war4 ,later1 however1 when they realised the enemy casualties that were being created by the gas1 and what a large part it was taking in the war of attrition1 the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished4 ,further1 when the projector arrived to produce similar effects with less demand upon infantry personnel1 and less dependence on the wind1 the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed1 and it became almost popular4 ,the peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the concentration of all this effort of preparation within a few days4 ,in terms of military efficiency1 the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced4 ,we know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night for many thousands of casualties1 and the amount of artillery effort to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger4 ,but under normal conditions of warfare1 such artillery effort would have been expended over a much longer period of time4 ,the ,livens ,projector4--,the ,somme offensive witnessed the use of a new ,british gas weapon which became of the utmost importance4 ,this was the mortar known as the ,livens ,projector4 ,its origin dates back many months1 however1 and is of considerable interest4 ,a ,british engineer1 ,lt4 ,livens 7afterwards ,major1 ,d4,s4,o41 ,m4,c47 of the ,signal ,corps1 was inspired to constructive and aggressive thought on the gas question by a double motive4 ,he quickly realised the tactical weakness of the ,german method at ,ypres1 once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise4 ,he saw the advantage of being able to command the point or locality of incidence of the cloud1 instead of being limited to the actual trench front4 ,prompted by a direct personal interest in the huge loss sustained by the ,lusitania outrage1 he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by developing his views on the future of gas clouds4 ,in a few months the general principles of the projector were defined and a crude specimen resulted4 ,caught up1 however1 in the gas organisation1 preparations for the cloud attack at ,loos absorbed all his attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him developing a flammenwerfer and training a company for its use4 ,it was really the ,somme battle which gave him the first opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice4 ,this arose in front of ,high ,wood1 which was a veritable nest of ,german machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold up our advance in that region4 ,the huge stationary flammenwerfer had recently been used by ,major ,livens and his company against a strong point in front of ,carnoy in the assault of ,july #ast4 ,here again the effect of flame was limited even more than that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement4 ,it was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil for flame and a crude projector was devised for the emergency1 using oil cans as mortars1 burying them in the earth for two-thirds of their length and employing water cans as bombs4 ,as soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its development was pressed4 ,the usual ,livens ,projector consisted of a simple tube mortar or projector closed at one end1 and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile4 ,by an electrical arrangement and suitable communications1 large numbers1 sometimes thousands1 of these projectors could be discharged at a given moment4 ,in this way quantities of gas1 comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary cloud attack1 could be used to produce a cloud which would originate1 as cloud1 as far as a mile away from the point of discharge4 ,in other words1 the advantages of cloud attack could be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction1 and with a much greater factor of local surprise4 ,thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used in large quantities during the ,british ,arras offensive in ,april1 #aiag1 the ,german ,army was thrown into great consternation4 ,but for the fact that protection had developed so strongly on both sides1 the use of the ,livens ,projector would have gone far towards a decision4 ,the simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will be to quote from one or two of the many ,intelligence reports collected4 ,thus from a captured document dated ,july1 #aiag1 belonging to the #aaath ,german ,division1 signed ,von ,busse1 we have3 ,the enemy has combined in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells4 ,the density is equal to that of gas clouds1 and the surprise effect of shell fire is also obtained4 ,for the bombardment the latter part of the night is generally chosen1 in a calm or light wind 7the direction of the latter is immaterial74 ,the enemy aims essentially at surprise4 ,our losses have been serious up to now1 as he has succeeded1 in the majority of cases1 in surprising us1 and masks have often been put on too late4 4 4 4 ,as soon as a loud report like a mine is heard #ajjj-aejj metres away1 give the gas alarm4 ,it does not matter if several false alarms are given4 ,masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer4 ,men affected1 even if apparently only slightly1 must be treated as serious cases1 laid flat1 kept still1 and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment4 ,anti-gas officers and ,company ,commanders will go through a fresh course of training on the above principles4 ,the influence of gas discipline is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt to reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline4 ,again1 from a prisoner we learn that every time a battalion goes into rest1 masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer on ,british gas projectors1 which are stated to be the most deadly form of warfare4 ,so great was the impression formed by the introduction of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on in the ,press4 ,thus1 quoting from reference to the military discussion before the main committee of the ,reichstag4 ,casualties from enemy poison gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment1 as the harm involved is only temporary1 and in most cases no ill after-effects persist 7,tagliche ,rundschau1 #bd4d4ah74 ,cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule accompanied by harmful consequences1 even though the treatment extends sometimes over a long period 7,vorwarts1 #be4d4ah71 ,based on the later mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful4 ,as it was1 they afforded poor consolation to the ,german people4 ,british ,gas ,shell4--,the ,british first used shell gas as lachrymators1 in trench mortar bombs1 in small quantities1 during the battle of the ,somme1 but for the first time1 during the battle of ,arras1 #aiag1 our supplies of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use4 ,our success can be measured by the report dated ,april #aath1 #aiag1 from the ,general ,commanding the first ,german ,army1 on ,experiences in the ,battle of ,arras1 in which he says3 ,the enemy made extensive use of gas ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries4 ,the fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing the mask for many hours4 ,artillery activity seems to have been paralysed by the effects of the gas4 ,in a general comparison of ,british and ,german methods of gas warfare1#a ,general ,hartley tells us our methods improved rapidly during #aiag4 ,at first we neglected1 almost entirely1 the question of rate of firing1 but we soon arrived at the method of crashes of lethal shell4 ,these got the surprise concentrations of gas which proved so effective1 and we realised that the number of shells required to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally4 ,at ,messines gas was used in much the same way as at ,arras4 #a ,journal of the ,royal ,artillery1 ,february1 #aibj4 ,german ,gas ,shell ,development1 #aiaf4--,the main evidence of ,allied reaction was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks1 but during the same period the ,germans1 who appeared to be abandoning the use of cloud gas1 were making steady efforts to regain their initiative by the comprehensive development of shell gas4 ,thus1 to quote from ,general ,hartley's report to the ,british ,association1 ,in the ,summer of #aiaf chlor-methyl-chloroformate with toxic properties similar to those of phosgene was used against us in large quantities during the battle of the ,somme4 ,later this was replaced by trichlor-methyl-chloro-formate1 a similar liquid1 which was used until the end of the war as the well-known ,green ,cross shell filling4 ,the use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in #aiaf4 ,many of those on the front in #aiaf will remember the surprise gas shell attack of ,december of that year1 on the ,baudimont gate at ,arras4 ,we were fortunately let off lightly with little over #ajj casualties1 but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line4 ,the appearance of the new substances represented definite ,german progress and had definite military results1 but they lost decisive value owing to the relative inefficiency of ,german gas shell tactics4 ,consideration of the ,allied reaction must include some reference to the appearance of the ,american ,army in the field4 ,the ,americans during their more or less educational period gave serious attention to the gas question1 and showed almost immediately1 by their preparations1 that they attached enormous importance to the new weapon4 ,main ,features of the ,period4--,it is difficult to generalise4 ,but the following features appear to characterise the period under discussion4 ,in the first place we see ,german policy tending towards the use of gas projectiles containing a variety of organic substances4 ,secondly1 we have the ,british exploitation of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method4 ,the ,livens ,projector provides the third important feature4 ,fourthly1 we note the somewhat tardy development of the ,british use of gas shell4 ,a number of causes1 no doubt1 unite in responsibility for the above4 ,but whether due to definitely framed policy on our part1 or merely to the hard facts of the case1 one important factor seems largely responsible4 ,it is the relative ease of production by ,germany as compared with ourselves4 ,when ,german military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell1 a variety of substances came quickly to hand1 not only from ,german research sources1 but in quantity from the dye factories4 ,no such quick response could have met1 or actually did meet1 the demands of ,allied military policy4 ,whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations1 there was no quick means of converting them into ,german casualties4 ,it is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote them to the exploitation of the older gas appliances in cloud methods4 ,but ,british chemical supply was weak1 owing to the absence of a strong organic chemical industry4 ,in other words1 ,german flexibility of supply meant flexibility in meeting the requirements of military policy1 and1 given sound military policy1 this flexibility meant surprise1 the essence of successful war4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,intensive ,,chemical ,,warfare ,the chemical struggle became very intense in the ,summer and ,autumn of #aiag4 ,projector attacks multiplied1 the use of chemical shell increased on both sides1 allied and enemy gas discipline was tightened up1 officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense1 a peculiar alertness towards gas4 ,the home front was strengthened in ,england and ,france by reinforced and sounder organisations1 and by the vigorous steps taken by ,america4 ,the ,germans began to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy4 ,at the end of #aiaf1 as a result of a review of the production situation1 they had arrived at the so-called ,hindenburg ,programme4 ,this included a large output of gas for shell1 and from its realisation the ,germans acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into #aiah4 ,it is a very clear indication of the progress made by ,germany in research1 that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the ,hindenburg ,programme found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production4 ,the ,mustard ,gas ,surprise4--,the next big surprise came from ,germany4 ,units in the line at ,nieuport and ,ypres in ,july1 #aiag1 were the first to experience it4 ,some were sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of ,german shell chemical which1 in many cases1 evaded the ,british gas discipline1 and mustard gas1 unrecognised1 caused many serious casualties4 ,even those who wore the mask were attacked by the vesicant or blistering influence of the gas4 ,the matter is vividly expressed in a letter1 given below1 which ,i received from an officer wounded in the ,nieuport attack3 ,i was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide1 commonly known as mustard stuff1 on ,july #bbnd4 ,i was digging in 7,livens ,projectors71 to fire on ,lambartzyde4 ,going up we met a terrible strafe of ,h4,e4 and gas shells in ,nieuport4 ,when things quietened a little ,i went up with the three ,g4,s4 wagons1 all that were left1 and the carrying parties4 ,i must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell as horseradish4 ,it had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat4 ,i suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on4 ,on arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud of the same stuff drifting from the front line system4 ,as it seemed to have no effect on the eyes ,i gave orders for all to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none of the stuff1 and we carried on4 ,coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack on ,nieuport4 ,next morning1 myself1 and all the eighty men we had up there were absolutely blind4 ,the horrid stuff had a delayed action on the eyes1 causing temporary blindness about seven hours afterwards4 ,about #cjjj were affected4 ,one or two of our party never recovered their sight and died4 ,the casualty clearing stations were crowded4 ,on ,august #crd1 with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses1 ,i came home1 and went into ,millbank ,hospital on ,august #aeth4 ,these early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst the troops assembling for the ,northern offensives4 ,the gas was distinctly a new departure4 ,effective in low concentrations1 with very little odour1 and no immediate sign of discomfort or danger1 very persistent1 remaining on the ground for days1 it caused huge casualties4 ,fortunately1 its most fatal effects could be prevented by wearing a respirator1 and only a very small proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal4 ,the insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas discipline is shown in the following example from an official report3 ,a battery was bombarded by the new gas shell from #aj p4m4 to #ab midnight and from #a4cj to #c4cj on the night of #bcrd-#bdth ,july4 ,the shelling then ceased and at #f a4m41 when the battery had to carry out a shoot1 the ,battery ,commander considered the air free from gas1 and ,box ,respirators were accordingly removed4 ,shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning1 including the ,battery ,commander4 ,on previous nights they had been fired at with gas shell in the same way1 but found it safe to remove ,box ,respirators after a couple of hours4 ,on the occasion in question the air was very still and damp4 ,in another case an officer in the ,boesinghe sector1 during the gas bombardment on the night of the #bb-bc ,july1 adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip1 but left the eyes uncovered4 ,his eyes were seriously affected1 but he had no lung symptoms on the morning of the #bdth4 ,mustard gas 7or ,yellow ,cross1 as it was called officially by the ,germans7 was the war gas par excellence for the purpose of causing casualties4 ,indeed1 it produced nearly eight times more ,allied casualties than all the various other kinds of ,german gas4 ,it was used for preparation a considerable time before the attack1 or during the attack1 on localities and objects with which the attackers would have no contact4 ,blue ,cross4--,another new type1 the ,german ,blue ,cross1 was introduced about the same time4 ,this represented at different times diphenylchlorarsine1 diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds4 ,the ,blue ,cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive4 ,the enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically1 and then exercise its effects4 ,these1 violent irritation of the nose and throat1 nausea and intense pain1 would cause the removal of the respirator and allow other lethal gases to have full play4 ,fortunately1 the ,german hopes of penetration were not realised1 but they were1 no doubt1 continuing to develop the vast possibilities of the new method4 ,german ,emphasis on ,gas ,shell4--,the ,green ,cross or lethal filling was another type of ,german gas shell4 ,green ,cross covered such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate4 ,although these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas1 they were relatively more fatal4 ,schwarte's book tells us that1 ,after the introduction of the ,green ,cross shell in the summer of #aiaf1 at ,verdun over #ajj1jjj gas shell were used to a single bombardment4 ,from the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific gas shell attack of ,march1 #aiah1 the ,germans persistently used their new types against us with considerable effect4 ,even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over1 the number of casualties caused by it was considerably greater than during the months when the ,germans were firing only non-persistent lethal shell of the ,green ,cross type4 ,the ,germans regarded these shell gas developments as largely responsible for our failure to break through in the ,autumn of #aiag4 ,the ,german ,projector4--,during this period they also developed a projector4 ,their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise4 ,fortunately1 protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient state that normal alert conditions of the front line system were largely able to counter the use of this new device by ,germany4 ,the first attack was against the ,french at ,rechicourt on the night of ,december #eth-#fth4 ,on the night of ,december #ajth-#aath1 #aiag1 they fired several hundred projectiles on the ,cambrai and ,givenchy sectors of the ,british line4 ,in both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously into a small area including our front and support lines4 ,the bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line1 as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line1 followed by a loud explosion4 ,the bombs1 which emitted a trail of sparks1 were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise4 ,they burst with a large detonation1 producing a thick1 white cloud4 ,the discharge was followed immediately by a bombardment with ,h4,e4 shrapnel and gas shell1 and a raid was attempted south of ,givenchy4 ,we learn that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases respirators were adjusted before the arrival of the bombs1 the resemblance to our projector attacks having been established at once4 ,when this was done practically no casualties occurred4 ,again1 to show the efficiency of ,british protection against projector gas1 we learn from official reports that1 ,at one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants4 ,it should be remembered that the ,british box respirator protects against very high concentrations of gas which pass at once through the ,german mask4 ,similar discharges were made against the ,french on two occasions in ,december1 and against the ,lens sector on ,december #cjth4 ,the compounds used in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin4 ,these attacks increased in number during the ensuing months4 ,german ,projector ,improvements4--,the ,germans developed a longer range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign4 ,the ,allied advance in #aiah uncovered a number of enemy dumps4 ,amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number of a new type of projector4 ,a prisoner of the #cgth pioneer gas battalion1 captured on ,august #bfth1 had said that they were to practise with a new type of projector with a range of #c kilometres1 the increased range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector4 ,he stated that the intention was to use the longer range weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector1 using the new type to deal with the reserve positions4 ,the capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth of his statement4 ,two kinds of bombs were used1 one containing ,h4,e4 and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene4 ,this was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly lethal gas by physical means1 for hitherto the highly lethal gases had only been slightly persistent4 ,the new projector had a calibre of #aeh mm4 and was termed the ,gaswerfer1 #aiah4 ,the importance of this new projector cannot be overestimated4 ,its large scale use would1 undoubtedly1 have resulted in imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances from the front line4 ,dyes in ,gas ,shell4--,another interesting ,german development of this period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell4 ,after gas bombardments in the winter of #aiaf-ag1 the snow was seen to be covered with coloured patches4 ,these coincided with the bursts of the shell4 ,analysis of the earth showed that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff4 ,a number of explanations were advanced to account for the use of the colour1 of which the most probable claimed its employment for the identification of affected localities several hours or even days after the bombardment4 ,this was especially the case with persistent types4 ,as the explosive charge of chemical shell was feeble1 some such means of identification was necessary4 ,it may be that the ,germans expected that troops advancing after such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour1 and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental4 ,german ,flame ,projectors4--,we have already referred to the use of flame projectors by the enemy1 and a picturesque account of their development and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract from the ,hamburger ,nachrichten of the #ith of ,june1 #aiah3 ,their ,origin4--,our ,flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident4 ,their present commander1 ,major ,r41 when an officer of the ,reserve1 received the order1 during peace manoeuvres1 to hold a certain fort at all costs4 ,during the sham fight1 having employed all means at his disposal1 he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit1 which was under his orders as commander of the fort1 and directed the water jets on the attacking force4 ,afterwards1 during the criticism of operations in the presence of the ,kaiser1 he claimed that he had subjected the attackers to streams of burning oil4 ,the ,kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible1 and he received an answer in the affirmative4 ,long series of experiments were necessary before ,engineer ,l4 succeeded in producing a combination of various oils1 which mixture is projected as a flame on the enemy by means of present day ,flammenwerfer4 ,major ,r4 occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire as commander of the ,munich ,fire ,brigade4 ,the ,prince of ,hades1' as he is called by his fire spouters1' enjoys great popularity among his men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called4 ,he can look back on an important development of his units4 ,whereas in ,january1 #aiae1 ,flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group of #cf men1 to-day they constitute a formation with special assault and bombing detachments1 and are furnished with all requisites for independent action4 ,in reading ,army ,communiques1 we often find mention of these troops4 ,if difficulty is experienced in clearing up an ,english or ,french ,infantry nest1 the ,prince of ,hades' appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out4 ,that conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute a life insurance policy is obvious2 nor is every man suitable4 ,special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof of keenness in assault are necessary for such work4 ,further ,flame ,development4--,specimens of a very neat portable ,german ,flammenwerfer were captured in ,august1 #aiag4 ,it contained three essential parts3 a ring-shaped oil container surrounding a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen1 which was used to expel the oil1 and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying the jet4 ,the whole was arranged to be carried on the back4 ,at about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred to the ,flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment4 ,the ,germans were fond of using the ,flammenwerfer during counter-attacks and raids in which the morale factor is so important4 ,thus in ,september1 #aiae1 in a raid against the ,british during our great offensive1 the ,german raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and the ,flammenwerfer men followed4 ,the bombing party advanced under cover of these men1 the smoke from the flame throwers acting as a screen4 ,british experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put ,german flame throwers out of action1 and it is clear that the ,germans themselves realised this weakness of isolated flame attacks for1 in one of their documents issued by ,german ,g4,h4,q4 in ,april1 #aiah1 they said3 ,flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages4 ,they must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison with the infantry1 which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns and its grenades4 ,the #aiah ,offensive4--,some idea of the importance of these developments and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the ,german plans for the use of gas in their #aiah offensive1 and their execution3 ,die ,technik im ,weltkriege tells us3 ,during the big ,german attacks in #aiah1 gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities which had never been seen before1 and even in open warfare the troops were soon asking for gas4 ,the ,yellow and ,blue ,cross shells first introduced into operation in ,july1 #aiag1 were not incorporated into comprehensive offensives until ,march1 #aiah4 ,owing to the exigencies of the campaign1 the initial surprise value of these gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive4 ,in ,december1 #aiag1 the ,german ,army was instructed anew regarding the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes1 laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack4 ,fortunately for us1 the gas shells destined for this purpose were not relatively so efficient as the ,german persistent types1 which were devoted to the more remote preparation for attack and to defensive purposes4 ,their penetrating ,blue ,cross types were a comparative failure4 ,although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack1 facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent ,yellow ,cross shell for defensive purposes in the great ,german retreat4 ,ludendorffs ,testimony4--,ludendorff1 himself1 emphasised the great importance which was attached to gas in this offensive4 ,he says#a3 ,and yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect1 and that was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind4 ,i had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at #aa a4m1 by my meteorologist1 ,lieutenant ,dr4 ,schmaus4 ,up till the morning of the #bjth strength and direction were by no means very favourable2 indeed1 it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack4 ,it would have been very hard to do4 ,so ,i was very anxious to see what sort of report ,i should get4 ,it was not strikingly favourable1 but it did indicate that the attack was possible4 ,at #ab noon the ,army ,groups were told that the programme would be carried out4 ,now it could no longer be stopped4 ,everything must run its course4 ,g4,h4,q4 higher commanders and troops had all done their duty4 ,the rest was in the hands of fate1 unfavourable wind diminished the effectiveness of the gas1 fog retarded our movements and prevented our superior training and leadership from reaping its full reward4 #a ,my ,war ,memories4 ,hutchinson ,co41 #aiai4 ,preparations for ,assault2--,gas ,defensive at ,armentieres4--,for twelve days prior to their ,march assault the ,germans used mustard gas over1 certain areas1 and the non-persistent types for other localities4 ,as an example of the first method1 we can state that nearly #bjj1jjj rounds of ,yellow ,cross shell were used on the #ith ,march1 and caused us heavy casualties4 ,the actual attack at once confirmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas4 ,in the second case1 of the non-persistent types of ,blue and ,green ,cross1 bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours before the assault1 on all defensive positions and organisations for several miles behind the front line4 ,millions of rounds must have been used4 ,although not without serious effect on the campaign1 this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations4 ,the failure of mask penetration by the ,blue ,cross shell prevented the full possibilities of ,green ,cross coming into play4 ,to illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive1 and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack1 we quote from a recent statement by ,general ,hartley4#a ,referring to the gas shelling immediately before the extension of the attack to the north of ,lens on #ith ,april1 he explains1 ,between the #gth ,april and #ith ,april there was no gas shelling between the ,la ,bassee ,canal and ,armentieres1 while there was heavy ,yellow ,cross shelling immediately south of the ,canal1 and ,armentieres had such a heavy bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas4 ,this indicated the probability of an attack on the front held by the ,portuguese1 which occurred on #ith ,april1 ,blue and ,green ,cross being used in the preliminary bombardment4 ,the ,portuguese front lay between the two ,yellow ,cross regions4 #a ,journal of the ,royal ,artillery1 ,february1 #aibj4 ,fixed ,gas ,barrage at ,kemmel4--,another most interesting example is also quoted1 dealing with the shelling preceding the attack on ,kemmel on #beth ,april4 ,this is an interesting case1 as non-persistent ,blue ,cross shell were used within the objective and ,yellow ,cross just behind it1 indicating that on #beth ,april the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained4 ,percentage of ,chemical ,shell4--,some idea of the importance which the ,germans attached to their chemical ammunition1 as distinct from explosives1 can be gathered from the following extract from a captured order of the ,seventh ,german ,army1 dated ,may #hth1 #aiah1 giving the proportion of chemical shell to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on the ,aisne on #bgth ,may1 #aiah4 7a7 ,counter-battery and long range bombardments4 ,for #g4g c_/m field guns1 #aj4e c_/m and #ae c_/m1 howitzers and #aj c_/m guns2 ,blue ,cross #gj1 ,green ,cross1 #aj2 ,h4,e4 #bj1 long #ae c_/m guns fire only ,h4,e4 7b7 ,bombardment of infantry positions4 7i7 ,creeping ,barrage4 ,for #g4g c_/m field guns1 #aj4e c_/m and #ae c_/m howitzers2 ,blue ,cross #cj1 ,green ,cross #aj1 ,h4,e4 #fj1 #ba c_/m howitzers fire only ,h4,e4 7ii7 ,box ,barrage4 ,for #g4g c_/m field guns1 #aj4e c_/m howitzers and #aj c_/m guns2 ,blue ,cross #fj1 ,green ,cross #aj1 ,h4,e4 #cj4 ,what more striking demonstration is needed than these extraordinarily high percentages8 ,gas ,retreat ,tactics2--,general ,hartley's ,analysis4--,no ,yellow ,cross shell were to be used in the bombardment1 but1 as mentioned above1 there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat1 during which they attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas with mustard gas4 ,this defensive use of mustard gas was most important4 ,again1 quoting ,general ,hartley1 ,yellow ,cross shell were used much farther forward than previously1 bombardments of the front line system and of forward posts were frequent1 and possible assembly positions were also shelled with this gas4 ,on more than one occasion when an attack was expected the enemy attempted to create an impassable zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas4 ,their gas bombardments usually occurred on fronts where they had reason to fear an attack1 with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas where troops might be massing4 ,it was instructive to note how supplies of ,yellow ,cross shell were switched from the ,third to the ,first ,army front late in ,august when they became nervous about the latter sector4 ,in ,yellow ,cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon1 which they did not use to the best advantage1 for instance1 they neglected its use on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they might have done4 ,as our offensive progressed their gas shelling became less organised1 and one saw very clearly the superior value of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones4 ,in the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated ground and take up alternative positions1 while in the case of a bombardment of a large area such as the ,cambrai salient1 the difficulty of doing so was greatly increased1 and consequently casualties were higher4 ,during our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions against gas as during stationary warfare1 and the casualties were increased on this account4 ,percentage of ,german ,gas ,shell in ,enemy ,dumps4--,a test of the importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind the front line for some specific operation1 or part of a campaign4 ,an examination of ,german production from this point of view is very interesting1 and also brings out a significant point4 ,the normal establishment of a ,german divisional ammunition dump in ,july1 #aiah1 contained about #ej per cent4 of gas shell4 ,the dumps captured later in the year contained from #cj per cent4 to #dj per cent4 ,these figures are significant1 for they show how much importance the ,german ,army attached to gas shell4 ,when we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them1 and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres the ,germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive1 some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its future possibilities can be obtained4 ,further1 when we realise that the production of explosives can be controlled and inspected during peace1 but that no such control can exist for chemical warfare products1 the significance for the future stands revealed4 ,forced ,exhaustion of ,stocks4--,it might be thought that the lower percentages found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing importance of chemical shell4 ,examining the case less superficially1 however1 we soon see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning4 ,in the first place1 we know that the ,german factories were still pressing on to their maximum output at the time of the ,armistice4 ,new units were being brought into operation4 ,secondly1 we have seen how huge quantities of mustard gas were diverted to those particular ,german armies which were most threatened by the final ,allied offensive1 indicating that certain portions of the ,german front were being starved for chemical shell4 ,the truth of the matter is that the ,germans had accumulated enormous stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them4 ,we learn from ,schwarte's book that1 ,although the production of ,yellow ,cross almost reached #ajjj tons a month1 yet finally the possibilities of use and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly output would have been sufficient4 ,yperite1 ,french ,mustard ,gas4--,during this period the volume of allied gas activities also increased considerably4 ,but until ,june1 #aiah1 our success was due to the development of more successful tactical methods rather than to any specific chemical surprise4 ,very great credit is due to the ,french for having produced large quantities of mustard gas by the above date4 ,judging from the ,german ,intelligence ,reports the surprise effect of the ,french production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier ,german use4 ,it again evaded the gas discipline of the troops1 and we find the ,german staff laying enormous emphasis on this question1 which was already very prominent in their general and operation orders4 ,the occasion provided a very striking example of ,german belief in their absolute predominance in production4 ,they were largely justified in this belief1 but it carried them too far4 ,they explained the use of mustard gas by the ,french as due to the use of ,german mustard gas obtained from blind ,german shell6 ,effect on ,german ,gas ,discipline4--,british mustard gas was not in use in the field until ,september1 #aiah1 but the ,french was a great success1 and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied success in the #aiah campaign4 ,the ,french termed mustard gas ,yperite after ,ypres1 the place where it was first used4 ,as far as such terms can be applied to any weapon1 ,yperite arrived to spread panic1 and terror amongst the ,german formations4 ,a document captured by the ,sixth ,french ,army shows that ,yperite used on the #acth ,june against the #aath ,bavarian ,division was the chief cause of the precipitate retreat of this ,division4 ,the ,seventh ,german ,army refers to another bombardment on the #ith of ,june1 in which the casualties exceeded five hundred4 ,it is curious to note that although the ,germans had so preached the superiority of their gases and gas methods1 serious blows by the ,allies found the ,german gas discipline unequal to them4 ,it is no exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the ,french1 and later by the ,british1 and the ,british projector1 produced1 on each occasion1 in the ,german ranks feelings allied to panic4 ,this is reflected in the many orders which have been captured from army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas discipline amongst the troops4 ,thus1 almost immediately after the first ,french use1 ,ludendorff1 chief of the ,german ,general ,staff1 issued a special detailed order on the subject1 and the ,german document captured by the ,french can be taken as representative4 ,our ,yellow ,cross has caused much damage to the enemy1 formerly less protected than now4 ,but as a natural sequence he had developed through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model4 ,on this account enemy troops have been able to cross1 at once and without loss1 areas which their artillery had just bombarded with gas4 ,we also must train our troops to an excellent standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army4 ,by the time of the ,armistice ,france had produced nearly #bjjj tons of mustard gas1 ,british and ,american production was rapidly increasing1 so that the output was attaining stupendous proportions4 ,some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns of #aiag-aiah can be obtained from the following figures3 ,allied ,gas ,statistics4--,between ,november1 #aiag1 and ,november1 #aiah1 ,france produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator4 ,the ,british figure was probably higher4 ,from ,april to ,november1 #aiah1 the ,french filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas4 ,from the #ast of ,july1 #aiae1 to the latter date more than seventeen million gas shell were completed by the ,french4 ,in addition to these huge gas shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors and as cloud gas4 ,during the period the ,british averaged fifty large scale operations of this type per month1 sometimes discharging monthly three hundred tons of gas4 ,the total ,french production of chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached #ej1jjj tons1 a large proportion of which production occurred during #aiag and #aiah4 ,the ,british was of the same order1 but ,german production was at least more than twice as high1 showing what great use they made of gas shell4 ,the huge ,american programme might have reduced the margin1 but no limits can be placed on ,german possibilities and elasticity in production4 ,critical ,importance of ,rapid ,german ,production4--,these figures are misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides4 ,as a general rule1 where the ,german lag between the approval of a substance and its use in the field covered weeks1 our lag covered months4 ,owing to efficient production1 chemical warfare was an infinitely more flexible weapon in ,german hands than in ours4 ,this will be readily understood when we analyse1 later1 the methods of production of some of the chief ,german war gases4 ,in general1 ,german development of these complicated substances provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of production of organic substances by the dye industry4 ,on the other hand1 except in very few exceptional cases1 ,british and ,french production1 although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned1 was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison4 ,the ,germans used mustard gas in ,july1 #aiag4 ,we identified it a few days afterwards4 ,but the first fruits of allied production were not in the field for eleven months4 ,british material was not used until a month or two before the ,armistice4 ,further1 in this case1 we were convinced of the value of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy4 ,we will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production4 ,the period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof of the ,german experiment of #aiae-aiaf4 ,shed of their trial nature1 the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part in the campaign4 ,they were surely destined to play a much more prominent part had the period of stabilised warfare continued4 ,projector cloud gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer4 ,but we will leave such considerations for a future chapter4 ,,chapter ,v ,,chemical ,,warfare ,,organisations ,we have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical account of the above4 ,the ramifications1 of ,allied organisations were so numerous1 the number of persons concerned so great1 the sacrifices made so heavy1 that only an exceedingly lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals4 ,in addition1 such an account would not serve our purpose4 ,we wish to show1 as briefly as possible1 how the different ,allied organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign1 how they compared with those of the enemy1 and what lesson the comparison may contain for the future4 ,two facts stand out in such a comparison4 ,we are struck with the extreme simplicity of the ,german organisations1 as we know them1 and the great complexity and multiplicity of the ,allied departments as we saw them4 ,we must admit from the beginning that we know least of the ,german home organisations for research and production1 but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity4 ,the ,inter-,allied ,commission of ,control may1 and certainly should1 obtain full information1 but at present the matter stands as follows4 ,german ,research4--,the ,germans relied upon two main and very strong centres for research4 ,they have already been indicated as the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,institute1 under the direction of ,professor ,haber1 and the enormous research organisations of the ,i4,g4 ,there are various references to internal gas organisation in captured documents4 ,it appears that they received their final form late in #aiag4 ,a great gas school 7,heeres-,gaschule7 was instituted in ,berlin where there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material4 ,rather earlier than this the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,institute was definitely appointed as the official research centre4 ,the ,war ,ministry had a chemical section named ,a4#aj1 which dealt with gas questions4 ,it is rumoured1 and there is strong reason to believe1 that the ,i4,g4 was largely staffed by officers of the ,reserve before the war4 ,whatever their pre-war associations1 if any1 with the ,war ,ministry1 hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities of their unique research and organic chemical producing facilities4 ,it is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have greatly assisted the ,i4,g4 in its operations1 inventions and general assistance for the army4 ,it appears that the subdivision of work left the1 direction of chemical research in ,berlin1 possibly at the above ,institute1 while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds1 and developing manufacturing processes for approved substances1 occurred in the laboratories of the ,i4,g4 ,leverkusen4--,we know1 for example1 that a very large number of substances was produced at ,leverkusen and samples forwarded to ,berlin1 of which only a few were finally approved for production4 ,the physiological work and field tests were certainly associated with the ,berlin organisation1 but it is not clear how much of this work occurred within the ,i4,g4 ,an ,allied mission to ,leverkusen reported as follows3--,it was emphatically stated that no means of testing the products were resorted to beyond inhala-tion and testing the effect of the substances on the staff1 but this statement must be accepted with reserve4 ,this is particularly so as we know that large numbers of respirator-drums had been made in this factory1 and that a gas school existed at ,leverkusen in #aiae4 ,a member of another ,allied mission was informed by one of the staff at ,leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware of the difficulties in chemical warfare1 apart from production1 for they had some experience in the designing and testing of chemical shell4 ,it maybe that the ,german ,government relied upon the ,i4,g4 for such work in the early stages of the chemical war1 pending the development of official organisation4 ,when we remember1 however1 that at ,leverkusen alone there was a staff of #aejj technical and commercial specialists1 apart from thousands of workpeople1 before the war1 and that the latter were increased by #aejj during the war1 we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which might have been rendered by this research centre alone4 ,the opinion of the members of the ,hartley ,commission#a was1 that much thought and attention had been given to chemical warfare by the chemists