,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,good--,a ,,dialogue ,,by ,g4 ,,lowes ,,dickinson ,fellow of ,king's ,college1 ,cambridge1 and ,author of a ,modern ,symposium ,,third ,,edition #aijj ,,dedication ,how do the waves along the level shore ,follow and fly in hurrying sheets of foam1 ,for ever doing what they did before1 ,for ever climbing what is never clomb6 ,is there an end to their perpetual haste1 ,their iterated round of low and high1 ,or is it one monotony of waste ,under the vision of the vacant sky8 ,and thou1 who on the ocean of thy days ,dost like a swimmer patiently contend1 ,and though thou steerest with a shoreward gaze ,misdoubtest of a harbour or an end1 ,what would the threat1 or what the promise be1 ,could ,i but read the riddle of the sea6 ,,preface ,an attempt at ,philosophic ,dialogue may seem to demand a word of explanation1 if not of apology4 ,for1 it may be said1 the ,dialogue is a literary form not only exceedingly difficult to handle1 but1 in its application to philosophy1 discredited by a long series of failures4 ,i am not indifferent to this warning2 yet ,i cannot but think that ,i have chosen the form best suited to my purpose4 ,for1 in the first place1 the problems ,i have undertaken to discuss have an interest not only philosophic but practical2 and ,i was ambitious to treat them in a way which might perhaps appeal to some readers who are not professed students of philosophy4 ,and1 secondly1 my subject is one which belongs to the sphere of right opinion and perception1 rather than to that of logic and demonstration2 and seems therefore to be properly approached in the tentative spirit favoured by the ,dialogue form4 ,on such topics most men1 ,i think1 will feel that it is in conversation that they get their best lights2 and ,dialogue is merely an attempt to reproduce in literary form this natural genesis of opinion4 ,lastly1 my own attitude in approaching the issues with which ,i have dealt was1 ,i found1 so little dogmatic1 so sincerely speculative1 that ,i should have felt myself hampered by the form of a treatise4 ,i was more desirous to set forth various points of view than finally to repudiate or endorse them2 and though ,i have taken occasion to suggest certain opinions of my own1 ,i have endeavoured to do so in the way which should be least imprisoning to my own thought1 and least provocative of the reader's antagonism4 ,it has been my object1 to borrow a phrase of ,renan1 'de prsenter des sries d'ides se dveloppant selon un ordre logique1 et non d'inculquer une opinion ou de prcher un systme dtermin4' ,and ,i may add1 with him1 ',moins que jamais je me sens l'audace de parler doctrinalernent en pareille matire4' ,in conclusion1 there is one defect which is1 ,i think1 inherent in the ,dialogue form1 even if it were treated with far greater skill than any to which ,i can pretend4 ,the connection of the various phases of the discussion can hardly be as clearly marked as it would be in a formal treatise2 and in the midst of digressions and interruptions1 such as are natural in conversation1 the main thread of the reasoning may sometimes be lost ,i have therefore appended a brief summary of the argument1 set forth in its logical connections4 ,,argument ,,book ,i4 ,i4 ,after a brief introduction1 the discussion starts with a consideration of the diversity of men's ideas about ,good1 a diversity which suggests prim facie a scepticism as to the truth of any of these ideas4 ,the sceptical position is stated2 and1 in answer1 an attempt is made to show that the position is one which is not really accepted by thinking men4 ,for such men1 it is maintained1 regulate their lives by their ideas about ,good1 and thus by implication admit their belief in these ideas4 ,this is admitted2 but the further objection is made1 that for the regulation of life it is only necessary for a man to admit a ,good for himself1 without admitting also a ,general ,good or ,good of all4 ,it is suggested1 in reply1 that the conduct of thinking men commonly does imply a belief in a ,general ,good4 ,against this it is urged that the belief implied is not in a ,good of all1 but merely in the mutual compatibility of the ,goods of individuals2 so that each whilst pursuing exclusively his own ,good1 may also believe that he is contributing to that of others4 ,in reply1 it is suggested 7#a7 that such a belief is not borne out by fact2 7#b7 that the belief does itself admit a ,good common to all1 namely1 society and its institutions4 ,in conclusion1 it is urged that to disbelieve in a ,general ,good is to empty life of what constitutes1 for most thinking men1 its main value4 ,,ii4 ,the position has now been taken up 7#a7 that men who reflect do1 whatever may be their theoretical opinion1 imply1 in their actual conduct1 a belief in their ideas about ,good1 7#b7 but that there seems to be no certainty that such ideas are true4 ,this latter proposition is distasteful to some of the party1 who endeavour to maintain that there really is no uncertainty as to what is good4 ,thus it is argued3 7#a7 ,that the criterion of ,good is a simple infallible instinct4 ,to which it is replied that there appear to be many such 'instincts' conflicting among themselves4 7#b7 ,that the criterion of ,good is the course of ,nature2 ,good being defined as the end to which ,nature is tending4 ,to which it is replied that such a judgment is as a priori and unbased as any other1 and as much open to dispute4 ,it is then urged that if we reject the proposed criterion1 we can have no scientific basis for ,ethics2 which leads to a brief discussion of the nature of ,science1 and the applicability of its methods to ,ethics4 7#c7 ,that the criterion of ,good is current convention4 ,to which it is replied1 that conventions are always changing1 and that the moral reformer is precisely the man who disputes those which are current4 ,especially1 it is urged that our own conventions are1 in fact1 vigorously challenged1 e4g4 by ,nietzsche4 7#d7 ,that the criterion of ,good is ,pleasure1 or the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,to which it is replied3 7a7 ,that this view is not1 as is commonly urged1 in accordance with 'common sense4' 7b7 ,that either ,pleasure must be taken in the simplest and narrowest sense2 in which case it is palpably inadequate as a criterion of ,good2 or its meaning must be so widely extended that the term ,pleasure becomes as indefinite as the term ,good4 7c7 ,that if the criterion of ,pleasure were to be fairly applied1 it would lead to results that would shock those who profess to adopt it4 ,,iii4 ,these methods of determining ,good having been set aside1 it is suggested that it is only by 'interrogating experience' that we can discover1 tentatively1 what things are good4 ,to this it is objected1 that perhaps all our ideas derived from experience are false1 and that the only method of determining ,good would be metaphysical1 and a priori4 ,in reply1 the bare possibility of such a method is admitted2 but it is urged that no one really believes that all our opinions derived from experience are false1 and that such a belief1 if held1 would deprive life of all ethical significance and worth4 ,finally1 it is suggested that the position in which we do actually find ourselves1 is that of men who have a real1 though imperfect perception of a real ,good1 and who are endeavouring1 by practice1 to perfect that perception4 ,in this respect an analogy is drawn between our perception of ,good and our perception of ,beauty4 ,it is further suggested that the end of life is not merely a knowledge but an experience of ,good2 this end being conceived as one to be realised in ,time4 ,,iv4 ,on this1 the point is raised1 whether it is not necessary to conceive ,good as eternally existing1 rather than as something to be brought into existence in the course of ,time8 ,on this view1 ,evil must be conceived as mere 'appearance4' ,in reply1 it is suggested3 7#a7 ,that it is impossible to reconcile the conception of eternal ,good with the obvious fact of temporal ,evil4 7#b7 ,that such a view reduces to an absurdity all action directed to ends in ,time4 ,and yet it seems that such action not only is but ought to be pursued1 as appears to be admitted even by those who hold that ,good exists eternally1 since they make it an end of action that they should come to see that everything is good4 7#c7 ,that this latter conception of the end of action--namely1 that we should bring ourselves to see that what appears to be ,evil is really ,good--is too flagrantly opposed to common sense to be seriously accepted4 ,to sum up3 ,in this ,book the following positions have been discussed and rejected3 7#a7 ,that our ideas about ,good have no relation to any real fact4 7#b7 ,that we have easy and simple criteria of ,good--such as 7a7 an infallible instinct1 7b7 the course of ,nature1 7c7 current conventions1 7d7 pleasure4 7#c7 ,that all ,reality is good1 and all ,evil is mere 'appearance4' ,and it has been suggested that our experience is1 or may be made1 a progressive discovery of ,good4 ,in the following ,book the question of the content of ,good is approached4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,book ,,ii4 ,this ,book comprises an attempt to examine some kinds of ,good1 to point out their defects and limitations1 and to suggest the character of a ,good which we might hold to be perfect--here referred to as ',the ,good4' ,the attitude adopted is tentative1 for it is based on the position1 at which we are supposed to have arrived1 that the experience of any one person1 or set of persons1 about ,good is limited and imperfect1 and that therefore in any attempt to describe what it is that we hold to be good1 to compare ,goods among one another1 and to suggest an absolute ,good1 we can only hope1 at best1 to arrive at some approximation to truth4 ,i4 ,this attitude is explained at the outset1 and certain preliminary points are then discussed4 ,these are3 7#a7 ,can any ,good be an end for us unless it is conceived to be an object of consciousness8 ,the negative answer is suggested4 7#b7 ,in pursuing ,good1 for whom do we pursue it8 ,it is suggested that the ,good we pursue is 7a7 ,that of future generations4 ,some difficulties in this view are brought out2 and it is hinted that what we really pursue is the ,good of 'the ,whole1' though it is not easy to see what we mean by that4 7b7 ,that of 'the species4' ,but this view too is seen to be involved in difficulty4 ,,ii4 ,the difficulty is left unsolved1 and the conversation passes on to an examination of some of our activities from the point of view of ,good4 ,in this examination a double object is kept in view3 7#a7 to bring out the characteristics and defects of each kind of ,good2 7#b7 to suggest a ,good which might be conceived to be free from defects1 such a ,good being referred to as ',the ,good4' 7#a7 ,it is first suggested that all activities are good1 if pursued in the proper order and proportion2 and that what seems bad in each1 viewed in isolation1 is seen to be good in a general survey of them all4 ,this view1 it is argued1 is too extravagant to be tenable4 7#b7 ,it is suggested that ,good consists in ethical activity4 ,to this it is objected that ethical actions are always means to an end1 and that it is this end that must be conceived to be really good4 7#c7 ,the activity of the senses in their direct contact with physical objects is discussed4 ,this is admitted to be a kind of ,good2 but such ,good1 it is maintained1 is defective1 not only because it is precarious1 but because it depends upon objects of which it is not the essence to produce that ,good1 but which1 on the contrary1 just as much and as often produce ,evil4 7#d7 ,this leads to a discussion of ,art4 ,in ,art1 it seems1 we are brought into relation with objects of which it may be said3 7a7 ,that they have1 by their essence1 that ,good which is called ,beauty4 7b7 ,that1 in a certain sense1 they may be said to be eternal4 7c7 ,that1 though complex1 they are such that their parts are necessarily connected1 in the sense that each is essential to the total ,beauty4 ,on the other hand1 the ,good of ,art suffers from the defects3 7a7 ,that outside and independent of ,art there is the 'real world1' so that this ,good is only a partial one4 7b7 ,that ,art is a creation of man1 whereas we seem to demand1 for a thing that shall be perfectly good1 that it shall be so of its own nature1 without our intervention4 7#e7 ,it is suggested that perhaps we may find the ,good we seek in knowledge4 ,this raises the difficulty that various views are held as to the nature of knowledge4 ,of these1 two are discussed3 7a7 the view that knowledge is 'the description and summing up in brief formul1 of the routine of our perceptions4' ,it is questioned whether there is really much ,good in such an activity4 ,and it is argued that1 whatever ,good it may have1 it cannot be the ,good1 seeing that knowledge may be1 and frequently is1 knowledge of ,bad4 7b7 the view that knowledge consists in the perception of 'necessary connections1' ,viewed from the standpoint of ,good1 this seems to be open to the same objection as 7a74 ,but1 further1 it is argued that the perpetual contemplation of necessary relations among ideas does not satisfy our conception of the ,good2 but that we require an element analogous somehow to that of sense1 though not1 like sense1 unintelligible and obscure4 7#f7 ,finally1 it is suggested that in our relation to other persons1 where the relation takes the form of love1 we may perhaps find something that comes nearer than any other of our experiences to being absolutely good4 ,for in that relation1 it is urged1 we are in contact 7a7 with objects1 not 'mere ideas4' 7b7 with objects that are good in themselves and 7c7 intelligible and 7d7 harmonious to our own nature4 ,it is objected that love1 so conceived1 is 7a7 rarely1 perhaps never1 experienced4 7b7 in any case1 is neither eternal nor universal4 ,this is admitted2 but it is maintained that the best love we know comes nearer than anything else to what we might conceive to be absolutely good4 ,,iii4 ,the question is now raised3 if 'the ,good' be so conceived1 is it not clearly unattainable8 ,the answer to this question seems to depend on whether or not we believe in personal immortality4 ,the following points are therefore discussed3 7a7 ,whether personal immortality is conceivable8 7b7 ,whether a belief in it is essential to a reasonable pursuit of ,good8 ,on these points no dogmatic solution is offered2 and the ,dialogue closes with the description of a dream4 ,,book ,i4 ,every summer1 for several years past1 it has been my custom to arrange in some pleasant place1 either in ,england or on the continent1 a gathering of old college friends4 ,in this way ,i have been enabled not only to maintain some happy intimacies1 but 7what to a man of my occupation is not unimportant7 to refresh and extend1 by an interchange of ideas with men of various callings1 an experience of life which might be otherwise unduly monotonous and confined4 ,last year1 in particular1 our meeting was rendered to me especially agreeable by the presence of a very dear friend1 ,philip ,audubon1 whom1 since his business lay in the ,east1 ,i had not had an opportunity of seeing for many years4 ,i mention him particularly1 because1 although1 as will be seen1 he did not take much part in the discussion ,i am about to describe1 he was1 in a sense1 the originator of it4 ,for1 in the first place1 it was he who had invited us to the place in which we were staying1--an upland valley in ,switzerland1 where he had taken a house2 and1 further1 it was through my renewed intercourse with him that ,i was led into the train of thought which issued in the following conversation4 ,his life in the ,east1 a life laborious and monotonous in the extreme1 had confirmed in him a melancholy to which he was constitutionally inclined1 and which appeared to be rather heightened than diminished by exceptional success in a difficult career4 ,i hesitate to describe his attitude as pessimistic1 for the word has associations with the schools from which he was singularly free4 ,his melancholy was not the artificial product of a philosophic system2 it was temperamental rather than intellectual1 and might be described1 perhaps1 as an intuition rather than a judgment of the worthlessness and irrationality of the world4 ,such a position is not readily shaken by argument1 nor did ,i make any direct attempt to assail it2 but it could not fail to impress itself strongly upon my mind1 and to keep my thoughts constantly employed upon that old problem of the worth of things1 in which1 indeed1 for other reasons1 ,i was already sufficiently interested4 ,a further impulse in the same direction was given by the arrival of another old friend1 ,arthur ,ellis4 ,he and ,i had been drawn together at college by a common interest in philosophy2 but in later years our paths had diverged widely4 ,fortune and inclination had led him into an active career1 and for some years he had been travelling abroad as correspondent to one of the daily papers4 ,i felt1 therefore1 some curiosity to renew my acquaintance with him1 and to ascertain how far his views had been modified by his experience of the world4 ,the morning after his arrival he joined ,audubon and myself in a kind of loggia at the back of the house1 which was our common place of rendezvous4 ,we exchanged the usual greetings1 and for some minutes nothing more was said1 so pleasant was it to sit silent in the shade listening to the swish of scythes 7they were cutting the grass in the meadow opposite7 and to the bubbling of a little fountain in the garden on our right1 while the sun grew hotter every minute on the fir-covered slopes beyond4 ,i wanted to talk1 and yet ,i was unwilling to begin2 but presently ,ellis turned to me and said3 ,well1 my dear philosopher1 and how goes the world with you8 ,what have you been doing in all these years since we met8 ,oh1 ,i replied1 nothing worth talking about4 ,what have you been thinking then8 ,just now ,i have been thinking how well you look4 ,knocking about the world seems to suit you4 ,i think it does4 ,and yet at this moment1 whether it be the quiet of the place1 or whether it be the sight of your philosophic countenance1 ,i feel a kind of yearning for the contemplative life4 ,i believe if ,i stayed here long you would lure me back to philosophy2 and yet ,i thought ,i had finally escaped when ,i broke away from you before4 ,it is not so easy1 ,i said1 to escape from that net1 once one is caught4 ,but it was not ,i who spread the snare2 ,i was only trying to help you out1 or1 at least1 to get out myself4 ,and have you found a way8 ,no1 ,i cannot say that ,i have4 ,that's why ,i want to talk to you and hear how you have fared4 ,i8 ,oh1 ,i have given the whole subject up4 ,you can hardly give up the subject till you give up life4 ,you may have given up reading books about it2 and1 for that matter1 so have ,i4 ,but that is only because ,i want to grapple with it more closely4 ,what do you do1 then1 if you do not read books8 ,i talk to as many people as ,i can1 and especially to those who have had no special education in philosophy2 and try to find out to what conclusions they have been led by their own direct experience4 ,conclusions about what8 ,about many things4 ,but in particular about the point we used to be fondest of discussing in the days before you had1 as you say1 given up the subject--,i mean the whole question of the values we attach1 or ought to attach1 to things4 ,oh6 he said1 well1 as to all that1 my opinion is the same as of old4 ',there's nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so1' ,so ,i used to say at college and so ,i say now4 ,i remember1 ,i replied1 that that is what you always used to say2 but ,i thought ,i had refuted you over and over again4 ,so you may have done1 as far as logic can refute2 but every bit of experience which ,i have had since last we met has confirmed me in my original view4 ,that1 ,i said1 is very interesting1 and is just what ,i want to hear about4 ,what is it that experience has done for you8 ,for1 as you know1 ,i have so little of my own1 ,i try to get all ,i can out of other people's4 ,well1 he said1 the effect of mine has been to bring home to me1 in a way ,i could never realize before1 the extraordinary diversity of men's ideals4 ,that1 you find1 is the effect of travel8 ,i think so4 ,travelling really does open the eyes4 ,for instance1 until ,i went to the ,east ,i never really felt the antagonism between the ,oriental view of life and our own4 ,now1 it seems to me clear that either they are mad or we are2 and upon my word1 ,i don't know which4 ,of course1 when one is here1 one supposes it is they4 ,but when one gets among them and really talks to them1 when one realizes how profound and intelligent is their contempt for our civilization1 how worthless they hold our aims and activities1 how illusory our progress1 how futile our intelligence1 one begins to wonder whether1 after all1 it is not merely by an effect of habit that one judges them to be wrong and ourselves right1 and whether there is anything at all except blind prejudice in any opinions and ideas about ,right and ,wrong4 ,in fact1 interposed ,audubon1 you agree1 like me1 with ,sir ,richard ,burton3 ',there is no good1 there is no bad1 these be the whims of mortal will2 ,what works me weal that call ,i good1 what harms and hurts ,i hold as ill4 ,they change with space1 they shift with race1 and in the veriest span of time1 ,each vice has worn a virtue's crown1 all good been banned as sin or crime4' ,yes1 he assented1 and that is what is brought home to one by travel4 ,though really1 if one had penetration enough1 it would not be necessary to travel to make the discovery4 ,a single country1 a single city1 almost a single village1 would illustrate1 to one who can look below the surface1 the same truth4 ,under the professed uniformity of beliefs1 even here in ,england1 what discrepancies and incongruities are concealed6 ,every type1 every individual almost1 is distinguished from every other in precisely this point of the judgments he makes about ,good4 ,what does the soldier and adventurer think of the life of a studious recluse8 or the city man of that of the artist8 and vice versa8 ,behind the mask of good manners we all of us go about judging and condemning one another root and branch4 ,we are in no real agreement as to the worth either of men or things4 ,it is an illusion of the 'canting moralist' 7to use ,stevenson's phrase7 that there is any fixed and final standard of ,good4 ,good is just what any one thinks it to be2 and one man has as much right to his opinion as another4 ,but1 ,i objected1 it surely does not follow that because there are different opinions about ,good1 they are all equally valuable4 ,no4 ,i should infer rather that they are all equally worthless4 ,that does not seem to me legitimate either2 and ,i venture to doubt whether you really believe it yourself4 ,well1 at any rate ,i am inclined to think ,i do4 ,in a sense perhaps you do2 but not in the sense which seems to me most important4 ,i mean that when it comes to the point1 you act1 and are practically bound to act1 upon your opinion about what is good1 as though you did believe it to be true4 ,how do you mean 'practically bound8' ,i mean that it is only by so acting that you are able to introduce any order or system into your life1 or in fact to give it to yourself any meaning at all4 ,without the belief that what you hold to be good really somehow is so1 your life1 ,i think1 would resolve itself into mere chaos4 ,i don't see that ,well1 ,i may be wrong1 but my notion is that what systematizes a life is choice2 and choice1 ,i believe1 means choice of what we hold to be good4 ,surely not6 ,surely we may choose what we hold to be bad4 ,i doubt it ,but how then do you account for what you call bad men8 ,i should say they are men who choose what ,i think bad but they think good4 ,but are there not men who deliberately choose what they think bad1 like ,milton's ,satan--',evil be thou my ,good'8 ,yes1 but by the very terms of the expression he was choosing what he thought good2 only he thought that evil was good4 ,but that is a contradiction4 ,yes1 it is the contradiction in which he was involved1 and in which ,i believe everyone is involved who chooses1 as you say1 the ,bad4 ,to them it is not only bad1 it is somehow also good4 ,does that apply to ,nero1 for example8 ,yes1 ,i think it very well might2 the things which he chose1 power and wealth and the pleasures of the senses1 he chose because he thought them good2 if his choice also involved what he thought bad1 such as murder and rapine and the like 7if he did think these bad1 which ,i doubt71 then there was a contradiction not so much in his choice as in its consequences4 ,but even if ,i were to admit that he and others have chosen and do choose what they believe to be bad1 it would not affect the point ,i want to make4 ,for to choose ,bad must be1 in your view1 as absurd as to choose ,good2 since1 ,i suppose1 you do not believe1 that our opinions about the one have any more validity than our opinions about the other4 ,so that if we are to abandon ,good as a principle of choice1 it is idle to say we may fall back upon ,bad4 ,no1 ,i don't say that we may2 nor do ,i see that we must ,we do not need either the one or the other4 ,you must have noticed--,i am sure ,i have--that men do not in practice choose with any direct reference to ,good or ,bad2 they choose what they think will bring them pleasure1 or fame1 or power1 or1 it may be1 barely a livelihood4 ,but believing1 surely1 that these things are good8 ,not necessarily2 not thinking at all about it1 perhaps4 ,perhaps not thinking about it as we are now2 but still1 so far believing that what they have chosen ,is good1 that if you were to go to them and suggest that1 after all1 it is bad they would be seriously angry and distressed4 ,but1 probably1 interposed ,audubon1 like me1 they could not help themselves4 ,we are none of us free1 in the way you seem to imagine4 ,we have to choose the best we can1 and often it is bad enough4 ,no doubt1 ,i replied1 but still1 as you say yourself1 what we choose is the best we can1 that is1 the most good we can4 ,the criterion is ,good1 only it is very little of it that we are able to realize4 ,no1 objected ,ellis1 ,i am not prepared to admit that the criterion is ,good4 ,you will find that men will frankly confess that other pursuits or occupations are1 in their opinion1 better than those they have chosen1 and that these better things were and are open to themselves1 and yet they continue to devote themselves to the worse1 knowing it all the time to be the worse4 ,but in most cases1 ,i replied1 these better things1 surely1 are not really 'open' to them1 except so far as external circumstances are concerned4 ,they are hampered in their choice by passions and desires1 by that part of them which does not choose1 but is passively carried away by alien attractions2 and the course they actually adopt is the best they can choose1 though they see a better which they would choose if they could4 ,the choice is always of ,good1 but it may be diverted by passion to less ,good4 ,i don't know1 he said1 that that is a fair account of the matter4 ,nor do ,i4 ,it is so hard to analyse what goes on in one's own consciousness1 much more what goes on in other people's4 ,still1 that is the kind of way ,i should describe my own experience1 and ,i should expect that most people who reflect would agree with me4 ,they would say1 ,i think1 that they always choose the best they can1 though regretting that they cannot choose better than they do2 and it would seem to them1 ,i think1 absurd to suggest that they choose ,bad1 or choose without any reference either to ,good or ,bad4 ,well1 he said1 granting1 for the moment1 that you are right--what follows8 ,why1 then1 ,i said1 it follows that we are1 as ,i said1 'practically bound' to accept as valid1 for the moment at least1 our opinions about what is good2 for otherwise we should have no principle to choose by1 if it be true that the principle of choice is ,good4 ,very well1 he said1 then we should have to do without choosing6 ,but could we8 ,i don't see why not2 many people do4 ,but what sort of people8 ,i mean what sort of life would it be8 ,ellis was preparing to answer when we were interrupted by a voice from behind4 ,the place in which we were sitting opened at the back into one of those large lofty barns which commonly form part of a ,swiss house2 and as the floor of this room was covered with straw1 it was possible to approach that way without making much noise4 ,for this reason1 two others of our party had been able to join us without our observing it4 ,their names were ,parry and ,leslie2 the former a man of thirty1 just getting into practice at the ,bar1 the latter still almost a boy in years1 though a very precocious one1 whom ,i had brought with me1 ostensibly as a pupil1 but really as a companion4 ,he was an eager student of philosophy1 and had something of that contempt of youth for any one older than twenty-five1 which ,i can never find it in my heart to resent1 though have long passed the age which qualifies me to become the object of it4 ,he it was who was speaking1 in a passionate way he had1 when anything like a philosophic discussion was proceeding4 ,why1 he was saying1 in answer to my last remark1 without choice one would be a mere slave of passion1 a creature of every random mood and impulse1 a beast1 a thing1 not a man at all6 ,ellis looked round rather amused4 ,well1 he said1 you fire-eater1 and why not8 ,i don't know that impulse is such a bad thing4 ,a good impulse is better than a bad calculation any day6 ,yes1 but you deny the validity of the distinction between ,good and ,bad1 so it's absurd for you to talk about a good impulse4 ,what is your position1 ,ellis8 asked ,parry4 ,i've been trying in vain to make head or tail of it ,why should ,i take a position at all8 rejoined ,ellis ,i protest against this bullying4 ,but you must take a position1 cried ,leslie1 if we are to discuss4 ,i don't see why2 you might take one instead4 ,yes1 but you began4 ,well1 he conceded1 anything to oblige you4 ,my position1 then1 to go back again to the beginning1 is this4 ,seeing that there are so many different opinions about what things are good1 and that no criterion has been discovered for testing these opinions---- ,my dear ,ellis1 interrupted ,parry1 ,i protest against all that from the very beginning4 ,for all practical purposes there is a substantial agreement about what is good4 ,my dear ,parry1 retorted ,ellis1 if ,i am to state a position1 let me state it without interruption4 ,considering1 as ,i was saying1 that there are so many different opinions about what things are good1 and that no criterion has been discovered for testing them1 ,i hold that we have no reason to attach any validity to these opinions1 or to suppose that it is possible to have any true opinions on the subject at all4 ,and what do you say to that8 asked ,parry1 turning to me4 ,i said1 or rather ,i suggested1 for the whole matter is very difficult to me1 that in spite of the divergency of opinions on the point1 and the difficulty of bringing them into harmony1 we are nevertheless practically bound1 whether we can justify it to our reason or not1 to believe that our own opinions about what is good have somehow some validity4 ,but how 'practically bound'8 asked ,leslie4 ,why1 as ,i was trying to get ,ellis to admit when you interrupted--and your interruption really completed my argument--,i imagine it to be impossible for us not to make choices2 and in making choices1 as ,i think1 we use our ideas about ,good as a principle of choice4 ,but you must remember1 said ,ellis1 that ,i have never admitted the truth of that last statement4 ,but1 ,i said1 if you do not admit it generally--and generally1 ,i confess1 ,i do not see how it could be proved or disproved1 except by an appeal to every individual's experience--do you not admit it in your own case8 ,do you not find that1 in choosing1 you follow your idea of what is good1 so far as you can under the limitations of your own passions and of external circumstances8 ,well1 he replied1 ,i wish to be candid1 and ,i am ready to admit that ,i do4 ,and that you cannot conceive yourself as choosing otherwise8 ,i mean that if you had to abandon as a principle of choice your opinion about ,good1 you would have nothing else to fall back upon8 ,no2 ,i think in that case ,i should simply cease to choose4 ,and can you conceive yourself doing that8 ,can you conceive yourself living1 as perhaps many men do1 at random and haphazard1 from moment to moment1 following blindly any impulse that may happen to turn up1 without any principle by which you might subordinate one to the other8 ,no1 he said1 ,i don't think ,i can4 ,that1 then1 ,i said1 is what ,i meant1 when ,i suggested that you1 at any rate1 and ,i1 and other people like us1 are practically bound to believe that our opinions about what is good have some validity1 even though we cannot say what or how much4 ,you say1 then1 that we have to accept in practice what we deny in theory8 ,yes1 if you like4 ,i say1 at least1 that the consequence of the attempt to bring our theoretical denial to bear upon our practice would be to reduce our life to a moral chaos1 by denying the only principle of choice which we find ourselves actually able to accept4 ,in your case and mine1 as it seems1 it is our opinion about ,good that engenders order among our passions and desires2 and without it we should sink back to be mere creatures of blind impulse1 such as perhaps in fact1 many men really are4 ,what6 cried ,audubon1 interrupting in a tone of half indignant protest1 do you mean to say that it is some idea about ,good that brings order into a man's life8 ,all ,i can say is that1 for my part1 ,i never once think1 from one year's end to another1 of anything so abstract and remote4 ,i simply go on1 day after day1 plodding the appointed round1 without reflexion1 without reason1 simply because ,i have to4 ,there's order in my life1 heaven knows6 but it has nothing to do with ideas about ,good4 ,and altogether1 he ejaculated1 in a kind of passion1 it's a preposterous thing to tell me that ,i believe in ,good1 merely because ,i lead a life like a mill-horse6 ,that would be an admirable reason for believing in ,bad--but ,good6 ,he lapsed again into silence2 and ,i was half unwilling to press him further1 knowing that he felt our dialectics to be a kind of insult to his concrete woes4 ,however1 it seemed to be necessary for the sake of the argument to give some answer1 so ,i began3-- ,but if you don't like the life of a mill-horse1 why do you lead it8 ,why8 because ,i have to6 he replied2 you don't suppose ,i would do it if ,i could help it8 ,no1 ,i said1 but why can't you help it8 ,because1 he said1 ,i have to earn my living4 ,then is it a good thing to earn your living8 ,no1 but it's a necessary thing4 ,necessary1 why8 ,because one must live4 ,then it is a good thing to live8 ,no1 it's a very bad one4 ,why do you live1 then8 ,because ,i can't help it4 ,but it is always possible to stop living4 ,no1 it isn't ,but why not8 ,because there are other people dependent on me1 and ,i don't choose to be such a mean skunk as to run away myself and leave other people here to suffer4 ,besides1 it's a sort of point of honour4 ,as ,i'm here1 ,i'm going to play the game4 ,all ,i say is that the game is not worth the playing2 and you will never persuade me into the belief that it ,is4 ,but1 my dear ,philip1 ,i said1 there is no need for me to persuade you1 for it is clear that you are persuaded already4 ,you believe1 as you have really admitted in principle1 that it is good to live rather than to die2 and to live1 moreover1 a monotonous1 laborious life1 which you say you detest ,take away that belief1 and your whole being is transformed4 ,either you change your manner of life1 abandon the routine which you hate1 break up the order imposed 7as ,i said at first7 by your idea about ,good1 and give yourself up to the chaos of chance desires2 or you depart from life altogether1 on the hypothesis that that is the good thing to do4 ,but in any case the truth appears to remain that somehow or other you do believe in ,good2 and that it is this belief which determines the whole course of your life4 ,well1 he said1 it's no use arguing the point1 but ,i am unconvinced4 ,and he sank back to his customary silence4 ,i thought it useless to pursue the subject with him2 but ,ellis took up the argument4 ,i agree with ,audubon1 he said4 ,for even if ,i admitted your general contention1 ,i should still maintain that it is not by virtue of any conscious idea of ,good that we introduce order into our lives4 ,we simply find ourselves1 as a matter of fact1 by nature and character1 preferring one object to another1 suppressing or developing this or that tendency4 ,our choices are not determined by our abstract notion of ,good2 on the contrary1 our notion of ,good is deduced from our choices4 ,you mean1 ,i suppose1 that we collect from our particular choices our general idea of the kind of things which we consider good4 ,that may be4 ,but the point ,i insist upon is that we do attach validity to these choices2 they are1 to us1 our choices of our ,good1 those that we approve as distinguished from those that we do not4 ,and my contention is that1 in spite of all diversity of opinions as to what really are the good things to choose1 we are bound to attach1 each of us1 some validity to our own1 under penalty of reducing our life to a moral chaos4 ,but what do you mean by 'validity'8 asked ,leslie4 ,do you mean that we must believe that our opinions are right8 ,yes1 ,i said1 or1 at least1 if not that they are right1 that they are the rightest we can attain to for the time being1 and until we see something righter4 ,but above all1 that opinions on this subject really are either right or wrong1 or more right and less right2 and that of this rightness or wrongness we really have some kind of perception1 however difficult it may be to give an account of it1 and that in accordance with such perception we may come to change our opinions or those of other people1 by the methods of discussion and persuasion and the like4 ,and all this1 as ,i understand1 is what ,ellis was denying4 ,certainly1 said ,ellis1 ,i was2 and ,i still do not see that you have proved it4 ,no1 ,i said1 ,i have not even tried to4 ,i have only tried to show that in spite of your denial you really do believe it1 because a belief in it is implied in all your practical activity4 ,and that1 ,i thought1 you did admit yourself4 ,but even so1 he replied1 it remains to be considered whether my theory is not more reasonable than my practice4 ,perhaps1 ,i replied2 but that1 ,i admit1 is not the question that really interests me4 ,what ,i want to get at is the belief which underlies the whole life of people like ourselves1 and of which1 it seems1 we cannot practically divest ourselves4 ,and such a belief1 ,i think1 is this which we have been discussing as to the validity of our opinions about ,good4 ,i see1 he said2 in fact you are concerning yourself not with philosophy but with psychology4 ,if you like2 it matters little what you call it4 ,only1 whatever it be1 you will do me a service if for the moment you will place yourself at my standpoint1 and see with me how things look from there4 ,very well1 he said1 ,i have no objection1 and so far1 on the whole1 ,i do agree with you2 though ,i am bound to point out that you might easily find an opponent less complaisant4 ,your argument is very much one ad hominem4 ,it is1 ,i said1 and that1 ,i confess1 is the only kind of argument in which ,i much believe in these matters4 ,i am content1 for the present1 if you and the others here go along with me4 ,i do1 said ,parry1 but you seem to me to be only stating1 in an unnecessarily elaborate way1 what after all is a mere matter of common sense4 ,perhaps it is1 ,i replied1 though ,i have always thought myself rather deficient in that kind of sense4 ,but what does ,leslie say8 ,oh1 he said1 ,i can't think how you can be content with anything so lame and impotent6 ,some method there must be1 absolute and priori1 by which we may prove for certain that ,good is1 and discover1 as well1 what things are good4 ,well1 ,i said1 if there be such a method1 you1 if anyone1 should find it2 and ,i wish you from my heart good luck in the quest4 ,it is only in default of anything better that ,i fall back on this--,i dare not call it method2 this appeal to opinion and belief4 ,and even so1 said ,ellis1 it is little enough that you have shown1 or rather1 that ,i have chosen to admit4 ,for even if it were granted that individuals1 in order to choose1 must believe in ,good1 it doesn't follow that they believe in anything except each a ,good for himself4 ,so that1 even on your own hypothesis1 all we could say would be that there are a number of different and perhaps incompatible ,goods1 each good for some particular individual1 but none necessarily good for all4 ,i1 at least1 admit no more than that4 ,how do you mean8 ,i asked1 for ,i am getting lost again4 ,i mean1 he replied1 something that ,i should have thought was familiar enough4 ,granted that there really is a ,good which each individual ought to choose1 and does choose1 if you like1 as far as he can see it2 or granted1 at least1 that he is bound to believe this1 under penalty of reducing his life to moral chaos2 still1 ,i see no reason to suppose that the thing which one individual ought to choose is identical1 or even compatible1 with that which another ought to choose4 ,there may be a whole series of distinct and mutually exclusive moral worlds4 ,in other words1 even though ,i may admit a ,good for each1 ,i am not prepared to admit a ,good for all4 ,but then1 ,i objected1 each of these ,goods will also be a not-,good2 and that seems to be a contradiction4 ,not at all1 he replied1 for each of them only professes to be ,good for me1 and that is quite compatible with being ,bad for another4 ,but1 cried ,leslie1 trembling with excitement1 your whole conception is absurd4 ,good is simply ,good2 it is not ,good for anybody or anything2 it is ,good in its own nature1 one1 simple1 immutable eternal4 ,it may be1 replied ,ellis1 but ,i hope you will not actually tear me to pieces if ,i humbly confess that ,i cannot see it4 ,i see no reason to admit any such ,good2 it even has no meaning to me4 ,well1 anyhow1 nothing else can have any meaning6 ,but1 to me1 something else has a meaning4 ,well1 what8 ,why1 what ,i have been trying1 apparently without success1 to explain4 ,but don't you see that each of those things you call ,goods1 oughtn't to be called ,good at all1 but each of them by some other particular name of its own8 ,oh1 ,i don't want to quarrel about names2 but ,i call each of them ,good because from one point of view--that of some particular individual--each of them is something that ought to be4 ,i1 at any rate1 admit no more than that4 ,for each individual there is something that ought to be2 but this1 which ought to be for him1 is very likely something that ought not to be for somebody else4 ,on this ,leslie threw himself back with a gesture of disgust and despair2 and ,i took the opportunity of intervening4 ,let us have some concrete instances1 ,i said1 of these incompatible ,goods4 ,by all means1 he replied1 nothing