,,utilitarianism      ,,by    ,,john    
,,stuart ,,mill        ,,reprinted      
,,from ',,fraser',s ,,magazine'         
,,seventh ,,edition    ,,london         
,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,and ,,co4        
#ahgi          ,,contents4              
,,chapter ,i4 ,,general ,,remarks       
,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,what ,,utilitarianism 
,,is    ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the     
,,ultimate ,,sanction ,,of ,,the        
,,principle ,,of ,,utility    ,,chapter 
,,iv4 ,,of ,,what ,,sort ,,of ,,proof   
,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility ,,is   
,,susceptible    ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of     
,,the ,,connexion ,,between ,,justice   
,,and ,,utility                         
,,utilitarianism4          ,,chapter ,i4
      ,,general ,,remarks4    ,there are
 few circumstances among those which    
make up the present  condition of human 
knowledge1 more unlike what might have  
been expected1  or more significant of  
the backward state in which speculation 
on the  most important subjects still   
lingers1 than the little progress which 

has been made in the decision of the    
controversy respecting the  criterion of
 right and wrong4 ,from the dawn of     
philosophy1 the question  concerning the
 summum bonum1 or1 what is the same     
thing1 concerning  the foundation of    
morality1 has been accounted the main   
problem in  speculative thought1 has    
occupied the most gifted intellects1 and
  divided them into sects and schools1  
carrying on a vigorous warfare  against 
one another4 ,and after more than two   
thousand years the same  discussions    
continue1 philosophers are still ranged 
under the same  contending banners1 and 
neither thinkers nor mankind at large   
seem  nearer to being unanimous on the  
subject1 than when the youth ,socrates  
listened to the old ,protagoras1 and    
asserted 7if ,plato's dialogue be       
grounded on a real conversation7 the    
theory of utilitarianism against  the   
popular morality of the so-called       
sophist4    ,it is true that similar    
confusion and uncertainty1 and in some  

cases  similar discordance1 exist       
respecting the first principles of all  
the  sciences1 not excepting that which 
is deemed the most certain of them1     
mathematics2 without much impairing1    
generally indeed without impairing  at  
all1 the trustworthiness of the         
conclusions of those sciences4 ,an      
apparent anomaly1 the explanation of    
which is1 that the detailed  doctrines  
of a science are not usually deduced    
from1 nor depend for  their evidence    
upon1 what are called its first         
principles4 ,were it not  so1 there     
would be no science more precarious1 or 
whose conclusions were  more            
insufficiently made out1 than algebra2  
which derives none of its  certainty    
from what are commonly taught to        
learners as its elements1  since these1 
as laid down by some of its most eminent
 teachers1 are as  full of fictions as  
,english law1 and of mysteries as       
theology4 ,the  truths which are        
ultimately accepted as the first        

principles of a  science1 are really the
 last results of metaphysical analysis1 
practised  on the elementary notions    
with which the science is conversant2   
and  their relation to the science is   
not that of foundations to an edifice1  
but of roots to a tree1 which may       
perform their office equally well       
though they be never dug down to and    
exposed to light4 ,but though in        
science the particular truths precede   
the general theory1 the contrary  might 
be expected to be the case with a       
practical art1 such as morals or        
legislation4 ,all action is for the sake
 of some end1 and rules of  action1 it  
seems natural to suppose1 must take     
their whole character  and colour from  
the end to which they are subservient4  
,when we engage in  a pursuit1 a clear  
and precise conception of what we are   
pursuing would  seem to be the first    
thing we need1 instead of the last we   
are to look  forward to4 ,a test of     
right and wrong must be the means1 one  

would  think1 of ascertaining what is   
right or wrong1 and not a consequence of
  having already ascertained it4    ,the
 difficulty is not avoided by having    
recourse to the popular theory  of a    
natural faculty1 a sense or instinct1   
informing us of right and  wrong4       
,for--besides that the existence of such
 a moral instinct is  itself one of the 
matters in dispute--those believers in  
it who have any  pretensions to         
philosophy1 have been obliged to abandon
 the idea that it  discerns what is     
right or wrong in the particular case in
 hand1 as our  other senses discern the 
sight or sound actually present4 ,our   
moral  faculty1 according to all those  
of its interpreters who are entitled to 
the name of thinkers1 supplies us only  
with the general principles of  moral   
judgments2 it is a branch of our reason1
 not of our sensitive  faculty2 and must
 be looked to for the abstract doctrines
 of morality1  not for perception of it 
in the concrete4 ,the intuitive1 no less

 than  what may be termed the inductive1
 school of ethics1 insists on the       
necessity of general laws4 ,they both   
agree that the morality of an           
individual action is not a question of  
direct perception1 but of the           
application of a law to an individual   
case4 ,they recognise also1 to a  great 
extent1 the same moral laws2 but differ 
as to their evidence1 and  the source   
from which they derive their authority4 
,according to the one  opinion1 the     
principles of morals are evident        
priori1 requiring  nothing to command   
assent1 except that the meaning of the  
terms be  understood4 ,according to the 
other doctrine1 right and wrong1 as well
 as  truth and falsehood1 are questions 
of observation and experience4 ,but     
both hold equally that morality must be 
deduced from principles2 and the        
intuitive school affirm as strongly as  
the inductive1 that there is a  science 
of morals4 ,yet they seldom attempt to  
make out a list of the   priori         

principles which are to serve as the    
premises of the science2  still more    
rarely do they make any effort to reduce
 those various  principles to one first 
principle1 or common ground of          
obligation4 ,they  either assume the    
ordinary precepts of morals as of       
priori  authority1 or they lay down as  
the common groundwork of those maxims1  
some generality much less obviously     
authoritative than the maxims           
themselves1 and which has never         
succeeded in gaining popular acceptance4
  ,yet to support their pretensions     
there ought either to be some one       
fundamental principle or law1 at the    
root of all morality1 or if there  be   
several1 there should be a determinate  
order of precedence among  them2 and the
 one principle1 or the rule for deciding
 between the  various principles when   
they conflict1 ought to be self-evident4
    ,to inquire how far the bad effects 
of this deficiency have been  mitigated 
in practice1 or to what extent the moral

 beliefs of mankind  have been vitiated 
or made uncertain by the absence of any 
distinct  recognition of an ultimate    
standard1 would imply a complete survey 
and  criticism of past and present      
ethical doctrine4 ,it would1 however1 be
  easy to show that whatever steadiness 
or consistency these moral beliefs  have
 attained1 has been mainly due to the   
tacit influence of a standard  not      
recognised4 ,although the non-existence 
of an acknowledged first  principle has 
made ethics not so much a guide as a    
consecration of men's  actual           
sentiments1 still1 as men's sentiments1 
both of favour and of  aversion1 are    
greatly influenced by what they suppose 
to be the effects  of things upon their 
happiness1 the principle of utility1 or 
as ,bentham  latterly called it1 the    
greatest happiness principle1 has had a 
large  share in forming the moral       
doctrines even of those who most        
scornfully  reject its authority4 ,nor  
is there any school of thought which    

refuses  to admit that the influence of 
actions on happiness is a most material 
and even predominant consideration in   
many of the details of morals1  however 
unwilling to acknowledge it as the      
fundamental principle of  morality1 and 
the source of moral obligation4 ,i might
 go much further1  and say that to all  
those  priori moralists who deem it     
necessary to  argue at all1 utilitarian 
arguments are indispensable4 ,it is not 
my  present purpose to criticise these  
thinkers2 but ,i cannot help  referring1
 for illustration1 to a systematic      
treatise by one of the most  illustrious
 of them1 the ,metaphysics of ,ethics1  
by ,kant4 ,this  remarkable man1 whose  
system of thought will long remain one  
of the  landmarks in the history of     
philosophical speculation1 does1 in the 
treatise in question1 lay down an       
universal first principle as the  origin
 and ground of moral obligation2 it is  
this3--',so act1 that the  rule on which
 thou actest would admit of being       

adopted as a law by all  rational       
beings4' ,but when he begins to deduce  
from this precept any of  the actual    
duties of morality1 he fails1 almost    
grotesquely1 to show  that there would  
be any contradiction1 any logical 7not  
to say  physical7 impossibility1 in the 
adoption by all rational beings of the  
most outrageously immoral rules of      
conduct4 ,all he shows is that the      
consequences of their universal adoption
 would be such as no one would  choose  
to incur4    ,on the present occasion1  
,i shall1 without further discussion of 
the  other theories1 attempt to         
contribute something towards the        
understanding and appreciation of the   
,utilitarian or ,happiness theory1  and 
towards such proof as it is susceptible 
of4 ,it is evident that this  cannot be 
proof in the ordinary and popular       
meaning of the term4  ,questions of     
ultimate ends are not amenable to direct
 proof4 ,whatever  can be proved to be  
good1 must be so by being shown to be a 

means to  something admitted to be good 
without proof4 ,the medical art is      
proved  to be good1 by its conducing to 
health2 but how is it possible to prove 
that health is good8 ,the art of music  
is good1 for the reason1 among  others1 
that it produces pleasure2 but what     
proof is it possible to give  that      
pleasure is good8 ,if1 then1 it is      
asserted that there is a  comprehensive 
formula1 including all things which are 
in themselves  good1 and that whatever  
else is good1 is not so as an end1 but  
as a  mean1 the formula may be accepted 
or rejected1 but is not a subject of    
what is commonly understood by proof4   
,we are not1 however1 to infer that  its
 acceptance or rejection must depend on 
blind impulse1 or arbitrary  choice4    
,there is a larger meaning of the word  
proof1 in which this  question is as    
amenable to it as any other of the      
disputed questions of  philosophy4 ,the 
subject is within the cognizance of the 
rational  faculty2 and neither does that

 faculty deal with it solely in the way 
of intuition4 ,considerations may be    
presented capable of determining the    
intellect either to give or withhold its
 assent to the doctrine2 and  this is   
equivalent to proof4    ,we shall       
examine presently of what nature are    
these considerations2 in  what manner   
they apply to the case1 and what        
rational grounds1  therefore1 can be    
given for accepting or rejecting the    
utilitarian  formula4 ,but it is a      
preliminary condition of rational       
acceptance or  rejection1 that the      
formula should be correctly understood4 
,i believe  that the very imperfect     
notion ordinarily formed of its meaning1
 is the  chief obstacle which impedes   
its reception2 and that could it be     
cleared1 even from only the grosser     
misconceptions1 the question would  be  
greatly simplified1 and a large         
proportion of its difficulties  removed4
 ,before1 therefore1 ,i attempt to enter
 into the philosophical  grounds which  

can be given for assenting to the       
utilitarian standard1 ,i  shall offer   
some illustrations of the doctrine      
itself2 with the view of  showing more  
clearly what it is1 distinguishing it   
from what it is not1  and disposing of  
such of the practical objections to it  
as either  originate in1 or are closely 
connected with1 mistaken interpretations
 of  its meaning4 ,having thus prepared 
the ground1 ,i shall afterwards         
endeavour to throw such light as ,i can 
upon the question1 considered as  one of
 philosophical theory4                  
,,chapter ,,ii4      ,,what             
,,utilitarianism ,,is4    ,a passing    
remark is all that needs be given to the
 ignorant blunder of  supposing that    
those who stand up for utility as the   
test of right and  wrong1 use the term  
in that restricted and merely colloquial
 sense in  which utility is opposed to  
pleasure4 ,an apology is due to the     
philosophical opponents of              
utilitarianism1 for even the momentary  

appearance of confounding them with any 
one capable of so absurd a              
misconception2 which is the more        
extraordinary1 inasmuch as the contrary 
accusation1 of referring everything to  
pleasure1 and that too in its  grossest 
form1 is another of the common charges  
against utilitarianism3  and1 as has    
been pointedly remarked by an able      
writer1 the same sort of  persons1 and  
often the very same persons1 denounce   
the theory as  impracticably dry when   
the word utility precedes the word      
pleasure1 and  as too practicably       
voluptuous when the word pleasure       
precedes the word  utility4 ,those who  
know anything about the matter are aware
 that every  writer1 from ,epicurus to  
,bentham1 who maintained the theory of  
utility1  meant by it1 not something to 
be contradistinguished from pleasure1   
but  pleasure itself1 together with     
exemption from pain2 and instead of     
opposing the useful to the agreeable or 
the ornamental1 have always  declared   

that the useful means these1 among other
 things4 ,yet the  common herd1         
including the herd of writers1 not only 
in newspapers and  periodicals1 but in  
books of weight and pretension1 are     
perpetually  falling into this shallow  
mistake4 ,having caught up the word     
utilitarian1 while knowing nothing      
whatever about it but its sound1 they   
habitually express by it the rejection1 
or the neglect1 of pleasure in  some of 
its forms2 of beauty1 of ornament1 or of
 amusement4 ,nor is the  term thus      
ignorantly misapplied solely in         
disparagement1 but  occasionally in     
compliment2 as though it implied        
superiority to  frivolity and the mere  
pleasures of the moment4 ,and this      
perverted use  is the only one in which 
the word is popularly known1 and the one
 from  which the new generation are     
acquiring their sole notion of its      
meaning4  ,those who introduced the     
word1 but who had for many years        
discontinued  it as a distinctive       

appellation1 may well feel themselves   
called upon to  resume it1 if by doing  
so they can hope to contribute anything 
towards  rescuing it from this utter    
degradation4,a    ,the creed which      
accepts as the foundation of morals1    
,utility1 or the  ,greatest ,happiness  
,principle1 holds that actions are right
 in proportion  as they tend to promote 
happiness1 wrong as they tend to produce
 the  reverse of happiness4 ,by         
happiness is intended pleasure1 and the 
absence of pain2 by unhappiness1 pain1  
and the privation of pleasure4 ,to  give
 a clear view of the moral standard set 
up by the theory1 much more  requires to
 be said2 in particular1 what things it 
includes in the ideas  of pain and      
pleasure2 and to what extent this is    
left an open question4  ,but these      
supplementary explanations do not affect
 the theory of life on  which this      
theory of morality is grounded--namely1 
that pleasure1 and  freedom from pain1  
are the only things desirable as ends2  

and that all  desirable things 7which   
are as numerous in the utilitarian as in
 any  other scheme7 are desirable either
 for the pleasure inherent in           
themselves1 or as means to the promotion
 of pleasure and the prevention  of     
pain4    ,now1 such a theory of life    
excites in many minds1 and among them in
 some  of the most estimable in feeling 
and purpose1 inveterate dislike4 ,to    
suppose that life has 7as they express  
it7 no higher end than  pleasure--no    
better and nobler object of desire and  
pursuit--they  designate as utterly mean
 and grovelling2 as a doctrine worthy   
only of  swine1 to whom the followers of
 ,epicurus were1 at a very early period1
  contemptuously likened2 and modern    
holders of the doctrine are             
occasionally made the subject of equally
 polite comparisons by its  ,german1    
,french1 and ,english assailants4       
,when thus attacked1 the ,epicureans    
have always answered1 that it is not    
they1 but their accusers1 who represent 

human nature in a degrading  light2     
since the accusation supposes human     
beings to be capable of no  pleasures   
except those of which swine are capable4
 ,if this supposition  were true1 the   
charge could not be gainsaid1 but would 
then be no  longer an imputation2 for if
 the sources of pleasure were precisely 
the  same to human beings and to swine1 
the rule of life which is good enough   
for the one would be good enough for the
 other4 ,the comparison of the          
,epicurean life to that of beasts is    
felt as degrading1 precisely because  a 
beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human
 being's conceptions of  happiness4     
,human beings have faculties more       
elevated than the animal  appetites1 and
 when once made conscious of them1 do   
not regard anything  as happiness which 
does not include their gratification4 ,i
 do not1  indeed1 consider the          
,epicureans to have been by any means   
faultless in  drawing out their scheme  
of consequences from the utilitarian    

principle4  ,to do this in any          
sufficient manner1 many ,stoic1 as well 
as ,christian  elements require to be   
included4 ,but there is no known        
,epicurean theory  of life which does   
not assign to the pleasures of the      
intellect2 of the  feelings and         
imagination1 and of the moral           
sentiments1 a much higher  value as     
pleasures than to those of mere         
sensation4 ,it must be admitted1        
however1 that utilitarian writers in    
general have placed the superiority  of 
mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in 
the greater permanency1  safety1        
uncostliness1 c41 of the former--that   
is1 in their  circumstantial advantages 
rather than in their intrinsic nature4  
,and on  all these points utilitarians  
have fully proved their case2 but they  
might have taken the other1 and1 as it  
may be called1 higher ground1  with     
entire consistency4 ,it is quite        
compatible with the principle of        
utility to recognise the fact1 that some

 kinds of pleasure are more  desirable  
and more valuable than others4 ,it would
 be absurd that while1  in estimating   
all other things1 quality is considered 
as well as  quantity1 the estimation of 
pleasures should be supposed to depend  
on  quantity alone4    ,if ,i am asked1 
what ,i mean by difference of quality in
 pleasures1 or  what makes one pleasure 
more valuable than another1 merely as a 
pleasure1 except its being greater in   
amount1 there is but one possible       
answer4 ,of two pleasures1 if there be  
one to which all or almost all who  have
 experience of both give a decided      
preference1 irrespective of any  feeling
 of moral obligation to prefer it1 that 
is the more desirable  pleasure4 ,if one
 of the two is1 by those who are        
competently acquainted  with both1      
placed so far above the other that they 
prefer it1 even  though knowing it to be
 attended with a greater amount of      
discontent1  and would not resign it for
 any quantity of the other pleasure     

which  their nature is capable of1 we   
are justified in ascribing to the       
preferred enjoyment a superiority in    
quality1 so far outweighing  quantity as
 to render it1 in comparison1 of small  
account4    ,now it is an unquestionable
 fact that those who are equally        
acquainted  with1 and equally capable of
 appreciating and enjoying1 both1 do    
give a  most marked preference to the   
manner of existence which employs their 
higher faculties4 ,few human creatures  
would consent to be changed into  any of
 the lower animals1 for a promise of the
 fullest allowance of a  beast's        
pleasures2 no intelligent human being   
would consent to be a  fool1 no         
instructed person would be an ignoramus1
 no person of feeling  and conscience   
would be selfish and base1 even though  
they should be  persuaded that the fool1
 the dunce1 or the rascal is better     
satisfied  with his lot than they are   
with theirs4 ,they would not resign what
 they  possess more than he1 for the    

most complete satisfaction of all the   
desires which they have in common with  
him4 ,if they ever fancy they  would1 it
 is only in cases of unhappiness so     
extreme1 that to escape  from it they   
would exchange their lot for almost any 
other1 however  undesirable in their own
 eyes4 ,a being of higher faculties     
requires more  to make him happy1 is    
capable probably of more acute          
suffering1 and is  certainly accessible 
to it at more points1 than one of an    
inferior type2  but in spite of these   
liabilities1 he can never really wish to
 sink into  what he feels to be a lower 
grade of existence4 ,we may give what   
explanation we please of this           
unwillingness2 we may attribute it to   
pride1 a name which is given            
indiscriminately to some of the most and
 to  some of the least estimable        
feelings of which mankind are capable2  
we  may refer it to the love of liberty 
and personal independence1 an appeal  to
 which was with the ,stoics one of the  

