,,progressive ,,morality    ,,fowler    
,illustration      ,,progressive        
,,morality    ,,an ,,essay ,,in ,,ethics
      ,,by    ,,thomas ,,fowler1 ,m4,a41
 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,s4,a4    ,,president ,,of
 ,,corpus ,,christi ,,college           
,,wykeham ,,professor ,,of ,,logic ,,in 
,,the ,,university ,,of ,,oxford        
#ahhd        ,,preface4    ,these pages 
represent an attempt to exhibit a       
scientific conception of  morality in a 
popular form1 and with a view to        
practical applications  rather than the 
discussion of theoretical difficulties4 
,for this purpose  it has been necessary
 to study brevity and avoid controversy4
 ,hence1 ,i  have made few references to
 other authors1 and ,i have almost      
altogether  dispensed with foot-notes4  
,but1 though ,i have attempted to state 
rather  than to defend my views1 ,i     
believe that they are1 in the main1     
those  which1 making exception for a few
 back eddies in the stream of modern    
thought1 are winning their way to       

general acceptance among the more       
instructed and reflective men of our    
day4    ,it is necessary that ,i should 
state that this ,essay is independent of
 a  much larger work1 entitled the      
',principles of ,morals1' on which ,i   
was1  some years ago1 engaged with my   
predecessor1 the late ,professor        
,wilson4  ,owing to the declining state 
of his health during the latter years of
  his life1 that work was1 at the time  
of his death1 left in a condition  which
 rendered its completion very difficult 
and its publication  probably           
undesirable4 ,for the present work ,i am
 solely responsible1  though no one can 
have been brought into close contact    
with so powerful  a mind as that of     
,professor ,wilson1 without deriving    
from it much  stimulus and retaining    
many traces of its influence4    ,it has
 long been my belief that the questions 
of theoretical ,ethics  would be far    
less open to dispute1 as well as far    
more intelligible1 if  they were        

considered with more direct reference to
 practice4 ,this little  book will1 ,i  
trust1 furnish an example1 however      
slight and imperfect1 of  such a mode of
 treatment4    ,c4,c4,c4    ,july #be1  
#ahhd4        ,,contents4      ,,chapter
 ,i4    ,introduction4 ,the ,sanctions  
of ,conduct4      ,,chapter ,,ii4       
,the ,moral ,sanction or ,moral         
,sentiment4 ,its  ,functions and the    
,justification of its claims  to        
,superiority4      ,,chapter ,,iii4     
,analysis and ,formation of the ,moral  
,sentiment4  ,its ,education and        
,improvement4      ,,chapter ,,iv4      
,the ,moral ,test and its               
,justification4      ,,chapter ,v4      
,examples of the ,practical ,application
 of the ,moral  ,test to existing       
,morality4        ,,progressive         
,,morality4             99       99     
99       99       99      ,,chapter ,i4 
,,introduction4 ,,the ,,sanctions ,,of  
,,conduct4      ,all reflecting men     
acknowledge that both the theory and the

 practice of  morality have advanced    
with the general advance in the         
intelligence and  civilisation of the   
human race4 ,but1 if this be so1        
morality must be a  matter capable of   
being reasoned about1 a subject of      
investigation and  of teaching1 in which
 the less intelligent members of a      
community have  always something to     
learn from the more intelligent1 and the
 more  intelligent1 in their turn1 have 
ever fresh problems to solve and new    
material to study4 ,it becomes1 then1 of
 prime importance to every  educated    
man1 to ask what are the data of        
,ethics1 what is the method by  which   
its general principles are investigated1
 what are the  considerations which the 
moralist ought to apply to the solution 
of the  complex difficulties of life and
 action4 ,and still1 in spite of these  
obvious facts1 ethical investigation1 or
 any approach to an independent  review 
of the current morality1 is always      
unpopular with the great mass  of       

mankind4 ,though the conduct of their   
own lives is the subject which  most    
concerns men1 it is that in which they  
are least patient of  speculation4      
,nothing is so wounding to the          
self-complacency of a man of  indolent  
habits of mind as to call in question   
any of the moral  principles on which he
 habitually acts4 ,praise and blame are 
usually  apportioned1 even by educated  
men1 according to vague and general     
rules1  with little or no regard to the 
individual circumstances of the case4   
,and of all innovators1 the innovator on
 ethical theory is apt to be the  most  
unpopular and to be the least able to   
secure impartial attention to  his      
speculations4 ,and hence it is that     
vague theories1 couched in              
unintelligible or only half-intelligible
 language1 and almost totally           
inapplicable to practice1 have usually  
done duty for what is called a  system  
of moral philosophy4 ,the authors or    
exponents of such theories  have the    

good fortune at once to avoid odium and 
to acquire a reputation  for profundity4
    ,in the following pages1 ,i shall   
attempt 7#a7 to discriminate morality1  
properly so called1 from other sanctions
 of conduct2 7#b7 to determine  the     
precise functions1 and the ultimate     
justification1 of the moral  sentiment1 
or1 in other words1 of the moral        
sanction2 7#c7 to enquire how  this     
sentiment has been formed1 and how it   
may be further educated and  improved2  
7#d7 to discover some general test of   
conduct2 7#e7 to give  examples of the  
application of this test to existing    
moral rules and  moral feelings1 with a 
view to shew how far they may be        
justified and  how far they require     
extension or reformation4 ,as my subject
 is almost  exclusively practical1 ,i   
shall studiously avoid mere theoretical 
puzzles1 such as is pre-eminently that  
of the freedom of the will1  which1 in  
whatever way resolved1 probably never   
influences1 and never  will influence1  

any sane man's conduct4 ,questions of   
this kind will  always excite interest  
in the sphere of speculation1 and       
speculation is  a necessity of the      
cultivated human intellect2 but it does 
not seem to  me that they can be        
profitably discussed in a treatise1 the 
aim of which  is simply to suggest      
principles for examining1 for testing1  
and1 if  possible1 for improving the    
prevailing sentiment on matters of      
practical  morals4    ,to begin with the
 first division of my subject1 ,how is  
morality1  properly so called1          
discriminated from other sanctions of   
conduct8 ,by a  sanction ,i may premise 
that ,i mean any pleasure which attracts
 to as  well as any pain which deters   
from a given course of action4 ,in books
 on  ,jurisprudence1 this word is       
usually employed to designate merely    
pains  or penalties1 but this           
circumstance arises from the fact that1 
at least  in modern times1 the law      
seldom has recourse to rewards1 and     

effects its  ends almost exclusively by 
means of punishments4 ,when we are      
considering  conduct1 however1 in its   
general aspects and not exclusively in  
its  relations to law1 we appear to need
 a word to express any inducement1      
whether of a pleasureable or painful    
nature1 which may influence a man's     
actions1 and such a word the term       
'sanction' seems conveniently to        
supply4 ,taking the word in this        
extended sense1 the sanctions of conduct
  may be enumerated as the physical1 the
 legal1 the social1 the religious1  and 
the moral4 ,of the physical sanction    
familiar examples may be found  in the  
headache from which a man suffers after 
a night's debauch1 the  pleasure of     
relaxation which awaits a well-earned   
holiday1 the danger to  life or limb    
which is attendant on reckless exercise1
 or the glow of  constant satisfaction  
which rewards a healthy habit of life4  
,these  pleasures and pains1 when once  
experienced1 exercise1 for the future1  

an  attracting or a deterring influence1
 as the case may be1 on the courses  of 
conduct with which they have            
respectively become associated4 ,thus1 a
  man who has once suffered from a      
severe headache1 after a night's        
drinking-bout1 will be likely to        
exercise more discretion in future1 or  
the prospect of agreeable diversion1 at 
the end of a hard day's work1  will     
quicken a man's efforts to execute his  
task4    ,the legal sanction is too     
familiar to need illustration4 ,without 
penal  laws1 no society of any size     
could exist for a day4 ,there are1      
however1  two characteristics of this   
sanction which it is important to point 
out4  ,one is that it works almost      
exclusively#a by means of penalties4    
,it would be an endless and thankless   
business1 in a society  of any size1    
even if it were possible1 to attempt to 
reward the virtuous  for their          
consideration in not breaking the laws4 
,the cheap1 the  effective1 indeed1 in  

most cases1 the only possible method is 
to punish  the transgressor4 ,by a      
carefully devised and properly graduated
 system  of penalties each citizen is   
thus furnished with the strongest       
inducement to refrain from those acts   
which may injure or annoy his           
neighbour4 ,another characteristic of   
the legal sanction is that1 though  it  
is professedly addressed to all citizens
 alike1 it actually affects  the        
uneducated and lower classes far more   
than the educated and higher  classes of
 society4 ,this circumstance arises     
partly from the fact that  persons in a 
comfortable position of life are under  
little temptation to  commit the more   
ordinary crimes forbidden by law1 such  
as are theft1  assault1 and the like1   
and partly from the fact that their     
education and  associations make them   
more amenable to the social1 and1 in    
most cases1  to the moral and religious 
sanctions1 about to be described        
presently4  ,few persons in what are    

called the higher or middle ranks of    
life have  any temptation to commit1    
say1 an act of theft1 and1 if they      
experienced  any such temptation1 they  
would be at least as likely to be       
restrained  by the consideration of what
 their neighbours would think or say    
about  them1 even apart from their own  
moral and religious convictions1 as by  
the fear of imprisonment4    ,footnote  
#a3 ,there are a few exceptions to the  
rule that the sanctions  employed by the
 state assume the form of punishments   
rather than of  rewards4 ,such are      
titles and honours1 pensions awarded for
 distinguished  service1 rewards to     
informers1 c4 ,but these exceptions are 
almost  insignificant1 when compared    
with the numerous examples of the       
general  rule4    ,one of the most      
effective sanctions in all conditions of
 life1 but  especially in the upper and 
better educated circles of a civilized  
society1 is what may be called the      
social sanction1 that is to say1 a      

regard for the good opinion and a dread 
of the evil opinion of those who  know  
us1 and especially of those amongst whom
 we habitually live4 ,it is  one of the 
characteristics of this sanction that it
 is much more  far-reaching than the    
legal sanction4 ,not only does it extend
 to many  acts of a moral character     
which are not affected1 in most         
countries1 by  the legal sanction1 such 
as lying1 backbiting1 ingratitude1      
unkindness1  cowardice1 but also to mere
 matters of taste or fashion1 such as   
dress1  etiquette1 and even the         
proprieties of language4 ,indeed1 as to 
the  latter class of actions1 there is  
always considerable danger of the       
social sanction becoming too strong4    
,society is apt to insist on all men    
being cast in one mould1 without much   
caring to examine the character of  the 
mould which it has adopted4 ,and it     
frequently happens that a wholly        
disproportionate value thus comes to be 
attached to the observance of  mere     

rules of etiquette and good-breeding as 
compared with acts and  feelings which  
really concern the moral and social     
welfare of mankind4  ,there is many a   
man1 moving in good society1 who would  
rather be guilty  of1 and even detected 
in1 an act of unkindness or mendacity1  
than be  seen in an unfashionable dress 
or commit a grammatical solecism or a   
broach of social etiquette4 ,vulgarity  
to such men is a worse reproach  than   
hardness of heart or indifferent        
morality4 ,in these cases1 as we  shall 
see hereafter1 the social sanction      
requires to be corrected by the  moral  
and religious sanctions1 and it is the  
special province of the  moral and      
religious teacher in each generation to 
take care that this  correction shall be
 duly and effectively applied4 ,the task
 may1 from  time to time1 require the   
drastic hand of the moral or religious  
reformer1 but1 unless some one has the  
courage to undertake it1 we are  in     
constant danger of neglecting the       

weightier matters of the law1 while  we 
are busy with the mint and cummin and   
anise of fashion and  convention4 ,but1 
notwithstanding the danger of           
exaggeration and  misapplication1 there 
can be no doubt of the vast importance  
and the  generally beneficial results of
 a keen sensitiveness to the opinions of
  our fellow-men4 ,without the powerful 
aid of this sanction1 the  restraints of
 morality and religion would often be   
totally ineffective4    ,when the social
 sanction operates1 not through society 
generally1 but  through particular      
sections of society1 it may be called a 
,law of  ,honour1 a term which          
originated in the usages of ,chivalry4  
,in a complex  and civilized form of    
society1 such as our own1 there may be  
many such  laws of honour1 and the same 
individual may be subject to several of 
them4 ,thus each profession1 the army1  
the navy1 the clerical1 the legal1  the 
medical1 the artistic1 the dramatic     
profession1 has its own peculiar  code  

of honour or rules of professional      
etiquette1 which its members can  only  
infringe on pain of ostracism1 or1 at   
least1 of loss of  professional         
reputation4 ,the same is the case with  
trades1 and is  specially exemplified in
 the instance of trades-unions1 or1     
their  mediaeval prototypes1 the guilds4
 ,a college or a school1 again1 has its 
own rules and traditions1 which the     
tutor or undergraduate1 the master  or  
boy1 can often only violate at his      
extreme peril4 ,almost every club1      
institution1 and society affords another
 instance in point4 ,the class of       
'gentlemen1' too1 that is to say1       
speaking roughly1 the upper and upper   
middle ranks of society1 claim to have a
 code of honour of their own1  superior 
to that of the ordinary citizen4 ,a     
breach of this code is  called          
'ungentlemanly' rather than wrong or    
immoral or unjust or unkind4  ,so far as
 this code insists on courtesy of       
demeanour and delicacy of  feeling and  

conduct1 it is a valuable complement to 
the ordinary rules  of morality1 though1
 so far as it fulfils this function1 it 
plainly  ought not to be the exclusive  
possession of one class1 but ought to be
  communicated1 by means of example and 
education1 to the classes who are  now  
supposed to be bereft of it4 ,there are 
points in this code1 however1  such as  
that the payment of 'debts of honour'   
should take precedence of  that of      
tradesmen's bills1 and that less        
courtesy is due to persons in  an       
inferior station than to those in our   
own1 which at least merit               
re-consideration4 ,it may1 indeed1 be   
said of all these laws or codes of      
honour1 that1 though they have probably1
 on the whole1 a salutary effect  in    
maintaining a high standard of conduct  
in the various bodies or  classes where 
they obtain1 they require to be         
constantly watched1 lest  they should   
become capricious or tyrannical1 and    
specially lest they  should conflict    

with the wider interests of society or  
the deeper  instincts of morality4 ,it  
must not be forgotten that we are 'men' 
before  we are 'gentlemen1' and that no 
claims of any profession1 institution1  
or class can replace or supplant those  
of humanity and citizenship4    ,we see1
 then1 or rather we are obliged at the  
present stage of our  enquiry to assume1
 that the social sanction1 whether it be
 derived from  the average sentiment of 
society at large or from the customs and
  opinions of particular aggregates of  
society1 requires constant  correction  
at the hands of the moralist4 ,the      
sentiment which it  represents may be   
only the sentiment of men of average    
moral tone1 or it  may even be that of  
men of an inferior or degraded morality1
 and hence  it often needs to be tested 
by the application of rules derived from
 a  higher standard both of feeling and 
intelligence4 ,nor is it the moral      
standard only which may be used to      
correct the social standard4 ,we may    

often advantageously have recourse to   
the legal standard for the same         
purpose4 ,for the laws of a country     
express1 as a rule1 the sentiments of   
the wisest and most experienced of its  
citizens1 and hence we might  naturally 
expect that they would be in advance of 
the average moral  sentiment of the     
people1 as well as of the social        
traditions of  particular professions or
 classes4 ,and this ,i believe to be    
usually the  case4 ,for instances1 we   
have to go no further than the          
comparison  between the laws and the    
popular or professional sentiment on    
bribery at  elections1 on smuggling1 on 
evasion of taxation1 on fraudulent      
business  transactions1 on duelling1 on 
prize-fighting1 or on gambling4 ,at the 
same time it must be confessed that1 as 
laws sometimes become  antiquated1 and  
the leanings of lawyers are proverbially
 conservative1  it occasionally happens 
that1 on some points1 the average moral 
sentiment is in advance of the law4 ,i  

may select as examples1 from            
comparatively recent legal history1 the 
continuance of religious  disabilities  
and the excessive punishment of ordinary
 or even trivial  crimes2 and1 perhaps1 
,i may venture to add1 as a possible    
reform in the  future now largely       
demanded by popular sentiment1 some     
considerable  modifications of the laws 
regulating the transfer of and the      
succession  to landed property4 ,thus it
 will be seen that law and the sentiment
 of  society may each be employed as    
corrective of the other1 and that1      
consequently1 their comparison implies a
 higher standard than either1 by  means 
of which each may be tested1 and to     
which each1 in its turn1 may  be        
referred4 ,this higher or common        
standard it will be our business to     
consider in a subsequent part of this   
,essay4 ,meanwhile1 it may be  pointed  
out that1 in addition to its function as
 an occasional  corrective of the legal 
sanction1 the social sanction subserves 

two  great objects3 first1 it largely   
complements the legal sanction1 being   
applicable to numberless cases which    
that sanction does not1 and1 in  fact1  
cannot reach2 secondly1 the legal       
sanction1 even in those cases  which it 
reaches1 is greatly reinforced by the   
social sanction1 which  adds the pains  
arising from an evil reputation1 and all
 the indefinable  social inconveniences 
which an evil reputation brings with it1
 to the  actual penalties inflicted by  
the law4    ,the religious sanction     
varies1 of course1 with the different   
religious  creeds1 and1 in the more     
imperfect forms of religion1 by no means
 always  operates in favour of morality4
 ,but it will be sufficient here to     
consider the religious sanction solely  
in relation to ,christianity4 ,as       
enforced by the ,bible and the ,church1 
the religious sanctions of conduct  are 
two1 which ,i shall call the higher and 
the lower sanctions4 ,by the  latter ,i 
mean the hope of the divine reward or   

the fear of the divine  punishment1     
either in this world or the next2 by the
 former1 the love of  ,god and that     
veneration for ,his nature which        
irresistibly inspires the  effort to    
imitate ,his perfections4 ,the lower    
religious sanction is  plainly the same 
in kind with the legal sanction4 ,if a  
man is induced to  do or to refrain from
 doing a certain action from fear of    
punishment1  the motive is the same1    
whether the punishment be for a long    
time or a  short one1 whether it is to  
take immediate effect or to be deferred 
for  a term of years4 ,and1 similarly1  
the same is the case with rewards4 ,no  
peculiar merit1 as it appears to me1 can
 be claimed by a man because he  acts   
from fear of divine punishment rather   
than of human punishment1 or  from hope 
of divine rewards rather than of human  
rewards4 ,the only  differences between 
the two sanctions are 7#a7 that the     
hopes and fears  inspired by the        
religious sanction are1 to one who      

believes in their  reality1 far more    
intense than those inspired by the legal
 sanction1 the  two being related as the
 temporal to the eternal1 and 7#b7 that1
 inasmuch  as ,god is regarded as       
omnipresent and omniscient1 the         
religious sanction  is immeasurably more
 far-reaching than the legal sanction or
 even than  the legal and the social    
sanctions combined4 ,thus the lower     
religious  sanction is1 to those who    
really believe in it1 far more effective
 than  the legal sanction1 though it is 
the same in kind4 ,but the higher       
religious sanction appeals to a totally 
different class of motives1 the  motives
 of love and reverence rather than of   
hope and fear4 ,in this  higher frame of
 mind1 we keep ,god's commandments1     
because we love ,him1  not because we   
hope for ,his rewards or fear ,his      
punishments4 ,we  reverence ,god1 and1  
therefore1 we strive to be like ,him1 to
 be perfect  even as ,he is perfect4 ,we
 have attained to that state of mind in 

which  perfect love has cast out fear1  
and1 hence1 we simply do good and act   
righteously because ,god1 who is the    
supreme object of our love and the      
supreme ideal of conduct1 is good and   
righteous4 ,there can be no  question   
that1 in this case1 the motives are far 
loftier and purer than  in the case of  
the legal and the lower religious       
sanctions4 ,but there  are few men1     
probably1 capable of these exalted      
feelings1 and1  therefore1 for the great
 mass of mankind the external           
inducements to  right conduct must1     
probably1 continue to be sought in the  
coarser  motives4 ,it may be mentioned1 
before concluding this notice of the    
religious sanctions1 that there is a    
close affinity between the higher       
religious sanction and that form of the 
social sanction which operates  through 
respect for the good opinions of those  
of our fellow-men whom we  love1        
reverence1 or admire4    ,but1 quite    
distinct from all the sanctions thus far

 enumerated1 there is  another sanction 
which is derived from our own reflexion 
on our own  actions1 and the approbation
 or disapprobation which1 after such    
reflexion1 we bestow upon them4 ,there  
are actions which1 on no  reasonable    
estimate of probabilities1 can ever come
 to the knowledge of  any other person  
than ourselves1 but which we look back  
on with pleasure  or regret4 ,it may be 
said that1 though1 in these cases1 the  
legal and  the social sanctions are     
confessedly excluded1 the sanction which
 really  operates is the religious      
sanction1 in either its higher or its   
lower  form4 ,but it can hardly be      
denied that1 even where there is no     
belief in  ,god1 or1 at least1 no vivid 
sense of ,his presence nor any effective
  expectation of ,his intervention1 the 
same feelings are experienced4  ,these  
feelings1 then1 appear to be distinct in
 character from any of the  others which
 we have so far considered1 and they    
constitute what may  appropriately be   

called the moral sanction1 in the strict
 sense of the  term4 ,it is one of the  
faults of ,bentham's system that he     
confounds this  sanction with the social
 sanction1 speaking indifferently of the
 moral  or popular 7that is to say1     
social7 sanction2 but let any one       
examine  carefully for himself the      
feelings of satisfaction or             
dissatisfaction  with which he looks    
back upon past acts of his own life1 and
 ask himself  whether he can discover in
 those feelings any reference to the    
praise or  blame of other persons1      
actual or possible4 ,there will1 if ,i  
mistake  not1 be many of them in which  
he can discover no such reference1 but  
in  which the feeling is simply that of 
satisfaction with himself for having    
done what he ought to have done1 or     
dissatisfaction with himself for  having
 done that which he ought not to have   
done4 ,whether these feelings  admit of 
analysis and explanation is another     
question1 and one with  which ,i shall  

deal presently1 but of their reality and
 distinctness no  competent and         
impartial person1 on careful            
self-examination1 can well  doubt4 ,the 
answer1 then1 to our first question1 ,i 
conceive to be that  the moral sanction1
 properly so called1 is distinguished   
from all other  sanctions of conduct in 
that it has no regard to the prospect of
  physical pleasure or pain1 or to the  
hope of reward or fear of  punishment1  
or to the estimation in which we shall  
be held by any other  being than        
ourselves1 but that it has regard simply
 and solely to the  internal feeling of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with    
which1 on  reflexion1 we shall look back
 upon our own acts4        ,,chapter    
,,ii4    ,,the ,,moral ,,sanction ,,or  
,,moral ,,sentiment4  ,,its ,,functions 
,,and ,,the ,,justification ,,of  ,,its 
,,claims ,,to ,,superiority4      ,i now
 proceed to consider more at length what
 are the precise functions  of the moral
 sentiment or moral sanction#a1 and what

