,,pragmatism    ,by    ,d4,l4 ,,murray  
,,with ,a ,,preface ,,by ,,dr4 ,f4,c4,s4
 ,,schiller      ,,philosophies         
,,ancient ,,and ,,modern    ,,pragmatism
          ,,contents      ,,preface ,,by
 ,,dr4 ,f4,c4,s4 ,,schiller    ,i4      
,,the ,,genesis ,,of ,,pragmatism       
,,ii4   ,,the ,,new ,,psychology        
,,iii4  ,,will ,,in ,,cognition    ,,iv4
   ,,the ,,dilemmas ,,of ,,dogmatism    
,v4    ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,truth     
,,and ,,error    ,,vi4   ,,the ,,failure
 ,,of ,,formal ,,logic    ,,vii4  ,,the 
,,bankruptcy ,,of ,,intellectualism     
,,viii4 ,,thought ,,and ,,life          
,,bibliography          ,,preface       
,mr4 ,murray's youthful modesty insists 
that his study of ,pragmatism needs  a  
sponsor2 this is not at all my own      
opinion1 but ,i may take the            
opportunity of pointing out how         
singularly qualified he is to give a    
good account of it4    ,in the first    
place he is young1 and youth is an      
almost indispensable  qualification for 

the appreciation of novelty2 for the    
mind works more  and more stiffly as it 
grows older1 and becomes less and less  
capable of  absorbing what is new4      
,hence1 if our 'great authorities' lived
 for ever1  they would become complete  
,struldbrugs4 ,this is the justification
 of  death from the standpoint of social
 progress4 ,and as there is no subject  
in which ,struldbruggery is more rampant
 than in philosophy1 a youthful  and    
nimble mind is here particularly needed4
 ,it has given ,mr4 ,murray an  eye also
 to the varieties of ,pragmatism and to 
their connections4    ,secondly1 ,mr4   
,murray has 7like myself7 enjoyed the   
advantage of a  severely                
intellectualistic training in the       
classical philosophy of  ,oxford        
,university1 and in its premier college1
 ,balliol4 ,the aim of this  training is
 to instil into the best minds the      
country produces an  adamantine         
conviction that philosophy has made no  
progress since  ,aristotle4 ,it costs   

about #ej1jjj a year1 but on the whole  
it is  singularly successful4 ,its      
effect upon capable minds possessed of  
common  sense is to produce that        
contempt for pure intellect which       
distinguishes  the ,british nation from 
all others1 and ensures the practical   
success of  administrators selected by  
an examination so gloriously irrelevant 
to  their future duties that1 since the 
lamentable demise of the ,chinese       
system1 it may boast to be the most     
antiquated in the world4 ,in minds1     
however1 which are more prone to        
theorizing1 but at the same time        
clear-headed1 this training produces a  
keenness of insight into the  defects of
 intellectualism and a perception of the
 intellectual  necessity of ,pragmatism 
which can probably be reached in no     
other way4  ,mr4 ,murray1 therefore1 is 
quite right in emphasizing1 above all1  
the  services of ,pragmatism as a       
rigorously critical theory of knowledge1
 and  in refuting the amiable delusion  

of many pedants that ,pragmatism is     
merely an emotional revolt against the  
rigors of ,logic4 ,it is  essentially a 
reform of ,logic1 which protests against
 a ,logic that has  become so formal as 
to abstract from meaning altogether4    
,thirdly1 an elementary introduction to 
,pragmatism was greatly needed1  less   
because the subject is inherently       
difficult than because it has  become so
 deeply involved in philosophic         
controversy4 ,intrinsically it  should  
be as easy to make philosophy           
intelligible as any other subject4  ,the
 exposition of a truth is difficult only
 to those who have not  understood it1  
or do not desire to reveal it4 ,but     
,british philosophy had  long become    
almost as open as ,german to the        
7,german7 gibe that  'philosophy is     
nothing but the systematic misuse of a  
terminology  invented expressly for this
 purpose1' and ,pragmatism1 too1 could  
obtain  a hearing only by showing that  
it could parley with its foes in the    

technical language of ,kant and ,hegel4 
,hence it had no leisure to compose a   
fitting introduction to itself for      
students of philosophy4 ,william        
,james's ,pragmatism1 great as it is as 
a work of genius1 brilliant as it is as 
a contribution to literature1  was      
intended mainly for the man in the      
street4 ,it is so lacking in the        
familiar philosophic catchwords that it 
may be doubted whether any  professor   
has quite understood it4 ,and moreover1 
it was written some  years ago1 and no  
longer covers the whole ground4 ,the    
other writings of  the pragmatists have 
all been too controversial and          
technical4    ,the critics of           
,pragmatism have produced only          
caricatures so gross as to  be          
unrecognizable1 and so obscure as to be 
unintelligible4 ,mr4 ,murray's  little  
book alone may claim to be 7within its  
limits7 a complete survey  of the field1
 simply worded1 and yet not unmindful of
 due technicality4  ,it is also up to   

date1 though in dealing with so         
progressive a subject  it is impossible 
to say how long it is destined to remain
 so4    ,f4,c4,s4 ,,schiller4           
,,chapter ,i      ,,the ,,genesis ,,of  
,,pragmatism    ,there is a curious     
impression to-day in the world of       
thought that  ,pragmatism is the most   
audacious of philosophic novelties1 the 
most  anarchical transvaluation of all  
respectable traditions4 ,sometimes it is
  pictured as an insurgence of emotion  
against logic1 sometimes as an  assault 
of theology upon the integrity of ,pure 
,reason4 ,one day it is  described as   
the reckless theorizing of dilettanti   
whose knowledge of  philosophy is too   
superficial to require refutation1 the  
next as a  transatlantic importation of 
the debasing slang of the ,wild ,west4  
,abroad  it is frequently denounced as  
an outbreak of the sordid commercialism 
of  the ,anglo-,saxon mind4    ,all     
these ideas are mistaken4 ,pragmatism is
 neither a revolt against  philosophy   

nor a revolution in philosophy1 except  
in so far as it is an  important        
evolution of philosophy4 ,it is a       
collective name for the most  modern    
solution of puzzles which have impeded  
philosophical progress  from time       
immemorial1 and it has arisen naturally 
in the course of  philosophical         
reflection4 ,it answers the big problems
 which are as  familiar to the scientist
 and the theologian as to the           
metaphysician and  epistemologist1 and  
which are both intelligible and         
interesting to  common sense4    ,the   
following questions stand out3 7#a7 ,can
 the possibility of knowledge  be       
maintained against ,hume and other      
sceptics8 ,certainly1 if it can be      
shown that ',the ,new ,psychology' has  
antiquated the analysis of mind  which  
,hume assumed and ',british             
,associationism' respectfully continued 
to uphold4 7#b7 ,seeing that inclination
 and volition indisputably play a  part 
in the acceptance of all beliefs1       

scientific and religious1 what  is the  
logical significance of this fact8 ,this
 yields the problem ',the  ,will to     
,believe1' and more generally of 'the   
place of ,will in  cognition4' 7#c7 ,is 
there no criterion by which the         
divergent claims of  rival creeds and   
philosophies--to be possessed of        
unconditional  truth--can be            
scientifically tested8 ,the sceptic's   
sneer1 that the  shifting systems of    
philosophy illustrate only the changing 
fashions of  a great illusion about     
man's capacity for truth1 plunges       
dogmatism into  a ',dilemma1' from which
 it can emerge only by finding a way of 
discriminating a 'truth' from an        
'error1' and so solving the 'problem of 
,truth and ,error4' ,the weird verbalism
 of the traditional ,logic suggests  a  
problem which strikes deeper even than  
the question1 ',what do you  mean by    
truth8' viz43 ',do you mean anything8'  
and so the 'problem of  ,meaning' is    
propounded by the failure of ,formal    

,logic4 ,is ,logic not  concerned at all
 with meaning1 is it only juggling with 
empty forms of  words8 ,lastly1 if from 
all this there springs up a conviction  
of ',the  ,bankruptcy of                
,intellectualism1' the question suggests
 itself whether the  relation between   
abstract thinking and concrete          
experience1 between  ',thought' and     
',life1' has been rightly grasped4 ,is  
life worth living  only for the sake of 
philosophic contemplation1 or is        
thinking only  worth doing to aid us in 
the struggle for life8 ,are 'theory' and
  'practice' two separate kingdoms with 
rigid frontiers1 strictly guarded1  or  
does it appear that theories which      
cannot be applied have1 in the  end1    
neither worth1 nor truth1 nor even      
meaning8    ,it is plain from this      
catalogue of inquiries that ,pragmatism 
makes no  abrupt breach in tradition4   
,it is not the ptroleuse of philosophy4 
,it  does not wipe out the history of   
speculation in order to announce a      

millennium of new ideas2 it claims1 on  
the contrary1 to be the  culmination and
 dnoment of that history4 ,it cannot    
rightly be  represented as trying either
 to sell new lamps for old1 or to       
jerry-build a new metaphysical system on
 the ruins of all previous              
achievements4 ,its real task is         
singularly modest4 ,it aims merely at   
instructing system-builders in the      
elementary laws which condition the     
stability of such structures and conduce
 to their conservation4    ,it is       
therefore a grave mistake to regard it  
as a parochial  eccentricity1 as a      
specific ,americanism4 ,nor is it the   
product of the  misplaced ingenuity of  
individual paradox-mongers4 ,it has come
 into  being by the convergence of      
distinct lines of thought pursued in    
different countries by different        
thinkers4    #a4 ,one of the most       
interesting of these has originated in  
the scientific  world4 ,the immense     
growth of scientific knowledge during   

the last  century was bound to react on 
human conceptions of scientific         
procedure4  ,the enormous number of new 
facts brought to light by manipulating  
hypotheses could not but modify our view
 of scientific law4 ,laws no  longer    
seem to scientists the immutable        
foundations of an eternal order1  but   
are inevitably treated as man-made      
formulae for grouping and  predicting   
the events which verify them4 ,the      
labours of physicists like  ,mach1      
,duhem1 and ,ostwald1 point to          
alternative formulations of new         
hypotheses for the best established     
laws4 ,the physics of ,newton are no    
longer final1 and the notion of 'energy'
 is a dangerous rival to the  older     
conception of 'matter4' ,it is1 of      
course1 indifferent to the  philosopher 
whether the new physics are successful  
in superseding the  old or not4 ,what it
 concerns him to note is that dogmatic  
confidence in  the finality of          
scientific laws has given place to a    

belief that our  laws are only working  
formulae for scientific purposes1 and   
that no  science can truly boast of     
having read off the mind of the ,deity4 
,as ,sir  ,j4,j4 ,thomson neatly puts   
it1 a scientific theory1 for the        
enlightened  modern scientist1 is a     
'policy and not a creed4' ,science has  
become  content to be only 'a conceptual
 shorthand1' provided that its message  
be humanly intelligible4 ,it no longer  
claims truth because abstractly  and    
absolutely it 'corresponds with         
,nature1' but because it yields a       
convenient means of mastering the flux  
of events4    ,even mathematics1 long   
the pattern of absolute knowledge1 has  
not  escaped the stigma of relativity4  
',metageometries' have been invented by 
,riemann and ,lobatschewski as rivals to
 the assumptions of ,euclid1 and  the   
brilliant writings of ,poincar have     
explained the human devices on  which   
mathematical concepts rest4 ,euclidean  
geometry is reduced to a  useful        

interpretation of the data of           
experience2 it is not theoretically  the
 only one4 ,its superior validity is    
dependent upon its use when  applied to 
the physical world4 ,even mathematics1  
therefore1 lend  themselves to the      
philosophic inference drawn by ,henri   
,bergson and  others1 that all          
conceptual systems of the human mind    
have a merely  conditional truth1       
depending on the circumstances of their 
application4    #b4 ,another            
fountain-head of ,pragmatic philosophy  
has been ,darwinism4  ,indeed1 the      
,pragmatic is the only philosophizing   
which has completely  assimilated       
,evolution4 ,the insight into the real  
fluidity of natural  species ought long 
ago to have toned down the artificial   
rigidity of  logical classifications4   
,to know reality man can no longer rest 
in a  'timeless' contemplation of a     
static system2 he must expand his       
thoughts  so as to cope with a          
perpetually changing process4 ,since the

 world  changes1 his 'truths' must      
change to fit it4 ,he is faced with the 
necessity of a continuous reconstruction
 of beliefs4 ,this influence of  ,darwin
 has inspired the logical theories of   
,professor ,dewey and the  ',chicago    
,school' of ,pragmatists4 ,thought in   
their writings is  essentially the      
instrument of this readjustment4 ,its   
function is to  effect the necessary    
changes in beliefs as economically and  
usefully as  possible4 ,it is an        
evolving process which keeps pace with  
the evolution  of reality and the       
changing situations of mortal life4     
#c4 ,it is not1 however1 entirely the   
reaction of science upon philosophy     
which has given birth to ,pragmatism4   
,philosophy itself has been rent by     
internal convulsions4 ,these have been  
emphasized in the work of ,dr4          
,f4,c4,s4 ,schiller1 who has shown that 
already in the days of ,plato the       
distinction between 'truth' and 'error' 
was baffling philosophy1 that  ,plato's 

