,,history ,,of ,,modern ,,philosophy ,from ,nicolas of ,cusa to the ,present ,time by ,,richard ,,falckenberg ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,erlangen ,,third ,,american ,,from ,,the ,,second ,,german ,,edition ,,translated ,,with ,,the ,,author',s ,,sanction ,,by ,a4,c4 ,,armstrong1 ,,jr4 ,professor of ,philosophy in ,wesleyan ,university #ahic ,,translator',s ,,preface4 ,the aim of this translation is the same as that of the original work4 ,each is the outcome of experience in university instruction in philosophy1 and is intended to furnish a manual which shall be at once scientific and popular1 one to stand midway between the exhaustive expositions of the larger histories and the meager sketches of the compendiums4 ,a pupil of ,kuno ,fischer1 ,fortlage1 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann1 ,lotze1 and ,eucken among others1 ,professor ,falckenberg began his career as ,docent in the university of ,jena4 ,in the year following the first edition of this work he became ,extraordinarius in the same university1 and in #ahhh ,ordinarius at ,erlangen1 choosing the latter call in preference to an invitation to ,dorpat as successor to ,teichmller4 ,the chair at ,erlangen he still holds4 ,his work as teacher and author has been chiefly in the history of modern philosophy4 ,besides the present work and numerous minor articles1 he has published the following3 ,ueber den intelligiblen ,charakter1 zur ,kritik der ,kantischen ,freiheitslehre #ahgi2 ,grundzge der ,philosophie des ,nicolaus ,cusanus1 #ahhj-ha2 and ,ueber die gegenwrtige ,lage der deutschen ,philosophie1 #ahij 7inaugural address at ,erlangen74 ,since #ahhd-e ,professor ,falckenberg has also been an editor of the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie und philosophische ,kritik1 until #ahhh in association with ,krohn1 and after the latter's death1 alone4 ,at present he has in hand a treatise on ,lotze for a ,german series analogous to ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 which is to be issued under his direction4 ,professor ,falckenberg's general philosophical position may be described as that of moderate idealism4 ,his historical method is strictly objective1 the aim being a free reproduction of the systems discussed1 as far as possible in their original terminology and historical connection1 and without the intrusion of personal criticism4 ,the translation has been made from the second ,german edition 7#ahib71 with still later additions and corrections communicated by the author in manuscript4 ,the translator has followed the original faithfully but not slavishly4 ,he has not felt free to modify ,professor ,falckenberg's expositions1 even in the rare cases where his own opinions would have led him to dissent1 but minor changes have been made wherever needed to fit the book for the use of ,english-speaking students4 ,thus a few alterations have been made in dates and titles1 chiefly under the ,english systems and from the latest authorities2 and a few notes added in elucidation of portions of the text4 ,thus again the balance of the bibliography has been somewhat changed1 including transfers from text to notes and vice versa and a few omissions1 besides the introduction of a number of titles from our ,english philosophical literature chosen on the plan referred to in the preface to the first ,german edition4 ,the glossary of terms foreign to the ,german reader has been replaced by a revision and expansion of the index1 with the analyses of the glossary as a basis4 ,wherever possible1 and this has been true in all important cases1 the changes have been indicated by the usual signs4 ,the translator has further rewritten ,chapter ,,xv41 ,section #c1 on recent ,british and ,american ,philosophy4 ,in this so much of the author's 7historical7 standpoint and treatment as proved compatible with the aim of a manual in ,english has been retained1 but the section as a whole has been rearranged and much enlarged4 ,the labor of translation has been lightened by the example of previous writers1 especially of the translators of the standard treatises of ,ueberweg and ,erdmann4 ,the thanks of the translator are also due to several friends who have kindly aided him by advice or assistance3 in particular to his friend and former pupil1 ,mr4 ,c4,m4 ,child1 ,m4,s41 who participated in the preparation of a portion of the translation2 and above all to ,professor ,falckenberg himself1 who1 by his willing sanction of the work and his co-operation throughout its progress1 has given a striking example of scholarly courtesy4 ,a4,c4,a41 ,jr4 ,wesleyan ,university1 ,june1 #ahic4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,german ,,edition4 ,since the appearance of ,eduard ,zeller's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der griechischen ,philosophie 7#ahhc2 #c;d ed4 #ahhi7 the need has become even more apparent than before for a presentation of the history of modern philosophy which should be correspondingly compact and correspondingly available for purposes of instruction4 ,it would have been an ambitious undertaking to attempt to supply a counterpart to the compendium of this honored scholar1 with its clear and simple summation of the results of his much admired five volumes on ,greek philosophy2 and it has been only in regard to practical utility and careful consideration of the needs of students--concerning which we have enjoyed opportunity for gaining accurate information in the review exercises regularly held in this university--that we have ventured to hope that we might not fall too far short of his example4 ,the predominantly practical aim of this ,history--it is intended to serve as an aid in introductory work1 in reviewing1 and as a substitute for dictations in academical lectures1 as well as to be a guide for the wider circle of cultivated readers--has enjoined self-restraint in the development of personal views and the limitation of critical reflections in favor of objective presentation4 ,it is only now and then that critical hints have been given4 ,in the discussion of phenomena of minor importance it has been impossible to avoid the oratio obliqua of exposition2 but1 wherever practicable1 we have let the philosophers themselves develop their doctrines and reasons1 not so much by literal quotations from their works1 as by free1 condensed reproductions of their leading ideas4 ,if the principiant view of the forces which control the history of philosophy1 and of the progress of modern philosophy1 expressed in the ,introduction and in the ,retrospect at the end of the book1 have not been everywhere verified in detail from the historical facts1 this is due in part to the limits1 in part to the pedagogical aim1 of the work4 ,thus1 in particular1 more space has for pedagogical reasons been devoted to the psychological explanation of systems1 as being more popular1 than in our opinion its intrinsic importance would entitle it to demand4 ,to satisfy every one in the choice of subjects and in the extent of the discussion is impossible2 but our hope is that those who would have preferred a guide of this sort to be entirely different will not prove too numerous4 ,in the classification of movements and schools1 and in the arrangement of the contents of the various systems1 it has not been our aim to deviate at all hazards from previous accounts2 and as little to leave unutilized the benefits accruing to later comers from the distinguished achievements of earlier workers in the field4 ,in particular we acknowledge with gratitude the assistance derived from the renewed study of the works on the subject by ,kuno ,fischer1 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann1 ,zeller1 ,windelband1 ,ueberweg-,heinze1 ,harms1 ,lange1 ,vorlnder1 and ,pnjer4 ,the motive which induced us to take up the present work was the perception that there was lacking a text-book in the history of modern philosophy1 which1 more comprehensive1 thorough1 and precise than the sketches of ,schwegler and his successors1 should stand between the fine but detailed exposition of ,windelband1 and the substantial but--because of the division of the text into paragraphs and notes and the interpolation of pages of bibliographical references--rather dry outline of ,ueberweg4 ,while the former refrains from all references to the literature of the subject and the latter includes far too many1 at least for purposes of instruction1 and ,j4,b4 ,meyer's ,leitfaden 7#ahhb7 is in general confined to biographical and bibliographical notices2 we have mentioned1 in the text or the notes and with the greatest possible regard for the progress of the exposition1 both the chief works of the philosophers themselves and some of the treatises concerning them4 ,the principles which have guided us in these selections--to include only the more valuable works and those best adapted for students' reading1 and further to refer as far as possible to the most recent works--will hardly be in danger of criticism4 ,but we shall not dispute the probability that many a book worthy of mention may have been overlooked4 ,the explanation of a number of philosophical terms1 which has been added as an appendix at the suggestion of the publishers1 deals almost entirely with foreign expressions and gives the preference to the designations of fundamental movements4 ,it is arranged1 as far as possible1 so that it may be used as a subject-index4 ,,jena1 ,december #bc1 #ahhe4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,german ,,edition4 ,the majority of the alterations and additions in this new edition are in the first chapter and the last two2 no departure from the general character of the exposition has seemed to me necessary4 ,i desire to return my sincere thanks for the suggestions which have come to me alike from public critiques and private communications4 ,in some cases contradictory requests have conflicted--thus1 on the one hand1 ,i have been urged to expand1 on the other1 to cut down the sections on ,german idealism1 especially those on ,hegel--and here ,i confess my inability to meet both demands4 ,among the reviews1 that by ,b4 ,erdmann in the first volume of the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 and1 among the suggestions made by letter1 those of ,h4 ,heussler1 have been of especial value4 ,since others commonly see defects more clearly than one's self1 it will be very welcome if ,i can have my desire continually to make this ,history more useful supported by farther suggestions from the circle of its readers4 ,in case it continues to enjoy the favor of teachers and students1 these will receive conscientious consideration4 ,for the sake of those who may complain of too much matter1 ,i may remark that the difficulty can easily be avoided by passing over ,chapters ,i41 ,v4 7 #a-c71 ,,vi41 ,,viii41 ,,xii41 ,,xv41 and ,,xvi4 ,professor ,a4,c4 ,armstrong1 ,jr41 is preparing an ,english translation4 ,my earnest thanks are due to ,mr4 ,karl ,niemann of ,charlottenburg for his kind participation in the labor of proof-reading4 ,r4,f4 ,,erlangen1 ,june #aa1 #ahib4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,contents4 ,,introduction ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,period ,,of ,,transition3 ,,from ,,nicolas ,,of ,,cusa ,,to ,,descartes #a4 ,nicolas of ,cusa #b4 ,the ,revival of ,ancient ,philosophy and the ,opposition to it #c4 ,the ,italian ,philosophy of ,nature #d4 ,philosophy of the ,state and of ,law #e4 ,skepticism in ,france #f4 ,german ,mysticism #g4 ,the ,foundation of ,modern ,physics #h4 ,philosophy in ,england to the ,middle of the ,seventeenth ,century 7a7 ,bacon's ,predecessors 7b7 ,bacon 7c7 ,hobbes 7d7 ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury #i4 ,preliminary ,survey ,,part ,i4 ,from ,descartes to ,kant4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,descartes #a4 ,the ,principles #b4 ,nature #c4 ,man ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,development ,,and ,,transformation ,,of ,,cartesianism ,,in ,,the ,,netherlands ,,and ,,in ,,france #a4 ,occasionalism3 ,geulincx #b4 ,spinoza 7a7 ,substance1 ,attributes1 and ,modes 7b7 ,anthropology2 ,cognition and the ,passions 7c7 ,practical ,philosophy #c4 ,pascal1 ,malebranche1 ,bayle ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,locke 7a7 ,theory of ,knowledge 7b7 ,practical ,philosophy ,,chapter ,v4 ,,english ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century #a4 ,natural ,philosophy and ,psychology #b4 ,deism #c4 ,moral ,philosophy #d4 ,theory of ,knowledge 7a7 ,berkeley 7b7 ,hume 7c7 ,the ,scottish ,school ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,french ,,illumination #a4 ,the ,entrance of ,english ,doctrines #b4 ,theoretical and ,practical ,sensationalism #c4 ,skepticism and ,materialism #d4 ,rousseau's ,conflict with the ,illumination ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,leibnitz #a4 ,metaphysics3 the ,monads1 ,representation1 the ,pre-established ,harmony2 the ,laws of ,thought and of the ,world #b4 ,the ,organic ,world #c4 ,man3 ,cognition and ,volition #d4 ,theology and ,theodicy ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,german ,,illumination #a4 ,the ,contemporaries of ,leibnitz #b4 ,christian ,wolff #c4 ,the ,illumination as ,scientific and as ,popular ,philosophy #d4 ,the ,faith ,philosophy ,,part ,,ii4 ,from ,kant to the ,present ,time4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,kant #a4 ,theory of ,knowledge 7a7 ,the ,pure ,intuitions 7,transcendental ,aesthetic7 7b7 ,the ,concepts and ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding 7,transcendental ,analytic7 7c7 ,the ,reason's ,ideas of the ,unconditioned 7,transcendental ,dialectic7 #b4 ,theory of ,ethics #c4 ,theory of the ,beautiful and of ,ends in ,nature 7a7 ,aesthetic ,judgment 7b7 ,teleological ,judgment #d4 ,from ,kant to ,fichte ,,chapter ,x4 ,,fichte #a4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge 7a7 ,the ,problem 7b7 ,the ,three ,principles 7c7 ,the ,theoretical ,ego 7d7 ,the ,practical ,ego #b4 ,the ,science of ,ethics and of ,right #c4 ,fichte's ,second ,period3 his ,view of ,history and his ,theory of ,religion ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,schelling #a;a4 ,philosophy of ,nature #a;b4 ,transcendental ,philosophy #b4 ,system of ,identity #c;a4 ,doctrine of ,freedom #c;b4 ,philosophy of ,mythology and ,revelation ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,schelling',s ,,co-,,workers #a4 ,the ,philosophers of ,nature #b4 ,the ,philosophers of ,identity 7,f4 ,krause7 #c4 ,the ,philosophers of ,religion 7,baader and ,schleiermacher7 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,hegel #a4 ,hegel's ,view of the ,world and his ,method #b4 ,the ,system 7a7 ,logic 7b7 ,the ,philosophy of ,nature 7c7 ,the ,doctrine of ,subjective ,spirit 7d7 ,the ,doctrine of ,objective ,spirit 7e7 ,absolute ,spirit ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,the ,,opposition ,,to ,,constructive ,,idealism3 ,,fries1 ,,herbart1 ,,schopenhauer #a4 ,the ,psychologists3 ,fries and ,beneke #b4 ,realism3 ,herbart #c4 ,pessimism3 ,schopenhauer ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,philosophy ,,out ,,of ,,germany #a4 ,italy #b4 ,france #c4 ,great ,britain and ,america #d4 ,sweden1 ,norway1 ,denmark1 and ,holland ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,german ,,philosophy ,,since ,,the ,,death ,,of ,,hegel #a4 ,from the ,division of the ,hegelian ,school to the ,materialistic ,controversy #b4 ,new ,systems3 ,trendelenburg1 ,fechner1 ,lotze1 and ,hartmann #c4 ,from the ,revival of the ,kantian ,philosophy to the ,present ,time 7a7 ,neo-,kantianism1 ,positivism1 and ,kindred ,phenomena 7b7 ,idealistic ,reaction against the ,scientific ,spirit 7c7 ,the ,special ,philosophical ,sciences #d4 ,retrospect ,,index 99 99 99 99 99 ,,introduction4 ,in no other department is a thorough knowledge of history so important as in philosophy4 ,like historical science in general1 philosophy is1 on the one hand1 in touch with exact inquiry1 while1 on the other1 it has a certain relationship with art4 ,with the former it has in common its methodical procedure and its cognitive aim2 with the latter1 its intuitive character and the endeavor to compass the whole of reality with a glance4 ,metaphysical principles are less easily verified from experience than physical hypotheses1 but also less easily refuted4 ,systems of philosophy1 therefore1 are not so dependent on our progressive knowledge of facts as the theories of natural science1 and change less quickly2 notwithstanding their mutual conflicts1 and in spite of the talk about discarded standpoints1 they possess in a measure the permanence of classical works of art1 they retain for all time a certain relative validity4 ,the thought of ,plato1 of ,aristotle1 and of the heroes of modern philosophy is ever proving anew its fructifying power4 ,nowhere do we find such instructive errors as in the sphere of philosophy2 nowhere is the new so essentially a completion and development of the old1 even though it deem itself the whole and assume a hostile attitude toward its predecessors2 nowhere is the inquiry so much more important than the final result2 nowhere the categories true and false so inadequate4 ,the spirit of the time and the spirit of the people1 the individuality of the thinker1 disposition1 will1 fancy--all these exert a far stronger influence on the development of philosophy1 both by way of promotion and by way of hindrance1 than in any other department of thought4 ,if a system gives classical expression to the thought of an epoch1 a nation1 or a great personality2 if it seeks to attack the world-riddle from a new direction1 or brings us nearer its solution by important original conceptions1 by a subtler or a simpler comprehension of the problem1 by a wider outlook or a deeper insight2 it has accomplished more than it could have done by bringing forward a number of indisputably correct principles4 ,the variations in philosophy1 which1 on the assumption of the unity of truth1 are a rock of offense to many minds1 may be explained1 on the one hand1 by the combination of complex variety and limitation in the motives which govern philosophical thought1--for it is the whole man that philosophizes1 not his understanding merely1--and1 on the other1 by the inexhaustible extent of the field of philosophy4 ,back of the logical labor of proof and inference stand1 as inciting1 guiding1 and hindering agents1 psychical and historical forces1 which are themselves in large measure alogical1 though stronger than all logic2 while just before stretches away the immeasurable domain of reality1 at once inviting and resisting conquest4 ,the grave contradictions1 so numerous in both the subjective and the objective fields1 make unanimity impossible concerning ultimate problems2 in fact1 they render it difficult for the individual thinker to combine his convictions into a self-consistent system4 ,each philosopher sees limited sections of the world only1 and these through his own eyes2 every system is one-sided4 ,yet it is this multiplicity and variety of systems alone which makes the aim of philosophy practicable as it endeavors to give a complete picture of the soul and of the universe4 ,the history of philosophy is the philosophy of humanity1 that great individual1 which1 with more extended vision than the instruments through which it works1 is able to entertain opposing principles1 and which1 reconciling old contradictions as it discovers new ones1 approaches by a necessary and certain growth the knowledge of the one all-embracing truth1 which is rich and varied beyond our conception4 ,in order to energetic labor in the further progress of philosophy1 it is necessary to imagine that the goddess of truth is about to lift the veil which has for centuries concealed her4 ,the historian of philosophy1 on the contrary1 looks on each new system as a stone1 which1 when shaped and fitted into its place1 will help to raise higher the pyramid of knowledge4 ,hegel's doctrine of the necessity and motive force of contradictories1 of the relative justification of standpoints1 and the systematic development of speculation1 has great and permanent value as a general point of view4 ,it needs only to be guarded from narrow scholastic application to become a safe canon for the historical treatment of philosophy4 ,in speaking above of the worth of the philosophical doctrines of the past as defying time1 and as comparable to the standard character of finished works of art1 the special reference was to those elements in speculation which proceed less from abstract thinking than from the fancy1 the heart1 and the character of the individual1 and even more directly from the disposition of the people2 and which to a certain degree may be divorced from logical reasoning and the scientific treatment of particular questions4 ,these may be summed up under the phrase1 views of the world4 ,the necessity for constant reconsideration of them is from this standpoint at once evident4 ,the ,greek view of the world is as classic as the plastic art of ,phidias and the epic of ,homer2 the ,christian1 as eternally valid as the architecture of the ,middle ,ages2 the modern1 as irrefutable as ,goethe's poetry and the music of ,beethoven4 ,the views of the world which proceed from the spirits of different ages1 as products of the general development of culture1 are not so much thoughts as rhythms in thinking1 not theories but modes of intuition saturated with feelings of worth4 ,we may dispute about them1 it is true2 we may argue against them or in their defense2 but they can neither be established nor overthrown by cogent proofs4 ,it is not only optimism and pessimism1 determinism and indeterminism1 that have their ultimate roots in the affective side of our nature1 but pantheism and individualism1 also idealism and materialism1 even rationalism and sensationalism4 ,even though they operate with the instruments of thought1 they remain in the last analysis matters of faith1 of feeling1 and of resolution4 ,the aesthetic view of the world held by the ,greeks1 the transcendental-religious view of ,christianity1 the intellectual view of ,leibnitz and ,hegel1 the panthelistic views of ,fichte ,i and ,schopenhauer are vital forces1 not doctrines1 postulates1 not results of thought4 ,one view of the world is forced to yield its pre-eminence to another1 which it has itself helped to produce by its own one-sidedness2 only to reconquer its opponent later1 when it has learned from her1 when it has been purified1 corrected1 and deepened by the struggle4 ,but the elder contestant is no more confuted by the younger than the drama of ,sophocles by the drama of ,shakespeare1 than youth by age or spring by autumn4 ,if it is thus indubitable that the views of the world held in earlier times deserve to live on in the memory of man1 and to live as something better than mere reminders of the past--the history of philosophy is not a cabinet of antiquities1 but a museum of typical products of the mind--the value and interest of the historical study of the past in relation to the exact scientific side of philosophical inquiry is not less evident4 ,in every science it is useful to trace the origin and growth of problems and theories1 and doubly so in philosophy4 ,with her it is by no means the universal rule that progress shows itself by the result2 the statement of the question is often more important than the answer4 ,the problem is more sharply defined in a given direction2 or it becomes more comprehensive1 is analyzed and refined2 or if now it threatens to break up into subtle details1 some genius appears to simplify it and force our thoughts back to the fundamental question4 ,this advance in problems1 which happily is everywhere manifested by unmistakable signs1 is1 in the case of many of the questions which irresistibly force themselves upon the human heart1 the only certain gain from centuries of endeavor4 ,the labor here is of more value than the result4 ,in treating the history of philosophy1 two extremes must be avoided1 lawless individualism and abstract logical formalism4 ,the history of philosophy is neither a disconnected succession of arbitrary individual opinions and clever guesses1 nor a mechanically developed series of typical standpoints and problems1 which imply one another in just the form and order historically assumed4 ,the former supposition does violence to the regularity of philosophical development1 the latter to its vitality4 ,in the one case1 the connection is conceived too loosely1 in the other1 too rigidly and simply4 ,one view underestimates the power of the logical ,idea1 the other overestimates it4 ,it is not easy to support the principle that chance rules the destiny of philosophy1 but it is more difficult to avoid the opposite conviction of the one-sidedness of formalistic construction1 and to define the nature and limits of philosophical necessity4 ,the development of philosophy is1 perhaps1 one chief aim of the world-process1 but it is certainly not the only one2 it is a part of the universal aim1 and it is not surprising that the instruments of its realization do not work exclusively in its behalf1 that their activity brings about results1 which seem unessential for philosophical ends or obstacles in their way4 ,philosophical ideas do not think themselves1 but are thought by living spirits1 which are something other and better than mere thought machines--by spirits who live these thoughts1 who fill them with personal warmth and passionately defend them4 ,there is often reason1 no doubt1 for the complaint that the personality which has undertaken to develop some great idea is inadequate to the task1 that it carries its subjective defects into the matter in hand1 that it does too much or too little1 or the right thing in the wrong way1 so that the spirit of philosophy seems to have erred in the choice and the preparation of its instrument4 ,but the reverse side of the picture must also be taken into account4 ,the thinking spirit is more limited1 it is true1 than were desirable for the perfect execution of a definite logical task2 but1 on the other hand1 it is far too rich as well4 ,a soulless play of concepts would certainly not help the cause1 and there is no disadvantage in the failure of the history of philosophy to proceed so directly and so scholastically1 as1 for instance1 in the system of ,hegel4 ,a graded series of interconnected general forces mediate between the logical ,idea and the individual thinker--the spirit of the people1 of the age1 of the thinker's vocation1 of his time of life1 which are felt by the individual as part of himself and whose impulses he unconsciously obeys4 ,in this way the modifying1 furthering1 hindering correlation of higher and lower1 of the ruler with his commands and the servant with his more or less willing obedience1 is twice repeated1 the situation being complicated further by the fact that the subject affected by these historical forces himself helps to make history4 ,the most important factor in philosophical progress is1 of course1 the state of inquiry at the time1 the achievements of the thinkers of the immediately preceding age2 and in this relation of a philosopher to his predecessors1 again1 a distinction must be made between a logical and a psychological element4 ,the successor often commences his support1 his development1 or his refutation at a point quite unwelcome to the constructive historian4 ,at all events1 if we may judge from the experience of the past1 too much caution cannot be exercised in setting up formal laws for the development of thought4 ,according to the law of contradiction and reconciliation1 a ,schopenhauer must have followed directly after ,leibnitz1 to oppose his pessimistic ethelism to the optimistic intellectualism of the latter2 when1 in turn1 a ,schleiermacher1 to give an harmonic resolution of the antithesis into a concrete doctrine of feeling1 would have made a fine third4 ,but it turned out otherwise1 and we must be content4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the estimate of the value of the history of philosophy in general1 given at the start1 is the more true of the history of modern philosophy1 since the movement introduced by the latter still goes on unfinished4 ,we are still at work on the problems which were brought forward by ,descartes1 ,locke1 and ,leibnitz1 and which ,kant gathered up into the critical or transcendental question4 ,the present continues to be governed by the ideal of culture which ,bacon proposed and ,fichte exalted to a higher level2 we all live under the unweakened spell of that view of the world which was developed in hostile opposition to ,scholasticism1 and through the enduring influence of those mighty geographical and scientific discoveries and religious reforms which marked the entrance of the modern period4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that the transition brought about by ,kant's notical and ethical revolution was of great significance1--more significant even than the ,socratic period1 with which we are fond of comparing it2 much that was new was woven on1 much of the old1 weakened1 broken1 destroyed4 ,and yet1 if we take into account the historical after-influence of ,cartesianism1 we shall find that the thread was only knotted and twisted by ,kantianism1 not cut through4 ,the continued power of the pre-,kantian modes of thought is shown by the fact that ,spinoza has been revived in ,fichte and ,schelling1 ,leibnitz in ,herbart and ,hegel1 the sensationalism of the ,french ,illuminati in ,feuerbach2 and that even materialism1 which had been struck down by the criticism of the reason 7one would have thought forever71 has again raised its head4 ,even that most narrow tendency of the early philosophy of the modern period1 the apotheosis of cognition is1--in spite of the moralistic counter-movement of ,kant and ,fichte1--the controlling motive in the last of the great idealistic systems1 while it also continues to exercise a marvelously powerful influence on the convictions of our ,hegel-weary age1 alike within the sphere of philosophy and 7still more7 without it4 ,in view of the intimate relations between contemporary inquiry and the progress of thought since the beginning of the modern period1 acquaintance with the latter1 which it is the aim of this ,history to facilitate1 becomes a pressing duty4 ,to study the history of philosophy since ,descartes is to study the pre-conditions of contemporary philosophy4 ,we begin with an outline sketch of the general characteristics of modern philosophy4 ,these may be most conveniently described by comparing them with the characteristics of ancient and of mediaeval philosophy4 ,the character of ancient philosophy or ,greek philosophy1--for they are practically the same1--is predominantly aesthetic4 ,the ,greek holds beauty and truth closely akin and inseparable2 cosmos is his common expression for the world and for ornament4 ,the universe is for him a harmony1 an organism1 a work of art1 before which he stands in admiration and reverential awe4 ,in quiet contemplation1 as with the eye of a connoisseur1 he looks upon the world or the individual object as a well-ordered whole1 more disposed to enjoy the congruity of its parts than to study out its ultimate elements4 ,he prefers contemplation to analysis1 his thought is plastic1 not anatomical4 ,he finds the nature of the object in its form2 and ends give him the key to the comprehension of events4 ,discovering human elements everywhere1 he is always ready with judgments of worth--the stars move in circles because circular motion is the most perfect2 the right is better than left1 upper finer than lower1 that which precedes more beautiful than that which follows4 ,thinkers in whom this aesthetic reverence is weaker than the analytic impulse--especially ,democritus--seem half modern rather than ,greek4 ,by the side of the ,greek philosophy1 in its sacred festal garb1 stands the modern in secular workday dress1 in the laborer's blouse1 with the merciless chisel of analysis in its hand4 ,this does not seek beauty1 but only the naked truth1 no matter what it be4 ,it holds it impossible to satisfy at once the understanding and taste2 nay1 nakedness1 ugliness1 and offensiveness seem to it to testify for1 rather than against1 the genuineness of truth4 ,in its anxiety not to read human elements into nature1 it goes so far as completely to read spirit out of nature4 ,the world is not a living whole1 but a machine2 not a work of art which is to be viewed in its totality and enjoyed with reverence1 but a clock-movement to be taken apart in order to be understood4 ,nowhere are there ends in the world1 but everywhere mechanical causes4 ,the character of modern thought would appear to a ,greek returned to earth very sober1 unsplendid1 undevout1 and intrusive4 ,and1 in fact1 modern philosophy has a considerable amount of prose about it1 is not easily impressed1 accepts no limitations from feeling1 and holds nothing too sacred to be attacked with the weapon of analytic thought4 ,and yet it combines penetration with intrusiveness2 acuteness1 coolness1 and logical courage with its soberness4 ,never before has the demand for unprejudiced thought and certain knowledge been made with equal earnestness4 ,this interest in knowledge for its own sake developed so suddenly and with such strength that1 in presumptuous gladness1 men believed that no previous age had rightly understood what truth and love for truth are4 ,the natural consequence was a general overestimation of cognition at the expense of all other mental activities4 ,even among the ,greek thinkers1 thought was held by the majority to be the noblest and most divine function4 ,but their intellectualism was checked by the aesthetic and eudaemonistic element1 and preserved from the one-sidedness which it manifests in the modern period1 because of the lack of an effective counterpoise4 ,however eloquently ,bacon commends the advantages to be derived from the conquest of nature1 he still understands inquiry for inquiry's sake1 and honors it as supreme2 even the ethelistic philosophers1 ,fichte and ,schopenhauer1 pay their tribute to the prejudice in favor of intellectualism4 ,the fact that the modern period can show no one philosophic writer of the literary rank of ,plato1 even though it includes such masters of style as ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,schopenhauer1 and ,lotze1 not to speak of lesser names1 is an external proof of how noticeably the aesthetic impulse has given way to one purely intellectual4 ,when we turn to the character of mediaeval thinking2 we find1 instead of the aesthetic views of antiquity and the purely scientific tendency of the modern era1 a distinctively religious spirit4 ,faith prescribes the objects and the limitations of knowledge2 everything is referred to the hereafter1 thought becomes prayer4 ,men speculate concerning the attributes of ,god1 on the number and rank of the angels1 on the immortality of man--all purely transcendental subjects4 ,side by side with these1 it is true1 the world receives loving attention1 but always as the lower story merely1#a above which1 with its own laws1 rises the true fatherland1 the kingdom of grace4 ,the most subtle acuteness is employed in the service of dogma1 with the task of fathoming the how and why of things whose existence is certified elsewhere4 ,the result is a formalism in thought side by side with profound and fervent mysticism4 ,doubt and trust are strangely intermingled1 and a feeling of expectation stirs all hearts4 ,on the one side stands sinful1 erring man1 who1 try as hard as he may1 only half unravels the mysteries of revealed truth2 on the other1 the ,god of grace1 who1 after our death1 will reveal himself to us as clearly as ,adam knew him before the fall4 ,god alone1 however1 can comprehend himself--for the finite spirit1 even truth unveiled is mystery1 and ecstasy1 unresisting devotion to the incomprehensible1 the culmination of knowledge4 ,in mediaeval philosophy the subject looks longingly upward to the infinite object of his thought1 expecting that the latter will bend down toward him or lift him upward toward itself2 in ,greek philosophy the spirit confronts its object1 the world1 on a footing of equality2 in modern philosophy the speculative subject feels himself higher than the object1 superior to nature4 ,in the conception of the ,middle ,ages1 truth and mystery are identical2 to antiquity they appear reconcilable2 modern thought holds them as mutually exclusively as light and darkness4 ,the unknown is the enemy of knowledge1 which must be chased out of its last hiding-place4 ,it is1 therefore1 easy to understand that the modern period stands in far sharper antithesis to the mediaeval era than to the ancient1 for the latter has furnished it many principles which can be used as weapons against the former4 ,grandparents and grandchildren make good friends4 ,footnote #a3 ,on the separation and union of the three worlds1 natura1 gratia1 gloria1 in ,thomas ,aquinas1 cf4 ,rudolph ,eucken1 ,die ,philosophie des ,thomas von ,aquino und die ,kultur der ,neuzeit1 ,halle4 #ahhf4 ,when a new movement is in preparation1 but there is a lack of creative force to give it form1 a period of tumultuous disaffection with existing principles ensues4 ,what is wanted is not clearly perceived1 but there is a lively sense of that which is not wanted4 ,dissatisfaction prepares a place for that which is to come by undermining the existent and making it ripe for its fall4 ,the old1 the outgrown1 the doctrine which had become inadequate1 was in this case ,scholasticism2 modern philosophy shows throughout--and most clearly at the start--an anti-,scholastic character4 ,if up to this time ,church dogma had ruled unchallenged in spiritual affairs1 and the ,aristotelian philosophy in things temporal1 war is now declared against authority of every sort and freedom of thought is inscribed on the banner4#a ,modern philosophy is ,protestantism in the sphere of the thinking spirit 7,erdmann74 ,not that which has been considered true for centuries1 not that which another says1 though he be ,aristotle or ,thomas ,aquinas1 not that which flatters the desires of the heart1 is true1 but that only which is demonstrated to my own understanding with convincing force4 ,philosophy is no longer willing to be the handmaid of theology1 but must set up a house of her own4 ,the watchword now becomes freedom and independent thought1 deliverance from every form of constraint1 alike from the bondage of ecclesiastical decrees and the inner servitude of prejudice and cherished inclinations4 ,but the adoption of a purpose leads to the consideration of the means for attaining it4 ,thus the thirst for knowledge raises questions concerning the method1 the instruments1 and the limits of knowledge2 the interest in notics and methodology vigorously develops1 remains a constant factor in modern inquiry1 and culminates in ,kant1 not again to die away4 ,footnote #a3 ,the doctrine of twofold truth1 under whose protecting cloak the new liberal movements had hitherto taken refuge1 was now disdainfully repudiated4 ,cf4 ,freudenthal1 ,zur ,beurtheilung der ,scholastik1 in vol4 iii4 of the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahij4 ,also1 ,h4 ,reuter1 ,geschichte der religisen ,aufklrung im ,mittelalter #ahge-gg2 and ,dilthey1 ,einleitung in die ,geisteswissenschaften1 #ahhc4 ,this negative aspect of modern tendencies needs1 however1 a positive supplement4 ,the mediaeval mode of thought is discarded and the new one is not yet found4 ,what can more fittingly furnish a support1 a preliminary substitute1 than antiquity8 ,thus philosophy1 also1 joins in that great stream of culture1 the ,renaissance and humanism1 which1 starting from ,italy1 poured forth over the whole civilized world4 ,plato and ,neoplatonism1 ,epicurus and the ,stoa are opposed to ,scholasticism1 the real ,aristotle to the transformed ,aristotle of the ,church and the distorted ,aristotle of the schools4 ,back to the sources1 is the cry4 ,with the revival of the ancient languages and ancient books1 the spirit of antiquity is also revived4 ,the dust of the schools and the tyranny of the ,church are thrown off1 and the classical ideal of a free and noble humanity gains enthusiastic adherents4 ,the man is not to be forgotten in the ,christian1 nor art and science1 the rights and the riches of individuality in the interest of piety2 work for the future must not blind us to the demands of the present nor lead us to neglect the comprehensive cultivation of the natural capacities of the spirit4 ,the world and man are no longer viewed through ,christian eyes1 the one as a realm of darkness and the other as a vessel of weakness and wrath1 but nature and life gleam before the new generation in joyous1 hopeful light4 ,humanism and optimism have always been allied4 ,this change in the spirit of thought is accompanied by a corresponding change in the object of thought3 theology must yield its supremacy to the knowledge of nature4 ,weary of ,christological and soteriological questions1 weary of disputes concerning the angels1 the thinking spirit longs to make himself at home in the world it has learned to love1 demands real knowledge1--knowledge which is of practical utility1--and no longer seeks ,god outside the world1 but in it and above it4 ,nature becomes the home1 the body of ,god4 ,transcendence gives place to immanence1 not only in theology1 but elsewhere4 ,modern philosophy is naturalistic in spirit1 not only because it takes nature for its favorite object1 but also because it carries into other branches of knowledge the mathematical method so successful in natural science1 because it considers everything sub ratione naturae and insists on the natural explanation of all phenomena1 even those of ethics and politics4 ,in a word1 the tendency of modern philosophy is anti-,scholastic1 humanistic1 and naturalistic4 ,this summary must suffice for preliminary orientation1 while the detailed division1 particularization1 modification1 and limitation of these general points must be left for later treatment4 ,two further facts1 however1 may receive preliminary notice4 ,the indifference and hostility to the ,church which have been cited among the prominent characteristics of modern philosophy1 do not necessarily mean enmity to the ,christian religion1 much less to religion in general4 ,in part1 it is merely a change in the object of religious feeling1 which blazes up especially strong and enthusiastic in the philosophy of the sixteenth century1 as it transfers its worship from a transcendent deity to a universe indued with a soul2 in part1 the opposition is directed against the mediaeval1 ecclesiastical form of ,christianity1 with its monastic abandonment of the world4 ,it was often nothing but a very deep and strong religious feeling that led thinkers into the conflict with the hierarchy4 ,since the elements of permanent worth in the tendencies1 doctrines1 and institutions of the ,middle ,ages are thus culled out from that which is corrupt and effete1 and preserved by incorporation into the new view of the world and the new science1 and as fruitful elements from antiquity enter with them1 the progress of philosophy shows a continuous enrichment in its ideas1 intuitions1 and spirit4 ,the old is not simply discarded and destroyed1 but purified1 transformed1 and assimilated4 ,the same fact forces itself into notice if we consider the relations of nationality and philosophy in the three great eras4 ,the ,greek philosophy was entirely national in its origin and its public1 it was rooted in the character of the people and addressed itself to fellow-countrymen2 not until toward its decline1 and not until influenced by ,christianity1 were its cosmopolitan inclinations aroused4 ,the ,middle ,ages were indifferent to national distinctions1 as to everything earthly1 and naught was of value in comparison with man's transcendent destiny4 ,mediaeval philosophy is in its aims un-national1 cosmopolitan1 catholic2 it uses the ,latin of the schools1 it seeks adherents in every land1 it finds everywhere productive spirits whose labors in its service remain unaffected by their national peculiarities4 ,the modern period returns to the nationalism of antiquity1 but does not relinquish the advantage gained by the extension of mediaeval thought to the whole civilized world4 ,the roots of modern philosophy are sunk deep in the fruitful soil of nationality1 while the top of the tree spreads itself far beyond national limitations4 ,it is national and cosmopolitan together2 it is international as the common property of the various peoples1 which exchange their philosophical gifts through an active commerce of ideas4 ,latin is often retained for use abroad1 as the universal language of savants1 but many a work is first published in the mother-tongue--and thought in it4 ,thus it becomes possible for the ideas of the wise to gain an entrance into the consciousness of the people1 from whose spirit they have really sprung1 and to become a power beyond the circle of the learned public4 ,philosophy as illumination1 as a factor in general culture1 is an exclusively modern phenomenon4 ,in this speculative intercourse of nations1 however1 the ,french1 the ,english1 and the ,germans are most involved1 both as producers and consumers4 ,france gives the initiative 7in ,descartes71 then ,england assumes the leadership 7in ,locke71 with ,leibnitz and ,kant the hegemony passes over to ,germany4 ,besides these powers1 ,italy takes an eager part in the production of philosophical ideas in the period of ferment before ,descartes4 ,each of these nations contributes elements to the total result which it alone is in a position to furnish1 and each is rewarded by gifts in return which it would be incapable of producing out of its own store4 ,this international exchange of ideas1 in which each gives and each receives1 and the fact that the chief modern thinkers1 especially in the earlier half of the era1 prior to ,kant1 are in great part not philosophers by profession but soldiers1 statesmen1 physicians1 as well as natural scientists1 historians1 and priests1 give modern philosophy an unprofessional1 worldly appearance1 in striking contrast to the clerical character of mediaeval1 and the prophetic character of ancient thinking4 ,germany1 ,england1 and ,france claim the honor of having produced the first modern philosopher1 presenting ,nicolas of ,cusa1 ,bacon of ,verulam1 and ,ren ,descartes as their candidates1 while ,hobbes1 ,bruno1 and ,montaigne have received only scattered votes4 ,the claim of ,england is the weakest of all1 for1 without intending to diminish ,bacon's importance1 it may be said that the programme which he develops--and in essence his philosophy is nothing more--was1 in its leading principles1 not first announced by him1 and not carried out with sufficient consistency4 ,the dispute between the two remaining contestants may be easily and equitably settled by making the simple distinction between forerunner and beginner1 between path-breaker and founder4 ,the entrance of a new historical era is not accompanied by an audible click1 like the beginning of a new piece on a music-box1 but is gradually effected4 ,a considerable period may intervene between the point when the new movement flashes up1 not understood and half unconscious of itself1 and the time when it appears on the stage in full strength and maturity1 recognizing itself as new and so acknowledged by others3 the period of ferment between the ,middle ,ages and modern times lasted almost two centuries4 ,it is in the end little more than logomachy to discuss whether this time of anticipation and desire1 of endeavor and partial success1 in which the new struggles with the old without conquering it1 and the opposite tendencies in the conflicting views of the world interplay in a way at once obscure and wayward1 is to be classed as the epilogue of the old era or the prologue of the new4 ,the simple solution to take it as a transition period1 no longer mediaeval but not yet modern1 has met with fairly general acceptance4 ,nicolas of ,cusa 7#adja-fd7 was the first to announce fundamental principles of modern philosophy--he is the leader in this intermediate preparatory period4 ,descartes 7#aeif-afej7 brought forward the first system--he is the father of modern philosophy4 ,a brief survey of the literature may be added in conclusion3 ,heinrich ,ritter's ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie 7vols4 ix4-xii4 of his ,geschichte der ,philosophie71 #ahej-ec1 to ,wolff and ,rousseau1 has been superseded by more recent works1 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann's able ,versuch einer wissenschaftlichen ,darstellung der neueren ,philosophie 7#f vols41 #ahcd-ec7 gives in appendices literal excerpts from non-,german writers2 the same author's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie 7#b vols41 #ahfi2 #c;d ed41 #ahgh7 contains at the end the first exposition of ,german ,philosophy since the ,death of ,hegel ,english translation in #c vols41 edited by ,w4 ,s4 ,hough1 #ahij4--,,tr44 ,ueberweg's ,grundriss 7#gth ed4 by ,m4 ,heinze1 #ahhh7 is indispensable for reference on account of the completeness of its bibliographical notes1 which1 however1 are confusing to the beginner ,english translation by ,g4,s4 ,morris1 with additions by the translator1 ,noah ,porter1 and ,vincenzo ,botta1 ,new ,york1 #ahgb-gd4--,,tr44 ,the most detailed and brilliant exposition has been given by ,kuno ,fischer 7#ahed seq42 #c;d ed41 #ahgh seq42 the same author's ,baco und seine ,nachfolger1 #b;d ed41 #ahge1--;,english translation1 #aheg1 by ,oxenford1--supplements the first two volumes of the ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie74 ,this work1 which is important also as a literary achievement1 is better fitted than any other to make the reader at home in the ideal world of the great philosophers1 which it reconstructs from its central point1 and to prepare him for the study 7which1 of course1 even the best exposition cannot replace7 of the works of the thinkers themselves4 ,its excessive simplification of problems is not of great moment in the first introduction to a system ,english translation of vol4 iii4 book #b 7#ast ed471 ,a ,commentary on ,kant's ,critick of the ,pure ,reason1 by ,j4,p4 ,mahaffy1 ,london1 #ahff2 vol4 i4 part #a and part #b1 book #a1 ,descartes and his ,school1 by ,j1 ,p4 ,gordy1 ,new ,york1 #ahhg2 of vol4 v4 chaps1 i4-v41 ,a ,critique of ,kant1 by ,w4,s4 ,hough1 ,london1 #ahhh4--,,tr44 ,wilhelm ,windelband 7,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 #b vols41 #ahgh and #ahhj1 to ,hegel and ,herbart inclusive7 accentuates the connection of philosophy with general culture and the particular sciences1 and emphasizes philosophical method4 ,this work is pleasant reading1 yet1 in the interest of clearness1 we could wish that the author had given more of positive information concerning the content of the doctrines treated1 instead of merely advancing reflections on them4 ,a projected third volume is to trace the development of philosophy down to the present time4 ,windelband's compendium1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahij-ia1 is distinguished from other expositions by the fact that1 for the most part1 it confines itself to a history of problems4 ,baumann's ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahij1 aims to give a detailed account of those thinkers only who have advanced views individual either in their content or in their proof4 ,eduard ,zeller has given his ,geschichte der deutschen ,philosophie seit ,leibniz 7#ahgc2 #b;d ed41 #ahge7 the benefit of the same thorough and comprehensive knowledge and mature judgment which have made his ,philosophie der ,griechen a classic4 ,bowen's ,modern ,philosophy1 ,new ,york1 #aheg 7#fth ed41 #ahia72 ,royce's ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy1 #ahib4--,,tr4 ,eugen ,dhring's hypercritical ,kritische ,geschichte der ,philosophie 7#ahfi2 #c;d ed41 #ahgh7 can hardly be recommended to students4 ,lewes 7,german translation1 #ahgf7 assumes a positivistic standpoint2 ,thilo 7#ahgd71 a position exclusively ,herbartian2 ,a4 ,stoeckl 7#c;d ed41 #ahhi7 writes from the standpoint of confessional ,catholicism2 ,vincenz ,knauer 7#b;d ed41 #ahhb7 is a ,gntherian4 ,with the philosophico-historical work of ,chr4 ,w4 ,sigwart 7#ahed71 and one of the same date by ,oischinger1 we are not intimately acquainted4 ,expositions of philosophy since ,kant have been given by the ,hegelian1 ,c4,l4 ,michelet 7a larger one in #b vols41 #ahcg-ch1 and a smaller one1 #ahdc72 by ,chalybaeus 7#ahcg2 #eth ed41 #ahfj1 formerly very popular and worthy of it1 ,english1 #ahed72 by ,fr4 ,k4 ,biedermann 7#ahdb-dc72 by ,carl ,fortlage 7#aheb1 ,kantio-,fichtean standpoint72 and by ,friedrich ,harms 7#ahgf74 ,the last of these writers unfortunately did not succeed in giving a sufficiently clear and precise1 not to say tasteful1 form to the valuable ideas and original conceptions in which his work is rich4 ,the very popular exposition by an anonymous author of ,hegelian tendencies1 ,deutschlands ,denker seit ,kant 7,dessau1 #ahea71 hardly deserves mention4 ,further1 we may mention some of the works which treat the historical development of particular subjects3 ,on the history of the philosophy of religion1 the first volume of ,otto ,pfleiderer's ,religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher ,grundlage 7#b;d ed41 #ahhc2--;,english translation by ,alexander ,stewart and ,allan ,menzies1 #ahhf-hh4--,,tr471 and the very trustworthy exposition by ,bernhard ,pnjer 7#b vols41 #ahhj1 #ahhc2 ,english translation by ,w4 ,hastie1 vol4 i41 #ahhg4--,,tr474 ,on the history of practical philosophy1 besides the first volume of ,i4,h4 ,fichte's ,ethik 7#ahej71 ,franz ,vorlnder's ,geschichte der philosophischen ,moral1 ,rechts- und ,staatslehre der ,englnder und ,franzosen 7#ahee72 ,fr4 ,jodl1 ,geschichte der ,ethik in der neueren ,philosophie 7#b vols41 #ahhb1 #ahhi71 and ,bluntschli1 ,geschichte der neueren ,staatswissenschaft 7#c;d ed41 #ahha72 ,sidgwick's ,outlines of the ,history of ,ethics1 #c;d ed41 #ahib1 and ,martineau's ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 #c;d ed41 #ahia4--,,tr44 ,on the history of the philosophy of history3 ,rocholl1 ,die ,philosophie der ,geschichte1 #ahgh2 ,richard ,fester1 ,rousseau und die deutsche ,geschichtsphilosophie1 #ahij ,flint1 ,the ,philosophy of ,history in ,europe1 vol4 i41 #ahgd1 complete in #c vols41 #ahic seq44 ,on the history of aesthetics1 ,r4 ,zimmermann1 #aheh2 ,h4 ,lotze1 #ahfh2 ,max ,schasler1 #ahga2 ,ed4 von ,hartmann 7since ,kant71 #ahhf2 ,heinrich von ,stein1 ,die ,entstehung der neueren ,aesthetik 7#ahhf72 ,bosanquet1 ,a ,history of ,aesthetic1 #ahib4--,,tr44 ,further1 ,fr4 ,alb4 ,lange1 ,geschichte des ,materialismus1 #ahff2 #dth ed41 #ahhb2 ,english translation by ,e4,c4 ,thomas1 #c vols41 #ahgh-ha4--,,tr42 ,jul4 ,baumann1 ,die ,lehren von ,raum1 ,zeit und ,mathematik in der neueren ,philosophie1 #ahfh-fi2 ,edm4 ,knig1 ,die ,entwickelung des ,causalproblems von ,cartesius bis ,kant1 #ahhh1 seit ,kant1 #ahij2 ,kurd ,lasswitz1 ,geschichte der ,atomistik vom ,mittelalter bis ,newton1 #b vols41 #ahij2 ,ed4 ,grimm1 ,zur ,geschichte des ,erkenntnissproblems1 von ,bacon zu ,hume1 #ahij4 ,the following works are to be recommended on the period of transition3 ,moritz ,carrire1 ,die philosophische ,weltanschauung der ,reformationszeit1 #ahdg2 #b;d ed41 #ahhg2 and ,jacob ,burckhardt1 ,kultur der ,renaissance in ,italien1 #dth ed41 #ahhf4 ,reference may also be made to ,a4 ,trendelenburg1 ,historische ,beitrge zur ,philosophie1 #c vols41 #ahdf-fg2 ,rudolph ,eucken1 ,geschichte und ,kritik der ,grundbegriffe der ,gegenwart1 #ahgh2 ,english translation by ,m4 ,stuart ,phelps1 #ahhj4--,,tr42 the same1 ,geschichte der philosophischen ,terminologie1 #ahgi2 the same1 ,beitrge zur ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 #ahhf 7including a valuable paper on parties and party names in philosophy72 the same1 ,die ,lebensanschauungen der grossen ,denker1 #ahij2 ,ludwig ,noack1 ,philosophiegeschichtliches ,lexicon1 #ahgi2 ,ed4 ,zeller1 ,vortrge und ,abhandlungen1 three series1 #ahfe-hd2 ,chr4 von ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 #b vols41 #ahha2 #b;d ed41 #ahhi4 ,r4 ,seydel's ,religion und ,philosophie1 #ahhg1 contains papers on ,luther1 ,schleiermacher1 ,schelling1 ,weisse1 ,fechner1 ,lotze1 ,hartmann1 ,darwinism1 etc41 which are well worth reading4 ,among the smaller compends ,schwegler's 7#ahdh2 recent editions revised and supplemented by ,r4 ,koeber7 remains still the least bad ,english translations by ,seelye and ,smith1 revised edition with additions1 ,new ,york1 #ahhj2 and ,j4,h4 ,stirling1 with annotations1 #gth ed41 #ahgi4--,,tr44 ,the meager sketches by ,deter1 ,koeber1 ,kirchner1 ,kuhn1 ,rabus1 ,vogel1 and others are useful for review at least4 ,fritz ,schultze's ,stammbaum der ,philosophie1 #ahij1 gives skillfully constructed tabular outlines1 but1 unfortunately1 in a badly chosen form4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,period ,,of ,,transition3 ,,from ,,nicolas ,,of ,,cusa ,,to ,,descartes4 ,the essays at philosophy which made their appearance between the middle of the fifteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth1 exhibit mediaeval and modern characteristics in such remarkable intermixture that they can be assigned exclusively to neither of these two periods4 ,there are eager longings1 lofty demands1 magnificent plans1 and promising outlooks in abundance1 but a lack of power to endure1 a lack of calmness and maturity2 while the shackles against which the leading minds revolt still bind too firmly both the leaders and those to whom they speak4 ,only here and there are the fetters loosened and thrown off2 if the hands are successfully freed1 the clanking chains still hamper the feet4 ,it is a time just suited for original thinkers1 a remarkable number of whom in fact make their appearance1 side by side or in close succession4 ,further1 however little these are able to satisfy the demand for permanent results1 they ever arouse our interest anew by the boldness and depth of their brilliant ideas1 which alternate with quaint fancies or are pervaded by them2 by the youthful courage with which they attacked great questions2 and not least by the hard fate which rewarded their efforts with misinterpretation1 persecution1 and death at the stake4 ,we must quickly pass over the broad threshold between modern philosophy and ,scholastic philosophy1 which is bounded by the year #adej1 in which ,nicolas of ,cusa wrote his chief work1 the ,idiota1 and #afdd1 when ,descartes began the new era with his ,principia ,philosophiae2 and can touch1 in passing1 only the most important factors4 ,we shall begin our account of this transition period with ,nicolas1 and end it with the ,englishmen1 ,bacon1 ,hobbes1 and ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury4 ,between these we shall arrange the various figures of the ,philosophical ,renaissance 7in the broad sense7 in six groups3 the ,restorers of the ,ancient ,systems and their ,opponents2 the ,italian ,philosophers of ,nature2 the ,political and ,legal ,philosophers2 the ,skeptics2 the ,mystics2 the ,founders of the ,exact ,investigation of ,nature4 ,in ,italy the new spiritual birth shows an aesthetic1 scientific1 and humanistic tendency2 in ,germany it is pre-eminently religious emancipation--in the ,reformation4 #a4 ,nicolas of ,cusa4 ,nicolas#a was born in #adja1 at ,cues 7,cusa7 on the ,moselle near ,treves4 ,he early ran away from his stern father1 a boatman and vine-dresser named ,chrypps 7or ,krebs71 and was brought up by the ,brothers of the ,common ,life at ,deventer4 ,in ,padua he studied law1 mathematics1 and philosophy1 but the loss of his first case at ,mayence so disgusted him with his profession that he turned to theology1 and became a distinguished preacher4 ,he took part in the ,council of ,basle1 was sent by ,pope ,eugen ,,iv4 as an ambassador to ,constantinople and to the ,reichstag at ,frankfort2 was made ,cardinal in #addh1 and ,bishop of ,brixen in #adej4 ,his feudal lord1 the ,count of ,tyrol1 ,archduke ,sigismund1 refused him recognition on account of certain quarrels in which they had become engaged1 and for a time held him prisoner4 ,previous to this he had undertaken journeys to ,germany and the ,netherlands on missionary business4 ,during a second sojourn in ,italy death overtook him1 in the year #adfd1 at ,todi in ,umbria4 ,the first volume of the ,paris edition of his collected works 7#aead7 contains the most important of his philosophical writings2 the second1 among others1 mathematical essays and ten books of selections from his sermons2 the third1 the extended work1 ,de ,concordantia ,catholica1 which he had completed at ,basle4 ,in #addj 7having already written on the ,reform of the ,calendar7 he began his imposing series of philosophical writings with the ,de ,docta ,ignorantia1 to which the ,de ,conjecturis was added in the following year4 ,these were succeeded by smaller treatises entitled ,de ,quaerendo ,deum1 ,de ,dato ,patris ,luminum1 ,de ,filiatione ,dei1 ,de ,genesi1 and a defense of the ,de ,docta ,ignorantia4 ,his most important work is the third of the four dialogues of the ,idiota 7,on the ,mind71 #adej4 ,he clothes in continually changing forms the one supreme truth on which all depends1 and which cannot be expressed in intelligible language but only comprehended by living intuition4 ,in many different ways he endeavors to lead the reader on to a vision of the inexpressible1 or to draw him up to it1 and to develop fruitfully the principle of the coincidence of opposites1 which had dawned upon him on his return journey from ,constantinople 7,de ,visione ,dei1 ,dialogus de ,possest1 ,de ,beryllo1 ,de ,ludo ,globi1 ,de ,venatione ,sapientiae1 ,de ,apice ,theoriae1 ,compendium74 ,sometimes he uses dialectical reasoning2 sometimes he soars in mystical exaltation2 sometimes he writes with a simplicity level to the common mind1 and in connection with that which lies at hand2 sometimes1 with the most comprehensive brevity4 ,besides these his philosophico-religious works are of great value1 ,de ,pace ,fidei1 ,de ,cribratione ,alchorani4 ,liberal ,catholics reverence him as one of the deepest thinkers of the ,church2 but the fame of ,giordano ,bruno1 a more brilliant but much less original figure1 has hitherto stood in the way of the general recognition of his great importance for modern philosophy4 ,footnote #a3 ,r4 ,zimmermann1 ,nikolaus ,cusanus als ,vorlufer ,leibnizens1 in vol4 viii4 of the ,sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen ,klasse der ,akademie der ,wissenschaften1 ,vienna1 #aheb1 p4 #cjf seq4 ,r4 ,falckenberg1 ,grundzge der ,philosophie des ,nikolaus ,cusanus mit besonderer ,bercksichtigung der ,lehre vom ,erkennen1 ,breslau1 #ahhj4 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,beitrge zur ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 ,heidelberg1 #ahhf1 p4 #f seq42 ,joh4 ,uebinger1 ,die ,gotteslehre des ,nikolaus ,cusanus1 ,mnster1 #ahhh4 ,scharpff1 ,des ,nikolaus von ,cusa wichtigste ,schriften in deutscher ,uebersetzung1 ,freiburg i4 ,br41 #ahfb4 ,human knowledge and the relation of ,god to the world are the two poles of the ,cusan's system4 ,he distinguishes four stages of knowledge4 ,lowest of all stands sense 7together with imagination71 which yields only confused images2 next above1 the understanding 7ratio71 whose functions comprise analysis1 the positing of time and space1 numerical operations1 and denomination1 and which keeps the opposites distinct under the law of contradiction2 third1 the speculative reason 7intellectus71 which finds the opposites reconcilable2 and highest of all the mystical1 supra-rational intuition 7visio sine comprehensione1 intuitio1 unio1 filiatio71 for which the opposites coincide in the infinite unity4 ,the intuitive culmination of knowledge1 in which the soul is united with ,god1--since here even the antithesis of subject and object disappears1--is but seldom attained2 and it is difficult to keep out the disturbing symbols and images of sense1 which mingle themselves in the intuition4 ,but it is just this insight into the incomprehensibility of the infinite which gives us a true knowledge of ,god2 this is the meaning of the learned ignorance1 the docta ignorantia4 ,the distinctions between these several stages of cognition are not1 however1 to be understood in any rigid sense1 for each higher function comprehends the lower1 and is active therein4 ,the understanding can discriminate only when it is furnished by sensation with images of that which is to be discriminated1 the reason can combine only when the understanding has supplied the results of analysis as material for combination2 while1 on the other hand1 it is the understanding which is present in sense as consciousness1 and the reason whose unity guides the understanding in its work of separation4 ,thus the several modes of cognition do not stand for independent fundamental faculties1 but for connected modifications of one fundamental power which work together and mutually imply one another4 ,the position that an intellectual function of attention and discrimination is active in sensuous perception1 is a view entirely foreign to mediaeval modes of thought2 for the ,scholastics were accustomed to make sharp divisions between the cognitive faculties1 on the principle that particulars are felt through sense and universals thought through the understanding4 ,the idea on which ,nicolas bases his argument for immortality has also an entirely modern sound3 viz41 that space and time are products of the understanding1 and1 therefore1 can have no power over the spirit which produces them2 for the author is higher and mightier than the product4 ,the confession that all our knowledge is conjecture does not simply mean that absolute and exact truth remains concealed from us2 but is intended at the same time to encourage us to draw as near as possible to the eternal verity by ever truer conjectures4 ,there are degrees of truth1 and our surmises are neither absolutely true nor entirely false4 ,conjecture becomes error only when1 forgetting the inadequacy of human knowledge1 we rest content with it as a final solution2 the ,socratic maxim1 ,i know that ,i am ignorant1 should not lead to despairing resignation but to courageous further inquiry4 ,the duty of speculation is to penetrate deeper and deeper into the secrets of the divine1 even though the ultimate revelation will not be given us until the hereafter4 ,the fittest instrument of speculation is furnished by mathematics1 in its conception of the infinite and the wonders of numerical relations3 as on the infinite sphere center and circumference coincide1 so ,god's essence is exalted above all opposites2 and as the other numbers are unfolded from the unit1 so the finite proceeds by explication from the infinite4 ,a controlling significance in the serial construction of the world is ascribed to the ten1 as the sum of the first four numbers--as reason1 understanding1 imagination1 and sensibility are related in human cognition1 so ,god1 spirit1 soul1 and body1 or infinity1 thought1 life1 and being are related in the objective sphere2 so1 further1 the absolute necessity of ,god1 the concrete necessity of the universe1 the actuality of individuals1 and the possibility of matter4 ,beside the quaternary the tern also exercises its power--the world divides into the stages of eternity1 imperishability1 and the temporal world of sense1 or truth1 probability1 and confusion4 ,the divine trinity is reflected everywhere3 in the world as creator1 created1 and love2 in the mind as creative force1 concept1 and will4 ,the triunity of ,god is very variously explained--as the subject1 object1 and act of cognition2 as creative spirit1 wisdom1 and goodness2 as being1 power1 and deed2 and1 preferably1 as unity1 equality1 and the combination of the two4 ,god is related to the world as unity1 identity1 complicatio1 to otherness1 diversity1 explicatio1 as necessity to contingency1 as completed actuality to mere possibility2 yet1 in such a way that the otherness participates in the unity1 and receives its reality from this1 and the unity does not have the otherness confronting it1 outside it4 ,god is triune only as the ,creator of the world1 and in relation to it2 in himself he is absolute unity and infinity1 to which nothing disparate stands opposed1 which is just as much all things as not all things1 and which1 as the ,areopagite had taught of old1 is better comprehended by negations than by affirmations4 ,to deny that he is light1 truth1 spirit1 is more true than to affirm it1 for he is infinitely greater than anything which can be expressed in words2 he is the ,unutterable1 the ,unknowable1 the supremely one and the supremely absolute4 ,in the world1 each thing has things greater and smaller by its side1 but ,god is the absolutely greatest and smallest2 in accordance with the principle of the coincidentia oppositorum1 the absolute maximum and the absolute minimum coincide4 ,that which in the world exists as concretely determinate and particular1 is in ,god in a simple and universal way2 and that which here is present as incompleted striving1 and as possibility realizing itself by gradual development1 is in ,god completed activity4 ,he is the realization of all possibility1 the ,can-be or ,can-is 7possest72 and since this absolute actuality is the presupposition and cause of all finite ability and action1 it may be unconditionally designated ability 7posse ipsum71 in antithesis to all determinate manifestations of force2 namely1 to all ability to be1 live1 feel1 think1 and will4 ,however much these definitions1 conceived in harmony with the dualistic view of ,christianity1 accentuate the antithesis between ,god and the world1 this is elsewhere much softened1 nay directly denied1 in favor of a pantheistic view which points forward to the modern period4 ,side by side with the assertion that there is no proportion whatever between the infinite and the finite1 the following navely presents itself1 in open contradiction to the former3 ,god excels the reason just as much as the latter is superior to the understanding1 and the understanding to sensibility1 or he is related to thought as thought to life1 and life to being4 ,nay1 ,nicolas makes even bolder statements than these1 when he calls the universe a sensuous and mutable ,god1 man a human ,god or a humanly contracted infinity1 the creation a created ,god or a limited infinity2 thus hinting that ,god and the world are at bottom essentially alike1 differing only in the form of their existence1 that it is one and the same being and action which manifests itself absolutely in ,god1 relatively and in a limited way in the system of creation4 ,it was chiefly three modern ideas which led the ,cusan on from dualism to pantheism--the boundlessness of the universe1 the connection of all being1 and the all-comprehensive richness of individuality4 ,endlessness belongs to the universe as well as to ,god1 only its endlessness is not an absolute one1 beyond space and time1 but weakened and concrete1 namely unlimited extension in space and unending duration in time4 ,similarly1 the universe is unity1 yet not a unity absolutely above multiplicity and diversity1 but one which is divided into many members and obscured thereby4 ,even the individual is infinite in a certain sense2 for1 in its own way1 it bears in itself all that is1 it mirrors the whole world from its limited point of view1 is an abridged1 compressed representation of the universe4 ,as the members of the body1 the eye1 the arm1 the foot1 interact in the closest possible way1 and no one of them can dispense with the rest1 so each thing is connected with each1 different from it and yet in harmony with it1 so each contains all the others and is contained by them4 ,all is in all1 for all is in the universe and in ,god1 as the universe and ,god in all4 ,in a still higher degree man is a microcosm 7parvus mundus71 a mirror of the ,all1 since he not merely1 like other beings1 actually has in himself all that exists1 but also has a knowledge of this richness1 is capable of developing it into conscious images of things4 ,and it is just this which constitutes the perfection of the whole and of the parts1 that the higher is in the lower1 the cause in the effect1 the genus in the individual1 the soul in the body1 reason in the senses1 and conversely4 ,to perfect1 is simply to make active a potential possession1 to unfold capacities and to elevate the unconscious into consciousness4 ,here we have the germ of the philosophy of ,bruno and of ,leibnitz4 ,as we have noticed a struggle between two opposite tendencies1 one dualistic and ,christian1 one pantheistic and modern1 in the theology of ,nicolas1 so at many other points a conflict between the mediaeval and the modern view of the world1 of which our philosopher is himself unconscious1 becomes evident to the student4 ,it is impossible to follow out the details of this interesting opposition1 so we shall only attempt to distinguish in a rough way the beginnings of the new from the remnants of the old4 ,modern is his interest in the ancient philosophers1 of whom ,pythagoras1 ,plato1 and the ,neoplatonists especially attract him2 modern1 again1 his interest in natural science#a 7he teaches not only the boundlessness of the world1 but also the motion of the earth72 his high estimation of mathematics1 although he often utilizes this merely in a fanciful symbolism of numbers2 his optimism 7the world an image of the divine1 everything perfect of its kind1 the bad simply a halt on the way to the good72 his intellectualism 7knowing the primal function and chief mission of the spirit2 faith an undeveloped knowledge2 volition and emotion1 as is self-evident1 incidental results of thought2 knowledge a leading back of the creature to ,god as its source1 hence the counterpart of creation72 modern1 finally1 the form and application given to the ,stoic-,neoplatonic concept of individuality1 and the idealistic view which resolves the objects of thought into products thereof4#b ,this last position1 indeed1 is limited by the lingering influence of nominalism1 which holds the concepts of the mind to be merely abstract copies1 and not archetypes of things4 ,moreover1 explicatio1 evolutio1 unfolding1 as yet does not always have the meaning of development to-day1 of progressive advance4 ,it denotes1 quite neutrally1 the production of a multiplicity from a unity1 in which the former has lain confined1 no matter whether this multiplicity and its procession signify enhancement or attenuation4 ,for the most part1 in fact1 involution1 complicatio 7which1 moreover1 always means merely a primal1 germinal condition1 never1 as in ,leibnitz1 the return thereto7 represents the more perfect condition4 ,the chief examples of the relation of involution and evolution are the principles in which science is involved and out of which it is unfolded2 the unit1 which is related to numbers in a similar way2 the spirit and the cognitive operations2 ,god and his creatures4 ,however obscure and unskillful this application of the idea of development may appear1 yet it is indisputable that a discovery of great promise has been made1 accompanied by a joyful consciousness of its fruitfulness4 ,of the numberless features which point backward to the ,middle ,ages1 only one need be mentioned1 the large space taken up by speculations concerning the ,god-man 7the whole third book of the ,de ,docta ,ignorantia71 and by those concerning the angels4 ,yet even here a change is noticeable1 for the earthly and the divine are brought into most intimate relation1 while in ,thomas ,aquinas1 for instance1 they form two entirely separate worlds4 ,in short1 the new view of the world appears in ,nicolas still bound on every hand by mediaeval conceptions4 ,a century and a half passed before the fetters1 grown rusty in the meanwhile1 broke under the bolder touch of ,giordano ,bruno4 ,footnote #a3 ,the attention of our philosopher was called to the natural sciences1 and thus also to geography1 which at this time was springing into new life1 by his friend ,paul ,toscanelli1 the ,florentine4 ,nicolas was the first to have the map of ,germany engraved 7cf4 ,s4 ,ruge in ,globus1 vol4 lx41 ,no4 ,i1 #ahia71 which1 however1 was not completed until long after his death1 and issued in #adia4 ,footnote #b3 ,on the modern elements in his theory of the state and of right1 cf4 ,gierke1 ,das deutsche ,genossenschaftsrecht1 vol4 iii4 ,,ii1 #ahha4 #b4 ,the ,revival of ,ancient ,philosophy and the ,opposition to it4 ,italy is the home of the ,renaissance and the birthplace of important new ideas which give the intellectual life of the sixteenth century its character of brave endeavor after high and distant ends4 ,the enthusiasm for ancient literature already aroused by the native poets1 ,dante 7#acjj71 ,petrarch 7#acda71 and ,boccaccio 7#acej71 was nourished by the influx of ,greek scholars1 part of whom came in pursuance of an invitation to the ,council of ,ferrara and ,florence 7#adch7 called in behalf of the union of the ,churches 7among these were ,pletho and his pupil ,bessarion2 ,nicolas ,cusanus was one of the legates invited71 while part were fugitives from ,constantinople after its capture by the ,turks in #adec4 ,the ,platonic ,academy1 whose most celebrated member1 ,marsilius ,ficinus1 translated ,plato and the ,neoplatonists into ,latin1 was founded in #addj on the suggestion of ,georgius ,gemistus ,pletho#a under the patronage of ,cosimo dei ,medici4 ,the writings of ,pletho 7,on the ,distinction between ,plato and ,aristotle71 of ,bessarion 7,adversus ,calumniatorem ,platonis1 #adfi1 in answer to the ,comparatio ,aristotelis et ,platonis1 #adfd1 an attack by the ,aristotelian1 ,george of ,trebizond1 on ,pletho's work71 and of ,ficinus 7,theologia ,platonica1 #adhb71 show that the ,platonism which they favored was colored by religious1 mystical1 and ,neoplatonic elements4 ,if for ,bessarion and ,ficinus1 just as for the ,eclectics of the later ,academy1 there was scarcely any essential distinction between the teachings of ,plato1 of ,aristotle1 and of ,christianity2 this confusion of heterogeneous elements was soon carried much farther1 when the two ,picos 7,john ,pico of ,mirandola1 died #adid1 and his nephew ,francis1 died #aecc7 and ,johann ,reuchlin 7,de ,verbo ,mirifico1 #adid2 ,de ,arte ,cabbalistica1 #aeag71 who had been influenced by the former1 introduced the secret doctrines of the ,jewish ,cabala into the ,platonic philosophy1 and ,cornelius ,agrippa von ,nettesheim of ,cologne 7,de ,occulta ,philosophia1 #aeaj2 cf4 ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #a seq47 made the mixture still worse by the addition of the magic art4 ,the impulse of the modern spirit to subdue nature is here already apparent1 only that it shows inexperience in the selection of its instruments2 before long1 however1 nature will willingly unveil to observation and calm reflection the secrets which she does not yield to the compulsion of magic4 ,footnote #a3 ,pletho died at an advanced age in #adej4 ,his chief work1 the ,greek3 ,nomoi1 was given to the flames by his ,aristotelian opponent1 ,georgius ,scholarius1 surnamed ,gennadius1 ,patriarch of ,constantinople4 ,portions of it only1 which had previously become known1 have been preserved4 ,on ,pletho's life and teachings1 cf4 ,fritz ,schultze1 ,g4,g4 ,plethon1 ,jena1 #ahgd4 ,a similar romantic figure was ,phillipus ,aureolus ,theophrastus ,bombast ,paracelsus#a von ,hohenheim 7#adic-aeda71 a traveled ,swiss1 who endeavored to reform medicine from the standpoint of chemistry4 ,philosophy for ,paracelsus is knowledge of nature1 in which observation and thought must co-operate2 speculation apart from experience and worship of the paper-wisdom of the ancients lead to no result4 ,the world is a living whole1 which1 like man1 the microcosm1 in whom the whole content of the macrocosm is concentrated as in an extract1 runs its life course4 ,originally all things were promiscuously intermingled in a unity1 the ,god-created prima materia1 as though inclosed in a germ1 whence the manifold1 with its various forms and colors1 proceeded by separation4 ,the development then proceeds in such a way that in each genus that is perfected which is posited therein1 and does not cease until1 at the last day1 all that is possible in nature and history shall have fulfilled itself4 ,but the one indwelling life of nature lives in all the manifold forms2 the same laws rule in the human body as in the universe2 that which works secretly in the former lies open to the view in the latter1 and the world gives the clew to the knowledge of man4 ,natural becoming is brought about by the chemical separation and coming together of substances2 the ultimate constituents revealed by analysis are the three fundamental substances or primitive essences1 quicksilver1 sulphur1 and salt1 by which1 however1 something more principiant is understood than the empirical substances bearing these names3 mercurius means that which makes bodies liquid1 sulfur1 that which makes them combustible1 sal1 that which makes them fixed and rigid4 ,from these are compounded the four elements1 each of which is ruled by elemental spirits--earth by gnomes or pygmies1 water by undines or nymphs1 air by sylphs1 fire by salamanders 7cf4 with this1 and with ,paracelsus's theory of the world as a whole1 ,faust's two monologues in ,goethe's drama72 which are to be understood as forces or sublimated substances1 not as personal1 demoniacal beings4 ,to each individual being there is ascribed a vital principle1 the ,archeus1 an individualization of the general force of nature1 ,vulcanus2 so also to men4 ,disease is a checking of this vital principle by contrary powers1 which are partly of a terrestrial and partly of a sidereal nature2 and the choice of medicines is to be determined by their ability to support the ,archeus against its enemies4 ,man is1 however1 superior to nature--he is not merely the universal animal1 inasmuch as he is completely that which other beings are only in a fragmentary way2 but1 as the image of ,god1 he has also an eternal element in him1 and is capable of attaining perfection through the exercise of his rational judgment4 ,paracelsus distinguishes three worlds3 the elemental or terrestrial1 the astral or celestial1 and the spiritual or divine4 ,to the three worlds1 which stand in relations of sympathetic interaction1 there correspond in man the body1 which nourishes itself on the elements1 the spirit1 whose imagination receives its food1 sense and thoughts1 from the spirits of the stars1 and1 finally1 the immortal soul1 which finds its nourishment in faith in ,christ4 ,hence natural philosophy1 astronomy1 and theology are the pillars of anthropology1 and ultimately of medicine4 ,this fantastic physic of ,paracelsus found many adherents both in theory and in practice4#b ,among those who accepted and developed it may be named ,r4 ,fludd 7died #afcg71 and the two ,van ,helmonts1 father and son 7died #afdd and #afii74 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,paracelsus cf4 ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #be seq42 ,eucken1 ,beitrge zur ,geschichteder neueren ,philosophie1 p4 #cb seq42 ,lasswitz1 ,geschichte der ,atomistik1 vol4 i4 p4 #bid seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,the influence of ,paracelsus1 as of ,vives and ,campanella1 is evident in the great educator1 ,amos ,comenius 7,komensky1 #aeib-afgj71 whose pansophical treatises appeared in #afcg-fh4 ,on ,comenius cf4 ,pappenheim1 ,berlin1 #ahga2 ,kvacsala1 ,doctor's ,dissertation1 ,leipsic1 #ahhf2 ,walter ,mueller1 ,dresden1 #ahhg4 ,beside the ,platonic philosophy1 others of the ancient systems were also revived4 ,stoicism was commended by ,justus ,lipsius 7died #afjf7 and ,caspar ,schoppe 7,scioppius1 born #aefb72 ,epicureanism was revived by ,gassendi 7#afdg71 and rhetorizing logicians went back to ,cicero and ,quintilian4 ,among the latter were ,laurentius ,valla 7died #adeg72 ,r4 ,agricola 7died #adhe72 the ,spaniard1 ,ludovicus ,vives 7#aeca71 who referred inquiry from the authority of ,aristotle to the methodical utilization of experience2 and ,marius ,nizolius 7#aeec71 whose ,antibarbarus was reissued by ,leibnitz in #afgj4 ,the adherents of ,aristotle were divided into two parties1 one of which relied on the naturalistic interpretation of the ,greek exegete1 ,alexander of ,aphrodisias 7about #bjj ,a4,d471 the other on the pantheistic interpretation of the ,arabian commentator1 ,averros 7died #aaih74 ,the conflict over the question of immortality1 carried on especially in ,padua1 was the culmination of the battle4 ,the ,alexandrist asserted that1 according to ,aristotle1 the soul was mortal1 the ,averroists1 that the rational part which is common to all men was immortal2 while to this were added the further questions1 if and how the ,aristotelian view could be reconciled with the ,church doctrine1 which demanded a continued personal existence4 ,the most eminent ,aristotelian of the ,renaissance1 ,petrus ,pomponatius 7,de ,immortalite ,animae1 #aeaf2 ,de ,fato1 ,libero ,arbitrio1 ,providentia et ,praedestinatione71 was on the side of the ,alexandrists4 ,achillini and ,niphus fought on the other side4 ,caesalpin 7died #afjc71 ,zabarella1 and ,cremonini assumed an intermediate1 or1 at least1 a less decided position4 ,still others1 as ,faber ,stapulensis in ,paris 7#aejj71 and ,desiderius ,erasmus 7#aebj71 were more interested in securing a correct text of ,aristotle's works than in his philosophical principles4 99 99 99 99 99 ,among the ,anti-,aristotelians only two famous names need be mentioned1 that of the influential ,frenchman1 ,petrus ,ramus1 and the ,german1 ,taurellus4 ,pierre de la ,rame 7assassinated in the massacre of ,st4 ,bartholomew1 #aegb71 attacked the 7unnatural and useless7 ,aristotelian logic in his ,aristotelicae ,animadversiones1 #aedc1 objecting1 with the ,ciceronians mentioned above1 to the separation of logic and rhetoric2 and attempted a new logic of his own1 in his ,institutiones ,dialecticae1 which1 in spite of its formalism1 gained acceptance1 especially in ,germany4#a ,nicolaus ,oechslein1 ,latinized ,taurellus 7born in #aedg at ,mmpelgard2 at his death1 in #afjf1 professor of medicine in the ,university of ,altdorf71 stood quite alone because of his independent position in reference to all philosophical and religious parties4 ,his most important works were his ,philosophiae ,triumphus1 #aegc2 ,synopsis ,aristotelis ,metaphysicae1 #aeif2 ,alpes ,caesae 7against ,caesalpin1 and the title punning on his name71 #aeig2 and ,de ,rerum ,aeternitate1 #afjd4b ,the thought of ,taurellus inclines toward the ideal of a ,christian philosophy2 which1 however1 ,scholasticism1 in his view1 did not attain1 inasmuch as its thought was heathen in its blind reverence for ,aristotle1 even though its faith was ,christian4 ,in order to heal this breach between the head and the heart1 it is necessary in religion to return from confessional distinctions to ,christianity itself1 and in philosophy1 to abandon authority for the reason4 ,we should not seek to be ,lutherans or ,calvinists1 but simply ,christians1 and we should judge on rational grounds1 instead of following ,aristotle1 ,averros1 or ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,anyone who does not aim at the harmony of theology and philosophy1 is neither a ,christian nor a philosopher4 ,one and the same ,god is the primal source of both rational and revealed truth4 ,philosophy is the basis of theology1 theology the criterion and complement of philosophy4 ,the one starts with effects evident to the senses and leads to the suprasensible1 to the ,first ,cause2 the other follows the reverse course4 ,to philosophy belongs all that ,adam knew or could know before the fall2 had there been no sin1 there would have been no other than philosophical knowledge4 ,but after the fall1 the reason1 which informs us1 it is true1 of the moral law1 but not of the divine purpose of salvation1 would have led us to despair1 since neither punishment nor virtue could justify us1 if revelation did not teach us the wonders of grace and redemption4 ,although ,taurellus thus softens the opposition between theology and philosophy1 which had been most sharply expressed in the doctrine of twofold truth 7that which is true in philosophy may be false in theology1 and conversely71 and endeavors to bring the two into harmony1 the antithesis between ,god and the world still remains for him immovably fixed4 ,god is not things1 though he is all4 ,he is pure affirmation2 all without him is composed1 as it were1 of being and nothing1 and can neither be nor be known independently3 negatio non nihil est1 alias nec esset nec intelligeretur1 sed limitatio est affirmationis4 ,simple being or simple affirmation is equivalent to infinity1 eternity1 unity1 uniqueness1--properties which do not belong to the world4 ,he who posits things as eternal1 sublates ,god4 ,god and the world are opposed to each other as infinite cause and finite effect4 ,moreover1 as it is our spirit which philosophizes and not ,god's spirit in us1 so the faith through which man appropriates ,christ's merit is a free action of the human spirit1 the capacity for which is inborn1 not infused from above2 in it1 ,god acts merely as an auxiliary or remote cause1 by removing the obstacles which hinder the operation of the power of faith4 ,with this anti-pantheistic tendency he combines an anti-intellectualistic one--being and production precedes and stands higher than contemplation2 ,god's activity does not consist in thought but in production1 and human blessedness1 not in the knowledge but the love of ,god1 even though the latter presupposes the former4 ,while man1 as an end in himself1 is immortal--and the whole man1 not his soul merely--the world of sense1 which has been created only for the conservation of man 7his procreation and probation71 must disappear2 above this world1 however1 a higher rears its walls to subserve man's eternal happiness4 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,ramus cf4 ,waddington's treatises1 one in ,latin1 ,paris1 #ahdi1 the other in ,french1 ,paris1 #ahee4 ,footnote #b3 ,schmid ,schwarzenburg has written on ,taurellus1 #ahfj1 #b;d ed41 #ahfd4 ,the high regard which ,leibnitz expressed for ,taurellus may be in part explained by the many anticipations of his own thoughts to be found in the earlier writer4 ,the intimate relation into which sensibility and understanding are brought is an instance of this from the theory of knowledge4 ,receptivity is not passivity1 but activity arrested 7through the body74 ,all knowledge is inborn2 all men are potential philosophers 7and1 so far as they are loyal to conscience1 ,christians72 the spirit is a thinking and a thinkable universe4 ,taurellus's philosophy of nature1 recognizing the relative truth of atomism1 makes the world consist of manifold simple substances combined into formal unity3 he calls it a well constructed system of wholes4 ,a discussion of the origin of evil is also given1 with a solution based on the existence and misuse of freedom4 ,finally1 it is to be mentioned to the great credit of ,taurellus1 that1 like his younger contemporaries1 ,galileo and ,kepler1 he vigorously opposed the ,aristotelian and ,scholastic animation of the material world and the anthropomorphic conception of its forces1 thus preparing the way for the modern view of nature to be perfected by ,newton4 #c4 ,the ,italian ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,we turn now from the restorers of ancient doctrines and their opponents to the men who1 continuing the opposition to the authority of ,aristotle1 point out new paths for the study of nature4 ,the physician1 ,hieronymus ,cardanus of ,milan 7#aeja-gf71 whose inclinations toward the fanciful were restrained1 though not suppressed1 by his mathematical training1 may be considered the forerunner of the school4 ,while the people should accept the dogmas of the ,church with submissive faith1 the thinker may and should subordinate all things to the truth4 ,the wise man belongs to that rare class who neither deceive nor are deceived2 others are either deceivers or deceived1 or both4 ,in his theory of nature1 ,cardanus advances two principles3 one passive1 matter 7the three cold and moist elements71 and an active1 formative one1 the world-soul1 which1 pervading the ,all and bringing it into unity1 appears as warmth and light4 ,the causes of motion are attraction and repulsion1 which in higher beings become love and hate4 ,even superhuman spirits1 the demons1 are subject to the mechanical laws of nature4 ,the standard bearer of the ,italian philosophy of nature was ,bernardinus ,telesius#a of ,cosenza 7#aejh-hh2 ,de ,rerum ,natura juxta ,propria ,principia1 #aefe1 enlarged #aehf71 the founder of a scientific society in ,naples called the ,telesian1 or after the name of his birthplace1 the ,cosentian ,academy4 ,telesius maintained that the ,aristotelian doctrine must be replaced by an unprejudiced empiricism2 that nature must be explained from itself1 and by as few principles as possible4 ,beside inert matter1 this requires only two active forces1 on whose interaction all becoming and all life depend4 ,these are warmth1 which expands1 and cold1 which contracts2 the former resides in the sun and thence proceeds1 the latter is situated in the earth4 ,although ,telesius acknowledges an immaterial1 immortal soul1 he puts the emphasis on sensuous experience1 without which the understanding is incapable of attaining certain knowledge4 ,he is a sensationalist both in the theory of knowledge and in ethics1 holding the functions of judgment and thought deducible from the fundamental power of perception1 and considering the virtues different manifestations of the instinct of self-preservation 7which he ascribes to matter as well74 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 on ,telesius1 ,florentine1 #b vols41 ,naples1 #ahgb-gd2 ,k4 ,heiland1 ,erkenntnisslehre und ,ethik des ,telesius1 ,doctor's ,dissertation at ,leipsic1 #ahia4 ,further1 ,rixner and ,siber1 ,leben und ,lehrmeinungen berhmter ,physiker am ,ende des ,,xvi4 und am ,anfang des ,,xvii4 ,jahrhunderts1 ,sulzbach 7#ahai-bf71 #g ,hefte1 #b;d ed41 #ahbi4 ,hefte #b-f discuss ,cardanus1 ,telesius1 ,patritius1 ,bruno1 and ,campanella2 the first is devoted to ,paracelsus1 and the seventh to the older ,van ,helmont 7,joh4 ,bapt474 ,with the name of ,telesius we usually associate that of ,franciscus ,patritius 7#aebi-ig71 professor of the ,platonic philosophy in ,ferrara and ,rome 7,discussiones ,peripateticae1 #aeha2 ,nova de ,universis ,philosophia1 #aeia71 who1 combining ,neoplatonic and ,telesian principles1 holds that the incorporeal or spiritual light emanates from the divine original light1 in which all reality is seminally contained2 the heavenly or ethereal light from the incorporeal2 and the earthly or corporeal1 from the heavenly--while the original light divides into three persons1 the ,one and ,all 7,unomnia71 unity or life1 and spirit4 ,the ,italian philosophy of nature culminates in ,bruno and ,campanella1 of whom the former1 although he is the earlier1 appears the more advanced because of his freer attitude toward the ,church4 ,giordano ,bruno was born in #aedh at ,nola1 and educated at ,naples2 abandoning his membership in the ,dominican ,order1 he lived1 with various changes of residence1 in ,france1 ,england1 and ,germany4 ,returning to his native land1 he was arrested in ,venice and imprisoned for seven years at ,rome1 where1 on ,february #ag1 #afjj1 he suffered death at the stake1 refusing to recant4 7,the same fate overtook his fellow-countryman1 ,vanini1 in #afai1 at ,toulouse47 ,besides three didactic poems in ,latin 7,frankfort1 #aeia71 the ,italian dialogues1 ,della ,causa1 ,principio ed ,uno1 ,venice1 #aehd 7,german translation by ,lasson1 #ahgb71 are of chief importance4 ,the ,italian treatises have been edited by ,wagner1 ,leipsic1 #ahbi1 and by ,de ,lagarde1 #b vols41 ,gttingen1 #ahhh2 the ,latin appeared at ,naples1 in #c vols41 #ahhj1 #ahhf1 and #ahia4 ,of a passionate and imaginative nature1 ,bruno was not an essentially creative thinker1 but borrowed the ideas which he proclaimed with burning enthusiasm and lofty eloquence1 and through which he has exercised great influence on later philosophy1 from ,telesius and ,nicolas1 complaining the while that the priestly garb of the latter sometimes hindered the free movement of his thought4 ,beside these thinkers he has a high regard for ,pythagoras1 ,plato1 ,lucretius1 ,raymundus ,lullus1 and ,copernicus 7died #aedc74a ,he forms the transition link between ,nicolas of ,cusa and ,leibnitz1 as also the link between ,cardanus and ,spinoza4 ,to ,spinoza ,bruno offered the naturalistic conception of ,god 7,god is the first cause immanent in the universe1 to which self-manifestation or self-revelation is essential2 ,he is natura naturans1 the numberless worlds are natura naturata72 ,leibnitz he anticipated by his doctrine of the monads1 the individual1 imperishable elements of the existent1 in which matter and form1 incorrectly divorced by ,aristotle as though two antithetical principles1 constitute one unity4 ,the characteristic traits of the philosophy of ,bruno are the lack of differentiation between pantheistic and individualistic elements1 the mediaeval animation and endlessness of the world1 and1 finally1 the religious relation to the universe or the extravagant deification of nature 7nature and the world are entirely synonymous1 the ,all1 the world-soul1 and ,god nearly so1 while even matter is called a divine being74#b ,footnote #a3 ,nicolaus ,copernicus 7,koppernik2 #adgc-aedc7 was born at ,thorn2 studied astronomy1 law1 and medicine at ,cracow1 ,bologna1 and ,padua2 and died a ,canon of ,frauenberg4 ,his treatise1 ,de ,revolutionibus ,orbium ,caelestium1 which was dedicated to ,pope ,paul ,,iii41 appeared at ,nuremberg in #aedc1 with a preface added to it by the preacher1 ,andreas ,osiander1 which calls the heliocentric system merely an hypothesis advanced as a basis for astronomical calculations4 ,copernicus reached his theory rather by speculation than by observation2 its first suggestion came from the ,pythagorean doctrine of the motion of the earth4 ,on ,copernicus cf4 ,leop4 ,prowe1 vol4 i4 ,copernicus ,leben1 vol4 ii4 7,urkunden71 ,berlin1 #ahhc-hd2 and ,k4 ,lohmeyer in ,sybel's ,historische ,zeitschrift1 vol4 lvii41 #ahhg4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 on ,bruno1 ,h4 ,brunnhofer 7somewhat too enthusiastic71 ,leipsic1 #ahhb2 also ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #di seq4 ,bruno completes the ,copernican picture of the world by doing away with the motionless circle of fixed stars with which ,copernicus1 and even ,kepler1 had thought our solar system surrounded1 and by opening up the view into the immeasurability of the world4 ,with this the ,aristotelian antithesis of the terrestrial and the celestial is destroyed4 ,the infinite space 7filled with the aether7 is traversed by numberless bodies1 no one of which constitutes the center of the world4 ,the fixed stars are suns1 and1 like our own1 surrounded by planets4 ,the stars are formed of the same materials as the earth1 and are moved by their own souls or forms1 each a living being1 each also the residence of infinitely numerous living beings of various degrees of perfection1 in whose ranks man by no means takes the first place4 ,all organisms are composed of minute elements1 called minima or monads2 each monad is a mirror of the ,all2 each at once corporeal and soul-like1 matter and form1 each eternal2 their combinations alone being in constant change4 ,the universe is boundless in time1 as in space2 development never ceases1 for the fullness of forms which slumber in the womb of matter is inexhaustible4 ,the ,absolute is the primal unity1 exalted above all antitheses1 from which all created being is unfolded and in which it remains included4 ,all is one1 all is out of ,god and in ,god4 ,in the living unity of the universe1 also1 the two sides1 the spiritual 7world-soul71 and the corporeal 7universal matter71 are distinguishable1 but not separate4 ,the world-reason pervades in its omnipresence the greatest and the smallest1 but in varying degrees4 ,it weaves all into one great system1 so that if we consider the whole1 the conflicts and contradictions which rule in particulars disappear1 resolved into the most perfect harmony4 ,whoever thus regards the world1 becomes filled with reverence for the ,infinite and bends his will to the divine law--from true science proceed true religion and true morality1 those of the spiritual hero1 of the heroic sage4 ,thomas ,campanella#a 7#aefh-afci7 was no less dependent on ,nicolas and ,telesius than ,bruno4 ,a ,calabrian by birth like ,telesius1 whose writings filled him with aversion to ,aristotle1 a ,dominican like ,bruno1 he was deprived of his freedom on an unfounded suspicion of conspiracy against the ,spanish rule1 spent twenty-seven years in prison1 and died in ,paris after a short period of quiet4 ,renewing an old idea1 ,campanella directed attention from the written volume of ,scripture to the living book of nature as being also a divine revelation4 ,theology rests on faith 7in theology1 ,campanella1 in accordance with the traditions of his order1 follows ,thomas ,aquinas72 philosophy is based on perception1 which in its instrumental part comprises mathematics and logic1 and in its real part1 the doctrine of nature and of morals1 while metaphysics treats of the highest presuppositions and the ultimate grounds1--the pro-principles1 ,campanella starts1 as ,augustine before him and ,descartes in later times1 from the indisputable certitude of the spirit's own existence1 from which he rises to the certitude of ,god's existence4 ,on this first certain truth of my own existence there follow three others3 my nature consists in the three functions of power1 knowledge1 and volition2 ,i am finite and limited1 might1 wisdom1 and love are in man constantly intermingled with their opposites1 weakness1 foolishness1 and hate2 my power1 knowledge1 and volition do not extend beyond the present4 ,the being of ,god follows from the idea of ,god in us1 which can have been derived from no other than an infinite source4 ,it would be impossible for so small a part of the universe as man to produce from himself the idea of a being incomparably greater than the whole universe4 ,i attain a knowledge of ,god's nature from my own by thinking away from the latter1 in which1 as in everything finite1 being and non-being are intermingled1 every limitation and negation1 by raising to infinity my positive fundamental powers1 posse1 cognoscere1 and velle1 or potentia1 sapientia1 and amor1 and by transferring them to him1 who is pure affirmation1 ens entirely without non-ens4 ,thus ,i reach as the three pro-principles or primalities of the existent or the ,godhead1 omnipotence1 omniscience1 and infinite love4 ,but the infrahuman world may also be judged after the analogy of our fundamental faculties4 ,the universe and all its parts possess souls2 there is naught without sensation2 consciousness1 it is true1 is lacking in the lower creatures1 but they do not lack life1 feeling1 and desire1 for it is impossible for the animate to come from the inanimate4 ,everything loves and hates1 desires and avoids4 ,plants are motionless animals1 and their roots1 mouths4 ,corporeal motion springs from an obscure1 unconscious impulse of self-preservation2 the heavenly bodies circle about the sun as the center of sympathy2 space itself seeks a content 7horror vacui74 ,footnote #a3 ,campanella's works have been edited by ,al4 d',ancona1 ,turin1 #ahed1 ,cf4 ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #abe seq4 ,the more imperfect a thing is1 the more weakened is the divine being in it by non-being and contingency4 ,the entrance of the naught into the divine reality takes place by degrees4 ,first ,god projects from himself the ideal or archetypal world 7mundus archetypus71 i4e41 the totality of the possible4 ,from this ideal world proceeds the metaphysical world of eternal intelligences 7mundus mentalis71 including the angels1 the world-soul1 and human spirits4 ,the third product is the mathematical world of space 7mundus sempiternus71 the object of geometry2 the fourth1 the temporal or corporeal world2 the fifth1 and last1 the empirical world 7mundus situalis71 in which everything appears at a definite point in space and time4 ,all things not only love themselves and seek the conservation of their own being1 but strive back toward the original source of their being1 to ,god2 i4e41 they possess religion4 ,in man1 natural and animal religion are completed by rational religion1 the limitations of which render a revelation necessary4 ,a religion can be considered divine only when it is adapted to all1 when it gains acceptance through miracles and virtue1 and when it contradicts neither natural ethics nor the reason4 ,religion is union with ,god through knowledge1 purity of will1 and love4 ,it is inborn1 a law of nature1 not1 as ,machiavelli teaches1 a political invention4 ,campanella desired to see the unity in the divine government of the world embodied in a pyramid of states with the papacy at the apex3 above the individual states was to come the province1 then the kingdom1 the empire1 the 7,spanish7 world-monarchy1 and1 finally1 the universal dominion of the ,pope4 ,the ,church should be superior to the ,state1 the vicegerent of ,god to temporal rulers and to councils4 #d4 ,philosophy of the ,state and of ,law4 ,the originality of the modern doctrines of natural law was formerly overestimated1 as it was not known to how considerable an extent the way had been prepared for them by the mediaeval philosophy of the state and of law4 ,it is evident from the equally rich and careful investigations of ,otto ,gierke#a that in the political and legal theories of a ,bodin1 a ,grotius1 a ,hobbes1 a ,rousseau1 we have systematic developments of principles long extant1 rather than new principles produced with entire spontaneity4 ,their merit consists in the principiant expression and accentuation and the systematic development of ideas which the ,middle ,ages had produced1 and which in part belong to the common stock of ,scholastic science1 in part constitute the weapons of attack for bold innovators4 ,marsilius of ,padua 7,defensor ,pacis1 #acbe71 ,occam 7died #acdg71 ,gerson 7about #adjj71 and the ,cusan#b 7,concordantia ,catholica1 #adcc7 especially1 are now seen in a different light4 ,under the husk of the mediaeval system there is revealed a continuously growing antique-modern kernel1 which draws all the living constituents out of the husk1 and finally bursts it 7,gierke1 ,deutsches ,genossenschaftsrecht1 vol4 iii4 p4 #cab74 ,without going beyond the boundaries of the theocratico-organic view of the state prevalent in the ,middle ,ages1 most of the conceptions whose full development was accomplished by the natural law of modern times were already employed in the ,scholastic period4 ,here we already find the idea of a transition on the part of man from a pre-political natural state of freedom and equality into the state of citizenship2 the idea of the origin of the state by a contract 7social and of submission72 of the sovereignty of the ruler 7rex major populo2 plenitudo potestatis71 and of popular sovereignty#c 7populus major principe72 of the original and inalienable prerogatives of the generality1 and the innate and indestructible right of the individual to freedom2 the thought that the sovereign power is superior to positive law 7princeps legibus solutus71 but subordinate to natural law2 even tendencies toward the division of powers 7legislative and executive71 and the representative system4 ,these are germs which1 at the fall of ,scholasticism and the ecclesiastical reformation1 gain light and air for free development4 ,footnote #a3 ,gierke1 ,johannes ,althusius und die ,entwickelung der naturrechtlichen ,staatstheorien1 ,breslau1 #ahhj2 the same1 ,deutsches ,genossenschaftsrecht1 vol4 iii4 ,,ii1 ,berlin1 #ahha4 ,cf4 further1 ,sigm4 ,riezler1 ,die literarischen ,widersacher der ,ppste1 ,leipsic1 #ahgd2 ,a4 ,franck1 ,rformateurs et ,publicistes de ,l',europe1 ,paris1 #ahfd4 ,footnote #b3 ,nicolas' political ideas are discussed by ,t4 ,stumpf1 ,cologne1 #ahfe4 ,footnote #c3 ,cf4 ,f4 von ,bezold1 ,die ,lehre von der ,volkssouvernitt im ,mittelalter1 7,sybel's ,historische ,zeitschrift1 vol4 xxxvi41 #ahgf74 ,the modern theory of natural law1 of which ,grotius was the most influential representative1 began with ,bodin and ,althusius4 ,the former conceives the contract by which the state is founded as an act of unconditional submission on the part of the community to the ruler1 the latter conceives it merely as the issue of a 7revocable7 commission3 in the view of the one1 the sovereignty of the people is entirely alienated1 transferred1 in that of the other1 administrative authority alone is granted1 conceded1 while the sovereign prerogatives remain with the people4 ,bodin is the founder of the theory of absolutism1 to which ,grotius and the school of ,pufendorf adhere1 though in a more moderate form1 and which ,hobbes develops to the last extreme4 ,althusius1 on the other hand1 by his systematic development of the doctrine of social contract and the inalienable sovereignty of the people1 became the forerunner of ,locke#a and ,rousseau4 ,footnote #a3 ,ulrich ,huber 7#afgd7 may be called the first representative of constitutionalism1 and so the intermediate link between ,althusius and ,locke4 ,cf4 ,gierke1 ,althusius1 p4 #bij4 ,the first independent political philosopher of the modern period was ,nicolo ,machiavelli of ,florence 7#adfi-aebg74 ,patriotism was the soul of his thinking1 questions of practical politics its subject1 and historical fact its basis4#a ,he is entirely unscholastic and unecclesiastical4 ,the power and independence of the nation are for him of supreme importance1 and the greatness and unity of ,italy1 the goal of his political system4 ,he opposes the ,church1 the ecclesiastical state1 and the papacy as the chief hindrances to the attainment of these ends1 and considers the means by which help may be given to the ,fatherland4 ,in normal circumstances a republican constitution1 under which ,sparta1 ,rome1 and ,venice have achieved greatness1 would be the best4 ,but amid the corruption of the times1 the only hope of deliverance is from the absolute rule of a strong prince1 one not to be frightened back from severity and force4 ,should the ruler endeavor to keep within the bounds of morality1 he would inevitably be ruined amid the general wickedness4 ,let him make himself liked1 especially make himself feared1 by the people2 let him be fox and lion together2 let him take care1 when he must have recourse to bad means for the sake of the ,fatherland1 that they are justified by the result1 and still to preserve the appearance of loyalty and honor when he is forced to act in their despite--for the populace always judges by appearance and by results4 ,the worst thing of all is half-way measures1 courses intermediate between good and evil and vacillating between reason and force4 ,even ,moses had to kill the envious refractories1 while ,savonarola1 the unarmed prophet1 was destroyed4 ,god is the friend of the strong1 energy the chief virtue2 and it is well when1 as was the case with the ancient ,romans1 religion is associated with it without paralyzing it4 ,the current view of ,christianity as a religion of humility and sloth1 which preaches only the courage of endurance and makes its followers indifferent to worldly honor1 is unfavorable to the development of political vigor4 ,the ,italians have been made irreligious by the ,church and the priesthood2 the nearer ,rome1 the less pious the people4 ,when ,machiavelli1 in his proposals looking toward ,lorenzo 7,,ii47 dei ,medici 7died #aeai71 approves any means for restoring order1 it must be remembered that he has an exceptional case in mind1 that he does not consider deceit and severity just1 but only unavoidable amid the anarchy and corruption of the time4 ,but neither the loftiness of the end by which he is inspired1 nor the low condition of moral views in his time1 justifies his treatment of the laws as mere means to political ends1 and his unscrupulous subordination of morality to calculating prudence4 ,machiavelli's general view of the world and of life is by no means a comforting one4 ,men are simple1 governed by their passions and by insatiable desires1 dissatisfied with what they have1 and inclined to evil4 ,they do good only of necessity2 it is hunger which makes them industrious and laws that render them good4 ,everything rapidly degenerates3 power produces quiet1 quiet1 idleness1 then disorder1 and1 finally1 ruin1 until men learn by misfortune1 and so order and power again arise4 ,history is a continual rising and falling1 a circle of order and disorder4 ,governmental forms1 even1 enjoy no stability2 monarchy1 when it has run out into tyranny1 is followed by aristocracy1 which gradually passes over into oligarchy2 this in turn is replaced by democracy1 until1 finally1 anarchy becomes unendurable1 and a prince again attains power4 ,no state1 however1 is so powerful as to escape succumbing to a rival before it completes the circuit4 ,protection against the corruption of the state is possible only through the maintenance of its principles1 and its restoration only by a return to the healthy source whence it originated4 ,this is secured either by some external peril compelling to reflection1 or internally1 by wise thought1 by good laws 7framed in accordance with the general welfare1 and not according to the ambition of a minority71 and by the example of good men4 ,footnote #a3 ,in his ,essays on the ,first ,decade of ,livy 7,discorsi71 ,machiavelli investigates the conditions and the laws of the maintenance of states2 while in ,the ,prince 7,,ii ,principe1 #aeae71 he gives the principles for the restoration of a ruined state4 ,besides these he wrote a history of ,florence1 and a work on the art of war1 in which he recommended the establishment of national armies4 ,in the interval between ,machiavelli and the system of natural law of ,grotius1 the ,netherlander 7#afbe3 ,de ,jure ,belli et ,pacis71 belong the socialistic ideal state of the ,englishman1 ,thomas ,more 7,de ,optimo ,reipublicae ,statu deque ,nova ,insula ,utopia1 #aeaf71 the political theory of the ,frenchman1 ,jean ,bodin 7,six ,livres de la ,rpublique1 #aegg1 ,latin #aehd2 also a philosophico-historical treatise1 ,methodus ad ,facilem ,historiarum ,cognitionem1 and the ,colloquium ,heptaplomeres1 edited by ,noack1 #aheg71 and the law of war of the ,italian1 ,albericus ,gentilis1 at his death professor in ,oxford 7,de ,jure ,belli1 #aehh74 ,common to these three was the advocacy of religious tolerance1 from which atheists alone were to be excepted2 common1 also1 their ethical standpoint in opposition to ,machiavelli1 while they are at one with him in regard to the liberation of political and legal science from theology and the ,church4 ,with ,gentilis 7#aeea-afaa7 this separation assigns the first five commandments to divine1 and the remainder to human law1 the latter being based on the laws of human nature 7especially the social impulse74 ,in place of this derivation of law and the state from the nature of man1 ,jean ,bodin 7#aecj-if7 insists on an historical interpretation2 endeavors1 though not always with success1 to give sharp definitions of political concepts2#a rejects composite state forms1 and among the three pure forms1 monarchy1 aristocracy1 and democracy1 rates 7hereditary7 monarchy the highest1 in which the subjects obey the laws of the monarch1 and the latter the laws of ,god or of nature by respecting the freedom and the property of the citizens4 ,so far1 no one has correctly distinguished between forms of the state and modes of administration4 ,even a democratic state may be governed in a monarchical or aristocratic way4 ,so far1 also1 there has been a failure to take into account national peculiarities and differences of situation1 conditions to which legislation must be adjusted4 ,the people of the temperate zone are inferior to those of the ,north in physical power and inferior to those of the ,south in speculative ability1 but superior to both in political gifts and in the sense of justice4 ,the nations of the ,north are guided by force1 those of the ,south by religion1 those between the two by reason4 ,mountaineers love freedom4 ,a fruitful soil enervates men1 when less fertile1 it renders them temperate and industrious4 ,footnote #a3 ,what is the state8 ,what is sovereignty8 ,the former is defined as the rational and supremely empowered control over a number of families and of whatever is common to them2 the latter is absolute and continuous authority over the state1 with the right of imposing laws without being bound by them4 ,the prince1 to whom the sovereignty has been unconditionally relinquished by the people in the contract of submission1 is accountable to ,god alone4 ,attention has only recently been called 7by ,o4 ,gierke1 in the work already mentioned1 ,heft vii4 of his ,untersuchungen zur deutschen ,staats- und ,rechtsgeschichte1 ,breslau1 #ahhj7 to the ,westphalian1 ,johannes ,althusius 7,althusen or ,althaus7 as a legal philosopher worthy of notice4 ,he was born1 #aeeg1 in the ,grafschaft ,witgenstein2 was a teacher of law in ,herborn and ,siegen from #aehf1 and ,syndic in ,emden from #afjd to his death in #afch4 ,his chief legal work was the ,dicaeologica1 #afag 7a recasting of a treatise on ,roman law which appeared in #aehf71 and his chief political work the ,politica1 #afjc 7altered and enlarged #afaj1 and reprinted1 in addition1 three times before his death and thrice subsequently74 ,down to the beginning of the eighteenth century he was esteemed or opposed as chief among the ,monarchomachi1 so called by the ,scotchman1 ,barclay 7,de ,regno et ,regali ,potestate1 #afjj72 since that time he has fallen into undeserved oblivion4 ,the sovereign power 7majestas7 of the people is untransferable and indivisible1 the authority vested in the chosen wielder of the administrative power is revocable1 and the king is merely the chief functionary2 individuals are subjects1 it is true1 but the community retains its sovereignty and has its rights represented over against the chief magistrate by a college of ephors4 ,if the prince violates the compact1 the ephors are authorized and bound to depose the tyrant1 and to banish or execute him4 ,there is but one normal state-form2 monarchy and polyarchy are mere differences in administrative forms4 ,mention should finally be made of his valuation of the social groups which mediate between the individual and the state3 the body politic is based on the narrower associations of the family1 the corporation1 the commune1 and the province4 ,while with ,bodin the historical1 and with ,gentilis the a priori method of treatment predominates1 ,hugo ,grotius#a combines both standpoints4 ,he bases his system on the traditional distinction of two kinds of law4 ,the origin of positive law is historical1 by voluntary enactment2 natural law is rooted in the nature of man1 is eternal1 unchangeable1 and everywhere the same4 ,he begins by distinguishing with ,gentilis the jus humanum from the jus divinum given in the ,scriptures4 ,the former determines1 on the one hand1 the legal relations of individuals1 and1 on the other1 those of whole nations2 it is jus personale and jus gentium4#b ,footnote #a3 ,hugo de ,groot lived #aehc-afde4 ,he was born in ,delft1 became ,fiscal of ,holland in #afjg1 and ,syndic of ,rotterdam and member of the ,states ,general in #afac4 ,a leader of the aristocratic party with ,oldenbarneveld1 he adhered to the ,arminians or ,remonstrants1 was thrown into prison1 freed in #afba through the address of his wife1 and fled to ,paris1 where he lived till #afca as a private scholar1 and1 from #afce1 as ,swedish ambassador4 ,here he composed his epoch-making work1 ,de ,jure ,belli et ,pacis1 #afbe4 ,previous to this had appeared his treatise1 ,de ,veritate ,religionis ,christianae1 #afai1 and the ,mare ,liberum1 #afji1 the latter a chapter from his maiden work1 ,de ,jure ,praedae1 which was not printed until #ahfh4 ,footnote #b3 ,the meaning which ,grotius here gives to jus gentium 7international law71 departs from the customary usage of the ,scholastics1 with whom it denotes the law uniformly acknowledged among all nations4 ,thomas ,aquinas understands by it1 in distinction to jus naturale proper1 the sum of the conclusions deduced from this as a result of the development of human culture and its departure from primitive purity4 ,cf4 ,gierke1 ,althusius1 p4 #bgc2 ,deutsches ,genossenschaftsrecht1 vol4 iii4 p4 #fab4 ,on the meaning of natural law cf4 ,gierke's ,inaugural ,address as ,rector at ,breslau1 ,naturrecht und ,deutsches ,recht1 ,frankfort-on-the-,main1 #ahhc4 ,the distinction between natural and conventional law which has been already mentioned1 finds place within both3 the positive law of persons is called jus civile1 and the positive law of nations1 jus gentium voluntarium4 ,positive law has its origin in regard for utility1 while unwritten law finds its source neither in this nor 7directly7 in the will of ,god1#a but in the rational nature of man4 ,man is by nature social1 and1 as a rational being1 possesses the impulse toward ordered association4 ,unlawful means whatever renders such association of rational beings impossible1 as the violation of promises or the taking away and retention of the property of others4 ,in the 7pre-social7 state of nature1 all belonged to all1 but through the act of taking possession 7occupatio7 property arises 7sea and air are excluded from appropriation74 ,in the state of nature everyone has the right to defend himself against attack and to revenge himself on the evil-doer2 but in the political community1 founded by contract1 personal revenge is replaced by punishment decreed by the civil power4 ,the aim of punishment is not retribution1 but reformation and deterrence4 ,it belongs to ,god alone to punish because of sin committed1 the state can punish only to prevent it4 7,the antithesis quia peccatum est--ne peccetur comes from ,seneca47 ,footnote #a3 ,natural law would be valid even if there were no ,god4 ,with these words the alliance between the modern and the mediaeval philosophy of law is severed4 ,this energetic revival of the distinction already common in the ,middle ,ages between positive and natural1 which ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury brought forward at the same period 7#afbd7 in the philosophy of religion1 gave the catchword for a movement in practical philosophy whose developments extend into the nineteenth century4 ,not only the illumination period1 but all modern philosophy down to ,kant and ,fichte1 is under the ban of the antithesis1 natural and artificial4 ,in all fields1 in ethics as well as in notics1 men return to the primitive or storm back to it1 in the hope of finding there the source of all truth and the cure for all evils4 ,sometimes it is called nature1 sometimes reason 7natural law and rational law are synonymous1 as also natural religion and the religion of the reason71 by which is understood that which is permanent and everywhere the same in contrast to the temporary and the changeable1 that which is innate in contrast to that which has been developed1 in contrast1 further1 to that which has been revealed4 ,whatever passes as law in all places and at all times is natural law1 says ,grotius2 that which all men believe forms the content of natural religion1 says ,lord ,herbert4 ,before long it comes to be said3 that alone is genuine1 true1 healthy1 and valuable which has eternal and universal validity2 all else is not only superfluous and valueless but of evil1 for it must be unnatural and corrupt4 ,this step is taken by ,deism1 with the principle that whatever is not natural or rational in the sense indicated is unnatural and irrational4 ,parallel phenomena are not wanting1 further1 in the philosophy of law 7,gierke1 ,althusius74 ,but these errors must not be too harshly judged4 ,the confidence with which they were made sprang from the real and the historical force of their underlying idea4 ,as already stated1 the natural forms the antithesis to the supernatural1 on the one hand1 and to the historical1 on the other4 ,this combination of the revealed and the historical will not appear strange1 if we remember that the mediaeval view of the world under criticism was1 as ,christian1 historico-religious1 and1 moreover1 that for the philosophy of religion the two in fact coincide1 inasmuch as revelation is conceived as an historical event1 and the historical religions assume the character of revealed4 ,the term arbitrary1 applied to both in common1 was questionable1 however3 as revelation is a divine decree1 so historical institutions are the products of human enactment1 the state1 the result of a contract1 dogmas1 inventions of the priesthood1 the results of development1 artificial constructions6 ,it took long ages for man to free himself from the idea of the artificial and conventional in his view of history4 ,hegel was the first to gather the fruit whose seeds had been sown by ,leibnitz1 ,lessing1 ,herder1 and the historical school of law4 ,as often1 however1 as an attempt was made from this standpoint of origins to show laws in the course of history1 only one could be reached1 a law of necessary degeneration1 interrupted at times by sudden restorations--thus the ,deists1 thus ,machiavelli and ,rousseau4 ,everything degenerates1 science itself only contributes to the fall--therefore1 back to the happy beginnings of things6 ,if1 finally1 we inquire into the position of the ,church in regard to the questions of legal philosophy1 we may say that1 among the ,protestants1 ,luther1 appealing to the ,scripture text1 declares rulers ordained by ,god and sacred1 though at the same time he considers law and politics but remotely related to the inner man2 that ,melancthon1 in his ,elements of ,ethics 7#aech71 as in all his philosophical text-books1#a went back to ,aristotle1 but found the source of natural law in the ,decalogue1 being followed in this by ,oldendorp 7#aeci71 ,hemming 7#aefb71 and ,b4 ,winkler 7#afae74b ,footnote #a3 ,the edition of ,melancthon's works by ,bretschneider and ,bindseil gives the ethical treatises in vol4 xvi4 and the other philosophical treatises in vol4 xiii4 7in part also in vols4 xi4 and xx474 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 ,c4v4 ,kaltenborn1 ,die ,vorlufer des ,hugo ,grotius1 ,leipsic1 #ahdh4 ,on the ,catholic side1 the ,jesuits 7the ,order was founded in #aecd1 and confirmed in #aedj71 on the one hand1 revived the ,pelagian theory of freedom in opposition to the ,luthero-,augustinian doctrine of the servitude of the will1 and1 on the other1 defended the natural origin of the state in a 7revocable7 contract in opposition to its divine origin asserted by the ,reformers1 and the sovereignty of the people even to the sanctioning of tyrannicide4 ,bellarmin 7#aedb-afba7 taught that the prince derives his authority from the people1 and as the latter have given him power1 so they retain the natural right to take it back and bestow it elsewhere4 ,the view of ,juan ,mariana 7#aecg-afbd2 ,de ,rege1 #aeii7 is that1 as the people in transferring rights to the prince retain still greater power themselves1 they are entitled in given cases to call the king to account4 ,if he corrupts the state by evil manners1 and1 degenerating into the tyrant1 despises religion and the laws1 he may1 as a public enemy1 be deprived by anyone of his authority and his life4 ,it is lawful to arrest tyranny in any way1 and those have always been highly esteemed who1 from devotion to the public welfare1 have sought to kill the tyrant4 #e4 ,skepticism in ,france4 ,toward the end of the sixteenth century1 and in the very country which was to become the cradle of modern philosophy1 there appeared1 as a forerunner of the new thinking1 a skepticism in which that was taken for complete and ultimate truth which with ,descartes constitutes merely a moment or transition point in the inquiry4 ,the earliest and the most ingenious among the representatives of this philosophy of doubt was ,michel de ,montaigne 7#aecc-ib71 who in his ,essays--which were the first of their kind and soon found an imitator in ,bacon2 they appeared in #aehj in two volumes1 with an additional volume in #aehh--;combined delicate observation and keen thinking1 boldness and prudence1 elegance and solidity4 ,the ,french honor him as one of their foremost writers4 ,the most important among these treatises or essays is considered to be the ,apology for ,raymond of ,sabunde 7ii4 #ab7 with valuable excursuses on faith and knowledge4 ,montaigne bases his doubt on the diversity of individual views1 each man's opinion differing from his fellow's1 while truth must be one4 ,there exists no certain1 no universally admitted knowledge4 ,the human reason is feeble and blind in all things1 knowledge is deceptive1 especially the philosophy of the day1 which clings to tradition1 which fills the memory with learned note-stuff1 but leaves the understanding void and1 instead of things1 interprets interpretations only4 ,both sensuous and rational knowledge are untrustworthy3 the former1 because it cannot be ascertained whether its deliverances conform to reality1 and the latter1 because its premises1 in order to be valid1 need others in turn for their own establishment1 etc41 ad infinitum4 ,every advance in inquiry makes our ignorance the more evident2 the doubter alone is free4 ,but though certainty is denied us in regard to truth1 it is not withheld in regard to duty4 ,in fact1 a twofold rule of practical life is set up for us3 nature1 or life in accordance with nature and founded on self-knowledge1 and supernatural revelation1 the ,gospel 7to be understood only by the aid of divine grace74 ,submission to the divine ruler and benefactor is the first duty of the rational soul4 ,from obedience proceeds every virtue1 from over-subtlety and conceit1 which is the product of fancied knowledge1 comes every sin4 ,montaigne1 like all who know men1 has a sharp eye for human frailty4 ,he depicts the universal weakness of human nature and the corruption of his time with great vivacity and not without a certain pleasure in the obscene2 and besides folly and passion1 complains above all of the fact that so few understand the art of enjoyment1 of which he1 a true man of the world1 was master4 ,the skeptico-practical standpoint of ,montaigne was developed into a system by the ,paris preacher1 ,pierre ,charron 7#aeda-afjc71 in his three books ,on ,wisdom 7#afja74 ,doubt has a double object3 to keep alive the spirit of inquiry and to lead us on to faith4 ,from the fact that reason and experience are liable to deception and that the mind has at its disposal no means of distinguishing truth from falsehood1 it follows that we are born not to possess truth but to seek it4 ,truth dwells alone in the bosom of ,god2 for us doubt and investigation are the only good amid all the error and tribulation which surround us4 ,life is all misery4 ,man is capable of mediocrity alone2 he can neither be entirely good nor entirely evil2 he is weak in virtue1 weak in vice1 and the best degenerates in his hands4 ,even religion suffers from the universal imperfection4 ,it is dependent on nationality and country1 and each religion is based on its predecessor2 the supernatural origin of which all religions boast belongs in fact to ,christianity alone1 which is to be accepted with humility and with submission of the reason4 ,charron lays chief emphasis1 however1 on the practical side of ,christianity1 the fulfillment of duty2 and the wisdom which forms the subject of his book is synonymous with uprightness 7probit71 the way to which is opened up by self-knowledge and whose reward is repose of spirit4 ,and yet we are not to practice it for the sake of the reward1 but because nature and reason1 i4e41 ,god1 absolutely 7entirely apart from the pleasurable results of virtue7 require us to be good4 ,true uprightness is more than mere legality1 for even when outward action is blameless1 the motives may be mixed4 ,i desire men to be upright without paradise and hell4 ,religion seeks to crown morality1 not to generate it2 virtue is earlier and more natural than piety4 ,in his definition of the relation between religion and ethics1 his delimitation of morality from legality1 and his insistence on the purity of motives 7do right1 because the inner rational law commands it71 an anticipation of ,kantian principles may be recognized4 ,under ,francis ,sanchez 7died #afcb2 his chief work is entitled ,quod ,nihil ,scitur71 a ,portuguese by birth1 and professor of medicine in ,montpellier and ,toulouse1 skepticism was transformed from melancholy contemplation into a fresh1 vigorous search after new problems4 ,in the place of book-learning1 which disgusts him by its smell of the closet1 its continued prating of ,aristotle1 and its self-exhaustion in useless verbalism1 ,sanchez desires to substitute a knowledge of things4 ,perfect knowledge1 it is true1 can be hoped for only when subject and object correspond to each other4 ,but how is finite man to grasp the infinite universe8 ,experience1 the basis of all knowledge1 gropes about the outer surface of things and illumines particulars only1 without the ability either to penetrate to their inner nature or to comprehend the whole4 ,we know only what we produce4 ,thus ,god knows the world which he has made1 but to us is vouchsafed merely an insight into mediate or second causes1 causae secundae4 ,here1 however1 a rich field still lies open before philosophy--only let her attack her problem with observation and experiment rather than with words4 ,the ,french nation1 predisposed to skepticism by its prevailing acuteness1 has never lacked representatives of skeptical philosophy4 ,the transition from the philosophers of doubt whom we have described to the great ,bayle was formed by ,la ,mothe le ,vayer 7died #afgb2 ,five ,dialogues1 #afga71 the tutor of ,louis ,,xiv41 and ,p4,d4 ,huet7ius71 ,bishop of ,avranches 7died #agba71 who agreed in holding that a recognition of the weakness of the reason is the best preparation for faith4 #f4 ,german ,mysticism4 ,in a period which has given birth to a skeptical philosophy1 one never looks in vain for the complementary phenomenon of mysticism4 ,the stone offered by doubt in place of bread is incapable of satisfying the impulse after knowledge1 and when the intellect grows weary and despairing1 the heart starts out in the quest after truth4 ,then its path leads inward1 the mind turns in upon itself1 seeks to learn the truth by inner experience and life1 by inward feeling and possession1 and waits in quietude for divine illumination4 ,the ,german mysticism of ,eckhart#a 7about #acjj71 which had been continued in ,suso and ,tauler and had received a practical direction in the ,netherlands1--,ruysbroek 7about #acej7 to ,thomas ,kempis 7about #adej71--now puts forth new branches and blossoms at the turning point of the centuries4 ,footnote #a3 ,master ,eckhart's ,works have been edited by ,f4 ,pfeiffer1 ,leipsic1 #aheg4 ,the following have written on him3 ,jos4 ,bach1 ,vienna1 #ahfd2 ,ad4 ,lasson1 ,berlin1 #ahfh2 the same1 in the second part of ,ueberweg's ,grundriss1 last section2 ,denifle1 in the ,archiv fr ,litteratur und ,kulturgeschichte des ,mittelalters4 ii4 #dag seq42 ,h4 ,siebeck1 ,der ,begriff des ,gemuts in der deutschen ,mystik 7,beitrge zur ,entstehungsgeschichte der neueren ,psychologie1 i71 ,giessen ,programme1 #ahia4 ,luther himself was originally a mystic1 with a high appreciation of ,tauler and ,thomas ,kempis1 and published in #aeah that attractive little book by an anonymous ,frankfort author1 the ,german ,theology4 ,when1 later1 he fell into literalism1 it was the mysticism of ,german ,protestantism which1 in opposition to the new orthodoxy1 held fast to the original principle of the ,reformation1 i4e41 to the principle that faith is not assent to historical facts1 not the acceptance of dogmas1 but an inner experience1 a renewal of the whole man4 ,religion and theology must not be confounded4 ,religion is not doctrine1 but a new birth4 ,with ,schwenckfeld1 and also with ,franck1 mysticism is still essentially pietism2 with ,weigel1 and by the addition of ideas from ,paracelsus1 it is transformed into theosophy1 and as such reaches its culmination in ,bhme4 ,caspar ,schwenckfeld sought to spiritualize the ,lutheran movement and protested against its being made into a pastors' religion4 ,though he had been aroused by ,luther's pioneer feat1 he soon saw that the latter had not gone far enough2 and in his ,letter on the ,eucharist1 #aebg1 he defined the points of difference between ,luther's view of the ,sacrament and his own4 ,luther1 he maintained1 had fallen back to an historical view of faith1 whereas the faith which saves can never consist in the outward acceptance of an historical fact4 ,he who makes salvation dependent on preaching and the ,sacrament1 confuses the invisible and the visible ,church1 ,ecclesia interna and externa4 ,the layman is his own priest4 ,according to ,sebastian ,franck 7#aejj-de71 there are in man1 as in everything else1 two principles1 one divine and one selfish1 ,christ and ,adam1 an inner and an outer man2 if he submits himself to the former 7by a timeless choice71 he is spiritual1 if to the latter1 carnal4 ,god is not the cause of sin1 but man1 who turns the divine power to good or evil4 ,he who denies himself to live ,god is a ,christian1 whether he knows and confesses the ,gospel or not4 ,faith does not consist in assent1 but in inner transformation4 ,the historical element in ,christianity and its ceremonial observances are only the external form and garb 7its figure71 have merely a symbolic significance as media of communication1 as forms of revelation for the eternal truth1 proclaimed but not founded by ,christ2 the ,bible is merely the shadow of the living ,word of ,god4 ,valentin ,weigel 7born in #aecc1 pastor in ,zschopau from #aefg71 whose works were not printed until after his death1 combines his predecessors' doctrine of inner and eternal ,christianity with the microcosmos-idea of ,paracelsus4 ,god1 who lacks nothing1 has not created the world in order to gain1 but in order to give4 ,man not only bears the earthly world in his body1 and the heavenly world of the angels in his reason 7his spirit71 but by virtue of his intellect 7his immortal soul7 participates in the divine world also4 ,as he is thus a microcosm and1 moreover1 an image of ,god1 all his knowledge becomes self-knowledge1 both sensuous perception 7which is not caused by the object1 but only occasioned by it71 and the knowledge of ,god4 ,the literalist knows not ,god1 but he alone who bears ,god in himself4 ,man is favored above other beings with the freedom to dwell in himself or in ,god4 ,when man came out from ,god1 he was his own tempter and made himself proud and selfish4 ,thus evil1 which had before remained hidden1 was revealed1 and became sin4 ,as the separation from ,god is an eternal act1 so also redemption and resurrection form an inner event4 ,christ is born in everyone who gives up the ,i-ness 7,ichheit72 each regenerate man is a son of ,god4 ,but no vicarious suffering can save him who does not put off the old ,adam1 no matter how much an atheology sunk in literalism may comfort itself with the hope that man can drink at another's cost 7that the merit of another is imputed to him74#a ,footnote #a3 ,weigel is discussed by ,j4,o4 ,opel1 ,leipsic1 #ahfd4 ,german mysticism reaches its culmination in the ,grlitz cobbler1 ,jacob ,bhme 7#aege-afbd2 ,aurora1 or the ,rising ,dawn2 ,mysterium ,magnum1 or on the ,first ,book of ,moses1 etc4 ,the works of ,bhme1 collected by his apostle1 ,gichtel1 appeared in #afhb in ten volumes1 and in #agcj in six volumes2 a new edition was prepared by ,schiebler in #ahca-dg1 with a second edition in #ahfa seq474 ,bhme's doctrine#a centers about the problem of the origin of evil4 ,he transfers this to ,god himself and joins therewith the leading thought of ,eckhart1 that ,god goes through a process1 that he proceeds from an unrevealed to a revealed condition4 ,at the sight of a tin vessel glistening in the sun1 he conceived1 as by inspiration1 the idea that as the sunlight reveals itself on the dark vessel so all light needs darkness and all good evil in order to appear and to become knowable4 ,everything becomes perceptible through its opposite alone3 gentleness through sternness1 love through anger1 affirmation through negation4 ,without evil there would be no life1 no movement1 no distinctions1 no revelation2 all would be unqualified1 uniform nothingness4 ,and as in nature nothing exists in which good and evil do not reside1 so in ,god1 besides power or the good1 a contrary exists1 without which he would remain unknown to himself4 ,the theogonic process is twofold3 self-knowledge on the part of ,god1 and his revelation outward1 as eternal nature1 in seven moments4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,windelband's fine exposition1 ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 vol4 i4 #ai4 ,the following have written on ,bhme3 ,fr4 ,baader 7in vols4 iii4 and xiii4 of his ,werke72 ,hamberger1 ,munich1 #ahdd3 ,h4 ,a4 ,fechner1 ,grlitz1 #aheg2 ,a4 v4 ,harless1 ,berlin1 #ahgj1 new edition1 ,leipsic1 #ahhb4 ,at the beginning of the first development ,god is will without object1 eternal quietude and rest1 unqualified groundlessness without determinate volition4 ,but in this divine nothingness there soon awakes the hunger after the aught 7somewhat1 existence71 the impulse to apprehend and manifest self1 and as ,god looks into and forms an image of himself1 he divides into ,father and ,son4 ,the ,son is the eye with which the ,father intuits himself1 and the procession of this vision from the groundless is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,thus far ,god1 who is one in three1 is only understanding or wisdom1 wherein the images of all the possible are contained2 to the intuition of self must be added divisibility2 it is only through the antithesis of the revealed ,god and the unrevealed groundless that the former becomes an actual trinity 7in which the persons stand related as essence1 power1 and activity71 and the latter becomes desire or nature in ,god4 ,at the creation of the world seven equally eternal qualities1 source-spirits or nature-forms1 are distinguished in the divine nature4 ,first comes desire as the contractile1 tart quality or pain1 from which proceed hardness and heat2 next comes mobility as the expansive1 sweet quality1 as this shows itself in water4 ,as the nature of the first was to bind and the second was fluid1 so they both are combined in the bitter quality or the pain of anxiety1 the principle of sensibility4 7,contraction and expansion are the conditions of perceptibility47 ,from these three forms fright or lightning suddenly springs forth4 ,this fourth quality is the turning-point at which light flames up from darkness and the love of ,god breaks forth from out his anger2 as the first three1 or four1 forms constitute the kingdom of wrath1 so the latter three constitute the kingdom of joy4 ,the fifth quality is called light or the warm fire of love1 and has for its functions external animation and communication2 the sixth1 report and sound1 is the principle of inner animation and intelligence2 the seventh1 the formative quality1 corporeality1 comprehends all the preceding in itself as their dwelling4 ,the dark fire of anger 7the hard1 sweet1 and bitter qualities7 and the light fire of love 7light1 report1 and corporeality71 separated by the lightning-fire1 in which ,god's wrath is transformed into mercy1 stand related as evil and good4 ,the evil in ,god is not sin1 but simply the inciting sting1 the principle of movement2 which1 moreover1 is restrained1 overcome1 transfigured by gentleness4 ,sin arises only when the creature refuses to take part in the advance from darkness to light1 and obstinately remains in the fire of anger instead of forcing his way through to the fire of love4 ,thus that which was one in ,god is divided4 ,lucifer becomes enamored of the tart quality 7the centrum naturae or the matrix7 and will not grow into the heart of ,god2 and it is only after such lingering behind that the kingdom of wrath become a real hell4 ,heaven and hell are not future conditions1 but are experienced here on earth2 he who instead of subduing animality becomes enamored of it1 stands under the wrath of ,god2 whereas he who abjures self dwells in the joyous kingdom of mercy4 ,he alone truly believes who himself becomes ,christ1 who repeats in himself what ,christ suffered and attained4 ,the creation of the material world is a result of ,lucifer's fall4 ,bhme's description of it1 based on the ,mosaic account of creation1 may be passed without notice2 similarly his view of cognition1 familiar from the earlier mystics1 that all knowledge is derived from self-knowledge1 that our destination is to comprehend ,god from ourselves1 and the world from ,god4 ,man1 whose body1 spirit1 and soul hold in them the earthly1 the sidereal1 and the heavenly1 is at once a microcosm and a little ,god4 ,under the intractable form of ,bhme's speculations and amid their riotous fancy1 no one will fail to recognize their true-hearted sensibility and an unusual depth and vigor of thought4 ,they found acceptance in ,england and ,france1 and have been revived in later times in the systems of ,baader and ,schelling4 #g4 ,the ,foundation of ,modern ,physics4 ,in no field has the modern period so completely broken with tradition as in physics4 ,the correctness of the ,copernican theory is proved by ,kepler's laws of planetary movement1 and ,galileo's telescopical observations2 the scientific theory of motion is created by ,galileo's laws of projectiles1 falling bodies1 and the pendulum2 astronomy and mechanics form the entrance to exact physics--,descartes ventures an attempt at a comprehensive mechanical explanation of nature4 ,and thus an entirely new movement is at hand4 ,forerunners1 it is true1 had not been lacking4 ,roger ,bacon 7#abad-id7 had already sought to obtain an empirical knowledge of nature based upon mathematics2 and the great painter ,leonardo da ,vinci 7#adeb-aeai7 had discovered the principles of mechanics1 though without gaining much influence over the work of his contemporaries4 ,it was reserved for the triple star which has been mentioned to overthrow ,scholasticism4 ,the conceptions with which the ,scholastic-,aristotelian philosophy of nature sought to get at phenomena--substantial forms1 properties1 qualitative change--are thrown aside2 their place is taken by matter1 forces working under law1 rearrangement of parts4 ,the inquiry into final causes is rejected as an anthropomorphosis of natural events1 and deduction from efficient causes is alone accepted as scientific explanation4 ,size1 shape1 number1 motion1 and law are the only and the sufficient principles of explanation4 ,for magnitudes alone are knowable2 wherever it is impossible to measure and count1 to determine force mathematically1 there rigorous1 exact science ceases4 ,nature a system of regularly moved particles of mass2 all that takes place mechanical movement1 viz41 the combination1 separation1 dislocation1 oscillation of bodies and corpuscles2 mathematics the organon of natural science6 ,into this circle of modern scientific categories are articulated1 further1 ,galileo's new conception of motion and the conception of atoms1 which1 previously employed by physicists1 as ,daniel ,sennert 7#afai7 and others1 is now brought into general acceptance by ,gassendi1 while the four elements are definitively discarded 7,lasswitz1 ,geschichte der ,atomistik1 #ahij74 ,still another doctrine of ,democritus is now revived2 an evident symptom of the quantification and mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena being furnished by the doctrine of the subjectivity of sense qualities1 in which1 although on varying grounds1 ,kepler1 ,galileo1 ,descartes1 ,gassendi1 and ,hobbes agree4#a ,descartes and ,hobbes will be discussed later4 ,here we may give a few notes on their fellow laborers in the service of the mechanical science of nature4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 chapter vi4 in ,natorp's work on ,descartes' ,erkenntnisstheorie1 ,marburg1 #ahhb1 and the same author's ,analekten zur ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xviii4 #ahhb1 p4 #egb seq4 ,we begin with ,john ,kepler#a 7#aega-afcj2 chief work1 ,the ,new ,astronomy or ,celestial ,physics1 in ,commentaries on the ,motions of ,mars1 #afji74 ,kepler's merit as an astronomer has long obscured his philosophical importance1 although his discovery of the laws of planetary motion was the outcome of endeavors to secure an exact foundation for his theory of the world4 ,the latter is aesthetic in character1 centers about the idea of a universal world-harmony1 and employs mathematics as an instrument of confirmation4 ,for the fact that this theory satisfies the mind1 and1 on the whole1 corresponds to our empirical impression of the order of nature1 is not enough in ,kepler's view to guarantee its truth2 by exact methods1 by means of induction and experiment1 a detailed proof from empirical facts must be found for the existence not only of a general harmony1 but of definitely fixed proportions4 ,herewith the philosophical application of mathematics loses that obscure mystical character which had clung to it since the time of ,pythagoras1 and had strongly manifested itself as late as in ,nicolas of ,cusa4 ,mathematical relations constitute the deepest essence of the real and the object of science4 ,where matter is1 there is geometry2 the latter is older than the world and as eternal as the divine ,spirit2 magnitudes are the source of things4 ,true knowledge exists only where quanta are known2 the presupposition of the capacity for knowledge is the capacity to count2 the spirit cognizes sensuous relations by means of the pure1 archetypal1 intellectual relations born in it1 which1 before the advent of sense-impressions1 have lain concealed behind the veil of possibility2 inclination and aversion between men1 their delight in beauty1 the pleasant impression of a view1 depend upon an unconscious and instinctive perception of proportions4 ,this quantitative view of the world1 which1 with a consciousness of its novelty as well as of its scope1 is opposed to the qualitative view of ,aristotle2#b the opinion that the essence of the human spirit1 as well as of the divine1 nay1 the essence of all things1 consists in activity2 that1 consequently1 the soul is always active1 being conscious of its own harmony at least in a confused way1 even when not conscious of external proportions2 further1 the doctrine that nature loves simplicity1 avoids the superfluous1 and is accustomed to accomplish large results with a few principles--these remind one of ,leibnitz4 ,at the same time1 the law of parsimony and the methodological conclusions concerning true hypotheses and real causes 7an hypothesis must not be an artificially constructed set of fictions1 forcibly adjusted to reality1 but is to trace back phenomena to their real grounds71 obedience to which enabled him to deduce a priori from causes the conclusions which ,copernicus by fortunate conjecture had gathered inductively from effects--these made our thinker a forerunner of ,newton4 ,the physical method of explanation must not be corrupted either by theological conceptions 7comets are entirely natural phenomena67 or by anthropomorphic views1 which endow nature with spiritual powers4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,sigwart1 ,kleine ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #ahb seq42 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,beitrge zur ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 p4 #ed seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,aristotle erred when he considered qualitative distinctions 7idem and aliud7 ultimate4 ,these are to be traced back to quantitative differences1 and the aliud or diversum is to be replaced by plus et minus4 ,there is nothing absolutely light1 but only relatively4 ,since all things are distinguished only by more or less1 the possibility of mediating members or proportions between them is given4 ,intermediate between ,bacon and ,descartes1 both in the order of time and in the order of fact1 and a co-founder of modern philosophy1 stands ,galileo ,galilei 7#aefd-afda74a ,galileo exhibits all the traits characteristic of modern thinking3 the reference from words to things1 from memory to perception and thought1 from authority to self-ascertained principles1 from chance opinion1 arbitrary opinion1 and the traditional doctrines of the schools1 to knowledge1 that is1 to one's own1 well grounded1 indisputable insight1 from the study of human affairs to the study of nature4 ,study ,aristotle1 but do not become his slave2 instead of yielding yourselves captive to his views1 use your own eyes2 do not believe that the mind remains unproductive unless it allies itself with the understanding of another2 copy nature1 not copies merely6 ,he equals ,bacon in his high estimation of sensuous experience in contrast to the often illusory conclusions of the reason1 and of the value of induction2 but he does not conceal from himself the fact that observation is merely the first step in the process of cognition1 leaving the chief rle for the understanding4 ,this1 supplementing the defect of experience--the impossibility of observing all cases--by its a priori concept of law and with its inferences overstepping the bounds of experience1 first makes induction possible1 brings the facts established into connection 7their combination under laws is thought1 not experience71 reduces them to their primary1 simple1 unchangeable1 and necessary causes by abstraction from contingent circumstances1 regulates perception1 corrects sense-illusions1 i4 e41 the false judgments originating in experience1 and decides concerning the reality or fallaciousness of phenomena4 ,demonstration based on experience1 a close union of observation and thought1 of fact and ,idea 7law7--these are the requirements made by ,galileo and brilliantly fulfilled in his discoveries2 this1 the inductive speculation1 as ,dhring terms it1 which derives laws of far-reaching importance from inconspicuous facts2 this1 as ,galileo himself recognizes1 the distinctive gift of the investigator4 ,galileo anticipates ,descartes in regard to the subjective character of sense qualities and their reduction to quantitative distinctions1#b while he shares with him the belief in the typical character of mathematics and the mechanical theory of the world4 ,the truth of geometrical propositions and demonstrations is as unconditionally certain for man as for ,god1 only that man learns them by a discursive process1 whereas ,god's intuitive understanding comprehends them with a glance and knows more of them than man4 ,the book of the universe is written in mathematical characters2 motion is the fundamental phenomenon in the world of matter2 our knowledge reaches as far as phenomena are measurable2 the qualitative nature of force1 back of its quantitative determinations1 remains unknown to us4 ,when ,galileo maintains that the ,copernican theory is philosophically true and not merely astronomically useful1 thus interpreting it as more than a hypothesis1 he is guided by the conviction that the simplest explanation is the most probable one1 that truth and beauty are one1 as in general he concedes a guiding though not a controlling influence in scientific work to the aesthetic demand of the mind for order1 harmony1 and unity in nature1 to correspond to the wisdom of the ,creator4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,natorp's essay on ,galileo1 in vol4 xviii4 of the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 #ahhb4 ,footnote #a3 ,this doctrine is developed by ,galileo in the controversial treatise against ,padre ,grassi1 ,the ,scales 7,il ,saggiatore1 #afbc1 in the ,florence edition of his collected works1 #ahdb seq41 vol4 iv4 pp4 #adi-cfi2 cf4 ,natorp1 ,descartes' ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahhb1 chap4 vi474 ,in substance1 moreover1 this doctrine is found1 as ,heussler remarks1 ,baco1 p4 #id1 in ,bacon himself1 in ,valerius ,terminus 7,works1 ,spedding1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bag-beb47 ,one of the most noted and influential among the contemporaries1 countrymen1 and opponents of ,descartes1 was the priest and natural scientist1 ,petrus ,gassendi1#a from #afcc ,provost of ,digne1 later for a short period professor of mathematics at ,paris4 ,his renewal of ,epicureanism1 to which he was impelled by temperament1 by his reverence for ,lucretius1 and by the anti-,aristotelian tendency of his thinking1 was of far more importance for modern thought than the attempts to revive the ancient systems which have been mentioned above 7p4 #bi74 ,its superior influence depends on the fact that1 in the conception of atoms1 it offered exact inquiry a most useful point of attachment4 ,the conflict between the ,gassendists and the ,cartesians1 which at first was a bitter one1 centered1 as far as physics was concerned1 around the value of the atomic hypothesis as contrasted with the corpuscular and vortex theory which ,descartes had opposed to it4 ,it soon became apparent1 however1 that these two thinkers followed along essentially the same lines in the philosophy of nature1 sharply as they were opposed in their notical principles4 ,descartes' doctrine of body is conceived from an entirely materialistic standpoint1 his anthropology1 indeed1 going further than the principles of his system would allow4 ,gassendi1 on the other hand1 recognizes an immaterial1 immortal reason1 traces the origin of the world1 its marvelous arrangement1 and the beginning of motion back to ,god1 and1 since the ,bible so teaches1 believes the earth to be at rest1--holding that1 for this reason1 the decision must be given in favor of ,tycho ,brah and against ,copernicus1 although the hypothesis of the latter affords the simpler and1 scientifically1 the more probable explanation4 ,both thinkers rejoice in their agreement with the dogmas of the ,church1 only that with ,descartes it came unsought in the natural progress of his thought1 while ,gassendi held to it in contradiction to his system4 ,it is the more surprising that ,gassendi's works escaped being put upon the ,index1 a fate which overtook those of ,descartes in #affc4 ,footnote #b3 ,pierre ,gassendi1 #aeib-afee3 ,on the ,life and ,character of ,epicurus1 #afdg2 ,notes on the ,tenth ,book of ,diogenes ,lartius1 with a ,survey of the ,doctrine of ,epicurus1 #afdi4 ,works1 ,lyons1 #afeh1 ,florence1 #agbg4 ,cf4 ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism1 book i4 #c1 chap1 #a2 ,natorp1 ,analekten1 ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xviii4 #ahhb1 p4 #egb seq4 ,as modern thought derives its mechanical temper equally from both these sources1 and the natural science of the day has appropriated the corpuscles of ,descartes under the name of molecules1 as well as the atoms of ,gassendi1 though not without considerable modification in both conceptions 7,lange1 vol4 i4 p4 #bfi71 so we find attempts at mediation at an early period4 ,while ,pre ,mersenne 7#aehh-afdh71 who was well versed in physics1 sought an indecisive middle course between these two philosophers1 the ,english chemist1 ,robert ,boyle1 effected a successful synthesis of both4 ,the son of ,richard ,boyle1 ,earl of ,cork1 he was born at ,lismore in #afbf1 lived in literary retirement at ,oxford from #afed1 and later in ,cambridge1 and died1 #afib1 in ,london1 president of the ,royal ,society4 ,his principal work1 ,the ,sceptical ,chemist 7,works1 vol4 i4 p4 #bij seq471 appeared in #affa1 the tract1 ,de ,ipsa ,natura1 in #afhb4a ,by his introduction of the atomic conception he founded an epoch in chemistry1 which1 now for the first1 was freed from bondage to the ideas of ,aristotle and the alchemists4 ,atomism1 however1 was for ,boyle merely an instrument of method and not a philosophical theory of the world4 ,a sincerely religious man1#b he regards with disfavor both the atheism of ,epicurus and his complete rejection of teleology--the world-machine points to an intelligent ,creator and a purpose in creation2 motion1 to a divine impulse4 ,he defends1 on the other hand1 the right of free inquiry against the priesthood and the pedantry of the schools1 holding that the supernatural must be sharply distinguished from the natural1 and mere conjectures concerning insoluble problems from positions susceptible of experimental proof2 while1 in opposition to submission to authority1 he remarks that the current coin of opinion must be estimated1 not by the date when and the person by whom it was minted but by the value of the metal alone4 ,cartesian elements in ,boyle are the start from doubt1 the derivation of all motion from pressure and impact1 and the extension of the mechanical explanation to the organic world4 ,his inquiries relate exclusively to the world of matter so far as it was completed on the last day but one of creation4 ,he defends empty space against ,descartes and ,hobbes4 ,he is the first to apply the mediaeval terms1 primary and secondary qualities1 to the antithesis between objective properties which really belong to things1 and sensuous or subjective qualities present only in the feeling subject4#c ,footnote #a3 ,boyle's ,works were published in ,latin at ,geneva1 in #affj1 in six volumes1 and in #agad in five2 an edition by ,birch appeared at ,london1 #agdd1 in five volumes1 second edition1 #aggb1 in six4 ,cf4 ,buckle1 ,history of ,civilization in ,england1 vol4 i4 chap4 vii4 pp4 #bfe-bfh2 ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism1 vol4 i4 pp4 #bih-cjf2 vol4 ii4 p4 #cea seq42 ,georg ,baku1 ,der ,streit ber den ,naturbegriff1 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 xcviii41 #ahia1 p4 #afb seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,the foundation named after him had for its object to promote by means of lectures the investigation of nature on the basis of atomism1 and1 at the same time1 to free it from the reproach of leading to atheism and to show its harmony with natural religion4 ,samuel ,clarke's work on ,the ,being and ,attributes of ,god1 #agje1 originated in lectures delivered on this foundation4 ,footnote #c3 ,eucken1 ,geschichte der philosophischen ,terminologie1 pp4 #id1 #aif4 #h4 ,philosophy in ,england to the ,middle of the ,seventeenth ,century4 7a7 ,bacon's ,predecessors4--,the darkness which lay over the beginnings of modern ,english philosophy has been but incompletely dispelled by the meritorious work of ,ch4 de ,rmusat 7,histoire de la ,philosophie en ,angleterre depuis ,bacon jusqu'a ,locke1 #b vols41 #ahgh74 ,the most recent investigations of ,j4 ,freudenthal 7,beitrge zur ,geschichte der ,englischen ,philosophie1 in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vols4 iv4 and v41 #ahia7 have brought assistance in a way deserving of thanks1 since they lift at important points the veil which concealed ,bacon's relations to his predecessors and contemporaries1 by describing the scientific tendencies and achievements of ,digby and ,temple4 ,the following may be taken from his results4 ,everard ,digby 7died #aeib2 chief work1 ,theoria ,analytica1 #aegi71 instructor in logic in ,cambridge from #aegc1 who was strongly influenced by ,reuchlin and who favored an ,aristotelian-,alexandrian-,cabalistic eclecticism1 was the first to disseminate ,neoplatonic ideas in ,england2 and1 in spite of the lack of originality in his systematic presentation of theoretical philosophy1 aroused the study of this branch in ,england into new life4 ,his opponent1 ,sir ,william ,temple #a 7#aeec-afbf71 by his defense and exposition of the doctrine of ,ramus 7introduced into ,great ,britain by ,george ,buchanan and his pupil1 ,andrew ,melville71 made ,cambridge the chief center of ,ramism4 ,he was the first who openly opposed ,aristotle4 ,footnote #a3 ,temple was secretary to ,philip ,sidney1 ,william ,davison1 and the ,earl of ,essex1 and1 from #afai1 ,provost of ,trinity ,college1 ,dublin4 ,his maiden work1 ,de ,unica ,p4 ,rami ,methodo1 which he published under the pseudonym1 ,mildapettus #aehj1 was aimed at ,digby's ,de ,duplici ,methodo4 ,his chief work1 ,p4 ,rami ,dialectics ,libri ,dua ,scholiis1 ,illustrati1 appeared in #aehd4 ,bacon was undoubtedly acquainted with both these writers and took ideas from both4 ,digby represented the scholastic tendency1 which ,bacon vehemently opposed1 yet without being able completely to break away from it4 ,temple was one of those who supplied him with weapons for this conflict4 ,finally1 it must be mentioned that many of the ,english scientists of the time1 especially ,william ,gilbert 7#aedj-afjc2 ,de ,magnete1 #afjj71 physician to ,queen ,elizabeth1 used induction in their work before ,bacon advanced his theory of method4 7b7 ,bacon4--,the founder of the empirical philosophy of modern times was ,francis ,bacon 7#aefa-afbf71 a contemporary of ,shakespeare4 ,bacon began his political career by sitting in ,parliament for many years under ,queen ,elizabeth1 as whose counsel he was charged with the duty of engaging in the prosecution of his patron1 the ,earl of ,essex1 and at whose command he prepared a justification of the process4 ,under ,james ,i1 he attained the highest offices and honors1 being made ,keeper of the ,great ,seal in #afag1 ,lord ,chancellor and ,baron ,verulam in #afah1 and ,viscount ,st4 ,albans in #afba4 ,in this last year came his fall4 ,he was charged with bribery1 and condemned2 the king remitted the imprisonment and fine1 and for the remainder of his life ,bacon devoted himself to science1 rejecting every suggestion toward a renewal of his political activity4 ,the moral laxity of the times throws a mitigating light over his fault2 but he cannot be aquitted of self-seeking1 love of money and of display1 and excessive ambition4 ,as ,macaulay says in his famous essay1 he was neither malignant nor tyrannical1 but he lacked warmth of affection and elevation of sentiment2 there were many things which he loved more than virtue1 and many which he feared more than guilt4 ,he first gained renown as an author by his ethical1 economic1 and political ,essays1 after the manner of ,montaigne2 of these the first ten appeared in #aeig1 in the third edition 7#afbe7 increased to fifty-eight2 the ,latin translation bears the title ,sermones ,fideles4 ,his great plan for a restoration of the sciences was intended to be carried out in four1 or rather1 in six parts4 ,but only the first two parts of the ,instauratio ,magna were developed3 the encyclopaedia1 or division of all sciences#a1 a chart of the globus intellectualis1 on which was depicted what each science had accomplished and what still remained for each to do2 and the development of the new method4 ,bacon published his survey of the circle of the sciences in the ,english work1 the ,advancement of ,learning1 #afje1 a much enlarged revision of which1 ,de ,dignitate et ,augmentis ,scientiarum1 appeared in ,latin in #afbc4 ,in #afab he printed as a contribution to methodology the draft1 ,cogitata et ,visa 7written #afjg71 later recast into the first book of the ,novum ,organum1 #afbj4 ,this title1 ,novum ,organum1 of itself indicates opposition to ,aristotle1 whose logical treatises had for ages been collected under the title ,organon4 ,if in this work ,bacon had given no connected exposition of his reforming principles1 but merely a series of aphorisms1 and this an incomplete one1 the remaining parts are still more fragmentary1 only prefaces and scattered contributions having been reduced to writing4 ,the third part was to have been formed by a description of the world or natural history1 ,historia ,naturalis1 and the last1--introduced by a ,scala ,intellectus 7ladder of knowledge1 illustrations of the method by examples71 and by ,prodromi 7preliminary results of his own inquiries71--by natural science1 ,philosophia ,secunda4 ,the best edition of ,bacon's works is the ,london one of ,spedding1 ,ellis ,heath1 #aheg seq41 #g vols41 #b;d ed41 #ahgj2 with #g volumes additional of ,the ,letters and ,life of ,francis ,bacon1 including ,his ,occasional ,works1 and a ,commentary1 by ,j4 ,spedding1 #ahfb-gd4 ,spedding followed this further with a briefer ,account of the ,life and ,times of ,francis ,bacon1 #b vols41 #ahghb4 ,footnote #a3 ,according to the faculties of the soul1 memory1 imagination1 and understanding1 three principal sciences are distinguished2 history1 poesy1 and philosophy4 ,of the three objects of the latter1 nature strikes the mind with a direct ray1 ,god with a refracted ray1 and man himself with a reflected ray4 ,theology is natural or revealed4 ,speculative 7theoretical7 natural philosophy divides into physics1 concerned with material and efficient causes1 and metaphysics1 whose mission1 according to the traditional view1 is to inquire into final causes1 but in ,bacon's own opinion1 into formal causes2 operative 7technical7 natural philosophy is mechanics and natural magic4 ,the doctrine concerning man comprises anthropology 7including logic and ethics7 and politics4 ,this division of ,bacon was still retained by ,d',alembert in his preliminary discourse to the ,encyclopdie4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 on ,bacon1 ,k4 ,fischer1 #b;d ed41 #ahge2 ,chr4 ,sigwart1 in the ,preussische ,jahrbcher1 #ahfc and #ahfd1 and in vol4 ii4 of his ,logik2 ,h4 ,heussler1 ,baco und seine geschichtliche ,stellung1 ,breslau1 #ahhi4 ,adamson1 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #ith4 ed41 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bjj-bbb2 ,fowler1 ,english ,philosophers ,series1 #ahha2 ,nichol1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #b vols41 #ahhh-hi4--,,tr4 ,bacon's merit was threefold3 he felt more forcibly and more clearly than previous thinkers the need of a reform in science2 he set up a new and grand ideal--unbiased and methodical investigation of nature in order to mastery over nature2 and he gave information and directions as to the way in which this goal was to be attained1 which1 in spite of their incompleteness in detail1 went deep into the heart of the subject and laid the foundation for the work of centuries4#a ,his faith in the omnipotence of the new method was so strong1 that he thought that science for the future could almost dispense with talent4 ,he compares his method to a compass or a ruler1 with which the unpractised man is able to draw circles and straight lines better than an expert without these instruments4 ,footnote #a3 ,his detractors are unjust when they apply the criterion of the present method of investigation and find only imperfection in an imperfect beginning4 ,all science hitherto1 ,bacon declares1 has been uncertain and unfruitful1 and does not advance a step1 while the mechanic arts grow daily more perfect2 without a firm basis1 garrulous1 contentious1 and lacking in content1 it is of no practical value4 ,the seeker after certain knowledge must abandon words for things1 and learn the art of forcing nature to answer his questions4 ,the seeker after fruitful knowledge must increase the number of discoveries1 and transform them from matters of chance into matters of design4 ,for discovery conditions the power1 greatness1 and progress of mankind4 ,man's power is measured by his knowledge1 knowledge is power1 and nature is conquered by obedience--scientia est potentia2 natura parendo vincitur4 ,bacon declares three things indispensable for the attainment of this power-giving knowledge3 the mind must understand the instruments of knowledge2 it must turn to experience1 deriving the materials of knowledge from perception2 and it must not rise from particular principles to the higher axioms too rapidly1 but steadily and gradually through middle axioms4 ,the mind can accomplish nothing when left to itself2 but undirected experience alone is also insufficient 7experimentation without a plan is groping in the dark71 and the senses1 moreover1 are deceptive and not acute enough for the subtlety of nature--therefore1 methodical experimentation alone1 not chance observation1 is worthy of confidence4 ,instead of the customary divorce of experience and understanding1 a firm alliance1 a lawful marriage1 must be effected between them4 ,the empiricists merely collect1 like the ants2 the dogmatic metaphysicians spin the web of their ideas out of themselves1 like the spiders2 but the true philosopher must be like the bee1 which by its own power transforms and digests the gathered material4 ,as the mind1 like a dull and uneven mirror1 by its own nature distorts the rays of objects1 it must first of all be cleaned and polished1 that is1 it must be freed from all prejudices and false notions1 which1 deep-rooted by habit1 prevent the formation of a true picture of the world4 ,it must root out its prejudices1 or1 where this is impossible1 at least understand them4 ,doubt is the first step on the way to truth4 ,of these ,phantoms or ,idols to be discarded1 ,bacon distinguishes four classes3 ,idols of the ,theater1 of the ,market ,place1 of the ,den1 and of the ,tribe4 ,the most dangerous are the idola theatri1 which consist in the tendency to put more trust in authority and tradition than in independent reflection1 to adopt current ideas simply because they find general acceptance4 ,bacon's injunction concerning these is not to be deceived by stage-plays 7i4e41 by the teachings of earlier thinkers which represent things other than they are72 instead of believing others1 observe for thyself6 ,the idola fori1 which arise from the use of language in public intercourse1 depend upon the confusion of words1 which are mere symbols with a conventional value and which are based on the carelessly constructed concepts of the vulgar1 with things themselves4 ,here ,bacon warns us to keep close to things4 ,the idola specus are individual prepossessions which interfere with the apprehension of the true state of affairs1 such as the excessive tendency of thought toward the resemblances or the differences of things1 or the investigator's habit of transferring ideas current in his own department to subjects of a different kind4 ,such individual weaknesses are numberless1 yet they may in part be corrected by comparison with the perceptions of others4 ,the idola tribus1 finally1 are grounded in the nature of the human species4 ,to this class belong1 among others1 illusions of the senses1 which may in part be corrected by the use of instruments1 with which we arm our organs2 further1 the tendency to hold fast to opinions acceptable to us in spite of contrary instances2 similarly1 the tendency to anthropomorphic views1 including1 as its most important special instance1 the mistake of thinking that we perceive purposive relations everywhere and the working of final causes1 after the analogy of human action1 when in reality efficient causes alone are concerned4 ,here ,bacon's injunction runs1 not to interpret natural phenomena teleologically1 but to explain them from mechanical causes2 not to narrow the world down to the limits of the mind1 but to extend the mind to the boundaries of the world1 so that it shall understand it as it really is4 ,to these warnings there are added positive rules4 ,when the investigator1 after the removal of prejudices and habitual modes of thought1 approaches experience with his senses unperverted and a purified mind1 he is to advance from the phenomena given to their conditions4 ,first of all1 the facts must be established by observation and experiment1 and systematically arranged1#a then let him go on to causes and laws4#b ,the true or scientific induction#c thus inculcated is quite different from the credulous induction of common life or the unmethodical induction of ,aristotle4 ,bacon emphasizes the fact that hitherto the importance of negative instances1 which are to be employed as a kind of counter-proof1 has been completely overlooked1 and that a substitute for complete induction1 which is never attainable1 may be found1 on the one hand1 in the collection of as many cases as possible1 and1 on the other1 by considering the more important or decisive cases1 the prerogative instances4 ,then the inductive ascent from experiment to axiom is to be followed by a deductive descent from axioms to new experiments and discoveries4 ,bacon rejects the syllogism on the ground that it fits one to overcome his opponent in disputation1 but not to gain an active conquest over nature4 ,in his own application of these principles of method1 his procedure was that of a dilettante2 the patient1 assiduous labor demanded for the successful promotion of the mission of natural investigation was not his forte4 ,his strength lay in the postulation of problems1 the stimulation and direction of inquiry1 the discovery of lacunae and the throwing out of suggestions2 and many ideas incidentally thrown off by him surprise us by their ingenious anticipations of later discoveries4 ,the greatest defect in his theory was his complete failure to recognize the services promised by mathematics to natural science4 ,the charge of utilitarianism1 which has been so broadly made1 is1 on the contrary1 unjust4 ,for no matter how strongly he emphasizes the practical value of knowledge1 he is still in agreement with those who esteem the godlike condition of calm and cheerful acquaintance with truth more highly than the advantages to be expected from it2 he desires science to be used1 not as a courtezan for pleasure1 but as a spouse for generation1 fruit and comfort1 and--leaving entirely out of view his isolated acknowledgments of the inherent value of knowledge--he conceives its utility wholly in the comprehensive and noble sense that the pursuit of science1 from which as such all narrow-minded regard for direct practical application must keep aloof1 is the most important lever for the advancement of human culture4 ,footnote #a3 ,bacon illustrates the method by the explanation of heat4 ,the results of experimental observation are to be arranged in three tables4 ,the table of presence contains many different cases in which heat occurs2 the table of absence1 those in which1 under circumstances otherwise the same1 it is wanting2 the table of degrees or comparison enumerates phenomena whose increase and decrease accompany similar variations in the degree of heat4 ,that which remains after the exclusion now to be undertaken 7of that which cannot be the nature or cause of heat71 yields as a preliminary result or commencement of interpretation 7as a first vintage71 the definition of heat3 a motion1 expansive1 restrained1 and acting in its strife upon the smaller particles of bodies4 ,footnote #b3 ,this goal of ,baconian inquiry is by no means coincident with that of exact natural science4 ,law does not mean to him1 as to the physical scientist of to-day1 a mathematically formulated statement of the course of events1 but the nature of the phenomenon1 to be expressed in a definition 7,e4 ,knig1 ,entwickelung des ,causalproblems bis ,kant1 #ahhc1 pp4 #aed-aef74 ,bacon combines in a peculiar manner ancient and modern1 ,platonic and corpuscular fundamental ideas4 ,rejecting final causes with the atomists1 yet handing over material and efficient causes 7the latter of which sink with him to the level of mere changing occasional causes7 to empirical physics1 he assigns to metaphysics1 as the true science of nature1 the search for the forms and properties of things4 ,in this he is guided by the following metaphysical presupposition3 ,phenomena1 however manifold they may be1 are at bottom composed of a few elements1 namely1 permanent properties1 the so-called simple natures1 which form1 as it were1 the alphabet of nature or the colors on her palette1 by the combination of which she produces her varied pictures2 e4 g41 the nature of heat and cold1 of a red color1 of gravity1 and also of age1 of death4 ,now the question to be investigated becomes1 ,what1 then1 is heat1 redness1 etc48 ,the ground essence and law of the natures consist in certain forms1 which ,bacon conceives in a ,platonic way as concepts and substances1 but phenomenal ones1 and1 at the same time1 with ,democritus1 as the grouping or motion of minute material particles4 ,thus the form of heat is a particular kind of motion1 the form of whiteness a determinate arrangement of material particles4 ,cf4 ,natge1 ,ueber ,f4 ,bacons ,formenlehre1 ,leipsic1 #ahia1 in which ,heussler's view is developed in more detail4 ,cf4 further1 ,fowler's ,bacon1 ,english ,philosophers ,series1 #ahha1 chap4 iv4--,,tr4 ,footnote #c3 ,the ,baconian method is to be called induction1 it is true1 only in the broad sense4 ,even before ,sigwart1 ,apelt1 ,theorie der ,induction1 #ahed1 pp4 #aea1 #aec1 declared that the question it discussed was essentially a method of abstraction4 ,this1 however1 does not detract from the fame of ,bacon as the founder1 of the theory of inductive investigation 7in later times carefully elaborated by ,mill74 ,bacon intended that his reforming principles should accrue to the benefit of practical philosophy also1 but gave only aphoristic hints to this end4 ,everything is impelled by two appetites1 of which the one aims at individual welfare1 the other at the welfare of the whole of which the thing is a part 7bonum suitatis--bonum communionis74 ,the second is not only the nobler but also the stronger2 this holds of the lower creatures as well as of man1 who1 when not degenerate1 prefers the general welfare to his individual interests4 ,love is the highest of the virtues1 and is never1 as other human endowments1 exposed to the danger of excess2 therefore the life of action is of more worth than the life of contemplation4 ,by this principle of morals ,bacon marked out the way for the ,english ethics of later times4#a ,he notes the lack of a science of character1 for which more material is given in ordinary discourse1 in the poets and the historians1 than in the works of the philosophers2 he explains the power of the affections over the reason by the fact that the idea of present good fills the imagination more forcibly than the idea of good to come1 and summons persuasion1 habit1 and morals to the aid of the latter4 ,we must endeavor so to govern the passions 7each of which combines in itself a masculine impetuosity with a feminine weakness7 that they shall take the part of the reason instead of attacking it4 ,elsewhere ,bacon gives 7not entirely unquestionable7 directions concerning the art of making one's way4 ,acute observations and ingenious remarks everywhere abound4 ,in order to inform one's self of a man's intentions and ends1 it is necessary to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech1 which invites a similar liberty1 and in secrecy1 which induces trust4 ,in order to get on one must have a little of the fool and not too much of the honest4 ,as the baggage is to an army1 so is riches to virtue4 ,it cannot be spared nor left behind1 but it hindereth the march2 yea1 and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory 7impedimenta--baggage and hindrance74 ,on envy and malevolence he says3 ,for men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon others' evil2 444 and whoso is out of hope to attain another's virtue will seek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,vorlaender1 p4 #bfg seq4 ,in ethics1 as in theoretical philosophy1 ,bacon demands the completion of natural knowledge by revelation4 ,the light of nature 7the reason and the conscience7 is able only to convince us of sin and not to give us complete information concerning our duty1--e4g41 the lofty moral principle1 ,love your enemies4 ,similarly1 natural theology is quite sufficient to place the existence of ,god beyond doubt1 by reasoning from the order in nature 7slight tastes of philosophy may perchance move one to atheism but fuller draughts lead back to religion72 but the doctrines of ,christianity are matters of faith4 ,religion and science are separate fields1 any confusion of which involves the danger of an heretical religion or a fabulous philosophy4 ,the more a principle of faith contradicts the reason1 the greater the obedience and the honor to ,god in accepting it4 7c7 ,hobbes4--,hobbes stands in sharp contrast to ,bacon both in disposition and in doctrine4 ,bacon was a man of a wide outlook1 a rich1 stimulating1 impulsive nature1 filled with great plans1 but too mobile and desultory to allow them to ripen to perfection2 ,hobbes is slow1 tenacious1 persistent1 unyielding1 his thought strenuous and narrow4 ,to this corresponds a profound difference in their systems1 which is by no means adequately characterized by saying that ,hobbes brings into the foreground the mathematical element neglected by his predecessor1 and turns his attention chiefly to politics4 ,the dependence of ,hobbes on ,bacon is1 in spite of their personal acquaintance1 not so great as formerly was universally assumed4 ,his guiding stars are rather the great mathematicians of the ,continent1 ,kepler and ,galileo1 while ,cartesian influences also are not to be denied4 ,he finds his mission in the construction of a strictly mechanical view of the world4 ,mechanism applied to the world gives materialism2 applied to knowledge1 sensationalism of a mathematical type2 applied to the will1 determinism2 to morality and the state1 ethical and political naturalism4 ,nevertheless1 the empirical tendency of his nation has a certain power over him2 he holds fast to the position that all ideas ultimately spring from experience4 ,with his energetic but short-breathed thinking1 he did not succeed in fusing the rationalistic elements received from foreign sources with these native tendencies1 so as to produce a unified system4 ,as ,grimm has correctly shown 7,zur ,geschichte des ,erkenntnissproblems71 there is an unreconciled contradiction between the dependence of thought on experience1 which he does not give up1 and the universal validity of the truths derived from pure reason1 which he asserts on the basis of the mathematico-philosophical doctrines of the ,continent4 ,a similar unmediated dualism will meet us in ,locke also4 ,thomas ,hobbes 7#aehh-afgi7 was repelled while a student at ,oxford by ,scholastic methods in thought1 with which he agreed only in their nominalistic results 7there are no universals except names74 ,during repeated sojourns in ,paris1 where he made the acquaintance of ,gassendi1 ,mersenne1 and ,descartes1 he devoted himself to the study of mathematics1 and was greatly influenced by the doctrines of ,galileo2 while the disorders of the ,english revolution led him to embrace an absolutist theory of the state4 ,his chief works were his politics1 under the title ,leviathan1 #afea1 and his ,elementa ,philosophiae1 in three parts 7,de ,corpore1 ,de ,homine1 ,de ,cive71 of which the third1 ,de ,cive1 appeared first 7in ,latin2 in briefer form and anonymously1 #afdb1 enlarged #afdg71 the first1 ,de ,corpore1 in #afee1 and the second1 ,de ,homine1 in #afeh4 ,these had been preceded by two books #a written1 like the two last parts of the ,elements1 in ,english3 ,on ,human ,nature and ,de ,corpore ,politico1 composed #afdj1 printed without the author's consent in #afej4 ,besides these he wrote two treatises ,of ,liberty and ,necessity1 #afdf and #afed1 and prepared1 #affh1 a collected edition of his works 7in ,latin74 ,in ,molesworth's edition1 #ahci-de1 the ,latin works occupy five volumes and the ,english eleven4#b ,footnote #a3 ,or rather one2 the treatise ,on ,human ,nature consists of the first thirteen chapters of the work1 ,elements of ,law1 ,natural and ,politic1 and the ,de ,corpore ,politico of the remainder4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 on ,hobbes1 ,g4,c4 ,robertson 7,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 vol4 x471 #ahhf2 ,tnnies in the ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 ,jahrg4 #c-e1 #ahgi-ha4 ,philosophy is formally defined by ,hobbes as knowledge of effects from causes and causes from effects by means of legitimate rational inference4 ,this implies the equal validity of the deductive and inductive methods1--while ,bacon had proclaimed the latter the most important instrument of knowledge1--as well as the exclusion of theology based on revelation from the domain of science4 ,philosophy is objectively defined as the theory of body and motion3 all that exists is body2 all that occurs1 motion4 ,everything real is corporeal2 this holds of points1 lines1 and surfaces1 which as the limits of body cannot be incorporeal1 as well as of the mind and of ,god4 ,the mind is merely a 7for the senses