most effective means for the            
inculcation of it2 to the love of power1
 or to the love of excitement1  both of 
which do really enter into and          
contribute to it3 but its most          
appropriate appellation is a sense of   
dignity1 which all human beings  possess
 in one form or other1 and in some1     
though by no means in exact1  proportion
 to their higher faculties1 and which is
 so essential a part  of the happiness  
of those in whom it is strong1 that     
nothing which  conflicts with it could  
be1 otherwise than momentarily1 an      
object of  desire to them4 ,whoever     
supposes that this preference takes     
place at a  sacrifice of happiness-that 
the superior being1 in anything like    
equal  circumstances1 is not happier    
than the inferior-confounds the two very
  different ideas1 of happiness1 and    
content4 ,it is indisputable that the   
being whose capacities of enjoyment are 
low1 has the greatest chance of  having 
them fully satisfied2 and a             

highly-endowed being will always feel   
that any happiness which he can look    
for1 as the world is constituted1  is   
imperfect4 ,but he can learn to bear its
 imperfections1 if they are at  all     
bearable2 and they will not make him    
envy the being who is indeed            
unconscious of the imperfections1 but   
only because he feels not at all  the   
good which those imperfections qualify4 
,it is better to be a human  being      
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied2      
better to be ,socrates  dissatisfied    
than a fool satisfied4 ,and if the fool1
 or the pig1 is of a  different opinion1
 it is because they only know their own 
side of the  question4 ,the other party 
to the comparison knows both sides4     
,it may be objected1 that many who are  
capable of the higher pleasures1        
occasionally1 under the influence of    
temptation1 postpone them to the  lower4
 ,but this is quite compatible with a   
full appreciation of the  intrinsic     
superiority of the higher4 ,men often1  

from infirmity of  character1 make their
 election for the nearer good1 though   
they know it  to be the less valuable2  
and this no less when the choice is     
between two  bodily pleasures1 than when
 it is between bodily and mental4 ,they 
pursue  sensual indulgences to the      
injury of health1 though perfectly aware
 that  health is the greater good4 ,it  
may be further objected1 that many who  
begin with youthful enthusiasm for      
everything noble1 as they advance in    
years sink into indolence and           
selfishness4 ,but ,i do not believe that
  those who undergo this very common    
change1 voluntarily choose the lower    
description of pleasures in preference  
to the higher4 ,i believe that  before  
they devote themselves exclusively to   
the one1 they have already  become      
incapable of the other4 ,capacity for   
the nobler feelings is in  most natures 
a very tender plant1 easily killed1 not 
only by hostile  influences1 but by mere
 want of sustenance2 and in the majority

 of young  persons it speedily dies away
 if the occupations to which their      
position  in life has devoted them1 and 
the society into which it has thrown    
them1  are not favourable to keeping    
that higher capacity in exercise4 ,men  
lose  their high aspirations as they    
lose their intellectual tastes1 because 
they have not time or opportunity for   
indulging them2 and they addict         
themselves to inferior pleasures1 not   
because they deliberately prefer  them1 
but because they are either the only    
ones to which they have  access1 or the 
only ones which they are any longer     
capable of enjoying4  ,it may be        
questioned whether any one who has      
remained equally  susceptible to both   
classes of pleasures1 ever knowingly and
 calmly  preferred the lower2 though    
many1 in all ages1 have broken down in  
an  ineffectual attempt to combine both4
    ,from this verdict of the only      
competent judges1 ,i apprehend there can
 be  no appeal4 ,on a question which is 

the best worth having of two  pleasures1
 or which of two modes of existence is  
the most grateful to  the feelings1     
apart from its moral attributes and from
 its consequences1  the judgment of     
those who are qualified by knowledge of 
both1 or1 if  they differ1 that of the  
majority among them1 must be admitted as
 final4  ,and there needs be the less   
hesitation to accept this judgment      
respecting the quality of pleasures1    
since there is no other tribunal to  be 
referred to even on the question of     
quantity4 ,what means are there of      
determining which is the acutest of two 
pains1 or the intensest of two          
pleasurable sensations1 except the      
general suffrage of those who are       
familiar with both8 ,neither pains nor  
pleasures are homogeneous1 and  pain is 
always heterogeneous with pleasure4     
,what is there to decide  whether a     
particular pleasure is worth purchasing 
at the cost of a  particular pain1      
except the feelings and judgment of the 

experienced8  ,when1 therefore1 those   
feelings and judgment declare the       
pleasures  derived from the higher      
faculties to be preferable in kind1     
apart from  the question of intensity1  
to those of which the animal nature1    
disjoined from the higher faculties1 is 
susceptible1 they are entitled  on this 
subject to the same regard4    ,i have  
dwelt on this point1 as being a         
necessary part of a perfectly  just     
conception of ,utility or ,happiness1   
considered as the directive  rule of    
human conduct4 ,but it is by no means an
 indispensable condition  to the        
acceptance of the utilitarian standard2 
for that standard is not  the agent's   
own greatest happiness1 but the greatest
 amount of happiness  altogether2 and if
 it may possibly be doubted whether a   
noble character  is always the happier  
for its nobleness1 there can be no doubt
 that it  makes other people happier1   
and that the world in general is        
immensely a  gainer by it4              

,utilitarianism1 therefore1 could only  
attain its end by  the general          
cultivation of nobleness of character1  
even if each  individual were only      
benefited by the nobleness of others1   
and his own1  so far as happiness is    
concerned1 were a sheer deduction from  
the  benefit4 ,but the bare enunciation 
of such an absurdity as this last1      
renders refutation superfluous4         
,according to the ,greatest ,happiness  
,principle1 as above explained1 the     
ultimate end1 with reference to and for 
the sake of which all other  things are 
desirable 7whether we are considering   
our own good or that of  other people71 
is an existence exempt as far as        
possible from pain1 and  as rich as     
possible in enjoyments1 both in point of
 quantity and  quality2 the test of     
quality1 and the rule for measuring it  
against  quantity1 being the preference 
felt by those who1 in their             
opportunities  of experience1 to which  
must be added their habits of           

self-consciousness  and                 
self-observation1 are best furnished    
with the means of comparison4  ,this1   
being1 according to the utilitarian     
opinion1 the end of human  action1 is   
necessarily also the standard of        
morality2 which may  accordingly be     
defined1 the rules and precepts for     
human conduct1 by the  observance of    
which an existence such as has been     
described might be1 to  the greatest    
extent possible1 secured to all mankind2
 and not to them  only1 but1 so far as  
the nature of things admits1 to the     
whole sentient  creation4    ,against   
this doctrine1 however1 arises another  
class of objectors1 who  say that       
happiness1 in any form1 cannot be the   
rational purpose of human  life and     
action2 because1 in the first place1 it 
is unattainable3 and  they              
contemptuously ask1 ,what right hast    
thou to be happy8 a question  which ,mr4
 ,carlyle clenches by the addition1     
,what right1 a short time  ago1 hadst   

thou even to be8 ,next1 they say1 that  
men can do without  happiness2 that all 
noble human beings have felt this1 and  
could not  have become noble but by     
learning the lesson of ,entsagen1 or    
renunciation2 which lesson1 thoroughly  
learnt and submitted to1 they  affirm to
 be the beginning and necessary         
condition of all virtue4    ,the first  
of these objections would go to the root
 of the matter were it  well founded2   
for if no happiness is to be had at all 
by human beings1  the attainment of it  
cannot be the end of morality1 or of any
 rational  conduct4 ,though1 even in    
that case1 something might still be said
 for  the utilitarian theory2 since     
utility includes not solely the pursuit 
of  happiness1 but the prevention or    
mitigation of unhappiness2 and if the   
former aim be chimerical1 there will be 
all the greater scope and more          
imperative need for the latter1 so long 
at least as mankind think fit to  live1 
and do not take refuge in the           

simultaneous act of suicide  recommended
 under certain conditions by ,novalis4  
,when1 however1 it is  thus positively  
asserted to be impossible that human    
life should be  happy1 the assertion1 if
 not something like a verbal quibble1 is
 at  least an exaggeration4 ,if by      
happiness be meant a continuity of      
highly  pleasurable excitement1 it is   
evident enough that this is impossible4 
,a  state of exalted pleasure lasts only
 moments1 or in some cases1 and with    
some intermissions1 hours or days1 and  
is the occasional brilliant flash  of   
enjoyment1 not its permanent and steady 
flame4 ,of this the  philosophers who   
have taught that happiness is the end of
 life were as  fully aware as those who 
taunt them4 ,the happiness which they   
meant was  not a life of rapture1 but   
moments of such1 in an existence made up
 of  few and transitory pains1 many and 
various pleasures1 with a decided       
predominance of the active over the     
passive1 and having as the  foundation  

of the whole1 not to expect more from   
life than it is capable  of bestowing4  
,a life thus composed1 to those who have
 been fortunate  enough to obtain it1   
has always appeared worthy of the name  
of  happiness4 ,and such an existence is
 even now the lot of many1 during  some 
considerable portion of their lives4    
,the present wretched  education1 and   
wretched social arrangements1 are the   
only real hindrance  to its being       
attainable by almost all4    ,the       
objectors perhaps may doubt whether     
human beings1 if taught to  consider    
happiness as the end of life1 would be  
satisfied with such a  moderate share of
 it4 ,but great numbers of mankind have 
been satisfied  with much less4 ,the    
main constituents of a satisfied life   
appear to be  two1 either of which by   
itself is often found sufficient for the
  purpose3 tranquillity1 and excitement4
 ,with much tranquillity1 many find     
that they can be content with very      
little pleasure3 with much  excitement1 

many can reconcile themselves to a      
considerable quantity of  pain4 ,there  
is assuredly no inherent impossibility  
in enabling even the  mass of mankind to
 unite both2 since the two are so far   
from being  incompatible that they are  
in natural alliance1 the prolongation of
  either being a preparation for1 and   
exciting a wish for1 the other4 ,it  is 
only those in whom indolence amounts to 
a vice1 that do not desire  excitement  
after an interval of repose2 it is only 
those in whom the  need of excitement is
 a disease1 that feel the tranquillity  
which  follows excitement dull and      
insipid1 instead of pleasurable in      
direct  proportion to the excitement    
which preceded it4 ,when people who are 
tolerably fortunate in their outward lot
 do not find in life sufficient         
enjoyment to make it valuable to them1  
the cause generally is1 caring  for     
nobody but themselves4 ,to those who    
have neither public nor private         
affections1 the excitements of life are 

much curtailed1 and in any case  dwindle
 in value as the time approaches when   
all selfish interests must  be          
terminated by death3 while those who    
leave after them objects of  personal   
affection1 and especially those who have
 also cultivated a  fellow-feeling with 
the collective interests of mankind1    
retain as  lively an interest in life on
 the eve of death as in the vigour of   
youth  and health4 ,next to selfishness1
 the principal cause which makes life   
unsatisfactory1 is want of mental       
cultivation4 ,a cultivated mind--,i do  
not mean that of a philosopher1 but any 
mind to which the fountains of          
knowledge have been opened1 and which   
has been taught1 in any tolerable       
degree1 to exercise its faculties--finds
 sources of inexhaustible  interest in  
all that surrounds it2 in the objects of
 nature1 the  achievements of art1 the  
imaginations of poetry1 the incidents of
  history1 the ways of mankind past and 
present1 and their prospects in  the    

future4 ,it is possible1 indeed1 to     
become indifferent to all this1  and    
that too without having exhausted a     
thousandth part of it2 but only  when   
one has had from the beginning no moral 
or human interest in these  things1 and 
has sought in them only the             
gratification of curiosity4    ,now     
there is absolutely no reason in the    
nature of things why an amount  of      
mental culture sufficient to give an    
intelligent interest in these  objects  
of contemplation1 should not be the     
inheritance of every one  born in a     
civilized country4 ,as little is there  
an inherent necessity  that any human   
being should be a selfish egotist1      
devoid of every  feeling or care but    
those which centre in his own miserable 
individuality4 ,something far superior  
to this is sufficiently common  even    
now1 to give ample earnest of what the  
human species may be made4  ,genuine    
private affections1 and a sincere       
interest in the public good1  are       

possible1 though in unequal degrees1 to 
every rightly brought-up  human being4  
,in a world in which there is so much to
 interest1 so much  to enjoy1 and so    
much also to correct and improve1 every 
one who has  this moderate amount of    
moral and intellectual requisites is    
capable of  an existence which may be   
called enviable2 and unless such a      
person1  through bad laws1 or subjection
 to the will of others1 is denied the   
liberty to use the sources of happiness 
within his reach1 he will not  fail to  
find this enviable existence1 if he     
escape the positive evils of  life1 the 
great sources of physical and mental    
suffering--such as  indigence1 disease1 
and the unkindness1 worthlessness1 or   
premature loss  of objects of affection4
 ,the main stress of the problem lies1  
therefore1  in the contest with these   
calamities1 from which it is a rare good
  fortune entirely to escape2 which1 as 
things now are1 cannot be  obviated1 and
 often cannot be in any material degree 

mitigated4 ,yet no  one whose opinion   
deserves a moment's consideration can   
doubt that most  of the great positive  
evils of the world are in themselves    
removable1  and will1 if human affairs  
continue to improve1 be in the end      
reduced  within narrow limits4 ,poverty1
 in any sense implying suffering1 may be
  completely extinguished by the wisdom 
of society1 combined with the good      
sense and providence of individuals4    
,even that most intractable of  enemies1
 disease1 may be indefinitely reduced in
 dimensions by good  physical and moral 
education1 and proper control of noxious
 influences2  while the progress of     
science holds out a promise for the     
future of  still more direct conquests  
over this detestable foe4 ,and every    
advance  in that direction relieves us  
from some1 not only of the chances which
  cut short our own lives1 but1 what    
concerns us still more1 which deprive   
us of those in whom our happiness is    
wrapt up4 ,as for vicissitudes of       

fortune1 and other disappointments      
connected with worldly circumstances1   
these are principally the effect either 
of gross imprudence1 of  ill-regulated  
desires1 or of bad or imperfect social  
institutions4 ,all  the grand sources1  
in short1 of human suffering are in a   
great degree1  many of them almost      
entirely1 conquerable by human care and 
effort2 and  though their removal is    
grievously slow--though a long          
succession of  generations will perish  
in the breach before the conquest is    
completed1  and this world becomes all  
that1 if will and knowledge were not    
wanting1  it might easily be made--yet  
every mind sufficiently intelligent and 
generous to bear a part1 however small  
and unconspicuous1 in the  endeavour1   
will draw a noble enjoyment from the    
contest itself1 which he  would not for 
any bribe in the form of selfish        
indulgence consent to be  without4      
,and this leads to the true estimation  
of what is said by the objectors        

concerning the possibility1 and the     
obligation1 of learning to do  without  
happiness4 ,unquestionably it is        
possible to do without  happiness2 it is
 done involuntarily by                  
nineteen-twentieths of mankind1  even in
 those parts of our present world which 
are least deep in  barbarism2 and it    
often has to be done voluntarily by the 
hero or the  martyr1 for the sake of    
something which he prizes more than his 
individual happiness4 ,but this         
something1 what is it1 unless the       
happiness of others1 or some of the     
requisites of happiness8 ,it is noble   
to be capable of resigning entirely     
one's own portion of happiness1 or      
chances of it3 but1 after all1 this     
self-sacrifice must be for some end2  it
 is not its own end2 and if we are told 
that its end is not happiness1  but     
virtue1 which is better than happiness1 
,i ask1 would the sacrifice  be made if 
the hero or martyr did not believe that 
it would earn for  others immunity from 

similar sacrifices8 ,would it be made1  
if he thought  that his renunciation of 
happiness for himself would produce no  
fruit  for any of his fellow creatures1 
but to make their lot like his1 and     
place them also in the condition of     
persons who have renounced  happiness8  
,all honour to those who can abnegate   
for themselves the  personal enjoyment  
of life1 when by such renunciation they 
contribute  worthily to increase the    
amount of happiness in the world2 but he
 who  does it1 or professes to do it1   
for any other purpose1 is no more       
deserving of admiration than the ascetic
 mounted on his pillar4 ,he may  be an  
inspiriting proof of what men can do1   
but assuredly not an  example of what   
they should4    ,though it is only in a 
very imperfect state of the world's     
arrangements  that any one can best     
serve the happiness of others by the    
absolute  sacrifice of his own1 yet so  
long as the world is in that imperfect  
state1 ,i fully acknowledge that the    

readiness to make such a sacrifice  is  
the highest virtue which can be found in
 man4 ,i will add1 that in  this        
condition of the world1 paradoxical as  
the assertion may be1 the  conscious    
ability to do without happiness gives   
the best prospect of  realizing such    
happiness as is attainable4 ,for nothing
 except that  consciousness can raise a 
person above the chances of life1 by    
making  him feel that1 let fate and     
fortune do their worst1 they have not   
power  to subdue him3 which1 once felt1 
frees him from excess of anxiety        
concerning the evils of life1 and       
enables him1 like many a ,stoic in the  
worst times of the ,roman ,empire1 to   
cultivate in tranquillity the  sources  
of satisfaction accessible to him1      
without concerning himself  about the   
uncertainty of their duration1 any more 
than about their  inevitable end4       
,meanwhile1 let utilitarians never cease
 to claim the morality of  self-devotion
 as a possession which belongs by as    

good a right to them1  as either to the 
,stoic or to the ,transcendentalist4    
,the utilitarian  morality does         
recognise in human beings the power of  
sacrificing their  own greatest good for
 the good of others4 ,it only refuses to
 admit that  the sacrifice is itself a  
good4 ,a sacrifice which does not       
increase1 or  tend to increase1 the sum 
total of happiness1 it considers as     
wasted4  ,the only self-renunciation    
which it applauds1 is devotion to the   
happiness1 or to some of the means of   
happiness1 of others2 either of  mankind
 collectively1 or of individuals within 
the limits imposed by the  collective   
interests of mankind4    ,i must again  
repeat1 what the assailants of          
utilitarianism seldom have  the justice 
to acknowledge1 that the happiness which
 forms the  utilitarian standard of what
 is right in conduct1 is not the agent's
 own  happiness1 but that of all        
concerned4 ,as between his own happiness
 and  that of others1 utilitarianism    