,theaetetus has failed to establish it1 
and that the famous  dictum of          
,protagoras1 ',man is the measure of all
 things1' distinctly  foreshadows the   
',pragmatic1' or1 as he calls it1 the   
',humanist1'  solution of the           
difficulty4    ,elsewhere ,dr4 ,schiller
 has commented on the controversies     
raised by  ,hume's criticism of         
dogmatism4 ,he has shown that ,kant     
failed to answer  ,hume because he      
accepted ,hume's psychology1 and that no
 a priori  philosophers have since been 
able to devise any consistent and       
tenable  doctrine4 ,the idealistic      
theories of the ',absolute' reveal their
  futility by their want of application 
to the genuine problems of life1  and by
 the theoretic agnosticism from which   
they cannot escape4 ,hence  the need for
 a new ,theory of ,knowledge and a      
thorough reform of ,logic4    #d4 ,at   
this point he joins forces with ,mr4    
,alfred ,sidgwick1 who has long  been   
urging a radical criticism of the       

procedures of ,formal ,logic1 and  shown
 the gulf between them and the processes
 of concrete thought4  ,sidgwick has    
demonstrated that the belief in formal  
truth renders ,logic  merely verbal1 and
 that the actual meaning of assertions  
completely  escapes it4    #e4 ,the most
 sensational approach to ,pragmatism1   
however1 is that from  the side of      
religion4 ,the ,pragmatic method of     
deciding religious  problems1 which     
asserts the legitimacy of a ',faith'    
that precedes  knowledge1 has always    
been1 more or less consciously1         
practised by the  religious4 ,it is     
brilliantly advocated in the ,thoughts  
of ,pascal1 and  clearly and forcibly   
defended in that most remarkable essay  
in  unprofessional philosophy1 ,cardinal
 ,newman's ,grammar of ,assent4 ,this   
line of reasoning1 however1 is most     
familiarly associated with the name  of 
,william ,james2 he first illustrated   
the ,pragmatic ,method by a famous      
paper 7for a theological audience7 on   

,the ,will to ,believe1 and founded  the
 psychological study of religious       
experience in his ,gifford ,lectures  on
 ,the ,varieties of ,religious          
,experience4    #f4 ,this brings us to  
the last1 and historically the most     
fertile1 of the  sources of ,pragmatism1
 ,psychology4 ,the publication in #ahij 
of ,james's  great ,principles of       
,psychology opened a new era in the     
history of that  science4 ,more than    
that1 it was destined in the long run to
 work a  transformation in philosophy as
 a whole1 by introducing into it those  
biological and voluntaristic principles 
to which he afterwards applied  the     
generic name of ,pragmatism1 or         
philosophy of action4 ,we must pass1    
then1 to consider the ,new ,psychology  
of ,william ,james4          ,,chapter  
,,ii      ,,the ,,new ,,psychology      
,until the year #ahij1 when ,james's    
,principles were published1 the         
psychology of ,hume reigned absolutely  
in philosophy4,a ,all empiricists       

accepted it enthusiastically1 as the sum
 of philosophic wisdom2 all  apriorists 
submitted to it1 even in supplementing  
and modifying it by  'transcendental'   
and metaphysical additions2 in either   
case it remained  uncontested as        
psychology1 and1 by propounding an      
utterly erroneous  analysis of the mind 
and its experience1 entangled philosophy
 in  inextricable difficulties4         
,hume had1 as philosophers commonly do1 
set out from the practically  sufficient
 analysis of experience which all find  
ready-made in language4  ,he accepted1  
therefore1 from common sense the belief 
that physical  reality is composed of a 
multitude of separate existences that   
act on  one another1 and tried to       
conceive mental life strictly on the    
same  analogy4 ,his theory of           
experience1 therefore1 closely parallels
 the  atomistic theory of matter4 ,just 
as the physicist explains bodies as     
collections of discrete particles1 so   
,hume reduced all the contents of  the  

mind to a number of elementary          
sensations4 ,whether the mind was       
reflecting on its own internal ideas1 or
 whether it was undergoing  impressions 
which it supposed to come from an       
external source1 all that  was really   
happening was a succession of detached  
sensations4 ,it seemed  to ,hume        
indisputable that every distinct        
perception 7or 'impression'7  was a     
distinct existence1 and that all 'ideas'
 were equally distinct1  though fainter1
 copies of impressions4 ,beyond         
impressions and ideas it  was           
unnecessary to look4 ,thus to look at a 
chessboard was to have a  number of     
sensations of black and white arranged  
in a certain order1 to  listen to a     
piece of music was to experience a      
succession of loud and  soft auditory   
sensations1 to handle a stone was to    
receive a group of  sensations of touch4
 ,to suppose that anything beyond these 
sensory units  was ever really          
experienced was futile fiction4         

,experience was a mosaic1  of which the 
stones were the detached sensations1 and
 their washed-out  copies1 the ideas4   
,if this analysis of the mind were      
correct--and its correctness was not    
disputed for more than a hundred years1 
for were not the sensations  admitted to
 be the ultimate analysis of all that   
was perceived8--the  common-sense belief
 that knowledge revealed a world outside
 the thinker  was1 of course1 erroneous4
 ,for common sense could hardly treat   
'things'  as merely 'sensations'        
artificially grouped together in space1 
each  'thing' being a complex of a      
number of sensations having relation to 
similar complexes4 ,it held rather that 
the successive appearances of  things   
were related in time1 in such a way that
 they could be supposed  to reveal a    
single object able to endure in spite of
 surface changes1  and to manifest the  
identity of its sensory 'qualities4'    
,similarly1 the  succession of ideas    
within the mind was for it supported by 

the inward  unity of the soul within    
which they arose4 ,moreover1 ,hume's    
analysis  made havoc of all idea1 of    
'causation4' ,if every sensation was a  
separate being1 how was it to be        
connected with any other in any regular 
or necessary connection8 ,two events    
related as 'cause' and 'effect' must  be
 a myth4    ,these subversive           
consequences of his theory ,hume did not
 conceal1 though  he did not push his   
mental 'atomism' to its logical extreme4
 ,when he  defined material objects as  
'coloured points disposed in a certain  
order1' he was in fact admitting space  
as a relating factor2 when he  spoke of 
the succession of impressions and ideas 
in experience1 he was  tacitly assuming 
that what was apprehended was not a bare
 succession of  sensations1 but also the
 fact that they were succeeding one     
another1  and so allowing a sense of    
temporal relation4 ,but further than    
this he  refused to go4 ,the idea of a  
continuous self was fantastic4 ,there   

was  nothing beneath the ideas to       
connect them4 ,the notion of causal     
connection was equally chimerical4 ,each
 sensation was distinct and  existed in 
its own right4 ,it could therefore occur
 alone4 ,there was  nothing to link     
together the distinct impressions4      
,hence necessary  connection in events  
could not be more than a fiction of the 
mind based  on expectation of customary 
sequences2 how the mind he had described
 as  non-existent could form an         
expectation or observe a sequence was   
calmly  left a mystery4    ,hume1 then1 
seemed to leave to his successors in    
philosophy a task of  synthesis4 ,he had
 tumbled the soul off her high          
watch-tower1 but how to  combine her    
shattered fragments again into a working
 unity he declined  to say4 ,he saw the 
sceptical implications of his analysis1 
but professed  himself unable to suggest
 a remedy4    ,he had1 however1 made the
 embarrassments of the theory of        
knowledge  sufficiently clear for ,kant1

 his most important successor1 to hit   
upon  the most obvious palliative1 and  
in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason ,kant 
set himself to patch up ,hume's         
analysis4 ,experience as it came through
  the channels of sense1 he admitted    
,hume had analysed correctly2 it was  'a
 manifold1' a whirl of separate         
sensations4 ,but these per se could  not
 yield knowledge4 ,they must be made to 
cohere1 and the way to do this  he had  
found4 ,the mind on to which they fell  
was equipped with a  complicated        
apparatus of faculties which could      
organize the chaotic  manifold of sense 
and turn it into the connected world    
which common  sense and science         
recognize4 ,first it views the data of  
sense in the  light of its own 'pure    
intuitions1' and1 lo6 they are seen to  
be in  ,space and ,time2 then it        
solidifies them with its own            
'categories1' which  turn them into     
'substances' and 'causes' and endow them
 with all the  attributes required to   

sustain that status2 finally it refers  
them all  to a ,transcendental ,ego1    
which is not1 indeed1 a soul1 but       
sufficiently  like one to provide       
something that can admire the creative  
synthesis of  'mind as such4'    ,had   
,hume lived to read ,kant's ,critique1  
he would probably have jeered  at the   
vain complications of ,kant's           
transcendental machinery1 and made  it  
clear that between the primary manifold 
of sensation and the first              
constructions of the intellect there    
still yawns a gulf which ,kant's        
laboured explanations nowhere bridge4   
,why does the chaotic 'matter' of       
sensations submit itself so tamely to   
the forming of the mind8 ,how can the a 
priori necessities of thought1  which   
are the 'presuppositions' of the        
complexities ,kant loved1 operate  upon 
so alien a stuff as the sensations are  
assumed to be8 ,and1 after  all1 was not
 ,kant a bit premature in proclaiming   
the finality of his  analysis and of his

 refutation of empiricism for all time8 
,the searching  question1 ,why should   
the future resemble the past8 had       
received no  answer1 and so might not   
the mind itself1 with all its           
categories1 be  susceptible to change8  
,was it certain that the miracle whereby
 the data  presented to our faculties   
conformed to them would be a standing   
one8  ,had not ,kant himself as good as 
admitted that our faculties might       
distort reality instead of making it    
intelligible8    ,the truth is that at  
this point ,kant is open to a charge    
against which  the assumptions he shared
 with ,hume admit of no defence4 ,hume  
had been  the first to discover that we 
are in the habit of trying to           
rationalize  our sense-data by putting  
ideal constructions upon them1 though he
 had  abstained from sanctifying the    
practice by a hideous jargon of         
technical  terminology4 ,but this way of
 eking out the facts only seemed to him 
to  falsify them4 ,truth in his view was

 to be reached by accepting with        
docility the sensations given from      
without4 ,to set to work to 'imagine'   
connections between them1 and to claim  
for them a higher truth1 had  seemed to 
him an outrage4 ,what right1 then1 had  
,kant to legitimate the  mind's         
impudence in tampering with sensations8 
,was not every a priori  form an        
'imagination1' and a vain one at that8  
,to these objections the ,kantian school
 have never found an answer4 ,they  have
 simply repeated ,kant's phrases about  
the necessary  'presuppositions' which  
were to be added to ,hume's data4 ,the  
,english  psychologists 7the ,mills1    
,bain1 etc47 exhibited a similar        
fidelity4 ,they  never accepted the a   
priori1 but relied on 'the association  
of ideas'  to build up a mind out of    
isolated sensations4 ,but was this      
expedient  really thinkable8 ,for if all
 'sensations' or qualities are separate 
entities1 how can the addition of more  
'distinct existences' of the same  sort 

really bind them together8 ,if in 'the  
cat is upon the wall1' 'upon'  is a     
distinct entity which has to relate     
'cat' and 'wall1' what is to  connect   
'cat' with 'upon' and 'upon' with       
'wall'8 ,the atomizing method  carried  
to its logical extreme demands that not 
only 'sensations' but  also 'thoughts'  
should be essentially disconnected1 and 
then1 of course1  no thinking can       
cohere4    ,psychology1 then1 had worked
 itself to a breakdown by accepting the 
'sensationalistic' analysis offered by  
,hume1 and dragged philosophy with  it4 
,yet the escape was as easy as the egg  
of ,columbus to the insight of  genius4 
,william ,james had merely to invert the
 problem4 ,instead of  assuming with    
,hume that because some experiences     
seemed to attest the  presence of       
distinct objects1 all connections were  
illusory and all  experience must       
ultimately consist of psychical atoms1  
,james had merely  to maintain that this
 separation was secondary and           

