,discourses on the ,first ,decade of ,titus ,livius by ,niccolo ,machiavelli ,,citizen ,,and ,,secretary ,,of ,,florence ,,translated ,,from ,,the ,,italian ,,by ,,ninian ,,hill ,,thomson1 ,m4,a4 ,,london ,,kegan ,,paul1 ,,trench ,,co41 #a1 ,,paternoster ,,square #ahhc ,,to ,,professor ,,pasquale ,,villari4 ,,dear ,,professor ,,villari1 ,permit me to inscribe your name on a translation of ,machiavelli's ,discourses which ,i had your encouragement to undertake1 and in which ,i have done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original4 ,yours faithfully1 ,,ninian ,,hill ,,thomson4 ,,florence1 ,may #ag1 #ahhc4 ,,book ,i4 ,,preface ,,chapter ,i4 ,of the beginnings of ,cities in general1 and in particular of that of ,rome ,,ii4 ,of the various kinds of ,government2 and to which of them the ,roman ,commonwealth belonged ,,iii4 ,of the accidents which led in ,rome to the creation of ,tribunes of the ,people1 whereby the ,republic was made more perfect ,,iv4 ,that the dissensions between the ,senate and ,commons of ,rome made ,rome free and powerful ,v4 ,whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the ,commons or of the ,nobles2 and whether those who seek to acquire power1 or they who seek to maintain it1 are the greater cause of commotions ,,vi4 ,whether it was possible in ,rome to contrive such a ,government as would have composed the differences between the ,commons and the ,senate ,,vii4 ,that to preserve liberty in a ,state1 there must exist the right to accuse ,,viii4 ,that calumny is as hurtful in a ,commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful ,,ix4 ,that to give new institutions to a ,commonwealth1 or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis1 must be the work of one ,man ,x4 ,that in proportion as the founder of a ,kingdom or ,commonwealth merits praise1 he who founds a ,tyranny deserves blame ,,xi4 ,of the ,religion of the ,romans ,,xii4 ,that it is of much moment to make account of ,religion2 and that ,italy1 through the ,roman ,church1 being wanting therein1 has been ruined ,,xiii4 ,of the use the ,romans made of ,religion in giving institutions to their ,city2 in carrying out their enterprises2 and in quelling tumults ,,xiv4 ,that the ,romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion2 and made a prudent show of observing the rites of ,religion even when forced to disregard them2 and any who rashly slighted ,religion they punished ,,xv4 ,how the ,samnites1 as a last resource in their broken fortunes1 had recourse to ,religion ,,xvi4 ,that a ,people accustomed to live under a ,prince1 if by any accident it become free1 can hardly preserve that freedom ,,xvii4 ,that a corrupt ,people obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it ,,xviii4 ,how a free ,government existing in a corrupt ,city may be preserved1 or not existing may be created ,,xix4 ,after a strong ,prince a weak ,prince may maintain himself3 but after one weak ,prince no ,kingdom can stand a second ,,xx4 ,that the consecutive reigns of two valiant ,princes produce great results3 and that well-ordered ,commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant ,rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended ,,xxi4 ,that it is a great reproach to a ,prince or to a ,commonwealth to be without a ,national ,army ,,xxii4 ,what is to be noted in the combat of the three ,roman ,horatii and the three ,alban ,curiatii ,,xxiii4 ,that we should never hazard our whole fortunes1 where we put not forth our entire strength2 for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful ,,xxiv4 ,that well-ordered ,states always provide rewards and punishments for their ,citizens2 and never set off deserts against misdeeds ,,xxv4 ,that he who would reform the institutions of a free ,state1 must retain at least the semblance of old ways ,,xxvi4 ,that a new ,prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession1 ought to make everything new ,,xxvii4 ,that ,men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad ,,xxviii4 ,whence it came that the ,romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the ,athenians ,,xxix4 ,whether a ,people or a ,prince is the more ungrateful ,,xxx4 ,how ,princes and ,commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude2 and how a ,captain or ,citizen may escape being undone by it ,,xxxi4 ,that the ,roman ,captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct2 and where loss resulted to the ,republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment1 were not punished at all ,,xxxii4 ,that a ,prince or ,commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them ,,xxxiii4 ,when a mischief has grown up in1 or against a ,state1 it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence ,,xxxiv4 ,that the authority of the ,dictator did good and not harm to the ,roman ,republic2 and that it is1 not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the ,people1 but those which ambitious ,citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a ,state ,,xxxv4 ,why the creation of the ,decemvirate in ,rome1 although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the ,citizens1 was hurtful to the liberties of that ,republic ,,xxxvi4 ,that ,citizens who have held the higher offices of a ,commonwealth should not disdain the lower ,,xxxvii4 ,of the mischief bred in ,rome by the ,agrarian ,law3 and how it is a great source of disorder in a ,commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect ,,xxxviii4 ,that weak ,republics are irresolute and undecided2 and that the course they may take depends more on ,necessity than ,choice ,,xxxix4 ,that often the same accidents are seen to befall different ,nations ,,xl4 ,of the creation of the ,decemvirate in ,rome1 and what therein is to be noted4 ,wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a ,commonwealth ,,xli4 ,that it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity1 or to a haughty bearing from a humble ,,xlii4 ,how easily men become corrupted ,,xliii4 ,that men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute ,soldiers ,,xliv4 ,that the ,multitude is helpless without a head3 and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave ,,xlv4 ,that it is of evil example1 especially in the maker of a law1 not to observe the law when made3 and that daily to renew acts of severity in a ,city is most hurtful to the ,governor ,,xlvi4 ,that men climb from one step of ambition to another1 seeking at first to escape injury1 and then to injure others ,,xlvii4 ,that though men deceive themselves in generalities1 in particulars they judge truly ,,xlviii4 ,he who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person1 should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked1 or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good ,,xlix4 ,that if ,cities which1 like ,rome1 had their beginning in freedom1 have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom1 ,cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible ,l4 ,that neither any ,council nor any ,magistrate should have power to bring the ,government of a ,city to a stay ,,li4 ,what a ,prince or ,republic does of necessity1 should seem to be done by choice ,,lii4 ,that to check the arrogance of a ,citizen who is growing too powerful in a ,state1 there is no safer method1 nor less open to objection1 than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself ,,liii4 ,that the ,people1 deceived by a false show of advantage1 often desire what would be their ruin2 and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them ,,liv4 ,of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited ,multitude ,,lv4 ,that the ,government is easily carried on in a ,city wherein the body of the ,people is not corrupted3 and that a ,princedom is impossible where equality prevails1 and a ,republic where it does not ,,lvi4 ,that when great calamities are about to befall a ,city or ,country1 signs are seen to presage1 and seers arise who foretell them ,,lvii4 ,that the ,people are strong collectively1 but individually weak ,,lviii4 ,that a ,people is wiser and more constant than a ,prince ,,lix4 ,to what ,leagues or ,alliances we may most trust1 whether those we make with ,commonwealths or those we make with ,princes ,,lx4 ,that the ,consulship and all the other ,magistracies in ,rome were given without respect to ,age ,,book ,,ii4 ,,preface ,i4 ,whether the ,empire acquired by the ,romans was more due to ,valour or to ,fortune ,,ii4 ,with what ,nations the ,romans had to contend1 and how stubborn these were in defending their ,freedom ,,iii4 ,that ,rome became great by destroying the ,cities which lay round about her1 and by readily admitting ,strangers to the rights of ,citizenship ,,iv4 ,that ,commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power ,v4 ,that changes in ,sects and ,tongues1 and the happening of ,floods and ,pestilences1 obliterate the memory of the past ,,vi4 ,of the methods followed by the ,romans in making ,war ,,vii4 ,of the quantity of land assigned by the ,romans to each colonist ,,viii4 ,why certain ,nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the ,countries of others ,,ix4 ,of the ,causes which commonly give rise to wars between ,states ,x4 ,that contrary to the vulgar opinion1 ,money is not the sinews of ,war ,,xi4 ,that it were unwise to ally yourself with a ,prince who has reputation rather than strength ,,xii4 ,whether when ,invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it ,,xiii4 ,that ,men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by ,fraud than by ,force ,,xiv4 ,that ,men often err in thinking they can subdue ,pride by ,humility ,,xv4 ,that weak ,states are always dubious in their resolves2 and that tardy resolves are always hurtful ,,xvi4 ,that the ,soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient ,warfare ,,xvii4 ,what importance the ,armies of the present day should allow to ,artillery2 and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just ,,xviii4 ,that the authority of the ,romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold ,foot ,soldiers of more account than ,horse ,,xix4 ,that conquests made by ill governed ,states and such as follow not the valiant methods of the ,romans1 lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement ,,xx4 ,of the dangers incurred by ,princes or ,republics who resort to ,auxiliary or ,mercenary ,arms ,,xxi4 ,that ,capua was the first ,city to which the ,romans sent a ,prtor2 nor there1 until four hundred years after they began to make war ,,xxii4 ,that in matters of moment ,men often judge amiss ,,xxiii4 ,that in chastising their ,subjects when circumstances required it the ,romans always avoided half measures ,,xxiv4 ,that1 commonly1 ,fortresses do much more harm than good ,,xxv4 ,that he who attacks a ,city divided against itself1 must not think to get possession of it through its divisions ,,xxvi4 ,that ,taunts and ,abuse breed hatred against him who uses them1 without yielding him any advantage ,,xxvii4 ,that prudent ,princes and ,republics should be content to have obtained a victory2 for1 commonly1 when they are not1 their victory turns to defeat ,,xxviii4 ,that to neglect the redress of ,grievances1 whether public or private1 is dangerous for a ,prince or ,commonwealth ,,xxix4 ,that ,fortune obscures the minds of ,men when she would not have them hinder her designs ,,xxx4 ,that really powerful ,princes and ,commonwealths do not buy ,friendships with money1 but with their valour and the fame of their prowess ,,xxxi4 ,of the danger of trusting banished men ,,xxxii4 ,in how many ways the ,romans gained possession of ,towns ,,xxxiii4 ,that the ,romans entrusted the ,captains of their ,armies with the fullest ,powers ,,book ,,iii4 ,i4 ,for a ,sect or ,commonwealth to last long1 it must often be brought back to its beginnings ,,ii4 ,that on occasion it is wise to feign folly ,,iii4 ,that to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the ,sons of ,brutus ,,iv4 ,that an ,usurper is never safe in his ,princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it ,v4 ,how an ,hereditary ,king may come to lose his ,kingdom ,,vi4 ,of ,conspiracies ,,vii4 ,why it is that changes from ,freedom to ,servitude1 and from ,servitude to ,freedom1 are sometimes made without bloodshed1 but at other times reek with blood ,,viii4 ,that he who would effect changes in a ,commonwealth1 must give heed to its character and condition ,,ix4 ,that to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times ,x4 ,that a ,captain cannot escape battle when his ,enemy forces it on him at all hazards ,,xi4 ,that one who has to contend with many1 though he be weaker than they1 will prevail if he can withstand their first onset ,,xii4 ,a prudent ,captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own ,soldiers to fight1 and to relieve his ,enemy from that necessity ,,xiii4 ,whether we may trust more to a valiant ,captain with a weak ,army1 or to a valiant ,army with a weak ,captain ,,xiv4 ,of the effect produced in ,battle by strange and unexpected ,sights or ,sounds ,,xv4 ,that one and not many should head an ,army2 and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one ,,xvi4 ,that in times of difficulty true ,worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour ,,xvii4 ,that we are not to offend a ,man1 and then send him to fill an important ,office or ,command ,,xviii4 ,that it is the highest quality of a ,captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary ,,xix4 ,whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a ,multitude ,,xx4 ,how one humane act availed more with the men of ,falerii than all the might of the ,roman ,arms ,,xxi4 ,how it happened that ,hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by ,scipio1 wrought the same results in ,italy which the other achieved in ,spain ,,xxii4 ,that the severity of ,manlius ,torquatus and the gentleness of ,valerius ,corvinus won for both the same ,glory ,,xxiii4 ,why ,camillus was banished from ,rome ,,xxiv4 ,that prolonged ,commands brought ,rome to ,servitude ,,xxv4 ,of the ,poverty of ,cincinnatus and of many other ,roman ,citizens ,,xxvi4 ,how women are a cause of the ruin of ,states ,,xxvii4 ,how a divided ,city may be reunited2 and how it is a false opinion that to hold ,cities in subjection they must be kept divided ,,xxviii4 ,that a ,republic must keep an eye on what its ,citizens are about2 since often the seeds of a ,tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds ,,xxix4 ,that the faults of a ,people are due to its ,prince ,,xxx4 ,that a ,citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his ,country1 must first stand clear of ,envy4 ,how a ,city should prepare for its defence on the approach of an ,enemy ,,xxxi ,that strong ,republics and valiant ,men preserve through every change the same spirit and bearing ,,xxxii4 ,of the methods which some have used to make ,peace impossible ,,xxxiii4 ,that to insure victory in battle1 you must inspire your soldiers with confidence in one another and in you ,,xxxiv4 ,by what reports1 rumours1 or surmises the ,citizens of a ,republic are led to favour a fellow-citizen3 and whether the ,magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a ,people or by a ,prince ,,xxxv4 ,of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures2 and that the more unusual the measures1 the greater the danger ,,xxxvi4 ,why it has been and still may be affirmed of the ,gauls1 that at the beginning of a fray they are more than ,men1 but afterwards less than ,women ,,xxxvii4 ,whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes2 and how1 avoiding these1 we may get knowledge of a new ,enemy ,,xxxviii4 ,of the ,qualities of a ,captain in whom his ,soldiers can confide ,,xxxix4 ,that a ,captain should have good knowledge of ,places ,,xl4 ,that ,fraud is fair in ,war ,,xli4 ,that our ,country is to be defended by ,honour or by ,dishonour1 and in either way is well defended ,,xlii4 ,that ,promises made on compulsion are not to be observed ,,xliii4 ,that ,men born in the same ,province retain through all times nearly the same character ,,xliv4 ,that where ordinary methods fail1 ,hardihood and ,daring often succeed ,,xlv4 ,whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy's attack1 or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset ,,xlvi4 ,how the ,characteristics of ,families come to be perpetuated ,,xlvii4 ,that love of his ,country should lead a good ,citizen to forget private wrongs ,,xlviii4 ,that on finding an ,enemy make what seems a grave blunder we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind ,,xlix4 ,that a ,commonwealth to preserve its ,freedom has constant need of new ,ordinances4 ,of the services in respect of which ,quintius ,fabius received the surname of ,maximus ,,niccol ,,machiavelli ,,to ,,zanobi ,,buondelmonti ,,and ,,cosimo ,,rucellai ,,health4 ,i send you a gift1 which if it answers ill the obligations ,i owe you1 is at any rate the greatest which ,niccol ,machiavelli has it in his power to offer4 ,for in it ,i have expressed whatever ,i have learned1 or have observed for myself during a long experience and constant study of human affairs4 ,and since neither you nor any other can expect more at my hands1 you cannot complain if ,i have not given you more4 ,you may indeed lament the poverty of my wit1 since what ,i have to say is but poorly said2 and tax the weakness of my judgment1 which on many points may have erred in its conclusions4 ,but granting all this1 ,i know not which of us is less beholden to the other3 ,i to you1 who have forced me to write what of myself ,i never should have written2 or you to me1 who have written what can give you no content4 ,take this1 however1 in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend should be taken1 in respect whereof we always look more to the intention of the giver than to the quality of the gift4 ,and1 believe me1 that in one thing only ,i find satisfaction1 namely1 in knowing that while in many matters ,i may have made mistakes1 at least ,i have not been mistaken in choosing you before all others as the persons to whom ,i dedicate these ,discourses2 both because ,i seem to myself1 in doing so1 to have shown a little gratitude for kindness received1 and at the same time to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads many authors to inscribe their works to some ,prince1 and blinded by hopes of favour or reward1 to praise him as possessed of every virtue2 whereas with more reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every shameful vice4 ,to avoid which error ,i have chosen1 not those who are but those who from their infinite merits deserve to be ,princes2 not such persons as have it in their power to load me with honours1 wealth1 and preferment1 but such as though they lack the power1 have all the will to do so4 ,for men1 if they would judge justly1 should esteem those who are1 and not those whose means enable them to be generous2 and in like manner those who know how to govern kingdoms1 rather than those who possess the government without such knowledge4 ,for ,historians award higher praise to ,hiero of ,syracuse when in a private station than to ,perseus the ,macedonian when a ,king affirming that while the former lacked nothing that a ,prince should have save the name1 the latter had nothing of the ,king but the kingdom4 ,make the most1 therefore1 of this good or this evil1 as you may esteem it1 which you have brought upon yourselves2 and should you persist in the mistake of thinking my opinions worthy your attention1 ,i shall not fail to proceed with the rest of the ,history in the manner promised in my ,preface4 ,farewell4 ,,discourses ,,on ,,the ,,first ,,decade ,,of ,,titus ,,livius4 ,,book ,i4 ,,preface4 ,albeit the jealous temper of mankind1 ever more disposed to censure than to praise the work of others1 has constantly made the pursuit of new methods and systems no less perilous than the search after unknown lands and seas2 nevertheless1 prompted by that desire which nature has implanted in me1 fearlessly to undertake whatsoever ,i think offers a common benefit to all1 ,i enter on a path which1 being hitherto untrodden by any1 though it involve me in trouble and fatigue1 may yet win me thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit4 ,and although my feeble discernment1 my slender experience of current affairs1 and imperfect knowledge of ancient events1 render these efforts of mine defective and of no great utility1 they may at least open the way to some other1 who1 with better parts and sounder reasoning and judgment1 shall carry out my design2 whereby1 if ,i gain no credit1 at all events ,i ought to incur no blame4 ,when ,i see antiquity held in such reverence1 that to omit other instances1 the mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at a great price1 in order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn his house1 or to have it copied by those who take delight in this art2 and how these1 again1 strive with all their skill to imitate it in their various works2 and when1 on the other hand1 ,i find those noble labours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the monarchies and republics of old times1 by kings1 captains1 citizens1 lawgivers1 and others who have toiled for the good of their country1 rather admired than followed1 nay1 so absolutely renounced by every one that not a trace of that antique worth is now left among us1 ,i cannot but at once marvel and grieve2 at this inconsistency2 and all the more because ,i perceive that1 in civil disputes between citizens1 and in the bodily disorders into which men fall1 recourse is always had to the decisions and remedies1 pronounced or prescribed by the ancients4 ,for the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient jurisconsults1 which1 being reduced to a system1 teach the jurisconsults of our own times how to determine2 while the healing art is simply the recorded experience of the old physicians1 on which our modern physicians found their practice4 ,and yet1 in giving laws to a commonwealth1 in maintaining ,states and governing kingdoms1 in organizing armies and conducting wars1 in dealing with subject nations1 and in extending a ,state's dominions1 we find no prince1 no republic1 no captain1 and no citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients4 ,this ,i persuade myself is due1 not so much to the feebleness to which the present methods of education have brought the world1 or to the injury which a pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and cities of ,christendom1 as to the want of a right intelligence of ,history1 which renders men incapable in reading it to extract its true meaning or to relish its flavour4 ,whence it happens that by far the greater number of those who read ,history1 take pleasure in following the variety of incidents which it presents1 without a thought to imitate them2 judging such imitation to be not only difficult but impossible2 as though the heavens1 the sun1 the elements1 and man himself were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards motion1 order1 and power4 ,desiring to rescue men from this error1 ,i have thought fit to note down with respect to all those books of ,titus ,livius which have escaped the malignity of ,time1 whatever seems to me essential to a right understanding of ancient and modern affairs2 so that any who shall read these remarks of mine1 may reap from them that profit for the sake of which a knowledge of ,history is to be sought4 ,and although the task be arduous1 still1 with the help of those at whose instance ,i assumed the burthen1 ,i hope to carry it forward so far1 that another shall have no long way to go to bring it to its destination4 ,,chapter ,i4--,of the ,beginnings of ,cities in general1 and in particular of that of ,rome4 ,no one who reads how the city of ,rome had its beginning1 who were its founders1 and what its ordinances and laws1 will marvel that so much excellence was maintained in it through many ages1 or that it grew afterwards to be so great an ,empire4 ,and1 first1 as touching its origin1 ,i say1 that all cities have been founded either by the people of the country in which they stand1 or by strangers4 ,cities have their origins in the former of these two ways when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely if they live dispersed in many and small societies1 each of them unable1 whether from its situation or its slender numbers1 to stand alone against the attacks of its enemies2 on whose approach there is no time left to unite for defence without abandoning many strongholds1 and thus becoming an easy prey to the invader4 ,to escape which dangers1 whether of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater authority among them1 they restrict themselves to dwell together in certain places1 which they think will be more convenient to live in and easier to defend4 ,among many cities taking their origin in this way were ,athens and ,venice2 the former of which1 for reasons like those just now mentioned1 was built by a scattered population under the direction of ,theseus4 ,to escape the wars which1 on the decay of the ,roman ,empire daily renewed in ,italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of ,barbarians1 numerous refugees1 sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the ,adriatic ,sea1 gave beginning to ,venice2 where1 without any recognized leader to direct them1 they agreed to live together under such laws as they thought best suited to maintain them4 ,and by reason of the prolonged tranquility which their position secured1 they being protected by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the tribes who then harassed ,italy had no ships wherewith to molest them1 they were able from very small beginnings to attain to that greatness they now enjoy4 ,in the second case1 namely of a city being founded by strangers1 the settlers are either wholly independent1 or they are controlled by others1 as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a republic1 to relieve their countries of an excessive population1 or to defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small cost4 ,of this sort many cities were settled by the ,romans1 and in all parts of their dominions4 ,it may also happen that such cities are founded by a prince merely to add to his renown1 without any intention on his part to dwell there1 as ,alexandria was built by ,alexander the ,great4 ,cities like these1 not having had their beginning in freedom1 seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms4 ,the city of ,florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been independent from the first2 for whether we ascribe its origin to the soldiers of ,sylla1 or1 as some have conjectured1 to the mountaineers of ,fiesole 7who1 emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout the world during the reign of ,octavianus1 came down to occupy the plain on the banks of the ,arno71 in either case1 it was founded under the auspices of ,rome nor could1 at first1 make other progress than was permitted by the grace of the sovereign ,state4 ,the origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people1 either by themselves or under some prince1 are constrained by famine1 pestilence1 or war to leave their native land and seek a new habitation4 ,settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities which they find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take possession1 as did ,moses2 or they build new ones1 as did neas4 ,it is in this last case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of the city founded are best seen2 and this good fortune will be more or less remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who gives the city its beginning4 ,the capacity of a founder is known in two ways3 by his choice of a site1 or by the laws which he frames4 ,and since men act either of necessity or from choice1 and merit may seem greater where choice is more restricted1 we have to consider whether it may not be well to choose a sterile district as the site of a new city1 in order that the inhabitants1 being constrained to industry1 and less corrupted by ease1 may live in closer union1 finding less cause for division in the poverty of their land2 as was the case in ,ragusa1 and in many other cities built in similar situations4 ,such a choice were certainly the wisest and the most advantageous1 could men be content to enjoy what is their own without seeking to lord it over others4 ,but since to be safe they must be strong1 they are compelled avoid these barren districts1 and to plant themselves in more fertile regions2 where1 the fruitfulness of the soil enabling them to increase and multiply1 they may defend themselves against any who attack them1 and overthrow any who would withstand their power4 ,and as for that languor which the situation might breed1 care must be had that hardships which the site does not enforce1 shall be enforced by the laws2 and that the example of those wise nations be imitated1 who1 inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries1 and such as were likely to rear a listless and effeminate race1 unfit for all manly exercises1 in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity and relaxing influence of the soil and climate1 subjected all who were to serve as soldiers to the severest training2 whence it came that better soldiers were raised in these countries than in others by nature rugged and barren4 ,such1 of old1 was the kingdom of the ,egyptians1 which1 though of all lands the most bountiful1 yet1 by the severe training which its laws enforced1 produced most valiant soldiers1 who1 had their names not been lost in antiquity1 might be thought to deserve more praise than ,alexander the ,great and many besides1 whose memory is still fresh in men's minds4 ,and even in recent times1 any one contemplating the kingdom of the ,soldan1 and the military order of the ,mamelukes before they were destroyed by ,selim the ,grand ,turk1 must have seen how carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of warlike exercise2 showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which their genial soil and climate might have disposed them1 unless neutralized by strenuous laws4 ,i say1 then1 that it is a prudent choice to found your city in a fertile region when the effects of that fertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws4 ,when ,alexander the ,great thought to add to his renown by founding a city1 ,dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build it on ,mount ,athos1 which not only offered a strong position1 but could be handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the human form1 which would be a thing strange and striking1 and worthy of so great a monarch4 ,but on ,alexander asking how the inhabitants were to live1 ,dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that4 ,whereupon1 ,alexander laughed1 and leaving ,mount ,athos as it stood1 built ,alexandria2 where1 the fruitfulness of the soil1 and the vicinity of the ,nile and the sea1 might attract many to take up their abode4 ,to him1 therefore1 who inquires into the origin of ,rome1 if he assign its beginning to neas1 it will seem to be of those cities which were founded by strangers if to ,romulus1 then of those founded by the natives of the country4 ,but in whichever class we place it1 it will be seen to have had its beginning in freedom1 and not in subjection to another ,state4 ,it will be seen1 too1 as hereafter shall be noted1 how strict was the discipline which the laws instituted by ,romulus1 ,numa1 and its other founders made compulsory upon it2 so that neither its fertility1 the proximity of the sea1 the number of its victories1 nor the extent of its dominion1 could for many centuries corrupt it1 but1 on the contrary1 maintained it replete with such virtues as were never matched in any other commonwealth4 ,and because the things done by ,rome1 and which ,titus ,livius has celebrated1 were effected at home or abroad by public or by private wisdom1 ,i shall begin by treating1 and noting the consequences of those things done at home in accordance with the public voice1 which seem most to merit attention2 and to this object the whole of this first ,book or first ,part of my ,discourses1 shall be directed4 ,,chapter ,,ii4--,of the various kinds of ,government2 and to which of them the ,roman ,commonwealth belonged4 ,i forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset have been dependent upon others1 and shall speak only of those which from their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign control1 being governed from the first as pleased themselves1 whether as republics or as princedoms4 ,these as they have had different origins1 so likewise have had different laws and institutions4 ,for to some at their very first commencement1 or not long after1 laws have been given by a single legislator1 and all at one time2 like those given by ,lycurgus to the ,spartans2 while to others they have been given at different times1 as need rose or accident determined2 as in the case of ,rome4 ,that republic1 indeed1 may be called happy1 whose lot has been to have a founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can continue to live securely1 without need to amend them2 as we find ,sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years1 without deterioration and without any dangerous disturbance4 ,on the other hand1 some measure of unhappiness attaches to the ,state which1 not having yielded itself once for all into the hands of a single wise legislator1 is obliged to recast its institutions for itself2 and of such ,states1 by far the most unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of government1 by which ,i mean that its institutions lie wholly outside the path which might lead it to a true and perfect end4 ,for it is scarcely possible that a ,state in this position can ever1 by any chance1 set itself to rights1 whereas another whose institutions are imperfect1 if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its amendment1 may in the course of events arrive at perfection4 ,it is certain1 however1 that such ,states can never be reformed without great risk2 for1 as a rule1 men will accept no new law altering the institutions of their ,state1 unless the necessity for such a change be demonstrated2 and since this necessity cannot arise without danger1 the ,state may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is established4 ,in proof whereof we may instance the republic of ,florence1 which was reformed in the year #aejb1 in consequence of the affair of ,arezzo1 but was ruined in #aeab1 in consequence of the affair of ,prato4 ,desiring1 therefore1 to discuss the nature of the government of ,rome1 and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its perfection1 ,i say1 as has been said before by many who have written of ,governments1 that of these there are three forms1 known by the names ,monarchy1 ,aristocracy1 and ,democracy1 and that those who give its institutions to a ,state have recourse to one or other of these three1 according as it suits their purpose4 ,other1 and1 as many have thought1 wiser teachers1 will have it1 that there are altogether six forms of government1 three of them utterly bad1 the other three good in themselves1 but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become hurtful4 ,the good are the three above named2 the bad1 three others dependent upon these1 and each so like that to which it is related1 that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other4 ,for a ,monarchy readily becomes a ,tyranny1 an ,aristocracy an ,oligarchy1 while a ,democracy tends to degenerate into ,anarchy4 ,so that if the founder of a ,state should establish any one of these three forms of ,government1 he establishes it for a short time only1 since no precaution he may take can prevent it from sliding into its contrary1 by reason of the close resemblance which1 in this case1 the virtue bears to the vice4 ,these diversities in the form of ,government spring up among men by chance4 ,for in the beginning of the world1 its inhabitants1 being few in number1 for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts2 but afterwards1 as they increased and multiplied1 gathered themselves into societies1 and1 the better to protect themselves1 began to seek who among them was the strongest and of the highest courage1 to whom1 making him their head1 they tendered obedience4 ,next arose the knowledge of such things as are honourable and good1 as opposed to those which are bad and shameful4 ,for observing that when a man wronged his benefactor1 hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy for the other1 and that the ungrateful were blamed1 while those who showed gratitude were honoured1 and reflecting that the wrongs they saw done to others might be done to themselves1 to escape these they resorted to making laws and fixing punishments against any who should transgress them2 and in this way grew the recognition of ,justice4 ,whence it came that afterwards1 in choosing their rulers1 men no longer looked about for the strongest1 but for him who was the most prudent and the most just4 ,but1 presently1 when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer elective1 hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their ancestors1 and1 quitting worthy courses1 took up the notion that princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in sumptuous display and wantonness1 and whatever else ministers to pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated1 and therefore to feel fear1 and passing from fear to infliction of injuries1 a tyranny soon sprang up4 ,forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince1 and plots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were weak1 or afraid for themselves1 but by such as being conspicuous for their birth1 courage1 wealth1 and station1 could not tolerate the shameful life of the tyrant4 ,the multitude1 following the lead of these powerful men1 took up arms against the prince and1 he being got rid of1 obeyed these others as their liberators2 who1 on their part1 holding in hatred the name of sole ruler1 formed themselves into a government and at first1 while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh1 observed the laws they themselves made1 and postponing personal advantage to the common welfare1 administered affairs both publicly and privately with the utmost diligence and zeal4 ,but this government passing1 afterwards1 to their descendants who1 never having been taught in the school of ,adversity1 knew nothing of the vicissitudes of ,fortune1 these not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality1 but abandoning themselves to avarice1 ambition1 and lust1 converted1 without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best into a government of the few2 and so very soon met with the same fate as the tyrant4 ,for the multitude loathing its rulers1 lent itself to any who ventured1 in whatever way1 to attack them2 when some one man speedily arose who with the aid of the people overthrew them4 ,but the recollection of the tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the minds of the people1 who therefore felt no desire to restore the monarchy1 they had recourse to a popular government1 which they established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any place in it4 ,and because all governments inspire respect at the first1 this government also lasted for a while1 but not for long1 and seldom after the generation which brought it into existence had died out4 ,for1 suddenly1 liberty passed into license1 wherein neither private worth nor public authority was respected1 but1 every one living as he liked1 a thousand wrongs were done daily4 ,whereupon1 whether driven by necessity1 or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to escape anarchy1 the people reverted to a monarchy1 from which1 step by step1 in the manner and for the causes already assigned1 they came round once more to license4 ,for this is the circle revolving within which all ,states are and have been governed2 although in the same ,state the same forms of ,government rarely repeat themselves1 because hardly any ,state can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more than once1 and still together4 ,for it may be expected that in some sea of disaster1 when a ,state must always be wanting prudent counsels and in strength1 it will become subject to some neighbouring and better-governed ,state2 though assuming this not to happen1 it might well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of government to another4 ,i say1 then1 that all these six forms of government are pernicious--the three good kinds1 from their brief duration the three bad1 from their inherent badness4 ,wise legislators therefore1 knowing these defects1 and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity1 have made choice of a form which shares in the qualities of all the first three1 and which they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately4 ,for where we have a monarchy1 an aristocracy1 and a democracy existing together in the same city1 each of the three serves as a check upon the other4 ,among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution of this nature1 was ,lycurgus1 who so framed the laws of ,sparta as to assign their proper functions to kings1 nobles1 and commons2 and in this way established a government1 which1 to his great glory and to the peace and tranquility of his country1 lasted for more than eight hundred years4 ,the contrary1 however1 happened in the case of ,solon2 who by the turn he gave to the institutions of ,athens1 created there a purely democratic government1 of such brief duration1 that he himself lived to witness the beginning of the despotism of ,pisistratus4 ,and although1 forty years later1 the heirs of ,pisistratus were driven out1 and ,athens recovered her freedom1 nevertheless because she reverted to the same form government as had been established by ,solon1 she could maintain it for only a hundred years more2 for though to preserve it1 many ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great and the turbulence of the people1 against which ,solon had not provided1 still1 since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was given a place in her constitution1 ,athens1 as compared with ,sparta1 had but a short life4 ,but let us now turn to ,rome1 which city1 although she had no ,lycurgus to give her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her long in freedom1 through a series of accidents1 caused by the contests between the commons and the senate1 obtained by chance what the foresight of her founders failed to provide4 ,so that ,fortune1 if she bestowed not her first favours on ,rome1 bestowed her second2 because1 although the original institutions of this city were defective1 still they lay not outside the true path which could bring them to perfection4 ,for ,romulus and the other kings made many and good laws1 and such as were not incompatible with freedom2 but because they sought to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth1 when the city became free many things were found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was necessary to supply1 since these kings had not supplied them4 ,and although the kings of ,rome lost their sovereignty1 in the manner and for the causes mentioned above1 nevertheless those who drove them out1 by at once creating two consuls to take their place1 preserved in ,rome the regal authority while banishing from it the regal throne1 so that as both senate and consuls were included in that republic1 it in fact possessed two of the elements above enumerated1 to wit1 the monarchic and the aristocratic4 ,it then only remained to assign its place to the popular element1 and the ,roman nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed hereafter1 the commons against them1 when1 not to lose the whole of their power1 they were forced to concede a share to the people2 while with the share which remained1 the senate and consuls retained so much authority that they still held their own place in the republic4 ,in this way the tribunes of the people came to be created1 after whose creation the stability of the ,state was much augmented1 since each the three forms of government had now its due influence allowed it4 ,and such was the good fortune of ,rome that although her government passed from the kings to the nobles1 and from these to the people1 by the steps and for the reasons noticed above1 still the entire authority of the kingly element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles1 nor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the commons2 but three1 blending together1 made up a perfect ,state2 which perfection1 as shall be fully shown in the next two ,chapters1 was reached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate4 ,,chapter ,,iii4--,of the ,accidents which led in ,rome to the creation of ,tribunes of the ,people2 whereby the ,republic