,,review ,,of ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,mr    
,,john ,,stuart ,,mill    ,,entitled1   
',,examination ,,of ,,sir ,,william     
,,hamiltons ,,philosophy'    ,,by       
,,george ,,grote    ,,author ,,of       
',,the ,,history ,,of ,,ancient         
,,greece1'    ',,plato ,,and ,,the      
,,other ,,companions ,,of ,,socrates1'  
,,etc4    #ahfh    ,reprinted from the  
',westminster ,review1' ,january #a1    
#ahff4      ,,john ,,childs ,,and ,,son1
 ,,printers          ,an ,examination of
 ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 
and of the  ,principal ,philosophical   
,questions discussed in his ,writings4  
,by ,,john  ,,stuart ,,mill4 ,london3   
,longmans4 #ahfe4    ,the work bearing  
the above title is an octavo volume1    
consisting of  twenty-eight chapters1   
and five hundred and sixty pages4 ,this 
is no  great amount of print2 but the   
amount of matter contained in it is     
prodigious1 and the quality of that     
matter such as to require a full        
stretch of attention4 ,mr ,mill gives   

his readers no superfluous  sentences1  
scarcely even a superfluous word1 above 
what is necessary to  express his       
meaning briefly and clearly4 ,of such a 
book no complete  abstract can be given 
in the space to which we are confined4  
,to students of philosophy--doubtless   
but a minority among the general  circle
 of ,english readers--this work comes   
recommended by the strongest  claims    
both of interest and instruction4 ,it   
presents in direct  antithesis two most 
conspicuous representatives of the      
modern  speculative mind of             
,england--,sir ,w4 ,hamilton and ,mr    
,john ,stuart ,mill4    ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton has exercised powerful        
influence over the stream of  thought   
during the present generation4 ,the     
lectures on ,logic and  ,metaphysics    
delivered by him at ,edinburgh1 for     
twenty years1 determined  the view taken
 of those subjects by a large number of 
aspiring young  students1 and determined
 that view for many of them permanently 

and  irrevocably4#a ,several eminent    
teachers and writers of the present day 
are proud of considering themselves his 
disciples1 enunciate his  doctrines in  
greater or less proportion1 and seldom  
contradict him  without letting it be   
seen that they depart unwillingly from  
such a  leader4 ,various new phrases and
 psychological illustrations have       
obtained footing in treatises of        
philosophy1 chiefly from his authority4 
,we do not number ourselves among his   
followers2 but we think his  influence  
on philosophy was in many ways          
beneficial4 ,he kept up the idea  of    
philosophy as a subject to be studied   
from its own points of view3 a  dignity 
which in earlier times it enjoyed1      
perhaps1 to mischievous  excess1 but    
from which in recent times it has far   
too much  receded--especially in        
,england4 ,he performed the great       
service of  labouring strenuously to    
piece together the past traditions of   
philosophy1 to re-discover those which  

had been allowed to drop into  oblivion1
 and to make out the genealogy of       
opinions as far as negligent            
predecessors had still left the         
possibility of doing so4    ,the        
forty-six lectures on ,metaphysics1 and 
the thirty-five lectures on  ,logic1    
published by ,messrs ,mansel and        
,veitch1 constitute the biennial  course
 actually delivered by ,sir ,w4         
,hamilton in the ,professorial ,chair4  
,they ought therefore to be looked at   
chiefly with reference to the minds  of 
youthful hearers1 as preservatives      
against that mischief forcibly          
described by ,rousseau--',l'inhabitude  
de penser dans la jeunesse en te  la    
capacit pendant le reste de la vie4'    
,now1 in a subject so abstract1 obscure1
 and generally unpalatable1 as  ,logic  
and ,metaphysics1 the difficulty which  
the teacher finds in  inspiring interest
 is extreme4 ,that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton   
overcame such  difficulty with          
remarkable success1 is the affirmation  

of his two  editors2 and our impression1
 as readers of his lectures1 disposes us
 to  credit them4 ,that ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton should have done this         
effectively is  in itself sufficient to 
stamp him as a meritorious professor--as
 a  worthy successor to the chair of    
,dugald ,stewart1 whose unrivalled      
perfection in that department is        
attested by every one4 ,many a man who  
ultimately adopted speculative opinions 
opposed to ,dugald ,stewart1  received  
his first impulse and guidance in the   
path of speculation from  the lasting   
impression made by ,stewart's lectures4 
,but though we look at these lectures1  
as they ought to be looked at1  chiefly 
with a view to the special purpose for  
which they were destined1  we are far   
from insinuating that they have no other
 merits1 or that they  are useless for  
readers who have already a metaphysical 
creed of their  own4 ,we have found them
 both instructive and interesting3 they 
go over a  large proportion of the field

 of speculative philosophy1 partly from 
the  point of view 7not always the same7
 belonging to the author1 partly from   
that of numerous predecessors whom he   
cites4 ,we recognize also in ,sir ,w4   
,hamilton an amount of intellectual     
independence which seldom accompanies   
such vast erudition4 ,he recites many   
different opinions1 but he judges  them 
all for himself2 and1 what is of still  
greater moment1 he  constantly gives the
 reasons for his judgments4 ,to us these
 reasons are  always of more or less    
value1 whether we admit them to be valid
 or not4  ,many philosophers present    
their own doctrine as if it were so much
  ascertained and acknowledged truth1   
either intimating1 or leading you to    
suppose1 that though erroneous beliefs  
to the contrary formerly  prevailed1    
these have now become discredited with  
every one4 ,we do not  censure this way 
of proceeding1 but we prefer the manner 
of ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton4 ,he always keeps
 before us divergence and discrepancy of

 view  as the normal condition of       
reasoned truth or philosophy2 the       
characteristic postulate of which is1   
that every affirmative and every        
negative shall have its appropriate     
reasons clearly and fully  enunciated4  
,in this point of view the appendix     
annexed to the lectures is also         
valuable2 and the four copious          
appendixes or dissertations following   
the edition of ,reid's works1 are more  
valuable still4 ,how far ,sir ,w4       
,hamilton has there furnished good proof
 of his own doctrines on ,external      
,perception1 and on the ,primary        
,qualities of ,matter1 we shall not now 
determine2 but to those who dissent from
 him1 as well as to those who  agree    
with him1 his reasonings on these       
subjects are highly instructive3  while 
the full citations from so many other   
writers contribute  materially not only 
to elucidate the points directly        
approached1 but  also to enlarge our    
knowledge of philosophy generally4 ,we  

set particular  value upon this         
preservation of the traditions of       
philosophy1 and upon  this maintenance  
of a known perpetual succession among   
the speculative  minds of humanity1 with
 proper comparisons and contrasts4 ,we  
have found  among the names quoted by   
,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 and1 thanks to his  
care1  several authors hardly at all    
known to us1 and opinions cited from    
them  not less instructive than curious4
 ,he deserves the more gratitude1       
because he departs herein from received 
usage since ,bacon and ,descartes4  ,the
 example set by these great men was     
admirable1 so far as it went to  throw  
off the authority of predecessors2 but  
pernicious so far as it  banished those 
predecessors out of knowledge1 like mere
 magazines of  immaturity and error4    
,throughout the eighteenth century1 all 
study of  the earlier modes of          
philosophizing was1 for the most part1  
neglected4  ,of such neglect1 remarkable
 instances are pointed out by ,sir ,w4  

,hamilton4    ,while speaking about the 
general merits and philosophical        
position of  ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 we
 have hitherto said nothing about those 
of ,mr  ,mill4 ,but before we proceed to
 analyze the separate chapters of his   
volume1 we must devote a few words to   
the fulfilment of another  obligation4  
,mr ,john ,stuart ,mill has not been the
 first to bestow honour on the  surname 
which he bears4 ,his father1 ,mr ,james 
,mill1 had already ennobled  the name4  
,an ampler title to distinction in      
history and philosophy can  seldom be   
produced than that which ,mr ,james     
,mill left behind him4 ,we  know no work
 which surpasses his ',history of       
,british ,india' in the main            
excellencies attainable by historical   
writers3 industrious accumulation1      
continued for many years1 of original   
authorities--careful and  conscientious 
criticism of their statements--and a    
large command of  psychological         
analysis1 enabling the author to        

interpret phenomena of  society1 both   
extremely complicated1 and far removed  
from his own  personal experience4      
,again1 ,mr ,james ,mill's ',elements of
 ,political  ,economy' were1 at the time
 when they appeared1 the most logical   
and  condensed exposition of the entire 
science then existing4 ,lastly1 his     
latest avowed production1 the ',analysis
 of the ,phenomena of the ,human        
,mind1' is a model of perspicuous       
exposition of complex states of         
consciousness1 carried farther than by  
any other author before him2 and        
illustrating the fulness which such     
exposition may be made to attain1 by    
one who has faith in the comprehensive  
principle of association1 and has       
learnt the secret of tracing out its    
innumerable windings4 ,it is1  moreover1
 the first work in which the great fact 
of ,indissoluble  ,association is       
brought into its due theoretical        
prominence4 ,these are  high merits1 of 
which lasting evidence is before the    

public2 but there  were other merits in 
,mr ,james ,mill1 less publicly         
authenticated1 yet not  less real4 ,his 
unpremeditated oral exposition was      
hardly less effective  than his prepared
 work with the pen2 his colloquial      
fertility on  philosophical subjects1   
his power of discussing himself1 and of 
stimulating others to discuss1 his ready
 responsive inspirations through  all   
the shifts and windings of a sort of    
,platonic dialogue--all these           
accomplishments were1 to those who knew 
him1 even more impressive than  what he 
composed for the press4 ,conversation   
with him was not merely  instructive1   
but provocative to the dormant          
intelligence4 ,of all persons  whom we  
have known1 ,mr ,james ,mill was one who
 stood least remote from  the lofty     
,platonic ideal of ,dialectic--,greek3  
,tou didhonai kahi  dhechesthai         
lhogon--7the giving and receiving of    
reasons7 competent  alike to examine    
others1 or to be examined by them1 on   

philosophy4 ,when  to this we add a     
strenuous character1 earnest            
convictions1 and  single-minded devotion
 to truth1 with an utter disdain of mere
  paradox--it may be conceived that such
 a man exercised powerful  intellectual 
ascendancy over younger minds4 ,several 
of those who enjoyed  his society--men  
now at1 or past1 the maturity of life1  
and some of them  in distinguished      
positions--remember and attest with     
gratitude such  ascendancy in their own 
cases3 among them the writer of the     
present  article1 who owes to the       
historian of ,british ,india an amount  
of  intellectual stimulus and guidance  
such as he can never forget4    ,when a 
father1 such as we have described1      
declining to send his son  either to    
school or college1 constituted himself  
schoolmaster from the  beginning1 and   
performed that duty with laborious      
solicitude--when1  besides full infusion
 of modern knowledge1 the forcing       
process applied  by the ,platonic       

,socrates to the youth-,thettus1 was    
administered by ,mr  ,james ,mill1      
continuously and from an earlier age1 to
 a youthful mind not  less pregnant than
 that of ,thettus--it would be          
surprising if the son  thus trained had 
not reached even a higher eminence than 
his father4 ,the  fruit borne by ,mr    
,john ,stuart ,mill has been worthy of  
the culture  bestowed1 and the volume   
before us is at once his latest and his 
ripest  product4    ,the ',examination  
of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's            
,philosophy' is intended by ,mr  ,mill  
7so he tells us in the preface to the   
sixth published edition of  his ',system
 of ,logic1 ,ratiocinative and          
,inductive'7 as a sequel and  complement
 to that system4 ,we are happy to       
welcome so valuable an  addition2 but   
with or without that addition1 the      
',system of ,logic'  appears to us to   
present the most important advance in   
speculative  theory which the present   
century has witnessed4 ,either half of  

it1 the  ,ratiocinative or the          
,inductive1 would have surpassed any    
previous work  on the same subject4 ,the
 ,inductive half discriminates and      
brings into  clear view1 for the first  
time1 those virtues of method which have
  insensibly grown into habits among    
consummate scientific inquirers of  the 
post-,baconian age1 as well as the      
fallacies by which some of these        
authors have been misled4 ,the          
,ratiocinative half1 dealing with       
matters  which had already been well    
handled by ,dutrieu and other scholastic
  logicians1 invests their dead though  
precise formalism with a real life  and 
application to the actual process of    
finding and proving truth4 ,but  besides
 thus working each half up to           
perfection1 ,mr ,mill has performed  the
 still more difficult task of overcoming
 the repugnance1 apparently  an         
inveterate repugnance1 between them1 so 
as chemically to combine the  two into  
one homogeneous compound2 thus          

presenting the problem of  ,reasoned    
,truth1 ,inference1 ,proof1 and         
,disproof1 as one connected whole4  ,for
 ourselves1 we still recollect the mist 
which was cleared from our  minds when  
we first read the ',system of ,logic1'  
very soon after it was  published4 ,we  
were familiar with the ,syllogistic     
,logic in ,burgersdicius  and ,dutrieu2 
we were also familiar with examples of  
the best procedure  in modern inductive 
science2 but the two streams flowed     
altogether apart  in our minds1 like two
 parallel lines never joining nor       
approaching4 ,the  irreconcilability of 
the two was at once removed1 when we had
 read and  mastered the second and third
 chapters of the ,second ,book of the   
',system  of ,logic2' in which ,mr ,mill
 explains the functions and value of the
  ,syllogism1 and the real import of its
 major premiss4 ,this explanation       
struck us at the time as one of the most
 profound and original efforts  of      
metaphysical thought that we had ever   

perused1 and we see no reason  to       
retract that opinion now4#b ,it appears 
all the more valuable when we  contrast 
it with what is said by ,mr ,mill's two 
contemporaries--,hamilton  and ,whately3
 the first of whom retains the ancient  
theory of reasoning1  as being only a   
methodized transition from a whole to   
its parts1 and  from the parts up to the
 whole--,induction being only this      
ascending part  of the process1 whereby1
 after having given a complete          
enumeration of  all the compound parts1 
you conclude to the sum total described 
in one  word as a whole2#c while the    
second 7,whately7 agrees in             
subordinating  ,induction to ,syllogism1
 but does so in a different way--by     
representing  inductive reasoning as a  
syllogism1 with its major premiss       
suppressed1  from which major premiss it
 derived its authority4 ,the explanation
 of ,mr  ,mill attacks the problem from 
the opposite side4 ,it subordinates     
syllogism to induction1 the technical to