of the ,company4 #a ,a post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts1 to the ,rhine chemical factories1 ,march1 #aiai4 ,hochst4--,a great volume of chemical warfare research occurred also at ,hochst4 ,the admission was made that the research department of the factory was continuously employed during the war on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical warfare1 many hundreds being prepared and sent to ,berlin for examination4 ,the firm employed #cjj academically trained chemists in peace time1 but during the war many more were engaged1 partly for research and partly because all shell filling was carried out under the supervision of trained chemists4 ,ludwigshafen4--,the most influential branch of the ,i4,g4 was1 undoubtedly1 the ,badische ,anilin und ,soda ,fabrik4 ,it might have been expected1 as they shared largely in production1 that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur at these works1 but this was emphatically denied to ,allied missions4 ,it may be1 however1 that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise was developed there1 requiring a large amount of technical development and control1 this was considered a sufficient contribution to the general cause4 ,early ,formulation of ,policy4--,in examining what signs we have of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare research and production in ,germany1 we are struck by the fact that all the substances used with such dire effect against us during the war must have been approved for production by the ,government at a relatively early date4 ,the following table1 assembled from information supplied by the ,german factories1 brings this point out very clearly4 ,first ,use ,war ,chemical4 ,factory4 ,production ,began4 in the ,field1 ,diphosgene ,hochst ,sept41 #aiaf ,summer1 #aiae 7,green ,cross7 ,leverkusen ,june1 #aiae ,mustard ,gas ,leverkusen ,spring1 #aiag ,july1 #aiag 7,yellow ,cross7 ,diphenyl- ,hochst ,may1 #aiag ,july1 #aiag chlorarsine 7,blue ,cross7 ,diphenyl- ,a4,g4,f4,a4 8 ,feb41 #aiah ,june1 #aiaa cyanarsine 7,blue ,cross7 ,ethyl-dichlor- ,hochst ,aug41 #aiag ,march1 #aiah arsine 7,blue ,cross7 ,we have chosen the later products to establish the point1 for it is self-evident for the earlier products1 some of which were made before the war4 ,movements of ,personnel4--,the movements of ,german chemical personnel give us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy4 ,the factories were called upon to produce1 as we have already shown1 towards the end of #aiad1 but this production largely involved the use of substances already manufactured on a certain scale4 ,large scale production of the more advanced types of war chemical seems to have been directly stimulated by the ,hindenburg programme1 in connection with which the ,companies withdrew large numbers of their skilled workers from the front4 ,german ,simplicity of ,organisation4--,we can safely conclude from the above that ,germany required no cumbersome government mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals1 for the semi-industrial work in developing processes for approved substances1 nor for their production4 ,by relying on the ,i4,g41 the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,institute1 and probably some other organisation for field and physiological tests1 ,germany escaped the necessity for comprehensive government organisation1 the development of which was such a handicap to ,allied countries4 ,it is certainly very suggestive that we only met1 in the field1 substances approved before the summer of #aiag4 ,it is with great interest and a certain amount of apprehension that we speculate upon the research developments after that period with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted4 ,if this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas1 ,blue ,cross compounds1 and the different cloud substances1 what hidden surprises were matured in the later period8 ,this feature of simplicity1 of linking up a new war with an old peace1 activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation4 ,we have seen how ,germany created special formations for cloud attacks1 but for a time practically abandoned them1 throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell4 ,in other words1 she substituted a normal weapon1 the artillery4 ,we1 on the other hand1 largely impelled by the enforced simplicity of our production1 tended more towards the development of special formations and special weapons for cloud production1 but with such success that the ,german ,pioneer formations1 after being practically dropped1 found a use in developing and using our new weapon1 the ,livens ,projector4 ,german ,organisation at the ,front2--,the ,gas ,regiment4--,it is probable that the earliest form of ,german organisation at the front consisted in the liaison between ,professor ,haber and the ,german ,g4,h4,q4 ,it will be remembered that ,ludendorff1 discussing cloud and shell gas1 refers to this co-operation1 stating3#a ,geheimrat ,haber proved of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas4 ,it was also rumoured soon after the first ,german attack that the organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific guidance of this renowned ,professor4 ,the attack was carried out by the #ceth and #cfth ,pioneer ,regiments1 each furnished with chemically trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare4 ,the importance of protection was realised very early1 and a gas school for officers of all armies was organised at ,leverkusen for training in protection4 ,we cannot but regard it as significant that ,leverkusen is also the site of the enormous ,bayer#b organic chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production4 ,the school dealt mainly with protection4 #a ,my ,war ,memories1 page #cch4 #b ,a branch of the great ,german dye combine1 the ,interessen ,gemeinschaft1 known as the ,i4,g4 ,early ,german ,gas ,school4--,apparently1 at the end of ,november1 #aiaf1 special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the headquarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations4 ,in addition1 these staffs had the normal routine function of supervising inspection and instruction in gas warfare at the front4 ,at about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer 7gasschutzoffizier7 with similar duties to those outlined above4 ,in other words1 the arrangement was generalised throughout the army4 ,this officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men specially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units4 ,the great need for these staffs is brought out in ,german official documents4 ,new ,gas ,regiments2--,gas ,shell ,experts4--,in #aiag two new ,pioneer battalions1 the #cgth and #chth respectively1 were created for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks4 ,these developments in organisation1 both advisory and combatant1 led1 at about this time1 to the centralisation of the gas services at the front under a ,kommandeur der ,gastruppen at ,g4,h4,q4 ,it would thus appear that the ,germans achieved the centralisation of their gas services some months later than ourselves4 ,further developments in organisation1 of which we are aware1 were connected with two main tendencies in ,german gas warfare4 ,in the first place1 the vast employment of gas shell led the ,germans to create special gas experts on the ,divisional artillery staffs4 ,we have this on the authority of an order by ,ludendorff dated ,june #afth1 #aiah4 ,this gas shell expert was not necessarily an imported specialist1 but was usually a specially trained officer chosen from the staff in question4 ,this was a very important move1 for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell4 ,this artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison with the ,divisional ,gas ,officer4 ,inspection of ,protective ,masks and ,method4--,the second tendency was towards stricter protective standards and inspection4 ,the gas inspection centre at ,berlin was given more responsibilities in the field and the protection of horses1 dogs and carrier pigeons received great emphasis4 ,british ,field ,organisation2--,breach ,organisations4--,our own field development followed very similar lines4 ,the immediate need in ,april1 #aiae1 was for organisations on the front to advise formations on temporary methods of protection1 to ascertain quickly the nature of any new ,german chemical attack1 and to provide special means of examining the treatment of the new kind of casualty4 ,these were breach organisations1 so to speak1 countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks while more comprehensive and permanent cadres were created to absorb them4 ,the personnel of these breach organisations was largely composed of chemists already at the front who had in some cases taken part in the first ,german attacks4 ,efforts were soon on foot to mobilise ,british chemists for offensive purposes4 ,so remote from the old army standards and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare1 that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scientific soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these matters at the front or at home4 ,accordingly1 in ,june1 #aiae1 ,brigadier-,general ,c4 ,h4 ,foulkes1 ,c4,m4,g41 ,d4,s4,o4 7then ,major1 ,r4,e47 was given the difficult task of assembling and training an offensive gas formation1 and acting as ,gas ,adviser to ,g4,h4,q4 ,the ,special ,companies thus created have already been referred to in quotations from despatches4 ,in addition to this combatant personnel a number of specialists and advisory organisations came into being4 ,additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions1 and chemical advisers by higher formations4 ,central ,laboratory4--,a central laboratory was instituted at ,g4,h4,q4 under the late ,colonel ,w4 ,watson1 ,c4,m4,g41 ,f4,r4,s41 which did particularly valuable work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals4 ,with the development of gas shell1 the chemical advisers included this subject in their province4 ,reference must also be made to the medical and physiological side4 ,new ,type of ,casualty4--,after the introduction of gas warfare the army was always faced with the possibility that some entirely new chemical would produce a new type of casualty which would require special and sometimes unusual treatment4 ,a new element was thus introduced into army medical work4 ,the effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden development of a strange epidemic4 ,reaction to meet these new conditions took the form of the development of medical research organisations at home1 and of the appointment of a special medical and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the ,directorate of ,gas ,services4 ,it was thus possible1 after any enemy gas attack1 and with little delay1 to institute inquiries with regard to treatment of casualties1 stimulate special investigations1 and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment1 and1 in general1 introduce satisfactory alert conditions throughout the medical organisation along the whole of the ,allied front4 ,in this connection the effective liaison between the medical specialists of the ,british and ,french armies must be mentioned4 ,directorate of ,gas ,services4--,these various services were centralised in the ,directorate of ,gas ,services1 in the ,spring of #aiaf1 under ,major-,general ,h4 ,f4 ,thuillier1 ,c4,b41 ,c4,m4,g41 ,r4,e4 ,it is interesting to note that although in their rear organisations for research and supply the ,french preceded us in the adoption of a logical symmetrical arrangement1 yet in the field we were the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service which was so essential4 ,british ,home ,organisations2--,the ,royal ,society4--,after the battle of the ,marne1 ,germany rapidly realised the need for scientific and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war had passed4 ,many signs and definite statements by ,falkenhayn and others in authority have shown us how this realisation found outlet in various schemes for research and production4 ,the need for scientific attention to various war problems was also realised in ,england1 and found expression in the mobilisation of prominent scientists by the ,royal ,society1 which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific activities and to assist various ,ministries or administrative government departments in connection with scientific matters4 ,royal ,society ,chemical ,sub-,committee4--,the ,chemical ,sub-,committee included such prominent names as ,lord ,rayleigh1 ,sir ,william ,ramsay and ,sir ,oliver ,lodge4 ,retaliation1 decided on early in ,may1 #aiae1 was reflected in organisation4 ,lord ,kitchener entrusted ,colonel ,jackson1 ,c4,m4,g41 ,r4,e4 7later ,major-,general ,sir ,louis ,jackson1 ,k4,b4,e41 ,c4,b41 ,c4,m4,g41 ,r4,e471 then in charge of a fortification section of the ,war ,office1 with the task of examining and taking action on the possibilities of retaliation1 and a liaison with the above chemical committee of the ,royal ,society was soon established4 ,protection became a part of the duties of the ,medical ,services and was placed under the direct control of ,colonel1 afterwards ,sir ,william ,horrocks1 who became chairman of the specially appointed ,anti-,gas ,committee4 ,further1 a little later1 the ,chemical ,sub-,committee above referred to became an advisory body to ,colonel ,jackson4 ,this was the origin of the ,chemical ,warfare ,department1 but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering transformations before reaching its final1 more or less efficient and symmetrical form4 ,the ,trench ,warfare ,department4--,with the formation of the ,ministry of ,munitions late in ,may1 #aiae1 ,colonel ,jackson's section was transferred to it4 ,at this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping chemical warfare research1 design1 and supply under one head4 ,probably this was the chief reason which prompted ,lord ,kitchener1 then ,secretary of ,state for ,war1 to agree to the transference of this section to another ,ministry1 and consent to the birth of the ,trench ,warfare ,department4 ,scientific ,advisory ,committee2--,commercial ,advisory ,committee4--,even at this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found necessary to cover such functions as in ,germany were rendered unnecessary by the existence of the ,i4,g4 ,it became clear that the new department would require strong permanent scientific advice1 and this was found in the formation of the ,scientific ,advisory ,committee4 ,this included the most active members of the former relevant ,royal ,society ,committee1 amongst whom were ,professor ,a4 ,w4 ,crossley1 the ,secretary1 and ,professors ,h4 ,b4 ,baker1 ,j4 ,f4 ,thorpe1 and ,sir ,george ,beilby1 all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this new branch of warfare4 ,a parallel ,commercial ,advisory ,committee was appointed1 composed of representatives of some of the leading manufacturers of the country4 ,split ,between ,research and ,supply4--,we cannot follow in detail the many fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department4 ,they represent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research1 and circumstances imposed upon the department by the reorganisation and fusion of ,ministries and departments4 ,there were brief periods1 notably at the commencement and in the final stages1 when the desired centralised organisation was approached1 but there were also periods when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble and unsatisfactory liaison between the two4 ,speaking generally1 the break between research and supply occurred in ,december1 #aiae1 when the ,trench ,warfare ,department was split up into two parts4 ,these were the ,trench ,warfare ,research ,department1 in which was included the ,scientific ,advisory ,committee1 and1 shortly afterwards1 changed its name to that of the ,chemical ,advisory ,committee1 and the ,trench ,warfare ,supply ,department4 ,the relationships between those two departments remained practically unchanged until the formation of the ,chemical ,warfare ,department in ,october1 #aiag4 ,this statement must be qualified1 however1 by a reference to the services rendered by ,professor1 later ,sir ,john ,cadman1 ,k4,c4,m4,g41 in bringing about this liaison1 not only with supply in ,england1 but also with that in ,france4 ,during the early period the ,royal ,society ,committee of ,physiology became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the ,chemical ,warfare ,department1 as the ,chemical ,warfare ,medical ,committee4 ,munitions ,inventions ,department4--,another feature which is worthy of notice because it was common to ,allied organisations other than the ,british1 and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential unity of chemical warfare activities1 was the duplication of effort by the ,munitions ,inventions ,department4 ,suggestions which could only have value when considered as part of the definitely directed chemical warfare policy were constantly raised with the ,inventions ,department1 but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison between the two departments by ,colonel ,crossley4 ,imperial ,college of ,science4--,during the early period the ,imperial ,college of ,science rendered great services by assisting in research4 ,it continued to do so during the rest of the war1 but was later associated with a large number of ,british university chemical and scientific departments in pursuing a huge programme of chemical warfare research4 ,we can only make passing reference to the development of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy4 ,the ,porton ground1 however1 was a model of its kind1 a pioneer amongst ,allied experimental grounds1 and a tribute to the creative and administrative efforts of ,lt4-,colonel ,crossley1 ,c4,m4,g41 ,c4,b4,e41 who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war4 ,the ,chemical ,warfare ,department4--,the growing importance of chemical warfare1 the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by ,germany in the summer of #aiag1 and various other reasons led to reorganisation of the ,chemical ,warfare services in this country in ,october1 #aiag1 and the ,chemical ,warfare ,department1 under ,major-,general ,thullier1 formerly ,director of ,gas ,services1 ,b4,e4,f41 was constituted4 ,this reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research and other activities of the department and a still greater mobilisation of the chemists of the country4 ,although this change witnessed further centralisation by the incorporation of the ,anti-,gas ,department1 thereby settling once and for all the inherent association between offensive and defensive research1 a fact which had been apparent to many long before1 yet it still ignored the fundamental connection between offensive research and supply4 ,this had been recognised in ,french organisation as early as #aiae1 yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war4 ,the ,anti-,gas ,department4--,we have mentioned the origin of the ,anti-,gas ,department4 ,although separate in organisation from chemical warfare research1 yet the remarkable work and personality of the late ,lt4-,colonel ,e4 ,f4 ,harrison1 ,c4,m4,g41 overcame the disadvantages by energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organisation4 ,general ,hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating3 ,colonel ,harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war4 ,it is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator1 but this he would have been the first to deny4 ,his great merit was as an organiser4 ,he gathered round him an enthusiastic group of young chemists and physicists1 and the box respirator represents the joint result of their researches1 carried out under his inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment4 ,he organised the manufacture of the respirator on a large scale1 and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite of all the difficulties of production1 the supplies promised to ,france never failed4 ,fifty million respirators were produced by the department1 and of these nineteen million were box respirators4 ,anti-gas research was at first centred in the ,r4,a4,m4 ,college1 ,millbank1 and from the beginning of #aiag in the ,physiological ,institute1 ,university ,college1 ,london4 ,the work done in research and production not only protected the whole of the ,british ,army1 but formed the backbone of ,american and a large part of ,italian protection4 ,further1 the sacrifices made in connection with this work are not sufficiently known4 ,numbers of young scientists sacrificed their health and sometimes life1 in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions of ,englishmen and ,allies depended4 ,designs ,committee4--,we cannot leave this branch of the subject without referring to the ,chemical ,warfare ,designs ,committee4 ,an important trend in chemical warfare was its growing independence of the normal weapons of war1 and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal and newer types4 ,this tendency found expression in the above ,committee under the direction of ,professor ,jocelyn ,field ,thorpe4 ,the development of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem1 and the importance of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing with the limitation of armaments4 ,french ,organisation4--,french development followed very similar lines4 ,from ,april #bhth1 #aiae1 a ,commission of military representatives and scientists was organised under ,general ,curmer4 ,this gave place in ,june to a ,chemical ,warfare ,research ,committee under ,m4 ,weiss1 ,directeur des ,mines au ,ministere des ,traveaux ,publics4 ,in ,august1 #aiae1 three special ,committees were formed2 one under ,m4 ,kling for problems from the front1 whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable identifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the ,allies2 another under ,m4 ,moureu for offensive research1 whose brilliant organic investigation characterised later ,french developments1 and the other under ,m4 ,vincent1 for research on protection4 ,but1 in the meantime1 the importance of gas shell was impressed upon the ,french and1 on the #ast ,july1 #aiae1 this organisation passed into ,m4 ,albert ,thomas's new ,ministere de ,l',artillerie et des ,munitions4 ,manufacture passed into the hands of the ,directeur du ,materiel ,chimique de ,guerre4 ,in ,september1 #aiae1 these sections were centralised under ,general ,ozil1 attached to the same ,ministry4 ,general ,ozil's service was strongly supported by a number of eminent ,french scientists1 and achieved unusual success in the face of great practical difficulties4 ,a very close liaison was maintained with the army1 and the initiative1 energy1 and devotion of all concerned cannot be too highly praised4 ,in production alone the difficulties were enormous4 ,there was no highly organised dye industry available4 ,the prewar ,german monopoly had seen to that4 ,elaborate organisations and continuous research work under difficult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth1 running normal activities of the great ,german dye combine4 ,the salient points in ,french production are dealt with more fully in another chapter4 ,in research and protection ,french activities were no less handicapped and just as creditable4 ,the protection of the ,french armies was largely achieved through the genius and tireless industry of ,professor ,paul ,lebeau4 ,quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new ,german weapon1 the ,french developed their chemical offensive and defensive with characteristic elan and intuition4 ,contributing largely to ,allied research1 they took the lead in ,inter-,allied co-operation and liaison1 and their activities in this field were due to much worthier causes than mere geographical position4 ,italian ,development4--,the ,italians were alive to the importance of chemical warfare4 ,world famous names such as those of ,senator ,paterno and ,professor ,villavecchia were associated with their organisation4 ,once again1 however1 although not lacking in invention and initiative1 they were continually hampered by production1 which imposed such grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seriously the success of their campaign4 ,the success of the great ,german offensive against ,italy in the autumn of #aiag was largely ascribed to the ,german use of gas of such types and in such amounts that the ,italian protective appliances were outmanoeuvred4 ,further1 in spite of the offensive qualities of the ,italian gas organisation under ,col4 ,penna1 lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation1 so essential in maintaining gas morale4 ,towards the end of the war1 when the ,french and ,british production improved1 and with the entry of ,america and the promise of supplies therefrom1 it was possible to assist the ,italians from ,allied sources1 and arrangements were made to supply them with the ,british ,respirator1 to assist them in the development of the ,livens ,projector1 to supply large quantities of mustard and other gases1 and to assist them in production4 ,the use of the ,british box respirator was undoubtedly a great factor in repelling the ,austrian offensive of ,june1 #aiah4 ,their experimental fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed1 and1 backed by production1 ,italian chemical genius would have been capable of producing very serious results4 ,supply ,organisations4--,what a marked contrast between the organisation required for ,german and ,allied chemical warfare production6 ,such organisation implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation with research organisations1 for semi-scale work1 commercial functions1 priority1 raw material supply1 transport1 and all their concomitants4 ,in ,germany1 the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions4 ,the ,government addressed itself to one producing organisation which was responsible for most of the relevant research4 ,whole ,government departments were rendered unnecessary by this centralised production4 ,british ,supply ,organisation4--,in ,england the situation was entirely different4 ,even before the advent of mustard gas the ,government was compelled to apply to at least twenty contractors4 ,the products required were foreign to the normal activities of many of these4 ,they required assistance in raw materials1 transport1 technical methods1 either the result of the work of other factories or of research4 ,the latter again involved complex official organisation1 cumbrous even if efficiently carried out4 ,this at once introduced difficulties4 ,the centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead of in the centres of production4 ,much depended upon the co-ordination of the official departments4 ,quite apart from the ,government plants finally engaged in chemical warfare production1 more than fifty plants were used in private organisations1 of which a very high percentage were entirely new4 ,allied ,handicaps4--,the functions of the allied ,government supply departments were or should have been much more than those of an individual negotiating a contract4 ,owing to the fact that these were new plants1 and that the products were foreign to the production of many of the firms concerned1 two alternatives had to be faced4 ,either the technical and service departments of each firm had to be considerably strengthened1 or else a special organisation had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government technical and liaison personnel4 ,for reasons of secrecy and general efficiency the latter procedure evolved1 but neither represented the ideal solution4 ,the ,german ,solution4--,this was the ,german arrangement in which these functions were all embodied in the centralised producing organisation1 the ,i4,g4 ,the ,german ,government took the role of a pure contractor1 the only additional function being the choice of product and method1 a question of policy4 ,this implied the existence of a ,government experimental organisation1 but purely for this purpose4 ,departmental ,difficulties4--,the ,allied task would have been much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one1 in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided upon at first1 and need have suffered no very radical changes4 ,as it was1 however1 the ,british supply organisation had to administer some seventy plants1 which were really in private hands1 and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external perplexities of the problem4 ,they arose in its relationships with other ,government departments4 ,allied ,success ,against ,odds4--,taking a broad view of the case1 although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas production with anything but dismay1 except in a few cases1 yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded as well as we did with these entirely new substances4 ,the whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the ,allies is one of devoted effort by all concerned1 against overwhelming odds1 and although the level of results was poor compared with ,germany1 yet we find here and there brilliant examples of ,allied adaptability and tenacity amongst which the ,french development of mustard gas stands pre-eminent4 ,what we have already said about supply organisation may be summed up in one sentence4 ,the ,germans were already organised to produce4 ,we had to create ,government departments to administer a large number of plants in private hands1 and they had to cope not only with the external difficulties of the situation but with the almost overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation4 ,the checquered career of the ,british supply department provides a good example4 ,the ,french and ,americans suffered less than ourselves from these troubles1 the latter having the benefit of the combined experience of the other ,allies4 ,allied ,lack of ,vision in ,production4--,a survey of the earliest supply organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events have obscured4 ,few people realised the developments which chemical warfare would produce4 ,the early production of chemicals for gas warfare was grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores1 and graded in order of importance1 from the point of view of supply organisation with catapults and spring guns1 flame projectors and body shields6 ,it is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather than vision forced the importance of chemical warfare upon those responsible for munition production in the early stages of the war4 ,chemical warfare production remained under the ,trench ,warfare ,supply ,department for many months1 where it was one of ten ,trench ,warfare sections4 ,the vicissitudes of trench warfare supply are too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here1 but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly4 ,british ,lag in ,organisation4--,examining ,allied organisations1 we find that the ,french and ,americans approached this ideal solution more rapidly than ourselves1 and we can trace in our own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this centralised control1 although the last configuration1 under the direction of ,major-,general ,h4 ,f4 ,thuillier1 was the nearest approach4 ,french organisation for supply provides another example of their national characteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry4 ,as early as ,september1 #aiae1 the ,french centralised their research organisation1 the ,inspection des ,etudes et ,experience ,chimiques1 and their supply organisation1 the ,direction du ,materiel ,chimique de ,guerre1 in their ,service ,chimique de ,guerre under ,general ,ozil4 ,french and ,american ,characteristics4--,their early concentration on gas shell shows that this symmetrical organisation was due not only to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development4 ,american supply organisation again provides evidence of the national characteristic4 ,they had no ,i4,g4 but they had plenty of money and material1 and the total of ,allied experience in production4 ,they therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing centre known as ,edgewood ,arsenal4 ,we refer to this later4 ,the tremendous potentialities of this ,arsenal will readily he seen1 although they did not become effective during the war4 ,it would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical warfare to leave the matter at this stage1 or to make a minute analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success4 ,we may say that although the efforts of all concerned were beyond praise1 yet they were so initially handicapped that it was practically impossible even to approach the ,german efficiency4 ,in ,france and ,england we were suffering from the faults of past years1 our lack of attention to the application of science to industry4 ,the ,americans would also have suffered1 for they were in the same plight1 but they adopted the drastic solution of ,edgewood ,arsenal4 ,as we show later1 however1 this solution was really only a very necessary and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease4 ,we cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries4 ,if it is1 then the outlook is very poor4 ,inter-,allied ,chemical ,warfare ,liaison4--,chemical warfare offered1 in theory1 a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst the ,allies1 ,the new methods1 unhampered by tradition1 seemed1 at first sight1 admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy by an allied ,generalissimo and staff4 ,co-ordination never reached this stage1 although strong liaison organisations were developed4 ,inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in ,paris1 where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion of allied work4 ,the continuity of these relationships was maintained by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented4 ,the contact1 so close between actual allied scientific workers in this field1 became less evident in the application of their results to field warfare1 for several reasons4 ,in the first place1 close scientific contact in research was replaced by the actual field relationships of the armies1 and1 as is well known1 the central inter-allied command did not materialise until the spring of #aiah1 and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle to the actual battlefield4 ,the traditional differences between4 the methods of the different services of each ally still existed to a large extent1 and they found expression in type of armament1 equipment1 and military standards1 such as1 for example1 gun calibres and shell design1 to which chemical warfare had to conform4 ,no inter-allied gas mask materialised1 although this would have been of inestimable advantage4 ,probably the example of most complete co-ordination occurred on the supply side1 where absence of the above traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination4 ,inter-,allied ,supply4--,the writer was responsible for initiating1 in #aiag1 an ,inter-,allied ,chemical ,supply ,committee1 whose function was to pool effectively the allied raw materials1 and to arrange their distribution in accordance with allied programmes1 the exchange of which implied a considerable step4 ,later this ,committee became one of a number1 similarly constituted1 forming part of the ,inter-,allied ,munitions ,council4 ,thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply1 now that the emergenices of the situation have passed1 an important contrast emerges4 ,after three years of war1 and although protected by the powerful arm of the blockade1 we were1 still resorting1 for chemical warfare supply1 to measures which1 compared with the ,german methods1 were complicated1 clumsy1 and inefficient4 ,this was1 in a sense1 forced upon us by the number of the allies1 and the fact that they held the outer lines4 ,but it is easily forgotten that ,germany also had a number of allies1 and that ,germany supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all4 ,nature of ,chemical ,warfare ,research4--,so1 much has been vaguely said1 and is vaguely known1 about research in chemical warfare that a brief analysis will be of value4 ,discovery of ,new ,substances4--,research for this purpose has a number of very distinct functions1 ,the most obvious is the discovery of new substances4 ,but there are others in connection with which research work represents a much greater volume4 ,very few new substances which found valuable application during the war were revealed by chemical warfare research4 ,the bulk of the important substances were already known as such1 although their importance for war was probably not realised4 ,it is most important to emphasise the fact that even in the future1 should there be no direct attempts to reveal new chemical warfare substances1 they will undoubtedly arise as a normal outcome of research1 even if1 without exception1 every chemist in the world became a most pronounced pacifist4 ,a valuable substance once discovered or decided upon1 however1 whole series of research investigations become necessary4 ,technical ,method of ,preparation2--,filling ,problem2--,protection2-- ,half-,scale ,investigation4--,the substance must be prepared in the most efficient manner for manufacture1 which may not be the mode of its discovery4 ,it must be used in shells1 cylinders1 or some other war chemical device4 ,each device represents a different filling problem1 different difficulties with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container4 ,if a projectile is in question the ballistics become of importance4 ,more important than any of these1 except production1 is the question of protection4 ,it is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive chemical must be protected against it4 ,it may1 therefore1 be necessary to modify the existing mask or protective appliance1 or to create an entirely new one4 ,if research reveals the necessity for the latter course of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance4 ,in addition1 according to productive difficulties1 it may be necessary to undertake comprehensive and very expensive research on half-scale methods for production4 ,it is impossible in many cases to proceed directly from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious risk of failure4 ,two ,classes of ,research4--,broadly1 these research functions form two classes1 those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval4 ,there must be1 of course1 a certain amount of overlapping and liaison between the two classes4 ,herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the ,germans4 ,their great producing organisation1 the ,i4,g41 was able to take over automatically certain of these research functions1 in particular all those with regard to preparation and production1 even of protective appliances4 ,the ,government reserved what we have called the policy functions1 and was responsible1 we assume1 for the mass1 of physiological and design research which must always precede approval or a decision on policy4 ,signs were not lacking1 further1 that the ,i4,g4 was even employed on certain occasions for this latter type of research4 ,conclusion4--,from the facts at our disposal there can be no doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of the ,allies for chemical warfare investigation were considerably more extensive and expensive than those of ,germany with the one notable exception of trained technical organic chemists4 ,it is very doubtful whether the ,german field experiments were as largely provided for as those of the ,allies4 ,when we think of the ,french grounds at ,versailles and ,entressin1 the ,british at ,porton1 the ,american grounds in ,france and in ,america1 and the ,italian organisations1 there can hardly be any doubt that the total ,german facilities were much smaller4 ,under the actual circumstances of the war1 however1 it was difficult to develop more co-operation than was possible by a very close liaison4 ,the fact that all the experimental developments from these grounds required special modification to meet the peculiar needs of artillery and other equipment for each ally1 prevented the adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances4 ,even uniform shell marking was found impracticable4 ,the ,outer and ,inner ,lines4--,the ,allied situation compelled the multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries4 ,lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a considerable disadvantage1 compared with ,germany1 in the development of such organisations4 ,using a strategic comparison1 we can say that ,germany not only possessed the inner lines in the chemical war1 but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them1 in the shape of the great ,i4,g4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,struggle ,,for ,,the ,,initiative ,meaning of the ,chemical ,initiative4--,the ,german invasion of ,belgium in #aiad was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war4 ,by disregarding their pledge1 a scrap of paper1 they automatically introduced into this attack the elements of military surprise4 ,we1 the enemy1 were unprepared1 and a complete rearrangement of dispositions became necessary4 ,a recent writer has admirably summarised the facts4#a #a ,a4 ,f4 ,pollard4 ,a ,short ,history of the ,great ,war4 ,methuen1 #aibj4 ,germany began the war on the ,western front before it was declared1 and on #a-b ,august1 ,german cavalry crossed the ,french frontier between ,luxembourg and ,switzerland at three points in the direction of ,longwy1 ,luneville1 and ,belfort4 ,but these were only feints designed to prolong the delusion that ,germany would attack on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay the reconstruction of the ,french defence required to meet the real offensive4 ,the reasons for ,german strategy were conclusive to the ,general ,staff1 and they were frankly explained by ,bethmann-,hollweg to the ,british ,ambassador4 ,there was no time to lose if ,france was to be defeated before an effective ,russian move1 and time would be lost by a frontal attack4 ,the best railways and roads from ,berlin to ,paris ran through ,belgium2 the ,vosges protected more than half of the ,french frontier south of ,luxembourg1 ,belfort defended the narrow gap between them and ,switzerland1 and even the wider thirty miles' gap between the northern slopes of the ,vosges and ,luxembourg was too narrow for the deployment of ,germany's strength2 the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications of ,verdun1 ,toul1 and ,nancy4 ,strategy pointed conclusively to the ,belgium route1 and its advantages were clinched by the fact that ,france was relying on the illusory scrap of paper4 ,the first ,german cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain the decisive initiative1 by the unauthorised use of a surprise of an entirely different nature4 ,modern writers are at great pains to establish how the world war1 although leaving the final function of the infantry unchanged1 rendered them and their staff subservient to mass munition production4 ,mr4 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells explains this to the ,kaiser in a delightful imaginary interview between that august person and an hypothetical manufacturer4#a ,professor ,pollard tells us how1 when the first ,german surprise had failed1 the war became a test of endurance rather than generalship4 ,we will leave a clear field for any military challenge to such a point of view4 ,our objection is that it is not fully developed4 ,the war was still a test of generalship1 that of directed production4 ,this war has shown1 and future wars may unfortunately confirm1 that the type and secrecy of production is as important as its volume4 ,there will still be the purely military surprise and manoeuvre1 but superimposed1 co-ordinated1 and sometimes predominant will appear the technical surprise1 the result of the generalship of production4 #a ,war and the ,future4 ,cassel1 #aiag4 ,such a surprise is achieved by the sudden introduction on a large scale of some entirely new war weapon1 capable of achieving a strategic or tactical objective in an unsuspected manner4 ,although the general idea of this second type of surprise existed before the war1 particularly in naval warfare1 it required the coincidence of the ,great ,european ,war and modern scientific development to demonstrate its great importance on land4 ,thus the first ,german gas attack found the opposing troops entirely unprotected1 not merely through the absence of a mask1 but in training and technical discipline4 ,the case is quoted of an indignant gassed soldier who1 in an early gas attack1 when reproached for not protecting himself1 thereupon opened his tunic and revealed a mask firmly tied round his chest6 ,it is a far cry from such a case to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an army of millions4 ,the attack reaped the corresponding results in casualties and morale4 ,it found the opposing medical services unequipped1 not only to treat the new type of casualty1 but even to determine its nature rapidly and efficiently4 ,in short1 it found the enemy utterly unprepared1 either in theory or practice1 to counter its effect4 ,the importance of this second type of surprise lies in its peculiar potentialities4 ,it may affect a given military result with an extraordinarily small expenditure of material1 energy1 and eventually human life1 when compared with the older military weapons4 ,chemical warfare is a weapon1 par excellence1 to achieve this second type of surprise4 ,therein lies its chief importance4 ,as a result1 the history of chemical warfare becomes one of continual attempts1 on both sides1 to achieve surprise and to counter it by some accurate forecast in protective methods4 ,it is a struggle for the initiative4 ,more than this1 as the use of chemical warfare becomes an organic part of operations1 as it did during the war1 these operations become correspondingly dependent upon conditions imposed by the chemical campaign4 ,one can imagine the case of an army unprotected against a new gas1 aware that the enemy is ready to employ the latter1 compelled to postpone some huge offensive until its protective methods were equal to countering the new chemical4 ,general ,fries1 the ,american authority1 states1 in reference to mustard gas1 and the ,northern offensives in #aiag3 ,it is no disparagement of the ,british1 nor of any one else1 to say that they held up the date of their attack for two weeks pending further investigations into the effects of this new gas4 ,ludendorff1 referring to the ,german offensive in ,march1 #aiah1 tells us1 ,our artillery relied on gas for its effect4 ,up till the morning of the #bjth strength and direction 7of the wind7 were by no