too7 refined body1 or1 as it is stated in another place1 a movement in certain parts of the organic body4 ,all events1 even internal events1 the feelings and passions1 are movements of material parts4 ,endeavor is a diminutive motion1 as the atom is the smallest of bodies2 sensation and representation are changes in the perceiving body4 ,space is the idea of an existing thing as such1 i4 e41 merely as existing outside the perceiving subject2 time1 the idea of motion4 ,all phenomena are corporeal motions1 which take place with mechanical necessity4 ,neither formal nor final causes exist1 but only efficient causes4 ,all that happens takes its origin in the activity of an external cause1 and not in itself2 a body at rest 7or in motion7 remains at rest 7or in motion7 forever1 unless affected by another in a contrary sense4 ,and as bodies and their changes constitute the only objects of philosophy1 so the mathematical method is the only correct method4 ,there are two kinds of bodies3 natural bodies1 which man finds in nature1 and artificial bodies1 which he himself produces4 ,by the latter ,hobbes refers especially to the state as a human artefact4 ,man stands between the two as the most perfect natural body and an element in the political body4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 besides the introductory philosophia prima1 which discusses the underlying concepts1 consists of three parts3 physics1 anthropology1 and politics4 ,even the theory of the state is capable of demonstrative treatment2 moral phenomena are as subject to the law of mechanical causation as physical phenomena4 ,the first factor in the cognitive process is an impression on a sense-organ1 which1 occasioned by external motion1 continues onward to the heart and from this center gives rise to a reaction4 ,the perception or sensation which thus arises is entirely subjective1 a function of the knower merely1 and in no way a copy of the external movement4 ,the properties light1 color1 and sound1 which we believe to be without us1 are merely internal phenomena dependent on outer and inner motions1 but with no resemblance to them4 ,memory consists in the lingering effects or residuary traces of perception2 it is a sense or consciousness of having felt before 7sentire se sensisse meminisse est71 and ideas are distinguished from sensations as the perfect from the present tense4 ,experience is the totality of perceptions retained in memory1 together with a certain foresight of the future after the analogy of the past4 ,these stages of cognition1 which can yield prudence but not necessary and universal knowledge1 are present in animals as well as men4 ,the human capacity for science is dependent on the faculty of speech2 words are conventional signs to facilitate the retention and communication of ideas4 ,as the memory-images denoted by words are weaker1 fainter1 and less clearly discriminated than the original sensations1 it comes to pass that a number of similar ideas of memory receive a common name4 ,thus abstract general ideas and generic concepts arise1 to which nothing real corresponds1 for in reality particulars alone exist4 ,the universal is a human artefact4 ,the combination of words into propositions1 being an addition or subtraction of arbitrary symbols or marks1 is called judgment2 the combination of propositions into syllogisms1 inference2 the united body of true or demonstrated principles1 science--hence mathematics is the type of all knowledge4 ,in short1 thought is nothing but calculation and the words with which we operate are mere counters2 he who takes counters for coin is a fool4 ,animals lack reason1 i4e41 this power of combining artificial symbols4 ,hobbes's theory of the will is characterized by the same6 sensationalism and mechanism as his theory of knowledge4 ,all spiritual events originate in impressions of sense4 ,man responds to the action of objects by a double reaction1 adding to the theoretical reaction of sensation a practical one in the feeling of pleasure or pain 7according as the impression furthers or hinders the vital function71 whence desire and aversion follow in respect to future experience4 ,further developments from the feelings experienced at the signs of honor 7the acknowledgment of superior power7 and the contrary1 are the affections of pride1 courage1 anger1 of shame and repentance1 of hope and love1 of pity1 etc4 ,deliberation is the alternation of different appetites2 the final1 victorious one which immediately precedes action is called will4 ,freedom cannot be predicated of the will1 but only of the action1 and even in this case it means simply the absence of external restraints1 the procedure of the action from the will of the agent2 while the action is necessary nevertheless4 ,every motion is the inevitable result of the sum of the preceding 7including cerebral7 motions4 ,things which we desire are termed good1 and those which we shun1 evil4 ,nothing is good per se or absolutely1 but only relatively1 for a given person1 place1 time1 or set of circumstances4 ,different things are good to different men1 and there is no objective1 universal rule of good and evil1 so long as men are considered as individuals1 apart from society4 ,a definite criterion of the good is first reached in the state3 that is right which the law permits1 that wrong which it forbids2 good means that which is conducive to the general welfare4 ,in the state of nature nothing is forbidden2 nature gives every man a right to everything1 and right is coextensive with might4 ,what1 then1 induces man to abandon the state of nature and enter the state of citizenship8 ,the opinion of ,aristotle and ,grotius that the state originates in the social impulse is false2 for man is essentially not social1 but selfish1 and nothing but regard for his own interests bids him seek the protection of the state2 the civil commonwealth is an artificial product of fear and prudence4 ,the highest good is self-preservation2 all other goods1 as friendship1 riches1 wisdom1 knowledge1 and1 above all1 power1 are valuable only as instruments of the former4 ,the precondition of well-being1 for which each man strives by nature1 is security for life and health4 ,this is wanting in the state of nature1 in which the passions govern2 for the state of nature is a state of war of everyone against everyone 7bellum omnium contra omnes74 ,each man strives for success and power1 and1 since he cannot trust his fellow1 seeks to subdue1 nay1 to kill him2 each looks upon his fellow as a wolf which he prefers to devour rather than submit himself to the like operation4 ,now1 as no one is so weak as to be incapable of inflicting on his fellows that worst of evils1 death1 and thus the strongest is unsafe1 reason1 in the interest of everyone1 enjoins a search after peace and the establishment of an ordered community4 ,the conditions of peace are the laws of nature1 which relate both to politics and to morals but which do not attain their full binding authority until they become positive laws1 injunctions of the sovereign power4 ,peace is attainable only when each man1 in return for the protection vouchsafed to him1 gives up his natural right to all4 ,the compact by which each renounces his natural liberty to do what he pleases1 provided all others are ready for the same renunciation1--to which are added1 further1 the laws of justice 7sanctity of covenants71 equity1 gratitude1 modesty1 sociability1 mercifulness1 etc41 whose opposites would bring back the state of nature1--this compact is secured against violation by the transfer of the general power and freedom to a single will 7the will of an assembly or of an individual person71 which then represents the general will4 ,the civil contract includes1 then1 two moments3 first1 renunciation2 second1 irrevocable transference and 7absolute7 submission4 ,the second unites the multitude into a civil personality1 the most perfect unity being vouchsafed by absolute monarchy4 ,the sovereign is the soul of the political body2 the officials1 its limbs2 reward and punishment1 its nerves2 law and equity1 its reason4 ,the social contract theory has often experienced democratic interpretation and application1 both before and since ,hobbes's time2 and1 in fact1 it does not include per se the irrevocability of the transfer1 the absoluteness of the sovereign power1 and the monarchical head1 which ,hobbes considered indispensable in order to guard against the danger of anarchy4 ,in every abridgment of the supreme power1 whether by division or limitation1 he sees a step toward the renewal of the state of nature2 and he defends with iron rigor the omnipotence of the state and the complete lack of legal status on the part of all individuals in contrast with it4 ,the citizen is not to obey his own conscience1 which has simply the value of a private opinion1 but the laws1 as the public conscience2 while the supreme ruler1 on the contrary1 is superior to the civil laws1 for it is he that decrees1 interprets1 alters1 and abrogates them4 ,he is lord over the property1 the life1 and the death of the citizens1 and can do no one wrong4 ,for he alone has retained his original natural right to all1 which the rest have entirely and forever renounced4 ,he must have regard1 indeed1 to the welfare of the people1 but he is accountable to ,god alone4 ,the obligation of the subject to obey is extinguished in one case only1--when the civil power is incapable of providing him further with external and internal protection4 ,for the rest1 ,hobbes declares the existing public order the lawful one1 the evils of arbitrary rule much more tolerable than the universal hostility of the state of nature1 and aversion to tyrants a disease inherited from the republicans of antiquity4 ,the sovereign1 by the laws and by instruction1 determines what is good and evil2 he determines also what is to be believed4 ,religion unsanctioned by the state is superstition4 ,the temporal ruler is also the spiritual ruler1 the king1 the chief pastor1 and the clergy his servants4 ,one and the same community is termed state in so far as it consists of men1 and church in so far as it consists of ,christian men 7the ecclesiastical commonwealth74 ,the dogmas which the law prescribes are to be received without investigation1 to be swallowed like pills1 without mastication4 ,the principle that every passion and every action is in its nature indifferent1 that right and wrong exist only in the state1 that the will of a despot is to determine what is moral and what immoral1 has given just offense4 ,moreover1 this was not1 in fact1 ,hobbes's deepest conviction4 ,even without ascribing great importance to isolated statements1#a it must be admitted that his doctrine was interpreted more narrowly than it was intended4 ,he does not say that no moral distinctions whatever exist before the foundation of the state1 but only that the state first supplies a fixed criterion of the good4 ,moral ideas have a certain currency before this1 but they lack power to enforce themselves4 ,further1 when he ascribes the origin of the state to self-interest1 this does not mean that reason1 conscience1 generosity1 and love for our fellows are entirely wanting in the state of nature1 but only that they are not general enough1 and1 as against the passions1 not strong enough to furnish a foundation for the edifice of the state4 ,not only exaggeration in statement but also uncouthness of thought may be forgiven the representative of a movement which is at once new and strengthened by the consciousness of agreement with a naturalistic theory of knowledge and physics2 and the vigor of execution compels admiration1 even though many obscurities remain to be deplored 7e4 g41 the relation of the two moral standards1 the standard of the reason or natural law and the standard of positive law74 ,and recognition must be accorded to the significant kernel of doctrine formed1 on the one hand1 by the endeavor to separate ethics from theology1 and on the other1 by the thoughts--which1 it is true1 were not perfectly brought out--that the moral is not founded on a natural social impulse1 but on a law of the reason1 and first gains a definite criterion in society1 and that the interests of the individual are inseparably connected with those of the community4 ,in any case1 the attempt to form a naturalistic theory of the state would be an undertaking deserving of thanks1 even if the promulgation of this theory had done no further service than to challenge refutation4 ,footnote #a3 ,god inscribed the divine or natural law 7,do not that to another1 etc47 on the heart of man1 when he gave him the reason to rule his actions4 ,the laws of nature are1 it is true1 not always legally binding 7in foro externo71 but always and everywhere binding on the conscience 7in foro interno74 ,justice is the virtue which we can measure by civil laws2 love1 that which we measure by the law of nature merely4 ,the ruler ought to govern in accordance with the law of nature4 7d7 ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury4--,between ,bacon 7#afje1 #afbj7 and ,hobbes 7#afdb1 #afea7 stands ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury 7#aeha-afdh71 who1 by his work ,de ,veritate 7#afbd71a became the founder of deism1 that theory of natural religion1 which1 in opposition to the historical dogmatic faith of the ,church theology1 takes the reason1 which is the same in all men1 as its basis and morality for its content4 ,lord ,herbert introduces his philosophy of religion by a theory of knowledge which makes universal consent the highest criterion of truth 7summa veritatis norma consensus universalis71 and bases knowledge on certain self-evident principles 7principia71 common to all men in virtue of a natural instinct1 which gives safe guidance4 ,these common notions 7notitiae communes7 precede all reflective inquiry1 as well as all observation and experience1 which would be impossible without them4 ,the most important among them are the religious and ethical maxims of conscience4 ,footnote #a3 ,tractatus de ,veritate prout distinguitur a ,revelatione1 a ,verisimili1 a ,possibile1 et a ,false4 ,also1 ,de ,religione ,gentilium1 #afde1 complete #affc4 ,this natural instinct is both an impulse toward truth and a capacity for good or impulse to self-preservation4 ,the latter extends not only to the individual but to all things with which the individual is connected1 to the species1 nay1 to all the rest of the world1 and its final goal is eternal happiness3 all natural capacities are directed toward the highest good or toward ,god4 ,the sense for the divine may indeed be lulled to sleep or led astray by our free will1 but not eradicated4 ,to be rational and to be religious are inseparable2 it is religion that distinguishes man from the brute1 and no people can be found in which it is lacking4 ,if atheists really exist1 they are to be classed with the irrational and the insane4 ,the content of natural religion may be summed up in the following five articles1 which all nations confess3 #a4 ,that there is a ,supreme ,being 7numen supremum74 #b4 ,that he ought to be worshiped4 #c4 ,that virtue and piety are the chief elements of worship4 #d4 ,that man ought to repent of his sins4 #e4 ,that there are rewards and punishments in a future life4 ,besides these general principles1 on the discovery of which ,lord ,herbert greatly prides himself1 the positive religions contain arbitrary additions1 which distinguish them from one another and which owe their origin1 for the most part1 to priestly deception1 although the rhapsodies of the poets and the inventions of the philosophers have contributed their share4 ,the essential principles of natural religion 7,god1 virtue1 faith1 hope1 love1 and repentance7 come more clearly to light in ,christianity than in the religions of heathendom1 where they are overgrown with myths and ceremonies4 ,the ,religio ,medici 7#afdb7 of ,sir ,thomas ,browne shows similar tendencies4 #i4 ,preliminary ,survey4 ,in the line of development from the speculations of ,nicolas of ,cusa to the establishment of the ,english philosophy of nature1 of religion1 and of the state by ,bacon1 ,herbert1 and ,hobbes1 and to the physics of ,galileo1 modern ideas have manifested themselves with increasing clearness and freedom4 ,hobbes himself shows thus early the influence of ,descartes's decisive step1 with which the twilight gives place to the brightness of the morning4 ,in ,descartes the empiricism and sensationalism of the ,english is confronted by rationalism1 to which the great thinkers of the ,continent continue loyal4 ,in ,britain1 experience1 on the ,continent the reason is declared to be the source of cognition2 in the former1 the point of departure is found in particular impressions of sense1 on the latter1 in general concepts and principles of the understanding2 there the method of observation is inculcated and followed1 here1 the method of deduction4 ,this antithesis remained decisive in the development of philosophy down to ,kant1 so that it has long been customary to distinguish two lines or schools1 the ,empirical and the ,rationalistic1 whose parallelism may be exhibited in the following table 7when only one date is given it indicates the appearance of the philosopher's chief work73 ,empiricism4 ,rationalism4 ,bacon1 #afbj4 7,nicolas1 #adej2 ,bruno1 #aehd74 ,hobbes1 #afea4 ,descartes1 died #afej4 ,locke1 #afij 7#afcb-agjd74 ,spinoza1 7#afcb-7 #afgg4 ,berkeley1 #agaj4 ,leibnitz1 #agaj4 ,hume1 #agdh4 ,wolff1 died #aged4 ,we must not forget1 indeed1 the lively interchange of ideas between the schools 7especially the influence of ,descartes on ,hobbes1 and of the latter on ,spinoza2 further1 of ,descartes on ,locke1 and of the latter on ,leibnitz7 which led to reciprocal approximation and enrichment4 ,berkeley and ,leibnitz1 from opposite presuppositions1 arrive at the same idealistic conclusion--there is no real world of matter1 but only spirits and ideas exist4 ,hume and ,wolff conclude the two lines of development3 under the former1 empiricism disintegrates into skepticism2 under the latter1 rationalism stiffens into a scholastic dogmatism1 soon to run out into a popular eclecticism of common sense4 ,if we compare the mental characteristics of the three great nations which1 in the period between ,descartes and ,kant1 participated most productively in the work of philosophy1--the ,italians1 with their receptive temperament and so active in many fields1 exerted a decisive influence on its development and progress in the transition period alone1--it will be seen that the ,frenchman tends chiefly to acuteness1 the ,englishman to clearness and simplicity1 the ,german to profundity of thought4 ,france is the land of mathematical1 ,england of practical1 ,germany of speculative thinkers2 the first is the home of the skeptics1 though of the enthusiasts as well2 the second1 of the realists2 the third1 of the idealists4 ,the ,english philosopher resembles a geographer who1 with conscientious care1 outlines a map of the region through which he journeys2 the ,frenchman1 an anatomist who1 with steady stroke1 lays bare the nerves and muscles of the organism2 the ,german1 a mountaineer who loses in clear vision of particular objects as much as he gains in loftiness of position and extent of view4 ,the ,englishman describes the given reality1 the ,frenchman analyses it1 the ,german transfigures it4 ,the ,english thinker keeps as close as possible to phenomena1 and the principles which he uses in the explanation of phenomena themselves lie in the realm of concrete experience4 ,he explains one phenomenon by another2 he classifies and arranges the given material without analyzing it2 he keeps constantly in touch with the popular consciousness4 ,his reverence for reality1 as this presents itself to him1 and his distrust of far-reaching abstraction1 are so strong that it is enough for him to take his bearings from the real1 and to give a true reproduction of it1 while he willingly renounces the ambition to form it anew in concepts4 ,with this respect for concrete reality he combines a similar reverence for ethical postulates4 ,when the development of a given line of thought threatens to bring him into conflict with practical life1 he is honest enough to draw the conclusions which follow from his premises and to give them expression1 but he avoids the collision by a simple compromise1 shutting up the refinements of philosophy in the study and yielding in practice to the guidance of natural instinct and conscience4 ,his support1 therefore1 of theories which contradict current views in morals is free from the levity in which the ,frenchman indulges4 ,life and thought are separate fields1 contradictions between them are borne in patience1 and if science draws its material from life it shows itself grateful for the favor by giving life the benefit of the useful outcome of its labors1 and1 at the same time1 shielding it from the revolutionary or disintegrating effect of its doubtful paradoxes4 ,while the deliberate craft of ,english philosophy does not willingly lose sight of the shores of the concrete world1 ,french thought sails boldly and confidently out into the open sea of abstraction4 ,it is not strange that it finds the way to the principles more rapidly than the way back to phenomena4 ,a free road1 a fresh start1 a straight course--such is the motto of ,french thinking4 ,whatever is inconsistent with rectilinearity is ignored1 or opposed as unfitting4 ,the line drawn by ,descartes through the world between matter and spirit1 and that by ,rousseau between nature and culture1 are distinctive of the philosophical character of their countrymen4 ,dualism is to them entirely congenial2 it satisfies their need for clearness1 and with this they are content4 ,antithesis is in the ,frenchman's blood2 he thinks in it and speaks in it1 in the salon or on the platform1 in witty jest or in scientific earnestness of thought4 ,either ,a or not-,a1 and there is no middle ground4 ,this habit of precision and sharp analysis facilitates the formation of closed parties1 whereas each individual ,german1 in philosophy as in politics1 forms a party of his own4 ,the demand for the removal of the rubbish of existing systems and the sanguine return to the sources1 give ,french philosophy an unhistorical1 radical1 and revolutionary character4 ,minds of the second order1 who are incapable of taking by themselves the step from that which is given to the sources1 prove their radicalism by following down to the roots that which others have begun 7so ,condillac and the sensationalism of ,locke74 ,moreover1 philosophical principles are to be translated into action2 the thinker has shown himself the doctrinaire in his destructive analysis of that which is given1 so1 also1 he hopes to play the dictator by overturning existing institutions and establishing a new order of things1--only his courageous endeavor flags as soon in the region of practice as in that of theory4 ,the ,german lacks the happy faculty1 which distinguishes the two nations just discussed1 of isolating a problem near at hand1 and he is accustomed to begin his system with ,leda's egg2 but1 by way of compensation1 he combines the lofty flight of the ,french with the phlegmatic endurance of the ,english1 i4e41 he seeks his principles far above experience1 but1 instead of stopping with the establishment of points of view or when he has set the note1 he carries his principles through in detail with loving industry and comprehensive architectonic skill4 ,while common sense turns the scale with the ,english and analytical thought with the ,french1 the ,german allows the fancy and the heart to take an important part in the discussion1 though in such a way that the several faculties work together and in harmony4 ,while in ,france rationalism1 mysticism1 and the philosophy of the heart were divided among different thinkers 7,descartes1 ,malebranche and ,pascal1 ,rousseau71 there is in every ,german philosopher something of all three4 ,the skeptical ,kant provides a refuge for the postulates of thought in the sanctuary of faith2 the earnest1 energetic ,fichte1 toward the end of his life1 takes his place among the mystics2 ,schelling thinks with the fancy and dreams with the understanding2 and under the broad cloak of the ,hegelian dialectic method1 beside the reflection of the ,critique of ,reason and of the ,science of ,knowledge1 the fancies of the ,philosophy of ,nature1 the deep inwardness of ,bhme1 even the whole wealth of empirical fact1 found a place4 ,as synthesis is predominant in his view of things1 so a harmonizing1 conciliatory tendency asserts itself in his relations to his predecessors3 the results of previous philosophers are neither discarded out of hand nor accepted in the mass1 but all that appears in any way useful or akin to the new system is wrought in at its proper place1 though often with considerable transformation4 ,in this work of mediation there is considerable loss in definiteness1 the just and comprehensive consideration of the most diverse interests not always making good the loss4 ,and since such a philosophy1 as we have already shown1 engages the whole man1 its disciple has neither impulse nor strength left for reforming labors2 while1 on the other hand1 he perceives no external call to undertake them1 since he views the world through the glasses of his system4 ,thus philosophy in ,germany1 pursued chiefly by specialists1 remains a professional affair1 and has not exercised a direct transforming influence on life 7for ,fichte1 who helped to philosophize the ,french out of ,germany1 was an exception72 but its influence has been the greater in the special sciences1 which in ,germany more than any other land are handled in a philosophic spirit4 ,the mental characteristics of these nations are reflected also in their methods of presentation4 ,the style of the ,english philosopher is sober1 comprehensible1 diffuse1 and slightly wearisome4 ,the ,french use a fluent1 elegant1 lucid style which entertains and dazzles by its epigrammatic phrases1 in which not infrequently the epigram rules the thought4 ,the ,german expresses his solid1 thoughtful positions in a form which is at once ponderous and not easily understood2 each writer constructs his own terminology1 with a liberal admixture of foreign expressions1 and the length of his paragraphs is exceeded only by the thickness of his books4 ,these national distinctions may be traced even in externals4 ,the ,englishman makes his divisions as they present themselves at first thought1 and rather from a practical than from a logical point of view4 ,the analytic ,frenchman prefers dichotomy1 while trichotomy corresponds to the synthetic1 systematic character of ,german thinking2 and ,kant's nave delight1 because in each class the third category unites its two predecessors1 has been often experienced by many of his countrymen at the sight of their own trichotomies4 ,the division of labor in the pre-,kantian philosophy among these three nationalities entirely agrees with the account given of the peculiarities of their philosophical endowment4 ,the beginning falls to the share of ,france2 ,locke receives that tangled skein1 the problem of knowledge1 from the hand of ,descartes1 and passes it on to ,leibnitz2 and while the ,illumination in all three countries is converting the gold inherited from ,locke and ,leibnitz into small coin1 the solution of the riddle rings out from ,knigsberg4 ,,part ,i4 ,,from ,,descartes ,,to ,,kant4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,descartes4 ,the long conflict with ,scholasticism1 which had been carried on with ever increasing energy and ever sharper weapons1 was brought by ,descartes to a victorious close4 ,the new movement1 long desired1 long sought1 and prepared for from many directions1 at length appears1 ready and well-established4 ,descartes accomplishes everything needful with the sure simplicity of genius4 ,he furnishes philosophy with a settled point of departure in self-consciousness1 offers her a method sure to succeed in deduction from clear and distinct conceptions1 and assigns her the mechanical explanation of nature as her most imperative and fruitful mission4 ,ren ,descartes was born at ,la ,haye in ,touraine1 in #aeif1 and died at ,stockholm in #afej4 ,of the studies taught in the ,jesuit school at ,la ,flche1 mathematics alone was able to satisfy his craving for clear and certain knowledge4 ,the years #afac-ag he spent in ,paris2 then he enlisted in the military service of the ,netherlands1 and1 in #afai1 in that of ,bavaria4 ,while in winter quarters at ,neuburg1 he vowed a pilgrimage to ,loretto if the ,virgin would show him a way of escape from his tormenting doubts2 and made the saving discovery of the foundations of a wonderful science4 ,at the end of four years this vow was fulfilled4 ,on his return to ,paris 7#afbe71 he was besought by his learned friends to give to the world his epoch-making ideas4 ,though1 to escape the distractions of society1 he kept his residence secret1 as he had done during his first stay in ,paris1 and frequently changed it1 he was still unable to secure the complete privacy and leisure for scientific work which he desired4 ,therefore he went to ,holland in #afbi1 and spent twenty years of quiet productivity in ,amsterdam1 ,franecker1 ,utrecht1 ,leeuwarden1 ,egmond1 ,harderwijk1 ,leyden1 the palace of ,endegeest1 and five other places4 ,his work here was interrupted only by a few journeys1 but much disturbed in its later years by annoying controversies with the theologian ,gisbert ,votius of ,utrecht1 with ,regius1 a pupil who had deserted him1 and with professors from ,leyden4 ,his correspondence with his ,french friends was conducted through ,pre ,mersenne4 ,in #afdi he yielded to pressing invitations from ,queen ,christina of ,sweden and removed to ,stockholm4 ,there his weak constitution was not adequate to the severity of the climate1 and death overtook him within a few months4 ,the two decades of retirement in the ,netherlands were ,descartes's productive period4 ,his motive in developing and writing out his thoughts was1 essentially1 the desire not to disappoint the widely spread belief that he was in possession of a philosophy more certain than the common one4 ,the work entitled ,le ,monde1 begun in #afcj and almost completed1 remained unprinted1 as the condemnation of ,galileo 7#afcb7 frightened our philosopher from publication2 fragments of it only1 and a brief summary1 appeared after the author's death4 ,the chief works1 the ,discourse on ,method1 the ,meditations on the ,first ,philosophy1 and the ,principles of ,philosophy appeared between #afcg and #afdd1--the ,discours de la ,mthode in #afcg1 together with three dissertations 7the ,dioptrics1 the ,meteors1 and the ,geometry71 under the common title1 ,essais ,philosophiques4 ,to the 7six7 ,meditationes de ,prima ,philosophia1 published in #afda1 and dedicated to the ,paris ,sorbonne1 are appended the objections of various savants to whom the work had been communicated in manuscript1 together with ,descartes's rejoinders4 ,he himself considered the criticisms of ,arnauld1 printed fourth in order1 as the most important4 ,the ,third ,objections are from ,hobbes1 the ,fifth from ,gassendi1 the ,first1 which were also the first received1 from the theologian ,caterus of ,antwerp1 while the ,second and ,sixth1 collected by ,mersenne1 are from various theologians and mathematicians4 ,in the second edition there were added1 further1 the ,seventh ,objections1 by the ,jesuit ,bourdin1 and the ,replies of the author thereto4 ,the four books of the ,principia ,philosophiae1 published in #afdd and dedicated to ,elizabeth1 ,countess ,palatine1 give a systematic presentation of the new philosophy4 ,the ,discourse on ,method appeared1 #afdd1 in a ,latin translation1 the ,meditations and the ,principles in ,french1 in #afdg4 ,the ,treatise on the ,passions was published in #afej2 the ,letters1 #afeg-fg1 in ,french1 #affh1 in ,latin4 ,the ,opera ,postuma1 #agja1 beside the ,compendium of ,music 7written in #afah7 and other portions of his posthumous writings1 contain the ,rules for the ,direction of the ,mind1 supposed to have been written in #afbi1 and the ,search for ,truth by the ,light of ,nature4 ,the complete works have been often published1 both in ,latin and in ,french4 ,the eleven volume edition of ,cousin appeared in #ahbd-bf4a ,footnote #a3 ,of the many treatises on the philosophy of ,descartes those of ,c4 ,schaarschmidt 7,descartes und ,spinoza1 #ahej7 and ,j4,h4 ,lwe1 #ahee1 may be mentioned4 ,further1 ,m4 ,heinze has discussed ,die ,sittenlehre des ,descartes1 #ahgb2 ,ed4 ,grimm1 ,descartes' ,lehre von den angeborenen ,ideen1 #ahgc2 ,g4 ,glogau1 ,darlegung und ,kritik des ,grundgedankens der ,cartesianisch4 ,metaphysik 7,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxiii4 p4 #bji seq471 #ahgh2 ,paul ,natorp1 ,descartes' ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahhb2 and ,kas4 ,twardowski1 ,idee und ,perception in ,descartes1 #ahib4 ,in ,french1 ,francisque ,bouillier 7,histoire de la ,philosophie ,cartsienne1 #ahed7 and ,e4 ,saisset 7,prcurseurs et ,disciples de ,descartes1 #ahfb7 have written on ,cartesianism4 ,the ,method1 ,meditations1 and ,selections from the ,principles have been translated into ,english by ,john ,veitch1 #eth ed41 #ahgi1 and others since2 and ,h4,a4,p4 ,torrey has published ,the ,philosophy of ,descartes in ,extracts from his ,writings1 #ahib 7,sneath's ,modern ,philosophers74 ,the ,english reader may be referred1 also1 to ,mahaffy's ,descartes1 #ahhj1 in ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics2 to the article ,cartesianism1 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #ith ed41 vol4 v41 by ,edward ,caird2 and1 for a complete discussion1 to the ,english translation of ,fischer's ,descartes and his ,school' by ,j4,p4 ,gordy1 #ahhg4--,,tr4 ,we begin our discussion with ,descartes's notical and metaphysical principles1 and then take up in order his doctrine of nature and of man4 #a4 ,the ,principles4 ,that which passes nowadays for science1 and is taught as such in the schools1 is nothing but a mass of disconnected1 uncertain1 and often contradictory opinions4 ,a principle of unity and certainty is entirely lacking4 ,if anything permanent and irrefutable is to be accomplished in science1 everything hitherto considered true must be thoroughly demolished and built up anew4 ,for we come into the world as children and we form judgments of things1 or repeat them after others1 before we have come into the full possession of our intellectual powers2 so that it is no wonder that we are filled with a multitude of prejudices1 from which we can thoroughly escape only by considering everything doubtful which shows the least sign of uncertainty4 ,let us renounce1 therefore1 all our old views1 in order later to accept better ones in their stead2 or1 perchance1 to take the former up again after they shall have stood the test of rational criticism4 ,the recognized precaution1 never to put complete confidence in that which has once deceived us1 holds of our relation to the senses as elsewhere4 ,it is certain that they sometimes deceive us--perhaps they do so always4 ,again1 we dream every day of things which nowhere exist1 and there is no certain criterion by which to distinguish our dreams from our waking moments1--what guarantee have we1 then1 that we are not always dreaming8 ,therefore1 our doubt must first of all be directed to the existence of sense-objects4 ,nay1 even mathematics must be suspected in spite of the apparent certainty of its axioms and demonstrations1 since controversy and error are found in it also4 ,i doubt or deny1 then1 that the world is what it appears to be1 that there is a ,god1 that external objects exist1 that ,i have a body1 that twice two are four4 ,one thing1 however1 it is impossible for me to bring into question1 namely1 that ,i myself1 who exercise this doubting function1 exist4 ,there is one single point at which doubt is forced to halt--at the doubter1 at the self-existence of the thinker4 ,i can doubt everything except that ,i doubt1 and that1 in doubting1 ,i am4 ,even if a superior being sought to deceive me in all my thinking1 he could not succeed unless ,i existed1 he could not cause me not to exist so long as ,i thought4 ,to be deceived means to think falsely2 but that something is thought1 no matter what it be1 is no deception4 ,it might be true1 indeed1 that nothing at all existed2 but then there would be no one to conceive this non-existence4 ,granted that everything may be a mistake2 yet the being mistaken1 the thinking is not a mistake4 ,everything is denied1 but the denier remains4 ,the whole content of consciousness is destroyed2 consciousness itself1 the doubting activity1 the being of the thinker1 is indestructible4 ,cogitatio sola a me divelli nequit4 ,thus the settled point of departure required for knowledge is found in the self-certitude of the thinking ego4 ,from the fact that ,i doubt1 i4e41 think1 it follows that ,i1 the doubter1 the thinker1 am4 ,cogito1 ergo sum is the first and most certain of all truths4 ,the principle1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 is not to be considered a deduction from the major premise1 ,whatever thinks exists4 ,it is rather true that this general proposition is derived from the particular and earlier one4 ,i must first realize in my own experience that1 as thinking1 ,i exist1 before ,i can reach the general conclusion that thought and existence are inseparable4 ,this fundamental truth is thus not a syllogism1 but a not further deducible1 self-evident1 immediate cognition1 a pure intuition--sum cogitans4 ,now1 if my existence is revealed by my activity of thought1 if my thought is my being1 and the converse1 if in me thought and existence are identical1 then ,i am a being whose essence consists in thinking4 ,i am a spirit1 an ego1 a rational soul4 ,my existence follows only from my thinking1 not from any chance action4 ,ambulo ergo sum would not be valid1 but mihi videor or puto me ambulare1 ergo sum4 ,if ,i believe ,i am walking1 ,i may undoubtedly be deceived concerning the outward action 7as1 for instance1 in dreams71 but never concerning my inward belief4 ,cogitatio includes all the conscious activities of the mind1 volition1 emotion1 and sensation1 as well as representation and cognition2 they are all modi cogitandi4 ,the existence of the mind is therefore the most certain of all things4 ,we know the soul better than the body4 ,it is for the present the only certainty1 and every other is dependent on this1 the highest of all4 ,what1 then1 is the peculiarity of this first and most certain knowledge which renders it self-evident and independent of all proof1 which makes us absolutely unable to doubt it8 ,its entire clearness and distinctness4 ,accordingly1 ,i may conclude that everything which ,i perceive as clearly and distinctly as the cogito ergo sum is also true1 and ,i reach this general rule1 omne est verum1 quod clare et distincte percipio4 ,so far1 then1 we have gained three things3 a challenge2 to be inscribed over the portals of certified knowledge1 de omnibus dubitandum2 a basal truth1 sum cogitans2 a criterion of truth1 clara et distinct a perceptio4 ,the doubt of ,descartes is not the expression of a resigned spirit which renounces the unattainable2 it is precept1 not doctrine1 the starting point of philosophy1 not its conclusion1 a methodological instrument in the hand of a strong and confident longing for truth1 which makes use of doubt to find the indubitable4 ,it is not aimed at the possibility of attaining knowledge1 but at the opinion that it has already been attained1 at the credulity of the age1 at its excessive tendency toward historical and poly-historical study1 which confuses the acquisition and handing down of information with knowledge of the truth4 ,that knowledge alone is certain which is self-attained and self-tested--and this cannot be learned or handed down2 it can only be rediscovered through examination and experience4 ,instead of taking one's own unsupported conjectures or the opinions of others as a guide1 the secret of the search for truth is to become independent and of age1 to think for one's self2 and the only remedy against the dangers of self-deception and the ease of repetition is to be found in doubting everything hitherto considered true4 ,this is the meaning of the ,cartesian doubt1 which is more comprehensive and more thorough than the ,baconian4 ,descartes disputed only the certitude of the knowledge previously attained1 not the possibility of knowledge--for of the latter no man is more firmly convinced than he4 ,he is a rationalist1 not a skeptic4 ,the intellect is assured against error just as soon as1 freed from hindrances1 it remains true to itself1 as it puts forth all its powers and lets nothing pass for truth which is not clearly and distinctly known4 ,descartes demands the same thing for the human understanding as ,rousseau at a later period for the heart3 a return to uncorrupted nature4 ,this faith in the unartificial1 the original1 the natural1 this radical and naturalistic tendency is characteristically ,french4 ,the purification of the mind1 its deliverance from the rubbish of scholastic learning1 from the pressure of authority1 and from inert acceptance of the thinking of others--this is all4 ,descartes finds the clearest proof of the mind's capacity for truth in mathematics1 whose trustworthiness he never seriously questioned1 but only hypothetically1 in order to exhibit the still higher certainty of the ,i think1 therefore ,i am4 ,he wants to give philosophy the stable character which had so impressed him in mathematics when he was a boy1 and recommends her1 therefore1 not merely the evidence of mathematics as a general example1 but the mathematical method for definite imitation4 ,metaphysics1 like mathematics1 must derive its conclusions by deduction from self-evident principles4 ,thus the geometrical method begins its rule in philosophy1 a rule not always attended with beneficial results4 ,with this criterion of truth ,descartes advances to the consideration of ideas4 ,he distinguishes volition and judgment from ideas in the narrow sense 7imagines71 and divides the latter1 according to their origin1 into three classes3 ideae innatae1 adventitiae1 a me ipso factae1 considering the second class1 the adventitious ideas1 the most numerous1 but the first1 the innate ideas1 the most important4 ,no idea is higher or clearer than the idea of ,god or the most perfect being4 ,whence comes this idea8 ,that every idea must have a cause1 follows from the clear and distinct principle that nothing produces nothing4 ,it follows from this same principle1 ex nihilo nihil fit1 however1 that the cause must contain as much reality or perfection--realitas and perfectio are synonymous--as the effect1 for otherwise the overplus would have come from nothing4 ,so much 7objective1 representative7 reality contained in an idea1 so much or more 7formal1 actual7 reality must be contained in its cause4 ,the idea of ,god as infinite1 independent1 omnipotent1 omniscient1 and creative substance1 has not come to me through the senses1 nor have ,i formed it myself4 ,the power to conceive a being more perfect than myself1 can have only come from someone who is more perfect in reality than ,i4 ,since ,i know that the infinite contains more reality than the finite1 ,i may conclude that the idea of the infinite has not been derived from the idea of the finite by abstraction and negation2 it precedes the latter1 and ,i become conscious of my defects and my finitude only by comparison with the absolute perfection of ,god4 ,this idea1 then1 must have been implanted in me by ,god himself4 ,the idea of ,god is an original endowment2 it is as innate as the idea of myself4 ,however incomplete it may be1 it is still sufficient to give a knowledge of ,god's existence1 although not a perfect comprehension of his being1 just as a man may skirt a mountain without encircling it4 ,descartes brings in the idea of ,god in order to escape solipsism4 ,so long as the self-consciousness of the ego remained the only certainty1 there was no conclusive basis for the assumption that anything exists beyond self1 that the ideas which apparently come from without are really occasioned by external things and do not spring from the mind itself4 ,for our natural instinct to refer them to objects without us might well be deceptive4 ,it is only through the idea of ,god1 and by help of the principle that the cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect1 that ,i am taken beyond myself and assured that ,i am not the only thing in the world4 ,for as this idea contains more of representative1 than ,i of actual reality1 ,i cannot have been its cause4 ,to this empirical argument1 which derives ,god's existence from our idea of ,god 7from the fact that we have an idea of him71 ,descartes joins the 7modified7 ontological argument of ,anselm1 which deduces the existence of ,god from the concept of ,god4 ,while the ideas of all other things include only the possibility of existence1 necessary existence is inseparable from the concept of the most perfect being4 ,god cannot be thought apart from existence2 he has the ground of his existence in himself2 he is a se or causa sui4 ,finally1 ,descartes adds a third argument4 ,the idea of perfections which ,i do not possess can only have been imparted to me by a more perfect being than ,i1 which has bestowed on me all that ,i am and all that ,i am capable of becoming4 ,if ,i had created myself1 ,i would have bestowed upon myself these absent perfections also4 ,and the existence of a plurality of causes is negatived by the supreme perfection which ,i conceive in the idea of ,god1 the indivisible unity of his attributes4 ,among the attributes of ,god his veracity is of special importance4 ,it is impossible that he should will to deceive us2 that he should be the cause of our errors4 ,god would be a deceiver1 if he had endowed us with a reason to which error should appear true1 even when it uses all its foresight in avoiding it and assents only to that which it clearly and distinctly perceives4 ,error is man's own fault2 he falls into it only when he misuses the divine gift of knowledge1 which includes its own standard4 ,thus ,descartes finds new confirmation for his test of truth in the veracitas dei4 ,erdmann has given a better defense of ,descartes than the philosopher himself against the charge that this is arguing in a circle1 inasmuch as the existence of ,god is proved by the criterion of truth1 and then the latter by the former3 ,the criterion of certitude is the ratio cognoscendi of ,god's existence2 ,god is the ratio essendi of the criterion of certitude4 ,in the order of existence ,god is first1 he creates the reason together with its criterion2 in the order of knowledge the criterion precedes1 and ,god's existence follows from it4 ,descartes himself endeavors to avoid the circle by making intuitive knowledge self-evident1 and by not bringing in the appeal to ,god's veracity in demonstrative knowledge until1 in reflective thought1 we no longer have each separate link in the chain of proof present to our minds with full intuitive certainty1 but only remember that we have previously understood the matter with clearness and distinctness4 ,our ideas represent in part things1 in part qualities4 ,substance is defined by the concept of independence as res quae ita existit1 ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum2 a pregnant definition with which the concept of substance gains the leadership in metaphysics1 which it held till the time of ,hume and ,kant1 sharing it then with the conception of cause or1 rather1 relinquishing it to the latter4 ,the ,spinozistic conclusion that1 according to the strict meaning of this definition1 there is but one substance1 ,god1 who1 as causa sui1 has absolutely no need of any other thing in order to his existence1 was announced by ,descartes himself4 ,if created substances are under discussion1 the term does not apply to them in the same sense 7not univoce7 as when we speak of the infinite substance2 created beings require a different explanation1 they are things which need for their existence only the co-operation of ,god1 and have no need of one another4 ,substance is cognized through its qualities1 among which one is pre-eminent from the fact that it expresses the essence or nature of the thing1 and that it is conceived through itself1 without the aid of the others1 while they presuppose it and cannot be thought without it4 ,the former fundamental properties are termed attributes1 and these secondary ones1 modes or accidents4 ,position1 figure1 motion1 are contingent properties of body2 they presuppose that it is extended or spatial2 they are modi extensionis1 as feeling1 volition1 desire1 representation1 and judgment are possible only in a conscious being1 and hence are merely modifications of thought4 ,extension is the essential or constitutive attribute of body1 and thought of mind4 ,body is never without extension1 and mind never without thought--mens semper cogitat4 ,guided by the self-evident principle that the non-existent has no properties1 we argue from a perceived quality to a substance as its possessor or support4 ,substances are distinct from one another when we can clearly and distinctly cognize one without the other4 ,now1 we can adequately conceive mind without a corporeal attribute and body without a spiritual one2 the former has nothing of extension in it1 the latter nothing of thought3 hence thinking substance and extended substance are entirely distinct and have nothing in common4 ,matter and mind are distinct realiter1 matter and extension idealiter merely4 ,thus we attain three clear and distinct ideas1 three eternal verities3 substantia infinita sive deus1 substantia finita cogitans sive mens1 substantia extensa sive corpus4 ,by this abrupt contraposition of body and mind as reciprocally independent substances1 ,descartes founded that dualism1 as whose typical representative he is still honored or opposed4 ,this dualism between the material and spiritual worlds belongs to those standpoints which are valid without being ultimate truth2 on the pyramid of metaphysical knowledge it takes a high1 but not the highest1 place4 ,we may not rest in it1 yet it retains a permanent value in opposition to subordinate theories4 ,it is in the right against a materialism which still lacks insight into the essential distinction between mind and matter1 thought and extension1 consciousness and motion2 it loses its validity when1 with a full consideration and conservation of the distinction between these two spheres1 we succeed in bridging over the gulf between them1 whether this is accomplished through a philosophy of identity1 like that of ,spinoza and ,schelling1 or by an idealism1 like that of ,leibnitz or ,fichte4 ,in any case philosophy retains as an inalienable possession the negative conclusion1 that1 in view of the heterogeneity of consciousness and motion1 the inner life is not reducible to material phenomena4 ,this clear and simple distinction1 which sets bounds to every confusion of spiritual and material existence1 was an act of emancipation2 it worked on the sultry intellectual atmosphere of the time with the purifying and illuminating power of a lightning flash4 ,we shall find the later development of philosophy starting from the ,cartesian dualism4 ,descartes himself looked upon the fundamental principles which have now been discussed as merely the foundation for his life work1 as the entrance portal to his cosmology4 ,posterity has judged otherwise2 it finds his chief work in that which he considered a mere preparation for it4 ,the start from doubt1 the self-certitude of the thinking ego1 the rational criterion of certitude1 the question of the origin of ideas1 the concept of substance1 the essential distinction between conscious activity and corporeal being1 and1 also1 the principle of thoroughgoing mechanism in the material world 7from his philosophy of nature7--these are the thoughts which assure his immortality4 ,the vestibule has brought the builder more fame1 and has proved more enduring1 than the temple3 of the latter only the ruins remain2 the former has remained undestroyed through the centuries4 #b4 ,nature4 ,what guarantee have we for the existence of material objects affecting our senses8 ,that the ideas of sense do not come from ourselves1 is shown by the fact that it is not in our power to determine the objects which we perceive1 or the character of our perception of them4 ,the supposition that ,god has caused our perceptions directly1 or by means of something which has no resemblance whatever to an external object extended in three dimensions and movable1 is excluded by the fact that ,god is not a deceiver4 ,in reliance on ,god's veracity we may accept as true whatever the reason declares concerning body1 though not all the reports of the senses1 which so often deceive us4 ,at the instance of the senses we clearly and distinctly perceive matter distinct from our mind and from ,god1 extended in three dimensions1 length1 breadth1 and depth1 with variously formed and variously moving parts1 which occasion in us sensations of many kinds4 ,the belief that perception makes known things as they really are is a prejudice of sense to be discarded2 on the contrary1 it merely informs us concerning the utility or harmfulness of objects1 concerning their relation to man as a being composed of soul and body4 7,the body is that material thing which is very intimately joined with the mind1 and occasions in the latter certain feelings1 e4g41 pain1 which as merely cogitative it would not have47 ,sense qualities1 as color1 sound1 odor1 cannot constitute the essence of matter1 for their variation or loss changes nothing in it2 ,i can abstract from them without the material thing disappearing4#a ,there is one property1 however1 extensive magnitude 7quantitas71 whose removal would imply the destruction of matter itself4 ,thus ,i perceive by pure thought that the essence of matter consists in extension1 in that which constitutes the object of geometry1 in that magnitude which is divisible1 figurable1 and movable4 ,this thesis 7corpus extensio sive spatium7 is next defended by ,descartes against several objections4 ,in reply to the objection drawn from the condensation and rarefaction of bodies1 he urges that the apparent increase or decrease in extension is1 in fact1 a mere change of figure2 that the rarefaction of a body depends on the increase in size of the intervals between its parts1 and the entrance into them of foreign bodies1 just as a sponge swells up when its pores become filled with water and1 therefore1 enlarged4 ,the demand that the pores1 and the bodies which force their way into them1 should always be perceptible to the senses1 is groundless4 ,he meets the second point1 that we call extension by itself space1 and not body1 by maintaining that the distinction between extension and corporeal substance is a distinction in thought1 and not in reality2 that attribute and substance1 mathematical and physical bodies1 are not distinct in fact but only in our thought of them4 ,we apply the term space to extension in general1 as an abstraction1 and body to a given individual1 determinate1 limited extension4 ,in reality1 wherever extension is1 there substance is also1--the non-existent has no extension1--and wherever space is1 there matter is also4 ,empty space does not exist4 ,when we say a vessel is empty1 we mean that the bodies which fill it are imperceptible2 if it were absolutely empty its sides would touch4 ,descartes argues against the atomic theory and against the finitude of the world1 as he argues against empty space3 matter1 as well as space1 has no smallest1 indivisible parts1 and the extension of the world has no end4 ,in the identification of space and matter the former receives fullness from the latter1 and the latter unlimitedness from the former1 both internal unlimitedness 7endless divisibility7 and external 7boundlessness74 ,hence there are not several matters but only one 7homogeneous7 matter1 and only one 7illimitable7 world4 ,footnote #a3 ,they are merely subjective states in the perceiver1 and entirely unlike the motions which give rise to them1 although there is a certain agreement1 as the differences and variations in sensation are paralleled by those in the object4 ,matter is divisible1 figurable1 movable quantity4 ,natural science needs no other principles than these indisputably true conceptions1 by which all natural phenomena may be explained1 and must employ no others4 ,the most important is motion1 on which all the diversity of forms depends4 ,corporeal being has been shown to be extension2 corporeal becoming is motion4 ,motion is defined as the transporting of one part of matter1 or of one body1 from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it1 or which we regard as at rest1 to the vicinity of other bodies4 ,this separation of bodies is reciprocal1 hence it is a matter of choice which shall be considered at rest4 ,besides its own proper motion in reference to the bodies in its immediate vicinity1 a body can participate in very many other motions3 the traveler walking back and forth on the deck of a ship1 for instance1 in the motion of the vessel1 of the waves1 and of the earth4 ,the common view of motion as an activity is erroneous2 since it requires force not only to set in motion bodies which are at rest1 but also to stop those which are in motion1 it is clear that motion implies no more activity than rest4 ,both are simply different states of matter4 ,since there is no empty space1 each motion spreads to a whole circle of bodies3 ,a forces ,b out of its place1 ,b drives out ,c1 and so on1 until ,z takes up the position which ,a has left4 ,the ultimate cause of motion is ,god4 ,he has created bodies with an original measure of motion and rest1 and1 in accordance with his immutable character1 he preserves this quantity of motion unchanged3 it remains constant in the world as a whole1 though it varies in individual bodies4 ,for with the power to create or destroy motion bodies lack1 further1 the power to alter their quantity of motion4 ,by the side of ,god1 the primary cause of motion1 the laws of motion appear as secondary causes4 ,the first of these is the one become familiar under the name1 law of inertia3 ,everything continues of itself in the state 7of motion or rest7 in which it is1 and changes its state only as a result of some extraneous cause4 ,the second of these laws1 which are so valuable in mechanics1 runs3 ,every portion of matter tends to continue a motion which has been begun in the same direction1 hence in a straight line1 and changes its direction only under the influence of another body1 as in the case of the circle above described4 ,descartes bases these laws on the unchangeableness of ,god and the simplicity of his world-conserving 7i4e41 constantly creative7 activity4 ,the third law relates to the communication of motion2 but ,descartes does not recognize the equality of action and reaction as universally as the fact demands4 ,if a body in motion meets another body1 and its power 7to continue its motion in a straight line7 is less than the resistance of the other on which it has impinged1 it retains its motion1 but in a different direction3 it rebounds in the opposite direction4 ,if1 on the contrary1 its force is greater1 it carries the other body along with it1 and loses so much of its own motion as it imparts to the latter4 ,the seven further rules added to these contain much that is erroneous4 ,as actio in distans is rejected1 all the phenomena of motion are traced back to pressure and impulse4 ,the distinction between fluid and solid bodies is based on the greater or less mobility of their parts4 ,the leading principle in the special part of the ,cartesian physics1--we can only briefly sketch it1--which embraces1 first1 celestial1 and1 then1 terrestial phenomena1 is the axiom that we cannot estimate ,god's power and goodness too highly1 nor ourselves too meanly4 ,it is presumptuous to seek to comprehend the purposes of ,god in creation1 to consider ourselves participants in his plans1 to imagine that things exist simply for our sake--there are many things which no man sees and which are of advantage to none4 ,nothing is to be interpreted teleologically1 but all must be interpreted from clearly known attributes1 hence purely mechanically4 ,after treating of the distances of the various heavenly bodies1 of the independent light of the sun and the fixed stars and the reflected light of the planets1 among which the earth belongs1 ,descartes discusses the motion of the heavenly bodies4 ,in reference to the motion of the earth he seeks a middle course between the theories of ,copernicus and ,tycho ,brah4 ,he agrees with ,copernicus in the main point1 but1 in reliance on his definition of motion1 maintains that the earth is at rest1 viz41 in respect to its immediate surroundings4 ,it is clear that the harmony of his views with those of the ,church 7though it was only a verbal agreement7 was not unwelcome to him4 ,according to his hypothesis1--as he suggests1 perhaps an erroneous hypothesis1--the fluid matter which fills the heavenly spaces1 and which may be compared to a vortex or whirlpool1 circles about the sun and carries the planets along with it4 ,thus the planets move in relation to the sun1 but are at rest in relation to the adjacent portions of the matter of the heavens4 ,in view of the biblical doctrine1 according to which the world and all that therein is was created at a stroke1 he apologetically describes his attempt to explain the origin of the world from chaos under the laws of motion as a scientific fiction1 intended merely to make the process more comprehensible4 ,it is more easily conceivable1 if we think of the things in the world as though they had been gradually formed from elements1 as the plant develops from the seed4 ,we now pass to the ,cartesian anthropology1 with its three chief objects3 the body1 the soul1 and the union of the two4 #c4 ,man4 ,the human body1 like all organic bodies1 is a machine4 ,artificial automata and natural bodies are distinguished only in degree4 ,machines fashioned by the hand of man perform their functions by means of visible and tangible instruments1 while natural bodies employ organs which1 for the most part1 are too minute to be perceived4 ,as the clock-maker constructs a clock from wheels and weights so that it is able to go of itself1 so ,god has made man's body out of dust1 only1 being a far superior artist1 he produces a work of art which is better constructed and capable of far more wonderful movements4 ,the cause of death is the destruction of some important part of the machine1 which prevents it from running longer2 a corpse is a broken clock1 and the departure of the soul comes only as a result of death4 ,the common opinion that the soul generates life in the body is erroneous4 ,it is rather true that life must be present before the soul enters into union with the body1 as it is also true that life must have ended before it dissolves the bond4 ,the sole principles of physiology are motion and heat4 ,the heat 7vital warmth1 a fire without light71 which ,god has put in the heart as the central organ of life1 has for its function the promotion of the circulation of the blood1 in the description of which ,descartes mentions with praise the discoveries of ,harvey 7,de ,motu ,cordis et ,sanguinis in ,animalibus1 #afbh74 ,from the blood are separated its finest1 most fiery1 and most mobile parts1 called by ,descartes animal spirits 7spiritus animales sive corporales71 and described as a very subtle wind or pure and vivid flame1 which ascend into the cavities of the brain1 reach the pineal gland suspended in its center 7conarion1 glans pinealis1 glandula71 pass into the nerves1 and1 by their action on the muscles connected with the nerves1 effect the motions of the limbs4 ,these views refer to the body alone1 and so are as true of animals as of men4 ,if automata existed similar to animals in all respects1 both external and internal1 it would be absolutely impossible to distinguish them from real animals4 ,if1 however1 they were made to resemble human bodies1 two signs would indicate their unreality--we would find no communication of ideas by means of language1 and also an absence of those bodily movements which take their origin in the reason 7and not merely in the constitution of the body74 ,the only thing which raises man above the brute is his rational soul1 which we are on no account to consider a product of matter1 but which is an express creation of ,god1 superadded4 ,the union of the soul or the mind 7anima sive mens7 with the body is1 it is true1 not so loose that the mind merely dwells in the body1 like a pilot in a ship1 nor1 on the other hand1 in view of the essential contrariety of the two substances1 is it so intimate as to be more than a unio compositionis4 ,although the soul is united to the whole body1 an especially active intercourse between them is developed at a single point1 the pineal gland1 which is distinguished by its central1 protected position1 above all1 by the fact that it is the only cerebral organ that is not double4 ,this gland1 together with the animal spirits passing to and from it1 mediates between mind and body2 and as the point of union for the twofold impressions from the 7right and left7 eyes and ears1 without which objects would be perceived double instead of single1 is the seat of the soul4 ,here the soul exercises a direct influence on the body and is directly affected by it2 here it dwells1 and at will produces a slight1 peculiar movement of the gland1 through this a change in the course of the animal spirits 7for it is not capable of generating motion1 but only of changing its direction71 and1 finally1 movements of the members2 just as1 on the other hand1 it remarks the slightest change in the course of the spiritus through a corresponding movement of the gland1 whose motions vary according to the sensuous properties of the object to be perceived1 and responds by sensations4 ,although ,descartes thus limits the direct interaction of soul and body to a small part of the organism1 he makes an exception in the case of memoria1 which appears to him to be more of a physical than a psychical function1 and which he conjectures to be diffused through the whole brain4 ,in spite of the comprehensive meaning which ,descartes gives to the notion cogitatio1 it is yet too narrow to leave room for an anima vegetativa and an anima sensitiva4 ,whoever makes mind and soul equivalent1 holds that their essence consists in conscious activity alone1 and interprets sensation as a mode of thought1 cannot escape the paradox of denying to animals the possession of a soul4 ,descartes does not shrink from such a conclusion4 ,animals are mere machines2 they are bodies animated1 but soulless2 they lack conscious perception and appetition1 though not the appearance of them4 ,when a clock strikes seven it knows nothing of the fact2 it does not regret that it is so late nor long soon to be able to strike eight2 it wills nothing1 feels nothing1 perceives nothing4 ,the lot of the brute is the same4 ,it sees and hears nothing1 it does not hunger or thirst1 it does not rejoice or fear1 if by these anything more than mere corporeal phenomena is to be meant2 of all these it possesses merely the unconscious material basis2 it moves and motion goes on in it--that is all4 ,the psychology of ,descartes1 which has had important results1#a divides cogitationes into two classes3 actiones and passiones4 ,action denotes everything which takes its origin in1 and is in the power of1 the soul2 passion1 everything which the soul receives from without1 in which it can make no change1 which is impressed upon it4 ,the further development of this distinction is marred by the crossing of the most diverse lines of thought1 resulting in obscurities and contradictions4 ,descartes's simple1 nave habits of thought and speech1 which were those of a man of the world rather than of a scholar1 were quite incompatible with the adoption and consistent use of a finely discriminated terminology2 he is very free with sive1 and not very careful with the expressions actio1 passio1 perceptio1 affectio1 volitio4 ,first he equates activity and willing1 for the will springs exclusively from the soul--it is only in willing that the latter is entirely independent2 while1 on the other hand1 passivity is made equivalent to representation and cognition1 for the soul does not create its ideas1 but receives them1--sensuous impressions coming to her quite evidently from the body4 ,these equations1 actio--the practical1 passio the theoretical function1 are soon limited and modified1 however4 ,the natural appetites and affections are forms of volition1 it is true1 but not free products of the mind1 for they take their origin in its connection with the body4 ,further1 not all perceptions have a sensuous origin2 when the soul makes free use of its ideas in imagination1 especially when in pure thought it dwells on itself1 when without the interference of the imagination it gazes on its rational nature1 it is by no means passive merely4 ,every act of the will1 again1 is accompanied by the consciousness of volition4 ,the volitio is an activity1 the cogitatio volitionis a passivity2 the soul affects itself1 is passively affected through its own activity1 is at the same instant both active and passive4 ,footnote #a3 ,for details cf4 the able monograph of ,dr4 ,anton ,koch1 #ahha4 ,thus not every volition1 e4g4 sensuous desire1 is action nor all perception1 e4g4 that of the pure intellect1 passion4 ,finally1 certain psychical phenomena fall indifferently under the head of perception or of volition1 e4g41 pain1 which is both an indistinct idea of something and an impulse to shun it4 ,in accordance with these emendations1 and omitting certain disturbing points of secondary importance1 the matter may be thus represented3 ,,cogitatio4 ,,actio ,,passio 7,mens sola2 clarae et distinctae 7,mens unita cum corpore2 ideae47 confusae ideae47 ,,volitio3 #f4 ,voluntas4 #c;b4 ,commotiones #c;a4 ,affectus4 #b4 ,appetitus naturales4 intellectuales _/ --------v------- ,judicium4 ,sensus interni ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------- ,,perceptio3 #d4 ,imaginatio ------------ _/ #e4 ,intellectus #d;b4 ,phantasia4 #d;a4 ,memoria4 #a4 ,sensus externi4 ,accordingly six grades of mental function are to be distinguished3 7#a7 ,the external senses4 7#b7 ,the natural appetites4 7#c7 ,the passions 7which1 together with the natural appetites1 constitute the internal senses1 and from which the mental emotions produced by the intellect are quite distinct74 7#d7 ,the imagination with its two divisions1 passive memory and active phantasy4 7#e7 ,the intellect or reason4 7#f7 ,the will4 ,these various stages or faculties are1 however1 not distinct parts of the soul1 as in the old psychology1 in opposition to which ,descartes emphatically defends the unity of the soul4 ,it is one and the same psychical power that exercises the higher and the lower1 the rational and the sensuous1 the practical and the theoretical activities4 ,of the mental functions1 whether representative images1 perceptions1 or volitions1 a part are referred to body 7to parts of our own body1 often also to external objects71 and produced by the body 7by the animal spirits and1 generally1 by the nerves as well71 while the rest find both object and cause in the soul4 ,intermediate between the two classes stand those acts of the will which are caused by the soul1 but which relate to the body1 e4g41 when ,i resolve to walk or leap2 and1 what is more important1 the passions1 which relate to the soul itself1 but which are called forth1 sustained1 and intensified by certain motions of the animal spirits4 ,since only those beings which consist of a body as well as a soul are capable of the passions1 these are specifically human phenomena4 ,these affections1 though very numerous1 may be reduced to a few simple or primary ones1 of which the rest are mere specializations or combinations4 ,descartes enumerates six primitive passions 7which number ,spinoza afterward reduced one-half7--admiratio1 amor et odium1 cupiditas 7dsir71 gaudium et tristitia4 ,the first and the fourth have no opposites1 the former being neither positive nor negative1 and the latter both at once4 ,wonder1 which includes under it esteem and contempt1 signifies interest in an object which neither attracts us by its utility nor repels us by its hurtfulness1 and yet does not leave us indifferent4 ,it is aroused by the powerful or surprising impression made by the extraordinary1 the rare1 the unexpected4 ,love seeks to appropriate that which is profitable2 hate1 to ward off that which is harmful1 to destroy that which is hostile4 ,desire or longing looks with hope or fear to the future4 ,when that which is feared or hoped for has come to pass1 joy and grief come in1 which relate to existing good and evil1 as desire relates to those to come4 ,the ,cartesian theory of the passions forms the bridge over which its author passes from psychology to ethics4 ,no soul is so weak as to be incapable of completely mastering its passions1 and of so directing them that from them all there will result that joyous temper advantageous to the reason4 ,the freedom of the will is unlimited4 ,although a direct influence on the passions is denied it1--it can neither annul them merely at its bidding1 nor at once reduce them to silence1 at least1 not the more violent ones1--it still has an indirect power over them in two ways4 ,during the continuance of the affection 7e4g41 fear7 it is able to arrest the bodily movements to which the affection tends 7flight71 though not the emotion itself1 and1 in the intervals of quiet1 it can take measures to render a new attack of the passion less dangerous4 ,instead of enlisting one passion against another1 a plan which would mean only an appearance of freedom1 but in fact a continuance in bondage1 the soul should fight with its own weapons1 with fixed maxims 7judicia71 based on certain knowledge of good and evil4 ,the will conquers the emotions by means of principles1 by clear and distinct knowledge1 which sees through and corrects the false values ascribed to things by the excitement of the passions4 ,besides this negative requirement1 subjection of the passions1 ,descartes' contributions to ethics--in the letters to ,princess ,elizabeth on human happiness1 and to ,queen ,christina on love and the highest good--were inconsiderable4 ,wisdom is the carrying out of that which has been seen to be best1 virtue is steadfastness1 sin inconstancy therein4 ,the goal of human endeavor is peace of conscience1 which is attained only through the determination to be virtuous1 i4e41 to live in harmony with self4 ,besides its ethical mission1 the will has allotted to it the theoretical function of affirmation and negation1 i4e41 of judgment4 ,if ,god in his veracity and goodness has bestowed on man the power to know truth1 how is misuse of this power1 how is error possible8 ,single sensations and ideas cannot be false1 but only judgments--the reference of ideas to objects4 ,judgment or assent is a matter of the will2 so that when it makes erroneous affirmations or negations1 when it prefers the false judgment to the true1 it alone is guilty4 ,our understanding is limited1 our will unlimited2 the latter reaches further than the former1 and can assent to a judgment even before its constituent parts have attained the requisite degree of clearness4 ,false judgment is prejudgment1 for which we can hold neither ,god nor our own nature responsible4 ,the possibility of error1 as well as the possibility of avoiding error1 resides in the will4 ,this has the power to postpone its assent or dissent1 to hold back its decision until the ideas have become entirely clear and distinct4 ,the supreme perfection is the libertas non errandi4 ,thus knowledge itself becomes a moral function2 the true and the good are in the last analysis identical4 ,the contradiction with which ,descartes has been charged1 that he makes volition and cognition reciprocally determinative1 that he bases moral goodness on the clearness of ideas and vice versa1 does not exist4 ,we must distinguish between a theoretical and a practical stadium in the will2 it is true of the latter that it depends on knowledge of the right1 of the former that the knowledge of the right is dependent on it4 ,in order to the possibility of moral action the will must conform to clear judgment2 in order to the production of the latter the will must be moral4 ,it is the unit-soul1 which first1 by freely avoiding overhasty judgment1 cognizes the truth1 to exemplify it later in moral conduct4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,development ,,and ,,transformation ,,of ,,cartesianism ,,in ,,the ,,netherlands ,,and ,,in ,,france4#a ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,g4 ,monchamp1 ,histoire du ,cartsianisme en ,belgique1 ,brussels1 #ahhf4 #a4 ,occasionalism3 ,geulincx4 ,the propagation and defense of a system of thought soon give occasion to its adherents to purify1 complete1 and transform it4 ,obscurities and contradictions are discovered1 which the master has overlooked or allowed to remain1 and the disciple exerts himself to remove them1 while retaining the fundamental doctrines4 ,in the system of ,descartes there were two closely connected points which demanded clarification and correction1 viz41 his double dualism 7#a7 between extended substance and thinking substance1 7#b7 between created substance and the divine substance4 ,in contrast with each other matter and mind are substances or independent beings1 for the clear conception of body contains naught of consciousness1 thought1 representation1 and that of mind nothing of extension1 matter1 motion4 ,in comparison with ,god they are not so2 apart from the creator they can neither exist nor be conceived4 ,in every case where the attempt is made to distinguish between intrinsic and general 7as here1 between substance in the stricter and wider senses71 an indecision betrays itself which is not permanently endured4 ,the substantiality of the material and spiritual worlds maintained by ,descartes finds an excellent counterpart in his 7entirely modern7 tendency to push the concursus dei as far as possible into the background1 to limit it to the production of the original condition of things1 to give over motion1 once created1 to its own laws1 and ideas implanted in the mind to its own independent activity2 but it is hard to reconcile with it the view1 popular in the ,middle ,ages1 that the preservation of the world is a perpetual creation4 ,in the former case the relation of ,god to the world is made an external relation2 in the latter1 an internal one4 ,in the one the world is thought of as a clock1 which once wound up runs on mechanically1 in the second it is likened to a piece of music which the composer himself recites4 ,if ,god preserves created things by continually recreating them they are not substances at all2 if they are substances1 preservation becomes an empty word1 which we repeat after the theologians without giving it any real meaning4 ,matter and spirit stand related in our thought only by way of exclusion2 is the same true of them in reality8 ,they can be conceived and can exist without each other2 can they1 further1 without each other effect all that we perceive them to accomplish8 ,there are some motions in the material world which we refer to a voluntary decision of the soul1 and some among our ideas 7e4g41 perceptions of the senses7 which we refer to corporeal phenomena as their causes4 ,if body and soul are substances1 how can they be dependent on each other in certain of their activities1 if they are of opposite natures1 how can they affect each other8 ,how can the incorporeal1 unmoved spirit move the animal spirits and receive impulses from them8 ,the substantiality 7reciprocal independence7 of body and mind1 and their interaction 7partial reciprocal dependence71 are incompatible1 one or the other is illusory and must be abandoned4 ,the materialists 7,hobbes7 sacrifice the independence of mind1 the idealists 7,berkeley1 ,leibnitz71 the independence of matter1 the occasionalists1 the interaction of the two4 ,this forms the advance of the last beyond ,descartes1 who either navely maintains that1 in spite of the contrariety of material and mental substances1 an exchange of effects takes place between them as an empirical fact1 or1 when he realizes the difficulty of the anthropological problem1--how is the union of the two substances in man possible1--ascribes the interaction of body and mind1 together with the union of the two1 to the power of ,god1 and by this abandonment of the attempt at a natural explanation1 opens up the occasionalistic way of escape4 ,further1 in his more detailed description of the intercourse between body and mind ,descartes had been guilty of direct violations of his laws of natural philosophy4 ,if the quantity of motion is declared to be invariable and a change in its direction is attributed to mechanical causes alone1 we must not ascribe to the soul the power to move the pineal gland1 even in the gentlest way1 nor to control the direction of the animal spirits4 ,these inconsistencies also are removed by the occasionalistic thesis4 ,the question concerning the substantiality of mind and matter in relation to ,god1 is involved from the very beginning in this latter problem1 ,how is the appearance of interaction between the two to be explained without detriment to their substantiality in relation to each other8 ,the denial of the reciprocal dependence of matter and spirit leads to sharper accentuation of their common dependence upon ,god4 ,thus occasionalism forms the transition to the pantheism of ,spinoza1 ,geulincx emphasizing the non-substantiality of spirits1 and ,malebranche the non-substantiality of bodies1 while ,spinoza combines and intensifies both4 ,and yet history was not obliging enough to carry out this convenient and agreeable scheme of development with chronological accuracy1 for she had ,spinoza complete his pantheism before ,malebranche had prepared the way4 ,the relation which was noted in the case of ,bruno and ,campanella is here repeated3 the earlier thinker assumes the more advanced position1 while the later one seems backward in comparison2 and that which1 viewed from the standpoint of the question itself1 may be considered a transition link1 is historically to be taken as a reaction against the excessive prosecution of a line of thought which1 up to a certain point1 had been followed by the one who now shrinks back from its extreme consequences4 ,the course of philosophy takes first a theological direction in the earlier occasionalists1 then a metaphysical 7naturalistic7 trend in ,spinoza1 to renew finally1 in ,malebranche1 the first of these movements in opposition to the second4 ,the ,cartesian school1 as a whole1 however1 exhibits a tendency toward mysticism1 which was concealed to a greater or less extent by the rationalistic need for clear concepts1 but never entirely suppressed4 ,although the real interaction of body and mind be denied1 some explanation must1 at least1 be given for the appearance of interaction1 i4e4 for the actual correspondence of bodily and mental phenomena4 ,occasionalism denotes the theory of occasional causes4 ,it is not the body that gives rise to perception1 nor the mind that causes the motion of the limbs which it has determined upon--neither the one nor the other can receive influence from its fellow or exercise influence upon it2 but it is ,god who1 on the occasion of the physical motion 7of the air and nerves72 produces the sensation 7of sound71 and1 at the instance of the determination of the will1 produces the movement of the arms4 ,the systematic development and marked influence of this theory1 which had already been more or less clearly announced by the ,cartesians ,cordemoy and ,de la ,forge1#a was due to the talented ,arnold ,geulincx 7#afbd-fi71 who was born at ,antwerp1 taught in ,lyons 7#afdf-eh7 and ,leyden1 and became a convert to ,calvinism4 ,it ultimately gained over the majority of the numerous adherents of the ,cartesian philosophy in the ,dutch universities1--,renery 7died #afci7 and ,regius 7van ,roy2 ,fundamenta ,physicae1 #afdf2 ,philosophia ,naturalis1 #affa7 in ,utrecht2 further1 ,balthasar ,bekker 7#afcd-ih2 ,the ,world ,bewitched1 #afij71 the brave opponent of the belief in angels and devils1 of magic1 and of prosecution for witchcraft1--in the clerical orders in ,france and1 finally1 in ,germany4 ,footnote #a3 ,gerauld de ,cordemoy1 a ,parisian advocate 7died #afhd1 ,dissertations ,philosophiques1 #afff71 communicated his occasionalistic views orally to his friends as early as #afeh 7cf4 ,l4 ,stein in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 i41 #ahhh1 p4 #ef74 ,louis de la ,forge1 a physician of ,saumur1 ,tractatus de ,mente ,humana1 #afff1 previously published in ,french2 cf4 ,seyfarth1 ,gotha1 #ahhg4 ,but the logician1 ,johann ,clauberg1 professor in ,duisburg 7#afbb-fe2 ,opera1 edited by ,schalbruch1 #afia71 is1 according to the investigations of ,herm4 ,mller 7,j4 ,clauberg und seine ,stellung im ,cartesianismus1 ,jena1 #ahia71 to be stricken from the list of thinkers who prepared the way for occasionalism1 since in his discussion of the anthropological problem 7corporis et animae conjunctio7 he merely develops the ,cartesian position1 and does not go beyond it4 ,he employs the expression occasio1 it is true1 but not in the sense of the occasionalists4 ,according to ,clauberg the bodily phenomenon becomes the stimulus or occasion 7not for ,god1 but7 for the soul to produce from itself the corresponding mental phenomenon4 ,geulincx himself1 besides two inaugural addresses at ,leyden 7as ,lector in #affb1 ,professor ,extraordinary in #affe71 published the following treatises3 ,quaestiones ,quodlibeticae 7in the second edition1 #affe1 entitled ,saturnalia7 with an important introductory discourse2 ,logica ,fundamentis ,suis ,restituta1 #affb2 ,methodus ,inveniendi ,argumenta 7new edition by ,bontekoe1 #afge72 and the first part of his ,ethics--,de ,virtute et ,primis ejus ,proprietatibus1 quae vulgo ,virtutes ,cardinales ,vocantur1 ,tractatus ,ethicus ,primus1 #affe4 ,this chief work was issued complete in all six parts with the title1 ,greek3 ,gnothi seauton sive ,ethica1 #afge1 by ,bontekoe1 under the pseudonym ,philaretus4 ,the ,physics1 #afhh1 the ,metaphysics1 #afia1 and the ,annotata ,majora in ,cartesii ,principia ,philosophiae1 #afia1 were also posthumous publications1 from the notes of his pupils4 ,in view of the rarity of these volumes1 and the importance of the philosopher1 it is welcome news that ,j4,p4,n4 ,land has undertaken an edition of the collected works1 in three volumes1 of which the first two have already appeared4#a ,the ,hague1 #ahia-ib4b ,footnote #a3 ,on vol4 i4 cf4 ,eucken1 ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxviii41 #ahib1 p1#bjj seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,on ,geulincx see ,v4 van der ,haeghen1 ,geulincx1 tude sur sa ,vie1 sa ,philosophie1 et ses ,ouvrages1 ,ghent1 #ahhf1 including a complete bibliography2 and ,land in vol4 iv4 of the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahij4 ,english translation1 ,mind1 vol4 xvi4 p4 #bbc seq4 ,geulincx bases the occasionalistic position on the principle1 quod nescis1 quomodo fiat1 id non facis4 ,unless ,i know how an event happens1 ,i am not its cause4 ,since ,i have no consciousness how my decision to speak or to walk is followed by the movement of my tongue or limbs1 ,i am not the one who effects these4 ,since ,i am just as ignorant how the sensation in my mind comes to pass as a sequel to the motion in the sense-organ2 since1 further1 the body as an unconscious and non-rational being can effect nothing1 it is neither ,i nor the body that causes the sensation4 ,both the bodily movement and the sense-impression are1 rather1 the effects of a higher power1 of the infinite spirit4 ,the act of my will and the sense-stimulus are only causae occasionales for the divine will1 in an incomprehensible way1 to effect1 in the one case1 the execution of the movement of the limbs resolved upon1 and1 in the other1 the origin of the perception2 they are 7unsuitable7 instruments1 effective only in the hand of ,god2 he brings it to pass that my will goes out beyond my soul1 and that corporeal motion has results in it4 ,the meaning of this doctrine is misapprehended when it is assumed1--an assumption to which the ,leibnitzian account of occasionalism may mislead one1--that in it the continuity of events1 alike in the material and the psychical world1 is interrupted by frequent scattered interferences from without1 and all becoming transformed into a series of disconnected miracles4 ,an order of nature such as would be destroyed by ,god's action does not exist2 ,god brings everything to pass2 even the passage of motion from one body to another is his work4 ,further1 ,geulincx expressly says that ,god has imposed such laws on motion that it harmonizes with the soul's free volition1 of which1 however1 it is entirely independent 7similar statements occur also in ,de la ,forge74 ,and with this our thinker appears--as ,pfleiderer#a emphasizes--closely to approach the pre-established harmony of ,leibnitz4 ,the occasionalistic theory certainly constitutes the preliminary step to the ,leibnitzian2 but an essential difference separates the two4 ,the advance does not consist in the substitution by ,leibnitz of one single miracle at creation for a number of isolated and continually recurring ones1 but 7as ,leibnitz himself remarks1 in reply to the objection expressed by ,father ,lami1 that a perpetual miracle is no miracle7 in the exchange of the immediate causality of ,god for natural causation4 ,with ,geulincx mind and body act on each other1 but not by their own power2 with ,leibnitz the monads do not act on one another1 but they act by their own power4#b--,when ,geulincx in the same connection advances to the statements that1 in view of the limitedness and passivity of finite things1 ,god is the only truly active1 because the only independent1 being in the world1 that all activity is his activity1 that the human 7finite7 spirit is related to the divine 7infinite7 spirit as the individual body to space in general1 viz41 as a section of it1 so that1 by thinking away all limitations from our mind1 we find ,god in us and ourselves in him1 it shows how nearly he verges on pantheism4 ,footnote #a3 ,edm4 ,pfleiderer1 ,geulincx1 als ,hauptvertreter der occasionalistischen ,metaphysik und ,ethik1 ,tbingen1 #ahhb2 the same1 ,leibniz und ,geulincx mit besonderer ,beziehung auf ihr ,uhrengleichnis1 ,tbingen1 #ahhd4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,ed4 ,zeller1 ,sitzungsberichte der ,berliner ,akademie der ,wissenschaften1 #ahhd1 p4 #fgc seq42 ,eucken1 ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xix41 #ahic1 p4 #ebe seq2 vol4 xxiii41 #ahhg1 p4 #ehg seq4 ,geulincx's services to notics have been duly recognized by ,ed4 ,grimm 7,jena1 #ahge71 although with an excessive approximation to ,kant4 ,in this field he advances many acute and suggestive thoughts1 as the deduction which reappears in ,lotze1 that the actually existent world of figure and motion cognized by thought1 though the real world1 is poorer than the wonderful world of motley sensuous appearance conjured forth in our minds on the occasion of the former1 that the latter is the more beautiful and more worthy of a divine author4 ,further1 the conviction1 also held by ,lotze1 that the fundamental activities of the mind cannot be defined1 but only known through inner experience or immediate consciousness 7he who loves1 knows what love is2 it is a per conscientiam et intimam experientiam notissima res72 the praiseworthy attempt to give a systematic arrangement1 according to their derivation from one another1 to the innate mathematical concepts1 which ,descartes had simply co-ordinated 7the concept of surface is gained from the concept of body by abstracting from the third dimension1 thickness--the act of thus abstracting from certain parts of the content of thought1 ,geulincx terms consideratio in contrast to cogitatio1 which includes the whole content72 and1 finally1 the still more important inquiry1 whether it is possible for us to reach a knowledge of things independently of the forms of the understanding1 as in pure thought we strip off the fetters of sense4 ,the possibility of this is denied2 there is no higher faculty of knowledge to act as judge over the understanding1 as the latter over the sensibility1 and even the wisest man cannot free himself from the forms of thought 7categories1 modi cogitandi74 ,and yet the discussion of the question is not useless3 the reason should examine into the unknowable as well as the knowable2 it is only in this way that we learn that it is unknowable4 ,as the highest forms of thought ,geulincx names subject 7the empty concept of an existent1 ens or quod est7 and predicate 7modus entis71 and derives them from two fundamental activities of the mind1 a combining function 7simulsumtio1 totatio7 and an abstracting function 7one which removes the nota subjecti74 ,substance and accident1 substantive and adjective1 are expressions for subjective processes of thought and hence do not hold of things in themselves4 ,with reference to the importance1 nay1 to the indispensability1 of linguistic signs in the use of the understanding1 the science of the forms of thought is briefly termed grammar4 ,the principle ubi nihil vales1 ibi nihil velis1 forms the connection between the occasionalistic metaphysics and ethics1 the latter deducing the practical consequences of the former4 ,where thou canst do nothing1 there will nothing4 ,since we can effect nothing in the material world1 to which we are related merely as spectators1 we ought also not to seek in it the motives and objects of our actions4 ,god1 does not require works1 but dispositions only1 for the result of our volition is beyond our power4 ,our moral vocation1 then1 consists in renunciation of the world and retirement into ourselves1 and in patient faithfulness at the post assigned to us4 ,virtue is amor dei ac rationis1 self-renouncing1 active1 obedient love to ,god and to the reason as the image and law of ,god in us4 ,the cardinal virtues are diligentia1 sedulous listening for the commands of the reason2 obedientia1 the execution of these justitia1 the conforming of the whole life to what is perceived to be right2 finally1 humilitas1 the recognition of our impotency and self-renunciation 7inspectio and despectio1 or derelictio1 neglectus1 contemptus1 incuria sui74 ,the highest of these is humility1 pious submission to the divine order of things2 its condition1 the self-knowledge commended in the title of the ,ethics2 the primal evil1 self-love 7,philautia--ipsissimum peccatum74 ,man is unhappy because he seeks happiness4 ,happiness is like our shadows2 it shuns us when we pursue it1 it follows us when we flee from it4 ,the joys which spring from virtue are an adornment of it1 not an enticement to it2 they are its result1 not its aim4 ,the ethics of ,geulincx1 which we cannot further trace out here1 surprises one by its approximation to the views of ,spinoza and of ,kant4 ,with the former it has in common the principle of love toward ,god1 as well as numerous details2 with the latter1 the absoluteness of the moral law 7in rebus moralibus absolute praecipit ratio aut vetat1 nulla interposita conditione72 with both the depreciation of sympathy1 on the ground that it is a concealed egoistic motive4 ,the denial of substantiality to individual things1 brought in by the occasionalists1 is completed by ,spinoza1 who boldly and logically proclaims pantheism on the basis of ,cartesianism and gives to the divine ,all-one a naturalistic instead of a theological character4 #b4 ,spinoza4 ,benedictus 7originally ,baruch7 de ,spinoza sprang from a ,jewish family of ,portugal or ,spain1 which had fled to ,holland to escape persecution at home4 ,he was born in ,amsterdam in #afcb2 taught by the ,rabbin ,morteira1 and1 in ,latin1 by ,van den ,ende1 a free-thinking physician who had enjoyed a philological training2 and expelled by anathema from the ,jewish communion1 #afef1 on account of heretical views4 ,during the next four years he found refuge at a friend's house in the country near ,amsterdam1 after which he lived in ,rhynsburg1 and from #affd in ,voorburg1 moving thence1 in #affi1 to ,the ,hague1 where he died in #afgg4 ,spinoza lived in retirement and had few wants2 he supported himself by grinding optical glasses2 and1 in #afgc1 declined the professorship at ,heidelberg offered him by ,karl ,ludwig1 the ,elector ,palatine1 because of his love of quiet1 and on account of the uncertainty of the freedom of thought which the ,elector had assured him4 ,spinoza himself made but two treatises public3 his dictations on the first and second parts of ,descartes's ,principia ,philosophiae1 which had been composed for a private pupil1 with an appendix1 ,cogitata ,metaphysica1 #affc1 and the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus1 published anonymously in #afgj1 in defense of liberty of thought and the right to unprejudiced criticism of the biblical writings4 ,the principles expressed in the latter work were condemned by all parties as sacrilegious and atheistic1 and awakened concern even in the minds of his friends4 ,when1 in #afge1 ,spinoza journeyed to ,amsterdam with the intention of giving his chief work1 the ,ethics1 to the press1 the clergy and the followers of ,descartes applied to the government to forbid its issue4 ,soon after ,spinoza's death it was published in the ,opera ,posthuma1 #afgg1 which were issued under the care of ,hermann ,schuller1#a with a preface by ,spinoza's friend1 the physician ,ludwig ,meyer1 and which contained1 besides the chief work1 three incomplete treatises 7,tractatus ,politicus1 ,tractatus de ,intellectus ,emendatione1 ,compendium ,grammatices ,linguae ,hebraeae7 and a collection of ,letters by and to ,spinoza4 ,the ,ethica ,ordine ,geometrico ,demonstrata1 in five parts1 treats 7#a7 of ,god1 7#b7 of the nature and origin of the mind1 7#c7 of the nature and origin of the emotions1 7#d7 of human bondage or the strength of the passions1 7#e7 of the power of the reason or human freedom4 ,it has become known within recent times that ,spinoza made a very early sketch of the system developed in the ,ethics1 the ,tractatus ,brevis de ,deo et ,homine ejusque ,felicitate1 of which a ,dutch translation in two copies was discovered1 though not the original ,latin text4 ,this treatise was published by ,bhmer1 #aheb1 in excerpts1 and complete by ,van ,vloten1 #ahfb1 and by ,schaarschmidt1 #ahfi4 ,it was not until our own century1 and after ,jacobi's ,ueber die ,lehre des ,spinoza in ,briefen an ,moses ,mendelssohn 7#aghe7 had aroused the long slumbering interest in this much misunderstood philosopher1 who has been oftener despised than studied1 that complete editions of his works were prepared1 by ,paulus #ahjb-jc2 ,gfrrer1 #ahcj2 ,bruder1 #ahdc-df2 ,ginsberg 7in ,kirchmann's ,philosophische ,bibliothek1 #d vols471 #ahge-hb2 and ,van ,vloten and ,land1#b #b vols41 #ahhb-hc4 ,b4 ,auerbach has worked ,spinoza's life into a romantic novel1 ,spinoza1 ein ,denkerleben1 #ahcg2 #b;d ed41 #ahee ,english translation by ,c4,t4 ,brooks1 #ahhb4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,l4 ,stein in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 i41 #ahhh1 p4 #eed seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,for the literature on ,spinoza the reader is referred to ,ueberweg and to ,van der ,linde's ,b4 ,spinoza1 ,bibliografie1 #ahga2 while among recent works we shall mention only ,camerer's ,die ,lehre ,spinozas1 ,stuttgart1 #ahgg4 ,an ,english translation of ,the ,chief ,works of ,spinoza has been given by ,elwes1 #ahhc-hd2 a translation of the ,ethics by ,white1 #ahhc2 and one of selections from the ,ethics1 with notes1 by ,fullerton in ,sneath's ,modern ,philosophers1 #ahib4 ,among the various works on ,spinoza1 the reader may be referred to ,pollock's ,spinoza1 ,his ,life and ,times1 #ahhj 7with bibliography to same year72 ,martineau's ,study of ,spinoza1 #ahhc2 and ,j4 ,caird's ,spinoza1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhh4--,,tr4 ,we shall consider ,spinoza's system as a completed whole as it is given in the ,ethics2 for although it is interesting for the investigator to trace out the development of his thinking by comparing this chief work with its forerunner 7that ,tractatus ,brevis concerning ,god1 man1 and the happiness of the latter1 whose dialogistical portions we may surmise to have been the earliest sketch of the ,spinozistic position1 and which was followed by the ,tractatus de ,intellectus ,emendatione7 such a procedure is not equally valuable for the student4 ,in regard to ,spinoza's relations to other thinkers it cannot be doubted1 since ,freudenthal's#a proof1 that he was dependent to a large degree on the predominant philosophy of the schools1 i4e4 on the later ,scholasticism 7,suarez#b71 especially on its ,protestant side 7,jacob ,martini1 ,combachius1 ,scheibler1 ,burgersdijck1 ,heereboord72 ,descartes1 it is true1 felt the same influence4 ,jol1#c3 ,schaarschmidt1 ,sigwart1#d ,r4 ,avenarius1#e and ,bhmer#f have advanced the view that the sources of ,spinoza's philosophy are not to be sought exclusively in ,cartesianism1 but rather that essential elements were taken from the ,cabala1 from the ,jewish ,scholasticism 7,maimonides1 #aaij2 ,gersonides1 died #acdd2 ,chasdai ,crescas1 #adaj71 and from ,giordano ,bruno4 ,in opposition to this ,kuno ,fischer has defended1 and in the main successfully1 the proposition that ,spinoza reached1 and must have reached1 his fundamental pantheism by his own reflection as a development of ,descartes's principles4 ,the traces of his early ,talmudic education1 which have been noticed in ,spinoza's works1 prove no dependence of his leading ideas on ,jewish theology4 ,his pantheism is distinguished from that of the ,cabalists by its rejection of the doctrine of emanation1 and from ,bruno's1 which nevertheless may have influenced him1 by its anti-teleological character4 ,when with ,greek philosophers1 ,jewish theologians1 and the ,apostle ,paul he teaches the immanence of ,god 7,epist4 #ba71 when with ,maimonides and ,crescas he teaches love to ,god as the principal of morality1 and with the latter of these1 determinism also1 it is not a necessary consequence that he derived these theories from them4 ,that which most of all separates him from the mediaeval scholastics of his own people1 is his rationalistic conviction that ,god can be known4 ,his agreement with them comes out most clearly in the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus4 ,but even here it holds only in regard to undertaking a general criticism of the ,scriptures and to their figurative interpretation1 while1 on the other hand1 the demand for a special historical criticism1 and the object which with ,spinoza was the basis of the investigation as a whole1 were foreign to mediaeval ,judaism--in fact1 entirely modern and original4 ,this object was to make science independent of religion1 whose records and doctrines are to edify the mind and to improve the character1 not to instruct the understanding4 ,spinoza could not have learned the complete separation of religion and science from ,jewish literature2 this was a tendency which sprang from the spirit of his own time 7,windelband1 ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 vol4 i4 p4 #aid74 ,footnote #a3 ,j4 ,freudenthal1 ,spinoza und die ,scholastik in the ,philosophische ,aufstze1 ,zeller zum #ej-;,jhrigen ,doktorjubilum gewidmet1 ,leipsic1 #ahhg1 p4 #he seq4 ,freudenthal's proof covers the ,cogitata ,metaphysica and many of the principal propositions of the ,ethics4 ,footnote #b3 ,the ,spanish ,jesuit1 ,francis ,suarez1 lived #aedh-afag4 ,works1 ,venice1 #agad ,cf4 ,karl ,werner1 ,suarez und die ,scholastik der letzten ,jahrhunderte1 ,regensburg1 #ahfa4 ,footnote #c3 ,m4 ,jol1 ,don ,chasdai ,crescas' religions-philosophische ,lehren in ihrem geschichtlichen ,einfluss1 #ahff2 ,spinozas ,theo4-pel4 ,traktat auf seine ,quellen geprft1 #ahgj2 ,zur ,genesis der ,lehre ,spinozas mit besonderer ,bercksichtigung des kurzen ,traktats1 #ahga4 ,footnote #d3 ,spinozas neu entdeckter ,traktat elutert u4 s4 w41 #ahff2 ,spinozas kurzer ,traktat bersetzt mit ,einleitungen und ,erluterungen1 #ahgj4 ,footnote #e3 ,ueber die beiden ersten ,phasen des ,spinozistischen ,pantheismus und das ,verhltniss der zweiten zur dritten ,phase1 #ahfh4 ,footnote #f3 ,spinozana in ,fichte's ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie vols4 xxxvi41 xlii41 lvii41 #ahfj-gj4 ,the logical presuppositions of ,spinoza's philosophy lie in the fundamental ideas of ,descartes1 which ,spinoza accentuates1 transforms1 and adopts4 ,three pairs of thoughts captivate him and incite him to think them through3 first1 the rationalistic belief in the power of the human spirit to possess itself of the truth by pure thought1 together with confidence in the omnipotence of the mathematical method2 second1 the concept of substance1 together with the dualism of extension and thought2 finally1 the fundamental mechanical position1 together with the impossibility of interaction between matter and spirit1 held in common with the occasionalists1 but reached independently of them4 ,whatever new elements are added 7e4 g41 the transformation of the ,deity from a mere aid to knowledge into its most important1 nay1 its only object2 as1 also1 the enthusiastic1 directly mystical devotion to the all-embracing world-ground7 are of an essentially emotional nature1 and to be referred less to historical influences than to the individuality of the thinker4 ,the divergences from his predecessors1 however1 especially the extension of mechanism to mental phenomena and the denial of the freedom of the will1 inseparable from this1 result simply from the more consistent application of ,cartesian principles4 ,spinoza is not an inventive1 impulsive spirit1 like ,descartes and ,leibnitz1 but a systematic one2 his strength does not lie in brilliant inspirations1 but in the power of resolutely thinking a thing through2 not in flashes of thought1 but in strictly closed circles of thought4 ,he develops1 but with genius1 and to the end4 ,nevertheless this consecutiveness of ,spinoza1 the praises of which have been unceasingly sung by generations since his day1 has its limits4 ,it holds for the unwavering development of certain principles derived from ,descartes1 but not with equal strictness for the inter-connection of the several lines of thought followed out separately4 ,his very custom of developing a principle straight on to its ultimate consequences1 without regard to the needs of the heart or to logical demands from other directions1 make it impossible for the results of the various lines of thought to be themselves in harmony2 his vertical consistency prevents horizontal consistency4 ,if the original tendencies come into conflict 7the consciously held theoretical principles into conflict with one another1 or with hidden aesthetic or moral principles71 either one gains the victory over the other or both insist on their claims2 thus we have inconsistencies in the one case1 and contradictions in the other 7examples of which have been shown by ,volkelt in his maiden work1 ,pantheismus und ,individualismus im ,systeme ,spinozas1 #ahgb74 ,science demands unified comprehension of the given1 and seeks the smallest number of principles possible2 but her concepts prove too narrow vessels for the rich plenitude of reality4 ,he who asks from philosophy more than mere special inquiries finds himself confronted by two possibilities3 first1 starting from one standpoint1 or a few such1 he may follow a direct course without looking to right or left1 at the risk that in his thought-calculus great spheres of life will be wholly left out of view1 or1 at least1 will not receive due consideration2 or1 second1 beginning from many points of departure and ascending along converging lines1 he may seek a unifying conclusion4 ,in ,spinoza we possess the most brilliant example of the former one-sided1 logically consecutive power of 7also1 no doubt1 violence in7 thought1 while ,leibnitz furnishes the type of the many-sided1 harmonistic thinking4 ,the fact that even the rigorous ,spinoza is not infrequently forced out of the strict line of consistency1 proves that the man was more many-sided than the thinker would have allowed himself to be4 ,to begin with the formal side of ,spinozism3 the rationalism of ,descartes is heightened by ,spinoza into the imposing confidence that absolutely everything is cognizable by the reason1 that the intellect is able by its pure concepts and intuitions entirely to exhaust the multiform world of reality1 to follow it with its light into its last refuge4#a ,spinoza is just as much in earnest in regard to the typical character of mathematics4 ,descartes 7with the exception of an example asked for in the second of the ,objections1 and given as an appendix to the ,meditations1 in which he endeavors to demonstrate the existence of ,god and the distinction of body and spirit on the synthetic ,euclidean method71 had availed himself of the analytic form of presentation1 on the ground that1 though less cogent1 it is more suited for instruction since it shows the way by which the matter has been discovered4 ,spinoza1 on the other hand1 rigorously carried out the geometrical method1 even in externals4 ,he begins with definitions1 adds to these axioms 7or postulates71 follows with propositions or theorems as the chief thing1 finally with demonstrations or proofs1 which derive the later propositions from the earlier1 and these in turn from the self-evident axioms4 ,to these four principal parts are further added as less essential1 deductions or corollaries immediately resulting from the theorems1 and the more detailed expositions of the demonstrations or scholia4 ,besides these1 some longer discussions are given in the form of remarks1 introductions1 and appendices4 ,footnote #a3 ,heussler's objections 7,der ,rationalismus des #ag ,jahrhunderts1 #ahhe1 pp4 #hb-he7 to this characterization of ,kuno ,fischer's are not convincing4 ,the question is not so much about a principle demonstrable by definite citations as about an unconscious motive in ,spinoza's thinking4 ,fischer's views on this point seem to us correct4 ,spinoza's mode of thinking is1 in fact1 saturated with this strong confidence in the omnipotence of the reason and the rational constitution of true reality4 ,if everything is to be cognizable through mathematics1 then everything must take place necessarily2 even the thoughts1 resolutions1 and actions of man cannot be free in the sense that they might have happened otherwise4 ,thus there is an evident methodological motive at work for the extension of mechanism to all becoming1 even spiritual becoming4 ,but there are metaphysical reasons also4 ,descartes had navely solved the anthropological problem by the answer that the interaction of mind and body is incomprehensible but actual4 ,the occasionalists had hesitatingly questioned these conclusions a little1 the incomprehensibility as well as the actuality1 only at last to leave them intact4 ,for the explanation that there is a real influence of body on mind and vice versa1 though not an immediate but an occasional one1 one mediated by the divine will1 is scarcely more than a confession that the matter is inexplicable4 ,spinoza1 who admits neither the incognizability of anything real1 nor any supernatural interferences1 roundly denies both4 ,there is no intercourse between body and soul2 yet that which is erroneously considered such is both actually present and explicable4 ,the assumed interaction is as unnecessary as it is impossible4 ,body and soul do not need to act on one another1 because they are not two in kind at all1 but constitute one being which may be looked at from two different sides4 ,this is called body when considered under its attribute of extension1 and spirit when considered under its attribute of thought4 ,it is quite impossible for two substances to affect each other1 because by their reciprocal influence1 nay1 by their very duality1 they would lose their independence1 and1 with this1 their substantiality4 ,there is no plurality of substances1 but only one1 the infinite1 the divine substance4 ,here we reach the center of the system4 ,there is but one becoming and but one independent1 substantial being4 ,material and spiritual becoming form merely the two sides of one and the same necessary world-process2 particular extended beings and particular thinking beings are nothing but the changeable and transitory states 7modi7 of the enduring1 eternal1 unified world-ground4 ,necessity in becoming and unity of being1 mechanism and pantheism--these are the controlling conceptions in ,spinoza's doctrine4 ,multiplicity1 the self-dependence of particular things1 free choice1 ends1 development1 all this is illusion and error4 7a7 ,substance1 ,attributes1 and ,modes4--,there is but one substance1 and this is infinite 7,i4 prop4 #aj1 schol2 prop4 #ad1 cor4 #a74 ,why1 then1 only one and why infinite8 ,with ,spinoza as with ,descartes independence is the essence of substantiality4 ,this is expressed in the third definition3 ,by substance ,i understand that which is in itself and is conceived by means of itself1 i4e41 that the conception of which can be formed without the aid of the conception of any other thing4 ,per substantiam intelligo id1 quod in se est et per se concipitur2 hoc est id1 cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei1 a quo formari debeat4 ,an absolutely self-dependent being can neither be limited 7since1 in respect to its limits1 it would be dependent on the limiting being71 nor occur more than once in the world4 ,infinity follows from its self-dependence1 and its uniqueness from its infinity4 ,substance is the being which is dependent on nothing and on which everything depends2 which1 itself uncaused1 effects all else2 which presupposes nothing1 but itself constitutes the presupposition of all that is3 it is pure being1 primal being1 the cause of itself and of all4 ,thus in ,spinoza the being which is without presuppositions is brought into the most intimate relation with the fullness of multiform existence1 not coldly and abstractly exalted above it1 as by the ancient ,eleatics4 ,substance is the being in 7not above7 things1 that in them which constitutes their reality1 which supports and produces them4 ,as the cause of all things ,spinoza calls it ,god1 although he is conscious that he understands by the term something quite different from the ,christians4 ,god does not mean for him a transcendent1 personal spirit1 but only the ens absolute infinitum 7def4 sexta71 the essential heart of things3 ,deus sive substantia4 ,how do things proceed from ,god8 ,neither by creation nor by emanation4 ,he does not put them forth from himself1 they do not tear themselves free from him1 but they follow out of the necessary nature of ,god1 as it follows from the nature of the triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles 7,i4 prop4 #ag1 schol474 ,they do not come out from him1 but remain in him2 just this fact that they are in another1 in ,god1 constitutes their lack of self-dependence 7,i4 prop4 #ah1 dem43 nulla res1 quae extra ,deum in se sit74 ,god is their inner1 indwelling cause 7causa immanens1 non vero transiens4--,i4 prop4 #ah71 is not a transcendent creator1 but natura naturans1 over against the sum of finite beings1 natura naturata 7,i4 prop4 #bi1 schol473 ,deus sive natura4 ,since nothing exists out of ,god1 his actions do not follow from external necessity1 are not constrained1 but he is free cause1 free in the sense that he does nothing except that toward which his own nature impels him1 that he acts in accordance with the laws of his being 7def4 septima3 ea res libera dicitur1 quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur2 ,epist4 #bf74 ,this inner necessitation is so little a defect that its direct opposite1 undetermined choice and inconstancy1 must rather be excluded from ,god as an imperfection4 ,freedom and 7inner7 necessity are identical2 and antithetical1 on the one side1 to undetermined choice and1 on the other1 to 7external7 compulsion4 ,action in view of ends must also be denied of the infinite2 to think of ,god as acting in order to the good is to make him dependent on something external to him 7an aim7 and lacking in that which is to be attained by the action4 ,with ,god the ground of his action is the same as the ground of his existence2 ,god's power and his essence coincide 7,i4 prop4 #cd3 ,dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia74 ,he is the cause of himself 7def4 prima3 per causam sui intelligo id1 cujus essentia involvit existentiam1 sive id1 cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens72 it would be a contradiction to hold that being was not1 that ,god1 or substance1 did not exist2 he cannot be thought otherwise than as existing2 his concept includes his existence4 ,to be self-caused means to exist necessarily 7,i4 prop4 #g74 ,the same thing is denoted by the predicate eternal1 which1 according to the eighth definition1 denotes existence itself1 in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the mere definition of the eternal thing4 ,the infinite substance stands related to finite1 individual things1 not only as the independent to the dependent1 as the cause to the caused1 as the one to the many1 and the whole to the parts1 but also as the universal to the particular1 the indeterminate to the determinate4 ,from infinite being as pure affirmation 7,i4 prop4 #h1 schol4 ,i3 absoluta affirmatio7 everything which contains a limitation or negation1 and this includes every particular determination1 must be kept at a distance3 determinatio negatio est 7,epist4 #ej and #da3 a determination denotes nothing positive1 but a deprivation1 a lack of existence2 relates not to the being but to the non-being of the thing74 ,a determination states that which distinguishes one thing from another1 hence what it is not1 expresses a limitation of it4 ,consequently ,god1 who is free from every negation and limitation1 is to be conceived as the absolutely indeterminate4 ,the results thus far reached run3 ,substantia una infinita--,deus sive natura--causa sui 7aeterna7 et rerum 7immanens7--libera necessitas--non determinata4 ,or more briefly3 ,substance ,god nature4 ,the equation of ,god and substance had been announced by ,descartes1 but not adhered to1 while ,bruno had approached the equation of ,god and nature--,spinoza decisively completes both and combines them4 ,a further remark may be added concerning the relation of ,god and the world4 ,in calling the infinite at once the permanent essence of things and their producing cause1 ,spinoza raises a demand which it is not easy to fulfill1 the demand to think the existence of things in substance as a following from substance1 and their procession from ,god as a remaining in him4 ,he refers us to mathematics3 the things which make up the world are related to ,god as the properties of a geometrical figure to its concepts1 as theorems to the axiom1 as the deduction to the principle1 which from eternity contains all that follows from it and retains this even while putting it forth4 ,it cannot be doubted that such a view of causality contains error1--it has been characterized as a confusion of ratio and causa1 of logical ground and real cause1--but it is just as certain that ,spinoza committed it4 ,he not only compares the dependence of the effect on its cause to the dependence of a derivative principle on that from which it is derived1 but fully equates the two2 he thinks that in logico-mathematical consequences he has grasped the essence of real effects3 for him the type of all legality1 as also of real becoming1 was the necessity which governs the sequence of mathematical truths1 and which1 on the one hand1 is even and still1 needing no special exertion of volitional energy1 while1 on the other1 it is rigid and unyielding1 exalted above all choice4 ,philosophy had sought the assistance of mathematics because of the clearness and certainty which distinguish the conclusions of the latter1 and which she wished to obtain for her own4 ,in excess of zeal she was not content with striving after this ideal of indefectible certitude1 but1 forgetting the diversity of the two fields1 strove to imitate other qualities which are not transferable2 instead of learning from mathematics she became subservient to it4 ,substance does not affect us by its mere existence1 but through an ,attribute4 ,by attribute is meant1 according to the fourth definition1 that which the understanding perceives of substance as constituting the essence of it 7quod intellectus de substantia percipit1 tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens74 ,the more reality a substance contains1 the more attributes it has2 consequently infinite substance possesses an infinite number1 each of which gives expression to its essence1 but of which two only fall within our knowledge4 ,among the innumerable divine attributes the human mind knows those only which it finds in itself1 thought and extension4 ,although man beholds ,god only as thinking and extended substance1 he yet has a clear and complete2 an adequate--idea of ,god4 ,since each of the two attributes is conceived without the other1 hence in itself 7per se71 they are distinct from each other realiter1 and independent4 ,god is absolutely infinite1 the attributes only in their kind 7in suo genere74 ,how can the indeterminate possess properties8 ,are the attributes merely ascribed to substance by the understanding1 or do they possess reality apart from the knowing subject8 ,this question has given rise to much debate4 ,according to ,hegel and ,ed4 ,erdmann the attributes are something external to substance1 something brought into it by the understanding1 forms of knowledge present in the beholder alone2 substance itself is neither extended nor cogitative1 but merely appears to the understanding under these determinations1 without which the latter would be unable to cognize it4 ,this formalistic interpretation1 which1 relying on a passage in a letter to ,de ,vries 7,epist4 #bg71 explains the attributes as mere modes of intellectual apprehension1 numbers ,kuno ,fischer among its opponents4 ,as the one party holds to the first half of the definition1 the other places the emphasis on the second half 7that which the understanding perceives--as constituting the essence of substance74 ,the attributes are more than mere modes of representation--they are real properties1 which substance possesses even apart from an observer1 nay1 in which it consists2 in ,spinoza1 moreover1 must be conceived is the equivalent of to be4 ,although this latter realistic party undoubtedly has the advantage over the former1 which reads into ,spinoza a subjectivism foreign to his system1 they ought not to forget that the difference in interpretation has for its basis a conflict among the motives which control ,spinoza's thinking4 ,the reference of the attributes to the understanding1 given in the definition1 is not without significance4 ,it sprang from the wish not to mar the indeterminateness of the absolute by the opposition of the attributes1 while1 on the other hand1 an equally pressing need for the conservation of the immanence of substance forbade a bold transfer of the attributes to the observer4 ,the real opinion of ,spinoza is neither so clear and free from contradictions1 nor so one-sided1 as that which his interpreters ascribe to him4 ,fischer's further interpretation of the attributes of ,god as his powers is tenable1 so long as by causa and potentia we understand nothing more than the irresistible1 but non-kinetic1 force with which an original truth establishes or effects those which follow from it4 ,as the dualism of extension and thought is reduced from a substantial to an attributive distinction1 so individual bodies and minds1 motions and thoughts1 are degraded a stage further4 ,individual things lack independence of every sort4 ,the individual is1 as a determinate finite thing1 burdened with negation and limitation1 for every determination includes a negation2 that which is truly real in the individual is ,god4 ,finite things are modi of the infinite substance1 mere states1 variable states1 of ,god4 ,by themselves they are nothing1 since out of ,god nothing exists4 ,they possess existence only in so far as they are conceived in their connection with the infinite1 that is1 as transitory forms of the unchangeable substance4 ,they are not in themselves1 but in another1 in ,god1 and are conceived only in ,god4 ,they are mere affections of the divine attributes1 and must be considered as such4 ,to the two attributes correspond two classes of modes4 ,the most important modifications of extension are rest and motion4 ,among the modes of thought are understanding and will4 ,these belong in the sphere of determinate and transitory being and do not hold of the natura naturans3 ,god is exalted above all modality1 above will and understanding1 as above motion and rest4 ,we must not assert of the natura naturata 7the world as the sum of all modes71 as of the natura naturans1 that its essence involves existence 7,i4 prop4 #bd73 we can conceive finite things as non-existent1 as well as existent 7,epist4 #bi74 ,this constitutes their contingency1 which must by no means be interpreted as lawlessness4 ,on the contrary1 all that takes place in the world is most rigorously determined2 every individual1 finite1 determinate thing and event is determined to its existence and action by another similarly finite and determinate thing or event1 and this cause is1 in turn1 determined in its existence and action by a further finite mode1 and so on to infinity 7,i4 prop4 #bh74 ,because of this endlessness in the series there is no first or ultimate cause in the phenomenal world2 all finite causes are second causes2 the primary cause lies within the sphere of the infinite and is ,god himself4 ,the modes are all subject to the constraint of an unbroken and endless nexus of efficient causes1 which leaves room neither for chance1 nor choice1 nor ends4 ,nothing can be or happen otherwise than as it is and happens 7,i4 prop4 #bi1 #cc74 ,the causal chain appears in two forms3 a mode of extension has its producing ground in a second mode of extension2 a mode of thought can be caused only by another mode of thought--each individual thing is determined by one of its own kind4 ,the two series proceed side by side1 without a member of either ever being able to interfere in the other or to effect anything in it--a motion can never produce anything but other motions1 an idea can result only in other ideas2 the body can never determine the mind to an idea1 nor the soul the body to a movement4 ,since1 however1 extension and thought are not two substances1 but attributes of one substance1 this apparently double causal nexus of two series proceeding in exact correspondence is1 in reality1 but a single one4 7,,iii4 prop4 #b1 schol47 viewed from different sides4 ,that which represents a chain of motions when seen from the side of extension1 bears the aspect of a series of ideas from the side of thought4 ,modus extensionis et idea illius modi una cademque est res1 sed duobus modis expressa 7,,ii4 prop4 #g1 schol42 cf4 ,,iii4 prop4 #b1 schol474 ,the soul is nothing but the idea of an actual body1 body or motion nothing but the object or event in the sphere of extended actuality corresponding to an idea4 ,no idea exists without something corporeal corresponding to it1 no body1 without at the same time existing as idea1 or being conceived2 in other words1 everything is both body and spirit1 all things are animated 7,,ii4 prop4 #ac1 schol474 ,thus the famous proposition results2 ,ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum 7sive corporum2 ,,ii4 prop4 #g71 and in application to man1 the order of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind 7,,iii4 prop4 #b1 schol474 ,the attempt to solve the problem of the relation between the material and the mental worlds by asserting their thoroughgoing correspondence and substantial identity1 was philosophically justifiable and important1 though many evident objections obtrude themselves upon us4 ,the required assumption1 that there is a mental event corresponding to every bodily one1 and vice versa1 meets with involuntary and easily supported opposition1 which ,spinoza did nothing to remove4 ,similarly he omitted to explain how body is related to motion1 mind to ideas1 and both to actuality4 ,the ascription of a materialistic tendency to ,spinoza is not without foundation4 ,corporeality and reality appear well-nigh identical for him1--the expressions corpora and res are used synonymously1--so that there remains for minds and ideas only an existence as reflections of the real in the sphere of an ideality 7whose degree of actuality it is difficult to determine74 ,moreover1 individualistic impulses have been pointed out1 which1 in part1 conflict with the monism which he consciously follows1 and1 in part1 subserve its interests4 ,an example of this is given in the relation of mind and idea3 ,spinoza treats the soul as a sum of ideas1 as consisting in them4 ,an 7at least apparently substantial7 bond among ideas1 an ego1 which possesses them1 does not exist for him3 the ,cartesian cogito has become an impersonal cogitatur or a ,deus cogitat4 ,in order to the unique substantiality of the infinite1 the substantiality of individual spirits must disappear4 ,that which argues for the latter is their ,i-ness 7,ichheit71 the unity of self-consciousness2 it is destroyed1 if the mind is a congeries of ideas1 a composite of them4 ,thus in order to relieve itself from the self-dependence of the individual mind1 monism allies itself with a spiritual atomism1 the most extreme which can be conceived4 ,the mind is resolved into a mass of individual ideas4 ,mention may be made in passing1 also1 of a strange conception1 which is somewhat out of harmony with the rest of the system1 and of which1 moreover1 little use is made4 ,this is the conception of infinite modes4 ,as such are cited1 facies totius mundi1 motus et quies1 intellectus absolute infinitus4 ,kuno ,fischer's interpretation of this difficult conception may be accepted4 ,it denotes1 according to him1 the connected sum of the modes1 the itself non-finite sum total of the finite--the universe meaning the totality of individual things in general 7without reference to their nature as extended or cogitative72 rest and motion1 the totality of material being2 the absolutely infinite understanding1 the totality of spiritual being or the ideas4 ,individual spirits together constitute1 as it were1 the infinite intellect2 our mind is a part of the divine understanding1 yet not in such a sense that the whole consists of the parts1 but that the part exists only through the whole4 ,when we say1 the human mind perceives this or that1 it is equivalent to saying that ,god--not in so far as he is infinite1 but as he expresses himself in this human mind and constitutes its essence--has this or that idea 7,,ii4 prop4 ,,ii1 coroll74 ,the discussion of these three fundamental concepts exhausts all the chief points in ,spinoza's doctrine of ,god4 ,passing over his doctrine of body 7,,ii4 between prop4 #ac and prop4 #ad7 we turn at once to his discussion of mind and man4 7b7 ,anthropology3 ,cognition and the ,passions4--,each thing is at once mind and body1 representation and that which is represented1 idea and ideate 7object74 ,body and soul are the same being1 only considered under different attributes4 ,the human mind is the idea of the human body2 it cognizes itself in perceiving the affections of its body2 it represents all that takes place in the body1 though not all adequately4 ,as man's body is composed of very many bodies1 so his soul is composed of very many ideas4 ,to judge of the relation of the human mind to the mind of lower beings1 we must consider the superiority of man's body to other bodies2 the more complex a body is1 and the greater the variety of the affections of which it is capable1 the better and more adapted for adequate cognition1 the accompanying mind4--,a result of the identity of soul and body is that the acts of our will are not free 7,epist4 #fb73 they are1 in fact1 determinations of our body1 only considered under the attribute of thought1 and no more free than this from the constraint of the causal law 7,,iii4 prop4 #b1 schol474--,since the mind does nothing without at the same time knowing that it does it--since1 in other words1 its activity is a conscious activity1 it is not merely idea corporis humani1 but also idea ideae corporis or idea mentis4 ,all adherents of the ,eleatic separation of the one pure being from the manifold and changing world of appearance are compelled to make a like distinction between two kinds and two organs of knowledge4 ,the representation of the empirical manifold of separately existing individual things1 together with the organ thereof1 ,spinoza terms imaginatio2 the faculty of cognizing the true reality1 the one1 all-embracing substance1 he calls intellectus4 ,imaginatio 7imagination1 sensuous representation7 is the faculty of inadequate1 confused ideas1 among which are included abstract conceptions1 as well as sensations and memory-images4 ,the objects of perception are the affections of our body2 and our perceptions1 therefore1 are not clear and distinct1 because we are not completely acquainted with their causes4 ,in the merely perceptual stage1 the mind gains only a confused and mutilated idea of external objects1 of the body1 and of itself2 it is unable to separate that in the perception 7e4g41 heat7 which is due to the external body from that which is due to its own body4 ,an inadequate idea1 however1 is not in itself an error2 it becomes such only when1 unconscious of its defectiveness1 we take it for complete and true4 ,prominent examples of erroneous ideas are furnished by general concepts1 by the idea of ends1 and the idea of the freedom of the will4 ,the more general and abstract an idea1 the more inadequate and indistinct it becomes2 and this shows the lack of value in generic concepts1 which are formed by the omission of differences4 ,all cognition which is carried on by universals and their symbols1 words1 yields opinion and imagination merely instead of truth4 ,quite as valueless and harmful is the idea of ends1 with its accompaniments4 ,we think that nature has typical forms hovering before it1 which it is seeking to actualize in things2 when this intention is apparently fulfilled we speak of things as perfect and beautiful2 when it fails1 of imperfect and ugly things4 ,such concepts of value belong in the sphere of fictions4 ,the same is true of the idea of the freedom of the will1 which depends on our ignorance of that which constrains us4 ,apart from the consideration that the will1 the general conception of which comes under the rubric of unreal abstractions1 is in fact merely the sum of the particular volitions1 the illusion of freedom1 e4g41 that we will and act without a cause1 arises from the fact that we are conscious of our action 7and also of its proximate motives71 but not of its 7remoter7 determining causes4 ,thus the thirsty child believes it desires its milk of its own free will1 and the timid one1 that it freely chooses to run away 7,ethica1 ,,iii4 prop4 #b1 schol42 ,i4 app47 ,if the falling stone were conscious1 it would1 likewise1 consider itself free1 and its fall the result of an undetermined decision4 ,two degrees are to be distinguished in the true or adequate knowledge of the intellect3 rational knowledge attained through inference1 and intuitive1 self-evident knowledge2 the latter has principles for its object1 the former that which follows from them4 ,instead of operating with abstract concepts the reason uses common notions1 notiones communes4 ,genera do not exist1 but1 no doubt1 something common to all things4 ,all bodies agree in being extended2 all minds and ideas in being modes of thought2 all beings whatever in the fact that they are modes of the divine substance and its attributes2 that which is common to all things1 and which is equally in the part and in the whole1 cannot but be adequately conceived4 ,the ideas of extension1 of thought1 and of the eternal and infinite essence of ,god are adequate ideas4 ,the adequate idea of each individual actual object involves the idea of ,god1 since it can neither exist nor be conceived apart from ,god1 and all ideas1 in so far as they are referred to ,god1 are true4 ,the ideas of substance and of the attributes are conceived through themselves1 or immediately 7intuitively7 cognized2 they are underivative1 original1 self-evident ideas4 ,there are thus three kinds1 degrees1 or faculties of cognition--sensuous or imaginative representation1 reason1 and immediate intuition4 ,knowledge of the second and third degrees is necessarily true1 and our only means of distinguishing the true from the false4 ,as light reveals itself and darkness1 so the truth is the criterion of itself and of error4 ,every truth is accompanied by certainty1 and is its own witness 7,,ii4 prop4 #dc1 schol474--,adequate knowledge does not consider things as individuals1 but in their necessary connection and as eternal sequences from the world-ground4 ,the reason perceives things under the form of eternity3 sub specie aeternitatis 7,,ii4 prop4 #dd1 cor4 #b74 ,in his theory of the emotions1 ,spinoza is more dependent on ,descartes than anywhere else2 but even here he is guided by a successful endeavor after greater rigor and simplicity4 ,he holds his predecessor's false concept of freedom responsible for the failure of his very acute inquiry4 ,all previous writers on the passions have either derided1 or bewailed1 or condemned them1 instead of investigating their nature4 ,spinoza will neither denounce nor ridicule human actions and appetites1 but endeavor to comprehend them on the basis of natural laws1 and to consider them as though the question concerned lines1 surfaces1 and bodies4 ,he aims not to look on hate1 anger1 and the rest as flaws1 but as necessary1 though troublesome1 properties of human nature1 for which1 as really as for heat and cold1 thunder and lightning1 a causal explanation is requisite4--,as a determinate1 finite being the mind is dependent in its existence and its activity on other finite things1 and is incomprehensible without them2 from its involution in the general course of nature the inadequate ideas inevitably follow1 and from these the passive states or emotions2 the passions thus belong to human nature1 as one subject to limitation and negation4--,the destruction of contingent and perishable things is effected by external causes2 no one is destroyed by itself2 so far as in it lies everything strives to persist in its being 7,,iii4 prop4 #d and #f74 ,the fundamental endeavor after self-preservation constitutes the essence of each thing 7,,iii4 prop4 #g74 ,this endeavor 7conatus7 is termed will 7voluntas7 or desire 7cupiditas7 when it is referred to the mind alone1 and appetite 7appetitus7 when referred to the mind and body together2 desire or volition is conscious appetite 7,,iii4 prop4 #i1 schol474 ,we call a thing good because we desire it1 not desire a thing because we hold it good 7cf4 ,hobbes1 p4 #ge74 ,to desire two further fundamental forms of the emotions are added1 pleasure and pain4 ,if a thing increases the power of our body to act1 the idea of it increases the power of our soul to think1 and is gladly imagined by it4 ,pleasure 7laetitia7 is the transition of a man to a greater1 and pain 7tristitia7 his transition to a lesser perfection4 ,all other emotions are modifications or combinations of the three original ones1 to which ,spinoza reduces the six of ,descartes 7cf4 p4 #aje74 ,in the deduction and description of them his procedure is sometimes aridly systematic1 sometimes even forced and artificial1 but for the most part ingenious1 appropriate1 and psychologically acute4 ,whatever gives us pleasure augments our being1 and whatever pains us diminishes it2 hence we seek to preserve the causes of pleasurable emotions1 and love them1 to do away with the causes of painful ones1 and hate them4 ,love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause2 hate is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause4 ,since all that furthers or diminishes the being of 7the cause of our pleasure7 the object of our love1 exercises at the same time a like influence on us1 we love that which rejoices the object of our love and hate that which disturbs it2 its happiness and suffering become ours also4 ,the converse is true of the object of our hate3 its good fortune provokes us and its ill fortune pleases us4 ,if we are filled with no emotion toward things like ourselves1 we sympathize in their sad or joyous feelings by involuntary imitation4 ,pity1 from which we strive to free ourselves as from every painful affection1 inclines us to benevolence or to assistance in the removal of the cause of the misery of others4 ,envy of those who are fortunate1 and commiseration of those who are in trouble1 are alike rooted in emulation4 ,man is by nature inclined to envy and malevolence4 ,hate easily leads to underestimation1 love to overestimation1 of the object1 and self-love to pride or self-satisfaction1 which are much more frequently met with than unfeigned humility4 ,immoderate desire for honor is termed ambition2 if the desire to please others is kept within due bounds it is praised as unpretentiousness1 courtesy1 modesty 7modestia74 ,ambition1 luxury1 drunkenness1 avarice1 and lust have no contraries1 for temperance1 sobriety1 and chastity are not emotions 7passive states71 but denote the power of the soul by which the former are moderated1 and which is discussed later under the name fortitudo4 ,self-abasement or humility is a feeling of pain arising from the consideration of our weakness and impotency2 its opposite is self-complacency4 ,either of these may be accompanied by the 7erroneous7 belief that we have done the saddening or gladdening act of our own free will2 in this case the former affection is termed repentance4 ,hope and fear are inconstant pleasure and pain1 arising from the idea of something past or to come1 concerning whose coming and whose issue we are still in doubt4 ,there is no hope unmingled with fear1 and no fear without hope2 for he who still doubts imagines something which excludes the existence of that which is expected4 ,if the cause of doubt is removed1 hope is transformed into a feeling of confidence and fear into despair4 ,there are as many kinds of emotions as there are classes among their objects or causes4 ,besides the emotions to be termed passions in the strict sense1 states of passivity1 ,spinoza recognizes others which relate to us as active4 ,only those which are of the nature of pleasure or desire belong to this class of active emotions2 the painful affections are entirely excluded1 since without exception they diminish or arrest the mind's power to think4 ,the totality of these nobler impulses is called fortitudo 7fortitude71 and a distinction is made among them between animositas 7vigor of soul7 and generositas 7magnanimity1 noble-mindedness71 according as rational desire is directed to the preservation of our own being or to aiding our fellow-men4 ,presence of mind and temperance are examples of the former1 modesty and clemency of the latter4 ,by this bridge1 the idea of the active emotions1 we may follow ,spinoza into the field of ethics4 7c7 ,practical ,philosophy4--,spinoza's theory of ethics is based on the equation of the three concepts1 perfection1 reality1 activity 7,v4 prop4 #dj1 dem474 ,the more active a thing is1 the more perfect it is and the more reality it possesses4 ,it is active1 however1 when it is the complete or adequate cause of that which takes place within it or without it2 passive when it is not at all the cause of this1 or the cause only in part4 ,a cause is termed adequate1 when its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived from it alone4 ,the human mind1 as a modus of thought1 is active when it has adequate ideas2 all its passion consists in confused ideas1 among which belong the affections produced by external objects4 ,the essence of the mind is thought2 volition is not only dependent on cognition1 but at bottom identical with it4 ,descartes had already made the will the power of affirmation and negation4 ,spinoza advances a step further3 the affirmation cannot be separated from the idea affirmed1 it is impossible to conceive a truth without in the same act affirming it1 the idea involves its own affirmation4 ,will and understanding are one and the same 7,,ii4 prop4 #di1 cor474 ,for ,spinoza moral activity is entirely resolved into cognitive activity4 ,to the two stages of knowing1 imaginatio and intellectus1 correspond two stages of willing--desire1 which is ruled by imagination1 and volition1 which is guided by reason4 ,the passive emotions of sensuous desire are directed to perishable objects1 the active1 which spring from reason1 have an eternal object--the knowledge of the truth1 the intuition of ,god4 ,for reason there are no distinctions of persons1--she brings men into concord and gives them a common end 7,,iv4 prop4 #ce-cg1dj71--;and no distinctions of time 7,,iv4 prop4 #fb1 #ff71 and in the active emotions1 which are always good1 no excess 7,,iv4 prop4 #fa74 ,the passive emotions arise from confused ideas4 ,they cease to be passions1 when the confused ideas of the modifications of the body are transformed into clear ones2 as soon as we have clear ideas1 we become active and cease to be slaves of desire4 ,we master the emotions by gaining a clear knowledge of them4 ,now1 an idea is clear when we cognize its object not as an individual thing1 but in its connection1 as a link in the causal chain1 as necessary1 and as a mode of ,god4 ,the more the mind conceives things in their necessity1 and the emotions in their reference to ,god1 the less it is passively subject to the emotions1 the more power it attains over them3 ,virtue is power 7,,iv4 def4 #h2 prop4 #bj1 dem474 ,it is true1 indeed1 that one emotion can be conquered only by another stronger one1 a passive emotion only by an active one4 ,the active emotion by which knowledge gains this victory over the passions is the joyous consciousness of our power 7,,iii4 prop4 #eh1 #ei74 ,adequate ideas conceive their objects in union with ,god2 thus the pleasure which proceeds from knowledge of1 and victory over1 the passions is accompanied by the idea of ,god1 and1 consequently 7according to the definition of love71 by love toward ,god 7,v4 prop4 #ae1 #cb74 ,the knowledge and love of ,god1 together1 intellectual love toward ,god1#a is the highest good and the highest virtue 7,,iv4 prop4 #bh74 ,blessedness is not the reward of virtue1 but virtue itself4 ,the intellectual love of man toward ,god1 in which the highest peace of the soul1 blessedness1 and freedom consist1 and in virtue of which 7since it1 like its object and cause1 true knowledge1 is eternal71 the soul is not included in the destruction of the body 7,v4 prop4 #bc1 #cc71 is a part of the infinite love with which ,god loves himself1 and is one and the same with the love of ,god to man4 ,the eternal part of the soul is reason1 through which it is active2 the perishable part is imagination or sensuous representation1 through which it is passively affected4 ,we are immortal only in adequate cognition and in love to ,god2 more of the wise man's soul is immortal than of the fool's4 ,footnote #a3 ,the conception amor ,dei intellectualis in ,spinoza is discussed in a dissertation by ,c4 ,llmann1 ,jena1 #ahhd4 ,spinoza's ethics is intellectualistic--virtue is based on knowledge4#a ,it is1 moreover1 naturalistic--morality is a necessary sequence from human nature2 it is a physical product1 not a product of freedom2 for the acts of the will are determined by ideas1 which in their turn are the effects of earlier causes4 ,the foundation of virtue is the effort after self-preservation3 ,how can a man desire to act rightly unless he desires to be 7,,iv4 prop4 #ba1 #bb78 ,since reason never enjoins that which is contrary to nature1 it of necessity requires every man to love himself1 to seek that which is truly useful to him1 and to desire all that makes him more perfect4 ,according to the law of nature all that is useful is allowable4 ,the useful is that which increases our power1 activity1 or perfection1 or that which furthers knowledge1 for the life of the soul consists in thought 7,,iv4 prop4 #bf2 app4 cap4 #e74 ,that alone is an evil which restrains man from perfecting the reason and leading a rational life4 ,virtuous action is equivalent to following the guidance of the reason in self-preservation 7,,iv4 prop4 #bd74--,nowhere in ,spinoza are fallacies more frequent than in his moral philosophy2 nowhere is there a clearer revelation of the insufficiency of his artificially constructed concepts1 which1 in their undeviating abstractness1 are at no point congruent with reality4 ,he is as little true to his purpose to exclude the imperative element1 and to confine himself entirely to the explanation of human actions considered as facts1 as any philosopher who has adopted a similar aim4 ,he relieves the inconsistency by clothing his injunctions under the ancient ideal of the free wise man4 ,this1 in fact1 is not the only thing in ,spinoza which reminds one of the customs of the ,greek moralists4 ,he renews the ,platonic idea of a philosophical virtue1 and the opinion of ,socrates1 that right action will result of itself from true insight4 ,arguing from himself1 from his own pure and strong desire for knowledge1 to mankind in general1 he makes reason the essence of the soul1 thought the essence of reason1 and holds the direction of the impulse of self-preservation to the perfection of knowledge1 which is the better part of us1 to be the natural one4 ,footnote #a3 ,that virtue which springs from knowledge is alone genuine4 ,the painful1 hence unactive1 emotions of pity and repentance may impel to actions whose accomplishment is better than their omission4 ,emotion caused by sympathy for others and contrition for one's own guilt1 both of which increase present evil by new ones1 have only the value of evils of a lesser kind4 ,they are salutary for the irrational man1 in so far as the one spurs him on to acts of assistance and the other diminishes his pride4 ,they are harmful to the wise man1 or1 at least1 useless2 he is in no need of irrational motives to rational action4 ,action from insight is alone true morality4 ,all men endeavor after continuance of existence 7,,iii4 prop4 #f72 why not all after virtue8 ,if all endeavor after it1 why do so few reach the goal8 ,whence the sadly large number of the irrational1 the selfish1 the vicious8 ,whence the evil in the world8 ,vice is as truly an outcome of nature as virtue4 ,virtue is power1 vice is weakness2 the former is knowledge1 the latter ignorance4 ,whence the powerless natures8 ,whence defective knowledge8 ,whence imperfection in general8 ,the concept of imperfection expresses nothing positive1 nothing actual1 but merely a defect1 an absence of reality4 ,it is nothing but an idea in us1 a fiction which arises through the comparison of one thing with another possessing greater reality1 or with an abstract generic concept1 a pattern1 which it seems unable to attain4 ,that concepts of value are not properties of things themselves1 but denote only their pleasurable or painful effects on us1 is evident from the fact that one and the same thing may be at the same time good1 bad1 and indifferent3 the music which is good for the melancholy man may be bad for the mourner1 and neither good nor bad for the deaf4 ,knowledge of the bad is an abstract1 inadequate idea2 in ,god there is no idea of evil4 ,if imperfection and error were something real1 it would have to be conceded that ,god is the author of evil and sin4 ,in reality everything is that which it can be1 hence without defect3 everything actual is1 in itself considered1 perfect4 ,even the fool and the sinner cannot be otherwise than he is2 he appears imperfect only when placed beside the wise and the virtuous4 ,sin is thus only a lesser reality than virtue1 evil a lesser good2 good and bad1 activity and passivity1 power and weakness are merely distinctions in degree4 ,but why is not everything absolutely perfect8 ,why are there lesser degrees of reality8 ,two answers are given4 ,the first is found only between the lines3 the imperfections in the being and action of individual things are grounded in their finitude1 particularly in their involution in the chain of causality1 in virtue of which they are acted on from without1 and are determined in their action not by their own nature only1 but also by external causes4 ,man sins because he is open to impressions from external things1 and only superior natures are strong enough to preserve their rational self-determination in spite of this4 ,the other answer is expressly given at the end of the first part 7with an appeal to the sixteenth proposition1 that everything which the divine understanding conceives as creatable has actually come into existence74 ,to those who ask why ,god did not so create all men that they should be governed only by reason1 ,i reply only3 because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest2 or1 more strictly1 because the laws of his nature were so ample as so suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intellect4 ,all possible degrees of perfection have come into being1 including sin and error1 which represent the lowest grade4 ,the universe forms a chain of degrees of perfection1 of which none must be wanting3 particular cases of defect are justified by the perfection of the whole1 which would be incomplete without the lowest degree of perfection1 vice and wickedness4 ,here we see ,spinoza following a path which ,leibnitz was to broaden out into a highway in his ,theodicy4 ,both favor the quantitative view of the world1 which softens the antitheses1 and reduces distinctions of kind to distinctions of degree4 ,not till ,kant was the qualitative view of the world1 which had been first brought into ethics by ,christianity1 restored to its rights4 ,an ethics which denies freedom and evil is nothing but a physics of morals4 ,in his theory of the state ,spinoza follows ,hobbes pretty closely1 but rejects absolutism1 and declares democracy1 in which each is obedient to self-imposed law1 to be the form of government most in accordance with reason4 7,so in the ,tractatus ,theologico-,politicus1 while in the later ,tractatus ,politicus he gives the preference to aristocracy47 ,in accordance with the supreme right of nature each man deems good1 and seeks to gain1 that which seems to him useful2 all things belong to all1 each may destroy the objects of his hate4 ,conflict and insecurity prevail in the state of nature as a result of the sensuous desires and emotions 7homines ex natura hostes72 and they can be done away with only through the establishment of a society1 which by punitive laws compels everyone to do1 and leave undone1 that which the general welfare demands4 ,strife and breach of faith become sin only in the state2 before its formation that alone was wrong which no one had the desire and power to do4 ,besides this mission1 however1 of protecting selfish interests by the prevention of aggression1 the civil community has a higher one1 to subserve the development of reason2 it is only in the state that true morality and true freedom are possible1 and the wise man will prefer to live in the state1 because he finds more freedom there than in isolation4 ,thus the dislocation of concepts1 which is perceptible in ,spinoza's ethics1 repeats itself in his politics4 ,first1 virtue is based on the impulse of self-preservation and the good is equated with that which is useful to the individual2 then1 with a transformation of mere utility into true utility1 the rational moment is brought in 7first as practical prudence1 next as the impulse after knowledge1 and then1 with a gradual change of meaning1 as moral wisdom71 until1 finally1 in strange contrast to the naturalistic beginning1 the ,christian idea of virtue as purity1 self-denial1 love to our neighbors and love to ,god1 is reached4 ,in a similar way ,spinoza conceives the starting point of the state naturalistically1 its culmination idealistically4#a ,footnote #a3 ,c4 ,schindler in his dissertation ,ueber den ,begriff des ,guten und ,ntzlichen bei ,spinoza1 ,jena1 #ahhe1 p4 #db1 a work1 however1 which does not penetrate to the full depth of the matter4 ,cf4 ,eucken1 ,lebensanschauungen1 p4 #djf4 ,the fundamental ideas of the ,spinozistic system1 and those which render it important1 are rationalism1 pantheism1 the essential identity of the material and spiritual worlds1 and the uninterrupted mechanism of becoming4 ,besides the twisting of ethical concepts just mentioned1 we may briefly note the most striking of the other difficulties and contradictions which ,spinoza left unexplained4 ,there is a break between his endeavor to exalt the absolute high above the phenomenal world of individual existence1 and1 at the same time1 to bring the former into the closest possible conjunction with the latter1 to make it dwell therein--a break between the transcendent and immanent conceptions of the idea of ,god4 ,no light is vouchsafed on the relation between primary and secondary causes1 between the immediate divine causality and the divine causality mediated through finite causes4 ,the infinity of ,god is in conflict with his complete cognizability on the part of man2 for how is a finite1 transitory spirit able to conceive the ,infinite and ,eternal8 ,how does the human intellect rise above modal limitations to become capable and worthy of the mystical union with ,god8 ,reference has been already made to the twofold nature of the attributes 7as forms of intellectual apprehension and as real properties of substance7 which invites contradictory interpretations4 #c4 ,pascal1 ,malebranche1 ,bayle4 ,returning from ,holland to ,france1 we find a combination of ,cartesianism and mysticism similar to that which we have noticed in the former country4 ,under ,geulincx these two forces had lived peacefully together2 in ,spinoza they had entered into the closest alliance2 with ,blaise ,pascal 7#afbc-fb71 the first to adopt a religious tendency1 they came into a certain antithesis4 ,spinoza had taught3 through the knowledge of ,god to the love of ,god2 in ,pascal the watchword becomes1 ,god is not conceived through the reason1 but felt with the heart4 ,after attacking the ,jesuits in his ,provincial ,letters1 and unveiling the worthlessness of their casuistical morality1 ,pascal1 constrained by a genuine piety1 undertook to construct a philosophy of ,christianity2 but the attempt was ended by the early death of the author1 who had always suffered under a weak constitution4 ,fragments of this work were published by his friends1 the ,jansenists1 under the title1 ,thoughts on ,religion1 #affi1 though not without mediating alterations4 ,the ,port-,royal ,logic 7,the ,art of ,thinking1 #affb71 edited by ,arnauld and ,nicole1 was based on a treatise of ,pascal4 ,his thought1 which was not distinguished by clearness1 but by depth and movement1 and which1 after the ,french fashion1 delighted in antitheses1 was influenced by ,descartes1 ,montaigne1 and ,epictetus4 ,he1 too1 finds in mathematics the example for all science1 and holds that whatever transcends mathematics transcends the reason4 ,by the application of mathematics to the study of nature we attain a mundane science1 which is certain1 no doubt1 and which makes constant progress1#a but which does not satisfy1 since it reveals nothing of the infinite1 of the whole1 without which the parts remain unintelligible4 ,hence all natural philosophy together is not worth an hour's toil4 ,pascal consoles himself for our ignorance concerning external things by the stability of ethics4 ,footnote #a3 ,it is this uninterrupted progress which raises the reason above the operations of nature and the instincts of animals4 ,while the bees build their cells to-day just as they did a thousand years ago1 science is continually developing4 ,this guarantees to us our immortal destiny4 ,the leading principles of his ethics are as follows3 ,in sin the love to ,god created in us has left us and self-love has transgressed its limits2 pride has delivered us over to selfishness and misery4 ,our nature is corrupted1 but not beyond redemption4 ,in his actions worthless and depraved1 man is seen to be exalted and incomprehensible in his ends2 in reality he is worthy of abhorrence1 but great in his destination4 ,no philosophy or religion has so taught us at once to know the greatness and the misery of man as ,christianity3 this bids him recognize his low condition1 but at the same time to endeavor to become like ,god4 ,we must humbly despise the world and renounce ourselves2 in order to love ,god1 we must hate ourselves4 ,moral reformation is an act of divine grace1 and the merit of human volition consists only in not resisting this4 ,god transforms the heart by a heavenly sweetness1 grants it to know that spiritual pleasure is greater than bodily pleasure1 and infuses into it a disgust at the allurements of sin4 ,virtue is finding one's greatest happiness in ,god or in the eternal good4 ,as morality is a matter of feeling1 not of thought1 so ,god1 so even the first principles on which the certitude of demonstration depends1 are the object1 not of reason1 but of the heart4 ,that which certifies to the highest indemonstrable principles is a feeling1 a belief1 an instinct of nature3 les principes se sentent4 ,as a defender of the needs and rights of the heart1 ,pascal is a forerunner of the great ,rousseau4 ,his depreciation of the reason to exalt faith establishes a certain relationship with the skeptics of his native land1 among whom ,cousin has unjustly classed him 7tudes sur ,pascal1 #eth ed41 #aheg74a ,footnote #a3 ,of the works on ,pascal we may mention that of ,h4 ,reuchlin1 #ahdj3 ,havet's edition of the ,penses1 with notes1 ,paris1 #ahff2 and the tude by ,ed4 ,droz1 ,paris1 #ahhf4 ,nicolas ,malebranche 7#afch-agae71 a member of the ,oratory of ,jesus1 in ,paris1 which was opposed by the ,jesuits1 completed the development of ,cartesianism in the religious direction adopted by ,pascal4 ,his thought is controlled by the endeavor to combine ,cartesian metaphysics and ,augustinian ,christianity1 those two great forces which constituted the double citadel of his order4 ,his collected works appeared three years before his death2 and a new edition in four volumes1 prepared by ,j4 ,simon1 in #ahga4 ,his chief work1 ,on the ,search for ,truth 7new edition by ,f4 ,bouillier1 #ahhj71 appeared in #afge1 and was followed by the ,treatise on ,ethics 7new edition by ,h4 ,joly1 #ahhb7 and the ,christian and ,metaphysical ,meditations in #afhd1 the ,discussions on ,metaphysics and on ,religion in #afhh1 and various polemic treatises4 ,the best known among the doctrines of ,malebranche is the principle that we see all things in ,god 7que nous voyons toutes choses en ,dieu4--,recherche1 iii4 #b1 #f74 ,what does this mean1 and how is it established8 ,it is intended as an answer to the question1 ,how is it possible for the mind to cognize the body if1 as ,descartes has shown1 mind and body are two fundamentally distinct and reciprocally independent substances8 ,the seeker after truth must first understand the sources of error4 ,of these there are two1 or1 more exactly1 five--as many as there are faculties of the soul4 ,error may spring from either the cognitive or the appetitive faculty2 in the first case1 either from sense-perception1 the imagination1 or the pure understanding1 and1 in the latter1 from the inclinations or the passions4 ,the inclinations and the passions do not reveal the nature of things1 but only express how they affect us1 of what value they are to us4 ,further still1 the senses and the imagination only reproduce the impressions which things make on us as feeling subjects1 express only what they are for us1 not what they are in themselves4 ,the senses have been given us simply for the preservation of our body1 and so long as we expect nothing further from them than practical information concerning the 7useful or hurtful7 relation of things to our body1 there is no reason for mistrusting them1--here we are not deceived by sensation1 but at most by the overhasty judgment of the will4 ,consider the senses as false witnesses in regard to the truth1 but as trustworthy counselors in relation to the interests of life6--,sensation and imagination belong to the soul in virtue of its union with the body2 apart from this it is pure spirit4 ,the essence of the soul is thought1 for this function is the only one which cannot be abstracted from it without destroying it4 ,hence there can be no moment in the life of the soul when it ceases to think2 it thinks always 7l'me pense toujours71 only it does not always remember the fact4 ,the kinds of knowledge differ with the classes of things cognized4 ,god is known immediately and intuitively4 ,he is necessary and unlimited being1 the universal1 infinite being1 being absolutely2 he only is known through himself4 ,the concept of the infinite is the presupposition of the concept of the finite1 and the former is earlier in us2 we gain the conception of a particular thing only when we omit something from the idea of being in general1 or limit it4 ,god is cogitative1 like spirits1 and extended1 like bodies1 but in an entirely different manner from created things4 ,we know our own soul through consciousness or inner perception4 ,we know its existence more certainly than that of bodies1 but understand its nature less perfectly than theirs4 ,to know that it is capable of sensations of pain1 of heat1 of light1 we must have experienced them4 ,for knowledge of the minds of others we are dependent upon conjecture1 on analogical inferences from ourselves4 ,but how is the unextended soul capable of cognizing extended body8 ,only through the medium of ideas4 ,the ideas occupy an intermediate position between objects1 whose archetypes they are1 and representations in the soul1 whose causes they are4 ,the ideas1 after the pattern of which ,god has created things1 and the relations among them 7necessary truths71 are eternal1 hence uncaused2 they constitute the wisdom of ,god and are not dependent on his will4 ,things are in ,god in archetypal form1 and are cognized through these their archetypes in ,god4 ,ideas are not produced by bodies1 by the emission of sensuous images1#a nor are they originated by the soul1 or possessed by it as an innate possession4 ,but ,god is the cause of knowledge1 although he neither imparts ideas to the soul in creation nor produces them in it on every separate occasion4 ,the ideas or perfections of things are in ,god and are beheld by spirits1 who likewise dwell in ,god as the universal reason4 ,as space is the place of bodies1 so ,god is the place of spirits4 ,as bodies are modes of extension1 so their ideas are modifications of the idea of extension or of intelligible extension4 ,the principle stated at the beginning1 that things are perceived in ,god1 is1 therefore1 supported in the following way3 we perceive bodies 7through ideas1 which ideas1 and we ourselves1 are7 in ,god4 ,footnote #a3 ,malebranche's refutation of the emanation hypothesis of the ,peripatetics is acute and still worthy of attention4 ,if bodies transmitted to the sense-organs forms like themselves1 these copies1 which would evidently be corporeal1 must1 by their departure1 diminish the mass of the body from which they came away1 and also1 because of their impenetrability1 obstruct and interfere with one another1 thus destroying the possibility of clear impressions4 ,a further point against the image theory is furnished by the increase in the size of an object1 when approached4 ,and1 above all1 it can never be made conceivable how motion can be transformed into sensations or ideas4 ,as the knowledge of truth has been found to consist in seeing things as ,god sees them1 so morality consists in man's loving things as ,god loves them1 or1 what amounts to the same thing1 in loving them to that degree which is their due in view of their greater or less perfection4 ,if1 in the last analysis1 all cognition is knowledge of ,god1 so all volition is loving ,god2 there is implanted in every creature a direction toward the ,creator4 ,god is not only the primordial1 unlimited being1 he is also the highest good1 the final end of all striving4 ,as the ideas of things are imperfect participations in1 or determinations of universal being1 the absolute perfection of ,god1 so the particular desires1 directed toward individual objects1 are limitations of the universal will toward the good4 ,how does it happen that the human will1 so variously mistaking its fundamental direction toward ,god1 attaches itself to perishable goods1 and prefers worthless objects to those which have value1 and earthly to heavenly pleasure8 ,the soul is1 on the one hand1 united to ,god1 on the other1 united to the body4 ,the possibility of error and sin rests on its union with the body1 since with the ideas 7as representations of the pure understanding7 are associated sensuous images1 which mingle with and becloud them1 and passions with the inclinations 7or the will of the soul1 in so far as it is pure spirit74 ,this gives1 however1 merely the possibility of the immoral1 sensuous1 ,god-estranged disposition1 which becomes actual only through man's free act1 when he fails to stand the test4 ,for sin does not consist in having passions1 but in consenting to them4 ,the passion is not caused by the corporeal movement of which it is the sequel1 but only occasioned by it2 and the same is true of the movement of the limbs and the decision of the will4 ,the one true cause of all that happens is ,god4 ,it is he who produces affections in the soul1 and motion in the material world4 ,for the body possesses only the capacity of being moved2 and the soul cannot be the cause of the movement1 since it would then have to know how it produces the latter4 ,in fact those who lack a medical training have no idea of the muscular and nervous processes involved4 ,without ,god we cannot even move the tongue4 ,it is he who raises our arm1 even when we use it contrary to his law4 ,anxious to guard his pantheism from being identified with that of ,spinoza1 ,malebranche points out that1 according to his views1 the universe is in ,god1 not1 as with ,spinoza1 that ,god is in the universe2 that he teaches creation1 which ,spinoza denies2 that he distinguishes1 which ,spinoza had not done1 between the world in ,god 7the ideas of things7 and the world of created things1 and between intelligible and corporeal extension4 ,it may be added that he maintains the freedom of ,god and of man1 which ,spinoza rejects1 and that he conceives ,god1 who brings everything to pass1 not as nature1 but as omnipotent will4 ,nevertheless1 as ,kuno ,fischer has shown1 he approaches the naturalism of ,spinoza more nearly than he is himself conscious1 when he explains finite things as limitations 7hence as modes7 of the divine existence1 posits the will of ,god in dependence on his wisdom 7the uncreated world of ideas71 thus limiting it in its omnipotence1 and1 which is decisive1 makes ,god the sole author of motion1 i4e41 a natural cause4 ,his attempt at a ,christian pantheism was consequently unsuccessful4 ,but its failure has not shattered the well-grounded fame of its thoughtful author as the second greatest metaphysician of ,france4 ,pierre ,poiret#a 7#afdf-agai2 for some years a preacher in ,hamburg2 lived later in ,rhynsburg near ,leyden7 was rendered hostile to ,cartesianism through the influence of mystical writings 7among others those of ,antoinette ,bourignon1 which he published71 and through the perception of the results to which it had led in ,spinoza4 ,all cognition is taking up the form of the object4 ,the perfection of man is based more on his passive capacities than on his active reason1 which is concerned with mere ideas1 unreal shadows2 the mathematical spirit leads to fatalism1 to the denial of freedom4 ,the passive faculties1 on the contrary1 are in direct intercourse with reality1 the senses with external material objects1 and the arcanum of the mind1 the basis of the soul1 the intellect1 with spiritual truths and with ,god1 whose existence is more certain than our own4 ,man is not unconcerned in the development of the highest power of the mind1 he must offer himself to ,god in sincere humility4 ,in subordination to the passive intellect1 the external faculty1 the active reason1 is also to be cultivated2 it deserves care1 like the skin4 ,evil consists in the absurdity that the creature1 who apart from ,god is nothing1 ascribes to himself an independent existence4 ,footnote #a3 ,poiret3 ,cogitationes ,rationates de ,deo1 ,anima1 et ,malo1 #afgg1 the later editions including a vehement attack on the atheism of ,spinoza3 ,l'conomie ,divine1 #afhb2 ,de ,eruditione ,solida1 ,superficiaria1 et ,falsa1 #afib2 ,fides et ,ratio ,collatae1 against ,locke1 #agjg4 ,le ,vayer and ,huet1 who have been already mentioned 7pp4 #ej-ea71 mediate between the founders of skepticism and ,bayle1 its most gifted representative4 ,the latter of these two wrote a ,criticism of the ,cartesian ,philosophy1 #afhi1 besides a ,treatise on the ,impotence of the ,human ,mind1 which did not appear until after his death4 ,he opposes1 among other things1 the criterion of truth based on evidence1 since there is an evidence of the false not to be distinguished from that of the true1 as well as the position that ,god becomes a deceiver in the bestowal of a weak and blind reason--for he gives us1 at the same time1 the power to know its deceptive character4 ,as the last among those influenced by ,descartes but who advanced beyond him1 may be mentioned the acute ,pierre ,bayle 7#afdg-agjf2 professor in ,sedan and ,rotterdam2 ,works1 #agbe-caa71 who greatly excited the world of letters by his occasional and polemic treatises1 and still more by the journal1 ,nouvelles de la ,rpublique des ,lettres from #afhd1 and his ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary1 in two volumes1 #afie and #afig4 ,nowhere do the most opposite antitheses dwell in such close proximity as in the mind of ,bayle4 ,along with an ever watchful doubt he harbors a most active zeal for knowledge1 with a sincere spirit of belief 7which has been wrongly disputed by ,lange1 ,zeller1 and ,pnjer7 a demoniacal pleasure in bringing to light absurdities in the doctrines of faith1 with absolute confidence in the infallibility of conscience an entirely pessimistic view of human morality4 ,his strength lies in criticism and polemics1 his work in the latter 7aside from his hostility to fanaticism and the persecution of those differing in faith7 being directed chiefly against optimism and the deistic religion of reason1 which holds the ,christian dogmas capable of proof1 or1 at least1 faith and knowledge capable of reconciliation4 ,the doctrines of faith are not only above reason1 incomprehensible1 but contrary to reason2 and it is just on this that our merit in accepting them depends4 ,the mysteries of the ,gospel do not seek success before the judgment seat of thought1 they demand the blind submission of the reason2 nay1 if they were objects of knowledge they would cease to be mysteries4 ,thus we must choose between religion and philosophy1 for they cannot be combined4 ,for one who is convinced of the untrustworthiness of the reason and her lack of competence in things supernatural1 it is in no wise contradictory or impossible to receive as true things which she declares to be false2 he will thank ,god for the gift of a faith which is entirely independent of the clearness of its objects and of its agreement with the axioms of philosophy4 ,even1 when in purely scientific questions he calls attention to difficulties and shows contradictions on every hand1 ,bayle by no means intends to hold up principles with contradictory implications as false1 but only as uncertain4#b ,the reason1 he says1 generalizing from his own case1 is capable only of destruction1 not of construction2 of discovering error1 not of finding truth2 of finding reasons and counter-reasons1 of exciting doubt and controversy1 not of vouchsafing certitude4 ,so long as it contents itself with controverting that which is false1 it is potent and salutary2 but when1 despising divine assistance1 it advances beyond this1 it becomes dangerous1 like a caustic drug which attacks the healthy flesh after it has consumed that which was diseased4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 on ,bayle1 ,l4 ,feuerbach4 #ahch1 #b;d ed41 #ahdd2 ,eucken in the ,allgemeine ,zeitung1 supplement to ,nos4 #bea1 #beb1 ,october #bg1 #bh1 #ahia4 ,footnote #b3 ,thus1 in regard to the problem of freedom1 he finds it hard to comprehend how the creatures1 who are not the authors of their own existence1 can be the authors of their own actions1 but1 at the same time1 inadmissible to think of ,god as the cause of evil4 ,he seeks only to show the indemonstrability and incomprehensibility of freedom1 not to reject it4 ,for he sees in it the condition of morality1 and calls attention to the fact that the difficulties in which those who deny freedom involve themselves are far greater than those of their opponents4 ,he shows himself entirely averse to the determinism and pantheism of ,spinoza4 ,he who seeks to refute skepticism must produce a criterion of truth4 ,if such exists1 it is certainly that advanced by ,descartes1 the evidence1 the evident clearness of a principle4 ,well1 then1 the following principles pass for evident3 ,that one1 who does not exist1 can have no responsibility for an evil action2 that two things1 which are identical with the same thing1 are identical with each other2 that ,i am the same man to-day that ,i was yesterday4 ,now1 the revealed doctrines of original sin and of the ,trinity show that the first and second of these axioms are false1 and the ,church doctrine of the preservation of the world as a continuous creation1 that the last principle is uncertain4 ,thus if not even self-evidence furnishes us a criterion of truth1 we must conclude that none whatever exists4 ,further1 in regard to the origin of the world from a single principle1 its creation by ,god1 we find this supported1 no doubt1 both by the conclusions of the pure reason and by the consideration of nature1 but controvened by the fact of evil1 by the misery and wickedness of man4 ,is it conceivable that a holy and benevolent ,god has created so unhappy and wicked a being8 ,bayle's motives in defending faith against reason were1 on the one hand1 his personal piety1 on the other1 his conviction of the unassailable purity of ,christian ethics4 ,all the sects agree in regard to moral principles1 and it is this which assures us of the divinity of the ,christian revelation4 ,nevertheless1 he does not conceal from himself the fact that possession of the theoretical side of religion is far from being a guarantee of practice in conformity with her precepts4 ,it is neither true that faith alone leads to morality nor that unbelief is the cause of immorality4 ,a state composed of atheists would be not at all impossible1 if only strict punishments and strict notions of honor were insisted upon4 ,the judgments of the natural reason in moral questions are as certain and free from error as its capacity is shown to be weak and limited in theoretical science4 ,the idea of morality never deceives anyone2 the moral law is innate in every man4 ,although ,christianity has given the best development of our duties1 yet the moral law can be understood and followed by all men1 even by heathen and atheists4 ,we do not need to be ,christians in order to act virtuously2 the knowledge given by conscience is not dependent upon revelation4 ,from the knowledge of the good to the practice of it is1 it is true1 a long step2 we may be convinced of moral truth without loving it1 and ,god's grace alone is able to strengthen us against the power of the passions1 by adding to the illumination of the mind an inclination of the heart toward the good4 ,temperament1 custom1 self-love move the soul more strongly than general truths4 ,as in life pleasure is far outbalanced by pain and vexation1 so far more evil acts are done than good ones3 history is a collection of misdeeds1 with scarcely one virtuous act for a thousand crimes4 ,it is not the external action that constitutes the ethical character of a deed1 but the motive or disposition2 almsgiving from motives of pride is a vice1 and only when practiced out of love to one's neighbors1 a virtue4 ,god looks only at the act of the will2 our highest duty1 and one which admits of no exceptions1 is never to act contrary to conscience4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,locke4 ,after the ,cartesian philosophy had given decisive expression to the tendencies of modern thought1 and had been developed through occasionalism to its completion in the system of ,spinoza1 the line of further progress consisted in two factors3 ,descartes's principles--one-sidedly rationalistic and abstractly scientific1 as they were--were1 on the one hand1 to be supplemented by the addition of the empirical element which ,descartes had neglected1 and1 on the other1 to be made available for general culture by approximation to the interests of practical life4 ,england1 with its freer and happier political conditions1 was the best place for the accomplishment of both ends1 and ,locke1 a typically healthy and sober ,english thinker1 with a distaste for extreme views1 the best adapted mind4 ,descartes1 the rationalist1 had despised experience1 and ,bacon1 the empiricist1 had despised mathematics2 but ,locke aims to show that while the reason is the instrument of science1 demonstration its form1 and the realm of knowledge wider than experience1 yet this instrument and this form are dependent for their content on a supply of material from the senses4 ,the emphasis1 it is true1 falls chiefly on the latter half of this programme1 and posterity1 especially1 has almost exclusively attended to the empirical side of ,locke's theory of knowledge in giving judgment concerning it4 ,john ,locke was born at ,wrington1 not far from ,bristol1 in #afcb4 ,at ,oxford he busied himself with philosophy1 natural science1 and medicine1 being repelled by the ,scholastic thinkers1 but strongly attracted by the writings of ,descartes4 ,in #affe he became secretary to the ,english ambassador to the ,court of ,brandenburg4 ,returning thence to ,oxford he made the acquaintance of ,lord ,anthony ,ashley 7from #afgb ,earl of ,shaftesbury2 died in ,holland #afhc71 who received him into his own household as a friend1 physician1 and tutor to his son 7the father of ,shaftesbury1 the moral philosopher71 and with whose varying fortunes ,locke's own were henceforth to be intimately connected4 ,twice he became secretary to his patron 7once in #affg--with an official secretaryship in #afgb1 when ,shaftesbury became ,lord ,chancellor--and again in #afgi1 when he became ,president of the ,council71 but both times he lost his post on his friend's fall4 ,the years #afge-gi were spent in ,montpellier and ,paris4 ,in #afhc he went into voluntary exile in ,holland 7where ,shaftesbury had died in ,january of the same year71 and remained there until #afhi1 when the ascension of the throne by ,william of ,orange made it possible for him to return to ,england4 ,here he was made ,commissioner of ,appeals1 and1 subsequently1 one of the ,commissioners of ,trade and ,plantations 7till #agjj74 ,he died in #agjd at ,gates1 in ,essex1 at the house of ,sir ,francis ,masham1 whose wife was the daughter of ,cudworth1 the philosopher4 ,locke's chief work1 ,an ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 which had been planned as early as #afgj1 was published in #afhi-ij1 a short abstract of it having previously appeared in ,french in ,le ,clerc's ,bibliothque ,universelle1 #afhh4 ,his theoretical works include1 further1 the two posthumous treatises1 ,on the ,conduct of the ,understanding 7originally intended for incorporation in the fourth edition of the ,essay1 which1 however1 appeared in #agjj without this chapter1 which probably had proved too extended7 and the ,elements of ,natural ,philosophy4 ,to political and politico-economic questions ,locke contributed the two ,treatises on ,government1 #afij1 and three essays on money and the coinage4 ,in the year #afhi appeared the first of three ,letters on ,tolerance1 followed1 in #afic1 by ,some ,thoughts on ,education1 and1 in #afie1 by ,the ,reasonableness of ,christianity as delivered in the ,scriptures4 ,the collected works appeared for the first time in #agad1 and in nine volumes in #ahec2 the philosophical works 7edited by ,st4 ,john7 are given in ,bonn's ,standard ,library 7#ahfg-fh74a ,footnote #a3 ,lord ,king and ,fox ,bourne have written on ,locke's life1 #ahbi and #ahgf4 ,a comparison of ,locke's theory of knowledge with ,leibnitz's critique was published by ,hartenstein in #ahfe1 and one by ,von ,benoit 7prize dissertation7 in #ahfi1 and an exposition of his theory of substance by ,de ,fries in #ahgi4 ,victor ,cousin's ,philosophie de ,locke has passed through six editions4 ,among more recent ,english discussions reference may be made to ,green's ,introduction to ,hume's ,treatise on ,human ,nature1 #ahgd 7new ed4 #ahij71 which is a valuable critique of the line of development1 ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume2 ,fowler's ,locke1 in the ,english ,men of ,letters1 #ahhj2 and ,fraser's ,locke1 in ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahij4--,,tr4 7a7 ,theory of ,knowledge4--,locke's theory of knowledge is controlled by two tendencies1 one native1 furnished by the ,baconian empiricism1 and the other ,continental1 supplied by the ,cartesian question concerning the origin of ideas4 ,bacon had demanded the closest connection with experience as the condition of fruitful inquiry4 ,locke supports this commendation of experience by a detailed description of the services which it renders to cognition1 namely1 by showing that1 in simple ideas1 perception supplies the material for complex ideas1 and for all the cognitive work of the understanding4 ,descartes had divided ideas1 according to their origin1 into three classes3 those which are self-formed1 those which come from without1 and those which are innate 7p4 #gi71 and had called this third class the most valuable4 ,locke disputes the existence of ideas in the understanding from birth1 and makes it receive the elements of knowledge from the senses1 that is1 from without4 ,he is a representative of sensationalism1--not in the stricter sense1 first put into the term by those who subsequently continued his endeavors1 that thought arises from perception1 that it is transformed sensation--but in the wider sense1 that thought is 7free7 operation with ideas1 which are neither created by it nor present in it from the first1 but given to it by perception1 that1 consequently1 the cognitive process begins with sensation and so its first attitude is a passive one4 ,from the standpoint of the ,cartesian problem1 which he solves in a sense opposite to ,descartes1 ,locke supplements the empiricism of ,bacon by basing it on a psychologically developed theory of knowledge4 ,that in the course of the inquiry he introduces a new principle1 which causes him to diverge from the true empirical path1 will appear in the sequel4 ,the question ,how our ideas come into the mind receives a negative answer 7in the first book of the ,essay73 ,there are no innate principles in the mind#a ,the doctrine of the innate character of certain principles is based on their universal acceptance4 ,the asserted agreement of mankind in regard to the laws of thought1 the principles of morality1 the existence of ,god1 etc41 is neither cogent as an argument nor correct in fact4 ,in the first place1 even if there were any principles which everyone assented to1 this would not prove that they had been created in the soul2 the fact of general consent would admit of a different explanation4 ,granted that no atheists existed1 yet it would not necessarily follow that the universal conviction of the existence of ,god is innate1 for it might have been gradually reached in each case through the use of the reason--might have been inferred1 for instance1 from the perception of the purposive character of the world4 ,second1 the fact to which this theory of innate ideas appeals