artificial1 and that  experience was    
initially a continuum4 ,once this is    
pointed out1 the fact  is obvious4 ,the 
stream of experience no doubt contains  
what it is  afterwards possible to      
single out as 'sensations1' but it      
presents them  also as connected by     
'relations4' ,moreover1 the 'sensations'
 or  'qualities' and their 'relations'  
exhibit the immediate indiscerptible    
unity of a fluid rather than a          
succession of flashes4 ,temporal and    
spatial relations with all the          
connections they sustain are perceived  
just as directly as what we come to     
distinguish as the 'things' in them4    
',consciousness1' ,james insists1 'does 
not appear to itself chopped up in      
bits1' and 'we ought to say a feeling of
 and1 a feeling of if1 a  feeling of    
but1 and a feeling of by1 quite as      
readily as we say a  feeling of blue or 
a feeling of cold4 ,all things in       
experience  naturally 'compenetrate1' to
 use a phrase of ,bergson's2 they are   

distinct and they are united at the same
 time4    ,the great crux in ,hume is   
thus seen to be illusory4 ,immediate    
experience  does not require            
'synthesis'3 it calls for 'analysis4'   
,it is not a  jigsaw puzzle1 to be      
pieced together without glue3 it is a   
confused  whole which has to be divided 
and set in order for clear thinking4    
,hume's mistake was to have started from
 experience as partly analysed  by      
common sense1 and not from the flux as  
given4 ,his 'sensations' were  the      
qualities already analysed out of the   
flux2 he took these selections  for the 
whole and neglected the other less      
obvious features in it--viz41  the      
relations which floated them4    ,thus  
the puzzle ',how do relations relate8'  
received its solution in  this new      
account of experience4 ,philosophers are
 puzzled by this  question because they 
confuse percepts with concepts4         
,percepts are  given in relation2 but   
concepts1 being ideal dissections of the

  perceptual flux1 are discontinuous    
terms which have to be related by an    
act of thought1 because they were made  
for this very purpose of  distinction4  
,thus the eye sees cats sitting upon    
walls1 as parts of a  rural landscape1  
and without the sharp distinctions which
 exist between  the concepts 'cat1'     
'upon1' 'wall4' ,these ideas were meant 
to  disconnect 'the cat' in thought from
 the site it sat upon4 ,thought1  then1 
has made the 'atomism' it professed to  
find4 ,it has only to  unmake it1 and to
 allow the distinctions it held apart to
 merge again  into the stream of change4
    ,all ,hume's problems1 therefore1   
are unreal1 and those of his apriorist  
critics are doubly removed from reality4
 ,the whole conception of  philosophy as
 aiming at uniting disjointed data in a 
higher synthesis  runs counter to the   
real movement1 which aims at the        
analysis of a given  whole4 ,the real   
question about causation is not how     
events can be  connected causally1 but  

why are certain antecedents preferred   
and  dissected out and entitled         
'causes4' ,so the 'self' is not one     
7undiscoverable7 item imagined to keep  
in order a host of other such  items4   
,any given moment of a consciousness is 
just the mass of its  'sensations1' but 
these are consciously the heirs of its  
history and  connected with a past which
 is remembered4 ,no ,transcendental ,ego
 could  do more to support the process  
of experience than is achieved by 'a    
stream of consciousness which carries   
its own past along4' ,here1 then1  is   
the straight way ,james desiderated1 a  
critical philosophy which goes1  not    
'through' the complexities of ,kantism1 
but leaves them on one side  as         
superfluous 'curios4'    ,but there     
remains an even more important deduction
 from the new  psychology4 ,hume had    
been convicted of error in selecting    
those elements  of the flux which served
 his purpose and neglecting the rest4   
,but this  mistake might reveal the     

important fact that all analysis was a  
choice1  and inspired by volitions4 ,a  
mind that analyses cannot but be active 
in handling its experience4 ,it         
manipulates it to serve its ends4 ,it   
emphasizes only those portions of the   
flux which seem to it important4  ,in a 
better and fairer analysis than ,hume's 
these features will persist4  ,it1 too1 
would be a product of selection1 of a   
selection depending on  its maker's     
preferences4 ,as ,james showed1 the     
distinction between  'dreams' and       
'realities1' between 'things' and       
'illusions1' results only  from the     
differential values we attach to the    
parts of the flux  according as they    
seem important or interesting to us or  
not4 ,the  volitional contribution is   
all-pervasive in our thinking4 ,and once
 this  volitional interference with     
'pure perception' is shown to be        
indispensable1 it must be allowed to be 
legitimate4 ,nor can this  approval of  
our interference be restricted to       

selections4 ,it must be  extended to    
additions4 ,just as we can select       
factors from 'the given'  to construct  
'reality1' we can add hypotheses to it  
to make it  'intelligible4' ,we can     
claim the right of causal analysis1 and 
assume  that our dissections have laid  
bare the inner springs of the connection
  of events4 ,moreover1 to the 'real    
world which our choice has built out  of
 the chaos of 'appearances' we may      
hypothetically add 'infernal' and       
'heavenly' regions4,b ,both are         
transformations of 'the given' by the   
will1 but1 like the postulate of causal 
series1 experience may confirm  them4   
,kant's a priori activity of the mind   
may thus in a sense supply  an answer to
 ,hume--but only in a voluntaristic     
philosophy which would  probably have   
seemed too bold both to him and to      
,hume4        ,there can be no doubt    
that we do not approach the data of     
perception in  an attitude of quiescent 
resignation4 ,our desires and needs     

equip us  with assumptions and 'first   
principles1' which originate from       
within1  not from without4 ,but how     
precisely should this mental            
contribution to  knowledge be conceived8
 ,in the last chapter of his ,psychology
 ,james  suggested that the mind's      
organization is essentially biological4 
,it has  evolved according to sound     
,darwinian principles1 and in so doing  
the  fittest of its 'variations' have   
survived4 ,but were these variations    
quite fortuitous8 ,may they not have    
been purposive responses to the         
stimulation of environment8 ,can logic  
have been invented like saws and  ships 
for purposes of human service8 ,these   
are some of the stimulating  questions  
which ,james's work in ,psychology has  
suggested4    ,,footnotes3    ,footnote 
,a3 ,not in ,bradley's ,logic4          
,footnote ,b3 ,this is the substance of 
the doctrine of ',the ,will to          
,believe4'          ,,chapter ,,iii     
,,will ,,in ,,cognition    ,the new     

psychology of ,james was bound to       
produce a new theory of  knowledge1 and 
though it did not actually explore this 
problem1 it  contained several valuable 
suggestions upon the subject4 ,for      
instance1  in a brief passage discussing
 ',the ,relations of ,belief and ,will1'
 ,james  pointed out that belief is     
essentially an attitude of the will     
towards  an idea1 adding that in order  
to acquire a belief 'we need only in    
cold  blood act as if the thing in      
question were real1 and keep acting as  
if  it were real1 and it will infallibly
 end by growing into such a  connection 
with our life that it will become real' 
7ii41 p4 #cba74 ,this  passage is an    
outline of the doctrine of ',the ,will  
to ,believe1' which he  was afterwards  
to develop so forcibly4    ,again1 in   
his last chapter1 ,james criticized the 
doctrine of ,spencer  that all the      
principles of thought1 all its general  
truths and axioms1  were derived from   
impressions of the external world4 ,he  

argued1 on the  other hand1 that such   
ways of looking at phenomena must       
originate in the  mind1 and be prior to 
the experience which confirms them4     
,without  digging further into the      
character of this mental contribution to
  knowledge1 ,james contented himself   
with the suggestion that the use of     
these axiomatic principles might be     
construed in ,darwinian style as a      
'variation' surviving by its fitness1   
thus introducing into his account  of   
mental process the important idea that  
thinking might be tested by  its vital  
value4    ,what if knowledge be neither 
a dull submission to dictation from     
without  nor an unexplained necessity of
 thought8 ,what if it be a bold         
adventure1  an experimental sally of a  
,will to live1 to know and to control   
reality8  ,what if its principles were  
frankly risky1 and their truth had to be
  desired before it was tested and      
assured8 ,in a word1 what if first      
principles were to begin with           

postulates8 ,thus the way is paved from 
the new psychology to a new theory of   
knowledge4 ,a third alternative to  the 
banal dilemma of 'empiricism' or        
'apriorism' suggests itself4    ,the old
 empiricist view1 as typified by ,mill1 
was that the mind had  been impressed   
with all its principles1 such as the    
truths of  arithmetic1 the axioms of    
geometry1 and the law of causation1 by  
an  uncontradicted course of experience1
 until it generalized facts into        
'laws1' and was enabled to predict a    
similar future with certainty4 ,but     
this theory had really been exploded in 
advance by ,hume4 ,facts do not  appear 
as causally connected1 nor1 if they did1
 would this guarantee  that they will   
continue to do so in the future4 ,the   
continuum of  experience1 we may add1 is
 not given as a series of arithmetical  
units  or geometrical equalities1 unless
 we deliberately measure it out in      
accordance with mathematical principles4
 ,empiricism thus gives no real  account

 of the scientific rational order of the
 world4    ,but does it follow from the 
failure of empiricism that apriorism is 
true8 ,this has always been assumed1 and
 held to dispense rationalist           
philosophers from giving any direct and 
positive proof that these  principles   
are a priori truths4 ,but manifestly    
their procedure is  logically far from  
cogent4 ,if a third explanation can be  
thought of1 it  will not follow that    
apriorism is true4 ,all that follows is 
that  something has to be assumed before
 experience proves it4 ,what that       
something is1 and whence it comes1      
remains an open question4 ,moreover1    
apriorism has not escaped from the      
empirical doubt about the future4  ,even
 granted that facts now conform to the  
necessities of our thoughts1  why should
 they so comport themselves for ever8   
,let us1 therefore1 try a compromise1   
which ignores neither that which we     
bring to experience 7like empiricism71  
nor that which we gain from  experience 

7like apriorism74 ,this compromise is   
effected by the doctrine  of            
postulation4 ,for though a postulate    
proceeds from us1 and is meant to  guide
 thought in anticipating facts1 it yet  
allows the facts to test and  mould it2 
so that its working modifies1 expands1  
or restricts its  demands1 and fits it  
to meet the exigencies of experience1   
and permits1  also1 a certain           
reinterpretation of the previous 'facts'
 in order to  conform them to the       
postulate4    ,a postulate thus fully   
meets the demands of apriorism4 ,it is  
'universal'  in claim1 because it is    
convenient and economical to make a rule
 carry  as far as it will go2 and it is 
'necessary1' because all fresh facts are
  on principle subjected to it1 in the  
hope that they will support and         
illustrate it4 ,yet a postulate can     
never be accused of being a mere        
sophistication1 or a bar to the progress
 of knowledge1 because it is  always    
willing to submit to verification in the

 course of fresh  experience1 and can   
always be reconstructed or abandoned1   
should it  cease to edify4 ,a long and  
successful course of service raises a   
postulate to the dignity of an          
'axiom'--i4e41 a principle which it is  
incredible anyone should think worth    
disputing--whereas repeated failure  in 
application degrades it to the position 
of a prejudice--i4e41 an a  priori      
opinion which is always belied by its   
consequences4    ,a 'postulate' thus    
differs essentially from the 'a priori  
truth' by  its dependence upon the will1
 by its being the product of a free     
choice4  ,we have always to select the  
assumptions upon which we mean to act in
  our commerce with reality4 ,we select 
the rules upon which we go1 and we      
select the 'facts' by which we claim to 
support our rules1 stripping  them of   
all the 'irrelevant' details involved by
 their position in the  flux of         
happenings4 ,thus we emphasize that side
 of things which fits in  with our      

