,,recent ,,tendencies ,,in ,,ethics     
,three ,lectures to ,clergy ,given at   
,cambridge    ,,by    ,w4 ,r4 ,,sorley1 
,m4,a4 ,,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 ,,edin4          
,knightbridge ,professor of ,moral      
,philosophy    ,,mcmiv                  
,,preface      ,these lectures were     
given to a summer meeting of clergy1    
held at  ,cambridge in the month of     
,july last4 ,some passages have been    
added as  they were written out for the 
press1 and the crudities of the spoken  
word have1 ,i hope1 been pruned away2   
but1 in other respects1 the  original   
plan of the lectures has been retained4 
,they are now  published in the hope    
that they may prove of interest to those
 who  heard them1 and to others who may 
desire an account1 in short compass  and
 in popular form1 of some leading       
features of the ethical thought  of the 
present day4    ,it is inevitable for   
such an account to be controversial3    
otherwise it  could not give a true     
picture of contemporary opinion4        

,intellectual  and social causes have   
conspired to accentuate traditional     
differences  in ethics1 and to make the 
questions in dispute penetrate to the   
very  heart of morality4 ,it has been my
 aim to trace the new influences  which 
are at work1 and to estimate the value  
of the ethical doctrines  to which they 
have seemed to lead4 ,the estimate has  
taken the form of  a criticism1 but the 
criticism is in the interests of        
construction4    ,w4,r4 ,,sorley4       
,,cambridge1 #gth ,march1 #aijd4        
,,contents4      ,i4 ,,characteristics  
,,ii4 ,,ethics ,,and ,,evolution  ,,iii4
 ,,ethics ,,and ,,idealism    ,,index   
,i4    ,,characteristics4      ,a survey
 of ethical thought1 especially ,english
 ethical thought1  during the last      
century would have to lay stress upon   
one  characteristic feature4 ,it was    
limited in range1--limited1 one may     
say1 by its regard for the importance of
 the facts with which it  had to deal4  
,the thought of the period was certainly

 not without  controversy2 it was indeed
 controversial almost to a fault4 ,but  
the controversies of the time centred   
almost exclusively round two  questions3
 the question of the origin of moral    
ideas1 and the question  of the         
criterion of moral value4 ,these        
questions were of course  traditional in
 the schools of philosophy2 and for more
 than a century  ,english moralists were
 mainly occupied with inherited topics  
of  debate4 ,they gave precision to the 
questions under discussion2 and  their  
controversies defined the traditional   
opposition of ethical  opinion1 and     
separated moralists into two hostile    
schools known as  ,utilitarian and      
,intuitionist4    ,as regards the former
 question--that of the origin of moral  
ideas--the  ,utilitarian ,school held   
that they could be traced to experience2
 and  by 'experience' they meant in the 
last resort sense-perceptions  and the  
feelings of pleasure and of pain which  
accompany or follow  sense-perception4  

,all the facts of our moral             
consciousness1  therefore1--the         
knowledge of right and wrong1 the       
judgments of  conscience1 the           
recognition of duty and responsibility1 
the feelings  of reverence1 remorse1 and
 moral indignation1--all these could be 
traced1 they thought1 to an origin in   
experience1 to an origin which  in the  
last resort was sensuous1 that is1 due  
to the perceptions of  the senses and   
the feelings of pleasure and pain which 
accompany or  follow them4    ,with     
regard to the criterion or standard of  
morality1--the second  question to which
 ,i have to call attention1--they held  
that the  distinction between right and 
wrong depended upon the consequences of 
an action in the way of pleasure and    
pain4 ,that action was right which  on  
the whole and in the long run would     
bring pleasure or happiness to  those   
whom it affected3 that action was wrong 
which on the whole and  in the long run 
would bring pain rather than pleasure to

 those whom it  affected4    ,from their
 view as to the origin of moral ideas1  
the school might more  properly be      
called the ,empirical ,school4 ,it is   
from their views on the  question of the
 standard of value1 or the criterion of 
morality1 that  it claimed1 and that it 
received1 the name ,utilitarian#a4 ,on  
both  these points the ,utilitarian     
,school was opposed by an energetic but 
less compact body of writers1 known as  
,intuitionists4    ,footnote #a3 ,it    
seems to have been through ,j4,s4       
,mill's influence  that the term        
obtained currency4 ,it was used by him  
as the name of a  little society to be  
composed of young men agreeing in       
fundamental  principles which he formed 
in the winter of #ahbb-bc4 ,he did not  
invent the word1 but found in one of    
,galt's novels1 the ',annals of the     
,parish4' ,with a boy's fondness for a  
name and a banner ,i seized  on the     
word1 and for some years called myself  
and others by it as  a sectarian        

appellation 7',autobiography1' pp4 #gi1 
#hj2 cf4  ',utilitarianism1' p4 #i n47  
,a couple of sentences from ,galt may be
  quoted3 ,as there was at the time a   
bruit and a sound about universal       
benevolence1 philanthropy1 utility1 and 
all the other disguises with  which an  
infidel philosophy appropriated to      
itself the charity1  brotherly love1 and
 well-doing inculcated by our holy      
religion1 ,i set  myself to task upon   
these heads4444 ,with well-doing1       
however1 ,i went  more roundly to work4 
,i told my people that ,i thought they  
had more  sense than to secede from     
,christianity to become ,utilitarians1  
for  that it would be a confession of   
ignorance of the faith they deserted1   
seeing that it was the main duty        
inculcated by our religion to do all  in
 morals and manners to which the        
new-fangled doctrine of utility         
pretended4 ,mill is wrong in supposing  
that his use of the term was  the first 
time that any one had taken the title of

 ,utilitarian2 and  ,galt1 who          
represents his annalist as writing of   
the year #agid1  is historically        
justified4 ,writing in #agha ,bentham   
uses the word  'utilitarian1' and again 
in #ahjb he definitely asserts that it  
is the  only name of his creed          
7',works1' x4 #ib1 #cib74 ,m4 ,halvy    
7',l'volution  de la doctrine           
utilitaire1' p4 #cjj7 draws attention to
 the presence of  the word in ,jane     
,austen's ',sense and ,sensibility1'    
published in #ahaa4    ,the             
,intuitionists maintained--to put the   
matter briefly--that the  moral         
consciousness of man could not be       
entirely accounted for by  experiences  
of the kind laid stress on by the       
,utilitarians4 ,they  maintained that   
moral ideas were in their origin        
spiritual1 although  they might be      
called into definite consciousness by   
the experience of  the facts to which   
they could be applied4 ,experience might
 call them  forth into the light of day2

 but it was held that they belonged1 in 
nature and origin1 to the constitution  
of man's mind4 ,on this ground1         
therefore1 the school was properly      
called ,intuitional3 they held that     
moral ideas were received by direct     
vision or intuition1 as it were1  not by
 a process of induction from particular 
facts4    ,and1 in the second place1    
with regard to the criterion of         
morality1  that also 7they held7 was not
 dependent on the consequences in the   
way of happiness and misery which the   
,utilitarians emphasised4 ,on the       
contrary1 moral ideas themselves had an 
independent validity2 they had  a worth 
and authority for conduct which could   
not be accounted for by  any            
consequences in which action resulted3  
belonging as they did to  the essence of
 the human spirit1 they also had        
authority over the  conduct of man's    
life4    ,now the ethical controversies 
of last century were almost entirely    
about these two points and between these

 two opposed schools4 ,no doubt  the two
 questions thus discussed did go very   
near to the root of the  whole matter4  
,they pointed to the consideration of   
the question of  man's place in the     
universe and his spiritual nature as    
determining  the part which it was his  
to play in the world4 ,they suggested1  
if  they did not always raise1 the      
question whether man is entirely a      
product of nature or whether he has a   
spiritual essence to which  nature may  
be subdued4 ,but the larger issues      
suggested were not  followed out4       
,common consent seemed to limit the     
discussion to the two  questions        
described2 and this limitation of the   
controversy tended to  a precision and  
clearness in method1 which is often     
wanting in the  ethical thought of the  
present day1 disturbed as it is by new  
and more  far-reaching problems4        
,this limitation of scope1 which ,i     
venture to select as the leading        
characteristic of last century's ethical

 enquiries1 may be further  seen in the 
large amount of agreement between the   
two schools  regarding the content of   
morality4 ,the ,utilitarians no more    
than  the ,intuitionists were opponents 
of the traditional--as we may call      
it--the ,christian morality of modern   
civilisation4 ,they both adopted  and   
defended the well-recognised virtues of 
truth and justice1 of  temperance and   
benevolence1 which have been accepted by
 the common  tradition of ages as the   
expression of man's moral consciousness4
 ,the  ,intuitionists no doubt were     
sometimes regarded--they may indeed have
  sometimes regarded themselves--as in a
 peculiar way the guardians of  the     
traditional morality1 and as interested 
more than their opponents  in defending 
a view in harmony with man's spiritual  
essence and  inheritance4 ,but we do not
 find any attack upon the main content  
of morality by the ,utilitarian writers4
 ,on the contrary1 they were  interested
 in vindicating their own full          

acceptance of the traditional  morality4
 ,this is1 in particular1 the case with 
,john ,stuart ,mill1 the  high-minded   
representative of the ,utilitarian      
philosophy in the middle  of last       
century4 ,in the golden rule of ,jesus  
of ,nazareth1 he says1  we read the     
complete spirit of the ethics of        
utility4 ,to do as one  would be done   
by1 and to love one's neighbour as      
oneself1 constitute  the ideal          
perfection of utilitarian morality4#a   
,footnote #a3 ,utilitarianism1 #ith ed41
 pp4 #bd1 #be4    ,no doubt ,mill was a 
practical reformer as well as a         
philosophical  thinker1 and he wished on
 certain special points to revise the   
accepted code4 ,he says that the        
received code of ethics is by no  means 
of divine right1 that mankind has still 
much to learn as to the  effects of     
actions on the general happiness4#a ,he 
would even take  this point--the        
modifiability of the ordinary moral     
code--as a sort  of test question       

distinguishing his own system from that 
of the  intuitional moralists2 and in   
one place he says that the contest      
between the morality which appeals to an
 external standard1 and  that which     
grounds itself on internal conviction1  
is the contest  of progressive morality 
against stationary--of reason and       
argument  against the deification of    
mere opinion and habit4 ,the doctrine   
that  the existing order of things is   
the natural order1 and that1 being      
natural1 all innovation upon it is      
criminal1 is as vicious in morals  as it
 is now at last admitted to be in       
physics and in society and              
government4#b    ,footnote #a3 ,ibid41  
p4 #ce4    ,footnote #b3 ,dissertations1
 ii4 #dgb4    ,a passage such as this   
leads us to ask1 ,what exactly is the   
extent of  the modifications which ,mill
 seeks to make in the ordinary scale of 
values8 ,does he1 for instance1 wish to 
invert any ordinary moral  rules8 ,would
 he do away with1 or in any important   

respect modify1 the  duties of truth or 
justice1 temperance or benevolence8 ,far
 from it ,he  only suggests1 as many    
moralists of both parties have          
suggested1 that  in the application of  
moral law to the details of experience  
certain  modifications are required4    
,how far he goes in this direction may  
be  seen from his own instance1 that of 
truth4 ,he would admit certain          
exceptions to the law of truth2 he would
 give the less rigorous  answers to the 
time-honoured questions as to whether   
one should tell  the truth to an invalid
 in a dangerous illness or to a would-be
  criminal4 ,but ,mill always asserts   
the sanctity of the general  principle2 
and1 on this account1 he holds that in  
order that the  exception may not extend
 itself beyond the need1 and may have   
the  least possible effect in weakening 
reliance on veracity1 it ought  to be   
recognised and1 if possible1 its limits 
defined2 and if the  principle of       
utility is good for anything1 it must be

 good for  weighing these conflicting   
utilities against one another1 and      
marking  out the region within which one
 or the other preponderates#a4 ,he      
holds that there are such limits to     
veracity4 ,he even thinks--though  here 
he is not quite correct--that such      
limits have been acknowledged  by all   
moralists#b4 ,he would have been correct
 if he had said that  they had been     
acknowledged by moralists of all        
schools3 the admission  of these limits 
is not peculiar to ,utilitarians4 ,but  
he vigorously  defends the validity of  
the general rule1 and maintains that1 in
  considering any possible exception1 we
 have to take account not merely  of the
 present utility of the falsehood1 but  
of its effect upon the  sanctity of the 
general principle in the minds of men4  
,the ,utilitarian  doctrine is expressly
 used by him to confirm the ordinary    
general laws  of the moral              
consciousness4 ,nay1 these rules--such  
as the duties of  being temperate and   

just and benevolent--were1 according to 
,mill1  themselves the result of        
experiences of utility on the part of   
our  predecessors1 and from them handed 
down to us by the tradition of the      
race4 ,no doubt in this ,mill is        
applying a theoretical view too easily  
to a question of history4 ,it is one    
thing to maintain1 as he does1  that    
utility is the correct test of morality2
 it is another thing  altogether to say 
that our ordinary moral rules are the   
records or  expressions of earlier      
judgments of utility4 ,the former       
statement  is made as a controversial   
statement which is admitted to be so    
far doubtful that most men need to be   
convinced of it4 ,the latter  statement 
could only be true if nobody had ever   
doubted the former--if  everybody in    
past ages had accepted utility as the   
standard of  morality4 ,but1 for our    
present purpose1 his attitude to this   
question  is of interest only as        
bringing out the point that the         

different  schools of ethical thought   
during last century had a large basis of
  common agreement1 and that this basis 
of common agreement was their           
acknowledgment of the validity of the   
moral rules recognised by the  ordinary 
conscience4    ,footnote #a3            
,utilitarianism1 p4 #cd4    ,footnote   
#b3 ,ibid41 p4 #cc4    ,the             
,utilitarians no more than the          
,intuitionists sought to make  any      
fundamental change in the content of    
right and of wrong as  acknowledged by  
modern society4 ,their controversies    
were almost  entirely of what may be    
called an academic kind1 and1 however   
decided1  would have little effect upon 
a man's practical attitude4 ,but it     
would  not be possible to make any such 
confident assertion regarding the       
ethical controversies of the present    
day4 ,we have no longer the same  common
 basis of agreement to rely upon that   
our predecessors had a  generation ago4 
,there are many indications in recent   

literature that  the suggestion is now  
made more readily than it was twenty or 
thirty  years ago that the scale of     
moral values may have to be revised2 and
  it seems to me that the ethical       
controversies of the coming generation  
will not be restricted to academic      
opponents whose disputes concern        
nothing more than the origin of moral   
ideas and their ultimate  criterion4    
,modern controversy will involve these  
questions1 but it  will go deeper and it
 will spread its results wider3 it      
appears as  if it would not hesitate to 
call in question the received code of   
morality1 and to revise our standard of 
right and wrong4 ,one school at  any    
rate has already made a claim of this   
sort1 and the extravagance  of its      
teaching has not prevented it from      
attracting adherents4    ,it is on this 
ground1 therefore1--because ,i believe  
that the ethical  question is no longer 
so purely an academic question as it was
 some  years ago1 because it affects not

 only the philosophic thinker but the   
practical man who is concerned with the 
problems of his day1--that ,i  have     
selected the topic for these lectures4  
,it is not merely that many  modern     
writers assert some general doctrine as 
to the relativity of  right and wrong4  
,so much was implied1 though it was not 
much laid  stress upon1 in the          
utilitarian doctrine4 ,for the          
utilitarian conduct  is right according 
to the amount of happiness it produces3 
goodness  is relative to its tendency to
 produce happiness4 ,but a much greater 
importance may attach to the assertion  
of the relativity of morals  when one   
couples that doctrine with the idea now 
prevalent of the  indefinitely great    
changes which the progress of the race  
brings  about1 not only in the social   
order but also in the structure and     
faculties of man himself4    ,hence it  
is not surprising to find that there are
 at the present day  some writers who   
ask for nothing less than a revision of 

the whole  traditional morality1 and in 
whose minds that demand is connected    
with  the dominant doctrine of progress 
as it is expressed in the theory of     
evolution4    ,perhaps we might trace   
the beginnings of this controversy as to
 the  content of what is right and what 
is wrong to an older opposition  in     
ethical thought1 an opposition which    
especially affects the  utilitarian     
doctrine--the controversy of ,egoism and
 ,altruism4 ,if  we look at these two   
conceptions of egoism and altruism as   
the  ,utilitarians did1 if we regard the
 conception of egoism as having  to do  
with one's own personal happiness1 and  
that of altruism as  describing the     
general happiness1 the happiness of     
others rather than  of oneself1 then    
obviously the questions arise whether   
the conduct  which produces the greatest
 happiness of others will or will not   
also  produce the greatest happiness of 
the individual agent1 and which  should 
be chosen in the event of their         

disagreement4 ,is my happiness  and that
 which will tend to it always to be got 
on the same lines of  conduct as those  
which will bring about the greatest     
happiness of the  greatest number8      
,the ,utilitarian writers of last       
century were of course conscious of     
this problem1 conscious that there was a
 possible discrepancy between  egoistic 
conduct and altruistic conduct2 but they
 agreed to lay stress  upon altruistic  
results as determining moral quality4   
,their tendency  was to minimise the    
difference between the egoistic and the 
altruistic  effects of action1 and in so
 far as a difference had to be allowed  
to  emphasise the importance of the     
claims of the community at large1 that  
is1 roughly speaking1 to take the       
altruistic standpoint4 ,recent and  more
 careful investigators have brought out 
more exactly the extent  and            
significance of the divergence4 ,in     
particular this was done with  perfect  
clearness and precision by the late     