requires him to be as strictly impartial
  as a disinterested and benevolent     
spectator4 ,in the golden rule of ,jesus
  of ,nazareth1 we read the complete    
spirit of the ethics of utility4 ,to  do
 as one would be done by1 and to love   
one's neighbour as oneself1  constitute 
the ideal perfection of utilitarian     
morality4 ,as the means of  making the  
nearest approach to this ideal1 utility 
would enjoin1 first1  that laws and     
social arrangements should place the    
happiness1 or 7as  speaking practically 
it may be called7 the interest1 of every
  individual1 as nearly as possible in  
harmony with the interest of the  whole2
 and secondly1 that education and       
opinion1 which have so vast a  power    
over human character1 should so use that
 power as to establish in  the mind of  
every individual an indissoluble        
association between his own  happiness  
and the good of the whole2 especially   
between his own  happiness and the      
practice of such modes of conduct1      

negative and  positive1 as regard for   
the universal happiness prescribes3 so  
that not  only he may be unable to      
conceive the possibility of happiness to
  himself1 consistently with conduct    
opposed to the general good1 but also   
that a direct impulse to promote the    
general good may be in every  individual
 one of the habitual motives of action1 
and the sentiments  connected therewith 
may fill a large and prominent place in 
every human  being's sentient existence4
 ,if the impugners of the utilitarian   
morality  represented it to their own   
minds in this its true character1 ,i    
know not  what recommendation possessed 
by any other morality they could        
possibly  affirm to be wanting to it3   
what more beautiful or more exalted     
developments of human nature any other  
ethical system can be supposed to       
foster1 or what springs of action1 not  
accessible to the utilitarian1  such    
systems rely on for giving effect to    
their mandates4    ,the objectors to    

utilitarianism cannot always be charged 
with  representing it in a discreditable
 light4 ,on the contrary1 those among   
them who entertain anything like a just 
idea of its disinterested  character1   
sometimes find fault with its standard  
as being too high for  humanity4 ,they  
say it is exacting too much to require  
that people shall  always act from the  
inducement of promoting the general     
interests of  society4 ,but this is to  
mistake the very meaning of a standard  
of  morals1 and to confound the rule of 
action with the motive of it4 ,it is    
the business of ethics to tell us what  
are our duties1 or by what test  we may 
know them2 but no system of ethics      
requires that the sole motive  of all we
 do shall be a feeling of duty2 on the  
contrary1 ninety-nine  hundredths of all
 our actions are done from other        
motives1 and rightly  so done1 if the   
rule of duty does not condemn them4 ,it 
is the more  unjust to utilitarianism   
that this particular misapprehension    

should be  made a ground of objection to
 it1 inasmuch as utilitarian moralists  
have  gone beyond almost all others in  
affirming that the motive has nothing   
to do with the morality of the action1  
though much with the worth of the       
agent4 ,he who saves a fellow creature  
from drowning does what is morally      
right1 whether his motive be duty1 or   
the hope of being paid for his  trouble3
 he who betrays the friend that trusts  
him1 is guilty of a  crime1 even if his 
object be to serve another friend to    
whom he is under  greater obligations4,b
 ,but to speak only of actions done from
 the  motive of duty1 and in direct     
obedience to principle3 it is a         
misapprehension of the utilitarian mode 
of thought1 to conceive it as  implying 
that people should fix their minds upon 
so wide a generality as  the world1 or  
society at large4 ,the great majority of
 good actions are  intended1 not for the
 benefit of the world1 but for that of  
individuals1  of which the good of the  

world is made up2 and the thoughts of   
the most  virtuous man need not on these
 occasions travel beyond the particular 
persons concerned1 except so far as is  
necessary to assure himself that  in    
benefiting them he is not violating the 
rights--that is1 the  legitimate and    
authorized expectations--of any one     
else4 ,the  multiplication of happiness 
is1 according to the utilitarian ethics1
 the  object of virtue3 the occasions on
 which any person 7except one in a      
thousand7 has it in his power to do this
 on an extended scale1 in other  words1 
to be a public benefactor1 are but      
exceptional2 and on these  occasions    
alone is he called on to consider public
 utility2 in every  other case1 private 
utility1 the interest or happiness of   
some few  persons1 is all he has to     
attend to4 ,those alone the influence of
 whose  actions extends to society in   
general1 need concern themselves        
habitually about so large an object4 ,in
 the case of abstinences  indeed--of    

things which people forbear to do1 from 
moral considerations1  though the       
consequences in the particular case     
might be beneficial--it  would be       
unworthy of an intelligent agent not to 
be consciously aware  that the action is
 of a class which1 if practised         
generally1 would be  generally          
injurious1 and that this is the ground  
of the obligation to  abstain from it4  
,the amount of regard for the public    
interest implied in  this recognition1  
is no greater than is demanded by every 
system of  morals2 for they all enjoin  
to abstain from whatever is manifestly  
pernicious to society4    ,the same     
considerations dispose of another       
reproach against the doctrine  of       
utility1 founded on a still grosser     
misconception of the purpose of a       
standard of morality1 and of the very   
meaning of the words right and  wrong4  
,it is often affirmed that              
utilitarianism renders men cold and     
unsympathizing2 that it chills their    

moral feelings towards  individuals2    
that it makes them regard only the dry  
and hard  consideration of the          
consequences of actions1 not taking into
 their  moral estimate the qualities    
from which those actions emanate4 ,if   
the  assertion means that they do not   
allow their judgment respecting the     
rightness or wrongness of an action to  
be influenced by their opinion of  the  
qualities of the person who does it1    
this is a complaint not against         
utilitarianism1 but against having any  
standard of morality at all2 for        
certainly no known ethical standard     
decides an action to be good or bad     
because it is done by a good or a bad   
man1 still less because done by an      
amiable1 a brave1 or a benevolent man or
 the contrary4 ,these  considerations   
are relevant1 not to the estimation of  
actions1 but of  persons2 and there is  
nothing in the utilitarian theory       
inconsistent  with the fact that there  
are other things which interest us in   

persons  besides the rightness and      
wrongness of their actions4 ,the        
,stoics1  indeed1 with the paradoxical  
misuse of language which was part of    
their  system1 and by which they strove 
to raise themselves above all concern   
about anything but virtue1 were fond of 
saying that he who has that has         
everything2 that he1 and only he1 is    
rich1 is beautiful1 is a king4 ,but  no 
claim of this description is made for   
the virtuous man by the  utilitarian    
doctrine4 ,utilitarians are quite aware 
that there are other  desirable         
possessions and qualities besides       
virtue1 and are perfectly  willing to   
allow to all of them their full worth4  
,they are also aware  that a right      
action does not necessarily indicate a  
virtuous character1  and that actions   
which are blameable often proceed from  
qualities  entitled to praise4 ,when    
this is apparent in any particular case1
 it  modifies their estimation1 not     
certainly of the act1 but of the agent4 

,i grant that they are1 notwithstanding1
 of opinion1 that in the long run  the  
best proof of a good character is good  
actions2 and resolutely  refuse to      
consider any mental disposition as good1
 of which the  predominant tendency is  
to produce bad conduct4 ,this makes them
  unpopular with many people2 but it is 
an unpopularity which they must  share  
with every one who regards the          
distinction between right and wrong  in 
a serious light2 and the reproach is not
 one which a conscientious  utilitarian 
need be anxious to repel4    ,if no more
 be meant by the objection than that    
many utilitarians look on  the morality 
of actions1 as measured by the          
utilitarian standard1 with  too         
exclusive a regard1 and do not lay      
sufficient stress upon the other        
beauties of character which go towards  
making a human being loveable or        
admirable1 this may be admitted4        
,utilitarians who have cultivated their 
moral feelings1 but not their sympathies

 nor their artistic perceptions1  do    
fall into this mistake2 and so do all   
other moralists under the same          
conditions4 ,what can be said in excuse 
for other moralists is equally          
available for them1 namely1 that if     
there is to be any error1 it is  better 
that it should be on that side4 ,as a   
matter of fact1 we may  affirm that     
among utilitarians as among adherents of
 other systems1  there is every         
imaginable degree of rigidity and of    
laxity in the  application of their     
standard3 some are even puritanically   
rigorous1  while others are as indulgent
 as can possibly be desired by sinner or
 by  sentimentalist4 ,but on the whole1 
a doctrine which brings prominently     
forward the interest that mankind have  
in the repression and prevention  of    
conduct which violates the moral law1 is
 likely to be inferior to no  other in  
turning the sanctions of opinion against
 such violations4 ,it is  true1 the     
question1 ,what does violate the moral  

law8 is one on which  those who         
recognise different standards of        
morality are likely now and  then to    
differ4 ,but difference of opinion on   
moral questions was not  first          
introduced into the world by            
utilitarianism1 while that doctrine     
does supply1 if not always an easy1 at  
all events a tangible and  intelligible 
mode of deciding such differences4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,it may not be superfluous to notice a  
few more of the common  misapprehensions
 of utilitarian ethics1 even those which
 are so obvious  and gross that it might
 appear impossible for any person of    
candour and  intelligence to fall into  
them3 since persons1 even of            
considerable  mental endowments1 often  
give themselves so little trouble to    
understand  the bearings of any opinion 
against which they entertain a          
prejudice1  and men are in general so   
little conscious of this voluntary      
ignorance  as a defect1 that the        

vulgarest misunderstandings of ethical  
doctrines  are continually met with in  
the deliberate writings of persons of   
the  greatest pretensions both to high  
principle and to philosophy4 ,we not    
uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility 
inveighed against as a godless          
doctrine4 ,if it be necessary to say    
anything at all against so mere an      
assumption1 we may say that the question
 depends upon what idea we have  formed 
of the moral character of the ,deity4   
,if it be a true belief that  ,god      
desires1 above all things1 the happiness
 of his creatures1 and that  this was   
his purpose in their creation1 utility  
is not only not a  godless doctrine1 but
 more profoundly religious than any     
other4 ,if it be  meant that            
utilitarianism does not recognise the   
revealed will of ,god as  the supreme   
law of morals1 ,i answer1 that an       
utilitarian who believes in  the perfect
 goodness and wisdom of ,god1           
necessarily believes that  whatever ,god

 has thought fit to reveal on the       
subject of morals1 must  fulfil the     
requirements of utility in a supreme    
degree4 ,but others  besides            
utilitarians have been of opinion that  
the ,christian revelation  was intended1
 and is fitted1 to inform the hearts and
 minds of mankind  with a spirit which  
should enable them to find for          
themselves what is  right1 and incline  
them to do it when found1 rather than to
 tell them1  except in a very general   
way1 what it is3 and that we need a     
doctrine of  ethics1 carefully followed 
out1 to interpret to us the will of     
,god4  ,whether this opinion is correct 
or not1 it is superfluous here to       
discuss2 since whatever aid religion1   
either natural or revealed1 can  afford 
to ethical investigation1 is as open to 
the utilitarian moralist  as to any     
other4 ,he can use it as the testimony  
of ,god to the usefulness  or           
hurtfulness of any given course of      
action1 by as good a right as  others   

can use it for the indication of a      
transcendental law1 having no  connexion
 with usefulness or with happiness4     
,again1 ,utility is often summarily     
stigmatized as an immoral doctrine by   
giving it the name of ,expediency1 and  
taking advantage of the popular  use of 
that term to contrast it with           
,principle4 ,but the ,expedient1 in  the
 sense in which it is opposed to the    
,right1 generally means that  which is  
expedient for the particular interest of
 the agent himself3 as  when a minister 
sacrifices the interest of his country  
to keep himself  in place4 ,when it     
means anything better than this1 it     
means that which  is expedient for some 
immediate object1 some temporary        
purpose1 but  which violates a rule     
whose observance is expedient in a much 
higher  degree4 ,the ,expedient1 in this
 sense1 instead of being the same thing 
with the useful1 is a branch of the     
hurtful4 ,thus1 it would often be       
expedient1 for the purpose of getting   

over some momentary embarrassment1  or  
attaining some object immediately useful
 to ourselves or others1 to  tell a lie4
 ,but inasmuch as the cultivation in    
ourselves of a sensitive  feeling on the
 subject of veracity1 is one of the most
 useful1 and the  enfeeblement of that  
feeling one of the most hurtful1 things 
to which  our conduct can be            
instrumental2 and inasmuch as any1 even 
unintentional1 deviation from truth1    
does that much towards weakening  the   
trustworthiness of human assertion1     
which is not only the principal  support
 of all present social well-being1 but  
the insufficiency of which  does more   
than any one thing that can be named to 
keep back  civilisation1 virtue1        
everything on which human happiness on  
the largest  scale depends2 we feel that
 the violation1 for a present advantage1
 of a  rule of such transcendent        
expediency1 is not expedient1 and that  
he who1  for the sake of a convenience  
to himself or to some other individual1 

does what depends on him to deprive     
mankind of the good1 and inflict  upon  
them the evil1 involved in the greater  
or less reliance which they  can place  
in each other's word1 acts the part of  
one of their worst  enemies4 ,yet that  
even this rule1 sacred as it is1 admits 
of possible  exceptions1 is acknowledged
 by all moralists2 the chief of which is
 when  the withholding of some fact 7as 
of information from a male-factor1 or   
of bad news from a person dangerously   
ill7 would preserve some one            
7especially a person other than oneself7
 from great and unmerited evil1  and    
when the withholding can only be        
effected by denial4 ,but in order  that 
the exception may not extend itself     
beyond the need1 and may have  the least
 possible effect in weakening reliance  
on veracity1 it ought to  be recognized1
 and1 if possible1 its limits defined2  
and if the  principle of utility is good
 for anything1 it must be good for      
weighing  these conflicting utilities   

against one another1 and marking out the
  region within which one or the other  
preponderates4    ,again1 defenders of  
utility often find themselves called    
upon to reply  to such objections as    
this--that there is not time1 previous  
to action1  for calculating and weighing
 the effects of any line of conduct on  
the  general happiness4 ,this is exactly
 as if any one were to say that it is   
impossible to guide our conduct by      
,christianity1 because there is not     
time1 on every occasion on which        
anything has to be done1 to read        
through the ,old and ,new ,testaments4  
,the answer to the objection is1 that   
there has been ample time1 namely1 the  
whole past duration of the human        
species4 ,during all that time mankind  
have been learning by experience  the   
tendencies of actions2 on which         
experience all the prudence1 as well  as
 all the morality of life1 is dependent4
 ,people talk as if the  commencement of
 this course of experience had hitherto 

been put off1 and  as if1 at the moment 
when some man feels tempted to meddle   
with the  property or life of another1  
he had to begin considering for the     
first  time whether murder and theft are
 injurious to human happiness4 ,even    
then ,i do not think that he would find 
the question very puzzling2 but1  at all
 events1 the matter is now done to his  
hand4 ,it is truly a  whimsical         
supposition1 that if mankind were agreed
 in considering  utility to be the test 
of morality1 they would remain without  
any  agreement as to what is useful1 and
 would take no measures for having      
their notions on the subject taught to  
the young1 and enforced by law  and     
opinion4 ,there is no difficulty in     
proving any ethical standard  whatever  
to work ill1 if we suppose universal    
idiocy to be conjoined  with it1 but on 
any hypothesis short of that1 mankind   
must by this time  have acquired        
positive beliefs as to the effects of   
some actions on  their happiness2 and   

the beliefs which have thus come down   
are the rules  of morality for the      
multitude1 and for the philosopher until
 he has  succeeded in finding better4   
,that philosophers might easily do this1
  even now1 on many subjects2 that the  
received code of ethics is by no  means 
of divine right2 and that mankind have  
still much to learn as to  the effects  
of actions on the general happiness1 ,i 
admit1 or rather1  earnestly maintain4  
,the corollaries from the principle of  
utility1 like  the precepts of every    
practical art1 admit of indefinite      
improvement1  and1 in a progressive     
state of the human mind1 their          
improvement is  perpetually going on4   
,but to consider the rules of morality  
as  improvable1 is one thing2 to pass   
over the intermediate generalizations   
entirely1 and endeavour to test each    
individual action directly by the  first
 principle1 is another4 ,it is a strange
 notion that the  acknowledgment of a   
first principle is inconsistent with the

 admission  of secondary ones4 ,to      
inform a traveller respecting the place 
of his  ultimate destination1 is not to 
forbid the use of landmarks and         
direction-posts on the way4 ,the        
proposition that happiness is the end   
and aim of morality1 does not mean that 
no road ought to be laid down to  that  
goal1 or that persons going thither     
should not be advised to take  one      
direction rather than another4 ,men     
really ought to leave off talking  a    
kind of nonsense on this subject1 which 
they would neither talk nor  listen to  
on other matters of practical           
concernment4 ,nobody argues that  the   
art of navigation is not founded on     
astronomy1 because sailors  cannot wait 
to calculate the ,nautical ,almanack4   
,being rational  creatures1 they go to  
sea with it ready calculated2 and all   
rational  creatures go out upon the sea 
of life with their minds made up on the 
common questions of right and wrong1 as 
well as on many of the far more         

difficult questions of wise and foolish4
 ,and this1 as long as foresight  is a  
human quality1 it is to be presumed they
 will continue to do4  ,whatever we     
adopt as the fundamental principle of   
morality1 we require  subordinate       
principles to apply it by3 the          
impossibility of doing  without them1   
being common to all systems1 can afford 
no argument  against any one in         
particular3 but gravely to argue as if  
no such  secondary principles could be  
had1 and as if mankind had remained till
  now1 and always must remain1 without  
drawing any general conclusions  from   
the experience of human life1 is as high
 a pitch1 ,i think1 as  absurdity has   
ever reached in philosophical           
controversy4    ,the remainder of the   
stock arguments against utilitarianism  
mostly  consist in laying to its charge 
the common infirmities of human nature1 
and the general difficulties which      
embarrass conscientious persons in      
shaping their course through life4 ,we  

are told that an utilitarian will  be   
apt to make his own particular case an  
exception to moral rules1 and1  when    
under temptation1 will see an utility in
 the breach of a rule1  greater than he 
will see in its observance4 ,but is     
utility the only  creed which is able to
 furnish us with excuses for evil doing1
 and means  of cheating our own         
conscience8 ,they are afforded in       
abundance by all  doctrines which       
recognise as a fact in morals the       
existence of  conflicting               
considerations2 which all doctrines do1 
that have been  believed by sane        
persons4 ,it is not the fault of any    
creed1 but of the  complicated nature of
 human affairs1 that rules of conduct   
cannot be so  framed as to require no   
exceptions1 and that hardly any kind of 
action  can safely be laid down as      
either always obligatory or always      
condemnable4 ,there is no ethical creed 
which does not temper the  rigidity of  
its laws1 by giving a certain latitude1 

under the moral  responsibility of the  
agent1 for accommodation to             
peculiarities of  circumstances2 and    
under every creed1 at the opening thus  
made1  self-deception and dishonest     
casuistry get in4 ,there exists no moral
  system under which there do not arise 
unequivocal cases of conflicting        
obligation4 ,these are the real         
difficulties1 the knotty points both in 
the theory of ethics1 and in the        
conscientious guidance of personal      
conduct4 ,they are overcome practically 
with greater or with less success       
according to the intellect and virtue of
 the individual2 but it can  hardly be  
pretended that any one will be the less 
qualified for dealing  with them1 from  
possessing an ultimate standard to which
 conflicting  rights and duties can be  
referred4 ,if utility is the ultimate   
source of  moral obligations1 utility   
may be invoked to decide between them   
when  their demands are incompatible4   
,though the application of the standard 