 is the justification  of the weight    
which we attach to it1 or rather of the 
preference which  we assign to it1 or   
feel that we ought to assign to it1 over
 all the  other sanctions of conduct4   
,we have already seen that the moral    
sentiment or sanction is the feeling of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction  which  
we experience when we reflect on our own
 acts1 without any  reference to any    
external authority or external opinion4 
,now it is  important to ask whether    
this feeling is uniformly felt on the   
occurrence of the same acts1 or whether 
it ever varies1 so that acts1  for      
instance1 which are at one time viewed  
with satisfaction1 are at  another time 
regarded with indifference or with      
positive  dissatisfaction4 ,it would    
seem as if no man who reflects on       
ethical  subjects1 and profits by the   
observation and experience of life1     
could  possibly answer this question in 
any other than one way4 ,there must be  
very few educated and reflective men who

 have not seen reason1 with  advancing  
years1 to alter their opinion on many   
of1 at least1 the minor  points of      
morality in which they were instructed  
as children4 ,a familiar  instance      
occurs at once in the different way in  
which most of us view  card-playing or  
attendance at balls or theatres from the
 much stricter  views which prevailed in
 many respectable ,english households a 
generation ago4 ,on the other hand1     
excess in eating and drinking is        
regarded with far less indulgence now   
than it was in the days of our  fathers 
and grandfathers4 ,on these points1     
then1 at least1 and such as  these1 it  
must be allowed that there is a         
variation of moral sentiment1  or1 in   
other words1 that the acts condemned or 
approved by the moral  sanction are not 
invariably the same4 ,moreover1 any of  
us who are  accustomed to reason on     
moral questions1 and can observe        
carefully the  processes through which  
the mind passes1 will notice that there 

is  constantly going on a re-adjustment1
 so to speak1 of our ethical  opinions1 
whether we are reviewing abstract       
questions of morality or the  specific  
acts of ourselves or others4 ,we at one 
time think ourselves or  others more1   
and1 at another time1 less blameable for
 the self-same  acts1 or we come to     
regard some particular class of acts in 
a different  light from what we used to 
do1 either modifying our praise or      
blame1 or1  in extreme cases1 actually  
substituting one for the other4 ,but1   
though  these facts are patent1 and may 
be verified by any one in his experience
  either of himself or others1 there    
have actually been moralists who have   
appeared to maintain the position that1 
when a man is unbiassed by  passion or  
interest1 his moral judgments are and   
must be invariably the  same4 ,this     
error has1 undoubtedly1 been largely    
fostered by the loose  and popular use  
of the terms conscience and moral sense4
 ,these terms1  and especially the word 

conscience1 are often employed to       
designate a  sort of mysterious entity1 
supposed to have been implanted in the  
mind  by ,god ,himself1 and endowed by  
,him with the unique prerogative of     
infallibility4 ,even so philosophical   
and sober a writer as ,bishop ,butler   
has given some countenance to this      
extravagant supposition1 and to the     
exaggerated language which he employs on
 the prerogatives of conscience1  and to
 the emphatic manner in which he insists
 on the absolute1 if not  the           
infallible1 character of its decisions1 
may be traced much of the  misconception
 which still prevails on the subject4   
,but we have only to  take account of   
the notorious fact that the consciences 
of two equally  conscientious men may   
point in entirely opposite directions1  
in order to  see that the decisions of  
conscience cannot1 at all events1 be    
credited  with infallibility4 ,those who
 denounce and those who defend religious
  persecution1 those who insist on the  

removal and those who insist on the     
retention of religious disabilities1    
those who are in favour of and  those   
who are opposed to a relaxation of the  
marriage laws1 those who  advocate a    
total abstention from intoxicating      
liquors and those who  allow of a       
moderate use of them1--men on both sides
 in these  controversies1 or1 at least1 
the majority of them1 doubtless act     
conscientiously1 and yet1 as they arrive
 at opposite conclusions1 the           
conscience of one side or other must be 
at fault4 ,there is no act of  religious
 persecution1 there are few acts of     
political or personal  cruelty1 for     
which the authority of conscience might 
not be invoked4 ,i  doubt not that      
,queen ,mary acted as conscientiously in
 burning the  ,reformers as they did in 
promulgating their opinions or we do in 
condemning her acts4 ,it is plain1 then1
 not only that the decisions of         
conscience are not infallible1 but that 
they must1 to a very large  extent1 be  

relative to the circumstances and       
opinions of those who form  them4 ,in   
any intelligible or tenable sense of the
 term1 conscience  stands simply for the
 aggregate of our moral opinions        
reinforced by the  moral sanction of    
self-approbation or self-disapprobation4
 ,that we ought  to act in accordance   
with these opinions1 and that we are    
acting wrongly  if we act in opposition 
to them1 is a truism4 ',follow          
,conscience' is the  only safe guide1   
when the moment of action has arrived4  
,but it is  equally important to insist 
on the fallibility of conscience1 and to
  urge men1 by all means in their power1
 to be constantly improving and         
instructing their consciences1 or1 in   
plain words1 to review and1  wherever   
occasion offers1 to correct their       
conceptions of right and  wrong4 ,the   
'plain1 honest man' of ,bishop ,butler  
would1 undoubtedly1  always follow his  
conscience1 but it is by no means       
certain that his  conscience would      

always guide him rightly1 and it is     
quite certain that  it would often      
prompt him differently from the         
consciences of other  'plain1 honest    
men' trained elsewhere and under other  
circumstances4 ,to  act contrary to our 
opinions of right and wrong would be    
treason to our  moral nature1 but it    
does not follow that those opinions are 
not  susceptible of improvement and     
correction1 or that it is not as much   
our  duty to take pains to form true    
opinions as to act in accordance with   
our opinions when we have formed them4  
,footnote #a3 ,i use the expressions    
'moral sanction' and 'moral  sentiment' 
as equivalent terms1 because the        
pleasures and pains1 which  constitute  
the moral sanction1 are inseparable1    
even in thought1 from  the moral        
feeling4 ,the moral feeling of          
self-approbation or  self-disapprobation
 cannot even be conceived apart from the
 pleasures or  pains which are attendant
 on it1 and by means of which it reveals

 itself  to us4    ,it should be noticed
 that the expression 'moral sentiment'  
is habitually  used in two senses1 as   
the equivalent 7#a7 of the moral feeling
 only1 7#b7  of the entire moral        
process1 which1 as we shall see in the  
third  chapter1 consists partly of a    
judgment1 partly of a feeling4 ,it is in
  the latter sense1 for instance1 that  
we speak of the 'current moral          
sentiment' of any given age or country1 
meaning the opinions then or  there     
prevalent on moral questions1 reinforced
 by the feeling of  approbation or      
disapprobation4 ,as1 however1 the moral 
feeling always  follows immediately and 
necessarily on the moral judgment1      
whenever that  judgment pronounces      
decisively for or against an action1 and
 always  implies a previous judgment 7,i
 am here again obliged to anticipate the
  discussion in chapter #c71 the        
ambiguity is of no practical importance 
at  the present stage of our enquiry4   
,it is almost needless to add that the  

word 'sentiment1' when used alone1 has  
the double meaning of a feeling  and an 
opinion1 an ambiguity which is sometimes
 not without practical  inconvenience4  
,the terms 'conscience' and 'moral      
sense' are very convenient expressions  
for popular use1 provided we always bear
 in mind that 'illuminate' or           
'instruct' your 'conscience' or 'moral  
sense' is quite as essential a  rule as 
'follow' your 'conscience' or 'moral    
sense4' ,but the scientific  moralist1  
in attempting to analyse the springs of 
moral action and to  detect the ultimate
 sanctions of conduct1 would do well to 
avoid these  terms altogether4 ,the     
analysis of moral as well as of         
intellectual acts  is often only        
obscured by our introducing the         
conception of 'faculties1'  and1 in the 
present instance1 it is far better to   
confine ourselves to  the expressions   
'acts' of 'approbation or               
disapprobation1' 'satisfaction  or      
dissatisfaction1' which we shall        

hereafter attempt to analyse1 than  to  
feign1 or at least assume1 certain      
'faculties' or 'senses' as  distinct    
entities from which such acts are       
supposed to proceed4 ,i shall1          
therefore1 in the sequel of this work1  
say little or nothing of  'conscience'  
or 'moral sense1' not because ,i think  
it desirable to  banish those words from
 popular terminology1 but because ,i    
think that1  in an attempt to present   
the principles of ethics in a scientific
 form1  they introduce needless         
complexity and obscurity4    ,if the    
statements thus far made in this chapter
 be accepted1 it follows  that the      
feelings of self-approbation and        
self-disapprobation1 which  constitute  
the moral sanction1 by no means         
invariably supervene on acts  of the    
same kind even in the case of the same  
individual1 much less in  the case of   
different individuals1 and that the acts
 which elicit the  moral sanction       
depend1 to a considerable extent1 on the

 circumstances  and education of the    
person who passes judgment on them4 ,the
 moral  sanction1 therefore1 though it  
always consists in the feelings of      
self-approbation1 or                    
self-disapprobation1 of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction at one's own acts1 is   
neither uniform1 absolute1 nor          
infallible2 but varies1 as applied not  
only by different individuals but  by   
the same individual at different times1 
in relation to varying  conditions of   
education1 temperament1 nationality1    
and1 generally1 of  circumstances both  
external and internal4 ,lastly1 it      
admits of constant  improvement and     
correction4 ,how1 then1 it may be asked1
 do we justify  the application of this 
sanction1 and why do we regard it as not
 only a  legitimate sanction of conduct1
 but as the most important of all       
sanctions1 and1 in cases of conflict1   
the supreme and final sanction8    ,the 
answer to this question is that1 if we  
regard an action as wrong1 no  matter   

whether our opinion be correct or not1  
no external considerations  whatsoever  
can compensate us for acting contrary to
 our convictions4  ,human nature1 in its
 normal condition1 is so constituted    
that the  remorse felt1 when we look    
back upon a wrong action1 far outweighs 
any  pleasure we may have derived from  
it1 just as the satisfaction with  which
 we look back upon a right action far   
more than compensates for any  pain with
 which it may have been attended4 ,the  
'mens sibi conscia recti'  is the       
highest reward which a man can have1 as1
 on the other hand1 the  retrospect on  
base1 unjust1 or cruel actions          
constitutes the most acute  of torments4
 ,now1 when a man looks back upon his   
past actions1 what he  regards is not so
 much the result of his acts as the     
intention and the  motives by which the 
intention was actuated4 ,it is not1     
therefore1 what  he would now think of  
the act so much as what he then thought 
of it that  is the object of his        

approbation or disapprobation4 ,and1    
consequently1  even though his opinions 
as to the nature of the act may         
meanwhile have  undergone alteration1 he
 approves or disapproves of what was his
  intention at the moment of performing 
it and of the state of mind from  which 
it then proceeded4 ,it is true that the 
subsequent results of our  acts and any 
change in our estimate of their moral   
character may  considerably modify the  
feelings with which we look back upon   
them1 but1  still1 in the main1 it holds
 good that the approval or disapproval  
with  which we regard our past conduct  
depends rather upon the opinions of     
right and wrong which we entertained at 
the moment of action than those  which  
we have come to entertain since4 ,to    
have acted1 at any time1 in a  manner   
contrary to what we then supposed to be 
right leaves behind it a  trace of      
dissatisfaction and pain1 which may1 at 
any future time1  reappear to trouble   
and distress us2 just as to have acted1 

in spite of  all conflicting            
considerations1 in a manner which we    
then conceived to  be right1 may1 in    
after years1 be a perennial source of   
pleasure and  satisfaction4 ,it is      
characteristic of the pleasures and     
pains of  reflexion on our past acts    
7which pleasures and pains of reflexion 
may1  of course1 connect themselves with
 other than purely moral                
considerations71 not only that they     
admit of being more intense than any    
other pleasures and pains1 but that1    
whenever there is any conflict  between 
the moral sanction and any other        
sanction1 it is to the moral  sanction  
that they attach themselves4 ,thus1 if a
 man has incurred  physical suffering1  
or braved the penalties of the law or   
the ill word  of society1 in pursuance  
of a course of conduct which he deemed  
to be  right1 he looks back upon his    
actions with satisfaction1 and the more 
important the actions1 and the clearer  
his convictions of right and the        

stronger the inducements to act         
otherwise1 the more intense will his    
satisfaction be4 ,but no such           
satisfaction is felt1 when a man has    
sacrificed his convictions of right to  
avoid physical pain1 or to escape  the  
penalties of the law1 or to conciliate  
the goodwill of society2 the  feeling1  
on the other hand1 will be that of      
dissatisfaction with  himself1 varying1 
according to circumstances1 from regret 
to remorse4  ,and1 if no similar remark 
has to be made with reference to the    
religious  sanction1 it is because1 in  
all the higher forms of religion1 the   
religious sanction is conceived of as   
applying to exactly the same  actions as
 the moral sanction4 ,what a man himself
 deems right1 that he  conceives ,god to
 approve of1 and what he conceives ,god 
as disapproving  of1 that he deems      
wrong4 ,but in a religion in which ,god 
was not regarded  as holy1 just1 and    
true1 or in which there was a plurality 
of gods1 some  good and some evil1 ,i   

conceive that a man would look back with
  satisfaction1 and not with            
dissatisfaction1 on those acts in which 
he  had followed his own sense of right 
rather than the supposed will of the    
,deity1 just as1 when there is a        
conflict between the two1 he now        
congratulates himself on having         
submitted to the claims of conscience   
rather than to those of the law4    ,the
 justification1 then1 of that claim to  
superiority1 which is asserted  by the  
moral sanction1 consists1 ,i conceive1  
in two circumstances3  first1 that the  
pleasures and pains1 the feelings of    
satisfaction and  dissatisfaction1 of   
self-approbation and                    
self-disapprobation1 by means  of which 
it works1 are1 in the normally          
constituted mind1 far more  intense and 
durable than any other pleasures and    
pains2 secondly1 that1  whenever this   
sanction comes into conflict with any   
other sanction1 its  defeat is sure1 on 
a careful retrospect of our acts1 to    

bring regret or  remorse1 whereas its   
victory is equally certain to bring     
pleasure and  satisfaction4 ,we arrive1 
then1 at the conclusion that it is the  
moral  sanction which is the distinctive
 guide of conduct1 and to which we must 
look1 in the last resort1 to enforce    
right action1 while the other  sanctions
 are mainly valuable in so far as they  
reinforce the moral  sanction or correct
 its aberrations4 ,a man must1          
ultimately1 be the  judge of his own    
conduct1 and1 as he acts or does not act
 according to  his own best judgment1 so
 he will subsequently feel satisfaction 
or  remorse2 but these facts afford no  
reason why he should not take pains  to 
inform his judgment by all the means    
which physical knowledge1 law1  society1
 and religion place at his disposal4    
,,chapter ,,iii4    ,,analysis ,,and    
,,formation ,,of ,,the ,,moral          
,,sentiment4 ,,its ,,education ,,and    
,,improvement4      ,before proceeding  
to our third question1 namely1 how the  

moral  sentiment1 which is the source of
 the moral sanction1 has been formed1   
and how it may be further educated and  
improved1 it is desirable to            
discriminate carefully between the      
intellectual and the emotional  elements
 in an act of approbation or            
disapprobation4 ,we sometimes speak  of 
moral judgment1 sometimes of moral      
feeling4 ,these expressions ought  not  
to be regarded as the symbols of rival  
theories on the nature of the  act of   
moral approbation1 as has sometimes been
 the case1 but as  designating distinct 
parts of the process1 or1 to put the    
same statement  rather differently1     
separate elements in the analysis4      
,hume1 whose  treatment of this subject 
is peculiarly lucid1 as compared with   
that of  most writers on ethics1 after  
reviewing the reasons assigned by those 
authors respectively who resolve the act
 of approbation into an act of  judgment
 or an act of feeling1 adds#a3 ',these  
arguments on each side  7and many more  

might be produced7 are so plausible1    
that ,i am apt to  suspect they may1 the
 one as well as the other1 be solid and 
satisfactory1 and that reason and       
sentiment concur in almost all moral    
determinations and conclusions4 ,the    
final sentence2 it is probable1  which  
pronounces characters and actions       
amiable or odious1 praiseworthy  or     
blameable2 that which stamps on them the
 mark of honour or infamy1  approbation 
or censure2 that which renders morality 
an active principle1  and constitutes   
virtue our happiness and vice our       
misery3 it is  probable1 ,i say1 that   
this final sentence depends on some     
internal sense  or feeling1 which nature
 has made universal in the whole        
species4 ,for what else can have an     
influence of this nature8  ,but1 in     
order to pave the way for such a        
sentiment and give  a proper discernment
 of its object1 it is often necessary1  
we find1 that  much reasoning should    
precede1 that nice distinctions be made1

 just  conclusions drawn1 distant       
comparisons formed1 complicated         
relations  examined1 and general facts  
fixed and ascertained4 ,some species of 
beauty1 especially the natural kinds1 on
 their first appearance1 command  our   
affection and approbation2 and1 where   
they fail of this effect1 it  is        
impossible for any reasoning to redress 
their influence1 or adapt  them better  
to our taste and sentiment4 ,but in many
 orders of beauty1  particularly those  
of the finer arts1 it is requisite to   
employ much  reasoning1 in order to feel
 the proper sentiment2 and a false      
relish may  frequently be corrected by  
argument and reflexion4 ,there are just 
grounds to conclude that moral beauty   
partakes much of this latter  species1  
and demands the assistance of our       
intellectual faculties1 in  order to    
give it a suitable influence on the     
human mind4'    ,footnote #a3 ,enquiry  
concerning the ,principles of ,morals1  
,section ,i4    ,this passage1 which ,i 

have thought it worth while to quote at 
length1  exhibits1 with sufficient      
clearness1 the respective provinces of  
reason  and feeling in the ethical      
estimation of action4 ,whether we are   
reviewing the actions of ourselves or of
 others1 what we seem to do1 in  the    
first instance1 is to refer them to some
 class1 or associate them  with certain 
actions of a similar kind which are     
familiar to us1 and1  then1 when their  
character has thus been determined1 they
 excite the  appropriate feeling of     
approbation or disapprobation1 praise or
 censure4  ,thus1 as soon as we have    
realised that a statement is a lie or an
 act is  fraudulent1 we at once         
experience a feeling of indignation or  
disgust at  the person who has made the 
statement or committed the act4 ,and1 in
 the  same way1 as soon as we have      
recognised that an act is brave or      
generous1 we regard with esteem or      
admiration the doer of it4 ,but1  though
 the feeling of approbation or          

disapprobation follows  instantaneously 
on the act of judgment1 the recognition 
of the character  of the action1 or its 
reference to a class1 which constitutes 
this act  of judgment1 may be1 and often
 is1 a process of considerable length   
and  complexity4 ,take the case of a    
lie4 ,what did the man really say8 ,in  
what  sense did he employ the words     
used8 ,what was the extent of his       
knowledge  at the time that he made the 
statement8 ,and what was his intention8 
,these and possibly other questions have
 to be answered1 before we are          
justified in accusing him of having told
 a lie4 ,when the offence is not  only a
 moral but a legal one1 the act of      
determining the character of  the action
 in question is often the result of a   
prolonged enquiry1  extending over weeks
 or months4 ,no sooner1 however1 is the 
intellectual  process completed1 and the
 action duly labelled as a lie1 or a    
theft1 or  a fraud1 or an act of cruelty
 or ingratitude1 or the like1 than the  

appropriate ethical emotion is at once  
excited4 ,the intellectual process  may 
also be exceedingly rapid1 or even      
instantaneous1 and always is so  when we
 have no doubt as to the nature either  
of the action or of the  intention or of
 the motives1 but its characteristic1 as
 distinguished  from the ethical        
emotion1 is that it may take time1 and1 
except in  perfectly clear cases or on  
very sudden emergencies requiring       
subsequent  action1 always ought to do  
so4    ,we are now in a position to see 
the source of much confusion in the     
ordinary mode of speaking and writing on
 the subject of the moral  faculty1 the 
moral judgment1 the moral feeling1 the  
moral sense1 the  conscience1 and       
kindred terms4 ,the instantaneous1 and  
the apparently  instinctive1            
authoritative1 and absolute character of
 the act of moral  approbation or       
disapprobation attaches to the          
emotional1 and not to the  intellectual 
part of the process4 ,when an action has

 once been  pronounced to be right or   
wrong1 morally good or evil1 or has been
  referred to some well-known class of  
actions whose ethical character is      
already determined1 the emotion of      
approval or disapproval is excited  and 
follows as a matter of course4 ,there is
 no reasoning or hesitation  about it1  
simply because the act is not a         
reasoning act4 ,hence1 it  appears to be
 instinctive1 and becomes invested with 
those superior  attributes of           
authoritativeness1 absoluteness1 and    
even infallibility1  which are not      
unnaturally ascribed to an act in which1
 there being no  process of reasoning1  
there seems to be no room for error4    
,and1 indeed1  the feelings of moral    
approbation and disapprobation can never
 be  properly described as erroneous1   
though they are frequently misapplied4  
,the error attaches to the preliminary  
process of reasoning1 reference1  or    
classification1 and1 if this be wrongly 
conducted1 there is no  justification   

for the feeling which is consequent upon
 it4 ,but1 instead  of our asking for   
the justification of the feeling in the 
rational  process which has preceded it1
 we often unconsciously justify our     
reasoning by the feeling1 and thus the  
whole process assumes the  unreflective 
character which properly belongs only to
 the emotional part  of it4 ,it is the  
want of a clear distinction between the 
logical process  which determines the   
character of an act1--the moral         
judgment1--and the  emotion which       
immediately supervenes when the         
character of the act is                 
determined1--the moral feeling1--that   
accounts for the exaggerated  epithets  
which are often attributed to the       
operations of the moral  faculty1 and   
for the haste and negligence in which   
men are consequently  encouraged to     
indulge1 when arriving at their moral   
decisions4 ,let it be  recollected that1
 when we have time for reflexion1 we    
cannot take too  much pains in forming  

our decisions upon conduct1 for there is
 always a  possibility of error in our  
judgments1 but that1 when our judgments 
are  formed1 we ought to give free scope
 to the emotions which they naturally   
evoke1 and then we shall develope a     
conscience1 so to speak1 at once        
enlightened and sensitive1 we shall     
combine accuracy and justness of        
judgment with delicacy and strength of  
feeling4    ,there remains the question 
whether the feelings of approval and    
disapproval1 which supervene on our     
moral judgments1 admit of any           
explanation1 or whether they are to be  
regarded as ultimate facts of our       
mental constitution4 ,it seems to me    
that1 on a little reflexion1 we are  led
 to adopt the former alternative4 ,what 
are the classes of acts1 under  their   
most general aspect1 which elicit the   
feelings of moral  approbation and      
disapprobation8 ,they are such as       
promote1 or tend to  promote1 the good  
either of ourselves or of others4 ,now  

the feelings of  which these classes of 
acts are the direct object are          
respectively the  self-regarding and the
 sympathetic feelings1 or1 as they have 
been  somewhat uncouthly called1 the    
egoistic and altruistic feelings4 ,we   
have  a variety of appetites and        
desires1 which centre in ourselves1     
including  what has been called rational
 self-love1 or a desire for what1 on    
cool  reflexion1 we conceive to be our  
own highest good on the whole1 as well  
as self-respect1 or a regard for our own
 dignity and character1 and for  our own
 opinion of ourselves4 ,when any of     
these various appetites or  desires are 
gratified1 we feel satisfaction1 and1 on
 the other hand1  when they are         
thwarted1 we feel dissatisfaction4      
,similarly1 we have a  number of        
affections1 of which others are the     
object1 some of them of a  malevolent or
 resentful1 but most of them of a       
benevolent character1  including a      
general desire to confer all the        