,professor ,sidgwick4  ,he showed that  
the difference--although it might be    
easily  exaggerated--was yet real and   
important1 that the two systems did not 
mean the same thing1 that we could not  
rely upon altruistic conduct  always    
being for individual benefit1 that there
 was no 'natural  identity' between     
egoism and altruism4 ,he held that      
morality1 to  save it from an unsolved  
dualism1 required a principle capable of
  reconciling the discrepancy between   
the conduct in accordance with the      
axiom of ,benevolence and the conduct in
 accordance with the equally  rational  
axiom of ,self-love4#a    ,footnote #a3 
,professor ,sidgwick's last words on the
 question are as  follows3 ,if then the 
reconciliation of duty and self-interest
 is to  be regarded as a hypothesis     
logically necessary to avoid a          
fundamental  contradiction in one chief 
department of our thought1 it remains   
to ask how far this necessity           
constitutes a sufficient reason for     

accepting this hypothesis4444 ,those who
 hold that the edifice of  physical     
science is really constructed of        
conclusions logically  inferred from    
self-evident premises1 may reasonably   
demand that any  practical judgments    
claiming philosophic certainty should be
 based on  an equally firm foundation4  
,if1 on the other hand1 we find that in 
our  supposed knowledge of the world of 
nature propositions are commonly  taken 
to be universally true1 which yet seem  
to rest on no other  grounds than that  
we have a strong disposition to accept  
them1 and  that they are indispensable  
to the systematic coherence of our      
beliefs1--it will be more difficult to  
reject a similarly supported  assumption
 in ethics1 without opening the door to 
universal  scepticism 7',methods of     
,ethics1' #fth ed41 pp4 #ejf1 #ejg74    
,but while this question of egoism and  
altruism has thus been  recognised as a 
possible source of perplexity1 affecting
 the ethical  standard itself1 both     

egoists and orthodox utilitarians have  
commonly  agreed--though for different  
reasons--to insist that morality means  
the same for them both1 and to hold with
 ,epicurus that we cannot lead  a life  
of pleasure which is not also a life of 
prudence1 honour1 and  justice4 ,it is  
only in quite recent days that a        
thoroughgoing attempt  has been made to 
revalue all the old standards of        
morality4 ,and  the attempt is made from
 a point of view which is certainly not 
altruistic4 ,the ,utilitarian writers of
 last generation1 if they  admitted the 
conflict of egoism and altruism1        
weighted every  consideration on the    
side of altruism4 ,they emphasised      
therefore the  agreement between their  
own utilitarian doctrine and the        
,christian  morality in which altruism  
is fundamental4 ,on the other hand1 the 
more  recent tendency to which ,i refer 
emphasises and exalts the egoistic      
side1 and thus accentuates the          
difference between the new moral        

code--if we may call it moral--and the  
,christian morality4    ,the boldest and
 most brilliant exponent of this        
tendency is ,friedrich  ,nietzsche#a1   
already the object of a cult in         
,germany1 and an author  to be reckoned 
with as one of the new forces in        
,european thought4 ,it  is true that    
some of the most characteristic products
 of his genius  are closely akin to the 
insanity which clouded his later years4 
,yet it  is impossible to read his      
writings without recognising his        
penetrating  insight as well as his     
abundance of virile passion4 ,besides1  
in  spite of all his extravagances--or1 
perhaps1 because of them--he is         
symptomatic of certain tendencies of the
 age4 ,nietzsche's demand  is for       
nothing less than a revision of the     
whole moral code and a  reversal of its 
most characteristic provisions4 ,and he 
has the rare  distinction of being a    
writer on morality who disclaims the    
title of  'moralist4'    ,footnote #a3  

,friedrich ,nietzsche1 the son of a     
clergyman1 was born in  ,saxony in      
#ahdd4 ,in #ahfi he became ,professor of
 ,classical ,philology  in ,basel1 and  
held this post for ten years1 though his
 work was  interrupted by ill-health for
 a long period4 ,his first book was     
published in #ahga2 the preface to the  
last was dated on the #cjth of          
,september #ahhh1 the day on which the  
first book of the ,transvaluation  of   
all ,values was completed4 ,he became   
hopelessly insane in #ahhi1 and  died in
 #aijj4 ,the reader will find a luminous
 estimate of his work  in the essay on  
,the ,life and ,opinions of ,friedrich  
,nietzsche in  ,pringle-,pattison's     
',man's ,place in the ,cosmos1' #bnd    
ed41 #aijb4    ,the ideas which         
,nietzsche expresses go to the root of  
the matter4 ,in  the first place1 he    
drew a distinction between what he      
regarded as two  different types of     
morality4 ,one of these he called the   
morality of  masters or nobles1 and he  

called the other the morality of slaves4
  ,self-reliance and courage may be     
cited as the qualities typical of the   
noble morality1 for they are the        
qualities which tend to make the man    
who possesses them a master over others1
 to give him a prominent and  powerful  
place in the world1 and to help him to  
subjugate to his will  both nature and  
his fellow-men4 ,on the other hand1     
there are the  qualities which form the 
characteristic features of ,christian   
morality--such as benevolence or love of
 one's neighbour1 the  fundamental      
precept of the ,gospels1 and the        
humility and obedience  which have been 
perhaps unduly emphasised in            
ecclesiastical ethics4  ,these are the  
qualities which he means when he speaks 
of the morality  of the slave4    ,in   
the second place1 therefore1 what is    
distinctive of ,nietzsche is  this3 that
 he explicitly rejects the ,christian   
morality1 in particular  the virtues of 
benevolence1 of obedience1 of humility3 

these are  regarded by him as belonging 
to a type of morality which is to be    
overcome and which he calls the servile 
morality4 ,he deliberately sets  in     
antithesis to one another what he calls 
,christian and what he calls  noble     
virtues3 meaning by the latter the      
qualities allied to courage1  force of  
will1 and strength of arm1 such as were 
manifested in certain  ,pagan races1 but
 above all in the heroes of the ,roman  
,republic4 ,he  would1 therefore1       
deliberately prefer the older ,pagan    
valuation of  conduct to the ,christian 
valuation4    ,in the third place1 he   
attempts what he calls a transvaluation 
of  all values4 ,every moral idea needs 
revision1 every moral idea1 every       
suggestion of value or worth in conduct1
 must be tried and tested  afresh1 and a
 new morality substituted for the old4  
,and with this  claim for revision is   
connected his idea that the egoistic    
principle  which underlies the ,pagan   
virtues preferred to the ,christian1 and

 the  higher development of the         
self-capacities to which it will lead1  
will  evolve a superior kind of         
men--,over-men or ,uebermenschen--to    
whom1  therefore1 we may look as setting
 the tone and giving the rule for       
subsequent conduct4    ,nietzsche is an 
unsystematic writer1 though none the    
less powerful on  that account4 ,he is  
apt to be perplexing to the reader who  
looks for  system or a definite and     
reasoned statement of doctrine2 but his 
aphorisms are all the more fitted to    
impress readers who are not  inclined to
 criticism1 and might shirk an elaborate
 argument4 ,it is  difficult1           
accordingly1 to select from him a series
 of propositions  that would give a     
general idea of the complete            
transmutation of  morality which he     
demands4 ,so far as ,i can make out1    
there is only one  point in which he    
still agrees with the old traditional   
morality1 and  that point seems to cause
 him no little difficulty4 ,no thinker  

can  afford to question the binding     
nature of the law of ,truth1 least of   
all a thinker so obviously in earnest   
about his own prophetic message  as     
,nietzsche was4 ,all his investigations 
presuppose the validity of  this law for
 his own thought2 all his utterances    
imply an appeal to  it2 and his         
influence depends on the confidence     
which others have in  his veracity4 ,and
 on this one point only ,nietzsche has  
to confess  himself a child of the older
 morality4 ,this book1 he says in the   
preface to one of the least paradoxical 
of his works1 ',dawn of ,day1'  ,this   
book 444 implies a contradiction and is 
not afraid of it3 in it  we break with  
the faith in morals--why8 ,in obedience 
to morality6 ,or  what name shall we    
give to that which passes therein8 ,we  
should prefer  more modest names4 ,but  
it is past all doubt that even to us a  
'thou  shalt' is still speaking1 even we
 still obey a stern law above us--and   
this is the last moral precept which    

impresses itself even upon  us1 which   
even we obey3 in this respect1 if in    
any1 we are still  conscientious        
people--viz41 we do not wish to return  
to that which we  consider outlived and 
decayed1 to something 'not worthy of    
belief1' be  it called ,god1 virtue1    
truth1 justice1 charity2 we do not      
approve of  any deceptive bridges to old
 ideals1 we are radically hostile to all
  that wants to mediate and to          
amalgamate with us2 hostile to any      
actual  religion and ,christianity2     
hostile to all the vague1 romantic1 and 
patriotic feelings2 hostile also to the 
love of pleasure and want of  principle 
of the artists who would fain persuade  
us to worship when we  no longer        
believe--for we are artists2 hostile1 in
 short1 to the whole  ,european         
,femininism 7or ,idealism1 if you prefer
 this name71 which  is ever 'elevating' 
and consequently 'degrading4' ,yet1 as  
such  conscientious people1 we          
immoralists and atheists of this day    

still  feel subject to the ,german      
honesty and piety of thousands of years'
  standing1 though as their most        
doubtful and last descendants2 nay1 in  
a certain sense1 as their heirs1 as     
executors of their inmost will1 a       
pessimist will1 as aforesaid1 which is  
not afraid of denying itself1  because  
it delights in taking a negative        
position4 ,we ourselves  are--suppose   
you want a formula--the consummate      
self-dissolution of  morals4 #a         
,footnote #a3 ,nietzsche1 ',werke1' iv4 
pp4 #h1 #i 7#ahii74 ,the translation  is
 taken 7with corrections7 from the      
,english version by ,johanna ,volz      
7#aijc74 ,nietzsche has so shocked and  
confused the ,english printer that  when
 the author writes himself an           
'immoralist' the compositor has  made   
him call himself an 'immortalist4' ,and 
errors of the sort do not  affect the   
printer only4 ,nietzsche's sneer at     
',femininism' is deftly  turned aside by
 ,miss ,volz1 by the simple device of   

substituting for  it the word           
,pessimism4 ,and ,dr ,tille1 the        
translator of his best-known  work1     
',thus spake ,zarathustra' 7#ahif1 p4   
xix71 has been bemused in  an even more 
wonderful manner4 ,he enumerates the    
best known  representatives of ,anarchic
 tendencies in political thought as     
,humboldt1 ,dunoyer1 ,stirner1          
,bakounine1 and ,auberon ,spencer6 ,the 
vision of ,mr ,auberon ,herbert and ,mr 
,herbert ,spencer doubled up into a     
single individual is 'a thing           
imagination boggles at4' ,perhaps it is 
the translator's idea of the            
,uebermensch4    ,perhaps it is         
impossible to understand ,nietzsche     
unless one admits  that his writings    
show traces of the disease which very   
soon prevented  his writing at all4 ,but
 at the same time1 while that is true1  
there is  much more in his work than the
 ravings of a distempered mind4 ,there  
may have been little method1 but there  
was a great deal of genius1 in  his     

madness4 ,while he always overstates his
 case1--his colossal egoism  leads him  
to exaggerate any doctrine1--and while  
,i do not think that  the actual        
doctrines of ,nietzsche in the way he   
puts them will ever  gain any general   
acceptance1 while his system of morality
 may not have  any chance of being the  
moral code of the next generation or    
even of  being regarded as the serious  
alternative to ,christian morality1 yet 
it is not too much to say that he is    
symptomatic of a new tendency in        
ethical thought1 a tendency of which he 
is the greatest1 if also the  most      
extravagant exponent1 but which has its 
roots in certain new  influences which  
have come to this generation with the   
ideas and the  triumphs1 scientific and 
material1 of the preceding generation4  
,there are two quite different kinds of 
influence to which the  formation of an 
ethical doctrine may be due4 ,in the    
first place1 there  are the moral       
sentiments and opinions of the community

 and of the  moralist himself2 and1 in  
the second place1 there are the         
scientific  and philosophical doctrines 
accepted by the writer or inspiring what
  is loosely called the spirit of the   
time4 ,in most ethical movements  the   
two kinds of influence will be found    
co-operating1 though the  latter is     
almost entirely absent in some cases4   
,the incoherence of  popular opinions   
about morality is a potent stimulus to  
reflexion1 and  may of itself give rise 
to systematic ethical enquiry4 ,this is 
more  particularly the case when a      
change of social conditions1 or contact 
with alien modes of life1 force into    
light the inadequacy of the             
conventional morality4 ,in such a case  
the new ethical reflexion may  have a   
disintegrating effect upon the          
traditional code1 and give  to the      
movement the character and importance of
 a revolution4 ,the  reflective activity
 of the ,sophists in ancient ,greece--a 
movement of  the deepest ethical        

significance--was in the main of this   
nature4  ,it consisted in a radical     
sifting and criticism of current moral  
standards1 and was due almost entirely  
to the first class of  influences1 being
 affected only in the slightest degree  
by scientific  or philosophical ideas4  
,influences of the same kind combine    
with science and philosophy in  moulding
 the ethical thought of the present day4
 ,contemporary ethical  speculation is  
by no means exclusively due to the      
thinkers who attempt  to arrive at a    
consistent interpretation of the nature 
of reality2 and  it has features which  
constantly remind us how closely moral  
reflexion  is connected with the order  
and changes of social conditions4       
,every age is no doubt apt to exaggerate
 its own claims to mark an  epoch4 ,but1
 after a century of achievements in     
applied science1 there  seems little    
risk of error in asserting that the     
world is now becoming  conscious as it  
never was before of the vast power given

 by material  resources when under the  
control of a cool intelligence4 ,and in 
the  competition of nations it is not   
surprising that there should be an      
imperious demand for the most alert and 
well-trained minds to utilise  these    
resources in war and in industry4 ,it is
 not surprising2 nor  would it be a fit 
subject for regret1 did not the         
concentration of the  outlook upon      
material success tend to the neglect of 
'things which  are more excellent4'     
,writing many years ago ,j4,s4 ,mill    
remarked that  hitherto it is           
questionable if all the mechanical      
inventions yet made  have lightened the 
day's toil of any human being4 #a       
,footnote #a3 ,political ,economy1 ,book
 iv4 chap4 vi4  #b4    ,there is a      
further question which ought to be asked
 of every new  advance in material      
civilisation1 ,does it foster1 or at    
least does  it leave unimpeded1 the     
development of man's spiritual          
inheritance8  ,certainly1 the control of

 nature by mind is not necessarily      
hostile  to the ideals which give       
dignity to the arts and sciences and to 
man  himself4 ,and yet it does not      
always favour their presence4 ,the weak 
nations of the world in arms and        
commerce have contributed their full    
share to the higher life of the race2   
and the triumphs of a country on  the   
battlefield or in business give no      
security for the presence among  its    
people of the ideals which illumine or  
of the righteousness which  exalts4 ,the
 history of ,germany herself might point
 the moral4 ,a  century ago1 when she   
lay crushed beneath the heel of         
,napoleon1 her  poets and philosophers  
were the prophets of ideals which helped
 to  bind her scattered states into a   
powerful nation1 and which enriched  the
 mind of man4 ,to-day we are forced to  
ask whether military and  industrial    
success have changed the national bent3 
for poetry seems  to have deserted her1 
and her philosophy betrays the dominance

 of  material interests4    ,material   
success and the struggle for it are apt 
to monopolise the  attention2 and       
perhaps the greatest danger of the new  
social order  is the growing            
materialisation of the mental outlook4  
,it would  be needless to point to the  
evidence1 amongst all classes in the    
mercantile nations1 of the feverish     
haste to be rich and to enjoy4 ,for  to 
point to this has been common with the  
moralists of all ages4 ,this  age like  
others--perhaps more than most--is      
strewn with the victims of  the         
struggle4 ,but it can also boast a      
product largely its own--the new  race  
of victors who have emerged triumphant1 
with wealth beyond the  dreams of       
avarice of the past generation4 ,their  
interests make them  cosmopolitan2 they 
are unrestrained by the traditional     
obligations of  ancient lineage2 and the
 world seems to lie before them as      
something  to be bought and sold4       
,neither they nor others have quite     

realised as  yet the power which        
colossal wealth gives in modern         
conditions4 ,and it  remains to be seen 
whether the multimillionaire will claim 
to figure  as ,nietzsche's 'over-man1'  
spurning ordinary moral conventions1 and
  will play the rle1 in future moral    
discourses1 which the ethical  dialogues
 of ,plato assign to the 'tyrant1'      
,general literature1 even in its highest
 forms1 seems to reflect a              
corresponding change of view as to what 
is of most worth in life4  ,already the 
strong hold on duty and the spiritual   
world which ,tennyson  unfalteringly    
displayed1 even the deeper insight into 
motive and the  faith in goodness which 
are shown by ,browning1 are read by us  
as  utterances of a past age4 ,we have  
grown used to a presentment of human    
life such as ,ibsen's in which the      
customary morality is regarded as  a    
thin veneer of convention which hardly  
covers the selfishness in  grain1 or to 
the description of life as a tangled    

mass of animal  passions1--a description
 which1 in spite of the genius of ,zola1
 does  not fail to weary and            
disgust1--or perhaps as only a spectacle
 in  which what men call good and evil  
are the light and shade of a picture    
which may serve to produce some artistic
 emotion4 ,an attitude akin  to these   
becomes an ethical point of view in     
,nietzsche1 the enfant  terrible of     
modern thought1 who maintains that man's
 life must be  interpreted              
physiologically only and not            
spiritually1 and who would  replace     
philanthropy by a boundless egoism4     
,influences of the second kind are      
usually more prominent than the         
preceding in the case of the            
philosophical moralist1 and they are    
not always avoided by the moralist who  
boasts his independence of  philosophy4 
,the former influences are more         
constantly at work3 they  supply the    
facts for all ethical reflexion4        
,ethical thought is not  so uniformly   

influenced by the conceptions arrived at
 in science  or philosophy4 ,but there  
are certain periods of history in which 
conceptions regarding the truth of      
things--whether arrived at by           
scientific methods or not--have had a   
profound influence upon men's  views of 
good and evil4 ,at the beginning of our 
era1 for instance1 the  view of ,god and
 man introduced by ,christianity1       
resulted in a deepened  and1 to some    
extent1 in a distinctive morality4      
,again1 at the time of  the             
,renaissance1 the new knowledge and new 
interests combined with the  weakening  
of the ,church's and of the ,empire's   
authority to bring about  the demand for
 a revision of the ecclesiastical       
morality1 and led to  some not very     
successful attempts to find a firmer    
basis for conduct4    ,at the present   
day also it is the case that            
philosophers of different  schools are  
for the most part agreed in claiming    
ethical importance  for their           

conceptions about reality4 ,in          
particular1 the scientific  thought of  
the last generation has been reformed   
under the1 influence  of the group of   
ideas which constitute the theory of    
evolution4 ,there  is hardly a          
department of thought which this new    
doctrine has not  touched2 and upon     
morality its influence may seem to be   
peculiarly  important and direct4 ,the  
theory of evolution1 as put forward by  
,darwin1 has established certain        
positions which have been regarded as   
of special significance for ethics4     
,in the first place1 it is an assertion 
of the unity of life4 ,and we  must not 
limit the generality of this            
proposition4 ,it is not merely  a denial
 of the fixity of species1 an assertion 
that there are no  natural kinds so     
inseparable from one another that each  
must be the  result of a distinct       
creative act4 ,it is also an assertion  
that human  life must be treated as a   
part in the larger whole of organic     

being1  that the mind of man is         
continuous with animal perception1 that 
moral  activity is continuous with      
non-moral impulse4 ,and the assertion of
  the unity of life is at the same time 
an assertion of the progress of  life4  
,what we call the higher forms are in   
all cases developments from  simpler and
 lower forms4    ,further1 the method of
 this progress has been described4      
,herein indeed  lay ,darwin's most      
important achievement4 ,he detected and 
demonstrated  the operation of a factor 
hitherto unsuspected4 ,this new factor  
to  which he drew attention as the chief
 agent in organic development was       
called by him 'natural selection1' ,the 
name has a positive sound and  suggests 
a process of active choice4 ,but ,darwin
 was fully aware that  the process to   
which he gave this name was a negative  
and not a  positive operation2 and as   
such it was clearly recognised by him4  
,the  name was1 no doubt1 chosen simply 
to bring out the fact that the  same    

kind of results as those which man      
produces by conscious and  artificial   
selection may be arrived at without     
conscious purpose by  the operation of  
merely natural forces4 ,instead of the  
'fit' being  directly chosen or         
encouraged1 what happens is simply that 
the 'unfit'  die out or are             
exterminated1 so that room to live and  
means of life  are left for the         
survivors4    ,what may be meant by this
 idea of 'fitness'--which meets us in   
the  famous phrase that the 'survival of
 the fittest' in the struggle for  life 
is the goal of evolution--is a question 
which brings us at once  to the         
consideration of the ethical            
significance of the theory4 ,for  it    
seems to lay claim to give both an      
explanation of progress and an          
interpretation of what constitutes worth
 in conduct4          ,,ii4    ,,ethics 
,,and ,,evolution4      ,there are two  
things which are not always kept        
distinct1--what may be  called the      