is not true4 ,no moral rule can be cited which is respected by all nations4 ,the idea of identity is entirely unknown to idiots and to children4 ,if the laws of identity and contradiction were innate they must appear in consciousness prior to all other truths2 but long before a child is conscious of the proposition ,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be1 it knows that sweet is not bitter1 and that black is not white4 ,the ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts1 but particular impressions of the senses4 ,would nature write so illegible a hand that the mind must wait a long time before becoming able to read what had been inscribed upon it8 ,it is often said1 however1 that innate ideas and principles may be obscured and1 finally1 completely extinguished by habit1 education1 and other extrinsic circumstances4 ,then1 if they gradually become corrupted and disappear1 they must at least be discoverable in full purity where these disturbing influences have not yet acted2 but it is especially vain to look for them in children and the ignorant4 ,perhaps1 however1 these possess such principles unconsciously2 perhaps they are imprinted on the understanding1 without being attended to8 ,this would be a contradiction in terms4 ,to be in the mind or the understanding simply means to be understood or to be known2 no one can have an idea without being conscious of it4 ,finally1 if the attempt be made to explain originally in the mind in so wide a sense that it would include all truths which man can ever attain or is capable of discovering by the right use of reason1 this would make not only all mathematical principles1 but all knowledge in general1 all sciences1 and all arts innate2 there would be no ground even for the exclusion of wisdom and virtue4 ,therefore1 either all ideas are innate or none are4 ,this is an important alternative4 ,while ,locke decides for the second half of the proposition1 ,leibnitz defends the first by a delicate application of the concept of unconscious representation and of implicit knowledge1 which his predecessor rejects out of hand4 ,footnote #a3 ,according to ,fox ,bourne this first book was written after the others4 ,geil 7,ueber die ,abhngigkeit ,lockes von ,descartes1 ,strassburg1 #ahhg1 chap1 iii47 has endeavored to prove that1 since the arguments controverted are wanting in ,descartes1 the attack was not aimed at ,descartes and his school1 but at native defenders of innate ideas1 as ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury and the ,english ,platonists 7,cudworth1 ,more1 ,parker1 ,gale74 ,that along with these the ,cartesian doctrine was a second and chief object of attack is shown by ,benno ,erdmann in his discussion of the treatises by ,g4 ,geil and ,r4 ,sommer 7,lockes ,verhltnis zu ,descartes1 ,berlin1 #ahhg7 in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ii1 pp4 #ii-aba4 ,locke's positive answer to the question concerning the origin of ideas is given in his second book4 ,ideas are not present in the understanding from the beginning1 nor are they originated by the understanding1 but received through sensation4 ,the understanding is like a piece of white paper on which perception inscribes its characters4 ,all knowledge arises in experience4 ,this is of two kinds1 derived either from the external senses or the internal sense4 ,the perception of external objects is termed ,sensation1 that of internal phenomena 7of the states of the mind itself7 ,reflection4 ,external and internal perception are the only windows through which the light of ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the understanding4 ,the two are not opened simultaneously1 however1 but one after the other2 since the perceptions of the sensible qualities of bodies1 unlike that of the operations of the mind itself1 do not require an effort of attention1 they are the earlier4 ,the child receives ideas of sensation before those of reflection2 internal perception presupposes external perception4 ,in this distinction between sensation and reflection1 we may recognize an after-effect of the ,cartesian dualism between matter and spirit4 ,the antithesis of substances has become a duality in the faculties of perception4 ,but while ,descartes had so far forth ascribed precedence to the mind in that he held the self-certitude of the ego to be the highest and clearest of all truths and the soul to be better known than the body1 in ,locke the relation of the two was reversed1 since he made the perception of self dependent on the precedent perception of external objects4 ,this antithesis was made still sharper in later thinking1 when ,condillac made full use of the priority of sensation1 which in ,locke had remained without much effect2 while ,berkeley1 on the other hand1 reduced external perception to internal perception4 ,all original ideas are representations either of the external senses or of the internal sense1 or of both4 ,and since1 in the case of ideas of sensation1 there is a distinction between those which are perceived by a single one of the external senses and those which come from more than one1 four classes of simple ideas result3 7#a7 ,those which come from one external sense1 as colors1 sounds1 tastes1 odors1 heat1 solidity1 and the like4 7#b7 ,those which come from more than one external sense 7sight and touch71 as extension1 figure1 and motion4 7#c7 ,reflection on the operations of our minds yields ideas of perception or thinking 7with its various modes1 remembrance1 judging1 knowledge1 faith1 etc471 and of volition or willing4 7#d7 ,from both external and internal perception there come into the mind the ideas of pleasure and pain1 existence1 power1 unity1 and succession4 ,these are approximately our original ideas1 which are related to knowledge as the letters to written discourse2 as all ,homer is composed out of only twenty-four letters1 so these few simple ideas constitute all the material of knowledge4 ,the mind can neither have more nor other simple ideas than those which are furnished to it by these two sources of experience4 ,locke differs from ,descartes again in regard to extension and thought4 ,extension does not constitute the essence of matter1 nor thought the essence of mind4 ,extension and body are not the same2 the former is presupposed by the latter as its necessary condition1 but it is the former alone which yields mathematical matter4 ,the essence of physical matter consists rather in solidity3 where impenetrability is found there is body1 and the converse2 the two are absolutely inseparable4 ,with space the case is different4 ,i cannot conceive unextended matter1 indeed1 but ,i can easily conceive immaterial extension1 an unfilled space ,further1 if the essence of the soul consisted in thought1 it must be always thinking4 ,as the ,cartesians maintained1 it must have ideas as soon as it begins to be1 which is manifestly contrary to experience4 ,thinking is merely an activity of the mind1 as motion is an activity of the body1 and not its essential characteristic4 ,the mind does not receive ideas until external objects occasion perception in it through impressions1 which it is not able to avert4 ,the understanding may be compared to a mirror1 which1 without independent activity and without being consulted1 takes up the images of things4 ,some of the simple ideas which have been mentioned above represent the properties of things as they really are1 others not4 ,the former class includes all ideas of reflection 7for we are ourselves the immediate object of the inner sense72 but among the ideas of sensation those only which come from different senses1 hence extension1 motion and rest1 number1 figure1 and1 further1 solidity1 are to be accounted primary qualities1 i4 e41 such as are actual copies of the properties of bodies4 ,all other ideas1 on the contrary1 have no resemblance to properties of bodies2 they represent merely the ways in which things act1 and are not copies of things4 ,the ideas of secondary or derivative qualities 7hard and soft1 warm and cold1 colors and sounds1 tastes and odors7 are in the last analysis caused--as are the primary--by motion1 but not perceived as such4 ,yellow and warm are merely sensations in us1 which we erroneously ascribe to objects2 with equal right we might ascribe to fire1 as qualities inherent in it1 the changes in form and color which it produces in wax and the pain which it causes in the finger brought into proximity with it4 ,the warmth and the brightness of the blaze1 the redness1 the pleasant taste1 and the aromatic odor of the strawberry1 exist in these bodies merely as the power to produce such sensations in us by stimulation of the skin1 the eye1 the palate1 and the nose4 ,if we remove the perceptions of them1 they disappear as such1 and their causes alone remain--the bulk1 figure1 number1 texture1 and motion of the insensible particles4 ,the ground of the illusion lies in the fact that such qualities as color1 etc41 bear no resemblance to their causes1 in no wise point to these1 and in themselves contain naught of bulk1 density1 figure1 and motion1 and that our senses are too weak to discover the material particles and their primary qualities4--,the distinction between qualities of the first and second order--first advanced by the ancient atomists1 revived by ,galileo and ,descartes on the threshold of the modern period1 retained by ,locke1 and still customary in the natural science of the day--forms an important link in the transition from the popular view of all sense-qualities as properties of things in themselves to ,kant's position1 that spatial and temporal qualities also belong to phenomena alone1 and are based merely on man's subjective mode of apprehension1 while the real properties of things in themselves are unknowable4 ,thus far the procedure of the understanding has been purely passive4 ,but besides the capacity for passively receiving simple ideas1 it possesses the further power of variously combining and extending these original ideas which have come into it from without1 of working over the material given in sensation by the combination1 relation1 and separation of its various elements4 ,in this it is active1 but not creative4 ,it is not able to form new simple ideas 7and just as little to destroy such as already exist71 but only freely to combine the elements furnished without its assistance by perception 7or1 following the figure mentioned above1 to combine into syllables and words the separate letters of sensation74 ,complex ideas arise from simple ideas through voluntary combination of the latter4 ,perception is the first step toward knowledge4 ,after perception the most indispensable faculty is retention1 the prolonged consciousness of present ideas and the revival of those which have disappeared1 or1 as it were1 have been put aside4 ,for an idea to be in the memory means that the mind has the capacity to reproduce it at will1 whereupon it recognizes it as previously experienced4 ,if our ideas are not freshened up from time to time by new impressions of the same sort they gradually fade out1 until finally 7as the idea of color in one become blind in early life7 they completely disappear4 ,ideas impressed upon the mind by frequent repetition are rarely entirely lost4 ,memory is the basis for the intellectual functions of discernment and comparison1 of composition1 abstraction1 and naming4 ,since1 amid the innumerable multitude of ideas1 it is not possible to assign to each one a definite sign1 the indispensable condition of language is found in the power of abstraction1 that is1 in the power of generalizing ideas1 of compounding many ideas into one1 and of indicating by the names of the general ideas1 or of the classes and species1 the particular ideas also which are contained under these4 ,here is the great distinction between man and the brute4 ,the brute lacks language because he lacks 7not all understanding whatever1 e4g41 not a capacity1 though an imperfect one1 of comparison and composition1 but7 the faculty of abstraction and of forming general ideas4 ,the object of language is simply the quick and easy communication of our thoughts to others1 not to give expression to the real essence of objects4 ,words are not names for particular things1 but signs of general ideas2 and abstracta nothing more than an artifice for facilitating intellectual intercourse4 ,this abbreviation1 which aids in the exchange of ideas1 involves the danger that the creations of the mind denoted by words will be taken for images of real general essences1 of which1 in fact1 there are none in existence1 but only particular things4 ,in order to prevent anyone to whom ,i am speaking from understanding my words in a different sense from the one intended1 it is necessary for me to define the complex ideas by analyzing them into their elements1 and1 on the other hand1 to give examples in experience of the simple ideas1 which do not admit of definition1 or to explain them by synonyms4 ,thus much from ,locke's philosophy of language1 to which he devotes the third book of the ,essay4 ,complex ideas1 which are very numerous1 may be divided into three classes3 ,modes1 ,substances1 and ,relations4 ,modes 7states1 conditions7 are such combinations of simple ideas which do not contain in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves1 but are considered as dependencies on1 or affections of substances4 ,they fall into two classes according as they are composed of the same simple ideas1 or simple ideas of various kinds2 the former are called simple1 the latter mixed1 modes4 ,under the former class belong1 for example1 a dozen or a score1 the idea of which is composed of simple units2 under the latter1 running1 fighting1 obstinacy1 printing1 theft1 parricide4 ,the formation of mixed modes is greatly influenced by national customs4 ,very complicated transactions 7sacrilege1 triumph1 ostracism71 if often considered and discussed1 receive for the sake of brevity comprehensive names1 which cannot be rendered by a single expression in the language of other nations among whom the custom in question is not found4 ,the elements most frequently employed in the formation of mixed modes are ideas of the two fundamental activities1 thinking and motion1 together with power1 which is their source4 ,locke discusses simple modes in more detail1 especially those derived from the ideas of space1 time1 unity1 and power4 ,modifications of space are distance1 figure1 place1 length2 since any length or measure of space can be repeated to infinity1 we reach the idea of immensity4 ,as modes of time are enumerated succession 7which we perceive and measure only by the flow of our ideas71 duration1 and lengths or measures of duration1 the endless repetition of which yields the idea of eternity4 ,from unity are developed the modes of numbers1 and from the unlimitedness of these the idea of infinity4 ,no idea1 however1 is richer in modes than the idea of power4 ,a distinction must be made between active power and passive power1 or mere receptivity4 ,while bodies are not capable of originating motion1 but only of communicating motion received1 we notice in ourselves1 as spiritual beings1 the capacity of originating actions and motions4 ,the body possesses only the passive power of being moved1 the mind the active power of producing motion4 ,this latter is termed will4 ,here ,locke discusses at length the freedom of the will1 but not with entire clearness and freedom from contradictions 7cf4 below74 ,modes are conditions which do not subsist of themselves1 but have need of a basis or support2 they are not conceivable apart from a thing whose properties or states they are4 ,we notice that certain qualities always appear together1 and habitually refer them to a substratum as the ground of their unity2 in which they subsist or from which they proceed4 ,substance denotes this self-existent we know not what1 which has or bears the attributes in itself1 and which arouses the ideas of them in us4 ,it is the combination of a number of simple ideas which are presumed to belong to one thing4 ,from the ideas of sensation the understanding composes the idea of body1 and from the ideas of reflection that of mind4 ,each of these is just as clear and just as obscure as the other2 of each we know only its effects and its sensuous properties2 its essence is for us entirely unknowable4 ,instead of the customary names1 material and immaterial substances1 ,locke recommends cogitative and incogitative substances1 since it is not inconceivable that the ,creator may have endowed some material beings with the capacity of thought4 ,god1--the idea of whom is attained by uniting the ideas of existence1 power1 might1 knowledge1 and happiness with that of infinity1--is absolutely immaterial1 because not passive1 while finite spirits 7which are both active and passive7 are perhaps only bodies which possess the power of thinking4 ,while the ideas of substances are referred to a reality without the mind as their archetype1 to which they are to conform and which they should image and represent1 ,relations 7e4g41 husband1 greater7 are free and immanent products of the understanding4 ,they are not copies of real things1 but represent themselves alone1 are their own archetypes4 ,we do not ask whether they agree with things1 but1 conversely1 whether things agree with them 7,book iv4 #d4e74 ,the mind reaches an idea of relation by placing two things side by side and comparing them4 ,if it perceives that a thing1 or a quality1 or an idea begins to exist through the operation of some other thing1 it derives from this the idea of the causal relation1 which is the most comprehensive of all relations1 since all that is actual or possible can be brought under it4 ,cause is that which makes another thing to begin to be2 effect1 that which had its beginning from some other thing4 ,the production of a new quality is termed alteration2 of artificial things1 making2 of a living being1 generation2 of a new particle of matter1 creation4 ,next in importance is the relation of identity and diversity4 ,since it is impossible for a thing to be in two different places at the same time and for two things to be at the same time in the same place1 everything that at a given instant is in a given place is identical with itself1 and1 on the other hand1 distinct from everything else 7no matter how great the resemblance between them7 that at the same moment exists in another place4 ,space and time therefore form the principium individuationis4 ,by what marks1 however1 may we recognize the identity of an individual at different times and in different places8 ,the identity of inorganic matter depends on the continuity of the mass of atoms which compose it2 that of living beings upon the permanent organization of their parts 7different bodies are united into one animal by a common life72 personal identity consists in the unity of self-consciousness1 not in the continuity of bodily existence 7which is at once excluded by the change of matter74 ,the identity of the person or the ego must be carefully distinguished from that of substance and of man4 ,it would not be impossible for the person to remain the same in a change of substances1 in so far as the different beings 7for instance1 the souls of ,epicurus and ,gassendi7 participated in the same self-consciousness2 and1 conversely1 for a spirit to appear in two persons by losing the consciousness of its previous existence4 ,consciousness is the sole condition of the self1 or personal identity4--,the determinations of space and time are for the most part relations4 ,our answers to the questions ,when8 ,how long8 ,how large8 denote the distance of one point of time from another 7e4g41 the birth of ,christ71 the relation of one duration to another 7of a revolution of the sun71 the relation of one extension to another well-known one taken as a standard4 ,many apparently positive ideas and words1 as young and old1 large and small1 weak and strong1 are in fact relative4 ,they imply merely the relation of a given duration of life1 of a given size and strength1 to that which has been adopted as a standard for the class of things in question4 ,a man of twenty is called young1 but a horse of like age1 old2 and neither of these measures of time applies to stars or diamonds4 ,moral relations1 which are based on a comparison of man's voluntary actions with one of the three moral laws1 will be discussed below4 ,the inquiry now turns from the origin of ideas to their cognitive value or their validity1 beginning 7in the concluding chapters of the second book7 with the accuracy of single ideas1 and advancing 7in ,book iv41 which is the most important in the whole work7 to the truth of judgments4 ,an idea is real when it conforms to its archetype1 whether this is a thing1 real or possible1 or an idea of some other thing2 it is adequate when the conformity is complete4 ,the idea of a four-sided triangle or of brave cowardice is unreal or fantastical1 since it is composed of incompatible elements1 and the idea of a centaur1 since it unites simple ideas in a way in which they do not occur in nature4 ,the layman's ideas of law or of chemical substances are real1 but inadequate1 since they have a general resemblance to those of experts1 and a basis in reality1 but yet only imperfectly represent their archetypes4 ,nay1 further1 our ideas of substances are all inadequate1 not only when they are taken for representations of the inner essences of things 7since we do not know these essences71 but also when they are considered merely as collections of qualities4 ,the copy never includes all the qualities of the thing1 the less so since the majority of these are powers1 i4e41 consist in relations to other objects1 and since it is impossible1 even in the case of a single body1 to discover all the changes which it is fitted to impart to1 or to receive from1 other substances4 ,ideas of modes and relations are all adequate1 for they are their own archetypes1 are not intended to represent anything other than themselves1 are images without originals4 ,an idea of this kind1 however1 though perfect when originally formed1 may become imperfect through the use of language1 when it is unsuccessfully intended to agree with the idea of some other person and denominated by a current term4 ,in the case of mixed modes and their names1 therefore1 the compatibility of their elements and the possible existence of their objects are not enough to secure their reality and their complete adequacy2 in order to be adequate they must1 further1 exactly conform to the meaning connected with their names by their author1 or in common use4 ,simple ideas are best off1 according to ,locke1 in regard both to reality and to adequacy4 ,for the most part1 it is true1 they are not accurate copies of the real qualities1 of things1 but only the regular effects of the powers of things4 ,but although real qualities are thus only the causes and not the patterns of sensations1 still simple ideas1 by their constant correspondence with real qualities1 sufficiently fulfill their divinely ordained end1 to serve us as instruments of knowledge1 i4e41 in the discrimination of things4--,an unreal and inadequate idea becomes false only when it is referred to an object1 whether this be the existence of a thing1 or its true essence1 or an idea of other things4 ,truth and error belong always to affirmations or negations1 that is1 to 7it may be1 tacit7 propositions4 ,ideas uncombined1 unrelated1 apart from judgments1 ideas1 that is1 as mere phenomena in the mind1 are neither true nor false4 ,knowledge is defined as the perception of the connexion and agreement1 or disagreement and repugnancy of two ideas2 truth1 as the right joining or separating of signs1 i4e41 ideas or words4 ,the object of knowledge is neither single ideas nor the relations of ideas to things1 but the relations of ideas among themselves4 ,this view was at once paradoxical and pregnant4 ,if all cognition1 as ,locke suggests in objection to his own theory1 consists in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 are not the visions of the enthusiast and the reasonings of sober thinkers alike certain8 are not the propositions1 ,a fairy is not a centaur1 and a centaur is a living being1 just as true as that a circle is not a triangle1 and that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles8 ,the mind directly perceives nothing but its own ideas1 but it seeks a knowledge of things6 ,if this is possible it can only be indirect knowledge--the mind knows things through its ideas1 and possesses criteria which show that its ideas agree with things4 ,two cases must be clearly distinguished1 for a considerable number of our ideas1 viz41 all complex ideas except those of substances1 make no claim to represent things1 and consequently cannot represent them falsely4 ,for mathematical and moral ideas and principles1 and the truth thereof1 it is entirely immaterial whether things and conditions correspondent to them exist in nature or not4 ,they are valid1 even if nowhere actualized2 they are eternal truths1 not in the sense that they are known from childhood1 but in the sense that1 as soon as known1 they are immediately assented to4#a ,the case is different1 however1 with simple ideas and the ideas of substances1 which have their originals without the mind and which are to correspond with these4 ,in regard to the former we may always be certain that they agree with real things1 for since the mind can neither voluntarily originate them 7e4g41 cannot produce sensations of color in the dark7 nor avoid having them at will1 but only receive them from without1 they are not creatures of the fancy1 but the natural and regular productions of external things affecting us4 ,in regard to the latter1 the ideas of substances1 we may be certain at least when the simple ideas which compose them have been found so connected in experience4 ,perception has an external cause1 whose influence the mind is not able to withstand4 ,the mutual corroboration furnished by the reports of the different senses1 the painfulness of certain sensations1 the clear distinction between ideas from actual perception and those from memory1 the possibility of producing and predicting new sensations of an entirely definite nature in ourselves and in others1 by means of changes which we effect in the external world 7e4g4 by writing down a word7--these give further justification for the trust which we put in the senses4 ,no one will be so skeptical as to doubt in earnest the existence of the things which he sees and touches1 and to declare his whole life to be a deceptive dream4 ,the certitude which perception affords concerning the existence of external objects is indeed not an absolute one1 but it is sufficient for the needs of life and the government of our actions2 it is as certain as our happiness or misery1 beyond which we have no concernment1 either of knowing or being4 ,in regard to the past the testimony of the senses is supplemented by memory1 in which certainty in regard to the continued existence of things previously perceived is transformed into high probability2 while in regard to the existence of other finite spirits1 numberless kinds of which may be conjectured to exist1 though their existence is quite beyond our powers of perception1 certitude sinks into mere 7though well-grounded7 faith4 ,footnote #a3 ,thus it results that knowledge1 although dependent on experience for all its materials1 extends beyond experience4 ,the understanding is completely bound in the reception of simple ideas2 less so in the combination of these into complex ideas2 absolutely free in the act of comparison1 which it can omit at will2 finally1 again1 completely bound in its recognition of the relation in which the ideas it has chosen to compare stand to one another4 ,there is room for choice only in the intermediate stage of the cognitive process2 at the beginning 7in the reception of the simple ideas of perception1 a1 b1 c1 d71 and at the end 7in judging how the concepts a b c and a b d stand related to each other71 the understanding is completely determined4 ,more certain than our sensitive knowledge of the existence of external objects1 are our immediate or intuitive knowledge of our own existence and our mediate or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of ,god4 ,every idea that we have1 every pain1 every thought assures us of our own existence4 ,the existence of ,god1 however1 as the infinite cause of all reality1 endowed with intelligence1 will1 and supreme power1 is inferred from the existence and constitution of the world and of ourselves4 ,reality exists2 the real world is composed of matter in motion and thinking beings1 and is harmoniously ordered4 ,since it is impossible for any real being to be produced by nothing1 and since we obtain no satisfactory answer to the question of origin until we rise to something existent from all eternity1 we must assume as the cause of that which exists an ,eternal ,being1 which possesses in a higher degree all the perfections which it has bestowed upon the creatures4 ,as the cause of matter and motion1 and as the source of all power1 this ,being must be omnipotent2 as the cause of beauty and order in the world1 and1 above all1 as the creator of thinking beings1 it must be omniscient4 ,but these perfections are those which we combine in the idea of ,god4 ,intuitive knowledge is the highest of the three degrees of knowledge4 ,it is gained when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas at first sight1 without hesitation1 and without the intervention of any third idea4 ,this immediate knowledge is self-evident1 irresistible1 and exposed to no doubt4 ,knowledge is demonstrative when the mind perceives the agreement 7or disagreement7 of two ideas1 not by placing them side by side and comparing them1 but through the aid of other ideas4 ,the intermediate links are called proofs2 their discovery is the work of the reason1 and quickness in finding them out is termed sagacity4 ,the greater the number of the intermediate steps1 the more the clearness and distinctness of the knowledge decreases1 and the more the possibility of error increases4 ,in order for an argument 7e4 g41 that a d7 to be conclusive1 every particular step in it 7a b1 b c1 c d7 must possess intuitive certainty4 ,mathematics is not the only example of demonstrative knowledge1 but the most perfect one1 since in mathematics1 by the aid of visible symbols1 the full equality and the least differences among ideas may be exactly measured and sharply determined4 ,besides real existence ,locke1 unsystematically enough1 enumerates three other sorts of agreement between ideas1--in the perception of which he makes knowledge consist1--viz41 identity or diversity 7blue is not yellow71 relation 7when equals are added to equals the results are equal71 and coexistence or necessary connexion 7gold is fixed74 ,we are best off in regard to the knowledge of the first of these1 identity or diversity1 for here our intuition extends as far as our ideas1 since we recognize every idea1 as soon as it arises1 as identical with itself and different from others4 ,we are worst off in regard to necessary connexion4 ,we know something1 indeed1 concerning the incompatibility or coexistence of certain properties 7e4 g41 that the same object cannot have two different sizes or colors at the same time2 that figure cannot exist apart from extension73 but it is only in regard to a few qualities and powers of bodies that we are able to discover dependence and necessary connexion by intuitive or demonstrative thought1 while in most cases we are dependent on experience1 which gives us information concerning particular cases only1 and affords no guarantee that things are the same beyond the sphere of our observation and experiment4 ,since empirical inquiry furnishes no certain and universal knowledge1 and since the assumption that like bodies will in the same circumstances have like effects is only a conjecture from analogy1 natural science in the strict sense does not exist4 ,both mathematics and ethics1 however1 belong in the sphere of the demonstrative knowledge of relations4 ,the principles of ethics are as capable of exact demonstration as those of arithmetic and geometry1 although their underlying ideas are more complex1 more involved1 hence more exposed to misunderstanding1 and lacking in visible symbols2 though these defects can1 and should1 in part be made good by careful and strictly consistent definitions4 ,such moral principles as where there is no property there is no injustice1 or no government allows absolute liberty1 are as certain as any proposition in ,euclid4 ,the advantage of the mathematical and moral sciences over the physical sciences consists in the fact that1 in the former1 the real and nominal essences of their objects coincide1 while in the latter they do not2 and1 further1 that the real essences of substances are beyond our knowledge4 ,the true inner constitution of bodies1 the root whence all their qualities1 and the coexistence of these1 necessarily proceed1 is completely unknown to us2 so that we are unable to deduce them from it4 ,mathematical and moral ideas1 on the other hand1 and their relations1 are entirely accessible1 for they are the products of our own voluntary operations4 ,they are not copied from things1 but are archetypal for reality and need no confirmation from experience4 ,the connexion constituted by our understanding between the ideas crime and punishment 7e4 g41 the proposition3 crime deserves punishment7 is valid1 even though no crime had ever been committed1 and none ever punished4 ,existence is not at all involved in universal propositions2 general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts1 and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas and their relations4 ,the truths of mathematics and ethics are both universal and certain1 while in natural science single observations and experiments are certain1 but not general1 and general propositions are only more or less probable4 ,both the particular experiments and the general conclusions are of great value under certain circumstances1 but they do not meet the requirements of comprehensive and certain knowledge4 ,the extent of our knowledge is very limited--much less1 in fact1 than that of our ignorance4 ,for our knowledge reaches no further than our ideas1 and the possibility of perceiving their agreements4 ,many things exist of which we have no ideas--chiefly because of the fewness of our senses and their lack of acuteness--and just as many of which our ideas are only imperfect4 ,moreover1 we are often able neither to command the ideas which we really possess1 or at least might attain1 nor to perceive their connexions4 ,the ideas which are lacking1 those which are undiscoverable1 those which are not combined1 are the causes of the narrow limits of human knowledge4 ,there are two ways by which knowledge may be extended3 by experience1 on the one hand1 and1 on the other1 by the elevation of our ideas to a state of clearness and distinctness1 together with the discovery and systematic arrangement of those intermediate ideas which exhibit the relation of other ideas1 in themselves not immediately comparable4 ,the syllogism1 as an artificial form1 is of little value in the perception of the agreements between these intermediate and final terms1 and of none whatever in the discovery of the former4 ,analytical and identical propositions which merely explicate the conception of the subject1 but express nothing not already known1 are1 in spite of their indefeasible certitude1 valueless for the extension of knowledge1 and when taken for more than verbal explanations1 mere absurdities4 ,even those most general propositions1 those principles which are so much talked of in the schools1 lack the utility which is so commonly ascribed to them4 ,maxims are1 it is true1 fit instruments for the communication of knowledge already acquired1 and in learned disputations may perform indispensable service in silencing opponents1 or in bringing the dispute to a conclusion2 but they are of little or no use in the discovery of new truth4 ,it is a mistake to believe that special cases 7as #e #b #c1 or #e #a #d7 are dependent on the truth of the abstract rule 7the whole is equal to the sum of its parts71 that they are confirmed by it and must be derived from it4 ,the particular and concrete is not only as clear and certain as the general maxim1 but better known than this1 as well as earlier and more easily perceived4 ,nay1 further1 in cases where ideas are confused and the meanings of words doubtful1 the use of axioms is dangerous1 since they may easily lend the appearance of proved truth to assertions which are really contradictory4 ,between the clear daylight of certain knowledge and the dark night of absolute ignorance comes the twilight of probability4 ,we find ourselves dependent on opinion and presumption1 or judgment based upon probability1 when experience and demonstration leave us in the lurch and we are1 nevertheless1 challenged to a decision by vital needs which brook no delay4 ,the judge and the historian must convince themselves from the reports of witnesses concerning events which they have not themselves observed2 and everyone is compelled by the interests of life1 of duty1 and of eternal salvation to form conclusions concerning things which lie beyond the limits of his own perception and reflective thought1 nay1 which transcend all human experience and rigorous demonstration whatever4 ,to delay decision and action until absolute certainty had been attained1 would scarcely allow us to lift a single finger4 ,in cases concerning events in the past1 the future1 or at a distance1 we rely on the testimony of others 7testing their reports by considering their credibility as witnesses and the conformity of the evidence to general experience in like cases72 in regard to questions concerning that which is absolutely beyond experience1 e4g41 higher orders of spirits1 or the ultimate causes of natural phenomena1 analogy is the only help we have4 ,if the witnesses conflict among themselves1 or with the usual course of nature1 the grounds pro and con must be carefully balanced2 frequently1 however1 the degree of probability attained is so great that our assent is almost equivalent to complete certainty4 ,no one doubts1--although it is impossible for him to know1--that ,caesar conquered ,pompey1 that gold is ductile in ,australia as elsewhere1 that iron will sink to-morrow as well as to-day4 ,thus opinion supplements the lack of certain knowledge1 and serves as a guide for belief and action1 wherever the general lot of mankind or individual circumstances prevent absolute certitude4 ,although in this twilight region of opinion demonstrative proofs are replaced merely by an occasion for taking a given fact or idea as true rather than false1 yet assent is by no means an act of choice1 as the ,cartesians had erroneously maintained1 for in knowledge it is determined by clearly discerned reasons1 and in the sphere of opinion1 by the balance of probability4 ,the understanding is free only in combining ideas1 not in its judgment concerning the agreement or the repugnancy of the ideas compared2 it lies within its own power to decide whether it will judge at all1 and what ideas it will compare1 but it has no control over the result of the comparison2 it is impossible for it to refuse its assent to a demonstrated truth or a preponderant probability4 ,in this recognition of objective and universally valid relations existing among ideas1 which the thinking subject1 through comparisons voluntarily instituted1 discovers valid or finds given1 but which it can neither alter nor demur to1 ,locke abandons empirical ground 7cf4 p4 #aee7 and approaches the idealists of the ,platonizing type4 ,his inquiry divides into two very dissimilar parts 7a psychological description of the origin of ideas and a logical determination of the possibility and the extent of knowledge71 the latter of which is1 in ,locke's opinion1 compatible with the former1 but which could never have been developed from it4 ,the rationalistic edifice contradicts the sensationalistic foundation4 ,locke had hoped to show the value and the limits of knowledge by an inquiry into the origin of ideas1 but his estimate of this value and these limits cannot be proved from the a posteriori origin of ideas--it can only be maintained in despite of this1 and stands in need of support from some 7rationalistic7 principle elsewhere obtained4 ,thinkers who trace back all simple ideas to outer and inner perception we expect to reject every attempt to extend knowledge beyond the sphere of experience1 to declare the combinations of ideas which have their origin in sensation trustworthy1 and those which are formed without regard to perception1 illusory2 or else1 with ,protagoras1 to limit knowledge to the individual perceiving subject1 with a consequent complete denial of its general validity4 ,but exactly the opposite of all these is found in ,locke4 ,the remarkable spectacle is presented of a philosopher who admits no other sources of ideas than perception and the voluntary combination of perceptions1 transcending the limits of experience with proofs of the divine existence1 viewing with suspicion the ideas of substance formed at the instance of experience1 and reducing natural science to the sphere of mere opinion2 while1 on the other hand1 he ascribes reality and eternal validity to the combinations of ideas formed independently of perception1 which are employed by mathematics and ethics1 and completely abandons the individualistic position in his nave faith in the impregnable validity of the relations of ideas1 which is evident to all who turn their attention to them4 ,the ground for the universal validity of the relations among ideas as well as of our knowledge of them1 naturally lies not in their empirical origin 7for my experience gives information to me alone1 and that only concerning the particular case in question71 but in the uniformity of man's rational constitution4 ,if two men really have the same ideas--not merely think they have because they use similar language--it is impossible1 according to ,locke1 that they should hold different opinions concerning the relation of their ideas4 ,with this conviction1 that the universal validity of knowledge is rooted in the uniformity of man's rational constitution1 and the further one1 that we attain certain knowledge only when things conform to our ideas1 ,locke closely approaches ,kant2 while his assumption of a fixed order of relations among ideas1 which the individual understanding cannot refuse to recognize1 and the typical character assigned to mathematics1 associate him with ,malebranche and ,spinoza4 ,in view of these points of contact with the rationalistic school and his manifold dependence on its founder1 we may venture the paradox1 that ,locke may not only be termed a ,baconian with ,cartesian leanings1 but 7almost7 a ,cartesian influenced by ,bacon4 ,the possibility must not be forgotten1 however1 that rationalistic suggestions came to him also from ,galileo1 ,hobbes1 and ,newton4#a ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 the article by ,benno ,erdmann cited p4 #aef1 note4 ,intermediate between knowledge and opinion stands faith as a form of assent which is based on testimony rather than on deductions of the reason1 but whose certitude is not inferior to that of knowledge1 since it is a communication from ,god1 who can neither deceive nor be deceived4 ,faith and the certainty thereof depend on reason1 in so far as reason alone can determine whether a divine revelation has really been made and the meaning of the words in which the revelation has come down to us4 ,in determining the boundaries of faith and reason ,locke makes use of the distinction--which has become famous--between things above reason1 according to reason1 and contrary to reason4 ,our conviction that ,god exists is according to reason2 the belief that there are more gods than one1 or that a body can be in two different places at the same time1 contrary to reason2 the former is a truth which can be demonstrated on rational grounds1 the latter an assumption incompatible with our clear and distinct ideas4 ,in the one case revelation confirms a proposition of which we were already certain2 in the other an alleged revelation is incapable of depriving our certain knowledge of its force4 ,above reason are those principles whose probability and truth cannot be shown by the natural use of our faculties1 as that the dead shall rise again and the account of the fall of part of the angels4 ,among the things which are not contrary to reason belong miracles1 for they contradict opinion based on the usual course of nature1 it is true1 but not our certain knowledge2 in spite of their supernatural character they deserve willing acceptance1 and receive it1 when they are well attested1 whereas principles contrary to reason must be unconditionally rejected as a revelation from ,god4 ,locke's demand for the subjection of faith to rational criticism assures him an honorable place in the history of ,english deism4 ,he enriched the philosophy of religion by two treatises of his own3 ,the ,reasonableness of ,christianity1 #afie1 and three ,letters on ,tolerance1 #afhi-afib4 ,the former transfers the center of gravity of the ,christian religion from history to the doctrine of redemption2 the ,letters demand religious freedom1 mutual tolerance among the different sects1 and the separation of ,church and ,state4 ,those sects alone are to receive no tolerance which themselves exercise none1 and which endanger the well-being of society2 together with atheists1 who are incapable of taking oaths4 ,in other respects it is the duty of the state to protect all confessions and to favor none4 7b7 ,practical ,philosophy4--,locke contributed to practical philosophy important suggestions concerning freedom1 morality1 politics1 and education4 ,freedom is the power to begin or forbear1 continue or put an end to actions 7thoughts and motions74 ,it is not destroyed by the fact that the will is always moved by desire1 more exactly1 by uneasiness under present circumstances1 and that the decision is determined by the judgment of the understanding4 ,although the result of examination is itself dependent on the unalterable relations of ideas1 it is still in our power to decide whether we will consider at all1 and what ideas we will take into consideration4 ,not the thought1 not the determination of the will1 is free1 but the person1 the mind2 this has the power to suspend the prosecution of desire1 and by its judgment to determine the will1 even in opposition to inclination4 ,four stages must1 consequently1 be distinguished in the volitional process3 desire or uneasiness2 the deliberative combination of ideas2 the judgment of the understanding2 determination4 ,freedom has its place at the beginning of the second stage3 it is open to me to decide whether to proceed at all to consideration and final judgment concerning a proposed action2 thus to prevent desire from directly issuing in movements2 and1 according to the result of my examination1 perhaps1 to substitute for the act originally desired an opposite one4 ,without freedom1 moral judgment and responsibility would be impossible4 ,the above appears to us to represent the essence of ,locke's often vacillating discussion of freedom 7,,ii4 #ba74 ,desire is directed to pleasure2 the will obeys the understanding1 which is exalted above motives of pleasure and the passions4 ,everything is physically good which occasions and increases pleasure in us1 which removes or diminishes pain1 or contributes to the attainment of some other good and the avoidance of some other evil4 ,actions1 on the contrary1 are morally good when they conform to a rule by which they are judged4 ,whoever earnestly meditates on his welfare will prefer moral or rational good to sensuous good1 since the former alone vouchsafes true happiness4 ,god has most intimately united virtue and general happiness1 since he has made the preservation of human society dependent on the exercise of virtue4 ,the mark of a law for free beings is the fact that it apportions reward for obedience and punishment for disobedience4 ,the laws to which an action must conform in order to deserve the predicate good are three in number 7,,ii4 #bh73 by the divine law men judge whether their actions are sins or duties2 by the civil law1 whether they be criminal or innocent 7deserving of punishment or not72 by the law of opinion or reputation1 whether they be virtues or vices4 ,the first of these laws threatens immorality with future misery2 the second1 with legal punishments2 the third1 with the disapproval of our fellow-men4 ,the third law1 the law of opinion or reputation1 called also philosophical1 coincides on the whole1 though not throughout1 with the first1 the divine law of nature1 which is best expressed in ,christianity1 and which is the true touchstone of the moral character of actions4 ,while ,locke1 in his polemic against innate ideas1 had emphasized the diversity of moral judgments among individuals and nations 7as a result of which an action is condemned in one place and praised as virtuous in another71 he here gives prominence to the fact of general agreement in essentials1 since it is only natural that each should encourage by praise and esteem that which is to his advantage1 while virtue evidently conduces to the good of all who come into contact with the virtuous4 ,amid the greatest diversity of moral judgments virtue and praise1 vice and blame1 go together1 while in general that is praised which is really praiseworthy--even the vicious man approves the right and condemns that which is faulty1 at least in others4 ,locke was the first to call attention to general approval as an external mark of moral action1 a hint which the ,scottish moralists subsequently exploited4 ,the objection that he reduced morality to the level of the conventional is unjust1 for the law of opinion and reputation did not mean for him the true principle of morality1 but only that which controls the majority of mankind--,if anyone is inclined to doubt that commendation and disgrace are sufficient motives to action1 he does not understand mankind2 there is hardly one in ten thousand insensible enough to endure in quiet the constant disapproval of society4 ,even if the lawbreaker hopes to escape punishment at the hands of the state1 and puts out of mind the thought of future retribution1 he can never escape the disapproval of his misdeeds on the part of his fellows4 ,in entire harmony with these views is ,locke's advice to educators1 that they should early cultivate the love of esteem in their pupils4 ,of the four principles of morals which ,locke employs side by side1 and in alternation1 without determining their exact relations--the reason1 the will of ,god1 the general good 7and1 deduced from this1 the approval of our fellow-men71 self-love--the latter two possess only an accessory significance1 while the former two co-operate in such a way that the one determines the content of the good and the other confirms it and gives it binding authority4 ,the ,christian religion does the reason a threefold service--it gives her information concerning our duty1 which she could have reached herself1 indeed1 without the help of revelation1 but not with the same certitude and rapidity2 it invests the good with the majesty of absolute obligation by proclaiming it as the command of ,god2 it increases the motives to morality by its doctrines of immortality and future retribution4 ,although ,locke thus intimately joins virtue with earthly joy and eternal happiness1 and although he finds in the expectation of heaven or hell a welcome support for the will in its conflict with the passions1 we must remember that he values this regard for the results and rewards of virtue only as a subsidiary motive1 and does not esteem it as in itself ethical3 eternal happiness forms1 as it were1 the dowry of virtue1 which adds to its true value in the eyes of fools and the weak1 though it constitutes neither its essence nor its basis4 ,virtue seems to the wise man beautiful and valuable enough even without this1 and yet the commendations of philosophers gain for her but few wooers4 ,the crowd is attracted to her only when it is made clear to it that virtue is the best policy4 ,in politics ,locke is an opponent of both forms of absolutism1 the despotic absolutism of ,hobbes and the patriarchal absolutism of ,filmer 7died #afdg2 his ,patriarcha declared hereditary monarchy a divine institution71 and a moderate exponent of the liberal tendencies of ,milton 7#afjh-gd7 and ,algernon ,sidney 7died #afhc2 ,discourses concerning ,government74 ,the two ,treatises on ,civil ,government1 #afij1 develop1 the first negatively1 the second positively1 the constitutional theory with direct reference to the political condition of ,england at the time4 ,all men are born free and with like capacities and rights4 ,each is to preserve his own interests1 without injuring those of others4 ,the right to be treated by every man as a rational being holds even prior to the founding of the state2 but then there is no authoritative power to decide conflicts4 ,the state of nature is not in itself a state of war1 but it would lead to this1 if each man should himself attempt to exercise the right of self-protection against injury4 ,in order to prevent acts of violence there is needed a civil community1 based on a free contract1 to which each individual member shall transfer his freedom and power4 ,submission to the authority of the state is a free act1 and1 by the contract made1 natural rights are guarded1 not destroyed2 political freedom is obedience to self-imposed law1 subordination to the common will expressing itself in the majority4 ,the political power is neither tyrannical1 for arbitrary rule is no better than the state of nature1 nor paternal1 for rulers and subjects are on an equality in the use of the reason1 which is not the case with parents and children4 ,the supreme power is the legislative1 intrusted by the community to its chosen representatives--the laws should aim at the general good4 ,subordinate to the legislative power1 and to be kept separate from it1 come the two executing powers1 which are best united in a single hand 7the king71 viz41 the executive power 7administrative and judicial71 which carries the laws into effect1 and the federative power1 which defends the community against external foes4 ,the ruler is subject to the law4 ,if the government1 through violation of the law1 has become unworthy of the power intrusted to it1 and has forfeited it1 sovereign authority reverts to the source whence it was derived1 that is1 to the people4 ,the people decides whether its representatives and the monarch have deserved the confidence placed in them1 and has the right to depose them1 if they exceed their authority4 ,as the sworn obedience 7of the subjects7 is to the law alone1 the ruler who acts contrary to law has lost the right to govern1 has put himself in a state of hostility to the people1 and revolution becomes merely necessary defense against aggression4 ,montesquieu made these political ideas of ,locke the common property of ,europe4#a ,rousseau did a like service for ,locke's pedagogical views1 given in the modest but important ,thoughts concerning ,education1 #afic4 ,the aim of education should not be to instill anything into the pupil1 but to develop everything from him2 it should guide and not master him1 should develop his capacities in a natural way1 should rouse him to independence1 not drill him into a scholar4 ,in order to these ends thorough and affectionate consideration of his individuality is requisite1 and private instruction is1 therefore1 to be preferred to public instruction4 ,since it is the business of education to make men useful members of society1 it must not neglect their physical development4 ,learning through play and object teaching make the child's task a delight2 modern languages are to be learned more by practice than by systematic study4 ,the chief difference between ,locke and ,rousseau is that the former sets great value on arousing the sense of esteem1 while the latter entirely rejects this as an educational instrument4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,theod4 ,pietsch1 ,ueber das ,verhltniss der politischen ,theorien ,lockes zu ,montesquieus ,lehre von der ,teilung der ,gewalten ,berlin dissertation1 ,breslau1 #ahhg4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,english ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century4 ,besides the theory of knowledge1 which forms the central doctrine in his system1 ,locke had discussed the remaining branches of philosophy1 though in less detail1 and1 by his many-sided stimulation1 had posited problems for the ,illumination movement in ,england and in ,france4 ,now the several disciplines take different courses1 but the after-influence of his powerful mind is felt on every hand4 ,the development of deism from ,toland on is under the direct influence of his rational ,christianity2 the ethics of ,shaftesbury stands in polemic relation to his denial of everything innate2 and while ,berkeley and ,hume are deducing the consequences of his theory of knowledge1 ,hartley derives the impulse to a new form of psychology from his chapter on the association of ideas4 #a4 ,natural ,philosophy and ,psychology4 ,in ,locke's famous countryman1 ,isaac ,newton 7#afdb-agbg71a the modern investigation of nature attains the level toward which it had striven1 at first by wishes and demands1 gradually1 also1 in knowledge and achievement1 since the end of the mediaeval period4 ,mankind was not able to discard at a stroke its accustomed ,aristotelian view of nature1 which animated things with inner1 spirit-like forces4 ,a full century intervened between ,telesius and ,newton1 the concept of natural law requiring so long a time to break out of its shell4 ,a tremendous revolution in opinion had to be effected before ,newton could calmly promulgate his great principle1 ,abandon substantial forms and occult qualities and reduce natural phenomena to mathematical laws1 before he could crown the discoveries of ,galileo and ,kepler with his own4 ,for this successful union of ,bacon's experimental induction with the mathematical deduction of ,descartes1 this combination of the analytic and the synthetic methods1 which was shown in the demand for1 and the establishment of1 mathematically formulated natural laws1 presupposes that nature is deprived of all inner life #b and all qualitative distinctions1 that all that exists is compounded of uniformly acting parts1 and that all that takes place is conceived as motion4 ,with this ,hobbes's programme of a mechanical science of nature is fulfilled4 ,the heavens and the earth are made subject to the same law of gravitation4 ,how far ,newton himself adhered to the narrow meaning of mechanism 7motion from pressure and impulse71 is evident from the fact that1 though he is often honored as the creator of the dynamical view of nature1 he rejected actio in distans as absurd1 and deemed it indispensable to assume some cause of gravity 7consisting1 probably1 in the impact of imponderable material particles74 ,it was his disciples who first ventured to proclaim gravity as the universal force of matter1 as the primary quality of all bodies 7so ,roger ,cotes in the preface to the second edition of the ,principia1 #agac74 ,footnote #a3 #affi-ie professor of mathematics in ,cambridge1 later resident in ,london2 #afgb1 member1 and1 #agjc1 president of the ,royal ,society4 ,chief work1 ,philosophic ,naturalis ,principia ,mathematica1 #afhg4 ,works1 #aggi seq4 ,on ,newton cf4 ,k4 ,snell1 #ahdc2 ,durdik1 ,leibniz und ,newton1 #ahfi2 ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism1 vol4 i4 p4 #cjf seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,that the mathematical view of nature1 since it leaves room for quantitative distinctions alone1 is equivalent to an examination of nature had been clearly recognized by ,poiret4 ,as he significantly remarked3 ,the principles of the ,cartesian physics relate merely to the cadaver of nature 7,erud41 p4 #bfj74 ,newton resembles ,boyle in uniting profound piety with the rigor of scientific thought4 ,he finds the most certain proof for the existence of an intelligent creator in the wonderful arrangement of the world-machine1 which does not need after-adjustment at the hands of its creator1 and whose adaptation he praises as enthusiastically as he unconditionally rejects the mingling of teleological considerations in the explanation of physical phenomena4 ,by this physico-theological argument he furnishes a welcome support to deism4 ,while the finite mind perceives in the sensorium of the brain the images of objects which come to it from the senses1 ,god has all things in himself1 is immediately present in all1 and cognizes them without sense-organs1 the expanse of the universe forming his sensorium4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the transfer of mechanical views to psychical phenomena was also accompanied by the conviction that no danger to faith in ,god would result therefrom1 but rather that it would aid in its support4 ,the chief representatives of this movement1 which followed the example of ,gay1 were the physician1 ,david ,hartley#a 7#agjd-eg71 and his pupil1 ,joseph ,priestley1#b a dissenting minister and natural scientist 7born #agcc1 died in ,philadelphia #ahjd2 the discoverer of oxygen gas1 #aggd74 ,the fundamental position of these psychologists is expressed in two principles3 7#a7 all cognitive and motive life is based on the mechanism of psychical elements1 the highest and most complex inner phenomena 7thoughts1 feelings1 volitions7 are produced by the combination of simple ideas1 that is1 they arise through the association of ideas 2 7#b7 all inner phenomena1 the complex as well as the simple1 are accompanied by1 or rather depend on1 more or less complicated physical phenomena1 viz41 nervous processes and brain vibrations4 ,although ,hartley and ,priestley are agreed in their demand for an associational and physiological treatment of psychology1 and in the attempt to give one1 they differ in this1 that ,hartley cautiously speaks only of a parallelism1 a correspondence between mental and cerebral processes1 and rejects the materialistic interpretation of inner phenomena1 pointing out that the heterogeneity of motion and ideas forbids the reduction of the latter to the former1 and that psychological analysis never reaches corporeal but only psychical elements4 ,moreover1 it is only with reluctance that1 conscious of the critical character of the conclusion1 he admits the dependence of brain vibrations on the mechanical laws of the material world and the thoroughgoing determinateness of the human will1 consoling himself with the belief that moral responsibility nevertheless remains intact4 ,priestley1 on the contrary1 boldly avows the materialistic and deterministic consequences of his position1 holds that psychical phenomena are not merely accompanied by material motions but consist in them 7thought is a function of the brain71 and makes psychology1 as the physics of the nerves1 a part of physiology4 ,the denial of immortality and the divine origin of the world is1 however1 by no means to follow from materialism4 ,priestley not only combated the atheism of ,holbach1 but also entered the deistic ranks with works of his own on ,natural ,religion and the ,corruptions of ,christianity4 ,footnote #a3 ,hartley1 ,observations on ,man1 his ,frame1 his ,duties1 his ,expectations4 #agdi4 ,footnote #b3 ,priestley1 ,hartley's ,theory of the ,human ,mind on the ,principles of the ,association of ,ideas1 #agge2 ,disquisitions relating to ,matter and ,spirit1 #aggg2 ,the ,doctrine of ,philosophical ,necessity1 #aggg2 ,free ,discussions of the ,doctrines of ,materialism1 #aggh 7against ,richard ,price's ,letters on ,materialism and ,philosophical ,necessity74 ,cf4 on both ,schoenlank's dissertation1 ,hartley und ,priestley1 die ,begrnder des ,assoziationismus in ,england1 #ahhb4 ,as early as in ,hartley#a the principle1 which is so important for ethics1 appears that things and actions 7e4g41 promotion of the good of others7 which at first are sought and done because they are means to our own enjoyment1 in time come to have a direct worth of their own1 apart from the original egoistic end4 ,james ,mill 7#ahbi7 has repeated this thought in later times4 ,as fame becomes an immediate object of desire to the ambitious man1 and gold to the miser1 so1 through association1 the impulse toward that which will secure approval may be transformed into the endeavor after that which deserves approval4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,jodl1 ,geschichte der ,ethik1 vol4 i4 p4 #aig seq4 ,among later representatives of the ,associational school we may mention ,erasmus ,darwin 7,zonomia1 or the ,laws of ,organic ,life1 #agid-if74 #b4 ,deism4 ,as ,bacon and ,descartes had freed natural science1 ,hobbes1 the state1 and ,grotius1 law from the authority of the ,church and had placed them on an independent basis1 i4e41 the basis of nature and reason1 so deism#a seeks to free religion from ,church dogma and blind historical faith1 and to deduce it from natural knowledge4 ,in so far as deism finds both the source and the test of true religion in reason1 it is rationalism2 in so far as it appeals from the supernatural light of revelation and inspiration to the natural light of reason1 it is naturalism2 in so far as revelation and its records are not only not allowed to restrict rational criticism1 but are made the chief object of criticism1 its adherents are freethinkers4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,lechler's ,geschichte des ,englischen ,deismus1 #ahda1 which is rigorously drawn from the sources4 ,hunt1 ,history of ,religious ,thought in ,england1 #ahga-gc #ahhd2 ,leslie ,stephen1 ,history of ,english ,thought in the ,eighteenth ,century1 #ahgf #ahhj2 ,cairns1 ,unbelief in the ,eighteenth ,century1 #ahha4 ,the general principles of deism may be compressed into a few theses4 ,there is a natural religion1 whose essential content is morality2 this comprises not much more than the two maxims1 ,believe in ,god and ,do your duty4 ,positive religions are to be judged by this standard4 ,the elements in them which are added to natural religion1 or conflict with it1 are superfluous and harmful additions1 arbitrary decrees of men1 the work of cunning rulers and deceitful priests4 ,christianity1 which in its original form was the perfect expression of the true religion of reason1 has experienced great corruptions in its ecclesiastical development1 from which it must now be purified4 ,these principles are supported by the following arguments3 ,truth is one and there is but one true religion4 ,if the happiness of men depends on the fulfilment of her commands1 these must be comprehensible to every man and must have been communicated to him2 and since a special revelation and legislation could not come to the knowledge of all1 they can be no other than the laws of duty inscribed on the human heart4 ,in order to salvation1 then1 we need only to know ,god as creator and judge1 and to fulfill his commands1 i4e44 to live a moral life4 ,the one true religion has been communicated to man in two forms1 through the inner natural revelation of reason1 and the outer historical revelation of the ,gospel4 ,since both have come from ,god they cannot be contradictory4 ,accordingly natural religion and the true one among the positive religions do not differ in their content1 but only in the manner of their promulgation4 ,reason tries historical religion by the standard furnished by natural religion1 and distinguishes actual from asserted revelation by the harmony of its contents with reason3 the deist believes in the ,bible because of the reasonableness of its teachings2 he does not hold these teachings true because they are found in the ,bible4 ,if a positive religion contains less than natural religion it is incomplete2 if it contains more it is tyrannical1 since it imposes unnecessary requirements4 ,the authority of reason to exercise the office of a judge in regard to the credibility of revelation is beyond doubt2 indeed1 apart from it there is no means of attaining truth1 and the acceptance of an external revelation as genuine1 and not merely as alleged to be such1 is possible only for those who have already been convinced of ,god's existence by the inner light of reason4 ,to these logical considerations is added an historical position1 which1 though only cursorily indicated at the beginning1 is evidenced in increasing detail as the deistic movement continues on its course4 ,natural religion is always and everywhere the same1 is universal and necessary1 is perfect1 eternal1 and original4 ,as original1 it is the earliest religion1 and as old as the world2 as perfect1 it is not capable of improvement1 but only of corruption and restoration4 ,twice it has existed in perfect purity1 as the religion of the first men and as the religion of ,christ4 ,twice it has been corrupted1 in the pre-,christian period by idolatry1 which proceeded from the ,egyptian worship of the dead1 in the period after ,christ by the love of miracle and blind reverence for authority4 ,in both cases the corruption has come from power-loving priests1 who have sought to frighten and control the people by incomprehensible dogmas and ostentations1 mysterious ceremonies1 and found their advantage in the superstition of the multitude1--each new divinity1 each new mystery meaning a gain for them4 ,as they had corrupted the primitive religion into polytheism1 so ,christianity was corrupted by conforming it to the prejudices of those to be converted1 in whose eyes the simplicity of the new doctrine would have been no recommendation for it4 ,the ,jew sought in it an echo of the ,law1 the heathen longed for his festivals and his occult philosophy2 so it was burdened with unprofitable ceremonial observances and needless profundity1 it was ,judaized and heathenized4 ,it was inevitable that the doctrines of original sin1 of satisfaction and atonement should prove especially objectionable to the purely rational temper of the deists4 ,neither the guilt of others 7the sin of our ancestors7 nor the atonement of others 7,christ's death on the cross7 can be imputed to us2 ,christ can be called the ,savior only by way of metaphor1 only in so far as the example of his death leads us on to faith and obedience for ourselves4 ,the name atheism1 which1 it is true1 orthodoxy held ready for every belief incorrect according to its standard1 was on the contrary undeserved4 ,the deists did not attack ,christian revelation1 still less belief in ,god4 ,they considered the atheist bereft of reason1 and they by no means esteemed historical revelation superfluous4 ,the end of the latter was to stir the mind to move men to reflection and conversion1 to transform morals1 and if anyone declared it unnecessary because it contains nothing but natural truths1 he was referred to the works of ,euclid1 which certainly contain nothing which is not founded in the reason1 but which no one but a fool will consider unnecessary in the study of mathematics4 ,that which we have here summarized as the general position of deism1 gained gradual expression through the regular development and specialization of deistic ideas in individual representatives of the movement4 ,the chief points and epochs were marked by ,toland's ,christianity not ,mysterious1 #afif2 ,collins's ,discourse of ,freethinking1 #agac2 ,tindal's ,christianity as ,old as the ,creation1 #agcj2 and ,chubb's ,true ,gospel of ,jesus ,christ1 #agch4 ,the first of these demands a critique of revelation1 the second defends the right of free investigation1 the third declares the religion of ,christ1 which is merely a revived natural religion1 to be the oldest religion1 the fourth reduces it entirely to moral life4 ,the deistic movement was called into life by ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury 7pp4 #gi-hj7 and continued by ,locke1 in so far as the latter had intrusted to reason the discrimination of true from false revelation1 and had admitted in ,christianity elements above reason1 though not things contrary to reason4 ,following ,locke1 ,john ,toland 7#afgj-agbb7 goes a step further with the proof that the ,gospel not only contains nothing contrary to reason1 but also nothing above reason1 and that no ,christian doctrine is to be called mysterious4 ,to the demand that we should worship what we do not comprehend1 he answers that reason is the only basis of certitude1 and alone decides on the divinity of the ,scriptures1 by a consideration of their contents4 ,the motive which impels us to assent to a truth must lie in reason1 not in revelation1 which1 like all authority and experience1 is merely the way by which we attain the knowledge of the truth2 it is a means of instruction1 not a ground of conviction4 ,all faith has knowledge and understanding for its conditions1 and is rational conviction4 ,before we can put our trust in the ,scriptures1 we must be convinced that they were in fact written by the authors to whom they are ascribed1 and must consider whether these men1 their deeds1 and their works1 were worthy of ,god4 ,the fact that ,god's inmost being is for us inscrutable does not make him a mystery1 for even the common things of nature are known to us only by their properties4 ,miracles are also in themselves nothing incomprehensible2 they are simply enhancements of natural laws beyond their ordinary operations1 by supernatural assistance1 which ,god vouchsafes but rarely and only for extraordinary ends4 ,toland explains the mysteries smuggled into the ethical religion of ,christianity as due to the toleration of ,jewish and heathen customs1 to the entrance of learned speculation1 and to the selfish inventions of the clergy and the rulers4 ,the ,reformation itself had not entirely restored the original purity and simplicity4 ,thus far ,toland the deist4 ,in his later writings1 the five ,letters to ,serena1 #agjd1 addressed to the ,prussian queen1 ,sophia ,charlotte1 and the ,pantheisticon 7,cosmopoli1 #agbj71 he advances toward a hylozoistic pantheism4 ,the first of the ,letters discusses the prejudices of mankind2 the second1 the heathen doctrine of immortality2 the third1 the origin of idolatry2 while the fourth and fifth are devoted to ,spinoza1 the chief defect in whose philosophy is declared to be the absence of an explanation of motion4 ,motion belongs to the notion of matter as necessarily as extension and impenetrability4 ,matter is always in motion2 rest is only the reciprocal interference of two moving forces4 ,the differences of things depend on the various movements of the particles of matter1 so that it is motion which individualizes matter in general into particular things4 ,as the ,letters ascribe the purposive construction of organic beings to a divine reason1 so the ,pantheisticon also stops short before it reaches the extreme of naked materialism4 ,everything is from the whole2 the whole is infinite1 one1 eternal1 all-rational4 ,god is the force of the whole1 the soul of the world1 the law of nature4 ,the treatise includes a liturgy of the pantheistic society with many quotations from the ancient poets4 ,anthony ,collins 7#afgf-agbi71 in his ,discourse of ,free-thinking1 shows the right of free thought 7i4 e41 of judgment on rational grounds7 in general1 from the principle that no truth is forbidden to us1 and that there is no other way by which we can attain truth and free ourselves from superstition1 and the right to apply it to ,god and the ,bible in particular1 from the fact that the clergy differ concerning the most important matters4 ,the fear that the differences of opinion which spring from freethinking may endanger the peace of society lacks foundation2 on the contrary1 it is only restriction of the freedom of thought which leads to disorders1 by weakening moral zeal4 ,the clergy are the only ones who condemn liberty of thought4 ,it is sacrilege to hold that error can be beneficial and truth harmful4 ,as a proof that freethinking by no means corrupts character1 ,collins gives in conclusion a list of noble freethinkers from ,socrates down to ,locke and ,tillotson4 ,among the replies to the views of ,collins we may mention the calmly objective ,boyle ,lectures by ,ibbot1 and the sharp and witty letter of ,richard ,bentley1 the philologist4 ,neither of these attacks ,collins's leading principle1 both fully admitting the right to employ the reason1 even in religious questions2 but they dispute the implication that freethinking is equivalent to contentious opposition4 ,on the one hand1 they maintain that ,collins's thinking is too free1 that is1 unbridled1 hasty1 presumptuous1 and paradoxical2 on the other1 that it is not free enough 7from prejudice74 ,after ,shaftesbury had based morality on a natural instinct for the beautiful and had made it independent of religion1 as well as served the cause of free thought by a keenly ironical campaign against enthusiasm and orthodoxy1 and ,clarke had furnished the representatives of natural religion a useful principle of morals in the objective rationality of things1 the debate concerning prophecy and miracles#a threatened to dissipate the deistic movement into scattered theological skirmishes4 ,at this juncture ,matthew ,tindal 7#afeg-agcc7 led it back to the main question4 ,his ,christianity as ,old as the ,creation is the doomsday book of deism4 ,it contains all that has been given above as the core of this view of religion4 ,christ came not to bring in a new doctrine1 but to exhort to repentance and atonement1 and to restore the law of nature1 which is as old as the creation1 as universal as reason1 and as unchangeable as ,god1 human nature1 and the relations of things1 which we should respect in our actions4 ,religion is morality2 more exactly1 it is the free1 constant disposition to do as much good as possible1 and thereby to promote the glory of ,god and our own welfare4 ,for the harmony of our conduct with the rules of reason constitutes our perfection1 and on this depends our happiness4 ,since ,god is infinitely blessed and self-sufficient his purpose in the moral law is man's happiness alone4 ,whatever a positive religion contains beyond the moral law is superstition1 which puts emphasis on worthless trivialities4 ,the true religion occupies the happy mean between miserable unfaith1 on the one hand1 and timorous superstition1 wild fanaticism1 and pietistical zeal on the other4 ,in proclaiming the sovereignty of reason in the sphere of religion as well as elsewhere1 we are only openly demanding what our opponents have tacitly acknowledged in practice 7e4 g4 in allegorical interpretation7 from time immemorial4 ,god has endowed us with reason in order that we should by it distinguish truth from falsehood4 ,footnote #a3 ,the chief combatant in the conflict over the argument from prophecy1 which was called forth by ,whiston's corruption hypothesis1 was ,collins 7,a ,discourse of the ,grounds and ,reasons of the ,christian ,religion1 #agbd74 ,christianity is based on ,judaism2 its fundamental article is that ,jesus is the prophesied ,messiah of the ,jews1 its chief proof the argument from ,old ,testament prophecy1 which1 it is true1 depends on the typical or allegorical interpretation of the passages in question4 ,whoever rejects this cuts away the ground from under the ,christian revelation1 which is only the allegorical import of the revelation of the ,jews4--,the second proof of revelation1 the argument from miracles1 was shaken by ,thomas ,woolston 7,six ,discourses on the ,miracles of our ,saviour1 #agbg-cj71 by his extension of the allegorical interpretation to these also4 ,he supported himself in this by the authority of the ,church ,fathers1 and1 above all1 by the argument that the accounts of the miracles1 if taken literally1 contradict all sense and understanding4 ,the unavoidable doubts which arise concerning the literal interpretation of the resurrection of the dead1 the healing of the sick1 the driving out of devils1 and the other miracles1 prove that these were intended only as symbolic representations of the mysterious and wonderful effects which ,jesus was to accomplish4 ,thus ,jairus's daughter means the ,jewish ,church1 which is to be revived at the second coming of ,christ2 ,lazarus typifies humanity1 which will be raised again at the last day2 the account of the bodily resurrection of ,jesus is a symbol of his spiritual resurrection from his grave in the letter of ,scripture4 ,sherlock1 whose ,trial of the ,witnesses of the ,resurrection of ,jesus was long considered a cogent answer to the attacks of ,woolston1 was opposed by ,peter ,annet1 who1 without leaving the refuge of figurative interpretation open1 proceeded still more regardlessly in the discovery of contradictory and incredible elements in the ,gospel reports1 and declared all the scriptural writers together to be liars and falsifiers4 ,if a man believes in miracles as supernatural interferences with the regular course of nature 7and they must be so taken if they are to certify to the divine origin of the ,scriptures71 he makes ,god mutable1 and natural laws imperfect arrangements which stand in need of correction4 ,the truth of religion is independent of all history4 ,thomas ,chubb 7#afgi-agdg71 a man of the people 7he was a glove maker and tallow-chandler71 and from #agae on a participant in deistic literature and concerned to adapt the new ideas to the men of his class1 preached in ,the ,true ,gospel of ,jesus ,christ an honorable working-man's ,christianity41 ,faith means obedience to the law of reason inculcated by ,christ1 not the acceptance of the facts reported about him4 ,the gospel of ,christ was preached to the poor before his death and his asserted resurrection and ascension4 ,it is probable that ,christ really lived1 because of the great effect of his message2 but he was a man like other men4 ,his gospel is his teaching1 not his history1 his own teaching1 not that of his followers--the reflections of the apostles are private opinions4 ,christ's teaching amounts1 in effect1 to these three fundamental principles3 7#a7 ,conform to the rational law of love to ,god and one's neighbor2 this is the only ground of divine acceptance4 7#b7 ,after transgression of the law1 repentance and reformation are the only grounds of divine grace and forgiveness4 7#c7 ,at the last day every one will be rewarded according to his works4 ,by proclaiming these doctrines1 by carrying them out in his own pure life and typical death1 and by founding religio-ethical associations on the principle of brotherly equality1 ,christ selected the means best fitted for the attainment of his purpose1 the salvation of human souls4 ,his aim was to assure men of future happiness 7and of the earthly happiness connected therewith71 and to make them worthy of it2 and this happiness can only be attained when from free conviction we submit ourselves to the natural moral law1 which is grounded on the moral fitness of things4 ,everything which leads to the illusion that the favor of ,god is attainable by any other means than by righteousness and repentance1 is pernicious2 as1 also1 the confusion of ,christian societies with legal and civil societies1 which pursue entirely different aims4 ,thomas ,morgan 7,the ,moral ,philosopher1 a ,dialogue between the ,christian ,deist1 ,philalethes1 and the ,christian ,jew1 ,theophanes1 #agcg seq47 stands on the same ground as his predecessors1 by holding that the moral truth of things is the criterion of the divinity of a doctrine1 that the ,christian religion is merely a restoration of natural religion1 and that the apostles were not infallible4 ,peculiar to him are the application of the first of these principles to the ,mosaic law1 with the conclusion that this was not a revelation2 the complete separation of the ,new ,testament from the ,old 7the ,church of ,christ and the expected kingdom of the ,jewish ,messiah are as opposed to each other as heaven and earth72 and the endeavor to give a more exact explanation of the origin of superstition1 the pre-,christian manifestations of which he traces back to the fall of the angels1 and those since ,christ to the intermixture of ,jewish elements4 ,he seeks to solve his problem by a detailed critique of ,israelitish history1 which is lacking in sympathy but not in spirit1 and in which1 introducing modern relations into the earliest times1 he explains the ,old ,testament miracles in part as myths1 in part as natural phenomena1 and deprives the heroes of the ,jews of their moral renown4 ,the ,jewish historians are ranked among the poets2 the ,god of ,israel is reduced to a subordinate1 local tutelary divinity2 the moral law of ,moses is characterized as a civil code limited to external conduct1 to national and mundane affairs1 with merely temporal sanctions1 and the ceremonial law as an act of worldly statecraft2 ,david is declared a gifted poet1 musician1 hypocrite1 and coward2 the prophets are made professors of theology and moral philosophy2 and ,paul is praised as the greatest freethinker of his time1 who defended reason against authority and rejected the ,jewish ritual law as indifferent4 ,whatever is spurious in ,christianity is a remnant of ,judaism1 all its mysteries are misunderstood and falsely 7i4e4 literally7 applied allegories4 ,out of regard for ,jewish prejudices ,christ's death was figuratively described as sacrificial1 as in earlier times ,moses had been forced to yield to the ,egyptian superstitions of his people4 ,morgan looks for the final victory of the rational morality of the pure1 ,pauline1 or deistic ,christianity over the ,jewish ,christianity of orthodoxy4 ,among the works of his opponents the following deserve mention3 ,william ,warburton's ,divine ,legation of ,moses1 and ,samuel ,chandler's ,vindication of the ,history of the ,old ,testament4 ,it maybe doubted whether ,bolingbroke 7died #agea2 cf4 p4 #bjc7 is to be classed among the deists or among their opponents4 ,on the one hand1 he finds in monotheism the original true religion1 which has degenerated into superstition through priestly cunning and fantastical philosophy2 in primitive ,christianity1 the system of natural religion1 which has been transformed into a complicated and contentious science by its weak1 foolish1 or deceitful adherents2 in theology1 the corruption of religion2 in ,bacon1 ,descartes1 and ,locke1 types of untrammeled investigation4 ,on the other hand1 he seeks to protect revelation from the reason whose cultivation he has just commended1 and to keep faith and knowledge distinct1 while he demands that the ,bible1 with all the undemonstrable and absurd elements which it contains1 be accepted on its own authority4 ,religion is an instrument indispensable to the government for keeping the people in subjection4 ,only the fear of a higher power1 not the reason1 holds the masses in check2 and the freethinkers do wrong in taking a bit out of the mouth of the sensual multitude1 when it were better to add to those already there4 ,as ,hume1 the skeptic1 leads empiricism to its fall1 so ,hume1 the philosopher of religion 7see below71 leads deism toward dissolution4 ,among those who defended revealed ,christianity against the deistical attacks we may mention the names of ,conybeare 7#agcb7 and ,joseph ,butler 7#agcf74 ,the former argues from the imperfection and mutability of our reason to like characteristics in natural religion4 ,butler 7cf4 p4 #bjf7 does not admit that natural and revealed religion are mutually exclusive4 ,christian revelation lends a higher authority to natural religion1 in which she finds her foundation1 and adapts it to the given relations and needs of mankind1 adding1 however1 to the rational law of virtue new duties toward ,god the ,son and ,god the ,holy ,ghost4 ,it is evident that in order to be able to deal with their opponents1 the apologetes are forced to accommodate themselves to the deistic principle of a rational criticism of revelation4 ,notwithstanding the fear which this principle inspired in the men of the time1 it soon penetrated the thought even of its opponents1 and found its way into the popular mind through the channels of the ,illumination4 ,although it was often defended and applied with violence and with a superfluous hatred of the clergy1 it forms the justifiable element in the endeavors of the deists4 ,it is a commonplace to-day that everything which claims to be true and valid must justify itself before the criticism of reason2 but then this principle1 together with the distinction between natural and positive religion based upon it1 exerted an enlightening and liberating influence4 ,the real flaw in the deistical theory1 which was scarcely felt as such1 even by its opponents1 was its lack of religious feeling and all historical sense1 a lack which rendered the idea acceptable that religions could be made1 and priestly falsehoods become world-moving forces4 ,hume was the first to seek to rise above this unspeakable shallowness4 ,there was a remarkable conflict between the ascription to man1 on the one hand1 of an assured treasure of religious knowledge in the reason1 and the abandonment of him1 on the other1 to the juggling of cunning priests and despots4 ,thus the deists had no sense either for the peculiarities of an inward religious feeling1 which1 in happy prescience1 rises above the earthly circle of moral duties to the world beyond1 or for the involuntary1 historically necessary origin and growth of the particular forms of religion4 ,here1 again1 we find that turning away from will and feeling to thought1 from history to nature1 from the oppressive complexity of that which has been developed to the simplicity of that which is original1 which we have noted as one of the most prominent characteristics of the modern period4 #c4 ,moral ,philosophy4 ,the watchword of deism was independence in religion2 that of modern ethical philosophy is independence in morals4 ,hobbes had given this out in opposition to the mediaeval dependence of ethics on theology2 now it was turned against himself1 for he had delivered morality from ecclesiastical bondage only to subject it to the no less oppressive and unworthy yoke of the civil power4 ,selfish consideration1 so he had taught1 leads men to transfer by contract all power to the ruler4 ,right is that which the sovereign enjoins1 wrong that which he forbids4 ,thus morality was conceived in a purely negative way as justice1 and based on interest and agreement4 ,cumberland1 recognizing the one-sidedness of the first of these positions1 announces the principle of universal benevolence1 at which ,bacon had hinted before him1 and in which he is followed by the school of ,shaftesbury4 ,opposition to the foundation of ethics on self-love and convention1 again1 springs up in three forms1 one idealistic1 one logical1 and one aesthetic4 ,ethical ideas have not arisen artificially through shrewd calculation and agreement1 but have a natural origin4 ,cudworth1 returning to ,plato and ,descartes1 assumes an innate idea of the good4 ,clarke and ,woolston base moral distinctions on the rational order of things1 and characterize the ethically good action as a logical truth translated into practice4 ,shaftesbury derives ethical ideas and actions from a natural instinct for judging the good and the beautiful4 ,moreover1 ,hobbes's ethics of interest experiences1 first1 correction at the hands of ,locke 7who1 along with a complete recognition of the legal character of the good1 distinguishes the sphere of morality from that of mere law1 and brings it under the law of reputation1 hence of a tacit agreement71 and then a frivolous intensification under ,mandeville and ,bolingbroke4 ,a preliminary conclusion is reached in the ethical labors of ,hume and ,smith4 ,richard ,cumberland 7,de ,legibus ,naturae1 #afgb7 turns to experience with the questions1 ,in what does morality consist8 ,whence does it arise8 and ,what is the nature of moral obligation8 and finds these answers3 ,those actions are good1 or in conformity to the moral law of nature1 which promote the common good 7commune bonum summa lex74 ,individual welfare must be subordinated to the good of all1 of which it forms only a part4 ,the psychological roots of virtuous action are the social and disinterested affections1 which nature has implanted in all beings1 especially in those endowed with reason4 ,there is nothing in man more pleasing to ,god than love4 ,we recognize our obligation to the virtue of benevolence1 or that ,god commands it1 from the rewards and punishments which we perceive to follow the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the law1--the subordination of individual to universal good is the only means of attaining true happiness and contentment4 ,men are dependent on mutual benevolence4 ,he who labors for the good of the whole system of rational beings furthers thereby the welfare of the individual parts1 among whom he himself is one2 individual happiness cannot be separated from general happiness4 ,all duties are implied in the supreme one3 ,give to others1 and preserve thyself4 ,this principle of benevolence1 advanced by ,cumberland with homely simplicity1 received in the later development of ,english ethics1 for which it pointed out the way1 a more careful foundation4 ,the series of emancipations of morality begins with the ,intellectual ,system of ,ralph ,cud worth 7,the ,intellectual ,system of the ,universe1 #afgh2 ,a ,treatise concerning ,eternal and ,immutable ,morality1 #agca74 ,ethical ideas come neither from experience nor from civil legislation nor from the will of ,god1 but are necessary ideas in the divine and the human reason4 ,because of their simplicity1 universality1 and immutability1 it is impossible for them to arise from experience1 which never yields anything but that which is particular and mutable4 ,it is just as impossible that they should spring from political constitutions1 which have a temporal origin1 which are transitory1 and which differ from one another4 ,for if obedience to positive law is right and disobedience wrong1 then moral distinctions must have existed before the law2 if1 on the other hand1 obedience to the civil law is morally indifferent1 then more than ever is it impossible that this should be the basis of the moral distinctions in question4 ,a law can bind us only in virtue of that which is necessarily1 absolutely1 or per se right2 therefore the good is independent1 also1 of the will of ,god4 ,the absolutely good is an eternal truth which ,god does not create by an act of his will1 but which he finds present in his reason1 and which1 like the other ideas1 he impresses on created spirits4 ,on the a priori ideas depends the possibility of science1 for knowledge is the perception of necessary truth4 ,in agreement with ,cudworth that the moral law is dependent neither on human compact nor on the divine will1 ,samuel ,clarke 7died #agbi7 finds the eternal principles of justice1 goodness1 and truth1 which ,god observes in his government of the universe1 and which should also be the guide of human action1 embodied in the nature of things or in their properties1 powers1 and relations1 in virtue of which certain things1 relations1 and modes of action are suited to one another1 and others not4 ,morality is the subjective conformity of conduct to this objective fitness of things2 the good is the fitting4 ,moral rules1 to which we are bound by conscience and by rational insight1 are valid independently of the command of ,god and of all hope or fear in reference to the life to come1 although the principles of religion furnish them an effective support1 and one which is almost indispensable in view of the weakness of human nature4 ,they are not universally observed1 indeed1 but universally acknowledged2 even the vicious man cannot refrain from praising virtue in others4 ,he who is induced by the voice of passion to act contrary to the eternal relations or harmony of things1 contradicts his own reason in thus undertaking to disturb the order of the universe2 he commits the absurdity of willing that things should be that which they are not4 ,injustice is in practice that which falsity and contradiction are in theoretical affairs4 ,in his well-known controversy with ,leibnitz1 ,clarke defends the freedom of the will against the determinism of the ,german philosopher4 ,in ,william ,wollaston 7died #agbd71 with whom the logical point of view becomes still more apparent1 ,clarke found a thinker who shared his convictions that the subjective moral principle of interest was insufficient1 and1 hence1 an objective principle to be sought2 that morality consists in the suitableness of the action to the nature and destination of the object1 and that1 in the last analysis1 it is coincident with truth4 ,the highest destination of man is1 on the one hand1 to know the truth1 and1 on the other1 to express it in actions4 ,that act is good whose execution includes the affirmation 7and its omission the negation7 of a truth4 ,according to the law of nature1 a rational being ought so to conduct himself that he shall never contradict a truth by his actions1 i4 e41 to treat each thing for what it is4 ,every immoral action is a false judgment2 the violation of a contract is a practical denial of it4 ,the man who is cruel to animals declares by his act that the creature maltreated is something which in fact it is not1 a being devoid of feeling4 ,the murderer acts as though he were able to restore life to his victim4 ,he who1 in disobedience toward ,god1 deals with things in a way contrary to their nature1 behaves as though he were mightier than the author of nature4 ,to this equation of truth and morality happiness is added as a third identical member4 ,the truer the pleasures of a being the happier it is2 and a pleasure is untrue whenever more 7of pain7 is given for it than it is worth4 ,a rational being contradicts itself when it pursues an irrational pleasure4--,the course of moral philosophy has passed over the logical ethics of ,clarke and ,wollaston as an abstract and unfruitful idiosyncrasy1 and it is certain that with both of these thinkers their plans were greater than their performances4 ,but the search for an ethical norm which should be universally valid and superior to the individual will1 did not lack justification in contrast to the subjectivism of the other two schools of the time--the school of interest and the school of benevolence1 which made virtue a matter of calculation or of feeling4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,english ethics of the period culminates in ,shaftesbury 7#afga-agac71 who1 reared on the principles of his grandfather's friend ,locke1 formed his artistic sense on the models of classical antiquity1 to recall to the memory of his age the ,greek ideal of a beautiful humanity4 ,philosophy1 as the knowledge of ourselves and that which is truly good1 a guide to morality and happiness2 the world and virtue1 a harmony2 the good1 the beautiful as well2 the whole1 a controlling force in the particular--these views1 and his tasteful style of exposition1 make ,shaftesbury a modern ,greek2 it is only his bitterness against ,christianity which betrays the son of the new era4 ,among the studies collected under the title ,characteristics of ,men1 ,manners1 ,opinions1 ,times1 #agaa1 the most important are those on ,enthusiasm1 on ,wit and ,humor1 on ,virtue and ,merit1 and the ,moralists4#a ,footnote #a3 ,georg v4 ,gizycki has written on ,shaftesbury's philosophy1 #ahgf4 ,cf4 ,fowler's ,shaftesbury and ,hutchison1 ,english ,philosophers ,series1 #ahhb4--,,tr4 ,shaftesbury's fundamental metaphysical concept is aesthetic3 unity in variety is for him the all-pervasive law of the world4 ,in every case where parts work in mutual dependence toward a common result1 there rules a central unity1 uniting and animating the members4 ,the lowest of these substantial unities is the ego1 the common source of our thoughts and feelings4 ,but as the parts of the organism are governed and held together by the soul1 so individuals are joined with one another into species and genera by higher unities4 ,each individual being is a member in a system of creatures1 which a common nature binds together4 ,moreover1 since order and harmony are spread throughout the world1 and no one thing exists out of relation to all others and to the whole1 the universe must be conceived as animated by a formative power which works purposively2 this all-ruling unity is the soul of the world1 the universal mind1 the ,deity4 ,the finality and beauty of those parts of the world which we can know justifies the inference to a like constitution of those which are unapproachable1 so that we may be certain that the numerous evils which we find in the details1 work for the good of a system superior to them1 and that all apparent imperfections contribute to the perfection of the whole4 ,as our philosopher makes use of the idea of the world-harmony to support theism and the theodicy1 so1 further1 he derives the content of morality from it1 thus giving ethics a natural basis independent of self-interest and conventional fancies4 ,a being is good when its impulses toward the preservation and welfare of the species is strong1 and those directed to its own good not too strong4 ,the virtue of a rational being is distinguished from the goodness of a merely sensible creature by the fact that man not only possesses impulses1 but reflects upon them1 that he approves or disapproves his own conduct and that of others1 and thus makes his affections the object of a higher1 reflective1 judging affection4 ,this faculty of moral distinctions1 the sense for right and wrong1 or1 which amounts to the same thing1 for beauty and ugliness1 is innate2 we approve virtue and condemn vice by nature1 not as the result of a compact1 and from this natural feeling for good and evil exercise develops a cultivated moral taste or tact4 ,and when1 further1 the reason1 by means of this faculty of judgment1 gains control over the passions1 man becomes an ethical artist1 a moral virtuoso4 ,virtue pleases by its own worth and beauty1 not because of any external advantage4 ,we must not corrupt the love of the good for its own sake by mixing with it the hope of future reward1 which at the best is admissible only as a counter-weight against evil passions4 ,when ,shaftesbury speaks of future bliss1 his highest conception of the heavenly life is uninterrupted friendship1 magnanimity1 and nobility1 as a continual rewarding of virtue by new virtue4 ,the good is the beautiful1 and the beautiful is the harmonious1 the symmetrical2 hence the essence of virtue consists in the balance of the affections and passions4 ,of the three classes into which ,shaftesbury divides the passions1 one1 including the unnatural or unsocial affections1 as malevolence1 envy1 and cruelty1 which aim neither at the good of the individual nor that of others1 is always and entirely evil4 ,the two other classes1 the social 7or natural7 affections and the self-affections1 may be virtuous or vicious1 according to their degree1 i4 e41 according to the relation of their strength to that of the other affections4 ,in itself a benevolent impulse is never too strong2 it can become so only in comparison with self-love1 or in respect to the constitution of the individual in question1 and conversely4 ,commonly the social impulses do not attain the normal standard1 while the selfish exceed it2 but the opposite case also occurs4 ,excessive parental tenderness1 the pity which enervates and makes useless for aid1 religious zeal for making converts1 passionate partisanship1 are examples of too violent social affections which interfere with the activity of the other inclinations4 ,just as erroneous1 on the other side1 is the neglect of one's own good4 ,for although the possession of selfish inclinations does not make a man virtuous1 yet the lack of them is a moral defect1 since they are indispensable to the general good4 ,no one can be useful to others who does not keep himself in a condition for service4 ,the impulse to care for private welfare is good and necessary in so far as it comports with the general welfare or contributes to this4 ,the due proportion between the social passions1 which constitute the direct source of good1 and those of self-love1 consists in subordinating the latter to the former4 ,the kinship of this ethics of harmony with the ethical views of antiquity is evident4 ,it is completed by the eudemonistic conclusion of the system4 ,as the harmony of impulses constitutes the essence of virtue1 so also it is the way to true happiness4 ,experience shows that unsocial1 unsympathetic1 vicious men are miserable2 that love to society is the richest source of happiness2 that even pity for the suffering of others occasions more pleasure than pain4 ,virtue secures us the love and respect of others1 secures us1 above all1 the approval of our own conscience1 and true happiness consists in satisfaction with ourselves4 ,the search after this pure1 constant1 spiritual pleasure in the good1 which is never accompanied by satiety and disgust1 should not be called self-seeking2 he alone takes pleasure in the good who is already good himself4 ,shaftesbury is not well disposed toward positive ,christianity1 holding that it has made virtue mercenary by its promises of heavenly rewards1 removed moral questions entirely out of this world into the world to come1 and taught men most piously to torment one another out of pure supernatural brotherly love4 ,in opposition to such transcendental positions ,shaftesbury1 a priest of the modern view of the world1 gives virtue a home on earth1 seeks the hand of ,providence in the present world1 and teaches men to reach faith in ,god by inspiring contemplation of the well-ordered universe4 ,virtue without piety is possible1 indeed1 though not complete4 ,but morality is first and fixed1 hence it is the condition and the criterion of genuine religion4 ,revelation does not need to fear free rational criticism1 for the ,scriptures are accredited by their contents4 ,besides reason1 banter is with ,shaftesbury a second means for distinguishing the genuine from the spurious3 ridicule is the test of truth1 and wit and humor the only cure for enthusiasm4 ,with these he scourges the over-pious as religious parasites1 who for safety's sake prefer to believe too much rather than too little4 ,before ,shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense and the disinterested affections had gained adherents and developers1 the danger1 which indeed had not always been escaped1 that man might content himself with the satisfaction of possessing noble impulses1 without taking much care to realize them in useful actions1 called forth by way of reaction1 a paradoxical attempt at an apology for vice4 ,mandeville1 a ,london physician of ,french extraction1 and born in ,holland1 had aroused attention by his poem1 ,the ,grumbling ,hive2 or ,knaves ,turned ,honest1 #agjf1 and in response to vehement attacks upon his work1 had added a commentary to the second edition1 ,the ,fable of the ,bees2 or ,private ,vices ,public ,benefits1 #agad4 ,the moral of the fable is that the welfare of a society depends on the industry of its members1 and this1 in turn1 on their passions and vices4 ,greed1 extravagance1 envy1 ambition1 and rivalry are the roots of the acquisitive impulse1 and contribute more to the public good than benevolence and the control of desire4 ,virtue is good for the individual1 it is true1 since it makes him contented with himself and acceptable to ,god and man1 but great states require stronger motives to labor and industry in order to be prosperous4 ,a people among whom frugality1 self-denial1 and quietness of spirit were the rule would remain poor and ignorant4 ,besides holding that virtue furthers the happiness of society1 ,shaftesbury makes a second mistake in assuming that human nature includes unselfish inclinations4 ,it is not innate love and goodness that make us social1 but our passions and weaknesses 7above all1 fear72 man is by nature self-seeking4 ,all actions1 including the so-called virtues1 spring from vanity and egoism2 thus it has always been1 thus it is in every grade of society4 ,in social life1 indeed1 we dare not display all these desires openly1 nor satisfy them at will4 ,shrewd lawgivers have taught men to conceal their natural passions and to limit them by artificial ones1 persuading them that renunciation is true happiness1 on the ground that through it we attain the supreme good--reputation among1 and the esteem of our fellows4 ,since then honor and shame have become the strongest motives and have incited men to that which is called virtue1 i4e41 to actions which apparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations for the good of society1 while they are really done out of pride and self-love4 ,by constantly feigning noble sentiments before others man comes1 finally1 to deceive himself1 believing himself a being whose happiness consists in the renunciation of self and all that is earthly1 and in the thought of his moral excellence4--,the crass assumptions in ,mandeville's reasoning are evident at a glance4 ,after analyzing virtue into the suppression of desire1 after labeling the impulse after moral approbation vanity1 lawful self-love egoism1 and rational acquisitiveness avarice1 it was easy for him to prove that it is vice which makes the individual industrious and the state prosperous1 that virtue is seldom found1 and that if it were universal it would become injurious to society4 ,with different shading and with less one-sidedness1 ,bolingbroke 7cf4 p4 #aic7 defended the standpoint of naturalism4 ,god has created us for happiness in common2 we are destined to assist one another4 ,happiness is attainable in society alone1 and society cannot exist without justice and benevolence4 ,he who exercises virtue1 i4e41 promotes the good of the species1 promotes at the same time his own good4 ,all actions spring from self-love1 which1 guided at first by an immediate instinct1 and later1 by reason developed through experience1 extends itself over ever widening spheres4 ,we love ourselves in our relatives1 in our friends1 further still1 in our country1 finally1 in humanity1 so that self-love and social love coincide1 and we are impelled to virtue by the combined motives of interest and duty4 ,this is an ethic of common sense from the standpoint of the cultured man of the world--which at the proper time has the right1 no doubt1 to gain itself a hearing4 ,meanwhile ,shaftesbury's ideas had impressed ,hutcheson and ,butler1 according to the peculiarities of each4 ,both of these writers deem it necessary to explain and correct the distinction between the selfish and the benevolent affections by additions1 which were of influence on the ethics of ,hume2 both devote their zeal to the new doctrine of feelings of reflection or moral taste1 in which the former gives more prominence to the aesthetic1 merely judging factor1 the latter to the active or mandatory one4 ,francis ,hutcheson#a 7died #agdg71 professor at ,glasgow1 in his posthumous ,system of ,moral ,philosophy1 #agee1 which had been preceded by an ,inquiry concerning the ,original of our ,ideas of ,beauty and ,virtue1 #agbe1 pursues the double aim of showing against ,hobbes and ,locke the originality and disinterestedness both of benevolence and of moral approval4 ,virtue is not exercised because it brings advantage to the agent1 nor approved on account of advantage to the observer4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,fowler's treatise1 cited above--,,tr4 7#a7 ,the benevolent affections are entirely independent of self-love and regard for the rewards of ,god and of man1 nay1 independent even of the lofty satisfaction afforded by self-approbation4 ,this last1 indeed1 is vouchsafed to us only when we seek the good of others without personal aims3 the joy of inward approval is the result of virtue1 not the motive to it4 ,if love were in reality a concealed egoism1 it would yield to control in cases where it promises advantage1 which1 as experience shows1 is not the fact4 ,benevolence is entirely natural and as universal in the moral world as gravitation in the corporeal2 and like gravitation further in that its intensity increases with propinquity--the nearer the persons1 the greater the love4 ,benevolence is more widespread than malevolence2 even the criminal does more innocent and kind acts in his life than criminal ones--the rarity of the latter is the reason why so much is said about them4 7#b7 ,moral judgment is also entirely uninfluenced by consideration of the advantageous or disadvantageous results for the agent or the spectator4 ,the beauty of a good deed arouses immediate satisfaction4 ,through the moral sense we feel pleasure at observing a virtuous action1 and aversion when we perceive an ignoble one1 feelings which are independent of all thought of the rewards and punishments promised by ,god1 as well as of the utility or harm for ourselves4 ,hutcheson argues a complete distinction between moral approval and the perception of the agreeable and the useful1 from the facts that we judge a benevolent action which is forced1 or done from motives of personal advantage1 quite differently from one inspired by love2 that we pay esteem to high-minded characters whether their fortunes be good or ill2 and that we are moved with equal force by fictitious actions1 as1 for instance1 on the stage1 and by those which really take place4 7#c7 ,a few further particulars may be emphasized from the comprehensive systematization which ,hutcheson industriously and thoughtfully gave to ,shaftesbury's ideas4 ,two points reveal the forerunner of ,hume4 ,first1 the rle assigned to the reason in moral affairs is merely subsidiary4 ,our motive to action is never the knowledge of a true proposition1 but always simply a wish1 affection1 or impulse4 ,ultimate ends are given by the feelings alone2 the reason can only discover the means thereto4 ,secondly1 the turbulent1 blind1 rapidly passing passions are distinguished from the calm1 permanent affections1 which are mediated by cognition4 ,the latter are the nobler2 among them1 in turn1 the highest place is occupied by those conducive to the general good1 whose worth is still further determined by the extent of their objects4 ,from this is derived the law that a kind affection receives the more lively approval1 the more calm and deliberate it is1 the higher the degree of happiness experienced by the object of the action1 and the greater the number of persons affected by it4 ,patriotism and love of mankind in general are higher virtues than affection for friends and children4 ,as the goal of the self-regarding affections1 perfection makes its appearance--for the first time in ,english ethics--by the side of happiness4 ,joseph ,butler#a 7#afib-ageb2 ,sermons on ,human ,nature1 #agbf2 cf4 p4 #aid7 maintains still more strictly than ,hutcheson the immediateness both of the affections and the moral estimation of them4 ,he declares that even the self-regarding impulses as such are un-egoistic1 and makes moral judgment leave out of view all consequences1 either foreseen or present1 whereas his predecessor had resolved the goodness of the action into its advantageous effects 7not for the agent and the spectator1 but for its object and7 for society4 ,the conscience--so ,butler terms the moral sense--directly approves or disapproves characters and actions in themselves1 no matter what good or ill they occasion in the world4 ,we judge a mode of action good1 not because it is useful to society1 but because it corresponds to the demands of the conscience4 ,this must be unconditionally obeyed1 whatever be the issue4 ,we must not act contrary to truth and justice1 even if it should seem to bring about more happiness than misery4--,butler1 too1 furnishes material for the ethics of ,hume1 by his revival of the separation1 previously defended by the ,stoics1 of desire and passion from self-love or interest4 ,self-love desires a thing because it expects pleasure from it1 but the natural impulses impel us toward their objects immediately1 i4 e41 without a representation of the pleasure to be gained2 and repetition is necessary before the artificial motive of egoistic pleasure-seeking can be added to the natural motive of inborn desire4 ,self-love always presupposes original1 immediate affections4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,collins's ,butler1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics4 #ahha4--,,tr4 ,the ,english moral science of the century is brought to a conclusion by ,adam ,smith#a 7#agbc-ij71 the celebrated founder of political economy4#b ,smith not only takes into consideration--like his greater friend1 ,hume--all the problems proposed by his predecessors1 but1 further 7in his ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 #agei1 published while he was professor at ,glasgow71 combines the various attempts at their solution1 not by eclectic co-ordination but by working them over for himself1 and arranges them on a uniform principle1 thus accomplishing a work which has not yet received due recognition beyond the limits of his native land4 ,he reached this comprehensive moral principle by recognizing the full bearing of a thought which ,hume had incidentally expressed1 that moral judgment depends on participation in the feelings of the agent1 and by following out with fine psychological observation this sympathy of men into its first and last manifestations4 ,in this way a twofold kind of morality was revealed to him3 mere propriety of behavior and real merit in action4 ,on the one hand1 that is1 the sympathy of the spectator--as ,hume has one-sidedly emphasized--is directed to the utility of the consequences 7or to the merit7 of the action1 and1 on the other1 to the fitness of the motives 7or their propriety74 ,an action is proper when the impartial spectator is able to sympathize with its motive1 and meritorious if he can sympathize also with its end or effect2 i4e41 if1 in the first case1 the feelings are suitable to their objects 7neither too strong nor too weak71 and1 in the second case1 the consequences of the act are advantageous to others4 ,merit propriety utility4 ,the main conclusion is this3 ,sympathy is that by means of which virtue is recognized and approved1 as well as that which is approved as virtue2 it is ratio cognoscendi as well as ratio essendi1 the criterion as well as the source of morality4 ,thus ,smith endeavors to solve the two principal problems of ,english ethics--the criterion and the origin of virtue--with a common answer4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,farrer's ,adam ,smith1 ,english ,philosophers ,series1 #ahhj4--,,tr4 ,footnote #b3 ,the epoch-making work1 with which he called economic science into existence1 ,the ,wealth of ,nations appeared in #aggf4 ,cf4 ,wilhelm ,hassbach1 ,untersuchungen ber ,adam ,smith1 ,leipsic1 #ahia4 ,sympathy denotes primarily nothing more than the innate and purely formal power of imitating to a certain degree the feelings of others4 ,from this modest germ is developed by a progressive growth the wide-spreading tree of morality3 moral judgment1 the moral imperative with its religious sanction1 and ethical character4 ,accordingly we may distinguish different stages in the development of sympathy--the psychological stage of mere fellow-feeling1 the aesthetic stage of moral appreciation1 the imperative stage of moral precepts1 which further on are construed as commands of ,god 7the famous ,kantian definition of religion was announced in ,glasgow a generation earlier than in ,knigsberg71 finally1 the concluding stage wherein these laws of duty are taken up into the disposition4 ,besides these1 there results from the mechanism of the sympathetic feelings a series of phenomena1 which1 although they do not entirely conform to the ethical standard1 yet exercise a salutary effect on the permanence of society2 e4g41 our exceptional judgment of the deeds of the great1 the rich1 and the fortunate1 as also the higher worth ascribed to good 7and1 conversely1 the greater guilt to bad7 intentions when successfully carried out into action1 in comparison with those which fall short of their result4 ,the first1 the purely psychological stage1 includes three cases4 ,the spectator sympathizes 7#a7 with the feelings of the agent2 7#b7 with the gratitude or anger of the person affected by the action2 7#c7 the person observed sympathizes in return with the imitative and judging feelings of the spectator4 ,the fundamental laws of sympathy are as follows3 ,we are roused to imitate the feeling of another by the perception either of its signs 7its natural consequences or its natural expression in visible and audible motions71 or of its causes 7the circumstances and experiences which occasion it71 the latter exercising a more potent influence than the former4 ,the wooden leg of the beggar is more effective in exciting our pity than his anxious air2 the sight of dental instruments is more eloquent than the plaints of the sufferer from toothache4 ,in order to be able to imitate vividly the feelings of a person1 we must know the causes of them4--,the feeling of the spectator is1 on the average1 less intense than that of the person observed1 so long as the latter does not control and repress his emotions in view of the calmness of the former4 ,the difference of intensity between the original and the sympathetic feelings differs widely with the various classes of emotions4 ,it is difficult to take part in feelings which arise from bodily conditions1 but easy to share those in the production of which the imagination is concerned--hence easier to share in hope and fear than in pleasure and pain4--,we sympathize more readily with feelings which are agreeable to the observer1 the observed1 and other participants than with such as are not so2 more willingly1 therefore1 with cheerfulness1 love1 benevolence than with grief1 hatred1 malevolence4 ,this is not only true of temporary affections1 but especially of those general dispositions which depend on a more or less happy situation in life2 we sympathize more vividly with the fortunes of the rich and noble1 because we consider them happier than the poor and lowly4 ,wealth and high rank are objects of general desire chiefly because their possessor enjoys the advantage of knowing that whatever gives him joy or sorrow always arouses similar feelings in countless other men4 ,the root of all ambition is the wish to rule over the hearts of our fellows by compelling them to make our feelings their own2 the central nerve of all happiness consists in seeing our own sensations shared by those about us and reflected back1 as it were1 from manifold mirrors4 ,small annoyances often have a diverting effect on the spectator2 great success easily excites his envy2 great sorrows and minor joys1 on the contrary1 are always sure of our sympathy4 ,hence the morose man1 to whom everything is an occasion of ill-humor1 is nowhere welcome1 and the man of cheerful disposition1 who rejoices in each little event and whose good spirits are contagious1 everywhere4 ,not less admirable than the fine gift of observation which guides ,smith in his discovery of the primary manifestations and the laws of sympathy is the skill with which he deduces moral phenomena1 from the simplest to the most complex--moral judgment1 the moral law1 its application to one's own conduct1 the conscience--from the interchange of sympathetic feelings4 ,from involuntary comparison of the representative feeling of the spectator with its original in the person observed arises an agreeable or disagreeable feeling of judgment1 a judgment of value1 approbating or rejecting the latter4 ,this is approving when the intensity of the original harmonizes with that of the copy1 disapproving when the former exceeds or fails to attain the latter4 ,in the one case the emotion is judged suitable to the object which causes it2 in the other1 too violent or too weak4 ,it is always a certain mean of passion which1 as proper1 receives approval 7esteem1 love1 or admiration74 ,in the case of the social passions excess is more readily condoned1 in the case of the unsocial and selfish ones1 defect2 hence we judge the over-sensitive more leniently than the over-vengeful4 ,anger must be well-grounded and must express itself with great moderation to arouse in the spectator a like degree of sympathetic resentment4 ,for here the sympathy of the spectator is divided between two parties1 and fellow-feeling with the angry one is weakened by fear for the person menaced by him1 whereas1 in the case of kind affections1 sympathy is increased by doubling4 ,while our judgment of propriety or decorum rests on simple participation in the sentiments of the agent1 our judgment of merit and demerit is based1 in addition1 on sympathy with the feelings of gratitude or resentment experienced by the person on whom the action terminates4 ,an act is meritorious if it appears to us to deserve thanks and reward1 ill-deserving if it seems to merit resentment and punishment4 ,nature has inscribed on the heart1 apart from all reflection on the utility of punishment1 an independent1 immediate1 and instinctive approbation of the sacred law of retribution4 ,this is the point at which a hitherto purely contemplative sympathy passes over into an active impulse1 which prepares us to support the victim of attack and insult in his defense and revenge4 ,this participation in the circumstances and feelings of others is a reciprocal phenomenon4 ,the spectator takes pains to share the sentiments of the person observed2 and the latter1 on his part1 endeavors to reduce the emotions which move him to a degree which will render participation in them possible for the former4 ,in these reciprocal efforts we have the beginnings of the two classes of virtues--the gentle1 amiable virtues of sympathy and sensibility1 and the exalted1 estimable virtues of self-denial and self-command4 ,both of these conditions of mind1 however1 are considered virtues only when they are manifested in unusual intensity3 humanity is a remarkably delicate fellow-feeling1 greatness of soul a rare degree of self-command4 7,the consideration for those about one which is ethically demanded is given1 moreover1 to a certain extent involuntarily4 ,the man in trouble and the merry man alike restrain themselves in the company of persons who are indifferent1 or in an opposite mood1 while they give rein to their emotions when with those similarly affected4 ,joy is enhanced by sympathy1 and grief mitigated47 ,thus the perfection of human nature and the divinely willed harmony among the feelings of men are dependent on every man feeling little for himself and much for others2 on his holding his selfish inclinations in check and giving free course to his benevolent ones4 ,this is the injunction of ,christianity as well as of nature4 ,and as1 on the one hand1 the content of the moral law is thus deduced from sympathy1 so1 on the other1 this yields the formal criterion of good3 ,look upon thy sentiments and actions in the light in which the impartial spectator would see them4 ,conscience is the spectator taken up into our own breast4 ,it remains to consider the origin of this third1 imperative stage4 ,from daily experience of the fact that we judge the conduct of others1 and they ours1 and from the wish to gain their approval1 arises the habit of subjecting our own actions to criticism4 ,we learn to look at ourselves through the eyes of others1 we assign the spectator and judge a place in our own heart1 we make his calm objective judgment our own1 and hear the man within calling to us3 ,thou art responsible for thy acts and intentions4 ,in this way we are placed in a position to overcome two great delusions1 one of passion1 which overestimates the present at the expense of the future1 and one of self-love1 which overestimates the individual at the expense of other men2 delusions from which the impartial spectator is free1 for the pleasure of the moment seems to him no more desirable than pleasure to come1 and one person is just the same to him as another4 ,through comparison of like cases in the exercise of self-examination certain rules or principles are formed concerning what is right and good4 ,reverence for these general rules of living is called the sense of duty4 ,the last step in the process consists in our enhancement of the binding authority of moral rules by looking on them as commands of ,god4 ,here ,smith adds subtle discussions of the question1 in what cases actions ought to be done simply out of regard for these abstract maxims1 and in what others we welcome the co-operation of a natural impulse or passion4 ,we ought to be angry and to punish with reluctance1 merely because reason enjoins it1 but1 on the other hand1 we should be benevolent and grateful from affection2 she is not a model wife who performs her duties merely from a sense of duty1 and not from inclination also4 ,further1 in all cases where the rules cannot be formulated with perfect exactness and definiteness 7as they can in the case of justice71 and are not absolutely valid without exception1 reverence for them must be assisted by a natural taste for modifying and supplementing the general maxims to suit particular instances4 ,in this sketch of the course of ,smith's moral philosophy much that is fine and much that is of importance has of necessity been passed over--his excellent analysis of the relations of benevolence and justice1 and numerous descriptions of traits of character1 e4 g41 his ingenious parallel between pride and vanity4 ,we may briefly mention1 in conclusion1 his observations on the irregularities of moral judgment4 ,prosperity and success exert an influence on this1 which1 though hurtful to its purity1 must1 on the whole1 be considered advantageous to mankind4 ,our lenience toward the defects of princes1 the great1 and the rich1 and our over-praise for their excellent qualities are1 from the moral standpoint1 an injustice1 but one which has this advantage1 that it encourages ambition and industry1 and maintains social distinctions intact1 which without loyalty and respect toward superiors would be broken down4 ,for most men the road to fortune coincides with the path to virtue4 ,again1 it is a beneficent provision of nature that we put a higher estimate on a successfully executed act of benevolence1 and reward it more1 than a kind intention which fails of execution2 that we judge and punish the purposed crime which is not carried out more leniently than the one which is completed2 that we even ascribe a certain degree of accountability to an unintentional act of good or evil--although in these cases the moralist is compelled to see an ethically unjustifiable corruption of the judgment by external success or failure beyond the control of the agent4 ,the first of these irregularities does not allow the man of good intentions to content himself with noble desires merely1 but spurs him on to greater endeavors to carry them out--man is created for action2 the second protects us from the inquisitorial questioning of motives1 for it is easy for the most innocent to fall under grave suspicion4 ,to this inconsistency of feeling we owe the necessary legal principle that deeds only1 not intentions1 are punishable4 ,god has reserved for himself judgment concerning dispositions4 ,the third irregularity1 that he who inflicts unintentional injury is not guilty1 even in his own eyes1 but yet seems bound to make atonement and reparation1 is useful in so far as it warns everyone to be prudent1 while the corresponding illusion1 in virtue of which we are grateful to an involuntary benefactor--for instance1 the bearer of good tidings--and reward him1 is at least not harmful1 for any reason appears sufficient for the bestowal of kind intentions and actions4 ,it is impossible to explain in brief the relation of ,smith's ethical theory to his political economy4 ,his merit in the former consists in his comprehensive and characteristic combination of the results reached by his predecessors1 and in his preparation for ,kantian views1 so far as this was possible from the empirical standpoint of the ,english4 ,his impartial spectator was the forerunner of the categorical imperative4 ,english ethics after ,smith may1 almost without exception1 be termed eclecticism4 ,this is true of ,ferguson 7,institutes of ,moral ,philosophy1 #agfi72 of ,paley 7#aghe72 of the ,scottish ,school 7,dugald ,stewart1 #agic74 ,bentham's utilitarianism was the first to bring in a new phase4 #d4 ,theory of ,knowledge4 7a7 ,berkeley4--,george ,berkeley1 a native of ,ireland1 ,bishop of ,cloyne 7#afhe-agec2 ,an ,essay toward a ,new ,theory of ,vision1 #agji2 ,a ,treatise concerning the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #agaj2 ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous1 #agac2 ,alciphron1 or the ,minute ,philosopher1 #agcb1 against the freethinkers2 ,works1 #aghd4 ,fraser's edition of the ,collected ,works appeared in #ahga1 in four volumes71#a is related to ,locke as ,spinoza to ,descartes4 ,he notices blemishes and contradictions allowed by his predecessor to remain1 and1 recognizing that the difficulty is not to be remedied by minor corrections and artificial hypotheses1 goes back to the fundamental principles1 takes these more earnestly than their author1 and1 by carrying them out more strictly1 arrives at a new view of the world4 ,the points in ,locke's doctrines which invited a further advance were the following3 ,locke proclaims that our knowledge extends no further than our ideas1 and that truth consists in the agreement of ideas among themselves1 not in the agreement of ideas with things4 ,but this principle had scarcely been announced before it was violated4 ,in spite of his limitation of knowledge to ideas1 ,locke maintains that we know 7if not the inner constitution1 yet7 the qualities and powers of things without us1 and have a sensitive certainty of their existence4 ,against this1 it is to be said that there are no primary qualities1 that is1 qualities which exist without as well as within us4 ,extension1 motion1 solidity1 which are cited as such1 are just as purely subjective states in us as color1 heat1 and sweetness4 ,impenetrability is nothing more than the feeling of resistance1 an idea1 therefore1 which self-evidently can be nowhere else than in the mind experiencing it4 ,extension1 size1 distance1 and motion are not even sensations 7we see colors only1 not quantitative determinations71 but relations which we in thinking add to the sense-qualities 7secondary qualities71 and which we are not able to represent apart from them2 their relativity alone would forbid us to consider them objective4 ,and material substances1 the support of qualities invented by the philosophers1 are not only unknown1 but entirely non-existent4 ,abstract matter is a phrase without meaning1 and individual things are collections of ideas in us1 nothing more4 ,if we take away all sense-qualities from a thing1 absolutely nothing remains4 ,our ideas are not merely the only2 objects of knowledge1 but also the only existing things--nothing exists except minds and their ideas4 ,spirits alone are active beings1 they only are indivisible substances1 and have real existence1 while the being of bodies 7as dependent1 inert1 variable beings1 which are in a constant process of becoming7 consists alone in their appearance to spirits and their being perceived by them4 ,incogitative1 hence passive1 beings are neither substances1 nor capable of producing ideas in us4 ,those ideas which we do not ourselves produce are the effects of a spirit which is mightier than we4 ,with this a second inconsistency was removed which had been overlooked by ,locke1 who had ascribed active power to spirits alone and denied it to matter1 but at the same time had made the former affected by the latter4 ,if external sense is to mean the capacity for having ideas occasioned by the action of external material things1 then there is no external sense4 ,a third point wherein ,locke had not gone far enough for his successor1 concerned the favorite ,english doctrine of nominalism4 ,locke1 with his predecessors1 had maintained that all reality is individual1 and that universals exist only in the abstracting understanding4 ,from this point ,berkeley advances a step further1 the last1 indeed1 which was possible in this direction1 by bringing into question the possibility even of abstract ideas4 ,as all beings are particular things1 so all ideas are particular ideas4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 also ,fraser's ,berkeley 7,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics7 #ahha2 ,eraser's ,selections from ,berkeley1 #dth ed41 #ahia2 and ,krauth's edition of the ,principles1 #ahgd1 with notes from several sources1 especially those translated from ,ueberweg4--,,tr4 ,berkeley looks on the refutation of these two fundamental mistakes--the assumption of general ideas in the mind1 and the belief in the existence of a material world outside it--as his life work1 holding them the chief sources of atheism1 doubt1 and philosophical discord4 ,the first of these errors arises from the use of language4 ,because we employ words which denote more than one object1 we have believed ourselves warranted in concluding that we have ideas which correspond to the extension of the words in question1 and which contain only those characteristics which are uniformly found in all objects so named4 ,this1 however1 is not the case4#a ,we speak of many things which we cannot represent3 names do not always stand for ideas4 ,the definition of the word triangle as a three-sided figure bounded by straight lines1 makes demands upon us which our faculties of imagination are never fully able to meet2 for the triangle that we represent to ourselves is always either right-angled or oblique-angled1 and not--as we must demand from the abstract conception of the figure--both and neither at once4 ,the name man includes men and women1 children and the aged1 but we are never able to represent a man except as an individual of a definite age and sex4 ,nevertheless we are in a position to make a safe use of these non-presentative but useful abbreviations1 and by means of a particular idea to develop truths of wider application4 ,this takes place when1 in the demonstration1 those qualities are not considered which distinguish the idea from others with a like name4 ,in this case the given idea stands for all others which are known by the same name2 the representative idea is not universal1 but serves as such4 ,thus when ,i have demonstrated the proposition1 the sum of all the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles1 for a given triangle1 ,i do not need to prove it for every triangle thereafter4 ,for not only the color and size of the triangle are indifferent1 but its other peculiarities as well2 the question whether it is right-angled or obtuse-angled1 whether it has equal sides1 whether it has equal or unequal angles1 is not mentioned in the demonstration1 and has no influence upon it4 ,abstracta exist only in this sense4 ,in considering the individual ,paul ,i can attend exclusively to those characteristics which he has in common with all men or with all living beings1 but it is impossible for me to represent this complex of common qualities apart from his individual peculiarities4 ,self-observation shows that we have no general concepts2 reason1 that we can have none1 for the combination of opposite elements in one idea would be a contradiction in terms4 ,motion in general1 neither swift nor slow1 extension in general1 at once great and small1 abstract matter without sensuous determinations--these can neither exist nor be perceived4 ,footnote #a3 ,against the ,berkeleyan denial of abstract notions the popular philosopher1 ,joh4 ,jak4 ,engel1 directed an essay1 ,ueber die ,realitt allgemeiner ,begriffe 7,engel's ,schriften1 vol4 x471 to which attention has been called by ,o4 ,liebmann1 ,analysis tier ,wirklichkeit1 #b;d ed41 p4 #dgc4 ,the materialistic hypothesis--so ,berkeley terms the assumption that a material world exists apart from perceiving mind1 and independently of being perceived--is1 first1 unnecessary1 for the facts which it is to explain can be explained as well1 or even better1 without it2 and1 second1 false1 since it is a contradiction to suppose that an object can exist unperceived1 and that a sensation or idea is the copy of anything itself not a sensation or idea4 ,ideas are the only objects of the understanding4 ,sensible qualities 7white1 sweet7 are subjective states of the soul2 sense objects 7sugar71 sensation-complexes4 ,if sensations need a substantial support1 this is the soul which perceives them1 not an external thing which can neither perceive nor be perceived4 ,single ideas1 and those combined into objects1 can exist nowhere else than in the mind2 the being of sense objects consists in their being perceived 7esse est percipi74 ,i see light and feel heat1 and combine these sensations of sight and touch into the substance fire1 because ,i know from experience that they constantly accompany and suggest each other4#a ,the assumption of an object apart from the idea is as useless as its existence would be4 ,why should ,god create a world of real things without the mind1 when these can neither enter into the mind1 nor 7because unperceived7 be copied by its ideas1 nor 7because they themselves lack perception and power7 produce ideas in it8 ,ideas signify nothing but themselves1 i4 e41 affections of the subject4 ,footnote #a3 ,the fire that ,i see is not the cause of the pain which ,i experience in approaching it1 but the visual image of the flame is only a sign which warns me not to go too near4 ,if ,i look through a microscope ,i see a different object from the one perceived with the naked eye4 ,two persons never see the same object1 they merely have like sensations4 ,the further question arises1 ,what is the origin of ideas8 ,men have been led into this erroneous belief in the reality of the material world by the fact that certain ideas are not subject to our will1 while others are4 ,sensations are distinguished from the ideas of imagination1 which we can excite and alter at pleasure1 by their greater strength1 liveliness1 and distinctness1 by their steadiness1 regular order1 and coherence1 and by the fact that they arise without our aid and whether we will or no4 ,unless these ideas are self-originated they must have an external cause4 ,this1 however1 can be nothing else than a willing1 thinking ,being2 for without will it could not be active and act upon me1 and without ideas of its own it could not communicate ideas to me4 ,because of the manifoldness and regularity of our sensations the ,being which produces them must1 further1 possess infinite power and intelligence4 ,the ideas of imagination are produced by ourselves1 real perceptions are produced by ,god4 ,the connected whole of divinely produced ideas we call nature1 and the constant regularity in their succession1 the laws of nature4 ,the invariableness of the divine working and the purposive harmony of creation reveal the wisdom and goodness of the ,almighty more clearly than astonishing and exceptional events4 ,when we hear a man speak we reason from this activity to his existence4 ,how much less are we entitled to doubt the existence of ,god1 who speaks to us in the thousandfold works of nature4 ,the natural or created ideas which ,god impresses on us are copies of the eternal ideas which he himself perceives1 not1 indeed1 by passive sensation1 but through his creative reason4 ,accordingly when it was maintained that things do not exist independently of perception1 the reference was not to the individual spirit1 but to all spirits4 ,when ,i turn my eyes away from an object it continues to exist1 indeed1 after my perception has ended--in the minds of other men and in that of the ,omnipresent ,one4 ,the pantheistic conclusion of these principles1 in the sense of ,geulincx and ,malebranche1#a which one expects1 was really suggested by ,berkeley4 ,everything exists only in virtue of its participation in the one1 permanent1 all-comprehensive spirit2 individual spirits are of the same nature with the universal reason1 only they are less perfect1 limited1 and not pure activity1 while ,god is passionless intelligence4 ,but if1 in the last analysis1 ,god is the cause of all1 this does not hold of the free actions of men1 least of all of wicked ones4 ,the freedom of the will must not be rejected because of the contradictions which its acceptance involves2 motion1 also1 and mathematical infinity imply incomprehensible elements4 ,in the philosophy of nature ,berkeley prefers the teleological to the mechanical view1 since the latter is able to discover the laws of phenomena only1 but not their efficient and final causes4 ,sense and experience acquaint us merely with the course of phenomenal effects2 the reason1 which opens up to us the realm of causation1 of the spiritual1 is the only sure guide to science and truth4 ,the understanding does not feel1 the senses do not know4 ,we have no 7sensuous7 idea of other spirits1 but only a notion of them2 instead of themselves we perceive their activities merely1 from which we argue to souls like ourselves1 while we know our own mind by immediate self-consciousness4#b ,footnote #a3 ,the example of ,arthur ,collier shows that the same results which ,berkeley reaches empirically can be obtained from the standpoint of rationalism4 ,following ,malebranche1 and developing further the idealistic tendencies of the latter1 ,collier had1 independently of ,berkeley1 conceived the doctrine of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world 2 but had not worked it out in his ,clavis ,universalis1 #agac1 until after the appearance of ,berkeley's chief work1 and not without consideration of this4 ,the general point of view and the arguments are the same3 ,existence is equivalent to being perceived by ,god2 the creation of a real world of matter apart from the ideal world in ,god and from sensuous perceptions in us would have been a superfluous device1 etc4 ,footnote #b3 ,it should be remembered1 however1 that this immediate knowledge of ourselves is also not after the manner of an idea or sensation4 ,our knowledge of spirits is always mediated by notions not by ideas in the strict sense1 that is1 not by images4 ,cf4 ,principles1 #bg1 #ace seq41 especially in the second edition4--,,tr4 ,in contrast to the fearlessness with which ,berkeley propounds his spiritualism1 his anxious endeavors to take away the appearance of paradox from his immaterialistic doctrine1 and to show its complete agreement with common sense1 excite surprise4 ,even the common man1 he argues1 desires nothing more than that his perceptions be real2 the distinction between idea and object is an invention of philosophers4 ,here ,berkeley cannot be acquitted of a certain sophistical play upon the term idea1 which1 in fact1 is ambiguous4 ,he understands by it that which the soul perceives 7its immediate1 inner object71 but the popular mind1 that through which the soul perceives an object4 ,the reality of an idea in us is different from the idea of a real thing1 or from the reality of that which is perceived without us by means of the idea1 and it is just this last meaning which common sense affirms and ,berkeley denies4 ,in any case it was a work of great merit to have transferred the existence of objects beyond our ideas1 of things-in-themselves1 out of the region of the self-evident into the region of the problematical4 ,we never get beyond the circle of our ideas1 and if we posit a thing-in-itself as the ground and object of the idea1 this also is simply a thought1 an idea4 ,for us there is no being except that of the perceiver and the perceived4 ,later we shall meet two other forms of idealism1 in ,leibnitz and ,fichte4 ,both of these agree with ,berkeley that spiritual beings alone are active1 and active beings alone real1 and that the being of the inactive consists in their being perceived4 ,but while in ,berkeley the objective ideas are impressed upon finite spirits by the ,infinite ,spirit from without and singly1 with ,leibnitz they appear as a fullness of germs1 which ,god implanted together in the monads at the beginning1 and which the individual develops into consciousness1 and with ,fichte they become the unconscious productions of the ,absolute ,ego acting in the individual egos4 ,for the two former as many worlds exist as there are individual spirits1 their harmony being guaranteed1 in the one case1 by the consistency of ,god's working1 and1 in the other1 by his foresight4 ,for ,fichte1 on the other hand1 there is but one world1 for the absolute is not outside the individual spirits1 but the uniformly working force within them4 7b7 ,hume4--,david ,hume was born in ,edinburgh in #agaa1 and died in the same city1 #aggf4 ,his position as librarian1 which he held in the place of his birth1 #ageb-eg1 gave the opportunity for his ,history of ,england7 #aged-fb74 ,his chief work1 the ,treatise on ,human ,nature1 which1 however1 found few readers1 was composed during his first residence in ,france in #agcd-cg4 ,later he worked over the first book of this work into his ,enquiry concerning ,human ,understanding 7#agdh72 the second book into ,a ,dissertation on the ,passions2 and the third into ,an ,enquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals4 ,these1 and others of his essays1 found so much favor that1 during his second sojourn in ,france1 as secretary to ,lord ,hertford1 in #agfc-ff1 he was already honored as a philosopher of world-wide renown4 ,then1 after serving for some time as ,under-,secretary of ,state1 he retired to private life at home 7#agfi74 ,the three books of the ,treatise on ,human ,nature1 which appeared in #agci-dj1 are entitled ,of the ,understanding1 ,of the ,passions1 ,of ,morals4 ,of the five volumes of the ,essays1 the first contains the ,essays ,moral1 ,political1 and ,literary1 #agda-db2 the second1 the ,enquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1 #agdh2 the third1 the ,enquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals1 #agea2 the fourth1 the ,political ,discourses1 #ageb2 the fifth1 #ageg1 the ,four ,dissertations1 including that ,on the ,passions and the ,natural ,history of ,religion4 ,after ,hume's death appeared the ,autobiography1 #aggg2 the ,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion1 #aggi2 and the two small essays on ,suicide and the ,immortality of the ,soul1 #aghc4a ,the ,philosophical ,works were published in #ahbg1 and frequently afterward4#b ,footnote #a3 ,or #aggg1 cf4 ,green and ,grose's edition1 vol4 iii4 p4 #fg seq4--,tr4 ,footnote #b3 ,among the works on ,hume we may mention ,jodl's prize treatise1 #ahgb1 and ,huxley's ,hume 7,english ,men of ,letters71 #ahgi4 ,the reader may be referred also to ,knight's ,hume 7,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics71 #ahhf2 to ,t4,h4 ,green's ,introductions in ,green and ,grose's edition of the collected works in four volumes1 #ahgd 7new ed4 #ahhi-ij71 which is now standard2 and to ,selby-,bigge's reprint of the original edition of the ,treatise1 ,i vol41 #ahhh1 with a valuable ,analytical ,index4 ,hume's object1 like that of ,berkeley1 is the improvement of ,locke's doctrine of knowledge4 ,in several respects he does not go so far as ,berkeley1 in others very much farther4 ,in agreement with ,berkeley's ultra-nominalism1 which combats even the possibility of abstract ideas1 he yet does not follow him to the extent of denying external reality4 ,on the other hand1 he carries out more consistently ,berkeley's hint that immediate sensation includes less than is ascribed to it 7e4g41 that by vision we perceive colors only1 and not distance1 etc471 as well as his principle--destructive to the certainty of our knowledge of nature--that there is no causality among phenomena2 and brings the question of substance to1 the negative conclusion1 that there is no need whatever for a support for groups of qualities1 and1 therefore1 that substantiality is to be denied to immaterial as well as to material beings4 ,the points in ,locke's philosophy which seemed to ,hume to need completion were different from those at which ,berkeley had struck in4 ,the antithesis of rational and empirical knowledge is more sharply conceived2 the combination of ideas is not left to the choice of the understanding but placed under the dominion of psychological laws2 and to the distinction between outer and inner experience 7to the former of which priority is conceded1 on the ground that we must have had an external sensation before we can1 through reflection1 be conscious of it as an internal phenomenon71 there is added a second1 as important as the other and crossing it1 between impressions and ideas1 of which the former are likewise made prior to the latter4 ,everyone will acknowledge the considerable difference between a sensation actually present 7of heat1 for instance7 and the mere idea of one previously experienced1 or shortly to come4 ,this consists in the greater force1 liveliness1 and vividness of the former4 ,although these two classes of states 7the idea of a landscape described by a poet and the perception of a real one1 anger and the thought of anger7 are only quantitatively distinct1 they are scarcely ever in danger of being confused--the most lively idea is always less so than the weakest perception4 ,the actual1 outer or inner1 sensations may be termed impressions2 the weaker images of memory or imagination1 which they leave behind them1 ideas4 ,since nothing can gain entrance to the soul except through the two portals of outer and inner experience1 there is no idea which has not arisen from an impression or several such2 every idea is the image and copy of an impression4 ,but as the understanding and imagination variously combine1 separate1 and transpose the elements furnished by the senses and lingering in memory1 the possibility of error arises4 ,a hidden1 and1 therefore more dangerous source of error consists in the reference of an idea to a different impression than the one of which it is the copy4 ,the concepts substance and causality are examples of such false reference4 ,the combination of ideas takes place without freedom1 in a purely mechanical1 way according to fixed rules1 which in the last analysis reduce to three fundamental laws of association3 ,ideas are associated 7#a7 according to their resemblance and contrast2 7#b7 according to their contiguity in space and time2 7#c7 according to their causal connection4 ,mathematics is based on the operation of the first of these laws1 on the immediate or mediate knowledge of the resemblance1 contrariety1 and quantitative relations of ideas2 the descriptive and experimental part of the sciences of nature and of man on the second2 religion1 metaphysics1 and that part of physical and moral science which goes beyond mere observation on the third4 ,the theory of knowledge has to determine the boundaries of human understanding and the degree of credibility to which these sciences are entitled4 ,the objects of human thought and inquiry are either relations of ideas or matters of fact4 ,to the former class belong the objects of mathematics1 the truths of which1 since they are analytic 7i4 e41 merely explicate in the predicate the characteristics already contained in the subject1 and add nothing new to this71 and since they concern possible relations only1 not reality1 possess intuitive or demonstrative certainty4 ,it is only propositions concerning quantity and number that are discoverable a priori by the mere operation of thought1 without dependence on real existence1 and that can be proved from the impossibility of their opposites--mathematics is the only demonstrative science4 ,we reach certainty in matters of fact by direct perception1 or by inferences from other facts1 when they transcend the testimony of our senses and memory4 ,these arguments from experience are of an entirely different sort from the rational demonstrations of mathematics2 as the contrary of a fact is always thinkable 7the proposition that the sun will not rise to-morrow implies no logical contradiction71 they yield1 strictly speaking1 probability only1 no matter how strong our conviction of their accuracy may be4 ,nevertheless it is advisable to separate this species of inferences from experience--whose certainty is not doubted except by the philosophers--from uncertain probabilities1 as a class intermediate between the latter and demonstrative truth 7demonstrations--proofs--probabilities74 ,all reasonings concerning matters of fact are based on the relation of cause and effect4 ,whence1 then1 do we obtain the knowledge of cause and effect8 ,not by a priori thought4 ,pure reason is able only to analyze concepts into their elements1 not to connect new predicates with them4 ,all its judgments are analytic1 while synthetic judgments rest on experience4 ,judgments concerning causation belong in this latter class1 for effects are entirely distinct from causes2 the effect is not contained in the cause1 nor the latter in the former4 ,in the case of a phenomenon previously unknown we cannot tell from what causes it has proceeded1 nor what its effect will be4 ,we argue that fire will warm us1 and bread afford nourishment1 because we have often perceived these causal pairs closely connected in space and time4 ,but even experience does not vouchsafe all that we desire4 ,it shows nothing more than the coexistence and succession of phenomena and events2 while the judgment itself1 e4 g41 that the motion of one body stands in causal connection with that of another1 asserts more than mere contiguity in space and time1 it affirms not merely that the one precedes the other1 but that it produces it--not merely that the second follows the first1 but that it results from it4 ,the bond which connects the two events1 the force that puts forth the second from the first1 the necessary connection between the two is not perceived1 but added to perception by thought1 construed into it4#a ,what1 then1 is the occasion and what the warrant for transforming perceived succession in time into causal succession1 for substituting must for is1 for interpreting the observed connection of fact into a necessary connection which always eludes observation8 ,footnote #a3 ,the weakness of the concept of cause had been recognized before ,hume by the skeptic1 ,j4 ,glanvil 7#afcf-hj74 ,causality itself cannot be perceived2 we infer it from the constant succession of two phenomena1 without being able to show warrant for the transformation of thereafter into thereby4 ,we do not causally connect every chance pair of successive events1 but those only which have been repeatedly observed together4 ,the wonder is1 then1 that through oft-repeated observation of certain objects we come to believe that we know something about the behavior of other like objects1 and the further behavior of these same ones4 ,from the fact that ,i have seen a given apple fall ten times to the ground1 ,i infer that all the apples in the world do the same when loosened1 instead of flying upward1 which1 in itself1 is quite as thinkable2 ,i infer further that this has always been the case1 and will continue to be so to all eternity4 ,where is the intermediate link between the proposition1 ,i have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect1 and this other1 ,i foresee that other objects which are1 in appearance1 similar1 will be attended with similar effects8 ,this postulate1 that the future will be like the past1 and that like causes will have like effects1 rests on a purely psychological basis4 ,in virtue of the laws of association the sight of an object or event vividly recalls the image of a second1 often observed in connection with the former1 and leads us involuntarily to expect its appearance anew4 ,the idea of causal connection is based on feeling 7the feeling of inner determination to pass from one idea to a second71 not upon insight2 it is a product of the imagination1 not of the understanding4 ,from the habitual perception of two events in connection 7sunshine and heat7 arises the mental determination to think of the second when we perceive the first1 and1 anticipating the senses1 to count on its appearance4 ,it is now possible to state of what impression the idea of the causal nexus is the copy3 the impression on which it is based is the habitual transition from the idea of a thing to its customary attendant4 ,hence the idea of causality has a purely subjective significance1 not the objective one which we ascribe to it4 ,it is impossible to determine whether there is a real necessity of becoming corresponding to the felt necessity of thought4 ,in life we never doubt the fact1 but for science our conviction of the uniformity of nature remains a merely probable 7though a very highly probable7 conviction4 ,complete certainty is vouchsafed only by rational demonstration and immediate experience4 ,the necessary bond which we postulate between cause and effect can neither be demonstrated nor felt4 ,if all experiential reasonings depend on the idea of causality1 and this has no other support than subjective mental habit1 it follows that all knowledge of nature which goes beyond mere observed fact is not knowledge 7neither demonstrative knowledge nor knowledge of fact71 but belief4#a ,the probability of our belief in the regularity of natural phenomena increases1 indeed1 with every new verification of the assumptions based thereon2 but1 as has been shown1 it never rises to absolute certainty4 ,nevertheless inferences from experience are trustworthy and entirely sufficient for practical life1 and the aim of the above skeptical deliverances was not to shake belief--only a fool or a lunatic can doubt in earnest the immutability of nature--but only to make it clear that it is mere belief1 and not1 as hitherto held1 demonstrative or factual knowledge4 ,our doubt is intended to define the boundary between knowledge and belief1 and to destroy that absolute confidence which is a hindrance rather than a help to investigation4 ,we should recognize it as a wise provision of nature that the regulation of our thoughts and the belief in the objective validity of our anticipation of future events have not been confided to the weak1 inconstant1 inert1 and fallacious reason1 but to a powerful instinct4 ,in life and action we are governed by this natural impulse1 in spite of all the scruples of the skeptical reason4 ,footnote #a3 ,hume distinguishes belief as a form of knowledge from religious faith1 both in fact and in name4 ,in the ,treatise--the passage is wanting in the ,enquiry--our conviction of the external existence of the objects of perception is also ascribed to the former1 which later formed ,jacobi's point of departure4 ,religious faith is referred to revelation4 ,in ,hume's earlier work his destructive critique of the idea of cause is accompanied by a deliverance in a similar strain on the concept of substance1 which is not included in the shorter revision4 ,substances are not perceived through impressions1 but only qualities and powers4 ,the unknown something which is supposed to have qualities1 or in which these are supposed to inhere1 is an unnecessary fiction of the imagination4 ,a permanent similarity of attributes by no means requires a self-identical support for these4 ,a thing is nothing more than a collection of qualities1 to which we give a special name because they are always found together4 ,the idea of substance1 like the idea of cause1 is founded in a subjective habit which we erroneously objectify4 ,the impression from which it has arisen is our inner perception that our thought remains constant in the repeated experience of the same group of qualities 7whenever ,i see sugar1 ,i do the same thing1 that is1 ,i combine the qualities white color1 sweet taste1 hardness1 etc41 with one another71 or the impression of a uniform combination of ideas4 ,the idea of substance becomes erroneous through the fact that we refer it not to the inner activity of representation1 to which it rightly belongs1 but to the external group of qualities1 and make it a real1 permanent substratum for the latter4 ,mental substances disappear along with material substances4 ,the soul or mind is1 in reality1 nothing more than the sum of our inner states1 a collection of ideas which flow on in a continuous and regular stream2 it is like a stage1 across which feelings1 perceptions1 thoughts1 and volitions are passing while it does not itself come into sight4 ,a permanent self or ego1 as a substratum of ideas1 is not perceived2 there is no invariable1 permanent impression4 ,that which leads to the assumption of personal identity is only the frequent repetition of similar trains of ideas1 and the gradual succession of our ideas1 which is easily confused with constancy4 ,thus robbed of its substantiality1 the soul has no further claims to immateriality and immortality1 and suicide ceases to be a crime4#a ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 the essays on ,suicide and the ,immortality of the ,soul1 #aghc1 whose authorship by ,hume1 however1 is not absolutely established of4 ,green and ,grose1 as above1 p4 #bba1 note first4--,,tr4 ,is ,hume roundly to be called a skeptic8 #a ,he never impugned the validity of mathematical reasonings1 nor experimental truths concerning matters of fact2 in regard to the former his thought is rationalistic1 in regard to the latter it is empirical or1 more accurately1 sensationalistic4 ,his attitude toward the empirical sciences of nature and of mind is that of a semi-skeptic or probabilist1 in so far as they go beyond the establishment of facts to the proof of connections under law and to inferences concerning the future4 ,habit is for him a safe guide for life1 although it does not go beyond probabilities2 absolute knowledge is unattainable for us1 but not indispensable4 ,toward metaphysics1 as an alleged science of the suprasensible1 he takes up an entirely negative attitude4 ,if an argument from experience is to be assured of merely that degree of probability which is sufficient for belief1 it must not only have a well-established fact 7an impression or memory-image7 for its starting point1 but1 together with its conclusion1 it must keep within the limits of possible experience4 ,the limits of possible experience are also the limits of the knowable2 inferences to the continued existence of the soul after death and to the being of ,god are vain sophistry and illusion4 ,according to the famous conclusion of the ,essay1 all volumes which contain anything other than abstract reasonings concerning quantity or number or experimental reasonings concerning matter of fact and existence deserve to be committed to the flames4 ,in view of this limitation of knowledge to that which is capable of exact measurement and that which is present in experience1 as well of the principle that the elements added by thought are to be sharply distinguished from the positively given 7the immediate facts of perception71 we must agree with those who call ,hume the father of modern positivism4#b ,footnote #a3 ,in the ,essay1 ,hume describes his own standpoint as mitigated or academical skepticism in antithesis to the ,cartesian1 which from doubt and through doubt hopes to reach the indubitable1 and to the excessive skepticism of ,pyrrhonism1 which cripples the impulse to inquiry4 ,this moderate skepticism asks us only1 after resisting the tendency to unreflecting conclusions1 to make a duty of deliberation and caution in judging1 and to restrain inquiry within those fields which are accessible to our knowledge1 i4e41 the fields of mathematics and empirical fact4 ,in the ,treatise ,hume had favored a sharper skepticism and extended his doubt more widely1 e4g41 even to the trustworthiness of geometry4 ,cf4 on this point ,ed4 ,grimm1 ,zur ,geschichte des ,erkenntnissproblems1 #ahij1 p1 #eei seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,so ,volkelt1 ,erfahrung und ,denken1 #ahhf1 p4 #aje4 99 99 99 99 99 ,as a philosopher of religion ,hume is the finisher and destroyer of deism4 ,of the three principles of the deists--religion1 its origin and its truth are objects of scientific investigation2 religion has its origin in the reason and the consciousness of duty2 natural religion is the oldest1 the positive religions are degenerate or revived forms of natural religion--he accepts the first1 while rejecting the other two4 ,religion may correspond to reason or contradict it1 but not proceed from it4 ,religion has its basis in human nature1 yet not in its rational but its sensuous side2 not in the speculative desire for knowledge1 but in practical needs2 not in the contemplation of nature1 but in looking forward with fear or joy to the changing events of human life4 ,anxiety and hope concerning future events lead us to posit unseen powers as directing our destiny1 and to seek their favor4 ,the capriciousness of fortune points to a plurality of gods2 the tendency to conceive all things like ourselves gives them human characteristics2 the powerful impression made by all that comes within the sphere of the senses incites us to connect the divine power with visible objects2 the allegorical laudation and deification of eminent men leads to a completed polytheism4 ,that this and not 7mono-7 theism was the original form of religion1 ,hume assumes to be a fact for historical times1 and a well-founded conjecture for prehistoric ages4 ,those who hold that humanity began with a perfect religion find it difficult to explain the obscuration of the truth1 endow immature ages with a developed use of the reason which they can scarcely have possessed1 make error grow worse with increasing culture1 and contradict the historical progress upward which is everywhere else observed4 ,the philosophical knowledge of ,god is a very late product of mature reflection2 even monotheism1 as a popular religion1 did not arise from rational reflection1 although its chief principle is in agreement with the results of philosophy1 but from the same irrational motives as polytheism4 ,its origin from polytheism is accomplished by the transformation of the leading god 7the king of the gods or the tutelary deity of the nation7 through the fear and emulous flattery of his votaries into the one1 infinite1 spiritual ruler of the world4 ,amid the folly of the superstitious herd1 however1 this refined idea is not long preserved in its purity2 the more exalted the conception entertained of the supreme deity1 the more imperatively the need makes itself felt for the interpolation between this being and mankind of mediators and demi-gods1 partaking more of the human nature of the worshipers and more familiar to them4 ,later a new purification takes place1 so that the history of religion shows a continuous alternation of the lower and higher forms4 ,after depriving theism of its prerogative of originality1 ,hume further takes away from it its fame as in every respect the best religion4 ,it is disadvantageously distinguished from polytheism by the fact that it is more intolerant1 makes its followers pusillanimous1 and1 by its incomprehensible dogmas1 puts their faith to severer tests2 while it is on a level with polytheism in that most of its adherents exalt belief in foolish mysteries1 fanaticism1 and the observance of useless customs above the practice of virtue4 ,the ,natural ,history of ,religion1 which far outbids the conclusions of the deists by its endeavors to explain religion1 not on rational1 but on historical and psychological grounds1 and to separate it entirely from knowledge by relegating it to the sphere of practice1 leaves the possibility of a philosophical knowledge of ,god an open question4 ,the ,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion greatly diminish this hope4 ,the most cogent argument for the intelligence of the world-ground1 the teleological argument1 is a hypothesis which has grave weaknesses1 and one to which many other equally probable hypotheses may be opposed4 ,the finite world1 with its defects and abounding misery amid all its order and adaptation1 can never yield an inference to an infinite1 perfect unit-cause1 to an all-powerful1 all-wise1 and benevolent deity4 ,to this the eleventh section of the ,enquiry adds the argument1 that it is inadmissible to ascribe to the inferred cause other properties than those which are necessary to explain the observed effect4 ,the tenth section of the same ,essay argues that there is no miracle supported by a sufficient number of witnesses credible because of their intelligence and honesty1 and free from a preponderance of contradictory experiences and testimony of greater probability4 ,in short1 the reason is neither capable of reaching the existence of ,god by well-grounded inference nor of comprehending the truth of the ,christian religion with its accompanying miracles4 ,that which transcends experience cannot be proven and known1 but only believed in4 ,whoever is moved by faith to give assent to things which contradict all custom and experience1 is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person4 ,hume never denied the existence of ,god1 never directly impugned revelation4 ,his final word is doubt and uncertainty4 ,it is certain that his counsel not to follow the leadership of the reason in religious matters1 but to submit ourselves to the power of instinct and common opinion1 was less earnest and less in harmony with the nature of the philosopher than his other advice1 to take refuge from the strife of the various forms of superstition in the more quiet1 though dimmer regions of--naturally1 the skeptical--philosophy4 ,hume's originality and greatness in this field consist in his genetic view of the historical religions4 ,they are for him errors1 but natural ones1 grounded in the nature of man1 sick men's dreams1 whose origin and course he searches out with frightful cold-bloodedness1 with the dispassionate interest of the dissector4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in his moral philosophy#a ,hume shows himself the empiricist only1 not the skeptic4 ,the laws of human nature are capable of just as exact empirical investigation as those of external nature2 observation and analysis promise even more brilliant success in this most important1 and yet hitherto so badly neglected1 branch of science than in physics4 ,as knowledge and opinion have been found reducible to the associative play of ideas1 and the store of ideas1 again1 to original impressions and shown derivable from these2 so man's volition and action present themselves as results of the mechanical working of the passions1 which1 in turn1 point further back to more primitive principles4 ,the ultimate motives of all action are pleasure and pain1 to which we owe our ideas of good and evil4 ,the direct passions1 desire and aversion1 joy and sorrow1 hope and fear1 are the immediate effects of these original elements4 ,from the direct arise in certain circumstances the indirect passions1 pride and humility1 love and hatred 7together with respect and contempt72 the first two1 if the objects which excite feeling are immediately connected with ourselves1 the latter1 when pleasure and pain are aroused by the accomplishments or the defects of others4 ,while love and hate are always conjoined with a readiness for action1 with benevolence or anger1 pride and humility are pure1 self-centered1 inactive emotions4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,g4 von ,gizycki1 ,die ,ethik ,david ,humes1 #ahgh4 ,all moral phenomena1 will1 moral judgment1 conscience1 virtue1 are not simple and original data1 but of a composite or derivative nature4 ,they are without exception products of the regular interaction of the passions4 ,with such views there can be1 of course1 no question of a freedom of the will4 ,if anyone objects to determinism1 that virtues and vices1 if they are involuntary and necessary1 are not praise-or blame-worthy1 he is to be referred to the applause paid to beauty and talent1 which are considered meritorious1 although they are not dependent upon our choice4 ,the legal attitude of theology and law first caused all desert to be based upon freedom1 whereas the ancient philosophers spoke unhesitatingly of intellectual virtues4 ,hume does not1 like nearly all his predecessors and contemporaries1 find the determining grounds of volition in ideas1 but in the feelings4 ,after curtailing the rights of the reason in the theoretical field in favor of custom and instinct1 he dispossesses her also in the sphere of practice4 ,impassive reason1 judging only of truth and falsehood1 is an inactive faculty1 which of itself can never inspire us with inclination and desire toward an object1 can never itself become a motive4 ,it is only capable of influencing the will indirectly1 through the aid of some affection4 ,abstract relations of ideas1 and facts as well1 leave us entirely indifferent so long as they fail to acquire an emotional value through their relation to our state of mind4 ,when we speak of a victory of reason over passion it is nothing but a conquest of one passion by another1 i4 e41 of a violent passion by a calm one4 ,that which is commonly called reason here is nothing but one of those general and calm affections 7e4 g41 the love of life7 which direct the will to a distant good1 without exciting any sensible emotion in the mind2 by passion we commonly understand the violent passions only1 which engender a marked disturbance in the soul and the production of which requires a certain propinquity of the object4 ,a man is said to be industrious from reason1 when a calm desire for money makes him laborious4 ,it is a mistake to consider all violent passions powerful1 and all calm ones weak4 ,the prevalence of calm affections constitutes the essence of strength of mind4 ,as reason is thus degraded from a governor of the will to a slave of the passions1 so1 further1 judgment concerning right and wrong is taken away from her4 ,moral distinctions are determined by our sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable4 ,we pass an immediate judgment of taste on the actions of our fellow-men2 the good pleases1 evil displeases4 ,the sight of virtue gives us satisfaction2 that of vice repels us4 ,accordingly an action or trait of mind is virtuous when it calls forth in the observer an agreeable1 disinterested sentiment of approbation4 ,what1 then1 are the actions which receive such general approval1 and how is the praise to be explained which the spectator bestows on them8 ,we approve such traits of character as are immediately agreeable or useful1 either to the person himself or to others4 ,this yields four classes of praiseworthy qualities4 ,the first class1 those which are agreeable to the possessor 7quite apart from any utility to himself or to others71 includes cheerfulness1 greatness of mind1 courage1 tranquillity1 and benevolence2 the second1 those immediately agreeable to others1 modesty1 good manners1 politeness1 and wit2 the third1 those useful to ourselves1 strength of will1 industry1 frugality1 strength of body1 intelligence and other mental gifts4 ,the fourth class comprises the highest virtues1 the qualities useful to others1 benevolence and justice4 ,pleasure and utility are in all cases the criterion of merit4 ,the monkish virtues of humility and mortification of the flesh1 which bring no pleasure or advantage either to their possessor or to society1 are considered meritorious by no one who understands the subject4 ,if the moral value of actions is thus made to depend on their effects1 we cannot dispense with the assistance of reason in judging moral questions1 since it alone can inform us concerning these results of action4 ,reason1 however1 is not sufficient to determine us to praise or blame4 ,nothing but a sentiment can induce us to give the preference to beneficial and useful tendencies over pernicious ones4 ,this feeling is evidently no other than satisfaction in the happiness of men and uneasiness in view of their misery--in short1 it is sympathy4 ,by means of the imagination we enter into the experiences of others and participate in their joy and sorrow4 ,whatever depresses or rejoices them1 whatever inspires them with pride1 fills us with similar emotions4 ,from the habit of sympathetically passing moral judgment on the actions of others1 and of seeing our own judged by them1 is developed the further one of keeping a constant watch over ourselves and of considering our dispositions and deeds from the standpoint of the good of others4 ,this custom is called conscience4 ,allied to this is the love of reputation1 which continually leads us to ask1 ,how will our behavior appear in the eyes of those with whom we associate8 ,within the fourth and most important class1 the social virtues1 ,hume distinguishes between the natural virtues of humanity and benevolence and the artificial virtues of justice and fidelity4 ,the former proceed from our inborn sympathy with the good of others1 while the latter1 on the other hand1 are not to be derived from a natural passion1 an instinctive love of humanity1 but are the product of reflection and art1 and take their origin in a social convention4 ,in order that an action may gain the approval of the spectator two other things are required besides its salutary effects3 it must be a mark of character1 of a permanent disposition1 and it must proceed from disinterested motives4 ,hume is obliged by this latter position to show that disinterested benevolence actually exists1 that the unselfish affections do not secretly spring from self-love4 ,to cite only one of the thousand examples of benevolence in which no discernible interest is concerned1 we desire happiness for our friends even when we have no expectation of participating in it4 ,the accounts of human selfishness are greatly overdrawn1 and those who deduce all actions from it make the mistake of taking the inevitable consequences of virtue--the pleasure of self-approval and of being esteemed by others--for the only motives to virtue4 ,because virtue1 in the outcome1 produces inner satisfaction and is praised by others1 it does not follow that it is practiced merely for the sake of these agreeable consequences4 ,self-love is a secondary impulse1 whose appearance at all presupposes primary impulses4 ,only after we have experienced the pleasure which comes from the satisfaction of such an original impulse 7e4 g41 ambition71 can this become the object of a conscious reflective search after pleasure1 or of egoism4 ,power brings no enjoyment to the man by nature devoid of ambition1 and he who is naturally ambitious does not desire fame because it affords him pleasure1 but conversely1 fame affords him pleasure because he desires it4 ,the natural propensity which terminates directly on the object1 without knowledge or foresight of the pleasurable results1 comes first1 and egoistic reflection directed toward the hoped-for enjoyment can develop only after this has been satisfied4 ,the case is the same with benevolence as with the love of fame4 ,it is implanted in the constitution of our minds as an original impulse immediately directed toward the happiness of other men4 ,after it has been exercised and its exercise rewarded by self-satisfaction1 admiration1 thanks1 and reciprocation1 it is indeed possible for the expectation of such agreeable consequences to lead us to the repetition of beneficent acts4 ,but the original motive is not an egoistic1 regard for useful consequences4 ,if1 from the force of the passion alone1 vengeance may be so eagerly pursued that every consideration of personal quiet and security is silenced1 it may also be conceded that humanity causes us to forget our own interests4 ,nay1 further1 the social affections1 as ,shaftesbury has proven1 are the strongest of all1 and the man will rarely be found in whom the sum of the benevolent impulses will not outweigh that of the selfish ones4 ,in the section on justice ,hume attacks the contract theory4 ,law1 property1 and the sacredness of contracts exist first in society1 but not first in the state4 ,the obligation to observe contracts is1 indeed1 made stronger by the civil law and civil authority1 but not created by them4 ,law arises from convention1 i4 e41 not from a formal contract1 but a tacit agreement1 a sense of common interest1 and this agreement1 in turn1 proceeds from an original propensity to enter into social relations4 ,the unsocial and lawless state of nature is a philosophical fiction which has never existed2 men have always been social4 ,they have all at least been born into the society of the family1 and they know no-more terrible punishment than isolation4 ,states are not created1 however1 by a voluntary act1 but have their roots in history4 ,the question at issue between ,hobbes and ,hume was thus adjusted at a later period by ,kant3 the state1 it is true1 has not historically arisen from a contract1 yet it is allowable and useful to consider it under the aspect of a contract as a regulative idea4 ,only once since ,david ,hume1 in ,herbert ,spencer1 has the ,english nation produced a mind of like comprehensive power4 ,hume and ,locke form the culminating points of ,english thought4 ,they are national types1 in that in them the two fundamental tendencies of ,english thinking1 clearness of understanding and practical sense1 were manifested in equal force4 ,in ,locke these worked together in harmonious co-operation4 ,in ,hume the friendly alliance is broken1 the common labor ceases2 each of the two demands its full rights2 a painful breach opens up between science and life4 ,reason leads inevitably to doubt1 to insight into its own weakness1 while life demands conviction4 ,the doubter cannot act1 the agent cannot know4 ,it is true that a substitute is found for defective knowledge in belief based upon instinct and custom2 but this is a makeshift1 not a solution of the problem1 an acknowledgment of the evil1 not a cure for it4 ,further1 ,hume's greatness does not consist in the fact that he preached modesty to the contending parties1 that he banished the doubting reason into the study and restricted life to belief in probabilities1 but in the mental strength which enabled him to endure sharp contradictions1 and1 instead of an overhasty and easy reconciliation1 to suspend the one impulse until the other had made its demands thoroughly1 completely1 and regardlessly heard4 ,though he is distinguished from other skeptics by the fact that he not only shows the fundamental conceptions of our knowledge of nature and the principles of religion uncertain and erroneous1 but finds necessary errors in them and acutely uncovers their origin in the lawful workings of our inner life1 yet his historical influence essentially rests on his skepticism4 ,in his own country it roused in the ,scottish ,school the reaction of common sense1 while in ,germany it helped to wake a kindred but greater spirit from the bonds of his dogmatic slumbers1 and to fortify him for his critical achievements4 7c7 ,the ,scottish ,school4--,priestley's associational psychology1 ,berkeley's idealism1 and ,hume's skepticism are legitimate deductions from ,locke's assumption that the immediate objects of thought are not things but ideas1 and that judgment or knowledge arises from the combination of ideas originally separate4 ,the absurdity of the consequences shows the falsity of the premises4 ,the true philosophy must not contradict common sense4 ,it is not correct to look upon the mind as a sheet of white paper on which experience inscribes single characters1 and then to make the understanding combine these originally disconnected elements into judgments by means of comparison1 and the belief in the existence of the object come in as a later result added to the ideas by reflection4 ,it is rather true that the elements discovered by the analysis of the cognitive processes are far from being the originals from which these arise4 ,it is not isolated ideas that come first1 but judgments1 self-evident axioms of the understanding1 which form part of the mental constitution with which ,god has endowed us2 and sensation is accompanied by an immediate belief in the reality of the object4 ,sensation guarantees the presence of an external thing possessing a certain character1 although it is not an image of this property1 but merely a sign for something in no wise resembling itself4 ,this is the standpoint of the founder#a of the ,scottish ,school1 ,thomas ,reid 7#agaj-if1 professor in ,aberdeen and ,glasgow2 ,an ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind on the ,principles of ,common ,sense1 #agfd2 ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers of ,man1 #aghe1 ,essays on the ,active ,powers1 #aghh1 together under the title1 ,essays on the ,powers of the ,human ,mind4 ,collected ,works1 #ahjd1 and often since1 especially the edition by ,hamilton1 with valuable notes and dissertations1 #gth ed41 #b vols41 #ahgb74 ,we may recognize in it a revival of the common