means favourable1 and it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack4 ,such a point becomes of greater importance as the influence of other arms decreases4 ,if we assume international arrangements for the limitation of other types of armament in the future1 chemical warfare at once stands out as decisive4 ,controlling ,factors2--,rapid ,manufacture4--,certain well-defined factors hold a controlling position in the chemical initiative4 ,before any chemical discovery can be used for surprise on the front a second step must occur2 this is large scale manufacture4 ,this period is vital to surprise4 ,success in chemical warfare is largely dependent on secrecy1 which means achieving production in the shortest possible time1 and this is particularly important at the commencement of hostilities4 ,throughout the war the ,germans possessed this advantage and1 in the future1 unless certain steps are taken1 it will be theirs again4 ,a very simple example will suffice to show the importance of the combination of these two factors4 ,let us assume the not remote possibility that ,germany had refrained from using poison gas until she had reached the stage of development which existed at the time of her #aiah offensive4 ,there is little room for doubt that the big scale use of cloud attacks which would then have been available1 and of shell gas1 in particular mustard gas1 would have achieved decisive success4 ,the ,allies would have been totally unprotected1 the moral effect would have been enormous1 and1 even if we ignore the latter1 the number of casualties would have produced a gap the size of which was only dependent on ,german wishes4 ,rapid ,identification ,essential4--,it is important to remember1 however1 that once a chemical campaign has commenced1 certain factors may militate against any lengthy retention of the initiative by either party4 ,organisations develop whose function is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical devices so that protective research and production can commence with the minimum delay4 ,this assumes the existence of a protective appliance and organisation4 ,the very efficient collaboration of the ,british ,central ,laboratory in ,france for the examination of new gas shell with the ,french organisation centred in ,paris provides numerous examples of the functioning of this safeguard4 ,no time was lost in identifying the nature of the various chemicals employed by ,germany in her shell fillings4 ,speed was vital4 ,the use of a new type of chemical in shell1 bomb1 or other contrivance1 in any sector of the front1 on whatever scale1 however small1 was reported without delay4 ,then followed instantaneous collection and examination1 after which all front line formations1 other formations1 allies1 and rear organisations were expeditiously warned4 ,the harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type might be followed by the use of hundreds of thousands in a deadly attack one hundred miles away or on another allied front4 ,not only were captured offensive contrivances of value for this purpose1 but the rapid examination of new enemy masks was of prime importance1 for it could be assumed that the enemy would be protected against his own surprises in store for others4 ,attempts to ascertain the enemy's gas activities were not confined to examining captured material after their first use4 ,raids and artillery fire were both used to obtain intelligence regarding preparations1 or to break up the gas emplacements4 ,the ,germans have provided us with a particularly gallant and interesting attempt4 ,near ,nieuport the front penetrated a region inundated by the ,belgians during the desperate ,german offensives of #aiad4 ,the trench system1 winding through a mile or so of sand dunes1 passed in a southeasterly direction through the marshy sector known as ,lombartzyde4 ,here the bogged front lines were intersected by the ,yser canal1 the ,german front trench being some #hj yards away4 ,allied gas was installed in the ,lombartzyde and neighbouring sectors ready for discharge on the first favourable opportunity4 ,for some reason or other the ,germans suspected this1 and at night a raiding party swam down the ice cold ,yser1 and1 negotiating the submerged wire1 landed in the ,allied support line4 ,stunning the sentry with a bomb which1 fortunately1 refused to explode1 they proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplacements4 ,either through unexpected disturbance1 or for some other reason1 they were compelled to leave before completing their inspection1 and successfully swam the ,yser canal back to their own trenches4 ,this hazardous enterprise represents but one of many raids whose function it was to ascertain the presence of enemy gas4 ,propaganda and ,morale4--,another factor intended to facilitate the attainment of the chemical initiative was the ,german use of propaganda4 ,rumours1 reflected in the ,press1 were often current at the ,front1 at home1 and in neutral countries1 that some particularly fiendish chemical contrivance was about to be launched against the ,allies by ,germany4 ,thus1 in ,january and ,february of #aiaf1 vigorous propaganda activity of this kind in ,switzerland preceded the great ,german offensive at ,verdun4 ,the new gas was heralded by fantastic stories4 ,certain death was threatened for all within one hundred yards of the shell burst4 ,the origin of the report was traced to various sources4 ,in one case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a ,german factory1 desirous of warning the ,french through ,swiss friends1 in other cases ,german scientists were reported to be influencing ,francophile neutrals in order that they might warn the ,french4 ,but an analysis of the propaganda reveals something more than its sensational nature4 ,the information arrived at well-defined periods1 which usually preceded the actual use of a new gas or chemical device by ,germany4 ,but when the actual effort is compared with the prophecy we find that in no case was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas4 ,thus1 before the use of phosgene by the ,germans at the end of #aiae1 definite reports reached the ,allies regarding the projected use of at least ten new gases by ,germany1 which were described not only chemically1 but as being colourless1 odourless1 powerful1 blinding1 and instantaneously deadly6 ,no such volume of propaganda was experienced before the first ,german cloud attack at ,ypres4 ,indeed1 one would not have expected it1 for the mere fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war1 and of military value4 ,this propaganda was not without its effect1 and1 but for the excellent ,allied gas discipline1 would have been an effective precursor to the gas itself4 ,cases were not absent1 at the ,battle of ,loos1 for example1 in which the ,german use of lachrymators found ,british soldiers so mentally unprepared1 or rather let us say prepared by propaganda1 as to spread ridiculous rumours on the battlefield as to the all-powerful nature of the new ,german gas shell4 ,these were1 in fact1 bursting a few yards away1 with no more serious results than lachrymation and vomiting4 ,the extended use of shell gas by the ,germans in the summer of #aiaf was again preceded by intensive propaganda during the early months of that year1 in which the promise of prussic acid was prominent4 ,the influence of a name is very curious4 ,prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties than any other gas4 ,this fact became apparent with the increasing use of the ,french ,vincennite1 which contained prussic acid4 ,yet ,german propaganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire fear in the ,allied soldiers by the threat to use prussic acid4 ,it is clear that armies cannot abandon gas discipline1 and that an important factor in strengthening this discipline is a wise distribution of gas knowledge4 ,the use of mustard gas and newer shell gases in #aiag was again preceded by a burst of propaganda4 ,in this period we find the first reference to long-range gas shell and aircraft gas bomb1 and1 curiously enough1 a certain amount of propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical1 which partially described mustard gas4 ,as further confirmation of the ,general ,staff origin of this propaganda we find that the #aiah outburst occurred two or three months earlier in the year than in #aiag4 ,this was accounted for1 no doubt1 by its intended influence upon ,allied morale in the great ,german offensive of early #aiah4 ,this last wave of propaganda includes one very interesting example4 ,it is better known than other cases through its association with the ,international ,red ,cross at ,geneva4 ,this body represented in ,february1 #aiah1 that ,germany was about to use a really terrible gas which would have such disastrous effects that it was absolutely essential to make a last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas warfare4 ,the official wire reads as follows3--,protest of ,international ,red ,cross against the use of ,poison ,gas4 ,i have received private letter from ,monsieur ,x41 ,president of ,international ,red ,cross1 which ,i think that ,i ought to lay before you4 ,he says that ,red ,cross were induced to make protest by what they had heard of new gas ,germans are preparing although ,red ,cross understands that the ,allies are aware of the gas and are taking their precautions4 ,as they did not wish to draw an indictment of ,germany they appealed to both groups of belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this weapon4 ,red ,cross asks whether the ,entente leaders through ,inter-,allied ,council at ,versailles could not make a loud declaration which would reach the peoples of the ,central ,empires as well as their rulers1 pledging themselves not to use such gas on condition that the two ,emperors similarly bind themselves not to employ it4 ,if the latter refuse1 all the guilt will rest with them4 ,although there can be no doubt that the ,international ,red ,cross and the ,swiss involved in this move were absolutely bona fide1 yet whoever was responsible for initiating the move on the ,german side played his hand very well4 ,if1 as actually occurred1 the protest did not result in the cessation of gas hostilities1 it still served its purpose as propaganda aimed at ,allied morale4 ,knowing his dispositions for gas defence1 and our own offensive preparations1 it is probable that the enemy was willing to withdraw before being overwhelmed by ,allied and ,american production4 ,after three years of costly improvised production by the ,allies1 ,germany could no longer securely enjoy the fruits of the initiative provided by the plants and factories of the ,i4,g4 ,peculiar ,peace-,time ,danger4--,there can be no doubt therefore that the mere contact of two armies during war acts as a check against the decisive use of chemical warfare1 except in the very early stages4 ,during peace this contact will be practically non-existent1 and it would be possible for any country so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery that1 given rapid means of production1 it could repeat the ,german surprise of #aiae1 this time with decisive results4 ,should such a nation possess a monopoly in the means of rapid production1 the world is practically at her mercy4 ,should she be prepared to break her word1 the usual means of controlling disarmament are impotent against these developments4 ,war ,fluctuations of ,initiative4--,in the light of the above remarks the fluctuations in the initiative during the recent war are very significant4 ,the first marked feature was the development of ,british and ,allied protection to counter the enemy attacks which would presumably follow the first ,german use of cloud gas4 ,immediately after the ,german chemical surprise1 and while the ,allies were still undecided whether to retaliate1 work proceeded feverishly on the development of some form of protection for the hitherto unprotected soldier4 ,in response to ,lord ,kitchener's dramatic appeal to the women of ,england and ,france1 masks were sent to ,france in sufficient quantity within a few days4 ,they were of a very primitive type1 and consisted of a pad of cotton wool impregnated with certain chemicals1 to be held in place over the mouth1 which was superseded1 in ,may1 by a very similar contrivance1 slightly more efficient with regard to the length of time of protection4 ,dr4 ,haldane and certain other prominent chemists and physiologists worked on the different improvised types4 ,with this feeble protection1 or1 in the first case1 with none at all1 our armies had to face the first ,german cloud gas attacks4 ,the idea of the gas helmet which covered the whole head was brought to ,england by ,captain ,macpherson of the ,newfoundland ,corps1 early in ,may4 ,suitably impregnated1 it made satisfactory tests4 ,the helmet type of respirator made of flannel was first tested in the ,anti-,gas laboratories on ,may #ajth1 #aiae1 and was a great success compared with previously suggested types4 ,arrangements for its manufacture were accordingly made1 and this began in ,june1 #aiae4 ,this protective device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid film eyepiece1 and was called the hypo helmet4 ,the fabric was impregnated with the same solution as the cotton waste pads described above1 the dipping being carried out largely at ,oxford ,works1 but partly in the ,royal ,army ,clothing ,department1 ,pimlico4 ,its manufacture was continued until ,september1 #aiae1 about two and a half millions being made in all4 ,from ,june1 #aiae1 we never really lost the initiative in the matter of defence1 although1 at different times1 the struggle was very intense4 ,it was this helmet1 with the modified phenate impregnation1 which1 known as the ,p4 helmet1 formed the first line of defence against the probable employment of phosgene by ,germany4 ,it became known as the ,tube ,helmet when fitted with a mouthpiece for exhaled air1 and1 in this form1 countered the formidable enemy phosgene attack in ,december1 #aiae4 ,the later addition of hexamine1 suggested from ,russia1 greatly improved the efficiency against phosgene and led to the ,p4,h4 helmet1 which was issued from ,january1 #aiaf4 ,it was not withdrawn until ,february1 #aiah1 but in the later stages was used as a second line of defence4 ,the magnitude of this manoeuvring for protection can be judged from the facts that two and a half millions of hypo helmets1 nine millions of ,p4 helmets1 and fourteen millions of ,p4,h4 helmets were issued during the campaign4 ,there is no doubt that this early period1 however1 was a very costly experiment on the use of the different masks1 the success of which involved the loss of numbers of men who were compelled1 through reasons of supply or uncertain design1 to use the less efficient types4 ,in one case1 for example1 the trial of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise efficient masks absolutely useless by breaking1 and caused losses4 ,we cannot afford to repeat such experiments in future4 ,failure to develop protective appliances fatally implies large-scale experiments in future wars in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur4 ,if steady research in peace can diminish this possible loss1 shall it be stopped8 ,the urgency of these developments can be understood from a case quoted by ,general ,hartley3#a ,a certain modification of the respirator was considered necessary in ,france1 and officers were sent home to explain what was needed4 ,within forty-eight hours of their arrival arrangements were made to modify the respirators1 and within a few weeks the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the new pattern4 ,less than three months after the change had been recommended three attacks were made by the ,germans which would certainly have had very serious consequences if our troops had not been in possession of the improved respirator1 as the older pattern would not have withstood the concentration of gas employed4 ,this was only one of many changes that were made in the respirator to meet new developments4 #a ,report before the ,british ,association1 #aiai4 ,how urgent was the need for these developments8 ,it was vital4 ,here is a case showing frightful losses sustained by partially or inefficiently protected troops4 ,between ,may and ,july of #aiae the ,germans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the ,russians1 immediately west of ,warsaw4 ,in all these attacks1 taken together1 gas was discharged for a total time of not more than one hour1 and they were all practically from the same position1 on a front of about six miles4 ,the affair seems relatively small1 yet what was the result8 ,the ,russians lost not less than #ejjj dead on the field1 and their total casualties were of the order of #be1jjj officers and men4 ,a ,siberian regiment had1 before the last attack1 a ration strength of about forty officers and #djjj men4 ,this was reduced by a twenty minutes gas discharge to four officers and four hundred men4 ,no other weapon could have reproduced1 under the most favourable conditions for its use1 in as many days1 what gas was able to do in as many minutes4 ,although our protection had countered the later ,german attacks with cloud gas1 yet it threatened to fail to meet the situation created by the use of a variety of organic chemicals in shell4 ,in order to counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the enemy1 compounds which penetrated the helmet insufficiently to cause serious casualties but sufficiently to hamper the individual by lachrymation1 goggles were introduced in which the eyes were protected by rims of rubber sponge4 ,this remedied the weakness of the ,p4,h4 helmet and produced the ,p4,h4,g4 helmet1 of which more than one and a half millions were issued during #aiaf-aiag4 ,towards the end of #aiae the standard protection was the ,p4 and ,p4,h4 helmet1 but the use of lachrymators compelled us to use the ,p4,h4,g4 ,even this helmet was not satisfactory against the high concentrations of phosgene or lachrymators1 and after much research the opinion gained ground that further development must be on other lines4 ,in addition1 the need for a more general form of protection was emphasised by the ,german adoption of a mask of cartridge design4 ,in other words1 the fabric of the helmet1 or facial portion of the mask1 was made impermeable1 and the filtration of the poisoned air occurred through a cartridge1 or filtering box1 attached to the fabric in the form of a snout4 ,the cartridge provided a much greater protective range and capacity4 ,it was clear that such ,german protection was evidence of their plans for the further use of gas4 ,the new ,german cartridge mask appeared in the autumn of #aiae4 ,doctor ,h4 ,pick1 reviewing ,german protective measures in ,schwarte's book1 enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal mask and explains1 ,it was only our early recognition of these requirements which gave us an advantage over the enemy from the first in the sphere of defensive measures against gas1 and which spared us from having to undertake radical alterations in the apparatus as the ,english1 ,french1 and ,russians had to do more than once4 ,this early adoption of a comprehensive view on protection by ,germany is a testimony to both ,german thoroughness and their definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chemical war4 ,the latter is not mere inference1 for it is borne out by the dates at which they commenced production in their dye factories4 ,further1 even if the ,german cartridge mask was only decided upon after ,loos1 which is not probable1 our feeble reply in that battle would hardly have justified such a radical advance in protection4 ,it was thus forecasted that not only would new ranges of compounds be employed which it would be most difficult to counter individually1 but aggressive methods would arise1 either entirely new or modifications of the cloud method1 which would enable much higher concentrations to be obtained than those in evidence hitherto4 ,accordingly the first type of the well-known ,british ,box ,respirator was designed1 giving a big capacity of highly efficient filtering material1 or granule1 contained in a canister1 with an improved face-piece and breathing arrangements4 ,without going into details1 it may be said that ,colonel ,harrison and ,major ,lambert were associated with a number of other enthusiastic workers in developing the ,box ,respirator4 ,here again the question of chemical supply threatened to influence our retention of the initiative4 ,without going into the development of the granule in the respirator1 the supply of potassium permanganate was of prime importance1 and the country was woefully deficient in the production of this substance4 ,the determined efforts of ,british manufacturers overcame this difficulty4 ,it was now possible to work on general lines for the improvement of this canister to increase its protective range1 and to modify the canister specifically in accordance with intelligence as to what the enemy had recently done or was about to do4 ,in this way1 and successively1 the army was successfully protected against the higher concentrations employed and the newer substances introduced4 ,the issue of the large ,box ,respirator commenced in ,february1 #aiaf4 ,it was replaced by the small ,box ,respirator which came out in ,august1 #aiaf1 and of which over sixteen millions had been issued before the signing of the ,armistice4 ,at one time over a quarter of a million small ,box ,respirators were produced weekly4 ,the chief modifications were the use of a smaller box or canister1 the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in the former type4 ,it became necessary in the spring of #aiag to provide more efficient protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate the respirator as minute particles1 and the first form consisted in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small ,box ,respirator4 ,the use of ,blue ,cross compounds by ,germany in the summer of #aiag rendered this matter more urgent1 and a special filter jacket was designed which fitted round the ,small ,box ,respirator4 ,a million were made and sent to ,france4 ,developments proceeded on these lines4 ,altogether1 more than fifty million masks and respirators of different kinds were manufactured by the ,british ,anti-,gas ,department for our own and ,allied armies4 ,we thus have some idea of the importance of protection in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on4 ,there can be no doubt as to the answer to this question4 ,it is not only in the interest of the army1 whether a ,league of ,nations or a national army1 but also in those of the civil population4 ,the ,tense ,protective ,struggle4--,few people realise how the development of ,allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced upon each side in a number of critical steps4 ,at each of these1 had research and production been unequal to the task1 the armies would have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some peculiar way1 thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel1 rifle1 and machine-gun fire4 ,the army has an apt expression4 ,an officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed half naked4 ,to be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness4 ,a modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten than one without boots4 ,more than this1 it must be clearly understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production will remain of very little use unless1 supported by comprehensive research which1 itself1 gains enormously in efficiency if related to enemy offensive activities4 ,the ,german ,mask4--,consider the ,german mask for a moment4 ,we have seen how ,germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge form before any of the other belligerents1 and in good time to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene1 at the end of #aiae4 ,indeed1 ,germany probably held up the use of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed1 although ,schwarte's book claims that the ,german mask issue in #aiae was mainly a protection against chlorine4 ,the filling consisted of some such material as powdered pumice-stone saturated with a solution of potash1 and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal in order to protect against organic irritants and phosgene4 ,these were the familiar one-layer drums4 ,then came the ,british concentrated cloud gas offensive in the summer of #aiaf1 which undoubtedly found the ,german mask unequal to some of the higher concentrations which were obtained under most favourable conditions4 ,the ,gas ,officer of the ,sixth ,german ,army stated in a document issued in ,november1 #aiaf3 ,considerable losses were caused by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly4 ,the casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dugouts1 to the neglect of gas discipline1 masks not being at hand1 to faulty masks1 and to the use of old pattern drums 99which could not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy4 7,the italics are our own4--,v4,l47 ,evidence is found in the introduction of the ,german three-layer drum in the autumn of #aiaf4 ,an army does not undertake the manufacture of millions of new appliances without very good reason4 ,this new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection4 ,the middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal1 which had the property of absorbing large quantities of organic irritants and phosgene4 ,in the three-layer drum the latter gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes1 although we have reason to believe that the ,german staff was always apprehensive1 and ,german soldiers suspicious of the actual penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality of projector discharges4 ,dr4 ,pick explains in ,schwarte's book what is already well known1 that the charcoal layer has a wide1 non-specific effect1 and it retains almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small1 even if very strongly neutral in character 7as1 for example1 chlorpicrin74 ,he goes on to say the progressive development of gas warfare led to the use of these very materials1 whilst substances with acid properties1 such as chlorine1 fell more and more into disuse4 ,the three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence4 ,when the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in #aiag1 the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers4 ,this stage of development ended in #aiah1 when the other layers were done away with altogether1 and the entire three sets were filled with ,a' charcoal4 ,a' charcoal was a particularly efficient form4 ,we learn from the same source that the increased protection against phosgene was very welcome to the ,germans in view of the danger arising from gas projector attacks4 ,further1 the capacity for absorption of the ,german charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign production4 ,this was certainly true for the greater part of the war4 ,but ,dr4 ,pick continues1 in a sentence which is full of significance3 ,in consequence of the high quality of the drum's absorption1 we were able to carry on to the end of the war with a drum of relatively small proportions4 ,this point is so important as to demand further explanation4 ,enforced ,german ,modifications4--,the most important disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing4 ,men undertaking arduous and dangerous duties in the presence of gas must wear a mask1 but they cannot undertake these duties if their breathing is seriously interfered with4 ,this is particularly so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery4 ,now the resistance depends1 for a given type of filling1 upon the area of the cross-section of the drum4 ,breathing will be easier through a very large area than through a very small one4 ,the ,british appliance was a frank admission that1 with its filling1 a large drum was necessary1 so large that the weight of it could not be borne by the mask itself1 but by attachment to the chest1 the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible rubber tube4 ,but the ,germans adopted from the beginning a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge was attached to and supported by the mask4 ,in other words1 their development was limited by the weight of their drum1 unless they completely changed their type on ,british lines4 ,it is quite clear that they realised this1 for ,doctor ,pick tells us1 referring to the large size of the ,british box3 ,for this reason the weight of the box is so great that it is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask4 ,it is1 therefore1 carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece of the mask by a flexible tube4 ,the development of ,british cloud gas compelled the ,germans so to modify their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably4 ,they countered this1 however1 by introducing an exceedingly active charcoal1 realising that the weight of their drum had already reached the limit possible with that type of apparatus1 and that they could not1 therefore1 get better breathing capacity by increasing its size4 ,when1 however1 the ,blue ,cross compounds were introduced1 it was necessary for both armies to take special precautions4 ,these precautions involved introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum4 ,dr4 ,pick tells us3 ,when the material of the ,blue ,cross type became of greater importance1 a supplementary apparatus had to be issued4 ,a thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid4 ,this arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the ,blue ,cross type used by the enemy1 as1 for instance1 stannic chloride1 whilst the ,german ,blue ,cross gas1 which was more penetrating1 was only retained to a moderate degree4 ,this is a direct admission that1 in order to counter the ,allied use of ,blue ,cross gas1 further filtering arrangements would have been necessary4 ,but the resistance to breathing of the ,german apparatus was already strained to the utmost4 ,it is exceedingly improbable that the ,germans1 having already reached the limit of size of the canister or drum1 and being unable to obtain better breathing by increase in size1 could have introduced any such device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit4 ,in other words1 the use of ,blue ,cross by the ,allies would have compelled them to adopt the ,british type of apparatus1 that is1 a bigger box supported by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube4 ,this would have led them into an impasse4 ,shortage of ,rubber4--,we know how1 in the beginning of #aiag1 they were compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask4 ,dr4 ,pick admits that this was due to lack of raw material1 rubber1 and there are many other signs that this was so4 ,although leather was not altogether a bad substitute for this purpose1 rubber would have been essential for the flexible tube1 and the millions required to refit the army would have completely broken the ,german rubber resources4 ,many facts1 including their feverish development of synthetic rubber1 small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost1 go to prove this conclusion4 ,the submarine1 ,deutschland1 returning to ,germany in #aiaf1 from its historic trip to ,america1 carried shipments of the most sorely needed commodities1 including large quantities of raw rubber4 ,stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles4 ,the first naval expedition to ,baltic ports after the ,armistice found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber4 ,the ,germans were being driven into an impossible position4 ,in other words1 the ,allies1 by a proper use of ,blue ,cross compounds1 could have regained the gas initiative4 ,there is no doubt that they were within a few months of doing so4 ,once again we see the importance of production4 ,lack of raw materials for protective purposes was endangering the ,german position1 but delay in offensive production by the ,allies removed that danger4 ,although their pressing need was obvious1 the ,blue ,cross arsenic compounds were not available4 ,the chemical war involves manoeuvring for position just as definitely as the older forms1 but in it production1 formerly a routine activity1 assumes critical strategic importance4 ,gas ,discipline4--,this constant vigilance against enemy surprise imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption of a protective appliance which1 in itself1 was a very big thing4 ,given the mask1 the army had to be taught how and when to use it4 ,a gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask at the right time with the least hampering of operations4 ,gas discipline thus became one of the most important features of general training1 a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results4 ,this discipline1 like all other protective work1 was dependent in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initiative4 ,one example out of many is found in the numerous ,german ,army ,orders which followed our introduction of the ,livens projector4 ,this weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly possible and for a time ,german gas discipline was severely shaken1 and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation4 ,the introduction of this weapon1 in fact1 was the first clear case of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the ,allies4 ,a telegram from ,german ,general ,headquarters stated3 ,the ,english have achieved considerable success by firing gas mines simultaneously from a considerable number of projectors on to one point4 ,casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning1 and because its concentration was so great that a single breath would incapacitate a man4 ,this is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative was very difficult to obtain after two years of war1 whereas by the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement4 ,the general development of ,german protection was a partial safeguard1 but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an order was issued for all ,german working parties to wear gas masks when within #ajjj yards of the front line on nights not obviously unsuitable for ,allied gas discharges4 ,it is difficult to exaggerate the military importance of such an imposition4 ,summary4--,we have thus covered a period1 the main features of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by ,germany and our rapid and successful protective reaction4 ,the conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar4 ,the complete surprise attending it could only be repeated at the commencement of another war4 ,it failed for entirely different reasons from those which prevented the decisive use of phosgene by the ,germans4 ,but our reaction carried us further1 and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack1 the ,livens projector1 which1 in its turn1 taxed the ,german protection to the utmost1 and threatened to overcome it4 ,history repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle4 ,two attempts at the cloud initiative1 the ,german phosgene attempt and the ,livens projector1 were both partially successful4 ,had either of those attempts shared the surprise of ,april #bbnd1 #aiae1 their success would have been many times greater4 ,it was contact on the battle front that developed a protective appliance and organisation1 by giving us an insight into enemy appliances and projects4 ,we cannot emphasise too strongly the significance of this for the future4 ,apart from remote exceptions1 contact will be entirely absent4 ,we can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will be revealed1 either between nations or to a central body4 ,suppose the ,germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities of cloud gas1 and1 realising the dependence of their one method upon wind direction and caprice1 had developed our method of producing cloud at a distance4 ,the combinations of the two methods at ,ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure4 ,this is a feeble example of what may occur4 ,new ,german ,attempts4--,by this time it was not easy to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise by the use of chemicals aimed at the respiratory system4 ,it appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field4 ,professor ,f4 ,p4 ,kirschbaum1 writing on gas warfare1 in ,schwarte's book1 reveals how ,germany counted on obtaining the gas initiative against the ,french at ,verdun4 ,he explains how the decision to use ,green ,cross on a large scale coincided with certain modifications in the design of the ,german gas shell1 which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid4 ,the manufacture of ,green ,cross1 he also tells us1 was assured in the special progress in technical chemistry1 and the output was adequate1 and goes on to explain1 ,the first use of per stuff#a found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection4 ,the ,french had equipped their troops with protection against chlorine1 but had provided no protection against phosgene1--the results of ,green ,cross ammunition were recognised by the troops4 ,during the big operations before ,verdun1 however1 the enemy did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask ,m#b for the respirator ,,xtx4 ,gas mask ,m#b was a protection against ,green ,cross4 ,for this reason ,green ,cross ammunition alone could not be expected to have an effect1 as soon as the enemy carried out defensive measures by means of gas mask ,m#b or some better apparatus4 ,this reverse spurred on the ,germans to renewed efforts4 ,the writer proceeds to explain how in #aiaf these efforts resulted in finding two important substitutes1 mustard gas or ,yellow ,cross and the arsenic compounds of the ,blue ,cross type4 #a ,diphosgene or ,green ,cross constituents4 ,yellow and ,blue ,cross4--,the ,germans had1 somewhat hastily1 laid aside their cloud activities4 ,but they were very keenly pursuing another line1 the development of shell gas4 ,thus1 in ,july1 #aiag1 they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative by the use of shell gas1 and were very largely successful in one case4 ,we refer to the ,yellow and ,blue ,cross shell1 containing mustard gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively4 ,captain ,geyer1 writing in ,schwarte's book1 relates3 ,gas was used to a much greater extent1 over #ajj1jjj shells to a bombardment after the introduction of the ,green ,cross shell in the summer of #aiaf at ,verdun4 ,from that time the use of gas became much more varied as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased1 field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles4 ,the most tremendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery1 and indeed in the use of gas in general1 came in the summer of #aiag with the introduction of the three elements1 ,green1 ,yellow1 and ,blue1 one after another4 ,this introduced the most varied possibilities of employing gas1 which were utilised to the full in many places on the front during the successful defensive operations of #aiag1 above all in ,flanders and at ,verdun4 ,the hardly perceptible poisoning of an area by means of ,yellow ,cross shell and the surprise gas attack became two of the new regulation methods of using gas4 ,yellow ,cross4--,the respirator afforded complete protection against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system1 but this gas evaded protection in other ways4 ,in the first place1 its early unfamiliarity evaded the gas discipline of the ,allies1 and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary4 ,this was speedily corrected1 but its second line of attack was not easily1 and never finally countered4 ,we refer to its vesicant action4 ,mustard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds in such slight concentrations1 even through clothing1 that it was a tremendous casualty producer1 putting men out of action for several weeks or months1 with a very low rate of mortality4 ,used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army1 its results might well have been decisive4 ,this was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function4 ,we had too readily assumed that gas1 or chemical attack1 would be restricted to the respiratory system1 or to the eyes4 ,we had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe4 ,mustard gas was a rude awakening4 ,it was impossible to protect fully against mustard gas1 unless we protected the whole body1 and it was never possible to do this during the war without too seriously influencing the movements of the soldier4 ,blue ,cross4--,the ,blue ,cross ,shell was a deliberate attempt to pierce the respirator4 ,it represented to the ,german mind such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unprotected4 ,some idea of the ,german estimate of its importance can be found in the following quotation from ,captain ,geyer3 ,the search for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations led to the discovery of a series of effective substances4 ,in view of the obvious importance of highly irritant compounds capable of existing in a very finely divided1 pulverised1 or particulate form1 research was made in the domain of little volatile substances with boiling points up to #djj'j4 ,this led to the astonishing discovery that diphenylarsenious chloride when scattered would penetrate all gas masks then in use1 even the ,german1 practically unweakened1 and would have serious irritant effects on the wearers4 ,this discovery could only be explained by the supposition that the irritant works in the form of particles which it is difficult to keep back by means of a respirator1 even a completely protecting respirator1 such as the ,german and ,english gas masks were at that time4 ,further analysis showed that the mixture of air and gas examined revealed a concentration of gas greatly in excess of the point of saturation for the vapour given off by this stuff4 ,finally1 ultra microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles4 ,a new type of fighting material had been discovered4 ,he also tells us how1 following this discovery1 production rose to #fjj tons monthly1 and used up all the arsenic obtainable in ,germany4 ,the ,allies were fully alive to the importance of this matter1 and we have already explained that1 had they been in possession of large quantities of ,blue ,cross compounds1 they might have forced ,german protection into an impossible position4 ,no better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed by ,germany owing to her flexible and efficient producing organisation4 ,captain ,geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these projectiles was considerable1 and1 therefore1 the monthly production reached a figure of over one million shell4 ,we have already emphasised the question of design in chemical warfare1 and its importance is borne out by the comparative failure of these ,german projectiles4 ,geyer explains how only minute particles less than #a_/aj1jjj of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask1 and he develops the difficulties experienced by ,germany in obtaining such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance4 ,he explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at a suitable shell1 and their unsuccessful struggle to overcome the necessity of a glass container1 which1 he says1 demanded a considerable advance in the technical work of shell production4 ,this attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of ,blue ,cross illustrates another method of attack4 ,geyer says1 ,blue and ,green ,cross ammunition were used simultaneously in the field--called coloured cross 7,buntkreuz7 in order1 by the use of ,blue ,cross1 to force the enemy to remove gas masks1 whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous effects of ,green ,cross4 ,matters seldom reached that point1 however1 for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of coloured cross' ammunition1 they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire4 ,the ,english in particular had tried to protect the troops against the effects of diphenylarsenious chloride1 and of diphenylarsenious cyanide 7which followed it and was even more effective7 by the use of filters made of woollen material and wadding4 ,they were to a great extent technically successful1 but the most effective defensive apparatus1 the jacket' to the box1 was unsatisfactory from the military point of view1 as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned4 ,the reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation4 ,the relative inefficiency of the ,german shell rendered this unnecessary4 ,in addition1 as ,captain ,geyer explains1 our troops were specially protected in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds4 ,an examination of our protective device by the ,germans obviously led them to believe that resistance to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable4 ,but here the exceptional gas discipline of the ,british troops became effective4 ,there is no doubt that the new mask was worn just as constantly and satisfactorily as the old4 ,captain ,geyer's remarks are also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred3 they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising the minds of those responsible for ,german protection4 ,particulate ,clouds4--,the principle of particulate clouds was not entirely new1 both sides having used smoke combined with lethal gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator4 ,it was thought that the particulate form of the smoke would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up vapours and gases4 ,the reasoning was perfectly sound4 ,it was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way4 ,there were good grounds to believe that such substances would penetrate the respirator1 and either produce a casualty or compel the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms produced1 to allow some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier4 ,fortunately for us1 these objectives were not attained1 but this was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the ,german preparations than to any inherent impossibility4 ,after this period1 although chemical warfare became increasingly an organic part of ,german 7and ,allied7 operations1 yet there is no serious field evidence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative4 ,it must be remembered1 however1 that gas figured very largely indeed in the ,march1 #aiah1 attempt1 by ,germany1 to regain the general initiative4 ,it is stated authoritatively1 for example1 that in ,july1 #aiah1 the ,german ,divisional ,ammunition ,dump contained normally #ej per cent4 of gas shell and1 in the preparation1 in ,may1 #aiah1 for ,german attacks on the ,aisne1 artillery programmes included as much as #hj