'evolution of ethics' and the 'ethics of
 evolution1' ,the  former might more    
correctly be called the evolution of    
morality1--the  account of the way in   
which moral customs1 moral institutions1
 and  moral ideas have been developed   
and have come to take their place in    
the life of mankind4 ,clearly these are 
all features of human life2  and1 if the
 theory of evolution applies to human   
life1 we must expect  it also to have   
some contribution to make to this       
portion of man's  development1--to the  
growth of the customs1 institutions1 and
 ideas  which enter into and make up his
 morality4    ,but by the 'ethics of    
evolution' is meant something more than 
the  'evolution of ethics' or           
development of morality4 ,it signifies a
  theory which turns the facts of       
evolution to account in determining  the
 value for man of different kinds of    
conduct and feeling and idea4  ,when one
 speaks of the ethics of evolution one  
must be understood to  mean that the    

evolution theory does something more    
than trace the  history of things1 that 
it gives us somehow or other a standard 
or  criterion of moral worth or value4  
,this additional point may be  expressed
 by the technical distinction between   
origin and validity4  ,clearly there is 
a very great difference between showing 
how something  has come to be what it is
 and assigning to it worth or validity  
for  the guidance of life or thought ,it
 may be that the former enquiry has     
some bearing upon the latter2 but only  
confusion will result if the  two       
problems are not clearly distinguished  
at the outset1--as they  very seldom are
 distinguished by writers on the theory 
of evolution in  its application to     
ethics4    ,it may be said that the     
evolutionist writers on ethics seek to  
base an  ethics of evolution upon the   
evolution of ethics1 but that they are  
not always aware of the real nature and 
difficulties of their task4  ,sometimes 
they seem to think that in tracing the  

evolution of ethics  they are also and  
at the same time determining and        
establishing a  theory of the ethics of 
evolution4 ,we must avoid this error1   
and keep  the two problems distinct in  
our minds4 ,yet from the nature of the  
case it holds true that it is only      
through the facts which the theory  of  
evolution establishes or can establish  
as to the development of  morality that 
it is able to make any contribution to  
the solution of  the further question as
 to the criterion of morality--the      
question1  that is to say1 of moral     
worth or value4    ,we cannot1          
therefore1 avoid dealing with the       
evolution of ethics4 ,but  in what      
follows ,i am not considering it for its
 own sake--though it  is an interesting 
and important question4 ,in order to    
simplify  the argument1 we may allow    
what is claimed for it1 and give the    
evolutionist credit for even greater    
success on the field of  historical     
investigation--which is his own         

field--than he would1 if  fair-minded1  
claim for himself4 ,the problem ,i have 
in view lies beyond  this historical    
question4 ,it is the problem how far the
 known facts  and probable theories     
regarding the development of morality   
can make  any contribution towards      
determining the standard of worth for   
our  ideas1 our sentiments1 and our     
conduct4 ,now if we read the accredited 
exponents of the doctrine of evolution  
we shall find amongst them a            
considerable variety of view regarding  
the bearing of the theory of  evolution 
upon this properly ethical problem--the 
problem of the  criterion or standard of
 goodness4    ,in the first place1 it is
 desirable to characterise briefly      
,darwin's  own contribution to this     
matter4 ,the suggestion made by him     
deals  almost entirely with what ,i have
 called the development of morality1    
not with the ethics of evolution2 and   
perhaps it may seem to us now  a rather 
obvious suggestion4 ,but he was the     

first to make this  suggestion2 and it  
comes from him as a direct application  
of the  theory he had established with  
regard to animal development4 ,his      
suggestion is simply this--that moral   
qualities are selected in the  struggle 
for existence in much the same way as   
purely physical or  animal excellences  
are selected1 that is1 by their         
contributing to the  continued and more 
efficient life of the organism4 ,but    
,darwin saw very  clearly that the      
qualities which are recognised as moral 
are not  by any means in all cases      
contributory to individual success and  
efficiency4 ,they are not all of them   
qualities that contribute to the        
success of one individual in his        
struggle with other individuals  for the
 means of subsistence4 ,we may say that 
courage1 prudence1  self-reliance1 will 
have that effect1 and that consequently 
in the  struggle for life the           
individuals who show such qualities will
 have  a better chance of survival than 

those without them4 ,but what about     
qualities such as sympathy1 willingness 
to help another1 obedience1  and        
faithfulness to a community or to a     
cause8 ,clearly1 these are not          
qualities which are of special          
assistance to the individual4 ,but they 
are qualities which are or may be of    
very great importance to the  tribe or  
community of individuals4 ,supposing    
such qualities of mutual  help1 of      
willingness even to sacrifice oneself   
for others--the  qualities which are    
commonly grouped as expressions of the  
social  instinct1--supposing these to   
have been somehow developed in the      
members of a tribe1 that tribe would1   
other things being equal1 have  an      
advantage in a struggle with another    
tribe whose members did not  possess    
these qualities4 ,now the advantage thus
 gained in the struggle  would be a case
 of the operation of natural selection3 
it would  exterminate or weaken the     
tribe without these social qualities1   

and it  would thus give opportunity for 
the growing efficiency of the tribe     
that possessed them4    ,put in the     
briefest way1 this is the explanation   
which ,darwin gave  of the growth of the
 social qualities in mankind2 and the   
social  qualities make up1 to a large   
extent at any rate1 what we call moral  
qualities4 ,darwin1 however1 saw further
 than this3 he saw that1 while  this    
might account for the development of    
what we may call savage and  barbarian  
virtues1 there was in civilised mankind 
a development of  sympathy which went   
far beyond this1 and which one could not
 with good  reason account for by       
asserting that it rendered assistance to
 the  community in its struggle for     
existence with other communities4       
,thus1 with regard to the former        
question1 he says3 ,a tribe including   
many members who1 from possessing in a  
high degree the spirit of  patriotism1  
fidelity1 obedience1 courage1 and       
sympathy1 were always  ready to aid one 

another1 and to sacrifice themselves for
 the common  good1 would be victorious  
over most other tribes2 and this would  
be  natural selection#a4    ,footnote   
#a3 ,descent of ,man1 ,part ,i4 chap4 v4
 p4 #bjc 7new ed41 #aija74    ,but when 
he comes to the case of civilised men he
 finds a difficulty4  ,with savages1 he 
says1 the weak in body or mind are soon 
eliminated2 and those that survive      
commonly exhibit a vigorous state  of   
health4 ,we civilised men1 on the other 
hand1 do our utmost to check  the       
process of elimination2 we build asylums
 for the imbecile1 the  maimed1 and the 
sick2 we institute poor-laws2 and our   
medical men  exert their utmost skill to
 save the life of every one to the last 
moment4444 ,the aid which we feel       
impelled to give to the helpless is     
mainly an incidental result of the      
instinct of sympathy1 which was         
originally acquired as part of the      
social instincts4444 ,nor could  we     
check our sympathy1 even at the urging  

of hard reason1 without  deterioration  
in the noblest part of our nature#a4    
,this sympathy1  which natural selection
 cannot preserve or vindicate even in   
the  struggle of communities1 is        
nevertheless recognised by ,darwin as   
having a moral value outside of and     
above natural selection and the         
struggle for existence1--a value of     
which these have no right to  judge4 ,he
 thinks that if we followed hard        
reason--and by 'hard reason'  he        
obviously means an imitation on our part
 of the action of natural  selection--we
 should be led to sweep away all those  
institutions by  which civilised mankind
 guards its weaker members4 ,but this1  
he says1  would be only to deteriorate  
the noblest part of our nature4 ,what is
  noblest in our nature1 then1 is not   
that which natural selection has        
favoured or maintained4 ,there is1      
therefore1 implied in his view a        
limitation of the ethical significance  
of the principle of natural  selection4 

,for1 when we come to this crucial      
question of conduct1  it is not allowed 
to give any criterion of moral validity4
 ,more  comprehensive attempts on the   
same lines as ,darwin's have been made  
subsequently2 and various writers have  
tried to show how the moral  criterion  
may be resolved into social efficiency1 
or how it may be  derived from a        
problematic future state of the human   
race on this  earth when the need for   
struggle has disappeared and all things 
go smoothly4 ,the former view may be    
found in ,sir ,leslie ,stephen's        
',science of ,ethics'2 the latter is the
 peculiar property of ,mr ,herbert      
,spencer4 ,somewhat unwillingly ,i must 
for the present leave these  special    
views without consideration1#b because  
,i wish to bring out  still more plainly
 the various attitudes of the           
evolutionists to  morality1 and         
especially to draw attention to a view  
very different  from those just         
mentioned1 though not altogether without

 support in  ,darwin1 which1 as put     
forward some years ago by the late      
,professor  ,huxley#c1 produced no      
little flutter in scientific dovecots4  
,footnote #a3 ,descent of ,man1 pp4     
#bje1 #bjf4    ,footnote #b3 ,for a     
discussion of these views ,i may be     
allowed to  refer to my' ,ethics of     
,naturalism1' chap4 viii4 7chap4 ix4 in 
the new  edition74 ,the same volume     
contains a more exhaustive examination  
than  is possible in this lecture of the
 whole subject of evolutionist  ethics4 
,footnote #c3 ,the ,romanes ,lecture1   
#ahic1 ,evolution and ,ethics4 ,in      
#ahid this was republished1 with        
prolegomena1 in vol4 ix4 of ',collected 
,essays1' with the title1 ,evolution and
 ,ethics1 and other ,essays4            
,professor ,huxley reviewed what he     
called the cosmic process as it was     
guided by the law of evolution4 ,he     
showed how at each step of that  process
 new results were only attained by      
enormous waste and pain on  the part of 

those living creatures which were thrust
 aside as unfit  for their surroundings1
 and he held consequently that the whole
 cosmic  process is of an entirely      
different character from what we must   
mean  when we use the term 'moral4'     
,according to him morality is opposed   
to the method of evolution1 and cannot  
be based upon the theory of  evolution4 
,it is of independent worth2 but        
,professor ,huxley1 perhaps  wisely1    
refrained from investigating its        
justification1 while  enforcing the     
apparent paradox that ethical nature1   
while born of  cosmic nature1 is        
necessarily at enmity with its parent   
,the practice of that which is ethically
 best--what we call goodness  or        
virtue--involves a course of conduct    
which1 in all respects1 is  opposed to  
that which leads to success in the      
cosmic struggle  for existence4 ,in     
place of ruthless self-assertion it     
demands  self-restraint2 in place of    
thrusting aside1 or treading down1 all  

competitors1 it requires that the       
individual shall not merely respect1    
but shall help1 his fellows2 its        
influence is directed1 not so much to   
the survival of the fittest1 as to the  
fitting of as many as possible  to      
survive4 ,it repudiates the gladiatorial
 theory of existence4444  ,let us       
understand once for all that the ethical
 progress of society  depends1 not on   
imitating the cosmic process1 still less
 in running  away from it1 but in       
combating it4#a    ,footnote #a3        
,evolution and ,ethics1 pp4 #ha-hc4     
,here1 then1 is a view very different   
from the easy optimism of ,mr  ,herbert 
,spencer4 ,the cosmic order has nothing 
to say to the moral  order1 except that1
 somehow or other1 it has given it      
birth2 the  moral order has nothing to  
say to the cosmic order1 except that it 
is certainly bad4 ,morality is occupied 
in opposing the methods of  evolution4  
,still another view is possible4 ,it may
 be held that the morality of           

self-restraint and self-sacrifice are   
opposed--as ,huxley says they are       
opposed--to the methods of cosmic       
evolution2 and yet the gladiatorial     
theory of existence may not be          
repudiated2 but morality may be         
modified to suit the claims of          
evolution4 ,this is the position adopted
  by the philosopher ,nietzsche1 whose  
whole thought is permeated by the  idea 
of evolution4 ,like ,professor ,huxley1 
,nietzsche might say that  morality is  
opposed to the cosmic process4 ,but by  
morality he would  mean something that  
is not to be encouraged1 but that is to 
be shed  from human life1 or at least   
fundamentally transformed1 just because 
it is in opposition to the laws of      
cosmic progress4 ,on the other hand1    
the morality--if we may use the         
term--which the cosmic process teaches  
us will be a development of the         
conceptions of self-assertion and       
self-reliance1 qualities which1         
according to ordinary morality--the     

morality1 for instance1 of ,professor   
,huxley--require to be permeated  and   
even superseded by self-restraint and   
possibly self-sacrifice in  order that  
the moral law may be satisfied4 ,not    
obedience1 not mutual  help1 not        
benevolence1 but the will to rule or    
desire of power1 is  with ,nietzsche    
fundamental1 the primary impulse in the 
history of the  whole progress of the   
world1 and still of first importance for
 the  further development of mankind4   
,this view is at the opposite extreme   
from ,huxley's1 for it overlooks  the   
advantages mankind has gained by means  
of the social instinct and  the social  
solidarity which it secures4 ,but there 
is a further  point in ,nietzsche's     
reflexions which is suggested by the    
theory  of development4 ,natural        
selection is not the sole agent in the  
development of organic life3 it cannot  
be too often enforced that  natural     
selection produces nothing1 that its    
operation is purely  negative4 ,it does 

not properly select at all1 it only     
excludes4 ,what  it does is to cut off  
the unfit specimens of living beings    
which  nature supplies4 ,it would have  
no field of operation were it not  for  
the variety of nature4 ,while           
individuals tend to repeat the          
characteristics of their parents1 they  
do not repeat them without  change3 the 
principle of heredity is counterbalanced
 by a principle  of variety equally hard
 to explain4 ,all organic life exhibits 
this  tendency to variation2 and one    
variation proves better adapted than    
another to the environment4 ,it is this 
which makes possible the  operation of  
'natural selection4' ,unfit varieties   
are exterminated by  natural selection1 
and room is thus left for varieties     
which are fit  to perpetuate themselves 
and to increase in efficiency4    ,now1 
if we apply this conception to human    
conduct1 should we not  encourage all   
varieties to carry on their experiments 
in living and  in morality so that we   

may see whether success will justify    
them8 ,an  affirmative answer to this   
question is sometimes vaguely hinted at2
 by  ,nietzsche it is proclaimed from   
the housetops4    ,there is no monopoly 
of morals1 and every morality which     
exclusively  asserts itself destroys too
 much good strength1 and is too dearly  
bought by mankind4 ,the straying ones1  
who so often are the inventive  and     
productive ones1 shall no longer be     
sacrificed2 it shall not even  be deemed
 a disgrace to stray from morals either 
in deeds or thoughts2  numerous new     
experiments shall be made in matters of 
life and society2  an enormous incubus  
of bad conscience shall be removed from 
the  world--these are the general aims  
which ought to be recognised and        
furthered by all honest and             
truth-seeking people4#a    ,footnote #a3
 ,nietzsche1 ,werke1 iv4 #afa1 #afb2    
,dawn of ,day1  #afd4    ,reflecting for
 a moment on what precedes1 we may      
observe that1 from  the mouths of the   

evolutionists themselves1 we have       
encountered three  different views      
regarding the ethical significance of   
evolution4 ,in  the first place1 there  
is the view of ,darwin that natural     
selection is  a criterion of moral      
fitness only up to a certain stage1 and 
that the  noblest part of man's morality
 is independent of this test2 in the    
second place1 there is the view of      
,huxley that morality is entirely       
opposed to the cosmic process as ruled  
by natural selection2 and1 in  the third
 place1 there is the view of ,nietzsche 
that the principles  of biological      
development 7variation1 that is to say1 
and natural  selection7 should be       
allowed free play so that1 in the future
 as  in the past1 successful variations 
may be struck out by triumphant  egoism4
 ,neither these views1 nor the still    
more elaborate treatment of  ,spencer1  
do ,i propose to examine in detail4 ,but
 ,i wish to offer some  reflexions upon 
the fundamental conception underlying   