expectations1 until the facts are       
'faked' sufficiently to  figure as      
'cases' of our 'law4' ,postulation and  
the verifying of  postulates is thus a  
process of reciprocal discrimination and
 selection4  ,the postulate once        
formulated1 we seek in the flux for     
confirmations of  it1 and thus construct
 a system of 'facts' which are relative 
to it2  that is how the postulate reacts
 upon experience4 ,if1 on the other     
hand1  this process of selection is     
unfruitful1 and the confirmations of our
  rule turn out infinitesimal1 we alter 
the rule2 and thus the 'facts' in  the  
case reject the postulate4    ,this     
continuous process of selection and     
rejection of 'principles' and  'facts'  
has1 as we have said1 a thoroughly      
biological tinge4 ,the  fitness of a    
postulate to survive is being           
continually tested4 ,it  springs in the 
first place from a human hope that      
events may be  systematized in a certain
 way1 and it endures so long as it      

enables men  to deal with them in that  
way4 ,if it fails1 the formation of     
fresh  ideals and fresh hypotheses is   
demanded2 but that which causes one     
postulate to prevail over another is    
always the satisfaction which1 if       
successful1 it promises to some need or 
desire4 ,thus 'thought' is  everywhere  
inspired by 'will4' ,it is an           
instrument1 the most potent  man has    
found1 whereby he brings about a harmony
 with his environment4  ,this harmony is
 always something of a compromise4 ,we  
postulate  conformity between ,nature   
and one of our ideals4 ,we usually      
desire more  than we can get1 but insist
 on all that ,nature can concede4       
,causation serves as a good example4    
,experience as it first comes to us  is 
a mere flood of happenings1 with no     
distinction between causal and  casual  
sequences4 ,clearly our whole ability to
 control our life1 or even  to continue 
it1 demands that we should predict what 
happens1 and guide  our actions         

accordingly4 ,we therefore postulate a  
right to dissect  the flux1 to fit      
together selected series without        
reference to the  rest4 ,thus1 a        
systematic network of natural 'laws' is 
slowly knit  together1 and chaos visibly
 transforms itself into scientific      
order4 ,the  postulation of 'causes' is 
verified by its success4 ,moreover1 it  
is to  be noted that to this postulate  
there is no alternative4 ,a belief that 
all events are casual would be          
scientifically worthless4 ,so is a      
doctrine 7still popular among           
philosophers7 that the only true 'cause'
  is the total universe at one moment1  
the only true 'effect1' the whole  of   
reality at the next4 ,for that is merely
 to reinstate the given chaos  science  
tried to analyse1 and to forbid us to   
make selections from it4  ,it would make
 prediction wholly vain1 and entangle   
truth in a totality  of things which is 
unique at every instant1 and never can  
recur4    ,the principles of mathematics

 are as clearly postulates4 ,in         
,euclidean  geometry we assume          
definitions of 'points1' 'lines1'       
'surfaces1' etc41  which are never found
 in nature1 but form the most convenient
  abstractions for measuring things4    
,both 'space' and 'time1' as defined    
for mathematical purposes1 are ideal    
constructions drawn from empirical      
'space' 7extension7 and 'time'          
7succession7 feelings1 and purged of the
  subjective variations of these        
experiences4 ,nevertheless1 geometry    
forms the handiest system for applying  
to experience and calculating  shapes   
and motions4 ,but1 ideally1 other       
systems might be used4 ,the             
'metageometries' have constructed other 
ideal 'spaces' out of postulates        
differing from ,euclid's1 though when   
applied to real space their greater     
complexity destroys their value4 ,the   
postulatory character of the            
arithmetical unit is quite as clear2    
for1 in application1 we always have  to 

agree as to what is to count as 'one'2  
if we agree to count apples1  and count 
the two halves of an apple as each      
equalling one1 we are said  to be       
'wrong1' though1 if we were dividing the
 apple among two  applicants1 it would  
be quite right to treat each half as    
'one' share4  ,again1 though one penny  
added to another makes two1 one drop of 
water  added to another makes one1 or a 
dozen1 according as it is dropped4      
,common sense1 therefore1 admits that we
 may reckon variously1 and that         
arithmetic does not apply to all things4
    ,again1 it is impossible to concede 
any meaning even to the central 'law  of
 thought' itself--the ,law of ,identity 
7',a is ,a'7--except as a  postulate4   
,outside of ,formal ,logic and lunatic  
asylums no one wishes to  assert that   
',a is ,a4' ,all significant assertion  
takes the form ',a is ,b4'  ,but ,a and 
,b are different1 and1 indeed1 no two   
',a's' are ever quite  the same4 ,hence1
 when we assert either the 'identity' of

 ',a' in two  contexts1 or that of ',a' 
and ',b1' in ',a is ,b1' we are clearly 
ignoring  differences which really      
exist--i4e41 we postulate that in spite 
of  these differences ,a and ,b will for
 our purposes behave as if they were    
one 7'identical'74 ,and we should       
realize that this postulate is of our   
making1 and involves a risk4 ,it may be 
that experience refuses to  confirm it1 
and convicts us instead of a 'mistaken  
identity4' ,in short1  every identity we
 reason from is made by our postulating 
an irrelevance  of differences4         
,there is thus1 perhaps1 no fundamental 
procedure of thought in which we  cannot
 trace some deliberately adopted        
attitude4 ,we distinguish between       
'ourselves' and the 'external' world1   
perhaps because we have more  control   
over our thoughts and limbs1 and less1  
or none1 over sticks and  stones and    
mountains2 fundamental as it is1 it is a
 distinction within  experience1 and is 
not given ready-made1 but elaborated in 

the course of  our dealings with it4    
,similarly1 in accordance with its      
varying degrees  of vividness1          
continuity1 and value1 experience itself
 gets sorted into  'realities1'         
'dreams1' and 'hallucinations4' ,in     
short1 when the  processes of           
discriminating between 'dreams' and     
'reality' are  considered1 all these    
distinctions will ultimately be found to
 be  judgments of value4    ,nor is it  
only in the realm of scientific knowing 
that postulation  reveals itself as a   
practicable and successful method of    
anticipating  experience and            
consolidating fact4 ,the same method has
 always been  employed by man in        
reaching out towards the final syntheses
 which 7in  imagination7 complete his   
vision of reality4 ,the 'truths' of all 
religions originate in postulates4      
',gods' and 'devils1' 'heavens' and     
'hells1' are essentially demands for a  
moral order in experience which         
transcend the given4 ,the value of the  

actual world is supplemented and        
enhanced by being conceived as projected
 and continued into a greater1  and our 
postulates are verified by the salutary 
influence they exercise  on our earthly 
life4 ,both postulation and             
verification1 then1 are  applicable to  
the problems of religion as of science4 
,this is the  meaning of the ,will to   
,believe4 ,when ,james first defined and
 defended  it1 it provoked abundant     
protest1 on the ground that it allowed  
everyone  to believe whatever he pleased
 and to call it 'true4' ,the critics had
  simply failed to see that verification
 by experience is just as integral  a   
part of voluntaristic procedure as      
experimental postulation1 and that      
,james himself had from the first       
asserted this4 ,indeed1 that he had     
first given a theological illustration  
of the function of volition in  knowing 
was merely an accident4 ,but that the   
will to believe was capable  of being   
generalized into a voluntarist theory of

 all knowledge was soon  shown in ,dr4  
,schiller's ,axioms as ,postulates4     
,,chapter ,,iv      ,,the ,,dilemmas    
,,of ,,dogmatism    ,every man1         
probably1 is by instinct a dogmatist4   
,he feels perfectly sure  that he knows 
some things1 and is right about them    
against the world4  ,whatever he        
believes in he does not doubt1 but holds
 to be  self-evidently or indisputably  
true4 ,his naive dogmatism1 moreover1   
spontaneously assumes that his truth is 
universal and shared by all  others4    
,if now he could live like a fakir1     
wholly wrapped in a cloud of his own    
imaginings1 and nothing ever happened to
 disappoint his expectations1 to  jar   
upon his prejudices1 and to convict him 
of error2 if he never held  converse    
with anyone who took a different view   
and controverted him1 his  dogmatism    
would be lifelong and incurable4 ,but as
 he lives socially1 he  has in practice 
to outgrow it1 and this lands him in a  
serious  theoretical dilemma4 ,he has to

 learn to live with others who differ   
from  him in their dogmatizing4 ,social 
life plainly would become impossible  if
 all rigidly insisted on the absolute   
rightness of their own beliefs  and the 
absolute wrongness of all others4    ,so
 compromises have to be made to get at a
 common 'truth4' ,it must be  recognized
 that not everything which is believed  
to be 'knowledge' is  knowledge4 ,in    
fact1 it is safer to assume that none   
have knowledge1  though all think they  
have2 to say fact1 men only have        
'opinions1' which  may be nearer to or  
farther from 'the truth1' but are not of
 necessity  as unquestionable as they   
seem to be4 ,out of this concession to  
the  social life arise three problems4  
,how are 'opinions' to be compared with 
each other1 and how is the extent of    
their 'truth' or 'error' to be          
determined8 ,how is the belief in       
absolute truth to be interpreted and    
discounted8 ,how is the penitent        
dogmatist1 once he has allowed doubt to 

corrupt his self-confidence1 to be      
stopped from doubting all things and    
turning sceptic8    ,as regards the     
first problem1 the first question is    
whether we shall try  to test opinions  
and to arrive at a standard of value by 
which to  measure them by comparing the 
opinions themselves with one another1 or
  shall presume that there must be some 
absolute standard which alone is  truly 
true1 whether we are aware of it or not4
 ,the former view is  relativism1 the   
latter is absolutism1 in the matter of  
truth4    ,now1 there can be no doubt   
that absolutism is more congenial to our
  natural prejudices4 ,accordingly it is
 the method tried first2 but it  soon   
conducts dogmatism to an awkward series 
of dilemmas4    #a4 ,if there is        
absolute truth1 who has it8 and who can 
use the absolute  criterion of opinions 
it is supposed to form8 ,not1 surely1   
everyone who  thinks he has4 ,it will   
never do to let every dogmatist vote for
  himself and condemn all others4 ,that 

way war and madness lie4 ,until  there  
is absolute agreement1 there cannot be  
absolute truth4    #b4 ,but absolute    
truth may still be reverenced as an     
ideal1 to save us  from the scepticism  
to which a complete relativity of truth 
would lead4  ,but would it save us8 ,if 
it is admitted that no one can arrogate 
to  himself its possession1 what use is 
it to believe that it is an ideal8  ,for
 if no one can assume that he has it1   
all human truth is1 in fact1  such as   
the relativist asserted1 and scepticism 
is just as inevitable as  before4 ,it   
makes no difference to the sceptical    
inference whether there  is no absolute 
truth1 or whether it is unattained by   
man1 and human  unattainable4    #c4 ,it
 was a mistake1 therefore1 to admit that
 opinions cannot be  compared together4 
,some are much more certain than others1
 and1 indeed1  'self-evident' and       
'intuitive4' ,let us therefore take     
these to be  'truer4' ,if so1 the       
thinker who feels most certain he is    

right is most  likely to be right4      
#d4 ,this suggestion will be welcomed by
 all dogmatists--until they  discover   
that it does not help them to agree     
together1 because they are  all as      
certain as can be4 ,but a               
critically-minded man will urge against 
it that 'certainty' is a subjective and 
psychological criterion1 and  that no   
one has been able to devise a method for
 distinguishing the  alleged logical    
from the undeniable psychological       
certainty4 ,he will  hesitate to say1   
therefore1 that because a belief seems  
certain it is  true1 and to trust the   
formal claim to infallibility which is  
made in  every judgment4 ,and when      
'intuitions' are appealed to1 he will   
ask how  'true' intuitions are to be    
discriminated from 'false1' sound from  
insane1 and inquire to what he is       
committing himself in admitting the     
truth of intuitions4 ,he will demand1   
therefore1 the publication of a  list of
 the intuitions which are absolutely    

true4 ,but he will not get  it1 and if  
he did1 it may be predicted that he     
would not find a single  one which has  
not been disputed by some eminent       
philosopher4    #e4 ,intuitions1        
therefore1 are an embarrassment1 rather 
than a help to  ,intellectualism4 ,it   
has to maintain both that intuitions are
 the  foundations of all truth and      
certitude1 and also that not all are    
true4  ,but our natural curiosity as to 
how these sorts are to be known apart is
  left unsatisfied4 ,we must not ask    
which are true1 and which not4 ,no one  
can say in advance about what matters   
intuitive certainty is possible2  what  
is1 or is not1 an intuition is revealed 
only to reflection after  the event4    
,only if an intuition has played us     
false1 we may be sure it  was not       
infallible2 it must either have been one
 of the fallible sort1  or else no      
intuition at all4    #f4 ,at this point 
universal scepticism begins to raise its
 hydra head1  and to grin at the        