per cent4 gas shell for certain objectives4 ,potential ,production and ,peace4--,enough has been said to show the general nature of the chemical warfare struggle4 ,the question of the chemical initiative is vital at the commencement of hostilities4 ,unless1 then1 we completely rule out any possibility whatever of a future war1 it is vital for that occasion4 ,we have indicated sufficiently clearly the factors upon which such initiative depends1 to show the critical importance of manufacturing capacity1 and protective preparedness4 ,a further quotation from ,schwarte's book is very much to the point4 ,it tells us3 ,whilst on our side only a few gases were introduced1 but with successful results1 the use of gas by the enemy presents quite another picture4 ,we know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the enemy1 and of fifteen types of gas projectile used by the ,french alone1 and we know1 from blind' 7dud7 shells which have been found1 what they contain4 ,the only effective gases amongst them were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide4 ,the other substances are harmless preparations1 used most probably for purposes of camouflage1 a method highly esteemed by the enemy1 but which did not enter into the question with us1 owing to the capacity of our chemical industry for the production of effective materials4 ,this is true to a considerable extent4 ,our dependence on improvised and relatively inefficient production imposed conditions upon ,allied policy1 whereas1 in ,germany1 they had but to command a flexible and highly efficient producing machine4 ,the world movement towards disarmament will hardly countenance the maintenance of permanent chemical arsenals4 ,in the face of war experience and further research developments the laborious war improvisation of these arsenals will not save us as it did in the last struggle4 ,any nation devoid of the means of production invites enemy chemical aggression and is helpless against it4 ,this1 and the need to keep abreast of chemical warfare development--particularly in protection-- are the chief lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,review ,,of ,,production ,critical ,importance of ,production4--,our analysis of the struggle for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production4 ,in the chemical more than in any other form of warfare1 production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions as an organic part of the offensive scheme4 ,a tendency in modern war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear4 ,staffs cannot leave the discoveries of the technical workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations1 for their sudden introduction into a campaign may have more influence on its result than the massing of a million men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault4 ,the use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort4 ,when1 after the first brilliant assault on the ,somme on ,july #ast1 we began to lose men1 material1 and the initiative1 in an endless series of local attacks1 we were even then regaining it by the home development of the tank4 ,even before the colossal ,german effort was frustrated by the first ,marne battle and the development of trench warfare1 the ,german laboratories were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas4 ,after the lull in their gas attacks1 when the ,germans sought to gain the initiative and a decision by the use of phosgene1 the quiet work of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered the move weeks before4 ,but in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective without large-scale production4 ,this was absolutely fundamental4 ,had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank1 had the ,germans failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of succeeding in weeks1 and had the box respirator taken longer to produce1 all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments would have had practically no influence on the campaign1 for they would have had no incidence upon it4 ,we could go on multiplying examples4 ,but what is the conclusion8 ,from this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges4 ,the initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs1 unless we enlarge the staff conception4 ,vital moves can be engineered from a point very remote in organisation and distance from the ,g4,h4,q4 of armies in the field4 ,but there is a critical step between the invention and its effect on military initiative4 ,this is production1 which for these newer methods becomes an organic part of the campaign4 ,but the future is our chief preoccupation4 ,what would be the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war8 ,it would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise4 ,three factors would be pre-eminent1 the nature of the idea or invention1 the magnitude on which it is employed1 and its actual time of incidence1 that is1 the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use4 ,now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors1 which are entirely dependent on production4 ,when1 in #aiag1 the ,allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to reply to ,german ,yellow ,cross1 their urgent representations met with no satisfactory response until nearly a year had elapsed4 ,this was not due to lack of invention1 for we had simply to copy the ,german discovery4 ,failure to meet the crying demands of the ,front was due to delay in production4 ,any eventual chemical surprise will1 under genuine conditions of disarmament1 depend on peace industry1 for no such conditions will tolerate the existence of huge military arensals4 ,we have already indicated the type of peace-time industry par excellence1 which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war4 ,it is the organic chemical industry4 ,therefore1 whatever the war may have taught us as to the value of chemical industry1 its importance from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times4 ,the surprise factor is responsible4 ,the next war will only commence once1 however long it may drag on1 and it is to the start that all efforts of a nation planning war will be directed4 ,it is1 therefore1 of importance to examine in detail the development of chemical production during the recent war4 ,a close examination is of more than historical significance1 and should provide answers to certain vital questions4 ,german chemical industry was the critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall4 ,how did the activities of this industry compare with our own production8 ,to this an answer is attempted below1 but graver questions follow4 ,was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal economic conditions1 and were we the victims of a considered policy8 ,if so1 who directed it1 and when did it first give evidence of activity8 ,an answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter4 ,significance of the ,german ,dye ,industry4--,at the end of #aiad the nation began to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the ,german dye monopoly4 ,apart from the immediate economic war disadvantages1 the variety and sinister peace ramifications of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed4 ,mr4 ,runciman1 then ,president of the ,board of ,trade1 stated with regard to the dye industry3 ,the inquiries of the ,government have led them to the conclusion that the excessive dependence of this country on a single foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry in which millions of our workpeople were employed1 constitutes a permanent danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of ,state encouragement4 ,measures were defined later4 ,in the debate in the ,house of ,commons in ,february1 #aiae1 on the aniline dye industry1 a member prominent in the discussion1 referring to taking sides on the question of ,free ,trade1 stated that1 ,it was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of the ,house is occupied with regard to ,,matters ,,connected ,,with ,,the ,,war1 and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils4 ,fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance of the technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry4 ,these are two out of many references to the pressure due to the absence of ,german dyes1 which illustrate the purely economic grounds on which the issue was being discussed1 on the one hand1 and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other4 ,exactly one month later came the first ,german gas shock4 ,such statements as the above tempt us to ask who1 at this time1 realised the common source of the direct military and indirect economic attack4 ,it can hardly be doubted that the existence of the ,german dye factories was largely responsible for the first ,german use of gas on the front4 ,we have already seen how1 from the first month of the war1 the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research4 ,falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor which finally determined its use4 ,referring to difficulties of production1 he says1 ,only those who held responsible posts in the ,german ,g4,h4,q4 in the winter of #aiad-ae 4 4 4 can form any estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time4 ,the adjustment of science and engineering 4 4 4 took place almost noiselessly1 so that they were accomplished before the enemy quite knew what was happening4 ,particular stress was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions 4 4 4 as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare4 ,referring to protective methods of trench warfare1 he continues1 ,where one party had gained time 4 4 4 the ordinary methods of attack often failed completely4 ,a weapon had1 therefore1 to be found which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax the limited capacity of ,german war industry in its production4 ,such a weapon existed in gas4 ,the ,germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred1 and ,ludendorff supplements our information by telling us how he discussed the supply of war material with ,herr ,duisburg and ,herr ,krupp von ,bohlen in ,halbach1 whom ,i had asked to join the train in the autumn of #aiaf4 ,the former was the ,chairman of the ,i4,g41 the great dye combine4 ,those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon after the first shock4 ,for the ,germans the answer was obvious4 ,the ,allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months1 if not years4 ,without the means of production available in ,germany1 we are not at all1 convinced that the gas experiment would have been made1 and had it not been made1 and its formidable success revealed1 ,germany's hesitation to use this new weapon would probably have carried the day4 ,this1 at least1 is the most generous point of view4 ,in other words1 the ,german poison gas experiment owed a large part of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly4 ,the combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led to the great experiment4 ,the future may again provide this combination1 unless the monopoly is removed4 ,following up this line of thought1 we can see how tempting was the ,german course of action4 ,falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed upon ,germany by the stabilisation of the ,western ,front early in #aiae4 ,the tension between the ,great ,general ,headquarters and the ,home ,government was already in evidence1 and would have caused difficulty in attaining suitable home and liaison organisations1 in particular with regard to supply4 ,we can well understand this when we remember the drastic changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments4 ,but what organisation was required for chemical warfare supply8 ,very little6 ,quoting from the report of the ,hartley ,mission to the chemical factories in the occupied zone1 we know that when the ,government wished to produce a new gas a conference with the various firms was held at ,berlin to determine how manufacture should be subdivided in order to use the existing plant to the best advantage4 ,the firms referred to were the constituent members of the highly organised ,i4,g4 ,there was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an efficient one existing in the ,i4,g4 ready to meet the ,government demands4 ,the path could not have been smoother4 ,ludendorff states in his memoirs that the ,hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production4 ,increased supply of explosives was also provided for4 ,he says3 ,we aimed at approximately doubling the previous production4 ,and again3 ,gas production1 too1 had to keep pace with the increased output of ammunition4 ,the discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less4 ,the use of gas shells increased correspondingly4 ,this programme represented a determined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of #aiaf4 ,it included not only gas but explosives1 both of which could be supplied by the ,i4,g4 ,explosives demanded oleum1 nitric acid1 and nitrating plants1 which already existed1 standardised1 in the factories of the dye combine4 ,the unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted for the production of explosives is instanced in the operation of a ,t4,n4,t4 plant at ,leverkusen1 producing #bej tons per month4 ,the conversion only took six weeks4 ,the factories of the ,i4,g4 supplied a considerable proportion of the high explosives used by ,germany4 ,in the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace production was even more intimate4 ,chemical warfare products are closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished organic chemicals and intermediates produced by the dye industry4 ,therefore1 in most cases1 even when the suggestion of the new chemical may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye research laboratories1 the products fall automatically into the class handled by the dye industry4 ,is there any doubt that the ,i4,g4 was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass production of the older war chemicals1 explosives1 and the newer types1 poison gases8 ,is there even a shadow of exaggeration in our claims8 ,there may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with ,germany at all costs1 regardless of the honourable settling of her debts1 regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed4 ,can even such concoct material to whitewash the military front of the ,i4,g48 ,if they would1 they must explain away these facts4 ,the plants of the ,i4,g4 produced more than two thousand tons of explosives per week1 at their average pre-war rate4 ,this is an enormous quantity4 ,how can we best visualise it8 ,in view of the chapters on ,disarmament which follow1 we will use the following comparison4 ,the ,treaty of ,versailles allows ,germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell of different stated calibres4 ,how much explosive will these shell require8 ,they could be filled by less than two days' explosives production of the ,i4,g4 at its average war rate4 ,between two and three million shell could be filled by the result of a week's production in this organisation4 ,further1 the average rate of poison gas production within the ,i4,g4 was at least three thousand tons per month1 sufficient to fill more than two million shell of ,treaty calibres4 ,unless drastic action has been taken1 the bulk of this capacity will remain1 and ,germany will be able to produce enough poison gas in a week to fill the ,treaty stock of shell2 this in a country where the manufacture and use of such substances are specially prohibited4 ,it is appropriate at this stage to describe as briefly as possible the origin and composition of this great ,german combination1 the ,interessen ,gemeinschaft1 known as the ,i4,g4 ,there is no need to go into the gradual self-neglect1 and the eventual rooting out by ,germany1 of the dye-producing industry in other countries1 notably ,england1 ,france1 and ,america4 ,the ,interessen ,gemeinschaft4--,by the end of the nineteenth century the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost exclusively in six great firms4 ,these were the ,badische ,anilin und ,soda ,fabrik1 ,ludwigshafen on the ,rhine1 known as the ,badische2 the ,farbenfabriken vorm4 ,friedr4 ,bayer1 ,co41 in ,leverkusen1 known as ,bayer2 ,aktien-,gesellschaft fur ,anilin-,fabrikation in ,berlin2 ,farbwerke vorm4 ,meister ,lucius ,bruning in ,hochst am ,main1 referred to as ,hochst2 ,leopold ,cassella ,g4m4b4,h4 in ,frankfort2 and ,kalle ,co41 ,aktien-,gesellschaft in ,biebrich4 ,each of these six great companies had attained enormous proportions long before the war4 ,only two other concerns had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale4 ,these were the ,chemische ,fabrik ,greisheim-,elektron of ,frankfort ,a4,m41 a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers1 and the ,chemische ,fabriken vormals ,weiler-ter ,meer1 ,uerdingen4 ,the position of all these establishments1 with one single exception1 along the ,rhine and its tributaries is well known4 ,their growth has been illustrated in their own prospectuses4 ,hochst was organised in #ahfc and started with five workmen4 ,in #aiab it employed #gfhj workmen1 #cgd foremen1 #cjg academically trained chemists1 and #gd highly qualified engineers4 ,the works of the ,badische1 which was organised in #ahfe1 covered1 in #aiad1 #ejj acres1 with a water front of a mile and half on the ,rhine4 ,there were #ajj acres of buildings1 #aa1jjj workmen1 and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks4 ,the establishment of ,bayer was on a scale entirely comparable4 ,quoting from an official ,american report1#a ,griesheim ,elektron1 prior to the war1 had enormous works chiefly devoted to the manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years1 when by absorption of the ,oehler ,works and the ,chemikalien ,werke ,griesheim1 its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the larger houses4 ,this move on the part of the ,griesheim ,elektron is interesting as an example of the general tendency which has characterised the development of the ,german dye industry4 ,this firm1 producing inorganic materials and intermediates1 absorbed the ,oehler ,works in order to find an independent outlet for its intermediate products1 thus becoming directly interested in dyestuffs production4 ,this move towards independence in the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere1 owing to the manner in which it simplified ,german production for chemical warfare4 ,combination1 however1 did not cease in the creation of these enormous establishments4 ,the cartel fever raged here as in other ,german industries4 ,by #aijd two immense combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry4 ,one of these comprised ,bayer1 ,badische1 and ,berlin2 the other ,hochst1 ,cassella1 and ,kalle4 ,by pooling profits1 by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in the other companies of its own cartel1 and by other familiar means1 the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business and the immense increases of export trade were minimised4 ,the centripetal tendency1 however1 did not stop here4 ,in #aiaf1 the two pre-existing cartels were combined with ,griesheim ,elektron1 ,weilerter ,meer1 and various smaller companies in one gigantic cartel1 representing a nationalisation of the entire ,german dye and pharmaceutical industry4 ,the combination was extremely close4 ,profits of the companies were pooled1 and after being ascertained each year on common principles were divided according to agreed percentages4 ,each factory maintained an independent administration1 but they kept each other informed as to processes and experiences4 ,there was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff obstacles in other countries materials were to he produced outside of ,germany by common action and at common expense whenever and wherever desirable4 #a ,alien ,property ,custodian's ,report1 #aiai4 ,at the time of the formation of this enormous organisation the capitalisation of each of the principal component companies was largely increased4 ,hochst1 ,badische1 and ,bayer each increased their capitalisation by #cf1jjj1jjj marks1 bringing the capital of each up to #ij1jjj1jjj marks4 ,berlin increased its capital from #ai1hjj1jjj to #cc1jjj1jjj marks4 ,other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group to over #chc1jjj1jjj marks4 ,for many years a large part of the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations4 ,the real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure4 ,in fact1 it is estimated that the actual investment in the works comprising the cartel is not less than #djj1jjj1jjj4 ,it cannot be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has been created expressly for the expected war after the war1 and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently and on a larger scale the various methods by which ,german attacks upon all competition were carried on4 ,two additional features must be indicated4 ,a policy to which we have referred was most actively followed1 aiming at complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters relevant to production1 especially regarding raw materials4 ,we mention later how the war has strengthened the strong prewar position of the ,i4,g4 in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials for the intermediates and finished dyes4 ,recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation1 including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new synthetic processes from carbide1 for acetic acid and the other products normally obtained by wood distillation4 ,again1 the policy of the ,i4,g4 appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war4 ,exchanges of directing personnel and of capital amongst the branches have been recorded for which the term cartel is no longer a fair description4 ,in addition1 considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only reveal the vision and activity of the ,i4,g4 but which indicate its close contact with the ,german ,government4 ,with such an organisation in existence and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors and the ,german ,government for other purposes than chemical warfare1 and in agreement with the paternal policy adopted by the latter towards this chemical industry1 production became simplicity itself4 ,war ,production by the ,i4,g4--,let us1 therefore1 examine in some detail the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the ,i4,g4 ,in order to obtain an idea regarding case of production1 we will later make a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the ,allies4 ,from the point of view of this statement1 there are two main classes of production1 that in which the majority of the steps involved were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye1 pharmaceutical or other chemical product1 and1 in the second place1 that in which no such coincidence occurred1 but in which the general technique developed1 and the varieties of existing plant covered the needs of the case4 ,without stretching the point1 every war chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories4 ,in order to assist the less technical reader1 we will consider the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they appeared against us on the front4 ,chlorine4--,this important raw material1 used in a variety of operations1 notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black1 two highly important dyes1 was produced along the ,rhine before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day4 ,the only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already existing plant at the large factory of ,ludwigshaven4 ,the following table of production illustrates the point3 ,,chlorine 7,,metric ,,tons ,,per ,,day7 #aiad #aiah ,leverkusen #bj #bj ,hochst #d #h ,ludwigshafen #ac #ce ---- ---- ,total #cg #fc ,chlorine was important1 nor only as a raw material for most of the known chemical warfare products1 but also1 in the liquid form1 for cloud attack4 ,owing to the development of protection1 the use of liquid chlorine for the latter purpose became obsolete4 ,phosgene4--,this was produced in considerable quantity before the war at ,leverkusen and ,ludwigshafen1 leading to many exceedingly important dyes1 amongst the most commonly used at present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely used in ,england4 ,more expansion of plant was necessitated4 ,at ,leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons a month1 and we learn the plant remains intact ready for use4 ,at ,ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher1 amounting to #fjj tons per month4 ,as production was commenced before the war1 there were no difficulties in developing the process1 expansion alone being necessary4 ,xylyl ,bromide4--,this was one of the early lachrymators1 and was produced at ,leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons4 ,production began1 according to a statement on the works1 in ,march1 #aiae4 ,its case can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at ,ypres4 ,the ,germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their brominated lachrymators4 ,in this connection their persistent efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their ,stassfurt product and to crush the ,american industry before the war are significant4 ,the success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult situation during the war1 both with regard to production of drugs and lachrymators4 ,german bromine was associated with potash in the ,stassfurt mineral deposits1 whereas the ,american product was produced from numerous salt springs and rock salt mines4 ,although ,germany had not succeeded in crushing the ,american industry1 yet the outbreak of war found her in a predominant position1 for her two chief opponents1 ,france and ,england1 were cut off from their supplies1 which were ,german2 and ,american production was of little use1 owing to the great excess of demand over supply1 and the manipulation of output by ,german agents in ,america4 ,a possible source of bromine existed in the ,french ,tunisian salt lagoons1 whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an ,austrian combination4 ,the ,french wisely developed a ,tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their own needs1 and1 on different occasions1 supplied us with small quantities4 ,but the development of such an enterprise in time of war was a severe handicap4 ,diphosgene or ,trichlormethyl ,chloroformate4--,this substance was toxic1 a lachrymator1 and slightly persistent4 ,it attained a maximum monthly ,output ,of #cjj tons at ,leverkusen1 and about #bej tons at ,hochst4 ,this was not a simple compound to make1 and had no direct relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry4 ,at the same time1 it provides an example of the way in which general technique developed by the industry was rapidly used to master the new process4 ,in particular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here4 ,the reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate and its subsequent chlorination4 ,the methyl-formate plant was part of an existing installation1 but the chlorination and distillation plant were specially installed4 ,chlorpicrin4--,this was mixed with diphosgene and used in the familiar ,green ,cross shell4 ,the production was very readily mastered and attained the rate of #bjj tons per month4 ,picric acid1 chlorine1 and lime were required1 all three being normal raw materials or products of the industry4 ,at ,hochst no new plant was installed1 the manufacture being carried out in the synthetic indigo plant4 ,phenylcarbylamine ,chloride4--,this was used in ,german chemical shell1 and was not particularly effective against us1 although produced in large quantities by the ,germans1 in vessels used in peace time for a very common intermediate1 monochlorbenzene4 ,the ease of production of this substance may account for its use in large quantities by the ,germans1 in order to increase their gas shell programme4 ,mustard ,gas or ,dichlordiethyl ,sulphide4--,this was prepared in four stages3 7#a7 ,preparation of ,ethylene--by heating alcohol with an aluminium oxide catalyst at #djj'j ,c4 7#b7 ,preparation of ,ethylene-chlor-hydrin1 by passing ethylene and carbon dioxide into a #aj per cent4 solution of bleaching powder at a temperature below zero centigrade1 and subsequent concentration of the product to a #bj per cent4 solution4 7#c7 ,conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thiodiglycol by treatment with sodium sulphide4 7#d7 ,conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas 7dichlordiethyl-sulphide71 using gaseous hydrochloric acid4 ,the thiodiglycol was produced at ,ludwigshafen and provides one of the best examples of the adaptation of the ,german dye works for the purpose of producing war chemical4 ,technically1 ethylene is a fairly difficult gas to produce in large quantities1 but1 for the ,ludwigshafen works1 these difficulties were a thing of the past4 ,there were twelve big units before the war1 and1 by the time of the ,armistice1 these had been increased to seventy-two in connection with mustard gas manufacture4 ,in a similar way1 the number of the units for chlorhydrin1 the next step1 was increased from three to eighteen4 ,these two processes had all been worked out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo4 ,these new plants were identical with the peace-time units4 ,the expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay4 ,success was assured4 ,the last step1 the production of thiodiglycol1 occurred in the causticising house1 to which no substantial alterations or additions appear to have been made for the purpose4 ,as sodium sulphide is used in large quantities as a raw material in the dye industry1 and was already produced within the ,i4,g41 no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply4 ,the thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories1 one of which was ,leverkusen1 where #cjj tons of mustard gas were produced monthly4 ,the reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which required very considerable care4 ,at one stage of the war the ,allies viewed with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method4 ,but the technique of the ,german dye industry solved this as satisfactorily and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems1 bringing its technical experience to bear on the different difficulties involved4 ,diphenychlorarsine4--,this was the earliest and main constituent of the familiar ,blue ,cross shell4 ,it was prepared in four stages3 7#a7 ,the preparation of phenyl arsinic acid4 7#b7 ,the conversion of the above to phenyl arsenious oxide4 7#c7 ,the conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid4 7#d7 ,the conversion of the latter into diphenyl-chlor-arsine4 ,this is another example of a highly complicated product which might have presented great difficulties of production1 but the problem of whose manufacture was solved1 almost automatically1 by the ,german organisation4 ,the first step1 that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid1 was carried out at ,ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye sheds without any alteration of plant1 just as a new azo dye might have been produced in the same shed4 ,it is believed that another dye factory also produced this substance4 ,at ,ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred4 ,this was again carried out in the azo colour shed1 with no more modification than that involved in passing1 from one azo dye to another4 ,this chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was1 and could still be1 practically invisible in operation4 ,not only was the process practically the same as azo dye production1 but1 as the compounds were not particularly poisonous in the intermediate stages1 there was no risk to the workers1 and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions4 ,the final stage1 the preparation of diphenylchlorarsine1 the actual ,blue ,cross shell constituent1 occurred at ,hochst1 which also carried out the first three stages1 already outlined as occurring at ,ludwigshafen and ,leverkusen4 ,the last stage was a simple one and was carried out in plant and buildings previously used for peace purposes4 ,the other substances employed provide further examples of this ease of production4 ,ethyl-dichlor-arsine was produced in homogeneously lead-lined vessels1 identical with those used for diphosgene4 ,dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved by applying the ,german method of using tiled vessels4 ,the part played by the ,i4,g4 in the ,german chemical warfare organisation has already been outlined1 and we have seen how the ,german ,government was content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine4 ,the latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best use of their organisation1 which was done after reviewing the plant at their disposal in the different branches4 ,an interesting feature of the production of war chemicals by the ,i4,g4 is thus revealed by examining the actual locality of the separate operations leading to any one of the individual poison gases4 ,the attached table shows us how the production of any particular war chemical involved a number of stages1 each of which occurred in a different factory4 ,the directors of the ,i4,g4 simply chose a particular plant in a particular factory which was most suited for the operation concerned4 ,they ,the table 7spread over pages #afb-afc7 are raw ,,ocr feed6 ,,needs ,,fixed666 ,,first ,,stage ,,raw ,,war ,,chemical ,,materials ,,from ,,the ,i4,g4 ,,process ,,factory ,phenyl ,carbylamine #a4 ,aniline ,condensation of aniline ,kalle ,chloride #b4 ,chlorine with carbon bisul #c4 ,caustic phide to phenyldithio soda carbamic acid ,mustard ,gas #a4 ,carbon ,preparation of ,ethyl-,ludwigs dioxide lene from ,alcohol hafen #b4 ,bleaching powder #c4 ,sodium sulphide #d4 ,hydro chloric acid ,diphenylchlorarsine ,i4 ,aniline ,conversion of ,diazo- ,ludwigs #b4 ,sodium benzene to ,phenylar- hafen nitrite sinic acid ,kalle #c4 ,sodium ,hochst bisulphite #d4 ,sodium hydrate #e4 ,sulphur dioxide #f4 ,hydro chloric acid ,ethyl -dichl or a rsine #a4 ,ethyl ,production of ,ethylar-,ludwigs chloride sinic acid from ,ethyl hafen #b4 ,caustic chloride soda #c4 ,sulphur dioxide #d4 ,hydro chloric acid gas #e4 ,iodine ,sym-dichlor-methyl- ,i4 ,chlorsul- ,production of ,formal- ,mainz ether phonic dehyde from ,methyl#aaf;chst acid alcohol ,z4 ,sulphuric acid #afb ,review of ,production ,,second ,,stage ,,third ,,stage ,,fourth ,,stage ,,process ,,factori ,,process ,f,a,c,t,o,ri ,,process ,,factory ,conversion of ,kalle ,chlorination of ,hochst ,phenyidithio- ,phenyl ,mus carbamic acid tard ,oil giving to ,phenyl ,mus- ,phenyl ,carby tard ,oil by lamine ,chlo zinc chloride ride ,conversion of ,lud- ,conversion of ,lud- ,conversion of ,lever ,ethylene into wigs- ,chlorhydrin wigs- ,thiodiglycol kusen ,ethylene hafen to ,thio-di- hafen to ,mustard ,chlorhydrin glycol ,gas ,reduction of ,lever- ,conversion to ,lever- ,reduction of ,a4,g4,f4,a4 ,phenyl arjinic kusen ,diphenylar- kusen ,diphenylar- ,hochst acid to ,phenyl and sinic acid by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide ,hochst treatment ,hijchst ,diphenyl3 with ,diazo chlor-arsine benzene by ,sulphur dioxide in ,h,cl solution ,reduction of ,lud- ,conversion of ,w7chst ,ethyl arsinic wigs- ,ethyl arseni acid to ,ethyl hafen ous ,oxide to arsenious oxide ,ethyl dichlor by sulphur arsine by dioxide ,h,cl and iodine ,conversion of ,h#h;chst paraformalde hyde to sym dichlor methyl ether by means of chlorsul phonic acid ,,end ,,of ,,table ,,needing ,,fixed6 aimed at the minimum conversion1 and in a number of cases none was required4 ,the above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that the organic chemical industry is the logical place for efficient chemical warfare production4 ,it cannot leave us unconvinced as to the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence4 ,allied ,difficulties4--,our own production was nothing but a series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations4 ,we have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical warfare organisation for research and supply during the war4 ,these added to the difficulties of the supply department1 just as they did to its complement1 the research department4 ,only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible the relative success achieved1 not only by the departments1 but in particular by the firms with whom they were called upon to co-ordinate4 ,we wanted mustard gas1 and realised its need in ,july1 #aiag4 ,research work began almost from that date1 yet successful large scale production did not materialise in ,england until more than a year later4 ,we must admit1 however1 that the ,french were in a position to use their product on the front in ,july1 #aiah4 ,let us examine some of our difficulties4 ,the first efforts were directed towards the process by which1 as we eventually ascertained1 the ,germans produced the whole of their mustard gas4 ,the actual chemical laboratory details of the process presented no serious obstacle1 but difficulties multiplied as soon as we attempted large scale work4 ,we wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin4 ,some work had been done on this during the war for the ,national ,health ,insurance ,commissioners in connection with the production of novocain4 ,half scale work had occurred at the works of a ,midland chemical firm1 and experience so gained was freely offered and used in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers4 ,pressing requests for the material were continually coming from ,g4,h4,q41 the programmes outlined being more and more ambitious4 ,we had to reproduce the result of years of ,german effort spent in developing their monochlor-hydrin process for indigo4 ,as a consequence1 large sums of money were expended on the process1 although it never eventually operated4 ,its difficulties1 and other reasons1 led us to research on other and more direct methods which the ,french were also investigating4 ,the successful outcome of this early research was due1 in particular1 to ,sir ,william ,pope and those associated with him in the work4 ,the process was so promising that the long and cumbersome chlor-hydrin method was abandoned4 ,as a result our five or six months' work on the ,german method meant so much time lost4 ,the new direct1 sulphur monochloride method was taken up actively and several private firms attempted to develop the small scale manufacture4 ,the work was dangerous4 ,lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique1 which was practically a ,german monopoly1 rendered the task much more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one of the ,i4,g4 factories4 ,the ,french1 realising the importance of the new methods1 spared nothing in their attempts to develop them4 ,their casualties multiplied at the works1 but the only reply was to put the factories concerned under the same regime as the front1 and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel4 ,the ,french realised the nature of their task1 and organised for it4 ,when the difficulties of production were pointed out in ,august1 #aiag1 in the ,british ,ministry of ,munitions1 reports were instanced that the ,germans had used forced labour4 ,the ,french in their production at ,rousillon1 on the ,rhone1 employed volunteer ,german prisoners4 ,it was a curious contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants representatives of the ,american1 ,italian1 and ,british ,missions1 with ,french officers1 ,french technical men1 and ,german prisoners4 ,the latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work4 ,they were used for certain limited purposes1 such as handling raw materials1 and were not1 as a rule1 exposed to the dangerous operations against which the ,french struggled so heroically and successfully4 ,it was as though a small section of the front had been transferred to the heart of ,france4 ,we saw the minister visiting a factory and pinning the ,legion of ,honour on to the breast of a worker blinded by yperite4 ,we saw messages of congratulation from the front to the factories themselves4 ,the morale was wonderful4 ,as a result1 the ,french mastered the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell filling by ,june1 #aiah4 ,they shared information with us1 but the race had started neck and neck1 and it was impossible to discard completely the large plants to which we were already committed4 ,without disparaging our own efforts1 we must pay a tribute to the achievement of the ,french yperite producing and filling factories4 ,it is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without going beyond our scope1 and we can only draw general comparisons4 ,but we must draw attention to the following4 ,the ,german factories passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which1 compared with the final ,allied method1 was clumsy and complicated1 but which suited their pre-war plant4 ,their policy was1 therefore1 sound from the point of view of the campaign4 ,the ,allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining large scale manufacture with a simpler process4 ,the same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic endeavour was shown in this country1 but we were handicapped in mustard gas production by the energetic way in which we had pressed forward the industrial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method4 ,the ,french1 less committed in terms of plant and finance1 could more readily adjust their energy1 materials1 and money to the new method4 ,it must not be forgotten1 also1 that1 at this period1 chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing certain critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency4 ,here again the earlier centralisation of research and production by ,france was a great factor in her favour4 ,our difficulties with phosgene1 and in particular with the arsenic compounds described above1 were of the same nature1 involving us in casualties1 great expenditure1 and little success1 when compared with ,german production4 ,the great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as ,february1 #aiah1 and investigations began even at that date1 but they had not appeared in the field by the time of the ,armistice4 ,whatever mistakes we may have made locally during the war1 they are small compared with the big mistake which was responsible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare production4 ,we were almost completely lacking in organic chemical industrial experience4 ,it is interesting to note that the activities of those elements of organic chemical industry which did exist in ,france and ,england fully justified the conclusions we have drawn4 ,thus1 although entering late into the field of chemical warfare production1 ,doctor ,herbert ,levinstein1 ,professor ,a4 ,g4 ,green1 and their collaborators of the firm of ,levinstein ,limited were able to develop rapidly a successful industrial mustard gas process which was of considerable assistance to ,england and ,america4 ,this work1 both in research and production1 deserves the greatest credit4 ,again1 the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist in ,french production and were of considerable assistance4 ,it would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other war activities of our own dye industries4 ,the outbreak of war found them by no means inactive4 ,in this country1 for example1 our own dye factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment4 ,in particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the ,levinstein firm1 at ,ellesmere ,port1 was a considerable achievement4 ,in addition1 the new ,state-aided enterprise at ,huddersfield was largely diverted to explosives production1 and rendered very valuable services in the supply of ,tetryl1 ,t4,n4,t41 synthetic phenol1 picric acid1 and oleum4 ,for such reasons1 the need for essential dyes1 and the use of dye capacity for explosives1 the important part which the rapidly expanding industry could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised quickly enough by the relevant authorities4 ,this is not surprising1 for the war significance of the ,german dye industry was not fully realised until the ,armistice4 ,it required the ,hartley ,mission to drive this fact home4 ,when1 however1 the brilliant researches1 referred to above1 on the mustard gas method had decided our policy1 the dye factory of ,levinstein ,limited vigorously converted the process into a technical success1 and what was still a laboratory reaction in the spring of #aiag became a successful manufacturing process in ,july of that year4 ,released from its war responsibilities at the time of the ,armistice1 the ,british industry developed so rapidly that ,lord ,moulton1 in a speech to the ,colour ,users ,association on ,november #bhth1 #aiai1 stated3 ,a few months before the war broke out ,england produced only one-tenth of the dyes she needed1 but the amount which ,i am informed we shall be able to turn out at the end of this year would1 in weight1 be within one-fifth of the amount which ,england used before the war4 ,but the ,allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack of suitable peace-time plant1 and industrial organic chemical experience-- they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw materials and intermediates1 the products of other chemical manufacture4 ,they had to create a liquid chlorine industry4 ,in ,april1 #aiae1 the only liquid chlorine plant in ,england was in the hands of the firm of ,castner ,kellner1 whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day4 ,increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments4 ,chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and--practically every important substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder4 ,tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of chlorpicrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front4 ,we refer elsewhere to the developing use of bleach in order to create lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard gas4 ,a very simple calculation will show what quantities would be required for such an operation4 ,it is true that1 as regards chlorine1 we were more favourably situated than ,france1 and forwarded her considerable supplies in exchange for phosgene4 ,this chlorine was essential for phosgene production4 ,new plants were brought into being at different places1 largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm1 but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary1 in order to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time1 to institute a control of chlorine4 ,more than #bj1jjj tons of liquid chlorine were produced