happiness that we can4  ,here1 again1 we
 feel satisfaction1 when our affections 
are gratified1  and dissatisfaction1    
when they are thwarted4 ,now these      
feelings of  satisfaction and           
dissatisfaction1 which are called reflex
 feelings1  because they are reflected1 
as it were1 from the objects of our     
desires1  include1 though they are by no
 means coextensive with1 the feelings of
  moral approbation and disapprobation4 
,when1 for instance1 we gratify the     
appetites of hunger or thirst1 or our   
love of curiosity or power1 we  feel    
satisfaction1 but we can hardly be said 
to regard the gratification  of these   
appetites or feelings with moral        
approval or disapproval4 ,we  perform   
thousands of acts1 and see thousands of 
acts performed1 every  day1 which never 
excite any moral feeling whatever4 ,but 
there are few  men in whom an undoubted 
act of kindness or generosity or        
resistance to  temptation would not at  
once elicit admiration or respect1 or1  

if they  reflected on such acts in their
 own case1 of self-approval4 ,now1 what 
are the circumstances which distinguish 
these acts which merely cause us        
satisfaction from those which elicit the
 moral feeling of approbation8  ,this   
question is one by no means easy to     
answer1 and the solution of it  must    
obviously depend to some extent on the  
moral surroundings and  prepossessions  
of the person who undertakes to answer  
it4 ,but1  attempting to take as wide a 
survey as possible of those acts which1 
in  different persons1 elicit moral     
approbation or disapprobation1 ,i will  
endeavour to discriminate the           
characteristics which they have in      
common4    ,all those acts1 then1 it    
seems to me1 which elicit a             
distinctively moral  feeling have been  
the result of some conflict amongst the 
various  desires and affections1 or1 to 
adopt the more ordinary phraseology1 of 
a  conflict of motives4 ,we neither     
approve nor disapprove of acts with     

regard to which there seems to have been
 little or no choice1 which  appear to  
have resulted naturally from the        
pre-existing circumstances4  ,thus1 if a
 well-to-do man pays his debts promptly1
 or a man of known  poverty asks to have
 the time of payment deferred1 we       
neither visit the  one with praise nor  
the other with censure1 though1 if their
 conduct  were reversed1 we should      
censure the former and praise the       
latter4 ,the  reason of this difference 
of treatment is plain4 ,there is not1 or
 at  least need not be1 any conflict1 in
 the case of the well-to-do man1        
between his own convenience or any      
reasonable gratification of his  desires
 and the satisfaction of a just claim4  
,hence1 in paying the debt  promptly1 he
 is only acting as we might expect him  
to act1 and his  conduct excites no     
moral feeling on our part1 though1 if he
 were to act  differently1 he would     
incur our censure4 ,the poor man1 on the
 other  hand1 must have put himself to  

some inconvenience and exercised some   
self-denial in order to meet his        
engagement at the exact time at which   
the payment became due1 and hence he    
merits our praise1 though1 if he  had   
acted otherwise1 the circumstances might
 have excused him4    ,another          
characteristic of acts which we praise  
or blame1 in the case of  others1 or    
approve or disapprove1 on reflexion1 in 
our own case1 seems  to be that they    
must possess some importance4 ,the great
 majority of our  acts are too trivial  
to merit any notice1 such as is implied 
in a moral  judgment4 ,when a man makes 
way for another in the street1 or       
refrains  from eating or drinking more  
than is good for him1 neither he nor the
  bystander probably ever thinks of     
regarding the act as a meritorious  one4
 ,it is taken as a matter of course1    
though the opposite conduct  might1     
under certain circumstances1 be of      
sufficient importance to incur  censure4
 ,it is impossible here1 as in most     

other cases where we speak of           
'importance1' to draw a definite line1  
but it may at least be laid down  that  
an act1 in order to be regarded as moral
 or immoral1 must be of  sufficient     
importance to arrest attention1 and     
stimulate reflexion4    ,thus far1 then1
 we have arrived at the conclusion that 
acts which are  the objects of moral    
approbation and disapprobation must have
 a certain  importance1 and must be the 
result of a certain amount of conflict  
between different motives4 ,but we have 
not as yet attempted to detect  any     
principle of discrimination between     
those acts which are the objects  of    
praise or approbation and those which   
are the objects of censure or           
disapprobation4 ,now it seems to me that
 such a principle may be found in  the  
fact that all those acts of others which
 we praise or those acts of  ourselves  
which1 on reflexion1 we approve involve 
some amount of  sacrifice1 whereas all  
those acts of others which we blame1 or 

those  acts of ourselves which1 on      
reflexion1 we disapprove involve some   
amount  of self-indulgence4 ,the        
conflict is between a man's own lower   
and higher  good1 or between his own    
good and the greater good of others1 or1
 in  certain cases1 as we shall see     
presently1 between the lesser good of   
some1 reinforced by considerations of   
self-interest or partiality1 and  the   
greater good of others1 not so          
reinforced1 or even1 occasionally1      
between the pleasure or advantage of    
others and a disproportionate  injury to
 himself2 and he who1 in the struggle1  
gives the preference to  the former of  
these motives usually becomes the object
 of censure or1 on  reflexion1 of       
self-disapprobation1 while he who gives 
the preference to  the latter becomes   
the object of praise or1 on reflexion1  
of  self-approbation4 ,i shall endeavour
 to illustrate this position by a few   
instances mostly taken from common life4
 ,we praise a man who1 by due  economy1 

makes decent provision for himself in   
old age1 as we blame a  man who fails to
 do so4 ,quite apart from any public or 
social  considerations1 we admire and   
applaud in the one man the power of     
self-restraint and the habit of         
foresight1 which enable him to          
subordinate his immediate gratifications
 to his larger interests in the  remote 
future1 and to forego sensual and       
passing pleasures for the  purpose of   
preserving his self-respect and personal
 independence in  later life4 ,and we   
admire and applaud him still more1 if to
 these purely  self-regarding           
considerations he adds the social one of
 wishing to avoid  becoming a burden on 
his family or his friends or the public4
 ,just in  the same way1 we condemn the 
other man1 who1 rather than sacrifice   
his  immediate gratification1 will incur
 the risk of forfeiting his             
self-respect and independence in after  
years as well as of making others       
suffer for his improvidence4 ,a man who1

 by the exercise of similar  economy and
 forethought1 makes provision for his   
family or relations we  esteem still    
more than the man who simply makes      
provision for himself1  because the     
sacrifice of passing pleasures is       
generally still greater1  and because   
there is also1 in this case1 a total    
sacrifice of all  self-regarding        
interests1 except1 perhaps1 self-respect
 and reputation1  for the sake of       
others4 ,similarly1 the man who has a   
family or relations  dependent upon him1
 and who neglects to make future        
provision for them1  deservedly incurs  
our censure far more than the man who   
merely neglects  to make provision for  
himself1 because his self-indulgence has
 to  contend against the full force of  
the social as well as the higher        
self-regarding motives1 and its         
persistence is1 therefore1 the less     
excusable4    ,i will next take the     
familiar case of a trust1 voluntarily   
undertaken1  but involving considerable 

trouble to the trustee1 a case of a much
 more  complicated character than the   
last4 ,if the trustee altogether        
neglects  or does not devote a          
reasonable amount of attention to the   
affairs of  the trust1 there is no doubt
 that1 besides any legal penalties which
 he  may incur1 he merits moral censure4
 ,rather than sacrifice his own ease  or
 his own interests1 he violates the     
obligation which he has undertaken  and 
brings inconvenience1 or possibly       
disaster1 to those whose interests  he  
has bound himself to protect4 ,but the  
demands of the trust may become  so     
excessive as to tax the time and pains  
of the trustee to a far  greater extent 
than could ever have been anticipated1  
and to interfere  seriously with his    
other employments4 ,in this case no     
reasonable person1  ,i presume1 would   
censure the trustee for endeavouring1   
even at some  inconvenience or expense  
to the persons for whose benefit the    
trust  existed1 to release himself from 

his obligation or to devolve part of    
the work on a professional adviser4     
,while1 however1 the work connected     
with the trust did not interfere with   
other obligations or with the  promotion
 of the welfare of others1 no one1 ,i   
imagine1 would censure the  trustee for 
continuing to perform it1 to his own    
inconvenience or  disadvantage1 if he   
chose to do so4 ,his neighbours might1  
perhaps1 say  that he was foolish1 but  
they would hardly go to the length of   
saying  that he acted wrongly4 ,neither1
 on the other hand1 would they be likely
  to praise him1 as the sacrifice he was
 undergoing would be out of  proportion 
to the good attained by it1 and the     
interests of others to  which he was    
postponing his own interests would not  
be so distinctly  greater as to warrant 
the act of self-effacement4 ,but now let
 us suppose  that1 in attending to the  
interests of the trust1 he is neglecting
 the  interests of others who have a    
claim upon him1 or impairing his own    

efficiency as a public servant or a     
professional man4 ,if the interests     
thus at stake were plainly much greater 
than those of the trust1 as they  might 
well be1 the attitude of neutrality     
would soon be converted into  one of    
positive censure1 unless he took means  
to extricate himself from  the          
difficulty in which he was placed4      
,the supposition just made illustrates  
the fact that the moral feelings  may   
attach themselves not only to cases in  
which the collision is  between a man's 
own higher and lower good1 or between   
his own good and  that of another1 but  
also to those in which the competition  
is entirely  between the good of others4
 ,it may be worth while to illustrate   
this  last class of cases by one or two 
additional examples4 ,a man tells a lie 
in order to screen a friend4 ,the act is
 a purely social one1 for he  stands in 
no fear of his friend1 and expects no   
return4 ,it might be said  that the     
competition1 in this example1 is between

 serving his friend and  wounding his   
own self-respect4 ,but the consciousness
 of cowardice and  meanness which       
attends a lie spoken in a man's own     
interest hardly  attaches to a lie      
spoken for the purpose of protecting    
another4 ,and1 any  way1 a little       
reflexion might show that the apparently
 benevolent  intention comes into       
collision with a very extensive and very
 stringent  social obligation1 that of  
not impairing our confidence in one     
another's  assertions4 ,without         
maintaining that there are no           
conceivable  circumstances under which a
 man would be justified in committing a 
breach of veracity1 it may at least be  
said that1 in the lives of most  men1   
there is not likely to occur any case in
 which the greater social  good would   
not be attained by the observation of   
the general rule to  tell the truth     
rather than by the recognition of an    
exception in favour  of a lie1 even     
though that lie were told for purely    

benevolent reasons4  ,in all those      
circumstances in which there is a keen  
sense of  comradeship1 as at school or  
college1 or in the army or navy1 this is
 a  principle which requires to be      
constantly kept in view1 and to be      
constantly enforced4 ,the not infrequent
 breach of it1 under such               
circumstances1 affords a striking       
illustration of the manner in which  the
 laws of honour1 spoken of in the first 
chapter1 occasionally  over-ride the    
wider social sentiment and even the     
dictates of personal  morality1 ,esprit 
de corps is1 doubtless1 a noble         
sentiment1 and1 on  the whole1          
productive of much good1 but1 when it   
comes into collision  with the more     
general rules of morality1 its effects  
are simply  pernicious4 ,i will next    
take an example of the conflict between 
two  impulses1 each having for its      
object the good of others1 from the very
  familiar case of a man having to      
appoint to1 or vote in the election to1 

a vacant office or situation4 ,the      
interests of the public service or of   
some institution require that the most  
competent candidate should be           
preferred4 ,but a relative1 or a friend1
 or a political ally is standing4       
,affection1 therefore1 or friendship1 or
 loyalty to party ties often  dictates  
one course of conduct1 and regard for   
the public interests  another4 ,when the
 case is thus plainly stated1 there are 
probably few  men who would seriously   
maintain that we ought to subordinate   
the wider  to the narrower              
considerations1 and still1 in practice1 
there are few  men who have the courage 
to act constantly on what is surely the 
right  principle in this matter1 and1   
what is worse still1 even if they did1  
they would not always be sustained by   
public opinion1 while they would  be    
almost certain to be condemned by the   
circle in which they move4 ,so          
frequently do the difficulties of this  
position recur1 that ,i have often      

heard a shrewd friend observe that no   
man who was fit for the exercise  of    
patronage would ever desire to be       
entrusted with it4 ,the moral rule  in  
ordinary cases is plain enough2 it is to
 appoint or vote for the  candidate who 
is most competent to fulfil the duties  
of the post to be  filled up4 ,there are
 exceptional cases in which it may be   
allowable  slightly to modify this rule1
 as where it is desirable to encourage  
particular services1 or particular      
nationalities1 or the like1 but1 even   
in these cases1 the rule of superior    
competency ought to be the              
preponderating consideration4           
,parliamentary and1 in a lesser degree1 
municipal elections1 of course1 form a  
class apart4 ,here1 in the  selection of
 candidates within the party1 superior  
competency ought to  be the guiding     
consideration1 but1 in the election     
itself1 the main  object being to       
promote or prevent the passing of       
certain public  measures1 the elector   

quite rightly votes for those who will  
give effect  to his opinions1           
irrespectively of personal              
qualifications1 though1 even  in these  
cases1 there might be an amount of      
unfitness which would  warrant          
neutrality or opposition4 ,peculiarly   
perplexing cases of  competition between
 the rival claims of others sometimes   
occur in the  domain of the resentful   
feelings1 which1 in their purified and  
rationalised form1 constitute the sense 
of justice4 ,my servant1 or a  friend1  
or a relative1 has committed a theft4   
,shall ,i prosecute him8 ,a  general    
regard to the public welfare undoubtedly
 demands that ,i should  do so4 ,there  
are few obligations more imperative on  
the individual  citizen than that of    
denouncing and prosecuting crime4 ,but1 
in the  present case1 there is the      
personal tie1 involving the obligation  
of  protection and assistance4 ,this    
tie1 obviously1 must count for          
something1 as a rival consideration4 ,no

 man1 except under the most  extreme    
circumstances1 would prosecute his wife1
 or his father1 or his  mother4 ,the    
question1 then1 is how far this         
consideration is to count  against the  
other1 and much must1 evidently1 depend 
on the degree of  relationship or of    
previous intimacy1 the time and amount  
and kind of  service1 and the like4 ,a  
similar conflict of motives arises when 
the  punishment invoked would entail the
 culprit's ruin1 or that of his wife  or
 family or others who are dependent upon
 him4 ,it is impossible1 in  cases of   
this kind1 to lay down beforehand any   
strict rules of conduct1  and the       
rectitude of the decision must largely  
turn on the experience1  skill1 and     
honesty of the person who attempts to   
resolve the difficulty4    ,instances of
 the last division1 where the conflict  
is between the  pleasure or advantage of
 others and a disproportionate injury to
  oneself1 are of comparatively         
infrequent occurrence4 ,it is not often 

that a man hesitates sufficiently       
between his own manifest disadvantage   
and the small gains or pleasures of his 
neighbours to make this class of  cases 
of much importance to the moralist4 ,as 
a rule1 we may be trusted  to take care 
of ourselves1 and other people credit us
 sufficiently with  this capacity not to
 trade very much upon the weakness of   
mere  good-nature1 however much they may
 trade upon our ignorance and folly4    
,the most familiar example1 perhaps1 of 
acts of imprudence of the kind  here    
contemplated is to be found in the      
facility with which some people  yield  
to social temptations1 as where they    
drink too much1 or bet1 or  play cards1 
when they know that they will most      
likely lose their money1  out of a      
feeling of mere good fellowship2 or     
where1 from the mere desire  to amuse   
others1 they give parties which are     
beyond their means4 ,the  gravest       
example is to be found in certain cases 
of seduction4 ,instances  of men making 

large and imprudent sacrifices of money 
for inadequate  objects are very rare1  
and are rather designated as foolish    
than wrong4  ,with regard to all the    
failings and offences which fall under  
this head1  it may be remarked that1    
from their false show of generosity1    
society is  apt to treat them too       
venially1 except where they entail      
degradation or  disgrace4 ,if it be     
asked how actions of this kind1 seeing  
that they are  done out of some regard  
to others1 can be described as involving
  self-indulgence1 or the resistance to 
them can be looked on in the light  of  
sacrifice1 it may be replied that the   
conflict is between a feeling  of       
sociality or a spirit of                
over-complaisance or the like1 on the   
one  side1 and a man's self-respect or a
 regard to his own highest interests1   
on the other1 and that some natures find
 it much easier to yield to the  former 
than to maintain the latter4 ,it is     
quite possible that the spirit  of      

sacrifice may be exhibited in the       
maintenance1 against temptation1 of  a  
man's own higher interests1 and the     
spirit of self-indulgence in  weakly    
yielding to a perverted sympathy or an  
exaggerated regard for the  opinions of 
others4    ,before concluding this      
chapter1 there are a few objections to  
be met and  explanations to be made4 ,in
 the first place1 it may be objected    
that the  theory ,i have adopted1 that  
the moral feeling is excited only where 
there has been a conflict of motives1   
runs counter to the ordinary view1  that
 acts proceeding from a virtuous or     
vicious habit are done without  any     
struggle and almost without any         
consciousness of their import4 ,i do    
not at all deny that a habit may become 
so perfect that the acts  proceeding    
from it cease to involve any struggle   
between conflicting  motives1 but1 in   
this case1 ,i conceive that our         
approbation or  disapprobation is       
transferred from the individual acts to 

the habit from  which they spring1 and  
that what we really applaud or condemn  
is the  character rather than the       
actions1 or at least the actions simply 
as  indicative of the character4 ,and   
the reason that we often praise or      
blame acts proceeding from habit more   
than acts proceeding from  momentary    
impulse is that we associate such acts  
with a good or evil  character1 as the  
case may be1 and1 therefore1 include the
 character as  well as the acts in the  
judgment which we pass upon them4    ,it
 may possibly have occurred to the      
reader that1 in the latter part of  this
 chapter1 ,i have been somewhat         
inconsistent in referring usually to    
the social sanction of praise and blame 
rather than to the distinctively  moral 
sanction of self-approbation and        
self-disapprobation4 ,i have  employed  
this language solely for the sake of    
convenience1 and to avoid  the cumbrous 
phraseology which the employment of the 
other phrases would  sometimes have     

occasioned4 ,in a civilized and educated
 community1 the  social sentiment may1  
on almost all points except those which 
involve  obscure or delicate            
considerations of morality1 be taken to 
be identical  with the moral sentiment  
of the most reflective members of the   
society1  and hence in the tolerably    
obvious instances which ,i have selected
 there  was no need to draw any         
distinction between the two1 and ,i have
 felt  myself at liberty to be guided   
purely by considerations of convenience4
  ,all that ,i have said of the praise  
or blame1 the applause or censure1 of   
others1 of course1 admits of being      
transferred to the feelings with  which1
 on reflexion1 we regard our own acts4  
,i am aware that the expressions1       
'higher and lower good1' 'greater and   
lesser good1' are more or less vague4   
,but the traditional acceptation of  the
 terms sufficiently fixes their meaning 
to enable them to serve as a  guide to  
moral conduct and moral feeling1        

especially when modified by  the        
experience and reflexion of men who have
 given habitual attention to  the       
working of their own motives and the    
results of their own practice4  ,as ,i  
shall shew in the next chapter1 any     
terms which we employ to  designate the 
test of moral action and the objects of 
the moral feeling  are indefinite1 and  
must depend1 to some extent1 on the     
subjective  interpretation of the       
individual4 ,all that we can do is to   
avail  ourselves of the most adequate   
and intelligible terms that we can find4
  ,but1 admitting the necessary         
indefiniteness of the terms1 it may be  
asked whether it can really be meant1 as
 a general proposition1 that the  praise
 of others and our approbation of       
ourselves1 on reflexion1 attach  to acts
 in which we subordinate our own good to
 the greater good of  others1 however   
slight the preponderance of our         
neighbour's good over  out own may be4  
,if we have to undergo an almost equal  

risk in order to  save another1 or1 in  
order to promote another's interests1 to
 forego  interests almost as great1 is  
not our conduct more properly designated
  as weak or quixotic1 than noble or    
generous8 ,this would not1 ,i think1 be 
the answer of mankind at large to the   
question1 or that of any person  whose  
moral sentiments had been developed     
under healthy influences4 ,when  a man1 
at the risk of his own life1 saves      
another from drowning1 or1 at  a similar
 risk1 protects his comrade in battle1  
or1 rushing into the  midst of a fire1  
attempts to rescue the helpless victims1
 surely the  feeling of the bystanders  
is that of admiration1 and not of pity  
or  contempt4 ,when a man1 with his life
 in his hands1 goes forth on a          
missionary or a philanthropic           
enterprise1 like ,xavier1 or ,henry     
,martyn1  or ,howard1 or ,livingstone1  
or ,patteson1 or when a man1 like       
,frederick  ,vyner1 insists on          
transferring his own chance of escape   

from a murderous  gang of brigands to   
his married friend1 humanity at large   
rightly  regards itself as his debtor1  
and ordinary men feel that their very   
nature has been ennobled and exalted by 
his example4 ,but it is not only  these 
acts of widely recognised heroism that  
exact a response from  mankind4 ,in many
 a domestic circle1 there are men and   
women1 who  habitually sacrifice their  
own ease and comfort to the needs of an 
aged  or sick or helpless relative1 and1
 surely1 it is not with scorn for  their
 weakness that their neighbours1 who    
know their privations1 regard  them1 but
 with sympathy and respect for their    
patience and self-denial4  ,the         
pecuniary risks and sacrifices which men
 are ready to make for one  another1 in 
the shape of sureties and bonds and     
loans and gifts1 are  familiar to us    
all1 and1 though these are often        
unscrupulously wrung  from a thoughtless
 or over-pliant good-nature1 yet there  
are many  instances in which men        

knowingly1 deliberately1 and at         
considerable  danger or loss to         
themselves1 postpone their own security 
or convenience  to the protection or    
relief of their friends4 ,it is in cases
 of this  kind1 perhaps1 that the line  
between weakness and generosity is most 
difficult to draw1 and1 where a man has 
others dependent on him for  assistance 
or support1 the weakness which yields to
 the solicitations of  a reckless or    
unscrupulous friend may become          
positively culpable4    ,the last class 
of instances will be sufficient to shew 
that it is not  always easy to determine
 where the good of others is greater    
than our  own4 ,nor is it ever possible 
to determine this question with         
mathematical exactness4 ,men may1       
therefore1 be at least excused if1      
before sacrificing their own interests  
or pleasures1 they require that  the    
good of others for which they make the  
sacrifice shall be plainly              
preponderant4 ,and1 even then1 there is 