may be difficult1 it is better than none
 at all3 while in other systems1  the   
moral laws all claiming independent     
authority1 there is no common  umpire   
entitled to interfere between them2     
their claims to precedence  one over    
another rest on little better than      
sophistry1 and unless  determined1 as   
they generally are1 by the              
unacknowledged influence of             
considerations of utility1 afford a free
 scope for the action of  personal      
desires and partialities4 ,we must      
remember that only in these  cases of   
conflict between secondary principles is
 it requisite that  first principles    
should be appealed to4 ,there is no case
 of moral  obligation in which some     
secondary principle is not involved2 and
 if  only one1 there can seldom be any  
real doubt which one it is1 in the  mind
 of any person by whom the principle    
itself is recognized4    ,,footnotes3   
,footnote ,a3 ,the author of this essay 
has reason for believing himself  to be 

the first person who brought the word   
utilitarian into use4 ,he did  not      
invent it1 but adopted it from a passing
 expression in ,mr4 ,galt's  ,annals of 
the ,parish4 ,after using it as a       
designation for several  years1 he and  
others abandoned it from a growing      
dislike to anything  resembling a badge 
or watchword of sectarian distinction4  
,but as a name  for one single opinion1 
not a set of opinions--to denote the    
recognition  of utility as a standard1  
not any particular way of applying      
it--the  term supplies a want in the    
language1 and offers1 in many cases1 a  
convenient mode of avoiding tiresome    
circumlocution4    ,footnote ,b3 ,an    
opponent1 whose intellectual and moral  
fairness it is a  pleasure to           
acknowledge 7the ,rev4 ,j4 ,llewellyn   
,davis71 has objected to  this passage1 
saying1 ,surely the rightness or        
wrongness of saving a man  from drowning
 does depend very much upon the motive  
with which it is  done4 ,suppose that a 

tyrant1 when his enemy jumped into the  
sea to  escape from him1 saved him from 
drowning simply in order that he might  
inflict upon him more exquisite         
tortures1 would it tend to clearness to 
speak of that rescue as 'a morally right
 action8' ,or suppose again1  according 
to one of the stock illustrations of    
ethical inquiries1 that a  man betrayed 
a trust received from a friend1 because 
the discharge of it  would fatally      
injure that friend himself or some one  
belonging to him1  would utilitarianism 
compel one to call the betrayal 'a      
crime' as much  as if it had been done  
from the meanest motive8    ,i submit1  
that he who saves another from drowning 
in order to kill him  by torture        
afterwards1 does not differ only in     
motive from him who does  the same thing
 from duty or benevolence2 the act      
itself is different4  ,the rescue of the
 man is1 in the case supposed1 only the 
necessary first  step of an act far more
 atrocious than leaving him to drown    

would have  been4 ,had ,mr4 ,davis said1
 ,the rightness or wrongness of saving a
 man  from drowning does depend very    
much--not upon the motive1 but--upon    
the intention no utilitarian would have 
differed from him4 ,mr4 ,davis1  by an  
oversight too common not to be quite    
venial1 has in this case  confounded the
 very different ideas of ,motive and    
,intention4 ,there is no  point which   
utilitarian thinkers 7and ,bentham      
pre-eminently7 have taken  more pains to
 illustrate than this4 ,the morality of 
the action depends  entirely upon the   
intention--that is1 upon what the agent 
wills to do4  ,but the motive1 that is1 
the feeling which makes him will so to  
do1 when  it makes no difference in the 
act1 makes none in the morality3 though 
it  makes a great difference in our     
moral estimation of the agent1          
especially if it indicates a good or a  
bad habitual disposition--a  bent of    
character from which useful1 or from    
which hurtful actions are  likely to    

arise4          ,,chapter ,,iii4        
,,of ,,the ,,ultimate ,,sanction ,,of   
,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility4       
,the question is often asked1 and       
properly so1 in regard to any supposed  
moral standard--,what is its sanction8  
what are the motives to obey it8  or    
more specifically1 what is the source of
 its obligation8 whence does  it derive 
its binding force8 ,it is a necessary   
part of moral philosophy  to provide the
 answer to this question2 which1 though 
frequently  assuming the shape of an    
objection to the utilitarian morality1  
as if it  had some special applicability
 to that above others1 really arises in 
regard to all standards4 ,it arises1 in 
fact1 whenever a person is called  on to
 adopt a standard or refer morality to  
any basis on which he has  not been     
accustomed to rest it4 ,for the         
customary morality1 that which          
education and opinion have consecrated1 
is the only one which presents  itself  
to the mind with the feeling of being in

 itself obligatory2 and  when a person  
is asked to believe that this morality  
derives its  obligation from some       
general principle round which custom has
 not thrown  the same halo1 the         
assertion is to him a paradox2 the      
supposed  corollaries seem to have a    
more binding force than the original    
theorem2  the superstructure seems to   
stand better without1 than with1 what is
  represented as its foundation4 ,he    
says to himself1 ,i feel that ,i am     
bound not to rob or murder1 betray or   
deceive2 but why am ,i bound to  promote
 the general happiness8 ,if my own      
happiness lies in something  else1 why  
may ,i not give that the preference8    
,if the view adopted by the utilitarian 
philosophy of the nature of the  moral  
sense be correct1 this difficulty will  
always present itself1  until the       
influences which form moral character   
have taken the same hold  of the        
principle which they have taken of some 
of the  consequences--until1 by the     

improvement of education1 the feeling of
  unity with our fellow creatures shall 
be 7what it cannot be doubted that      
,christ intended it to be7 as deeply    
rooted in our character1 and to our  own
 consciousness as completely a part of  
our nature1 as the horror of  crime is  
in an ordinarily well-brought-up young  
person4 ,in the mean  time1 however1 the
 difficulty has no peculiar application 
to the  doctrine of utility1 but is     
inherent in every attempt to analyse    
morality and reduce it to principles2   
which1 unless the principle is  already 
in men's minds invested with as much    
sacredness as any of its  applications1 
always seems to divest them of a part of
 their sanctity4    ,the principle of   
utility either has1 or there is no      
reason why it might  not have1 all the  
sanctions which belong to any other     
system of morals4  ,those sanctions are 
either external or internal4 ,of the    
external  sanctions it is not necessary 
to speak at any length4 ,they are1 the  

hope  of favour and the fear of         
displeasure from our fellow creatures or
 from  the ,ruler of the ,universe1     
along with whatever we may have of      
sympathy  or affection for them or of   
love and awe of ,him1 inclining us to do
 ,his  will independently of selfish    
consequences4 ,there is evidently no    
reason why all these motives for        
observance should not attach themselves 
to the utilitarian morality1 as         
completely and as powerfully as to any  
other4 ,indeed1 those of them which     
refer to our fellow creatures are  sure 
to do so1 in proportion to the amount of
 general intelligence2 for  whether     
there be any other ground of moral      
obligation than the general  happiness  
or not1 men do desire happiness2 and    
however imperfect may be  their own     
practice1 they desire and commend all   
conduct in others  towards themselves1  
by which they think their happiness is  
promoted4  ,with regard to the religious
 motive1 if men believe1 as most profess

 to  do1 in the goodness of ,god1 those 
who think that conduciveness to the     
general happiness is the essence1 or    
even only the criterion1 of good1  must 
necessarily believe that it is also that
 which ,god approves4 ,the  whole force 
therefore of external reward and        
punishment1 whether  physical or moral1 
and whether proceeding from ,god or from
 our fellow  men1 together with all that
 the capacities of human nature admit1  
of  disinterested devotion to either1   
become available to enforce the         
utilitarian morality1 in proportion as  
that morality is recognized2 and  the   
more powerfully1 the more the appliances
 of education and general  cultivation  
are bent to the purpose4    ,so far as  
to external sanctions4 ,the internal    
sanction of duty1 whatever  our standard
 of duty may be1 is one and the same--a 
feeling in our own  mind2 a pain1 more  
or less intense1 attendant on violation 
of duty1  which in properly cultivated  
moral natures rises1 in the more serious

  cases1 into shrinking from it as an   
impossibility4 ,this feeling1 when      
disinterested1 and connecting itself    
with the pure idea of duty1 and  not    
with some particular form of it1 or with
 any of the merely accessory            
circumstances1 is the essence of        
,conscience2 though in that complex     
phenomenon as it actually exists1 the   
simple fact is in general all  encrusted
 over with collateral associations1     
derived from sympathy1 from  love1 and  
still more from fear2 from all the forms
 of religious feeling2  from the        
recollections of childhood and of all   
our past life2 from  self-esteem1 desire
 of the esteem of others1 and           
occasionally even  self-abasement4 ,this
 extreme complication is1 ,i apprehend1 
the origin of  the sort of mystical     
character which1 by a tendency of the   
human mind of  which there are many     
other examples1 is apt to be attributed 
to the idea  of moral obligation1 and   
which leads people to believe that the  

idea  cannot possibly attach itself to  
any other objects than those which1 by  
a supposed mysterious law1 are found in 
our present experience to excite  it4   
,its binding force1 however1 consists in
 the existence of a mass of  feeling    
which must be broken through in order to
 do what violates our  standard of      
right1 and which1 if we do nevertheless 
violate that  standard1 will probably   
have to be encountered afterwards in the
 form of  remorse4 ,whatever theory we  
have of the nature or origin of         
conscience1  this is what essentially   
constitutes it4    ,the ultimate        
sanction1 therefore1 of all morality    
7external motives  apart7 being a       
subjective feeling in our own minds1 ,i 
see nothing  embarrassing to those whose
 standard is utility1 in the question1  
what  is the sanction of that particular
 standard8 ,we may answer1 the same as  
of all other moral standards--the       
conscientious feelings of mankind4      
,undoubtedly this sanction has no       

binding efficacy on those who do not    
possess the feelings it appeals to2 but 
neither will these persons be  more     
obedient to any other moral principle   
than to the utilitarian one4  ,on them  
morality of any kind has no hold but    
through the external  sanctions4        
,meanwhile the feelings exist1 a feet in
 human nature1 the  reality of which1   
and the great power with which they are 
capable of  acting on those in whom they
 have been duly cultivated1 are proved  
by  experience4 ,no reason has ever been
 shown why they may not be cultivated   
to as great intensity in connection with
 the utilitarian1 as with any  other    
rule of morals4    ,there is1 ,i am     
aware1 a disposition to believe that a  
person who sees in  moral obligation a  
transcendental fact1 an objective       
reality belonging  to the province of   
,things in themselves1 is likely to be  
more obedient  to it than one who       
believes it to be entirely subjective1  
having its  seat in human consciousness 

only4 ,but whatever a person's opinion  
may be  on this point of ,ontology1 the 
force he is really urged by is his own  
subjective feeling1 and is exactly      
measured by its strength4 ,no one's     
belief that ,duty is an objective       
reality is stronger than the belief     
that ,god is so2 yet the belief in ,god1
 apart from the expectation of  actual  
reward and punishment1 only operates on 
conduct through1 and in  proportion to1 
the subjective religious feeling4 ,the  
sanction1 so far as  it is              
disinterested1 is always in the mind    
itself2 and the notion1  therefore1 of  
the transcendental moralists must be1   
that this sanction  will not exist in   
the mind unless it is believed to have  
its root out  of the mind2 and that if a
 person is able to say to himself1 ,that
 which  is restraining me1 and which is 
called my conscience1 is only a feeling 
in my own mind1 he may possibly draw the
 conclusion that when the  feeling      
ceases the obligation ceases1 and that  

if he find the feeling  inconvenient1 he
 may disregard it1 and endeavour to get 
rid of it4 ,but  is this danger confined
 to the utilitarian morality8 ,does the 
belief  that moral obligation has its   
seat outside the mind make the feeling  
of  it too strong to be got rid of8 ,the
 fact is so far otherwise1 that all     
moralists admit and lament the ease with
 which1 in the generality of  minds1    
conscience can be silenced or stifled4  
,the question1 ,need ,i obey  my        
conscience8 is quite as often put to    
themselves by persons who never  heard  
of the principle of utility1 as by its  
adherents4 ,those whose  conscientious  
feelings are so weak as to allow of     
their asking this  question1 if they    
answer it affirmatively1 will not do so 
because they  believe in the            
transcendental theory1 but because of   
the external  sanctions4    ,it is not  
necessary1 for the present purpose1 to  
decide whether the  feeling of duty is  
innate or implanted4 ,assuming it to be 

innate1 it is  an open question to what 
objects it naturally attaches itself2   
for the  philosophic supporters of that 
theory are now agreed that the intuitive
  perception is of principles of        
morality1 and not of the details4 ,if   
there be anything innate in the matter1 
,i see no reason why the feeling  which 
is innate should not be that of regard  
to the pleasures and pains  of others4  
,if there is any principle of morals    
which is intuitively  obligatory1 ,i    
should say it must be that4 ,if so1 the 
intuitive ethics  would coincide with   
the utilitarian1 and there would be no  
further  quarrel between them4 ,even as 
it is1 the intuitive moralists1 though  
they believe that there are other       
intuitive moral obligations1 do  already
 believe this to be one2 for they       
unanimously hold that a large  portion  
of morality turns upon the consideration
 due to the interests of  our fellow    
creatures4 ,therefore1 if the belief in 
the transcendental  origin of moral     

obligation gives any additional efficacy
 to the internal  sanction1 it appears  
to me that the utilitarian principle has
 already  the benefit of it4    ,on the 
other hand1 if1 as is my own belief1 the
 moral feelings are not  innate1 but    
acquired1 they are not for that reason  
the less natural4 ,it  is natural to man
 to speak1 to reason1 to build cities1  
to cultivate the  ground1 though these  
are acquired faculties4 ,the moral      
feelings are not  indeed a part of our  
nature1 in the sense of being in any    
perceptible  degree present in all of   
us2 but this1 unhappily1 is a fact      
admitted by  those who believe the most 
strenuously in their transcendental     
origin4  ,like the other acquired       
capacities above referred to1 the moral 
faculty1  if not a part of our nature1  
is a natural outgrowth from it2 capable1
  like them1 in a certain small degree1 
of springing up spontaneously2 and      
susceptible of being brought by         
cultivation to a high degree of         

development4 ,unhappily it is also      
susceptible1 by a sufficient use of  the
 external sanctions and of the force of 
early impressions1 of being  cultivated 
in almost any direction3 so that there  
is hardly anything so  absurd or so     
mischievous that it may not1 by means of
 these influences1  be made to act on   
the human mind with all the authority of
 conscience4  ,to doubt that the same   
potency might be given by the same means
 to the  principle of utility1 even if  
it had no foundation in human nature1   
would be flying in the face of all      
experience4    ,but moral associations  
which are wholly of artificial creation1
 when  intellectual culture goes on1    
yield by degrees to the dissolving force
  of analysis3 and if the feeling of    
duty1 when associated with utility1     
would appear equally arbitrary2 if there
 were no leading department of  our     
nature1 no powerful class of sentiments1
 with which that association  would     
harmonize1 which would make us feel it  

congenial1 and incline us  not only to  
foster it in others 7for which we have  
abundant interested  motives71 but also 
to cherish it in ourselves2 if there    
were not1 in  short1 a natural basis of 
sentiment for utilitarian morality1 it  
might  well happen that this association
 also1 even after it had been implanted 
by education1 might be analysed away4   
,but there is this basis of powerful    
natural sentiment2 and this it is       
which1 when once the general happiness  
is recognized as the ethical  standard1 
will constitute the strength of the     
utilitarian morality4 ,this  firm       
foundation is that of the social        
feelings of mankind2 the desire to  be  
in unity with our fellow creatures1     
which is already a powerful  principle  
in human nature1 and happily one of     
those which tend to become  stronger1   
even without express inculcation1 from  
the influences of  advancing            
civilization4 ,the social state is at   
once so natural1 so  necessary1 and so  

habitual to man1 that1 except in some   
unusual  circumstances or by an effort  
of voluntary abstraction1 he never      
conceives himself otherwise than as a   
member of a body2 and this  association 
is riveted more and more1 as mankind are
 further removed  from the state of     
savage independence4 ,any condition1    
therefore1 which  is essential to a     
state of society1 becomes more and more 
an inseparable  part of every person's  
conception of the state of things which 
he is  born into1 and which is the      
destiny of a human being4 ,now1 society 
between human beings1 except in the     
relation of master and slave1 is        
manifestly impossible on any other      
footing than that the interests of  all 
are to be consulted4 ,society between   
equals can only exist on the            
understanding that the interests of all 
are to be regarded equally4 ,and  since 
in all states of civilization1 every    
person1 except an absolute  monarch1 has
 equals1 every one is obliged to live on

 these terms with  somebody2 and in     
every age some advance is made towards a
 state in which  it will be impossible  
to live permanently on other terms with 
anybody4  ,in this way people grow up   
unable to conceive as possible to them a
  state of total disregard of other     
people's interests4 ,they are under a   
necessity of conceiving themselves as at
 least abstaining from all the  grosser 
injuries1 and 7if only for their own    
protection47 living in a  state of      
constant protest against them4 ,they are
 also familiar with the  fact of        
co-operating with others1 and proposing 
to themselves a  collective1 not an     
individual1 interest1 as the aim 7at    
least for the  time being7 of their     
actions4 ,so long as they are           
co-operating1 their  ends are identified
 with those of others2 there is at least
 a temporary  feeling that the interests
 of others are their own interests4 ,not
 only  does all strengthening of social 
ties1 and all healthy growth of         

society1 give to each individual a      
stronger personal interest in           
practically consulting the welfare of   
others2 it also leads him to  identify  
his feelings more and more with their   
good1 or at least with  an ever greater 
degree of practical consideration for   
it4 ,he comes1 as  though instinctively1
 to be conscious of himself as a being  
who of  course pays regard to others4   
,the good of others becomes to him a    
thing  naturally and necessarily to be  
attended to1 like any of the physical   
conditions of our existence4 ,now1      
whatever amount of this feeling a       
person has1 he is urged by the strongest
 motives both of interest and of        
sympathy to demonstrate it1 and to the  
utmost of his power encourage it  in    
others2 and even if he has none of it   
himself1 he is as greatly  interested as
 any one else that others should have   
it4 ,consequently1 the  smallest germs  
of the feeling are laid hold of and     
nourished by the  contagion of sympathy 