 the real2 it divests the major  premiss
 of its illusory pretence to be itself  
the proving authority1 or  even any real
 and essential part of the proof--and   
acknowledges it  merely as a valuable   
precautionary test and security for     
avoiding  mistake in the process of     
proving4 ,taking ,mr ,mill's ',system of
 ,logic' as  a whole1 it is one of the  
books by which we believe ourselves to  
have  most profited4 ,the principles of 
it are constantly present to our mind   
when engaged in investigations of       
evidence1 whether scientific or         
historical4    ,concerned as we are here
 with ,mr ,mill only as a logician and  
philosopher1 we feel precluded from     
adverting to his works on other         
topics--even to his ',elements of       
,political ,economy1' by which he is    
probably more widely known than by      
anything else4 ,of the many  obligations
 which ,political ,economy owes to him1 
one only can be noticed  consistent with
 the scope of the present article3 the  

care which he has  taken--he alone1 or  
at least1 he more explicitly and        
formally than any  other expositor--to  
set forth the general position of that  
science in  the aggregate field of      
scientific research2 its relation to    
sociology as  a whole1 or to other      
fractions thereof1 how far derivative or
  co-ordinate2 what are its fundamental 
postulates or hypotheses1 with  what    
limits the logical methods of induction 
and deduction are  applicable to it1 and
 how far its conclusions may be relied  
on as  approximations to truth4 ,all    
these points will be found instructively
  handled in the ,sixth ,book of ,mr    
,mill's ',system of ,logic1' as well as 
in  his smaller and less known work1    
',essays on ,some ,unsettled ,questions 
in  ,political ,economy4' ,we find him1 
while methodizing and illustrating the  
data of the special science1 uniformly  
keeping in view its relation to         
philosophy as a whole4    ,but there is 
yet another work in which the interests 

of philosophy1 as a  whole1 come into   
the foreground and become the special   
object of  vindication in their largest 
compass and most vital requirements4 ,we
  mean ,mr ,mill's ',essay on ,liberty1'
 one half of which takes for its  thesis
 the libertus philosophandi4 ,he        
maintains1 emphatically1 in this  book1 
the full dignity of reasoned truth      
against all the jealous  exigencies of  
traditional dogma and self-justifying   
sentiment4 ,he claims  the most         
unreserved liberty of utterance for     
negative and affirmative on  all        
questions--not merely for the purpose of
 discriminating truth from  falsehood1  
but also to keep up in individual minds 
the full sense and  understanding of the
 matters controverted1 in place of a    
mere partial  and one-sided adhesion4   
,at first sight1 indeed1 it might seem  
as if ,mr  ,mill was fighting with a    
shadow2 for liberty of philosophizing is
 a  postulate which1 in general terms1  
every one concedes4 ,but when you come  

to fathom the real feelings which       
underlie this concession1 you discover  
that almost every man makes it under    
reserves which1 though acting in        
silence1 are not the less efficacious4  
,every one has some dogmas which  he    
cannot bear to hear advocated1 and      
others which he will not allow to  be   
controverted in his presence4 ,a writer 
has to consider not merely by  what     
reasons any novelty of belief or        
disbelief may be justified1 but  also   
how much it will be safe for him to     
publish1 having regard to the  irritable
 sore places of the public judgment4 ,in
 ,july1 #ahfd1 we were  present at the  
annual meeting of the ,french ,academy  
at ,paris1 where the  prizes for essays 
sent in1 pursuant to subjects announced 
for study  beforehand1 are awarded4 ,we 
heard the titles of various compositions
  announced by the ,president 7,m4      
,villemain71 with a brief critical      
estimate of each4 ,their comparative    
merits were appreciated1 and the  prize 

awarded to one of the competitors4      
,among the compositions sent to  compete
 for the prize1 one was a work by ,m4   
,taine1 upon which the  ,president      
bestowed the most remarkable encomiums1 
in every different  point of view3      
extent of knowledge1 force of thought1  
style1  arrangement1 all were praised in
 a manner which we have rarely heard    
exceeded4 ,nevertheless1 the prize was  
not awarded to this work1 but to        
another which the ,president praised in 
a manner decidedly less marked  and     
emphatic4 ,what was here the ratio      
decidendi8 ,the reason was1 and  the    
,president declared it in the most      
explicit language1 that the work  of ,m4
 ,taine was deeply tainted with         
materialism4 ',sans doute1' said  the   
esteemed veteran of ,french literature  
in pronouncing his award1  'sans doute  
les opinions sont libres1 mais'--,it is 
precisely against  this mais--ushering  
in the special anathematized or         
consecrated  conclusion which it is     

intended to except from the general     
liberty of  enforcing or impugning--in  
matters of philosophical discussion1    
that ,mr  ,mill1 in the ',essay on      
,liberty1' declares war as champion of  
,reasoned  ,truth4    ,he handles this  
grand theme--eleythheroys eleythhers    
philosophein--involving as it does the  
best interests of philosophy1  as an    
instructress to men's judgments1 and a  
stimulus to their  intelligence--with   
great depth of psychological analysis   
sustained by  abundant historical       
illustration4 ,and he in the same volume
 discusses  most profitably another     
question akin to it--,to what extent1   
and by what  principles1 the            
interference of others is justifiable1  
in restraining  the liberty of taste and
 action for each individual8 ,a question
 at once  grave and neglected1 but the  
discussion of which does not belong to  
our  present article4    ,a new work    
from one who has already manifested such
 mastery of  philosophy1 both in        

principle and in detail1 and a work     
exhibiting the  analysis and            
appreciation of the philosophical views 
of an eminent  contemporary1 must raise 
the highest expectation4 ,we think no   
reader  will be disappointed who peruses
 ,mr ,mill's ',examination1' and we     
shall  now endeavour to give some       
account of the manner in which he       
performs  it4 ,upon topics so abstract  
and subtle as the contents of this      
volume1  the antithesis between two     
rival theories is the best way1 and     
often the  only way1 for bringing truth 
into clear view2 and the ',examination' 
here  before us is professedly          
controversy4 ,but of controversy in its 
objectionable sense--of captious or     
acrimonious personality--not a trace    
will here be found4 ,a dignified1       
judicial equanimity of tone is          
preserved from first to last4 ,moreover1
 though the title and direct  purpose of
 the volume is negative and critical1   
yet the destructive  criticism is       

pervaded by many copious veins of       
constructive exposition1  embodying ,mr 
,mill's own views upon some of the most 
intricate problems  of metaphysics4     
,mr ,mill begins his work by analyzing  
and explaining the doctrine called  the 
,relativity of ,human ,knowledge3       
',the doctrine 7chap4 ii4 p4 #e7 which  
is thought to belong in       the most  
especial manner to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1  
and which was       the ground of his   
opposition to the transcendentalism of  
the       later ,french and ,german     
metaphysicians1 is that which he and    
others have called the ,relativity of   
,human ,knowledge4 ,it is       the     
subject of the most generally known and 
impressive of       all his             
writings--the one which first revealed  
to the       ,english metaphysical      
reader that a new power had arisen in   
philosophy4 ,together with its          
developments1 it composes the           
,philosophy of the ,conditioned1 which  
he opposed to the       ,french and     

,german philosophies of the ,absolute1  
and which is       regarded by most of  
his admirers as the greatest of his     
titles to a permanent place in the      
history of metaphysical       thought4  
,but1 the relativity of human knowledge1
 like most       other phrases into     
which the words relative or relation    
enter1 is vague1 and admits of a great  
variety of meanings1'       c4    ,mr   
,mill then proceeds to distinguish these
 various meanings1 and to  determine in 
which of them the phrase is understood  
by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4    ,one meaning  
is1 that we only know anything by       
knowing it as  distinguished from       
something else--that all consciousness  
is of  difference4 ,it is not1 however1 
in this sense that the expression is    
ordinarily or intentionally used by ,sir
 ,w4 ,hamilton1 though he fully         
recognizes the truth which1 when thus   
used1 it serves to express4 ,in         
general1 when he says that all our      
knowledge is relative1 the relation  he 

has in view is not between the thing    
known and other objects compared  with  
it1 but between the thing known and the 
mind knowing--7p4 #f74    ,the doctrine 
in this last meaning is held by         
different philosophers in  two different
 forms4 ,some 7e4g4 ,berkeley1 ,hume1   
,ferrier1 c471 usually  called          
,idealists1 maintain not merely that all
 we can possibly know of  anything is   
the manner in which it affects the human
 faculties1 but that  there is nothing  
else to be known2 that affections of    
human or of other  minds are all that we
 can know to exist--that the difference 
between the  ego and the non-ego is only
 a formal distinction between two       
aspects of  the same reality4 ,other    
philosophers 7,brown1 ,mr ,herbert      
,spencer1 ,auguste  ,comte1 with many   
others7 believe that the ego and the    
non-ego denote two  realities1 each     
self-existent1 and neither dependent on 
the other2 that  the ,noumenon1 or      
'thing per se1' is in itself a different

 thing from  the ,phenomenon1 and       
equally or more real1 but that1 though  
we know its  existence1 we have no means
 of knowing what it is4 ,all that we can
 know  is1 relatively to ourselves1 the 
modes in which it affects us1 or the    
phenomena which it produces--7pp4       
#i--aa74    ,the doctrine of            
,relativity1 as held by ,kant and his   
many followers1 is  next distinguished  
from the same doctrine as held by       
,hartley1 ,james  ,mill1 ,professor     
,bain1 c41 compatible with either       
acceptance or  rejection of the         
,berkeleian theory4 ,kant maintains that
 the attributes  which we ascribe to    
outward things1 or which are inseparable
 from them  in thought1 contain         
additional elements over and above      
sensations plus  an unknowable          
cause--additional elements added by the 
mind itself1 and  therefore still only  
relative1 but constituting the original 
furniture  of the mind itself--inherent 
laws1 partly of our sensitive1 partly of

  our intellectual faculty4 ,it is on   
this latter point that ,hartley and     
those going along with him diverge4     
,admitting the same additional          
elements1 these philosophers do not     
ascribe to the mind any innate forms  to
 account for them1 but hold that place1 
extension1 substance1 cause1  and the   
rest1 c41 are conceptions put together  
out of ideas of  sensation1 by the known
 laws of ,association--7pp4 #ab--ad74   
,partial ,relativity is the opinion     
professed by most philosophers 7and by  
most persons who do not philosophize74  
,they hold that we know things  partly  
as they are in themselves1 partly as    
they are merely in relation  to us4     
,this discrimination of the various     
schools of philosophers is highly       
instructive1 and is given with the full 
perspicuity belonging to ,mr  ,mill's   
style4 ,he proceeds to examine in what  
sense ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton  maintained the
 ,relativity of ,human ,knowledge4 ,he  
cites passages both  from the           

',discussions on ,philosophy' and from  
the ,lectures1 in which  that doctrine  
is both affirmed in its greatest        
amplitude1 and enunciated  in the most  
emphatic language--7pp4 #ag1 #ah1 #bb1  
#bc74 ,but he also  produces extracts   
from the most elaborate of ,sir ,w4     
,hamilton's  ',dissertations on ,reid1' 
in which a doctrine quite different and 
inconsistent is proclaimed--that our    
knowledge is only partially1 not        
wholly1 relative2 that the secondary    
qualities of matter1 indeed1 are  known 
to us only relatively1 but that the     
primary qualities are known to  us as   
they are in themselves1 or as they exist
 objectively1 and that  they may be even
 evolved by demonstration  priori--7pp4 
#ai-bf1 #cj74  ,the inconsistency       
between the two doctrines1 professed at 
different  times1 and in different      
works1 by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 is        
certainly  manifest4 ,mr ,mill is of    
opinion that one of the two must be     
taken 'in a  non-natural sense1' and    

that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton either did not  
hold1 or had  ceased to hold1 the       
doctrine of the full relativity of      
knowledge 7pp4  #bj-bh7--the hypothesis 
of a flat contradiction being in his    
view  inadmissible4 ,but we think it at 
least equally possible that ,sir ,w4    
,hamilton held both the two opinions in 
their natural sense1 and enforced  both 
of them at different times by argument2 
his attention never  having been called 
to the contradiction between them4 ,that
 such  forgetfulness was quite possible1
 will appear clearly in many parts of   
the present article4 ,his argument in   
support of both is equally              
characterized by that peculiar energy of
 style which is frequent with  him1 and 
which no way resembles the qualifying   
refinements of one  struggling to keep  
clear of a perceived contradiction4     
,from hence ,mr ,mill 7chap4 iv47       
proceeds to criticise at considerable   
length what he justly denominates the   
celebrated and striking review of       

,cousin's philosophy1 which forms the   
first paper in ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's     
',discussions on ,philosophy4'          
,according to ,mr ,mill--         ',the 
question really at issue is this3 ,have 
we or have we       not an immediate    
intuition of ,god8 ,the name of ,god is 
veiled       under two extremely        
abstract phrases1 ,the ,infinite and the
       ,absolute1 perhaps from a        
reverential feeling2 such1 at           
least1 is the reason given by ,sir ,w4  
,hamilton's disciple1 ,mr       ,mansel1
 for preferring the more vague          
expressions2 but it is       one of the 
most unquestionable of all logical      
maxims1 that       the meaning of the   
abstract must be sought for in the      
concrete1 and not conversely2 and we    
shall see1 both in the       case of    
,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and of ,mr     
,mansel1 that the       process cannot  
be reversed with impunity4'--p4 #cb4    
,upon this we must remark1 that though  
the 'logical maxim' here laid  down by  