can be simpler4 ,it is good1 say1 for ,nero1 to preserve supreme power2 but it is bad for the people who come in his way4 ,it is good for an ,american millionaire to make and increase his fortune2 but it is bad for the people he ruins in the process4 ,and so on1 ad infinitum2 one has only to look at the world to see that the ,goods of individuals are not only diverse but incompatible one with another4 ,of course1 ,i said1 it is true that people do hold things to be good which are in this way mutually incompatible4 ,but does not the fact of this incompatibility make one suspect that perhaps the things in question are not really good8 ,it may1 in some cases1 but ,i see no ground for the suspicion4 ,it may very well be that what is good for me is in the nature of things incompatible with what is good for you4 ,i don't say it may not be so2 but does one believe it to be so8 ,doesn't one believe that what is really good for one must somehow be compatible with what is really good for others8 ,some people may believe it1 but many don't2 and it can never be proved4 ,no2 and so ,i am driven back upon my argument ad hominem4 ,do not you1 as a matter of fact1 believe it8 ,no1 ,i don't know that ,i do4 ,do you believe then that there is nothing which is good for people in general8 ,i don't see what is to prevent my believing it4 ,but1 at any rate you do not act as if you believed it4 ,in what way do ,i not8 ,why1 for instance1 you said last night that you intended to enter ,parliament4 ,well8 ,and in a few weeks you will be making speeches all over the country in favour of--well1 ,i don't quite know what--shall we say in favour of the war8 ,say so1 by all means1 if you like4 ,and this war1 ,i presume1 you believe to be a good thing8 ,well8 ,good1 that is1 not merely for yourself but for the world at large8 or at least for the ,english or the ,boers1 or one or other of them8 ,do you admit that8 ,oh1 he said1 ,i am nothing if not frank6 ,at present1 we will admit1 ,i think the war a good thing 7whatever that may mean72 but what of that8 ,very probably ,i am wrong4 ,very probably you are2 but that is not the point4 ,the main thing is1 that you admit that it is possible to be wrong or right at all2 that there is something to be wrong or right about4 ,but ,i don't know that ,i do admit it1 or1 at any rate1 that ,i shall always admit it4 ,probably1 after changing my opinions again and again1 ,i shall come to the conclusion that none of them are worth anything at all2 that1 in fact1 there's nothing to have an opinion about2 and then ,i shall retire from politics altogether2 and then--then how will you get hold of me8 ,oh1 ,i replied1 easily enough6 ,for you will still continue1 ,i suppose1 to do some kind of work1 and work which will necessarily affect innumerable people besides yourself2 and you will believe1 ,i presume1 that somehow or other the work you do is contributing to some general ,good8 ',you presume'6 you do indeed presume6 ,suppose ,i believe nothing of the kind8 ,suppose ,i deny altogether a general ,good8 ,we will suppose it1 if you like1 ,i said4 ,and now let us go on to examine the consequences of the supposition4 ,by all means6 he said1 proceed6 ,well1 ,i began1 since you are still living in society1 7for that1 ,i suppose1 you allow me to assume17 you are1 by the nature of the case1 interchanging with others innumerable offices4 ,at the same time1 on the supposition we are adopting1 that you deny a general ,good1 your only object in this interchange will be your own ,good1 7in which you admit that you do believe47 ,if1 for example1 you are a doctor1 your aim1 at the highest1 is to develop yourself1 to increase your knowledge1 your skill1 your self-control2 at the lowest1 it is to accumulate a fortune2 but in neither case can your purpose be to alleviate or cure disease1 nor to contribute to the advance of science2 for that would be to suppose that these ends1 although they purport to be general1 nevertheless are somehow good1 which is the hypothesis we were excluding4 ,similarly1 if you are a lawyer1 you will not set your heart on doing justice1 or perfecting the law2 such ends as these for you are mere illusions2 for even if justice exist at all1 it certainly is not a ,good1 for if it were1 it would be a ,good for all1 and1 as we agree1 there is no such thing4 ,men like ,bentham1 therefore1 to you will be mere visionaries1 and the legal system as a whole will have no sense or purport1 except so far as it contributes to sharpen your wits and fill your pocket ,and so1 in general1 with all professions and occupations2 whichever you may adopt1 you will treat it merely as a means to your own ,good2 and since you have no ,good which is also common to other men1 you will use these others without scruple to further what you conceive to be your own advantage1 without necessarily paying any regard to what they may conceive to be theirs4 ,well1 he said1 and why not8 ,i don't ask 'why not'8 ,i replied1 ,i ask merely whether it would be so8 whether you do1 as a matter of fact1 conceive it possible that you should ever adopt such an attitude8 ,well1 no1 he admitted1 ,i don't think it is2 but that is an idiosyncrasy of mine2 and ,i have no doubt there are plenty of other men who are precisely in the position you describe4 ,take1 for example1 a man like the late ,jay ,gould4 ,do you suppose that he1 in his business operations1 ever had any regard for anything except his own personal advantage8 ,do you suppose he cared how many people he ruined8 ,do you suppose he cared even whether he ruined his country1 except so far as such ruin might interfere with his own profit8 ,or look again at the famous ,mr4 ,leiter of ,chicago6 ,what do you suppose it mattered to him that he might be starving half the world1 and imperilling the governments of ,europe8 ,it was enough for him that he should realize a fortune2 of all the rest1 ,i suppose1 he washed his hands4 ,he and men like him adopt1 ,i have no doubt1 precisely the position which you are trying to show is impossible4 ,no1 ,i said1 ,i am not trying to show that it is impossible in general2 ,i am only trying to show that it is impossible for you4 ,and my object is to suggest that if a man does deny a general ,good1 he denies it1 as ,i say1 at his peril4 ,if his denial is genuine1 and not merely verbal1 it will lead him to conduct of the kind ,i have described4 ,but surely1 interrupted ,leslie1 you have no right to assume that a disbelief in a general ,good1 however genuine1 necessarily involves a sheer egoism in conduct8 ,for a man might find that his own ,good consisted in furthering the ,good of other people2 and in that case of course he will try to further it4 ,but1 ,i replied1 on our hypothesis there is no ,good of other people4 ,each individual1 we agreed1 has his ,good1 but there is no ,good common to all4 ,and thus we could have no guarantee that in furthering the ,good of one we are also furthering that of others4 ,so that even supposing a man to believe that his own ,good consists in furthering the ,good of others1 yet he will not be able to put his belief into practice1 but at most will be able to help some one man1 with the likelihood that in so doing he is thwarting and injuring many others4 ,though1 therefore1 he may not wish to be an egoist1 yet he cannot work for a common ,good2 and that simply because there is no common ,good to work for4 ,at this point ,parry1 who had been sitting silent during the discussion1 probably because of its somewhat abstract character1 suddenly broke in upon it as follows4 ,he had a great fund of optimism and what is sometimes called common sense1 which to me was rather pleasant and refreshing1 though some of the others1 and especially ,leslie and ,ellis1 were apt1 ,i think1 to find it irritating4 ,his present speech was characteristic of his manner4 ,ah6 he began1 there you touch upon the point which has vitiated your argument throughout4 ,you seem to assume that because every man has his own ,good1 and there is no ,good we can affirm to be common to all1 therefore these individual ,goods are incompatible one with another1 so that a man who is intent on his own ,good is necessarily hindering1 or1 at least1 not helping1 other people who are intent on theirs4 ,but ,i believe1 and my view is borne out by all experience1 that exactly the opposite is the case4 ,every man1 in pursuing his own advantage1 is also enabling the rest to pursue theirs4 ,the world1 if you like to put it so1 is a world of egoists2 but a world constructed with such exquisite art1 that the egoism of one is not only compatible with1 but indispensable to that of another4 ,on this principle all society rests4 ,the producer1 seeking his own profit1 is bound to satisfy the consumer2 the capitalist cannot exist without supporting the labourer2 the borrower and lender are knit by the closest ties of mutual advantage2 and so with all the ranks and divisions of mankind1 social1 political1 economic1 or what you will4 ,balanced1 one against the other1 in delicate counterpoise1 in subtlest interaction of part with part1 they sweep on in one majestic system1 an equilibrium for ever disturbed1 yet ever recovering itself anew1 created1 it is true1 and maintained by countless individual impulses1 yet summing up and reflecting all of these in a single1 perfect1 all-harmonious whole4 ,and when we consider---- ,but here he was interrupted by a kind of groan from ,audubon2 and ,ellis1 seeing his opportunity1 broke in ironically1 as follows3 ,the theme1 my dear ,parry1 is indeed a vast one1 and suggests countless developments4 ,when1 for example1 we consider 7to borrow your own phrase7 the reciprocal relations of the householder and the thief1 of the murderer and his victim1 of the investor and the fraudulent company-promoter2 when1 turning from these private examples1 we cast our eyes on international relations1 when we observe the perfect accord of interest between all the great powers in the far ,east2 when we note the smooth harmonious working of that flawless political machine so aptly named the ,european ,concert1 each member pursuing its own advantage1 yet co-operating without friction to a common end2 or when1 reverting to the economic sphere1 we contemplate the exquisite adjustment that prevails between the mutual interest of labour and capital--an adjustment broken only now and again by an occasional disturbance1 just to show that the centre of gravity is changing2 when we observe the ,world ,trust quietly1 without a creak or a groan1 annihilating the individual producer2 or when1 to take the sublime example which has already been quoted1 we perceive a single individual1 in the pursuit of his own ,good1 positively co-operating with revolutionists on the other side of the globe1 and contributing1 by the process of starvation1 to the deliverance of a great and oppressed people--if indeed1 in such a world as ours1 anyone can be said to be oppressed--when1 my dear ,parry1 we contemplate these things1 then--then--words fail me6 ,finish the sentence as you only can4 ,oh1 said ,parry1 good-naturedly enough1 of course ,i know very well you can make anything ridiculous if you like4 ,but ,i still maintain that we must take broad views of these matters1 and that the position adopted is substantially correct1 if you take long enough periods of time4 ,every man in the long run by pursuing his own ,good does contribute also to the ,good of others4 ,well1 ,i said1 anxious to keep the argument to the main point1 let us admit for the moment that it is so4 ,you assert1 then1 that everyone's ,good is distinct from everyone else's1 and that there is no common ,good2 but that each one's pursuit of his own ,good is essential to the realization of the ,good of all the rest ,yes1 he said2 roughly1 that is the kind of thing ,i believe4 ,well1 but1 ,i continued1 on that system there is at least one thing which we shall have to call a common ,good4 ,and what is that8 ,society itself6 ,for society is the condition indispensable to all alike for the realization of any individual ,good2 and a common condition of ,good is1 ,i suppose1 in a sense1 a common ,good4 ,yes1 he replied1 ,i suppose1 in a sense1 it is4 ,well1 ,i said1 ,i want no larger admission4 ,for under 'society' what is not included6 ,sanction society1 and you sanction1 or at least you admit the possibility of a sanction for every kind of common activity and end2 and the motives of men in undertaking these common activities become a matter of comparative indifference4 ,whatever they are consciously aiming at1 whether it be their own ,good1 or the ,good of all1 or1 as is more probable1 a varying mixture of both1 the fact remains that they do1 and we do1 admit a common ,good1 the maintenance and development of society itself4 ,and that is all ,i was concerned to get you to agree to4 ,but1 said ,leslie1 do you really think that there is no common ,good except this1 which you yourself admit to be rather a condition of ,good than ,good itself8 ,no1 ,i replied1 that is not my view4 ,i do not1 myself1 regard society as nothing but a condition of the realization of independent1 individual ,goods4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think that the ,good of each individual consists in his relations with other individuals4 ,but this ,i do not know that ,i am in a position to establish4 ,meantime1 however1 we can1 ,i think1 maintain1 that few candid men1 understanding the issue1 will really deny altogether a common ,good2 for they will have to admit that in society we have at the very least a common condition of ,good4 ,but still1 objected ,leslie1 even so we have no proof that there is a common ,good1 but only that most civilized men1 if pressed1 would probably admit one4 ,certainly1 ,i replied1 and ,i pretend nothing more4 ,i have not attempted to prove that there is a common ,good1 nor even that it is impossible not to believe in one4 ,i merely wished to show1 as before1 that if a man disbelieves1 he disbelieves1 so to speak1 at his own peril4 ,and to sum up the argument1 what ,i think we have shown is1 that to deny a common ,good is1 in the first place1 to deny to one's life and action all worth except what is bound up with one's own ,good1 to the complete exclusion of any ,good of all4 ,in the second place1 it is to deny all worth to every public and social institution--to religion1 law1 government1 the family1 all activities1 in a word1 which contribute to and make up what we call society4 ,further1 it is to empty history1 which is the record of society1 of its main interest and significance1 and in particular to eliminate the idea of progress2 for progress1 of course1 implies a common ,good towards which progress is directed4 ,in brief1 it is to strip a man of his whole social self1 and reveal him a poor1 naked1 shivering ,ego1 implicated in relations from which he may derive what advantage he can for himself1 but which1 apart from that advantage1 have no point or purport or aim2 it is to make him an ,egoist even against his will2 leaving him for his solitary ideal a cult of self-development1 deprived of its main attraction by its dissociation from the development of others4 ,now1 if any man1 having a full sense of what is implied in his words 7a sense1 not merely conceived by the intellect1 but felt1 as it were1 in every nerve and tissue7 will seriously and deliberately deny that he believes in a common ,good2 if he will not merely make the denial with his lips1 but actually carry it out in his daily life1 adjusting to his verbal proposition his habitual actions1 feelings1 and thoughts2 if he will and can really and genuinely do this1 then ,i1 for my part1 am willing to admit that ,i cannot prove him to be wrong4 ,all ,i can do is to set my experience against his1 and to appeal to the experience of others2 and we must wait till further experience on either side leads 7if it ever is to lead7 to an agreement4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if a man merely makes the denial with his lips1 because1 perhaps1 he conceives it impossible to prove the opposite1 or because he sees that what is good cannot be defined beyond dispute1 or whatever other plausible reason he may have2 and if1 while he persists in his denial1 he continues to act as if the contrary were true1 taking part with zest and enthusiasm in the common business of life1 pushing causes1 supporting institutions1 subscribing to societies1 and the like1 and that without any pretence that in so doing he is seeking merely his own ,good--in that case ,i shall take leave to think that he does not really believe what he says 7though no doubt he may genuinely think he does71 and ,i shall take his life and his habits1 the whole tissue of his instincts and desires1 as a truer index to his real opinion than the propositions he enunciates with his lips4 ,but1 cried ,leslie1 that is a mere appeal to prejudice6 ,of course we all want to believe that there is a common ,good2 the question is1 whether we have a right to4 ,perhaps1 ,i replied1 but the question ,i wished to raise was the more modest one1 whether we can help it8 ,whether we have a right or no is another matter1 more difficult and more profound than ,i care to approach at present4 ,if1 indeed1 it could be proved beyond dispute to the reason1 either that certain things are good or that they are not1 there would be no place for such discussions as this4 ,but1 it appears1 such proof has not yet been given1--or do you think it has8 ,no6 he said1 but ,i think it might be and must be6 ,possibly1 ,i said1 but meantime1 perhaps1 it is wiser to fall back on this kind of reasoning which you call an appeal to prejudice1--and so no doubt in a sense it is2 for it is an appeal to the passion men have to find worth in their lives1 and their refusal to accept any view by which such worth is denied4 ,to anyone who refuses to accept any judgment about what is good1 ,i prove1 or endeavour to prove1 that such refusal cuts away the whole basis of his life2 and ,i ask him if he is prepared to accept that consequence4 ,if he affirms that he is1 and affirms it not only with his lips but in his action1 then ,i have no more to say2 but if he cannot accept the consequences1 then1 ,i suppose1 he will reconsider the premisses1 and admit that he does really believe that judgments about what is good may be true1 and1 provisionally1 that his own are true1 or at least as true as he can make them1 and that he does in fact accept and act upon them as true1 and intends to do so until he is convinced that they are false4 ,and this attitude of his feelings1 you may call1 if you like1 an attitude of faith2 it is1 ,i think1 the attitude most men would adopt if they were pressed home upon the subject2 and to my mind it is reasonable enough1 and rather to be praised than to be condemned4 ,i don't think so at all1 cried ,leslie1 ,i consider it very unsatisfactory4 ,so do ,i1 said ,parry1 and for my part1 ,i can't see what you're all driving at4 ,you seem to be making a great fuss about nothing4 ,oh no6 retorted ,ellis1 not about nothing6 about a really delightful paradox6 ,we have arrived at the conclusion that we are bound to believe in ,good1 but that we haven't the least notion what it is6 ,exactly6 said ,parry1 and that is just what ,i dispute6 ,what8 ,that we are bound to believe in ,good8 ,no6 ,but that we don't know what ,good is1 or rather1 what things are good4 ,oh6 ,i cried1 do you really think we do know8 ,i wish ,i could think that6 ,the trouble with me is1 that while ,i seem to see that we are bound to trust our judgments about what is good1 yet ,i cannot see that we know that they are true4 ,indeed1 from their very diversity1 it seems as if they could not all be true4 ,my only hope is1 that perhaps they do all contain some truth1 although they may contain falsehood as well4 ,but surely1 said ,parry1 you exaggerate the difficulty4 ,all the confusion seems to me to arise from the assumption that we can't see what lies under our noses4 ,i don't believe1 myself1 that there is all this difficulty in discovering ,good4 ,philosophers always assume1 as you seem to be doing1 that it is all a matter of opinion and reasoning1 and that opinions and reasons really determine conduct4 ,whereas in fact1 ,i believe1 conduct is determined1 at least in essentials1 by something very much more like instinct4 ,and it is to this instinct which1 by the nature of the case1 is simple and infallible1 that we ought to look to tell us what is good1 and not to our reason1 which1 as you admit yourself1 can only land us in contradictory judgments4 ,i know1 of course1 that you have a prejudice against any such view4 ,not at all6 ,i said1 if only ,i could understand it4 ,i should be glad of any simple and infallible criterion2 only ,i have never yet been able to find one4 ,that1 ,i believe1 is because you look for it in the wrong place2 or1 perhaps1 because you look for it instead of simply seeing it4 ,you will never discover what is good by any process of rational inquiry4 ,it's a matter of direct perception1 above and beyond all argument4 ,perhaps it is1 ,i said1 but surely not of perception1 as you said1 simple and infallible8 ,if not that1 at least sufficiently clear and distinct for all practical purposes4 ,and to my mind1 all discussion about ,good is for this reason rather factitious and unreal4 ,i don't mean to say1 of course1 that it isn't amusing1 among ourselves1 to pass an hour or two in this kind of talk2 but ,i should think it very unfortunate if the habit of it were to spread among the mass of men4 ,for inquiry does tend in the long run to influence opinion1 and generally to influence it in the wrong way2 whereas1 if people simply go on following their instinct1 they are much more likely to do what is right1 than if they try to act on so-called rational grounds4 ,but1 cried ,leslie1 who during this speech had found obvious difficulty in containing himself1 what is this instinct which you bid us follow8 ,what authority has it8 ,what validity8 ,what is its content8 ,what is it1 anyhow1 that it should be set up in this way above reason8 ,as to authority1 replied ,parry1 the point about an instinct is1 that its authority is unimpeachable4 ,it commands and we obey2 there's no question about it4 ,but there is question about the content of ,good4 ,i should rather say that we make question4 ,but1 after all1 how small a part of our life is affected by our theories6 ,as a rule1 we act simply and without reflection2 and such action is the safest and most prosperous4 ,the safest and most prosperous6 ,but how do you know that8 ,what standard are you applying8 ,where do you get it from8 ,from common sense4 ,and what is common sense8 ,oh1 a kind of instinct too6 ,a kind of instinct8 ,how many are there then8 ,and does every instinct require another to justify it1 and so ad infinitum8 ,logomachy1 my dear ,leslie6 cried ,parry1 with imperturbable good-humour4 ,he had a habit of treating ,leslie as if he were a clever child4 ,but really1 ,parry1 ,i interposed1 this is the critical point4 ,is it your view that an instinct is its own sufficient justification1 or does it require justification by something else8 ,no1 he said1 it justifies itself4 ,take1 for example1 a strong instinct1 like that of self-preservation4 ,how completely it stands above all criticism6 ,not that it cannot be criticised in a kind of dilettante1 abstract way2 but in the moment of action the criticism simply disappears in face of the overwhelming fact it challenges4 ,do you mean to say1 then1 said ,leslie1 that because this instinct is so strong therefore it is always good to follow it8 ,i should say so1 generally speaking4 ,how is it1 then1 that you consider it disgraceful that a man should run away in battle8 ,ah6 replied ,parry1 that is a very interesting point6 ,there you get a superposition of the social upon the merely individual instinct4 ,and how does that come about8 ,that may be a matter of some dispute2 but it has been ingeniously explained as follows4 ,we start with the primary instinct of self-preservation4 ,this means1 at first1 that each individual strives to preserve himself4 ,but as time goes on individuals discover that they can only preserve themselves by associating with others1 and that they must defend society if they want to defend themselves4 ,they thus form a habit of defending society2 and this habit becomes in time a second instinct1 and an instinct so strong that it even overrides the primary one from which it was derived2 till at last you get individuals sacrificing in defence of the community those very lives which they originally entered the community to preserve4 ,what a charming paradox6 cried ,ellis4 ,and so it is really true that every soldier who dies on the field of battle does so only by virtue of a miscalculation8 ,and if he could but pull himself up and remember that1 after all1 the preservation of his life was the only motive that induced him to endanger it1 he would run away like a sensible man1 and try some other device to achieve his end1 the device of society having evidently broken down1 so far as he is concerned4 ,there you are again1 said ,parry1 with your crude rationalism6 ,the point is that the social habit has now become an instinct1 and has therefore1 as ,i say1 imperative authority6 ,no operations of the reason touch it in the least ,well1 rejoined ,ellis1 ,i must say that it seems to me very hard that a man can't rectify such an important error4 ,the imposition is simply monstrous6 ,here are a number of fellows shut up in society on the distinct understanding1 to begin with1 that society was to help them to preserve their lives2 instead of which1 it starves them and hangs them and sends them to be shot in battle1 and they aren't allowed to raise a word of protest or even to perceive what a fraud is being perpetrated upon them6 ,i don't see that it's hard at all1 replied ,parry2 it seems to me a beautiful device of nature to ensure the predominance of the better instincts4 ,the better instincts6 ,i cried1 but there is the point6 ,these instincts of yours1 it seems1 conflict2 in battle1 for example1 the instinct to run away conflicts with the instinct to stay and fight8 ,no doubt1 he admitted4 ,and sometimes one prevails and sometimes the other8 ,yes4 ,and in the one case we say that the man does right1 when he stays and fights2 and in the other that he does wrong1 when he runs away8 ,i suppose so4 ,well1 then1 how does your theory of instincts help us to know what is ,good8 ,for it seems that after all we have to choose between instincts1 to approve one and condemn another4 ,and our problem still remains1 how can we do this8 how can we get any certainty of standard8 ,perhaps the faculty that judges is itself an instinct8 ,perhaps it is1 ,i replied1 ,i don't really know what an instinct is4 ,my quarrel is not with the word instinct1 but with what seemed to be your assumption that whatever it is in us that judges about ,good judges in a single1 uniform1 infallible way4 ,whereas1 in fact1 as you had to admit1 sometimes at the same moment it pronounces judgments not only diverse but contradictory4 ,but1 he replied1 those seem to me to be exceptional cases4 ,as a rule the difficulty doesn't occur4 ,when it does1 ,i admit that we require a criterion4 ,but ,i should expect to find it in science rather than in philosophy4 ,in science6 exclaimed ,leslie4 ,what has science to do with it8 ,what has not science to do with8 said a new voice from behind4 ,it was ,wilson who1 in his turn1 had joined us from the breakfast room 7he always breakfasted late71 and had overheard the last remark4 ,he was a lecturer in ,biology at ,cambridge1 rather distinguished in that field1 and an enthusiastic believer in the capacity of the scientific method to solve all problems4 ,i was saying1 ,leslie repeated in answer to his question1 that science has nothing to do with the ,good4 ,so much the worse for the ,good1 rejoined ,wilson1 if indeed that be true4 ,but you1 ,i suppose1 would never admit that it is1 ,i interposed4 ,i was anxious to hear what he had to say1 though at the same time ,i was desirous to avoid a discussion between him and ,leslie1 for their types of mind and habits of thought were so radically opposed that it was as idle for them to engage in debate as for two bishops of opposite colour to attempt to capture one another upon a chessboard4 ,he answered readily enough to my challenge4 ,i think1 he said1 that there is only one method of knowledge1 and that is the method we call scientific4 ,but do you think there is any knowledge of ,good at all1 even by that method8 or that there is nothing but erroneous opinions8 ,i think1 he replied1 that there is a possibility of knowledge1 but only if we abjure dialectics4 ,here1 as everywhere1 the only safe guide is the actual concrete operation of ,nature4 ,how do you mean8 asked ,leslie1 his voice vibrating with latent hostility4 ,i mean that the real significance of what we call ,good is only to be ascertained by observing the course of ,nature2 ,good being in fact identical with the condition towards which she tends1 and morality the means to attaining it4 ,but---- ,leslie was beginning1 when ,parry cut him short4 ,wait a moment6 he said4 ,let ,wilson have a fair hearing6 ,this end and this means1 continued ,wilson1 we can only ascertain by a study of the facts of animal and human evolution4 ,biology and ,sociology1 throwing light back and forward upon one another1 are rapidly superseding the pseudo-science of ,ethics4 ,oh dear6 cried ,ellis1 sotto-voce1 here comes the social organism6 ,i knew it would be upon us sooner or later4 ,and though at present1 ,i admit1 proceeded ,wilson1 not hearing1 or ignoring1 this interruption1 we are hardly in a position to draw any certain conclusions1 yet to me1 at least1 it seems pretty clear what kind of results we shall arrive at4 ,yes6 cried ,parry1 eagerly1 and what are they8 ,well1 replied ,wilson1 ,i will indicate1 if you like1 the position ,i am inclined to take up1 though of course it must be regarded as provisional4 ,of course6 ,pray go on6 ,well1 he proceeded1 biology1 as you know1 starts with the single cell---- ,how do you spell it8 said ,ellis1 with shameless frivolity1 with a ,c or with an ,s8 ,of these cells1 continued ,wilson1 imperturbably1 every animal body is a compound or aggregation2 the aggregation involving a progressive modification in the structure of each cell1 the differentiation of groups of cells to perform special functions1--digestive1 respiratory1 and the rest1--and the subordination of each cell or group of cells to the whole4 ,similarly1 in sociology---- ,dear ,wilson1 cried ,ellis1 unable any longer to contain himself1 mightn't we take all this for granted8 ,wait a minute1 ,i said1 let him finish his analogy4 ,that's just it6 cried ,leslie1 it's nothing but an analogy4 ,and ,i don't see how---- ,hush1 hush6 said ,parry4 ,do let him speak6 ,i was about to say1 continued ,wilson1 when ,i was interrupted1 that in the social organism---- ,ah6 interjected ,ellis1 here it is6 ,in the social organism1 the individual corresponds to the cell1 the various trades and professions to the organs4 ,society has thus its alimentary system1 in the apparatus of production and exchange2 its circulatory system1 in the network of communications2 its nervous system1 in the government machinery2 its---- ,by the bye1 interrupted ,ellis1 could you tell me1 for ,i never could find it in ,herbert ,spencer1 what exactly in society corresponds to the spleen8 ,or the liver8 added ,leslie4 ,or the vermiform appendix8 ,ellis pursued4 ,oh1 well1 said ,wilson1 a little huffed at last1 if you are tired of being serious it's no use for me to continue4 ,i'm sorry1 ,wilson6 said ,ellis4 ,i won't do it again2 but one does get a little tired of the social organism4 ,more people talk about it1 answered ,wilson1 than really understand it4 ,very true1 retorted ,ellis1 especially among biologists4 ,at this point ,i began to fear we should lose our subject in polemics2 so ,i ventured to recall ,wilson to the real issue4 ,supposing1 ,i said1 that we grant the whole of your position1 how does it help us to judge what is good8 ,why1 he said1 in this way4 ,what we learn from biology is1 that it is the constant effort of nature to combine cells into individuals and individuals into societies--the protozoon1 in other words1 evolves into the animal1 the animal into what some have called the 'hyper-zoon1' or super-organism4 ,well1 now1 to this physical evolution corresponds a psychical one4 ,what kind of consciousness an animal may have1 we can indeed only conjecture2 and we cannot even go so far as conjecture in the case of the cell2 but we may reasonably assume that important psychical changes of the original elements are accompaniments and conditions of their aggregation into larger entities2 and the morality 7if you will permit the word7 of the cell that is incorporated in an animal body will consist in adapting itself as perfectly as may be to the new conditions1 in subordinating its consciousness to that of the ,whole--briefly1 in acquiring a social instead of an individual self4 ,and now1 to follow the clue thus obtained into the higher manifestations of life4 ,as the cell is to the animal1 so is the individual to society1 and that on the psychical as well as on the physical side4 ,nature has perfected the animal2 she is perfecting society2 that is the end and goal of all her striving4 ,when1 therefore1 you raise the question1 what is ,good1 biology has this simple answer to give you3 ,good is the perfect social soul in the perfect social body4 ,as he concluded1 ,ellis exclaimed softly1',parturiunt montes1' and ,leslie took it up with3 ,and not even a mouse6 ,whether it is a mouse or no1 ,i said1 it would be hard to say1 until we had examined it more closely4 ,at present it seems to me more like a cloud1 which may or may not conceal the goddess ,truth4 ,but the question ,i really want to ask is1 ,what particular advantage ,wilson gets from the biological method8 ,for the conclusion itself1 ,i suppose1 might have been reached1 and commonly is1 without any recourse to the aid of natural science4 ,no doubt1 he said1 but my contention is1 that it is only by the scientific method that you get proof4 ,you1 for example1 may assert that you believe the social virtues ought to prevail over individual passions2 but if your position were challenged1 ,i don't see how you would defend it4 ,whereas ,i can simply point to the whole evolution of ,nature as tending towards the ,good ,i advocate2 and can say3--if you resist that tendency you are resisting ,nature herself6 ,but isn't it rather odd1 said ,ellis1 that we should be able to resist ,nature8 ,not at all1 he replied1 for our very resistance is part of the plan2 it's the lower stage persisting into the higher1 but destined sooner or later to be absorbed4 ,i see1 ,i said1 and the keynote of your position is1 as you said at the beginning1 that ,good is simply what ,nature wants4 ,so that1 instead of looking within to find our criterion1 we ought really to look without1 to discover1 if we can1 the tendency of ,nature and to acquiesce in that as the goal of our aspiration4 ,precisely1 he replied1 that is the position4 ,well1 ,i said1 it is plausible enough2 but the plausibility1 ,i am inclined to think1 comes from the fact that you have been able to make out1 more or less1 that the tendency of ,nature is in the direction which1 on the whole1 we prefer4 ,how do you mean8 ,well1 ,i said1 supposing your biological researches had led you to just the opposite conclusion1 that the tendency of ,nature was not from the cell to the animal1 and from the individual to society1 but in precisely the reverse direction1 so that the end of all things was a resolution into the primitive elements--do you think you would have been as ready to assert that it is the goal of ,nature that must determine our ideal of ,good8 ,but why consider such a hypothetical case8 ,i am not so sure1 ,i replied1 that it is more hypothetical than the other4 ,at any rate it is a hypothesis adopted by one of your authorities4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 you will remember1 conceives the process of ,nature to be one1 not1 as you appear to think1 of continuous progress1 but rather of a circular movement1 from the utmost simplicity to the utmost complexity of ,being1 and back again to the original condition4 ,what you were describing is the movement which we call upward1 and which we can readily enough believe to be good1 at any rate upon a superficial view of it4 ,but now1 suppose us to have reached the point at which the opposite movement begins2 suppose what we had to look forward to and to describe as the course of ,nature were a process1 not from simple to complex1 from homogeneous to heterogeneous1 or whatever the formula may be1 but one in exactly the contrary direction1 a dissolution of society into its individuals1 of animals into the cells of which they are composed1 of life into chemistry1 of chemistry into mechanism1 and so on through the scale of ,being1 reversing the whole course of evolution--should we1 in such a case1 still have to say that the process of ,nature was right1 and that she is to give the law to our judgment about ,good8 ,yes1 he replied1 ,i think we should2 and for this reason4 ,only those who do on the whole approve the course of ,nature have the qualities enabling them to survive2 the others will1 in the long run1 be eliminated4 ,there is thus a constant tendency to harmonize opinions with the actual process of the world2 and that1 no doubt1 is why we approve what you call the upward movement1 which is the one in which ,nature is at present engaged4 ,but1 for the same reason1 if1 or when1 a movement in the opposite direction should set in1 people holding opinions like ours will tend to be eliminated1 while those will tend to survive more and more who approve the current of evolution then prevailing4 ,and in this way1 said ,ellis1 an exquisite unanimity will be at last attained1 by the simple process of eliminating the dissentients6 ,precisely6 ,well1 cried ,leslie1 no doubt that will be very satisfactory for the people who survive2 but it does not help us much4 ,what we want to know is1 what we are to judge to be ,good1 not what somebody else will be made to judge1 centuries hence4 ,and for my part1 said ,ellis1 ,i'm not much impressed by the argument you attribute to ,nature1 that if we don't agree with her we shall be knocked on the head4 ,i1 for instance1 happen to object strongly to her whole procedure3 ,i don't much believe in the harmony of the final consummation--even if it were to be final1 and not merely the turn of the tide2 and ,i am sensibly aware of the horrible discomfort of the intermediate stages1 the pushing1 kicking1 trampling of the host1 and the wounded and dead left behind on the march4 ,of all this ,i venture to disapprove2 then comes ,nature and says1 'but you ought to approve6' ,i ask why1 and she says1 ',because the procedure is mine4' ,i still demur1 and she comes down on me with a threat--',very good1 approve or no1 as you like2 but if you don't approve you will be eliminated6' ',by all means1' ,i say1 and cling to my old opinion with the more affection that ,i feel myself invested with something of the glory of a martyr4 ,nature1 it seems1 is waiting for me round the corner because ,i venture to stick to my principles4 ',ruat caelum6' ,i cry2 and in my humble opinion it's ,nature1 not ,i1 that cuts a poor figure6 ,my dear ,ellis1 protested ,wilson1 what's the use of talking like that8 ,it's not really sublime1 it's only ridiculous6 ,certainly6 retorted ,ellis2 it's you who are sublime4 ,i prefer the ridiculous4 ,so1 ,i said1 does ,wilson1 if one may judge by appearances4 ,for ,i cannot help thinking he is really laughing at us4 ,not at all1 he replied1 ,i am perfectly serious4 ,but surely1 ,i said1 you must see that any discussion about ,good must turn somehow upon our perception of it8 ,the course of ,nature may1 as you say1 be good2 but ,nature cannot be the measure of ,good2 the measure can only be ,good itself2 and the most that the study of ,nature could do would be to illuminate our perception by giving it new material for judgment4 ,judge we must1 in the last resort2 and the judgment can never be a mere statement as to the course which ,nature is pursuing4 ,well1 said ,wilson1 but you will admit at least the paramount importance of the study of ,nature1 if we are ever to form a right judgment8 ,i feel much more strongly1 ,i replied1 the importance of the study of ,man2 however1 we need not at present discuss that4 ,all that ,i wanted to insist upon was1 that the contention which you have been trying to sustain1 that it is possible1 somehow or other1 to get rid of the subjectivity of our judgments about ,good by substituting for them a statement about the tendencies of ,nature--that this contention cannot be upheld4 ,if that be so1 he said1 ,i don't see how you are ever to get a scientific basis for your judgment4 ,i don't know1 ,i replied1 that we can4 ,it depends upon what you include under science4 ,oh1 he said1 by science ,i mean the resumption in brief formul of the sequence of phenomena2 or1 more briefly1 a description of what happens4 ,if that be so1 ,i replied1 the method of judging about ,good can certainly not be scientific2 for judgments about ,good are judgments of what ought to be1 not of what is4 ,but then1 objected ,wilson1 what method is left you8 ,you have nothing to fall back upon but a chaos of opinions4 ,but might there not be some way of judging between opinions8 ,how should there be1 in the absence of any external objective test8 ,what do you mean by that8 ,why1 he replied1 the kind of test which you have in the case of the sciences4 ,they depend1 in the last resort1 not on ideas of ours1 but on the routine of common sense-perception2 a routine which is independent of our choice or will1 but is forced upon us from without with an absolute authority such as no imaginings of our own can impugn4 ,thus we get a certainty upon which1 by the power of inference1 whose mechanism we need not now discuss1 we are able to build up a knowledge of what is4 ,but when1 on the other hand1 we turn to such of our ideas as deal with the ,good1 the ,beautiful1 and the like--here we have no test external to ourselves1 no authority superior and independent4 ,invite a group of men to witness a scientific experiment1 and none of them will be able to deny either the sequence of the phenomena produced1 or the chain of reasoning 7supposing it to be sound7 which leads to the conclusion based upon them4 ,invite the same men to judge of a picture1 or consult them on a question of moral casuistry1 and they will propound the most opposite opinions2 nor will there be any objective test by which you can affirm that one opinion is more correct than another4 ,the deliverances of the external sense are1 or at least can be made1 by correction of the personal equation1 infallible and the same for all2 those of the internal sense are different not only in different persons1 but in the same person at different times4 ,yes1 said ,leslie1 impatiently1 we have all admitted that6 ,the question is whether-- ,excuse me1 ,wilson interposed1 ,i haven't yet come to my main point4 ,i was going to say that not merely are there these differences of opinion1 but even if there were not1 even if the opinions were uniform1 they would still1 as opinions1 be subjective and devoid of scientific validity4 ,it is the external reference that gives