was made more perfect4 ,they who lay the foundations of a ,state and furnish it with laws must1 as is shown by all who have treated of civil government1 and by examples of which history is full1 assume that #8all men are bad1 and will always1 when they have free field1 give loose to their evil inclinations2 and that if these for a while remain hidden1 it is owing to some secret cause1 which1 from our having no contrary experience1 we do not recognize at once1 but which is afterwards revealed by ,time1 of whom we speak as the father of all truth4 ,in ,rome1 after the expulsion of the ,tarquins1 it seemed as though the closest union prevailed between the senate and the commons1 and that the nobles1 laying aside their natural arrogance1 had learned so to sympathize with the people as to have become supportable by all1 even of the humblest rank4 ,this dissimulation remained undetected1 and its causes concealed1 while the ,tarquins lived2 for the nobles dreading the ,tarquins1 and fearing that the people1 if they used them ill1 might take part against them1 treated them with kindness4 ,but no sooner were the ,tarquins got rid of1 and the nobles thus relieved of their fears1 when they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom which before they had kept in their breasts1 offending and insulting them in every way they could2 confirming what ,i have observed already1 that men never behave well unless compelled1 and that whenever they are free to act as they please1 and are under no restraint everything falls at once into confusion and disorder4 ,wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger are needed to make men industrious1 so laws are needed to make them good4 ,when we do well without laws1 laws are not needed2 but when good customs are absent1 laws are at once required4 ,on the extinction of the ,tarquins1 therefore1 the dread of whom had kept the nobles in check1 some new safeguard had to be contrived1 which should effect the same result as had been effected by the ,tarquins while they lived4 ,accordingly1 after much uproar and confusion1 and much danger of violence ensuing between the commons and the nobles1 to insure the safety of the former1 tribunes were created1 and were invested with such station and authority as always afterwards enabled them to stand between the people and the senate1 and to resist the insolence of the nobles4 ,,chapter ,,iv4--,that the ,dissensions between the ,senate and ,commons of ,rome1 made ,rome free and powerful4 ,touching those tumults which prevailed in ,rome from the extinction of the ,tarquins to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which ,i have no wish to avoid1 and as to certain other matters of a like nature1 ,i desire to say something in opposition to the opinion of many who assert that ,rome was a turbulent city1 and had fallen into utter disorder1 that had not her good fortune and military prowess made amends for other defects1 she would have been inferior to every other republic4 ,i cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of ,rome were the causes of her empire2 yet it certainly seems to me that those holding this opinion fail to perceive1 that in a ,state where there are good soldiers there must be good order1 and1 generally speaking1 good fortune4 ,and looking to the other circumstances of this city1 ,i affirm that those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the commons1 condemn what was the prime cause of ,rome becoming free2 and give more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions were attended1 than to the good results which followed from them2 not reflecting that while in every republic there are two conflicting factions1 that of the people and that of the nobles1 it is in this conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin1 as may readily be seen to have been the case in ,rome4 ,for from the time of the ,tarquins to that of the ,gracchi1 a period of over three hundred years1 the tumults in ,rome seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile1 and very seldom to bloodshed4 ,so that we cannot truly declare those tumults to have been disastrous1 or that republic to have been disorderly1 which during all that time1 on account of her internal broils1 banished no more than eight or ten of her citizens1 put very few to death1 and rarely inflicted money penalties4 ,nor can we reasonably pronounce that city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue2 for virtuous actions have their origin in right training1 right training in wise laws1 and wise laws in these very tumults which many would thoughtlessly condemn4 ,for he who looks well to the results of these tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments1 nor to violence hurtful to the common good1 but to laws and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty4 ,and should any object that the behaviour of the ,romans was extravagant and outrageous2 that for the assembled people to be heard shouting against the senate1 the senate against the people2 for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly through the streets1 closing their shops1 and quitting the town1 were things which might well affright him even who only reads of them2 it may be answered1 that the inhabitants of all cities1 more especially of cities which seek to make use of the people in matters of importance1 have their own ways of giving expression to their wishes2 among which the city of ,rome had the custom1 that when its people sought to have a law passed they followed one or another of those courses mentioned above1 or else refused to be enrolled as soldiers when1 to pacify them1 something of their demands had to be conceded4 ,but the demands of a free people are hurtful to freedom1 since they originate either in being oppressed1 or in the fear that they are about to be so4 ,when this fear is groundless1 it finds its remedy in public meetings1 wherein some worthy person may come forward and show the people by argument that they are deceiving themselves4 ,for though they be ignorant1 the people are not therefore1 as ,cicero says1 incapable of being taught the truth1 but are readily convinced when it is told them by one in whose honesty they can trust4 ,we should1 therefore1 be careful how we censure the government of ,rome1 and should reflect that all the great results effected by that republic1 could not have come about without good cause4 ,and if the popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes1 they merit all praise2 since these magistrates not only gave its due influence to the popular voice in the government1 but also acted as the guardians of ,roman freedom1 as shall be clearly shown in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,v4--,whether the ,guardianship of public ,freedom is safer in the hands of the ,commons or of the ,nobles2 and whether those who seek to acquire ,power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of ,commotions4 ,of the provisions made by wise founders of republics1 one of the most necessary is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty2 for according as this is placed in good or bad hands1 the freedom of the ,state will be more or less lasting4 ,and because in every republic we find the two parties of nobles and commons1 the question arises1 to which of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted4 ,among the ,lacedmonians of old1 as now with the ,venetians1 it was placed in the hands of the nobles1 but with the ,romans it was vested in the commons4 ,we have1 therefore1 to determine which of these ,states made the wiser choice4 ,if we look to reasons1 something is to be said on both sides of the question2 though were we to look to results1 we should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles1 inasmuch as the liberty of ,sparta and ,venice has had a longer life than that of ,rome4 ,as touching reasons1 it may be pleaded for the ,roman method1 that they are most fit to have charge of a thing1 who least desire to pervert it to their own ends4 ,and1 doubtless1 if we examine the aims which the nobles and the commons respectively set before them1 we shall find in the former a great desire to dominate1 in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated over1 and hence a greater attachment to freedom1 since they have less to gain than the others by destroying it4 ,wherefore1 when the commons are put forward as the defenders of liberty1 they may be expected to take better care of it1 and1 as they have no desire to tamper with it themselves1 to be less apt to suffer others to do so4 ,on the other hand1 he who defends the method followed by the ,spartans and ,venetians1 may urge1 that by confiding this guardianship to the nobles1 two desirable ends are served3 first1 that from being allowed to retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger party in the ,state1 the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied2 and1 second1 that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude which as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and tumults1 and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses4 ,in instance whereof might be cited the case of ,rome itself1 wherein the tribunes of the people being vested with this authority1 not content to have one consul a plebeian1 insisted on having both2 and afterwards laid claim to the censorship1 the prtorship and all the other magistracies in the city4 ,nor was this enough for them1 but1 carried away by the same factious spirit1 they began after a time to pay court to such men as they thought able to attack the nobility1 and so gave occasion to the rise of ,marius and the overthrow of ,rome4 ,wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well1 might hesitate which party he should choose as the guardian of public liberty1 being uncertain which class is more mischievous in a commonwealth1 that which would acquire what it has not1 or that which would keep the authority which it has already4 ,but1 on the whole1 on a careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus3--,either we have to deal with a republic eager like ,rome to extend its power1 or with one content merely to maintain itself2 in the former case it is necessary to do in all things as ,rome did2 in the latter1 for the reasons and in the manner to be shown in the following ,chapter1 we may imitate ,venice and ,sparta4 ,but reverting to the question which class of citizens is more mischievous in a republic1 those who seek to acquire or those who fear to lose what they have acquired already1 ,i note that when ,marcus ,menenius and ,marcus ,fulvius1 both of them men of plebeian birth1 were made the one dictator1 the other master of the knights1 that they might inquire into certain plots against ,rome contrived in ,capua1 they had at the same time authority given them by the people to investigate whether1 in ,rome itself1 irregular and corrupt practices had been used to obtain the consulship and other honours of the city4 ,the nobles suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against them1 everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by irregular and unworthy means1 it was not by them1 but by the plebeians1 who1 with neither birth nor merit to recommend them1 had need to resort to corruption4 ,and more particularly they accused the dictator himself4 ,and so telling was the effect of these charges1 that ,menenius1 after haranguing the people and complaining to them of the calumnies circulated against him1 laid down his dictatorship1 and submitted himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him4 ,when his cause came to be tried he was acquitted2 but at the hearing it was much debated1 whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it1 is the more dangerous citizen2 the desires of both being likely to lead to the greatest disorders4 ,nevertheless1 ,i believe that1 as a rule1 disorders are more commonly occasioned by those seeking to preserve power1 because in them the fear of loss breeds the same passions as are felt by those seeking to acquire2 since men never think they hold what they have securely1 unless when they are gaining something new from others4 ,it is also to be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less effort and greater efficacy4 ,further1 it may be added1 that their corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have nothing1 with the desire to have2 either for the sake of punishing their adversaries by despoiling them1 or to obtain for themselves a share of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse4 ,,chapter ,,vi4--,whether it was possible in ,rome to contrive such a ,government as would have composed the ,differences between the ,commons and the ,senate4 ,i have spoken above of the effects produced in ,rome by the controversies between the commons and the senate4 ,now1 as these lasted down to the time of the ,gracchi1 when they brought about the overthrow of freedom1 some may think it matter for regret that ,rome should not have achieved the great things she did1 without being torn by such disputes4 ,wherefore1 it seems to me worth while to consider whether the government of ,rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to prevent like controversies4 ,in making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have enjoyed freedom for a great while1 undisturbed by any violent contentions or tumults1 and see what their government was1 and whether it would have been possible to introduce it into ,rome4 ,of such republics we have an example in ancient times in ,sparta1 in modern times in ,venice1 of both which ,states ,i have already made mention4 ,sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a limited senate4 ,venice has made no distinction in the titles of her rulers1 all qualified to take part in her government being classed under the one designation of 8,gentlemen10 an arrangement due rather to chance than to the foresight of those who gave this ,state its constitution4 ,for many persons1 from causes already noticed1 seeking shelter on these rocks on which ,venice now stands1 after they had so multiplied that if they were to continue to live together it became necessary for them to frame laws1 established a form of government2 and assembling often in their councils to consult for the interests of their city1 when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient for political existence1 they closed the entrance to civil rights against all who came afterwards to live there1 not allowing them to take any part in the management of affairs4 ,and when in course of time there came to be many citizens excluded from the government1 to add to the importance of the governing body1 they named these 8,gentlemen0 7gentiluomini71 the others 8,plebeians0 7popolani74 ,and this distinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing disturbance2 for as at the time of its origin1 whosoever then lived in ,venice was made one of the governing body1 none had reason to complain2 while those who came to live there afterwards1 finding the government in a completed form1 had neither ground nor opportunity to object4 ,no ground1 because nothing was taken from them2 and no opportunity1 because those in authority kept them under control1 and never employed them in affairs in which they could acquire importance4 ,besides which1 they who came later to dwell in ,venice were not so numerous as to destroy all proportion between the governors and the governed2 the number of the 8,gentlemen0 being as great as1 or greater than that of the 8,plebeians40 ,for these reasons1 therefore1 it was possible for ,venice to make her constitution what it is1 and to maintain it without divisions4 ,sparta1 again1 being governed1 as ,i have said1 by a king and a limited senate1 was able to maintain herself for the long period she did1 because1 from the country being thinly inhabited and further influx of population forbidden1 and from the laws of ,lycurgus 7the observance whereof removed all ground of disturbance7 being held in high esteem1 the citizens were able to continue long in unity4 ,for ,lycurgus having by his laws established in ,sparta great equality as to property1 but less equality as to rank1 there prevailed there an equal poverty2 and the commons were less ambitious1 because the offices of the ,state1 which were held to their exclusion1 were confined to a few2 and because the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp these offices4 ,and this was due to the ,spartan kings1 who1 being appointed to that dignity for life1 and placed in the midst of this nobility1 had no stronger support to their authority than in defending the people against injustice4 ,whence it resulted that as the people neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess1 the conflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were escaped1 together with the causes which would have led to them2 and in this way they were able to live long united4 ,but of this unity in ,sparta there were two chief causes3 one1 the fewness of its inhabitants1 which allowed of their being governed by a few2 the other1 that by denying foreigners admission into their country1 the people had less occasion to become corrupted1 and never so increased in numbers as to prove troublesome to their few rulers4 ,weighing all which circumstances1 we see that to have kept ,rome in the same tranquility wherein these republics were kept1 one of two courses must have been followed by her legislators2 for either1 like the ,venetians1 they must have refrained from employing the commons in war1 or else1 like the ,spartans1 they must have closed their country to foreigners4 ,whereas1 in both particulars1 they did the opposite1 arming the commons and increasing their number1 and thus affording endless occasions for disorder4 ,and had the ,roman commonwealth grown to be more tranquil1 this inconvenience would have resulted1 that it must at the same time have grown weaker1 since the road would have been closed to that greatness to which it came1 for in removing the causes of her tumults1 ,rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth4 ,and he who looks carefully into the matter will find1 that in all human affairs1 we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running into another4 ,so that if you would have your people numerous and warlike1 to the end that with their aid you may establish a great empire1 you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards control at your pleasure2 while should you keep them few and unwarlike1 to the end that you may govern them easily1 you will be unable1 should you extend your dominions1 to preserve them1 and will become so contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you4 ,for which reason in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to encounter least inconvenience1 and accept that as the course to be preferred1 since we shall never find any line of action entirely free from disadvantage4 ,rome might1 therefore1 following the example of ,sparta1 have created a king for life and a senate of limited numbers1 but desiring to become a great empire1 she could not1 like ,sparta1 have restricted the number of her citizens4 ,so that to have created a king for life and a limited senate had been of little service to her4 ,were any one1 therefore1 about to found a wholly new republic1 he would have to consider whether he desired it to increase as ,rome did in territory and dominion1 or to continue within narrow limits4 ,in the former case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as possible on the pattern of the ,roman1 leaving room for dissensions and popular tumults1 for without a great and warlike population no republic can ever increase1 or increasing maintain itself4 ,in the second case he might give his republic a constitution like that of ,venice or ,sparta2 but since extension is the ruin of such republics1 the legislator would have to provide in every possible way against the ,state which he had founded making any additions to its territories4 ,for these1 when superimposed upon a feeble republic1 are sure to be fatal to it3 as we see to have been the case with ,sparta and ,venice1 the former of which1 after subjugating nearly all ,greece1 on sustaining a trifling reverse1 betrayed the insufficiency of her foundations1 for when1 after the revolt of ,thebes under ,pelopidas1 other cities also rebelled1 the ,spartan kingdom was utterly overthrown4 ,venice in like manner1 after gaining possession of a great portion of ,italy 7most of it not by her arms but by her wealth and subtlety71 when her strength was put to the proof1 lost all in one pitched battle4 ,i can well believe1 then1 that to found a republic which shall long endure1 the best plan may be to give it internal institutions like those of ,sparta or ,venice2 placing it in a naturally strong situation1 and so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better of it easily1 yet1 at the same time1 not making it so great as to be formidable to its neighbours2 since by taking these precautions1 it might long enjoy its independence4 ,for there are two causes which lead to wars being made against a republic2 one1 your desire to be its master1 the other the fear lest it should master you2 both of which dangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove4 ,for if1 as we are to assume1 this republic be well prepared for defence1 and consequently difficult of attack1 it will seldom or never happen that any one will form the design to attack it1 and while it keeps within its own boundaries1 and is seen from experience not to be influenced by ambition1 no one will be led1 out of fear for himself1 to make war upon it1 more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its extension4 ,and were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium1 ,i veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of political life1 and the true tranquility of a republic4 ,but all human affairs being in movement1 and incapable of remaining as they are1 they must either rise or fall2 and to many conclusions to which we are not led by reason1 we are brought by necessity4 ,so that when we have given institutions to a ,state on the footing that it is to maintain itself without enlargement1 should necessity require its enlargement1 its foundations will be cut from below it1 and its downfall quickly ensue4 ,on the other hand1 were a republic so favoured by ,heaven as to lie under no necessity of making war1 the result of this ease would be to make it