dogmatist's discomfiture4 ,for in point 
of fact the  history of thought reveals1
 not a steady accumulation of           
indubitable  truth1 but a continuous    
strife of opinions1 in which the most   
widely  accepted beliefs daily succumb  
to fresh criticism and fall into        
disrepute as the 'errors of the past4'  
,nothing1 it seems1 can guarantee  a    
'truth1' however firmly it may be       
believed for a time1 from the  corrosive
 force of new speculation and changed   
opinion2 to survey the  field of        
philosophic dispute1 strewn with the    
remains of 'infallible'  systems and    
'absolute' certainties1 is to be led    
irresistibly to a  sceptical doubt as to
 the competence of human thought4 ,if   
'absolute  truth' is our ideal and      
acquaintance with 'absolute reality' our
 aim1  then1 in view of the persistent  
illusions on both these points to which 
the human mind is liable1 it seems      
necessary to recognize the  hopelessness
 of our search4 ,thus the last dilemma  

of dogmatism is  reached4 ,in view of   
the diversity of human beliefs and the  
discredit  which has historically fallen
 on the most axiomatic articles of      
faith1  we must either admit scepticism 
to be the issue of the debate1 or else1 
condemning our absolute view of truth1  
find some means of utilizing the        
relative truths which are all that      
humanity seems able to grasp4 ,but to   
come to terms with relativism is to     
renounce the dogmatic attitude          
entirely1 and to approach the problems  
of philosophy in a totally  different   
spirit4          ,,chapter ,v      ,,the
 ,,problem ,,of ,,truth ,,and ,,error   
,it has been shown in the last chapter  
how urgent has become the problem  of   
discriminating between the true and     
false among relative 'truths4'  ,for    
absolute truth has become a chimera1    
self-evidence an illusion1 and          
intuition untrustworthy4 ,all three are 
psychologically very real to  those who 
believe in them1 but logically they     

succumb to the assaults of  a scepticism
 which infers from the fact that no     
'truths' are absolute  that all may     
reasonably be overthrown4    ,the only  
obstacle to its triumph lies in the     
existence of 'relative'  truths which   
are not absolute1 and do not claim to   
be1 and in the  unexamined possibility  
that in a relativist interpretation of  
all truth  a meaning may be found for   
the distinction between 'true' and      
'false4'  ,now1 not even a sceptic could
 deny that the size of an object is     
better  measured by a yard-measure than 
by the eye1 even though it may be       
meaningless to ask what its size may be 
absolutely2 or that it is  probable that
 bread will be found more nourishing    
than stone1 even  though it may not be a
 perfect elixir of life4 ,even if he    
denied this1  the sceptic's acts would  
convict his words of insincerity1 and   
practically1 at any rate1 no one has    
been or can be a sceptic1  whatever the 
extent of his theoretic doubts4    ,this

 fact is construed by the pragmatist as 
a significant indication of  the way out
 of the epistemological impasse4 ,the   
'relative' truths1  which               
,intellectualism passed by with         
contempt1 may differ in practical  value
 and lead to the conceptions of         
practical truth and certainty  which may
 be better adapted to the requirements  
of human life than the  elusive and     
discredited ideals of absolute truth and
 certainty1 and may  enable us to       
justify the distinctions we make between
 the 'true' and the  'false4 ,at any    
rate1 this suggestion seems worth       
following up4    ,to begin with1 we must
 radically disabuse our minds of the    
idea that  thinking starts from         
certainty4 ,even the self-evident and   
self-confident 'intuitions' that impress
 the uncritical so much with  their     
claim to infallibility are really the   
results of antecedent doubts  and       
ponderings1 and would never be          
enunciated unless there were thought  to

 be a dispute about them4 ,in real life 
thought starts from  perplexities1 from 
situations in which1 as ,professor      
,dewey says1 beliefs  have to be        
'reconstructed1' and it aims at setting 
doubts at rest4 ,it is  psychologically 
impossible for a rational mind to assert
 what it knows  to be true1 and supposes
 everyone else to admit the truth of4   
,this is  why even a philosopher's      
conversation does not consist of a      
rehearsal of  all the unchallenged      
truisms that he can remember4    ,being 
thus conditioned by a doubt1 every      
judgment is a challenge4 ,it  claims    
truth1 and backs its claims by the      
authority of its maker2 but it  would be
 folly to imagine that it thereby       
becomes ipso facto true1 or  is meant to
 be universally accepted without        
testing4 ,its maker must know  this as  
well as anyone1 unless his dogmatism has
 quite blotted out his  common sense4   
,indeed1 he may himself have given      
preference to the  judgment he made over

 the alternatives that occurred to him  
only after  much debate and hesitation1 
and may propound it only as a basis for 
further discussion and testing4         
,initially1 then1 every judgment is a   
truth-claim1 and this claim is  merely  
formal4 ,it does not mean that the claim
 is absolutely true1  and that it is    
impious to question it4 ,on the         
contrary1 it has still to  be validated 
by others1 and may work in such a way   
that its own maker  withdraws it1 and   
corrects it by a better4 ,the           
intellectualist accounts  of truth have 
all failed to make this vital           
distinction between  'truth-claim' and  
validated truth4 ,they rest on a        
confusion of formal  with absolute      
truth1 and it is on this account that   
they cannot  distinguish between 'truth'
 and error4 ,for false judgments also   
formally  claim 'truth1' ,no judgment   
alleges that it is false4,c        ,on  
the other hand1 if the distinction      
between truth-claims and validated      

truths is made1 there ceases to be any  
theoretic difficulty about the          
conception and correction of errors1    
however difficult it may be to  detect  
them in practice4 ',truths' will be     
'claims' which have worked  well and    
maintained themselves2 'errors1' such as
 have been superseded  by better ones4  
,all 'truths' must be tested by         
something more  objective than their own
 self-assertiveness1 and this testing by
 their  working and the consequences to 
which they lead may go on indefinitely4 
,in other words1 however much a 'truth' 
has been validated1 it is always        
possible to test it further4 ,i4e41 it  
is never theoretically  'absolute1'     
however well it may practically be      
assured4 ,for a  confirmation of this   
doctrine ,pragmatism appeals to the     
history of  scientific truth1 which has 
shown a continuous correction of        
'truths1'  which were re-valued as      
'errors1' as better statements for them 
became  available4    ,it may also be   

confirmed negatively by the breakdown of
 the current  definitions of truth1     
which all seem in the end to mean       
nothing4    ,the oldest and commonest   
definition of a 'truth' which is given  
is that  it is 'the correspondence of a 
thought to reality4' ,but               
,intellectualism  never perceived the   
difficulties lurking in it4 ,at first   
sight this  seems a brave attempt to get
 outside the circle of thought in order 
to  test its value and to control its   
vagaries4 ,unluckily1 this theory can   
only assert1 and neither explains nor   
proves1 the connection between the      
thought and the reality it desiderates4 
,for1 granting that it is the  intent of
 every thought to correspond with       
reality1 we must yet inquire  how the   
alleged correspondence is to be made    
out4 ,made out it must be2  for as the  
criterion is quite formal and holds of  
all assertions1 the  claim to           
'correspond' may be false4 ,to prove the
 correspondence1 then1  the 'reality'   

would have somehow to be known apart    
from the truth-claim  of the thought1 in
 order that the two might be compared   
and found to  agree4 ,but if the reality
 were already known directly1 what would
 be  the need of asserting an idea of it
 and claiming 'truth' for this8 ,how1   
moreover1 could the claim be tested1 if1
 as is admitted1 the reality is  not    
directly known8 ,to assert the          
'correspondence' must become a          
groundless postulate about something    
which is defined to transcend all       
knowledge4 ,the correspondence theory1  
then1 does not test the  truth-claim of 
the assertion2 it only gives a fresh    
definition of it4 ,a  'true' thought1 it
 says1 is one which claims to correspond
 with a  'reality4' ,but so does a      
false1 and hence the theory leaves us as
 we  were1 puzzled to distinguish       
them4,d        ,yet the theory is not   
wholly wrong4 ,many of our thoughts do  
claim to  correspond with reality in    
ways that can be verified4 ,if the      

judgment  ',there is a green carpet in  
my hall' is taken to mean ',if ,i enter 
my  hall1 ,i shall see a green carpet1' 
perception tests whether the  judgment  
'corresponds' with the reality          
perceived1 and so goes to  validate or  
disprove the claim4 ,but the limits     
within which this  correspondence works 
are very strait4 ,it applies only to    
such judgments  as are anticipations of 
perception1,e and will test a           
truth-claim only  where there is        
willingness to act on it4 ,it implies an
 experiment1 and  is not a wholly       
intellectual process4        ,the       
superiority of the 'correspondence'     
theory over the belief in  'intuitions' 
lies in its insistence that thought is  
not to audit its own  accounts4 ,its    
success or failure depends upon factors 
external to it1  which establish the    
truth or falsehood of its claims4 ,no   
such guarantee  is offered by the next  
theory1 which is known as the           
'consistence' or  'coherence' theory4   

,in order to avoid the difficulty which 
wrecked the  'correspondence' theory1   
that of making the truth of an assertion
 reside  in an inexperienceable relation
 to an unattainable reality1 this view  
maintains that an idea is true if it is 
consistent with the rest of our         
thoughts1 and so can be fitted with them
 into a coherent system4 ,no  doubt a   
coherence among our ideas is a          
convenience and a part of their         
'working1' but it is hardly a test of   
their objective truth4 ,for a           
harmonious system of thoughts is        
conceivable which would either not      
apply to reality at all1 or1 if applied1
 would completely fail4 ,on this  theory
 systematic delusions1 fictions1 and    
dreams1 might properly lay  claim to    
truth4 ,true1 they might not be quite   
consistent3 but neither  are the systems
 of our sciences4 ,if1 then1 this       
absolute coherence be  insisted on1 this
 test condemns our whole knowledge2 if  
not1 it remains  formal1 and fails to   

recognize any distinctions of value in  
the claims  which can be systematized4  
,to avoid this reductio ad absurdum1 it 
has been suggested that it is  not the  
coherence of the idea in human1 finite1 
minds which constitutes  'truth1' but   
the perfect consistency of the          
experience of an ,absolute  ,mind4 ,the 
test1 then1 of our limited coherency    
will lie in its relation  to this       
,absolute ,system4 ,but here we have the
 correspondence doctrine  once again in 
a fresh disguise2 our human systems are 
now 'true' if they  correspond with the 
,absolute's1 ,but as there is no way for
 us of sharing  the ,absolute           
,experience1 our test is again illusory1
 and productive of a  depressing        
scepticism2 and1 again1 we have only    
asserted that truth is  what claims to  
be part of the ,absolute ,system4    ,a 
word may be devoted to the simple       
refusal of intuitionists to give an     
account of ,truth on the ground that it 
is 'indefinable4' ,truth is taken  to be

 an ultimate unanalyzable quality of    
certain propositions1  intuitively felt1
 and incapable of description4 ,error1  
by the same  token1 should be equally   
indefinable and as immediately          
apprehended4  ,how1 then1 can there be  
differences of opinion1 and mistakes as 
to what  is true and what false8 ,how is
 it that a proposition which is felt to 
be  'true' so often turns out to be     
erroneous8 ,if all errors are felt to be
  true by those they deceive1 is it not 
clear that immediate feeling is  not a  
good enough test of a validated truth8  
,thus1 once again1 we find  that an     
account of truth-claim is being foisted 
on us in place of a  description of     
truth-testing4    ,the intellectualist1 
then1 being in every case unable to     
justify the  vital distinction commonly 
made between the true and the false1 we 
return to the pragmatist4 ,he starts    
with no preconceptions as to what  truth
 must mean1 whether it exists or not2 he
 is content to watch how  de facto      

claims to truth get themselves validated
 in experience4 ,he  observes that every
 question is intimately related to some 
scheme of  human purposes4 ,for it has  
to be put1 in order to come into being4 
,hence every inquiry arises1 and every  
question is asked1 because of  obstacles
 and problems which arise in the        
carrying out of human  purposes4 ,so    
soon as uncertainty arises in the course
 of fulfilling a  purpose1 an idea or   
belief is formulated and acted on1 to   
fill the gap  where immediate certitude 
has broken down4 ,this engenders the    
truth-claim1 which is necessarily a     
'good' in its maker's eyes1 because  it 
has been selected by him and judged     
preferable to any alternative  that     
occurred to him4    ,how1 then1 is it   
tested8 ,simply by the consequences     
which follow from  adopting it and using
 it as an assumption upon which to work4
 ,if these  consequences are            
satisfactory1 if they promote the       
purpose in hand1  instead of thwarting  