its certainty to science2 and such a reference is impossible in the case of judgments about the ,beautiful and the ,good4 ,such judgments are merely records of what we think or feel4 ,these ideas of ours may or may not happen to be consistent one with another2 but whether they are so or not1 they are merely our ideas1 and have nothing to do with the essential nature of reality4 ,i am not sure1 ,i replied1 that the distinction really holds in the way in which you put it4 ,let us take for a moment the point of view of ,god--only for the sake of argument1 ,i added1 seeing him about to protest4 ,god1 we will suppose1 knows all ,being through and through as it really is2 and along with this knowledge of reality he has a conviction that reality is good4 ,now1 with this conviction of his none other1 ex hypothesi1 can compete2 for he being ,god1 we must at any rate admit that if anybody can be right1 it must be he4 ,no one then can dispute or shake his opinion2 and since he is eternal he will not change it of himself4 ,is there then1 under the circumstances1 any distinction of validity between his judgment that what is1 is1 and his judgment that what is1 is good8 ,i don't see the use1 he replied1 of considering such an imaginary case4 ,but if you press me ,i can only say that ,i still adhere to my view that any judgment about ,good1 whether made by ,god or anybody else1 can be no more than a subjective expression of opinion4 ,but1 ,i rejoined1 in a sense1 all certainty is subjective1 in so far as the certainty has to be perceived4 ,it is impossible to eliminate the ,subject4 ,in the case1 for example1 upon which you dwelt1 of the impressions of external sense1 the certainty of the impressions is your and my certainty that we have them2 and so in the case of a cogent argument2 for any given person the test of the cogency is his perception that the cogency is there4 ,and it is the same with the ,beautiful and the ,good2 there is no conceivable test except perception4 ,our difficulty here is simply that perceptions conflict2 not that we have no independent test4 ,but if1 as in the case ,i imagined1 the perception of ,good was harmonious with itself1 then the certainty on that point would be as final and complete as the certainty in the proof of a proposition of ,euclid4 ,i am afraid1 said ,wilson1 ,i don't follow you4 ,you're beginning to talk metaphysics4 ,call it what you will1 ,i replied1 so long only as it is sense4 ,no doubt1 he said1 but ,i don't feel sure that it is4 ,in that case you can show me where ,i am wrong4 ,no1 he replied1 for1 as ,i said1 ,i can't follow you4 ,he means he won't1 said ,ellis1 breaking in with his usual air of an unprejudiced outsider1 ,but after all1 what does it really matter8 ,whatever the reason may be for our uncertainty as to ,good1 the fact remains that we are uncertain4 ,there's my ,good1 thy ,good1 his ,good1 our ,good1 your ,good1 their ,good2 and all these ,goods in process of flux1 according to the time of day1 the time of life1 and the state of the liver4 ,that being so1 what is the use of discussing ,good in itself8 ,and why be so disturbed about it8 ,there's ,leslie1 for instance1 looking as if the bottom were knocked out of the universe because he can't discover his objective standard6 ,my dear boy1 life goes on just the same1 my life1 his life1 your life1 all the lives4 ,why not make an end of the worry at once by admitting frankly that ,good is a chimra1 and that we get on very well without it8 ,but ,i don't get on well without it6 ,leslie protested4 ,no1 ,i said1 and ,i hoped that by this time we were agreed that none of us could4 ,but ,ellis is incorrigible4 ,you don't suppose1 he replied1 that ,i am going to agree with you merely because you override me in argument--even if you did1 which you don't4 ,but at least1 cried ,leslie1 you needn't tell us so often that you disagree4 ,very well1 he said1 ,i am dumb4 ,and for a moment there was silence1 till ,i began to fear that our argument would collapse2 when1 to my relief1 ,parry returned to the charge4 ,you will think me1 he began1 as obstinate as ,ellis2 but ,i can't help coming back to my old point of view4 ,somehow or other1 ,i feel sure you are making a difficulty which the practical man does not really feel4 ,you object to my saying that he knows what is good by instinct2 but somehow or other ,i am sure that he does know it4 ,and what ,i suggest now is1 that he finds it written in experience4 ,in whose experience8 ,leslie asked defiantly4 ,in that of the race1 or1 at least1 in that of his own age and country4 ,now1 do be patient a moment1 and let me explain6 ,what ,i want to suggest is1 that every civilization worth the name possesses1 in its laws and institutions1 in the customs it blindly follows1 the moral code it instinctively obeys1 an actual objective standard1 worked out in minute detail1 of what1 in every department of life1 really is good4 ,to this standard every plain man1 without reasoning1 and even without reflexion1 does in fact simply and naturally conform2 so do all of us who are discussing here1 in all the common affairs of our daily life4 ,we know1 if ,i may say so1 better than we know2 and the difficulties into which we are driven1 in speculations such as that upon which we are engaged1 arise1 to my mind1 from a false and unnecessary abstraction--from putting aside all the rich content of actual life1 and calling into the wilderness for the answer to a question which solves itself in the street and the market-place4 ,well1 ,i said1 for my own part1 ,i am a good deal in sympathy with what you say4 ,at the same time there is a difficulty4 ,a difficulty6 cried ,leslie1 there are hundreds and thousands6 ,perhaps1 ,i replied1 but the particular one to which ,i was referring is this4 ,every civilization1 no doubt1 has its own standard of ,good2 but these standards are different and even opposite2 so that it would seem we require some criterion by which to compare and judge them4 ,no1 cried ,parry1 that is just what ,i protest against4 ,we are not concerned with other ideals than our own4 ,every great civilization believes in itself4 ,take1 for instance1 the ancient ,greeks1 of whom you are so fond of talking4 ,in my opinion they are absurdly over-estimated2 but they had at least that good quality--they believed in themselves4 ,to them the whole non-,greek world was barbarian2 the standard of ,good was frankly their own standard2 and it was a standard knowable and known1 however wide might be the deviations from it in practice4 ,we find accordingly that for them the ideal was rooted in the real4 ,plato1 even1 in constructing his imaginary republic1 does not build in the void1 evoking from his own consciousness a ,cloud-,cuckoo-city for the ,birds2 on the contrary1 he bases his structure upon the actual1 following the general plan of the institutions of ,sparta and ,crete2 and neither to him nor to ,aristotle does it ever occur that there is1 or could be1 any form of state worth considering1 except the city-state with which they were familiar4 ,it is the same with their treatment of ethics2 their ideal is that of the ,greeks1 not of ,man in general1 and stands in close relation to the facts of contemporary life4 ,so1 too1 with their art2 it is not1 like that of our modern romanticists1 an impotent yearning for vaguely-imagined millenniums4 ,on the contrary1 it is an ideal interpretation of their own activity1 a mirror focussing into feature and form the very same fact which they saw distorted and blurred in the troubled stream of time4 ,the ,good1 in the ,greek world1 was simply the essence and soul of the ,real2 and the ,socrates of ,xenophon who frankly identified justice with the laws1 was only expressing1 and hardly with exaggeration1 the current convictions of his countrymen4 ,that1 to my mind1 is the attitude of health2 and it is the one natural to the plain man in every well-organized society4 ,good is best known when it is not investigated2 and people like ourselves would do no useful service if we were to induce in others the habit of discussion which education has made a second nature to ourselves4 ,my dear ,parry6 cried ,ellis1 you alarm me6 ,is it possible that we are all anarchists in disguise8 ,parry1 ,i observed1 seems to agree with the view attributed by ,browning to ,paracelsus1 that thought is disease1 and natural health is ignorance4 ,well1 rejoined ,ellis1 there is a good deal to be said for that4 ,there's a good deal to be said for everything1 ,i rejoined4 ,but if thought indeed be disease1 we must recognise the fact that we are suffering from it2 and so1 ,i fear1 is the whole modern world4 ,it was easy for the ,greeks to be 'healthy'2 practically they had no past4 ,but for us the past overweights the present2 we cannot1 if we would1 get rid of the burden of it4 ,all that was once absolute has become relative1 including our own conceptions and ideals2 and as we look back down the ages and see civilization after civilization come into being1 flourish and decay1 it is impossible for us to believe that the society in which we happen to be born is more ultimate than any of these1 or that its ideal1 as reflected in its institutions1 has any more claim than theirs to be regarded as a final and absolute expression of ,good4 ,well1 said ,parry1 let us admit1 if you like1 that ideals evolve1 but1 in any case1 the ideal of our own time has more validity for us than any other4 ,as to those of the past1 they were1 no doubt1 important in their day1 but they have no importance for the modern world4 ,the very fact that they are past is proof that they are also superseded4 ,what6 cried ,leslie1 indignantly1 do you mean to say that everything that is later in time is also better8 ,that we are better artists than the ,greeks8 better citizens than the ,romans8 more spiritual than the men of the ,middle ,ages8 more vigorous than those of the ,renaissance8 ,i don't know1 replied ,parry1 that ,i am bound to maintain all that4 ,i only say that on the whole ,i believe that ideals progress2 and that therefore it is the ideals of our own time1 and that alone1 which we ought practically to consider4 ,the ideal of our own time8 ,i said1 but which of them8 there are so many4 ,no1 there is really only one1 as ,i said before2 the one that is embodied in current laws and customs4 ,but these are always themselves in process of change4 ,yes1 gradual change4 ,not necessarily gradual2 and even if it were1 still change4 ,and to sanction a change1 however slight1 may always mean1 in the end1 the sanctioning of a whole revolution4 ,besides1 cried ,leslie1 even if there were anything finally established1 what right have we to judge that the established is the ,good8 ,i don't know that we have any right2 but ,i am sure it is what we do4 ,perhaps we do1 many of us1 ,i said1 but always1 so far as we reflect1 with a lurking sense that we may be all wrong4 ,or how else do you account for the curious1 almost physical1 sinking and disquiet we are apt to experience in the presence of a bold denier8 ,i don't know that ,i do experience it4 ,do you not8 ,i do so often2 and only yesterday ,i had a specially vivid experience of the kind4 ,what was that8 ,well1 ,i was reading ,nietzsche4 ,who is he8 ,a ,german writer4 ,it does not much matter1 but ,i had him in my mind when ,i was speaking4 ,well1 but what does he say8 ,it's not so much what he says1 as what he denies4 ,what does he deny1 then8 ,everything that you1 ,i suppose1 would assert4 ,i should conjecture1 at least1 that you believe in progress1 democracy1 and all the rest of it4 ,well8 ,well1 he repudiates all that4 ,everything that you would reckon as progress1 he reckons as decadence4 ,democracy he regards1 with all that it involves1 as a revolt of the weak against the strong1 of the bad against the good1 of the herd against the master4 ,every great society1 in his view1 is aristocratic1 and aristocratic in the sense that the many are deliberately and consciously sacrificed to the few2 and that1 not as a painful necessity1 but with a good conscience1 in free obedience to the universal law of the world4 ',be strong1 be hard' are his ultimate ethical principles4 ,the modern virtues1 or what we affect to consider such1 sympathy1 pity1 justice1 thrift1 unselfishness and the like1 are merely symptoms of moral degeneration4 ,the true and great and noble man is above all things selfish2 and the highest type of humanity is to be sought in ,napoleon or ,csar ,borgia4 ,but that's mere raving6 ,so you are pleased to say2 and so1 indeed1 it really may be4 ,but not simply because it contradicts those current notions which we are embodying1 as fast as we can1 in our institutions4 ,it is precisely those notions that it challenges2 and it is idle to meet it with a bare denial4 ,i can conceive no better way of meeting it6 ,perhaps1 for purposes of battle4 ,yet1 even so1 you would surely be stronger if you had reason for your faith4 ,but ,i think my reason sufficient--those are not the ideas of the age4 ,but for all you know they may be those of the next4 ,well1 that will be its concern4 ,but surely1 on your own theory1 it must also be yours2 for you said that the later was also the better4 ,and the better1 ,i suppose1 is what you want to attain4 ,well6 ,well then1 in supporting the ideas and institutions generally current1 you may be hindering instead of helping the realization of the ,good you want to achieve4 ,but ,i don't believe ,nietzsche's ideas ever could represent the ,good6 ,why not8 ,because ,i don't4 ,but1 at any rate1 do you abandon the position that we can take the ideas of our time as a final criterion8 ,i suppose so--,i don't know--,i'm sure there's something in it6 ,do you believe yourself that they have no import for us8 ,i didn't say that2 but ,i think we have to find what the import is4 ,we cannot substitute for our own judgment the mere fact of a current convention1 any more than we can substitute the mere fact of the tendency of ,nature4 ,for1 after all1 it is the part of a moral reformer to modify the convention4 ,or do you not think so8 ,perhaps1 he admitted1 it may be6 ,perhaps it may be6 cried ,leslie1 but palpably it is6 ,is there any institution or law or opinion you could name which is not open to obvious criticism8 ,take what you will--parliamentary government1 the family1 the law of real property--is there one of them that could be adequately and successfully defended8 ,certainly6 began ,parry1 with some indignation4 ,the family-- ,oh1 ,i interrupted1 we are not yet in a position to discuss that6 ,but upon one thing we seem to be agreed--that whatever may be the value of current standards of ,good in assisting our judgment1 we cannot permit them simply to supersede it by an act of authority4 ,and so once more we are thrown back each upon his own opinions4 ,to which1 according to you1 interposed ,parry1 we are bound to attach some validity4 ,and yet which we are aware1 added ,ellis1 cannot possibly have any4 ,i was about to protest against this remark when ,i saw1 coming round from the garden1 ,bartlett and ,dennis1 the two remaining members of our party4 ,they had just returned from a mountaineering expedition2 and now1 having had their bath1 had come out to join us in our usual place of assembly4 ,bartlett had in his hand the ,times and the ,daily ,chronicle4 ,he was a keen business man1 and a ,radical politician of some note2 and though not naturally inclined to speculative thought1 would sometimes take part in our discussions if ever they seemed to touch on any practical issue4 ,on these occasions his remarks were often very much to the point2 but his manner being somewhat aggressive and polemic1 his interposition did not always tend to make smooth the course of debate4 ,it was therefore with mingled feelings of satisfaction and anxiety that ,i greeted his return4 ,after some talk about their expedition1 he turned to me and said1 ,we ought to apologise1 ,i suppose1 for interrupting a discussion8 ,not at all6 ,i replied2 but1 as you are here1 perhaps you will be willing to help us8 ,oh1 he said1 ,i leave that to ,dennis4 ,this kind of thing isn't much in my line4 ,what kind of thing8 ,leslie interjected4 ,i don't believe you even know what we're talking about6 ,talking about4 ,why1 philosophy1 of course6 ,what else should it be when you get together8 ,this time1 ,i said1 it's not exactly philosophy1 but something more like ethics4 ,what is the question8 asked ,dennis4 ,dennis was always ready for a discussion1 and the more abstract the theme1 the better he was pleased4 ,he had been trained for the profession of medicine1 but coming into possession of a fortune1 had not found it necessary to practise1 and had been devoting his time for some years past to ,art and ,metaphysics4 ,i always enjoyed talking to him1 though the position he had come to hold was one which ,i found it very difficult to understand1 and ,i am not sure that ,i have been able to represent it fairly4 ,we have been discussing1 ,i said1 in answer to his question1 our judgments about what is good1 and trying without much success to get over the difficulty1 that whereas1 on the one hand1 we seem to be practically obliged to trust these judgments1 on the other we find it hard to say which of them1 if any1 are true1 and how far and in what sense4 ,oh1 he replied1 then ,bartlett ought really to be able to help you4 ,at any rate he's very positive himself about what's good and what's bad4 ,curiously enough1 he and ,i have been touching upon the same point as you1 and ,i find1 among other things1 that he is a convinced ,utilitarian4 ,i never said so1 said ,bartlett1 but ,i have no objection to the word4 ,it savours of healthy homes and pure beer6 ,and is that your idea of ,good8 asked ,leslie1 irritated1 as ,i could see1 by this obtrusion of the concrete4 ,yes1 he replied1 why not8 ,it's as good an idea as most4 ,i suppose1 ,i said1 all of us here should agree that the things you speak of are good4 ,but somebody might very well deny it4 ,of course somebody can deny anything1 if only for the sake of argument4 ,you mean that no one could be serious in such a denial8 ,i mean that everybody really knows perfectly well what is good and what is bad2 the difficulty is1 not to know it1 but to do it6 ,but surely you will admit that opinions do differ8 ,they don't differ nearly so much as people pretend1 on important points2 or1 if they do1 the difference is not about what ought to be done1 but about how to do it4 ,what ought to be done1 then8 asked ,leslie defiantly4 ,well1 for example we ought to make our cities decent and healthy4 ,why8 ,because we ought2 or1 if you like1 because it will make people happy4 ,but ,i don't like at all6 ,i don't see that it's necessarily good to make people happy4 ,oh well1 if you deny that-- ,well1 if ,i deny that8 ,i don't believe you to be serious1 that's all4 ,good simply means1 what makes people happy2 and you must know that as well as ,i do4 ,you see6 interposed ,dennis2 ,i told you he was a ,utilitarian4 ,i daresay ,i am2 at any rate1 that's what ,i think2 and so1 ,i believe1 does everybody else4 ',the ,universe1' murmured ,ellis1 'so far as sane conjecture can go1 is an immeasurable swine's trough1 consisting of solid and liquid1 and of other contrasts and kinds2 especially consisting of attainable and unattainable1 the latter in immensely greater quantities for most pigs4' ,that's very unfair1 ,parry protested1 as an account of ,hedonism4 ,i don't see that it is at all1 cried ,leslie4 ,i think1 ,i said1 that it represents ,bentham's position well enough1 though probably not ,bartlett's4 ,oh well1 said ,parry1 ,bentham was only an egoistic ,hedonist4 ,a what8 said ,bartlett4 ,an egoistic ,hedonist4 ,and what may that be8 ,an egoistic ,hedonist1 ,parry was beginning1 but ,ellis cut him short4 ,it's best explained1 he said1 by an example4 ,here1 for example1 is ,bentham's definition of the pleasures of friendship2 they are1 he says1 'those which accompany the persuasion of possessing the goodwill of such and such individuals1 and the right of expecting from them1 in consequence1 spontaneous and gratuitous services4' ,we all laughed1 though ,parry1 who loved fair play1 could not help protesting4 ,you really can't judge1 he said1 by a single example4 ,can't you8 cried ,ellis2 well then1 here's another4 ',the pleasures of piety' are 'those which accompany the persuasion of acquiring or possessing the favour of ,god2 and the power1 in consequence1 of expecting particular favours from him1 either in this life or in another4' ,we laughed again2 and ,parry said1 ,well1 ,i resign myself to your levity4 ,and after all1 it doesn't much matter1 for no one now is an egoistic ,hedonist4 ,what are we then1 asked ,bartlett1 you and ,i8 ,why1 of course1 altruistic ,hedonists1 said ,parry4 ,and what's the difference8 ,the difference is1 ,parry began to explain1 but ,ellis interrupted him again4 ,the difference is1 he cried1 that one is a brute and the other a prig4 ,really1 ,ellis1 ,parry began in a tone of remonstrance4 ,but1 ,parry1 ,i interposed1 are you a ,utilitarian8 ,not precisely1 he replied2 but my conclusions are much the same as theirs4 ,and of all the priori systems ,i prefer ,utilitarianism1 because it is at least clear1 simple1 and precise4 ,that is what ,i can never see that it is4 ,why1 what is your difficulty8 ,in the first place1 ,i said1 the system appears to rest upon a dogma4 ,true1 he said1 but that particular dogma--the greatest happiness of the greatest number--is one which commends itself to everyone's consciousness4 ,i don't believe it6 said ,ellis4 ,let us take an example4 ,a crossing-sweeper1 we will suppose1 is suffering from a certain disease about which the doctors know nothing4 ,their only chance of discovering how to cure it is to vivisect the patient2 and it is found1 by the hedonistic calculus1 that if they do so1 a general preponderance of pleasure over pain will result4 ,accordingly1 they go to the crossing-sweeper and say1',o crossing-sweeper6 ,in the name of the utilitarian philosophy we call upon you to submit to vivisection4 ,the tortures you will have to endure1 it is true1 will be inconceivable3 but think of the result6 ,a general preponderance in the community at large of pleasure over pain6 ,for every atom of pain inflicted on you1 an atom of pleasure will accrue to somebody else4 ,upon you1 it is true1 will fall the whole of the pain2 whereas the pleasure will be so minutely distributed among innumerable individuals that the increment in each case will be almost imperceptible4 ,no matter1 it will be there6 and our arithmetic assures us that the total gain in pleasure will exceed the total loss in pain4 ,it will also be distributed among a greater number of individuals4 ,thus all the requirements of the hedonistic calculus are satisfied6 ,your duty lies plain before you6 ,rise to the height of your destiny1 and follow us to the dissecting room6 ,what do you think the crossing-sweeper would say8 ,i leave it to ,bartlett to express his sentiments6 ,my dear ,ellis1 said ,parry1 your example is absurd4 ,the case1 to begin with1 is one that could not possibly occur4 ,and even if it did1 one could not expect the man who was actually to suffer1 to take an impartial view of the situation4 ,but1 ,i said1 putting the sufferer out of the question1 what would really be the opinion of the people for whom he was to suffer8 ,do you think they would believe they ought to accept the sacrifice8 ,every man1 ,i think1 would repudiate it with horror for himself2 and what right has he to accept it for other people8 ,on the utilitarian hypothesis1 said ,parry1 he certainly ought to4 ,no doubt2 but would he8 ,utilitarianism claims to rest upon common sense1 but1 in the case adduced1 ,i venture to think common sense would repudiate it4 ,perhaps1 he said1 but the example is misleading4 ,it is a case1 as ,i said1 that could not occur--a mere marginal case4 ,still1 ,i said1 a marginal case may suggest a fundamental fallacy4 ,anyhow1 ,i cannot see myself that the judgment that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is good has a more obvious and indisputable validity than any other judgments of worth4 ,it seems to me to be just one judgment among others2 and1 like the others1 it may be true or false4 ,however1 ,i will not press that point4 ,but what ,i should like to insist upon is1 that the doctrine which ,bartlett seemed to hold-- ,i hold no doctrine1 interrupted ,bartlett2 ,i merely expressed an opinion1 which ,i am not likely to change for all the philosophy in the world4 ,and with that he opened the ,chronicle1 and presently becoming absorbed1 paid for some time no further attention to the course of our debate4 ,well1 ,i continued1 the doctrine1 whether ,bartlett holds it or no1 that the ultimately good thing is the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 cannot be insisted upon as one which appeals at once to everyone's consciousness as true1 so that1 in fact1 since its enunciation1 the controversy about ,good may be regarded as closed4 ,it will hardly be maintained1 ,i imagine1 even by ,parry1 that the truth of the doctrine is a direct and simple intuition1 so that it has only to be stated to be accepted8 ,certainly not1 ,parry replied1 the contention of the ,utilitarians is that everyone who has the capacity and will take the trouble to reflect will1 in fact1 arrive at their conclusions4 ,the conclusions being like other conclusions about what is good1 the result of a difficult process of analysis1 in which there are many possibilities of error1 and no more self-evident and simple than any other judgment of the kind8 ,he agreed4 ,and further1 the general principle1 tentative and uncertain as it is1 requiring itself to be perpetually interpreted anew for every fresh case that turns up4 ,how do you mean8 ,why1 ,i said1 even if we grant that the end of action is the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 yet we have still to discover wherein that happiness consists4 ,but1 he said1 happiness we define quite simply as pleasure4 ,yes2 but how do we define pleasure8 ,we don't need to define it4 ,pleasure and pain are simply sensations4 ,if ,i cut my finger1 ,i feel pain2 if ,i drink when ,i am thirsty1 ,i feel pleasure4 ,there can be no mistake about these feelings2 they are simple and radical4 ,undoubtedly4 ,but if you limit pleasure and pain to such simple cases as these1 you will never get out of them a system of ,ethics4 ,and1 on the other hand1 if you extend the terms indefinitely1 they lose at once all their boasted precision1 and become as difficult to interpret as ,good and ,evil4 ,how do you mean8 ,why1 ,i said1 if all conduct turned on such simple choices as that between thick soup and clear1 then perhaps its rules might be fairly summed up in the utilitarian formula4 ,but in fact1 as everyone knows1 the choices are far more difficult2 they are between1 let us say1 a bottle of port and a ,beethoven symphony2 leisure and liberty now1 or #ajjj a-year twenty years hence2 art and fame at the cost of health1 or sound nerves and obscurity2 and so on1 and so on through all the possible cases1 infinitely more complex in reality than ,i could attempt to indicate here1 all of which1 no doubt1 could be brought under your formula1 but none of which the formula would help to solve4 ,of course1 said ,parry1 the hedonistic calculus is difficult to apply4 ,no one1 that ,i know of1 denies that4 ,no one could very well deny it1 ,i replied4 ,but now1 see what follows4 ,granting1 for the moment1 for the sake of argument1 that in making these difficult choices we really do apply what you call the hedonistic calculus-- ,which ,i1 for my part1 altogether deny6 cried ,leslie4 ,well1 ,i resumed1 but granting it for the moment1 yet the important point is not the criterion1 but the result4 ,it is a small thing to know in general terms 7supposing even it were true that we do know it7 that what we ought to seek is a preponderance of pleasure over pain2 the whole problem is to discover1 in innumerable detailed cases1 wherein precisely the preponderance consists4 ,but this can only be learnt1 if at all1 by long and difficult1 and1 it may be1 painful experience4 ,we do not really know1 priori1 what things are pleasurable1 in the extended sense which we must give to the word if the doctrine is to be at all plausible1 any more definitely than we know what things are good4 ,and the ,utilitarians by substituting the word ,pleasure for the word ,good1 even if the substitution were legitimate1 have not really done much to help us in our choice4 ,but1 he objected1 we do at least know what ,pleasure is1 even if we do not know what things are pleasurable4 ,and so ,i might say we do know what ,good is1 even if we do not know what things are good4 ,but we know ,pleasure by direct sensation4 ,and so ,i might say we know ,good by direct perception4 ,but you cannot define ,good4 ,neither can you define ,pleasure4 ,both must be recognised by direct experience4 ,but1 at any rate1 he said1 there is this distinction1 that in the case of ,pleasure everyone does recognise it when it occurs2 whereas there is no such general recognition of ,good4 ,that1 ,i admitted1 may1 perhaps1 be true2 ,i am not sure4 ,but1 broke in ,leslie1 what does it matter whether it be true or no8 ,what has all this to do with the question8 ,it's immaterial whether ,pleasure or ,good is the more easily and generally recognisable4 ,the point is that they are radically different things4 ,no1 objected ,parry1 our point is that they are the same thing4 ,but ,i don't believe you really think so1 or that anyone can4 ,and ,i don't believe that anyone cannot6 ,do you mean to say that you really agree with ,bentham that1 quantity of pleasure being equal1 pushpin is as good as poetry8 ,yes2 at least ,i agree with what he means1 though the particular example doesn't appeal to me1 for ,i hardly know what either pushpin or poetry is4 ,well then1 let us take ,plato's example4 ,do you think that1 quantity of pleasure being equal1 scratching oneself when one itches is as good as1 say1 pursuing scientific research4 ,yes4 ,but of course the point is that quantity of pleasure is not equal4 ,you mean1 interposed ,ellis1 that there is more pleasure in scratching8 ,no1 of course not4 ,but at least you will admit that there is more pleasure in some physical experiences8 ,plato1 for example1 takes the case of a catamite4 ,i admit nothing of the kind4 ,in the first place1 these gross physical pleasures do not last4 ,but suppose they did8 ,imagine an eternal1 never-changing bliss of scratching1 or of-- ,i don't see the use of discussing the matter in this kind of way4 ,it seems to me to deserve serious treatment ,but ,i am perfectly serious4 ,i do genuinely believe that a heaven of scratching1 or at any rate of some analogous but intenser experience1 would involve an indefinitely greater sum of pleasure than a heaven of scientific research4 ,well1 all ,i can say is1 ,i don't agree with you4 ,but why not8 cried ,leslie4 ,if you were candid ,i believe you would4 ,the fact is that you have predetermined that scientific research is a better thing than such physical pleasure1 and then you bring out your calculation of pleasure so as to agree with that foregone conclusion4 ,and that is what the ,utilitarians always do4 ,being ordinary decent people they accept the same values as the rest of the world1 and on the same grounds as the rest of the world4 ,and then they pretend1 and no doubt believe themselves1 that they have been led to their conclusions by the hedonistic calculus4 ,but really1 if they made an impartial attempt to apply the calculus fairly1 they would arrive at quite different results1 results which would surprise and shock themselves1 and destroy the whole plausibility of their theory4 ,that is your view of the matter4 ,but isn't it yours8 ,no1 certainly not4 ,at any rate1 ,i interposed1 it seems to be clear that this utilitarian doctrine has nothing absolute or final or self-evident about it4 ,all we can say is that among the many opinions about what things are good1 there is also this opinion1 very widely held1 that all pleasurable things are good1 and that nothing is good that is not pleasurable4 ,but that1 like any other opinion1 can be and is disputed4 ,so that we return pretty much to the point we left1 that there are a number of conflicting opinions about what things are good1 that to these opinions some validity must be attached1 but that it is difficult to see how we are to reconcile them or to choose between them4 ,only1 somehow or other1 as it seems to me1 the truth about ,good must be adumbrated in these opinions1 and by interrogating the actual experience of men in their judgments about good things1 we may perhaps be able to get at least some1 shadowy notion of the object of our quest ,and so1 said ,ellis1 getting up and stretching himself1 even by your own confession we end where we began4 ,not quite1 ,i replied4 ,besides1 have we ended8 ,for some minutes it seemed as though we had4 ,the mid-day heat 7it was now twelve o'clock7 and the silence broken only by the murmur of the fountain 7for the mowers opposite had gone home to their dinner7 seemed to have induced a general disinclination to the effort of speech or thought ,even ,dennis whom ,i had never known to be tired in body or mind1 and who was always debating something--it seemed to matter very little what--even he1 ,i thought at first1 was ready to let the discussion drop4 ,but presently it became clear that he was only revolving my last words in his mind1 for before long he turned to me and said3 ,i don't know what you mean by 'interrogating experience1' or what results you hope to attain by that process4 ,at this ,leslie pricked up his ears1 and ,i saw that he at least was as eager as ever to pursue the subject further4 ,why1 continued ,dennis1 should there not be a method of discovering ,good independently of all experience8 ,the phrase immediately arrested ,wilson's attention4 ',a method independent of experience1' he cried1 why1 what kind of a method would that be8 ,it is not so easy to describe1 replied ,dennis4 ,but ,i was thinking of the kind of method1 for example1 that is worked out by ,hegel in his ,logic8 ,i have never read ,hegel1 said ,wilson4 ,so that doesn't convey much to my mind4 ,well1 said ,dennis1 ,i am afraid ,i can't summarize him6 ,can't you8 cried ,ellis1 ,i can6 ,here he is in a nutshell6 ,take any statement you like--for example1 ',nothing exists6'--put it into the dialectical machine1 turn the handle1 and hey presto6 out comes the ,absolute6 ,the thing's infallible2 it does not matter what you put in2 you always get out the same identical sausage4 ,dennis laughed4 ,there1 ,wilson1 he said1 ,i hope you understand now6 ,i can't say ,i do1 replied ,wilson1 but ,i daresay it doesn't much matter4 ,perhaps1 then1 said ,ellis1 you would prefer the ,kantian plan4 ,what is that8 ,oh1 it's much simpler than the other4 ,you go into your room1 lock the door1 and close the shutters1 excluding all light ,then you proceed to invert the mind1 so as to relieve it of all its contents2 look steadily into the empty vessel1 as if it were a well2 and at the bottom you will find ,truth in the form of a categorical imperative4 ,or1 if you don't like that1 there's the method of ,fichte4 ,you take an ,ego1 by preference yourself2 convert it into a proposition2 negate it1 affirm it1 negate it again1 and so on ad infinitum1 until you get out the whole ,universe in the likeness of yourself4 ,but that's rather a difficult method2 probably you would prefer ,spinoza's4 ,you take-- ,no6 cried ,dennis1 there ,i protest6 ,spinoza is too venerable a name4 ,so are they all1 all venerable names1 said ,ellis4 ,but the question is1 to which of them do you swear allegiance8 ,for they all arrive at totally different results4 ,i don't know that ,i swear allegiance to any of them1 he replied4 ,i merely ventured to suggest that it is only by some such method of pure reason that one can ever hope to discover ,good4 ,you do not profess then1 ,i said1 to have discovered any such method yourself8 ,no4 ,nor do you feel sure that anyone else has8 ,no4 ,you simply lie down and block the road8 ,yes1 he said1 and you may walk over me if you can4 ,no1 ,i said1 ,it will be simpler1 ,i think1 if possible1 to walk round you4 ,for by this time an idea had occurred to me4 ,do so1 he said1 by all means1 if you can4 ,well ,i began1 let us suppose for the sake of argument that there really is some such method as you suggest of discovering ,good--a purely rational method1 independent of all common experience4 ,let us suppose it1 he said1 if you are willing4 ,is it your idea then1 ,i continued1 that this ,good so discovered1 would be out of all relation to what we call goods8 ,or would it be merely the total reality of which they are imperfect and inadequate expressions8 ,i do not see1 he said1 why it should have any relationship to them4 ,all the things we call good may really be bad2 or some good and some bad in a quite chaotic fashion4 ,there is no reason to suppose that our ideas about ,good have any validity unless it were by an accidental coincidence4 ,and further1 ,i said1 though we really do believe there is a ,good1 and that there is a purely rational and priori method of discovering it1 yet we do not profess to have ascertained that method ourselves1 nor do we feel sure that it has been ascertained by anyone8 ,in any case1 we admit1 ,i suppose1 that to the great mass of men1 both of our own and all previous ages1 such a method has remained unknown and unsuspected8 ,he agreed4 ,but these men1 nevertheless1 have been pursuing ,goods under the impression that they were really good4 ,yes4 ,and in this pursuit they have been expending1 great men and small alike1 or rather those whom we call great and small1 all that store of energy1 of passion1 and blood and tears which makes up the drama of history8 ,undoubtedly6 ,but that expenditure1 as we now see1 was futile and absurd4 ,the purposes to which it was directed were not really good1 nor had they any tendency to promote ,good1 unless it were in some particular case by some fortunate chance4 ,whatever men have striven to achieve1 whether like ,christ1 to found a religion1 or1 like ,csar1 to found a polity1 whether their quest were virtue or power or truth1 or any other of the ends we are accustomed to value and praise1 or whether they sought the direct opposites of these1 or simply lived from hour to hour following without reflexion the impulse of the moment1 in any and every case all alike1 great and small1 good and bad1 leaders and followers1 or however else we may class them1 were1 in fact1 equally insignificant and absurd1 the idle sport of illusions1 one as empty and baseless as another4 ,the history of nations1 the lives of individual men1 are stripped1 in this view1 of all interest and meaning2 nowhere is there advance or retrogression1 nowhere better or worse1 nowhere sense or consistency at all4 ,systems1 however imposing1 structures1 however vast1 fly into dust and powder at a touch4 ,the stars fall from the human firmament2 the beacon-lights dance like will-o'-the-wisps2 the whole universe of history opens1 cracks1 and dissolves in smoke2 and we1 from an ever-vanishing shore1 gaze with impotent eyes at the last gleam on the wings of the dove of ,reason as it dips for ever down to eternal night4 ,will not that be the only view we can take of the course of human action if we hold that what we believe to be goods have no relation to the true ,good8 ,yes1 he admitted1 ,i suppose it will4 ,and if we turn1 ,i continued1 from the past to the present and the future1 we find ourselves1 ,i think1 in even worse case4 ,for we shall all1 those of us who may come to accept the hypothesis you put forward1 be deprived of the consolation even of imagining a reason and purpose in our lives4 ,the great men of the past1 at any rate1 could and did believe that they were helping to realize great ,goods2 but we1 in so far as we are philosophers1 shall have to forego even that satisfaction4 ,we shall believe1 indeed1 that ,good exists1 and that there is a method of discovering it by pure reason2 but this method1 we may safely assume1 we shall not most of us have ascertained4 ,or do you think we shall8 ,i cannot tell1 he said2 ,i do not profess to have ascertained it myself4 ,and meantime1 ,i said1 you have not even the right to assume that it is a good thing to endeavour to ascertain it4 ,for the pursuit of ,truth1 it must be admitted1 is one of the things which we call good2 and these1 we agreed1 have not any relation to the true ,good4 ,consider1 then1 the position of these unfortunate men who have learnt indeed that there is a ,good1 but who know nothing about it1 except that it has nothing to do with what they call good4 ,what kind of life will they live8 ,whatever they may put their hand to1 they will at once be paralyzed by the thought that it cannot possibly be worth pursuing4 ,politics1 art1 pleasure1 science--of these and all other ends they know but one thing1 that all is vanity4 ,as by the touch of enchantment1 their world is turned to dust4 ,like ,tantalus they stretch lips and hands towards a water for ever vanishing1 a fruit for ever withdrawn4 ,at war with empty phantoms1 they 'strike with their spirit's knife1' as ,shelley has it1 'invulnerable nothings1' ,dizzy and lost they move about in worlds not only unrealized1 but unrealizable1 'children crying in the night1 with no language but a cry1' and no father to cry to4 ,and in all this blind confusion the only comfort vouchsafed is that somehow or other they may1 they cannot tell how1 discover a ,good of which the only thing they know is that it has no connection with the ,goods they have lost4 ,is not this a fair account of the condition to which men would be reduced who really did accept and believe your hypothesis8 ,yes1 he said1 perhaps it is1 but still ,i must protest against this appeal to prejudice and passion4 ,supposing the truth really were as ,i suggested1 we should have to face it1 whether or no it seemed to ruin our own life4 ,yes1 ,i agreed1 supposing the truth were so4 ,but1 after all1 we have no sufficient theoretical reason for believing it to be so1 and every kind of practical reason against it4 ,we cannot1 it is true1 demonstrate--and that was admitted from the first--that any of our judgments about what is good are true2 but there is no reason why we should not believe--and ,i should say we must believe--that somehow or other they do at least have truth in them4 ,well1 and if so8 ,if so1 we do not depend1 as you said we do1 or at least we do not believe ourselves to depend1 for our knowledge about ,good1 upon some purely rational process not yet discovered2 but those things which we judge to be good really1 we think1 in some sense or so1 and by analyzing and classifying and comparing our experiences of such things we may come to see more clearly what it is in them that we judge to be good2 and again by increasing experience we may come to know more ,good than we knew2 and generally1 if we once admit that we have some light1 we may hope1 by degrees1 to get more2 and that getting of more light will be the most important business1 not only of philosophy1 but of life4 ,but if we can judge of ,good at all1 why do we not judge rightly8 ,if we really have a perception1 how is it that it is confused1 not clear8 ,i cannot tell how or why2 but perhaps it is something of this kind4 ,our experience1 in the first place1 is limited1 and we cannot know ,good