effeminate and divided which two evils together1 and each by itself1 would insure its ruin4 ,and since it is impossible1 as ,i believe1 to bring about an equilibrium1 or to adhere strictly to the mean path1 we must1 in arranging our republic1 consider what is the more honourable course for it to take1 and so contrive that even if necessity compel its enlargement1 it may be able to keep what it gains4 ,but returning to the point first raised1 ,i believe it necessary for us to follow the method of the ,romans and not that of the other republics1 for ,i know of no middle way4 ,we must1 consequently1 put up with those dissensions which arise between commons and senate1 looking on them as evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of ,rome4 ,in connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority of the tribunes was essential in ,rome to the guardianship of freedom1 we may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic from the power of impeachment2 which1 together with others1 was conferred upon the tribunes2 a subject to be noticed in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,vii4--,that to preserve ,liberty in a ,state there must exist the ,right to accuse4 ,to those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom1 no more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to accuse1 either before the people1 or before some council or tribunal1 those citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of their country4 ,a law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a ,state3 first1 that the citizens from fear of being accused1 do not engage in attempts hurtful to the ,state1 or doing so1 are put down at once and without respect of persons3 and next1 that a vent is given for the escape of all those evil humours which1 from whatever cause1 gather in cities against particular citizens2 for unless an outlet be duly provided for these by the laws1 they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the ,state4 ,there is nothing1 therefore1 which contributes so much to the stability and permanence of a ,state1 as to take care that the fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of law with a recognized outlet4 ,this might be shown by many examples1 but by none so clearly as by that of ,coriolanus related by ,livius1 where he tells us1 that at a time when the ,roman nobles were angry with the plebeians 7thinking that the appointment of tribunes for their protection had made them too powerful71 it happened that ,rome was visited by a grievous famine1 to meet which the senate sent to ,sicily for corn4 ,but ,coriolanus1 hating the commons1 sought to persuade the senate that now was the time to punish them1 and to deprive them of the authority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles1 by withholding the distribution of corn1 and so suffering them to perish of hunger4 ,which advice of his coming to the ears of the people1 kindled them to such fury against him1 that they would have slain him as he left the ,senate ,house1 had not the tribunes cited him to appear and answer before them to a formal charge4 ,in respect of this incident ,i repeat what ,i have just now said1 how useful and necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a channel by which the displeasure of the multitude against a single citizen may find a vent4 ,for when none such is regularly provided1 recourse will be had to irregular channels1 and these will assuredly lead to much worse results4 ,for when a citizen is borne down by the operation of the ordinary laws1 even though he be wronged1 little or no disturbance is occasioned to the state3 the injury he suffers not being wrought by private violence1 nor by foreign force1 which are the causes of the overthrow of free institutions1 but by public authority and in accordance with public ordinances1 which1 having definite limits set them1 are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the commonwealth4 ,for proof of which ,i am content to rest on this old example of ,coriolanus1 since all may see what a disaster it would have been for ,rome had he been violently put to death by the people4 ,for1 as between citizen and citizen1 a wrong would have been done affording ground for fear1 fear would have sought defence1 defence have led to faction1 faction to divisions in the ,state1 and these to its ruin4 ,but the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it1 all the evils which must have followed had it been left in private hands were escaped4 ,in ,florence1 on the other hand1 and in our own days1 we have seen what violent commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure against particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws1 in the instance of ,francesco ,valori1 at one time looked upon as the foremost citizen of our republic4 ,but many thinking him ambitious1 and likely from his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil freedom1 and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an adverse faction1 the result was1 that1 apprehending irregular attacks1 he sought to gain partisans for his support2 while his opponents1 on their side1 having no course open to them of which the laws approved1 resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve1 and1 at last1 to open violence4 ,and as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful methods1 these were attended by injury not to him only1 but to many other noble citizens2 whereas1 could he have been met by constitutional restraints1 his power might have been broken without injury to any save himself4 ,i might also cite from our ,florentine history the fall of ,piero ,soderini1 which had no other cause than there not being in our republic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens can be impeached4 ,for to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be tried1 eight judges only are not enough2 the judges must be numerous1 because a few will always do the will of a few4 ,but had there been proper methods for obtaining redress1 either the people would have impeached ,piero if he was guilty1 and thus have given vent to their displeasure without calling in the ,spanish army2 or if he was innocent1 would not have ventured1 through fear of being accused themselves1 to have taken proceedings against him4 ,so that in either case the bitter spirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end4 ,wherefore1 when we find one of the parties in a ,state calling in a foreign power1 we may safely conclude that it is because the defective laws of that ,state provide no escape for those malignant humours which are natural to men2 which can best be done by arranging for an impeachment before a sufficient number of judges1 and by giving countenance to this procedure4 ,this was so well contrived in ,rome that in spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and the senate1 neither the senate nor the commons1 nor any single citizen1 ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power2 for having a remedy at home1 there was no need to seek one abroad4 ,although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what ,i affirm1 ,i desire to adduce one other1 recorded by ,titus ,livius in his history1 where he relates that a sister of ,aruns having been violated by a ,lucumo of ,clusium1 the chief of the ,etruscan towns1 ,aruns being unable1 from the interest of her ravisher1 to avenge her1 betook himself to the ,gauls who ruled in the province we now name ,lombardy1 and besought them to come with an armed force to ,clusium2 showing them how with advantage to themselves they might avenge his wrongs4 ,now1 had ,aruns seen that he could have had redress through the laws of his country1 he never would have resorted to these ,barbarians for help4 ,but as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic1 so calumny1 on the other hand1 is useless and hurtful1 as in the following ,chapter ,i shall proceed to show4 ,,chapter ,,viii4--,that ,calumny is as hurtful in a ,commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful4 ,such were the services rendered to ,rome by ,furius ,camillus in rescuing her from the oppression of the ,gauls1 that no ,roman1 however high his degree or station1 held it derogatory to yield place to him1 save only ,manlius ,capitolinus1 who could not brook such glory and distinction being given to another4 ,for he thought that in saving the ,capitol1 he had himself done as much as ,camillus to preserve ,rome1 and that in respect of his other warlike achievements he was no whit behind him4 ,so that1 bursting with jealousy1 and unable to remain at rest by reason of the other's renown1 and seeing no way to sow discord among the ,fathers1 he set himself to spread abroad sinister reports among the commons2 throwing out1 among other charges1 that the treasure collected to be given to the ,gauls1 but which1 afterwards1 was withheld1 had been embezzled by certain citizens1 and if recovered might be turned to public uses in relieving the people from taxes or from private debts4 ,these assertions so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold meetings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout the city4 ,but this displeasing the senate1 and the matter appearing to them grave and dangerous1 they appointed a dictator to inquire into it1 and to restrain the attacks of ,manlius4 ,the dictator1 forthwith1 caused ,manlius to be cited before him2 and these two were thus brought face to face in the presence of the whole city1 the dictator surrounded by the nobles1 and ,manlius by the commons4 ,the latter1 being desired to say with whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be found1 since the senate were as anxious to know this as the commons1 made no direct reply1 but answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what they already knew4 ,whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison4 ,in this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all free ,states1 as1 indeed1 in every society1 and how we must neglect no means which may serve to check it4 ,and there can be no more effectual means for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for impeachment1 which is as useful in a commonwealth as the other is pernicious4 ,and between them there is this difference1 that calumny needs neither witness1 nor circumstantial proof to establish it1 so that any man may be calumniated by any other2 but not impeached2 since impeachment demands that there be substantive charges made1 and trustworthy evidence to support them4 ,again1 it is before the magistrates1 the people1 or the courts of justice that men are impeached2 but in the streets and market places that they are calumniated4 ,calumny1 therefore1 is most rife in that ,state wherein impeachment is least practised1 and the laws least favour it4 ,for which reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his ,state that it shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear or favour2 and1 after duly providing for this1 should visit calumniators with the sharpest punishments4 ,those punished will have no cause to complain1 since it was in their power to have impeached openly where they have secretly calumniated4 ,where this is not seen to1 grave disorders will always ensue4 ,for calumnies sting without disabling2 and those who are stung being more moved by hatred of their detractors than by fear of the things they say against them1 seek revenge4 ,this matter1 as we have said1 was well arranged for in ,rome1 but has always been badly regulated in our city of ,florence4 ,and as the ,roman ordinances with regard to it were productive of much good1 so the want of them in ,florence has bred much mischief4 ,for any one reading the history of our city may perceive1 how many calumnies have at all times been aimed against those of its citizens who have taken a leading part in its affairs4 ,thus1 of one it would be said that he had plundered the public treasury1 of another1 that he had failed in some enterprise because he had been bribed2 of a third1 that this or the other disaster had originated in his ambition4 ,hence hatred sprung up on every side1 and hatred growing to division1 these led to factions1 and these again to ruin4 ,but had there existed in ,florence some procedure whereby citizens might have been impeached1 and calumniators punished1 numberless disorders which have taken there would have been prevented4 ,for citizens who were impeached1 whether condemned or acquitted1 would have had no power to injure the ,state2 and they would have been impeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated2 for calumny1 as ,i have said already1 is an easier matter than impeachment4 ,some1 indeed1 have made use of calumny as a means for raising themselves to power1 and have found their advantage in traducing eminent citizens who withstood their designs2 for by taking the part of the people1 and confirming them in their ill-opinion of these great men1 they made them their friends4 ,of this1 though ,i could give many instances1 ,i shall content myself with one4 ,at the siege of ,lucca the ,florentine army was commanded by ,messer ,giovanni ,guicciardini1 as its commissary1 through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune the town was not taken4 ,but whatever the cause of this failure1 ,messer ,giovanni had the blame2 and the rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of ,lucca4 ,which calumny being fostered by his enemies1 brought ,messer ,giovanni to very verge of despair2 and though to clear himself he would willingly have given himself up to the ,captain of ,justice he found he could not1 there being no provision in the laws of the republic which allowed of his doing so4 ,hence arose the bitterest hostility between the friends of ,messer ,giovanni1 who were mostly of the old nobility 7grandi71 and those who sought to reform the government of ,florence2 and from this and the like causes1 the affair grew to such dimensions as to bring about the downfall of our republic4 ,manlius ,capitolinus1 then1 was a calumniator1 not an accuser2 and in their treatment of him the ,romans showed how calumniators should be dealt with2 by which ,i mean1 that they should be forced to become accusers2 and if their accusation be proved true1 should be rewarded1 or at least not punished1 but if proved false should be punished as ,manlius was4 ,,chapter ,,ix4--,that to give new ,institutions to a ,commonwealth1 or to reconstruct old ,institutions on an entirely new basis1 must be the work of one ,man4 ,it may perhaps be thought that ,i should not have got so far into the history of ,rome1 without some mention of those who gave that city its institutions1 and saying something of these institutions themselves1 so far as they relate to religion and war4 ,as ,i have no wish to keep those who would know my views on these matters in suspense1 ,i say at once1 that to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder of a civil government like ,romulus1 should first have slain his brother1 and afterwards have consented to the death of ,titus ,tatius the ,sabine1 whom he had chosen to be his colleague in the kingship2 since his countrymen1 if moved by ambition and lust of power to inflict like injuries on any who opposed their designs1 might plead the example of their prince4 ,this view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard the object which led ,romulus to put those men to death4 ,but we must take it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions1 that no commonwealth or kingdom ever has salutary institutions given it from the first or has its institutions recast in an entirely new mould1 unless by a single person4 ,on the contrary1 it must be from one man that it receives its institutions at first1 and upon one man that all similar reconstruction must depend4 ,for this reason the wise founder of a commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only1 or the line of his descendants1 but his ,state and country1 must endeavour to acquire an absolute and undivided authority4 ,and none who is wise will ever blame any action1 however extraordinary and irregular1 which serves to lay the foundation of a kingdom or to establish a republic4 ,for although the act condemn the doer1 the end may justify him2 and when1 as in the case of ,romulus1 the end is good1 it will always excuse the means2 since it is he who does violence with intent to injure1 not he who does it with the design to secure tranquility1 who merits blame4 ,such a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid transmitting the absolute authority he acquires1 as an inheritance to another2 for as men are1 by nature1 more prone to evil than to good1 a successor may turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor has used to promote worthy ends4 ,moreover1 though it be one man that must give a ,state its institutions1 once given they are not so likely to last long resting for support on the shoulders of one man only1 as when entrusted to the care of many1 and when it is the business of many to maintain them4 ,for though the multitude be unfit to set a ,state in order1 since they cannot1 by reason of the divisions which prevail among them1 agree wherein the true well-being of the ,state lies1 yet when they have once been taught the truth1 they never will consent to abandon it4 ,and that ,romulus1 though he put his brother to death1 is yet of those who are to be pardoned1 since what he did was done for the common good and not from personal ambition1 is shown by his at once creating a senate1 with whom he took counsel1 and in accordance with whose voice he determined4 ,and whosoever shall well examine the authority which ,romulus reserved to himself1 will find that he reserved nothing beyond the command of the army when war was resolved on1 and the right to assemble the senate4 ,this is seen later1 on ,rome becoming free by the expulsion of the ,tarquins1 when the ,romans altered none of their ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year instead of a king for life2 for this proves that all the original institutions of that city were more in conformity with a free and constitutional government1 than with an absolute and despotic one4 ,in support of what has been said above1 ,i might cite innumerable instances1 as of ,moses1 ,lycurgus1 ,solon1 and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths1 who1 from the full powers given them1 were enabled to shape their laws to the public advantage2 but passing over these examples1 as of common notoriety1 ,i take one1 not indeed so famous1 but which merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise laws4 ,agis1 ,king of ,sparta1 desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits within which the laws of ,lycurgus had held them1 because he thought that1 from having somewhat deviated from them1 his city had lost much of its ancient virtue and1 consequently much of its strength and power1 was1 at the very outset of his attempts1 slain by the ,spartan ,ephori1 as one who sought to make himself a tyrant4 ,but ,cleomenes coming after him in the kingdom1 and1 on reading the notes and writings which he found of ,agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained1 being stirred by the same desire1 perceived that he could not confer this benefit on his country unless he obtained sole power4 ,for he saw that the ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was useful for many against the will of a few4 ,wherefore1 finding fit occasion1 he caused the ,ephori and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way1 to be put to death2 after which1 he completely renewed the laws of ,lycurgus4 ,and the result of his measures would have been to give fresh life to ,sparta1 and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that of ,lycurgus1 had it not been for the power of the ,macedonians and the weakness of the other ,greek ,states4 ,for while engaged with these reforms1 he was attacked by the ,macedonians1 and being by himself no match for them1 and having none to whom he could turn for help1 he was overpowered2 and his plans1 though wise and praiseworthy1 were never brought to perfection4 ,all which circumstances considered1 ,i conclude that he who gives new institutions to a ,state must stand alone2 and that for the deaths of ,remus and ,tatius1 ,romulus is to be excused rather than blamed4 ,,chapter ,x4--,that in proportion as the ,founder of a ,kingdom or ,commonwealth merits ,praise1 he who founds a ,tyranny deserves ,blame4 ,of all who are praised they are praised the most1 who are the authors and founders of religions4 ,after whom come the founders of kingdoms and commonwealths4 ,next to these1 they have the greatest name who as commanders of armies have added to their own dominions or those of their country4 ,after these1 again1 are ranked men of letters1 who being of various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree4 ,to all others1 whose number is infinite1 is ascribed that measure of praise to which his profession or occupation entitles him4 ,and1 conversely1 all who contribute to the overthrow of religion1 or to the ruin of kingdoms and commonwealths1 all who are foes to letters and to the arts which confer honour and benefit on the human race 7among whom ,i reckon the impious1 the cruel1 the ignorant1 the indolent1 the base and the worthless71 are held in infamy and detestation4 ,no one1 whether he be wise or foolish1 bad or good1 if asked to choose between these two kinds of men1 will ever be found to withhold praise from what deserves praise1 or blame from what is to be blamed4 ,and yet almost all1 deceived by a false good and a false glory1 allow themselves either ignorantly or wilfully to follow in the footsteps such as deserve blame rather than praise2 and1 have it in their power to establish1 to their lasting renown1 a commonwealth or kingdom1 turn aside to create a tyranny without a thought how much they thereby lose in name1 fame1 security1 tranquility1 and peace of mind2 and into how much infamy1 scorn1 danger1 and disquiet they run4 ,but were they to read history1 and turn to profit the lessons of the past1 it seems impossible that those living in a republic as private citizens1 should not prefer1 in their native city1 to play the part of ,scipio rather of ,csar2 or that those who by good fortune or merit have risen to be rulers1 should not seek rather to resemble ,agesilaus1 ,timoleon1 and ,dion1 than to ,nabis1 ,phalaris and ,dionysius2 since they would see how the latter are loaded with