,mr ,mill may be generally sound1 we    
think the application of it             
inconvenient in the present case4       
,discussions on points of philosophy    
are best conducted without either       
invoking or offending religious         
feeling4 ,m4 ,cousin maintains that we  
have a direct intuition of the          
,infinite and the ,absolute3 ,sir ,w4   
,hamilton denies that we have4 ,upon    
this point ,mr ,mill sides entirely with
 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 and considers      
'that the latter has rendered good      
service to philosophy by refuting ,m4   
,cousin1' though much of the reasoning  
employed in such refutation seems  to   
,mr ,mill unsound4 ,but ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton goes further1 and affirms that
  we have no faculties capable of       
apprehending the ,infinite and the      
,absolute--that both of them are        
inconceivable to us1 and by consequence 
unknowable4 ,herein ,mr ,mill is opposed
 to him1 and controverts his  doctrine  
in an elaborate argument4    ,of this   

argument1 able and ingenious1 like all  
those in the present  volume1 our limits
 only enable us to give a brief         
appreciation4 ,in so  far as ,mr ,mill  
controverts ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 we think
 him perfectly  successful1 though there
 are some points in his reasoning in    
which we do  not fully concur4    ,in   
our opinion1 as in his1 the ,absolute   
alone 7in its sense as opposed  to      
relative7 can be necessarily unknowable1
 inconceivable1 incogitable4  ,nothing  
which falls under the condition of      
relativity can be declared to  be so4   
,the structure of our minds renders us  
capable of knowing  everything which is 
relative1 though there are many such    
things which we  have no evidence1 nor  
shall ever get evidence1 to enable us to
 know4 ,now  the ,infinite falls within 
the conditions of relativity1 as indeed 
,sir ,w4  ,hamilton himself admits1 when
 he intimates 7p4 #eh7 that though it   
cannot  be known1 it is1 must be1 and   
ought to be1 believed by us1 according  

to the marked distinction which he draws
 between belief and knowledge4  ,we     
agree with ,mr ,mill in the opinion that
 it is thinkable1 conceivable1          
knowable4 ,doubtless we do not conceive 
it adequately1 but we conceive it       
sufficiently to discuss and reason upon 
it intelligibly to ourselves and        
others4 ,that we conceive the ,infinite 
inadequately1 is not to be held as      
proof that we do not conceive it at all2
 for in regard to finite things  also1  
we conceive the greater number of them  
only inadequately4    ,we cannot        
construe to the imagination a polygon   
with an infinite number  of sides 7i4e4 
with a number of sides greater than any 
given number71  but neither can we      
construe to the imagination a polygon   
with a million  of sides2 nevertheless1 
we understand what is meant by the first
  description as well as by the second1 
and can reason upon both4 ,there  is1   
indeed1 this difference between the two3
 ,that the terms used in  describing the

 first1 proclaim at once in their direct
 meaning that we  should in vain attempt
 to construe it to the imagination2     
whereas the  terms used in describing   
the second do not intimate that fact4   
,we know  the fact only by trial1 or by 
an estimate of our own mental force     
which  is the result of many past       
trials4 ,if the difference here noted   
were all  which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has  
in view when he declares the ,infinite  
to be  unknowable and incogitable1 we   
should accede to his opinion2 but we    
apprehend that he means much more1 and  
he certainly requires more to  justify  
the marked antithesis in which he places
 himself against ,m4  ,cousin and       
,hegel4 ,indeed1 the facility with which
 he declares matters to  be incogitable1
 which these two and other philosophers 
not only cogitate  but maintain as      
truth1 is to us truly surprising4 ,the  
only question  which appears to us      
important is1 whether we can understand 
and reason  upon the meaning of the     

terms and propositions addressed to us4 
,if we  can1 the subjects propounded    
must be cogitable and conceivable1      
whether  we admit the propositions      
affirmed concerning them or not2 if we  
cannot1  then these subjects are indeed 
incogitable by ourselves in the present 
state of our knowledge1 but they may not
 be so to our opponent who  employs the 
terms4    ,in criticising the arguments 
of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton against ,m4       
,cousin1 ,mr  ,mill insists much on a   
distinction between 7#a7 the ,infinite1 
and 7#b7 the  ,infinite in any one or   
more positive attributes1 such as       
infinite  wisdom1 goodness1 redness1    
hardness1 c4#d ,he thinks that ,sir ,w4 
,hamilton has made out his case against 
the first1 but not against the  last2   
that the first is really 'an unmeaning  
and senseless abstraction1'  a          
fasciculus of negations1 unknowable and 
inconceivable1 but not the  last4 ,we   
think that ,mr ,mill makes more of this 
distinction than the  case warrants2    

that the first is not unmeaning1 but an 
intelligible  abstraction1 only a higher
 reach of abstraction than the last2    
that it  is knowable inadequately1 in   
the same way as the last--though more   
inadequately1 because of its higher     
abstraction4    ,as the finite is       
intelligible1 so also is its            
negation--the ,infinite3 we  do not say 
7with ,m4 ,cousin7 that the two are     
conjointly given in  consciousness--but 
the two are understood and partially    
apprehended by  the mind conjointly and 
in contrast4 ,though the ,infinite is   
doubtless  negative as to a degree1 it  
is not wholly or exclusively negative1  
since  it includes a necessary reference
 to some positive attribute1 to which   
the degree belongs2 the positive element
 is not eliminated1 but merely  left    
undetermined4 ,the ,infinite 7like the  
,finite1 ,greek3 to  peperasmhenon--to  
hapeiron7 is a genus2 it comprehends    
under it the  ,infinitely ,hard and the 
,infinitely ,soft1 the ,infinitely      

,swift and the  ,infinitely ,slow--the  
infinite1 in short1 of any or all       
positive  attributes4 ,it includes1     
doubtless1 'a farrago of                
contradictions2' but  so1 also1 does the
 ,finite--and so1 also1 do the actual   
manifestations of  the real1 concrete   
universe1 which manifestations          
constitute a portion  of the ,finite4   
,whoever attempts to give any           
philosophical account of the  generation
 of the universe1 tracing its phenomena1
 as an aggregate1 to  some              
ultra-phenomenal origin1 must include in
 his scheme a fundamentum  for all those
 opposite and contradictory             
manifestations which experience         
discloses in the universe4 ,there always
 have been1 and still are1 many         
philosophers who consider the ,abstract 
and ,general to be prior both in  nature
 and time to the ,concrete and          
,particular2 and who hold further  that 
these two last are explained1 when      
presented as determinate and  successive

 manifestations of the two first1 which 
they conceive as  indeterminate and     
sempiternal4 ,now the ,infinite 7,ens   
,infinitum or ,entia  ,infinita1        
according to the point of view in which 
we look at it7 is a  generic word1      
including all these supposed            
indeterminate antecedents2  and         
including therefore1 of course1 many    
contradictory agencies4 ,but  this does 
not make it senseless or unmeaning2 nor 
can we distinguish it  from 'the        
,infinite in some one or more given     
attributes1' by any other  character    
than by greater reach of abstraction4   
,we cannot admit the  marked distinction
 which ,mr ,mill contends for--that the 
one is  unknowable and the other        
knowable4    ,it may be proper to add   
that the mode of philosophizing which we
 have  just described is not ours4 ,we  
do not agree in this way either of      
conceiving1 or of solving1 the problem  
of philosophy4 ,but it is a mode  so    
prevalent that ,trendelenberg speaks of 

it1 justly enough1 as 'the  ancient     
,hysteron-,proteron of ,abstraction4'   
,the doctrine of these  philosophers    
appears to us unfounded1 but we cannot  
call it unmeaning4    ,in another point1
 also1 we differ from ,mr ,mill         
respecting that inferior  abstraction   
which he calls 'the ,infinite in some   
particular attribute4'  ,he speaks as if
 this could be known not only as an     
abstraction1 a  conceivable1 an         
ideal--but also as a concrete reality2  
as if 'we could  know a concrete reality
 as infinite or as absolute' 7p4 #de72  
as if there  really existed in actual   
nature 'concrete persons or things      
possessing  infinitely or absolutely    
certain specific attributes'--7pp4      
#ee--ic74 ,to  this doctrine we cannot  
subscribe4 ,as we understand concrete   
reality1 we  find no evidence to believe
 that there exist in nature any real    
concrete  persons or things1 possessing 
to an infinite degree such attributes as
  they do possess3 e4g4 any men         

infinitely wise or infinitely strong1   
any horses infinitely swift1 any stones 
infinitely hard4 ,such concrete  real   
objects appear to us not admissible1    
because experience not only  has not    
certified their existence in any single 
case1 but goes as far to  disprove their
 existence as it can do to disprove     
anything4 ,all the real  objects in     
nature known to us by observation are   
finite1 and possess  only in a finite   
measure their respective attributes4    
,upon this is  founded the process of   
,science1 so comprehensively laid out by
 ,mr ,mill  in his ',system of ,logic   
'--,induction1 ,deduction from general  
facts  attested by ,induction1          
,verification by experience of the      
results  obtained by ,deduction4 ,the   
attributes1 whiteness or hardness1 in   
the  abstract1 are doubtless infinite2  
that is1 the term will designate1  alike
 and equally1 any degree of whiteness or
 hardness which you may  think of1 and  
any unknown degree even whiter and      

harder than what you  think of4 ,but    
when perceived as invested in a given   
mass of snow or  granite before us1 they
 are divested of that indeterminateness1
 and  become restricted to a determinate
 measure and degree4    ,having thus    
indicated the points on which we are    
compelled to dissent  from ,mr ,mill's  
refutation of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in the 
pleading against ,m4  ,cousin1 we shall 
pass to the seventh chapter1 in which   
occurs his first  controversy with ,mr  
,mansel4 ,this passage has excited more 
interest1 and  will probably be         
remembered by a larger number of        
readers1 than any  portion of the book4 
,we shall give it in his own words 7pp4 
#ii--ajc71  since the energetic         
phraseology is quite as remarkable as   
the thought3--         ',there is but   
one way for ,mr ,mansel out of this     
difficulty1       and he adopts it4 ,he 
must maintain1 not merely that an       
,absolute ,being is unknowable in       
himself1 but that the       ,relative   

attributes of an ,absolute ,being are   
unknowable       also4#e ,he must say   
that we do not know what ,wisdom1       
,justice1 ,benevolence1 ,mercy1 c41 are1
 as they exist in ,god4                 
,accordingly1 he does say so4 ,it is a  
fact 7says ,mr ,mansel7       which     
experience forces upon us1 and which it 
is useless1       were it possible1 to  
disguise1 that the representation of    
,god after the model of the highest     
human morality which we       are       
capable of conceiving1 is not sufficient
 to account for       all the phenomena 
exhibited by the course of his natural  
,providence4 ,the infliction of physical
 suffering1 the       permission of     
moral evil1 the adversity of the good1  
the       prosperity of the wicked1 the 
crimes of the guilty involving       the
 misery of the innocent1 the tardy      
appearance and partial                  
distribution of moral and religious     
knowledge in the       world--these are 
facts1 which no doubt are reconcilable1 

we       know not how1 with the         
,infinite ,goodness of ,god1 but which  
certainly are not to be explained on the
 supposition that       its sole and    
sufficient type is to be found in the   
finite       goodness of man4           
',in other words' 7continues ,mr ,mill  
commenting7 'it is       necessary to   
suppose that the infinite goodness      
ascribed to       ,god is not the       
goodness which we know and love in our  
fellow-creatures1 distinguished only as 
infinite in degree2       but is        
different in kind1 and another quality  
altogether4       ,accordingly ,mr      
,mansel combats as a heresy of his      
opponents1       the opinion that       
infinite goodness differs only in degree
       from finite goodness4--,here1    
then1 ,i take my stand upon the         
acknowledged principle of logic and of  
morality2 that when       we mean       
different things we have no right to    
call them by       the same name1 and to
 apply to them1 the same predicates1    

moral and intellectual4 ,if1 instead of 
the glad tidings that       there exists
 a ,being in whom all the excellences   
which the       highest human form can  
conceive1 exist in a degree             
inconceivable to us1 ,i am informed that
 the world is ruled       by a being    
whose attributes are infinite1 but what 
they are       we cannot learn1 except  
that the highest human morality does    
not sanction them--convince me of this  
and ,i will hear my       fate as ,i    
may4 ,but when ,i am told that ,i must  
believe this1       and at the same time
 call this being by the names which     
express and affirm the highest human    
morality1 ,i say1 in       plain terms1 
that ,i will not4 ,whatever power such a
 being       may have over me1 there is 
one thing he shall not do2 he           
shall not compel me to worship him4 ,i  
will call no being       good who is not
 what ,i mean when ,i apply that epithet
 to my       fellow-creatures2 and if   
such a being can sentence me to         

hell for not so calling him1 to hell ,i 
will go4'    ,this concluding           
declaration is memorable in many ways4  
,mr ,mill announces  his resolution to  
determine for himself1 and according to 
his own reason  and conscience1 what    
,god he will worship1 and what ,god he  
will not  worship4 ,for ourselves1 we   
cordially sympathize with his           
resolution4 ,but  ,mr ,mill must be     
aware that this is a point on which     
society is equally  resolved that no    
individual shall determine for himself1 
if they can  help it4#f ,each new-born  
child finds his religious creed ready   
prepared for him4 ,in his earliest days 
of unconscious infancy1 the stamp  of   
the national1 gentile1 phratric1 ,god1  
or ,gods1 is imprinted upon him  by his 
elders2 and if the future man1 in the   
exercise of his own  independent reason1
 acquires such convictions as compel him
 to renounce  those ,gods1 proclaiming  
openly that he does so--he must count   
upon such  treatment as will go far to  

spoil the value of the present life to  
him1  even before he passes to those    
ulterior liabilities which ,mr ,mill    
indicates in the distance4 ,we are not  
surprised that a declaration so  unusual
 and so impressive should have been     
often cited in critical  notices of this
 volume2 that during the month preceding
 the last  ,westminster election1 it was
 studiously brought forward by some     
opponents of ,mr ,mill1 and more or less
 regretted by his friends1 as  likely to
 offend many electors1 and damage his   
chance of success2 and  that a          
conspicuous and noble-minded            
ecclesiastic1 the ,dean of              
,westminster1 thought the occasion so   
grave as to come forward with his       
characteristic generosity1 for the      
purpose of shielding a distinguished    
man suspected of heresy4    ,the sublime
 self-assertion1 addressed by           
,prometheus to ,zeus1 under whose       
sentence he was groaning1 has never     
before been put into such plain         