except in so far as we experience it--so1 at least1 ,i think1 though perhaps you may not agree4 ,and if that be so1 even if our judgments about ,good that we have experienced were clear1 our conclusions drawn from them would yet be very imperfect and tentative1 because there would be so much ,good that we had not experienced4 ,but1 in fact1 as it seems1 our judgments even about what we do experience are confused1 because every experience is indefinitely complex1 and contains1 along with the ,good1 so much that is indifferent or bad4 ,and to analyze out precisely what it is that we are judging to be good is often a difficult and laborious task1 though it is one that should be a main preoccupation with us all4 ,you think1 then1 that there are two reasons for the obscurity and confusion that prevail in our judgments about ,good--one1 that our experience is limited1 the other that it is complex8 ,yes2 and our position in this respect1 as it always seems to me1 is like that of people who are learning to see1 or to develop some other sense4 ,something they really do perceive1 but they find it hard to say what4 ,their knowledge of the object depends on the state of the organ2 and it is only by the progressive perfecting of that1 that they can settle their doubts and put an end to their disputes1 whether with themselves or with other people4 ,how do you mean8 ,well1 if you will allow me to elaborate my metaphor1 ,i conceive that we have a kind of internal sense1 like a rudimentary eye1 whose nature it is to be sensitive to ,good1 just as it is the nature of the physical eye to be sensitive to light4 ,but this eye of the soul1 being1 as ,i said1 rudimentary1 does not as yet perceive ,good with any clearness or precision1 but only in a faint imperfect way1 catching now one aspect of it1 now another1 but never resting content in any of these1 being driven on by the impulse to realize itself to ever surer and finer discrimination1 with the sense that it is learning its own nature as it learns that of its object1 and that it will never be itself a true and perfect organ until it is confronted with the true and perfect ,good4 ,and as by the physical eye we learn by degrees to distinguish colours and forms1 to separate and combine them1 and arrange them in definite groups1 and then1 going further1 after discerning in this way a world of physical things1 proceed to fashion for our delight a world of art1 in that finer experience becoming aware of our own finer self2 so1 by this eye of hers1 does the soul1 by long and tentative effort1 learn to distinguish and appraise the ,goods which ,nature presents to her2 and then1 still unsatisfied1 proceed to shape for herself a new world1 as it were1 of moral art1 fashioning the relations of man to ,nature and to his fellow-man under the stress of her need to realize herself1 ever creating and ever destroying only to create anew1 learning in the process her own nature1 yet aware that she has never learnt it1 but passing on without rest to that unimagined consummation wherein the impulse that urges her on will be satisfied at last1 and she will rest in the perfect enjoyment of that which she knows to be ,good1 because in it she has found not only her object but herself4 ,is not this a possible conception8 ,i do not say1 he replied1 that it is impossible2 but ,i still feel a difficulty4 ,what is it8 ,i said1 for ,i am anxious not to shirk anything4 ,well1 he said1 you will remember when ,parry suggested that the perception of ,good might perhaps be an instinct1 you objected that instincts conflict one with another1 and that we therefore require another faculty to choose between them4 ,now it seems to me that your own argument is open to the same objection4 ,you postulate some faculty--which perhaps you might as well call an instinct--and this faculty1 as ,i understand you1 in the effort to realize itself1 proceeds to discriminate various objects as good4 ,but1 now1 does this same faculty also know that the ,goods are good1 and which is better than which1 and generally in what relations they stand to one another and to the absolutely ,good8 ,or do we not require here1 too1 another faculty to make these judgments1 and must not this faculty1 as ,i said at first1 have previously achieved1 by some method of its own1 a knowledge of ,good1 in order that it may judge between ,goods8 ,no1 ,i said1 in that way you will get1 as you hint1 nothing but an infinite regress4 ,the perception of ,good1 whenever it comes1 must be1 in the last analysis1 something direct1 immediate1 and self-evident2 and so far ,i am in agreement with ,parry4 ,my only quarrel with him was in regard to his assumption that the judgments we make about ,good are final and conclusive4 ,the experiences we recognize as good are always1 it seems to me1 also bad2 because we are never able to apprehend or experience what is absolutely ,good4 ,only1 as ,i like to believe--you may say ,i have no grounds for the belief--we are always progressing towards such a ,good2 and the more of it we apprehend and experience1 the more we are aware of our own well-being2 or perhaps ,i ought to say1 of the well-being of that part of us1 whatever it may be--,i call it the soul--which pursues after ,good4 ,for her attitude1 perhaps you will agree1 towards her object1 is not simply one of perception1 but one of appetency and enjoyment4 ,her aim is not merely to know ,good1 but to experience it2 so that along with her apprehension of ,good goes her apprehension of her own well-being1 dependent upon and varying with her relation to that1 her object4 ,thus she is aware of a tension1 as it were1 when she cannot expand1 of a drooping and inanition when nutriment fails1 of a rush of health and vigour as she passes into a new and larger life1 as she freely unfolds this or that aspect of her complex being1 triumphs at last over an obstacle that has long hemmed and thwarted her course1 and rests for a moment in free and joyous consciousness of self1 like a stream newly escaped from a rocky gorge1 to meander in the sun through a green melodious valley4 ,and this perception she has of her own condition is like our perception of health and disease4 ,we know when we are well1 not by any process of ratiocination1 by applying from without a standard of health deduced by pure thought1 but simply by direct sensation of well-being4 ,so it is with this soul of ours1 which is conversant with ,good4 ,her perception of ,good is but the other side of her perception of her own well-being1 for her well-being consists in her conformity to ,good4 ,thus every phase of her growth 7in so far as she grows7 is in one sense good1 and in another bad2 good in so far as it is self-expression1 bad in so far as the expression is incomplete4 ,from the limitations of her being she flies1 towards its expansion she struggles2 and by her perception that every ,good she attains is also bad1 she is driven on in her quest of that ultimate ,good which would be1 if she could reach it1 at once the complete realization of herself1 and her complete conformity to ,good4 ,but1 he objected1 apart from other difficulties1 in your method of discovering the ,good is there no place for ,reason at all8 ,i would not say that1 ,i replied1 though ,i am bound to confess that ,i see no place for what you call pure ,reason4 ,it is the part of ,reason1 on my hypothesis1 to tabulate and compare results4 ,she does not determine directly what is good1 but works1 as in all the sciences1 upon given data1 recording the determinations not 7in this case7 of the outer but of the inner sense1 noticing what kinds of activity satisfy1 and to what degree1 the expanding nature of this soul that seeks ,good1 and deducing therefrom1 so far as may be1 temporary rules of conduct based upon that unique and central experience which is the root and foundation of the whole4 ,temporary rules1 ,i say1 because1 by the nature of the case1 they can have in them nothing absolute and final1 inasmuch as they are mere deductions from a process which is always developing and transforming itself4 ,systems of morals1 maxims of conduct are so many landmarks left to show the route by which the soul is marching2 casts1 as it were1 of her features at various stages of her growth1 but never the final record of her perfect countenance4 ,and that is why the current morality1 the positive institutions and laws1 on which ,parry insisted with so much force1 both have and have not the value he assigned to them4 ,they are in truth invaluable records of experience1 and he is rash who attacks them without understanding2 and yet1 in a sense1 they are only to be understood in order to be superseded1 because the experience they resume is not final1 but partial and incomplete4 ,would you agree with that1 ,parry1 or no8 ,i am not sure1 he said4 ,it would be a dangerous doctrine to put in practice4 ,yes1 ,i said1 but ,i fear that life itself is a dangerous thing1 and nothing we can do will make it safe4 ,our only hope is courage and sanity4 ,but1 said ,dennis1 to return to the other point1 on your view is our knowledge of ,good altogether subsequent to experience8 ,yes1 ,i replied1 our knowledge is1 if you like2 but it is a knowledge of experience in ,good4 ,we first recognize ,good by what ,i call direct perception2 then we analyze and define what we have recognized2 and the results of this process1 ,i suppose1 is what we call knowledge1 so far as it goes4 ,and there can be no knowledge of ,good independent of experience8 ,i do not know2 perhaps there might be2 only ,i should like to suggest that even if we could arrive at such a knowledge by pure reason1 we should have achieved only a definition of ,good1 not ,good itself2 for ,good1 ,i suppose you will agree1 must be a state of experience1 not a formula4 ,even if it be so1 he said1 it might still be possible to arrive at its formula by pure reason4 ,it may be so1 ,i replied1 only ,i console myself with the thought1 that if1 as is the case with so many of us1 we cannot see our way to any such method1 we are not left1 on my hypothesis1 altogether forlorn4 ,for though we cannot know ,good1 we can go on realizing ,goods1 and so making progress towards the ultimate ,good1 which is the goal not merely of knowledge but of action4 ,and how1 may ,i ask1 said ,wilson1 after a pause1 in your conception1 is ,good related to ,happiness8 ,that1 ,i replied1 is one of the points we have to ascertain by experience4 ,for ,i regard the statement that happiness is the end as one of the numerous attempts which men have made to interpret the deliverances of their internal sense4 ,i do not imagine the interpretation to be final and complete1 and indeed it is too abstract and general to have very much meaning4 ,but some meaning1 no doubt1 it has2 and exactly what1 may form the subject of much interesting discussion in detail1 which belongs1 however1 rather to the question of the content of ,good1 than to that of the method of discovering it4 ,the method6 replied ,wilson1 but have you really indicated a method at all8 ,i have indicated1 ,i replied what ,i suppose to be the method of all science1 namely1 the interpretation of experience4 ,but1 he objected1 everything depends on the kind of interpretation4 ,true1 ,i admitted1 but long ago ,i did my best to prove that we could not learn anything about ,good by the scientific method as you defined it4 ,for that can tell us only about what is1 not about what ought to be4 ,at the same time1 the recording and comparing and classifying of the deliverances of this internal sense1 has a certain analogy to the procedure of science4 ,at any rate1 it might1 ,i think1 fairly be called a method1 though a method difficult to apply1 and one1 above all1 which only he can apply who has within himself the requisite experience4 ,and in this respect the study of the ,good resembles the study of the ,beautiful4 ,how do you mean8 ,why1 ,i said1 those who are conversant with the arts are well aware that there is such a thing as a true canon1 though they do not profess to be in complete possession of it4 ,they have a perception of the ,beautiful1 not ready-made and final1 but tentative and in process of growth4 ,this perception they cultivate by constant observation of beautiful works1 some more and some less1 according to their genius and opportunities2 and thus they are always coming to see1 though they never see perfectly1 just as ,i said was the case in the matter of the ,good4 ,but1 objected ,parry1 what proof is there that there is any standard at all in such matters8 ,there is no proof1 ,i replied1 except the perception itself2 and that is sufficient proof to those who have it4 ,and to some slight extent1 no doubt1 all men have it2 only many do not care to develop it2 and so1 feeling in themselves that they have no standard of judgment in art1 they suppose that all others are like themselves2 and that there really is no standard and no knowledge possible in such matters4 ,and it is the same with ,good2 if a man will not choose to cultivate his inner sense1 and to train it to clear and ever clearer perception1 he will either never believe that there is any knowledge of ,good1 or any meaning at all in the word2 or else1 since all men feel the need of an end for action1 he will have recourse to a fixed dogma1 taken up by accident and clung to with obstinate desperation1 without any root in his true inner nature2 and to him all discussion about ,good will seem to be mere folly1 since he will believe either that he possesses it already or that it cannot be possessed at all4 ,or ,if he ask after the method of discovering it1 he will be unable to understand it1 because he does not choose to develop the necessary experience2 and so he will go through life for ever unconvinced1 arguing often and angrily1 but always with no result1 while all the time the knowledge he denies is lying hidden within him1 if only he had the patience and faith to seek it there4 ,but without that1 there is no possibility of convincing him2 and it will be wiser altogether to leave him alone4 ,this1 whether you call it a method or no1 is the only idea ,i can form as to the possibility of discovering what is ,beautiful and ,good4 ,there was silence for a few moments1 and then ,wilson said3 ,do you mean to imply1 on your hypothesis1 that we all are always seeking ,good8 ,no1 ,i said2 whatever ,i may think on that point1 ,i have not committed myself4 ,it is enough for my purpose if we admit that we have the faculty of seeking ,good1 supposing we choose to do so4 ,and also the faculty of seeking ,bad8 ,possibly2 ,i do not pronounce upon that4 ,well1 anyhow1 do you admit the existence of ,bad8 ,oh yes1 ,i cried1 as much as you like2 for it is bad1 to my mind1 that we should be in a difficult quest of ,good1 instead of in secure possession of it4 ,and about the nature of that quest ,i make no facile assumption4 ,i do not pretend that what ,i have called the growth of the soul from within is a smooth and easy process1 a quiet unfolding of leafy green in a bright and windless air4 ,if ,i recognize the delight of expansion1 ,i recognize also the pain of repression--the thwarted desire1 the unfulfilled hope1 the passion vain and abortive4 ,i do not say even whether or no1 in this dim travail of the spirit1 pleasure prevails over pain1 evil over good4 ,the most ,i would claim is to have suggested a meaning for our life in terms of ,good2 and my view1 ,i half hoped1 would have appealed in particular to you1 because what ,i have offered is not an abstract formula1 hard to interpret1 hard to relate to the actual facts of life1 but an attempt to suggest the significance of those facts themselves1 to supply a key to the cryptogram we call experience4 ,and in proportion as we really believed this view to be true1 it would lead us not away from but into life1 not shutting us up1 as has been too much the bent of philosophy1 like the homunculus of ,goethe's ',faust1' in the crystal phial of a set and rigid system1 to ring our little chiming bell and flash our tiny light over the vast sea of experience1 which all around us foams and floods1 myriad-streaming1 immense1 and clearly seen1 yet never felt1 through that transparent barrier2 but rather1 like him when he broke the glass1 made free of the illimitable main1 to follow under the yellow moon the car of ,galatea1 her masque of nymphs and tritons1 her gliding pomp of cymbals and conchs1 away through tempest and calm1 by night or day1 companioned or alone1 to the haunts of the far ,cabeiri1 and the home where the ,mothers dwell4 ,as ,i concluded1 ,i looked across at ,audubon1 to see if ,i had made any impression upon him4 ,but he only smiled at me rather ironically and said1 ,is that meant1 may ,i ask1 for an account of everyday experience8 ,rather1 ,i replied1 for an interpretation of it4 ,it would need a great deal of interpretation1 he said1 to make anything of the kind out of mine4 ,no doubt1 ,i said2 yet ,i am not without hope that the interpretation may be true2 and that some day you may recognize it to be so yourself4 ,meantime1 perhaps1 ,i1 who look on1 see more of the game than you who play it2 and surely in moments of leisure like this you will not refuse to listen to my poor attempt to read the riddle of the sphinx4 ,oh1 he said1 ,i listen gladly enough1 but as ,i would to a poem4 ,and do you think1 ,i replied1 that there is not more truth in poetry than in philosophy or science8 ,but ,wilson entered a vigorous protest1 and for a time there was a babel of argument and declamation1 from which no clear line of thought disengaged itself4 ,dennis1 however1 in his persistent way1 had been revolving in his mind what ,i had said1 and at the first opportunity he turned to me with the remark1 ,there's one point in your position that ,i can't understand4 ,do you mean to say that it is our seeking that determines the ,good1 or the ,good that determines our seeking4 ,really1 ,i said1 ,i don't know4 ,i should say both are true4 ,we1 in the process of our seeking1 affirm what we find to be good1 and in that sense determine for ourselves what for us was previously indeterminate2 but1 on the other hand1 our determination is not mere caprice2 it is determination of ,good1 which we must therefore suppose somehow or other to 'be' before we discern it4 ,but then1 in what sense is it8 ,that is what it is so hard to say4 ,perhaps it is the law of our seeking1 the creative and urging principle of the world1 striving through us to realize itself1 and recognized by us in that effort and strain4 ,then your hypothesis is that ,good has to be brought about1 even while you admit that in some sense it is8 ,yes1 it exists partially1 and it ought to come to exist completely4 ,well now1 that is exactly what seems to me absurd4 ,if ,good is at all it is eternal and complete4 ,but then1 ,i ask in my turn1 in what sense is it8 ,in the only sense that anything really is4 ,the rest is nothing but appearance4 ,what we call ,evil1 you mean1 is nothing but appearance4 ,yes4 ,you think1 in fact1 with the poet1 that 'all that is1 is good'8 ,yes1 he replied1 all that really is4 ,ah6 ,i said1 but in that 'really' lies the crux of the matter4 ,take1 for instance1 a simple fact of our own experience--pain4 ,would you say1 perhaps1 that pain is good8 ,no1 he replied1 not as it appears to us2 but as it really is4 ,as it really is to whom1 or in whom8 ,to the ,absolute1 we will say2 to ,god1 if you like4 ,well1 but what is the relation of the pain as it is in ,god to the pain that appears to us8 ,i don't pretend to know1 he said1 but that is hardly the point4 ,the point is1 that it is only in connection with what is in ,god that the word ,good has any real meaning4 ,appearance is neither good nor bad2 it is simply not real4 ,but1 cried ,audubon1 interrupting in a kind of passion1 ,it is in appearance that we live and move and have our being4 ,what is the use of saying that appearance is neither good nor bad1 when we are feeling it as the one or the other every moment of our lives8 ,and as to the ,good that is in ,god1 who knows or cares about it8 ,what consolation is it to me when ,i am suffering from the toothache1 to be told that ,god is enjoying the pain that tortures me8 ,it is simply absurd to call ,god's ,good good at all1 unless it has some kind of relation to our ,good4 ,well1 said ,dennis1 as to that1 ,i can only say that1 in my opinion1 it is nothing but our weakness that leads us to take such a view4 ,when ,i am really at my best1 when my intellect and imagination are working freely1 and the humours and passions of the flesh are laid to rest1 ,i seem to see1 with a kind of direct intuition1 that the world1 just as it is1 is good1 and that it is only the confusion and obscurity due to imperfect vision that makes us call it defective and wish to alter it for the better4 ,when ,i perceive ,truth at all1 ,i perceive that it is also ,good2 and ,i cannot then distinguish between what is1 and what ought to be4 ,really1 cried ,audubon1 really8 ,well1 that ,i cannot understand4 ,i hardly know how to make it clear1 he replied1 unless it were by a concrete example4 ,i find that when ,i think out any particular aspect of things1 so far1 that is to say1 as ,i can think it out at all1 all the parts and details fall into such perfect order and arrangement that it becomes impossible for me any longer to desire that anything should be other than it is4 ,and that1 even in the regions where at other times ,i am most prone to discover error and defect4 ,you know1 for instance1 that ,i am something of an economist8 ,what are you not8 ,i said4 ,if you sin1 it is not from lack of light6 ,well1 he continued1 there is1 ,i suppose1 no department of affairs which one is more inclined to criticise than this4 ,and yet the more one investigates the more one discovers1 even here1 the harmony and necessity that pervade the whole universe4 ,the ebb and flow of business from this trade or country to that1 the rise and fall of wages1 or of the rate of interest1 the pouring of capital into or out of one industry or another1 the varying relations of imports to exports1 the periods of depression and recovery1 and in close connection with all this the ever-changing conditions of the lives of countless workmen throughout the world1 their well-being or ill-being1 it may be their very life and death1 together with the whole fate of future generations in health1 capacity1 opportunity1 and the like1--all this complexus of things1 so chaotic and unintelligible at the first view1 so full1 as we say1 of iniquity1 injustice1 and the like1 falls1 as we penetrate further1 into one vast and harmonious system1 so inspiring to the imagination1 so inevitable to the understanding1 that our objections and cavillings1 ethical1 sthetic1 or what you will1 simply vanish away at the clearer vision1 or1 if they persist1 persist as mere irrelevant illusions2 while we abandon ourselves to the contemplation of the whole1 as of some world-symphony1 whose dissonances1 no less than its concords1 are taken up and resolved in the irresistible march and progress1 the ocean-flooding of the ,whole4 ,you will think1 he continued1 that ,i am absurdly rhapsodical over what1 after all1 is matter prosaic enough2 but what ,i wanted to suggest was that it is ,reality so conceived that appeals to me at once as ,truth and as ,good4 ,this partial vision of mine in the economic sphere is a kind of type of the way in which ,i conceive the ,absolute4 ,i conceive ,him to be a ,being necessary and therefore perfect2 a ,being in face of whom our own incoherent and tentative criticisms1 our complaints that this or that should1 if only it could1 be otherwise1 our regrets1 desires1 aspirations1 and the like1 shew but as so many testimonies to our own essential imperfection1 weaknesses to be surmounted1 rather than signs of worth to stamp us1 as we vainly boast1 the elect of creation4 ,he finished2 and ,i half expected that ,leslie would intervene1 since ,i saw1 as ,i thought1 many weak points in the position4 ,but he kept silence1 impressed1 perhaps1 by that idea of the ,perfect and ,eternal which has a natural home in the minds of the generous and the young4 ,so ,i began myself rather tentatively3 ,i think1 ,i said1 ,i understand the position you wish to indicate2 and so stated1 in general terms1 no doubt it is attractive4 ,it is when we endeavour to work it out in detail that the difficulties appear4 ,the position1 as ,i understand it1 is1 that1 from the point of view of the ,absolute1 what we call ,evil and what we call ,good simply have no existence4 ,good and ,evil1 in our sense1 are mere appearances2 and ,good1 in the absolute sense1 is identical with the ,absolute or with ,god8 ,yes1 he said1 that is my notion4 ,and so1 for example1 to apply the idea in detail1 in the region which you yourself selected1 all that we regret1 or hate1 or fear in our social system--poverty1 disease1 starvation and the rest--is not really evil at all1 does not in fact exist1 but is merely what appears to us8 ,there is1 in fact1 no social evil8 ,no1 he replied1 in the sense ,i have explained there is none4 ,well then1 ,i continued1 how is it with all our social and other ideals8 ,our desire to make our own lives and other people's lives happier8 ,our efforts to subdue nature1 to conquer disease1 to introduce order and harmony where there appears to be discord and confusion8 ,how is it with those finer and less directly practical impulses by which you yourself are mainly pre-occupied--the quest of knowledge or of beauty for their own sake1 the mere putting of ourselves into right relations with the universe1 apart from any attempt to modify it8 ,are all these desires and activities mere illusions of ours1 or worse than illusions1 errors and even vices1 impious misapprehensions of the absolutely ,good1 frivolous attempts to adapt the ,perfect to our own imperfections8 ,no1 he replied1 ,i would not put it so4 ,some meaning1 ,i apprehend1 there must be in time and change1 and some meaning also in our efforts1 though not1 ,i believe1 the meaning which we imagine4 ,the divine life1 as ,i conceive it1 is a process2 only a process that is somehow eternal1 circular1 so to speak1 not rectilinear1 much as ,milton appears to imagine it when he describes the blessed spirits 'progressing the dateless and irrevoluble circle of eternity'2 and of this eternal process our activity1 which we suppose to be moving towards an end1 is somehow or other an essential element4 ,so that1 in this way1 it is necessary and right that we should strive after ideals2 only1 when we are thinking philosophically1 we ought to make clear to ourselves that in truth the ,ideal is eternally fulfilled1 its fulfilment consisting precisely ,in that process which we are apt to regard as a mere means to its realization4 ,this1 as ,hegel has it1 is the 'cunning' of the ,absolute ,reason1 which deludes us into the belief that there is a purpose to be attained1 and by the help of that delusion preserves that energy of action which all the time is really itself the ,end4 ,i looked up at him as he finished1 to see whether he was quite serious2 and as he appeared to be so1 and as ,leslie still kept silence1 ,i took up the argument as follows4 ,i understand1 ,i said1 in a sort of way what you mean2 but still the same difficulty recurs which ,audubon has already put forward4 ,on your hypothesis there seems to be an impassable gulf between ,god's conception of ,good and ours4 ,to ,god1 as it seems1 the world is eternally good2 and in its goodness is included that illusion by which it appears to us so bad1 that we are continually employed in trying to make it better4 ,the maintenance of this illusion is essential to the nature of the world2 to us1 evil always must appear4 ,but1 as we know by experience1 the evil that appears is just as terrible and just as hateful as it would be if it really were4 ,a toothache1 as ,audubon put it1 is no less a pain to us because it is a pleasure to ,god4 ,we cannot1 if we would1 adopt ,his point of view2 and clearly it would be impious to try1 since we should be endeavouring to defeat ,his ingenious plan to keep the world going by hoodwinking us4 ,we therefore are chained and bound to the whirling wheel of appearance2 to us what seems good is good1 and what seems bad1 bad2 and your contention that all existence is somehow eternally good is for us simply irrelevant2 it belongs to the point of view of ,god to which we have no access4 ,yes1 cried ,audubon1 and what a ,god to call ,god at all6 ,why not just as much the devil8 ,what are we to think of the ,being who is responsible for a world of whose economy our evil is not merely an accident1 a mistake1 but positively an essential1 inseparable condition6 ,what1 indeed6 exclaimed ,leslie4 ,call ,him ,god1 by all means1 if you like1 but such a ,god as ,zeus was to ,prometheus1 omnipotent1 indeed1 and able to exact with infallible precision ,his daily and hourly toll of blood and tears1 but powerless at least to chain the mind ,he has created free1 or to exact allegiance and homage from spirits greater1 though weaker1 than ,himself4 ,this was the sort of talk1 ,i knew1 that rather annoyed ,dennis4 ,i did not therefore1 for the moment1 leave him time to reply1 but proceeded to a somewhat different point3 ,even putting aside1 ,i said1 the moral character of ,god1 as it appears in your scheme of the universe1 must we not perhaps accuse ,him of a slight lapse of intelligence8 ,for1 as ,i understand the matter1 it was essential to the success of the ,absolute's plan that we should never discover the deception that is being played upon us4 ,but1 it seems1 we do discover it4 ,hegel1 for example1 by your own confession1 has not only detected but exposed it4 ,well then1 what is to be done8 ,do you suppose that we could1 even if we would1 continue to lend ourselves to the imposition8 ,must not our aims and purposes cease to have any interest for us1 once we are clear that they are not true ends8 ,and that which1 according to the hypothesis1 is the true end1 the 'dateless and irrevoluble circle' of activity1 that1 surely1 we at least cannot sanction or approve1 seeing that it involves and perpetuates the very misery and pain whose destruction was our only motive for acting at all4 ,for1 whatever may be the case with ,god1 we1 you will surely admit1 are forbidden by all that in us is highest and best1 to approve or even to acquiesce in the deliberate perpetuation of a world of whose existence all that we call evil is an essential and eternal constituent ,so that1 as ,i said at first1 it looks as if the ,absolute ,reason had not been1 after all1 quite as cunning as it thought1 since it has allowed us to discover and expose the very imposition it had invented to cheat us into concurrence with its plans4 ,dennis laughed a little at this2 and then1 ,well1 he began1 between you1 with your genial irony1 and ,audubon and ,leslie with their heaven-defying rhetoric1 ,i scarcely know whether ,i stand on my head or my heels4 ,but1 the fact is1 ,i think ,i made a slip in stating my view2 or perhaps there was really a latent contradiction in my mind4 ,at any rate1 what ,i believe1 whether or no ,i can believe it consistently1 is that it is possible for us1 so to speak1 to take ,god's point of view2 so that the evil against which we rebel we may come at last to acquiesce in1 as seen from the higher point of view4 ,and1 seriously1 don't you think it is conceivable that that may be1 after all1 the true meaning of the discipline of life8 ,i cannot tell1 ,i said1 perhaps it may4 ,but1 meantime1 allow me to press home the importance of your admission4 ,for1 as you say1 there is at least one of our aims which has a real significance1 namely1 that of reaching the point of view of ,god4 ,but this is something that lies in the future1 something to be brought about4 ,and so1 on your own hypothesis1 ,good1 after all1 would not be that which eternally exists1 but something which has to be realized in time--namely1 a change of mind on the part of all rational beings1 whereby they view the world no longer in a partial imperfect way1 but1 in ,spinoza's phrase1 'sub specie ternitatis' ,no1 he said1 ,i cannot admit that that is an end for the ,absolute1 though ,i admit it is an end for us4 ,the ,absolute1 somehow or other1 is eternally perfect and good2 and this eternal perfection and goodness are unaffected by any change that may take place in our minds4 ,well1 ,i said1 ,i must leave it to the ,absolute and yourself to settle how that can possibly be4 ,meantime1 ,i am content with your admission that1 for us1 at least1 there is an end and a ,good lying before us to be realized in the future4 ,for that1 as ,i understand1 you do admit4 ,in your own life1 for example1 even if you aim at nothing else1 or at nothing else which you wholly approve1 yet you do aim1 at least1 with your whole nature at this--to attain a view of the world as it may be conceived in its essence to be1 not merely as it appears to us4 ,yes1 he said1 ,i admit that is my aim4 ,that aim1 then1 is your ,good8 ,i suppose so4 ,and it is something1 as ,i said1 that lies in the future8 ,for you do not1 ,i suppose1 count yourself to have attained1 or at least to have attained as perfectly as you hope to8 ,he agreed again4 ,well then1 ,i continued1 what may be the relation of this ,good of yours1 awaiting realization in the future1 to that eternal ,good of ,god in which you also believe1 we will reserve1 with your permission1 for some future inquiry4 ,it is enough for our present purpose that even you1 who assert the eternal perfection of the world1 do nevertheless at the same time admit a future ,good2 and much more do other men admit it1 who have no idea that the world is perfect at all4 ,so that we may1 ,i think1 safely suppose it to be generally agreed that the ,good is something to be realized in the future1 so far1 at any rate as it concerns us--and1 for my part1 ,i have no desire to go farther than that4 ,well1 he said1 ,i am content for the present to leave the matter so4 ,but ,i reserve the right to go back upon the argument4 ,of course6 ,i replied1 for it is not1 ,i hope1 an argument1 but a discussion2 and a discussion not for victory but for truth4 ,meantime1 then1 let us take as a hypothesis that ,good is something to be brought about2 and let us consider next the other point that ,is included in your position4 ,according to you1 as ,i understand1 what requires to be brought about1 if ever ,good is to be realized1 is not any change in the actual stuff1 so to speak1 of the world1 in the structure1 as it were1 of our experience1 but only a change in our attitude towards all this--a change in the subject1 as they say1 and not in the object4 ,our aim should be not to abolish what we call evil1 by successive modifications of physical and social conditions1 but rather1 all these remaining essentially the same1 to come to see that what appears to be evil is not really so4 ,yes1 he said1 that is the view ,i would suggest4 ,so that1 for example1 though we might still experience a toothache1 we should no longer regard it as an evil2 and so with all the host of things we are in the habit of calling bad3 they would continue unchanged 'in themselves1' as you ,hegelians say1 only to us they would appear no longer bad1 but good8 ,yes2 as ,i said at first1 all reality is good1 and all ,evil1 so-called1 is merely illusion4 ,i was about to reply when ,i was forestalled by ,bartlett4 ,for some time past the discussion had been left pretty much to ,dennis and myself1 with an occasional incursion from ,audubon and ,leslie4 ,ellis had gone indoors2 ,parry and ,wilson were talking together about something else2 and ,bartlett appeared to be still absorbed in the ,chronicle4 ,i noticed1 however1 that for the last few moments he had been getting restless1 and ,i suspected that he was listening1 behind his newspaper1 to what we were saying4 ,i was not therefore altogether surprised when1 upon ,dennis' last remark1 he suddenly broke into our debate with the exclamation2 ,would it be' in order' to introduce a concrete example8 ,there is a curiously apt one here in the ,chronicle4 ,and upon our assenting1 he read us a long extract about phosphorus-poisoning1 the details of which ,i now forget1 but at any rate it brought before us1 very vividly1 a tale of cruel suffering and oppression4 ,now1 he said1 as he finished1 is that1 may ,i ask1 the kind of thing that it amuses you to call mere illusion8 ,yes1 replied ,dennis stoutly1 that will do very well for an example4 ,well1 he rejoined1 ,i do not propose to dispute about words2 but for my own part ,i should have thought that1 if anything is real1 that is2 and so1 ,i think1 you would find it1 if you yourself were the sufferer4 ,but1 objected ,dennis1 do you think that it is in the moment of suffering that one is most competent to judge about the reality of pain8 ,certainly1 for it is only in the moment of suffering that one really knows what it is that one is judging about4 ,i am not sure about that4 ,i doubt whether it is true that experience involves knowledge and vice versa4 ,it is1 indeed1 to my mind1 part of the irony of life1 that we know so much which we can never experience1 and experience so much which we can never know4 ,i don't follow that1 said ,bartlett1 but of one thing ,i am sure1 that you will never get rid of evil by calling it illusion4 ,no1 ,dennis conceded1 you will never of course get rid of it1 in the sense you mean1 by that1 or indeed1 in my opinion1 by any other means4 ,but we were discussing not what we are to do with evil1 but how we are to conceive it4 ,but1 he objected1 if you begin by conceiving it as illusion1 you will never do anything with it at all4 ,perhaps not1 but ,i am not sure that that is my business4 ,at any rate1 ,dennis1 ,i interposed1 you will1 ,i expect1 admit1 that for us1 while we live in the region of what you call ',appearance1' ,evil is at least as pressing and as obvious as ,good4 ,yes1 he said1 ,i am ready to admit that4 ,and1 ,i continued1 for my part ,i agree with ,bartlett and with ,leslie1 that it is ,appearance with which we are concerned4 ,what ,i have been contending for throughout1 is that in the world in which we live 7whether we are to call it ,reality or ,appearance71 ,evil and ,good are the really dominating facts2 and that we cannot dismiss them from our consideration either on the ground that we know nothing of them 7as ,ellis was inclined to maintain7 or on the ground that we know all about them 7as ,parry and ,wilson seemed to think74 ,on the contrary1 it is1 ,i believe1 our main business to find out about them2 and that we can find out about them is with me an article of faith1 and so1 ,i believe1 it is with most people1 whether or no they are aware of it or are ready to admit it4 ,dennis was preparing to reply1 when ,ellis reappeared to summon us to lunch4 ,we followed him in gladly enough1 for it was past our usual hour and we were hungry2 and the conversation naturally taking a lighter turn1 ,i have nothing further to record until we reassembled in the afternoon4 ,,book ,,ii4 ,when we reassembled for coffee on the loggia after lunch1 ,i did not suppose we should continue the morning's discussion4 ,the conversation had been turning mostly on climbing1 and other such topics1 and finally had died away into a long silence1 which1 for my own part1 ,i felt no particular inclination to break4 ,we had let down an awning to shelter us from the sun1 where it began to shine in upon us1 so that it was still cool and pleasant where we sat2 and so delightful did ,i feel the situation to be1 that ,i was almost vexed to be challenged to renew our interrupted debate4 ,the challenge1 rather to my surprise1 came from ,audubon1 who suddenly said to me1 propos of nothing1 in a tone at once ironic and genial3 ,well1 ,i thought you talked very well this morning4 ,really6 ,i rejoined1 ,i imagined you were thinking it all great nonsense4 ,so no doubt it was1 he replied2 still1 it amused me to hear you4 ,i am glad of that1 at any rate2 ,i was afraid perhaps you were bored4 ,not at all4 ,of course1 ,i couldn't fail to see that you weren't arriving anywhere4 ,but that ,i never expected4 ,in fact1 what amuses me most about you is1 the way in which you continue to hope that you're going to get at some result4 ,but didn't we8 ,i don't see that you did4 ,you showed1 or tried to show1 that we must believe in ,good2 but you made no attempt to discover what ,good is4 ,no1 ,i admitted2 that1 of course1 is much more difficult4 ,exactly2 but it is the only point of importance4 ,well1 ,i said1 perhaps if we were to try1 we should find that we can come to some agreement even about that4 ,i don't believe it4 ,but why not8 ,because people are so radically different1 that there is no common ground to build upon4 ,but is the difference really so radical as all that8 ,yes1 he said1 ,i think so4 ,at any rate1 the proof of the pudding is in the eating1 and ,i make you an offer4 ,here are eight of us1 all ,englishmen1 all contemporaries1 all brought up more or less in the same way4 ,and ,i venture to say that1 if you will raise the question1 you won't find1 even among ourselves1 with all the chances in your favour1 any substantial agreement about what we think good4 ,this direct challenge was rather alarming4 ,i didn't feel that ,i could refuse to take it up1 but ,i was anxious to guard myself against the consequences of failure4 ,so ,i began1 with some hesitation1 ,you must remember that ,i have never maintained that at any given moment any given set of people will be found to be in agreement on all points4 ,all ,i ventured to suggest was1 that instead of our all being made1 as you contend1 radically different1 we have1 underneath our differences1 a common nature1 capable of judging1 and judging truly1 about ,good1 though only on the basis of actual experience of ,good4 ,and on this view ,i shall1 of course1 expect to find differences of opinion1 corresponding to differences of experience1 even among people as much alike as ourselves2 only ,i shall not expect the differences to be finally irreconcilable1 but that we shall be able to supplement and elucidate one another's conclusions by bringing to bear each his own experience upon that of the rest4 ,well1 he said1 we shall see4 ,i have invited you to make the experiment4 ,i am willing1 ,i replied1 if it is agreeable to the others4 ,only ,i must ask you to understand from the beginning precisely what it is ,i am trying to do4 ,i shall be merely describing to you what ,i have been able to perceive1 with such experience as ,i have had1 in this difficult matter2 and you will judge1 all of you1 whether or no1 and to what extent1 your perceptions coincide with mine1 the object being simply to clear up these perceptions of ours1 if we can2 to define somehow1 as it were1 what we have seen1 in the hope of coming to see something more4 ,they agreed to take me on my own terms1 and ,i was about to begin1 when1 happening to catch ,dennis' eye1 ,i suddenly felt discouraged4 ,after all1 ,i said1 ,i doubt whether it's much use my making the attempt4 ,why1 what's the matter8 ,nothing1 ,i said4 ,at least--well1 ,i may as well confess it1 though it seems like giving away my whole case4 ,the fact is1 that there are certain quite fundamental points in this connection on which ,dennis and ,i have never been able to agree2 and although ,i believe we should in time come to understand one another1 ,i doubt whether we can do so here and now4 ,at any rate1 he doesn't look at all as if he meant to make it easy