them all1  accounting in this way1      
perhaps1 for the differences of opinion 
between ,darwin and ,spencer1 ,huxley   
and ,nietzsche4 ,the conception of      
natural selection and of evolution by   
natural selection is applied by  men of 
science and by philosophers in three    
very different spheres1 to  three very  
different kinds of struggle or          
competition4 ,there may be  many        
different kinds of competition3 it will 
be sufficient here to  consider the     
three following3--    ,first1 there is  
the competition between individuals for 
individual  life and success4 ,now1 so  
far as we are dealing with this         
competition1  the only qualities which  
natural selection will favour are of    
course  the qualities which lead to the 
continuance and efficiency of the       
individual organism4 ,the qualities     
'selected' in this process are          
therefore only the self-assertive       
qualities1--the qualities of  strength1 
of courage1 of prudence1 and also of    

temperance4    ,but in the second place 
there is also1 as ,i have already       
indicated and  as was seen by ,darwin   
7though he did not draw this            
distinction71 a  second kind of         
competition1 the competition between    
groups4 ,now the  group competition has 
as its end the continuance and          
efficiency of  the group1 be it horde or
 tribe or nation1 or be it one of those 
subsidiary groups which enter into      
national life4 ,in this competition     
between groups it is clear that those   
qualities will be favoured by  natural  
selection which contribute to the       
efficiency of the group2 and  the       
qualities which contribute to the       
efficiency of the group are not  those  
only which contribute to the efficiency 
of the individual1 but  also qualities  
implying self-restraint and even        
self-sacrifice on the  part of one      
member of the group for the sake of     
other members of the  group or of the   
group as a whole4 ,the habit of         

obedience1 for example1  obedience to   
the authority of the group or its       
representative1 may be  of fundamental  
importance in maintaining the existence 
of the group  as a group1 although that 
habit of obedience has no place at all  
in  promoting the interests of the      
individual when he is competing with    
other individuals4    ,thirdly1 there is
 still another kind of competition which
 is a little  more difficult to make    
quite clear1 because it is not on the   
plane of  individual life and it is not 
to be identified with the life of  the  
community4 ,it is a competition on the  
intellectual level1 the  competition    
between ideas1 and with this one may    
also couple 7so far  as it does not     
directly concern the struggle for social
 existence and  thus belong to the      
second class7 the competition between   
institutions1  including therein also   
habits and customs4 ,the various        
institutions in  our national life1 and 
the various habits of our life1 may be  

said to  be forms which have to maintain
 themselves often in competition with   
other and antagonistic forms of         
institution4 ,the same holds of our     
various ideas or general conceptions1   
whether about morality1 which we  have  
now specially in view1 or about matters 
more purely intellectual4  ,for         
instance1 forty or fifty years ago1     
there was a fierce controversy  amongst 
biologists between the group of ideas   
represented by ,darwin's  theory and the
 group of ideas represented by the      
traditional view of  the fixity of      
species4 ,there was a long conflict     
between these two  groups of ideas1 and 
we may now say that the ,darwinian group
 of ideas  has emerged from the conflict
 victorious4    ,now1 when the phrase   
'natural selection in morals' is used1  
the  reference is commonly to a conflict
 of this last kind4 ,the suggestion  is 
that different ideas and also different 
standards of action are  manifested at  
the same time within the same community1

 that they  compete with one another for
 existence1 and that gradually those    
which  are better adapted to the life of
 the community survive1 while the       
others grow weaker and in the end       
disappear4 ,in this way the law of      
natural selection is made to apply to   
moral ideas and moral standards1  and   
also to intellectual standards and to   
the institutions and customs  in which  
our ideas are expressed4    ,these1     
then1 are the three ways in which the   
competition in man's life  and the      
selection between the competing factors 
is carried out4 ,and  sometimes ,i think
 one sees a tendency to suggest that    
this needs  only to be stated1 and that 
the whole question of the application of
  evolution to ethics is then settled4  
,you may say that such and such  moral  
qualities1 as for instance the quality  
of sympathy1 do not aid  the individual 
in competition with other individuals4  
,the reply might  be ,no1 but they aid  
the group in competition with other     

groups4 ,or you  may say1 as ,darwin    
said1 that even this competition will   
not account  for the civilised          
development of sympathy4 ,but even so we
 are not at  the end of our tether2 and 
we can fall back on the conflict of     
ideas4  ,the idea of sympathy or of     
altruism1 for instance1 may conflict    
with  some other idea1 such as that of  
egoism4 ,at first the competition is a  
group-competition1 in which the group   
with altruistic members succeeds  at the
 expense of the egoistic group4 ,by the 
victory of the former our  society      
becomes more and more a society whose   
basis is sympathy and  all that sympathy
 implies1 while conflicting ideas lose  
the lead4 ,so  in general with the      
competition of ideas3 the idea which    
fails to  adapt itself to its conditions
 will disappear1 and the idea which is  
thus adapted will persist2 and this also
 7it is said7 is just natural           
selection4 ,now ,i venture to ask the   
question1 ,is it8 ,i will put the       

question whether all these three        
processes are really forms of the  same 
process1 or1 in other words and to put  
the matter more simply1 ,is  it simply  
natural selection that is operative in  
all these different  forms of           
competition8    ,for the sake of        
clearness ,i will take first this       
last-mentioned form  of competition1 the
 process by which one idea drives       
another out of  the intellectual or     
moral currency of a community4 ,the     
competition  between the idea of fixity 
of species and ,darwin's idea of the    
unity  of life has been already cited as
 an instance2 and it was pointed  out   
that1 gradually and after a controversy 
of some forty years1 the  former idea   
almost disappeared1 and in the minds at 
any rate of those  who know1 the        
,darwinian theory became victorious4    
,was it natural  selection that brought 
about the result8 ,to test the matter   
let us ask  once more how natural       
selection operates4 ,its mode of        

operation is  always simply negative4   
,and if1 in the struggle of life1 it    
selects  the courageous man rather than 
the coward1 the temperate man rather    
than the intemperate1 the method by     
which this result is reached is  simple3
 when it comes to a conflict the        
courageous man kills the  coward or     
reduces him to subjection2 the          
intemperate man has less  vitality than 
the temperate3 he too disappears1       
although perhaps  gradually4    ,take   
again the group-competition so far as it
 is influenced by  natural selection4   
,the tribe which manifests the qualities
 of social  solidarity is selected      
simply in this way1 that when it comes  
into  conflict with a tribe which has   
not this solidarity the latter  is      
beaten1 and is thus unable to obtain the
 pastures or the  hunting-ground which  
it desires1 and therefore gradually or  
swiftly it  is exterminated or left     
behind in the race for life4 ,now1 ,i   
ask1 ,did  this process take place when 

,darwinism supplanted the traditional   
theory of the fixity of species8 ,surely
 it is clear that it is only in  the    
rarest cases that false or inadequate   
ideas on such subjects have  any        
tendency to shorten life or weaken      
health4 ,bishop ,wilberforce was  killed
 by a fall from his horse1 not by the   
triumphant dialectic of  ,professor     
,huxley4 ,sir ,richard ,owen lived to a 
patriarchal old age1 and  did not       
disappear from the face of the earth    
because he still clung to  an idea which
 the best intellect of his time had     
relinquished4 ,there  is nothing in the 
doctrine of the fixity of species--if   
you hold  it--which will in the least   
degree tend to diminish vitality4       
,natural  selection has practically no  
effect at all in exterminating those who
  adhere to this idea4 ,there is no     
means of livelihood from which it  would
 exclude them except indeed that it     
might prevent them from  occupying      
,chairs of ,biology4 ,apart from that ,i

 do not think it will  hinder them in   
any of the various modes of activity in 
which the  struggle for life is         
manifested4    ,what was it then that   
led to the victory of the one idea over 
the  other8 ,the cause was intellectual4
 ,with the experts1 it was logical      
conviction3 one set of ideas was found  
to fit the facts somewhat  better than  
the other set of ideas4 ,with men in    
general the  intellectual change came   
more slowly and in a different way3 they
  adopted or imitated the ideas of those
 who knew4 ,it was therefore not        
natural selection at all which led to   
the presence and power of the  one idea 
rather than the other in the minds of   
thoughtful men4 ,one  idea was          
deliberately accepted and the other     
deliberately rejected4  ,the former was 
accepted on grounds of which the most   
general account  would be1 if we may use
 the term1 to call them subjective4 ,but
 natural  selection is a physical1      
external1 objective process4 ,it is     

carried  out without the individual's   
volition3 he is not aiming at the end4  
,it is simply natural law which1 with   
many varieties of living beings  before 
it1 exterminates the unfit individuals4 
,thus nature in its own  blind way      
produces a result of the same kind as   
that which the will of  man would bring 
about by subjective selection4    ,the  
origin of this term 'natural selection' 
is overlooked when people  talk glibly  
about 'natural selection' of ideas4     
,darwin used the term  'natural         
selection' because he thought he saw an 
analogy between the  tendency of nature 
and the selective purposes of           
intelligent beings4  ,it was because    
nature1 working without intelligence1   
produced the same  kind of result as man
 does by intelligent selection1 that he 
ventured  to use this term 'selection'  
of the process of nature4 ,perhaps he   
was  hardly justified in adopting the   
term1 as nature does not select2 she    
only passes by4 ,at the same time1      

artificial selection also includes1     
although it is not limited to1 this     
negative or weeding-out process4  ,when 
you select a certain plant for growth in
 your garden you weed out  the          
neighbouring plants which encroach upon 
it1 so as to give it a  chance to grow  
and thrive4 ,by removing its            
competitors1 you let air  and light     
surround the plant1 and it spreads its  
leaves to the sun4  ,the healthy growth 
which results is due to the removal of  
obstacles  by an external power2 and it 
is in this way--by the removal of       
obstacles--that natural selection works4
    ,intelligent or artificial selection
 is not restricted to this negative     
method of working2 and its operation1   
positive as well as negative1  was      
certainly well known long before        
,darwin's day4 ,starting with the       
familiar facts of artificial or         
purposive selection1 ,darwin showed how 
results similar to those aimed at and   
reached in this way might be  brought   

about by the operation of certain       
natural laws1 working  without purpose  
or design4 ,purposive selection pursues 
its ends more  directly and in general  
attains them far more quickly than does 
natural selection4 ,a still more        
striking characteristic is the fact     
that it does not entail the waste and   
pain which mark the course of  natural  
selection4 ,witness the records of      
natural selection in the  vegetable and 
animal kingdoms1 where thousands are    
called into  fruitless being that one   
alone may survive and prosper4          
,wastefulness  is the most striking     
feature of its method1 and its path is  
strewn  with wreckage4 ,in all these    
respects the conflict of ideas belongs  
to the level of purposive and not of    
natural selection4 ,it involves         
consciousness of the end1 which natural 
selection never does2 it is             
comparatively rapid in reaching its goal
 and comparatively direct in  the route 
it takes2 and the victory of an idea    

does not take effect  through any       
general extermination of the individuals
 who cherish ideas  'unfit' for         
survival4    ,i do not deny that there  
may be a certain natural selection in   
the  case of human beings2 but that     
process is always clumsy and slow and   
wasteful1 and the purposive intelligent 
selection which takes its  place is one 
of the greatest possible gains to living
 beings3  its presence distinguishes men
 from animals2 its predominance         
distinguishes civilised men from        
savages2 the higher the stage  of       
civilisation1 the more marked is the    
development of selective  intelligence4 
,and in the conflict of ideas1 whether  
moral or  intellectual1 the issue is    
determined by a selection which is      
predominantly purposive1 and only in the
 slightest degree natural4    ,if we    
return to the conflict of groups we     
shall see that even there  purposive    
selection enters4 ,how 7we may ask7 do  
those qualities of  obedience1          

willingness to help another1 and the    
like1 arise in a  community and thus    
enable it to win the victory over a less
 organised  or more savage enemy8       
,surely it is not a sufficient answer to
 say that  these qualities have been    
somehow developed1 and then have        
contributed  to the victory of the      
community possessing them4 ,all through 
civilised  life1 and probably throughout
 a great part of savage life1 there is  
the keenest enquiry into and perception 
of the qualities which  will make for   
success4 ,these qualities are carefully 
selected and  positively fostered4 ,you 
drill your armies--that is1 you         
cultivate  the habit of discipline and  
all that discipline implies--so that the
  victory may be gained2 in other words1
 the quality is not produced by  natural
 selection at all4 ,the issue may       
resemble the result of natural          
selection1 for it leads to conflict and 
defeat of the unfit2 but the  conqueror 
is he who has foreseen the conditions of

 the struggle3  has deliberately        
equipped his forces for the fight1 and  
been the  intelligent organiser of      
victory4    ,even in the case of        
competition between individuals1 at     
least among  civilised men1 it is clear 
that natural selection is very far from 
being the only factor4 ,a man trains    
himself for a profession4 ,it does  not 
just somehow come about that a number of
 people accidentally  develop certain   
varieties of occupation1 and that       
natural selection  makes play with this 
result1 cutting off the unfit and       
leaving only  those who are fairly well 
adapted to their positions4 ,something  
of  this sort no doubt takes place to a 
limited extent2 but1 so far as it  does 
take place1 our methods are denounced as
 defective and1 perhaps1  as            
old-fashioned4 ',haphazard' is a        
wasteful principle1 and should be       
superseded by intelligent initiative and
 deliberate preparation4 ,and  this     
indeed is the usual process4 ,one adapts

 oneself carefully and of  set purpose  
to the conditions of one's life1 instead
 of simply waiting  for natural         
selection to cut one off should one     
happen to be unfit4    ,even among      
animals there are certain processes     
which cannot be brought  under natural  
selection4 ,there are the first efforts1
 slight as they  may be1 towards        
learning by experience4 ,there are also 
all those facts  which ,darwin classes  
under sexual selection1 where there is a
 positive  choosing1 due no doubt not to
 intelligent purpose but nevertheless to
  a subjective impulse4 ,this marks the 
beginning of the end of the  reign of   
natural selection1 because in it for the
 purely objective or  external factor   
there is substituted an internal1       
subjective factor2  instead of the      
process of cutting off unsuitable       
individuals among  chance varieties     
there appears the process of selecting  
that variety  which pleases or attracts4
    ,the result of this whole           

investigation is that natural selection 
cannot be properly applied so as to     
explain the conflict of moral  ideas4   
,it is not able to account for all the  
phenomena of the  competition between   
groups4 ,even in sub-human life there   
are  indications of the processes which 
supersede natural selection4 ,from  this
 result the ethical consequence may be  
drawn1 that there is no  good ground for
 taking the lower1 the less developed1  
method of  selection as our guide in    
preference to the higher and more       
developed4  ,surely we are not to take  
natural selection as the sole factor of 
ethical import because we see it at the 
crude beginnings of life on  this earth1
 while the process of life itself in its
 higher ranges  passes beyond natural   
selection4 ,the physiological           
interpretation  of life and conduct put 
forward by ,nietzsche1 and by a good    
many  biological philosophers1 would    
take natural selection1 and its bearing 
upon the animal nature of man1 as the   

sole test of efficiency and  ethical    
value4 ,but this interpretation of man's
 life disregards the  achievements of   
evolution itself for the sake of pinning
 its faith to  the humble beginnings of 
the organic process4    ,after this long
 enquiry into the nature and scope of   
natural  selection1 we should be better 
prepared to understand the degree and   
kind of ethical significance which can  
be rightly assigned to the  theory of   
evolution4 ,in the first place let us   
consider the now  familiar claim that   
man must be taken as part of the cosmos1
 and that  man's conduct must be        
regarded and studied in its place in the
 cosmic  process4 ,at the time when it  
was first made this claim may have      
seemed  a startling one2 but ,i think   
that we must admit that1 keeping to     
their  own ground and using the         
instruments that are theirs by right1   
the  evolutionist writers have succeeded
 in showing man's connexion with  the   
animal kingdom and with organic life    

generally1 and thus his place  in the   
whole cosmic process4 ,the claim must   
therefore be admitted4    ,but if man is
 part of the universe1 then the universe
 is not  intelligible apart from man1   
and the cosmic process is not fully     
understood unless we also have an       
understanding of human activity4  ,this1
 therefore1 is the counter-claim that ,i
 would suggest4 ,the course  and method 
of evolution1 or of the 'cosmic         
process'--to use ,huxley's  term--is    
imperfectly described if the methods and
 principles of human  action are left   
out of account4    ,no doubt the reply  
may be made1 as the reply has been made1
 that after  all man occupies but a     
minute space in the cosmos1 that he is  
but an  insignificant speck on an       
unimportant planet4 ,but1 if this is at 
all  meant to imply that we may safely  
leave the peculiarities of human        
activity out of account1 then ,i say    
that the suggestion hardly  deserves    
consideration4 ,surely the assumption is

 too gross and  unwarrantable that      
material magnitude is the standard of   
importance1  or that the significance of
 man's life can be measured by the size 
of  his material organism4 ,we must     
therefore never delude ourselves with   
the idea that we have a full account of 
the cosmos or the cosmic  process unless
 we have taken account of the           
peculiarities of man's  nature and man's
 activity4    ,in the second place1 the 
discussion of the principle of natural  
selection suggests a further reflexion4 
,the process of natural  selection is a 
process which always tends to some end1 
because by it  some organisms are       
selected1 and they are the organisms    
which are  fittest to live4 ,by         
'fittest' is of course meant that which 
is  best adapted to the environment1 or1
 as it is simply a question of          
survival1 that which so fits the        
conditions of the environment that it   
is able to survive4 ,the canon of the   
principle of natural selection is  on   