and the influences of education2 and a  
complete  web of corroborative          
association is woven round it1 by the   
powerful  agency of the external        
sanctions4 ,this mode of conceiving     
ourselves and  human life1 as           
civilization goes on1 is felt to be more
 and more  natural4 ,every step in      
political improvement renders it more   
so1 by  removing the sources of         
opposition of interest1 and levelling   
those  inequalities of legal privilege  
between individuals or classes1 owing to
  which there are large portions of     
mankind whose happiness it is still     
practicable to disregard4 ,in an        
improving state of the human mind1 the  
influences are constantly on the        
increase1 which tend to generate in     
each individual a feeling of unity with 
all the rest2 which feeling1 if         
perfect1 would make him never think of1 
or desire1 any beneficial  condition for
 himself1 in the benefits of which they 
are not included4  ,if we now suppose   

this feeling of unity to be taught as a 
religion1 and  the whole force of       
education1 of institutions1 and of      
opinion1  directed1 as it once was in   
the case of religion1 to make every     
person  grow up from infancy surrounded 
on all sides both by the profession and 
by the practice of it1 ,i think that no 
one1 who can realize this  conception1  
will feel any misgiving about the       
sufficiency of the  ultimate sanction   
for the ,happiness morality4 ,to any    
ethical student who  finds the          
realization difficult1 ,i recommend1 as 
a means of facilitating  it1 the second 
of ,m4 ,comte's two principal works1 the
 ,systme de  ,politique ,positive4 ,i   
entertain the strongest objections to   
the system  of politics and morals set  
forth in that treatise2 but ,i think it 
has  superabundantly shown the          
possibility of giving to the service of 
humanity1 even without the aid of belief
 in a ,providence1 both the  physical   
power and the social efficacy of a      

religion2 making it take  hold of human 
life1 and colour all thought1 feeling1  
and action1 in a  manner of which the   
greatest ascendency ever exercised by   
any religion  may be but a type and     
foretaste2 and of which the danger is1  
not that it  should be insufficient1 but
 that it should be so excessive as to   
interfere unduly with human freedom and 
individuality4    ,neither is it        
necessary to the feeling which          
constitutes the binding  force of the   
utilitarian morality on those who       
recognize it1 to wait for  those social 
influences which would make its         
obligation felt by mankind  at large4   
,in the comparatively early state of    
human advancement in which  we now live1
 a person cannot indeed feel that       
entireness of sympathy  with all others1
 which would make any real discordance  
in the general  direction of their      
conduct in life impossible2 but already 
a person in  whom the social feeling is 
at all developed1 cannot bring himself  

to  think of the rest of his fellow     
creatures as struggling rivals with him 
for the means of happiness1 whom he must
 desire to see defeated in their  object
 in order that he may succeed in his4   
,the deeply-rooted conception  which    
every individual even now has of himself
 as a social being1 tends  to make him  
feel it one of his natural wants that   
there should be  harmony between his    
feelings and aims and those of his      
fellow creatures4  ,if differences of   
opinion and of mental culture make it   
impossible for  him to share many of    
their actual feelings-perhaps make him  
denounce and  defy those feelings-he    
still needs to be conscious that his    
real aim and  theirs do not conflict2   
that he is not opposing himself to what 
they  really wish for1 namely1 their own
 good1 but is1 on the contrary1         
promoting it4 ,this feeling in most     
individuals is much inferior in         
strength to their selfish feelings1 and 
is often wanting altogether4 ,but  to   

those who have it1 it possesses all the 
characters of a natural  feeling4 ,it   
does not present itself to their minds  
as a superstition of  education1 or a   
law despotically imposed by the power of
 society1 but as  an attribute which it 
would not be well for them to be        
without4 ,this  conviction is the       
ultimate sanction of the                
greatest-happiness morality4  ,this it  
is which makes any mind1 of             
well-developed feelings1 work with1  and
 not against1 the outward motives to    
care for others1 afforded by  what ,i   
have called the external sanctions2 and 
when those sanctions are  wanting1 or   
act in an opposite direction1           
constitutes in itself a  powerful       
internal binding force1 in proportion to
 the sensitiveness and  thoughtfulness  
of the character2 since few but those   
whose mind is a  moral blank1 could bear
 to lay out their course of life on the 
plan of  paying no regard to others     
except so far as their own private      

interest  compels4          ,,chapter   
,,iv4      ,,of ,,what ,,sort ,,of      
,,proof ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,utility
 ,,is ,,susceptible4    ,it has already 
been remarked1 that questions of        
ultimate ends do not  admit of proof1 in
 the ordinary acceptation of the term4  
,to be incapable  of proof by reasoning 
is common to all first principles2 to   
the first  premises of our knowledge1 as
 well as to those of our conduct4 ,but  
the  former1 being matters of fact1 may 
be the subject of a direct appeal to    
the faculties which judge of            
fact--namely1 our senses1 and our       
internal  consciousness4 ,can an appeal 
be made to the same faculties on        
questions  of practical ends8 ,or by    
what other faculty is cognizance taken  
of them8    ,questions about ends are1  
in other words1 questions what things   
are  desirable4 ,the utilitarian        
doctrine is1 that happiness is          
desirable1 and  the only thing          
desirable1 as an end2 all other things  

being only  desirable as means to that  
end4 ,what ought to be required of this 
doctrine--what conditions is it         
requisite that the doctrine should      
fulfil--to make good its claim to be    
believed8    ,the only proof capable of 
being given that an object is visible1  
is that  people actually see it4 ,the   
only proof that a sound is audible1 is  
that  people hear it3 and so of the     
other sources of our experience4 ,in    
like  manner1 ,i apprehend1 the sole    
evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is desirable1 is that people do
 actually desire it4 ,if the end  which 
the utilitarian doctrine proposes to    
itself were not1 in theory  and in      
practice1 acknowledged to be an end1    
nothing could ever convince  any person 
that it was so4 ,no reason can be given 
why the general  happiness is desirable1
 except that each person1 so far as he  
believes  it to be attainable1 desires  
his own happiness4 ,this1 however1 being
 a  fact1 we have not only all the proof

 which the case admits of1 but all      
which it is possible to require1 that   
happiness is a good3 that each  person's
 happiness is a good to that person1 and
 the general happiness1  therefore1 a   
good to the aggregate of all persons4   
,happiness has made  out its title as   
one of the ends of conduct1 and         
consequently one of  the criteria of    
morality4    ,but it has not1 by this   
alone1 proved itself to be the sole     
criterion4  ,to do that1 it would seem1 
by the same rule1 necessary to show1 not
 only  that people desire happiness1 but
 that they never desire anything else4  
,now it is palpable that they do desire 
things which1 in common language1  are  
decidedly distinguished from happiness4 
,they desire1 for example1  virtue1 and 
the absence of vice1 no less really than
 pleasure and the  absence of pain4 ,the
 desire of virtue is not as universal1  
but it is as  authentic a fact1 as the  
desire of happiness4 ,and hence the     
opponents of  the utilitarian standard  

deem that they have a right to infer    
that there  are other ends of human     
action besides happiness1 and that      
happiness is  not the standard of       
approbation and disapprobation4    ,but 
does the utilitarian doctrine deny that 
people desire virtue1 or  maintain that 
virtue is not a thing to be desired8    
,the very reverse4 ,it  maintains not   
only that virtue is to be desired1 but  
that it is to be  desired               
disinterestedly1 for itself4 ,whatever  
may be the opinion of  utilitarian      
moralists as to the original conditions 
by which virtue is  made virtue2 however
 they may believe 7as they do7 that     
actions and  dispositions are only      
virtuous because they promote another   
end than  virtue2 yet this being        
granted1 and it having been decided1    
from  considerations of this            
description1 what is virtuous1 they not 
only  place virtue at the very head of  
the things which are good as means to   
the ultimate end1 but they also         

recognise as a psychological fact the   
possibility of its being1 to the        
individual1 a good in itself1 without   
looking to any end beyond it2 and hold1 
that the mind is not in a right  state1 
not in a state conformable to ,utility1 
not in the state most  conducive to the 
general happiness1 unless it does love  
virtue in this  manner--as a thing      
desirable in itself1 even although1 in  
the individual  instance1 it should not 
produce those other desirable           
consequences which  it tends to produce1
 and on account of which it is held to  
be virtue4  ,this opinion is not1 in the
 smallest degree1 a departure from the  
,happiness principle4 ,the ingredients  
of happiness are very various1 and  each
 of them is desirable in itself1 and not
 merely when considered as  swelling an 
aggregate4 ,the principle of utility    
does not mean that any  given pleasure1 
as music1 for instance1 or any given    
exemption from  pain1 as for example    
health1 are to be looked upon as means  

to a  collective something termed       
happiness1 and to be desired on that    
account4 ,they are desired and desirable
 in and for themselves2 besides  being  
means1 they are a part of the end4      
,virtue1 according to the  utilitarian  
doctrine1 is not naturally and          
originally part of the end1  but it is  
capable of becoming so2 and in those who
 love it  disinterestedly it has become 
so1 and is desired and cherished1 not as
 a  means to happiness1 but as a part of
 their happiness4    ,to illustrate this
 farther1 we may remember that virtue is
 not the only  thing1 originally a      
means1 and which if it were not a means 
to anything  else1 would be and remain  
indifferent1 but which by association   
with  what it is a means to1 comes to be
 desired for itself1 and that too with  
the utmost intensity4 ,what1 for        
example1 shall we say of the love of    
money8 ,there is nothing originally more
 desirable about money than about  any  
heap of glittering pebbles4 ,its worth  

is solely that of the things  which it  
will buy2 the desires for other things  
than itself1 which it is  a means of    
gratifying4 ,yet the love of money is   
not only one of the  strongest moving   
forces of human life1 but money is1 in  
many cases1  desired in and for itself2 
the desire to possess it is often       
stronger  than the desire to use it1 and
 goes on increasing when all the desires
  which point to ends beyond it1 to be  
compassed by it1 are falling off4  ,it  
may be then said truly1 that money is   
desired not for the sake of an  end1 but
 as part of the end4 ,from being a means
 to happiness1 it has  come to be itself
 a principal ingredient of the          
individual's conception  of happiness4  
,the same may be said of the majority of
 the great objects  of human            
life--power1 for example1 or fame2      
except that to each of these  there is a
 certain amount of immediate pleasure   
annexed1 which has at  least the        
semblance of being naturally inherent in

 them2 a thing which  cannot be said of 
money4 ,still1 however1 the strongest   
natural  attraction1 both of power and  
of fame1 is the immense aid they give to
  the attainment of our other wishes2   
and it is the strong association  thus  
generated between them and all our      
objects of desire1 which gives  to the  
direct desire of them the intensity it  
often assumes1 so as in  some characters
 to surpass in strength all other       
desires4 ,in these cases  the means have
 become a part of the end1 and a more   
important part of it  than any of the   
things which they are means to4 ,what   
was once desired as  an instrument for  
the attainment of happiness1 has come to
 be desired  for its own sake4 ,in being
 desired for its own sake it is1        
however1  desired as part of happiness4 
,the person is made1 or thinks he would 
be  made1 happy by its mere possession2 
and is made unhappy by failure to       
obtain it4 ,the desire of it is not a   
different thing from the desire of      

happiness1 any more than the love of    
music1 or the desire of health4  ,they  
are included in happiness4 ,they are    
some of the elements of which  the      
desire of happiness is made up4         
,happiness is not an abstract idea1  but
 a concrete whole2 and these are some of
 its parts4 ,and the  utilitarian       
standard sanctions and approves their   
being so4 ,life would  be a poor thing1 
very ill provided with sources of       
happiness1 if there  were not this      
provision of nature1 by which things    
originally  indifferent1 but conducive  
to1 or otherwise associated with1 the   
satisfaction of our primitive desires1  
become in themselves sources of         
pleasure more valuable than the         
primitive pleasures1 both in permanency1
  in the space of human existence that  
they are capable of covering1 and  even 
in intensity4 ,virtue1 according to the 
utilitarian conception1 is a  good of   
this description4 ,there was no original
 desire of it1 or motive  to it1 save   

its conduciveness to pleasure1 and      
especially to protection  from pain4    
,but through the association thus       
formed1 it may be felt a  good in       
itself1 and desired as such with as     
great intensity as any other  good2 and 
with this difference between it and the 
love of money1 of  power1 or of fame1   
that all of these may1 and often do1    
render the  individual noxious to the   
other members of the society to which he
  belongs1 whereas there is nothing     
which makes him so much a blessing to   
them as the cultivation of the          
disinterested1 love of virtue4 ,and     
consequently1 the utilitarian standard1 
while it tolerates and approves  those  
other acquired desires1 up to the point 
beyond which they would be  more        
injurious to the general happiness than 
promotive of it1 enjoins  and requires  
the cultivation of the love of virtue up
 to the greatest  strength possible1 as 
being above all things important to the 
general  happiness4    ,it results from 

the preceding considerations1 that there
 is in reality  nothing desired except  
happiness4 ,whatever is desired         
otherwise than as  a means to some end  
beyond itself1 and ultimately to        
happiness1 is  desired as itself a part 
of happiness1 and is not desired for    
itself  until it has become so4 ,those  
who desire virtue for its own sake1     
desire  it either because the           
consciousness of it is a pleasure1 or   
because the  consciousness of being     
without it is a pain1 or for both       
reasons united2  as in truth the        
pleasure and pain seldom exist          
separately1 but almost  always together1
 the same person feeling pleasure in the
 degree of  virtue attained1 and pain in
 not having attained more4 ,if one of   
these  gave him no pleasure1 and the    
other no pain1 he would not love or     
desire  virtue1 or would desire it only 
for the other benefits which it might   
produce to himself or to persons whom he
 cared for4    ,we have now1 then1 an   

answer to the question1 of what sort of 
proof the  principle of utility is      
susceptible4 ,if the opinion which ,i   
have now  stated is psychologically     
true--if human nature is so constituted 
as to  desire nothing which is not      
either a part of happiness or a means of
  happiness1 we can have no other proof1
 and we require no other1 that  these   
are the only things desirable4 ,if so1  
happiness is the sole end of  human     
action1 and the promotion of it the test
 by which to judge of all  human        
conduct2 from whence it necessarily     
follows that it must be the  criterion  
of morality1 since a part is included in
 the whole4    ,and now to decide       
whether this is really so2 whether      
mankind do desire  nothing for itself   
but that which is a pleasure to them1 or
 of which the  absence is a pain2 we    
have evidently arrived at a question of 
fact and  experience1 dependent1 like   
all similar questions1 upon evidence4   
,it can  only be determined by practised

 self-consciousness and                 
self-observation1  assisted by          
observation of others4 ,i believe that  
these sources of  evidence1 impartially 
consulted1 will declare that desiring a 
thing and  finding it pleasant1 aversion
 to it and thinking of it as painful1   
are  phenomena entirely inseparable1 or 
rather two parts of the same            
phenomenon2 in strictness of language1  
two different modes of naming the  same 
psychological fact3 that to think of an 
object as desirable 7unless  for the    
sake of its consequences71 and to think 
of it as pleasant1 are  one and the same
 thing2 and that to desire anything1    
except in  proportion as the idea of it 
is pleasant1 is a physical and          
metaphysical  impossibility4    ,so     
obvious does this appear to me1 that ,i 
expect it will hardly be  disputed3 and 
the objection made will be1 not that    
desire can possibly  be directed to     
anything ultimately except pleasure and 
exemption from  pain1 but that the will 

is a different thing from desire2 that a
 person  of confirmed virtue1 or any    
other person whose purposes are fixed1  
carries out his purposes without any    
thought of the pleasure he has in       
contemplating them1 or expects to derive
 from their fulfilment2 and  persists in
 acting on them1 even though these      
pleasures are much  diminished1 by      
changes in his character or decay of his
 passive  sensibilities1 or are         
outweighed by the pains which the       
pursuit of the  purposes may bring upon 
him4 ,all this ,i fully admit1 and have 
stated it  elsewhere1 as positively and 
emphatically as any one4 ,will1 the     
active  phenomenon1 is a different thing
 from desire1 the state of passive      
sensibility1 and though originally an   
offshoot from it1 may in time take  root
 and detach itself from the parent      
stock2 so much so1 that in the  case of 
an habitual purpose1 instead of willing 
the thing because we  desire it1 we     
often desire it only because we will it4

 ,this1 however1 is  but an instance of 
that familiar fact1 the power of habit1 
and is nowise  confined to the case of  
virtuous actions4 ,many indifferent     
things1 which  men originally did from a
 motive of some sort1 they continue to  
do from  habit4 ,sometimes this is done 
unconsciously1 the consciousness coming 
only after the action3 at other times   
with conscious volition1 but  volition  
which has become habitual1 and is put   
into operation by the  force of habit1  
in opposition perhaps to the deliberate 
preference1 as  often happens with those
 who have contracted habits of vicious  
or  hurtful indulgence4 ,third and last 
comes the case in which the habitual    
act of will in the individual instance  
is not in contradiction to the  general 
intention prevailing at other times1 but
 in fulfilment of it2 as  in the case of
 the person of confirmed virtue1 and of 
all who pursue  deliberately and        
consistently any determinate end4 ,the  
distinction  between will and desire    

thus understood1 is an authentic and    
highly  important psychological fact2   
but the fact consists solely in         
this--that  will1 like all other parts  
of our constitution1 is amenable to     
habit1  and that we may will from habit 
what we no longer desire for itself1 or 
desire only because we will it4 ,it is  
not the less true that will1 in  the    
beginning1 is entirely produced by      
desire2 including in that term  the     
repelling influence of pain as well as  
the attractive one of  pleasure4 ,let us
 take into consideration1 no longer the 
person who has a  confirmed will to do  
right1 but him in whom that virtuous    
will is still  feeble1 conquerable by   
temptation1 and not to be fully relied  
on2 by  what means can it be            
strengthened8 ,how can the will to be   
virtuous1  where it does not exist in   
sufficient force1 be implanted or       
awakened8  ,only by making the person   
desire virtue--by making him think of it
 in  a pleasurable light1 or of its     

absence in a painful one4 ,it is by     
associating the doing right with        
pleasure1 or the doing wrong with pain1 
or by eliciting and impressing and      
bringing home to the person's           
experience the pleasure naturally       
involved in the one or the pain in the  
other1 that it is possible to call forth
 that will to be virtuous1  which1 when 
confirmed1 acts without any thought of  
either pleasure or  pain4 ,will is the  
child of desire1 and passes out of the  
dominion of its  parent only to come    
under that of habit4 ,that which is the 
result of  habit affords no presumption 
of being intrinsically good2 and there  
would be no reason for wishing that the 
purpose of virtue should become         
independent of pleasure and pain1 were  
it not that the influence of the        
pleasurable and painful associations    
which prompt to virtue is not           
sufficiently to be depended on for      
unerring constancy of action until it   
has acquired the support of habit4 ,both

 in feeling and in conduct1 habit  is   
the only thing which imparts certainty2 
and it is because of the  importance to 
others of being able to rely absolutely 
on one's feelings  and conduct1 and to  
oneself of being able to rely on one's  
own1 that the  will to do right ought to
 be cultivated into this habitual       
independence4  ,in other words1 this    
state of the will is a means to good1   
not  intrinsically a good2 and does not 
contradict the doctrine that nothing  is
 a good to human beings but in so far as
 it is either itself  pleasurable1 or a 
means of attaining pleasure or averting 
pain4    ,but if this doctrine be true1 
the principle of utility is proved4     
,whether it is so or not1 must now be   
left to the consideration of the        
thoughtful reader4          ,,chapter   
,v4      ,,on ,,the ,,connexion         
,,between ,,justice ,,and ,,utility4    
,in all ages of speculation1 one of the 
strongest obstacles to the  reception of
 the doctrine that ,utility or          