notions of ,herbert1 as well as a transfer of the innate faculty of judgment inculcated by the ethical and aesthetic writers from the practical to the theoretical field2 the common sense of ,reid is an original sense for truth1 as the taste of ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson was a natural sense for the good and the beautiful4 ,like ,jacobi at a later period1 ,reid points out that mediate1 reasoned knowledge presupposes a knowledge which is immediate1 and all inference and demonstration1 fixed1 undemonstrable1 immediately certain fundamental truths4 ,the fundamental judgments or principles of common sense1 which are true for us1 even if possibly not true in themselves1 are discoverable by observation 7empirical rationalism74 ,in the enumeration of them two dangers are to be avoided3 we must neither raise contingent principles to the position of axioms1 nor1 from an exaggerated endeavor after unity1 underestimate the number of these self-evident principles4 ,reid himself is always more sparing with them than his disciples4 ,he distinguishes two classes3 first principles of necessary truth1 and first principles of contingent truth or truth of fact4 ,as first principles of necessary truth he cites1 besides the axioms of logic and mathematics1 grammatical1 aesthetic1 moral1 and metaphysical principles 7among the last belong the principles3 ,that the qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject1 which we call body1 and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject1 which we call mind2 that whatever begins to exist1 must have a cause which produced it74 ,he lays down twelve principles as the basis of our knowledge of matters of fact1 in which his reference to the doubt of ,berkeley and ,hume is evident4 ,the most important of these are3 ,the existence of everything of which ,i am conscious2 that the thoughts of which ,i am conscious1 are the thoughts of a being which ,i call myself1 my mind1 my person2 our own personal identity and continued existence1 as far back as we remember anything distinctly2 that those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses1 and are what we perceive them to be2 that we have some degree of power over our actions1 and the determinations of our will2 that there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men2 that there is a certain regard due444 to human authority in matters of opinion2 that1 in the phenomena of nature1 what is to be1 will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances4 ,footnote #a3 ,in the sense of chief founder2 cf4 ,mc,cosh's ,scottish ,philosophy1 #ahge1 pp4 #cf1 #fh seq41 which is the standard authority on the school as a whole4--,,tr4 ,the widespread and lasting favor experienced by this theory1 with its invitation to forget all earnest work in the problems of philosophy by taking refuge in common sense1 shows that a general relaxation had succeeded the energetic endeavors which ,hume had demanded of himself and of his readers4 ,with this declaration of the infallibility of common consciousness1 the theory of knowledge1 which had been so successfully begun1 was incontinently thrust aside1 although1 indeed1 empirical psychology gained by the industrious investigation of the inner life by means of self-observation4 ,james ,beattie continued the attack on ,hume in his ,essay on the ,nature and ,immutability of ,truth in ,opposition to ,sophistry and ,skepticism1 #aggj1 on the principle that wisdom must never contradict nature1 and that whatever our nature compels us to believe1 hence whatever all agree in1 is true4 ,in his briefer dissertations ,beattie discussed ,memory and ,imagination1 ,fable and ,romance1 the ,effects of ,poetry and ,music1 ,laughter1 the ,sublime1 etc4 ,while ,beattie had given the preference to psychological and aesthetic questions1 ,james ,oswald 7#aggb7 appealed to common sense in matters of religion1 describing it as an instinctive faculty of judgment concerning truth and falsehood4 ,the most eminent among the followers of ,reid was ,dugald ,stewart 7professor in ,edinburgh2 ,elements of the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1 #agib-ahbg2 ,collected ,works1 edited by ,hamilton1 #ahed-eh71 who developed the doctrines of the master and in some points modified them4 ,thomas ,brown 7#aggh-ahbj71 who is highly esteemed by ,mill1 ,spencer1 and ,bain1 approximated the teachings of ,reid and ,stewart to those of ,hume4 ,the philosophy of the ,scottish ,school was long in favor both in ,england and in ,france1 where it was employed as a weapon against materialism4 ,by way of appendix we may mention the beginnings of a psychological aesthetics in ,henry ,home 7,lord ,kames1 #afif-aghb71 and ,edmund ,burke 7#agbh-ig74a ,home1 in ethics a follower of ,hutcheson1 is fond of supporting his aesthetic views by examples from ,shakespeare4 ,beauty 7chap4 iii47 appears to belong to the object itself1 but in reality it is only an effect1 a secondary quality1 of the object2 like color1 it is nothing but an idea in the mind1 for an object is said to be beautiful for no other reason but that it appears so to the spectator4 ,it arises from regularity1 proportion1 order1 simplicity--properties which belong to sublimity as well 7chap1 iv471 but to which they are by no means so essential1 since it is satisfied with a less degree of them4 ,while the beautiful excites emotions of sweetness and gayety1 the sublime rouses feelings which are agreeable1 it is true1 but which are not sweet and gay1 but strong and more serious4 ,burke's explanation goes deeper4 ,he derives the antithesis of the sublime and the beautiful from the two fundamental impulses of human nature1 the instinct of self-preservation and the social impulse4 ,whatever is contrary to the former makes a strong and terrible impression on the soul2 whatever favors the latter makes a weak but agreeable one4 ,the terrible delights us 7first depressing and then exalting us71 when we merely contemplate it1 without being ourselves affected by the danger or the pain--this is the sublime4 ,on the other hand1 that is beautiful which inspires us with tenderness and affection without our desiring to possess it4 ,sublimity implies a certain greatness1 beauty1 a certain smallness4 ,delight in both is based on bodily phenomena4 ,terror moderated exercises a beneficent influence on the nerves by stimulating them and giving them tension2 the gentle impression of beauty exerts a quieting effect upon them4 ,the disturbances caused by the former1 and the recovery induced by the latter1 are both conducive to health1 and hence1 experienced as pleasures4 ,footnote #a3 ,home1 ,elements of ,criticism1 #agfb4 ,burke1 ,a ,philosophical ,inquiry info the ,origin of our ,ideas of the ,sublime and the ,beautiful1 #agef4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,french ,,illumination4 ,in the last decade of the seventeenth century ,france had yielded the leadership in philosophy to ,england4 ,whereas ,hobbes had in ,paris imbibed the spirit of the ,galilean and ,cartesian inquiry1 while ,bacon1 ,locke1 and even ,hume had also visited ,france with advantage1 now ,french thinkers take the watchword from the ,english4 ,montesquieu and ,voltaire1 returning from ,england in the same year 7#agbi71 acquaint their countrymen with the ideas of ,locke and his contemporaries4 ,these are eagerly caught up2 are1 step by step1 and with the logical courage characteristic of the ,french mind1 developed to their extreme conclusions2 and1 at the same time1 spread abroad in this heightened form among the people beyond the circles of the learned1 nay1 even beyond the educated classes4 ,the ,english temperament is favorable neither to this advance to extreme revolutionary inferences nor to this propagandist tendency4 ,locke combines a rationalistic ethics with his semi-sensational theory of knowledge2 ,newton is far from finding in his mechanical physics a danger for religious beliefs2 the deists treat the additions of positive religion rather as superfluous ballast than as hateful unreason2 ,bolingbroke wishes at least to conceal from the people the illuminating principles which he offers to the higher classes4 ,such halting where farther progress threatens to become dangerous to moral interests does more honor to the moral1 than to the logical1 character of the philosopher4 ,but with the transfer of these ideas to ,france1 the wall of separation is broken down between the theory of knowledge and the theory of ethics1 between natural philosophy and the philosophy of religion2 sensationalism forces its way from the region of theory into the sphere of practice1 and the mechanical theory is transformed from a principal of physical interpretation into a metaphysical view of the world of an atheistical character4 ,naturalism is everywhere determined to have its own3 if knowledge comes from the senses1 then morality must be rooted in self-interest2 whoever confines natural science to the search for mechanical causes must not postulate an intelligent ,power working from design1 even to explain the origin of things and the beginning of motion--has no right to speak of a free will1 an immortal soul1 and a deity who has created the world4 ,further1 as ,bayle's proof that the dogmas of the ,church were in all points contradictory to reason had1 contrary to its author's own wishes1 exerted an influence hostile to religion1 and as1 moreover1 the political and social conditions of the time incited to revolt and to a break with all existing institutions1 the philosophical ideas from over the ,channel and the condition of things at home alike pressed toward a revolutionary intensification of modern principles1 which found comprehensive expression in the atheists' ,bible1 the ,system of ,nature of ,baron ,holbach1 #aggj4 ,the movement begins in the middle of the thirties1 when ,montesquieu commences to naturalize ,locke's political views in ,france1 and ,voltaire does the same service for ,locke's theory of knowledge1 and ,newton's natural philosophy1 which had already been commended by ,maupertuis4 ,the year #agdh1 the year also of ,hume's ,essay1 brings ,montesquieu's chief work and ,la ,mettrie's ,man a ,machine4 ,while the ,encyclopedia1 the herald of the ,illumination1 begun in #agea1 is advancing to its completion 7#aggb1 or rather #aghj71 ,condillac 7#aged7 and ,bonnet 7#agee7 develop theoretical sensationalism1 and ,helvetius 7,on ,mind1 #ageh2 in the same year1 ,d',alembert's ,elements of ,philosophy7 practical sensationalism4 ,rousseau1 engaged in authorship from #agea and a contributor to the ,encyclopedia until #ageg comes into prominence1 #agfb1 with his two chief works1 ,emile and the ,social ,contract4 ,parallel with these we find interesting phenomena in the field of political economy3 ,morelly's communistic ,code of ,nature 7#agee71 the works of ,quesnay 7#ageh71 the leader of the physiocrats1 and those of ,turgot1 #aggd4 ,our discussion takes up1 first1 the introduction and popularization of ,english ideas2 then1 the further development of these into a consistent sensationalism1 into the morality of interest1 and into materialism2 finally1 the reaction against the illumination of the understanding in ,rousseau's philosophy of feeling4#a ,footnote #a3 ,on the whole chapter cf4 ,damiron1 ,mmoires pour ,servir l',histoire de la ,philosophie au ,,xviii4 ,sicle1 #c vols41 #aheh-fd2 and ,john ,morley's ,voltaire1 #ahgb #ahhf1 ,rousseau1 #ahgc #ahhf1 and ,diderot and the ,encyclopedists1 #ahgh new ed41 #ahhf4 #a4 ,the ,entrance of ,english ,doctrines4 ,montesquieu#a 7#afhi-agee7 made ,locke's doctrine of constitutional monarchy and the division of powers 7pp4 #agi-ahj71 with which he joins the historical point of view of ,bodin and the naturalistic positions of the time1 the common property of the cultivated world4 ,laws must be adapted to the character and spirit of the nation2 the spirit of the people1 again1 is the result of nature1 of the past1 of manners1 of religion1 and of political institutions4 ,nature has bestowed many gifts on the ,southern peoples1 but few on those of the ,north2 hence the latter need freedom1 while the former readily dispense with it4 ,warm climates produce greater sensibility and passionateness1 cold ones1 muscular vigor and industry2 in the temperate zones nations are less constant in their habits1 their vices1 and their virtues4 ,the laws of religion concern man as man1 those of the state concern him as a citizen2 the former have for their object the moral good of the individual1 the latter1 the welfare of society2 the first aim at immutable1 the second at mutable good4 ,laws and manners are closely interrelated4 ,right is older than the state1 and the law of justice holds even in the state of nature2 but in order to assure peace positive right is required in three forms1 international1 political1 and civil4 ,footnote #a3 ,montesquieu1 ,persian ,letters1 #agba2 ,considerations on the ,causes of the ,greatness of the ,romans and of their ,decadence1 #agcd2 ,spirit of ,laws1 #agdh4 ,each of the four political forms has a passion for its underlying principle3 despotism has fear2 monarchy1 honor 7personal and class prejudice72 aristocracy1 the moderation of the nobility2 democracy1 political virtue1 which subordinates personal to general welfare1 and especially the inclination to equality and frugality4 ,while republics are destroyed by extravagance1 lust1 and self-seeking1 a monarchy can dispense with civil virtue1 patriotism1 and moral disinterestedness1 since in it false honor1 luxury1 and wantonness subserve the public good4 ,great states tend toward despotism2 smaller ones toward aristocracy1 or a democratic republicanism2 for those of medium size monarchy1 which is intermediate between the two former1 is the best form of constitution4 ,although ,montesquieu1 in his ,lettres ,persanes1 shows himself enthusiastic for the federal republics of ,switzerland and the ,netherlands1 his opinions are different after his return from ,england1 and in his ,esprit des ,lois he praises the ,english form of government as the ideal of civil liberty4 ,political freedom consists in liberty to do 7not what we wish1 but7 what we ought1 or in doing that which the laws allow4 ,such lawful freedom is possible only where the constitution of the state and criminal legislation inspire the citizen with a sense of security4 ,in order to prevent misuse of the supreme power1 the different authorities in the state must be divided so that they shall hold one another in check4 ,in particular ,montesquieu demands for the judicial power absolute independence of the executive power 7which ,locke had termed the federative7 as well as of the legislative power4 ,the last belongs to parliament1 which includes in its two houses an aristocratic and a democratic element4 ,voltaire#a 7#afid-aggh7--;he himself had made this anagram from his name1 ,arouet l7e7 j7eune7--seemed by his many-sided receptivity almost made to be the interpreter of ,english ideas2 in the words of ,windelband1 he combines ,newton's mechanical philosophy of nature1 ,locke's notical empiricism1 and ,shaftesbury's moral philosophy under the deistic point of view4 ,the same qualities which made him the first journalist1 enabled him to free philosophy from its scholastic garb1 and1 by concentrating it on the problems which press most upon the lay mind 7,god1 freedom1 immortality71 to make it a living force among the people4 ,his superficiality1 as ,erdmann acutely remarks1 was his strength4 ,true religion1 so reason teaches us1 consists in loving ,god and in being just and forbearing to our fellow-men as to our brothers2 morality is so natural and necessary that it is no wonder that all philosophers since ,zoroaster have inculcated the same principles4 ,the less of dogma the better the religion2 atheism is not so bad as superstition1 which teaches men to commit crimes with an easy conscience4 ,he considered it the chief mission of his life to destroy these two miserable errors4 ,he endeavored to controvert atheism by rational arguments1 while with passionate hatred and contemptuous wit he attacked positive ,christianity and his persecutors1 the priesthood4 ,the existence of ,god is for him not merely a moral postulate1 but a result of scientific reasoning4 ,one of his famous sayings was3 ,if ,god did not exist it would be necessary to invent him2 but all nature cries out to us that he exists4 ,he defends immortality in spite of theoretical difficulties1 because of its practical necessity2 his attitude toward the freedom of the will1 which he had energetically defended in the beginning1 grows constantly more skeptical with increasing age4 ,his position in regard to the question of evil experiences a similar change--the ,lisbon earthquake made him an opponent of optimism1 though he had previously favored it4 ,footnote #a3 ,david ,friedrich ,strauss1 ,voltaire1 sechs ,vortrge1 #ahgj4 #b4 ,theoretical and ,practical ,sensationalism4 ,we turn next from the popular introduction and dissemination of ,locke's doctrines1 which left their contents unchanged1 to their principiant development by the ,french sensationalists4 ,condillac 7#agae-hj7 always thinks of his work as a completion of ,locke's1 whose ,essay he held not to have gone down to the final root of the cognitive process4 ,locke did not go far enough1 ,condillac thinks1 in his rejection of innate elements2 he failed to trace out the origin of perception1 reflection1 cognition1 and volition1 as also the relation between the external senses1 the internal sense1 and the combining intellect1 which he discussed as separate sources1 the two former of particular1 and the last of complex1 ideas2 in short1 he omitted to inquire into the origin of the first function of the soul4 ,berkeley was right in feeling that a simplification was needed here2 but by erroneously reducing outer perception to inner perception1 he reached the absurd conclusion of denying the external world4 ,the true course is just the opposite of this--the one already taken by the ,bishop of ,cork1 ,peter ,browne 7died #agce2 ,the ,procedure1 ,extent1 and ,limits of the ,human ,understanding1 #agbh73 understanding and reflection must be reduced to sensation4 ,all psychical functions are transformed sensations4 ,the soul has only one original faculty1 that of sensation2 all the others1 theoretical and practical alike1 are acquired1 i4e41 they have gradually developed from the former4 ,condillac is related to ,locke as ,fichte to ,kant2 in the former case the transition is mediated by ,browne1 in the latter by ,reinhold4 ,each crowns the work of his predecessor with a unifying conclusion2 each demands and offers a genetic psychology which finds the origin of all the spiritual functions--from sensation and feelings of pleasure and pain up to rational cognition and moral will--in a single fundamental power of the soul4 ,but there is a great difference1 materially as well as formally1 between these kindred undertakings1 a difference corresponding to that between ,locke's empiricism and ,kant's idealism4 ,the idea of ends1 which controls the course of thought in ,fichte as in ,leibnitz1 is entirely lacking in ,condillac2 that which is first in time1 sensation1 is for the ,science of ,knowledge and the ,monadology only the beginning1 not the essence1 of psychical activity1 while ,condillac makes no distinction between beginning and ground1 but expressly identifies principe and commencement4 ,with ,fichte and ,leibnitz sensation is immature thought1 with ,condillac thought is refined sensation4 ,the former teach a teleological1 the latter a mechanical mono-dynamism4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge1 moreover1 makes a very serious task of the deduction of the particular psychical functions from the original power1 while ,condillac takes it extraordinarily easy4 ,good illustrations of his way of effacing distinctions instead of explaining them are given by such monotonously recurring phrases as memory is nothing but modified sensation2 comparison and simultaneous attention to two ideas are the same thing2 sensation gradually becomes comparison and judgment2 reflection is in its origin attention itself2 speech1 thought1 and the formation of general notions are at bottom the same2 the passions are only various kinds of desire2 understanding and will spring from one root1 etc4 ,the demand for a single fundamental psychical power comes from ,descartes1 and ,condillac does not hesitate to retain the word penser itself as a general designation for all mental functions4 ,similarly he holds fast to the dualism between extension and sensation as reciprocally incompatible properties1 opposes the soul as the simple subject of thought to divisible matter1 and sees in the affections of the bodily organs merely the occasions on which the soul of itself alone exercises its sensitive activity4 ,even freedom--the supremacy of thought over the passions--is maintained1 in striking contrast to the whole tendency of his doctrine and to the openly announced principle1 that pleasure controls the attention and governs all our actions4 ,he has just as little intention of doubting the existence of ,god4 ,all is dependent on ,god4 ,he is our lawgiver2 it is in virtue of his wisdom that from small beginnings--perception and need--the most splendid results1 science and morality1 are developed under the hands of man4 ,whoever undertakes to complain that ,he has concealed from us the nature of things and granted us to know relations alone1 forgets that we need no more than this4 ,we do not exist in order to know2 to live is to enjoy4 ,the theme of the ,treatise on the ,sensations1 #aged1 is3 ,memory1 comparison1 judgment1 abstraction1 and reflection 7in a word1 cognition7 are nothing but different forms of attention2 similarly the emotions1 the appetites1 and the will1 nothing but modifications of desire2 while both alike take their origin in sensation4 ,sensation is the sole source and the sole content of the life of the mind as a whole4 ,to prove these positions ,condillac makes use of the fiction of a statue1 in which one sense awakes after another1 first the lowest of the senses1 smell1 and last the most valuable1 the sense of touch1 which compels us 7by its perception of density or resistance7 to project our sensations1 and thus wakes in us the idea of an external world4 ,in themselves sensations are merely subjective states1 modes of our own being2 without the sense of touch we would ascribe odor1 sound1 and color to ourselves4 ,condillac distinguishes between sensation and ideas in a twofold sense1 as mere ideas 7the memory or imagination of something not present71 and as ideas of objective things 7the image1 representative of a body72 this latter sense is meant when he says1 touch sensations only are also ideas4 ,for the details of the deduction1 which often makes very happy use of a rich store of psychological material1 the reader must be referred to the more extended expositions4 ,here we can only cite as examples the chief among the genetic definitions4 ,perceptions 7impressions7 and consciousness are the same thing under different names4 ,a lively sensation1 in which the mind is entirely occupied1 becomes attention1 without the necessity of assuming an additional special faculty in the mind4 ,attention1 by its retentive effect on the sensation1 becomes memory4 ,double attention--to a new sensation1 and to the lingering trace of the previous one--is comparison2 the recognition of a relation 7resemblance or difference7 between two ideas is judgment2 the separation of an idea from another naturally connected with it1 by the aid of voluntary linguistic symbols1 is abstraction2 a series of judgments is reflection2 and the sum total of inner phenomena1 that wherein ideas succeed one another1 the ego or person4 ,all truths concern relations among ideas4 ,the tactual idea of solidity accustoms us to project the sensations of the other senses also1 to transfer them thither where they are not2 hence arise the ideas of our body1 of external objects1 and of space4 ,if we perceive several such projected qualities together1 we refer them to a substratum--substance1 which we know to exist1 although not what it is4 ,by force we mean the unknown1 but indubitably existent1 cause of motion4 ,there are no indifferent mental states2 every sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain4 ,joy and pain give the determining law for the operation of our faculties4 ,the soul dwells longer on agreeable sensations2 without interest1 ideas would pass away like shadows4 ,the remembrance of past impressions more agreeable than the present ones is need2 from this springs desire 7dsir7 then the emotions of love1 hate1 hope1 fear1 and astonishment2 finally1 the will as an unconditional desire accompanied by the thought of its possible fulfillment4 ,all inclinations1 good and bad alike1 spring from self-love4 ,the predicates good and beautiful denote the pleasure-giving qualities of things1 the former1 that which is agreeable to smell and taste 7and the passions71 the latter1 that which pleases sight1 hearing1 feeling 7and the intellect74 ,morality is the conformity of our actions to laws1 which men have established by convention with mutual obligations4 ,in this way the good1 which at first was the servant of the passions1 becomes their lord4 ,man's superiority to the brute depends on the greater perfection of his sense of touch2 on the greater variety of his wants and his associations of ideas2 on the idea of death1 which leads him to seek not merely the avoidance of pain but also self-preservation2 and the possession of language4 ,without denomination no abstractions1 no thought1 no handing down of knowledge4 ,although all that is mental has its origin1 in the last analysis1 in simple sensations1 its development requires emancipation from the sensuous1 and language is the means for freeing ourselves from the pressure of sensations by the generalization and combination of ideas4 ,a more moderate representative of sensationalism was ,charles ,bonnet1 who later exercised a considerable influence in ,germany1 especially until ,tetens 7#agbj-ic2 ,essay in ,psychology1 or ,considerations on the ,operations of the ,soul1 #agee2 ,analytical ,essay on the ,faculties of the ,soul1 #agfj2 ,philosophical ,palingenesis1 or ,ideas on the ,past and the ,future of ,living ,beings1 #agfi1 including a defense of ,christianity2 ,collected ,works1 #aggi74 ,sensations1 to which he1 too1 reduces all mental life1 are1 in his view1 reactions of the immaterial soul to sense stimuli1 which operate merely as occasional causes4 ,on the other hand1 he emphasizes more strongly than ,condillac the dependence of psychical phenomena on physiological conditions1 and endeavors to show definite brain vibrations as the basis not only of habit1 memory1 and the association of ideas1 but also of the higher mental operations4 ,in harmony with these views he adheres to determinism1 and finds the motive of all endeavor3 in self-love1 and its ultimate aim in happiness4 ,to the latter the hope of immortality is indispensable4 ,the link between ,bonnet's theory of the thoroughgoing dependence of the soul on the body and his orthodox convictions1 is formed by his idea of an imperishable ethereal body1 which enables the soul in the life to come to remember its life on earth and1 after the dissolution of the present material body1 to acquire a new one4 ,animals as well as men share in the continuance of existence and the transition to a higher stage4 ,the material earnestness of these thinkers is in sharp contrast to the superficial and frivolous manner in which ,helvetius 7#agae-ga7 carries out sensationalism in the sphere of ethics4 ,his chief work1 ,on ,mind1 came out in #ageh2 and a year after his death1 the work ,on ,man1 his ,intellectual ,faculties and his ,education4 ,the search for pleasure or self-love is1 as ,helvetius thinks he has discovered for the first time1#a the only motive of action2 the laws of interest reign in the moral world as the laws of motion in the physical world2 justice and love for our neighbors are based on utility2 we seek friends in order to be amused1 aided1 and1 in misfortune1 compassionated by them2 the philanthropist and the monster both seek only their own pleasure4 ,footnote #a3 ,in reality not only ,english moralists1 but also some among his countrymen1 had anticipated him in the position that all actions proceed from selfishness1 and that virtue is merely a refined egoism4 ,thus ,la ,rochefoucauld in his ,maxims 7,rflexions1 ou ,sentences et ,maximes ,morales1 #affe71 ,la ,bruyre 7,les ,charactres et les ,moeurs de ce ,sicle1 #afhg71 and ,la ,mettrie 7of4 pp1 #bea-bec74 ,helvetius draws the proof for these positions from ,condillac4 ,recollection and judgment are sensation4 ,the soul is originally nothing more than the capacity for sensation2 it receives the stimulus to its development from self-love1 i4e41 from powerful passions such as the love of fame1 on the one hand1 and1 on the other1 from hatred of ennui1 which induces man to overcome the indolence natural to him and to submit himself to the irksome effort of attention--without passion he would remain stupid4 ,the sum of ideas collected in him is called intellect4 ,all distinctions among men are acquired1 and concern the intellect only1 not the soul3 that which is innate--sensibility and self-love--is the same in all2 differences arise only through external circumstances1 through education4 ,man is the pupil of all that environs him1 of his situation and his chance experience4 ,the most important instrument in education is the law2 the function of the lawgiver is to connect public and personal welfare by means of rewards and punishments1 and thus to elevate morality4 ,a man is called virtuous when his stronger passions harmonize with the general interest4 ,unfortunately the virtues of prejudice1 which do not contribute to the public good1 are more honored among most nations than the political virtues1 to which alone real merit belongs4 ,and self-interest is always the one motive to just and generous action2 we serve only our own interests in furthering the welfare of the community4 ,as the promulgator of these doctrines was himself a kind and generous man1 ,rousseau could make to him the apt reply3 ,you endeavor in vain to degrade yourself below your own level2 your spirit gives evidence against your principles2 your benevolent heart discredits your doctrines4 ,the morality of enlightened self-love or intelligent self-interest appears in a milder form in ,maupertuis 7,works1 #ageb71 and ,frederick the ,great1#a to the latter of whom ,d',alembert objected by letter that interest could never generate the sense of duty and reverence for the law4 ,footnote #a3 ,essay on ,self-love as a ,principle of ,morals1 #aggj1 printed in the proceedings of the ,academy of ,sciences4 ,cf4 on ,frederick1 ,ed4 ,zeller1 #ahhf4 #c4 ,skepticism and ,materialism4 ,the ideas thus far developed move in a direction whose further pursuit inevitably issues in materialism4 ,diderot1 the editor of the ,encyclopedia of the ,sciences1 ,arts1 and ,trades 7#agea-gb71 which gathered all the currents of the ,illumination into one great stream and carried them to the open sea of popular culture1 reflects in his intellectual development the dialectical movement from deism through skepticism to atheism and materialism1 and was a co-laborer in the work which brought the whole movement to a conclusion1 ,holbach's ,system of ,nature4 ,two decades1 however1 before the latter work1 the outcome of a long development of thought1 appeared1 the physician ,la ,mettrie#a 7#agji-ea7 had promulgated materialism1 though rather in an anthropological form than as a world-system1 and with cynical satisfaction in the violation of traditional beliefs--in his ,natural ,history of the ,soul1 #agde1 in a disguised form1 and1 undisguised1 in his ,man a ,machine1 #agdh--;and at the same time 7,anti-,seneca1 or ,discourse on ,happiness1 #agdh7 had sketched out for ,helvetius the outlines of the sensationalistic morality of interest4 ,while ill with a violent fever he observed the influence of the heightened circulation of the blood on his mental tone1 and inferred that thought is the result of the bodily organization4 ,the soul can only be known from the body4 ,the senses1 the best philosophers1 teach us that matter is never without form and motion2 and whether all matter is sentient or not1 certainly all that is sentient is material1 and every part of the organism contains a vital principle 7the heart of a frog beats for an hour after its removal from the body2 the parts of cut-up polyps grow into perfect animals74 ,all ideas come from without1 from the senses2 without sense-impressions no ideas1 without education1 few ideas1 the mind of a man grown up in isolation remains entirely undeveloped2 and since the soul is entirely dependent on the bodily organs1 along with which it originates1 grows1 and declines1 it is subject to mortality4 ,not only animals1 as ,descartes has shown1 but men1 who differ from the brutes only in degree1 are mere machines2 by the soul we mean that part of the body which thinks1 and the brain has fine muscles for thinking as the leg its coarse ones for walking4 ,footnote #a3 ,la ,mettrie was born at ,st4 ,malo1 and educated in ,paris1 and in ,leyden under ,boerhave2 he died in ,berlin1 whither ,frederick the ,great had called him after he had been driven out of his native land and from ,holland4 ,on ,la ,mettrie cf4 ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #di-ia2 and ,du,bois-,reymond's ,address1 #ahge4 ,if man is nothing but body1 there is no other pleasure than that of the body4 ,there is a difference1 however1 between sensuous pleasure1 which is intense and brief1 and intellectual pleasure1 which is calm and lasting4 ,the educated man will prefer the latter1 and find in it a higher and more noble happiness2 but nature has been just enough to grant the common multitude1 in the coarser pleasures1 a more easily attainable happiness4 ,enjoy the moment1 till the farce of life is ended6 ,virtue exists only in society1 which restrains from evil by its laws1 and incites to good by rousing the love of honor4 ,the good man1 who subordinates his own welfare to that of society1 acts under the same necessity as the evil-doer2 hence repentance and pangs of conscience1 which increase the amount of pain in the world1 but are incapable of effecting amendment1 are useless and reprehensible3 the criminal is an ill man1 and must not be more harshly punished than the safety of society requires4 ,materialism humanizes and exercises a tranquilizing influence on the mind1 as the religious view of the world1 with its incitement to hatred1 disturbs it2 materialism frees us from the sense of guilt and responsibility1 and from the fear of future suffering4 ,a state composed of atheists1 is not only possible1 as ,bayle argued1 but it would be the happiest of all states4 ,among the editors of the ,encyclopedia1 the mathematician ,d',alembert 7,elements of ,philosophy1 #ageh7 remained loyal to skeptical views4 ,neither matter nor spirit is in its essence knowable2 the world is probably quite different from our sensuous conception of it4 ,as ,diderot 7#agac-hd71 and the ,encyclopedia with him1 advanced from skepticism to materialism1 ,d',alembert retired from the editorial board 7#ageg71 after ,rousseau1 also1 had separated himself from the ,encyclopedists4 ,diderot#a was the leading spirit in the second half of the eighteenth century1 as ,voltaire in the first half4 ,his lively and many-sided receptivity1 active industry1 clever and combative eloquence1 and enthusiastic disposition qualified him for this rle beyond all his contemporaries1 who testify that they owe even more to his stimulating conversation than to his writings4 ,he commenced by bringing ,shaftesbury's ,inquiry into ,virtue and ,merit to the notice of his countrymen2 and then turned his sword1 on the one hand1 against the atheists1 to refute whom1 he thought1 a single glance into the microscope was sufficient1 and1 on the other1 against the traditional belief in a ,god of anger and revenge1 who takes pleasure in bathing in the tears of mankind4 ,then followed a period of skepticism1 which is well illustrated by the prayer in the ,thoughts on the ,interpretation of ,nature1 #aged3 ,o ,god6 ,i do not know whether thou art1 but ,i will guide my thoughts and actions as though thou didst see me think and act1 etc4 ,under the influence of ,holbach's circle he finally reached 7in the ,conversation between ,d',alembert and ,diderot1 and ,d',alembert's ,dream1 written in #agfi1 but not published until #ahcj1 in vol4 iv4 of the ,mmoires1 ,correspondance1 et ,ouvrages ,indits de ,diderot7 the position of naturalistic monism--there exists but one great individual1 the ,all4 ,though he had formerly distinguished thinking substance from material substance1 and had based the immortality of the soul on the unity of sensation and the unity of the ego1 he now makes sensation a universal and essential property of matter 7la pierre sent71 declares the talk about the simplicity of the soul metaphysico-theological nonsense1 calls the brain a self-playing instrument1 ridicules self-esteem1 shame1 and repentance as the absurd folly of a being that imputes to itself merit or demerit for necessary actions1 and recognizes no other immortality than that of posthumous fame4 ,but even amid these extreme conclusions1 his enthusiasm for virtue remains too intense to allow him to assent to the audacious theories of ,la ,mettrie and ,helvetius4 ,footnote #a3 ,works in twenty-two vols41 ,paris1 ,brire1 #ahba2 latest edition1 #ahge seq4 ,cf4 on ,diderot the fine work by ,karl ,rosenkranz1 ,diderots ,leben und ,werke1 #ahff4 ,french natural science also tended toward materialism4 ,buffon 7,natural ,history1 #agdi seq7 endeavors to facilitate the mechanical explanation of the phenomena of life by the assumption of living molecules1 from which visible organisms are built up4 ,robinet 7,on ,nature1 #agfa seq471 availing himself of ,spinozistic and ,leibnitzian conceptions1 goes still further1 in that he endows every particle of matter with sensation1 looks on the whole world as a succession of living beings with increasing mentality1 and subjects the interaction of the material and psychical sides of the individual1 as well as the relation of pleasure and pain in the universe1 to a law of harmonious compensation4 ,the ,system of ,nature1 #aggj1 which bore on its title page the name of ,mirabaud1 who had died #agfj1 proceeded from the company of freethinkers accustomed to meet in the hospitable house of ,baron von ,holbach 7died #aghi71 a native of the ,palatinate4 ,its real author was ,holbach himself1 although his friends ,diderot1 ,naigeon1 ,lagrange1 the mathematician1 and the clever ,grimm 7died #ahjg7 seem to have co-operated in the preparation of certain sections4 ,the cumbrous seriousness and the dry tone of this systematic combination of the radical ideas which the century had produced1 were no doubt the chief causes of its unsympathetic reception by the public4 ,similarly unsuccessful was the popular account of materialism with which ,holbach followed it1 in #aggb1 and ,helvetius's excerpts from the ,system of ,nature1 #aggd4 ,holbach applies himself to the despiritualization of nature and the destruction of religious prejudices with sincere faith in the sacred mission of unbelief--the happiness of humanity depends on atheism4 ,o ,nature1 sovereign of all beings1 and ye her daughters1 ,virtue1 ,reason1 and ,truth1 be forever our only divinities4 ,what has made virtue so difficult and so rare8 ,religion1 which divides men instead of uniting them4 ,what has so long delayed the illumination of the reason1 and the discovery of truth8 ,religion with its mischievous errors1 ,god1 spirit1 freedom1 immortality4 ,immortality exists only in the memory of later generations2 man is the creature of a day2 nothing is permanent but the great whole of nature and the eternal law of universal change4 ,can a clock broken into a thousand pieces continue to mark the hours8 ,the senseless doctrine of freedom was invented only to solve the senseless problem of the justification of ,god in view of the existence of evil4 ,man is at every moment of his life a passive instrument in the hands of necessity2 the universe is an immeasurable and uninterrupted chain of actions and reactions1 an eternal round of interchanging motions1 ruled by laws1 a change in which would at once alter the nature of all things4 ,the most fatal error is the idea of human and divine spirits1 which has been advanced by philosophers and adopted with applause by fools4 ,the opinion that man is divided into two substances is based on the fact that1 of the changes in our body1 we directly perceive only the external molar movements1 while1 on the other hand1 the inner motions of the invisible molecules are known only by their effects4 ,these latter have been ascribed to the mind1 which1 moreover1 we have adorned with properties whose emptiness is manifested by the fact that they are all mere negations of that which we know4 ,experience reveals to us only the extended1 the corporeal1 the divisible--but the mind is to be the opposite of all three1 yet at the same time to possess the power 7how1 no man can tell7 of acting on that which is material and of being acted upon by it4 ,in thus dividing himself into body and soul1 man has in reality only distinguished between his brain and himself4 ,man is a purely physical being4 ,all so-called spiritual phenomena are functions of the brain1 special cases of the operation of the universal forces of nature4 ,thought and volition are sensation1 sensation is motion4 ,the moving forces in the moral world are the same as those in the physical world2 in the latter they are called attraction and repulsion1 in the former1 love and hate2 that which the moralist terms self-love is the same instinct of self-preservation which is familiar in physics as the force of inertia4 ,as man has doubled himself1 so also he has doubled nature4 ,evil gave the first impulse to the formation of the idea of ,god1 pain and ignorance have been the parents of superstition2 our sufferings were ascribed to unknown powers1 of which we were in fear1 but which1 at the same time1 we hoped to propitiate by prayer and sacrifice4 ,the wise turned with their worship and reverence toward a more worthy object1 to the great ,all2 and1 in fact1 if we seek to give the word ,god a tenable meaning1 it signifies active nature4 ,the error lay in the dualistic view1 in the distinction between nature and itself1 i4e4 its activity1 and in the belief that the explanation of motion required a separate immaterial ,mover4 ,this assumption is1 in the first place1 false1 for since the ,all is the complex of all that exists there can be nothing outside it2 motion follows from the existence of the universe as necessarily as its other properties2 the world does not receive it from without1 but imparts it to itself by its own power4 ,in the second place the assumption is useless2 it explains nothing1 but confuses the problems of natural science to the point of insolubility4 ,in the third place it is self-contradictory1 for after theology has removed the ,deity as far away from man as possible1 by means of the negative metaphysical predicates1 it finds itself necessitated to bring the two together again through the moral attributes--which are neither compatible with one another nor with the meta-physical--and crowns the absurdity by the assurance that we can please ,god by believing that which is incomprehensible4 ,finally1 the assumption is dangerous2 it draws men away from the present1 disturbs their peace and enjoyment1 stirs up hatred1 and thus makes happiness and morality impossible4 ,if1 then1 utility is the criterion of truth1 theism--even in the mild form of deism--is proven erroneous by its disastrous consequences4 ,all error is bane4 ,matter and motion are alike eternal4 ,nature is an active1 self-moving1 living whole1 an endless chain of causes and effects4 ,all is in unceasing motion1 all is cause 7nothing is dead1 nothing rests71 all is effect 7there is no spontaneous motion1 none directed to an end74 ,order and disorder are not in nature1 but only in our understanding2 they are abstract ideas to denote that which is conformable to our nature and that which is contrary to it4 ,the end of the ,all is itself alone1 is life1 activity2 the universal goal of particular beings1 like that of the universe1 is the conservation of being4 ,anthropology is for ,holbach essentially reduced to two problems1 the deduction of thought from motion1 and of morality from the physical tendency to self-preservation4 ,the forces of the soul are no other than those of the body4 ,all mental faculties develop from sensation2 sensations are motions in the brain which reveal to us motions without the brain4 ,all the passions may be reduced to love and hate1 desire and aversion1 and depend upon temperament1 on the individual mixture of the fluid parts4 ,virtue is the equilibrium of the fluids4 ,all human actions proceed from interest4 ,good and bad men are distinguished only by their organizations1 and by the ideas they form concerning happiness4 ,with the same necessity as that of the act itself1 follow the love or contempt of fellow-men1 the pleasure of self-esteem and the pain of repentance 7regret for evil consequences1 hence no evidence of freedom74 ,neither responsibility nor punishment is done away with by this necessity--have we not the right to protect ourselves against the stream which damages our fields1 by building dikes and altering its course8 ,the end of endeavor is permanent happiness1 and this can be attained through virtue alone4 ,the passions which are useful to society compel the affection and approval of our fellows4 ,in order to interest others in our welfare we must interest ourselves in theirs--nothing is more indispensable to man than man4 ,the clever man acts morally1 interest binds us to the good2 love for others means love for the means to our own happiness4 ,virtue is the art of making ourselves happy through the happiness of others4 ,nature itself chastises immorality1 since she makes the intemperate unhappy4 ,religion has hindered the recognition of these rules1 has misunderstood the diseases of the soul1 and applied false and ineffective remedies2 the renunciation which she requires is opposed to human nature4 ,the true moralist recognizes in medicine the key to the human heart2 he will cure the mind through the body1 control the passions and hold them in check by other passions instead of by sermons1 and will teach men that the surest road to personal ends is to labor for the public good4 ,illumination is the way to virtue and to happiness4 ,volney 7,chasseboeuf1 died #ahbj2 ,catechism of the ,french ,citizen1 #agic1 later under the title ,natural ,law or ,physical ,principles of ,morals deduced front the ,organization of ,man and of the ,universe2 further1 ,the ,ruins2 ,complete ,works1 #ahba7 belongs among the moralists of self-love1 although1 besides the egoistic interests1 he takes account of the natural sympathetic impulses also4 ,this is still more the case with ,condorcet 7,sketch of an ,historical ,view of the ,progress of the ,human ,mind1 #agid71 who was influenced alike by ,condillac and by ,turgot1 and who defends a tendency toward universal perfection both in the individual and in the race4 ,besides the selfish affections1 which are directed as much to the injury as to the support of others1 there lies in the organization of man a force which steadily tends toward the good1 in the form of underived feelings of sympathy and benevolence1 from which moral self-judgment is developed by the aid of reflection4 ,the aim of true ethics and social art is not to make the great virtues universal1 but to make them needless2 the nearer the nations approximate to mental and moral perfection1 the less they stand in need of these--happy the people in which good deeds are so customary that scarcely an opportunity is left for heroism4 ,the chief instrument for the moral cultivation of the people is the development of the reason1 the conscience1 and the benevolent affections4 ,habituation to deeds of kindness is a source of pure and inexhaustible happiness4 ,sympathy with the good of others must be so cultivated that the sacrifice of personal enjoyment will be a sweeter joy than the pleasure itself4 ,let the child early learn to enjoy the delight of loving and of being loved4 ,we must1 finally1 strive toward the gradual diminution of the inequalities of capacity1 of property1 and between ruler and ruled1 for to abolish them is impossible4 ,of the remaining philosophers of the revolutionary period mention may be made of the physician ,cabanis 7,relations of the ,physical and the ,moral in ,man1 #agii71 and ,destutt de ,tracy 7,elements of ,ideology1 #ahja seq474 ,the former is a materialist in psychology 7the nerves are the man1 ideas are secretions of the brain71 considers consciousness a property of organic matter 7the soul is not a being1 but a faculty71 and makes moral sympathy develop out of the animal instincts of preservation and nourishment4 ,de ,tracy1 also1 derives all psychical activity from organization and sensation4 ,his doctrine of the will1 though but briefly sketched1 is interesting4 ,the desires have a passive and an active side 7corresponding to the twofold action of the nerves1 on themselves and on the muscles72 on the one hand1 they are feelings of pleasure or pain1 and on the other1 they lead us to action--will is need1 and1 at the same time1 the source of the means for satisfying this need4 ,both these feelings and the external movements are probably based upon unconscious organic motions4 ,the will is rightly identified with the personality1 it is the ego itself1 the totality of the physico-psychical life of man attaining to self-consciousness4 ,the inner or organic life consists in the self-preserving functions of the individual1 the outer or animal life1 in the functions of relation 7of sense1 of motion1 of speech1 of reproduction72 individual interests are rooted in the former1 sympathy in the latter4 ,the primal good is freedom1 or the power to do what we will2 the highest thing in life is love4 ,in order to be happy we must avoid punishment1 blame1 and pangs of conscience4 #d4 ,rousseau's ,conflict with the ,illumination4 ,the ,genevese1 ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau#a 7#agab-gh71 stands in a similar relation of opposition to the ,french ,illumination as the ,scottish ,school to the ,english1 and ,herder and ,jacobi to the ,german4 ,he points us away from the cold sophistical inferences of the understanding to the immediate conviction of feeling2 from the imaginations of science to the unerring voice of the heart and the conscience2 from the artificial conditions of culture to healthy nature4 ,the vaunted ,illumination is not the lever of progress1 but the source of all degeneration2 morality does not rest on the shrewd calculation of self-interest1 but on original social and sympathetic instincts 7love for the good is just as natural to the human heart as self-love2 enthusiasm for virtue has nothing to do with our interest2 what would it mean to give up one's life for the sake of advantage872 the truths of religion are not objects of thought1 but of pious feeling4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,brockerhoff1 ,leipsic1 #ahfc-gd2 ,l4 ,moreau1 ,paris1 #ahgj4 ,rousseau commenced his career as an author with the ,discourse on the ,sciences and the ,arts1 #agej 7the discussion of a prize question1 crowned by the ,academy of ,dijon71 which he describes as entirely pernicious1 and the ,discourse on the ,origin and the ,bases of the ,inequality among ,men1 #agec4 ,by nature man is innocent and good1 becoming evil only in society4 ,reflection1 civilization1 and egoism are unnatural4 ,in the happy state of nature pity and innocent self-love 7amour de soi7 ruled1 and the latter was first corrupted by the reason into the artificial feeling of selfishness 7amour propre7 in the course of social development--thinking man is a degenerate animal4 ,property has divided men into rich and poor2 the magistracy1 into strong and weak2 arbitrary power1 into masters and slaves4 ,wealth generated luxury with its artificial delights of science and the theater1 which make us more unhappy and evil than we otherwise are2 science1 the child of vice1 becomes in turn the mother of new vices4 ,all nature1 all that is characteristic1 all that is good1 has disappeared with advancing culture2 the only relief from the universal degeneracy is to be hoped for from a return to nature on the part of the individual and society alike--from education and a state conformed to nature4 ,the novel ,emile is devoted to the pedagogical1 and the ,social ,contract1 or the ,principles of ,political ,law1 to the political problem4 ,both appeared in #agfb1 followed two years later by the ,letters from the ,mountain1 a defense against the attacks of the clergy4 ,in these later writings ,rousseau's naturalistic hatred of reason appears essentially softened4 ,social order is a sacred right1 which forms the basis of all others4 ,it does not proceed1 however1 from nature--no man has natural power over his fellows1 and might confers no right--consequently it rests on a contract4 ,not1 however1 on a contract between ruler and people4 ,the act by which the people chooses a king is preceded by the act in virtue of which it is a people4 ,in the social contract each devotes himself with his powers and his goods to the community1 in order to gain the protection of the latter4 ,with this act the spiritual body politic comes into being1 and attains its unity1 its ego1 its will4 ,the sum of the members is called the people2 each member1 as a participant in the sovereignty1 citizen1 and1 as bound to obedience to the law1 subject4 ,the individual loses his natural freedom1 receiving in exchange the liberty of a citizen1 which is limited by the general will1 and1 in addition1 property rights in all that he possesses1 equality before the law1 and moral freedom1 which first really makes him master of himself4 ,the impulse of mere desire is slavery1 obedience to self-imposed law1 freedom4 ,the sovereign is the people1 law the general popular will directed to the common good1 the supreme goods1 freedom and equality1 the chief objects of legislation4 ,the lawgiving power is the moral will of the body politic1 the government 7magistracy1 prince7 its executive physical power2 the former is its heart1 the latter its brain4 ,rousseau calls the government the middle term between the head of the state and the individual1 or between the citizen as lawgiver and as subject--the sovereign 7the people7 commands1 the government executes1 the subject obeys4 ,the act by which the people submits itself to its head is not a contract1 but merely a mandate2 whenever it chooses it can limit1 alter1 or entirely recall the delegated power4 ,in order to security against illegal encroachments on the part of the government1 ,rousseau recommends regular assemblies of the people1 in which1 under suspension of governmental authority1 the confirmation1 abrogation1 or alteration of the constitution shall be determined upon4 ,even the establishment of the articles of social belief falls to the sovereign people4 ,the essential difference between ,rousseau's theory of the state and that of ,locke and ,montesquieu consists in his rejection of the division of powers and of representation by delegates1 hence in its unlimited democratic character4 ,a generation after it was given to the world1 the ,french ,revolution made the attempt to translate it into practice4 ,the masses carried out what ,rousseau himself had thought1 it is true1 but never willed 7,windelband74 ,rousseau's theory of education is closely allied to ,locke's 7cf4 above71 whose leading idea--the development of individuality--was entirely in harmony with the subjectivism of the philosopher of feeling4 ,posterity has not found it a difficult task to free the sound kernel therein from the husks of exaggeration and idiosyncrasy which surrounded it4 ,among the latter belong the preference of bodily over intellectual development1 and the unlimited faith in the goodness of human nature4 ,exercise the body1 the organs1 the senses of the pupil1 and keep his soul unemployed as long as possible2 for the first1 take care only that his mind be kept free from error and his heart from vice4 ,in order to secure complete freedom from disturbance in this development1 it is advisable to isolate the child from society1 nay1 even from the family1 and to bring him up in retirement under the guidance of a private tutor4 ,as the ,swiss republican spoke in ,rousseau's politics1 so his religious theories#a betray the ,genevan ,calvinist4 ,the ,savoyard ,vicar's ,profession of ,faith 7in ,emile7 proclaims deism as a religion of feeling4 ,the rational proofs brought forward for the existence of ,god--from the motion of matter in itself at rest1 and from the finality of the world--are only designed1 as he declares by letter1 to confute the materialists1 and derive their impregnability entirely from the inner evidence of feeling1 which amid the vacillation of the reason pro and con gives the final decision4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,ch4 ,borgeaud1 ,rousseaus ,religionsphilosophie1 ,geneva and ,leipsic1 #ahhc4 ,if we limit our inquiry to that which is alone of importance for us1 and rely on the evidence of feeling1 it cannot be doubted that ,i myself exist and feel2 that there exists an external world which affects me2 that thought1 comparison or judgment concerning relations is different from sensation or the perception of objects--for the latter is a passive1 but the former an active process2 that ,i myself produce the activity of attention or consideration2 that1 consequently1 ,i am not merely a sensitive or passive1 but also an active or intelligent being4 ,the freedom of my thought and action guarantees to me the immateriality of my soul1 and is that which distinguishes me from the brute4 ,the life of the soul after the decay of the body is assured to me by the fact that in this world the wicked triumphs1 while the good are oppressed4 ,the favored position which man occupies in the scale of beings--he is able to look over the universe and to reverence its author1 to recognize order and beauty1 to love the good and to do it2 and shall he1 then1 compare himself to the brute8--fills me with emotion and gratitude to the benevolent ,creator1 who existed before all things1 and who will exist when they all shall have vanished away1 to whom all truths are one single idea1 all places a point1 all times a moment4 ,the how of freedom1 of eternity1 of creation1 of the action of my will upon matter1 etc41 is1 indeed1 incomprehensible to me1 but that these are so1 my feeling makes me certain4 ,the worthiest employment of my reason is to annihilate itself before ,god4 ,the more ,i strive to contemplate his infinite essence the less do ,i conceive it4 ,but it is1 and that suffices me4 ,the less ,i conceive it1 the more ,i adore4 ,in the depths of my heart ,i find the rules for my conduct engraved by nature in ineffaceable characters4 ,everything is good that ,i feel to be so4 ,the conscience is the most enlightened of all philosophers1 and as safe a guide for the soul as instinct for the body4 ,the infallibility of its judgment is evidenced by the agreement of different peoples2 amid the surprising differences of manners you will everywhere find the same ideas of justice1 the same notions of good and evil4 ,show me a land where it is a crime to keep one's word1 to be merciful1 benevolent1 magnanimous1 where the upright man is despised and the faithless honored6 ,conscience enjoins the limitation of our desires to the degree to which we are capable of satisfying them1 but not their complete suppression--all passions are good when we control them1 all evil when they control us4 ,in the second part of the ,profession du ,foi du ,vicaire ,savoyard ,rousseau turns from his attacks on sensationalism1 materialism1 atheism1 and the morality of interest1 to the criticism of revelation4 ,why1 in addition to natural religion1 with its three fundamental doctrines1 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 should other special doctrines be necessary1 which rather confuse than clear up our ideas of the ,great ,being1 which exact from us the acceptance of absurdities1 and make men proud1 intolerant1 and cruel--whereas ,god requires from us no other service than that of the heart8 ,every religion is good in which men serve ,god in a befitting manner4 ,if ,god had prescribed one single religion for us1 he would have provided it with infallible marks of its unique authenticity4 ,the authority of the fathers and the priesthood is not decisive1 for every religion claims to be revealed and alone true2 the ,mohammedan has the same right as the ,christian to adhere to the religion of his fathers4 ,since all revelation comes down to us by human tradition1 reason alone can be the judge of its divinity4 ,the careful examination of the documents1 which are written in ancient languages1 would require an amount of learning which could not possibly be a condition of salvation and acceptance with ,god4 ,miracles and prophecy are not conclusive1 for how are we to distinguish the true among them from the false8 ,if we turn from the external to the internal criteria of the doctrines themselves1 even here no decision can be reached between the reasons pro and con 7the author puts the former into the mouth of a believer1 and the latter into that of a rationalist72 even if the former outweighed the latter1 the difficulty would still remain of reconciling it with ,god's goodness and justice that the gospel has not reached so many of mankind1 and of explaining how those to whom the divinity of ,christ is now proclaimed can convince themselves of it1 while his contemporaries misjudged and crucified him4 ,in my opinion1 ,i am incapable of fathoming the truth of the ,christian religion and its value to those who confess it4 ,the investigation of the reason ends in reverential doubt3 ,i neither accept revelation nor reject it1 but ,i reject the obligation to accept it4 ,my heart1 however1 judges otherwise than the reflection of my intellect2 for this the sacred majesty and exalted simplicity of the ,scriptures are a most cogent proof that they are more than human1 and that ,he whose history they contain is more than man4 ,the touching grace and profound wisdom of his words1 the gentleness of his conduct1 the loftiness of his maxims1 his mastery over his passions1 abundantly prove that he was neither an enthusiast nor an ambitious sectary4 ,socrates lived and died like a philosopher1 ,jesus like a ,god4 ,the virtues of justice1 patriotism1 and moderation taught by ,socrates1 had been exercised by the great men of ,greece before he inculcated them4 ,but whence could ,jesus derive in his time and country that lofty morality which he alone taught and exemplified8 ,things of this sort are not invented4 ,the inventor of such deeds would be more wonderful than the doer of them4 ,thus again1 in the question of revealed religion1 the voice of the heart triumphs over the doubts of the reason1 as1 in the question of natural religion1 it had done over the objections of opponents4 ,it is true1 however1 that this enthusiasm is paid not to the current ,christianity of the priests1 but to ,i the real ,christianity of the gospel4 ,rousseau was the conscience of ,france1 which rebelled against the negations and the bald emptiness of the materialistic and atheistic doctrines4 ,by vindicating with fervid eloquence the participation of the whole man in the highest questions1 in opposition to the one-sided illumination of the understanding1 he became a pre-,kantian defender of the faith of practical reason4 ,his emphatic summons aroused a loud and lasting echo1 especially in ,germany1 in the hearts of ,goethe1 ,kant1 and ,fichte4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,leibnitz4 ,in the contemporaries ,spinoza and ,locke1 the two schools of modern philosophy1 the ,continental1 starting from ,descartes1 and the ,english1 which followed ,bacon1 had reached the extreme of divergence and opposition1 ,spinoza was a rationalistic pantheist1 ,locke1 an empirical individualist4 ,with ,leibnitz a twofold approximation begins4 ,as a rationalist he sides with ,spinoza against ,locke1 as an individualist with ,locke against ,spinoza4 ,but he not only separated rationalism from pantheism1 but also qualified it by the recognition 7which his historical tendencies had of themselves suggested to him7 of a relative justification for empiricism1 since he distinguished the factual truths of experience from the necessary truths of reason1 gave to the former a notical principle of their own1 the principle of sufficient reason1 and made sensation an indispensable step to thought4 ,to the tendencies thus manifested toward a just estimation and peaceful reconciliation of opposing standpoints1 ,leibnitz remained true in all the fields to which he devoted his activity4 ,thus1 in the sphere of religion1 he took an active part in the negotiations looking toward the reunion of the ,protestant and ,catholic ,churches1 as well as in those concerning the union of the ,lutheran and the ,reformed4 ,himself a stimulating man1 he yet needed stimulation from without4 ,he was an astonishingly wide reader1 and declared that he had never found a book that did not contain something of value4 ,with a ready adaptability to the ideas of others he combined a remarkable power of transformative appropriation2 he read into books more than stood written in them4 ,the versatility of his genius was unlimited3 jurist1 historian1 diplomat1 mathematician1 physical scientist1 and philosopher1 and in addition almost a theologian and a philologist--he is not only at home in all these departments1 because versed in them1 but everywhere contributes to their advancement by original ideas and plans4 ,in such a combination of productive genius and wealth of knowledge ,aristotle and ,leibnitz are unapproached4 ,gottfried ,wilhelm ,leibnitz was born in #afdf at ,leipsic1 where his father 7,friederich ,leibnitz1 died #afeb7 was professor of moral philosophy2 in his fifteenth year he entered the university of his native city1 with law as his principal subject4 ,besides law1 he devoted himself with quite as much of ardor to philosophy under ,jacob ,thomasius 7died #afhd1 the father of ,christian ,thomasius71 and to mathematics under ,e4 ,weigel in ,jena4 ,in #affc 7with a dissertation entitled ,de ,principio ,individui7 he became ,bachelor1 in #affd ,master of ,philosophy1 and in #afff1 at ,altdorf1 ,doctor of ,laws1 and then declined the professorship extraordinary offered him in the latter place4 ,having made the acquaintance of the former minister of the ,elector of ,mayence1 ,freiherr von ,boineburg1 in ,nuremberg1 he went1 after a short stay at ,frankfort-on-the-,main1 to the court of the ,elector at ,mayence1 at whose request he devoted himself to the reform of legal procedure1 besides writing1 while there1 on the most diverse subjects4 ,in #afgb he went to ,paris1 where he remained during four years with the exception of a short stay in ,london4 ,the special purpose of the journey to ,paris--to persuade ,louis ,,xiv to undertake a campaign in ,egypt1 in order to divert him from his designs upon ,germany--was not successful2 but ,leibnitz was captivated by the society of the ,parisian scholars1 among them the mathematician1 ,huygens4 ,from the end of #afgf until his death in #agaf ,leibnitz lived in ,hanover1 whither he had been called by ,johann ,friedrich1 as court councillor and librarian4 ,the successor of this prince1 ,ernst ,august1 who1 with his wife ,sophie1 and his daughter ,sophie ,charlotte1 showed great kindness to the philosopher1 wished him to write a history of the princely house of ,brunswick2 and a journey which he made in order to study for this purpose was extended as far as ,vienna and ,rome4 ,upon his return he took charge of the ,wolfenbttel library in addition to his other engagements4 ,the marriage of the ,princess ,sophie ,charlotte with ,frederick of ,brandenburg1 the first king of ,prussia1 brought ,leibnitz into close relations with ,berlin4 ,at his suggestion the ,academy 7,society7 of ,sciences was founded there in #agjj1 and he himself became its first president4 ,in ,charlottenburg he worked on his principal work1 the ,new ,essays concerning the ,human ,understanding1 which was aimed at ,locke1 but the publication of which was deferred on account of the death of the latter in the interim 7#agjd71 and did not take place until #agfe1 in ,raspe's collective edition4 ,the death of the ,prussian queen in #agje interrupted for several years the ,theodicy1 which had been undertaken at her request1 and which did not appear until #agaj4 ,in ,vienna1 where he resided in #agac-ad1 ,leibnitz composed a short statement of his system for ,prince ,eugen2 this1 according to ,gerhardt1 was not the sketch in ninety paragraphs1 familiar under the title ,monadology1 which was first published in the original by ,j4,e4 ,erdmann in his excellent ,complete ,edition of the ,philosophical ,works of ,leibnitz1 #ahdj1 but the ,principles of ,nature and of ,grace1 which appeared two years after the author's death in ,l',europe ,savante4 ,while ,ernst ,august1 as well as the ,german emperor and ,peter the ,great1 distinguished the philosopher1 who was not indifferent to such honors1 by the bestowal of titles and preferments1 his relations with the ,hanoverian court1 which until then had been so cordial1 grew cold after the ,elector ,georg ,ludwig ascended the ,english throne as ,george ,i4 ,the letters which ,leibnitz interchanged with his daughter-in-law1 gave rise to the correspondence1 continued to his death1 with ,clarke1 who defended the theology of ,newton against him4 ,the contest for priority between ,leibnitz and ,newton concerning the invention of the differential calculus was later settled by the decision that ,newton invented his method of fluxions first1 but that ,leibnitz published his differential calculus earlier and in a more perfect form4 ,the variety of pursuits in which ,leibnitz was engaged was unfavorable to the development and influence of his philosophy1 in that it hindered him from working out his original ideas in systematic form1 and left him leisure only for the composition of shorter essays4 ,besides the two larger works mentioned above1 the ,new ,essays and the ,theodicy1 we have of philosophical works by ,leibnitz only a series of private letters1 and articles for the scientific journals 7the ,journal des ,savants in ,paris1 and the ,acta ,eruditorum in ,leipsic1 etc471 among which may be mentioned as specially important the ,new ,system of ,nature1 and of the ,interaction of ,substances as well as of the ,union which exists between the ,soul and the ,body1 #afie1 which was followed during the next year by three explanations of it1 and the paper ,de ,ipsa ,natura1 #afih4 ,previous to ,erdmann 7#ahdj7 the following had deserved credit for their editions of ,leibnitz3 ,feller1 ,kortholt1 ,gruber1 ,raspe1 ,dutens1 ,feder1 ,guhrauer 7the ,german works71 and since ,erdmann1 ,pertz1 ,foucher de ,careil1 ,onno ,klopp1 and especially ,j4,c4 ,gerhardt4 ,the last named published the mathematical works in seven volumes in #ahdi-fc1 and recently1 ,berlin1 #ahge-ij1 the philosophical treatises1 also in seven volumes4#a ,in our account of the philosophy of ,leibnitz we begin with the fundamental metaphysical concepts1 pass next to his theory of living beings and of man 7theory of knowledge and ethics71 and close with his inquiries into the philosophy of religion4 ,footnote #a3 ,we have a life of ,leibnitz by ,g4,e4 ,guhrauer1 jubilee edition1 ,breslau1 #ahdf ,mackie's ,life1 ,boston1 #ahde is based on ,guhrauer4 ,among recent works on ,leibnitz1 we note the little work by ,merz1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhd1 and ,ludwig ,stein's ,leibniz und ,spinoza1 ,berlin1 #ahij1 in which with the aid of previously unedited material the relations of ,leibnitz to ,spinoza 7whom he visited at ,the ,hague on his return journey from ,paris7 are discussed1 and the attempt is made to trace the development of the theory of monads1 down to #afig4 ,the new exposition of the ,leibnitzian monadology by ,ed4 ,dillman1 which has just appeared1 we have not yet been able to examine ,the ,english reader may be referred further to ,dewey's ,leibniz in ,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhh1 and ,duncan's ,philosophical ,works of ,leibnitz 7selections translated1 with notes71 ,new ,haven1 #ahij1 as well as to the work of ,merz already mentioned4--,,tr4 #a4 ,metaphysics3 the ,monads1 ,representation1 the ,pre-established ,harmony2 the ,laws of ,thought and of the ,world4 ,leibnitz develops his new concept of substance1 the monad1#a in conjunction with1 yet in opposition to1 the ,cartesian and the atomistic conceptions4 ,the ,cartesians are right when they make the concept of substance the cardinal point in metaphysics and explain it by the concept of independence4 ,but they are wrong in their further definition of this second concept4 ,if we take independence in the sense of unlimitedness and aseity1 we can speak1 as the example of ,spinoza shows1 of only one1 the divine substance4 ,if the ,spinozistic result is to be avoided1 we must substitute independent action for independent existence1 self-activity for self-existence4 ,substance is not that which exists through itself 7otherwise there would be no finite substances71 but that which acts through itself1 or that which contains in itself the ground of its changing states4 ,substance is to be defined by active force1#b by which we mean something different from and better than the bare possibility or capacity of the ,scholastics4 ,the potentia sive facultas1 in order to issue into action1 requires positive stimulation from without1 while the vis activa 7like an elastic body7 sets itself in motion whenever no external hindrance opposes4 ,substance is a being capable of action 7la substance est un tre capable d'action74 ,with the equation of activity and existence 7quod non agit1 non existit7 the substantiality which ,spinoza had taken away from individual things is restored to them3 they are active1 consequently1 in spite of their limitedness1 substantial beings 7quod agit1 est substantia singularis74 ,because of its inner activity every existing thing is a determinate individual1 and different from every other being4 ,substance is an individual being endowed with force4 ,footnote #a3 ,according to ,l4 ,stein's conjecture1 ,leibnitz took the expression ,monad1 which he employs after #afif1 from the younger 7,franc4 ,mercurius7 van ,helmont4 ,footnote #b3 ,francis ,glisson 7#aeif-afgg1 professor of medicine in ,cambridge and ,london7 had as early as #afga1 conceived substances as forces in his treatise ,de ,natura ,substantiae ,energetica4 ,that ,glisson influenced ,leibnitz1 as maintained by ,h4 ,marion 7,paris1 #ahhj71 has not been proven2 cf4 ,l4 ,stein1 p4 #ahd4 ,the atomists are right when they postulate for the explanation of phenomenal bodies simple1 indivisible1 eternal units1 for every composite consists of simple parts4 ,but they are wrong when they regard these invisible1 minute corpuscles1 which are intended to subserve this purpose as indivisible3 everything that is material1 however small it be1 is divisible to infinity1 nay1 is in fact endlessly divided4 ,if we are to find indivisible units1 we must pass over into the realm of the immaterial and come to the conclusion that bodies are composed of immaterial constituents4 ,physical points1 the atoms1 are physical1 but not points2 mathematical points are indivisible1 but not real2 metaphysical or substantial points1 the incorporeal1 soul-like units1 alone combine in themselves indivisibility and reality--the monads are the true atoms4 ,together with indivisibility they possess immortality2 as it is impossible for them to arise and perish through the combination and separation of parts1 they cannot come into being or pass out of it in any natural way whatever1 but only by creation or annihilation4 ,their non-spatial or punctual character implies the impossibility of all external influence1 the monad develops its states from its own inner nature1 has need of no other thing1 is sufficient unto itself1 and therefore deserves the ,aristotelian name1 entelechy4 ,thus two lines of thought combine in the concept of the monad4 ,gratefully recognizing the suggestions from both sides1 ,leibnitz called ,cartesianism the antechamber of the true philosophy1 and atomism the preparation for the theory of monads4 ,from the first it followed that the substances were self-acting forces2 from the second1 that they were immaterial units4 ,through the combination of both determinations we gain information concerning the kind of force or activity which constitutes the being of the monad3 the monads are representative forces4 ,there is nothing truly real in the world save the monads and their representations ideas1 perceptions4 ,in discussing the representation in which the being and activity of the monads consist1 we must not think directly of the conscious activity of the human soul4 ,representation has in ,leibnitz a wider meaning than that usually associated with the word4 ,the distinction1 which has become of the first importance for psychology1 between mere representation and conscious representation1 or between perception and apperception1 may be best explained by the example of the sound of the waves4 ,the roar which we perceive in the vicinity of the sea-beach is composed of the numerous sounds of the single waves4 ,each single sound is of itself too small to be heard2 nevertheless it must make an impression on us1 if only a small one1 since otherwise their total--as a sum of mere nothings--could not be heard4 ,the sensation which the motion of the single wave causes is a weak1 confused1 unconscious1 infinitesimal perception 7petite1 insensible perception71 which must be combined with many similar minute sensations in order to become strong and distinct1 or to rise above the threshold of consciousness4 ,the sound of the single wave is felt1 but not distinguished1 is perceived1 but not apperceived4 ,these obscure states of unconscious representation1 which are present in the mind of man along with states of clear consciousness1 make up1 in the lowest grade of existence1 the whole life of the monad4 ,there are beings which never rise above the condition of deep sleep or stupor4 ,in conformity with this more inclusive meaning1 perception is defined as the representation of the external in the internal1 of multiplicity in unity 7representatio multitudinis in unitate74 ,the representing being1 without prejudice to its simplicity1 bears in itself a multitude of relations to external things4 ,what now is the manifold1 which is expressed1 perceived1 or represented1 in the unit1 the monad8 ,it is the whole world4 ,every monad represents all others in itself1 is a concentrated all1 the universe in miniature4 ,each individual contains an infinity in itself 7substantia infinitas actiones simul exercet7 and a supreme intelligence1 for which every obscure idea would at once become distinct1 would be able to read in a single monad the whole universe and its history--all that is1 has been1 or will be2 for the past has left its traces behind it1 and the future will bring nothing not founded in the present3 the monad is freighted with the past and bears the future in its bosom4 ,every monad is thus a mirror of the universe1#a but a living mirror 7miror vivant de l'univers71 which generates the images of things by its own activity or develops them from inner germs1 without experiencing influences from without4 ,the monad has no windows through which anything could pass in or out1 but in its action is dependent only on ,god and on itself4 ,footnote #a3 ,the objection has been made against ,leibnitz1 and not without reason1 that strictly speaking there is no content for the representation of the monads1 although he appears to offer them the richest of all contents1 the whole world4 ,the ,all which he makes them represent is itself nothing but a sum of beings1 also representative4 ,the objects of representation are merely representing subjects2 the monad ,a represents the monads from ,b to ,z1 while these in turn do nothing more than represent one another4 ,the monad mirrors mirrors--where is the thing that is mirrored8 ,the essence of substance consists in being related to others1 which themselves are only points of relation2 amid mere relativities we never reach a real4 ,that which prevented ,leibnitz himself from recognizing this empty formalism was1 no doubt1 the fact that for him the mere form of representation was at once filled with a manifold experiential content1 with the whole wealth of spiritual life1 and that the quantitative differences in representation1 which for him meant also degrees of feeling1 desire1 action1 and progress1 imperceptibly took on the qualitative vividness of individual characteristics4 ,moreover1 it must not be overlooked that the spiritual beings represent not merely the universe but the ,deity as well1 hence a very rich object4 ,all monads represent the same universe1 but each one represents it differently1 that is1 from its particular point of view--represents that which is near at hand distinctly1 and that which is distant confusedly4 ,since they all reflect the same content or object1 their difference consists only in the energy or degree of clearness in their representations4 ,so far then1 as their action consists in representation1 distinct representation evidently coincides with complete1 unhindered activity1 confused representation with arrested activity1 or passivity4 ,the clearer the representations of a monad the more active it is4 ,to have clear and distinct perceptions only is the prerogative of ,god2 to the ,omnipresent everything is alike near4 ,he alone is pure activity2 all finite beings are passive as well1 that is1 so far as their perceptions are not clear and distinct4 ,retaining the ,aristotelian-,scholastic terminology1 ,leibnitz calls the active principle form1 the passive matter1 and makes the monad1 since it is not1 like ,god1 purus actus and pure form1 consist of form 7entelechy1 soul7 and matter4 ,this matter1 as a constituent of the monad1 does not mean corporeality1 but only the ground for the arrest of its activity4 ,the materia prima 7the principle of passivity in the monad7 is the ground1 the materia secunda 7the phenomenon of corporeal mass7 the result of the indistinctness of the representations4 ,for a group of monads appears as a body when it is indistinctly perceived4 ,whoever deprives the monad of activity falls into the error of ,spinoza2 whoever takes away its passivity or matter falls into the opposite error1 for he deifies individual beings4 ,no monad represents the common universe and its individual parts just as well as the others1 but either better or worse4 ,there are as many different degrees of clearness and distinctness as there are monads4 ,nevertheless certain classes may be distinguished4 ,by distinguishing between clear and obscure perceptions1 and in the former class between distinct and confused ones--a perception is clear when it is sufficiently distinguished from others1 distinct when its component parts are thus distinguished--,leibnitz reaches three principal grades4 ,lowest stand the simple or naked monads1 which never rise above obscure and unconscious perception and1 so to speak1 pass their lives in a swoon or sleep4 ,if perception rises into conscious feeling1 accompanied by memory1 then the monad deserves the name of soul4 ,and if the soul rises to self-consciousness and to reason or the knowledge of universal truth1 it is called spirit4 ,each higher stage comprehends the lower1 since even in spirits many perceptions remain obscure and confused4 ,hence it was an error when the ,cartesians made thought or conscious activity--by which1 it is true1 the spirit is differentiated from the lower beings--to such a degree the essence of spirit that they believed it necessary to deny to it all unconscious perceptions4 ,from perception arises appetition1 not as independent activity1 but as a modification of perception2 it is nothing but the tendency to pass from one perception to another 7l'appetit est la tendance d'une perception une autre72 impulse is perception in process of becoming4 ,where the perceptions are conscious and rational appetition rises into will4 ,all monads are self-active or act spontaneously1 but only the thinking ones are free4 ,freedom is the spontaneity of spirits4 ,freedom does not consist in undetermined choice1 but in action without external compulsion according to the laws of one's own being4 ,the monad develops its representations out of itself1 from the germs which form its nature4 ,the correspondence of the different pictures of the world1 however1 is grounded in a divine arrangement1 through which the natures of the monads have from the beginning been so adapted to one another that the changes in their states1 although they take place in each according to immanent laws and without external influence1 follow an exactly parallel course1 and the result is the same as though there were a constant mutual interaction4 ,this general idea of a pre-established harmony finds special application in the problem of the interaction between body and soul4 ,body and soul are like two clocks so excellently constructed that1 without needing to be regulated by each other1 they show exactly the same time4 ,over the numberless lesser miracles with which occasionalism burdened the ,deity1 the one great miracle of the pre-established harmony has an undeniable advantage4 ,as one great miracle it is more worthy of the divine wisdom than the many lesser ones1 nay1 it is really no miracle at all1 since the harmony does not interfere with natural laws1 but yields them4 ,this idea may even be freed from its theological investiture and reduced to the purely metaphysical expression1 that the natures of the monads1 by which the succession of their representations is determined in conformity with law1 consist in nothing else than the sum of relations in which this individual thing stands to all other parts of the world1 wherein each member takes account of all others and at the same time is considered by them1 and thus exerts influence as well as suffers it4 ,in this way the external idea of an artificial adaptation is avoided4 ,the essence of each thing is simply the position which it occupies in the organic whole of the universe2 each member is related to every other and shares actively and passively in the life of all the rest4 ,the history of the universe is a single great process in numberless reflections4 ,the metaphysics of ,leibnitz begins with the concept of representation and ends with the harmony of the universe4 ,the representations were multiplicity 7the endless plurality of the represented7 in unity 7the unity of the representing monad72 the harmony is unity 7order1 congruity of the world-image7 in multiplicity 7the infinitely manifold degrees of clearness in the representations74 ,all monads represent the same universe2 each one mirrors it differently4 ,the unity1 as well as the difference1 could not be greater than it is2 every possible degree of distinctness of representation is present in each single monad1 and yet there is a single harmonic accord in which the unnumbered tones unite4 ,now order amid diversity1 unity in variety make up the concept of beauty and perfection4 ,if1 then1 this world shows1 as it does1 the greatest unity in the greatest multiplicity1 so that there is nothing wanting and nothing superfluous1 it is the most perfect1 the best of all possible worlds4 ,even the lowest grades contribute to the perfection of the whole2 their disappearance would mean a hiatus2 and if the unclear and confused representations appear imperfect when considered in themselves1 yet they are not so in reference to the whole2 for just on this fact1 that the monad is arrested in its representation or is passive1 i4e41 conforms itself to the others and subordinates itself to them1 rest the order and connection of the world4 ,thus the idea of harmony forms the bridge between the ,monadology and optimism4 ,as in regard to the harmony of the universe we found it possible to distinguish between a half-mythical1 narrative form of presentation and a purely abstract conception1 so we may make a similar distinction in the doctrine of creation4 ,this actual world has been chosen by ,god as the best among many other conceivable worlds4 ,through the will of ,god the monads of which the world consists attained their reality2 as possibilities or ideas they were present in the mind of ,god 7as it were1 prior to their actualization71 present1 too1 with all the distinctive properties and perfections that they now exhibit in a state of realization1 so that their merely possible or conceivable being had the same content as their actual being1 and their essence is not altered or increased by their existence4 ,now1 since the impulse toward actualization dwells in every possible essence1 and is the more justifiable the more perfect the essence1 a competition goes on before ,god1 in which1 first1 those monod-possibilities unite which are mutually compatible or compossible1 and1 then1 among the different conceivable combinations of monads or worlds that one is ordained for entrance into existence which shows the greatest possible sum of perfection4 ,it was1 therefore1 not the perfection of the single monad1 but the perfection of the system of which it forms a necessary part1 that was decisive as to its admission into existence4 ,the best world was known through ,god's wisdom1 chosen through his goodness1 and realized through his power4#a ,the choice was by no means arbitrary1 but wholly determined by the law of fitness or of the best 7principe du meilleur72 ,god's will must realize that which his understanding recognizes as most perfect4 ,it is at once evident that in the competition of the possible worlds the victory of the best was assured by the lex melioris1 apart from the divine decision4 ,footnote #a3 ,in regard to the dependence of the world on ,god1 there is a certain conflict noticeable in ,leibnitz between the metaphysical interests involved in the substantiality of individual beings1 together with the moral interests involved in guarding against fatalism1 and the opposing interests of religion4 ,on the one side1 creation is for him only an actualization of finished1 unchangeable possibilities1 on the other1 he teaches with the mediaeval philosophers that this was not accomplished by a single act of realization1 that the world has need of conservation1 i4e41 of continuous creation4 ,this law is the special expression of a more general one1 the principle of sufficient reason1 which ,leibnitz added1 as of equal authority1 to the ,aristotelian laws of thought4 ,things or events are real 7and assertions true7 when there is a sufficient reason for their existence1 and for their determinate existence4 ,the principium rationis sufficientis governs our empirical knowledge of contingent truths or truths of fact1 while1 on the other hand1 the pure rational knowledge of necessary or eternal 7mathematical and metaphysical7 truths rests on the principium contradictionis4 ,the principle of contradiction asserts1 that is1 whatever contains a contradiction is false or impossible2 whatever contains no contradiction is possible2 that whose opposite contains a contradiction is necessary4 ,or positively formulated as the principle of identity1 everything and every representative content is identical with itself4#b ,upon this antithesis between the rational laws of contradiction and sufficient reason--which1 however1 is such only for us men1 while the divine spirit1 which cognizes all things a priori1 is able to reduce even the truths of fact to the eternal truths--,leibnitz bases his distinction between two kinds of necessity4 ,that is metaphysically necessary whose opposite involves a contradiction2 that is morally necessary or contingent which1 on account of its fitness1 is preferred by ,god to its 7equally conceivable7 opposite4 ,to the latter class belongs1 further1 the physically necessary3 the necessity of the laws of nature is only a conditional necessity 7conditioned by the choice of the best72 they are contingent truths or truths of fact4 ,the principle of sufficient reason holds for efficient as well as for final causes1 and between the two realms there is1 according to ,leibnitz1 the most complete correspondence4 ,in the material world every particular must be explained in a purely mechanical way1 but the totality of the laws of nature1 the universal mechanism itself1 cannot in turn be mechanically explained1 but only on the basis of finality1 so that the mechanical point of view is comprehended in1 and subordinated to1 the teleological4 ,thus it becomes clear how ,leibnitz in the ratio sufficiens has final causes chiefly in mind4 ,footnote #b3 ,within the knowledge of reason1 as well as in experiential knowledge1 a further distinction is made between primary truths 7which need no proof7 and derived truths4 ,the highest truths of reason are the identical principles1 which are self-evident2 from these intuitive truths all others are to be derived by demonstration--proof is analysis and1 as free from contradictions1 demonstration4 ,the primitive truths of experience are the immediate facts of consciousness2 whatever is inferred from them is less certain than demonstrative knowledge4 ,nevertheless experience is not to be estimated at a low value2 it is through it alone that we can assure ourselves of the reality of the objects of thought1 while necessary truths guarantee only that a predicate must be ascribed to a subject 7e4g41 a circle71 but make no deliverance as to whether this subject exists or not4 ,to the broad and comprehensive tendency which is characteristic of ,leibnitz's thinking1 philosophy owes a further series of general laws1 which all stand in the closest relation to one another and to his monadological and harmonistic principles1 viz41 the law of continuity1 the law of analogy1 the law of the universal dissimilarity of things or of the identity of indiscernibles1 and1 finally1 the law of the conservation of force4 ,the most fundamental of these laws is the lex continui4 ,on the one hand1 it forbids every leap1 on the other1 all repetition in the series of beings and the series of events4 ,member must follow member without a break and without superfluous duplication2 in the scale of creatures1 as in the course of events1 absolute continuity is the rule4 ,just as in the monad one state continually develops from another1 the present one giving birth to the future1 as it has itself grown out of the past1 just as nothing persists1 as nothing makes its entrance suddenly or without the way being prepared for it1 and as all extremes are bound together by connecting links and gradual transitions1--so the monad itself stands in a continuous gradation of beings1 each of which is related to and different from each4 ,since the beings and events form a single uninterrupted series1 there are no distinctions of kind in the world1 but only distinctions in degree4 ,rest and motion are not opposites1 for rest may be considered as infinitely minute motion2 the ellipse and the parabola are not qualitatively different1 for the laws which hold for the one may be applied to the other4 ,likeness is vanishing unlikeness1 passivity arrested activity1 evil a lesser good1 confused ideas simply less distinct ones1 animals men with infinitely little reason1 plants animals with vanishing consciousness1 fluidity a lower degree of solidity1 etc4 ,in the whole world similarity and correspondence rule1 and it is everywhere the same as here--between apparent opposites there is a distinction in degree merely1 and hence1 analogy4 ,in the macrocosm of the universe things go on as in the microcosm of the monad2 every later state of the world is prefigured in the earlier1 etc4 ,if1 on the one side1 the law of analogy follows as a consequence from the law of continuity1 on the other1 we have the principium 7identitatis7 indiscernibilium4 ,as nature abhors gaps1 so also it avoids the superfluous4 ,every grade in the series must be represented1 but none more than once4 ,there are no two things1 no two events which are entirely alike4 ,if they were exactly alike they would not be two1 but one4 ,the distinction between them is never merely numerical1 nor merely local and temporal1 but always an intrinsic difference3 each thing is distinguished from every other by its peculiar nature4 ,this law holds both for the truly real 7the monads7 and for the phenomenal world--you will never find two leaves exactly alike4 ,by the law of the conservation of force1 ,leibnitz corrects the ,cartesian doctrine of the conservation of motion1 and approaches the point of view of the present day4 ,according to ,descartes it is the sum of actual motions1 which remains constant2 according to ,leibnitz1 the sum of the active forces2 while1 according to the modern theory1 it is the sum of the active and the latent or potential forces--a distinction1 moreover1 of which ,leibnitz himself made use4 ,we now turn from the formal framework of general laws1 to the actual1 to that which1 obeying these laws1 constitutes the living content of the world4 #b4 ,the ,organic ,world4 ,a living being is a machine composed of an infinite number of organs4 ,the natural machines formed by ,god differ from the artificial machines made by the hand of man1 in that1 down to their smallest parts1 they consist of machines4 ,organisms are complexes of monads1 of which one1 the soul1 is supreme1 while the rest1 which serve it1 form its body4 ,the dominant monad is distinguished from those which surround it as its body by the greater distinctness of its ideas4 ,the supremacy of the soul-monad consists in this one superior quality1 that it is more active and more perfect1 and clearly reflects that which the body-monads represent but obscurely4 ,a direct interaction between soul and body does not take place2 there is only a complete correspondence1 instituted by ,god4 ,he foresaw that the soul at such and such a moment would have the sensation of warmth1 or would wish an arm-motion executed1 and has so ordered the development of the body-monads that1 at the same instant1 they appear to cause this sensation and to obey this impulse to move4 ,now1 since ,god in this foreknowledge and accommodation naturally paid more regard to the perfect beings1 to the more active and more distinctly perceiving monads than to the less perfect ones1 and subordinated the latter1 as means and conditions1 to the former as ends1 the soul1 prior to creation1 actually exercised an ideal influence--through the mind of ,god--upon its body4 ,its activity is the reason why in less perfect monads a definite change1 a passion takes place1 since the action was attainable only in this way1 compossible with this alone4#a ,the monads which constitute the body are the first and direct object of the soul2 it perceives them more distinctly than it perceives1 through them1 the rest of the external world4 ,in view of the close connection of the elements of the organism thus postulated1 ,leibnitz1 in the discussions with ,father ,des ,bosses concerning the compatibility of the ,monadology with the doctrine of the ,church1 especially with the real presence of the body of ,christ in the ,supper1 consented1 in favor of the dogma1 to depart from the assumption that the simple alone could be substantial and to admit the possibility of composite substances1 and of a substantial bond connecting the parts of living beings4 ,it appears least in contradiction with the other principles of the philosopher to assign the rle of this vinculum substantiate to the soul or central monad itself4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,gustav ,class1 ,die metaphysischen ,voraussetzungen des ,leibnizischen ,determinismus1 ,tbingen1 #ahgd4 ,everything in nature is organized2 there are no soulless bodies1 no dead matter4 ,the smallest particle of dust is peopled with a multitude of living beings and the tiniest drop of water swarms with organisms3 every portion of matter may be compared to a pond filled with fish or a garden full of plants4 ,this denial of the inorganic does not release our philosopher from the duty of explaining its apparent existence4 ,if we thoughtfully consider bodies1 we perceive that there is nothing lifeless and non-representative4 ,but the phenomenon of extended mass arises for our confused sensuous perception1 which perceives the monads composing a body together and regards them as a continuous unity4 ,body exists only as a confused idea in the feeling subject2 since1 nevertheless1 a reality without the mind1 namely1 an immaterial monad-aggregate1 corresponds to it1 the phenomenon of body is a well-founded one 7phenomenon bene fundatum74 ,as matter is merely something present in sensation or confused representation1 so space and time are also nothing real1 neither substances nor properties1 but only ideal things--the former the order of coexistences1 the latter the order of successions4 ,if there are no soulless bodies1 there are also no bodiless souls2 the soul is always joined with an aggregate of subordinate monads1 though not always with the same ones4 ,single monads are constantly passing into its body1 or into its service1 while others are passing out2 it is involved in a continuous process of bodily transformation4 ,usually the change goes on slowly and with a constant replacement of the parts thrown off4 ,if it takes place quickly men call it birth or death4 ,actual death there is as little as there is an actual genesis2 not the soul only1 but every living thing is imperishable4 ,death is decrease and involution1 birth increase and evolution4 ,the dying creature loses only a portion of its bodily machine and so returns to the slumberous or germinal condition of involution1 in which it existed before birth1 and from which it was aroused through conception to development4 ,pre-existence as well as post-existence must be conceded both to animals and to men4 ,leuwenhoek's discovery of the spermatozoa furnished a welcome confirmation for this doctrine1 that all individuals have existed since the beginning of the world1 at least as preformed germs4 ,the immortality of man1 conformably to his superior dignity1 differs from the continued existence of all monads1 in that after his death he retains memory and the consciousness of his moral personality4 #c4 ,man3 ,cognition and ,volition4 ,in reason man possesses reflection or self-consciousness as well as the knowledge of ,god1 of the universal1 and of the eternal truths or a priori knowledge1 while the animal is limited in its perception to experience1 and in its reasoning to the connection of perceptions in accordance with memory4 ,man differs from higher beings in that the majority of his ideas are confused4 ,under confused ideas ,leibnitz includes both sense-perceptions--anyone who has distinct ideas alone1 as ,god1 has no sense-perceptions--and the feelings which mediate between the former and the perfectly distinct ideas of rational thought4 ,the delight of music depends1 in his opinion1 on an unconscious numbering and measuring of the harmonic and rhythmic relations of tones1 aesthetic enjoyment of the beautiful in general1 and even sensuous pleasure1 on the confused perception of a perfection1 order1 or harmony4 ,the application of the lex continui to the inner life has a very wide range4 ,the principal results are3 7#a7 the mind always thinks2 7#b7 every present idea postulates a previous one from which it has arisen2 7#c7 sensation and thought differ only in degree2 7#d7 in the order of time1 the ideas of sense precede those of reason4 ,we are never wholly without ideas1 only we are often not conscious of them4 ,if thought ceased in deep sleep1 we could have no ideas on awakening1 since every representation proceeds from a preceding one1 even though it be unconscious4 ,in the thoughtful ,new ,essays concerning the ,human ,understanding ,leibnitz develops his theory of knowledge in the form of a polemical commentary to ,locke's chief work4#a ,according to ,descartes some ideas 7the pure concepts7 are innate1 according to ,locke none1 according to ,leibnitz all4 ,or3 according to ,descartes some ideas 7sensuous perceptions7 come from without1 according to ,locke all do so1 according to ,leibnitz none4 ,leibnitz agrees with ,descartes against ,locke in the position that the mind originally possesses ideas2 he agrees with ,locke against ,descartes1 that thought is later than sensation and the knowledge of universals later than that of particulars4 ,the originality which ,leibnitz attributes to intellectual ideas is different from that which ,descartes had ascribed and ,locke denied to them4 ,they are original in that they do not come into the soul and are not impressed upon it from without2 they are not original in that they can develop only from previously given sense-ideas2 again1 they are original in that they can be developed from confused ideas only because they are contained in them implicite or as pre-dispositions4 ,thus ,leibnitz is able to agree with both his predecessors up to a certain point3 with the one1 that the pure concepts have their origin within the mind2 with the other1 that they are not the earliest knowledge1 but are conditioned by sensations4 ,this synthesis1 however1 was possible only because ,leibnitz looked on sensation differently from both the others4 ,if sensation is to be the mother of thought1 and the latter at the same time to preserve its character as original1 i4e41 as something not obtained from without1 sensation must1 first1 include an unconscious thinking in itself1 and1 secondly1 must itself receive a title to originality and spontaneity4 ,as the ,catholic dogma added the immaculate conception of the mother to that of the ,son1 so ,leibnitz transfers the 7virginal7 origin of rational concepts1 independent of external influence1 to sensations4 ,the monad has no windows4 ,it bears germinally in itself all that it is to experience1 and nothing is impressed on it from without4 ,the intellect should not be compared to a blank tablet1 but to a block of marble in whose veins the outlines of the statue are prefigured4 ,ideas can only arise from ideas1 never from external impressions or movements of corporeal parts4 ,thus all ideas are innate in the sense that they grow from inner germs2 we possess them from the beginning1 not developed 7explicite71 but potentially1 that is1 we have the capacity to produce them4 ,the old ,scholastic principle that there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in sense is entirely correct1 only one must add1 except the understanding itself1 that is1 the faculty of developing our knowledge out of ourselves4 ,thought lies already dormant in perception4 ,with the mechanical position 7sensuous representation precedes and conditions rational thought7 is joined the teleological position 7sensuous representations exist1 in order to render the origin of thoughts possible71 and with this purposive determination1 sensation attains a higher dignity3 it is more than has been seen in it before1 for it includes in itself the future concept of the understanding in an unconscious form1 nay1 it is itself an imperfect thought1 a thought in process of becoming4 ,sensation and thought are not different in kind1 and if the former is called a passive state1 still passivity is nothing other than diminished activity4 ,both are spontaneous2 thought is merely spontaneous in a higher degree4 ,footnote #a3 ,a careful comparison of ,locke's theory of knowledge with that of ,leibnitz is given by ,g4 ,hartenstein1 ,abhandlungen der k4 schs4 ,gesellschaft der ,wissenschaften1 ,leipsic1 #ahfe1 included in ,hartenstein's ,historisch-philosophische ,abhandlungen1 #ahgj4 ,by making sensation and feeling the preliminary step to thought1 ,leibnitz became the founder of that intellectualism which1 in the system of ,hegel1 extended itself far beyond the psychological into the cosmical field1 and endeavored to conceive not only all psychical phenomena but all reality whatsoever as a development of the ,idea toward itself4 ,this conception1 which may be characterized as intellectualistic in its content1 presents itself on its formal side as a quantitative way of looking at the world1 which sacrifices all qualitative antitheses in order to arrange the totality of being and becoming in a single series with no distinctions but those of degree4 ,if ,leibnitz here appears as the representative of a view of the world which found in ,kant a powerful and victorious opponent1 yet1 on the other hand1 he prepared the way by his conception of innate ideas for the ,critique of ,reason4 ,by his theory of knowledge he forms the transition link between ,descartes and ,kant1 since he interprets necessary truths not as dwelling in the mind complete and explicit from the start1 but as produced or raised into consciousness only on the occasion of sensuous experience4 ,it must be admitted1 moreover1 that this in reality was only a restoration of ,descartes's original position1 i4e41 a deliverance of it from the misinterpretations and perversions which it had suffered at the hands of adherents and opponents alike1 but which ,descartes1 it is true1 had failed to render impossible from the start by conclusive explanations4 ,the author of the theory of innate ideas certainly did not mean what ,locke foists upon him1 that the child in the cradle already possesses the ideas of ,god1 of thought1 and of extension in full clearness4 ,but whether ,leibnitz improved or only restored ,descartes1 it was in any case an important advance when experience and thought were brought into more definite relation1 and the productive force in rational concepts was secured to the latter and the occasion of their production to the former4 ,the unconscious or minute ideas1 which in notics had served to break the force of ,locke's objections against the innateness of the principles of reason1 are in ethics brought into the field against indeterminism4 ,they are involved whenever we believe ourselves to act without cause1 from pure choice1 or contrary to the motives present4 ,in this last case1 a motive which is very strong in itself is overcome by the united power of many in themselves weaken ,the will is always determined1 and that by an idea 7of ends71 which generally is of a very complex nature1 and in which the stronger side decides the issue4 ,an absolute equilibrium of motives is impossible3 the world cannot be divided into two entirely similar parts 7this in opposition to ,buridan's ass74 ,a spirit capable of looking us through and through would be able to calculate all our volitions and actions beforehand4 ,in spite of this admitted inevitableness of our resolutions and actions1 the predicate of freedom really belongs to them1 and this on two grounds4 ,first1 they are only physically or morally1 not metaphysically1 necessary2 as a matter of fact1 it is true1 they cannot happen otherwise1 but their opposite involves no logical contradiction and remains conceivable4 ,to express this thought the formula1 often repeated since1 that our motives only impel1 incite1 or stimulate the will1 but do not compel it 7inclinant1 non necessitant71 was chosen1 but not very happily4 ,secondly1 the determination of the will is an inner necessitation1 grounded in the being's own nature1 not an external compulsion4 ,the agent determines himself in accordance with his own nature1 and for this each bears the responsibility himself1 for ,god1 when he brought the monads out of possibility into actuality1 left their natures as they had existed before the creation in the form of eternal ideas in ,his understanding4 ,though ,leibnitz thus draws a distinction between his deterministic doctrine and the fatalism of ,spinoza1 he recognizes a second concept of freedom1 which completely corresponds to ,spinoza's4 ,a decision is the more free the more distinct the ideas which determine it1 and a man the more free the more he withdraws his will from the influence of the passions1 i4e41 confused ideas1 and subordinates it to that of reason4 ,god alone is absolutely free1 because he has no ideas which are not distinct4 ,the bridge between the two conceptions of freedom is established by the principle that reason constitutes the peculiar nature of man in a higher degree than the sum of his ideas2 for it is reason which distinguishes him from the lower beings4 ,according to the first meaning of freedom man is free1 according to the second1 which coincides with activity1 perfection1 and morality1 he should become free4 ,morality is the result of the natural development of the individual4 ,every being strives after perfection or increased activity1 i4e41 after more distinct ideas4 ,parallel to this theoretical advance runs a practical advance in a twofold form3 the increasing distinctness of ideas1 or enlightenment1 or wisdom1 raises the impulse to transitory1 sensuous pleasure into an impulse to permanent delight in our spiritual perfection1 or toward happiness1 while1 further1 it opens up an insight into the connection of all beings and the harmony of the world1 in virtue of which the virtuous man will seek to promote the perfection and happiness of others as well as his own1 i4e41 will love them1 for to love is to find pleasure in the happiness of others4 ,to promote the good of all1 again1 is the same as to contribute one's share to the world-harmony and to co-operate in the fulfillment of ,god's purposes4 ,probity and piety are the same4 ,they form the highest of the three grades of natural right1 which ,leibnitz distinguishes as jus strictum 7mere right1 with the principle3 ,injure no one71 aequitas 7equity or charity1 with the maxim3 ,to each his due71 and probitas sive pietas 7honorableness joined with religion1 according to the command3 ,lead an upright and morally pure life74 ,they may also be designated as commutative1 distributive1 and universal justice4 ,belief in ,god and immortality is a condition of the last4 #d4 ,theology and ,theodicy4 ,god is the ground and the end of the world4 ,all beings strive toward him1 as all came out from him4 ,in man the general striving toward the most perfect ,being rises into conscious love to ,god1 which is conditioned by the knowledge of ,god and produces virtuous action as its effect4 ,enlightenment and virtue are the essential constituents of religion2 all else1 as cultus and dogma1 have only a derivative value4 ,religious ceremonies are an imperfect expression of the practical element in piety1 as the doctrines of faith are a weak imitation of the theoretical4 ,it is a direct contradiction of the intention of the ,divine ,teacher when occult formulas and ceremonies1 which have no connection with virtue1 are made the chief thing4 ,the points in which the creeds agree are more important than those by which they are differentiated4 ,natural religion has found its most perfect expression in ,christianity1 although paganism and ,judaism had also grasped portions of the truth4 ,salvation is not denied to the heathen1 for moral purity is sufficient to make one a partaker of the grace of ,god4 ,the religion of the ,jews elevated monotheism1 which1 it is true1 made its appearance among the heathen in isolated philosophers1 but was never the popular religion1 into a law2 but it lacked the belief in immortality4 ,christianity made the religion of the sage the religion of the people4 ,whatever of positive doctrine revelation has added to natural religion transcends the reason1 it is true1 but does not contradict it4 ,it contains no principles contrary to reason 7whose opposite can be proved71 but1 no doubt1 principles above reason1 i4e41 such as the reason could not have found without help from without1 and which it cannot fully comprehend1 though it is able approximately to understand them and to defend them against objections4 ,hence ,leibnitz defended the ,trinity1 which he interpreted as ,god's power1 understanding1 and will1 the eternity of the torments of hell 7which brought him the commendation of ,lessing71 and other dogmas4 ,miracles also belong among the things the how and why of which we are not in a position to comprehend1 but only the that and what4 ,since the laws of nature are only physically or conditionally necessary1 i4e4 have been enacted only because of their fitness for the purposes of ,god1 they may be suspended in special cases when a higher end requires it4 ,while the positive doctrines of faith cannot be proved--as1 on the other hand1 they cannot be refuted--the principles of natural religion admit of strict demonstration4 ,the usual arguments for the existence of ,god are useful1 but need amendment4 ,the ontological argument of ,descartes1 that from the concept of a most perfect ,being his existence follows1 is correct so soon as the idea of ,god is shown to be possible or free from contradiction4 ,the cosmological proof runs3 ,contingent beings point to a necessary1 self-existent ,being1 the eternal truths especially presuppose an eternal intelligence in which they exist4 ,if we ask why anything whatever1 or why just this world exists1 this ultimate ground of things cannot be found within the world4 ,every contingent thing or event has its cause in another4 ,however far we follow out the series of conditions1 we never reach an ultimate1 unconditioned cause4 ,consequently the sufficient reason for the series must be situated without the world1 and1 as is evident from the harmony of things1 can only be an infinitely wise and good ,being4 ,here the teleological proof comes in3 ,from the finality of the world we reason to the existence of a ,being1 as the author of the world1 who works in view of ends and who wills and carries out that which is best1--to the supreme intelligence1 goodness1 and power of the ,creator4 ,a special inferential value accrues to this position from the system of pre-established harmony--it is manifest that the complete correspondence of the manifold substances in the world1 which are not connected with one another by any direct interaction1 can proceed only from a common cause endowed with infinite intelligence and power4 ,the possibility of proving the existence of one omnipotent and all-beneficent ,god1 and the impossibility of refuting the positive dogmas1 save the harmony of faith and reason1 which ,bayle had denied4 ,the conclusion of the ,new ,essays and the opening of the ,theodicy are devoted to this theme4 ,the second part gives1 also against ,bayle1 the justification of ,god in view of the evil in the world4 ,si ,deus est1 unde malum8 ,optimism has to reckon with the facts of experience1 and to show that this world1 in spite of its undeniable imperfections1 is still the best world4 ,god could certainly have brought into actuality a world in which there would have been less imperfection than in ours1 but it would at the same time have contained fewer perfections4 ,no world whatever can exist entirely free from evil1 entirely without limitation--whoever forbids ,god to create imperfect beings forbids him to create a world at all4 ,certain evils--in general terms1 the evil of finitude--are entirely inseparable from the concept of created beings2 imperfection attaches to every created thing as such4 ,other evils ,god has permitted because it was only through them that certain higher goods1 which ought not to be renounced1 could be brought to pass4 ,think of the lofty feelings1 noble resolves1 and great deeds which war occasions1 think of national enthusiasm1 readiness for sacrifice1 and defiance of death--all these would be given over1 if war should be taken out of the world on account of the suffering which it also brings in its train4 ,if we turn from the general principles to their application in detail1 we find a separate proof for the inevitableness or salutary nature of each of the three kinds of evil--the metaphysical evil of created existence1 the physical evil of suffering 7and punishment71 and the moral evil of sin4 ,metaphysical evil is absolutely unavoidable1 if a world is to exist at all2 created beings without imperfection1 finiteness1 limitation1 are entirely inconceivable--something besides gods must exist4 ,the physical evil of misery finds its justification in that it makes for good4 ,first of all1 the amount of suffering is not so great as it appears to discontented spirits to be4 ,life is usually quite tolerable1 and vouchsafes more joy and pleasure than grief and hardship2 in balancing the good and the evil we must especially remember to reckon on the positive side the goods of activity1 of health1 and all that which affords us1 perchance1 no perceptible pleasure1 but the removal of which would be felt as an evil 7,theodicy1 ii4 #bea74 ,most evils serve to secure us a much greater good1 or to ward off a still greater evil4 ,would a brave general1 if given the choice of leaving the battle unwounded1 but also without the victory1 or of winning the victory at the cost of a wound1 hesitate an instant to choose the latter8 ,other troubles1 again1 must be regarded as punishment for sins and as means of reformation2 the man who is resigned to ,god's will may be certain that the sufferings which come to him will turn out for his good4 ,especially if we consider the world as a whole1 it is evident that the sum of evil vanishes before the sum of good4 ,it is wrong to look upon the happiness of man as the end of the world4 ,certainly ,god had the happiness of rational beings in mind1 but not this exclusively1 for they form only a part of the world1 even if it be the highest part4 ,god's purpose has reference rather to the perfection of the whole system of the universe4 ,now the harmony of the universe requires that all possible grades of reality be represented1 that there should be indistinct ideas1 sense1 and corporeality1 not merely a realm of spirits1 and with these1 conditions of imperfection1 feelings of pain1 and theoretical and moral errors are inevitably given4 ,the connection and the order of the world demands a material element in the monad1 but happiness without alloy can never be the lot of a spirit joined to a body4 ,thirdly1 in regard to moral evil also we receive the assurance that the sum of the bad is much less than that of the good4 ,then1 moral evil is connected with metaphysical evil3 created beings cannot be absolutely perfect1 hence1 also1 not morally perfect or sinless4 ,but1 in return for this1 there is no being that is absolutely imperfect1 none only and entirely evil4 ,with this is joined the well-known principle of the earlier thinkers1 that evil is nothing actual1 but merely deprivation1 absence of good1 lack of clear reason and force of will4 ,that which is real in the evil action1 the power to act1 is perfect and good1 and1 as force1 comes from ,god--the negative or evil element in it comes from the agent himself2 just as in the case of two ships of the same size1 but unequally laden1 which drift with the current1 the speed comes from the stream and the retardation from the load of the vessels themselves4 ,god is not responsible for sin1 for he has only permitted it1 not willed it directly1 and man was already evil before he was created4 ,the fact that ,god foresaw that man would sin does not constrain the latter to commit the evil deed1 but this follows from his own 7eternal7 being1 which ,god left unaltered when he granted him existence4 ,the guilt and the responsibility fall wholly on the sinner himself4 ,the permission of evil is explained by the predominantly good results which follow from it 7not1 as in physical evil1 for the sufferer himself1 but for others7--from the crime of ,sextus ,tarquinius sprang a great kingdom with great men 7of4 the beautiful myth in connection with a dialogue of ,laurentius ,valla1 ,theodicy1 iii4 #dac-daf74 ,finally1 reference is made again to the contribution which evil makes to the perfection of the whole4 ,evil has the same function in the world as the discords in a piece of music1 or the shadows in a painting--the beauty is heightened by the contrast4 ,the good needs a foil in order to come out distinctly and to be felt in all its excellence4 ,in the ,leibnitzian theodicy the least satisfactory part is the justification of moral evil4 ,we miss the view defended in such grand outlines by ,hegel1 and so ingeniously by ,fechner1 that the good is not the flower of a quiet1 unmolested development1 but the fruit of energetic labor2 that it has need of its opposite2 that it not merely must approve itself in the battle against evil without and within the acting subject1 but that it is only through this conflict that it is attainable at all4 ,virtue implies force of will as well as purity1 and force develops only by resistance4 ,although he does not appreciate the full depth of the significance of pain1 ,leibnitz's view of suffering deserves more approval than his questionable application to the ethical sphere of the quantitative view of the world1 with its interpretation of evil as merely undeveloped good4 ,but1 in any case1 the compassionate contempt of the pessimism of the day for the shallow ,leibnitz is most unjustifiable4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,german ,,illumination4 #a4 ,the ,contemporaries of ,leibnitz4 ,the period between ,kepler and ,leibnitz in ,germany was very poor in noteworthy philosophical phenomena4 ,the physicist1 ,christoph ,sturm#a of ,altdorf 7died #agjc71 was a follower of ,descartes1 ,joachim ,jungius#b 7died #afeg7 a follower of ,bacon1 though not denying with the latter the value of the mathematical method in natural science4 ,hieronymus ,hirnhaym1 ,abbot at ,prague 7,the ,plague of the ,human ,race1 or the ,vanity of ,human ,learning1 #afgf71 declared the thirst for knowledge of his age a dangerous disease1 knowledge uncertain1 since no reliance can be placed on sense-perception and the principles of thought contradict the doctrines of faith1 and harmful1 since it contributes nothing to salvation1 but makes its possessors proud and draws them away from piety4 ,he maintained1 further1 that divine authority is the only refuge for man1 and moral life the true science4 ,side by side with such skepticism ,hirnhaym's contemporary1 the poet ,angelus ,silesius 7,joh4 ,scheffler1 died #affg71 defended mysticism4 ,the teacher of natural law1 ,samuel ,pufendorf#c 7#afcb-id1 professor in ,heidelberg and ,lund1 died in ,berlin71 aimed to mediate between ,grotius and ,hobbes4 ,natural law is demonstrable1 its real ground is the will of ,god1 its notical ground 7not revelation1 but7 reason and observation of the 7social7 nature of man1 and the fundamental law the promotion of universal good4 ,the individual must not violate the interests of society in satisfying his impulse to self-preservation1 because his own interests require social existence1 and1 consequently1 respect for its conditions4 ,footnote #a3 ,chr4 ,sturm3 ,physica ,conciliatrix1 #afhg2 ,physica ,electiva1 vol4 i4 #afig1 vol4 ii4 with preface by ,chr4 ,wolff1 #agbb2 ,compendium ,universalium seu ,metaphysica ,euclidea4 ,footnote #b3 ,j4 ,jung ,logica ,hamburgiensis1 #afch2 cf4 ,guhrauer1 #ahei4 ,footnote #c3 ,pufendorf3 ,elementa ,juris ,universalis1 #affj2 ,de ,statu ,imperii ,germanici1 #affg1 under the pseudonym ,monzambano2 ,de ,jure ,natures et ,gentium #afgb1 and an abstract of this1 ,de ,officio ,hominis et ,civis1 #afgc4 ,pufendorf was followed by ,christian ,thomasius#a 7#afee-agbh2 professor of law at the ,university of ,halle from its foundation in #afid74 ,he was the first instructor who ventured to deliver lectures in the ,german language--in ,leipsic from #afhg--;and at the same time was the editor of the first learned journal in ,german 7,teutsche ,monate1 ,geschichte der ,weisheit und ,thorheit74 ,in ,thomasius the characteristic features of the ,german ,illumination first came out in full distinctness1 namely1 the avoidance of scholasticism in expression and argument1 the direct relation of knowledge to life1 sober rationality in thinking1 heedless eclecticism1 and the demand for religious tolerance4 ,philosophy must be generally intelligible1 and practically useful1 knowledge of the world 7not of ,god72 its form1 free and tasteful ratiocination2 its object1 man and morals2 its first duty1 culture1 not learning2 its highest aim1 happiness2 its organ and the criterion of every truth1 common sense4 ,he alone gains true knowledge who frees his understanding from prejudice and judges only after examining for himself2 the joy of mental peace is given to no one who does not free his heart from foolish desires and vehement passions1 and devote it to virtue1 to rational love4 ,the positive doctrines of ,thomasius have less interest than this general standpoint1 which prefigured the succeeding period4 ,he divides practical philosophy into natural law which treats of the justum1 politics which treats of the decorum1 and ethics which treats of the honestum4 ,justice bids us1 ,do not to others what you would not that others should do to you2 decorum1 ,do to others as you would that they should do to you2 and morality1 ,do to yourself as you would that others should do to themselves4 ,the first two laws relate to external1 the third to internal1 peace2 legal duties may be enforced by compulsion1 moral duties not4 ,footnote #a3 ,thomasius3 ,institutionum ,jurisprudentiae ,divinae ,libri ,tres1 #afhh2 ,fundamenta ,juris ,naturae et ,gentium1 #agje1 both in ,latin2 in ,german1 appeared in #afia-if the ,introduction and ,application of ,rational and ,moral ,philosophy4 ,if ,thomasius was the leader of those popular philosophers who1 unconcerned about systematic continuity1 discussed every question separately before the tribunal of common sense1 and found in their lack of allegiance to any philosophical sect a sufficient guarantee of the unprejudicedness and impartiality of their reflections1 ,count ,walter von ,tschirnhausen 7#afea-agjh2 ,medecina ,mentis sive ,artis ,inveniendi ,praecepta ,generalia1 #afhg71 a friend of ,spinoza and ,leibnitz1 became the prototype of another group of the philosophers of the ,illumination4 ,this group favored eclecticism of a more scientific kind1 by starting from considerations of method and seeking to overcome the antithesis between rationalism and empiricism4 ,while fully persuaded of the validity and necessity of the mathematical method in philosophical investigations1 as well as elsewhere1 ,tschirnhausen still holds it indispensable that the deductions1 on the one hand1 start from empirical facts1 and1 on the other1 that they be confirmed by experiments4 ,inner experience gives us four primal facts1 of which the chief is the certainty of self-consciousness4 ,the second1 that many things affect us agreeably and many disagreeably1 is the basis of morals2 the third1 that some things are comprehensible to us and others not1 the basis of logic2 the fourth1 that through the senses we passively receive impressions from without1 the basis of the empirical sciences1 in particular1 of physics4 ,consequently consciousness1 will1 understanding1 and sensuous representation 7imaginatio71 together with corporeality1 are our fundamental concepts4 ,not perception 7perceptio71 but conception 7conceptio7 alone gives science2 that which we can conceive is true2 the understanding as such cannot err1 but undoubtedly the imagination can lead us to confuse the merely perceived with that which is conceived4 ,the method of science is geometrical demonstration1 which starts from 7genetic7 definitions1 and from their analysis obtains axioms1 from their combination1 theorems4 ,that which is thus proved a priori must1 as already remarked1 be confirmed a posteriori4 ,the highest of all sciences is natural philosophy1 since it considers not sense-objects only1 not 7like mathematics7 the objects of reason only1 but the actual itself in its true character4 ,hence it is the divine science1 while the human sciences busy themselves only with our ideas or the relations of things to us4 #b4 ,christian ,wolff4 ,christian ,wolff was born at ,breslau in #afgi1 studied theology at ,jena1 and in addition mathematics and philosophy1 habilitated at ,leipsic in #agjc1 and obtained1 through the instrumentality of ,leibnitz1 a professorship of mathematics at ,halle1 in #agjf4 ,his lectures1 which soon extended themselves over all philosophical disciplines1 met with great success4 ,this popularity1 as well as the rationalistic tendency of his thinking1 aroused the disfavor of the pietists1 ,francke and ,lange1 who succeeded1 in #agbc1 in securing from ,king ,frederick ,william ,i4 his removal from his chair and his expulsion from the kingdom4 ,finding a refuge in ,marburg1 he was called back to ,halle by ,frederick the ,great a short time after the latter's ascension of the throne4 ,here he taught and wrote zealously until his death in #aged4 ,in his lectures1 as well as in half of his writings1#a he followed the example of ,thomasius in using the ,german language1 which he prepared in a most praiseworthy manner for the expression of philosophical ideas and furnished with a large part of the technical terms current to-day4 ,thus the terms ,verhltniss 7relation71 ,vorstellung 7representation1 idea71 ,bewusstsein 7consciousness71 stetig 7continuus71 come from ,wolff1 as well as the distinction between ,kraft 7power7 and ,vermgen 7faculty71 and between ,grund 7ground7 and ,ursache 7cause71#b ,another great service consisted in the reduction of the philosophy of ,leibnitz to a systematic form1 by which he secured a dissemination for it which otherwise it would scarcely have obtained4 ,but he did not possess sufficient originality to contribute anything remarkable of his own1 and it showed little self-knowledge when he became indignant at the designation ,leibnitzio-,wolffian philosophy1 which was first used by his pupil1 ,bilfinger4 ,the alterations which he made in the doctrines of ,leibnitz are far from being improvements1 and the parts which he rejected are just the most characteristic and thoughtful of all4 ,such at least is the opinion of thinkers to-day1 though this mutilation and leveling down of the most daring of ,leibnitz's hypotheses was perhaps entirely advantageous for ,wolff's impression on his contemporaries2 what appeared questionable to him would no doubt have repelled them also4 ,leibnitz's two leading ideas1 the theory of monads and the pre-established harmony1 were most of all affected by this process of toning down4 ,wolff weakens the former by attributing a representative power only to actual souls1 which are capable of consciousness1 although he holds that bodies are compounded of simple beings and that the latter are endowed with 7a not further defined7 force4 ,he limits the application of the pre-established harmony to the relation of body and soul1 which to ,leibnitz was only a case especially favorable for the illustration of the hypothesis4 ,by such trifling the real meaning of both these ideas is sacrificed and their bloom rubbed off4--,while depth is lacking in ,wolff's thinking1 he is remarkable for his power of systematization1 his persevering diligence1 and his logical earnestness1 so that the praise bestowed on him by ,kant1 that he was the author of the spirit of thoroughness in ,germany1 was well deserved4 ,he1 too1 finds the end of philosophy in the enlightenment of the understanding1 the improvement of the heart1 and1 ultimately1 in the promotion of the happiness of mankind4 ,but while ,thomasius demanded as a condition of such universal intelligibility and usefulness that1 discarding the scholastic garb1 philosophy should appear in the form of easy ratiocination1 ,wolff1 on the other hand1 regards methodical procedure and certainty in results as indispensable to its usefulness1 and1 in order to this certainty1 insists on distinctness of conception and cogency of proof4 ,he demands a philosophia et certa et utilis4 ,if1 finally1 his methodical deliberateness1 especially in his later works1 leads him into wearisome diffuseness1 this pedantry is made good by his genuinely ,german1 honest spirit1 which manifests itself agreeably in his judgment on practical questions4 ,footnote #a3 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,powers of the ,human ,understanding1 #agab2 ,reasonable ,thoughts on ,god1 the ,world1 and the ,soul of ,man1 also on ,all ,things in ,general1 #agai 7,notes to this #agbd72 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,conduct of ,man1 #agbj2 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,social ,life of ,man1 #agba2 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,operations of ,nature1 #agbc2 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,purposes of ,natural ,things1 #agbd2 ,reasonable ,thoughts on the ,parts of ,man1 ,animals1 and ,plants1 #agbe1 all in ,german4 ,besides these there are extensive ,latin treatises 7#agbh-ec7 on ,logic1 ,ontology1 ,cosmology1 ,empirical and ,rational ,psychology1 ,natural ,theology1 and all branches of ,practical ,philosophy4 ,detailed extracts may be found in ,erdmann's ,versuch einer wissenschaftlichen ,darstellung1 ii4 #b4 ,the best account of the ,wolffian philosophy has been given by ,zeller 7pp4 #baa-bgc74 ,footnote #b3 ,eucken1 ,geschichte der ,terminologie pp4 #acc-acd4 ,wolff reaches his division of the sciences by combining the two psychological antitheses--the higher 7rational7 and lower 7sensuous7 faculties of cognition and appetition4 ,on the first is based the distinction between the rational and the empirical or historical method of treatment4 ,the latter concerns itself with the actual1 the former with the possible and necessary1 or the grounds of the actual2 the one observes and describes1 the other deduces4 ,the antithesis of cognition and appetition gives the basis for the division into theoretical and practical philosophy4 ,the former1 called metaphysics1 is divided into a general part1 which treats of being in general whether it be of a corporeal or a spiritual nature1 and three special parts1 according to their principal subjects1 the world1 the soul1 and ,god1--hence into ontology1 cosmology1 psychology1 and theology4 ,the science which establishes rules for action and regards man as an individual being1 as a citizen1 and as the head or member of a family1 is divided 7after ,aristotle7 into ethics1 politics1 and economics1 which are preceded by practical philosophy in general1 and by natural law4 ,the introduction to the two principal parts is furnished by formal logic4 ,philosophy is the science of the possible1 i4e41 of that which contains no contradiction2 it is science from concepts1 its principle1 the law of identity1 its form1 demonstration1 and its instrument1 analysis1 which in the predicate explicates the determinations contained in the concept of the subject4 ,in order to confirm that which has been deduced from pure concepts by the facts of experience1 psychologia rationalis is supplemented by psychologia empirica1 rational cosmology by empirical physics1 and speculative theology by an experimental doctrine of ,god 7teleology74 ,wolff gives no explanation how it comes about that the deliverances of the reason agree so beautifully with the facts of experience2 in his nave1 unquestioning belief in the infallibility of the reason he is a typical dogmatist4 ,a closer examination of the ,wolffian philosophy seems unnecessary1 since its most essential portions have already been discussed under ,leibnitz and since it will be necessary to recur to certain points in our chapter on ,kant4 ,therefore1 referring the reader to the detailed accounts in ,erdmann and ,zeller1 we shall only note that ,wolff's ethics opposes the principle of perfection to the ,english principle of happiness 7that is good which perfects man's condition1 and this is life in conformity with nature or reason1 with which happiness is necessarily connected72 that he makes the will determined by the understanding1 and assigns ignorance as the cause of sin2 that his philosophy of religion1 which argues for a natural religion in addition to revealed religion 7experiential and rational proofs for the existence of ,god1 and a deduction of his attributes71 and sets up certain tests for the genuineness of revelation1 favors a rationalism which was flexible enough to allow his pupils either to take part in orthodox movements or to advance to a deism hostile to the ,church4 ,among the followers of ,wolff1 ,alexander ,baumgarten 7#agad-fb7 deserves the first place1 as the founder of ,german aesthetics 7,aesthetica1 #agej seq474 ,he perceives a gap in the system of the philosophical sciences4 ,this contains in ethics a guide to right volition1 and in logic a guide to correct thinking1 but there are no directions for correct feeling1 no aesthetic4 ,the beautiful would form the subject of this discipline4 ,for the perfection 7the harmonious unity of a manifold1 which is pleasant to the spectator71 which manifests itself to the will as the good and to the clear thinking of the understanding as the true1 appears--according to ,leibnitz--to confused sensuous perception as beauty4 ,from this on the name aesthetics was established for the theory of the beautiful1 though in ,kant's great work it is used in its literal meaning as the doctrine of sense1 of the faculty of sensations or intuitions4 ,baumgarten's pupils and followers1 the aesthetic writer ,g4,f4 ,meier at ,halle1 ,baumeister1 and others1 contributed like himself to the dissemination of the ,wolffian system by their manuals on different branches of philosophy4 ,to this school belong also the following3 ,thmmig 7,institutiones ,philosophia ,wolfianae1 #agbe-bf72 the theologian ,siegmund ,baumgarten at ,halle1 the elder brother of the aesthete2 the mathematician ,martin ,knutzen1 ,kant's teacher2#a the literary historian ,gottsched #b at ,leipsic2 and ,g4 ,ploucquet1 who in his ,methodus ,calculandi in ,logicis1 with a ,commentatio de ,arte ,characteristica ,universali appended to his ,principia de ,substantiis et ,phaenomenis1 #agec1 took up again ,leibnitz's cherished plan for a logical calculus and a universal symbolic language4 ,the psychologist ,kasimir von ,creuz 7,essay on the ,soul1 in two parts1 #agec-ed71 and ,j4,h4 ,lambert1#c whom ,kant deemed worthy of a detailed correspondence1 take up a more independent position1 both demanding that the ,wolffian rationalism be supplemented by the empiricism of ,locke1 and the latter1 moreover1 in anticipation of the ,critique of ,reason1 pointing very definitely to the distinction between content and form as the salient point in the theory of knowledge4 ,footnote #a3 ,benno ,erdmann1 ,m4 ,knutzen und seine ,zeit1 #ahgf4 ,footnote #b3 ,th4 ,w4 ,danzel1 ,gottsched und seine ,zeit1 #ahdh4 ,footnote #c3 ,lambert3 ,cosmological ,letters1 #agfa2 ,new ,organon1 #agfd2 ,groundwork of ,architectonics1 #agga4 ,bernoulli edited some of ,lambert's papers and his correspondence4 ,among the opponents of the ,wolffian philosophy1 all of whom favor eclecticism1 ,a4 ,rdiger#a and ,chr4 ,aug4 ,crusius1#b who was influenced by ,rdiger1 and1 like him1 a professor at ,leipsic1 are the most important4 ,rdiger divides philosophy according to its objects1 wisdom1 justice1 prudence1 into three parts--the science of nature 7which must avoid one-sided mechanical views1 and employ ether1 air1 and spirit as principles of explanation72 the science of duty 7which1 as metaphysics1 treats of duties toward ,god1 as natural law1 of duties to our neighbor1 and deduces both from the primary duty of obedience to the will of ,god72 and the science of the good 7in which ,rdiger follows the treatise of the ,spaniard1 ,gracian1 on practical wisdom74 ,crusius agrees with ,rdiger that mathematics is the science of the possible1 and philosophy the science of the actual1 and that the latter1 instead of imitating to its own disadvantage the deductive-analytical method of geometry1 must1 with the aid of experience and with attention to the probability of its conclusions1 rise to the highest principles synthetically4 ,besides its deduction the determinism of the ,wolffian philosophy gave offense1 for it was believed to endanger morals1 justice1 and religion4 ,the will1 the special fundamental power of the soul 7consisting of the impulses to perfection1 love1 and knowledge71 is far from being determined by ideas2 it is rather they which depend on the will4 ,the application of the principle of sufficient reason1 which is wrongly held to admit of no exception1 must be restricted in favor of freedom4 ,for the rest1 we may note concerning ,crusius that he derives the principle of sufficient reason 7everything which is now1 and before was not1 has a cause7 and the principle of contingency from the principles of contradiction1 inseparability1 and incompatibility1 and these latter from the principle of conceivability2 that he rejects the ontological argument1 and makes the ground of obligation in morality consist in obedience toward ,god1 and its content in perfection4 ,among the other opponents of the ,wolffian philosophy1 we may mention the theologian ,budde7us7#c 7,institutiones ,philosophiae ,eclecticae1 #agje72 ,darjes 7who taught in ,jena and ,frankfort-on-the-,oder2 ,the ,way to ,truth1 #agee72 and ,crousaz 7#agdd74 ,footnote #a3 ,rdiger3 ,disputatio de eo quod ,omnes ,idea ,oriantur a ,sensione1 #agjd2 ,philosophia ,synthetica1 #agjg2 ,physica ,divina1 #agaf2 ,philosophia ,pragmatica1 #agbc4 ,footnote #b3 ,crusius3 ,de ,usu et ,limitibus ,principii ,rationis1 #agdc2 ,directions how to ,live a ,rational ,life 7theory of the will and of ethics71 #agdd2 ,a ,sketch of the ,necessary ,truths of ,reason1 #agde2 ,way to the ,certainty and ,trustworthiness of ,human ,knowledge1 #agdg4 ,footnote #c3 ,j4,j4 ,brucker 7,historia ,critica ,philosophiae1 #e vols41 #agdb-dd2 #b;d ed41 #f vols41 #agff-fg7 was a pupil of ,budde4 #c4 ,the ,illumination as ,scientific and as ,popular ,philosophy4 ,after a demand for the union of ,leibnitz and ,locke1 of rationalism and empiricism1 had been raised within the ,wolffian school itself1 and still more directly in the camp of its opponents1 under the increasing influence of the empirical philosophy of ,england1#a eclecticism in the spirit of ,thomasius took full possession of the stage in the ,illumination period4 ,there was the less hesitation in combining principles derived from entirely different postulates without regard to their systematic connection1 as the interest in scholastic investigation gave place more and more to the interest in practical and reassuring results4 ,metaphysics1 notics1 and natural philosophy were laid aside as useless subtleties1 and1 as in the period succeeding ,aristotle1 man as an individual and whatever directly relates to his welfare--the constitution of his inner nature1 his duties1 the immortality of the soul1 and the existence of ,god--became the exclusive subjects of reflection4 ,the fact that1 besides ethics and religion1 psychology was chosen as a favorite field1 is in complete harmony with the general temper of an age for which self-observation and the enjoyment of tender and elevated feelings in long1 delightfully friendly letters and sentimental diaries had become a favorite habit4 ,hand in hand with this narrowing of the content of philosophy went a change in the form of presentation4 ,as thinkers now addressed themselves to all cultivated people1 intelligibility and agreeableness were made the prime requisites2 the style became light and flowing1 the method of treatment facile and often superficial4 ,this is true not only of the popular philosophers proper--who1 as ,windelband pertinently remarks 7vol4 i4 p4 #efc71 did not seek after the truth1 but believed that they already possessed it1 and desired only to disseminate it2 who did not aim at the promotion of investigation1 but the instruction of the public--but to a certain extent1 also1 of those who were conscious of laboring in the service of science4 ,among the representatives of the more polite tendency belong1 ,moses ,mendelssohn#b 7#agbi-hf72 ,thomas ,abbt 7,on ,death for the ,fatherland1 #agfa2 ,on ,merit1 #agfe72 ,j4,j4 ,engel 7,the philosopher for the ,world1 #agge72 ,g4,s4 ,steinbart 7,the ,christian ,doctrine of ,happiness1 #aggh72 ,ernst ,platner 7,philosophical ,aphorisms1 #aggf1 #aghb2 on ,platner cf4 ,m4 ,heinze1 #ahhj72 ,g4,c4 ,lichtenberg 7died #agii2 ,miscellaneous ,writings1 #ahjj seq42 a selection is given in ,reclam's ,bibliothek72 ,christian ,garve 7died #agih2 ,essays1 #agib seq42 ,translations from the ,ethical ,works of ,aristotle1 ,cicero1 and ,ferguson72 and ,friedrich ,nicolai#c 7died #ahaa74 ,eberhard1 ,feder1 and ,meiners will be mentioned later among the opponents of the ,kantian philosophy4 ,footnote #a3 ,the influence of the ,english philosophers on the ,german philosophy of the eighteenth century is discussed by ,gustav ,zart1 #ahha4 ,footnote #b3 ,mendelssohn3 ,letters on the ,sensations1 #agee2 ,on ,evidence in the ,metaphysical ,sciences1 a prize essay crowned by the ,academy1 #agfd2 ,phaedo1 or on ,immortality1 #agfg2 ,jerusalem1 #aghc2 ,morning ,hours1 or on the ,existence of ,god1 #aghe2 ,to the ,friends of ,lessing 7against ,jacobi71 #aghf2 ,works1 #ahdc-dd4 ,cf4 on ,mendelssohn1 ,kayserling1 #ahef1 #ahfb1 #ahhc4 ,footnote #c3 ,nicolai3 ,library of ,belles ,lettres1 from #ageg2 ,letters on the ,most ,recent ,german ,literature1 from #agei2 ,universal ,german ,library1 from #agfe2 ,new ,universal ,german ,library1 #agic-ahje4 ,among the psychologists ,j4,n4 ,tetens1 whose ,philosophical ,essays on ,human ,nature1 #aggf-gg1 show a remarkable similarity to the views of ,kant1#a takes the first rank4 ,the two thinkers evidently influenced each other4 ,the three fold division of the activities of the soul1 knowing1 feeling1 and willing1 which has now become popular and which appears to us self-evident1 is to be referred to ,tetens1 from whom ,kant took it2 in opposition to the twofold division of ,aristotle and ,wolff into cognition and appetition1 he established the equal rights of the faculty of feeling--which had previously been defended by ,sulzer 7#agea71 the aesthetic writer1 and by ,mendelssohn 7#agee1 #agfc1 #aghe74 ,besides ,tetens1 the following should be mentioned among the psychologists3 ,tetens's opponent1 ,johann ,lossius 7#agge71 an adherent of ,bonnet2 ,d4 ,tiedemann 7,inquiries concerning ,man1 from #aggg71 who was estimable also as a historian of philosophy 7,spirit of ,speculative ,philosophy1 #agia-ig72 ,von ,irwing 7#aggb seq42 #b;d ed41 #aggg72 and ,k4 ,ph4 ,moriz 7,magazin zur ,erfahrungsseelenlehre1 from #aghe74 ,basedow 7died #agij71 ,campe 7died #ahah71 and ,j4,h4 ,pestalozzi 7#agde-ahbg7 did valuable work in pedagogics4 ,footnote #a3 ,sensation gives the content1 and the understanding spontaneously produces the form1 of knowledge4 ,the only objectivity of knowledge which we can attain consists in the subjective necessity of the forms of thought or the ideas of relation4 ,perception enables us to cognize phenomena only1 not the true essence of things and of ourselves1 etc4 ,one of the clearest and most acute minds among the philosophers of the ,illumination was the deist ,hermann ,samuel ,reimarus#a 7#afid-agfh71 from #agbh professor in ,hamburg4 ,he attacks atheism1 in whatever form it may present itself1 with as much zeal and conviction as he shows in breaking down the belief in revelation by his inexorable criticism 7in his ,defense1 communicated in manuscript to a few friends only74 ,he obtains his weapons for this double battle from the ,wolffian philosophy4 ,the existence of an extramundane deity is proved by the purposive arrangement of the world1 especially of organisms1 which aims at the good--not merely of man1 as the majority of the physico-theologists have believed1 but--of all living creatures4 ,to believe in a special revelation1 i4e41 a miracle1 in addition to such a revelation of ,god as this1 which is granted to all men1 and is alone necessary to salvation1 is to deny the perfection of ,god1 and to do violence to the immutability of his providence4 ,to these general considerations against the credibility of positive revelation are to be added1 as special arguments against the ,jewish and ,christian revelations1 the untrustworthiness of human testimony in general1 the contradictions in the biblical writings1 the uncertainty of their meaning1 and the moral character of the persons regarded as messengers of ,god1 whose teachings1 precepts1 and deeds in no wise correspond to their high mission4 ,jewish history is a tissue of sheer follies1 shameful deeds1 deceptions1 and cruelties1 the chief motives of which were self-interest and lust for power4 ,the ,new ,testament is also the work of man2 all talk of divine inspiration1 an idle delusion1 the resurrection of ,christ1 a fabrication of the disciples2 and the ,protestant system1 with its dogmas of the ,trinity1 the fall of man1 original sin1 the incarnation1 vicarious atonement1 and eternal punishment1 contrary to reason4 ,the advance of ,reimarus beyond ,wolff consists in the consistent application of the criteria for the divine character of revelation1 which ,wolff had set up without making a positive1 not to speak of a negative1 use of them4 ,his weakness#b consists in the fact that1 on the one hand1 he contented himself with a rationalistic interpretation of the biblical narratives1 instead of pushing on--as ,semler did after him at ,halle 7#agbe-ia7--to a historical criticism of the sources1 and1 on the other1 held fast to the alternative common to all the deists1 ,either divine or human1 either an actual event or a fabrication1 without any suspicion of that great intermediate region of religious myth1 of the involuntary and pregnant inventions of the popular fancy4 ,footnote #a3 ,h4,s4 ,reimarus3 ,discussions on the ,chief ,truths of ,natural ,religion1 #aged2 ,general ,consideration of the ,instincts of ,animals1 #agfb2 ,apology or ,defense for the ,rational ,worshipers of ,god4 ,fragments of the last of these works1 which was kept secret during its author's life1 were published by ,lessing 7the well-known ,wolffenbttel ,fragments1 from #aggd74 ,a detailed table of contents is to be found in ,reimarus und seine ,schutzschrift1 #ahfb1 by ,d4 ,fr4 ,strauss1 included in the fifth volume of his ,gesammelte ,schriften4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 ,o4 ,pfleiderer1 ,philosophy of ,religion1 vol4 i4 p4 #ajb1 p4 #ajf seq4 ,the philosophico-religious standpoint of ,g4,e4 ,lessing 7#agbi-ha71 in whom the ,illumination reached its best fruitage1 was less one-sided4 ,apart from the important aesthetic impulses which flowed from the ,laocoon 7#agff7 and the ,hamburg ,dramaturgy 7#agfg-fi71 his philosophical significance rests on two ideas1 which have had important consequences for the religious conceptions of the nineteenth century3 the speculative interpretation of certain dogmas 7the ,trinity1 etc471 and the application of the ,leibnitzian idea of development to the history of the positive religions4 ,by both of these he prepared the way for ,hegel4 ,in regard to his relation to his predecessors1 ,lessing sought to mediate between the pantheism of ,spinoza and the individualism of ,leibnitz2 and in his comprehension of the latter showed himself far superior to the ,wolffians4 ,he can be called a ,spinozist only by those who1 like ,jacobi1 have this title ready for everyone who expresses himself against a transcendent1 personal ,god1 and the unconditional freedom of the will4 ,moreover1 in view of his critical and dialectical1 rather than systematic1 method of thinking1 we must guard against laying too great stress on isolated statements by him4#a ,footnote #a3 ,a caution which ,gideon ,spicker 7,lessings ,weltanschauung1 #ahhc7 counsels us not to forget1 even in view of the oft cited avowal of determinism1 ,i thank ,god that ,i must1 and that ,i must the best4 ,among the numerous treatises on ,lessing we may note those by ,g4,e4 ,schwarz 7#ahed71 and ,zeller 7in ,sybel's ,historische ,zeitschrift1 #ahgj1 incorporated in the second collection of ,zeller's ,vortrge und ,abhandlungen1 #ahgg72 and on his theological position1 that of ,k4 ,fischer on ,lessing's ,nathan der ,weise1 #ahfd1 as well as ,j4,h4 ,witte's ,philosophie unserer ,dichterheroen1 vol4 i4 7,lessing and ,herder71 #ahhj4 ,cf4 in ,english1 ,sime1 #b vols41 #ahgg1 and ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 vol4 xiv4 pp1 #dgh-dhb4--,,tr4 ,lessing conceives the ,deity as the supreme1 all-comprehensive1 living unity1 which excludes neither a certain kind of plurality nor even a certain kind of change2 without life and action1 without the experience of changing states1 the life of ,god would be miserably wearisome4 ,things are not out of1 but in him2 nevertheless 7as contingent7 they are distinct from him4 ,the ,trinity must be understood in the sense of immanent distinctions4 ,god has conceived himself1 or his perfections1 in a twofold manner3 he conceived them as united and himself as their sum1 and he conceived them as single4 ,now ,god's thinking is creation1 his ideas actualities4 ,by conceiving his perfections united he created his eternal image1 the ,son of ,god2 the bond between ,god representing and ,god represented1 between ,father and ,son1 is the ,holy ,spirit4 ,but when he conceived his perfections singly he created the world1 in which these manifest themselves divided among a continuous series of particular beings4 ,every individual is an isolated divine perfection2 the things in the world are limited gods1 all living1 all with souls1 and of a spiritual nature1 though in different degrees4 ,development is everywhere2 at present the soul has five senses1 but very probably it once had less than five1 and in the future it will have more4 ,at first the actions of men were guided by obscure instinct2 gradually the reason obtained influence over the will1 and one day will govern it completely through its clear and distinct cognitions4 ,thus freedom is attained in the course of history--the rational and virtuous man consciously obeys the divine order of the world1 while he who is unfree obeys unconsciously4 ,lessing shares with the deistic ,illumination the belief in a religion of reason1 whose basis and essential content are formed by morality2 but he rises far above this level in that he regards the religion of reason not as the beginning but as the goal of the development1 and the positive religions as necessary transition stages in its attainment4 ,as natural religion differs in each individual according to his feelings and powers1 without positive enactments there would be no unity and community in religious matters4 ,nevertheless the statutory and historical element is not a graft from without1 but a shell organically grown around natural religion1 indispensable for its development1 and to be removed but gradually and by layers--when the inclosed kernel has become ripe and firm4 ,the history of religions is an education of the human race through divine revelation2 so teaches his small but thoughtful treatise of #aghj4a ,as the education of the individual man puts nothing extraneous into him1 but only gives him more quickly and easily that which he could have reached of himself1 so human reason is illuminated by revelation concerning things to which it could have itself attained1 only that without ,god's help the process would have been longer and more difficult--perhaps it would have wandered about for many millions of years in the errors of polytheism1 if ,god had not been pleased by a single stroke 7his revelation to ,moses7 to give it a better direction4 ,and as the teacher does not impart everything to the pupil at once1 but considers the state of development reached by him at each given period1 so ,god in his revelation observes a certain order and measure4 ,to the rude ,jewish people he revealed himself first as a national ,god1 as the ,god of their fathers2 they had to wait for the ,persians to teach them that the ,god whom they had hitherto worshiped as the most powerful among other gods was the only one4 ,although this lowest stage in the development of religion lacked the belief in immortality1 yet it must not be lightly valued2 let us acknowledge that it was an heroic obedience for men to observe the laws of ,god simply because they are the laws of ,god1 and not because of temporal or future rewards6 ,the first practical teacher of immortality was ,christ2 with him the second age of religion begins3 the first good book of elementary instruction1 the ,old ,testament1 from which man had hitherto learned1 was followed by the second1 better one1 the ,new ,testament4 ,as we now can dispense with the first primer in regard to the doctrine of the unity of ,god1 and as we gradually begin to be able to dispense with the second in regard to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul1 so this ,new ,testament may easily contain still further truths1 which for the present we wonder at as revelations1 until the reason shall learn to derive them from other truths already established4 ,lessing himself makes an attempt at a philosophical interpretation of the dogmas of the ,trinity 7see above71 of original sin1 and of atonement4 ,such an advance from faith to knowledge1 such a development of revealed truths into proved truths of reason1 is absolutely necessary4 ,we cannot dispense with the truths of revelation1 but we must not remain content with simply believing them1 but must endeavor to comprehend them2 for they have been revealed in order that they may become rational4 ,they are1 as it were1 the sum which the teacher of arithmetic tells his pupils beforehand so that they may guide themselves by it2 but if they content themselves with this solution--which was given merely as a guide--they would never learn to calculate4 ,hand in hand with the advance of the understanding goes the progress of the will4 ,future recompenses1 which the ,new ,testament promises as rewards of virtue1 are means of education1 and will gradually fall into disuse3 in the highest stage1 the stage of purity of heart1 virtue will be loved and practiced for its own sake1 and no longer for the sake of heavenly rewards4 ,slowly but surely1 along devious paths which are yet salutary1 we are being led toward that great goal4 ,it will surely come1 the time of consummation1 when man will do the good because it is good1 this time of the new1 eternal ,gospel1 this third age1 this ,christianity of reason4 ,continue1 ,eternal ,providence1 thine imperceptible march2 let me not despair of thee because it is imperceptible1 not even when to me thy steps seem to lead backward4 ,it is not true that the straight line is always the shortest4 ,footnote #a3 ,die ,erziehung des ,menschengeschlects4 ,with the thought that every individual must traverse the same course as that by which the race attains its perfection1 ,lessing connects the idea of the transmigration of souls4 ,why may not the individual man have been present in this world more than once8 ,is this hypothesis so ridiculous because it is the oldest8 ,if ,lessing abandoned the ranks of the deists by his recognition of the fact that the positive religions contain truth in a gradual process of purification1 by his free criticism1 on the other hand1 he broke with the orthodox1 whose idolatrous reverence for the ,bible was to him an abomination4 ,the letter is not the spirit1 the ,bible is not religion1 nor yet its foundation1 but only its records4 ,contingent historical truths can never serve as a proof of the necessary truths of reason4 ,christianity is older than the ,new ,testament4 ,already1 in the case of ,lessing1 we may doubt1 in view of his historical temper and of certain speculative tendencies1 whether he is to be included among the ,illuminati4 ,in the case of ,kant a decided protest must be raised against such a classification4 ,when ,hegel numbers him among the philosophers of the ,illumination1 on account of his lack of rational intuition1 and some theologians on account of his religious rationalism1 the answer to the former is that ,kant did not lack the speculative gift1 but only that it was surpassed by his gift of reflection1 and1 to the latter1 that in regard to the positive element in religion he judged very differently from the deists and appreciated the historical element more justly than they--if not to the same extent as ,lessing and ,herder4 ,we do not need to lay great stress on the fact that ,kant had a lively consciousness that he was making a contribution to thought1 and that the ,illumination contemplated this new doctrine without comprehending it1 in order to recognize that the difference between his efforts and achievements and those of the ,illumination is far greater than their kinship4 ,for although ,kant is upon common ground with it1 in so far as he adheres to its motto1 ,have courage to use thine own understanding1 become a man1 cease to trust thyself to the guidance of others1 and free thyself in all fields from the yoke of authority1 and1 although besides such formal injunctions to freedom of thought1 he also shares in certain material tendencies and convictions 7the turning from the world to man1 the attempt at a synthesis of reason and experience1 and the belief in a religion of reason72 yet in method and results1 he stands like a giant among a race of dwarfs1 like one instructed1 who judges from principles1 among men of opinion1 who merely stick results together1 a methodical systematizer among well-meaning but impotent eclectics4 ,the philosophy of the ,illumination is related to that of ,kant as argument to science1 as halting mediation to principiant resolution1 as patchwork to creation out of full resources1 yet at the same time as wish to deed and as negative preparation to positive achievement4 ,it was undeniably of great value to the ,kantian criticism that the ,illumination had created a point of intersection for the various tendencies of thought1 and had brought about the approximation and mutual contact of the opposing systems which then existed1 while1 at the same time1 it had crumbled them to pieces1 and thus awakened the need for a new1 more firmly and more deeply founded system4 #d4 ,the ,faith ,philosophy4 ,the philosophers of feeling or faith stand in the same relation to the ,german ,illumination as ,rousseau to the ,french4 ,here also the rights of feeling are vindicated against those of the knowing reason4 ,among the distinguished representatives of this anti-rationalistic tendency ,hamann led the way1 ,herder was the most prolific1 and ,jacobi the clearest4 ,that the fountain of certitude is to be sought not in discriminating thought1 but in intuition1 experience1 revelation1 and tradition2 that the highest truths can be felt only and not proved2 that all existing things are incomprehensible1 because individual--these are convictions which1 before ,jacobi defended them as based on scientific principles1 had been vehemently proclaimed by that singular man1 ,j4,g4 ,hamann 7died #aghh7 of ,knigsberg4 ,from an unprinted review by ,hamann1 ,herder drew the objections which his ,metacritique raises against ,kant's ,critique of ,reason--that the division of matter and form1 of sensibility and understanding1 is inadmissible2 that ,kant misunderstood the significance of language1 which is just where sensibility and understanding unite1 etc4 ,in ,herder#a 7#agdd-ahjc3 after #aggf ,superintendent-,general in ,weimar7 the philosophy of feeling gained a finer1 more perspicuous and harmonious nature1 who shared ,lessing's interest in history and his tendency to hold fast equally to pantheism and to individualism4 ,god is the all-one1 infinite1 spiritual 7non-personal7 primal force1 which wholly reveals itself in each thing 7,god3 ,dialogues on the ,system of ,spinoza1 #aghg74 ,to the life1 power1 wisdom1 and goodness of ,god correspond the life and perfection of the universe and of individual creatures1 each of which possesses its own irreplaceable value and bears in itself its future in germ4 ,everywhere1 one and the same life in an ascending series of powers and forms with imperceptible transitions4 ,always1 an inner and an outer together2 no power without organ1 no spirit without a body4 ,as thought is only a higher stage of sensation1 which develops from the lower by means of language--reason1 like sense1 is not a productive but a receptive faculty of knowing1 perceiving 7,vernehmen7--so the free process of history is only the continuation and completion of the nature-process 7,ideas for the ,philosophy of the ,history of ,mankind1 #aghd seq474 ,man1 the last child of nature and her first freedman1 is the nodal point where the physical series of events changes into the ethical2 the last member of the organisms of earth is at the same time the first in the spiritual development4 ,the mission of history is the unfolding of all the powers which nature has concentrated in man as the compendium of the world2 its law1 that everywhere on our earth everything be realized that can be realized there2 its end1 humanity and the harmonious development of all our capacities4 ,as nature forms a single great organism1 and from the stone to man describes a connected development1 so humanity is a one great individual which passes through its several ages1 from infancy 7the ,orient71 through boyhood 7,eygpt and ,phoenicia71 youth 7,greece71 and manhood 7,rome71 to old age 7the ,christian world74 ,the spirit stands in the closest dependence upon nature1 and nature is concerned in history throughout4 ,the finer organization of his brain1 the possession of hands1 above all1 his erect position1 make man1 man and endow him with reason4 ,similarly it is natural conditions1 climate1 the character of the soil1 the surrounding animal and vegetable life1 etc41 that play an essential part in determining the manners1 the characters1 and the destinies of nations4 ,the connection of nature with history by means of the concept of development and through the idea that the two merely represent different stages of the same fundamental process1 made ,herder the forerunner of ,schelling4 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,herder cf4 the biography by ,r4 ,haym1 #b vols41 #ahgg1 #ahhe2 and the work by ,witte which has been referred to above 7p4 #cjf1 note74 ,his polemic against ,kant in the ,metacritique1 #agii 7against the ,critique of ,pure ,reason71 and the dialogue ,calligone1 #ahjj 7against the ,critique of ,judgment71 is less pleasing4 ,these are neither dignified in tone nor essentially of much importance4 ,in the former the distinction between sensibility and reason is censured1 and in the latter the separation of the beautiful from the true and the good1 but ,kant's theory of aesthetics is for the most part grossly misunderstood4 ,the disinterested satisfaction ,herder makes a cold satisfaction2 the harmonious activity of the cognitive powers1 a tedious1 apish sport2 the satisfaction without a concept1 judgment without ground or cause4 ,the positive elements in his own views are more valuable4 ,pleasure in mere form1 without a concept1 and without the idea of an end1 is impossible4 ,all beauty must mean or express something1 must be a symbol of inner life2 its ground is perfection or adaptation4 ,beauty is that symmetrical union of the parts of a being1 in virtue of which it feels well itself and gives pleasure to the observer1 who sympathetically shares in this well-being4 ,the charm and value of the ,calligone lie more in the warmth and clearness with which the expressive beauty of single natural phenomena is described than in the abstract discussion4 ,friedrich ,heinrich ,jacobi 7#agdc-ahai7 gave the most detailed statement of the position of the philosophy of feeling1 and the most careful proof of it4 ,he was born in ,dsseldorf1 the son of a manufacturer2 until #agid he lived in his native place and at his country residence in ,pempelfort2 later he resided in ,holstein1 and1 from #ahje1 in ,munich1 where1 in #ahjg-ac1 he was president of the ,academy of ,sciences4 ,of his works1 collected in five volumes1 #ahab-be1 we are here chiefly concerned with the letters ,on the ,doctrine of ,spinoza1 #aghe2 ,david ,hume on ,faith1 or ,idealism and ,realism1 #aghg2 and the treatise ,on ,divine ,things1 #ahaa1 which called out ,schelling's merciless response1 ,memorial of ,jacobi4 ,besides ,hume and ,spinoza1 the sensationalism of ,bonnet and the criticism of ,kant had made the most lasting impression on ,jacobi4 ,his relation to ,kant is neither that of an opponent nor of a supporter and popularizer4 ,he declares himself in accord with ,kant's critique of the understanding 7the understanding is merely a formal function1 one which forms and combines concepts only1 but does not guarantee reality1 one to which the material of thought must be given from elsewhere and for which the suprasensible remains unattainable72 in regard to the critique of reason he raises the objection that it2 makes the ,ideas mere postulates1 which possess no guarantee for their reality4 ,the critique of sensibility appears to him still more unsatisfactory1 as it does not explain the origin of sensations4 ,without the concept of the thing-in-itself one cannot enter the ,kantian philosophy1 and with it one cannot remain there4 ,fichte has drawn the correct conclusion from the ,kantian premises2 idealism is the unavoidable result of the ,critique of ,reason and foretold by2 it as the ,messiah was foretold by ,john the ,baptist4 ,and by the evil fruit we know the evil root3 the idealistic theory is philosophical nihilism1 for it denies the reality of the external world1 as the materialism of ,spinoza denies a transcendent ,god and the freedom of the will4 ,reality slips away from both these systems--they are the only consistent ones there are--material reality escaping from the former and suprasensible reality from the latter2 and this must be so1 because reality1 of whatever kind it be1 cannot be known1 but only believed and felt4 ,the actual1 the existence of the noumenal as well as of the external world1 even the existence of our own body1 makes itself known to us through revelation alone2 the understanding comprehends relations only2 the certainty that a thing exists is attained only through experience and faith4 ,sense and reason are the organs of faith1 and hence the true sources of knowledge2 the former apprehends the natural1 the latter1 the supernatural1 while for the understanding is left only the analysis and combination of given intuitions4 ,philosophy as a science from concepts must necessarily prove atheistic and fatalistic4 ,conception and proof mean deduction from conditions4 ,how shall that which has no cause from which to explain it1 the unconditioned1 ,god1 and freedom1 be comprehended and proved8 ,demonstration rises along the chain of causes to the universe alone1 not to a transcendent ,creator2 mediate knowledge is confined to the sphere of conditioned being and mechanical becoming4 ,the intuitive knowledge of feeling alone leads us beyond this1 and along with the wonderful1 the inconceivable power of freedom in ourselves1 which is above all nature1 shows us the primal source of all wonders1 the transcendent ,god above us4 ,the inference from our own spiritual1 self-conscious1 free personality to that of ,god is no unauthorized anthropomorphism--in the knowledge of ,god we may fearlessly deify our human existence1 because ,god1 when he created man1 gave his divine nature human form4 ,reason and freedom are the same3 the former is theoretical1 the latter practical elevation to the suprasensible4 ,nevertheless virtue is not based upon an inflexible1 despotic1 abstractly1 formal law1 but upon an instinct1 which1 however1 does not aim at happiness4 ,thus ,jacobi attempts to mediate between the ethics of the ,illumination and the ethics of ,kant1 by agreeing with the former in regard to the origin of virtue 7it arises from a natural impulse71 and with the latter in regard to its nature 7it consists in disinterestedness74 ,hence with the ,illumination he rejects the imperative form1 and with ,kant the eudemonistic end4 ,at the same time he endeavors to introduce ,herder's idea of individuality into ethics1 by demanding that morality assume a special form in each man4 ,schiller and the romantic school take from ,jacobi their ideal of the beautiful soul1 which from natural impulse realizes in its action1 and still more in its being1 the good in an individual way4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,from ,,kant ,,to ,,the ,,present ,,time4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,kant4 ,the suit between empiricism and rationalism had continued for centuries1 but still awaited final decision4 ,are all our ideas the result of experience1 or are they 7wholly or in part7 an original possession of the mind8 ,are they received from without 7by perception71 or produced from within 7by self-activity78 ,is knowledge a product of sensation or of pure thought8 ,all who had thus far taken part in this discussion had resembled partisans or advocates rather than disinterested judges4 ,they had given less attention to investigation than to the defense of the traditional theses of their schools2 they had not endeavored to obtain results1 but to establish results already determined2 and1 along with real arguments1 popular appeals had not been despised4 ,each of the opposing schools had given variations on a definite theme1 and whenever timid attempts had been made to bring the two melodies into harmony they had met with no approval4 ,the proceedings thus far had at least made it evident to the unbiased hearer that each of the two parties made extravagant claims1 and1 in the end1 fell into self-contradiction4 ,if the claim of empiricism is true1 that all our concepts arise from perception1 then not only the science of the suprasensible1 which it denies1 but also the science of the objects of experience1 about which it concerns itself1 is impossible4 ,for perception informs us concerning single cases merely1 it can never comprehend all cases1 it yields no necessary and universal truth2 but knowledge which is not apodictically valid for every reasoning being and for all cases is not worthy the name4 ,the very reasons which were intended to prove the possibility of knowledge give a direct inference to its impossibility4 ,the empirical philosophy destroys itself1 ending with ,hume in skepticism and probabilism4 ,rationalism is overtaken by a different1 and yet an analogous fate--it breaks up into a popular eclecticism4 ,it believes that it has discovered an infallible criterion of truth in the clearness and distinctness of ideas1 and a sure example for philosophical method in the method of mathematics4 ,in both points it is wrong4 ,the criterion of truth is insufficient1 for ,spinoza and ,leibnitz built up their opposing theories--the pantheism of the one and the monadology of the other--from equally clear and distinct conceptions2 tried by this standard individualism is just as true as pantheism4 ,mathematics1 again1 does not owe its unquestioned acceptance and cogent force to the clearness and distinctness of its conceptions1 but to the fact that these are capable of construction in intuition4 ,the distinction between mathematics and metaphysics was overlooked1 namely1 that mathematical thought can transform its conceptions into intuitions1 can generate its objects or sensuously present them1 which philosophical thought is not in a position to do4 ,the objects of the latter must be given to it1 and to the human mind they are given in no other way than through sensuous intuition4 ,metaphysics seeks to be a science of the real1 but it is impossible to conjure being out of thought2 reality cannot be proved from concepts1 it can only be felt4 ,in making the unperceivable and suprasensible 7the real nature of things1 the totality of the world1 the ,deity1 and immortality7 the special object of philosophy1 rationalism looked on the understanding as a faculty of knowledge by which objects are given4 ,in reality objects can never be given through concepts2 these only render it possible to think objects given in some other way 7by intuition74 ,it is true that concepts of the suprasensible exist1 but nothing can be known through them1 there is nothing intuitively given to be subsumed under them4 ,with this failure to perceive the intuitive element in mathematics was joined the mistake of overlooking its synthetic character4 ,the syllogistic method of presentation employed in the ,euclidean geometry led to the belief that the more special theorems had been derived from the simpler ones1 and these from the axioms1 by a process of conceptual analysis2 while the fact is that in mathematics all progress is by intuition alone1 the syllogism serving merely to formulate and explain truths already attained1 but not to supply new ones4 ,following the example of mathematics thus misunderstood1 the mission of philosophy was made to consist in the development of the truths slumbering in pregnant first principles by means of logical analysis4 ,if only there were metaphysical axioms6 ,if we only did not demand1 and were not compelled to demand1 of true science that it increase our knowledge1 and not merely give an analytical explanation of knowledge4 ,when once the clearness and distinctness of conceptions had been taken in so purely formal a sense1 it was inevitable that in the end1 as productivity became less1 the principle should be weakened down to a mere demand for the explanation and elucidation of the metaphysical ideas present in popular consciousness4 ,thus the rationalistic current lost itself in the shallow waters of the ,illumination1 which soon gave as ready a welcome to the empirical theories--since these also were able to legitimate themselves by clear and distinct conceptions--as it had given to the results of the rationalistic systems4 ,it was thus easy to see that each of the contending parties had been guilty of one-sidedness1 and that in order to escape this a certain mean must be assumed between the two extremes2 but it was a much more difficult matter to discover the due middle ground4 ,neither of the opposing standpoints is so correct as its defenders believe1 and neither so false as its opponents maintain4 ,where1 then1 on either side1 does the mistaken narrowness begin1 and how far does the justification of each extend8 ,the conflict centers1 first1 about the question concerning the origin of human knowledge and the sphere of its validity4 ,rationalism is justified when it asserts that some ideas do not come from the senses4 ,if knowledge is to be possible1 some concepts cannot originate in perception1 those1 namely1 by which knowledge is constituted1 for if they should1 it would lack universality and necessity4 ,the sole organ of universally valid knowledge is reason4 ,empiricism1 on the other hand1 is justified when it asserts that the experiential alone is knowable4 ,whatever is to be knowable must be given as a real in sensuous intuition4 ,the only organ of reality is sensibility4 ,rationalism judges correctly concerning the origin of the most important classes of ideas2 empiricism concerning the sphere of their validity4 ,the two may be thus combined3 some concepts 7those which produce knowledge7 take their origin in reason or are a priori1 but they are valid for objects of experience alone4 ,the conflict concerns1 secondly1 the use of the deductive 7syllogistic7 or the inductive method4 ,empiricism1 through its founder ,bacon1 had recommended induction in place of the barren syllogistic method1 as the only method which would lead to new discoveries4 ,it demands1 above all things1 the extension of knowledge4 ,rationalism1 on the contrary1 held fast to the deductive method1 because the syllogism alone1 in its view1 furnishes knowledge valid for all rational beings4 ,it demands1 first of all1 universality and necessity in knowledge4 ,induction has the advantage of increasing knowledge1 but it leads only to empirical and comparative1 not to strict universality4 ,the syllogism has the advantage of yielding universal and necessary truth1 but it can only explicate and establish knowledge1 not increase it4 ,may it not be possible so to do justice to the demands of both that the advantages which they seek shall be combined1 and the disadvantages which have been feared1 avoided8 ,are there not cognitions which increase our knowledge 7are synthetic7 without being empirical1 which are universally and necessarily valid 7a priori7 without being analytic8 ,from these considerations arises the main question of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason3 ,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 ,the philosophy of experience had overestimated sense and underestimated the understanding1 when it found the source of all knowledge in the faculty of perception and degraded the faculty of thought to an almost wholly inactive recipient of messages coming to it from without4 ,from the standpoint of empiricism concepts 7,ideas7 deserve confidence only in so far as they can legitimate themselves by their origin in sensations 7impressions74 ,it overlooks the active character of all knowing4 ,among the rationalists1 on the other hand1 we find an underestimation of the senses and an overestimation of the understanding4 ,they believe that sense reveals only the deceptive exterior of things1 while reason gives their true non-sensuous essence4 ,that which the mind perceives of things is deceptive1 but that which it thinks concerning them is true4 ,the former power is the faculty of confused1 the latter the faculty of distinct knowledge4 ,sense is the enemy rather than the servant of true knowledge1 which consists in the development and explication of pregnant innate conceptions and principles4 ,these philosophers forget that we can never reach reality by conceptual analysis2 and that the senses have a far greater importance for knowledge than merely to give it an impulse2 that it is they which supply the understanding with real objects1 and so with the content of knowledge4 ,beside the 7formal7 activity 7of the understanding71 cognition implies a passive factor1 a reception of impressions4 ,neither sense alone nor the understanding alone produces knowledge1 but both cognitive powers are necessary1 the active and the passive1 the conceptual and the intuitive4 ,here the question arises1 ,how do concept and intuition1 sensuous and rational knowledge1 differ1 and what is the basis of their congruence8 ,notwithstanding their different points of departure and their variant results1 the two main tendencies of modern philosophy agree in certain points4 ,if the conflict between the two schools and their one-sidedness suggested the idea of supplementing the conclusions of the one by those of the other1 the recognition of the incorrectness of their common convictions furnished the occasion to go beyond them and to establish a new1 a higher point of view above them both1 as also above the eclecticism which sought to unite the opposing principles4 ,the errors common to both concern1 in the first place1 the nature of judgment and the difference between sensibility and understanding4 ,neither side had recognized that the peculiar character of judgment consists in active connection4 ,the rationalists made judgment an active function1 it is true1 but a mere activity of conscious development1 of elucidation and analytical inference1 which does not advance knowledge a single step4 ,the empiricists described it as a process of comparison and discrimination1 as the mere perception and recognition of the relations and connections already existing between ideas2 while in reality judgment does not discover the relations and connections of representations1 but itself establishes them4 ,in the former case the synthetic moment is ignored1 in the latter the active moment4 ,the imperfect view of judgment was one of the reasons for the appearance of extreme theories concerning the origin of ideas in reason or in perception4 ,rationalism regards even those concepts which have a content as innate1 whereas it is only formal concepts which are so4 ,empiricism regards all1 even the highest formal concepts 7the categories71 as abstracted from experience1 whereas experience furnishes only the content of knowledge1 and not the synthesis which is necessary to it4 ,on the one hand too much1 and on the other too little1 is regarded as the original possession of the understanding4 ,the question ,what concepts are innate8 can be decided only by answering the further question1 ,what are the concepts through which the faculty of judgment connects the representations obtained from experience8 ,these connective concepts1 these formal instruments of synthesis are a priori4 ,the agreement of the two schools is still greater