,english4#g ,mr ,mill's declaration     
reminds us also of ,hippolytus1 the     
chaste and pure youth1 whose tragic fate
 is so beautifully described by         
,euripides4 ,hippolytus is exemplary in 
his devotions to the ,goddess  ,artemis2
 but he dissents from all his           
countrymen1 and determines for  himself1
 in refusing to bestow the smallest mark
 of honour or worship  upon ,aphrodit1  
because he considers her to be a very   
bad ,goddess4#h ,in  this refusal he    
persists with inflexible principle 7even
 after having  received1 from an anxious
 attendant1 warning of the certain ruin 
which  it will bring upon him71 until   
the insulted ,aphrodit involves him1    
along with the unhappy ,phdra and       
,theseus himself1 in one common abyss   
of misery4 ,in like manner ,mr ,mill's  
declaration stands in marked  contrast  
with the more cautious proceeding of men
 like ,herodotus4 ,that  historian1     
alike pious and prudent1 is quite aware 
that all the ,gods are  envious and     

mischief-making1 and expressly declares 
them to be so4#i  ,yet1 far from        
refusing to worship them on that        
account1 he is assiduous  in prayer and 
sacrifice--perhaps1 indeed1 all the more
 assiduous in  consequence of what he   
believes about their attributes2#aj     
being  persuaded 7like the attendant who
 warned ,hippolytus7 that his only      
chance of mollifying their ungentle     
dispositions in regard to himself  is1  
by honorific tribute in words and       
offerings4    ,when1 however1 after     
appreciating as we are bound to do ,mr  
,mill's  declaration of subjective      
sentiment1 we pass to its logical       
bearing on  the controversy between him 
and ,mr ,mansel1 we are obliged to      
confess  that in this point of view it  
has little objective relevancy4 ,the    
problem was1 how to reconcile the actual
 evil and suffering in the  universe    
7which is recited as a fact by ,mr      
,mansel1 though in terms  conveying a   
most inadequate idea of its real        

magnitude7 with the  goodness of ,god4  
,mr ,mill repudiates the explanatory    
hypothesis tendered  by ,mr ,mansel1 as 
a solution1 but without suggesting any  
better  hypothesis of his own4 ,for     
ourselves1 we are far from endorsing ,mr
  ,mansel's solution as satisfactory2   
yet we can hardly be surprised if he    
considers it less unsatisfactory than no
 solution at all4 ,and when we  reflect 
how frequently and familiarly predicates
 applicable to man are  applied to the  
,supreme ,being1 when they cannot       
possibly be understood  about ,him in   
the same sense--we see no ground for    
treating the  proceeding as             
disingenuous1 which ,mr ,mill is        
disposed to do4 ,indeed1 it  cannot     
easily be avoided3 and ,mr ,mill himself
 furnishes us with some  examples in the
 present volume4 ,at page #dia1 he      
says3--         ',it would be difficult 
to find a stronger argument in favour   
of ,theism1 than that the eye must have 
been made by one who       sees1 and the

 ear by one who hears4'    ,in the words
 here employed1 seeing and hearing are  
predicted of ,god4    ,now when we      
predicate of men1 that they see or hear1
 we affirm facts  of extreme complexity1
 especially in the case of seeing2 facts
 partly  physical1 partly mental1       
involving multifarious movements and    
agencies  of nerves1 muscles1 and other 
parts of the organism1 together with    
direct sensational impressions1 and     
mental reconstruction of the past1      
inseparably associated therewith2 all   
which1 so far as they are known1  are   
perspicuously enumerated in the work of 
,professor ,bain#aa on the  ',senses and
 the ,intellect1' ,again1 ,mr ,mill     
speaks 7in p4 #ajb and  elsewhere7 of   
'the veracity of ,god4' ,when we say of 
our neighbour that  he is a veracious   
man1 we ascribe to him a habit of       
speaking the truth2  that is1 of        
employing his physical apparatus of     
speech1 and his mental  power of        
recalling and recombining words lodged  

in the memory1 for the  purpose of      
asserting no other propositions except  
such as declare facts  which he knows1  
or beliefs which he really entertains4  
,but how either  seeing1 or hearing1 or 
veracity1 in these senses1 can be       
predicated of ,god1 we are at a loss to 
understand4 ,and if they are to  be     
predicated of ,god in a different sense1
 this admits the same license  as ,mr   
,mansel contends for in respect to      
,goodness1 when he feels that           
undeniable facts preclude him from      
predicating that epithet univocally     
respecting ,god and respecting man4#ab  
,on the whole1 it seems to us1 that     
though ,mr ,mill will consent to        
worship only a ,god of perfect goodness1
 he has thrown no new light on  the     
grave problem--frankly stated though    
imperfectly solved1 by ,mr  ,mansel--how
 such a conception of ,god is to be     
reconciled with the extent  of evil and 
suffering actually pervading human life 
and animal life  throughout the earth4  

,we are compelled to say1 respecting ,mr
 ,mill's  treatment of this             
subject--what we should not say         
respecting his  treatment of any        
other--that he has left an old          
perplexing problem not  less perplexing 
than he found it4    ,reverting1 not    
unwillingly1 from theology to           
philosophy1 we now pass on  to ,mr      
,mill's ninth chapter 7p4 #abh seq471 of
 the ,interpretation of  ,consciousness4
 ,there is assuredly no lesson more     
requiring to be taught  than the proper 
mode of conducting such interpretation2 
for the number  of different modes in   
which ,consciousness has been           
interpreted is  astonishing4 ,mr ,mill  
begins by citing from ,sir ,w4          
,hamilton's lectures a  passage of some 
length1 upon which he bestows           
considerable praise1  regarding it as-- 
',one of the proofs that1 whatever may  
be the positive value       of his 7,sir
 ,w4 ,hamilton's7 achievements in       
metaphysics1 he       had a greater     

capacity for the subject than many      
metaphysicians of high reputation2 and  
particularly than       his two         
distinguished predecessors in the same  
school of       thought--,reid and      
,stewart4'--p4 #aca4    ,this is one of 
the greatest compliments to ,sir ,w4    
,hamilton that the book  contains1 and  
as such we are glad to cite it4    ,on  
the subject of ,consciousness1 ,mr ,mill
 has cited from ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton      
other good observations besides the one 
last alluded to2 but1  unfortunately1   
these are often neutralized by opposite 
or inconsistent  opinions also cited    
from other parts of his works4 ,the     
number of such  inconsistencies produced
 is indeed one remarkable feature in    
,sir ,w4  ,hamilton's philosophical     
character4 ,he seems to follow out      
energetically  7as ,plato in his various
 dialogues7 the vein of thought         
pervading his  mind at each particular  
moment1 without troubling himself to    
look back  upon his own prior           

speculations4 ,even compared with the   
best views of  ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1      
however1 ,mr ,mill's mode of handling   
the subject of  ,consciousness exhibits 
signal improvement4 ,to some of his     
observations  we shall call particular  
attention4    ,all philosophers agree   
that what ,consciousness testifies is to
 be  believed2 but they differ much on  
the question--,to what points           
,consciousness does testify8 and even on
 the still deeper question--,how  shall 
we proceed to ascertain what are these  
attested points8 ,what is  the proper   
method of studying or interrogating     
,consciousness8 ,upon this  ,mr ,mill   
remarks 7pp4 #ade--adg73--              
',here emerges the distinction between  
two different methods       of studying 
the problems of metaphysics2 forming the
 radical       difference between the   
two great schools into which            
metaphysicians are divided4 ,one of     
these ,i shall call for                 
distinction1 the introspective method2  

the other1 the       psychological4 ,m4 
,cousin observes that ,locke went wrong 
from the beginning1 by placing before   
himself1 as the       question to be    
first resolved1 the origin of our ideas4
       ,this 7he says7 was commencing at
 the wrong end4 ,the proper       course
 would have been to begin by determining
 what the       ideas now are2 to       
ascertain what it is that ,consciousness
       now tells us2 postponing till    
afterwards the attempt to       frame a 
theory concerning the origin of any of  
the mental       phenomena4         ',i 
accept the question as ,m4 ,cousin      
states it2 and ,i contend       that no 
attempt to determine what are the direct
 revelations       of ,consciousness can
 be successful1 or entitled to any      
regard1 unless preceded by what ,m4     
,cousin says ought only to       follow 
it--an inquiry into the origin of our   
acquired ideas4       ,for we have it   
not in our power to ascertain1 by any   
direct       process1 what              

,consciousness told us at the time when 
its       revelations were in their     
pristine purity4 ,it only offers        
itself to our inspection1 as it exists  
now1 when those       original          
revelations are overlaid and buried     
under a       mountainous heap of       
acquired notions and perceptions4       
',it seems to ,m4 ,cousin1 that if we   
examine with care and       minuteness  
our present states of ,consciousness1   
distinguishing and defining every       
ingredient which we find       to enter 
into them--every element that we seem to
 recognize       as real1 and cannot by 
merely concentrating our attention      
upon it analyze into anything           
simpler--we reach the ultimate       and
 primary truths1 which are the sources  
of all our       knowledge1 and which   
cannot be denied or doubted without     
denying or doubting the evidence of     
,consciousness       itself--that is1   
the only evidence that there is for     
anything4 ,i maintain this to be a      

misconception of the       condition    
imposed on inquirers by the difficulties
 of       psychological investigation4  
,to begin the inquiry at the       point
 where ,m4 ,cousin takes it up is1 in   
fact1 to beg the       question4 ,for he
 must be aware1 if not of the fact1 at  
least       of the belief of his        
opponents1 that the laws of the         
mind--the ,laws of ,association1        
according to one class of               
thinkers1 the ,categories of the        
,understanding1 according to            
another--are capable of creating1 out of
 those data of       ,consciousness     
which are uncontested1 purely mental    
conceptions1 which become so identified 
in thought with all       our states of 
,consciousness1 that we seem1 and cannot
 but       seem1 to receive them by     
direct intuition4 ,for example1 the     
belief in matter in the opinion of these
 thinkers is1 or at       least may be1 
thus produced3--         ',the proof    
that any of the alleged ,universal      

,beliefs1 or       ,principles of       
,common ,sense1 are affirmations of     
,consciousness--supposes two things3    
that the beliefs exist1       and that  
they cannot possibly have been acquired4
 ,the first       is1 in most cases1    
undisputed2 but the second is a subject 
of inquiry which often taxes the utmost 
resources of       psychologists4 ,locke
 was therefore right in believing that  
'the origin of our ideas' is the main   
stress of the problem       of mental   
science1 and the subject which must be  
first       considered in forming the   
theory of the ,mind4'    ,this citation 
from ,mr ,mill's book is already almost 
too long1 yet we  could have wished to  
prolong it still more1 from the         
importance of some  of the succeeding   
paragraphs4 ,it presents1 in clear      
discrimination and  contrast1 two       
opposite points of view according to    
which the phenomena  of mind are        
regarded by different philosophers1 and 
the method of  studying them determined3

 the introspective method1 adopted by   
,m4  ,cousin and others--the            
psychological or analytical method1     
pursued by  ,locke and by many other    
eminent men since ,locke--'the known and
 approved  method of physical science1  
adapted to the necessities of           
psychology'--7p4 #adh74    ,there are   
passages of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's        
writings in which he appears to  feel   
that the introspective method alone is  
insufficient for the  interpretation of 
,consciousness1 and that the analytical 
method must be  employed to reinforce   
it4 ,but on this as on other points he  
is not  always consistent with himself4 
,for in laying down the principle upon  
which the primary truths of             
,consciousness1 the original data of    
intelligence1 are to be ascertained and 
distinguished from  generalizations out 
of experience and custom1 he declares   
that the one  single and certain mark is
 ,necessity--they must be beliefs which 
we are  under the necessity of          

believing--of which we cannot get rid by
 any  mental effort4 ,he decides this1  
of course1 for himself1 by the          
introspective method alone4 ,he 7with   
,m4 ,cousin and other philosophers  who 
take the same view7 does not apply the  
analytical method to inquire  whether   
his necessity of belief may not be a    
purely acquired necessity  and nowise   
congenital4 ,it is1 indeed1 remarkable  
that these philosophers  do not even    
seek to apply the introspective method  
as far as that method  will really go4  
,they are satisfied with introspection  
of their own  present minds2 without    
collecting results of the like process  
as applied  to other minds1 in different
 times and places4 ,they declare various
  beliefs to be necessary to the human  
mind universally1 merely because  such  
is the actual fact with their own minds 
and with those immediately  around them2
 sometimes even in defiance of proof    
that there are 7or have  been7 persons  
not sharing such beliefs1 and           

occasionally even believing  the        
contrary2 therefore1 when even the      
introspective method really  disallows  
their affirmative instead of sustaining 
it4 ,this is1 in  truth1 an abuse of the
 introspective method2 yet even if that 
method  were employed in its fullest    
extent--if the same incapability of     
believing otherwise could be shown as   
common to all mankind--it might  still  
be only the effect of a strong          
association4 ,the analytical method     
must still be called in to ascertain    
whether we are forced to suppose  such  
incapability to be an original fact of  
consciousness1 or whether it  may not   
have been generated in the mind by      
circumstances under the  natural working
 of the laws of association4 ,it is     
certain that these  laws not only may1  
but must1 give birth to artificial      
inconceivabilities  in the mind--and    
that some of these may be equal in      
strength to such1 if  any1 as are       
natural4         ',the ,history of      