,happiness is the criterion of  right   
and wrong1 has been drawn from the idea 
of ,justice1 ,the powerful  sentiment1  
and apparently clear perception1 which  
that word recalls with  a rapidity and  
certainty resembling an instinct1 have  
seemed to the  majority of thinkers to  
point to an inherent quality in things2 
to show  that the ,just must have an    
existence in ,nature as something       
absolute-generically distinct from every
 variety of the ,expedient1 and1  in    
idea1 opposed to it1 though 7as is      
commonly acknowledged7 never1 in  the   
long run1 disjoined from it in fact4    
,in the case of this1 as of our other   
moral sentiments1 there is no  necessary
 connexion between the question of its  
origin1 and that of its  binding force4 
,that a feeling is bestowed on us by    
,nature1 does not  necessarily          
legitimate all its promptings4 ,the     
feeling of justice might  be a peculiar 
instinct1 and might yet require1 like   
our other instincts1  to be controlled  

and enlightened by a higher reason4 ,if 
we have  intellectual instincts1 leading
 us to judge in a particular way1 as    
well  as animal instincts that prompt us
 to act in a particular way1 there is   
no necessity that the former should be  
more infallible in their sphere  than   
the latter in theirs3 it may as well    
happen that wrong judgments  are        
occasionally suggested by those1 as     
wrong actions by these4 ,but  though it 
is one thing to believe that we have    
natural feelings of  justice1 and       
another to acknowledge them as an       
ultimate criterion of  conduct1 these   
two opinions are very closely connected 
in point of fact4  ,mankind are always  
predisposed to believe that any         
subjective feeling1  not otherwise      
accounted for1 is a revelation of some  
objective reality4  ,our present object 
is to determine whether the reality1 to 
which the  feeling of justice           
corresponds1 is one which needs any such
 special  revelation2 whether the       

justice or injustice of an action is a  
thing  intrinsically peculiar1 and      
distinct from all its other qualities1  
or  only a combination of certain of    
those qualities1 presented under a      
peculiar aspect4 ,for the purpose of    
this inquiry1 it is practically         
important to consider whether the       
feeling itself1 of justice and          
injustice1 is sui generis like our      
sensations of colour and taste1 or  a   
derivative feeling1 formed by a         
combination of others4 ,and this it is  
the more essential to examine1 as people
 are in general willing enough  to      
allow1 that objectively the dictates of 
justice coincide with a part  of the    
field of ,general ,expediency2 but      
inasmuch as the subjective  mental      
feeling of ,justice is different from   
that which commonly attaches  to simple 
expediency1 and1 except in extreme cases
 of the latter1 is far  more imperative 
in its demands1 people find it difficult
 to see1 in  ,justice1 only a particular

 kind or branch of general utility1 and 
think  that its superior binding force  
requires a totally different origin4    
,to throw light upon this question1 it  
is necessary to attempt to  ascertain   
what is the distinguishing character of 
justice1 or of  injustice3 what is the  
quality1 or whether there is any        
quality1  attributed in common to all   
modes of conduct designated as unjust   
7for  justice1 like many other moral    
attributes1 is best defined by its      
opposite71 and distinguishing them from 
such modes of conduct as are            
disapproved1 but without having that    
particular epithet of  disapprobation   
applied to them4 ,if1 in everything     
which men are  accustomed to            
characterize as just or unjust1 some one
 common attribute  or collection of     
attributes is always present1 we may    
judge whether this  particular attribute
 or combination of attributes would be  
capable of  gathering round it a        
sentiment of that peculiar character and

 intensity  by virtue of the general    
laws of our emotional constitution1 or  
whether  the sentiment is inexplicable1 
and requires to be regarded as a special
  provision of ,nature4 ,if we find the 
former to be the case1 we shall1 in     
resolving this question1 have resolved  
also the main problem3 if the  latter1  
we shall have to seek for some other    
mode of investigating it4           99  
99       99       99       99    ,to    
find the common attributes of a variety 
of objects1 it is necessary  to begin1  
by surveying the objects themselves in  
the concrete4 ,let us  therefore advert 
successively to the various modes of    
action1 and  arrangements of human      
affairs1 which are classed1 by universal
 or widely  spread opinion1 as ,just or 
as ,unjust4 ,the things well known to   
excite  the sentiments associated with  
those names1 are of a very multifarious 
character4 ,i shall pass them rapidly in
 review1 without studying any           
particular arrangement4    ,in the first

 place1 it is mostly considered unjust  
to deprive any one  of his personal     
liberty1 his property1 or any other     
thing which belongs  to him by law4     
,here1 therefore1 is one instance of the
 application of  the terms just and     
unjust in a perfectly definite sense1   
namely1 that it  is just to respect1    
unjust to violate1 the legal rights of  
any one4  ,but this judgment admits of  
several exceptions1 arising from the    
other  forms in which the notions of    
justice and injustice present           
themselves4  ,for example1 the person   
who suffers the deprivation may 7as the 
phrase  is7 have forfeited the rights   
which he is so deprived of3 a case to   
which we shall return presently4 ,but   
also1    ,secondly2 the legal rights of 
which he is deprived1 may be rights     
which  ought not to have belonged to    
him2 in other words1 the law which      
confers on him these rights1 may be a   
bad law4 ,when it is so1 or when  7which
 is the same thing for our purpose7 it  

is supposed to be so1  opinions will    
differ as to the justice or injustice of
 infringing it4  ,some maintain that no 
law1 however bad1 ought to be disobeyed 
by an  individual citizen2 that his     
opposition to it1 if shown at all1      
should  only be shown in endeavouring to
 get it altered by competent authority4 
,this opinion 7which condemns many of   
the most illustrious benefactors of     
mankind1 and would often protect        
pernicious institutions against the     
only weapons which1 in the state of     
things existing at the time1 have  any  
chance of succeeding against them7 is   
defended1 by those who hold  it1 on     
grounds of expediency2 principally on   
that of the importance1 to  the common  
interest of mankind1 of maintaining     
inviolate the sentiment  of submission  
to law4 ,other persons1 again1 hold the 
directly contrary  opinion1 that any    
law1 judged to be bad1 may blamelessly  
be disobeyed1  even though it be not    
judged to be unjust1 but only           

inexpedient2 while  others would confine
 the licence of disobedience to the case
 of unjust  laws3 but again1 some say1  
that all laws which are inexpedient are 
unjust2 since every law imposes some    
restriction on the natural liberty  of  
mankind1 which restriction is an        
injustice1 unless legitimated by        
tending to their good4 ,among these     
diversities of opinion1 it seems to  be 
universally admitted that there may be  
unjust laws1 and that law1              
consequently1 is not the ultimate       
criterion of justice1 but may give to   
one person a benefit1 or impose on      
another an evil1 which justice          
condemns4 ,when1 however1 a law is      
thought to be unjust1 it seems always   
to be regarded as being so in the same  
way in which a breach of law is  unjust1
 namely1 by infringing somebody's right2
 which1 as it cannot in  this case be a 
legal right1 receives a different       
appellation1 and is  called a moral     
right4 ,we may say1 therefore1 that a   

second case of  injustice consists in   
taking or withholding from any person   
that to  which he has a moral right4    
,thirdly1 it is universally considered  
just that each person should  obtain    
that 7whether good or evil7 which he    
deserves2 and unjust that  he should    
obtain a good1 or be made to undergo an 
evil1 which he does  not deserve4 ,this 
is1 perhaps1 the clearest and most      
emphatic form in  which the idea of     
justice is conceived by the general     
mind4 ,as it  involves the notion of    
desert1 the question arises1 what       
constitutes  desert8 ,speaking in a     
general way1 a person is understood to  
deserve  good if he does right1 evil if 
he does wrong2 and in a more particular 
sense1 to deserve good from those to    
whom he does or has done good1 and  evil
 from those to whom he does or has done 
evil4 ,the precept of  returning good   
for evil has never been regarded as a   
case of the  fulfilment of justice1 but 
as one in which the claims of justice   

are  waived1 in obedience to other      
considerations4    ,fourthly1 it is     
confessedly unjust to break faith with  
any one3 to  violate an engagement1     
either express or implied1 or disappoint
  expectations raised by our own        
conduct1 at least if we have raised     
those  expectations knowingly and       
voluntarily4 ,like the other obligations
 of  justice already spoken of1 this one
 is not regarded as absolute1 but as    
capable of being overruled by a stronger
 obligation of justice on the  other    
side2 or by such conduct on the part of 
the person concerned as is  deemed to   
absolve us from our obligation to him1  
and to constitute a  forfeiture of the  
benefit which he has been led to expect4
    ,fifthly1 it is1 by universal       
admission1 inconsistent with justice to 
be  partial2 to show favour or          
preference to one person over another1  
in  matters to which favour and         
preference do not properly apply4       
,impartiality1 however1 does not seem to

 be regarded as a duty in itself1  but  
rather as instrumental to some other    
duty2 for it is admitted that  favour   
and preference are not always           
censurable1 and indeed the cases in     
which they are condemned are rather the 
exception than the rule4 ,a  person     
would be more likely to be blamed than  
applauded for giving his  family or     
friends no superiority in good offices  
over strangers1 when he  could do so    
without violating any other duty2 and no
 one thinks it  unjust to seek one      
person in preference to another as a    
friend1  connexion1 or companion4       
,impartiality where rights are concerned
 is of  course obligatory1 but this is  
involved in the more general obligation 
of giving to every one his right4 ,a    
tribunal1 for example1 must be          
impartial1 because it is bound to award1
 without regard to any other            
consideration1 a disputed object to the 
one of two parties who has the  right to
 it4 ,there are other cases in which    

impartiality means1 being  solely       
influenced by desert2 as with those who1
 in the capacity of  judges1 preceptors1
 or parents1 administer reward and      
punishment as  such4 ,there are cases1  
again1 in which it means1 being solely  
influenced  by consideration for the    
public interest2 as in making a         
selection among  candidates for a       
,government employment4 ,impartiality1  
in short1 as an  obligation of justice1 
may be said to mean1 being exclusively  
influenced  by the considerations which 
it is supposed ought to influence the   
particular case in hand2 and resisting  
the solicitation of any motives  which  
prompt to conduct different from what   
those considerations would  dictate4    
,nearly allied to the idea of           
impartiality1 is that of equality2 which
  often enters as a component part both 
into the conception of justice and  into
 the practice of it1 and1 in the eyes of
 many persons1 constitutes  its essence4
 ,but in this1 still more than in any   

other case1 the notion  of justice      
varies in different persons1 and always 
conforms in its  variations to their    
notion of utility4 ,each person         
maintains that  equality is the dictate 
of justice1 except where he thinks that 
expediency requires inequality4 ,the    
justice of giving equal protection  to  
the rights of all1 is maintained by     
those who support the most  outrageous  
inequality in the rights themselves4    
,even in slave countries  it is         
theoretically admitted that the rights  
of the slave1 such as they  are1 ought  
to be as sacred as those of the master2 
and that a tribunal  which fails to     
enforce them with equal strictness is   
wanting in justice2  while1 at the same 
time1 institutions which leave to the   
slave scarcely  any rights to enforce1  
are not deemed unjust1 because they are 
not  deemed inexpedient4 ,those who     
think that utility requires distinctions
  of rank1 do not consider it unjust    
that riches and social privileges       

should be unequally dispensed2 but those
 who think this inequality  inexpedient1
 think it unjust also4 ,whoever thinks  
that government is  necessary1 sees no  
injustice in as much inequality as is   
constituted by  giving to the magistrate
 powers not granted to other people4    
,even among  those who hold levelling   
doctrines1 there are as many questions  
of  justice as there are differences of 
opinion about expediency4 ,some         
,communists consider it unjust that the 
produce of the labour of the  community 
should be shared on any other principle 
than that of exact  equality2 others    
think it just that those should receive 
most whose  needs are greatest2 while   
others hold that those who work harder1 
or who  produce more1 or whose services 
are more valuable to the community1 may 
justly claim a larger quota in the      
division of the produce4 ,and the  sense
 of natural justice may be plausibly    
appealed to in behalf of every  one of  
these opinions4    ,among so many       

diverse applications of the term        
,justice1 which yet is not  regarded as 
ambiguous1 it is a matter of some       
difficulty to seize the  mental link    
which holds them together1 and on which 
the moral sentiment  adhering to the    
term essentially depends4 ,perhaps1 in  
this  embarrassment1 some help may be   
derived from the history of the word1 as
  indicated by its etymology4    ,in    
most1 if not in all languages1 the      
etymology of the word which  corresponds
 to ,just1 points to an origin connected
 either with positive  law1 or with that
 which was in most cases the primitive  
form of  law-authoritative custom4      
,justum is a form of jussum1 that which 
has  been ordered4 ,jus is of the same  
origin4 ,dichanou comes from  dichae1 of
 which the principal meaning1 at least  
in the historical  ages of ,greece1 was 
a suit at law4 ,originally1 indeed1 it  
meant only the  mode or manner of doing 
things1 but it early came to mean the   
prescribed manner2 that which the       

recognized authorities1 patriarchal1    
judicial1 or political1 would enforce4  
,recht1 from which came right  and      
righteous1 is synonymous with law4 ,the 
original meaning1 indeed1  of recht did 
not point to law1 but to physical       
straightness2 as  wrong and its ,latin  
equivalents meant twisted or tortuous2  
and from  this it is argued that right  
did not originally mean law1 but on the 
contrary law meant right4 ,but however  
this may be1 the fact that recht  and   
droit became restricted in their meaning
 to positive law1 although  much which  
is not required by law is equally       
necessary to moral  straightness or     
rectitude1 is as significant of the     
original character  of moral ideas as if
 the derivation had been the reverse    
way4 ,the courts  of justice1 the       
administration of justice1 are the      
courts and the  administration of law4  
,la justice1 in ,french1 is the         
established term  for judicature4 ,there
 can1 ,i think1 be no doubt that the ide

 mre1  the primitive element1 in the    
formation of the notion of justice1 was 
conformity to law4 ,it constituted the  
entire idea among the ,hebrews1 up  to  
the birth of ,christianity2 as might be 
expected in the case of a  people whose 
laws attempted to embrace all subjects  
on which precepts  were required1 and   
who believed those laws to be a direct  
emanation from  the ,supreme ,being4    
,but other nations1 and in particular   
the ,greeks and  ,romans1 who knew that 
their laws had been made originally1 and
 still  continued to be made1 by men1   
were not afraid to admit that those men 
might make bad laws2 might do1 by law1  
the same things1 and from the  same     
motives1 which1 if done by individuals  
without the sanction of law1  would be  
called unjust4 ,and hence the sentiment 
of injustice came to be  attached1 not  
to all violations of law1 but only to   
violations of such  laws as ought to    
exist1 including such as ought to exist 
but do not2  and to laws themselves1 if 

supposed to be contrary to what ought to
 be  law4 ,in this manner the idea of   
law and of its injunctions was still    
predominant in the notion of justice1   
even when the laws actually in  force   
ceased to be accepted as the standard of
 it4    ,it is true that mankind        
consider the idea of justice and its    
obligations  as applicable to many      
things which neither are1 nor is it     
desired that  they should be1 regulated 
by law4 ,nobody desires that laws should
  interfere with the whole detail of    
private life2 yet every one allows  that
 in all daily conduct a person may and  
does show himself to be  either just or 
unjust4 ,but even here1 the idea of the 
breach of what  ought to be law1 still  
lingers in a modified shape4 ,it would  
always give  us pleasure1 and chime in  
with our feelings of fitness1 that acts 
which  we deem unjust should be         
punished1 though we do not always think 
it  expedient that this should be done  
by the tribunals4 ,we forego that       

gratification on account of incidental  
inconveniences4 ,we should be glad  to  
see just conduct enforced and injustice 
repressed1 even in the  minutest        
details1 if we were not1 with reason1   
afraid of trusting the  magistrate with 
so unlimited an amount of power over    
individuals4 ,when  we think that a     
person is bound in justice to do a      
thing1 it is an  ordinary form of       
language to say1 that he ought to be    
compelled to do  it4 ,we should be      
gratified to see the obligation enforced
 by anybody who  had the power4 ,if we  
see that its enforcement by law would be
  inexpedient1 we lament the            
impossibility1 we consider the impunity 
given  to injustice as an evil1 and     
strive to make amends for it by bringing
 a  strong expression of our own and the
 public disapprobation to bear upon  the
 offender4 ,thus the idea of legal      
constraint is still the generating  idea
 of the notion of justice1 though       
undergoing several transformations      

before that notion1 as it exists in an  
advanced state of society1  becomes     
complete4    ,the above is1 ,i think1 a 
true account1 as far as it goes1 of the 
origin  and progressive growth of the   
idea of justice4 ,but we must observe1  
that  it contains1 as yet1 nothing to   
distinguish that obligation from moral  
obligation in general4 ,for the truth   
is1 that the idea of penal  sanction1   
which is the essence of law1 enters not 
only into the  conception of injustice1 
but into that of any kind of wrong4 ,we 
do not  call anything wrong1 unless we  
mean to imply that a person ought to be 
punished in some way or other for doing 
it2 if not by law1 by the  opinion of   
his fellow creatures2 if not by opinion1
 by the reproaches of  his own          
conscience4 ,this seems the real turning
 point of the distinction  between      
morality and simple expediency4 ,it is a
 part of the notion of  ,duty in every  
one of its forms1 that a person may     
rightfully be  compelled to fulfil it4  