under the administration of the supply department concerned4 ,when we consider the effort which such an increase in production must have involved1 and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand1 but were continually being modified to meet expansions or diminutions of programme1 we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the ,germans owing to their large initial experience and production4 ,we have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old ,trench ,warfare ,supply ,department and the firms with which it was in contact1 notably the one referred to above1 in connection with the ,loos attack4 ,but for them1 we would not have been in a position to retaliate1 even at that date4 ,the ,allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine4 ,the ,french performed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine industry in ,tunis1 the development of which reads like a romance4 ,apparently this industry is dying out1 and ,german predominance in bromine is again asserted4 ,french mustard gas production1 for which they made such huge sacrifices1 was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride1 and examples can be multiplied4 ,the ,germans were in a very different position4 ,the development of their dye industry had followed the policy of absolute independence of external chemical industry4 ,this independence was acquired either by the absorption of other enterprises or by the definite development of processes and plant for raw materials and intermediates4 ,in every case the war has strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products4 ,in #aiah they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia as in #aiad1 three times as much nitric acid1 fifty per cent4 as much again of sulphuric acid1 and twice as much liquid chlorine4 ,this was not purely a commercial question4 ,our lack of such products was due to the fact that the ,allies1 in pre-war times1 possessed few or feeble industries whose consumption would stimulate the production of these raw materials4 ,they lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard for the fundamental importance of science1 and particularly chemical science1 in industry4 ,conclusion4--,we have shown how1 during the war1 chemical warfare proved its surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor4 ,we have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from the point of view of the future4 ,the only logical conclusion is that the country which does not possess a strong dye industry1 or enormously comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals1 cannot hope to escape serious military results1 possibly defeat1 from enemy chemical surprises4 ,the situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity exists as a monopoly in the hands of ,germany4 ,no patriotic and thinking person can1 therefore1 conclude otherwise than to encourage the creation of dye industries in countries other than ,germany1 particularly in our own4 ,it is true1 however1 that patriotic sentiment and political views do not always lead to the same solution4 ,but we must insist that there can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question1 and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility4 ,further1 there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue by inaccurate thinking4 ,when we find a ,member of ,parliament seriously discussing disarmament1 endeavouring to deal with the matter in detail1 and yet classing gas as one of those methods of warfare in connection with which production can he easily prevented1#a we can only stand in amazement before our traditional fault1 deliberate sidetracking of expert guidance4 ,when we realise that it was not until after the ,armistice that the ,hartley ,commission opened our eyes to the war importance of the ,german dye industry1 we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence4 #a ,the ,flaw in the ,covenant and the ,remedy1 ,major ,david ,davies1 ,m4,p4 ,from the point of view of results on the front1 for which all were working1 the ,german dye factories1 when considered as a war weapon1 were as much in advance of ,allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun is ahead of the old muzzle-loader4 ,further1 for progressive and flexible organic chemical production1 some such difference will always exist between the modern dye industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained to meet specific emergencies4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,american ,,developments ,special ,attention ,justified2--,special ,value of ,american ,opinion4--,various reasons prompt us to pay special attention to the development of chemical warfare by the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,in the preceding chapters we have attempted a more or less connected account of its development during the campaign4 ,such an account must necessarily make constant reference to ,french and ,british developments4 ,but ,american preparations1 although on a colossal scale1 were not in time to influence the campaign seriously and directly4 ,therefore1 purely for the symmetry of our account1 special reference should be made to ,america4 ,but a more serious reason is to be found in the great importance attached by ,america to this branch of warfare4 ,as everybody knows1 the arrival of the ,american troops in large numbers was preceded by an educational period1 during which ,american staffs1 officers1 and men became acquainted with ,allied staffs1 operations1 and methods on the ,western ,front4 ,they were less biased by military tradition1 and not under the same necessity as the ,european ,allies to organise in an improvised way for different violent emergencies4 ,their opinions of war methods on the ,western ,front are1 therefore1 of great interest4 ,chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime importance in their schemes1 receiving a stimulus and a momentum which1 rather than losing force during peace1 appears to have gathered intensity4 ,there was at first no particular background of emotion1 or desire for specific retaliation in this ,american development4 ,it was purely a question of deciding on technical grounds the relative importance of different methods of warfare4 ,solid facts determined the matter later4 ,we have it on the best authority that #ge1jjj out of the total #bge1jjj ,american casualties were due to gas4 ,early ,american ,activities4--,the earliest ,american activities1 consisted in attaching various officers to the ,british formations in ,france and to the ,french research and producing organisations centred in ,paris4 ,a period ensued of remarkably rapid and efficient assimilation of the best developments in allied chemical warfare4 ,two ,american gas companies were attached to ours for instruction in the first month of #aiah1 and they assisted in several gas attacks on the ,british front4 ,field ,activities4--,in a sense the development of chemical warfare organisations by the ,americans was deprived of its promised success4 ,the ,allies regained the general and final offensive before ,american plans matured4 ,but if the latter were prevented from participating in various types of cloud and stationary attack along the front1 yet the coincidence of their organisation with the development of more open warfare gave them an opportunity1 which they readily seized1 to demonstrate the possibilities of mobile chemical attack4 ,two gas companies1 known as the #cjth ,engineers1 were assembled1 partially trained1 and embarked for ,france at the end of #aiag4 ,they entered upon a course of training with the ,british ,special ,brigade ,r4,e4 while further units were being organised in ,america4 ,the projector at-tracted the ,americans1 and they were ready1 as ,general ,fries informs us1 to launch a big projector gas attack1 when ,marshal ,foch's counter attack disorganised the front concerned4 ,they then turned their attention to the use of the four-inch ,stokes mortar in an attempt to neutralise the ,german machine-gun nests1 using phosphorus for smoke and thermit shell1 and continued to assist the infantry either by taking part in the preparations for attack or in subsequent operations4 ,special ,difficulties4--,the great length of the ,american lines of communication led them to develop certain research and experimental organisations near to the front4 ,these had to deal with the short range problems1 those of immediate importance1 without referring them back to ,america4 ,the #cjjj miles of ocean represented a necessary loss of contact which prevented the home workers1 however willing1 from fully realising the needs of the problems concerned4 ,accordingly a strong experimental station1 ,hanlon ,field1 was developed near ,chaumont1 and a well-equipped laboratory was established at ,puteaux1 near ,paris4 ,edgewood ,arsenal4--,the organisations developed in ,america were of very great interest4 ,the ,american officers in the field1 through their contact with the ,british and ,french1 realised early that we were extended to the utmost in the matter of production1 that our demands and programmes were far ahead of our output1 and that they could not reasonably expect serious help from us1 either with regard to the results or the material means of production4 ,they1 therefore1 made surveys of our methods and wisely determined to concentrate on production in ,america4 ,as a result1 they developed the phenomenal chemical warfare arsenal of ,edgewood4 ,had the war lasted longer1 there can be no doubt that this centre of production would have represented one of the most important contributions by ,america to the world war4 ,probably had production been conceived on a smaller scale1 however1 its results would have materialised sooner and produced greater actual influence4 ,a few facts with regard to ,edgewood suffice to confirm its potentialities4 ,we learn#a that the arsenal organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant1 probably the largest in the world1 various chemical plants for the manufacture of the chief chemical warfare substances adopted by the ,european belligerents1 and shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more than #bjj1jjj shell and bomb daily4 #a ,journal of ,industrial and ,engineering ,chemistry1 ,january1 #aiai4 ,research4--,supporting this production1 and in connection with the other branches of chemical warfare1 a tremendous research organisation developed which1 with the exception of the combined research facilities of the ,i4,g4#b was probably the largest research organisation ever assembled for one specific object4 ,it grew until it contained #abjj technical men and #gjj service assistants1 and we are told that its work covered exhaustive research on more than #djjj different materials4 ,nor were the ,americans less ambitious on protection4 ,wisely adopting the ,british ,box ,respirator during the early stages1 they made vigorous attempts at the same time1 with considerable success1 to develop a form of their own4 #b ,the great ,german organic chemical combine4 ,production4--,an ,american opinion on the importance of ,edgewood ,arsenal at the time of the ,armistice is worth quoting4#c ,here is a mammoth plant1 constructed in record time1 efficiently manned1 capable of an enormous output of toxic material1 and just reaching its full possibilities of death-dealing at the moment when news is hourly expected of the signing of the ,armistice4 ,what a pity we did not possess this great engine of war from the day ,american troops first sailed for ,france1 for1 had we been so prepared1 how many of our boys who have gone ,west' could have returned for the welcome home6 ,shall we forget this lesson of preparedness8 ,is this great plant to be scrapped8 ,possibly wise heads may find a solution of the problem which will add this great resource to ,american chemical industry1 at the same time preserving its value to the nation as a greater asset1 in case of future war1 than a standing army4 #c ,journal of ,industrial and ,engineering ,chemistry1 ,january1 #aiai4 ,although mainly dependent on ,edgewood ,arsenal for their war schemes1 it is perfectly clear that the ,americans realised that theirs was not the ideal way1 in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient way to produce poison gases or chemical warfare substances4 ,indeed1 even during the war1 in spite of their huge arsenal they established contact with various ,american chemical producers4 ,at the present time1 except in connection with its use for emergencies during the next few years1 this huge source of production at ,edgewood must be regarded as an unnecessary burden upon the ,state4 ,to be of any use1 it requires costly maintenance4 ,it is only capable of producing a limited number of organic substances4 ,some of these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on4 ,this reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only out of accord with any international scheme for disarmament1 but it is altogether too ponderous1 and not sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies4 ,this is fully realised in ,america4 ,general ,fries1 addressing the ,american ,chemical ,society1 said3 ,the magnificent plant at ,edgewood may soon be a thing of the past4 ,we do not believe the ,government should attempt to manufacture poisonous gases on a huge scale4 ,he explains how1 by reliance upon normal chemical industry1 ,we believe we can build up more quickly and to a greater extent than by any other method the necessary large output of poisonous gases required in a war with a first-class ,power4 ,referring to the mobilisation of industry for this purpose1 he says3 ,we believe that if this is done satisfactorily it will be one of the greatest possible guarantees of future peace4 ,post-,armistice ,developments4--,but perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of ,american chemical warfare development concerns what has occurred since the ,armistice4 ,valuable and successful attempts have been made to educate not only the public but also political leaders to its real meaning4 ,no one examining the ,american daily and scientific press1 or reading the records of the various ,government ,committees on the proposed bills of chemical1 or chemical warfare1 interest can doubt that the ,americans are probably as a whole much more alive to the importance of this matter than any other ally4 ,discussions on the ,longworth ,bill and on the new chemical warfare service have provided full ventilation for the facts of the case1 in their proper setting4 ,it was a striking contrast to land in ,america early in #aibj and find ,new ,york plastered with recruiting posters setting forth the various reasons why ,americans should join their ,chemical ,warfare ,service4 ,it was not only a sign of ,american methods but also one of their appreciation of the importance of the matter4 ,this is amply borne out by their final step in reconstruction during the last few months4 ,a separate ,chemical ,warfare ,service has been reorgan-ised in ,america in such a way as to give it a position of independence equivalent to that of the older branches of the service4 ,the specific possibilities in the development of this form of warfare are acknowledged by the action of the ,american ,congress1 and this result is very largely due to the creation of an intelligently informed political and public opinion4 ,large grants of money have been placed at the disposal of the new ,chemical ,warfare ,service1 and its research facilities promise to equal the war establishments of the older services of other ,allied countries4 ,views of ,general ,fries4--,in view of the creation of this independent ,chemical ,warfare ,service in ,america and of its importance when measured in terms of financial and material facilities1 it is of interest to summarise some of the views already expressed by ,general ,fries1#a the head of the new service4 ,with regard to the general function of chemical warfare1 he tells us3 ,in the first place1 chemical warfare is a complete science in itself4 ,no other invention since that of gunpowder has made so profound a change in warfare as gas is making1 or will make1 in the future4 #a ,journal of ,industrial and ,engineering ,chemistry1 #aibj4 ,to-day there are only four really distinct arms of the ,service1 viz43 the ,infantry1 the ,artillery1 ,aviation1 and ,chemical ,warfare4 ,all other forms of warfare are a combination1 more or less complete1 of these4 ,the gases1 smoke1 and incendiary materials that make up chemical warfare are used to a greater or lesser extent by other arms1 but wherever gas is used it compels precautionary measures that are found in no other branch of the ,service4 ,considering its power1 it has no equal4 ,physical vigour is one of the greatest assets in any army4 ,gas1 used properly and in quantities that will be easily obtainable in future wars1 will make the wearing of the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two to five miles of the front line1 and in certain places for many miles beyond4 ,if it never killed a man1 the reduction in physical vigour1 and1 therefore1 in efficiency of an army forced at all times to wear masks1 would amount to at least #be per cent41 equivalent to disabling a quarter of a million men out of an army of a million4 ,the ,gas ,cloud ,inescapable4--,he goes on to explain some of the more specific military needs which can be met by chemical means1 and refers independently to a point which the ,germans have mentioned repeatedly in their memoirs4 ,one great reason why chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long-felt want on the part of the soldier1 that of shooting successfully around a stump or rock4 ,the gas cloud is inescapable4 ,it sweeps over and into everything in its path4 ,no trench is too deep for it1 no dug-out1 unless hermetically sealed1 is safe from it4 ,night and darkness only heighten its effect4 ,it is the only weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant sunshine4 ,only the mask and the training that go with it protect4 ,terror1 confusion1 lack of discipline and control are fatal4 ,importance of ,smoke4--,general ,fries is insistent on the future importance of smoke in warfare3 ,chemical warfare includes gas1 smoke1 and incendiary materials1 and they can't well be subdivided4 ,as before stated1 all the early gas attacks were in the form of clouds4 ,the value of that cloud1 not only for carrying gas but for screening purposes1 began to be realised in the fall of #aiag4 ,clouds of smoke may or may not be poisonous1 and they will or will not be poisonous1 at the will of the one producing the smoke4 ,for that reason every cloud of smoke in the future must be looked upon as possibly containing some deadly form of gas4 ,when you consider this for a moment1 you can realise the tremendous possibilities for ingenuity that gas and smoke afford the attacker4 ,the ,american1 trained for #cjj years in meeting nature on her great plains and in her vast forests1 was early appealed to by this side of chemical warfare4 ,as early as ,november #c1 #aiag1 the ,united ,states was urged1 in a cablegram from the ,chemical ,warfare ,service in ,france1 to push the development of a large phosphorous supply for use in smokes4 ,not only were the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by later events1 but to-day the future of smoke appears greater still4 ,the battle-field of the future will be covered with smoke-- not the all-pervading black smoke of the battles of the ,civil ,war and of earlier wars before smokeless powder came into use1 but a field covered with dots and patches of smoke1 big and little1 here and there and everywhere4 ,every man who has hunted ducks and been caught in a dense fog with ducks quacking all round1 and who has tried to get ducks by firing at the quack in the fog1 can realise the difficulty of hitting a man on the battlefield when you cannot see him1 and have only a quack1 or less1 by which to locate him4 ,the smoke will be generated in candles of two or three-pound cans that can be thrown out in front of trenches2 by knapsacks that can be carried and which will give off dense white smoke in large volume for many minutes2 by grenades which1 while they may be thrown by hand1 will generally be fired from rifles2 by artillery shells reaching ten1 fifteen1 twenty miles back of the main battle line2 and finally1 from aeroplane bombs whose radius of action is limited only by the size of the earth4 ,and thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war in the future4 ,it is more or less wholly protective in its nature1 but as it costs more and takes longer to train a man in the various problems involved in modern war than ever before in this history of the world1 it is worth while taking every precaution to protect him1 once you have him trained4 ,casualty ,percentages4--,he also brings out very dearly the unique possibility possessed by gas warfare of increasing its military efficiency1 while decreasing its relative atrocity3 ,the death rate in the first gas attack was probably in the neighbourhood of #ce per cent4 of all casualties-- and everybody in front of the wave was a casualty4 ,with the development of masks and training in the use of the mask and in taking advantage of the ground1 the death rate fell4 ,at the same time the total number of casualties fell1 but not at all in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate4 ,from a probable death rate of #ce per cent4 in the first attack it fell to #bd per cent41 then to #ah per cent41 and1 as gas attacks by artillery became general1 to #f per cent41 and finally1 with the extended use of mustard gas1 the rate fell to #b4e per cent4 or less4 ,again referring to casualties1 he gives us the startling fact that #ge1jjj out of the #bge1jjj ,american casualties were caused by gas1 ,and yet1 he says the ,germans used it in a halting1 comparatively feeble manner4 ,short ,range ,projectors4--,very much alive to the future of the short-range projectors developed in connection with gas warfare1 he tells us1 ,the ,gas ,regiment in the ,st4 ,mihiel battle fired on the ,cote des ,esparges one hundred of these high explosive bombs at the zero hour on the morning of the attack4 ,that hill1 famous for its strength through four years of struggle between the ,french and ,germans1 dis-appeared completely as an enemy standpoint4 ,nothing remained but torn and broken barbed wire1 bits of concrete pill-boxes1 and trenches filled with debris1 and a few scattered fragments of clothing4 ,the gas troops will1 in the future1 handle all short-range methods of firing gas1 smoke1 or high explosive4 ,they will deliver the greatest quantities of material possible up to ranges of a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters4 ,so effective and so efficient are these short-range methods of projection that the ,no-,man's-,land of the future will be the width covered by these projectors and mortars4 ,they can't1 and never will1 compete with the artillery1 where range and great accuracy are the most important factors4 ,the efficiency of artillery gas shell or artillery smoke or high explosive shell is only one-fifth that of the projector4 ,hence1 for economy and efficiency1 the artillery will be used to fire gas1 smoke1 high explosive1 and incendiary materials only at ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops4 ,again1 showing how the ,american authorities were seized with the importance of the matter1 we read3 ,vast ,expansion in ,personnel4--,so greatly were these possibilities appreciated in the summer of #aiah that the number of gas troops authorised for use against the ,germans was increased from six companies to fifty-four4 ,back of all this1 however1 was the productive capacity of the ,united ,states1 which ensured that those troops would be able to fight day and night1 summer1 winter1 and fall1 until the war was over4 ,no wonder the ,german quit--it was time1 and he knew it4 ,and in conclusion ,general ,fries tells us3 ,the universal adoption of gas warfare on sea and land and in the air1 combined with its persistent quality1 will make that nation able to produce and use gas in the largest quantity superior in war to any other nation on the globe4 ,the ,united ,states can reach that position and maintain it1 and ,i believe that we are going to get such encouragement from the ,war ,department that we can do it4 ,i feel sure that the army appreciates the value of chemical warfare1 and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists to chemical warfare4 ,so long as there is any danger of other nations continuing these methods of warfare1 research and experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued4 ,research must not only be directed towards the gases and apparatus1 likely to be employed in the future1 but also towards protection against all possible gases4 ,training in the use of gas will be confined to appropriate branches1 but training in defensive measures will include the whole army4 ,we must continue our studies of what is known as chemical warfare4 ,no nation has renounced the use of poison gases as the result of the ,peace ,conference4 ,there are nations whose word we could not respect if they did renounce it4 ,it is essential to study the offensive side of chemical warfare if we are to be prepared for defence4 ,the great importance of adequate defensive appliances arises from the fact that preparations for the offensive use of gas can be made in peace-time with great secrecy1 and may have far-reaching and even fatal results in the early stages of a war4 4 4 4 ,for these reasons it is necessary to make adequate provision for research1 experiment1 and design in connection with war material4 ,it is equally necessary to avoid overlap1 duplication of effort1 and the setting up of military institutions for scientific research which can better be done by existing civil institutions4 ,he also quotes from a statement from ,general ,debeney1 ,director of the ,french ,college of ,warfare3 ,should war begin now1 aviation1 and especially gas1 would play one of the most important parts4 ,the progress of aviation would make the rear of each front1 and very far in rear1 extremely dangerous1 and the progress of chemistry would permit the use of gas on zones of such an extent as cannot be imagined4 ,making gas is naturally rapidly done1 because all the manufacturers of chemical product--still so numerous in ,germany--can be requisitioned1 but to make airplanes is much slower4 ,the defence against gas seems to be more difficult than against airplanes4 ,i believe that against airplanes1 the anti-aircraft artillery is susceptible of making rapid progress1 and perhaps in that very instance gas will be one of the best ways1 if with appropriate shells 99the air can be poisoned all around the attacking airplanes4 ,it would be much more effective to create1 for example1 a sphere of poisoned air a mile round the airplane1 instead of trying to hit the machine directly with bits of the shell4 ,british1 ,french1 and even ,german opinion1 while not underestimating the importance of the matter1 may not agree in an unqualified way with all the above statements4 ,but we claim that they show vision in a branch of war which1 on account of its scientific basis1 may1 more than any other1 speedily prove the visionary a true prophet4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,german ,,chemical ,,policy ,the preceding account of chemical warfare leaves the impression of a successful ,allied struggle against persistently unfavourable circumstances4 ,we were constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace set by the enemy4 ,there were exceptions1 undoubtedly1 but in the main ,germany kept ahead in the chemical struggle4 ,so far1 in examining the root of our troubles1 we have been content to refer to the existence of the ,i4,g41 to describe its chemical warfare activities1 and to indicate1 briefly1 its unique power to produce large quantities of organic chemical products at short notice4 ,the close connection between the ,german dye industry and chemical warfare is now well recognised in official circles1 and1 to some extent1 by the general public4 ,its belated exposure was almost entirely due to the facts revealed by the ,inter-,allied ,mission to the ,german chemical factories some months after the ,armistice4 ,but the situation thus revealed was not created in a day1 nor by chance4 ,indeed1 one of the military features of industrial chemical development in the ,i4,g4 has already been traced to pre-war activities4 ,i refer to the ,haber process for the production of synthetic ammonia4 ,it would be short-sighted policy to accept the set of conditions against which we struggled1 and to explain them in terms of the ,i4,g41 without looking more closely into the pre-war activities of this organisation4 ,such an examination may reveal the basic forces which determined our inferior position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war4 ,it is true that we can explain away our inferiority by referring to the ,german breach of faith1 which automatically created conditions for which we were unprepared4 ,this is a comfortable solution4 ,but had chemical warfare been a strongly developed and accepted method of war before the outbreak of hostilities1 would we then have been prepared8 ,the records of the past1 before ,april1 #aiae1 must be consulted to answer this question4 ,we may find that our position is due to more than a mere negative attitude1 to more than our simple neglect of the organic chemical industry4 ,it maybe that there were forces which definitely exploited this national characteristic to our disadvantage4 ,the pre-war policy and activities of the ,i4,g4 must be examined from this point of view4 ,in no country has such an investigation been more complete than in ,america1 and official statements have been issued by the ,american ,alien ,property ,custodian#a which throw a flood of light on the pre-war activities of the constituent branches of the ,i4,g4 ,they conclusively reveal the existence of a carefully directed ,german chemical policy making for world domination in the organic chemical industry1 which greatly hampered the military effectiveness of other countries1 and directly strengthened the military resources of ,germany4 ,on broad lines1 the pre-war and war activities of the ,i4,g4 produced the same result as an attempt to strangle the economic life of possible opponents1 enfeebling their resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer blow designed to take maximum advantage of the situation thus created4 ,twenty years or more under the regime of a forceful economic policy1 not without its sinister aspects1 prepared the ground by weakening us in the concentrated chemical warfare which1 ensued4 ,the success of this policy manoeuvred us into such a position that we barely escaped defeat under the hammer blows of ,german chemical aggression4 ,this1 in fact1 appears to have been the ,german conception of modern war in its relation to industry1 and ,american reports have shown that it was carried through with typical thoroughness by familiar ,german methods4 #a ,alien ,property ,custodian ,report1 ,washington4 ,government ,printing ,office1 #aiai4 ,origin of ,german ,chemical ,monopolies4--,the completeness of our organic chemical deficiencies1 and the thorough way in which we had failed to develop organic chemical industries1 creates such a sharp impression1 when thrown into relief by the outbreak of war1 that we are led to inquire into the methods by which these monopolies were established4 ,let us admit1 without any further delay1 that ,germany owed the origin and assertion of these monopolies in part to her scientific development1 fostered by a vigorous policy of applying scientific research to industrial enterprise4 ,so far as her success depended upon such factors1 it merits our unqualified admiration and envy4 ,but stimulating these developments was a very definite general and commercial policy which requires close examination4 ,german ,chemical ,commercial ,policy2--,evidence of the ,u4,s4,a4 ,alien ,property ,custodian4--,giving every credit to ,german initiative and thoroughness in the application of science to industry1 we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly came to be so complete4 ,we can rely on more than mere rumour1 when examining the commercial methods of the great ,i4,g4 ,the ,american ,alien ,property ,custodian1 ,mr4 ,mitchell ,palmer1 and1 later1 ,mr4 ,francis ,p4 ,garvan1 had occasion and opportunity to make minute examination of the ,german dye agencies in ,america in connection with general investigations on the reorganisation of alien property4 ,their revelations truly merit the term1 showing remarkably clearly the unity of conception1 determination of purpose1 and co-operation with the ,german ,government which characterised the policy of the ,i4,g4 ,pre-war ,american ,situation4--,let us briefly consider the relevant aspects of the pre-war ,american situation4 ,according to fairly well-known facts1 confirmed by the reports of the two ,american officials mentioned above1 the ,american pre-war organic chemical industry consisted of little more than a series of small assembling plants4 ,although enormous supplies of coal-tar products were available1 yet the dye intermediates derived from them were not made in ,america1 but imported from ,germany4 ,after various attempts to establish the dye industry1 it seemed1 at one time1 about #ahhj1 to have definitely taken root1 but1 within the space of five years1 there were only four dye producing establishments remaining4 ,german ,price-cutting2--,salicylic ,acid4--,in every instance the manufacture was almost immediately brought to an end by ,german price-cutting4 ,the same source reveals the direct and indirect methods used by ,germany to prevent1 at all costs1 the development of an independent organic chemical industry4 ,there are many pointed examples of the direct method1 and we will glance at the case of salicylic acid4 ,this is a very important chemical1 used not only for certain important drugs but also as in intermediate for dyes and photographic chemicals4 ,in #aijc the ,united ,states possessed five manufacturers of this product4 ,in ten years' time three of these had failed1 and one of the survivors was a mere branch of a ,german house4 ,during this fatal ten years1 the product was being sold in that country at a price twenty-five per cent4 lower than in ,germany4 ,the manipulation of the prices of the other products of the ,german monopoly enabled them1 by such methods1 to maintain it4 ,many other examples1 including such important products as bromine1 oxalic acid1 and aniline1 could be quoted to show the results of the ,german price-cutting policy4 ,the direct significance of bromine for chemical warfare must be borne in mind4 ,full ,line ,forcing4--,besides directly attacking the production of raw materials and intermediates1 the ,germans used an indirect method which has been described as full line forcing4 ,they were the sole producers of certain specialities1 such as alizarine colours1 anthracene colours1 and synthetic indigo4 ,these were indispensable to the textile manufacturers1 and by refusing to supply them1 except to houses which would buy their other supplies from ,german manufacturers1 the latter could squeeze out home producers of simple dyes1 however efficient their production4 ,bribery and ,corruption2--,german ,patent ,policy4--,the dyeing industry was peculiarly susceptible to corruption4 ,it was so simple for the head dyer of a mill to show a partiality for dyes from any particular source of supply4 ,the ,american ,alien ,property ,custodian very frankly tells us#a3 ,the methods of the great ,german houses in carrying on their business in this country were from the first honeycombed with corruption4 ,bribery of dyers was carried on almost universally on a large scale4 4 4 4 ,so extensive was this corruption that ,i came across only one ,american consumer that had escaped its ill effects4 ,such were hardly the methods of decent commercial competition1 although it appears that the strong patriotic sense of the ,german was able to justify1 in his own eyes1 what might be regarded as reprehensible methods4 ,this is not a question of bringing up old reproaches1 but merely of coldly examining facts4 ,we have already referred to their patent policy1 whereby thousands of patents were taken out1 the only value of many of them1 being to cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals4 ,professor ,stieglitz explains how the ,german patents were useless in developing large scale manufacture4 ,the patent protects the product1 but does not reveal the method4 ,sir ,william ,pope has also brought out this point1 showing how the ,germans use thousands of bogus patents to protect their chemical industry4 ,he tells us1#a;b ,in fact1 some ,german patents are drawn up for the purpose of discouraging investigation by more practical methods2 thus1 any one who attempted to repeat the method for manufacturing a dyestuff protected by ,salzman ,kruger in the ,german patent ,no4 #ab1jif would be pretty certain to kill himself during the operation4 #a ,alien ,property ,custodian ,report1 #aiai1 p4 #cd4 #a;b ,science and the ,nation4 ,a4 ,c4 ,seward1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,cambridge ,university ,press1 #aiag4 ,propaganda and ,information2--,espionage2 ,activities of the ,dye ,agencies4--,but another method which was used in this commercial offensive1 to which we must draw further attention1 dealt with propaganda and information4 ,in his comprehensive report1 the ,american ,men ,property ,custodian examines a number of large industries and reveals how the ,german interest in these industries through their ,american ramifications were active1 sowing the seeds of ,german propaganda1 and collecting information1 both commercial and military1 for the use of the ,german ,government and its agents4 ,quoting again from this report1 ,in many of the large ,german-owned companies taken over by the ,alien ,property ,custodian1 after investigation it was found that espionage was one of the chief functions4 ,every scrap of information of commercial or military value to ,germany was carefully gathered by the representatives of these concerns in this country and quickly forwarded to the home office in ,germany4 ,the ,german agents were particularly keen on gathering information that would be helpful to ,germany's commercial warfare4 ,once in ,germany1 this information was carefully card-indexed for the use of the manufacturers4 ,bulletins of commercial information were also prepared and placed at their disposal4 ,in ,germany1 the collection of all commercial information is under a bureau which is controlled and financed by the great ,german banks1 such as the ,dresdner1 ,disconto1 and ,reichs ,bank4 ,this statement is not mere generalisation1 but is backed by innumerable examples4 ,thus we find a light railway equipment manufacturer1 a projectile company1 a wireless company1 various magneto companies1 insurance companies1 and ,german shipping companies1 all engaged in spreading propaganda1 acquiring information1 and influencing public opinion in favour of ,germany4 ,but1 undoubtedly more important than any of these1 and taking a leading part in the general scheme1 was the ,german dye organisation4 ,the ,american publications make this quite clear4 ,mr4 ,garvan goes so far as to say3 ,as long as you were supplied by the big six 7i4e4 the ,i4,g471 your business had no secret unknown to ,berlin4 ,in ,berlin you will find the card index system which recites every fact connected with each and every one of your sources which can be of any possible value to your rivals over there4 ,referring to assistance rendered by various ,american and ,allied departments1 including ,military1 ,naval1 and ,war ,trade ,intelligence1 we learn from the same sources3 ,all these bodies worked in close co-operation and their mutual assistance was of inestimable value4 ,information derived from these sources demonstrated that the chemical industry was a natural centre for espionage and that this had been true long before we entered the war--indeed1 before the war began4 ,the relation between the ,german ,government and the great ,german chemical houses was so close that representatives of the industry were naturally almost direct representatives of the ,government1 and their work in this country gave them unequalled opportunities for examining our industries from within4 ,with the outbreak of war1 this organisation became more clearly defined4 ,it was1 perhaps1 difficult before the war to know where to draw the line between purely commercial and actual governmental ,german activities4 ,the outbreak of war left no room for doubt4 ,the ,german dye agencies became1 at once1 the active agents of their ,government in various schemes1 the nature of which we shall outline1 and their information functions became very definitely describable as espionage4 ,manoeuvring ,raw ,materials4--,in the first place1 the ,alien ,property ,custodian found unexampled1 evidence of a definite ,german scheme to corner and divert certain important war materials destined for the ,allies4 ,chemical ,exchange ,association2--,doctor ,albert's ,letter4--,many such plots could be quoted1 but we will limit ourselves to one1#a chosen because on its stage move the chief figures of this espionage system4 ,this case has been described under the name of the ,chemical ,exchange ,association1 and is much more fitted for the pen of a ,conan ,doyle4 ,the move appears to have been initiated by ,dr4 ,albert1 the financial adviser of the ,german ,government in ,america1 in collaboration with von ,bernstorff4 ,its purpose was to corner the immediate supplies of ,american phenol in order to prevent its manufacture into high explosives1 including the well-known picric acid4 ,the outbreak of war instantly stopped the entry of phenol into the country4 ,further1 this product was not manufactured there to any extent before4 ,large supplies were required for the production of synthetic resins1 for the gramophone industry1 ,this led to the development of a phenol industry by the ,edison works1 and there appeared1 automatically1 a phenol surplus4 ,dr4 ,albert1 aware of the probable fate of this surplus as raw material for allied munitions1 determined to seize it for the ,german ,government1 and he did this through ,dr4 ,hugo ,schweitzer1 one of the most prominent members of the ,american agency of the great ,bayer works4 ,in ,june1 #aiae1 ,dr4 ,schweitzer contracted with the selling agents of the ,edison ,co4 for the entire surplus of phenol available for sale1 offering a large cash security which was furnished by ,dr4 ,albert4 ,a lapse of a week witnessed another contract with the ,heyden ,chemical ,works1 a branch of the ,german house1 by which this phenol was purchased for conversion into salicylic acid and other products4 ,to avoid exposing the nature of the deal1 ,dr4 ,schweitzer registered as the ,chemical ,exchange ,association4 ,the profits amounted to nearly a million dollars1 half of which belonged to ,dr4 ,schweitzer4 ,this1 we are told1 went immediately to the ,german ,government4 ,as a suitable climax to such a venture1 a dinner was given at the ,hotel ,astor by ,dr4 ,schweitzer in honour of ,dr4 ,albert1 and is described as a typical gathering of the most active ,german propagandists in the country4 ,it was as a result of this deal that ,dr4 ,albert sent ,dr4 ,schweitzer a memorable letter in which he praises his breadth of highmindedness1 and compares his work with a military coup accomplished by an army leader in destroying three railroad trains of forty cars containing four and a half million pounds of explosives4 #a ,alien ,property ,custodian ,report1 #aiai1 p4 #dc4 ,dye ,agency ,information ,system2--,dr4 ,albert on ,chemical ,warfare4-- ,although a great deal has been said in ,america with regard to the activities of ,dr4 ,schweitzer and his followers1 very little has been heard on this side4 ,explaining the complete information system possessed by the ,germans1 ,mr4 ,f4 ,p4 ,garvan informs us that the head of the system in ,america for years before the war was ,dr4 ,hugo ,schweitzer1 ,president of the ,bayer ,company there1 and he even quotes his secret service number given him by the ,imperial ,minister of ,war1 stating that he came to ,america1 became a citizen on the instruction of the ,german ,government1 and led the espionage and propagandist movements down to the day of his sudden death in ,november1 #aiag4 ,the relationships between ,dr4 ,albert and ,dr4 ,schweitzer1 when the former was leaving for ,germany in #aiag1 are very illuminating4 ,we learn from the same source how ,dr4 ,schweitzer received from the former nearly one and a half million dollars1 all to be spent in espionage and propaganda4 ,dr4 ,albert1 leaving ,dr4 ,schweitzer a letter of appreciation1 to which we have referred in connection with the ,chemical ,exchange1 makes a very significant reference to chemical warfare4 ,of still greater and more beneficial effect is the support which you have afforded to the purchase of bromine4 ,we have a well-founded hope that1 with the exclusion of perhaps small quantities1 we shall be in a position to buy up the total production of the country4 ,bromine1 together with chloral1 is used in making nitric gases1 which are of such great importance in trench warfare4 ,without bromine these nitric gases are of slight effect3 in connection with bromine they are of terrible effect4 ,bromine is produced only in the ,united ,states and ,germany4 ,while1 therefore1 the material is on hand in satisfactory quantities for the ,germans1 the ,allies are entirely dependent upon importation from ,america4 ,making due allowance for the fact that ,dr4 ,albert was not a technical man1 this information possesses an element of truth1 indeed ,france was driven to the extreme of establishing a bromine industry in the wilds of ,tunis in order to counter the ,german attack4 ,the ,moral ,aspect4--,such facts tempt us to think hardly of these representatives of ,german culture4 ,but they were1 no doubt1 fiercely patriotic ,germans1 and it is not difficult for us to understand their activities after the outbreak of war4 ,an ,american1 however1 can hardly adopt such a lenient view1 if1 as has been claimed1 many of these agents were naturalised ,americans1 for they were abusing the privileges and the confidence of their adopted country4 ,we have no wish1 however1 to dwell on this aspect of the matter1 and have no doubt whatever that many good ,germans could justify all these activities according to their own codes4 ,it would have been better not to have given this information the light of day1 were it not of some value for the future4 ,report of the ,new ,york ,world2--,german ,policy ,regarding ,dye ,supplies to the ,u4,s4,a4--,how far can the parent organisation of these dye agencies be