,,on ,,compromise ',it makes all the difference in the world whether we put ,truth in the first place or in the second place4' ,,whatley ,,on ,,compromise ,,by ,,john ,,morley ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited ,,st4 ,,martin',s ,,street1 ,,london #aijh ,this ,edition first printed #ahhf ,,note4 ,the writer has availed himself of the opportunity of a new edition to add three or four additional illustrations in the footnotes4 ,the criticisms on the first edition call for no remark1 excepting this1 perhaps1 that the present little volume has no pretensions to be anything more than an ,essay4 ,to judge such it performance as if it professed to be an exhaustive ,treatise in casuistry1 is to subject it to tests which it was never designed to bear4 ,merely to open questions1 to indicate points1 to suggest cases1 to sketch outlines1--as an ,essay does all these things1--may often be a process not without its own modest usefulness and interest4 ,may #d1 #ahgg4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introductory4 ,design of this ,essay ,the question stated ,suggested by some existing tendencies in ,england ,comparison with other countries ,test of this comparison ,the absent quality specifically defined ,history and decay of some recent aspirations ,illustrations ,characteristics of one present mood ,analysis of its causes 7#a7 ,influence of ,french examples 7#b7 ,influence of the ,historic ,method 7#c7 ,influence of the ,newspaper ,press 7#d7 ,increase of material prosperity 7#e7 ,transformation of the spiritual basis of thought 7#f7 ,influence of a ,state ,church ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,possible ,,utility ,,of ,,error ,questions of a dual doctrine lies at the outset of our inquiry ,this doctrine formulated ,marks the triumph of status quo ,psychological vindication of such a doctrine ,answered by assertion of the dogmatic character of popular belief ,and the pernicious social influence of its priests ,the root idea of the defenders of a dual doctrine ,thesis of the present chapter1 against that idea ,examination of some of the pleas for error ,i4 ,that a false opinion may be clothed with good associations ,,ii4 ,that all minds are not open to reason ,,iii4 ,that a false opinion1 considered in relation to the general mental attitude1 may be less hurtful than its premature demolition ,,iv4 ,that mere negative truth is not a guide ,v4 ,that error has been a stepping-stone to truth ,we cannot tell how much truth has been missed ,inevitableness is not utility ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,intellectual ,,responsibility ,,and ,,the ,,political ,,spirit4 ,the modern disciplina arcani ,hume's immoral advice ,evil intellectual effects of immoral compromise ,depravation that follows its grosser forms ,the three provinces of compromise ,radical importance of their separation ,effects of their confusion in practical politics ,economy or management in the ,formation of opinion ,its lawfulness turns on the claims of majority and minority over one another ,thesis of the present chapter ,its importance1 owing to the supremacy of the political spirit in ,england ,effects of the predominance of this spirit ,contrasted with epochs of intellectual responsibility ,a modern movement against the political spirit ,an objection considered ,importance to character of rationalised conviction1 and of ideals ,the absence of them attenuates conduct ,illustrations in modern politics ,modern latitudinarianism ,illustration in two supreme issues ,pascal's remarks upon a state of ,doubt ,dr4 ,newman on the same ,three ways of dealing with the issues ,another illustration of intellectual improbity ,the ,savoyard ,vicar ,mischievousness of substituting spiritual self-indulgence for reason ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,religious ,,conformity4 ,compromise in ,expression ,touches religion rather than politics ,hume on non-resistance ,reason why rights of free speech do not exactly coincide with rights of free thought ,digression into the matter of free speech ,dissent no longer railing and vituperative ,tendency of modern free thought to assimilate some elements from the old faith ,a wide breach still remains ,heresy1 however1 no longer traced to depravity ,tolerance not necessarily acquiescence in scepticism ,object of the foregoing digression ,the rarity of plain-speaking a reason why it is painful ,conformity in the relationship between child and parent ,between husband and wife ,in the education of children ,the case of an unbelieving priest ,the case of one who fears to lose his influence ,conformity not harmless nor unimportant ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,realisation ,,of ,,opinion4 ,the application of opinion to conduct ,tempering considerations ,not to be pressed too far ,our action in realising our opinions depends on our social theory ,legitimate and illegitimate compromise in view of that ,the distinction equally sound on the evolutional theory ,condition of progressive change ,a plea for compromise examined ,a second plea ,the allegation of provisional usefulness examined ,illustrated in religious institutions ,in political institutions ,burke's commendation of political compromise ,the saying that small reforms may be the worst enemies of great ones ,in what sense true ,illustration in the ,elementary ,education ,act ,wisdom of social patience ,the considerations which apply to political practice do not apply to our own lives ,nor to the publication of social opinions ,the amount of conscience in a community ,evil of attenuating this element ,historic illustration ,new side of the discussion ,is earnestness of conviction fatal to concession of liberty to others8 ,two propositions at the base of an affirmative answer ,earnestness of conviction consistent with sense of liability to error ,belief in one's own infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance ,the contrary notion due to juristic analogies in social discussion ,connection between the doctrine of liberty and social evolution ,the timid compromisers superfluous apprehension ,material limits to the effect of moral speculation ,illustration from the history of ,slavery ,illustration from ,french history ,practical influence of a faith in the self-protecting quality of a society ,conclusion ,,note ,,to ,,page #bdb4 ,the ,doctrine of ,liberty ,,on ,,compromise4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introductory4 ,the design of the following essay is to consider1 in a short and direct way1 some of the limits that are set by sound reason to the practice of the various arts of accommodation1 economy1 management1 conformity1 or compromise4 ,the right of thinking freely and acting independently1 of using our minds without excessive awe of authority1 and shaping our lives without unquestioning obedience to custom1 is now a finally accepted principle in some sense or other with every school of thought that has the smallest chance of commanding the future4 ,under what circumstances does the exercise and vindication of the right1 thus conceded in theory1 become a positive duty in practice8 ,if the majority are bound to tolerate dissent from the ruling opinions and beliefs1 under what conditions and within what limitations is the dissentient imperatively bound to avail himself of this toleration8 ,how far1 and in what way1 ought respect either for immediate practical convenience1 or for current prejudices1 to weigh against respect for truth8 ,for how much is it well that the individual should allow the feelings and convictions of the many to count1 when he comes to shape1 to express1 and to act upon his own feelings and convictions8 ,are we only to be permitted to defend general principles1 on condition that we draw no practical inferences from them8 ,is every other idea to yield precedence and empire to existing circumstances1 and is the immediate and universal workableness of a policy to be the main test of its intrinsic fitness8 ,to attempt to answer all these questions fully would be nothing less than to attempt a compendium of life and duty in all their details1 a ,summa of cases of conscience1 a guide to doubters at every point of the compass4 ,the aim of the present writer is a comparatively modest one2 namely1 to seek one or two of the most general principles which ought to regulate the practice of compliance1 and to suggest some of the bearings which they may have in their application to certain difficulties in modern matters of conduct4 ,it is pretty plain that an inquiry of this kind needs to be fixed by reference to a given set of social circumstances tolerably well understood4 ,there are some common rules as to the expediency of compromise and conformity1 but their application is a matter of endless variety and the widest elasticity4 ,the interesting and useful thing is to find the relation of these too vague rules to actual conditions2 to transform them into practical guides and real interpreters of what is right and best in thought and conduct1 in a special and definite kind of emergency4 ,according to the current assumptions of the writer and the preacher1 the one commanding law is that men should cling to truth and right1 if the very heavens fall4 ,in principle this is universally accepted4 ,to the partisans of authority and tradition it is as much a commonplace as to the partisans of the most absolute and unflinching rationalism4 ,yet in practice all schools alike are forced to admit the necessity of a measure of accommodation in the very interests of truth itself4 ,fanatic is a name of such ill repute1 exactly because one who deserves to be called by it injures good causes by refusing timely and harmless concession2 by irritating prejudices that a wiser way of urging his own opinion might have turned aside2 by making no allowances1 respecting no motives1 and recognising none of those qualifying principles1 which are nothing less than necessary to make his own principle true and fitting in a given society4 ,the interesting question in connection with compromise obviously turns upon the placing of the boundary that divides wise suspense in forming opinions1 wise reserve in expressing them1 and wise tardiness in trying to realise them1 from unavowed disingenuousness and self-illusion1 from voluntary dissimulation1 and from indolence and pusillanimity4 ,these are the three departments or provinces of compromise4 ,our subject is a question of boundaries4#a ,and this question1 being mainly one of time and circumstance1 may be most satisfactorily discussed in relation to the time and the circumstances which we know best1 or at least whose deficiencies and requirements are most pressingly visible to us4 ,though ,england counts her full share of fearless truth-seekers in most departments of inquiry1 yet there is on the whole no weakening1 but a rather marked confirmation1 of what has become an inveterate national characteristic1 and has long been recognised as such2 a profound distrust1 namely1 of all general principles2 a profound dislike both of much reference to them1 and of any disposition to invest them with practical authority2 and a silent but most pertinacious measurement of philosophic truths by political tests4 ',it is not at all easy1 humanly speaking1' says one who has tried the experiment1 'to wind an ,englishman up to the level of dogma4' ,the difficulty has extended further than the dogma of theology4 ,the supposed antagonism between expediency and principle has been pressed further and further away from the little piece of true meaning that it ever could be rightly allowed to have1 until it has now come to signify the paramount wisdom of counting the narrow1 immediate1 and personal expediency for everything1 and the whole1 general1 ultimate1 and completed expediency for nothing4 ,principle is only another name for a proposition stating the terms of one of these larger expediencies4 ,when principle is held in contempt1 or banished to the far dreamland of the philosopher and the student1 with an affectation of reverence that in a materialist generation is in truth the most overweening kind of contempt1 this only means that men are thinking much of the interests of to-day1 and little of the more ample interests of the many days to come4 ,it means that the conditions of the time are unfriendly to the penetration and the breadth of vision which disclose to us the whole range of consequences that follow on certain kinds of action or opinion1 and unfriendly to the intrepidity and disinterestedness which make us willing to sacrifice our own present ease or near convenience1 in the hope of securing higher advantages for others or for ourselves in the future4 ,let us take politics1 for example4 ,what is the state of the case with us1 if we look at national life in its broadest aspect8 ,a ,german has his dream of a great fatherland which shall not only be one and consolidated1 but shall in due season win freedom for itself1 and be as a sacred hearth whence others may borrow the warmth of freedom and order for themselves4 ,a ,spaniard has his vision either of militant loyalty to ,god and the saints and the exiled line of his kings1 or else of devotion to the newly won liberty and to the raising up of his fallen nation4 ,an ,american1 in the midst of the political corruption which for the moment obscures the great democratic experiment1 yet has his imagination kindled by the size and resources of his land1 and his enthusiasm fired by the high destinies which he believes to await its people in the centuries to come4 ,a ,frenchman1 republican or royalist1 with all his frenzies and 'fool-fury' of red or white1 still has his hope and dream and aspiration1 with which to enlarge his life and lift him on an ample pinion out from the circle of a poor egoism4 ,what stirs the hope and moves the aspiration of our ,englishman8 ,surely nothing either in the heavens above or on the earth beneath4 ,the ,english are as a people little susceptible in the region of the imagination4 ,but they have done good work in the world1 acquired a splendid historic tradition of stout combat for good causes1 founded a mighty and beneficent empire2 and they have done all this notwithstanding their deficiencies of imagination4 ,their lands have been the home of great and forlorn causes1 though they could not always follow the transcendental flights of their foreign allies and champions4 ,if ,englishmen were not strong in imagination1 they were what is better and surer1 strong in their hold of the great emancipating principles4 ,what great political cause1 her own or another's1 is ,england befriending to-day8 ,to say that no great cause is left1 is to tell us that we have reached the final stage of human progress1 and turned over the last leaf in the volume of human improvements4 ,the day when this is said and believed marks the end of a nation's life4 ,is it possible that1 after all1 our old protestant spirit1 with its rationality1 its austerity1 its steady political energy1 has been struck with something of the mortal fatigue that seizes catholic societies after their fits of revolution8 ,we need not forget either the atrocities or the imbecilities which mark the course of modern politics on the ,continent4 ,i am as keenly alive as any one to the levity of ,france1 and the ,greek3 hubris of ,germany4 ,it may be true that the ordinary ,frenchman is in some respects the victim of as poor an egoism as that of the ordinary ,englishman2 and that the ,american has no advantage over us in certain kinds of magnanimous sentiment4 ,what is important is the mind and attitude1 not of the ordinary man1 but of those who should be extraordinary4 ,the decisive sign of the elevation of a nation's life is to be sought among those who lead or ought to lead4 ,the test of the health of a people is to be found in the utterances of those who are its spokesmen1 and in the action of those whom it accepts or chooses to be its chiefs4 ,we have to look to the magnitude of the issues and the height of the interests which engage its foremost spirits4 ,what are the best men in a country striving for8 ,and is the struggle pursued intrepidly and with a sense of its size and amplitude1 or with creeping foot and blinking eye8 ,the answer to these questions is the answer to the other question1 whether the best men in the country are small or great4 ,it is a commonplace that the manner of doing things is often as important as the things done4 ,and it has been pointed out more than once that ,england's most creditable national action constantly shows itself so poor and mean in expression that the rest of ,europe can discern nothing in it but craft and sinister interest4 ,our public opinion is often rich in wisdom1 but we lack the courage of our wisdom4 ,we execute noble achievements1 and then are best pleased to find shabby reasons for them4 ,there is a certain quality attaching alike to thought and expression and action1 for which we may borrow the name of grandeur4 ,it has been noticed1 for instance1 that ,bacon strikes and impresses us1 not merely by the substantial merit of what he achieved1 but still more by a certain greatness of scheme and conception4 ,this quality is not a mere idle decoration4 ,it is not a theatrical artifice of mask or buskin1 to impose upon us unreal impressions of height and dignity4 ,the added greatness is real4 ,height of aim and nobility of expression are true forces4 ,they grow to be an obligation upon us4 ,a lofty sense of personal worth is one of the surest elements of greatness4 ,that the lion should love to masquerade in the ass's skin is not modesty and reserve1 but imbecility and degradation4 ,and that ,england should wrap herself in the robe of small causes and mean reasons is the more deplorable1 because there is no nation in the world the substantial elements of whose power are so majestic and imperial as our own4 ,our language is the most widely spoken of all tongues1 its literature is second to none in variety and power4 ,our people1 whether ,english or ,american1 have long ago superseded the barbarous device of dictator and ,caesar by the manly arts of self-government4 ,we understand that peace and industry are the two most indispensable conditions of modern civilisation1 and we draw the lines of our policy in accordance with such a conviction4 ,we have had imposed upon us by the unlucky prowess of our ancestors the task of ruling a vast number of millions of alien dependents4 ,we undertake it with a disinterestedness1 and execute it with a skill of administration1 to which history supplies no parallel1 and which1 even if time should show that the conditions of the problem were insoluble1 will still remain for ever admirable4 ,all these are elements of true pre-eminence4 ,they are calculated to inspire us with the loftiest consciousness of national life4 ,they ought to clothe our voice with authority1 to nerve our action by generous resolution1 and to fill our counsels with weightiness and power4 ,within the last forty years ,england has lost one by one each of those enthusiasms which may have been illusions1--some of them undoubtedly were so1--but which at least testified to the existence among us1 in a very considerable degree1 of a vivid belief in the possibility of certain broad general theories being true and right1 as well as in the obligation of making them lights to practical conduct and desire4 ,people a generation ago had eager sympathy with ,hungary1 with ,italy1 with ,poland1 because they were deeply impressed by the doctrine of nationalities4 ,they had again a generous and energetic hatred of such an institution as the negro slavery of ,america1 because justice and humanity and religion were too real and potent forces within their breasts to allow them to listen to those political considerations by which ,american statesmen used to justify temporising and compromise4 ,they had strong feelings about ,parliamentary ,reform1 because they were penetrated by the principle that the possession of political power by the bulk of a society is the only effective security against sinister government2 or else by the principle that participation in public activity1 even in the modest form of an exercise of the elective franchise1 is an elevating and instructing agency2 or perhaps by the principle that justice demands that those who are compelled to obey laws and pay national taxes should have a voice in making the one and imposing the other4 ,it may be said that the very fate of these aspirations has had a blighting effect on public enthusiasm and the capacity of feeling it4 ,not only have most of them now been fulfilled1 and so passed from aspiration to actuality1 but the results of their fulfilment have been so disappointing as to make us wonder whether it is really worth while to pray1 when to have our prayers granted carries the world so very slight a way forward4 ,the ,austrian is no longer in ,italy2 the ,pope has ceased to be master in ,rome2 the patriots of ,hungary are now in possession of their rights1 and have become friends of their old oppressors2 the negro slave has been transformed into an ,american citizen4 ,at home1 again1 the gods have listened to our vows4 ,parliament has been reformed1 and the long-desired mechanical security provided for the voter's freedom4 ,we no longer aspire after all these things1 you may say1 because our hopes have been realised and our dreams have come true4 ,it is possible that the comparatively prosaic results before our eyes at the end of all have thrown a chill over our political imagination4 ,what seemed so glorious when it was far off1 seems perhaps a little poor now that it is near2 and this has damped the wing of political fancy4 ,the old aspirations have vanished1 and no new ones have arisen in their place4 ,be the cause what it may1 ,i should express the change in this way1 that the existing order of facts1 whatever it may be1 now takes a hardly disputed precedence with us over ideas1 and that the coarsest political standard is undoubtingly and finally applied over the whole realm of human thought4 ,the line taken up by the press and the governing classes of ,england during the ,american ,civil ,war may serve to illustrate the kind of mood which we conceive to be gaining firmer hold than ever of the national mind4 ,those who sympathised with the ,southern ,states listened only to political arguments1 and very narrow and inefficient political arguments1 as it happened1 when they ought to have seen that here was an issue which involved not only political ideas1 but moral and religious ideas as well4 ,that is to say1 the ordinary political tests were not enough to reveal the entire significance of the crisis1 nor were the political standards proper for measuring the whole of the expediencies hanging in the balance4 ,the conflict could not be adequately gauged by such questions as whether the ,slave ,states had or had not a constitutional right to establish an independent government2 whether the ,free ,states were animated by philanthropy or by love of empire2 whether it was to the political advantage of ,england that the ,american ,union should be divided and consequently weakened4 ,such questions were not necessarily improper in themselves1 and we can imagine circumstances in which they might be not only proper but decisive4 ,but1 the circumstances being what they were1 the narrower expediencies of ordinary politics were outweighed by one of those supreme and indefeasible expediencies which are classified as moral4 ,these are1 in other words1 the higher1 wider1 more binding1 and transcendent part of the master art of social wellbeing4 ,here was only one illustration of the growing tendency to substitute the narrowest political point of view for all the other ways of regarding the course of human affairs1 and to raise the limitations which practical exigencies may happen to set to the application of general principles1 into the very place of the principles themselves4 ,nor is the process of deteriorating conviction confined to the greater or noisier transactions of nations4 ,it is impossible that it should be so4 ,that process is due to causes which affect the mental temper an a whole1 and pour round us an atmosphere that enervates our judgment from end to end1 not more in politics than in morality1 and not more in morality than in philosophy1 in art1 and in religion4 ,perhaps this tendency never showed itself more offensively than when the most important newspaper in the country criticised our great naturalist's scientific speculations as to the descent of man1 from the point of view of property1 intelligence1 and a stake in the country1 and severely censured him for revealing his particular zoological conclusions to the general public1 at a moment when the sky of ,paris was red with the incendiary flames of the ,commune4 ,it would be hard to reduce the transformation of all truth into a subordinate department of daily politics1 to a more gross and unseemly absurdity4 ,the consequences of such a transformation1 of putting immediate social convenience in the first place1 and respect for truth in the second1 are seen1 as we have said1 in a distinct and unmistakable lowering of the level of national life2 a slack and lethargic quality about public opinion2 a growing predominance of material1 temporary1 and selfish aims1 over those which are generous1 far-reaching1 and spiritual2 a deadly weakening of intellectual conclusiveness1 and clear-shining moral illumination1 and1 lastly1 of a certain stoutness of self-respect for which ,england was once especially famous4 ,a plain categorical proposition is becoming less and less credible to average minds4 ,or at least the slovenly willingness to hold two directly contradictory propositions at one and the same time is becoming more and more common4 ,in religion1 morals1 and politics1 the suppression of your true opinion1 if not the positive profession of what you hold to be a false opinion1 is hardly ever counted a vice1 and not seldom even goes for virtue and solid wisdom4 ,one is conjured to respect the beliefs of others1 but forbidden to claim the same respect for one's own4 ,this dread of the categorical proposition might be creditable1 if it sprang from attachment to a very high standard of evidence1 or from a deep sense of the relative and provisional quality of truth4 ,there might even be a plausible defence set up for it1 if it sprang from that formulated distrust of the energetic rational judgment in comparison with the emotional1 affective1 contemplative parts of man1 which underlies the various forms of religious mysticism4 ,if you look closely into our present mood1 it is seen to be the product mainly and above all of a shrinking deference to the status quo1 not merely as having a claim not to be lightly dealt with1 which every serious man concedes1 but as being the last word and final test of truth and justice4 ,physical science is allowed to be the sphere of accurate reasoning and distinct conclusions1 but in morals and politics1 instead of admitting that these subjects have equally a logic of their own1 we silently suspect all first principles1 and practically deny the strict inferences from demonstrated premisses4 ,faith in the soundness of given general theories of right and wrong melts away before the first momentary triumph of wrong1 or the first passing discouragement in enforcing right4 ,our robust political sense1 which has discovered so many of the secrets of good government1 which has given us freedom with order1 and popular administration without corruption1 and unalterable respect for law along with indelible respect for individual right1 this1 which has so long been our strong point1 is fast becoming our weakness and undoing4 ,for the extension of the ways of thinking which are proper in politics1 to other than political matter1 means at the same time the depravation of the political sense itself4 ,not only is social expediency effacing the many other points of view that men ought to take of the various facts of life and thought3 the idea of social expediency itself is becoming a dwarfed and pinched idea4 ,ours is the country where love of constant improvement ought to be greater than anywhere else1 because fear of revolution is less4 ,yet the art of politics is growing to be as meanly conceived as all the rest ,at elections the national candidate has not often a chance against the local candidate1 nor the man of a principle against the man of a class4 ,in parliament we are admonished on high authority that 'the policy of a party is not the carrying out of the opinion of any section of it1 but the general consensus of the whole1' which seems to be a hierophantic manner of saying that the policy of a party is one thing1 and the principle which makes it a party is another thing1 and that men who care very strongly about anything are to surrender that and the hope of it1 for the sake of succeeding in something about which they care very little or not at all4 ,this is our modern way of giving politicians heart for their voyage1 of inspiring them with resoluteness and self-respect1 with confidence in the worth of their cause and enthusiasm for its success4 ,thoroughness is a mistake1 and nailing your flag to the mast a bit of delusive heroics4 ,think wholly of to-day1 and not at all of to-morrow4 ,beware of the high and hold fast to the safe4 ,dismiss conviction1 and study general consensus4 ,no zeal1 no faith1 no intellectual trenchancy1 but as much low-minded geniality and trivial complaisance as you please4 ,of course1 all these characteristics of our own society mark tendencies that are common enough in all societies4 ,they often spring from an indolence and enervation that besets a certain number of people1 however invigorating the general mental climate may be4 ,what we are now saying is that the general mental climate itself has1 outside of the domain of physical science1 ceased to be invigorating2 that1 on the contrary1 it fosters the more inglorious predispositions of men1 and encourages a native willingness1 already so strong1 to acquiesce in a lazy accommodation with error1 an ignoble economy of truth1 and a vicious compromise of the permanent gains of adhering to a sound general principle1 for the sake of the temporary gains of departing from it4 ,without attempting an elaborate analysis of the causes that have brought about this debilitation of mental tone1 we may shortly remind ourselves of one or two facts in the political history1 in the intellectual history1 and in the religious history of this generation1 which perhaps help us to understand a phenomenon that we have all so keen an interest both in understanding and in modifying4 ,to begin with what lies nearest to the surface4 ,the most obvious agency at work in the present exaggeration of the political standard as the universal test of truth1 is to be found in some contemporary incidents4 ,the influence of ,france upon ,england since the revolution of #ahdh has tended wholly to the discredit of abstract theory and general reasoning among us1 in all that relates to politics1 morals1 and religion4 ,in #ahdh1 not in #aghi1 questions affecting the fundamental structure and organic condition of the social union came for the first time into formidable prominence4 ,for the first time those questions and the answers to them were stated in articulate formulas and distinct theories4 ,they were not merely written in books2 they so fascinated the imagination and inflamed the hopes of the time1 that thousands of men were willing actually to go down into the streets and to shed their blood for the realisation of their generous dream of a renovated society4 ,the same sight has been seen since1 and even when we do not see it1 we are perfectly aware that the same temper is smouldering4 ,those were premature attempts to convert a crude aspiration into a political reality1 and to found a new social order on a number of umcompromising deductions from abstract principles of the common weal4 ,they have had the natural effect of deepening the ,english dislike of a general theory1 even when such a theory did no more than profess to announce a remote object of desire1 and not the present goal of immediate effort4 ,it is not only the ,socialists who are responsible for the low esteem into which a spirit of political generalisation has fallen in other countries1 in consequence of ,french experience4 ,mr4 ,mill has described in a well-known passage the characteristic vice of the leaders of all ,french parties1 and not of the democratic party more than any other4 ',the commonplaces of politics in ,france1' he says1 'are large and sweeping practical maxims1 from which1 as ultimate premisses1 men reason downwards to particular applications1 and this they call being logical and consistent4 ,for instance1 they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure ought to be adopted1 because it is a consequence of the principle on which the form of government is founded2 of the principle of legitimacy1 or the principle of the sovereignty of the people4 ,to which it may be answered that if these be really practical principles1 they must rest on speculative grounds2 the sovereignty of the people 7for example7 must be a right foundation for government1 because a government thus constituted tends to produce certain beneficial effects4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as no government produces all possible beneficial effects1 but all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences2 and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them1 it would often be a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government1 than that it does1'#b ,the ,english feeling for compromise is on its better side the result of a shrewd and practical1 though informal1 recognition of a truth which the writer has here expressed in terms of ,method4 ,the disregard which the political action of ,france has repeatedly betrayed of a principle really so important has hitherto strengthened our own regard for it1 until it has not only made us look on its importance as exclusive and final1 but has extended our respect for the right kind of compromise to wrong and injurious kinds4 ,a minor event1 which now looks much less important than it did not many years ago1 but which still had real influence in deteriorating moral judgment1 was the career of a late sovereign of ,france4 ,some apparent advantages followed for a season from a rule which had its origin in a violent and perfidious usurpation1 and which was upheld by all the arts of moral corruption1 political enervation1 and military repression4 ,the advantages lasted long enough to create in this country a steady and powerful opinion that ,napoleon the ,third's early crime was redeemed by the seeming prosperity which followed4 ,the shocking prematureness of this shallow condonation is now too glaringly visible for any one to deny it4 ,not often in history has the great truth that 'morality is the nature of things' received corroboration so prompt and timely4 ,we need not commit ourselves to the optimistic or sentimental hypothesis that wickedness always fares ill in the world1 or on the other hand that whoso hearkens diligently to the divine voice1 and observes all the commandments to do them1 shall be blessed in his basket and his store and all the work of his hand4 ,the claims of morality to our allegiance1 so far as its precepts are solidly established1 rest on the same positive base as our faith in the truth of physical laws4 ,moral principles1 when they are true1 are at bottom only registered generalisations from experience4 ,they record certain uniformities of antecedence and consequence in the region of human conduct ,want of faith in the persistency of these uniformities is only a little less fatuous in the moral order than a corresponding want of faith would instantly disclose itself to be in the purely physical order4 ,in both orders alike there is only too much of this kind of fatuousness1 this readiness to believe that for once in our favour the stream shall flow up hill1 that we may live in miasmatic air unpoisoned1 that a government may depress the energy1 the self-reliance1 the public spirit of its citizens1 and yet be able to count on these qualities whenever the government itself may have broken down1 and left the country to make the best of such resources as are left after so severe and prolonged a drain4 ,this is the sense in which morality is the nature of things4 ,the system of the ,second ,empire was in the same sense an immoral system4 ,unless all the lessons of human experience were futile1 and all the principles of political morality mere articles of pedantry1 such a system must inevitably bring disaster1 as we might have seen that it was sowing the seeds of disaster4 ,yet because the catastrophe lingered1 opinion in ,england began to admit the possibility of evil being for this once good1 and to treat any reference to the moral and political principles which condemned the imperial system1 and all systems like it1 beyond hope or appeal1 as simply the pretext of a mutinous or ,utopian impatience4 ,this1 however1 is only one of the more superficial influences which have helped and fallen in with the working of profounder causes of weakened aspiration and impoverished moral energy1 and of the substitution of latitudinarian acquiescence and faltering conviction for the whole-hearted assurance of better times4 ,of these deeper causes1 the most important in the intellectual development of the prevailing forms of thought and sentiment is the growth of the ,historic ,method4 ,let us consider very shortly how the abuse of this method1 and an unauthorised extension and interpretation of its conclusions1 are likely to have had something to do with the enervation of opinion4 ,the ,historic ,method may be described as the comparison of the forms of an idea1 or a usage1 or a belief1 at any given time1 with the earlier forms from which they were evolved1 or the later forms into which they were developed1 and the establishment1 from such a comparison1 of an ascending and descending order among the facts4 ,it consists in the explanation of existing parts in the frame of society by connecting them with corresponding parts in some earlier frame2 in the identification of present forms in the past1 and past forms in the present4 ,its main process is the detection of corresponding customs1 opinions1 laws1 beliefs1 among different communities1 and a grouping of them into general classes with reference to some one common feature4 ,it is a certain way of seeking answers to various questions of origin1 resting on the same general doctrine of evolution1 applied to moral and social forms1 as that which is being applied with so much ingenuity to the series of organic matter4 ,the historic conception is a reference of every state of society to a particular stage in the evolution of its general conditions4 ,ideas of law1 of virtue1 of religion1 of the physical universe1 of history1 of the social union itself1 all march in a harmonious and inter-dependent order4 ,curiosity with reference to origins is for various reasons the most marked element among modern scientific tendencies4 ,it covers the whole field1 moral1 intellectual1 and physical1 from the smile or the frown on a man's face1 up to the most complex of the ideas in his mind2 from the expression of his emotions1 to their root and relations with one another in his inmost organisation4 ,as an ingenious writer1 too soon lost to our political literature1 has put it3--',if we wanted to describe one of the most marked results1 perhaps the most marked result1 of late thought1 we should say that by it everything is made an antiquity4 ,when in former times our ancestors thought of an antiquarian1 they described him as occupied with coins and medals and ,druids' stones4 ,but now there are other relics2 indeed all matter is become such4 ,man himself has to the eye of science become an antiquity4 ,she tries to read1 is beginning to read1 knows she ought to read1 in the frame of each man the result of a whole history of all his life1 and what he is and what makes him so4'#c ,character is considered less with reference to its absolute qualities than as an interesting scene strewn with scattered rudiments1 survivals1 inherited predispositions4 ,opinions are counted rather as phenomena to be explained than as matters of truth and falsehood4 ,of usages1 we are beginning first of all to think where they came from1 and secondarily whether they are the most fitting and convenient that men could be got to accept4 ,in the last century men asked of a belief or a story1 ,is it true8 ,we now ask1 ,how did men come to take it for true8 ,in short the relations among social phenomena which now engage most attention1 are relations of original source1 rather than those of actual consistency in theory and actual fitness in practice4 ,the devotees of the current method are more concerned with the pedigree and genealogical connections of a custom or an idea than with its own proper goodness or badness1 its strength or its weakness4 ,though there is no necessary or truly logical association between systematic use of this method rightly limited1 and a slack and slipshod preference of vague general forms over definite ideas1 yet every one can see its tendency1 if uncorrected1 to make men shrink from importing anything like absolute quality into their propositions4 ,we can see also1 what is still worse1 its tendency to place individual robustness and initiative in the light of superfluities1 with which a world that goes by evolution can very well dispense4 ,men easily come to consider clearness and positiveness in their opinions1 staunchness in holding and defending them1 and fervour in carrying them into action1 as equivocal virtues of very doubtful perfection1 in a state of things where every abuse has after all had a defensible origin2 where every error has1 we must confess1 once been true relatively to other parts of belief in those who held the error2 and where all parts of life are so bound up with one another1 that it is of no avail to attack one evil1 unless you attack many more at the same time4 ,this is a caricature of the real teaching of the ,historic ,method1 of which we shall have to speak presently2 but it is one of those caricatures which the natural sloth in such matters1 and the indigenous intellectual haziness of the majority of men1 make them very willing to take for the true philosophy of things4 ,then there is the newspaper press1 that huge engine for keeping discussion on a low level1 and making the political test final4 ,to take off the taxes on knowledge was to place a heavy tax on broad and independent opinion4 ,the multiplication of journals 'delivering brawling judgments unashamed on all things all day long1' has done much to deaden the small stock of individuality in public verdicts4 ,it has done much to make vulgar ways of looking at things and vulgar ways of speaking of them stronger and stronger1 by formulating and repeating and stereotyping them incessantly from morning until afternoon1 and from year's end to year's end4 ,for a newspaper must live1 and to live it must please1 and its conductors suppose1 perhaps not altogether rightly1 that it can only please by being very cheerful towards prejudices1 very chilly to general theories1 loftily disdainful to the men of a principle4 ,their one cry to an advocate of improvement is some sagacious silliness about recognising the limits of the practicable in politics1 and seeing the necessity of adapting theories to facts4 ,as if the fact of taking a broader and wiser view than the common crowd disqualifies a man from knowing what the view of the common crowd happens to be1 and from estimating it at the proper value for practical purposes4 ,why are the men who despair of improvement to be the only persons endowed with the gift of discerning the practicable8 ,it is1 however1 only too easy to understand how a journal1 existing for a day1 should limit its view to the possibilities of the day1 and how1 being most closely affected by the particular1 it should coldly turn its back upon all that is general4 ,and it is easy1 too1 to understand the reaction of this intellectual timorousness upon the minds of ordinary readers1 who have too little natural force and too little cultivation to be able to resist the narrowing and deadly effect of the daily iteration of short-sighted commonplaces4 ,far the most penetrating of all the influences that are impairing the moral and intellectual nerve of our generation1 remain still to be mentioned4 ,the first of these is the immense increase of material prosperity1 and the second is the immense decline in sincerity of spiritual interest4 ,the evil wrought by the one fills up the measure of the evil wrought by the other4 ,we have been1 in spite of momentary declensions1 on a flood tide of high profits and a roaring trade1 and there is nothing like a roaring trade for engendering latitudinarians4 ,the effect of many possessions1 especially if they be newly acquired1 in slackening moral vigour1 is a proverb4 ,our new wealth is hardly leavened by any tradition of public duty such as lingers among the ,english nobles1 nor as yet by any common custom of devotion to public causes1 such as seems to live and grow in the ,united ,states4 ,under such conditions1 with new wealth come luxury and love of ease and that fatal readiness to believe that ,god has placed us in the best of possible worlds1 which so lowers men's aims and unstrings their firmness of purpose4 ,pleasure saps high interests1 and the weakening of high interests leaves more undisputed room for pleasure4 ,management and compromise appear among the permitted arts1 because they tend to comfort1 and comfort is the end of ends1 comprehending all ends4 ,not truth is the standard1 but the politic and the reputable4 ,are we to suppose that it is firm persuasion of the greater scripturalness of episcopacy that turns the second generation of dissenting manufacturers in our busy ,lancashire into churchmen8 ,certainly such conversions do no violence to the conscience of the proselyte1 for he is intellectually indifferent1 a spiritual neuter4 ,that brings us to the root of the matter1 the serious side of a revolution that in this social consequence is so unspeakably ignoble4 ,this root of the matter is the slow transformation now at work of the whole spiritual basis of thought4 ,every age is in some sort an age of transition1 but our own is characteristically and cardinally an epoch of transition in the very foundations of belief and conduct4 ,the old hopes have grown pale1 the old fears dim2 strong sanctions are become weak1 and once vivid faiths very numb4 ,religion1 whatever destinies may be in store for it1 is at least for the present hardly any longer an organic power4 ,it is not that supreme1 penetrating1 controlling1 decisive part of a man's life1 which it has been1 and will be again4 ,the work of destruction is all the more perturbing to timorous spirits1 and more harassing even to doughtier spirits1 for being done impalpably1 indirectly1 almost silently and as if by unseen hands4 ,those who dwell in the tower of ancient faiths look about them in constant apprehension1 misgiving1 and wonder1 with the hurried uneasy mien of people living amid earthquakes4 ,the air seems to their alarms to be full of missiles1 and all is doubt1 hesitation1 and shivering expectancy4 ,hence a decisive reluctance to commit one's self4 ,conscience has lost its strong and on-pressing energy1 and the sense of personal responsibility lacks sharpness of edge4 ,the native hue of spiritual resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of distracted1 wavering1 confused thought4 ,the souls of men have become void4 ,into the void have entered in triumph the seven devils of ,secularity4 ,and all this hesitancy1 this tampering with conviction for fear of its consequences1 this want of faithful dealing in the highest matters1 is being intensified1 aggravated1 driven inwards like a fatal disorder toward the vital parts1 by the existence of a ,state ,church4 ,while thought stirs and knowledge extends1 she remains fast moored by ancient formularies4 ,while the spirit of man expands in search after new light1 and feels energetically for new truth1 the spirit of the ,church is eternally entombed within the four corners of acts of parliament4 ,her ministers vow almost before they have crossed the threshold of manhood that they will search no more4 ,they virtually swear that they will to the end of their days believe what they believe then1 before they have had time either to think or to know the thoughts of others4 ,they take oath1 in other words1 to lead mutilated lives4 ,if they cannot keep this solemn promise1 they have at least every inducement that ordinary human motives can supply1 to conceal their breach of it4 ,the same system which begins by making mental indolence a virtue and intellectual narrowness a part of sanctity1 ends by putting a premium on something too like hypocrisy4 ,consider the seriousness of fastening up in these bonds some thousands of the most instructed and intelligent classes in the country1 the very men who would otherwise be best fitted from position and opportunities for aiding a little in the long1 difficult1 and plainly inevitable work of transforming opinion4 ,consider the waste of intelligence1 and what is assuredly not less grave1 the positive dead-weight and thick obstruction1 by which an official hierarchy so organised must paralyse mental independence in a community4 ,we know the kind of man whom this system delights to honour4 ,he was described for us five and thirty years ago by a master hand4 ',mistiness is the mother of wisdom4 ,a man who can set down half a dozen general propositions which escape from destroying one another only by being diluted into truisms2 who can hold the balance between opposites so skilfully as to do without fulcrum or beam2 who never enunciates a truth without guarding himself against being supposed to exclude the contradictory1--who holds that scripture is the only authority1 yet that the ,church is to be deferred to1 that faith only justifies1 yet that it does not justify without works1 that grace does not depend upon the sacraments1 yet is not given without them1 that bishops are a divine ordinance1 yet that those who have them not are in the same religious condition as those who have1--this is your safe man and the hope of the ,church2 this is what the ,church is said to want1 not party men1 but sensible1 temperate1 sober1 well-judging persons1 to guide it through the channel of no meaning1 between the ,scylla and ,charybdis of ,aye and ,no4'#d ,the writer then thought that such a type could not endure1 and that the ,church must become more real4 ,on the contrary1 her reality is more phantom-like now than it was then4 ,she is the sovereign pattern and exemplar of management1 of the triumph of the political method in spiritual things1 and of the subordination of ideas to the status quo4 ,it is true that all other organised priesthoods are also bodies which move within formularies even more inelastic than those of the ,establishment4 ,but then they have not the same immense social power1 nor the same temptations to make all sacrifices to preserve it4 ,they affect the intellectual temper of large numbers of people1 but the people whom they affect are not so strongly identified with the greater organs of the national life4 ,the ,state ,church is bound up in the minds of the most powerful classes with a given ordering of social arrangements1 and the consequence of this is that the teachers of the ,church have reflected back upon thorn a sense of responsibility for these arrangements1 which obscures their spirituality1 clogs their intellectual energy and mental openness1 and turns them into a political army of obstruction to new ideas4 ,they feel themselves to a certain extent discharged from the necessity of recognising the tremendous conflict in the region of belief that goes on around them1 just as if they were purely civil administrators1 concerned only with the maintenance of the present order4 ,none of this is true of the private ,churches4 ,their teachers and members regard belief as something wholly independent of the civil ordering of things4 ,however little enlightened in some respects1 however hostile to certain of the ideas by which it is sought to replace their own1 they are at least representatives of the momentous principle of our individual responsibility for the truth of our opinions4 ,they may bring their judgments to conclusions that are less in accord with modern tendencies than those of one or two schools that still see their way to subscribing ,anglican articles and administering ,anglican rites4 ,at any rate1 they admit that the use of his judgment is a duty incumbent on the individual1 and a duty to be discharged without reference to any external considerations whatever1 political or otherwise4 ,this is an elevating1 an exhilarating principle1 however deficiencies of culture may have narrowed the sphere of its operations4 ,it is because a ,state ,church is by its very conception hostile to such a principle1 that we are justified in counting it apart from the private ,churches with all their faults1 and placing it among the agencies that weaken the vigour of a national conscience and check the free play and access of intellectual light4 ,here we may leave the conditions that have made an inquiry as to some of the limits of compromise1 which must always be an interesting and important subject1 one of especial interest and importance to ourselves at present4 ,is any renovation of the sacredness of principle a possible remedy for some of these elements of national deterioration8 ,they will not disappear until the world has grown into possession of a new doctrine4 ,when that comes1 all other good things will follow4 ,what we have to remember is that the new doctrine itself will never come1 except to spirits predisposed to their own liberation4 ,our day of small calculations and petty utilities must first pass away2 our vision of the true expediencies must reach further and deeper2 our resolution to search for the highest verities1 to give up all and follow them1 must first become the supreme part of ourselves4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #a3 ,see below1 ch4 iii4 ,footnote #b3 ,system of ,logic1 bk4 vi4 ch4 xi4 ,footnote #c3 ,bagehot4 ,footnote #d3 ,dr4 ,j4,h4 ,newman's ,essays ,critical and ,historical1 vol4 i4 p4 #cja4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,possible ,,utility ,,of ,,error4 ,das ,wahre frdert2 aus dem ,irrthum entwickelt sich nichts1 er verwickeltuns nur4-- ,,goethe4 ,at the outset of an inquiry how far existing facts ought to be allowed to overrule ideas and principles that are at variance with them1 a preliminary question lies in our way1 about which it may be well to say something4 ,this is the question of a dual doctrine4 ,in plainer words1 the question whether it is expedient that the more enlightened classes in a community should upon system not only possess their light in silence1 but whether they should openly encourage a doctrine for the less enlightened classes which they do not believe to be true for themselves1 while they regard it as indispensably useful in the case of less fortunate people4 ,an eminent teacher tells us how after he had once succeeded in presenting the principle of ,necessity to his own mind in a shape which seemed to bring with it all the advantages of the principle of ,free ,will1 he 'no longer suffered under the burden so heavy to one who aims at being a reformer in opinions1 of thinking one doctrine true1 and the contrary doctrine morally beneficial4'#e ,the discrepancy which this writer thought a heavy burden has struck others as the basis of a satisfactory solution4 ,nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere ,edita doctrina sapientum templa serena1 ,despicere unde queas alios passimque videre ,errare atque viam palantes quaerere vitae4 ,the learned are to hold the true doctrine2 the unlearned are to be taught its morally beneficial contrary4 ',let the ,church1' it has been said1 'admit two descriptions of believers1 those who are for the letter1 and those who hold by the spirit4 ,at a certain point in rational culture1 belief in the supernatural becomes for many an impossibility2 do not force such persons to wear a cowl of lead4 ,do not you meddle with what we teach or write1 and then we will not dispute the common people with you2 do not contest our place in the school and the academy1 and then we will surrender to your hands the country school4'#f ,this is only a very courageous and definite way of saying what a great many less accomplished persons than ,m4 ,renan have silently in their hearts1 and in ,england quite as extensively as in ,france4 ,they do not believe in hell1 for instance1 but they think hell a useful fiction for the lower classes4 ,they would deeply regret any change in the spirit or the machinery of public instruction which would release the lower classes from so wholesome an error4 ,and as with hell1 so with other articles of the supernatural system2 the existence of a ,being who will distribute rewards and penalties in a future state1 the permanent sentience of each human personality1 the vigilant supervision of our conduct1 as well as our inmost thoughts and desires1 by the heavenly powers2 and so forth4 ,let us discuss this matter impersonally1 without reference to our own opinions and without reference to the evidence for or against their truth4 ,i am not speaking now of those who hold all these ideas to be certainly true1 or highly probable1 and who at the same time incidentally insist on the great usefulness of such ideas in confirming morality and producing virtuous types of character4 ,with such persons1 of course1 there is no question of a dual doctrine4 ,they entertain certain convictions themselves1 and naturally desire to have their influence extended over others4 ,the proposition which we have to consider is of another kind4 ,it expresses the notions of those who--to take the most important kind of illustration--think untrue the popular ideas of supernatural interference in our obscure human affairs2 who think untrue the notion of the prolongation of our existence after death to fulfil the purpose of the supernatural powers2 or at least who think them so extremely improbable that no reasonable man or woman1 once awakened to a conviction of this improbability1 would thenceforth be capable of receiving effective check or guidance from beliefs1 that would have sunk slowly down to the level of doubtful guesses4 ,we have now to deal with those who while taking this view of certain doctrines1 still declare them to be indispensable for restraining from anti-social conduct all who are not acute or instructed enough to see through them4 ,in other words1 they think error useful1 and that it may be the best thing for society that masses of men should cheat and deceive themselves in their most fervent aspirations and their deepest assurances4 ,this is the furthest extreme to which the empire of existing facts over principles can well be imagined to go4 ,it lies at the root of every discussion upon the limits which separate lawful compromise or accommodation from palpable hypocrisy4 ,it will probably be said that according to the theory of the school of which ,m4 ,renan is the most eloquent representative1 the common people are not really cheating themselves or being cheated4 ,indeed ,m4 ,renan himself has expatiated on the charm of seeing figures of the ideal in the cottages of the poor1 images representing no reality1 and so forth4 ',what a delight1' he cries1 'for the man who is borne down by six days of toil to come on the seventh to rest upon his knees1 to contemplate the tall columns1 a vault1 arches1 an altar2 to listen to the chanting1 to hear moral and consoling words6'#g ,the dogmas which criticism attacks are not for these poor people 'the object of an explicit affirmation1' and therefore there is no harm in them2 'it is the privilege of pure sentiment to be invulnerable1 and to play with poison without being hurt by it4' ,in other words1 the dogmas are false1 but the liturgy1 as a performance stirring the senses of awe1 reverence1 susceptibility to beauty of various kinds1 appeals to and satisfies a sentiment that is both true and indispensable in the human mind4 ,more than this1 in the two or three supreme moments of life to which men look forward and on which they look back1--at birth1 at the passing of the threshold into fulness of life1 at marriage1 at death1--the ,church is present to invest the hour with a certain solemn and dignified charm4 ,that is the way in which the instructed are to look at the services of a ,church1 after they have themselves ceased to believe its faith1 us a true account of various matters which it professes to account for truly4 ,it will be perceived that this is not exactly the ground of those who think a number of what they confess to be untruths1 wholesome for the common people for reasons of police1 and who would maintain churches on the same principle on which they maintain the county constabulary4 ,it is a psychological1 not a political ground4 ,it is on the whole a more true1 as well as a far more exalted position4 ,the human soul1 they say1 has these lovely and elevating aspirations2 not to satisfy them is to leave man a dwarfed creature4 ,why quarrel with a system that leaves you to satisfy them in the true way1 and does much to satisfy thorn in a false but not very harmful way among those who unfortunately have to sit in the darkness of the outer court8 ,this is not a proper occasion for saying anything about the adequateness of the catholic1 or any other special manner of fostering and solacing the religious impulses of men4 ,we have to assume that the instructed class believe the catholic dogmas to be untrue1 and yet wishes the uninstructed to be handed over to a system that reposes on the theory that these dogmas are superlatively true4 ,what then is to be said of the tenableness of such a position8 ,to the plain man it looks like a deliberate connivance at a plan for the propagation of error--assuming1 as ,i say1 for the moment1 that these articles of belief are erroneous and contrary to fact and evidence4 ,ah1 but1 we are told1 the people make no explicit affirmation of dogma2 that does nothing for them2 they are indifferent to it4 ,a great variety of things might be said to this statement4 ,we might ask1 for instance1 whether the people ever made an explicit affirmation of dogma in the past1 or whether it was always the hazy indifferent matter which it is supposed to be now4 ,if so1 whether we shall not have to re-cast our most fundamental notions of the way in which ,christian civilisation has been evolved4 ,if not1 and if people did once explicitly affirm dogma1 when exactly was it that they ceased to do so8 ,the answers to these questions would all go to show that at the time when religion was the great controlling and organising force in conduct1 the prime elemental dogmas were accepted with the most vivid conviction of reality4 ,i do not pretend that the common people followed all the inferences which the intellectual subtlety of the master-spirits of theology drew so industriously from the simple premisses of scripture and tradition4 ,but assuredly dogma was at the foundation of the whole structure4 ,when did it cease to be so8 ,how was the structure supported1 after you had altered this condition of things8 ,apart from this historic issue1 the main question one would like to put to the upholder of duality of religion on this plea1 is the simple one1 whether the power of the ceremonial which charms him so much is not actually at this moment drawn wholly from dogma and the tradition of dogma2 whether its truth is not explicitly affirmed to the unlettered man1 and whether the inseparable connection between the dogma and the ceremonial is not constantly impressed upon him by the spiritual teachers to whom the dual system hands him and his order over for all time8 ,if any one of those philosophic critics will take the trouble to listen to a few courses of sermons at the present day1 and the remark applies not less to protestant than to catholic churches1 he will find that instead of that 'parole morale et consolante' which is so soothing to think of1 the pulpit is now the home of fervid controversy and often exacerbated declamation in favour of ancient dogma against modern science4 ,we do not say whether this is or is not the wisest line for the clergy to follow4 ,we only press the fact against those who wish us to believe that dogma counts for nothing in the popular faith1 and that therefore we need not be uneasy as to its effects4 ,next1 one would say to those who think that all will go well if you divide the community into two classes1 one privileged to use its own mind1 the other privileged to have its mind used by a priesthood1 that they overlook the momentous circumstance of these professional upholders of dogmatic systems being also possessed of a vast social influence in questions that naturally belong to another sphere4 ,there is hardly a single great controversy in modern politics1 where the statesman does not find himself in immediate contact with the real or supposed interests1 and with the active or passive sentiment1 of one of these religious systems4 ,therefore if the instructed or intellectually privileged class cheerfully leave the field open to men who1 ex hypothesi1 are presumed to be less instructed1 narrower1 more impenetrable by reason1 and the partisans of the letter against the spirit1 then this result follows4 ,they are deliberately strengthening the hands of the persons least fitted by judgment1 experience1 and temper1 for using such power rightly4 ,and they are strengthening them not merely in dealing with religious matters1 but1 what is of more importance1 in dealing with an endless variety of the gravest social and political matters4 ,it is impossible to map out the exact dimensions of the field in which a man shall exercise his influence1 and to which he is to be rigorously confined4 ,give men influence in one matter1 especially if that be such a matter as religious belief and ceremonial1 and it is simply impossible that this influence shall not extend with more or less effect over as much of the whole sphere of conduct as they may choose surrendering the common people without dispute or effort to organised priesthoods for religious purposes1 you would be inevitably including a vast number of other purposes in the self-same destination4 ,this does not in the least prejudice practical ways of dealing with certain existing circumstances1 such as the propriety or justice of allowing a catholic people to have a catholic university4 ,it is only an argument against erecting into a complete and definite formula the division of a society into two great castes1 the one with a religion of the spirit1 the other with a creed of the letter4 ,again1 supposing that the enlightened caste were to consent to abandon the common people to what are assumed to be lower and narrower forms of truth1--which is after all little more than a fine phrase for forms of falsehood1--what can be more futile than to suppose that such a compromise will be listened to for a single moment by a caste whose first principle is that they are the possessors and ministers1 not of an inferior or superior form of truth1 but of the very truth itself1 absolute1 final1 complete1 divinely sent1 infallibly interpreted8 ,the disciples of the relative may afford to compromise4 ,the disciples of the absolute1 never4 ,we shall see other objections as we go on to this state of things1 in which a minority holds true opinions and abandons the majority to false ones4 ,at the bottom of the advocacy of a dual doctrine slumbers the idea that there is no harm in men being mistaken1 or at least only so little harm as is more than compensated for by the marked tranquillity in which their mistake may wrap them4 ,this is not an idea merely that intellectual error is a pathological necessity of the mind1 no more to be escaped than the pathological necessities which afflict and finally dissolve the body4 ,that is historically true4 ,it is an idea that error somehow in certain stages1 where there is enough of it1 actually does good1 like vaccination4 ,well1 the thesis of the present chapter is that erroneous opinion or belief1 in itself and as such1 can never be useful4 ,this may seem a truism which everybody is willing to accept without demur4 ,but it is one of those truisms which persons habitually forget and repudiate in practice1 just because they have never made it real to themselves by considering and answering the objections that may be brought against it4 ,we see this repudiation before our eyes every day4 ,thus for instance1 parents theoretically take it for granted that error cannot be useful1 while they are teaching or allowing others to teach their children what they1 the parents1 believe to be untrue4 ,thus husbands who think the common theology baseless and unmeaning1 are found to prefer that their wives shall not question this theology nor neglect its rites4 ,these are only two out of a hundred examples of the daily admission that error may be very useful to other people4 ,i need hardly say that to deny this1 as the commonplace to which this chapter is devoted denies it1 is a different thing from denying the expediency of letting errors alone at a given time4 ,that is another question1 to be discussed afterwards4 ,you may have a thoroughly vicious and dangerous enemy1 and yet it may be expedient to choose your own hour and occasion for attacking him4 ',the passage from error to truth1' in the words of ,condorcet1 'may be accompanied by certain evils4 ,every great change necessarily brings some of these in its train2 and though they may be always far below the evil you are for destroying1 yet it ought to do what is possible to diminish them4 ,it is not enough to do good2 one must do it in a good way4 ,no doubt we should destroy all errors1 but as it is impossible to destroy them all in an instant1 we should imitate a prudent architect who1 when obliged to destroy a building1 and knowing how its parts are united together1 sets about its demolition in such a way as to prevent its fall from being dangerous4'#h ,those1 let us note by the way1 who are accustomed to think the moral tone of the eighteenth century low and gross compared with that of the nineteenth1 may usefully contrast these just and prudent word8 of caution in extirpating error1 with ,m4 ,renan's invitation to men whom he considers wrong in their interpretation of religion1 to plant their error as widely and deeply as they can2 and who are moreover themselves supposed to be demoralised1 or else they would not be likely to acquiesce in a previous surrender of the universities to men whom they think in mortal error4 ,apart however from ,m4 ,renan1 ,condorcet's words merely assert the duty of setting to work to help on the change from false to true opinions with prudence1 and this every sensible man admits4 ,our position is that in estimating the situation1 in counting up and balancing the expediencies of an attack upon error at this or that point1 nothing is to be set to the credit of error as such1 nor is there anything in its own operations or effects to entitle it to a moment's respite4 ,every one would admit this at once in the case of physical truths1 though there are those who say that some of the time spent in the investigation of physical truths might be more advantageously devoted to social problems4 ,but in the case of moral and religious truths or errors1 people1 if they admit that nothing is to be set to the credit of error as such1 still constantly have a subtle and practically mischievous confusion in their minds between the possible usefulness of error1 and the possible expediency of leaving it temporarily undisturbed4 ,what happens in consequence of such a confusion is this4 ,men leave error undisturbed1 because they accept in a loose way the proposition that a belief may be 'morally useful without being intellectually sustainable1' ,they disguise their own dissent from popular opinions1 because they regard such opinions as useful to other people4 ,we are not now discussing the case of those who embrace a creed for themselves1 on the ground that1 though they cannot demonstrate its truth to the understanding1 yet they find it pregnant with moralising and elevating characteristics4 ,we are thinking of a very different attitude--that1 namely1 of persons who believe a creed to be not more morally useful than it is intellectually sustainable1 so far as they themselves are concerned4 ,to them it is pure and uncompensated error4 ,yet from a vague and general idea that what is useless error to them may be useful to others1 they insist on doing their best to perpetuate the system which spreads and consecrates the error4 ,and how do they settle the question8 ,they reckon up the advantages1 and forget the drawbacks4 ,they detect and dwell on one or two elements of utility in the false belief or the worn-out institution1 and leave out of all account the elements that make in the other direction4 ,considering how much influence this vague persuasion has in encouraging a well-meaning hypocrisy in individuals1 and a profound stagnation in societies1 it may be well to examine the matter somewhat generally4 ,let us try to measure the force of some of the most usual pleas for error4 ,i4 ,a false opinion1 it may be said1 is frequently found to have clustering around it a multitude of excellent associations1 which do far more good than the false opinion that supports them1 does harm4 ,in the middle ages1 for instance1 there was a belief that a holy man had the gift of routing demons1 of healing the sick1 and of working divers other miracles4 ,supposing that this belief was untrue1 supposing that it was an error to attribute the sudden death of an incredible multitude of troublesome flies in a church to the fact of ,saint ,bernard having excommunicated them1 what then8 ,the mistaken opinion was still associated with a deep reverence for virtue and sanctity1 and this was more valuable1 than the error of the explanation of the death of the flies was noxious or degrading4 ,the answer to this seems to be as follows4 ,first1 in making false notions the proofs or close associates of true ones1 you are exposing the latter to the ruin which awaits the former4 ,for example1 if you have in the minds of children or servants associated honesty1 industry1 truthfulness1 with the fear of hell-fire1 then supposing this fear to become extinct in their minds1--which1 being unfounded in truth1 it is in constant risk of doing--the virtues associated with it are likely to be weakened exactly in proportion as that association was strong4 ,second1 for all good habits in thought or conduct there are good and real reasons in the nature of things4 ,to leave such habits attached to false opinions is to lessen the weight of these natural or spontaneous reasons1 and so to do more harm in the long run than effacement of them seems for a time to do good4 ,most excellences in human character have a spontaneous root in our nature4 ,moreover if they had not1 and where they have not1 there is always a valid and real external defence for them4 ,the unreal defence must be weaker than the real one1 and the substitution of a weak for a strong defence1 where both are to be had1 is not useful but the very opposite4 ,,ii4 ,it is true1 the objector would probably continue1 that there is a rational defence for all excellences of conduct1 as there is for all that is worthy and fitting in institutions4 ,but the force of a rational defence lies in the rationality of the man to whom it is proffered4 ,the arguments which persuade one trained in scientific habits of thought1 only touch persons of the same kind4 ,character is not all pure reason4 ,that fitness of things which you pronounce to be the foundation of good habits1 may be borne in upon men1 and may speak to them1 through other channels than the syllogism4 ,you assume a community of highly-trained wranglers and proficient sophisters4 ,the plain fact is that1 for the mass of men1 use and wont1 rude or gracious symbols1 blind custom1 prejudices1 superstitions1--however erroneous in themselves1 however inadequate to the conveyance of the best truth1--are the only safe guardians of the common virtues4 ,in this sense1 then1 error may have its usefulness4 ,a hundred years ago this apology for error was met by those high-minded and interesting men1 the ,french believers in human perfectibility1 with their characteristic dogma1--of which ,rousseau was the ardent expounder1--that man is born with a clear and unsophisticated spirit1 perfectly able to discern all the simple truths necessary for common conduct by its own unaided light4 ,his motives are all pure and unselfish and his intelligence is unclouded1 until priests and tyrants mutilate the one and corrupt the other4 ,we who have the benefit of the historic method1 and have to take into account the medium that surrounds a human creature the moment it comes into the world1 to say nothing of all the inheritance from the past which it brings within it into the world at the same moment1 cannot take up this ground4 ,we cannot maintain that everybody is born with light enough to see the rational defences of things for himself1 without the education of institutions4 ,what we do maintain is--and this is the answer to the plea for error at present under consideration--that whatever impairs the brightness of such light as a man has1 is not useful but hurtful4 ,our reply to those who contend for the usefulness of error on the ground of the comparative impotence of rationality over ordinary minds1 is something of this kind4 ,superstition1 blind obedience to custom1 and the other substitutes for a right and independent use of the mind1 may accidentally and in some few respects impress good ideas upon persons who are too darkened to accept those ideas on their real merits4 ,but then superstition itself is the main cause of this very darkness4 ,to hold error is in so far to foster erroneous ways of thinking on all subjects2 is to make the intelligence less and less ready to receive truth in all matters whatever4 ,men are made incapable of perceiving the rational defences1 and of feeling rational motives1 for good habits1--so far as they are thus incapable1--by the very errors which we are asked silently to countenance as useful substitutes for right reason4 ',erroneous motives1' as ,condorcet has expressed this matter1 'have an additional drawback attached to them1 the habit which they strengthen of reasoning ill4 ,the more important the subject on which you reason ill1 and the more you busy yourself about it1 by so much the more dangerous do the influences of such a habit become4 ,it is especially on subjects analogous to that on which you reason wrongly1 or which you connect with it by habit1 that such a defect extends most powerfully and most rapidly4 ,hence it is extremely hard for the man who believes himself obliged to conform in his conduct to what he considers truths useful to men1 but who attributes the obligation to erroneous motives1 to reason very correctly on the truths themselves2 the more attention he pays to such motives1 and the more importance he comes to attach to them1 the more likely he will be to go wrong4'#i ,so1 in short1 superstition does an immense harm by enfeebling rational ways of thinking2 it does a little good by accidentally endorsing rational conclusions in one or two matters4 ,and yet1 though the evil which it is said to repair is a trifle beside the evil which it is admitted to inflict1 the balance of expediencies is after all declared to be such as to warrant us in calling errors useful6 ,,iii4 ,a third objection now presents itself to me1 which ,i wish to state as strongly as possible4 ',even if a false opinion cannot in itself be more useful than a true one1 whatever good habits may seem to be connected with it1 yet1' it may be contended1 'relatively to the general mental attitude of a set of men1 to their other notions and maxims1 the false opinion may entail less harm than would be wrought by its mere demolition4 ,there are false opinions so intimately bound up with the whole way of thinking and feeling1 that to introduce one or two detached true opinions in their stead1 would1 even if it were possible1 only serve to break up that coherency of character and conduct which it is one of the chief objects of moralists and the great art of living to produce4 ,for a true opinion does not necessarily bring in its train all the other true opinions that are logically connected with it4 ,on the contrary1 it is only too notorious a fact in the history of belief1 that not merely individuals but whole societies are capable of holding at one and the same time contradictory opinions and mutually destructive principles4 ,on the other hand1 neither does a false opinion involve practically all the evil consequences deducible from it4 ,for the results of human inconsistency are not all unhappy1 and if we do not always act up to virtuous principle1 no more do we always work out to its remotest inference every vicious principle4 ,not insincerity1 but inconsistency1 has constantly turned the adherents of persecuting precepts into friends of tolerant practice4' ',it is a comparatively small thing to persuade a superstitious person to abandon this or that article of his superstition4 ,you have no security that the rejection of the one article which you have displaced will lead to the rejection of any other1 and it is quite possible that it may lead to all the more fervid an adhesion to what remains behind4 ,error1 therefore1 in view of such considerations may surely be allowed to have at least a provisional utility4' ,now undoubtedly the repudiation of error is not at all the same thing as embracing truth4 ,people are often able to see the force of arguments that destroy a given opinion1 without being able to see the force of arguments for the positive opinion that ought to replace it4 ,they can only be quite sure of seeing both1 when they have acquired not merely a conviction that one notion is false and another true1 but have furthermore exchanged a generally erroneous way of thinking for a generally correct way4 ,hence the truly important object with every one who holds opinions which he deems it of the highest moment that others should accept1 must obviously be to reach people's general ways of thinking2 to stir their love of truth2 to penetrate them with a sense of the difference in the quality of evidence2 to make them willing to listen to criticism and new opinion2 and perhaps above all to teach them to take ungrudging and daily trouble to clear up in their minds the exact sense of the terms they use4 ,if this be so1 a false opinion1 like an erroneous motive1 can hardly have even a provisional usefulness4 ,for how can you attack an erroneous way of thinking except in detail1 that is to say through the sides of this or that single wrong opinion8 ,each of these wrong opinions is an illustration and type1 as it is a standing support and abettor1 of some kind of wrong reasoning1 though they are not all on the same scale nor all of them equally instructive4 ,it is precisely by this method of gradual displacement of error step by step1 that the few stages of progress which the race has yet traversed1 have been actually achieved4 ,even if the place of the erroneous idea is not immediately taken by the corresponding true one1 or by the idea which is at least one or two degrees nearer to the true one1 still the removal of error in this purely negative way amounts to a positive gain4 ,why8 ,for the excellent reason that it is the removal of a bad element which otherwise tends to propagate itself1 or even if it fails to do that1 tends at the best to make the surrounding mass of error more inveterate4 ,all error is what physiologists term fissiparous1 and in exterminating one false opinion you may be hindering the growth of an uncounted brood of false opinions4 ,then as to the maintenance of that coherency1 interdependence1 and systematisation of opinions and motives1 which is said to make character organic1 and is therefore so highly prized by some schools of thought4 ,no doubt the loosening of this or that part of the fabric of heterogeneous origin1 which constitutes the character of a man or woman1 tends to loosen the whole4 ,but do not let us feed ourselves upon phrases4 ,this organic coherency1 what does it come to8 ,it signifies in a general way1 to describe it briefly1 a harmony between the intellectual1 the moral1 and the practical parts of human nature2 an undisturbed cooperation between reason1 affection1 and will2 the reason prescribing