in regard to the relation of sense and understanding1 notwithstanding the apparently sharp contrast between them4 ,the empiricist considers thought transformed1 sublimated perception1 while the rationalist sees in perception only confused and less distinct thought4 ,for the former concepts are faded images of sensations1 for the latter sensations are concepts which have not yet become clear2 the difference is scarcely greater than if the one should call ice frozen water1 and the other should prefer to call water melted ice4 ,both arrange intuition and thought in a single series1 and derive the one from the other by enhancement or attenuation4 ,both make the mistake of recognizing only a difference in degree where a difference in kind exists4 ,in such a case only an energetic dualism can afford help4 ,sense and understanding are not one and the same cognitive power at different stages1 but two heterogeneous faculties4 ,sensation and thought are not different in degree1 but in kind4 ,as ,descartes began with the metaphysical dualism of extension and thought1 so ,kant begins with the notical dualism of intuition and thought4 ,much more serious1 however1 than any of the mistakes yet mentioned was a sin of omission of which the two schools were alike guilty1 and the recognition and avoidance of which constituted in ,kant's own eyes the distinctive character of his philosophy and its principiant-advance beyond preceding systems4 ,the pre-,kantian thinker had proceeded to the discussion of knowledge without raising the question of the possibility of knowledge4 ,he had approached things in the full confidence that the human mind was capable of cognizing them1 and with a nave trust in the power of reason to possess itself of the truth4 ,his trust was nave and ingenuous1 because the idea that it could deceive him had never entered his mind4 ,now no matter whether this belief in man's capacity for knowledge and in the possibility of knowing things is justifiable or not1 and no matter how far it may be justifiable1 it was in any case untested2 so that when the skeptic approached with his objections the dogmatist was defenseless4 ,all previous philosophy1 so far as it had not been skeptical1 had been1 according to ,kant's expression1 dogmatic2 that is1 it had held as an article of faith1 and without precedent inquiry1 that we possess the power of cognizing objects4 ,it had not asked how this is possible2 it had not even asked what knowledge is1 what may and must be demanded of it1 and by what means our reason is in a position to satisfy such demands4 ,it had left human intelligence and its extent uninvestigated4 ,the skeptic1 on the other hand1 had been no more thorough4 ,he had doubted and denied man's capacity for knowledge just as uncritically as the dogmatist had believed and presupposed it4 ,he had directed his ingenuity against the theories of dogmatic philosophy1 instead of toward the fundamental question of the possibility of knowledge4 ,human intelligence1 which the dogmatist had approached with unreasoned trust and the skeptic with just as unreasoned distrust1 is subjected1 according to the plan of the critical philosopher1 to a searching examination4 ,for this reason ,kant termed his standpoint criticism1 and his undertaking a ,critique of ,reason4 ,instead of asserting and denying1 he investigates how knowledge arises1 of what factors it is composed1 and how far it extends4 ,he inquires into the origin and extent of knowledge1 into its sources and its limits1 into the grounds of its existence and of its legitimacy4 ,the ,critique of ,reason finds itself confronted by two problems1 the second of which cannot be solved until after the solution of the first4 ,the investigation of the sources of knowledge must precede the inquiry into the extent of knowledge4 ,only after the conditions of knowledge have been established can it be ascertained what objects are attainable by it4 ,its sphere cannot be determined except from its origin4 ,whether the critical philosopher stands nearer to the skeptic or to the dogmatist is rather an idle question4 ,he is specifically distinct from both1 in that he summons and guides the reason to self-contemplation1 to a methodical examination of its capacity for knowledge4 ,where the one had blindly trusted and the other suspected and denied1 he investigates2 they overlook1 he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge4 ,the critical problem does not mean1 ,does a faculty of knowledge exist8 but1 ,of what powers is it composed8 are all objects knowable which have been so regarded8 ,kant does not ask whether1 but how and by what means1 knowledge is possible4 ,everyone who gives himself to scientific reflection must postulate that knowledge is possible1 and the demand of the notical theorists of the day for a philosophy absolutely without assumptions is quite incapable of fulfillment4 ,nay1 in order to be able to begin his inquiry at all1 it was necessary for ,kant to assume still more special postulates2 for that a cognition of cognition is possible1 that there is a critical1 self-investigating reason could1 at first1 be only a matter of belief4 ,this would not have excluded a supplementary detailed statement concerning the how of this self-knowledge1 concerning the organ of the critical philosophy4 ,but ,kant never gave one1 and the omission subsequently led to a sharp debate concerning the character and method of the ,critique of ,reason4 ,on this point1 if we may so express it1 ,kant remained a dogmatist4 ,kant felt himself to be the finisher of skepticism2 but this was chiefly because he had received the strongest impulse to the development of his critique of knowledge from ,hume's inquiries concerning causation4 ,brought up in the dogmatic rationalism of the ,wolffian school1 to which he remained true for a considerable period as a teacher and writer 7till about #agfj71 although at the same time he was inquiring with an independent spirit1 ,kant was gradually won over through the influence of the ,english philosophy to the side of empirical skepticism4 ,then--as the result1 no doubt1 of reading the ,nouveaux ,essais of ,leibnitz1 published in #agfe--;he returned to rationalistic principles1 until finally1 after a renewal of empirical influences1#a he took the position crystallized in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 #agha1 which1 however1 experienced still other1 though less considerable1 changes in the sequel1 just as in itself it shows the traces of previous transformations4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,h4 ,vaihinger's ,kommentar zu ,kants ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 vol4 i41 #ahha1 pp4 #dh-di4 ,this is a work marked by acuteness1 great industry1 and an objective point of view which merits respect4 ,the second volume1 which treats of the ,transcendental ,aesthetic1 appeared in #ahib4 ,it would be a most interesting task to trace in the writings which belong to ,kant's pre-critical period the growth and development of the fundamental critical positions4 ,here1 however1 we can only mention in passing the subjects of his reflection and some of the most striking anticipations and beginnings of his epoch-making position4 ,even his maiden work1 ,thoughts on the ,true ,estimation of ,vis ,viva1 #agdg1 betokens the mediating nature of its author4 ,in this it is argued that when men of profound and penetrating minds maintain exactly opposite opinions1 attention must be chiefly directed to some intermediate principle to a certain degree compatible with the correctness of both parties4 ,the question under discussion was whether the measure of vis viva is equal1 as the ,cartesians thought1 to the product of the mass into the velocity1 or1 according to the ,leibnitzians1 to the product of the mass into the square of the velocity4 ,kant's unsatisfactory solution of the problem--the law of ,descartes holds for dead1 and that of ,leibnitz for living forces--drew upon him the derision of ,lessing1 who said that he had endeavored to estimate living forces without having tested his own4 ,a similar tendency toward compromise--this time it is a synthesis of ,leibnitz and ,newton--is seen in his ,habilitationsschrift1 ,principiorum ,primorum ,cognitionis ,metaphysicae ,nova ,dilucidatio1 #agee1 and in the dissertation ,monadologia ,physica1 #agef4 ,the former distinguishes between ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi1 rejects the ontological argument1 and defends determinism against ,crusius on ,leibnitzian grounds4 ,in the ,physical ,monadology ,kant gives his adherence to dynamism 7matter the product of attraction and repulsion71 and makes the monads or elements of body fill space without prejudice to their simplicity4 ,a series of treatises is devoted to subjects in natural science3 ,the ,effect of the ,tides in retarding the ,earth's ,rotation2 ,the ,obsolescence of the ,earth2 ,fire 7,inaugural ,dissertation71 ,earthquakes1 and the ,theory of the ,winds4 ,the most important of these1 the ,general ,natural ,history and ,theory of the ,heavens1 #agee1 which for a long time remained unnoticed1 and which was dedicated to ,frederick ,,ii41 developed the hypothesis 7carried out forty years later by ,laplace in ignorance of ,kant's work7 of the mechanical origin of the universe and of the motion of the planets4 ,it presupposes merely the two forces of matter1 attraction and repulsion1 and its primitive chaotic condition1 a world-mist with elements of different density4 ,it is noticeable that ,kant acknowledges the failure of the mechanical theory at two points3 it is brought to a halt at the origin of the organic world and at the origin of matter4 ,the mechanical cosmogony is far from denying creation2 on the contrary1 the proof that this well-ordered and purposive world necessarily arose from the regular action of material forces under law and without divine intervention1 can only serve to support our assumption of a ,supreme ,intelligence as the author of matter and its laws2 the belief is necessary1 just because nature1 even in its chaotic condition1 can act only in an orderly and regular way4 ,the empirical phase of ,kant's development is represented by the writings of the #fj's4 ,the ,false ,subtlety of the ,four ,syllogistic ,figures1 #agfb1 asserts that the first figure is the only natural one1 and that the others are superfluous and need reduction to the first4 ,in the ,only ,possible ,foundation for a ,demonstration of the ,existence of ,god1 #agfc1 which1 in the seventh ,reflection of the ,second ,division1 recapitulates the cosmogony advanced in the ,natural ,history of the ,heavens1 the discussions concerning being 7existence is absolute position1 not a predicate which increases the sum of the qualities but is posited in a merely relative way71 and the conclusion1 prophetical of his later point of view1 ,it is altogether necessary that we should be convinced of the existence of ,god1 but not so necessary that his existence should be demonstrated are more noteworthy than the argument itself4 ,this runs3 ,all possibility presupposes something actual wherein and whereby all that is conceivable is given as a determination or a consequence4 ,that actuality the destruction of which would destroy all possibility is absolutely necessary4 ,therefore there exists an absolutely necessary ,being as the ultimate real ground of all possibility2 this ,being is one1 simple1 unchangeable1 eternal1 the ens realissimum and a spirit4 ,the ,attempt to introduce the ,notion of ,negative ,quantities into ,philosophy1 #agfc1 distinguishes--contrary to ,crusius--between logical opposition1 contradiction or mere negation 7a and not-a1 pleasure and the absence of pleasure1 power and lack of power71 and real opposition1 which cannot be explained by logic 7a and -a1 pleasure and pain1 capital and debts1 attraction and repulsion2 in real opposition both determinations are positive1 but in opposite directions74 ,parallel with this it distinguishes1 also1 between logical ground and real ground4 ,the prize essay1 ,inquiry concerning the ,clearness 7,evidence7 of the ,principles of ,natural ,theology and ,ethics1 #agfd1 draws a sharp distinction between mathematical and metaphysical knowledge1 and warns philosophy against the hurtful imitation of the geometrical method1 in place of which it should rather take as an example the method which ,newton introduced into natural science4 ,quantity constitutes the object of mathematics1 qualities1 the object of philosophy2 the former is easy and simple1 the latter difficult and complicated--how much more comprehensible the conception of a trillion is than the philosophical idea of freedom1 which the philosophers thus far have been unable to make intelligible4 ,in mathematics the general is considered under symbols in concrete1 in philosophy1 by means of symbols in abstracto2 the former constructs its object in sensuous intuition1 while the object of the latter is given to it1 and that as a confused concept to be decomposed4 ,mathematics1 therefore1 may well begin with definitions1 since the conception which is to be explained is first brought into being through the definition1 while philosophy must begin by seeking her conceptions4 ,in the former the definition is first in order1 and in the latter almost always last2 in the one case the method is synthetic1 in the other it is analytic4 ,it is the function of mathematics to connect and compare clear and certain concepts of quantity in order to draw conclusions from them2 the function of philosophy is to analyze concepts given in a confused state1 and to make them detailed and definite4 ,philosophy has also this disadvantage1 that it possesses very many undecomposable concepts and undemonstrable propositions1 while mathematics has only a few such4 ,philosophical truths are like meteors1 whose brightness gives no assurance of their permanence4 ,they vanish1 but mathematics remains4 ,metaphysics is without doubt the most difficult of all human sciences 7,einsichten71 but a metaphysic has never yet been written2 for one cannot be so kind as to apply the term philosophy to all that is contained in the books which bear this title4 ,in the closing paragraphs1 on the ultimate bases of ethics1 the stern features of the categorical imperative are already seen1 veiled by the ,english theory of moral sense1 while the attractive ,observations on the ,feeling of the ,beautiful and the ,sublime1 which appeared in the same year1 still navely follow the empirical road4 ,the empirical phase reaches its skeptical termination in the satire ,dreams of a ,ghost-seer explained by the ,dreams of ,metaphysics1 #agff1 which pours out its ingenious sarcasm impartially on spiritualism and on the assumed knowledge of the suprasensible4 ,here ,kant is already clearly conscious of his new problem1 a theory of the limits of human reason1 conscious also that the attack on this problem is to be begun by a discussion of the question of space4 ,this second question had been for many years a frequent subject of his reflections2#a and it was this part of the general critical problem that first received definitive solution4 ,in the ,latin dissertation ,on the ,form and ,principles of the ,sensible and ,intelligible ,world1 #aggj1 which concludes the pre-critical period1 and which was written on the occasion of his assumption of his chair as ordinary professor1 the critique of sensibility1 the new theory of space and time1 is set forth in approximately the same form as in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 while the critique of the understanding and of reason1 the theory of the categories and the ,ideas and of the sphere of their validity1 required for its completion the intellectual labor of several more years4 ,for this essay1 ,de ,mundi ,sensibilis atque ,intelligibilis ,forma et ,principiis1 leaves unchallenged the possibility of a knowledge of things in themselves and of ,god1 thus showing that its author has abandoned the skepticism maintained in the ,dreams of a ,ghost-seer1 and has turned anew to dogmatic rationalism1 whose final overthrow required another swing in the direction of skeptical empiricism4 ,in regard to the progress of this latter phase of opinion1 the letters to ,m4 ,herz are almost the only1 though not very valuable1 source of information4 ,footnote #a3 ,new ,theory of ,motion and ,rest1 #ageh2 ,on the ,first ,ground of the ,distinction of ,positions in ,space1 #agfh2 besides several of the works mentioned above4 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason appeared in #agha1 much later than ,kant had hoped when he began a work on ,the ,limits of ,sensibility and ,reason1 and a second1 altered edition in #aghg4a ,after the ,prolegomena to every ,future ,metaphysic which may present itself as ,science1 #aghc1 had given a popular form to the critical doctrine of knowledge1 it was followed by the critical philosophy of ethics in the ,foundation of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics1 #aghe1 and the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 #aghh2 by the critical aesthetics and teleology in the ,critique of ,judgment1 #agij2 and by the critical philosophy of religion in ,religion within the ,limits of ,reason ,only1 #agicb 7consisting of four essays1 of which the first1 ,of ,radical ,evil1 had already appeared in the ,berliner ,monatsschrift in #agib74 ,the ,metaphysical ,elements of ,natural ,science1 #aghf1 and the ,metaphysics of ,ethics1 #agig 7in two parts1 ,metaphysical ,elements of the ,theory of ,right1 and ,metaphysical ,elements of the ,theory of ,virtue 71 are devoted to the development of the system4 ,the year #agih brought two more larger works1 the ,conflict of the ,faculties and the ,anthropology4 ,of the reviews1 that on ,herder's ,ideen maybe mentioned1 and among the minor essays1 the following3 ,idea for a ,universal ,history in a ,cosmopolitan ,sense1 ,answer to the ,question3 ,what is ,illumination f both in #aghd2 ,what does it mean to ,orient oneself in ,thought8 #aghf2 ,on the ,use of ,teleological ,principles in ,philosophy1 #aghh2 ,on a ,discovery according to which all ,recent ,criticism of ,pure ,reason is to be superseded by a ,previous ,one1 #agij2 ,on the ,progress of ,metaphysics since the ,time of ,wolff2 ,on ,philosophy in ,general1 ,the ,end of all ,things1 #agid2 ,on ,everlasting ,peace1 #agie4 ,kant's ,logic was published by ,jsche in #ahjj2 his ,physical ,geography and his ,observations on ,pedagogics by ,f4,t4 ,rink in #ahjc2 his lectures on the ,philosophical ,theory of ,religion 7#ahag2 #b;d4 ed41 #ahcj7 and on ,metaphysics 7#ahba2 cf4 ,benno ,erdmann in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xix4 #ahhc1 p4 #abi seq41 and vol4 xx4 #ahhd1 p4 #fe seq47 by ,plitz4 ,if we may judge by the specimens given by ,reicke in the ,altpreussische ,monatsschrift1 #ahhb-hd1 and by ,krause himself1#c the promised publication of a manuscript of ,kant's last years1 now in possession of the ,hamburg pastor1 ,albrecht ,krause1 and which discusses the transition from the metaphysical elements of natural science to physics1 will hardly meet the expectations which some have cherished concerning it4 ,benno ,erdmann has issued ,nachtrge zu ,kants ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft aus ,kants ,nachlass1 #ahha1 and ,reflexionen ,kants zur kritischen ,philosophie aus handschriftlichen ,aufzeichnungen--the first volume first ,heft 7,reflexionen zur ,anthropologie7 appearing in #ahhb1 the second volume 7,reflexionen zur ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 aus ,kants ,handexemplar von ,baumgartens ,metaphysica7 in #ahhd4 ,max ,mller has made an ,english translation of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 #b vols41 #ahha4d ,footnote #a3 ,there has been much discussion and much has been written concerning the relation of the two editions4 ,in opposition to ,schopenhauer and ,kuno ,fischer it must be maintained that the alterations in the second edition consist in giving greater prominence to realistic elements1 which in the first edition remained in the background1 though present even there4 ,footnote #b3 ,this publication was the occasion of a conflict between ,kant and the censorship concerning the right of free religious inquiry2 cf4 ,dilthey in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 in4 #ahij1 pp4 #dah-dej4 ,footnote #c3 ,a4 ,krause3 ,i4 ,kant wider ,k4 ,fischer1 zum ersten ,male mit ,hlfe des verloren gewesenen ,kantischen ,hauptwerkes vertheidigt1 #ahhd 7in reply1 ,k4 ,fischer1 ,das ,streber- und ,grnderthum in der ,litteratur1 #ahhd72 also1 ,das nachgelassene ,werk ,i4 ,kants1 mit ,belegen populr-wissenschaftlich dargestellt1 #ahhh4 ,footnote #d3 ,besides this 7centenary7 translation the ,english reader may be referred to the earlier version of ,meiklejohn in ,bonn's ,library2 to the versions of the ,prolegomena by ,bax 7also in ,bonn's ,library1 and including the ,metaphysical ,elements of ,natural ,science71 and ,mahaffy and ,bernard1 new ed41 #ahhi2 to ,abbot's ,kant's ,theory of ,ethics1 #dth ed41 #ahhi1 containing the ,foundation of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics and the ,critique of ,practical ,reason entire1 with portions of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics and ,religion within the ,limits of ,reason ,only2 to ,bernard's translation of the ,kritik of ,judgment1 #ahib2 and to ,watson's ,selections from ,kant1 #b;d ed41 #ahhh 7in ,sneath's ,modern ,philosophers1 #ahib74--,,tr4 ,the best complete edition of the works of ,kant is the second edition of ,hartenstein1 in eight volumes1 #ahfg-fh1 which is chronologically arranged and excellently gotten up4 ,simultaneously with the first edition of ,hartenstein in ten volumes1 in #ahch seq41 appeared the edition in twelve volumes by ,k4 ,rosenkranz and ,f4,w4 ,schubert 7containing in the last volumes a biography of ,kant by ,schubert1 and a history of the ,kantian philosophy by ,rosenkranz1 #ahdb74 ,kehrbach's edition of the principal works in ,reclam's ,universal-,bibliothek1 with the pagination of the original and collective editions 7#ahgg seq471 is more valuable than ,von ,kirchmann's edition of the complete works in his ,philosophische ,bibliothek4 ,among the works on ,kant those of ,kuno ,fischer 7vols4 iii4-iv4 of the ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 #c;d ed41 #ahhb2 also ,kant's ,leben und die ,grundlagen seiner ,lehre1 #ahfj7 take the first place4 ,the writings of ,liebmann1 ,cohen1 ,stadler1 ,riehl1 ,volkelt1 and others will be mentioned later1 in connection with the neo-,kantian movement2 here we may give some of the more important monographs and essays1 selected from the enormously developed ,kantian literature3 ,ad4 ,bhringer1 ,kants erkenntnisstheoretischer ,idealismus1 #ahhh2 ,k4 ,dieterich1 ,die ,kantische ,philosophie in ihrer inneren ,entwickelungsgeschichte1 #b parts1 #ahhe 7first published separately1 ,kant und ,newton1 #ahgg2 ,kant und ,rousseau1 #ahgh72 ,w4 ,dilthey1 ,aus den ,rostocker ,kanthandschriften in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vols4 ii4-iii4 #ahhi-ij2 ,m4,w4 ,drobisch1 ,kants ,ding an sich und sein ,erfahrungsbegriff1 #ahhe2 ,b4 ,erdmann1 ,kants ,kritizismus in der ,i4 und ,,ii4 ,auflage der ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 #ahgh2 the same1 ,kants ,prolegomena herausgegeben und erlutert1 #ahgh1 ,introduction 7in reply ,emil ,arnoldt1 ,kants ,prolegomena nicht doppelt redigiert1 #ahgi2 cf4 also ,h4 ,vaihinger1 ,die ,erdmann-,arnoldtsche ,kontroverse in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xvi4 #ahhj72 ,franz ,erhardt1 ,kritik der ,kantischen ,antinomienlehre1 #ahhh2 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,ueber ,bilder und ,gleichnisse bei ,kant1 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxiii1 #ahhc1 reprinted in his ,beitrge zur ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 #ahhf2 ,f4 ,frederichs1 ,der phnomenale ,idealismus ,berkeleys und ,kants1 #ahga2 the same1 ,kants ,prinzip der ,ethik1 #ahgi2 ,ed4 von ,hartmann1 ,das ,ding an sich und seine ,beschaffenheit1 #ahga1 in the #b;d ed41 #ahge1 and the #c;d1 #ahhe1 entitled ,kritische ,grundlegung des transzendentalen ,realismus2 ,c4 ,hebler1 ,kantiana1 in his ,philosophische ,aufstze1 #ahfi2 ,alfred ,hegler1 ,die ,psychologie in ,kants ,ethik1 #ahia2 ,a4 ,hlder1 ,darstellung der ,kantischen ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahgc ,j4 ,jacobson1 ,die ,auffindung des ,apriori1 #ahgf2 the same1 ,ueber die ,beziehungen zwischen ,kategorien und ,urtheilsformen1 #ahgg2 ,wilhelm ,koppelmann1 ,kants ,lehre vom analytischen ,urtheil1 ,philosoph4 ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxi1 #ahhe2 the same1 ,lotzes ,stellung zu ,kants ,kritizismus1 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxviii1 #ahhf2 the same1 ,kants ,lehre vom kategorischen ,imperativ1 #ahhh2 the same1 ,kant und die ,grundlagen der ,christlichen ,religion1 #ahij2 ,e4 ,laas1 ,kants ,analogien der ,erfahrung1 #ahgf2 the same1 ,einige ,bemerkungen zur ,transzendentalphilosophie1 ,strassburg ,abhandlungen1 #ahhd2 ,j4 ,mainzer1 ,die kritische ,epoche in der ,lehre von der ,einbildungskraft1 #ahha2 ,j4,b4 ,meyer1 ,kants ,psychologie1 #ahgj2 ,f4 ,paulsen1 ,was ,kant uns sein kann1 ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 #ahha2 ,b4 ,pnjer1 ,die ,religionslehre ,kants1 #ahgd2 ,r4 ,quaebicker1 ,kants und ,herbarts metaphysische ,grundansichten ber das ,wesen der ,seele1 #ahgj2 ,j4 ,rehmke1 ,physiologie und ,kantianismus1 address in ,eisenach1 #ahhc2 ,rud4 ,reicke1 ,lose ,bltter aus ,kants ,nachlass1 #ahhi 7on this ,h4 ,vaihinger in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 xcvi4 #ahhi72 ,o4 ,riedel1 ,die monadologischen ,bestimmungen in ,kants ,lehre vom ,ding an sich1 dissertation at ,kiel1 #ahhd2 ,o4 ,schneider1 ,die psychologische ,entwickelung des ,apriori1 #ahhc2 the same1 ,transzendentalpsychologie1 #ahia2 ,f4 ,staudinger1 ,noumena1 #ahhd2 ,m4 ,steckelmacher1 ,die formale ,logik ,kants1 ,breslau ,prize ,essay1 #ahgi2 ,a4 ,stern1 ,die ,beziehung ,garves zu ,kant1 nebst ungedruckten ,briefen1 #ahhd2 ,c4 ,stumpf1 ,psychologie und ,erkenntnisstheorie1 ,abhandlungen der bayerischen ,akademie der ,wissenschaften1 #ahia2 ,g4 ,thiele1 ,kants intellectuelle ,anschauung als ,grundbegriff seines ,kritizismus1 #ahgf2 the same1 ,die ,philosophie ,kants nach ihrem systematischen ,zusammenhange und ihrer logischhistorischen ,entiwickelung1 ,i4 7#a7 ,kants vorkritische ,naturphilosophie1 #ahhb2 7#b7 ,kants vorkritische ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahhg2 ,ad4 ,trendelenburg1 ,ueber eine ,lcke in ,kants ,beweis von der ausschliessenden ,subjectivitt des ,raumes and der ,zeit in vol4 iii4 of his ,historische ,beitrge zur ,philosophie1 #ahfg2 ,ueberhorst1 ,kants ,lehre von dem ,verhltnisse der ,kategorien zu der ,erfahrung1 #ahgh2 ,h4 ,vaihinger1 ,eine ,blattversetzung in ,kants ,prolegomena1 ,philosoph4 ,monatshefte1 vol4 xv4 #ahgi2 the same1 ,zu ,kants ,widerlegung des ,idealismus1 ,strassburg ,abhandlungen1 #ahhd2 ,j4 ,walter1 ,zum ,gedchtniss ,kants1 ,festrede1 #ahha2 ,th4 ,weber1 ,zur ,kritik der ,kantischen ,erkenntnisstheorie 7from the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie71 #ahhb2 ,w4 ,windelband1 ,ueber die verschiedenen ,phasen der ,kantischen ,lehre vom ,ding an sich1 ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 #ahgg 7cf4 the same author's ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 #eh72 ,j4 ,witte1 ,beitrge zum ,verstndniss ,kants1 #ahgd2 the same1 ,kantischer ,kritizismus gegenber unkritischem ,dilettantismus 7against ,a4 ,sthr71 #ahhe2 ,wohlrabe1 ,kants ,lehre vom ,gewissen1 #ahhi2 ,e4 ,zeller1 ,ueber das ,kantische ,moralprinzip1 #ahhj2 ,r4 ,zimmermann1 ,ueber ,kants ,widerlegung des ,idealismus von ,berkeley1 #ahga2 the same1 ,ueber ,kants mathematisches ,vorurtheil und dessen ,folgen1 #ahga4 ,popular expositions have been given by the following3 ,k4 ,fortlage 7in his ,philos4 ,vortrge1 #ahfi72 ,e4 ,last1 ,mehr ,licht6 ,die ,haupstze ,kants und ,schopenhauers1 #ahgi2 the same1 ,die realistiche und die idealistische ,anschauung entwickelt an ,kants ,idealitt von ,raum und ,zeit1 #ahhd2 ,h4 ,romundt1 ,antaeus1 neuer ,aufbau der ,lehre ,kants ber ,seele1 ,freiheit1 und ,gott1 #ahhb2 the same1 ,grundlegung zur ,reform der ,philosophie1 vereinfachte und erweiterte ,darstellung von ,kants ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 #ahhe2 the same1 ,die ,vollendung des ,socrates1 ,kants ,grundlegung zur ,reform der ,sittenlehre2 the same1 ,ein neuer ,paulus1 ,kants ,grundlegung zu einer sicheren ,lehre von der ,religion1 #ahhf2 the same1 ,die drei ,fragen ,kants1 #ahhg2 ,a4 ,krause1 ,populre ,darstellung von ,kants ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 #ahha2 ,k4 ,lasswitz1 ,die ,lehre ,kants von der ,idealitt des ,raumes und der ,zeit1 #ahhc2 ,wilhelm ,mnz1 ,die ,grundlagen der ,kantischen ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #b;d ed41 #ahhe4 ,among foreigners ,villers1 ,cousin1 ,nolen1 ,desdouits1 ,cantoni1 ,e4 ,caird ,a ,critical ,account of the ,philosophy of ,kant1 #ahgg2 ,the ,critical ,philosophy of ,immanuel ,kant1 #b vols41 #ahhi1 ,adamson ,on the ,philosophy of ,kant1 #ahgi1 and a valuable article in the ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #ith ed41 vol4 xiii41 ,stirling ,text-book to ,kant1 #ahha1 ,watson1 ,kant and his ,english ,critics1 #ahha1 ,morris ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhb1 ,wallace1 ,kant1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhb2 ,porter1 ,kant's ,ethics1 ,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhf2 ,green1 ,lectures1 ,works1 vol4 ii41 #ahhf4--,tr41 have among others made contributions to ,kantian literature4 ,of the older works we may mention the dictionaries of ,e4 ,schmid1 #aghh1 and ,mellin 7in six volumes71 #agig seq41 the critique of the ,kantian philosophy in the first volume of ,schopenhauer's chief work1 #ahai1 and the essay of ,c4,h4 ,weisse1 ,in welchem ,sinne hat sich die deutsche ,philosophie jetzt wieder an ,kant zu orientieren1 #ahdg4 ,kant's outward life was less eventful and less changeful than his philosophical development4#a ,born in ,knigsberg in #agbd1 the son of ,j4,g4 ,cant1 a saddler of ,scottish descent1 his home and school training were both strict and of a markedly religious type4 ,he was educated at the university of his native city1 and for nine years1 from #agdf on1 filled the place of a private tutor4 ,in #agee he became ,docent1 in #aggj ordinary professor in ,knigsberg1 serving also for six years of this time as under-librarian4 ,he seldom left his native city and never the province4 ,the clearness which marked his extremely popular lectures on physical geography and anthropology was due to his diligent study of works of travel1 and to an unusually acute gift of observation1 which enabled him to draw from his surroundings a comprehensive knowledge of the world and of man4 ,he ceased lecturing in #agig1 and in #ahjd old age ended a life which had always1 even in minute detail1 been governed by rule4 ,a man of extreme devotion to duty1 particularity1 and love of truth1 and an amiable1 bright1 and witty companion1 ,kant belongs to the acute rather than to the profound thinkers4 ,among his manifold endowments the tendency to combination and the faculty of intuition 7as the ,critique of ,judgment especially shows7 are present to a noticeable degree1 yet not so markedly as the power of strict analysis and subtle discrimination4 ,so that1 although a mediating tendency is rightly regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of the ,kantian thinking1 it must also be remembered that synthesis is everywhere preceded by a mighty work of analysis1 and that this still exerts its power even after the adjustment is complete4 ,thus ,kant became the energetic defender of a qualitative view of the world in opposition to the quantitative view of ,leibnitz1 for which antitheses 7e4g41 sensation and thought1 feeling and cognition1 good and evil1 duty and inclination7 fade into mere differences of degree4 ,footnote #a3 ,the following have done especially valuable service in the investigation of the development of ,kant's doctrine3 ,paulsen 7,versuch einer ,entwickelungsgeschichte der ,kantischen ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahge71 ,b4 ,erdmann1 ,vaihinger1 and ,windelband4 ,besides ,hume and ,leibnitz1 ,newton1 ,locke1 ,shaftesbury1 ,rousseau1 and ,wolff exercised an important influence on ,kant4 ,in the beginning of this chapter we have indicated how the new ideal of knowledge1 under whose banner ,kant brought about a reform of philosophy1 grew out of the conflict between the rationalistic 7dogmatic7 and the empirical 7skeptical7 systems4 ,this combines the ,baconian ideal of the extension of knowledge with the ,cartesian ideal of certainty in knowledge4 ,it is synthetic judgments alone which extend knowledge1 while analytic judgments are explicative merely4#a ,a priori judgments alone are perfectly certain1 absolutely universal1 and necessarily valid2 while a posteriori judgments are subjectively valid merely1 lack necessity1 and1 at best1 yield only relative universality4#b ,all analytic judgments are a priori1 all empirical or a posteriori judgments are synthetic4 ,between the two lies the object of ,kant's search4 ,do synthetic judgments a priori exist1 and how are they possible8 ,footnote #a3 ,all bodies are extended is an analytic judgment2 all bodies possess weight1 a synthetic judgment4 ,the former explicates the concept of the subject by bringing into notice an idea already contained in it and belonging to the definition as a part thereof2 it is based on the law of contradiction3 an unextended body is a self-contradictory concept4 ,the latter1 on the contrary1 goes beyond the concept of the subject and adds a predicate which had not been thought therein4 ,it is experience which teaches us that weight is joined to matter1 a fact which cannot be derived from the concept of matter4 ,almost all mathematical principles are synthetic1 and here1 as will be shown1 it is not experience but pure intuition which permits us to go beyond the concept and add a new mark to it4 ,footnote #b3 ,the ,scholastics applied the term a priori to knowledge from causes 7from that which precedes71 and a posteriori to knowledge from effects4 ,kant1 following ,leibnitz and ,lambert1 uses the terms to designate the antithesis1 knowledge from reason and knowledge from experience4 ,an a priori judgment is a judgment obtained without the aid of experience4 ,when the principle from which it is derived is also independent of experience it is absolutely a priori1 otherwise it is relatively a priori4 ,two sciences discuss the how1 and a third the if of such judgments1 which1 at the same time1 are ampliative and absolutely universal and necessary4 ,the first two sciences are pure mathematics and pure natural science1 of which the former is protected against doubt concerning its legitimacy by its evident character1 and the latter1 by the constant possibility of verification in experience2 each1 moreover1 can point to the continuous course of its development4 ,all this is absent in the third science1 metaphysics1 as science of the suprasensible1 and to its great disadvantage4 ,experiential verification is in the nature of things denied to a presumptive knowledge of that which is beyond experience2 it lacks evidence to such an extent that there is scarcely a principle to be found to which all metaphysicians assent1 much less a metaphysical text-book to compare with ,euclid2 there is so little continuous advance that it is rather true that the later comers are likely to overthrow all that their predecessors have taught4 ,in metaphysics1 therefore1 which1 it must be confessed1 is actual as a natural tendency1 the question is not1 as in the other two sciences1 concerning the grounds of its legitimacy1 but concerning this legitimacy itself4 ,mathematics and pure physics form synthetic judgments a priori1 and metaphysics does the same4 ,but the principles of the two former are unchallenged1 while those of the third are not4 ,in the former case the subject for investigation is1 ,whence this authority8 in the latter case1 ,is she thus authorized8 ,thus the main question1 ,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 divides into the subordinate questions1 ,how is pure mathematics possible8 ,how is pure natural science possible1 and1 ,how is metaphysics 7in two senses3 metaphysics in general1 and metaphysics as science7 possible8 ,the ,transcendental ,aesthetic 7the critique of sensibility or the faculty of intuition7 answers the first of these questions2 the ,transcendental ,analytic 7the critique of the understanding71 the second2 and the ,transcendental ,dialectic 7the critique of reason in the narrower sense7 and the ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,method 7,methodenlehre71 the third4 ,the ,analytic and the ,dialectic are the two parts of the ,transcendental ,logic 7critique of the faculty of thought71 which1 together with the ,aesthetic1 forms the ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,elements 7,elementarlehre71 in contrast to the ,doctrine of ,method4 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason follows this scheme of subordinate division1 while the ,prolegomena co-ordinates all four parts in the manner first mentioned4 ,let us anticipate the answers4 ,pure mathematics is possible1 because there are pure or a priori intuitions 7space and time71 and pure natural science or the metaphysics of phenomena1 because there are a priori concepts 7categories7 and principles of the pure understanding4 ,metaphysics as a presumptive science of the suprasensible has been possible in the form of unsuccessful attempts1 because there are ,ideas or concepts of reason which point beyond experience and look as though knowable objects were given through them2 but as real science it is not possible1 because the application of the categories is restricted to the limits of experience1 while the objects thought through the ,ideas cannot be sensuously given1 and all assumed knowledge of them becomes involved in irresolvable contradictions 7antinomies74 ,on the other hand1 a science is possible and necessary to teach the correct use of the categories1 which may be applied to phenomena alone1 and of the ,ideas1 which may be applied only to our knowledge of things 7and our volition71 and to determine the origin and the limits of our knowledge--that is to say1 a transcendental philosophy4 ,in regard to metaphysics 7knowledge from pure reason71 then1 this is the conclusion reached3 ,rejection of transcendent metaphysics 7that which goes beyond experience71 recognition and development of immanent metaphysics 7that which remains within the limits of possible experience74 ,it is not possible as a metaphysic of things in themselves2 it is possible as a metaphysic of nature 7of the totality of phenomena71 and as a metaphysic of knowledge 7critique of reason74 ,the interests of the reason are not exhausted1 however1 by the question1 ,what can we know8 but include two further questions1 ,what ought we to do8 and1 ,what may we hope8 ,thus to the metaphysics of nature there is added a metaphysics of morals1 and to the critique of theoretical reason1 a critique of practical reason or of the will1 together with a critique of religious belief4 ,for even if a knowledge of the suprasensible is denied to us1 yet practical grounds are not wanting for a sufficiently certain conviction concerning ,god1 freedom1 and immortality4 ,after carrying the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori from the knowledge of nature over to the knowledge of our duty1 ,kant raises it1 in the third place1 in regard to our judgment concerning the subjective and objective purposiveness of things1 or concerning their beauty and their perfection1 and adds to his critique of the intellect and the will a critique of the faculty of aesthetic and teleological judgment4 ,the ,kantian philosophy accordingly falls into three parts1 one theoretical1 one practical 7and religious71 one aesthetic and teleological4 99 99 99 99 99 ,before advancing to our account of the first of these parts1 a few preliminary remarks are indispensable concerning the presuppositions involved in ,kant's critical work and on the method which he pursues4 ,the presuppositions are partly psychological1 partly 7as the classification of the forms of judgment and inference1 and the twofold division of judgments7 logical1 either in the formal or the transcendental sense1 and partly metaphysical 7as the thing in itself74 ,kant takes the first of these from the psychology of his time1 by combining the ,wolffian classification of the faculties with that of ,tetens1 and thus obtains six different faculties3 lower 7sensuous7 and higher 7intellectual7 faculties of cognition1 of feeling1 and of appetition2 or sensibility 7the capacity for receiving representations through the way in which we are affected by objects71 understanding 7the faculty of producing representations spontaneously and of connecting them72 the sensuous feelings of pleasure and pain1 taste2 desire1 and will4 ,the understanding in the wide sense is equivalent to the higher faculty of cognition1 and divides further into understanding in the stricter sense 7faculty of concepts71 judgment 7faculty of judging71 and reason 7faculty of inference74 ,of these the first gives laws to the faculty of cognition or to nature1 the second laws to taste1 and the third laws to the will4 ,the most important of the fundamental assumptions concerns the relation1 the nature1 and the mission of the two faculties of cognition4 ,these do not differ in degree1 through the possession of greater or less distinctness--for there are sensuous representations which are distinct and intellectual ones which are not so--but specifically3 ,sensibility is the faculty of intuitions1 understanding the faculty of concepts4 ,intuitions are particular1 concepts general representations4 ,the former relate to objects directly1 the latter only indirectly 7through the mediation of other representations74 ,in intuition the mind is receptive1 in conception it acts spontaneously4 ,through intuitions objects are given to us2 through concepts they are thought4 ,it results from this that neither of the two faculties is of itself sufficient for the attainment of knowledge1 for cognition is objective thinking1 the determination of objects1 the unifying combination or elaboration of a given manifold1 the forming of a material content4 ,rationalists and empiricists alike have been deceived in regard to the necessity for co-operation between the senses and the understanding4 ,sensibility furnishes the material manifold1 which of itself it is not able to form1 while the understanding gives the unifying form1 to which of itself it cannot furnish a content4 ,intuitions without concepts are blind 7formless1 unintelligible71 concepts without intuitions are empty 7without content74 ,in the one case1 form and order are wanting2 in the other1 the material to be formed4 ,the two faculties are thrown back on each other1 and knowledge can arise only from their union4 ,a certain degree of form is attained in sense1 it is true1 since the chaos of sensations is ordered under the forms of intuition1 space and time1 which are an original possession of the intuiting subject1 but this is not sufficient1 without the aid of the understanding1 for the genesis of knowledge4 ,in view of the a priori nature of space and time1 though without detraction from their intuitive character 7they are immediate particular representations71 we may assign pure sensibility to the higher faculty of cognition and speak of an intuiting reason4 ,the forms of intuition and of thought come from within1 they lie ready in the mind a priori1 though not as completed representations4 ,they are functions1 necessary actions of the soul1 for the execution of which a stimulus from without1 through sensations1 is necessary1 but which1 when once this is given1 the soul brings forth spontaneously4 ,the external impulse merely gives the soul the occasion for such productive acts1 while their grounds and laws are found in its own nature4 ,in this sense ,kant terms them originally acquired1 and in the ,introduction to the ,critique of ,pure ,reason declares that although it is indubitable that all our knowledge begins with experience 7impressions of sense71 yet it does not all arise from experience4 ,that a representation or cognition is a priori#a does not mean that it precedes experience in time1 but that 7apart from the merely exciting1 non-productive stimulation through impressions already mentioned7 it is independent of all experience1 that it is not derived or borrowed from experience4 ,footnote #a3 ,the terms a priori representation and pure representation 7concept1 intuition7 are equivalent2 but in judgments1 on the other hand1 there is a distinction4 ,a judgment is a priori when the connection takes place independently of experience1 no matter whether the concepts connected are a priori or not4 ,if the former is the case the a priori judgment is pure 7mixed with nothing empirical72 if the latter1 it is mixed4 ,the material of intuition and thought is given to the soul1 received by it2 it arises through the action of objects upon the senses1 and is always empirical4 ,intuition is the only organ of reality2 in sensation the presence of a real object as the cause of the sensation is directly revealed4 ,when ,kant's transcendental idealism was placed by a reviewer on a level with the empirical idealism of ,berkeley1 which denies the existence of the external world1 he distinctly asserted that it had never entered his mind to question the reality of external things4 ,further1 after the existence of real things affecting the senses had been transformed in his mind from a basis of the investigation into an object of inquiry1 he endeavored to defend this assumption 7which at first he had navely borrowed from the realism of pre-scientific thought7 by arguments1 but without any satisfactory result4#a ,footnote #a3 ,the task of confirming the existence of things in themselves changes under his hands into another1 that of proving the existence of external phenomena4 ,that external objects are real as representations ,berkeley had never disputed4 ,on the basis of the inseparability of sensibility and understanding the ideal of knowledge--an extension of knowledge to be attained by a priori means 7p4 #ccc7--;experiences a remarkable addition in the position that the rational synthesis thus obtained must be a knowledge of reality1 must be applied to matter given in intuition4 ,to the question1 ,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 is joined a second equally legitimate inquiry1 ,how do they become objectively valid1 or applicable to objects of experience8 ,the principle from which their validity is proved--they are applicable to objects of experience because without them experience would not be possible1 because they are conditions of experience--like the criterion of apriority 7strict universality and necessity71 is one of the notic assumptions of the critical theory4#a ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ,kommentar1 i4 pp4 #dbe-dcj4 ,inasmuch as its investigation relates to the conditions of experience the ,kantian criticism follows a method which it itself terms transcendental4 ,heretofore1 when the metaphysical method had been adopted1 the object had been the suprasensible2 and when knowledge had been made the object of investigation1 the method followed had been empirical1 psychological4 ,kant had the right to consider himself the creator of notics1 for he showed it the transcendental point of view4 ,knowledge is an object of experience1 but its conditions are not4 ,the object is to explain knowledge1 not merely to describe it psychologically1--to establish a new science of knowledge from principles1 from pure reason4 ,that which lies beyond experience is sealed from our thought2 that which lies on this side of it is still uninvestigated1 though capable and worthy of investigation1 and in extreme need thereof4 ,criticism forbids the transcendent use of reason 7transcending experience72 it permits1 demands1 and itself exercises the transcendental#a use of it1 which explains an experiential object1 knowledge1 from its conditions1 which are not empirically given4 ,footnote ,a3 ,kant applies the term transcendental to the knowledge 7the discovery1 the proof7 of the a priori factor and its relation to objects of experience4 ,unfortunately he often uses the same word not only to designate the a priori element itself1 but also as a synonym for transcendent4 ,in all three cases its opposite is empirical1 namely1 empirico-psychological investigation by observation in distinction from notical investigation from principles2 empirical origin in distinction from an origin in pure reason1 and empirical use in distinction from application beyond the limits of experience4 ,there is1 apparently1 a contradiction between the empiristic result of the ,critique of ,reason 7the limitation of knowledge to objects of experience7 and its rationalistic proofs 7which proceed metaphysically1 not empirically71 and1 in fact1 a considerable degree of opposition really exists4 ,kant argues in a metaphysical way that there can be no metaphysics4 ,this contradiction is solved by the distinction which has been mentioned between that which is beyond1 and that which lies within1 the boundary of experience4 ,that metaphysic is forbidden which on the objective side soars beyond experience1 but that pure rational knowledge is permissible and necessary which develops from principles the grounds of experiential knowledge existing in the subject4 ,in the ,kantian school1 however1 these complementary elements1--empirical result1 transcendental or metaphysical1 properly speaking1 pro-physical method1--were divorced1 and the one emphasized1 favored1 and further developed at the expense of the other4 ,the empiricists hold to the result1 while they either weaken or completely misunderstand the rationalism of the method3 the a priori factor1 says ,fries1 was not reached by a priori1 but by a posteriori1 means1 and there is no other way by which it could have been reached4 ,the constructive thinkers1 ,fichte and his successors1 adopt and continue the metaphysical method1 but reject the empirical result4 ,fichte's aim is directed to a system of necessary1 unconscious processes of reason1 among which1 rejecting the thing in itself1 he includes sensation4 ,according to ,schelling nature itself is a priori1 a condition of consciousness4 ,this discrepancy between foundation and result continues in an altered form even among contemporary thinkers--as a discussion whether the main purpose of ,criticism is to be found in the limitation of knowledge to possible experience1 or the establishment of a priori elements--though many1 in adherence to ,kant's own view1 maintain that the metaphysics of knowledge and of phenomena 7immanent rationalism7 is the only legitimate metaphysics4 #a4 ,theory of ,knowledge4 7a7 ,the ,pure ,intuitions 7,transcendental ,aesthetic74--,the first part of the ,critique of ,reason1 the ,transcendental ,aesthetic1 lays down the position that space and time are not independent existences1 not real beings1 and not properties or relations which would belong to things in themselves though they were not intuited1 but forms of our intuition1 which have their basis in the subjective constitution of our1 the human1 mind4 ,if we separate from sensuous intuition all that the understanding thinks in it through its concepts1 and all that belongs to sensation1 these two forms of intuition remain1 which may be termed pure intuitions1 since they can be considered apart from all sensation4 ,as subjective conditions 7lying in the nature of the subject7 through which alone a thing can become an object of intuition for us1 they precede all empirical intuitions or are a priori4 ,space and time are neither substantial receptacles which contain all that is real nor orders inhering in things in themselves1 but forms of intuition4 ,now all our representations are either pure or empirical in their origin1 and either intuitive or conceptual in character4 ,kant advances four proofs for the position that space and time are not empirical and not concepts1 but pure intuitions3 7#a7 ,time is not an empirical concept which has been abstracted from experience4 ,for the coexistence or succession of phenomena1 i4e41 their existence at the same time or at different times 7from which1 as many believe1 the representation of time is abstracted71 itself presupposes time--a coexistence or succession is possible only in time4 ,it is no less false that space is abstracted from the empirical space relations of external phenomena1 their existence outside and beside one another1 or in different places1 for it is impossible to represent relative situation except in space4 ,therefore experience does not make space and time possible2 but space and time first of all make experience possible1 the one outer1 the other inner experience4 ,they are postulates of perception1 not abstractions from it4 7#b7 ,time is a necessary representation a priori4 ,we can easily think all phenomena away from it1 but we cannot remove time itself in view of phenomena in general2 we can think time without phenomena1 but not phenomena without time4 ,the same is true of space in reference to external objects4 ,both are conditions of the possibility of phenomena4 7#c7 ,time is not a discursive or general concept4 ,for there is but one time4 ,and different times do not precede the one time as the constituent parts of which it is made up1 but are mere limitations of it2 the part is possible only through the whole4 ,in the same way the various spaces are only parts of one and the same space1 and can be thought in it alone4 ,but a representation which can be given only by a single object is a particular representation or an intuition4 ,because1 therefore1 of the oneness of space and time1 the representation of each is an intuition4 ,the a priori1 immediate intuition of the one space is entirely different from the empirical1 general conception of space1 which is abstracted from the various spaces4 7#d7 ,determinate periods of time arise by limitation of the one1 fundamental time4 ,consequently this original time must be unlimited or infinite1 and the representation of it must be an intuition1 not a concept4 ,time contains in itself an endless number of representations 7its parts1 times71 but this is never the case with a generic concept1 which1 indeed1 is contained as a partial representation in an endless number of representations 7those of the individuals having the same name71 and1 consequently1 comprehends them all under itself1 but which never contains them in itself4 ,the general concept horse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a general characteristic1 and that of justice in each representation of a definite just act2 time1 however1 is not contained in the different times1 but they are contained in it4 ,similarly the relation of infinite space to the finite spaces is not the logical relation of a concept to examples of it1 but the intuitive relation of an unlimited whole to its limited parts4 ,the ,prolegomena employs as a fifth proof for the intuitive character of space1 an argument which had already appeared in the essay ,on the ,ultimate ,ground of the ,distinction of ,positions in ,space4 ,there are certain spatial distinctions which can be grasped by intuition alone1 and which are absolutely incapable of comprehension through the understanding--for example1 those of right and left1 above and below1 before and behind4 ,no logical marks can be given for the distinction between the object and its image in the mirror1 or between the right ear and the left4 ,the complete description of a right hand must1 in all respects 7quality1 proportionate position of parts1 size of the whole71 hold for the left as well2 but1 despite the complete similarity1 the one hand cannot be exactly super-imposed on the other2 the glove of the one cannot be worn on the other4 ,this difference in direction1 which has significance only when viewed from a definite point1 and the impossibility mentioned of a congruence between an object 7right hand7 and its reflected image 7left hand7 can be understood only by intuition2 they must be seen and felt1 and cannot be made clear through concepts1 and1 consequently1 can never be explained to a being which lacks the intuition of space4 ,in the transcendental exposition of space and time ,kant follows this metaphysical exposition1 which had to prove their non-empirical1 and non-discursive1 hence their a priori and intuitive1 character1 with the proof that only such an explanation of space and time could make it conceivable how synthetic cognitions a priori can arise from them4 ,the principles of mathematics are of this kind4 ,the synthetic character of geometrical truths is explained by the intuitive nature of space1 their apodictic character by its apriority1 and their objective reality or applicability to empirical objects by the fact that space is the condition of 7external7 perception4 ,the like is true of arithmetic and time4 ,if space were a mere concept1 no proposition could be derived from it which should go beyond the concept and extend our knowledge of its properties4 ,the possibility of such extension or synthesis in mathematics depends on the fact that spatial concepts can always be presented or constructed in intuition4 ,the geometrical axiom that in the triangle the sum of two sides is greater than the third is derived from intuition1 by describing the triangle in imagination or1 actually1 on the board4 ,here the object is given through the cognition and not before it4--,if space and time were empirical representations the knowledge obtained from them would lack necessity1 which1 as a matter of fact1 it possesses in a marked degree4 ,while experience teaches us only that something is thus or so1 and not that it could not be otherwise1 the axioms1 7space has only three dimensions1 time only one2 only one straight line is possible between two points71 nay1 all the propositions of mathematics are strictly universal and apodictically certain3 we are entirely relieved from the necessity of measuring all triangles in the world in order to find out whether the sum of their angles is equal to two right angles1 and we do not need1 as in the case of judgments of experience1 to add the limitation1 so far as it is yet known there are no exceptions to this rule4 ,the apriority is the ratio essendi of the strict necessity involved in the it must be so 7des ,soseinmssens71 while the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of the former4 ,now since the necessity of mathematical judgments can only be explained through the ideality of space1 this doctrine is perfectly certain1 not merely a probable hypothesis4--,the validity of mathematical principles for all objects of perception1 finally1 is based on the fact that they are rules under which alone experience is possible for us4 ,it should be mentioned1 further1 that the conceptions of change and motion 7change of place7 are possible only through and in the representation of time4 ,no concept could make intelligible the possibility of change1 that is1 of the connection of contradictory predicates in one and the same thing1 but the intuition of succession easily succeeds in accomplishing it4 ,the argument is followed by conclusions and explanations based upon it2 7#a7 ,space is the form of the outer1 time of the inner1 sense4 ,through the outer sense external objects are given to us1 and through the inner sense our own inner states4 ,but since all representations1 whether they have external things for their objects or not1 belong in themselves1 as mental determinations1 to our inner state1 time is the formal condition of all phenomena in general1 directly of internal 7psychical7 phenomena1 and1 thereby1 indirectly of external phenomena also4 7#b7 ,the validity of the relations of space and time cognizable a priori is established for all objects of possible experience1 but is limited to these4 ,they are valid for all phenomena 7for all things which at any time may be given to our senses71 but only for these1 not for things as they are in themselves4 ,they have empirical reality1 but1 at the same time1 transcendental ideality4 ,as external phenomena all things are beside one another in space1 and all phenomena whatever are in time and of necessity under temporal relations2 in regard to all things which can occur in our experience1 and in so far as they can occur1 space and time are objectively1 therefore empirically1 real4 ,but they do not possess absolute reality 7neither subsistent reality nor the reality of inherence72 for if we abstract from our sensuous intuition both vanish1 and1 apart from the subject 7,n4,b41 the transcendental subject1 concerning which more below71 they are naught4 ,it is only from man's point of view that we can speak of space1 and of extended1 moveable1 changeable things2 for we can know nothing concerning the intuitions of other thinking beings1 we have no means of discovering whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our intuitions1 and which for us are universally valid4 7#c7 ,nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself4 ,what we call external objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility1 whose true correlative1 the thing in itself1 cannot be known by ever so deep penetration into the phenomenon2 such properties as belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses4 ,similarly nothing that is intuited in time is a thing in itself1 so that we intuit ourselves only as we appear to ourselves1 and not as we are4 ,the merely empirical reality of space and time1 the limitation of their validity to phenomena1 leaves the certainty of knowledge within the limits of experience intact2 for we are equally certain of it1 whether these forms necessarily belong to things in themselves1 or only to our intuitions of things4 ,the assertion of their absolute reality1 on the other hand1 involves us in sheer absurdities 7that is1 it necessitates the assumption of two infinite nonentities which exist1 but without being anything real1 merely in order to comprehend all reality1 and on one of which even our own existence would be dependent71 in view of which the origin of so peculiar a theory as the idealism of ,berkeley appears intelligible4 ,the critical theory of space and time is so far from being identical with1 or akin to1 the theory of ,berkeley1 that it furnishes the best and only defense against the latter4 ,if anyone assumes the absolute or transcendental reality of these forms1 it is impossible for him to prevent everything1 including even our own existence1 from being changed thereby into mere illusion4 ,but the critical philosopher is far from degrading bodies to mere illusion2 external phenomena are just as real for him as internal phenomena1 though only as phenomena1 it is true1 as 7possible7 representations4 ,phenomenon and illusion are not the same4 ,the transcendental distinction between phenomena and things in themselves must not be confused with the distinction common to ordinary life and to physics1 in accordance with which we call the rainbow a mere appearance 7better1 illusion71 but the combination of sun and rain which gives rise to this illusion the thing in itself1 as that which in universal experience and in all different positions with respect to the senses1 is thus and not otherwise determined in intuition1 or that which essentially belongs to the intuition of the object1 and is valid for every human sensibility 7in antithesis to that which only contingently belongs to it1 and is valid only for a special position or organization of this or that sense74 ,similarly an object always appears to grow smaller as its distance increases1 while in itself it is and remains of some fixed size4 ,and this use of words is perfectly correct1 in the physical or empirical sense of in itself2 but in the transcendental sense the raindrops1 also1 together with their form and size1 are themselves mere phenomena1 the in itself of which remains entirely unknown to us4 ,kant1 moreover1 does not wish to see the subjectivity of the forms of intuition placed on a level with the subjectivity of sensations or explained by this1 though he accepts it as a fact long established4 ,the sensations of color1 of tone1 of temperature are1 no doubt1 like the representation of space in that they belong only to the subjective constitution of the sensibility1 and can be attributed to objects only in relation to our senses4 ,but the great difference between the two is that these sense qualities may be different in different persons 7the color of the rose may seem different to each eye71 or may fail to harmonize with any human sense2 that they are not a priori in the same strict sense as space and time1 and consequently afford no knowledge of the objects of possible experience independently of perception2 and that they are connected with the phenomenon only as the contingently added effects of a particular organization1 while space1 as the condition of external objects1 necessarily belongs to the phenomenon or intuition of them4 ,it is through space alone that it is possible for things to be external objects for us4 ,the subjectivity of sensation is individual1 while that of space and time is general or universal to mankind2 the former is empirical1 individually different1 and contingent1 the latter a priori and necessary4 ,space alone1 not sensation1 is a conditio sine qua non of external perception4 ,space and time are the sole a priori elements of the sensibility2 all other sensuous concepts1 even motion and change1 presuppose perception2 the movable in space and the succession of properties in an existing thing are empirical data4 ,in confirmation of the theory that all objects of the senses are mere phenomena1 the fact is adduced that 7with the exception of the will and the feelings1 which are not cognitions7 nothing is given us through the senses but representations of relations1 while a thing in itself cannot be known by mere relations4 ,the phenomenon is a sum total of mere relations4 ,in regard to matter we know only extension1 motion1 and the laws of this motion or forces 7attraction1 repulsion1 impenetrability71 but all these are merely relations of the thing to something1 else1 that is1 external relations4 ,where is the inner side which underlies this exterior1 and which belongs to the object in itself8 ,this is never to be found in the phenomenon1 and no matter how far the observation and analysis of nature may advance 7a work with unlimited horizons67 they reach nothing but portions of space occupied by matter and effects which matter exercises1 that is1 nothing beyond that which is comparatively internal1 and which1 in its turn1 consists of external relations4 ,the absolutely inner side of matter is a mere fancy2 and if the complaint that the inner side of things is concealed from us is to mean that we do not comprehend what the things which appear to us may be in themselves1 it is unjust and irrational1 for it demands that we should be able to intuit without senses1 in other words1 that we should be other than men4 ,the transcendent questions concerning the noumenon of things are unanswerable2 we know ourselves1 even1 only as phenomena6 ,a phenomenon consists in nothing but the relation of something in general to the senses4 ,it is indubitable that something corresponds to phenomena1 which1 by affecting our sensibility1 occasions sensations in us1 and thereby phenomena4 ,the very word1 the very concept1 phenomenon1 indicates a relation to something which is not phenomenon1 to an object not dependent on the sensibility4 ,what this may be continues hidden from us1 for knowledge is impossible without intuition4 ,things in themselves are unknowable4 ,nevertheless the idea 7it must be confessed1 the entirely empty idea7 of this transcendental object1 as an indeterminate somewhat x which underlies phenomena1 is not only allowable1 but1 as a limiting concept1 unavoidable in order to confine the pretensions of sense to the only field which is accessible to it1 that is1 to the field of phenomena4 ,the inference space and time are nothing but representations and representations are in us1 therefore space and time as well as all phenomena in them1 bodies with their forces and motions1 are in us1 does not accurately express ,kant's position1 for he might justly reply that1 according to him1 bodies as phenomena are in different parts in space from that which we assign to ourselves1 and thus without us2 that space is the form of external intuition1 and through it external objects arise for us from sensations2 but that1 in regard to the things in themselves which affect us1 we are entirely ignorant whether they are within or without us4 ,it can easily be shown by literal quotations that there were distinct tendencies in ,kant1 especially in the first edition of his principal work1 toward a radical idealism which doubts or denies not merely the cognizability1 but also the existence of objects external to the subject and its representations1 and which degrades the thing in itself to a mere thought in us1 or completely does away with it 7e4g41 ,the representation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient1 but1 444 independently of empirical conditions1 in itself contradictory 74 ,but these expressions indicate only a momentary inclination toward such a view1 not a binding avowal of it1 and they are outweighed by those in which idealism is more or less energetically rejected4 ,that which according to ,kant exists outside the representation of the individual is twofold3 7#a7 the unknown things in themselves with their problematical characteristics1 as the ground of phenomena2 7#b7 the phenomena themselves with their knowable immanent laws1 and their relations in space and time1 as possible representations4 ,when ,i turn my glance away from the rose its redness vanishes1 since this predicate belongs to it only in so far and so long as it acts in the light on my visual apparatus4 ,what1 then1 is left8 ,that thing in itself1 of course1 which1 when it appears to me1 calls forth in me the intuition of the rose4 ,but there is still something else remaining--the phenomenon of the rose1 with its size1 its form1 and its motion in the wind4 ,for these are predicates which must be attributed to the phenomenon itself as the object of my representation4 ,if the rose1 as determined in space and time1 vanished when ,i turned my head away1 it could not1 unless intuited by a subject1 experience or exert effects in space and time1 could not lose its leaves in the wind and strew the ground with its petals4 ,perception and thought inform me not merely concerning events of which ,i am a witness1 but also of others which have occurred1 or which will occur1 in my absence4 ,the process of stripping the leaves from the rose has actually taken place as a phenomenon and does not first become real by my subsequent representation of it or inference to it4 ,the things and events of the phenomenal world exist both before and after my perception1 and are something distinct from my subjective and momentary representations of them4 ,the space and time1 however1 in which they exist and happen are not furnished by the intuiting individual1 but by the supra-individual1 transcendental consciousness or generic reason of the race4 ,the phenomenon thus stands midway between its objective ground 7the absolute thing in itself7 and the subject1 whose common product it is1 as a relative thing in itself1 as a reality which is independent of the contingent and changing representation of the individual1 empirical subject1 which is dependent for its form on the transcendental subject1 and which is the only reality accessible to us1 yet entirely valid for us4 ,the phenomenal world is not a contingent and individual phenomenon1 but one necessary for all beings organized as we are1 a phenomenon for humanity4 ,my representations are not the phenomena themselves1 but images and signs through which ,i cognize phenomena1 i4e41 real things as they are for me and for every man 7not as they are in themselves74 ,the reality of phenomena consists in the fact that they can be perceived by men1 and the objective validity of my knowledge of them in the fact that every man must agree in it4 ,the laws which the understanding 7not the individual understanding67 imposes upon nature hold for phenomena1 because they hold for every man4 ,objectivity is universal validity4 ,if the world of phenomena which is intuited and known by us wears a different appearance from the world of things in themselves1 this does not justify us in declaring it to be mere seeming and dreaming2 a dream which all dream together1 and which all must dream1 is not a dream1 but reality4 ,as we must represent the world so it is1 though for us1 of course1 and not in itself4 ,many places in ,kant's works seem to argue against the intermediate position here ascribed to the world of phenomena--according to which it is less than things in themselves and more than subjective representation--which1 since they explain the phenomenon as a mere representation1 leave room for only two factors 7on the one hand1 the thing in itself that in the thing which cannot be represented2 on the other1 the thing for me my representation of the thing74 ,in fact1 the distinction between the phenomenon itself and the representation which the individual now has of it and now does not have1 is far from being everywhere adhered to with desirable clearness2 and wherever it is impossible to substitute that which has been represented and that which may be represented or possible intuitions for mere representations in me1 we must acknowledge that there is a departure from the standpoint which is assumed in some places with the greatest distinctness4 ,the latter finds unequivocal expression1 among other places1 in the ,analogies of ,experience and the ,deduction of the ,pure ,concepts of the ,understanding1 #b1 ,no4 #d 7first edition74 ,the second of these passages speaks of one and the same universal experience1 in which all perceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and regular connection1 and of the thoroughgoing affinity of phenomena as the basis of the possibility of the association of representations4 ,this affinity is ascribed to the objects of the senses1 not to the representations1 whose association is rather the result of the affinity1 and not to the things in themselves1 in regard to which the understanding has no legislative power4 ,the relation between the thing in itself and the phenomenon is also variable4 ,now they are regarded as entirely heterogeneous 7that which can never be intuited exists in a mode opposed to that of the intuited and intuitable71 and now as analogous to each other 7non-intuitable properties of the thing in itself correspond to the intuitable characteristics of the phenomenon74 ,the former is the case when it is said that phenomena are in space and time1 while things in themselves are not2 that in the first of these classes natural causation rules1 and in the second freedom2 that in the one-conditioned existence alone is found1 in the other unconditioned4#a ,but just as often things in themselves and phenomena are conceived as similar to one another1 as two sides of the same object1#b of which one1 like the counter-earth of the ,pythagoreans1 always remains turned away from us1 while the other is turned toward us1 but does not reveal the true being of the object4 ,according to this each particular thing1 state1 relation1 and event in the world of phenomena would have its real counterpart in the noumenal sphere3 un-extended roses in themselves would lie back of extended roses1 certain non-temporal processes back of their growth and decay1 intelligible relations back of their relations in space4 ,this is approximately the relation of the two conceptions as in part taught by ,lotze himself1 in part represented by him as taught by ,kant4 ,herbart's principle1 ,so much seeming1 so much indication of being 7wie viel ,schein so viel ,hindeutung aufs ,sein71 might also be cited in this connection4 ,that which continually impelled ,kant1 in spite of his proclamation of the unknowableness of things in themselves1 to form ideas about their character1 was the moral interest1 but this sometimes threw its influence in favor of their commensurability with phenomena and sometimes in the opposite scale4 ,for in his ethics ,kant needs the intelligible character or man as noumenon1 and must assume as many men in themselves 7to be consistent1 then1 in general1 as many beings in themselves7 as there are in the world of phenomena4 ,but for practical reasons1 again1 the causality of the man in himself must be thought of as entirely different from1 and opposed to1 the mechanical causality of the sense world4 ,kant's judgment is1 also1 no more stable concerning the value of the knowledge of the suprasensible1 which is denied to us4 ,i do not need to know what things in themselves may be1 because a thing can never be presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon4 ,and yet a natural and ineradicable need of the reason to obtain some conviction in regard to the other world is said to underlie the abortive attempts of metaphysics2 and ,kant himself uses all his efforts to secure to the practical reason the satisfaction of this need1 though he has denied it to the speculative reason1 and to make good the gap in knowledge by faith4 ,from the theoretical standpoint an extension of knowledge beyond the limits of phenomena appears impossible1 but unnecessary2 from the practical standpoint it is1 to a certain extent1 possible and indispensable4 ,footnote #a3 ,kant's conjectures concerning a common ground of material and mental phenomena1 and those concerning the common root of sensibility and understanding1 show the same tendency4 ,on the one hand1 duality1 on the other1 unity4 ,footnote #b3 ,phenomenon1 which always has two sides1 the one when the object in itself is considered 7apart from the way in which it is intuited1 and just because of which fact its character always remains problematical71 the other when we regard the form of the intuition of this object1 which must be sought not in the object in itself1 but in the subject to whom the object appears1 while it nevertheless actually and necessarily belongs to the phenomenon of this object4 ,this predicate --sc41 spatial quality1 extension--is attributed to things only in so far as they appear to us4 ,there is1 then1 a threefold distinction to be made3 7#a7 ,things in themselves1 which can never be the object of our knowledge1 because our forms of intuition are not valid for them4 7#b7 ,phenomena1 things for us1 nature or the totality of that which either is or1 at least1 may be the object of our knowledge 7here belong the possible inhabitants of the moon1 the magnetic matter which pervades all bodies1 and the forces of attraction and repulsion1 though the first have never been observed1 and the second is not perceptible on account of the coarseness of our senses1 and the last1 because forces in general are not perceptible2 nature comprehends everything whose existence is connected with our perceptions in a possible experience#a74 7#c7 ,our representations of phenomena1 i4e41 that of the latter which actually enters into the consciousness of the empirical individual4 ,in the realm of things in themselves there is no motion whatever1 but at most an intelligible correlate of this relation2 in the world of phenomena1 the world of physics1 the earth moves around the sun2 in the sphere of representation the sun moves around the earth4 ,it is true1 as has been said1 that ,kant sometimes ignores the distinction between phenomena as related to noumena and phenomena as related to representations2 and1 as a result of this1 that the phenomenon is either completely volatilized into the representation#b or split up into an objective half independent of us and a representative half dependent on us1 of which the former falls into the thing in itself1#c while the latter is resolved into subjective states of the ego4 ,footnote #a3 ,nothing is actually given to us but the perception and the empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions4 ,to call a phenomenon a real thing antecedent to perception1 means 444 that in the progress of experience we must meet with such a perception4 ,footnote #b3 ,phenomena are altogether in me1 exist only in our sensibility as a modification of it4 ,there is nothing in space but that which is actually represented in it4 ,phenomena are mere representations1 which1 if they are not given in us 7in perception7 nowhere exist4 ,footnote #c3 ,here ,kant is guilty of the fault which he himself has censured1 of confusing the physical and transcendental meanings of in itself4 ,he forgets that the thing1 if it is momentarily not intuited or represented by me1 and therefore is not immediately given for me as an individual1 is nevertheless still present for me as man1 is mediately given1 that is1 is discoverable by future search4 ,that which is without my present consciousness is not for this reason without all human consciousness4 ,in fact1 ,kant often overlooks the distinction between actual and possible intuition1 so that for him the objects of the latter slip out of space and time and into the thing in itself4 ,to the transcendental object we may ascribe the extent and connection of our possible perceptions1 and say that it is given in itself before all experience4 ,in it the real things of the past are given4 ,after the possibility and the legitimacy of synthetic judgments a priori have been proved for pure mathematics upon the basis of the pure intuitions1 there emerges1 in the second place1 the problem of the possibility of a priori syntheses in pure natural science1 or the question1 ,do pure concepts exist8 ,and after this has been answered in the affirmative1 the further questions come up1 ,is the application of these1 first1 to phenomena1 and second1 to things in themselves1 possible and legitimate1 and how far8 7b7 ,the ,concepts and ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding 7,transcendental ,analytic74--,sensations1 in order to become intuition or the perception of a phenomenon1 needed to be ordered in space and time2 in order to become experience or a unified knowledge of objects1 intuitions need a synthesis through concepts4 ,in order to objective knowledge the manifold of intuition 7already ordered by its arrangement in space and time7 must be connected in the unity of the concept4 ,sensibility gives the manifold to be connected1 the understanding the connecting unity4 ,the former is able to intuit only1 the latter only to think2 knowledge can arise only as the result of their union4 ,intuitions depend on affections1 concepts on functions1 that is1 on unifying acts of the understanding4 ,to discover the pure forms of thought it is necessary to isolate the understanding1 just as an isolation of the sensibility was necessary above in order to the discovery of the pure forms of intuition4 ,we obtain the elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding by rejecting all that is intuitive and empirical4 ,these elements must be pure1 must be concepts1 further1 not derivative or composite1 but fundamental concepts1 and their number must be complete4 ,this completeness is guaranteed only when the pure concepts or categories are sought according to some common principle1 which assigns to each its position in the connection of the whole1 and not 7as with ,aristotle7 collected by occasional1 unsystematic inquiries undertaken at random4 ,the table of the forms of judgment will serve as a guide for the discovery of the categories4 ,thought is knowledge through concepts2 the understanding can make no other use of concepts than to judge by means of them4 ,hence1 since the understanding is the faculty of judging1 the various kinds of connection in judgment must yield the various pure connective-concepts 7,verknpfungsbegriffe4--,k4 ,fischer7 or categories4 ,in regard to quantity1 every judgment is universal1 particular1 or singular2 in regard to quality1 affirmative1 negative1 or infinite2 in regard to relation1 categorical1 hypothetical1 or disjunctive2 and in regard to modality1 problematical1 assertory1 or apodictic4 ,to these twelve forms of judgment correspond as many categories1 viz41 ,i41 ,unity1 ,plurality1 ,totality2 ,,ii41 ,reality1 ,negation1 ,limitation2 ,,iii41 ,subsistence and ,inherence 7,substance and ,accident71 ,causality and ,dependence 7,cause and ,effect71 ,community 7,reciprocity between the ,active and the ,passive72 ,,iv41 ,possibility--,impossibility1 ,existence--,non-existence1 ,necessity--,contingency4 ,the first six of these fundamental concepts1 which have no correlatives1 constitute the mathematical1 the second six1 which appear in pairs1 the dynamical categories4 ,the former relate to objects of 7pure or of empirical7 intuition1 the latter to the existence of these objects 7in relation to one another or to the understanding74 ,although all other a priori division though concepts must be dichotomous1 each of the four heads includes three categories1 the third of which in each case arises from the combination of the second and first1#a but1 nevertheless1 is an original 7not a derivative7 concept1 since this combination requires a special actus of the understanding4 ,universality or totality is plurality regarded as unity1 limitation is reality combined with negation1 community is the reciprocal causality of substances1 and necessity is the actuality given by possibility itself4 ,kant omits1 as unnecessary here1 the useful1 easy1 and not unpleasant task of noting the great number of derivative concepts a priori 7predicables7 which spring from the combination of these twelve original concepts 7predicaments categories7 with one another1 or with the modes of pure sensibility1--the concepts force1 action1 passion1 would belong as subsumptions under causality1 presence and resistance under community1 origin1 extinction1 and change under modality1--since his object is not a system1 but only the principles of one4 ,his liking or even love for this division according to quantity1 quality1 relation1 and modality1 which he always has ready as though it were a universal key for philosophical problems1 reveals a very strong architectonic impulse1 against which even his ever active skeptical tendency is not able to keep up the battle4 ,footnote #a3 ,concerning this neat observation1 ,kant remarked that it might perhaps have important consequences in regard to the scientific form of all knowledge of reason4 ,this prophecy was fulfilled1 although in a different sense from that which floated before his mind4 ,fichte and ,hegel composed their thought-symphonies in the three-four time given by ,kant4 ,in view of the derivation of the forms of thought from the forms of judgment ,kant does not stop to give a detailed proof that the categories are concepts1 and that they are pure4 ,their discursive 7not intuitive7 character is evident from the fact that their reference to the object is mediate only 7and not1 as in the case of intuition1 immediate71 and their a priori origin1 from the necessity which they carry with them1 and which would be impossible if their origin were empirical4 ,here ,kant starts from ,hume's criticism of the idea of cause4 ,the ,scottish skeptic had said that the necessary bond between cause and effect can neither be perceived nor logically demonstrated2 that1 therefore1 the relation of causality is an idea which we--with what right8--add to perceived succession in time4 ,this doubt 7without the hasty conclusions71 says ,kant1 must be generalized1 must be extended to the category of substance 7which had been already done by ,hume1 pp4 #bbf-g1 though the author of the ,critique of ,reason was not aware of the fact71 and to all other pure concepts of the understanding4 ,then we may hope to kindle a torch at the spark which ,hume struck out4 ,the problem ,it is impossible to see why1 because something exists1 something else must necessarily exist1 is the starting point alike of ,hume's skepticism and ,kant's criticism4 ,the former recognized that the principle of causality is neither empirical nor analytic1 and therefore concluded that it is an invention of reason1 which confuses subjective with objective necessity4 ,the latter shows that in spite of its subjective origin it has an objective value2 that it is a truth which is independent of all experience1 and yet valid for all who have experience1 and for all that can be experienced4 ,of the two questions1 ,how can the concepts which spring from our understanding possess objective validity8 and1 ,how 7through what means or media7 does their application to objects of experience take place8 the first is answered in the ,deduction of the ,pure ,concepts of the ,understanding1 and the second in the chapter on their ,schematism4 ,the ,deduction1 the most difficult portion of the ,critique1 shows that the objective validity of the categories1 as concepts of objects in general1 depends on the fact that through them alone experience as far as regards the form of thought is possible1 i4e41 it is only through them that any object whatever can be thought4 ,all knowledge consists in judgments2 all judgments contain a connection of representations2 all connection--whether it be conscious or not1 whether it relates to concepts or to pure or empirical intuitions--is an act of the understanding2 it cannot be given by objects1 but only spontaneously performed by the subject itself4 ,we cannot represent anything as connected in the object unless we have ourselves first connected it4 ,the connection includes three conceptions3 that of the manifold to be connected 7which is given by intuition71 that of the act of synthesis1 and that of the unity2 this last is two-fold1 an objective unity 7the conception of an object in general in which the manifold is united71 and a subjective unity 7the unity of consciousness under which or1 rather1 through which the connection is effected74 ,the categories represent the different kinds of combination1 each one of these1 again1 being completed in three stages1 which are termed the ,synthesis of ,apprehension in ,intuition1 the ,synthesis of ,reproduction in ,imagination1 and the ,synthesis of ,recognition in ,concepts4 ,if ,i wish to think the time from one noon to the next1 ,i must 7#a7 grasp 7apprehend7 the manifold representations 7portions of time7 in succession2 7#b7 retain or renew 7reproduce7 in thought those which have preceded in passing to those which follow2 7#c7 be conscious that that which is now thought is the same with that thought before1 or know again 7recognize7 the reproduced representation as the one previously experienced4 ,if the mind did not exercise such synthetic activity the manifold of representation would not constitute a whole1 would lack the unity which consciousness alone can impart to it4 ,without this one consciousness1 concepts and knowledge of objects would be wholly impossible4 ,the unity of pure self-consciousness or of transcendental apperception is the postulate of all use of the understanding4 ,in the flux of internal phenomena there is no constant or abiding self1 but the unchangeable consciousness here demanded is a precedent condition of all experience1 and gives to phenomena a connection according to laws which determine an object for intuition1 i4e41 the conception of something in which they are necessarily connected4#a ,reference to an object is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness4 ,the connective activity of the understanding1 and with it experience1 is possible only through the synthetic unity of pure apperception1 the ,i think1 which must be able to accompany all my representations1 and through which they first become mine4 ,footnote #a3 ,object is that which opposes the random or arbitrary determination of our cognitions1 and which causes them to be determined in a certain way a priori4 ,experience 7in the strict sense7 is distinguished from perception 7experience in the wide sense7 by its objectivity or universal validity4 ,a judgment of perception 7the sun shines upon the stone and the stone becomes warm7 is only subjectively valid2 while1 on the other hand1 a judgment of experience 7the sun warms the stone7 aims to be valid not only for me and my present condition1 but always1 for me and for everyone else4 ,if the former is to become the latter1 an a priori concept must be added to the perception 7in the above case1 the concept of cause71 under which the perception is subsumed4 ,the category determines the perceptions in view of the form of the judgment1 gives to the judgment its reference to an object1 and thus gives to the percepts1 or rather1 concepts 7sunshine and warmth71 necessary and universally valid connection4 ,the reason why the judgments of others must agree with mine is the unity of the object to which they all relate1 with which they agree1 and hence must also all agree with one another4 ,though the categories take their origin in the nature of the subject1 they are objective and valid for objects of experience1 because experience is possible alone through them4 ,they are not the product1 but the ground of experience4 ,the second difficulty concerns their applicability to phenomena1 which are wholly disparate4 ,by what means is the gulf between the categories1 which are concepts and a priori1 and perceptions1 which are intuitous and empirical1 bridged over8 ,the connecting link is supplied by the imagination1 as the faculty which mediates between sensibility and understanding to provide a concept with its image1 and consists in the intuition of time1 which1 in common with the categories1 has an a priori character1 and1 in common with perceptions1 an intuitive character1 so that it is at once pure and sensuous4 ,the subsumption of phenomena or empirical intuitions under the category is effected through the ,schemata#a of the concepts of the understanding1 i4e41 through a priori determinations of time according to rules1 which relate to time-series1 time-content1 time-order1 and time-comprehension1 and indicate whether ,i have to apply this or that category to a given object4 ,footnote #a3 ,the schema is not an empirical image1 but stands midway between this 7the particular intuition of a definite triangle or dog7 and the unintuitable concept1 as a general intuition 7of a triangle or a dog in general1 which holds alike for right- and oblique-angled triangles1 for poodles and pugs71 or as a rule for determining our intuition in accordance with a concept4 ,each category has its own schema4 ,the schema of quantity is number1 as comprehending the successive addition of homogeneous parts4 ,filled time 7being in time7 is the schema of reality1 empty time 7not-being in time7 the schema of negation1 and more or less filled time 7the intensity of sensation1 indicating the degree of reality7 the schema of limitation4 ,permanence in time is the sign for the application of the category of substance2#a regular succession1 for the application of the concept of cause2 the coexistence of the determinations of one substance with those of another1 the signal for their subsumption under the concept of reciprocity4 ,the schemata of possibility1 actuality1 and necessity1 finally1 are existence at any time whatever 7whensoever71 existence at a definite time1 and existence at all times4 ,by such schematic syntheses the pure concept is brought near to the empirical intuition1 and the way is prepared for an application of the former to the latter1 or1 what is the same thing1 for the subsumption of the latter under the former4 ,footnote #a3 ,this determination is important for psychology4 ,since the inner sense shows nothing constant1 but everything in a continual flux1--for the permanent subject of our thoughts is an identical activity of the understanding1 not an intuitable object1--the concept of substance is not applicable to psychical phenomena4 ,representations of a permanent 7material substances7 exist1 indeed1 but not permanent representations4 ,the abiding self 7ego1 soul7 which we posit back of internal phenomena is1 as the ,dialectic will show1 a mere ,idea1 which1 or1 rather1 the object of which1 maybe thought as substance1 it is true1 but cannot be given in intuition1 hence cannot be known4 ,as a result of the fact that the schematism permits a presentation of the categories in time intuition antecedent to all experience1 the possibility is given of synthetic judgments a priori concerning objects of possible experience4 ,such judgments1 in so far as they are not based on higher and more general cognitions1 are termed principles1 and the system of them--to be given1 with the table of the categories as a guide1 in the ,analytic of ,principles or the ,doctrine of the ,faculty of ,judgment--furnishes the outlines of pure natural science4 ,when thus the rules of the subsumption to be effected have been found in the pure concepts1 and the conditions and criteria of the subsumption in the schemata1 it remains to indicate the principles which the understanding1 through the aid of the schemata1 actually produces a priori from its concepts4 ,the principle of quantity is the ,axiom of ,intuition1 the principle of quality the ,anticipation of ,perception2 the principles of relation are termed ,analogies of ,experience1 those of modality ,postulates of ,empirical ,thought in ,general4 ,the first runs1 ,all intuitions are extensive quantities2 the second1 ,in all phenomena sensation1 and the real which corresponds to it in the object1 has an intensive quantity1 i4e41 a degree4 ,the principle of the ,analogies is1 ,all phenomena1 as far as their existence is concerned1 are subject a priori to rules1 determining their mutual relation in time 7in the second edition this is stated as follows3 ,experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions74 ,as there are three modes of time1 there result three ,analogies1 the principles of permanence1 of succession 7production71 and of coexistence4 ,these are3 7#a7 ,in all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent1 and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature4 7#b7 ,all changes take place according to the law of connection between cause and effect2 or1 ,everything that happens 7begins to be7 presupposes something on which it follows according to a rule4 7#c7 ,all substances1 in so far as they are coexistent1 stand in complete community1 that is1 reciprocity1 one to another4 ,and1 finally1 the three ,postulates3 ,that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience 7in intuition and in concepts7 is possible1 ,that which is connected with the material conditions of experience 7sensation7 is actual 7perception is the only criterion of actuality74 ,that which1 in its connection with the actual1 is determined by universal conditions of experience1 is 7exists as7 necessary4 ,as the categories of substance and causality are specially preferred to the others by ,kant and the ,kantians1 and are even proclaimed by some as the only fundamental concepts1 so also the principles of relation have an established reputation for special importance4 ,the leading ideas in the proofs of the ,analogies of ,experience--for in spite of their underivative character the principles require1 and are capable of1 proof--may next be noted4 ,the time determinations of phenomena1 the knowledge of their duration1 their succession1 and their coexistence1 form an indispensable part of our experience1 not only of scientific experience1 but of everyday experience as well4 ,how is the objective time-determination of things and events possible8 ,if the matter in hand is the determination of the particulars of a fight with a bloody ending1 the witnesses are questioned and testify3 ,we heard and saw how ,a began the quarrel by insulting ,b1 and the latter answered the insult with a blow1 whereupon ,a drew his knife and wounded his opponent4 ,here the succession of perceptions on the part of the persons present is accepted as a true reproduction of the succession of the actual events4 ,but the succession of perceptions is not always the sure indication of an actual succession3 the trees along an avenue are perceived one after the other1 while they are in reality coexistent4 ,we might now propose the following statement3 ,the representation of the manifold of phenomena is always successive1 ,i apprehend one part after another4 ,i can decide whether these parts succeed one another in the object also1 or whether they are coexistent1 by the fact that1 in the second case1 the series of my perceptions is reversible1 while in the first it is not4 ,i can1 if ,i choose1 direct my glance along the avenue in such a way that ,i shall begin the second time with the tree at which ,i left off the first time2 if ,i wish to assure myself that the parts of a house are coexistent1 ,i cause my eye to wander from the upper to the lower portions1 from the right side to the left1 and then to perform the same motions in the opposite direction4 ,on the other hand1 it is not left to my choice to hear the thunder either before or after ,i see the lightning1 or to see a passing wagon now here1 now there1 but in these cases ,i am bound in the succession of my sensuous representations4 ,the possibility of interchange in the series of perceptions proves an objective coexistence1 the impossibility of this1 an objective succession4 ,but this criterion is limited to the immediate present1 and fails us when a time relation between unobserved phenomena is to be established4 ,if ,i go at evening into the dining room and see a vessel of bubbling water1 which is to be used in making tea1 over a burning spirit lamp1 whence do ,i derive the knowledge that the water began1 and could begin1 to boil only after the alcohol had been lighted1 and not before8 ,because ,i have often seen the flame precede the boiling of the water1 and in this the irreversibility of the two perceptions has guaranteed to me the succession of the events perceived8 ,then ,i may only assume that it is very probable1 not that it is certain1 that in this case also the order of the two events has been the same as ,i have observed several times before4 ,as a matter of fact1 however1 we all assert that the water could not have come into a boiling condition unless the generation of heat had preceded2 that in every case the fire must be there before the boiling of the water can commence4 ,whence do we derive this must8 ,simply and alone from the thought of a causal connection between the two events4 ,every phenomenon must follow in time that phenomenon of which it is the effect1 and must precede that of which it is the cause4 ,it is through the relation of causality1 and through this alone1 that the objective time relation of phenomena is determined4 ,if nothing preceded an event on which it must follow according to a rule1#a then all succession in perception would be subjective merely1 and nothing whatever would be objectively determined by it as to what was the antecedent and what the consequent in the phenomenon itself4 ,we should then have a mere play of representations without significance for the real succession of events4 ,only the thought of a rule1 according to which the antecedent state contains the necessary condition of the consequent state1 justifies us in transferring the time order of our representations to phenomena4#b ,nay1 even the distinction between the phenomenon itself1 as the object of our representations1 and our representations of it1 is effected only by subjecting the phenomenon to this rule1 which assigns to it its definite position in time after another phenomenon by which it is caused1 and thus forbids the inversion of the perceptions4 ,we can derive the rule of the understanding which produces the objective time order of the manifold from experience1 only because we have put it into experience1 and have first brought experience into being by means of the rule4 ,we recapitulate in ,kant's own words3 ,the objective 7time7 relation of phenomena remains undetermined by mere perception 7the mere succession in my apprehension1 if it is not determined by means of a rule in relation to an antecedent1 does not guarantee any succession in the object74 ,in order that this may be known as determined1 the relation between the two states must be so conceived 7through the understanding's concept of causality7 that it is thereby determined with necessity which of them must be taken as coming first1 and which second1 and not conversely4 ,thus it is only by subjecting the succession of phenomena to the law of causality that empirical knowledge of them is possible4 ,without the concept of cause no objective time determination1 and hence1 without it1 no experience4 ,footnote #a3 ,a reality following on an empty time1 that is1 a beginning of existence preceded by no state of things1 can as little be apprehended as empty time itself4 ,footnote #b3 ,if phenomena were things in themselves no one would be able1 from the succession of the representations of their manifold1 to tell how this is connected in the object4 ,that which the relation of cause and effect does for the succession#a of phenomena1 the relation of reciprocity does for their coexistence1 and that of substance and accident for their duration4 ,since absolute time is not an object of perception1 the position of phenomena in time cannot be directly determined1 but only through a concept of the understanding4 ,when ,i conclude that two objects 7the earth and the moon7 must be coexistent1 because perceptions of them can follow upon one another in both ways1 ,i do this on the presupposition that the objects themselves reciprocally determine their position in time1 hence are not isolated1 but stand in causal community or a relation of reciprocal influence4 ,it is only on the condition of reciprocity between phenomena1 through which they form a whole1 that ,i can represent them as coexistent4 ,footnote #a3 ,against the objection that cause and effect are frequently1 indeed in most cases1 simultaneous 7e4g4 the heated stove and the warmth of the room71 ,kant remarks that the question concerns the order of time merely1 and not the lapse of time4 ,the ball lying on a soft cushion is simultaneous1 it is true1 with its effect1 the depression in the cushion4 ,but ,i1 nevertheless1 distinguish the two by the time relation of dynamical connection4 ,for if ,i place the ball on the cushion1 its previously smooth surface is followed by a depression1 but if there is a depression in the cushion 7,i know not whence7 a leaden ball does not follow from it4 ,coexistence and succession can be represented only in a permanent substratum2 they are merely the modes in which the permanent exists4 ,since time 7in which all change takes place1 but which itself abides and does not change7 in itself cannot be perceived1 the substratum of simultaneity and succession must exist in phenomena themselves3 the permanent in relation to which alone all the time relations of phenomena can be determined1 is substance2 that which alters is its determinations1 accidents1 or special modes of existing4 ,alteration1 i4e41 origin and extinction1 is true of states only1 which can begin and cease to be1 and not of substances1 which change 7sich verndern71 i4e41 pass from one mode of existence into another1 but do not alter 7wechseln71 i4e41 pass from non-existence into existence1 or the reverse4 ,it is the permanent alone that changes1 and its states alone that begin and cease to be4 ,the origin and extinction of substances1 or the increase and diminution of their quantum1 would remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time2 for the time relations of the coexistent and the successive can be perceived only in an identical substratum1 in a permanent1 which exists always4 ,the law ,from nothing nothing comes1 and nothing can return to nothing1 is everywhere assumed and has been frequently advanced1 but never yet proved1 for1 indeed1 it is impossible to prove it dogmatically4 ,here the only possible proof for it1 the critical proof1 is given3 the principle of permanence is a necessary condition of experience4 ,the same argument establishes the principle of sufficient reason1 and the principle of the community of substances1 together with the unity of the world to be inferred from this4 ,the three ,analogies together assert3 ,all phenomena exist in one nature and must so exist1 because without such a unity a priori no unity of experience1 and therefore no determination of objects in experience1 would be possible4--,in connection with the ,postulates the same transcendental proof is given for a series of other laws of nature a priori1 viz41 that in the course of the changes in the world--for the causal principle holds only for effects in nature1 not for the existence of things as substances--there can be neither blind chance nor a blind necessity 7but only a conditional1 hence an intelligible1 necessity72 and1 further1 that in the series of phenomena1 there can be neither leap1 nor gap1 nor break1 and hence no void--in mundo non datur casus1 non datur fatum1 non datur saltus1 non datur hiatus4 ,while the dynamical principles have to do with the relation of phenomena1 whether it be to one another 7,analogies71 or to our faculty of cognition 7,postulates71 the mathematical relate to the quantity of intuitions and sensations1 and furnish the basis for the application of mathematics to natural science4#a ,an extensive quantity is one in which the representation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible1 and so precedes it4 ,i cannot represent a line without drawing it in thought1 i4e41 without producing all parts of it one after the other1 starting from a point4 ,all phenomena are intuited as aggregates or as collections of previously given parts4 ,that which geometry asserts of pure intuition 7i4e41 the infinite divisibility of lines7 holds also of empirical intuition4 ,an intensive quantity is one which is apprehended only as unity1 and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation #j4 ,every sensation1 consequently every reality in phenomena1 has a degree1 which1 however small it may be1 is never the smallest1 but can always be still more diminished2 and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible smaller intermediate sensations1 or an infinite series of ever decreasing degrees4 ,the property of quantities1 according to which no part in them is the smallest possible part1 and no part is simple1 is termed their continuity4 ,all phenomena are continuous quantities1 i4e41 all their parts are in turn 7further divisible7 quantities4 ,hence it follows1 first1 that a proof for an empty space or empty time can never be drawn from experience1 and secondly1 that all change is also continuous4 ,it is remarkable1 so ,kant ends his proof of the ,anticipation1 that of quantities in general we can know one quality only a priori1 namely1 their continuity1 while with regard to quality 7the real of phenomena7 nothing is known to us a priori but their intensive quantity1 that is1 that they must have a degree4 ,everything else is left to experience4 ,footnote #a3 ,in each particular science of nature1 science proper 7i4e41 apodictically certain science7 is found only to the extent in which mathematics can be applied therein4 ,for this reason chemistry can never be anything more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine2 and psychology not even this1 but only a natural history of the inner sense or natural description of the soul4 ,that which ,kant's ,metaphysical ,elements of ,natural ,science1 #aghf--;in four chapters1 ,phoronomy1 ,dynamics1 ,mechanics1 and ,phenomenology--advances as pure physics or the metaphysics of corporeal nature1 is a doctrine of motion4 ,the fundamental determination of matter 7of a somewhat which is to be the object of the external senses7 is motion1 for it is only through motion that these senses can be affected1 and the understanding itself reduces all other predicates of matter to this4 ,the second and most valuable part of the work defines matter as the movable1 that which fills space by its moving force1 and recognizes two original forces1 repulsive1 expansive superficial force or force of contact1 by which a body resists the entrance of other bodies into its own space1 and attractive1 penetrative force or the force which works at a distance1 in virtue of which all particles of matter attract one another4 ,in order to a determinate filling of space the co-operation of both fundamental forces is required4 ,in opposition to the mechanical theory of the atomists1 which explains forces from matter and makes them inhere in it1 ,kant holds fast to the dynamical view which he had early adopted 7cf4 p4 #cbd71 according to which forces are the primary factor and matter is constituted by them4 ,the outcome of the ,analytic of ,principles sounds bold enough4 ,the understanding is the lawgiver of nature3 ,it does not draw its laws a priori from nature1 but prescribes them to it2 the principles of the pure understanding are the most universal laws of nature1 the empirical laws of nature only particular determinations of these4 ,all order and regularity take their origin in the spirit1 and are put into objects by this4 ,universal and necessary knowledge remained inexplicable so long as it was assumed that the understanding must conform itself to objects2 it is at once explained if1 conversely1 we make objects conform themselves to the understanding4 ,this is a reversal of philosophical opinion which may justly be compared to the ,copernican revolution in astronomy2 it is just as paradoxical as the latter1 but just as incontestably true1 and just as rich in results4 ,the sequel will show that this strangely sounding principle1 that things conform themselves to our representations and the laws of nature are dependent on the understanding1 is calculated to make us humble rather than proud4 ,our understanding is lawgiver within the limits of its knowledge1 no doubt1 but it knows only within the limits of its legislative authority2 nature1 to which it dictates laws1 is nothing but a totality of phenomena2 beyond the limits of the phenomenal1 where its commands become of no effect1 its wishes also find no hearing4 ,in the second edition the ,analytic of ,principles contains as a supplement a ,refutation of ,idealism1 which1 in opposition to ,descartes's position that the only immediate experience is inner experience1 from which we reach outer experience by inference alone1 argues that1 conversely1 it is only through outer experience1 which is immediate experience proper1 that inner experience--as the consciousness of my own existence in time--is possible4 ,for all time determination presupposes something permanent in perception1 and this permanent something cannot be in me 7the mere representation of an external thing71 but only actually existing things which ,i perceive without me4 ,there is1 further1 a chapter on the ,ground of the ,distinction of all ,objects in general into ,phenomena and ,noumena1 with an appendix on the ,amphiboly 7ambiguity7 of the ,concepts of ,reflection4 ,the latter shows that the concepts of comparison3 identity and difference1 agreement and opposition1 the internal and the external1 matter and form1 acquire entirely different meanings when they relate to phenomena and to things in themselves 7in other words1 to things in their relation to the sensibility1 and in relation to the understanding merely72 and further1 in a criticism of the philosophy of ,leibnitz1 reproaches him with having intellectualized phenomena1 while ,locke is said to have sensationalized the concepts of the understanding4 ,the chapter on the distinction between phenomena and noumena very much lessens the hopes1 aroused1 perchance1 by the establishment of the non-empirical origin of the categories1 for an application of these not confined to any experience4 ,although the categories1 that is1 are in their origin entirely independent of all experience 7so much so that they first make experience possible71 they are yet confined in their application within the bounds of possible experience4 ,they serve only to spell phenomena1 that we may be able to read them as experience1 and when applied to things in themselves lose all significance4#a ,similarly the principles which spring from them are nothing more than principles of possible experience1 and can be referred to phenomena alone1 beyond which they are arbitrary combinations without objective reality4 ,things in themselves may be thought1 but they can never be known2 for knowledge1 besides the empty thought of an object1 implies intuitions which must be subsumed under it or by which the object must be determined4 ,in themselves the pure concepts relate to all that is thinkable1 not merely to that which can be experienced1 but the schemata1 which assures their applicability in the field of experience1 at the same time limit them to this sphere4 ,the schematism makes the immanent use of the categories1 and thus a metaphysics of phenomena1 possible1 but the transcendent use of them1 and consequently the metaphysics of the suprasensible1 impossible4 ,the case would be different if our intuition were intellectual instead of sensuous1 or1 which is the same thing1 if our understanding were intuitive instead of discursive2 then the objects which we think would not need to be given us from another source 7through sensuous intuition71 but would be themselves produced in the act by which we thought them4 ,the divine spirit may be such an archetypal1 creative understanding 7intellectus archetypus71 which generates objects by its thought2 the human spirit is not such1 and therefore is confined1 with its knowledge1 within the circle of possible perception4--,the conception of intellectual intuition leads to a distinction in regard to things in themselves3 in its negative meaning noumenon denotes a thing in so far as it is not the object of our sensuous intuition1 in its positive meaning a thing which is the object of a non-sensuous intuition4 ,the positive thing in itself is a problematical concept2 its possibility depends on the existence of an intuitive understanding1 something about which we are ignorant4 ,the negative thing in itself cannot be known1 indeed1 but it can be thought2 and the representation of it is a possible concept1 one which is not self-contradictory#b 7a principle which is of great importance for practical philosophy74 ,still further1 it is an indispensable concept1 which shows that the boundary where our intuition ends is not the boundary of the thinkable as well2 and even if it affords no positive extension of knowledge#c it is1 nevertheless1 very useful1 since it sets bounds to the use of the understanding1 and thus1 as it were1 negatively extends our knowledge4 ,that which lies beyond the boundary1 the how are they possible 7,wiemglichkeit7 of things in themselves is shrouded in darkness1 but the boundary itself1 i4e41 the that they are possible 7,dassmglichkeit71 of things in themselves1 and the unknowableness of their nature1 belongs to that which is within the boundary and lies in the light4 ,in this way ,kant believed that the categories of causality and substance might be applied to the relation of things in themselves to phenomena without offending against the prohibition of their transcendent use1 since here the boundary appeared only to be touched1 and not overstepped4 ,footnote #a3 ,a pure use of the categories is no doubt possible1 that is1 not self-contradictory1 but it has no kind of objective validity1 because it refers to no intuition to which it is meant to impart the unity of an object4 ,the categories remain forever mere functions of thought by which no object can be given to me1 but by which ,i can only think whatever may be given to me in intuition 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,max ,mller's translation1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bbj74 ,without the condition of sensuous intuition1 for which they supply the synthesis1 the categories have no relation to any definite object2 for without this condition they contain nothing but the logical function1 or the form of the concept1 by means of which alone nothing can be known and distinguished as to any object belonging to it 7,ibid41 pp4 #bac1 #bad74 ,footnote #b3 ,the thing in itself denotes the object in so far as it can be thought by us1 but not intuited1 and consequently not determined by intuitions1 i4e41 cannot be known4 ,it is only through the schematism that the categories are limited to phenomena4 ,o4 ,liebmann 7,kant und die ,epigonen1 p4 #bg1 and passim7 overlooks or ignores this when he says3 ,kant here allows himself to recognize an object emancipated from the forms of knowledge1 therefore an irrational object1 i4e41 to represent something which is not representable--wooden iron4 ,the thing in itself is insensible1 but not irrational1 and the forms of intuition and forms of thought joined by ,liebmann under the title forms of knowledge have in ,kant a by no means equal rank4 ,footnote #c3 ,a category by itself1 freed from all conditions of intuition 7e4g41 the representation of a substance which is thought without permanence in time1 or of a cause which should not act in time71 can yield no definite concept of an object4 ,though the concepts of the understanding possess a cognitive value in the sphere of phenomena alone1 the hope still remains of gaining an entrance into the suprasensible sphere through the concepts of reason4 ,it is indubitable that our spirit is conscious of a far higher need than that for the mere connection of phenomena into experience2 it is that which cannot be experienced1 the ,ideas ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 which form the real end of its inquiry4 ,can this need be satisfied1 and how8 ,can this end be attained1 and reality be given to the ,ideas8 ,this is the third question of the ,critique of ,reason4 7c7 ,the ,reason's ,ideas of the ,unconditioned 7,transcendental ,dialectic74--,all our knowledge begins with the senses1 proceeds thence to the understanding1 and ends with reason4 ,the understanding is the faculty of rules1 reason the faculty of principles4 ,the categories of the understanding are necessary concepts which make experience possible1 and which1 therefore1 can always be given in experience2 the ,ideas of reason are necessary concepts to which no corresponding object can be given4 ,each of the ,ideas gives expression to an unconditioned4 ,how does the concept of the unconditioned arise1 and what service does it perform for knowledge8 ,as perceptions are connected by the categories in the unity of the understanding1 and thus are elevated into experience1 so the manifold knowledge of experience needs a higher unity1 the unity of reason1 in order to form a connected system4 ,this is supplied to it by the ,ideas--which1 consequently1 do not relate directly to the objects of intuition1 but only to the understanding and its judgments--in order1 through the concept of the unconditioned1 to give completion to the knowledge of the understanding1 which always moves in the sphere of the conditioned1 i4e41 to give it the greatest possible unity together with the greatest possible extension4 ,the concept of the absolute grows out of the logical task which is incumbent on reason1 i4e41 inference1 and it may be best explained from this as a starting point4 ,in the syllogism the judgment asserted in the conclusion is derived from a general rule1 the major premise4 ,the validity of this general proposition is1 however1 itself conditional1 dependent on higher conditions4 ,then1 as reason seeks the condition for each conditioned moment1 and always commands a further advance in the series of conditions1 it acts under the ,idea of the totality of conditions1 which1 nevertheless1 since it can never be given in experience1 does not denote an object1 but only an heuristic maxim for knowledge1 the maxim1 namely1 never to stop with any one condition as ultimate1 but always to continue the search further4 ,the ,idea of the unconditioned or of the completeness of conditions is a goal which we never attain1 but which we are continually to approach4 ,the categories and the principles of the understanding were constitutive principles1 the ,ideas are regulative merely2 their function is to guide the understanding1 to give it a direction helpful for the connection of knowledge1 not to inform it concerning the actual character of things4 ,since reason is the faculty of inference 7as the understanding was found to be the faculty of judgment71 the forms of the syllogism perform the same service for us in our search for the ,ideas as the forms of judgment in the discovery of the categories4 ,to the categorical1 hypothetical1 and disjunctive syllogisms correspond the three concepts of reason1 the soul or the thinking subject1 the world or the totality of phenomena1 and ,god1 the original being or the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought4 ,by means of these we refer all inner phenomena to the ego as their 7unknown7 common subject1 think all beings and events in nature as ordered under the comprehensive system of the 7never to be experienced7 universe1 and regard all things as the work of a supreme 7unknowable7 intelligence4 ,these ,ideas are necessary concepts2 not accidental products nor mere fancies1 but concepts sprung from the nature of reason2 their use is legitimate so long as we remember that we can have a problematical concept of objects corresponding to them1 but no knowledge of these2 that they are problems and rules for knowledge1 never objects and instruments of it4 ,nevertheless the temptation to regard these regulative principles as constitutive and these problems as knowable objects is almost irresistible2 for the ground of the involuntary confusion of the required with the given absolute lies not so much in the carelessness of the individual as in the nature of our cognitive faculty4 ,the ,ideas carry with them an unavoidable illusion of objective reality1 and the sophistical inferences which spring from them are not sophistications of men1 but of pure reason itself1 are natural misunderstandings from which even the wisest cannot free himself4 ,at best we can succeed in avoiding the error1 not in doing away with the transcendental illusion from which it proceeds4 ,we can see through the illusion and avoid the erroneous conclusions built upon it1 not shake off the illusion itself4 ,on this erroneous objective use of the ,ideas three so-called sciences are based3 speculative psychology1 speculative cosmology1 and speculative theology1 which1 together with ontology1 constitute the stately structure of the 7,wolffian7 metaphysics4 ,the ,critique of ,reason completes its work of destruction when1 as ,dialectic 7,logic cf4 ,illusion71 it follows the refutation of dogmatic ontology--developed in the ,analytic--which believed that it knew things in themselves through the concepts of the understanding1 with a refutation of rational psychology1 rational cosmology1 and rational theology4 ,it shows that the first is founded on paralogisms1 and the second entangled in irreconcilable contradictions1 while the third makes vain efforts to prove the existence of the ,supreme ,being4 7i7 ,the ,paralogisms of ,rational ,psychology4 ,the transcendental self-consciousness or pure ego which accompanies and connects all my representations1 the subject of all judgments which ,i form1 is1 as the ,analytic recognized1 the presupposition of all knowing 7pp4 #ceh-cei71 but as such it can never become an object of knowledge4 ,we must not make a given object out of the subject which never can be a predicate1 nor substitute a real thinking substance for the logical subject of thought1 nor revamp the unity of self-consciousness into the simplicity and identical personality of the soul4 ,the rational psychology of the ,wolffian school is guilty of this error1 and whatever of proof it advances for the substantiality1 simplicity1 and personality of the soul1 and1 by way of deduction1 for its immateriality and immortality as well as for its relation to the body1 is based upon this substitution1 this ambiguity of the middle term1 and therefore upon a quaternio terminorum1--all its conclusions are fallacious4 ,it is allowable and unavoidable to add in thought an absolute subject1 the unity of the ego1 to inner phenomena2#a it is inadmissible to treat the ,idea of the soul as a knowable thing4 ,in order to be able to apply the category of substance to it1 we would have to lay hold of a permanent in intuition such as cannot be found in the inner sense4 ,empirical psychology1 then1 alone remains for the extension of our knowledge of mental life1 while rational psychology shrivels up from a doctrine into a mere discipline1 which watches that the limits of experience are not overstepped4 ,but even as a mere limiting determination it has great value4 ,for1 along with the hope of proving the immateriality and immortality of the soul1 the fear of seeing them disproved is also dissipated2 materialism is just as unfounded as spiritualism1 and if the conclusions of the latter concerning the soul as a simple1 immaterial substance which survives the death of the body1 cannot be proved1 yet we need not1 for that reason1 regard them as erroneous1 for the opposite is as little susceptible of demonstration4 ,the whole question belongs not in the forum of knowledge1 but in the forum of faith1 and that which we gain by the proof that nothing can be determined concerning it by theoretical reasoning 7viz41 assurance against materialistic objections7 is far more valuable than what we lose4 ,footnote #a3 ,the rational concept of the soul as a simple1 independent intelligence does not signify an actual being1 but only expresses certain principles of systematic unity in the explanation of psychical phenomena1 viz41 ,to regard all determinations as existing in one subject1 all powers1 as far as possible1 as derived from1 one fundamental power1 all change as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being1 and to represent all phenomena in space as totally distinct from acts of thought4 7#b7 ,the ,antinomies of ,rational ,cosmology4 ,if in its endeavor to spin metaphysical knowledge concerning the nature of the spirit and the existence of the soul after death out of the concept of the thinking ego the reason falls into the snare of an ambiguous terminus medius1 the difficulties which frustrate its attempts to use the ,idea of the world in the extension of its knowledge a priori are of quite a different character4 ,here the formal correctness of the method of inference is not open to attack4 ,it may be proved with absolute strictness 7and in the apagogical or indirect form1 from the impossibility of the contrary7 that the world has a beginning in time1 and also that it is limited in space2 that every compound substance consists of simple parts2 that1 besides the causality according to the laws of nature1 there is a causality through freedom1 and that an absolutely necessary ,being exists1 either as a part of the world or as the cause of it4 ,but the contrary may be proved with equal stringency 7and indirectly1 as before73 ,the world is infinite in space and time2 there is nothing simple in the world2 there is no freedom1 but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature2 and there exists no absolutely necessary ,being either within the world or without it4 ,this is the famous doctrine of the conflict of the four cosmological theses and antitheses or of the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason1 the discovery of which indubitably exercised a determining influence upon the whole course of the ,kantian ,critique of ,reason1 and which forms one of its poles4 ,the transcendental idealism1 the distinction between phenomena and noumena1 and the limitation of knowledge to phenomena1 all receive significant confirmation from the ,antithetic4 ,without the critical idealism 7that which is intuited in space and time1 and known through the categories1 is merely the phenomenon of things1 whose in itself is unknowable71 the antinomies would be insoluble4 ,how is reason to act in view of the conflict8 ,the grounds for the antitheses are just as conclusive as those for the theses2 on neither side is there a preponderance which could decide the result4 ,ought reason to agree with both parties or with neither8 ,the solution distinguishes the first two antinomies1 as the mathematical1 from the second two1 as the dynamical antinomies2 in the former1 since it is a question of the composition and division of quanta1 the conditions may be homogeneous with the conditioned1 in the latter1 heterogeneous4 ,in the former1 thesis and antithesis are alike false1 since both start from the inadmissible assumption that the universe 7the complete series of phenomena7 is given1 while in fact it is only required of us 7is an ,idea74 ,the world does not exist in itself1 but only in the empirical regress of phenomenal conditions1 in which we never can reach infinity and never the limitation of the world by an empty space or an antecedent empty time1 for infinite space1 like empty space 7and the same holds in regard to time71 is not perceivable4 ,consequently the quantity of the world is neither finite nor infinite4 ,the question of the quantity of the world is unanswerable1 because the concept of a sense-world existing by itself 7before the regress7 is self-contradictory4 ,similarly the problem whether the composite consists of simple elements is insoluble1 because the assumption that the phenomenon of body is a thing in itself1 which1 antecedent to all experience1 contains all the parts that can be reached in experience--in other words1 that representations exist outside of the representative faculty--is absurd4 ,matter is infinitely divisible1 no doubt1 yet it does not consist of infinitely numerous parts1 and just as little of a definite number of simple parts1 but the parts exist merely in the representation of them1 in the division 7decomposition71 and this goes as far as possible experience extends4 ,the case is different with the dynamical antinomies1 where thesis and antithesis can both be true1 in so far as the former is referred to things in themselves and the latter to phenomena4 ,the contradiction vanishes if we take that which the thesis asserts and the antithesis denies in different senses4 ,the fact that in the world of phenomena the causal nexus proceeds without interruption and without end1 so that there is no room in it either for an absolutely necessary ,being or for freedom1 does not conflict with this other1 that beyond the world of sense there may exist an omnipotent1 omniscient cause of the world1 and an intelligible freedom as the ground of our empirically necessary actions4 ,may exist1 since for the critical philosopher1 who has learned that every extension of knowledge beyond the limits of experience is impossible1 the question can concern only the conceivability of the world-ground and of freedom4 ,this possibility is amply sufficient to give a support for faith1 as1 on the other hand1 it is indispensable in order to satisfy at once the demands of the understanding and of reason1 especially to satisfy their practical interests4 ,for if it were not possible to resolve the apparent contradiction1 and to show its members capable of reconciliation1 it would be all over either with the possibility of experiential knowledge or with the basis of ethics and religion4 ,without unbroken causal connection1 no nature2 without freedom1 no morality2 and without a ,deity1 no religion4 ,of special interest is the solution of the third antinomy1 which is accomplished by means of the valuable 7though in the form in which it is given by ,kant1 untenable7 conception of the intelligible character4#a ,man is a citizen of two worlds4 ,as a being of the senses 7phenomenon7 he is subject in his volition and action to the control of natural necessity1 while as a being of reason 7thing in itself7 he is free4 ,for science his acts are the inevitable results of precedent phenomena1 which1 in turn1 are themselves empirically caused2 nevertheless moral judgment holds him responsible for his acts4 ,in the one case1 they are referred to his empirical character1 in the other1 to his intelligible character4 ,man cannot act otherwise than he does act1 if he be what he is1 but he need not be as he is2 the moral constitution of the intelligible character1 which reflects itself in the empirical character1 is his own work1 and its radical transformation 7moral regeneration7 his duty1 the fulfillment of which is demanded1 and1 hence1 of necessity possible4 ,footnote #a3 ,on the difficulties in the way of this theory and the possibility of their removal cf4 ,r4 ,falckenberg1 ,ueber den intelligiblen ,character1 zur ,kritik der ,kantischen ,freiheitslehre 7from the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxv471 ,halle1 #ahgi4 7#c7 ,speculative ,theology4 ,the principle of complete determination1 according to which of all the possible predicates of things1 as compared with their opposites1 one must belong to each thing1 relates the thing to be determined to the sum of all possible predicates or the ,idea of an ens realissimum1 which1 since it is the representation of a single being1 may be called the ,ideal of pure reason4 ,from this prototype things1 as its imperfect copies1 derive the material of their possibility2 all their manifold determinations are simply so many modes of limiting the concept of the highest reality1 which is their common substratum1 just as all figures are possible only as different ways of limiting infinite space4 ,or better3 the derivative beings are not related to the ideal of the original ,being as limitations to the sum of the highest reality 7on which view the ,supreme ,being would be conceived as an aggregate consisting of the derivative beings1 whereas these presuppose it1 and hence cannot constitute it71 but as consequences to a ground4 ,but reason does not remain content with this entirely legitimate thought of the dependence of finite things on the ideal of the ,being of all beings1 as a relation of concepts to the ,idea1 but1 dazzled by an irresistible illusion1 proceeds to realize1 to hypostatize1 and to personify this ideal1 and1 since she herself is dimly conscious of the illegitimacy of such a transformation of the mere ,idea into a given object1 devises arguments for the existence of ,god4 ,reason1 moreover1 would scarcely be induced to regard a mere creation of its thought as a real being1 if it were not compelled from another direction to seek a resting place somewhere in the regress of conditions1 and to think the empirical reality of the contingent world as founded upon the rock of something absolutely necessary4 ,there is no being1 however1 which appears more fit for the prerogative of absolute necessity than that one the concept of which contains the therefore to every wherefore1 and is in no respect defective2 in other words1 rational theology joins the rational ideal of the most perfect ,being with the fourth cosmological ,idea of the absolutely necessary ,being4 ,the proof of the existence of ,god may be attempted in three ways3 we may argue the existence of a supreme cause either by starting from a definite experience 7the special constitution and order of the sense-world1 that is1 its purposiveness71 or from an indefinite experience 7any existence whatever71 or1 finally1 abstracting from all experience1 from mere concepts a priori4 ,but neither the empirical nor the transcendent nor the intermediate line of thought leads to the goal4 ,the most impressive and popular of the proofs is the physico-theological argument4 ,but even if we gratuitously admit the analogy of natural products with the works of human art 7for the argument is not able to prove that the purposive arrangement of the things in the world1 which we observe with admiration1 is contingent1 and could only have been produced by an ordering1 rational principle1 not self-produced by their own nature according to general mechanical laws71 this can yield an inference only to an intelligent author of the purposive form of the world1 and not to an author of its matter1 only1 therefore1 to a world-architect1 not to a world-creator4 ,further1 since the cause must be proportionate to the effect1 this argument can prove only a very wise and wonderfully powerful1 but not an omniscient and omnipotent1 designer1 and so cannot give any definite concept of the supreme cause of the world4 ,in leaping from the contingency of the purposive order of the world to the existence of something absolutely necessary and thence to an all-comprehensive reality1 the teleological argument abandons the ground of experience and passes over into the cosmological argument1 which in its turn is merely a concealed ontological argument 7these two differ only in the fact that the cosmological proof argues from the antecedently given absolute necessity of a being to its unlimited reality1 and the ontological1 conversely1 from supreme reality to necessary existence74 ,the weaknesses of the cosmological argument in its first half consist in the fact that1 in the inference from the contingent to a cause for it1 it oversteps the boundary of the sense-world1 and1 in the inference from the impossibility of an infinite series of conditions to a first cause1 it employs the subjective principle of investigation--to assume hypothetically a necessary ultimate ground in behalf of the systematic unity of knowledge--as an objective principle applying to things in themselves4 ,the ontological argument1 finally1 which the two nominally empirical arguments hoped to avoid1 but in which in the end they were forced to take refuge1 goes to wreck on the impossibility of dragging out of an idea the existence of the object corresponding to it4 ,existence denotes nothing further than the position of the subject with all the marks which are thought in its concept--that is1 its relation to our knowledge1 but does not itself belong to the predicates of the concept1 and hence cannot be analytically derived from the latter4 ,the content of the concept is not enriched by the addition of being2 a hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred conceived dollars4 ,all existential propositions are synthetic2 hence the existence of ,god cannot be demonstrated from the concept of ,god4 ,it is a contradiction1 to be sure1 to say that ,god is not almighty1 just as it is a contradiction to deny that a triangle has three angles3 if posit the concept ,i must not remove the predicate which necessarily belongs to it4 ,if ,i remove the subject1 however1 together with its predicate 7the almighty ,god is not71 no contradiction arises1 for in that case nothing remains to be contradicted4 ,thus all the proofs for the existence of a necessary being are shown to be illusory1 and the basis of speculative theology uncertain4 ,nevertheless the idea of ,god retains its validity1 and the perception of the inability of reason to demonstrate its objective reality on theoretical grounds has great value4 ,for though the existence of ,god cannot be proved1 it is true1 by way of recompense1 that it cannot be disproved2 the same grounds which show us that the assertion of his existence is based on a weak foundation suffice also to prove every contrary assertion unfounded4 ,and should practical motives present themselves to turn the scale in favor of the assumption of a supreme and all-sufficient ,being1 reason would be obliged to take sides and to follow these grounds1 which1 it is true1 are not objectively sufficient1#a but still preponderant1 and than which we know none better4 ,after1 however1 the objective reality of the idea of ,god is guaranteed from the standpoint of ethics1 there remains for transcendental theology the important negative duty 7censorship1 ,censor7 of exactly determining the concept of the most perfect ,being 7as a being which through understanding and freedom contains the first ground of all other things71 of removing from it all impure elements1 and of putting an end to all opposite assertions1 whether atheistic1 deistic 7deism maintains the possibility of knowing the existence of an original being1 but declares all further determination of this being impossible71 or 7in the dogmatic sense7 anthropomorphic4 ,theism is entirely possible apart from a mistaken anthropomorphism1 in so far as through the predicates which we take from inner experience 7understanding and will7 we do not determine the concept of ,god as he is in himself1 but only analogically#b in his relation to the world4 ,that concept serves only to aid us in our contemplation of the world1#c not as a means of knowing the ,supreme ,being himself4 ,for speculative purposes it remains a mere ideal1 yet a perfectly faultless one1 which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge4 ,footnote #a3 ,they need favor to supply their lack of legitimate claims4 ,of themselves alone1 therefore1 they are unable to yield any theological knowledge1 but they are fitted to prepare the understanding for it1 and to give emphasis to other possible 7moral7 proofs4 ,footnote #b3 ,we halt at the boundary of the legitimate use of reason1 without overstepping it1 when we limit our judgment to the relation of the world to the ,supreme ,being1 and in this allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism only1 which in reality has reference to our language alone and not to the object4 ,footnote #c3 ,we are compelled to look on the world as if it were the work of a supreme intelligence and will4 ,we may confidently derive the phenomena of the world and their existence from other 7phenomena71 as if no necessary being existed1 and yet unceasingly strive after completeness in the derivation1 as though such a being were presupposed as a supreme ground4 ,in short1 physical 7mechanical7 explanation1 and a theistic point of view or teleological judgment4 ,thus the value of the ,ideas is twofold4 ,by showing the untenable ness of atheism1 fatalism1 and naturalism1 they ,i clear the way for the objects of faith4 ,by providing natural science with the standpoint of a systematical unity through teleological connection1 they make an extension of the use of the understanding possible within the realm of experience1#a though not beyond it4 ,the systematic development of the ,kantian teleology1 which is here indicated in general outlines only1 is found in the second part of the ,critique of ,judgment2 while the practical philosophy1 which furnishes the only possible proof1 the moral proof1 for the reality of the ,ideas1 erects on the site left free by the removal of the airy summer-houses of dogmatic metaphysics the solid mansion of critical metaphysics1 that is1 the metaphysics of duties and of hopes4 ,i was obliged to destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith4 ,the transition from the impossible theoretical or speculative knowledge of things in themselves to the possible practical knowledge of them 7the belief that there is a ,god and a future world7 is given in the ,doctrine of ,method1 which is divided into four parts 7the ,discipline1 the ,canon1 the ,architectonic1 and the ,history of ,pure ,reason71 in its second chapter4 ,there1 in the ideal of the ,summum ,bonum1 the proof is brought forward for the validity of the ,ideas ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 as postulates inseparable from moral obligation2 and by a cautious investigation of the three stages of assent 7opinion1 knowledge1 and belief7 both doctrinal and moral belief are assigned their places in the system of the kinds of knowledge4 ,footnote #a3 ,the principle to regard all order in the world 7e4g41 the shape of the earth1 mountains1 and seas1 the members of animal bodies7 as if it proceeded from the design of a supreme reason leads the investigator on to various discoveries4 ,we may now sum up the results of the three parts of ,kant's theoretical philosophy4 ,the pure intuitions1 the categories1 and the ,ideas are functions of the spirit1 and afford non-empirical 7erfahrungsfreie7 knowledge concerning the objects of possible experience 7and concerning the possibility of knowledge74 ,the first make universal and necessary knowledge possible in relation to the forms under which objects can be given to us2 the second make a similarly apodictic knowledge possible in relation to the forms under which phenomena must be thought2 the third make possible a judgment of phenomena differing from this knowledge1 yet not in conflict with it4 ,the categories and the ,ideas1 moreover1 yield problematical concepts of objects which are not given to us in intuition1 but which may exist outside of space and time3 things in themselves cannot be known1 it is true1 but they can be thought1 a fact of importance in case we should be assured of their existence in some other way than by sensuous intuition4 ,the determination of the limits of speculative reason is finished4 ,all knowing and all demonstration is limited to phenomena or possible experience4 ,but the boundary of that which can be experienced is not the boundary of that which is1 still less of that which ought to be2 the boundary of theoretical reason is not the boundary of practical reason4 ,we ought to act morally2 in order to be able to do this we must ascribe to ourselves the power to initiate a series of events2 and1 in general1 we are warranted in assuming everything the non-assumption of which makes moral action impossible4 ,if we were merely theoretical1 merely experiential beings1 we should lack all occasion to suppose a second1 intelligible world behind and above the world of phenomena2 but we are volitional and active beings under laws of reason1 and though we are unable to know things in themselves1 yet we may and must postulate them--our freedom1 ,god1 and immortality4 ,for not only that which is a condition of experience is true and necessary1 but that1 also1 which is a condition of morality4 ,the discovery of the laws and conditions of morality is the mission of practical philosophy4 #b4 ,theory of ,ethics4 ,the investigation now turns from the laws of nature1 which express a must1 to the laws of will1 in which an ought is expressed1 and by which certain actions are not compelled1 but prescribed4 7,if we were merely rational1 and not at the same time sensuous beings1 the moral law would determine the will in the form of a natural law2 since1 however1 the constant possibility of deviation is given in the sensibility1 or1 rather1 the moral standpoint can only be attained by conquering the sensuous impulses1 therefore the moral law speaks to us in the form of an ought1 of an imperative47 ,among the laws of the will or imperatives1 also1 there are some which possess the character of absolute necessity and universality1 and which1 consequently1 are a priori4 ,as the understanding dictates laws to the phenomenal world1 so practical reason gives a law to itself1 is autonomous2 and as the a priori laws of nature relate only to the form of the objects of experience1 so the moral law determines not the content1 but only the form of volition3 ,act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law4 ,the law of practical reason is a categorical imperative4 ,what does this designation mean1 and what is the basis of the formula of the moral law which has just been given8 ,practical principles are either subjectively valid1 in which case they are termed maxims 7volitional principles of the individual71 or objectively valid1 when they are called imperatives or precepts4 ,the latter are either valid under certain conditions 7,if you wish to become a clergyman you must study theology2 he who would prosper as a merchant must not cheat his customers71 or unconditionally valid 7,thou shalt not lie74 ,all prudential or technical rules are hypothetical imperatives1 the moral law is a categorical imperative4 ,the injunction to be truthful is not connected with the condition that we intend to act morally1 but this general purpose1 together with all the special purposes belonging to it1 to avoid lying1 etc41 is demanded unconditionally and of everyone--as surely as we are rational beings we are under moral obligation1 not in order to reputation here below and happiness above1 but without all ifs and in order to's4 ,thou shalt unconditionally1 whatever be the outcome4 ,and as the moral law is independent of every end to be attained1 so it suffers neither increase nor diminution in its binding force1 whether men obey it or not4 ,it has absolute authority1 no matter whether it is fulfilled frequently or seldom1 nay1 whether it is fulfilled anywhere or at any time whatsoever in the world6 ,there is an important difference between the good which we are under obligation to do and the evil which we are under obligation not to do1 and the goods and ills which we seek and avoid4 ,the goods are always relatively good only1 good for something--as means to ends--and a bad use can be made of all that nature and fortune give us as well as a good one4 ,that which duty commands is an end in itself1 in itself good1 absolutely worthful1 and no misuse of it is possible4 ,it might be supposed that pleasure1 that happiness is an ultimate end4 ,but men have very different opinions in regard to what is pleasant1 one holding one thing pleasurable and another another4 ,it is impossible to discover by empirical methods what duty demands of all men alike and under all circumstances2 the appeal is to our reason1 not to our sensibility4 ,if happiness were the end of rational beings1 then nature had endowed us but poorly for it1 since instead of an unfailing instinct she has given us the weak and deceitful reason as a guide1 which1 with its train1 culture1 science1 art1 and luxury1 has brought more trouble than satisfaction to mankind4 ,man has a destiny other than well-being1 and a higher one--the formation of good dispositions3 here we have the only thing in the whole world that can never be used for evil1 the only thing that does not borrow its value from a higher end1 but itself originally and inalienably contains it1 and that gives value to all else that merits esteem4 ,nothing can possibly be conceived in the world1 or even out of it1 which can be called good without qualification1 except a good will4 ,understanding1 courage1 moderation1 and whatever other mental gifts or praiseworthy qualities of temperament may be cited1 as also the gifts of fortune1 are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects1 but they may also become extremely evil and mischievous1 if the will which is to make use of them is not good4 ,these are the classic words with which ,kant commences the ,foundation of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics4 ,when does the will deserve the predicate good8 ,let us listen to the popular moral consciousness1 which distinguishes three grades of moral recognition4 ,he who refrains from that which is contrary to duty1 no matter from what motives--as1 for example1 the shopkeeper who does not cheat because he knows that honesty is the best policy--receives moderate praise for irreproachable outward behavior4 ,we bestow warmer praise and encouragement on him whom ambition impels to industry1 kind feeling to beneficence1 and pity to render assistance4 ,but he alone earns our esteem who does his duty for duty's sake4 ,only in this third case1 where not merely the external action1 nor merely the impulse of a happy disposition1 but the will itself1 the maxim1 is in harmony with the moral law1 where the good is done for the sake of the good1 do we find true morality1 that unconditioned1 self-grounded worth4 ,the man who does that which is in accordance with duty out of reflection on its advantages1 and he who does it from immediate--always unreliable--inclination1 acts legally2 he alone acts morally who1 without listening to advantage and inclination1 takes up the law into his disposition1 and does his duty because it is duty4 ,the sole moral motive is the consciousness of duty1 respect for the moral lazy#a ,footnote #a3 ,the respect or reverence which the law1 and1 derivatively1 the person in whom it is realized1 compel from us1 is1 as self-produced through a concept of reason and as the only feeling which can be known a priori1 specifically different from all feelings of inclination or fear awakened by sensuous influences4 ,as it strengthens and raises our rational nature1 the consciousness of our freedom and of our high destination1 but1 at the same time1 humbles our sensibility1 there is mingled with the joy of exaltation a certain pain1 which permits no intimate affection for the stern and sublime law4 ,it is not quite willingly that we pay our respect--just because of the depressing effect which this feeling exerts on our self-love4 ,here ,kant is threatened by a danger which he does not succeed in escaping4 ,the moral law demands perfect purity in our maxims2 only the idea of duty1 not an inclination1 is to determine the will4 ,quite right4 ,further1 the one judging is himself never absolutely certain1 even when his own volition is concerned1 that no motives of pleasure have mingled with the feeling of duty in contributing to the right action1 unless that which was morally demanded has been contrary to all his inclinations4 ,when a person who is not in need and who is free from cupidity leaves the money-box intrusted to his care untouched1 or when a man who loves life overcomes thoughts of suicide1 ,i may assume that the former was sufficiently protected against the temptation by his moderation1 and the other by his cheerful disposition1 and ,i rate their behavior as merely legal4 ,when1 on the other hand1 an official inclined to extravagance faithfully manages the funds intrusted to him1 or one who is oppressed by hopeless misery preserves his life1 although he does not love it1 then ,i may ascribe the abstinence from wrongdoing to moral principles4 ,this1 too1 may be admitted4 ,we are certain of the morality of a resolution only when it can be shown that no inclination was involved along with the maxim4 ,the cases where the right action is performed in opposition to inclination are the only ones in which we may be certain that the moral quality of the action is unmixed--are they1 then1 the only ones in which a moral disposition is present8 ,kant rightly maintains that the admixture of egoistic motives beclouds the purity of the disposition1 and consequently diminishes its moral worth4 ,with equal correctness he draws attention to the possibility that1 even when we believe that we are acting from pure principles1 a hidden sensuous impulse may be involved4 ,but he leaves unconsidered the possibility that1 even when the inclinations are favorable to right action1 the action may be performed1 not from inclination1 but because of the consciousness of duty4 ,given that a man is naturally industrious1 does this happy predisposition protect him from fits of idleness8 ,and if he resists them1 must it always be his inclination to activity and never moral principle which overcomes the temptation8 ,in yielding to the danger of confounding the limits of our certain knowledge of the purity of motives with the limits of moral action1 and in admitting true morality only where action proceeds from principle in opposition to the inclinations1 ,kant really deserves the reproach of rigorism or exaggerated purism--sometimes groundlessly extended to the justifiable strictness of his views--and the ridicule of the well-known lines of ,schiller 7,scruples of ,conscience and ,decision at the conclusion of his distich-group ,the ,philosophers73 ,the friends whom ,i love ,i gladly would serve1 but to this inclination incites me2 ,and so ,i am forced from virtue to swerve since my act1 through affection1 delights me4 ,the friends whom thou lovest thou must first seek to scorn1 for to no other way can ,i guide thee2 ',tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform the acts to which duty would lead thee4 ,if we return from this necessary limitation of a groundless inference 7that true morality is present only when duty is performed against our inclinations1 when it is difficult for us1 when a conflict with sensuous motives has preceded71 to the development of the fundamental ethical conceptions1 we find that important conclusions concerning the origin and content of the moral law result from the principle obtained by the analysis of moral judgment3 this law commands with unconditional authority--for every rational being and under all circumstances--what has unconditioned worth--the disposition which corresponds to it4 ,the universality and necessity 7unconditionalness7 of the categorical imperative proves that it springs from no other source than reason itself4 ,those who derive the moral law from the will of ,god subject it to a condition1 viz41 the immutability of the divine will4 ,those who find the source of moral legislation in the pursuit of happiness make rational will dependent on a natural law of the sensibility2 it would be folly to enjoin by a moral law that which everyone does of himself1 and does superabundantly4 ,moreover1 the theories of the social inclinations and of moral sense fail of their purpose1 since they base morality on the uncertain ground of feeling4 ,even the principle of perfection proves insufficient1 inasmuch as it limits the individual to himself1 and1 in the end1 like those which have preceded1 amounts to a refined self-love4 ,theonomic ethics1 egoistic ethics1 the ethics of sympathy1 and the ethics of perfection are all eudemonistic1 and hence heteronomic4 ,the practical reason#a receives the law neither from the will of ,god nor from natural impulse1 but draws it out of its own depths2 it binds itself4 ,footnote #a3 ,will and practical reason are identical4 ,the definition runs3 ,will is the faculty of acting in accordance with the representation of laws4 ,the grounds which establish the derivation of the moral law from the will or reason itself exclude at the same time every material determination of it4 ,if the categorical imperative posited definite ends for the will1 if it prescribed a direction to definite objects1 it could neither be known a priori nor be valid for all rational beings3 its apodictic character forbids the admission of empirical elements of every sort4#a ,if we think away all content from the law we retain the form of universal legality1#b and gain the formula3 ,act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation4 ,the possibility of conceiving the principle of volition as a universal law of nature is the criterion of morality4 ,if you are in doubt concerning the moral character of an action or motive simply ask yourself the question1 ,what would become of humanity if everyone were to act according to the same principle8 ,if no one could trust the word of another1 or count on aid from others1 or be sure of his property and his life1 then no social life would be possible4 ,even a band of robbers cannot exist unless certain laws are respected as inviolable duties4 ,footnote #a3 ,the moral law1 therefore1 is independent of all experience in three respects1 as to its origin1 its content1 and its validity4 ,it springs from reason1 it contains a formal precept only1 and its validity is not concerned1 whether it meets with obedience or not4 ,it declares what ought to be done1 even though this never should be done4 ,footnote #b3 ,the formal principle of the ,kantian ethics has met very varied criticism4 ,among others ,edmund ,pfleiderer 7,kantischer ,kritizismus und ,englische ,philosophie1 #ahha7 and ,zeller express themselves unfavorably1 ,fortlage and ,liebmann 7,zur ,analysis der ,wirklichkeit1 #b;d ed41 #ahhj1 p4 #fga7 favorably4 ,it was indispensable to free the supreme formula of the moral law from all material determinations1 i4e41 limitations4 ,this does not prevent us1 however1 from afterward giving the abstract outline a more concrete coloring4 ,first of all1 the concept of the dignity of persons in contrast to the utility of things offers itself as an aid to explanation and specialization4 ,things are means whose worth is always relative1 consisting in the useful or pleasant effects which they exercise1 in the satisfaction of a need or of the taste1 they can be replaced by other means1 which fulfill the same purpose1 and they have a 7market or fancy7 value2 while that which is above all value and admits of no equivalent has an ultimate worth or dignity1 and is an object of respect4 ,the legislation which determines all worth1 and with this the disposition which corresponds to it1 has a dignity1 an unconditioned1 incomparable worth1 and lends its subjects1 rational beings framed for morality1 the advantage of being ends in themselves4 ,therefore morality1 and humanity so far as it is capable of morality1 is that which alone possesses dignity4 ,accordingly the following formulation of the moral law may be held equivalent to the first3 ,so act as to treat humanity1 whether in thine own person or in that of any other1 in every case as an end1 never as a means only4 ,a further addition to the abstract formula of the categorical imperative results from the discussion of the question1 ,what universal ends admit of subsumption under it1 i4e41 stand the test of fitness to be principles of a universal legislation8 ,here again ,kant stands forth as an arbiter between the contending parties1 and1 with a firm grasp1 combines the useful elements from both sides after winnowing them out from the worthless principles4 ,the majority of the eudemonistic systems1 along with the promotion of private welfare1 prescribe the furtherance of universal good without being able to indicate at what point the pursuit of personal welfare should give way to regard for the good of others1 while in the perfectionist systems the social element is wanting or retreats unduly into the background4 ,the principle of happiness represents moral empiricism1 the principle of perfection moral rationalism4 ,kant resolves the antithesis by restricting the theses of the respective parties within their proper limits3 ,make thine own perfection and the happiness of others the end of thy actions2 these are the only ends which are at the same time duties4 ,the perfection of others is excluded by the fact that ,i cannot impart to anyone a good disposition1 for everyone must acquire it for himself2 personal happiness by the fact that everyone seeks it naturally4 ,this antithesis 7which is crossed by the further distinction between perfect1 i4e41 indispensable1 and imperfect duties7 serves as a basis for the division of moral duties into duties toward ourselves and duties toward other men4#a ,the former enjoin the preservation and development of our natural and moral powers1 the latter are duties of obligation 7of respect7 or of merit 7of love74 ,since no one can obligate me to feel1 we are to understand by love not the pathological love of complacency1 but only the active love of benevolence or practical sympathy4 ,since it is just as impossible that the increase of the evils in the world should be a duty1 the enervating and useless excitation of pity1 which adds to the pain of the sufferer the sympathetic pain of the spectator1 is to be struck off the list of virtues1 and active readiness to aid put in its place4 ,in friendship love and respect unite in exact equipoise4 ,veracity is one of the duties toward self2 lying is an abandonment of human dignity and under no conditions allowable1 not even if life depends on it4 ,footnote #a3 ,all duties are toward men1 not toward supra-human or infra-human beings4 ,that which we commonly term duties toward animals1 likewise the so-called duties toward ,god1 are in reality duties toward ourselves4 ,cruelty to animals is immoral1 because our sympathies are blunted by it4 ,to have religion is a duty to ourselves1 because the view of moral laws as laws of ,god is an aid to morality4 ,after it has been settled what the categorical imperative enjoins1 the further problem awaits us of explaining how it is possible4 ,the categorical imperative is possible only on ,i the presupposition of our freedom4 ,only a free being gives laws to itself1 just as an autonomous being alone is free4 ,in theoretical philosophy the pure self-consciousness1 the ,i think1 denoted a point where the thing in itself manifests to us not its nature1 indeed1 but its existence4 ,the same holds true in practical philosophy of the moral law4 ,the incontestable fact of the moral law empowers me to rank myself in a higher order of things than the merely phenomenal order1 and in another causal relation than that of the merely necessary 7mechanical7 causation of nature1 to regard myself as a legislative member of an intelligible world1 and one independent of sensuous impulses--in short1 to regard myself as free4 ,freedom is the ratio essendi of the self-given moral law1 the latter the ratio cognoscendi of freedom4 ,the law would have no meaning if we did not possess the power to obey it3 ,i can because ,i ought4 ,it is true that freedom is a mere ,idea1 whose object can never be given to me in an experience1 and whose reality1 consequently1 cannot be objectively known and proved1 but nevertheless1 is required with satisfactory subjective necessity as the condition of the moral law and of the possibility of its fulfillment4 ,i may not say it is certain1 but1 with safety1 ,i am certain that ,i am free4 ,freedom is not a dogmatic proposition of theoretical reason1 but a postulate of practical reason2 and the latter holds the primacy over the former to this extent1 that it can require the former to show that certain transcendent ,ideas of the suprasensible1 which are most intimately connected with moral obligation1 are compatible with the principles of the understanding4 ,it was just in view of the practical interests involved in the rational concepts ,god1 freedom1 immortality1 that it was so important to establish1 at least1 their possibility 7their conceivability without contradiction74 ,that1 therefore1 which the ,dialectic recognized as possible is in the ,ethics shown to be real3 ,whoever seeks to fulfill his moral destiny--and this is the duty of every man--must not doubt concerning the conditions of its possible fulfillment1 must1 in spite of their incomprehensibility1 believe in freedom and a suprasensible world4 ,they are both postulates of practical reason1 i4e41 assumptions concerning that which is in behalf of that which ought to be4 ,naturally the interests of the understanding must not be infringed upon by those of the will4 ,the principle of the complete causal determination of events retains its validity unimpeached for the sphere of the knowledge of the understanding1 that is1 for the realm of phenomena2 while1 on the other hand1 it remains permissible for us to postulate another kind of causality for the realm of things in themselves1 although we can have no idea of its how1 and to ascribe to ourselves a free intelligible character4 ,while the ,idea of freedom can be derived directly from the moral law as a postulate thereof1 the proof of the reality of the two other ,ideas is effected indirectly by means of the concept of the highest good1 in which reason conceives a union of perfect virtue and perfect happiness4 ,the moral law requires absolute correspondence between the disposition and the commands of reason1 or holiness of will4 ,but besides this supreme good 7bonum supremum7 of completed morality1 the highest good 7bonum consummatum7 further contains a degree of happiness corresponding to the degree of virtue4 ,everyone agrees in the judgment that1 by rights1 things should go well with the virtuous and ill with the wicked1 though this must not imply any deduction from the principle previously announced that the least impulse of self-interest causes the maxim to forfeit its worth3 the motive of the will must never be happiness1 but always the being worthy of happiness4 ,the first element in the highest good yields the argument for immortality1 and the second the argument for the existence of ,god4 7#a7 ,perfect correspondence between the will and the law never occurs in this life1 because the sensibility never allows us to attain a permanently good disposition1 armed against every temptation2 our will can never be holy1 but at best virtuous1 and our lawful disposition never escape the consciousness of a constant tendency to transgression1 or at least of impurity4 ,since1 nevertheless1 the demands of the 7,christian7 moral law continue in their unrelenting stringency to be the standard1 we are justified in the hope of an unlimited continuation of our existence1 in order that by constant progress in goodness we may draw nearer in infinitum to the ideal of holiness4 7#b7 ,the establishment of a rational proportion between happiness and virtue is also not to be expected until the future life1 for too often on earth it is the evil man who prospers1 while the good man suffers4 ,a justly proportioned distribution of rewards and punishment can only be expected from an infinite power1 wisdom1 and goodness1 which rules the moral world even as it has created the natural world4 ,deity alone is able to bring the physical and moral realms into harmony1 and to establish the due relation between well-being and right action4 ,this1 the moral argument1 is the only possible proof for the existence of ,god4 ,theology is not possible as speculative1 but only as moral theology4 ,the certitude of faith1 moreover1 is only different from1 not less than1 the certainty of knowledge1 in so far as it brings with it not an objective1 but a subjective1 although universally valid1 necessity4 ,hence it is better to speak of belief in ,god as a need of the reason than as a duty2 while a logical error1 not a moral one1 should be charged against the atheist4 ,the atheist is blind to the intimate connection which exists between the highest good and the ,ideas of the reason2 he does not see that ,god1 freedom1 and immortality are the indispensable conditions of the realization of this ideal4 ,thus faith is based upon duty without being itself duty3 ethics is the basis of religion1 which consists in our regarding moral laws as 7instar1 as if they were7 divine commands4 ,they are not valid or obligatory because ,god has given them 7this would be heteronomy71 but they should be regarded as divine because they are necessary laws of reason4 ,religion differs from ethics only in its form1 not in its content1 in that it adds to the conception of duty the idea of ,god as a moral lawgiver1 and thus increases the influence of this conception on the will2 it is simply a means for the promotion of morality4 ,since1 however1 besides natural religion or the pure faith of reason 7the moral law and the moral postulates71 the historical religions contain statutory determinations or a doctrinal faith1 it becomes the duty of the critical philosopher to inquire how much of this positive admixture can be justified at the bar of reason4 ,in this investigation the question of the divine revelation of dogma and ceremonial laws is neither supra-rationalistically affirmed nor naturalistically derived1 but rationalistically treated as an open question4 ,the four essays combined under the title ,religion within the ,limits of ,reason ,only treat of the ,radical ,evil in ,human ,nature1 the ,conflict of the ,good ,principle with the ,evil for the ,mastery over ,man1 the ,victory of the ,good ,principle over the ,evil and the ,founding of a ,kingdom of ,god upon ,earth1 and1 finally1 ,service and ,false ,service under the ,dominion of the ,good ,principle1 or ,religion and ,priestcraft2 or more briefly1 the fall1 the atonement 7the ,christ-idea71 the ,church1 and true and false service of ,god4 7#a7 ,the individual evil deeds of the empirical character point to an original fault of the intelligible character1 a propensity to evil dwelling in man and not further deducible4 ,this1 although it is self-incurred1 may be called natural and innate1 and consists 7not in the sensibility merely1 but7 in a freely chosen reversal of the moral order of our maxims1 in virtue of which the maxim of duty or morality is subordinated to that of well-being or self-love instead of being placed above it1 and that which should be the supreme condition of all satisfaction is degraded into a mere means thereto4 ,morality is therefore a conversion from the evil to the good1 and requires a complete revolution in the disposition1 the putting on of a new man1 a new birth1 which1 an act out of time1 can manifest itself in the temporal world of phenomena only as a gradual transformation in conduct1 as a continuous advance1 but which1 we may hope1 is judged by him who knows the heart1 who regards the disposition instead of particular imperfect actions1 as a completed unity4 7#b7 ,by the eternal ,son of ,god1 for whose sake ,god created all things1 we are to understand the ideal of the perfect man1 which in truth forms the end of creation1 and is come down from heaven1 etc4 ,to believe in ,christ means to resolve to realize in one's self the ideal of human nature which is well pleasing to ,god1 or to make the divine disposition of the ,son of ,god our own1 not to believe that this ideal has appeared on earth as an actual man1 in the person of ,jesus of ,nazareth4 ,the only saving faith is the belief of reason in the ideal which ,christ represents1 and not the historical belief in his person4 ,the vicarious atonement of the ideal man for those who believe on him is to be interpreted to mean that the sufferings and sacrifices 7crucifixion of the flesh7 imposed by moral conversion1 which are due to the sinful man as punishment1 are assumed by the regenerate man3 the new ,adam bears the sufferings of the old4 ,in the same way as that in which ,kant handles the history of ,christ and the doctrine of justification1 all biblical narratives and ecclesiastical doctrines are in public instruction 7from the pulpit7 to be interpreted morally1 even where the authors themselves had no such meaning in mind4 7#c7 ,the ,church is a society based upon the laws of virtue1 an ethical community or a people of ,god1 whose members confirm each other in the performance of duty by example and by the profession of a common moral conviction2 we are all brothers1 the children of one father4 ,ideally there is only one 7the universal1 invisible7 ,church1 and its foundation the pure faith of reason2 but in consequence of a weakness peculiar to human nature the foundation of an actual church required the addition of a statutory historical faith1 with claims to a divine origin1 from which a multitude of visible churches and the antithesis of orthodox and heretics have sprung4 ,the history of the ,church since the establishment of ,christianity represents the conflict between the historical faith and the faith of reason2 its goal is the submission of the former to the latter1 as1 indeed1 we have already begun to perceive that ,god does not require a special service beyond the practice of virtue4 7#d7 ,the true service of ,god consists in a moral disposition and its manifestation3 ,all that man supposes himself able to do in order to please ,god1 beyond living a good life1 is false service ,false service is the false subordination of the pure faith of reason to the statutory faith1 by which the attainment of the goal of religious development is hindered and the laity are brought into dangerous dependence upon the clergy4 ,priestcraft1 hypocrisy1 and fanaticism enter in the train of fetich service4 ,the church-faith is destined little by little to make itself superfluous4 ,it has been necessary as a vehicle1 as a means for the introduction and extension of the pure religion of morality1 and it still remains useful for a time1 until humanity shall become of age2 with man's entrance on the period of youth and manhood1 however1 the leading-string of holy traditions1 which in its time did good service1 becomes unnecessary1 nay1 finally1 a fetter4 7,this relative appreciation of the positive element in religion1 in antithesis to the unthinking rejection of it by the ,illumination1 resembles the view of ,lessing2 cf4 pp4 #cjf-cji47 ,moreover1 since it is a duty to be a co-worker in the transition from the historical to the pure religious faith1 the clergy must be free as scientific theologians1 as scholars and authors to examine the doctrines of faith and to give expression to dissenting opinions1 while1 as preachers in the pulpit1 speaking under commission1 they are bound to the creeds4 ,to decide the articles of belief unalterable would be a crime against human nature1 whose primal destination is just this--to progress4 ,to renounce illumination means to trample upon the divine rights of reason4 ,the ,general ,observations appended to each division add to the four principle discussions as many collateral inquiries concerning ,operations of ,grace1 ,miracles1 ,mysteries1 and ,means of ,grace1 objects of transcendent ideas1 which do not properly belong in the sphere of religion within pure reason itself1 but which yet border on it4 7#a7 ,we are entirely incapable of calling forth works of grace1 nay1 even of indicating the marks by which actual divine illuminations are distinguished from imaginary ones2 the supposed experience of heavenly influences belongs in the region of superstitious religious illusion4 ,but their impossibility is just as little susceptible of proof as their reality4 ,nothing further can be said on the question1 save that works of grace may exist1 and perhaps must exist in order to supplement our imperfect efforts after virtue2 and that everyone1 instead of waiting for divine assistance1 should do for his own amendment all that is in his power4 7#b7 ,kant judges more sharply in regard to the belief in miracles1 which contradict the laws of experience without in the least furthering the performance of our duties4 ,in practical life no one regards miracles as possible2 and their limitation to the past and to rare instances does not make them more credible4 7#c7 ,in so far as the ,christian mysteries actually represent impenetrable secrets they have no bearing on moral conduct2 so far as they are morally valuable they admit of rational interpretation and thus cease to be mysteries4 ,the ,trinity signifies the three moral qualities or powers united in the head of the moral state3 the one ,god as holy lawgiver1 gracious governor1 and just judge4 7#d7 ,the services of the ,church have worth as ethical ceremonies1 as emblems of the moral disposition 7prayer7 and of moral fellowship 7church attendance1 baptism1 and the ,lord's ,supper72 but to find in these symbolic ceremonies means of grace and to seek to purchase the favor of ,god by them1 is an error of the same kind as sorcery and fetichism4 ,the right way leads from virtue to grace1 not in the opposite direction2 piety without morality is worthless4 ,the ,kantian theory of religion is rationalistic and moralistic4 ,the fact that religion is based on morality should never be assailed4 ,but the foundation is not the building1 the origin not the content and essence of the thing itself4 ,as far as the nature of religion is concerned1 the ,kantian view does not exclude completion in the direction of ,schleiermacher's theory of feeling1 just as by its speculative interpretation of the ,christian dogmas and its appreciation of the history of religion as a gradual transformation of historical faith into a faith of reason1 it points out the path afterward followed by ,hegel4 ,the philosophy of religion of the future must be1 as some recent attempts aim to be 7,o4 ,pfleiderer1 ,biedermann1 ,lipsius71 a synthesis of ,kant1 ,schleiermacher1 and ,hegel4 ,while the moral law requires rightness not only of the action1 but also of the disposition1 the law of right is satisfied when the act enjoined is performed1 no matter from what motives4 ,legal right1 as the sum of the conditions under which the will of the one can consist with the will of others according to a universal law1 relates only to enforceable actions1 without concerning itself about motives4 ,private right includes right in things or property1 personal right or right of contract1 and real-personal right 7marriage right72 public right is divided into the right of states1 of nations1 and of citizens of the world4 ,kant's theory of punishment is original and important4 ,he bases it not upon prudential regard for the protection of society1 or the deterrence or reformation of the criminal1 but upon the exalted idea of retaliation 7jus talionis71 which demands that everyone should meet with what his deeds deserve3 ,eye for eye1 life for life4 ,in politics ,kant favors democratic theories1 though less decidedly than ,rousseau and ,fichte4 ,as he followed with interest the efforts after freedom manifested in the ,american and ,french ,revolutions1 so he opposed an hereditary nobility as a hindrance to the natural equality of rights1 and demanded freedom for the public expression of opinion as the surest means of guarding against revolutions4 ,the only legitimate form of the state is the republican1 i4e41 that in which the executive power is separated from the legislative power1 in contrast to despotism1 where they are united in one hand4 ,the best guaranty for just government and civil liberty is offered by constitutional monarchy1 in which the people through its representatives exercises the legislative power1 the sovereign the executive power1 and judges chosen by the people the judicial power4 ,the contract from which we may conceive the state to have arisen is not to be regarded as an historical fact1 but as a rational idea or rule1 by which we may judge whether the laws are just or not3 that which the people as a whole cannot prescribe for itself1 this cannot be prescribed for it by the ruler 7cf4 p4 #bce74 ,that there is a constant progress--not only of individuals1 but--of the race1 not merely in technical and intellectual1 but also in moral respects1 is supported both by rational grounds 7without faith in such progress we could not fulfill our duty as co-laborers in it7 and by experiential grounds 7above all1 the unselfish sympathy which all the world gave to the ,french ,revolution72 and the never-ending complaint that the times are growing worse proves only that mankind is continually setting up stricter standards for itself4 ,the beginning of history is to be placed at the point where man passes out of the condition of innocence1 in which instinct rules1 and begins to subdue nature1 which hitherto he has obeyed4 ,the goal of history1 again1 is the establishment of the perfect form of the state4 ,nature itself co-operates with freedom in the gradual transformation of the state based on necessity 7,notstaat7 into a rational state1 inasmuch as selfish competition and the commercial spirit require peace1 order1 and justice for their own security and help to bring them about4 ,and so1 further1 we need not doubt that humanity will constantly draw nearer to the ideal condition of everlasting peace among the nations 7guaranteed by a league of states which shall as a mediator settle disputes between individual states71 however impracticable the idea may at present appear4 ,if the bold declaration of ,fortlage1 that in ,kant the system of absolute truth appeared1 is true of any one part of his philosophy1 it is true of the practical part1 in which ,christian morality has found its scientific expression4 ,if we may justly complain that on the basis of his sharp distinction between legality and morality1 between legal duty and virtue-duty1 ,kant took into account only the legal side of the institutions of marriage and of the state1 overlooking the fact that besides these they have a moral importance and purpose1 if we may demand a social ethic as a supplement to his ethics1 which is directed to the duties of the individual alone1 yet these and other well-founded desiderata may be attained by slight corrections and by the addition of another story to the ,kantian edifice1 while the foundations are still retained4 ,the bases are immovable4 ,autonomy1 absolute oughtness1 the formal character of the law of reason1 and the incomparable worth of the pure1 disinterested disposition--these are the corner stones of the ,kantian1 nay1 of all morals4 #c4 ,theory of the ,beautiful and of ,ends in ,nature4 ,we now know the laws which the understanding imposes upon nature and those which reason imposes upon the will4 ,if there is a field in which to be 7,sein7 and ought to be 7,sollen71 nature and freedom1 which we have thus far been forced to consider antithetical1 are reconciled--and that there is such a field is already deducible from the doctrine of the religious postulates 7as practical truths or assumptions concerning what is1 in behalf of what ought to be71 and from the hints concerning a progress in history 7in which both powers co-operate toward a common