it1 and thus have a valuable effect upon
 life1 then  the truth-claim maintains  
its 'truth1' and is so far validated4   
,this is  the universal method of       
testing assertions alike in the         
formation of  mathematical laws1        
physical hypotheses1 religious beliefs1 
and ethical  postulates4 ,hence such    
pragmatic aphorisms as 'truth is useful'
 or  'truth is a matter of practical    
consequences' mean essentially that all 
assertions must be tested by being      
applied to a real problem of  knowing4  
,what is signified by such statements is
 that no 'truth' must  be accepted      
merely on account of the insistence of  
its claim1 but that  every idea must be 
tested by the consequences of its       
working4 ,its truth  will then depend   
upon those consequences being fruitful  
for life in  general1 and in particular 
for the purpose behind the particular   
inquiry  in which it arose4 ,truth is a 
value and a satisfaction2 but           
'intellectual satisfaction' is not a    

morbid delight in dialectical and       
verbal juggling3 it is the satisfaction 
which rewards the hard labour of        
rationalizing experience and rendering  
it more conformable with human  desires4
    ,it should be clear1 though it is   
often misunderstood1 that there is      
nothing arbitrary or 'subjective' in    
this method of testing beliefs4 ,it     
does not mean that we are free to assert
 the truth of every idea which  seems to
 us pretty or pleasant4 ,the very term  
'useful' was chosen by  pragmatists as a
 protest against the common philosophic 
licence of  alleging 'truths' which     
could never be applied or tested1 and   
were  supposed to be none the worse for 
being 'useless4' ,it is clear both that 
such 'truths' must be a monopoly of     
,intellectualism1 and also that they  do
 allow every man to believe whatever he 
wishes1 provided only that he  boldly   
claims 'self-evidence' for his          
idiosyncrasy4 ,in this purely           
subjective sense1 into which            

,intellectualism is driven1 it is1      
however1  clear that there can be no    
useless ideas4 ,for any idea anyone     
decided to  adopt1 because it pleased or
 amused him1 would be ipso facto true4  
,pragmatism1 therefore1 by refuting     
'useless' knowledge1 shows that it  does
 not admit such merely subjective       
'uses4' ,it insists that ideas  must be 
more objectively useful--viz41 by       
showing ability to cope with  the       
situation they were devised to meet4 ,if
 they fail to harmonize with  the       
situation they are untrue1 however      
attractive they may be4 ,for ideas  do  
not function in a void2 they have to    
work in a world of fact1 and to  adapt  
themselves to all facts1 though they may
 succeed in transforming  them in the   
end4    ,nor has an idea to reckon only 
with facts3 it has also to cohere with  
other ideas4 ,it must be congruous with 
the mass of other beliefs held  for good
 reasons by the thinker who accepts it4 
,for no one can afford to  have a stock 

of beliefs which conflict too violently 
with those of his  fellows4 ,if his     
'intuitions' contrast too seriously with
 those of  others1 and he acts on them1 
he will be shut up as a lunatic4 ,if1   
then1  the 'useful' idea has to approve 
itself both to its maker and his        
fellows without developing limitations  
in its use1 it is clear that a          
pragmatic truth is really far less      
arbitrary and subjective than the       
'truths' accepted as absolute1 on the   
bare ground that they seem              
'self-evident' to a few                 
intellectualists4    ,if1 however1 it be
 urged that pragmatic truths never grow 
absolutely  true at all1 and that the   
most prolonged pragmatic tests do not   
exclude  the possibility of an ultimate 
error in the idea1 there is no          
difficulty  about admitting this4 ,the  
pragmatic test yields practical1 and not
  'absolute1' certainty4 ,the existence 
of absolute certainty is denied1  and   
the demand for it1 in a world which     

contains only the practical  sort1      
merely plays into the hands of          
scepticism4 ,the uncertainty of all  our
 verificatory processes1 however1 is not
 the creation of the  pragmatist1 nor is
 he a god to abolish it4 ,abstractly1   
there is always a  doubt about what     
transcends our immediate experience1 and
 this is why it  is so healthy to have  
to repudiate so many theoretic doubts in
 every act  we do4 ,for beliefs have to 
be acted on1 and the results of the     
action  rightly react on the beliefs4   
,the pragmatic test is practically      
adequate1 and is the only one available4
 ,that it brings out the risk of  action
 only brings out its superiority to a   
theory which cannot get  started at all 
until it is supplied with absolute      
certainty1 and  meantime can only idly  
rail at all existing human truths4      
,we have in all this consistently       
referred the truth of ideas to          
individual experiences for verification4
 ,this evidently makes all truths  in   

some sense dependent upon the           
personality of those who assert and     
accept them4 ,intellectualist logic1 on 
the other hand1 has always  proclaimed  
that mental processes1 if true1 are     
'independent' of the  idiosyncrasies of 
particular minds4 ,ideas have a fixed   
meaning1 and  cohere in bodies of       
'universal' truth1 quite irrespective of
 whether any  particular mind harbours  
them or not4 ,this is not only a        
contention  fatal to the pragmatic      
claims1 but also bound up with other    
assumptions  of ,formal ,logic4 ,so it  
becomes necessary to inquire whether    
this ,logic  is a success1 and so can   
coherently abstract from the personality
 of the  knower and the particular      
situations that incite him to know4     
,,footnotes3    ,footnote ,c3 ,not even 
',i lie1' which is meaningless as it    
stands1 ,cf4  ,dr4 ,schiller's ,formal  
,logic1 p4 #cgc4    ,footnote ,d3 ,this 
same difficulty reappears in various    
forms1 as e4g41  in a recent theory     

which makes the truth of a judgment lie 
in its  asserting a relation between    
different objects1 and not in the       
existence  of those objects themselves4 
,this formula also applies as evidently 
to  false judgments as to true4 ,it1    
too1 brings no independent evidence of  
the existence of the objects referred   
to1 and might fall into error  through  
asserting a relation between objects    
which did not exist4 ,it is1  moreover1 
incapable of showing that a relation    
corresponding to the idea  we have of it
 really exists when we judge that it    
does4    ,footnote ,e3 ,each perception1
 however1 contains much that is supplied
 by  the mind1 not 'given' to it4       
,,chapter ,,vi      ,,the ,,failure ,,of
 ,,formal ,,logic    ,in order to escape
 the necessity of concerning itself with
 personality  and particular            
circumstances in questions of truth and 
error1  ,intellectualism appeals to     
,logic1 which it conceives as a purely  
formal  science and its impregnable     

citadel4 ,this appeal1 however1 rests on
 a  number of questionable assumptions1 
and most of these are not avowed4    #a4
 ,it assumes that forms of thought can  
be treated in abstraction from  their   
matter--in other words1 that the general
 types of thinking are  never affected  
by the particular context in which they 
occur4 ,now1 this  means that the       
question of real truth must not be      
raised2 for1 as we  have seen 7,chapter 
,v471 real truth is always an affair of 
particular  consequences4 ,the result   
is1 that as truth-claims are no longer  
tested1  they all pass as true for      
,logic1 and are even raised to the rank 
of  'absolute truths1' or are mistaken  
for them4 ,for the notion of a really   
7'materially'7 true judgment which      
someone has chosen1 made1 and tested1   
there is substituted that of a formally 
valid proposition1 and in the  end      
,logic gets so involved in the study of 
'validity' that it puts aside           
altogether all real tests of truth1 and 

becomes a game with verbal  symbols     
which is entirely irrelevant to         
scientific thinking4    #b4 ,formal     
,logic assumes the right of abstracting 
from the whole process  of making an    
assertion4 ,it presumes that the        
assertion has already been  made        
somehow4 ,how1 it does not inquire4 ,yet
 it is clear that in each  case there   
were concrete reasons why just that     
assertion was preferred  to any other4  
,these concrete reasons it makes bold to
 dismiss as  'psychological1' and       
between 'logic' and 'psychology',f it   
decrees an  absolute divorce4 ,where1   
when1 why1 by and to whom1 an assertion 
was  made1 is taken to be irrelevant1   
and put aside as 'extralogical4'        
#c4 ,this convenient assumption1        
however1 ultimately necessitates an     
abstraction from meaning1 though ,formal
 ,logic does not avow this openly4      
,every assertion is meant to convey a   
certain meaning in a certain  context1  
and therefore its verbal 'form' has to  

take on its own  individual nuance of   
meaning4 ,what any particular form of   
words does  in fact mean on any         
particular occasion always depends upon 
the use of  the words in a particular   
context4 ,meaning1 therefore1 cannot be 
depersonalized2 if meanings are         
depersonalized1 they cease to be real1  
and become verbal4    ,formal ,logic    
has1 in fact1 mistaken words1 which are 
7within the same  language7 identical on
 all occasions1 for the thoughts they   
are  intended to express1 which are     
varied to suit each occasion4 ,words    
alone  are tolerant of the abstract     
treatment ,formal ,logic demands4 ,this 
'science1' therefore1 finally reduces to
 mere verbalism1 distracted by          
inconsistent relapses into 'psychology4'
    ,but will this conception of ,logic 
either work out consistently in itself  
or lead to a tenable theory of          
scientific thinking8 ,emphatically not4 
,what is the use of a logic which 7#a7  
cannot effect the capital  distinction  

of all thought1 that between the true   
and the false8 7#b7 is  debarred by its 
own principles from considering the     
meaning of any  real assertion8 and 7#c7
 is thus tossed helplessly from horn to 
horn of  the dilemma 'either verbalism  
or psychology'8    ,we may select a few 
examples of this fatal dilemma4    #a4  
,in dealing with what it calls 'the     
meaning' of terms1 propositions1  etc41 
,formal ,logic has always to choose     
between the meaning of the  words and   
the meaning of the man4 ,for it is clear
 that words which  may be used          
ambiguously may on occasion leave no    
doubt as to their  meaning1 while       
conversely all may become 'ambiguous' in
 a context4 ,if1  therefore1 the        
occasion is abstracted from1 all forms  
must be treated  verbally as ambiguous  
formulae1 which may be used in different
 senses4  ,if it is1 nevertheless1      
attempted to deal with their actual     
meaning on  any given occasion1 what its
 maker meant the words to convey must be

  discovered1 and the inquiry at once   
becomes 'psychological'--that is to     
say1 'extralogical4'    #b4 ,if         
judgments are not to be verbal          
7'propositions'71 but real  assertions  
which are actually meant1 they must     
proceed from personal  selections1 and  
must have been chosen from among        
alternative  formulations because of    
their superior value for their maker's  
purpose4  ,but all this is plainly an   
affair of psychology4 ,so inevitable is 
this  that a truly formal ,ideal of     
',logic' would exclude all judgment     
whatever  from the complete system of   
'eternal' ,truth4 ,for from such a      
system no  part could be rightly        
extracted to stand alone4 ,such a       
selection could  be effected and        
justified only by the exigencies of a   
human thinker4    ,the impotent         
verbalism of the formal treatment of    
judgment appears in  another way when   
the question is raised how a 'true'     
judgment is to be  distinguished from a 