nothing against which the affections revolt1 and proscribing nothing which they crave2 and the will obeying the joint impulses of these two directing forces1 without liability to capricious or extravagant disturbance of their direction4 ,well1 if the reason were perfect in information and method1 and the affections faultless in their impulse1 then organic unity of character would be the final consummation of all human improvement1 and it would be criminal1 even if it were possible1 to undermine a structure of such priceless value4 ,but short of this there can be no value in coherency and harmonious consistency as such4 ,so long as error is an element in it1 then for so long the whole product is vitiated4 ,undeniably and most fortunately1 social virtues are found side by side with speculative mistakes and the gravest intellectual imperfections4 ,we may apply to humanity the idea which1 as ,hebrew students tell us1 is imputed in the ,talmud to the ,supreme ,being4 ,god prays1 the ,talmud says2 and his prayer is this1--',be it my will that my mercy overpower my justice4' ,and so with men1 with or without their will1 their mercifulness overpowers their logic4 ,and not their mercifulness only1 but all their good impulses overpower their logic4 ,to repeat the words which ,i have put into the objector's mouth1 we do not always work out every vicious principle to its remotest inference4 ,what1 however1 is this but to say that in such cases character is saved1 not by its coherency1 but by the opposite2 to say not that error is useful1 but what is a very different thing1 that its mischievousness is sometimes capable of being averted or minimised8 ,the apologist may retort that he did not mean answer to the argument from coherency of conduct4 ,in measuring utility you have to take into account not merely the service rendered to the objects of the present hour1 but the contribution to growth1 progress1 and the future4 ,from this point of view most of the talk about unity of character is not much more than a glorifying of stagnation4 ,it leaves out of sight the conditions necessary for the continuance of the unending task of human improvement4 ,now whatever ease may be given to an individual or a generation by social or religious error1 such error at any rate can conduce nothing to further advancement ,that1 at least1 is not one of its possible utilities4 ,this is also one of the answers to the following plea4 ',though the knowledge of every positive truth is an useful acquisition1 this doctrine cannot without reservation he applied to negative truth4 ,when the only truth ascertainable is that nothing can be known1 we do not1 by this knowledge1 gain any new fact by which to guide ourselves4'#aj ,but logical coherency1 but a kind of practical everyday coherency1 which may be open to a thousand abstract objections1 yet which still secures both to the individual and to society a number of advantages that might be endangered by any disturbance of opinion or motive4 ,no doubt1 and the method and season of chasing erroneous opinions and motives out of the mind must always be a matter of much careful and far-seeing consideration4 ,only in the course of such consideration1 let us not admit the notion in any form that error can have even provisional utility4 ,for it is not the error which confers the advantages that we desire to preserve1 but some true opinion or just motive or high or honest sentiment1 which exists and thrives and operates in spite of the error and in face of it1 springing from man's spontaneous and unformulated recognition of the real relations of things4 ,this recognition is very faint in the beginnings of society4 ,it grows clearer and firmer with each step forward4 ,and in a tolerably civilised age it has become a force on which you can fairly lean with a considerable degree of assurance4 ,and this leads to the central point of the the negative truth that nothing can be known is in fact a truth that guides us4 ,transcriber's note3 sic4 ,it leads us away from sterile and irreclaimable tracts of thought and emotion1 and so inevitably compels the energies which would otherwise have been wasted1 to feel after a more profitable direction4 ,by leaving the old guide-marks undisturbed1 you may give ease to an existing generation1 but the present ease is purchased at the cost of future growth4 ,to have been deprived of the faith of the old dispensation1 is the first condition of strenuous endeavour after the new4 ,no doubt history abounds with cases in which a false opinion on moral or religious subjects1 or an erroneous motive in conduct1 has seemed to be a stepping-stone to truth4 ,but this is in no sense a demonstration of the utility of error4 ,for in all such cases the erroneous opinion or motive was far from being wholly erroneous1 or wholly without elements of truth and reality4 ,if it helped to quicken the speed or mend the direction of progress1 that must have been by virtue of some such elements within it4 ,all that was error in it was pure waste1 or worse than waste4 ,it is true that the religious sentiment has clothed itself in a great number of unworthy1 inadequate1 depressing1 and otherwise misleading shapes1 dogmatic and liturgic4 ,yet on the whole the religious sentiment has conferred enormous benefits on civilisation4 ,this is no proof of the utility of the mistaken direction which these dogmatic or liturgic shapes imposed upon it4 ,on the contrary1 the effect of the false dogmas and enervating liturgies is so much that has to be deducted from the advantages conferred by a sentiment in itself valuable and of priceless capability4#aa ,yes1 it will be urged1 but from the historic conditions of the time1 truth could only be conveyed in erroneous forms1 and motives of permanent price for humanity could only be secured in these mistaken expressions4 ,here ,i would again press the point of this necessity for erroneous forms and mistaken expressions being1 in a great many of the most important instances1 itself derivative1 one among other ill consequences of previous moral and religious error4 ',it was gravely said1' ,bacon tells us1 'by some of the prelates in the ,council of ,trent1 where the doctrines of the ,schoolmen have great sway2 that the schoolmen were like ,astronomers1 which did faigne ,eccentricks and ,epicycles and ,engines of ,orbs to save the ,phenomena2 though they know there were no such ,things2 and in like manner that the ,schoolmen had framed a number of subtile and intricate ,axioms and ,theorems1 to save the practice of the ,church4' ,this is true of much else besides scholastic axioms and theorems4 ,subordinate error was made necessary and invented1 by reason of some pro-existent main stock of error1 and to save the practice of the ,church4 ,thus we are often referred to the consolation which this or that doctrine has brought to the human spirit4 ,but what if the same system had produced the terror which made absence of consolation intolerable8 ,how much of the necessity for expressing the enlarged humanity of the ,church in the doctrine of purgatory1 arose from the existence of the older unsoftened doctrine of eternal hell8 ,again1 how much of this alleged necessity of error1 as alloy for the too pure metal of sterling truth1 is to be explained by the interest which powerful castes or corporations have had in preserving the erroneous forms1 even when they could not resist1 or did not wish to resist1 their impregnation by newer and better doctrine8 ,this interest was not deliberately sinister or malignant4 ,it may be more correctly as well as more charitably explained by that infirmity of human nature1 which makes us very ready to believe what it is on other grounds convenient to us to believe4 ,nobody attributes to pure malevolence the heartiness with which the great corporation of lawyers1 for example1 resist the removal of superfluous and obstructive forms in their practice2 they have come to look on such forms as indispensable safeguards4 ,hence powerful teachers and preachers of all kinds have been spontaneously inclined to suppose a necessity1 which had no real existence1 of preserving as much as was possible of what we know to be error1 even while introducing wholesome modification of it4 ,this is the honest1 though mischievous1 conservatism of the human mind4 ,we have no right to condemn our foregoers2 far less to lavish on them the evil names of impostor1 charlatan1 and brigand1 which the zealous unhistoric school of the last century used so profusely4 ,but we have a right to say of them1 as we say of those who imitate their policy now1 that their conservatism is no additional proof of the utility of error4 ,least of all is it any justification for those who wish to have impressed upon the people a complete system of religious opinion which men of culture have avowedly put away4 ,and1 moreover1 the very priests must1 ,i should think1 be supposed to have put it away also4 ,else they would hardly be invited deliberately to abdicate their teaching functions in the very seats where teaching is of the weightiest and most far-spreading influence4 ,meanwhile our point is that the reforms in opinion which have been effected on the plan of pouring the new wine of truth into the old bottles of superstition--though not dishonourable to the sincerity of the reformers--are no testimony to even the temporary usefulness of error4 ,those who think otherwise do not look far enough in front of the event4 ,they forget the evil wrought by the prolonged duration of the error1 to which the added particle of truth may have given new vitality4 ,they overlook the ultimate enervation that is so often the price paid for the temporary exaltation4 ,nor1 finally1 can they know the truths which the error thus prolonged has hindered from coming to the birth4 ,a strenuous disputant has recently asserted against me that 'the region of the might have been lies beyond the limits of sane speculation4'#ab ,it in surely extending optimism too far to insist on carrying it back right through the ages4 ,to me at any rate the history of mankind is a huge pis-aller1 just as our present society is2 a prodigious wasteful experiment1 from which a certain number of precious results have been extracted1 but which is not now1 nor ever has been at any other time1 a final measure of all the possibilities of the time4 ,this is not inconsistent with the scientific conception of history2 it is not to deny the great law that society has a certain order of progress2 but only to urge that within that1 the only possible order1 there is always room for all kinds and degrees of invention1 improvement1 and happy or unhappy accident4 ,there is no discoverable law fixing precisely the more or the less of these2 nor how much of each of them a community shall meet with1 nor exactly when it shall meet with them4 ,we have to distinguish between possibility and necessity4 ,only certain steps in advance are possible at a given time2 but it is not inevitable that those potential advances should all be realised4 ,does anybody suppose that humanity has had the profit of all the inventive and improving capacity born into the world8 ,that ,turgot1 for example1 was the only man that ever lived who might have done more for society than he was allowed to do1 and spared society a cataclysm8 ,no1--history is a pis-aller4 ,it has assuredly not moved without the relation of cause and effect2 it is a record of social growth and its conditions2 but it is also a record of interruption and misadventure and perturbation4 ,you trace the long chain which has made us what we are in this aspect and that4 ,but where are the dropped links that might have made all the difference8 ,ubi sunt eorum tabulae qui post vota nuncupate perierunt8 ,where is the fruit of those multitudinous gifts which came into the world in untimely seasons8 ,we accept the past for the same reason that we accept the laws of the solar system1 though1 as ,comte says1 'we can easily conceive them improved in certain respects4' ,the past1 like the solar system1 is beyond reach of modification at our hands1 and we cannot help it4 ,but it is surely the mere midsummer madness of philosophic complacency to think that we have come by the shortest and easiest of all imaginable routes to our present point in the march2 to suppose that we have wasted nothing1 lost nothing1 cruelly destroyed nothing1 on the road4 ,what we have lost is all in the region of the 'might have been1' and we are justified in taking this into account1 and thinking much of it1 and in trying to find causes for the loss4 ,one of them has been want of liberty for the human intelligence2 and another1 to return to our proper subject1 has been the prolonged existence of superstition1 of false opinions1 and of attachment to gross symbols1 beyond the time when they might have been successfully attacked1 and would have fallen into decay but for the mistaken political notion of their utility4 ,in making a just estimate of this utility1 if we see reason to believe that these false opinions1 narrow superstitions1 gross symbols1 have been an impediment to the free exercise of the intelligence and a worthier culture of the emotions1 then we are justified in placing the unknown loss as a real and most weighty item in the account against them4 ,in short1 then1 the utmost that can be said on behalf of errors in opinion and motive1 is that they are inevitable elements in human growth4 ,but the inevitable does not coincide with the useful4 ,pain can be avoided by none of the sons of men1 yet the horrible and uncompensated subtraction which it makes from the value and usefulness of human life1 is one of the most formidable obstacles to the smoother progress of the world4 ,and as with pain1 so with error4 ,the moral of our contention has reference to the temper in which practically we ought to regard false doctrine and ill-directed motive4 ,it goes to show that if we have satisfied ourselves on good grounds that the doctrine is false1 or the motive ill directed1 then the only question that we need ask ourselves turns solely upon the possibility of breaking it up and dispersing it1 by methods compatible with the doctrine of liberty4 ,any embarrassment in dealing with it1 due to a semi-latent notion that it may be useful to some one else is a weakness that hinders social progress4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #e3 ,mill's ,autobiography p4 #agj4 ,footnote #f3 ,m4 ,renan's ,rforme ,intellectuelle et ,morale de la ,france1 p4 #ih4 ,footnote #g3 ,etudes d',histoire ,religieuse1 ,preface1 p4 xvi4 ,footnote #h3 ,in #aggi the ,academy of ,prussia announced this as the question for their annual prize essay3--',s'il est utile au peuple d'tre tromp4' ,they received thirty-three essays2 twenty showing that it is not useful1 thirteen showing that it is4 ,the ,academy1 with an impartiality that caused much amusement in ,paris and ,berlin1 awarded two prizes1 one to the best proof of the negative answer1 another to the best proof of the affirmative4 ,see ,bartholmess1 ,hist4 ,philosophique de l',acadmie de ,prusse1 i4 #bha1 and ii4 #bgh4 ,condorcet did not actually compete for the prize1 but he wrote a very acute piece1 suggested by the theme1 which was printed in #agij4 ,oeuv4 v4 #cdc4 ,to illustrate the common fact of certain currents of thought being in the air at given times1 we may mention that in #aggj was published the posthumous work of another ,frenchman1 ,chesneau du ,marsais 7#afgf-agef7 entitled3--',essai sur les ,prjugs2 ou de l'influence des ,opinions sur les ,moeurs et sur le ,bonheur des ,hommes4' ,the principal prejudices to which he refers are classed under ,antiquity--,ancestry--,native ,country--,religion--,respect for ,wealth4 ,some of the reasoning is almost verbally identical with ,condorcet's4 ,for an account of ,du ,marsais1 see ,d',alembert1 ,oeuv4 iii #dha4 ,footnote #i3 ,oeuv4 v4 #ced4 ,footnote #aj3 ,mill's ,three ,essays on ,religion1 p4#gc4 ,i have offered some criticisms on the whole passage in ,critical ,miscellanies1 ,second ,series1 pp4 #cjj-cjd4 ,footnote #aa3 ',enfin1 supposons pour un instant que le dogme de l'autre vie soit de quelqu'utilit1 et qu'il retienne vraiment un petit nombre d'individus1 qu'est-ce que ces foibles avantages compars la foule de maux que l'on en voir dcouler8 ,contre un homme timide que cette ide contient1 il en est des millions qu'elle ne peut contenir2 il en des millions qu'elle rend insenss1 farouches1 fanatiques1 inutiles et mchants2 il en est des millions qu'elle dtourne de leurs devoirs envers la socit2 il en est une infinit qu'elle afflige et qu'elle trouble1 sans aucun bien rel pour leurs associs4--,systme de la ,nature1 i4 xiii4 ,footnote #ab3 ,sir ,j4,f4 ,stephen's ,liberty1 ,equality1 and ,fraternity1 #b;d4 ed41 p4 #ai1 note4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,intellectual ,,responsibility ,,and ,,the ,,political ,,spirit4 ,we have been considering the position of those who would fain divide the community into two great castes2 the one of thoughtful and instructed persons using their minds freely1 but guarding their conclusions in strict reserve2 the other of the illiterate or unreflecting1 who should have certain opinions and practices taught them1 not because they are true or are really what their votaries are made to believe them to be1 but because the intellectual superiors of the community think the inculcation of such a belief useful in all cases save their own4 ,nor is this a mere theory4 ,on the contrary1 it is a fair description of an existing state of things4 ,we have the old disciplina arcani among us in as full force as in the primitive church1 but with an all-important difference4 ,the ,christian fathers practised reserve for the sake of leading the acolyte the more surely to the fulness of truth4 ,the modern economiser keeps back his opinions1 or dissembles the grounds of them1 for the sake of leaving his neighbours the more at their ease in the peaceful sloughs of prejudice and superstition and low ideals4 ,we quote ,saint ,paul when he talked of making himself all things to all men1 and of becoming to the ,jews a ,jew1 and as without the ,law to the heathen4 ,but then we do so with a view to justifying ourselves for leaving the ,jew to remain a ,jew1 and the heathen to remain heathen4 ,we imitate the same apostle in accepting old time-worn altars dedicated to the ,unknown ,god4 ,we forget that he made the ancient symbol the starting-point of a revolutionised doctrine4 ,there is1 as anybody can see1 a whole world of difference between the reserve of sagacious apostleship1 on the one hand1 dealing tenderly with scruple and tearfulness and fine sensibility of conscience1 and the reserve of intellectual cowardice on the other hand1 dealing hypocritically with narrow minds in the supposed interests of social peace and quietness4 ,the old disciplina arcani signified the disclosure of a little light with a view to the disclosure of more4 ,the new means the dissimulation of truth with a view to the perpetuation of error4 ,consider the difference between these two fashions of compromise1 in their effects upon the mind and character of the person compromising4 ,the one is fully compatible with fervour and hopefulness and devotion to great causes4 ,the other stamps a man with artifice1 and hinders the free eagerness of his vision1 and wraps him about with mediocrity1--not always of understanding1 but that still worse thing1 mediocrity of aspiration and purpose4 ,the coarsest and most revolting shape which the doctrine of conformity can assume1 and its degrading consequences to the character of the conformer1 may be conveniently illustrated by a passage in the life of ,hume4 ,he looked at things in a more practical manner than would find favour with the sentimental champions of compromise in nearer times4 ,there is a well-known letter of ,hume's1 in which he recommends a young man to become a clergyman1 on the ground that it was very hard to got any tolerable civil employment1 and that as ,lord ,bute was then all powerful1 his friend would be certain of preferment4 ,in answer to the young man's scruples as to the ,articles and the rest1 ,hume says3-- ',it is putting too great a respect on the vulgar and their superstitions to pique one's self on sincerity with regard to them4 ,if the thing were worthy of being treated gravely1 ,i should tell him the young man that the ,pythian oracle with the approbation of ,xenophon advised every one to worship the gods--,greek3 nhom pholes4 ,i wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular4 ,the common duties of society usually require it2 and the ecclesiastical profession only adds a little more to an innocent dissimulation1 or rather simulation1 without which it is impossible to pass through the world4'#ac ,this is a singularly straightforward way of stating a view which silently influences a much greater number of men than it is pleasant to think of4 ,they would shrink from throwing their conduct into so gross a formula4 ,they will lift up their hands at this quotation1 so strangely blind are we to the hiding-places of our own hearts1 even when others flash upon them the terrible illumination that comes of calling conduct and motives by plain names4 ,now it is not merely the moral improbity of these cases which revolts us--the improbity of making in solemn form a number of false statements for the sake of earning a livelihood2 of saying in order to get money or social position that you accept a number of propositions which in fact you utterly reject2 of declaring expressly that you trust you are inwardly moved to take upon you this office and ministration by the ,holy ,ghost1 when the real motive is a desire not to miss the chance of making something out of the ,earl of ,bute4 ,this side of such dissimulation is shocking enough4 ,and it is not any more shocking to the most devout believer than it is to people who doubt whether there be any ,holy ,ghost or not4 ,those who no longer place their highest faith in powers above and beyond men1 are for that very reason more deeply interested than others in cherishing the integrity and worthiness of man himself4 ,apart1 however1 from the immorality of such reasoned hypocrisy1 which no man with a particle of honesty will attempt to blink1 there is the intellectual improbity which it brings in its train1 the infidelity to truth1 the disloyalty to one's own intelligence4 ,gifts of understanding are numbed and enfeebled in a man1 who has once played such a trick with his own conscience as to persuade himself that1 because the vulgar are superstitious1 it is right for the learned to earn money by turning themselves into the ministers and accomplices of superstition4 ,if he is clever enough to see through the vulgar and their beliefs1 he is tolerably sure to be clever enough from time to time and in his better moments to see through himself4 ,he begins to suspect himself of being an impostor4 ,that suspicion gradually unmans him when he comes to use his mind in the sphere of his own enlightenment4 ,one of really superior power cannot escape these better moments and the remorse that they bring4 ,as he advances in life1 as his powers ought to be coming to fuller maturity and his intellectual productiveness to its prime1 just in the same degree the increasing seriousness of life multiplies such moments and deepens their remorse1 and so the light of intellectual promise slowly goes out in impotent endeavour1 or else in taking comfort that much goods are laid up1 or1 what is deadliest of all1 in a soulless cynicism4 ,we do not find out until it is too late that the intellect too1 at least where it is capable of being exercised on the higher objects1 has its sensitiveness4 ,it loses its colour and potency and finer fragrance in an atmosphere of mean purpose and low conception of the sacredness of fact and reality4 ,who has not observed inferior original power achieving greater results even in the intellectual field itself1 where the superior understanding happens to have been unequally yoked with a self-seeking character1 over scenting the expedient8 ,if ,hume had been in the early productive part of his life the hypocrite which he wished it were in his power to show himself in its latter part1 we may be tolerably sure that ,european philosophy would have missed one of its foremost figures4 ,it has been often said that he who begins life by stifling his convictions is in a fair way for ending it without any convictions to stifle4 ,we may1 perhaps1 add that he who sets out with the notion that the difference between truth and falsehood is a thing of no concern to the vulgar1 is very likely sooner or later to come to the kindred notion that it is not a thing of any supreme concern to himself4 ,let thus much have been said as to those who deliberately and knowingly sell their intellectual birthright for a mess of pottage1 making a brazen compromise with what they hold despicable1 lest they should have to win their bread honourably4 ,men need to expend no declamatory indignation upon them4 ,they have a hell of their own2 words can add no bitterness to it4 ,it is no light thing to have secured a livelihood on condition of going through life masked and gagged4 ,to be compelled1 week after week1 and year after year1 to recite the symbols of ancient faith and lift up his voice in the echoes of old hopes1 with the blighting thought in his soul that the faith is a lie1 and the hope no more than the folly of the crowd2 to read hundreds of times in a twelvemonth with solemn unction as the inspired word of the ,supreme what to him are meaningless as the ,abracadabras of the conjuror in a booth2 to go on to the end of his days administering to simple folk holy rites of commemoration and solace1 when he has in his mind at each phrase what dupes are those simple folk and how wearisomely counterfeit their rites3 and to know through all that this is really to be the one business of his prostituted life1 that so dreary and hateful a piece of play-acting will make the desperate retrospect of his last hours--of a truth here is the very ,greek3 bdhelygma ts ermhses1 the abomination of desolation of the human spirit indeed4 ,no one will suppose that this is designed for the normal type of priest4 ,but it is well to study tendencies in their extreme catastrophe4 ,this is only the catastrophe1 in one of its many shapes1 of the fatal doctrine that money1 position1 power1 philanthropy1 or any of the thousand seductive masks of the pseudo-expedient1 may carry a man away from love of truth and yet leave him internally unharmed4 ,the depravation that follows the trucking for money of intellectual freedom and self-respect1 attends in its degree each other departure from disinterested following of truth1 and each other substitution of convenience1 whether public or private1 in its place4 ,and both parties to such a compromise are losers4 ,the world which offers gifts and tacitly undertakes to ask no questions as to the real state of the timeserver's inner mind1 loses no less than the timeserver himself who receives the gifts and promises to hold his peace4 ,it is as though a society placed penalties on mechanical inventions and the exploration of new material resources1 and offered bounties for the steadiest adherence to all ancient processes in culture and production4 ,the injury to wealth in the one case would not be any deeper than the injury to morality is in the other4 ,to pass on to less sinister forms of this abnegation of intellectual responsibility4 ,in the opening sentences of the first chapter we spoke of a wise suspense in forming opinions1 a wise reserve in expressing them1 and a wise tardiness in trying to realise them4 ,thus we meant to mark out the three independent provinces of compromise1 each of them being the subject of considerations that either do not apply at all to the other two1 or else apply in a different degree4 ,disingenuousness or self-illusion1 arising from a depressing deference to the existing state of things1 or to what is immediately practicable1 or to what other people would think of us if they knew our thoughts1 is the result of compromising truth in the matter of forming and holding opinions4 ,secondly1 positive simulation is what comes of an unlawful willingness to compromise in the matter of avowing and publishing them4 ,finally1 pusillanimity or want of faith is the vice that belongs to unlawful compromise in the department of action and realisation4 ,this is not merely a division arranged for convenience of discussion4 ,it goes to the root of conduct and character1 and is the key to the present mood of our society4 ,it is always a hardy thing to attempt to throw a complex matter into very simple form1 but we should say that the want of energy and definiteness in contemporary opinions1 of which we first complained1 is due mainly to the following notion2 that if a subject is not ripe for practical treatment1 you and ,i are therefore entirely relieved from the duty of having clear ideas about it4 ,if the majority cling to an opinion1 why should we ask whether that is the sound and right opinion or the reverse8 ,now this notion1 which springs from a confusion of the three fields of compromise with one another1 quietly reigns almost without dispute4 ,the devotion to the practical aspect of truth is in such excess1 as to make people habitually deny that it can be worth while to form an opinion1 when it happens at the moment to be incapable of realisation1 for the reason that there is no direct prospect of inducing a sufficient number of persons to share it4 ',we are quite willing to think that your view is the right one1 and would produce all the improvements for which you hope2 but then there is not the smallest chance of persuading the only persons able to carry out such a view2 why therefore discuss it8' ,no talk is more familiar to us than this4 ,as if the mere possibility of the view being a right one did not obviously entitle it to discussion2 discussion being the only process by which people are likely to be induced to accept it1 or else to find good grounds for finally dismissing it4 ,it is precisely because we believe that opinion1 and nothing but opinion1 can effect great permanent changes1 that we ought to be careful to keep this most potent force honest1 wholesome1 fearless1 and independent4 ,take the political field4 ,politicians and newspapers almost systematically refuse to talk about a new idea1 which is not capable of being at once embodied in a bill1 and receiving the royal assent before the following ,august4 ,there is something rather contemptible1 seen from the ordinary standards of intellectual integrity1 in the position of a minister who waits to make up his mind whether a given measure1 say the disestablishment of the ,irish ,church1 is in itself and on the merits desirable1 until the official who runs diligently up and down the backstairs of the party1 tells him that the measure is practicable and required in the interests of the band4 ,on the one hand1 a leader is lavishly panegyrised for his highmindedness1 in suffering himself to be driven into his convictions by his party4 ,on the other1 a party is extolled for its political tact1 in suffering itself to be forced out of its convictions by its leader4 ,it is hard to decide which is the more discreditable and demoralising sight4 ,the education of chiefs by followers1 and of followers by chiefs1 into the abandonment in a month of the traditions of centuries or the principles of a lifetime may conduce to the rapid and easy working of the machine4 ,it certainly marks a triumph of the political spirit which the author of ,the ,prince might have admired4 ,it is assuredly mortal to habits of intellectual self-respect in the society which allows itself to be amused by the cajolery and legerdemain and self-sophistication of its rulers4 ,of course there are excellent reasons why a statesman immersed in the actual conduct of affairs1 should confine his attention to the work which his hands find to do4 ,but the fact that leading statesmen are of necessity so absorbed in the tasks of the hour furnishes all the better reason why as many other people as possible should busy themselves in helping to prepare opinion for the practical application of unfamiliar but weighty and promising suggestions1 by constant and ready discussion of them upon their merits4 ,as a matter of fact it is not the men most occupied who are usually most deaf to new ideas4 ,it is the loungers of politics1 the quidnuncs1 gossips1 bustling idlers1 who are most industrious in stifling discussion by protests against the waste of time and the loss of force involved in talking about proposals which are not exactly ready to be voted on4 ,as it is1 everybody knows that questions are inadequately discussed1 or often not discussed at all1 on the ground that the time is not yet come for their solution4 ,then when some unforeseen perturbation1 or the natural course of things1 forces on the time for their resolution1 they are settled in a slovenly1 imperfect1 and often downright vicious manner1 from the fact that opinion has not been prepared for solving them in an efficient and perfect manner4 ,the so-called settlement of the question of national education is the most recent and most deplorable illustration of what comes of refusing to examine ideas alleged to be impracticable4 ,perhaps we may venture to prophesy that the disendowment of the national church will supply the next illustration on an imposing scale4 ,gratuitous primary instruction1 and the redistribution of electoral power1 are other matters of signal importance1 which comparatively few men will consent to discuss seriously and patiently1 and for our indifference to which we shall one day surely smart4 ,a judicious and cool writer has said that 'an opinion gravely professed by a man of sense and education demands always respectful consideration--demands and actually receives it from those whose own sense and education give them a correlative right2 and whoever offends against this sort of courtesy may fairly be deemed to have forfeited the privileges it secures4'#ad ,that is the least part of the matter4 ,the serious mischief is the eventual miscarriage and loss and prodigal waste of good ideas4 ,the evil of which we have been speaking comes of not seeing the great truth1 that it is worth while to take pains to find out the best way of doing a given task1 even if you have strong grounds for suspecting that it will ultimately be done in a worse way4 ,and so also in spheres of thought away from the political sphere1 it is worth while 'to scorn delights and live laborious days' in order to make as sure as we can of having the best opinion1 even if we know that this opinion has an infinitely small chance of being speedily or ever accepted by the majority1 or by anybody but ourselves4 ,truth and wisdom have to bide their time1 and then take their chance after all4 ,the most that the individual can do is to seek them for himself1 even if he seek alone4 ,and if it is the most1 it is also the least4 ,yet in our present mood we seem not to feel this4 ,we misunderstand the considerations which should rightly lead us in practice to surrender some of what we desire1 in order to secure the rest2 and rightly make us acquiesce in a second-best course of action1 in order to avoid stagnation or retrogression4 ,we misunderstand all this1 and go on to suppose that there are the same grounds why we should in our own minds acquiesce in second-best opinions2 why we should mix a little alloy of conventional expression with the too fine ore of conviction2 why we should adopt beliefs that we suspect in our hearts to be of more than equivocal authenticity1 but into whose antecedents we do not greatly care to inquire1 because they stand so well with the general public4 ,this is compromise or economy or management of the first of the three kinds of which we are talking4 ,it is economy applied to the formation of opinion2 compromise or management in making up one's mind4 ,the lawfulness or expediency of it turns mainly1 as with the other two kinds of compromise1 upon the relative rights of the majority and the minority1 and upon the respect which is owing from the latter to the former4 ,it is a very easy thing for people endowed with the fanatical temperament1 or demoralised by the habit of looking at society exclusively from the juridical point of view1 to insist that no respect at all1 except the respect that arises from being too weak to have your own way1 is due from either to the other4 ,this shallow and mischievous notion rests either on a misinterpretation of the experience of civilised societies1 or else on nothing more creditable than an arbitrary and unreflecting temper4 ,those who have thought most carefully and disinterestedly about the matter1 are agreed that in advanced societies the expedient course is that no portion of the community should insist on imposing its own will upon any other portion1 except in matters which are vitally connected with the maintenance of the social union4 ,the question where this vital connection begins is open to much discussion4 ,the line defining the sphere of legitimate interference may be drawn variously1 whether at self-regarding acts1 or in some other condition and element of conduct4 ,wherever this line may be best taken1 not only abstract speculation1 but the practical and spontaneous tact of the world1 has decided that there are limits1 alike in the interest of majority and minority1 to the rights of either to disturb the other4 ,in other words1 it is expedient in certain affairs that the will of the majority should be absolutely binding1 while in affairs of a different order it should count for nothing1 or as nearly nothing1 as the sociable dependence of a man on his fellows will permit4 ,our thesis is this4 ,in the positive endeavour to realise an opinion1 to convert a theory into practice1 it may be1 and very often is1 highly expedient to defer to the prejudices of the majority1 to move very slowly1 to bow to the conditions of the status quo1 to practise the very utmost sobriety1 self-restraint1 and conciliatoriness4 ,the mere expression of opinion1 in the next place1 the avowal of dissent from received notions1 the refusal to conform to language which implies the acceptance of such notions1--this rests on a different footing4 ,here the reasons for respecting the wishes and sentiments of the majority are far less strong1 though1 as we shall presently see1 such reasons certainly exist1 and will weigh with all well-considering men4 ,finally1 in the formation of an opinion as to the abstract preferableness of one course of action over another1 or as to the truth or falsehood or right significance of a proposition1 the fact that the majority of one's contemporaries lean in the other direction is naught1 and no more than dust in the balance4 ,in making up our minds as to what would be the wisest line of policy if it were practicable1 we have nothing to do with the circumstance that it is not practicable4 ,and in settling with ourselves whether propositions purporting to state matters of fact are trim or not1 we have to consider how far they are conformable to the evidence4 ,we have nothing to do with the comfort and solace which they would be likely to bring to others or ourselves1 if they were taken as true4 ,a nominal assent to this truth will be instantly given even by those who in practice systematically disregard it4 ,the difficulty of transforming that nominal assent into a reality is enormous in such a community as ours4 ,of all societies since the ,roman ,republic1 and not even excepting the ,roman ,republic1 ,england has been the most emphatically and essentially political4 ,she has passed through military phases and through religious phases1 but they have been transitory1 and the great central stream of national life has flowed in political channels4 ,the political life has been stronger than any other1 deeper1 wider1 more persistent1 more successful4 ,the wars which built up our far-spreading empire were not waged with designs of military conquest2 they were mostly wars for a market4 ,the great spiritual emancipation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries figures in our history partly as an accident1 partly as an intrigue1 partly as a raid of nobles in search of spoil4 ,it was hardly until the reformed doctrine became associated with analogous ideas and corresponding precepts in government1 that people felt at home with it1 and became really interested in it4 ,one great tap-root of our national increase has been the growth of self-government1 or government by deliberative bodies1 representing opposed principles and conflicting interests4 ,with the system of self-government has grown the habit--not of tolerance precisely1 for ,englishmen when in earnest are as little in love with tolerance as ,frenchmen or any other people1 but--of giving way to the will of the majority1 so long as they remain a majority4 ,this has come to pass for the simple reason that1 on any other terms1 the participation of large numbers of people in the control and arrangement of public affairs immediately becomes unworkable4 ,the gradual concentration of power in the hands of a supreme deliberative body1 the active share of so many thousands of persons in choosing and controlling its members1 the close attention with which the proceedings of parliament are followed and watched1 the kind of dignity that has been lent to parliamentary methods by the great importance of the transactions1 have all tended in the same direction4 ,they have all helped both to fix our strongest and most constant interests upon politics1 and to ingrain the mental habits proper to politics1 far more deeply than any other1 into our general constitution and inmost character4 ,thus the political spirit has grown to be the strongest element in our national life2 the dominant force1 extending its influence over all our ways of thinking in matters that have least to do with politics1 or even nothing at all to do with them4 ,there has thus been engendered among us the real sense of political responsibility4 ,in a corresponding degree has been discouraged1 what it is the object of the present chapter to urge1 the sense of intellectual responsibility4 ,if it were inevitable that one of these two should always enfeeble or exclude the other1 if the price of the mental alacrity and open-mindedness of the age of ,pericles must always be paid in the political incompetence of the age of ,demosthenes1 it would be hard to settle which quality ought to be most eagerly encouraged by those who have most to do with the spiritual direction of a community4 ,no doubt the tone of a long-enduring and imperial society1 such as ,rome was1 must be conservative1 drastic1 positive1 hostile to the death to every speculative novelty4 ,but then1 after all1 the permanence of ,roman power was only valuable to mankind because it ensured the spread of certain civilising ideas4 ,and these ideas had originated among people so characteristically devoid of the sovereign faculty of political coherency as were the ,greeks and the ,jews4 ,in the ,greeks1 it is true1 we find not only ideas of the highest speculative fertility1 but actual political institutions4 ,still we should hardly point to ,greek history for the most favourable examples of their stable working4 ,practically and as a matter of history1 a society is seldom at the same time successfully energetic both in temporals and spirituals2 seldom prosperous alike in seeking abstract truth and nursing the political spirit4 ,there is a decisive preponderance in one direction or the other1 and the equal balance between free and active thinking1 and coherent practical energy in a community1 seems too hard to sustain4 ,the vast military and political strength of ,germany1 for instance1 did not exist1 and was scarcely anticipated in men's minds1 during the time of her most strenuous passion for abstract truth and deeper learning and new criticism4 ,in ,france never was political and national interest so debilitated1 so extinct1 as it was during the reign of ,lewis the ,fifteenth3 her intellectual interest was never so vivid1 so fruitful1 or so widely felt4 ,yet it is at least well1 and more than that1 it is an indispensable condition of social wellbeing1 that the divorce between political responsibility and intellectual responsibility1 between respect for what is instantly practicable and search after what is only important in thought1 should not be too complete and universal4 ,even if there were no other objection1 the undisputed predominance of the political spirit has a plain tendency to limit the subjects in which the men animated by it can take a real interest4 ,all matters fall out of sight1 or at least fall into a secondary place1 which do not bear more or less directly and patently upon the material and structural welfare of the community4 ,in this way the members of the community miss the most bracing1 widening1 and elevated of the whole range of influences that create great characters4 ,first1 they lose sincere concern about the larger questions which the human mind has raised up for itself4 ,second1 they lose a fearless desire to reach the true answers to them1 or if no certain answers should prove to be within reach1 then at any rate to be satisfied on good grounds that this is so4 ,such questions are not immediately discerned by commonplace minds to be of social import4 ,consequently they1 and all else that is not obviously connected with the machinery of society1 give way in the public consideration to what is so connected with it1 in a manner that cannot be mistaken4 ,again1 even minds that are not commonplace are affected for the worse by the same spirit4 ,they are aware of the existence of the great speculative subjects and of their importance1 but the pressure of the political spirit on such men makes them afraid of the conclusions to which free inquiry might bring them4 ,accordingly they abstain from inquiry1 and dread nothing so much as making up their minds4 ,they see reasons for thinking that1 if they applied themselves seriously to the formation of true opinions in this or that department1 they would come to conclusions which1 though likely to make their way in the course of some centuries1 are wholly unpopular now1 and which might ruin the influence of anybody suspected of accepting1 or even of so much as leaning towards1 them4 ,life1 they reflect1 is short2 missionaries do not pass for a very agreeable class1 nor martyrs for a very sensible class2 one can only do a trifling amount of good in the world1 at best2 it is moral suicide to throw away any chance of achieving even that trifle2 and therefore it is best not only not to express1 but not to take the trouble to acquire1 right views in this quarter or that1 and to draw clear away from such or such a region of thought1 for the sake of keeping peace on earth and superficial good will among men4 ,it would be too harsh to stigmatise such a train of thought as self-seeking and hypocritical4 ,it is the natural product of the political spirit1 which is incessantly thinking of present consequences and the immediately feasible4 ,there is nothing in the mere dread of losing it1 to hinder influence from being well employed1 so far as it goes4 ,but one can hardly overrate the ill consequences of this particular kind of management1 this unspoken bargaining with the little circle of his fellows which constitutes the world of a man4 ,if he may retain his place among them as preacher or teacher1 he is willing to forego his birthright of free explanation2 he consents to be blind to the duty which attaches to every intelligent man of having some clear ideas1 even though only provisional ones1 upon the greatest subjects of human interest1 and of deliberately preferring these1 whatever they may be1 to their opposites4 ,either an individual or a community is fatally dwarfed by any such limitation of the field in which one is free to use his mind4 ,for it is a limitation1 not prescribed by absorption in one set of subjects rather than another1 nor by insufficient preparation for the discussion of certain subjects1 nor by indolence nor incuriousness1 but solely by apprehension of the conclusions to which such use of the mind might bring the too courageous seeker4 ,if there were no other ill effect1 this kind of limitation would at least have the radical disadvantage of dulling the edge of responsibility1 of deadening the sharp sense of personal answerableness either to a ,god1 or to society1 or to a man's own conscience and intellectual self-respect4 ,how momentous a disadvantage this is1 we can best know by contemplating the characters which have sometimes lighted up the old times4 ,men were then devoutly persuaded that their eternal salvation depended on their having true beliefs4 ,any slackness in finding out which beliefs are the true ones would have to be answered for before the throne of ,almighty ,god1 at the sure risk and peril of everlasting damnation4 ,to what quarter in the large historic firmament can we turn our eyes with such certainty of being stirred and elevated1 of thinking better of human life and the worth of those who have been most deeply penetrated by its seriousness1 as to the annals of the intrepid spirits whom the protestant doctrine of indefeasible personal responsibility brought to the front in ,germany in the sixteenth century1 and in ,england and ,scotland in the seventeenth8 ,it is not their fanaticism1 still less is it their theology1 which makes the great ,puritan chiefs of ,england and the stern ,covenanters of ,scotland so heroic in our sight4 ,it is the fact that they sought truth and ensued it1 not thinking of the practicable nor cautiously counting majorities and minorities1 but each man pondering and searching so 'as ever in the great ,taskmaster's eye4' ,it is no adequate answer to urge that this awful consciousness of a divine presence and supervision has ceased to be the living fact it once was4 ,that partly explains1 but it certainly does not justify1 our present lassitude4 ,for the ever-wakeful eye of celestial power is not the only conceivable stimulus to responsibility4 ,to pass from those grim heroes of protestantism to the ,french philosophers of the last century is a wide leap in a hundred respects1 yet they too were pricked by the oestrus of intellectual responsibility4 ,their doctrine was dismally insufficient1 and sometimes1 as the present writer has often pointed out1 it was directly vicious4 ,their daily lives were surrounded by much shabbiness and many meannesses4 ,but1 after all1 no temptation and no menace1 no pains or penalties for thinking about certain subjects1 and no rewards for turning to think about something else1 could divert such men as ,voltaire and ,diderot from their alert and strenuous search after such truth as could be vouchsafed to their imperfect lights4 ,a catastrophe followed1 it is true1 but the misfortunes which attended it were due more to the champions of tradition and authority than to the soldiers of emancipation4 ,even in the case of the latter1 they were due to an inadequate doctrine1 and not at all either to their sense of the necessity of free speculation and inquiry1 or to the intrepidity with which they obeyed the promptings of that ennobling sense4 ,perhaps the latest attempt of a considerable kind to suppress the political spirit in non-political concerns was the famous movement which had its birth a generation ago among the gray quadrangles and ancient gardens of ,oxford1 'the sweet city with her dreaming spires1' where there has ever been so much detachment from the world1 alongside of the coarsest and fiercest hunt after the grosser prizes of the world4 ,no one has much less sympathy with the direction of the tractarian revival than the present writer1 in whose ,oxford days the star of ,newman had set1 and the sun of ,mill had risen in its stead4 ,and it is needful to distinguish the fervid and strong spirits with whom the revival began from the mimics of our later day4 ,no doubt the mere occasion of tractarianism was political4 ,its leaders were alarmed at the designs imputed to the newly reformed parliament of disestablishing the ,anglican ,church4 ,they asked themselves the question1 which ,i will put in their own words 7,tract i47--',should the government of the country so far forget their ,god as to cut off the ,church1 to deprive it of its temporal honours and substance1 on what will you rest the claims to respect and attention which you make upon your flock8 ,in answering this question they speedily found themselves1 as might have been expected1 at the opposite pole of thought from things political4 ,the whole strength of their appeal to members of the ,church lay in men's weariness of the high and dry optimism1 which presents the existing order of things as the noblest possible1 and the undisturbed way of the majority as the way of salvation4 ,apostolical succession and ,sacramentalism may not have been in themselves progressive ideas4 ,the spirit which welcomed them had at least the virtue of taking away from ,caesar the things that are not ,caesar's4 ,glaring as were the intellectual faults of the ,oxford movement1 it was at any rate a recognition in a very forcible way of the doctrine that spiritual matters are not to be settled by the dicta of a political council4 ,it acknowledged that a man is answerable at his own peril for having found or lost the truth4 ,it was a warning that he must reckon with a judge who will not account the status quo1 nor the convenience of a cabinet1 a good plea for indolent acquiescence in theological error4 ,it ended1 in the case of its most vigorous champions1 in a final and deliberate putting out of the eyes of the understanding4 ,the last act of assertion of personal responsibility was a headlong acceptance of the responsibility of tradition and the ,church4 ,this was deplorable enough4 ,but apart from other advantages incidental to the tractarian movement1 such as the attention which it was the means of drawing to history and the organic connection between present and past1 it had1 we repeat1 the merit of being an effective protest against what may be called the ,house of ,commons' view of human life--a view excellent in its place1 but most blighting and dwarfing out of it4 ,it was1 what every sincere uprising of the better spirit in men and women must always be1 an effective protest against the leaden tyranny of the man of the world and the so-called practical person4 ,the man of the world despises catholics for taking their religious opinions on trust and being the slaves of tradition4 ,as if he had himself formed his own most important opinions either in religion or anything else4 ,he laughs at them for their superstitious awe of the ,church4 ,as if his own inward awe of the ,greater ,number were one whit less of a superstition4 ,he mocks their deference for the past4 ,as if his own absorbing deference to the present were one tittle better bottomed or a jot more respectable4 ,the modern emancipation will profit us very little if the status quo is to be fastened round our necks with the despotic authority of a heavenly dispensation1 and if in the stead of ancient ,scriptures we are to accept the plenary inspiration of ,majorities4 ,it may be urged that if1 as it is the object of the present chapter to state1 there are opinions which a man should form for himself1 and which it may yet be expedient that he should not only be slow to attempt to realise in practical life1 but sometimes even slow to express1--then we are demanding from him the performance of a troublesome duty1 while we are taking from him the only motives which could really induce him to perform it4 ,if1 it may be asked1 ,i am not to carry my notions into practice1 nor try to induce others to accept them1 nor even boldly publish them1 why in the name of all economy of force should ,i take so much pains in forming opinions which are1 after all1 on these conditions so very likely to come to naught8 ,the answer to this is that opinions do not come to naught1 even if the man who holds them should never think fit to publish them4 ,for one thing1 as we shall see in our next division1 the conditions which make against frank declaration of our convictions are of rare occurrence4 ,and1 apart from this1 convictions may well exert a most decisive influence over our conduct1 even if reasons exist1 or seem to exist1 for not pressing them on others4 ,though themselves invisible to the outer world1 they may yet operate with magnetic force both upon other parts of our belief which the outer world does see1 and upon the whole of our dealings with it4 ,whether we are good or bad1 it is only a broken and incoherent fragment of our whole personality that even those who are intimate with us1 much less the common world1 can ever come into contact with4 ,the important thing is that the personality itself should be as little as possible broken1 incoherent1 and fragmentary2 that reasoned and consistent opinions should back a firm will1 and independent convictions inspire the intellectual self-respect and strenuous self-possession which the clamour of majorities and the silent yet ever-pressing force of the status quo are equally powerless to shake4 ,character is doubtless of far more importance than mere intellectual opinion4 ,we only too often see highly rationalised convictions in persons of weak purpose or low motives4 ,but while fully recognising this1 and the sort of possible reality which lies at the root of such a phrase as 'godless intellect' or 'intellectual devils'--though the phrase has no reality when it is used by self-seeking politicians or prelates--yet it is well to remember the very obvious truth that opinions are at least an extremely important part of character4 ,as it is sometimes put1 what we think has a prodigiously close connection with what we are4 ,the consciousness of having reflected seriously and conclusively on important questions1 whether social or spiritual1 augments dignity while it does not lessen humility4 ,in this sense1 taking thought can and does add a cubit to our stature4 ,opinions which we may not feel bound or even permitted to press on other people1 are not the less forces for being latent4 ,they shape ideals1 and it is ideals that inspire conduct4 ,they do this1 though from afar1 and though he who possesses them may not presume to take the world into his confidence4 ,finally1 unless a man follows out ideas to their full conclusion without fear what the conclusion may be1 whether he thinks it expedient to make his thought and its goal fully known or not1 it is impossible that he should acquire a commanding grasp of principles4 ,and a commanding grasp of principles1 whether they are public or not1 is at the very root of coherency of character4 ,it raises mediocrity near to a level with the highest talents1 if those talents are in company with a disposition that allows the little prudences of the hour incessantly to obscure the persistent laws of things4 ,these persistencies1 if a man has once satisfied himself of their direction and mastered their bearings and application1 are just as cogent and valuable a guide to conduct1 whether he publishes them ad urbem et orbem1 or esteems them too strong meat for people who have1 through indurated use and wont1 lost the courage of facing unexpected truths4 ,one conspicuous result of the failure to see that our opinions have roots to them1 independently of the feelings which either majorities or other portions of the people around us may entertain about them1 is that neither political matters nor any other serious branches of opinion1 engage us in their loftiest or most deep-reaching forms4 ,the advocate of a given theory of government or society is so misled by a wrong understanding of the practice of just and wise compromise in applying it1 as to forget the noblest and most inspiring shape which his theory can be made to assume4 ,it is the worst of political blunders to insist on carrying an ideal set of principles into execution1 where others have rights of dissent1 and those others persons whose assent is as indispensable to success1 as it is impossible to attain4 ,but to be afraid or ashamed of holding such an ideal set of principles in one's mind in their highest and most abstract expression1 does more than any one other cause to stunt or petrify those elements in character to which life should owe most of its savour4 ,if a man happens to be a ,conservative1 for instance1 it is pitiful that he should think so much more of what other people on his side or the other think1 than of the widest and highest of the ideas on which a conservative philosophy of life and human society reposes4 ,such ideas are these1--that the social union is the express creation and ordering of the ,deity3 that its movements follow his mysterious and fixed dispensation3 that the church and the state are convertible terms1 and each citizen of the latter is an incorporated member of the former3 that conscience1 if perversely and misguidedly self-asserting1 has no rights against the decrees of the conscience of the nation3 that it is the most detestable of crimes to perturb the pacific order of society either by active agitation or speculative restlessness2 that descent from a long line of ancestors in great station adds an element of dignity to life1 and imposes many high obligations4 ,we do not say that these and the rest of the propositions which make up the true theoretic basis of a conservative creed1 are proper for the hustings1 or expedient in an election address or a speech in parliament4 ,we do say that if these high and not unintelligible principles1 which alone can give to reactionary professions any worth or significance1 were present in the minds of men who speak reactionary language1 the country would be spared the ignominy of seeing certain real truths of society degraded at the hands of aristocratic adventurers and plutocratic parasites into some miserable process of 'dishing ,whigs4' ,this impoverishment of aims and depravation of principles by the triumph of the political spirit outside of its proper sphere1 cannot unfortunately be restricted to any one set of people in the state4 ,it is something in the very atmosphere1 which no sanitary cordon can limit4 ,liberalism1 too1 would be something more generous1 more attractive--yes1 and more practically effective1 if its professors and champions could allow their sense of what is feasible to be refreshed and widened by a more free recognition1 however private and undemonstrative1 of the theoretic ideas which give their social creed whatever life and consistency it may have4 ,such ideas are these3 ,that the conditions of the social union are not a mystery1 only to be touched by miracle1 but the results of explicable causes1 and susceptible of constant modification3 that the thoughts of wise and patriotic men should be perpetually turned towards the improvement of these conditions in every direction3 that contented acquiescence in the ordering that has come down to us from the past is selfish and anti-social1 because amid the ceaseless change that is inevitable in a growing organism1 the institutions of the past demand progressive re-adaptations3 that such improvements are most likely to be secured in the greatest abundance by limiting the sphere of authority1 extending that of free individuality1 and steadily striving after the bestowal1 so far as the nature of things will ever permit it1 of equality of opportunity3 that while there is dignity in ancestry1 a modern society is only safe in proportion as it summons capacity to its public counsels and enterprises2 that such a society to endure must progress3 that progress on its political side means more than anything else the substitution of ,justice as a governing idea1 instead of ,privilege1 and that the best guarantee for justice in public dealings is the participation in their own government of the people most likely to suffer from injustice4 ,this is not an exhaustive account of the progressive doctrine1 and we have here nothing to say as to its soundness4 ,we only submit that if those who use the watchwords of ,liberalism were to return upon its principles1 instead of dwelling exclusively on practical compromises1 the tone of public life would be immeasurably raised4 ,the cause of social improvement would be less systematically balked of the victories that are best worth gaining4 ,progress would mean something more than mere entrances and exits on the theatre of office4 ,we should not see in the mass of parliamentary candidates--and they are important people1 because nearly every ,englishman with any ambition is a parliamentary candidate1 actual or potential--that grave anxiety1 that sober rigour1 that immense caution1 which are all so really laughable1 because so many of those men are only anxious lest they should make a mistake in finding out what the majority of their constituents would like them to think2 only rigorous against those who are indiscreet enough to press a principle against the beck of a whip or a wire-puller2 and only very cautious not so much lest their opinion should be wrong1 as lest it should not pay4 ,indolence and timidity have united to popularise among us a flaccid latitudinarianism1 which thinks itself a benign tolerance for the opinions of others4 ,it is in truth only a pretentious form of being without settled opinions of our own1 and without any desire to settle them4 ,no one can complain of the want of speculative activity at the present time in a certain way4 ,the air1 at a certain social elevation1 is as full as it has ever been of ideas1 theories1 problems1 possible solutions1 suggested questions1 and proffered answers4 ,but then they are at large1 without cohesion1 and very apt to be the objects even in the more instructed minds of not much more than dilettante interest4 ,we see in solution an immense number of notions1 which people think it quite unnecessary to precipitate in the form of convictions4 ,we constantly hear the age lauded for its tolerance1 for its candour1 for its openness of mind1 for the readiness with which a hearing is given to ideas that forty years ago1 or even less than that1 would have excluded persons suspected of holding them from decent society1 and in fact did so exclude them4 ,before1 however1 we congratulate ourselves too warmly on this1 let us be quite sure that we are not mistaking for tolerance what is really nothing more creditable than indifference4 ,these two attitudes of mind1 which are so vitally unlike in their real quality1 are so hard to distinguish in their outer seeming4 ,one is led to suspect that carelessness is the right name for what looks like reasoned toleration1 by such a line of consideration as the following4 ,it is justly said that at the bottom of all the great discussions of modern society lie the two momentous questions1 first whether there is a ,god1 and second whether the soul is immortal4 ,in other words1 whether our fellow-creatures are the highest beings who take an interest in us1 or in whom we need take an interest2 and1 then1 whether life in this world is the only life of which we shall ever be conscious4 ,it is true of most people that when they are talking of evolution1 and the origin of species1 and the experiential or intuitional source of ideas1 and the utilitarian or transcendental basis of moral obligation1 these are the questions which they really have in their minds4 ,now1 in spite of the scientific activity of the day1 nobody is likely to contend that men are pressed keenly in their souls by any poignant stress of spiritual tribulation in the face of the two supreme enigmas4 ,nobody will say that there is much of that striving and wrestling and bitter agonising1 which whole societies of men have felt before now on questions of far less tremendous import4 ,ours1 as has been truly said1 is 'a time of loud disputes and weak convictions1' ,in a generation deeply impressed by a sense of intellectual responsibility this could not be4 ,as it is1 even superior men are better pleased to play about the height of these great arguments1 to fly in busy intellectual sport from side to side1 from aspect to aspect1 than they are intent on resolving what it is1 after all1 that the discussion comes to and to which solution1 when everything has been said and heard1 the balance of truth really to incline4 ,there are too many giggling epigrams2 people are too willing to look on collections of mutually hostile opinions with the same kind of curiosity which they bestow on a collection of mutually hostile beasts in a menagerie4 ,they have very faint predilections for one rather than another4 ,if they were truly alive to the duty of conclusiveness1 or to the inexpressible magnitude of the subjects which nominally occupy their minds1 but really only exercise their tongues1 this elegant ,pyrrhonism would be impossible1 and this light-hearted neutrality most unendurable4 ,well has the illustrious ,pascal said with reference to one of the two great issues of the modern controversy3--',the immortality of the soul is a thing that concerns us so closely and touches us so profoundly1 that one must have lost all feeling to be indifferent as to knowing how the matter is4 ,all our actions and all our thoughts must follow such different paths1 according as there are eternal goods to hope for or are not1 that it is impossible to take a step with sense and judgment1 without regulating it in view of this point1 which ought to be our first object4444 ,i can have nothing but compassion for those who groan and travail in this doubt with all sincerity1 who look on it as the worst of misfortunes1 and who1 sparing no pains to escape from it1 make of this search their chief and most serious employment4444 ,but he who doubts and searches not is at the same time a grievous wrongdoer1 and a grievously unfortunate man4 ,if along with this he is tranquil and self-satisfied1 if he publishes his contentment to the world and plumes himself upon it1 and if it is this very state of doubt which he makes the subject of his joy and vanity--,i have no terms in which to describe so extravagant a creature4'#ae ,who1 except a member of the school of extravagant creatures themselves1 would deny that ,pascal's irritation is most wholesome and righteous8 ,perhaps in reply to this1 we may be confronted by our own doctrine of intellectual responsibility interpreted in a directly opposite sense4 ,we may be reminded of the long array of difficulties that interfere between us and knowledge in that tremendous matter1 and of objections that rise in such perplexing force to an answer either one way or the other4 ,and finally we may be despatched with a eulogy of caution and a censure of too great heat after certainty4 ,the answer is that there is a kind of ,doubt not without search1 but after and at the end of search1 which is not open to ,pascal's just reproaches against the more ignoble and frivolous kind4 ,and this too has been described for us by a subtle doctor of ,pascal's communion4 ',are there pleasures of ,doubt1 as well as of ,inference and ,assent8 ,in one sense there are4 ,not indeed if doubt means ignorance1 uncertainty1 or hopeless suspense2 but there is a certain grave acquiescence in ignorance1 a recognition of our impotence to solve momentous and urgent questions1 which has a satisfaction of its own4 ,after high aspirations1 after renewed endeavours1 after bootless toil1 after long wanderings1 after hope1 effort1 weariness1 failure1 painfully alternating and recurring1 it is an immense relief to the exhausted mind to be able to say1 ,at length ,i know that ,i can know nothing about anything4 444 ,ignorance remains the evil which it ever was1 but something of the peace of certitude is gained in knowing the worst1 and in having reconciled the mind to the endurance of it4'#af ,precisely1 and what one would say of our own age is that it will not deliberately face this knowledge of the worst4 ,so it misses the peace of certitude1 and not only its peace1 but the strength and coherency that follow strict acceptance of the worst1 when the worst is after all the best within reach4 ,those who are in earnest when they blame too great haste after certainty1 do in reality mean us to embrace certainty1 but in favour of the vulgar opinions4 ,they only see the prodigious difficulties of the controversy when you do not incline to their own side in it4 ,they only panegyrise caution and the strictly provisional when they suspect that intrepidity and love of the conclusive would lead them to unwelcome shores4 ,these persons1 however1 whether fortunately or unfortunately1 have no longer much influence over the most active part of the national intelligence4 ,whether permanently or not1 resolute orthodoxy1 however prosperous it may seem among many of the uncultivated rich1 has lost its hold upon thought4 ,for thought has become dispersive1 and the centrifugal forces of the human mind1 among those who think seriously1 have for the time become dominant and supreme4 ,no one1 ,i suppose1 imagines that the singular ecclesiastical revival which is now going on1 is accompanied by any revival of real and reasoned belief2 or that the opulent manufacturers who subscribe so generously for restored cathedral fabrics and the like1 have been moved by the apologetics of ,aids to ,faith and the ,christian ,evidence ,society4 ,obviously only three ways of dealing with the great problems of which we have spoken are compatible with a strong and well-bottomed character4 ,we may affirm that there is a deity with definable attributes2 and that there is a conscious state and continued personality after the dissolution of the body4 ,or we may deny4 ,or we may assure ourselves that we have no faculties enabling us on good evidence either to deny or affirm4 ,intellectual self-respect and all the qualities that are derived from that1 may well go with any one of these three courses1 decisively followed and consistently applied in framing a rule of life and a settled scheme of its aims and motives4 ,why do we say that intellectual self-respect is not vigorous1 nor the sense of intellectual responsibility and truthfulness and coherency quick and wakeful among us8 ,because so many people1 even among those who might be expected to know better1 insist on the futile attempt to reconcile all those courses1 instead of fixing on one and steadily abiding in it4 ,they speak as if they affirmed1 and they act as if they denied1 and in their hearts they cherish a slovenly sort of suspicion that we can neither deny nor affirm4 ,it may be said that this comes to much the same thing as if they had formally decided in the last or neutral sense4 ,it is not so4 ,this illegitimate union of three contradictories fritters character away1 breaks it up into discordant parts1 and dissolves into mercurial fluidity that leavening sincerity and free and cheerful boldness1 which come of harmonious principles of faith and action1 and without which men can never walk as confident lovers of justice and truth4 ,ambrose's famous saying1 that 'it hath not pleased the ,lord to give his people salvation in dialectic1' has a profound meaning far beyond its application to theology4 ,it is deeply true that our ruling convictions are less the product of ratiocination than of sympathy1 imagination1 usage1 tradition4 ,but from this it does not follow that the reasoning faculties are to be further discouraged4 ,on the contrary1 just because the other elements are so strong that they can be trusted to take care of themselves1 it is expedient to give special countenance to the intellectual habits1 which alone can check and rectify the constantly aberrating tendencies of sentiment on the one side1 and custom on the other4 ,this remark brings us to another type1 of whom it is not irrelevant to speak shortly in this place4 ,the consequences of the strength of the political spirit are not all direct1 nor does its strength by any means spring solely from its indulgence to the less respectable elements of character1 such as languor1 extreme pliableness1 superficiality4 ,on the contrary1 it has an indirect influence in removing the only effective restraint on the excesses of some qualities which1 when duly directed and limited1 are among the most precious parts of our mental constitution4 ,the political spirit is the great force in throwing love of truth and accurate reasoning into a secondary place4 ,the evil does not stop here4 ,this achievement has indirectly countenanced the postponement of intellectual methods1 and the diminution of the sense of intellectual responsibility1 by a school that is anything rather than political4 ,theology has borrowed1 and coloured for her own use1 the principles which were first brought into vogue in politics4 ,if in the one field it is the fashion to consider convenience first and truth second1 in the other there is a corresponding fashion of placing truth second and emotional comfort first4 ,if there are some who compromise their real opinions1 or the chance of reaching truth1 for the sake of gain1 there are far more who shrink from giving their intelligence free play1 for the sake of keeping undisturbed certain luxurious spiritual sensibilities4 ,this choice of emotional gratification before truth and upright dealing with one's own understanding1 creates a character that is certainly far less unlovely than those who sacrifice their intellectual integrity to more material convenience4 ,the moral flaw is less palpable and less gross4 ,yet here too there is the stain of intellectual improbity1 and it is perhaps all the more mischievous for being partly hidden under the mien of spiritual exaltation4 ,there is in literature no more seductive illustration of this seductive type than ,rousseau's renowned character of the ,savoyard ,vicar--penetrated with scepticism as to the attributes of the deity1 the meaning of the holy rites1 the authenticity of the sacred documents2 yet full of reverence1 and ever respecting in silence what he could neither reject nor understand4 ',the essential worship1' he says1 'is the worship of the heart4 ,god never rejects this homage1 under whatever form it be offered to him4 ,in old days ,i used to say mass with the levity which in time infects even the gravest things when we do them too often4 ,since acquiring my new principles of reverential scepticism ,i celebrate it with more veneration3 ,i am overcome by the majesty of the ,supreme ,being1 by his presence1 by the insufficiency of the human mind1 which conceives so ill what pertains to its author4 ,when ,i approach the moment of consecration1 ,i collect myself for performing the act with all the feelings required by the church and the majesty of the sacrament4 ,i strive to annihilate my reason before the ,supreme ,intelligence1 saying1 ,who art thou that thou shouldst measure infinite power8'#ag ,the ,savoyard ,vicar is not imaginary4 ,the acquiescence in indefinite ideas for the sake of comforted emotions1 and the abnegation of strong convictions in order to make room for free and plenteous effusion1 have for us all the marks of a too familiar reality4 ,such a doctrine is an everyday plea for self-deception1 and a current justification for illusion even among some of the finer spirits4 ,they have persuaded themselves not only that the life of the religious emotions is the highest life1 but that it is independent of the intellectual forms with which history happens to have associated it4 ,and so they refine and sophisticate and make havoc with plain and honest interpretation1 in order to preserve a soft serenity of soul unperturbed4 ,now1 we are not at all concerned to dispute such positions as that ,feeling is the right starting-point of moral education2 that in forming character appeal should be to the heart rather than to the understanding2 that the only basis on which our faculties can be harmoniously ordered is the preponderance of affection over reason4 ,these propositions open much grave and complex discussion1 and they are not to our present purpose4 ,we only desire to state the evil of the notion that a man is warranted in comforting himself with dogmas and formularies1 which he has first to empty of all definite1 precise1 and clearly determinable significance1 before he can get them out of the way of his religious sensibilities4 ,whether ,reason or ,affection is to have the empire in the society of the future1 when ,reason may possibly have no more to discover for us in the region of morals and religion1 and so will have become emeritus and taken a lower place1 as of a tutor whose services the human family1 being now grown up1 no longer requires1--however this may be1 it is at least certain that in the meantime the spiritual life of man needs direction quite as much as it needs impulse1 and light quite as much as force4 ,this direction and light can only be safely procured by the free and vigorous use of the intelligence4 ,but the intelligence is not free in the presence of a mortal fear lest its conclusions should trouble soft tranquillity of spirit4 ,there is always hope of a man so long as he dwells in the region of the direct categorical proposition and the unambiguous term2 so long as he does not deny the rightly drawn conclusion after accepting the major and minor premisses4 ,this may seem a scanty virtue and very easy grace4 ,yet experience shows it to be too hard of attainment for those who tamper with disinterestedness of conviction1 for the sake of luxuriating in the softness of spiritual transport without interruption from a syllogism4 ,it is true that there are now and then in life as in history noble and fair natures1 that by the silent teaching and unconscious example of their inborn purity1 star-like constancy1 and great devotion1 do carry the world about them to further heights of living than can be attained by ratiocination4 ,but these1 the blameless and loved saints of the earth1 rise too rarely on our dull horizons to make a rule for the world4 ,the law of things is that they who tamper with veracity1 from whatever motive1 are tampering with the vital force of human progress4 ,our comfort and the delight of the religious imagination are no better than forms of self-indulgence1 when they are secured at the cost of that love of truth on which1 more than on anything else1 the increase of light and happiness among men must depend4 ,we have to fight and do lifelong battle against the forces of darkness1 and anything that turns the edge of reason blunts the surest and most potent of our weapons4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #ac3 ,burton's ,lift of ,hume1 ii4 #ahf-ahh ,footnote #ad3 ,isaac ,taylor's ,natural ,history of ,enthusiasm1 p4 #bbf4 ,footnote #ae3 ,penses1 ,,ii4 ,art ii4 ,footnote #af3 ,dr4 ,newman's ,grammar of ,assent1 p4 #bja4 ,footnote #ag3 ,emile1 bk4 iv4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,religious ,,conformity4 ,the main field of discussion touching ,compromise in expression and avowal lies in the region of religious belief4 ,in politics no one seriously contends that respect for the feelings and prejudices of other people requires us to be silent about our opinions4 ,a republican1 for instance1 is at perfect liberty to declare himself so4 ,nobody will say that he is not within his rights if he should think it worth while to practise this liberty1 though of course he will have to face the obloquy which attends all opinion that is not shared by the more demonstrative and vocal portions of the public4 ,it is true that in every stable society a general conviction prevails of the extreme undesirableness of constantly laying bare the foundations of government4 ,incessant discussion of the theoretical bases of the social union is naturally considered worse than idle4 ,it is felt by many wise men that the chief business of the political thinker is to interest himself in generalisations of such a sort as leads with tolerable straightness to practical improvements of a far-reaching and durable kind4 ,even among those1 however1 who thus feel it not to be worth while to be for ever handling the abstract principles which are1 after all1 only clumsy expressions of the real conditions that bring and keep men together in society1 yet nobody of any consideration pretends to silence or limit the free discussion of these principles4 ,although a man is not likely to be thanked who calls attention to the vast discrepancies between the theory and practice of the constitution1 yet nobody now would countenance the notion of an inner doctrine in politics4 ,we smile at the line that ,hume took in speaking of the doctrine of non-resistance4 ,he did not deny that the right of resistance to a tyrannical sovereign does actually belong to a nation4 ,but1 he said1 'if ever on any occasion it were laudable to conceal truth from the populace1 it must be confessed that the doctrine of resistance affords such an example2 and that all speculative reasoners ought