a wide margin between the acts  which we
 praise for their heroism1 or           
generosity1 or self-denial1 and  those  
which we condemn for their baseness1 or 
meanness1 or selfishness4  ,it must     
never be forgotten1 in the treatment of 
questions of morality1  that there is a 
large number of acts which we neither   
praise nor blame1  and this is          
emphatically the case where the         
competition is between a  man's own     
interests and those of his neighbours4  
,we applaud generosity2  we censure     
meanness3 but there is a large          
intermediate class of acts  which can   
neither be designated as generous nor   
mean4 ,it will be  observed that1 in my 
enumeration of the classes of acts to   
which praise  and blame1                
self-approbation and self-disapprobation
 attach1 ,i have  carefully drawn a     
distinction between the invariable      
connexion which  obtains between certain
 acts and the ethical approval of       
ourselves or  others1 and the only      

general connexion which obtains between 
the  omission of those acts and the     
ethical feeling of disapproval4 ,simply 
to  fall short of the ethical standard  
which we approve neither merits nor     
receives censure1 though there is a     
degree of deficiency1 determined        
roughly by society at large and by each 
individual for himself1 at which  this  
indifference is converted into positive 
condemnation4 ,a like  neutral zone of  
acts which we neither applaud nor       
condemn1 of course1  exists also in the 
case of acts which simply affect        
ourselves or simply  affect others1     
though it does not seem to be so        
extensive as in the case  where the     
conflict of motives is between the      
interests of others and  those of       
ourselves4    ,in determining the cases 
in which we shall subordinate our own   
interests  to those of others1 or do    
good to others at our own risk or loss1 
it is  essential that we should take    
account of the remote as well as the    

immediate effects of actions2 and1      
moreover1 that we should enquire into   
their general tendencies1 or1 in other  
words1 ask ourselves what would  happen 
if everybody or many people acted as we 
propose to act4 ,thus1 at  first sight1 
it might seem as if a rich man1 at a    
comparatively small  sacrifice to       
himself1 might promote the greater good 
of his poor  neighbours by distributing 
amongst them what to them would be      
considerable sums of money4 ,if ,i have 
ten thousand a year1 why should ,i  not 
make fifty poor families happy by       
endowing them with a hundred a  year    
each1 which to them would be a handsome 
competency8 ,the loss of  five thousand 
a year would be to me simply an         
abridgment of superfluous  luxuries1    
which ,i could soon learn to dispense   
with1 while to them the  gain of a      
hundred a year would be the substitution
 of comfort for penury  and of case for 
perpetual struggle4 ,the answer is that1
 in the first  place1 ,i should probably

 not1 in the long run1 be making these  
families  really happy4 ,the change of  
circumstances would1 undoubtedly1 confer
  considerable pleasure1 while it       
continued to be a novelty1 but their    
improved circumstances1 when they became
 accustomed to them1 would soon  be     
out-balanced by the ennui produced by   
want of employment2 while1  the motive  
to exertion being removed1 and the taste
 for luxuries  stimulated1 they or the  
next generation would probably lapse    
again into  poverty1 which would be all 
the more keenly felt for their temporary
  enjoyment of prosperity4 ,moreover1 ,i
 should be injuring the community at    
large1 by withdrawing a number of       
persons from industrial employments  and
 transferring them to the non-productive
 classes4 ,again1 if the five  thousand 
a year were withdrawn not from my       
personal expenditure1 but  from         
industrial enterprises in which ,i was  
engaged1 ,i should be actually          
depriving the families of many workmen  

and artisans of the fruits of  their    
honest labour for the purpose of        
enabling a smaller number of  families  
to live in sloth and indolence4 ,but1   
now1 suppose the case ,i  have imagined 
to become a general one1 and that it was
 a common  occurrence for rich men to   
dispense their superfluous wealth       
amongst  their poorer neighbours1       
without demanding any return in labour  
or  services4 ,the result would         
inevitably be the creation of a large   
class  of idle persons1 who would       
probably soon become a torment to       
themselves1  while their descendants1   
often brought up to no employment and   
with an  insufficient income to support 
them1 would probably lapse into         
pauperism4 ,the effect on the community 
at large1 if the evil became  widely    
spread1 would be the paralysis of trade 
and commerce4 ,of course1  ,i am aware  
that these evils would be1 to a certain 
extent1 modified in  practice by the    
good sense of the recipients1 some of   

whom might employ  their money on       
reproductive industries instead of on   
merely furnishing  themselves with the  
means of living at their ease2 but that 
the general  tendency would be that     
which ,i have intimated no one1 ,i      
think1 who is  acquainted with the      
indolent propensities of human nature1  
can well  doubt4 ,similar results might 
be shewn to follow from an              
indiscriminate  distribution of charity 
on a smaller scale4 ,it seems           
hard-hearted to  refuse a shilling to a 
beggar1 or a guinea to a charitable     
association1  when one would hardly miss
 the sum at the end of the week or the  
month4  ,but1 if we could trace all the 
consequences1 direct and remote1 of     
these  apparent acts of benevolence1 we 
should often see that the small act of  
sacrifice on our own part was by no     
means efficacious in promoting the      
'greater good' of the recipient1 and    
still less of society at large4 ,a  life
 of vagrancy or indolence may easily be 

made more attractive than  one of honest
 industry1 and well-meant efforts to    
anticipate all the  wants and           
misfortunes of the poor may often have  
the effect of making  them careless of  
the future and of destroying all        
elements of  independence and providence
 in their character4 ,another instance  
of the  contrast between the immediate  
and remote1 or apparent and real1       
results  of acts of intended beneficence
 is to be found in the prodigality with 
which well-to-do persons often          
distribute gratuities amongst servants4 
,these gratuities have the immediate    
effect of giving gratification to  the  
recipients and securing better service  
to the donors1 but they have  often the 
remote and more permanent effect of     
rendering the recipients  servile and   
corrupt1 and 7as in the case of railway 
porters7 of  depriving poorer or less   
prodigal persons of services to which   
they are  equally entitled4    ,in      
adducing these illustrations1 ,i must   

not be understood to be  advocating or  
defending a selfish employment of       
superfluous wealth1 but  to be shewing  
the evils which may result from an      
unenlightened  benevolence1 and the     
importance of ascertaining that the     
'greater good  of others1' to which we  
sacrifice our own interests or          
enjoyments1 is a  real1 and not merely  
an apparent good1 and1 moreover1 that   
our conduct1  if it became general1     
would promote the welfare of the        
community at  large1 and not merely     
particular sections of it to the injury 
of the  rest4    ,to sum up the results 
of this chapter1 we may repeat that we  
must  distinguish carefully between the 
intellectual act of moral judgment1 or  
the judgment we pass on matters of      
conduct1 and the emotional act of  moral
 feeling1 or the feeling which          
supervenes upon that judgment1 and      
that1 so far as we can give a precise   
definition of the latter1 it is an      
indirect or reflex form of one or other 

of the sympathetic1 resentful1  or      
self-regarding feelings1 occurring when1
 on consideration1 we realise  that1 in 
matters involving a conflict of motives 
and of sufficient  importance to arrest 
our attention and stimulate our         
reflexion1 one or  other of these       
feelings has been gratified or thwarted3
 moreover1 that  we praise1 in the case 
of others1 and approve1 in our own case1
 all  those actions of the above kind1  
in which a man subordinates his own     
lower to his higher good1 or his own    
good to the greater good of others1  or1
 when the interests only of others are  
at stake1 the lesser good of  some to   
the greater good of others1 as well as1 
under certain  circumstances1 those     
actions in which he refuses to          
subordinate his own  greater good to the
 lesser good of others2 while we blame1 
in the case  of others1 and disapprove1 
in our own case1 all those actions of   
the  above kind1 in which he manifestly 
and distinctly 7for there is a large    

neutral zone of actions1 which we       
neither applaud nor condemn7            
subordinates his own higher to his lower
 good1 or the greater good of  others to
 his own lesser good1 or1 where the     
interests only of others  are at stake1 
the greater good of some to the lesser  
good of others1 or1  lastly1 under      
certain circumstances1 the lesser good  
of others to the  greater good of       
himself1 especially where that greater  
good is the good  of his higher nature4 
,even at the present stage of our       
enquiry1 it must be tolerably evident   
to the reader that moral progress1 if   
such a fact exist1 will be due  mainly  
to the increasing accuracy and the      
extended applications of our  moral     
judgments1 or1 in other words1 to the   
development of the rational  rather than
 the emotional element in the ethical   
act4 ,the moral feeling  follows on the 
moral judgment1 and awards praise or    
blame1 experiences  satisfaction or     
dissatisfaction1 in accordance with the 

intellectual  decisions which have      
preceded it4 ,the character of the      
feeling1  therefore1 as distinct from   
its intensity1 is already determined for
 it  by a previous process4 ,and its    
intensity is undoubtedly greater amongst
  primitive and uneducated men than it  
is in civilized life4 ,amongst          
ourselves1 not only are the feelings of 
approbation and disapprobation          
themselves largely modified by the      
account we take of mixed motives1       
qualifying circumstances1 and the like1 
but the expression of1 them is  still   
further restrained by the caution which 
the civilized man  habitually practises 
in the presence of others4 ,indeed1     
great1 in many  respects1 as are the    
advantages of this moderation and       
restraint1 there  is a certain danger   
that1 as civilisation advances1 the     
approval of  virtue and the disapproval 
of vice may cease to be expressed in    
sufficiently plain and emphatic terms4  
,but1 on the other hand1 with the       

extension of experience and the         
ever-improving discipline of the        
intellectual faculties1 the moral       
judgment1 we may already presume 7for   
the confirmation of this presumption ,i 
must refer to the next chapter71  will  
always be growing in accuracy1 receiving
 further applications1 and  becoming a  
more and more adequate representative of
 facts4 ,the analysis1  therefore1 of   
the moral act1 with which we have been  
mainly engaged in  the foregoing        
chapter1 besides being essential to the 
determination of  any theoretical       
problem of ethics1 has a most important 
practical  bearing from the indication  
which it affords of the direction in    
which  moral progress is1 in the future1
 most likely to be found4    ,it must   
never be forgotten1 however1 that men   
may know what is right and  do what is  
wrong1 and1 hence1 the due stimulation  
of the moral emotions1  so that they may
 respond to the improved moral          
judgments1 is at once an  indispensable 

branch of moral education and an        
indispensable condition  of moral       
progress4 ,but this is the function1 not
 so much of the  scientific moralist1 as
 of the parent1 the instructor of youth1
 the  poet1 the dramatist1 the novelist1
 the journalist1 the artist1 and1  above
 all1 of the religious teacher4         
,,chapter ,,iv4    ,,the ,,moral ,,test 
,,and ,,its ,,justification4      ,the  
moral feeling1 as we have seen1 follows 
immediately and necessarily  on the     
moral judgment4 ,but what considerations
 guide the moral judgment8  ,our moral  
judgments1 as we have also seen1 are the
 result of a logical  process of        
reference to a class or of association  
with similars4 ,this  particular action 
is like certain other actions1 or       
belongs to a class  of actions1 which we
 habitually regard as right or wrong1   
and1  consequently1 as soon as the      
reference or association is made1 the   
moral  feeling supervenes4 ,now1 in this
 process1 there are two possible sources

  of error4 ,in the first place1 the act
 of reference or association may be     
faulty1 and the action may not really   
belong to the class to which we  refer  
or really be like the other actions with
 which we associate it4  ,this fault is 
one of classification1 and can only be  
remedied1 as all  other faulty acts of  
classification1 by learning to          
discriminate between  the essential and 
the non-essential marks of similarity1  
and insisting  on the presence of the   
essential marks4 ,in criminal cases1    
this is one  of the functions of the    
jury1 and1 unless they exercise great   
care1 they  may easily be mistaken as to
 whether an alleged act of fraud1 theft1
  assault1 c41 was really an act of that
 kind4 ,but1 even if the action be      
referred to its right head1 there       
remains the second question whether we  
are really justified in regarding the   
class of actions itself as right  or    
wrong4 ,failure to prosecute for or     
punish heresy or witchcraft was at  one 

time regarded at least as wrong as      
failure to punish or prosecute  for     
theft or murder would now be4 ,to       
decline to fight a duel was1 till  quite
 recently1 to place yourself outside the
 pale of gentlemen4 ,a  reluctance to   
sacrifice herself on the funeral pile of
 her dead husband  was1 till the        
practice of ,suttee was abolished by the
 ,british  government1 one of the most  
immoral traits which a ,brahman widow   
could  exhibit4 ,now1 have we any means 
of discriminating1 and1 if so1 how do we
  discriminate1 between those acts which
 are really1 and those which are  only  
reputed1 right or wrong8 ,that there is 
great need of such a test1  if it can be
 discovered1 is plain4 ,the wide        
divergences of opinion on  matters of   
conduct in different ages1 in different 
countries1 in  different classes of     
society1 and even amongst men of the    
same class ,in  the same country and at 
the same time1 shew at once the vast    
importance  of ascertaining some common 

measure of actions1 and that there is no
  uniform rule of right and wrong to be 
found in the human mind itself4 ,if     
there is such a rule1 it must be derived
 from some external  considerations1    
and1 if there is no such rule1 then     
morality must be1 to  a large extent1 a 
matter of prejudice1 fancy1 and caprice4
 ,now ,i  conceive that there is a      
simple mode of ascertaining whether     
there is  any test of actions other than
 the merely subjective determinations of
  our own minds1 or1 in other words1    
whether there are any reasons or        
external considerations by which the    
mind guides itself in its decisions  on 
matters of conduct4 ,do our moral       
opinions merely vary1 or do they  grow8 
,is there any progress to be traced in  
morality1 or does it simply  oscillate1 
within certain limits1 round a fixed    
point8 ,if some 'simple'  and 'innate'  
idea of right1 or some universal sense1 
were the test of  morality1 then we     
might expect that the moral decisions of

 all men would  be uniform1 or1 at      
least1 approximately uniform2 if1 on the
 other hand1  there were no test at all1
 or1 what amounts to much the same      
thing1 a  merely personal test1 then we 
might expect that the moral judgments of
  mankind would vary arbitrarily        
according to the disposition and        
temperament of each individual man4     
,but1 if there be a test derived from   
external considerations and capable of  
being applied to particular cases  by   
the ordinary processes of reasoning1    
then we may fairly expect that1  as the 
opportunities of observation and        
experience increase1 the test  will be  
applied more widely and more accurately1
 and that the science of  conduct will  
grow1 like all other sciences1 with the 
advance of  knowledge and of general    
civilisation4 ,now1 what1 as a mutter of
 fact1  has been the case8 ,can anyone  
affect to doubt that the morality of    
civilized countries is far higher and   
purer1 and far better adapted to  secure

 the preservation and progress of       
society1 than the customs of  savage or 
barbaric tribes8 ,or1 however enamoured 
a man may be of  classical antiquity1 is
 there any one who would be prepared to 
change  the ethical code and the        
prevailing ethical sentiment of modern  
times  for those of the ,greeks or      
,romans8 ,or1 again1 should we be       
willing1 in  this respect1 to go back   
three hundred1 or two hundred1 or even  
one  hundred years in our own history8  
,are not the abolition of slavery1 the  
improved and improving treatment of     
captives taken in war1 of women and     
children1 of the distressed and         
unfortunate1 and even of the lower      
animals1 alone sufficient to mark the   
difference between the morality of      
earlier and of later times8 ,i shall    
assume1 then1 that there is a test  of  
conduct1 and that this test is of such a
 character that its continued           
application1 by individual thinkers or  
by mankind at large1 consciously  or    

semi-consciously1 is sufficient to      
account for the existence of a          
progressive morality4 ,but1 if so1 it   
must be a test which experience  enables
 us to apply with increasing accuracy1  
and which is derived from  external     
considerations1 or1 in other words1 from
 the observation of the  effects and    
tendencies of actions4 ,and here ,i may 
observe1  parenthetically1 that to make 
'conscience' or 'moral reason' or 'moral
  sense' the test of action1 as1 for    
instance1 ,bishop ,butler appears to do 
in the case of conscience1 is1 even on  
the supposition of the  independent     
existence of these so-called            
'faculties1' to confound the  judge with
 the law which governs his decisions1   
the 'faculty' with the  rules in        
accordance with which it operates4      
,limiting ourselves1  therefore1 to a   
test which is derived from a            
consideration of the  results1 direct   
and indirect1 immediate and remote1 of  
our actions1 we  simply have to enquire 

what is the characteristic in these     
results which  men have in view when    
they try to act rightly1 and which they 
mistake1  ignore1 or lose sight of1 when
 they act wrongly4    ,there are1 in the
 main1 three answers to this question1  
though they are  rather different modes1
 ,i conceive1 of presenting the same    
idea1 than  distinct and independent    
explanations4 ,it may be said that we   
look to  the manner in which the action 
will affect the happiness or pleasure of
  those whom it concerns1 or their      
welfare or well-being1 or the           
development or perfection of their      
character4 ,now it seems to me that     
these are by no means necessarily       
antagonistic modes of speaking1 and     
that1 in attempting to determine the    
test of right action1 they are all      
useful as complementing each other4     
,there is1 however1 a view of the       
measure of actions which1 though derived
 from external considerations1  is      
opposed to them all1 and which it may be

 desirable to notice at once1  with the 
object of eliminating it from our       
enquiry4 ,it is that we are  only       
concerned with actions so far as they   
affect ourselves1 and that1  providing  
we observe the law of the land1 which   
will punish us if we do  not observe it1
 we are under no further obligations to 
our  fellow-citizens4 ,this paradox1 for
 such it is1 has mainly acquired        
notoriety though the advocacy of        
,hobbes1 though it has sometimes been   
ignorantly attributed to ,bentham and   
other writers of what is called the     
utilitarian school4 ,but1 be this as it 
may1 it is so plainly  inconsistent with
 some of the most obvious facts of human
 nature1 and  specially with the        
existence of that large and essential   
group of  emotions which we call the    
sympathetic feelings1 as well as with   
the  constitution of family1 social1 and
 civic life1 that it is unnecessary     
here further to discuss it4 ,the views  
now generally accepted as to the  origin

 of society in the family or tribal     
relations are alike  irreconcileable    
with the selfish psychology from which  
,hobbes educes his  system of morality  
and with that 'state of nature in which 
every man was  at war with every man'   
from which he traces the growth of law  
and  government4 ,reverting1 therefore1 
to those tests of conduct which         
recognise1 the independent existence of 
social as well as self-regarding        
springs of action1 ,i shall now make    
some remarks on the appropriateness  and
 adequacy1 for the purpose of           
designating such tests1 of the three    
classes of terms1 noticed above4 ,to    
begin with happiness or pleasure4       
,taking happiness to mean the balance of
 pleasures over pains1 and  degrees of  
happiness the proportions of this       
balance1 it will be  sufficient if ,i   
confine myself to the word 'pleasure4'  
,one statement1  then1 of the test of   
the morality or rightness of an action  
is that it  should result in a larger   

amount of pleasure than pain to all     
those whom  it affects4 ,but it is at   
once objected that there is the greatest
  variety of pleasures and pains1       
intellectual1 moral1 aesthetic1         
sympathetic1 sensual1 and so on2 and it 
is asked how are we to determine  their 
respective values1 and to strike the    
balance between the  conflicting kinds8 
,how much sensual pleasure would        
compensate for the  pangs of an evil    
conscience1 or what amount of           
intellectual enjoyment  would allay the 
cravings of hunger or thirst8 ,the only 
escape from this  difficulty is frankly 
to acknowledge that there are some      
pleasures and  pains which are          
incommensurable with one other1 and     
that1 therefore1  where they are        
concerned1 we must forego the attempt at
 comparison1 and  so act as to compass  
the immeasurably greater pleasure or    
avoid the  immeasurably greater pain4   
,especially is this the case with the   
pleasures and pains attendant on the    

exercise of the moral feelings4 ,a  man 
who is tormented with the recollection  
of having committed a great  crime will1
 as the phrase goes1 'take pleasure in  
nothing2' while1  similarly1 a man who  
is enjoying the retrospect of having    
done his duty1  in some important       
crisis1 will care little for obloquy or 
even for the  infliction of physical    
suffering4 ,making this admission1 then1
 as well  as recognising the fact that  
our pleasures differ in quality as well 
as  in volume1 so that the pleasures of 
the higher part of our nature1 the      
religious1 the intellectual1 the moral1 
the aesthetic1 the sympathetic  nature1 
affect us with a different kind of      
enjoyment from the sensual  pleasures1  
or those which are derived from them1 we
 may rightly regard  the tendency to    
produce a balance of pleasure over pain 
as the test of  the goodness of an      
action1 and the effort and intention to 
perform acts  having this tendency as   
the test of the morality of the agent4  