regarded as aware of their activities8 ,they were largely responsible for their inspiration4 ,mr4 ,garvan says1 ,practically all the dye salesmen were only nominally in the employ of the branches here2 all had secret and personal contracts with the ,home ,office4 ,from these facts alone there can hardly be any doubt as to the connivance of the home organisation4 ,again1 on ,april #bh1 #aiae1 the ,new ,york ,world printed an editorial explaining that two large ,german chemical and aniline dye concerns are reported to be establishing factories in ,new ,jersey1 to supply ,american demands hither to supplied from ,germany4 ,this statement apparently alarmed ,captain ,boy-,ed1 the ,german ,naval ,attache1 and he communicated with ,dr4 ,albert1 the financial representative in ,new ,york1 for the establishment of these factories would have countered the ,german policy of bringing political pressure by refusing dye shipments4 ,dr4 ,albert's reply to ,boy-,ed contains the following phrase3 ,with regard to the dyes1 ,i got into touch with local experts in order to determine what truth there is in the news4 ,according to my knowledge of things1 the matter is a fake1 inasmuch as 99our factories have bound themselves orally and by word of honour to do nothing in the present situation which might help the ,united ,states4 ,as further evidence of this definite policy1 witness a letter from ,consul-,general ,hossenfelder to the ,imperial ,german ,chancellor1 ,dr4 von ,bethmann-,hollweg4 ,this letter is dated ,new ,york1 ,march #c1 #aiaf1 and1 after a detailed examination of the economic relationships between ,germany and ,america1 states3 ,further1 we should1 according to my conviction1 hold ourselves absolutely passive in relation to the proposals for the exportation of potash1 chemicals1 and dyestuffs1 and if the opportunity arises1 make the sanction for them1 not dependent upon the consent for an exchange of articles1 but upon the abolition en bloc of all hindrances to intercourse contrary to international laws which have been instituted by ,england4 ,further1 ,dr4 ,albert1 cabling to the ,german ,government in ,april1 #aiaf1 on the export of dyestuffs1 tells us3 ,the hope was entertained of bringing ,american industries which were solely dependent upon ,german deliveries of dyestuffs into a position that they would have to insist on the importation of dyestuffs under the conditions demanded by ,germany4 ,there can then be no doubt that the parent organisation of the ,i4,g4 was in close touch with the activities of its agencies4 ,this1 then1 is a brief account of the methods by which ,germany created the monopoly whose existence threatened our success in the world war4 ,before leaving the question of the monopoly1 let us inquire a little more closely into its exact nature and range4 ,various ,american official reports have revealed the desperate measures necessitated in that country in order to meet deficiencies in vital products when the ,german source of supply was removed4 ,professor ,stieglitz's ,evidence4--,professor ,stieglitz1 of the ,university of ,chicago1 giving evidence before the ,united ,states ,senate1 stated3#a #a ,hearings before the ,committee on ,finance1 ,u4 ,s4 ,senate1 #aibj4 ,i have come to the conclusion that we would have saved a great deal of suffering and a great many lives in this country1 if we had had an organic chemical industry1 as they have in ,germany1 before we started the war4 ,characterising the dye industry as the source of war chemicals1 including explosives and poison gas1 he emphasises the drug question and shows how their development depends absolutely upon the existence of certain raw materials1 and facilities for comprehensive organic chemical research1 which only find a raison d'etre in the existence of a flourishing dye industry1 ,ehrlich's ,discovery4--,pointing out the difficulties in developing the manufacture of salvarsan1 he explains how the process was originally discovered by an organic chemist1 ,dr4 ,paul ,ehrlich1 co-operating with a ,german dye company1 the crude material coming from the dye plants1 the product itself strongly resembling dyes1 containing arsenic instead of part of their nitrogen4 ,the great importance of this drug is brought out by another witness before the same committee1 ,mr4 ,francis ,p4 ,garvan1 who explains how1 by refusing or neglecting to ship salvarsan1 ,germany wanted the ,united ,states to starve to death for lack of it1 and he continues3 ,think what an extension of disease and that an intensification of suffering and distress ,germany was willing to impose upon her best market in order to obtain her imperial will4 ,germany had monopolised the production of the important synthetic drugs1 including the derivatives of salicylic acid1 of which aspirin had developed wide use in ,allied countries4 ,after every household had learnt the value of ,german produced aspirin1 its supply was cut off at the outbreak of war4 ,the same disadvantages applied in the field of anaesthetics4 ,for a long period ,america had no local anaesthetics for hospital surgical work1 being compelled to use what were termed ,bulgarian ,operations1 that is1 operations without anaesthetics4 ,professor ,stieglitz claims that the lack of drugs and anaesthetics threw back ,american surgery some fifty to seventy years in civilisation4 ,but what of this country8 ,we have already outlined how the outbreak of war found us with1 at the most1 two or three relatively small producing centres1 which did valiant service during the war and amply proved the importance of the dye industry by revealing what could have been done had we been many times stronger4 ,was the same ,german chemical policy responsible for our pre-war position8 ,as far as we know official investigations have not been pursued to the same length as in ,america1 but it is beyond doubt that the ,german dye companies took every possible step to stifle the development of our organic chemical production4 ,when the war broke out1 our comfortable commercial contact with the ,i4,g4 became a strangle-hold4 ,it could not be otherwise4 ,whatever the ,german attitude1 and we could hardly expect it to be friendly1 the strangle-hold at the outbreak of war was inevitable4 ,but this dye menace facing our textile industries1 and weakening our power of retaliation in the chemical war1 was not the only danger from the ,i4,g4 ,we were in a critical position through failure to produce other commodities than dyes4 ,drugs and ,medicinal ,products2--,the ,german ,monopoly2--,national ,health ,insurance ,commission4--,the question of drugs assumed critical importance at the outbreak of war4 ,germany had been asserting her monopoly for years in the field of medicinal chemicals4 ,cessation of supplies at the outbreak of war caused grave apprehension of a serious shortage in these products1 so important for the adequate treatment of disease4 ,in some cases we possessed neither the raw materials nor the technical knowledge to undertake rapid home production4 ,but in the important group of the synthetic drugs derived from coal-tar products1 the raw materials were produced in quantity in the ,united1 ,kingdom1 only to be exported to ,germany1 thus contributing to her monopoly4 ,british manufacturers1 on the other hand1 held their own in the production of certain kinds of drugs1 such as the alkaloids1 gaseous anaesthetics1 and some inorganic salts of bismuth and mercury4 ,in a summary of certain war activities of the ,national ,health ,insurance ,commission1 we read3 ,it was chiefly in the making of the coal-tar synthetic remedies that ,germany was pre-eminent1 and that position was due not to any lack of skill or invention on the part of the ,british chemists1 but to the high degree of organisation attained by the ,german chemical industry1 which made it possible to convert the by-products of the aniline factories into medicaments of high therapeutic and commercial value4 ,the ,royal ,society2--,novocain4--,so serious was the situation that for some time we existed on feeble stocks4 ,but during this period the utmost efforts were made to develop our own production4 ,the ,royal ,society promptly came forward with a scheme to link up would-be producers with appropriate centres of research4 ,the latter not only assisted production but actually produced sufficient quantities of important drugs to tide us over the difficult period4 ,thus1 for example1 for the production of novocain the assistance of about forty university laboratories throughout the country was invoked1 and they proceeded to produce the intermediates1 diethylamine and ethylene-monochlor-hydrin4 ,these substances were converted into diethyl-amino-ethanol1 and the final step1 the production of novocain1 was undertaken by manufacturers1 including a prominent dye firm4 ,we have referred to one of these substances in connection with the ,german production of mustard gas1 and need only say that in ,england1 in a time of national emergency1 the ,government had to depend on the improvised assistance of forty teaching and research institutions for the production of small quantities of drug intermediates4 ,further1 this work1 although to the permanent credit of those who undertook it1 did not enable us later to produce rapidly war quantities of mustard gas1 itself dependent on the same important intermediate1 ethylene-monochlor-hydrin4 ,germany settled the drug and mustard gas question by a simple demand to the ,i4,g41 because the latter1 holding the indigo monopoly1 possessed actual large-scale ethylene-chlor-hydrin production4 ,other cases1 although equally creditable to those actually engaged in the work1 also reflect our national unpreparedness and neglect of chemical industry4 ,beta-,eucaine4--,beta-eucaine is a very important local anaesthetic4 ,before the war we obtained it almost exclusively from ,germany4 ,when urgently needed in #aiae for the ,war ,office and ,admiralty1 the ,government discovered that it could not obtain this substance from commercial sources4 ,seventeen laboratories co-operated to produce two hundred and sixteen pounds of the material4 ,such examples would be ludicrous did they not possess such a serious national aspect4 ,our position was almost as desperate regarding chloral-hydrate1 the important hypnotic1 and the rare carbo-hydrates required for bacteriological purposes4 ,sir ,william ,pope's comprehensive statement#a supplies further examples4 #a ,science and the ,nation1 ,a4 ,c1 ,seward4 ,f4,r4,s4 ,cambridge ,university ,press1 #aiag4 ,photographic ,chemicals4--,our dependence upon ,german monopoly1 so drastically revealed at the outbreak of war1 was not limited to dyes and drugs1 ,photographic chemicals were of special importance for war purposes1 yet1 when the development of aviation increased our demands for photographic chemicals1 we had no normal sufficient source to which to turn4 ,we needed not only the essential bulk chemicals1 such as amidol1 metol1 para-amidophenol1 and glycine1 but also certain rarer substances1 such as the photographic sensitisers1 which were so essential for the ,air ,force4 ,by calling upon chemical industry and research institutions both needs were satisfactorily met1 but the contrast with ,germany leads perforce to the same conclusion1 their case and speed of production as compared with ours4 ,this examination shows the fine texture of the tenacious web by which ,germany had entangled and stifled the organic chemical industries of other countries4 ,although at the outbreak of war the ,allies were slow to realise the war significance of the dye industry1 yet they were quick to determine that the resumption of peace would not find them in such an ignominious position4 ,steps were taken to establish dye industries in ,england1 ,france1 and ,america4 ,not only did plants spring up to meet the immediate needs of the textile industries of the world outside ,germany1 but the question received considerable ,government attention4 ,promises were made and steps taken to encourage the growing industries4 ,but these cannot be examined in detail here1 and the main facts are common knowledge4 ,two points emerge1 however1 which are of prime importance from the point of view of our discussion4 ,in the first place1 the acute needs of the armies prevented the maximum use of the war opportunity for developing ,allied dye industries on a sound basis4 ,no sooner was producing capacity installed1 than it was taken over for the production of urgently needed organic chemicals for explosives4 ,dye enthusiasts would have regarded the war as a supreme opportunity for a period of concentrated organic chemical research to make up the leeway which existed1 owing to forty years of ,german development4 ,but the research energies of the country were occupied on more pressing problems4 ,in ,germany1 the war chemical activities of the dye factories all contributed to their future post-war strength4 ,in ,england and ,france it was otherwise4 ,our equivalent energies were concentrated on developing improvised processes and plant1 absolutely necessary to counter the ,german attacks1 but almost without exception of no direct ultimate value to our peace organic chemical industries4 ,this is a point which merits careful consideration4 ,these industries voluntarily threw aside what was1 logically1 a great opportunity for them to push their research investigations so necessary for eventual success4 ,the state-aided ,huddersfield factory represented national vision1 whose fruits were stolen by our ceaseless need to improvise counters to ,german aggression4 ,but we owe to our dye industry the national recognition of these facts4 ,stress of war gave us true vision1 but prevented its logical outcome4 ,war needs are now removed1 and everything should be done to place at the disposal of the dye industries those facilities which they necessarily1 but gladly1 sacrificed in time of emergency4 ,the brief survey of the preceding pages reveals the existence of a ,german chemical policy pursued vigorously for many years before the war4 ,it also shows how this policy developed in ,america1 the chief neutral country1 during the war period1 for two years before her entry4 ,the ,americans have also established beyond doubt the active co-operation between the ,german ,government and the ,i4,g4 ,but1 if the policy of the ,german ,government and of the organic chemical industry had many points in common before the war1 they became one before hostilities were many months old4 ,the part played by the ,i4,g4 in munitions production1 in which it was virtually a tool of the ,government1 has already been seen4 ,it must be remembered that1 after the first ,battle of the ,marne1 the ,german ,government turned to the ,i4,g4 for a large part of its explosives and practically all its poison gas1 and1 as has been stated on many occasions1 and with reason1 ,germany would not have been able to continue the war after the summer of #aiae but for the commercial development of the ,haber process by the ,i4,g4 ,the story is too well known to repeat at length4 ,the basic element of explosives is nitrogen1 which is introduced by nitric acid4 ,this was produced from imported ,chili saltpetre1 but the blockade cut short these imports1 and but for the ,haber method1 the vital step in producing nitric acid from the air1 ,germany would have been compelled to abandon the struggle4 ,there is striking coincidence between the commencement of the ,great ,war and the successful completion of certain vital ,german chemical developments4 ,as late as #aiab ,germany still depended on other countries1 chiefly ,england1 for her phenol1 the basic raw material for picric acid as well as a dye necessity4 ,soon after that date the development of the ,bayer plant made her independent in that product1 and gave her1 in fact1 an exportable surplus4 ,war ,activities of the ,i4,g4--,reviewing all these activities and realising how they all emanate from this one organisation1 we are overwhelmed by its formidable nature as an offensive and defensive weapon in time of war4 ,here we have an organisation1 the ,i4,g41 whose sinister pre-war ramifications dominated the world by their hold on the supply of organic chemicals vital for peace and war4 ,this organisation functioned1 in a sense1 as the life blood of ,german offensive warfare4 ,german sources tell us very little of the war activities and future significance of the ,i4,g4 ,a veil of secrecy seems to be cast over the whole matter1 but behind this veil must exist an acute realisation of the value of the ,i4,g4 as a trump card for the future4 ,krupp is uncovered1 the whole world was alarmed at its meaning for war1 but heard with a comfortable sense of security how ,krupp was exchanging the sword for the plough4 ,but the gigantic ,i4,g4 controls in its great hand a sword or plough for war or peace at will4 ,this is no far-fetched metaphor4 ,the ,rhine ,factories and the ,armistice1--,it therefore becomes important to inquire into the attitude and activities of the ,i4,g4 since the ,armistice1 and to examine its position in world reconstruction4 ,for one brief period1 the few weeks following the ,armistice1 the ,german dye industries appear to have been without policy1 its leaders in confusion4 ,but with the confidence inspired by the ,allied ,rhineland occupation1 with the assistance provided by the ,allied controlling organisations1 with regard to labour1 fuel1 and commercial transactions1 the industrial morale speedily recovered4 ,the tide of revolution which accompanied the ,german debacle in the autumn of #aiah swept over the ,rhineland chemical factories4 ,colonel ,norris1 writing on his visit in ,february1 #aiai1 tells us that after peace was restored by the ,allied forces3#a-- the managers of several factories agreed that the occupation of the territory was the best thing that could have happened4 ,on the other side of the ,rhine1 labour refused to work1 and demanded unheard-of pay--everything was topsy-turvy4 ,in fact1 before the ,allied armies arrived1 revolutionary notions were growing rapidly along the ,rhine4 ,one director of a well-known chemical plant is said to have escaped by night with his life by way of the river1 when his employees were especially menacing4 ,when the ,british ,army came he returned1 and is now at his old post4 ,thus1 although the ,i4,g4 was model in its institutions for the welfare of employees1 at least one of its most prominent directors was compelled to take refuge from infuriated labour4 ,what with danger from the latter1 and the uncertainty of action by the oncoming ,allied troops1 the future of the factories appeared very gloomy4 ,in fact1 there are fairly credible rumours that the ,german directors were willing to dispose of their assets to the ,allies while they remained intact4 ,but the same ,allied troops1 whose advent was feared1 rolled back the tide of revolution from the banks of the ,rhine1 and restored industrial security4 ,it is doubtful whether the investing armies realised the full war significance of these factories1 except the ,french4 ,the latter instituted a fairly thorough control almost at once4 ,but1 judging from reports of different missions to these factories1 we were even backward in organising inspection of the purely munitions plants4 ,thus the ,hartley ,mission did not materialise until three months had elapsed4 #a ,journal of ,industrial and ,engineering ,chemistry1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 #aiai1 ,page #hag4 ,war ,mentality of the ,i4,g4--,we watch a vivid impression of the war mentality of the ,i4,g4 in a few phrases from ,colonel ,norris's account3 ,around the walls of the director's room was a beautifully painted and artistic frieze which pictured the various plants of the ,bayer ,company and their activities4 ,dr4 ,duisberg1 the director1 pointed out proudly to the ,americans the view of the company's plant on the ,hudson ,river4 ,we were not surprised to see it1 although pre-war advertisements had assured us at home that ,bayer aspirin had been made on the ,hudson for years by an ,american company4 ,during the war an ante-room had been decorated in a similar way1 with pictures illustrating the activity of the plant in the preparation of war-gas materials4 ,one saw how gas was made1 shells were filled1 and gas masks assembled4 ,the work was done by an artist1 and has a permanent value4 ,the fact that the thing was conceived and executed during the stress of war throws an interesting sidelight on ,german character4 ,incidentally1 it also throws a further sidelight upon the part played by ,leverkusen in the chemical warfare campaign4 ,german ,attitude towards ,inspection4--,as was quite to be expected1 the ,german factories did not receive our missions with open arms1 and they were particularly jealous of any inspection at ,oppau1 the site of the wonderful ,haber synthetic ammonia plant4 ,lieut4 ,mc,connel1 of the ,u4,s4 ,navy1 tells us3#a ,upon arrival at the plant the ,germans displayed a polite but sullen attitude4 ,they seemed willing to afford the opportunity of a cursory inspection1 but strongly objected to a detailed examination4 ,on the third day of the visit the writer was informed that his presence had become a source of serious objection and that if his examination were prolonged a formal complaint would be submitted to the ,peace ,conference4 ,the ,allies had only themselves to blame4 ,their facile yielding to the argument that this great arsenal was principally of peace significance1 owing to the fertilisers which it would eventually make1 and the feeble backing provided for inspecting missions1 were reflected in the semi-resistant attitude of the ,i4,g4 personnel4 #a ,journal of ,industrial and ,engineering ,chemistry1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 #aiai1 page #hcg4 ,the ,rhine and ,chaulny ,contrast4--,it was a curious contrast1 however1 to pass through ,chaulny on the way to the ,rhine4 ,at ,chaulny1 the oldest chemical works in ,france1 quoting again from ,colonel ,norris1 where ,gay-,lussac did his famous work on the manufacture of sulphuric acid1 where ,courtois discovered iodine1 and where plate glass was first made1 had grown with the times1 and was amongst the largest factories in ,france4 ,around it was a thriving town of about #ac1jjj inhabitants1 with some excellent public modern buildings4 ,when the ,germans in their first retreat were forced to leave the place1 they dismantled the factory and carried away everything that was portable4 ,the fortunes of war brought them back1 and before they left a second time a regiment of soldiers was put to work to destroy systematically the factory and the entire town4 ,for1 a month they kept at work1 and when they withdrew but a few bricks were left standing4 ,every boiler had been blown up with dynamite1 and every tank too heavy to be carted away rendered useless4 ,about half an acre was covered with chemical stoneware of all kinds2 each piece had been broken with a sledgehammer4 ,nothing was too small or too large to escape destruction4 ,and to make sure of a good job1 everything that would burn was set on fire4 ,yet within twenty-four hours one met ,germans1 in-directly or directly responsible for this policy of destruction1 resenting peaceful ,allied inquiries on the munition activities of their own plants4 ,we hardly know whether to attribute such effects of ,allied policy to our own integrity in respecting the peace activities of these arsenals or to official ignorance of their war-like nature4 ,german ,revolution and the ,industrial ,leaders4--,it is curious how the leadership of the captains of ,german industry was left untouched by the revolutionary disturbances of the post-,armistice period4 ,evidence is to be found in the composition of the main ,german delegation to ,paris for the settlement of the ,versailles ,treaty4 ,many of the members were big industrial magnates1 several had direct connection with chemical industry1 and at least one was a prominent director of the ,i4,g4 ,the ,german ,peace ,delegation4--,commenting on the composition of the main ,german delegation in the spring of #aiai1 we find the ,german press deploring the omission of any visible representative of ,army or ,navy4 ,does this imply the presence of invisible representation8 ,whether intended or not1 there is truth in the implication4 ,the list contains the name of one of the leading representatives of the big dye combine4 ,others of the delegates have chemical interests4 ,this is significant4 ,it more than implies the ,german official acknowledgment of the importance of the dye industry in general for the future of ,germany1 and of its prime importance for war4 ,recent ,signs of ,government ,interest4--,recent developments have merely strengthened the dye combine and provided further evidence of ,government interest in its welfare4 ,the chief signs of reviving4 ,german ,government interest in the ,i4,g4 are to be found in the loan for the nitrogen enterprise and in the privileges which it enjoys with regard to ,government taxes4 ,an ,american source1#a a witness before a ,senate ,committee1 reveals that the dye plants have to pay no direct ,government taxes4 ,according to an understanding with the present ,government1 all organic chemical productions1 the companies themselves1 as well as all dependencies1 without exception1 for the next ten years1 are freed from all direct ,state tax4 ,in so far as community taxes come into consideration1 ,i believe we will obtain a remission for our profession4 ,the latest sign of ,government support is to be found in the preferential treatment obtained by the ,german dye industry in coal deliveries4 ,coal is a critical factor in the ,german attempt to regain their monopoly4 ,nitrogen ,fixation4--,the industrial fixation of nitrogen by ,germany to form ammonia has great importance from the point of view of our discussion4 ,statements by various prominent ,germans1 such as ,dr4 ,max ,sering1 of the ,university of ,berlin1 and ,dr4 ,hugo ,schweitzer1 already referred to1 leave no doubt4 ,the former1 writing in #aiae1 tells us3 ,the complete cutting off of the supply of ,chili saltpetre during the war has been made good by our now taking nitrogen directly out of the air in large factories built during and before the war4 ,with extraordinary rapidity the question has been solved how the enormous quantities of the needed ammunition were to be produced1 a question which in ,england still meets with difficulties1 in spite of the help from ,america4 #a ,hearings before ,committee on ,finance1 ,u4 ,s4 ,senate1 #aibj1 page #aie4 ,the ,german ,nitrogen ,syndicate4--,the two great ,haber plants at ,oppau and ,merseburg are both constituent parts of the ,i4,g41 and they introduce a new element of ,government interest into the ,i4,g4 policy4 ,giving evidence before the ,committee on ,agriculture and ,forestry of the ,united ,states ,senate1 ,colonel ,joyce develops this question of ,government interest in detail4 ,he tells us how war nitrogen supply was energetically and specifically fostered by the ,german ,government through an ,imperial ,commissioner under the ,war ,department4 ,one of the three advisers of this campaign was ,doctor ,bueb1 representing the ,badische ,anilin- und ,soda-,fabrik4 ,colonel ,joyce tells us3 ,that was a strictly war control organisation1 but even before the war closed1 ,germany1 with her usual foresight1 was giving consideration to the future commercial aspects of her nitrogen works1 and in ,august1 #aiai1 there was definitely formed an association of the producers which was called the ,stickstoff ,syndikat ,g4m4b4,h4 or ,nitrogen ,syndicate4 ,this designation is a commercial one1 and the organisation is along commercial lines1 but it is1 reliably stated that the establishment of this syndicate was largely due to governmental influence4 ,this will be more easily understood if it be realised that the ,german ,government had given financial assistance to many of the new plants and plant increases which the war had necessitated4 ,haber ,process ,prominent4--,the ,badische ,co4 holds a large part of the capital stock of this syndicate1 whose ,board contains a ,government nominee4 in addition the ,board of ,managers will have a ,government chairman4 ,through such arrangements1 ,government interest in the ,i4,g4 nitrogen enterprise is clearly revealed4 ,in conclusion1 ,colonel ,joyce informs us1 ,this information1 which comes from most reliable sources and is not to be disputed1 shows that1 beyond question1 any one outside of ,germany producing or desiring to purchase nitrogenous fertilisers or similar compounds1 will have to deal with a single organisation1 essentially a branch of the ,german ,government1 which will have an absolute monopolistic control of all such products produced in ,germany or whatever surplus there may be for export 7,hearing before the ,committee on ,agriculture and ,forestry1 ,u4,s4 ,senate1 ,s4 #ccij1 ,mar4 #bbnd1 #aibj1 p4 #eb74 ,it is reported that the preliminary allotment of production to the ,badische ,co4 in the ,syndicate is three hundred thousand tons per annum1 which should leave a considerable exportable surplus4 ,this would constitute a formidable weapon in any price-cutting campaigns entered upon by the ,i4,g4 in order to preserve her various monopolies4 ,we learn from the ,colour ,trade ,journal of ,august1 #aibj1 that the ,german ,government has advanced something over ten million pounds for the construction and operation of the ,haber plant4 ,the ,new ,german ,dye ,combine4--,internal changes have accompanied the development of these external relationships4 ,the interchange of capital and directors between the different branches1 the use of all assets for a common purpose1 and the pooling of all profits effected in #aiai1 has brought about a closer union4 ,from the relatively loose pre-war combination held together by common price interests1 the organisation has passed through the cartel to what is now practically a form of trust4 ,the ,german dye industry is now a closely woven1 almost homogeneous institution4 ,it has added economic cohesion to technical efficiency1 and is to-day the largest technically efficient potential instrument of war in the world4 ,we have thus revealed the existence1 and indicated the nature1 of the resultant activities of the chemical policy guiding the pre-war ,german combination of organic chemical or dye producers4 ,further1 it is seen how the war stimulated and sealed closer relationships between the constituent firms1 and between the resultant organisation1 the ,i4,g41 and the ,german ,government4 ,continuing1 we find the above tendencies intensified since the ,armistice1 from unmistakable signs briefly referred to above4 ,aggressive ,nationalistic ,policy4--,both in peace and war1 the combination of interests1 known as the ,i4,g41 has successfully pursued an intensely nationalistic and aggressive chemical policy4 ,we might ignore what some have regarded as the sinister side of the ,i4,g4 activities1 considering the whole as a wonderful monument to ,german science1 thoroughness and patriotism1 which it undoubtedly is in many respects4 ,but the significance to the ,allies and associated countries remains the same4 ,even without any thought or intention on the part of present day ,germany to use this thing for war1 it remains a serious menace4 ,but the direct evidence which we possess does not actually support such a peaceful view4 ,her press confidently prophesies the resumption of the pre-war ,german monopoly1 reassuring its readers by careful analysis of the causes of the eventful failure to establish organic chemical industries in ,allied countries4 ,are we to yield in this field of economic war8 ,if so1 then one of the chief lessons of the ,great ,war will remain unheeded1 and the future cannot fall to prove this to the hilt1 to our cost4 ,,chapter ,x ,,lines ,,of ,,future ,,development ,the ,element of ,speculation4--,it is of considerable interest to ,introduce an element of speculation into our discussion of chemical warfare4 ,in glancing at future possibilities1 we can adopt one of two courses1 follow up the clearly marked lines of recent development1 or give the imagination play within the whole field of scientific possibility4 ,the former course lies more within the scope of this book4 ,chemical ,tactics and ,strategy4--,two basic military conceptions come to our assistance in attempting to characterise types of chemical warfare development4 ,with a little explanation it is possible to place this or that method in the tactical or strategic class4 ,any new chemical warfare development capable1 under a given system of individual protection1 of successfully attacking the hitherto protected individual1 may be termed strategic4 ,the method may be aimed at a protected or hitherto immune human function1 but if it overcomes protection it is then capable of effecting strategic results by its use on a sufficiently large scale4 ,thus we regard the first introduction of cloud gas by ,germany1 or their use of mustard gas1 as examples of strategic chemical warfare moves4 ,any fundamental discovery of this sort1 applicable to chemical warfare1 is capable of strategic effects4 ,used only on a small scale1 however1 these possibilities may be lost and tactical advantages may alone accrue4 ,the tactical type of chemical warfare method involves the use of some new or old war chemical device in achieving a tactical objective which may1 itself1 form part of a larger scheme with strategic significance4 ,examples were plentiful during the recent war4 ,we may refer to the use of smoke1 of gas shell for neutralisation1 or of cloud gas as preparation for a local infantry advance4 ,the same classification can be applied to the protective as to the offensive side of chemical warfare4 ,the equipment of an army of millions with a gas mask has a strategic value1 if it counters the large-scale use of gas by the enemy4 ,the mere fact of this protection may serve the same purpose as a violent resistance to a huge enemy attack4 ,it may render the attack1 and1 therefore1 the resistance1 out of the question4 ,by permitting the individual soldier to retain the efficient use of his weapons in gas1 the mask1 or other form of individual protection1 may render a costly counter-attack unnecessary4 ,in this way protective methods in chemical warfare may be the determining factor in some strategic campaign or tactical activity4 ,the distinction between tactics and strategy in chemical warfare cannot be made by grouping substances1 or their methods of application to war1 any more than one can say that certain infantry or artillery formations or weapons have a purely strategic or tactical function4 ,the distinction lies rather in the magnitude and incidence of use of the chemical appliance on the battle-field1 while depending on its novel nature4 ,a new substance1 possessing potential strategic value1 may be wasted1 and its surprise effect lost1 in some local affair4 ,this applies to the use of mustard gas by the ,germans and to our own use of the ,livens projector4 ,our armies were surprised and our plans modified by the ,german use of mustard gas at ,ypres and ,nieuport4 ,we were not clear where this new thing was tending4 ,think of its strategic and psychological value had it been used on a scale and front twenty times larger4 ,leaving the chemical field1 we can say that the first ,british use of the tank provided another example4 ,new ,war ,chemicals4--,the question of entirely new war chemicals is of general interest4 ,the first main group of substances with which we were faced during the war contained such types as chlorine and phosgene1 whose chief line of attack was directed towards the respiratory system4 ,specific protection rapidly developed and1 once obtained1 led to violent attempts to penetrate it or break it down4 ,in other words1 the attempts to penetrate the mask by using higher concentrations of phosgene were analogous1 from our point of view1 to similar attempts by the use of an entirely new substance aimed again at the respiratory system4 ,the introduction of mustard gas confirmed1 what the use of lachrymators had suggested1 that the most fruitful line would be found by attacking human functions hitherto immune4 ,first the lungs1 then the eyes1 then the skin of the human being came under fire1 so to speak4 ,what further developments appear possible on these lines8 ,assuming that means are found to protect satisfactorily the respiratory system1 and the eyes1 what other vulnerable points can the war chemical find in the human organism8 ,some more specific vesicant1 some modification of mustard gas1 might arise1 limited in attack to certain portions of the human being4 ,the ,germans were already at work on these lines4 ,camouflage ,chemicals4--,it is by no means visionary to picture the loss of the sense of taste and smell by the use of some chemical4 ,partially successful efforts were made by both sides during the war to mask the odour of the harmful constituent of a shell filling by introducing an appropriate camouflage compound4 ,whole series of chemicals were examined from this point of view by the ,american field laboratory at ,puteaux near ,paris4 ,the step from specific camouflage compounds to a single general type is by no means unbridgeable in theory4 ,an insight into work of this kind has been given by ,colonel ,r4 ,f4 ,bacon of the ,american ,chemical ,warfare ,service4 ,he says3 ,the gas-camouflage is of particular interest4 ,it has been found that malodorous compounds 7butyl mercaptan1 dimethyl tricarbonate1 etc471 are useful to mask the presence of other gases' or to force the enemy to wear respirators when no other gases' are present4 ,as in the case of lachrymators1 such stink gases' must frequently be accompanied by other gases1' in order that the enemy may never know when toxic gases are actually absent4 ,camouflage gases are also useful in that they save mustard gas' and the highly lethal gases4 ,their value has been demonstrated in trials at ,hanlon ,field and also at the front4 ,the use of such compounds has an obvious value4 ,by removing the possibility of detecting the dangerous chemical1 they enforce the permanent use of the protective appliance or encourage a fatal carelessness in the individual soldier4 ,functions ,hitherto ,immune4--,in this field of chemical attack upon hitherto immune human functions1 it is particularly easy to class suggestions as visionary and to be wise only after the event4 ,but it must be borne in mind that any nation in a position to effect such a surprise would be in a commanding position4 ,it is believed1 for example1 that the human being maintains his equilibrium through the proper functioning of the semi-circular canals1 organs situated behind the inner ear4 ,it does not appear possible to attain them chemically directly1 but they might be reached by the absorption of some suitable chemical into the system in the very small concentrations now possible on the field of battle4 ,we doubt whether any physiologist would go further than to say that such a mode of attack is improbable in the near future4 ,no qualified person would class it as impossible4 ,it has been advanced that the control of equilibrium occurs through the movement of certain hairs through a liquid within these canals4 ,if this be so1 then one would simply require to solidify or change the viscosity of this liquid4 ,would this be difficult8 ,probably not1 for most of the body fluids are of that colloidal nature in which coagulation occurs in the presence of small quantities of special agents4 ,such a result might cause the individual to lose his equilibrium4 ,this would prohibit all organised movement4 ,an army thus attained would be less mobile than a colony of cripples4 ,picture for a moment such a battle as the great ,german attack of ,march1 #aiah--millions of men urged forward from fixed positions under highly centralised control--they advance1 say1 two or three miles beyond this control and are largely dependent on local initiative for the attack4 ,they then enter clouds of shell chemical and in less than fifteen minutes a fair percentage becomes incapable of advancing in a fixed direction1 of obeying local orders1 or of anything more than a sort of drunken movement4 ,by this time their supporting artillery would have been identified and attained1 and the whole attack reduced to almost farcical conditions4 ,such a compound may never develop1 but who will class it as beyond the realm of eventual possibility8 ,every one is acquainted with the peculiar effects produced by various anaesthetics4 ,the emergency uses to which they are put and our personal acquaintance with them may have dulled the imagination4 ,think for a moment of the possibilities which they unfold4 ,gaseous anaesthetics1 in certain concentrations1 produce temporary unconsciousness1 other anaesthetics1 so called local1 produce absolute immobility without loss of consciousness4 ,chloroform and ether are common forms of the first type1 but they are required in such concentrations as to render their battle use impracticable4 ,but the second type1 of which stovaine1 the new synthetic drug1 is a good example1 produces its effects in very small concentration4 ,a few drops injected into the spinal column are sufficient to prevent all movement for a number of hours4 ,we cannot expect to obtain the conditions of the operating table on the battle-field1 but chemicals which are effective in very small quantities or concentrations may find another channel into the human system4 ,for this reason the development of the mask1 the protection of the respiratory channels1 is of great importance1 for it blocks the way to substances which by mere absorption might produce valuable military results4 ,chemical ,constitution and ,physiological ,action4--,it is impossible to adopt a more than speculative outlook in this field4 ,so little is known regarding the relationships between chemical constitution and physiological action and very few sound generalisations have been made4 ,a considerable amount of scientific work occurred on these lines in various countries before the war on the connection between the chemical nature of compounds and their taste and smell1 but the relationships are still obscure4 ,unsolved ,problems of ,mustard ,gas4--,the use of a chemical which attacks some unexpected human function introduces many disturbing and disorganising factors4 ,thus the introduction of mustard gas has left us with a number of unsolved problems4 ,by employing this substance ,germany departed from her usual caution and violated one of the first principles of chemical warfare4 ,it is unsound for any nation to introduce a new weapon1 unless that nation is1 itself1 furnished with the means of protection against its eventual employment by the enemy4 ,the ,germans have1 themselves1 explained this breach of the principles of war4 ,they were convinced that we could not retaliate with mustard gas1 because we could not produce it4 ,it was a miscalculation but based on grounds of which they were sure1 having been largely instrumental in determining them through their aggressive chemical policy4 ,mustard gas attacks the respiratory system and the outer skin of man4 ,the armies were efficiently protected against the first line of attack1 but they never developed efficient protection against the second4 ,protection of the skin of the individual soldier against mustard gas was theoretically possible in three ways4 ,in the first place a number of chemical solutions were devised which1 applied to the affected skin1 would destroy the poisonous chemical4 ,this was a bad method1 and was never efficiently employed4 ,german army orders after the ,french introduction of mustard gas were bristling with references to chloride of lime or bleaching powder4 ,it was to be kept in every conceivable place where the gas was likely to penetrate4 ,soldiers were provided with boxes of bleach called ,gelbolin4 ,permanganate of potash was carried as an alternative for a brief period4 ,a wire from the ,third ,german ,army to the ,war ,ministry1 ,berlin1 dated #agth ,july1 #aiah1 stated3 ,chloride of lime has all been issued in boxes to the troops4 ,reserves exhausted4 ,one had the impression of a drowning man catching at a straw4 ,supply on a sufficient scale to cover most cases was practically impossible4 ,each soldier would have to carry the protective chemical as part of his equipment1 and its proper use depended on training4 ,there was no time to identify and assemble the thousands of affected cases for central treatment4 ,mustard gas penetrated thick clothing1 even boots4 and was often only identified hours after the damage was done4 ,the second method which was attempted on a large scale was the protection of each soldier by special mustard-gas-proof clothing1 but a man1 fighting for his life on the battle-field1 will not tolerate such a handicap to movement1 and1 although hundreds of thousands of oiled suits were prepared and were of definite use in certain special cases1 for example in certain artillery formations1 yet the method must be rejected as unsuitable from a military point of view4 ,the third solution1 which was tried experimentally on a large scale1 was to cover soldiers going into action with a cream or paste of protective chemical4 ,this1 again1 could only be applied in special cases1 prior to an assault1 for example1 and could not be regarded as a permanent form of protection4 ,as we have seen1 mustard gas infected whole areas for many days1 owing to its great persistency4 ,it was often necessary to cross such zones for attack or counter-attack4 ,how was this to be effected without huge losses8 ,it was found possible1 literally by creating roads of bleach1 that is1 by sprinkling bleaching powder on chosen lanes through the infected area1 to pass columns of troops through such areas1 but this cannot be viewed as a practicable solution4 ,carried to its logical conclusion1 it would have taxed the possibilities of supply beyond their utmost capacity4 ,here1 then1 we have a case in which it is not possible to protect a soldier by some specific appliance1 and the war found us embarking on schemes of protection by the use of chemicals in quantities which threatened to carry us out of the range of possible manufacture4 ,a ,new ,type of ,obstacle4--,chemical warfare has introduced a new type of strategic and tactical obstacle4 ,mediaeval methods of war relied largely on natural and man-built barriers4 ,rivers1 moats1 forts were1 and still are1 to a certain extent1 critical factors in war4 ,the conceptions of a ,vauban could determine the issue of a campaign4 ,such obstacles were only effective1 however1 when properly manned and armed4 ,the ,hindenburg ,line and the ,canal du ,nord were tremendous obstacles when backed by ,german artillery1 rifles1 and machine-guns1 but1 without the latter1 they would have been mere inconveniences for the passage of an army4 ,the massing of a multitude of guns1 used for the first time during the recent war1 produced