,science' 7says ,mr ,mill1 following out
 the       same train of reasoning which
 we read in the third ,book of       his
 ',system of ,logic'7 'teems with       
inconceivabilities which       have been
 conquered2 and with supposed necessary 
truths1       which have first ceased to
 be thought necessary1 then to be       
thought true1 and have finally come to  
be deemed       impossible4'--p4 #aej4  
,after various observations1 chiefly    
exhibiting the rashness of many         
censures bestowed by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton 
on ,brown1 ,mr ,mill gives us three     
valuable chapters 7xi41 xii41 xiii471   
wherein he analyzes the belief in  an   
,external ,world1 the ,belief in ,mind  
as a separate substance or  ,noumenon1  
and the ,primary ,qualities of ,matter4 
,to each of these topics  he applies    
what he calls the psychological method1 
as contrasted with  the simply          
introspective method of ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton 7the ,ego and  ,non-,ego      
affirmed to be given together in the    

primary deliverance of  ,consciousness7 
and so many other philosophers4 ,he     
proves that these  beliefs are no way   
intuitive1 but acquired products2 and   
that the known  laws of ,association are
 sufficient to explain how they are     
acquired2  especially the ,law of       
,inseparable ,association1 together with
 that of  ,obliviscence--a very useful1 
discriminating phrase1 which we first   
find employed in this volume--7p4 #bei  
et passim74 ,he defines ,matter to  be a
 permanent possibility of ,sensation2 he
 maintains that this is  really all     
which 7apart from philosophical         
theories7 mankind in general  mean by   
it2 he shows that mere possibilities of 
sensation not only may1  but must1      
according to the known ,laws of         
,association1 come to present  'to our  
artificialized ,consciousness' a        
character of objectivity--7pp4  #aih1   
#aii74 ,the correlative subject1 though 
present in fact and  indispensable1 is  
eliminated out of conscious notice1     

according to the  ,law of ,obliviscence4
    ,these chapters will well repay the 
most careful perusal4 ,we can only  find
 room for one passage 7pp4 #bad1        
#bae73--         ',throughout the whole 
of our sensitive life1 except its       
first beginnings1 we unquestionably     
refer our sensations to       a me and  
not-me4 ,as soon as ,i have formed1 on  
the one       hand1 the notion of       
,permanent ,possibilities of ,sensation1
       and on the other1 of that        
continued series of feelings which      
,i call my life--both these notions are1
 by an irresistible       association1  
recalled by every sensation ,i have4    
,they       represent two things1 with  
both of which the sensation of       the
 moment1 be it what it may1 stands in   
relation2 and ,i       cannot be        
conscious of the sensation without being
 conscious       of it as related to    
these two things4 ,they have accordingly
       received relative names1         
expressive of the double relation       

in question4 ,the thread of             
consciousness which ,i apprehend        
the relation as a part of1 is called the
 ,subject2 the       group of ,permanent
 ,possibilities of ,sensation to which  
,i       refer it1 and which is         
partially realized and actualized in    
it1 is called the ,object of the        
sensation4 ,the sensation       itself  
ought to have a correlative name1 or    
rather ought to       have two such     
names--one denoting the sensation as    
opposed       to its ,subject1 the other
 denoting it as opposed to its          
,object2 but it is a remarkable fact    
that this necessity has       not been  
felt1 and that the need of a correlative
 name to       every relative one has   
been considered to be satisfied by      
the terms ,object and ,subject          
themselves4 ,it is true that       these
 two are related to one another1 but    
only through the       sensation4 ,we   
have no conception of either ,subject or
       ,object1 either ,mind or ,matter1

 except as something to which       we  
refer our sensations1 and whatever other
 feelings we are       conscious of4    
,the very existence of them both1 so far
 as       cognizable by us1 consists    
only in the relation they               
respectively bear to our states of      
feeling4 ,their relation       to each  
other is only the relation between those
 two       relations4 ,the immediate    
correlatives are1 not the pair1         
,object1 ,subject1 but the two pairs1   
,object1 ,sensation       objectively   
considered--,subject1 ,sensation        
subjectively       considered4 ,the     
reason why this is overlooked might     
easily       be shown1 and would furnish
 a good illustration of that            
important part of the ,laws of          
,association1 which may be       termed 
the ,laws of ,obliviscence4'    ,this   
chapter1 on the ,primary ,qualities of  
,matter1 controverts the  opinion of    
,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 that extension1 as  
consisting of  co-existent partes extra 

partes1 is immediately and necessarily  
apprehended by our consciousness4 ,it   
cites1 as well as confirms1 the  copious
 proof given by ,professor ,bain 7in his
 work on the ,senses and the            
,intellect7 that our conception of      
extension is derived from our muscular  
sensibility3 that our sensation of      
muscular motion impeded constitutes     
that of filled space3 that our          
conception of extension1 as an aggregate
  of co-existent parts1 arises from the 
sense of sight1 which comprehends  a    
great number of parts in a succession so
 rapid as to be confounded  with        
simultaneity--and which not only becomes
 the symbol of muscular and  tactile    
succession1 but even acquires such      
ascendancy as to supersede  both of them
 in our consciousness4 ,confirmation is 
here given to this  important doctrine1 
not merely by observations from ,mr     
,mill himself1 but  also from the very  
curious narrative1 discovered and       
produced by ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton1 out of 

a work of the ,german philosopher1      
,platner4 ,platner  instituted a careful
 examination of a man born blind1 and   
ascertained  that this man did not      
conceive extension as an aggregate of   
simultaneous  parts1 but as a series of 
sensations experienced or to be         
experienced in  succession--7pp4 #bcb1  
#bcc74 ,the case reported from ,platner 
both  corroborates the theory of        
,professor ,bain1 and receives its      
proper  interpretation from that theory2
 while it is altogether adverse to the  
doctrine of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton--as is   
also another case1 which he cites  from 
,maine de ,biran3--         ',it gives a
 very favourable idea of ,sir ,w4       
,hamilton's       sincerity and devotion
 to truth 7remarks ,mr ,mill1 p4 #bdg71 
that he should have drawn from          
obscurity1 and made generally           
known1 two cases so unfavourable to his 
own opinions4'    ,we think this remark 
perfectly just2 and we would point out  
besides1 in  appreciating ,sir ,w4      

,hamilton's merits1 that his appetite   
for facts was  useful to philosophy1 as 
well as his appetite for speculation4   
,but the  person whose usefulness to    
philosophy we prefer to bring into the  
foreground1 is ,platner himself4 ,he    
spent three weeks in patient            
examination of this blind man1 and the  
tenor of his report proves that  his    
sagacity in interpreting facts was equal
 to his patience in  collecting them4   
,the rarity of all such careful and     
premeditated  observation of the facts  
of mind1 appears to us one main reason  
why  7what ,mr ,mill calls7 the         
psychological theory finds so little    
acceptance2 and why those who maintain  
that what now seems a mental  integer   
was once a multiplicity of separate     
mental fragments1 can  describe the     
antecedent steps of the change only as a
 latens  processus1 which the reader    
never fully understands1 and often will 
not  admit4 ,every man's mind is        
gradually built up from infancy to      

maturity2  the process is always going  
on before our eyes1 yet the stages of   
it--especially the earliest stages1 the 
most pregnant with  instruction--are    
never studied and put on record by      
observers trained in  inductive logic1  
knowing beforehand what they ought to   
look for as the  sine qu non for proving
 or disproving any proposed theory4     
,such cases  as that cited by           
,platner--cases of one marked congenital
 defect of  sense1 enabling us to apply 
the ,method of ,difference--are always  
within  reach2 but few ,platners are    
found to scrutinize and record them4    
,historians of science describe to us   
the laborious and multiplied            
observations1 and the elaborate         
precaution for ensuring accuracy of     
observation1 which recent chemical and  
physical inquirers have found           
indispensable for the establishment of  
their results4 ,we cannot1  therefore1  
be surprised that mental philosophers1  
dealing with facts  even more obscure1  

and careless about enlarging1 varying1  
authenticating their records of         
particular facts1 should have had       
little success in establishing any      
results at all4    ,but if even those1  
who adopt the psychological theory1 have
 been remiss  in the observation of     
particular mental facts1--those who deny
 the  theory have been far more than    
remiss2 they have been blind to obvious 
facts contradicting the principles which
 they lay down4 ,mr ,mill1 in  chap1    
xiv41 deals with this denial1 common to 
,mr ,mansel with ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton4   
,that philosophers so eminent as both of
 them should declare  confidently--'what
 ,i cannot but think must be  priori1 or
 original to  thought2 it cannot be     
engendered by experience upon custom'   
7p4  #bfd7--;appears to us as           
extraordinary as it does to ,mr ,mill4  
,though no  one ever surpassed ,sir ,w4 
,hamilton in large acquaintance with the
 actual  diversities of human belief1   
and human incapacities of believing--yet

 he  never seems to have thought of     
bringing this acquaintance into account1
  when he assured the students in his   
lecture-room1 that custom1  experience1 
indissoluble association1 were          
altogether insufficient to  engender a  
felt necessity of believing4 ,such      
forgetfulness of well-known  mental     
facts cannot be reproached to the       
advocates of the psychological  theory4 
,in chap4 xv4 ,mr ,mill examines ,sir   
,w4 ,hamilton's doctrine on unconscious 
mental modifications4 ,he points out the
 confused manner in which ,sir ,w4      
,hamilton has conceived mental latency1 
as well as the inconclusive  character  
of the reasoning whereby he refutes the 
following doctrine of  ,dugald          
,stewart--,that in the most rapid trains
 of association1 each  separate item    
must have been successively present to  
consciousness1  though for a time too   
short to leave any memory4 ,sir ,w4     
,hamilton thinks  that the separate     
items may pass1 and often do pass1      

unconsciously2  which opinion ,mr ,mill 
also1 though not approving his reasons1 
is  inclined to adopt4         ',i am   
myself inclined 7p4 #bhe7 to admit      
unconscious mental       modifications1 
in the only sense in which ,i can attach
 any       very distinct meaning to     
them--namely1 unconscious               
modifications of the nerves4 ,it may    
well be believed that       the         
apparently suppressed links in a chain  
of association1       those which ,sir  
,w4 ,hamilton considers as latent1      
really are       so3 that they are not  
even momentarily felt1 the chain of     
causation being continued only          
physically--by one organic       state  
of the nerves succeeding another so     
rapidly1 that the       state of mental 
consciousness appropriate to each is not
       produced4'    ,mr ,mill gives    
various illustrations in support of this
 doctrine4 ,he at  the same time calls  
attention to a valuable lecture of ,sir 
,w4  ,hamilton's1 the thirty-second     

lecture on ,metaphysics2 especially to  
the  instructive citation from          
,cardaillac contained therein1 noting   
the  important fact1 which descriptions 
of the ,law of ,association often keep  
out of sight--that the suggestive agency
 of ,association is carried on1  not by 
single antecedents raising up single    
consequents1 but by a mass  of          
antecedents raising up simultaneously a 
mass of consequents1 among  which       
attention is very unequally distributed4
    ,we shall say little upon ,mr       
,mill's remarks on ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's 
,theory  of ,causation--7chap4 xvi474   
,this theory appears to ,mr ,mill       
absurd2 while  the theory of ,mr ,mill  
7continued from ,hume1 ,brown1 and      
,james ,mill7 on  the same subject1     
appears to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton           
insufficient and                        
unsatisfactory--'professing to explain  
the phenomenon of causality1 but1       
previously to explanation1 evacuating   
the phenomenon of all that  desiderates 

explanation'--7p4 #bie74 ,for ourselves 
we embrace the theory  of ,mr ,mill3#ac 
yet we are aware that the remark just   
cited from ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton          
represents the dissatisfaction          
entertained towards it by many          
objectors4 ,the unscientific and        
antiscientific yearnings1 prevalent     
among mankind1 lead them to put         
questions which no sound theory of      
,causation will answer2 and they are    
ready to visit and trust any oracle     
which professes to deliver a confident  
affirmative solution of such  questions4
 ,among all the terms employed by       
metaphysicians1 none is used  in a      
greater variety of meanings than the    
term ,cause4    ,in ,mr ,mill's next    
chapter 7xvi47 he comments on ,sir ,w4  
,hamilton's  doctrine of ,concepts or   
,general ,notions4 ,there are portions  
of this  chapter with which we agree    
less than with most other parts of the  
volume2 especially with his marked      
hostility to the term ,concept1 and  the

 reasons given for it1 which reasons    
appear to us not very consistent  with  
what he has himself said in the ',system
 of ,logic1' ,book ,,iv4 chap4  ii4     
#a--c4 ,the term ,concept has no        
necessary connection with the  theory   
called ,conceptualism4 ,it is equally   
available to designate the  idea called 
up by a general name1 as understood     
either by ,mr ,bailey or  by ,james     
,mill4 ,we think it useful as an        
equivalent to the ,german word          
,begriff1 which sense ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton
 has in view when he introduces  it1    
though he does not always adhere to his 
profession4 ,and when ,mr ,mill  says   
7p4 #cca7--         ',i consider it     
nothing less than a misfortune1 that the
       words ,concept1 ,general ,notion1
 or any other phrase to       express   
the supposed mental modification        
corresponding to a       general name1  
should ever have been invented4'    we  
dissent from his opinion4 ,to talk of   
'the ,concept of an individual1'        

however1 as ,mr ,mansel does 7pp4 #cch1 
#cci71 is improper and inconsistent     
with the purpose for which the name is  
given4    ,we are more fully in harmony 
with ,mr ,mill in his two next chapters 
7xviii4 et seq47 on ,judgment and       
,reasoning2 which are among the best    
chapters in this volume4 ,he there      
combats and overthrows the theory of    
,reasoning laid down by ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton2 but we doubt the propriety of
  his calling this 'the ,conceptualist  
theory' 7pp4 #cfg1 #cfh72 since it has  
nothing to do with ,conceptualism1 in   
the special sense of antithesis to      
,realism and ,nominalism1--but is1 in   
fact1 the theory of the ,syllogism as   
given in the ,analytics of ,aristotle1  
and generally admitted since4 ,not      
merely ,conceptualists1 but 7to use ,mr 
,mill's own language1 p4 #cff7  'nearly 
all the writers on logic1 taught a      
theory of the science too  small and    
narrow to contain their own facts4'     
,such1 indeed1 was the  theory          