'false4' ,for the logician1 if his      
public will not  accept either the      
relegation of this distinction to       
'psychology' or the  proper formal      
answer that all judgments are 7formally7
 'true' and even  'infallible1' can     
think of nothing better to say than that
 if the  'judgment' is not true it was  
not a 'true judgment1' but a false      
'opinion' which may be abandoned to     
'psychology4',g ,apparently he is  not  
concerned to help men to discriminate   
between 'judgments' and  'opinions1' or 
even to show that true 'judgments' do in
 fact occur4        #c4 ,inference      
involves ,formal ,logic in a host of    
difficulties4    7a7 ,if it is not to be
 a verbal manipulation of phrases whose 
coming  together is not inquired into1  
it must be a connected train of thought4
  ,but such a connection of thoughts    
cannot be conceived or understood       
without reference to the purpose of a   
reasoner1 who selects what he  requires 
from the totality of 'truths4' ,if1     

then1 ',logic' has merely to            
contemplate this eternal and immutable  
system of truth in its integrity1  and  
forbids all selection from it for a     
merely human purpose1 how can it  either
 justify1 or even understand1 the       
drawing of any inference  whatever8     
7b7 ,formal ,logic clearly will not     
quail before the charge of  uselessness4
 ,but on its own principles it ought to 
be consistent4 ,but by  this test also1 
when it is rigorously judged by it1 it  
fails completely4  ,its inconsistencies 
are many and incurable4 ,it cannot even 
be consistent  in its theory of the     
simplest fundamentals4 ,it is found upon
 some  occasions to define judgment as  
that which may be either true or  false2
 and upon others as that which is 'true'
 7formally7--i4e41 it  cannot decide    
whether or not to ignore the existence  
of error4    7c7 ,the ,formal view of   
inference regards it as a 'paradox4' ,an
  inference is required on the one hand 
to supply fresh information1 and  on the

 other to follow rigorously from its    
premisses2 it must1 in a  word1 exhibit 
both novelty and necessity4 ,it would   
seem1 however1  that if our inference   
genuinely had imparted new knowledge1   
the event  must be merely psychological2
 for how can any process or event       
perturb1  or add to1 the completed      
totality of truth in itself8 ,on the    
other hand1  if the 'necessity' of the  
operation be taken seriously1 the       
'inference'  becomes illusory2 for if   
the conclusion inferred is already      
contained  in the premisses1 what sense 
is there in the purely verbal process of
  drawing it out8    7d7 ,most glaringly
 inadequate of all1 however1 is the     
,formal doctrine  of ',proof' contained 
in its theory of the ,syllogism4 ,a     
,formal or verbal  syllogism depends    
essentially on the ability of its       
,middle ,term to  connect the terms in  
its conclusion4 ,if1 however1 the       
,middle ,term has  not the same meaning 
in the two premisses1 the syllogism     

breaks in  two1 and no 'valid'          
conclusion can be reached4 ,now1 whether
 in fact any  particular ,middle ,term  
bears the same meaning in any actual    
reasoning  ,formal ,logic has debarred  
itself from inquiring1 by deciding that 
actual  meaning was 'psychological4' ,it
 has to be content1 therefore1 with an  
identity in the word employed for its   
,middle1 ,but this evidence may  always 
fail2 for when two premisses which are  
7in general7 'true' are  brought        
together for the purpose of drawing a   
particular conclusion1 a  glaring       
falsehood may result4 ,e4g41 it would in
 general be granted  that 'iron sinks in
 water1' yet it does not follow that    
because 'this  ship is iron' it will    
'sink in water1' ,hence syllogistic     
'proof' seems  quite devoid of the      
'cogency' it claimed4 ,after a          
conclusion has been  'demonstrated' it  
has still to come true in fact4 ,this   
flaw in the  ,syllogism was first       
pointed out by ,mr4 ,alfred ,sidgwick4  

7e7 ,the formal ,syllogism1 moreover1   
conceals another formal flaw4 ,an       
infinite regress lurks in its bosom4    
,for if its premisses are disputed1     
they must in turn be 'proved4' ,four    
fresh premisses are needed1 and if      
these again are challenged1 the number  
of true premisses needed to prove  the  
first conclusion goes on doubling at    
every step ad infinitum4 ,the  only way 
to stop the process that occurred to    
logicians was an appeal to  the         
'self-evident' truth of 'intuitions'2   
but this has been shown to be           
argumentatively worthless4 ,from this   
difficulty the pragmatist alone         
escapes1 by assuming his premisses      
provisionally and arguing  forwards1 in 
order to test them by their             
consequences4 ,if the deduced           
conclusion can be verified in fact1 the 
premisses grow more assured4  ,thus     
every real inference is an experiment1  
and 'proof' is an affair of  continuous 
trial and verification--not an infinite 

falling back upon an  elusive           
'certainty1' but an infinite reaching   
forwards towards a fuller  consummation4
    7f7 ,so long as the logician regards
 his premisses not as hypotheses to  be 
tested1 but as established truths1 he   
must condemn the ,syllogism as a  formal
 fallacy4 ,it is inevitably a petitio   
principii4 ,if the argument  ',all men  
are mortal2 ,smith is a man1 therefore  
,smith is mortal1' means  that we know1 
before drawing our inference1 that      
literally all men are  mortal1 we must  
already have discovered that ,smith is  
mortal2 if we did  not know beforehand  
that ,smith is mortal1 we were not      
justified in  stating that all men are  
mortal4 ,nor is it an escape to         
interpret ',all  men are mortal' to mean
 that immortals are excluded from 'man' 
by  definition4 ,for then the question  
is merely begged in the minor premiss4  
,that ',smith is a man' cannot be       
asserted without assuming that he is    
mortal4 ,if1 lastly1 ',all men are      

mortal' be taken to state a law of      
nature conjoining inseparably mortality 
and humanity1 the logician  either      
already knows that ,smith is rightly    
classed under the species  'man1' and so
 subject to its mortality1 or else he   
assumes this4 ,but  how does he know    
,smith is not like ,elijah or ,tithonus1
 a peculiar case1  to which for some    
reason the law does not apply8 ,will he 
declare it to  be 'intuitively certain' 
that whatever is called1 or looks like1 
a case  of a 'law' ipso facto becomes   
one8    ,the logician's analysis of     
reasoning1 then1 breaks down4 ,in       
whichever  way he interprets the        
,syllogism it is revealed as either a   
superfluity  or a fallacy3 it is never a
 'formally valid inference' that can    
compel  assent4 ,but common sense is    
undismayed by the pragmatist's discovery
  that if the ,syllogism is to have any 
sense its premisses must be taken  as   
disputable2 for1 unlike ,formal ,logic1 
it has perceived that men do  not reason

 about what they think they know for    
certain1 but about  matters in dispute4 
#d4 ,it is not necessary to dwell at    
length on the futility of the formal    
notion of ,induction4 ,formal ,induction
 presupposes that enough particular     
instances have been collected to        
establish a general rule2 but in actual 
practice inductions always repose1 not  
on indiscriminate observation1  but on a
 selection of relevant instances1 and   
never claim to be based  upon an        
exhaustive knowledge of particulars4    
,hence in form the most  satisfactory   
induction is always incomplete1 and     
differs in no wise from  a bad one4     
',all bodies fall to the ground' is an  
induction which has  worked4 ',all swans
 are white' broke down when black swans 
were  discovered in ,australia4 ,the    
validity of an induction1 then1 is not a
  question of form4    ,the necessity   
for such selection no intellectualist   
theory of ,induction  has understood4   
,all have aimed at exhaustiveness1 and  

imagined that if  it could be attained1 
inductive reasoning would be rendered   
sound1 and  not impossible4 ,their ideal
 'cause' was the totality of reality1   
identified with its 'effect1' in a      
meaningless tautology4 ,nothing but     
voluntarism can enable logicians to see 
that our actual procedure in  knowing is
 the reverse of this1 that causal       
explanation is the  analysis of a       
continuum1 and that 'phenomena1'        
'events1' 'effects1'  and 'causes' are  
all creations of our selective          
attention2 that in  selecting them we   
run a risk of analyzing falsely1 and    
that if we do1  our 'inductions' will be
 worthless4 ,but whether they are right 
or wrong1  valuable or not1 real        
reasoning from 'facts' can never be a   
'formally  valid' process4    ,we are   
thus brought to see the hollowness of   
the contention that ',pure  ,reason' can
 ignore its psychological context and   
dehumanize itself4 ,a  thought1 to be   
thought at all1 must seem worth thinking

 to someone1 it  must convey the meaning
 he intends1 it must be true in his eyes
 and  relevant to his purposes in the   
situation in which it arises--i4e41 it  
must have a motive1 a value1 a meaning1 
a purpose1 a context1 and be  selected  
from a greater whole for its relevance  
to these4 ,none of these  features does 
intellectualist logic deign to          
recognize4 ,for if truth is  absolute   
and not relative1 it is all or nothing4 
,yet no actual thinking  has such       
transcendent aims4 ,it is content with  
selections relative to a  concrete      
situation4 ,if it were permissible to   
diversify a  debate--e4g41 about the    
authorship of the ,odyssey--by an       
irruption  of undisputed truths--e4g41 a
 recitation of the multiplication       
table--how would it be possible to      
distinguish a philosopher from a        
lunatic8    ,formal ,logic is either a  
perennial source of errors about real   
thinking1  or at best an aimless        
dissection of a caput mortuum--i4e41 of 

the  verbal husks of dead thoughts1     
whose value ,formal ,logic could neither
  establish nor apprehend1 ,a real      
,logic1 therefore1 would most anxiously 
avoid all the initial abstractions which
 have reduced ,formal ,logic to  such   
impotence1 and would abandon the insane 
attempt to eliminate the  thinker from  
the theory of thought4    ,,footnotes3  
,footnote ,f3 ,the descriptive science  
of thought1 in its concrete  actuality  
in different minds4    ,footnote ,g3    
,the most popular contribution which    
,oxford makes just now  to the theory of
 ,error is1 ',a judgment which is       
erroneous is not really  a judgment4'   
,so when a professor 'judges' he is     
infallible--by  definition6             
,,chapter ,,vii      ,,the ,,bankruptcy 
,,of ,,intellectualism    ,we have now  
struggled through the quagmires of      
intellectualist  philosophy1 and found  
that neither in its ,psychology1 which  
divided the  mind's integrity into a    
heap of faculties1 and comminuted it    

into a  dust-cloud of sensations2 nor in
 its ,epistemology1 which ignored the   
will to know and the value of knowing2  
nor in its ,logic1 which  abstracted    
thought wholly from the thinking and the
 thinker1 and so  finally from1 all     
meaning1 could man find a practicable   
route of  philosophic progress4 ,but our
 struggles will not have been in vain if
  they have left us with a willingness  
to try the pragmatist alternative1  and 
convinced us that it is not a wanton    
innovation1 but the only path  of       
salvation for the scientific spirit4    
,but before we venture on it1 it will be
 well to restore confidence in  the     
solvency of human thought by analysing  
the causes of the bankruptcy  of        
,intellectualism and exposing the       
extravagance of the assumptions  which  
conducted to it4    ,was it not1 after  
all1 an unwarranted assumption that     
severed the  intellect from its natural 
connection with human activity8 ,no     
doubt it  seemed to simplify the problem

 to suppose that the functioning of the 
intellect could be studied as a thing   
apart1 and unrelated to the  general    
context of the vital functions4 ,again1 
it was to simplify to  assume that      
thought could be considered apart from  
the personality of  the human thinker4  
,but it should not have been forgotten  
that it is  possible to pay too dearly  
for simplifications and abstractions1   
and  that they all involve a risk1 which
 the event may show should never have   
been taken4 ,so it is in this case4 ,its
 rash assumptions confront              
,intellectualism with a host of problems
 it cannot attack4 ,it can do  nothing  
to assuage the conflict of opinions     
which all claim truth with  equal       
confidence4 ,it cannot understand the   
correction of error which is            
continually proceeding4 ,nor can it     
understand1 either the existence of     
error or the meaning of truth1 or the   
means of distinguishing between  them4  
,it has no means of testing and         

confuting even the wildest and  maddest 
assertions4 ,it cannot discriminate     
between the intuitions of the  sage and 
of the lunatic4 ,it is forced to view   
energy of will in knowing  as a source  
merely of corruption1 and when it finds 
that as a psychic  fact willing is      
ineradicable1 it must conclude that we  
are  constitutionally incapable of that 
passive reflection of reality which  it 
regards as the sine qua non of truth4   
,hence1 if disinterestedness  is the    
condition of knowing1 knowledge is      
impossible4 ,and it is so  entangled in 
its unintelligible theory of truth as a 
copying of reality  that1 rather than   
renounce it1 when it finds that human   
knowing is not  copying1 it prefers a   
surrender to ,scepticism4    ,yet is not
 its whole procedure a signal example of
 human arbitrariness  and perversity8   
,we professed to be impelled by logical 
necessity at  every step1 but were free 
to escape from all our perplexities by  
adopting the pragmatic inferences from  

them4 ,the ,pragmatic ,method of        
observing the consequences readily      
suggests the means of discriminating    
between truth and error1 of sifting     
values and of testing claims4 ,and1     
though not infallible1 it is adequate to
 all our needs4 ,the pragmatic  notion  
that ,truth is practical closes the     
artificial gulf between the  theoretic  
and the practical side of life1 and     
assigns to truth a  biological function 
and vital value4 ,the humanist          
contention that ,truth  is human rescues
 man from the despondency in which his  
failure to grasp  absolute truth had    
left him4 ,the ,protagorean dictum that 
,man is the  measure of all things      
assures him that his knowledge may      
become  adequate to his reality1 and    
that the value of truths and the        
differences between truth and error also
 are susceptible of estimation4         
,true1 this policy averts the bankruptcy
 of the intellect by scaling down  the  
intolerable charges on it4 ,true1       