the face of it relative4 ,no one would  
say that the principle can be           
interpreted as an absolute law for      
conduct1 after the fashion of the       
absolute laws laid down by the          
rationalist moralists2 what is involved 
is simply a gelation to one's           
surroundings4 ,one must keep in touch   
with them1 one must adapt oneself to    
them1 in order to live4    ,but ,i wish 
to point out that the principle is not  
only relative1 but  that its relation is
 limited to certain features of the     
environment  which surrounds mankind1   
namely1 to those features and those     
features  only which prevent organisms  
unsuited to the conditions of life from 
surviving at all4 ,the only way in which
 natural selection works is by  killing 
off rapidly or gradually the organisms  
which are not fitted to  obtain from the
 environment the means of life--that is 
to say1 it  has to do with life only1   
with the continuance of life as a       
possible  material phenomenon4 ,given   

that the organisms are fit enough to    
survive1 given that their animal        
vitality is not diminished1 a  question 
remains3 what is the standard of worthy 
survival8 and to that  question the     
process and principle of natural        
selection can give no  answer4 ,to use  
the old distinction3 even if it is able 
to account for  being1 it can give no   
standard for wellbeing4    ,now the     
environment of civilised man is a great 
deal larger in range  than those        
material phenomena which contribute to  
his nourishment and  thus to his        
existence as an animal organism4 ,no    
doubt his first effort  is to maintain  
himself as an animal--that is the       
condition of all  his subsequent        
activity--but he seeks also to suit     
himself to an  environment which is     
wider and subtler than merely animal    
conditions  of life2 to adapt himself to
 society1 perhaps only as a member of   
it1  perhaps also as a leader or        
reformer2 to adapt himself to the       

dominant  ideas of his time1 absorbing  
them1 perhaps also modifying them2 to   
adapt himself to a whole region of      
interests which may in our life be      
built upon an animal basis1 but of which
 the animal basis gives no              
explanation--interests social1 artistic1
 intellectual1 spiritual4    ,it is     
correct1 therefore1 to say of man that  
his environment is much  larger than the
 material universe2 it is whatever he   
conceives the  universe as being1 and   
whatever it can be for him3 whether he  
seeks  from it merely intellectual      
understanding1 whether he regards it as 
a vehicle for artistic production1 or   
whether he may see in it an  opportunity
 for realising his own being by         
fulfilling the will of  ,god--perhaps by
 submerging his own individuality in    
deity4 ,the  objects of philosophy1 art1
 and religion1--all these are parts of  
the  environment of civilised man1 and  
yet his self-adaptation to them has  no 
direct effect whatever upon his         

continuance on the earth as an  animal  
organism4 ,in other words1 the process  
of natural selection  can give us no    
canon at all for putting a value upon   
these various  activities1 or upon the  
way in which man adapts himself to these
 parts  of his environment4    ,it is   
said by ,mr ,herbert ,spencer that we   
must interpret the more  developed by   
the less developed2#a and the inference 
would seem to  be that1 as animal       
existence is the basis of all higher    
activities1 we  must interpret these by 
it4 ,but if this claim can be admitted  
at all1  it can only be if our aim goes 
no further than to trace a historical   
process4 ,if we desire to understand    
capacity or function--still more  if we 
speak of worth or goodness--then it is  
much more correct to say  that we must  
interpret the less developed by the more
 developed4  ,if you wish to trace the  
growth of the oak-tree from its earliest
  beginnings to maturity1 then study the
 acorn and the soil2 but if you  wish to

 know what the capacity and the function
 of the acorn are1 then  you must       
interpret the less developed by the more
 developed1 you  must see what an oak is
 like when it spreads its branches under
 the  heavens4    ,footnote #a3         
,principles of ,ethics1 i4 #g4    ,in   
the third place1 the way in which the   
action of natural selection  differs    
according to circumstances affects its  
ethical significance4  ,it operates as  
between individuals1 and it operates as 
between  groups1--although in the latter
 operation especially it is always      
mixed with other forces than natural    
selection4 ,the competition  between    
individuals favours egoistic qualities1 
the competition  between groups favours 
qualities which may be called           
altruistic4    ,now no principle        
whatever can be got out of the theory of
 natural  selection1 or out of the      
evolution theory in general1 which will 
decide between these divergent          
operations4 ,the question may be put1   

,are we to cultivate the qualities which
 will give us success in the  battle of 
individual with individual1 or are we to
 cultivate in  ourselves qualities which
 will contribute to the success of the  
community8 ,all the answer that the     
evolution theory can give to this       
question is1 that when individual fights
 with individual1 the man with  stronger
 egoistic qualities will succeed1 and   
that when group fights  group1 those    
groups that possess stronger altruistic 
qualities will  tend to success4 ,but   
which set of qualities we are to        
cultivate1 or  whether we are to        
manifest a sort of balance of the two1  
is a question  upon which we can get no 
light from the theory of evolution      
considered  by itself4 ,and consequently
 we find a very prevalent1 though       
perhaps  hardly ever definitely         
expressed1 code of conduct according to 
which  the individual takes as the guide
 for his own action the egoistic        
qualities which give success in the     

struggle between different  individuals1
 but recommends to all his fellows in   
the same community  that they should    
cultivate those altruistic qualities    
which will lead  to the advantage of    
society4    ,the theory of evolution    
makes no contribution at all to these   
questions of worth or validity or moral 
value which we have been  discussing4   
,all one can get out of it is certain   
canons for living1  but none for good   
living4 ,it may draw one's attention to 
this fact1 if  anybody's attention needs
 to be drawn to it1 that existence is   
prior  to wellbeing2 but what the nature
 of wellbeing is--upon that it throws   
no light4    ,we have been met by the   
suggestion that we should interpret by  
means  of the lower or less developed1  
and again that we should set up a       
purely physiological standard4 ,but the 
suggestion overlooks two  things3 first 
of all1 the difficulties in the         
application of natural  selection itself
 with its divergent tendencies2 and1    

secondly1 the  fact that this process of
 evolution has itself resulted in the   
development of certain higher activities
 and higher tendencies1 and  that there 
is no good ground for holding that their
 worth is to be  tested by means of the 
lower qualities out of which they have  
grown4    ,now a good many evolutionist 
moralists seem to see this1 and         
accordingly restrict themselves almost  
entirely to what we may call  the       
historical point of view4 ,they show how
 moral customs and moral  ideas adapted 
to them have arisen1 and how these ideas
 and customs  have corresponded with the
 institutions of the time to which they 
belonged4 ,their tendency1 accordingly1 
is to restrict ethics to  the question  
of origin and history and description1  
to deprive it  altogether of what is    
sometimes called its normative          
character--that  is to say1 its         
character as a science which lays down  
rules or sets up  ideals for conduct4   
,they would take away from it altogether

 the power  of determining and          
establishing a criterion between right  
and wrong4  ,in other words1 the        
fundamental ethical question would be   
entirely  excluded from the scope of the
 science of ethics4#a    ,footnote #a3  
,cf4 ,green1 ',prolegomena to ,ethics1' 
p4 #g3 ,a philosopher  who would        
reconstruct our ethical systems in      
conformity with the  doctrines of       
evolution and descent1 if he would be   
consistent1 must  deal less scrupulously
 with them than perhaps any one has yet 
been  found to do4 ,if he has the       
courage of his principles1 having       
reduced  the speculative part of them to
 a natural science1 he must abolish the 
practical or preceptive part altogether4
    ,that1 so far as ,i can see1 is the 
tendency of a good deal of quite  recent
 writing from the point of view of the  
evolution school3 in the  face of       
controversy and in the face of          
difficulties to give up the  attempt    
which they started on so confidently    

thirty years ago1--the  attempt to show 
that evolution affords a means of       
deciding between  right and wrong and of
 establishing an ideal for human        
conduct4  ,failing in this attempt1 they
 seem to turn round and say that ethics 
should content itself with describing   
facts instead of laying down a  law or  
setting up an ideal4    ,now1 whatever  
truth there may be in the assertion of  
the difficulty  of determining an ideal 
for conduct1 there is one thing certain3
 that  whether or not the ideal can be  
philosophically or scientifically       
defined and established1 some ideal is  
always being set up4 ,human  action     
implies choice1 implies the selection of
 one course rather  than another2 and   
the course that is chosen is always     
chosen for some  reason1 because it     
seems better than the course which is   
passed by4  ,choice always follows some 
kind of principle4 ,we may use different
  principles at different times1 we may 
use badly established  principles1 we   

may use uncriticised principles1 but    
principles we do  use1 and we cannot act
 voluntarily without using them1 even   
when we  are not definitely conscious of
 them4    ,it is not possible1          
therefore1 to entertain the suggestion  
that these  principles should be        
excluded from ethics4 ,ethics must      
consider them1  even if it should fail  
in reaching a correct account of them4  
,we are  bound to ask1 for instance1    
what principles can decide between those
  divergent tendencies brought to light 
by natural selection1 between  the      
conditions of success for the group and 
the conditions of success  for the      
individual8 ,the conflict between       
individual development and  group       
development is continually pressing to  
the front ,the individual  cannot reach 
a high stage of development except in   
and through a  highly developed society4
 ,but the efficiency which a highly     
developed  society requires of its      
members is not the same as individual   

development2 it more commonly implies a 
specialisation which tends to  warp or  
cramp individual capacity4 ,this is a   
long familiar opposition4  ,and the     
theory of evolution can do nothing to   
reconcile it ,all it can  say is that in
 certain cases natural selection points 
one way1 and  that in certain cases it  
points the other way4 ,if ethical       
significance  be claimed for it1 it must
 be said that natural selection is      
divided  against itself1 and that it is 
without any principle for reconciling   
its own divergences4    ,it is because  
biological evolution is essentially an  
historical  doctrine that its votaries  
should not be too eager to apply it     
directly to ethics4 ,it has accomplished
 much if able to tell us how  things    
have happened in the past1 without also 
dictating how they  ought to take place 
now4 ,it is specially absurd to say that
 earlier  methods must govern later     
developments4 ,that is what is done when
 we  are asked to take as our guide in  

voluntary choice a principle which      
ignores volition4 ,the whole progress   
from animal to man and from  savage to  
civilised man shows a gradual           
supersession of the principle  of       
natural selection by a principle of     
subjective selection which  steadily    
grows in purposiveness and in           
intelligence4 ,to say that  intelligence
 should take nature as its guide is to  
ask civilised man  to put off both his  
civilisation and his manhood4    ,the   
course of evolution may describe the    
working of different  principles2 but it
 cannot of itself supply a test of their
 value4 ,how  then is such a test to be 
got8 ,can ,metaphysics help us8 ,i have 
pointed  out that the evolutionist      
ethics is relative--implying always a   
relation between organism and           
environment--but this relativity is     
qualified by its objective character4   
,it does do something for morals3  it   
brings man's conduct into relation with 
the world as a whole4  ,no doubt the    

environment which more immediately      
surrounds man is a  succession of       
changing phenomena1 so that although the
 basis we get is  objective1            
nevertheless it is unable to give us a  
permanent standard  of reference4 ,at   
the same time we may trace in this      
theory some  advance on the older types 
of ethical thinking spoken of in last   
lecture4 ,subjectivity adhered even to  
the ,utilitarian type of thought3  for  
what can be more subjective than the    
pleasant feeling upon  which morality is
 made by it to depend8 ,there was also a
 certain  subjectivity attaching to the 
,intuitional type of thought1 because   
the  ,intuitionists simply referred     
their judgments to conscience1 the law  
in man1 and did not connect conscience  
with a wider or more objective  view of 
the universe4    ,the suggestion remains
 that we may get a basis for morality   
which  is both objective and permanent  
from that more complete view of the     
universe which is given or which is     

sought by metaphysics4 ,metaphysics     
aims at completeness4 ,that is1 indeed1 
its predominant characteristic  as a    
body of knowledge4 ,it may begin with   
the part1 if you like1 with  the 'flower
 in the crannied wall'2 but when that is
 seen in all its  relations to the rest 
of the world1 then you will 'know what  
,god and  man is1' ,if the universe is a
 whole1 then1 beginning at any point1   
with any detail1 if you only push the   
enquiry far enough1 you are  bound to   
become metaphysical3 for you are        
attempting to understand  reality as a  
whole4    ,in this ,metaphysics         
resembles ,religion4 ,both seek the     
ultimate1 the  final1 the whole4 ,but   
,metaphysics is distinguished from      
,religion in  seeking the whole only by 
way of knowledge4 ,so far it is like    
any other science4 ,it is a process or  
the result of a process of  knowledge4  
,it seeks to know reality as a whole1   
and in knowing a part  to know it in its
 relations to the whole4 ,religion also 

considers  everything in its relation to
 the whole4 ,but in religion knowledge  
is  not the fundamental thing3 its      
object is to relate man to ,god1 in his 
consciousness1 and in his life as a     
whole4    ,the theory of evolution      
itself very often tends to become a     
metaphysical theory4 ,it does so when it
 holds the course of  development which 
it traces to be either itself the       
ultimate reality  or the most adequate  
appearance of that reality4 ,this theory
 is now  commonly known by the name of  
,naturalism2 according to it the facts  
dealt with by the natural sciences are  
the only reality which is  knowable2    
man's nature is part of these and has to
 be adapted to  them1 and there is      
nothing further with which it can be    
brought into  relation4 ,this theory is 
not the same as the scientific theory of
  evolution1 nor is it a necessary      
consequence of it2 but in the  minds of 
many the two go together4 ,the          
conclusion of the preceding             

argument--that the ethical significance 
of evolution is not deep  enough to give
 any answer to the fundamental question 
of morals--is  not a criticism of the   
theory of evolution so far as restricted
 to  the domain of science1 but it is a 
criticism of the ,naturalism which      
professes to be a final philosophy4     
,,iii4    ,,ethics ,,and ,,idealism4    
,there has been no movement of          
metaphysical thought in our time which  
can be compared for its widespread      
influence or for its general  acceptance
 with the theory of evolution in        
biological science4  ,intimate as is its
 connexion with the progress of science1
 metaphysics  does not keep step with   
it1--any more than it simply marks time 
as the  former advances4 ,it reflects   
the influence of each new generalisation
  of science2 but if and so far as it   
reflects this influence only1 it  cannot
 be an adequate metaphysics4            
,metaphysics must re-think each new     
fact brought to light1 each new         

generalisation established by science4  
,it must think them in their relation to
 the whole1 and attempt to  understand  
them by setting them in their place in  
the complete system  of knowledge and   
reality4 ,this complete system is indeed
 an  ideal1 never adequately            
comprehended by the human mind2 but it  
is  nevertheless the ideal which        
determines all efforts of constructive  
philosophy--including those efforts     
which take the generalisation of  some  
special science as their                
all-comprehending principle4 ,an attempt
  of this kind to make a philosophy out 
of a scientific generalisation  has in  
our own time been the obvious result of 
the theory of  evolution1 and has given 
new vogue to the philosophical system   
called  ,naturalism4 ,that system draws 
its strength from the scientific        
doctrine of evolution2 but as a         
philosophy it gives an extended         
application to the generalisation       
established by a group of sciences1  and

 valid for the facts within their range4
 ,it interprets the law  of development 
which rules the sequences of nature as  
the highest  attainable principle for   
explaining the system of things4 ,some  
of the  questions which it leaves       
unanswered1 and some of the facts which 
it overlooks1 have been pointed out in  
last lecture4 ,of this theory  perhaps  
enough has already been said4    ,in    
spite of the increased vogue which      
naturalism has obtained from its        
alliance with triumphant evolutionism1  
it cannot be said to represent  the     
prevailing type of thought amongst the  
,english metaphysicians  of the last    
generation4 ,that generation was        
remarkable for the  reappearance in this
 country of a reasoned ,idealism2 and   
all forms of  ,idealism have at least   
this in common1 that they refuse to look
 upon  the material process as the      
ultimate character of reality--so far as
  reality is known or knowable4    ,it  
may also be said--and this is a         

characteristic which is not merely      
negative--that all forms of ,idealism   
agree in ascribing special  significance
 to the moral and religious aspects of  
life4 ,this holds  true of the great    
idealists1 different as their types of  
thought may  be--of ,plato and          
,aristotle1 of ,spinoza and ,leibniz1 of
 ,kant1 ,fichte1  and ,hegel4 ,it holds 
true also of the leading representatives
 of recent  ,english idealism4 ,but the 
ethical tone of a treatise and the      
ethical  interest of its author are not 
always a guarantee that ethical         
conceptions have a secure position in   
his system of thought4 ,this is  the    
case1 ,i think1 with ,spinoza2 and it   
seems to me to hold also of  some       
writers of the present day4 ,mr         
,bradley1 for instance1 is perhaps  the 
most influential1 as he is without doubt
 not the least brilliant1  of           
contemporary metaphysicians2 he carries 
on the tradition of a  school of thought
 predominantly ethical2 his first book  

was a defence  of the ethical positions 
of that school2 but1 if we turn to the  
elaborate metaphysical treatise which   
has resulted from his mature  reflexion1
 its most impressive feature will be    
found to be the almost  complete        
bankruptcy of the system in the region  
of ethics4    ,not only had this        
idealist movement in its beginnings a   
predominantly  ethical tone4 ,it was    
really started in the interest of moral 
ideals as  well as of intellectual      
thoroughness2 and its contribution of   
greatest  value to ,english thought was 
a work on ethics4 ,the ',prolegomena  to
 ,ethics' of ,t4,h4 ,green was a fitting
 result of his unwearied  controversies 
in defence of the spiritual nature of   
man and the  universe4 ,no one is more  
worthy than he to be called by the      
,platonic  name a 'friend of ideas1'    
,and he was a friend of ideas because he
 saw  their necessity for maintaining   
and realising the higher capacities  of 
human life4 ,green's ',prolegomena' was 

published in #ahhc1 the year  after his 
death4 ,and1 had ,i been speaking twenty
 years ago1 ,i should  have had to      
emphasise the ethical character of the  
metaphysics of the  day4 ,his           
metaphysical thinking1 through all its  
subtleties1 never  strayed far from the 
moral ideal4 ,owing to his teaching that
 ideal1  and the general character of   
the philosophy with which it was        
associated1 have permeated a great part 
of the better thought of the  present   
day1 and have influenced its practical  
activities in various                   
directions1--social1 political1 and     
religious4 ,but the magnetism of  his   
personality has been removed2 and those 
whose business it is to  test           
intellectual notions have been impressed
 by the difficulties  involved in       
,green's metaphysical positions and in  
his connexion of  them with morality4   
,the single word 'self-realisation' has 
been taken to express the view  of the  
moral ideal enforced by ,green4 ,and it 