for me2 and if ,i cannot carry him along with me1 ,i suppose ,i may as well give up at once4 ,oh1 said ,audubon1 if that is all1 ,i will make a concession4 ,we will leave ,dennis out of the reckoning4 ,it shall be enough if you can persuade the rest of us4 ,but1 ,i urged1 ,i doubt1 even so1 whether ,dennis will ever allow me to get to the end4 ,you see1 he never lets things pass if he doesn't happen to agree4 ,oh1 cried ,ellis1 it's all right4 ,we will keep him in order4 ,dennis laughed4 ,you're disposing of me1 he said1 in a very easy manner4 ,but perhaps ,i had better go away altogether2 for1 if ,i stay1 ,i certainly cannot pledge myself not to interrupt4 ,no1 ,i said1 that seems hardly fair4 ,what ,i propose is1 that we should both try to be as conciliatory as we can4 ,and then1 by the process of 'give and take1' ,i shall perhaps slip past you without any really scandalous concession on either side4 ,well1 he said1 you can try4 ,so1 after casting about in my mind1 ,i began1 with some hesitation1 as follows3 ,the first thing1 then1 that ,i want to say is this3 ,good1 as it seems to me1 necessarily involves some form of conscious activity4 ,as ,i had expected1 ,dennis interrupted me at once4 ,i don't see that at all1 he said4 ,consciousness may have nothing to do with it4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 it may not1 ,i replied1 with all the suavity ,i could command4 ,i should rather have said that ,i1 as a matter of fact1 can form no idea of ,good except in connection with consciousness4 ,can you not8 he exclaimed1 but ,i can6 ,if a thing is good it's good1 so it appears to me1 whether or no there is any consciousness of it4 ,but1 ,i said1 ,i1 you see1 myself1 have no experience of anything existing apart from consciousness1 so it is difficult for me to know whether such a thing would be good or no4 ,but you1 perhaps1 are differently constituted4 ,not in that point1 he replied4 ,i admit1 of course1 that there is no experience without consciousness4 ,but we can surely conceive that of which we have no experience8 ,and ,i should have thought it was clear that ,good1 like ,truth1 is1 whether or no anyone is aware of it4 ,or would you say that #b #b #d is only true when someone is thinking of it8 ,as to that1 ,i replied1 ,i would rather not say anything about it just now4 ,on the logical point you may be right2 but that1 ,i think1 need not at present detain us1 because what ,i am trying to get at1 for the moment1 is something rather different4 ,i will put it like this3 ,good1 if it is to be conceived as an object of human action1 must be conceived1 must it not1 as an object of consciousness8 ,for otherwise do you think we should trouble to pursue it8 ,i don't know1 he said1 whether we should2 but perhaps we ought to4 ,but1 ,i urged1 do you really think we ought8 ,do you think1 to take an example1 that it could be a possible or a right aim for an artist1 say1 to be perpetually producing1 in a state of complete unconsciousness1 works which on completion should be immediately hermetically sealed and buried for all eternity at the bottom of the sea8 ,do you think that he could or ought to consider such production as a ,good8 ,and so with all the works of man4 ,do we1 and really ought we to1 do anything except with some reference to consciousness8 ,i don't know whether we do1 he replied1 but ,i think it quite possible that we ought4 ,well1 ,i said1 we shall not1 ,i suppose1 just now1 come to a closer agreement ,but is there anyone else who shares your view8 for1 if not1 ,i will1 with your permission1 go on to the next point ,none spoke1 and ,dennis made no further opposition4 ,so1 after a pause1 ,i proceeded as follows3 ,i shall assume1 then1 that ,good1 in the sense in which ,i am conceiving it1 as an end of human action1 involves some kind of conscious activity4 ,and the next question would seem to be1 activity of whom8 ,that1 at any rate1 said ,leslie1 appears to be simple enough4 ,it must be an activity of some person or persons4 ,once more1 murmured ,dennis1 ,i protest4 ,but this time ,i ventured to ignore him1 and merely said1 in answer to ,leslie1 ,the question1 then1 will be1 what persons8 ,why1 he replied1 ourselves1 ,i suppose6 ,what do you say1 ,parry8 ,i asked4 ,i don't quite understand1 he replied1 the kind of way you put your questions4 ,but my own idea has always been1 what ,i suppose is most people's now1 that the ,good we are working for is that of some future generation4 ,at this ,leslie made some inarticulate interjection1 which ,i thought it better to ignore4 ,and1 answering ,parry1 ,i said1 ,suppose1 then1 we were to make a beginning by examining your hypothesis4 ,by all means1 he said1 though ,i should have thought we should all have accepted it--unless1 perhaps1 it were ,dennis4 ,i most certainly don't6 cried ,leslie4 ,nor ,i1 added ,audubon4 ,oh you6 cried ,parry1 you accept nothing6 ,true2 he replied1 my motto is 'j'attends4' ,well1 ,i resumed1 let us follow the argument and see where it leads us4 ,the hypothesis is1 that ,good involves some state of activity of some generation indefinitely remote4 ,is not that so1 ,parry8 ,yes1 he said1 and one can more or less define what the state of activity1 as you call it1 will be4 ,of course1 interposed ,ellis1 it will be one of heterogeneous1 co-ordinate1 coherent---- ,that1 ,i interrupted1 is not at present the question4 ,the question is merely as to the location of ,good4 ,according to ,parry1 it is located in this particular remote generation1 and1 ,i suppose1 in those that follow it4 ,but now1 what about all the other generations1 from the beginning of the world onward8 ,good1 it would seem1 can have no meaning for them1 since it is the special privilege of those who come after them4 ,oh1 yes1 it has6 he replied1 for it is their business to bring it about1 not indeed for themselves1 but for their successors4 ,but1 cried ,leslie1 what an absurd idea6 ,countless myriads of men and women are born upon the earth1 live through their complex lives of action and suffering1 pleasure and pain1 hopes1 fears1 satisfactions1 aspirations1 and the like1 pursuing what they call ,good1 and avoiding what they call ,bad1 under the naf impression that there is ,good and ,bad for them--and yet the significance of all this is not really for themselves at all1 but for some quite other people who will have the luck to be born in the remote future1 and for whose sake alone their fellow-creatures1 from the very beginning of time1 have been brought into being like so many lifeless tools1 to be used up and laid aside1 when done with1 on the black infinite ash-heap of the dead4 ,oh1 come6 said ,parry1 you exaggerate6 ,these tools1 as you call them1 have a good enough time4 ,it does not follow1 because the final ,good lies in the future1 that the present has no ,good at all4 ,it has just as much ,good as people can get out of it4 ,but then1 said ,leslie1 in that case it is this ,good of their own with which each generation is really concerned4 ,so far as they do get ,good at all they get it as an activity in themselves4 ,certainly1 said ,ellis2 and for my own part1 ,i am sick of that cant of living for future generations4 ,let us1 at least1 live for ourselves1 whether we live well or badly4 ,well1 replied ,parry1 rather stiffly1 of course every one has his own ideas4 ,but ,i confess that1 for my own part1 the men ,i admire are those who have sacrificed themselves for the future4 ,but1 ,parry1 ,i interposed1 let us get clear about this2 and with a view to clearness let us take our own case4 ,we1 as ,i understand you1 have to keep in view a double ,good3 first1 a ,good for ourselves1 which is not indeed the perfect ,good 7for that is reserved for a future generation71 but still is something ,good as far as it goes--whether it be a certain degree of happiness1 or however else we may have to define it2 and as to this ,good1 there appears to be no difficulty1 for we who pursue it are also the people who get it ,that is so1 is it not8 ,he agreed4 ,but now1 ,i continued1 we come to the point of dispute4 ,for besides this ,good of our own1 we have also1 according to the theory1 to consider a ,good in which we have no share1 that of those who are to be born in some indefinite future4 ,and to this remote and alien ,good we have even1 on occasion1 to sacrifice our own4 ,certainly1 he said1 all good citizens will think so4 ,i believe1 ,i admitted1 that they will4 ,and yet1 how strange it seems6 ,for consider it in this way4 ,imagine that the successive generations can somehow be viewed as contemporaneous--being projected1 as it were1 from the plane of time into that of space4 ,it's rather hard1 he said1 to imagine that4 ,well1 but try1 for the sake of argument2 and consider what we shall have4 ,we shall have a society divided into two classes1 composed1 the one of all the generations who1 if they followed one another in time1 would precede the first millenarian one2 the other of all the millenarian-generations themselves4 ,and of these two classes the first would be perpetually engaged in working for the second1 sacrificing to it1 if need be1 on occasion1 all its own ,good1 but without any hope or prospect of ever entering itself into that other ,good which is the monopoly of the other class1 but to the production of which its own efforts are directed4 ,what should we say of such a society8 ,should we not say that it was founded on injustice and inequality1 and all those other phrases with which we are wont to denounce a system of serfdom or slavery8 ,but1 he objected1 your projection of time into space has falsified the whole situation4 ,for in fact the millenarian generation would not come into being until the others had ceased to be2 and therefore the latter would not be being sacrificed to it4 ,no1 ,i said1 but they would have been sacrificed2 and surely it comes to the same thing8 ,i am not sure1 he replied1 and anyhow1 ,i don't think sacrifice is the right word4 ,in a society every man's interest is in the ,whole2 and when he works for the ,whole he is also working for himself4 ,no doubt that is true1 ,i replied1 in a society properly constituted1 but ,i question whether it would be true in such a society as ,i have described4 ,and then there is a further difficulty--and here1 ,i confess1 my projection of time into space really does falsify the issue2 for in the succession of generations in time1 where is the ,whole8 ,each generation comes into being1 passes1 and disappears2 but how1 or in what1 are they summed up8 ,why1 he said1 in a sense they are all summed up in the last generation4 ,but in what sense8 ,do you mean that their consciousness somehow persists into it1 so that they actually enjoy its ,good8 ,of course not1 he said1 but ,i mean that it was conditioned by them1 and is the result of their labour and activities4 ,in that sense1 ,i replied1 you might say that the oysters ,i eat are summed up in me4 ,but it would be a poor consolation to the oysters6 ,well1 he rejoined1 whatever you may say1 ,i still think it right that each generation should sacrifice itself 7as you call it7 for the next4 ,and so1 ,i believe1 would you1 when it came to the point4 ,at any rate1 ,i have often heard you inveigh against the shortsightedness of modern politicians1 and their unwillingness to run great risks and undertake great labours for the future4 ,quite true1 ,i said1 that is the view ,i take4 ,but ,i was trying to see how the view could be justified4 ,for it seems to me1 ,i confess1 that we can only be expected to labour for what is1 in some sense or other1 our own ,good2 and ,i do not see how the ,good of future generations1 in your way of putting it1 is also ours4 ,but1 he said1 we have an instinct that it is4 ,i believe we have1 ,i replied1 but the question would be1 what that instinct really means4 ,somehow or other1 ,i think it must mean1 as you yourself suggested1 that our ,good is the ,good of the ,whole4 ,only the difficulty is to see how there is a ,whole at all4 ,well1 he said1 perhaps there is no ,whole4 ,what then8 ,why1 then1 ,i replied1 how can we justify an instinct which bids us labour and sacrifice ourselves for a ,good1 which1 on this hypothesis1 has no significance for us1 but only for other people4 ,perhaps1 he said1 we cannot justify it1 but ,i am sure we ought to obey it2 and1 indeed1 ,i believe we cannot do otherwise4 ,even taking the view that the order of the world is altogether unjust1 as ,i admit it would be on the view we are considering1 yet1 since we cannot remedy the injustice1 we are bound at least to make the best of it2 and the best we can do is to prepare the ,good for those who come after us1 even though we can never enter into it ourselves4 ,i am not so sure about that1 ,ellis interrupted1 ,i think the best we can do is to try and realize ,good for ourselves--as much as we can get1 even if we admit that this is but little4 ,for we do at least know1 or may hope to discover1 what ,good for ourselves is2 whereas ,good for other people is far more hypothetical4 ,but1 surely1 he objected1 that would lead to action we cannot approve--to a sacrifice of all larger ,goods to our own pleasure of the moment4 ,we should breed1 for example1 without any regard to the future efficacy of the race---- ,that1 interrupted ,ellis1 we do as it is4 ,yes1 but we don't justify it--those of us1 at least1 who think4 ,and1 again1 we should squander on immediate gratifications wealth which ought to be stored up against the future4 ,and so on1 and so on2 it is not necessary to multiply examples4 ,but1 ,i objected1 we should only do these things if we thought that kind of short-sighted activity to be good2 but1 as a matter of fact1 we do not1 we who object to it4 ,and that is because1 as ,i hinted before1 our idea of even our own ,good is that of an activity in and for the ,whole1 and not merely in and for ourselves4 ,and1 whether it is reasonable or no1 we cannot help extending the idea of the ,whole1 so as to include future generations4 ,but1 as it seems to me1 the real meaning and justification of our action is not merely that we are seeking the ,good of future generations but that we are endeavouring to realize our own ,good1 which consists in some such form of activity4 ,so that really1 as was suggested at the beginning1 ,good will be a kind of activity in ourselves1 even though that activity be directed towards ends in which we do not expect to share4 ,at this point1 ,dennis1 who had been struggling to speak1 broke in at last1 in spite of ,ellis's efforts to restrain him4 ,why do you keep saying ',our ,good'8 he cried4 ,why do you not say the ,good8 ,i can't understand this talk of me and thee1 our ,good1 and their ,good1 as if there were as many ,goods as there are people4 ,well1 ,i said1 the distinction1 after all1 was introduced by ,parry1 who said that we ought to aim at the ,good of a future generation4 ,still1 ,i admit that ,i was getting a little unhappy myself at the kind of language into which ,i was betrayed4 ,but what ,i want to say is this3 ,so far as it is true at all that it is good to labour for future generations1 goodness consists in the activity of so labouring1 as much1 at least1 as in the result produced in those for whose sake the labour is4 ,that1 at least1 is the only way in which ,i can find the position reasonable at all4 ,i don't see it1 said ,parry1 and was preparing to re-state his position1 when ,wilson suddenly intervened with a new train of thought4 ,the fact is1 he said1 you have begun altogether at the wrong end4 ,i daresay1 ,i said1 ,i can't find the end2 it's all such a coil4 ,well1 he said1 this is where ,i believe the trouble came in4 ,you started with the idea that the ,good must be good for individuals2 and that was sure to land you in confusion4 ,what then is your idea8 ,i asked4 ,why1 he said1 as you might expect from a biologist1 ,i regard everything from the point of view of the species4 ,at this ,i saw ,ellis sit up and prepare for an encounter4 ,nature1 continued ,wilson1 has always in view the ,whole not the ,part1 the species not the individual4 ,and this law1 which is true of the whole creation1 is thrown into special relief in the case of man1 because there the interest of the species is embodied in a particular form--the ,society or the ,state--and may be clearly envisaged1 as a thing apart1 towards the maintenance of which conscious efforts may be directed4 ,and this1 which is the end of ,nature1 according to you1 is also the ,good8 ,naturally4 ,well1 ,i said1 ,i will not recapitulate here the objections ,i have already urged against the view that the course of ,nature determines the content of the ,good4 ,for1 quite apart from that1 it is a view which many people hold--and one which was held long before there was a science of biology--that the community is the end1 and the individual only the means4 ,but1 he said1 biology has given a new basis and a new colour to the view4 ,i don't know about that1 cried ,ellis1 unable any longer to restrain himself1 but ,i am sure it has given us a new kind of language4 ,in the old days1 when ,wilson's opinion was represented by ,plato1 men were still men1 and were spoken of as such1 however much they might be subordinated to the community4 ,but now6--why1 if you open one of these sociological books1 mostly1 ,i am bound to say1 in ,german1 ',entwurf einer ,sozial-anthropologie1' ',versuch einer anthropologischen ,darstellung der menschlichen ,gesellschaft vom ,sozial-biologischen ,standpunkt aus1' and the like--you will hardly be able to realize that you are dealing with human beings at all4 ,i have seen an unmarried woman called a 'female non-childbearing human4' ,and at the worst1 men actually cease to be even animals2 they become mere numbers2 they are calculated by the theory of combinations2 they are masses1 averages1 classes1 curves1 anything but men6 ,for every million of the population1 it has been solemnly estimated1 there will be one genius1 one imbecile1 #bef1gia individuals just above the mean1 #bef1gia just below it6 ,observe1 #bef1gia6 ,not1 as one might have been tempted to believe1 #bef1gij6 ,what a saving grace in that odd unit6 ,and this is the kind of thing that is revolutionizing history and politics6 ,no more great men1 no more heroic actions1 no more inspirations1 passions1 and ideals6 ,nothing but calculations of the chances that ,a will meet and breed out of ,b6 ,nothing but analysis of the mechanism of survival6 ,nothing but---- ,my dear ,ellis1 interrupted ,wilson1 you appear to me to be digressing4 ,digressing6 he cried ,would that ,i could digress out of this world altogether6 ,would that ,i could digress to a planet where they have no arithmetic6 ,where a man could be a man1 not a figure in an addition sum1 a unit in an average1 an individual in a species---- ,where1 exclaimed ,audubon1 taking him up1 a man could be himself1 as ,i have often said1 'imperial1 plain1 and true4' ,there was a chorus of protestation at the too familiar quotation2 and for a time ,i was unable to lay hold of the broken thread of the argument4 ,but at last ,i got a hearing for the question ,i was anxious to address to ,wilson4 ,you say1 ,i began1 that by ,good we mean the ,good of the community8 ,i say1 he replied1 that that is what we ought to mean4 ,but in what sense do you understand the word community8 ,in the sense of that organization of individuals which represents1 so to speak1 the species4 ,how represents8 ,in the sense that it is its function to maintain and perfect the species4 ,but is that the function of the community8 ,if it is not1 it ought to be2 and to a great extent it is4 ,if you look at the social mechanism1 not with the eyes of a mere historian1 who usually sees nothing1 but with those of a biologist and man of science1 intent upon essentials1 you will find that it is nothing but an elaborate apparatus of selection1 natural or artificial1 as you like to call it4 ,first1 there is the struggle of races1 which may be traced not only in war and conquest1 but more insidiously under the guise of peace1 so that1 for example1 at this day you may witness throughout ,europe the gradual extinction of the long-headed fair by the round-headed dark stock4 ,then there is the struggle of nation with nation1 resulting in the gradual elimination of the weaker--that1 of course1 is obvious enough2 but what is not always so clearly seen is the not less certain fact1 that within the limits of each society the same process is everywhere at work4 ,to pass over the economic struggle for existence1 of which we are perhaps sufficiently aware1 what else is our system of examinations but a mechanism of selection1 whereby it is determined that certain persons only shall have access to certain professions8 ,what else is the convention whereby marriages are confined to people of the same class1 thus securing the perpetuation of certain types1 and especially of the better-gifted and better-disposed8 ,turn where we may we find the same phenomenon4 ,society is a machine for sifting out the various elements of the race1 combining the like1 disparting the unlike1 bringing some to the top1 others to the bottom1 preserving these1 eliminating those1 indifferent to the fate1 good or bad1 of the individuals it controls1 but envisaging always the well-being of the ,whole4 ,but1 ,i objected1 is it so certain that it is well-being that is kept in view8 ,do you not recognize a process of deterioration as well as of improvement8 ,you mentioned1 for instance1 that the long-headed fair race1 is giving place to what ,i understand is regarded as an inferior type4 ,no doubt1 he admitted1 there are periods of decline4 ,still1 on the whole1 the movement is an upward one4 ,well1 ,i replied1 that1 after all1 is not the question we are at present discussing4 ,your main point is1 that when we speak of ,good we mean1 or should mean1 the ,good1 not of the individual1 but of the species4 ,but what1 ,i should like to know1 is the species8 ,is it somehow an entity1 or being1 that it has a ,good8 ,no1 he replied1 it is merely1 of course1 a general name for the individuals2 only for all the individuals taken together1 not one by one or in groups4 ,the ,good of the species1 then1 is the ,good of all the individuals taken together4 ,yes4 ,but ,i said1 how can that be8 ,it is good for the species1 according to you1 that certain individuals should be eliminated1 or should sink to the bottom1 or whatever else their fate may be4 ,but is that also good for the individual in question8 ,i don't know about that1 he replied1 and ,i don't see that it matters4 ,i only say that it is good for the species4 ,but they are part of the species2 so that if it is good for the species it is good for them4 ,no6 for the ,good of the species consists in the selection of the best individuals4 ,it is indifferent to all the rest ,then by the ,good of the species you mean the good of the selected individuals8 ,not exactly2 ,i mean it is good that those individuals should be selected4 ,but good for whom1 if not for them8 ,for the individuals who are eliminated8 ,or for you who look on8 ,or perhaps1 for ,god8 ,god6 ,no6 ,i mean good1 simply good4 ,i'm afraid ,i don't understand1 ,i said4 ,does ,good then hang1 as it were1 in the air1 being ,good for nobody at all8 ,well1 if you like1 we will say it is good for ,nature4 ,but is ,nature1 then1 a conscious being8 ,i don't say that ,i am very sorry1 ,i said1 but really ,i cannot understand you4 ,if you reject ,god1 ,i see only two alternatives remaining4 ,either the ,good you speak of is that of all the individuals of the species taken together1 or it is that of the best individuals2 and in either case ,i seem to see difficulties4 ,what difficulties8 asked ,parry4 ,for ,wilson did not speak4 ,why1 ,i said1 taking the first alternative1 ,i do not see how it can be good for the inferior individuals to be degraded or eliminated4 ,i should have thought1 if there were any ,good for them1 it would consist in their being made better4 ,i don't see that1 objected ,dennis2 it might be the best possible thing1 for them1 to be eliminated4 ,but in that case1 ,i said1 the best possible thing would be absence of ,bad1 not ,good4 ,and so far as we could talk of ,good at all1 we could not apply it to them8 ,perhaps not ,well then1 in that case we have to fall back upon the other alternative1 and say that by the ,good of the species we mean that of the ultimately selected individuals4 ,well1 what then8 ,why1 then1 we return1 do we not1 to the position of ,parry1 that the ,good is that of some particular generation8 ,and there1 too1 we were met by difficulties4 ,so that altogether ,i do not really see what meaning to attach to ,wilson's conception4 ,there is no meaning to be attached to it6 cried ,ellis4 ,the species is a mere screen invented to conceal the massacre of individuals4 ,i'm sick of these biologico-sociologico-anthropologico-his torico treatises1 with their talk of races1 of nations1 of classes1 never of men6 their prate about laws as if they were the real entities1 and the people who are supposed to be subject to them mere indifferent particles of stuff6 their analysis of the perfection with which the machine works1 its combinations1 differentiations1 subordinations1 co-ordinations1 and all the other abominations of desolations standing where they ought not1 as depressing to the mind as they are cacophonous to the ear6 and1 worst of all1 their impudent demand that we should admire the diabolical process6 ,admire6 ,as though we should be asked to admire the beauty of the rack and the thumbscrew6 ,it's a matter of taste1 no doubt1 said ,wilson1 but in me the spectacle of natural law does awaken feelings of admiration4 ,in me1 replied ,ellis1 it awakens1 just as often1 feelings of disgust1 and especially when its theatre is human life4 ,at any rate1 whether you admire it or not1 the spectacle is there4 ,no doubt1 if you choose to look at it2 but why should you8 ,it's not a good drama2 it isn't up to date2 it has no first-hand knowledge1 nor original vision of life4 ,it simply ignores all the important facts4 ,which do you call the important facts8 ,why1 of course1 the emotions2 the hopes1 fears1 aspirations1 sympathies and the rest6 ,there's more valuable information contained in even an inferior novel that in all the sociological treatises that ever have been or will be written4 ,oh1 come6 cried ,parry4 ,i assure you1 replied ,ellis1 ,i am serious4 ,take1 for example1 these unfortunate creatures who are in process of elimination4 ,to the sociologist their elimination is their only raison d'tre4 ,he cancels them out with the same delight as if they were figures in a complex fraction4 ,but pick up any novel dealing with the life of the slums1 and you find that these figures are really composed of innumerable individual units1 existing each for himself1 and each his own sufficient justification1 each a sacred book comprising its own unique secret1 a master-piece of the divine tragedian1 a universe self-moved and self-contained1 a centre of infinity1 a mirror of totality1 in a word1 a human soul4 ,all that ,i altogether deny1 said ,wilson1 but1 even if it were true1 it would not affect the sociological laws4 ,i don't say it would4 ,i only say that the sociological laws are as unimportant1 if possible1 as the law of gravitation4 ,which1 replied ,wilson1 may be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of your view4 ,anyhow1 ,i interposed1 we are digressing from our point4 ,what ,i really want to know is whether ,wilson has any more light to throw on my difficulties with regard to his notion of the species4 ,i have nothing more to say1 he replied1 than ,i have said already4 ,but ,i have6 cried ,dennis1 and something very much to the point4 ,you see now the absurdities into which you are led by the position you insisted on assuming1 that ,good involves conscious activity4 ,if it does1 as you rightly inquired 7though with a suicidal audacity71 conscious activity in whom8 ,and to that question1 of course1 you can find no answer4 ,and yet1 ,i said1 endeavouring to turn the tables upon him1 ,i have known you to maintain yourself that ,good not merely involves1 but is1 a conscious activity2 only an activity in or of ,god4 ,rather1 he replied1 that it is ,god4 ,but ,i don't really know whether we ought to call ,god a conscious activity4 ,whatever ,he or ,it be1 is something that transcends our imagination4 ,only the things we call good are somehow reflexes of ,god2 and we have to accept them as such without further inquiry4 ,at any rate1 we have no right to endeavour1 as you keep doing1 to locate ,good in some individual persons4 ,well1 ,i said1 here we come again to a fundamental difference of view4 ,all the ,good of which ,i am aware as actually existing is associated1 somehow or other1 with personal consciousness4 ,i am willing to admit1 for the sake of argument1 that the ultimate ,good1 if ever we come to know it1 might1 perhaps1 not be so associated4 ,but of that1 as yet1 ,i know nothing2 you1 perhaps1 are more fortunate4 ,and if you can give us an account of ,good1 ,i mean1 of course1 of its content1 which shall represent it intelligibly to us as independent of any consciousness like our own1 ,i am quite ready to relinquish the argument to you4 ,i don't know1 he replied1 that ,i can represent ,it to you in a way that you would admit to be intelligible4 ,i don't profess to have had what you call 'experience' of it4 ,well1 then1 said ,ellis1 what's the good of talking8 ,what1 indeed6 ,i echoed1 in some despondency4 ,for ,i began to feel it was impossible to carry on the conversation4 ,but at this point1 to my great relief1 ,bartlett came to the rescue1 not indeed with a solution of the difficulty in which we were involved1 but with a diversion of which ,i was only too glad to take advantage4 ,it seems to me1 he said1 that you are getting off the track6 ,whatever the ultimate ,good may be1 what we really want to know1 is the kind of thing we can conceive to be good for people like ourselves4 ,and ,i thought that was what you were going to discuss4 ,so ,i was1 ,i said1 if ,dennis would have let me4 ,i will let you1 by all means1 ,dennis interposed1 so long as it is quite understood that everything you say has nothing to do with the real subject4 ,very well1 said ,bartlett1 that's understood4 ,and now let's get along1 on the basis of you and me and the man in the street4 ,what are we trying to get1 when we try to get ,good8 ,that ,i take it is the real question4 ,and ,i can only answer1 ,i said1 as ,i did before1 that we are trying to get some state of conscious experience1 to enter into some activity4 ,very well1 then1 what activity8 he inquired1 catching me up sharp1 as if he were afraid of ,dennis interposing again4 ,what activity6 cried ,ellis1 why all and every one as much as another1 and the more the merrier4 ,what6 ,i exclaimed1 rather taken aback1 all at once do you mean8 whether they be good or whether they be bad1 all alike indifferently8 ,there are no bad activities1 he replied1 none bad essentially in themselves4 ,their goodness and badness depends on the way in which they are interchanged or combined4 ,any pursuit or occupation palls in time if it is followed exclusively2 but all may be delightful in the just measure and proportion4 ,we are complex creatures1 and we ought to employ all our faculties alike1 never one alone at the cost of all the others4 ,that may be sound enough1 ,i said1 but will you not describe more in detail the kind of life which you consider to be good8 ,how can ,i8 he replied4 ,it is like trying to sum infinity6 ,the most ,i can do is to hint and rhapsodize4 ,hint away1 then6 cried ,parry2 rhapsodize away6 we're all listening4 ,well1 then1 he said1 my ideal of the good life would be to move in a cycle of ever-changing activity1 tasting to the full the peculiar flavour of each new phase in the shock of its contrast with that of all the rest4 ,to pass1 let us say1 from the city with all its bustle1 smoke1 and din1 its press of business1 gaiety1 and crime1 straight away1 without word or warning1 breaking all engagements1 to the farthest and loneliest corner of the world4 ,to hunt or fish for weeks and months in strange wild places1 camping out among strange beasts and birds1 lost in pathless forests1 or wandering over silent plains4 ,then1 suddenly1 back in the crowd1 to feel the press of business1 to make or lose millions in a week1 to adventure1 compete1 and win2 but always1 at the moment when this might pall1 with a haven of rest in view1 an ancient ,english mansion1 stately1 formal1 and august1 islanded1 over its sunken fence1 by acres of buttercups4 ,there to study1 perhaps to write1 perhaps to experiment1 dreaming in my garden at night of new discoveries1 to revolutionize science and bring the world of commerce to my feet4 ,then1 before ,i have time to tire1 to be off on my travels again1 washing gold in ,klondike1 trading for furs in ,siberia1 fighting in ,madagascar1 in ,cuba1 or in ,crete1 or smoking hasheesh in tents with ,persian mystics4 ,to make my end action itself1 not anything action may gain1 choosing not to pursue the ,good for fear ,i should let slip ,goods1 but1 in my pursuit of ,goods1 attaining the only ,good ,i can conceive--a full and harmonious exercise of all my faculties and powers4 ,on hearing him speak thus ,i felt1 ,i confess1 such a warmth of sympathy that ,i hesitated to attempt an answer4 ,but ,leslie1 who was young enough still to live mainly in ideas1 broke in with his usual zeal and passion4 ,but1 he said1 all this activity of which you speak is no more good than it is bad2 every phase of it1 by your own confession1 is so imperfect in itself that it requires to be constantly exchanged for some other1 equally defective4 ,not at all1 answered ,ellis1 each phase is good in its time and place2 but each becomes bad if it is pursued exclusively to the detriment of others4 ,but is each good in itself8 or1 at least1 is it more good than bad8 ,you choose1 in imagination1 to dwell upon the good aspect of each2 but in practice you would have to experience also the bad4 ,your hunting in trackless forests will involve exposure1 fatigue1 and hunger2 your fighting in ,madagascar1 fever1 wounds1 and disillusionment2 and so through all your chapter of accidents--for accidents they are at best1 and never the substance of ,good2 rather1 indeed1 a substance of ,evil1 dogged by a shadow of ,good4 ,oh6 cried ,ellis1 what a horrid prosaic view--from an idealist1 too6 ,why1 the ,bad is all part of the ,good2 one takes the rough with the smooth4 ,or rather the ,good stands above what you call good and bad2 it consists in the activity itself which feeds upon both alike4 ,if ,i were ,dennis ,i should say it is the synthesis of both4 ,well1 said ,leslie1 ,i never heard before of a synthesis produced by one side of the antithesis simply swallowing the other4 ,didn't you8 said ,ellis4 ,then you have a great deal yet to learn4 ,this is known as the synthesis of the lion and the lamb4 ,oh1 synthesis6 cried ,parry4 ,heaven save us from synthesis6 ,what is it you are trying to say8 ,that's what ,i want to know1 ,i said ,we seem to be coming perilously near to ,dennis's position1 that what we call ,evil is mere appearance4 ,well1 said ,ellis1 extremes meet6 ,dennis arrived at his view by a denial of the world2 ,i arrive at mine by an affirmation of it4 ,but do you really think1 ,i urged1 that everything in the world is good8 ,i think1 he replied1 that everything may be made to minister to ,good if you approach it in the proper way4 ,that reads1 said ,audubon1 like an extract from a sermon4 ,as ,i remarked before1 replied ,ellis1 extremes meet ,but1 ,ellis1 ,i protested1 do explain6 ,how are you going to answer ,leslie8 ,leslie is really too young1 he replied1 to be answerable at all4 ,but if you insist on my being serious1 what ,i meant to suggest is1 that when our activity is freshest and keenest we find delight in what is called ,evil no less than in what is called ,good4 ,the complexity of the world charms us1 its 'downs' as well as its 'ups1' its abysses and glooms no less than its sunny levels4 ,we would not alter it if we could2 it is better than we could make it2 and we accept it not merely with acquiescence but with triumph4 ,oh1 do we6 said ,audubon4 ,we1 answered ,ellis1 not you6 ,you1 of course1 do not accept anything4 ,but who are 'we'8 asked ,leslie4 ,all of us1 he replied1 who try to make an art of living4 ,yes1 art1 that is the word6 ,to me life appears like a great tragi-comedy4 ,it has its shadows as well as its lights1 but we would not lose one of them1 for fear of destroying the harmony of the whole4 ,call it good1 or call it bad1 no matter1 so it is4 ,the villain no less than the hero claims our applause2 it would be dull without him4 ,we can't afford to miss anything or anyone4 ,in fact1 cried ,audubon1 ',konx ,ompax6 ,totality6' ,you and ,dennis are strangely agreed for once6 ,yes1 he replied1 but for very different reasons1 as the judge said on the one occasion when he concurred with his colleagues4 ,dennis accepts the ,whole because he finds it a perfect logical system2 ,i1 because ,i find it a perfect work of art4 ,his prophet is ,hegel2 mine is ,walt ,whitman4 ,walt ,whitman6 ,and you profess to be an artist6 ,so was he1 not in words but in life4 ,one thing to him was no better nor worse than another2 small and great1 high and low1 good and bad1 he accepts them all1 with the instinctive delight of an actual physical contact4 ,listen to him6 ,and he began to quote3 ,i do not call one greater and one smaller1 ,that which fills its period and place is equal to any4 ,i believe a leaf of grass is no less than the journey-work of the stars4 ,and the pismire is equally perfect1 and a grain of sand1 and the egg of the wren1 ,and the tree-toad is a 'chef-d'oeuvre' for the highest2 ,and the running blackberry would adorn the parlours of heaven1 ,and the narrowest hinge in my hand puts to scorn all machinery1 ,and the cow-crunching with depressed head surpasses any statue1 ,and a mouse is miracle enough to stagger sextillions of infidels4 ,that's all very well1 objected ,leslie1 though1 of course1 it's rather absurd2 but it does not touch the question of evil at all4 ,wait a bit1 cried ,ellis1 he's ready for you there4 ,i am not the poet of goodness only1 ,i do not decline to be the poet of wickedness also4 ,what blurt is this about virtue and about vice8 ,evil propels me and reform of evil propels me1 ,i stand indifferent1 ,my gait is no fault-finder's or rejector's gait1 ,i moisten the roots of all that grows4 99 99 99 99 99 ,this is the meal equally set1 this is the meat for natural hunger1 ,it is for the wicked just the same as the righteous1 ,i make appointment with all1 ,i will not have a single person slighted or kept away1 ,the kept-woman1 spunger1 thief are hereby invited1 ,the heavy-lipped slave is invited1 the venerealee is invited2 ,there shall be no difference between them and the rest4 ,that's rather strong1 remarked ,parry4 ,don't you like it8 ,ellis inquired4 ,i think ,i might like it if ,i were drunk4 ,ah1 but a poet1 you see1 is always drunk6 ',well1 ,i unfortunately1 am often sober2 and then ,i find the sponger and the venerealee anything but agreeable objects4 ,besides1 said ,audubon1 though it's very good of ,walt ,whitman to invite us all1 the mere fact of dining with him1 however miscellaneous the company1 doesn't alter the character of the dinner4 ,no1 cried ,leslie1 and that's just the point ,ellis has missed all through4 ,even if it be true that the world appears to him as a work of art1 it doesn't appear so to the personages of the drama4 ,what's play to him is grim earnest to them2 and1 what's more1 he himself is an actor not a mere spectator1 and may have that fact brought home to him1 any moment1 in his flesh and blood4 ,of course6 replied ,ellis1 and ,i wouldn't have it otherwise4 ,the point of the position is that one should play one's part oneself1 but play it as an artist with one's eye upon the total effect1 never complaining of ,evil merely because one happens to suffer1 but taking the suffering itself as an element in the sthetic perfection of the ,whole4 ,i should like to see you doing that1 said ,bartlett1 rather brutally1 when you were down with a fit of yellow fever4 ,or shut up in a mad-house1 said ,leslie4 ,or working eight hours a day at business1 said ,audubon1 with the thermometer #ajj degrees in the shade4 ,oh well1 answered ,ellis1 those are the confounded accidents of our unhealthy habits of life4 ,i am afraid1 ,i said1 they are accidents very essential to the substance of the world4 ,besides1 cried ,parry1 there's the whole moral question1 which you seem to ignore altogether4 ,if there be any activity that is good1 it must be1 ,i suppose1 the one that is right2 and the activity you describe seems to have nothing to do with right and wrong4 ,right and wrong6 ,right and wrong6 echoed ,ellis1 ,das hr ich sechzlg ,jahre wiederholen1 ,ich fluche drauf1 aber verstohlen4 ,you may curse as much as you like1 replied ,parry1 but you can hardly deny that there is an intimate connection between ,good and ,right4 ,instead of replying ,ellis began to whistle2 so ,i took up ,parry's point and said1 ,yes1 but what is the connection8 ,my own idea is that ,right is really a means to ,good4 ,and ,i should separate off all activity that is merely a means from that which is really an end in itself1 and good4 ,but is there any activity1 objected ,leslie1 which is not merely a means8 ,oh yes1 ,i said1 ,i should have thought so4 ,most men1 it seems to me1 are well enough content with what they are doing for its own sake2 even though at the same time they have remoter ends in view1 and if these were cut off would cease1 perhaps1 to take pleasure in the work of the moment4 ,the attitude is not very logical1 perhaps1 but ,i think it is very common4 ,why else is it that men who believe and maintain that they only work in order to make money1 nevertheless are so unwilling to retire when the money is made2 or1 if they do1 are so often dissatisfied and unhappy8 ,oh1 said ,audubon1 that is only because boredom is worse than pain4 ,it is not that they find any satisfaction in their work2 it's only that they find even greater distress in idleness4 ,but1 surely1 ,i replied1 even you yourself would hardly maintain that there is nothing men do for its own sake1 and because they take delight in it4 ,if there were nothing else at least there is play--and ,i have known you play cricket yourself6 ,known him play cricket6 cried ,ellis4 ,why1 if he had his way1 he would do nothing else1 except at the times when he was riding or shooting4 ,well1 ,i said1 that's enough1 for the moment1 to refute him4 ,and1 in fact1 ,i suppose none of us would seriously maintain that there is no form of activity which men feel to be good for its own sake1 though the ,good of course may be partial and precarious4 ,no1 said ,ellis1 ,i should rather inquire whether there is any form which they pursue merely and exclusively as a means to something else4 ,oh1 surely6 ,i said4 ,one might mention1 for instance1 the act of visiting the dentist4 ,or what is more important1 and what1 ,i suppose1 ,parry had in his mind1 there is the whole class of activities which one distinguishes as moral4 ,do you mean to say1 said ,parry1 that moral action has no ,good in itself but is only a means to some other ,good8 ,i don't know1 ,i replied2 ,i am rather inclined to think so4 ,but it all depends upon how we define it4 ,and how do you define it8 ,i should say that its