another form of temporary obstacle1 but troops could be trained to1 and actually did1 advance through the barrage4 ,further1 the ultimate limits of supply and the use of counter artillery introduces time and quantitative limitations to the use of the really intensive barrage4 ,chemical warfare1 however1 has introduced a method of blocking out chosen areas of the battle-field in such a way as to prevent their effective use for military defence1 communications1 or other purposes4 ,it is now possible1 by chemical means1 to give a normal piece of country the same value as a natural obstacle1 or one organised for defence by formidable engineering construction1 and manned by rifles and machine-guns4 ,this can be achieved by the use of a highly persistent dangerous gas or war chemical of which1 so far1 mustard gas is the most effective example4 ,we have seen how the ,germans formed defensive flanks during their ,march1 #aiah1 offensive1 by spraying certain areas between their fronts of attack with mustard gas4 ,it is true that1 in the quantities in which it has1 so far1 been used1 mustard gas has not converted open areas into absolute obstacles against the movement of a determined individual1 platoon1 or even larger unit4 ,but even in the quantities which have already appeared on the battle-field1 it has rendered whole zones practically unusable for huge masses of men1 owing to the certainty of a very high percentage of casualties4 ,up to the present its value has been rather as a serious factor in ,staff consideration of losses than as an actual physical barrier4 ,many of the casualties are only incurred a few hours after contact with the gas4 ,this may not deter a man from crossing an affected zone1 but it may deter the ,staffs from using that zone1 when they realise that this would imply the certainty of many thousands of casualties amongst the troops4 ,the choice is between two evils1 tactical acquiescence to the enemy's plan1 blocking out a certain area1 or the certainty of huge casualties4 ,a very interesting case occurred in the ,german attack near ,mt4 ,kemmel in the spring of #aiah1 where large quantities of ,german mustard gas were used some distance in front of the original line of ,german attack4 ,in this case1 not only was it clear that the ,germans would not attempt to advance beyond a limited objective 7and they did not71 but the development of their attack left them organising their defences behind their own mustard gas barrage4 ,the ,persistent ,lethal ,substance4--,the importance of these considerations can hardly be exaggerated when we realise that1 at any time1 a substance possessing the same strategic value as mustard gas1 but much more violent casualty effects1 may be discovered4 ,the ,germans were certainly aware of these possibilities4 ,according to the statement of an apparently reliable prisoner of the #cjth ,r4,i4,r41 ,july1 #aiah1 the ,regimental ,gas ,officer stated in a lecture that1 as the ,allies had used a new gas1 the ,germans were going to employ a ,white ,cross gas shell4 ,this gas was stronger than any of the gases at present in use2 it possessed a persistence up to eight days1 and could1 therefore1 not be used on the front for an assault4 ,its persistence was favoured by damp or misty weather and by the nature of the ground4 ,neither the ,german drum nor the masks of the ,allies afforded protection against it4 ,the last important ,german development consisted in the use of pumice impregnated with phosgene in their ,livens bombs4 ,it was clear that the ,germans were attempting to produce a gas which was not only highly lethal but persistent4 ,following up this idea1 we can forecast the use of a chemical which will not only permit the formation of defensive flanks1 or pockets1 in the enemy front1 or in our own defensive positions1 through their influence on ,staff considerations with regard to casualties1 but1 by replacing the relatively mild casualty effect of mustard gas by a highly and rapidly lethal effect1 will render these areas not only strategically1 but physically1 impassable4 ,one of the most significant possibilities in chemical warfare development is the arrival of this type of the compound1 the highly lethal1 highly persistent chemical4 ,the ,critical ,range4--,these considerations are very interesting from the military point of view4 ,consider the phenomenal amount of muscular energy required to organise any captured stretch of territory against counter-attack4 ,the type of compound we have outlined is likely to change completely the aspect of attack and counter-attack4 ,the ,somme battlefield1 for example1 gave the impression of a series of defensive positions organised by the one side or the other after attack or counter-attack1 in order to hold small gains of ground1 which were never intended to represent the final advance4 ,successful progress from one trench system meant building another1 under the pounding of the enemy's artillery1 and the deadly fire of machine-guns1 exposing1 in this improvised system1 large numbers of troops1 among which casualties constituted a continuous drain upon eventual reserves4 ,the arrival of the highly persistent lethal compound should provide an effective substitute for this laborious constructional protection in the shape of the persistent lethal barrage4 ,this will render immediate counter-attack and near machine-gun fire very difficult4 ,automatically1 fewer men will be needed to hold the advanced positions4 ,it is true that1 with the next attack1 kicking off and assembly positions will be required1 for these can be much more efficiently developed behind a deep chemical barrage and will demand the exposure of fewer men where more time is available for preparation4 ,such conditions1 however1 can only occur if one1 side possesses some distinct advantage with regard to surprise by1 or efficient protection against1 the persistent lethal compound4 ,when both sides are equally matched in this respect1 a duel will arise in which the winner will be the one who can throw the critical concentrations of chemical into a given area at the greatest range4 ,this might be called the critical range4 ,herein lies the importance of the development of such weapons as the ,livens projector1 and the ,germans had certainly grasped an important principle1 when they used our own modified weapon against us with a much greater range than our own4 ,if we admit the possibility of a persistent lethal compound1 this question of critical range assumes outstanding importance4 ,the ,new ,no-,man's-,land4--,the recent war witnessed a rather sudden adoption of trench warfare1 during a period in which the artillery strengths of both sides were relatively feeble1 when compared with the later stages of the war4 ,accordingly1 there arose very definite lines of field fortifications1 and strongly held trench systems1 separated from each other by a comparatively narrow ,no-,man's-,land1 ,with the development of the formidable artillery strengths of belligerents1 there was a tendency to form a much wider ,no-,man's-,land1 and the front line systems were lightly held1 approximating1 in many cases1 to an outpost line4 ,the discovery and mass production of a persistent lethal substance is likely to convert ,no-,man's-,land into a permanently infected gas zone1 manned by special outposts of permanently protected troops4 ,combined with the development of smoke1 this may render unnecessary the highly organised trench assembly systems of the recent war1 used before the assault1 and1 with the development of the tank as a fast fighting machine1 and for the transport of troops1 one can obtain a glimpse of the nature of the new attack and counter-attack4 ,a recent writer#a has shown us the future tank carrying war into the enemy's country and destroying his nerve centres by actually reaching and paralysing the ,g4,h4,q4s4 of armies and smaller formations4 ,such operations will have to occur through a wide zone of the new gas and will necessitate the anti-gas tank4 ,indeed1 one of the most important functions of the tank will be to carry the advance guard of an army beyond the infected ,no-,man's-,land1 and such an advance will occur behind a series of smoke barrages created1 in the first place1 by the artillery1 and1 later1 by the advance of tanks themselves4 #a ,tanks in the ,great ,war1 ,col4 ,j4 ,f4 ,c4 ,fuller41 ,d4,s4,o4 ,the ,alert ,gas ,zone4--,the development of the gas alert idea has definite interest for the future of chemical warfare4 ,it is well known how the development of gas shell and surprise gas shoots by the ,germans led to the necessity for gas alert conditions between certain times and within certain distances of the front line4 ,the mask had to be worn in the so-called ready position1 in order that swift adjustment might be possible in case of surprise attack4 ,the summer of #aiag witnessed a great increase in gas shell activity4 ,this was reflected in important changes in the gas alert regulations4 ,in the autumn of that year all periods of readiness were abolished and replaced by a constant state of readiness4 ,in the forward area absolute readiness was required within two miles of the front line1 and special precautions were taken as far back as twelve miles4 ,that the ,germans suffered under the same restraints is witnessed by many captured documents4 ,in particular1 a divisional order taken in ,december1 #aiag1 gave the gas danger zone as within fifteen kilometres of the front line1 and within this region every one must carry a mask4 ,the alert position of the mask was insisted upon within two kilometres of the front line4 ,by ,july the alert zone had increased in depth in both armies4 ,this tendency must have increased1 had the war continued1 for both sides were employing gas in guns of larger calibres1 and weapons were being devised1 such as the improved ,german ,livens projector1 which gave high concentrations at much greater distances from the front line1 i4e4 with greater critical ranges4 ,we have seen how the possible development of a persistent lethal compound may produce an infected and wide ,no-,man's-,land4 ,imposed on this1 there will1 no doubt1 be gas alert conditions of great depths4 ,how do these conceptions work out for the war of movement8 ,it would appear that the possession of such a compound and the means of producing and using it on a very large scale could determine the stationary or open nature of warfare1 if other forces were not too unequal4 ,a new military factor emerges1 the artificial1 permanent1 unmanned obstacle1 which can be laid down at will on areas whose magnitude depends finally on manufacturing capacity4 ,the germ of the idea appeared during the war at ,kemmel and in the various mustard gas barrages formed by artillery or delayed mines used by the ,germans in their great retreat4 ,the sudden development of such barriers will be equivalent in effect to the creation of strong trench systems1 but these could never result1 under war conditions1 in time to approach the strategic flexibility and importance of the persistent lethal infected barrier4 ,gas and ,aircraft4--,the combination of gas and aircraft presents the possibility of attaining strategic effects by chemical means4 ,many rumours were afloat1 towards the end of the war1 regarding the use of gas by enemy aircraft1 and there was apprehension amongst the civil populations1 which has been reflected in numerous public utterances4 ,evidence on the matter is very scanty4 ,in ,july1 #aiag1 the use of gas in aeroplane bombs by the ,germans was reported1 but not confirmed4 ,further reports in ,august indicated the use of ,blue ,cross1 owing to the sneezing effects which were produced on those within reach of the air bomb4 ,in ,october1 the evidence was more conclusive4 ,but the ,german aeroplanes left no blind or dud shell1 and1 beyond the violent nasal and sneezing effects of ,blue ,cross1 evidence was again absent4 ,this report was very persistent1 for1 in ,july1 #aiah1 there were again rumours that ,blue ,cross bombs had been dropped on the ,british near ,ficheux4 ,the ,air ,forces of the different armies were1 perhaps1 the last to feel the effects of the gas campaign1 but the pilots of low-flying aeroplanes in the #aiah offensive were constantly crossing pockets of gas1 and this1 added to the fact that the pilots were often compelled to land in gas1 led to their equipment with gas masks4 ,a respirator of special type was taken from a ,german aviator in ,april1 #aiah1 after the fighting at ,passchendaele4 ,but the war gave us no direct evidence of the successful use of gas and war chemicals from aircraft4 ,this1 however1 is no criterion as to its eventual importance4 ,the ,allies definitely refrained from employing the combination until ,germany should give them the start in what was regarded as a new atrocity4 ,the main reason for their lack of development on these lines was probably the fact that the most suitable type of gas only developed during the later stages of the war1 when it was required exceedingly urgently on the front4 ,no really harmful persistent compound appeared before the advent of mustard gas1 and the dangerous non-persistent types1 such as phosgene1 could not have been used with great success1 owing to the fact that very considerable quantities would have been required to produce any serious effect4 ,mustard gas1 however1 which could have haunted a city for days1 would not have been required in such large quantities4 ,but its more urgent need on the front1 and the fact that soon after it arrived the ,germans were sending out feelers to see whether the ,allies would consider the cessation of chemical warfare1 were probably sufficient reasons to explain their failure to use it from aeroplanes4 ,another point must be raised in connection with the use of gas from aircraft which has not yet received much attention4 ,we must remember that the use of projectiles from aircraft over a city was a very different proposition from their use over a battle-field4 ,one of the advantages of gas over explosives on the field of battle was its greater range of action4 ,it produced effects at longer distances from the point of impact1 but no such incentive existed for the use of gas from aeroplanes over large cities4 ,explosives1 which might miss their objective on the field of battle1 could not do so in a city4 ,they were bound to hit something4 ,the load of the aeroplane is always important1 and the essential is to carry1 weight for weight1 the material which will produce the most effect4 ,there is no doubt what this will he when the persistent lethal compound arrives1 and mustard gas would probably have been superior to explosives for use by ,german aircraft on ,british cities4 ,protective ,development2--,individual ,protection4--,the question of protection against chemical attack presents some knotty problems for the future4 ,let us glance at the broad lines of war development in this field and forecast their future in a speculative way4 ,protection developed along two main lines4 ,individual protection covered the mask and any other protective appliance used by the individual soldier1 while the term collective protection was applied to any method or appliance which afforded simultaneous protection for a number of individuals4 ,in general1 the former represented an attempt to purify the poisoned air actually inspired by the soldier1 whereas the latter was an attempt to purify the atmosphere of a locality or to prevent its initial poisoning4 ,how far can the individual form of protection develop to meet the possibilities of the chemical attack8 ,it certainly seems to have countered satisfactorily all the war attacks upon the respiratory system1 although1 as we have pointed out1 the ,germans might have failed1 had we been sufficiently prompt in introducing our arsenic compounds4 ,but we have forecasted the use of chemicals which may attack human functions hitherto immune4 ,for the sake of our argument1 we can divide these into two classes1 those attained through the respiratory and digestive systems and those attained through contact with some other part of the body4 ,the former can probably be satisfactorily met by developments in the mask4 ,even that does not appear certain1 when we remember the emphasis laid by ,germany upon the possibility of penetrating the mask by using a particulate cloud4 ,the last word has certainly not been spoken in the struggle between the mask and the chemical attempting to penetrate it4 ,but both the introduction of mustard gas and general speculative grounds justify us in concluding that attacks may materialise upon other parts of the human organism1 ,we cannot foresee the actual point of attack and can1 therefore1 only view with assurance some form of protection which covers the whole body4 ,collective ,protection4--,all parties dabbled in such a form of protection1 but the ,french were the only ones to make a large-scale experiment on the front4 ,it was not very successful1 for the burden of these oilskin suits was intolerable4 ,it may be that some successful form of protection for the whole body will materialise1 but on general grounds we can assume that development will follow other lines4 ,what are the possibilities8 ,they all lie in the direction of collective protection4 ,the individual cannot be satisfactorily protected from the new gas and remain an efficient soldier4 ,we must1 therefore1 see whether it is not possible to protect numbers of men by removing them from contact with the poisoned atmosphere4 ,a stationary form of such protection was used by all the armies1 but emphasised by the ,french1 by the creation of a large number of enormous underground chambers1 some capable of holding more than a thousand men1 the entries to which were carefully protected by special filtering devices to prevent the entry of the poisoned external atmosphere4 ,on the ,british front these enormous dug-outs1 although not absent1 were largely replaced by the efficient gas-proof organisation of the smaller dugouts4 ,the use of impregnated blankets for this purpose must be well known to any who visited the front or took part in hostilities4 ,but you cannot imprison a whole army in this way4 ,the value of these collective protective chambers depended on the fact that a certain number of men were always on the alert in the defensive systems outside and around the chambers1 exposed to those gases against which the latter chambers were devised4 ,in my opinion1 the further intensive development of gas warfare1 such as would have accompanied1 say1 the doubling or quadrupling of the ,german factory output1 would have forced us into realising the limit of this collective protection4 ,it would have compelled us to immobilise1 in these shelters1 more men than was consistent with the safety of the zone in question4 ,undoubtedly1 the future of collective protection lies in some form which will leave the soldier his combatant powers1 in other words some mobile form4 ,this has already been forecasted by ,colonel ,fuller in his book on ,tanks in the ,great ,war4 ,but he passes lightly over the protection of the tank against gas4 ,with the increase in depth of infected zones1 through the increasingly lethal nature of the persistent compound1 the tank will he compelled to rely on filtration methods of protection1 instead of the use of compressed oxygen in a gas-tight compartment4 ,once committed to the use of oxygen1 the only safe procedure will be to close up the tank and employ the oxygen while there is any suspicion of the presence of gas1 and1 under these conditions1 oxygen transport would become a factor militating against the prime purpose of the tank1 the transport of troops and arms4 ,it is safe to forecast a tense struggle between chemical weapons and protective tank devices in the event of future wars4 ,conclusion4--,the facts which we have surveyed in early chapters1 and the development foreshadowed above1 form part of a much wider subject1 for they are but one aspect of scientific warfare4 ,in what main directions has science modified or revolutionised modern war8 ,its influence has touched practically every weapon in manufacture or design1 introducing profound modifications in many cases4 ,the sum total of such changes may be claimed to have revolutionised warfare1 but the term revolution should be reserved1 for some more specific scientific innovation1 which threatens to change the nature of war rather than merely improve existing weapons4 ,modern wars have all echoed the popular cry for some new scientific principle or device to settle hostilities with one sharp stroke4 ,this conception has been the sport of writers of fiction and others for many years4 ,the electric death-dealing ray1 the all-powerful gas1 the deadly bacteria1 and the explosion wave have all shared in buoying up the hopes or quickening the fears of warring peoples4 ,contrary to popular supposition1 a decisive scientific military surprise of this nature is not likely to follow close on the heels of the discovery of a new phenomenon4 ,it is more than eighty years since the mind of a ,faraday delved so fruitfully into electrical science1 yet the oft prophesied large scale direct use of high voltage electricity1 or some other form in war has not materialised4 ,organic chemistry was a well-founded branch of science early in the nineteenth century1 and flourishing industries1 fostered by it1 were in existence thirty years ago1 yet it was not until the early twentieth century1 and the recent war1 that we witnessed the rapid growth of organic chemical warfare1 which1 ,i claim1 was as revolutionary as any other war development4 ,the physical sciences1 have left their mark on every weapon and mechanical appliance1 and the cumulative effect of these changes is indeed large1 but the most revolutionary upheaval in warfare1 with permanent results1 came from chemistry4 ,the flexible nature of organic chemistry must not be lost sight of4 ,in the physical sciences1 electricity1 for example1 years of co-ordinated world progress are required to produce an epoch-making discovery which might have critical and direct war significance4 ,radioactivity has shown us what undreamt-of energy is bound up in the atom1 and many are the prophesies regarding the harnessing of these forces for constructive activities4 ,at least one prominent novelist has pictured their destructive use in the radioactive bomb4 ,but the use of this wonderful store of energy for peace and war can only result from years of costly and voluminous research1 and we have no idea of the difficulties involved in production1 without which any invention1 however telling and revolutionary1 has no incidence on war4 ,but in organic chemistry a single worker1 following up some rare family of compounds1 may stumble upon a substance pot far removed chemically from related compounds yet infinitely more potent for war4 ,mustard gas1 or ,b3,b dichlordiethylsulphide1 is a member of a group of compounds differing only slightly in chemical structure the one from the other4 ,yet its nearest chemical relative is comparatively harmless4 ,the persistent lethal compound which will vastly change the nature of warfare will probably be but a slight chemical modification of some harmless substance1 ,thus1 by comparison with other branches of science as the handmaids of war1 organic chemistry is sympathetic1 flexible1 and theoretically capable of yielding revolutionary discoveries in a relatively short time4 ,we can only base such speculations on general grounds4 ,circumstances may disprove our contention over a short historical period1 but it will be borne out in the long run4 ,this is not the only reason1 however1 for the unique war importance of organic chemicals4 ,it so happens that many of them are essential to our daily life1 as dyes1 drugs1 photographic and other synthetic products4 ,industries1 therefore1 have arisen for their manufacture4 ,and this is not all4 ,organic chemical factories have proved to be not only arsenals in disguise but endowed with the flexibility of their parent1 the science itself4 ,the factories and plants ignore the war significance of the problems put to them4 ,they can develop the production of practically any chemical which research can produce4 ,the will of man can thus silently and swiftly convert the dye factory into an arsenal4 ,these inherent possibilities of organic chemistry1 flexibility in research and production1 make chemical warfare the most important war problem in the future reconstruction of the world4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,humane ,,or ,,inhumane8 ,a good deal of abuse has been showered on chemical warfare methods by those who understand very little about them4 ,it has been claimed by such that gas is particularly atrocious4 ,feeling on the matter has been so strong in certain quarters that the fact that all war is particularly vile and atrocious seems to have been completely lost sight of4 ,let us take up this matter in a rational way4 ,in the first place1 what do we mean by the atrocity or inhumanity of a weapon8 ,we can either appeal to the imagination or the reason1 in the first case1 by visualising the battlefields1 or1 in the second1 by making a cold analysis of the casualties caused by gas4 ,nature of ,gas ,casualties4--,every normal person who experienced and survived the throes of the different stages of the war1 and of the different gas surprises1 mainly ,german1 which were sprung upon us1 finds it difficult to think out1 or express1 a cool and balanced view on the question of poison gas4 ,but such a balanced view is most important for the future4 ,it must be remembered that the official protests in #aiae arose on the grounds1 to use ,lord ,kitchener's words1 that they employed these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack1 according to the rules of war1 might have otherwise failed4 ,had the rules of war permitted their use1 we should1 no doubt1 have been protected4 ,but these protests1 submerged in popular sentiment1 became an outcry against the atrocity of the new weapon4 ,this1 a just criticism at the time1 became inaccurate when the ,allies reacted1 methods of protection developed1 and the specific tactical uses of gas were realised4 ,the view of the peculiar atrocity of gas has outlived the truth of war experience with regard to it4 ,we agree that chemical warfare is atrocious4 ,but it is no exception1 for thus are all the aggressive methods of warfare4 ,indeed1 when we attempt to interpret atrocity in terms of available casualty statistics1 we find that gas is slightly less atrocious than the other weapons4 ,we must either incline to this view or dispute the figures1 which are authoritative4 ,consider the ,american figures4 ,these will he more truly representative than our own1 because their troops were only exposed during the later and more developed phases of the war4 ,of the total strength of the ,a4,e4,f41 the number gassed was about six per cent41 wounded by rifle and machine-gun fire about one per cent41 wounded by high explosive one and a half per cent41 shrapnel wounds three percent41 and bayonet wounds less than one half per cent4 ,but although enemy gas caused more than #gj1jjj casualties1 yet of these only one and a half per cent4 were fatal1 while the total number of deaths for all types of casualties was thirty per cent4 ,thus against the ,american army1 measured by casualties produced1 gas was by far the most effective1 and yet by far the least deadly weapon4 ,what can be more atrocious than the actual cone of tens or even hundreds of dead and wounded invariably left before an untouched machine-gun emplacement in an assault8 ,what is more horrible than the captured first line trench after its treatment by the preparatory bombardment1 or the mutilation of men peacefully sleeping in billets behind the battle front and thrown1 broken and bloody1 through their billet walls under the wheels of passing transport1 as one has seen them8 ,the whole experience of real war is beyond adjectives4 ,but1 leaving impressions1 let us turn to facts4 ,with regard to the future and from the point of view of atrocity1 gas has a hopeful outlook as compared with other weapons4 ,this may seem a curious statement to make1 but consider the following4 ,we cannot envisage advances in the use of explosives in shell or bomb to render them more humane4 ,explosives1 if their development be pressed1 can only become more violent1 with a wider range of action4 ,chemical warfare may follow the same lines1 but it has the unique possibility of developing on more humane lines4 ,the vesicant action of mustard gas produced huge casualties with relatively little permanent harm4 ,chemicals may be found which temporarily influence human functions1 enabling military objectives to be attained with a remarkably small amount of pain and death4 ,in a fair review of the whole situation1 this possibility cannot be overlooked4 ,it is more than possible that a ,league of ,nations1 compelled to employ an element of force in its eventual control of peace1 may find its most effective and humane weapon in some chemical development4 ,however visionary these views may appear1 they are not unjustified as scientific possibilities4 ,analysis of war gas casualties reveal two main trends4 ,as the struggle became more intense the number of casualties multiplied4 ,they were considerable during the first period of cylinder attack1 and the rate remained steady until the beginning of the mustard gas period4 ,from the summer of #aiag to ,november1 #aiah1 there were more than ten times as many gas casualties as for the preceding three years of war4 ,but the percentage mortality1 the number of deaths amongst each hundred men attained1 decreased considerably4 ,as high as twenty-five per cent4 during the early cylinder attacks1 it decreased to two and a half per cent4 for the huge number of mustard gas cases4 ,yet mustard gas was an exceedingly important military factor4 ,it illustrates the possibility of development on these lines1 but we must by no means disregard the atrocity of chemical warfare1 and safeguards are required for the future4 ,we cannot do better than conclude by quoting from ,general ,hartley's report to the ,british ,association4 ,he says3 ,the general impression that gas is an inhumane weapon is derived partly from the ,german breach of faith in using it contrary to the ,hague ,convention1 and partly from the nature and number of casualties in the earliest cloud attacks which were made against unprotected troops4 ,under the stress of a long war the individual is apt to forget the physical and mental sufferings it involves1 unless he is daily in contact with them1 but a dramatic occurrence such as that of the first gas attack forces on the imagination the brutal significance of war--the struggle for victory by killing--and the new weapon is judged as inhumane1 like gunpowder in the fifteenth century4 ,if we accept war as a possibility1 the most humane weapon is that which leads to a decision with the smallest amount of human suffering and death4 ,judged from this standpoint1 gas compares favourably with other weapons during the period when both sides were fully equipped for offence and defence4 ,the death-rate among gas casualties was much lower than that among casualties from other causes1 and not only was the death-rate lower1 but a much smaller proportion of the injured suffered any permanent disability4 ,there is no comparison between the permanent damage caused by gas1 and the suffering caused to those who were maimed and blinded by shell and rifle fire4 ,it is now generally admitted that in the later stages of the war many military objects could be attained with less suffering by using gas than by any other means4 ,sargent's ,picture4--,the judgment of future generations on the use of gas may well be influenced by the pathetic appeal of ,sargent's picture of the first ,mustard ,gas' casualties at ,ypres1 but it must not be forgotten in looking at that picture that #ge per cent4 of the blinded men he drew were fit for duty within three months1 and that had their limbs and nerves been shattered by the effects of high explosive1 their fate would have been infinitely worse4 ,need for ,safeguards4--,we have continually referred to the need for safeguards instead of mere reliance on prohibition4 ,such views and facts as the above should be more generally known in order that very worthy sentiments may not impel us to adopt an unsound solution for future peace4 ,however alarmed and revolted we may have been in #aiae and later during the war1 it is essential to take a balanced view in the present critical period of reconstruction4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,chemical ,,warfare ,,and ,,disarmament ,preceding chapters have shown how chemical warfare has now become a normal1 technical1 and increasingly important part of the science of war4 ,further1 it has opened vast possibilities1 the limits of which it is very difficult to fix4 ,the ,treaty of ,versailles4--,chemical warfare received definite attention in the formulation of the ,treaty of ,versailles4 ,lord ,moulton1 one of the few ,allied representatives who realised the full importance of the matter1 has drawn attention to its ,treaty aspect in a recent speech4 ,he lays emphasis on the fact that the full significance of the ,german dye industry was not realised during the war4 ,referring to its chameleon-like nature in peace and war1 ,lord ,moulton says3 ,all this was imperfectly present to my mind throughout the war1 and ,i was aware of the gravity of the matter1 but until ,i learnt what had passed in ,germany ,i could not appreciate it fully4 ,i have spoken to you of the extent to which the ,germans turned their chemical works into general works for supplying explosives4 ,i have not touched the part in which they played the most deadly game against us1 and that was where they used their chemical works to produce those toxic gases4 ,the same statement tells us1 ,the knowledge that ,i have gleaned as to what was going on in ,germany during the war makes me feel that all my anticipa-tions of the importance of chemical industries in time of war1 all the views that ,i expressed of that importance1 did not nearly approach what has been proved to have gone on in the enemy's country during the war4 ,he then proceeds to explain how a clause was inserted in the treaty--whereby the ,germans have to tell us all the secrets of their manufacture of explosives1 all their methods of making toxic gases-- in fact1 all the military secrets that made them so terrible4 ,this clause was a very just one4 ,it is not fair that when we have gone through this agonising struggle1 and when we are still suffering from the consequences of all the wealth of knowledge and ingenuity which they employed for their infamous purposes-- it is not fair1 ,i say1 to allow them to keep these secrets to themselves1 and ,i think you will agree with me it was in the highest degree consonant with justice that we should make them reveal them all to us4 ,small wonder that we missed this vital point1 that we failed to fathom the force behind the ,german chemical war1 if such an eminent authority was left groping for the truth4 ,there was no time for mature reflection with the problems of war supply pressing forward in an endless stream4 ,lord ,moulton was himself responsible for the brilliant solution of the most important1 the problem of explosives supply4 ,the realisation of the facts in question led to the direct admission of their importance in the ,treaty4 ,article #agb1 the one in question1 states3 ,within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present ,treaty1 the ,german ,government will disclose 4 4 4 the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives1 toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war1 or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used4 ,german ,information4--,this clause should be fulfilled in detail4 ,in any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end1 the ,germans1 in addition to those devices in operation1 must have had a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation4 ,it is important to get as much information as possible on this development4 ,a striking fact emerges4 ,the years #aiae1 #aiaf1 and the early part of #aiag witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were used by ,germany on the front4 ,all the research and other work which precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier4 ,what surprises1 then1 had the ,german laboratories in store for us after #aiag8 ,have these been revealed under authority of the ,treaty8 ,probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation with regard to the ,haber process4 ,its critical importance in the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use the ,treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace4 ,this process undoubtedly saved ,germany in #aiae and is largely responsible for the three years of war agony which followed4 ,it can only have missed specific reference in the ,treaty on account of its claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry4 ,to yield to such views1 however ideal the motives1 is to threaten the greater ideal of world peace4 ,limitation of ,armament4--,this clause1 covering only war development1 cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future4 ,it is rather the fruits of victory1 the logical outcome of ,allied success and the ,german breach of faith4 ,but the ,treaty of ,versailles contains an admission of the importance of chemical warfare for the future4 ,article #aga states3 ,the use of asphyxiating1 poisonous1 or other gases and of analogous liquids1 materials1 or devices being prohibited1 their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in ,germany4 ,the same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture1 storage1 and the use of the same products or devices4 ,what kind of guarantee is this8 ,how far is it supported by other disarmament8 ,it is very important to answer these questions4 ,in a sense the full execution of the other relevant ,treaty clauses would provide a partial answer4 ,we deal with these in the next chapter4 ,report of the ,hartley ,mission4--,chemical warfare is the point faible in world disarmament4 ,judging from the above clause of the ,treaty1 it is clear that this is not fully recognised4 ,once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition4 ,the lesson of the war is not learnt4 ,the chemical menace is not countered4 ,why should this be8 ,there are two main reasons4 ,in the first place1 very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch of warfare1 for facts had rarely been disclosed1 and those with no direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions4 ,the vivid recollection of the first ,german cloud attack1 and of the introduction of mustard gas1 have1 for most people1 obscured the solid facts of the case4 ,the great importance of the projector1 the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery1 and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army of millions with a modern gas mask1 have not been grasped4 ,the ,hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the ,german dye factories for chemical warfare production4 ,but we have a shrewd idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed on production than on the use of the materials concerned1 that is1 on the military value of chemical warfare4 ,new ,conceptions in ,chemical ,disarmament4--,the second difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook4 ,let us examine the matter as simply as possible4 ,during the many discussions on disarmament in ,paris1 various principles were suggested as a basis4 ,one which received recognition in the ,treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors or guns1 using the term projector in a general way to cover all projectile-throwing weapons4 ,thus1 in the sense implied1 rifles1 machine-guns1 field and heavy guns are projectors4 ,recent writers have termed gas a projectile1 one which1 on account of its fluid nature1 ignores the limitations of explosive shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely4 ,this is true--with one most important qualification4 ,gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector1 the gun1 and with the limitation of the latter its dependence will decrease4 ,new forms of chemical weapon will evolve4 ,now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector1 and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors can be controlled1 because it is usually so complicated4 ,these remarks apply1 for example1 to the manufacture of a field or heavy gun4 ,but there is one serious exception to the covering power of this method of limitation4 ,you cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors1 but you can run a chemical campaign without them4 ,facing the difficulties which are before any ,league of ,nations or international body planning world disarmament1 let us assume armament reduced to a police basis4 ,in other words1 the use of force is not entirely ruled out1 but is limited to the minimum required for reducing local disorder1 maintaining the peace1 and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war4 ,the nations1 then1 agree to limit their personnel and material within certain prescribed bounds4 ,the work of the ,league of ,nations1 or central organisation1 does not finish here4 ,we cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions1 in other words1 some check or guarantee must be instituted4 ,this may take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their inspection by the ,league4 ,here we meet with considerable difficulty4 ,unless some simple covering principle for inspection can be determined upon1 we shall end up with one-half the world inspecting the administration and organisation of the other4 ,the matter becomes an absurdity4 ,limitation1 ,mechanical and ,chemical4--,considering the present trend of war development1 we can divide the factors requiring limitation into three classes--the combatants1 and weapons of a mechanical and chemical nature4 ,tank ,disarmament4--,a little thought will show that the limitation of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types1 and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility of inspection4 ,periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry1 for such weapons as rifles1 machine-guns1 field and heavy guns4 ,if we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance1 the tank1 we find it no exception to the above remarks4 ,without projectors1 that is1 machine-guns1 rifles1 etc41 it merely becomes a means of conveying troops and material from one place to another4 ,two possibilities then arise4 ,the number of tanks required might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light projectors without entering upon large-scale production4 ,secondly1 the tank might become an offensive weapon without projectors1 by the use of some chemical contrivance4 ,this merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit the output of the tank itself4 ,are such steps possible8 ,we assume that the modern tank is1 and will increasingly become1 a weapon practically as specific as a big gun1 requiring a number of special parts which normal industry does not provide1 and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors4 ,we now come to the third type requiring limitation under a disarmament scheme4 ,chemical ,limitation4--,can we limit chemical armament8 ,our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so1 unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry which is essential for world progress by its contribution of dyes1 drugs1 and other synthetic commodities4 ,the factories of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted into arsenals than any other type4 ,it is true that1 under normal conditions of warfare1 the decisive success of a chemical campaign might be restricted by the use of other weapons1 such as artillery4 ,but1 under conditions where the latter are seriously limited1 the chemical weapon becomes1 relatively1 of much greater importance4 ,one of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without a complicated form of projector1 or with none at all4 ,having thus shown the independence of the chemical weapon1 under conditions of limitation of armament1 we are faced with an important question4 ,what can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare8 ,research4--,in the first place1 can any research results accrue under ,treaty or ,league conditions8 ,the chief poison gases used during the war owed their discovery1 as individuals1 to pre-war research which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical4 ,phosgene was discovered in #ahaa by ,j4 ,davy1 while experimenting on the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine4 ,guthrie1 in #ahfj1 trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects of organic chemistry1 examining the nature of certain so-called radicles or groups of atoms1 came across a family of compounds of which mustard gas1 or ,b3,b dichlordiethylsulphide1 was a member4 ,this he found to be a dangerous substance1 but the nearest members of the series were harmless4 ,these substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research4 ,we admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially directed towards their discovery1 but it is practically impossible to control such work4 ,the research worker's nearest confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare4 ,no serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon such research4 ,if1 then1 the ,government of any country desires to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for chemical warfare production1 these can be produced under ,,any international arrangements1 however prohibitive4 ,production4--,but what of production8 ,here1 again1 we have an entirely different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun4 ,let us assume that the production of some vitally important new organic compound involves four different steps1 and that the last step produces the toxic substance4 ,this is a fair assumption4 ,let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection1 i4e4 the final product is a liquid or gas with obviously toxic properties4 ,given a big organic chemical industry1 there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control4 ,with regard to the first three steps1 in practically every case they will be related to some new or existing dye1 drug1 photographic1 or other commercial organic product4 ,the products of these first reactions can either be stored1 ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction1 in which case there is no possibility of detection1 or the reaction can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container4 ,the only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial secrets of the factories and plants1 and could even then be misled owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced4 ,the inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs4 ,consider the ,leverkusen works for a moment4 ,they cover a very wide range of products1 are admirably planned on a well thought out and rational scheme1 and there is a reason for the position of every unit4 ,their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical works with which we are acquainted4 ,even under such favourable conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult4 ,each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant1 and is devoted to the production of primary1 intermediate or finished materials4 ,for the inspection of suspected poison gas production1 an examination of the first two would be of no assistance1 for the war and peace materials would be identical4 ,differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks4 ,each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred different compounds at the same time1 and each one of these compounds may1 itself1 involve two1 three1 or four different stages4 ,the members of one official mission1 when asking to be shown the plant for the manufacture of p-amidophenol1 an important dye and photographic chemical1 were taken to a large building filled with assorted plant1 and were told by the guides1 ,we have no special plant for the product you mention2 we make it in this building with a great many other products1 for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one product only1 but is readily adaptable for making a variety4 ,in many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked eye after their introduction into the first plant unit1 being fed by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another4 ,it would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct chemical tests at the different stages4 ,the difficulty of inspection is incontestable4 ,it could be done with a large staff1 but we must remember that the ,rhine plants are1 themselves1 but a small corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection4 ,even under the most favourable conditions for detection1 the chances are exceedingly small4 ,but1 in most cases1 an enemy with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake manufacture during peace4 ,he could rely on the potentialities of his chemical industry1 which would enable him to commence production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war4 ,the question of the use of the chemical then arises4 ,if of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature1 it could take its share of use in the limited number of guns available2 on the other hand1 it might be capable of use in one of the very simple weapons already devised for chemicals1 or to be devised in the future4 ,consider the ,livens projector1 by no means a favourable case4 ,the latest ,german designs have a range well over a mile4 ,this range maybe increased4 ,yet the ,livens projector can be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant1 in a tube works1 where the bomb can also be produced4 ,the very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy is not required1 and simplification of production of the gas projector follows naturally4 ,we conclude from the above that whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting chemical warfare1 we can find no safeguard in practicable methods of control1 and must find safety in some other measure4 ,mechanical and ,chemical ,preparations for ,war4--,there is a fundamental difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war4 ,this difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method from the point of view of disarmament4 ,all the modern mechanical types of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy1 witness the ,lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts1 the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism1 and the future tank with its anti-gas1 anti-water1 and general anti devices4 ,this characteristic of great structural development has certain concomitants which are of considerable military importance4 ,it imposes certain conditions on production1 involving special factories for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts4 ,it implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance4 ,all this brings control and inspection within the region of the theoretically possible1 and militates against sudden surprise4 ,the structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions in military training4 ,it takes a definite period of time to create a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves4 ,he must know the different jambs1 and simple repairs4 ,he must be trained4 ,the same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance1 such as the tank4 ,in other words1 this characteristic is a distinct check on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament4 ,but consider the chemical method4 ,the specific property of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately its influence on the human organism1 which causes casualties or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops4 ,there is1 again1 a question of structure1 the chemical structure of the substance in question4 ,this1 however1 does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for the mechanical type1 unless it be in a very restricted sense4 ,in research1 the discovery of the most effective chemical the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers1 pots and pans1 and common chemicals1 directed by a trained mind4 ,being atomic or molecular1 the structure imposes no large scale conditions on the research4 ,nor is it fair to say that from the point of view of production there is a parallel between the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it4 ,the chemically complicated ,blue ,cross arsenic compounds were produced by ,germany in a plant which was simplicity itself when compared with the marvellous installation developed to produce oleum1 a concentrated form of the relatively simple sulphuric acid1 a fundamental substance in explosives production4 ,instead of manipulating a huge lathe1 or forge1 or exceedingly complicated multiple mechanical device1 you manipulate temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium4 ,naturally1 chemical engineering is very important1 but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel with the intricacy of the chemical molecule1 whereas a distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance4 ,more than this1 we believe that developments in both fields will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference4 ,we see thus how1 on general grounds1 the chemical weapon tends to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be perfectly adequate for the mechanical type4 ,recent ,disarmament ,proposals4--,a superficial examination of recent disarmament speeches by prominent ,league of ,nations advocates leaves one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal4 ,but later reflection1 in the cold light of reason1 produces a critical1 but not cynical1 frame of mind4 ,disarmament depends for success on the way in which we tackle certain critical cases1 ,the carrying out of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war4 ,the outstanding example is the chemical arm1 whose peculiar requirements in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood4 ,the great case and rapidity with which the ,german dye factories mobilised for poison gas production on a super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated4 ,it took forty years and more to develop those factories4 ,yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages of poison gas1 and as many hours were sufficient for others4 ,in some cases1 indeed1 they were already producing eventual munitions long before the outbreak of war4 ,we must not remain insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon4 ,when with one hand ,germany withdrew life-giving drugs from ,america1 with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison made in the same factories4 ,even when our textile industries were threatened through lack of indigo1 from the very plants on which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas1 each ounce of which threatened ,allied limb and life4 ,but how does this touch disarmament8 ,very simply4 ,a few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances will show that we are not pressing the point without need4 ,but let us follow the matter through in a logical way4 ,the ,covenant of the ,league2--,need for ,guarantees4--,we start from the sure ground of the ,covenant of the ,league of ,nations4 ,article #h1 recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety1 refers to the formulation and revision of plans for such reduction and states3 ,the members of the ,league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments1 their military and naval programmes1 and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes4 ,here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries4 ,but later exponents of the ,league express dissatisfaction with ,article #h1 claiming the wording to be vague4 ,thus1 from ,major ,david ,davies1 ,m4,p41#a ,the whole wording of ,article #h is vague4 ,these proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion which has brought about so many wars4 ,nations who put their trust in the ,league are entitled to an assurance that the ,league will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude4 ,the proposals concerning armaments in ,article #h and elsewhere do not give this assurance4 ,something more definite is required1 and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered by an efficient disarmament scheme4 #a ,the ,flaw in the ,covenant and the ,remedy4 ,major ,david ,davies1 ,m4,p4 7a7 ,allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal order within its own boundaries1 and sufficient also to furnish its quota for the ,league of ,nations when required4 7b7 ,ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation4 7c7 ,provide the ,league of ,nations with an adequate force for immediate use4 ,all the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an ,international ,police ,force4 ,this scheme1 which is given in the merest outline1 is based on the assumption that our national security must always be absolutely safeguarded1 and that before we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must be certain that the alternative offers complete protection4 ,other exponents emphasise this last essential4 ,this reference to an ,international ,police ,force raises an important issue4 ,such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations4 ,without any doubt1 one of the most important contributions from the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries4 ,viscount ,grey--,germany ,must ,disarm ,first4--,viscount ,grey1 at the public meeting in support of the ,league of ,free ,nations on ,october #ajth1 #aiah1 stated3 ,germany must disarm first4 ,she led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments4 ,she must lead the way down the hill4 ,that as a first condition1 from our point of view1 goes without saying4 ,there can be no talk of disarmament until ,germany1 as the greater armer1 is disarmed4 ,one can only heartily agree with such expressions1 but the denouement brings a sense of disappointment4 ,there is a feeling that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution4 ,the peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely admitted in these utterances4 ,thus ,major ,david ,davies states3 ,if they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack1 it was more than possible that they would have completely broken the ,allied line1 and ,lord ,grey1 ,you cannot limit the amount of merchant ships or commercial aeroplanes1 and the fewer the armaments1 fighting aeroplanes1 and ships of war1 the more potential as weapons of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships1 aeroplanes1 chemicals of all kinds4 ,left in this state the case is true but not complete4 ,the essential point is that the new and telling types of armament will develop from these very peace industries4 ,we are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude in a state of disarmament1 but with the critical types which may develop from them4 ,so far1 so good1 but what steps are proposed to counter the menace8 ,in reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals1 we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer weapons fall into two classes4 ,suggested ,methods4--,in the first place1 it is suggested that war's newest weapons--poison gas1 aeroplanes1 submarines1 heavy artillery1 and tanks1 should be ceded to the ,league to form the ,headquarter's ,force1 and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any new invention for warlike purposes4 ,there should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can claim long traditions4 ,vested interests have not yet been created on a permanent footing4 ,great disturbance would not be caused at present by the suggestion of denationalisation4 ,this really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition1 which is absolutely useless1 unless supported by the second class of safeguard1 periodic inspection4 ,major ,davies suggests all arsenals and munition factories would be open to inspection by the ,general ,staff1 who would use them1 when necessary1 for arming the quota of a nation other than that in whose territory they were situated4 ,we know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the ,i4,g4 for war purposes4 ,a distinction must be made between those weapons whose production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection4 ,in attempting such a classification1 ,major ,davies claims1 ,it is difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles1 but it is easy to prevent the manufacture of tanks1 aeroplanes1 gas1 or submarines4 ,no one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks and heavy guns1 and aware1 at the same time1 of the ,german methods of producing mustard gas or ,blue ,cross compounds1 could make such an elementary mistake in classification1 and any international disarmament arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security4 99,gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is difficult to prevent4 ,vested ,interests4--,with regard to the vested interests in the new method of warfare1 the most striking example is again the ,i4,g4 ,we find ,ludendorff consulting ,krupp and the ,i4,g4 representative when formulating his plans for a vast munition programme4 ,few people have realised the existence of another ,krupp in the ,i4,g4 ,it would1 indeed1 be a revelation to find ,germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly4 ,for such a situation is the only one consistent with safety4 ,while the sole big source of production of these substances exists in ,germany or in any one country for that matter1 no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground4 ,handing ,over ,inventions4--,certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous ideas with regard to new war inventions1 and their handing over to the ,league4 ,how can an invention be handed over8 ,if every country informed the ,league of its new scientific war developments1 those countries would still be aware of them4 ,it is possible1 commercially1 to hand over any invention by assigning a patent1 but this is of no use for war purposes4 ,what country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a valuable war invention8 ,secondly1 the cession of an invention to the ,league depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned4 ,no country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions4 ,suppose a gas ten times more useful1 from a military point of view1 than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the ,i4,g4 ,an inspector1 or ,secret ,service agent1 at the next bench in the laboratory might never know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye4 ,world equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries of some absorbed scientist working1 say1 in a greenhouse in ,st4 ,john's ,wood4 ,we come back to the same point1 that the crux of the situation lies in the possession of the means of production4 ,there is hope of controlling this for a weapon like a tank1 but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare4 ,if the ,league requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from a monopoly source so complete as the ,i4,g4 ,further1 with or without a ,league the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace4 ,neglect of ,chemical ,disarmament in the ,treaty4--,let us face the facts4 ,our treatment of chemical industry during the ,treaty negotiations and in the ,treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature4 ,we knew that the nitrogen plants at ,oppau and ,merseburg were the most menacing munition plants in existence4 ,we knew the grave dangers of leaving ,germany1 a guilty country1 in possession of the poison gas monopoly4 ,yet1 deaf to such arguments1 the ,treaty opportunity was ignored4 ,even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns4 ,here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large scale production4 ,the former cannot be checked1 and the latter cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion for war purposes4 ,yet three distinct features of this weapon make the disarmament need imperative4 ,in the first place1 everything points to chemical disarmament as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons4 ,the aggressive agent in war is the chemical4 ,all weapons1 except the bayonet1 depend upon it4 ,in the second place1 chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not1 first and foremost1 tackle this question4 ,thirdly1 no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon than did ,germany for chemical warfare4 ,yet the levelling up process which occurred during the war1 tending towards armament equilibrium1 towards removal of enormous disparity1 failed to touch the chemical arm4 ,germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon1 has still further increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war4 ,this age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war and disarmament4 ,others will follow as science progresses4 ,without them1 the possibility of sudden decisions1 and therefore war incentive will be removed4 ,sir ,oliver ,lodge prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy4 ,the fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell4 ,it is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness4 ,at present the chemical industry holds the field4 ,surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution of these organic chemical forces4 ,this1 indeed1 is the one solid chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about4 ,the certain establishment of these industries in the chief countries outside ,germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard of local politics and the reach of organised ,german attack4 ,true1 it is essential that no such support should in any way drug the will1 weaken the initiative and impoverish the service of the fostered industries4 ,this must depend upon wise organisation and control in the country concerned4 ,i claim1 however1 that it is one of the main duties of any ,league of ,nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed two steps beyond the paragraph in ,article #h of the ,covenant4 ,this runs as follows3 ,the members of the ,league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments1 their military1 naval1 and air programmes1 and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes4 ,such an exchange of information must be used1 first1 to isolate that industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period1 either on account of its value as a universal check1 or because it fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent4 ,the chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions1 for without it1 all weapons except the bayonet become silent1 and it includes the organic chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period4 ,secondly1 rational disarmament must prevent the existence of monopoly in this critical industry4 ,it may be objected that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws4 ,but we must face the possibility that the war of the future can never be averted without such interference4 ,indeed1 if we accept the reports of the ,american ,alien ,property ,custodian1 this very monopoly which now threatens us was established by methods open to the same objections4 ,it is indeed an interesting question whether the ,german dye monopoly resulted from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law4 ,further1 the question is not so simple as it appears1 for1 in the industries which disarmament most concerns1 governing technical changes are constantly occurring1 and the normal home for the production of a whole range of chemical products may be shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials or new types of energy and power4 ,we must be ready1 in certain critical cases1 to regard disarmament as the paramount need4 ,international agreement1 through the ,league or otherwise1 must find a suitable method to control the critical industry and prevent its use against world peace4 ,to be the ardent possessor of an ideal1 to be its official guardian1 does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international and national issue4 ,after our gigantic praiseworthy1 but wasteful1 attempts at chemical armament1 let us at least disarm on rational lines4 ,,conclusion ,,the ,,treaty ,,and ,,the ,,future ,i have endeavoured to present the facts of chemical warfare as briefly yet as truly as possible1 giving a glimpse of the war possibilities inherent in this branch of applied chemical science4 ,nor have ,i ignored the hidden forces which inspired1 stimulated1 and supported the huge war chemical experiment4 ,the great ,rhine factories of the ,i4,g4 still cast their shadow on the outer world1 obscuring the issues of reconstruction4 ,this looming menace1 its share in the past and future of chemical warfare1 and the fatal growth of the latter present questions demanding an imperative answer4 ,it is the weak point of world disarmament4 ,the ,treaty of ,versailles answers the riddle in principle1 but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled8 ,article #afh demands the limitation of munitions production to factories or works approved by the ,allied and ,associated ,governments4 ,all other establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall be closed down4 ,true1 the plants of the ,i4,g41 like most other munition plants1 have a dual function for peace and war4 ,but their recent vital use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope of the above clause4 ,are they still equipped for war purposes8 ,very drastic action will have been necessary by the ,inter-,allied ,commission of ,control to justify a negative answer4 ,has that action been taken8 ,if not1 the ,i4,g41 a second ,krupp1 remains in splendid isolation1 secure behind our mediaeval but generous conception of munitions1 for fifty per cent4 of the ,german shell fillings1 the message of their guns1 were eventually provided by the ,i4,g4 ,it is true that they were manufactured in synthetic dye and fertiliser plants1 but the explosives were none the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous4 ,do we understand that the ,allied and ,associated ,governments voluntarily leave ,germany in unquestioned possession of this vast source of munitions in the face of the ,treaty ,article #afh8 ,article #afi wisely requires that any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material1 except such as may be recognised as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the ,german ,army1 must be surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless4 ,the most formidable examples of such excess production were1 and remain1 the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants of the ,i4,g4 ,the factories of the latter represent explosives and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs of the ,german ,army4 ,why1 then1 should they be left4 intact8 ,what is the authorised equipment of the ,german ,army8 ,in the first place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden by the ,treaty4 ,the plants in question are therefore all in excess of authorised production1 and should be destroyed or rendered useless4 ,at present1 to the best of our belief1 they stand ready to produce at short notice at the rate of more than #cjjj tons of ,poison gas per month4 ,does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment8 ,if so1 we are ourselves contravening another clause of the ,treaty4 ,the ,treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell4 ,based on the figures1 we find that the actual war explosives production of the ,i4,g41 which1 we believe1 still largely remains available1 could meet the total stock allowed to ,germany by the current production of little more than one day6 ,even if the ,treaty provided authority1 could these plants evade their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need8 ,consider the question of ,german poison gas1 all produced within the ,i4,g41 and its use and manufacture in ,germany forbidden by the ,treaty4 ,it was made in converted or multiplied dye plants1 or in special plants of the same type4 ,germany's great advantage was due1 unquestionably1 to her pre-war dye monopoly4 ,the #aiac figures for production and home consumption are given below1 under 7,a7 and 7,b7 3 ,a ,b ,c ,country4 ,dye ,production1 ,home ,dye ,dye ,production1 #aiac4 ,consumption4 #aiah1 ,tons ,tons ,tons ,germany #ace1jjj #bj1jjj #ace1jjj 7probably more7 ,switzerland #aj1jjj #c1jjj #ab1jjj ,france #g1ejj #i1dcj #ah1jjj ,u4,k 4 #d1ejj #ca1gcj #be1jjj ,u4,s4,a #c1jjj #bf1jbj #bg1jjj ,other ,countries #c1jjj #gb1hbj #d1jjj ---- ---- ---- ,total #afc1jjj #afc1jjj #bba1jjj ,the completeness of the ,german monopoly stands clearly revealed4 ,if1 therefore1 any plants capable of making dyes were built for poison gas or explosives during war1 they could find no post-war raison d'etre unless the feeble production of other countries had even further diminished4 ,do the above figures 7,c7 justify such an assumption8 ,there is an increase of production outside ,germany of nearly #fj1jjj tons per annum4 ,almost all of this1 representing development under definitely expressed national policy1 must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the exceedingly dangerous situation of a ,german dye and poison gas monopoly4 ,much of this #fj1jjj tons per annum ,german excess could be covered by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives4 ,there is every reason1 for world peace1 to eliminate such excess plants4 ,there is no important reason1 for commerce1 to maintain them4 ,in addition1 many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon4 ,even if a generous ruling1 superimposed on the ,treaty1 offered these guilty plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use1 the claim could not be supported before neutral experts4 ,the ,treaty provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants4 ,nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this critical disarmament measure4 ,the need may justify ,treaty exemption for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect is not so overwhelmingly important4 ,the matter demands examination4 ,we can hardly conceive that this has not been done4 ,are our missions equipped to meet the best ,german commercial minds on such a matter8 ,in any case1 ,allied ,governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry policy inconsistent with the special ,treaty immunity of the excess ,i4,g4 munition plants4 ,our figures remove any ground for the economic argument4 ,the nitrogen fixation plants of the ,i4,g4 undoubtedly demand the same critical examination4 ,these plants were built almost entirely for war purposes1 for the production of ammonia to be oxidised to nitric acid4 ,ammonium nitrate also resulted4 ,these substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare1 and1 as a matter of fact1 their production in these very plants was the chief factor which enabled ,germany to continue the war beyond #aiae4 ,under the simple reading of the ,treaty clauses1 the plants should be destroyed or rendered useless4 ,here1 possibly1 strong arguments will be advanced by ,germany for the retention of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil4 ,the argument is strong1 for the impoverishment of ,german soil has been such as to demand1 theoretically1 enormous tonnages of ammonium sulphate4 ,but it is vital1 for the stability of peace1 that this unique capacity for producing explosives must not remain the monopoly of any one country4 ,it is the expressed intention of certain governments outside ,germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise4 ,if1 then1 we admit the immunity of these ,german plants from the ,treaty1 for strong agricultural reasons1 we must not allow ,germany to use this privilege as a military advantage4 ,in other words1 if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions4 ,in the first place1 the plants to evade the ,treaty clauses must be proved necessary for ,german agriculture4 ,secondly1 the products of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other4 ,as far as we know1 no attempt has been made to apply the ,treaty to the nitrogen fixation plants1 and their products1 instead of being mainly used for agriculture on ,german soil1 have served as a deliberate weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries4 ,indeed1 the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full demands of ,german agriculture were met1 the plants built and projected leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use4 ,according to the ,frankfurter ,zeitung of ,november #bcrd1 #aiai1 the total consumption of nitrogenous material by ,germany was1 in #aiac1 as follows3 ,tons ,source and ,nature ,tons ,calculated as ,nitrogen ,chili ,saltpetre #gej1jjj #aaf1jjj ,ammonium ,sulphate #dfj1jjj1 #ib1jjj ,norwegian ,nitrate #ce1jjj #d1ejj ,calcium ,cyanamide #cj1jjj #f1jjj ,haber ,ammonium ,sulphate 7by ,fixation7 #bj1jjj #d1jjj ------- ,total #bbb1ejj ,the same journal1 ,october #ah1 #aiai1 states the capacity of the finished ,haber plants to be equivalent to #cjj1jjj tons of nitrogen per annum1 and the total consumption of the old ,german ,empire was thus less than the amount available from one source alone1 i4e4 nitrogen fixation by the ,haber process4 ,but other pre-war ,german sources of nitrogen1 expanded by the war1 will easily contribute their pre-war quota4 ,we can therefore very safely assume ,german capacity of above #djj1jjj tons of nitrogen per annum1 approximately twice the pre-war consumption4 ,it is exceedingly unlikely that ,germany will actually consume such a quantity4 ,in any case1 a large excess is now deliberately used to recapture world chemical markets1 and this1 as explained above1 should be dealt with under the ,treaty even if special immunity be afforded the capacity required for home purposes4 ,we are indeed entitled to ask1 what is being done on this vital matter8 ,article #agj prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind into ,germany4 ,considered from the point of view of chemical munitions1 this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation4 ,far from importing1 possession of the ,i4,g4 leaves ,germany the greatest potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world4 ,further1 it is not improbable that countries outside ,germany may encourage her in munitions production for export4 ,lord ,moulton stated in a speech at ,manchester in ,december1 #aiad3 ,supposing our ,war ,minister had been in the last few years buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness1 and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by ,krupp's of ,essen4 ,gentlemen1 ,i think he would have been lynched about three months ago4 ,we have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days6 ,knowing the true war significance of the ,i4,g4 as a second ,krupp1 if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries1 that warning may become a prophecy4 ,article #aga forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous materials in ,germany4 ,has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control8 ,with such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production1 need ,germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace8 ,once engaged in war1 what is the value of the prohibition8 ,true1 failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of the ,treaty4 ,but a similar breach of ,international ,convention is already involved1 and admitted in the first phrase of ,article #aga3 ,the use of poison gases being prohibited1 etc4 ,it is difficult to see1 therefore1 unless penalties be actually incurred for the existing breach1 why ,article ,,iv would be a serious deterrent for the future4 ,a trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this ,treaty ,article1 and the actual operation of other ,articles which should support it4 ,the ,treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference to chemical warfare4 ,they issued a special edict against its use4 ,this alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of the ,disarmament ,clauses of the ,treaty1 measures of general application to the means of production of the different types of weapon4 ,have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic action under the ,treaty8 ,it is to be feared that they and other war chemical plants of the ,i4,g4 have received undeserved immunity4 ,where lies our help apart from the ,treaty8 ,world peace depends upon disarmament4 ,true peace must come from a radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals4 ,the forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers4 ,but a ,league of ,nations can forward the cause by wise measures of disarmament1 and this implies limiting war producing capacity4 ,the weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry4 ,there must be a redistribution of capacity1 for while ,germany retains a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions1 which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas1 and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration and sustenance1 disarmament will be a hollow farce4 ,the ,league of ,nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production of certain munitions4 ,but organic chemical factories must survive for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity4 ,they cannot be inspected and controlled1 as we have shown1 and there is only one sound solution4 ,the obstacle to peace must be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories4 ,we cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country4 ,it now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created and wielded it with such success4 ,redistributed1 this dangerous productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength to a ,league of ,nations1 and will invite a national sense of security1 so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime4 ,this has only one meaning1 the establishment of dye industries in ,allied countries4 ,this may clash with certain political schools of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of the organic way in which production links up with national defence4 ,but let there be no misunderstanding4 ,the refusal to support this critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues4 ,political principles responsible for such opposition no longer merit the name2 they have become a fetish4 ,our armies repelled the ,german chemical attack4 ,they stood and fell unprotected before the early ,german clouds and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas4 ,the awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more than rest contented with the sacrifice4 ,it is an imperative and patriotic duty to the fallen1 to the future of the race1 and to the ,empire1 that1 faced once again with modern war1 we should be able to say1 every possible precaution was taken4 ,but the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic chemical industries are fostered on ,imperial soil4 ,but what of chemical warfare itself8 ,it is a growth1 malignant or otherwise1 according to our creeds1 which will continue until very definite steps be taken to suppress it1 with all war4 ,therefore1 urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely essential until the web of peace is strongly organised1 which cannot be until the immediate menace of the monopoly in production is removed4 ,but even then1 until the general peace is fairly implanted1 we must be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous enemy4 ,research and training in chemical protection must be continued1 and this can only be ensured by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare4 ,the ,struggle for the ,initiative has at least established this4 ,each nation and any ,league of ,nations must seriously face the question of the establishment of elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisations4 ,it seems to me that the logical course of thought and action is as follows4 ,if guarantees are forthcoming1 internationally1 removing this grave ,german chemical warfare threat through her manufacturing monopoly1 then the need for a definite chemical striking force and organisation will be greatly reduced4 ,national safety is itself a corollary of world disarmament4 ,but if satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming it would be consistent with national safety to limit the chemical warfare equipment of each nation to what would actually represent a scientific military brain4 ,so long as national ministries for war or defence exist1 they must possess even under the most stringent disarmament conditions1 fully accredited within their regular staffs1 an individual or individuals with scientific and military training1 who represent knowledge1 vision1 and the power to expand in chemical warfare4 ,what would be said of a great nation not equipped to think for the future on naval or artillery questions8 ,technical naval and military minds have evolved for these purposes4 ,we are not slow to judge and act on the value of a new ship1 tank1 or machine-gun4 ,the chemical arm is even more specialised and demands the same combination of scientific and military thinking and training4 ,whatever international disarmament decisions may be forthcoming1 unless they seriously dismember the ,defence ,ministries1 we should ensure that the pre-war position is corrected and that our staff conception and organisation covers the chemical weapon4 ,one alone of the ,allied and ,associated ,powers was able to see the chemical menace with clear and unprejudiced vision4 ,this was ,america1 for she not only entered the war less hampered by traditions than the rest1 but at a period when the chemical war was in full blast4 ,more than a quarter of all her casualties were due to gas1 and no other arm produced as many in her ranks4 ,as a result1 we see ,america establishing an independent peace ,chemical ,warfare ,service1 as sister service to the ,infantry and ,artillery4 ,this can only be interpreted as a frank realisation of the place of chemical warfare and of the need for serious international guarantees in the present situation4 ,let us take a balanced view of the facts1 realise the unique significance of chemical warfare and chemical industry1 for war and disarmament1 and act accordingly4 ,,index ,raw ,,ocr1 needs fixed or stripped out444 ,a4 charcoal1 #abi4 ,aircraft1 gas and1 #aha1 #ahe1 #bbi1 #bcj1 #bca4 ,aisne1 ,german attacks on1 #gg1 #ada4 ,aktien ,gesellschaft fur ,anilin ,fabrikation1 #aea4 ,alert ,gas ,zone1 #bbi4 ,alien ,property ,custodian1 report of1 ,y#i1 #aeb1 #ahg1 #ahi7 #aij1 #aia1 #aid #bfb4 ,allied ,gas ,statistics1 #hb4 -,missions1 #hf1 #hg-,reaction1 #dh4 ,american activities1 #fd1 #agca #agd4 -chemical warfare development1 #aje1 #agc,p #agd1 #agh1 #bgc;f #bgd4 chemical warfare service1 #di1 #agh,p #cagi7 #bgd4 ,amidol1 #bjc4 ,ammonia1 synthetic1 see ,nitrogen ,fixation4 ,anaesthetics1 #bja1 #bbj4 -local1 #aii1 #bjb1 #bbj4 ,anti-,gas ,committee1 ,british1 #ie4 -,department1 ,british1 #ih1 #abg4 ,armendires1 bombardment of1 #gg4 ,arras1 ,battle of1 #fc-1 ,british #aiag offensive1 #fa4 ,arsenic ,compounds1 #bf1 #bh1 #fi1 #acf1 #acg7 #aci1 x#fo1 x#fc- ,see also ,blue ,cross4 ,artillery ,gas experts1 #ia4 ,asphyxiating ,compounds1 #be4 ,aspirin1 #aii1 #bjh4 ,austria-,hungary1 gas battalion of1 #dg4 ,azo ,dyes1 #afo4 ,badische ,anilin und ,soda ,fabrik1 #hh1 #aaea,p #bjg,p #bab4 ,bleaching ,powder1 x#f;g1 #bba1 #bbb4 ,blue ,cross1 #bi1 #fi1 #gd-gga #hi1 #abf1 #aca,p #acb1 #acfp #acg1 z#fo1 #bbi1 #bec1 #beh4 ,bn4 ,stuff1 #db4 ,box ,respirator1 ,british1 #fi1 #ii1 #aaja,p #abe1 x#bft #agf4 ,bribery and ,corruption1 x#io4 ,british ,association1 ,general ,hartley's report1 #fd1 #abc1 #bdj4-- ,central ,laboratory1 #ic1aaae4 -,dyes ,limited1 #aaf;g1 x#f;g4 ,brominated m ethyl -ethylketone1 #db4 ,bromine1 ,american ,industry1 #aeg7 #aij1 #aia4 -,french1 #aaeg1 #aga,p z#if4 -,monopoly1 ,german1 #aeg4 ,bromoacetone1 #bf1 #da4 ,b4 ,stuff1 #dr4 ,buntkreuz1 ii#cq4 ,cacodyl oxide1 #ce4 ,cambrai sector1 attack ,or'1 #gj1 #gi4 ,camouflage chemicals1 #ada1 #bag1 #bah4 ,canadians1 gas attack on1 #ai4 ,captured ,documents1 #eb1 #ect #gd1 #hb1 #abh1 #acc1 #bba1 #bbb1 #bbi4 ,carnoy1 attack at1 #fa4 #bg,s ,index ,cartridge ,mask1 ,german1 #abd1 #cabh4 ,castner ,kellner1 #afi4 ,casualties1 gas1 #ef1 #ic1 ,x#gd1 #ahb1 #bcg-bda1 #bgd4 ,chaulny1 #bji4 ,chemical ,advisory ,committee1 #if4 -,exchange ,association1 x#id1 z#if4 -,initiative1 see ,initiative1 struggle for4 -,policy1 ,german1 z#hf-;i#h,s1 #bjj1 #bje4 -,warfare ,department1 ,british1 #if-ih4--;,designs ,committee1 #ii4--,medical ,committee1 #ig4 -,organisations1 #he1 #bae1 #bag1 #bbh1 #bci1 #bfd4 ngli,sh1 #ib1 #i'1--' ,e #ajc #aje1 #afe4--1 ,french1 #id1 #ii1 #ajj1 #aje4--1 ,german1 #he1 #hi1 #ajb1 #ajc1 #adi4 ,italian1 iox4 ,policy1 #hh1 #bdip #bej4 ,production1 see ,production4 ,research1 see ,research4--,service1 ,american1 see ,american ,chemical ,warfare ,service4 ,chemische ,fabrik ,griesheim ,elektron1 i,si1 #aeb4--;,fabriken ,yorm4 ,weilerter-,meer1 x#ex4 ,chloral ,hydrate1 #aif1 #bjb4 ,chlorine1 #bc1 ,z#e1 #ce1 #cf1 x#ee1 #aef1 #afi1 #agap #bag4 #bgf ,chlormethylch,ioroform ate1 #fd1f #i4 ,chloroform1 z#bj4 ,chlorpicrin1 #be1 #aeh1 #afi4 ,cloud ,gas attacks1 #bc1 #df ,szy #ef1 #eg1 #fe1 #bae4 ,coloured ,cross1 x#ci4 ,colour ,users ,association1 ,y#fi4 ,commercial ,advisory ,committee1 ,british1 #if4 ,critical ,industries1 #bfa-z#fc1 #bgb4 -,range1 #bbf1 #bbi4 ,defence1 national1 see ,dye ,industry and ,national ,defence4 ,dianisidine1 double salts ,of1 #da4 ,dichlor-diethyl-sulphide1 see ,mustard ,gas4 ,dichlor-methylether1 x#fc4 ,diethfiamine1 #bja4 ,diphenylchlorarsine1 see ,arsenic compounds4 ,diphenylcyanarsine1 see ,arsenic compounds4 ,diphosgene1 #be1 #bi1 #aeg1 #afc4 ,directeur du ,mat#friel ,chimique de ,guerre1 ioo4 ,director of ,gas ,services1 #id1 #ih4 ,disarmament1 #bj1 #b11 #adb1 #ade1 #aej1 #agbt #agg1 #bdb1 #bde1 #bdf1 #beb1 #bed-bfb1 #bfg1 #bga-bgd4 ,see also ,limitation of ,armaments4 ,drugs1 igg-#bor4 ,dumps1 enemy1 #gi #ada4 ,dye ,agency1 ,german information system1 r#ib1 x#ic1 #aieg #aig4 -,industry and ,national ,defence1 #afc1 #agat #agbt #aih1 #bjc1 #bjd1 #bgb4 -,industry1 ,british1 #adf1 #afh1 #bjc #bjd- ,index ,dye ,industry1 ,german1 #adf1 #adg1 #aec x#hf1 #bdb1 #be -,monopoly1 ,german1 see ,monopoly1 ,german ,dye4 supplies to ,america1 #aig4 ,dyes1 use in ,gas ,shell1 #gb4 ,edgewood ,arsenal1 xo#e1 xo#f1 #age-agh;,entressin experimental grounds1 #aaj4 ,espionage1 #aib1 #aic;,ether1 #bbj4 ,fthyldichlorarsine1 x#fc4 ,ethylenemonochlorhydrin1 x#fd1 #bjb4 ,p-,eucaine1 #bjb4 ,exhaustion of ,stocks1 forced1 go4 ,explosives1 ,english ,production1 x#f;g4 ,german ,production1 i#dq1 #aaej7 #aaea4 ,farben fabriken vorm4 ,fr4 ,bayer and ,,co41 #ij1 #ae,t1 #aid1 #bjh4 ,farbwerke vorm4 ,meister ,lucius and ,briining1 #hg1 #aea;,field ,organisation1 ,british1 go4--,german1 go4 -,tests1 #hf1 xio4 ,flame ,projector1 see ,flammenwerfer4 ,flammenwerfer1 #dc1 #fca1 #gb7 #gc;,flexibility of ,supply1 ,german1 #fe1 #ach4 ,french ,college of ,warfare1 #ahe4 ,full ,line ,forcing1 x#io4 ,future of ,chemical ,warfare1 #ad-d1 #ahc4 ,gas and ,aircraft1 see ,aircraft4 -,casualties1 see ,casualties1 gas4 -,discipline1 #fb1 #ha-hb1 #acb,p #acc1 #adj- ,gas ,experts on ,artillery staffs1 see ,artillery ,gas ,experts4 -,mask1 see ,mask1 gas1 and ,helmet1 gas4--,personnel1 #hi4--,regiment go1 gi4--,school1 ,german1 #hf1 go1 gi4 -,shell1 see ,shell1 gas4 -,specific uses ,of1 #ci;,gaswerfer1 #aiah1 #ga;,gelbolin1 #bba4 ,german ,dye ,industry1 see ,dye ,industry1 ,german4 ,patent ,policy1 see ,patent ,policy1 ,german4 ,press1 #cc1 #ed4 -,production1 see ,production1 ,german4 ,givenchy1 attack near1 #ea1 #gj;,green ,cross1 #bi1 #fi,p #gg1 #ace1 1#cf1 i#e;g4 ,haber ,process1 see ,nitrogen4 ,fixation4 ,hague ,convention1 #cb1 #cc1 #bdj;,hanlon ,field1 experimental sta tion1 #age1 #bcah;,hartley ,mission1 #hg1 #ad #adi1 #agb1 #bjg1 #bde4 ,heeres-,gasschule1 see ,gas ,school1 ,german4 ,helmet1 ,gas1 ,x#ba1 #abb1 #abd- ,see also ,mask4 ,hexamine1 x#bb4 ,hill #fo1 attack on1 #dj4 ,hindenburg ,programme1 #ff1 #hi1 #adi4 #aaf;chst1 ,y#g1 #aea1 #aeb1 #aef1 #aeg1 #aeh1 x#fx4 ,hohenzollern ,redoubt1 storming ,of1 #ea4 ,hooge1 attack on #bnd ,army1 #dd4 #bgg ,i ndex ,hydrocyanic acid1 see ,prussic acid1 ,i4,g41 see ,interessen ,gemeinschaft4 ,immune ,functions1 #bag1 #bx#h1 #bcb4 ,imperial ,college of ,science1 #ig;,indigo1 #bh1 #aeet #aeh1 #aei1 #afe1 x#fh1 #bjb1 #bee4 ,initiative1 ,struggle for1 #aaa1 #aba1 #acdg #bgc;,interessen ,gemeinschaft1 #ah1 #cb1 #hf1 #hi1 #aji,p #adh1 #adi-aea1 z#ed1 #afc1 x#hf1 #ahg1 #aib1 #aih1 #bjj1 #bjb1 #bje1 #bad1 #beh-bfo1 #bfd-bfg1 #bg,p4 ,inter-,allied ,chemical ,supply ,committee1 #ajg-;,commission of ,control1 #e1 #bfd4--,liaison1 xo#f4--,munitions ,council1 #ajg4 ,intensive ,chemical ,warfare1 #ff4 ,international ,police ,force1 #bef4 ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,institute1 #ce1 #he1 #i4 ,kalle and ,co41 #aea1 ,kernmel1 attack on1 #gg1 #bbd1 #bbi4 ,k4 ,stuff1 #da,kornmandeurder,gastruppen1gi1 ,krupp's ,works1 #bjf4 ,la ,bassie ,canal1 #gf4 ,lachrymator,s1 #bf1 #db1 x#ah1 #abd1 #aef1 #agj1 #baga #bah4 ,league of ,nations1 #br1 #abg1 #bei1 #bdf1 #bdg1 #bee1 #bef1 #beh1 #bfo1 #bfa1 #bfb1 #bfca #bga-bgc,lens1 attack at1 #gg1 #gf4 ,le ,rutoire ,farm1 #dc1 ,leopold ,cassella1 ,g4m4b4,h41 #caea4 ,leverkusen1 #hf1 go1 z#d;g1 r#elt #aef-aeh1 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