,but when  we enunciate the production  
of pleasure as our aim1 or the balance  
of  pleasure-producing over             
pain-producing results as the test of   
right  action1 we are not always        
understood to have admitted these       
explanations1 and1 consequently1 there  
is always a danger of our being         
supposed to degrade morality by         
identifying it with the gratification1  
in ourselves and others1 of the coarser 
and more material impulses of  our      
nature4 ,though1 then1 if due           
distinctions and admissions be made1    
the tendency to produce1 in the long    
run1 the greatest amount of  happiness  
or misery1 pleasure or pain1 may be     
taken as the test of the  goodness or   
badness of an action1 the phraseology is
 so misleading1 and  so liable to       
frustrate the practical objects of the  
moralist1 that it is  desirable1 if     
possible1 to find terms not equally     
lending themselves to  misinterpretation
 and perversion4 ,let us now1 then1     

consider whether we  are supplied with  
such terms in the phrases 'perfection'  
or  'development' of 'character4' ,it is
 a noble idea of human action to        
suppose that its end is the perfection  
of individual men1 or the  development  
of their various capacities to the      
utmost extent that is  available4 ,and  
yet1 as the phrases 'pleasure' and      
'happiness' are apt  too exclusively to 
suggest material well-being and the     
gratification of  the more animal parts 
of our nature1 so the phrases           
'perfection' or  'development' of       
'character' are apt altogether to keep  
out of sight  these necessary           
pre-suppositions of a healthy and       
progressive condition  of humanity4     
,unless there were some standard of     
comfortable living1 and  a constant     
effort not only to maintain but to      
improve it1 and unless  some zest were  
given to every-day life by the          
gratification of the  appetites1 within 
reasonable limits1 and the endeavour to 

obtain the  means of indulging them1    
men1 constituted as they are1 would be  
in  danger of sinking into sloth1       
squalor1 and indigence1 and1 to the     
great  mass of mankind1 the opportunity 
of developing and perfecting their      
higher nature would never occur4 ,we    
seem1 therefore1 to require some  term  
which will not only suggest the highest 
results of moral endeavour1  but also   
the conditions which1 in the case of    
humanity1 are essential to  the         
attainment of those results4 ,moreover1 
to a greater extent even than  the words
 'pleasure' and 'happiness1' the        
expressions 'perfection' and            
'development' of 'character' are in     
danger of being supposed to imply an    
exclusive reference to self4 ,it is true
 that we cannot properly develope  our  
characters1 much less attain to all the 
perfection of which they are  capable1  
without quickening the moral feeling and
 giving larger scope to  the sympathetic
 emotions2 but1 in the mere attempt to  

improve their own  nature1 men are very 
apt to lose sight of their relations to 
others4 ,the  phrases ought1 however1 to
 be taken1 and usually are intended to  
be  taken1 to include the effort to     
improve the character of others as well 
as our own2 and if this extension of    
their meaning be well understood1  and  
it is also understood that the          
development or perfection of  character 
implies certain conditions of material  
comfort and the  gratification1 within  
reasonable limits1 of our appetitive    
nature1 there  ought to be no objection 
on the part of the moralist to their    
employment  for the purpose of          
designating the test of right conduct2  
and1 any way1  they are useful as       
supplementing1 correcting1 and elevating
 the  associations attached to the more 
commonly employed terms1 pleasure and   
happiness4 ,but are there no terms by   
which the somewhat exclusive            
associations connected with the two sets
 of phrases already examined may  be    

avoided8 ,i venture to suggest that such
 terms may be found by  reverting to the
 old1 but now usually discarded1        
expressions 'welfare'  and 'well-being4'
 ,these words1 it seems to me1 do not   
primarily suggest  material prosperity1 
like happiness1 nor the gratification of
 the lower  parts of our nature1 like   
pleasure1 nor the exclusive development 
of the  higher parts of our nature1 like
 perfection1 but cover the whole ground 
of healthy human activity and the       
conditions which are favourable to it4  
,corresponding1 too1 almost exactly with
 the ,greek3 eudaimonia of  ,aristotle1 
they have the advantage of venerable    
historic associations4  ,lastly1 they   
seem to have less of a personal and more
 of a social  reference than any of the 
other terms employed4 ,we speak1 ,i     
think1 more  naturally of the well-being
 or welfare of society1 than of the     
happiness1 pleasure1 or perfection of   
society4 ,i cannot1 therefore1 but      
think that the moralist would be wise in

 at least trying the experiment  of     
recurring to these terms in place of    
those which1 in recent systems  of      
ethics1 have usually superseded them4   
,if it be said that they are  vague1 and
 that different people will attach      
different meanings to them1  according  
to their own prepossessions and their   
own theories of life1 ,i  can only reply
 that this objection applies with at    
least equal force to  any of the other  
terms which we have passed in review4   
,and1 if it be  said that our           
conceptions of well-being and welfare   
are not fixed1 but  that our ideas of   
the nature and proper proportions of    
their  constituents are undergoing      
constant modification and growth1 ,i may
 ask  if this is less the case with     
regard to happiness1 or the sum of      
pleasures1 or the balance of pleasures  
over pains1 or the perfection or  due   
development of human character1 all of  
which expressions1 indeed1  when        
properly qualified and explained1 ,i    

acknowledge to be the  equivalents of   
those for which ,i have stated a        
preference4 ,and here  occurs a         
difficulty with respect to all these    
expressions and ideas4 ,if  their       
meaning or content is not fixed1 and    
specially if they are  undergoing a     
constant change1 in the way of growth1  
with the progress of  reason and        
society1 how can we employ them as a    
test of morality1 which  is itself also 
a variable conception8 ,surely this is  
to make one  indefinite idea the gauge  
of another indefinite idea4 ,the answer 
to this  question will1 ,i trust1 bring 
out clearly the nature of a moral test1 
as  well as the different modes of its  
application4    ,the ultimate origin of 
moral rules1 ,i conceive1 so far at     
least as  science can trace them1 is to 
be found in the effort of men to adapt  
themselves to the circumstances1 social 
and physical1 in which they are  placed4
 ,at first1 probably1 this process of   
adaptation was almost  automatic and    

unconscious1 but1 when men once began   
consciously to adapt  means to ends1    
they would soon begin to reflect on     
their acts1 and to  ask themselves the  
reasons why they had selected this      
course of conduct  rather than another4 
,the justifying reasons of their past   
acts1 like the  impelling motives of    
their future acts1 could have reference 
to nothing  but the convenience or      
gratification of themselves or those    
amongst whom  they lived4 ,and the acts 
which they justified in themselves they 
would  approve of in others4 ,here1     
then1 already we have a test consciously
  applied to the estimation of conduct4 
,experience shews that this or that     
action promotes some object which is    
included in the narrow conception  of   
well-being entertained by the primitive 
man4 ,he1 therefore1 continues  to act  
in accordance with the rule which       
prescribes it1 or the habit  from which 
it proceeds4 ,and1 in like manner1 if he
 finds from experience  that the action 

does not promote that object1 and he is 
free to exercise  his own choice1 he    
desists from it and1 perhaps1 tries the 
experiment of  substituting another4    
,now1 in these cases1 it is plain that  
any judgment  which the man exercises   
independently1 and apart from the       
society of  which he is a member1 is    
guided solely by the consideration      
whether the  course of conduct is       
efficacious in attaining its end1 that  
end being  part of his conception of the
 well-being of himself1 his family1 or  
his  tribe4 ,if he thinks about the     
matter for himself at all1 this is the  
only consideration of which he can take 
account4 ,there are three courses  open 
to him4 ,he need not reflect on the     
action at all1 but simply follow  in the
 wake of his neighbours 7and this1 of   
course1 is far the commonest  case72 or1
 if there is any divergence of opinion  
about it amongst his  neighbours1 he may
 deliberate as to whose opinion it is   
safest to  follow2 or1 lastly1 he may   

consider for himself1 whether the action
 is  really the best means of attaining 
the end aimed at1 that is to say1 he    
may test the means by its conduciveness 
to the end1 which is always1 in  some   
shape1 the welfare of himself or others4
 ,if he follows the opinion  of others1 
it is plain that their opinion1 so far  
as it has been formed  independently1   
has been formed in the manner above     
described4 ,the only  alternative1      
therefore1 is between the acceptance of 
existing opinions1  without any         
consideration or examination1 and their 
reference to the  conception of         
well-being1 or however else the idea may
 be expressed1 as  a measure of their   
appropriateness and sufficiency4 ,the   
idea of  well-being itself may be       
inadequate1 and even in parts incorrect1
 and1  as society advances1 it is       
undoubtedly undergoing a constant       
process of  expansion and rectification2
 but it seems to me that this regard for
  their own welfare or that of others1  

however we may phrase it1 is the  only  
guiding-principle of conduct1 in the    
light of which men can  reconsider and  
review their rules4 ,unless they follow 
the mere blind  impulses of feeling 7in 
which case they do not follow rules at  
all1 but  simply act irrationally71 or  
else observe implicitly the maxims of   
conduct which they find prevalent around
 them1 they must1 and can only1  ask the
 question whether it is possible to     
alter their conduct for the  better1    
that is to say1 whether they can better 
promote their own  welfare or that of   
others by some modification of their    
actions4 ,take  the case of ,slavery4   
,there was a time when savage or        
barbaric tribes1  moved by a regard to  
their own interests1 and also1 we may   
trust1  touched by some compassion for  
their victims1 began to substitute1 for 
the wholesale butchery of their enemies 
defeated in war1 the practice of        
retaining some or all of them for the   
purposes of domestic or agrarian        

service4 ,again1 there came a time when1
 viewed by the side of other  forms of  
service which had meanwhile come into   
existence1 slavery1 with  its various   
incidents1 began to shock the           
philanthropic sentiments of  the more   
civilized races of mankind1 while the   
question also began to be  raised       
whether slave-labour was not            
economically at a disadvantage1 when    
compared with free labour1 and the      
result of these combined                
considerations1 often aided by a strong 
and enthusiastic outburst of  popular   
feeling1 has been the total             
disappearance of slavery amongst        
civilized1 and its almost total         
disappearance even amongst barbaric or  
semi-civilized races4 ,take1 too1 the   
revolting practice1 common among  many  
savage tribes1 past and present1 of     
killing and eating aged parents  or     
other infirm members of the tribe1 when 
engaged in war4 ,this practice  which1  
at first sight1 seems so utterly        

unnatural1 was doubtless  dictated1 in  
part at least1 by the desire to save    
their victims from the  worse fate of   
being tortured and mutilated by their   
enemies4  ,subsequently1 in the history 
of some of these tribes1 there has come 
a  time when it has been discovered that
 a more humane mode of attaining  the   
same object is to build strong places   
and leave the feebler folk at  home4 ,if
 we follow the varying marriage customs 
of savage or barbaric  tribes1 we shall 
find1 in the same way1 that they have   
always been  originally framed on       
reasons of convenience1 and that1 when  
they have  been changed1 it has been    
because different views of well-being1  
including the needs of purity1 closer   
attachment1 increased care of  children1
 and the like1 have begun to prevail4   
,in all these examples1  which might be 
multiplied to any extent1 it is plain   
that changes of  conduct are moulded and
 determined by changes of opinion as to 
what is  best and most suitable for the 

circumstances of the individual1 the    
family1 the tribe1 or whatever the      
social aggregate may be4 ,and ,i may    
venture to affirm that1 wherever any    
change of moral conduct takes  place1   
unless it be dictated by blind passion1 
or mere submission to  authority1       
enforced or voluntary1 the change is    
invariably due to some  change of       
opinion on what constitutes the         
advantage of the persons whom  it       
affects4 ,it is true1 therefore1 that   
moral conduct varies1 and it is  true   
that our conceptions of well-being vary1
 but the two do not vary  independently 
of one another1 or either of them       
capriciously4 ,increased  experience of 
ourselves and of others1 enlarged       
observation of the  external world1 more
 matured reflexion are constantly       
expanding and  rectifying our           
conceptions of what constitutes human   
welfare1 and to  this constantly amended
 conception are readjusted1 from time to
 time1  our conduct and our sentiments  

on the conduct both of ourselves and of 
others4 ,in brief1 then1 the conduct of 
men and the sentiments of men on        
conduct vary with their conceptions of  
well-being1 and their conceptions  of   
well-being are determined by experience 
7including the opportunity  for         
experience7 and reflexion4    ,my       
conclusion may1 perhaps1 be illustrated 
and enforced by one further             
consideration4 ,it generally happens1 in
 the progress of society1 that1  after a
 number of rules of conduct have been   
accumulated1 they become  enshrined in  
some sacred book1 some code1 or1 at     
least1 some constant  and authoritative 
tradition4 ,in this manner they may be  
stereotyped for  ages4 ,now1 after a    
time1 these rules1 especially if they   
are numerous  and minute1 become        
unsuited1 at least in part1 to the      
altered  circumstances of the society1  
and probably bear hardly on many of the 
individuals composing it4 ,when this    
condition of things is beginning to  be 

intolerable1 there often arises the     
social reformer1 and what is the  course
 which he pursues8 ,he endeavours to    
shew how unsuitable the rules  have     
become to attain the ends which they    
were originally intended to  compass1 in
 how much better a manner other rules   
would attain these  objects1 how        
grievously the present rules bear on    
many classes and  individuals in the    
state1 how unequal they are in their    
incidence1 at  what a disadvantage they 
place the community in comparison with  
neighbouring communities1 how easily    
they may be altered1 and the like4  ,in 
fact1 the considerations which he urges 
may all be included in the  one argument
 that the existing rules are opposed to 
the well-being of  the state1 and that  
the advantages resulting from their     
abrogation will  more than compensate   
for any disturbance of existing         
relations which may  ensue from the     
change4 ,apart from force1 or mere rant1
 rhetoric1 or  imposture1 it is         

difficult to see what other resource the
 reformer has  open to him4 ,and1 in    
those cases where there is no           
accumulation of  antiquated rules and no
 need of the individual reformer1 but   
where  society at large has the happy   
knack of imperceptibly accommodating its
  practice and principles of action to  
altered circumstances1 there can be  no 
doubt that it is by considerations of   
well-being1 half conscious  though the  
process of application may be1 that the 
change is directed4  ,the plastic power 
by which men accommodate their actions  
and even their  maxims of conduct to    
modifications in surrounding            
circumstances is one  of the advantages 
which they gain by the progress of      
civilisation4 ,in  ancient society the  
tyranny of custom is often almost       
absolute4 ,in  modern society changes1  
which would otherwise require the       
drastic hand  of the reformer1 are often
 quietly effected by the gradual and    
almost  imperceptible action of the     

people themselves4 ,it is thus that the 
equity branch of ,english law1 and much 
of our case law1 grew up1 giving        
expression to changes which had already 
occurred in the current of  popular     
opinion4 ,it is thus that the obligation
 of 'gentlemen' to offer1  on the       
slightest provocation1 and to accept1   
without questioning1 a  'challenge' to  
take each other's lives1 has1 in most   
civilized  countries1 now grown         
obsolete1 having gradually become       
enfeebled  together with the exaggerated
 military spirit which gave it birth4   
,it is  thus also that1 with an increase
 of the industrial spirit1 with softened
  manners1 and with that quickening of  
our sympathetic nature which has        
gradually been effected by the teaching 
of ,christianity1 a strong  sentiment   
against slavery1 a respect for human    
life as such1 a regard  for the weak1   
the suffering1 the oppressed1 and many  
tender feelings of  a similar kind1 have
 almost insensibly been developed as an 

essential  element in modern            
civilisation4    ,these considerations  
naturally lead me to notice the two     
different ways  in which the test of    
conduct may be1 and as a fact is1       
applied4 ,one mode  is the conscious and
 intentional application of it by the   
reflective  man4 ,the other is the      
semi-conscious and almost instinctive   
application  of it by the community at  
large4 ,in morals1 as in the arts1 men1 
almost  without knowing it1 are         
constantly re-adjusting their means to  
their  ends1 feeling their way to some  
tentative solution of a new difficulty  
or a better solution of an old one1     
shaping their conduct with reference  to
 the special needs of the situation in  
which they are placed4 ,it is  thus1 for
 the most part1 that new circumstances  
develope new rules1 and  that the simple
 maxims of a primitive people are       
gradually replaced by  the multifarious 
code of law and morals with which we are
 now familiar4  ,the guiding principle  

throughout the process is the conception
 of their  own good1 comprehending1 as  
it does1 not only ease1 personal        
comfort1  and gratification of the      
various appetites and desires1 which1 in
 the  early stages of society1 are the  
preponderating considerations1 but also 
those higher constituents of welfare1   
both individual and social1 which       
attain an ever-increasing importance as 
society advances1 such as are  the      
development of the moral1 the           
intellectual1 and the aesthetic         
faculties2 the purification of the      
religious sentiments1 the expansion  of 
the sympathetic feelings1 the diffusion 
of liberty and prosperity1  the         
consolidation of national unity1 the    
elevation of human life4 ,this          
principle works throughout the          
community1 actuating some men in its    
higher1 others in its lower forms2 but1 
except where the force of  tradition or 
prejudice is too strong for it1         
invariably moulding conduct  into       

accordance with the more complex        
requirements of advancing  civilisation4
 ,its action1 of course1 is not wholly  
advantageous4 ,growing  needs and more  
complicated relations suggest to men    
fresh devices for  compassing their     
selfish ends1 such as the various forms 
of fraud1  forgery1 and conspiracy1 as  
well as more enlarged or more effective 
schemes of beneficence1 stricter or more
 intelligent applications of the        
principle of justice1 and possibilities 
of higher and freer developments  of    
their faculties4 ,but1 on the whole1 and
 setting aside as exceptional  certain  
periods of retrogression1 such as the   
decline of the ,roman  ,empire1 the     
evolution of society seems to be        
attended by the progress of  morality1  
and specially by the amelioration of    
social relations1 whether  between      
individuals1 families1 or states4 ,the  
intelligence that  apprehends the       
greater good re-acts upon the desire to 
attain it1 and  the result is the       

combination of more rational aims with a
 purer  interest in the pursuit of them4
    ,this tendency in society at large  
to modify and re-adjust its conduct in  
conformity with fuller and more improved
 conceptions of well-being1  which are  
themselves suggested by a growing       
experience1 is reinforced1  especially  
in the later stages of civilisation1 by 
the consciously  reflective action of   
philosophers and reformers4 ,it is the  
function of  these classes not only to  
give expression to the thoughts which   
are  working obscurely in the minds of  
other men1 but also to detect those     
aspects and bearings of conduct which   
are not obvious to the general          
intelligence4 ,this task is effected    
partly by tracing actions to their      
indirect and remote results1 partly by  
more distinctly realising their         
results1 whether immediate or remote1   
direct or indirect1 and partly by       
generalising them1 that is to say1 by   
considering what would happen to        

society if men generally were to act in 
that manner4 ,thus1 take the case  of   
lying4 ,in primitive states of society1 
and even in some more advanced  nations1
 no great opprobrium attaches to telling
 a lie4 ,in ancient  ,greece1 for       
instance1 veracity by no means occupied 
the same prominent  position among the  
virtues that it does among ourselves1   
and1 even now1  ,teutonic races are     
generally credited with a peculiar      
sensitiveness on  the subject of        
truthfulness4 ,this improved sentiment  
as regards veracity  is1 no doubt1      
partly due to the realisation of its    
importance and of the  inconveniences   
which result from the breaches of it1   
especially in  commercial affairs1 by   
the members of a community at large2 but
 it must  also1 to a great extent1 have 
been produced by the definite teaching  
conveyed in books1 and by moral and     
religious instructors4 ,follow out a    
lie to all its consequences1 realise the
 feelings of the person deceived  by it1

 when he has discovered the deception1  
above all1 consider what  would be the  
result if men were commonly to deceive  
one another1 and no  man could place any
 dependence on the information which his
 neighbour  gave him2 and then a        
falsehood excites very different        
feelings from what  it does when        
regarded simply as an isolated act4 ,or1
 again1 take the  evasion of taxes4     
,there is probably1 even yet1 no country
 in which the  popular sentiment on this
 subject is sufficiently enlightened and
  severe4 ,a man smuggles a box of      
cigars1 or evades paying a tax for his  
dog1 or makes an insufficient return of 
his income1 and few of his  neighbours1 
if the fact come to their knowledge1    
think the worse of him4  ,the character 
and consequences of the action are not  
obvious1 and hence  they do not perceive
 what1 on reflexion1 or1 if guided by   
proper  instruction1 they could hardly  
fail to realise1 that the act is really 
a  theft1 only practised on the         

community at large instead of on an     
individual member of it1 and that1 if   
every one were to act in the same  way1 
the collection of taxes and1            
consequently1 the administration and    
defence of the country1 the maintenance 
of its army and navy1 its  police1 its  
harbours and roads1 would become an     
impossibility1 and it  would quickly    
relapse into barbarism4 ,other familiar 
instances of the  advantage to be       
derived from the conscious and          
intentional application  of the         
reasoning powers to matters of conduct  
may be found in the  successive reforms 
of the penal code of any civilized      
country1 or in the  abolition of        
slavery4 ,punishment is1 in all very    
early stages of  society1 capricious1   
mostly unregulated by any definite      
customs or  enactments1 and1            
consequently1 often disproportioned1    
either in the way  of excess or defect1 
to the character of the offence4 ,as the
 community  advances in complexity and  

intelligence1 successive reformers arise
 who  attempt1 by definite enactment1 to
 regulate the amount of punishment due  
to each description of offence1 and1    
from time to time1 to increase or       
diminish1 as occasion seems to require1 
the severity of the existing  code4 ,the
 considerations by which1 at least in   
our own time1 these  reforms are        
determined are such as these3 the       
adequacy or inadequacy of  the          
punishment to deter men from the        
commission of the offence1 the  tendency
 of excessive punishment to produce a   
reaction of sentiment in  favour of the 
criminal1 and a reluctance on the part  
of the judge or  jury to convict1 the   
superfluous suffering inflicted by that 
part of the  punishment which is in     
excess of the requirements of the case1 
due  publicity and notoriety as a means 
of warning others1 the reform of the    
criminal himself1 and so on4 ,all these 
considerations1 it will be  observed1   
are derived from tracing the effects of 

the punishment either  on the criminal  
himself1 or on persons who are under a  
similar  temptation to commit the crime1
 or on the sentiment of society at      
large1  or of that portion of society   
which is connected with the             
administration  of justice1 and it is   
only by the exercise of great           
circumspection1 and  of a keen          
intelligence on the part of the         
statesman1 the jurist1 or the  moralist1
 that grave errors can be avoided1 and  
an adequate estimate of  the probable   
results can be formed4 ,the mere        
instinct of the community1  unmodified  
and uncorrected by the conscious        
speculations of its more  thoughtful    
members1 would be in much danger of     
either causing a large  amount of       
needless suffering to the criminal1 or  
of seriously  diminishing the security  
of society4 ,it would almost certainly  
be guilty  of grave inequalities in the 
apportionment of punishment to specific 
crimes4 ,the history of slavery         

similarly shews the importance of the   
functions of the moralist and the       
reformer4 ,it must have been at the     
suggestion of some prominent member of a
 tribe1 whose intelligence was  in      
advance of that of his fellows1 that men
 first took to capturing  their defeated
 enemies1 with a view to future service1
 instead of  slaughtering them on the   
field of battle4 ,and we know that1 in  
the time  of ,plato and ,aristotle1     
there had already arisen a strong       
sentiment  against the enslaving of     
,greeks by ,greeks1 originating probably
 in the  instinctive sympathy of race1  
but quickened and fostered1 doubtless1  
by  the superior capacity which men     
possess of realising suffering and      
misfortune in those who are constituted 
and endowed like themselves1 by  the new
 conception of a ,pan-hellenic unity1   
and by the vivid sense  which1 on       
reflexion1 the citizens of each state   
must have entertained of  their own     
liability to be reduced1 in turn1 to the

 same condition4 ,in  modern times1 the 
movement which has led to the entire    
abolition of  slavery in civilized      
countries owes much1 undoubtedly1 to the
 softened  manners and wider sympathies 
of a society largely transformed by the 
combined operation of ,christianity and 
culture1 but it has been  promoted1 to  
no inconsiderable degree1 by conscious  
reflexion and direct  argument4 ,social 
and religious reasons1 derived from the 
community of  nature and origin in man1 
reinforced by a vivid realisation of the
  sufferings of others1 and appealing   
forcibly to the tender and  sympathetic 
feelings1 have co-operated with the     
economical  considerations drawn from   
the wastefulness and comparative        
inefficiency  of slave labour1 and with 
what may be called the self-regarding   
reason  of the hardening and debasing   
effect of slave-owning on the character 
of  the slave-owner himself4    ,it will
 be sufficient1 in this connexion1      
simply to allude to the ideals  of      

mercy1 purity1 humility1 long-suffering1
 and self-denial1 which are  pourtrayed 
in the ,christian teaching and have1    
ever since the early days  of           
,christianity1 exercised so vast and    
powerful an influence on large  sections
 of mankind4    ,there is1 of course1 a 
process of constant ,interaction going  
on between  the two elements in the     
constitution of moral sentiment which ,i
 have  been attempting to describe4 ,the
 circumstances1 opinions1 and feelings  
of the society of which he is a member1 
must necessarily contribute to          
determine the opinions and feelings1 the
 character and aims1 of the  moralist or
 the reformer4 ,in turn1 the moralist or
 reformer modifies1  corrects1 and      
elevates the current moral sentiment of 
those who are  brought within the       
influence of his work4 ,and this result 
is usually a  permanent one4 ,when the  
average moral sentiment on a particular 
point of  conduct has been consciously  
raised1 and the change is fully         

realised1  it seldom happens that it    
afterwards recedes1 though the automatic
 or  semi-conscious adaptations of      
society to new needs and circumstances1 
when regarded from a more general point 
of view1 are not infrequently  found to 
be regressive as well as progressive4   
,thus1 though we may  imagine the       
distinctions between the different      
classes of society  becoming more       
numerous or more accentuated 7as ,i     
believe to have  actually occurred in   
,england during the present century71 or
 the evasion  of taxation becoming more 
general than it at present is1 we can   
hardly  conceive a recurrence to        
slavery1 or a needless increase in the  
severity  of punishments1 or a revival  
of the hard-drinking habits of the last 
century4 ,when society is fully aware of
 its moral gains1 it is not  likely     
knowingly to surrender them4 ,hence1    
allowing for occasional  oscillations   
and for possible exceptions in certain  
departments of  conduct1 morality1 as a 