practical knowledge is not  absolute2   
but if it is enough to live by1 is it   
not better to live by it  than to be    
lured on to perish in the deserts of    
,scepticism by the  mirage of an        
absolute truth not humanly attainable8  
,true1 verification  is not 'proof1' but
 as its conclusions are not             
incorrigible1 its defects  are not      
fatal1 and its demands are not          
impracticable4 ,true1 no truth and  no  
reality are wholly 'objective1' in the  
sense of wholly indifferent to  our     
action2 but to say that the human and   
'subjective' factor in all  knowledge   
must be taken into account does not     
preclude our apprehending  and measuring
 an 'objective' world as real as1 and   
more knowable than1  any other theory   
can offer4    ,thus the proposals of    
,pragmatism for reconstructing the      
business of the  intellect1 and rescuing
 it from the bankruptcy of              
,intellectualism1 are  not unreasonable4
 ,they open out to it a prospect of     

recovering its  credit and its          
usefulness by returning to the service  
of ,life4          ,,chapter ,,viii     
,,thought ,,and ,,life    ,the mission  
of ,pragmatism is to bring ,philosophy  
into relation to real  ,life and        
,action4 ,so far from regarding ,thought
 as a self-centred1  self-enclosed      
activity1 ,pragmatism insists upon      
replacing it in its  context among the  
other functions of life1 and in         
measuring its value by  its effect upon 
them4 ,so far1 again1 from regarding the
 abstract  intellect as a vast          
,juggernaut machine which absorbs and   
crushes the  individual thinker1 it     
treats him individually as having his   
own  constitution1 raison d'tre1 and    
intrinsic interest1 and credits him     
with a power to make new truths and to  
enrich the resources of thought4  ,each 
thinker has before him an individual    
situation1 a system of aims  and values1
 a stock of knowledge and of means from 
which he must select  what is relevant  

to his ends1 and so cannot escape in any
 judgment from  the responsibilities of 
a personal decision4    ,thus1 for      
,pragmatism every thought is an act with
 a person behind it1  who is responsible
 for launching it into the world of     
fact4 ,the result  of this change of    
attitude is immediate4 ,in the first    
place1 as has been  shown in ,chapter   
,v41 by bringing thought face to face   
with the whole  experience upon which it
 claims to work1 we are enabled to find 
a  tangible rule for evaluating its     
assertions and distinguishing truth     
from error4 ,and1 secondly1 by          
recognizing that the mind is not an     
apparatus which functions in a vacuum1  
but is a constituent of an  individual  
organism1 we see that thinking always   
depends upon a purpose2  for it is the  
purpose of an inquiry which gives       
reflection its cue1 and  determines its 
scope and 7most essential of all7 its   
meaning4    ,we are thus led from the   
narrower logical question1 ',what       

constitutes  the truth of a statement8' 
to a wider outlook1 from which we can   
survey the place of knowing in human    
life at large4 ,this may be called  the 
transition from ,pragmatism to          
,humanism4 ,this last word was          
introduced into philosophic terminology 
by ,dr4 ,schiller in order to  describe 
his general philosophical position as   
distinct from the  original question of 
the theory of knowledge1 which had been 
treated by  ,james under the name of    
,pragmatism4    ,to the ,humanist the   
best definition of life is one which    
displays it as  throughout purposive1 as
 a rational pursuit of ends4 ,this      
raises the  question of the validity of 
valuations4 ,valuation is a widespread  
human  practice4 ,in their most general 
aspect we classify all objects as 'good'
  and 'bad1' according as they are ends 
to be pursued or avoided1 or means      
which further or frustrate the pursuit  
of ends4 ,this general antithesis       
between the 'good' and the 'bad' has    

numerous specific forms1 applicable  to 
different departments of human activity4
 ,thus1 in conduct1 actions  are judged 
'good' or 'evil' and 'right' or 'wrong'2
 in thinking1 ideas  are 'true' or      
'false1' and 'relevant' or 'irrelevant'2
 for art1 objects  are 'beautiful' or   
'ugly1' and so forth1 for the modes of  
valuation in  life are innumerable4 ,any
 one of these adjectives either denotes 
value  or censures lack of worth1 and   
each gets its meaning by reference to   
the  specific purpose1 moral1 aesthetic1
 or intellectual1 it appeals to4 ,the   
summum bonum1 or supreme good1 will then
 be the ideal of the  harmonious        
satisfaction of all purposes4    ,what1 
then1 from the standpoint of ,humanism1 
is the function of  'truth-values' in   
our life8 ,they indicate a relation to  
the cognitive  end4 ,what is this end8  
,surely not self-sufficing8 ,a truth    
that is merely  true in itself has no   
interest for human life1 and no human   
mind has an  interest in discovering and

 affirming it4 ,truth1 therefore1 cannot
  stand aloof from life4 ,it must       
somehow subserve our vital purposes4    
,but  how shall it do this8 ,only by    
becoming applicable to the reality we   
have  to live with1 by becoming useful  
for the changes we desire to effect in  
it4 ,whoever will not admit this1 and   
renders truth inapplicable1 does in     
fact render it unmeaning4    ,the fact  
that thought essentially refers to a    
'reality' external to it  in no way     
diminishes its purposive character4     
,whether the mind is  idealizing an     
aspect of reality 7as in mathematics7 or
 abstracting1  classifying1 and         
predicting 7as in science71 it is always
 the fact that  a particular kind of    
reality is needed for some serious or   
trivial  purpose which guides the       
operations of the thinker4 ,a mind which
 craved  to embrace all or 'any' reality
 need not think2 it would do better to  
float without discrimination upon the   
flux of change4 ,this procedure  would  

be so absolutely antithetical to human  
knowing that it seems a  wanton paradox 
on that account to treat it as the final
 goal of  knowledge4    ,actually1 of   
course1 the philosophers who claim to be
 devoted to pure  theory follow no such 
course4 ,they deliberately choose their 
ideal of  what is worth knowing--e4g41  
',god1' or 'the unity of all things1' or
  'the laws of the universe'--and1      
disregarding all other existences1  they
 pursue the kind of reality they desire 
because of its religious or  moral or   
aesthetic value4 ,for there could be no 
greater mistake than to  suppose that   
the common antithesis between 'reality' 
and the 'un-real'  usually means the    
same thing as the distinction between   
what 'exists'  and what is absolutely   
non-existent4 ,on the contrary1 it is   
usually a  judgment of value4 ,we may   
say that the 'haunted' house is real and
 the  'ghost' is not2 but as an         
hallucination the ghost is real enough4 
,utopia  is unreal for the politician1  

but exists as an ideal for the theorist4
  ,the ,platonist treats our physical   
world of sight and touch1 which we      
think the most real of all1 as a mere   
illusion compared to the ',ideas'  of   
his metaphysical world4 ,the thinker who
 declares he wants to know all  about   
'reality' does not mean that he wishes  
to investigate everything  which in any 
sense exists1 but that he wishes to know
 what he  considers best worth          
knowing--and this1 of course1 implies a 
personal  valuation1 a purged and       
expurgated extract1 which will not      
offend his  taste4 ,so all philosophies 
are1 in fact1 selective4 ,even the more 
conscientious rationalists show very    
little anxiety to include in their      
intellectual scheme a knowledge of their
 opponents' opinions--indeed1  they seem
 to think that the existence of such    
facts may be made  dependent wholly on  
their will to recognize them4 ,an       
exposition of  ,pragmatism is for them a
 'reality' which does not count3 it is  

not worth  knowing about4 ,and this is  
only natural1 after all4 ,for 'reality1'
 the  object of the mind's search1 is   
always a selection1 conceived after the 
likeness of the heart's desire1 the     
product of a human purpose4    ,to      
recognize this is to appreciate the     
wisdom of ,humanism's refusal to  treat 
the world1 for good or bad1 as a given  
and completed whole4 ,for  not only is  
what we call the real world always a    
selection from a larger  whole from     
which we have ventured to exclude great 
masses of  irrelevance1 but every day   
brings fresh experience1 and may bring  
fresh  enlightenment4 ,and since man has
 always an interest in improving his    
condition1 is it not futile to forbid   
him to re-make his world as beat  he    
can8 ,why prematurely claim to have     
reached finality1 when unexpected       
novelties may shatter any system before 
it is even completed8 ,our world  is    
plastic1 it is most 'really' what we can
 make of it1 and the process  of our    

making is not ended4 ,whether a decree  
of ,fate has fixed any  ultimate limits 
to our efforts we have no means of      
knowing1 and no  occasion to assume4 ,is
 not our wisest course1 then1 to persist
 in  trying8 ,it is bad method ever to  
despair of knowing what we need4    ,for
 good or ill1 the world with which the  
,humanist contends is always a  world   
that reveals itself to him4 ,reality1 as
 it is assumed1 presumed1  or guessed to
 be 'in itself1' apart from our         
experience of it1 is  cancelled from his
 reckonings4 ,for he cannot discover how
 he 7or anyone7  can get any 'knowledge'
 or 'intuition' which transcends all    
human  faculties4 ,the theories of      
metaphysicians on these lofty themes he 
regards as personal postulates which1 in
 so far as they cannot be  subjected to 
the pragmatic method1 must remain open  
questions4 ,human  experience does not  
warrant such gratuitous demands4 ,it    
confirms neither  the rigid system of   
unchanging fact which realism postulates

 7seeing  that the only facts that      
science speaks of are ever changing in  
its  progress71 nor finds its problems1 
conflicts1 and errors credible as a     
reflexion of any ,universal ,mind1      
unless ,idealism ultimately repudiates  
the sanity of its ,absolute4    ,the    
superiority of ,humanism1 then1 lies in 
this1 that it does not  discourage human
 enterprise by assuming that the real is
 completely  rigid and eternally        
achieved without regard to human effort4
 ,in the  drama that unrolls reality1   
every man1 it teaches1 has a duty and a 
power to play his humble but essential  
part4 ,humanism is neither an  ,optimism
 nor a ,pessimism--both of which must   
consistently1 in their  extreme form1   
deny that reality can be improved--but  
concedes to man the  right and duty to  
improve the world4 ,it impresses us with
 the necessity  of acting1 it vindicates
 the procedure of acting on our hopes1  
it shows  us how we may correct our     
errors1 and so gives reasons for our    

faith in  the possibility of ,progress4 
,,bibliography        ,,william ,,james3
      ,the ,principles of ,psychology1  
#ahij4      ,the ,will to ,believe1 and 
,other ,essays in ,popular ,philosophy1 
#ahig4      ,the ,varieties of          
,religious ,experience1 #aijb4          
,pragmatism1 a ,new ,name for ,some ,old
 ,ways of ,thinking1 #aijg4      ,a     
,pluralistic ,universe1 #aiji4      ,the
 ,meaning of ,truth1 #aiji4      ,some  
,problems of ,philosophy1 #aiaa4        
,radical ,empiricism1 #aiab4            
,f4,c4,s4 ,,schiller3      ,riddles of  
the ,sphinx1 #ahia 7revised edition1    
#aiaj74      ,axioms as ,postulates 7in 
,personal ,idealism1 ed4 ,henry         
,sturt1 #aijb74      ,humanism3         
,philosophical ,essays1 #aijc4          
,studies in ,humanism1 #aijg4           
,formal ,logic1 a ,scientific and       
,social ,problem1 #aiab4      ,,henry   
,,sturt3      ,idola ,theatri1 a        
,criticism of ,oxford ,thought and      
,thinkers from the        ,standpoint of

 ,personal ,idealism1 #aijf4      ,j4   
,,dewey ,,and ,,others3      ,studies in
 ,logical ,theory1 #aijc4      ,j4      
,,dewey3      ,the ,influence of        
,darwinism1 and ,other ,essays1 #aiaj4  
,h4,v4 ,,knox3      ,the ,evolution of  
,truth1 ,quarterly ,review1 ,no4 #dai4  
,april1 #aiji4      ,a4,w4 ,,moore3     
,pragmatism and its ,critics1 #aiaa4    
,a4 ,,sidgwick3      ,the ,application  
of ,logic1 #aiaj4