specific quality consists in the refusal to seize some immediate and inferior ,good with a view to the attainment of one that is remoter but higher4 ,oh1 well1 of course1 cried ,leslie1 if you define it so1 your proposition follows of itself4 ,so ,i thought1 ,i said4 ,but how would you define it8 ,i should say it is a free and perfect activity in ,good4 ,in that case1 it is of course the very activity we are in quest of1 and we should come upon it1 if we were successful1 at the end of our inquiry4 ,but ,i was supposing that the essence of morality is expressed in the word 'ought'2 and in that ,i take to be implied the definition ,i suggested--namely1 action pursued not for its own sake1 but for the sake of something else4 ,oh1 oh6 cried ,dennis1 there ,i really must protest6 ,i've kept silent as long as ,i possibly could2 but when it comes to describing as a mere means the only kind of activity which is an end in itself---- ,the only kind that is an end in itself6 ,i repeated1 in some dismay4 ,is that really what you think8 ,of course it is6 why not8 ,i don't know4 ,i have always supposed that1 when we are doing what we ought1 we are acting with a view to some ultimate ,good4 ,well1 ,i1 on the contrary1 believe that we ought absolutely1 without reference to anything else4 ,it is a unique form of activity1 dependent on nothing but itself2 and for anything we have yet shown1 it may be the ,good we are in quest of4 ,this suggestion1 unexpected as it was1 threw me into great perplexity4 ,i did not see exactly how to meet it2 yet it awakened no response in me1 nor as ,i thought ,in any of the others4 ,but while ,i was hesitating1 ,leslie began3 ,do you mean that the ,good might consist simply in doing what we ought1 without any other accompaniment or conditions8 ,yes1 ,i think it might4 ,so that1 for example1 a man might be in possession of the ,good1 even while he was being racked or burnt alive1 so long only as he was doing what he ought ,yes1 ,i suppose he might be4 ,it's a trifle paradoxical1 said ,ellis4 ,in fact1 added ,bartlett1 it might be called nonsense4 ,i don't see why1 replied ,dennis2 for we haven't yet shown that the ,good is dependent on the things we call good4 ,no1 ,i said1 but we did show--or at least for the time being we agreed to admit--that it must have some relation to what we call goods2 that they do somehow or other1 and more or less1 express its nature2 and indeed our whole present inquiry is based upon the hypothesis that it is by examining goods that we may get to know something about the ,good4 ,so that ,i do not see how we can entertain an idea of ,good which flatly contradicts all our experience of goods4 ,well1 said ,dennis1 ,i ought perhaps to modify the position4 ,let us say that the ,good consists in the activity of doing what we ought1 only that activity can't exist in its true perfection unless everybody participates in it at once4 ,but if everybody participated in it1 there would be no more burnings2 and so ,leslie's difficulty would not arise4 ,well1 ,i said1 the modification is very radical6 ,but even so1 ,i don't know what to make of the position4 ,for it is very difficult to conceive a society perpetually and exclusively occupied1 so to speak1 in 'oughting4' ,just imagine the kind of life ,it would be--without pleasure1 without business1 without knowledge1 without anything at all analogous to what we call good1 purged wholly and completely of all that might taint the purity of the moral sense1 of philanthropy1 of friendship1 of love1 even1 ,i suppose1 of the love of virtue1 a life simply of obligation1 without anything to be obliged to except a law4 ,but1 he protested1 you are taking an absurd and impossible case4 ,i am taking the case which you yourself put1 when you said that ,good consisted simply in doing what one ought1 independently of all other accompaniment or condition4 ,but perhaps that is not what you really meant8 ,no1 he said2 of course1 what ,i meant was that it is life according to the moral law that is ,good2 but ,i did not intend to separate the law from the life1 and call it ,good all by itself4 ,but is the life the better for the law1 in the sense1 ,i mean1 in which law involves constraint8 ,or would it not be better still if the same life were pursued freely for its own sake8 ,perhaps so4 ,but1 then1 in that case1 the more we realized ,good the less we should be aware of obligation4 ,and would a life without conscious and felt obligation be a life specifically ethical1 in the sense in which you seemed to be using the word8 ,i should think not2 for 'ought' in the ethical sense does certainly seem to me to involve the idea of obligation4 ,in that case it would seem to be truer to say that activity is ,good1 not in so far as it is ethical but precisely in so far as it is not4 ,at any rate1 ,i should maintain that we come nearer to a realization of ,good in the activities which we pursue without effort or friction1 than in those which involve a struggle between duty and inclination4 ,but the activities we pursue without effort or friction often enough are bad4 ,no doubt2 but some of them are good1 and it is to those ,i should look for the best idea ,i could form of what ,good might be4 ,well1 he said1 go on6 ,once more ,i have entered my protest2 and now ,i leave the road clear4 ,the worst of you is1 said ,ellis1 that you always turn up in front6 ,when we think we have passed you once for all1 you take a short cut across the fields1 and there you are in the middle of the road1 with the same old story1 that we're altogether on the wrong track4 ,well1 said ,dennis1 sententiously1 ,i do my duty4 ,and1 replied ,ellis1 no doubt you have your reward6 ,proceed6 he continued1 turning to me4 ,well1 ,i said1 ,i suppose ,i must try to go through to the end1 though these tactics of ,dennis make me very nervous4 ,i shall suppose1 however1 that ,i have convinced him that it is not in ethical activity as such that we can expect to find the most perfect example of ,good4 ,and now ,i propose to examine in turn some other of our activities1 starting with that which seems to be the most primitive of all4 ,and which is that8 ,i was thinking of the activity of our bodily senses1 our direct contact1 so to speak1 with objects1 without the intermediation of reflection1 through the touch1 the sight1 the hearing1 and the rest4 ,is there anything in all this which we could call good8 ,is there anything6 cried ,ellis4 ,what a question to ask6 ,and he broke out with the lines from ,browning's ,saul3 ,oh1 the wild joys of living6 the leaping from rock up to rock1 ,the strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree1 the cool silver shock ,of the plunge in a pool's living water1 the hunt of the bear1 ,and the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair4 ,and the meal1 the rich dates yellowed over with gold dust divine1 ,and the locust-flesh steeped in the pitcher1 the full draught of wine1 ,and the sleep in the dried river-channel where bulrushes tell ,that the water was wont to go warbling so softly and well4 ,how good is man's life1 the mere living6 how fit to employ ,all the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy4 ,the quotation seemed to loosen all tongues2 and there followed a flood of such talk as may be heard in almost every company of ,englishmen1 in praise of sport and physical exercise1 touched with a sentiment not far removed from poetry--the only poetry of which they are not half-ashamed4 ,audubon even joined in1 forgetting for the moment his customary pose1 and rhapsodizing with the rest over his favourite pursuits of snipe-shooting and cricket4 ,much of this talk was lost upon me1 for ,i am nothing of a sportsman2 but some touches there were that recalled experiences of my own1 and for that reason1 ,i suppose1 have lingered in my memory4 ,thus1 ,i recollect1 some one spoke of skating on ,derwentwater1 the miles of black1 virgin ice1 the ringing and roaring of the skates1 the sunset glow1 and the moon rising full over the mountains2 and another recalled a bathe on the shore of gina1 the sun on the rocks and the hot scent of the firs1 as though the whole naked body were plunged in some thereal liqueur1 drinking it in with every sense and at every pore1 like a great sponge of sheer sensation4 ,after some minutes of this talk1 as ,i still sat silent1 ,ellis turned to me with the appeal1 ,but what about you1 who are supposed to be our protagonist8 ,here are we all rhapsodizing and you sit silent4 ,have you nothing to contribute to your own theme8 ,oh1 ,i replied1 any experiences of mine would be so trivial they would be hardly worth recording4 ,the most that could be said of them would be that they might1 perhaps1 illustrate more exactly than yours what one might call the pure ,goods of sense4 ,for1 as far as ,i can understand1 the delights you have been describing are really very complex4 ,in addition to pleasures of mere sensation1 there is clearly an sthetic charm--you kept speaking of heather and sunrises1 and colours and wide prospects2 and then there is the satisfaction you evidently feel in skill1 acquiring or acquired1 and in the knowledge you possess of the habits of beasts and birds4 ,all this1 of course1 goes beyond the delight of simple sense perception1 though1 no doubt1 inextricably bound up with it ,but what ,i was thinking of at first was something less complex and more elementary in which1 nevertheless1 ,i think we can detect ,good--,good of sheer unadulterated sensation4 ,think1 for example1 of the joys of a cold bath when one is dusty and hot6 ,you will laugh at me1 but sometimes when ,i have felt the water pouring down my back ,i have shouted to myself in my tub 'nunc dimittis4' ,they burst out laughing1 and ,ellis cried3 ,you gross sensualist6 ,and to think of all this being concealed behind that masque of austere philosophy6 ,then they set off again ,in praise of the delights of such simple sensations1 and especially of those of the palate1 instancing1 ,i remember1 the famous tale about ,keats--how he covered his tongue and throat with cayenne pepper that he might enjoy1 as he said1 the delicious coolness of claret in all its glory4 ,and when this had gone on for some time1 ,perhaps enough has been said1 ,i began1 to illustrate this particular kind of ,good4 ,we have1 ,i think1 recognized to the full its merits2 and we shall be equally ready1 ,i suppose1 to recognize its defects4 ,i don't know about that1 said ,ellis4 ,i1 for my part1 at any rate1 shall be very loth to dwell upon them4 ,i sometimes think these are the only pure ,goods4 ,but at least1 ,i replied1 you will admit that they are precarious4 ,it is only at moments1 and at moments that come and go without choice of ours1 that this harmonious relation becomes established between our senses and the outer world4 ,the very same things which at such times appear to be perfectly at one with ourselves1 as if they had been made for us and we for them1 we see and feel to have also a nature not only distinct but even alien and hostile to our own4 ,the water which cools our skin and quenches our thirst also drowns2 the fire which warms and comforts also burns2 and so on through all the chapter--,i need not weary you with details4 ,nature1 you will agree1 not only ministers to our bodies1 she torments and destroys them2 she is our foe in ways at least as varied and efficacious as she is our friend4 ,but1 objected ,ellis1 that is only because we don't treat her properly2 we have to learn how to manage her4 ,perhaps1 ,i replied1 though ,i should prefer to say1 we have to learn how to fight and subdue her4 ,but in any case we have laid our finger here upon a defect in this first kind of ,goods--they are1 as ,i said1 precarious4 ,and the discovery of that fact1 one might say1 was the sword of the angel that drove man out of his imaginary ,eden4 ,for at first we may suppose him1 7if ,wilson will permit me to romance a little17 seizing every delight as it offered itself1 under an instinctive impression that there were nothing but delights to be met with1 eating when he was hungry1 drinking when he was thirsty1 sleeping when he was tired1 and so on1 in unquestioning trust of his natural impulses4 ,but then1 as he learnt by experience how evil follows good1 and pleasure often enough is bought by pain1 he would begin1 would he not1 instead of simply accepting ,good where it is1 to endeavour to create it where it is not1 sacrificing often enough the present to the future1 and rejecting many immediate delights for the sake of those more remote8 ,and this involves a complete change in his attitude2 for he is endeavouring now to establish by his own effort that harmony between himself and the world which he fondly hoped at first was immediately given4 ,but1 objected ,wilson1 he never did hope anything of the kind4 ,this reconstruction of the past is all imaginary4 ,i dare say it may be1 ,i replied1 but that is of little consequence1 if it helps us to seize our point more clearly2 for we are not at present writing history4 ,man1 then1 we will suppose1 is thus set out upon what is1 whether he knows it or not1 his quest to create1 since he is unable to find ready-made1 a world of objects harmonious to himself4 ,but in this quest has he been1 should you say1 successful8 ,more or less1 ,i suppose1 answered ,parry1 for he is progressively satisfying his needs1 even if they are never completely satisfied4 ,perhaps1 ,i replied1 though ,i sometimes have my doubts4 ,the relation of man to nature1 ,i have thought1 is very strange and obscure4 ,it is as though he began with the idea that he had only to remove a few blemishes from her face to make her completely accordant with his desire4 ,but no sooner has he gone to work than these surface blemishes1 as he thought them1 prove to have roots deeper than all his probings2 the more he cuts away the more he exposes of an element radically alien to himself1 terrible and incomprehensible1 branching wide and striking deep1 and throwing up from depths unknown those symptoms and symbols of itself which he mistook for mere superficial stains4 ,really1 protested ,parry1 ,i see no grounds for such a view4 ,perhaps not1 ,i said1 but anyhow you will1 ,i suppose1 admit that a certain precariousness does attach to these ,goods of sense1 whether they be freely offered by nature or painfully acquired by the labour of man4 ,not necessarily1 he objected1 for we are constantly reducing to order and routine what was once haphazard and uncontrolled4 ,for the great mass of civilized men the primitive goods of life1 food1 shelter1 clothing and the like1 are practically secured against all chance4 ,are they8 cried ,bartlett1 ,i admire your optimism6 ,and ,i too1 ,i said4 ,but even granting that it were as you say1 we are then met by this curious fact1 that the ,goods we really care about1 in our practical activity1 are never those that are secure but those that are precarious4 ,as soon as we are safe against one risk we proceed to take another1 so that there is always a margin1 as it were1 of precarious ,goods1 and those exactly the ones which we hold most precious4 ,in fact1 said ,audubon1 as soon as you get your ,good it ceases to be good4 ,that's precisely what ,i am always saying4 ,then1 ,i said1 there is the less need to labour the point4 ,one way or other1 it seems1 either because they are difficult to secure1 or because1 when secured1 they lose their specific quality4 ,goods of this kind are caught in the wheels of chance and change1 whether they be offered to man by the free gift of ,nature1 or wrung from her in the sweat of his brow4 ,in other words1 they are1 as ,i said1 precarious4 ,and now1 have they any other defects8 ,have they any8 cried ,leslie1 why they have nothing else6 ,well1 ,i said1 but what in particular8 ,oh1 he replied1 it's all summed up1 ,i suppose1 in the fact that they are ,goods of sense1 and not of intellect or of imagination4 ,is it then1 ,i asked1 a defect in content that you are driving at8 ,do you mean that they satisfy only a part of our nature1 not the whole8 ,for that1 ,i suppose1 would be equally true of the other ,goods you mentioned1 such as those of the intellect4 ,yes1 he replied1 but it is the inferior part to which the ,goods we are speaking of appeal4 ,perhaps2 but in what respect inferior8 ,why1 simply as the body is inferior to the soul4 ,but how is that8 ,you will think me very stupid1 but the more ,i think of it the less ,i understand this famous distinction between body and soul1 and the relation of one to the other4 ,i doubt1 said ,wilson1 whether there is a distinction at all4 ,i don't say that1 ,i replied4 ,i only say that ,i can't understand it2 and ,i should be thankful1 if possible1 to keep it out of our discussion4 ,so should ,i6 said ,wilson4 ,well1 but1 ,leslie protested1 how can we8 ,i think perhaps we might1 ,i said4 ,for instance1 in the case before us1 why should we not try directly to define that specific property of the ,goods of sense which1 according to you1 constitutes their defect1 without having recourse to these difficult terms body and soul at all8 ,well1 he agreed1 we might try4 ,what1 then ,i said1 do you suggest8 ,he hesitated a little1 and then began in a tentative kind of way3 ,i think what ,i feel about these ,goods is that we are somehow their slaves2 they possess us1 instead of our possessing them4 ,they come upon us we hardly know how or whence2 they satisfy our desires we can't tell why2 our relation to them seems to be passive rather than active4 ,and that1 you think1 would not be the case with a true and perfect ,good8 ,no1 ,i think not ,how1 then1 should we feel towards such a ,good8 ,we should feel1 ,i think1 that it was somehow an expression of ourselves1 and we of it2 that it was its nature and its whole nature to present itself as a ,good and our nature and our whole nature to experience it as such4 ,there would be nothing in ,it alien to us and nothing in us alien to it4 ,whereas in the case of ,goods of sense----8 ,whereas in their case1 he said1 surely nothing of the kind applies4 ,for these ,goods appear to arise in things and under circumstances which have quite another nature than that of being good for us4 ,it is not the essence of water to quench our thirst1 of fire to cook for us1 or of the sun to give us light---- ,or of cork-trees to stop our ginger-beer bottles1 added ,ellis4 ,quite so1 he continued2 in every case these things that do us good are also quite as ready to do us harm1 and1 for that matter1 to do innumerable things which have no relation to us at all4 ,so that the goodness they have in them1 so far as it is goodness to our senses1 they have1 as it were1 only by accident2 and we feel that essentially either they are not ,goods1 or their goodness is something beyond and different from that which is revealed to sense4 ,your quarrel1 then ,i said1 with the ,goods of sense1 so far as ,i understand you1 is that they inhere1 as it were1 in a substance which1 so far as we can tell1 is indifferent to ,good1 or at any rate to ,good of that kind8 ,yes4 ,whereas a true ,good1 you think1 must be good in essence and substance8 ,yes2 don't you think so too8 ,i do1 ,i replied1 but how about the others8 ,dennis assented1 and the others did not object1 not appearing1 indeed1 to have attended much to the argument4 ,so ,i continued1 ,we have then1 so far1 discovered in this class of ,goods1 two main defects1 the first1 that they are precarious2 the second1 which is closely connected with the other1 and is in fact1 ,i suppose1 its explanation1 that they are1 shall we say1 accidental1 understanding the word in the sense we have just defined4 ,now1 let us see if we cannot find any class of ,goods similar to these1 but free from their defects4 ,but similar in what respect1 he asked1 if they are not to have similar defects8 ,similar1 ,i meant1 in being direct presentations to sense4 ,but are there any such ,goods8 ,i think so1 ,i said4 ,what do you say to works of ,art8 ,these1 are they not1 are direct presentations to sense8 ,yet such that it is their whole nature and essence on the one hand to be beautiful1 and to that extent ,good--for ,i suppose you will admit that the ,beautiful is a kind of ,good2 and on the other hand1 if ,i may dare to say so1 to be1 in a certain sense1 eternal4 ,eternal6 cried ,ellis1 ,i only wish they were6 ,what wouldn't we give for the works of ,polygnotus and ,apelles6 ,oh yes1 ,i said1 of course1 in that way1 regarded as material objects1 they are as perishable as all the works of nature4 ,but ,i was talking of them as ,art1 not as mere things2 and from that point of view1 surely1 each is a moment1 or a series of moments1 cut away1 as it were1 from the contact of chance or change and set apart in a timeless world of its own1 never of its own nature1 to pass into something else1 but only through the alien nature of the matter to which it is bound4 ,what do you mean8 cried ,parry4 ,i am quite at sea4 ,perhaps1 ,i said1 you will understand the point better if ,i give it you in the words of a poet4 ,and ,i quoted the well-known stanzas from ,keats' ,ode on a ,grecian ,urn3 ,heard melodies are sweet1 but those unheard ,are sweeter2 therefore1 ye soft pipes1 play on2 ,not to the sensual ear1 but1 more endear'd4 ,pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone2 ,fair youth beneath the trees1 thou canst not leave ,thy song1 nor ever can those trees be bare2 ,bold lover1 never1 never canst thou kiss1 ,though winning near the goal--yet1 do not grieve2 ,she cannot fade1 though thou hast not thy bliss1 ,for ever wilt thou love and she be fair6 ,ah1 happy1 happy boughs6 that cannot shed ,your leaves1 nor ever bid the spring adieu2 ,and1 happy melodist1 unwearied1 ,for ever piping songs for ever new2 ,more happy love6 more happy1 happy love6 ,for ever warm and still to be enjoyed1 ,for ever panting and for ever young2 ,all breathing human passion far above1 ,that leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloyed1 ,a burning forehead1 and a parching tongue4 ,well1 said ,parry1 when ,i had done1 that's very pretty2 but ,i don't see how it bears on the argument4 ,i think1 ,i replied1 that it illustrates the point ,i wanted to make4 ,part1 ,i mean1 of the peculiar charm of works of ,art consists in the fact that they arrest a fleeting moment of delight1 lift it from our sphere of corruption and change1 and fix it like a star in the eighth heaven4 ,yes1 said ,ellis1 we grant you that ,or at least1 added ,parry1 we don't care to dispute it ,and the other point which ,i want to make is1 ,i think1 clearer still--that the ,good of works of ,art1 that is to say their ,beauty1 results from the very principle of their nature1 and is not a mere accident of circumstances4 ,of course1 said ,leslie1 their ,beauty is their only raison d'tre8 ,and yet1 ,i went on1 they are still ,goods of sense1 and so far resemble the other ,goods of which we were speaking before4 ,yes1 said ,dennis1 but with what a difference6 ,that is the point ,i have been waiting to come to4 ,what point8 ,i asked4 ,why1 he said1 in the case of what you call ,goods of sense1 in their simplest and purest form1 making abstraction from all sthetic and other elements--as in the example you gave of a cold bath--the relation of the object to the sense is so simple and direct1 that really1 if we were to speak accurately1 we should have1 ,i think1 to say1 that so far as the perception of ,good is concerned the object is merged in the subject1 and what you get is simply a good sensation4 ,perhaps1 ,i agreed1 that is how we ought to put it4 ,but at the time ,i did not think it necessary to be so precise4 ,but it has become necessary now1 ,i think1 he replied1 if we are to bring out a characteristic of works of ,art which will throw light1 ,i believe1 on the general nature of ,good4 ,what characteristic is that8 ,why1 he replied1 when we come to works of ,art1 the important thing is the object1 not the subject2 if there is any merging of the one in the other1 it is the subject that is merged in the object1 not vice versa4 ,we have to contemplate the object1 anyhow1 as having a character of its own2 and it is to this character that ,i want to draw attention4 ,in what respect8 ,in respect that every work of ,art1 and1 for that matter1 every work of nature--so far as it can be viewed sthetically--comprises a number of elements necessarily connected in a whole2 and this necessary connection is the point on which we ought to insist ,but necessary how8 asked ,wilson4 ,do you mean logically necessary8 ,no1 he replied1 sthetically4 ,i mean1 that we have a direct perception that nothing in the work could be omitted or altered without destroying the whole4 ,this1 at any rate1 is the ideal2 and it holds1 more or less1 in proportion as the work is more or less perfect4 ,everyone1 ,i suppose1 who understands these things would agree to that4 ,no one seemed inclined to dispute the statement2 certainly ,i was not1 myself2 so ,i answered1 ,no doubt what you say is true of works of ,art2 but will your contention be that it is also true of ,good in general8 ,yes1 he said1 ,i think so1 in so far at least as ,good is to be conceived as comprising a number of elements4 ,for no one1 ,i suppose1 would imagine that such elements might be thrown together haphazard and yet constitute a good whole4 ,i suppose not1 ,i agreed1 and1 if you are right1 what we seem to have arrived at is this3 among the works which man creates in his quest of the ,good1 there is one class1 that of works of ,art1 which1 in the first place1 may be said1 in a sense1 to be not precarious1 seeing that by their form1 through which they are ,art1 they are set above the flux of time1 though by their matter1 we admit1 they are bound to it ,and1 in the second place1 the ,good which they have1 they have by virtue of their essence2 ,good is their substance1 not an accident of their changing relations4 ,and1 lastly1 being complex wholes1 the parts of which they are composed are bound together in necessary connection4 ,these characteristics1 at any rate1 we have discovered in works of ,art3 and no doubt many more might be discoverable4 ,but now1 let us turn to the other side1 and consider the defects in which this class of ,goods is involved4 ,ah6 cried ,bartlett1 when you come to that1 ,i have something to say4 ,well1 ,i said1 what is it8 ,we shall be glad of any help4 ,it can be summed up1 he replied1 in a single word4 ,whatever may be the merits of a work of ,art--and they may be all that you say--it has this one grand defect--it isn't real6 ,real6 cried ,leslie4 ,what is real8 ,the word's the plague of my life6 ,people use it as if they meant something by it1 something very tremendous and august1 and when you press them they never know what it is4 ,they talk of 'real life'--real life6 what is it8 ,as if one life wasn't as real as another6 ,oh1 as to real life1 said ,ellis1 ,i can tell you what that is4 ,real life is the shady side of life4 ,nonsense1 said ,parry1 real life is the life of men of the world4 ,or1 retorted ,ellis1 more generally1 it is the life of the person speaking1 as opposed to that of the person to whom he speaks4 ,well1 but1 ,i interposed1 it is not 'real life' that is our present concern1 but ,bartlett's meaning when he used the word 'real4' ,in what sense is ,art not real8 ,why1 he replied1 by your own confession ,art is something ideal4 ,it is beautiful1 it is good1 it is lifted above chance and change2 its connection with matter1 that is to say with reality1 is a kind of flaw1 an indecency from which we discreetly turn our eyes4 ,the real world is nothing of all this2 on the contrary1 it is ugly1 brutal1 material1 coarse1 and bad as bad can be6 ,i don't see that it is at all6 cried ,leslie1 and1 even if it were1 you have no right to assume that that is the reality of it4 ,how do you know that its reality doesn't consist precisely in the ,ideal1 as all poets and philosophers have thought8 ,and1 in that case1 ,art would be more real than what you would call ,reality1 because it would represent the essence of the world1 the thing it would like to be if it could1 and is1 so far as it can4 ,that was ,aristotle's view1 anyhow4 ,then all ,i can say is1 replied ,bartlett1 that ,i don't agree with ,aristotle6 ,anyhow1 even if ,art represents what the world would like to be1 it certainly doesn't represent what it is4 ,i don't know2 surely it does1 sometimes1 said ,parry1 for instance1 there's the realistic novel6 ,oh1 that6 cried ,ellis4 ,that's the most ideal of all--only it's apt to be such bad idealism6 ,anyhow1 said ,bartlett1 in so far as it is real1 it's not ,art1 in the sense1 in which we have been using the word4 ,i began to be afraid that we should drift away into a discussion of realism in ,art4 ,so1 to recall the conversation to the point at issue1 ,i turned to ,bartlett1 and said3 ,your criticism seems to me to be fair enough as far as it goes4 ,you say that the world of ,art is a world by itself2 that side by side of it1 and unaffected by it1 moves the world of what you call real life4 ,and that whatever be the relation between the two worlds1 whether we are to say that the one imitates the other1 or interprets it1 or idealizes it1 it does not1 in any case1 set it aside4 ,art is a refuge from life1 not a substitute for it2 a little blessed island in the howling sea of fact4 ,its ,good is thus only a partial ,good2 whereas the true ,good1 ,i suppose1 would be somehow universal4 ,still1 said ,leslie1 as far as it goes it is a ,good without blemish4 ,i am not so sure1 ,i said1 even of that4 ,i am inclined to think that ,bartlett's criticism1 if we squeeze it tight1 will yield us more than we have yet got out of it--perhaps even more than he knows is in it ,you don't mean to say1 cried ,bartlett1 that you are coming over to my side6 ,yes1 ,i said1 like a spy to the enemy's camp to see where your strength really lies4 ,i have no objection1 he replied1 if it ends in your discovering new defences for me4 ,well1 ,i said1 we shall see4 ,anyhow1 this is what ,i had in my mind4 ,we were saying just now that when people talk about 'real life1' the 'real world1' and so on1 they are not always very clear as to what they mean4 ,but one thing1 ,i think1 perhaps they have obscurely in their heads--that the ,real is something from which you cannot escape2 something which forces itself upon you without reference to choice or desire1 having a nature of its own which may or may not conform1 more or less to yours1 but in any case is distinct and independent4 ,that is why they would say1 for example1 that the illusions of a madman are not real1 meaning that they do not represent real things1 however vivid their appearance may be1 because they are the productions merely of his own consciousness2 whereas the very same appearances presented to a sane man would be called without hesitation real1 because they would be conceived to proceed from objects having an independent nature of their own4 ,something of this kind1 ,i suppose1 is included in the notion 'real' as it is held by ordinary people4 ,perhaps said ,leslie1 but what then8 ,and how does it bear upon ,art8 ,i am not sure1 ,i replied1 but it occurred to me that works of ,art1 though of course they are real objects1 are such that a certain violence1 as it were1 has been done to their reality in our interest4 ,what ,i mean will be best understood1 ,i think1 if we put ourselves for the moment into the position of the artist4 ,to him certain materials are presented which of course are real in our present acceptation of the term1 being such as they are of their own nature1 without any dependence upon him4 ,upon these materials he flings himself1 and shapes them according to his desire1 impressing1 as it were1 his own nature upon theirs1 till they confront him as a kind of image of himself in an alien stuff4 ,so far1 then1 he has a ,good1 and a ,good presented to him as real2 but for the ,goodness of this reality he is himself responsible4 ,in so far as it is1 so to speak1 merely real1 it has still the nature which was first presented to him1 before he began his work--a nature indifferent1 if not opposed1 to all his operations1 as is shown by the fact that it changes and passes away into something else1 just as it would have done if he had never touched it4 ,to this nature he has1 as ,i said1 done a certain violence in order to stamp upon it the appearance of ,good2 but the ,good is still1 in a sense1 only an appearance2 the reality of the thing remains independent and alien4 ,so that what the man has found1 in so far as he has found ,good1 is after all only a form of himself2 and one can conceive him feeling a kind of despair1 like that of ,wotan in the ,walkre1 when in his quest for a free1 substantial1 self-subsistent ,good he finds after all1 for ever1 nothing but images of himself3 ',das ,andre1 das ich ersehne1 ,das ,andre1 erseh' ich nie4' ,i don't know whether what ,i am saying is intelligible1 for ,i find it rather hard to put it into words4 ,yes1 he said1 ,i think ,i understand4 ,but what you are saying1 so far as it is true1 seems to be true only for the artist himself4 ,to all others the work of ,art must appear as something independent of themselves4 ,true1 ,i said1 and yet ,i think that they too feel1 or might be made to fed if it were brought home to them1 this same antagonism between the nature of the stuff and the form that has been given to it4 ,the form will seem from this point of view something factitious and artificial given to the stuff1 not indeed by themselves1 but by one like themselves1 and in their interest4 ,they will contrast1 perhaps1 as is often done1 a picture of the landscape with the landscape ,itself4 ,the picture1 they will say1 however beautiful1 is not a 'natural' ,good1 not a real ,good1 not a ,good in its own right2 it is a kind of makeshift produced by human effort1 beautiful1 if you will1 admirable1 if you will1 to be sought1 to be cherished1 to be loved in default of a better1 with the best faculties of brain and soul1 but still not that ultimate thing we wanted1 that ,good in and of itself1 as well as through and for us1 ,good by its own nature apart from our interposition1 self-moved1 self-determined1 self-dependent1 and in which alone our desires could finally rest4--,don't you think that some such feeling may1 perhaps1 be at the bottom of ,bartlett's criticism of ,art as unreal8 ,bartlett laughed4 ,if so1 he said1 it is quite unknown to myself4 ,for to tell the truth1 ,i have not understood a word that you have said4 ,well1 ,i said1 in that case1 at any rate you can't disagree with me4 ,but what do the others think8 ,and ,i turned to ,dennis and ,leslie1 for ,wilson and ,parry did not seem to be attending4 ,leslie assented with enthusiasm4 ,but ,dennis shook his head4 ,i don't know1 he said1 what to think about all that4 ,it seems to me rather irrelevant to the work of ,art as such4 ,perhaps1 ,i said1 but surely not to the work of ,art as ,good8 ,or do you not agree with me that the true ,good must be such purely of its own nature8 ,perhaps so1 he replied2 it wants thinking over4 ,but in any case ,i agree with you so far1 that ,i should never place the ,good in ,art4 ,in what then8 ,i should be much more inclined to place it in ,knowledge4 ,in ,knowledge6 ,i repeated4 ,that seems to me very strange6 ,but why strange8 he said4 ,surely there is good authority for the view4 ,it was ,aristotle's for example1 and ,spinoza's4 ,i know1 ,i replied1 and ,i used to think it was also mine4 ,but of late ,i have come to realize more clearly what ,knowledge is2 and now ,i see1 or seem to see1 that whatever its value may be1 it is something that falls very far short of ,good4 ,why1 he said1 what is your idea of ,knowledge8 ,you had better ask ,wilson1 ,i replied1 it is he who has instructed me4 ,very well1 he said1 ,i appeal to ,wilson4 ,and ,wilson1 nothing loth1 enunciated his definition of ,knowledge4 ,knowledge1 he said1 is the description and summing up in brief formul of the routine of our perceptions4 ,there6 ,i exclaimed4 ,no one1 ,i suppose1 would identify that with ,good8 ,but--objected ,dennis--in the first place1 ,i don't understand the definition2 and1 in the second place1 ,i don't agree with it4 ,as to understanding it1 replied ,wilson1 there need be no difficulty there4 ,you have only to seize clearly one or two main positions4 ,first1 that ,knowledge is of perceptions only1 not of things in themselves2 secondly1 that these perceptions occur in fixed routines2 thirdly 444 ,but1 interrupted ,dennis1 what is a perception8 ,i suppose it's a perception of something8 ,no1 he said1 ,i don't know that it is4 ,what then8 ,simply a state in me8 ,very likely4 ,then does nothing exist except my states8 ,nothing else exists primarily for you4 ,then what about the world before ,i existed1 and after ,i cease to exist8 ,you infer such a world from your states4 ,then there is something besides my states--this world which ,i infer2 and that1 ,i suppose1 and not merely my perceptions1 is the reality of which ,i have knowledge8 ,not exactly1 he replied1 the fact is 444 ,i don't think1 ,i interrupted1 that we ought to plunge into a discussion of the nature of ,reality4 ,it is ,good with which we are at present concerned4 ,but1 said ,dennis1 we wanted to find out the connection of ,knowledge with ,good2 and to do so we must first discover what ,knowledge is4 ,well then1 ,i said1 let us first take ,wilson's account of ,knowledge1 and see what he makes of that with regard to ,good2 and then we will take yours1 and see what we make of that4 ,and if we don't find that either satisfies the requirements of ,good we will leave ,knowledge and go on to something else4 ,very well1 he replied1 ,i am content1 so long as ,i get my chance4 ,you shall have your chance4 ,but first we will take ,wilson4 ,and ,i dare say he will not keep us long4 ,for you will hardly maintain1 ,i suppose1 ,i continued1 turning to him1 that ,knowledge1 as you define it1 could be identified with ,good8 ,i don't know1 he said2 to tell the truth1 ,i don't much believe in ,good1 in any absolute sense4 ,but that ,knowledge1 as ,i define it1 is a good thing1 ,i have no doubt whatever4 ,neither have ,i1 ,i replied2 but good1 as it seems to me1 mainly as a means1 in so far as it enables us to master ,nature4 ,well1 he said1 and what greater ,good could there be8 ,i don't dispute the greatness of such a ,good4 ,i merely wish to point out that if we look at it so1 it is in the mastery of ,nature that the ,good in question consists1 and not in the ,knowledge itself4 ,or should you say that there is ,good in the scientific activity itself1 quite apart from any practical results to which it may lead8 ,certainly1 he replied1 and the former1 in my opinion1 is the higher and more ideal ,good4 ,this activity itself of inventing brief formul to resume the routine of our perceptions8 ,yes4 ,well1 but what is the ,good of it8 ,that is what it is so hard for a layman to get hold of4 ,does it consist in the discovery of ,reality8 ,for that1 ,i could understand1 would be good4 ,no1 he said1 for we do not profess to touch ,reality4 ,we deal merely with our perceptions4 ,so that when1 for example1 you conceive such and such a perfect fluid1 or whatever you call it1 and such and such motions in it1 you do not suppose this fluid to be real4 ,no4 ,it is merely a conception by means of which we are enabled to give an account of the order in which certain of our perceptions occur4 ,but it is very satisfactory to be able to give such an account4 ,i suppose it must be1 ,i said1 but once more1 could you say more precisely wherein the satisfaction consists8 ,is it1 perhaps1 in the discovery of necessary connections8 ,no1 he said1 we don't admit necessity4 ,we admit only an order which is1 as a matter of fact1 regular4 ,you say1 for example1 that it so happens that all bodies do move in relation to one another in the way summed up in the law of gravitation2 but that you see no reason why they should8 ,yes4 ,but 444 began ,dennis1 who had found difficulty all this time in restraining himself4 ,one moment6 ,i pleaded1 let ,wilson have his say4 ,and turning to him ,i continued3 ,if1 then1 the satisfaction to be derived from scientific activity does not consist in the discovery of ,reality1 nor yet in that of necessary connection1 wherein should you say1 does it consist8 ,perhaps in the regulating of expectation8 ,what do you mean by that8 ,i mean1 that it is painful for us to live in a world in which we don't know what to expect2 it excites not only our fears and apprehensions1 but also a kind of intellectual disgust4 ,and1 conversely1 it is a relief and a pleasure to discover an order among our experiences1 not only because it enables us the better to utilize them for our ends 7for that belongs to the practical results of science71 but because in itself we prefer order to disorder1 even if no other advantage were to be got out of it4 ,i don't know that we do6 objected ,ellis1 it depends on the kind of order4 ,an order of dull routine is far more intolerable than a disorder of splendid possibilities6 ,ask the ,oriental why he objects to ,british rule6 ,simply because it is regular6 ,he prefers the chances of rapine1 violent and picturesque1 to the dreary machine-like depredations of the tax-collector4 ,yes1 ,i said1 but there you take in a number of complex factors4 ,i was thinking merely of the ,good to be got out of scientific activity as such4 ,and ,i think there is an intellectual satisfaction in the discovery of order1 even though it be dissociated from necessity4 ,no doubt there is1 said ,wilson1 but ,i shouldn't say that is the only reason for our delight in ,knowledge4 ,the fact is1 ,knowledge is an extension of experience1 and is good simply as such4 ,the sense of ,more and still ,more beyond what has yet been discovered1 of new facts1 new successions1 new combinations1 of ever fresh appeals to our interest1 our wonder1 our admiration1 the mere excitement of discovery for its own sake1 quite apart from anything else to which it may lead1 a dash of adventure1 too1 a heightening of life--that is what is the real spur to science and1 to my mind1 its sufficient justification4 ,but1 ,i objected1 that is rather an account of the general process of ,experience than of the special one of ,knowledge4 ,no doubt there is an attraction in all activity--,ellis has already expounded it2 and all experience involves a kind of ,knowledge2 but what we wanted to get at was the special attraction of scientific activity2 and that seems to be1 so far as ,i can see1 simply the discovery of order4 ,well1 he said1 if you like--what then8 ,why1 then1 ,i said1 we can easily see the defect in this kind of activity1 when viewed from the standpoint of ,good4 ,what is it8 ,why1 clearly1 that that in which we discover the order may be bad4 ,there is a science of disease as well as of health2 and an activity concerned with the ,bad could hardly be purely good1 even though it were a discovery of order in the ,bad4 ,or do you think that if all men were diseased1 they would nevertheless be in possession of the ,good1 if only they had perfect knowledge of the laws of disease8 ,no1 he said1 of course not4 ,we have to take into account1 not only the character of ,knowledge1 but the character of the object known4 ,quite so1 that is my point4 ,you agree then with me that ,knowledge may be in various ways good1 but that in so far as it is1 or may be knowledge of ,bad1 it cannot be said by itself to constitute the ,good4 ,i think1 he agreed1 that ,i might admit that4 ,well1 