constantly taught until the publication 
of ,mr ,mill's ',system of  ,logic2' the
 first two books of which corrected it1 
by arguments which  are reinforced and  
amplified in these two chapters on      
,judgment and  ,reasoning1 as well as in
 the two chapters next following--chaps1
 xx4 and  xxi4--7',is ,logic the        
,science of the ,forms of ,thought--,on 
the  ,fundamental ,laws of ,thought4'7  
,the contrast which is there presented1 
in  many different ways1 between the    
limited theory of logic taught by ,sir  
,w4 ,hamilton and ,mr ,mansel1 and the  
enlarged theory of ,mr ,mill1 is        
instructive in a high degree4 ,we       
consider ,mr ,mill as the real preserver
  of all that is valuable in ,formal    
,logic1 from the unfortunate            
consequences of an erroneous estimate1  
brought upon it through the  exaggerated
 pretensions of logicians4 ,when ,sir   
,w4 ,hamilton contrasts it  pointedly   
with physical science 7of which he talks
 with a sort of  supercilious           

condescension1 in one of the worst      
passages of his  writings1 p4           
#dja7--when all its apparent fruits were
 produced in the  shape of ingenious but
 barren verbal technicalities--what hope
 could be  entertained that ,formal     
,logic could hold its ground in the     
estimation of  the recent generation of 
scientific men8 ,mr ,mill has divested  
it of that  assumed demonstrative       
authority which ,bacon called 'regere   
res per  syllogismum2' but he has at the
 same time given to it a firm root      
amidst  the generalities of objective   
science4 ,he has shown that in the great
  problem of ,evidence or ,proof1 the   
,laws of ,formal ,logic1 though bearing 
only on one part of the entire          
procedure1 yet bear upon one essential  
part1 proper to be studied separately3  
and that the maintenance of  consistency
 between our affirmations 7which is the 
only special province  of ,formal       
,logic71 has great importance and value 
as a part of the  process necessary for 

ascertaining and vindicating their      
truth1 or  exposing their character when
 false or uncertified--but no importance
 or  value except as a part of that     
larger exigency4    ,while ,mr ,mill was
 amending the ,syllogistic theory so as 
to ensure for  ,formal ,logic its       
legitimate place among the essentials of
 scientific  procedure1 ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton was at the same time enlarging
 it on its  technical side1 in two modes
 which are highly esteemed both by      
himself  and by others3 #a4 ,the        
recognition of two kinds of ,syllogisms2
 one in  ,extension1 the other in       
,comprehension3 #b4 ,the doctrine of the
  ,quantification of the                
,predicate4--,both these novelties are  
here  criticised by ,mr ,mill in chapter
 xxii41 which we recommend the reader to
  peruse conjointly with ,lectures #ae  
and #af of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton on ,logic4
    ,now whereas the main objection1 by 
which the study of the syllogistic      
logic has been weighed down and         

discredited in modern times1 is this1   
that it encumbers the memory with formal
 distinctions1 having no useful         
application to the real process and     
purposes of reasoning--the procedure  of
 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton might almost lead us
 to imagine that he himself was  trying 
to aggravate that objection to the      
uttermost4 ,he introduces a  variety of 
new canons 7classifying ,syllogisms as  
,extensive and  ,intensive1 by a        
distinction founded on the double       
quantity of notions1  in ,extension and 
in ,comprehension7 which he intimates   
that all former  logicians have         
neglected--while it plainly appears1    
even on his own  showing1 that the      
difference between syllogisms1 in       
respect to these two  sorts of quantity1
 is of no practical value2 and that 'we 
can always  change a categorical        
syllogism of the one quantity into a    
categorical  syllogism of the other1 by 
reversing the order of the two premises1
 and  by reversing the meaning of the   

copula' 7,lect4 xvi4 p4 #bif72 nay1 that
  every syllogism is already a syllogism
 in both quantities 7,mill1 p4  #dca74  
,against these useless ceremonial       
reforms of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 we  may  
set the truly philosophical explanation 
here given by ,mr ,mill of the  meaning 
of propositions4         ',all          
judgments' 7he says--p4 #dbc71 'except  
where both the       terms are proper   
names1 are really judgments in          
,comprehension2 though it is customary1 
and the natural       tendency of the   
mind1 to express most of them in terms  
of       ,extension4 ,in other words1 we
 never really predicate       anything  
but attributes2 though1 in the usage of 
language1       we commonly predicate   
them by means of words which are names  
of concrete objects--because' 7p4       
#dbf7--'we have no other                
convenient and compact mode of speaking4
 ,most attributes1       and nearly all 
large bundles of attributes1 have no    
names of       their own4 ,we can only  

name them by a circumlocution4 ,we are  
accustomed to speak of attributes1 not  
by names given to       themselves1 but 
by means of the names which they give to
 the       objects they are attributes  
of4' ',all our ordinary       judgments'
 7p4 #dbh7 'are in ,comprehension only2 
,extension       not being thought of4  
,but we may1 if we please1 make the     
,extension of our general terms an      
express object of thought4       ,when  
,i judge that all oxen ruminate1 ,i have
 nothing in my       thoughts but the   
attributes and their co-existence4 ,but 
when       by reflection ,i perceive    
what the proposition implies1 ,i        
remark that other things may ruminate   
besides oxen1 and that       the unknown
 multitude of things which ruminate form
 a mass1       with which the unknown   
multitude of things having the          
attributes of oxen is either identical  
or is wholly       comprised in it4     
,which of these two is the truth ,i may 
not       know1 and if ,i did1 took no  

notice of it when ,i assented to        
the proposition1 all oxen ruminate2 but 
,i perceive1 on       consideration1    
that one or other of them must be true4 
,though ,i had not this in my mind when 
,i affirmed that all       oxen         
ruminate1 ,i can have it now2 ,i can    
make the concrete       objects denoted 
by each of the two names an object of   
thought1 as a collective though         
indefinite aggregate2 in       other    
words1 ,i can make the ,extension of the
 names 7or       notions7 an object of  
direct consciousness4 ,when ,i do this1 
,i perceive that this operation         
introduces no new fact1 but       is    
only a different mode of contemplating  
the very fact       which ,i had        
previously expressed by the words1 all  
oxen       ruminate4 ,the fact is the   
same1 but the mode of                   
contemplating it is different4 ,there is
 thus in all       ,propositions a      
judgment concerning attributes 7called  
by ,sir       ,w4 ,hamilton a ,judgment 

in ,comprehension7 which we make as a   
matter of course2 and a possible        
judgment in or concerning               
,extension1 which we may make1 and which
 will be true if       the former is    
true4'    ,from the lucid explanation   
here cited 7and from a following        
paragraph  too long to describe p4      
#dcc71 we see that there is no real     
distinction  between ,judgments in      
,comprehension and ,judgments in        
,extension2 that the  appearance of     
distinction between them arises from the
 customary mode  of enunciation1 which  
custom is here accounted for2 that the  
addition to  the theory of the          
,syllogism1 for which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton
 takes credit1 is  alike troublesome and
 unprofitable4    ,the like may also be 
said about his other innovation1 the    
,quantification  of the ,predicate4     
,still more extensive are the changes   
7as stated by  himself7 which this      
innovation would introduce in the canons
 of  ,syllogism4 ,indeed1 when we read  

his language 7,appendix to ',lectures on
  ,logic1' pp4 #bia--big7 censuring     
generally the prior logicians from      
,aristotle downwards1 and contending    
that 'more than half the value of  logic
 had been lost' by their manner of      
handling it--we may appreciate  the     
magnitude of the reform which he        
believed himself to be introducing4     
,the larger the reform1 the more it     
behoved him to be sure of the ground  on
 which he was proceeding4 ,but on this  
point we remark a serious  deficiency4  
,after laying down1 with appropriate    
emphasis1 the valuable  logical         
postulate1 to state explicitly what is  
thought implicitly1 on  which1 ,sir ,w4 
,hamilton says1         ',logic ever    
insists1 but which logicians have never 
fairly       obeyed--it follows that    
logically we ought to take into         
account the quantity1 always understood 
in thought1 but       usually1 and for  
manifest reasons1 elided in expression1 
not       only of the subject1 but also 

of the predicate1 of a                  
judgment4'--7',discussions on ,philos41'
 p4 #fad47    ,here ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton  
assumes that the quantity of the        
predicate is  always understood in      
thought2 and the same assumption is     
often repeated1  in the ,appendix to his
 ',lectures on ,logic1' p4 #bia and     
elsewhere1 as if  it was alike obvious  
and incontestable4 ,now it is precisely 
on this  point that issue is here taken 
with ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,mr ,mill      
denies  altogether 7p4 #dcg7 that the   
quantity of the predicate is always     
understood or present in thought1 and   
appeals to every reader's  consciousness
 for an answer3--         ',does he1    
when he judges that all oxen ruminate1  
advert even       in the minutest degree
 to the question1 whether there is      
anything else that ruminates8 ,is this  
consideration at all       in his       
thoughts1 any more than any other       
consideration       foreign to the      
immediate subject8 ,one person may know 

that       there are other ruminating   
animals1 another may think that         
there are none1 a third may be without  
any opinion on the       subject2 but if
 they all know what is meant by         
ruminating1       they all1 when they   
judge that every ox ruminates1 mean     
precisely the same thing4 ,the mental   
process they go       through1 as far as
 that one judgment is concerned1 is     
precisely identical2 though some of them
 may go on farther1       and add other 
judgments to it4'    ,the last sentence 
cited from ,mr ,mill indicates the vice 
of ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton's proceeding in  
quantifying the predicate1 and explains 
why it  was that logicians before him   
declined to do so4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1  
in  this proceeding1 insists on stating 
explicitly1 not merely all that is      
thought implicitly1 but a great deal    
more2#ad adding to it something  else1  
which may1 indeed1 be thought           
conjointly1 but which more  frequently  
is not thought at all4 ,he requires us  

to pack two distinct  judgments into one
 and the same proposition3 he           
interpolates the meaning  of the        
,propositio ,conversa simpliciter into  
the form of the ,propositio             
,convertenda 7when an universal         
,affirmative71 and then claims it as a  
great advantage1 that the proposition   
thus interpolated admits of being       
converted simpliciter1 and not merely   
per accidens4 ,mr ,mill is1             
nevertheless1 of opinion 7pp4 #dci-ddc7 
that though 'the quantified  syllogism  
is not a true expression of what is in  
thought1 yet writing  the predicate with
 a quantification may be sometimes a    
real help to the  ,art of ,logic4' ,we  
see little advantage in providing a new 
complicated  form1 for the purpose of   
expressing in one proposition what      
naturally  throws itself into two1 and  
may easily be expressed in two4 ,if a   
man is  prepared to give us information 
on one ,quaesitum1 why should he be     
constrained to use a mode of speech     

which forces on his attention at the    
same time a second and distinct         
,quaesitum--so that he must either give 
us information about the two at once1 or
 confess himself ignorant  respecting   
the second8    ,the two next chapters of
 ,mr ,mill1 noticing some other minor   
peculiarities 7all of them unfortunate1 
and one1 p4 #ddg1 really  unaccountable7
 of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's ,formal ,logic2
 and some ,fallacious  ,modes of        
,thought countenanced by ,sir ,w4       
,hamilton 7chs4 xxiii41  xxiv4--pp4     
#ddf1 #dgh71 we are compelled to pass   
over4 ,we must find space1  however1 for
 a few words on the ,freedom of the     
,will 7ch4 xxv471 which  7in ,mr ,mill's
 language1 pp4 #dhh--edi71 'was so      
fundamental with ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton1   
that it may be regarded as the central  
idea of his system--the  determining    
cause of most of his philosophical      
opinions4' ,prior to ,sir  ,w4          
,hamilton1 we find some writers who     
maintain the doctrine of  ,free-will1   

others who maintain that of ,necessity3 
each supporting their  respective       
conclusions by reasons which they deem  
sufficient4 ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton declares
 that both the one doctrine and the     
other are  inconceivable and            
incomprehensible2 yet that1 by the law  
of ,excluded  ,middle1 one or other of  
them must be true3 and he decides in    
favour of  ,free-will1 of which he      
believes himself to be distinctly       
conscious2  moreover1 ,free-will is     
essential 7he thinks7 to moral          
responsibility1 of  which also he feels 
himself conscious4 ,he confesses        
himself1 however1  unable to explain the
 possibility of ,free-will2 but he      
maintains that  the same may be said    
about ,necessity also4 ',the champions  
of both the  two opposite doctrines are 
at once resistless in attack1 and       
impotent in  defence'--7,hamilton's     
',footnotes on ,reid1' p4 #fjb47 ,mr    
,mansel also  asserts1 even more        
confidently than ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1    

that we are  directly conscious of      
,free-will--7p4 #ejc74    ,sir ,w4      
,hamilton has himself given some of the 
best arguments against the  doctrine of 
,free-will1 in refutation of ,reid3     
arguments1 some of which  are here cited
 by ,mr ,mill with praise which they    
well deserve--7pp4 #dig1  #dih74 ,but   
,mr ,mill's own reasoning on the same   
side is of a still higher  order1       
enlarging the grounds previously urged  
in the last book of his  ',system of    
,logic1' ,he protests against the term  
,necessity2 and  discards the idea of   
,necessity1 if it be understood to imply
 anything  more than invariability of   
antecedence and consequence4 ,if it mean
  that1 experience proves thus much     
about antecedents in the world of  mind1
 as in the world of matter3 if it mean  
more1 experience does not  prove more1  
either in the world of matter or in the 
world of mind3 nor  have we any grounds 
for affirming it in either--7p4 #eja47  
,if it were  true1 therefore1 that      

consciousness attested ,free-will1 we   
should find  the testimony of           
consciousness opposed to a full proof   
from experience  and induction4 ,but    
does consciousness really attest what is
 called  ,free-will8 ,mr ,mill analyzes 
the case1 and declares in the negative4 
',to be conscious of ,free-will1 must   
mean to be conscious1       before ,i   
have decided1 that ,i am able to decide 
either way2       exception may be taken
 in limine to the use of the word       
consciousness in such an application4   
,consciousness tells       me what ,i do
 or feel4 ,but what ,i am able to do1 is
 not a       subject of consciousness4  
,consciousness is not prophetic2 we     
are conscious of what is1 not of what   
will or can be4 ,we       never know    
that we are able to do a thing1 except  
from       having done it1 or something 
similar to it4 ,having acted1 we        
know1 as far as that experience reaches1
 how we are able to       act2 and this 
knowledge1 when it has become familiar1 