goal7--then the source of its laws is evidently to be sought in that faculty which mediates alike between understanding and reason and between knowing and feeling3 in ,judgment1 as the higher faculty of feeling4 ,judgment1 in the general sense1 is the faculty of thinking a particular as contained in a universal1 and exercises a twofold function3 as determinant judgment it subsumes the particular under a given universal 7a law71 as reflective it seeks the universal for a given particular4 ,since the former coincides with the understanding1 we are here concerned only with the reflective judgment1 judgment in the narrower sense1 which does not cognize objects1 but judges them1 and this according to the principle of purposiveness4#a ,footnote #a3 ,the universal laws springing from the understanding1 to which every nature must conform to become an object of experience for us1 determine nothing concerning the particular form of the given reality2 we cannot deduce the special laws of nature from them4 ,nevertheless the nature of our cognitive faculty does not allow us to accept the empirical manifoldness of our world as contingent1 but impels us to regard it as purposive or adapted to our knowledge1 and to look upon these special laws as if an intelligence had given them in order to make a system of experience possible4 ,this1 in turn1 is of two kinds4 ,an object is really or objectively purposive 7perfect7 when it corresponds to its nature or its determination1 formally or subjectively purposive 7beautiful7 when it is conformed to the nature of our cognitive faculty4 ,the perception of purpose is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure2 in the first case1 where the pleasure is based on a concept of the object1 it is a logical satisfaction1 in the second1 where it springs only from the harmony of the object with our cognitive powers1 aesthetic satisfaction4 ,the objects of the teleological and the aesthetic judgment1 the purposive and the beautiful products of nature and art1 constitute the desired intermediate field between nature and freedom2 and here again the critical question comes up1 ,how1 in relation to these1 synthetic judgments a priori are possible8 7a7 ,esthetic ,judgment4--,the formula holds of ,kant's aesthetics as well as of his theoretical and practical philosophy1 that his aim is to overcome the opposition between the empirical and the rationalistic theories1 and to find a middle course of his own between the two extremes4 ,neither ,burke nor ,baumgarten satisfied him4 ,the ,english aesthetics was sensational1 the ,german1 i4e41 that of the ,wolffian school1 rationalistic4 ,the former identified the beautiful with the agreeable1 the latter identified it with the perfect or with the conformity of the object to its concept2 in the one case1 aesthetic appreciation is treated as sensuous pleasure1 in the other1 it is treated as a lower1 confused kind of knowledge1 its peculiar nature being in both cases overlooked4 ,in opposition to the sensualization of aesthetic appreciation1 its character as judgment must be maintained2 and in opposition to its rationalization1 its character as feeling4 ,this relation of the ,kantian aesthetics to that of his predecessors explains both its fundamental tendency and the elements in it which appear defective and erroneous4 ,in any case1 ,kant shows himself in this field also an unapproachable master of careful analysis4 ,the first task of aesthetics is the careful distinction of its object from related phenomena4 ,the beautiful has points of contact with the agreeable1 the good1 the perfect1 the useful1 and the true4 ,it is distinguished from the true by the fact that it is not an object of knowledge1 but of satisfaction4 ,if we inquire further into the difference between the satisfaction in the beautiful and the satisfaction in the agreeable1 in the good 7in itself71 and in the 7good for something1 as a means1 or in the7 useful1 which latter three have this in common1 that they are objects of appetition--of sensuous want1 of moral will1 of prudential desire--it becomes evident that the beautiful pleases through its mere representation 7that is1 independently of the real existence of the object71 and that the delight in the beautiful is a contemplative pleasure4 ,it is for contemplation only1 not to be sensuously enjoyed nor put to practical use2 and1 further1 its production is not a universal duty4 ,sensuous1 prudential1 or moral appetition has always an interest in the actual existence of the object2 the beautiful1 on the other hand1 calls forth a disinterested satisfaction4 ,according to quality the beautiful is the object of a disinterested1 free 7bound by no interest71 and sportive satisfaction4 ,according to quantity and modality the judgment of taste claims universal and necessary validity1 without this being based upon concepts4 ,this posits further differences between the beautiful and the agreeable and the good4 ,the good also pleases universally1 but it pleases through concepts2 the agreeable as well as the beautiful pleases without a concept1 but it does not please universally4 ,that which pleases the reason through the concept is good2 that which pleases the senses in sensation is agreeable4 ,that which pleases universally and necessarily without a concept is beautiful4 ,moral judgment demands the assent of all1 and its universal validity is demonstrable4 ,the judgment concerning the agreeable is not capable of demonstration1 but neither does it pretend to possess universal validity2 we readily acknowledge that what is pleasant to one need not be so to every other man4 ,in regard to the beautiful1 on the contrary1 we do not content ourselves with saying that tastes differ1 but we expect it to please all4 ,we expect everyone to assent to our judgment of taste1 although it is able to support itself by no proofs4 ,here there is a difficulty3 since the judgment of taste does not express a characteristic of the object1 but a state of mind in the observer1 a feeling1 a satisfaction1 it is purely subjective2 and yet it puts forth a claim to be universally communicable4 ,the difficulty can be removed only on the assumption of a common aesthetic sense1 of a corresponding organization of the powers of representation in all men1 which yields the common standard for the pleasurableness of the impression4 ,the agreeable appeals to that in man which is different in different individuals1 the beautiful to that which functions alike in all2 the former addresses itself to the passive sensibility1 the latter to the active judgment4 ,the agreeable--because of the non-calculable differences in our sensuous inclinations1 which are in part conditioned by bodily states--possesses no universality whatever1 the good possesses an objective1 and the beautiful a subjective universality4 ,the judgment concerning the agreeable has an empirical1 that concerning the beautiful an a priori1 determining ground3 in the former case1 the judgment follows the feeling1 in the latter1 it precedes it4 ,an object is considered beautiful 7for1 strictly speaking1 we may say only this1 not that it is beautiful7 when its form puts the powers of the human mind in a state of harmony1 brings the intuitive and rational faculties into concordant activity1 and produces an agreeable proportion between the imagination and the understanding4 ,in giving the occasion for an harmonious play of the cognitive activities 7that is1 for an easy combination of the manifold into unity7 the beautiful object is purposive for us1 for our function of apprehension2 it is--here we obtain a determination of the judgment of taste from the standpoint of relation--purposive without a definite purpose4 ,we know perfectly well that a landscape which attracts us has not been specially arranged for the purpose of delighting us1 and we do not wish to find in a work of art anything of an intention to please4 ,an object is perfect when it is purposive for itself 7corresponds to its concept72 useful when it is purposive for our desire 7corresponds to a practical intention of man72 beautiful when the arrangement of its parts is purposive for the relation between the fancy and understanding of the beholder 7corresponds in an unusual degree to the conditions of our apprehension74 ,perfection is internal 7real1 objective7 purposiveness1 and utility is external purposiveness1 both for a definite purpose2 beauty1 on the other hand1 is purposiveness without a purpose1 formal1 subjective purposiveness4 ,the beautiful pleases by its mere form4 ,the satisfaction in the perfect is of a conceptual or intellectual kind1 the satisfaction in the beautiful1 emotional or aesthetic in character4 ,the combination of these four determinations yields an exhaustive definition of the beautiful3 ,the beautiful is that which universally and necessarily arouses disinterested satisfaction by its mere form 7purposiveness without the representation of a purpose74 ,since the pleasurableness of the beautiful rests on the fact that it establishes a pleasing harmony between the imagination and the understanding1 hence between sensuous and intellectual apprehension1 the aesthetic attitude is possible only in sensuous-rational beings4 ,the agreeable exists for the animal as well1 and the good is an object of approval for pure spirits2 but the beautiful exists for humanity alone4 ,kant succeeded in giving very delicate and felicitous verbal expression to these distinctions3 the agreeable gratifies 7vergngt7 and excites inclination 7,neigung72 the good is approved 7gebilligt7 and arouses respect 7,achtung72 the beautiful pleases 7gefllt7 and finds favor 7,gunst74 ,in the progress of the investigation the principle that beauty depends on the form alone1 and that the concept1 the purpose1 the nature of the object is not taken into account at all in aesthetic judgment1 experiences limitation4 ,in its full strictness this applies only to a definite and1 in fact1 a subordinate division of the beautiful1 which ,kant marks off under the name of pure or free beauty4 ,with this he contrasts adherent beauty1 as that which presupposes a generic concept to which its form must correspond and which it must adequately present4 ,too much a purist not to mark the coming in of an intellectual pleasure as a beclouding of the purity of the aesthetic satisfaction1 he is still just enough to admit the higher worth of adherent beauty4 ,for almost the whole of artificial beauty and a considerable part of natural beauty belong to this latter division1 which we to-day term ideal and characteristic beauty4 ,examples of free or purely formal beauty are tapestry patterns1 arabesques1 fountains1 flowers1 and landscapes1 the pleasurableness of which rests simply on the proportion of their form and relations1 and not upon their conformity to a presupposed significance and determination of the thing4 ,a building1 on the contrary--a dwelling1 a summer-house1 a temple--is considered beautiful only when we perceive in it not merely harmonious relations of the parts one to another1 but also an agreement between the form and the purpose or generic concept3 a church must not look like a chalet4 ,here the external form is compared with an inner nature1 and harmony is required between form and content4 ,adherent beauty is significant and expressive beauty1 which1 although the satisfaction in it is not purely aesthetic1 nevertheless stands higher than pure beauty1 because it gives to the understanding also something to think1 and hence busies the whole spirit4 ,the analytical investigations concerning the nature of the beautiful receive a valuable supplement in the classical definition of genius4 ,kant gives two definitions of productive talent1 one formal and one genetic4 ,natural beauty is a beautiful thing2 artificial beauty1 a beautiful representation of a thing4 ,the gift of agreeably presenting a thing which in itself1 perhaps1 is ugly1 is called taste4 ,to judge of the beautiful it is sufficient to possess taste1 but for its production there is still another talent needed1 spirit or genius4 ,for an art product can fulfill the demands of taste and yet not aesthetically satisfy2 while formally faultless1 it may be spiritless4 ,while beautiful nature looks as though it were art 7as though it were calculated for our enjoyment71 beautiful art should resemble nature1 must not appear to be intentional though1 no doubt1 it is so1 must show a careful but not an overnice adherence to rules 7i4e41 not one which fetters the powers of the artist74 ,this is the case when the artist bears the rule in himself1 that is1 when he is gifted4 ,genius is the innate disposition 7through7 which 7nature7 gives rules to art2 its characteristics are originality1 exemplariness1 and unreflectiveness4 ,it does not produce according to definite rules which can be learned1 but it is a law in itself1 it is original4 ,it creates instinctively without consciousness of the rule1 and cannot describe how it produces its results4 ,it creates typical works which impel others to follow1 not to imitate4 ,it is only in art that there are geniuses1 i4e41 spirits who produce that which absolutely cannot be learned1 while the great men of science differ only in degree1 not in kind1 from their imitators and pupils1 and that which they discover can be learned by rule4 ,this establishes the criteria by which genius may be recognized4 ,if we ask by what psychological factors it is produced the answer is as follows3 ,genius presupposes a certain favorable relation between imagination and reason4 ,genius is the faculty of aesthetic ,ideas1 but an aesthetic ,idea is a representation of the imagination which animates the mind1 which adds to a concept of the understanding much of ineffable thought1 much that belongs to the concept but which cannot be comprehended in a definite concept4 ,with the aid of this idea ,kant solves the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment4 ,the thesis is3 ,the judgment of taste is not based upon concepts2 for otherwise it would admit of controversy 7would be determinable by proofs74 ,the antithesis is3 ,it is based upon concepts2 for otherwise we could not contend about it 7endeavor to obtain assent74 ,the two principles are reconcilable1 for concept is understood differently in the two cases4 ,that which the thesis rightly seeks to exclude from the judgment of beauty is the determinate concept of the understanding2 that which the antithesis with equal justice pronounces indispensable is the indeterminate concept1 the aesthetic ,idea4 ,the freest play is afforded the imagination by poetry1 the highest of all arts1 which1 with rhetoric 7insidious1 on account of its earnest intention to deceive71 forms the group termed arts of speech4 ,to the class of formative arts belong architecture1 sculpture1 and painting as the art of design4 ,a third group1 the art of the beautiful play of sensations1 includes painting as the art of color1 and music1 which as a fine art is placed immediately after poetry1 as an agreeable art at the very foot of the list1 and as the play of tone in the vicinity of the entertaining play of fortune games of chance and the witty play of thought4 ,the explanation of the comic 7the ludicrous is based1 according to ,kant1 on a sudden transformation of strained expectation into nothing7 lays great 7indeed exaggerated7 weight on the resulting physiological phenomena1 the bodily shock which heightens vital feeling and favors health1 and which accompanies the alternating tension and relaxation of the mind4 ,besides free and adherent beauty1 there is still a third kind of aesthetic effect1 the ,sublime4 ,the beautiful pleases by its bounded form4 ,but also the boundless and formless can exert aesthetic effect3 that which is great beyond all comparison we judge sublime4 ,now this magnitude is either extensive in space and time or intensive greatness of force or power2 accordingly there are two forms of the sublime4 ,that phenomenon which mocks the power of comprehension possessed by the human imagination or surpasses every measure of our intuition1 as the ocean and the starry heavens1 is mathematically sublime4 ,that which overcomes all conceivable resistance1 as the terrible forces of nature1 conflagrations1 floods1 earthquakes1 hurricanes1 thunderstorms1 is dynamically sublime or mighty4 ,the former is relative to the cognitive1 the latter to the appetitive faculty4 ,the beautiful brings the imagination and the understanding into accord2 by the sublime the fancy is brought into a certain favorable relation1 not directly to be termed harmony1 with reason4 ,in the one case there arose a restful1 positively pleasurable mood2 here a shock is produced1 an indirect and negative pleasure proceeding from pain4 ,since the sublime exceeds the functional capability of our sensuous representations and does violence to the imagination1 we first feel small at the sight of the absolutely great1 and incapable of compassing it with our sensuous glance4 ,the sensibility is not equal to the impression2 this at first seems contrary to purpose and violent4 ,this humiliating impression1 however1 is quickly followed by a reaction1 and the vital forces1 which were at first checked1 are stimulated to the more lively activity4 ,moreover1 it is the sensuous part of man which is humbled and the spiritual part that is exalted3 the overthrow of sensibility becomes a triumph for reason4 ,the sight of the sublime1 that is1 awakens the ,idea of the unconditioned1 of the infinite4 ,this ,idea can never be adequately presented by an intuition1 but can be aroused only by the inadequacy of all that is sensuous to present it2 the infinite is presented through the impossibility of presenting it4 ,we cannot intuit the infinite1 but we can think it4 ,in comparison with reason 7as the faculty of ,ideas1 the faculty of thinking the infinite7 even the greatest thing that can be given in the sense-world appears small2 reason is the absolutely great4 ,that is sublime the mere ability to think which proves a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense4 ,that is sublime which pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of the senses4 ,the conflict between phantasy and reason1 the insufficiency of the former for the attainment of the rational ,idea1 makes us conscious of the superiority of reason4 ,just because we feel small as sensuous beings we feel great as rational beings4 ,the pleasure 7related to the moral feeling of respect and1 like this1 mingled with a certain pain7 which accompanies this consciousness of inner greatness is explained by the fact that the imagination1 in acknowledging reason superior1 places itself in the appropriate and purposive relation of subordination4 ,it is evident from the foregoing that the truly sublime is reason1 the moral nature of man1 his predisposition and destination1 which point beyond the present world4 ,schiller declares that in space the sublime does not dwell1 and ,kant says1 ,sublimity is contained in none of the things of nature1 but only in our mind1 in so far as we are conscious of being superior to nature within us and without us4 ,nevertheless1 since in this contemplation we fix our thoughts entirely on the object without reflecting on ourselves1 we transfer the admiration of right due to the reason and its ,idea of the infinite by subreption to the object by which the ,idea is occasioned1 and call the object itself sublime1 instead of the mood which it wakes in us4 ,if the sublime marks the point where the aesthetic touches on the boundary of the moral1 the beautiful is also not without some relation to the good4 ,by showing the agreement of sensibility and reason1 which is demanded by the moral law1 realized in aesthetic intuition 7as a voluntary yielding of the imagination to the legitimacy of the understanding71 it gives us the inspiring consciousness that the antithesis is reconcilable1 that the rational can be presented in the sensuous1 and so becomes a symbol of the good4 7b7 ,teleological ,judgment4--,teleological judgment is not knowledge1 but a way of looking at things which comes into play where the causal or mechanical explanation fails us4 ,this is not the case if the purposiveness is external1 relative to its utility for something else4 ,the fact that the sand of the sea-shore furnishes a good soil for the pine neither furthers nor prevents a causal knowledge of it4 ,only inner purposiveness1 as it is manifested in the products of organic nature1 brings the mechanical explanation to a halt4 ,organisms are distinguished above inorganic forms by the fact that of themselves they are at once cause and effect1 that they are self-productive and this both as a species 7the oak springs from the acorn1 and in its turn bears acorns7 and as individuals 7self-preservation1 growth1 and the replacement of dying parts by new ones71 and also by the fact that the reciprocally productive parts are in their form and their existence all conditioned by the whole4 ,this latter fact1 that the whole is the determining ground for the parts1 is perfectly obvious in the products of human art4 ,for here it is the representation of the whole 7the idea of the work desired7 which as the ground precedes the existence and the form of the parts 7of the machine74 ,but where is the subject to construct organisms according to its representations of ends8 ,we may neither conceive nature itself as endowed with forces acting in view of ends1 nor a praetermundane intelligence interfering in the course of nature4 ,either of these suppositions would be the death of natural philosophy3 the hylozoist endows matter with a property which conflicts with its nature1 and the theist oversteps the boundary of possible experience4 ,above all1 the analogy of the products of organic nature with the products of human technique is destroyed by the fact that machines do not reproduce themselves and their parts cannot produce one another1 while the organism organizes itself4 ,for our discursive understanding an interaction between the whole and the parts is completely incomprehensible4 ,we understand when the parts precede the whole 7mechanically7 or the representation of the whole precedes the parts 7teleologically72 but to think the whole itself 7not the ,idea thereof7 as the ground of the parts1 which is demanded by organic life1 is impossible for us4 ,it would have been otherwise if an intuitive understanding had been bestowed upon us4 ,for a being possessing intellectual intuition the antithesis between possibility and actuality1 between necessity and contingency1 between mechanism and teleology1 would disappear along with that between thought and intuition4 ,for such a being everything possible 7all that it thinks7 would be at the same time actual 7present for intuition71 and all that appears to us contingent--intentionally selected from several possibilities and in order to an end--would be necessary as well2 with the whole would be given the parts corresponding thereto1 and consequently natural mechanism and purposive connection would be identical1 while for us1 to whom the intuitive understanding is denied1 the two divide4 ,hence the teleological view is a mere form of human representation1 a subjective principle4 ,we may not say that a mechanical origin of living beings is impossible1 but only that we are unable to understand it4 ,if we knew how a blade of grass or a frog sprang from mechanical forces1 we would also be in a position to produce them4 ,the antinomy of the teleological judgment--thesis3 all production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws2 antithesis3 some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws1 but to judge them requires the causality of final causes--is insoluble so long as both propositions are taken for constitutive principles2 but it is soluble when they are taken as regulative principles or standpoints for judgment4 ,for it is in no wise contradictory1 on the one hand1 to continue the search for mechanical causes as far as this is in any way possible1 and1 on the other1 clearly to recognize that1 at last1 this will still leave a remainder which we cannot make intelligible without calling to our aid the concept of ends4 ,assuming that it were possible to carry the explanation of life from life1 from ancestral organisms 7for the generatio aequivoca is an absurd theory7 so far that the whole organic world should represent one great family descended from one primitive form as the common mother1 even then the concept of final causes would only be pushed further back1 not eliminated3 the origin of the first organization will always resist mechanical explanation4 ,besides this mission of putting limits to causal derivation and of filling the gap in knowledge by a necessary1 although subjective1 way of looking at things1 the ,idea of ends has still another1 the direct promotion of knowledge from efficient causes through the discovery of new causal problems4 ,thus1 for example1 physiology owes the impulse to the discovery of previously unnoticed mechanical connections 7cf4 also p4 #chb note7 to the question concerning the purpose of organs4 ,as doctrines mechanism and teleology are irreconcilable and impossible2 as rules or maxims of inquiry they are compatible1 and the one as indispensable as the other4 ,after the problem of life1 which is insoluble by means of the mechanical explanation1 has necessitated the application of the concept of ends1 the teleological principle must1 at least by way of experiment1 be extended to the whole of nature4 ,this consideration culminates in the position that man1 as the subject of morality1 must be held to be the final aim of the world1 for it is only in regard to a moral being that no further inquiry can be raised as to the purpose of its existence4 ,it also repeats the moral argument for the existence of a supreme reason1 thus supplementing physico-theology1 which is inadequate to the demonstration of one absolutely perfect ,deity2 so that the third ,critique1 like the two preceding1 concludes with the ,idea of ,god as an object of practical faith4 99 99 99 99 99 ,there are three original and pregnant pairs of thoughts which cause ,kant's name to shine in the philosophical sky as a star of the first magnitude3 the demand for a critique of knowledge and the proof of a priori forms of knowledge2 the moral autonomy and the categorical imperative2 the regulative validity of the ,ideas of reason and the practical knowledge of the transcendent world4 ,no philosophical theory1 no scientific hypothesis can henceforth avoid the duty of examining the value and legitimacy of its conclusions1 as to whether they keep within the limits of the competency of human reason2 whether ,kant's determination of the origin and the limits of knowledge may count on continued favor or not1 the fundamental critical idea1 that reflection upon the nature and range of our cognitive faculty is indispensable1 retains its validity for all cases and makes an end of all philosophizing at random4#a ,no ethical system will with impunity pass by the autonomous legislation of reason and the unconditional imperative 7the admonition of conscience translated into conceptual language73 the nature and worth of moral will will be everywhere sought in vain if they are not recognized where ,kant has found them--in the unselfish disposition1 in that maxim which is fitted to become a general law for all rational beings4 ,the doctrine of the ,ideas1 finally1 reveals to us1 beyond the daylight of phenomenal knowledge1 the starlit landscape of another mode of looking at things1#b in which satisfaction is afforded for the hitherto unmet wishes of the heart and demands of the reason4 ,footnote #a3 ,reason consists just in this1 that we are able to give account of all our concepts1 opinions1 and assertions1 either on objective or subjective grounds4 ,footnote #b3 ,those who regard all future metaphysics as refuted by the ,critique of ,reason are to be referred to the positive side of the ,kantian doctrine of ,ideas4 ,kant admits that the mechanical explanation does not satisfy reason1 and that1 besides it1 a judgment according to ,ideas is legitimate4 ,when1 therefore1 the speculation of the constructive school gives an ideal interpretation of the world1 it may be regarded as an extended application of regulative principles1 which exceeds its authority only when it professes to be objective knowledge4 ,the effect of the three ,critiques upon the public was very varied4 ,the first great work excited alarm by the sharpness of its negations and its destruction of dogmatic metaphysics1 which to its earliest readers appeared to be the core of the matter2 ,kant was for them the universal destroyer4 ,then the ,science of ,knowledge brought into prominence the positive1 boldly conquering side1 the investigation of the conditions of empirical knowledge4 ,in later times the endeavor has been made to do justice to both sides1 but1 in opposition to the overbold procedure of the constructive thinkers1 who had fallen into a revived dogmatism1 more in the spirit of caution and resignation4 ,the second great work aroused glowing enthusiasm3 ,kant is no mundane luminary1 writes ,jean ,paul in regard to the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 but a whole solar system shining at once4 ,the third1 because of its subject and by its purpose of synthetic reconciliation between fields heretofore sharply separated1 gained the sympathy of our poet-heroes ,schiller and ,goethe1 and awakened in a young1 speculative spirit ,ideas for a ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,schelling reclaimed the intuitive understanding1 which ,kant had problematically attributed to the primal spirit1 as the property of the philosopher1 after ,fichte had drawn attention to the fact that the consciousness of the categorical imperative1 which ,kant had not thoroughly investigated1 could be nothing else than intellectual intuition1 because in it knowing and doing coincide4 ,fichte1 however1 does not derive the material for his system from the ,critique of ,judgment1 though he also had a high appreciation of it1 but from the two earlier ,critiques1 the fundamental conceptions of which he--following the hint that practical and theoretical reason are only different applications of one and the same reason--brings into the closest connection4 ,he unites the central idea of the practical philosophy1 the freedom and autonomous legislation of the will1 with the leading principle of the theoretical philosophy1 the spontaneity of the understanding1 under the original synthesis of the pure ego1 in order to deduce from the activity of the ego not only the a priori forms of knowledge1 but also1 rejecting the thing in itself1 the whole content of empirical consciousness4 ,the thought which intervenes between the ,kantian ,critique of ,reason and the development of thoroughgoing idealism by ,fichte1 with its criticisms of and additions to the former and its preparation for the latter1 may be glanced at in a few supplementary pages4 #d4 ,from ,kant to ,fichte4 ,to begin with the works which aided in the extension and recognition of the ,kantian philosophy1 besides ,kant's ,prolegomena1 the following stand in the front rank3 ,exposition of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 by the ,knigsberg court preacher1 ,johannes ,schulz1 #aghd2 the flowing ,letters concerning the ,kantian ,philosophy1 by ,k4,l4 ,reinhold in ,wieland's ,deutscher ,merkur1 #aghf-hg2 and the ,allgemeine ,litteraturzeitung1 in ,jena1 founded in #aghe1 and edited by the philologist ,schtz and the jurist ,hufeland1 which offered itself as the organ of the new doctrine4 ,jena became the home and principal stronghold of ,kantianism2 while by the beginning of the nineteenth century almost all ,german chairs belonged to it1 and the non-philosophical sciences as well received from it stimulation and guiding ideas4 ,in the camp of the enemy there was no less of activity4 ,the ,wolffian1 ,eberhard of ,halle1 founded a special journal for the purpose of opposing the ,kantian philosophy3 the ,philosophisches ,magazin1 #aghi1 continued from #agib as the ,philosophisches ,archiv4 ,the ,illumination collected its forces in the ,philosophische ,bibliothek1 edited by ,feder and ,meiners4 ,nicolai waved the banner of common sense in the ,allgemeine deutsche ,bibliothek1 and in satirical romances1 and was handled as he deserved by the heroes of poetry and philosophy 7cf4 the ,xenien of ,goethe and ,schiller1 ,kant's ,letter on ,bookmaking1 and ,fichte's cutting disposal of him1 ,nicolai's ,life and ,peculiar ,opinions74 ,the attacks of the faith-philosophers have been already noticed 7pp4 #caj-cad74 ,the advance from ,kant to ,fichte was preparing alike among friends and enemies1 and this in two points4 ,the demand was in part for a formal complement 7a first principle from which the ,kantian results could be deduced1 and by which the dualism of sense and understanding could be overcome71 in part for material correction 7the removal of the thing in itself7 and development 7to radical idealism74 ,karl ,leonhard ,reinhold 7born at ,vienna in #ageh2 fled from a college of the ,st4 ,barnabite order1 #aghc2 in #aghg-id professor in ,jena1 and then as the successor of ,tetens in ,kiel1 where he died in #ahbc7 undertook the former task in his ,attempt at a ,new ,theory of the ,human ,faculty of ,representation1 #aghi4 ,kant's classical theory of the faculty of cognition requires for its foundation a theory of the faculty of representation1 or an elementary philosophy1 which shall take for its object the deduction of the several functions of reason 7intuition1 concept1 ,idea7 from the original activity of representation4 ,the ,kantian philosophy lacks a first principle1 which1 as first1 cannot be demonstrable1 but only a fact immediately evident and admitted by everyone4 ,the primal fact1 which we seek1 is consciousness4 ,no one can dispute that every representation contains three things3 the subject1 the object1 and1 between the two1 the activity of representation4 ,accordingly the principle of consciousness runs3 ,the representation is distinguished in consciousness from the represented object and the representing subject1 and is referred to both4 ,from this first principle ,reinhold endeavors to deduce the well-known principles of the material manifold given by the action of objects1 and the forms of representation spontaneously produced by the subject1 which combine this manifold into unity4 ,when1 a few years later1 ,fichte's ,science of ,knowledge brilliantly succeeded in bridging the gap between sense and understanding by means of a first principle1 thus accomplishing what ,reinhold had attempted1 the latter became one of his adherents1 only to attach himself subsequently to ,jacobi1 and then to ,bardili 7,outlines of ,logic1 #ahjj71 and to end with a verbal philosophy lacking both in influence and permanence4 ,in ,reinhold's elementary philosophy the thing in itself was changed from a problematical1 negative1 merely limiting concept into a positive element of doctrine4 ,objections were raised against ,kantianism1 as thus dogmatically modified in the direction of realism1 by ,schulze1 ,maimon1 and ,beck--by the first for purposes of attack1 by the second in order to further development1 and by the third with an exegetical purpose4 ,gottlob ,ernst ,schulze1 professor in ,helmstdt1 and from #ahaj in ,gttingen1 in his ,aenesidemus 7#agib1 published anonymously71 which was followed later by psychological works1 defended the skeptical position in opposition to the ,critique of ,reason4 ,hume's skepticism remains unrefuted by ,kant and ,reinhold4 ,the thing in itself1 which is to produce the material of representation by affecting the senses1 is a self-contradictory idea4 ,the application of the category of cause to things in themselves violates the doctrine that the latter are unknowable and that the use of the pure concepts of the understanding beyond the sphere of experience is inadmissible4 ,the transcendental philosophy has never proved that the ground of the material of representation cannot1 just as the form thereof1 reside in the subject itself4 ,side by side with the anti-critical skepticism of ,aenesidemus-,schulze1 ,salomon ,maimon 7died #ahjj2 cf4 ,witte1 #ahgf71 who was highly esteemed by the greatest philosophers of his time1 represents critical skepticism4 ,with ,reinhold he holds consciousness 7as the combination of a manifold into objective unity7 to be the common root of sensibility and understanding1 and with ,schulze1 the concept of the thing in itself to be an imaginary or irrational quantity1 a thought that cannot be carried out2 it is not only unknowable1 but unthinkable4 ,that alone is knowable which we ourselves produce1 hence only the form of representation4 ,the matter of representation is given1 but this does not mean that it arises from the action of the thing in itself1 but only that we do not know its origin4 ,understanding and sense1 or spontaneity and receptivity1 do not differ generically1 but only in degree1 viz41 as complete and incomplete consciousness4 ,sensation is an incomplete consciousness1 because we do not know how its object arises4 ,by the removal of the thing in itself ,aenesidemus-,schulze sought to refute the ,kantian theory and ,maimon to improve it4 ,sigismund ,beck 7#agfa-ahdj71 in his ,only ,possible ,standpoint from which the ,critical ,philosophy must be ,judged1 #agif1a seeks by it to elucidate the ,kantian theory1 holding up idealism as its true meaning4 ,in opposition to the usual opinion that a representation is true when it agrees with its object1 he points to the impossibility of comparing the one with the other4 ,of objects out of consciousness we can know nothing2 after the removal of all that is subjective there is nothing positive left of the representation4 ,everything in it is produced by us2 the matter arises together with the form through the original synthesis4 ,footnote #a3 ,this book forms the third volume of his ,expository ,abridgment of the ,critical ,writings of ,professor ,kant2 in the same year appeared the ,outlines of the ,critical ,philosophy4 ,cf4 on ,beck1 ,dilthey in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 ii41 #ahhi1 pp4 #eib-fej4 ,the last mentioned attempts to develop the ,kantian philosophy were so far surpassed by ,fichte's great achievement that they have received from their own age and from posterity a less grateful appreciation and remembrance than was essentially their due4 ,a phenomenon of a different sort1 which is also to be placed at the threshold between ,kant and ,fichte1 but which forms rather a supplement to the notics and ethics of the latter than a link in the transition to them1 has1 on the contrary1 gained an honorable position in the memory of the ,german people1 viz41 ,schiller's aesthetics4#a ,in its center stand the ,kantian antithesis of sensibility and reason and the reconciliation of the two sides of human nature brought about by its occupation with the beautiful4 ,artistic activity or the play-impulse mediates between the lower1 sensuous matter-impulse and the higher1 rational form-impulse1 and unites the1 two in harmonious co-operation4 ,where appetite seeks after satisfaction1 and where the strict idea of duty rules1 there only half the man is occupied2 neither lust nor moral worth is beautiful4 ,in order that beauty and grace may arise1 the matter-impulse and the form-impulse1 or sensibility and reason1 must manifest themselves uniformly and in harmony4 ,only when he plays is man wholly and entirely man2 only through art is the development of humanity possible4 ,the discernment of the fact that the beautiful brings into equilibrium the two fundamental impulses1 one or the other of which preponderates in sensuous desire and in moral volition1 does not of itself decide the relative rank of artistic and moral activity4 ,the recognition of this mediating position of art may be connected with the view that it forms a transitional stage toward and a means of education for morality1 as well as with the other1 that in it human nature attains its completion4 ,evidence of both views can be found in ,schiller's writings4 ,at first he favors the ,kantian moralism1 which admits nothing higher than the good will1 and sets art the task of educating men up to morality by ennobling their natural impulses4 ,gradually1 however1 aesthetic activity changes in his view from a preparation for morality into the ultimate goal of human endeavor4 ,peaceful reconciliation is of more worth than the spirit's hardly gained victory in the conflict with the sensibility2 fine feeling is more than rational volition2 the highest ideal is the beautiful soul1 in which inclination not merely obeys the command of duty1 but anticipates it4 ,footnote #a3 ,the most important of ,schiller's aesthetic essays are those ,on ,grace and ,dignity1 #agic2 ,on ,nave and ,sentimental ,poetry1 #agie-if2 and the ,letters on ,aesthetic ,education1 intermediate between them4 ,cf4 ,kuno ,fischer1 ,schiller als ,philosoph1 #aheh1 #b;d ed4 7,schillerschriften1 iii41 iv47 #ahia-ib4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,fichte4 ,fichte is a ,kantian in about the same sense that ,plato was a ,socratic4 ,instead of taking up and developing particular critical problems he makes the vivifying kernel1 the soul of criticism1 his own4 ,with the self-activity of reason 7as a real force and as a problem7 for his fundamental idea1 he outlines with magnificent boldness a new view of the world1 in which the idealism concealed in ,kant's philosophy under the shell of cautious limitations was roused into vigorous life1 and the great ,knigsberger's noble words on the freedom1 the position1 and the power of the spirit translated from the language of sober foresight into that of vigorous enthusiasm4 ,the world can be understood only from the standpoint of spirit1 the spirit only from the will4 ,the ego is pure activity1 and all reality its product4 ,fichte's system is all life and action3 its aim is not to mediate knowledge1 but to summon the hearer and reader to the production of a new and pregnant fundamental view1 in which the will is as much a participant as the understanding2 it begins not with a concept or a proposition1 but with a demand for action 7posit thyself2 do consciously what thou hast done unconsciously so often as thou hast called thyself ,i2 analyze1 then1 the act of self-consciousness1 and cognize in their elements the forces from which all reality proceeds72 its ,god is not a completed absolute substance1 but a self-realizing world-order4 ,this inner vivacity of the ,fichtean principle1 which recalls the pure actuality of ,aristotle's ,greek3 nous and the ceaseless becoming of ,heraclitus1 finds its complete parallel in the fact that1 although he was wanting neither in logical consecutiveness nor in the talent for luminous and popular exposition1 ,fichte felt continually driven to express his ideas in new forms1 and1 just when he seemed to have succeeded in saying what he meant with the greatest clearness1 again unsatisfied1 to seek still more exact and evident renderings for his fundamental position1 which proved so difficult to formulate4 ,the author of the ,wissenschaftslehre was the son of a poor ribbon maker1 and was born at ,rammenau in ,lusatia in #agfb4 ,the talents of the boy induced the ,freiherr von ,miltiz to give him the advantage of a good education4 ,fichte attended school in ,meissen and in ,pforta1 and was a student of theology at the universities of ,jena and ,leipsic4 ,while a tutor in ,zurich he made the acquaintance of ,lavater and ,pestalozzi1 as well as of his future wife1 ,johanna ,rahn1 a niece of ,klopstock4 ,returning to ,leipsic1 his whole mode of thought was revolutionized by the ,kantian philosophy1 in which it was his duty to instruct a pupil4 ,this gives to the mind1 as his letters confess1 an inconceivable elevation above all earthly things4 ,i have adopted a nobler morality1 and1 instead of occupying myself with things without me1 have been occupied more with myself4 ,i now believe with all my heart in human freedom1 and am convinced that only on this supposition duty and virtue of any kind are possible4 ,i live in a new world since ,i have read the ,critique of ,practical ,reason4 ,things which ,i believed never could be proved to me1 e4g41 the idea of an absolute freedom and duty1 have been proved1 and ,i feel the happier for it4 ,it is inconceivable what reverence for humanity1 what power this philosophy gives us1 what a blessing it is for an age in which the citadels of morality had been destroyed1 and the idea of duty blotted out from all the dictionaries6 ,a journey to ,warsaw1 whither he had been attracted by the expectation of securing a position as a private tutor1 soon afforded him the opportunity of visiting at ,knigsberg the author of the system which had effected so radical a transformation in his convictions4 ,his rapidly written treatise1 ,essay toward a ,critique of ,all ,revelation1 attained the end to which its inception was due by gaining for its author a favorable reception from the honored master4 ,kant secured for ,fichte a tutor's position in ,dantzic1 and a publisher for his maiden work4 ,when this appeared1 at ,easter1 #agib1 the name of its author was by oversight omitted from the title page1 together with the preface1 which had been furnished after the rest of the book2 and as the anonymous work was universally ascribed to ,kant 7whose religious philosophy was at this time eagerly looked for71 the young writer became famous at a stroke as soon as the error was explained4 ,a second edition was issued as early as the following year4 ,after his marriage in ,zurich1 where he had completed several political treatises 7the address1 ,reclamation of the ,freedom of ,thought from the ,princes of ,europe1 who have hitherto suppressed it1 ,heliopolis in the ,last ,year of the ,old ,darkness1 and the two ,hefte1 ,contributions toward the ,correction of the ,public ,judgment on the ,french ,revolution1 #agic71 ,fichte accepted1 in #agid1 a call to ,jena1 in place of ,reinhold1 who had gone to ,kiel1 and whose popularity was soon exceeded by his own4 ,the same year saw the birth of the ,wissenschaftslehre4 ,his stay in ,jena was embittered by conflicts with the clergy1 who took offense at his ethical lectures 7,on the ,vocation of the ,scholar7 held on ,sunday mornings 7though not at an hour which interfered with church service71 and with the students1 who1 after they had been untrue to their decision--which they had formed as a result of these lectures--to dissolve their societies or orders1 gave vent to their spite by repeatedly smashing the windows of ,fichte's residence4 ,accordingly he took leave of absence1 and spent the summer of #agie in ,osmannstdt4 ,the years #agif-ih1 in which1 besides the two ,introductions to the ,science of ,knowledge1 the ,natural ,right and the ,science of ,ethics 7one of the most all important works in ,german philosophical literature7 appeared1 mark the culmination of ,fichte's famous labors4 ,the so-called atheistic controversy#a resulted in ,fichte's departure from ,jena4 ,the ,philosophisches ,journal1 which since #agig had been edited by ,fichte in association with ,niethammer1 had published an article by ,magister ,forberg1 rector at ,saalfeld1 entitled ,the ,development of the ,concept of ,religion1 and as a conciliating introduction to this a short essay by ,fichte1 ,on the ,ground of our ,belief in a ,divine ,government of the ,world4#b ,for this it was confiscated by the ,dresden government on the charge of containing atheistical matter1 while other courts were summoned to take like action4 ,in ,weimar hopes were entertained of an amicable adjustment of the matter4 ,but when ,fichte1 after publishing two vindications#c couched in vehement language1 had in a private letter uttered the threat that he would answer with his resignation any censure proceeding from the ,university ,senate1 not only was censure for indiscretion actually imposed1 but his 7threatened7 resignation accepted4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,karl ,august ,hase1 ,jenaisches ,fichtebchlein1 #ahef4 ,footnote #b3 ,it is a mistake1 ,fichte writes here1 referring to the conclusion of ,forberg's article 7,is there a ,god8 ,it is and remains uncertain1 etc471 to say that it is doubtful whether there is a ,god or not4 ,that there is a moral order of the world1 which assigns to each rational individual his determined place and counts on his work1 is most certain1 nay1 it is the ground of all other certitude4 ,the living and operative moral order 7ordo ordinans7 is itself ,god2 we need no other ,god1 and can conceive no other4 ,there is no ground in reason for going beyond this world order to postulate a particular being as its cause4 ,whoever ascribes personality and consciousness to this particular being makes it finite2 consciousness belongs only to the individual1 limited ego4 ,and it is allowable to state this frankly and to beat down the prattle of the schools1 in order that the true religion of joyous well-doing may lift up its head4 ,footnote #c3 ,appeal to the ,public1 and ,formal ,defense against the ,charge of ,atheism1 #agii4 ,the first of these maintains that ,fichte's standpoint and that of his opponents are related as duty and advantage1 sensible and suprasensible1 and that the substantial ,god of his accusers1 to be derived from the sensibility1 is1 as personified fate1 as the distributer of all happiness and unhappiness to finite beings1 a miserable fetich4 ,going to ,berlin1 ,fichte found a friendly government1 a numerous public for his lectures1 and a stimulating circle of friends in the romanticists1 the brothers ,schlegel1 ,tieck1 ,schleiermacher1 etc4 ,in the first years of his ,berlin residence there appeared ,the ,vocation of ,man4 ,the ,exclusive ,commercial ,state1 #ahjj2 ,the ,sun-clear ,report to the ,larger ,public on the ,essential ,nature of the ,new ,philosophy1 and the ,answer to ,reinhold1 #ahja4 ,three works1 which were the outcome of his lectures and were published in the year #ahjf 7,characteristics of the ,present ,age1 ,the ,nature of the ,scholar1 ,way to the ,blessed ,life or ,doctrine of ,religion71 form a connected whole4 ,in the summer of #ahje ,fichte filled a professorship at ,erlangen1 and later1 after the outbreak of the war1 he occupied for a short time a chair at ,knigsberg1 finding a permanent university position at the foundation of the ,university of ,berlin in #ahaj4 ,his glowing ,addresses to the ,german ,nation1 #ahjh1 which essentially aided in arousing the national spirit1 have caused his name to live as one of the greatest of orators and most ardent of patriots in circles of the ,german people where his philosophical importance cannot be understood4 ,his death in #ahad was also a result of unselfish labor in the service of the ,fatherland4 ,he succumbed to a nervous fever contracted from his wife1 who1 with self-sacrifice equal to his own1 had shared in the care of the wounded1 and who had brought the contagion back with her from the hospital4 ,on his monument is inscribed the beautiful text1 ,the teachers shall shine as the brightness of the firmament1 and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars that shine forever and ever4 ,forberg in his journal records this estimate3 ,the leading trait in ,fichte's character is his absolute integrity4 ,all his words are weighty and important4 ,his principles are stern and little modified by affability4 ,the spirit of his philosophy is proud and courageous1 one which does not so much lead as possess us and carry us along4 ,his philosophemes are inquiries in which we see the truth arise before our eyes1 and which just for this reason lay the foundations of science and conviction4 ,the philosopher's son1 ,immanuel ,hermann ,fichte 7his own name was ,johann ,gottlieb71 wrote a biography of his father 7#ahcj2 #b;d ed41 #ahfb71 and supervised the publication of both the ,posthumous ,works 7#ahcd-ce1 #c vols47 and the ,collected ,works 7#ahde-df1 #h vols474 ,the simple and luminous ,facts of ,consciousness of #ahaa1 or #ahag 7not the lecture of #ahac with the same title71 is especially valuable as an introduction to the system4 ,among the many redactions of the ,wissenschaftslehre1 the epoch-making ,foundation of the whole ,science of ,knowledge1 #agid1 with the two ,introductions to the ,science of ,knowledge1 #agig1 takes the first rank1 while of the practical works the most important are the ,foundation of ,natural ,right according to the ,principles of the ,science of ,knowledge1 #agif1 and the ,system of the ,science of ,ethics according to the ,principles of the ,science of ,knowledge1 #agih1 and next to these the ,lectures on the ,theory of the ,state1 #ahbj 7delivered in #ahac74a ,footnote #a3 ,at the same time as ,j4,h4 ,lwe's book ,die ,philosophie ,fichtes1 #ahfb1 there appeared in celebration of the centenary of ,fichte's birthyear1 or birthday1 a large number of minor essays and addresses by ,friedrich ,harms1 ,a4,l4 ,kym1 ,trendelenburg1 ,franz ,hoffman1 ,karl ,heyder1 ,f4,c4 ,lott1 ,karl ,kstlin1 ,j4,b4 ,meyer1 and others 7cf4 ,reichlin-,meldegg in vol4 xlii4 of the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie74 ,lasson has written1 #ahfc1 on ,fichte's relation to ,church and state1 ,zeller on ,fichte as a political thinker 7,vortrge und ,abhandlungen1 #ahfe71 and ,f4 ,zimmer on his philosophy of religion4 ,among foreign works we may note ,adamson's ,fichte1 #ahha1 and the ,english translations of several of ,fichte's works by ,kroeger ,science of ,knowledge1 #ahfh2 ,science of ,rights1 #ahfi--;both also1 #ahhi and ,william ,smith ,popular ,writings1 #dth ed41 #ahhi2 also ,everett's ,fichte's ,science of ,knowledge 7,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhd71 and several translations in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 including one of ,the ,facts of ,consciousness4--,,tr4 #a4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge4 7a7 ,the ,problem4--,in ,fichte's judgment ,kant did not succeed in carrying through the transformation in thought which it was his aim to effect1 because the age did not understand the spirit of his philosophy4 ,this spirit1 and with it the great service of ,kant1 consists in transcendental idealism1 which by the doctrine that objects conform themselves to representations1 not representations to objects1 draws philosophy away from external objects and leads it back into ourselves4 ,we have followed the letter1 he thinks1 instead of the spirit of ,kant1 and because of a few passages with a dogmatic ring1 whose references to a given matter1 the thing in itself1 and the like1 were intended only as preliminary1 have overlooked the numberless others in which the contrary is distinctly maintained4 ,thus the interpreters of ,kant1 using their own prejudices as a criterion1 have read into him exactly that which he sought to refute1 and have made the destroyer of all dogmatism himself a dogmatist2 thus in the ,kantianism of the ,kantians there has sprung up a marvelous combination of crude dogmatism and uncompromising idealism4 ,though such an absurd mingling of entirely heterogeneous elements may be excused in the case of interpreters and successors1 who have had to construct for themselves the guiding principle of the whole from their study of the critical writings1 yet we cannot assume it in the author of the system1 unless we believe the ,critique of ,pure ,reason the result of the strangest chance1 and not the work of intellect4 ,two men only1 ,beck1 the teacher of the ,standpoint1 and ,jacobi1 the clearest mind of the century1 are to be mentioned with respect as having risen above the confusion of the time to the perception that ,kant teaches idealism1 that1 according to him1 the object is not given1 but made4 ,besides the perspicuity which would have prevented these misunderstandings1 ,fichte misses something further in ,kant's work4 ,considered as a system ,kant's expositions were incomplete2 and1 on his own confession1 his aim was not to furnish the science itself1 but only the foundation and the materials for it4 ,therefore1 although the ,kantian philosophy is established as far as its inner content is concerned1 there is still need of earnest work to systematize the fragments and results which he gives into a firmly connected and impregnable whole4 ,the ,wissenschaftslehre takes this completion of idealism for its mission4 ,it cannot solve the problem by a commentary on the ,kantian writings1 nor by the correction and addition of particulars1 but only by restoring the whole at a stroke4 ,he alone finds the truth who new creates it in himself1 independently and in his own way4 ,thus ,fichte's system contains the same view of the matter as the critical system--the author is aware1 runs the preface to the programme1 ,on the ,concept of the ,science of ,knowledge1 #agid1 that he never will be able to say anything at which ,kant has not hinted1 immediately or mediately1 more or less clearly1 before him1--but in his procedure he is entirely independent of the ,kantian exposition4 ,we shall first raise the question1 ,what in the ,kantian philosophy is in need of completion8 and1 secondly1 ,what method must be adopted in completing it8 ,kant discusses the laws of intelligence when they are already applied to objects1 without enlightening us concerning the ground of these laws4 ,he derived the pure concepts 7the laws of substantiality1 of causality1 etc47 from 7logic1 and thus mediately from7 experience instead of deducing them from the nature of intelligence2 similarly he never furnished this deduction for the forms of intuition1 space and time4 ,in order to understand that intelligence1 and why intelligence1 must act in just this way 7must think just by means of these categories71 we must prove1 and not merely1 with ,kant1 assert1 that these functions or forms are really laws of thought--or1 what amounts to the same thing1 that they are conditions of self-consciousness4 ,again1 even if it be granted that ,kant has explained the properties and relations of things 7that they appear in space and time1 and that their accidents must be referred to substances71 the question still remains unanswered1 ,whence comes the matter which is taken up into these forms8 ,so long as the whole object is not made to arise before the eyes of the thinker1 dogmatism is not driven out of its last corner4 ,the thing in itself is1 like the rest1 only a thought in the ego4 ,if thus the antithesis between the form and the matter of cognition undergoes modification1 so1 further1 the allied distinction between understanding and sensibility must1 as ,reinhold accurately recognized1 be reduced to a common principle and receptivity be conceived as self-limiting spontaneity4 ,in his practical philosophy also ,kant left much unfinished4 ,the categorical imperative is susceptible of further deduction1 it is not the principle itself1 but a conclusion from the true principle1 from the injunction to absolute self-dependence on the part of reason2 moreover1 the nature of our consciousness of the moral law must be more thoroughly discussed1 and in order to gain a real1 instead of a merely formal1 ethics the relation of this law to natural impulse4 ,finally1 ,kant never discussed the foundation of philosophy as a whole1 but always separated its theoretical from its practical side1 and ,reinhold also did nothing to remove this dualism4 ,in short1 some things that ,kant only asserted or presupposed can and must be proved1 some that he kept distinct must be united4 ,in what way are both to be accomplished8 ,since correct inferences from correct premises yield correct results1 and correct inference is easy to secure1 everything depends on the correct point of departure4 ,if we neglect this and consider only the process and the results of inference1 there are two consistent systems3 the dogmatic or realistic course of thought1 which seeks to derive representations from things2 and the idealistic1 which1 conversely1 seeks to derive being from thought4 ,now1 no matter how consistently dogmatism may proceed 7and when it does so it becomes1 like the system of ,spinoza1 materialism and fatalism or determinism1 maintaining that all is nature1 and all goes on mechanically2 treats the spirit as a thing among others1 and denies its metaphysical and moral independence1 its immateriality and freedom71 it may be shown to be false1 because it starts from a false principle4 ,thought can never be derived from being1 because it is not contained therein2 from being only being can proceed1 and never representation4 ,being1 however1 can be derived from thought1 for consciousness is also being2 nay1 it is more than this1 it is conscious being4 ,and as consciousness contains both being and a knowledge of this being1 idealism is superior to realism1 because idealism includes the latter as a moment in itself1 and hence can explain it1 though it is not explicable by it4 ,dogmatism makes the mistake of going beyond consciousness or the ego1 and working with empty1 merely formal concepts4 ,a concept is empty when nothing actual corresponds to it1 or no intuition can be subsumed under it 7here it is to be noted that1 besides sensuous intuition1 there is an intellectual intuition also2 an example is found in the ego as a self-intuiting being74 ,philosophy1 indeed1 may abstract and must abstract1 must rise above that which is given--for how could she explain life and particular knowledge if she assumed no higher standpoint than her object8--but true abstraction is nothing other than the separation of factors which in experience always present themselves together2 it analyzes empirical consciousness in order to reconstruct it from its elements1 it causes empirical consciousness to arise before our eyes1 it is a pragmatic history of consciousness4 ,such abstraction1 undertaken in order to a genetic consideration of the ego1 does not go beyond experience1 but penetrates into the depths of experience1 is not transcendent1 but transcendental1 and1 since it remains in close touch with that which is intuitable1 yields a real philosophy in contrast to all merely formal philosophy4 ,these theoretical advantages of idealism are supplemented by momentous reasons of a practical kind1 which determine the choice between the two systems1 besides which none other is possible4 ,the moral law says3 ,thou shalt be self-dependent4 ,if ,i ought to be so ,i must be able to be so2 but if ,i were matter ,i would not be able4 ,thus idealism proves itself to be the ethical mode of thought1 while the opposite mode shows that those who favor it have not raised themselves to that independence of all that is external which is morally enjoined1 for in order to be able to know ourselves free we must have made ourselves free4#a ,thus the philosophy which a man chooses depends on what sort of a man he is4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the categorical imperative calls for belief in the reality of the external world and of other minds1 this is nothing against idealism4 ,for idealism does not deny the realism of life1 but explains it as a necessary1 though not a final1 mode of intuition4 ,the dogmatic mode of thought is merely an explanation from the standpoint of common consciousness1 and for idealism1 as the only view which is both scientifically and practically satisfactory1 this explanation itself needs explaining4 ,realism and idealism1 like natural impulse and moral will in the sphere of action1 are both grounded in reason4 ,but idealism is the true standpoint1 because it is able to comprehend and explain the opposing theory1 while the converse is not the case4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,o4 ,liebmann 7,ueber den individuellen ,beweis fr die ,freiheit des ,willens p1 #aca4 #ahff7 ,here we discover the noteworthy point where theoretical and practical philosophy actually pass over into each other4 ,for this principle results3 ,in order to carry out the individual proof for the freedom of the will1 ,i must do my duty4 ,the nature1 the goal1 and the methods of the ,science of ,knowledge have now been determined4 ,it is genuine1 thoroughgoing idealism1 which raises the ,kantian philosophy to the rank of an evident science by deducing its premises from a first principle which is immediately certain1 and by removing the twofold dualism of intuition and thought1 of knowledge and volition1 viz41 by proving both contraries acts of one and the same ego4 ,while ,reinhold had sought a supreme truth as a fundamental principle of unity1 without which the doctrine of knowledge would lack the systematic form essential to science1 while ,beck had interpreted the spirit of the ,kantian philosophy in an idealistic sense1 and ,jacobi had demanded the elimination of the thing in itself1 all these desires combined are fulfilled in ,fichte's doctrine1 and at the same time the results of the ,critique of ,reason are given that evidence which ,aenesidemus-,schulze had missed in them4 ,as an answer to the question1 ,how is knowledge brought about8 7as well the knowledge of common sense as that given in the particular sciences71 how is experience possible81 and as a construction of common consciousness as this manifests itself in life and in the particular sciences1 ,fichteanism adopts the name ,science of ,knowledge1 being distinguished from the particular sciences by the fact that they discuss the voluntary1 and it the necessary1 representations or actions of the spirit4 7,the representation of a triangle or a circle is a free one1 it may be omitted2 the representation of space in general is a necessary one1 from which it is impossible for us to abstract47 ,how does intelligence come to have sensations1 to intuit space and time1 and to form just such categories 7thing and property1 cause and effect1 and not others quite different78 ,while ,kant correctly described these functions of the intuiting and thinking spirit1 and showed them actual1 they must further be proven1 be shown necessary or deduced4 ,deduced whence8 ,from the deed-acts 7,thathandlungen7 of the ego which lie at the basis of all consciousness1 and the highest of which are formulated in three principles4 7b7 ,the ,three ,principles4--,at the portal of the ,science of ,knowledge we are met not by an assertion1 but by a summons--a summons to self-contemplation4 ,think anything whatever and observe what thou dost1 and of necessity must do1 in thinking4 ,thou wilt discover that thou dost never think an object without thinking thyself therewith1 that it is absolutely impossible for thee to abstract from thine ego4 ,and second1 consider what thou dost when thou dost think thine ego4 ,this means to affirm or posit one's self1 to be a subject-object4 ,the nature of self-consciousness is the identity of the representing subject and the represented object4 ,the pure ego is not a fact1 but an original doing1 the act of being for self 7,frsichsein71 and the 7philosophical1 or--as seems to be the case according to some passages--even the common7 consciousness of this doing an intellectual intuition2 through this we become conscious of the deed-act which is ever 7though unconsciously7 performing4 ,this is the meaning of the first of the principles3 ,the ego posits originally and absolutely its own being1 or1 more briefly3 ,the ego posits itself2 more briefly still3 ,i am4 ,the nature of the ego consists in positing itself as existing4#a ,since1 besides this self-cogitation of the ego1 an op-position is found among the facts of empirical consciousness 7think only of the principle of contradiction71 and yet1 besides the ego1 there is nothing which could be opposed1 we must assume as a second principle3 ,to the ego there is absolutely opposited a non-ego4 ,these two principles must be united1 and this can be accomplished only by positing the contraries 7ego and non-ego71 since they are both in the ego1 as reciprocally limiting or partially sublating one another1 that is1 each as divisible 7capable of quantitative determination74 ,accordingly the third principle runs3 ,the ego opposes in the ego a divisible non-ego to the divisible ego4 ,from these principles ,fichte deduces the three laws of thought1 identity1 contradiction1 and sufficient reason1 and the three categories of quality--reality1 negation1 and limitation or determination4 ,instead of following him in these labors1 we may emphasize the significance of his view of the ego as pure activity without an underlying substratum1 with which he carries dynamism over from the ,kantian philosophy of nature to metaphysics4 ,we must not conceive the ego as something which must exist before it can put forth its activities4 ,doing is not a property or consequence of being1 but being is an accident and effect of doing4 ,all substantiality is derivative1 activity is primal2 being arises from doing4 ,the ego is nothing more than self-position2 it exists not only for itself 7fr sich71 but also through itself 7durch sich74 ,footnote #a3 ,the ego spoken of in the first of the principles1 the ego as the object of intellectual intuition and as the ground and creator of all being1 is1 as the second ,introduction to the ,science of ,knowledge clearly announces1 not the individual1 but the ,i-ness 7,ichheit7 7which is to be presupposed as the prius of the manifold of representation1 and which is exalted above the opposition of subject and object71 mentality in general1 eternal reason1 which is common to all and the same in all1 which is present in all thinking and at the basis thereof1 and to which particular persons stand related merely as accidents1 as instruments1 as special expressions1 destined more and more to lose themselves in the universal form of reason4 ,but1 further still1 a distinction must be made between the absolute ego as intuition 7as the form of ,i-ness71 from which the ,science of ,knowledge starts1 and the ego as ,idea 7as the supreme goal of practical endeavor7 with which it ends4 ,in neither is the ego conceived as individual2 in the former the ,i-ness is not yet determined to the point of individuality1 in the latter individuality has disappeared1 ,fichte is right when he thinks it remarkable that a system whose beginning and end and whole nature is aimed at forgetfulness of individuality in the theoretical sphere and denial of it in the practical sphere should be called egoism4 ,and yet not only opponents1 but even adherents of ,fichte1 as is shown by ,friedrich ,schlegel's philosophy of genius1 have1 by confusing the pure and the empirical ego1 been guilty of the mistake thus censured4 ,on the philosophy of the romanticists cf4 ,erdmann's ,history1 vol4 ii4 #cad1 #cae2 ,zeller1 p4 #efb seq42 and ,r4 ,haym1 ,die ,romantische ,schule1 #ahgj4 ,the actions expressed in the three principles are never found pure in experience1 nor do they represent isolated acts of the ego4 ,intelligence can think nothing without thinking itself therewith2 it is equally impossible for it to think ,i am without at the same time thinking something else which is not itself2 subject and object are inseparable4 ,it is rather true that the acts of position described are one single1 all-inclusive act1 which forms only the first member in a connected system of pre-conscious actions1 through which consciousness is produced1 and the complete investigation of whose members constitutes the further business of the ,science of ,knowledge as a theory of the nature of reason4 ,in this the ,science of ,knowledge employs a method which1 by its rhythm of analysis and synthesis1 development and reconciliation of opposites1 became the model of ,hegel's dialectic method4 ,the synthesis described in the third principle1 although it balances thesis and antithesis and unites them in itself1 still contains contrary elements1 in order to whose combination a new synthesis must be sought4 ,in this1 in turn1 the analytic discovery and the synthetic adjustment of a contrariety is repeated1 etc41 etc4 ,the original synthesis1 moreover1 prescribes a division of the inquiry into two parts1 one theoretical and the other practical4 ,for it contains the following principles3 ,the ego posits itself as limited by the non-ego--it functions cognitively2 and3 ,the ego posits itself as determining the non-ego--it functions volitionally and actively4 7c7 ,the ,theoretical ,ego4--,in positing itself as determined by the non-ego1 the ego is at once passive 7affected by something other than itself7 and active 7it posits its own limitation74 ,this is possible only as it posits reality in itself only in part1 and transfers to the non-ego so much as it does not posit in itself4 ,passivity is diminished activity1 negation of the totality of reality4 ,from reflection on this relation between ego and non-ego spring the categories of reciprocal determination1 of causality 7the non-ego as the cause of the passion of the ego71 and substantiality 7this passion merely the self-limitation of the ego74 ,the conflict between the causality of the non-ego 7by which the ego is affected7 and the substantiality of the ego 7in which and the activity of which all reality is contained7 is resolved only by the assumption of two activities 7or1 rather1 of two opposite directions of one activity7 in the ego1 one of which 7centrifugal1 expansive7 strives infinitely outward while the other 7centripetal or contractile7 sets a bound to the former1 and drives the ego back into itself1 whereupon another excursus follows1 and a new limitation and return1 etc4 ,with every repetition of this double act of production and reflection a special class of representations arises4 ,through the first limitation of the in itself unlimited activity sensation arises 7as a product of the productive imagination74 ,because the ego produces this unconsciously1 it appears to be given1 brought about by influence from without4 ,the second stage1 intuition1 is reached when the ego reflects on sensation1 when it opposes to itself something foreign which limits it4 ,thirdly1 by reflection on intuition an image of that which is intuited is constructed1 and1 as such1 distinguished from a real thing to which the image corresponds2 at this point the categories and the forms of intuition1 space and time1 appear1 which thus arise along with the object4#a ,the fourth stadium is understanding1 which steadies the fluctuating intuition into a concept1 realizes the object1 and looks upon it as the cause of the intuition4 ,fifthly1 judgment makes its appearance as the faculty of free reflection and abstraction1 or the power to consider a definite content or to abstract from it4 ,as judgment is itself the condition of the bound reflection of the understanding1 so it points in turn to its condition1 to the sixth and highest stage of intelligence1 reason1 by means of which we are able to abstract from all objects whatever1 while reason itself1 pure self-consciousness1 is that from which abstraction is never possible4 ,it is only in the highest stage that consciousness or a representation of representation takes place4 ,and at the culmination of the theoretical ego the point of transition to the practical ego appears4 ,here the ego becomes aware that in positing itself as determined by the non-ego it has only limited itself1 and therefore is itself the ground of the whole content of consciousness2 here it apprehends itself as determining the non-ego or as acting1 and recognizes as its chief mission to impress the form of the ego as far as possible on the non-ego1 and ever to extend the boundary further4 ,footnote #a3 ,the object is a product of the ego only for the observer1 not for the observed ego itself1 to which1 from this standpoint of imagination1 it appears rather as a thing in itself independent of the ego and affecting it4 ,further1 it must so appear1 because the ego1 in its after reflection on its productive activity1 and just by this reflection1 transforms the productive action considered into a fixed and independent product found existing4 ,the deduction of representation whose outline has just been given was the first example 7often imitated in the school of ,schelling and ,hegel7 of a constructive psychology1 which1 from the mission or the concept of the soul--in this case from the nature of self-consciousness--deduces the various psychical functions as a system of actions1 each of which is in its place implied by the rest1 as it in turn presupposes them4 ,this is distinguished from the sensationalistic psychology1 which is also genetic 7cf4 pp4 #bde-bej71 as well as from the mechanical or associational psychology1 which likewise excludes the idea of an isolated coexistence of mental faculties1 by the fact that it demands a new manifestation of the soul-ground in order to the ascent from one member of the series to the next higher4 ,it is also distinguished from sensationalism by its teleological point of view4 ,for no matter how much ,fichte1 too1 may speak of the mechanism of consciousness1 it is plain to the reader of the theoretical part of his system not only that he makes this mechanism work in the service of an end1 but also that he finds its origin in purposive activity of the ego2 while the practical part gives further and decisive confirmation of the fact4 ,the danger and the defect of such a constructive treatment of psychology--as we may at once remark for all later attempts--lies in imagining that the task of mental science has been accomplished and all its problems solved when each particular activity of the ego has been assigned its mission and work for the whole1 and its place in the system1 without any indication of the means through which this destination can be fulfilled4 7d7 ,the ,practical ,ego4--,the deduction of representation has shown how 7through what unconscious acts of the ego7 the different stages of cognition1 the three sensuous and the three intellectual functions of representation1 come into being4 ,it has proved incapable1 however1 of giving any account of the way in which the ego comes at one point to arrest its activity1 which tends infinitely outward1 and to turn it back upon itself4 ,we know1 indeed1 that this first limitation1 through which sensation arises1 and on which as a basis the understanding1 by continued reflection constructs the objective world1 was necessary in order that consciousness and knowledge might arise4 ,if the ego did not limit its infinite activity neither representation nor an objective world would exist4 ,but why1 then1 are there such things as consciousness1 representation1 and a world8 ,from the standpoint of the theoretical ego this problem1 ,whence the original non-ego or opposition 7,anstoss71 which impels the ego back upon itself8 cannot be solved1 since it is only through the opposition that it itself arises4 ,the deduction of the opposition1 which the theoretical part of the ,science of ,knowledge did not furnish1 is to be looked for from the practical part4 ,the primacy of practical reason1 already emphasized by ,kant1 gives us the answer3 ,the ego limits itself and is theoretical1 in order to be practical4 ,the whole machinery of representation and the represented world exists only to furnish us the possibility of fulfilling our duty4 ,we are intelligence in order that we may be able to be will4 ,action1 action--that is the end of our existence4 ,action is giving form to matter1 it is the alteration or elaboration of an object1 the conquest of an impediment1 of a limitation4 ,we cannot act unless we have something in1 on1 and against which to act4 ,the world of sensation and intuition is nothing but a means for attaining our ethical destiny1 it is the material of our duty under the form of sense4 ,the theoretical ego posits an object 7,gegenstand7 that the practical ego may experience resistance 7,widerstand74 ,no action is possible without a world as the object of action2 no world is possible without a consciousness which represents it2 no consciousness possible without reflection of the ego on itself2 no reflection without limitation1 without an opposition or non-ego4 ,the ,anstoss is deduced4 ,the ego posits a limit 7is theoretical7 in order 7as practical7 to overcome it4 ,our duty is the only per se 7,ansich7 of the phenomenal world1 the only truly real element in it3 ,things are in themselves that which we ought to make of them4 ,objectivity exists only to be more and more sublated1 that is1 to be so worked up that the activity of the ego may in it become evident4--,the same ground of explanation which reveals the necessity of an external nature enables us to understand why the one infinite ego 7the universal life or the ,deity1 as ,fichte puts it in his later works7 divides into the many empirical egos or individuals1 why it does not carry out its plan immediately1 but through finite spirits as its organs4 ,action is possible only under the form of the individual1 only in individuals are consciousness and morality possible4 ,without resistance1 no action2 without conflict1 no morality4 ,individuality1 it is true1 is to be overcome and destroyed in moral endeavor2 but in order to this it must have existed4 ,virtue is a conquest over external and internal nature4 ,a gradation of practical functions corresponding to the series of theoretical activities leads from feeling and striving 7longing and desire7 through the system of impulses 7the impulse to representation or reflection1 to production1 to satisfaction7 up to moral will or the impulse to harmony with self1 which stands opposed to the natural impulses as the categorical imperative4 ,the practical ego mediates between the theoretical and the absolute ego4 ,the ego ought to be infinite and self-dependent1 but finds itself finite and dependent on a non-ego--a contradiction which is resolved by the ego becoming practical1 by the fact that in ever increasing measure it subdues nature to itself1 and by such increasing extension of the boundary draws nearer and ever nearer to the realization of its destination1 to become absolute ego4 #b4 ,the ,science of ,ethics and of ,right4 ,the moral law demands the control of the sensuous impulse by the pure impulse4 ,if the former aims at comfortable ease and enjoyment1 the latter is directed toward satisfaction with one's self1 to endeavor and self-dependence4 7,enjoyment is inevitable1 it is true1 as satisfaction where any impulse whatever is carried out2 only it must not form the end of action47 ,morality is activity for its own sake1 the radical evil--from which only a miracle can deliver us1 but a miracle which we must ourselves perform--is inertness1 lack of will to rise above the natural determinateness of the impulse of self-preservation to the clear consciousness of duty and of freedom4 ,for the moral man there is no resting2 each end attained becomes for him the impulse to renewed endeavor1 each task fulfilled leads him to a fresh one4 ,become self-dependent1 act autonomously1 make thyself free2 let every action have a place in a series1 in the continuation of which the ego must become independent4 ,to this formal and universal norm1 again1 there is added a special injunction for each individual4 ,each individual spirit has its definite mission assigned to it by the world-order3 each ought to do that which it alone should and can do4 ,always fulfill thy moral vocation1 thy special destination4#a ,or both in popular combination3 ,never act contrary to conscience4 ,footnote #a3 ,although ,fichte was justly charged with surpassing even the abstractness of the ,kantian ethics with his bald moral principle1 the self-dependence of the ego1 he deserves praise for having given ethics a concrete content of indisputable soundness and utility by his introduction of ,jacobi's idea of purified individuality4 ,the elevation to freedom is accomplished gradually4 ,at first freedom consists only in the consciousness of the natural impulse1 then follows a breaking away from this by means of maxims1 which in the beginning are maxims of individual happiness4 ,later on a blind enthusiasm for self-dependence arises and produces an heroic spirit1 which would rather be generous than just1 which bestows sympathy more readily than respect2 true morality1 however1 does not arise until1 with constant attention to the law and continued watchfulness of self1 duty is done for its own sake4 ,no man is for a moment secure of his morality without continued endeavor4 ,in order to deliverance from the original sin of inertness and its train1 cowardice and falsity1 men stand in need of examples1 such as have been given them in the founders of religions1 to construe for them the riddle of freedom4 ,the necessary enlightenment concerning moral conviction is given by the ,church1 whose symbols are not to be looked upon as dogmatic propositions1 but only as means for the proclamation of the eternal verities1 and which1 like the state 7for both are institutions based on necessity71 has for its object to make itself unnecessary as time goes on4 ,the system of duties distinguishes four classes of duties on the basis of the twofold opposition of universal 7non-transferable7 and particular 7transferable7 duties1 and of unconditional duties 7directed to the whole7 and conditional duties 7directed toward self74 ,these four classes are the duties of self-preservation1 of class1 of non-interference with others1 and of vocation4 ,the lower calling includes the producers1 artisans1 and tradesmen1 whose action terminates directly on nature2 and the higher1 the scholars1 teachers of the people or clergy1 artists1 and government officials1 who work directly on the community of rational beings4 ,fichte's thoughtful and sympathetically written discussion of marriage is in pleasant contrast to the bald1 purely legal view of this relation adopted by ,kant4 ,natural right is for ,fichte1 as for ,kant1 whose theory of right1 moreover1 appeared later than ,fichte's1 entirely independent of ethics1 and distinguished from the latter by its exclusive reference to external conduct instead of to the disposition and the will4 ,the rule of right gains from the moral law1 it is true1 new sanction for conscience1 but cannot be derived from the law4--,the concept of right is to be deduced as a necessary act of the ego1 i4e41 to be shown a condition of self-consciousness4 ,the ego must posit itself as an individual1 and can accomplish this only by positing itself in a relation of right to other finite rational beings2 without a thou1 no ,i4 ,a finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself a free activity in an external sense-world2 and it cannot effect this latter unless 7#a7 it ascribes free activity to other beings as well1 hence not without assuming other finite rational beings outside itself1 and positing itself as standing in the relation of right to them2 and unless 7#b7 it ascribes to itself a material body and posits this as standing under the influence of a person outside it4 ,but1 further1 ,fichte considers it possible to deduce the particular constitution both of the external world and of the human body 7as the sphere of all free actions possible to the person74 ,in the former there must be present a tough1 durable matter capable of resistance1 and light and air in order to the possibility of intercourse between spirits2 while the latter must be an organized1 articulated nature-product1 furnished with senses1 capable of infinite determination1 and adapted to all conceivable motions4 ,if a community of free beings1 such as has been shown the condition of individual self-consciousness1 is to be possible1 the following must hold as the law of right3 ,so limit thy freedom that others may be free along with thee4 ,this law is conditioned on the lawful behavior of others4 ,where this is lacking1 where my fellow does not recognize and treat me as a free1 rational being1 the right of coercion comes in2 coercion1 however1 is not to be exercised by the individual himself--since then there would be no guaranty either for its successful exercise or for the non-violation of the legal limit--but devolves upon the state4 ,the state takes its origin in the common will of all to unite for the safeguarding of their rights1 and determines by positive laws 7intermediate between the law of right and legal judgments7 what shall be considered rights4 ,thus there result three subjects for natural right3 original rights or the sum of that which pertains to freedom or personality 7inviolability of the body and of property71 the right of coercion1 and political right4 ,the aim of punishment is the reform of the evil doer and the deterrence of others4 ,fichte is in agreement with ,kant concerning the principle of popular sovereignty 7,rousseau7 and the exercise of the political power through representatives2 but not so concerning the guaranties against the violation of the fundamental law of the state4 ,instead of the division of powers recommended by ,kant he demands supervision of the rulers of the state by ephors1 who1 themselves without any legislative or executive authority1 shall suspend the rulers in case they violate the law1 and call them to account before the community4 ,every constitution in which the rulers are not responsible is despotic4 ,fichte did not continue loyal to this principle1 that the state is merely a legal institution4 ,he not only demands a state organization of labor by which everyone shall be placed in a position to live from his work1 in the ,natural ,right and the ,exclusive ,commercial ,state1 but1 in his posthumous ,theory of ,right1 #ahab1 he makes it the chief duty of the state to lead men1 by the moral and intellectual training of the people1 to do from insight what they have hitherto done from traditional belief4 ,through the education of the people the empirical state is gradually to transform itself into the rational state4 #c4 ,fichte's ,second ,period3 his ,view of ,history and his ,theory of ,religion4 ,fichte's transfer to ,berlin brought him into more intimate contact with the world1 and along with new experiences and new emotions gave him new problems4 ,while a vigorously developing religious sentiment turned his speculation to the relation of the individual ego to the primal source of spiritual life1 empirical reality also acquired greater significance for him1 and the intellectual1 moral1 and political situation of the time especially attracted his attention4 ,the last required philosophical interpretation1 demanded at once inquiry into its historical conditions and a consideration of the means by which the glaring contradiction between the condition of the nation at the time and the ideals of reason could be diminished4 ,the ,addresses to the ,german ,nation outlined a plan for a moral reformation of the world1 to start with the education of the ,german people2#a while the ,characteristics of the ,present ,age1 which had preceded the ,addresses1 defined the place of the age in the general development of humanity4 ,the scheme of historical periods given in the ,characteristics and similarly in the ,theory of the ,state 7innocence--sin--supremacy of reason1 with intermediate stages between each two7 is interesting as a forerunner of ,hegel's undertaking4 ,footnote #a3 ,among all nations you are the one in whom the germ of human perfection is most decidedly present4 ,the spiritual regeneration of mankind must proceed from the ,german people1 for they are the one original or primitive people of the new age1 the only one which has preserved its living language--,french is a dead tongue--and has raised itself to true creative poetry and free science4 ,the ground of distinction between ,germanism and the foreign spirit lies in the question1 whether we believe in an original element in man1 in the freedom1 infinite perfectibility1 and eternal progress of our race1 or put no faith in all these4 ,history is produced through the interaction of the two principles1 faith and understanding1 which are related to each other as law and freedom1 and strives toward a condition in which these two shall be so reconciled that faith shall have entirely passed over into the form of understanding1 shall have been transformed into insight1 and understanding shall have taken up the content of faith into itself4 ,history begins with the coming together of two original and primitive races1 one of order or faith1 and one of freedom or understanding1 neither of which would attain to an historical development apart from the other4 ,from the legal race the free race learns respect for the law1 as in turn it arouses in the former the impulse toward freedom4 ,the course of history divides into five periods4 ,in the state of innocence or of rational instinct that which is rational is done unconsciously1 out of natural impulse2 in the state of commencing sin the instinct for the good changes into an external compulsory authority1 the law of reason appears as a ruling power from without1 which can be disobeyed as well as obeyed4 ,we ourselves live in the period of completed sinfulness1 of absolute license and indifference to all truth1 of unlimited caprice and selfishness4 ,but however far removed from the moral ideal this age appears1 in which the individual1 freed from all restraints1 heeds naught except his egoistic desire1 and in his care for his own welfare forgets to labor for the universal1 yet this ultimate goal1 this doing from free insight that which in the beginning was done out of blind faith1 cannot be attained unless authority shall have first been shaken off and the individual become self-dependent4 ,a few signs already betoken the dawn of the fourth era1 that of rational science or of commencing justification1 in which truth shall be acknowledged supreme1 and the individual ego1 at least as cognitive1 shall submit itself to the generic reason4 ,finally1 with the era of rational art1 or the state of completed justification and sanctification1 wherein the will of the individual shall entirely merge in life for the race1 the end of the life of humanity on earth--the free determination of all its relations according to reason--will be fulfilled4 ,in the ,jena period the religious life of the ego simply coincided for ,fichte with its practical life2 piety coincided with moral conduct2 the ,deity with the absolute ego1 with the moral law1 with the moral order of the world4 ,a change subsequently took place in his views on this point4 ,he experienced feelings which1 at least in quality1 were distinct from readiness for moral action1 no matter how intimately they are intertwined with this1 and no matter how little they can actually be separated from it2 religion is possible neither without a metaphysical belief in a suprasensible world1 nor without obedience to the moral law1 yet in itself it is not that belief nor this action1 but the inner spirit which pervades and animates all our thought and action--it is life1 love1 blessedness4 ,and as quiet blessedness is here distinguished from ceaseless action1 so for our thinker the inactive ,deity1 the self-identical life of the absolute1 separates from the active universal reason1 which in its individual organs advances from task to task4 ,the earlier undivided and unique principle1 the absolute ego1 divides into the ,ichheit 7moral law1 world-order71 and an absolute as the ground thereof4 ,the spirit 7the ego1 or1 as ,fichte now prefers to say1 knowledge7 an image of ,god1 the world an image of the spirit4 ,the active order of the world 7the moral law which realizes itself in individuals7 the immediate1 and objective reality the mediate1 revelation of the absolute6 ,does this view of religion1 which ,fichte incorporates also in the later expositions of the ,science of ,knowledge1 indicate an abandonment and denial of the earlier standpoint8 ,the philosophy of ,fichte's second period is a new system--so judge the majority of the historians of philosophy4 ,it is not a transformation1 but a completion of the earlier system2 the doctrine promulgated in ,berlin continues to be idealistic1 as that advanced in ,jena had itself been pantheistic--this is the opinion of ,fortlage and ,harms1 in agreement with the philosopher himself and with his son4 ,kuno ,fischer1 also1 who shows a constant advance in the development of ,fichteanism1 a gradual transition without a break1 may be counted among the minority who hold that throughout his life ,fichte taught but one system4 ,we believe it our duty to adhere to this latter view4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge 7the world a product of the ego7 enters as it is into the later form of the ,fichtean philosophy2 the latter gives up none of the fundamental positions of the former1 but only adds to it a culmination1 by which the appearance of the building is altered1 it is true1 but not the edifice itself4 ,in the discussion of the question the following three have been emphasized as the most important points of distinction between the two periods3 ,in the earlier system ,god is made equivalent to the absolute ego and the moral order of the world1 in the later he is separated from these and removed beyond them2 in the former the nature of ,god is described as activity1 in the latter1 as being2 in the one1 action is designated as the highest mission of man1 in the other1 blessed devotion to ,god4 ,all three variations of the later doctrine from the earlier may be admitted without giving up the position that the former is only an extension of the latter and not an essential modification of it 7i4e41 in its teachings concerning the relation of the ego and the world74 ,fichte experienced religious feelings the philosophical outcome of which he worked into his system4 ,he now knows a first thing 7the ,deity as distinct from the absolute ego7 and a last thing 7the inwardness of religious devotion to the world-ground71 which he had before not overlooked1 much less denied1 but combined in one with the second 7the absolute ego or the moral order of the world7 and the one before the last 7moral action74 ,it is incorrect to say that1 in his later doctrine1 ,fichte substituted the inactive absolute in place of the active absolute ego1 and the quiet blessedness of contemplation in place of ceaseless action4 ,not in place of these1 but beyond them1 while all else remains as it was4 ,the categorical imperative1 the absolute ego or knowledge is no longer ,god himself1 but the first manifestation of ,god1 though a necessary revelation of him4 ,religion had previously been included for ,fichte in moral action2 now fellowship with ,god goes beyond this1 though morality remains its indispensable condition and inseparable companion4 ,finally1 how to construe the previously avoided predicate1 being1 in relation to the ,deity1 is shown by the no less frequent designation of the absolute as the ,universal ,life4 ,the expression being1 which it must be confessed is ambiguous1 here signifies in our opinion only the quiet1 self-identical activity of the absolute1 in opposition to the unresting1 changeful activity of the world-order and its finite organs1 not that inert and dead being posited by the ego1 the ascription of which to the ,deity ,fichte had forbidden in his essay which had been charged with atheism1 not to speak of the existence-mode of a particular self-conscious and personal being4 ,instead of speaking of a conversion of ,fichte to the position of his opponents1 we might rather venture the paradoxical assertion1 that1 when he characterizes the absolute as the only true being1 he intends to produce the same view in the mind of the reader as in his earlier years1 when he expressed himself against the application of the concepts existence1 substance1 and conscious personality to ,god1 on the ground that they are categories of sense4 ,the chief thing1 at least1 remains unaltered3 the opposition to a view of religion which transforms the sublime and sacred teaching of ,christianity into an enervating doctrine of happiness4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,schelling4 ,friedrich ,wilhelm ,joseph 7von7 ,schelling was born ,january #bg1 #agge1 at ,leonberg 7in ,wrtemberg71 and died ,august #bj1 #ahed1 at the baths of ,ragatz 7in ,switzerland74 ,in #agij-ie he attended the seminary at ,tbingen1 in company with ,hlderlin and ,hegel1 who were five years older than himself2 at seventeen he published a dissertation on the ,fall of ,man1 and a year later an essay on ,religious ,myths2 and was called in #agih from ,leipsic--where1 after several treatises#a in explanation of the ,science of ,knowledge1 he had issued1 in #agig1 the ,ideas for a ,philosophy of ,nature--to ,jena4 ,in the latter place he became acquainted with his future wife1 ,caroline1#b ne ,michalis 7#agfc-ahji71 widow of ,bhmer and at this time the brilliant wife of ,august ,wilhelm ,schlegel4 ,from #ahjc to #ahjf he served as professor in ,wrzburg2 then followed two residences of fourteen years each in ,munich1 separated by seven years in ,erlangen3 #ahjf-bj as ,member of the ,academy of ,sciences and ,general ,secretary of the ,academy of the ,plastic ,arts 7he received this latter position after delivering on the king's birthday his celebrated address on ,the ,relation of the ,plastic ,arts to ,nature1 #ahjg72 and #ahbg-da as professor in the newly established university1 and ,president of the ,academy of ,sciences4 ,in #ahab ,schelling married his second wife1 ,pauline ,gotter4 ,besides various journals#c and the works to be noticed later1 two polemic treatises should be mentioned1 the ,exposition of the ,true ,relation of the ,philosophy of ,nature to the ,improved ,doctrine of ,fichte1 #ahjf1 in which his former friend is charged with plagiarism1 and the ,memorial of the ,treatise on ,divine ,things by ,herr ,jacobi1 #ahab1 which answers a bitter attack of ,jacobi still more bitterly4 ,from this on our philosopher1 once so fond of writing1 becomes silent4#d ,the often promised issue of the positive philosophy1 which had already been twice commenced in print 7,the ,ages of the ,world1 #ahae2 ,mythological ,lectures1 #ahcj71 was both times suspended4 ,being called to the ,berlin ,academy by ,frederick ,william ,,iv41 in order to counterbalance the prevailing ,hegelianism1 ,schelling delivered lectures in the university also 7on ,mythology and ,revelation71 which he ceased1 however1 when notes taken by his hearers were printed without his consent4#e ,his collected works were published in fourteen volumes 7#ahef-fa7 under the care of his son1 ,k4,e4,a4 ,schelling4#f ,footnote #a3 ,on the ,possibility of a ,form of ,philosophy in ,general1 ,on the ,ego as ,principle of ,philosophy1 both in #agie2 ,letters on ,dogmatism and ,criticism1 #agif2 ,essays in ,explanation of the ,science of ,knowledge1 #agig4 ,footnote #b3 ,karoline1 ,letters1 edited by ,g4 ,waitz1 #ahga4 ,footnote #c3 ,kritisches ,journal der ,philosophie 7with ,hegel71 #ahjb2 ,zeitschrift fr spekulative ,physik1 #ahjj 7continued as ,neue ,zeitschrift fr spekulative ,physik72 ,jahrbcher der ,medizin als ,wissenschaft 7with ,marcus71 #ahjf-jh2 ,allgemeine ,zeitschrift von ,deutschen fr ,deutsche1 #ahac4 ,footnote #d3 ,besides a supplement to ,die ,weltalter and his inaugural lecture at ,berlin1 he published only two prefaces1 one to ,viktor ,cousin ber franzsische und deutsche ,philosophie1 done into ,german by ,hubert ,beckers1 #ahcd1 and one to ,steffens's ,nachgelassene ,schriften1 #ahdf4 ,footnote #e3 ,paulus1 ,die endch offenbar gewordene positive ,philosophie der ,offenbarung1 #ahdc4 ,frauenstdt had previously published a sketch from this later doctrine1 #ahdb4 ,footnote #f3 ,on ,schelling cf4 the ,lectures by ,k4 ,rosenkranz1 #ahdc2 the articles by ,heyder in vol4 xiii4 of ,herzog's ,realencyclopdie fr protestantische ,theologie1 #ahfj1 and ,jodl in the ,allgemeine deutsche ,biographie2 ,r4 ,haym1 ,die romantische ,schule1 #ahgj2 ,aus ,schellings ,leben1 in ,briefen1 edited by ,plitt1 #c vols41 #ahfi-gj4 ,cf4 also ,watson's ,schelling's ,transcendental ,idealism 7,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhb72 and several translations from ,schelling in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy4--,,tr4 ,the leading motive in ,schelling's thinking is an unusually powerful fancy1 which gives to his philosophy a lively1 stimulating1 and attractive character1 without making it to a like degree logically satisfactory4 ,if the systems of ,fichte and ,hegel1 which in their content are closely related to ,schelling's1 impress us by their logical severity1 ,schelling chains us by his lively intuition and his suggestive power of feeling his way into the inner nature of things4 ,with him analogies outweigh reasons2 he is more concerned about the rich content of concepts than about their sharp definition2 and in the endeavor to show the unity of the universe1 both in the great and in the little1 especially to show the unity of nature and spirit1 he dwells longer on the relationship of objects than on their antitheses1 which he is glad to reduce to mere quantitative and temporary differences4 ,he adds to this an astonishing mobility of thought1 in virtue of which every offered suggestion is at once seized and worked into his own system1 though in this the previous standpoint is unconsciously exchanged for a somewhat altered one4 ,schelling's philosophy is1 therefore1 in a continual state of flux1 nearly every work shows it in a new form1 and it is always ideas from without whose incorporation has caused the transition4 ,besides ,leibnitz1 ,kant1 and ,fichte1 who were already familiar to ,schelling as a pupil at ,tbingen1 it was first ,herder1 then ,spinoza and ,bruno1 who exerted a transforming influence on his system1 to be followed later by ,neoplatonism and ,bhme's mysticism1 and1 finally1 by ,aristotle and the ,gnostics1 not to speak of his intercourse with his contemporaries ,kielmeyer1 ,steffens1 ,baader1 ,eschenmayer1 and others4 ,omitting his early adherence to ,fichte1 at least three periods must be distinguished in ,schelling's thinking4 ,the first period 7#agig-ahjj7 includes the epoch-making feat of his youth1 the philosophy of nature1 and1 as an equally legitimate second part of his system1 the philosophy of spirit or transcendental philosophy4 ,the latter is a supplementary recasting of ,fichte's ,science of ,knowledge1 while in the former ,schelling follows ,kant and ,herder4 ,the second period1 from #ahja1 adds to these two co-ordinate parts1 the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit1 and as a fundamental discipline1 a science of the absolute1 the philosophy of identity1 which may be characterized as ,spinozism revived on a ,fichtean basis4 ,besides the example of ,spinoza1 ,giordano ,bruno had most influence on this form of ,schelling's philosophy4 ,with the year #ahji1 after the signs of a new phase had become perceptible from #ahjd on1 his system enters on its third1 the theosophical1 period1 the period of the positive philosophy1 in which we shall distinguish a mystical and a scholastic stage4 ,the former is represented by the doctrine of freedom inspired by ,jacob ,bhme2 the latter1 by the philosophy of mythology and revelation1 which goes back to ,aristotle and the ,gnostics4 ,in the first period the absolute for ,schelling is creative nature2 in the second1 the identity of opposites2 in the third it is an antemundane process which advances from the not-yet-present of the contraries to their overcoming4 ,in neither of these advances is it ,schelling's intention to break with his previous teachings1 but in each case only to add a supplement4 ,that which has hitherto been the whole is retained as a part4 ,the philosophy of nature takes its place beside the completed ,fichtean transcendental philosophy1 with equal rights1 though with a reversed procedure2 then the theory of identity assumes a place above both2 finally1 a positive 7existential7 philosophy is added to the previous negative 7rational7 philosophy4 #a;a4 ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,schelling agrees with ,fichte that philosophy is transcendental science1 the doctrine of the conditions of consciousness1 and has to answer the question1 ,what must take place in order that knowledge may arise8 ,they agree1 further1 that these conditions of knowledge are necessary acts1 outgoings of an active original ground which is not yet conscious self1 but seeks to become such1 and that the material world is the product of these actions4 ,nature exists in order that the ego may develop4 ,but while ,fichte correctly understood the purpose of nature1 to help intelligence into being1 he failed to recognize the dignity of nature1 for he deprived it of all self-dependence1 all life of its own1 all generative power1 and treated it merely as a dead tool1 as a passive1 merely posited non-ego4 ,nature is not a board which the original ego nails up before itself in order1 striking against it1 to be driven back upon itself1 to be compelled to reflection1 and thereby to become theoretical ego2 in order1 further1 working over the non-ego1 and transforming it1 to exercise its practical activity3 but it is a ladder on which spirit rises to itself4 ,spirit develops out of nature2 nature itself has a spiritual element in it2 it is undeveloped1 slumbering1 unconscious1 benumbed intelligence4 ,by transferring to nature the power of self-position or of being subject1 ,schelling exalts the drudge of the ,science of ,knowledge to the throne4 ,the threefold division1 infinite original activity--nature or object--individual ego or subject1 remains as in ,fichte1 only that the first member is not termed pure ego1 but nature1 yet creative nature1 natura naturans4 ,schelling's aim is to show how from the object a subject arises1 from the existent something represented1 from the representable a representer1 from nature an ego4 ,he could only hope to solve this problem if he conceived natural objects--in the highest of which1 man1 he makes conscious spirit break forth or nature intuit itself--as themselves the products of an original subject1 of a creative ground striving toward consciousness4 ,for him also doing is more original than being4 ,it would not be exact1 therefore1 to define the difference between ,fichte and ,schelling by saying that1 with the former1 nature proceeds from the ego1 and with the latter the ego1 from nature4 ,it is rather true that with them both nature and spirit are alike the products of a third and higher term1 which seeks to become spirit1 and can accomplish this only by positing nature4 ,in the ,science of ,knowledge1 it is true1 this higher ground is conceived as an ethical1 in the ,philosophy of ,nature as a physical1 power1 although one framed for intelligence2 in the former1 moreover1 the natura naturata appears as the position once for all of a non-spiritual1 in the latter as a progressive articulated construction1 with gradually increasing intelligence4 ,in the unconscious products of nature1 nature's aim to reflect upon itself1 to become intelligence1 fails1 in man it succeeds4 ,nature is the embryonic life of spirit4 ,nature and spirit are essentially identical3 ,that which is posited out of consciousness is in its essence the same as that which is posited in consciousness also4 ,therefore the knowable must itself bear the impress of the knower4 ,nature the preliminary stage1 not the antithesis1 of spirit2 history1 a continuation of physical becoming2 the parallelism between the ideal and the real development-series--these are ideas from ,herder which ,schelling introduces into the transcendental philosophy4 ,the ,kantio-,fichtean moralism1 with its sharp contraposition of nature and spirit1 is limited in the ,naturphilosophie by ,herder's physicism4 ,nature is a priori 7everything individual in it is pre-determined by the whole1 by the ,idea of a nature in general72 hence the forms of nature can be deduced from the concept of nature4 ,the philosopher creates nature anew1 he constructs it4 ,speculative physics considers nature as subject1 becoming1 productivity 7not1 like empirical science1 as object1 being1 product71 and for this purpose it needs1 instead of individualizing reflection1 an intuition directed to the whole4 ,to this productive nature1 as to the absolute ego of ,fichte1 are ascribed two opposite activities1 one expansive or repulsive1 and one attractive1 and on these is based the universal law of polarity4 ,the absolute productivity strives toward an infinite product1 which it never attains1 because apart from arrest no product exists4 ,at definite points a check must be given it in order that something knowable may arise4 ,thus every product in nature is the result of a positive1 centrifugal1 accelerating1 universalizing force1 and a negative1 limiting1 retarding1 individualizing one4 ,the endlessness of the creative activity manifests itself in various ways3 in the striving for development on the part of every product1 in the preservation of the genus amid the disappearance of individuals1 in the endlessness of the series of products4 ,nature's creative impulse is inexhaustible1 it transcends every product4 ,qualities are points of arrest in the one universal force of nature2 all nature is a connected development4 ,because of the opposition in the nature-ground between the stimulating and the retarding activity1 the law of duality everywhere rules4 ,to these two forces1 however1 still a third factor must be added as their copula1 which determines the relation or measure of their connection4 ,this is the source of the threefold division of the ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,the magnet with its union of opposite polar forces is the type of all configuration in nature4 ,with ,fichte's synthetic method and ,herder's naturalistic principles ,schelling combines ,kantian ideas1 especially ,kant's dynamism 7matter is a force-product71#a and his view of the organic 7organisms are self-productive beings1 and are regarded by us as ends in themselves1 because of the interaction between their members and the whole74 ,the three organic functions sensibility1 irritability1 and reproduction1 on the other hand1 ,schelling took from ,kielmeyer1 whose address ,on the ,relations of the ,organic ,forces1 #agic1 excited great attention4 ,the concept of life is dominant in ,schelling's theory of nature4 ,the organic is more original than the inorganic2 the latter must be explained from the former2 that which is dead must be considered as a product of departing life4 ,no less erroneous than the theory of a magic vital force is the mechanical interpretation1 which looks on life merely as a chemical phenomenon4 ,the dead1 mechanical and chemical1 forces are merely the negative conditions of life2 to them there must be added as a positive force a vital stimulus external to the individual1 which continually rekindles the conflict between the opposing activities on which the vital process depends4 ,life consists1 that is1 in the perpetual prevention of the equilibrium which is the object of the chemical process4 ,this constant disturbance proceeds from universal nature1 which1 as the common principle of organic and inorganic nature1 as that which determines them for each other1 which founds a pre-established harmony between them1 deserves the name of the world-soul4 ,schelling thus recognizes a threefold nature3 organized1 inorganic1 and universal organizing 7according to ,harms1 cosmical7 nature1 of which the two former arise from the third and are brought by it into connection and harmony4 7,as ,schelling here takes an independent middle course between the mechanical explanation of life and the assumption of a specific vital force1 so in all the burning physical questions of the time he seeks to rise above the contending parties by means of mediating solutions4 ,thus1 in the question of single or double electricity1 he ranges himself neither on the side of ,franklin nor on that of his opponents2 in regard to the problem of light1 endeavors to overcome the antithesis between ,newton's emanation theory and the undulation theory of ,euler2 and1 in his chapter on combustion1 attacks the defenders of phlogiston as well as those who deny it74 ,footnote #a3 ,schelling terms his philosophy of nature dynamic atomism1 since it posits pure intensities as the simple 7atoms71 from which qualities are to be explained4 ,schelling's philosophy of nature#a proposes to itself three chief problems3 the construction of general1 indeterminate1 homogeneous matter1 with differences in density alone1 of determinate1 qualitatively differentiated matter and its phenomena of motion or the dynamical process1 and of the organic process4 ,for each of these departments of nature an original force in universal nature is assumed--gravity1 light1 and their copula1 universal life4 ,gravity--this does not mean that which as the force of attraction falls within the view of sensation1 for it is the union of attraction and repulsion--is the principle of corporeality1 and produces in the visible world the different conditions of aggregation in solids1 fluids1 and gases4 ,light--this1 too1 is not to be confounded with actual light1 of which it is the cause--is the principle of the soul 7from it proceeds all intelligence1 it is a spiritual potency1 the first subject in nature71 and produces in the visible world the dynamical processes magnetism1 electricity1 and chemism4 ,the higher unity of gravity and light is the copula or life1 the principle of the organic1 of animated corporeality or the processes of growth and reproduction1 irritability1 and sensibility4 ,footnote #a3 ,this is contained in the following treatises3 ,ideas for a ,philosophy of ,nature1 #agig2 ,on the ,world-soul1 #agih2 ,first ,sketch of a ,system of the ,philosophy of ,nature1 #agii2 ,universal ,deduction of the ,dynamical ,process or the ,categories of ,physics 7in the ,zeitschrift fr spekulative ,physik7 #ahjj4 ,in the above exposition1 however1 the modified philosophy of nature of the second period has also been taken into account4 ,general matter or the filling of space1 arises from the co-operation of three forces3 the centrifugal1 which manifests itself as repulsion 7first dimension71 the centripetal1 manifested as attraction 7second dimension71 and the synthesis of the two1 manifested as gravity 7third dimension74 ,these forces are raised by light to a higher potency1 and then make their appearance as the causes of the dynamical process or of the specific differences of matter4 ,the linear function of magnetism is the condition of coherence2 the surface force of electricity1 the basis of the qualities perceivable by sense2 the tri-dimensional force of the chemical process1 in which the two former are united1 produces the chemical qualities4 ,galvanism forms the transition to living nature1 in which through the operation of the copula these three dynamical categories are raised to organic categories4 ,to magnetism as the most general1 and hence the lowest force1 corresponds reproduction 7the formative impulse1 as nutrition1 growth1 and production1 including the artistic impulse72 electricity develops into irritability or excitability2 the higher analogue to the chemical process as the most individual and highest stage is sensibility or the capacity of feeling4 7,such at least is ,schelling's doctrine after ,steffens had convinced him of the higher dignity of that which is individual1 whereas at first he had made sensibility parallel with magnetism1 and reproduction with chemism1 because the former two appear most seldom1 and the latter most frequently4 ,electricity and irritability always maintained their intermediate position47 ,with the awakening of feeling nature has attained its goal--intelligence4 ,as inorganic substances are distinguished only by relative degrees of repulsion and attraction1 so the differentiation of organisms is conditioned by the relation of the three vital functions3 in the lower forms reproduction predominates1 then irritability gradually increases1 while in the highest forms both of these are subordinated to sensibility4 ,all species1 however1 are connected by a common life1 all the stages are but arrests of the same fundamental force4 ,this accentuation of the unity of nature1 which establishes a certain kinship between ,schelling's philosophy of nature and ,darwinism1 was a great idea1 which deserves the thanks of posterity in spite of such defects as its often sportive1 often heedlessly bold reasoning in details4 ,the parallelism of the potencies of nature1 as we have developed it by leaving out of account the numerous differences between the various expositions of the ,naturphilosophie1 may be shown by a table3 ,i4 ,,universal ,,nature4 ,,ii4 ,,inorganic ,,nature ,,iii4 ,,organic ,,nature4 7,,organizing7 #c4 ,copula #c4 ,organization or ,life4 _/,chemical ,g _/,sensi- ,man4 _/ ,process 7#c;d a bility4 #b4 ,light #b4;,dynamical,dimen- l _/ 7,soul74 ,process4 sion7 v ,irritabi- ,male b4 ,at- 7,determi- ,electri- a lity4 7,light7 traction4 nate city 7#b;d ,di-n ,animal4 #a4 ,gra- matter47 mension47 i vity #a4 ,indeter- ,magnetism s ,repro- ,female a4 ,re- 7,body7 minate 7#ast ,di- m duction 7-,gravity7 pulsion _/ matter4 mension47 _/ ,plant4 #a;b4 ,transcendental ,philosophy4 ,the philosophy of nature explained the products of nature teleologically1 deduced them from the concept or the mission of nature1 by ignoring the mechanical origin of physical phenomena and inquiring into the significance of each stage in nature in view of this ideal meaning of the whole4 ,it asks what is the outcome of the chemical process for the whole of nature1 what is given by electricity1 by magnetism1 etc4--what part of the general aim of nature is attained1 is realized through this or that group of phenomena4 ,the philosophy of spirit given in the ,system of ,transcendental ,idealism1 #ahjj1 finds itself confronted by corresponding questions concerning the phenomena of intelligence1 of morals1 and of art4 ,here again ,schelling does not trace out the mechanics of the soul-life1 but is interested only in the meaning1 in the teleological significance of the psychical functions4 ,his aim is a constructive psychology in the ,fichtean sense1 a history of consciousness1 and the execution of his design as well closely follows the example of the ,wissenschaftslehre4 ,since truth is the agreement of thought and its object1 every cognition necessarily implies the coming together of a subjective and an objective factor4 ,the problem of this coming together may be treated in two ways4 ,with the philosophy of nature we may start from the object and observe how intelligence is added to nature4 ,the transcendental philosophy takes the opposite course1 it takes its position with the subject1 and asks1 ,how is there added to intelligence an object corresponding to it8 ,the transcendental philosopher has need of intellectual intuition in order to recognize the original object-positing actions of the ego1 which remain concealed from common consciousness1 sunk in the outcome of these acts4 ,the theoretical part of the system explains the representation of objective reality 7the feeling connected with certain representations that we are compelled to have them71 from pure self-consciousness1 whose opposing moments1 a real and an ideal force1 limit each other by degrees1--and follows the development of spirit in three periods 7epochs74 ,the first of these extends from sensation1 in which the ego finds itself limited1 to productive intuition1 in which a thing in itself is posited over against the ego and the phenomenon between the two2 the second1 from this point to reflection 7feeling of self1 outer and inner intuition together with space and time1 the categories of relation as the original categories72 the third1 finally1 through judgment1 wherein intuition and concept are separated as well as united1 up to the absolute act of will4 ,willing is the continuation and completion of intuition2#a intuition was unconscious production1 willing is conscious production4 ,it is only through action that the world becomes objective for us1 only through interaction with other active intelligences that the ego attains to the consciousness of a real external world1 and to the consciousness of its freedom4 ,the practical part follows the will from impulse 7the feeling of contradiction between the ideal and the object7 through the division into moral law and resistant natural impulse up to arbitrary will4 ,observations on legal order1 on the state1 and on history are added as supplements4 ,the law of right1 by which unlawful action is directed against itself1 is not a moral1 but a natural order1 which operates with blind necessity4 ,the state1 like law1 is a product of the genus1 and not of individuals4 ,the ideal of a cosmopolitan legal condition is the goal of history1 in which caprice and conformity to law are one1 in so far as the conscious free action of individuals subserves an unconscious end prescribed by the world-spirit4 ,history is the never completed revelation of the absolute 7of the unity of the conscious and the unconscious7 through human freedom4 ,we are co-authors in the historical world-drama1 and invent our own parts4 ,not until the third 7the religious7 period1 in which he reveals himself as providence1 will ,god be2 in the past 7the tragical7 period1 in which the divine power was felt as fate1 and in the present 7the mechanical7 period1 in which he appears as the plan of nature1 ,god is not1 but is only becoming4 ,footnote #a3 ,with this transformation of the antithesis between knowledge and volition into a mere difference in degree1 ,schelling sinks back to the standpoint of ,leibnitz4 ,in all the idealistic thinkers who start from ,kant we find the endeavor to overcome the ,critical dualism of understanding and will1 as also that between intellect and sensibility4 ,schiller brings the contrary impulses of the ego into ultimate harmonious union in artistic activity4 ,fichte traces them back to a common ground2 ,schelling combines both these methods by extolling art as a restoration of the original identity4 ,hegel reduces volition to thought1 ,schopenhauer makes intellect proceed from will4 ,an interesting supplement to the ,fichtean philosophy is furnished by the third1 the aesthetic1 part of the transcendental idealism1 which makes use of ,kant's theory of the beautiful in a way similar to that in which the philosophy of nature had availed itself of his theory of the organic4 ,art is the higher third in which the opposition between theoretical and practical action1 the antithesis of subject and object1 is removed2 in which cognition and action1 conscious and unconscious activity1 freedom and necessity1 the impulse of genius and reflective deliberation are united4 ,the beautiful1 as the manifestation of the infinite in the finite1 shows the problem of philosophy1 the identity of the real and the ideal1 solved in sensuous appearance4 ,art is the true organon and warrant of philosophy2 she opens up to philosophy the holy of holies1 is for philosophy the supreme thing1 the revelation of all mysteries4 ,poesy and philosophy 7the aesthetic intuition of the artist and the intellectual intuition of the thinker7 are most intimately related2 they were united in the old mythology--why should not this repeat itself in the future8 #b4 ,system of ,identity4 ,the assertion which had already been made in the first period that nature and spirit are fundamentally the same1 is intensified in the second into the proposition1 ,the ground of nature and spirit1 the absolute1 is the identity of the real and the ideal1 and in this form is elevated into a principle4 ,as the absolute is no longer employed as a mere ground of explanation1 but is itself made the object of philosophy1 the doctrine of identity is added to the two co-ordinate disciplines1 the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit1 as a higher third1 which serves as a basis for them1 and in ,schelling's exposition of which several phases must be distinguished4#a ,footnote #a3 ,the philosophy of identity is given in the following treatises3 ,exposition of my ,system of ,philosophy1 #ahja2 ,further ,expositions of the ,system of ,philosophy1 #ahjb2 ,bruno1 or on the ,divine and ,natural ,principle of ,things1 #ahjc2 ,lectures on the ,method of ,academical ,study1 #ahjc2 ,aphorisms by way of ,introduction to the ,philosophy of ,nature1 ,aphorisms on the ,philosophy of ,nature 7both in the ,jahrbcher fr ,medizin71 #ahjf4 ,besides these the following also bear on this doctrine3 the additions to the second edition of the ,ideas1 #ahjc1 and the ,exposition1 against ,fichte1 #ahjf4 ,following ,spinoza1 whom he at first imitated even in the geometrical method of proof1 ,schelling teaches that there are two kinds of knowledge1 the philosophical knowledge of the reason and the confused knowledge of the imagination1 and1 as objects of these1 two forms of existence1 the infinite1 undivided existence of the absolute1 and the finite existence of individual things1 split up into multiplicity and becoming4 ,the manifold and self-developing things of the phenomenal world owe their existence to isolating thought alone2 they possess as such no true reality1 and speculation proves them void4 ,while things appear particular to inadequate representation1 the philosopher views them sub specie aeterni1 in their per se1 in their totality1 in the identity1 as ,ideas4 ,to construe things is to present them as they are in ,god4 ,but in ,god all things are one2 in the absolute all is absolute1 eternal1 infinitude itself4 7,accord-to ,hegel's parody1 the absolute is the night1 in which all cows are black47 ,the world-ground appears as nature and spirit2 yet in itself it is neither the one nor the other1 but the unity of both which is raised above all contrariety1 the indifference of objective and subjective4 ,although amid the finitude of the things of the world the self-identity of the absolute breaks up into a plurality of self-developing individual existences1 yet even in the phenomenal world of individuals the unity of the ground is not entirely lost3 each particular existence is a definite expression of the absolute1 and to it as such the character of identity belongs1 though in a diminished degree and mingled with difference 7,bruno's monads74 ,the world-ground is absolute1 the individual thing is relative1 identity and totality2 nothing exists which is merely objective or merely subjective2 everything is both1 only that one or other of these two factors always predominates4 ,this ,schelling terms quantitative difference3 the phenomena of nature1 like the phenomena of spirit1 are a unity of the real and the ideal1 only that in the former there is a preponderance of the real1 in the latter a preponderance of the ideal4 ,at first ,schelling1 in ,neoplatonic fashion1 maintained the existence of another intermediate region between the spheres of the infinite and the finite3 absolute knowing or the self-knowledge of the identity4 ,in this1 as the form of the absolute1 the objective and the subjective are not absolutely one1 as they are in the being or essence of the absolute1 but ideally 7potentially7 opposed1 though one realiter4 ,later he does away with this distinction also1 as existing for reflection alone1 not for rational intuition1 and outbids his earlier determinations concerning the simplicity of the absolute with the principle1 that it is not only the unity of opposites1 but also the unity of the unity and the opposition or the identity of the identity1 in which fanciful description the dialogue ,bruno pours itself forth4 ,a further alteration is brought in by characterizing the absolute as the identity of the finite and the infinite1 and by equating the finite with the real or being1 the infinite with the ideal or knowing4 ,with this there is joined a philosophical interpretation of the ,trinity akin to ,lessing's4 ,in the absolute or eternal the finite and the infinite are alike absolute4 ,god the ,father is the eternal1 or the unity of the finite and the infinite2 the ,son is the finite in ,god 7before the falling away72 the ,spirit is the infinite or the return of the finite into the eternal4 ,in the construction of the real series ,schelling proceeds still more schematically and analogically than in the ,naturphilosophie of the first period1 the contents of which are here essentially reproduced4 ,with this is closely connected his endeavor1 in correspondence with the principles of the theory of identity1 to show in every phenomenon the operation of all three moments of the absolute4 ,in each natural product all three potencies or stages1 gravity ,a7#a71 light ,a7#b71 and organization ,a7#c71 are present1 only in subordination to one of their number4 ,since the third potency is never lacking1 all is organic2 that which appears to us as inorganic matter is only the residuum left over from organization1 that which could become neither plant nor animal4 ,new here is the cohesion-series of ,steffens 7the phenomenon of magnetism71 in which nitrogen forms the south pole1 carbon the north pole1 and iron the point of indifference1 while oxygen1 hydrogen1 and water represent the east pole1 west pole1 and indifference point in electrical polarity4 ,in the organic world plants represent the carbon pole1 animals the nitrogen pole2 the former is the north pole1 the latter the south4 ,moreover1 the points of indifference reappear3 the plant corresponds to water1 the animal to iron4 ,schelling was far outdone in fantastic analogies of this kind by his pupils1 especially by ,oken1 who in his ,sketch of the ,philosophy of ,nature1 #ahje1 compares the sense of hearing1 for example1 to the parabola1 to a metal1 to a bone1 to the bird1 to the mouse1 and to the horse4 ,as nature was the imaging of the infinite 7unity or essence7 into the finite 7plurality or form71 so spirit is the taking up of the finite into the infinite4 ,in the spiritual realm also all three divine original potencies are every1 where active1 though in such a way that one is dominant4 ,in intuition 7sensation1 consciousness1 intuition1 each in turn thrice divided7 the infinite and the eternal are subordinated to the finite2 in thought or understanding 7concept1 judgment1 inference1 each in three kinds7 the finite and the eternal are subordinated to the infinite2 in reason 7which comprehends all under the form of the absolute7 the finite and the infinite are subordinated to the eternal4 ,intuition is finite cognition1 thought infinite cognition1 reason eternal cognition4 ,the forms of the understanding do not suffice for the knowledge of reason2 common logic with its law of contradiction has no binding authority for speculation1 which starts with the equalization of opposites4 ,in the ,aphorisms by way of ,introduction science1 religion1 and art figure as stages of the ideal all1 in correspondence with the potencies of the real all--matter1 motion1 and organization4 ,nature culminates in man1 history in the state4 ,reason1 philosophy1 is the re-establishment of identity1 the return of the absolute to itself4 ,unconditioned knowledge1 as ,schelling maintains in his encyclopedia1 i4e41 his ,lectures on the ,method of ,academical ,study1 is the presupposition of all particular knowledge4 ,the function of universities is to maintain intact the connection between particular knowledge and absolute knowledge4 ,the three higher faculties correspond to the three potencies in the absolute3 ,natural ,science and ,medicine to the real or finite2 ,history and ,law to the ideal or infinite2 ,theology to the eternal or the copula4 ,there is further a faculty of arts1 the so-called ,philosophical ,faculty1 which imparts whatever in philosophy is teachable4 ,the two lectures on theology 7viii4 and ix47 are especially important4 ,there are two forms of religion1 one of which discovers ,god in nature1 while the other finds him in history2 the former culminates in the ,greek religion1 the latter in the ,christian1 and with the founding of this the third period of history 7which ,schelling had previously postponed into the future71 the period of providence begins4 ,in ,christianity mythology is based on religion1 not religion on mythology1 as was the case in heathenism4 ,the speculative kernel of ,christianity is the incarnation of ,god1 already taught by the ,indian sages2 this1 however1 is not to be understood as a single event in time1 but as eternal4 ,it has been a hindrance to the development of ,christianity that the ,bible1 whose value is far below that of the sacred books of ,india1 has been more highly prized than that which the patristic thinking succeeded in making out of its meager contents4 ,if1 finally1 we compare ,schelling's system of identity with its model1 the system of ,spinoza1 two essential differences become apparent4 ,although both thinkers start from a principiant equal valuation of the two phenomenal manifestations of the absolute1 nature and spirit1 ,spinoza tends to posit thought in dependence on extension 7the soul represents what the body is71 while in ,schelling1 conversely1 the ,fichtean preference of spirit is still potent 7the state and art stand nearer to the absolute identity than the organism1 although1 principiantly considered1 the greatest possible approximation to the equilibrium of the real and the ideal is as much attained in the one as in the other74 ,the second difference lies in the fact that the idea of development is entirely lacking in ,spinoza1 while in ,schelling it is everywhere dominant4 ,it reminds one of ,lessing and ,herder1 who also attempted to combine ,spinozistic and ,leibnitzian elements4 #c;a4 ,doctrine of ,freedom4 ,the system of identity had1 with ,spinoza1 distinguished two worlds1 the real world of absolute identity and the imagined world of differentiated and changeable individual things2 it had traced back the latter to the former as its ground1 but had not deduced it from the former4 ,whence1 then1 the imagination which1 instead of the unchangeable unity1 shows us the changing manifold8 ,whence the imperfections of the finite1 whence evil8 ,the pantheism of ,spinoza is inseparably connected with determinism1 which denies evil without explaining it4 ,evil and finitude demand explanation1 not denial1 and this without the abandonment of pantheism4 ,but explanation by what8 ,by the absolute1 for besides the absolute there is naught4 ,how1 then1 must the pantheistic doctrine of the absolute be transformed in order that the fact of evil and the separate existence of the finite may become comprehensible8 ,to this task are devoted the ,inquiries into the ,nature of ,human ,freedom 7,philosophical ,works1 vol4 i41 #ahji1 with which should be compared the ,memorial of ,jacobi1 #ahab1 and the ,answer to ,eschenmayer1 #ahac74 ,as early as in the ,bruno1 the problem occasionally emerges why matters do not rest with the original infinite unity of the absolute1 why the finite breaks away from the identical primal ground4 ,the possibility of the separation1 it is answered1 lies in the fact that the finite is like the infinite realiter1 and yet1 ideally1 is different from it2 the actuality of the coming forth1 however1 lies in the non-deducible self-will of the finite4 ,then after ,eschenmayer#a 7,philosophy in its ,transition to ,not-philosophy1 #ahjc7 had characterized the procession of the ,ideas out of the ,godhead as an impenetrable mystery for thought1 before which philosophy must yield to faith1 ,schelling1 in the essay ,religion and ,philosophy1 #ahjd1 goes more deeply into the problem4 ,the origin of the sense-world is conceivable only as a breaking away1 a spring1 a falling away1 which consists in the soul's grasping itself in its selfhood1 in its subordination of the infinite in itself to the finite1 and in its thus ceasing to be in ,god4 ,the procession of the world from the infinite is a free act1 a fact which can only be described1 not deduced as necessary4 ,the counterpart of this attainment of independence on the part of things or creation is history as the return of the world to its source4 ,they are related to each other as the fall to redemption4 ,both the dismission of the world and its reception back1 together with the intervening development1 are1 however1 events needed by ,god himself in order to become actual ,god3 ,he develops through the world4 7,a similar thought was not unknown in the ,middle ,ages3 if ,god is to give a complete revelation of himself he must make known his grace2 and this presupposes sin4 ,as the occasion of divine grace1 the fall is a happy1 saving fault2 without it ,god could not have revealed himself as gracious1 as forgiving1 hence not completely47 ,schelling's study of ,jacob ,bhme1 to which he was led by ,baader1 essentially contributed to the concentration of his thought on this point4 ,the ,exposition of the ,true ,relation1 etc41 already distinctly betrays the influence of this mystic4 ,in correspondence with ,bhme's doctrine that ,god is living ,god only through his inclusion of negation in himself1 it is here maintained3 ,a being can manifest itself only when it is not merely one1 but has another1 an opposition 7the many71 in itself1 whereby it is revealed to itself as unity4 ,with the addition of certain ,kantian ideas1 in particular the idea of transcendental freedom and the intelligible character1 ,schelling's theosophy now assumes the following form3 ,the only way to guard against the determinism and the lifeless ,god of ,spinoza is to assume something in ,god which is not ,god himself1 to distinguish between ,god as existent and that which is merely the ground of his existence or nature in ,god4 ,in ,god also the perfect proceeds from the imperfect1 he too develops and realizes himself4 ,the actual1 perfect ,god1 who is intelligence1 wisdom1 goodness1 is preceded by something which is merely the possibility of all this1 an obscure1 unconscious impulse toward self-representation4 ,for in the last analysis there is no being but willing2 to willing alone belong the predicates of the primal being1 groundlessness1 eternity1 independence of time1 self-affirmation4 ,this ground of existence is an obscure longing to give birth to self1 an unconscious impulse to become conscious2 the goal of this longing is the understanding1 the ,logos1 the ,word1 wherein ,god becomes revealed to self4 ,by the self-subordination of this longing to the understanding as its matter and instrument1 ,god becomes actual ,god1 becomes spirit and love4 ,the operation of the light understanding on the dark nature-will consists in a separation of forces1 whence the visible world proceeds4 ,whatever in the latter is perfect1 rational1 harmonious1 and purposive is the work of the understanding2 the irrational remainder1 on the other hand1 conflict and lawlessness1 abortion1 sickness and death1 originates in the dark ground4 ,each thing has two principles in it3 its self-will it receives from nature in ,god1 yet1 at the same time1 as coming from the divine understanding1 it is the instrument of the universal will4 ,in ,god the light and dark principles stand in indissoluble unity1 in man they are separable4 ,the freedom of man's will makes him independent of both principles2 going over from truth to falsehood1 he may strive to make his selfhood supreme and to reduce the spiritual in him to the level of a means1 or--with divine assistance--continuing in the center1 he may endeavor to subordinate the particular will to the will of love4 ,good consists in overcoming resistance1 for in every case a thing can be revealed only through its opposite4 ,if man yields to temptation it is his own guilty choice4 ,evil is not merely defect1 privation1 but something positive1 selfhood breaking away1 the reversal of the rightful order between the particular and the universal will4 ,the possibility of a separation of the two wills lies in the divine ground 7it is permitted in order that by overmastering the self-will the will of love may approve itself71 the actuality of evil is the free act of the creature4 ,freedom is to be conceived1 in the ,kantian sense1 as equally far removed from chance or caprice and from compulsion3 ,man chooses his own non-temporal1 intelligible nature2 he predestinates himself in the first creation1 i4e41 from eternity1 and is responsible for his actions in the sense-world1 which are the necessary results of that free primal act4 ,footnote #a3 ,k4 ,ad4 ,eschenmayer was originally a physician1 then1 #ahaa-cf1 professor of philosophy in ,tbingen1 and died in #aheb at ,kirchheim unter ,teck4 ,as in nature and in the individual1 so also in the history of mankind1 the two original grounds of things do battle with one another4 ,the golden age of innocence1 of happy indecision and unconsciousness concerning sin1 when neither good nor evil yet was1 was followed by a period of the omnipotence of nature1 in which the dark ground of existence ruled alone1 although it did not make itself felt as actual evil until1 in ,christianity1 the spiritual light was born in personal form4 ,the subsequent conflict of good against evil1 in which ,god reveals himself as spirit1 leads toward a state wherein evil will be reduced to the position of a potency and everything subordinated to spirit1 and thus the complete identity of the ground of existence and the existing ,god be brought about4 ,besides this after-reconciliation of the two divine moments1 ,schelling recognizes another1 original unity of the two4 ,the not yet unfolded unity of the beginning 7,god as ,alpha7 he terms indifference or groundlessness2 the more valuable unity of the end1 attained by unfolding 7,god as ,omega7 is called identity or spirit4 ,in the former the contraries are not yet present2 in the latter they are present no longer4 ,the groundless divides into two equally eternal beginnings1 nature and light1 or longing and understanding1 in order that the two may become one in love1 and thereby the absolute develop into the personal ,god4 ,in this way ,schelling endeavors to overcome the antithesis between naturalism and theism1 between dualism and pantheism1 and to remove the difficulties which arise for pantheism from the fact of evil1 as well as from the concepts of personality and of freedom4 ,in the two moments of the absolute 7nature in ,god--personal spirit7 we recognize at once the antithesis of the real and ideal which was given in the philosophy of identity4 ,the chief difference between the mystical period and the preceding one consists in the fact that the absolute itself is now made to develop 7from indifference to identity1 from the neither-nor to the as-well-as of the antithesis71 and that there is conceded to the sense-world a reality which is more than apparent1 more than merely present for imagination4 ,that which facilitated this rapid1 almost unceasing change of position for ,schelling1 and which at the same time concealed the fact from him1 was1 above all1 the ambiguous and variable meaning of his leading concepts4 ,the objective1 for example1 now signifies unconscious being1 becoming1 and production1 now represented reality1 now the real1 in so far as it is not represented1 but only is4 ,god sometimes means the whole absolute1 sometimes only the infinite1 spiritual moment in the absolute4 ,scarcely a single term is sharply defined1 much less consistently used in a single meaning4 #c;b4 ,philosophy of ,mythology and ,revelation4 ,once again ,schelling is ready with a new statement of the problem4 ,philosophy is the science of the existent4 ,in this1 however1 a distinction is to be made between the what 7quid sit7 and the that 7quod sit71 or between essence and existence4 ,the apprehension of the essence1 of the concept1 is the work of reason1 but this does not go as far as actual being4 ,rational philosophy cognizes only the universal1 the possible1 the necessary truths 7whose contradictory is unthinkable71 but not the particular and factual4 ,this philosophy can only assert3 ,if anything exists it must conform to these laws2 existence is not given with the what4 ,hegel has ignored this distinction between the logical and the actual1 has confused the rational and the real4 ,even the system of identity was merely rational1 i4e41 negative1 philosophy1 to which there must be added1 as a second part1 a positive or existential philosophy1 which does not1 like the former1 rise to the highest principle1 to ,god1 but starts from this supreme ,idea and shows its actuality4 ,the content of this phase of ,schelling's thought#a was so unfruitful1 and its influence so small1 that brief hints concerning it must here suffice4 ,first of all1 the doctrine of the divine potencies and of creation is repeated in altered form1 and then there is given a philosophy of the history of religion as a reflection of the theogonic process in human consciousness4 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,schelling's negative and positive philosophy1 published in the four volumes of the second division of the ,works1 cf4 ,karl ,groos1 ,die reine ,vernunftwissenschaft1 systematische ,darstellung von ,schellings negativer ,philosophie1 #ahhi2 ,konstantin ,frantz1 ,schellings positive ,philosophie1 in three parts1 #ahgi-hj2 ,ed4 von ,hartmann1 ,gesammelte ,studien und ,aufstze1 #ahgf1 p4 #fej seq42 ,ad4 ,planck1 ,schellings nachgelassene ,werke1 #aheh2 also the essay by ,heyder1 referred to above4 ,the potencies are now called the infinite ability to be 7inactive will1 subject71 pure being 7being without potentiality1 object71 and spirit1 which is free from the one-sidednesses of mere potentiality and of mere being1 and master of itself 7subject-object72 to these is added1 further--not as a fourth1 but as that which has the three predicates and is wholly in each--the absolute proper1 as the cause and support of these attributes4 ,the original unity of the three forms is dissolved1 as the first raises itself out of the condition of a mere potency and withdraws itself from pure being in order to exist for itself2 the tension extends itself to the two others--the second now comes out from its selflessness1 subdues the first1 and so leads the third back to unity4 ,in creation the three potencies stand related as the unlimited ,can-be1 the limiting ,must-be1 and the ,ought-to-be1 or operate as material1 formal1 and final causes1 all held in undivided combination by the soul4 ,it was not until the end of creation that they became personalities4 ,man1 in whom the potencies come to rest1 can divide their unity again2 his fall calls forth a new tension1 and thereby the world becomes a world outside of ,god4 ,history1 the process o progressive reconciliation between the ,god-estranged world and ,god1 passes through two periods--heathenism1 in which the second person works as a natural potency1 and ,christianity1 in which it works with freedom4 ,in the discussion of these positive philosophy becomes a philosophy of mythology and revelation4 ,the irresistible force of mythological ideas is explained by the fact that the gods are not creations of the fancy1 but real powers1 namely1 these potencies1 which form the substance of human conciousness4 ,the history of religion has for its starting-point the relative monotheism of humanity in its original unity1 and for its goal the absolute monotheism of ,christianity4 ,with the separation into nations polytheism arises4 ,this is partly simultaneous polytheism 7a plurality of gods under a chief god71 partly successive polytheism 7an actual plurality of divinities1 changing dynasties of several chief gods71 and develops from star worship or ,sabeism up to the religion of the ,greeks4 ,the ,greek mysteries form the transition from mythology to revelation4 ,while in the mythological process one or other of the divine potencies 7,ground1 ,son1 ,spirit7 was always predominant1 in ,christianity they return into unity4 ,the true monotheism of revelation shows ,god as an articulated unity1 in which the opposites are contained1 as being overcome4 ,the person of ,christ constitutes the content of ,christianity1 who1 in his incarnation and sacrificial death1 yields up the independence out of ,god which had come to him through the fall of man4 ,the three periods in the development of the ,church 7real1 substantial unity--ideality or freedom--the reconciliation of the two7 were foreshadowed in the chief apostles3 ,peter1 with his leaning toward the past1 represents the ,papal ,church2 ,paul the thinker the ,protestant ,church2 and the gentle ,john the ,church of the future4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,schelling',s ,,co-,,workers4 ,in his period of vigorous creation ,schelling was the center of an animated philosophical activity4 ,each phase of his philosophy found a circle of enthusiastic fellow-laborers1 whom we must hesitate to term disciples because of their independence and of their reaction on ,schelling himself4 ,only ,g4,m4 ,klein 7#aggf-ahbj1 professor in ,wrzburg71 ,stutzmann 7died #ahaf in ,erlangen2 ,philosophy of the ,universe1 #ahjf2 ,philosophy of ,history1 #ahjh71 and the historians of philosophy ,ast and ,rixner can be called disciples of ,schelling4 ,prominent among his co-workers in the philosophy of nature were ,steffens1 ,oken1 ,schubert1 and ,carus2 besides these the physiologist ,burdach1 the pathologist ,kieser1 the plant physiologist ,nees von ,esenbeck1 and the medical thinker ,schelver 7,philosophy of ,medicine1 #ahji7 deserve mention4 ,besides ,hegel1 ,j4,j4 ,wagner and ,friedrich ,krause distinguished themselves as independent founders of systems of identity2 ,troxler1 ,suabedissen1 and ,berger are also to be assigned to this group4 ,baader and ,schleiermacher were competitors of ,schelling in the philosophy of religion1 and ,solger in aesthetics4 ,finally ,fr4 ,j4 ,stahl 7died #ahfa2 ,philosophy of ,right1 #ahcj seq4471 was also influenced by ,schelling4 ,there is a wide divergence in ,schelling's school1 as ,j4,e4 ,erdmann accurately remarks1 between the naturalistic pantheist ,oken and the mystical theosophist ,baader1 in whom elements which had been united in ,schelling appear divided4 #a4 ,the ,philosophers of ,nature4 ,henrik ,steffens#a 7a ,norwegian1 #aggc-ahde2 professor in ,halle1 ,breslau1 and ,berlin7 makes individual development the goal of nature--which is first completely attained in man and in his peculiarity or talent--and holds that the catastrophes of the spirit are reflected in the history of the earth4 ,lorenz ,oken#b 7#aggi-ahea2 professor in ,jena #ahjg-bg1 then in ,munich and ,zurich7 identifies ,god and the universe1 which comes to self-consciousness in man1 the most perfect animal2 teaches the development of organisms from an original slime 7a mass of organic elements1 infusoria1 or cells72 and looks on the animal kingdom as man anatomized1 in that the animal world contains in isolated development that which man possesses collected in minute organs--the worm is the feeling animal1 the insect the light animal1 the snail the touch animal1 the bird the hearing animal1 the fish the smelling animal1 the amphibian the taste animal1 the mammal the animal of all senses4 ,footnote #a3 ,steffens1 ,contributions to the ,inner ,natural ,history of the ,earth1 #ahja2 ,caricatures of the ,holiest1 #ahai-ba2 ,anthropology1 #ahbb4 ,footnote #b3 ,oken3 ,on the ,significance of the ,bones of the ,skull1 #ahjg2 ,text-book of the ,philosophy of ,nature1 #ahji-aa1 #b;d ed4 #ahca1 #c;d ed4 #ahdc2 the journal ,isis1 from #ahag4 ,on ,oken cf4 ,c4 ,gttler1 #ahhe4 ,while in ,steffens geological interests predominate1 and in ,oken biological interests1 ,schubert1 ,carus1 and ,ennemoser are the psychologists of the school4 ,gotthilf ,heinrich ,schubert#a 7#aghj-ahfj2 professor in ,erlangen and ,munich7 brings the human soul into intimate relation with the world-soul1 whose phantasy gives form to all that is corporeal1 and delights to dwell on the abnormal and mysterious phenomena of the inner life1 the border-land between the physical and the psychical1 on the unconscious and the half-conscious1 on presentiments and clairvoyance1 as from another direction also ,schelling's philosophy was brought into perilous connection with somnambulism4 ,a second predominantly contemplative thinker was ,karl ,gustav ,carus#b 7#aghi-ahfi2 at his death in ,dresden physician to the king2 ,lectures on ,psychology1 #ahca2 ,psyche1 #ahdf2 ,physis1 #ahea71 greatly distinguished for his services to comparative anatomy4 ,carus endows the cell with unconscious psychical life1--a memory for the past shows itself in the inheritance of dispositions and talents1 just as the formation of milk in the breasts of the pregnant and the formation of lungs in the embryo betray a prevision of the future1--and points out that with the higher development of organic and spiritual life the antitheses constantly become more articulate3 individual differences are greater among men than among women1 among adults than among children1 among ,europeans than among negroes4 ,footnote #a3 ,g4,h4 ,schubert3 ,views of the ,dark ,side of ,natural ,science1 #ahjh2 ,the ,primeval ,world and the ,fixed ,stars1 #ahbb2 ,history of the ,soul1 #ahcj 7in briefer form1 ,text-book of the ,science of ,man and of the ,soul1 #ahch74 ,footnote #b3 ,not to be confused with ,friedrich ,august ,carus 7#aggj-ahjg2 professor in ,leipsic71 whose ,history of ,psychology1 #ahjh1 forms the third part of his posthumous works4 #b4 ,the ,philosophers of ,identity4 ,it has been said of the ,dane ,johann ,erich von ,berger 7#aggb-ahcc2 from #ahad professor in ,kiel2 ,universal ,outlines of ,science1 #ahag-bg7 that he adopted a middle course between ,fichte and ,schelling4 ,the same may be asserted of ,karl ,ferdinand ,solger 7#aghj-ahai2 at his death professor in ,berlin2 ,erwin1 ,four ,dialogues on ,beauty and ,art1 #ahae2 ,lectures on ,aesthetics1 edited by ,heyse1 #ahbi71 who points out the womb of the beautiful in the fancy1 and introduces into aesthetics the concept of irony1 that spirit of sadness at the vanity of the finite1 though this is needed by the ,idea in order to its manifestation4 ,in ,johann ,jacob ,wagner#a 7#agge-ahda2 professor in ,wrzburg7 and in ,j4,p4,v4 ,troxler#b 7#aghj-ahff7 we find1 as in ,steffens1 a fourfold division instead of ,schelling's triads4 ,both ,wagner and ,troxler find an exact correspondence between the laws of the universe and those of the human mind4 ,wagner 7in conformity to the categories essence and form1 opposition and reconciliation7 makes all becoming and cognition advance from unity to quadruplicity1 and finds the four stages of knowledge in representation1 perception1 judgment1 and ,idea4 ,troxler shares with ,fries the anthropological standpoint1 7philosophy is anthropology1 knowledge of the world is self-knowledge71 and distinguishes1 besides the emotional nature or the unity of human nature1 four constituents thereof1 spirit1 higher soul1 lower soul 7body1 ,leib71 and body 7,krper71 and four corresponding kinds of knowledge1 in reverse order1 sensuous perception1 experience1 reason1 and spiritual intuition1 of which the middle two are mediate or reflective in character1 while the first and last are intuitive4 ,for ,d4 ,th4 ,a4 ,suabedissen also 7#aggc-ahce2 professor in ,marburg2 ,examination of ,man1 #ahae-ah7 philosophy is the science of man1 and self-knowledge its starting point4 ,footnote #a3 ,j4,j4 ,wagner3 ,ideal ,philosophy1 #ahjd2 ,mathematical ,philosophy1 #ahaa2 ,organon of ,human ,knowledge1 #ahcj1 in three parts1 ,system of the ,world1 of ,knowledge1 and of ,language4 ,on ,wagner cf4 ,l4 ,rabus1 #ahfb4 ,footnote #b3 ,troxler3 ,glances into the ,nature of ,man1 #ahab2 ,metaphysics1 #ahbh2 ,logic1 #ahcj4 ,the relatively limited reputation enjoyed in his own time and to-day by ,friedrich ,krause#a 7born in ,eisenberg #agha2 habilitated in ,jena #ahjb2 lived privately in ,dresden2 became a ,privatdocent in ,gttingen from #ahbd2 and died at ,munich #ahcb2 ,prototype of ,humanity1 #ahab1 and numerous other works7 has been due1 on the one hand1 to the appearance of his more gifted contemporary ,hegel1 and1 on the other1 to his peculiar terminology4 ,he not only ,germanized all foreign words in a spirit of exaggerated purism1 but also coined new verbal roots1 7,ml1 ,ant1 ,or1 ,om7 and from these formed the most extraordinary combinations 7,vereinselbganzweseninnesein1 ,oromlebselbstschauen74 ,his most important pupil1 ,ahrens 7professor in ,leipsic1 died #ahgd2 ,course of ,philosophy1 #ahcf-ch2 ,natural ,right1 #aheb71 helped ,krause's doctrine to gain recognition in ,france and ,belgium by his fine translations into ,french2 while it was introduced into ,spain by ,j4,s4 del ,rio of ,madrid 7died #ahfi74--,since the finite is a negative1 the infinite a positive concept1 and hence the knowledge of the infinite primal1 the principle of philosophy is the absolute1 and philosophy itself knowledge of ,god or the theory of essence4 ,the ,subjective ,analytic ,course leads from the self-viewing of the ego up to the vision of ,god2 the ,synthetic ,course starts from the fundamental ,idea1 ,god1 and deduces from this the partial ,ideas1 or presents the world as the revelation of ,god4 ,for his attempted reconciliation of theism and pantheism ,krause invented the name panentheism1 meaning thereby that ,god neither is the world nor stands outside the world1 but has the world in himself and extends beyond it4 ,he is absolute identity1 nature and reason are relative identity1 viz41 the identity of the real and ideal1 the former with the character of reality1 the latter with the character of ideality4 ,or1 the absolute considered from the side of its wholeness 7infinity7 is nature1 considered from the side of its selfhood 7unconditionality7 is reason2 ,god is the common root of both4 ,above nature and reason is humanity1 which combines in itself the highest products of both1 the most perfect animal body and self-consciousness4 ,the humanity of earth1 the humanity known to us1 is but a very small portion of the humanity of the universe1 which in the multitude of its members1 which cannot be increased1 constitutes the divine state4 ,krause's most important work is his philosophy of right and of history1 with its marks of a highly keyed idealism4 ,he treats human right as an effluence of divine right2 besides the state or legal union1 he recognizes many other associations--the science and the art union1 the religious society1 the league of virtue or ethical union4 ,his philosophy of history 7,general ,theory of ,life1 edited by ,von ,leonhardi1 #ahdc7 follows the ,fichteo-,hegelian rhythm1 unity1 division1 and reunion1 and correlates the several ages with these4 ,the first stage is germinal life2 the second1 youth2 the third1 maturity4 ,the culmination is followed by a reverse movement from counter-maturity1 through counter-youth1 to counter-childhood1 whereupon the development recommences--without cessation4 ,it is to be regretted that this noble-minded man joined to his warm-hearted disposition1 broad outlook1 and rigorous method a heated fancy1 which1 crippling the operation of these advantageous qualities1 led his thought quite too far away from reality4 ,ahrens1 ,von ,leonhardi1 ,lindemann1 and ,roeder may be mentioned as followers of ,krause4 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,krause cf4 ,p4 ,hohlfeld1 ,die ,krausesche ,philosophic1 #ahgi2 ,b4 ,martin1 #ahha2 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,zur ,erinnerung an ,krause1 ,festrede1 #ahha4 ,from his posthumous works ,hohlfeld and ,wnsche have published the ,lectures on ,aesthetics1 the ,system of ,aesthetics 7both #ahhb71 and numerous other treatises4 #c4 ,the ,philosophers of ,religion4 ,franz 7von7 ,baader1 the son of a physician1 was born in ,munich in #agfe1 resided there as superintendent of mines1 and1 from #ahbf1 as professor of speculative dogmatics1 and died there also in #ahda4 ,his works1 which consisted only of a series of brief treatises1 were collected 7#af vols41 #ahea-fj7 by his most important adherent1 ,franz ,hoffman#a 7at his death in #ahha professor in ,wrzburg74 ,baader may be characterized as a mediaeval thinker who has worked through the critical philosophy1 and who1 a believing1 yet liberal ,catholic1 endeavors to solve with the instruments of modern speculation the old ,scholastic problem of the reconciliation of faith and knowledge4 ,his themes are1 on the one hand1 the development of ,god1 and1 on the other1 the fall and redemption1 which mean for him1 however1 not merely inner phenomena1 but world-events4 ,he is in sympathy with the ,neoplatonists1 with ,augustine1 with ,thomas ,aquinas1 with ,eckhart1 with ,paracelsus1 above all1 with ,jacob ,bhme1 and ,bhme's follower ,louis ,claude ,st4 ,martin 7#agdc-ahjd71 but does not overlook the value of the modern ,german philosophy4 ,with ,kant he begins the inquiry with the problem of knowledge2 with ,fichte he finds in self-consciousness the essence1 and not merely a property1 of spirit2 with ,hegel he looks on ,god or the absolute spirit not only as the object1 but also as the subject of knowledge4 ,he rejects1 however1 the autonomy of the will and the spontaneity of thought2 and though he criticises the ,cartesian separation between the thought of the creator and that of the creature1 he as little approves the pantheistic identification of the two--human cognition participates in the divine1 without constituting a part of it4 ,footnote #a3 ,besides ,hoffman1 ,lutterbeck and ,hamberger have described and expounded ,baader's system4 ,see also ,baumann's paper in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xiv41 #ahgh1 p4 #cba seq4 ,in accordance with its three principal objects1 ,god1 ,nature1 and ,man1 philosophy divides into fundamental science 7logic or the theory of knowledge and theology71 the philosophy of nature 7cosmology or the theory of creation and physics71 and the philosophy of spirit 7ethics and sociology74 ,in all its parts it must receive religious treatment4 ,without ,god we cannot know ,god4 ,in our cognition of ,god he is at once knower and known2 our being and all being is a being known by him2 our self-consciousness is a consciousness of being known by ,god3 cogitor1 ergo cogito et sum2 my being and thinking are based on my being thought by ,god4 ,conscience is a joint knowing with ,god's knowing 7conscientia74 ,the relation between the known and the knower is threefold4 ,cognition is incomplete and lacks the free co-operation of the knower when ,god merely pervades 7durchwohnt7 the creature1 as is the case with the devil's timorous and reluctant knowledge of ,god4 ,a higher stage is reached when the known is present to the knower and dwells with him 7beiwohnt74 ,cognition becomes really free and perfect when ,god dwells in 7inwohnt7 the creature1 in which case the finite reason yields itself freely and in admiration to the divine reason1 lets the latter speak in itself1 and feels its rule1 not as foreign1 but as its own4 7,baader maintains a like threefoldness in the practical sphere3 the creature is either the object or1 rather1 the passive recipient1 or the organ1 or the representative of the divine action1 i4e41 in the first case1 ,god alone works2 in the second1 he co-operates with the creature2 in the third1 the creature works with the forces and in the name of ,god4 ,joyful obedience1 conscious of its grounds1 is the highest freedom74 ,knowing and loving1 thought and volition1 knowledge and faith1 philosophy and dogma are as little to be abstractly divided as thing and self1 being and thought1 object and subject4 ,true freedom and genuine speculation are neither blind traditional belief nor doubting1 ,god-estranged thinking1 but the free recognition of authority1 and self-attained conviction of the truth of the ,church doctrine4 ,baader distinguishes a twofold creation of the world and a double process of development 7an esoteric and an exoteric revelation7 of ,god himself4 ,the creation of the ideal world1 as a free act of love1 is a non-deducible fact2 the theogonic process1 on the contrary1 is a necessary event by which ,god becomes a unity returning from division to itself1 and so a living ,god4 ,the eternal self-generation of ,god is a twofold birth3 in the immanent or logical process the unsearchable will 7,father7 gives birth to the comprehensible will 7,son7 to unite with it as ,spirit2 the place of this self-revelation is wisdom or the ,idea4 ,in the emanent or real process1 since desire or nature is added to the ,idea and is overcome by it1 these three moments become actual persons4 ,in the creation of the--at first immaterial--world1 in which ,god unites1 not with his essence1 but with his image only1 the same two powers1 desire and wisdom1 operate as the principles of matter and form4 ,the materialization of the world is a consequence of the fall4 ,evil consists in the elevation of selfhood1 which springs from desire1 into self-seeking4 ,lucifer fell because of pride1 and man1 yielding to ,lucifer's temptation1 from baseness1 by falling in love with nature beneath him4 ,by the creation of matter ,god has out of pity preserved the world1 which was corrupted by the fall1 from the descent into hell1 and at the same time has given man occasion for moral endeavor4 ,the appearance of ,christ1 the personification of the moral law1 is the beginning of reconciliation1 which man appropriates through the sacrament4 ,nature participates in the redemption1 as in the corruption4 ,friedrich ,daniel ,ernst ,schleiermacher was born in #agfh at ,breslau1 and died in #ahcd in ,berlin1 where he had become preacher at ,trinity church in #ahji1 professor of theology in #ahaj1 member of the philosophical section of the ,academy in #ahaa1 and its secretary in #ahad4 ,reared in the ,moravian schools at ,niesky and ,barby1 he studied at ,halle2 and1 between #agid and #ahjd1 was a preacher in ,landsberg on the ,warthe1 in ,berlin 7at the ,charit ,hospital71 and in ,stolpe1 then professor in ,halle4 ,he first attracted attention by the often republished ,discourses on ,religion addressed to the ,educated among those who despise it1 #agii 7critical edition by ,pnjer1 #ahgi71 which was followed in the succeeding year by the ,monologues1 and the anonymous ,confidential ,letters on ,lucinde 7,lucinde was the work of his friend ,fr4 ,schlegel74 ,besides several collections of sermons1 mention must further be made of his ,outlines of a ,critique of ,previous ,ethics1 #ahjc2 ,the ,celebration of ,christmas1 #ahjf2 and his chief theological work1 ,the ,christian ,faith1 #ahbb1 new edition #ahcj4 ,in the third 7the philosophical7 division of his ,collected ,works 7#ahce-fd7 the second and third volumes contain the essays on the history of philosophy1 on ethical1 and on academic subjects2 vols4 vi4 to ix41 the ,lectures on ,psychology1 ,esthetics1 the ,theory of the ,state1 and ,education1 edited by ,george1 ,lommatsch1 ,brandis1 and ,platz2 and the first part of vol4 iv41 the ,history of ,philosophy 7to ,spinoza71 edited by ,ritter4 ,the ,monologues and ,the ,celebration of ,christmas have appeared in ,reclam's ,bibliothek4 ,schleiermacher's philosophy is a rendezvous for the most diverse systems4 ,side by side with ideas from ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,schelling we meet ,platonic1 ,spinozistic1 and ,leibnitzian elements2 even ,jacobi and the ,romanticists have contributed their mite4 ,schleiermacher is an eclectic1 but one who1 amid the fusion of the most diverse ideas1 knows how to make his own individuality felt4 ,in spite of manifold echoes of the philosophemes of earlier and of contemporary thinkers1 his system is not a conglomeration of unrelated lines of thought1 but resembles a plant1 which in its own way works over and assimilates the nutritive elements taken up from the soil4 ,schleiermacher is attractive rather than impressive2 he is less a discoverer than a critic and systematizer4 ,his fine critical sense works in the service of a positive aim1 subserves a harmonizing tendency2 he takes no pleasure in breaking to pieces1 but in adjusting1 limiting1 and combining4 ,there is no one of the given views which entirely satisfies him1 none which simply repels him2 each contains elements which seem to him worthy of transformation and adoption4 ,when he finds himself confronted by a sharp conflict of opinion1 he seeks by careful mediation to construct a whole out of the two half truths1 though this1 it is true1 does not always give a result more satisfactory than the partial views which he wishes to reconcile4 ,a single example may be given of this conciliatory tendency3 space1 time1 and the categories are not only subjective forms of knowledge1 but at the same time objective forms of reality4 ,not only is the watchword of his philosophy1 which became the prototype of the numberless ideal realisms with which ,germany was flooded after ,hegel's death4 ,if the skeptical and eclectic movements1 which constantly make their appearance together1 are elsewhere divided among different thinkers1 they here come together in one mind in the form of a mediating criticism1 which1 although it argues logically1 is yet in the end always guided by the invisible cords of a feeling of justice in matters scientific4 ,in its weaker portions ,schleiermacher's philosophy is marked by lack of grasp1 pettiness1 and sportiveness4 ,it lacks courage and force1 and the rare delicacy of the thought is not entirely able to compensate for this defect4 ,in its fear of one-sidedness it takes refuge in the arms of an often faint-hearted policy of reconciliation4 ,we shall not discuss the specifically theological achievements of this many-sided man1 nor his great services in behalf of the philological knowledge of the history of philosophy--through his translation of ,plato1 #ahjd-bh1 and a series of valuable essays on ,greek thinkers--but shall confine our attention to the leading principles of his theory of knowledge1 of religion1 and of ethics4 ,the ,dialectic#a 7edited by ,jonas1 #ahci71 treats in a transcendental part and a technical or formal part of the concept and the forms of knowledge4 ,knowledge is thought4 ,what distinguishes that thought which we call knowledge from that other thought which does not deserve this honorable title1 from mere opinion8 ,two criteria3 its agreement with the thought of other thinkers 7its universality and necessity71 and its agreement with the being which is thought in it4 ,that thought alone is knowledge which is represented as necessarily valid for all who are capable of thought1 and as corresponding to a being or reproducing it4 ,these two agreements 7among thinkers1 and of thought with the being which is thought7 are the criteria of knowledge--let us turn now to its factors4 ,these are essentially the two brought forward by ,kant1 sensibility and understanding2 ,schleiermacher calls them the organic function and the intellectual function4 ,the organic activity of the senses furnishes us1 in sensations1 the unordered1 manifold material of knowledge1 which is formed and unified by the activity of reason4 ,if we except two concepts which limit our knowledge1 chaos and ,god--absolute formlessness or chaos is an idea just as incapable of realization as absolute unity or deity--every actual cognition is a product of both factors1 of the sensuous organization and of reason4 ,but these two do not play equal parts in every cognitive act4 ,when the organic function is predominant we have perception2 when the intellectual function predominates we have thought in the strict sense4 ,a perfect balance of the two would be intuition1 which1 however1 constitutes the goal of knowledge1 never fully to be realized4 ,these two kinds of knowledge1 therefore1 are not specifically1 but only relatively1 different3 in all perception reason is also active1 and in all thought sensibility1 only to a less degree than the opposite function4 ,moreover1 perception and thought1 or sensibility and reason1 are by no means to relate to different objects4 ,they have the same object1 only that the organic activity represents it as an indefinite1 chaotic manifold1 while the activity of reason 7whose work consists in discrimination and combination71 represents it as a well-ordered multiplicity and unity4 ,it is the same being which is represented by perception in the form of an image1 and by thought in the form of a concept4 ,in the former case we have the world as chaos2 in the latter1 we have it as cosmos4 ,inasmuch as the two factors in knowledge represent the same object in relatively different ways1 it may be said of them that they are opposed to each other1 and yet identical4 ,the same is true of the two modes of being which ,schleiermacher posits as real and ideal over against the two factors in thought4 ,the real is that which corresponds to the organic function1 the ideal that which corresponds to the activity of reason4 ,these forms of being also are opposed1 and yet identical4 ,our self-consciousness gives clear proof of the fact that thought and being can be identical2 in it1 as thinking being1 we have the identity of the real and the ideal1 of being and thought immediately given4 ,as the ego1 in which the subject of thought and the object of thought are one1 is the undivided ground of its several activities1 so ,god is the primal unity1 which lies at the basis of the totality of the world4 ,as in ,schelling1 the absolute is described as self-identical1 absolute unity1 exalted above the antithesis of real and ideal1 nay1 above all antitheses4 ,god is the negation of opposites1 the world the totality of them4 ,if there were an adequate knowledge of the absolute identity it would be an absolute knowledge4 ,this is denied1 however1 to us men1 who are never able to rise above the opposition of sensuous and intellectual cognition4 ,the unity of thought and being is presupposed in all thinking1 but can never actually be thought4 ,as an ,idea this identity is indispensable1 but to think it definitely1 either by conception or judgment1 is impossible4 ,the concepts supreme power 7,god or creative nature7 and supreme cause 7fate or providence7 do not attain to that which we seek to think in them3 that which has in it no opposition is an idea incapable of realization by man1 but1 nevertheless1 a necessary ideal1 the presupposition of all cognition 7and volition71 and the ground of all certitude4 ,all knowledge must be related to the absolute unity and be accompanied by it4 ,since1 then1 the absolute identity cannot be presented1 but ever sought for only1 and absolute knowledge exists only as an ideal1 dialectic is not so much a science as a technique of thought and proof1 an introduction to philosophic thinking or 7since knowledge is thought in common7 to discussion in conformity with the rules of the art4 ,with this the name dialectic returns to its original ,platonic meaning4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,quaebicker1 ,ueber ,schleiermachers erkeuntnisstheoretische ,grundansicht1 #ahga1 and the ,inquiries by ,bruno ,weiss in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vols4 lxxiii4-lxxv41 #ahgh-gi4 ,the popular ideas of ,god ill stand examination by the standard furnished by the principle of identity4 ,the plurality of attributes which we are accustomed to ascribe to ,god agree but poorly with his unity free from all contrariety4 ,in reality ,god does not possess these manifold attributes2 they first arise in the religious consciousness1 in which his unconditioned and undivided working is variously reflected and1 as it were1 divided4 ,they are only the various reflections of his undivided nature in the mind of the observer4 ,in ,god ability and performance1 intelligence and will1 his thought of self and his thought of the world coincide in one4 ,even the concept of personality must not be ascribed to ,god1 since it is a limitation of the infinite and belongs to mythology2 while the idea of life1 on the contrary1 is allowable as a protection against atheism and fatalism4 ,when ,schleiermacher1 further1 equates the activity of ,god and the causality of nature he ranges himself on the pantheistic side in regard to the question of the immanence or transcendence of ,god1 without being willing to acknowledge it4 ,it sounds ,spinozistic enough when he says3 ,god never was without the world1 he exists neither before nor outside it1 we know him only in us and in things4 ,besides that which he actually brings forth1 ,god could not produce anything further1 and just as little does he miraculously interfere in the course of the world as regulated by natural law4 ,everything takes place necessarily1 and man is distinguished above other beings neither by freedom 7if by freedom we understand anything more than inner necessitation7 nor by eternal existence4 ,like all individual beings1 so we are but changing states in the life of the universe1 which1 as they have arisen1 will disappear again4 ,the common representations of immortality1 with their hope of future compensation1 are far from pious4 ,the true immortality of religion is this--amid finitude to become one with the infinite1 and in one moment to be eternal4 ,schleiermacher's optimism well harmonizes with this view of the relation between ,god and the world4 ,if the universe is the phenomenon of the divine activity1 then considered as a whole it is perfect2 whatever of imperfection we find in it1 is merely the inevitable result of finitude4 ,the bad is merely the less perfect2 everything is as good as it can be2 the world is the best possible2 everything is in its right place2 even the meanest thing is indispensable2 even the mistakes of men are to be treated with consideration4 ,all is good and divine4 ,in this way ,schleiermacher weds ideas from ,spinoza to ,leibnitzian conceptions4 ,from the former he appropriates pantheism1 from the latter optimism and the concept of individuality2 he shares determinism with both3 all events1 even the decisions of the will1 are subject to the law of necessity4 ,in the philosophy of religion ,schleiermacher created a new epoch by his separation between religion and related departments with which it had often been identified before his time1 as it has been since4 ,in its origin and essence religion is not a matter of knowing1 further1 not a matter of willing1 but a matter of the heart4 ,it lies quite outside the sphere of speculation and of practice1 coincides neither with metaphysics nor with ethics1 is not knowledge and not volition1 but an intermediate third3 it has its own province in the emotional nature1 where it reigns without limitation2 its essence is intuition and feeling in undivided unity4 ,in feeling is revealed the presence of the infinite2 in feeling we become immediately aware of the ,deity4 ,the absolute1 which in cognition and volition we only presuppose and demand1 but never attain1 is actually given in feeling alone as the relative identity and the common ground of cognition and volition4 ,religion is piety1 an affective1 not an objective1 consciousness4 ,and if certain religious ideas and actions ally themselves with the pious state of mind1 these are not essential constituents of religion1 but derivative elements1 which possess a religious significance only in so far as they immediately develop from piety and exert an influence upon it4 ,that which makes an act religious is always feeling as a point of indifference between knowing and doing1 between receptive and forthgoing activity1 as the center and junction of all the powers of the soul1 as the very focus of personality4 ,and as feeling in general is the middle point in the life of the soul1 so1 again1 the religious feeling is the root of all genuine feeling4 ,what sort of a feeling1 then1 is piety8 ,schleiermacher answers3 ,a feeling of absolute dependence4 ,dependence on what8 ,on the universe1 on ,god4 ,religion grows out of the longing after the infinite1 it is the sense and taste for the ,all1 the direction toward the eternal1 the impulse toward the absolute unity1 immediate experience of the world harmony2 like art1 religion is the immediate apprehension of a whole4 ,in and before ,god all that is individual disappears1 the religious man sees one and the same thing in all that is particular4 ,to represent all events in the world as actions of a ,god1 to see ,god in all and all in ,god1 to feel one's self one with the eternal1--this is religion4 ,as we look on all being within us and without as proceeding from the world-ground1 as determined by an ultimate cause1 we feel ourselves dependent on the divine causality4 ,like all that is finite1 we also are the effect of the absolute ,power4 ,while we stand in a relation of interaction with the individual parts of the world1 and feel ourselves partially free in relation to them1 we can only receive effects from ,god without answering them2 even our self-activity we have from him4 ,nevertheless the feeling of dependence is not to be depressing1 not humbling merely1 but the joyous sense of an exaltation and broadening of life4 ,in our devotion to the universe we participate in the life of the universe2 by leaning on the infinite we supplement our finitude--religion makes up for the needy condition of man by bringing him into relation with the absolute1 and teaching him to know and to feel himself a part of the whole4 ,from this elevating influence of religion1 which ,schleiermacher eloquently depicts1 it is at once evident that his definition of it as a feeling of absolute dependence is only half correct4 ,it needs to be supplemented by the feeling of freedom1 which exalts us by the consciousness of the oneness of the human reason and the divine4 ,it is only to this side of religion1 neglected by ,schleiermacher1 that we can ascribe its inspiring influence1 which he in vain endeavors to derive from the feeling of dependence4 ,power can never spring from humility as such4 ,this defect1 however1 does not detract from ,schleiermacher's merit in assigning to religion a special field of spiritual activity4 ,while ,kant treats religion as an appendix to ethics1 and ,hegel1 with a one-sidedness which is still worse1 reduces it to an undeveloped form of knowledge1 ,schleiermacher recognizes that it is not a mere concomitant phenomenon--whether an incidental result or a preliminary stage--of morality or cognition1 but something independent1 co-ordinate with volition and cognition1 and of equal legitimacy4 ,the proof that religion has its habitation in feeling is the more deserving of thanks since it by no means induced ,schleiermacher to overlook the connection of the ,god-consciousness with self-consciousness and the consciousness of the world4 ,schleiermacher's theory1 moreover1 may be held correct without ignoring the relatively legitimate elements in the views of religion which he attacked4 ,with the view that religion has its seat in feeling1 it is quite possible to combine a recognition of the fact that it has its origin in the will1 and its basis in morals1 and that1 further1 it has the significance of being 7to use ,schopenhauer's words7 the metaphysics of the people4 ,although religion and piety be made synonymous1 it must still be admitted that in a being capable of knowing and willing as well as of feeling1 this devout frame will have results in the spheres of cognition and action4 ,in regard to cultus ,schleiermacher maintains that a religious observance which does not spring from one's own feeling and find an echo therein is superstitious1 and demands that religious feeling1 like a sacred melody1 accompany all human action1 that everything be done with religion1 nothing from religion4 ,instead of expressing itself in single specifically religious actions1 the religious feeling should uniformly pervade the whole life4 ,let a private room be the temple where the voice of the priest is raised4 ,dogmas1 again1 are descriptions of pious excitation1 and take their origin in man's reflection on his religious feelings1 in his endeavor to explain them1 in his expression of them in ideas and words4 ,the concepts and principles of theology are valid only as descriptions and presentations of feelings1 not as cognitions2 by their unavoidable anthropomorphic character alone they are completely unfitted for science4 ,the dogmatic system is an envelopment which religion accepts with a smile4 ,he who treats religious doctrines as science falls into empty mythology4 ,principles of faith and principles of knowledge are in no way related to one another1 neither by way of opposition nor by way of agreement2 they never come into contact4 ,a theology in the sense of an actual science of ,god is impossible4 ,further1 out of its dogmas the ,church constructs prescriptive symbols1 a step which must be deplored4 ,it is to be hoped that some time religion will no longer have need of the ,church4 ,in view of the present condition of affairs it must be said that the more religious a man is the more secular he must become1 and that the cultured man opposes the ,church in order to promote religion4 ,so-called natural religion is nothing more than an abstraction of thought2 in reality positive religions alone exist4 ,because of the infinity of ,god and the finitude of man1 the one1 universal1 eternal religion can only manifest itself in the form of particular historical religions1 which are termed revealed because founded by religious heroes1 creative personalities1 in whom an especially lively religious feeling is aroused by a new view of the universe1 and determines 7not1 like artistic inspiration1 single moments1 but7 their whole existence4 ,three stages are to be distinguished in the development of religion1 