to observe with regard to this principle the same cautious silence which the laws1 in every species of government1 have ever prescribed to themselves4' ,as if the cautious silence of the political writer could prevent a populace from feeling the heaviness of an oppressor's hand1 and striving to find relief from unjust burdens4 ,as if any nation endowed with enough of the spirit of independence to assent to the right of resistance when offered to them as a speculative theorem1 would not infallibly be led by the same spirit to assert the right without the speculative theorem4 ,that so acute a head as ,hume's should have failed to perceive these very plain considerations1 and that he should moreover have perpetrated the absurdity of declaring the right of resistance1 in the same breath in which he declares the laudableness of keeping it a secret1 only allows how carefully a man need steer after he has once involved himself in the labyrinths of ,economy4#ah ,in religion the unreasonableness of imposing a similar cautious silence is not yet fully established1 nor the vicious effects of practising it clearly recognised4 ,in these high matters an amount of economy and management is held praiseworthy1 which in any other subject would be universally condemned as cowardly and ignoble4 ,indeed the preliminary stage has scarcely been reached--the stage in which public opinion grants to every one the unrestricted right of shaping his own beliefs1 independently of those of the people who surround him4 ,any woman1 for instance1 suspected of having cast behind her the ,bible and all practices of devotion and the elementary articles of the common creed1 would be distrustfully regarded even by those who wink at the same kind of mental boldness in men4 ,nay1 she would be so regarded even by some of the very men who have themselves discarded as superstition what they still wish women to retain for law and gospel4 ,so long as any class of adults are effectually discouraged in the free use of their minds upon the most important subjects1 we are warranted in saying that the era of free thought1 which naturally precedes the era of free speech1 is still imperfectly developed4 ,the duties and rights of free speech are by no means identical with those of independent thought4 ,one general reason for this is tolerably plain4 ,the expression of opinion directly affects other people1 while its mere formation directly affects no one but ourselves4 ,therefore the limits of compromise in expression are less widely and freely placed1 because the rights and interests of all who may be made listeners to our spoken or written words are immediately concerned4 ,in forming opinions1 a man or woman owes no consideration to any person or persons whatever4 ,truth is the single object4 ,it is truth that in the forum of conscience claims an undivided allegiance4 ,the publication of opinion stands on another footing4 ,that is an external act1 with possible consequences1 like all other external acts1 both to the doer and to every one within the sphere of his influence4 ,and1 besides these1 it has possible consequences to the prosperity of the opinion itself4#ai ,a hundred questions of fitness1 of seasonableness1 of conflicting expediencies1 present themselves in this connection1 and nothing gives more anxiety to a sensible man who holds notions opposed to the current prejudices1 than to hit the right mark where intellectual integrity and prudence1 firmness and wise reserve1 are in exact accord4 ,when we come to declaring opinions that are1 however foolishly and unreasonably1 associated with pain and even a kind of turpitude in the minds of those who strongly object to them1 then some of our most powerful sympathies are naturally engaged4 ,we wonder whether duty to truth can possibly require us to inflict keen distress on those to whom we are bound by the tenderest and most consecrated ties4 ,this is so wholly honourable a sentiment1 that no one who has not made himself drunk with the thin sour wine of a crude and absolute logic will refuse to consider it4 ,before1 however1 attempting to illustrate cases of conscience in this order1 we venture to make a short digression into the region of the matter1 as distinct from the manner of free speech4 ,one or two changes of great importance in the way in which men think about religion1 bear directly upon the conditions on which they may permit themselves and others to speak about it4 ,the peculiar character of all the best kinds of dissent from the nominal creed of the time1 makes it rather less difficult for us to try to reconcile unflinching honesty with a just and becoming regard for the feelings of those who have claims upon our forbearance1 than would have been the case a hundred years ago4 ',it is not now with a polite sneer1' as a high ecclesiastical authority lately admitted1 'still less with a rude buffet or coarse words1 that ,christianity is assailed4' ,before churchmen congratulate themselves too warmly on this improvement in the nature of the attack1 perhaps they ought to ask themselves how far it is due to the change in the position of the defending party4 ,the truth is that the coarse and realistic criticism of which ,voltaire was the consummate master1 has done its work4 ,it has driven the defenders of the old faith into the milder and more genial climate of non-natural interpretations1 and the historic sense1 and a certain elastic relativity of dogma4 ,the old criticism was victorious1 but after victory it vanished4 ,one reason of this was that the coarse and realistic forms of belief had either vanished before it1 or else they forsook their ancient pretensions and clothed themselves in more modest robes4 ,the consequence of this1 and of other causes which might be named1 is that the modern attack1 while fully as serious and much more radical1 has a certain gravity1 decorum1 and worthiness of form4 ,no one of any sense or knowledge now thinks the ,christian religion had its origin in deliberate imposture4 ,the modern freethinker does not attack it2 he explains it4 ,and what is more1 he explains it by referring its growth to the better1 and not to the worse part of human nature4 ,he traces it to men's cravings for a higher morality4 ,he finds its source in their aspirations after nobler expression of that feeling for the incommensurable things1 which is in truth under so many varieties of inwoven pattern the common universal web of religious faith4 ,the result of this way of looking at a creed which a man no longer accepts1 is that he is able to speak of it with patience and historic respect4 ,he can openly mark his dissent from it1 without exacerbating the orthodox sentiment by galling pleasantries or bitter animadversion upon details4 ,we are now awake to the all-important truth that belief in this or that detail of superstition is the result of an irrational state of mind1 and flows logically from superstitious premisses4 ,we see that it is to begin at the wrong end1 to assail the deductions as impossible1 instead of sedulously building up a state of mind in which their impossibility would become spontaneously visible4 ,besides the great change which such a point of view makes in men's way of speaking of a religion1 whose dogmas and documents they reject1 there is this further consideration leaning in the same direction4 ,the tendency of modern free thought is more and more visibly towards the extraction of the first and more permanent elements of the old faith1 to make the purified material of the new4 ,when ,dr4 ,congreve met the famous epigram about ,comte's system being ,catholicism minus ,christianity1 by the reply that it is ,catholicism plus ,science1 he gave an ingenious expression to the direction which is almost necessarily taken by all who attempt1 in however informal a manner1 to construct for themselves some working system of faith1 in place of the faith which science and criticism have sapped4 ,in what ultimate form1 acceptable to great multitudes of men1 these attempts will at last issue1 no one can now tell4 ,for we1 like the ,hebrews of old1 shall all have to live and die in faith1 'not having received the promises1 but having seen them afar off1 and being persuaded of them1 and embracing them1 and confessing that we are strangers and pilgrims on the earth4' ,meanwhile1 after the first great glow and passion of the just and necessary revolt of reason against superstition have slowly lost the exciting splendour of the dawn1 and become diffused in the colourless space of a rather bleak noonday1 the mind gradually collects again some of the ideas of the old religion of the ,west1 and willingly1 or even joyfully1 suffers itself to be once more breathed upon by something of its spirit4 ,christianity was the last great religious synthesis4 ,it is the one nearest to us4 ,nothing is more natural than that those who cannot rest content with intellectual analysis1 while awaiting the advent of the ,saint ,paul of the humanitarian faith of the future1 should gather up provisionally such fragmentary illustrations of this new faith as are to be found in the records of the old4 ,whatever form may be ultimately imposed on our vague religious aspirations by some prophet to come1 who shall unite sublime depth of feeling and lofty purity of life with strong intellectual grasp and the gift of a noble eloquence1 we may at least be sure of this1 that it will stand as closely related to ,christianity as ,christianity stood closely related to the old ,judaic dispensation4 ,it is commonly assumed that the rejecters of the popular religion stand in face of it1 as the ,christians stood in face of the pagan belief and pagan rites in the ,empire4 ,the analogy is inexact4 ,the modern denier1 if he is anything better than that1 or entertains hopes of a creed to come1 is nearer to the position of the ,christianising ,jew4#bj ,science1 when she has accomplished all her triumphs in her own order1 will still have to go back1 when the time comes1 to assist in the building up of a new creed by which men can live4 ,the builders will have to seek material in the purified and sublimated ideas1 of which the confessions and rites of the ,christian churches have been the grosser expression4 ,just as what was once the new dispensation was preached a ,judaeos ad ,judaeos apud ,judaeos1 so must the new1 that is to be1 find a ,christian teacher and ,christian hearers4 ,it can hardly be other than an expansion1 a development1 a readaptation1 of all the moral and spiritual truth that lay hidden under the worn-out forms4 ,it must be such a harmonising of the truth with our intellectual conceptions as shall fit it to be an active guide to conduct4 ,in a world 'where men sit and hear each other groan1 where but to think is to be full of sorrow1' it is hard to imagine a time when we shall be indifferent to that sovereign legend of ,pity4 ,we have to incorporate it in some wider gospel of ,justice and ,progress4 ,i shall not1 ,i hope1 be suspected of any desire to prophesy too smooth things4 ,it is no object of ours to bridge over the gulf between belief in the vulgar theology and disbelief4 ,nor for a single moment do we pretend that1 when all the points of contact between virtuous belief and virtuous disbelief are made the most of that good faith will allow1 there will not still and after all remain a terrible controversy between those who cling passionately to all the consolations1 mysteries1 personalities1 of the orthodox faith1 and us who have made up our minds to face the worst1 and to shape1 as best we can1 a life in which the cardinal verities of the common creed shall have no place4 ,the future faith1 like the faith of the past1 brings not peace but a sword4 ,it is a tale not of concord1 but of households divided against themselves4 ,those who are incessantly striving to make the old bottles hold the new wine1 to reconcile the irreconcilable1 to bring the ,bible and the dogmas of the churches to be good friends with history and criticism1 are prompted by the humanest intention4#ba ,one sympathises with this amiable anxiety to soften shocks1 and break the rudeness of a vital transition4 ,in this essay1 at any rate1 there is no such attempt4 ,we know that it is the son against the father1 and the mother-in-law against the daughter-in-law4 ,no softness of speech will disguise the portentous differences between those who admit a supernatural revelation and those who deny it4 ,no charity nor goodwill can narrow the intellectual breach between those who declare that a world without an ever-present ,creator with intelligible attributes would be to them empty and void1 and those who insist that none of the attributes of a ,creator can ever be grasped by the finite intelligence of men4#bb ,our object in urging the historic1 semi-conservative1 and almost sympathetic quality1 which distinguishes the unbelief of to-day from the unbelief of a hundred years ago1 is only to show that the most strenuous and upright of plain-speakers is less likely to shock and wound the lawful sensibilities of devout persons than he would have been so long as unbelief went no further than bitter attack on small details4 ,in short1 all save the purely negative and purely destructive school of freethinkers1 are now able to deal with the beliefs from which they dissent1 in a way which makes patient and disinterested controversy not wholly impossible4 ,one more point of much importance ought to be mentioned4 ,the belief that heresy is the result of wilful depravity is fast dying out4 ,people no longer seriously think that speculative error is bound up with moral iniquity1 or that mistaken thinking is either the result or the cause of wicked living4 ,even the official mouthpieces of established beliefs now usually represent a bad heart as only one among other possible causes of unbelief4 ,it divides the curse with ignorance1 intellectual shallowness1 the unfortunate influence of plausible heresiarchs1 and other alternative roots of evil4 ,they thus leave a way of escape1 by which the person who does not share their own convictions may still be credited with a good moral character4 ,some persons1 it is true1 'cannot see how a man who deliberately rejects the ,roman ,catholic religion can1 in the eyes of those who earnestly believe it1 be other than a rebel against ,god4' ,they assure us that1 'as opinions become better marked and more distinctly connected with action1 the truth that decided dissent from them implies more or less of a reproach upon those who hold them decidedly1 becomes so obvious that every one perceives it4' ,no doubt a protestant or a sceptic regards the beliefs of a catholic as a reproach upon the believer's understanding4 ,so the man whose whole faith rests on the miraculous and on acts of special intervention1 regards the strictly positive and scientific thinker as the dupe of a crude and narrow logic4 ,but this now carries with it no implication of moral obliquity4 ,de ,maistre's rather grotesque conviction that infidels always die of horrible diseases with special names1 could now only be held among the very dregs of the ecclesiastical world4 ,nor is it correct to say that 'when religious differences come to be1 and are regarded as1 mere differences of opinion1 it is because the controversy is really decided in the sceptical sense4' ,those who agree with the present writer1 for example1 are not sceptics4 ,they positively1 absolutely1 and without reserve1 reject as false the whole system of objective propositions which make up the popular belief of the day1 in one and all of its theological expressions4 ,they look upon that system as mischievous in its consequences to society1 for many reasons1--among others because it tends to divert and misdirect the most energetic faculties of human nature4 ,this1 however1 does not make them suspect the motives or the habitual morality of those who remain in the creed in which they were nurtured4 ,the difference is a difference of opinion1 as purely as if we refused to accept the undulatory theory of light2 and we treat it as such4 ,then reverse this4 ,why is it any more impossible for those who remain in the theological stage1 who are not in the smallest degree sceptical1 who in their heart of hearts embrace without a shadow of misgiving all the mysteries of the faith1 why is it any more impossible for them than for us1 whose convictions are as strong as theirs1 to treat the most radical dissidence as that and nothing other or worse8 ,logically1 it perhaps might not be hard to convict them of inconsistency1 but then1 as has been so often said1 inconsistency is a totally different thing from insincerity1 or doubting adherence1 or silent scepticism4 ,the beliefs of an ordinary man are a complex structure of very subtle materials1 all compacted into a whole1 not by logic1 but by lack of logic2 not by syllogism or sorites1 but by the vague4 ,as a plain matter of fact and observation1 we may all perceive that dissent from religious opinion less and less implies reproach in any serious sense4 ,we all of us know in the flesh liberal catholics and latitudinarian protestants1 who hold the very considerable number of beliefs that remain to them1 quite as firmly and undoubtingly as believers who are neither liberal nor latitudinarian4 ,the compatibility of error in faith with virtue in conduct is to them only a mystery the more1 a branch of the insoluble problem of ,evil1 permitted by a ,being at once all-powerful and all-benevolent4 ,stringent logic may make short work of either fact1--a benevolent author of evil1 or a virtuous despiser of divine truth4 ,but in an atmosphere of mystery1 logical contradictions melt away4 ,faith gives a sanction to that tolerant and charitable judgment of the character of heretics1 which has its real springs partly in common human sympathy whereby we are all bound to one another1 and partly in experience1 which teaches us that practical righteousness and speculative orthodoxy do not always have their roots in the same soil4 ,the world is every day growing larger4 ,the range of the facts of the human race is being enormously extended by naturalists1 by historians1 by philologists1 by travellers1 by critics4 ,the manifold past experiences of humanity are daily opening out to us in vaster and at the same time more ordered proportions4 ,and so even those who hold fast to ,christianity as the noblest1 strongest1 and only final conclusion of these experiences1 are yet constrained to admit that it is no more than a single term in a very long and intricate series4 ,the object of the foregoing digression is to show some cause for thinking that dissent from the current beliefs is less and less likely to inflict upon those who retain them any very intolerable kind or degree of mental pain4 ,therefore it is in so far all the plainer1 as well as easier1 a duty not to conceal such dissent4 ,what we have been saying comes to this4 ,if a believer finds that his son1 for instance1 has ceased to believe1 he no longer has this disbelief thrust upon him in gross and irreverent forms4 ,nor does he any longer suppose that the unbelieving son must necessarily be a profligate4 ,and moreover1 in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred1 he no longer supposes that infidels1 of his own family or acquaintance at any rate1 will consume for eternal ages in lakes of burning marl4 ,let us add another consideration4 ,one reason why so many persons are really shocked and pained by the avowal of heretical opinions is the very fact that such avowal is uncommon4 ,if unbelievers and doubters were more courageous1 believers would be less timorous4 ,it is because they live in an enervating fool's paradise of seeming assent and conformity1 that the breath of an honest and outspoken word strikes so eager and nipping on their sensibilities4 ,if they were not encouraged to suppose that all the world is of their own mind1 if they were forced out of that atmosphere of self-indulgent silences and hypocritical reserves1 which is systematically poured round them1 they would acquire a robuster mental habit4 ,they would learn to take dissents for what they are worth4 ,they would be led either to strengthen or to discard their own opinions1 if the dissents happened to be weighty or instructive2 either to refute or neglect such dissents as should be ill-founded or insignificant4 ,they will remain valetudinarians1 so long as a curtain of compromise shelters them from the real belief of those of their neighbours who have ventured to use their minds with some measure of independence4 ,a very brief contact with people who1 when the occasion comes1 do not shrink from saying what they think1 is enough to modify that excessive liability to be shocked at truth-speaking1 which is only so common because truth-speaking itself is so unfamiliar4 ,now1 however great the pain inflicted by the avowal of unbelief1 it seems to the present writer that one relationship in life1 and one only1 justifies us in being silent where otherwise it would be right to speak4 ,this relationship is that between child and parents4 ,those parents are wisest who train their sons and daughters in the utmost liberty both of thought and speech2 who do not instill dogmas into them1 but inculcate upon them the sovereign importance of correct ways of forming opinions2 who1 while never dissembling the great fact that if one opinion is true1 its contradictory cannot be true also1 but must be a lie and must partake of all the evil qualities of a lie1 yet always set them the example of listening to unwelcome opinions with patience and candour4 ,still all parents are not wise4 ,they cannot all endure to hear of any religious opinions except their own4 ,where it would give them sincere and deep pain to hear a son or daughter avow disbelief in the inspiration of the ,bible and so forth1 then it seems that the younger person is warranted in refraining from saying that he or she does not accept such and such doctrines4 ,this1 of course1 only where the son or daughter feels a tender and genuine attachment to the parent4 ,where the parent has not earned this attachment1 has been selfish1 indifferent1 or cruel1 the title to the special kind of forbearance of which we are speaking can hardly exist4 ,in an ordinary way1 however1 a parent has a claim on us which no other person in the world can have1 and a man's self-respect ought scarcely to be injured if he finds himself shrinking from playing the apostle to his own father and mother4 ,one can indeed imagine circumstances where this would not be true4 ,if you are persuaded that you have had revealed to you a glorious gospel of light and blessedness1 it is impossible not to thirst to impart such tidings most eagerly to those who are closest about your heart4 ,we are not in that position4 ,we have as yet no magnificent vision1 so definite1 so touching1 so 'clothed with the beauty of a thousand stars1' as to make us eager1 for the sake of it1 to murder all the sweetnesses of filial piety in an aggressive eristic4 ,this much one concedes4 ,yet let us ever remember that those elders are of nobler type who have kept their minds in a generous freedom1 and have made themselves strong with that magnanimous confidence in truth1 which the ,hebrew expressed in old phrase1 that if counsel or work be of men it will come to nought1 but if it be of ,god ye cannot overthrow it4 ,even in the case of parents1 and even though our new creed is but rudimentary1 there can be no good reason why we should go further in the way of economy than mere silence4 ,neither they nor any other human being can possibly have a right to expect us1 not merely to abstain from the open expression of dissents1 but positively to profess unreal and feigned assents4 ,no fear of giving pain1 no wish to soothe the alarms of those to whom we owe much1 no respect for the natural clinging of the old to the faith which has accompanied them through honourable lives1 can warrant us in saying that we believe to be true what we are convinced is false4 ,the most lax moralist counts a lie wrong1 even when the motive is unselfish1 and springs from the desire to give pleasure to those whom it is our duty to please4 ,a deliberate lie avowedly does not cease to be one because it concerns spiritual things4 ,nor is it the less wrong because it is uttered by one to whom all spiritual things have become indifferent4 ,filial affection is a motive which would1 if any motive could1 remove some of the taint of meanness with which pious lying1 like every other kind of lying1 tends to infect character4 ,the motive may no doubt ennoble the act1 though the act remains in the category of forbidden things4 ,but the motive of these complaisant assents and false affirmations1 taken at their very best1 is still comparatively a poor motive4 ,no real elevation of spirit is possible for a man who is willing to subordinate his convictions to his domestic affections1 and to bring himself to a habit of viewing falsehood lightly1 lest the truth should shock the illegitimate and over-exacting sensibilities either of his parents or any one else4 ,we may understand what is meant by the logic of the feelings1 and accept it as the proper corrective for a too intense egoism4 ,but when the logic of the feelings is invoked to substitute the egoism of the family for the slightly narrower egoism of the individual1 it can hardly be more than a fine name for self-indulgence and a callous indifference to all the largest human interests4 ,this brings us to consider the case of another no less momentous relationship1 and the kind of compromise in the matter of religious conformity which it justifies or imposes4 ,it constantly happens that the husband has wholly ceased to believe the religion to which his wife clings with unshaken faith4 ,we need not enter into the causes why women remain in bondage to opinions which so many cultivated men either reject or else hold in a transcendental and non-natural sense4 ,the only question with which we are concerned is the amount of free assertion of his own convictions which a man should claim and practise1 when he knows that such convictions are distasteful to his wife4 ,is it lawful1 as it seems to be in dealing with parents1 to hold his conviction silently8 ,is it lawful either positively or by implication to lead his wife to suppose that he shares her opinions1 when in truth he rejects them8 ,if it were not for the maxims and practice in daily use among men otherwise honourable1 one would not suppose it possible that two answers could be given to these questions by any one with the smallest pretence of principle or self-respect4 ,as it is1 we all of us know men who deliberately reject the entire ,christian system1 and still think it compatible with uprightness to summon their whole establishments round them at morning and evening1 and on their knees to offer up elaborately formulated prayers1 which have just as much meaning to them as the entrails of the sacrificial victim had to an infidel haruspex4 ,we see the same men diligently attending religious services2 uttering assents to confessions of which they really reject every syllable2 kneeling1 rising1 bowing1 with deceptive solemnity2 even partaking of the sacrament with a consummate devoutness that is very edifying to all who are not in the secret1 and who do not know that they are acting a part1 and making a mock both of their own reason and their own probity1 merely to please persons whose delusions they pity and despise from the bottom of their hearts4 ,on the surface there is certainly nothing to distinguish this kind of conduct from the grossest hypocrisy4 ,is there anything under the surface to relieve it from this complexion8 ,is there any weight in the sort of answer which such men make to the accusation that their conformity is a very degrading form of deceit1 and a singularly mischievous kind of treachery8 ,is the plea of a wish to spare mental discomfort to others an admissible and valid plea8 ,it seems to us to be none of these things1 and for the following among other reasons4 ,if a man drew his wife by lot1 or by any other method over which neither he nor she has any control1 as in the case of parents1 perhaps he might with some plausibleness contend that he owed her certain limited deferences and reserves1 just as we admit that he may owe them to his parents4 ,but this is not the case4 ,marriage1 in this country at least1 is the result of mutual choice4 ,if men and women do as a matter of fact usually make this choice hastily and on wofully imperfect information of one another's characters1 that is no warrant for a resort to unlawful expedients to remedy the blunder4 ,if a woman cares ardently enough about religion to feel keen distress at the idea of dissent from it on the part of those closely connected with her1 she surely may be expected to take reasonable pains to ascertain beforehand the religious attitude of one with whom she is about to unite herself for life4 ,on the other hand1 if a man sets any value on his own opinions1 if they are in any real sense a part of himself1 he must be guilty of something like deliberate and systematic duplicity during the acquaintance preceding marriage1 if his dissent has remained unsuspected4 ,certainly if men go through society before marriage under false colours1 and feign beliefs which they do not hold1 they have only themselves to thank for the degradation of having to keep up the imposture afterwards4 ,suppose a protestant were to pass himself off for a catholic because he happened to meet a catholic lady whom he desired to marry4 ,everybody would agree in calling such a man by a very harsh name4 ,it is hard to see why a freethinker1 who by reticence and conformity passes himself off for a believer1 should be more leniently judged4 ,the differences between a catholic and a protestant are assuredly not any greater than those between a believer and an unbeliever4 ,we all admit the baseness of dissimulation in the former case4 ,why is it any less base in the latter8 ,marriages1 however1 are often made in haste1 or heedlessly1 or early in life1 before either man or woman has come to feel very deeply about religion either one way or another4 ,the woman does not know how much she will need religion1 nor what comfort it may bring to her4 ,the man does not know all the objections to it which may disclose themselves to his understanding as the years ripen4 ,there is always at work that most unfortunate maxim1 tacitly held and acted upon in ninety-nine marriages out of a hundred1 that money is of importance1 and social position is of importance1 and good connections are of importance1 and health and manners and comely looks1 and that the only thing which is of no importance whatever is opinion and intellectual quality and temper4 ,now granting that both man and woman are indifferent at the time of their union1 is that any reason why upon either of them acquiring serious convictions1 the other should be expected1 out of mere complaisance1 to make a false and hypocritical pretence of sharing them8 ,to see how flimsy is this plea of fearing to give pain to the religious sensitiveness of women1 we have only to imagine one or two cases which go beyond the common experience1 yet which ought not to strain the plea1 if it be valid4 ,thus1 if my wife turns catholic1 am ,i to pretend to turn catholic too1 to save her the horrible distress of thinking that ,i am doomed to eternal perdition8 ,or if she chooses to embrace the doctrine of direct illumination from heaven1 and to hear voices bidding her to go or come1 to do or abstain from doing1 am ,i too to shape my conduct after these fancied monitions8 ,or if it comes into her mind to serve tables1 and to listen in all faith to the miracles of spiritualism1 am ,i1 lest ,i should pain her1 to feign a surrender of all my notions of evidence1 to pretend a transformation of all my ideas of worthiness in life and beyond life1 and to go to sances with the same regularity and seriousness with which you go to church8 ,of course in each of these cases everybody who does not happen to share the given peculiarity of belief1 will agree that however severely a husband's dissent might pain the wife1 whatever distress and discomfort it might inflict upon her1 yet he would be bound to let her suffer1 rather than sacrifice his veracity and self-respect4 ,why then is it any less discreditable to practise an insincere conformity in more ordinary circumstances8 ,if the principle of such conformity is good for anything at all1 it ought to cover these less usual cases as completely as the others which are more usual4 ,indeed there would be more to be said on behalf of conformity for politeness' sake1 where the woman had gone through some great process of change1 for then one might suppose that her heart was deeply set on the matter4 ,even then the plea would be worthless1 but it is more indisputably worthless still where the sentiment which we are bidden to respect at the cost of our own freedom of speech is nothing more laudable than a fear of moving out of the common groove of religious opinion1 or an intolerant and unreasoned bigotry1 or mere stupidity and silliness of the vulgarest type4#bc ,ah1 it is said1 you forget that women cannot live without religion4 ,the present writer is equally of this opinion that women cannot be happy without a religion1 nor men either4 ,that is not the question4 ,it does not follow because a woman cannot be happy without a religion1 that therefore she cannot be happy unless her husband is of the same religion4 ,still less1 that she would be made happy by his insincerely pretending to be of the same religion4 ,and least of all is it true1 if both these propositions were credible1 that even then for the sake of her happiness he is bound not merely to live a life of imposture1 but in so doing to augment the general forces of imposture in the world1 and to make the chances of truth1 light1 and human improvement more and more unfavourable4 ,women are at present far less likely than men to possess a sound intelligence and a habit of correct judgment4 ,they will remain so1 while they have less ready access than men to the best kinds of literary and scientific training1 and--what is far more important--while social arrangements exclude them from all those kinds of public activity1 which are such powerful agents both in fitting men to judge soundly1 and in forming in them the sense of responsibility for their judgments being sound4 ,it may be contended that this alleged stronger religiosity of women1 however coarse and poor in its formulae1 is yet of constant value as a protest in favour of the maintenance of the religious element in human character and life1 and that this is a far more important thing for us all than the greater or less truth of the dogmas with which such religiosity happens to be associated4 ,in reply to this1 without tediously labouring the argument1 ,i venture to make the following observations4 ,in the first place1 it is an untenable idea that religiosity or devoutness of spirit is valuable in itself1 without reference to the goodness or badness of the dogmatic forms and the practices in which it clothes itself4 ,a fakir would hardly be an estimable figure in our society1 merely because his way of living happens to be a manifestation of the religious spirit4 ,if the religious spirit leads to a worthy and beautiful life1 if it shows itself in cheerfulness1 in pity1 in charity and tolerance1 in forgiveness1 in a sense of the largeness and the mystery of things1 in a lifting up of the soul in gratitude and awe to some supreme power and sovereign force1 then whatever drawback there may be in the way of superstitious dogma1 still such a spirit is on the whole a good thing4 ,if not1 not4 ,it would be better without the superstition3 even with the superstition it is good4 ,but if the religious spirit is only a fine name for narrowness of understanding1 for stubborn intolerance1 for mere social formality1 for a dread of losing that poor respectability which means thinking and doing exactly as the people around us think and do1 then the religious spirit is not a good thing1 but a thoroughly bad and hateful thing4 ,to that we owe no management of any kind4 ,any one who suppresses his real opinions1 and feigns others1 out of deference to such a spirit as this in his household1 ought to say plainly both to himself and to us that he cares more for his own ease and undisturbed comfort than he cares for truth and uprightness4 ,for it is that1 and not any tenderness for holy things1 which is the real ground of his hypocrisy4 ,now with reference to the religious spirit in its nobler form1 it is difficult to believe that any one genuinely animated by it would be soothed by the knowledge that her dearest companion is going through life with a mask on1 quietly playing a part1 uttering untrue professions1 doing his best to cheat her and the rest of the world by a monstrous spiritual make-believe4 ,one would suppose that instead of having her religious feeling gratified by conformity on these terms1 nothing could wound it so bitterly nor outrage it so unpardonably4 ,to know that her sensibility is destroying the entireness of the man's nature1 its loyalty alike to herself and to truth1 its freedom and singleness and courage--surely this can hardly be less distressing to a fine spirit than the suspicion that his heresies may bring him to the pit1 or than the void of going through life without even the semblance of religious sympathy between them4 ,if it be urged that the woman would never discover the piety of the man to be a counterfeit1 we reply that unless her own piety were of the merely formal kind1 she would be sure to make the discovery4 ,the congregation in the old story were untouched by the disguised devil's eloquence on behalf of religion3 it lacked unction4 ,the verbal conformity of the unbeliever lacks unction1 and its hollowness is speedily revealed to the quick apprehension of true faith4#bd ,let us not be supposed to be arguing in favour of incessant battle of high dialectic in the household4 ,nothing could be more destructive of the gracious composure and mental harmony1 of which household life ought to be1 but perhaps seldom is1 the great organ and instrument4 ,still less are we pleading for the freethinker's right at every hour of day or night to mock1 sneer1 and gibe at the sincere beliefs and conscientiously performed rites of those1 whether men or women1 whether strangers or kinsfolk1 from whose religion he disagrees4 ',it is not ancient impressions only1' said ,pascal1 'which are capable of abusing us4 ,the charm of novelty has the same power4' ,the prate of new-born scepticism may be as tiresome and as odious as the cant of gray orthodoxy4 ,religious discussion is not to be foisted upon us at every turn either by defenders or assailants4 ,all we plead for is that when the opportunity meets the freethinker full in front1 he is called upon to speak as freely as he thinks4 ,not more than this4 ,a plain man has no trouble in acquiring this tact of reasonableness4 ,we may all write what we please1 because it is in the discretion of the rest of the world whether they will hearken or not4 ,but in the family this is not so4 ,if a man systematically intrudes disrespectful and unwelcome criticism upon a woman who retains the ancient belief1 he is only showing that freethinker may be no more than bigot differently writ4 ,it ought to be essential to no one's self-respect that he cannot consent to live with people who do not think as he thinks4 ,we may be sure that there is something shallow and convulsive about the beliefs of a man who cannot allow his house-mates to possess their own beliefs in peace4 ,on the other hand1 it is essential to the self-respect of every one with the least love of truth that he should be free to express his opinions on every occasion1 where silence would be taken for an assent which he does not really give4 ,still more unquestionably1 he should be free from any obligation to forswear himself either directly1 as by false professions1 or by implication1 as when he attend services1 public or private1 which are to him the symbol of superstition and mere spiritual phantasmagoria4 ,the vindication of this simple right of living one's life honestly can hardly demand any heroic virtue4 ,a little of the straightforwardness which men are accustomed to call manly1 is the only quality that is needed2 a little of that frank courage and determination in spiritual things1 which men are usually so ready to practise towards their wives in temporal things4 ,it must be a keen delight to a cynic to see a man who owns that he cannot bear to pain his wife by not going to church and saying prayers1 yet insisting on having his own way1 fearlessly thwarting her wishes1 and contradicting her opinions1 in every other detail1 small and great1 of the domestic economy4 ,the truth of the matter is that the painful element in companionship is not difference of opinion1 but discord of temperament4 ,the important thing is not that two people should be inspired by the same convictions1 but rather that each of them should hold his and her own convictions in a high and worthy spirit4 ,harmony of aim1 not identity of conclusion1 is the secret of the sympathetic life2 to stand on the same moral plane1 and that1 if possible1 a high one2 to find satisfaction in different explanations of the purpose and significance of life and the universe1 and yet the same satisfaction4 ,it is certainly not less possible to disbelieve religiously than to believe religiously4 ,this accord of mind1 this emulation in freedom and loftiness of soul1 this kindred sense of the awful depth of the enigma which the one believes to be answered1 and the other suspects to be for ever unanswerable--here1 and not in a degrading and hypocritical conformity1 is the true gratification of those spiritual sensibilities which are alleged to be so much higher in women than in men4 ,where such an accord exists1 there may still be solicitude left in the mind of either at the superstition or the incredulity of the other1 but it will be solicitude of that magnanimous sort which is in some shape or other the inevitable and not unfruitful portion of every better nature4 ,if there are women who petulantly or sourly insist on more than this kind of harmony1 it is probable that their system of divinity is little better than a special manifestation of shrewishness4 ,the man is as much bound to resist that1 as he is bound to resist extravagance in spending money1 or any other