is as suitable as any  single word could
 be4 ,but it is clear that1 in every    
action whatever  of a conscious being1  
self-realisation may be said to be the  
end3 some  capacity is being developed1 
satisfaction is being sought for some   
desire4 ,a man may develop his          
capacities1 seek and to some extent     
attain satisfaction--in a manner1       
realise himself--not only in  devotion  
to a scientific or artistic ideal or in 
labours for the  common good1 but also  
in selfish pursuit of power or even in  
sensual  enjoyment4 ,so far as the word 
'self-realisation' can be made to cover 
such different activities1 it is void of
 moral content and cannot  express the  
nature of the moral ideal4 ,green is    
perfectly alive to the  need of a       
distinction--and to the difficulty of   
drawing it4 ,according  to his own      
statement it is true not only of moral  
activity but of  every act of willing   
that in it a self-conscious individual  
directs  himself to the realisation of  

some idea1 as to an object in which for 
the time he seeks self-satisfaction4#a  
,and he proceeds to ask the  question1  
,how can there be any such intrinsic    
difference between the  objects willed  
as justifies the distinction which      
'moral sense' seems  to draw between    
good and bad action1 between virtue and 
vice8 ,and if  there is such a          
difference1 in what does it consist8#b  
,now we may  define a good action as the
 sort of action which proceeds from a   
good  man2 or we may define a good man  
as a man who performs good actions4     
,and for each method of definition      
something may be said4 ,but if we  adopt
 both methods together and say in one   
breath that good is what  the good man  
does and that the good man is he who    
does good1 is our  logic any better than
 that of the ordination-candidate who   
defined the  functions of an archdeacon 
as archdiaconal functions8 ,and yet     
,green  comes very near to describing   
this logical circle4 ,the moral good1   

he says1 is that which satisfies the    
desire of amoral agent2 but  the        
question1 444 ,what do we mean by       
calling ourselves moral agents8  is one 
to which a final answer cannot be given 
without an answer to  the question1     
,what is moral good8#c    ,footnote #a3 
,prolegomena to ,ethics1  #aed1 p4 #afj4
    ,footnote #b3 ,ibid41  #aef1 p4     
#afc4    ,footnote #c3 ,prolegomena to  
,ethics1  #aga1 #agb1 p4 #agi4    ,when 
,green really grapples with the         
difficulty of distinguishing the  moral 
from the immoral in character or in     
conduct1 it is possible  to distinguish 
different ways in which he attempts to  
draw the  distinction--these different  
ways being1 however1 not independent but
  complementary to one another in his   
thought4 ,the first suggestion is  that 
good is distinguished from evil1 or the 
true good from a good  which is merely  
apparent1 by its permanence4 ,it gives a
 lasting  satisfaction instead of a     
merely transient satisfaction3 the true 

good 444 is an end in which the effort  
of a moral agent can really  find       
rest4#a ,in this statement two points   
seem to be involved which  the use of   
the rather metaphorical term 'finding   
rest' tends to  confuse4 ,if we are     
looking for the distinction simply of a 
good action  or motive from a bad one we
 may point to the approval of conscience
 in  the former case3 this has a        
permanence--or rather an independence of
  time--which distinguishes it from the 
satisfaction of some temporary  desire4 
,but ,i do not think that this is what  
,green means4 ,he wished  to avoid      
falling back upon mere disconnected     
judgments of conscience  after the      
manner of the intuitional moralists4    
,the 'true good' for him  seems to mean 
the attainment1 the complete            
realisation1 of the moral  ideal4 ,were 
this reached we should indeed 'find     
rest1' for moral  activity as we know it
 would be at an end4 ,but the moral     
ideal  is never thus attained2 its      

realisation1 as ,green holds1 is only   
progressive and never completed4        
,consequently 'rest' is never 'found4'  
,it is of the nature of the moral life  
to press onward constantly  towards a   
goal which it cannot attain2 each       
achievement leads to a  further effort  
and a higher reach4    ,footnote #a3    
,ibid41  #aga1 p4 #agi4    ,by itself1  
therefore1 the assertion that the moral 
agent 'finds rest'  in the 'true good'  
does not enable us to distinguish the   
moral agent  or the moral action from   
the immoral4 ,for we are unable to      
define the  'true good4' ,it is not a   
part of experience2 it is an ideal3 and 
,green  allows that we can give no      
complete account of it2 he even says    
that we can give no positive account of 
it4 ,at the same time this              
consideration leads to another and      
connected method for distinguishing     
good from evil4    ,of a life of        
completed development1 ,green holds1 of 
activity with  the end attained1 we can 

only speak or think in negatives1 and   
thus  only can we speak or think of that
 state of being in which1 according  to 
our theory1 the ultimate moral good must
 consist4#a ,but the  development is a  
real process which manifests itself in  
habits and  social institutions2 and    
from these its actual achievements we   
can to  a certain extent see what the   
moral capability of man has in it to    
become1 and thus know enough of ultimate
 moral good to guide our  conduct4 ,one 
of the most valuable portions of        
,green's own work is his  description of
 the gradual widening and purifying of  
human conceptions  regarding goodness in
 character and conduct4 ,but all this   
implies some  standard of discrimination
 and selection between what is good and 
what is evil in human achievement4      
,which developments are truly           
realisations of the moral capability of 
man1 and so tend to the  attainment of  
ultimate good1 and which developments   
are expressions  of those capacities    

which seek an apparent good only and are
 to be  classed as evil1 as impediments 
to the realisation of the good1--these  
have to be discriminated2 and is it so  
clear that from the mere record  of     
human deeds we are able to draw the     
distinction8 ,do we not need  some      
criterion of goodness to guide our      
judgment8 and does not ,green  himself  
use such a criterion when he appeals to 
the tendency of  certain institutions   
and habits to make the welfare of all   
the  welfare of each1 and of certain    
arts to make nature the friend of       
man8#b ,common welfare and the          
utilisation of nature in the service  of
 man seem to be taken as tests of the   
true development of moral  capabilities4
 ,the criteria themselves may be        
excellent2 but they  are not got out of 
the mere record3 they are brought by us 
to its  contemplation4 ,to this special 
question ,i can find no answer in       
,green4  ,he is indeed aware that there 
is a difficulty2 or rather he admits    

that something has been taken for       
granted4 ,he has assumed that  there is 
some best state of being for man2 that  
this best state is  eternally present to
 a divine consciousness2 and further1   
that this  eternal mind is reproducing  
itself as the self of man4#c ,on this   
supposition only1 he says1 can our moral
 activity be explained2 and  he holds   
that the supposition can be justified   
metaphysically and has  been so         
justified by himself in the earlier part
 of his treatise4    ,footnote #a3      
,prolegomena to ,ethics1  #agb1 p4 #ahj4
    ,footnote #b3 ,prolegomena1  #agb1  
p4 #ahj4    ,footnote #c3 ,ibid41  #agc1
 #agd1 p4 #aha4    ,now ,i am willing to
 admit that ,green showed a correct     
instinct in  examining the nature of man
 before entering upon his properly      
ethical  enquiry4 ,one must know what   
man is before one can say what his      
'good' or his duty is2 and it is only   
because man's nature cannot be          
accounted for as a merely natural or    

animal product that the way is  open for
 an idealist ethics such as ,green's4   
,but perhaps ,green laid  too much      
stress on the problem of historical     
causation4 ,what matters  it how we came
 by our knowledge1 provided it is the   
case that we can  know ourselves and the
 world8 ,if we can now distinguish right
 and  wrong1 can ally ourselves with the
 good1 and follow a moral ideal1 of     
what great importance are the steps by  
which the moral consciousness  was      
attained8 ,and the question here is     
whether the special results  reached by 
,green in his metaphysical enquiry into 
human nature have  brought us any nearer
 to a solution of the present ethical   
difficulty4  ,as we have seen1 the      
metaphysical view which ,green arrives  
at is that  the consciousness which is  
in man and which raises him above nature
  is the manifestation of--the          
reproduction of itself by--an eternal   
self-consciousness4 ,man's own          
self-consciousness in knowledge and     

volition is simply ,god's               
self--consciousness reproduced 7to use  
,green's term7 in man's animal nature3  
so that the animal body and  its        
temporal activities become in some      
unexplained 7and no doubt  inexplicable7
 way organic 7to use ,green's           
terminology once more1  where no        
terminology seems adequate7 to a        
spiritual reality which is  eternal and 
infinite4    ,i am far from denying the 
greatness of this conception or its     
practical value4 ,there is no stronger  
support to moral endeavour than  the    
conviction that the moral life is a     
realisation of the divine  purpose1 that
 in all goodness the spirit of ,god is  
manifest1 that the  good man is the     
servant of ,god or even ,his            
fellow-worker4 ,by whatever  metaphor   
this may be expressed--and ,green's     
statement that the divine               
self--consciousness 'reproduces' itself 
in human morality is also  a            
metaphor--it betrays the assurance that 

moral achievement is  permanent1 and    
that 7in spite of all apparent failures7
 goodness will  prevail4 ,he who fights 
for the good may be confident of        
victory4    ,this is the practical value
 of the conception2 but in order that it
  may have this practical value1 the    
distinction of good from evil  must be  
first of all made clear4 ,green's appeal
 to an eternal  self-consciousness does 
nothing of itself to elucidate this     
distinction4 ,tendencies to exalt       
selfish interest over common welfare1   
and to prefer sensual to what are called
 higher gratifications1 enter  into the 
nature of man1 and have fashioned his   
history4 ,green does  not even ask the  
question whether these also are not to  
be considered  manifestations or        
'reproductions' of the eternal          
self-consciousness4  ,but his           
metaphysical view does not exclude them2
 and if they are  included1 morality    
disappears for lack of any criterion    
between good  and evil4 ,if good is to  

be discriminated from evil1 it must be  
by some  other means than by describing 
the whole conscious activity of man as  
a reproduction of the divine4 ,instead  
of doing anything to solve the  problem 
of the meaning of goodness1 ,green      
simply brings forward a new             
difficulty--that of understanding how   
the temporal process in which  human    
morality is developed can be related to 
a reality which is  defined as out of   
time or eternal4 ,this difficulty cannot
 be avoided  in a metaphysical theory of
 morality4 ,and it does not stand alone4
  ,green's own dialectics were directed 
against the ,sensationalist and         
,hedonist theories which used to be     
regarded as typical of ,english         
thought2 and on them they acted as a    
powerful solvent4 ,his own views  of the
 spiritual nature of man and its        
relation to the eternal                 
self-consciousness were worked out with 
the confidence and enthusiasm  of a     
reformer rather than with the caution of

 a critic4 ,but criticism  has followed1
 and not only from the representatives  
of opposed  schools4 ,writers whose     
intellectual affinities are on the whole
 the  same as his have let their        
dialectic play around his fundamental   
conceptions with a result very different
 from that which he  contemplated4 ,mr  
,bradley1 like ,green1 has faith in an  
eternal ,reality1  which might be called
 spiritual1 inasmuch as it is not       
material2 like  ,green1 he looks upon   
man's moral activity as an              
appearance--what ,green  calls a        
reproduction--of this eternal reality4  
,but under this general  agreement there
 lies a world of difference4 ,he        
refuses1 by the use of  the term        
self-consciousness1 to liken his        
,absolute to the personality  of man1   
and he brings out the consequence1 which
 in ,green is more or  less concealed1  
that the evil equally with the good in  
man and in the  world are appearances of
 the ,absolute4    ,mr ,bradley's whole 

work is ruled by the distinction between
  ,appearance and ,reality1 which gives 
his book a title4 ,on the  one hand     
there is the ,absolute ,reality1 spoken 
of as perfect1 and  described as        
all--comprehensive and harmonious       
throughout4 ,neither  change nor time   
nor any relation can belong to it4 ,but 
intelligence  works by discrimination   
and comparison2 knowledge implies       
relations2  it is1 therefore1 excluded  
from reality4 ,truth is mere appearance4
 ,the  same judgment must be passed on  
our moral activity4 ,we strive after    
and perhaps reach an ideal1 or1 as ,mr  
,bradley says1 we aim at  satisfying a  
desire2 and this1 too1 is a process far 
removed from  reality4#a ,goodness1 like
 truth1 is mere appearance4    ,footnote
 #a3 ,appearance and ,reality1 pp4 #djb1
 #daj4    ,this needs no elaboration4   
,if all predication involves relation1  
and  relation is excluded from          
reality1#a then no predicate--not even  
truth or goodness--can be asserted of   

the real4 ,nay more1 to be  consistent1 
we ought not even to say that reality or
 the ,absolute  7for the two terms are  
here interchangeable7 is perfect1 or    
one1 or  all-comprehensive1 or          
harmonious3 for all these are           
predicates4 ,ens  realissimum is the    
only ens reale2 all else is mere        
appearance4    ,footnote #a3 ,ibid41 pp4
 #cb-cd4    ,just here1 however1 lies an
 indication of another line of thought4 
,for  what is an appearance1 and what is
 it that appears8 ,it can only be       
reality that thus appears2 the 'mere'   
appearance is yet an 'appearance  of    
reality4' ,it might seem that this is to
 catch1 not at a straw1 but  at the     
shadow of a straw4 ,for if we say that  
'reality appears1' are  we not thereby  
predicating something of reality1 making
 it enter into  relation8 ,but let that 
pass4 ,among these appearances we may be
 able to  distinguish degrees of        
significance or of adequacy1            
nay--strange as  it may seem to the     

reader who has followed ,mr ,bradley's  
first line of  thought--degrees of      
reality4 ,relations are excluded from   
reality2  and degree is a relation2 but 
reality has degrees4 ,the logic is      
unsatisfactory1 but the conclusion may  
perhaps have a value of its  own4       
,here1 then1 is another view of the     
universe--not an unchanging1            
relationless1 eternal reality1 but      
varying degrees of reality  manifested  
in that complex process which we call   
sometimes the world  and sometimes      
'experience1' ,but the two views are    
connected4 ,for it is  assumed that the 
,absolute ,reality is harmonious and    
all-comprehensive2  and it is further   
asserted that these two characteristics 
of harmony  and comprehensiveness may be
 taken as criteria of the degree of     
reality possessed by any appearance4    
,the more harmonious anything  is--the  
fewer its internal discrepancies or     
contradictions--the higher  is its      
degree of reality2 and the greater its  

comprehensiveness--the  fewer predicates
 left outside it--the higher also is its
 degree of  reality4 ,no attempt is made
 at a measured scale of degrees of      
reality1  such1 for example1 as is      
offered by the ,hegelian dialectic2 but 
a sort  of rough classification of      
various 'appearances' is offered4 ,in   
this  classification a place is given to
 goodness which is comparatively  high1 
and yet subordinate and                 
self-contradictory4 #a    ,footnote #a3 
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #dbj4      
,mr ,bradley's ,absolute1 we may say1   
has two faces1 one of which is          
described as good1 while the other is   
inscrutable4 ,obviously1 he says1  the  
good is not the ,whole1 and the ,whole1 
as such1 is not good4 ,and1  viewed thus
 in relation to the ,absolute1 there is 
nothing either bad or  good1 there is   
not anything better or worse4 ,for the  
,absolute is not  its appearances4 ,this
 is the inscrutable side4 ,but yet the  
,absolute  appears in its phenomena and 

is real nowhere outside them2444 it is  
all  of them in unity4 ,and so1 regarded
 from this other side1 the ,absolute  is
 good1 and it manifests itself          
throughout in various degrees of        
goodness and badness4#a ,what would be  
contradiction in another writer  is only
 two-sidedness in ,mr ,bradley4 ,and it 
is this second side which  interests us1
 for here the ,absolute is good1 and    
yet1 good as it is1  manifests itself in
 badness as well as goodness1 and that  
in various  degrees4 ,if we are to      
follow another statement of the         
doctrine1 however1  we shall have to    
allow that the badness is also good1 and
 that the  various degrees are all      
equal4 ,for the ,absolute is perfect in 
all its  detail1 it is equally true and 
good throughout4#b ,whether or not the  
good is contradictory1 as ,mr ,bradley  
maintains1#c we must allow that he      
succeeds in making his account of it    
contradictory4    ,footnote #a3         
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #daa4      