is       often confounded with1 and     
called by1 the name of                  
consciousness4 ,but it does not derive  
any increase of       authority from    
being misnamed3 its truth is not supreme
       over1 but depends upon1          
experience4 ,if our so-called           
consciousness is not borne out by       
experience1 it is a       delusion4 ,it 
has no title to credence1 but as an     
interpretation of experience2 and if it 
is a false       interpretation1 it must
 give way4'--pp4 #ejc1 #ejd    ,after   
this salutary and much-needed warning   
against the confusion  between          
consciousness as an infallible          
authority1 and belief upon  experience1 
of which we are conscious as a          
belief--,mr ,mill proceeds to  sift the 
alleged self-evident connection between 
,free-will and  ,accountability4 ,he    
shows1 not merely that there is no      
connection1 but  that there is a        
positive repugnance1 between the two4   
,by ,free-will is  meant that a volition

 is not determined by motives1 but is a 
spontaneous  mental fact1 neither having
 a cause1 nor admitting of being        
predicted4  ,now1 the very reason for   
giving notice that we intend to punish  
certain  acts1 and for inflicting       
punishment if the acts be committed1 is1
 that  we trust in the efficacy of the  
threat and the punishment as deterring  
motives4 ,if the volition of agents be  
not influenced by motives1 the  whole   
machinery of law becomes unavailing1 and
 punishment a purposeless  infliction of
 pain4 ,in fact1 it is on that very     
ground that the madman  is exempted from
 punishment2 his volition being presumed
 to be not  capable of being acted upon 
by the deterring motive of legal        
sanction4  ,the free agent1 thus        
understood1 is one who can neither feel 
himself  accountable1 nor be rendered   
accountable1 to or by others4 ,it is    
only  the necessary agent 7the person   
whose volitions are determined by       
motives1 and1 in case of conflict1 by   

the strongest desire or the  strongest  
apprehension7 that can be held really   
accountable1 or can  feel himself to be 
so4         ',the true doctrine of the  
,causation of human actions 7says       
,mr ,mill1 p4 #eaf7 maintains1 in       
opposition both to pure and       to    
modified ,fatalism1 that not only our   
conduct1 but our       character1 is in 
part amenable to our will3 that we can1 
by       employing the proper means1    
improve our character3 and that       if
 our character is such that1 while it   
remains what it is1       it            
necessitates us to do wrong--it will be 
just to apply       motives which will  
necessitate us to strive for its        
improvement4 ,we shall not indeed do so 
unless we desire our       improvement1 
and desire it more than we dislike the  
means       which must he employed for  
the purpose4'    ,it thus appears that  
of the two propositions1 #a1 volitions  
are  necessary1 or depend on causes2 #b1
 volitions are free1 or do not depend   

on causes--neither the one nor the other
 is inconceivable or  incomprehensible1 
as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton supposed them to  
be4 ,that the first  is true1 and the   
second false1 we learn by experience1   
and by that  alone2 just as we learn the
 like in regard to the phenomena of the 
material world4 ,indeed1 the fact that  
human volitions are both  predictable   
and modifiable1 quite as much as all    
those physical  phenomena that depend   
upon a complication of causes--which is 
only a  corollary from what has just    
been said--is so universally recognized 
and  acted upon by all men1 that there  
would probably be little difference of  
opinion about this question1 if the     
antithesis were not obscured and        
mystified by the familiar1 but          
equivocal1 phrases of ,free-will and    
,necessity4    ,passing over chapter    
xxvii41 in which ,mr ,mill refutes ,sir 
,w4 ,hamilton's  opinion that the study 
of mathematics is worthless1 or nearly  
so1 as an  intellectual discipline--we  

shall now call attention to the         
concluding  remarks which sum up the    
results of the volume4 ,after saying    
that he  'differs from almost everything
 in ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's philosophy1 on 
which he particularly valued himself1 or
 which is specially his own1'  ,mr ,mill
 describes ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's general 
merits as follows3--         ',they     
chiefly consist in his clear and        
distinct mode of       bringing before  
the reader many of the fundamental      
questions       of metaphysics3 some    
good specimens of psychological         
analysis on a small scale3 and the many 
detached logical and       psychological
 truths which he has separately seized1 
and       which are scattered through   
his writings1 mostly applied to         
resolve some special difficulty1 and    
again lost sight of4 ,i       can hardly
 point to anything he has done towards  
helping the       more thorough         
understanding of the greater mental     
phenomena1       unless it be his theory

 of ,attention 7including               
,abstraction71 which seems to me the    
most perfect we have2       but the     
subject1 though a highly important1 is  
comparatively       a simple one4'--p4  
#edg4    ,agreeing in this general view 
of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's merits1 we      
should be  disposed to describe them in 
language stronger and more emphatic as  
to  degree1 than that which has just    
been cited4 ,but what is stated in the  
pages immediately following 7pp4 #eej1  
#eea7--,that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's       
doctrines appear to be usually taken up 
under the stimulus of some  special     
dispute1 and often afterwards forgotten2
 ,that he did not think  out subjects   
until they were thoroughly mastered1 or 
until consistency  was attained between 
the different views which the author    
took from  different points of          
observation2 ,that accordingly1 his     
philosophy seems  made up of scraps from
 several conflicting metaphysical       
systems--,all  this is literally and    

amply borne out by the many             
inconsistencies and  contradictions     
which ,mr ,mill has brought to view in  
the preceding  chapters4 ,it would      
appear that the controversial           
disposition was  powerful with ,sir ,w4 
,hamilton1 and that a present impulse of
 that sort  7as has been said respecting
 ,bayle1 ,burke1 and others7 not only   
served  to provoke new intellectual     
combinations in his mind1 but also      
exercised a ,lethan influence in causing
 obliviscence of the old4 ,but we  can  
hardly follow ,mr ,mill in ascribing the
 defect to 'excessive  absorption of    
time and energy by the study of old     
writers' 7p4 #eea74 ,if  this study did 
no other good1 it at least kept the     
memory in exercise4  ,now1 what         
surprises us most in ,sir ,w4           
,hamilton's inconsistencies1 is the     
amount of self-forgetfulness which they 
imply4    ,while the laborious erudition
 of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton cannot be fairly 
regarded as having produced any of his  

intellectual defects1 it  undoubtedly   
stamped upon him his special title of   
excellence as a  philosopher4 ,this is  
fully recognized by ,mr ,mill2 though he
 treats it as  belonging not so much to 
a philosopher as to an historian of     
philosophy4  ,he concludes 7pp4         
#eeb--eed73--         ',it is much to be
 regretted that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton did  
not       write the history of          
philosophy1 instead of choosing1 as     
the direct object of his intellectual   
exertions1 philosophy       itself4 ,he 
possessed a knowledge of the materials  
such as no       one1 probably for many 
generations1 will take the trouble of   
acquiring again4 ,independently of the  
great interest and       value attaching
 to a knowledge of the historical       
development       of speculation1 there 
is much in the old writers on           
philosophy1 even those of the middle    
ages1 really worth       preserving for 
its scientific value4 ,but this should  
be       extracted1 and rendered into   

the phraseology of modern       thought1
 by persons as familiar with that as    
with the       ancient1 and possessing a
 command of its language3 a             
combination never yet so perfectly      
realized as in ,sir ,w4       ,hamilton4
 ,this1 which no one but himself could  
have done1 he       has left undone1 and
 has given us1 instead1 a contribution  
to mental philosophy1 which has been    
more than equalled by       many not    
superior to him in powers1 and wholly   
destitute of       erudition4 ,of all   
persons in modern times entitled to the 
name of philosophers1 the two1 probably1
 whose reading on       the subject was 
the scantiest1 in proportion to their   
intellectual capacity1 were ,archbishop 
,whately and ,dr ,brown4                
,accordingly they are the only two of   
whom ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1       though   
acknowledging their abilities1 speaks   
with some       tinge of                
superciliousness4 ,it cannot be denied  
that both ,dr       ,brown and ,whately 

would have thought and written better   
than       they did1 if they had been   
better read in the writings of          
previous thinkers2 but ,i am not afraid 
that posterity will       contradict me 
when ,i say1 that either of them has    
done far       greater service to the   
world in the origination and            
diffusion of important thought1 than    
,sir ,w4 ,hamilton with       all his   
learning2 because1 though indolent      
readers1 they       were both of them   
active and fertile thinkers4            
',it is not that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's   
erudition is not       frequently of    
real use to him on particular questions 
of       philosophy4 ,it does him one   
valuable service3 it enables him        
to know all the various opinions which  
can be held on the       questions he   
discusses1 and to conceive and express  
them       clearly1 leaving none of them
 out4 ,this it does1 though even        
this not always2 but it does little     
else1 even of what might       be       

expected from erudition when enlightened
 by philosophy4       ,he knew1 with    
extraordinary accuracy1 the ,greek3 hoti
 of       each philosopher's opinions1  
but gave himself little trouble         
about the ,greek3 dihoti4 ,with one     
exception1 ,i find no       remark      
bearing upon that point in any part of  
his writings4       ,i imagine he would 
have been much at a loss if he had been 
required to draw up a philosophical     
estimate of the mind of       any great 
thinker4 ,he never seems to look at any 
opinion of       a philosopher in       
connection with the same philosopher's  
other opinions4 ,accordingly he is weak 
as to the mutual       relations of     
philosophical doctrines4 ,one of the    
most       striking examples of this    
inability is in the case of             
,leibnitz1' c4    ,here we find in a few
 sentences the conclusion which ,mr     
,mill conceives  to be established by   
his book4 ,we shall state how far we are
 able to  concur with it4 ,he has       

brought the matter to a direct issue1 by
 weighing  ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in the    
balance against two other actual        
cotemporaries2  instead of comparing him
 with some unrealized ideal found only  
in the  fancy of critics and reviewers4 
,comparing ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton with ,dr  
,brown1 we cordially subscribe to the   
opinion of ,mr ,mill4 ,we think that ,dr
 ,brown has 'done far greater  service  
to the world than ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 in
 the origination and  diffusion of      
important thought4' ,to speak only of   
two chief subjects in  the field of     
important thought--,causality and the   
,freedom of the  ,will--we not only     
adopt the conclusions of ,dr ,brown1 but
 we admire both  his acuteness and his  
originality in vindicating and          
illustrating the  first of the two1     
while we dissent entirely from the views
 of ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton4 ,this alone    
would be sufficient to make us approve  
the  superiority assigned by ,mr ,mill  
to ,dr ,brown4 ,we discover no          

compensating  item to be placed to the  
credit of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton3 for the   
great  doctrine of the ,relativity of   
,knowledge1 which is our chief point of 
philosophical brotherhood with him1 was 
maintained by ,brown also4    ,but in   
regard to ,dr ,whately1 our judgment is 
altogether different4 ,we  cannot       
consent to admit him as a superior1 or  
even as an equal1 to ,sir  ,w4          
,hamilton1 'in the origination and      
diffusion of important thought4' ,he    
did much service by reviving an         
inclination and respect for ,logic1 and 
by clearing up a part of the technical  
obscurity which surrounded it3  but we  
look upon him as an acute and           
liberal-minded ,english theologian1     
enlarging usefully1 though timidly1 the 
intellectual prison in which  many      
orthodox minds are confined--rather than
 as a fit aspirant to the  cosmopolitan 
honours of philosophy4 ',an active and  
fertile thinker1' ,mr  ,mill calls      
,whately2 and such he undoubtedly was4  

,but such also we  consider ,sir ,w4    
,hamilton to have been in a degree1 at  
least equal4 ,if  the sentence which we 
have quoted above be intended to deny   
the  predicate1 'active and fertile     
thinker1' of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 we     
cannot  acquiesce in it4 ,his intellect 
appears to us thoroughly active and     
fertile1 even when we dissent from his  
reasonings--nay1 even in the  midst of  
his inconsistencies1 when a new growth  
of opinions is  unexpectedly pushed up  
on ground which we supposed to be       
already  pre-occupied by another both   
older and different4 ,and we find this  
same  judgment implied in the           
discriminating remarks upon his         
philosophical  procedure made by ,mr    
,mill himself--7pp4 #bga1 #bgb74 ,for   
example1  respecting ,causality and the 
,freedom of the ,will1 we detect no want
 of  activity and fertility1 though     
marked evidence of other                
defects--especially the unconditional   
surrender of a powerful mind to  certain

 privileged inspirations1 worshipped as 
'necessities of thought4'    ,while thus
 declaring how far we concur in the     
parallel here drawn of ,sir  ,w4        
,hamilton with ,brown and ,whately1 we  
must at the same time add that  the     
comparison is taken under circumstances 
unduly favourable to these  two last4   
,there has been no exposure of their    
errors and  inconsistencies1 equal in   
penetration and completeness to the     
crushing  volume which ,mr ,mill has    
devoted to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,to make 
the odds  fair1 he ought to furnish a   
similar systematic examination to ,brown
 and  ,whately2 enabling us to read     
their works 7as we now do those of ,sir 
,w4  ,hamilton7 with the advantage of   
his unrivalled microscope1 which detects
  the minutest breach or incoherence in 
the tissue of reasoning--and of  his    
large command of philosophical          
premisses1 which brings into full       
notice what the author had overlooked4  
,thus alone could the competition       

between the three be rendered perfectly 
fair4    ,we regret1 as ,mr ,mill does1 
that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton did not         
undertake the  composition of a history 
of philosophy4 ,nevertheless we must    
confess  that we should hardly feel such
 regret1 if we could see evidence to    
warrant ,mr ,mill's judgment 7p4 #eed7  
that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton was             
'indifferent to the ,greek3 dihoti of a 
man's opinions1 and that he was         
incompetent to draw up an estimate of   
the opinions of any great  thinker1' c4 
,such incompetence1 if proved to be     
frequent and  considerable1 would       
deprive an author of all chance of      
success in  writing a history of        
philosophy4 ,but the study of ,sir      
,william ,hamilton's  works does not    
prove it to us1 though ,mr ,mill has    
convicted him of an  erroneous estimate 
of ,leibnitz4 ,we say frequent and      
considerable1  because no historian of  
philosophy is exempt from the defect    
more or  less2 or rather 7to pass out of