vice of character4 ,if he does not resist it1 if he suppresses his opinions1 and practices a hypocritical conformity1 it must be from weakness of will and principle4 ,against this we have nothing to say4 ,a considerable proportion of people1 men no less than women1 are born invertebrate1 and they must got on as they best can4 ,but let us at least bargain that they shall not erect the maxims of their own feebleness into a rule for those who are braver and of stronger principle than themselves4 ,and do not let the accidental exigencies of a personal mistake be made the foundation of a general doctrine4 ,it is a poor saying1 that the world is to become void of spiritual sincerity1 because ,xanthippe has a turn for respectable theology4 ,one or two words should perhaps be said in this place as to conformity to common religious belief in the education of children4 ,where the parents differ1 the one being an unbeliever1 the other a believer1 it is almost impossible for anybody to lay down a general rule4 ,the present writer certainly has no ambition to attempt the thorny task of compiling a manual for mixed marriages4 ,it is perhaps enough to say that all would depend upon the nature of the beliefs which the religious person wished to inculcate4 ,considering that the woman has an absolutely equal moral right with the man to decide in what faith the child shall be brought up1 and considering how important it is that the mother should take an active part in the development of the child's affections and impulses1 the most resolute of deniers may perhaps think that the advantages of leaving the matter to her1 outweigh the disadvantages of having a superstitious bias given to the young mind4 ,in these complex cases an honest and fair-minded man's own instincts are more likely to lead him right than any hard and fast rule4 ,two reserves in assenting to the wife's control of early teaching will probably suggest themselves to everybody who is in earnest about religion4 ,first1 if the theology which the woman desires to instill contains any of those wicked and depraving doctrines which neither ,catholicism nor ,calvinism is without1 in the hands of some professors1 the husband is as much justified in pressing his legal rights over the child to the uttermost1 as he would be if the proposed religion demanded physical mutilation4 ,secondly1 he will not himself take part in baptismal or other ceremonies which are to him no better than mere mummeries1 nor will he ever do anything to lead his children at any age to suppose that he believes what he does not believe4 ,such limitations as these are commanded by all considerations alike of morality and good sense4 ,to turn to the more normal case where either the man has had the wise forethought not to yoke himself unequally with a person of ardent belief which he does not share1 or where both parents dissent from the popular creed4 ,here1 whatever difficulties may attend its application1 the principle is surely as clear as the sun at noonday4 ,there can be no good plea for the deliberate and formal inculcation upon the young of a number of propositions which you believe to be false4 ,to do this is to sow tares not in your enemy's field1 but in the very ground which is most precious of all others to you and most full of hope for the future4 ,to allow it to be done merely that children may grow up in the stereotyped mould1 is simply to perpetuate in new generations the present thick-sighted and dead-heavy state of our spirits4 ,it is to do one's best to keep society for an indefinite time sapped by hollow and void professions1 instead of being nourished by sincerity and whole-heartedness4#be ,nor here1 more than elsewhere in this chapter1 are we trying to turn the family into a field of ceaseless polemic4 ,no one who knows the stuff of which life is made1 the pressure of material cares1 the play of passion1 the busy energising of the affections1 the anxieties of health1 and all the other solicitudes1 generous or ignoble1 which naturally absorb the days of the common multitude of men--is likely to think such an ideal either desirable or attainable4 ,least of all is it desirable to give character a strong set in this polemical direction in its most plastic days4 ,the controversial and denying humour is a different thing from the habit of being careful to know what we mean by the words we use1 and what evidence there is for the beliefs we hold4 ,it is possible to foster the latter habit without creating the former4 ,and it is possible to bring up the young in dissent from the common beliefs around them1 or in indifference to them1 without engendering any of that pride in eccentricity for its own sake1 which is so little likeable a quality in either young or old4 ,there is1 however1 little risk of an excess in this direction4 ,the young tremble even more than the old at the penalties of nonconformity4 ,there is more excuse for them in this4 ,such penalties in their case usually come closer and in more stringent forms4 ,neither have they had time to find out1 as their elders have or ought to have found out1 what a very moderate degree of fortitude enables us to bear up against social disapproval1 when we know that it is nothing more than the common form of convention4 ,the great object is to keep the minds of the young as open as possible in the matter of religion2 to breed in them a certain simplicity and freedom from self-consciousness1 in finding themselves without the religious beliefs and customs of those around them2 to make them regard differences in these respects as very natural and ordinary matters1 susceptible of an easy explanation4 ,it is of course inevitable1 unless they are brought up in cloistered seclusion1 that they should hear much of the various articles of belief which we are anxious that they should not share4 ,they will ask you whether the story of the creation of the universe is true2 whether such and such miracles really happened2 whether this person or that actually lived1 and actually did all that he is said to have done4 ,plainly the right course is to tell them1 without any agitation or excess or vehemence or too much elaboration1 the simple truth in such matters exactly as it appears to one's own mind4 ,there is no reason why they should not know the best parts of the ,bible as well as they know the ,iliad or ,herodotus4 ,there are many reasons why they should know them better4 ,but one most important condition of this is constantly overlooked by people1 who like to satisfy their intellectual vanity by scepticism1 and at the same time to make their comfort safe by external conformity4 ,if the ,bible is to be taught only because it is a noble and most majestic monument of literature1 it should be taught as that and no more4 ,that a man who regards it solely us supreme literature1 should impress it upon the young as the supernaturally inspired word of ,god and the accurate record of objective occurrences1 is a piece of the plainest and most shocking dishonesty4 ,let a youth be trained in simple and straightforward recognition of the truth that we can know1 and can conjecture1 nothing with any assurance as to the ultimate mysteries of things4 ,let his imagination and his sense of awe be fed from those springs1 which are none the less bounteous because they flow in natural rather than supernatural channels4 ,let him be taught the historic place and source of the religions which he is not bound to accept1 unless the evidence for their authority by and by brings him to another mind4 ,a boy or girl trained in this way has an infinitely better chance of growing up with the true spirit and leanings of religion implanted in the character1 than if they had been educated in formulae which they could not understand1 by people who do not believe them4 ,the most common illustration of a personal mistake being made the base of a general doctrine1 is found in the case of those who1 after committing themselves for life to the profession of a given creed1 awake to the shocking discovery that the creed has ceased to be true for them4 ,the action of a popular modern story1 ,mrs4 ,gaskell's ,north and ,south1 turns upon the case of a clergyman whoso faith is overthrown1 and who in consequence abandons his calling1 to his own serious material detriment and under circumstances of severe suffering to his family4 ,i am afraid that current opinion1 especially among the cultivated class1 would condemn such a sacrifice as a piece of misplaced scrupulosity4 ,no man1 it would be said1 is called upon to proclaim his opinions1 when to do so will cost him the means of subsistence4 ,this will depend upon the value which he sets upon the opinions that be has to proclaim4 ,if such a proposition is true1 the world must efface its habit of admiration for the martyrs and heroes of the past1 who embraced violent death rather than defile themselves by a lying confession4 ,or is present heroism ridiculous1 and only past heroism admirable8 ,however1 nobody has a right to demand the heroic from all the world2 and if to publish his dissent from the opinions which he nominally holds would reduce a man to beggary1 human charity bids us say as little as may be4 ,we may leave such men to their unfortunate destiny1 hoping that they will make what good use of it may be possible4 ,non ragioniam di lor4 ,these cases only show the essential and profound immorality of the priestly profession--in all its forms1 and no matter in connection with what church or what dogma--which makes a man's living depend on his abstaining from using his mind1 or concealing the conclusions to which use of his mind has brought him4 ,the time will come when society will look back on the doctrine1 that they who serve the altar should live by the altar1 as a doctrine of barbarism and degradation4 ,but if one1 by refusing to offer a pinch of incense to the elder gods1 should thus strip himself of a marked opportunity of exerting an undoubtedly useful influence over public opinion1 or over a certain section of society1 is he not justified in compromising to the extent necessary to preserve this influence8 ,instead of answering this directly1 we would make the following remarks4 ,first1 it can seldom be clear in times like our own that religious heterodoxy must involve the loss of influence in other than religious spheres4 ,the apprehension that it will do so is due rather to timorousness and a desire to find a fair reason for the comforts of silence and reserve4 ,if a teacher has anything to tell the world in science1 philosophy1 history1 the world will not be deterred from listening to him by knowing that he does not walk in the paths of conventional theology4 ,second1 what influence can a man exert1 that should seem to him more useful than that of a protester against what he counts false opinions1 in the most decisive and important of all regions of thought8 ,surely if any one is persuaded1 whether rightly or wrongly1 that his fellows are expending the best part of their imaginations and feelings on a dream and a delusion1 and that by so doing moreover they are retarding to an indefinite degree the wider spread of light and happiness1 then nothing that he can tell them about chemistry or psychology or history can in his eyes be comparable in importance to the duty of telling them this4 ,there is no advantage nor honest delight in influence1 if it is only to be exerted in the sphere of secondary objects1 and at the cost of the objects which ought to be foremost in the eyes of serious people4 ,in truth the men who have done most for the world have taken very little heed of influence4 ,they have sought light1 and left their influence to fare as it might list4 ,can we not imagine the mingled mystification and disdain with which a ,spinosa or a ,descartes1 a ,luther or a ,pascal1 would have listened to an exhortation in our persuasive modern manner on the niceties of the politic and the social obligation of pious fraud8 ,it is not given to many to perform the achievements of such giants as these1 but every one may help to keep the standard of intellectual honesty at a lofty pitch1 and what better service can a man render than to furnish the world with an example of faithful dealing with his own conscience and with his fellows8 ,this at least is the one talent that is placed in the hands of the obscurest of us all4#bf ,and what is this smile of the world1 to win which we are bidden to sacrifice our moral manhood2 this frown of the world1 whose terrors are more awful than the withering up of truth and the slow going out of light within the souls of us8 ,consider the triviality of life and conversation and purpose1 in the bulk of those whose approval is held out for our prize and the mark of our high calling4 ,measure1 if you can1 the empire over them of prejudice unadulterated by a single element of rationality1 and weigh1 if you can1 the huge burden of custom1 unrelieved by a single leavening particle of fresh thought4 ,ponder the share which selfishness and love of ease have in the vitality and the maintenance of the opinions that we are forbidden to dispute4 ,then how pitiful a thing seems the approval or disapproval of these creatures of the conventions of the hour1 as one figures the merciless vastness of the universe of matter sweeping us headlong through viewless space2 as one hears the wail of misery that is for ever ascending to the deaf gods2 as one counts the little tale of the years that separate us from eternal silence4 ,in the light of these things1 a man should surely dare to live his small span of life with little heed of the common speech upon him or his life1 only caring that his days may be full of reality1 and his conversation of truth-speaking and wholeness4 ,those who think conformity in the matters of which we have been speaking harmless and unimportant1 must do so either from indifference or else from despair4 ,it is difficult to convince any one who is possessed by either one or other of these two evil spirits4 ,men who have once accepted them1 do not easily relinquish philosophies that relieve their professors from disagreeable obligations of courage and endeavour4 ,to the indifferent person one can say nothing4 ,we can only acquiesce in that deep and terrible scripture1 ',he that is filthy1 let him be filthy still4' ,to those who despair of human improvement or the spread of light in the face of the huge mass of brute prejudice1 we can only urge that the enormous weight and the firm hold of baseless prejudice and false commonplace are the very reasons which make it so important that those who are not of the night nor of the darkness should the more strenuously insist on living their own lives in the daylight4 ,to those1 finally1 who do not despair1 but think that the new faith will come so slowly that it is not worth while for the poor mortal of a day to make himself a martyr1 we may suggest that the new faith when it comes will be of little worth1 unless it has been shaped by generations of honest and fearless men1 and unless it finds in those who are to receive it an honest and fearless temper4 ,our plea is not for a life of perverse disputings or busy proselytising1 but only that we should learn to look at one another with a clear and steadfast eye1 and march forward along the paths we choose with firm step and erect front4 ,the first advance towards either the renovation of one faith or the growth of another1 must be the abandonment of those habits of hypocritical conformity and compliance which have filled the air of the ,england of to-day with gross and obscuring mists4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #ah3 ,it may be said that ,hume meant no more than this3 that of two equally oppressed nations1 the one which had been taught to assent to the doctrine of resistance would be more likely to practise 'the sacred duty of insurrection' than the other1 from whom the doctrine had been concealed4 ,or1 in other words1 that the first would rise against oppression1 when the oppression had reached a pitch which to the second would still seem bearable4 ,the answer to ,hume's proposition1 interpreted in this way1 would be that if the doctrine of resistance be presented to the populace in its true shape1--if it be 'truth1' as he admits1--then the application of it in practice should be as little likely to prove mischievous as that of any other truth4 ,if the gist of the remark be that this is a truth which the populace is especially likely to apply wrongly1 in consequence of its ignorance1 passion1 and heedlessness1 we may answer by appealing to history1 which is rather a record of excessive patience in the various nations of the earth than of excessive petulance4 ,footnote #ai3 ,there is another ground for the distinction between the conditions of holding and those of expressing opinion4 ,this depends upon the psychological proposition that belief is independent of the will4 ,though this or any other state of the understanding may be involuntary1 the manifestation of such a state is not so1 but is a voluntary act1 and1 'being neutral in itself1 may be commendable or reprehensible according to the circumstances in which it takes place4' 7,bailey's ,essay on ,formation of ,opinion1 #g74 ,footnote #bj3 ,the following words1 illustrating the continuity between the ,christian and ,jewish churches1 are not without instruction to those who meditate on the possible continuity between the ,christian church and that which is one day to grow into the place of it3--',not only do forms and ordinances remain under the ,gospel equally as before2 but1 what was in use before is not so much superseded by the ,gospel ordinances as changed into them4 ,what took place under the ,law is a pattern1 what was commanded is a rule1 under the ,gospel4 ,the substance remains1 the use1 the meaning1 the circumstances1 the benefit is changed2 grace is added1 life is infused3 the body is of ,christ2 but it is in great measure that same body which was in being before ,he came4 ,the ,gospel has not put aside1 it has incorporated into itself the revelation which went before it4 ,it avails itself of the ,old ,testament1 as a great gift to ,christian as well as to ,jew4 ,it does not dispense with it1 but it dispenses it4 ,persons sometimes urge that there is no code of duty in the ,new ,testament1 no ceremonial1 no rules for ,church polity4 ,certainly not2 they are unnecessary2 they are already given in the ,old4 ,why should the ,old ,testament remain in the ,christian church but to be used8 ,there we are to look for our forms1 our rites1 our polity2 only illustrated1 tempered1 spiritualised by the ,gospel4 ,the preempts remain1 the observance of them is changed1'--,dr4 ,j4,h4 ,newman2 ,sermon on ,subjects of the ,day1 p4 #bje4 ,footnote #ba3 ,there is a set of most acute and searching criticisms on this matter in ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's ,essays on ,free-,thinking and ,plain-,speaking 7,longmans1 #ahgc74 ,the last essay in the volume1 ,an ,apology for ,plain-,speaking1 is a decisive and remarkable exposition of the treacherous playing with words1 which underlies even the most vigorous efforts to make the phrases and formula of the old creed hold the reality of new faith4 ,footnote #bb3 ,upon this sentence the following criticism has been made3--',surely both of these so-called contradictions are deliberately affirmed by the vast majority of all thinkers upon the subject4 ,what orthodox asserter of the omnipresence of a ,creator with intelligible attributes ever maintained that these attributes could be grasped by men8'--,the orthodox asserter1 no doubt1 says that he does not maintain that the divine attributes can be grasped by men2 but his habitual treatment of them as intelligible1 and as the subjects of propositions made in languages that is designed to be intelligible1 shows that his first reservation is merely nominal1 as it is certainly inconsistent with his general position4 ,religious people who warn you most solemnly that man who is a worm and the son of a worm cannot possibly compass in his puny understanding the attributes of the ,divine ,being1 will yet--as an eminent divine not in holy orders has truly said--tell you all about him1 as if he were the man who lives in the next street4 ,footnote #bc3 ,that able man1 the late ,j4,e4 ,cairnes1 suggested the following objection to this paragraph4 ,when two persons marry1 there is a reasonable expectation1 almost amounting to an understanding1 that they will both of them adhere to their religion1 just as both of them tacitly agree to follow the ways of the world in the host of minor social matters4 ,if1 therefore1 either of them turns to some other creed1 the person so turning has1 so to speak1 broken the contract4 ,the utmost he or she can contend for is forbearance4 ,if a woman embraces catholicism1 she may seek tolerance1 but she has no right to exact conformity4 ,if the man becomes an unbeliever1 he in like manner breaks the bargain1 and may be justly asked not to flaunt his misdemeanour4 ,my answer to this would turn upon the absolute inexpediency of such silent bargains being assumed by public opinion4 ,in the present state of opinion1 where the whole air is alive with the spirit of change1 nobody who takes his life or her life seriously1 could allow an assumption which means reduction of one of the most important parts of character1 the love of truth1 to a nullity4 ,footnote #bd3 ,the reader remembers how ,wolmar1 the atheistic husband of ,julie in ,rousseau's ,new ,helosa1 is distressed by the chagrin which his unbelief inflicts on the piety of his wife4 ',he told me that he had been frequently tempted to make a feint of yielding to her arguments1 and to pretend1 for the sake of calming her sentiments that he did not really hold4 ,but such baseness of soul is too far from him4 ,without for a moment imposing on ,julie1 such dissimulation would only have been a new torment to her4 ,the good faith1 the frankness1 the union of heart1 that console for so many troubles1 would have been eclipsed between them4 ,was it by lessening his wife's esteem for him that he could reassure her8 ,instead of using any disguise1 he tells her sincerely what he thinks1 but he says it in so simple a tone1 etc4--,v4 v4 #abf4 ,footnote #be3 ,the common reason alleged by freethinkers for having their children brought up in the orthodox ways is that1 if they were not so brought up1 they would be looked on as contaminating agents whom other parents would take care to keep away from the companionship of their children4 ,this excuse may have had some force at another time4 ,at the present day1 when belief is so weak1 we doubt whether the young would be excluded from the companionship of their equals in age1 merely because they had not been trained in some of the conventional shibboleths4 ,even if it were so1 there are certainly some ways of compensating for the disadvantages of exclusion from orthodox circles4 ,i have heard of a more interesting reason2 namely1 that the historic position of the young1 relatively to the time in which they are placed1 is in some sort falsified1 unless they have gone through a training in the current beliefs of their age3 unless they have undergone that1 they miss1 as it were1 some of the normal antecedents4 ,i do not think this plea will hold good4 ,however desirable it may be that the young should know all sorts of erroneous beliefs and opinions as products of the past1 it can hardly be in any degree desirable that they should take them for truths4 ,if there were no other objection1 there would be this1 that the disturbance and waste of force involved in shaking off in their riper years the erroneous opinions which had been instilled into them in childhood1 would more than counter-balance any advantages1 whatever their precise nature may be1 to be derived from having shared in their own proper persons the ungrounded notions of others4 ,footnote #bf3 ,miss ,martineau has an excellent protest against 'the dereliction of principle shown in supposing that any ,cause can be of so much importance as fidelity to truth1 or can be important at all otherwise than in its relation to truth which wants vindicating4 ,it reminds me of an incident which happened when ,i was in ,america1 at the time of the severest trials of the ,abolitionists4 ,a pastor from the southern ,states lamented to a brother clergyman in the ,north the introduction of the ,anti-slavery question1 because the views of their sect were getting on so well before6 ,getting on6 cried the northern minister4 ,what is the use of getting your vessel on when you have thrown both captain and cargo overboard8 ,thus1 what signifies the pursuit of any one reform1 like those specified1--,anti-slavery and the ,woman question1--when the freedom which is the very soul of the controversy1 the very principle of the movement1--is mourned over in any other of its many manifestations8 ,the only effectual advocates of such reforms as those are people who follow truth wherever it leads4'--,autobiography1 ii4 #ddb4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,realisation ,,of ,,opinion4 ,a person who takes the trouble to form his own opinions and beliefs will feel that he owes no responsibility to the majority for his conclusions4 ,if he is a genuine lover of truth1 if he is inspired by the divine passion for seeing things as they are1 and a divine abhorrence of holding ideas which do not conform to the facts1 he will be wholly independent of the approval or assent of the persons around him4 ,when he proceeds to apply his beliefs in the practical conduct of life1 the position is different4 ,there are now good reasons why his attitude should be in some ways less inflexible4 ,the society in which he is placed is a very ancient and composite growth4 ,the people from whom he dissents have not come by their opinions1 customs1 and institutions by a process of mere haphazard4 ,these opinions and customs all had their origin in a certain real or supposed fitness4 ,they have a certain depth of root in the lives of a proportion of the existing generation4 ,their fitness for satisfying human needs may have vanished1 and their congruity with one another may have come to an end4 ,that is only one side of the truth4 ,the most zealous propagandism cannot penetrate to them4 ,the quality of bearing to be transplanted from one kind of soil and climate to another is not very common1 and it is far from being inexhaustible even where it exists4 ,in common language we speak of a generation as something possessed of a kind of exact unity1 with all its parts and members one and homogeneous4 ,yet very plainly it is not this4 ,it is a whole1 but a whole in a state of constant flux4 ,its factors and elements are eternally shifting4 ,it is not one1 but many generations4 ,each of the seven ages of man is neighbour to all the rest4 ,the column of the veterans is already staggering over into the last abyss1 while the column of the newest recruits is forming with all its nameless and uncounted hopes4 ,to each its tradition1 its tendency1 its possibilities4 ,only a proportion of each in one society can have nerve enough to grasp the banner of a new truth1 and endurance enough to bear it along rugged and untrodden ways4 ,and then1 as we have said1 one must remember the stuff of which life is made4 ,one must consider what an overwhelming preponderance of the most tenacious energies and most concentrated interests of a society must be absorbed between material cares and the solicitude of the affections4 ,it is obviously unreasonable to lose patience and quarrel with one's time1 because it is tardy in throwing off its institutions and beliefs1 and slow to achieve the transformation which is the problem in front of it4 ,men and women have to live4 ,the task for most of them is arduous enough to make them well pleased with even such imperfect shelter as they find in the use and wont of daily existence4 ,to insist on a whole community being made at once to submit to the reign of new practices and new ideas1 which have just begun to commend themselves to the most advanced speculative intelligence of the time1--this1 even if it were a possible process1 would do much to make life impracticable and to hurry on social dissolution4 ',it cannot be too emphatically asserted1' as has been said by one of the most influential of modern thinkers1 'that this policy of compromise1 alike in institutions1 in actions1 and in beliefs1 which especially characterises ,english life1 is a policy essential to a society going through the transitions caused by continued growth and development4 ,ideas and institutions proper to a past social state1 but incongruous with the new social state that has grown out of it1 surviving into this new social state they have made possible1 and disappearing only as this new social state establishes its own ideas and institutions1 are necessarily1 during their survival1 in conflict with these new ideas and institutions--necessarily furnish elements of contradiction in men's thoughts and deeds4 ,and yet1 as for the carrying on of social life1 the old must continue so long as the new is not ready1 this perpetual compromise is an indispensable accompaniment of a normal development4'#bg ,yet we must not press this argument1 and the state of feeling that belongs to it1 further than they may be fairly made to go4 ,the danger in most natures lies on this side1 for on this side our love of ease works1 and our prejudices4 ,the writer in the passage we have just quoted is describing compromise as a natural state of things1 the resultant of divergent forces4 ,he is not professing to define its conditions or limits as a practical duty4 ,nor is there anything in his words1 or in the doctrine of social evolution of which he is the most elaborate and systematic expounder1 to favour that deliberate sacrifice of truth1 either in search or in expression1 against which our two previous chapters were meant to protest4#bh ,when ,mr4 ,spencer talks of a new social state establishing its own ideas1 of course he means1 and can only mean1 that men and women establish their own ideas1 and to do that1 it is obvious that they must at one time or another have conceived them without any special friendliness of reference to the old ideas1 which they were in the fulness of time to supersede4 ,still less1 of course1 can a new social state ever establish its ideas1 unless the persons who hold them confess them openly1 and give to them an honest and effective adherence4 ,every discussion of the more fundamental principles of conduct must contain1 expressly or by implication1 some general theory of the nature and constitution of the social union4 ,let us state in a few words that which seems to command the greatest amount both of direct and analogical evidence in our time4 ,it is perhaps all the more important to discuss our subject with immediate and express reference to this theory1 because it has become in some minds a plea for a kind of philosophic indifference towards any policy of ,thorough1 as well as an excuse for systematic abstention from vigorous and downright courses of action4 ,a progressive society is now constantly and justly compared to a growing organism4 ,its vitality in this aspect consists of a series of changes in ideas and institutions4 ,these changes arise spontaneously from the operation of the whole body of social conditions1 external and internal4 ,the understanding and the affections and desires are always acting on the domestic1 political1 and economic ordering4 ,they influence the religious sentiment4 ,they touch relations with societies outside4 ,in turn they are constantly being acted on by all these elements4 ,in a society progressing in a normal and uninterrupted course1 this play and interaction is the sign and essence of life4 ,it is1 as we are so often told1 a long process of new adaptations and re-adaptations2 of the modification of tradition and usage by truer ideas and improved institutions4 ,there may be1 and there are1 epochs of rest1 when this modification in its active and demonstrative shape slackens or ceases to be visible4 ,but even then the modifying forces are only latent4 ,further progress depends on the revival of their energy1 before there has been time for the social structure to become ossified and inelastic4 ,the history of civilisation is the history of the displacement of old conceptions by new ones more conformable to the facts4 ,it is the record of the removal of old institutions and ways of living1 in favour of others of greater convenience and ampler capacity1 at once multiplying and satisfying human requirements4 ,now compromise1 in view of the foregoing theory of social advance1 may be of two kinds1 and of these two kinds one is legitimate and the other not4 ,it may stand for two distinct attitudes of mind1 one of them obstructive and the other not4 ,it may mean the deliberate suppression or mutilation of an idea1 in order to make it congruous with the traditional idea or the current prejudice on the given subject1 whatever that may be4 ,or else it may mean a rational acquiescence in the fact that the bulk of your contemporaries are not yet prepared either to embrace the new idea1 or to change their ways of living in conformity to it4 ,in the one case1 the compromiser rejects the highest truth1 or dissembles his own acceptance of it4 ,in the other1 he holds it courageously for his ensign and device1 but neither forces nor expects the whole world straightway to follow4 ,the first prolongs the duration of the empire of prejudice1 and retards the arrival of improvement4 ,the second does his best to abbreviate the one1 and to hasten and make definite the other1 yet he does not insist on hurrying changes which1 to be effective1 would require the active support of numbers of persons not yet ripe for them4 ,it is legitimate compromise to say3--',i do not expect you to execute this improvement1 or to surrender that prejudice1 in my time4 ,but at any rate it shall not be my fault if the improvement remains unknown or rejected4 ,there shall be one man at least who has surrendered the prejudice1 and who does not hide that fact4' ,it is illegitimate compromise to say3--',i cannot persuade you to accept my truth2 therefore ,i will pretend to accept your falsehood4' ,that this distinction is as sound on the evolutional theory of society as on any other is quite evident4 ,it would be odd if the theory which makes progress depend on modification forbade us to attempt to modify4 ,when it is said that the various successive changes in thought and institution present and consummate themselves spontaneously1 no one means by spontaneity that they come to pass independently of human effort and volition4 ,on the contrary1 this energy of the members of the society is one of the spontaneous elements4 ,it is quite as indispensable as any other of them1 if indeed it be not more so4 ,progress depends upon tendencies and forces in a community4 ,but of these tendencies and forces1 the organs and representatives must plainly be found among the men and women of the community1 and cannot possibly be found anywhere else4 ,progress is not automatic1 in the sense that if we were all to be cast into a deep slumber for the space of a generation1 we should awake to find ourselves in a greatly improved social state4 ,the world only grows better1 even in the moderate degree in which it does grow better1 because people wish that it should1 and take the right steps to make it better4 ,evolution is not a force1 but a process2 not a cause1 but a law4 ,it explains the source1 and marks the immovable limitations1 of social energy4 ,but social energy itself can never be superseded either by evolution or by anything else4 ,the reproach of being impracticable and artificial attaches by rights not to those who insist on resolute1 persistent1 and uncompromising efforts to remove abuses1 but to a very different class--to those1 namely1 who are credulous enough to suppose that abuses and bad customs and wasteful ways of doing things will remove themselves4 ,this credulity1 which is a cloak for indolence or ignorance or stupidity1 overlooks the fact that there are bodies of men1 more or less numerous1 attached by every selfish interest they have to the maintenance of these abusive customs4 ',a plan1' says ,bentham1 'may be said to be too good to be practicable1 where1 without adequate inducement in the shape of personal interest1 it requires for its accomplishment that some individual or class of individuals shall have made a sacrifice of his or their personal interest to the interest of the whole4 ,when it is on the part of a body of men or a multitude of individuals taken at random that any such sacrifice is reckoned upon1 then it is that in speaking of the plan the term ,utopian may without impropriety be applied4' ,and this is the very kind of sacrifice which must be anticipated by those who so misunderstand the doctrine of evolution as to believe that the world is improved by some mystic and self-acting social discipline1 which dispenses with the necessity of pertinacious attack upon institutions that have outlived their time1 and interests that have lost their justification4 ,we are thus brought to the position--to which1 indeed1 bare observation of actual occurrences might well bring us1 if it were not for the clouding disturbances of selfishness1 or of a true philosophy of society wrongly applied--that a society can only pursue its normal course by means of a certain progression of changes1 and that these changes can only be initiated by individuals or very small groups of individuals4 ,the progressive tendency can only be a tendency1 it can only work its way through the inevitable obstructions around it1 by means of persons who are possessed by the special progressive idea4 ,such ideas do not spring up uncaused and unconditioned in vacant space4 ,they have had a definite origin and ordered antecedents4 ,they are in direct relation with the past4 ,they present themselves to one person or little group of persons rather than to another1 because circumstances1 or the accident of a superior faculty of penetration1 have placed the person or group in the way of such ideas4 ,in matters of social improvement the most common reason why one hits upon a point of progress and not another1 is that the one happens to be more directly touched than the other by the unimproved practice4 ,or he is one of those rare intelligences1 active1 alert1 inventive1 which by constitution or training find their chief happiness in thinking in a disciplined and serious manner how things can be better done4 ,in all cases the possession of a new idea1 whether practical or speculative1 only raises into definite speech what others have needed without being able to make their need articulate4 ,this is the principle on which experience shows us that fame and popularity are distributed4 ,a man does not become celebrated in proportion to his general capacity1 but because he does or says something which happened to need doing or saying at the moment4 ,this brings us directly to our immediate subject4 ,for such a man is the holder of a trust ,it is upon him and those who are like him that the advance of a community depends4 ,if he is silent1 then repair is checked1 and the hurtful elements of worn-out beliefs and waste institutions remain to enfeeble the society1 just as the retention of waste products enfeebles or poisons the body4 ,if in a spirit of modesty which is often genuine1 though it is often only a veil for love of ease1 he asks why he rather than another should speak1 why he before others should refuse compliance and abstain from conformity1 the answer is that though the many are ultimately moved1 it is always one who is first to leave the old encampment4 ,if the maxim of the compromiser were sound1 it ought to be capable of universal application4 ,nobody has a right to make an apology for himself in this matter1 which he will not allow to be valid for others4 ,if one has a right to conceal his true opinions1 and to practice equivocal conformities1 then all have a right4 ,one plea for exemption is in this case as good as another1 and no better4 ,that he has married a wife1 that he has bought a yoke of oxen and must prove them1 that he has bidden guests to a feast--one excuse lies on the same level as the rest4 ,all are equally worthless as answers to the generous solicitation of enlightened conscience4 ,suppose1 then1 that each man on whom in turn the new ideas dawned wore to borrow the compromiser's plea and imitate his example4 ,we know what would happen4 ,the exploit in which no one will consent to go first1 remains unachieved4 ,you wait until there are persons enough agreeing with you to form an effective party8 ,but how are the members of the band to know one another1 if all are to keep their dissent from the old1 and their adherence to the new1 rigorously private8 ,and how many members constitute the innovating band an effective force6 ,when one-half of the attendants at a church are unbelievers1 will that warrant us in ceasing to attend1 or shall we tarry until the dissemblers number two-thirds8 ,conceive the additions which your caution has made to the moral integrity of the community in the meantime4 ,measure the enormous hindrances that will have been placed in the way of truth and improvement1 when the day at last arrives on which you and your two-thirds take heart to say that falsehood and abuse have now reached their final term1 and must at length be swept away into the outer darkness4 ,consider how much more terrible the shock of change will be when it does come1 and how much less able will men be to meet it1 and to emerge successfully from it4 ,perhaps the compromiser shrinks1 not because he fears to march alone1 but because he thinks that the time has not yet come for the progressive idea which he has made his own1 and for whose triumph one day he confidently hopes4 ,this plea may mean two wholly different states of the case4 ,the time has not yet come for what8 ,for making those positive changes in life or institution1 which the change in idea must ultimately involve8 ,that is one thing4 ,or for propagating1 elaborating1 enforcing the new idea1 and strenuously doing all that one can to bring as many people as possible to a state of theory1 which will at last permit the requisite change in practice to be made with safety and success8 ,this is another and entirely different thing4 ,the time may not have come for the first of these two courses4 ,the season may not be