according as the world is represented as an unordered unity 7chaos71 or as an indeterminate manifold of forces and elements 7plurality without unity71 or1 finally1 as an organized plurality dominated by unity 7system7--fetichism with fatalism1 polytheism1 mono- 7including pan-7 theism4 ,among the religions of the third stadium ,islam is physical or aesthetic in spirit2 ,judaism and ,christianity1 on the other hand1 ethical or teleological4 ,the ,christian religion is the most perfect1 because it gives the central place to the concept of redemption and reconciliation 7hence to that which is essential to religion7 instead of to the ,jewish idea of retribution4 ,the concept of individuality became of the highest importance for ,schleiermacher's ethics1 as well as for his philosophy of religion2 and by his high appreciation of it he ranges himself with ,leibnitz1 ,herder1 ,goethe1 and ,novalis4 ,now two sides may be distinguished both in regard to that which the individual is and to that which he ought to accomplish4 ,like every particular being1 man is an abbreviated1 concentrated presentation of the universe2 he contains everything in himself1 contains all1 that is1 in a not yet unfolded1 germinal manner1 awaiting development in life in time1 but yet in a form peculiar to him1 which is never repeated elsewhere4 ,this yields a twofold moral task4 ,the individual ought to rouse into actuality the infinite fullness of content which he possesses as possibility1 as slumbering germs1 should harmoniously develop his capacities2 yet in this he must not look upon the unique form which has been bestowed upon him as worthless4 ,he is not to feel himself a mere specimen1 an unimportant repetition of the type1 but as a particular1 and in this particularity a significant1 expression of the absolute1 whose omission would cause a gap in the world4 ,it is surprising that the majority of the thinkers who have defended the value of individuality lay far less stress upon the micro-cosmical nature of the individual and the development of his capacities in all directions than on care for his peculiar qualities4 ,so also ,schleiermacher4 ,yet he gradually returned from the extreme individualism--the ,monologues affect one almost repellently by the impulse which they give to vain self-reflection--which he at first defended4 ,in the ,ethics 7edited by ,kirchmann1 #ahgj2 earlier editions by ,schweizer1 #ahce1 and ,twesten1 #ahda7 ,schleiermacher brings the well-nigh forgotten concept of goods again into honor4 ,the three points of view from which ethics is to be discussed1 and each of which presents the whole ethical field in its own peculiar way--the good1 virtue1 duty--are related as resultant1 force1 and law of motion4 ,every union of reason and nature produced by the action of the former on the latter is called a good2 the sum of these unities1 the highest good4 ,according as reason uses nature as an instrument in formation or as a symbol in cognition her action is formative or indicative2 it is1 further1 either common or peculiar4 ,on the crossing of these 7fluctuating7 distinctions of identical and individual organization and symbolization is based the division of the theory of goods3 ,,spheres4 ,,relations4 ,,goods4 ,ident4 ,organ43 ,intercourse4 ,right4 ,the ,state4 ,individ4 ,organ43 ,property4 ,free ,sociability4 ,class1 ,house1 ,friendship4 ,ident4 ,symbol43 ,knowledge4 ,faith4 ,school and ,university4 ,individ4 ,symbol43 ,feeling4 ,revelation4 ,the ,church 7,art74 ,the four ethical communities1 each of which represents the organic union of opposites--rulers and subjects1 host and guests1 teachers and pupils or scholars and the public1 the clergy and the laity--have for their foundation the family and the unity of the nation4 ,virtue 7the personal unification of reason and sensibility7 is either disposition or skill1 and in each case either cognitive or presentative2 this yields the cardinal virtues wisdom1 love1 discretion1 and perseverance4 ,the division of duties into duties of right1 duties of love1 duties of vocation1 and duties of conscience rests on the distinction between community in production and appropriation1 each of which may be universal or individual4 ,the most general laws of duty 7duty is the ,idea of the good in an imperative form7 run3 ,act at every instant with all thy moral power1 and aiming at thy whole moral problem2 act with all virtues and in view of all goods1 further1 ,always do that action which is most advantageous for the whole sphere of morality1 in which two different factors are included3 ,always do that toward which thou findest thyself inwardly moved1 and that to which thou findest thyself required from without4 ,instead of following further the wearisome schematism of ,schleiermacher's ethics1 we may notice1 finally1 a fundamental thought which our philosopher also discussed by itself3 ,the sharp contraposition of natural and moral law1 advocated by ,kant1 is unjustifiable2 the moral law is itself a law of nature1 viz41 of rational will4 ,it is true neither that the moral law is a mere ought nor that the law of nature is a mere being1 a universally followed must4 ,for1 on the one hand1 ethics has to do with the law which human action really follows1 and1 on the other1 there are violations of rule in nature also4 ,immorality1 the imperfect mastery of the sensuous impulses by rational will1 has an analogue in the abnormalities--deformities and diseases--in nature1 which show that here also the higher 7organic7 principles are not completely successful in controlling the lower processes4 ,the higher law everywhere suffers disturbances1 from the resistance of the lower forces1 which cannot be entirely conquered4 ,it is ,schleiermacher's determinism which leads him1 in view of the parallelism of the two legislations1 to overlook their essential distinction4 ,adherents of ,schleiermacher are ,vorlnder 7died #ahfg71 ,george 7died #ahgd71 the theologian1 ,richard ,rothe 7died #ahfg2 cf4 ,nippold1 #ahgc seq471 and the historians of philosophy1 ,brandis 7died #ahfg7 and ,h4 ,ritter 7died #ahfi74a ,footnote #a3 ,w4 ,dilthey 7born #ahcd71 the successor of ,lotze in ,berlin1 is publishing a life of ,schleiermacher 7vol4 i4 #ahfg-gj74 ,cf4 also ,dilthey's briefer account in the ,allgemeine deutsche ,biographie1 and ,haym's ,romantische ,schule1 #ahgj4 ,further1 ,aus ,schleiermachers ,leben1 in ,briefen1 #d vols41 #aheh-fc4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,hegel4 ,georg ,wilhelm ,friedrich ,hegel was born at ,stuttgart on ,august #bg1 #aggj4 ,he attended the gymnasium of his native city1 and1 from #aghh1 the ,tbingen seminary as a student of theology2 while in #agic-ahjj he resided as a private tutor in ,berne and ,frankfort-on-the-,main4 ,in the latter city the plan of his future system was already maturing4 ,a manuscript outline divides philosophy1 following the ancient division1 logic1 physics1 and ethics1 into three parts1 the first of which 7the fundamental science1 the doctrine of the categories and of method1 combining logic and metaphysics7 considers the absolute as pure ,idea1 while the second considers it as nature1 and the third as real 7ethical7 spirit4 ,hegel habilitated in #ahja at ,jena1 with a ,latin dissertation ,on the ,orbits of the ,planets1 in which1 ignorant of the discovery of ,ceres1 he maintained that on rational grounds--assuming that the number-series given in ,plato's ,timaeus is the true order of nature--no additional planet could exist between ,mars and ,jupiter4 ,this dissertation gives1 further1 a deduction of ,kepler's laws4 ,the essay on the ,difference between the ,systems of ,fichte and ,schelling had appeared even previous to this4 ,in company with ,schelling he edited in #ahjb-jc the ,kritisches ,journal der ,philosophie4 ,the article on ,faith and ,knowledge published in this journal characterizes the standpoint of ,kant1 ,jacobi1 and ,fichte as that of reflection1 for which finite and infinite1 being and thought form an antithesis1 while true speculation grasps these in their identity4 ,in the night before the battle of ,jena ,hegel finished the revision of his ,phenomenology of ,spirit1 which was published in #ahjg4 ,the extraordinary professorship given him in #ahje he was forced to resign on account of financial considerations2 then he was for a year a newspaper editor in ,bamberg1 and in #ahjh went as a gymnasial rector to ,nuremberg1 where he instructed the higher classes in philosophy4 ,his lectures there are printed in the eighteenth volume of his works1 under the title ,propaedeutic4 ,in the ,nuremberg period fell his marriage and the publication of the ,logic 7vol4 i4 #ahab1 vol4 ii4 #ahaf74 ,in #ahaf he was called as professor of philosophy to ,heidelberg 7where the ,encyclopedia appeared1 #ahag71 and two years later to ,berlin4 ,the ,outlines of the ,philosophy of ,right1 #ahba1 is the only major work which was written in ,berlin4 ,the ,jahrbcher fr wissenschaftliche ,kritik1 founded in #ahbg as an organ of the school1 contained a few critiques1 but for the rest he devoted his whole strength to his lectures4 ,he fell a victim to the cholera on ,november #ad1 #ahca4 ,the collected edition of his works in eighteen volumes 7#ahcb-de7 contains in vols4 ii4-viii4 the four major works which had been published by ,hegel himself 7the ,encyclopaedia with additions from the ,lectures72 in vols4 i41 xvi41 and xvii4 the minor treatises2 in vols4 ix4-xv4 the ,lectures1 edited by ,cans1 ,hotho1 ,marheineke1 and ,michelet4 ,the ,letters from and to ,hegel have been added as a nineteenth volume1 under the editorship of ,karl ,hegel1 #ahhg4a ,footnote #a3 ,hegel's ,life has been written by ,karl ,rosenkranz 7#ahdd71 who has also defended the master 7,apologie ,hegels1 #aheh7 against ,r4 ,haym 7,hegel und seine ,zeit1 #aheg71 and extolled him as the national philosopher of ,germany 7#ahgj2 ,english by ,g4,s4 ,hall74 ,cf41 further1 the neat popular exposition by ,karl ,kstlin1 #ahgj1 and the essays by ,ed4 von ,hartmann1 ,ueber die dialektische ,methode1 #ahfh1 and ,hegels ,panlogismus 7#ahgj1 incorporated in the ,gesammelte ,studien und ,aufstze1 #ahgf74 ,the ,english reader may consult ,e4 ,caird's ,hegel in ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhc2 ,harris's ,hegel's ,logic1 ,morris's ,hegel's ,philosophy of the ,state and of ,history1 and ,kedney's ,hegel's ,aesthetics in ,griggs's ,philosophical ,classics2 and ,wallace's translation of the ,logic--from the ,encyclopaedia--with ,prolegomena1 #ahgd1 #b;d4 ed41 ,translation1 #ahib1 ,prolegomena to follow4 ,stirling's ,secret of ,hegel1 #b vols41 ,london1 #ahfe1 includes a translation of a part of the ,logic1 and numerous translations from different works of the master are to be found in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy4 ,the ,lectures on the ,philosophy of ,history have been translated by ,j4 ,sibree1 ,m4,a41 in ,bohn's ,library1 #ahfj1 and ,e4,s4 ,haldane is issuing a translation of those on the ,history of ,philosophy1 vol4 i41 #ahib4--,,tr4 ,we may preface our exposition of the parts of the system by some remarks on ,hegel's standpoint in general and his scientific method4 #a4 ,hegel's ,view of the ,world and his ,method4 ,in ,hegel there revives in full vigor the intellectualism which from the first had lain in the blood of ,german philosophy1 and which ,kant's moralism had only temporarily restrained4 ,the primary of practical reason is discarded1 and theory is extolled as the ground1 center1 and aim of human1 nay1 of all existence4 ,leibnitz and ,hegel are the classical representatives of the intellectualistic view of the world4 ,in the former the subjective psychological point of view is dominant1 in the latter1 the objective cosmical position3 ,leibnitz argues from the representative nature of the soul to an analogous constitution of all elements of the universe2 from the general mission of all that is real1 to be a manifestation of reason1 ,hegel deduces that of the individual spirit1 to realize a determinate series of stages of thought4 ,the true reality is reason2 all being is the embodiment of a pregnant thought1 all becoming a movement of the concept1 the world a development of thought4 ,the absolute or the logical ,idea exists first as a system of antemundane concepts1 then it descends into the unconscious sphere of nature1 awakens to self-consciousness in man1 realizes its content in social institutions1 in order1 finally1 in art1 religion1 and science to return to itself enriched and completed1 i4e41 to attain a higher absoluteness than that of the beginning4 ,philosophy is the highest product and the goal of the world-process4 ,as will1 intuition1 representation1 and feeling are lower forms of thought1 so ethics1 art1 and religion are preliminary stages in philosophy2 for it first succeeds in that which these vainly attempt1 in presenting the concept adequately1 in conceptual form4 ,if we develop that which is contained as a constituent factor or by implication in the intellectualistic thesis1 ,all being is thought realized1 all becoming a development of thought1 we reach the following definitions3 7i7 ,the object of philosophy is formed by the ,ideas of things4 ,its aim is to search out the concept1 the purpose1 the significance of phenomena1 and to assign to these their corresponding positions in the world and in the system of knowledge4 ,it is chiefly interested in discovering where in the scale of values a thing belongs according to its meaning and its destination2 the procedure is teleological1 valuing1 aesthetic4 ,instead of a causal explanation of phenomena we are given an ideal interpretation of them4 7,so ,lotze accurately describes the character of ,german idealism47 7#b7 ,if all that is real is a manifestation of reason and each thing a stage1 a modification of thought1 then thought and being are identical4 7#c7 ,if the world is thought in becoming1 and philosophy has to set forth this process1 philosophy is a theory of development4 ,if each thing realizes a thought1 then all that is real is rational2 and if the world-process attains its highest stadium in philosophy1 and this in turn its completion in the system of absolute idealism1 then all that is rational is real4 ,reason or the ,idea is not merely a demand1 a longed for ideal1 but a world-power which accomplishes its own realization4 ,the rational is real and the real is rational 7,preface to the ,philosophy of ,right74 ,or to sum it up--,hegel's philosophy is idealism1 a system of identity1 and an optimistic doctrine of development4 ,what1 then1 distinguishes ,hegel from other idealists1 philosophers of identity1 and teachers of development8 ,what in particular distinguishes him from his predecessor ,schelling8 ,in ,schelling nature is the subject and art the conclusion of the development2 his idealism has a physical and aesthetical character1 as ,fichte's an ethical character4 ,in ,hegel1 however1 the concept is the subject and goal of the development1 his philosophy is1 in the words of ,haym1 a ,logisierung of the world1 a logical idealism4 ,the theory of identity is that system which looks upon nature and spirit as one in essence and as phenomenal modes of an absolute which is above them both4 ,but while ,schelling treats the real and the ideal as having equal rights1 ,hegel restores the ,fichtean subordination of nature to spirit1 without1 however1 sharing ,fichte's contempt for nature4 ,nature is neither co-ordinate with spirit nor a mere instrument for spirit1 but a transition stage in the development of the absolute1 viz41 the ,idea in its other-being 7,anderssein74 ,it is spirit itself that becomes nature in order to become actual1 conscious spirit2 before the absolute became nature it was already spirit1 not1 indeed1 for itself 7fr sich71 yet in itself 7an sich71 it was ,idea or reason4 ,the ideal is not merely the morning which follows the night of reality1 but also the evening which precedes it4 ,the absolute 7the concept7 develops from in-itself 7,ansich7 through out-of-self 7,aussersich7 or other-being to for-itself 7,frsich72 it exists first as reason 7system of logical concepts71 then as nature1 finally as living spirit4 ,thus ,hegel's philosophy of identity is distinguished from ,schelling's by two factors3 it subordinates nature to spirit1 and conceives the absolute of the beginning not as the indifference of the real and ideal1 but as ideal1 as a realm of eternal thoughts4 ,the assertion that ,hegel represents a synthesis of ,fichte and ,schelling is therefore justified4 ,this is true1 further1 for the character of ,hegel's thought as a whole1 in so far as it follows a middle course between the world-estranged1 rigid abstractness of ,fichte's thinking and ,schelling's artistico-fanciful intuition1 sharing with the former its logical stringency as well as its dominant interest in the philosophy of spirit1 and with the latter its wide outlook and its sense for the worth and the richness of that which is individual4 ,we have characterized ,hegel's system1 thirdly1 as a philosophy of development4 ,the point of distinction here is that ,hegel carries out with logical consecutiveness and up to the point of obstinacy the principle of development which ,fichte had discovered1 and which ,schelling also had occasionally employed1--the threefold rhythm thesis1 antithesis1 synthesis4 ,here we come to ,hegel's dialectic method4 ,he reached this as the true method of speculation through a comparison of the two forms of philosophy which he found dominant at the beginning of his career--the ,illumination culminating in ,kant1 on the one hand1 and1 on the other1 the doctrine of identity defended by ,schelling and his circle--neither of which entirely satisfied him4 ,in regard to the main question he feels himself one with ,schelling3 philosophy is to be metaphysics1 the science of the absolute and its immanence in the world1 the doctrine of the identity of opposites1 of the1 per se of things1 not merely of their phenomenon4 ,but the form which ,schelling had given it seems to him unscientific1 unsystematic1 for ,schelling had based philosophical knowledge on the intuition of genius--and science from intuition is impossible4 ,the philosophy of the ,illumination impresses him1 on the other hand1 by the formal strictness of its inquiry2 he agrees with it that philosophy must be science from concepts4 ,only not from abstract concepts4 ,kant and the ,illumination stand on the platform of reflection1 for which the antithesis of thought and being1 finite and infinite remains insoluble1 and1 consequently1 the absolute transcendent1 and the true essence of things unknowable4 ,hegel wishes to combine the advantages of both sides1 the depth of content of the one1 and the scientific form of the other4 ,the intuition with which ,schelling works is immediate cognition1 directed to the concrete and particular4 ,the concept of the philosophy of reflection is mediate cognition1 moving in the sphere of the abstract and universal4 ,is it not feasible to do away with the 7unscientific7 immediateness of the one1 and the 7non-intuitive1 content-lacking7 abstractness of the other1 to combine the concrete with the mediate or conceptual1 and in this way to realize the ,kantian ideal of an intuitive understanding8 ,a concrete concept would be one which sought the universal not without the particular1 but in it2 which should not find the infinite beyond the finite1 nor the absolute at an unattainable distance above the world1 nor the essence hidden behind the phenomenon1 but manifesting itself therein4 ,if the philosophy of reflection1 in the abstract lifelessness of its concepts1 looked on opposites as incapable of sublation1 and ,schelling regarded them as immediately identical1 if the former denied the identity of opposites1 and the latter maintained it primordially given 7in the absolute indifference which is to be grasped by intuition71 the concrete concept secures the identity of opposites through self-mediation1 their passing over into it2 it teaches us to know the identity as the result of a process4 ,first immediate unity1 then divergence of opposites1 and1 finally1 reconciliation of opposites--this is the universal law of all development4 ,the conflict between the philosophy of reflection and the philosophy of intuition1 which ,hegel endeavors to terminate by a speculation at once conceptual and concrete1 concerns 7#a7 the organ of thought1 7#b7 the object of thought1 7#c7 the nature and logical dignity of the contradiction4 ,the organ of the true philosophy is neither the abstract reflective understanding1 which finds itself shut up within the limits of the phenomenal1 nor mystical intuition1 which expects by a quick leap to gain the summit of knowledge concerning the absolute1 but reason as the faculty of concrete concepts4 ,that concept is concrete which does not assume an attitude of cold repulsion toward its contrary1 but seeks self-mediation with the latter1 and moves from thesis through antithesis1 and with it1 to synthesis4 ,reason neither fixes the opposites nor denies them1 but has them become identical4 ,the unity of opposites is neither impossible nor present from the first1 but the result of a development4 ,the object of philosophy is not the phenomenal world or the relative1 but the absolute1 and this not as passive substance1 but as living subject1 which divides into distinctions1 and returns from them to identity1 which develops through the opposites4 ,the absolute is a process1 and all that is real the manifestation of this process4 ,if science is to correspond to reality1 it also must be a process4 ,philosophy is thought-movement 7dialectic72 it is a system of concepts1 each of which passes over into its successor1 puts its successor forth from itself1 just as it has been generated by its predecessor4 ,all reality is development1 and the motive force in this development 7of the world as well as of science7 is opposition1 contradiction4 ,without this there would be no movement and no life4 ,thus all reality is full of contradiction1 and yet rational4 ,the contradiction is not that which is entirely alogical1 but it is a spur to further thinking4 ,it must not be annulled1 but sublated 7aufgehoben71 i4e41 at once negated and conserved4 ,this is effected by thinking the contradictory concepts together in a third higher1 more comprehensive1 and richer concept1 whose moments they then form4 ,as sublated moments they contradict each other no longer2 the opposition or contradiction is overcome4 ,but the synthesis is still not a final one2 the play begins anew2 again an opposition makes its appearance1 which in turn seeks to be overcome1 etc4 ,each separate concept is one-sided1 defective1 represents only a part of the truth1 needs to be supplemented by its contrary1 and1 by its union with this1 its complement1 yields a higher concept1 which comes nearer to the whole truth1 but still does not quite reach it4 ,even the last and richest concept--the absolute ,idea--is by itself alone not the full truth2 the result implies the whole development through which it has been attained4 ,it is only at the end of such a dialectic of concepts that philosophy reaches complete correspondence with the living reality1 which it has to comprehend2 and the speculative progress of thought is no capricious sporting with concepts on the part of the thinking subject1 but the adequate expression of the movement of the matter itself4 ,since the world and its ground is development1 it can only be known through a development of concepts4 ,the law which this follows1 in little as in great1 is the advance from position to opposition1 and thence to combination4 ,the most comprehensive example of this triad--,idea1 ,nature1 ,spirit--gives the division of the system2 the second--,subjective1 ,objective1 ,absolute ,spirit--determines the articulation of the third part4 #b4 ,the ,system4 ,hegel began with a ,phenomenology by way of introduction1 in which 7not to start1 like the school of ,schelling1 with absolute knowledge as though shot from a pistol7 he describes the genesis of philosophical cognition with an attractive mingling of psychological and philosophico-historical points of view4 ,he makes spirit--the universal world-spirit as well as the individual consciousness1 which repeats in brief the stages in the development of humanity--pass through six stadia1 of which the first three 7consciousness1 self-consciousness1 reason7 correspond to the progress of the intermediate part of the ,doctrine of ,subjective ,spirit1 which is entitled ,phnomenologie1 and the others 7ethical spirit1 religion1 and absolute knowledge7 give an abbreviated presentation of that which the ,doctrine of ,objective and ,absolute ,spirit develops in richer articulation4 7a7 ,logic considers the ,idea in the abstract element of thought1 only as it is thought1 and not yet as it is intuited1 nor as it thinks itself2 its content is the truth as it is without a veil in and for itself1 or ,god in his eternal essence before the creation of the world4 ,unlike common logic1 which is merely formal1 separating form and content1 speculative logic1 which is at the same time ontology or metaphysics1 treats the categories as real relations1 the forms of thought as forms of reality3 as thought and thing are the same1 so logic is the theory of thought and of being in one4 ,its three principal divisions are entitled ,being1 ,essence1 the ,concept4 ,the first of these discusses quality1 quantity1 and measure or qualitative quantum4 ,the second considers essence as such1 appearance1 and 7essence appearing or7 actuality1 and this last1 in turn1 in the moments1 substantiality1 causality1 and reciprocity4 ,the third part is divided into the sections1 subjectivity 7concept1 judgment1 syllogism71 objectivity 7mechanism1 chemism1 teleology71 and the ,idea 7life1 cognition1 the absolute ,idea74 ,as a specimen of the way in which ,hegel makes the concept pass over into its opposite and unite with this in a synthesis1 it will be sufficient to cite the famous beginning of the ,logic4 ,how must the absolute first be thought1 how first defined8 ,evidently as that which is absolutely without presupposition4 ,the most general concept which remains after abstracting from every determinate content of thought1 and from which no further abstraction is possible1 the most indeterminate and immediate concept1 is pure being4 ,as without quality and content it is equivalent to nothing4 ,in thinking pure being we have rather cogitated nothing2 but this in turn cannot be retained as final1 but passes back into being1 for in being thought it exists as a something thought4 ,pure being and pure nothing are the same1 although we mean different things by them2 both are absolute indeterminateness4 ,the transition from being to nothing and from nothing to being is becoming4 ,becoming is the unity1 and hence the truth of both4 ,when the boy is becoming a youth he is1 and at the same time is not1 a youth4 ,being and not-being are so mediated and sublated in becoming that they are no longer contradictory4 ,in a similar way it is further shown that quality and quantity are reciprocally dependent and united in measure 7which may be popularly illustrated thus3 progressively diminishing heat becomes cold1 distances cannot be measured in bushels72 that essence and phenomenon are mutually inseparable1 inasmuch as the latter is always the appearance of an essence1 and the former is essence only as it manifests itself in the phenomenon1 etc4 ,the significance of the ,hegelian logic depends less on its ingenious and valuable explanations of particulars than on the fundamental idea1 that the categories do not form an unordered heap1 but a great organically connected whole1 in which each member occupies its determinate position1 and is related to every other by gradations of kinship and subordination4 ,this purpose to construct a globus of the pure concepts was itself a mighty feat1 which is assured of the continued admiration of posterity notwithstanding the failure in execution4 ,he who shall one day take it up again will draw many a lesson from ,hegel's unsuccessful attempt4 ,before all1 the connections between the concepts are too manifold and complex for the monotonous transitions of this dialectic method 7which ,chalybaeus wittily called articular disease7 to be capable of doing them justice4 ,again1 the productive force of thought must not be neglected1 and to it1 rather than to the mobility of the categories themselves1 the matter of the transition from one to the other must be transferred4 7b7 ,the ,philosophy of ,nature shows the ,idea in its other-being4 ,out of the realm of logical shades1 wherein the souls of all reality dwell1 we move into the sphere of external1 sensuous existence1 in which the concepts take on material form4 ,why does the ,idea externalize itself8 ,in order to become actual4 ,but the actuality of nature is imperfect1 unsuited to the ,idea1 and only the precondition of a better actuality1 the actuality of spirit1 which has been the aim from the beginning3 reason becomes nature in order to become spirit2 the ,idea goes forth from itself in order--enriched--to return to itself again4 ,only the man who once has been in a foreign land knows his home aright4 ,the relation of natural objects to one another and their action upon one another is an external one3 they are governed by mechanical necessity1 and the contingency of influences from without arrests and disturbs their development1 so that while reason is everywhere discernible in nature1 it is not reason alone2 and much that is illogical1 contrary to purpose1 lawless1 painful1 and unhealthy1 points to the fact that the essence of nature consists in externality4 ,this inadequacy in the realization of the ,idea1 however1 is gradually removed by development1 until1 in life1 the way is prepared for the birth of spirit4 ,as ,hegel in his philosophy of nature--which falls into three parts1 mechanics1 physics1 and organics--follows ,schelling pretty closely1 and1 moreover1 does not show his power1 it does not seem necessary to dwell longer upon it4 ,in the next section1 also1 in view of the fact that its models1 the constructive psychologies of ,fichte and ,schelling1 have already been discussed in detail1 a statement of the divisions and connections must suffice4 7c7 ,the ,doctrine of ,subjective ,spirit makes freedom 7being with or in self7 the essence and destination of spirit1 and shows how spirit realizes this predisposition in increasing independence of nature4 ,the subject of anthropology is spirit as the 7natural1 sensitive1 and actual7 soul of a body2 here are discussed the distinctions of race1 nation1 sex1 age1 sleeping and waking1 disposition and temperament1 together with talents and mental diseases1 in short1 whatever belongs to spirit in its union with a body4 ,phenomenology is the science of the ego1 i4e41 of spirit1 in so far as it opposes itself to nature as the non-ego1 and passes through the stages of 7mere7 consciousness1 self-consciousness1 and 7the synthesis of the two7 reason4 ,psychology 7better pneumatology7 considers spirit in its reconciliation with objectivity under the following divisions3 ,theoretical ,intelligence as intuition 7sensation1 attention1 intuition71 as representation 7passive memory1 phantasy1 memory71 and 7as conceiving1 judging1 reasoning7 thought2 ,practical ,intelligence as feeling1 impulse 7passion and caprice71 and happiness2 finally1 the unity of the knowing and willing spirit1 free spirit or rational will1 which in turn realizes itself in right1 ethics1 and history4 7d7 ,the ,doctrine of ,objective ,spirit1 comprehending ethics1 the philosophy of right1 of the state1 and of history1 is ,hegel's most brilliant achievement4 ,it divides as follows3 7#a7 ,right 7property1 contract1 punishment72 7#b7 ,morality 7purpose1 intention and welfare1 good and evil72 7#c7 ,social ,morality3 7a7 the family2 7b7 civil society2 7c7 the state 7internal and external polity1 and the history of the world74 ,in right the will or freedom attains to outer actuality1 in morality it attains to inner actuality1 in social morality to objective and subjective actuality at once1 hence to complete actuality4 ,right1 as it were a second1 higher nature1 because a necessity posited and acknowledged by spirit1 is originally a sum of prohibitions2 wherever it seems to command the negative has only received a positive expression4 ,private right contains two things--the warrant to be a person1 and the injunction to respect other persons as such4 ,property is the external sphere which the will gives to itself2 without property no personality4 ,through punishment 7retaliation7 right is restored against un-right 7,unrecht71 and the latter shown to be a nullity4 ,the criminal is treated according to the same maxim as that of his action--that coercion is allowable4 ,in the stadium of morality the good exists in the form of a requirement which can never be perfectly fulfilled1 as a mere imperative2 there remains an irrepressible opposition between the moral law and the individual will1 between intention and execution4 ,here the judge of good and evil is the conscience1 which is not secure against error4 ,that which is objectively evil may seem good and a duty to subjective conviction4 7,according to ,fichte this was impossible74 ,on account of the conflict between duty and will1 which is at this stage irrepressible1 ,hegel is unable to consider morality1 the sphere of the subjective disposition1 supreme4 ,he thinks he knows a higher sphere1 wherein legality and morality become one3 social morality 7,sittlichkeit74 ,this sphere takes its name from ,sitte1 that custom ruling in the community which is felt by the individual not as a command from without1 but as his own nature4 ,here the good appears as the spirit of the family and of the people1 pervading individuals as its substance4 ,marriage is neither a merely legal nor a merely sentimental relation1 but an ethical 7sittliches7 institution4 ,while love rules in the family1 in civil society each aims at the satisfaction of his private wants1 and yet1 in working for himself1 subserves the good of the whole4 ,class distinctions are based on the division of labor demanded by the variant needs of men 7the agricultural1 industrial1 and thinking classes74 ,class and party honor is1 in ,hegel's view1 among the most essential supports of general morality4 ,strange to say1 he brings the administration of justice and the police into the same sphere4 ,the state1 the unity of the family and civil society1 is the completed actualization of freedom4 ,its organs are the political powers 7which are to be divided1 but not to be made independent73 the legislative power determines the universal1 the executive subsumes the particular thereunder1 the power of the prince combines both into personal unity4 ,in the will of the prince the state becomes subject4 ,the perfect form of the state is constitutional monarchy1 its establishment the goal of history1 which ,hegel1 like ,kant1 considers chiefly from the political standpoint4 ,history is the development of the rational state2 the world-spirit the guiding force in this development2 its instruments the spirits of the nations and great men4 ,a particular people is the expression of but one determinate moment of the universal spirit2 and when it has fulfilled its commission it loses its legal warrant1 and yields up its dominion to another1 now the only authorized one3 the history of the world is the judgment of the world1 which is held over the nations4 ,the world-historical characters1 also1 are only the instruments of a higher power1 the purposes of which they execute while imagining that they are acting in their own interests--their own deed is hidden from them1 and is neither their purpose nor their object4 ,this should be called the cunning of reason1 that it makes the passions work in its service4 ,history is progress in the consciousness of freedom4 ,at first one only knows himself free1 then several1 finally all4 ,this gives three chief periods1 or rather four world-kingdoms1--,oriental despotism1 the ,greek 7democratic7 and the ,roman 7aristocratic7 republic1 and the ,germanic monarchy1--in which humanity passes through its several ages4 ,like the sun1 history moves from east to west4 ,china and ,india have not advanced beyond the preliminary stages of the state2 the ,chinese kingdom is a family state1 ,india a society of classes stiffened into castes4 ,the ,persian despotism is the first true state1 and this in the form of a conquering military state4 ,in the youth and manhood of humanity the sovereignty of the people replaces the sovereignty of one2 but not all have yet the consciousness of freedom1 the slaves have no share in the government4 ,the principle of the ,greek world1 with its fresh life and delight in beauty1 is individuality2 hence the plurality of small states1 in which ,sparta is an anticipation of the ,roman spirit4 ,the ,roman ,republic is internally characterized by the constitutional struggle between the patricians and the plebeians1 and externally by the policy of world conquest4 ,out of the repellent relations between the universal and the individual1 which oppose one another as the abstract state and abstract personality1 the unhappy imperial period develops4 ,in the ,roman ,empire and ,judaism the conditions were given for the appearance of ,christianity4 ,this brings with it the idea of humanity3 every man is free as man1 as a rational being4 ,in the beginning this emancipation was religious2 through the ,germans it became political as well4 ,the remaining divisions cannot here be detailed4 ,their captions run3 ,the ,elements of the ,germanic ,spirit 7the ,migrations2 ,mohammedanism2 the ,frankish ,empire of ,charlemagne72 the ,middle ,ages 7the ,feudal ,system and the ,hierarchy2 the ,crusades2 the ,transition from ,feudal ,rule to ,monarchy1 or the ,cities72 ,modern ,times 7the ,reformation2 its ,effect on ,political ,development2 ,illumination and ,revolution74 ,the philosophy of history#a is ,hegel's most brilliant and most lasting achievement4 ,his view of the state as the absolute end1 the complete realization of the good1 is dominated1 no doubt1 by the antique ideal1 which cannot take root again in the humanity of modern times4 ,but his splendid endeavor to comprehend history1 to bring to light the laws of historical development and the interaction between the different spheres of national life1 will remain an example for all time4 ,the leading ideas of his philosophy of history have so rapidly found their way into the general scientific consciousness that the view of history which obtained in the period of the ,illumination is well nigh incomprehensible to the investigator of to-day4 ,footnote #a3 ,a well-chosen collection of aphorisms from the philosophy of history is given by ,m4 ,schasler under the title ,hegel3 ,populre ,gedanken aus seinen ,werken1 #b;d4 ed41 #ahgc4 7e7 ,absolute ,spirit is the unity of subjective and objective spirit4 ,as such1 spirit becomes perfectly free 7from all contradictions7 and reconciled with itself4 ,the break between subject and object1 representation and thing1 thought and being1 infinite and finite is done away with1 and the infinite recognized as the essence of the finite4 ,the knowledge of the reconciliation of the highest opposites or of the infinite in the finite presents itself in three forms3 in the form of intuition 7art71 of feeling and representation 7religion71 of thought 7philosophy74 7#a7 ,aesthetics4--,the beautiful is the absolute 7the infinite in the finite7 in sensuous existence1 the ,idea in limited manifestation4 ,according to the relation of these moments1 according as the outer form or the inner content predominates1 or a balance of the two occurs1 we have the symbolic form of art1 in which the phenomenon predominates and the ,idea is merely suggested2 or the classical form1 in which ,idea and intuition1 or spiritual content and sensuous form1 completely balance and pervade each other1 in which the former of them is ceaselessly taken up into the latter2 or the romantic form1 in which the phenomenon retires1 and the ,idea1 the inwardness of the spirit predominates4 ,classical art1 in which form and content are perfectly conformed to each other1 is the most beautiful1 but romantic art is1 nevertheless1 higher and more significant4 ,oriental1 including ,egyptian and ,hebrew1 art was symbolic2 ,greek art1 classical2 ,christian art is romantic1 bringing into art entirely new sentiments of a knightly and a religious sort--love1 loyalty and honor1 grief and repentance--and understanding how by careful treatment to ennoble even the petty and contingent4 ,the sublime belongs to symbolic art2 the ,roman satire is the dissolution of the classical1 and humor the dissolution of the romantic1 ideal4 ,architecture is predominantly symbolic2 sculpture permits the purest expression of the classical ideal2 painting1 music1 and poetry bear a romantic character4 ,this does not exclude the recurrence of these three stages within each art--in architecture1 for example1 as monumental 7the obelisk71 useful 7house and temple71 and ,gothic 7the cathedral7 architecture4 ,as the plastic arts reached their culmination among the ,hellenes1 so the romantic arts culminate among the ,christian nations4 ,in poetry1 as the most perfect and universal 7or the totality of7 art1 uniting in itself the two contraries1 the symbolic and the classical1 the lyric is a repetition of the architectonic-musical1 the epic1 of the plastic-pictorial1 the drama1 the union of the lyric and the epic4 7#b7 ,philosophy of ,religion4--,the withdrawal from outer sensibility into the inner spirit1 begun in romantic art1 especially in poetry1 is completed in religion4 ,in religion the nations have recorded the way in which they represent the substance of the world2 in it the unity of the infinite and the finite is felt1 and represented through imagination4 ,religion is not merely a feeling of piety1 but a thought of the absolute1 only not in the form of thinking4 ,religion and philosophy are materially the same1 both have ,god or the truth for their object1 they differ only in form--religion contains in an empirical1 symbolic form the same speculative content which philosophy presents in the adequate form of the concept4 ,religion is developing knowledge as it gradually conquers imperfection4 ,it appears first as definite religion in two stadia1 natural religion and the religion of spiritual individuality1 and finally attains the complete realization of its concept in the absolute religion of ,christianity4 ,natural religion1 in its lowest stage magic1 develops in three forms--as the religion of measure 7,chinese71 of phantasy 7,indian or ,brahmanical71 and of being in self 7,buddhistic74 ,in the ,persian 7,zoroastrian7 religion of light1 the ,syrian religion of pain1 and the ,egyptian religion of enigma1 is prepared the way for the transformation into the religion of freedom4 ,the ,greek solves the riddle of the ,sphinx by apprehending himself as subject1 as man4 ,the religion of spiritual individuality or free subjectivity passes through three stadia3 the ,jewish religion of sublimity 7unity71 the ,greek religion of beauty 7necessity71 the ,roman religion of purposiveness 7of the understanding74 ,in contrast to the ,jewish religion of slavish obedience1 which by miracle makes known the power of the one ,god and the nullity of nature1 which has been created by his will1 and the prosaic severity of the ,roman1 which1 in ,jupiter and ,fortuna1 worships only the world-dominion of the ,roman people1 the more cheerful art-religion of the ,hellenes reverences in the beautiful forms of the gods1 the powers which man is aware of in himself--wisdom1 bravery1 and beauty4 ,the ,christian or revealed religion is the religion of truth1 of freedom1 of spirit4 ,its content is the unity of the divine nature and the human1 ,god as knowing himself in being known of man2 the knowledge of ,god is ,god's self-knowledge4 ,its fundamental truths are the ,trinity 7signifying that ,god differentiates and sublates the difference in love71 the incarnation 7as a figure of the essential unity of the infinite and finite spirit71 the fall1 and ,christ's atoning death 7this signifies that the realization of the unity between man and ,god presupposes the overcoming of naturality and selfishness74 7#c7 ,philosophy4--,finally the task remains of clothing the absolute content given in religion in the form adequate to it1 in the form of the concept4 ,in philosophy absolute spirit attains the highest stage1 its perfect self-knowledge4 ,it is the self-thinking ,idea4 ,here we must not look for further detailed explanations3 philosophy is just the course which has been traversed4 ,its systematic exposition is encyclopaedia2 the consideration of its own actualization1 the history of philosophy1 which1 as a philosophical discipline1 has to show the conformity to law and the rationality of this historical development1 to show the more than mere succession1 the genetic succession1 of systems1 as well as their connection with the history of culture4 ,each system is the product and expression of its time1 and as the self-reflection of each successive stage in culture cannot appear before this has reached its maturity and is about to be overcome4 ,not until the approach of the twilight does the owl of ,minerva begin its flight4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,the ,,opposition ,,to ,,constructive ,,idealism3 ,,fries1 ,,herbart1 ,,schopenhauer4 ,in ,fries1 ,herbart1 and ,schopenhauer a threefold opposition was raised against the idealistic school represented by ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel4 ,the opposition of ,fries is aimed at the method of the constructive philosophers1 that of ,herbart against their ontological positions1 and that of ,schopenhauer against their estimate of the value of existence4 ,fries and ,beneke declare that a speculative knowledge of the suprasensible is impossible1 and seek to base philosophy on empirical psychology2 to the monism 7panlogism7 of the idealists ,herbart opposes a pluralism1 to their philosophy of becoming1 a philosophy of being2 ,schopenhauer rejects their optimism1 denying rationality to the world and the world-ground4 ,among themselves the thinkers of the opposition have little more in common than their claim to a better understanding of the ,kantian philosophy1 and a development of it more in harmony with the meaning of its author1 than it had experienced at the hands of the idealists4 ,whoever fails to agree with them in this1 and ascribes to the idealists whom they oppose better grounded claims to the honor of being correct interpreters and consistent developers of ,kantian principles1 will be ready to adopt the name ,semi-,kantians1 given by ,fortlage to the members of the opposition1--a title which seems the more fitting since each of them appropriates only a definitely determinable part of ,kant's views1 and mingles a foreign element with it4 ,in ,fries this non-,kantian element comes from ,jacobi's philosophy of faith2 in ,herbart it comes from the monadology of ,leibnitz1 and the ancient ,eleatico-atomistic doctrine2 in ,schopenhauer1 from the religion of ,india and 7as in ,beneke7 from the sensationalism of the ,english and the ,french4 ,we can only hint in passing at the parallelism which exists between the chief representatives of the idealistic school and the leaders of the opposition4 ,fries's theory of knowledge and faith is the empirical counterpart of ,fichte's ,science of ,knowledge4 ,schopenhauer1 in his doctrine of ,will and ,idea1 in his vigorously intuitive and highly fanciful view of nature and art1 and1 in general1 in his aesthetical mode of philosophizing1 with its glad escape from the fetters of method1 has so much in common with ,schelling that many unhesitatingly treat his system as an offshoot of the ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,the contrast between ,herbart and ,hegel is the more pronounced since they are at one in their confidence in the power of the concept4 ,the most conspicuous point of comparison between the metaphysics of the two thinkers is the significance ascribed by them to the contradiction as the operative moment in the movement of philosophical thought4 ,the attitude of hostility which ,schleiermacher assumed in relation to ,hegel's intellectualistic conception of religion induced ,harms to give to ,schleiermacher also a place in the ranks of the opposition4 ,following the chronological order1 we begin with the campaign opened by ,fries under the banner of anthropology against the main branch of the ,kantian school4 #a4 ,the ,psychologists3 ,fries and ,beneke4 ,jacob ,friedrich ,fries 7#aggc-ahdc7 was born and reared at ,barby1 studied at ,jena1 and habilitated at the same university in the year #ahja2 he was professor at ,heidelberg in #ahjf-af1 and at ,jena from #ahaf until his death4 ,his chief work was the ,new ,critique of ,reason1 in three volumes1 #ahjg 7#b;d ed41 #ahbh seq471 which had been preceded1 in #ahje1 by the treatise ,knowledge1 ,faith1 and ,presentiment4 ,besides these he composed a ,handbook of ,psychical ,anthropology1 #ahba 7#b;d ed41 #ahcg seq471 text-books of ,logic1 ,metaphysics1 the ,mathematical ,philosophy of ,nature1 and ,practical ,philosophy and the ,philosophy of ,religion1 and a philosophical novel1 ,julius and ,evagoras1 or the ,beauty of the ,soul4 ,fries adopts and popularizes ,kant's results1 while he rejects ,kant's method4 ,with ,reinhold and ,fichte1 he thinks transcendental prejudice has forced its way into philosophy1 a phase of thought for which ,kant himself was responsible by his anxiety to demonstrate everything4 ,that a priori forms of knowledge exist cannot be proved by speculation1 but only by empirical methods1 and discovered by inner observation2 they are given facts of reason1 of which we become conscious by reflection or psychological analysis4 ,the a priori element cannot be demonstrated nor deduced1 but only shown actually present4 ,the question at issue#a between ,fries and the idealistic school therefore becomes1 ,is the discovery of the a priori element itself a cognition a priori or a posteriori8 ,is the criticism of reason a metaphysical or an empirical1 that is1 an anthropological inquiry8 ,herbart decides with the idealists3 ,all concepts through which we think our faculty of knowledge are themselves metaphysical concepts 7,lehrbuch zur ,einleitung1 p4 #bca74 ,fries decides3 ,the criticism of reason is an empirico-psychological inquiry1 as in general empirical psychology forms the basis of all philosophy4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,kuno ,fischer's ,pro-,rectoral ,address1 ,die beiden ,kantischen ,schulen in ,jena1 #ahfb4 ,with the exception of this divergence in method ,fries accepts ,kant's results almost unchanged1 unless we must call the leveling down which they suffer at his hands a considerable alteration4 ,only the doctrine of the ,ideas and of the knowledge of reason is transformed by the introduction and systematization of ,jacobi's principle of the immediate evidence of faith4 ,reason1 the faculty of ,ideas1 i4e41 of the indemonstrable yet indubitable principles1 is fully the peer of the sensibility and the understanding4 ,the same subjective necessity which guarantees to us the objective reality of the intuitions and the categories accompanies the ,ideas as well2 the faith which reveals to us the per se of things is no less certain than the knowledge of phenomena4 ,the ideal view of the world is just as necessary as the natural view2 through the former we cognize the same world as through the latter1 only after a higher order2 both spring from reason or the unity of transcendental apperception1 only that in the natural view we are conscious of the fact1 from which we abstract in the ideal view1 that this is the condition of experience4 ,that which necessitates us to rise from knowledge to faith is the circumstance that the empty unity-form of reason is never completely filled by sensuous cognition4 ,the ,ideas are of two kinds3 the aesthetic ,ideas are intuitions1 which lack clear concepts corresponding to them2 the logical ,ideas are concepts under which no correspondent definite intuitions can be subsumed4 ,the former are reached through combination2 the latter by negation1 by thinking away the limitations of empirical cognition1 by removing the limits from the concepts of the understanding4 ,by way of the negation of all limitations we reach as many ,ideas as there are categories1 that is1 twelve1 among which the ,ideas of relation are the most important4 ,these are the three axioms of faith--the eternity of the soul 7its elevation above space and time1 to be carefully distinguished from immortality1 or its permanence in time71 the freedom of the will1 and the ,deity4 ,every ,idea expresses something absolute1 unconditioned1 perfect1 and eternal4--,the dualism of knowledge and faith1 of nature and freedom1 or of phenomenal reality and true1 higher reality1 is bridged over by a third and intermediate mode of apprehension1 feeling or presentiment1 which teaches us the reconciliation of the two realities1 the union of the ,idea and the phenomenon1 the interpenetration of the eternal and the temporal4 ,the beautiful is the ,idea as it manifests itself in the phenomenon1 or the phenomenon as it symbolizes the eternal4 ,the aesthetico-religious judgment looks on the finite as the revelation and symbol of the infinite4 ,in brief1 ,of phenomena we have knowledge2 in the true nature of things we believe2 presentiment enables us to cognize the latter in the former4 ,theoretical philosophy is divided into the philosophy of nature1 which is to use the mathematical method1 hence to give a purely mechanical explanation of all external phenomena1 including those of organic life1 and to leave the consideration of the world as a teleological realm to religious presentiment--and psychology4 ,the object of the former is external nature1 that of the latter internal nature4 ,i know myself only as phenomenon1 my body through outer1 my ego through inner1 experience4 ,it is only a variant mode of appearing on the part of one and the same reality--so ,fries remarks in opposition to the influxus physicus and the harmonia praestabilata--which now shows me my person inwardly as my spirit1 and now outwardly as the life-process of my body4 ,practical philosophy includes ethics1 the philosophy of religion1 and aesthetics4 ,in accordance with the threefold interest of our animal1 sensuo-rational1 and purely rational impulses1 there result three ideals for the legislation of values4 ,these are the ideal of happiness1 the ideal of perfection1 and the ideal of morality1 or of the agreeable1 the useful1 and the good1 the third of which alone possesses an unconditioned worth and validity as a universal and necessary law4 ,the moral laws are deduced from faith in the equal personal dignity of men1 and the ennobling of humanity set up as the highest mission of morality4 ,the three fundamental aesthetical tempers are the idyllic and epic of enthusiasm1 the dramatic of resignation1 the lyric of devotion4 ,fries's system is thus a union of ,kantian positions with elements from ,jacobi1 in which the former experience deterioration1 and the latter improvement1 namely1 more exact formulation4 ,among his adherents1 and he has them still1 the following appear deserving of mention3 the botanists ,schleiden and ,hallier2 the theologian ,de ,wette2 the philosophers ,calker 7of ,bonn1 died #ahgj7 and ,apelt 7#ahab-ei74 ,the last made himself favorably known by his ,epochs of the ,history of ,humanity1 #ahde-df1 ,theory of ,induction1 #ahed1 and ,metaphysics1 #aheg2 his ,philosophy of ,religion 7#ahfj7 did not appear until after his death4 ,the ,catholic theologian1 ,georg ,hermes of ,bonn 7#agge-ahca7 favored a ,kantianism akin to that of ,fries4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the psychological view founded by ,fries was consistently developed by ,friedrich ,eduard ,beneke 7#agih-ahed74 ,with the exception of three years of teaching in ,gttingen1 #ahbd-bg1 whither he had gone in consequence of a prohibition of his lectures called forth by his ,foundation of the ,physics of ,ethics1 #ahbb1 he was a member of the university of his native city1 ,berlin1 first as ,docent1 and1 from #ahcb1 after the death of ,hegel1 who was unfavorably disposed toward him1 as professor extraordinary4#a ,besides ,kant1 ,jacobi1 and ,fries1 ,schleiermacher1 ,herbart 7with whom he became acquainted in #ahba71 and the ,english thinkers exerted a determining influence on the formation of his philosophy4 ,beneke denies the possibility of speculative knowledge even more emphatically than ,fries4 ,kant's undertaking was aimed at the destruction of a non-experiential science from concepts1 and if it has not succeeded in preventing the neo-,scholasticism of the ,fichtean school1 with its overdrawn attempts to revive a deductive knowledge of the absolute1 this has been chiefly due to the false1 non-empirical method of the great critic of reason4 ,the root and basis of all knowledge is experience2 metaphysics itself is an empirical science1 it is the last in the series of philosophical disciplines4 ,whoever begins with metaphysics1 instead of ending with it1 begins the house at the roof4 ,the point of departure for all cognition is inner experience or self-observation2 hence the fundamental science is psychology1 and all other branches of philosophy nothing but applied psychology4 ,by the inner sense we perceive our ego as it really is1 not merely as it appears to us2 the only object whose per se we immediately know is our own soul2 in self-consciousness being and representation are one4 ,thus1 in opposition to ,kant1 ,beneke stands on the side of ,descartes3 ,the soul is better known to us than the external world1 to which we only transfer the existence immediately given in the soul as a result of instinctive analogical inference1 so that in the descent of our knowledge from men organized like ourselves to inorganic matter the inadequacy of our representations progressively increases4 ,footnote #a3 ,on ,beneke's character cf4 the fourth of ,fortlage's ,acht psychologische ,vortrge1 which are well worth reading4 ,psychology--we may mention of ,beneke's works in this field the ,psychological ,sketches1 #ahbe-bg1 and the ,text-book of ,psychology1 #ahcc1 the third and fourth 7#ahgg7 editions of which1 edited by ,dressler1 contain as an appendix a chronological table of all ,beneke's works--must1 as internal natural science1 follow the same method1 and1 starting with the immediately given1 employ the same instruments in the treatment of experience as external natural science1 i4e4 the explanation of facts by laws1 and1 further still1 by hypotheses and theories4 ,gratefully recognizing the removal of two obstacles to psychology1 the doctrine of innate ideas and the traditional theory of the faculties of the soul by ,locke and ,herbart1 7the commonly accepted faculties--memory1 understanding1 feeling1 will--are in fact not simple powers1 but mere abstractions1 hypostatized class concepts of extremely complex phenomena17 ,beneke seeks to discover the simple elements from which all mental life is compounded4 ,he finds these in the numerous elementary faculties of receiving and appropriating external stimuli1 which the soul in part possesses1 in part acquires in the course of its life1 and which constitute its substance2 each separate sense of itself includes many such faculties4 ,every act or product of the soul is the result of two mutually dependent factors3 stimulus and receptivity4 ,their coming together gives the first of the four fundamental processes1 that of perception4 ,the second is the constant addition of new elementary faculties4 ,by the third1 the equilibration or reciprocal transfer of the movable elements in representations1 ,beneke explains the reproduction of an idea through another associated with it1 and the widening of the mental horizon by emotion1 e4g41 the astounding eloquence of the angry4 ,since each representation which passes out of consciousness continues to exist in the soul as an unconscious product 7where we cannot tell2 the soul is not in space71 it is not retention1 but obliviscence which needs explanation4 ,that which persists of the representation which is passing into unconsciousness1 and which makes its reappearance in consciousness possible1 is called a trace in reference to its departed cause1 and a disposition 7,angelegtheit7 in reference to its future results4 ,every such trace or germ 7,anlage7--that which lies intermediate between perception and recollection--is a force1 a striving1 a tendency4 ,the fourth of the fundamental processes 7which may be traced downward into the material world1 since the corporeal and the psychical differ only in degree and pass over into each other7 is the combination of mental products according to the measure of their similarity1 as these come to light in the formation of judgments1 comparisons1 witticisms1 of collective images1 collective feelings1 and collective desires4 ,the innate differences among men depend on the greater or lesser powerfulness1 vivacity1 and receptivity of their elementary faculties2 all further differences arise gradually and are due to the external stimuli2 even the distinction between the human and the animal soul1 which consists in the spiritual nature of the former1 is not original4 ,of the five constructive forms of the soul1 which result from the varying relation between stimulus and faculty1 four are emotional products or products of moods4 ,if the stimulus is too small pain 7dissatisfaction1 longing7 arises1 while pleasure springs from a marked1 but not too great1 fullness of stimulus4 ,if the stimulus gradually increases to the point of excess1 blunted appetite and satiety come in2 when the excess is sudden it results in pain4 ,a clear representation1 a sensation arises when the stimulus is exactly proportioned to the faculty2 it is in this case only that the soul assumes a theoretical attitude1 that it merely perceives without any admixture of agreeable or disagreeable feelings4 ,desire is pleasure remembered1 the ego the complex of all the representations which have ever arisen in the soul1 the totality of the manifold given within me4 ,for the immortality of the immaterial soul ,beneke advances an original and attractive argument based on the principle that1 in consequence of the constantly increasing traces1 through which the substance of the soul is continually growing1 consciousness turns more and more from the outer to the inner1 until finally perception dies entirely away4 ,at death the connection with the outer world ceases1 it is true1 but not the inner being of the soul1 for which that which has hitherto been highest now becomes the foundation for new and still higher developments4 ,like ,herbart1 on whom he was in many ways dependent1 ,beneke discussed psychology and pedagogics with greater success than logic1 metaphysics1 practical philosophy1 and the philosophy of religion4 ,he combats the apriorism of ,kant in ethics as elsewhere4 ,the moral law does not arise until the end of a long development4 ,first in order are the immediately felt values of things1 which we estimate according to the degree of enhancement or depression in the psychical state which they call forth4 ,from the feelings are formed concepts1 from concepts judgments2 and the abstraction of the categorical imperative is a highly derivative phenomenon and a very late result1 although the feeling of oughtness or of moral obligation1 which accompanies the correct estimation of values and bids us prefer spiritual to sensuous delights and the general good to our own welfare1 grows necessarily out of the inner nature of the human soul4 ,there are two sources of religion3 one theoretical1 for the idea of ,god2 the other practical1 for the worship of ,god4 ,we are impelled to the assumption of a suprasensible1 an unconditioned1 a providence1 on the one hand1 by the desire for a unitary conclusion for our fragmentary knowledge of the world2 and1 on the other1 by moral need1 by our unsatisfied longing after the good4 ,the attributes which we ascribe to ,god are taken from experience1 the abstract attributes from being in general1 the naturalistic from the world1 the spiritual from man4 ,as an inevitable outcome of the transformation of religious feelings into representations1 and one which is harmless because of the unmistakableness of their symbolic character1 the anthropomorphic predicates1 through which we think the ,deity as personal1 themselves establish the superiority of theism over pantheism4 ,the object of religion1 moreover1 is accessible only to the subjective certitude of feeling which is given by faith1 and not to scientific knowledge4 ,feuerbach's anthropological standpoint will be discussed below4 ,like ,friedrich ,ueberweg 7#ahbf-ga2 professor in ,knigsberg2 ,system of ,logic1 #aheg1 #eth ed41 edited by ,j4,b4 ,meyer1 #ahhb--;,english translation1 #ahga71 ,karl ,fortlage was strongly influenced in his psychological views by ,beneke4 ,born in #ahjf at ,osnabrck1 and at his death in #ahha a professor in ,jena1 ,fortlage shared with ,beneke an impersonality of character1 as well as the fate of meeting with less esteem from his contemporaries than he merited by the seriousness and originality of his thinking4 ,to his ,system of ,psychology1 #ahee1 in two volumes1 he added1 as it were1 a third volume1 his ,contributions to ,psychology1 #ahge1 besides psychological lectures of a more popular cast 7,eight ,lectures1 #ahfi1 #b;d ed41 #ahgb2 ,four ,lectures1 #ahgd74a ,fortlage characterizes his psychological method--in the criticism of which ,f4,a4 ,lange fails to show the justice for which he is elsewhere to be commended--as observation by the inner sense4 ,in the first place1 consciousness1 as the active form of representation1 must be separated from that of which we are conscious1 from the content of representation1 which is in itself unconscious1 but capable of coming into consciousness4 ,next ,fortlage seeks to determine the laws of these two factors4 ,in regard to the content of representation he distinguishes more sharply than ,herbart between the fusibility of the homogeneous and the capacity for complex combination possessed by the heterogeneous 7the fusion of similars goes on even without aid from consciousness1 while the connection of dissimilars is brought about only through the help of the latter71 and adds to these two general properties of the content of representation two further ones1 its revivability 7its persistence in unconsciousness71 and its dissolubility in the scale of size1 color1 etc4 ,consciousness1 on the other hand1 which for ,fortlage coincides with the ego or self1 is treated as the presupposition of all representations1 not as their result--it is underived activity4 ,he explains the nature of consciousness by the concept of attention1 characterizes them both as questioning activity 7,fragethtigkeit71 and follows them out in their various degrees from expectation through observation up to reflection4 ,the listening and watching of the hunter when waiting for the game is only a prolongation of the same consciousness which accompanies all less exciting representations4 ,the essential element in conscious or questioning activity is the oscillation between yes and no4 ,as soon as the disjunction is decided by a yes1 the desire which lies at its basis1 and which in the condition of consciousness is arrested1 passes over into activity4 ,all consciousness is based on interest1 and in its origin is arrested impulse 7,triebhemmung74 ,the direction of impulse to an intuition to be expected only in the future is called consciousness4 ,the rank of a being depends on its capacity for reflection3 the greater the extent of its attention and the smaller the stimuli which suffice to rouse this to action1 the higher it stands4 ,impulse--this is the fundamental idea of ,fortlage's psychology1 like will with ,fichte1 and representation with ,herbart--consists of an element of representation and an element of feeling4 ,pleasure effort-image impulse4 ,footnote #a3 ,among ,fortlage's other works we may mention his valuable ,history of ,poetry1 #ahci2 the ,genetic ,history of ,philosophy since ,kant1 #aheb2 and the attractive ,six ,philosophical ,lectures1 #ahfi1 #b;d ed41 #ahgb4 ,in his metaphysical convictions1 to which he gave expression in his ,exposition and ,criticism of the ,arguments for the ,existence of ,god1 #ahdj1 among other works1 ,fortlage belongs to the philosophers of identity4 ,originally sailing in ,hegel's wake1 he soon recognizes that the roots of the theory of identity go back to the ,kantio-,fichtean philosophy1 with which the system of absolute truth1 as he holds1 has come into being4 ,he thus becomes an adherent of the ,science of ,knowledge1 whose deductive results he finds inductively confirmed by psychological experience4 ,psychology is the empirical test for the metaphysical calculus of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,in regard to the absolute ,fortlage is in agreement with ,krause1 the younger ,fichte1 ,ulrici1 etc41 and calls his standpoint transcendent pantheism4 ,according to this all that is good1 exalted1 and valuable in the world is divine in its nature2 the human reason is of the same essence as the divine reason 7there can be nothing higher than reason72 the ,godhead is the absolute ego of ,fichte1 which employs the empirical egos as organs1 which thinks and wills in individuals1 in so far as they think the truth and will the good1 but at the same time as universal subject goes beyond them4 ,if1 after the example of ,hegel1 we give up transcendent pantheism in favor of immanence1 two unphilosophical modes of representing the absolute at once result--on the one hand1 materialism2 on the other1 popular1 unphilosophical theism4 ,if the ,fichtean ,science of ,knowledge could be separated from its difficult method1 which it is impossible ever to make comprehensible to the unphilosophical mind1 it would be called to take the place of religion4#a ,footnote #a3 ,among ,fortlage's posthumous manuscripts was one on the ,philosophy of ,religion1 on which ,eucken published an essay in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxii4 #ahhc1 p4 #ahj seq4 after ,lipsius had given a single chapter from it--,the ,ideal of ,morality according to ,christianity--in his ,jahrbcher fr protestantische ,theologie 7vol4 ix4 pp4 #a-de74 ,the journals ,im ,neuen ,reich1 #ahha1 ,no4 #bd1 and ,die ,gegenwart1 #ahhb1 ,no4 #cd1 contained warmly written notices of ,fortlage by ,j4 ,volkelt4 ,leopold ,schmid 7in ,giessen1 died #ahfi7 gives a favorable and skillfully composed outline of ,fortlage's system in his ,grundzge der ,einleitung in die ,philosophie mit einer ,beleuchtung der von ,k4 ,ph4 ,fischer1 ,sengler1 und ,fortlage ermglichten ,philosophie der ,that1 #ahfj1 pp4 #bbf-ceg4 ,cf4 also ,moritz ,brasch1 ,k4 ,fortlage1 ,ein philosophisches ,charakterbild1 in ,unsere ,zeit1 #ahhc1 ,heft ,,ii1 pp4 #gcj-gef1 incorporated in the same author's ,philosophie der ,gegenwart1 #ahhh4 #b4 ,realism3 ,herbart4 ,johann ,friedrich ,herbart was scientifically the most important among the philosophers of the opposition4 ,herbart was born at ,oldenburg in #aggf1 the son of a councilor of justice1 and had already become acquainted with the systems of ,wolff and ,kant before he entered the ,university of ,jena in #agid4 ,in #agif he handed in to his instructor ,fichte a critique of two of ,schelling's treatises1 in which the youthful thinker already broke away from idealism4 ,while a private tutor in ,switzerland he made the acquaintance of ,pestalozzi4 ,in #ahjb he habilitated in ,gttingen1 where1 in #ahje1 he was promoted to a professorship extraordinary2 while in #ahji he received the professorship in ,knigsberg once held by ,kant1 and later by ,w4 ,tr4 ,krug 7died #ahdb74 ,he died in #ahda at ,gttingen1 whither he had been recalled in #ahcc4 ,his ,collected ,works were published in twelve volumes1 #ahej-eb 7reprinted #ahhc seq471 by his pupil ,hartenstein1 who has also given an excellent exposition of his master's system in his ,probleme und ,grundlehren der allgemeinen ,metaphysik1 #ahcf1 and his ,grundbegriffe der ethischen ,wissenschaften1 #ahdd2 a new edition1 in chronological order1 and under the editorship of ,k4 ,kehrbach1 began to appear in #ahhb1 or rather #ahhg1 and has now advanced to the fourth volume1 #ahia4 ,herbart's chief works were written during his ,knigsberg residence3 the ,text-book of ,introduction to ,philosophy1 #ahac1 #dth ed41 #ahcg 7very valuable as an introduction to ,herbartian modes of thought72 ,general ,metaphysics1 #ahbi 7preceded in #ahjf and #ahjh by ,the ,principal ,points in ,metaphysics1 with a supplement1 ,the ,principal ,points in ,logic72 ,text-book of ,psychology1#a #ahaf1 #b;d ed41 #ahcd2 ,on the ,possibility and ,necessity of applying ,mathematics to ,psychology1 #ahbb2 ,psychology as a ,science1 #ahbd-be4 ,the two works on ethics1 which were widely separated in time1 were1 on the other hand1 written in ,gttingen3 ,general ,practical ,philosophy1 #ahjh2 ,analytical ,examination of ,natural ,right and of ,morals1 #ahcf4 ,to these may be added a ,discourse on ,evil1 #ahag2 ,letters on the ,doctrine of the ,freedom of the ,human ,will1 #ahcf2 and the ,brief ,encyclopaedia of ,philosophy1 #ahca1 #b;d ed41 #ahda4 ,his works on education and instruction1 whose influence and value perhaps exceed those of his philosophical achievements 7collected editions of the pedagogical works have been prepared by ,o4 ,willmann1 #ahgc-ge1 #b;d ed41 #ahhj2 and by ,bartholomaei71 extended through his whole life4 ,besides pedagogics1 psychology was the chief sphere of his services4 ,footnote #a3 ,english translation by ,m4,k4 ,smith1 #ahia4 ,in antithesis to the philosophy of intuition with its imagined superiority to the standpoint of reflection1 ,herbart makes philosophy begin with attention to concepts1 defining it as the elaboration of concepts4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 is not distinguished from other sciences by its object1 but by its method1 which again must adapt itself to the peculiarity of the object1 to the starting point of the investigation in question--there is no universal philosophical method4 ,there are as many divisions of philosophy as there are modes of elaborating concepts4 ,the first requisite is the discrimination of concepts1 both the discrimination of concepts from others and of the marks within each concept4 ,this work of making concepts clear and distinct is the business of logic4 ,with this discipline1 in which ,herbart essentially follows ,kant1 are associated two other forms of the elaboration of concepts1 that of physical and that of aesthetic concepts4 ,both of these classes require more than a merely logical elucidation4 ,the physical concepts1 through which we apprehend the world and ourselves1 contain contradictions and must be freed from them2 their correction is the business of meta-physics4 ,metaphysics is the science of the comprehensibility of experience4 ,the aesthetic 7including the ethical7 concepts are distinguished from the nature-concepts by a peculiar increment which they occasion in our representation1 and which consists in a judgment of approval or disapproval4 ,to clear up these concepts and to free them from false allied ideas is the task of aesthetics in its widest sense4 ,this includes all concepts which are accompanied by a judgment of praise or blame2 the most important among them are the ethical concepts4 ,thus1 aside from logic1 we reach two principal divisions of philosophy1 which are elsewhere contrasted as theoretical and practical1 but here in ,herbart as metaphysics and aesthetics4 ,herbart maintains that these are entirely independent of each other1 so that aesthetics1 since it presupposes nothing of metaphysics1 may be discussed before metaphysics1 while the philosophy of nature and psychology depend throughout on ontological principles4 ,together with natural theology the two latter sciences constitute applied metaphysics4 ,this in turn presupposes general metaphysics1 which subdivides into four parts3 ,methodology1 ,ontology1 ,synechology1 i4e41 the theory of the continuous 7,greek3 suneches71 which treats of the continua1 space1 time1 and motion1 and ,eidolology1 i4e41 the theory of images or representations4 ,the last forms the transition to psychology1 while synechology forms the preparation for the philosophy of nature1 whose most general problems it solves4 ,our exposition will not need to observe these divisions closely4 ,metaphysics starts with the given1 but cannot rest content with it1 for it contains contradictions4 ,in resolving these we rise above the given4 ,what is given8 ,kant has not answered this question with entire correctness4 ,we may1 indeed1 term the totality of the given phenomena1 but this presupposes something which appears4 ,if nothing existed there would also nothing appear4 ,as smoke points to fire1 so appearance to being4 ,so much seeming1 so much indication of being4 ,things in themselves may be known mediately1 though not immediately1 by following out the indications of being contained by the given appearance4 ,further1 not merely the unformed matter of cognition is given to us1 but it is rather true that everything comes under this concept which experience so presses on us that we cannot resist it2 hence not merely single sensations1 but entire sensation-groups1 not merely the matter1 but also the forms of experience4 ,if the latter were really subjective products1 as ,kant holds1 it would necessarily be possible for us at will to think each perceptive-content either under the category of substance1 or property1 or cause--possible for us1 if we chose1 to see a round table quadrilateral4 ,in reality we are bound in the application of these forms2 they are given for each object in a definite way4 ,the given forms--,herbart calls them experience-concepts--contain contradictions4 ,how can these contradictions be removed8 ,we may neither simply reject the concepts which are burdened with contradictions1 for they are given1 nor leave them as they are1 for the logical principium contradictionis requires that the contradiction as such be rooted out4 ,the experience-concepts are valid 7they find application in experience71 but they are not thinkable4 ,therefore we must so transform and supplement them that they shall become free from contradictions and thinkable4 ,the method which ,herbart employs to remove the contradictions is as follows3 ,the contradiction always consists in the fact that an a should be the same as a b1 but is not so4 ,the desiderated likeness of the two is impossible so long as we think a as one thing4 ,that which is unsuccessful in this case will succeed1 perhaps1 if in thought we break up the a into several things--,greek3 a b g4 ,then we shall be able to explain through the together 7,zusammen7 of this plurality what we were unable to explain from the undecomposed a1 or from the single constituents of it4 ,the together is a relation established by thought among the elements of the real4 ,for this reason ,herbart terms his method of finding out necessary supplements to the given the method of relations4 ,another name for the same thing is the method of contingent aspects4 ,mechanics operates with contingent aspects when1 for the sake of explanation1 it resolves a given motion into several components4 ,such fictions and substitutions--auxiliary concepts1 which are not real1 but which serve only as paths for thought--may be successfully employed by metaphysics also4 ,the abstract expression of this method runs3 ,the contradiction is to be removed by thinking one of its members as manifold rather than as one4 ,in order to observe the workings of this ,herbartian machine we shall go over the four principal contradictions by which his acuteness is put to the test--the problems of inherence1 of change1 of the continuous1 of the ego4 ,we call the given sensation-complexes things1 and ascribe properties to them4 ,how can one and the same thing have different properties--how can the one be at the same time many8 ,to say that the thing possesses the properties does not help the matter4 ,the possession of the different properties is itself just as manifold and various as the properties which are possessed4 ,hence the concept of the thing and its properties must be so transformed that the plurality which seems to be in the thing shall be transferred without it4 ,instead of one thing let us assume several1 each with a single definite property1 from whose together the appearance of many qualities in one thing now arises4 ,the appearance of manifold properties in the one thing has its ground in the together of many things1 each of which has one simple quality4 ,again1 it is just as impossible for a thing to have different qualities in succession1 or to change1 as it is for it to have them at the same time4 ,the popular view of change1 which holds that a thing takes on different forms 7ice1 water1 steam7 and yet remains the same substance1 is untenable4 ,how is it possible to become another1 and yet to remain the same8 ,the universal feeling that the concept needs correction betrays itself in the fact that everyone involuntarily adds a cause to the change in thought1 and seeks a cause for it1 and thus of himself undertakes a transformation of the concept1 though1 it is true1 an inadequate one4 ,if we think this concept through we come upon a trilemma1 a threefold impossibility4 ,whether we endeavor to deduce the change from external or from internal causes1 or 7with ,hegel7 to think it as causeless1 in each case we involve ourselves in inconceivabilities4 ,all three ideas--change as mechanism1 as self-determination or freedom1 as absolute becoming--are alike absurd4 ,we can escape these contradictions only by the bold decision to conceive the quality of the existent as unchangeable4 ,for the truly existent there is no change whatever4 ,it remains1 however1 to explain the appearance of change1 in which the wand of decomposition and the together again proves its magic power4 ,supported by the motley manifoldness of phenomena1 we posit real beings as qualitatively different1 and view this diversity as partial contraposition2 we resolve1 e4g41 the simple quality a into the elements x z1 and a second quality b into y - z4 ,so long as the individual things remain by themselves1 the opposition of the qualities will not make itself evident4 ,but as soon as they come together1 something takes place--now the opposites 7z and -z7 seek to destroy or at least to disturb each other4 ,the reals defend themselves against the disturbance which would follow if the opposites could destroy each other1 by each conserving its simple1 unchangeable quality1 i4e41 by simply remaining self-identical4 ,self-conservation against threatened disturbances from without 7it may be compared to resistance against pressure7 is the only real change1 and apparent change1 the empirical changes of things1 to be explained from this4 ,that which changes is only the relations between the beings1 as a thing maintains itself now against this and now against that other thing2 the relations1 however1 and their change are something entirely contingent and indifferent to the existent4 ,in itself the self-conservation of a real is as uniform as the quality which is conserved1 but in virtue of the changing relations 7the variety of the disturbing things7 it can express itself for the observer in manifold ways as force4 ,the real itself changes as little as a painting changes1 for instance1 when1 seen near at hand1 the figures in it are clearly distinguished1 while for the distant observer1 on the contrary1 they run together into an indistinguishable chaos4 ,change has no meaning in the sphere of the existent4 ,anyone who speaks thus has denied change1 not deduced it4 ,among the many objections experienced by ,herbart's endeavor to explain the empirical fact of change by his theory of self-conservation against threatened disturbances ,lotze's is the most cogent3 ,the unsuccessful attempt to solve the difficulties in the concept of becoming and action is still instructive1 for it shows that they cannot be solved in this way--from the concept of inflexible being4 ,if the together1 the threatened disturbance1 and the reaction against the latter be taken as realities1 then1 in the affection by the disturber1 the concept of change remains uneliminated and uncorrected2 if they be taken as unreal concepts auxiliary to thought1 change is relegated from the realm of being to the realm of seeming4 ,herbart gives to them a kind of semi-reality1 less true than the unmoving ground of things 7their unchangeable1 permanent qualities71 and more true than their contradictory exterior 7the empirical appearance of change74 ,between being and seeming he thrusts in1 as though between day and night1 the twilight region of his contingent aspects1 with their relations1 which are nothing to the real1 their disturbances1 which do not come to pass1 and their self-conservations1 which are nothing but undisturbed continuance in existence on the part of the real4 ,besides the contradictions in the concepts of inherence1 of change1 and action and passion1 it is the concept of being which prevents our philosopher from ascribing a living character to reality4 ,being1 as ,kant correctly perceived1 contains nothing qualitative2 it is absolute position4 ,whoever affirms that an object is1 expresses thereby that the matter is to rest with the simple position2 in which is included that it is nothing dependent1 relative1 or negative4 7,every negation is something relative1 relates to a precedent position1 which is to be annulled by it47 ,besides being1 the existent contains something more--a quality2 it consists of this absolute position and a what4 ,if this what is separated from being we reach an image2 united with being it yields an essence or a real4 ,this what of things is not their sensuous qualities2 the latter belong rather to the mere phenomenon4 ,no one of them indicates what the object is by itself1 when left alone4 ,they depend on contingent circumstances1 and apart from these they would not exist--what is color in the dark8 what sound in airless space8 what weight in empty space8 what fusibility without fire8--they are each and all relative4 ,since being excludes negation of every kind1 the quality of the existent must be absolutely simple and unchangeable2 it brooks no manifoldness1 no quantity1 no distinctions in degree1 no becoming2 all this were a corruption of the purely affirmative or positive character of being4 ,the existent is unextended and eternal4 ,the ,eleatics are to be praised because the need of escaping from the contradictions in the world of experience led them to make themselves masters of the concept of being without relation and without negation1 and of the simple1 homogeneous quality of the existent in its full purity4 ,but while the ,eleatics conceived the existent as one1 the atomists made an advance by assuming a plurality of reals4 ,the truly one never becomes a plurality2 plurality is given1 hence an original plurality must be postulated4 ,herbart characterizes his own standpoint as qualitative atomism1 since his reals are differentiated by their properties1 not by quantitative relations 7size and figure74 ,the idealists and the pantheists make a false use of the tendency toward unity which1 no doubt1 is present in our reason1 when they maintain that true being must be one4 ,there is absolutely nothing in the concept of being to forbid us to think the existent as many2 while the world of phenomena1 with its many things and their many properties1 gives irrefragable grounds which compel us to this conclusion4 ,hence1 according to ,herbart1 the true reality is a 7very large1 though not1 it is true1 an infinite#a7 plurality of supra-sensible 7non-spatial and non-temporal7 reals1 or1 according to the ,leibnitzian expression1 monads1 which all their life have nothing further to do than to preserve intact against disturbances the simple quality in which they consist 7for the existent is not distinct from its quality2 it does not have the quality1 but is the quality74 ,each thing has but one response for the most varied influences3 it answers all suggestions from without by affirming its what1 by continually repeating1 as it were1 the same note1 which gains a varying meaning only in so far as1 in accordance with the character of the disturber1 it appears now as a third1 now as a fifth or seventh4 ,this picture of the world is certainly not attractive2 in it all change and becoming1 all life and all activity is offered up on the altar of monotonous being4 ,happily ,herbart is inconsistent enough to enliven this comfortless waste of changeless being by the relatively real or semi-real manifoldness of the self-conservations4 ,the infinite divisibility of space and of matter forms the chief difficulty in the problem of the continuous4 ,herbart endeavors to solve it by the assumption of an intelligible space with fixed lines 7lines formed by a definite number of points1 hence finitely divisible1 and not continuous74 ,metaphysics demands the fixed or discrete line1 although common thought is incapable of conceiving it4 ,space is a mere form of combination in representation or for the observer1 and yet it is objective1 i4e41 it is valid for all intelligences1 and not merely for human intelligence4 ,from his complex and unproductive endeavors to derive the appearance of continuity from discontinuous reality we hurry on to the fourth1 the psychological problem1 which ,herbart discusses with great acuteness4 ,he considers it the chief merit of ,fichte's ,science of ,knowledge that it called attention to this problem4 ,the concept of the ego1 of whose reality we have so strong and immediate a conviction that1 in the formula of asseveration1 as true as ,i exist1 it is made the criterion of all other certitude1 labors under various contradictions4 ,besides the familiar difficulty1 here especially sensible1 of one thing with many marks1 it contains other absurdities of its own4 ,in the ego or self-consciousness subject and object are to be identical4 ,the identity of the representing and the represented ego is a self-contradictory idea1 for the law of contradiction forbids the equation of opposites1 while a subject is subject only through the fact that it is not object4 ,but1 again1 self-consciousness can never be realized1 because it involves a regressus in infinitum4 ,the ego is defined as that which represents itself4 ,what is this self8 ,it is1 in turn1 the self-knower4 ,this new explanation contains still a further self2 which once more signifies the self-knower and so on to infinity4 ,the ego represents the representation 7,vorstellen7 of its representation 7,vorstellen71 etc4 ,the representation 7,vorstellung7 of the ego1 therefore1 can never be actually brought to completion4 7,the assumption of the freedom of the will leads to an analogous regressus in infinitum1 in which the question1 ,willst thou thy volition8 ,willst thou the willing of this volition8 is repeated to infinity47 ,the only escape from this tissue of absurdities is to think the ego otherwise than is done by popular consciousness4 ,the knowing and the known ego are by no means the same1 but the observing subject in self-consciousness is one group of representations1 the observed subject another4 ,thus1 for example1 newly formed representations are apperceived by the existing older ones1 but the highest apperceiver is not1 in turn1 itself apperceived4 ,the ego is not a unit being1 which represents itself in the literal meaning of the phrase1 but that which is represented is a plurality4 ,the ego is the junction of numberless series of representations1 and is constantly changing its place2 it dwells now in this representation1 now in that4 ,but as we distinguish the point of meeting from the series which meet there1 and imagine that it is possible simultaneously to abstract from all the represented series 7whereas in fact we can only abstract from each one separately71 there arises the appearance of a permanent ego as the unit subject of all our representations4 ,in reality the ego is not the source of our representations1 but the final result of their combination4 ,the representation1 not the ego1 is the fundamental concept of psychology1 the ego constituting rather its most difficult problem4#a ,it is a result of other representations1 which1 however1 in order to yield this result1 must be together in a single substance1 and must interpenetrate one another 7,text-book of ,introduction1 p4 #bdc74 ,in this way ,herbart defends the substantiality of the soul against ,kant and ,fries4 ,the soul's immortality 7as also its pre-existence7 goes without saying1 because of the non-temporal character of the real4 ,footnote #a3 ,on the ,herbartian psychology1 cf4 ,ribot1 ,german ,psychology of ,to-day1 ,english ,translation by ,baldwin1 #ahhf1 pp4 #bd-fg2 and ,g4,f4 ,stout1 ,mind1 vols4 xiii4-xiv4--,,tr4 ,the soul is one of these reals which1 unchangeable in themselves1 enter into various relations with others1 and conserve themselves against the latter4 ,in its simple what as unknowable as the rest1 it is yet familiar to us in its self-conservations4 ,in the absence of a more fitting expression for the totality of psychical phenomena we call these representations1 the phenomenal manifoldness of which is due to the variety of the disturbances and exists for the observer alone4 ,in itself1 without a plurality of dispositions and impulses1 the soul is originally not a representative force1 but first becomes such under certain circumstances1 viz41 when it is stimulated to self-conservation by other beings4 ,the sum of the reals which stand in immediate relation to the soul is called its body2 this1 an aggregate of simple beings1 furnishes the intermediate link of causal relation between the soul and the external world4 ,the soul has its 7movable7 seat in the brain4 ,in opposition to the physiological treatment of psychology1 ,herbart remarks that psychology throws much more light on physiology than she can ever receive from it4 ,the simplest representations are the sensations1 which1 amid all their variety1 still group themselves into definite classes 7odors1 sounds1 colors74 ,they serve us as symbols of the disturbing reals1 but they are not images of things1 nor effects of these1 but products of the soul itself3 the generation of sensations is the soul's peculiar way of guarding itself against threatened disturbances4 ,every representation once come into being disappears again from consciousness1 it is true1 but not from the soul4 ,it persists1 unites with others1 and stands with them in a relation of interaction--in both cases according to definite laws4 ,these original representations are the only ones which the soul produces by its own activity2 all other psychical phenomena1 feeling1 desire1 will1 attention1 memory1 judgment1 the whole wealth of inner events1 result of themselves from the interplay of the primary representations under law4 ,representation 7more exactly sensation7 is alone original2 space1 time1 the categories1 which ,kant makes a priori1 are all acquired1 i4e41 like all the higher mental life1 they are the results of a psychical mechanism1 results whose production needs no renewed exertion on the part of the soul itself4 ,it has been a very harmful error in psychology hitherto to ascribe each particular mental activity to a special faculty of the soul having a similar name1 instead of deriving it from combinations of simple representations4 ,abstract1 empty class ideas have been treated as real forces1 in the belief that thus the single concrete acts had been explained4 ,there is no bitterer foe of the faculty theory than ,herbart4 ,his campaign against it1 if not victorious1 was yet salutary1 and the motives of his hostility1 up to a certain point1 entirely justified4 ,nothing is more useless than the assurance that what the soul actually does1 that it must also have the power to do4 ,who disputes this8 ,a faculty explains nothing so long as the laws under which its functions and its relations to other faculties remain unexplained4 ,but although the faculty idea serves no positive end1 it cannot be entirely discarded4 ,it marks the boundary where our ability to reduce one class of psychical phenomena to another ceases4 ,herbart's polemic has no force against the moderate and necessary use of this idea1 no matter how much it was in place in view of the impropriety of a superfluous multiplication of the faculties of the soul4 ,the realization of the ideal of psychology1 the reduction of the complex phenomena of mental life to the smallest possible number of simple elements1 is limited by the heterogeneity of the original phenomena1 knowing1 feeling1 willing1 which wholly resists derivation from the combination of sensations4 ,that which blinded ,herbart to these limitations was that tendency toward unity1 which1 as a metaphysician and moral philosopher1 he had all too willfully suppressed1 and which now took revenge for this infringement of its rights by misleading the psychologist to an exaggeration which had important consequences4 ,nevertheless his unsuccessful attempt remains interesting and worthy of gratitude4 ,the discovery of the laws which govern the interaction of the psychical elements is the task of a statics and a mechanics of representations4 ,the former investigates the equilibrium or the settled final state2 the latter1 the change1 i4e4 the movements of representations4 ,these names of themselves betray ,herbart's conviction that mathematics can and must be applied to psychology4 ,the bright hopes1 however1 which ,herbart formed for the attempt at a mathematical psychology1 were fulfilled neither in his own endeavors nor in those of his pupils1 although1 as ,lotze remarks1 it would be asserting too much to say that the most general formulas which he set up contradict experience4--,the unity of the soul forces representations to act on one another4 ,disparate representations1 those1 that is1 which belong to different representative series1 as the visual image of a rose and the auditory image of the word rose1 or as the sensations yellow1 hard1 round1 ringing1 connected in the concept gold piece1 enter into complications complexes4 ,homogeneous representations 7the memory image and the perceptual image of a black poodle7 fuse into a single representation4 ,opposed representations 7red and blue7 arrest one another when they are in consciousness together4 ,the connection and graded fusion of representations is the basis of their retention and reproduction1 as well as of the formation of continuous series of representations4 ,the reproduction is in part immediate1 a free rising of the representation by its own power as soon as the hindrances give way2 in part mediate1 a coming up through the help of others4 ,on the arrest of partially or totally opposed representations ,herbart bases his psychological calculus4 ,let there be given simultaneously in consciousness three opposed representations of different intensities1 the strongest to be called a1 the weakest c1 the intermediate one b4 ,what happens8 ,they arrest one another1 i4e4 a part of each is forced to sink below the threshold of consciousness4#a ,what is the amount of the arrest8 ,as much as all the weaker representations together come to--the sum of arrest or the sum of that which becomes unconscious 7as it were the burden to be divided7 is equal to the sum of all the representations with the exception of the strongest 7hence b c71 and is divided among the individual representations in the inverse ratio of their strength1 consequently in such a way that the strongest 7the one which most actively and successfully resists arrest7 has the least1 and the weakest the most1 of it to bear4 ,it may thus come to pass that a representation is entirely driven out of consciousness by two stronger ones1 while it is impossible for this to happen to it from a single one1 no matter how superior it be4 ,the simplest case of all is when two equally strong representations are present1 in which case each is reduced to the half of its original intensity4 ,the sum of that which remains in consciousness is always equal to the greatest representation4 ,footnote #a3 ,by their mutual pressure representations are transformed into a mere tendency to represent1 which again becomes actual representation when the arrest ceases4 ,the parts of a representation transformed into a tendency1 and the residua remaining unobscured1 are not pieces cut off1 but the quantity denotes merely a degree of obscuration in the whole representation1 or rather in the representation which actually takes place4 ,as soon as a representation reaches the zero point of consciousness1 or as soon as a new representation 7sensation7 comes in1 the others begin at once to rise or sink4 ,the ,mechanics seeks to investigate the laws of these movements of representations2 but we may the more readily pass over its complicated calculations since their precise formulas can never more than very roughly represent the true state of the case1 which simply rebels against precision4 ,the rock on which every immanent use of mathematics in psychology must strike1 is the impossibility of exactly measuring one representation by another4 ,we may1 indeed1 declare one stronger than another on the basis of the immediate impression of feeling1 but we cannot say how much stronger it is1 nor with reason assert that it is twice or half as intense4 ,herbart's mathematical psychology was wrecked by this insurmountable difficulty4 ,the demand for exactness which it raised1 but which it was unable to satisfy with the means at its disposal1 has recently been renewed1 and has led to assured results in psycho-physics1 which works on a different basis and with ingenious methods of measurement4 ,herbart endeavors1 as we have seen1 to deduce the various mental activities from the play of representations1 ,feeling and desire are not something beside representations1 are not special faculties of the soul1 but results of the relations of representations1 changing states of representations arrested and working upward against hindrances4 ,a representation which has been forced out of consciousness persists as a tendency or effort to represent1 and as such exerts a pressure on the conscious representations4 ,if a representation is suspended between counteracting forces a feeling results2 desire is the rise of a representation in the face of hindrances1 aversion is hesitation in sinking4 ,if the effort is accompanied by the idea that its goal is attainable1 it is termed will4 ,the character of a man depends on the fact that definite masses of representations have become dominant1 and by their strength and persistence hold opposing representations in check or suppress them4 ,the longer the dominant mass of representations exercises its power1 the firmer becomes the habit of acting in a certain way1 the more fixed the will4 ,herbart's intellectualistic denial of self-dependence to the practical capacities of the soul leads him logically to determinism4 ,volition depends on insight1 is determined by representations2 freedom signifies nothing but the fact that the will can be determined by motives4 ,if the individual decisions of man were undetermined he would have no character2 if the character were free in the choice between two actions1 then1 along with the noblest resolve1 there would remain the possibility of an opposite decision2 freedom of choice would make pure chance the doer of our deeds4 ,pedagogics1 above all1 must reject the idea of an undetermined freedom2 education1 along with imputation1 correction1 and punishment1 would be a meaningless word1 if no determining influence on the will of the pupil were possible4--,this last objection overlooks the fact that the pedagogical influence is always mediate1 and can do no more than1 by disciplining the impulses of the pupil and by supplying him with aids against immoral inclinations1 to lighten his moral task4 ,we can work on the motives only1 never directly on the will itself4 ,otherwise it would be inexplicable that even the best pedagogical skill proves powerless in the case of many individuals4 ,herbart's psychology was preceded by a philosophy of nature1 which construes matter from attraction and repulsion1 and declares an actio in distans impossible4 ,the intermediate link between physics and psychology is formed by the science of organic life 7physiology or biology72 and with this natural theology is connected by the following principles3 ,the purposiveness which we notice with admiration in men and the higher animals compels us1 since it can neither come from chance nor be explained on natural grounds alone1 to assume as its author a supreme artificer1 an intelligence which works by ends4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that the existence of the ,deity is not demonstrated by the teleological argument2 this is only an hypothesis1 but one as highly probable as the assumption that the human bodies by which we are surrounded are inhabited by human souls--a fact which we can only assume1 not perceive nor prove4 ,the assurance of faith is different from that of logic and experience1 but not inferior to it4 ,religion is based on humility and grateful reverence1 which is favored1 not injured1 by the immeasurable sublimity of its object1 the incompleteness of our idea of the ,supreme ,being1 and the knowledge of our ignorance4 ,if faith rests1 on the one hand1 on the teleological view of nature1 it is1 on the other1 connected with moral need1 and exercises1 in addition1 aesthetic influences4 ,by comforting the suffering1 setting right the erring1 reclaiming and pacifying the sinner1 warning1 strengthening1 and encouraging the morally sound1 religion brings the spirit into a new and better land1 shows it a higher order of things1 the order of providence1 which1 amid all the mistakes of men1 still furthers the good4 ,the religious spirit always includes an ethical element1 and the bond of the ,church holds men together even where the state is destroyed4 ,indispensable theoretically as a supplement to our knowledge1 and practically because of the moral imperfection of men1 who need it to humble1 warn1 comfort1 and lift them up1 religion is1 nevertheless1 in its origin independent of knowledge and moral will4 ,faith is older than science and morals3 the doctrine of religion did not wait for astronomy and cosmology1 nor the erection of temples for ethics4 ,before the development of the moral concepts religion already existed in the form of wonder without a special object1 of a gloomy awe which ascribed every sudden inner excitement to the impulse of an invisible power4 ,since a speculative knowledge of the nature of ,god is impossible1 the only task which remains for metaphysics is the removal of improper determinations from that which tradition and phantasy have to say on the subject4 ,we are to conceive ,god as personal1 extramundane1 and omnipotent1 as the creator1 not of the reals themselves1 but of their purposive coexistence 7,zusammen74 ,in order1 however1 to rise from the idea of the original1 most real1 and most powerful being to that of the most excellent being we need the practical ,ideas1 without which the former would remain an indifferent theoretical concept4 ,man can pray only to a wise1 holy1 perfect1 just1 and good ,god4 ,this1 in essential outline1 is the content of the scattered observations on the philosophy of religion given by ,herbart4 ,drobisch 7,fundamental ,doctrines of the ,philosophy of ,religion1 #ahdj71 from the standpoint of religious criticism and with a renewal of the moral argument1 and ,taute 7#ahdj-eb7 and ,flgel 7,miracles and the ,possibility of a ,knowledge of ,god1 #ahfi7 with an apologetic tendency and one toward a belief in miracles1 have1 among others1 endeavored to make up for the lack of a detailed treatment of this discipline by ,herbart--from which1 moreover1 much of value could hardly have been expected in view of the jejuneness of his metaphysical conceptions and the insufficiency of his appreciation of evil4 ,it remains only to glance at ,herbart's ,aesthetics4 ,the beautiful is distinguished from the agreeable and the desirable1 which1 like it1 are the objects of preference and rejection1 by the facts1 first1 that it arouses an involuntary and disinterested judgment of approval2 and second1 that it is a predicate which is ascribed to the object or is objective4 ,to these is added1 thirdly1 that while desire seeks for that which is to come1 taste possesses in the present that which it judges4 ,that which pleases or displeases is always the form1 never the matter2 and further1 is always a relation1 for that which is entirely simple is indifferent4 ,as in music we have succeeded in discovering the simplest relations1 which please immediately and absolutely--we know not why--so this must be attempted in all branches of the theory of art4 ,the most important among them1 that which treats of moral beauty1 moral philosophy1 has therefore to inquire concerning the simplest relations of will1 which call forth moral approval or disapproval 7independently of the interest of the spectator71 to inquire concerning the practical ,ideas or pattern-concepts1 in accordance with which moral taste1 involuntarily and with unconditional evidence1 judges concerning the worth or unworth of 7actually happening or merely represented7 volitions4 ,herbart enumerates five such primary ,ideas or fundamental judgments of conscience4 7#a7 ,the ,idea of inner freedom compares the will with the judgment1 the conviction1 the conscience of the agent himself4 ,the agreement of his desire with his own judgment1 with the precept of his taste1 pleases1 lack of agreement displeases4 ,since the power to determine the will according to one's own insight of itself establishes only an empty consistency and loyalty to conviction1 and may also subserve immoral craft1 the first ,idea waits for its content from the four following4 7#b7 ,the ,idea of perfection has reference to the quantitative relations of the manifold strivings of a subject1 in intensity1 extension1 and concentration4 ,the strong is pleasing in contrast with the weak1 the greater 7more extended1 richer7 in contrast with the smaller1 the collected in contrast with the scattered2 in other words1 in the individual desires it is energy which pleases1 in their sum variety1 in the system co-operation4 ,while the first two ,ideas have compared the will of the individual man with itself1 the remaining ones consider its relation to the will of other rational beings1 the third to a merely represented will1 and the last two to an actual one4 7#c7 ,according to the ,idea of benevolence or goodness1 which gives the most immediate and definite criterion of the worth of the disposition1 the will pleases if it is in harmony with the 7represented7 will of another1 i4e41 makes the satisfaction of the latter its aim4 7#d7 ,the ,idea of right is based on the fact that strife displeases4 ,if several wills come together at one point without ill-will 7in claiming a thing71 the parties ought to submit themselves to right as a rule for the avoidance of strife4 7#e7 ,in retribution and equity1 also1 the original element is displeasure1 displeasure in an unrequited act as a disturbance of equilibrium4 ,this last ,idea demands that no deed of good or evil remain unanswered2 that in reward1 thanks1 and punishment1 a quantum of good and evil equal to that of which he has been the cause return upon the agent4 ,the one-sided deed of good or ill is a disturbance1 the removal of which demands a corresponding requital4 ,herbart warns us against the attempt to derive the five original ,ideas 7which scientific analysis alone separates1 for in life we always judge according to all of them together7 from a single higher ,idea1 maintaining that the demand for a common principle of morals is a prejudice4 ,from the union of several beings into one person proceed five other pattern-concepts1 the derived or social ,ideas of the ethical institutions in which the primary ,ideas are realized4 ,these correspond to the primary ,ideas in the reverse order3 ,the system of rewards1 which regulates punishment2 the legal society1 which hinders strife2 the system of administration1 aimed at the greatest possible good of all2 the system of culture1 aimed at the development of the greatest possible power and virtuosity2 finally1 as the highest1 and that which unites the others in itself1 society as a person1 which1 when it is provided with the necessary power1 is termed the state4 ,if we combine the totality of the original ,ideas into the unity of the person the concept of virtue arises4 ,if we reflect on the limitations which oppose the full realization of the ideal of virtue1 we gain the concepts of law and duty4 ,an ethics1 like that of ,kant1 which exclusively emphasizes the imperative or obligatory character of the good1 is one-sided2 it considers morality only in arrest1 a mistake which goes with its false doctrine of freedom4 ,on the other hand1 it was a great merit in ,kant that he first made clear the unconditional validity of moral judgment1 independent of all eudemonism4 ,politics and pedagogics are branches of the theory of virtue4 ,the end of education is development in virtue1 and1 as a means to this1 the arousing of varied interests and the production of a stable character4 ,in conclusion1 we may sum up the points in which ,herbart shows himself a follower of ,kant--he calls himself a ,kantian of the year #ahbh4 ,his practical philosophy takes from ,kant its independence of theoretical philosophy1 the disinterested character of aesthetic judgment1 the absoluteness of ethical values1 the non-empirical origin of the moral concepts3 ,the fundamental ethical relations are not drawn from experience4 ,his metaphysics owes to ,kant the critical treatment of the experience-concepts 7its task is to make experience comprehensible71 in which the leading idea in the ,kantian doctrine of the antinomies1 the inevitableness of contradictions1 is generalized1 extended to all the fundamental concepts of experience1 and1 as it were1 transferred from the ,dialectic to the ,analytic2 it owes to him1 further1 the conception of being as absolute position1 and1 finally1 the dualism of phenomena and things in themselves4 ,herbart 7with ,schopenhauer7 considers the renewal of the ,platonic distinction between seeming and being the chief service of the great critical philosopher1 and finds his greatest mistake in the a priori character ascribed to the forms of cognition4 ,in the doctrine of the pure intuitions and the categories1 and the ,critique of ,judgment1 he rejects1 and with full consciousness1 just those parts of ,kant on which the ,fichtean school had built further4 ,finally1 ,herbart's method of thought1 his impersonality1 the at times anxious caution of his inquiry1 and the neatness of his conceptions1 are somewhat akin to ,kant's1 only that he lacked the gift of combination to a much greater degree than his great predecessor on the ,knigsberg rostrum4 ,his remarkable acuteness is busier in loosening than in binding2 it is more happy in the discovery of contradictions than in their resolution4 ,therefore he does not belong to the kings who have decided the fate of philosophy for long periods of time2 he stands to one side1 though it is true he is the most important figure among these who occupy such a position4 ,the first to give his adherence to ,herbart in essential positions1 and so to furnish occasion for the formation of an ,herbartian school1 was ,drobisch 7born #ahjb71 in two critiques which appeared in #ahbh and #ahcj4 ,besides ,drobisch1 from whom we have valuable discussions of ,logic 7#ahcf1 #eth ed41 #ahhg7 and ,empirical ,psychology 7#ahdb71 and an interesting essay on ,moral ,statistics and the ,freedom of the ,will 7#ahfg71 ,l4 ,strmpell 7born #ahab2 ,the ,principal ,points in ,herbart's ,metaphysics ,critically ,examined1 #ahdj71 is a professor in ,leipsic4 ,the organ of the school1 the ,zeitschrift fr exakte ,philosophie1 now edited by ,flgel 7the first volume1 #ahfj1 contained a survey of the literature of the school71 was at first issued by ,t4 ,ziller1 the pedagogical thinker1 and ,allihn4 ,the ,zeitschrift fr ,vlkerpsychologie und ,sprachwissenschaft1 from #ahei1 edited by ,m4 ,lazarus 7born #ahbd2 ,the ,life of the ,soul1 #c vols41 #ahef seq41 #c;d ed41 #ahhc seq47 and ,h4 ,steinthal 7born #ahbc2 ,the ,origin of ,language1 #dth ed41 #ahhh2 ,sketch of the ,science of ,language1 part i4 #b;d ed41 #ahha2 ,general ,ethics1 #ahhe7 of ,berlin1 also belongs to the ,herbartian movement4 ,distinguished service has been done in psychology by ,nahlowsky 7,the ,life of ,feeling1 #ahfb1 #b;d4 ed41 #ahhd71 ,theodor ,waitz in ,marburg 7#ahba-hd2 ,foundation of ,psychology1 #ahdf2 ,text-book of ,psychology1 #ahdi71 and ,volkmann in ,prague 7#ahbb-gg2 ,text-book of ,psychology1 #c;d4 ed41 by ,cornelius1 #ahhd and #ahhe72 while ,friedrich ,exner 7died #ahec7 was formerly much spoken of as an opponent of the ,hegelian psychology 7#ahdc-dd74 ,robert ,zimmermann in ,vienna 7born #ahbd7 represents an extreme formalistic tendency in aesthetics 7,history of ,aesthetics1 #aheh2 ,general ,esthetics as ,science of ,form1 #ahfe2 further1 a series of thorough essays on subjects in the history of philosophy74 ,among historians of philosophy ,thilo has given a rather one-sided representation of the ,herbartian standpoint4 ,the school's philosophers of religion have been mentioned above 7p4 #ecb74 ,beneke1 whom we have joined with ,fries on account of his anthropological standpoint1 stands about midway between ,herbart and ,schopenhauer4 ,he shares in the former's interest in psychology1 in the latter's foundation of metaphysical knowledge on inner experience1 and in the dislike felt by both for ,hegel2 while1 on the other hand1 he differs from ,herbart in his empirical method1 and from ,schopenhauer in the priority ascribed to representation over effort4 #c4 ,pessimism3 ,schopenhauer4 ,schopenhauer is in all respects the antipodes of ,herbart4 ,if in ,herbart philosophy breaks up into a number of distinct special inquiries1 ,schopenhauer has but one fundamental thought to communicate1 in the carrying out of which1 as he is convinced1 each part implies the whole and is implied by the whole4 ,the former operates with sober concepts where the latter follows the lead of gifted intuition4 ,the one is cool1 thorough1 cautious1 methodical to the point of pedantry2 the other is passionate1 ingenious1 unmethodical to the point of capricious dilettantism4 ,in the one case1 philosophy is as far as possible exact science1 in which the person of the thinker entirely retires behind the substance of the inquiry2 in the other1 philosophy consists in a sum of artistic conceptions1 which derive their content and value chiefly from the individuality of the author4 ,the history of philosophy has no other system to show which to the same degree expresses and reflects the personality of the philosopher as ,schopenhauer's4 ,this personality1 notwithstanding its limitations and its whims1 was important enough to give interest to ,schopenhauer's views1 even apart from the relative truth which they contain4 ,arthur ,schopenhauer 7#aghh-ahfj7 was the son of a merchant in ,dantzic and his wife ,johanna1 ne ,trosiener1 who subsequently became known as a novelist4 ,his early training was gained from foreign travel1 but after the death of his father he exchanged the mercantile career1 which he had begun at his father's request1 for that of a scholar1 studying under ,g4,e4 ,schulze in ,gttingen1 and under ,fichte at ,berlin4 ,in #ahac he gained his doctor's degree in ,jena with a dissertation ,on the ,fourfold ,root of the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason4 ,then he moved from ,weimar1 the residence of his mother1 where he had associated considerably with ,goethe and had been introduced to ,indian philosophy by ,fr4 ,mayer1 to ,dresden 7#ahad-ah74 ,in the latter place he wrote the essay ,on ,sight and ,colors 7#ahaf2 subsequently published by the author in ,latin71 and his chief work1 ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea 7#ahai2 new edition1 with a second volume1 #ahdd74 ,after the completion of the latter he began his first ,italian journey1 while his second tour fell in the interval between his two quite unsuccessful attempts 7in ,berlin #ahbj and #ahbe7 to propagate his philosophy from the professor's desk4 ,from #ahca until his death he lived in learned retirement in ,frankfort-on-the-,main4 ,here he composed the opuscule ,on ,will in ,nature1 #ahcf1 the prize treatises ,on the ,freedom of the ,human ,will and ,on the ,foundation of ,ethics 7together1 ,the ,two ,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics1 #ahda71 and the collection of minor treatises ,parerga and ,paralipomena1 #b vols41 #ahea 7including an essay ,on ,religion74 ,j4 ,frauenstdt has published a considerable amount of posthumous material 7among other things the translation1 ,b4 ,gracians ,handorakel der ,weltklugheit72 the ,collected ,works 7#f vols41 #ahgc-gd1 #b;d ed41 #ahgg1 with a biographical notice72 ,lichtstrahlen aus ,schopenhauers ,werken1 #ahfa1 #eth ed4 #ahhe2 and a ,schopenhauer ,lexicon1 #b vols41 #ahga4a ,footnote #a3 ,from the remaining ,schopenhauer literature 7,f4 ,laban has published a chronological survey of it1 #ahhj7 we may call attention to the critiques of the first edition of the chief work by ,herbart and ,beneke1 and that of the second edition by ,fortlage 7,jenaische ,litteratur ,zeitung1 #ahde1 ,nos4 #adf-aea72 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann ,herbart und ,schopenhauer1 eine ,antithese 7,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 #ahea72 ,wilh4 ,gwinner1 ,schopenhauers ,leben1 #ahgh 7the second edition of ,schopenhauer aus persnlichem ,umgang dargestellt1 #ahfb72 ,fr4 ,nietzsche1 ,schopenhauer als ,erzieher 7,unzeitgemsse ,betrachtungen1 ,stck iii41 #ahgd72 ,o4 ,busch1 ,a4 ,schopenhauer1 #b;d4 ed41 #ahgh2 ,k4 ,peters1 ,schopenhauer als ,philosoph und ,schriftsteller1 #ahhj2 ,r4 ,koeber1 ,die ,philosophie ,a4 ,schopenhauers1 #ahhh4 ,the ,english reader may be referred to ,haldane and ,kemp's translation of ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea1 #c vols41 #ahhc-hf2 the translation of ,the ,fourfold ,root and the ,will in ,nature in ,bohn's ,philosophical ,library1 #ahhi2 ,saunders's translations from the ,parerga and ,paralipomena1 #ahhi seq42 ,helen ,zimmern's ,arthur ,schopenhauer1 his ,life and his ,philosophy1 #ahgf2 ,w4 ,wallace's ,schopenhauer1 ,great ,writers ,series1 #ahij 7with a bibliography by ,anderson1 including references to numerous magazine articles1 etc472 ,sully's ,pessimism1 #b;d ed41 #ahhb1 chap4 iv42 and ,royce's ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy1 chap1 viii41 #ahib4--,,tr4 ,in regard to subjective idealism ,schopenhauer confesses himself a thoroughgoing ,kantian4 ,that sensations are merely states in us has long been known2 ,kant opened the eyes of the world to the fact that the forms of knowledge are also the property of the subject4 ,i know things only as they appear to me1 as ,i represent them in virtue of the constitution of my intellect2 the world is my idea4 ,the ,kantian theory1 however1 is capable of simplification1 the various forms of cognition may be reduced to a single one1 to the category of causality or principle of sufficient reason--which was preferred by ,kant himself--as the general expression of the regular connection of our representations4 ,this principle1 in correspondence with the several classes of objects1 or rather of representations--viz41 pure 7merely formal7 intuitions1 empirical 7complete7 intuitions1 acts of will1 abstract concepts--has four forms3 it is the principium rationis essendi1 rationis fiendi1 rationis agendi1 rationis cognoscendi4 ,the ratio essendi is the law which regulates the coexistence of the parts of space and the succession of the divisions of time4 ,the ratio fiendi demands for every change of state another from which it regularly follows as from its cause1 and a substance as its unchangeable substratum--matter4 ,all changes take place necessarily1 all that is real is material2 the law of causality is valid for phenomena alone1 not beyond them1 and holds only for the states of substances1 not for substances themselves4 ,in inorganic nature causes work mechanically1 in organic nature as stimuli 7in which the reaction is not equal to the action71 and in animated nature as motives4 ,a motive is a conscious 7but not therefore a free7 cause2 the law of motivation is the ratio agendi4 ,this serial order1 mechanical cause1 stimulus1 and motive1 denotes only distinctions in the mode of action1 not in the necessity of action4 ,man's actions follow as inevitably from his character and the motives which influence him as a clock strikes the hours2 the freedom of the will is a chimera4 ,finally1 the ratio cognoscendi determines that a judgment must have a sufficient ground in order to be true4 ,judgment or the connection of concepts is the chief activity of the reason1 which1 as the faculty of abstract thought and the organ of science1 constitutes the difference between man and the brute1 while the possession of the understanding with its intuition of objects is common to both4 ,in opposition to the customary overestimation of this gift of mediate representations1 of language1 and of reflection1 ,schopenhauer gives prominence to the fact that the reason is not a creative faculty like the understanding1 but only a receptive power1 that it clarifies and transforms the content furnished by intuition without increasing it by new representations4 ,objective cognition is confined within the circle of our representations2 all that is knowable is phenomenon4 ,space1 time1 and causality spread out like a triple veil between us and the per se of things1 and prevent a vision of the true nature of the world4 ,there is one point1 however1 at which we know more than mere phenomena1 where of these three disturbing media only one1 time-form1 separates us from the thing in itself4 ,this point is the consciousness of ourselves4 ,on the one hand1 ,i appear to myself as body4 ,my body is a temporal1 spatial1 material object1 an object like all others1 and with them subject to the laws of objectivity4 ,but besides this objective cognition1 ,i have1 further1 an immediate consciousness of myself1 through which ,i apprehend my true being--,i know myself as willing4 ,my will is more than a mere representation1 it is the original element in me1 the truly real which appears to me as body4 ,the will is related to the intellect as the primary to the secondary1 as substance to accident2 it is related to the body as the inner to the outer1 as reality to phenomenon4 ,the act of will is followed at once and inevitably by the movement of the body willed1 nay1 the two are one and the same1 only given in different ways3 will is the body seen from within1 body the will seen from without1 the will become visible1 objectified4 ,after the analogy of ourselves1 again1 who appear to ourselves as material objects but in truth are will1 all existence is to be judged4 ,the universe is the mac-anthropos2 the knowledge of our own essence1 the key to the knowledge of the essence of the world4 ,like our body1 the whole world is the visibility of will4 ,the human will is the highest stage in the development of the same principle which manifests its activity in the various forces of nature1 and which properly takes its name from the highest species4 ,to penetrate further into the inner nature of things than this is impossible4 ,what that which presents itself as will and which still remains after the negation of the latter 7see below7 is in itself1 is for us absolutely unknowable4 ,the world is per se will4 ,none of the predicates are to be attributed to the primal will which we ascribe to things in consequence of our subjective forms of thought--neither determination by causes or ends1 nor plurality3 it stands outside the law of causality1 as also outside space and time1 which form the principium individuationis4 ,the primal will is groundless1 blind stress1 unconscious impulse toward existence2 it is one1 the one and all1 ,greek3 en nai pan4 ,that which manifests itself as gravity1 as magnetic force1 as the impulse to growth1 as the vis medicatrix naturae1 is only this one world-will1 whose unity 7not conscious character67 shows itself in the purposiveness of its embodiments4 ,the essence of each thing1 its hidden quality1 at which empirical explanation finds its limit1 is its will3 the essence of the stone is its will to fall2 that of the lungs is the will to breathe2 teeth1 throat1 and bowels are hunger objectified4 ,those qualities in which the universal will gives itself material manifestation form a series with grades of increasing perfection1 a realm of unchangeable specific forms or eternal ,ideas1 which 7with a real value difficult to determine7 stand midway between the one primal will and the numberless individual beings4 ,that the organic individual does not perfectly correspond to the ideal of its species1 but only approximates this more or less closely1 is grounded in the fact that the stadia in the objectification of the will1 or the ,ideas1 contend1 as it were1 for matter2 and whatever of force is used up in the victory of the higher ,ideas over the lower is lost for the development of the examples of the former4 ,the higher the level on which a being stands the clearer the expression of its individuality4 ,the most general forces of nature1 which constitute the raw mass1 play the fundamental bass in the world-symphony1 the higher stages of inorganic nature1 with the vegetable and animal worlds1 the harmonious middle parts1 and man the guiding treble1 the significant melody4 ,with the human brain the world as idea is given at a stroke2 in this organ the will has kindled a torch in order to throw light upon itself and to carry out its designs with careful deliberation2 it has brought forth the intellect as its instrument1 which1 with the great majority of men1 remains in a position of subservience to the will4 ,brain and thought are the same2 the former is nothing other than the will to know1 as the stomach is will to digest4 ,those only talk of an immaterial soul who import into philosophy--where such ideas do not belong--concepts taught them when they were confirmed4 ,schopenhauer's philosophy is as rich in inconsistencies as his personality was self-willed and unharmonious4 ,he carries into his system all the contradictions and whims of his capricious nature1 says ,zeller4 ,from the most radical idealism 7the objective world a product of representation7 he makes a sharp transition to the crassest materialism 7thought a function of the brain72 first matter is to be a mere idea1 now thought is to be merely a material phenomenon6 ,the third and fourth books of ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea1 which develop the aesthetic and ethical standpoint of their author1 stand in as sharp a contradiction to the first 7potical7 and the second 7metaphysical7 books as these to each other4 ,while at first it was maintained that all representation is subject to the principle of sufficient reason1 we are now told that1 besides causal cognition1 there is a higher knowledge1 one which is free from the control of this principle1 viz41 aesthetic and philosophical intuition4 ,if1 before1 it was said that the intellect is the creature and servant of the will1 we now learn that in favored individuals it gains the power to throw off the yoke of slavery1 and not only to raise itself to the blessedness of contemplation free from all desire1 but even to enter on a victorious conflict with the tyrant1 to slay the will4 ,the source of this power--is not revealed4 ,r4 ,haym 7,a4 ,schopenhauer1 #ahfd1 reprinted from the ,preussische ,jahrbcher7 was not far wrong in characterizing ,schopenhauer's philosophy as a clever novel1 which entertains the reader by its rapid vicissitudes4 ,the contemplation which is free from causality and will is the essence of aesthetic life2 the partial and total sublation1 the quieting and negation of the will1 that of ethical life4 ,it is but seldom1 and only in the artistic and philosophical genius1 that the intellect succeeds in freeing itself from the supremacy of the will1 and1 laying aside the question of the why and wherefore1 where and when1 in sinking itself completely in the pure what of things4 ,while with the majority of mankind1 as with animals1 the intellect always remains a prisoner in the service of the will to live1 of self-preservation1 of personal interests1 in gifted men1 in artists and thinkers1 it strips off all that is individual1 and1 in disinterested vision of the ,ideas1 becomes pure1 timeless subject1 freed from the will4 ,art removes individuality from the subject as well as from the object2 its comforting and cheering influence depends on the fact that it elevates those enjoying it to the stand-point--raised above all pain of desire--of a fixed1 calm1 completely objective contemplation of the unchangeable essence1 of the eternal types of things4 ,for aesthetic intuition the object is not a thing under relations of space1 time1 and cause1 but only an expression1 an exemplification1 a representative of the ,idea4 ,poetry1 which presents--most perfectly in tragedy--the ,idea of humanity1 stands higher than the plastic arts4 ,the highest rank1 however1 belongs to music1 since it does not1 like the other arts1 represent single ,ideas1 but--as an unconscious metaphysic1 nay1 a second1 ideal world above the material world--the will itself4 ,in view of this high appreciation of their art1 it is not surprising that musicians have contributed a considerable contingent to the band of ,schopenhauer worshipers4 ,a different source of attraction for the wider circle of readers was supplied by the piquant spice of pessimism4 ,if the purposiveness of the phenomena of nature points to the unity of the primal will1 the unspeakable misery of life1 which ,schopenhauer sets forth with no less of eloquence1 proves the blindness and irrationality of the world-ground4 ,to live is to suffer2 the world contains incomparably more pain than pleasure2 it is the worst possible world4 ,in the world of sub-animal nature aimless striving2 in the animal world an insatiable impulse after enjoyment--while the will1 deceiving itself with fancied happiness to come1 which always remains denied it1 and continually tossed to and fro between necessity and ennui1 never attains complete satisfaction4 ,the pleasure which it pursues is nothing but the removal of a dissatisfaction1 and vanishes at once when the longing is stilled1 to be replaced by fresh wants1 that is1 by new pains4 ,in view of the indescribable misery in the world1 to favor optimism is evidence not so much of folly and blindness as of a wanton disposition4 ,the old saying is true3 ,non-existence is better than existence4 ,the misery1 however1 is the just punishment for the original sin of the individual1 which gave itself its particular existence by an act of intelligible freedom4 ,redemption from the sin and misery of existence is possible only through a second act of transcendental freedom1 which1 since it consists in the complete transformation of our being1 and since it is supernatural in its origin1 the ,church is right in describing as a new birth and work of grace4 ,morality presupposes pessimistic insight into the badness of the world and the fruitlessness of all desire1 and pantheistic discernment of the untruth of individual existence and the identity in essence of all individuals from a metaphysical standpoint4 ,man is able to free himself from egoistic self-affirmation only when he perceives the two truths1 that all striving is vain and the longed-for pleasure unattainable1 and that all individuals are at bottom one1 viz4 manifestations of the same primal will4 ,this is temporarily effected in sympathy1 which1 as the only counterpoise to natural selfishness1 is the true moral motive and the source of all love and justice4 ,the sympathizer sees himself in others and feels their suffering as his own4 ,the entire negation of the will1 however1 inspiring examples of which have been furnished by the ,christian ascetics and ,oriental penitents1 stands higher than the vulgar virtue of sympathy with the sufferings of others4 ,here knowledge1 turned away from the individual and vain to the whole and genuine1 ceases to be a motive for the will and becomes a means of stilling it2 the intellect is transformed from a motive into a quietive1 and brings him who gives himself up to the ,all safely out from the storm of the passions into the peace of deliverance from existence4 ,absence of will1 resignation1 is holiness and blessedness in one4 ,for him who has slain the will in himself the motley deceptive dream of phenomena has vanished1 he lives in the ether of true reality1 which for our knowledge is an empty nothingness 7,nirvana71 yet 7as the ultimate1 incomprehensible per se1 which remains after the annulling of the will7 only a relative nothingness--relative to the phenomenon4 ,schopenhauer disposes of the sense of responsibility and the reproofs of conscience1 which are inconvenient facts for his determinism1 by making them both refer1 not to single deeds and the empirical character1 but to the indivisible act of the intelligible character4 ,conscience does not blame me because ,i have acted as ,i must act with my character and the motives given1 but for being what in these actions ,i reveal myself to be4 ,operari sequitur esse4 ,my action follows from my being1 my being was my own free choice1 and a new act of freedom is alone capable of transforming it4 ,if ,schopenhauer is fond of referring to the agreement of his views with the oldest and most perfect religions1 the idea lies in the background that religion1--which springs from the same metaphysical needs as philosophy1 and1 for the great multitude1 who lack the leisure and the capacity for philosophical thought1 takes the place of the former1--as the metaphysics of the people1 clothes the same fundamental truths which the philosopher offers in conceptual form and supports by rational grounds in the garb of myth and allegory1 and places them under the protection of an external authority4 ,when this character of religion is overlooked1 and that which is intended to be symbolical is taken for literal truth 7it is not the supernaturalists alone who start with this unjust demand1 but the rationalists also1 with their minimizing interpretations71 it becomes the worst enemy of true philosophy4 ,in ,christianity the doctrines of original sin and of redemption are especially congenial to our philosopher1 as well as mysticism and asceticism4 ,he declares ,mohammedanism the worst religion on account of its optimism and abstract theism1 and ,buddhism the best1 because it is idealistic1 pessimistic1 and--atheistic4 ,it was not until after the appearance of the second edition of his chief work that ,schopenhauer experienced in increasing measure the satisfaction--which his impatient ambition had expected much earlier--of seeing his philosophy seriously considered4 ,a zealous apostle arose for him in ,julius ,frauenstdt 7died #ahgh2 ,letters on the ,philosophy of ,schopenhauer1 #ahed2 ,new ,letters on the ,philosophy of ,schopenhauer1 #ahgf71 who1 originally an ,hegelian1 endeavored to remove pessimism from the master's system4 ,like ,eduard von ,hartmann1 who will be discussed below1 ,julius ,bahnsen 7died #ahhb2 ,the ,contradiction in the ,knowledge and ,being of the ,world1 the ,principle and ,particular ,verification of ,real-,dialectic1 #ahhj-ha2 also1 interesting characterological studies7 seeks to combine elements from ,schopenhauer and ,hegel1 while ,k4 ,peters 7,will-world and ,world-will1 #ahhc7 shows in another direction points of contact with the first named thinker4 ,of the younger members of the school we may name ,p4 ,deussen in ,kiel 7,the ,elements of ,metaphysics1 #b;d ed41 #ahij71 and ,philipp ,mainlnder 7,philosophy of ,redemption1 #b;d ed41 #ahgi74 ,as we have mentioned above1 ,schopenhauer's doctrines have exercised an attractive force in artistic circles also4 ,richard ,wagner 7#ahac-hc2 ,collected ,writings1 #i vols41 #ahga-gc1 vol4 x4 #ahhc2 #b;d ed41 #ahhg-hh71 whose earlier aesthetic writings 7,the ,art-work of the ,future1 #ahej2 ,opera and ,drama1 #ahea7 had shown the influence of ,feuerbach1 in his later works 7,beethoven1 #ahgj2 ,religion and ,art1 in the third volume of the ,bayreuther ,bltter1 #ahhj7 became an adherent of ,schopenhauer1 after1 in the ,ring of the ,nibelung1 he had given poetical expression to a view of the world nearly allied to ,schopenhauer's1 though this was previous to his acquaintance with the works of the latter4#a ,one of the most thoughtful disciples of the ,frankfort philosopher and the ,bayreuth dramatist is ,fried rich ,nietzsche 7born #ahdd74 ,his ,unseasonable ,reflections1 #ahgc-gf1b is a summons to return from the errors of modern culture1 which1 corrupted by the seekers for gain1 by the state1 by the polite writers and savants1 especially by the professors of philosophy1 has made men cowardly and false instead of simple and honorable1 mere self-satisfied philistines of culture4 ,in his writings since #ahghc ,nietzsche has exchanged the rle of a ,german ,rousseau for that of a follower of ,voltaire1 to arrive finally at the ideal of the man above men4#d ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 on ,wagner1 ,fr4 v4 ,hausegger1 ,wagner und ,schopenhauer1 #ahgh4 ,english translation of ,wagner's ,prose ,works by ,ellis1 vol4 i41 #ahib4--,,tr4 ,footnote #b3 ,d4 ,strauss1 the ,confessor and the ,author2 ,on the ,advantage and ,disadvantage of ,history for ,life2 ,schopenhauer as an ,educator2 ,r4 ,wagner in ,bayreuth4 ,footnote #c3 ,human1 ,all-too-human1 new ed41 #ahhf2 ,the ,dawn1 ,thoughts on ,human ,prejudices1 #ahha2 ,the ,merry ,science1 #ahhb2 ,so spake ,zarathustra1 #ahhc-hd2 ,beyond ,good and ,evil1 #ahhf2 ,on the ,genealogy of ,morals1 #ahhg1 #b;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,the ,wagner ,affair1 #ahhh1 #b;d ed41 #ahib2 ,gtzendmmerung1 or ,how to ,philosophize with the ,hammer1 #ahhi4 ,footnote #d3 ,cf4 ,h4 ,kaatz1 ,die ,weltanschauung ,fr4 ,nietzsches1 ,i4 ,kultur und ,moral1 #ahib4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,philosophy ,,out ,,of ,,germany4 #a4 ,italy4 ,the ,cartesian philosophy1 which had been widely accepted in ,italy1 and had still been advocated1 in the sense of ,malebranche1 by ,sigismond ,gerdil 7#agah-ahjb71 was opposed as an unhistorical view of the world by ,giambattista ,vico1#a the bold and profound creator of the philosophy of history 7#affh-agdd2 from #afig professor of rhetoric in the ,university of ,naples74 ,vico's leading ideas are as follows3 ,man makes himself the criterion of the universe1 judges that which is unknown and remote by the known and present4 ,the free will of the individual rests on the judgments1 manners1 and habits of the people1 which have arisen without reflection from a universal human instinct4 ,uniform ideas among nations unacquainted with one another are motived in a common truth4 ,history is the development of human nature2 in it neither chance nor fate rules1 but the legislative power of providence1 in virtue of which men through their own freedom progressively realize the idea of human nature4 ,the universal course of civilization is that culture transfers its abode from the forests and huts into villages1 cities1 and1 finally1 into academies2 the nature of the nations is at first rude1 then stern1 gradually it becomes mild1 nay1 effeminate1 and finally wanton2 at first men feel only that which is necessary1 later they regard the useful1 the convenient1 the agreeable and attractive1 until the luxury sprung from the sense for the beautiful degenerates into a foolish misuse of things4 ,vico divides antiquity into three periods3 the divine 7theocracy71 the heroic 7aristocracy71 and the human 7democracy and monarchy74 ,the same course of things repeats itself in the nations of later times3 to the patriarchal dominion of the fanciful1 myth-making ,orient correspond the spiritual states of the migrations2 to the old ,greek aristocracy1 the chivalry and robbery of the period of the ,crusades2 to the republicanism and the monarchy of later antiquity1 the modern period1 which gives even the citizens and peasants a share in the universal equality4 ,if ,european culture had not been transplanted to ,america1 the same three-act drama of human development would there be playing4 ,vico carries this threefold division into his consideration of manners1 laws1 languages1 character1 etc4 ,footnote #a3 ,vico3 ,principles of a ,new ,science of the ,common ,nature of ,nations1 #agbe2 ,works1 in six volumes1 edited by ,g4 ,ferrari1 #ahce-cg1 new ed44 #ahec seq4 ,on ,vico cf4 ,k4 ,werner1 #ahgg and #ahgi4 ,also ,flint's ,vico1 ,blackwood's ,philosophical ,classics1 #ahhd4--,,tr4 ,if ,vico anticipates the ,hegelian view of history1 ,antonio ,genovesi 7#agab-fi71 who also taught at the ,university of ,naples1 and while the former was still living1 shows himself animated by a presentiment of the ,kantian criticism4#a ,appreciating ,leibnitz and ,locke1 and appropriating the idea of the monads from the one and the unknowableness of substance from the other1 he reaches the conviction--according to statements in his letters--that sense-bodies are nothing but the appearances of intelligible unities2 that each being for us is an activity1 whose substratum and ground remains unknown to us2 that self-consciousness and the knowledge of external impressions yield phenomena alone1 through the elaboration of which we produce the intellectual worlds of the sciences4 ,for the rest1 ,genovesi thus advises his friends3 ,study the world1 devote yourselves to languages and to mathematics1 think more about men than about the things above us1 and leave metaphysical vagaries to the monks6 ,his countrymen honor in him the man who first included ethics and politics in philosophical instruction1 and who used the ,italian language both from the desk and in his writings1 holding that a nation whose scientific works are not composed in its own tongue is barbarian4 ,footnote #a3 ,in the following account we have made use of a translation of the concluding section of ,francesco ,florentine's ,handbook of the ,history of ,philosophy1 #ahgi-ha1 which was most kindly placed at our disposal by ,dr4 ,j4 ,mainzer4 ,cf4 ,la ,filosofia ,contemporanea in ,italia1 #ahgf1 by the same author2 further1 ,bonatelli1 ,die ,philosophic in ,italien seit1 #ahae2 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophic und philosophische ,kritik1 vol4 liv4 #ahfi1 p4 #acd seq42 and especially1 ,k4 ,werner1 ,die ,italienische ,philosophic des ,,xix4 ,jahrhunderts1 #e vols41 #ahhd-hf4 ,the ,english reader may be referred to the appendix on ,italian philosophy in vol4 ii4 of the ,english translation of ,ueberweg1 by ,vincenzo ,botta2 and to ,barzellotti's ,philosophy in ,italy1 ,mind1 vol4 in4 #ahgh4--,,tr4 ,the sensationalism of ,condillac1 starting from ,parma1 gained influence over ,melchiore ,gioja 7#agfg-ahbh2 ,statistical ,logic1 #ahjc2 ,ideology1 #ahbb7 and ,giandomenico ,romagnosi 7#agfa-ahce2 ,what is the ,sound ,mind8 #ahbg71 but not without experiencing essential modification from both4 ,the importance of these men1 moreover1 lies more in the sphere of social philosophy than in the sphere of notics4 ,of the three greatest ,italian philosophers of this century1 ,galluppi1 ,rosmini1 and ,gioberti1 the first named is more in sympathy with the ,kantian position than he himself will confess4 ,pasquale ,galluppi#a 7#aggj-ahdf2 from #ahca professor at ,naples7 adheres to the principle of experience1 but does not conceive experience as that which is sensuously given1 but as the elaboration of this through the synthetic relations 7rapporti7 of identity and difference1 which proceed from the activity of the mind4 ,vincenzo de ,grazia 7,essay on the ,reality of ,human ,knowledge1 #ahci-db71 who holds all relations to be objective1 and ,ottavio ,colecchi 7died #ahdg2 ,philosophical ,investigations1 #ahdc71 who holds them all subjective1 oppose the view of ,galluppi that some are objective and others subjective4 ,according to ,de ,grazia judgment is observation1 not connection2 it finds out the relations contained in the data of sensation2 it discovers1 but does not produce them4 ,colecchi reduces the ,kantian categories to two1 substance and cause4 ,testa1 ,borelli 7#ahbd71 and1 among the younger men1 ,cantoni1 are ,kantians2 ,labriola is an ,herbartian4 ,footnote #a3 ,galluppi3 ,philosophical ,essay on the ,critique of ,knowledge1 #ahai seq42 ,lectures on ,logic and ,metaphysics1 #ahcb seq42 ,philosophy of the ,will1 #ahcb seq42 ,on the ,system of ,fichte1 or ,considerations on ,transcendental ,idealism and ,absolute ,rationalism1 #ahda4 ,by the ,letters on the ,history of ,philosophy from ,descartes to ,kant1 #ahbg1 in the later editions to ,cousin1 he became the founder of this discipline in his native land4 ,antonio ,rosmini-,serbati#a 7born #agig at ,rovereto1 died #ahee at ,stresa7 regards knowledge as the common product of sensibility and understanding1 the former furnishing the matter1 the latter the form4 ,the form is one3 the ,idea of being which precedes all judgment1 which does not come from myself1 which is innate1 and apprehensible by immediate inner perception 7essere ideale1 ente universale74 ,the pure concepts 7substance1 cause1 unity1 necessity7 arise when the reflecting reason analyzes this general ,idea of being2 the mixed ,ideas 7space1 time1 motion2 body1 spirit71 when the understanding applies it to sensuous experience4 ,the universal ,idea of being and the particular existences are in their being identical1 but in their mode of existence different4 ,in his posthumous ,theosophy1 #ahei seq41 ,rosmini no longer makes the universal being receive its determinations from without1 but produce them from its own inner nature by means of an a priori development4 ,vincenzo ,gioberti#a 7born #ahja in ,turin1 died #aheb at ,paris7 has been compared as a patriot with ,fichte1 and in his cast of thought with ,spinoza4 ,in place of ,rosmini's psychologism1 which was advanced by ,descartes and which leads to skepticism1 he seeks to substitute ontologism1 which is alone held capable of reconciling science and the ,catholic religion4 ,by immediate intuition 7the content of which ,gioberti comprehends in the formula ,being creates the existences7 we cognize the absolute as the creative ground of two series1 the series of thought and the series of reality4 ,the endeavors of ,rosmini and ,gioberti to bring the reason into harmony with the faith of the ,church were fiercely attacked by ,giussepe ,ferrari 7#ahaa-gf7 and ,ausonio ,franchi 7#ahec71 while ,francesco ,bonatelli 7,thought and ,cognition1 #ahfd7 and ,terenzio ,mamiani 7#ahjj-he2 ,confessions of a ,metaphysician1 #ahfe71 follow a line of thought akin to the ,platonizing views of the first named thinkers4 ,the review ,filosofia delle ,scuole ,italiane1 called into life by ,mamiani in #ahgj1 has been continued since #ahhf under the direction of ,l4 ,ferri as the ,rivista ,italiana di ,filosofia4 ,footnote #a3 ,rosmini3 ,new ,essay on the ,origin of ,ideas1 #ahcj 7,english translation1 #ahhc-hd72 ,principles of ,moral ,science1 #ahca2 ,philosophy of ,right1 #ahda4 ,footnote ,b3 ,gioberti3 ,introduction to the ,study of ,philosophy1 #ahdj2 ,philosophical ,errors of ,a4 ,rosmini1 #ahdb2 ,on the ,beautiful1 #ahda2 ,on the ,good1 #ahdb2 ,protology edited by ,massari1 #aheg4 ,on both cf4 ,r4 ,seydel1 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 #ahei4 ,the ,thomistic doctrine has many adherents in ,italy1 among whom the ,jesuit ,m4 ,liberatore 7#ahfe7 may be mentioned4 ,the ,hegelian philosophy has also found favor there 7especially in ,naples71 as well as positivism4 ,the former is favored by ,vera1 ,mariano1 ,ragnisco1 and ,spaventa 7died #ahhe72 the ,rivista di ,filosofia ,scientifica1 #ahha seq41 founded by ,morselli1 supports the latter1 and ,e4 ,caporali's ,la ,nuova ,scienza1 #ahhd1 moves in a similar direction4 ,pietro ,siciliani 7,on the ,revival of the ,positive ,philosophy in ,italy1 #ahga7 makes the third1 the critical1 period of philosophy by which scholasticism is overthrown and the reason made authoritative1 commence with ,vico1 and bases his doctrine on ,vico's formula3 ,the conversion 7transposition7 of the verum and the factum1 and vice versa4 ,subsequently he inclined to positivism1 which he had previously opposed1 and among the representatives of which we may mention1 further1 ,r4 ,ardig of ,pavia 7,psychology as ,positive ,science1 #ahgj2 ,the ,ethics of ,positivism1 #ahhe2 ,philosophical ,works1 #ahhc seq471 and ,andrea ,angiulli of ,naples 7died #ahij2 ,philosophy and the ,schools1 #ahhi71 who explain matter and spirit as two phenomena of the same essence2 further1 ,giuseppe ,sergi1 ,giovanni ,cesca1 and the psychiatrist1 ,c4 ,lombroso1 the head of the positivistic school of penal law4 #b4 ,france4 ,among the ,french philosophers of this century#a none can compare in far-reaching influence1 both at home and abroad1 with ,auguste ,comte1#b the creator of positivism 7born at ,montpellier in #agih1 died at ,paris in #aheg71 whose chief work1 the ,course of ,positive ,philosophy1 #f vols41 appeared in #ahcj #db4 ,english version1 freely translated and condensed1 by ,harriet ,martineau1 #ahec4 ,footnote #a3 ,accounts of ,french philosophy in the nineteenth century have been given by ,taine 7#aheg1 #c;d ed41 #ahfg72 ,janet 7,la ,philosophie ,franaise ,contemporaine1 #b;d ed41 #ahgi72 ,a4 ,franck2 ,ferraz 7#c vols41 #ahhj-hi72 ,felix ,ravaisson 7#b;d ed41 #ahhd72 the ,swede1 ,j4 ,borelius 7,glances at the ,present ,position of ,philosophy in ,germany and ,france1 ,german translation by ,jonas1 #ahhg72 and ,ribot1 ,mind1 vol4 ii41 #ahgg4 ,footnote #b3 ,on ,comte cf4 ,b4 ,pnjer1 ,jahrbcher fr protestantische ,theologie1 #ahgh2 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,zur ,wrdigung ,comtes und des ,positivismus1 in the ,aufstze zum ,zellerjubilum1 #ahhg2 ,maxim4 ,brtt1 ,der ,positivismus1 ,programme of the ,realgymnasium des ,johanneums1 ,hamburg1 #ahhi2 also1 besides ,mill1 p4 #efj1 ,john ,morley1 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 vol4 vi4 pp4 #bbi-bch1 and ,e4 ,caird1 ,the ,social ,philosophy and ,religion of ,comte1 #ahhe4--,tr4 ,the positive philosophy seeks to put an end to the hoary error that anything more is open to our knowledge than given facts--phenomena and their relations4 ,we do not know the essence of phenomena1 and just as little their first causes and ultimate ends2 we know--by means of observation1 experiment1 and comparison--only the constant relations between phenomena1 the relations of succession and of similarity among facts1 the uniformities of which we call their laws4 ,all knowledge is1 therefore1 relative2 there is no absolute knowledge1 for the inmost essence of facts1 and likewise their origin1 the way in which they are produced1 is for us impenetrable4 ,we know only1 and this by experience1 that the phenomenon ,a is invariably connected with the phenomenon ,b1 that the second always follows on the first1 and call the constant antecedent of a phenomenon its cause4 ,we know such causes only as are themselves phenomena4 ,the fact that our knowledge is limited to the succession and coexistence of phenomena is not to be lamented as a defect3 the only knowledge which is attainable by us is at the same time the only useful knowledge1 that which lends us practical power over phenomena4 ,when we inquire into causes we desire to hasten or hinder the effect1 or to change it as we wish1 or at least to anticipate it in order to make our preparations accordingly4 ,such foresight and control of events can be attained only through a knowledge of their laws1 their order of succession1 their phenomenal causes4 ,savoir pour prvoir4 ,but1 although the prevision of facts is the only knowledge which we need1 men have always sought after another1 an absolute knowledge1 or have even believed that they were in possession of it2 the forerunners of the positive philosophy themselves1 ,bacon and ,descartes1 have been entangled in this prejudice4 ,a long intellectual development was required to reach the truth1 that our knowledge does not extend beyond the cognition of the succession and coexistence of facts2 that the same procedure must be extended to abstract speculation which the common mind itself makes use of in its single actions4 ,on the other hand1 the positive philosophy1 notwithstanding its rejection of metaphysics1 is far from giving its sanction to empiricism4 ,every isolated1 empirical observation is useless and uncertain2 it obtains value and usefulness only when it is defined and explained by a theory1 and combined with other observations into a law--this makes the difference between the observations of the scholar and the layman4 ,the positive stage of a science1 which begins when we learn to explain phenomena by their laws1 is preceded by two others3 a theological stage1 which ascribes phenomena to supposed personal powers1 and a metaphysical stage1 which ascribes them to abstract natural forces4 ,these three periods denote the childhood1 the youth1 and the manhood of science4 ,the earliest view of the world is the theological view1 which derives the events of the world from the voluntary acts of supernatural intelligent beings4 ,the crude view of nature sees in each individual thing a being animated like man2 later man accustoms himself to think of a whole class of objects as governed by one invisible being1 by a divinity2 finally the multitude of divinities gives place to a single ,god1 who creates1 maintains1 and rules the universe1 and by extraordinary acts1 by miracles1 interferes in the course of events4 ,thus fetichism 7in its highest form1 astrolatry71 polytheism1 and monotheism are the stages in the development of the theological mode of thought4 ,in the second1 the metaphysical1 period1 the acts of divine volition are replaced by entities1 by abstract concepts1 which are regarded as realities1 as the true reality back of phenomena4 ,a force1 a power1 an occult property or essence is made to dwell in things2 the mysterious being which directs events is no longer called ,god1 but ,nature1 and invested with certain inclinations1 with a horror of a vacuum1 an aversion to breaks1 a tendency toward the best1 a vis medicatrix1 etc4 ,here belong1 also1 the vegetative soul of ,aristotle1 the vital force and the plastic impulse of modern investigators4 ,finally the positive stage is reached1 when all such abstractions1 which are even yet conceived as half personal and acting voluntarily1 are abandoned1 and the unalterable and universally valid laws of phenomena established by observation and experiment alone4 ,but to explain the laws of nature themselves transcends1 according to ,comte1 the fixed limits of human knowledge4 ,the beginning of the world lies outside the region of the knowable1 atheism is no better grounded than the theistic hypothesis1 and if ,comte asserts that a blindly acting mechanism is less probable than a world-plan1 he is conscious that he is expressing a mere conjecture which can never be raised to the rank of a scientific theory4 ,the origin and the end of things are insoluble problems1 in answering which no progress has yet been made in spite of man's long thought about them4 ,only that which lies intermediate between the two inscrutable termini of the world is an object of knowledge4 ,it is not only the human mind in general that exhibits this advance from the theological1 through the metaphysical1 to the positive mode of thought1 but each separate science goes through the same three periods--only that the various disciplines have developed with unequal rapidity4 ,while some have already culminated in the positive method of treatment1 others yet remain caught in the theological period of beginnings1 and others still are in the metaphysical transition stage4 ,up to the present all three phases of development exist side by side1 and even among the objects of the most highly developed sciences there are some which we continue to regard theologically2 these are the ones which we do not yet understand how to calculate1 as the changes of the weather or the spread of epidemics4 ,which science first attained the positive state1 and in what order have the others followed8 ,with this criterion ,comte constructs his classification of the sciences1 in which1 however1 he takes account only of those sciences which he calls abstract1 that is1 those which treat of events in distinction from objects4 ,the abstract sciences 7as biology7 investigate the most general laws of nature1 valid for all phenomena1 from which the particular phenomena which experience presents to us cannot be deduced1 but on the basis of which an entirely different world were also possible4 ,the concrete sciences1 on the other hand 7e4g41 botany and zology71 have to do with the actually given combinations of phenomena4 ,the former follow out each separate one of the general laws through all its possible modes of operation1 the latter consider only the combination of laws given in an object4 ,thus oaks and squirrels are the result of very many laws1 inasmuch as organisms are dependent not only on biological1 but also on physical1 chemical1 and mathematical laws4 ,comte enumerates six of these abstract sciences1 and arranges them in such a way that each depends on the truths of the preceding1 and adds to these its own special truths1 while the first 7the most general and simplest7 presupposes no earlier laws whatever1 but is presupposed by all the later ones4 ,according to this principle of increasing particularity and complexity the following scale results3 7i7 ,mathematics1 in which the science of number1 as being absolutely without presuppositions1 precedes geometry and mechanics2 7#b7 ,astronomy2 7#c7 ,physics 7with five subordinate divisions1 in which the first place belongs to the theory of weight1 and the last to electrology1 while the theory of heat1 acoustics1 and optics are intermediate72 7#d7 ,chemistry2 7#e7 ,biology or physiology2 7#f7 ,sociology or the science of society4 ,this sequence1 which is determined by the increasing complexity and increasing dependence of the objects of the sciences1 is the order in which they have historically developed--before the special laws of the more complicated sciences can be ascertained1 the general laws of the more simple ones must be accurately known4 ,it is also advisable to follow this same order of increasing complexity and difficulty in the study of the sciences1 for acquaintance with the methods of those which are elementary is the best preparation for the pursuit of the higher ones4 ,in arithmetic and geometry we study positivity at its source2 in the sociological spirit it finds its completion4 ,mathematics entered on its positive stage at quite an early period1 chemistry and biology only in recent times1 while1 in the highest and most complicated science1 the metaphysical 7negative1 liberal1 democratic1 revolutionary7 mode of thought is still battling with the feudalism of the theological mode4 ,to make sociology positive is the mission of the second half of ,comte's work1 and to this goal his philosophical activity had been directed from the beginning4 ,comte rates the efforts of political economy very low1 with the exception of the work of ,adam ,smith1 and will not let them pass as a preparation for scientific sociology1 holding that they are based on false abstractions4 ,psychology1 which is absent from the above enumeration1 is to form a branch of biology1 and exclusively to use the objective method1 especially phrenology 7to the three faculties of the soul1 heart1 character1 and intellect1 correspond three regions of the brain74 ,self-observation1 so ,comte1 making an impossibility out of a difficulty1 teaches1 can at most inform us concerning our feelings and passions1 and not at all concerning our own thinking1 since reflection brings to a stop the process to which it attends1 and thus destroys its object4 ,the sole source of knowledge is external sense-perception4 ,in his ,positive ,polity ,comte subsequently added a seventh fundamental science1 ethics or anthropology4 ,sociology1#a the elevation of which to the rank of a positive science is the principal aim of our philosopher1 uses the same method as the natural sciences1 namely1 the interrogation and interpretation of experience by means of induction and deduction1 only that here the usual relation of these two instruments of knowledge is reversed4 ,between inorganic and organic philosophy1 both of which proceed from the known to the unknown1 there is this difference1 that in the former the advance is from the elements1 as that which alone is directly accessible1 to the whole which is composed of them1 while in the latter the opposite is the case1 since here the whole is better known than the individual parts of which it consists4 ,hence1 in inorganic science the laws of the composite phenomena are obtained by deduction 7from the laws of the simple facts inductively discovered7 and confirmed by observation2 in sociology1 on the other hand1 the laws are found through 7historical7 experience1 and deductively verified 7from the nature of man as established by biology7 only in the sequel4 ,since the phenomena of society are determined not merely by the general laws of human nature1 but1 above all1 by the growing influence of the past1 historical studies must form the basis of sociological inquiry4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,krohn3 ,beitrge zur ,kenntniss und ,wrdigung der ,soziologie1 ,jahrbcher fr ,nationalkonomie und ,statistik1 ,new ,series1 vols4 i4 and iii41 #ahhj and #ahha4 ,of the two parts of sociology1 the ,statics1 which investigates the equilibrium 7the conditions of the existence1 the permanence1 and the coexistence of social states71 and ,dynamics1 which investigates the movement 7the laws of the progress7 of social phenomena1 the first was in essence established by ,aristotle4 ,the fundamental concept of the ,statics is the consensus1 the harmony1 solidarity1 or mutual dependence of the members of the social organism4 ,all its parts1 science1 art1 religion1 politics1 industry1 must be considered together2 they stand in such intimate harmony and correlation that1 for every important change of condition in one of these parts1 we may be certain of finding corresponding changes in all the others1 as its causes and effects4 ,besides the selfish propensities1 there dwell in man an equally original1 but intrinsically weaker1 impulse toward association1 which instinctively leads him to seek the society of his fellows without reflection on the advantages to be expected therefrom1 and a moderate degree of benevolence4 ,as altruism conflicts with egoism1 so the reason1 together with the impulse to get ahead1 which can only be satisfied through labor1 is in continual conflict with the inborn disinclination to regulated activity 7especially to mental effort74 ,the character of society depends on the strength of the nobler incentives1 that is1 the social inclinations and intellectual vivacity in opposition to the egoistic impulses and natural inertness4 ,the former nourish the progressive1 the latter the conservative spirit4 ,women are as much superior to men in the stronger development of their sympathy and sociability as they are inferior in insight and reason4 ,society is a group of families1 not of individuals1 and domestic life is the foundation1 preparation1 and pattern for social life1 ,comte praises the family1 the connecting link between the individual and the species1 as a school of unselfishness1 and approves the strictness of the ,catholic ,church in regard to the indissolubility of the marriage relation4 ,he remarks the evil consequences of the constantly increasing division of labor1 which makes man egoistic and narrow-minded1 since it hides rather than reveals the social significance of the employment of the individual and its connection with the welfare of the community1 and seeks for a means of checking them4 ,besides the universal education of youth1 he demands the establishment of a spiritual power to bring the general interest continually to the minds of the members of all classes and avocations1 to direct education1 and to enjoy the same authority in moral and intellectual matters as is conceded to the astronomer in the affairs of his department4 ,the function of this power would be to occupy the position heretofore held by the clergy4 ,comte conceives it as composed of positive philosophers1 entirely independent of the secular authorities1 but in return cut off from political influence and from wealth4 ,secular authority1 on the other hand1 he wishes put into the hands of an aristocracy of capitalists1 with the bankers at the head of these governing leaders of industry4 ,the ,dynamics1 the science of the temporal succession of social phenomena1 makes use of the principle of development4 ,the progress of society1 which is to be regarded as a great individual1 consists in the growing predominance of the higher1 human activities over the lower and animal4 ,the humanity in us1 it is true1 will never attain complete ascendency over the animality1 but we can approach nearer and nearer to the ideal1 and it is our duty to aid in this march of civilization4 ,although the law of progress holds good for all sides of mental life1 for art1 politics1 and morals1 as well as for science1 nevertheless the most important factor in the evolution of the human race is the development of the intellect as the guiding power in us 7though not in itself the strongest74 ,awakened first by the lower wants1 the intellect assumes in increasing measure the guidance of human operations1 and gives a determinate direction to the feelings4 ,the passions divide men1 and1 without the guidance of the speculative faculty1 would mutually cripple one another2 that which alone unites them into a collection force is a common belief1 an idea4 ,ideas are related to feeling--to quote a comparison from ,john ,stuart ,mill's valuable treatise ,auguste ,comte and ,positivism1 #c;d ed41 #ahhb1 a work of which we have made considerable use--as the steersman who directs the ship is to the steam which drives it forward4 ,thus the history of humanity has been determined by the history of man's intellectual convictions1 and this in turn by the three familiar stages in the theory of the universe4 ,with the development from the theological to the positive mode of thought is most intimately connected1 further1 the transition from the military to the industrial mode of life4 ,as the religious spirit prepares the way for the scientific spirit1 so without the dominion of the military spirit industry could not have been developed4 ,it was only in the school of war that the earliest societies could learn order2 slavery was beneficial in that through it labor was imposed upon the greater part of mankind in spite of their aversion to it4 ,the political preponderance of the legists corresponds to the intermediate1 metaphysical stage4 ,the sociological law 7discovered by ,comte in the year #ahbb7 harmonizes also with the customary division which separates the ancient from the modern world by the ,middle ,ages4 ,in his philosophy of history ,comte gives the further application of these principles4 ,here he has won commendation even from his opponents for a sense of justice which merits respect and for his comprehensive view4 ,the outlooks and proposals for the future here interspersed were in later writings#a worked out into a comprehensive theory of the regeneration of society2 the extravagant character of which has given occasion to his critics to make a complete division between the second1 subjective or sentimental1 period of his thinking1 in which the philosopher is said to be transformed into the high priest of a new religion1 and the first1 the positivistic period1 although the major part of the qualities pointed out as characteristic of the former are only intensifications of some which may be shown to have been present in the latter4 ,beneath the surface of the most sober inquiry mystical and dictatorial tendencies pulsate in ,comte from the beginning1 and science was for him simply a means to human happiness4 ,but now he no longer demands the independent pursuit of science in order to the attainment of this end1 but only the believing acceptance of its results4 ,the intellect is to be placed under the dominion of the heart1 and only such use made of it as promises a direct advantage for humanity2 the determination of what problems are most important at a given time belongs to the priesthood4 ,the systematic unity or harmony of the mind demands this dominion of the feelings over thought4 ,the religion of positivism1 which has love for its principle1 order for its basis1 and progress for its end1 is a religion without ,god1 and without any other immortality than a continuance of existence in the grateful memory of posterity4 ,the dogmas of the positivist religion are scientific principles4 ,its public cultus with nine sacraments and a large number of annual festivals1 is paid to the ,grand tre ,humanity 7which is not omnipotent1 but1 on account of its composite character1 most dependent1 yet infinitely superior to any of its parts72 and1 besides this1 space1 the earth1 the universe1 and great men of the past are objects of reverence4 ,private devotion consists in the adoration of living or dead women as our guardian angels4 ,the ethics of the future declares the good of others to be the sole moral motive to action 7altruism74 ,comte's last work1 the ,philosophy of ,mathematics1 #ahef1 indulges in a most remarkable numerical mysticism4 ,the historical influence exercised by ,comte through his later writings is extremely small in comparison with that of his chief work4 ,besides ,blignires and ,robinet1 ,e4 ,littr1 the well-known author of the ,dictionnaire de la ,langue ,franaise 7#ahfc seq47 who was the most eminent of ,comte's disciples and the editor of his ,collected ,works 7#ahfg seq471 has written on the life and work of the master4 ,comte's school divided into two groups--the apostates1 with ,littr 7#ahja-ha7 at their head1 who reject the subjective phase and hold fast to the earlier doctrine1 and the faithful1 who until #ahgg1 when a new division between strict and liberal ,comteans took place within this group1 gathered about ,p4 ,laffitte 7born #ahbc74b ,the leader of the ,english positivists is ,frederic ,harrison 7born #ahca74 ,positivistic societies exist also in ,sweden1 ,brazil1 ,chili1 and elsewhere4 ,positivism has been developed in an independent spirit by ,j4,s4 ,mill and ,herbert ,spencer4 ,footnote #a3 ,positivist ,catechism1 #aheb ,english translation by ,congreve1 #aheh1 #b;d ed41 #ahhc2 ,system of ,positive ,polity1 #d vols41 #ahea-ed ,english translation1 #ahge-gg4 ,cf4 ,pnjer1 ,a4 ,comtes ,religion der ,menschheit in the ,jahrbcher fr protestantische ,theologie1 #ahhb4 ,footnote #b3 ,on this division cf4 ,e4 ,caro1 ,m4 ,littr et le ,positivisme1 #ahhc1 and ,herm4 ,gruber 7,s4,j471 ,der ,positivismus vom ,tode ,comtes bis auf unsere ,tage1 #ahia4 ,the following brief remarks on the course of ,french philosophy may also be added4 ,against the sensationalism of ,condillac as continued by ,cabanis1 ,destutt de ,tracy 7see above1 pp4 #bei-bfj71 and various physiologists1 a twofold reaction asserted itself4 ,one manifestation of this proceeded from the theological school1 represented by the traditionalists ,victor de ,bonald 7#ahah71 ,joseph de ,maistre 7#agec-ahba2 ,st4 ,petersburg ,soires1 #ahba71 and ,f4 de ,lamennais 7#aghb-ahed71 who1 however1 after his break with the ,church 7,words of a ,believer1 #ahcd7 developed in his ,sketch of a ,philosophy1 #ahda seq41 an ontological system after ,italian and ,german models4 ,the other came from the spiritualistic school1 at whose head stood ,maine de ,biran#a 7#agff-ahbd2 ,on the ,foundations of ,psychology2 his ,works have been edited by ,cousin1 #ahda1 ,naville1 #ahei1 and ,bertrand7 and ,royer ,collard 7#agfc-ahde74 ,their pupil ,victor ,cousin 7#agib-ahfg2 ,works1 #ahdf-ej71 who admired ,hegel also1 became the head of the eclectic school4 ,cousin will neither deny metaphysics with the ,scotch1 nor construe metaphysics a priori with the ,germans1 but with ,descartes bases it on psychology4 ,for a time an idealist of the ,hegelian type 7infinite and finite1 ,god and the world1 are mutually inseparable2 the ,ideas reveal themselves in history1 in the nations1 in great men71 he gradually sank back to the position of common sense4 ,his adherents1 among whom ,thodore ,jouffroy 7died #ahdb7 was the most eminent1 have done special service in the history of philosophy4 ,from ,cousin's school1 which was opposed by ,p4 ,leroux and ,j4 ,reynaud1 have come ,ravaisson1 ,saisset1 ,jules ,simon1 ,p4 ,janet 7born #ahbc71b and ,e4 ,caro 7born #ahbf2 ,the ,philosophy of ,goethe1 #ahff74 ,kant has influenced ,charles ,renouvier 7born #ahag2 ,essays in ,general ,criticism1 #d vols41 #ahed-fd7 and ,e4 ,vacherot 7born #ahji2 ,metaphysics and ,science1 #aheh1 #b;d ed41 #ahfc2 ,science and ,consciousness1 #ahgb74 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,e4 ,knig in ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxv4 #ahhi1 p4#afj seq4 ,footnote #b3 ,janet3 ,history of ,political ,science in its ,relations to ,morals1 #aheh1 #c;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,german ,materialism of the ,present ,day1 #ahfd1 ,english translation by ,masson1 #ahff3 ,the ,family1 #ahee2 ,the ,philosophy of ,happiness1 #ahfb2 ,the ,brain and ,thought1 #ahfg2 ,elements of ,morals1 #ahfi ,english translation by ,corson1 #ahhd2 ,the ,theory of ,morals1 #ahgd ,english translation by ,mary ,chapman1 #ahhc2 ,final ,causes1 #ahgf ,english translation by ,affleck1 with a preface by ,flint1 new ed41 #ahhc4 ,among other thinkers of reputation we may mention the socialist ,henri de ,saint-,simon 7#agfj-ahbe2 ,selected ,works1 #ahei71 the physiologist ,claude ,bernard 7#ahac-gh71 the positivist ,h4 ,taine 7#ahbh-ic2 ,the ,philosophy of ,art1 ,english translation by ,durand1 #b;d ed41 #ahgc2 ,on ,intelligence1 #ahgb1 ,english translation by ,haye1 #ahga71 ,e4 ,renan 7#ahbc-ib2 ,the ,life of ,jesus1 #ahfc1 ,english translation by ,wilbour1 ,philosophical ,dialogues and ,fragments--,english1 #ahhc71 the writer on aesthetics and ethics ,j4,m4 ,guyau 7,the ,problems of ,contemporary ,aesthetics1 #ahhd2 ,sketch of an ,ethic without ,obligation or ,sanction1 #ahhe2 ,the ,irreligion of the ,future1 #ahhg71 ,alfred ,fouille 7,the ,future of ,metaphysics founded on ,experience1 #ahhi2 ,morals1 ,art1 and ,religion according to ,guyau1 #ahhi2 ,the ,evolutionism of the ,idea-,forces1 #ahij71 and the psychologist ,th4 ,ribot1#a editor of the ,revue ,philosophique 7from #ahgf74 ,footnote #a3 ,ribot3 ,heredity1 #b;d ed41 #ahhb ,english translation1 #ahge2 ,the ,diseases of ,memory1 #ahha ,english translation1 #ahhb2 ,the ,diseases of the ,will1 #ahhc ,english4 #ahhd2 ,the ,diseases of ,personality1 #ahhe ,english1 #ahhg2 ,the ,psychology of ,attention1 #ahhi ,english1 #ahij2 ,german ,psychology of ,to-day1 #b;d ed41 #ahhe ,english translation by ,baldwin1 #ahhf4 #c4 ,great ,britain and ,america4 ,prominent among the ,british philosophers of the nineteenth century#a are ,hamilton1 ,bentham1 ,j4,s4 ,mill1 and ,spencer4 ,hamilton is the leading representative of the ,scottish ,school2 ,bentham is known as the advocate of utilitarianism2 ,mill1 an exponent of the traditional empiricism of ,english thinking1 develops the theory of induction and the principle of utility2 ,spencer combines an agnostic doctrine of the absolute and thoroughgoing evolution in the phenomenal world into a comprehensive philosophical system4#b ,in recent years there has been a reaction against empirical doctrines on the basis of neo-,kantian and neo-,hegelian principles4 ,foremost among the leaders of this movement we may mention ,t4,h4 ,green4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,harald ,hffding1 ,einleitung in die englische ,philosophie unserer ,zeit 7,danish1 #ahgd71 ,german 7with alterations and additions by the author7 by ,h4 ,kurella1 #ahhi2 ,david ,masson1 ,recent ,british ,philosophy1 #ahfe1 #c;d ed41 #ahgg2 ,ribot1 ,la ,psychologie ,anglaise ,contemporaine1 #ahgj1 #b;d ed41 #ahge ,english1 #ahgd ,guyau1 ,la ,morale ,anglaise ,contemporaine1 #ahgi ,morris1 ,british ,thought and ,thinkers1 #ahhj2 ,porter1 ,on ,english and ,american ,philosophy1 ,ueberweg's ,history1 ,english translation1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #cdh-dfj2 ,o4 ,pfleiderer1 ,development of ,theology1 #ahij1 book iv4--,,tr4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 on ,mill and ,spencer1 ,bernh4 ,pnjer1 ,jahrbcher fr protestantische ,theologie1 #ahgh4 ,the ,scottish philosophy has been continued in the nineteenth century by ,james ,mackintosh 7,dissertation on the ,progress of ,ethical ,philosophy1 #ahcj1 #c;d ed41 #ahfc71 and ,william ,whewell 7,history of the ,inductive ,sciences1 #c;d ed41 #aheg2 ,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences1 #ahdj1 #c;d ed41 #aheh-fj74 ,its most important representative is ,sir ,william ,hamilton#a of ,edinburgh 7#aghh-ahef71 who1 like ,whewell1 is influenced by ,kant4 ,hamilton bases philosophy on the facts of consciousness1 but1 in antithesis to the associational psychology1 emphasizes the mental activity of discrimination and judgment4 ,our knowledge is relative1 and relations its only object4 ,consciousness can never transcend itself1 it is bound to the antithesis of subject and object1 and conceives the existent under relations of space and time4 ,hence the unconditioned is inaccessible to knowledge and attainable by faith alone4 ,among ,hamilton's followers belong ,mansel 7,metaphysics1 #c;d4 ed41 #ahge2 ,limits of ,religions ,thought1 #eth ed41 #ahgj7 and ,veitch4 ,the ,scottish doctrine was vigorously opposed by ,j4,f4 ,ferrier 7#ahjh-fd2 ,institutes of ,metaphysics1 #b;d ed41 #ahef71 who himself developed an idealistic standpoint4 ,footnote #a3 ,hamilton3 ,discussions on ,philosophy and ,literature1 #aheb1 #c;d ed41 #ahff2 ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 #b;d ed41 #ahfj1 and on ,logic1 #b;d ed41 #ahff1 edited by his pupils1 ,mansel and ,veitch2 ,reid's ,works1 with notes and dissertations1 #ahdf1 #gth ed41 #ahgb4 ,on ,hamilton cf4 ,veitch1 #ahhb1 #ahhc ,monck1 #ahha4 ,in the ,united ,states the ,scottish philosophy has exercised a wide influence4 ,in recent times it has been strenuously advocated1 chiefly in the spirit of ,reid1 by ,james ,mc,cosh 7a native of ,scotland1 but since #ahfh in ,america2 ,the ,intuitions of the ,mind1 #c;d ed41 #ahgb2 ,the ,laws of ,discursive ,thought1 new ed41 #ahia2 ,first and ,fundamental ,truths1 #ahhi72 while in ,noah ,porter 7died #ahib2 ,the ,human ,intellect1 new ed41 #ahgf2 ,the ,elements of ,moral ,science1 #ahhe7 it appears modified by elements from ,german thinking4 ,jeremy ,bentham#a 7#agdh-ahcb7 is noteworthy for his attempt to revive ,epicureanism in modern form4 ,virtue is the surest means to pleasure1 and pleasure the only self-evident good4 ,every man strives after happiness1 but not every one in the right way4 ,the honest man calculates correctly1 the criminal falsely2 hence a careful calculation of the value of the various pleasures1 and a prudent use of the means to happiness1 is the first condition of virtue2 in this the easily attainable minor joys1 whose summation amounts to a considerable quantum1 must not be neglected4 ,the value of a pleasure is measured by its intensity1 duration1 certainty1 propinquity1 fecundity in the production of further pleasure1 purity or freedom from admixture of consequent pain1 and extent to the greatest possible number of persons4 ,every virtuous action results in a balance of pleasure4 ,inflict no evil on thyself or others from which a balance of good will not result4 ,the end of morality is the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 in the production of which each has first to care for his own welfare3 whoever injures himself more than he serves others acts immorally1 for he diminishes the sum of happiness in the world2 the interest of the individual coincides with the interest of society4 ,the two classes of virtues are prudence and benevolence4 ,the latter is a natural1 though not a disinterested affection3 happiness enjoyed with others is greater than happiness enjoyed alone4 ,love is a pleasure-giving extension of the individual2 we serve others to be served by them4 ,footnote #a3 ,bentham3 ,introduction to the ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 #aghi2 new ed41 #ahbc1 reprinted #ahgf2 ,deontology1 #ahcd1 edited by ,bowring1 who also edited the ,works1 #ahch-dc4 ,the ,principles of ,civil and ,criminal ,legislation1 edited in ,french from ,bentham's manuscripts by his pupil ,etienne ,dumont 7#ahja1 #b;d ed41 #ahbj2 ,english by ,hildreth1 #eth ed41 #ahhg71 was translated into ,german with notes by ,f4,e4 ,beneke1 #ahcj4 ,associationalism has been reasserted by ,james ,mill 7#aggc-ahcf2 ,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 #ahbi71 whose influence lives on in the work of his greater son4 ,the latter1 ,john ,stuart ,mill1#a was born in ,london #ahjf1 and was from #ahbc to #aheh a secretary in the ,india ,house2 after the death of his wife he lived 7with the exception of two years of service as a ,member of ,parliament7 at ,avignon2 his death occurred in #ahgc4 ,mill's ,system of ,logic appeared in #ahdc1 #ith ed41 #ahge2 his ,utilitarianism1 #ahfc1 new ed41 #ahga2 ,an ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 #ahfe1 #eth ed41 #ahgh2 his notes to the new edition of his father's work1 ,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 #b;d ed41 #ahgh1 also deserve notice4 ,with the phenomenalism of ,hume and the 7somewhat corrected7 associational psychology of his father as a basis1 ,mill makes experience the sole source of knowledge1 rejecting a priori and intuitive elements of every sort4 ,matter he defines as a permanent possibility of sensation2 mind is resolved into a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling1 even though the author is not unaware of the difficulty involved in the question how a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series4 ,mathematical principles1 like all others1 have an experiential origin--the peculiar certitude ascribed to them by the ,kantians is a fiction--and induction is the only fruitful method of scientific inquiry 7even in mental science74 ,the syllogism is itself a concealed induction4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 on ,mill4 ,taine1 ,le ,positivisme ,anglais1 #ahfd ,english1 by ,haye2 the objections of ,jevons 7,contemporary ,review1 ,december1 #ahgg seq41 reprinted in ,pure ,logic and other ,minor ,works1 #ahij2 cf4 ,mind1 vol4 xvi4 pp4 #ajf-aaj7 to ,mill's doctrine of the inductive character of geometry1 his treatment of the relation of resemblance1 and his exposition of the four methods of experimental inquiry in their relation to the law of causation2 and the finely conceived essay on utilitarianism1 by ,c4 ,hebler1 ,philosophische ,aufstze1 #ahfi1 pp4 #ce-ff4 ,also ,mill's own ,autobiography1 #ahgc3 ,bain's ,john ,stuart ,mill1 a ,criticism1 #ahhb2 and ,t4,h4 ,green1 ,lectures on the ,logic1 ,works1 vol4 ii4--,,tr4 ,when ,i assert the major premise the inference proper is already made1 and in the conclusion the comprehensive formula for a number of particular truths which was given in the premise is merely explicated1 interpreted4 ,because universal judgments are for him merely brief expressions for aggregates of particular truths1 ,mill is able to say that all knowledge is generalization1 and at the same time to argue that all inference is from particulars to particulars4 ,inference through a general proposition is not necessary1 yet useful as a collateral security1 inasmuch as the syllogistic forms enable us more easily to discover errors committed4 ,the ground of induction1 the uniformity of nature in reference both to the coexistence and the succession of phenomena1 since it wholly depends on induction1 is not unconditionally certain2 but it may be accepted as very highly probable1 until some instance of lawless action 7in itself conceivable7 shall have been actually proved4 ,like the law of causation1 the principles of logic are also not a priori1 but only the highest generalizations from all previous experience4 ,mill's most brilliant achievement is his theory of experimental inquiry1 for which he advances four methods3 7#a7 ,the ,method of ,agreement3 ,if two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common1 