whole1 almost necessarily advances with 
the  general progress of intelligence4  
,it is not altogether easy to adjust the
 respective claims of society at  large 
and of the individual thinker in the    
constitution of moral theory1  or1 in   
other words1 to determine the limits    
within which the speculative  moralist  
may legitimately endeavour to reform the
 existing moral  sentiment4 ,it is plain
 that it must be open to the moralist1  
and1 in  fact1 to every intelligent     
citizen1 to criticize the current       
morality1  or else moral progress1 even 
if it took place at all1 would1 on many 
points of conduct1 be exceedingly slow4 
,but1 on the other hand1 it is  equally 
plain that a constant discussion of the 
accepted rules of  conduct would weaken 
the moral sentiment1 lessen the sense of
  obligation1 and suggest a general     
uncertainty as to the validity of the   
maxims which1 in their relations to one 
another1 men usually take for  granted4 
,hence1 though it would be almost fatal 

to moral progress to  discourage        
speculation on moral topics1 the        
moralist must always bear in  mind that 
his task is one which is not lightly to 
be undertaken1 and  that1 with an       
exception to be noticed presently1 the  
presumption should  always be in favour 
of existing rules of conduct4 ,if for no
 other  reason1 this presumption ought  
to be made on the practical ground that 
a  disturbance of the moral sentiment on
 one point is likely to weaken its      
force generally1 and1 before we expose  
men to this danger1 we ought to  have   
some adequate justification4 ,but there 
is also the speculative  ground that any
 given society1 and indeed mankind      
generally1 has been  engaged for ages in
 feeling its way1 instinctively or      
semi-consciously1  towards a solution of
 the self-same problems which the       
philosopher is  attempting to solve     
consciously and of set purpose4 ,that1  
on the whole1  a society has solved     
these problems in the manner best suited

 to its  existing needs and             
circumstances may fairly be taken for   
granted1 and1  even where the ethical   
stand-point of the reformer is very     
superior to  the stand-point of the     
society which he wishes to reform1 he   
will be  wise in endeavouring to        
introduce his reforms gradually1 and1 if
  possible1 in connexion with principles
 already acknowledged1 rather than  in  
attempting to effect a moral revolution1
 the ultimate results of  which it may  
be impossible to foresee4 ,the work of  
the moralist is1  therefore1 best       
regarded as corrective of1 and          
supplementary to1 the  work which       
mankind is constantly doing for itself1 
and not as  antagonistic to it4 ,the    
method is the same in both cases3 only  
it is  applied semi-consciously1 and    
merely as occasions suggest it1 in the  
one  case2 consciously and spontaneously
 in the other4 ,in both cases alike  the
 guiding principle1 whether of action or
 of speculation upon action1  is the    

adaptation of conduct to surrounding    
circumstances1 physical and  social1    
with a view to promote1 to the utmost   
extent possible1 the  well-being of the 
individual and of the society of which  
he is a member4  ,where the interests of
 the individual and of the society      
clash1 society1  that is to say1 a man's
 fellow-citizens1 usually approves1 as  
we saw in  the last chapter1 of the     
sacrifice of individual to social       
interests1 a  course of conduct which is
 also1 on reflexion1 usually stamped by 
the  individual's own approbation1 and  
hence we may say briefly that their     
tendency to promote or impair the       
welfare of society is the test by       
which1 in different ways1 all actions   
are estimated alike by the  philosopher1
 in his hours of speculation1 and by the
 community at large1  in the practical  
work of life4    ,in laying down the    
principle that the presumption of the   
moralist should  always be in favour of 
existing rules of conduct1 ,i intimated 

that there  was one exception to this   
principle4 ,the exception includes all  
those  cases which are legitimate1      
though not obvious1 applications of     
existing  rules1 and to which1          
therefore1 the ordinary moral sentiment 
does not  attach in the same way that it
 does to the plainer and more direct    
applications4 ,thus1 if it can be shewn1
 as it undoubtedly can be1 that         
smuggling falls under the head of       
stealing1 and holding out false hopes   
under that of lying1 the moralist need  
take no account of the lax moral        
sentiment which exists with regard to   
these practices1 though1 of  course1 in 
estimating the guilt of the individual  
as distinct from the  character of the  
act1 due allowance must be made for his 
imperfect  appreciation of the moral    
bearings of his conduct4 ,this          
exception1 as  will be found in the next
 chapter1 covers1 and therefore at once 
justifies1 a large proportion of the    
criticisms which1 in the present        

advanced stage of morality1 when the    
more fundamental principles have  been  
already settled1 it is still open to us 
to make4    ,it remains now to enquire  
what is the justification of the test   
propounded in this chapter4 ,i do not   
found it on any external                
considerations1 whether of ,law or      
,revelation1 both of which1 ,i conceive1
  presuppose morality1 but on the very  
make and constitution of our  nature4   
,the justification of the moral test and
 the source of the moral  feeling are   
alike1 ,i conceive1 to be discovered by 
an examination of  human nature1 and1 so
 far as that nature has a divine origin1
 so far is  the origin of morality      
divine4 ,whatever the ultimate source of
 morality  may be1 to us1 at all events1
 it can only be known as revealed or    
reflected in ourselves4 ,what1 then1 is 
it in the constitution of our  nature1  
which leads us to aim at the well-being 
of ourselves and those  around us1 and  
to measure our own conduct and that of  

others by the  extent to which it       
promotes these ends8 ,in answering this 
question1 ,i  must give a brief account 
of the ultimate principles of human     
nature1  though this account has been   
partly anticipated in the last chapter4 
,human nature1 in its last analysis1    
seems1 so far as it is concerned  with  
action1 to consist of certain impulses  
or feelings1 and a power of  comparing  
with one another the results which      
follow from the  gratification of these 
feelings1 which power reacts upon the   
several  feelings themselves by way of  
intensifying1 checking1 or controlling  
them4 ,this power we call ,reason4 ,the 
feelings themselves fall into two       
principal groups1 the egoistic or       
self-regarding feelings1 which centre   
in a man's self1 and are developed by   
his personal needs1 and the  altruistic 
or sympathetic feelings1 which centre in
 others and are  developed by the social
 surroundings in which he finds himself 
placed4  ,these two groups of feelings1 

,i conceive1 were independent of one    
another from the first1 or at least as  
soon as man could be called man1  and   
neither of them admits of being resolved
 into the other4 ,as the one  was       
developed by and adapted to personal    
needs1 so the other was  developed by   
and adapted to the manifold requirements
 of family or  tribal life1 which1 from 
the first1 was inseparable from the life
 of the  individual4 ,intermediate      
between these two groups of feelings1   
the  purely self-regarding and the      
purely sympathetic1 and derived probably
  from the interaction of both1 is      
another group1 which may be called the  
semi-social group4 ,this group includes 
shame1 love of reputation1 love  of     
notoriety1 desire of fame1 and the like1
 but1 on analysis1 it will be  found    
that all these feelings admit of being  
referred to two heads1 the  love of     
approbation and the fear of             
disapprobation4 ,lastly1 if any of  our 
desires or feelings are thwarted by the 

intentional action of other  men1 the   
result in our minds is a feeling which  
we call ,resentment1 and  which1 though 
it regards others1 is1 unlike the       
sympathetic feelings1 a  malevolent and 
not a benevolent feeling4 ,it is        
important1 in considering  the economy  
of human nature1 to notice that         
,resentment1 as is also the  case with  
the love of cruelty1 is a secondary not 
a primary1 a derived  not an original   
affection of our minds2 for1 apart from 
the desire to  gratify some             
self-regarding or sympathetic feeling1  
or disappointment  when that desire is  
not gratified1 there is1 ,i conceive1 no
 such thing  as ill-feeling in one human
 being towards another4 ,resentment is  
properly a reflex form of sympathy or   
self-regard1 arising when our           
sympathetic feelings are wounded by an  
injury done to another1 or our          
self-regarding desires are frustrated by
 an injury done to ourselves2  when1 in 
fact1 any emotional element in our      

nature is1 by the  intentional          
intervention of another1 disappointed of
 attaining its end4  ,each of these     
groups of feelings admits of being      
studied apart1 though  in the actual    
conduct of life they are seldom found to
 operate alone1  and each1 under the    
continued action of reason1 assumes a   
form or forms  in which its various     
elements are brought into harmonious    
working with  each other1 so as best to 
promote the ends which the whole group  
subserves4 ,these forms1 thus           
rationalised or moralised1 if ,i may be 
allowed the use of such expressions1    
are1 in the case of the  self-regarding 
feelings1 self-respect and rational     
self-love2 in the  case of the          
sympathetic feelings1 rational          
benevolence2 in the case of  the        
semi-social feelings1 a reasonable      
regard for the opinion of others2  and  
in the case of the resentful feelings1 a
 sense of justice4 ,these  higher forms 
of the several groups of feelings       

themselves require to be  harmonised1   
before man can satisfy the needs of his 
nature as a whole4  ,and1 when          
co-ordinated under the control of       
reason1 they become a  rational desire  
for the combined welfare of the         
individual and of  society1 or1 if we   
choose to use different but equivalent  
expressions1  of the individual         
considered as an unit of society1 or of 
society  considered as including the    
individual4 ,in a settled state of      
existence1  the interests of the        
individual and of society1 even leaving 
out of  account the pleasures and pains 
of the moral sanction1 are1 for the most
  part1 identical4 ,if an individual    
pursues a selfish course of conduct1    
neglecting the interests and feelings of
 others1 he is almost certain to  suffer
 for it in the long run4 ,and the       
prosperity and general well-being  of   
the community in which they live is1 to 
citizens1 living a normal  life and     
pursuing ordinary avocations1 an        

essential condition of their  own       
prosperity and well-being4 ,on the other
 hand1 it is by each man  attending to  
his own business and directing his      
efforts to the promotion  of his own    
interests or those of his family1 his   
firm1 or whatever may  be the smaller   
social aggregate in which his work      
chiefly lies1 that the  interests of the
 community at large are best secured4   
,men whose time is  mainly taken up with
 philanthropic enterprises are very     
likely to  neglect the duties which lie 
immediately before them4 ',to learn and 
labour truly to get mine own living1 and
 to do my duty in that state of  life1  
unto which it shall please ,god to call 
me' is a very homely1 but  it is an     
essential lesson4 ,that the great mass  
of the citizens of a  country should lay
 it well to heart1 and act habitually on
 it1 is the  first condition of national
 prosperity4 ,of course1 this primary   
regard  to our own interests1 or those  
of the persons with whom we are more    

immediately connected1 must be limited  
by wider considerations4 ,a man  has    
duties1 not only to himself and his own 
family1 but to his  neighbours1 to the  
various institutions with which he is   
connected1 to  his town1 his country1   
mankind at large1 and even the whole    
sentient  creation4 ,how far these      
should limit each other or a man's      
individual or  family interests is a    
question by no means easy to answer1 and
 is the  main problem which each man has
 to be perpetually solving for himself1 
and society at large for us all4 ,there 
is hardly any waking hour in  which we  
have not to attempt to settle rival     
claims of this kind1 and1  according as 
we settle them to our own satisfaction  
or not1 so have we  peace or trouble of 
mind4 ,no one can reasonably deny that  
the more  immediate interests of the    
individual and of the various social    
aggregates1 including society at large1 
are frequently in conflict4 ,it  seems  
to me1 ,i must confess1 that it is also 

futile to deny that there  are          
occasions1 though such occasions may be 
rare1 in which even a man's  interests  
in the long run are incompatible with   
his social duties4 ,to  take one or two 
instances4 ,it may sometimes be for the 
good of society  that a man should speak
 out his mind freely on some question of
 private  conduct or public policy1     
though his utterances may be on the     
unpopular  side or offend persons of    
consideration and influence4 ,the man   
performs  what he conceives to be his   
duty1 but he knows that1 in doing so1 he
 is  sacrificing his prospects4 ,or1    
again1 he is invited to join in some    
popular movement which he believes to be
 of a questionable or pernicious        
tendency1 and1 because he believes that 
to take part in it would be  untrue to  
his own convictions and possibly harmful
 to others1 he  refrains from doing so1 
at the risk of losing preferment1 or    
custom1 or  patronage4 ,then1 we are all
 familiar with the difficulties in which

 men  are often placed1 when they have  
to record a vote2 their convictions and 
the claims of the public service being  
on one side1 and their own  interests   
and prospects on the other4 ,in all     
these cases it is true  that1 if their  
moral nature be in a healthy condition1 
they approve1 on  reflexion1 of having  
taken the more generous course1 while it
 is often a  matter of life-long regret 
if they have sacrificed their nobler    
impulses  to their selfish interests4   
,and1 taking into account these         
after-feelings of self-approbation and  
self-disapprobation1 it is often  the   
case1 and is always the case where these
 feelings are very strong1  that a man  
gains more happiness1 in the long run1  
by following the path  of duty and      
obeying his social impulses than by     
confining himself to the  narrow view   
which would be dictated by a cool       
calculation of what is  most likely to  
conduce to his own private good4 ,but1  
where the moral  feelings are not       

strong1 and still more where they are   
almost in  abeyance1 ,i fear that the   
theory that virtue and happiness are    
invariably coincident will hardly be    
supported by a candid examination  of   
facts4 ,to some men1 ,i fear it must be 
acknowledged1 present wealth  and power 
and dignity are more than a sufficient  
recompense for any  remorse which they  
may continue to feel for past greed or  
lack of  candour or truthfulness4 ,these
 considerations will serve to shew the  
immense importance of moral education1  
alike in the family1 the school1  and   
the state4 ,if we are to depend on men  
acting rightly1 and with a due  regard  
to wider interests than their own1 we   
must take pains to develope  in them    
moral feelings sufficiently strong and  
sensitive to make the  reflexion on     
wrong or selfish acts more painful to   
them than the  sacrifice which is needed
 for dutiful and generous conduct4 ,so  
far as  society1 through its various    
instruments of law and opinion1 of      

education and domestic influences1 can  
effect this object1 so far will  it     
promote its own security and            
advancement4    ,our adoption1 then1 of 
a tendency to promote social welfare or 
well-being1 as the test of conduct1 is  
justified1 ,i conceive1 by an           
examination of the internal constitution
 of human nature and of the  conditions 
which are necessary to secure the       
harmonious working of its  various      
parts4 ,it may be objected that this    
test is vague in its  conception and    
difficult in its application4 ,both     
objections1 to a great  extent1 hold    
good4 ,if they did not1 moral theory and
 moral practice  would be very easy     
matters1 but1 as a fact1 we know that   
they are by no  means easy4 ,the        
conception of social well-being must be 
more or less  vague1 because we are     
constantly filling it up by experience2 
it is not  a fixed1 but a growing       
conception1 and1 though we may be       
certain of the  character and importance

 of many of the elements which have     
already been  detected in it by the     
experience of past generations1 it seems
  impossible to fix any limits to its   
development in the future history of    
mankind4 ,man will constantly be        
discovering new wants1 new and more     
refined susceptibilities of his nature1 
and with them his conception of  human  
well-being must necessarily grow4 ,but1 
though not a fixed or final  conception1
 the idea of social well-being is       
sufficiently definite1 in  each         
generation1 to act as a guide and       
incentive to conduct4 ,it is the  star1 
gradually growing brighter and brighter1
 which lights our path1  and1 any way1  
we know that1 if it were not above us in
 the heavens1 we  should be walking in  
the darkness4    ,it must be confessed  
that the test of social well-being is   
not always  easy of application4 ,even1 
when we know what the good of the       
community  consists in1 it is not always
 easy to say what course of action will 

promote it1 or what course of action is 
likely to retard it4 ,society  arrives1 
in a comparatively early period of its  
development1 at certain  broad rules of 
conduct1 such as those which condemn    
murder1 theft1  ingratitude to friends1 
disobedience to parents4 ,but the more  
remote  applications of these rules1 the
 nicer shades of conduct1 such as those 
relating to social intercourse1 the     
choice between clashing duties1 the     
realisation of our obligations to the   
community at large1 require for  their  
appreciation a large amount of          
intelligence and an accumulated  stock  
of experience which are not to be found 
in primitive societies4  ,hence1 the    
rules of conduct1 which at first are few
 and simple1  gradually become more     
numerous and complex4 ,nor have we yet  
arrived at  the time1 nor do we seem to 
be within any appreciable distance of   
it1  when the code is complete1 or even 
the parts of it which already exist  are
 altogether free from doubt and         

discussion4 ,in the simpler relations   
of life1 he that runs may read1 but with
 increasing complications comes         
increasing uncertainty4 ,to remove1 as  
far as may be1 this uncertainty  from   
the domain of conduct is the task of    
advancing civilisation1 and  specially  
of those members of a community who have
 sufficient leisure1  education1 and    
intelligence to review the motives and  
compare the  results of actions4 ,the   
task has doubtless its special          
difficulties1 and  the conclusions of   
the moralist will by no means always    
command assent1  but that the art of    
life is an easy one1 who is there1 at   
all  experienced in affairs or          
accustomed to reflexion1 that will      
contend8    ,i may here pause for a     
moment1 in order to emphasise the fact1 
which is  already abundantly apparent   
from what has preceded1 that1 with ever 
widening and deepening conceptions of   
well-being1 man is constantly  learning 
to subordinate his individual interests 

to those of society at  large1 or rather
 to identify his interests with those of
 the larger  organism of which he is a  
part4 ,it is thus that we may justify   
the  peculiar characteristic of the     
moral sentiment1 indicated in the last  
chapter1 which seems1 in all acts of    
which it approves1 to demand an  element
 of sacrifice1 whether of the lower to  
the higher self1 or of the  individual  
to his fellows4 ,in order thoroughly to 
realise ourselves1 we  must be conscious
 of our absorption1 or at least of our  
inclusion1 in a  greater and grander    
system than that of our individual      
surroundings2 in  order to find our     
lives1 we must first discover the art of
 losing them4        ,,chapter ,v4      
,,practical ,,applications ,,of ,,the   
,,moral ,,test4      ,in this chapter ,i
 propose1 without any attempt to be     
exhaustive or  systematic1 to give some 
examples of the manner in which the test
 of  conduct may be applied to practical
 questions1 either by extending         

existing rules to cases which do not    
obviously fall under them1 or by        
suggesting more refined maxims of       
conduct than those which are commonly   
prevalent4 ,in either case1 ,i am       
accepting the somewhat invidious task of
  pointing out defects in the commonly  
received theory1 or the commonly        
approved practice1 of morality4 ,but1 if
 morality is progressive1 as ,i  contend
 that it is1 and progresses by the      
application to conduct of a  test which 
itself involves a growing conception1   
the best mode of  exhibiting the        
application of that test will be in the 
more recent  acquisitions or the more   
subtle deductions of morality1 rather   
than in  its fundamental rules or most  
acknowledged maxims4    ,i shall begin  
with a topic1 the examples of which are 
ready to hand1 and  may easily be       
multiplied1 to almost any extent1 by the
 reader for  himself--the better        
realisation of our duties to society at 
large as  distinct from particular      

individuals4 ,when the primary mischief 
resulting from a wrong act falls upon   
individuals1 and especially upon  our   
neighbours or those with whom we are    
constantly associating1 it can  hardly  
escape our observation4 ,and1 even if it
 does1 the probability is  that our     
attention will be quickly called to it  
by the reprobation of  others4 ,but1    
when the consequences of the act are    
diffused over the  whole community1 or a
 large aggregate of persons1 so that the
 effect on  each individual is almost   
imperceptible1 we are very apt to       
overlook the  mischief resulting from   
it1 and so not to recognise its wrongful
  character1 while1 at the same time1   
from lack of personal interest1  others 
fail to call us to account4 ,hence it is
 that men1 almost without  any thought1 
and certainly often without any scruple1
 commit offences  against the public or 
against corporations or societies or    
companies1  which they would themselves 
deem it impossible for them to commit   

against individuals4 ,and yet the       
character of the acts is exactly the    
same4 ,take smuggling4 ,a man smuggles  
cigars or tobacco to an amount by  which
 he saves himself twenty shillings1 and 
defrauds the state to the  same extent4 
,this is simply an act of theft1 only   
that the object of the  theft is the    
community at large and not an           
individual4 ,so far as the  mischief or 
wrongfulness of the act goes1 apart from
 the intention of  the agent1 he might  
as well put his hands into the pocket of
 one of his  fellow-passengers and      
extract the same amount of money4 ,the  
twenty  shillings which1 by evading     
payment of the duty1 he has appropriated
 to  his own uses1 has been taken from  
the rest of the tax-payers1 and he has  
simply shifted on to them the obligation
 which properly attached to  himself4   
,sooner or later they must make up the  
deficit4 ,if many men were  to act in   
the same way1 the burden of the honest  
tax-payer would be  largely increased1  

and1 if the practice became general1 the
 state would  have to resort to some    
other mode of taxation or collect its   
customs-revenue at a most               
disproportionate cost4 ,thus1 a little  
reflexion shows that smuggling is really
 theft1 and ,i cannot but think  that it
 would be to the moral as well as the   
material advantage of the  community if 
it were called by that name1 and were   
visited with the same  punishment as    
petty larceny4 ,exactly the same        
remarks1 of course1 apply  to the       
evasion of income-tax1 or of rates or   
taxes of any kind1 which  are imposed by
 a legitimate authority4 ,travelling on 
a railway without a  ticket or in a     
higher class or for a greater distance  
than that for  which the ticket was     
taken is1 similarly1 only a thinly      
disguised case  of theft1 and should be 
treated accordingly4 ,the sale or       
purchase of  pirated editions of books  
is another case of the same kind1 the   
persons  from whom the money is stolen  

being the authors or publishers4 ,many  
paltry acts of pilfering1 such as the   
unauthorised use of  government-paper or
 franks1 or purloining novels or        
letter-paper from a  club1 or plucking  
flowers in a public garden1 fall under  
the same head  of real1 though not      
always obvious1 thefts4 ,there is1 of   
course1 a  certain degree of pettiness  
which makes them insignificant1 but     
there is  always a danger lest men      
should think too lightly of acts of this
 kind1  whether done by themselves or   
others4 ,the best safeguard1 perhaps1   
against thoughtless wrong-doing to the  
community or large social  aggregates is
 to ask ourselves these two questions3  
,should we commit  this act1 or what    
should we think of a man who did commit 
it1 in the  case of a private           
individual8 ,what would be the result1  
if every one who  had the opportunity   
were to do the same8 ,many of these acts
 would1 then1  stand out in their true  
light1 and we should recognise that they

 are not  only mean but criminal4       
,other1 but analogous1 instances of the 
failure of men to realise their         
obligations to society or to large      
social aggregates are to be found in    
the careless and perfunctory manner in  
which persons employed by  government1  
or by corporations1 or large companies1 
often perform their  duties4 ,if they   
were in the service of a private        
employer1 they would at  all events     
realise1 even if they did not act on    
their conviction1 that  they were       
defrauding him by idling away their time
 or attending to their  own affairs1 or 
those of charities or institutions in   
which they were  interested1 when they  
ought to be attending to the concerns of
 their  employer4 ,but in a government  
or municipal office1 or the             
establishment  of a large company1 no   
one in particular seems to be injured by
 the  ineffective discharge of their    
functions2 and hence it does not occur  
to  them that they are receiving their  