infamy1 while the former have been extolled beyond bounds4 ,they would see1 too1 how ,timoleon and others like him1 had as great authority in their country as ,dionysius or ,phalaris in theirs1 while enjoying far greater security4 ,nor let any one finding ,csar celebrated by a crowd of writers1 be misled by his glory2 for those who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune1 and overawed by the greatness of that empire which1 being governed in his name1 would not suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning him4 ,but let him who desires to know how historians would have written of ,csar had they been free to declare their thoughts mark what they say of ,catiline1 than whom ,csar is more hateful1 in proportion as he who does is more to be condemned than he who only desires to do evil4 ,let him see also what praises they lavish upon ,brutus1 because being unable1 out of respect for his power1 to reproach ,csar1 they magnify his enemy4 ,and if he who has become prince in any ,state will but reflect1 how1 after ,rome was made an empire1 far greater praise was earned those emperors who lived within the laws1 and worthily1 than by those who lived in the contrary way1 he will see that ,titus1 ,nerva1 ,trajan1 ,hadrian1 ,antoninus and ,marcus had no need of prtorian cohorts1 or of countless legions to guard them1 but were defended by their own good lives1 the good-will of their subjects1 and the attachment of the senate4 ,in like manner he will perceive in the case of ,caligula1 ,nero1 ,vitellius1 and ever so many more of those evil emperors1 that all the armies of the east and of the west were of no avail to protect them from the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up against them4 ,and were the history of these emperors rightly studied1 it would be a sufficient lesson to any prince how to distinguish the paths which lead to honour and safety from those which end in shame and insecurity4 ,for of the twenty-six emperors from ,csar to ,maximinus1 sixteen came to a violent1 ten only to a natural death2 and though one or two of those who died by violence may have been good princes1 as ,galba or ,pertinax1 they met their fate in consequence of that corruption which their predecessors had left behind in the army4 ,and if among those who died a natural death1 there be found some bad emperors1 like ,severus1 it is to be ascribed to their signal good fortune and to their great abilities1 advantages seldom found united in the same man4 ,from the study of this history we may also learn how a good government is to be established2 for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth1 except ,titus1 were bad1 all were good who succeeded by adoption2 as in the case of the five from ,nerva to ,marcus4 ,but so soon as the empire fell once more to the heirs by birth1 its ruin recommenced4 ,let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from ,nerva to ,marcus1 and contrast it with that which went before and that which came after1 and then let him say in which of them he would wish to have been born or to have reigned4 ,for during these times in which good men governed1 he will see the prince secure in the midst of happy subjects1 and the whole world filled with peace and justice4 ,he will find the senate maintaining its authority1 the magistrates enjoying their honours1 rich citizens their wealth1 rank and merit held in respect1 ease and content everywhere prevailing1 rancour1 licence1 corruption and ambition everywhere quenched1 and that golden age restored in which every one might hold and support what opinions he pleased4 ,he will see1 in short1 the world triumphing1 the sovereign honoured and revered1 the people animated with love1 and rejoicing in their security4 ,but should he turn to examine the times of the other emperors1 he will find them wasted by battles1 torn by seditions1 cruel alike in war and peace2 many princes perishing by the sword2 many wars foreign and domestic2 ,italy overwhelmed with unheard-of disasters2 her towns destroyed and plundered2 ,rome burned2 the ,capitol razed to the ground by ,roman citizens2 the ancient temples desolated2 the ceremonies of religion corrupted2 the cities rank with adultery2 the seas covered with exiles and the islands polluted with blood4 ,he will see outrage follow outrage2 rank1 riches1 honours1 and1 above all1 virtue imputed as mortal crimes2 informers rewarded2 slaves bribed to betray their masters1 freedmen their patrons1 and those who were without enemies brought to destruction by their friends2 and then he will know the true nature of the debt which ,rome1 ,italy1 and the world owe to ,csar2 and if he possess a spark of human feeling1 will turn from the example of those evil times1 and kindle with a consuming passion to imitate those which were good4 ,and in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be the ruler of a corrupt city2 not that1 like ,csar1 he may destroy it1 but that1 like ,romulus1 he may restore it2 since man cannot hope for1 nor ,heaven offer any better opportunity of fame4 ,were it indeed necessary in giving a constitution to a ,state to forfeit its sovereignty1 the prince who1 to retain his station1 should withhold a constitution1 might plead excuse2 but for him who in giving a constitution can still retain his sovereignty1 no excuse is to be made4 ,let those therefore to whom ,heaven has afforded this opportunity1 remember that two courses lie open to them2 one which will render them secure while they live and glorious when they die2 another which exposes them to continual difficulties in life1 and condemns them to eternal infamy after death4 ,,chapter ,,xi4--,of the ,religion of the ,romans4 ,though ,rome had ,romulus for her first founder1 and as a daughter owed him her being and nurture1 nevertheless1 when the institutions of ,romulus were seen by ,heaven to be insufficient for so great a ,state1 the ,roman senate were moved to choose ,numa ,pompilius as his successor1 that he might look to all matters which ,romulus had neglected4 ,he finding the people fierce and turbulent1 and desiring with the help of the peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience1 called in the aid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society1 and gave it such a form1 that for many ages ,god was nowhere so much feared as in that republic4 ,the effect of this was to render easy any enterprise in which the senate or great men of ,rome thought fit to engage4 ,and whosoever pays heed to an infinity of actions performed1 sometimes by the ,roman people collectively1 often by single citizens1 will see1 that esteeming the power of ,god beyond that of man1 they dreaded far more to violate their oath than to transgress the laws2 as is clearly shown by the examples of ,scipio and of ,manlius ,torquatus4 ,for after the defeat of the ,romans by ,hannibal at ,cann1 many citizens meeting together1 resolved1 in their terror and dismay1 to abandon ,italy and seek refuge in ,sicily4 ,but ,scipio1 getting word of this1 went among them1 and menacing them with his naked sword1 made them swear never to abandon their country4 ,again1 when ,lucius ,manlius was accused by the tribune ,marcus ,pomponius1 before the day fixed for trial1 ,titus ,manlius1 afterwards named ,torquatus1 son to ,lucius1 went to seek this ,marcus1 and threatening him with death if he did not withdraw the charge against his father1 compelled him to swear compliance2 and he1 through fear1 having sworn1 kept his oath4 ,in the first of these two instances1 therefore1 citizens whom love of their country and its laws could not have retained in ,italy1 were kept there by the oath forced upon them2 and in the second1 the tribune ,marcus1 to keep his oath1 laid aside the hatred he bore the father1 and overlooked the injury done him by the son1 and his own dishonour4 ,and this from no other cause than the religion which ,numa had impressed upon this city4 ,and it will be plain to any one who carefully studies ,roman ,history1 how much religion helped in disciplining the army1 in uniting the people1 in keeping good men good1 and putting bad men to shame2 so that had it to be decided to which prince1 ,romulus or ,numa1 ,rome owed the greater debt1 ,i think the balance must turn in favour of ,numa2 for when religion is once established you may readily bring in arms2 but where you have arms without religion it is not easy afterwards to bring in religion4 ,we see1 too1 that while ,romulus in order to create a senate1 and to establish his other ordinances civil and military1 needed no support from ,divine authority1 this was very necessary to ,numa1 who feigned to have intercourse with a ,nymph by whose advice he was guided in counselling the people4 ,and this1 because desiring to introduce in ,rome new and untried institutions1 he feared that his own authority might not effect his end4 ,nor1 indeed1 has any attempt ever been made to introduce unusual laws among a people1 without resorting to ,divine authority1 since without such sanction they never would have been accepted4 ,for the wise recognize many things to be good which do not bear such reasons on the face of them as command their acceptance by others2 wherefore1 wise men who would obviate these difficulties1 have recourse to ,divine aid4 ,thus did ,lycurgus1 thus ,solon1 and thus have done many besides who have had the same end in view4 ,the ,romans1 accordingly1 admiring the prudence and virtues of ,numa1 assented to all the measures which he recommended4 ,this1 however1 is to be said1 that the circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured with religious feeling1 and of the men with whom he had to deal being rude and ignorant1 gave ,numa better facility to carry out his plans1 as enabling him to mould his subjects readily to any new impression4 ,and1 doubtless1 he who should seek at the present day to form a new commonwealth1 would find the task easier among a race of simple mountaineers1 than among the dwellers in cities where society is corrupt2 as the sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a rough block1 than from the block which has been badly shaped out by another4 ,but taking all this into account1 ,i maintain that the religion introduced by ,numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity of ,rome1 since it gave rise to good ordinances1 which in turn brought with them good fortune1 and with good fortune1 happy issues to whatsoever was undertaken4 ,and as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the greatness of a ,state1 so their neglect is the occasion of its decline2 since a kingdom without the fear of ,god must either fall to pieces1 or must be maintained by the fear of some prince who supplies that influence not supplied by religion4 ,but since the lives of princes are short1 the life of this prince1 also1 and with it his influence1 must soon come to an end2 whence it happens that a kingdom which rests wholly on the qualities of its prince1 lasts for a brief time only2 because these qualities1 terminating with his life1 are rarely renewed in his successor4 ,for as ,dante wisely says3-- 8,seldom through the boughs ,doth human worth renew itself2 for such ,the will of ,him who gives it1 that to ,him ,we may ascribe it40#a #a ,rade volta risurge per li rami ,l'umana probitate3 e questo vuole ,quei che la d1 perch da lui si chiami4 ,purg4 vii4 #aba-abc4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom lies1 not in its having a ruler who governs it prudently while he lives1 but in having one who so orders things1 that when he dies1 the ,state may still maintain itself4 ,and though it be easier to impose new institutions or a new faith on rude and simple men1 it is not therefore impossible to persuade their adoption by men who are civilized1 and who do not think themselves rude4 ,the people of ,florence do not esteem themselves rude or ignorant1 and yet were persuaded by the ,friar ,girolamo ,savonarola that he spoke with ,god4 ,whether in this he said truth or no1 ,i take not on me to pronounce1 since of so great a man we must speak with reverence2 but this ,i do say1 that very many believed him without having witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their belief2 his life1 his doctrines1 the matter whereof he treated1 being sufficient to enlist their faith4 ,let no man1 therefore1 lose heart from thinking that he cannot do what others have done before him2 for1 as ,i said in my ,preface1 men are born1 and live1 and die1 always in accordance with the same rules4 ,,chapter ,,xii4--,that it is of much moment to make account of ,religion2 and that ,italy1 through the ,roman ,church1 being wanting therein1 has been ruined4 ,princes and commonwealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted1 should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion1 and always hold them in reverence2 since we can have no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see ,divine worship held therein in contempt4 ,this is easily understood when it is seen on what foundation that religion rests in which a man is born4 ,for every religion has its root in certain fundamental ordinances peculiar to itself4 ,the religion of the ,gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the oracles and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers4 ,all their other ceremonies and observances depended upon these2 because men naturally believed that the ,god who could forecast their future weal or woe1 could also bring them to pass4 ,wherefore the temples1 the prayers1 the sacrifices1 and all the other rites of their worship1 had their origin in this1 that the oracles of ,delos1 of ,dodona1 and others celebrated in antiquity1 held the world admiring and devout4 ,but1 afterwards1 when these oracles began to shape their answers to suit the interests of powerful men1 and their impostures to be seen through by the multitude1 men grew incredulous and ready to overturn every sacred institution4 ,for which reason1 the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths should maintain the foundations of the faith which they hold2 since thus it will be easy for them to keep their country religious1 and1 consequently1 virtuous and united4 ,to which end they should countenance and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion1 even should they think it untrue2 and the wiser they are1 and the better they are acquainted with natural causes1 the more ought they to do so4 ,it is from this course having been followed by the wise1 that the miracles celebrated even in false religions1 have come to be held in repute2 for from whatever source they spring1 discreet men will extol them1 whose authority afterwards gives them currency everywhere4 ,these miracles were common enough in ,rome1 and among others this was believed1 that when the ,roman soldiers were sacking the city of ,veii1 certain of them entered the temple of ,juno and spoke to the statue of the goddess1 saying1 8,wilt thou come with us to ,rome80 when to some it seemed that she inclined her head in assent1 and to others that they heard her answer1 8,yea40 ,for these men being filled with religious awe 7which ,titus ,livius shows us by the circumstance that1 in entering the temple1 they entered devoutly1 reverently1 and without tumult71 persuaded themselves they heard that answer to their question1 which1 perhaps1 they had formed beforehand in their minds4 ,but their faith and belief were wholly approved of and confirmed by ,camillus and by the other chief men of the city4 ,had religion been maintained among the princes of ,christendom on the footing on which it was established by its ,founder1 the ,christian ,states and republics had been far more united and far more prosperous than they now are2 nor can we have surer proof of its decay than in witnessing how those countries which are the nearest neighbours of the ,roman ,church1 the head of our faith1 have less devoutness than any others2 so that any one who considers its earliest beginnings and observes how widely different is its present practice1 might well believe its ruin or its chastisement to be close at hand4 ,but since some are of opinion that the welfare of ,italy depends upon the ,church of ,rome1 ,i desire to put forward certain arguments which occur to me against that view1 and shall adduce two very strong ones1 which1 to my mind1 admit of no answer4 ,the first is1 that1 through the ill example of the ,roman ,court1 the country has lost all religious feeling and devoutness1 a loss which draws after it infinite mischiefs and disorders2 for as the presence of religion implies every excellence1 so the contrary is involved in its absence4 ,to the ,church1 therefore1 and to the priests1 we ,italians owe this first debt1 that through them we have become wicked and irreligious4 ,and a still greater debt we owe them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin1 namely1 that by the ,church our country is kept divided4 ,for no country was ever united or prosperous which did not yield obedience to some one prince or commonwealth1 as has been the case with ,france and ,spain4 ,and the ,church is the sole cause why ,italy stands on a different footing1 and is subject to no one king or commonwealth4 ,for though she holds here her seat1 and exerts her temporal authority1 she has never yet gained strength and courage to seize upon the entire country1 or make herself supreme2 yet never has been so weak that when in fear of losing her temporal dominion1 she could not call in some foreign potentate to aid her against any ,italian ,state by which she was overmatched4 ,of which we find many instances1 both in early times1 as when by the intervention of ,charles the ,great she drove the ,lombards1 who had made themselves masters of nearly the whole country1 out of ,italy2 and also in recent times1 as when1 with the help of ,france1 she first stripped the ,venetians of their territories1 and then1 with the help of the ,swiss1 expelled the ,french4 ,the ,church1 therefore1 never being powerful enough herself to take possession of the entire country1 while1 at the same time1 preventing any one else from doing so1 has made it impossible to bring ,italy under one head2 and has been the cause of her always living subject to many princes or rulers1 by whom she has been brought to such division and weakness as to have become a prey1 not to ,barbarian kings only1 but to any who have thought fit to attack her4 ,for this1 ,i say1 we ,italians have none to thank but the ,church4 ,and were any man powerful enough to transplant the ,court of ,rome1 with all the authority it now wields over the rest of ,italy1 into the territories of the ,swiss 7the only people who at this day1 both as regards religion and military discipline1 live like the ancients17 he would have clear proof of the truth of what ,i affirm1 and would find that the corrupt manners of that ,court had1 in a little while1 wrought greater mischief in these territories than any other disaster which could ever befall them4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4--,of the use the ,romans made of ,religion in giving ,institutions to their ,city1 in carrying out their ,enterprises1 and in quelling ,tumults4 ,here it seems to me not out of place to cite instances of the ,romans seeking assistance from religion in reforming their institutions and in carrying out their warlike designs4 ,and although many such are related by ,titus ,livius1 ,i content myself with mentioning the following only3 ,the ,romans having appointed tribunes with consular powers1 all of them1 save one1 plebeians1 it so chanced that in that very year they were visited by plague and famine1 accompanied by many strange portents4 ,taking occasion from this1 the nobles1 at the next creation of tribunes1 gave out that the gods were angry with ,rome for lowering the majesty of her government1 nor could be appeased but by the choice of tribunes being restored to a fair footing4 ,whereupon the people1 smitten with religious awe1 chose all the tribunes from the nobles4 ,again1 at the siege of ,veii1 we find the ,roman commanders making use of religion to keep the minds of their men well disposed towards that enterprise4 ,for when1 in the last year of the siege1 the soldiers1 disgusted with their protracted service1 began to clamour to be led back to ,rome1 on the ,alban lake suddenly rising to an uncommon height1 it was found that the oracles at ,delphi and elsewhere had foretold that ,veii should fall that year in which the ,alban lake overflowed4 ,the hope of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers1 led them to put up with the weariness of the war1 and to continue in arms2 until1 on ,camillus being named dictator1 ,veii was taken after a ten years' siege4 ,in these cases1 therefore1 we see religion1 wisely used1 assist in the reduction of this city1 and in restoring the tribuneship to the nobles2 neither of which ends could well have been effected without it4 ,one other example bearing on the same subject ,i must not omit4 ,constant disturbances were occasioned in ,rome by the tribune ,terentillus1 who1 for reasons to be noticed in their place1 sought to pass a certain law4 ,the nobles1 in their efforts to baffle him1 had recourse to religion1 which they sought to turn to account in two ways4 ,for first they caused the ,sibylline books to be searched1 and a feigned answer returned1 that in that year the city ran great risk of losing its freedom through civil discord2 which fraud1 although exposed by the tribunes1 nevertheless aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons that they slackened in their support of their leaders4 ,their other contrivance was as follows3 ,a certain ,appius ,herdonius1 at the head of a band of slaves and outlaws1 to the number of four thousand1 having seized the ,capitol by night1 an alarm was spread that were the ,equians and ,volscians1 those perpetual enemies of the ,roman name1 then to attack the city1 they might succeed in taking it4 ,and when1 in spite of this1 the tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts to pass the law1 declaring the act of ,herdonius to be a device of the nobles and no real danger4 ,publius ,rubetius1 a citizen of weight and authority1 came forth from the ,senate ,house1 and in words partly friendly and partly menacing1 showed them the peril in which the city stood1 and that their demands were unseasonable2 and spoke to such effect that the commons bound themselves by oath to stand by the consul2 in fulfilment of which engagement they aided the consul1 ,publius ,valerius1 to carry the ,capitol by assault4 ,but ,valerius being slain in the attack1 ,titus ,quintius was at once appointed in his place1 who1 to leave the people no breathing time1 nor suffer their thoughts to revert to the ,terentillian law1 ordered them to quit ,rome and march against the ,volscians2 declaring them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath they had sworn not to desert the consul4 ,and though the tribunes withstood him1 contending that the oath had been sworn to the dead consul and not to ,quintius1 yet the people under the influence of religious awe1 chose rather to obey the consul than believe the tribunes4 ,and ,titus ,livius commends their behaviour when he says3 8,that neglect of the gods which now prevails1 had not then made its way nor was it then the practice for every man to interpret his oath1 or the laws1 to suit his private ends40 ,the tribunes accordingly1 fearing to lose their entire ascendency1 consented to obey the consul1 and to refrain for a year from moving in the matter of the ,terentillian law2 while the consuls1 on their part1 undertook that for a year the commons should not be called forth to war4 ,and thus1 with the help of religion1 the senate were able to overcome a difficulty which they never could have overcome without it4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4--,that the ,romans interpreted the ,auspices to meet the occasion2 and made a prudent show of observing the ,rites of ,religion even when forced to disregard them2 and any who rashly slighted ,religion they punished4 ,auguries were not only1 as we have shown above1 a main foundation of the old religion of the ,gentiles1 but were also the cause of the prosperity of the ,roman commonwealth4 ,accordingly1 the ,romans gave more heed to these than to any other of their observances2 resorting to them in their consular comitia2 in undertaking new enterprises2 in calling out their armies2 in going into battle2 and1 in short1 in every business of importance1 whether civil or military4 ,nor would they ever set forth on any warlike expedition1 until they had satisfied their soldiers that the gods had promised them victory4 ,among other means of declaring the auguries1 they had in their armies a class of soothsayers1 named by them pullarii1 whom1 when they desired to give battle1 they would ask to take the auspices1 which they did by observing the behaviour of fowls4 ,if the fowls pecked1 the engagement was begun with a favourable omen4 ,if they refused1 battle was declined4 ,nevertheless1 when it was plain on the face of it that a certain course had to be taken1 they would take it at all hazards1 even though the auspices were adverse2 contriving1 however1 to manage matters so adroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on religion2 as was done by the consul ,papirius in the great battle he fought with the ,samnites wherein that nation was finally broken and overthrown4 ,for ,papirius being encamped over against the ,samnites1 and perceiving that if he fought1 victory was certain1 and consequently being eager to engage1 desired the omens to be taken4 ,the fowls refused to peck2 but the chief soothsayer observing the eagerness of the soldiers to fight and the confidence felt both by them and by their captain1 not to deprive the army of such an opportunity of glory1 reported to the consul that the auspices were favourable4 ,whereupon ,papirius began to array his army for battle4 ,but some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked1 this was told to ,spurius ,papirius1 the nephew of the consul1 who reporting it to his uncle1 the latter straightway bade him mind his own business1 for that so far as he himself and the army were concerned1 the auspices were fair2 and if the soothsayer had lied1 the consequences were on his head4 ,and that the event might accord with the prognostics1 he commanded his officers to place the soothsayers in front of the battle4 ,it so chanced that as they advanced against the enemy1 the chief soothsayer was killed by a spear thrown by a ,roman soldier2 which1 the consul hearing of1 said1 8,all goes well1 and as the ,gods would have it1 for by the death of this liar the army is purged of blame and absolved from whatever displeasure these may have conceived against it40 ,and contriving1 in this way to make his designs tally with the auspices1 he joined battle1 without the army knowing that the ordinances of religion had in any degree been disregarded4 ,but an opposite course was taken by ,appius ,pulcher1 in ,sicily1 in the first ,carthaginian war4 ,for desiring to join battle1 he bade the soothsayers take the auspices1 and on their announcing that the fowls refused to feed1 he answered1 8,let us see1 then1 whether they will drink10 and1 so saying1 caused them to be thrown into the sea4 ,after which he fought and was defeated4 ,for this he was condemned at ,rome1 while ,papirius was honoured2 not so much because the one had gained while the other had lost a battle1 as because in their treatment of the auspices the one had behaved discreetly1 the other with rashness4 ,and1 in truth1 the sole object of this system of taking the auspices was to insure the army joining battle with that confidence of success which constantly leads to victory2 a device followed not by the ,romans only1 but by foreign nations as well2 of which ,i shall give an example in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xv4--,how the ,samnites1 as a last resource in their broken ,fortunes1 had recourse to ,religion4 ,the ,samnites1 who before had met with many defeats at the hands of the ,romans1 were at last decisively routed by them in ,etruria1 where their armies were cut to pieces and their commanders slain4 ,and because their allies also1 such as the ,etruscans1 the ,umbrians1 and the ,gauls1 were likewise vanquished1 they 8could now no longer0 as ,livius tells us1 8either trust to their own strength or to foreign aid2 yet1 for all that1 would not cease from hostilities1 nor resign themselves to forfeit the liberty which they had unsuccessfully defended1 preferring new defeats to an inglorious submission40 ,they resolved1 therefore1 to make a final effort2 and as they knew that victory was only to be secured by inspiring their soldiers with a stubborn courage1 to which end nothing could help so much as religion1 at the instance of their high priest1 ,ovius ,paccius1 they revived an ancient sacrificial rite performed by them in the manner following4 ,after offering solemn sacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies1 standing between the slain victims and the smoking altars1 to swear never to abandon the war4 ,they then summoned the common soldiers1 one by one1 and before the same altars1 and surrounded by a ring of many centurions with drawn swords1 first bound them by oath never to reveal what they might see or hear2 and then1 after imprecating the ,divine wrath1 and reciting the most terrible incantations1 made them vow and swear to the gods1 as they would not have a curse light on their race and offspring1 to follow wherever their captains led1 never to turn back from battle1 and to put any they saw turn back to death4 ,some who in their terror declined to swear1 were forthwith slain by the centurions4 ,the rest1 warned by their cruel fate1 complied4 ,assembling thereafter to the number of forty thousand1 one-half of whom1 to render their appearance of unusual splendour were clad in white1 with plumes and crests over their helmets1 they took up their ground in the neighbourhood of ,aquilonia4 ,but ,papirius1 being sent against them1 bade his soldiers be of good cheer1 telling them 8that feathers made no wounds1 and that a ,roman spear would pierce a painted shield20 and to lessen the effect which the oath taken by the ,samnites had upon the minds of the ,romans1 he said that such an oath must rather distract than strengthen those bound by it1 since they had to fear1 at once1 their enemies1 their comrades1 and their ,gods4 ,in the battle which ensued1 the ,samnites were routed1 any firmness lent them by religion or by the oath they had sworn1 being balanced by the ,roman valour1 and the terror inspired by past defeats4 ,still we see that1 in their own judgment1 they had no other refuge to which to turn1 nor other remedy for restoring their broken hopes2 and this is strong testimony to the spirit which religion rightly used can arouse4 ,some of the incidents which ,i have now been considering may be thought to relate rather to the foreign than to the domestic affairs of ,rome1 which last alone form the proper subject of this ,book2 nevertheless since the matter connects itself with one of the most important institutions of the ,roman republic1 ,i have thought it convenient to notice it here1 so as not to divide the subject and be obliged to return to it hereafter4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4--,that a ,people accustomed to live under a ,prince1 if by any accident it become free1 can hardly preserve that ,freedom4 ,should a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident become free1 as did the ,romans on the expulsion of the ,tarquins1 we know from numberless instances recorded in ancient history1 how hard it will be for it to maintain that freedom4 ,and this is no more than we might expect4 ,for a people in such circumstances may be likened to the wild animal which1 though destined by nature to roam at large in the woods1 has been reared in the cage and in constant confinement and which1 should it chance to be set free in the open country1 being unused to find its own food1 and unfamiliar with the coverts where it might lie concealed1 falls a prey to the first who seeks to recapture it4 ,even thus it fares with the people which has been accustomed to be governed by others2 since ignorant how to act by itself either for attack or defence1 and neither knowing foreign princes nor being known of them1 it is speedily brought back under the yoke1 and often under a heavier yoke than that from which it has just freed its neck4 ,these difficulties will be met with1 even where the great body of the citizens has not become wholly corrupted2 but where the corruption is complete1 freedom1 as shall presently be shown1 is not merely fleeting but impossible4 ,wherefore my remarks are to be taken as applying to those ,states only wherein corruption has as yet made no great progress1 and in which there is more that is sound than unsound4 ,to the difficulties above noticed1 another has to be added1 which is1 that a ,state in becoming free makes for itself bitter enemies but not warm friends4 ,all become its bitter enemies who1 drawing their support from the wealth of the tyrant1 flourished under his government4 ,for these men1 when the causes which made them powerful are withdrawn1 can no longer live contented1 but are one and all impelled to attempt the restoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining their former importance4 ,on the other hand1 as ,i have said1 the ,state which becomes free does not gain for itself warm friends4 ,for a free government bestows its honours and rewards in accordance with certain fixed rules1 and on considerations of merit1 without which none is honoured or rewarded4 ,but when a man obtains only those honours or rewards which he seems to himself to deserve1 he will never admit that he is under any obligation to those who bestow them4 ,moreover the common benefits that all derive from a free government1 which consist in the power to enjoy what is our own1 openly and undisturbed1 in having to feel no anxiety for the honour of wife or child1 nor any fear for personal safety1 are hardly recognized by men while they still possess them1 since none will ever confess obligation to him who merely refrains from injury4 ,for these reasons1 ,i repeat1 a ,state which has recently become free1 is likely to have bitter enemies and no warm friends4 ,now1 to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders1 there is no more potent1 effectual1 wholesome1 and necessary remedy than to slay the sons of ,brutus4 ,they1 as the historian tells us1 were along with other young ,romans led to conspire against their country1 simply because the unusual privileges which they had enjoyed under the kings1 were withheld under the consuls2 so that to them it seemed as though the freedom of the people implied their servitude4 ,any one1 therefore1 who undertakes to control a people1 either as their prince or as the head of a commonwealth1 and does not make sure work with all who are hostile to his new institutions1 founds a government which cannot last long4 ,undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy1 who1 to secure their position1 are forced to advance by unusual and irregular paths1 and with the people for their enemies4 ,for while he who has to deal with a few adversaries only1 can easily and without much or serious difficulty secure himself1 he who has an entire people against him can never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses the weaker his authority becomes2 so that his best course is to strive to make the people his friends4 ,but since these views may seem to conflict with what ,i have said above1 treating there of a republic and here of a prince1 that ,i may not have to return to the subject again1 ,i will in this place discuss it briefly4 ,speaking1 then of those princes who have become the tyrants of their country1 ,i say that the prince who seeks to gain over an unfriendly people should first of all examine what it is the people really desire1 and he will always find that they desire two things3 first1 to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their servitude2 and second1 to regain their freedom4 ,the first of these desires the prince can gratify wholly1 the second in part4 ,as regards the former1 we have an instance exactly in point4 ,clearchus1 tyrant of ,heraclea1 being in exile1 it so happened that on a feud arising between the commons and the nobles of that city1 the latter1 perceiving they were weaker than their adversaries1 began to look with favour on ,clearchus1 and conspiring with him1 in opposition to the popular voice recalled him to ,heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom4 ,clearchus finding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the nobles1 whom he could in no way either satisfy or correct1 and the fury of the people1 who could not put up with the loss of their freedom1 resolved to rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and recommend himself to the people4 ,wherefore1 watching his opportunity1 he caused all the nobles to be put to death1 and thus1 to the extreme delight of the people1 satisfied one of those desires by which they are possessed1 namely1 the desire for vengeance4 ,as for the other desire of the people1 namely1 to recover their freedom1 the prince1 since he never can content them in this1 should examine what the causes are which make them long to be free2 and he will find a very few of them desiring freedom that they may obtain power1 but all the rest1 whose number is countless1 only desiring it that they may live securely4 ,for in all republics1 whatever the form of their government1 barely forty or fifty citizens have any place in the direction of affairs2 who1 from their number being so small1 can easily be reckoned with1 either by making away with them1 or by allowing them such a share of honours as1 looking to their position1 may reasonably content them4 ,all those others whose sole aim it is to live safely1 are well contented where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances as provide for the general security1 while they establish his own authority2 and when he does this1 and the people see that nothing induces him to violate these laws1 they soon begin to live happily and without anxiety4 ,of this we have an example in the kingdom of ,france1 which enjoys perfect security from this cause alone1 that its kings are bound to compliance with an infinity of laws upon which the well-being of the whole people depends4 ,and he who gave this ,state its constitution allowed its kings to do as they pleased as regards arms and money2 but provided that as regards everything else they should not interfere save as the laws might direct4 ,those rulers1 therefore1 who omit to provide sufficiently for the safety of their government at the outset1 must1 like the ,romans1 do so on the first occasion which offers2 and whoever lets the occasion slip1 will repent too late of not having acted as he should4 ,the ,romans1 however1 being still uncorrupted at the time when they recovered their freedom1 were able1 after slaying the sons of ,brutus and getting rid of the ,tarquins1 to maintain it with all those safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered4 ,but had they already become corrupted1 no remedy could have been found1 either in ,rome or out of it1 by which their freedom could have been secured2 as ,i shall show in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4--,that a corrupt ,people obtaining ,freedom can hardly preserve it4 ,i believe that if her kings had not been expelled1 ,rome must very soon have become a weak and inconsiderable ,state4 ,for seeing to what a pitch of corruption these kings had come1 we may conjecture that if two or three more like reigns had followed1 and the taint spread from the head to the members1 so soon as the latter became infected1 cure would have been hopeless4 ,but from the head being removed while the trunk was still sound1 it was not difficult for the ,romans to return to a free and constitutional government4 ,it may be assumed1 however1 as most certain1 that a corrupted city living under a prince can never recover its freedom1 even were the prince and all his line to be exterminated4 ,for in such a city it must necessarily happen that one prince will be replaced by another1 and that things will never settle down until a new lord be established2 unless1 indeed1 the combined goodness and valour of some one citizen should maintain freedom1 which1 even then1 will endure only for his lifetime2 as happened twice in ,syracuse1 first under the rule of ,dion1 and again under that of ,timoleon1 whose virtues while they lived kept their city free1 but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny4 ,but the strongest example that can be given is that of ,rome1 which on the expulsion of the ,tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and to maintain it2 yet1 on the deaths of ,csar1 ,caligula1 and ,nero1 and on the extinction of the ,julian line1 was not only unable to establish her freedom1 but did not even venture a step in that direction4 ,results so opposite arising in one and the same city can only be accounted for by this1 that in the time of the ,tarquins the ,roman people were not yet corrupted1 but in these later times had become utterly corrupt4 ,for on the first occasion1 nothing more was needed to prepare and determine them to shake off their kings1 than that they should be bound by oath to suffer no king ever again to reign in ,rome2 whereas1 afterwards1 the authority and austere virtue of ,brutus1 backed by all the legions of the ,east1 could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom1 which he1 following in the footsteps of the first ,brutus1 had won for them2 and this because of the corruption wherewith the people had been infected by the ,marian faction1 whereof ,csar becoming head1 was able so to blind the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which it was about to lay its neck4 ,though this example of ,rome be more complete than any other1 ,i desire to instance likewise1 to the same effect1 certain peoples well known in our own days2 and ,i maintain that no change1 however grave or violent1 could ever restore freedom to ,naples or ,milan1 because in these ,states the entire body of the people has grown corrupted4 ,and so we find that ,milan1 although desirous to return to a free form of government1 on the death of ,filippo ,visconti1 had neither the force nor the skill needed to preserve it4 ,most fortunate1 therefore1 was it for ,rome that her kings grew corrupt soon1 so as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had reached the vitals of the city4 ,for it was because these were sound that the endless commotions which took place in ,rome1 so far from being hurtful1 were1 from their object being good1 beneficial to the commonwealth4 ,from which we may draw this inference1 that where the body of the people is still sound1 tumults and other like disorders do little hurt1 but that where it has become corrupted1 laws1 however well devised1 are of no advantage1 unless imposed by some one whose paramount authority causes them to be observed until the community be once more restored to a sound and healthy condition4 ,whether this has ever happened ,i know not1 nor whether it ever can happen4 ,for we see1 as ,i have said a little way back1 that a city which owing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline1 if it is to recover at all1 must be saved not by the excellence of the people collectively1 but of some one man then living among them1 on whose death it at once relapses into its former plight2 as happened with ,thebes1 in which the virtue of ,epaminondas made it possible while he lived to preserve the form of a free ,government1 but which fell again on his death into its old disorders2 the reason being that hardly any ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city which has long been accustomed to wrong4 ,wherefore1 unless things be put on a sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced age1 or by two virtuous rulers succeeding one another1 the city upon their death at once falls back into ruin2 or1 if it be preserved1 must be so by incurring great risks1 and at the cost of much blood4 ,for the corruption ,i speak of1 is wholly incompatible with a free government1 because it results from an inequality which pervades the ,state and can only be removed by employing unusual and very violent remedies1 such as few are willing or know how to employ1 as in another place ,i shall more fully explain4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4--,how a ,free ,government existing in a corrupt ,city may be preserved1 or not existing may be created4 ,i think it neither out of place1 nor inconsistent with what has been said above1 to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt city can be maintained1 or1 not existing1 can be introduced4 ,and on this head ,i say that it is very difficult to bring