the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause 7or effect7 of the given phenomenon4 7#b7 ,the ,method of ,difference3 ,if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs1 and an instance in which it does not occur1 have every circumstance in common save one1 that one occurring only in the former2 the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ1 is the effect1 or the cause1 or an indispensable part of the cause1 of the phenomenon1 ,these two methods 7the method of observation1 and the method of artificial experiment7 may also be employed in combination1 and the ,canon of the ,joint ,method of ,agreement and ,difference runs3 ,if two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common1 while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance1 the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect1 or the cause1 or an indispensable part of the cause1 of the phenomenon4 7#c7 ,the ,method of ,residues3 ,subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents1 and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents4 7#d7 ,the ,method of ,concomitant ,variations3 ,whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner1 is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon1 or is connected with it through some fact of causation4 ,when the phenomena are complex the deductive method must be called in to aid3 from the inductively ascertained laws of the action of single causes this deduces the laws of their combined action2 and1 as a final step1 the results of such ratiocination are verified by the proof of their agreement with empirical facts4 ,to explain a phenomenon means to point out its cause2 the explanation of a law is its reduction to other1 more general laws4 ,in all this1 however1 we remain within the sphere of phenomena2 the essence of nature always eludes our knowledge4 ,in the chapter ,of ,liberty and ,necessity 7book vi4 chap1 ii47 ,mill emphasizes the position that the necessity to which human actions are subject must not be conceived1 as is commonly done1 as irresistible compulsion1 for it denotes nothing more than the uniform order of our actions and the possibility of predicting them4 ,this does not destroy the element in the idea of freedom which is legitimate and practically valuable3 we have the power to alter our character2 it is formed by us as well as for us2 the desire to mould it is one of the most influential circumstances in its formation4 ,the principle of morality is the promotion of the happiness of all sentient beings4 ,mill differs from ,bentham1 however1 from whom he derives the principle of utility1 in several important particulars--by his recognition of qualitative as well as of quantitative differences in pleasures1 of the value of the ordinary rules of morality as intermediate principles1 of the social feelings1 and of the disinterested love of virtue4 ,opponents of the utilitarian theory have not been slow in availing themselves of the opportunities for attack thus afforded4#a ,a third distinguished representative of the same general movement is ,alexander ,bain1 the psychologist 7born #ahah2 ,the ,senses and the ,intellect1 #c;d ed41 #ahfh2 ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 #c;d ed41 #ahge2 ,mental and ,moral ,science1 #ahfh1 #c;d ed41 #ahgb1 part ii41 #ahgb2 ,mind and ,body1 #c;d ed41 #ahgd74 ,footnote #a3 ,on the relation of ,bentham and ,mill cf4 ,hffding1 p4 #fh3 ,sidgwick's ,outlines1 chap4 iv4 #af2 and ,john ,grote's ,examination of the ,utilitarian ,philosophy1 #ahgj1 chap4 i4 ,the system projected by ,herbert ,spencer 7born #ahbj71 the major part of which has already appeared1 falls into five parts3 ,first ,principles1 #ahfb1 #gth ed41 #ahhi2 ,principles of ,biology1 #ahfd-fg1 #dth ed41 #ahhh2 ,principles of ,psychology1 #ahee1 #eth ed41 #ahij2 ,principles of ,sociology 7vol4 i4 #ahgf1 #c;d ed41 #ahhe2 part iv4 ,ceremonial ,institutions1 #ahgi1 #c;d ed41 #ahhh1 part v4 ,political ,institutions1 #ahhb1 #b;d ed41 #ahhe1 part vi4 ,ecclesiastical ,institutions1 #ahhe1 #b;d ed41 #ahhf1 together constituting vol4 ii472 ,principles of ,ethics 7part i4 ,the ,data of ,ethics1 #ahgi1 #eth ed41 #ahhh2 parts ii4 and iii4 ,the ,inductions of ,ethics and ,the ,ethics of ,individual ,life1 constituting with part i4 the first volume1 #ahib2 part iv4 ,justice1 #ahia74 ,a comprehensive exposition of the system has been given1 with the authority of the author1 by ,f4,h4 ,collins in his ,epitome of the ,synthetic ,philosophy1 #ahhi4a ,the treatise on ,education1 #ahfa1 #bc;d ed41 #ahij1 his sociological writings1 and his various essays have also contributed essentially to ,mr4 ,spencer's fame1 both at home and abroad4 ,the ,first ,principles begin with the ,unknowable4 ,since human opinions1 no matter how false they may seem1 have sprung from actual experiences1 and1 when they find wide acceptance and are tenaciously adhered to1 must have something in them which appeals to the minds of men1 we must assume that every error contains a kernel of truth1 however small it be4 ,no one of opposing views is to be accepted as wholly true1 and none rejected as entirely false4 ,to discover the incontrovertible fact which lies at their basis1 we must reject the various concrete elements in which they disagree1 and find for the remainder the abstract expression which holds true throughout its divergent manifestations4 ,no antagonism is older1 wider1 more profound1 and more important than that between religion and science4 ,here too some most general truth1 some ultimate fact must lie at the basis4 ,the ultimate religious ideas are self-contradictory and untenable4 ,no one of the possible hypotheses concerning the nature and origin of things--every religion may be defined as an a priori theory of the universe1 the accompanying ethical code being a later growth--is logically defensible3 whether the world is conceived atheistically as self-existent1 or pantheistically as self-created1 or theistically 7fetichism1 polytheism1 or monotheism71 as created by an external agency1 we are everywhere confronted by unthinkable conclusions4 ,the idea of a ,first ,cause or of the absolute 7as ,mansel1 following ,hamilton1 has proved in his ,limits of ,religious ,thought7 is full of contradictions4 ,but however widely the creeds diverge1 they show entire unanimity1 from the grossest superstition up to the most developed theism1 in the belief that the existence of the world is a mystery which ever presses for interpretation1 though it can never be entirely explained4 ,and in the progress of religion from crude fetichism to the developed theology of our time1 the truth1 at first but vaguely perceived1 that there is an omnipresent ,inscrutable which manifests itself in all phenomena1 ever comes more clearly into view4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 also ,fiske's ,outlines of ,cosmic ,philosophy1 #b vols41 #ahgd4 ,numerous critiques and discussions of ,spencer's views have been given in various journals and reviews2 among more extended works reference may be made to ,bowne1 ,the ,philsophy of ,herbert ,spencer1 #ahgd2 ,malcolm ,guthrie1 ,on ,mr4 ,spencer's ,formula of ,evolution1 #ahgi1 and the same author1 ,on ,mr4 ,spencer's ,unification of ,knowledge1 #ahhb2 and ,t4,h4 ,green1 on ,spencer and ,lewes1 ,works1 vol4 i4--,,tr4 ,science meets this ultimate religious truth with the conviction1 grasped with increasing clearness as the development proceeds from ,protagoras to ,kant1 that the reality hidden behind all phenomena must always remain unknown1 that our knowledge can never be absolute4 ,this principle maybe established inductively from the incomprehensibility of the ultimate scientific ideas1 as well as deductively from the nature of intelligence1 through an analysis of the product and the process of thought4 7#a7 ,the ideas space1 time1 matter1 motion1 and force1 as also the first states of consciousness1 and the thinking substance1 the ego as the unity of subject and object1 all represent realities whose nature and origin are entirely incomprehensible4 7#b7 ,the subsumption of particular facts under more general facts leads ultimately to a most general1 highest fact1 which cannot be reduced to a more general one1 and hence cannot be explained or comprehended4 7#c7 ,all thought 7as has been shown by ,hamilton in his essay ,on the ,philosophy of the ,unconditioned1 and by his follower ,mansel7 is the establishment of relations1 every thought involving relation1 difference1 and 7as ,spencer adds7 likeness4 ,hence the absolute1 the idea of which excludes every relation1 is entirely beyond the reach of an intelligence which is concerned with relations alone1 and which always consists in discrimination1 limitation1 and assimilation--it is trebly unthinkable4 ,therefore3 ,religion and ,science agree in the supreme truth that the human understanding is capable of relative knowledge only or of a knowledge of the relative 7,relativity74 ,nevertheless1 according to ,spencer1 it is too much to conclude with the thinkers just mentioned1 that the idea of the absolute is a mere expression for inconceivability1 and its existence problematical4 ,the nature of the absolute is unknowable1 but not the existence of a basis for the relative and phenomenal4 ,the considerations which speak in favor of the relativity of knowledge and its limitation to phenomena1 argue also the existence of a non-relative1 whose phenomenon the relative is2 the idea of the relative and the phenomenal posits eo ipso the existence of the absolute as its correlative1 which manifests itself in phenomena4 ,we have at least an indefinite1 though not a definite1 consciousness of the ,unknowable as the ,unknown ,cause1 the ,universal ,power1 and on this is founded our ineradicable belief in objective reality4 ,all knowledge is limited to the relative1 and consists in increasing generalization3 the apex of this pyramid is formed by philosophy4 ,common knowledge is un-unified knowledge2 science is partially unified knowledge2 philosophy1 which combines the highest generalizations of the sciences into a supreme one1 is completely unified knowledge4 ,the data of philosophy are--besides an ,unknowable ,power--the existence of knowable likenesses and differences among its manifestations1 and a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of subject and object4 ,further1 derivative data are space 7relations of coexistence71 time 7relations of irreversible sequence71 matter 7coexistent positions that offer resistance71 motion 7which involves space1 time1 and matter71 and force1 the ultimate of ultimates1 on which all others depend1 and from our primordial experiences of which all the other modes of consciousness are derivable4 ,similarly the ultimate primary truth is the persistence of force1 from which1 besides the indestructibility of matter and the continuity of 7actual or potential7 motion1 still further truths may be deduced3 the persistence of relations among forces or the uniformity of law1 the transformation and equivalence of 7mental and social as well as of physical7 forces1 the law of the direction of motion 7along the line of least resistance1 or the line of greatest traction1 or their resultant71 and the unceasing rhythm of motion4 ,beyond these analytic truths1 however1 philosophy demands a law of universal synthesis4 ,this must be the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion1 for each single thing1 and the whole universe as well1 is involved in a 7continuously repeated7 double process of evolution and dissolution1 the former consisting in the integration of matter#a and the dissipation of motion1 the latter in the absorption of motion and the disintegration of matter4 ,the law of evolution1 in its complete development1 then runs3 ,evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion2 during which the matter passes from an indefinite1 incoherent homogeneity to a definite1 coherent heterogeneity2 and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation4 ,this is inductively supported by illustrations from every region of nature and all departments of mental and social life2 and1 further1 shown deducible from the ultimate principle of the persistence of force1 through the mediation of several corollaries to it1 viz41 the instability of the homogeneous under the varied incidence of surrounding forces1 the multiplication of effects by action and reaction1 and segregation4 ,finally the principle of equilibration indicates the impassable limit at which evolution passes over into dissolution1 until the eternal round is again begun4 ,if it may be said of ,hegel himself1 that he vainly endeavored to master the concrete fullness of reality with formal concepts1 the criticism is applicable to ,spencer in still greater measure4 ,the barren schemata of concentration1 passage into heterogeneity1 adaptation1 etc41 which are taken from natural science1 and which are insufficient even in their own field1 prove entirely impotent for the mastery of the complex and peculiar phenomena of spiritual life4 ,footnote #a3 ,organic growth is the concentration of elements before diffused2 cf4 the union of nomadic families into settled tribes4 ,armed with these principles1 however1 ,mr4 ,spencer advances to the discussion of the several divisions of ,special ,philosophy4 ,passing over inorganic nature1 he finds his task in the interpretation of the phenomena of life1 mind1 and society in terms of matter1 motion1 and force under the general evolution formula4 ,this procedure1 however1 must not be understood as in any wise materialistic4 ,such an interpretation would be a misrepresentation1 it is urged1 for the strict relativity of the standpoint limits all conclusions to phenomena1 and permits no inference concerning the nature of the ,unknowable4 ,the ,principles of ,biology take up the phenomena of life4 ,life is defined as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,no attempt is made to explain its origin1 yet 7in the words of ,mr4 ,sully7 it is clear that the lowest forms of life are regarded as continuous in their essential nature with sub-vital processes4 ,the evolution of living organisms1 from the lowest to the highest1 with the development of all their parts and functions1 results from the co-operation of various factors1 external and internal1 whose action is ultimately reducible to the universal law4 ,the field of psychology is intimately allied with biology1 and yet istinguished from it4 ,mental life is a subdivision of life in general1 and may be subsumed under the general definition2 but while biological truths concern the connection between internal phenomena1 with but tacit or occasional recognition of the environment1 psychology has to do neither with the internal connection nor the external connection1 but the connection between these two connections4 ,psychology in its subjective aspect1 again1 is a field entirely sui generis4 ,the substance of mind1 conceived as the underlying substratum of mental states1 is unknowable2 but the character of those states of which mind1 as we know it1 is composed1 is a legitimate subject of inquiry4 ,if this be carefully investigated1 it seems highly probable that the ultimate unit of consciousness is something of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock4 ,mind is proximately composed of feelings and the relations between feelings2 from these1 revived1 associated1 and integrated1 the whole fabric of consciousness is built up4 ,there is1 then1 no sharp distinction between the several phases of mind4 ,if we trace its development objectively1 in terms of the correspondence between inner and outer phenomena1 we find a gradual progress from the less to the more complex1 from the lower to the higher1 without a break4 ,reflex action1 instinct1 memory1 reason1 are simply stages in the process4 ,all is dependent on experience4 ,even the forms of knowledge1 which are a priori to the individual1 are the product of experience in the race1 integrated and transmitted by heredity1 and become organic in the nervous structure4 ,in general the correspondence of inner and outer in which mental life consists is mediated by the nervous organism4 ,the structure and functions of this condition consciousness and furnish the basis for the interpretation of mental evolution in terms of evolution at large1 regarded as a process of physical transformation4 ,nevertheless mental phenomena and bodily phenomena are not identical1 consciousness is not motion4 ,they are both phenomenal modes of the unknowable1 disparate in themselves1 and giving no indication of the ultimate nature of the absolute4 ,subjective analysis of human consciousness yields further proof of the unity of mental composition4 ,all mental action is ultimately reducible to the continuous differentiation and integration of states of consciousness4 ,the criterion of truth is the inconceivability of the negation4 ,tried by this test1 as by all others1 realism is superior to idealism1 though in that transfigured form which implies objective existence without implying the possibility of any further knowledge concerning it1--hence in a form entirely congruous with the conclusion reached by many other routes4 ,sociology deals with super-organic evolution1 which involves the co-ordinated actions of many individuals4 ,to understand the social unit1 we must study primitive man1 especially the ideas which he forms of himself1 of other beings1 and of the surrounding world4 ,the conception of a mind or other-self is gradually evolved through observation of natural phenomena which favor the notion of duality1 especially the phenomena of sleep1 dreams1 swoons1 and death4 ,belief in the influence of these doubles of the dead on the fortunes of the living leads to sorcery1 prayer1 and praise4 ,ancestor-worship is the ultimate source of all forms of religion2 to it can be traced even such aberrant developments as fetichism and idolatry1 animal-1 plant-1 and nature-worship4 ,thus the primitive man feels himself related not only to his living fellows1 but to multitudes of supernatural beings about him4 ,the fear of the living becomes the root of the political1 and the fear of the dead the root of the religious1 control4 ,a society is an organic entity4 ,though differing from an individual organism in many ways1 it yet resembles it in the permanent relations among its component parts4 ,the ,domestic ,relations1 by which the maintenance of the species is now secured1 have come from various earlier and less developed forms2 the militant type of society is accompanied by a lower1 the industrial type by a higher stage of this development4 ,ceremonial observance is the most primitive kind of government1 and the kind from which the political and religious governments have differentiated4 ,political organization is necessary in order to co-operation for ends which benefit the society directly1 and the individual only indirectly4 ,the ultimate political force is the feeling of the community1 including as its largest part ancestral feeling4 ,many facts combine to obscure this truth1 but however much it may be obscured1 public feeling remains the primal source of authority4 ,the various forms and instruments of government have grown up through processes in harmony with the general law4 ,the two antithetical types of society are the militant and the industrial--the former implies compulsory co-operation under more or less despotic rule1 with governmental assumption of functions belonging to the individual and a minimizing of individual initiative2 in the latter1 government is reduced to a minimum and best conducted by representative agencies1 public organizations are largely replaced by private organizations1 the individual is freer and looks less to the state for protection and for aid4 ,the fundamental conditions of the highest social development is the cessation of war4 ,the ideas and sentiments at the basis of ,ecclesiastical ,institutions have been naturally derived from the ghost-theory already described4 ,the goal of religious development is the final rejection of all anthropomorphic conceptions of the ,first ,cause1 until the harmony of religion and science shall be reached in the veneration of the ,unknowable4 ,the remaining parts of ,mr4 ,spencer's ,sociology will treat of ,professional ,institutions1 ,industrial ,institutions1 ,linguistic ,progress1 ,intellectual1 ,moral1 and ,aesthetic ,progress4 ,the subject matter of ethics is the conduct termed good or bad4 ,conduct is the adjustment of acts to ends4 ,the evolution of conduct is marked by increasing perfection in the adjustment of acts to the furtherance of individual life1 the life of offspring1 and social life4 ,the ascription of ethical character to the highly evolved conduct of man in relation to these ends implies the fundamental assumption1 that life is good or bad according as it does1 or does not1 bring a surplus of agreeable feeling4 ,the ideal of moral science is rational deduction3 a rational utilitarianism can be attained only by the recognition of the necessary laws--physical1 biological1 psychological1 and sociological--which condition the results of actions2 among these the biological laws have been largely neglected in the past1 though they are of the utmost importance as furnishing the link between life and happiness4 ,the psychological view1 again1 explains the origin of conscience4 ,in the course of development man comes to recognize the superiority of the higher and more representative feelings as guides to action2 this form of self-restraint1 however1 is characteristic of the non-moral restraints as well1 of the political1 social1 and religious controls4 ,from these the moral control proper has emerged--differing from them in that it refers to intrinsic instead of extrinsic effects--and the element of coerciveness in them1 transferred1 has generated the feeling of moral compulsion 7which1 however1 will diminish as fast as moralization increases74 ,such a rational ethics1 based on the laws which condition welfare rather than on a direct estimation of happiness1 and premising the relativity of all pains and pleasures1 escapes fundamental objections to the earlier hedonism 7e4g41 those to the hedonic calculus72 and1 combining the valuable elements in the divergent ethical theories1 yields satisfactory principles for the decision of ethical problems4 ,egoism takes precedence of altruism2 yet it is in turn dependent on this1 and the two1 on due consideration1 are seen to be co-essential4 ,entirely divorced from the other1 neither is legitimate1 and a compromise is the only possibility2 while in the future advancing evolution will bring the two into complete harmony4 ,the goal of the whole process will be the ideal man in the ideal society1 the scientific anticipation of which1 absolute ethics1 promises guidance for the relative and imperfect ethics of the transition period4 ,examination of the actual1 not the professed1 ideas and sentiments of men reveals wide variation in moral judgments4 ,this is especially true of the pro-ethical consciousnesses of external authorities1 coercions1 and opinions--religious1 political1 and social--by which the mass of mankind are governed2 and is broadly due to variation in social conditions4 ,where the need of external co-operation predominates the ethics of enmity develops2 where internal1 peaceful co-operation is the chief social need the ethics of amity results3 and the evolution principle enables us to infer that1 as among certain small tribes in the past1 so in the great cultivated nations of the future1 the life of amity will unqualifiedly prevail4 ,the ,ethics of ,individual ,life shows the application of moral judgments to all actions which affect individual welfare4 ,the very fact that some deviations from normal life are now morally disapproved1 implies the existence of both egoistic and altruistic sanctions for the moral approval of all acts which conduce to normal living and the disapproval of all minor deviations1 though for the most part these have hitherto remained unconsidered4 ,doubtless1 however1 moral control must here be somewhat indefinite2 and even scientific observation and analysis must leave the production of a perfectly regulated conduct to the organic adjustment of constitution to social conditions4 ,the ,ethics of ,social ,life includes justice and beneficence4 ,human justice emerges from sub-human or animal justice1 whose law 7passing over gratis benefits to offspring7 is that each individual shall receive the benefits and evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct4 ,this is the law of human justice1 also1 but here it is more limited than before by the non-interference which gregariousness requires1 and by the increasing need for the sacrifice of individuals for the good of the species4 ,the egoistic sentiment of justice arises from resistance to interference with free action2 the altruistic develops through sympathy under social conditions1 these being maintained meanwhile by a pro-altruistic sentiment1 into which dread of retaliation1 of social reprobation1 of legal punishment1 and of divine vengeance enter as component parts4 ,the idea of justice emerges gradually from the sentiment of justice3 it has two elements1 one brute or positive1 with inequality as its ideal1 one human or negative1 the ideal of which is equality4 ,in early times the former of these was unduly appreciated1 as in later times the latter1 the true conception includes both1 the idea of equality being applied to the limits and the idea of inequality to the benefits of action4 ,thus the formula of justice becomes3 ,every man is free to do that which he wills1 provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man --a law which finds its authority in the facts1 that it is an a priori dictum of consciousness after it has been subject to the discipline of prolonged social life1 and that it is also deducible from the conditions of the maintenance of life at large and of social life4 ,from this law follow various particular corollaries or rights1 all of which coincide with ordinary ethical concepts and have legal enactments corresponding to them4 ,political rights so-called do not exist2 government is simply a system of appliances for the maintenance of private rights4 ,both the nature of the state and its constitution are variable3 the militant type requires centralization and a coercive constitution2 the industrial type implies a wider distribution of political power1 but requires a representation of interests rather than a representation of individuals4 ,government develops as a result of war1 and its function of protection against internal aggression arises by differentiation from its primary function of external defense4 ,these two1 then1 constitute the essential duties of the state2 when war ceases the first falls away1 and its sole function becomes the maintenance of the conditions under which each individual may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest life of fellow-citizens4 ,all beyond this1 all interference with this life of the individual1 whether by way of assistance1 restraint1 or education1 proves in the end both unjust and impolitic4 ,the remaining parts of the ,ethics will treat of ,negative and ,positive ,beneficence4 ,if ,j4,s4 ,mill and ,spencer 7the latter of whom1 moreover1 had announced evolution as a world-law before the appearance of ,darwin71 move in a direction akin to positivism1 the same is true1 further1 of ,g4,h4 ,lewes 7#ahag-gh2 ,history of ,philosophy1 #eth ed41 #ahhj2 ,problems of ,life and ,mind1 #ahgd seq74 ,turning to the discussion of particular disciplines1 we may mention as prominent among ,english logicians1#a besides ,hamilton1 ,whewell1 and ,mill1 ,whately1 ,mansel1 ,thomson1 ,de ,morgan1 ,boole 7,an ,investigation of the ,laws of ,thought1 #ahed72 ,w4,s4 ,jevons 7,the ,principles of ,science1 #b;d ed41 #ahgg72 ,venn 7,symbolic ,logic1 #ahha2 ,empirical ,logic1 #ahhi71 ,bradley1 and ,bosanquet4 ,among more recent investigators in the field of psychology we may name ,carpenter1 ,ferrier1 ,maudsley1 ,galton1 ,ward1 and ,sully 7,the ,human ,mind1 #ahib71 and in the field of comparative psychology1 ,lubbock1 ,romanes 7,mental ,evolution in ,animals1 #ahhc2 ,mental ,evolution in ,man1 #ahhi71 and ,morgan 7,animal ,life and ,intelligence1 #ahia74 ,among ethical writers the following1 besides ,spencer and ,green1 hold a foremost place3 ,h4 ,sidgwick 7,the ,methods of ,ethics1 #dth ed41 #ahij71 ,leslie ,stephen 7,the ,science of ,ethics1 #ahhb71 and ,james ,martineau 7,types of ,ethical ,theory1 #c;d ed41 #ahia74 ,the quarterly review ,mind 7vols4 i4-xvi4 #ahgf-ia1 edited by ,g4 ,croom ,robertson2 new series from #ahib1 edited by ,g4,f4 ,stout7 has since its foundation played an important part in the development of ,english thought4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,nedich1 ,die ,lehre von der ,quantifikation des ,prdikats in vol4 iii4 of ,wundt's ,philosophische ,studien2 ,l4 ,liard1 ,les ,logiciens ,anglais ,contemporains1 #ahgh2 ,al4 ,riehl in vol4 i4 of the ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 #ahgg cf4 also appendix ,a to the ,english translation of ,ueberweg's ,logic4--,,tr44 ,german idealism1 for which ,s4,t4 ,coleridge 7died #ahcd7 and ,thomas ,carlyle 7died #ahha7 endeavored to secure an entrance into ,england1 for a long time gained ground there but slowly4 ,later years1 however1 have brought increasing interest in ,german speculation1 and much of recent thinking shows the influence of ,kantian and ,hegelian principles4 ,as pioneer of this movement we may name ,j4,h4 ,stirling 7,the ,secret of ,hegel1 #ahfe72 and as its most prominent representatives ,john ,caird 7,an ,introduction to the ,philosophy of ,religion1 #ahhj71 ,edward ,caird 7,the ,critical ,philosophy of ,immanuel ,kant1 #ahhi2 ,the ,evolution of ,religion1 #ahic71 both in ,glasgow1 and ,t4,h4 ,green 7#ahcf-hb2 professor at ,oxford2 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 #c;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,works1 edited by ,nettleship1 #c vols41 #ahhe-hh74a ,in opposition to the hereditary empiricism of ,english philosophy--which appears in ,spencer and ,lewes1 as it did in ,locke1 ,berkeley1 and ,hume1 though in somewhat altered form--,green maintains that all experience is constituted by intelligible relations4 ,knowledge1 therefore1 is possible only for a correlating self-consciousness2 while nature1 as a system of relations1 is likewise dependent on a spiritual principle1 of which it is the expression4 ,thus the central conception of ,green's philosophy becomes1 that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy1 of which it is the essence to be self-conscious1 that is1 to be itself and not itself in one 7,nettleship74 ,to this universal consciousness we are related as manifestations or communications under the limitations of our physical organization4 ,as such we are free1 that is1 self-determined1 determined by nothing from without4 ,the moral ideal is self-realization or perfection1 the progressive reproduction of the divine self-consciousness4 ,this is possible only in terms of a development of persons1 for as a self-conscious personality the divine spirit can reproduce itself in persons alone2 and1 since social life is to personality what language is to thought1 the realization of the moral ideal implies life in common4 ,the nearer determination of the ideal is to be sought in the manifestations of the eternal spirit as they have been given in the moral history of individuals and nations4 ,this shows what has already been implied in the relation of morality to personality and society1 that moral good must first of all be a common good1 one in which the permanent well-being of self includes the well-being of others also4 ,this is the germ of morality1 the development of which yields1 first1 a gradual extension of the area of common good1 and secondly1 a fuller and more concrete determination of its content4 ,further representatives of this movement are ,w4 ,wallace1 ,adamson1 ,bradley2 ,a4 ,seth is an ex-member4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 on ,green the ,memoir by ,nettleship in vol4 iii4 of the ,works4 ,the first and greatest of ,american philosophical thinkers was the ,calvinistic theologian ,jonathan ,edwards 7#agjc-eh2 treatise on the ,freedom of ,will1 #aged2 ,works1 #aj vols41 edited by ,dwight1 #ahcj74 ,edwards's deterministic doctrine found numerous adherents 7among them his son1 who bore his father's name1 died #ahja7 as well as strenuous opponents 7,tappan1 ,whedon1 ,hazard among later names71 and essentially contributed to the development of philosophical thought in the ,united ,states4 ,for a considerable period this crystallized for the most part around elements derived from ,british thinkers1 especially from ,locke and the ,scottish ,school4 ,in #ahbi ,james ,marsh called attention to ,german speculation #a by his ,american edition of ,coleridge's ,aids to ,reflection1 with an important introduction from his own hand4 ,later ,w4,e4 ,channing 7#aghj-ahdb71 the head of the ,unitarian movement1 attracted many young and brilliant minds1 the most noted of whom1 ,ralph ,waldo ,emerson 7#ahjc-hb71 became a leader among the ,new ,england transcendentalists4 ,metaphysical idealism has1 perhaps1 met with less resistance in ,america than in ,england4 ,kant and ,hegel have been eagerly studied 7,g4,s4 ,morris1 died #ahhi2 ,c4,c4 ,everett2 ,j4 ,watson in ,canada2 ,josiah ,royce1 ,the ,spirit of ,modern ,philosophy1 #ahib2 and others72 and ,the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 edited by ,w4,t4 ,harris1 has since #ahfg furnished a rallying point for idealistic interests4 ,the influence of ,lotze has also been considerable 7,b4,p4 ,bowne in ,boston74 ,sympathy with ,german speculation1 however1 has not destroyed the naturally close connection with the work of writers who use the ,english tongue4 ,thus ,spencer's writings have had a wide currency1 and his system numbers many disciples1 though these are less numerous among students of philosophy by profession 7,john ,fiske1 ,outlines of ,cosmic ,philosophy1 #ahgd74 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,porter1 op4 cit4 ,in the latest decades the broadening of the national life1 the increasing acquaintance with foreign thought1 and the rapid development of university work have greatly enlarged and deepened the interest in philosophical pursuits4 ,this is manifested most clearly in the field of psychology1 including especially the new or physiological psychology1 and the history of philosophy1 though indications of pregnant thought in other departments1 as ethics and the philosophy of religion1 and even of independent construction1 are not wanting4 ,among psychologists of the day we may mention ,g4,s4 ,hall1 editor of ,the ,american ,journal of ,psychology 7#ahhg seq471 ,g4,t4 ,ladd 7,elements of ,physiological ,psychology1 #ahhg71 and ,william ,james 7,principles of ,psychology1 #ahij74 ,the ,international ,journal of ,ethics 7,philadelphia1 #ahij seq471 edited by ,s4 ,burns ,weston1 is devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice2 among the foreign members of its editorial committee are ,jodl and ,von ,gizycki4 ,the weekly journal of popular philosophy1 ,the ,open ,court1 published in ,chicago1 has for its object the reconciliation of religion and science2 the quarterly1 ,the ,monist 7#ahij seq471 published by the same company under the direction of ,paul ,carus 7,the ,soul of ,man1 #ahia71 the establishment of a monistic view of the world4 ,several journals1 among them the ,educational ,review 7#ahia seq41 edited by ,n4,m4 ,butler71 point to a growing interest in pedagogical inquiry4 ,the ,american ,philosophical ,review 7#ahib seq41 edited by ,j4,g4 ,schurman1 ,the ,ethical ,import of ,darwinism1 #ahhg7 is a comprehensive exponent of ,american philosophic thought4 #d4 ,sweden1 ,norway1 ,denmark1 and ,holland4 ,in ,sweden an empirical period represented by ,leopold 7died #ahbi7 and ,th4 ,thorild 7died #ahjh71 and based upon ,locke and ,rousseau1 was followed1 after the introduction of ,kant by ,d4 ,bothius1 #agid1 by a drift toward idealism4 ,this was represented in an extreme form by ,b4 ,hijer 7died #ahab71 a contemporary and admirer of ,fichte1 who defended the right of philosophical construction1 and more moderately by ,christofer ,jacob ,bstrom 7#agig-ahff71 the most important systematic thinker of his country4 ,as predecessors of ,bstrom we may mention ,biberg 7died #ahbg71 ,e4,g4 ,geijer 7died #ahdf71 and ,s4 ,grubbe 7died #ahec71 like him professors in ,upsala1 and of his pupils1 ,s4 ,ribbing1 known in ,germany by his peculiar conception of the ,platonic doctrine of ideas 7,german translation1 #ahfc-fd71 the moralist ,sahlin 7#ahgg71 the historian1 of ,swedish philosophy#a 7#ahgc seq47 ,a4 ,nyblaeus of ,lund1 and ,h4 ,edfeldt of ,upsala1 the editor of ,bstrom's works 7#ahhc74 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,hffding1 ,die ,philosophie in ,schweden in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xv4 #ahgi1 p4 #aic seq4 ,bstrom's philosophy is a system of self-activity and personalism which recalls ,leibnitz and ,krause4 ,the absolute or being is characterized as a concrete1 systematically articulated1 self-conscious unity1 which dwells with its entire content in each of its moments1 and whose members both bear the character of the whole and are immanent in one another1 standing in relations of organic inter-determination4 ,the antithesis between unity and plurality is only apparent1 present only for the divisive view of finite consciousness4 ,god is infinite1 fully determinate personality 7for determination is not limitation71 a system of self-dependent living beings1 differing in degree1 in which we1 as to our true being1 are eternally and unchangeably contained4 ,every being is a definite1 eternal1 and living thought of ,god2 thinking beings with their states and activities alone exist2 all that is real is spiritual1 personal4 ,besides this true1 suprasensible world of ,ideas1 which is elevated above space1 time1 motion1 change1 and development1 and which has not arisen by creation or a process of production1 there exists for man1 but only for him--man is formally perfect1 it is true1 but materially imperfect 7since he represents the real from a limited standpoint7--a sensuous world of phenomena as the sphere of his activity4 ,to this he himself belongs1 and in it he is spontaneously to develop the suprasensible content which is eternally given him 7i4e41 his true nature71 namely1 to raise it from the merely potential condition of obscure presentiment to clear1 conscious actuality4 ,freedom is the power to overcome our imperfection by means of our true nature1 to realize our suprasensible capacities1 to become for ourselves what we are in ourselves 7in ,god74 ,the ethics of ,bstrom is distinguished from the ,kantian ethics1 to which it is related1 chiefly by the fact that it seeks to bring sensibility into a more than merely negative relation to reason4 ,society is an eternal1 and also a personal1 ,idea in ,god4 ,the most perfect form of government is constitutional monarchy2 the ideal goal of history1 the establishment of a system of states embracing all mankind4 ,j4 ,borelius of ,lund is an ,hegelian1 but differs from the master in regard to the doctrine of the contradiction4 ,the ,hegelian philosophy has adherents in ,norway also1 as ,g4,v4 ,lyng 7died #ahhd2 ,system of ,fundamental ,ideas71 ,m4,j4 ,monrad 7,tendencies of ,modern ,thought1 #ahgd1 ,german translation1 #ahgi71 both professors in ,christiania1 and ,monrad's pupil ,g4 ,kent 7,hegel's ,doctrine of the ,nature of ,experience1 #ahia74 ,the ,danish philosophy of the nineteenth century has been described by ,hffding in the second volume of the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahhh4 ,he begins with the representatives of the speculative movement3 ,steffens 7see above71 ,niels ,treschow 7#agea-ahcc71 ,hans ,christian ,oersted 7#aggg-ahea2 ,spirit in ,nature1 ,german translation1 ,munich1 #ahej-ea71 and ,frederik ,christian ,sibbern 7#aghe-ahgb74 ,a change was brought about by the philosophers of religion ,sren ,kierkegaard 7#ahac-ee7 and ,rasmus ,nielsen 7#ahji-hd2 ,philosophy of ,religion1 #ahfi71 who opposed speculative idealism with a strict dualism of knowledge and faith1 and were in turn opposed by ,georg ,brandes 7born #ahdb7 and ,hans ,brchner 7#ahbj-ge74 ,among younger investigators the ,copenhagen professors1 ,harald ,hffding#a 7born #ahdc7 and ,kristian ,kroman#b 7born #ahdf7 stand in the first rank4 ,footnote #a3 ,hffding3 ,the ,foundations of ,human ,ethics1 #ahgf1 ,german translation1 #ahhj2 ,outlines of ,psychology1 #ahhb1 ,english translation by ,lowndes1 #ahia1 from the ,german translation1 #ahhg2 ,ethics1 #ahhg1 ,german translation by ,bendixen1 #ahhh4 ,footnote #b3 ,kroman3 ,our ,knowledge of ,nature1 ,german translation1 #ahhc2 ,a ,brief ,logic and ,psychology1 ,german translation by ,bendixen1 #ahij4 ,land 7,mind1 vol4 iii4 #ahgh7 and ,g4 von ,antal 7#ahhh7 have written on philosophy in ,holland4 ,down to the middle of the nineteenth century the field was occupied by an idealism based upon the ancients1 in particular upon ,plato3 ,franz ,hemsterhuis 7#agba-ij2 ,works1 new ed41 #ahdf-ej71 and the philologists ,wyttenbach and ,van ,heusde4 ,then ,cornelius ,wilhelm ,opzoomer#c 7#ahba-ib2 professor in ,utrecht7 brought in a new movement4 ,opzoomer favors empiricism4 ,he starts from ,mill and ,comte1 but goes beyond them in important points1 and assigns faith a field of its own beside knowledge4 ,in opposition to apriorism he seeks to show that experience is capable of yielding universal and necessary truths2 that space1 time1 and causality are received along with the content of thought2 that mathematics itself is based upon experience2 and that the method of natural science1 especially deduction1 must be applied to the mental sciences4 ,the philosophy of mind considers man as an individual being1 in his connection with others1 in relation to a higher being1 and in his development2 accordingly it divides into psychology 7which includes logic1 aesthetics1 and ethology71 sociology1 the philosophy of religion1 and the philosophy of history4 ,central to ,opzoomer's system is his doctrine of the five sources of knowledge3 ,sensation1 the feeling of pleasure and pain1 aesthetic1 moral1 and religious feeling4 ,if we build on the foundation of the first three alone1 we end in materialism2 if we leave the last unused1 we reach positivism2 if we make religious feeling the sole judge of truth1 mysticism is the outcome4 ,the criteria of science are utility and progress4 ,these are still wanting in the mental sciences1 in which the often answered but never decided questions continually recur1 because we have neither derived the principles chosen as the basis of the deduction from an exact knowledge of the phenomena nor tested the results by experience4 ,the causes of this defective condition can only be removed by imitating the study of nature3 we must learn that no conclusions can be reached except from facts1 and that we are to strive after knowledge of phenomena and their laws alone4 ,we have no right to assume an essence of things beside and in addition to phenomena1 which reveals itself in them or hides behind them4 ,pupils of ,opzoomer are his successor in his ,utrecht chair1 ,van der ,wyck1 and ,pierson4 ,we may also mention ,j4,p4,n4 ,land1 who has done good service in editing the works of ,spinoza and of ,geulincx1 and the philosopher of religion ,rauwenhoff 7#ahhh74 ,footnote #a3 ,opzoomer3 ,the ,method of ,science1 a ,handbook of ,logic1 ,german translation by ,schwindt1 #aheb2 ,religion1 ,german translation by ,mook1 #ahfi4 ,on the system of the ,hungarian philosopher ,cyrill ,horvth 7died #ahhd at ,pesth7 see the essay by ,e4 ,nemes in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxviii1 #ahhf4 ,since #ahhi a review1 ,problems of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 has appeared at ,moscow in ,russian1 under the direction of ,professor ,n4 von ,grot4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,german ,,philosophy ,,since ,,the ,,death ,,of ,,hegel4 ,with ,hegel the glorious dynasty which1 with a strong hand1 had guided the fate of ,german philosophy since the conclusion of the preceding century disappears4 ,from his death 7#ahca7 we may date the second period of post-,kantian philosophy1#a which is markedly and unfavorably distinguished from the first by a decline in the power of speculative creation and by a division of effort4 ,if previous to this the philosophical public1 comprising all the cultured1 had been eagerly occupied with problems in common1 and had followed with unanimous interest the work of those who were laboring at them1 during the last fifty years the interest of wider circles in philosophical questions has grown much less active2 almost every thinker goes his own way1 giving heed only to congenial voices2 the inner connection of the schools has been broken down2 the touch with thinkers of different views has been lost4 ,the latest decades have been the first to bring a change for the better1 in so far as new rallying points of philosophical interest have been created by the neo-,kantian movement1 by the systems of ,lotze and ,von ,hartmann1 by the impulse toward the philosophy of nature proceeding from ,darwinism1 by energetic labors in the field of practical philosophy1 and by new methods of investigation in psychology4 ,footnote #a3 ,on philosophy since #ahca cf4 vol4 iii4 of ,j4,e4 ,erdmann's ,history2 ,ueberweg1 ,grundriss1 part iii4 #cg-di 7,english translation1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #bib-eaf72 ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism2 ,b4 ,erdmann1 ,die ,philosophie der ,gegenwart in the ,deutsche ,rundschau1 vols4 xix41 xx41 #ahgi1 ,june and ,july numbers2 7,a4 ,krohn17 ,streifzge durch die ,philosophie der ,gegenwart in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie und philosophische ,kritik1 vols4 lxxxvii41 lxxxix41 #ahhe-hf2 7,burt1 ,history of ,modern ,philosophy1 #ahib71 also the third volume of ,windelband's ,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 when it appears4 #a4 ,from the ,division of the ,hegelian ,school to the ,materialistic ,controversy4 ,a decade after the philosophy of ,hegel had entered on its supremacy a division in the school was called forth by ,strauss's ,life of ,jesus7#ahce74 ,the differences were brought to light by the discussion of religious problems1 in regard to which ,hegel had not expressed himself with sufficient distinctness4 ,the relation of knowledge and faith1 as he had defined it1 admitted of variant interpretations and deductions1 and this in favor of ,church doctrine as well as in opposition to it4 ,philosophy has the same content as religion1 but in a different form1 i4e41 not in the form of representation1 but in the form of the concept--it transforms dogma into speculative truth4 ,the conservative ,hegelians hold fast to the identity of content in the two modes of cognition2 the liberals1 to the alteration in form1 which1 they assert1 brings an alteration in content with it4 ,according to ,hegel the lower stage is sublated in the higher1 i4e41 conserved as well as negated4 ,the orthodox members of the school emphasize the conservation of religious doctrines1 their justification from the side of the philosopher2 the progressists1 their negation1 their overcoming by the speculative concept4 ,the general question1 whether the ecclesiastical meaning of a dogma is retained or to be abandoned in its transformation into a philosopheme1 divides into three special questions1 the anthropological1 the soteriogical1 and the theological4 ,these are3 whether on ,hegelian principles immortality is to be conceived as a continuance of individual existence on the art of particular spirits1 or only as the eternity of the universal reason2 whether by the ,god-man the person of ,christ is to be understood1 or1 on the other hand1 the human species1 the ,idea of ,humanity2 whether personality belongs to the ,godhead before the creation of the world1 or whether it first attains to self-consciousness in human spirits1 whether ,hegel was a theist or a pantheist1 whether he teaches the transcendence or the immanence of ,god4 ,the ,old ,hegelians defend the orthodox interpretation2 the ,young ,hegelians oppose it4 ,the former1 ,gschel1 ,gabler1 ,hinrichs1 ,schaller 7died #ahfh2 ,history of the ,philosophy of ,nature since ,bacon1 #ahda seq471 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann in ,halle 7#ahje-ib2 ,body and ,soul1 #ahcg2 ,psychological ,letters1 #ahea1 #fth ed41 #ahhb2 ,earnest ,sport1 #ahga1 #dth ed41 #ahij71 form1 according to ,strauss's parliamentary comparison carried out by ,michelet1 the right2 the latter1 ,strauss1 ,feuerbach1 ,bruno ,bauer1 and ,a4 ,ruge1 who1 with ,echtermeyer1 edited the ,hallesche1 afterward ,deutsche1 ,jahrbcher fr ,wissenschaft und ,kunst1 #ahch-db1 the left4 ,between them1 and forming the center1 stand ,karl ,rosenkranz#a in ,knigsberg 7#ahje-gi71 ,c4,l4 ,michelet in ,berlin 7p4 #af2 ,hegel1 the ,unrefuted ,world-philosopher1 #ahgj2 ,system of ,philosophy1 #ahgf seq471 and the theologians ,marheineke 7a pupil of ,daub at ,heidelberg7 and ,w4 ,vatke 7,philosophy of ,religion1 edited by ,preiss1 #ahhh74 ,contrasted with these is the group of semi- or pseudo-,hegelians 7p4 #eif71 who declare themselves in accord with the theistic doctrines of the right1 but admit that the left represents ,hegel's own opinion1 or at least the correct deductions from his position4 ,footnote #a3 ,k4 ,rosenkranz3 ,psychology1 #ahcg1 #c;d ed41 #ahfc2 ,science of the ,logical ,idea1 #aheh2 ,studies1 #ahci seq41 ,new ,studies1 #ahge seq42 ,aesthetics of the ,ugly1 #ahec2 several works on the history of poetry4 ,the following should also be mentioned as ,hegelians3 the philosopher of history1 ,von ,cieszkowski1 the pedagogical writer1 ,thaulow 7at ,kiel1 died #ahhc71 the philosopher of religion and of law1 ,a4 ,lasson at ,berlin1 the aesthetic writers ,hotho1 ,friedrich ,theodor ,vischer#a 7#ahjg-hg71 and ,max ,schasler 7,critical ,history of ,aesthetics1 #ahgb2 ,aesthetics1 #ahhf71 the historians of philosophy1 ,schwegler 7died #aheg2 ,history of ,greek ,philosophy1 #ahei1 #dth ed41 #ahhf1 edited by ,karl ,kstlin1 whose ,aesthetics appeared #ahfi71 ,eduard ,zeller#b of ,berlin 7born #ahad71 and ,kuno ,fischer 7born #ahbd2 #ahef-gb professor at ,jena1 since then at ,heidelberg2 ,logic and ,metaphysics1 #b;d ed41 #ahfe74 ,while ,weissenborn 7died #ahgd7 is influenced by ,schleiermacher also1 and ,zeller and ,fischer strive back toward ,kant1 ,johannes ,volkelt#c in ,wrzburg 7born #ahdh71 who started from ,hegel and advanced through ,schopenhauer and ,hartmann1 has of late years established an independent notical position and has done good service by his energetic opposition to positivism 7,das ,denken als ,hlfvorstellungs--,thtigkeit und als ,aupassungsvorgang in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophic1 vols4 xcvi41 xcvii41 #ahhi-ij74 ,footnote #a3 ,vischer3 ,aesthetics1 #ahdf-eh2 ,critical ,excursions1 #ahdd seq42 several ,hefte ,altes and ,neues4 ,the diary in the second part of the novel ,auch ,einer develops an original pantheistic view of the world4 ,footnote #b3 ,zeller3 ,the ,philosophy of the ,greeks in its ,historical ,development1 #e vols41 #c;d ed41 vol4 i4 #eth ed4 7,english translation1 #ahfh seq472 three collections of ,addresses and ,essays1 #ahfe1 #ahgg1 #ahhd4 ,footnote #c3 ,volkelt3 ,the ,phantasy in ,dreams1 #ahge2 ,kant's ,theory of ,knowledge1 #ahgi2 ,on the ,possibility of ,metaphysics1 inaugural address at ,basle1 #ahhd2 ,experience and ,thought1 ,critical ,foundation of the ,theory of ,knowledge1 #ahhf2 ,lectures ,introductory to the ,philosophy of the ,present ,time 7delivered in ,frankfort on the ,main71 #ahib4 ,the leaders of the ,hegelian left require more detailed consideration4 ,in ,david ,friedrich ,strauss#a 7#ahjh-gd1 born and died at ,ludwigsburg7 the philosophy of religion becomes a historical criticism of the ,bible and of dogmatics4 ,the biblical narratives are1 in great part1 not history 7this has been the common error alike of the super-naturalistic and of the rationalistic interpreters71 but myths1 that is1 suprasensible facts presented in the form of history and in symbolic language4 ,it is evident from the contradictions in the narratives and the impossibility of miracles that we are not here concerned with actual events4 ,the myths possess 7speculative1 absolute7 truth1 but no 7historical7 reality4 ,they are unintentional creations of the popular imagination2 the spirit of the community speaks in the authors of the ,gospels1 using the historical factor 7the life-history of ,jesus7 with mythical embellishments as an investiture for a supra-historical1 eternal truth 7the speculative ,idea of incarnation74 ,the ,god become man1 in which the infinite and the finite1 the divine nature and the human1 are united1 is the human race4 ,the ,idea of incarnation manifests itself in a multitude of examples which supplement one another1 instead of pouring forth its whole fullness in a single one4 ,the 7real7 ,idea of the race is to be substituted for a single individual as the subject of the predicates 7resurrection1 ascension1 etc47 which the ,church ascribes to ,christ4 ,the ,son of ,god is ,humanity4 ,footnote #a3 ,strauss3 ,the ,life of ,jesus1 #ahce-cf1 #dth ed41 #ahdj ,english translation by ,george ,eliot1 #b;d4 ed41 #ahic2 the same for the ,german ,people1 #ahfd ,english translation1 #ahfe2 ,christian ,dogmatics1 #ahdj-da2 ,voltaire1 #ahgj2 ,collected ,writings1 #ab vols41 edited by ,zeller1 #ahgf-gh4 ,on ,strauss cf4 ,zeller1 #ahgd ,english1 #ahgd1 and ,hausrath1 #ahgf-gh4 ,in his second principal work ,strauss criticises the dogmas of ,christianity as sharply as he had criticised the ,gospel narrative in the first one4 ,the historical development of these has of itself effected their destruction3 the history of dogma is the objective criticism of dogma4 ,christianity and philosophy1 theism and pantheism1 dualism and immanence1 are irreconcilable opposites4 ,to be able to know we must cease to believe4 ,dogma is the product of the unphilosophical1 uncultured consciousness2 belief in revelation1 only for those who have not yet risen to reason4 ,in the transformation of religious representations into philosophical ,ideas nothing specifically representative is left2 the form of representation must be actually overcome4 ,the ,christian contraposition of the present world and that which is beyond is explained by the fact that the sensuo-rational spirit of man1 so long as it does not philosophically know itself as the unity of the infinite and the finite1 but only feels itself as finite1 sensuo-empirical consciousness1 projects the infinite1 which it has in itself1 as though this were something foreign1 looks on it as something beyond the world4 ,this separation of faith is entirely unphilosophical2 it is the mission of the philosopher to reduce all that is beyond the world to the present4 ,thus for him immortality is not something to come1 but the spirit's own power to rise above the finite to the ,idea4 ,and like future existence1 so the transcendent ,god also disappears4 ,the absolute is the universal unity of the world1 which posits and sublates the individual as its modes4 ,god is the being in all existence1 the life in all that lives1 the thought in all that think3 he does not stand as an individual person beside and above other persons1 but is the infinite which personifies itself and attains to consciousness in human spirits1 and this from eternity2 before there was a humanity of earth there were spirits on other stars1 in whom ,god reflected himself4 ,three decades later ,strauss again created a sensation by his confession of materialism and atheism1 ,the ,old ,faith and the ,new1 #ahgb 7since the second edition1 ,with a ,postscript as ,preface71#a in which he continues the conflict against religious dualism4 ,the question ,are we--the cultured men of the day--still ,christians8 is answered in the negative4 ,christianity is a cult of poverty1 despising the world1 and antagonistic to labor and culture2 but we have learned to esteem science and art1 riches and acquisition1 as the chief levers of culture and of human progress4 ,christianity dualistically tears apart body and soul1 time and eternity1 the world and ,god2 we need no ,creator1 for the life-process has neither beginning nor end4 ,the world is framed for the highest reason1 it is true1 but it has not been framed by a highest reason4 ,our highest ,idea is the ,all1 which is conformed to law1 and instinct with life and reason1 and our feeling toward the universe--the consciousness of dependence on its laws--exercises no less of ethical influence1 is no less full of reverence1 and no less exposed to injury from an irreverent pessimism1 than the feeling of the devout of the old type toward their ,god4 ,hence the answer to the second question ,have we still a religion8 maybe couched in the affirmative4 ,the new faith does not need a cultus and a ,church4 ,since the dry services of the free congregations offer nothing for the fancy and the spirit1 the edification of the heart must be accomplished in other ways--by participation in the interests of humanity1 in the national life1 and1 not last1 by aesthetic enjoyment4 ,thus in his last work1 which in two appendices reaches a discussion of the great ,german poets and musicians1 the old man returns to a thought to which he had given earlier expression1 that the religious cultus should be replaced by the cultus of genius4 ,footnote #a3 ,english translation by ,mathilde ,blind1 #ahgc4 ,as ,strauss went over from ,hegelianism to pantheism1 so ,ludwig ,feuerbach#a 7#ahjd-gb71 a son of the great jurist1 ,anselm ,feuerbach1 after he had for a short time moved in the same direction1 took the opposite1 the individualistic course1 only1 like ,strauss1 to end at last in materialism4 ,my first thought1 as he himself describes the course of his development1 was ,god2 my second1 reason2 my third and last1 man4 ,as theology has been overcome by ,hegel's philosophy of reason1 so this in turn must give place to the philosophy of man4 ,the new philosophy makes man1 including nature as his basis1 the highest and sole subject of philosophy1 and1 consequently1 anthropology the universal science4 ,only that which is immediately self-evident is true and divine4 ,but only that which is sensible is evident 7sonnenklar72 it is only where sensibility begins that all doubt and conflict cease4 ,sensible beings alone are true1 real beings2 existence in space and time is alone existence2 truth1 reality1 and sensibility are identical4 ,while the old philosophy took for its starting point the principle1 ,i am an abstract1 a merely thinking being2 the body does not belong to my essence1 the new philosophy1 on the other hand1 begins with the principle1 ,i am a real1 a sensible being2 the body in its totality is my ego1 my essence itself4 ,feuerbach1 however1 uses the concept of sensibility in so wide and vague a sense that1 supported--or deceived--by the ambiguity of the word sensation1 he includes under it even the most elevated and sacred feelings4 ,even the objects of art are seen1 heard1 and felt2 even the souls of other men are sensed4 ,in the sensations the deepest and highest truths are concealed4 ,not only the external1 but the internal also1 not only flesh1 but spirit1 not only the thing1 but the ego1 not only the finite1 the phenomenal1 but also the true divine essence is an object of the senses4 ,sensation proves the existence of objects outside our head--there is no other proof of being than love1 than sensation in general4 ,everything is perceivable by the senses1 if not directly1 yet indirectly1 if not with the vulgar1 untrained senses1 yet with the cultivated senses1 if not with the eye of the anatomist or chemist1 yet with that of the philosopher4 ,all our ideas spring from the senses1 but their production requires communication and converse between man and man4 ,the higher concepts cannot be derived from the individual ,ego without a sensuously given ,thou2 the highest object of sense is man2 man does not reach concepts and reason in general by himself1 but only as one of two4 ,the nature of man is contained in community alone2 only in life with others and for others does he attain his destiny and happiness4 ,the conscience is the ego putting itself in the place of another who has been injured4 ,man with man1 the unity of ,i and ,thou1 is ,god1 and ,god is love4 ,footnote #a3 ,feuerbach was born at ,landshut1 studied at ,heidelberg and ,berlin1 habilitated1 #ahbh1 at ,erlangen1 and lived1 #ahcf-fj1 in the village of ,bruckberg1 not far from ,bayreuth1 and from #ahfj until his death in ,rechenberg1 a suburb of ,nuremberg4 ,collected ,works in #aj vols41 #ahdf-ff4 ,the chief works are entitled3 ,p4 ,bayle1 #ahch1 #b;d ed41 #ahdd2 ,philosophy and ,christianity1 #ahci2 ,the ,essence of ,christianity1 #ahda1 #dth ed41 #ahhc ,english translation by ,george ,eliot1 #ahed2 ,principles of the ,philosophy of the ,future1 #ahdc2 ,the ,essence of ,religion1 #ahde2 ,theogony1 #aheg2 ,god1 ,freedom1 and ,immortality1 #ahff4 ,karl ,grn1 #ahgd1 ,c4,n4 ,starcke1 #ahhe1 and ,w4 ,bolin1 #ahia1 treat of ,feuerbach4 ,to the philosophy of religion ,feuerbach assigns the task of giving a psychological explanation of the genesis of religion1 instead of showing reason in religion4 ,in bidding us believe in miracles dogma is a prohibition to think4 ,hence the philosopher is not to justify it1 but to uncover the illusion to which it owes its origin4 ,speculative theology is an intoxicated philosophy2 it is time to become sober1 and to recognize that philosophy and religion are diametrically opposed to each other1 that they are related to each other as health to disease1 as thought to phantasy4 ,religion arises from the fact that man objectifies his own true essence1 and opposes it to himself as a personal being1 without coming to a consciousness of this divestment of self1 of the identity of the divine and human nature4 ,hence the ,hegelian principles1 that the absolute is self-consciousness1 that in man ,god knows himself1 must be reversed3 self-consciousness is the absolute2 in his ,god man knows himself only4 ,the ,godhead is our own universal nature1 freed from its individual limitations1 intuited and worshiped as another1 independent being1 distinct from us4 ,god is self objectified1 the inner nature of man expressed2 man is the beginning1 the middle1 and the end of religion4 ,all theology is anthropology1 for all religion is a self-deification of man4 ,in religion man makes a division in his own nature1 posits himself as double1 first as limited 7as a human individual71 then as unlimited1 raised to infinity 7as ,god72 and this deified self he worships in order to obtain from it the satisfaction of his needs1 which the course of the world leaves unmet4 ,thus religion grows out of egoism3 its basis is the difference between our will and our power2 its aim1 to set us free from the dependence which we feel before nature4 7,like culture1 religion seeks to make nature an intelligible and compliant being1 only that in this it makes use of the supernatural instruments faith1 prayer1 and magic2 it is only gradually that men learn to attack the evils by natural means47 ,that which man himself is not1 but wishes to be1 that he represents to himself in his gods as existing2 they are the wishes of man's heart transformed into real beings1 his longing after happiness satisfied by the fancy4 ,the same holds true of all dogmas3 as ,god is the affirmation of our wishes1 so the world beyond is the present embellished and idealized by the fancy4 ,instead of ,god is merciful1 is love1 is omnipotent1 he performs miracles and hears prayers1 the statement must be reversed3 mercy1 love1 omnipotence1 to perform miracles1 and to hear prayers1 is divine4 ,in the sacraments of baptism and the ,lord's supper ,feuerbach sees the truth that water and food are indispensable and divine4 ,as ,feuerbach1 following out this naturalistic tendency1 reached the extreme of materialism1 the influence of his philosophy--whose different phases there is no occasion to trace out in detail--had already passed its culmination4 ,from his later writings little more has found its way into public notice than the pun1 that man is 7ist7 what he eats 7isst74 ,the remaining members of the ,hegelian left may be treated more briefly4 ,bruno ,bauer#a 7died in #ahhb2 his principal work is the ,critique of the ,synoptics1 in three volumes1 #ahda-db1 which had been preceded1 in #ahdj1 by a ,critique of the ,evangelical ,history of ,john7 at first belonged on the right of the school1 but soon went over to the extreme left4 ,he explains the ,gospel narratives as creations with a purpose 7,tendenzdichtungen71 as intentional1 but not deceitful1 inventions1 from which1 despite their unreality1 history may well be learned1 inasmuch as they reflect the spirit of the time in which they were constructed4 ,his own publications and those of his brother ,edgar are much more radical after the year #ahdd4 ,in these the brothers advocate the standpoint of pure or absolute criticism1 which extends itself to all things and events for or against which sides are taken from any quarter1 and calmly watches how everything destroys itself4 ,as soon as anything is admitted1 it is no longer true4 ,nothing is absolutely valid1 all is vain2 it is only the criticising1 all-destroying ego1 free from all ethical ties1 that possesses truth4 ,footnote #a3 ,not to be confused with the head of the ,tbingen ,school1 ,ferdinand ,christian ,baur 7died #ahfj74 ,one further step was possible beyond ,feuerbach and ,bruno ,bauer1 that from the community to the particular1 selfish individual1 from the criticising1 therefore thinking1 ego1 to the ego of sensuous enjoyment4 ,this step was taken in that curious book ,the ,individual and his ,property1 which ,kaspar ,schmidt1 who died in #ahef at ,berlin1 published in #ahde 7#b;d ed41 #ahhb71 under the pseudonym of ,max ,stirner4 ,the ,individual of whom the title speaks is the egoist4 ,for me nothing is higher than myself2 ,i use men and use up the world for my own pleasure4 ,i seek to be and have all that ,i can be and have2 ,i have a right to all that is within my power4 ,morality is a delusion1 justice1 like all ,ideas1 a phantom4 ,those who believe in ideals1 and worship such generalities as self-consciousness1 man1 society1 are still deep in the mire of prejudice and superstition1 and have banished the old orthodox phantom of the ,deity only to replace it by a new one4 ,nothing whatever is to be respected4 99 99 99 99 99 ,among the opponents of the ,hegelian philosophy the members of the theistic school1 who have above been designated as semi-,hegelians1 approximate it most closely4 ,these endeavor1 in part retaining the dialectic method1 to blend the immanence of the absolute1 which philosophy cannot give up and concerning which ,hegel had erred only by way of over-emphasis1 with the transcendence of ,god demanded by ,christian consciousness1 to establish a theism which shall contain pantheism as a moment in itself4 ,god is present in all creatures1 yet distinct from them2 he is intramundane as well as extramundane2 he is self-conscious personality1 free creative spirit1 is this from all eternity1 and does not first become such through the world-development4 ,he does not need the world for his perfection1 but out of his goodness creates it4 ,philosophy must begin with the living ,godhead instead of beginning1 like ,hegel's ,logic1 with the empty concept of being4 ,for the categories--as ,schelling had already objected--express necessary forms or general laws only1 to which all reality must conform1 but which are never capable of generating reality2 the content which appears in them and which obeys them1 can only be created by a ,deity1 and only empirically cognized4 ,this is the standpoint of ,christian ,hermann ,weisse#a in ,leipsic 7#ahja-ff71 ,karl ,philipp ,fischer#b in ,erlangen 7#ahjg-he71 ,immanuel ,hermann ,fichte#c 7#agig-ahgi2 #ahdb-fe professor in ,tbingen71 and the follower of ,schleiermacher1 ,julius ,braniss in ,breslau 7#agib-ahgc74 ,the following hold similar views1 influenced1 like ,weisse and ,k4 ,ph4 ,fischer1 by ,schelling3 ,jacob ,sengler of ,freiburg 7#agii-ahgh2 ,the ,idea of ,god1 #ahde seq471 ,leopold ,schmid of ,giessen 7#ahjh-fi2 cf4 p4 #eaf1 note71 ,johannes ,huber 7died #ahgi71 ,moritz ,carrire#d 7born #ahag71 both in ,munich1 ,k4 ,steffensen of ,basle 7#ahaf-hh2 ,collected ,essays1 #ahij71 and ,karl ,heyder in ,erlangen 7#ahab-hf2 ,the ,doctrine of ,ideas1 vol4 i4 #ahgd74 ,chalybaeus at ,kiel 7died #ahfb71 and ,friedrich ,harms at ,berlin 7died #ahhj2 ,metaphysics1 posthumously edited by ,h4 ,wiese1 #ahhe71 who1 like ,fortlage and ,i4,h4 ,fichte1 start from the system of the elder ,fichte1 should also be mentioned as sympathizing with the opinions of those who have been named4 ,footnote #a3 ,weisse3 ,system of ,aesthetics1 #ahcj2 ,the ,idea of the ,godhead1 #ahcc2 ,philosophical ,dogmatics1 #ahee4 ,his pupil ,rudolf ,seydel has published several of his posthumous works2 ,h4 ,lotze also acknowledges that he owes much to ,weisse4 ,rud4 ,seydel in ,leipsic 7born #ahce71 ,logic1 #ahff2 ,ethics1 #ahgd2 cf4 p4 #ag4 ,footnote #b3 ,k4 ,ph4 ,fischer3 ,the ,idea of the ,godhead1 #ahci2 ,outlines of the ,system of ,philosophy1 #ahdh seq42 ,the ,untruth of ,sensationalism and ,materialism1 #ahec4 ,footnote #c3 ,i4,h4 ,fichte3 ,system of ,ethics1 #ahej-ec1 the first volume of which gives a history of moral philosophy since #agej2 ,anthropology1 #ahef1 #c;d ed41 #ahgf2 ,psychology1 #ahfd4 ,footnote #d3 ,carrire3 ,aesthetics1 #ahei1 #c;d ed41 #ahhe2 ,the ,moral ,order of the ,world1 #ahgg1 #b;d ed41 #ahia2 ,art in connection with the ,development of ,culture1 #e vols41 #ahfc-gc4 ,the same may be said1 further1 of ,hermann ,ulrici#a of ,halle 7#ahjf-hd71 for many years the editor of the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie und philosophische ,kritik1 founded in #ahcg by the younger ,fichte and now edited by the author of this ,history1 which1 as the organ of the theistic school1 opposed1 first1 the pantheism of the ,young ,hegelians1 and then the revived materialism so loudly proclaimed after the middle of the century4 ,this ,zeitschrift of ,fichte and ,ulrici1 following the altered circumstances of the time1 has experienced a change of aim1 so that it now seeks to serve idealistic efforts of every shade2 while the ,philosophische ,monatshefte 7founded by ,bergmann in #ahfh1 edited subsequently by ,schaarschmidt1 and now7 edited by ,p4 ,natorp of ,marburg1 favors neo-,kantianism1 and the ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophie 7begun in #ahgg1 and7 edited by ,r4 ,avenarius of ,zurich1 especially cultivates those parts of philosophy which are open to exact treatment4 ,footnote #a3 ,ulrici3 ,on ,shakespeare's ,dramatic ,art1 #ahci1 #c;d ed41 #ahfh ,english1 #ahgf2 ,faith and ,knowledge1 #aheh2 ,god and ,nature1 #ahfa1 #b;d ed41 #ahff2 ,god and ,man1 in two volumes1 ,body and ,soul1 #ahff1 #b;d ed41 #ahgd1 and ,natural ,law1 #ahgb2 various treatises on ,logic--in which consciousness is based on the distinguishing activity1 and the categories conceived as functional modes of this--on ,spiritualism1 etc4 ,the appearance of materialism was the consequence of the flagging of the philosophic spirit1 on the one hand1 and1 on the other1 of the dissatisfaction of the representatives of natural science with the constructions of the ,schelling-,hegelian school4 ,if the ,german naturalist is especially exposed to the danger of judging all reality from the section of it with which he is familiar1 from the world of material substances and mechanical motions1 the reason lies in the fact that he does not find it easy1 like the ,englishman for example1 to let the scientific and the philosophico-religious views of the world go on side by side as two entirely heterogeneous modes of looking at things4 ,the metaphysical impulse to generalization and unification spurs him on to break down the boundary between the two spheres1 and1 since the physical view of things has become part of his flesh and blood1 psychical phenomena are for him nothing but brain-vibrations1 and the freedom of the will and all religious ideas1 nothing but illusions4 ,the materialistic controversy broke out most actively at the convention of naturalists at ,gttingen in #ahed1 when ,rudolph ,wagner in his address ,on the ,creation of ,man and the ,substance of the ,soul declared1 in opposition to ,karl ,vogt1 that there is no physiological reason for denying the descent of man from one pair and an immaterial immortal soul4 ,vogt's answer was entitled ,collier ,faith and ,science4 ,among others ,schaller 7,body and ,soul1 #ahee71 ,j4,b4 ,meyer in a treatise with the same title1 #ahef1 and the ,jena physicist1 ,karl ,snell1#a took part in the controversy by way of criticism and mediation4 ,a much finer nature than the famous leaders of materialism--,moleschott 7,the ,circle of ,life1 #aheb1 in answer to ,liebig's ,chemical ,letters71 and ,louis ,bchner1 with whose ,force and ,matter 7#ahee1 #afth ed41 #ahhh2 ,english translation by ,collingwood1 #dth ed41 #ahhd7 the gymnasiast of to-day still satisfies his freethinking needs--is ,h4 ,czolbe 7#ahai-gc2 ,new ,exposition of ,sensationalism1 #ahee2 ,the ,limits and ,origin of ,human ,knowledge1 #ahfe71 who1 on ethical grounds1 demands the exclusion of everything suprasensible and contentment with the given world of phenomena1 but holds that1 besides matter and motion1 eternal1 purposive forms and original sensations in a world-soul are necessary to explain organic and psychical phenomena4 ,footnote #a3 ,snell 7#ahjf-hf73 ,the ,materialistic ,question1 #aheh2 ,the ,creation of ,man1 #ahfc4 ,r4 ,seydel has edited ,lectures on the ,descent of ,man1 #ahhh1 from ,snell's posthumous writings4 #b4 ,new ,systems3 ,trendelenburg1 ,fechner1 ,lotze1 and ,hartmann4 ,the speculative impulse1 especially in the soul of the ,german people1 is ineradicable4 ,it has neither allowed itself to be discouraged by the collapse of the ,hegelian edifice1 nor to be led astray by the clamor of the apostles of empiricism1 nor to be intimidated by the papal proclamation of the infallibility of ,thomas ,aquinas4#a ,manifold attempts have been made at a new conception of the world1 and with varying success4 ,of the earlier theories#b only two have been able to gather a circle of adherents--the dualistic theism of ,gnther 7#aghc-ahfc71 and the organic view of the world of ,trendelenburg 7#ahjb-gb74 ,footnote #b3 ,in #ahgi a summons was sent forth from ,rome for the revival and dissemination of the ,thomistic system as the only true philosophy 7cf4 ,r4 ,eucken1 ,die ,philosophic des ,thomas von ,aquino und die ,kultur der ,neuzeit1 #ahhf74 ,this movement is supported by the journals1 ,jahrbuch fr ,philosophie und spekulative ,theologie1 edited by ,professor ,e4 ,commer of ,mnster1 #ahhf seq41 and ,philosophisches ,jahrbuch1 edited1 at the instance and with the support of the ,grres ,society1 by ,professor ,const4 ,gutberlet of ,fulda1 #ahhh seq4 ,while the text-books of ,hagemann1 ,stoeckl1 ,gutberlet1 ,pesch1 ,commer1 ,c4,m4 ,schneider1 and others also follow ,scholastic lines1 ,b4 ,bolzano 7died #ahdh71 ,m4 ,deutinger 7died #ahfd7 and his pupil ,neudecker1 ,oischinger1 ,michelis1 and ,w4 ,rosenkrantz 7#ahba-gd2 ,science of ,knowledge1 #ahff-fh71 who was influenced by ,schelling1 have taken a freer course4 ,footnote #b3 ,trahndorff1 gymnasial professor in ,berlin 7#aghb-ahfc71 ,aesthetics1 #ahbg 7cf4 ,e4 von ,hartmann in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxii4 #ahhf1 p4 #ei seq41 and ,j4 von ,billewicz1 in the same1 vol4 xxi4 #ahhe1 p4 #efa seq472 ,j4,f4 ,reiff in ,tbingen3 ,system of the ,determinations of the ,will1 #ahdb2 ,k4 ,chr4 ,planck 7died #ahhj73 ,the ,ages of the ,world1 #ahej seq42 ,testament of a ,german1 edited by ,karl ,kstlin1 #ahha2 ,f4 ,rse 7#ahae-ei71 ,on the ,method of the ,knowledge of the ,absolute1 #ahda2 ,psychology as ,introduction to the ,philosophy of ,individuality1 #ahef4 ,emanuel ,sharer follows ,rse4 ,friedrich ,rohmer 7died #ahef73 ,science of ,god1 ,science of ,man1 in ,friedrich ,rohmer's ,wissenschaft und ,leben1 edited by ,bluntschli and ,rud4 ,seele1 #f vols41 #ahga-ib4 ,anton ,gnther 7engaged in authorship from #ahbg2 ,collected ,writings1 #ahha2 ,anti-,savarese1 edited with an appendix by ,p4 ,knoodt71 who in #aheg was compelled to retract his views1 invokes the spirit of ,descartes in opposition to the ,hegelian pantheism4 ,in agreement with ,descartes1 ,gnther starts from self-consciousness 7in the ego being and thought are identical71 and brings not only the ,creator and the created world1 but also nature 7to which the soul is to be regarded as belonging7 and spirit into a relation of exclusive opposition1 yet holds that in man nature 7body and soul7 and spirit are united1 and that they interact without prejudice to their qualitative difference4 ,j4,h4 ,pabst 7died in #ahch in ,vienna71 ,theodor ,weber of ,breslau1 ,knoodt of ,bonn 7died #ahhi71 ,v4 ,knauer of ,vienna and others are ,gntherians4 ,adolf ,trendelenburg#a of ,berlin1 the acute critic of ,hegel and ,herbart1 in his own thinking goes back to the philosophy of the past1 especially to that of ,aristotle4 ,motion and purpose are for him fundamental facts1 which are common to both being and thinking1 which mediate between the two1 and make the agreement of knowledge and reality possible4 ,the ethical is a higher stage of the organic4 ,space1 time1 and the categories are forms of thought as well as of being2 the logical form must not be separated from the content1 nor the concept from intuition4 ,we must not fail to mention that ,trendelenburg introduced a peculiar and fruitful method of treating the history of philosophy1 viz41 the historical investigation of particular concepts1 in which ,teichmller of ,dorpat 7#ahcb-hh2 ,studies in the ,history of ,concepts1 #ahgd2 ,new ,studies in the ,history of ,concepts1 #ahgf-gi2 ,the ,immortality of the ,soul1 #b;d ed41 #ahgi2 ,the ,nature of ,love1 #ahhj2 ,literary ,quarrels in the ,fourth ,century before ,christ1 #ahha and #ahhd71 and ,eucken of ,jena 7cf4 pp4 #ag and #fbc7 have followed his example4 ,kym in ,zurich 7born #ahbb2 ,metaphysical ,investigations1 #ahge2 ,the ,problem of ,evil1 #ahgh7 is a pupil of ,trendelenburg4 ,footnote #a3 ,trendelenburg3 ,logical ,investigations1 #ahdj1 #c;d ed41 #ahgj2 ,historical ,contributions to ,philosophy1 #c vols41 #ahdf1 #ahee1 #ahfg2 ,natural ,law on the ,basis of ,ethics1 #ahfj1 #b;d ed41 #ahfh4 ,on ,trendelenburg cf4 ,eucken in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 #ahhd4 ,of more recent systematic attempts the following appear worthy of mention3 ,von ,kirchmann 7#ahjb-hd2 from #ahfh editor of the ,philosophische ,bibliothek71 ,the ,philosophy of ,knowledge1 #ahfe2 ,aesthetics1 #ahfh2 ,on the ,principles of ,realism1 #ahge2 ,catechism of ,philosophy #b;d ed41 #ahha2 ,e4 ,dhring 7born #ahcc71 ,natural ,dialectic1 #ahfe2 ,the ,value of ,life1 #ahfe1 #c;d ed1 #ahha2 ,critical ,history of the ,principles of ,mechanics1 #ahgc1 #b;d ed41 #ahgg2 ,course of ,philosophy1 #ahge 7cf4 on ,dhring1 ,helene ,druskowitz1 #ahhi72 ,j4 ,baumann of ,gttingen 7born #ahcg71 ,philosophy as ,orientation concerning the ,world1 #ahgb2 ,handbook of ,ethics1 #ahgi2 ,elements of ,philosophy1 #ahia2 ,l4 ,noir1 ,the ,monistic ,idea1 #ahge1 and many other works2 ,frohschammer of ,munich 7born #ahba71 ,the ,phantasy as the ,fundamental ,principle of the ,world-process1 #ahgg2 ,on the ,genesis of ,humanity1 and its ,spiritual ,development in ,religion1 ,morality and ,language1 #ahhc2 ,on the ,organization and ,culture of ,human ,society1 #ahhe4 ,in the first rank of the thinkers who have made their appearance since ,hegel and ,herbart stand ,fechner and ,lotze1 both masters in the use of exact methods1 yet at the same time with their whole souls devoted to the highest questions1 and superior to their contemporaries in breadth of view as in the importance and range of their leading ideas--,fechner a dreamer and sober investigator by turns1 ,lotze with gentle hand reconciling the antitheses in life and science4 ,gustav ,theodor ,fechner#a 7#ahja-hg2 professor at ,leipsic7 opposes the abstract separation of ,god and the world1 which has found a place in natural inquiry and in theology alike1 and brings the two into the same relation of correspondence and reciprocal reference as the soul and the body4 ,the spirit gives cohesion to the manifold of material parts1 and needs them as a basis and material for its unifying activity4 ,as our ego connects the manifold of our activities and states in the unity of consciousness1 so the divine spirit is the supreme unity of consciousness for all being and becoming4 ,in the spirit of ,god everything is as in ours1 only expanded and enhanced4 ,our sensations and feelings1 our thoughts and resolutions are ,his also1 only that ,he1 whose body all nature is1 and to whom not only that which takes place in spirits is open1 but also that which goes on between them1 perceives more1 feels deeper1 thinks higher1 and wills better things than we4 ,according to the analogy of the human organism1 both the heavenly bodies and plants are to be conceived as beings endowed with souls1 although they lack nerves1 a brain1 and voluntary motion4 ,how could the earth bring forth living beings1 if it were itself dead8 ,shall not the flower itself rejoice in the color and fragrance which it produces1 and with which it refreshes us8 ,though its psychical life may not exceed that of an infant1 its sensations1 at all events1 since they do not form the basis of a higher activity1 are superior in force and richness to those of the animal4 ,thus the human soul stands intermediate in the scale of psychical life3 beneath and about us are the souls of plants and animals1 above us the spirits of the earth and stars1 which1 sharing in and encompassing the deeds and destinies of their inhabitants1 are in their turn embraced by the consciousness of the universal spirit4 ,the omnipresence of the divine spirit affords at the same time the means of escaping from the desolate night view of modern science1 which looks upon the world outside the perceiving individual as dark and silent4 ,no1 light and sound are not merely subjective phenomena within us1 but extend around us with objective reality--as sensations of the divine spirit1 to which everything that vibrates resounds and shines4 ,footnote #a3 ,nanna1 or on the ,psychical ,life of ,plants1 #ahdh2 ,zend-,avesta1 or on the ,things of ,heaven and the ,world ,beyond1 #ahea2 ,physical and ,philosophical ,atomism1 #ahee2 ,the ,three ,motives and ,grounds of ,belief1 #ahfc2 ,the ,day ,view1 #ahgi2 ,elements of ,aesthetics1 #ahgf2 ,elements of ,psycho-physics1 #ahfj2 ,in the ,cause of ,psycho-physics1 #ahgg2 ,review of the ,chief ,points in ,psycho-physics1 #ahhb2 ,book of the ,life after ,death1 #ahcf1 #c;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,on the ,highest ,good1 #ahdf2 ,four ,paradoxes1 #ahdf2 ,on the ,question of the4 ,soul1 #ahfa2 ,minor ,works by ,dr4 ,mises 7,fechner's pseudonym71 #ahge4 ,on ,fechner cf4 ,j4 ,e4 ,kuntze1 ,leipsic1 #ahib4 ,the door of the world beyond also opens to the key of analogy4 ,similar laws unite the here with the hereafter4 ,as intuition prepares the way for memory1 and lives on in it1 so the life of earth merges in the future life1 and continues active in it1 elevated to a higher plane4 ,fechner treats the problem of evil in a way peculiar to himself4 ,we must not consider the fact of evil apart from the effort to remove it4 ,it is the spur to all activity--without evil1 no labor and no progress4 ,fechner's psycho-physics1 a science which was founded by him in continuation of the investigations of ,bernoulli1 ,euler1 and especially of ,e4,h4 ,weber1 wears an entirely different aspect from that of his metaphysics 7the day view1 moreover does not claim to be knowledge1 but belief--though a belief which is historically1 practically1 and theoretically well-grounded74 ,this aims to be an exact science of the relations between body and mind1 and to reach indirectly what ,herbart failed to reach by direct methods1 that is1 a measurement of psychical magnitudes1 using in this attempt the least observable differences in sensations as the unit of measure4 ,weber's law of the dependence of the intensity of the sensation on the strength of the stimulus--the increase in the intensity of the sensation remains the same when the relative increase of the stimulus 7or the relation of the stimuli7 remains constant2#a so that1 e4g41 in the case of light1 an increase from a stimulus of intensity #a to one of intensity #ajj1 gives just the same increase in the intensity of the sensation as an increase from a stimulus of intensity #b 7or #c7 to a stimulus of #bjj 7or #cjj7--;is much more generally valid than its discoverer supposed2 it holds good for all the senses4 ,in the case of the pressure sense of the skin1 with an original weight of #ae grams 7laid upon the hand when at rest and supported71 in order to produce a sensation perceptibly greater we must add not #a gram1 but #e1 and with an original weight of #cj grams1 not #e1 but #aj4 ,equal additions to the weights are not enough to produce a sensation of pressure whose intensity shall render it capable of being distinguished with certainty1 but the greater the original weights the larger the increments must be2 while the intensities of the sensations form an arithmetical1 those of the stimuli form a geometrical1 series2 the change in sensation is proportional to the relative change of the stimulus4 ,sensations of tone show the same proportion 7#c3d7 as those of pressure2 the sensibility of the muscle sense is finer 7when weights are raised the proportion is #ae3af71 as also that of vision 7the relative brightness of two lights whose difference of intensity is just perceptible is #ajj3aja74 ,in addition to the investigations on the threshold of difference there are others on the threshold of stimulation 7the point at which a sensation becomes just perceptible71 on attention1 on methods of measurement1 on errors1 etc4 ,moreover1 ,fechner does not fail to connect his psycho-physics1 the presuppositions and results of which have recently been questioned in several quarters1#b with his metaphysical conclusions4 ,both are pervaded by the fundamental view that body and spirit belong together 7consequently that everything is endowed with a soul1 and that nothing is without a material basis71 nay1 that they are the same essence1 only seen from different sides4 ,body is the 7manifold7 phenomenon for others1 while spirit is the 7unitary7 self-phenomenon1 in which1 however1 the inner aspect is the truer one4 ,that which appears to us as the external world of matter1 is nothing but a universal consciousness which overlaps and influences our individual consciousness4 ,this is ,spinozism idealistically interpreted4 ,in aesthetics ,fechner shows himself an extreme representative of the principle of association4 ,footnote #a3 ,fechner teaches3 ,the sensation increases and diminishes in proportion to the logarithm of the stimulus and of the psycho-physical nervous activity1 the latter being directly proportional to the external stimulus4 ,others1 on the contrary1 find a direct dependence between nervous activity and sensation1 and a logarithmic proportion between the external stimulus and the nervous activity4 ,footnote #b3 ,so by ,helmholtz2 ,hering 7,fechners psychophysisches ,gesetz1 #ahge72 ,p4 ,langer 7,grundlagen der ,psychophysik1 #ahgf72 ,g4,e4 ,mller in ,gttingen 7,zur ,grundlegung der ,psychophysik1 #ahgh72 ,f4,a4 ,mller 7,das ,axiom der ,psychophysik1 #ahhb72 ,a4 ,elsas 7,ueber die ,psychophysik1 #ahhf72 ,o4 ,liebmann 7,aphorismen zur ,psychologie1 ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 ci4--,wundt has published a number of papers from his psycho-physical laboratory in his ,philosophische ,studien1 #ahha seq4 ,cf4 also ,hugo ,mnsterberg1 ,neue ,grundlegung der ,psychophysik in ,heft iii4 of his ,beitrge zur experimentellen ,psychologie1 #ahhi seq74 ,further1 ,delboeuf1 in ,french1 and a growing literature in ,english as ,a4 ,seth1 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 vol4 xxiv4 #dfi-dga2 ,ladd1 ,elements of ,physiological ,psychology1 part ii4 chap1 v42 ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 i4 p4 #ecc seq42 and numerous articles as ,ward1 ,mind1 vol4 i42 ,jastrow1 ,american ,journal of ,psychology1 vols4 i4 and iii4--,,tr4 ,the most important of the thinkers mentioned in the title of this section is ,rudolph ,hermann ,lotze 7#ahag-ha3 born at ,bautzen2 a student of medicine1 and of philosophy under ,weisse1 in ,leipsic2 #ahdd-ha professor in ,gttingen2 died in ,berlin74 ,like ,fechner1 gifted rather with a talent for the fine and the suggestive than for the large and the rigorous1 with a greater reserve than the former before the mystical and peculiar1 as acute1 cautious1 and thorough as he was full of taste and loftiness of spirit1 ,lotze has proved that the classic philosophers did not die out with ,hegel and ,herbart4 ,his ,microcosmus 7#c vols41 #ahef-fd1 #dth ed41 #ahhd seq2 ,english translation by ,hamilton and ,jones1 #c;d ed41 #ahhh71 which is more than an anthropology1 as it is modestly entitled1 and ,history of ,aesthetics in ,germany1 #ahfh1 which also gives more than the title betrays1 enjoy a deserved popularity4 ,these works were preceded by the ,medical ,psychology1 #aheb1 and a polemic treatise against ,i4,h4 ,fichte1 #aheg1 as well as by a ,pathology and a ,physiology1 and followed by the ,system of ,philosophy1 which remained incomplete 7part i4 ,logic1 #ahgd1 #b;d ed41 #ahha1 ,english translation edited by ,bosanquet1 #b;d ed41 #ahhh2 part ii4 ,metaphysics1 #ahgi1 ,english translation edited by ,bosanquet1 #b;d ed41 #ahhg74 ,lotze's ,minor ,treatises have been published by ,peipers in three volumes 7#ahhe-ia72 and ,rehnisch has edited eight sets of dictata from his lectures1 #ahga-hd4a ,since these ,outlines1 all of which we now have in new editions1 make a convenient introduction to the ,lotzean system1 and are1 or should be1 in the possession of all1 a brief survey may here suffice4 ,footnote #a3 ,outlines of ,psychology1 ,practical ,philosophy1 ,philosophy of ,religion1 ,philosophy of ,nature1 ,logic and the ,encyclopedia of ,philosophy1 ,metaphysics1 ,aesthetics1 and the ,history of ,philosophy since ,kant1 all of which may be emphatically commended to students1 especially the one first mentioned1 and1 in spite of its subjective position1 the last4 ,english translations of these ,outlines except the fourth and the last1 by ,ladd1 #ahhd seq4 ,on ,lotze cf4 the obituaries by ,j4 ,baumann 7,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xvii471 ,h4 ,sommer 7,im ,neuen ,reich71 ,a4 ,krohn 7,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxi4 pp4 #ef-ic71 ,r4 ,falckenberg 7,augsburg ,allgemeine ,zeitung1 #ahha1 ,no4 #bcc71 and ,rehnisch 7,national ,zeitung and the ,revue ,philosophique1 vol4 xii474 ,the last of these was reprinted in the appendix to the ,grundzge der ,aesthetik1 #ahhd1 which contains1 further1 a chronological table of ,lotze's works1 essays1 and critiques1 as well as of his lectures4 ,hugo ,sommer has zealously devoted himself to the popularization of the ,lotzean system4 ,cf41 further1 ,fritz ,koegel1 ,lotzes ,aesthetik1 ,gttingen1 #ahhf1 and the article by ,koppelmann referred to above1 p4 #ccj4 ,the subject of metaphysics is reality4 ,things which are1 events which happen1 relations which exist1 representative contents and truths which are valid1 are real4 ,events happening and relations existing presuppose existing things as the subjects in and between which they happen and exist4 ,the being of things is neither their being perceived 7for when we say that a thing is we mean that it continues to be1 even when we do not perceive it71 nor a pure1 unrelated position1 its position in general1 but to be is to stand in relations4 ,further1 the what or essence of the things which enter into these relations cannot be conceived as passive quality1 but only abstractly1 as a rule or a law which determines the connection and succession of a series of qualities4 ,the nature of water1 for example1 is the unintuitable somewhat which contains the ground of the change of ice1 first into the liquid condition1 and then into steam1 when the temperature increases1 and conversely1 of the possibility of changing steam back into water and ice under opposite conditions4 ,and when we speak of an unchangeable identity of the thing with itself1 as a result of which it remains the same essence amid the change of its phenomena1 we mean only the consistency with which it keeps within the closed series of forms a#a1 a#b1 a#c1 without ever going over into the series b#a1 b#b4 ,the relations1 however1 in which things stand1 cannot pass to and fro between things like threads or little spirits1 but are states in things themselves1 and the change of the former always implies a change in these inner states4 ,to stand in relations means to exchange actions4 ,in order to experience such effects from others and to exercise them upon others1 things must neither be wholly incomparable 7as red1 hard1 sweet7 and mutually indifferent1 nor yet absolutely independent2 if the independence of individual beings were complete the process of action would be entirely inconceivable4 ,the difficulty in the concept of causality--how does being a come to produce in itself a different state a because another being b enters into the state ,greek3 b8--is removed only when we look on the things as modes1 states1 parts of a single comprehensive being1 of an infinite1 unconditioned substance1 in so far as there is then only an action of the absolute on itself4 ,nevertheless the assumption that1 in virtue of the unity and consistency of the absolute or of its impulse to self-preservation1 state ,greek3 b in being b follows state ,greek3 a in being a as an accommodation or compensation follows a disturbance1 is not a full explanation of the process of action1 does not remove the difficulty as to how one state can give rise to another4 ,metaphysics is1 in general1 unable to show how reality is made1 but only to remove certain contradictions which stand in the way of the conceivability of these notions4 ,the so far empty concept of an absolute looks to the philosophy of religion for its content2 the conception of the ,godhead as infinite personality 7it is a person in a far higher sense than we7 is first produced when we add to the ontological postulate of a comprehensive substance the ethical postulate of a supreme good or a universal world-,idea4 ,by thing we understand the permanent unit-subject of changing states4 ,but the fact of consciousness furnishes the only guaranty that the different states a1 ,greek3 b1 y1 are in reality states of one being1 and not so many different things alternating with one another4 ,only a conscious being1 which itself effects the distinction between itself and the states occurring in it1 and in memory and recollection feels and knows itself as their identical subject1 is actually a subject which has states4 ,hence1 if things are to be real1 we must attribute to them a nature in essence related to that of our soul4 ,reality is existence for self4 ,all beings are spiritual1 and only spiritual beings possess true reality4 ,thus ,lotze combines the monadology of ,leibnitz with the pantheism of ,spinoza1 just as he understands how to reconcile the mechanical view of natural science 7which is valid also for the explanation of organic life7 with the teleology and the ethical idealism of ,fichte4 ,the sole mission of the world of forms is to aid in the realization of the ideal purposes of the absolute1 of the world of values4 ,the ideality of space1 which ,kant had based on insufficient grounds1 is maintained by ,lotze also1 only that he makes things stand in intellectual relations1 which the knowing subject translates into spatial language4 ,the same character of subjectivity belongs not only to our sensations1 but also to our ideas concerning the connection of things4 ,representations are results1 not copies1 of the external stimuli2 cognition comes under the general concept of the interaction of real elements1 and depends1 like every effect1 as much upon the nature of the being that experiences the effect as upon the nature of the one which exerts it1 or rather1 more upon the former than upon the latter4 ,if1 nevertheless1 it claims objective reality1 truth must not be interpreted as the correspondence of thought and its object 7the cognitive image can never be like the thing itself71 nor the mission of cognition1 made to consist in copying a world already finished and closed apart from the realm of spirits1 to which mental representation is added as something accessory4 ,light and sound are not therefore illusions because they are not true copies of the waves of ether and of air from which they spring1 but they are the end which nature has sought to attain through these motions1 an end1 however1 which it cannot attain alone1 but only by acting upon spiritual subjects2 the beauty and splendor of colors and tones are that which of right ought to be in the world2 without the new world of representations awakened in spirits by the action of external stimuli1 the world would lack its essential culmination4 ,the purpose of things is to be known1 experienced1 and enjoyed by spirits4 ,the truth of cognition consists in the fact that it opens up the meaning and destination of the world4 ,that which ought to be is the ground of that which is2 that which is exists in order to the realization of values in it2 the good is the only real4 ,it is true that we are not permitted to penetrate farther than to the general conviction that the ,idea of the good is the ground and end of the world2 the question1 how the world has arisen from this supreme ,idea as from the absolute and why just this world with its determinate forms and laws has arisen1 is unanswerable4 ,we understand the meaning of the play1 but we do not see the machinery by which it is produced at work behind the stage4 ,in ethics ,lotze emphasizes with ,fechner the inseparability of the good and pleasure3 it is impossible to state in what the worth or goodness of a good is to consist1 if it be conceived out of all relation to a spirit capable of finding enjoyment in it4 ,if ,lotze's philosophy harmoniously combines ,herbartian and ,fichteo-,hegelian elements1 ,eduard von ,hartmann 7born #ahdb2 until #ahfd a soldier1 now a man of letters in ,berlin7 aims at a synthesis of ,schopenhauer and ,hegel2 with the pessimism of the former he unites the evolutionism of the latter1 and while the one conceives the nature of the world-ground as irrational will1 and the other as the logical ,idea1 he follows the example of ,schelling in his later days by making will and representation equally legitimate attributes of his absolute1 the ,unconscious4 ,his principal theoretical work1 ,the ,philosophy of the ,unconscious1 #ahfi 7#ajth ed41 #ahia2 ,english translation by ,coupland1 #ahhd71 was followed in #ahgi by his chief ethical one1 ,the ,moral ,consciousness 7#b;d ed41 #ahhf1 in the ,selected ,works72 the two works on the philosophy of religion1 ,the ,religious ,consciousness of ,humanity in the ,stages of its ,development1 #ahha1 and ,the ,religion of ,spirit1 #ahhb1 together form the third chief work 7,the ,self-,disintegration of ,christianity and the ,religion of the ,future1 #ahgd1 and ,the ,crisis of ,christianity in ,modern ,theology1 #ahhj1 are to be regarded as forerunners of this72 the fourth is the ,aesthetics 7part i4 ,german ,aesthetics since ,kant1 #ahhf2 part ii4 ,philosophy of the ,beautiful1 #ahhg74 ,the ,collected ,studies and ,essays1 #ahgf1 were preceded by two treatises on the philosophy of nature1 ,truth and ,error in ,darwinism1 #ahge1 and ,the ,unconscious from the ,standpoint of ,physiology and the ,theory of ,descent1 published anonymously in #ahgb1 in the latter of which1 disguised as a ,darwinian1 he criticises his own philosophy4 ,of his more recent publications we may mention the ,philosophical ,questions of the ,day1 #ahhe2 ,modern ,problems1 #ahhf2 and the controversial treatise ,lotzes ,philosophy1 #ahhh4a ,footnote #a3 ,on ,hartmann cf4 ,volkelt in ,nord und ,sd1 ,july1 #ahha2 the same1 ,das ,unbewusste und der ,pessimismus1 #ahgc2 ,vaihinger1 ,hartmann1 ,dhring und ,lange1 #ahgf2 ,r4 ,koeber1 ,das philosophische ,system ,ed4 v1 ,hartmann1 #ahhd2 ,o4 ,pfleiderer1 critique of the ,phnomenologie des sittlichen ,bewusstseins 7,im neuen ,reich71 #ahgi2 ,l4 von ,golther1 ,der moderne ,pessimismus1 #ahgh2 ,j4 ,huber1 ,der ,pessimismus1 #ahgf2 ,weygoldt1 ,kritik des philosophischen ,pessimismus der neuesten ,zeit1 #ahge2 ,m4 ,venetianer1 ,der ,allgeist1 #ahgd2 ,a ,taubert 7,hartmann's first wife71 ,der ,pessimismus und seine ,gegner1 #ahgc2 ,o4 ,plmacher1 ,der ,kampf ums ,unbewusste 7with a chronological table of ,hartmann literature appended71 #ahha2 the same1 ,der ,pessimismus in ,vergangenheit und ,gegenwart1 #ahhd2 ,krohn1 ,streifzge 7see above72 ,seydel 7see above74 ,during the year #ahhb four publications appeared under the title ,der ,pessimismus und die ,sittenlehre1 by ,bacmeister1 ,christ1 ,rehmke1 and ,h4 ,sommer 7#b;d ed41 #ahhc74 ,english translation of ,truth and ,error in ,darwinism in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 vols4 xi4-xiii41 and of ,the ,religion of the ,future1 by ,dare1 #ahhf2 cf4 also ,sully's ,pessimism1 chap4 v4--,,tr4 ,in polemical relation1 on the one hand1 to the nave realism of life1 and1 on the other1 to the subjective idealism of ,kant1 or rather of the neo-,kantians1 the logical conclusion of which would be absolute illusionism1 ,hartmann founds his transcendental realism1 which mediates between these two points of view 7the existence and true nature of the world outside our representations is knowable1 if only indirectly2 the forms of knowledge1 in spite of their subjective origin1 have a more than subjective1 a transcendental1 significance7 by pointing out that sense-impressions1 which are accompanied by the feeling of compulsion and are different from one another1 cannot be explained from the ego1 but only by the action of things in themselves external to us1 i4e41 independent of consciousness1 and themselves distinct from one another4 ,the causality of things in themselves is the bridge which enables us to cross the gulf between the immanent world of representations and the transcendent world of being4 ,the causality of things in themselves proves their reality1 their difference at different times1 their changeability and their temporal character2 change1 however1 demands something permanent1 existence1 an existing1 unchangeable1 supra-temporal1 and non-spatial substance 7whether a special substance for each thing in itself or a common one for all1 is left for the present undetermined74 ,my action upon the thing in itself assures me of its causal conditionality or necessity2 the various affections of the same sense1 that there are many things in themselves2 the peculiar form of change shown by some bodies1 that these1 like my body1 are united with a soul4 ,thus it is evident that1 besides the concept of cause1 a series of other categories must be applied to the thing in itself1 hence applied transcendentally4 ,the speculative results obtained by ,hartmann on an inductive basis are as follows3 ,the per se 7,ansich7 of the empirical world is the ,unconscious4 ,the two attributes of this absolute are the active1 groundless1 alogical1 infinite will1 and the passive1 finite representation 7,idea72 the former is the ground of the that of the world1 the latter the ground of its purposive what and how4 ,without the will the representation1 which in itself is without energy1 could not become real1 and without the representation 7of an end7 the will1 which in itself is without reason1 could not become a definite willing 7relative or immanent dualism of the attributes1 a necessary moment in absolute monism74 ,the empirical preponderance of pain over pleasure1 which can be shown by calculation1#a proves that the world is evil1 that its non-existence were better than its existence2 the purposiveness everywhere perceptible in nature and the progress of history toward a final goal 7it is true1 a negative one7 proves1 nevertheless1 that it is the best world that was possible 7reconciliation of eudemonistic pessimism with evolutionistic optimism74 ,the creation of the world begins when the blind will to live groundlessly and fortuitously passes over from essence to phenomenon1 from potency to act1 from supra-existence to existence1 and1 in irrational striving after existence1 draws to itself the only content which is capable of realization1 the logical ,idea4 ,this latter seeks to make good the error committed by the will by bringing consciousness into the field as a combatant against the insatiable1 ever yearning1 never satisfied will1 which one day will force the will back into latency1 into the 7antemundane7 blessed state of not-willing4 ,the goal of the world-development is deliverance from the misery of existence1 the peace of non-existence1 the return from the will and representation1 become spatial and temporal1 to the original1 harmonious equilibrium of the two functions1 which has been disturbed by the origin of the world or to the antemundane identity of the absolute4 ,the task of the logical element is to teach consciousness more and more to penetrate the illusion of the will--in its three stages of childlike 7,greek7 expectation of happiness to be attained here1 youthful 7,christian7 expectation of happiness to be attained hereafter1 and adult expectation of happiness to be attained in the future of the world-development--and1 finally1 to teach it to know1 in senile longing after rest1 that only the doing away with this miserable willing1 and1 consequently1 with earthly existence 7through the resolve of the majority of mankind7 can give the sole attainable blessedness1 freedom from pain4 ,the world-process is the incarnation1 the suffering1 and the redemption of the absolute2 the moral task of man is not personal renunciation and cowardly retirement1 but to make the purposes of the ,unconscious his own1 with complete resignation to life and its sufferings to labor energetically in the world-process1 and1 by the vigorous promotion of consciousness1 to hasten the fulfillment of the redemptive purpose2 the condition of morality is insight into the fruitlessness of all striving after pleasure and into the essential unity of all individual beings with one another and with the universal spirit1 which exists in the individuals1 but at the same time subsists above them4 ,to know one's self as of divine nature1 this does away with all divergence between selfwill and universal will1 with all estrangement between man and ,god1 with all undivine1 that is1 merely natural1 conduct4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,volkelt1 ,ueber die ,lust als hchsten ,werthmassstab 7in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 lxxxviii471 #ahhf1 and ,o4 ,pfleiderer1 ,philosophy of ,religion1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bdi seq4 ,religion1 which1 in common with philosophy1 has for its basis the metaphysical need for1 or the mystical feeling of1 the unity of the human individual and the world-ground1 needs transformation1 since in its traditional forms it is opposed to modern culture1 and the merging of religion 7as a need of the heart7 in metaphysics is impossible4 ,the religion of the future1 for which the way has already been prepared by the speculative ,protestantism of the present1 is concrete monism 7the divine unity is transcendent as well as immanent in the plurality of the beings of earth1 every moral man a ,god-man71 which includes in itself the abstract monism 7pantheism7 of the ,indian religions and the ,judeo-,christian 7mono-7 theism as subordinate moments4 7,the original henotheism and its decline into polytheism1 demonism1 and fetichism was followed by--,egyptian and ,persian1 as well as ,greek1 ,roman1 and ,german--naturalism1 and then by supernaturalism in its monistic and its theistic form4 ,the chief defect of the ,christian religion is the transcendental-eudemonistic heteronomy of its ethics47 ,the ,religion of ,spirit divides into three parts4 ,the psychology of religion considers the religious function in its subjective aspect1 faith as a combined act of representation1 feeling1 and will1 in which one of these three elements may predominate--though feeling forms the inmost kernel of the theoretical and practical activities as well--and1 as the objective correlate of faith1 grace 7revealing1 redeeming1 and sanctifying71 which elevates man above peripheral and phenomenal dependence on the world1 and frees him from it1 through his becoming conscious of his central and metaphysical dependence upon ,god4 ,the metaphysics of religion 7in theological1 anthropological1 and cosmological sections7 proves by induction from the facts of religion the existence1 omnipotence1 spirituality1 omniscience1 righteousness1 and holiness of the ,all-one1 which coincides with the moral order of the world4 ,further1 it proves the need and the capacity of man for redemption from guilt and evil--here three spheres of the individual will are distinguished1 one beneath ,god1 one contrary to ,god1 and one conformable to ,god1 or a natural1 an evil1 and a moral sphere--and1 preserving alike the absoluteness of ,god and the reality of the world1 shows that it is not so much man as ,god himself1 who1 as the bearer of all the suffering of the world1 is the subject of redemption4 ,the ethics of religion discusses the subjective and objective processes of redemption1 namely1 repentance and amendment on the part of the individual and the ecclesiastical cultus of the future1 which is to despise symbols and art4 ,it is to ,hartmann's credit1 though the fact has not been sufficiently appreciated by professional thinkers1 that in a time averse to speculation he has devoted his energies to the highest problems of metaphysics1 and in their elaboration has approached his task with scientific earnestness and a comprehensive and thorough consideration of previous results4 ,thus the critique of ethical standpoints in the historical part of the ,phenomenology of the ,moral ,consciousness1 especially1 contains much that is worthy of consideration2 and his fundamental metaphysical idea1 that the absolute is to be conceived as the unity of will and reason1 also deserves in general a more lively assent than has been accorded to it1 while his rejection of an infinite consciousness has justly met with contradiction4 ,it has been impossible here to go into his discussions in the philosophy of nature--they cannot be described in brief--on matter 7atomic forces71 on the mechanical and teleological views of life and its development1 on instinct1 on sexual love1 etc41 which he very skillfully uses in support of his metaphysical principle4 #c4 ,from the ,revival of the ,kantian ,philosophy to the ,present ,time4 7a7 ,neo-,kantianism1 ,positivism1 and ,kindred ,phenomena4--,the ,kantian philosophy has created two epochs3 one at the time of its appearance1 and a second two generations after the death of its author4 ,the new ,kantian movement1 which is one of the most prominent characteristics of the philosophy of the present time1 took its beginning a quarter of a century ago4 ,it is true that even before #ahfe individual thinkers like ,ernst ,reinhold of ,jena 7died #ahee71 the admirer of ,fries1 ,j4,b4 ,meyer of ,bonn1 ,k4,a4 von ,reichlin-,meldegg1 and others had sought a point of departure for their views in ,kant2 that ,k4 ,fischer's work on ,kant 7#ahfj7 had given a lively impulse to the renewed study of the critical philosophy2 nay1 that the cry ,back to ,kant had been expressly raised by ,fortlage 7as early as #ahcb in his treatise ,the ,gaps in the ,hegelian ,system71 and by ,zeller 7p4 #ehi74 ,but the movement first became general after ,f4,a4 ,lange in his ,history of ,materialism had energetically advocated the ,kantian doctrine according to his special conception of it1 after ,helmholtz#a 7born #ahba7 had called attention to the agreement of the results of physiology with those of the ,critique of ,reason1 and at the same time ,liebmann's youthful work1 ,kant and the ,epigones1 in which every chapter ended with the inexorable refrain1 therefore we must go back to ,kant1 had given the strongest expression to the longing of the time4 ,footnote #a3 ,helmholtz3 ,on ,human ,vision1 #ahee2 ,physiological ,optics1 #ahfg2 ,sensations of ,tone1 #ahfc1 #dth ed41 #ahgg ,english translation by ,ellis1 #b;d ed41 #ahhe4 ,otto ,liebmann 7cf4 also the chapter on ,the ,metamorphoses of the ,a ,priori in his ,analysis of ,reality7 sees the fundamental truth of criticism in the irrefutable proof that1 space1 time1 and the categories are functions of the intellect1 and that subject and object are necessary correlates1 inseparable factors of the empirical world1 and finds ,kant's fundamental error1 which the ,epigones have not corrected1 but made still worse1 in the non-concept of the thing in itself1 which must be expelled from the ,kantian philosophy as a remnant of dogmatism1 as a drop of alien blood1 and as an illegitimate invader which has debased it4 ,according to ,friedrich ,albert ,lange#a 7#ahbh-ge2 during the last years of his life professor at ,marburg71 materialism1 which is unfruitful and untenable as a principle1 a system1 and a view of the world1 but useful and indispensable as a method and a maxim of investigation1 must be supplemented by formal idealism1 which1 rejecting all science from mere reason limits knowledge to the sensuous1 to that which can be experienced1 yet at the same time conceives the formal element in the sense world as the product of the organization of man1 and hence makes objects conform to our representations4 ,above the sensuous world of experience and of mechanical becoming1 however1 the speculative impulse to construction1 rounding off the fragmentary truth of the sciences into a unified picture of the whole truth1 rears the ideal world of that which ought to be4 ,notwithstanding their indefeasible certitude1 the ,ideas possess no scientific truth1 though they have a moral value which makes them more than mere fabrics of the brain3 man is framed not merely for the knowledge of truth1 but also for the realization of values4 ,but since the significance of the ,ideas is only practical1 and since determinations of value are not grounds of explanation1 science and metaphysics or concept poetry 7,begriffsdichtung7 must be kept strictly separate4 ,footnote #a3 ,f4,a4 ,lange3 ,logical ,studies1 #ahgg4 ,cf4 ,m4 ,heinze in the ,vierteljahrsschrift fr wissenschaftliche ,philosophic1 #ahgg1 and ,vaihinger in the work cited above1 p4 #faj note4 ,friedrich ,paulsen of ,berlin 7born in #ahdf2 cf4 pp4 #ccj1 #ccb1 note7 sees in the ,kantian philosophy the foundation for the philosophy of the future4 ,a profounder ,wolff 7the self-dominion of the reason71 a ,prussian ,hume 7the categories of the understanding are not world-categories2 rejection of anthropomorphic metaphysics71 and a ,german ,rousseau 7the primacy of the will1 consideration of the demands of the heart2 the good will alone1 not deeds nor culture1 constitutes the worth of man2 freedom1 the rights of man7 in one person1 ,kant has withdrawn from scientific discussion the question concerning the dependence of reality on values or the good1 which is theoretically insoluble but practically to be answered in the affirmative1 and given it over to faith4 ,kant is in so far a positivist that he limits the mission of knowledge to the reduction of the temporo-spatial relations of phenomena to rules1 and declares the teleological power of values to be undemonstrable4 ,but science is able to prove this much1 that the belief in a suprasensible world1 in the indestructibility of that which alone has worth1 and in the freedom of the intelligible character1 which the will demands1 is not scientifically impossible4 ,since1 according to formal rationalism1 the whole order of nature is a creation of the understanding1 and hence atomism and mechanism are only forms of representation1 valid1 no doubt1 for our peripheral point of view1 but not absolutely valid1 since1 further1 the empirical view of the world apart from the ,idea of the divine unity of the world 7which1 it is true1 is incapable of theoretical realization7 would lack completion1 the immediate conviction of the heart in regard to the power of the good is in no danger of attack from the side of science1 although this can do no further service for faith than to remove the obstacles which oppose it4 ,the will1 not the intellect1 determines the view of the world2 but this is only a belief1 and in the world of representation1 the intelligible world1 with which the will brings us into relation1 can come before us only in the form of symbols4--,while ,albrecht ,krause 7,the ,laws of the ,human ,heart1 a ,formal ,logic of ,pure ,feeling1 #ahgf7 and ,a4 ,classen 7,physiology of the ,sense of ,sight1 #ahgg7 are strict followers of ,kant1 ,j4 ,volkelt 7,analysis of the ,fundamental ,principles of ,kant's ,theory of ,knowledge1 #ahgi7 has traced the often deplored inconsistencies and contradictions in ,kant down to their roots1 and has shown that in ,kant's thinking1 which has hitherto been conceived as too simple and transparent1 but which1 in fact1 is extremely complicated and struggling in the dark1 a number of entirely heterogeneous principles of thought 7skeptical1 subjectivistic1 metaphysico-work1 rationalistic1 a priori1 and practical motives7 are at which1 conflicting with and crippling one another1 make the attainment of harmonious results impossible4 ,benno ,erdmann 7p4 #ccj7 and ,hans ,vaihinger 7pp4 #cbc note1 #cca7 have given ,kant's principal works careful philological interpretation4 ,among the various differences of opinion which exist within the neo-,kantian ranks1 the most important relates to the question1 whether the individual ego or a transcendental consciousness is to be looked upon as the executor of the a priori functions4 ,in agreement with ,schopenhauer and with ,lotze1 who makes the subjectivity of space1 time1 and the pure concepts parallel with that of the sense qualities1 ,lange teaches that the human individual is so organized that he must apprehend that which is sensuously given under these forms4 ,others1 on the contrary1 urge that the individual soul with its organization is itself a phenomenon1 and consequently cannot be the bearer of that which precedes phenomena--space1 time1 and the categories as conditions of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be presupposed4 ,the antithesis of subject and object1 the soul and the world1 first arises in the sphere of phenomena4 ,the empirical subject1 like the world of objects1 is itself a product of the a priori forms1 hence not that which produces them4 ,to the transcendental group belong ,hermann ,cohen#a in ,marburg1 ,a4 ,stadler#b1 ,natorp1 ,lasswitz 7p4#ag71 ,e4 ,knig 7p4 #ag71 ,koppelmann 7p4 #ccj71 ,staudinger 7p4 #cca74 ,fritz ,schultze of ,dresden is also to be counted among the neo-,kantians 7,philosophy of ,natural ,science1 #ahhb2 ,kant and ,darwin1 #ahge2 ,the ,fundamental ,thoughts of ,materialism1 #ahha2 ,the ,fundamental ,thoughts of ,spiritualism1 #ahhc2 ,comparative ,psychology1 i4 #a1 #ahib74 ,footnote #a3 ,cohen3 ,kant's ,theory of ,experience1 #ahga1 #b;d ed41 #ahhf2 ,kant's ,foundation of ,ethics1 #ahgg2 ,kant's ,foundation of ,aesthetics1 #ahhi4 ,footnote #b3 ,stadler3 ,kant's ,teleology1 #ahgd2 ,the ,principles of the ,pure ,theory of ,knowledge in the ,kantian ,philosophy1 #ahgf2 ,kant's ,theory of ,matter1 #ahhc4 ,the ,german positivists#a3--;,e4 ,laas of ,strasburg 7#ahcg-he71 ,a4 ,riehl of ,freiburg in ,baden 7born #ahdd71 and ,r4 ,avenarius of ,zurich 7born #ahdc7--;develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical connection with ,kant4 ,ernst ,laas defines positivism 7founded by ,protagoras1 advocated in modern times by ,hume and ,j4,s4 ,mill1 and hostile to ,platonic idealism7 as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than positive facts 7i4e41 perceptions71 and requires every opinion to exhibit the experiences on which it rests4 ,its basis is constituted by three articles of belief3 7#a7 ,the correlative facts1 subject and object1 exist and arise only in connection 7objects are directly known only as the contents of a consciousness1 cui objecta sunt1 subjects only as centers of relation1 as the scene or foundation of a representative content1 cui subjecta sunt3 outside my thoughts body does not exist as body1 nor ,i myself as soul74 7#b7 ,the variability of the objects of perception4 7#c7 ,sensationalism--all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived as differences in degree1 all higher mental processes and states1 including thought1 as the perceptions and experiences1 transformed according to law1 of beings which feel1 have wants1 possess memory1 and are capable of spontaneous motion4 ,the subject coincides with its feeling of pleasure and pain1 from which sensation is distinguished by its objective content4 ,the illusions of metaphysics are scientifically untenable and practically unnecessary4 ,various yearnings1 wants1 presentiments1 hopes1 and fancies1 it is true1 lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense and experience1 but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be adduced4 ,as physics has discarded transcendent causes and learned how to get along with immanent causes1 so ethics also must endeavor to establish the worth of moral good without excursions into the suprasensible4 ,the ethical obligations arise naturally from human relations1 from earthly needs4 ,the third volume of ,laas's work differs from the earlier ones by conceding the rank of facts to the principles of logic as well as to perception4 ,aloys ,riehl opposes the theory of knowledge 7which starts from the fundamental fact of sensation7 as scientific philosophy to metaphysics as unscientific1 and banishes the doctrine of the practical ideals from the realm of science into the region of religion and art4 ,richard ,avenarius defends the principle of pure experience4 ,sensation1 which is all that is left as objectively given after the removal of the subjective additions1 constitutes the content1 and motion the form of being4 ,footnote #a3 ,laas3 ,idealism and ,positivism1 #ahgi-hd4 ,riehl3 ,philosophical ,criticism1 #ahgf-hg2 ,address ,on ,scientific and ,unscientific ,philosophy1 #ahhc4 ,avenarius 7p4 #eih73 ,philosophy as ,thought concerning the ,world according to the ,principle of ,least ,work1 #ahgf2 ,critique of ,pure ,experience1 vol4 i4 #ahhh1 vol4 ii4 #ahij2 ,man's ,concept of the ,world1 #ahia4 ,c4 ,gring 7died #ahgi2 ,system of ,critical ,philosophy1 #ahge7 may also be placed here4 ,with the neo-,kantians and the positivists there is associated1 thirdly1 a coherent group of notical thinkers1 who1 rejecting extramental elements of every kind1 look on all conceivable being as merely a conscious content4 ,this monism of consciousness is advocated by ,w4 ,schuppe of ,greifswald 7born #ahcf2 ,notical ,logic1 #ahgh71 ,j4 ,rehmke1 also of ,greifswald 7,the ,world as ,percept and ,concept1 #ahhj2 ,the ,question of the ,soul in vol4 ii4 of the ,zeitschrift fr ,psychologie1 #ahia71 ,a4 von ,leclair 7,contributions to a ,monistic ,theory of ,knowledge1 #ahhb71 and ,r4 von ,schubert-,soldern 7,foundations of a ,theory of ,knowledge1 #ahhd2 ,on the ,transcendence of ,object and ,subject1 #ahhb2 ,foundations for an ,ethics1 #ahhg74 ,j4 ,bergmann#a in ,marburg 7born #ahdj7 occupies a kindred position4 ,footnote #a3 ,bergmann3 ,outlines of a ,theory of ,consciousness1 #ahgj2 ,pure ,logic1 #ahgi2 ,being and ,knowing1 #ahhj2 ,the ,fundamental ,problems of ,logic1 #ahhb2 ,on the ,right1 #ahhc2 ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 #ahhf2 ,on the ,beautiful1 #ahhg2 ,history of ,philosophy1 vol4 i41 ,pre-,kantian ,philosophy1 #ahib4 ,it is the same scientific spirit of the time1 which in the fifties led many who were weary of the idealistic speculations over to materialism1 that now secures such wide dissemination and so widespread favor for the endeavors of the neo-,kantians and the positivists or neo-,baconians1 who desire to see metaphysics stricken from the list of the sciences and replaced by notics1 and the theory of the world relegated to faith4 ,the philosophy of the present1 like the pre-,socratic philosophy and the philosophy of the early modern period1 wears the badge of physics4 ,the world is conceived from the standpoint of nature1 psychical phenomena are in part neglected1 in part see their inconvenient claims reduced to a minimum1 while it is but rarely that we find an appreciation of their independence and co-ordinate value1 not to speak of their superior position4 ,the power which natural science has gained over philosophy dates essentially from a series of famous discoveries and theories1 by which science has opened up entirely new and wide outlooks1 and whose title to be considered in the formation of a general view of reality is incontestable4 ,to mention only the most prominent1 the following have all posited important and far-reaching problems for philosophy as well as for science3 ,johannes ,mller's 7,mller died #aheh7 theory of the specific energies of the senses1 which ,helmholtz made use of as an empirical confirmation of the ,kantian apriorism2 the law of the conservation of energy discovered by ,robert ,mayer 7#ahdb1 #ahej2 ,helmholtz1 #ahdg1 #ahfb71 and1 in particular1 the law of the transformation of heat into motion1 which invited an examination of all the forces active in the world to test their mutual convertibility2 the extension of mechanism to the vital processes1 favored even by ,lotze2 the renewed conflict between atomism and dynamism2 further1 the ,darwinian theory#a 7#ahei71 which makes organic species develop from one another by natural selection in the struggle for existence 7through inheritance and adaptation72 finally1 the meta-geometrical speculations#b of ,gauss 7#ahbh71 ,riemann 7,on the ,hypotheses which lie at the ,basis of ,geometry1 #ahed1 published in #ahfg71 ,helmholtz 7#ahfh71 ,b4 ,erdmann 7,the ,axioms of ,geometry1 #ahgg74 ,g4 ,cantor1 and others1 which look on our ,euclidean space of three dimensions as a special case of the unintuitable yet thinkable analytic concept of a space of n dimensions4 ,the circumstance that these theories are still largely hypothetical in their own field appears to have stirred up rather than moderated the zeal for carrying them over into other departments and for applying them to the world as a whole4 ,thus1 especially1 the ,darwinians#c have undauntedly attempted to utilize the biological hypothesis of the master as a philosophical principle of the world1 and to bring the mental sciences under the point of view of the mechanical theory of development1 though thus far with more daring and noise than success4 ,the finely conceived ethics of ,hffding 7p4 #ehe7 is an exception to the rule which is the object of this remark4 ,footnote #a3 ,a critical exposition of the modern doctrine of development and of the causes used to explain it is given by ,otto ,hamann1 ,entwickelungslehre und ,darwinismus1 ,jena1 #ahib4 ,cf4 also1 ,o4 ,liebmann1 ,analysis der ,wirklichkeit2 and ,ed4 von ,hartmann 7above1 p4 #faj74 ,among the numerous works in ,english the reader may be referred to the article ,evolution1 by ,huxley and ,sully1 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #ith ed41 vol4 viii42 ,wallace's ,darwinism1 #ahhi2 ,romanes1 ,darwin and after ,darwin1 i4 ,the ,darwinian ,theory1 #ahib2 and ,conn's ,evolution of ,to-day1 #ahhf4--,,tr4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 ,liebmann1 ,analysis der ,wirklichkeit1 #b;d ed41 pp4 #ec-ei4 ,g4 ,frege 7,begriffsschrift1 #ahgi2 ,the ,foundations of ,arithmetic1 #ahhd2 ,function and ,concept1 #ahia2 ,on ,sense and ,meaning in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 c4 #ahib7 has also chosen the region intermediate between mathematics and philosophy for his field of work4 ,we note1 further1 ,e4,g4 ,husserl1 ,philosophy of ,arithmetic1 vol4 i41 #ahia4 ,footnote #c3 ,ernst ,haeckel of ,jena 7born #ahcd2 ,general ,morphology1 #ahff2 ,natural ,history of ,creation1 #ahfh ,english1 #ahge ,i ,anthropogeny1 #ahgd2 ,aims and ,methods of the ,development ,history of ,to-day1 #ahge2 ,popular ,lectures1 #ahgh seq4--,english1 #ahhc71 ,g4 ,jger1 ,a4 ,schleicher 7,the ,darwinian ,theory and the ,science of ,language1 #ahfe71 ,ernst ,krause 7,carus ,sterne1 the editor of ,kosmos7 ,o4 ,caspari1 ,carneri 7,morals and ,darwinism1 #ahga71 ,o4 ,schmidt1 ,du ,prel1 ,paul ,re 7,the ,origin of the ,moral ,feelings1 #ahgg2 ,the ,genesis of ,conscience1 #ahhe2 ,the ,illusion of ,free ,will1 #ahhe72 ,g4,h4 ,schneider 7,the ,animal ,will1 #ahhj2 ,the ,human ,will1 #ahhb2 ,the ,good and ,,iii of the ,human ,race1 #ahhc74 ,besides the theory of knowledge1 in the elaboration of which the most eminent naturalists#a participate with acuteness and success1 psychology and the practical disciplines also betray the influence of the scientific spirit4 ,while sociology and ethics1 following the ,english model1 seek an empirical basis and begin to make philosophical use of statistical results 7,e4,f4 ,schffle1 ,frame and ,life of the ,social ,body1 new ed41 #ahhe2 ,a4 von ,oettingen1 ,moral ,statistic in its ,significance for a ,social ,ethics1 #c;d ed41 #ahhb71 psychology endeavors to attain exact results in regard to psychical life and its relation to its physical basis--besides ,fechner and the ,herbartians1 ,w4 ,wundt and ,a4 ,horwicz should be mentioned here4 ,wundt and1 of late1 ,haeckel go back to the ,spinozistic parallelism of material and psychical existence1 only that the latter emphasizes merely the inseparability 7,nichtohneeinander7 of the two sides 7the cell-body and the cell-soul7 with a real difference between them and a metaphysical preponderance of the material side1 while the former emphasizes the essential unity of body and soul1 and the higher reality of the spiritual side4 ,footnote #a3 ,helmholtz1 ,virchow 7born #ahba71 ,zllner 7#ahcd-hb2 ,on the ,nature of ,comets1 #ahgb71 and ,du ,bois-,reymond 7born #ahah71 who1 in his lectures ,on the ,limits of the ,knowledge of ,nature1 #ahgb1 and ,the ,seven ,world-riddles1 #ahhj 7both together in #ahhb1 and reprinted in the first series of his ,addresses1 #ahhf71 looks on the origin of life1 the purposive order of nature1 and thought as problems soluble in the future1 but declares1 on the other hand1 that the nature of matter 7atoms7 and force 7actio in distant71 the origin of motion1 the genesis of consciousness 7of sensation1 together with pleasure and pain7 from the knowable conditions of psychical life1 and the freedom of the will1 are absolute limits to our knowledge of nature4 7b7 ,idealistic ,reaction against the ,scientific ,spirit4--,in opposition to the preponderance of natural science and the empirico-skeptical tendency of the philosophy of the day conditioned by it1 an idealistic counter-movement is making itself increasingly felt as the years go on4 ,wilhelm ,dilthey#a abandons metaphysics as a basis1 it is true1 but 7with the assent of ,gierke1 ,preussische ,jahrbcher1 vol4 liii4 #ahhd7 declares against the transfer of the method of natural science to the mental sciences1 which require a special foundation4 ,in spite of his critical rejection of metaphysics1 ,wilhelm ,windelband in ,strasburg 7born #ahdh2 ,preludes1 #ahhd7 is1 like ,dilthey1 to be counted among the idealists4 ,in opposition to the individualism of the positivists1 the folk-psychologists--at their head ,steinthal and ,lazarus 7p4 #ecf72 ,gustav ,glogau#b in ,kiel 7born #ahdd7 is an adherent of the same movement--defend the power of the universal over individual spirits4 ,the spirit of the people is not a phrase1 an empty name1 but a real force1 not the sum of the individuals belonging to the people1 but an encompassing and controlling power1 which brings forth in the whole body processes 7e4g41 language7 which could not occur in individuals as such4 ,it is only as a member of society that anyone becomes truly man2 the community is the subject of the higher life of spirit4 ,footnote #a3 ,dilthey3 ,introduction to the ,mental ,sciences1 part i41 #ahhc2 ,poetic ,creation in the ,zeller ,aufstze1 #ahhg2 ,contributions to the ,solution of the ,question of the ,origin of our ,belief in the ,reality of the ,external ,world1 and its ,validity1 ,sitzungsberichte of the ,berlin ,academy of ,sciences1 #ahij2 ,conception and ,analysis of ,man in the ,fifteenth and ,sixteenth ,centuries in the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vols4 iv41 v41 #ahia-ib4 ,footnote #b3 ,glogau3 ,sketch of the ,fundamental ,philosophical ,sciences 7part i41 ,the ,form and the ,laws of ,motion of the ,spirit1 #ahhj2 part ii41 ,the ,nature and the ,fundamental ,forms of ,conscious ,spirit1 #ahhh72 ,outlines of ,psychology2 #ahhd4 ,if folk-psychology1 whose title but imperfectly expresses the comprehensive endeavor to construct a psychology of society or of the universal spirit1 is1 as it were1 an empirical confirmation of ,hegel's theory of ,objective ,spirit1 ,rudolf ,eucken#a 7born #ahdf71 pressing on in the ,fichtean manner from the secondary facts of consciousness to an original real-life1 endeavors to solve the question of a universal becoming1 of an all-pervasive force1 of a supporting unity 7totality7 in the life of spirit 7neither in a purely notical nor a purely metaphysical1 but7 in a nological way1 and demands that the fundamental science or doctrine of principles direct its attention not to cognition by itself1 but to the activity of psychical life as a whole4 ,footnote #a3 ,eucken3 ,the ,unity of ,spiritual ,life in the ,consciousness and ,deeds of ,humanity1 #ahhh2 ,prolegomena to this1 #ahhe4 ,a detailed analysis of the latter by ,falckenberg is given in the ,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie1 vol4 xc1 #ahhg2 cf4 above1 pp4 #ag and #faj4 ,we have elsewhere discussed the more recent attempts to establish a metaphysic which shall be empirically well grounded and shall cautiously rise from facts4#a ,in regard to the possibility of metaphysics three parties are to be distinguished3 ,on the left1 the positivists1 the neo-,kantians1 and the monists of consciousness1 who deny it out of hand4 ,on the right1 a series of philosophers--e4g41 adherents of ,hegel1 ,herbart1 and ,schopenhauer--who1 without making any concessions to the modern theory of knowledge1 hold fast to the possibility of a speculative metaphysics of the old type4 ,in the center1 a group of thinkers who are willing to renounce neither a solid notical foundation nor the attainment of metaphysical conclusions--so ,eduard von ,hartmann1 ,wundt1#b ,eucken1 ,volkelt 7pp4 #eij1 #fag74 ,otto ,liebmann 7born #ahdj2 ,on the ,analysis of ,reality1 #ahgf1 #b;d ed41 #ahhj2 ,thoughts and ,facts1 ,heft i4 #ahhb7 demands a sharp separation between the certain and the uncertain and an exact estimation of the degree of probability which theories possess2 puts the principles of metaphysics under the rubric of logical hypothesis2 and1 in his ,climax of the ,theories1 #ahhd1 calls attention to the fact that experiential science1 in addition to axioms necessarily or apodictically certain and empeiremes possessing actual or assertory certainty1 needs1 further1 a number of interpolation maxims1 which form an attribute of our type of intellectual organization 7i4e41 principles1 according to the standard of which we supplement the fragmentary and discrete series of single perceptions and isolated observations by the interpolation of the needed intermediate links1 so that they form a connected experience74 ,the most important of these maxims are the principles of real identity1 of the continuity of existence1 of causality1 and of the continuity of becoming4 ,experience is a gift of the understanding2 the premises1 as a rule1 latent in ordinary consciousness1 on whose anticipatory application our experience is based throughout1 assert something absolutely incapable of being experienced4 ,if1 in order to the production of a pure experience1 we eliminate all subjective additions of the understanding contained in experiential thought 7all that cannot be present at the moment or locally at hand1 in short1 all that cannot be the direct object and content of actual observation71 this breaks up into an unordered1 unconnected aggregate of discontinuous perceptual fragments2 in order that a complete and articulated condition of experience may result1 these fragments 7the purely factual content of observation1 the incoherent matter of perception7 must be supplemented and connected by very much that is not observed4 ,footnote #a3 ,r4 ,falckenberg1 ,ueber die gegenwrtige ,lage der deutschen ,philosophie1 inaugural address at ,erlangen1 ,leipsic1 #ahij4 ,footnote #b3 ,wundt3 ,essays1 #ahhe1 including ,philosophy and ,science2 ,system of ,philosophy1 #ahhi4 ,on the latter cf4 ,volkelt's paper in the ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vol4 xxvii4 #ahia2 and on the ,essays a notice by the same author in the same review1 vol4 xxiii4 #ahhg4 ,further1 a reaction against crude naturalism is observable in the practical field1 though political economists 7,roscher7 and jurists take a more active part in it than the philosophers4 ,personally ,r4 von ,jhering 7#ahah-ib2 ,purpose in ,law1 #b vols41 #ahgg-hc1 #b;d ed41 #ahhd-hf7 stands on idealistic ground1 although1 rejecting the nativistic and formalistic theory1 he is in principle an adherent of realism1 of the principle of interest and social utility 7the moral is that ,which is permanently useful to society74 ,finally1 similar motives underlie the growing interest in the history of philosophy4 ,the idealistic impulse seeks the nourishment which the un-metaphysical present denies to it from the great works of the past1 and hopes1 by keeping alive the classical achievements of previous times1 to enhance the consciousness of the urgency and irrepressibleness of the highest questions1 and to awaken courage for renewed attempts at their solution4 ,thus the study of history enters the service of systematic philosophy4 7c7 ,the ,special ,philosophical ,sciences4--,the more the courage to attack the central problems of philosophy has been paralyzed by the neo-,kantian theory of knowledge and the coming-in of the positivistic spirit1 the more lively has been the work of the last decades in the special departments3 the transfer of the center of gravity from metaphysics to the particular sciences is the most prominent characteristic of the philosophy of the time4 ,logic sees century-old convictions shattered and new foundations arising4 ,psychology has entered into competition with physiology in regard to the discovery of the laws of the psychical functions which depend on bodily processes1 while metaphysical questions are forced into the background and there is a growing distrust of the reliability of inner observation4 ,the philosophy of religion is favored with undiminished interest and aesthetics1 after long neglect1 with a renewal of attention2 the philosophy of history is about to reconquer its former rights4 ,there is1 moreover1 an especially lively interest in ethics2 and the investigation of the history of philosophy is more widely extended than ever before4 ,we will close our sketch with a short survey of the particular disciplines4 ,in the department of logic the following should be mentioned as classical achievements3 the works of ,christoph ,sigwart of ,tbingen 7vol4 i4 #ahgc1 #b;d ed41 #ahhi2 vol4 ii4 #ahgh71 of ,lotze 7p4 #fje71 and of ,wundt 7vol4 i4 ,erkenntnisslehre1 #ahhj2 vol4 ii4 ,methodenlehre1 #ahhc74 ,besides these1 ,bergmann 7p4 #fbj71 ,schuppe 7p4 #fai71 and ,benno ,erdmann 7,logik1 vol4 i4 #ahib7 deserve notice4 ,in psychology the following writers have made themselves prominent3 ,wilhelm ,wundt at ,leipsic 7born #ahcb71 ,grundzge der physiologischen ,psychologie1 #ahgd1 #c;d ed41 #ahhg2 ,a4 ,horwicz1 ,psychologische ,analysen auf physiologischer ,grundlage1 #ahgb seq42 ,franz ,brentano in ,vienna 7born #ahch71 ,psychologie vom empirischen ,standpunkte1 vol4 i4 #ahgd2 ,carl ,stumpf of ,munich 7born #ahdh71 ,ueber den psychologischen ,ursprung der ,raumvorstellung1 #ahgc1 ,tonpsychologie1 vol4 i4 #ahhc1 vol4 ii4 #ahij2 ,theodor ,lipps of ,breslau 7born #ahea71 ,grundthatsachen des ,seelenlebens1 #ahhc4 ,the following may be mentioned in the same connection3 ,j4,h4 ,witte1 ,das ,wesen der ,seele1 #ahhh2 ,h4 ,mnsterberg1 ,die ,willenshandlung1 #ahhh1 ,beitrge zur experimentellen ,psychologie1 #ahhi seq12 ,goswin ,k4 ,uphues at ,halle1 ,wahrnehmung und ,empfindung1 #ahhh1 ,ueber die ,erinnerung1 #ahhi2 ,h4 ,schmidkunz1 ,psychologie der ,suggestion1 #ahib2 ,h4 ,ebbinghaus1 the co-editor of the ,zeitschrift fr ,psychologie una ,physiologie der ,sinnesorgane1 #ahij seq42 ,h4 ,spitta2 ,max ,dessoir1 ,der ,hautsinn1 in the ,archiv fr ,anatomie una ,physiologie1 #ahib4 ,the following works are psychological contributions to the theory of knowledge3 ,e4,l4 ,fischer1 ,theorie der ,gesichtswahrnehmung1 #ahia2 ,hermann ,schwarz1 ,das ,wahrnehmungsproblem1 #ahib4 ,finally we may add ,a4 ,dorner in ,knigsberg1 ,das menschliche ,erkennen1 #ahhg2 and ,e4,l4 ,fischer1 ,die ,grundfragen der ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahhg4 ,the literature of moral philosophy has been substantially enriched by ,wundt1 ,ethik1 #ahhf1 #b;d ed41 #ahib2 and ,friedrich ,paulsen1 ,system der ,ethik1 #ahhi1 #b;d ed41 #ahia4 ,we may mention1 further1 ,baumann 7p4 #fja72 ,schuppe1 ,grundzge der ,ethik und ,rechtsphilosophie1 #ahhb2 ,witte1 ,freiheit des ,willens1 #ahhb2 ,g4 ,class in ,erlangen1 ,ideale und ,gter1 #ahhf2 ,richard ,wallaschek1 ,ideen zur praktischen ,philosophic1 #ahhf2 ,f4 ,tnnies in ,kiel1 ,gemeinschaft und ,gesellschaft1 #ahhg2 ,a4 ,dring1 ,philosophische ,gterlehre1 #ahhh2 ,th4 ,ziegler1 ,sittliches ,sein und ,werden1 #b;d ed41 #ahij2 ,g4 ,simmel1 ,einleitung in die ,moralwissenschaft1 vol4 i4 #ahib4 ,of the newer works in the field of aesthetics1 in addition to ,a4 ,zeising's ,aesthetische ,forschungen1 #ahee1 ,c4 ,hermann's ,aesthetik1 #ahge1 and ,hartmann's ,philosophie des ,schnen1 #ahhg1 we may mention the ,einleitung in die ,aesthetik of ,karl ,groos1 #ahib1 and the following by ,lipps3 ,der ,streit ber die ,tragdie1 #ahij2 ,aesthetische ,faktoren der ,raumanschauung1 #ahia2 the essay ,psychologie der ,komik 7,philosophische ,monatshefte1 vols4 xxiv4-xxv4 #ahhh-hi71 and ,aesthetische ,litteraturberichte1 7in the same review1 vol4 xxvi4 #ahij seq474 ,among the writers and works on the philosophy of history we may note ,conrad ,hermann in ,leipsic 7born #ahai71 ,philosophie der ,geschichte1 #ahgj2 ,bernheim1 ,geschichtsforschung und ,geschichtsphilosophie1 #ahhj2 ,karl ,fischer1 ,ist eine ,philosophie der ,geschichte wissenschaftlich erforderlich bezw4 mglich8 ,dillenburg ,programme1 #ahhi2 ,hinneberg1 ,die philosophischen ,grundlagen der ,geschichtswissenschaft in ,sybel's ,historische ,zeitschrift1 vol4 lxiii4 #ahhi2 ,a4 ,dippe1 ,das ,geschichtsstudium mit seinen ,zielen und ,fragen1 #ahia2 ,georg ,simmel1 ,die ,probleme der ,geschichtsphilosophie1 #ahib4 ,in the philosophy of religion1 which is discussed especially by the theologians1 a neo-,kantian and a neo-,hegelian tendency confront each other4 ,the former1 dividing in its turn1 is represented1 on the one hand1 by the ,ritschlian school--,w4 ,herrmann in ,marburg 7,die ,metaphysik in der ,theologie1 #ahgf1 ,die ,religion im ,verhltniss zum ,welterkennen und zur ,sittlichkeit1 #ahhi71 ,j4 ,kaftan in ,berlin 7,das ,wesen der christlichen ,religion1 #ahha7--;and1 on the other1 by ,r4,a4 ,lipsius in ,jena 7born #ahcj2 ,dogmatik1 #ahgf1 #b;d ed41 #ahgi2 ,philosophie und ,religion1 #ahhe74 ,the latter is represented by ,a4,e4 ,biedermann of ,zurich 7#ahai-he2 ,christliche ,dogmatik1 #ahfh2 #b;d ed41 #ahhd-he71 a pupil of ,w4 ,vatke1 and by ,otto ,pfleiderer of ,berlin 7born #ahci2 ,religionsphilosophie1 #ahgi2 #b;d ed41 #ahhc-d74 ,the neo-,kantians base religion exclusively on the practical side of human nature1 especially on the moral law1 derive it from the contrast between external dependence on nature and the inner freedom or supernatural destination of the spirit1 and wish it preserved from all intermixture with metaphysics4 ,according to the neo-,hegelians1 on the contrary1 the theoretical element in religion is no less essential2 and is capable of being purified1 of being elevated from the form of representation1 which is full of contradictions1 into the adequate form of pure thought1 capable1 therefore1 of reconciliation with philosophy4 ,hugo ,delff 7,ueber den ,weg zum ,wissen und zur ,gewissheit zu gelangen1 #ahhb2 ,die ,hauptprobleme der ,philosophie und ,religion1 #ahhf7 follows ,jacobi's course4 ,among the numerous works on the history of philosophy1 besides the masterpieces of ,zeller1 ,j4,e4 ,erdmann1 and ,kuno ,fischer1 the following are especially worthy of attention3 ,cl4 ,bumker in ,breslau1 ,das ,problem der ,materie in der griechischen ,philosophie1 #ahij2 ,h4 ,bonitz1 ,platonische ,studien1 #c;d ed41 #ahhf1 ,aristotelische ,studien1 #ahfb seq41 ,index ,aristotelicus1 #ahgj1 ,kleine ,schriften2 ,p4 ,deussen 7born #ahde71 ,das ,system der ,vedanta1 #ahhc1 ,h4 ,diels in ,berlin1 ,doxographi ,graeci1 #ahgi2 ,eucken in ,jena 7p4 #ag71 ,die ,methode der aristotelischen ,forschung1 #ahgb1 ,address ,ueber den ,werth der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahgd2 ,j4 ,freudenthal in ,breslau 7born #ahci1 pp4 #fc1 #aah71 ,hellenistische ,studien1 #c ,hefte1 #ahgi1 ,ueber die ,theologie des ,xenophanes1 #ahhf2 ,m4 ,heinze in ,leipsic1 ,die ,lehre vom ,logos in der griechischen ,philosophie1 #ahgb2 ,g4 ,freiherr von ,hertling in ,munich 7born #ahdc71 ,materie und ,form und die ,definition der ,seele bei ,aristoteles1 #ahga1 ,albertus ,magnus1 #ahhj2 ,h4 ,heussler in ,basle 7p4 #fe note71 ,der ,rationalismus des ,,xvii4 ,jahrhunderts in seinen ,beziehungen zur ,eniwickelungslehre1 #ahhe2 ,fr4 ,jodl in ,prague 7born #ahdi2 pp4 #af1 #bba note72 ,a4 ,krohn 7#ahdj-hi71 ,sokrates und ,xenophon1 #ahgd1 ,der platonische ,staat1 #ahgf1 ,die platonische ,frage1 #ahgh--on ,krohn1 an obituary by ,falckenberg in the ,biographisches ,jahrbuch fr ,alterthumskunde1 ,jahrg4 #ab1 #ahhi2 ,p4 ,natorp 7pp4 #hh note1 #eih71 ,forschungen zur ,geschichte des ,erkenntnissproblems im ,alterthum1 #ahhd2 ,edmund ,pfleiderer in ,tbingen 7born #ahdb2 p4 #aac note#a71 ,empirismus und ,skepsis im ,d4 ,humes ,philosophie1 #ahgd1 ,die ,philosophie des ,heraklit im ,lichte der ,mysterienidee1 #ahhf2 ,k4 von ,prantl 7#ahbj-hh71 ,geschichte der ,logik im ,abendlande1 #d vols41 #ahee-gj2 ,carl ,schaarschmidt 7pp4 #hh note1 #aag-aah72 ,johannes ,sarisberiensis1 #ahfb1 ,die ,sammlung der platonischen ,schriften1 #ahff2 ,l4 ,schmidt in ,marburg 7born #ahbd71 ,die ,ethik der alten ,griechen1 #ahha2 ,gustav ,schneider1 ,die platonische ,metaphysik1 #ahhd2 ,h4 ,siebeck in ,giessen1 ,untersuchungen zur ,philosophie der ,griechen1 #ahgc1 #b;d ed41 #ahhh1 ,geschichte der ,psychologie1 part i4 #ahhj-hd2 ,chr4 von ,sigwart 7born #ahcj2 pp4 #ag1 #aah72 ,heinrich von ,stein in ,rostock 7born #ahcc71 ,sieben ,bcher zur ,geschichte des ,platonismus1 #ahfb-ge2 ,ludwig ,stein in ,berne1 editor of the ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 founded in #ahgg1 ,die ,psychologie der ,stoa1 ,i4 ,metaphysisch-,anthropologischer ,theil1 #ahhf1 ,,ii4 ,erkenntnisstheorie1 #ahhh1 ,leibniz und ,spinoza1 #ahij2 ,l4 ,strmpell1 ,geschichte der griechischen ,philosophie1 #ahed1 #ahfa2 ,susemihl in ,greifswald1 ,die ,politik des ,aristoteles1 ,greek and ,german with notes1 #ahgi1 further1 a series of essays on ,plato and ,aristotle2 ,teichmller 7p4 #fja72 ,trendelenburg 7pp4 #fjj-fja71 ,aristotelis de ,anima1 #b;d ed41 by ,belger4 #ahhg2 ,th4 ,waitz1 ,aristotelis ,organon1 #ahdd-df2 ,j4 ,walter in ,knigsberg1 ,die ,lehre von der praktischen ,vernunft in der griechischen ,philosophie1 #ahgd1 ,geschichte der ,aesthetik im ,alterthum1 #ahib2 ,tob4 ,wildauer in ,innsbruck1 ,die ,psychologie des ,willens bei ,sokrates1 ,platon1 und ,aristoteles1 #ahgg1 #ahgi2 ,w4 ,windelbund in ,strasburg 7pp4 #ae-af71 ,geschichte der alten ,philosophie1 #ahhh2 ,theob4 ,ziegler in ,strasburg1 ,geschichte der christlichen ,ethik1 #ahhf1 #b;d ed41 with index1 #ahib2 ,rob4 ,zimmermann 7pp4 #ai note1 #cca1 #ecf71 ,studien und ,kritiken1 #ahgj4 #d4 ,retrospect4 ,in order to avoid the appearance of arbitrary construction we have been sparing with references of a philosophico-historical character4 ,in conclusion1 looking back at the period passed over1 we may give expression to some convictions concerning the guiding threads in the development of modern philosophy1 though these here claim only the rights of subjective opinion4 ,a mirror of modern culture1 and conscious of its sharp antithesis to ,scholasticism1 modern philosophy in its pre-,kantian period is pre-eminently characterized by naturalism4 ,nature1 as a system of masses moved according to law1 forms not only the favorite object of investigation1 but also the standard by which psychical reality is judged and explained4 ,the two directions in which this naturalism expresses itself1 the mechanical view of the world1 which endeavors to understand the universe from the standpoint of nature and all becoming from the standpoint of motion1#a and the intellectualistic view1 which seeks to understand the mind from the standpoint of knowledge1 are most intimately connected4 ,where the general view of the ,all takes form and color from nature1 a content and a mission can come to the mind from no other source than the external world2 whether we 7empirically7 make it take up the material of representation from without or 7rationalistically7 make it create an ideal reproduction of the content of external reality from within1 it is always the function of knowledge1 conceived as the reproduction of a completed reality1 which1 since it brings us into contact with nature1 advances into the foreground and determines the nature of psychical activity4 ,as is conceivable1 along with dogmatic faith in the power of the reason to possess itself of the reality before it and to reconstrue it in the system of science1 and with triumphant references to the mathematical method as a guaranty for the absolute certainty of philosophical knowledge1 the notical question emerges as to the means by which1 and the limits within which1 human knowledge is able to do justice to this great problem4 ,descartes gave out the programme for all these various tendencies--the mechanical explanation of nature1 the absolute separation of body and soul 7despiritualization of matter71 thought the essence of the mind1 the demand for certain knowledge1 armed against every doubt1 and the question as to the origin of ideas4 ,its execution by his successors shows not only a lateral extension in the most various directions 7the dualistic view of the world held by the occasionalists1 the monistic or pantheistic view of ,spinoza1 the pluralistic or individualistic view of ,leibnitz2 similarly the antithesis between the sensationalism of ,locke and ,condillac and the rationalism of ,spinoza and ,leibnitz71 but also a progressive deepening of problems1 mediated by party strife which puts every energy to the strain4 ,what a tremendous step from the empiricism of ,bacon to the skepticism of ,hume1 from the innate ideas of ,descartes to the potential a priori of ,leibnitz6 ,from the moment when the negative and positive culminations of the pre-,kantian movement in thought--,hume and ,leibnitz--came together in one mind1 the conditions of the ,kantian reform were given1 just as the preparation for the ,socratic reform had been given in the skepticism of the ,sophists and the ,greek3 nous principle of ,anaxagoras4 ,footnote #a3 ,even for ,leibnitz the mind is a machine 7automaton spirituale71 and psychical action a movement of ideas4 ,kant1 who dominates the second period of modern philosophy down to the present time1 is related to his predecessors in a twofold way4 ,in his criticism he completes the notical tendency1 and at the same time overcomes naturalism1 by limiting the mechanical explanation 7and with it certain knowledge1 it is true7 to phenomena and opposing moralism to intellectualism4 ,nature must be conceived from the standpoint of the spirit 7as its product1 for all conformity to law takes its origin in the spirit71 the spirit from the standpoint of the will4 ,metaphysics1 as the theory of the a priori conditions of experience1 is raised to the rank of a science1 while the suprasensible is removed from the region of proof and refutation and based upon the rock of moral will4 ,in the positive side of the ,kantian philosophy--the spirit the law-giver of nature1 the will the essence of spirit and the key to true reality--we find its kernel1 that in it which is forever valid4 ,the conclusions on the absolute worth of the moral disposition1 on the ultimate moral aim of the world1 on the intelligible character1 and on radical evil1 reveal the energy with which ,kant took up the mission of furnishing the life-forces opened up by ,christianity--which the ,middle ,ages had hidden rather than conserved under the crust of ,aristotelian conceptions entirely alien to them1 and the pre-,kantian period of modern times had almost wholly ignored--an entrance into philosophy1 and of transforming and enriching the modern view of the world from this standpoint4 ,kant's position is as opposite and superior to the specifically modern1 to the naturalistic temper of the new period1 as ,plato stands out1 a stranger and a prophet of the future1 above the level of ,greek modes of thought4 ,more fortunate1 however1 than ,plato1 he found disciples who followed further in the direction pointed out by that face of the ,janus-head of his philosophy which looked toward the future3 the ethelism of ,fichte and the historicism of ,hegel have their roots in ,kant's doctrine of the practical reason4 ,these are acquisitions which must never be given up1 which must ever be reconquered in face of attack from forces hostile to spirit and to morals4 ,in life1 as in science1 we must ever anew win ethical idealism in order to possess it4 ,as yet the reconciliation of the historical and the scientific1 the ,christian and the modern spirit is not effected4 ,for the inbred naturalism of the modern period has not only asserted itself1 amalgamated with ,kantian elements1 in the realistic metaphysics and mechanical psychology of ,herbart and in the system of ,schopenhauer1 as a lateral current by the side of ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel1 but1 under the influence of the new and powerful development of the natural sciences1 has once more confidently risen against the traditions of the idealistic school1 although now it is tempered by criticism and concedes to the practical ideals at least a refuge in faith4 ,the conviction that the rule of neo-,kantianism is provisional does not rest merely on the mutability of human affairs4 ,the widespread active study of the philosophy of the great ,knigsberger gives ground for the hope that also those elements in it from which the systems of the idealists have proceeded as necessary consequences will again find attention and appreciation4 ,the perception of the fact that the naturalistico-mechanical view represents only a part1 a subordinate part1 of the truth will lead to the further truth1 that the lower can only be explained by the higher4 ,we shall also learn more and more to distinguish between the permanent import of the position of fundamental idealism and the particular form which the constructive thinkers have given it2 the latter may fall before legitimate assaults1 but the former will not be affected by them4 ,the revival of the ,fichteo-,hegelian idealism by means of a method which shall do justice to the demands of the time by a closer adherence to experience1 by making general use of both the natural and the mental sciences1 and by an exact and cautious mode of argument--this seems to us to be the task of the future4 ,the most important of the post-,hegelian systems1 the system of ,lotze1 shows that the scientific spirit does not resist reconciliation with idealistic convictions in regard to the highest questions1 and the consideration which it on all sides enjoys1 that there exists a strong yearning in this direction4 ,but when a deeply founded need of the time becomes active1 it also rouses forces which dedicate themselves to its service and which are equal to the work4 ,,the ,,end4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,index4 ,abbt ,absolute1 the ,fichte on ,schelling on ,f4 ,krause on ,schleiermacher on ,hegel on ,fortlage on ,spencer on ,bstrom on ,strauss on ,feuerbach on the theistic school on ,lotze on ,hartmann on ,see also ,god the ,unconditioned ,achillini ,adamson1 ,r4 ,aesthetics of ,home 7,lord ,kames7 of ,burke of ,baumgarten of ,herder of ,kant of ,schiller of ,schelling of ,hegel of ,j4,f4 ,fries of ,herbart of ,schopenhauer ,agnosticism1 of ,spencer ,agricola1 ,r4 ,agrippa of ,nettesheim ,ahrens1 ,h4 ,alexandrists ,allihn ,althusius ,anderson ,angiulli1 ,a4 ,annet1 ,p4 ,antal1 ,g4 von ,antinomies1 the of ,kant his antinomy of aesthetic judgment and of teleological judgment ,apelt1 ,e4,f4 ,a priori1 the in ,kant in ,kant and the post-,kantians nature1 in ,schelling in ,j4,f4 ,fries ,beneke on ,herbart on ,j4,s4 ,mill on ,spencer's doctrine of the racial origin of ,opzoomer on ,cf4 ,ideas ,aquinas1 ,thomas ,ardig1 ,r4 ,aristotelians1 the opponents of ,arnauld ,arnoldt1 ,e4 ,associationalism of ,hartley and ,priestley of ,hume of the ,mills of ,bain ,ast1 ,g4,a4,f4 ,atomism in modern physics in ,gassendi and ,descartes in ,boyle ,leibnitz on ,attributes in ,descartes ,spinoza's doctrine of ,auerbach ,augustine ,avenarius1 ,r4 ,averroists ,baader1 ,f4 7von71 and ,schelling system of ,bach1 ,j4 ,bacmeister ,bacon1 ,francis a beginner of modern philosophy1 doctrine of1 in relation to ,locke ,bacon1 ,roger ,bahnsen1 ,j4 ,bain1 ,alexander ,baku ,barclay ,bardili ,bartholomaei ,barzellotti1 ,g4 ,basedow ,bauer1 ,bruno ,bauer1 ,edgar ,baumann1 ,j4 ,baumeister ,baumgarten1 ,alex4 ,baumgarten1 ,siegmund ,bumker1 ,cl4 ,baur1 ,f4,c4 ,bayle1 ,p41 doctrine of1 and ,leibnitz ,beattie1 ,j4 ,beck1 ,sigismund ,beckers1 ,h41 ,bekker1 ,balthasar1 ,,iii ,belger ,bellarmin ,beneke1 ,f4,e4 ,benoit1 ,g4 von ,bentham1 ,j4 ,bentley1 ,richard ,berger1 ,j4,e4 von ,bergmann1 ,j4 ,berkeley1 ,george1 position in modern philosophy1 view of mind and matter1 relation to ,locke on perception1 on knowledge1 his system1 relation to ,hume1 relation to ,scottish ,school1 relation to ,condillac1 his idealism criticised by ,kant1 referred to ,bernard1 ,claude ,bernheim ,bessarion ,bezold1 ,f4 von1 ,biberg ,biedermann1 ,a4,e4 ,biedermann1 ,fr4 ,k4 ,bilfinger ,billewicz1 ,j4 von1 ,biran1 ,maine de ,blignires ,bluntschli ,bodin7us7 ,body and ,mind1 see ,mind and ,body ,bothius1 ,d4 ,bhme1 ,jacob1 system of1 and ,schelling ,bhmer ,bhringer1 ,a4 ,bolin1 ,w4 ,bolingbroke ,bolzano1 ,b4 ,bonald1 ,victor de ,bonatelli1 ,f4 ,bonitz1 ,h4 ,bonnet ,bontekoe ,boole1 ,g4 ,borelius1 ,j4 ,borelli ,borgeaud ,bosanquet1 ,b4 ,bstrom1 ,c4,j4 ,botta1 ,v4 ,bouillier ,bourdin ,bourignon1 ,antoinette ,bowen1 ,f4 ,bowne1 ,b4,p4 ,boyle1 ,r4 ,bradley1 ,f4,h4 ,brah1 ,tycho ,brandes1 ,g4 ,brandis1 ,c4,a4 ,braniss1 ,j4 ,brasch1 ,m4 ,brentano1 ,f4 ,brchner1 ,h4 ,brockerhoff ,brown1 ,thomas ,browne1 ,peter ,browne1 ,sir ,thomas ,brucker ,bruder ,brunnhofer ,bruno1 ,giordano system of and ,spinoza1 and ,schelling ,brtt1 ,m4 ,buchanan1 ,george ,bchner1 ,l4 ,buckle ,budde ,buffon ,burckhardt ,burdach1 ,k4,f4 ,burgersdijck ,burke1 ,edmund ,burt1 ,b4,c4 ,busch1 ,o4 ,butler1 ,joseph ,butler1 ,n4,m4 ,cabanis ,caesalpin ,caird1 ,edward ,caird1 ,john ,cairns ,calker1 ,f4,v4 ,camerer ,campanella1 ,thomas system of ,campe ,cantoni ,cantor1 ,g4 ,caporali1 ,e4 ,cardanus1 ,hieronymus ,carlyle1 ,thomas ,carneri ,caro1 ,e4 ,carpenter1 ,w4,b4 ,carrire1 ,m4 ,cartesians1 the ,locke's relation to ,leibnitz's relation to ,carus1 ,f4,a4 ,carus1 ,k4,g4 ,carus1 ,p4 ,caspari1 ,o4 ,categories1 the1 ,kant on ,hegel's doctrine of ,caterus ,causation ,spinoza's view of ,locke on ,hume's skeptical analysis of ,kant on ,schopenhauer on ,lotze on ,hartmann on ,see also ,sufficient ,reason1 ,teleology ,cesca1 ,giovanni ,chalybaeus ,chandler1 ,samuel ,channing1 ,w4,e4 ,character1 the ,intelligible in ,kant in ,schelling in ,schopenhauer ,charron1 ,pierre ,christ1 ,p4 ,chubb1 ,thomas ,cieszkowski1 ,a4 von ,clarke1 ,samuel ethics of ,class1 ,g4 ,classen1 ,a4 ,clauberg ,cogito ergo sum the ,cartesian ,cohen1 ,h4 ,colecchi1 ,a4 ,coleridge1 ,s4,t4 ,collard1 ,royer ,collier1 ,arthur ,collins1 ,anthony ,collins1 ,f4,h4 ,collins1 ,w4,l4 ,combachius ,comenius ,commer1 ,e4 ,common ,sense1 ,scottish doctrine of ,comte1 ,auguste ,condillac doctrine of ,condorcet ,conn1 ,h4,w4 ,conybeare1 ,j4 ,copernicus1 ,n4 ,cordemoy ,cosmological ,argument1 the in ,locke in ,rousseau in ,leibnitz in ,kant ,cotes1 ,roger ,cousin1 ,victor ,cremonini ,crescas1 ,chasdai ,creuz1 ,k4 von ,critique of ,reason1 the meaning of the neo-,kantians on its central position in modern thought ,crousaz ,crusius1 ,c4,a4 ,cudworth1 ,ralph ethics of ,cumberland1 ,richard ,czolbe1 ,h4 ,d',alembert ,damiron ,danzel ,darjes ,darwin1 ,charles ,darwin1 ,erasmus ,daub1 ,k4 ,da ,vinci1 ,leonardo ,deism naturalism of in ,herbert in ,english thinkers of ,,xviii4 century in ,hume in ,rousseau of ,reimarus in ,lessing ,kant's relation to ,see also ,faith1 ,faith and ,reason1 ,religion1 ,theology ,delboeuf ,delff1 ,h4 ,de ,morgan1 ,a4 ,denifle ,des ,bosses ,descartes1 ,ren system of and occasionalism and ,spinoza and ,locke and ,leibnitz ,see also ,spinoza ,desdouits ,dessoir1 ,m4 ,deter ,determinism in ,hobbes in ,spinoza of the early associationalists of ,hume in ,leibnitz of ,schleiermacher of ,herbart of ,schopenhauer of ,j4,s4 ,mill of ,jonathan ,edwards ,see also ,character1 the ,intelligible2 ,freedom of the ,will ,deussen1 ,p4 ,deutinger1 ,m4 ,de ,wette ,dewey1 ,j4 ,diderot1 ,denis ,diels1 ,h4 ,dieterich1 ,k4 ,digby1 ,everard ,dillman ,dilthey1 ,w4 doctrine of1 ,dippe1 ,a4 ,dring1 ,a4 ,dorner1 ,a4 ,doubt the ,cartesian in ,bayle ,rousseau's reverential ,drobisch1 ,m4,w4 ,droz ,druskowitz1 ,helene ,du ,bois-,reymond1 ,e ,dhring1 ,e4 ,dumont1 ,e4 ,duncan1 ,g4,m4 ,durdik ,ebbinghaus1 ,h4 ,eberhard1 ,j4,a4 ,echtermeyer ,eckhart ,eclecticism1 of the ,german ,illumination of ,schleiermacher of ,cousin and his ,school ,edfeldt1 ,h4 ,education ,locke on ,rousseau on ,edwards1 ,jonathan ,ego1 the certain knowledge of1 in ,campanella1 and ,descartes the individual1 and the transcendental consciousness in ,kant ,fichte's doctrine of a complex of representations in ,beneke ,fortlage on ,herbart's doctrine of the neo-,kantians on the individual1 and the transcendental consciousness ,see also ,soul ,ellis ,emerson1 ,r4,w4 ,empiricism founded by ,bacon in ,hobbes and rationalism of ,locke of ,j4,s4 ,mill of ,opzoomer ,liebmann on ,see also ,experience1 ,sensationalism ,encyclopedists1 the ,engel1 ,j4,j4 ,ennemoser ,erasmus1 ,desiderius ,erdmann1 ,benno works by ,erdmann1 ,j4,e4 works by philosophy of ,erhardt1 ,f4 ,eschenmayer1 ,k4,a4 ,ethelism in ,crusius of ,fichte of ,schopenhauer in ,hartmann ,see also ,panthelism4 ,ethics ,bacon on ,hobbes's political theory of ,descartes on ,geulincx on ,spinoza on ,pascal on ,malebranche on ,locke on ,english1 of ,,xviii4 century ,hume's empirical and mechanical of ,french sensationalists of ,french materialists of ,rousseau of ,leibnitz of ,herder of ,kant of ,fichte of ,schleiermacher of ,hegel of ,j4,f4 ,fries of ,beneke of ,herbart of ,schopenhauer of ,comte of ,bentham of ,j4,s4 ,mill1 of ,spencer of ,t4,h4 ,green of ,lotze of ,hartmann recent ,german interest in ,eucken1 ,r4 works by philosophy of ,everett1 ,c4,c4 ,evil ,weigel on the origin of ,bhme on the origin of ,spinoza's doctrine of ,leibnitz's doctrine of ,schelling's theory of ,baader's theory of ,fechner's view of ,see also ,optimism1 ,pessimism ,evolution in the sense of explication in ,nicolas of ,cusa and involution in ,leibnitz cosmical1 of ,spencer biological1 of ,darwin ,cf4 also the systems of ,schelling1 ,hegel1 ,hartmann ,exner1 ,f4 ,experience the basis of science in ,bacon ,kant on ,green on ,liebmann's view of ,see also ,empiricism1 ,sensationalism ,external ,world1 the reality of1 in ,descartes knowledge and reality of1 in ,locke ,berkeley on ,kant on the reality of the material of duty in the form of sense in ,fichte ,faber ,stapulensis 7,lefvre of ,etaples7 ,faith the reformers' view of ,deistic view of ,kant on ,kant on moral or practical ,paulsen on practical ,see also ,deism ,faith and ,reason1 the relation of1 in modern philosophy ,bayle on ,locke on ,deistic view of in ,rousseau ,leibnitz on ,lessing on ,baader on ,schleiermacher on ,see also ,deism ,faith ,philosophy1 the of ,hamann of ,herder of ,jacobi elements of1 in ,j4,f4 ,fries ,falckenberg1 ,r4 works by ,farrer1 ,j4,a4 ,fechner1 ,g4,t4 system of ,fechner1 ,h4,a4 ,feder1 ,j4,g4,h4 ,feeling the basis of knowledge in ,pascal the central doctrine of ,rousseau central to religion in ,schleiermacher ,see also ,the ,faith ,philosophy ,ferguson1 ,adam ,ferrari1 ,giuseppe ,ferraz ,ferri1 ,l4 ,ferrier1 ,d4 ,ferrier1 ,j4,f4 ,fester1 ,r4 ,feuerbach1 ,l4 philosophy of ,fichte1 ,i4,h4 ,fichte1 ,j4,g4 and ,kant system of and ,schelling and ,hegel and ,herbart and ,lotze ,see also ,idealism1 ,jacobi1 ,kant ,ficinus ,filmer ,final ,causes1 see ,teleology ,fiorentino1 ,f4 ,fischer1 ,e4,l4 ,fischer1 ,k4 ,ph4 ,fischer1 ,karl ,fischer1 ,kuno works by on ,spinoza on ,kant his philosophy and neo-,kantianism ,fiske1 ,john ,flint1 ,k4 ,fludd1 ,r4 ,flgel ,forberg ,forge1 ,l4 de la ,fortlage1 ,karl works by system of ,fouille1 ,a4 ,fowler1 ,thos4 ,fox ,bourne ,franchi1 ,a4 ,franck1 ,a4 ,franck1 ,sebastian ,francke ,frantz1 ,k4 ,eraser1 ,a4,c4 ,frauenstdt1 ,j4 ,frederichs1 ,f4 ,frederick the ,great ,freedom of the ,will1 ,hobbes's denial of ,descartes's unlimited affirmation of denied by ,spinoza ,locke on denied by ,hume in ,rousseau ,leibnitz on ,herder on ,kant on ,fichte on ,schelling on ,herbart on ,schopenhauer on ,j-,s4 ,mill on ,see also ,character1 the ,intelligible2 ,determinism ,frege1 ,g4 ,freudenthal1 ,j4 ,fries1 ,a4 de ,fries1 ,j4,f41 and ,kant an opponent of constructive idealism his system and ,herbart ,froschammer ,fullerton1 ,g4,s4 ,gabler ,gale ,galileo 7,galileo ,galilei7 his work as a foundation for modern physics his system ,galluppi1 ,p4 ,galton1 ,francis ,garve1 ,c4 ,gassendi1 ,p4 ,gauss ,gay ,geijer1 ,e4,g4 ,geil ,genovesi1 ,a4 ,gentilis1 ,albericus ,george1 ,l4 ,george of ,trebizond ,georgius ,scholarius 7,gennadius7 ,gerdil1 ,s4 ,gerhardt ,gerson ,gersonides ,geulincx1 ,arnold ,gichtel ,gierke1 ,o4 ,gilbert1 ,william ,gioberti1 ,v4 ,gioja1 ,m4 ,gizycki1 ,g4 von ,glanvil ,glisson1 ,francis ,glogau1 ,g4 ,god1 doctrine of1 in ,nicolas of ,cusa in ,taurellus in ,bruno ,campanella's argument for the existence of ,weigel's doctrine of ,bhme's doctrine of ,descartes's arguments for the existence of ,spinoza's doctrine of ,malebranche's view of ,locke's doctrine of ,berkeley ascribes ideas of sense-world to ,hume's doctrine of ,voltaire's doctrine of ,holbach's discussion of ,leibnitz's doctrine of ,reimarus's doctrine of ,lessing's doctrine of ,herder's doctrine of ,jacobi's doctrine of ,kant on the arguments for the existence of ,fichte's doctrine of ,schelling's doctrine of ,f4 ,krause's doctrine of ,baader's doctrine of ,schleiermacher's doctrine of ,beneke's doctrine of ,herbart's doctrine of ,bstrom's doctrine of the doctrine of1 in ,hegel's ,school ,strauss's doctrine of ,feuerbach's doctrine of the doctrine of1 in the ,theistic ,school ,fechner on the relation of ,god and the world ,lotze's doctrine of ,hartmann's doctrine of ,see also3 ,cosmological ,argument ,deism ,ontological ,argument ,religion ,teleological ,argument ,theology ,ghring1 ,c4 ,golther1 ,l4 von ,gschel ,goethe ,gottsched ,gracian1 ,b4 ,grazia1 ,v4 de ,green1 ,t4,h41 works by doctrine of ,grimm1 ,e4 ,grimm1 ,f4,m41 ,baron von ,groos1 ,k4 ,grot1 ,n4 von ,grote1 ,john ,grotius1 ,hugo ,grubbe1 ,s4 ,gruber1 ,h4 ,grn1 ,k4 ,guhrauer ,gnther1 ,a4 ,gutberlet1 ,c4 ,guthrie1 ,m4 ,gttler1 ,c4 ,guyau1 ,j4,m4 ,gwinner1 ,w4 ,haeckel1 ,e4 ,haeghen1 ,v4 van der ,hagemann ,hall1 ,g4,s4 ,hallier ,hamann1 ,j4,g4 ,hamann1 ,o4 ,hamberger ,hamilton1 ,sir ,william ,harless1 ,a4 von ,harmony ,leibnitz's pre-established ,wolff's development of ,leibnitz's1 pre-established ,harms1 ,f4 ,harris1 ,w4,t4 ,harrison1 ,frederic ,hartenstein1 ,g4 ,hartley1 ,david ,hartmann1 ,e4 von works by system of ,harvey ,hase1 ,k4,a4 ,hassbach ,hausegger ,hausrath ,havet ,haym1 ,r4 ,hazard1 ,r4,g4 ,heath ,hebler1 ,c4 ,heereboord ,hegel1 ,g4,w4,f4 and ,schelling system of opponents of influence and followers of ,see also ,j4,g4 ,fichte1 ,kant1 ,schelling ,hegelians1 the ,old the ,young ,see also ,semi-,hegelians ,hegler1 ,a4 ,heiland1 ,k4 ,heinze1 ,m4 ,helmholtz1 ,h4 ,helmont1 ,f4,m4 van ,helmont1 ,j4,b4 van ,helvetius1 ,c4,a4 ,hemming ,hemsterhuis1 ,f4 ,herbart1 ,j4,f4 system of ,see also ,j4,g4 ,fichte ,herbert1 ,lord1 of ,cherbury ,herder1 ,j4,g4 system of ,schelling and ,hering ,hermann1 ,c4 ,hermann1 ,w4 ,hermes1 ,g4 ,herz1 ,m4 ,heusde1 ,p4,w4 van ,heussler1 ,h4 ,heyder1 ,karl ,hinneberg ,hinrichs ,hirnhaym ,history ,machiavelli on ,herder's philosophy of ,kant's view of ,fichte's view of ,schelling's view of ,f4 ,krause's philosophy of ,hegel's philosophy of ,vico's philosophy of ,history of ,philosophy1 the importance of method in ,hegel's view of recent development of ,hobbes1 ,thomas his system and ,descartes and ,spinoza and ,locke and ,hume and ,pufendorf ,hffding1 ,h4 ,hoffmann1 ,franz ,hijer1 ,b4 ,holbach1 ,baron von ,hlder1 ,a4 ,hlderlin ,home1 ,henry1 7,lord ,kames7 ,horvth ,horwicz1 ,a4 ,hotho ,huber1 ,j4 ,huber1 ,u4 ,huet7ius71 ,p4,d4 ,hufeland ,hume1 ,david system of and ,scottish ,school and ,kant ,see also ,berkeley1 ,locke ,hunt1 ,j4 ,husserl1 ,e4,g4 ,hutcheson1 ,francis ,huxley1 ,t4,h4 ,ibbot ,idealism phenomenal or individual of ,berkeley in ,leibnitz critical or transcendental1 of ,kant post-,kantian1 of ,beck subjective1 of ,fichte objective1 of ,schelling absolute or logical1 of ,hegel the opposition to constructive in ,schopenhauer ,german1 in ,great ,britain of ,green in ,america ethical or ideological1 of ,lotze idealistic reaction in ,germany against the scientific spirit ,falckenberg on 7ethical7 idealism and the future ,ideas1 innate1 in ,descartes1 ,locke1 ,leibnitz1 the rationalists and the empiricists origin of1 in ,descartes1 ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 the rationalists and empiricists1 and ,herbart impressions and1 in ,hume unconscious ideas or representations in ,leibnitz ,ideas of reason in ,kant the logical ,idea the subject of the world-process in ,hegel ,identity1 ,locke on ,spinozism a system of ,schelling's philosophy or system of the philosophy of1 among ,schelling's followers ,hegel's doctrine a system of ,fortlage's system of philosophy of1 in ,schopenhauer ,immortality ,hume on ,voltaire on ,rousseau on ,leibnitz on ,kant on ,schleiermacher on ,beneke on ,herbart on ,hegel's followers on ,strauss on ,fechner on ,imperative1 the ,categorical in ,kant in ,fichte in ,beneke ,induction ,kepler on ,galileo on used before ,bacon ,bacon's theory of in ,hobbes ,j4,s4 ,mill's theory of ,irwing1 ,von ,jacobi1 ,f4,h4 system of and ,fichte and the anti-idealists ,jacobson1 ,j4 ,jger1 ,g4 ,james1 ,william ,janet1 ,paul ,jansenists ,jastrow1 ,j4 ,jesuits ,jevons1 ,w4,s4 ,jhering1 ,r4 von ,jodl1 ,f4 ,jol1 ,m4 ,jouffroy1 ,t4 ,judgment ,descartes on rationalists and empiricists both mistake nature of ,kant on synthetic judgments a priori the categories and1 in ,kant judgments of perception and of experience in ,kant ,kant on aesthetic and teleological ,jungius ,kaatz1 ,h4 ,kaftan1 ,j4 ,kaltenborn1 ,c4 von ,kant1 ,i4 position in modern philosophy and ,locke and the ,illumination system of the development to ,fichte and ,fichte and ,schelling and ,hegel and ,schopenhauer his influence1 followers1 and opponents ,see also ,berkeley1 ,critique of ,reason1 ,j4,g4 ,fichte1 ,hume1 ,leibnitz1 ,locke1 ,schopenhauer1 ,wolff ,kayserling ,kedney1 ,j4,s4 ,kent1 ,g4 ,kepler1 ,j4 philosophy of ,kielmeyer ,kierkegaard1 ,s4 ,kieser ,king1 ,lord ,kirchmann1 ,j4,h4 von ,kirchner ,klein1 ,g4,m4 ,knauer1 ,v4 ,knight1 ,w4 ,knoodt1 ,p4 ,knowledge theory of1 in modern thought doctrine of1 in ,nicolas of ,cusa declared deceptive by ,montaigne mathematical basis of1 in ,kepler and ,galileo in ,bacon in ,hobbes in ,herbart the two views of ,geulincx on ,descartes on ,spinoza on ,malebranche on 7we see all things in ,god7 ,locke's doctrine of ,berkeley on ,hume's skeptical doctrine of ,scottish doctrine of sensationalistic doctrine of1 in ,france ,leibnitz's theory of ,kant on ,fichte's ,science of ,schelling's philosophy of ,baader on ,schleiermacher's doctrine of ,hegel on philosophical ,j4,f4 ,fries's doctrine of ,beneke on speculative ,schopenhauer's doctrine of ,comte's doctrine of ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton's doctrine of ,j4,s4 ,mill's doctrine of ,spencer's doctrine of ,t4,h4 ,green's doctrine of ,feuerbach's doctrine of ,lotze's doctrine of ,hartmann's doctrine of the neo-,kantians on the ,german positivists on influence of recent science on the theory of ,liebmann's doctrine of ,see also ,agnosticism1 ,critique of ,reason1 ,empiricism1 ,faith1 ,faith and ,reason1 ,nominalism1 ,positivism1 ,rationalism and ,empiricism1 ,relativity1 ,sensationalism1 ,skepticism ,knutzen1 ,m4 ,koch1 ,a4 ,koeber1 ,r4 von ,koegel1 ,f4 ,knig1 ,e4 ,koppelmann ,kstlin1 ,karl ,krause1 ,a4 ,krause1 ,e4 ,krause1 ,f4 ,krauth1 ,c4,p4 ,krohn1 ,a4 ,kroman1 ,k4 ,krug1 ,w4,t4 ,kuhn ,kuntze1 ,j4,e4 ,kvacsala ,kym1 ,a4,l4 ,laas1 ,e4 ,laban1 ,f4 ,labriola1 ,la ,bruyre ,ladd1 ,g4,t4 ,laffitte1 ,p4 ,lagrange ,lambert1 ,j4,h4 ,lamennais1 ,f4 de ,la ,mettrie1 ,j4,o4 de ,la ,mothe la ,vayer ,land1 ,j4,p4,n4 ,lange1 ,f4,a4 ,lange1 ,j4,j4 ,la ,rochefoucauld ,lasson1 ,a4 ,lasswitz1 ,k4 ,last1 ,e4 ,lavater ,law 7or ,right7 early philosophy of ,montesquieu on ,pufendorf on ,c4 ,thomasius on ,kant's theory of legal right ,fichte's theory of right ,schelling's view of ,f4 ,krause's philosophy of right ,hegel's philosophy of right ,lazarus1 ,m4 ,lechler ,leclair1 ,a4 von ,leibnitz1 ,friedrich 7the father7 ,leibnitz1 ,g4,w4 position in modern thought and occasionalism system of and the ,illumination 7,wolff1 ,lessing7 and ,kant ,see also ,descartes1 ,locke1 ,spinoza ,leonhardi1 ,h4,k4 von ,leopold ,lessing1 ,g4,e4 system of ,lewes1 ,g4,h4 ,liard1 ,l4 ,liberatore1 ,m4 ,lichtenberg ,liebig ,liebmann1 ,o4 ,linde1 ,a4 van der ,lindemann ,lipps1 ,t4 ,lipsius1 ,justus ,lipsius1 ,r4,a4 ,littr1 ,e4 ,locke1 ,j4 position in modern philosophy system of and ,berkeley and ,hume and the ,french ,illumination 7and ,rousseau7 and ,leibnitz and ,kant ,see also ,bacon1 ,berkeley1 ,descartes1 ,empiricism1 ,kant ,lohmeyer ,lombroso1 ,c4 ,lossius ,lott1 ,f4,c4 ,lotze1 ,r4,h4 system of ,lwe1 ,j4,h4 ,lubbock1 ,j4 ,llmann1 ,c4 ,luther ,lutterbeck ,lyng1 ,g4,v4 ,macaulay1 ,t4,b4 ,machiavelli1 ,n4 ,mackie ,mackintosh1 ,j4 ,mahaffy1 ,j4,p4 ,maimon1 ,s4 ,maimonides ,mainlnder1 ,p4 ,mainzer1 ,j4 ,maistre1 ,j1 de ,malebranche1 ,nicolas system of ,mamiani1 ,t4 ,mandeville1 ,bernard de ,mansel1 ,h4,l4 ,marcus ,marheineke ,mariana1 ,juan ,mariano ,marion1 ,h4 ,marsh1 ,james ,marsilius of ,padua ,martin1 ,b4 ,martineau1 ,harriet ,martineau1 ,james ,martini1 ,jacob ,masson1 ,david ,materialism in ,hobbes ,spinoza's tendency toward in the early associationalists in ,france in ,,xviii4 century ,kant on in ,schopenhauer and ,spencer's philosophy in ,strauss of ,feuerbach the controversy over1 in ,germany ,lange on ,mathematics the philosophical use of1 advocated by ,nicolas of ,cusa by ,kepler scientific use of1 ignored by ,bacon ,hobbes's recognition of method of1 adopted by ,spinoza ,kant on philosophy and ,kant on science and applied to psychology by ,herbart and by ,fechner recent1 and philosophy ,maudsley1 ,henry ,maupertuis ,mayer1 ,f4 ,mayer1 ,r4 ,mc,cosh1 ,j4 ,mechanism in modern thought in modern physical science the central doctrine of ,hobbes fundamental in ,spinoza applied to mind by the associationalists of ,j4,f4 ,fries of ideas in ,herbart in ,lotze in recent physical science ,see also ,naturalism1 ,physical ,science1 ,teleology ,meier1 ,g4,f4 ,meiners ,melancthon ,mellin ,melville1 ,andrew ,mendelssohn ,mersenne ,merz1 ,j4,t4 ,metaphysics ,bacon on of ,descartes of ,spinoza of ,leibnitz the ,wolffian division of ,kant on ,hegel on of ,fortlage of ,herbart ,comte on of ,fechner of ,lotze of ,hartmann recent ,german views on ,meyer1 ,j4,b4 ,meyer1 ,ludwig ,michelet1 ,c4,l4 ,michelis1 ,mill1 ,james ,mill1 ,j4,s4 ,milton1 ,john ,mind and ,body ,descartes on occasionalistic view of1 in ,geulincx ,spinoza on ,hartley and ,priestley on ,leibnitz on ,j4,f4 ,fries on ,modern ,philosophy value of history of characteristics of relation to the church relation to nationality beginnings of bibliography of two main schools of future of ,modes 7of ,substance7 in ,descartes in ,spinoza in ,locke ,moleschott ,monads ,giordano ,bruno's doctrine of ,leibnitz's doctrine of ,wolff's development of ,leibnitz's doctrine of ,monchamp1 ,g4 ,monck1 ,w4,h4,s4 ,monrad1 ,m4,j4 ,montaigne1 ,m4 de ,montesquieu ,more1 ,h4 ,more1 ,thomas ,moreau ,morelly ,morgan1 ,c4,l4 ,morgan1 ,thomas ,moriz ,morley1 ,j4 ,morris1 ,g4,s4 ,morselli ,mueller1 ,w4 ,mller1 ,f4,a4 ,mller1 ,g4,e4 ,mller1 ,h4 ,mller1 ,johannes ,mller1 ,max ,mnsterberg1 ,h4 ,mnz1 ,w4 ,nahlowsky ,naigeon ,natge ,natorp1 ,p4 ,naturalism characteristic of modern philosophy ,see also ,mechanism1 ,physical ,science1 ,teleology ,nature1 ,philosophy of early ,italian ,schelling's among ,schelling's followers ,hegel's ,j4,f4 ,fries's ,herbart's ,see also ,physical ,science ,nedich ,nees von ,esenbeck ,nemes1 ,e4 ,neo-,kantians ,nettleship1 ,r4,l4 ,neudecker ,newton1 ,isaac ,nichol ,nicolai1 ,f4 ,nicolas of ,cusa ,nicole ,nielsen1 ,r4 ,niethammer ,nietzsche1 ,f4 ,niphus ,nippold ,nizolius1 ,marius ,noack1 ,l4 ,noir1 ,l4 ,nolen ,nominalism in ,hobbes in ,locke of ,berkeley of ,hume ,noumena ,see also ,phenomena1 ,things in themselves ,novalis ,nyblaeus1 ,a4 ,occam ,occasionalists ,oischinger ,oken1 ,l4 ,oldendorp ,ontological argument1 the in ,descartes in ,spinoza in ,leibnitz in ,kant ,opel1 ,j4,o4 ,opposites the unity of1 in ,nicolas of ,cusa in ,schelling the reconciliation and identity of1 in ,hegel ,optimism in ,voltaire of ,leibnitz of ,schleiermacher ,opzoomer1 ,c4,w4 ,oratorians ,oersted1 ,h4,c4 ,oswald1 ,james ,oettingen1 ,a4 von ,pabst1 ,j4,h4 ,paley1 ,w4 ,pantheism of ,nicolas of ,cusa of ,spinoza ,malebranche's ,christian in ,toland ,berkeley's tendency to of ,holbach in ,fichte in ,schelling in ,schleiermacher ,fortlage's transcendent of ,strauss the theistic school on ,see also ,hegel1 ,panthelism ,panthelism of ,fichte in ,schelling of ,schopenhauer ,see also ,ethelism ,pappenheim ,paracelsus ,parker ,pascal1 ,blaise ,patritius1 ,franciscus ,paulsen1 ,f4 ,paulus ,pertz ,pessimism of ,schopenhauer of ,hartmann ,pesch ,pestalozzi1 ,j4,h4 ,peters1 ,k4 ,pfleiderer1 ,e4 ,pfleiderer1 ,o4 ,phenomena and things in themselves in ,kant and representation in ,kant and things in themselves in ,herbart in ,schopenhauer in ,lotze ,see also ,noumena1 ,things in themselves ,physical ,science concepts of modern ,newton's development of its influence on philosophy in ,,xix century ,pico1 ,francis1 of ,mirandola ,pico1 ,john1 of ,mirandola ,pierson ,pietsch1 ,t4 ,planck1 ,a4 ,planck1 ,k4,c4 ,platner ,platonists ,pletho1 ,g4,g4 ,plitt ,ploucquet ,plmacher1 ,o4 ,poiret1 ,p4 ,pollock1 ,f4 ,pomponatius1 ,petrus ,porter1 ,n4 ,positivism in ,italy of ,comte of ,comte's followers in ,england in ,sweden1 ,brazil1 and ,chili in ,germany ,prantl ,prel1 ,k4 du ,price1 ,richard ,priestley1 ,j4 ,prowe1 ,l4 ,psychology the associational the sensationalistic of ,leibnitz of ,wolff of ,tetens ,kant on rational constructive the basis of philosophy in ,j4,f4 ,fries and ,beneke of ,beneke of ,fortlage of ,herbart of ,comte physiological folk-psychology of ,spencer ,see also ,ego1 ,mind and ,body1 ,soul ,pufendorf1 ,samuel ,pnjer1 ,b41 works by ,quaebicker1 ,r4 ,qualities ,primary and ,secondary1 so termed by ,boyle ,locke's doctrine of ,kant's relation to ,berkeley's co-ordination of ,quesnay ,rabus1 ,l4 ,ragnisco ,ramus 7,pierre de la ,rame7 ,rationalism and ,empiricism in ,locke in ,leibnitz in ,tschirnhausen in others of the ,german ,illuminati in relation to ,kant ,rauwenhoff ,ravaisson1 ,f4 ,realism of ,herbart the transfigured1 of ,spencer the transcendental realism of ,hartmann ,re1 ,p4 ,regius ,regulative and constitutive principles1 in ,kant ,rehmke1 ,j4 ,rehnisch ,reichlin-,meldegg1 ,k4,a4 von ,reicke1 ,r ,reid1 ,thomas ,reiff1 ,j4,f4 ,reimarus ,reinhold1 ,e4 ,reinhold1 ,k4,l4 ,relativity of ,knowledge in ,comte of ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton of ,mansel of ,spencer ,religion ,bacon's view of ,hobbes on ,lord ,herbert's doctrine of natural ,pascal on deistic view of ,hume on ,voltaire on ,holbach on ,rousseau's view of ,leibnitz on ,reimarus on ,lessing's developmental theory of ,kant on ,fichte on ,schelling on ,schleiermacher's philosophy of ,hegel's philosophy of ,beneke on ,herbart's doctrine of ,schopenhauer's doctrine of ,comte's religion of humanity ,spencer's view of ,hegel's followers on ,strauss on ,feuerbach's doctrine of ,hartmann's philosophy of ,see also ,deism1 ,faith1 ,faith and ,reason1 ,god1 ,theology ,rmusat1 ,c4 de ,renan1 ,e4 ,renery ,renouvier1 ,c4 ,reuchlin1 ,h4 ,reuchlin1 ,j4 ,reuter1 ,h4 ,reynaud1 ,j4 ,ribbing1 ,s4 ,ribot1 ,th4 ,riedel1 ,o4 ,riehl1 ,a4 ,riemann ,riezler1 ,s4 ,right1 see ,law ,rio1 ,j4,s4 del ,ritschl1 ,a4 ,ritter1 ,h4 ,rixner ,robertson1 ,g4,c4 ,robinet ,robinet1 ,j4,b4 ,rocholl ,roeder ,rohmer1 ,f4 ,romagnosi1 ,g4 ,romanes1 ,g4,j4 ,romanticists1 the ,romundt1 ,h4 ,roscher ,rse1 ,f4 ,rosenkrantz1 ,w4 ,rosenkranz1 ,k4 ,rosmini1 ,a4 ,rothe1 ,r4 ,rousseau1 ,j4,j4 system of ,royce1 ,j4 ,rdiger ,ruge1 ,a4 ,ruge1 ,s4 ,ruysbroek ,sahlin ,st4 ,martin1 ,l4,c4 ,saint ,simon1 ,h4 de ,saisset1 ,e4 ,sanchez1 ,francis ,schaarschmidt1 ,c4 ,schffle1 ,e4,f4 ,schaller ,schrer1 ,e4 ,schasler1 ,m4 ,scheffler ,scheibler ,schelling1 ,f4,w4,j4 7von7 system of immediate followers of and ,hegel ,see also ,j4,g4 ,fichte1 ,hegel1 ,kant1 ,spinoza ,schelver ,schematism1 ,kant's ,schiller ,schindler1 ,c4 ,schlegel1 ,f4 ,schleicher1 ,a4 ,schleiden ,schleiermacher1 ,f4,d4,e4 system of ,schmid1 ,e4 ,schmid1 ,leopold ,schmidkunz1 ,h4 ,schmid-,schwarzenberg ,schmidt1 ,k4 ,schmidt1 ,l4 ,schmidt1 ,o4 ,schneider1 ,c4,m4 ,schneider1 ,g4 ,schneider1 ,g4,h4 ,schneider1 ,o4 ,schoenlank ,schopenhauer1 ,a4 and ,kant system of followers of ,schoppe 7,scioppius7 ,schubert1 ,f4,w4 ,schubert1 ,g4,h4 ,schubert-,soldern1 ,r4 von ,schuller1 ,h4 ,schultze1 ,fritz ,schulz1 ,j4 ,schulze1 ,g4,e4 7,aenesidemus-,schulze7 ,schuppe1 ,w4 ,schurman1 ,j4,g4 ,schtz ,schwarz1 ,h4 ,schwarz1 ,g4,e4 ,schwegler1 ,a4 ,schwenckfeld ,scottish ,school1 the ,selby-,bigge ,semi-,hegelians1 the ,semi-,kantians1 the ,semler ,sengler1 ,j4 ,sennert1 ,d4 ,sensation a source of knowledge in ,locke and in ,hume the sole source of knowledge in ,condillac ,leibnitz's view of ,see also ,rationalism and ,empiricism1 ,sensationalism ,sensationalism in ,hobbes in modern thought in general of ,locke of ,condillac of ,bonnet of ,helvetius of ,la ,mettrie of ,holbach in ,italy of ,feuerbach of the ,german positivists ,see also ,empiricism1 ,experience1 ,sensation ,sergi1 ,g4 ,seth1 ,a4 ,seydel1 ,r4 ,seyfarth ,shaftesbury ,sherlock1 ,t4 ,sibbern1 ,f4,c4 ,siber ,siciliani1 ,p4 ,sidgwick1 ,h4 ,sidney1 ,algernon ,siebeck ,sigwart1 ,chr4 von ,sigwart1 ,chr4 ,w4 ,silesius ,sime1 ,j4 ,simmel1 ,g4 ,simon1 ,j4 ,skepticism1 in ,montaigne in ,charron in ,f4 ,sanchez in ,bayle of ,hume of ,diderot1 of ,d',alembert the anti-,critical1 of ,schulze the ,critical1 of ,maimon ,smith1 ,adam ,snell1 ,k4 ,social ,contract1 the theory of1 in ,hobbes ,hume on in ,rousseau ,kant on ,solger1 ,k4,f4 ,sommer1 ,h4 ,sommer1 ,r4 ,soul1 the1 thought the essence of1 in ,descartes a congeries of ideas in ,spinoza thought the essence of1 in ,malebranche1 thought merely an activity of1 in ,locke a sum of inner states in ,hume ,leibnitz's monadological view of ,kant on ,herbart on ,see also ,ego1 ,immortality1 ,mind and ,body ,space 7and ,time71 ,hobbes on in ,leibnitz in ,kant in ,herbart in ,schopenhauer in ,spencer in ,lotze ,spaventa ,spedding ,spencer1 ,h4 system of ,spicker1 ,g4 ,spinoza1 ,b4 de position in modern philosophy and ,descartes system of and ,leibnitz and ,schelling ,see also ,descartes ,spirit1 ,schilling's philosophy of ,hegel's phenomenology of his doctrine of subjective of objective of absolute recent ,german philosophy of ,spitta1 ,h4 ,stadler1 ,a4 ,stahl1 ,f4,j4 ,starcke1 ,c4,n4 ,state1 the1 early theories of ,hobbes on ,spinoza on ,locke on ,montesquieu on ,rousseau's theory of ,kant's view of ,fichte on ,schelling on ,hegel on ,spencer on ,see also ,social ,contract ,staudinger1 ,f4 ,steckelmacher1 ,m4 ,steffens1 ,h4 ,steffensen1 ,k4 ,steinbart ,stein1 ,h4 von ,stein1 ,l4 ,steinthal ,stephen1 ,leslie ,stern1 ,a4 ,stewart1 ,dugald ,stirling1 ,j4,h4 ,stirner1 ,max 7pseudonym1 cf4 ,k4 ,schmidt7 ,stoeckl1 ,a4 ,sthr1 ,a4 ,stout1 ,g4,f4 ,strauss1 ,d4,f4 ,strmpell1 ,l4 ,stumpf1 ,c4 ,stumpf1 ,t4 ,sturm1 ,christoph ,stutzmann ,suabedissen ,suarez1 ,francis ,substance ,descartes on ,spinoza on ,locke on ,berkeley on 7material7 ,hume's skeptical analysis of ,leibnitz's doctrine of ,kant on ,schopenhauer on ,hartmann on ,sufficient ,reason1 the ,principle of in ,leibnitz in ,schopenhauer ,sully1 ,james ,sulzer ,susemihl ,suso ,taine1 ,h4 ,tappan1 ,h4,p4 ,taubert1 ,a4 ,tauler ,taurellus ,taute ,teichmller ,teleological ,argument1 the in ,boyle ,hume on ,reimarus on ,leibnitz on ,kant on ,herbart on ,teleology minimized by modern thought rejected by modern physics in ,boyle ,bacon on ,hobbes's denial of ,descartes on ,spinoza's denial of ,newton on ,leibnitz on ,kant on in ,fichte ,schelling on in ,hegel in ,trendelenburg in ,hartmann ,see also ,mechanism1 ,naturalism1 ,sufficient ,reason1 ,teleological ,argument ,telesius ,temple1 ,sir ,william ,testa ,tetens1 ,j4,n4 ,thaulow ,theology relation of1 to philosophy in ,taurellus in ,campanella and science in ,bacon in ,leibnitz ,lessing's speculative ,kant's view of ,schelling on ,schleiermacher's view of ,comte on the theological stage of thought ,strauss on ,feuerbach on ,see also ,deism1 ,faith1 ,faith and ,reason1 ,god1 ,religion ,thiele1 ,g4 ,things in themselves in ,kant's critics and immediate successors in ,fichte ,liebmann on ,see also ,phenomena1 ,noumena ,thomas ,kempis ,thilo ,thomasius1 ,christian ,thomasius1 ,jacob 7,father of ,christian7 ,thomson1 ,w4 ,thorild1 ,t4 ,thmmig ,tieck ,tiedemann ,tillotson1 ,j4 ,time1 ,kant on objective determinations of ,see also ,space and ,time ,tindal1 ,matthew ,toland1 ,john ,tnnies1 ,f4 ,torrey1 ,h4,a4,p4 ,toscanelli ,tracy1 ,destutt de ,trahndorff ,transcendental and ,transcendent1 meaning of1 in ,kant ,trendelenburg1 ,a4 ,treschow1 ,n4 ,tschirnhausen ,turgot ,twardowski1 ,k4 ,ueberhorst ,ueberweg1 ,f4 ,uebinger1 ,j4 ,ulrici1 ,h4 ,unconditioned1 the in ,kant in ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton in ,mansel in ,spencer ,see also the ,absolute ,unconscious1 the1 ,hartmann's philosophy of ,uphues1 ,g4,k4 ,vacherot1 ,e4 ,vaihinger1 ,h4 ,valla1 ,l4 ,vanini ,vatke1 ,w4 ,veitch1 ,j4 ,venetianer1 ,m4 ,venn1 ,j4 ,vera ,vico ,villers ,virchow1 ,r4 ,vischer1 ,f4,t4 ,vives ,vloten1 ,j4 van ,votius ,vogel ,vogt1 ,karl ,volkelt1 ,j4 works by position of ,volkmann von ,volkmar ,volney 7,chasseboeuf7 ,voltaire ,vorlnder1 ,f4 ,waddington ,wagner1 ,j4,j4 ,wagner1 ,richard ,wagner1 ,rudolph ,waitz1 ,theodor ,wallace1 ,a4,r4 ,wallace1 ,william ,wallaschek1 ,r4 ,walter1 ,j4 ,warburton1 ,w4 ,ward1 ,j4 ,watson1 ,john ,weber1 ,e4,h4 ,weber1 ,theodor ,weigel1 ,e4 ,weigel1 ,valentin ,weiss1 ,bruno ,weisse1 ,c4,h4 ,weissenborn ,werner1 ,k4 ,weston1 ,s4 ,burns ,weygoldt ,whately1 ,richard ,whedon1 ,d4,d4 ,whewell1 ,w4 ,whiston1 ,w4 ,wildauer1 ,t4 ,willmann1 ,o4 ,windelband1 ,w4 ,winkler1 ,b4 ,witte1 ,j4,h4 ,wohlrabe ,wolff1 ,christian system of and ,kant ,wollaston1 ,william ,woolston1 ,t4 ,wundt1 ,w4 ,wyck1 ,van der ,wyttenbach1 ,d4 ,zabarella ,zart1 ,g4 ,zeising1 ,a4 ,zeller1 ,e4 works of position of ,ziegler1 ,t4 ,ziller1 ,t4 ,zimmer1 ,f4 ,zimmermann1 ,r4 ,zimmern1 ,helen ,zllner