 the self-confidence of the ,absolute   
into  the modesty of the ,relative7 we  
seldom find any historian whose estimate
  of great philosophical thinkers does  
not often differ from our own4  ,hence  
we are glad when ample original extracts
 are produced1 enabling us  to test the 
historian1 and judge for ourselves--a   
practice which ,sir ,w4  ,hamilton would
 have required no stimulus to enforce   
upon him4 ,there  ought1 indeed1 to be  
various histories of philosophy1        
composed from  different points of view2
 for the ablest historian cannot get    
clear of  a certain exclusiveness       
belonging to himself4 ,but1 so far as we
 can  conjecture what ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton
 would or could have done1 we think     
that a history of philosophy composed by
 him would have surpassed any  work of  
the kind in our language4    ,we trust  
that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's works will    
long continue to be read1  along with   
,mr ,mill's examination of them2 and we 
should be glad if the  works of other   

philosophers could be read along with a 
comment of equal  acuteness and         
impartiality4 ,any point of view which  
could command the  adherence of such a  
mind as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's1 deserves  
to be fully  considered4 ,moreover1 the 
living force of philosophy1 as          
directress of  human intelligence1      
depends upon keeping up in each of her  
devotees a  full mastery of many        
divergent and opposite veins of         
reasoning--a  knowledge1 negative and   
affirmative1 of the full case of        
opponents as  well as of his own4    ,it
 is to ,philosophy alone that our       
allegiance is sworn2 and while we       
concur mostly with ,mr ,mill's opinions1
 we number both him and ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton as a noble pair of brethren1  
serving alike in her train4    ,amicus  
,hamilton2 magis amicus ,mill2 amica    
ante omnes ,philosophia4  ,,footnotes3  
,footnote #a3 ,mr ,mansel and ,mr       
,veitch1 the editors of ,sir ,w4        
,hamilton's  ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 

posthumously published1 say in their    
preface  7p4 xiii47--    ',for twenty   
years--from #ahcf to #ahef--the courses 
of logic and  metaphysics were the means
 through which ,sir ,william ,hamilton  
sought to  discipline and imbue with his
 philosophical opinions the numerous    
youth  who gathered from ,scotland and  
other countries to his classroom2 and   
while1 by these prelections1 the author 
supplemented1 developed1 and  moulded   
the national philosophy1 leaving thereon
 the ineffaceable  impress of his genius
 and learning1 he1 at the same time and 
by the same  means1 exercised over the  
intellects and feelings of his pupils an
  influence which1 for depth1 feeling1  
and elevation1 was certainly never      
surpassed by that of any philosophical  
instructor4 ,among his pupils  there are
 not a few who1 having lived for a      
season under the  constraining power of 
his intellect1 and been led to reflect  
on those  great questions regarding the 
character1 origin1 and bounds of human  

knowledge1 which his teaching stirred   
and quickened1 bear the memory of  their
 beloved and revered instructor         
inseparably blended with what is        
highest in their present intellectual   
life1 as well as in their  practical    
aims and aspirations4'    ,footnote #b3 
,we are happy to find such high         
authorities as ,dr ,whewell1  ,mr       
,samuel ,bailey1 and ,sir ,john         
,herschel concurring in this estimation 
of  the new logical point of view thus  
opened by ,mr ,mill4 ,we will not call  
it a discovery1 since ,sir ,john        
,herschel thinks the expression         
unsuitable4--,see the recent sixth      
edition of the ',system of ,logic1' vol4
  i4 p4 #bbi4    ,footnote #c3 ,see ,sir
 ,william4 ,hamilton's ',lectures on    
,logic' 7,lect4  xvii4 p4 #cbj1 #cba2   
also ,appendix to those ,lectures1 p4   
#cfa74 ,he here  distinguishes also     
formal induction from1 material         
induction1 which  latter he brings under
 the grasp of syllogism1 by an          

hypothesis in  substance similar to that
 of ,whately4 ,there is1 however1 in    
,lecture xix4  7p4 #chj71 a passage in a
 very different spirit1 which one might 
almost  imagine to have been written by 
,mr ,mill3 ',in regard to simple        
syllogisms1 it was an original dogma of 
the ,platonic school1 and an  early     
dogma of the ,peripatetic1 that science1
 strictly so called1 was  only          
conversant with1 and was exclusively    
contained in1 universals2 and  the      
doctrine of ,aristotle1 which taught    
that all our general knowledge  is only 
an induction from an observation of     
particulars1 was too easily  forgotten  
or perverted by his followers4 ,it thus 
obtained almost the  force of an        
acknowledged principle that everything  
to be known must be  known under some   
general form or notion4 ,hence the      
exaggerated  importance attributed to   
definition and deduction2 it not being  
considered that we only take out of a   
general notion what we had  previously  

placed therein1 and that the            
amplification of our knowledge  is not  
to be sought for from above but from    
below--not from speculation  about      
abstract generalities1 but from the     
observation of concrete  particulars4   
,bat however erroneous and irrational1  
the persuasion had  its day and         
influence1 and it perhaps determined1 as
 one of its effects1  the total neglect 
of one half1 and that not the least     
important half of  the reasoning        
process4'    ,these very just           
observations are suggested to ,sir      
,william ,hamilton by a  train of       
thought which has little natural        
tendency to suggest them1  viz41 by the 
distinction upon which he so much       
insists1 between the  logic of          
comprehension and the logic of          
extension1 and by his anxiety to        
explain why the former had been         
exclusively cultivated and the latter   
neglected4    ,that which ,sir ,william 
,hamilton calls here truly the doctrine 

of  ,aristotle 7enunciated especially at
 the close of the ,analyt4 ,post471 and 
which he states to have been forgotten  
by ,aristotle's followers1 was not      
always remembered by ,aristotle himself4
    ,footnote #d3 ,the distinction is   
given by ,stier and other logicians4 #a4
  ,infinitum simpliciter4 #b4 ,infinitum
 secundum quid1 sive in certo  genere4  
,footnote #e3 ,this doctrine has been   
affirmed 7so far as reason is           
concerned1 apart from revelation7 not   
merely by ,mr ,mansel1 but also by      
,pascal1 one of the most religious      
philosophers of the seventeenth         
century1 in the ',penses'3--            
',parlons selon les lumieres naturelles4
 ,s'il y a un ,dieu1 il est  infiniment 
incomprhensible2 puisque1 n'ayant ni    
principes ni bornes1 il  n'a nul rapport
  nous2 nous sommes done incapables de  
connitre ni ce  qn'il est1 ni s'il      
est4'--7,see ,arago1 ,biographie de     
,condorcet1 p4  lxxxiv41 prefixed to his
 edition of ,condorcet's works47        

,footnote #f3 ,the indictment under     
which ,socrates was condemned at        
,athens1 as reported by ,xenophon at the
 commencement of the ,memorabilia1  ran 
thus--',socrates is guilty of crime1    
inasmuch as he does not believe  in     
those ,gods in whom the ,city believes1 
but introduces other novelties  in      
regard to the ,gods2 he is guilty also1 
inasmuch as he corrupts the  youth4'    
,these words express clearly a sentiment
 entertained not merely by the          
,athenian people1 but generally by other
 societies also4 ,they all agree  in    
antipathy to free1 individual1          
dissenting reason2 though that          
antipathy manifests itself by acts1 more
 harsh in one place1 less harsh  in     
another4 ,the ,hindoo who declares      
himself a convert to ,christianity1     
becomes at the same time an outcast     
7,greek3 aphrhtr1 athhemistos1          
anhestios7 among those whose ,gods he   
has deserted4 ,as a general fact1  the  
man who dissents from his fellows upon  

fundamentals of religion1  purchases an 
undisturbed life only by being content  
with that  'semi-liberty under silence  
and concealment1' for which ,cicero was 
thankful under the dictatorship of      
,julius ,csar4 ',obsecro--abiiciamus    
ista et semi-liberi saltern1 simus2 quod
 assequemur et tacendo et  latendo'     
7,epist4 ad ,attic1 xiii4 #ca74         
,contrast with this the memorable       
declaration of ,socrates1 in the        
,platonic ,apology1 that silence and    
abstinence from cross-examination were  
intolerable to him2 that life  would not
 be worth having under such conditions4 
,footnote #g3 ,aeschyl4 ,prometh41      
#iif-ajjf--      pros tauta1 rhipthesth 
men aithaloussa phlox1    leykoptherps  
de niphadi kai bronthmasin              
chthonhiois kykhat phanta kahi tarasshet
    gnhampsei gar ouden tndhe m'----    
eiselthet se mhpot1 hs eg1 ,dios        
gnhmn phobtheis1 thlhynoys genhsomai1   
kai liparhs ton mhega stygohymenon      
gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhn1    

lyshai me dhesmn tnde toy pantos ohe4   
,also v4 #ajdg1 et seq4 ,the memorable  
ode of ,goethe1 entitled  ,prometheus1  
embodies a similar vein of sentiment in 
the finest  poetry4    ,footnote #h3    
,euripid ,hippol41 #aj--      7,aph7 oh 
gar me thaeseos pais1 ',amazonos tokos  
monos politon taesde gaes ,troizaenias  
legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai     
,phoibou d' adelphaen ,artemin1--       
tima1 megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--   
7,hipp47 taen saen dhe ,khyprin pholl'  
heg ,chairein lhego--    7#aab47    ,see
 also v4 #acbh--adjb4    ,footnote #i3  
,herodot4 t4 #cb4 ,o ,kroise1           
epistumenon me to theion pan eohn       
phthonerohn te kai taraxodes1 epeirotas 
ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri2  also   
iii4 #dj    ,footnote #aj3 ,see ,eurip4 
,hipp41 #f-if-adi4 ,the language of the 
attendant1  after his affectionate      
remonstrance to ,hippolytus had been    
disregarded1  supplicating ,aphrodit to 
pardon the recalcitrancy of that        
virtuous but  obstinate youth1 is       

characteristic and touching 7#aad-abj47 
,footnote #aa3 ,see especially his      
chapter ii4 on the ,sensations of       
,sight1  pp4 #bbb1 #bda--bdg1 in the    
second edition of this work4            
,footnote #ab3 ,descartes says1 in his  
',principia ,philosophi1' i #ea--';,et  
quidem substantia qu null plan re       
indigeat1 unica tantum potest           
intelligi--nempe ,deus4 ,alias vero     
omnes1 non nisi ope concurss ,dei       
existere posse perspicimus4 ,atque ideo 
nomen substanti non convenit ,deo  et   
illis univoc1 ut dici solet in scholis1 
hoc est1 nulla ejus  nominis            
significatio potest distinct intelligi1 
qu ,deo et creaturis  sit communis4'    
,footnote #ac3 ,at the same time1 we    
cannot go along with ,mr ,mill in the   
following affirmation 7p4 #bja73--      
',this natural probability is converted 
into certainty when we take into        
consideration that universal law of our 
experience which is termed the  ,law of 
,causation1 and which makes us unable to

 conceive the beginning  of anything    
without an antecedent condition1 or     
cause4' ,such  'inability to conceive'  
appears to us not in correspondence with
 facts4  ,first1 it cannot be properly  
either affirmed or denied1 until        
agreement  is obtained what the word    
cause means4 ,if three persons1 ,a1 ,b1 
and ,c1  agree in affirming it--,a      
adopting the meaning of ,aristotle1 ,b  
that of  ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and ,c
 that of ,mr ,mill--the agreement is    
purely  verbal2 or rather1 all three    
concur in having a mental exigency      
pressing  for satisfaction1 but differ  
as to the hypothesis which satisfies it4
    ,next1 if we reason upon ,mr ,mill's
 theory as to ,cause1 certainly those   
who deny his theory can have no         
difficulty in conceiving events without 
any cause 7in that sense73 nor have     
those who adopt this theory any  greater
 difficulty4 ,these latter believe that 
there are1 throughout1  constant and    
uniform conditions on which the         

occurrence of every event  depends2 but 
they can perfectly conceive events as   
occurring without  any such uniform     
sequence4 ,in truth1 the belief in such 
causation1 as  pervading all nature1 is 
an acquired result of scientific        
training4  ,the greater part of mankind 
believe that some events occur in       
regular1  others in irregular           
succession4 ,moreover1 a full half of   
the  metaphysical world espouse the     
doctrine of free-will1 and consider that
  all volitions occur without any cause 
at all4    ,footnote #ad3 ,among the    
various authorities 7upon this question 
of  quantifying the predicate7 collected
 by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in the valuable  
,appendix to his ',lectures on ,logic1' 
we find one 7p4 #caa7 which takes  the  
same ground of objection as ,mr ,mill1  
in these words3--',the cause why  the   
quantitative note is not usually joined 
with the predicate1 is1 that  there     
would thus be two qusita at once2 to    
wit1 whether the predicate  were        

affirmed of the subject1 and whether it 
were denied of everything  beside4 ,for 
when we say1 all man is all rational1 we
 judge that all  man is rational1 and   
judge likewise that rational is denied  
of  everything but man4 ,but these are1 
in reality1 two different qusita2  and  
therefore it has become usual to state  
them1 not in one1 but in two  several   
propositions4 ,and this is self-evident1
 seeing that a  qusitum1 in itself1 asks
 only--,does or does not this inhere in 
that8 and not ,does or does not this    
inhere in that1 and at the same  time   
inhere in nothing else8'    ,the author 
of this just and sagacious remark--much 
surpassing what the  other writers      
quoted in the ,appendix say--was a ,jew 
who died at  ,perpignan in or near      
#acgj1 named ,levi ,ben ,gerson or      
,gersonides4 ,an  interesting account of
 this man1 eminent as a writer and      
thinker in his  age1 will be found in a 
biography by ,dr ,joel1 published at    
,breslau in  #ahfb1 ',levi ,ben ,gerson 

als ,religions--philosoph4' ,he         
distinguished  himself as a writer on   
theology1 philosophy1 and astronomy2 he 
was one  of the successors to the free  
speculative vein of ,maimonides1 and one
 of  the continuators of the ,arabic    
,aristotelian philosophy4 ,he both      
commented on and combated the doctrines 
of ,averroes4 ,dr ,joel thinks that  he 
died earlier than #acgj4