wages without rendering the  equivalent 
of them4 ,the inadequate supervision    
which overlooks or  condones this       
listlessness is1 of course1 itself also 
the result of a  similar failure to     
realise responsibility4    ,the spirit  
in which patronage is often administered
 affords an instance  of a similar kind4
 ,if a man were engaging a person to    
perform some  service for himself or his
 family1 or one of his intimate friends1
 he  would simply look to competency1   
including1 perhaps1 moral character1    
for the special work to be done4 ,but1  
when he has to appoint to a public      
post1 and especially if he is only one  
of a board of electors1 he is  very apt 
to think that there is no great harm in 
appointing or voting  for a relative or 
friend1 or a person who has some special
 bond of  connexion with him1 such as   
that of political party1 though he may  
not  be the candidate best qualified for
 the position4 ,and1 if it does occur   
to him that he is acting wrongly1 he is 

more likely to think of the  wrong which
 he is doing to the individual who      
possesses the highest  qualifications   
7and to him it is an undoubted wrong1   
for it frustrates  just expectations7   
than of the wrong which he is doing to  
the community  or the institution which 
he is depriving of the services of the  
fittest  man4 ,and yet1 if he takes the 
trouble to reflect1 he must see that he 
is  guilty of a breach of trust2 that1  
having undertaken a public duty1 he  has
 abused the confidence reposed in him4  
,a vote given in return for a bribe1 a  
case which now seldom occurs  except in 
parliamentary elections1 is open to the 
same ethical  objections as a vote given
 on grounds of partiality2 and1 as the  
motive  which dictates the breach of    
trust is purely selfish1 it incurs the  
additional reproach of meanness4 ,but   
why1 it may be asked1 should not a  man 
accept a bribe1 if1 on other grounds1 he
 would vote for the  candidate who      
offers it8 ,simply1 because he is       

encouraging a practice  which would1 in 
time1 deprive ,parliament of most of its
 more competent  members1 and reduce it 
to an oligarchy of millionaires1 as well
 as  degrading himself by a sordid act4 
,to receive a present for a vote1 even  
if the vote be given conscientiously1 is
 to lend countenance to a  practice     
which must inevitably corrupt the       
consciences1 and pervert the  judgment1 
of others4 ,it hardly needs to be       
pointed out that the man who  offers the
 bribe is acting still more immorally   
than the man who accepts  it4 ,he is not
 only causing others to act immorally1  
but1 as no man can  be a proper judge of
 his own competency1 he is attempting to
 thrust  himself into an office of trust
 without any regard to his fitness to   
fill it4 ,intimidation1 on the part of  
the man who practises it1 is on  the    
same ethical level as bribery1 with     
respect to the two points just          
mentioned2 but1 as it appeals to the    
fears of men instead of their love  of  

gain1 and costs nothing to him who      
employs it1 it is more odious1 and      
deserves1 at the hands of the law1 a    
still more severe punishment4 ,to  yield
 to intimidation is1 under most         
circumstances1 more excusable than  to  
yield to bribery2 for the fear of losing
 what one has is to most men  a more    
powerful inducement than the hope of    
gaining what one has not1  and1         
generally speaking1 the penalty         
threatened by the intimidator is  far in
 excess of the advantage offered by the 
briber4    ,as it betrays a vain and    
grasping disposition1 when a man        
attempts to  thrust himself into an     
office to which he is not called by the 
spontaneous voice of his                
fellow-citizens1 so to refuse office1   
when  there is an evident opportunity of
 doing good service to the community1   
betrays pride or indolence1 coupled with
 an indifference to the public  welfare4
 ,in democratic communities1 there is   
always a tendency on the  part of what  

may be called superfine persons to hold 
aloof from public1  and especially      
municipal1 life4 ,if this sentiment of  
fastidiousness or  indifference were to 
spread widely1 and a fashion which      
begins in one  social stratum quickly   
permeates to those immediately below it1
 there  would be great danger1 as there 
seems to be in ,america1 of the public  
administration becoming seriously and   
permanently deteriorated4 ,to  prevent  
this evil1 it is desirable to create1 in
 every community1 a  strong sentiment   
against the practice of persons1 who    
have the requisite  means1 leisure1 and 
ability1 withholding themselves from    
public life1  when invited by their     
fellow-citizens to take their part in   
it4 ,there  may1 of course1 be paramount
 claims of another kind1 such as those  
of  science1 or art1 or literature1 or  
education1 but the superior  importance 
of these claims on the individuals      
themselves1 where they  obviously exist1
 and where the claims of the public     

service are not  urgent1 would readily  
be allowed4    ,it seems to be a rapid  
transition from cases of this kind to   
suicide1  but1 amongst the many reasons1
 moral and religious1 which may be urged
  against suicide1 there is one which   
connects itself closely with the        
considerations which have just been     
under our notice4 ,as pointed out  long 
ago by ,aristotle1 the suicide wrongs   
the state rather than himself4  ,where a
 man is still able to do any service to 
the state1 in either a  private or a    
public capacity1 he is under a social1  
and1 therefore1 a  moral obligation to  
perform that service1 and1 consequently1
 to withdraw  from it by a voluntary    
death is to desert the post of duty4    
,this  consideration1 of course1 holds  
only where a man's life is still of     
value to society1 but it should be      
pointed out that1 where this ceases  to 
be the case1 many other considerations  
often1 and some always do1  intervene4  
,there are few men who have not         

relatives1 friends1 or  neighbours1 who 
will be pained1 even if they are not    
injured materially1  by an act of       
suicide1 and1 wherever the injury is a  
material one1 as in  the case of leaving
 helpless relatives unprovided for1 it  
becomes an act  of cruelty4 ,then1 under
 all circumstances1 there remain the    
evil example  of cowardice and1 to those
 who acknowledge the obligations of     
religion1  the sin of cutting short the 
period of probation which ,god has      
assigned  us4    ,amongst duties to     
society1 which are seldom fully realised
 in their  social aspect1 is the duty of
 bringing up children in such a manner  
as  to render them useful to the state1 
instead of a burden upon it4 ,under     
this head1 there are two distinct cases1
 that of the rich and that of  the poor1
 or1 more precisely1 that of those who  
are in sufficiently good  circumstances 
to educate their children without the   
assistance of the  state or of their    
neighbours1 and that of those who       

require such  assistance4 ,in the latter
 case1 it is the duty of society to     
co-operate  with the parent in giving   
the child an education which shall fit  
it for  the industrial occupations of   
life1 and hence the moral obligation on 
the richer members of a community to    
provide elementary schools1 aided  by   
the state or by some smaller political  
aggregate1 or else by  voluntary        
efforts4 ,the object of this assistance 
is not so much charity  to the parent or
 the individual children1 as the        
prevention of crime and  pauperism1 and 
the supply of an orderly and competent  
industrial class4  ,in rendering the    
assistance1 whether it come from public 
or private  funds1 great care ought to  
be taken not to weaken1 but1 rather to  
stimulate1 the interest of the parent in
 the child's progress1 both by          
assigning to him a share of the         
responsibility of supervision1 and1 if  
possible1 by compelling him to          
contribute an equitable proportion of   

the  cost4 ,so largely1 if not so fully1
 are the duties of the state and of     
individuals of the wealthier classes1 in
 the matter of educating the  children  
of the poor1 now recognised1 that the   
dangers arising from a  defective or    
injudicious education seem1 in the      
immediate future1 to  threaten the      
richer rather than the poorer classes4  
,over-indulgence and  the encouragement 
of luxurious habits during childhood2   
the weakened  sense of responsibility1  
on the part of the parent1 which is     
often  caused by the transference to    
others of authority and supervision     
during  boyhood or girlhood2 the undue  
stimulation of the love of amusement1 or
  of the craving for material comforts1 
during the opening years of  manhood or 
womanhood2 the failure to create serious
 interests or teach  adequately the     
social responsibilities which wealth and
 position bring  with them1--all these  
mistakes or defects in the education of 
the  children of the upper classes      

constitute a grave peril to society1    
unless they are remedied in time4 ,it   
seems1 so far as we can forecast  the   
future1 that it is only by all classes  
taking pains to ascertain  their        
respective duties and functions in      
sustaining and promoting the  well-being
 of the community1 and making serious   
efforts to perform them1  that the      
society of the next few generations can 
be saved from constant  convulsions4 ,as
 intelligence expands1 and a sense of   
the importance of  social co-operation  
becomes diffused1 it is almost certain  
that the  existence of a merely idle and
 self-indulgent class will no longer be 
tolerated4 ,hence1 it is as much to the 
interests of the wealthier  classes     
themselves as of society at large1 that 
their children should be  educated with 
a full sense of their social            
responsibilities1 and  equipped with all
 the moral and intellectual aptitudes   
which are  requisite to enable them to  
take a lead in the development of the   

community of which they are members4    
,and here1 perhaps1 ,i may take occasion
 to draw attention to the  importance of
 the acquisition of political knowledge 
by all citizens of  the state1 and      
especially by those who belong to the   
leisured classes4  ,it is a plain duty  
to society1 that men should not exercise
 political  power1 unless they have some
 knowledge of the questions at issue4   
,the  amount of this knowledge may vary 
almost infinitely1 from that of the     
veteran statesman to that of the newly  
enfranchised elector1 but it is  within 
the power of every one1 who can observe 
and reason1 to acquire  some knowledge  
of at least the questions which affect  
his own employment  and the welfare of  
his own family and neighbourhood1 and1  
unless he will  take thus much pains1 he
 might surely have the modesty to forego
 his  vote4 ,to record a vote simply to 
please some one else is only one degree 
baser than to barter it for money or    
money's worth1 and indeed it is  often  

only an indirect mode of doing the same 
thing4    ,there is a large class of    
cases1 primarily affecting individuals  
rather  than society at large1 which1 if
 we look a little below the surface and 
trace their results1 are of a much more 
pernicious character than is  usually   
recognised1 and1 as ethical knowledge   
increases1 ought to incur  far more     
severe reprobation than they now do4    
,foremost amongst these is  what ,i may 
call the current morality of debts4 ,a  
man incurs a debt with  a tradesman     
which he has no intention or no         
reasonable prospect of  paying1 knowing 
that the tradesman has no grounds for   
suspecting his  inability to pay4 ,the  
tradesman parts with the goods1         
supposing that he  will receive the     
equivalent2 the customer carries them   
off1 knowing that  this equivalent is   
not1 and is not likely to be1           
forthcoming4 ,i confess  that ,i am     
entirely unable to distinguish this case
 from that of ordinary  theft4 ,and     

still there is many a man1 well received
 in society1 who  habitually acts in    
this manner1 and whose practice must be 
more than  suspected by his friends and 
associates4 ,he and his friends would be
  much astonished if he were accosted as
 a thief1 and still ,i cannot see  how  
he could reasonably repudiate this      
title4 ,short of this extreme  case1    
which1 however1 is by no means uncommon1
 there are many degrees of  what may be 
called criminal negligence or imprudence
 in contracting  debts1 as where a man  
runs up a large bill with only a slender
  probability of meeting it1 or a larger
 bill than he can probably meet in      
full1 or one of which he must defer the 
payment beyond a reasonable  time4 ,in  
all these cases1 which are much         
aggravated1 if the goods  obtained are  
luxuries and not necessaries 7for it is 
one of the plainest  duties of every    
man1 who is removed from absolute want1 
to live within  his means71 there is    
either actual dishonesty or a dangerous 

approximation to it1 and it would be a  
great advance in every-day  morality if 
society were to recognise this fact     
distinctly1 and  apportion its censures 
accordingly4 ,where the tradesman knows 
that he is  running a risk1 the customer
 being also aware that he knows it1 and 
adapts his charges to the fact1 it is a 
case of ',greek meet ,greek1' and1  even
 if the customer deserves reprobation1  
the tradesman certainly  deserves no    
compassion4 ,but this is a case outside 
the range of honest  dealing altogether1
 and must be regulated by other         
sentiments and other  laws than those   
which prevail in ordinary commerce4     
,there is another  well-known1 and to   
many men only too familiar1 exception to
 the ordinary  relation of debtor and   
creditor4 ,a friend 'borrows' money of  
you1 though  it is understood on both   
sides that he will have no opportunity  
of  repaying it1 and that it is         
virtually a gift4 ,here1 as the creditor
 does  not expect any repayment1 and the

 debtor knows that he does not1 there   
is no act of dishonesty1 but the debtor1
 by asking for a loan and not a  gift1  
evades the obligation of gratitude and  
reciprocal service which  would attach  
to the latter1 and thus takes a certain 
advantage of his  benefactor4 ,in this  
case it would be far more               
straightforward1 even if  it involved   
some humiliation1 to use plain words1   
and to accept at once  the true position
 of a recipient1 and not affect the     
seeming one of a  borrower4 ,connected  
with the subject of debtor and creditor 
is the  ungrounded notion1 to which ,i  
have already adverted1 that the payment 
of  what are called debts of honour     
ought to take precedence of all other   
pecuniary obligations4 ,as these 'debts 
of honour' generally arise from  bets or
 play or loans contracted with friends1 
the position assumed is  simply that    
debts incurred to members of our own    
class or persons whom  we know place us 
under a greater obligation than debts   

incurred to  strangers or persons       
belonging to a lower grade in society4  
,as thus  stated1 the maxim is evidently
 preposterous and indefensible1 and     
affords a good instance1 as ,i have     
noticed in a previous chapter1 of the   
subordination of the laws of general    
morality to the convenience and         
prejudices of particular cliques and    
classes4 ,if there is any  competition  
at all admissible between just debts1   
surely those which  have been incurred  
in return for commodities supplied have 
a stronger  claim than those1 arising   
from play or bets1 which represent no   
sacrifice on the part of the creditor4  
,another instance of the class of cases 
which ,i am now considering is to  be   
found in reckless gambling4 ,men who    
indulge in this practice are  usually   
condemned as being simply hare-brained  
or foolish2 but1 if we  look a little   
below the surface1 we shall find that   
their conduct is  often highly criminal4
 ,many a time a man risks on play or a  

bet or a  horse-race or a transaction on
 the stock exchange the permanent       
welfare1  sometimes even the very       
subsistence1 of his wife and children or
 others  depending on him2 or1 if he    
loses1 he cuts short a career of future 
usefulness1 or he renders himself unable
 to develope1 or perhaps even to        
retain1 his business or his estates1 and
 so involves his tenants1 or  clerks1 or
 workmen in his ruin1 or1 perhaps1 he   
becomes bankrupt and is  thus the cause 
of wide-spread misery amongst his       
creditors4 ,and1 even if  these extreme 
results do not follow1 his rash conduct 
may be the cause  of much minor         
suffering amongst his relatives or      
tradesmen or  dependents1 who may have  
to forego many legitimate enjoyments in 
consequence of his one act of greed or  
thoughtlessness1 while1 in all  cases1  
he is encouraging by his example a      
practice which1 if not his own  ruin1 is
 certain to be the ruin of others4 ,the 
light-heartedness with  which many a man

 risks his whole fortune1 and the       
welfare of all who are  dependent on    
him1 for what would1 if gained1 be no   
great addition to his  happiness1 is a  
striking example of the frequent        
blindness of men to all  results except 
those which are removed but one step    
from their actions4  ,a gamester1       
however sanguine1 sees that he may lose 
his money1 but he  does not see all the 
ill consequences to himself and others  
which the  loss of his money will       
involve4 ,hence an act1 which1 if we    
look to the  intention1 is often only   
thoughtless1 becomes1 in result1        
criminal1 and  it is of the utmost      
importance that society1 by its         
reprobation1 should  make men realise   
what the true nature of such actions is4
    ,i pass now to a case of a different
 character1 which has only1 within      
recent years1 begun to attract the      
attention of the moralist and           
politician at all--the peril to life and
 health ensuing on the neglect  of      

sanitary precautions4 ,a man carelessly 
neglects his drains1 or allows  a mass  
of filth to accumulate in his yard1 or  
uses well-water without  testing its    
qualities or ascertaining its           
surroundings4 ,after a time a  fever    
breaks out in his household1 and1       
perhaps1 communicates itself to  his    
neighbours1 the result being several    
deaths and much sickness and  suffering4
 ,these deaths and this suffering are   
the direct result of his  negligence1   
and1 though it would1 doubtless1 be hard
 and unjust to call  him a murderer1 he 
is this in effect4 ,of course1 if1      
notwithstanding  warning or reflexion1  
he persists in his negligence1 with a   
full  consciousness of the results which
 may possibly ensue from it1 he incurs  
a grave moral responsibility1 and it is 
difficult to conceive a case  more fit  
for censure1 or even punishment4 ,nor   
are the members of a  corporation or a  
board1 in the administration of an area 
of which they  have undertaken the      

charge1 less guilty1 under these        
circumstances1 than  is a private       
individual in the management of his own 
premises4 ,if men  were properly        
instructed in the results of their      
actions or  pretermissions1 in matters  
of this nature1 and made fully conscious
 of  the responsibility which those     
results entail upon them1 there would   
soon be a marked decrease in physical   
suffering1 disease1 and premature       
deaths4 ,the average duration of life1  
in civilized countries1 has  probably   
already been lengthened by the increased
 knowledge and the  increased sense of  
responsibility which have even now been 
attained4    ,closely connected with    
these considerations on the diminution  
of death1  disease1 and suffering by    
improved sanitary arrangements1 is the  
delicate subject of the propagation of  
hereditary disease4 ,it is a            
commonplace that the most important of  
all the acts of life1 is that on  which 
men and women venture most              

thoughtlessly4 ,but experience shews1   
unmistakably1 that there are many forms 
of disease1 both mental and  bodily1    
which are transmitted from the parents  
to the children1 and  that1             
consequently1 the marriage of a diseased
 parent1 or of a parent  with a tendency
 to disease1 will probably be followed  
by the existence  of diseased children4 
,in a matter of this kind1 everything1  
of course1  depends on the amount of the
 risk incurred1 that is to say1 on the  
extent of the evil and the probability  
of its transmission4 ,the former  of    
these data is supplied by common        
observation1 the latter by the          
researches of the pathologist4 ,it is   
for the moralist simply to draw         
attention to the subject1 and to insist 
on the responsibility attaching  to a   
knowledge of it4 ,the marriages of      
persons who are very poor1 and  have no 
reasonable prospect of bringing up      
children in health1 decency1  and       
comfort1 are open to similar            

considerations but1 as in the last      
case1 ,i must content myself with simply
 adverting to the responsibility        
attaching to them1 and noting the extent
 to which that responsibility is        
usually ignored4 ,in connexion with this
 question1 it may be added that  many of
 the attempts made by well-meaning      
people to alleviate poverty  and        
distress have1 unfortunately1 too often 
the effect of ultimately  aggravating   
those evils by diverting attention from 
their real causes4 ,a  not unnatural    
reluctance to discuss or reflect on     
matters of this  delicate character1    
combined with the survival of maxims and
 sentiments  derived from an entirely   
different condition of society1 are1    
doubtless1  to a great extent1 the      
reasons of the backward condition of    
morality on  this subject4    ,the      
importance1 from a social point of view1
 of the careful education of  children  
with reference to their future position 
in life has already  been considered1   

but1 in connexion with the class of     
duties ,i am now  treating1 ,i may draw 
attention to the obligation under which 
parents  lie1 in this respect1 to their 
children themselves4 ,the ancient       
morality1 which was the product of the  
patriarchal form of society1 when  the  
patria potestas was still in vigour1    
laid peculiar stress on the  duties of  
children to parents1 while it almost    
ignored the reciprocal  duties of       
parents to children4 ,when the members  
of a family were seldom  separated1 and 
the pressure of population had not yet  
begun to be felt1  this was the natural 
order of ideas with respect to the      
parental  relation4 ,but now that the   
common labour of the household is       
replaced by  competition amongst        
individuals1 and most young men and     
women have1 at  an early age1 to leave  
their families and set about earning    
their own  living1 or carving out their 
own career1 it is obvious1 on reflexion1
  that parents are guilty of a gross    

breach of duty1 if they do not use      
their utmost endeavours to facilitate   
the introduction of their children  to  
the active work of life1 and to fit them
 for the circumstances in  which they   
are likely to be placed4 ,to bring up a 
son or daughter in  idleness or         
ignorance ought to be as great a        
reproach to a parent as it  is to a     
child to dishonour its father or mother4
 ,and yet1 in the upper  and middle     
classes at all events1 there are many   
parents who1 without  incurring much    
reprobation from their friends1 prefer  
to treat their  children like playthings
 or pet animals rather than to take the 
pains to  train them with a view to     
their future trials and duties4 ,it     
ought to be  thoroughly realised1 and1  
as the moral consciousness becomes      
better  adapted to the existing         
circumstances of society1 it is to be   
trusted  that it will be realised1 that 
parents have no moral right to do what  
they choose with their children1 but    

that they are under a strict  obligation
 both to society and to their children  
themselves so to mould  their           
dispositions and develope their         
faculties and inform their minds  and   
train their bodies as to render them    
good and useful citizens1 and  honest   
and skilful men4 ,it is to be hoped     
that1 some day1 people will  regard with
 as much surprise the notion that       
parents have a right to  neglect the    
education of their children as we now   
regard with wonder1  when we first hear 
of it2 the maxim of archaic law1 that a 
parent had a  right to put his child to 
death4    ,much of the trouble1         
vexation1 and misery of which men are   
the cause to  themselves is due to      
cowardice1 or the false shame which     
results from  attaching undue importance
 to custom1 fashion1 or the opinion of  
others1  even when that opinion is not  
confirmed by their own reflexion4 ,shame
 is  an invaluable protection to men1 as
 a restraining feeling4 ,but the        

objects to which it properly attaches   
are wrong-doing1 unkindness1            
discourtesy1 to others1 and1 as regards 
ourselves1 ignorance1  imprudence1      
intemperance1 impurity1 and avoidable   
defects or  misfortunes4 ,while it      
confines itself to objects such as      
these1 it is  one of the sternest and1  
at the same time1 most effective        
guardians of  virtue and self-respect4  
,but1 as soon as a man begins to care   
about what  others will say of          
circumstances not under his own control1
 such as his  race1 his origin1 his     
appearance1 his physical defects1 or his
 lack of  wealth or natural talents1 he 
may be laying up for himself a store of 
incalculable misery1 and is certainly   
enfeebling his character and  impairing 
his chances of future usefulness4 ,it is
 under the influence of  this motive1   
for instance1 that many a man lives     
above his income1 not  for the purpose  
of gratifying any real wants either of  
himself or his  family1 but for the sake

 of 'keeping up appearances1' though he 
is  exposing his creditors to           
considerable losses1 his family to many 
probable disadvantages1 and himself to  
almost certain disgrace in the  future4 
,it is under the influence of this      
motive1 too1 that many men1 in  the     
upper and middle classes1 rather than   
marry on a modest income1 and  drop out 
of the society of their fashionable     
acquaintance1 form  irregular sexual    
connexions1 which are a source of injury
 to themselves  and ruin to their       
victims4    ,a circumstance which has   
probably contributed largely1 in recent 
times1  to aggravate the feeling of     
false shame is the new departure which1 
in  commercial communities1 has been    
taken by class-distinctions4 ,the old   
line1 which formed a sharp separation   
between the nobility and all other      
classes1 has been almost effaced1 and in
 its place have been substituted  many  
shades of difference between different  
grades of society1 together  with a     