,duty is a thing which may be exacted   
from a  person1 as one exacts a debt4   
,unless we think that it might be       
exacted  from him1 we do not call it his
 duty4 ,reasons of prudence1 or the     
interest of other people1 may militate  
against actually exacting it2 but  the  
person himself1 it is clearly           
understood1 would not be entitled to    
complain4 ,there are other things1 on   
the contrary1 which we wish that  people
 should do1 which we like or admire them
 for doing1 perhaps  dislike or despise 
them for not doing1 but yet admit that  
they are not  bound to do2 it is not a  
case of moral obligation2 we do not     
blame them1  that is1 we do not think   
that they are proper objects of         
punishment4 ,how  we come by these ideas
 of deserving and not deserving         
punishment1 will  appear1 perhaps1 in   
the sequel2 but ,i think there is no    
doubt that this  distinction lies at the
 bottom of the notions of right and     
wrong2 that  we call any conduct wrong1 

or employ instead1 some other term of   
dislike  or disparagement1 according as 
we think that the person ought1 or ought
  not1 to be punished for it2 and we say
 that it would be right to do so  and   
so1 or merely that it would be desirable
 or laudable1 according as  we would    
wish to see the person whom it concerns1
 compelled or only  persuaded and       
exhorted1 to act in that manner4,c      
,this1 therefore1 being the             
characteristic difference which marks   
off1  not justice1 but morality in      
general1 from the remaining provinces of
  ,expediency and ,worthiness2 the      
character is still to be sought which   
distinguishes justice from other        
branches of morality4 ,now it is known  
that ethical writers divide moral duties
 into two classes1 denoted by  the      
ill-chosen expressions1 duties of       
perfect and of imperfect  obligation2   
the latter being those in which1 though 
the act is  obligatory1 the particular  
occasions of performing it are left to  

our  choice2 as in the case of charity  
or beneficence1 which we are indeed     
bound to practise1 but not towards any  
definite person1 nor at any  prescribed 
time4 ,in the more precise language of  
philosophic jurists1  duties of perfect 
obligation are those duties in virtue of
 which a  correlative right resides in  
some person or persons2 duties of       
imperfect  obligation are those moral   
obligations which do not give birth to  
any  right4 ,i think it will be found   
that this distinction exactly coincides 
with that which exists between justice  
and the other obligations of  morality4 
,in our survey of the various popular   
acceptations of justice1  the term      
appeared generally to involve the idea  
of a personal right--a  claim on the    
part of one or more individuals1 like   
that which the law  gives when it       
confers a proprietary or other legal    
right4 ,whether the  injustice consists 
in depriving a person of a possession1  
or in breaking  faith with him1 or in   

treating him worse than he deserves1 or 
worse than  other people who have no    
greater claims1 in each case the        
supposition  implies two things--a wrong
 done1 and some assignable person who is
  wronged4 ,injustice may also be done  
by treating a person better than        
others2 but the wrong in this case is to
 his competitors1 who are also          
assignable persons4 ,it seems to me that
 this feature in the case--a  right in  
some person1 correlative to the moral   
obligation--constitutes  the specific   
difference between justice1 and         
generosity or beneficence4  ,justice    
implies something which it is not only  
right to do1 and wrong  not to do1 but  
which some individual person can claim  
from us as his  moral right4 ,no one has
 a moral right to our generosity or     
beneficence1  because we are not morally
 bound to practise those virtues towards
 any  given individual4 ,and it will be 
found1 with respect to this as with     
respect to every correct definition1    

that the instances which seem to        
conflict with it are those which most   
confirm it4 ,for if a moralist          
attempts1 as some have done1 to make out
 that mankind generally1 though  not any
 given individual1 have a right to all  
the good we can do them1  he at once1 by
 that thesis1 includes generosity and   
beneficence within  the category of     
justice4 ,he is obliged to say1 that our
 utmost exertions  are due to our fellow
 creatures1 thus assimilating them to a 
debt2 or  that nothing less can be a    
sufficient return for what society does 
for  us1 thus classing the case as one  
of gratitude2 both of which are         
acknowledged cases of justice4 ,wherever
 there is a right1 the case is  one of  
justice1 and not of the virtue of       
beneficence3 and whoever does  not place
 the distinction between justice and    
morality in general where  we have now  
placed it1 will be found to make no     
distinction between them  at all1 but to
 merge all morality in justice4         

,having thus endeavoured to determine   
the distinctive elements which  enter   
into the composition of the idea of     
justice1 we are ready to enter  on the  
inquiry1 whether the feeling1 which     
accompanies the idea1 is  attached to it
 by a special dispensation of nature1 or
 whether it could  have grown up1 by any
 known laws1 out of the idea itself2 and
 in  particular1 whether it can have    
originated in considerations of general 
expediency4    ,i conceive that the     
sentiment itself does not arise from    
anything which  would commonly1 or      
correctly1 be termed an idea of         
expediency2 but that1  though the       
sentiment does not1 whatever is moral in
 it does4    ,we have seen that the two 
essential ingredients in the sentiment  
of  justice are1 the desire to punish a 
person who has done harm1 and the       
knowledge or belief that there is some  
definite individual or  individuals to  
whom harm has been done4    ,now it     
appears to me1 that the desire to punish

 a person who has done  harm to some    
individual1 is a spontaneous outgrowth  
from two sentiments1  both in the       
highest degree natural1 and which either
 are or resemble  instincts2 the impulse
 of self-defence1 and the feeling of    
sympathy4    ,it is natural to resent1  
and to repel or retaliate1 any harm done
 or  attempted against ourselves1 or    
against those with whom we sympathize4  
,the origin of this sentiment it is not 
necessary here to discuss4  ,whether it 
be an instinct or a result of           
intelligence1 it is1 we know1  common to
 all animal nature2 for every animal    
tries to hurt those who  have hurt1 or  
who it thinks are about to hurt1 itself 
or its young4  ,human beings1 on this   
point1 only differ from other animals in
 two  particulars4 ,first1 in being     
capable of sympathizing1 not solely with
  their offspring1 or1 like some of the 
more noble animals1 with some  superior 
animal who is kind to them1 but with all
 human1 and even with  all sentient     

beings4 ,secondly1 in having a more     
developed intelligence1  which gives a  
wider range to the whole of their       
sentiments1 whether  self-regarding or  
sympathetic4 ,by virtue of his superior 
intelligence1  even apart from his      
superior range of sympathy1 a human     
being is capable  of apprehending a     
community of interest between himself   
and the human  society of which he forms
 a part1 such that any conduct which    
threatens  the security of the society  
generally1 is threatening to his own1   
and  calls forth his instinct 7if       
instinct it be7 of self-defence4 ,the   
same  superiority of intelligence1      
joined to the power of sympathizing with
  human beings generally1 enables him to
 attach himself to the collective  idea 
of his tribe1 his country1 or mankind1  
in such a manner that any  act hurtful  
to them rouses his instinct of sympathy1
 and urges him to  resistance4    ,the  
sentiment of justice1 in that one of its
 elements which consists of  the desire 

to punish1 is thus1 ,i conceive1 the    
natural feeling of  retaliation or      
vengeance1 rendered by intellect and    
sympathy applicable  to those injuries1 
that is1 to those hurts1 which wound us 
through1 or  in common with1 society at 
large4 ,this sentiment1 in itself1 has  
nothing  moral in it2 what is moral is1 
the exclusive subordination of it to the
  social sympathies1 so as to wait on   
and obey their call4 ,for the natural   
feeling tends to make us resent         
indiscriminately whatever any one does  
that is disagreeable to us2 but when    
moralized by the social feeling1 it     
only acts in the directions conformable 
to the general good2 just  persons      
resenting a hurt to society1 though not 
otherwise a hurt to  themselves1 and not
 resenting a hurt to themselves1 however
 painful1  unless it be of the kind     
which society has a common interest with
 them  in the repression of4    ,it is  
no objection against this doctrine to   
say1 that when we feel our  sentiment of

 justice outraged1 we are not thinking  
of society at large1  or of any         
collective interest1 but only of the    
individual case4 ,it is  common enough  
certainly1 though the reverse of        
commendable1 to feel  resentment merely 
because we have suffered pain2 but a    
person whose  resentment is really a    
moral feeling1 that is1 who considers   
whether an  act is blameable before he  
allows himself to resent it--such a     
person1  though he may not say expressly
 to himself that he is standing up for  
the interest of society1 certainly does 
feel that he is asserting a rule  which 
is for the benefit of others as well as 
for his own4 ,if he is not  feeling     
this--if he is regarding the act solely 
as it affects him  individually--he is  
not consciously just2 he is not         
concerning himself  about the justice of
 his actions4 ,this is admitted even by 
anti-utilitarian moralists4 ,when ,kant 
7as before remarked7 propounds as  the  
fundamental principle of morals1 ',so   

act1 that thy rule of conduct  might be 
adopted as a law by all rational        
beings1' he virtually  acknowledges that
 the interest of mankind collectively1  
or at least of  mankind                 
indiscriminately1 must be in the mind of
 the agent when  conscientiously        
deciding on the morality of the act4    
,otherwise he uses  words without a     
meaning3 for1 that a rule even of utter 
selfishness  could not possibly be      
adopted by all rational beings--that    
there is  any insuperable obstacle in   
the nature of things to its             
adoption--cannot  be even plausibly     
maintained4 ,to give any meaning to     
,kant's principle1  the sense put upon  
it must be1 that we ought to shape our  
conduct by a  rule which all rational   
beings might adopt with benefit to their
  collective interest4    ,to           
recapitulate3 the idea of justice       
supposes two things2 a rule of  conduct1
 and a sentiment which sanctions the    
rule4 ,the first must be  supposed      

common to all mankind1 and intended for 
their good4 ,the other  7the sentiment7 
is a desire that punishment may be      
suffered by those who  infringe the     
rule4 ,there is involved1 in addition1  
the conception of  some definite person 
who suffers by the infringement2 whose  
rights 7to  use the expression          
appropriated to the case7 are violated  
by it4 ,and the  sentiment of justice   
appears to me to be1 the animal desire  
to repel or  retaliate a hurt or damage 
to oneself1 or to those with whom one   
sympathizes1 widened so as to include   
all persons1 by the human capacity  of  
enlarged sympathy1 and the human        
conception of intelligent               
self-interest4 ,from the latter         
elements1 the feeling derives its       
morality2 from the former1 its peculiar 
impressiveness1 and energy of           
self-assertion4    ,i have1 throughout1 
treated the idea of a right residing in 
the  injured person1 and violated by the
 injury1 not as a separate element in   

the composition of the idea and         
sentiment1 but as one of the forms in   
which the other two elements clothe     
themselves4 ,these elements are1 a  hurt
 to some assignable person or persons on
 the one hand1 and a demand  for        
punishment on the other4 ,an examination
 of our own minds1 ,i think1  will show1
 that these two things include all that 
we mean when we speak  of violation of a
 right4 ,when we call anything a        
person's right1 we mean  that he has a  
valid claim on society to protect him in
 the possession  of it1 either by the   
force of law1 or by that of education   
and opinion4  ,if he has what we        
consider a sufficient claim1 on whatever
 account1 to  have something guaranteed 
to him by society1 we say that he has a 
right  to it4 ,if we desire to prove    
that anything does not belong to him by 
right1 we think this done as soon as it 
is admitted that society ought  not to  
take measures for securing it to him1   
but should leave it to  chance1 or to   

his own exertions4 ,thus1 a person is   
said to have a right  to what he can    
earn in fair professional competition2  
because society  ought not to allow any 
other person to hinder him from         
endeavouring to  earn in that manner as 
much as he can4 ,but he has not a right 
to three  hundred a-year1 though he may 
happen to be earning it2 because society
  is not called on to provide that he   
shall earn that sum4 ,on the  contrary1 
if he owns ten thousand pounds three per
 cent4 stock1 he has  a right to three  
hundred a-year2 because society has come
 under an  obligation to provide him    
with an income of that amount4    ,to   
have a right1 then1 is1 ,i conceive1 to 
have something which society  ought to  
defend me in the possession of4 ,if the 
objector goes on to ask  why it ought1  
,i can give him no other reason than    
general utility4 ,if  that expression   
does not seem to convey a sufficient    
feeling of the  strength of the         
obligation1 nor to account for the      

peculiar energy of  the feeling1 it is  
because there goes to the composition of
 the  sentiment1 not a rational only but
 also an animal element1 the thirst  for
 retaliation2 and this thirst derives   
its intensity1 as well as its  moral    
justification1 from the extraordinarily 
important and impressive  kind of       
utility which is concerned4 ,the        
interest involved is that of  security1 
to every one's feelings the most vital  
of all interests4  ,nearly all other    
earthly benefits are needed by one      
person1 not needed  by another2 and many
 of them can1 if necessary1 be          
cheerfully foregone1  or replaced by    
something else2 but security no human   
being can possibly  do without2 on it we
 depend for all our immunity from evil1 
and for the  whole value of all and     
every good1 beyond the passing moment2  
since  nothing but the gratification of 
the instant could be of any worth to    
us1 if we could be deprived of          
everything the next instant by whoever  

was momentarily stronger than ourselves4
 ,now this most indispensable of  all   
necessaries1 after physical nutriment1  
cannot be had1 unless the  machinery for
 providing it is kept unintermittedly in
 active play4 ,our  notion1 therefore1  
of the claim we have on our fellow      
creatures to join  in making safe for us
 the very groundwork of our existence1  
gathers  feelings round it so much more 
intense than those concerned in any of  
the more common cases of utility1 that  
the difference in degree 7as is  often  
the case in psychology7 becomes a real  
difference in kind4 ,the  claim assumes 
that character of absoluteness1 that    
apparent infinity1  and                 
incommensurability with all other       
considerations1 which constitute  the   
distinction between the feeling of right
 and wrong and that of  ordinary        
expediency and inexpediency4 ,the       
feelings concerned are so  powerful1 and
 we count so positively on finding a    
responsive feeling in  others 7all being

 alike interested71 that ought and      
should grow into  must1 and recognized  
indispensability becomes a moral        
necessity1  analogous to physical1 and  
often not inferior to it in binding     
force4    ,if the preceding analysis1 or
 something resembling it1 be not the    
correct account of the notion of        
justice2 if justice be totally          
independent of utility1 and be a        
standard per se1 which the mind can     
recognize by simple introspection of    
itself2 it is hard to understand  why   
that internal oracle is so ambiguous1   
and why so many things appear  either   
just or unjust1 according to the light  
in which they are  regarded4 ,we are    
continually informed that ,utility is an
 uncertain  standard1 which every       
different person interprets differently1
 and that  there is no safety but in the
 immutable1 ineffaceable1 and           
unmistakeable  dictates of ,justice1    
which carry their evidence in           
themselves1 and are  independent of the 

fluctuations of opinion4 ,one would     
suppose from this  that on questions of 
justice there could be no controversy2  
that if we  take that for our rule1 its 
application to any given case could     
leave us  in as little doubt as a       
mathematical demonstration4 ,so far is  
this from  being the fact1 that there is
 as much difference of opinion1 and as  
fierce discussion1 about what is just1  
as about what is useful to  society4    
,not only have different nations and    
individuals different  notions of       
justice1 but1 in the mind of one and the
 same individual1  justice is not some  
one rule1 principle1 or maxim1 but many1
 which do  not always coincide in their 
dictates1 and in choosing between which1
 he  is guided either by some extraneous
 standard1 or by his own personal       
predilections4    ,for instance1 there  
are some who say1 that it is unjust to  
punish any  one for the sake of example 
to others2 that punishment is just1 only
  when intended for the good of the     

sufferer himself4 ,others maintain the  
extreme reverse1 contending that to     
punish persons who have attained  years 
of discretion1 for their own benefit1 is
 despotism and injustice1  since if the 
matter at issue is solely their own     
good1 no one has a  right to control    
their own judgment of it2 but that they 
may justly be  punished to prevent evil 
to others1 this being an exercise of the
  legitimate right of self-defence4 ,mr4
 ,owen1 again1 affirms that it is       
unjust to punish at all2 for the        
criminal did not make his own           
character2 his education1 and the       
circumstances which surround him1 have  
made him a criminal1 and for these he is
 not responsible4 ,all these  opinions  
are extremely plausible2 and so long as 
the question is argued  as one of       
justice simply1 without going down to   
the principles which lie  under justice 
and are the source of its authority1 ,i 
am unable to see  how any of these      
reasoners can be refuted4 ,for1 in      

truth1 every one of  the three builds   
upon rules of justice confessedly true4 
,the first  appeals to the acknowledged 
injustice of singling out an individual1
 and  making him a sacrifice1 without   
his consent1 for other people's benefit4
  ,the second relies on the acknowledged
 justice of self-defence1 and the       
admitted injustice of forcing one person
 to conform to another's notions  of    
what constitutes his good4 ,the ,owenite
 invokes the admitted  principle1 that  
it is unjust to punish any one for what 
he cannot help4  ,each is triumphant so 
long as he is not compelled to take into
  consideration any other maxims of     
justice than the one he has selected2   
but as soon as their several maxims are 
brought face to face1 each  disputant   
seems to have exactly as much to say for
 himself as the  others4 ,no one of them
 can carry out his own notion of justice
 without  trampling upon another equally
 binding4 ,these are difficulties2 they 
have always been felt to be such2 and   

many devices have been invented to  turn
 rather than to overcome them4 ,as a    
refuge from the last of the  three1 men 
imagined what they called the freedom of
 the will2 fancying  that they could not
 justify punishing a man whose will is  
in a  thoroughly hateful state1 unless  
it be supposed to have come into that   
state through no influence of anterior  
circumstances4 ,to escape from the      
other difficulties1 a favourite         
contrivance has been the fiction of a   
contract1 whereby at some unknown period
 all the members of society  engaged to 
obey the laws1 and consented to be      
punished for any  disobedience to them2 
thereby giving to their legislators the 
right1  which it is assumed they would  
not otherwise have had1 of punishing    
them1 either for their own good or for  
that of society4 ,this happy  thought   
was considered to get rid of the whole  
difficulty1 and to  legitimate the      
infliction of punishment1 in virtue of  
another received  maxim of justice1     

volenti non fit injuria2 that is not    
unjust which is  done with the consent  
of the person who is supposed to be hurt
 by it4 ,i  need hardly remark1 that    
even if the consent were not a mere     
fiction1  this maxim is not superior in 
authority to the others which it is     
brought in to supersede4 ,it is1 on the 
contrary1 an instructive specimen  of   
the loose and irregular manner in which 
supposed principles of  justice grow up4
 ,this particular one evidently came    
into use as a help  to the coarse       
exigencies of courts of law1 which are  
sometimes obliged  to be content with   
very uncertain presumptions1 on account 
of the  greater evils which would often 
arise from any attempt on their part to 
cut finer4 ,but even courts of law are  
not able to adhere consistently to  the 
maxim1 for they allow voluntary         
engagements to be set aside on the      
ground of fraud1 and sometimes on that  
of mere mistake or  misinformation4     
,again1 when the legitimacy of          

inflicting punishment is admitted1 how  
many conflicting conceptions of justice 
come to light in discussing the  proper 
apportionment of punishment to offences4
 ,no rule on this subject  recommends   
itself so strongly to the primitive and 
spontaneous sentiment  of justice1 as   
the lex talionis1 an eye for an eye and 
a tooth for a  tooth4 ,though this      
principle of the ,jewish and of the     
,mahomedan law has  been generally      
abandoned in ,europe as a practical     
maxim1 there is1 ,i  suspect1 in most   
minds1 a secret hankering after it2 and 
when  retribution accidentally falls on 
an offender in that precise shape1 the  
general feeling of satisfaction evinced1
 bears witness how natural is  the      
sentiment to which this repayment in    
kind is acceptable4 ,with many  the test
 of justice in penal infliction is that 
the punishment should be  proportioned  
to the offence2 meaning that it should  
be exactly measured  by the moral guilt 
of the culprit 7whatever be their       

standard for  measuring moral guilt73   
the consideration1 what amount of       
punishment is  necessary to deter from  
the offence1 having nothing to do with  
the  question of justice1 in their      
estimation3 while there are others to   
whom  that consideration is all in all2 
who maintain that it is not just1 at    
least for man1 to inflict on a fellow   
creature1 whatever may be his  offences1
 any amount of suffering beyond the     
least that will suffice to  prevent him 
from repeating1 and others from         
imitating1 his misconduct4    ,to take  
another example from a subject already  
once referred to4 ,in a  co-operative   
industrial association1 is it just or   
not that talent or  skill should give a 
title to superior remuneration8 ,on the 
negative side  of the question it is    
argued1 that whoever does the best he   
can1  deserves equally well1 and ought  
not in justice to be put in a position  
of inferiority for no fault of his own2 
that superior abilities have  already   

advantages more than enough1 in the     
admiration they excite1 the  personal   
influence they command1 and the internal
 sources of  satisfaction attending     
them1 without adding to these a superior
 share of  the world's goods2 and that  
society is bound in justice rather to   
make  compensation to the less favoured1
 for this unmerited inequality of       
advantages1 than to aggravate it4 ,on   
the contrary side it is contended1  that
 society receives more from the more    
efficient labourer2 that his  services  
being more useful1 society owes him a   
larger return for them2  that a greater 
share of the joint result is actually   
his work1 and not  to allow his claim to
 it is a kind of robbery2 that if he is 
only to  receive as much as others1 he  
can only be justly required to produce  
as  much1 and to give a smaller amount  
of time and exertion1 proportioned to   
his superior efficiency4 ,who shall     
decide between these appeals to         
conflicting principles of justice8      