advanced enough for us to push on to active conquest4 ,but the time has always come1 and the season is never unripe1 for the announcement of the fruitful idea4 ,we must go further than that4 ,in so far as it can be done by one man without harming his neighbours1 the time has always come for the realisation of an idea4 ,when the change in way of living or in institution is one which requires the assent and co-operation of numbers of people1 it may clearly be a matter for question whether men enough are ready to yield assent and co-operation4 ,but the expression of the necessity of the change and the grounds of it1 though it may not always be appropriate1 can never be premature1 and for these reasons4 ,the fact of a new idea having come to one man is a sign that it is in the air4 ,the innovator is as much the son of his generation as the conservative4 ,heretics have as direct a relation to antecedent conditions as the orthodox4 ,truth1 said ,bacon1 has been rightly named the daughter of ,time4 ,the new idea does not spring up uncaused and by miracle4 ,if it has come to me1 there must be others to whom it has only just missed coming4 ,if ,i have found my way to the light1 there must be others groping after it very close in my neighbourhood4 ,my discovery is their goal4 ,they are prepared to receive the new truth1 which they were not prepared to find for themselves4 ,the fact that the mass are not yet ready to receive1 any more than to find1 is no reason why the possessor of the new truth should run to hide under a bushel the candle which has been lighted for him4 ,if the time has not come for them1 at least it has come for him4 ,no man can ever know whether his neighbours are ready for change or not4 ,he has all the following certainties1 at least3--that he himself is ready for the change2 that he believes it would be a good and beneficent one2 that unless some one begins the work of preparation1 assuredly there will be no consummation2 and that if he declines to take a part in the matter1 there can be no reason why every one else in turn should not decline in like manner1 and so the work remain for ever unperformed4 ,the compromiser who blinds himself to all those points1 and acts just as if the truth were not in him1 does for ideas with which he agrees1 the very thing which the acute persecutor does for ideas which he dislikes--he extinguishes beginnings and kills the germs4 ,the consideration on which so many persons rely1 that an existing institution1 though destined to be replaced by a better1 performs useful functions provisionally1 is really not to the point4 ,it is an excellent reason why the institution should not be removed or fundamentally modified1 until public opinion is ripe for the given piece of improvement4 ,but it is no reason at all why those who are anxious for the improvement1 should speak and act just as they would do if they thought the change perfectly needless and undesirable4 ,it is no reason why those who allow the provisional utility of a belief or an institution or a custom of living1 should think solely of the utility and forget the equally important element of its provisionalness4 ,for the fact of its being provisional is the very ground why every one who perceives this element1 should set himself to act accordingly4 ,it is the ground why he should set himself1 in other words1 to draw opinion in every way open to him--by speech1 by voting1 by manner of life and conduct--in the direction of new truth and the better practice4 ,let us not1 because we deem a thing to be useful for the hour1 act as if it were to be useful for ever4 ,the people who selfishly seek to enjoy as much comfort and ease as they can in an existing state of things1 with the desperate maxim1 ',after us1 the deluge1' are not any worse than those who cherish present comfort and case and take the world as it comes1 in the fatuous and self-deluding hope1 ',after us1 the millennium4' ,those who make no sacrifice to avert the deluge1 and those who make none to hasten their millennium1 are on the same moral level4 ,and the former have at least the quality of being no worse than their avowed principle1 while the latter nullify their pretended hopes by conformities which are only proper either to profound social contentment1 or to profound social despair4 ,nay1 they seem to think that there is some merit in this merely speculative hopefulness4 ,they act as if they supposed that to be very sanguine about the general improvement of mankind1 is a virtue that relieves them from taking trouble about any improvement in particular4 ,if those who defend a given institution are doing their work well1 that furnishes the better reason why those who disapprove of it and disbelieve in its enduring efficacy1 should do their work well also4 ,take the ,christian churches1 for instance4 ,assume1 if you will1 that they are serving a variety of useful functions4 ,if that were all1 it would be a reason for conforming4 ,but we are speaking of those for whom the matter does not end here4 ,if you are convinced that the dogma is not true2 that a steadily increasing number of persons are becoming aware that it is not true2 that its efficacy as a basis of spiritual life is being lowered in the same degree as its credibility2 that both dogma and church must be slowly replaced by higher forms of faith1 if not also by more effective organisations2 then1 all who hold such views as these have as distinctly a function in the community as the ministers and upholders of the churches1 and the zeal of the latter is simply the most monstrously untenable apology that could be invented for dereliction of duty by the former4 ,if the orthodox to some extent satisfy certain of the necessities of the present1 there are other necessities of the future which can only be satisfied by those who now pass for heretical4 ,the plea which we are examining1 if it is good for the purpose for which it is urged1 would have to be expressed in this way3--,the institution is working as perfectly as it can be made to do1 or as any other in its place would be likely to do1 and therefore ,i will do nothing by word or deed towards meddling with it4 ,those who think this1 and act accordingly1 are the consistent conservatives of the community4 ,if a man takes up any position short of this1 his conformity1 acquiescence1 and inertia at once become inconsistent and culpable4 ,for unless the institution or belief is entirely adequate1 it must be the duty of all who have satisfied themselves that it is not so1 to recognise its deficiences1 and at least to call attention to them1 even if they lack opportunity or capacity to suggest remedies4 ,now we are dealing with persons who1 from the hypothesis1 do not admit that this or that factor in an existing social state secures all the advantages which might be secured if instead of that factor there were some other4 ,we are speaking of all the various kinds of dissidents1 who think that the current theology1 or an established church1 or a monarchy1 or an oligarchic republic1 is a bad thing and a lower form1 even at the moment while they attribute provisional merit to it4 ,they can mean nothing by classing each of these as bad things1 except that they either bring with them certain serious drawbacks1 or exclude certain valuable advantages4 ,the fact that they perform their functions well1 such as they are1 leaves the fundamental vice or defect of these functions just where it was4 ,if any one really thinks that the current theology involves depraved notions of the supreme impersonation of good1 restricts and narrows the intelligence1 misdirects the religious imagination1 and has become powerless to guide conduct1 then how does the circumstance that it happens not to be wholly and unredeemedly bad in its influence1 relieve our dissident from all care or anxiety as to the points in which1 as we have seen1 he does count it inadequate and mischievous8 ,even if he thinks it does more good than harm--a position which must be very difficult for one who believes the common supernatural conception of it to be entirely false--even then1 how is he discharged from the duty of stigmatising the harm which he admits that it does8 ,again1 take the case of the ,english monarchy4 ,grant1 if you will1 that this institution has a certain function1 and that by the present chief magistrate this function is estimably performed4 ,yet if we are of those who believe that in the stage of civilisation which ,england has reached in other matters1 the monarchy must be either obstructive and injurious1 or else merely decorative2 and that a merely decorative monarchy tends in divers ways to engender habits of abasement1 to nourish lower social ideals1 to lessen a high civil self-respect in the community2 then it must surely be our duty not to lose any opportunity of pressing these convictions4 ,to do this is not necessarily to act as if one were anxious for the immediate removal of the throne and the crown into the museum of political antiquities4 ,we may have no urgent practical solicitude in this direction1 on the intelligible principle that a free people always gets as good a kind of government as it deserves4 ,our conviction is not1 on the present hypothesis1 that monarchy ought to be swept away in ,england1 but that monarchy produces certain mischievous consequences to the public spirit of the community4 ,and so what we are bound to do is to take care not to conceal this conviction2 to abstain scrupulously from all kinds of action and observance1 public or private1 which tend ever so remotely to foster the ignoble and degrading elements that exist in a court and spread from it outwards2 and to use all the influence we have1 however slight it may be1 in loading public opinion to a right attitude of contempt and dislike for these ignoble and degrading elements1 and the conduct engendered by them4 ,a policy like this does not interfere with the advantages of the monarchy1 such as they are asserted to be1 and it has the effect of making what are supposed to be its disadvantages as little noxious as possible4 ,the question whether we can get others to agree with us is not relevant4 ,if we were eager for instant overthrow1 it would be the most relevant of all questions4 ,but we are in the preliminary stage1 the stage for acting on opinion4 ,the fact that others do not yet share our opinion1 is the very reason for our action4 ,we can only bring them to agree with us1 if it be possible on any terms1 by persistency in our principles4 ,this persistency1 in all but either very timid or very vulgar natures1 always has been and always will be independent of external assent or co-operation4 ,the history of success1 as we can never too often repeat to ourselves1 is the history of minorities4 ,and what is more1 it is for the most part the history of insurrection exactly against what the worldly spirits of the time1 whenever it may have been1 deemed mere trifles and accidents1 with which sensible men should on no account dream of taking the trouble to quarrel4 ',halifax1' says ,macaulay1 'was in speculation a strong republican and did not conceal it4 ,he often made hereditary monarchy and aristocracy the subjects of his keen pleasantry1 while he was fighting the battles of the court and obtaining for himself step after step in the peerage4' ,we are perfectly familiar with this type1 both in men who have1 and men who have not1 such brilliant parts as ,halifax4 ,such men profess to nourish high ideals of life1 of character1 of social institutions4 ,yet they never think of these ideals1 when they are deciding what is practically attainable4 ,one would like to ask them what purpose is served by an ideal1 if it is not to make a guide for practice and a landmark in dealing with the real4 ,a man's loftiest and most ideal notions must be of a singularly ethereal and1 shall we not say1 senseless kind1 if he can never see how to take a single step that may tend in the slightest degree towards making them more real4 ,if an ideal has no point of contact with what exists1 it is probably not much more than the vapid outcome of intellectual or spiritual self-indulgence4 ,if it has such a point of contact1 then there is sure to be something which a man can do towards the fulfilment of his hopes4 ,he cannot substitute a new national religion for the old1 but he can at least do something to prevent people from supposing that the adherents of the old are more numerous than they really are1 and something to show them that good ideas are not all exhausted by the ancient forms4 ,he cannot transform a monarchy into a republic1 but he can make sure that one citizen at least shall aim at republican virtues1 and abstain from the debasing complaisance of the crowd4 ',it is a very great mistake1 said ,burke1 many years before the ,french ,revolution is alleged1 and most unreasonably alleged1 to have alienated him from liberalism3 'it is a very great mistake to imagine that mankind follow up practically any speculative principle1 either of government or of freedom1 as far as it will go in argument and logical illation4 ,all government1 indeed every human benefit and enjoyment1 every virtue1 and every prudent act1 is founded on compromise and barter4 ,we balance inconveniences2 we give and take2--we remit some rights that we may enjoy others4444 ,man acts from motives relative to his interests2 and not on metaphysical speculations4#bi ,these are the words of wisdom and truth1 if we can be sure that men will interpret them in all the fulness of their meaning1 and not be content to take only that part of the meaning which falls in with the dictates of their own love of ease4 ,in ,france such words ought to be printed in capitals on the front of every newspaper1 and written up in letters of burnished gold over each faction of the ,assembly1 and on the door of every bureau in the ,administration4 ,in ,england they need a commentary which shall bring out the very simple truth1 that compromise and barter do not mean the undisputed triumph of one set of principles4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 do they mean the mutilation of both sets of principles1 with a view to producing a tertium quid that shall involve the disadvantages of each1 without securing the advantages of either4 ,what ,burke means is that we ought never to press our ideas up to their remotest logical issues1 without reference to the conditions in which we are applying them4 ,in politics we have an art4 ,success in politics1 as in every other art1 obviously before all else implies both knowledge of the material with which we have to deal1 and also such concession as is necessary to the qualities of the material4 ,above all1 in politics we have an art in which development depends upon small modifications4 ,that is the true side of the conservative theory4 ,to hurry on after logical perfection is to show one's self ignorant of the material of that social structure with which the politician has to deal4 ,to disdain anything short of an organic change in thought or institution in infatuation4 ,to be willing to make such changes too frequently1 even when they are possible1 is foolhardiness4 ,that fatal ,french saying about small reforms being the worst enemies of great reforms is1 in the sense in which it is commonly used1 a formula of social ruin4 ,on the other hand1 let us not forget that there is a sense in which this very saying is profoundly true4 ,a small and temporary improvement may really be the worst enemy of a great and permanent improvement1 unless the first is made on the lines and in the direction of the second4 ,and so it may1 if it be successfully palmed off upon a society as actually being the second4 ,in such a case as this1 and our legislation presents instances of the kind1 the small reform1 if it be not made with reference to some large progressive principle and with a view to further extension of its scope1 makes it all the more difficult to return to the right line and direction when improvement is again demanded4 ,to take an example which is now very familiar to us all4 ,the ,education ,act of #ahgj was of the nature of a small reform4 ,no one pretends that it is anything approaching to a final solution of a complex problem4 ,but the government insisted1 whether rightly or wrongly1 that their ,act was as large a measure as public opinion was at that moment ready to support4 ,at the same time it was clearly agreed among the government and the whole of the party at their backs1 that at some time or other1 near or remote1 if public instruction was to be made genuinely effective1 the private1 voluntary1 or denominational system would have to be replaced by a national system4 ,to prepare for this ultimate replacement was one of the points to be most steadily borne in mind1 however slowly and tentatively the process might be conducted4 ,instead of that1 the authors of the ,act deliberately introduced provisions for extending and strengthening the very system which will have eventually to be superseded4 ,they thus by their small reform made the future great reform the more difficult of achievement4 ,assuredly this is not the compromise and barter1 the give and take1 which ,burke intended4 ,what ,burke means by compromise1 and what every true statesman understands by it1 is that it may be most inexpedient to meddle with an institution merely because it does not harmonise with 'argument and logical illation4' ,this is a very different thing from giving new comfort and strength with one hand1 to an institution whose death-warrant you pretend to be signing with the other4 ,in a different way the second possible evil of a small reform may be equally mischievous--where the small reform is represented as settling the question4 ,the mischief here is not that it takes us out of the progressive course1 as in the case we have just been considering1 but that it sets men's minds in a posture of contentment1 which is not justified by the amount of what has been done1 and which makes it all the harder to arouse them to new effort when the inevitable time arrives4 ,in these ways1 then1 compromise may mean1 not acquiescence in an instalment1 on the ground that the time is not ripe to yield us more than an instalment1 but either the acceptance of the instalment as final1 followed by the virtual abandonment of hope and effort2 or else it may mean a mistaken reversal of direction1 which augments the distance that has ultimately to be traversed4 ,in either of these senses1 the small reform may become the enemy of the great one4 ,but a right conception of political method1 based on a rightly interpreted experience of the conditions on which societies unite progress with order1 leads the wise conservative to accept the small change1 lest a worse thing befall him1 and the wise innovator to seize the chance of a small improvement1 while incessantly working in the direction of great ones4 ,the important thing is that throughout the process neither of them should lose sight of his ultimate ideal2 nor fail to look at the detail from the point of view of the whole2 nor allow the near particular to bulk so unduly large as to obscure the general and distant4 ,if the process seems intolerably slow1 we may correct our impatience by looking back upon the past4 ,people seldom realise the enormous period of time which each change in men's ideas requires for its full accomplishment4 ,we speak of these changes with a peremptory kind of definiteness1 as if they had covered no more than the space of a few years4 ,thus we talk of the time of the ,reformation1 as we might talk of the ,reform ,bill or the ,repeal of the ,corn ,duties4 ,yet the ,reformation is the name for a movement of the mind of northern ,europe1 which went on for three centuries4 ,then if we turn to that still more momentous set of events1 the rise and establishment of ,christianity1 one might suppose from current speech that we could fix that within a space of half a century or so4 ,yet it was at least four hundred years before all the foundations of that great superstructure of doctrine and organisation were completely laid4 ,again1 to descend to less imposing occurrences1 the transition in the ,eastern ,empire from the old ,roman system of national organisation to that other system to which we give the specific name of ,byzantine1--this transition1 so infinitely less important as it was than either of the two other movements1 yet occupied no less than a couple of hundred years4 ,the conditions of speech make it indispensable for us to use definite and compendious names for movements that were both tardy and complex4 ,we are forced to name a long series of events as if they were a single event4 ,but we lose the reality of history1 we fail to recognise one of the most striking aspects of human affairs1 and above all we miss that most invaluable practical lesson1 the lesson of patience1 unless we remember that the great changes of history took up long periods of time which1 when measured by the little life of a man1 are almost colossal1 like the vast changes of geology4 ,we know how long it takes before a species of plant or animal disappears in face of a better adapted species4 ,ideas and customs1 beliefs and institutions1 have always lingered just as long in face of their successors1 and the competition is not less keen nor less prolonged1 because it is for one or other inevitably destined to be hopeless4 ,history1 like geology1 demands the use of the imagination1 and in proportion as the exercise of the historic imagination is vigorously performed in thinking of the past1 will be the breadth of our conception of the changes which the future has in store for us1 as well as of the length of time and the magnitude of effort required for their perfect achievement#cj4 ,this much1 concerning moderation in political practice4 ,no such considerations present themselves in the matters which concern the shaping of our own lives1 or the publications of our social opinions4 ,in this region we are not imposing charges upon others1 either by law or otherwise4 ,we therefore owe nothing to the prejudices or habits of others4 ,if any one sets serious value upon the point of difference between his own ideal and that which is current1 if he thinks that his 'experiment in living' has promise of real worth1 and that if more persons could be induced to imitate it1 some portion of mankind would be thus put in possession of a better kind of happiness1 then it is selling a birthright for a mess of pottage to abandon hopes so rich and generous1 merely in order to avoid the passing and casual penalties of social disapproval4 ,and there is a double evil in this kind of flinching from obedience to the voice of our better selves1 whether it takes the form of absolute suppression of what we think and hope1 or only of timorous and mutilated presentation4 ,we lose not only the possible advantage of the given change4 ,besides that1 we lose also the certain advantage of maintaining or increasing the amount of conscientiousness in the world4 ,and everybody can perceive the loss incurred in a society where diminution of the latter sort takes place4 ,the advance of the community depends not merely on the improvement and elevation of its moral maxima1 but also on the quickening of moral sensibility4 ,the latter work has mostly been effected1 when it has been effected on a large scale1 by teachers of a certain singular personal quality4 ,they do nothing to improve the theory of conduct1 but they have the art of stimulating men to a more enthusiastic willingness to rise in daily practice to the requirements of whatever theory they may accept4 ,the love of virtue1 of duty1 of holiness1 or by whatever name we call this powerful sentiment1 exists in the majority of men1 where it exists at all1 independently of argument4 ,it is a matter of affection1 sympathy1 association1 aspiration4 ,hence1 even while1 in quality1 sense of duty is a stationary factor1 it is constantly changing in quantity4 ,the amount of conscience in different communities1 or in the same community at different times1 varies infinitely4 ,the immediate cause of the decline of a society in the order of morals is a decline in the quantity of its conscience1 a deadening of its moral sensitiveness1 and not a depravation of its theoretical ethics4 ,the ,greeks became corrupt and enfeebled1 not for lack of ethical science1 but through the decay in the numbers of those who were actually alive to the reality and force of ethical obligations4 ,mahometans triumphed over ,christians in the ,east and in ,spain--if we may for a moment isolate moral conditions from the rest of the total circumstances--not because their scheme of duty was more elevated or comprehensive1 but because their respect for duty was more strenuous and fervid4 ,the great importance of leaving this priceless element in a community as free1 as keen1 and as active as possible1 is overlooked by the thinkers who uphold coercion against liberty1 as a saving social principle4 ,every act of coercion directed against an opinion or a way of living is in so far calculated to lessen the quantity of conscience in the society where such acts are practised4 ,of course1 where ways of living interfere with the lawful rights of others1 where they are not strictly self-regarding in all their details1 it is necessary to force the dissidents1 however strong may be their conscientious sentiment4 ,the evil of attenuating that sentiment is smaller than the evil of allowing one set of persons to realise their own notions of happiness1 at the expense of all the rest of the world4 ,but where these notions can be realised without unlawful interference of that kind1 then the forcible hindrance of such realisation is a direct weakening of the force and amount of conscience on which the community may count4 ,there is one memorable historic case to illustrate this4 ,lewis ,,xiv41 in revoking the ,edict of ,nantes1 and the author of the still more cruel law of #agbd1 not only violently drove out multitudes of the most scrupulous part of the ,french nation2 they virtually offered the most tremendous bribes to those of less stern resolution1 to feign conversion to the orthodox faith4 ,this was to treat conscience as a thing of mean value4 ,it was to scatter to the wind with both hands the moral resources of the community4 ,and who can fail to see the strength which would have been given to ,france in her hour of storm1 a hundred years after the revocation of the ,edict of ,nantes1 if her protestant sons1 fortified by the training in the habits of individual responsibility which protestantism involves1 had only been there to aid8 ,this consideration brings us to a new side of the discussion4 ,we may seem to have been unconsciously arguing as strongly in favour of a vigorous social conservatism as of a self-asserting spirit of social improvement4 ,all that we have been saying may appear to cut both ways4 ,if the innovator should decline to practise silence or reserve1 why should the possessor of power be less uncompromising1 and why should he not impose silence by force8 ,if the heretic ought to be uncompromising in expressing his opinions1 and in acting upon them1 in the fulness of his conviction that they are right1 why should not the orthodox be equally uncompromising in his resolution to stamp out the heretical notions and unusual ways of living1 in the fulness of his conviction that they are thoroughly wrong8 ,to this question the answer is that the hollow kinds of compromise are as bad in the orthodox as in the heretical4 ,truth has as much to gain from sincerity and thoroughness in one as in the other4 ,but the issue between the partisans of the two opposed schools turns upon the sense which we design to give to the process of stamping out4 ,those who cling to the tenets of liberty limit the action of the majority1 as of the minority1 strictly to persuasion4 ,those who dislike liberty1 insist that earnestness of conviction justifies either a majority or a minority in using not persuasion only1 but force4 ,i do not propose here to enter into the great question which ,mr4 ,mill pressed anew upon the minds of this generation4 ,his arguments are familiar to every reader1 and the conclusion at which he arrived is almost taken for a postulate in the present essay4#ca ,the object of these chapters is to reiterate the importance of self-assertion1 tenacity1 and positiveness of principle4 ,the partisan of coercion will argue that this thesis is on one side of it a justification of persecution1 and other modes of interfering with new opinions and new ways of living by force1 and the strong arm of the law1 and whatever other energetic means of repression may be at command4 ,if the minority are to be uncompromising alike in seeking and realising what they take for truth1 why not the majority8 ,now this implies two propositions4 ,it is the same as to say1 first1 that earnestness of conviction is not to be distinguished from a belief in our own infallibility2 second1 that faith in our infallibility is necessarily bound up with intolerance4 ,neither of these propositions is true4 ,let us take them in turn4 ,earnestness of conviction is perfectly compatible with a sense of liability to error4 ,this has been so excellently put by a former writer that we need not attempt to better his exposition4 ',every one must1 of course1 think his own opinions right2 for if he thought them wrong1 they would no longer be his opinions3 but there is a wide difference between regarding ourselves as infallible1 and being firmly convinced of the truth of our creed4 ,when a man reflects on any particular doctrine1 he may be impressed with a thorough conviction of the improbability or even impossibility of its being false3 and so he may feel with regard to all his other opinions1 when he makes them objects of separate contemplation4 ,and yet when he views them in the aggregate1 when he reflects that not a single being on the earth holds collectively the same1 when he looks at the past history and present state of mankind1 and observes the various creeds of different ages and nations1 the peculiar modes of thinking of sects and bodies and individuals1 the notions once firmly held1 which have been exploded1 the prejudices once universally prevalent1 which have been removed1 and the endless controversies which have distracted those who have made it the business of their lives to arrive at the truth2 and when he further dwells on the consideration that many of these1 his fellow-creatures1 have had a conviction of the justness of their respective sentiments equal to his own1 he cannot help the obvious inference1 that in his own opinion it is next to impossible that there is not an admixture of error2 that there is an infinitely greater probability of his being wrong in some than right in all4'#cb ,of course this is not an account of the actual frame of mind of ordinary men4 ,they never do think of their opinions in the aggregate in comparison with the collective opinions of others1 nor ever draw the conclusions which such reflections would suggest4 ,but such a frame of mind is perfectly attainable1 and has often been attained1 by persons of far lower than first-rate capacity4 ,and if this is so1 there is no reason why it should not be held up for the admiration and imitation of all those classes of society which profess to have opinions4 ,it would thus become an established element in the temper of the age4 ,nor need we fear that the result of this would be any flaccidity of conviction1 or lethargy in act4 ,a man would still be penetrated with the rightness of his own opinion on a given issue1 and would still do all that he could to make it prevail in practice4 ,but among the things which he would no longer permit himself to do1 would be the forcible repression in others of any opinions1 however hostile to his own1 or of any kind of conduct1 however widely it diverged from his own1 and provided that it concerned themselves only4 ,this widening of his tolerance would be the natural result of a rational and realised consciousness of his own general fallibility4 ,next1 even belief in one's own infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance4 ,for it may be said that though no man in his senses would claim to be incapable of error1 yet in every given case he is quite sure that he is not in error1 and therefore this assurance in particular is tantamount by process of cumulation to a sense of infallibility in general4 ,now even if this were so1 it would not of necessity either produce or justify intolerance4 ,the certainty of the truth of your own opinions is independent of any special idea as to the means by which others may best be brought to share them4 ,the question between persuasion and force remains apart--unless1 indeed1 we may say that in societies where habits of free discussion have once begun to take root1 those who are least really sure about their opinions1 are often most unwilling to trust to persuasion to bring them converts1 and most disposed to grasp the rude implements of coercion1 whether legal or merely social4 ,the cry1 ',be my brother1 or ,i slay thee1' was the sign of a very weak1 though very fiery1 faith in the worth of fraternity4 ,he whose faith is most assured1 has the best reason for relying on persuasion1 and the strongest motive to thrust from him all temptations to use angry force4 ,the substitution of force for persuasion1 among its other disadvantages1 has this further drawback1 from our present point of view1 that it lessens the conscience of a society and breeds hypocrisy4 ,you have not converted a man1 because you have silenced him4 ,opinion and force belong to different elements4 ,to think that you are able by social disapproval or other coercive means to crush a man's opinion1 is as one who should fire a blunderbuss to put out a star4 ,the acquiescence in current notions which is secured by law or by petulant social disapproval1 is as worthless and as essentially hypocritical1 as the conversion of an ,irish pauper to protestantism by means of soup-tickets1 or that of a savage to ,christianity by the gift of a string of beads4 ,here is the radical fallacy of those who urge that people must use promises and threats in order to encourage opinions1 thoughts1 and feelings which they think good1 and to prevent others which they think bad4 ,promises and threats can influence acts4 ,opinions and thoughts on morals1 politics1 and the rest1 after they have once grown in a man's mind1 can no more be influenced by promises and threats than can my knowledge that snow is white or that ice is cold4 ,you may impose penalties on me by statute for saying that snow is white1 or acting as if ,i thought ice cold1 and the penalties may affect my conduct4 ,they will not1 because they cannot1 modify my beliefs in the matter by a single iota4 ,one result therefore of intolerance is to make hypocrites4 ,on this1 as on the rest of the grounds which vindicate the doctrine of liberty1 a man who thought himself infallible either in particular or in general1 from the ,pope of ,rome down to the editor of the daily newspaper1 might still be inclined to abstain from any form of compulsion4 ,the only reason to the contrary is that a man who is so silly as to think himself incapable of going wrong1 is very likely to be too silly to perceive that coercion may be one way of going wrong4 ,the currency of the notion that earnest sincerity about one's opinions and ideals of conduct is inseparably connected with intolerance1 is indirectly due to the predominance of legal or juristic analogies in social discussion4 ,for one thing1 the lawyer has to deal mainly with acts1 and to deal with them by way of repression4 ,his attention is primarily fixed on the deed1 and only secondarily on the mind of the doer4 ,and so a habit of thought is created1 which treats opinion as something equally in the sphere of coercion with actions4 ,at the same time it favours coercive ways of affecting opinion4 ,then1 what is still more important1 the jurist's conception of society has its root in the relation between sovereign and subject1 between lawmaker and those whom law restrains4 ,exertion of power on one hand1 and compliance on the other--this is his type of the conditions of the social union4 ,the fertility and advance of discussion on social issues depends on the substitution of the evolutional for the legal conception4 ,the lawyer's type of proposition is absolute4 ,it is also1 for various reasons which need not be given here1 inspired by involuntary reference to the lower1 rather than to the more highly developed1 social states4 ,in the lower states law1 penalties1 coercion1 compulsion1 the strong hand1 a sternly repressive public opinion1 were the conditions on which the community was united and held together4 ,but the line of thought which these analogies suggest1 becomes less and less generally appropriate in social discussion1 in proportion as the community becomes more complex1 more various in resource1 more special in its organisation1 in a word1 more elaborately civilised4 ,the evolutionist's idea of society concedes to law its historic place and its actual part4 ,but then this idea leads directly to a way of looking at society1 which makes the replacement of law by liberty a condition of reaching the higher stages of social development4 ,the doctrine of liberty belongs to the subject of this chapter1 because it is only another way of expressing the want of connection between earnestness in realising our opinions1 and anything like coercion in their favour4 ,if it were true that aversion from compromise1 in carrying out our ideas1 implied the rightfulness of using all the means in our power to hinder others from carrying out ideas hostile to them1 then we should have been preaching in a spirit unfavourable to the principle of liberty4 ,our main text has been that men should refuse to sacrifice their opinions and ways of living 7in the self-regarding sphere7 out of regard to the status quo1 or the prejudices of others4 ,and this1 as a matter of course1 excludes the right of forcing or wishing any one else to make such a sacrifice to us4 ,well1 the first foundation-stone for the doctrine of liberty is to be sought in the conception of society as a growing and developing organism4 ,this is its true base1 apart from the numerous minor expediencies which may be adduced to complete the structure of the argument4 ,it is fundamentally advantageous that in societies which have reached our degree of complex and intricate organisation1 unfettered liberty should be conceded to ideas and1 within the self-regarding sphere1 to conduct also4 ,the reasons for this are of some such kind as the following4 ,new ideas and new 'experiments in living' would not arise1 if there were not a certain inadequateness in existing ideas and ways of living4 ,they may not point to the right mode of meeting inadequateness1 but they do point to the existence and consciousness of it4 ,they originate in the social capability of growth4 ,society can only develop itself on condition that all such novelties 7within the limit laid down1 for good and valid reasons1 at self regarding conduct7 are allowed to present themselves4 ,first1 because neither the legislature nor any one else can ever know for certain what novelties will prove of enduring value4 ,second1 because even if we did know for certain that given novelties were pathological growths and not normal developments1 and that they never would be of any value1 still the repression necessary to extirpate them would involve too serious a risk both of keeping back social growth at some other point1 and of giving the direction of that growth an irreparable warp4 ,and let us repeat once more1 in proportion as a community grows more complex in its classes1 divisions1 and subdivisions1 more intricate in its productive1 commercial1 or material arrangements1 so does this risk very obviously wax more grave4 ,in the sense in which we are speaking of it1 liberty is not a positive force1 any more than the smoothness of a railroad is a positive force4#cc ,it is a condition4 ,as a force1 there is a sense in which it is true to call liberty a negation4 ,as a condition1 though it may still be a negation1 yet it may be indispensable for the production of certain positive results4 ,the vacuity of an exhausted receiver is not a force1 but it is the indispensable condition of certain positive operations4 ,liberty as a force may be as impotent as its opponents allege4 ,this does not affect its value as a preliminary or accompanying condition4 ,the absence of a strait-waistcoat is a negation2 but it is a useful condition for the activity of sane men4 ,no doubt there must be a definite limit to this absence of external interference with conduct1 and that limit will be fixed at various points by different thinkers4 ,we are now only urging that it cannot be wisely fixed for the more complex societies by any one who has not grasped this fundamental preconception1 that liberty1 or the absence of coercion1 or the leaving people to think1 speak1 and act as they please1 is in itself a good thing4 ,it is the object of a favourable presumption4 ,the burden of proving it inexpedient always lies1 and wholly lies1 on those who wish to abridge it by coercion1 whether direct or indirect4 ,one reason why this truth is so reluctantly admitted1 is men's irrational want of faith in the self-protective quality of a highly developed and healthy community4 ,the timid compromiser on the one hand1 and the advocate of coercive restriction on the other1 are equally the victims of a superfluous apprehension4 ,the one fears to use his liberty for the same reason that makes the other fearful of permitting liberty4 ,this common reason is the want of a sensible confidence that1 in a free western community1 which has reached our stage of development1 religious1 moral1 and social novelties--provided they are tainted by no element of compulsion or interference with the just rights of others1 may be trusted to find their own level4 ,moral and intellectual conditions are not the only motive forces in a community1 nor are they even the most decisive4 ,political and material conditions fix the limits at which speculation can do either good or harm4 ,let us take an illustration of the impotence of moral ideas to override material circumstances2 and we shall venture to place this illustration somewhat fully before the reader4 ,there is no more important distinction between modern civilised communities and the ancient communities than