broad line of demarcation between what  
may be called the genteel  and the      
ungenteel classes4 ,it was a certain    
advantage of the old line  that it could
 not be passed1 and1 hence1 though there
 might be some  jealousy felt towards   
the nobility as a class1 there were none
 of the  heart-burnings which attach to 
an uncertain position or a futile effort
  to rise4 ,in modern society1 on the   
other hand1 there is hardly any one     
whose position is so fixed1 that he may 
not easily rise above or fall  below it1
 and hence there is constant room for   
social ambition1 social  disappointment1
 and social jealousy4 ,again1 the broad 
line of gentility1  which now           
corresponds most closely with the old   
distinction of nobility1  is determined 
by such a number of                     
considerations1--birth1 connexions1     
means1 manners1 education1 with the     
arbitrary1 though almost essential1     
condition of not being engaged in retail
 trade1--that those who are just        

excluded by it are apt to feel their    
position somewhat unintelligible1  and1 
therefore1 all the more galling to their
 pride and self-respect ,it  would be   
curious to ascertain what proportion of 
the minor  inconveniences and vexations 
of modern life is due to the perplexity1
 on  the one side1 and the soreness1 on 
the other1 created by the  exclusiveness
 of class-distinctions4 ,that these     
distinctions are an  evil1 in           
themselves1 there can1 ,i think1 be no  
doubt4 ,men cannot1 of  course1 all know
 one another1 much less be on terms of  
intimacy with one  another1 and the     
degree of their acquaintance or intimacy
 will always be  largely dependent on   
community of tastes1 interests1         
occupations1 and  early associations4   
,but these facts afford no reason why   
one set of men  should look down with   
superciliousness and disdain on another 
set of men  who have not enjoyed the    
same early advantages or are not at     
present  endowed with the same gifts or 

accomplishments as themselves1 or why   
they should hold aloof from them when   
there is any opportunity of  common     
action or social intercourse4 ,the pride
 of class is eminently  unreasonable1   
and1 in those who profess to believe in 
,christianity1  pre-eminently           
inconsistent4 ,it will always1 probably1
 continue to exist1  but we may hope    
that it will be progressively modified  
by the advance of  education1 by the    
spread of social sympathy1 and by a     
growing habit of  reflexion4 ,the ideal 
social condition would be one in which1 
though men  continued to form themselves
 into groups1 no one thought the worse  
or  the more lightly of another1 because
 he belonged to a different group  from 
himself4    ,connected with exaggerated 
class-feeling are abuses of-esprit de   
corps4 ,unlike class-feeling1 esprit de 
corps is1 in itself1 a good4  ,it binds 
men together1 as in a vessel or a       
regiment1 a school or a  college1 an    
institution or a municipality1 and leads

 them to sacrifice  their ease or their 
selfish aims1 and to act loyally and    
cordially with  one another in view of  
the common interest4 ,it is only when it
  sacrifices to the interests of its own
 body wider interests still1 and        
subordinates patriotism or morality to  
the narrower sentiment attaching  to a  
special law of honour1 that it incurs   
the reprobation of the  moralist4 ,but  
that it does sometimes deservedly incur 
this reprobation1  admits of no         
question4 ,a man1 to save the honour of 
his regiment1 may  impair the efficiency
 of an army1 or1 to promote the         
interests of his  college or school1 may
 inflict a lasting injury on education1 
or1 to  protect his associates1 may     
withhold or pervert evidence1 or1 to    
aggrandize his trade1 may ruin his      
country4 ,it is the special province  of
 the moralist1 in these cases1 to       
intervene1 and point out how the  more  
general is being sacrificed to the more 
special interest1 the wider  to the     

narrower sentiment1 morality itself to a
 point of honour or  etiquette4 ,but1 at
 the same time1 he must recollect that  
the esprit de  corps of any small       
aggregate of men is1 as such1 always an 
ennobling  and inspiriting sentiment1   
and that1 unless it plainly detach them 
from  the rest of the community1 and is 
attended with pernicious consequences   
to society at large1 it is unwise1 if   
not reckless1 to seek to impair  it4    
,to descend to a subject of less1 though
 still of considerable1  importance1 ,i 
may notice that cowardice and fear of   
'what people will  say' lies at the     
bottom of much ill-considered charity   
and of that  facility with which men1   
often to the injury of themselves or    
their  families1 if not of the very     
objects pleaded for1 listen to the      
solicitations of the inconsiderate or   
interested subscription-monger4 ,it  has
 now become a truism that enormous      
mischief is done by the  indiscriminate 
distribution of alms to beggars or      

paupers4 ,it is no less  true1 though   
not so obvious1 that much unintentional 
harm is often done  by subscriptions for
 what are called public objects4 ,people
 ought to  have sufficient mental       
independence to ask themselves what will
 be the  ultimate effects of subscribing
 their money1 and1 if they honestly     
believe that those effects will be      
pernicious or of doubtful utility1  they
 ought to have the courage to refuse it4
 ,there is no good reason1  simply      
because a man asks me and ,i find that  
others are yielding to him1  why ,i     
should subscribe a guinea towards       
disfiguring a church1 or  erecting an   
ugly and useless building1 or extending 
pauperism1 or  encouraging the growth of
 luxurious habits1 or spreading opinions
 which  ,i do not believe4 ,and ,i may  
be the more emboldened in my refusal1   
when ,i  consider how mixed1 or how     
selfish1 are often the motives of those 
who  solicit me1 and that the love of   
notoriety1 or the gratification of a    

feeling of self-importance1 or a fussy  
restlessness1 or the craving for        
preferment is frequently quite as       
powerful an incentive of their  activity
 as a desire to promote the objects     
explicitly avowed4 ,there is1  moreover1
 an important consideration1 connected  
with this subject1 which  often escapes 
notice1 namely1 the extent to which new 
and multiplied  appeals to charity often
 interfere with older1 nearer1 and more 
pressing  claims4 ,thus1 the managers of
 the local hospital or dispensary or    
charity organisation have often too good
 cause to regret the  enthusiastic      
philanthropy1 which is sending help1 of 
questionable  utility1 to distant parts 
of the world4 ,people cannot subscribe  
to  everything1 and they are too apt to 
fall in with the most recent and  most  
fashionable movement4 ,in venturing on  
these remarks1 ,i trust it is  needless 
to say that ,i am far from deprecating  
the general practice of  subscribing to 
charities and public objects1 a form of 

co-operation  which has been rendered   
indispensable by the habits and         
circumstances of  modern life4 ,i am    
simply insisting on the importance and  
responsibility  of ascertaining whether 
the aims proposed are likely to be      
productive of  good or evil1 and        
deprecating the cowardice or            
listlessness which yields  to a         
solicitation1 irrespectively of the     
merits of the proposal4    ,these       
solicitations often take the offensive  
form1 which is  intentionally           
embarrassing to the person solicited1 of
 an appeal to  relieve the purveyor of  
the subscription-list himself from the  
obligation incurred by a 'guarantee4'   
,the issue is thus ingeniously and      
unfairly transferred from the claims of 
the object1 which it is designed  to    
promote1 to the question of relieving a 
friend or a neighbour from a  heavy     
pecuniary obligation4 ',surely you will 
never allow me to pay all  this money   
myself4' ,but why not1 unless ,i approve

 of the object1 and1  even if ,i do1 why
 should ,i increase my subscription1 on 
account of an  obligation voluntarily   
incurred by you1 without any            
encouragement from  me8 ,in a case of   
this kind1 the 'guarantee' ought to be  
regarded as  simply irrelevant1 and the 
question decided solely on the merits of
 the  result to be attained4 ,of course1
 ,i must be understood to be speaking   
here only of those cases in which the   
'guarantee' is used as an  additional   
argument for eliciting subscriptions1   
not of those cases in  which1 for       
convenience sake1 or in order to secure 
celerity of  execution1 a few wealthy   
persons generously advance the whole sum
  required for a project1 being quite   
willing to pay it themselves1 unless    
they meet with ready and cheerful       
co-operation4    ,in the department of  
social intercourse1 there are several   
applications  of existing moral         
principles1 and specially of the softer 
virtues of  kindness1 courtesy1 and     

consideration for others1 the observance
 of  which would sensibly sweeten our   
relations to our fellow-men and1 to     
persons of a sensitive temperament1     
render life far more agreeable and      
better worth living than it actually is4
 ,a few of these applications ,i  shall 
attempt to point out4 ,amongst savage   
races1 and in the less  polished ranks  
of civilized life1 men who disagree1 or 
have any grudge  against one another1   
resort to physical blows or coarse      
invective4 ,in  polite and educated     
circles1 these weapons are replaced by  
sarcasm and  innuendo4 ,there are1 of   
course1 many advantages gained by the   
substitution of this more refined mode  
of warfare1 but the mere fact  that the 
intellectual skill which it displays    
gives pleasure to the  bystanders1 and  
wins social applause1 renders its       
employment far more  frequent than1 on  
cool reflexion1 could be justified by   
the occasions  for it4 ,there can be no 
doubt that it gives pain1 often intense 

pain1  especially where the victim is   
not ready enough to retaliate           
effectively  in kind4 ,and there can be 
no more justification for inflicting    
this  peculiar kind of pain than any    
other1 unless the circumstances are such
  as to demand it4 ,any one1 who will   
take the trouble to analyse his acts    
and motives1 will generally find1 when  
he employs these weapons1 that he  is   
actuated not so much by any desire to   
reform the object of his attack  or to  
deter1 by these means1 him or others    
from wrong-doing1 as by a  desire to    
show off his own cleverness and to leave
 behind him a mark of  his power in the 
smart which he inflicts4 ,these         
unamiable motives are  least            
justifiable1 when the victim is a social
 inferior1 or a person  who1 by his age 
or position1 is unable to retaliate on  
equal terms4 ,to  vanity and cruelty are
 then added cowardice1 and1 though all  
these vices  may only be displayed on a 
very small scale1 they are none the less

  really present4 ,it may be laid down1 
however difficult1 with our present     
social habits1 it may be to keep the    
rule1 that sarcasm should never be      
employed1 except deliberately1 and as a 
punishment1 and that for  innuendo1 if  
justifiable by facts1 men should always 
have the courage to  substitute direct  
assertion4    ,of the minor social      
vices1 one of the commonest is a        
disregard1 in  conversation1 of other   
persons' feelings4 ,men who lay claim to
 the  character of gentlemen are        
specially bound to shew their tact and  
delicacy of feeling by avoiding all     
subjects which have a disagreeable      
personal reference or are likely to     
revive unpleasant associations in  the  
minds of any of those who are present4  
,and yet these are qualities  which are 
often strangely conspicuous by their    
absence even in educated  and cultivated
 society4 ,one of the most repulsive and
 least excusable  forms which this      
indifference to other persons' feelings 

takes is in  impertinent curiosity4     
,there are some people who1 for the sake
 of  satisfying a purposeless curiosity1
 will ask questions which they know  it 
cannot be agreeable to answer4 ,in all  
cases1 curiosity of this kind  is       
evidence of want of real refinement1 and
 is a breach of the finer  rules of     
social morality2 but1 when the questions
 asked are intended to  extract1        
directly or indirectly1 unwilling       
information on a man's  private life or 
circumstances1 they assume the character
 of sheer  vulgarity4 ,a man's private  
affairs1 providing his conduct of them  
does  not injuriously affect society1   
are no one's business but his own1 and  
much pain and vexation of the smaller   
kind would be saved1 if this very  plain
 fact were duly recognised in social    
intercourse4    ,it may be noticed in   
passing1 that there still lingers on in 
society a  minor form of persecution1 a 
sort of inquisition on a small scale1   
which  consists in attempting to extract

 from a man a frank statement of his    
religious1 social1 or political         
opinions1 though it is known or         
suspected all the time1 that1 if he     
responds to the invitation1 it will  be 
to his social or material disadvantage4 
,in cases of this kind1 it  becomes a   
casuistical question how far a man is   
called on to disclose  his real         
sentiments at the bidding of any        
impertinent questioner4 ,that  the free 
expression of opinion should be attended
 with this danger is1  of course1 a     
proof how far removed we still are from 
perfect  intellectual toleration4       
,impertinent curiosity is offensive1 not
 only because it shews an  indifference 
to the feelings of the person           
questioned1 but because it  savours of  
gratuitous interference in his affairs4 
,this quality it  shares with another of
 the minor social vices1 the tendering  
of unasked  for advice1 or1 in brief1   
impertinent advice4 ,there are certain  
circumstances and relations in which men

 have the right1 even if they  are not  
under the obligation1 to give           
unsolicited advice1 as where a man  is  
incurring an unknown danger or foregoing
 some unsuspected advantage1  or to     
their servants1 or children1 or wards1  
or pupils2 but1 in all  these cases1    
either the special circumstance or the  
special relation  implies superiority of
 knowledge or superiority of position on
 the part  of the person tendering the  
advice1 and to assume this superiority1 
where it does not plainly exist1 is an  
act of impertinence4 ,just as the       
assumption of superiority wounds a man's
 self-respect1 so does the  disposition 
to meddle in his affairs1 which is      
generally founded on that  assumption1  
affect his sense of independence1 and1  
hence1 an act which  includes both      
grounds of offence seems to be a        
peculiarly legitimate  object of        
resentment4 ,the lesson of letting other
 people alone is one  which men are slow
 to learn1 though there are few who1 in 

their own  case1 do not resent any      
attack on their liberty of judgment or  
action4  ,this is emphatically one of   
the cases in which we should try to put 
ourselves in the place of others1 and   
act to them as we would that they       
should act towards us4    ,excessive1   
and often ill-natured1 criticism of     
others is one of the  minor vices which 
seem to grow up with advancing          
civilisation and  intelligence rather   
than to retreat before them4 ,it seems1 
as a rule1 to  prevail much more in     
educated than in uneducated society4    
,the reason is  not difficult to find4  
,education naturally makes men more     
fastidious and  more keenly alive to the
 defects of those with whom they        
associate4 ,and  then1 when educated men
 converse together1 they are apt1 merely
 from the  facility with which they deal
 with language1 to express in an        
exaggerated form the unfavourable       
estimate which they have formed of      
others1 especially if this exaggerated  

form can be compressed into an  epigram4
 ,but it requires little reflexion to   
see that this keen and  exaggerated     
habit of criticism must be productive of
 much discomfort in  a society in which 
it is general1 and that1 when applied to
 literary  work1 even though it may be a
 protection against inaccuracy and      
breaches  of taste1 it must be a great  
discouragement to the young and         
repressive  of much honest and valuable 
effort4 ,to restrain the critical       
spirit1  whether applied to mind or     
conduct1 with proper limits1 it is      
necessary1  keeping these considerations
 in view1 to ask how much we can        
reasonably  or profitably require of    
men1 and1 above all1 never to lose that 
sympathetic touch with others which     
renders us as keenly alive to their     
difficulties as their errors1 to their  
aspirations as their failure to  fulfil 
them4    ,i shall say nothing here of   
detraction1 backbiting1 or malicious    
representation1 because these are social

 vices which are too obvious and  too   
generally acknowledged to be of any     
service as illustrations of  those      
extensions or new applications of       
morality which ,i have in view in  the  
present chapter4 ,i may1 however1 notice
 in passing1 that the  invention or     
exaggeration of stories1 which have a   
tendency to bring men  into ridicule or 
contempt1 is a practice which1 from the 
entertainment  it affords1 is too easily
 tolerated by society1 and usually fails
 to  meet with the reprobation it       
deserves4      ,i shall advert to only  
one other topic1 namely1 the treatment  
of the  lower animals4 ,with rare       
exceptions1 it is only of late that this
  subject has been regarded as falling  
within the sphere of ethics1 and it  is 
greatly to the credit of ,bentham that  
he was amongst the first to  recognise  
its importance and to commend it to the 
consideration of the  legislator4 ,that 
the lower animals1 as sentient beings1  
have a claim on  our sympathies1 and    

that1 consequently1 we have duties in   
respect of  them1 ,i can no more doubt  
than that we have duties in respect to  
the  inferior members of our own race4  
,but1 at the same time1 considering     
their place in the economy of nature1 ,i
 cannot doubt that man has a  right1    
within certain limits1 to use them1 and 
even to kill them1 for  his own         
advantage4 ,what these limits are is a  
question by no means  devoid of         
difficulty4 ,there are those who        
maintain that we have no right  to kill 
animals for food1 while there are those 
who1 without maintaining  this extreme  
position1 hold that we have no right to 
cause them pain for  the purposes of our
 own amusement1 or even for the         
alleviation of human  suffering by means
 of the advancement of physiological and
 medical  science4 ,it will be seen that
 the three questions here raised are the
  legitimacy of the use of animal food1 
of field sports1 and of  vivisection4   
,as respects the first1 ,i do not doubt 

that1 considering  their relative places
 in the scale of being1 man is morally  
justified in  sacrificing the lives of  
the lower animals to the maintenance of 
his own  health and vigour1 let alone   
the probability that1 if he did not1    
they  would multiply to such an extent  
as to endanger his existence1 and would 
themselves1 in the aggregate1 experience
 more suffering from the  privation     
caused by the struggle for life than    
they now do by incurring  violent       
deaths4 ,at the same time1 though man   
may kill the lower animals  for his own 
convenience1 he is bound not to inflict 
needless suffering  on them4 ,the       
torture of an animal1 for no adequate   
purpose1 is  absolutely indefensible4   
,cock-fights1 bull-fights1 and the like 
seem to  me to admit of no more         
justification than the gladiatorial     
shows4 ,are  field-sports1 then1 in the 
same category8 ,the answer1 ,i think1   
depends  on three considerations3 7#a7  
would the animal be killed any way1     

either  for food1 or as a beast of prey2
 7#b7 what is the amount of suffering   
inflicted on it1 in addition to that    
which would be inflicted by killing  it 
instantaneously2 7#c7 for what purpose  
is this additional suffering  inflicted4
 ,i shall not attempt to apply these    
considerations in detail1  but ,i shall 
simply state as my opinion that1 amongst
 the results of a  legitimate           
application of them1 would be the       
conclusions that worrying a  dog or a   
cat is altogether unjustifiable2 that   
fox-hunting might be  justified on the  
ground that the additional suffering    
caused to the fox  is far more than     
counterbalanced by the beneficial       
effects1 in health  and enjoyment1 to   
the hunter2 that shooting1 if the       
sportsman be  skilful1 is one of the    
most painless ways of putting a bird or 
a stag to  death1 and1 therefore1       
requires no justification1 whereas1 if  
the  sportsman be unskilful1 the        
sufferings which he is liable to cause1 

through a lingering and painful death1  
ought to deter him from  practising his 
art4 ,with regard to the much-debated   
question of  vivisection1 it seems to me
 utterly untenable1 and eminently       
inconsistent on the part of those who   
eat animal food or indulge in           
field-sports1 to maintain that1 under no
 circumstances1 is it morally           
justifiable to inflict pain on the lower
 animals for the purpose of             
ascertaining the causes or remedies of  
disease4 ,but1 having once made  this   
admission1 ,i should insist on the      
necessity of guarding it by  confining  
the power of operating on the living    
animal to persons duly  authorised1 and 
by limiting it to cases of research as  
distinct from  demonstration4 ,those1   
moreover1 who are invested with this    
serious  responsibility1 ought to feel  
morally bound to inflict no superfluous 
suffering1 and ought1 consequently1 to  
employ anaesthetics1 wherever  they     
would not unduly interfere with the     

conduct of the experiment2 to  resort1  
as far as possible1 to the lower rather 
than the higher  organisms1 as being    
less susceptible of pain2 and to limit  
their  experiments1 both in number and  
duration1 as far as is consistent with  
the objects for which they are permitted
 to perform them4 ,this whole  question1
 however1 of our relation to the lower  
animals is one which is  fraught with   
much difficulty1 and supplies a good    
instance of the range  of subjects      
within which the moral sentiment is     
probably in the course  of development4 
,recent researches1 and1 still more1    
recent speculations1  have tended to    
impress us with the nearness of our     
kinship to other  animals1 and1 hence1  
our sympathies with them and our        
interest in their  welfare have been    
sensibly quickened4 ,the word           
philanthropy no longer  expresses the   
most general of the sympathetic         
feelings1 and we seem to  require some  
new term which shall denote our         

fellow-feeling with the  whole sentient 
creation4    ,such is a sample1 and ,i  
must repeat that it is intended only as 
a  sample1 of the class of questions to 
which1 as it seems to me1 the moral     
test still admits of further            
application4 ,morality1 or the science  
and  art of conduct1 had its small      
beginnings1 ,i conceive1 in the primeval
  household and has only attained its   
present grand proportions by gradual    
increments1 derived partly from the     
semi-conscious operations of the  human 
intelligence adapting itself to the     
circumstances in which it is  placed1   
partly from the conscious meditations of
 reflective men4 ,that it  is likely to 
advance in the future1 as it has done in
 the past1  notwithstanding the many    
hindrances to its progress which        
confessedly  exist1 is1 ,i think1 an    
obvious inference from experience4 ,we  
may not  unreasonably hope that there   
will be a stricter sense of justice1 a  
more  complete realisation of duty1 more

 delicacy of feeling1 a greater         
refinement of manners1 more kindliness1 
quicker and wider sympathies in  the    
coming generations than there are       
amongst ourselves4 ,i have  attempted1  
in this ,essay1 briefly to delineate the
 nature of the  feelings on which this  
progress depends1 and of the            
considerations by  which it is guided1  
as well as to indicate some few out of  
the many  directions which it is likely 
to take in the future4 ,in the former   
part  of my task1 ,i am aware that ,i   
have run counter to many prejudices of  
long standing1 and that the theories    
which ,i consider to be alone           
consistent with the fact of the progress
 of morality1 may by some be  thought to
 impair its authority4 ,but if morality 
has its foundations in  the constitution
 of human nature1 which itself proceeds 
from the ,divine  ,source of all things1
 ,i conceive that its credentials are   
sufficiently  assured4 ,in the present  
chapter1 ,i have1 in attempting to      

illustrate the  possibility of future   
improvements in the art and theory of   
conduct1  been necessarily led to note  
some deficiencies in the existing moral 
sentiment4 ,this is always an unwelcome 
and invidious task4 ,men do not  like to
 be reminded of their moral failings1   
and there is hardly any  man1 however   
critical he may be of others1 who1 in   
the actual conduct of  life1 does not   
appear to delude himself with the idea  
that his own moral  practice is perfect4
 ,i appeal1 however1 from the           
unconscious assumptions  of men to their
 powers of reflexion1 and ,i ask each   
man who reads this  book to consider    
carefully within himself whether1 on the
 principles  here set out1 much of the  
conduct and many of the ethical maxims  
which  are now generally accepted do not
 admit of refinement and improvement4   
,in the sphere of morals1 as in all     
other departments of human activity1  we
 are bound to do for our successors what
 our predecessors were bound  to do1 and

 mostly did1 for us--transmit the       
heritage we have received  with all the 
additions and adaptations which the new 
experiences and  changing conditions of 
life have rendered necessary or         
desirable4