,justice has in this case two sides to  
it1 which it is impossible to bring into
 harmony1 and the two disputants  have  
chosen opposite sides2 the one looks to 
what it is just that the  individual    
should receive1 the other to what it is 
just that the  community should give4   
,each1 from his own point of view1 is   
unanswerable2 and any choice between    
them1 on grounds of justice1 must  be   
perfectly arbitrary4 ,social utility    
alone can decide the preference4    ,how
 many1 again1 and how irreconcileable1  
are the standards of justice  to which  
reference is made in discussing the     
repartition of taxation4  ,one opinion  
is1 that payment to the ,state should be
 in numerical  proportion to pecuniary  
means4 ,others think that justice       
dictates what  they term graduated      
taxation2 taking a higher percentage    
from those who  have more to spare4 ,in 
point of natural justice a strong case  
might be  made for disregarding means   
altogether1 and taking the same absolute

 sum  7whenever it could be got7 from   
every one3 as the subscribers to a mess1
  or to a club1 all pay the same sum for
 the same privileges1 whether they  can 
all equally afford it or not4 ,since the
 protection 7it might be  said7 of law  
and government is afforded to1 and is   
equally required by1  all1 there is no  
injustice in making all buy it at the   
same price4 ,it is  reckoned justice1   
not injustice1 that a dealer should     
charge to all  customers the same price 
for the same article1 not a price       
varying  according to their means of    
payment4 ,this doctrine1 as applied to  
taxation1 finds no advocates1 because it
 conflicts strongly with men's  feelings
 of humanity and perceptions of social  
expediency2 but the  principle of       
justice which it invokes is as true and 
as binding as those  which can be       
appealed to against it4 ,accordingly1 it
 exerts a tacit  influence on the line  
of defence employed for other modes of  
assessing  taxation4 ,people feel       

obliged to argue that the ,state does   
more for the  rich than for the poor1 as
 a justification for its taking more    
from  them3 though this is in reality   
not true1 for the rich would be far     
better able to protect themselves1 in   
the absence of law or government1  than 
the poor1 and indeed would probably be  
successful in converting the  poor into 
their slaves4 ,others1 again1 so far    
defer to the same  conception of        
justice1 as to maintain that all should 
pay an equal  capitation tax for the    
protection of their persons 7these being
 of equal  value to all71 and an unequal
 tax for the protection of their        
property1  which is unequal4 ,to this   
others reply1 that the all of one man is
 as  valuable to him as the all of      
another4 ,from these confusions there is
 no  other mode of extrication than the 
utilitarian4           99       99      
99       99       99    ,is1 then1 the  
difference between the ,just and the    
,expedient a merely  imaginary          

distinction8 ,have mankind been under a 
delusion in thinking  that justice is a 
more sacred thing than policy1 and that 
the latter  ought only to be listened to
 after the former has been satisfied8   
,by no  means4 ,the exposition we have  
given of the nature and origin of the   
sentiment1 recognises a real            
distinction2 and no one of those who    
profess the most sublime contempt for   
the consequences of actions as an       
element in their morality1 attaches more
 importance to the distinction  than ,i 
do4 ,while ,i dispute the pretensions of
 any theory which sets up  an imaginary 
standard of justice not grounded on     
utility1 ,i account the  justice which  
is grounded on utility to be the chief  
part1 and  incomparably the most sacred 
and binding part1 of all morality4      
,justice  is a name for certain classes 
of moral rules1 which concern the       
essentials of human well-being more     
nearly1 and are therefore of more       
absolute obligation1 than any other     

rules for the guidance of life2 and  the
 notion which we have found to be of the
 essence of the idea of  justice1 that  
of a right residing in an individual1   
implies and  testifies to this more     
binding obligation4    ,the moral rules 
which forbid mankind to hurt one another
 7in which we  must never forget to     
include wrongful interference with each 
other's  freedom7 are more vital to     
human well-being than any maxims1       
however  important1 which only point out
 the best mode of managing some         
department of human affairs4 ,they have 
also the peculiarity1 that they  are the
 main element in determining the whole  
of the social feelings of  mankind4 ,it 
is their observance which alone         
preserves peace among human  beings3 if 
obedience to them were not the rule1 and
 disobedience the  exception1 every one 
would see in every one else a probable  
enemy1  against whom he must be         
perpetually guarding himself4 ,what is  
hardly  less important1 these are the   

precepts which mankind have the         
strongest  and the most direct          
inducements for impressing upon one     
another4 ,by  merely giving to each     
other prudential instruction or         
exhortation1 they  may gain1 or think   
they gain1 nothing3 in inculcating on   
each other the  duty of positive        
beneficence they have an unmistakeable  
interest1 but  far less in degree3 a    
person may possibly not need the        
benefits of  others2 but he always needs
 that they should not do him hurt4 ,thus
 the  moralities which protect every    
individual from being harmed by others1 
either directly or by being hindered in 
his freedom of pursuing his own  good1  
are at once those which he himself has  
most at heart1 and those  which he has  
the strongest interest in publishing and
 enforcing by word  and deed4 ,it is by 
a person's observance of these1 that his
 fitness to  exist as one of the        
fellowship of human beings1 is tested   
and decided2  for on that depends his   

being a nuisance or not to those with   
whom he is  in contact4 ,now it is these
 moralities primarily1 which compose the
  obligations of justice4 ,the most     
marked cases of injustice1 and those    
which give the tone to the feeling of   
repugnance which characterizes the      
sentiment1 are acts of wrongful         
aggression1 or wrongful exercise of     
power over some one2 the next are those 
which consist in wrongfully  withholding
 from him something which is his due2 in
 both cases1  inflicting on him a       
positive hurt1 either in the form of    
direct  suffering1 or of the privation  
of some good which he had reasonable    
ground1 either of a physical or of a    
social kind1 for counting upon4    ,the 
same powerful motives which command the 
observance of these primary  moralities1
 enjoin the punishment of those who     
violate them2 and as the  impulses of   
self-defence1 of defence of others1 and 
of vengeance1 are  all called forth     
against such persons1 retribution1 or   

evil for evil1  becomes closely         
connected with the sentiment of justice1
 and is  universally included in the    
idea4 ,good for good is also one of the 
dictates of justice2 and this1 though   
its social utility is evident1 and      
though it carries with it a natural     
human feeling1 has not at first  sight  
that obvious connexion with hurt or     
injury1 which1 existing in the  most    
elementary cases of just and unjust1 is 
the source of the  characteristic       
intensity of the sentiment4 ,but the    
connexion1 though  less obvious1 is not 
less real4 ,he who accepts benefits1 and
 denies a  return of them when needed1  
inflicts a real hurt1 by disappointing  
one  of the most natural and reasonable 
of expectations1 and one which he  must 
at least tacitly have encouraged1       
otherwise the benefits would  seldom    
have been conferred4 ,the important     
rank1 among human evils and  wrongs1 of 
the disappointment of expectation1 is   
shown in the fact that  it constitutes  

the principal criminality of two such   
highly immoral acts  as a breach of     
friendship and a breach of promise4 ,few
 hurts which human  beings can sustain  
are greater1 and none wound more1 than  
when that on  which they habitually and 
with full assurance relied1 fails them  
in the  hour of need2 and few wrongs are
 greater than this mere withholding of  
good2 none excite more resentment1      
either in the person suffering1 or in  a
 sympathizing spectator4 ,the principle1
 therefore1 of giving to each  what they
 deserve1 that is1 good for good as well
 as evil for evil1 is  not only included
 within the idea of ,justice as we have 
defined it1 but  is a proper object of  
that intensity of sentiment1 which      
places the  ,just1 in human estimation1 
above the simply ,expedient4    ,most of
 the maxims of justice current in the   
world1 and commonly  appealed to in its 
transactions1 are simply instrumental to
 carrying  into effect the principles of
 justice which we have now spoken of4   

,that  a person is only responsible for 
what he has done voluntarily1 or could  
voluntarily have avoided2 that it is    
unjust to condemn any person  unheard2  
that the punishment ought to be         
proportioned to the offence1  and the   
like1 are maxims intended to prevent the
 just principle of evil  for evil from  
being perverted to the infliction of    
evil without that  justification4 ,the  
greater part of these common maxims have
 come into  use from the practice of    
courts of justice1 which have been      
naturally  led to a more complete       
recognition and elaboration than was    
likely to  suggest itself to others1 of 
the rules necessary to enable them to   
fulfil their double function1 of        
inflicting punishment when due1 and of  
awarding to each person his right4      
,that first of judicial virtues1        
impartiality1 is an obligation of       
justice1 partly for the reason last     
mentioned2 as being a necessary         
condition of the fulfilment of the other

 obligations of justice4 ,but  this is  
not the only source of the exalted rank1
 among human  obligations1 of those     
maxims of equality and impartiality1    
which1 both  in popular estimation and  
in that of the most enlightened1 are    
included  among the precepts of justice4
 ,in one point of view1 they may be     
considered as corollaries from the      
principles already laid down4 ,if it  is
 a duty to do to each according to his  
deserts1 returning good for  good as    
well as repressing evil by evil1 it     
necessarily follows that we  should     
treat all equally well 7when no higher  
duty forbids7 who have  deserved equally
 well of us1 and that society should    
treat all equally  well who have        
deserved equally well of it1 that is1   
who have deserved  equally well         
absolutely4 ,this is the highest        
abstract standard of social  and        
distributive justice2 towards which all 
institutions1 and the  efforts of all   
virtuous citizens1 should be made in the

 utmost possible  degree to converge4   
,but this great moral duty rests upon a 
still deeper  foundation1 being a direct
 emanation from the first principle of  
morals1  and not a mere logical         
corollary from secondary or derivative  
doctrines4  ,it is involved in the very 
meaning of ,utility1 or the             
,greatest-,happiness ,principle4 ,that  
principle is a mere form of words       
without rational signification1 unless  
one person's happiness1 supposed  equal 
in degree 7with the proper allowance    
made for kind71 is counted  for exactly 
as much as another's4 ,those conditions 
being supplied1  ,bentham's dictum1     
'everybody to count for one1 nobody for 
more than  one1' might be written under 
the principle of utility as an          
explanatory  commentary4,d ,the equal   
claim of everybody to happiness in the  
estimation of the moralist and the      
legislator1 involves an equal claim  to 
all the means of happiness1 except in so
 far as the inevitable  conditions of   

human life1 and the general interest1 in
 which that of  every individual is     
included1 set limits to the maxim2 and  
those limits  ought to be strictly      
construed4 ,as every other maxim of     
justice1 so  this1 is by no means       
applied or held applicable universally2 
on the  contrary1 as ,i have already    
remarked1 it bends to every person's    
ideas  of social expediency4 ,but in    
whatever case it is deemed applicable at
  all1 it is held to be the dictate of  
justice4 ,all persons are deemed to     
have a right to equality of treatment1  
except when some recognised  social     
expediency requires the reverse4 ,and   
hence all social  inequalities which    
have ceased to be considered expedient1 
assume the  character not of simple     
inexpediency1 but of injustice1 and     
appear so  tyrannical1 that people are  
apt to wonder how they ever could have  
been  tolerated2 forgetful that they    
themselves perhaps tolerate other       
inequalities under an equally mistaken  

notion of expediency1 the  correction of
 which would make that which they       
approve seem quite as  monstrous as what
 they have at last learnt to condemn4   
,the entire  history of social          
improvement has been a series of        
transitions1 by which  one custom or    
institution after another1 from being a 
supposed primary  necessity of social   
existence1 has passed into the rank of  
an  universally stigmatized injustice   
and tyranny4 ,so it has been with the   
distinctions of slaves and freemen1     
nobles and serfs1 patricians and        
plebeians2 and so it will be1 and in    
part already is1 with the  aristocracies
 of colour1 race1 and sex4    ,it       
appears from what has been said1 that   
justice is a name for certain  moral    
requirements1 which1 regarded           
collectively1 stand higher in the  scale
 of social utility1 and are therefore of
 more paramount obligation1  than any   
others2 though particular cases may     
occur in which some other  social duty  

is so important1 as to overrule any one 
of the general  maxims of justice4      
,thus1 to save a life1 it may not only  
be allowable1  but a duty1 to steal1 or 
take by force1 the necessary food or    
medicine1  or to kidnap1 and compel to  
officiate1 the only qualified medical   
practitioner4 ,in such cases1 as we do  
not call anything justice which is  not 
a virtue1 we usually say1 not that      
justice must give way to some  other    
moral principle1 but that what is just  
in ordinary cases is1 by  reason of that
 other principle1 not just in the       
particular case4 ,by this  useful       
accommodation of language1 the character
 of indefeasibility  attributed to      
justice is kept up1 and we are saved    
from the necessity of  maintaining that 
there can be laudable injustice4    ,the
 considerations which have now been     
adduced resolve1 ,i conceive1 the  only 
real difficulty in the utilitarian      
theory of morals4 ,it has always  been  
evident that all cases of justice are   

also cases of expediency3 the           
difference is in the peculiar sentiment 
which attaches to the former1 as        
contradistinguished from the latter4 ,if
 this characteristic sentiment  has been
 sufficiently accounted for2 if there is
 no necessity to assume  for it any     
peculiarity of origin2 if it is simply  
the natural feeling of  resentment1     
moralized by being made coextensive with
 the demands of  social good2 and if    
this feeling not only does but ought to 
exist in all  the classes of cases to   
which the idea of justice corresponds2  
that idea  no longer presents itself as 
a stumbling-block to the utilitarian    
ethics4 ,justice remains the appropriate
 name for certain social  utilities     
which are vastly more important1 and    
therefore more absolute  and imperative1
 than any others are as a class 7though 
not more so than  others may be in      
particular cases72 and which1 therefore1
 ought to be1  as well as naturally are1
 guarded by a sentiment not only        

different in  degree1 but also in kind2 
distinguished from the milder feeling   
which  attaches to the mere idea of     
promoting human pleasure or convenience1
 at  once by the more definite nature of
 its commands1 and by the sterner       
character of its sanctions4      ,,the  
,,end4    ,,footnotes3    ,footnote ,c3 
,see this point enforced and illustrated
 by ,professor ,bain1  in an admirable  
chapter 7entitled ,the ,ethical         
,emotions1 or the ,moral  ,sense7 of the
 second of the two treatises composing  
his elaborate and  profound work on the 
,mind4    ,footnote ,d3 ,this           
implication1 in the first principle of  
the utilitarian  scheme1 of perfect     
impartiality between persons1 is        
regarded by ,mr4  ,herbert ,spencer 7in 
his ,social ,statics7 as a disproof of  
the  pretentions of utility to be a     
sufficient guide to right2 since 7he    
says7 the principle of utility          
presupposes the anterior principle1 that
  everybody has an equal right to       

happiness4 ,it may be more correctly    
described as supposing that equal       
amounts of happiness are equally        
desirable1 whether felt by the same or  
by different persons4 ,this1  however1  
is not a pre-supposition2 not a premise 
needful to support the  principle of    
utility1 but the very principle itself2 
for what is the  principle of utility1  
if it be not that 'happiness' and       
'desirable' are  synonymous terms8 ,if  
there is any anterior principle implied1
 it can be  no other than this1 that the
 truths of arithmetic are applicable to 
the  valuation of happiness1 as of all  
other measurable quantities4    ,mr4    
,herbert ,spencer1 in a private         
communication on the subject of the     
preceding ,note1 objects to being       
considered an opponent of               
,utilitarianism2 and states that he     
regards happiness as the ultimate end   
of morality2 but deems that end only    
partially attainable by empirical       
generalizations from the observed       

results of conduct1 and completely      
attainable only by deducing1 from the   
laws of life and the conditions of      
existence1 what kinds of action         
necessarily tend to produce happiness1  
and what kinds to produce unhappiness4  
,with the exception of the word         
necessarily1 ,i have no dissent to      
express from this doctrine2 and         
7omitting that word7 ,i am not aware    
that any modern advocate of             
utilitarianism is of a different        
opinion4 ,bentham1 certainly1 to whom in
  the ,social ,statics ,mr4 ,spencer    
particularly referred1 is1 least of all 
writers1 chargeable with unwillingness  
to deduce the effect of actions  on     
happiness from the laws of human nature 
and the universal conditions  of human  
life4 ,the common charge against him is 
of relying too  exclusively upon such   
deductions1 and declining altogether to 
be bound  by the generalizations from   
specific experience which ,mr4 ,spencer 
thinks  that utilitarians generally     

confine themselves to4 ,my own opinion  
7and1  as ,i collect1 ,mr4 ,spencer's7  
is1 that in ethics1 as in all other     
branches of scientific study1 the       
consilience of the results of both      
these processes1 each corroborating and 
verifying the other1 is  requisite to   
give to any general proposition the kind
 and degree of  evidence which          
constitutes scientific proof4