about either of these results1 and next to impossible to lay down rules as to how it may be done2 because the measures to be taken must vary with the degree of corruption which prevails4 ,nevertheless1 since it is well to reason things out1 ,i will not pass this matter by1 but will assume1 in the first place1 the case of a very corrupt city1 and then take the case of one in which corruption has reached a still greater height2 but where corruption is universal1 no laws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it4 ,because as good customs stand in need of good laws for their support1 so laws1 that they may be respected1 stand in need of good customs4 ,moreover1 the laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning1 when men were good1 are no longer suitable when they have become bad2 but while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances1 its institutions rarely or never change2 whence it results that the introduction of new laws is of no avail1 because the institutions1 remaining unchanged1 corrupt them4 ,and to make this plainer1 ,i say that in ,rome it was first of all the institutions of the ,state1 and next the laws as enforced by the magistrates1 which kept the citizens under control4 ,the institutions of the ,state consisted in the authority of the people1 the senate1 the tribunes1 and the consuls2 in the methods of choosing and appointing magistrates2 and in the arrangements for passing laws4 ,these institutions changed little1 if at all1 with circumstances4 ,but the laws by which the people were controlled1 as for instance the law relating to adultery1 the sumptuary laws1 the law as to canvassing at elections1 and many others1 were altered as the citizens grew more and more corrupted4 ,hence1 the institutions of the ,state remaining the same although from the corruption of the people no longer suitable1 amendments in the laws could not keep men good1 though they might have proved very useful if at the time when they were made the institutions had likewise been reformed4 ,that its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has become corrupted1 is plainly seen in two matters of great moment1 ,i mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws4 ,for the ,roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of their ,state on none save those who sought them2 which was a good institution at first1 because then none sought these offices save those who thought themselves worthy of them1 and to be rejected was held disgraceful2 so that1 to be deemed worthy1 all were on their best behaviour4 ,but in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most mischievous4 ,for it was no longer those of greatest worth1 but those who had most influence1 who sought the magistracies2 while all who were without influence1 however deserving1 refrained through fear4 ,this untoward result was not reached all at once1 but like other similar results1 by gradual steps4 ,for after subduing ,africa and ,asia1 and reducing nearly the whole of ,greece to submission1 the ,romans became perfectly assured of their freedom1 and seemed to themselves no longer to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear4 ,but this security and the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the consulship1 no longer to look to merit1 but only to favour1 selecting for the office those who knew best how to pay court to them1 not those who knew best how to vanquish their enemies4 ,and afterwards1 instead of selecting those who were best liked1 they came to select those who had most influence2 and in this way1 from the imperfection of their institutions1 good men came to be wholly excluded4 ,again1 as to making laws1 any of the tribunes and certain others of the magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people2 but before these were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or against them4 ,this was a good system so long as the citizens were good1 since it is always well that every man should be able to propose what he thinks may be of use to his country1 and that all should be allowed to express their views with regard to his proposal2 so that the people1 having heard all1 may resolve on what is best4 ,but when the people grew depraved1 this became a very mischievous institution2 for then it was only the powerful who proposed laws1 and these not in the interest of public freedom but of their own authority2 and because1 through fear1 none durst speak against the laws they proposed1 the people were either deceived or forced into voting their own destruction4 ,in order1 therefore1 that ,rome after she had become corrupted might still preserve her freedom1 it was necessary that1 as in the course of events she had made new laws1 so likewise she should frame new institutions1 since different institutions and ordinances are needed in a corrupt ,state from those which suit a ,state which is not corrupted2 for where the matter is wholly dissimilar1 the form cannot be similar4 ,but since old institutions must either be reformed all at once1 as soon as they are seen to be no longer expedient1 or else gradually1 as the imperfection of each is recognized1 ,i say that each of these two courses is all but impossible4 ,for to effect a gradual reform requires a sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and in the germ4 ,but it may well happen that no such person is found in a city2 or that1 if found1 he is unable to persuade others of what he is himself persuaded4 ,for men used to live in one way are loath to leave it for another1 especially when they are not brought face to face with the evil against which they should guard1 and only have it indicated to them by conjecture4 ,and as for a sudden reform of institutions which are seen by all to be no longer good1 ,i say that defects which are easily discerned are not easily corrected1 because for their correction it is not enough to use ordinary means1 these being in themselves insufficient2 but recourse must be had to extraordinary means1 such as violence and arms2 and1 as a preliminary1 you must become prince of the city1 and be able to deal with it at your pleasure4 ,but since the restoration of a ,state to new political life presupposes a good man1 and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man1 it can1 consequently1 very seldom happen that1 although the end be good1 a good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways1 or that a bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously1 or think of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority4 ,from all these causes comes the difficulty1 or rather the impossibility1 which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing free government1 or in establishing a new one4 ,so that had we to establish or maintain a government in that city1 it would be necessary to give it a monarchical1 rather than a popular form1 in order that men too arrogant to be restrained by the laws1 might in some measure be kept in check by a power almost absolute2 since to attempt to make them good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour4 ,this1 as ,i have said1 was the method followed by ,cleomenes2 and if he1 that he might stand alone1 put to death the ,ephori2 and if ,romulus1 with a like object1 put to death his brother and ,titus ,tatius the ,sabine1 and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus acquired1 it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because neither ,cleomenes nor ,romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as that of which ,i am now speaking1 that they were able to effect their ends and to give a fair colour to their acts4 ,,chapter ,,xix4--,after a strong ,prince a weak ,prince may maintain himself3 but after one weak ,prince no ,kingdom can stand a second4 ,when we contemplate the excellent qualities of ,romulus1 ,numa1 and ,tullus1 the first three kings of ,rome1 and note the methods which they followed1 we recognize the extreme good fortune of that city in having her first king fierce and warlike1 her second peaceful and religious1 and her third1 like the first1 of a high spirit and more disposed to war than to peace4 ,for it was essential for ,rome that almost at the outset of her career1 a ruler should be found to lay the foundations of her civil life2 but1 after that had been done1 it was necessary that her rulers should return to the virtues of ,romulus1 since otherwise the city must have grown feeble1 and become a prey to her neighbours4 ,and here we may note that a prince who succeeds to another of superior valour1 may reign on by virtue of his predecessor's merits1 and reap the fruits of his labours2 but if he live to a great age1 or if he be followed by another who is wanting in the qualities of the first1 that then the kingdom must necessarily dwindle4 ,conversely1 when two consecutive princes are of rare excellence1 we commonly find them achieving results which win for them enduring renown4 ,david1 for example1 not only surpassed in learning and judgment1 but was so valiant in arms that1 after conquering and subduing all his neighbours1 he left to his young son ,solomon a tranquil ,state1 which the latter1 though unskilled in the arts of war1 could maintain by the arts of peace1 and thus happily enjoy the inheritance of his father's valour4 ,but ,solomon could not transmit this inheritance to his son ,rehoboam1 who neither resembling his grandfather in valour1 nor his father in good fortune1 with difficulty made good his right to a sixth part of the kingdom4 ,in like manner ,bajazet1 sultan of the ,turks1 though a man of peace rather than of war1 was able to enjoy the labours of ,mahomet his father1 who1 like ,david1 having subdued his neighbours1 left his son a kingdom so safely established that it could easily be retained by him by peaceful arts4 ,but had ,selim1 son to ,bajazet1 been like his father1 and not like his grandfather1 the ,turkish monarchy must have been overthrown2 as it is1 he seems likely to outdo the fame of his grandsire4 ,i affirm it to be proved by these examples1 that after a valiant prince a feeble prince may maintain himself2 but that no kingdom can stand when two feeble princes follow in succession1 unless1 as in the case of ,france1 it be supported by its ancient ordinances4 ,by feeble princes1 ,i mean such as are not valiant in war4 ,and1 to put the matter shortly1 it may be said1 that the great valour of ,romulus left ,numa a period of many years within which to govern ,rome by peaceful arts2 that after ,numa came ,tullus1 who renewed by his courage the fame of ,romulus2 and that he in turn was succeeded by ,ancus1 a prince so gifted by nature that he could equally avail himself of the methods of peace or war2 who setting himself at first to pursue the former1 when he found that his neighbours judged him to be effeminate1 and therefore held him in slight esteem1 understood that to preserve ,rome he must resort to arms and resemble ,romulus rather than ,numa4 ,from whose example every ruler of a ,state may learn that a prince like ,numa will hold or lose his power according as fortune and circumstances befriend him2 but that the prince who resembles ,romulus1 and like him is fortified with foresight and arms1 will hold his ,state whatever befall1 unless deprived of it by some stubborn and irresistible force4 ,for we may reckon with certainty that if ,rome had not had for her third king one who knew how to restore her credit by deeds of valour1 she could not1 or at any rate not without great difficulty1 have afterwards held her ground1 nor could ever have achieved the great exploits she did4 ,and for these reasons ,rome1 while she lived under her kings1 was in constant danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad4 ,,chapter ,,xx4--,that the consecutive ,reigns of two valiant ,princes produce great results3 and that well-ordered ,commonwealths are assured of a ,succession of valiant ,rulers by whom their ,power and ,growth are rapidly extended4 ,when ,rome had driven out her kings1 she was freed from those dangers to which1 as ,i have said1 she was exposed by the possible succession of a weak or wicked prince4 ,for the chief share in the government then devolved upon the consuls1 who took their authority not by inheritance1 nor yet by craft or by ambitious violence1 but by the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens1 and were always men of signal worth2 by whose valour and good fortune ,rome being constantly aided1 was able to reach the height of her greatness in the same number of years as she had lived under her kings4 ,and since we find that two successive reigns of valiant princes1 as of ,philip of ,macedon and his son ,alexander1 suffice to conquer the world1 this ought to be still easier for a commonwealth1 which has it in its power to choose1 not two excellent rulers only1 but an endless number in succession4 ,and in every well ordered commonwealth provision will be made for a succession of this sort4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4--,that it is a great reproach to a ,prince or to a ,commonwealth to be without a national ,army4 ,those princes and republics of the present day who lack forces of their own1 whether for attack or defence1 should take shame to themselves1 and should be convinced by the example of ,tullus1 that their deficiency does not arise from want of men fit for warlike enterprises1 but from their own fault in not knowing how to make their subjects good soldiers4 ,for after ,rome had been at peace for forty years1 ,tullus1 succeeding to the kingdom1 found not a single ,roman who had ever been in battle4 ,nevertheless when he made up his mind to enter on a war1 it never occurred to him to have recourse to the ,samnites1 or the ,etruscans1 or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed to arms1 but he resolved1 like the prudent prince he was1 to rely on his own countrymen4 ,and such was his ability that1 under his rule1 the people very soon became admirable soldiers4 ,for nothing is more true than that where a country1 having men1 lacks soldiers1 it results from some fault in its ruler1 and not from any defect in the situation or climate4 ,of this we have a very recent instance4 ,every one knows1 how1 only the other day1 the ,king of ,england invaded the realm of ,france with an army raised wholly from among his own people1 although from his country having been at peace for thirty years1 he had neither men nor officers who had ever looked an enemy in the face4 ,nevertheless1 he did not hesitate with such troops as he had1 to attack a kingdom well provided with officers and excellent soldiers who had been constantly under arms in the ,italian wars4 ,and this was possible through the prudence of the ,english king and the wise ordinances of his kingdom1 which never in time of peace relaxes its warlike discipline4 ,so too1 in old times1 ,pelopidas and ,epaminondas the ,thebans1 after they had freed ,thebes from her tyrants1 and rescued her from thraldom to ,sparta1 finding themselves in a city used to servitude and surrounded by an effeminate people1 scrupled not1 so great was their courage1 to furnish these with arms1 and go forth with them to meet and to conquer the ,spartan forces on the field4 ,and he who relates this1 observes1 that these two captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred in ,lacedmon alone1 but in every country where men are found1 if only some one arise among them who knows how to direct them to arms2 as we see ,tullus knew how to direct the ,romans4 ,nor could ,virgil better express this opinion1 or show by fitter words that he was convinced of its truth than1 when he says3-- 8,to arms shall ,tullus rouse ,his sluggish warriors40#b #b ,residesque movebit ,tullus in arma viros4 ,virg4 ,aen4 vi4 #had4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4--,what is to be noted in the combat of the three ,roman ,horatii and the three ,alban ,curiatii4 ,it was agreed between ,tullus king of ,rome1 and ,metius king of ,alba1 that the nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule over the other4 ,the three ,alban ,curiatii were slain2 one of the ,roman ,horatii survived4 ,whereupon the ,alban king with all his people became subject to the ,romans4 ,the surviving ,horatius returning victorious to ,rome1 and meeting his sister1 wife to one of the dead ,curiatii1 bewailing the death of her husband1 slew her2 and being tried for this crime1 was1 after much contention1 liberated1 rather on the entreaties of his father than for his own deserts4 ,herein three points are to be noted4 ,first1 that we should never peril our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces4 ,second1 that in a well-governed ,state1 merit should never be allowed to balance crime4 ,and third1 that those are never wise covenants which we cannot or should not expect to be observed4 ,now1 for a ,state to be enslaved is so terrible a calamity that it ought never to have been supposed possible that either of these kings or nations would rest content under a slavery resulting from the defeat of three only of their number4 ,and so it appeared to ,metius2 for although on the victory of the ,roman champions1 he at once confessed himself vanquished1 and promised obedience2 nevertheless1 in the very first expedition which he and ,tullus undertook jointly against the people of ,veii1 we find him seeking to circumvent the ,roman1 as though perceiving too late the rash part he had played4 ,this is enough to say of the third point which ,i noted as deserving attention4 ,of the other two ,i shall speak in the next two ,chapters4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4--,that we should never hazard our whole ,fortunes where we put not forth our entire ,strength2 for which reason to guard a ,defile is often hurtful4 ,it was never judged a prudent course to peril your whole fortunes where you put not forth your whole strength2 as may happen in more ways than one4 ,one of these ways was that taken by ,tullus and ,metius1 when each staked the existence of his country and the credit of his army on the valour and good fortune of three only of his soldiers1 that being an utterly insignificant fraction of the force at his disposal4 ,for neither of these kings reflected that all the labours of their predecessors in framing such institutions for their ,states1 as might1 with the aid of the citizens themselves1 maintain them long in freedom1 were rendered futile1 when the power to ruin all was left in the hands of so small a number4 ,no rasher step1 therefore1 could have been taken1 than was taken by these kings4 ,a like risk is almost always incurred by those who1 on the approach of an enemy1 resolve to defend some place of strength1 or to guard the defiles by which their country is entered4 ,for unless room be found in this place of strength for almost all your army1 the attempt to hold it will almost always prove hurtful4 ,if you can find room1 it will be right to defend your strong places2 but if these be difficult of access1 and you cannot there keep your entire force together1 the effort to defend is mischievous4 ,i come to this conclusion from observing the example of those who1 although their territories be enclosed by mountains and precipices1 have not1 on being attacked by powerful enemies1 attempted to fight on the mountains or in the defiles1 but have advanced beyond them to meet their foes2 or1 if unwilling to advance1 have awaited attack behind their mountains1 on level and not on broken ground4 ,the reason of which is1 as ,i have above explained1 that many men cannot be assembled in these strong places for their defence2 partly because a large number of men cannot long subsist there1 and partly because such places being narrow and confined1 afford room for a few only2 so that no enemy can there be withstood1 who comes in force to the attack2 which he can easily do1 his design being to pass on and not to make a stay2 whereas he who stands on the defensive cannot do so in force1 because1 from not knowing when the enemy may enter the confined and sterile tracts of which ,i speak1 he may have to lodge himself there for a long time4 ,but should you lose some pass which you had reckoned on holding1 and on the defence of which your country and army have relied1 there commonly follows such panic among your people and among the troops which remain to you1 that you are vanquished without opportunity given for any display of valour1 and lose everything without bringing all your resources into play4 ,every one has heard with what difficulty ,hannibal crossed the ,alps which divide ,france from ,lombardy1 and afterwards those which separate ,lombardy from ,tuscany4 ,nevertheless the ,romans awaited him1 in the first instance on the banks of the ,ticino1 in the second on the plain of ,arezzo1 preferring to be defeated on ground which at least gave them a chance of victory1 to leading their army into mountain fastnesses where it was likely to be destroyed by the mere difficulties of the ground4 ,and any who read history with attention will find1 that very few capable commanders have attempted to hold passes of this nature1 as well for the reasons already given1 as because to close them all were impossible4 ,for mountains1 like plains1 are traversed not only by well-known and frequented roads1 but also by many by-ways1 which1 though unknown to strangers1 are familiar to the people of the country1 under whose guidance you may always1 and in spite of any opposition1 be easily conducted to whatever point you please4 ,of this we have a recent instance in the events of the year #aeae4 ,for when ,francis ,i4 of ,france resolved on invading ,italy in order to recover the province of ,lombardy1 those hostile to his attempt looked mainly to the ,swiss1 who it was hoped would stop him in passing through their mountains4 ,but this hope was disappointed by the event4 ,for leaving on one side two or three defiles which were guarded by the ,swiss1 the king advanced by another unknown pass1 and was in ,italy and upon his enemies before they knew4 ,whereupon they fled terror-stricken into ,milan2 while the whole population of ,lombardy1 finding themselves deceived in their expectation that the ,french would be detained in the mountains1 went over to their side4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4--,that well-ordered ,states always provide ,rewards and ,punishments for their ,citizens2 and never set off ,deserts against ,misdeeds4 ,the valour of ,horatius in vanquishing the ,curiatii deserved the highest reward4 ,but in