,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 p4 #dja4          
,footnote #c3 ,ibid41 p4 #dji4    ,i    
will try to put the gist of the matter  
in my own words4 ,mr ,bradley's         
,absolute is eternal1 relationless1     
ineffable4 ,to it goodness cannot be    
ascribed2 indeed no predicate can be    
properly applied to it1 for any         
predication implies relation3 in earlier
 language than ,mr ,bradley's it        
involves determination and therefore    
negation4 ,even to say that the         
,absolute appears or manifests itself is
 to predicate something1 to  imply      
relation1 and thus is an offence against
 the absoluteness of the  ,absolute4    
,but nevertheless there is a world of   
phenomena1 which the  most mystical of  
philosophers must recognise1 if only as 
a world  of illusion4 ,the sum-total of 
these phenomena may be called the       
appearances of the ,absolute2 and the   
,absolute1 according to ,mr  ,bradley1  
is real nowhere outside them4 ,in this  
sense of reality we  may make predicates

 about it4 ,indeed all our predicates1  
,mr ,bradley  teaches in his ',logic1'  
have reality--the universe of           
reality--for  their ultimate subject4   
,in this sense it may be possible to    
speak of reality as good 7though  it is 
a misapplication of the term ,absolute  
to call it good74 ,but  the question    
remains what we mean by good in this    
connexion1 and  what justification we   
have for using the predicate4 ,and the  
answer  must be that ,mr ,bradley means 
very little1 since the goodness is      
manifested in various degrees of        
goodness and badness1 and that the      
justification for using the term is not 
made clear4 ,it seems to  be used of    
reality in a somewhat vague sense1 as it
 were jure  dignitatis and to have as   
little ethical significance as right    
honourable when applied to a politician 
or reverend to a clergyman3  cases in   
which it might be consistent to say that
 right honourable  gentlemen manifest   
various degrees of honour and dishonour1

 or that  reverend gentlemen are worthy 
of various degrees of reverence and the 
opposite4 ,all the details of the       
phenomenal world are bound together  by 
chains of necessity2 each is an         
essential part of the sum-total4#a  ,how
 can the distinction of good and evil   
apply as between these parts8           
,footnote #a3 ,appearance and           
,reality-,appearance and ,reality1 p4   
#dja4    ,we may speak of parts as      
higher or lower2 and ,mr ,bradley       
defines the  lower as that which1 to be 
made complete1 would have to undergo a  
more total transformation of its        
nature4#a ,the meaning of this is  not  
clear4 ,the reference may be to the     
complete state which a thing  may reach 
in process of growth4 ,thus an early    
stage of a rose-bud  may be said to be  
lower than its later stage because it   
requires a  greater transformation      
before it produces the bloom4 ,but here 
'lower'  does not mean ethically lower1 
unless immaturity be confused with      

evil4 ,or the complete state may be     
regarded as the type of some order  or  
class1 from which different individuals 
differ in greater or less  degree4 ,this
 meaning is not suggested by the author2
 and it could have  ethical implication 
only if the type had been first of all  
shown to  have an ethical value4 ,or    
again1 the completeness referred to may 
be  that which is alone complete in the 
strict sense of the word1 namely1  the  
universe4 ,and we might say that a      
rose-leaf would require greater         
transformation in order to become       
complete in this sense than a           
rose-bush1 or that the act of giving a  
cup of cold water was less  complete    
than the far-reaching activity say of   
the first ,napoleon4  ,but this         
difference in completeness would not    
entail a corresponding  difference in   
moral worth or goodness4    ,footnote   
#a3 ,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #dja4  
,where all stages are essential1 it is  
not possible to say that one  is good   

and another evil4 ,is not the good      
something that ought to be  striven for1
 attained1 and preserved8 and is not    
evil something that  ought not to be at 
all8 ,and how can we say that any part  
ought not to  be when every part is     
essential8    ,from the monistic view of
 reality1 as set forth by ,mr ,bradley1 
there  is no direct route to the        
distinction between good and evil4 ,if  
the  distinction is reached at all1 it  
will be found to be psychological       
rather than cosmical1 to be relative to 
the attitude of the human mind  which   
contemplates the facts1 and in this     
strict sense to be1 what ,mr  ,bradley  
calls it1 appearance4    ,and this is   
the view which ,mr ,bradley takes when  
he proceeds to describe  what he means  
by the 'good4' ,it is1 he says1 that    
which satisfies  desire4 ,it is that    
which we approve of1 and in which we can
 rest with a  feeling of contentment4#a 
,desire--approval--feeling--to these    
mental attitudes the good is relative3  

they are expressed in its  definition4  
,mr ,bradley1 it will be seen1 re-states
 ,green's doctrine with  a difference   
which makes it at once more logical and 
less ethical4 ,green  had said that the 
moral good is that which satisfies the  
desire of a  moral agent2 and in so     
saying had simply walked round the      
difficulty1  for he was unable to say   
wherein consisted the peculiarity of the
 moral  agent without reference to the  
conception of moral good which he had   
started out to define4 ,but ,mr ,bradley
 dispenses with the qualification1  and 
says simply that the good satisfies     
desire4 ,and in so far his  definition  
is more logical4 ,the question is       
whether it distinguishes  good from     
evil4 ,both the practical importance and
 the theoretical  difficulty of the     
problem arise from the fact that evil is
 sometimes  desired1 and that the evil  
desire may be satisfied4 ,the desire of 
a  malevolent man may be satisfied by   
another's downfall1 and his mind may    

even rest with a feeling of contentment 
in that result1 much in the  same way as
 the benevolent man is satisfied and    
content with another's  happiness4      
,fortunately1 the case is not so common3
 the dominant leanings  of most men are 
in sympathy with good rather than with  
evil3 but it is  common enough to make  
the emotional characteristics of the    
individual an  uncertain basis on which 
to rest the distinction of good from    
evil4    ,footnote #a3 ,appearance and  
,reality1 p4 #djb4    ,there is also    
another way of putting the matter3 the  
good is  coextensive with approbation4#a
 ,if by 'approbation' we mean simply    
'holding for good1' then the sentence   
will mean that the good is what  we hold
 for good--that is to say1 that our     
judgments about good  are always true   
judgments1--a proposition which either  
ignores the  divergence between         
different individual judgments about    
good1 or else  implies a complete       
relativity such that that is good to    

each man at  any time which he at that  
time approves or holds to be good2 and  
this  latter view would make all        
discussion impossible4 ,but this is not 
what  ,mr ,bradley means4 ,approbation  
is to be taken in its widest sense2  in 
which sense to approve is to have an    
idea in which we feel  satisfaction1 and
 to have or imagine the presence of this
 idea in  existence4#b ,and here the    
criterion is the same as before1 and    
equally subjective4 ,in desire idea and 
existence are separated2 they  are      
united in the satisfaction of desire2   
and approbation is said to  be just the 
feeling of satisfaction in an idea which
 is also present  7or imagined as       
present7 in existence4 ,not only actual 
satisfaction of  the desire but also    
imagined satisfaction is covered by     
approbation2  but this approval is still
 simply a feeling of some individual    
person4    ,footnote #a3 ,appearance and
 ,reality1 p4 #djg    ,footnote #b3     
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #dah4      

,we need not concern ourselves at       
present with the adequacy of this       
statement as an account of the way in   
which we come to 'approve' or  hold     
something as good4 ,the point is1 that  
it does not advance us at  all towards  
determining the validity of this        
approval1 or towards an  objective      
criterion for distinguishing 'good' from
 evil4    ,mr ,bradley draws a          
distinction between a general and a more
 special  or restricted meaning of      
goodness4 ,for the former it is enough  
that  existence be found to be in       
accordance with the idea2 for the       
latter1 it is necessary that the idea   
itself produce the fact4#a  ,in the     
former sense beauty1 truth1 pleasure1   
and sensation are all  things that are  
good1#b quite irrespective of their     
origin2 in the  latter sense1 only that 
is good which the idea has produced1 or 
in  which it has realised itself1 which 
is the work1 therefore1 of some  finite 
soul4 ,in this narrower meaning goodness

 is the result of will3  the good1 in   
short1 will become the realised end or  
completed will4  ,it is now an idea     
which not only has an answering content 
in fact1  but1 in addition also1 has    
made1 and has brought about1 that       
correspondence4444 ,goodness thus will  
be confined to the realm of  ends1 or of
 self-realisation4 ,it will be          
restricted1 in other words1  to what is 
commonly called the sphere of           
morality1#c ,even in its  more general  
meaning1 as we have seen1 ,mr ,bradley  
has not succeeded in  giving an         
objective account of good4 ,for the     
correspondence of idea  and existence in
 which it is said to consist is defined 
in relation  to desire1 and to some kind
 of feeling on the part of the conscious
  subject4 ,nor was his account         
successful in distinguishing good from  
evil3 to that distinction feeling is a  
blind guide4 ,when he goes on  to       
discuss goodness in the narrower sense1 
in which it belongs to the  results of  

finite volition1 he adopts1 as          
expressing the nature of  goodness1 that
 conception of 'self-realisation' which1
 as put forward  by ,green1 has been    
found inadequate4 ,the same conception  
was used by  ,mr ,bradley1 in his first 
work1 as the most general expression for
 the  end in itself1 ,may we not say1 he
 asked1 that to realise self is  always 
to realise a whole1 and that the        
question in morals is to find  the true 
whole1 realising which will practically 
realise the true  self8#d ,it is easy to
 make the distinction between good and  
evil  depend upon this1 that in the     
former the true self is realised1 and   
that what is realised in the latter is  
only a false self4 ,but it is  equally  
easy to see that this is only to        
substitute one unexplained  distinction 
for another4 ,this short and easy method
 is not that which  ,mr ,bradley adopts 
in his later work4 ,he has something of 
much greater  interest to say regarding 
the nature of the self-realisation in   

which  goodness is made to consist2 and 
upon it he lays stress1 solely with  a  
view to bring out the radical vice of   
all goodness4#e ,goodness1  it is said1 
is self-realisation2 and ,reality--it   
was assumed at the  outset--is          
harmonious and all-comprehensive4 ,these
 last characters are  also criteria of  
degrees of reality1 and consequently of 
degrees  of self-realisation4 ,there    
are1 therefore1 two marks of            
self-realisation--harmony and extent2   
and these two may and do  diverge4 ,no  
doubt in the end1 they will come        
together2 but in that  end goodness1 as 
such1 will have perished4#f ,we must    
admit1 says  ,mr ,bradley1 that two     
great divergent forms of moral goodness 
exist4  ,in order to realise the idea of
 a perfect self a man may have to       
choose between two partially conflicting
 methods4 ,morality1 in short1  may     
dictate either self--sacrifice or       
self--assertion1#g ,the  conscious      
duplicity of the hypocrite1 according to

 an outspoken  adherent of ,mr          
,bradley's1 is but the natural          
exaggeration of the  unconscious        
duplicity which resides in the very     
heart of morality4#h    ,footnote #a3   
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #dab4      
,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 p4 #daj4          
,footnote #c3 ,appearance and ,reality1 
pp4 #dab1 #dac4    ,footnote #d3        
,ethical ,studies 7#ahgf71 pp4 #ei1 #fc4
    ,footnote #e3 ,appearance and       
,reality1 p4 #dad4    ,footnote #f3     
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #dad4      
,footnote #g3 ,ibid41 p4 #dae4          
,footnote #h3 ,a4,e4 ,taylor1 ,problem  
of ,conduct 7#aija71 p4 #fe4    ,it is  
worth while considering this view of the
 contradictions inherent  in morality4  
,to start with1 goodness was defined by 
relation to  desire3 the good was said  
to be what satisfies desire4 ,desire is 
plainly a mental state in which idea and
 existence are separated4 ,as  such it  
cannot be attributed to the ,absolute   
,reality4 ,it will involve  a           

contradiction1 therefore1 if we identify
 goodness with ,absolute  ,reality2 for 
goodness implies a distinction 7between 
idea and  existence7 which cannot find  
place in the ,absolute4 ,but if degrees 
of reality be asserted1 we must admit   
stages short of the ,absolute1  and     
goodness may belong to such a stage in  
which process or  development is allowed
 as a fact4 ,but ,mr ,bradley will have 
it not only  that it is a contradiction 
to identify this process with the       
,absolute1  but also that the conception
 of goodness is itself contradictory4 ,a
  satisfied desire1 he says1 is1 in     
short1 inconsistent with itself4  ,for1 
so far as it is quite satisfied1 it is  
not a desire2 and1 so far  as it is a   
desire1 it must remain at least partly  
unsatisfied4#a ,of  course1 if the      
desire is satisfied1 it ceases4 ,it was 
and it is not4  ,but there is no more   
contradiction here than in any other    
case of  temporal succession4 ,a        
satisfied desire is1 it is true1 no     

longer a  desire4 ,but the phrase is    
contradictory only in appearance2 for it
  means that the desire has been        
satisfied and in its satisfaction has   
ceased to exist as a desire4 ,a much    
more important discrepancy is  asserted 
when it is said that two great divergent
 forms of moral  goodness exist4 ,the   
fight for moral goodness is 'under two  
flags'--self-assertion and              
self-sacrifice4 ,and the allies seem    
hostile to one another1 at least in some
 respects and with some  persons4#b ,we 
have here the time-honoured opposition  
of egoism and  altruism1 with a         
difference4 ,mr ,bradley's most notable 
adherent in the  region of ethical      
enquiry prefers to overlook the         
difference and  to return to the older  
opposition of conflicting ideals4#c ,but
 ,mr  ,bradley himself declines to rate 
the social factor in conduct so  high4  
,it is not altruism or social activity  
which is the opponent of  self-assertion
 or egoism1 but self-sacrifice2 and both

 self-assertion  and self-sacrifice are 
kinds of self-realisation3 in the former
 the  self seeks its realisation by     
perfecting its harmony2 in the latter1  
by increasing its extent4 ,it is not in 
content that the two modes of           
self-realisation differ3 social factors1
 for instance1 may enter into  both2 it 
is in the diverse uses made of the      
contents3#d 'system' is  aimed at in the
 one2 'width' in the other4#e ,the      
harmony of these two  methods is        
attained only when both morality and the
 individual self  are transcended and   
submerged4#f    ,footnote #a3           
,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #daj4      
,footnote #b3 ,appearance and ,reality1 
p4 #dae4    ,footnote #c3 ,taylor1      
,problem of ,conduct1 p4 #agi ff4       
,footnote #d3 ,appearance and ,reality1 
p4 #daf4    ,footnote #e3 ,ibid41 p4    
#dad4    ,footnote #f3 ,ibid41 p4 #dai4 
,this discrepancy of aim1 and then      
coming together of the hostile  factors 
only in the annulling and disappearance 

of both1 is a process  quite in         
accordance with the general dialectic of
 ,mr ,bradley4 ,but two  things may be  
noted with regard to it4 ,in the first  
place the effort  after system is called
 self-assertion1 and the effort after   
width or  expansion is called           
self-sacrifice4 ,perhaps the author may 
claim a  right to give what names he    
likes to the processes he describes4    
,but  in this case the names have a     
recognised meaning in the literature of 
morals1 and no hint is given that they  
are used here in any meaning  other than
 the ordinary4 ,and surely the term     
'self-sacrifice' is an  inappropriate   
term for describing the conduct which   
seeks expansion by  multiplying the     
objects of desire--by the pursuit of    
whatever offers a  chance of widened    
interests1 whether social or            
intellectual1 aesthetic  or             
sensual1--even although my individuality
 suffers loss thereby1  and the health  
and harmony of my self is injured4#a    

,loss may be the  result2 but           
aggrandisement is what is sought1 though
 the effort fails  through lack of      
organisation or system4 ,and again      
'self' is not the  only possible centre 
for the systematisation of conduct4     
,system in  conduct may be realised in  
other ways than as self-assertion4 ,it  
is  sought as truly by the man of       
science who gives up everything for  the
 pursuit of truth or by the             
philanthropist who forgets himself in   
promoting the social welfare4 ,such     
modes of life as these--and not  merely 
self-assertive conduct--may become      
centres of a moral activity  which aims 
at system4    ,footnote #a3 ,appearance 
and ,reality1 p1 #dag4    ,the second   
remark which has to be made on this     
final point is1 that  neither on the    
method of system and self-assertion nor 
on the method  of expansion and         
self-sacrifice has the author given or  
suggested any  criterion for the        
distinction of good and evil4 ,he has   

cast his net  so wide as to include all 
conduct within it without discrimination
 of  moral worth4 ,his own result is    
that the good is1 as such1 transcended  
and submerged4#a ,but this result loses 
all significance if it is the  case1 as 
our enquiry seems to prove1 that the    
good as such has  never been reached at 
all1 nor any tenable suggestion offered 
for  distinguishing it from evil4       
,footnote #a3 ,appearance and ,reality1 
p4 #dai4    ,this is the fundamental    
question for any philosophy of ethics2  
but it  receives no answer at all from  
the prevailing school of metaphysical   
thought4 ,this school offers no solution
 of the problem which was found         
insoluble by the type of philosophy     
whose aim is to co-ordinate the  results
 of science4 ,a comparison of the       
purposes and results of the  two schools
 may be instructive4    ,mr ,herbert    
,spencer has told us that since the time
 of his first essay1  written as far    
back as #ahdb1 his ultimate purpose1    

lying behind all  proximate purposes1   
has been that of finding for the        
principles of right  and wrong in       
conduct at large a scientific basis4444 
,now that moral  injunctions are losing 
the authority given by their supposed   
sacred  origin1 the secularisation of   
morals is becoming imperative4 ,few     
things  can happen more disastrous than 
the decay and death of a regulative     
system no longer fit1 before another and
 fitter regulative system has  grown up 
to replace it4444 ,those who believe    
that the vacuum can be  filled1 and that
 it must be filled1 are called on to do 
something in  pursuance of their        
belief4#a ,but more than fifty years    
after the  publication of this first    
essay1 as1 with the completion of the   
',principles of ,ethics1' his whole     
system of philosophy lay unrolled       
before him1 he made the significant and 
pathetic confession that the  doctrine  
of evolution has not furnished guidance 
to the extent ,i had  hoped4444 ,right  

regulation of the actions of so complex 
a being as man1  living under conditions
 so complex as those presented by a     
society1  evidently forms a             
subject-matter unlikely to admit of     
definite  conclusions throughout its    
entire range4#b ,and the lack of        
confidence  which the author himself    
felt in these parts1 there is good      
reason to  extend to the whole structure
 of evolutionary ethics4    ,footnote   
#a3 ,preface to ,data of ,ethics1 #ahgi4
    ,footnote #b3 ,preface to           
,principles of ,ethics1 vol4 ii41 #ahic4
    ,neither the purpose of their       
structure nor its collapse is so        
explicitly proclaimed by the            
metaphysicians with whom this lecture   
has  dealt4 ,but we hardly need to read 
between the lines in order to see  the  
prominence of the moral interest in all 
that ,green wrote2 and it  was after he 
had shown the inadequacy of the         
empirical method in the  hands of ,hume 
to give any criterion or ideal for      

conduct that he made  his significant   
appeal to ,englishmen under             
five-and-twenty to leave  the           
anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent
 amongst us and take up  the study of   
,kant and ,hegel4#a ,his call to        
speculation has been  widely responded  
to2 but1 if we turn to the most         
important product of  this speculative  
movement1 we have to extract what       
enlightenment we  can from the dictum   
that1 in the only sense in which the    
,absolute  is good1 it manifests itself 
in various degrees of goodness and      
badness4#b    ,footnote #a3 ,green1     
,introduction to ,hume's ,treatise      
7#ahgd71 ii4 #ga4    ,footnote #b3      
,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 p4  
#daa4    ,the most notable recent       
systems of philosophy1 idealist as well 
as  naturalist1 are thus presented to   
us1 almost confessedly1 as void of      
application to conduct4 ,this result1   
and foresight of this result1  have led 
to a widespread suspicion of any attempt

 at ethical  construction which is based
 upon a theory of reality4 ,in          
consequence1  recourse is sometimes had 
to a purely empirical treatment of      
morality  such as that indicated at the 
close of the second lecture4 ,such an   
account1 however1 can never rise from   
the description of conduct to  setting  
up an ideal for life4 ,and accordingly  
some thinkers have  remained convinced  
of the necessity of ideals for the moral
 life1  although unable to find an      
adequate ground for these ideals in     
their  system of reality4    ,this      
attitude was adopted by ,f4,a4 ,lange1  
who1 at the close of his  ,history of   
,materialism1 declared that there was   
need for an ,ideal of  ,worth to        
supplement the deficiencies of the facts
 of being4 ,one thing  is certain1 he   
said1 that man needs to supplement      
reality by an  ,ideal ,world of his own 
creation1 and that in such creations the
  highest and noblest functions of his  
mind co-operate4 ,but must this  free   

act of the mind bear ever and ever again
 the deceptive form of  demonstrative   
science8 ,if it does so1 materialism    
will always reappear  and destroy the   
over-bold speculations4#a ,it would thus
 seem that  moral life postulates an    
ideal which the mind is able to frame1  
but  for which it can establish no      
connexion with the world of reality4    
,footnote #a3 ,geschichte des           
,materialismus1 #crd ed41 p4 #ede f4    
,more recently a brilliant ,french      
writer1 who has attempted to  establish 
a system of morality without obligation 
or sanction1 has  suggested that the    
place of the categorical law of duty may
 be taken  by a speculative hypothesis1 
and that hope may serve where there is  
no  ground for belief4 ,the speculative 
hypothesis is a risk taken in the       
sphere of thought2 action in accordance 
with this hypothesis is a  risk taken in
 the sphere of will2 and that being is  
higher who will  undertake and risk the 
more whether in thought or action4#a    