then1 ,i said1 let us leave it there4 ,and now1 what has ,dennis to say8 ,ah6 he said1 you unmuzzle me at last4 ,it has really been very hard to sit by in silence and listen to these heresies without a protest4 ,heresies6 retorted ,wilson1 if it comes to that1 which of us is the heretic8 ,what1 ,i asked1 is the point of disagreement8 ,it's a fundamental one4 ,on ,wilson's view1 ,knowledge is merely the discovery of order among our perceptions4 ,if that were all1 ,i shouldn't value it much4 ,but on my view1 it is the discovery of necessary connection2 and in the necessity lies the fascination4 ,but where1 argued ,wilson1 do you find your necessity8 ,all that is really given is succession4 ,the necessity is merely what we read into the facts4 ,not at all6 ,the necessity is 'given1' as you call it1 as much as anything else1 if only you choose to look for it4 ,the type of all ,knowledge is mathematical knowledge2 and all mathematical knowledge is necessary4 ,but it is all based on assumptions4 ,that may be2 but granting the assumptions1 it deduces from them necessary consequences4 ,and all true science is of that type4 ,a law of ,nature is not a mere description of a routine2 it's a statement that1 given such and such conditions1 such and such results follow of necessity4 ,still1 you admit that the conditions have to be given6 ,everything is based ultimately on certain successions and coincidences of which all that can be said is simply that they exist1 without any possibility of getting behind them4 ,i don't know about that1 he said1 but at any rate it would be the ideal of ,knowledge to establish necessary connections throughout2 so that1 given any one phenomenon of the universe1 all the rest would inevitably follow4 ,and it is only in so far as it progresses towards this consummation that ,knowledge is ,knowledge at all4 ,a routine simply given without internal coherence is to my mind a contradiction in terms2 either the routine is necessary1 or it's not a routine at all1 but at best a mere appearance of a routine4 ,i think1 ,i interposed1 we must leave you and ,wilson to fight this out in private4 ,at present1 let us assume that your conception of ,knowledge is the true one1 as we did with his1 and examine it from the point of view of the ,good4 ,your conception1 then1 to begin with1 seems to me to be involved in the same defect we have already noted--namely1 that it may be knowledge of ,bad just as much as knowledge of ,good4 ,and ,i suppose you would hardly maintain1 any more than ,wilson did1 that the ,good may consist in knowledge of ,bad8 ,but1 he objected1 ,i protest altogether against this notion that there is ,knowledge on the one hand and something of which there is knowledge on the other4 ,true ,knowledge1 if ever we could attain to it1 would be a unique kind of activity1 in which there would be no distinction1 or at least no antagonism1 between thinking on the one hand and the thing thought on the other4 ,i don't know1 ,i said1 that ,i quite understand4 ,have we in fact any knowledge of that kind1 that might serve as a kind of type of what you mean8 ,yes1 he replied1 ,i think we have4 ,for example1 if we are dealing with pure number1 as in arithmetic1 we have an object which is somehow native to our thought1 commensurate with it1 or however you like to put it2 and it is the same with other abstract notions1 such as substance and causation4 ,i see1 ,i said4 ,and on the other hand1 the element which is alien to thought1 and which is the cause of the impurity of most of what we call knowledge1 is the element of sense--the something given1 which thought cannot1 as it were1 digest1 though it may dress and serve it up in its own sauce8 ,yes1 he said1 that is my idea4 ,so that knowledge1 to be perfect1 must not be of sense1 but only of pure thought1 as ,plato suggested long ago8 ,yes4 ,and such a knowledge1 if we could attain it1 you would call the ,good8 ,i think so4 ,well1 ,i said1 in the first place1 ,i have to point out that such a ,good 7if it be one7 implies an existence not merely better than that of which we have an experience1 but radically and fundamentally different4 ,for our whole life is bathed in sense4 ,not only are we sunk in it up to the neck1 but the greater part of the time our heads are under too1--in fact most of us never get them out at all2 it is only a few philosophers every now and again who emerge for a moment or two into sun and air1 to breathe that element of pure thought which is too fine even for them1 except as a rare indulgence4 ,at other times1 they too must be content with the grosser atmosphere which is the common sustenance of common men4 ,well1 he said1 but what of that8 ,we have not been maintaining that the ,good is within easy reach of all4 ,no1 cried ,ellis4 ,but even if it were1 and were such as you describe it1 very few people would care to put out their hands to take it4 ,i1 at any rate1 for my part can see hardly a vestige of ,good in the kind of activity ,i understand you to mean4 ,it is as though you should say1 that ,good consists in the perpetual perception that #b #b #d4 ,but that is an absurd parody4 ,for the point of knowledge would be1 that it would be a closed circle of necessary connections4 ,one would move in it1 as in infinity1 with a motion that is also rest1 central at once and peripheral1 free and yet bound by law4 ,that is my ideal of a perfect activity6 ,in form1 perhaps1 ,i said1 but surely not in content6 ,for what1 in fact1 in our experience comes nearest to what you describe8 ,i suppose the movement of a logic like ,hegel's8 ,yes2 only that1 of course1 is imperfect1 full of lapses and flaws6 ,but even if it were perfect1 cried ,ellis1 would it be any the better8 ,imagine being deprived of the whole content of life--of nature1 of history1 of art1 of religion1 of everything in which we are really interested2 imagine being left to turn for ever1 like a squirrel in a cage1 or rather like the idea of a squirrel in the idea of a cage1 round and round the wheel of these hollow notions1 without hands1 without feet1 without anything anywhere by which we could lay hold of a something that is not thought1 a something solid1 resistant1 palpitating1 'luscious and aplomb1' as ,walt ,whitman might say1 a sense1 a flesh1 call it what you will1 the unintelligible1 but still the indispensable1 that which1 even if it be bad1 we cannot afford to miss1 and which1 if it be not the ,good itself1 the ,good must somehow include6 ,dennis appeared to be somewhat struck by this way of putting the matter4 ,but1 he urged1 my difficulty is that if you admit sense1 or anything analogous to it1 anything at once directly presented and also alien to thought1 you get1 as you said yourself1 something which is unintelligible2 and a ,good which is not intelligible will be1 so far1 not good4 ,but1 ,i said1 what do you mean by intelligible8 ,i think1 he replied1 that ,i mean two things1 both of which must be present4 ,first1 that there shall be a necessary connection among the elements presented2 and secondly1 that the elements themselves should be of such a kind as to be1 as it were1 transparent to that which apprehends them1 so that it asks no questions as to what they are or whence they come1 but accepts them naturally and as a matter of course1 with the same inevitability as it accepts its own being4 ,and these conditions1 you think1 are fulfilled by the objects of thought as you defined them8 ,i think so4 ,i am not so sure of that1 ,i said1 it would require a long discussion4 ,but1 anyhow1 you also seemed to admit1 when ,ellis pressed you1 that thought of that kind could hardly be identified absolutely with ,good4 ,i admit1 he replied1 that there are difficulties in that view4 ,but at the same time the ,good1 whatever it be1 ought to be intelligible in the sense you have explained8 ,i should say so4 ,and so should ,i4 ,but now1 the question is1 can we not conceive of any other kind of object1 which might have1 on the one hand1 the intelligibility you ascribe to pure ideas1 and on the other1 that immediate something1 'luscious and aplomb1' to borrow ,ellis's quotation1 which he desiderated as a constituent of the ,good8 ,i don't know1 he said1 perhaps we might4 ,what is it you have in your mind8 ,well1 ,i replied1 let us recur for a moment to works of art4 ,in them we have1 to begin with1 directly presented elements other than mere ideas4 ,no doubt4 ,and further1 these elements1 we agreed1 have a necessary connection one with the other4 ,yes1 but not logically necessary4 ,no doubt1 but still a necessary connection4 ,and it is the necessity of the connection1 surely1 that is important2 the character of the necessity is a secondary consideration4 ,perhaps4 ,one condition1 then1 of intelligibility is satisfied by a work of art4 ,but how is it with the other8 ,how is it with the elements themselves8 ,are they transparent1 to use your phrase1 to that which apprehends them8 ,certainly not1 for they are mere sense--of all things the most obscure and baffling4 ,and yet1 ,i replied1 not mere sense1 for they are sense made beautiful2 as beautiful1 they are akin to us1 and1 so far1 intelligible4 ,you suggest1 then1 that ,beauty is akin to something in us1 in a way analogous to that in which1 according to me1 ideas are akin to thought8 ,it seems so to me4 ,in so far as a thing is beautiful it does not1 ,i think1 demand explanation1 but only in so far as it is something else as well4 ,perhaps4 ,but anyhow1 inasmuch as a work of art is also sense1 so far at least it is not intelligible4 ,true2 and here we come by a new path upon the defect which we noticed before in works of art--that their ,beauty1 or ,goodness1 is not essential to their whole nature1 but is something imposed1 as it were1 on an alien stuff4 ,and it is this alien element that we now pronounce to be unintelligible4 ,yes2 and so1 as we agreed before1 we cannot pronounce works of art to be absolutely good4 ,no4 ,but what are we to do then8 ,where are we to turn8 ,is there nothing in our experience to suggest the kind of object we seem to want8 ,no one answered4 ,i looked round in vain for any help1 and then1 in a kind of despair1 moved by ,i know not what impulse1 ,i made a direct appeal to ,audubon4 ,come6 ,i cried1 you have said nothing for the last hour6 ,i am sure you must have something to suggest4 ,no1 he said1 ,i haven't4 ,your whole way of dealing with these things is a mystery to me4 ,i can't conceive1 for example1 why you have never once referred all through to what ,i should have thought was the best ,good we know--if1 indeed1 we know any ,good at all4 ,what do you mean8 ,why1 he said1 one's relations to persons4 ,they're the only things that ,i think really worth having--if anything were worth having4 ,a light suddenly broke on me1 and ,i cried1 ,yes6 an idea6 ,well1 said ,ellis1 what is it1 you man of forlorn hopes8 ,why1 ,i said1 suppose the very object we are in search of should be found just there8 ,where8 ,why1 in persons6 ,persons6 he repeated4 ,but what persons8 ,any1 every1 all8 ,wait one moment1 ,i cried1 and don't confuse me6 ,let me approach the matter properly4 ,very well1 he said1 you shan't be hurried6 ,you shall have your chance4 ,let us remind ourselves1 then1 ,i proceeded1 of the point we had reached4 ,the ,good1 we agreed1 so far as we have been able to form a conception of it1 must be something immediately presented1 and presented in such a way1 that it should be directly intelligible--intelligible not only in the relations that obtain between its elements1 but also in the substance1 so to speak1 of the elements themselves4 ,of such intelligibility we had a type1 as ,dennis maintained1 in the objects of pure thought1 ideas and their relations4 ,but the ,good1 we held1 could not consist in these4 ,it must be something1 we felt1 somehow analogous to sense1 and yet it could not be sense1 for sense did not seem to be intelligible4 ,but now1 when ,audubon spoke1 it occurred to me that perhaps we might find in persons what we want ,and that is what ,i should like to examine now4 ,well1 said ,ellis1 proceed4 ,to begin with1 then1 a person1 ,i suppose we shall agree1 is not sense1 though he is manifested through sense4 ,what does that mean8 said ,wilson4 ,it means only1 that a person is not his body1 although we know him through his body4 ,if he isn't his body1 said ,wilson1 he is probably only a function of it4 ,oh6 ,i said1 ,i know nothing about that4 ,i only know that when we talk of a person1 we don't mean merely his body4 ,no1 said ,ellis1 but we certainly mean also his body4 ,heaven save me from a mere naked soul1 'ganz ohne ,krper1 ganz abstrakt1' as ,heine says4 ,but1 at any rate1 ,i said1 let me ask you1 for the moment1 to consider the soul apart from the body4 ,the soul1 cried ,wilson1 ,i thought we weren't to talk about body and soul4 ,well1 ,i said1 ,i didn't intend to1 but ,i seem to have been driven into it unawares4 ,but what do you mean by the soul8 ,i mean1 ,i replied1 what ,i suppose to be the proper object of psychology--for even people who object to the word 'soul' don't mind talking 7in ,greek1 of course7 of the science of the soul4 ,anyhow1 what ,i mean is that which thinks and feels and wills4 ,well1 but what about it8 said ,ellis4 ,the first thing about it is that it is1 as it seems to me1 of all things the most intelligible4 ,i should have said1 ,wilson objected1 that it was of all things the least4 ,yes2 but we are probably thinking of different things4 ,what you have in your mind is the connection of this thing which you refuse to call the soul1 with the body1 the genesis and relations of its various faculties1 the measurement of its response to stimuli1 and all the other points which are examined in books of psychology4 ,all that ,i agree is very unintelligible2 ,i1 at least1 make no profession of understanding it4 ,but what ,i meant was1 that looking at persons as we know them in ordinary life1 or as they are shown to us in literature and art1 they really are intelligible to us in the same way that we are intelligible to ourselves4 ,and how is that8 ,why1 through motives and passions4 ,there is1 ,i suppose1 no feeling or action of which human beings are capable1 from the very highest to the very lowest1 which other human beings may not sympathetically understand1 through the mere fact that they have the same nature4 ,they will understand more or less according as they have more or less sympathy and insight2 but in any case they are capable of understanding1 and it is the business of literature and art to make them understand4 ,that is surely a curious use of the word 'understand4' ,but it is the one1 ,i think1 which is important for us4 ,at any rate1 what ,i mean is that the object presented is so akin1 not indeed 7as in the case of ideas7 merely to our thought1 but to our whole complex nature1 that it does not demand explanation4 ,what6 cried ,audubon4 ,well1 all ,i can say is that most of the people ,i1 at any rate1 come across do most emphatically demand explanation4 ,i don't see why they're there1 or what they're doing1 or what they're for4 ,their existence ,is a perpetual problem to me6 ,and what's worse1 probably my existence is the same to them6 ,but1 ,i said1 surely if you had leisure or inclination to study them all sympathetically1 you would end by understanding them4 ,i don't think ,i should4 ,at least ,i might in a sort of pathological way1 as one comes to understand a disease2 but ,i shouldn't understand why they exist4 ,it seems to me1 most people aren't fit to exist2 and ,i dare say they have the same opinion about me4 ,but are there no people of whose existence you approve8 ,yes1 a few3 my friends4 ,surely1 cried ,ellis1 you flatter us6 ,how often have you said that you don't see why we are this1 that1 or the other6 ,how often have you complained of our faces1 our legs1 our arms1 in fact1 our whole physique1 not to mention spiritual blemishes6 ,well1 he replied1 ,i don't deny that it's a great grief to me to be unable really and objectively to approve of any of my friends4 ,still---- ,still1 ,i interrupted1 you have given me the suggestion ,i wanted4 ,for the relation of affection1 however imperfect it may be1 gives us at least something which perhaps we shall find comes nearer to what we might conceive to be absolutely ,good than anything else we have yet hit upon4 ,how so8 ,well1 to begin with1 one's friend appears to one1 does he not1 as an object good in its own nature1 not merely by imposition of our own ideal upon an alien stuff1 as we said was the case with works of art8 ,i don't know about that6 said ,audubon4 ,in my own case1 at any rate1 ,i am sure that my friends never see me at all as ,i really am1 but simply read into me their own ideal4 ,they have just as much imposed upon me their own conception1 as if ,i were the marble out of which they had carded a statue4 ,you must allow us to be the judges of that1 ,i replied4 ,well1 but1 he said1 anyhow you can't deny that such illusions are common4 ,what lover ever saw his mistress as she really is8 ,no1 ,i said1 ,i don't deny that4 ,but at the same time ,i should affirm that the truer the love1 the less the illusion4 ,in what is commonly called love1 no doubt1 the physical element is the predominant1 or even the only one present2 and in that case there may be illusion to an indefinite extent4 ,but the love which is based upon years of common experience1 which has grown with the growth of the whole person1 in power and intelligence and insight1 which has survived countless disappointments and surmounted countless obstacles1 the love of husband and wife1 the love1 as we began by saying1 of friends--such love1 as ,browning says boldly1 'is never blind4' ,and such love1 ,i suppose you will admit1 does exist1 however rarely8 ,yes1 ,i suppose so4 ,well1 then1 in the case of such a love1 it is the object as it really is1 not as it has been falsely fashioned by the imagination1 that is directly apprehended as good4 ,and you cannot fairly say that its ,good is merely the ideal of the lover transferred to the person of the loved4 ,but1 objected ,leslie1 though that may be so1 yet still the ,good1 that ,is the person1 does inhere in an alien stuff--the body4 ,but1 ,i replied1is the body alien8 ,is it not rather an expression of the person8 as essential1 somehow or other1 as the soul8 ,certainly6 cried ,ellis4 ,give me the flesh1 the flesh6 ',not with my soul1 ,love6--bid no soul like mine ,lap thee around nor leave the poor sense room6 ,take sense too--let me love entire and whole-- ,not with my soul4' ,i don't agree with the sentiment of that1 said ,leslie1 and anyhow1 ,i don't see how it bears on the question4 ,for the point of the poem is rather to emphasize than to deny the opposition between body and soul4 ,yes1 replied ,ellis1 but also to suggest what you idealists call the transcending of it4 ,do you mean that in the marriage relation1 for example 444 ,yes1 ,i mean that in that act the flesh1 so to speak1 is annihilated at the very moment of its assertion1 and what you get is a feeling of total union with the person1 body and soul at once1 or rather1 neither one nor the other1 but simply that which is in and through both4 ,i should have thought1 objected ,leslie1 it was rather a case of the soul being merged in the body4 ,that depends1 replied ,ellis4 ,yes1 ,i said1 it depends on many things6 ,but what ,i was thinking of was that1 quite apart from that experience1 and in the moments of sober observation1 one does feel1 does one not1 a correspondence between body and soul1 as though the one were the expression of the other8 ,i don't know1 objected ,audubon4 ,what ,i feel is much more often a discrepancy4 ,but still1 ,i urged1 even when there appears to be a discrepancy to begin with1 don't you think that in the course of years the spirit does tend to stamp its own likeness on the flesh1 and especially on the features of the face8 ',for soul is form1' quoted ,leslie1 'and doth the body make4' ,yes1 ,i said1 and that verse1 ,i believe1 is not merely a beautiful fancy of the poet's1 but rather as the ,greeks maintained--and on such a point they were good judges--a profound and significant truth4 ,at any rate1 ,i find it to be so in the case of the people ,i care about--though there ,i know ,audubon will dissent4 ,in them1 every change of expression1 every tone of voice1 every gesture has its significance2 there is nothing that is not expressive--not a curl of the hair1 not a lift of the eyebrows1 not a trick of speech or gait4 ,the body becomes1 as it were1 transparent and pervious to the soul2 and that inexplicable element of sense1 which baffles us everywhere else1 seems here at last to receive its explanation in presenting itself as the perfect medium of spirit4 ,if you come to that1 cried ,ellis1 you might as well extend your remarks to the clothes4 ,for they1 to a lover's eyes1 are often as expressive and adorable as the body itself4 ,well1 ,i said1 the clothes1 too1 are a sort of image of the soul1 'an imitation of an imitation1' as ,plato would say4 ,but1 seriously1 don't you agree with me that there is something in the view which regards the body as the 'word made flesh1' a direct expression of the person1 not a mere stuff in which he ,inheres8 ,yes1 he said1 there may be something in it4 ,at any rate1 ,i understand what you mean4 ,and in so far as that is so1 ,i continued1 the body1 though it be a thing of sense1 would nevertheless be directly intelligible in the same way as the soul8 ,perhaps1 in a sort of way4 ,and so we should have ,in the person loved an object which1 though presented to sense1 would be at once good and intelligible2 and our activity in relation to this object1 the activity1 that is1 of love1 would come nearer than any other experience of ours to what we might call a perfect ,good8 ,but1 objected ,leslie1 it is still far enough from being the ,good itself4 ,for after all1 say what you may about the body being the medium of the soul1 it is still body1 still sense1 and1 like other sensible things1 subject to change and decay1 and in the end to death4 ,and with the fate of the body1 so far as we know1 that of the person is involved4 ,so that this1 too1 like all other ,goods of sense1 is precarious4' ,perhaps it is1 ,i said1 ,i cannot tell4 ,but all that ,i mean to maintain at present is that in the activity of love1 as we have analysed it1 we have something which gives us1 if it be only for a moment1 yet still in a real experience1 an idea1 at least1 a suggestion1 to say no more1 of what we might mean by a perfect ,good1 even though we could not say that it be the ,good itself4 ,but what1 then1 would you call the ,good itself8 ,a love1 ,i suppose1 which in the first place would be eternal1 and in the second all-comprehensive4 ,for there is another defect in love1 as we know it1 to which you did not refer1 namely1 that it is a relation only to one or two individuals1 while outside and beyond it proceeds the main current of our lives1 involving innumerable relations of a very different kind from this4 ,yes1 cried ,ellis1 and that is why this gospel of love1 with all its attractiveness1 which ,i admit1 seems to me1 nevertheless1 so trivial and absurd4 ,just consider6 ,here is the great round world with all that in it is1 infinite in time1 infinite in space1 infinite in complexity2 here is the whole range of human relations1 to say nothing of those that are not human1 of activities innumerable in and upon nature and man himself1 of inventions1 discoveries1 institutions1 laws1 arts1 sciences1 religions2 and the meaning and purpose and end of all this we calmly assert to be--what8 ,a girl and a boy kissing on the village green6 ,but1 ,i protested1 who said anything about boys and girls and kisses and village greens8 ,well1 ,i suppose that is love1 of a sort8 ,yes1 of a sort1 no doubt2 but not a very good one4 ,you are thinking1 then1 of a special kind of love8 ,i am thinking of the kind which ,i conceive to be the best4 ,and what is that8 ,one1 as ,i said just now1 that should be eternal and all-comprehensive4 ,and so1 in the end1 you have nothing better than an imaginary heaven to land us in6 ,i have no power1 ,i fear1 to land you there4 ,but ,i believe there is that dwelling within you which will not let you rest in anything short4 ,then ,i fear ,i shall never rest6 ,that may be4 ,but meantime all ,i want to do is to ascertain1 if we can1 the meaning of your unrest4 ,i have no interest in what you call an imaginary heaven1 except in so far as its conception is necessary to enable us to interpret the world we know4 ,but how should it be necessary8 ,i have never found it so4 ,it is necessary1 ,i think1 to explain our dissatisfaction4 ,for the ,goods we actually realize always point away from themselves to some other ,good whose realization perhaps1 as you say1 for us is impossible4 ,but even if the ,good were chimerical1 we cannot deny the passion that pursues it2 for it is the same passion that urges us to the pursuit of such ,goods as we really can attain4 ,and if we want to understand the nature of that passion1 we must understand the nature of its ,good1 whether it be attainable or no4 ,only it is for the sake of life here that we need that comprehension1 not for the sake of life somewhere else4 ,but do you reduce our passion for ,good to this passion for ,love8 ,i don't 'reduce' it2 ,i interpret it so4 ,and so we come back to the girl and the boy and the village green6 ,no6 we come back to the whole of life1 of which that is only an episode4 ,let me try to explain how the thing presents itself to me4 ,by all means6 ,that is what ,i want4 ,very well2 ,i will do my best4 ,let us look then at life just as it is4 ,here we find ourselves involved with one another in the most complex relations--economic1 political1 social1 domestic1 and the rest2 and about and in these relations centres the interest of our life1 whether it be pleasurable or painful1 empty or full1 or whatever its character4 ,among these relations some few perhaps--or1 it may be1 even none--realize for a longer or shorter time1 with more or less completeness1 that ultimate identity in diversity1 that 'me in thee' which we call love2 the rest comprise various degrees of attraction and repulsion1 hatred1 contempt1 indifference1 toleration1 respect1 sympathy1 and so on2 and all together1 always changing1 dissolving1 and combining anew1 weave about us1 as they cross and intertwine1 the shifting1 restless web we call life4 ,now these relations are an effect and result of the pursuit of ,good2 but they are never the final goal of that pursuit4 ,the goal1 ,i think1 would be a perfect union of all with all2 and is not attained by anything that falls short of this1 whether the defect be in depth or ,in extent4 ,and that is how it is that love itself1 even in its richer phases1 and still more in those which are merely light and sensual1 though1 as ,i think1 through it alone can we form our truest conception of ,good1 yet1 as we have it1 never is the ,good1 even if it appear to be so for the moment2 for those who seek ,good1 ,i believe1 will never feel that they have found it merely in union with one other person4 ,for what love gains in intension it is apt to lose in extension2 so that in practice it may even come to frustrate the very end it seeks1 limiting instead of expanding1 narrowing just in proportion as it deepens1 and1 by causing the disruption of all other ties1 impoverishing the natures it should have enriched4 ,or don't you think that this happens sometimes1 for instance in married life8 ,i do indeed4 ,and1 on the other hand1 ,i continued1 it may very well be that one who passes through life without attaining the fruition of love1 yet with his gaze always set upon it1 in and through many other connections1 may yet come closer to the end of his seeking than one who1 having known love1 has sunk to rest in it then and there1 as though he had come already to his journey's end1 when really he has only reached an inn upon the road4 ,so that ,i am far from thinking1 as you pretended to suppose1 that the boy and girl on the village green realize then and there the consummation of the world4 ,still1 he objected1 ,i do not see1 in the scheme you put forward1 what place is left for the common business of life--for the things which really do1 for the most part1 occupy and possess men's minds1 and the more1 in my opinion1 the greater their force and capacity4 ,you mean1 ,i suppose1 war and politics1 and such things as that8 ,yes1 and generally all that one calls business4 ,well1 ,i said1 what these things mean to those who pursue them1 ,i am not as competent as you to say4 ,but surely1 what they are in essence is just1 like most other activities1 relations between human beings--relations of command and obedience1 of respect1 admiration1 antagonism1 comradeship1 infinitely complex1 infinitely various1 but still all of them strung1 as it were1 upon a single thread of passion2 all of them at tension to become something else2 all pointing to the consummation which it is the nature of that which created them to seek1 and all1 in that sense1 paradoxical as it may sound1 only means to love4 ,you don't repudiate such activities then8 ,how should ,i8 ,i repudiate nothing4 ,i am not trying to judge1 but1 if ,i could1 to explain4 ,it is the men of action1 ,i suppose1 who have the greatest extension of life1 and sometimes1 no doubt1 the greatest intension too4 ,but every man has to live his own way1 according to his opportunities and capacity4 ,only1 as ,i think myself1 all are involved in the same scheme1 and all are driven to the same consummation4 ,a consummation in the clouds6 ,i do not know about that2 but at any rate1 and this is the important point1 that which urges us to it is here and now4 ,everything is rooted in it4 ,our pleasures and pains alike1 our longing and dissatisfaction1 our restlessness never-to-be-quenched1 our counting as nothing what has been attained in the pressing on to more1 our lying down and rising up1 our stumbling and recovering1 whether we fail1 as we call it1 or succeed1 whether we act or suffer1 whether we hate or love1 all that we are1 all that we hope to be springs from the passion for ,good1 and points1 if we are right in our analysis1 to love as its end4 ,upon this ,audubon broke out3--,that's all very well6 ,but the one crucial point you persistently evade4 ,it may be quite true1 for aught ,i know1 that the ,good you describe is the ,good we seek--though ,i am not aware of seeking it myself4 ,but1 after all1 the real question is1 ,can we get it8 ,if not1 we are mere fools to seek it4 ,so1 ,i said1 you have brought me to bay at last6 ,and1 since you challenge me1 ,i am bound to admit that ,i don't know whether we can get it or no4 ,well then1 he said1 impatiently1 what is the good of all this discussion8 ,clearly1 ,i replied1 no good at all1 if there be no ,good1 which is the point to which you are always harking back4 ,but you have surely forgotten the basis of our whole argument8 ,what basis8 ,why1 that from the very beginning we have been trying to find out1 not so much what we know 7for on that point ,i admit that we know little enough71 as what it is necessary for us to believe1 if we are to find significance in life4 ,but how can we believe what we don't know8 ,why1 ,i replied1 we can surely adopt postulates1 as indeed we always do in practical life4 ,every man who is about to undertake anything makes the assumption1 in the first place1 that it is worth doing1 and ,in the second place that it is possible to be done4 ,he may be wrong in both these assumptions1 but without them he could not move a step4 ,and so with regard to the business of life1 as a whole1 it is necessary to assume1 if we are to make anything of it at all1 both that there is ,good1 and that we know something about it2 and also1 ,i think1 that it is somehow or other realizable2 but ,i do not know that any of these assumptions could be proved4 ,but what right have we1 then1 to make such assumptions8 ,we have none at all1 so far as knowledge is concerned4 ,indeed1 to my mind1 it is necessary1 if we are to be honest with ourselves1 that we should never forget that they are assumptions1 so long as they have not received definite proof4 ,but still they are1 ,i think1 as ,i said1 assumptions we are bound to make1 if we are to give any meaning to life4 ,we might perhaps call them 'postulates of the will'2 and our attitude1 when we adopt them1 that of faith4 ,faith6 protested ,wilson1 that is a dangerous word6 ,it is1 ,i agreed4 ,yet ,i doubt whether we can dispense with it4 ,only we must remember that to have 'faith' in a proposition is not to affirm that it is true1 but to live as we should do if it were4 ,it is1 in fact1 an attitude of the will1 not of the understanding2 the attitude of the general going into battle1 not of the philosopher in his closet4 ,but1 he objected1 where we do not know1 the proper attitude is suspense of mind4 ,in many matters1 no doubt1 ,i replied1 but surely not in those with which we are dealing4 ,for we must live or die2 and if we are to choose to do either1 we must do so by virtue of some assumption about the ,good4 ,but why should we choose to do either8 ,why should not we simply wait8 ,but wait how8 wait affirming or denying8 active or passive8 ,is it possible to wait without adopting an attitude8 ,is not waiting itself an attitude1 an acting on the assumption that it is good to wait8 ,but1 at any rate1 it does not involve assumptions as large as those which you are trying to make us accept4 ,i am not trying to make you do anything2 ,i am only trying to discover what you make yourself do4 ,and do you1 as a matter of fact1 really dispute the main conclusions to which we have come1 or rather1 if you will accept my phrase1 the main 'postulates of the will' which we have elicited8 ,what are they8 ,let me have them again4 ,well1 ,i said1 here they are4 ,first1 that ,good has some meaning4 ,agreed6 ,second1 that we know something about that meaning4 ,doubtful6 said ,dennis4 ,but it will be no use now to resume that controversy4 ,no1 ,i replied1 only ,i thought ,i had shown that if we know nothing about it1 then1 for us1 it has no meaning2 and so our first assumption is also destroyed1 and with it all significance in life4 ,well1 he said1 go on4 ,we can't go over all that again4 ,third1 ,i continued1 that among our experiences the one which comes nearest to ,good is that which we called love4 ,possible6 said ,dennis1 but a very tentative approximation4 ,certainly1 ,i agreed1 and subject to constant revision4 ,and after that8 ,well1 ,i said1 now comes the point ,audubon raised4 ,is it necessary to include also the postulate that ,good can be realized8 ,but surely1 objected ,wilson1 here at least there is no room for what you call faith4 ,for whether or no the ,good can be realized is a question of knowledge4 ,no doubt1 ,i replied1 and so are all questions--if only we could know4 ,but ,i was assuming that this is one of the things we do not know4 ,but1 he said1 it is one we are always coming to know4 ,every year we are learning more and more about the course and destiny of mankind4 ,should you say1 then1 ,i asked1 that we are nearer to knowing whether or no the soul is immortal8 ,he looked at me in sheer amazement2 and then1 ,what a question6 he cried4 ,i should say that we have long known that it isn't ,then1 ,i said1 if so1 we know that the ,good cannot be realized4 ,what6 he exclaimed4 ,i had not understood that your conception of the ,good involved the idea of personal immortality4 ,i am almost afraid it does1 ,i replied1 but ,i am not quite sure4 ,we have already touched upon the point1 if you remember1 when we were considering whether we must regard the ,good as realizable in ourselves1 or only in some generation of people to come4 ,and we thought then that it must somehow be realizable in us4 ,but we did not see at the time what that would involve1 though ,i was afraid all along of something of the kind4 ,well1 ,i said1 for fear you should think you have been cheated1 we will reconsider the point2 and first1 if you like1 we will suppose that we mean by the ,good of some future generation1 still retaining for ,good the signification we gave to it4 ,the question then of whether or no the ,good can be realized1 will be the question whether or no it is possible that at some future time all individuals should be knit together in that ultimate relation which we called love4 ,but1 cried ,leslie1 the love was to be eternal6 ,so that their souls at least would have to be immortal2 and if theirs1 why not ours8 ,i looked at ,wilson2 and ,well1 ,i said1 what are we to say8 ,for my part1 he replied1 ,i have nothing to say4 ,i consider the whole idea of immortality illegitimate4 ,yet on that1 ,i said1 hangs the eternal nature of our ,good4 ,but may we retain1 perhaps1 the all-comprehensiveness8 ,how could we6 cried ,leslie1 for it is only the individuals who happened to be alive who could be comprehended so long as they were alive4 ,another glory shorn from our ,good6 ,i said4 ,still1 let us hold fast to what we may6 ,shall we say that if the ,good is to be realized the individuals then alive1 so long as they are alive1 will be bound together in this relation8 ,you can say that if you like1 said ,wilson1 and something of that kind ,i suppose one would envisage as the end4 ,only ,i'm not sure that ,i very well know what you mean by love4 ,alas6 ,i cried1 is even that to go8 ,is nothing at all to be left of my poor conception8 ,you1 can say if you like1 he replied1 and ,i suppose it comes to much the same thing1 that all individuals will be related in a perfectly harmonious way4 ,in other words1 cried ,ellis1 that you will have a society perfectly definite1 heterogeneous1 and co-ordinate6 ',there's glory for you6' as ,humpty ,dumpty said4 ,well1 ,i said1 this is something very different from what we defined to be ,good6 ,but this1 at any rate1 you think1 on grounds of positive science1 that it might be possible to realize8 ,yes1 replied ,wilson2 or if not that1 ,i think at any rate that science may ultimately be in a position to decide whether or no it can be realized4 ,but1 ,i said1 do you not think the same about personal immortality8 ,to be honest1 he replied1 ,i do not think that the question of personal immortality is one which science ought even to entertain4 ,but1 ,i urged1 ,i thought science was beginning to entertain it4 ,does not the ',society for ,psychical ,research' deal with such questions8 ',the ,society for ,psychical ,research6' he exclaimed4 ,i do not call that science4 ,well1 ,i said1 at any rate there are men of a scientific turn of mind connected with it ,and ,i mentioned the names of one or two1 whereupon ,wilson broke out into indignation1 declaring with much vehemence that the gentlemen in question were bringing discredit both upon themselves and the ,university to which they belonged2 and then followed a discussion upon the proper objects and methods of science1 which ,i do not exactly recall4 ,only ,i remember that ,wilson took up a position which led ,ellis1 with some justice as ,i thought1 to declare that science appeared to be developing all the vices of theology without any of its virtues--the dogmatism1 the index expurgatorius1 and the whole machinery for suppressing speculation1 without any of the capacity to impose upon the conscience a clear and well-defined scheme of life4 ,this debate1 however1 was carried on in a tone too polemic to elicit any really fruitful result2 and as soon as ,i was able ,i endeavoured to steer the conversation back into the smoother waters from which it had been driven4 ,let us admit1 ,i said1 if you like1 for the sake of argument1 that on the question of the immortality of the soul we do not and cannot know anything at all4 ,but1 objected ,wilson1 ,i maintain that we do know that there is no foundation at all for the idea4 ,it is a mere reflection of our hopes and fears1 or of those of our ancestors4 ,but1 ,i said1 even if it be1 that does not prove that it is not true2 it merely shows that we have no sufficient reason for thinking it to be true4 ,well1 he said1 put it so1 if you like2 that is enough to relegate the notion to the limbo of centaurs and chimras4 ,what we have no reason to suppose to be true1 we have no reason to concern ourselves with4 ,pardon me1 ,i replied1 but ,i think we have1 if the idea is one that interests us1 as ,is the case with what we are discussing4 ,we may not know whether or no it is true1 but we cannot help profoundly caring4 ,well1 he said1 ,i may be peculiarly constituted1 but1 honestly1 ,i do not myself care in the least ,but1 ,i said1 perhaps you ought to1 if you care about the ,good2 and that is really the question ,i want to come back to4 ,what is the minimum we must believe if we are to make life significant8 ,is it sufficient to believe in what you call the 'progress of the race'8 ,or must we also believe in the progress of the individual1 involving1 as it does1 personal immortality8 ,well1 said ,wilson1 ,i don't profess to take lofty views of life--that ,i leave to the philosophers4 ,but ,i must say it seems to me to be a finer thing to work for a future in which one knows one will not participate oneself than for one in which one's personal happiness is involved4 ,i have always sympathized with ,comte1 pedant as he was1 in the remark he made when he was dying4 ,which one8 interrupted ,ellis4 ',quelle perte irrparable8' ,that always struck me as the most humorous thing ever said4 ,no1 said ,wilson1 gravely1 but when he said that the prospect of death would be to him infinitely less sublime1 if it did not involve his own extinction2 the notion being1 ,i suppose1 that death is the triumphant affirmation of the supremacy of the race over the individual4 ,and that1 ,i think myself1 is the sound and healthy and manly view4 ,my dear ,wilson1 cried ,ellis1 you talk of lofty views2 but this is a pinnacle of loftiness to which ,i1 for one1 could never aspire4 ,positively1 to rejoice in the extinction of the individual with his faculties undeveloped1 his opportunities unrealized1 his ambitions unfulfilled--why it's sublime6 its ,kiplingese--there's no other word for it6 ,shake hands1 ,wilson6 you're a hero4 ,really1 said ,wilson1 rather impatiently1 ,i see nothing strained or high-faluting in the view4 ,and as to what you say about faculties undeveloped and the rest1 that seems to me unreal and exaggerated6 ,most men have a good enough time1 and get pretty much what they deserve4 ,a healthy1 normal man is ready to die--he has done what he had it in him to do1 and passed on his work to the next generation4 ,i have often wondered1 said ,ellis1 meditatively1 what 'normal' means4 ,does it mean one in a million1 should you say8 ,or perhaps that is too large a proportion8 ,some people say1 do they not1 that there never was a normal man8 ,by 'normal1' retorted ,wilson1 doggedly1 ,i mean average1 and ,i include every one except a few decadents and faddists4 ,at this point1 seeing that we were threatened with another digression1 ,i thought it best to intervene again4 ,we are diverging1 ,i said1 a little from the issue4 ,wilson's position1 as ,i understand him1 is that the prospect of the future ,good of the race is sufficient to give significance to the life of the individual1 even though he realize no ,good for himself4 ,no1 replied ,wilson1 ,i don't say that2 for ,i think he always does realize sufficient ,good for himself4 ,but is it because of that ,good which he realizes for himself that his life has significance8 ,or