the fact that the latter rested on ,slavery1 while the former have abolished it4 ,hence there can hardly be a more interesting question than this--by what agencies so prodigious a transformation of one of the fundamental conditions of society was brought about4 ,the popular answer is of a very ready kind1 and it passes quite satisfactorily4 ,this answer is that the first great step towards free labour1 the transformation of personal slavery into serfdom1 was the result of the spiritual change which was wrought in men's minds by the teaching of the ,church4 ,it is unquestionable that the influence of the ,church tended to mitigate the evils of slavery1 to humanise the relations between master and slave1 between the lord and the serf4 ,but this is a very different thing from the radical transformation of those relations4 ,if we think of society as an organism we instantly understand that so immense a change as this could not possibly have been effected without the co-operation of the other great parts of the social system1 any more than a critical evolution could take place in the nutritive apparatus of an animal1 without a change in the whole series of its organs4 ,thus in order that serfage should be evolved from slavery1 and free labour again from serfage1 it could not be enough that an alteration should have been wrought in men's ideas as to their common brotherhood1 and the connected ideas as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of certain human relations4 ,there must have been an alteration also of the economic and material conditions4 ,history confirms the expectations which we should thus have been led to entertain4 ,the impotence of spiritual and moral agencies alone in bringing about this great metamorphosis1 is shown by such facts as these4 ,for centuries after the new faith had consolidated itself1 slavery was regarded without a particle of that deep abhorrence which the possession of man by man excites in us now4 ,in the ninth and tenth centuries the slave trade was the most profitable branch of the commerce that was carried on in the ,mediterranean4 ,the historian tells us that1 even so late as this1 slaves were the principal article of ,european export to ,africa1 ,syria1 and ,egypt1 in payment for the produce of the ,east which was brought from those countries4 ,it was the crumbling of the old social system which1 by reducing the population1 lessening the wealth1 and lowering the standard of living among the free masters1 tended to extinguish slavery1 by diminishing the differences between the masters and their bondsmen4 ,again1 it was certain laws enacted by the ,roman government for the benefit of the imperial fisc1 which first conferred rights on the slave4 ,the same laws brought the free farmer1 whose position was less satisfactory for the purposes of the revenue1 down nearer and nearer to a servile condition4 ,again1 in the ninth and tenth centuries1 pestilence and famine accelerated the extinction of predial slavery by weakening the numbers of the free population4 ',history1' we are told by that thoroughly competent authority1 ,mr4 ,finlay1 'affords its testimony that neither the doctrines of ,christianity1 nor the sentiments of humanity1 have ever yet succeeded in extinguishing slavery1 where the soil could be cultivated with profit by slave labour4 ,no ,christian community of slave-holders has yet voluntarily abolished slavery4 ,in no country where it prevailed has rural slavery ceased1 until the price of productions raised by slave labour has fallen so low as to leave no profit to the slave-owner4' ,the moral of all this is the tolerably obvious truth1 that the prosperity of an abstract idea depends as much on the medium into which it is launched1 as upon any quality of its own4 ,stable societies are amply furnished with force enough to resist all effort in a destructive direction4 ,there is seldom much fear1 and in our own country there is hardly any fear at all1 of hasty reformers making too much way against the spontaneous conservatism which belongs to a healthy and well-organised community4 ,if dissolvent ideas do make their way1 it is because the society was already ripe for dissolution4 ,new ideas1 however ardently preached1 will dissolve no society which was not already in a condition of profound disorganisation4 ,we may be allowed just to point to two memorable instances1 by way of illustration1 though a long and elaborate discussion would be needed to bring out their full force4 ,it has often been thought since1 as it was thought by timorous reactionaries at the time1 that ,christianity in various ways sapped the strength of the ,roman ,empire1 and opened the way for the barbarians4 ,in truth1 the most careful and competent students know now that the ,empire slowly fell to pieces1 partly because the political arrangements were vicious and inadequate1 but mainly because the fiscal and economic system impoverished and depopulated one district of the vast empire after another4 ,it was the break-up of the ,empire that gave the ,church its chance2 not the ,church that broke up the ,empire4 ,it is a mistake of the same kind to suppose that the destructive criticism of the ,french philosophers a hundred years ago was the great operative cause of the catastrophe which befel the old social rgime4 ,if ,voltaire1 ,diderot1 ,rousseau1 had never lived1 or if their works had all been suppressed as soon as they were printed1 their absence would have given no new life to agriculture1 would not have stimulated trade1 nor replenished the bankrupt fisc1 nor incorporated the privileged classes with the bulk of the nation1 nor done anything else to repair an organisation of which every single part had become incompetent for its proper function4 ,it was the material misery and the political despair engendered by the reigning system1 which brought willing listeners to the feet of the teachers who framed beneficent governments on the simple principles of reason and the natural law4 ,and these teachers only busied themselves with abstract politics1 because the real situation was desperate4 ,they had no alternative but to evolve social improvements out of their own consciousness4 ,there was not a single sound organ in the body politic1 which they could have made the starting-point of a reconstitution of a society on the base of its actual or historic structure4 ,the mischiefs which resulted from their method are patent and undeniable4 ,but the method was made inevitable by the curse of the old rgime4#cd ,nor is there any instance in history of mere opinion making a breach in the essential constitution of a community1 so long as the political conditions were stable and the economic or nutritive conditions sound4 ,if some absolute monarch were to be seized by a philanthropic resolution to transform the ordering of a society which seemed to be at his disposal1 he might possibly1 by the perseverance of a lifetime1 succeed in throwing the community into permanent confusion4 ,joseph ,,ii4 perhaps did as much as a modern sovereign can do in this direction4 ,yet little came of his efforts1 either for good or harm4 ,but a man without the whole political machinery in his power need hardly labour under any apprehension that he may1 by the mere force of speculative opinion1 involuntarily work a corresponding mischief4 ,if it is true that the most fervent apostles of progress usually do very little of the good on which they congratulate themselves1 they ought surely on the same ground to be acquitted of much of the harm for which they are sometimes reviled4 ,in a country of unchecked and abundant discussion1 a new idea is not at all likely to make much way against the objection of its novelty1 unless it is really commended by some quality of temporary or permanent value4 ,so far therefore as the mere publication of new principles is concerned1 and so far also as merely self-regarding action goes1 one who has the keenest sense of social responsibility1 and is most scrupulously afraid of doing anything to slacken or perturb the process of social growth1 may still consistently give to the world whatever ideas he has gravely embraced4 ,he may safely trust1 if the society be in a normal condition1 to its justice of assimilation and rejection4 ,there are a few individuals for whom newness is a recommendation4 ,but what are these few among the many to whom newness is a stumbling-block8 ,old ideas may survive merely because they are old4 ,a new one will certainly not1 among a considerable body of men in a healthy social state1 gain any acceptance worth speaking of1 merely because it is new4 ,the recognition of the self-protecting quality of society is something more than a point of speculative importance4 ,it has a direct practical influence4 ,for it would add to the courage and intrepidity of the men who are most attached to the reigning order of things4 ,if such men could only divest themselves of a futile and nervous apprehension1 that things as they are have no root in their essential fitness and harmony1 and that order consequently is ever hanging on a trembling and doubtful balance1 they would not only gain by the self-respect which would be added to them and the rest of the community1 but all discussion would become more robust and real4 ,if they had a larger faith in the stability for which they profess so great an anxiety1 they would be more free alike in understanding and temper to deal generously1 honestly1 and effectively with those whom they count imprudent innovators4 ,there is nothing more amusing or more instructive than to turn to the debates in parliament or the press upon some innovating proposal1 after an interval since the proposal was accepted by the legislature4 ,the flaming hopes of its friends1 the wild and desperate prophecies of its antagonists1 are found to be each as ill-founded as the other4 ,the measure which was to do such vast good according to the one1 such portentous evil according to the other1 has done only a part of the promised good1 and has done none of the threatened evil4 ,the true lesson from this is one of perseverance and thoroughness for the improver1 and one of faith in the self-protectiveness of a healthy society for the conservative4 ,the master error of the latter is to suppose that men are moved mainly by their passions rather than their interests1 that all their passions are presumably selfish and destructive1 and that their own interests can seldom be adequately understood by the persons most directly concerned4 ,how many fallacies are involved in this group of propositions1 the reader may well be left to judge for himself4 ,we have in this chapter considered some of the limitations which are set by the conditions of society on the duty of trying to realise our principles in action4 ,the general conclusion is in perfect harmony with that of the previous chapters4 ,a principle1 if it be sound1 represents one of the larger expediencies4 ,to abandon that for the sake of some seeming expediency of the hour1 is to sacrifice the greater good for the less1 on no more creditable ground than that the less is nearer4 ,it is better to wait1 and to defer the realisation of our ideas until we can realise them fully1 than to defraud the future by truncating them1 if truncate them we must1 in order to secure a partial triumph for them in the immediate present4 ,it is better to bear the burden of impracticableness1 than to stifle conviction and to pare away principle until it becomes more hollowness and triviality4 ,what is the sense1 and what is the morality1 of postponing the wider utility to the narrower8 ,nothing is so sure to impoverish an epoch1 to deprive conduct of nobleness1 and character of elevation4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #bg3 ,the ,study of ,sociology1 p4 #cif4 ,footnote #bh3 ,no one1 for instance1 has given more forcible or decisive expression than ,mr4 ,spencer has done to the duty of not passively accepting the current theology4 ,see his ,first ,principles1 pt4 i4 ch4 vi1 #cd2 paragraph beginning1--',whoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the highest truth1 lest it should be too much in advance of the time1 may reassure himself by looking at his acts from an impersonal point of view1' etc4 ,footnote #bi3 ,speech on ,conciliation with ,america4 ,footnote #cj3 ',toute normit dans les esprits d'un certain ordre n'est souvent qu'une grande vue prise hors du temps et du lieu1 et ne gardant aucun rapport rel avec les objets environnants4 ,le propre de certaines prunelles ardentes est de franchir du regard les intervalles et de les supprimer4 ,tantt c'est une ide qui retarde de plusieurs sicles1 et que ces vigoureux esprits se figurent encore prsente et vivante2 tantt c'est une ide qui avance1 et qu'ils croient incontinent ralisable4 ,m4 de ,couan tait ainsi2 il voyait #ahad ds #ahjd1 et de l une supriorit2 mais il jugeait #ahad possible ds #ahjd ou #ahje1 et de l tout un chimrique entassement4--,voil un point blanc l'horizon1 chacun jurerait que c'est un nuage4 ,c'est une montagne1 dit le voyageur l'oeil d'aigle2 mais s'il ajoute3 ,nous y arriverons ce soir1 dans deux heures2 si1 chaque heure de marche1 il crie avec emportement3 ,nous y sommes1 et le veut dmontrer1 il choque les voisins avec sa poutre1 et donne l'avantage aux yeux moins perants et plus habitus la plaine4'--,ste4 ,beuve's ,volupt1 p4 #bfb ,footnote #ca3 ,it is sometimes convenient to set familiar arguments down once more2 so ,i venture to reprint in a note at the end of the chapter a short exposition of the doctrine of liberty1 which ,i had occasion to make in considering ,sir ,j4,f4 ,stephen's vigorous attack on that doctrine4 ,footnote #cb3 ,mr4 ,samuel ,bailey's ,essays on the ,formation and ,publication of ,opinions1 etc41 p4 #ach1 7#ahbf47 ,footnote #cc3 ,there is a sense1 and a most important sense1 in which liberty is a positive force4 ,it is its robust and bracing influence on character1 which makes wise men prize freedom and strive for the enlargement of its province4 ,as ,mr4 ,mill expressed this3--',it is of importance not only what men do1 but what manner of men they are that do it1' ,milton pointed to the positive effect of liberty on character in the following passage3--',they are not skilful considerers of human things who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin4 ,though ye take from a covetous man his treasure1 he has yet one jewel left2 ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness4 ,banish all objects of lust1 shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercised in any hermitage1 ye cannot make them chaste that came not thither so4 ,suppose we could expel sin by this means2 look how much we thus expel of sin1 so much we expel of virtue4 ,and were ,i the chooser1 a dram of well-doing should be preferred before many times as much the forcible hindrance of evil-doing4 ,for ,god sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person1 more than the restraint of ten vicious4' ,footnote #cd3 ,there is1 ,i think1 nothing in this paragraph really inconsistent with ,de ,tocqueville's well-known and striking chapter1 ',comment les hommes de lettres devinrent les principaux hommes politiques du pays1 et des effets qui en rsultrent4' 7,ancien ,rgime1 iii4 i47 ,thus ,snac de ,meilhan writes in #agie2--';,c'est quand la ,rvolution a t entame qu'on a cherch dans ,mably1 dans ,rousseau1 des armes pour sustenter le systme vers lequel entrainait l'effervescence de quelques esprits hardis4 ,mais ce ne sont point les auteurs que j'ai cits qui ont enflamme les ttes2 ,m4 ,necker seul a produit cet effet1 et dtermin l'explosion1' 444 ',les crits de ,voltaire ont certainement nui la religion1 et branl la croyance dans un assez grand nombre2 mais ils n'ont aucun rapport avec les affaires du gouvernement1 et sont plus favorables que contraires la monarchie4444' ,of ,rousseau's ,social ,contract3--',ce livre profond et abstrait tait peu lu1 et etendu de bien peu de gens4' ,mably--'avait peu de vogue4' ,de ,gouvernment1 etc41 en ,france1 p4 #abi1 etc4 ,,note ,,to ,,page #bdb4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,liberty4 ,mr4 ,mill's memorable plea for social liberty was little more than an enlargement1 though a very important enlargement1 of the principles of the still more famous ,speech for ,liberty of ,unlicensed ,printing with which ,milton ennobled ,english literature two centuries before4 ,milton contended for free publication of opinion mainly on these grounds3 ,first1 that the opposite system implied the 'grace of infallibility and incorruptibleness' in the licensers4 ,second1 that the prohibition of bold books led to mental indolence and stagnant formalism both in teachers and congregations1 producing the 'laziness of a licensing church4' ,third1 that it 'hinders and retards the importation of our richest merchandise1 truth2' for the commission of the licenser enjoins him to let nothing pass which is not vulgarly received already1 and 'if it come to prohibiting1 there is not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself1 whose first appearance to our eyes1 bleared and dimmed with prejudice and custom1 is more unsightly and unplausible than many errors1 even as the person is of many a great man slight and contemptible to see to4' ,fourth1 that freedom is in itself an ingredient of true virtue1 and 'they are not skilful considerers of human things who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin2 that virtue therefore1 which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil1 and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers1 and rejects it1 is but a blank virtue1 not a pure2 her virtue is but an excremental virtue1 which was the reason why our sage and serious poet ,spenser1 whom ,i dare be known to think a better teacher than ,scotus or ,aquinas1 describing true temperance under the form of ,guion1 brings him in with his palmer through the cave of ,mammon and the tower of earthly bliss1 that he might see and know and yet abstain4' ,the four grounds on which ,mr4 ,mill contends for the necessity of freedom in the expression of opinion to the mental wellbeing of mankind1 are virtually contained in these4 ,his four grounds are1 7#a7 that the silenced opinion may be true2 7#b7 it may contain a portion of truth1 essential to supplement the prevailing opinion2 7#c7 vigorous contesting of opinions that are even wholly true1 is the only way of preventing them from sinking to the level of uncomprehended prejudices2 7#d7 without such contesting1 the doctrine will lose its vital effect on character and conduct4 ,but ,milton drew the line of liberty at what he calls 'neighbouring differences1 or rather indifferences4' ,the ,arminian controversy had loosened the bonds with which the newly liberated churches of the ,reformation1 had made haste to bind themselves again1 and weakened that authority of confessions1 which had replaced the older but not more intolerant authority of the universal church4 ,other controversies which raged during the first half of the seventeenth century1--those between catholics and protestants1 between prelatists and presbyterians1 between socinians and trinitarians1 between latitudinarians1 puritans1 and sacramentalists1--all tended to weaken theological exclusiveness4 ,this slackening1 however1 was no more than partial4 ,roger ,williams1 indeed1 the ,welsh founder of ,rhode ,island1 preached1 as early as #afca1 the principles of an unlimited toleration1 extending to catholics1 ,jews1 and even infidels4 ,milton stopped a long way short of this4 ,he did not mean 'tolerated popery and open superstition1 which1 as it extirpates all religious and civil supremacies1 so itself should be extirpate1 provided first that all charitable and compassionate means be used to win and regain the weak and the misled3 that also which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or manners no law can possibly permit that intends not to unlaw itself4' ,locke1 writing five-and-forty years later1 somewhat widened these limitations4 ,his question was not merely whether there should be free expression of opinion1 but whether there should furthermore be freedom of worship and of religious union4 ,he answered both questions affirmatively1--not on the semi-sceptical ground of ,jeremy ,taylor1 which is also one of the grounds taken by ,mr4 ,mill1 that we cannot be sure that our own opinion is the true one1--but on the strength of his definition of the province of the civil magistrate4 ,locke held that the magistrate's whole jurisdiction reached only to civil concernments1 and that 'all civil power1 right1 and dominion is bounded to that only care of promoting these things2 and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the saving of souls4 ,this chiefly because the power of the civil magistrate consists only in outward force1 while true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind1 without which nothing can be acceptable to ,god1 and such is the nature of the understanding that it cannot he compelled to the belief of anything by outward force4444 ,it is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's opinions2 and that light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings1 or any other outward penalties4' ',i may grow rich by an art that ,i take not delight in2 ,i may be cured of some disease by remedies that ,i have not faith in2 but ,i cannot be saved by a religion that at ,i distrust and a ritual that ,i abhor4' 7,first ,letter concerning ,toleration47 ,and much more in the same excellent vein4 ,but ,locke fixed limits to toleration4 #a4 ,no opinions contrary to human society1 or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society1 are to be tolerated by the magistrate4 ,thus1 to take examples from our own day1 a conservative minister would think himself right on this principle in suppressing the ,land and ,labour ,league2 a catholic minister in dissolving the ,education ,league2 and any minister in making mere membership of the ,mormon sect a penal offence4 #b4 ,no tolerance ought to be extended to 'those who attribute unto the faithful1 religious1 and orthodox1 that is in plain terms unto themselves1 any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals1 in civil concernments2 or who1 upon pretence of religion1 do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion4' ,as ,i have seldom heard of any sect1 except the ,friends1 who did not challenge as much authority as it could possibly get over persons not associated with it1 this would amount to a universal proscription of religion2 but ,locke's principle might at any rate be invoked against ,ultra-montanism in some circumstances4 #c4 ,those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of ,god4 ,the taking away of ,god1 though but even in thought1 dissolves all society2 and promises1 covenants1 and oaths1 which are the bonds of human society1 have no hold on such4 ,thus the police ought to close ,mr4 ,bradlaugh's ,hall of ,science1 and perhaps on some occasions the ,positivist ,school4 ,locke's principles depended on a distinction between civil concernments1 which he tries to define1 and all other concernments4 ,warburton's arguments on the alliance between church and state turned on the same point1 as did the once-famous ,bangorian controversy4 ,this distinction would fit into ,mr4 ,mill's cardinal position1 which consists in a distinction between the things that only affect the doer or thinker of them1 and the things that affect other persons as well4 ,locke's attempt to divide civil affairs from affairs of salvation1 was satisfactory enough for the comparatively narrow object with which he opened his discussion4 ,mr4 ,mill's account of civil affairs is both wider and more definite2 naturally so1 as he had to maintain the cause of tolerance in a much more complex set of social conditions1 and amid a far greater diversity of speculative energy1 than any one dreamed of in ,locke's time4 ,mr4 ,mill limits the province of the civil magistrate to the repression of acts that directly and immediately injure others than the doer of them4 ,so long as acts1 including the expression of opinions1 are purely self-regarding1 it seems to him expedient in the long run that they should not be interfered with by the magistrate4 ,he goes much further than this4 ,self-regarding acts should not be interfered with by the magistrate4 ,not only self-regarding acts1 but all opinions whatever1 should1 moreover1 be as little interfered with as possible by public opinion1 except in the way of vigorous argumentation and earnest persuasion in a contrary direction2 the silent but most impressive solicitation of virtuous example2 the wise and careful upbringing of the young1 so that when they enter life they may be most nobly fitted to choose the right opinions and obey the right motives4 ,the consideration by which he supports this rigorous confinement of external interference on the part of government1 or the unorganised members of the community whose opinion is called public opinion1 to cases of self-protection1 are these1 some of which have been already stated3-- #a4 ,by interfering to suppress opinions or experiments in living1 you may resist truths and improvements in a greater or less degree4 #b4 ,constant discussion is the only certain means of preserving the freshness of truth in men's minds1 and the vitality of its influence upon their conduct and motives4 #c4 ,individuality is one of the most valuable elements of wellbeing1 and you can only be sure of making the most of individuality1 if you have an atmosphere of freedom1 encouraging free development and expansion4 #d4 ,habitual resort to repressive means of influencing conduct tends more than anything else to discredit and frustrate the better means1 such as education1 good example1 and the like4 7,liberty1 #adh47 ,the principle which he deduces from these considerations is--'that the sole end for which mankind are warranted1 individually or collectively1 in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection2 the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community1 is to prevent harm to others4 ,his own good1 either physical or moral1 is not a sufficient warrant4 ,he cannot be rightfully compelled to do or forbear because it will make him happier1 because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right4 ,these are good reasons for remonstrating with him1 or reasoning with him1 or persuading him1 or entreating him1 but not for compelling him1 or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise4 ,to justify that1 the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to others4' 7,liberty1 #bb47 ,two disputable points in the above doctrine are likely at once to reveal themselves to the least critical eye4 ,first1 that doctrine would seem to check the free expression of disapproval2 one of the most wholesome and indispensable duties which anybody with interest in serious questions has to perform1 and the non-performance of which would remove the most proper and natural penalty from frivolous or perverse opinions and obnoxious conduct4 ,mr4 ,mill deals with this difficulty as follows3--',we have a right in various ways to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one1 not to the oppression of his individuality1 but in the exercise of ours4 ,we are not bound1 for example1 to seek his society2 we have a right to avoid it 7though not to parade the avoidance7 for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us4 ,we have a right1 and it may be our duty1 to caution others against him1 if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates4 ,we may give others a preference over him in optional good offices1 except those which tend to his improvement4 ,in these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself2 but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural1 and as it were the spontaneous1 consequences of the faults themselves1 not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment4' 7,liberty1 #aci47 ,this appears to be a satisfactory way of meeting the objection4 ,for though the penalties of disapproval may be just the same1 whether deliberately inflicted1 or naturally and spontaneously falling on the object of such disapproval1 yet there is a very intelligible difference between the two processes in their effect on the two parties concerned4 ,a person imbued with ,mr4 ,mill's principle would feel the responsibility of censorship much more seriously2 would reflect more carefully and candidly about the conduct or opinion of which he thought ill2 would be more on his guard against pharisaic censoriousness1 and that desire to be ever judging one another1 which ,milton well called the stronghold of our hypocrisy4 ,the disapproval of such a person would have an austere colour1 a gravity1 a self-respecting reserve1 which could never belong to an equal degree of disapproval in a person who had started from the officious principle1 that if we are sure we are right1 it is straightway our business to make the person whom we think wrong smart for his error4 ,and in the same way such disapproval would be much more impressive to the person whom it affected4 ,if it was justified1 he would be like a froward child who is always less effectively reformed--if reformable at all--by angry chidings and passionate punishments than by the sight of a cool and austere displeasure which lets him persist in his frowardness if he chooses4 ,the second weak point in the doctrine lies in the extreme vagueness of the terms1 protective and self-regarding4 ,the practical difficulty begins with the definition of these terms4 ,can any opinion1 or any serious part of conduct1 be looked upon as truly and exclusively self-regarding8 ,this central ingredient in the discussion seems insufficiently laboured in the essay on ,liberty4 ,yet it is here more than anywhere else that controversy is needed to clear up what is in just as much need of elucidation1 whatever view we may take of the inherent virtue of freedom--whether we look on freedom as a mere negation1 or as one of the most powerful positive conditions of attaining the highest kind of human excellence4 ,to some persons the analysis of conduct1 on which the whole doctrine of liberty rests1 seems metaphysical and arbitrary4 ,they are reluctant to admit there are any self-regarding acts at all4 ,this reluctance implies a perfectly tenable proposition1 a proposition which has been maintained by nearly all religious bodies in the world's history in their non-latitudinarian stages4 ,to distinguish the self-regarding from the other parts of conduct1 strikes them not only as unscientific1 but as morally and socially mischievous4 ,they insist that there is a social as well as a personal element in every human act1 though in very different proportions4 ,there is no gain1 they contend1 and there may be much harm1 in trying to mark off actions1 in which the personal element decisively preponderates1 from actions of another sort4 ,mr4 ,mill did so distinguish actions1 nor was his distinction either metaphysical or arbitrary in its source4 ,as a matter of observation1 and for the practical purposes of morality1 there are kinds of action whose consequences do not go beyond the doer of them4 ,no doubt1 you may say that by engaging in these kinds in any given moment1 the doer is neglecting the actions in which the social element preponderates1 and therefore even acts that seem purely self-regarding have indirect and negative consequences to the rest of the world4 ,but to allow considerations of this sort to prevent us from using a common-sense classification of acts by the proportion of the personal element in them1 is as unreasonable as if we allowed the doctrine of the conservation of physical force1 or the evolution of one mode of force into another1 to prevent us from classifying the affections of matter independently1 as light1 heat1 motion1 and the rest4 ,there is one objection obviously to be made to most of the illustrations which are designed to show the public element in all private conduct4 ,the connection between the act and its influence on others is so remote 7using the word in a legal sense71 though quite certain1 distinct1 and traceable1 that you can only take the act out of the self-regarding category1 by a process which virtually denies the existence of any such category4 ,you must set a limit to this 'indirect and at-a-distance argument1' as ,locke called a similar plea1 and the setting of this limit is the natural supplement to ,mr4 ,mill's 'simple principle4' ,the division between self-regarding acts and others then1 rests on observation of their actual consequences4 ,and why was ,mr4 ,mill so anxious to erect self-regarding acts into a distinct and important class1 so important as to be carefully and diligently secured by a special principle of liberty8 ,because observation of the recorded experience of mankind teaches us1 that the recognition of this independent provision is essential to the richest expansion of human faculty4 ,to narrow or to repudiate such a province1 and to insist exclusively on the social bearing of each part of conduct1 is to limit the play of motives1 and to thwart the doctrine that 'mankind obtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own1 under the rules and conditions required by the rest1 than when each makes the good of the rest his only object4' ,to narrow or to repudiate such a province is to tighten the power of the majority over the minority1 and to augment the authority of whatever sacerdotal or legislative body may represent the majority4 ,whether the lawmakers be laymen in parliament1 or priests of humanity exercising the spiritual power1 it matters not4 ,we may best estimate the worth and the significance of the doctrine of ,liberty by considering the line of thought and observation which led to it4 ,to begin with1 it is in ,mr4 ,mill's hands something quite different from the same doctrine as preached by the ,french revolutionary school2 indeed one might even call it reactionary1 in respect of the ,french theory of a hundred years back4 ,it reposes on no principle of abstract right1 but1 like the rest of its author's opinions1 on principles of utility and experience4 ,dr4 ,arnold used to divide reformers into two classes1 popular and liberal4 ,the first he defined as seekers of liberty1 the second as seekers of improvement2 the first were the goats1 and the second were the sheep4 ,mr4 ,mill's doctrine denied the mutual exclusiveness of the two parts of this classification1 for it made improvement the end and the test1 while it proclaimed liberty to be the means4 ,every thinker now perceives that the strongest and most durable influences in every western society lead in the direction of democracy1 and tend with more or less rapidity to throw the control of social organisation into the hands of numerical majorities4 ,there are many people who believe that if you only make the ruling body big enough1 it is sure to be either very wise itself1 or very eager to choose wise leaders4 ,mr4 ,mill1 as any one who is familiar with his writings is well aware1 did not hold this opinion4 ,he had no more partiality for mob rule than ,de ,maistre or ,goethe or ,mr4 ,carlyle4 ,he saw its evils more clearly than any of these eminent men1 because he had a more scientific eye1 and because he had had the invaluable training of a political administrator on a large scale1 and in a very responsible post4 ,but he did not content himself with seeing these evils1 and he wasted no energy in passionate denunciation of them1 which he knew must prove futile4 ,guizot said of ,de ,tocqueville1 that he was an aristocrat who accepted his defeat4 ,mr4 ,mill was too penetrated by popular sympathies to be an aristocrat in ,de ,tocqueville's sense1 but he likewise was full of ideas and hopes which the unchecked or undirected course of democracy would defeat without chance of reparation4 ,this fact he accepted1 and from this he started4 ,mr4 ,carlyle1 and one or two rhetorical imitators1 poured malediction on the many-headed populace1 and with a rather pitiful impatience insisted that the only hope for men lay in their finding and obeying a strong man1 a king1 a hero1 a dictator4 ,how he was to be found1 neither the master nor his still angrier and more impatient mimics could ever tell us4 ,now ,mr4 ,mill's doctrine laid down the main condition of finding your hero2 namely1 that all ways should be left open to him1 because no man1 nor majority of men1 could possibly tell by which of these ways their deliverers were from time to time destined to present themselves4 ,wits have caricatured all this1 by asking us whether by encouraging the tares to grow1 you give the wheat a better chance4 ,this is as misleading as such metaphors usually are4 ,the doctrine of liberty rests on a faith drawn from the observation of human progress1 that though we know wheat to be serviceable and tares to be worthless1 yet there are in the great seed-plot of human nature a thousand rudimentary germs1 not wheat and not tares1 of whose properties we have not had a fair opportunity of assuring ourselves4 ,if you are too eager to pluck up the tares1 you are very likely to pluck up with them these untried possibilities of human excellence1 and you are1 moreover1 very likely to injure the growing wheat as well4 ,the demonstration of this lies in the recorded experience of mankind4 ,nor is this all4 ,mr4 ,mill's doctrine does not lend the least countenance to the cardinal opinion of some writers in the last century1 that the only need of human character and of social institutions is to be let alone4 ,he never said that we were to leave the ground uncultivated1 to bring up whatever might chance to grow4 ,on the contrary1 the ground was to be cultivated with the utmost care and knowledge1 with a view to prevent the growth of tares--but cultivated in a certain manner4 ,you may take the method of the ,inquisition1 of the more cruel of the ,puritans1 of ,de ,maistre1 of ,mr4 ,carlyle2 or you may take ,mr4 ,mill's method of cultivation4 ,according to the doctrine of ,liberty1 we are to devote ourselves to prevention1 as the surest and most wholesome mode of extirpation4 ,persuade2 argue2 cherish virtuous example2 bring up the young in habits of right opinion and right motive2 shape your social arrangements so as to stimulate the best parts of character4 ,by these means you will gain all the advantages that could possibly have come of heroes and legislative dragooning1 as well as a great many more which neither heroes nor legislative dragooning could ever have secured4 ,it is well with men1 ,mr4 ,mill said1 moreover1 in proportion as they respect truth4 ,now they at once prove and strengthen their respect for truth1 by having an open mind to all its possibilities1 while at the same time they hold firmly to their own proved convictions1 until they hear better evidence to the contrary4 ,there is no anarchy1 nor uncertainty1 nor paralysing air of provisionalness in such a frame of mind4 ,so far is it from being fatal to loyalty or reverence1 that it is an indispensable part of the groundwork of the only loyalty that a wise ruler or teacher would care to inspire--the loyalty springing from a rational conviction that1 in a field open to all comers1 he is the best man they can find4 ,only on condition of liberty without limit is the ablest and most helpful of 'heroes' sure to be found2 and only on condition of liberty without limit are his followers sure to be worthy of him4 ,you must have authority1 and yet must have obedience4 ,the noblest and deepest and most beneficent kind of authority is that which rests on an obedience that is rational and spontaneous4 ,the same futile impatience which animates the political utterances of ,mr4 ,carlyle and his more weak-voiced imitators1 takes another form in men of a different training or temperament4 ,they insist that if the majority has the means of preventing vice by law1 it is folly and weakness not to resort to those means4 ,the superficial attractiveness of such a doctrine is obvious4 ,the doctrine of liberty implies a broader and a more patient view4 ,it says3--,even if you could be sure that what you take for vice is so--and the history of persecution shows how careful you should be in this preliminary point--even then it is an undoubted and1 indeed1 a necessary tendency of this facile repressive legislation1 to make those who resort to it neglect the more effective1 humane1 and durable kinds of preventive legislation4 ,you pass a law 7if you can7 putting down drunkenness2 there is a neatness in such a method very attractive to fervid and impatient natures4 ,would you not have done better to leave that law unpassed1 and apply yourselves sedulously instead to the improvement of the dwellings of the more drunken class1 to the provision of amusements that might compete with the ale-house1 to the extension and elevation of instruction1 and so on8 ,you may say that this should be done1 and yet the other should not be left undone2 but1 as matter of fact and history1 the doing of the one has always gone with the neglect of the other1 and ascetic law-making in the interests of virtue has never been accompanied either by law-making or any other kinds of activity for making virtue easier or more attractive4 ,it is the recognition how little punishment can do1 that leaves men free to see how much social prevention can do4 ,i believe1 then1 that what seems to the criminal lawyers and passionate philanthropists self-evident1 is in truth an illusion1 springing from a very shallow kind of impatience1 heated in some of them by the addition of a cynical contempt for human nature and the worth of human existence4 ,if people believe that the book of social or moral knowledge is now completed1 that we have turned over the last page and heard the last word1 much of the foundation of ,mr4 ,mill's doctrine would disappear4 ,but those who hold this can hardly have much to congratulate themselves upon4 ,if it were so1 and if governments were to accept the principle that the only limits to the enforcement of the moral standard of the majority are the narrow expediencies of each special case1 without reference to any deep and comprehensive principle covering all the largest considerations1 why1 then1 the society to which we ought to look with most admiration and envy1 is the ,eastern ,empire during the ninth and tenth centuries1 when the ,byzantine system of a thorough subordination of the spiritual power had fully consolidated itself6