,thus1  for example1 if ,i would perform
 an act of charity pure and simple1  and
 wish to justify this act rationally1 ,i
 must imagine an eternal  ,charity at   
the ground of things and of myself1 ,i  
must objectify the  sentiment which     
leads to my action2 and here the moral  
agent plays  the same rle as the        
artist4444 ,in every human action there 
is  an element of error1 of illusion3   
and it is conjectured that this  element
 increases as the action rises above the
 commonplace3 the most  loving hearts   
are the most often deceived1 in the     
highest geniuses the  greatest          
incoherences are often found4#b         
,footnote #a3 ,guyau1 ,esquisse d'une   
morale sans obligation ni sanction      
7#ahhe7 p4 #bej4    ,footnote #b3       
,ibid41 pp4 #bbf1 #bbg4    ,this        
solution can hardly be regarded as other
 than a counsel of  despair4 ,its       
ethical value is merely apparent4 ,what 
is of importance  for ethics is not so  
much the presence of some ideal3 it is  

the kind  of ideal that matters4 ,it is 
possible to have an ideal of selfishness
  as well as an ideal of love1 a sensual
 ideal as well as a spiritual4          
,nietzsche's over-man is an ideal2 the  
,mohammedan paradise is an ideal2  and  
conduct can be modelled on them4 ,but it
 is not enough to have  system in       
conduct1 irrespective of the worth of   
the ideal which  determines the system4 
,some criterion is needed for deciding  
between  competing ideals4 ,as long as  
they are looked upon as mere illusions1 
as expressions of doubt1 or as a hazard 
staked on the unknowable1  caprice takes
 the place of law2 where all is equally 
uncertain there  is no security for the 
worth of the ideal itself4              
,unsatisfactory as they are in this     
form1 the opinions referred to are      
echoes of a pregnant doctrine of        
,kant's--the doctrine that the moral    
consciousness brings us into closer     
touch with reality than the merely      
theoretical reason can reach4 ,various  

lines of recent thought may  be said to 
have been suggested by this view4       
,almost every idealist  metaphysician   
has tended to look upon thought itself  
as constituting  the inmost reality of  
the universe which it conceives or      
understands2  and ,kant's doctrine may  
make us pause and ask whether this      
tendency is  not simply an assumption   
without warrant4    ,again1 the         
psychological analysis of knowledge has 
brought out the  fact of its constant   
dependence upon practical interests4 ,it
 is the  need to perform or attain      
something1 which is the motive that     
leads  to the understanding of things2  
and the understanding of things with    
which alone we are satisfied is commonly
 that which helps us so to  describe our
 experience as to be able to control    
some practical  result4 ',knowledge is  
power'2 and not only so1 but in its     
early stages  and in most of its later  
developments1 knowledge is for power3 it
 is  for purposes of his own that man   

becomes the 'interpreter of nature4'    
,it is to men of science rather than to 
philosophers that we owe the            
'descriptive theory' of scientific      
concepts which1 within the last  few    
years1 has gone far to revolutionise the
 prevailing attitude of  philosophy to  
science4 ,concepts1 such as 'mass1'     
'energy1' and the  like1 are no longer  
held to express realities the denial of 
which  would be treason to science2 they
 are simply descriptive notions whose   
truth consists in their utility3 that is
 to say1 in their ability to  comprehend
 all the relevant facts in a simple     
description4 ,and1 in the  same way1    
scientific principles are of the nature 
of postulates1 whose  justification is  
no necessary law of thought1 but must   
rather be  sought in the results of     
scientific investigation4    ,these     
three doctrines--the descriptive theory 
of science1 the  practical nature of    
knowledge as it is brought out by       
psychological  analysis1 and the special

 claims of the moral consciousness--have
  combined to bring about a tendency    
strongly opposed to the older  idealist 
tradition1 the tendency to regard       
practical results as the  sole test of  
truth4    ,this conception is put       
forward now in philosophical literature 
as  a new and independent point of view4
 ,the point of view is only in  process 
of being hardened into a theory2 but1   
under the name  of ,pragmatism1 it has  
already become the subject of a vigorous
  propaganda4 ,with the value of this   
doctrine as a general theory of  reality
 we need not at present concern         
ourselves4 ,in spite of the high  claims
 it makes for the theoretical           
significance of moral ideas1 its        
adherents have not as yet devoted much  
attention to the question of  the worth 
of these moral ideas and the criteria by
 which that worth  may be determined4   
,yet this surely is the fundamental     
question for  ethical theory4 ,on the   
other hand1 as against a merely         

theoretical  interpretation of the      
universe1 into which the moral element  
enters  only as a sort of               
loosely-connected appendix1 the         
pragmatists are  amply justified4       
,practical ends are prior to theoretical
 explanations  of what happens4 ,but    
practical ends vary1 and some measure of
 their  relative values is needed4      
,there is one thing which all reasoning 
about morality assumes and  must assume2
 and that is morality itself4 ,the moral
 concept--whether  described as worth or
 as duty or as goodness--cannot be      
distilled out  of any knowledge about   
the laws of existence or of occurrence4 
,nor  will speculation about the real   
conditions of experience yield it1      
unless adequate recognition be first of 
all given to the fact that the          
experience which is the subject-matter  
of philosophy is not merely a  sensuous 
and thinking1 but also a moral1         
experience4 ,the approval  of the good1 
the disapproval of the evil1 and the    

preference of  the better3 these would  
seem to be basal facts for an adequate  
philosophical theory3 and they imply the
 striving for a best--however  imperfect
 the apprehension of that best may      
always remain4 ,only  when these        
facts--the characteristic facts of moral
 experience--are  recognised as         
constituents of the experience which is 
our  subject-matter1 are we in a        
position profitably to enquire what is  
good and what evil1 and how the best is 
to be conceived4    ,the recognition of 
these facts would only be a beginning2  
but it would  be a beginning which would
 avoid the cardinal error fallen into   
not  only by the leading exponents of   
evolutionist morality1 but also to be   
found in much of the ethical work of    
idealist metaphysicians4 ,it seems  to  
have been assumed that moral principles 
can be reached by the  application of   
scientific generalisations or of the    
results of a  metaphysical analysis     
which has started by overlooking the    

facts  of the moral consciousness4 ,even
 as a metaphysic this procedure is      
inadequate2 and the interpretations of  
reality to which it has led  have erred 
by over-intellectuality4    ,the systems
 of naturalism and of idealism1 whose   
ethical consequences  have been passed  
in review1 have one feature in common2  
and it is  a feature which from of old  
has been regarded as a mark of genuine  
philosophy4 ,they both seek the ,one in 
the many2 but they seek it on  different
 roads4 ,for the naturalist the most    
comprehensive description  of things may
 be the conception of mass-points in    
motion2 or it may be  some more         
recondite conception to which physical  
analysis points4 ,in  either case the   
unity reached will be mechanical4 ,for  
the idealist1  on the other hand1 reason
 may be said to be the central principle
 of  things3 the unity of reality is a  
rational unity4 ,i have contended in    
these lectures that neither the         
mechanical unity of the naturalists  nor

 the rational unity of the idealists has
 succeeded in comprehending  within its 
unifying principle the essential nature 
of morality with  its deep-going dualism
 of good and evil4 ,but while ,i have   
maintained  that even the conception of 
reality as the reproduction of itself by
  an eternal self-consciousness is an   
inadequate conception1 it is still      
possible to hold that reality is a      
connected whole1 and that its true      
principle of unity is an ethical        
principle4    ,if ,i were asked what is 
meant by an ethical unity1 ,i should    
answer1 in  the first place1 that it    
implies purpose4 ,the unity of reality  
is not  exhibited by a description of   
its present or past conditions or even  
by an account of its causal connexions4 
,these modes of description are  all    
affected by the fragmentariness which   
always belongs to temporal              
apprehension4 ,but1 when things are seen
 in the light of a purpose1 a  view of  
them as a whole becomes possible1 and   

the fragmentariness of  time is         
transcended4 ,and1 in the second place1 
,i should say that an  ethical unity    
implies the presence within itself of   
different finite  centres of conscious  
activity1 whose freedom is not          
inconsistent with  their relation to one
 another and to the ,whole4    ,in his  
own life1 so far as it is a moral life1 
each individual seeks  system or unity4 
,and this unity is realised on three    
different  levels--as we may call       
them--which may be distinguished for    
clearness'  sake1 though it is not      
possible actually to separate them4 ,on 
each  level morality is realised through
 system1 and system is brought about  by
 the rule of the morally higher and the 
submission of the morally  lower3 in    
this goodness lies1 in the opposite     
evil4 ,if we isolate the  individual and
 consider him apart1 he may be said to  
attain goodness  by the due ordering and
 control of his sensuous and passional  
nature by rational or spiritual ends4   

,the result may be described1           
negatively1 as the suppression of       
sensualism4 ,but the positive           
description remains imperfect until we  
can say what the rational  or spiritual 
principle is which is to weld all man's 
'particular  impulses' into an organic  
whole4    ,and this cannot be done so   
long as we contemplate the mere         
individual  in isolation4 ,we cannot    
remain at the level of bare             
individuality4  ,personality itself is  
not a merely individual product3 neither
 the  knowledge nor the activity of the 
individual can be explained without     
reference to his position as a member of
 society2 his inheritance is a  social  
inheritance4 ,nor can the individual    
establish a claim to deal  with his own 
personality as a merely individual end4 
,it is a factor in  social life2 and1 in
 systematising his own life1 he must    
have regard  to the social factor4 ,in  
this respect he attains goodness only   
when his individual life seeks a unity  

higher than that of his own             
individuality1 and not centred in his   
selfish interests4 ,from this  point of 
view we may say1 again negatively1 that 
goodness consists in  the suppression of
 selfishness4 ,but once again there is a
 difficulty  about the positive         
description4 ,many moralists1           
undoubtedly1 are  content to rest with  
the social aspect3 to regard the        
'health' or  'vitality' of society as   
the final expression of morality4 ,but a
 life  which is simply absorbed by      
society cannot be said to be a perfect  
unity4 ,society itself is a process2 and
 its changes are determined in  large   
measure by the moral ideals of its      
members4 ,for its unity we  must look to
 an end--an ideal--of which its actual  
forms can offer  indications only4 ,both
 man and society are factors in a       
universal  order2 and their perfection  
cannot be independent of the purpose of 
this order4 ,when the consciousness of  
it fills man's life1 morality is  merged

 in religion4          ,,index4         
,absolute1 the1 #aja ff4    as good1    
#aje4    as not good1 #ajd4  ,altruism1 
#ae ff41 #gd f41 #aah4  ,appearance1    
#aja ff4  ,approbation1 #aaa ff4        
,aristotle1 #hg4  ,artificial selection1
 #fa ff4  ,austen1 ,jane1 #d n4         
,benevolence1 #af4  ,bentham1 ,j41 #d n4
  ,bradley1 ,f4,h41 #hh1 #ajj ff4       
,browning1 ,r41 #ca4    ,characteristics
 of goodness1 #aac4    reality1 #ajc4   
,competition between groups1 #eb f41    
#eh1 #gd1 #gi4    ideas1 #ec ff4        
individuals1 #eb1 #gd1 #gi4  ,content of
 morality1 agreement as to1 #g4         
,christian morality1 #g1 #ah1 #bj4      
,cosmic process and moral order1 #df ff4
    ,darwin1 ,c41 #ce ff41 #ci ff41 #eg1
 #fj1 #fb4  ,degrees of reality1 #ajc   
ff4  ,descriptive ethics1 #gf ff4       
theory of science1 #abi4  ,desire and   
goodness1 #ij ff41 #ajb1 #aaj ff4       
,distinction of good and evil1 #ic ff41 
#aac4    ,egoism1 #ae ff41 #gd f41 #aah4
  ,empiricism1 #c4  ,ens reale1 #ajb4   

realissimum1 #ajb4  ,environment1 moral1
 #gj ff4  ,epicurus1 #ag4  ,eternal     
mind1 the1 #if ff4  ,ethical            
controversies at present day1 #ac ff4   
in nineteenth century1 #a ff4  ,ethical 
unity of things1 #acc ff4  ,ethics of   
evolution1 #cf ff4  ,evolution1 ethical 
significance of1 #ea1 #fg ff4           
,evolution of ethics1 #cf ff4           
,evolution1 theory of1 #cc ff41 #cf ff4 
,exceptional cases1 #aa4  ,experiments  
in morality1 #ej4    ,fichte1 ,j4,g41   
#hg4  ,fittest1 survival of the1 #ce1   
#fi ff4    ,galt1 ,j41 #d n4  ,good1 the
 true1 #ib ff4  ,goodness as appearance1
 #ajb ff4  ,goodness as contradictory1  
#aag4  ,green1 ,t4,h41 #gg n41 #hi ff41 
#abc4  ,guyau1 #abe f4    ,halvy1 ,e41  
#d n4  ,hedonism1 #ajj4  ,hegel1 #hg1   
#ajd1 #abc4  ,higher and lower1 #ajg ff4
  ,huxley1 ,t4,h41 #de ff41 #fh4        
,ibsen1 #ca4  ,idealism1 #hg ff4        
,ideals1 need of1 #abe4  ,illusions as  
ideals1 #abg4  ,immoralist1 #bd4        
,individual and group1 #dj ff4          

,influences forming ethical thought3    
current morality1 #bf ff4    science and
 philosophy1 #cb ff4  ,intelligent      
selection1 #fa ff41 #hj4  ,intuitionism1
 #b ff41 #ha4    ,kant1 #hg1 #abc1 #abg 
f4    ,lange1 ,f4,a41 #abe4  ,leibniz1  
#hg4    ,material and moral progress1   
#bi f4  ,mechanical unity1 #acc4        
,metaphysics1 #hb1 #he ff4  ,mill1      
,j4,s41 #c n41 #h ff41 #bh4             
,modifications of general rules1 #i4    
,monism and ethics1 #aji4  ,moral       
consciousness and reality1 #abh4        
environment1 #gj ff4    experience1     
#aca4    ideas1 origin of1 #a ff4       
order and cosmic process1 #df ff4       
value1 criterion of1 #a ff41 #ge4       
,natural selection1 #ce1 #dc ff41 #di4  
in morals1 #ee4  ,naturalism1 #hc f41   
#hf f4  ,nietzsche1 ,f41 #ah ff41 #ca   
f41    #dg ff41 #fg41 #abg4  ,nobles1   
morality of1 #bj4    ,origin and        
validity1 #cg1 #ig4  ,over-man1 the1    
#bb1 #ca4  ,owen1 ,sir ,r41 #ei4        
,physiological interpretation    of     

life1 #fg1 #gf4  ,plato1 #ca1 #hg4      
,practical nature of knowledge1 #abh4   
,pragmatism1 #acj4  ,progress of life1  
#cd4  ,progressive morality1 #i4        
,psychological ethics1 #aji ff4         
,purposive selection1 #fa ff41 #hj4     
,rational unity1 #acc4  ,religion1 #hb  
f41 #acf4  ,renaissance1 #cc4           
,science and metaphysics1 #he4          
,self-assertion1 #aaf ff4  ,self-love1  
#ag4  ,self-realisation1 #ij ff41 #aac  
ff4  ,self-sacrifice1 #aaf ff4          
,selfishness1 suppression of1 #acf4     
,sensationalism1 #ajj4  ,sensualism1    
suppression of1 #ace4  ,servile         
morality1 #bj4  ,sexual selection1 #ff4 
,sidgwick1 ,h41 #af f4  ,social         
qualities1 #dj ff4  ,sophists1 the1 #bg4
  ,spencer1 ,h41 #dd1 #dg1 #ea1 #gc1    
#abb4  ,spinoza1 #hg f4  ,stephen1 ,sir 
,l41 #dd4  ,subjective selection1 #fj1  
#ff1 #hj4  ,subjectivity in ethics1 #ha4
    ,taylor1 ,a4,e41 #aaf1 #aah4        
,tennyson1 #ca4  ,tille1 ,a41 #be n4    
,transvaluation1 #ba4  ,truth as        

appearance1 #aja4    as moral law1 #i   
ff41 #bb f4    ,uebermensch1 the1 #bb1  
#be n4  ,unity of life1 #cd4            
,utilitarianism1 the term1 #c n4    the 
theory1 #b ff41 #ha4    ,variation1 #di4
  ,volz1 ,j41 #bd n4    ,wellbeing1 #ga1
 #ge4  ,wilberforce1 ,s41 #ei4    ,zola1
 #ca4