because of the future ,good of the race8 ,i don't know2 both1 ,i suppose4 ,you do not think then that the future ,good of the race is sufficient1 by itself1 to give significance to the lives of individuals who are never to partake in it8 ,i don't like that way of putting the question4 ,what ,i believe is1 that in realizing his own ,good a man is also contributing to that of the race4 ,there is no such antagonism between the two ends as you seem to suggest4 ,i don't say that there is an antagonism2 but ,i do insist that there is a distinction4 ,and ,i cannot help feeling--and this is where we seem to disagree--that in estimating the ,good of individual lives we must have regard to that which they realize in and for themselves1 not merely to that which they may be contributing to produce some day in somebody else4 ,these 'somebody elses1' cried ,ellis1 being after all nothing but other individuals like themselves6 so that you get an infinite series of people doing ,good to one another1 and none of them getting any ,good for themselves1 like the3 islanders who lived by taking in one another's washing6 ,well1 but1 said ,wilson1 supposing ,i consent1 for the sake of argument1 to let you estimate the worth of life by the ,good which individuals realize in themselves4 ,what follows then8 ,why1 then ,i said1 it would1 ,i think1 be very hard to maintain that we do most of us realize ,good enough to make it seem worth while to have lived at all1 if indeed we are simply extinguished at death4 ,at any rate1 if we set aside an exceptional few1 and look frankly at the mass of men and women1 judging them not as means to something else1 but as ends in themselves1 with reference not to happiness1 or content1 or acquiescence1 or indifference1 but simply to ,good--if we look at them so1 can we honestly say that there is enough significance in their lives to justify the labour and expense of producing and maintaining them8 ,i don't know1 he replied1 they probably think themselves that there is4 ,probably1 ,i rejoined1 they do not think about it at all4 ,but what ,i should like to know is1 what do you think8 ,i don't see1 he objected1 how ,i can have any opinion2 the problem is too vast and indeterminate4 ,is it8 cried ,audubon1 intervening in his curious abrupt way1 and with more than his usual energy of protest ,well1 indeterminate or no1 it's the one point on which ,i have no doubt4 ,most people are only fit to have their necks broken1 and it would be the kindest thing for them if some one would do it4 ,well1 ,i said1 at any rate that is a vigorous opinion4 ,does anyone else share it8 ,i do1 said ,leslie1 on the whole4 ,most men1 if they are not actually bad1 are at best indifferent--'sacs merely1 floating with open mouths for food to slip in4' ,upon my word6 cried ,bartlett1 it's wonderful how much you know about them1 considering how very little you've seen of them6 ,oh6 ,i said1 turning to him1 then you do not agree with this estimate8 ,i6 he said4 ,oh1 no6 ,i am not a superior person6 ,most men1 ,i suppose1 are as good as we are1 and probably a great deal better6 ,they might well be that1 ,i replied1 without being particularly good4 ,but perhaps1 as you seem to suggest1 it might be better to confine ourselves to our own experience and consider whether for ourselves1 so far as we can see1 we should think life much worth having1 supposing death to be the end of it all4 ,oh1 as to that1 of course ,i should1 for my part1 cried ,ellis1 and so1 ,i hope1 should we all4 ,in fact1 ,i consider it rather monstrous to ask the question at all4 ,my dear ,ellis1 ,i protested1 you are really the most inconsistent of men6 ,not a minute ago you were laughing at ,wilson for his acquiescence in the extinction of the individual 'with his opportunities unrealized1 his faculties undeveloped1' and all the rest of it4 ,and now you appear to be adopting precisely the same attitude yourself4 ,i can't help it1 he replied2 consistent or no1 life's good enough for me4 ,and so it should be for you1 you ungrateful ruffian6 ,i am not so sure1 ,i said1 that it should be2 not so sure as ,i was a few years ago4 ,why1 you ,methuselah1 what has age got to do with it8 ,just this1 ,i replied1 that up to a certain time of life all the ,good that we get we take to be prophetic of more ,good to come4 ,what we actually realize we value less for itself than for something else which it promises4 ,the moments of good experience we expand till they fill all infinity2 the intervening tracts of indifferent or bad we simply forget or ignore4 ,life is good1 we say1 because the universe is good2 and this goodness we expect to grasp in its entirety1 not to-day1 perhaps1 nor to-morrow1 but at least the day after4 ,and so1 like the proverbial ass1 we are lured on by a wisp of hay4 ,but being1 at bottom1 intelligent brutes1 we begin1 in time1 to reflect2 we put back our ears1 and plant our feet stiff and rigid where we stand1 and refuse to budge an inch till we have some further information as to the meaning of the journey into which we are being enticed4 ,that1 at least1 is the point that has been reached by this ass who is now addressing you4 ,i want to know something more about that bundle of hay2 and that is why ,i am interested in the question of personal immortality4 ,which means--to drop the metaphor----8 ,which means1 that ,i have come to realize that ,i am not likely to get more ,good out of life than ,i have already had1 and that ,i may very likely get less2 or if more in some respects1 then less in others4 ,for1 in the first place1 the world1 as it seems1 is just as much bad as good1 and whether ,good or ,bad predominate ,i cannot say4 ,and in the second place1 even of what ,good there is--and ,i do not under-estimate its worth--it is but an infinitesimal portion that ,i am capable of realizing1 so limited am ,i by temperament and circumstance1 so bound by the errors and illusions of the past1 so hampered by the disabilities crowding in from the future4 ,for though1 as ,i think1 the older ,i get the more clearly ,i recognize what is good1 and the more ,i learn to value and to perceive it1 yet at the same time the less do ,i become capable of making it my own1 and must in the nature of things become less and less so1 in so far at least as ,goods other than those of the intellect are concerned4 ,and this is a position which seems to be involved in the mere fact of age and death frankly seen from the naturalistic point of view2 and so it has always been felt and expressed from the time of the ,greeks onwards1 and not least effectively1 perhaps1 by ,browning in his ',cleon'--you remember the passage3 '444 ,every day my sense of joy ,grows more acute1 my soul 7intensified ,by power and insight7 more enlarged1 more keen2 ,while every day my hairs fall more and more1 ,my hand shakes1 and the heavy years increase-- ,the horror quickening still from year to year1 ,the consummation coming past escape1 ,when ,i shall know most1 and yet least enjoy-- ,when all my works wherein ,i prove my worth1 ,being present still to mock me in men's mouths1 ,alive still in the phrase of such as thou1 ,i1 ,i the feeling1 thinking1 acting man1 ,the man who loved his life so over-much1 ,shall sleep in my urn4' ,you see the point2 indeed1 it is so familiar1 ,i have laboured it1 perhaps1 too much4 ,but the result seems to be1 that while it is natural enough that in youth1 for those who are capable of ,good1 life should seem to be pre-eminently worth the having1 yet the last judgment of age1 for those who believe that death is the end1 will be a doubt1 and perhaps more than a doubt1 even in the case of those most favoured by fortune1 whether after all a life has been worth the trouble of living which has unfolded such infinite promise only to bury it fruitless in the grave4 ,i think that's rather a morbid view6 said ,parry4 ,i do not know1 ,i said1 whether it is morbid1 nor do ,i very much care2 the question is1 whether it is reasonable1 and whether it is not the position naturally and perhaps inevitably adopted not by the worst but by the best men among those who have abandoned the belief in personal immortality4 ,that1 interposed ,wilson1 is surely not the case4 ,one knows of people who1 though they have no belief in survival after death1 yet maintain a perfectly cheerful and healthy attitude towards life4 ,harriet ,martineau is one that occurs to me4 ,to her1 you may remember1 life appeared not less but more worth living when she had become convinced of her own annihilation at death2 and she awaited with perfect equanimity and calm its imminent approach1 not as a deliverance from a condition which was daily becoming more intolerable1 but as a fitting crown and consummation to a career of untiring and fruitful activity4 ,that1 exclaimed ,parry with enthusiasm1 is what ,i call magnanimous6 ,i don't6 retorted ,leslie1 ,i call it simply stupid and unimaginative4 ,call it what you like1 said ,wilson2 anyhow it is a position which can be and has been adopted4 ,yes1 ,i agreed1 but one which1 ,i think1 a clearer analysis of the facts1 a franker survey and a more penetrating insight1 would make it increasingly difficult to sustain4 ,and after all1 an estimate which is to endure must be not only magnanimous but reasonable4 ,but to her1 and to others like her1 it did and does appear to be reasonable4 ,and you ought to admit1 ,i think1 that there are cases in which life is well worth living quite apart from the hypothesis of personal immortality4 ,i am ready to admit1 ,i replied1 that there are people to whom it seems to be so1 but ,i doubt whether they are very numerous1 among those1 ,i mean1 who have reflected on the subject1 and whose opinions alone we need consider4 ,i1 at any rate1 have commonly found in talking to people about death--supposing1 which is unusual1 that they are willing to talk about it at all--that they adopt one of two views1 either of which presupposes the worthlessness of life1 if life1 as we know it1 be indeed all ,what views do you mean8 ,why1 either they believe that death means annihilation1 and rejoice in the prospect as a deliverance from an intolerable evil2 or they hold that there is a life beyond1 and that they will find there the reason and justification for existence which they have never been able to discover here4 ,you forget1 surely1 said ,wilson1 a third point of view1 which ,i should have thought was as common as either of the others1--that of those who believe in a life after death1 but look forward to it with inexpressible fear of the possible evils which it may contain4 ,true1 ,i said1 but such fear1 ,i suppose1 is a reflex of actual experience1 and implies1 does it not1 a vivid sense of the evils of existence as we know it8 ,so that these people1 too1 ,i should maintain1 have not really found life satisfactory1 or they would look forward with hope rather than fear to the possibility of ,its continuance4 ,but in their case1 at any rate1 the hypothesis of personal immortality is an aggravation1 not a remedy1 of the evil4 ,no doubt2 but ,i have been assuming throughout that the hypothesis involves the realization of that ,good which1 without it1 we recognize to be unattainable2 and it is only in that sense1 and from that point of view1 that ,i have introduced it4 ,well1 he persisted1 considering how improbable the hypothesis is1 ,i should be very loth to admit that it is one which it is practically necessary to adopt4 ,and ,i still maintain that most people do not require it--ordinary simple people1 ,i mean1 who do their work and make no fuss about it4 ,perhaps not1 ,i replied1 for it is characteristic of such people to make no hypothesis at all1 but to adopt for the moment any view suggested by the state of their spirits4 ,but ,i believe that if ever you can get a man1 no matter how plain and unsophisticated1 to reflect fairly upon his own experience1 and to look impartially at the facts all round1 abstracting from all bias of habit and mood and prejudice1 he will admit that if it be true that the individual is extinguished at death1 together with all his possibilities of realizing ,good1 then life cannot rationally be judged to be worth the living1 however imperatively we may be compelled to continue to live it4 ,but it ,is just that imperative compulsion1 cried ,parry1 on which ,i rely6 ,that seems to me the justification of life--the fact that we are forced to live6 ,i trust that instinct more than all the inclination in the world6 ,but1 ,i said1 when you say that you trust the instinct1 do you mean that you judge it to be good8 ,yes1 ,i suppose so4 ,then in trusting the instinct you are really trusting your reason1 which judges the instinct to be good1 or1 if not your reason1 the faculty1 whatever it be1 which judges of ,good4 ,and the only difference between us is1 that ,i try to ascertain what we do really believe to be good1 whereas you accept and cling to a particular judgment about ,good1 without any attempt to test it and harmonize it with others4 ,but you admit yourself that all your results are tentative and problematical in the extreme4 ,certainly4 ,and yet these results you venture to set in opposition to a simple1 profound1 imperative cry of ,nature6 ,why should ,i not8 ,for ,i have no right to suppose that nature is good1 except in so far as ,i can reasonably judge her to be so4 ,that seems to me a sort of blasphemy4 ,i am afraid1 ,i said1 if ,i must choose1 ,i would rather blaspheme ,nature than ,reason4 ,but ,i hope ,i am not blaspheming either4 ,for it may be that what you call ,nature has provided for the realization of ,good4 ,that1 at any rate1 is the hypothesis ,i was suggesting2 and it is you who appear to be setting it aside4 ,but1 objected ,wilson1 you talk of this hypothesis as if it were something one could really entertain6 ,to me it is not a hypothesis at all2 it's simply an inconceivability4 ,do you mean that it is self-contradictory8 ,no1 not exactly that4 ,simply that it is unimaginable4 ,oh6 ,i said2 but what one can imagine depends on the quality of one's imagination6 ,to me1 for example1 the immortality of the soul does not seem any harder to imagine than birth and life1 and death and consciousness4 ,it's all such a mystery together1 if once one begins trying to realize it4 ,no one1 interposed ,ellis1 has put that point better than ,walt ,whitman4 ,true1 ,i replied1 and that reminds me that ,i think you hardly did justice to his view when you were quoting him a little while ago4 ,it is true that he does1 as you said1 accept all facts1 good and bad1 and even appears at times to obliterate the distinction between them4 ,but also1 whether consistently or no1 he regards them all as phases of a process1 good only because of what they promise to be4 ,so that his view really requires a belief in immortality to justify it2 and to him such belief is as natural and simple as to ,wilson it is absurd4 ,there is a passage somewhere1 ,i remember--perhaps you can quote it--it begins1 ',is it wonderful that ,i should be immortal8' ,yes1 he said1 ,i remember3 ,is it wonderful that ,i should be immortal8 as every one is immortal2 ,i know it is wonderful--but my eyesight is equally wonderful1 and how ,i was conceived in my mother's womb is equally wonderful1 ,and passed from a babe1 in the creeping trance of a couple of summers and winters to articulate and walk4 ,all this is equally wonderful4 ,and that my soul embraces you this hour1 and we affect each other without ever seeing each other1 and never perhaps to see each other1 is every bit as wonderful4 ,and that ,i can think such thoughts as these is just as wonderful1 ,and that ,i can remind you1 and you think them and know them to be true1 is just as wonderful4 ,and that the moon spins round the earth1 and on with the earth1 is equally wonderful1 ,and that they balance themselves with the sun and stars is equally wonderful4 ,that1 ,i said1 is the passage ,i meant1 and it shows that ,whitman1 at any rate1 did not share ,wilson's feeling that the immortality of the soul is unimaginable4 ,well1 said ,wilson1 imaginable or no1 we have no reason to believe it to be true4 ,no reason1 indeed1 ,i agreed1 so far as demonstration is concerned1 though equally1 as ,i think1 no reason to deny it4 ,but the point ,i raised was1 whether1 if we are to take a positive view of life and hold that it somehow has a good significance1 we are not bound to adopt this1 hypothesis of immortality--to believe1 that is1 that1 somehow or other1 there awaits us a state of being in which all souls shall be bound together in that harmonious and perfect relation of which we have a type and foretaste in what we call love4 ,for1 if it be true that perfect ,good does involve some such relation1 and yet that it is one unattainable under the conditions of our present life1 then we must say either that such ,good is unattainable--and in that case why should we idly pursue it8--or that we believe we shall attain it under some other conditions of existence4 ,and according as we adopt one or the other position--so it seems to me--our attitude towards life will be one of affirmation or of negation4 ,but1 he objected1 even if you were right in your conception of ,good1 and even if it be true that ,good in its perfection is unattainable1 yet we might still choose to get at least what ,good we can--and some ,good you admit we can get--and might find in that pursuit a sufficient justification for life4 ,we might1 indeed1 ,i admitted1 but also we might very well find1 that the ,good we can attain is so small1 and the ,evil so immensely preponderant1 that we ought to labour rather to bring to an end an existence so pitiful than to perpetuate it indefinitely in the persons of our luckless descendants4 ,that1 thank heaven1 said ,parry1 is not the view which is taken by the ,western world4 ,the ,west ,i replied1 has not yet learned to reflect4 ,its activity is the slave of instinct1 blind and irresponsible4 ,yes1 he assented eagerly1 and that is its saving grace6 ,this instinct1 which you call blind1 is health and sanity and vigour4 ,i know1 ,i said1 that you think so1 and so does ,mr4 ,kipling1 and all the train of violent and bloody bards who follow the camp of the modern army of progress4 ,i have no quarrel with you or with them2 you may very well be right in your somewhat savage worship of activity4 ,i am only trying to ascertain the conditions of your being right1 and ,i seem to find it in personal immortality4 ,no1 he persisted4 ,we are right without condition1 right absolutely and beyond all argument4 ,pursue ,good is the one ultimate law2 whether or no it can be attained is a minor matter2 and if to inquire into the conditions of its attainment is only to weaken us in the pursuit1 then ,i say the inquiry is wrong1 and ought to be discouraged4 ,well ,i said1 ,i will not dispute with you further4 ,whether you are right or wrong ,i cannot but admire your strenuous belief in ,good and in our obligation to pursue it4 ,and that1 after all1 was my main point4 ,on the other question about what ,good is and whether it is attainable1 ,i could hardly wish to make converts1 so conscious am ,i that ,i have infinitely more to learn than to teach4 ,only1 that there is really something to learn1 of that ,i am profoundly convinced4 ,perhaps even ,audubon will agree with me there8 ,i don't know that ,i do1 he replied1 and anyhow it doesn't seem to me to make much difference4 ,whatever we may think about ,good1 that doesn't affect the nature of ,reality--and ,reality1 ,i believe1 is bad6 ,ah1 ,reality6 ,i rejoined1 but what is ,reality8 ,is it just what we see and touch and handle8 ,yes1 ,i suppose so4 ,that is a sober view1 and one which ,i have constantly tried to impress upon myself4 ,sometimes1 even1 ,i think ,i have succeeded1 under the combined stress of logic and experience4 ,but there comes an unguarded moment1 some evening in summer1 like this1 when ,i am walking1 perhaps1 alone in a solitary wood1 or in a meadow beside a quiet stream2 and suddenly all my work is undone1 and ,i am overwhelmed by a direct apprehension1 or what seems at least for the moment to be such1 that everything ,i hear and see and touch is mere illusion after all1 and behind it lies the true ,reality1 if only ,i could find the way to seize it4 ,it is due1 ,i suppose1 to some native and ineradicable strain of mysticism2 or perhaps1 as ,i sometimes think1 to the memory of a strange experience which ,i once underwent and have never been able to forget ,what was that8 ,it will not be very easy1 ,i fear1 to describe1 but perhaps it may be worth while to make the attempt1 for it bears1 more or less1 on the subject of our conversation4 ,once then1 you must know1 and once only1 a good many years ago now1 ,i was put under the influence of ansthetics2 and during the time ,i was unconscious1 or rather1 conscious in a new way1 ,i had a very curious dream1 if dream it were1 which has never ceased to affect my thoughts and my life4 ,it was as follows3 ,as soon as ,i lost consciousness of the world without1 my soul1 ,i thought1 which seemed at first to be diffused throughout my body1 began to draw itself upward1 beginning at the feet4 ,it passed through the veins of the legs and belly to the heart1 which was beating like a thousand drums1 and thence by the aorta and the carotids to the brain1 whence it emerged by the fissures of the skull into the outer air4 ,no sooner was it free 7though still attached1 as ,i felt with some uneasiness1 by a thin elastic cord to the pia mater7 than it gathered itself together 7into what form ,i could not say71 and with incredible speed shot upwards1 till it reached what seemed to be the floor of heaven4 ,through this it passed1 ,i know not how1 and found itself all at once in a new world4 ,what this world was like ,i must now endeavour to explain1 difficult though it be to find suitable language2 for the things here1 of which our words are symbols1 are themselves only symbols of the things there4 ,the feeling ,i had1 however1 7for ,i was now identified with my soul1 and had forgotten all about my body7--the feeling ,i had was that of sitting alone beside a river4 ,what kind of country it was ,i can hardly describe1 for there was nowhere any definite colour or form1 only a suggestion1 such as ,i have seen in drawings1 of vast infinite tracts of empty space4 ,i could not even say there was light or darkness1 for my organ of perception did not seem to be the eye2 only ,i was aware of an emotional effect similar to that of twilight1 cold1 grey1 and formless as night itself4 ,the silence was absolute1 if indeed silence it were1 for it was not by the ear that ,i perceived either sound or its absence2 but something there was1 analogous to silence in its effect ,and in the midst of the silence and the twilight 7since so ,i must call them7 flowed the river1 or what seemed such1 distinguishable1 as ,i thought at first1 rather by the fact that it flowed1 than by any peculiarity of substance1 colour1 or form1 from the stretches of empty space that formed its banks4 ,but presently1 as ,i looked more closely1 ,i saw1 rising from its surface1 dipping1 rising1 and dipping again1 in a regular rhythm1 without change or pause1 what ,i can only compare to a shoal of flying fish4 ,not that they looked like fish1 or indeed like anything ,i had ever seen1 but that was the image suggested by their motion4 ,as soon as ,i saw them ,i knew what they were3 they were souls2 and the river down which they passed was the river of ,time2 and their dipping in and out again was the sequence of their lives and deaths4 ,all this did not surprise me at all4 ,rather1 ,i felt it was something ,i had always known1 yet something inexpressibly flat and disillusioning4 ',of course6' ,i said to myself1 or thought1 or whatever may have been my mode of cognition--',of course6 ,that is it1 and that is all6 ,souls are indeed immortal--why should we ever have imagined otherwise8 ,they are immortal1 and what of it8 ,i see the death-side now as ,i saw the life-side then2 and one has as little meaning as the other4 ,as it has been1 so it will be1 now1 henceforth1 and for ever1 in and out1 in and out1 without pause or stint1 futile1 trivial1 silly1 stale1 tedious1 monotonous1 and vain6' ,the long pre-occupation of men with religion1 philosophy1 and art1 seemed to me now as incomprehensible as it was ridiculous4 ,there was nothing after all to be interested about6 ,there was simply this6 ,the dreariness of my mood was indescribable1 and corresponded so closely to the scene before me that ,i found myself wondering which was effect1 which cause4 ,the silence1 the tracts of unformed space1 the unsubstantial river1 the ceaseless vibration along its surface of infinite moving points1 all this was a reflex of my thoughts and they of it4 ,my misery was ,intolerable2 to escape became my only object2 and with this in view ,i rose and began to move1 ,i knew not whither1 along the silent shore4 ,as ,i went1 ,i presently became aware of what looked like high towers standing along the margin of the stream4 ,i say they looked like towers1 but ,i should rather have said they symbolized them2 for they had no specific shape1 round or square1 nor any definite substance or dimensions4 ,they suggested rather1 if ,i may say so1 the idea of verticality2 and otherwise were as blank and void of form or colour as everything else in this strange land4 ,i made my way towards them along the bank2 and when ,i had come close under the first1 ,i saw that there was a door in it1 and written over the door1 in a language ,i cannot now recall1 but which then ,i knew that ,i had always known1 an inscription whose sense was3 ',i am the ,eye2 come into me and see4' ,miserable as ,i was1 it was impossible that ,i should hesitate2 ,i did not know1 it is true1 what might await me within1 but it could not be worse and might well be better than my present plight4 ,the door was open2 ,i stepped in2 and no sooner had ,i crossed the threshold than ,i was aware of an experience more extraordinary and delightful than it had ever been my lot to encounter4 ,i had the sensation of seeing light for the first time6 ,for hitherto1 as ,i have tried to explain1 though it has been necessary to speak in terms of sight1 ,i have done so only by a metaphor1 and it was not really by vision that ,i became acquainted with the scene ,i have described4 ,but now ,i saw1 and saw pure light6 ,and yet not only saw1 but1 as ,i thought apprehended it with the other senses1 both with those we know and with others of which we have not yet dreamt4 ,i heard light1 ,i tasted and touched it1 it enveloped and embraced me2 ,i swam in it as in an element1 wafted and washed and luxuriantly lapped4 ,pure light1 and nothing else6 ,no objects1 at first6 ,it was only by degrees1 and as the first intoxication subsided1 that ,i began to be aware of anything but the medium itself4 ,i saw then that ,i was standing at what seemed to be a window1 looking out over the scene ,i had just left ,but how changed it was6 ,the river now1 like a blue and golden snake1 ran through a sunny champaign bright with flowers2 above it hung a cloudless summer sky2 and the happy souls went leaping in and out like dolphins on a calm day in the ,mediterranean4 ,on all this ,i gazed with inexpressible delight2 but as ,i looked an extraordinary thing occurred4 ,the flowery plain before me seemed to globe itself into a sphere2 the blue river clasped it like a girdle2 for a moment it hung before me like a star1 then opened out and split into a thousand more1 and these again into others and yet others1 till a whole heaven of stars was revolving about me in the most wonderful dance-measure you can conceive1 infinitely complex1 but never for a moment confused1 for the stars were of various colours1 more beautiful far than any of ours1 and by these1 as they crossed and intertwined in exquisite harmonies1 the threads of the intricate figure were kept distinct4 ,what ,i was looking upon1 ,i knew1 was the same heaven that our astronomers describe2 only ,i was privileged actually to perceive the movements they can only infer and predict4 ,for here on earth our faculties are proportioned to our needs1 and our apprehension of time and change is measured by units too small for us to be able to embrace by sense the large and spacious circuits of the stars4 ,but ,i1 in my then condition1 had powers commensurate with all existence2 so that not only could ,i follow with the eye the coils of that celestial morrice1 but in each one of the whirling orbs1 as they approached or receded in the dance1 ,i could trace1 so far as ,i was minded1 the course of its secular history2 whole series of changes and transformations such as we laboriously infer1 from fossils and rocks and hard unmalleable things1 being there 7as though petrifaction were reversed and solidest things made fluid7 unrolled before me1 molten and glowing and swift1 in a stream of torrential evolution whose moments were centuries4 ,wonderful it was1 and strange1 to see the first trembling film creep like a mantle over a globe of fire1 shiver1 and break1 and form again1 and gradually harden and cohere1 now crushed into ridges and pits1 now extended into plains1 and tossing the hissing seas from bed to bed1 as the levels of the viscous surface rose and fell4 ,wonderful1 too1 when the crust was formed and life became possible1 how everywhere1 in wet or dry1 hot or cold alike1 wherever footing could be found1 came up and flourished and decayed things that root and things that move1 winged or finned or legged1 creeping1 flying1 running1 breeding1 in mud or sand1 in jungle1 forest1 and marsh1 pursuing and pursued1 devouring and devoured1 pairing1 contending1 killing1 things huge beyond belief1 mammoth and icthyosaurus1 things minute and numerous past the power of calculation1 coming and going as they could find space1 species succeeding to species1 and crowding every point and vantage for life on the heaving tumultuous bosom of eddying worlds4 ,wonderful it was1 but terrible1 too2 for what struck me with a kind of chill1 even while ,i was wrapt in admiration1 was the fact that though everything was in constant change1 and in the change there was clearly an order and routine1 yet ,i could not detect anything that seemed like purpose4 ,direction there was1 but not direction to an end2 for the end was no better than the beginning1 it was only different2 the idea of ,good1 in short1 did not apply4 ,and this fact1 which was striking enough in the case of the phenomena ,i have described1 made itself felt with even more insistence when ,i turned to consider the course of human history4 ,for that too ,i saw unrolled before me1 not only on our own1 but on innumerable other worlds1 in various phases and in various forms1 both those which we know1 and others of which we have no conception1 and which ,i am now quite unable to recall4 ,men ,i saw housing in caves1 or on piles in swamps and lakes1 dwellers in wagons and tents1 hunters1 or shepherds under the stars1 men of the mountain1 men of the plain1 of the river-valley and the coast1 nomad tribes1 village tribes1 cities1 kingdoms1 empires1 wars and peace1 politics1 laws1 manners1 arts and sciences4 ,yet in all this1 so far as ,i could observe1 although1 through all vacillations1 there appeared to be a steady trend in a definite direction1 there was nothing to indicate what we call purpose4 ,men1 ,i saw1 had ideas about ,good1 but these ideas of theirs1 though they were part of the efficient causes of events1 were in no sense the explanation of the process4 ,there was no explanation1 for there was no final cause1 no purpose1 end1 or justification at all4 ,man1 like nature1 was the plaything of a blind fate4 ,the idea of ,good had no application4 ,the horror ,i felt as this truth 7for so ,i thought it7 was borne in upon me was proportioned to my previous delight4 ,i had now but one desire1 to escape1 even though it were only back to what ,i had left4 ,and as the ,angel-,boys in ',faust' cry out to ,pater ,seraphicus for release1 when they can no longer bear the sights they see through his eyes1 so ,i1 in my anguish1 cried1 ',let me out6 ,let me out6' ,and instantly ,i found myself standing again at the foot of the tower1 in that land of twilight1 silence1 and infinite space1 with the souls going down the river1 in and out1 in and out1 futile1 trivial1 tedious1 monotonous1 and vain4 ,looking up1 ,i saw written over the door from which ,i had emerged1 and which was opposite to that by which ,i had entered1 words whose sense was3 ',eye hath not seen4' ,i walked round the ,tower1 and found a third door facing the river2 and over that was written3 ',turris scientiae4' ,but all these doors were now closed2 nor indeed1 had they been open1 should ,i have felt any inclination to renew the experience from which ,i had escaped4 ,i therefore turned away sadly enough and made my way along the bank towards the second tower4 ,over the door of this was written in the same language as before3 ',i am the ,ear2 come into me and hear4' ,the door was open1 and ,i went in1 this time with some apprehension1 but with still more curiosity and hope4 ,no sooner was ,i within than ,i was overwhelmed by an experience analogous to that which had greeted me in the ,tower of ,sight1 but even more ravishingly sweet4 ,this time what ,i felt was the sensation of pure sound3 sound1 not merely heard1 but1 as before in the case of light1 apprehended at once by every avenue of sense1 and folding and sustaining1 as it seemed1 my whole being in a clear and buoyant element of tone4 ,it was only by degrees that out of this absolute essence of sheer sound distinctions of rhythm and pitch began to appear1 and to assume definite musical form4 ,the theme at first was pastoral and sweet1 suggestive of rustling grasses and murmuring reeds1 interwoven with which was an exquisite lilting tune1 the song of the souls as they sped down the river4 ,but one by one other elements crept into the strain2 it increased in volume and variety of tone1 in complexity of rhythm and tune1 till it grew at length into a symphony so august1 so solemn1 and so profound1 that there is nothing ,i know of in our music here to which ,i can fitly compare it4 ,it reminded me1 however1 of ,wagner more than of any other composer1 in the richness of its colour1 the insistence and force of its rhythms1 its fragments of ineffable melody1 and above all1 its endless chromatic sequences1 for ever suggesting but never actually reaching the full close which ,i knew not whether most to dread or to desire4 ,the music itself was wonderful enough2 but more wonderful still was my clear perception1 while ,i listened1 that what was being presented to me now through the medium of sound was precisely the same world which ,i had seen from the ,tower of ,sight4 ,every phenomenon1 and sequence of phenomena1 which ,i had witnessed there1 ,i recognized now1 in appropriate musical form4 ,the foundation of all was a great basal rhythm1 given out on something that throbbed like drums1 terrible in its persistence and yet beautiful too2 and this1 ,i knew1 represented the mechanical basis of the world1 the processes which science knows as 'laws of motion' and the like1 but which really1 as ,i then perceived1 might more aptly be described as the more inveterate of ,nature's habits4 ,upon this foundation1 which varied1 indeed1 but by almost imperceptible gradations1 was built up an infinitely complex structure of intermediate parts1 increasing from below upwards in freedom1 ease and beauty of form1 till high above all floated on the ear snatches of melody1 haunting1 poignant1 meltingly tender1 or1 as it might be1 martial and gay exquisite in themselves1 yet never complete1 fragments rather1 as it seemed1 of some theme yet to come1 which they had hardly time to suggest before they were torn1 as it were1 from their roots and sent drifting down the stream1 to reappear in new settings1 richer combinations1 and fairer forms2 and these1 ,i knew1 were symbols of the lives and deaths of conscious beings4 ,as this character of the music and its representative meaning grew gradually clearer to me1 there began to mingle with my delight a certain feeling of anguish4 ,for while1 on the one hand1 ,i passionately desired to hear given out in full the theme which as yet had been only suggested in fragmentary hints1 on the other1 ,i knew that with its appearance the music would come to a close1 just at the moment when its cessation would involve the keenest revulsion of feeling4 ,and this moment1 ,i felt1 was rapidly approaching4 ,the rhythm grew more and more rapid1 the instruments scaled higher and higher1 the tension of chromatic progressions was strained to what seemed breaking point1 till suddenly1 with an effect as though a stream1 long pent in a gorge1 had escaped with a burst into broad sunny meadows1 the whole symphony broke away into the major key1 and high and clear1 chanted1 as it seemed1 on ten thousand trumpets1 silver1 thereal1 and exquisitely sweet for all their resonant clangour1 ,i heard the ultimate melody of things4 ,for a moment only2 for1 as ,i had foreseen1 with the emergence of that air1 the music came abruptly to a close2 and ,i found myself sitting bathed in tears at the door of the tower on the opposite side to that by which ,i had entered2 and there once more was the land of silence1 twilight1 and infinite space1 with the souls going down the river1 in and out1 in and out1 futile1 trivial1 tedious1 monotonous and vain6 ,as soon as ,i had recovered myself1 ,i looked up and saw written over the door the inscription3 ',ear hath not heard4' ,and going round to the side facing the river1 ,i saw there inscribed3 ',turris ,artis8' ,whereupon1 full of perplexity1 ,i made my way down towards the third tower1 reflecting1 as ,i went2 in a curious passion at once of hope and fear1 ',neither this1 then1 nor that1 neither ,eye nor ,ear1 has given me what ,i sought4 ,each is a symbol2 but this1 as it seems1 a more perfect symbol than that2 for it1 at least1 is ,beauty1 and the other was only ,power4 ,but is there1 then1 nothing but symbols8 ,or shall ,i1 in one of these towers1 shall ,i perhaps find the thing that is symbolized8' ,by this time ,i had reached the third tower1 and over the door facing me ,i saw written3 ',i am the ,heart2 come into me and feel4' ,i entered without hesitation1 and this time ,i was met by an experience even stranger and more delightful than before1 but also1 ,i fear1 more indescribable4 ,at first1 ,i was aware of nothing but a pure feeling1 which was not of any particular sense1 7as1 before1 of sight and hearing17 but was rather1 ,i think1 the general feeling of ,life itself1 the kind of diffused sensation of well-being one has in health1 underlying all particular activities4 ,in this sensation ,i seemed1 as before1 to be lapped1 as in an element2 but this time the feeling did not pass4 ,on the contrary1 ,i found1 when ,i came to myself1 that ,i actually was in the river1 leaping along with the other souls in such an ecstasy of physical delight as ,i have never felt before or since4 ,such1 at least1 was my first impression2 but gradually it changed into something which ,i despair of rendering in words1 for indeed ,i can hardly render it in my own thoughts4 ,conceive1 however1 that as1 according to the teaching of science1 every part of matter is affected by every other1 insomuch that1 as they say1 the fall of an apple disturbs the balance of the universe2 so1 in my experience then1 7and this1 ,i believe1 is really true7 all souls were intimately connected by spiritual ties4 ,nothing that happened in one but was somehow or other1 more or less obscurely1 reflected in the rest1 so that all were so closely involved and embraced in a network of fine relations that they formed what may be compared to a planetary system1 sustained in their various orbits by force of attraction and repulsion1 distinguished into greater and lesser constellations1 and fulfilling in due proportion their periods and paths under the control of spiritual laws4 ,of this system ,i was myself a member2 about me were grouped some of my dearest friends2 and beyond and around stretched away1 like infinite points of light1 in a clear heaven of passion1 the world of souls4 ,i speak1 of course1 in a figure1 for what ,i am describing in terms of space1 ,i apprehended through the medium of feeling2 and by 'feeling' ,i mean all degrees of affection1 from extreme of love to extreme of hate4 ,for hate there was1 as well as love1 the one representing repulsion1 the other attraction2 and by their joint influence the whole system was sustained4 ,it was not1 however1 in equilibrium2 at least1 not in stable equilibrium4 ,there was a trend1 as ,i soon became aware1 towards a centre4 ,the energy of love was constantly striving to annihilate distance and unite in a single sphere the scattered units that were only kept apart by the energy of hate4 ,this effort ,i felt proceeding in every particular group1 and1 more faintly1 from one group to another3 ,i felt it with an intensity at once of pain and of rapture1 such as ,i cannot now even imagine1 much less describe2 and most of all did ,i feel it within the limits of my own group1 of which some of those now present were members4 ,but within this group in particular ,i was aware of an extraordinary resistance4 ,one of its members1 ,i thought1 7,i mention no names17 steadily refused either to form a closer union with the rest of us1 or to enter into more intimate relations with other groups4 ,this resistance ,i felt in the form of an indescribable tension1 a tension which grew more and more acute1 till suddenly the whole system seemed to collapse1 and ,i found myself in darkness and alone1 being dragged down1 down1 by the cord which attached me to my body4 ,at the same time there was a roaring in my ears1 and ,i saw my body1 as ,i thought1 like a fearful wild beast with open jaws2 it swallowed me down1 and ,i awoke with a shock to find myself in the operator's room1 with a voice in my ears which somehow sounded like ,audubon's1 though ,i afterwards ascertained it was really that of the assistant1 uttering the rather ridiculous words1 ',i don't see why6' ,that1 then1 was the end of my dream1 and ,i have never since been able to continue it1 and to discover what was written over the other doors of the third tower1 or what lay within the towers ,i did not enter4 ,so that ,i have had to go on ever since with the knowledge ,i then acquired1 that whatever ,reality may ultimately be1 it is in the life of the affections1 with all its confused tangle of loves and hates1 attractions1 repulsions1 and1 worst of all1 indifferences1 it is in this intricate commerce of souls that we may come nearest to apprehending what perhaps we shall never wholly apprehend1 but the quest of which alone1 as ,i believe1 gives any significance to life1 and makes it a thing which a wise and brave man will be able to persuade himself it is right to endure4 ,with that ,i ended2 and ,wilson was just beginning to explain to me that my dream had no real significance1 but was just a confused reproduction of what ,i must have been thinking about before ,i took the ther1 when we were interrupted by the arrival of tea4 ,in the confusion that ensued ,audubon came over to me and said3 ,it was curious your dreaming that about me1 for it is exactly the way ,i should behave4 ,of course it is1 ,i replied1 and that1 no doubt1 is why ,i dreamt it4 ,well1 he said1 you can say what you like1 but ,i really do not see why6 ,and with that the conversation ,i had to report closed4