slaying his sister he had been guilty of a heinous crime4 ,and so displeasing to the ,romans was an outrage of this nature1 that although his services were so great and so recent1 they brought him to trial for his life4 ,to one looking at it carelessly1 this might seem an instance of popular ingratitude1 but he who considers the matter more closely1 and examines with sounder judgment what the ordinances of a ,state should be1 will rather blame the ,roman people for acquitting ,horatius than for putting him on his trial4 ,and this because no well-ordered ,state ever strikes a balance between the services of its citizens and their misdeeds2 but appointing rewards for good actions and punishment for bad1 when it has rewarded a man for acting well1 will afterwards1 should he act ill1 chastise him1 without regard to his former deserts4 ,when these ordinances are duly observed1 a city will live long in freedom1 but when they are neglected1 it must soon come to ruin4 ,for when a citizen has rendered some splendid service to his country1 if to the distinction which his action in itself confers1 were added an over-weening confidence that any crime he might thenceforth commit would pass unpunished1 he would soon become so arrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him4 ,still1 while we would have punishment terrible to wrongdoers1 it is essential that good actions should be rewarded1 as we see to have been the case in ,rome4 ,for even where a republic is poor1 and has but little to give1 it ought not to withhold that little2 since a gift1 however small1 bestowed as a reward for services however great1 will always be esteemed most honourable and precious by him who receives it4 ,the story of ,horatius ,cocles and that of ,mutius ,scvola are well known3 how the one withstood the enemy on the bridge while it was being cut down1 and the other thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of the mistake made when he sought the life of ,porsenna the ,etruscan king4 ,to each of these two1 in requital of their splendid deeds1 two ploughgates only of the public land were given4 ,another famous story is that of ,manlius ,capitolinus1 to whom1 for having saved the ,capitol from the besieging ,gauls1 a small measure of meal was given by each of those who were shut up with him during the siege4 ,which recompense1 in proportion to the wealth of the citizens of ,rome at that time1 was thought ample2 so that afterwards1 when ,manlius1 moved by jealousy and malice1 sought to arouse sedition in ,rome1 and to gain over the people to his cause1 they without regard to his past services threw him headlong from that ,capitol in saving which he had formerly gained so great a renown4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4--,that he who would reform the ,institutions of a free ,state1 must retain at least the semblance of old ,ways4 ,whoever takes upon him to reform the government of a city1 must1 if his measures are to be well received and carried out with general approval1 preserve at least the semblance of existing methods1 so as not to appear to the people to have made any change in the old order of things2 although1 in truth1 the new ordinances differ altogether from those which they replace4 ,for when this is attended to1 the mass of mankind accept what seems as what is2 nay1 are often touched more nearly by appearances than by realities4 ,this tendency being recognized by the ,romans at the very outset of their civil freedom1 when they appointed two consuls in place of a single king1 they would not permit the consuls to have more than twelve lictors1 in order that the old number of the king's attendants might not be exceeded4 ,again1 there being solemnized every year in ,rome a sacrificial rite which could only be performed by the king in person1 that the people might not be led by the absence of the king to remark the want of any ancient observance1 a priest was appointed for the due celebration of this rite1 to whom was given the name of ,rex sacrificulus1 and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest4 ,in this way the people were contented1 and had no occasion from any defect in the solemnities to desire the return of their kings4 ,like precautions should be used by all who would put an end to the old government of a city and substitute new and free institutions4 ,for since novelty disturbs men's minds1 we should seek in the changes we make to preserve as far as possible what is ancient1 so that if the new magistrates differ from the old in number1 in authority1 or in the duration of their office1 they shall at least retain the old names4 ,this1 ,i say1 should be seen to by him who would establish a constitutional government1 whether in the form of a commonwealth or of a kingdom4 ,but he who would create an absolute government of the kind which political writers term a tyranny1 must renew everything1 as shall be explained in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4--,a new ,prince in a ,city or ,province of which he has taken ,possession1 ought to make ,everything new4 ,whosoever becomes prince of a city or ,state1 more especially if his position be so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional government either in the form of a republic or a monarchy1 will find that the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew the whole institutions of that ,state2 that is to say1 to create new magistracies with new names1 confer new powers1 and employ new men1 and like ,david when he became king1 exalt the humble and depress the great1 8filling the hungry with good things1 and sending the rich empty away40 ,moreover1 he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them1 removing their inhabitants from one place to another2 and1 in short1 leave nothing in the country as he found it2 so that there shall be neither rank1 nor condition1 nor honour1 nor wealth which its possessor can refer to any but to him4 ,and he must take example from ,philip of ,macedon1 the father of ,alexander1 who by means such as these1 from being a petty prince became monarch of all ,greece2 and of whom it was written that he shifted men from province to province as a shepherd moves his flocks from one pasture to another4 ,these indeed are most cruel expedients1 contrary not merely to every ,christian1 but to every civilized rule of conduct1 and such as every man should shun1 choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a king on terms so hurtful to mankind4 ,but he who will not keep to the fair path of virtue1 must to maintain himself enter this path of evil4 ,men1 however1 not knowing how to be wholly good or wholly bad1 choose for themselves certain middle ways1 which of all others are the most pernicious1 as shall be shown by an instance in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4--,that ,men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad4 ,when in the year #aeje1 ,pope ,julius ,,ii4 went to ,bologna to expel from that city the family of the ,bentivogli1 who had been princes there for over a hundred years1 it was also in his mind1 as a part of the general design he had planned against all those lords who had usurped ,church lands1 to remove ,giovanpagolo ,baglioni1 tyrant of ,perugia4 ,and coming to ,perugia with this intention and resolve1 of which all men knew1 he would not wait to enter the town with a force sufficient for his protection1 but entered it unattended by troops1 although ,giovanpagolo was there with a great company of soldiers whom he had assembled for his defence4 ,and thus1 urged on by that impetuosity which stamped all his actions1 accompanied only by his body-guard1 he committed himself into the hands of his enemy1 whom he forthwith carried away with him1 leaving a governor behind to hold the town for the ,church4 ,all prudent men who were with the ,pope remarked on his temerity1 and on the pusillanimity of ,giovanpagolo2 nor could they conjecture why the latter had not1 to his eternal glory1 availed himself of this opportunity for crushing his enemy1 and at the same time enriching himself with plunder1 the ,pope being attended by the whole ,college of ,cardinals with all their luxurious equipage4 ,for it could not be supposed that he was withheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples of conscience2 because in the breast of a profligate living in incest with his sister1 and who to obtain the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to death1 no virtuous impulse could prevail4 ,so that the only inference to be drawn was1 that men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly good1 and shrink in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with an inherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature4 ,for which reason ,giovanpagolo1 who thought nothing of incurring the guilt of incest1 or of murdering his kinsmen1 could not1 or more truly durst not1 avail himself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would have admired2 which would have won for him a deathless fame as the first to teach the prelates how little those who live and reign as they do are to be esteemed2 and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending any infamy or danger that could attach to it4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4--,whence it came that the ,romans were less ungrateful to their ,citizens than were the ,athenians4 ,in the histories of all republics we meet with instances of some sort of ingratitude to their great citizens1 but fewer in the history of ,rome than of ,athens1 or indeed of any other republic4 ,searching for the cause of this1 ,i am persuaded that1 so far as regards ,rome and ,athens1 it was due to the ,romans having had less occasion than the ,athenians to look upon their fellow-citizens with suspicion4 ,for1 from the expulsion of her kings down to the times of ,sylla and ,marius1 the liberty of ,rome was never subverted by any one of her citizens2 so that there never was in that city grave cause for distrusting any man1 and in consequence making him the victim of inconsiderate injustice4 ,the reverse was notoriously the case with ,athens2 for that city1 having1 at a time when she was most flourishing1 been deprived of her freedom by ,pisistratus under a false show of good-will1 remembering1 after she regained her liberty1 her former bondage and all the wrongs she had endured1 became the relentless chastiser1 not of offences only on the part of her citizens1 but even of the shadow of an offence4 ,hence the banishment and death of so many excellent men1 and hence the law of ostracism1 and all those other violent measures which from time to time during the history of that city were directed against her foremost citizens4 ,for this is most true which is asserted by the writers on civil government1 that a people which has recovered its freedom1 bites more fiercely than one which has always preserved it4 ,and any who shall weigh well what has been said1 will not condemn ,athens in this matter1 nor commend ,rome1 but refer all to the necessity arising out of the different conditions prevailing in the two ,states4 ,for careful reflection will show that had ,rome been deprived of her freedom as ,athens was1 she would not have been a whit more tender to her citizens4 ,this we may reasonably infer from remarking what1 after the expulsion of the kings1 befell ,collatinus and ,publius ,valerius2 the former of whom1 though he had taken part in the liberation of ,rome1 was sent into exile for no other reason than that he bore the name of ,tarquin2 while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter1 and what almost led to his banishment1 was his having built a house upon the ,clian hill4 ,seeing how harsh and suspicious ,rome was in these two instances1 we may surmise that she would have shown the same ingratitude as ,athens1 had she1 like ,athens1 been wronged by her citizens at an early stage of her growth1 and before she had attained to the fulness of her strength4 ,that ,i may not have to return to this question of ingratitude1 ,i shall say all that remains to be said about it in my next ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4--,whether a ,people or a ,prince is the more ungrateful4 ,in connection with what has been said above1 it seems proper to consider whether more notable instances of ingratitude are supplied by princes or peoples4 ,and1 to go to the root of the matter1 ,i affirm that this vice of ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in suspicion4 ,for a prince or people when they have sent forth a captain on some important enterprise1 by succeeding in which he earns a great name1 are bound in return to reward him2 and if moved by avarice and covetousness they fail to do so1 or if1 instead of rewarding1 they wrong and disgrace him1 they commit an error which is not only without excuse1 but brings with it undying infamy4 ,and1 in fact1 we find many princes who have sinned in this way1 for the cause given by ,cornelius ,tacitus when he says1 that 8men are readier to pay back injuries than benefits1 since to requite a benefit is felt to be a burthen1 to return an injury a gain40#c #c ,proclivius est injuri quam beneficio vicem exsolvere1 quia gratia oneri1 ultio in quastu habetur4 ,tacit4 ,hist4 iv4 #b4 ,when1 however1 reward is withheld1 or1 to speak more correctly1 where offence is given1 not from avarice but from suspicion1 the prince or people may deserve some excuse2 and we read of many instances of ingratitude proceeding from this cause4 ,for the captain who by his valour has won new dominions for his prince1 since while overcoming his enemies1 he at the same time covers himself with glory and enriches his soldiers1 must needs acquire such credit with his own followers1 and with the enemy1 and also with the subjects of his prince1 as cannot be wholly agreeable to the master who sent him forth4 ,and since men are by nature ambitious as well as jealous1 and none loves to set a limit to his fortunes1 the suspicion which at once lays hold of the prince when he sees his captain victorious1 is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant act or word of the captain himself4 ,so that the prince will be unable to think of anything but how to secure himself2 and to this end will contrive how he may put his captain to death1 or at any rate deprive him of the credit he has gained with the army and among the people2 doing all he can to show that the victory was not won by his valour1 but by good fortune1 or by the cowardice of the enemy1 or by the skill and prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other battle4 ,after ,vespasian1 who was then in ,juda1 had been proclaimed emperor by his army1 ,antonius ,primus1 who commanded another army in ,illyria1 adopted his cause1 and marching into ,italy against ,vitellius who had been proclaimed emperor in ,rome1 courageously defeated two armies under that prince1 and occupied ,rome2 so that ,mutianus1 who was sent thither by ,vespasian1 found everything done to his hand1 and all difficulties surmounted by the valour of ,antonius4 ,but all the reward which ,antonius had for his pains1 was1 that ,mutianus forthwith deprived him of his command of the army1 and by degrees diminished his authority in ,rome till none was left him4 ,thereupon ,antonius went to join ,vespasian1 who was still in ,asia2 by whom he was so coldly received and so little considered1 that in despair he put himself to death4 ,and of cases like this1 history is full4 ,every man living at the present hour knows with what zeal and courage ,gonsalvo of ,cordova1 while conducting the war in ,naples against the ,french1 conquered and subdued that kingdom for his master ,ferdinand of ,aragon2 and how his services were requited by ,ferdinand coming from ,aragon to ,naples1 and first of all depriving him of the command of the army1 afterwards of the fortresses1 and finally carrying him back with him to ,spain1 where soon after he died in disgrace4 ,this jealousy1 then1 is so natural to princes1 that they cannot guard themselves against it1 nor show gratitude to those who serving under their standard have gained great victories and made great conquests on their behalf4 ,and if it be impossible for princes to free their minds from such suspicions1 there is nothing strange or surprising that a people should be unable to do so4 ,for as a city living under free institutions has two ends always before it1 namely to acquire liberty and to preserve it1 it must of necessity be led by its excessive passion for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both these objects4 ,of the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty1 ,i shall speak1 hereafter1 in the proper place4 ,of mistakes committed in the endeavour to preserve liberty are to be noted1 the injuring those citizens who ought to be rewarded1 and the suspecting those who should be trusted4 ,now1 although in a ,state which has grown corrupt these errors occasion great evils1 and commonly lead to a tyranny1 as happened in ,rome when ,csar took by force what ingratitude had denied him1 they are nevertheless the cause of much good in the republic which has not been corrupted1 since they prolong the duration of its free institutions1 and make men1 through fear of punishment1 better and less ambitious4 ,of all peoples possessed of great power1 the ,romans1 for the reasons ,i have given1 have undoubtedly been the least ungrateful1 since we have no other instance of their ingratitude to cite1 save that of ,scipio4 ,for both ,coriolanus and ,camillus were banished on account of the wrongs which they inflicted on the commons2 and though the former was not forgiven because he constantly retained ill will against the people1 the latter was not only recalled1 but for the rest of his life honoured as a prince4 ,but the ingratitude shown towards ,scipio arose from the suspicion wherewith the citizens came to regard him1 which they had not felt in the case of the others1 and which was occasioned by the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown1 the fame he had won by prevailing in so dangerous and protracted a war1 the suddenness of his victories1 and1 finally1 the favour which his youth1 together with his prudence and his other memorable qualities had gained for him4 ,these qualities were1 in truth1 so remarkable that the very magistrates1 not to speak of others1 stood in awe of his authority1 a circumstance displeasing to prudent citizens1 as before unheard of in ,rome4 ,in short1 his whole bearing and character were so much out of the common1 that even the elder ,cato1 so celebrated for his austere virtue1 was the first to declare against him1 saying that no city could be deemed free which contained a citizen who was feared by the magistrates4 ,and since1 in this instance1 the ,romans followed the opinion of ,cato1 they merit that excuse which1 as ,i have said already1 should be extended to the prince or people who are ungrateful through suspicion4 ,in conclusion it is to be said that while this vice of ingratitude has its origin either in avarice or in suspicion1 commonwealths are rarely led into it by avarice1 and far seldomer than princes by suspicion1 having1 as shall presently be shown1 far less reason than princes for suspecting4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4--,how ,princes and ,commonwealths may avoid the vice of ,ingratitude2 and how a ,captain or ,citizen may escape being undone by it4 ,that he may not be tormented by suspicion1 nor show ungrateful1 a prince should go himself on his wars as the ,roman emperors did at first1 as the ,turk does now1 and1 in short1 as all valiant princes have done and do4 ,for when it is the prince himself who conquers1 the glory and the gain are all his own2 but when he is absent1 since the glory is another's1 it will seem to the prince that he profits nothing by the gain1 unless that glory be quenched which he knew not how to win for himself2 and when he thus becomes ungrateful and unjust1 doubtless his loss is greater than his gain4 ,to the prince1 therefore1 who1 either through indolence or from want of foresight1 sends forth a captain to conduct his wars while he himself remains inactive at home1 ,i have no advice to offer which he does not already know4 ,but ,i would counsel the captain whom he sends1 since ,i am sure that he can never escape the attacks of ingratitude1 to follow one or other of two courses1 and either quit his command at once after a victory1 and place himself in the hands of his prince1 while carefully abstaining from every vainglorious or ambitious act1 so that the prince1 being relieved from all suspicion1 may be disposed to reward1 or at any rate not to injure him2 or else1 should he think it inexpedient for him to act in this way1 to take boldly the contrary course1 and fearlessly to follow out all such measures as he thinks will secure for himself1 and not for his prince1 whatever he has gained2 conciliating the good-will of his soldiers and fellow-citizens1 forming new friendships with neighbouring potentates1 placing his own adherents in fortified towns1 corrupting the chief officers of his army and getting rid of those whom he fails to corrupt1 and by all similar means endeavouring to punish his master for the ingratitude which he looks for at his hands4 ,these are the only two courses open2 but since1 as ,i said before1 men know not how to be wholly good or wholly bad1 it will never happen that after a victory a captain will quit his army and conduct himself modestly1 nor yet that he will venture to use those hardy methods which have in them some strain of greatness2 and so1 remaining undecided1 he will be crushed while he still wavers and doubts4 ,a commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude is1 as compared with a prince1 at this disadvantage1 that while a prince can go himself on his expeditions1 the commonwealth must send some one of its citizens4 ,as a remedy1 ,i would recommend that course being adopted which was followed by the ,roman republic in order to be less ungrateful than others1 having its origin in the nature of the ,roman government4 ,for the whole city1 nobles and commons alike1 taking part in her wars1 there were always found in ,rome at every stage of her history1 so many valiant and successful soldiers1 that by reason of their number1 and from one acting as a check upon another1 the nation had never ground to be jealous of any one man among them2 while they1 on their part1 lived uprightly1 and were careful to betray no sign of ambition1 nor give the people the least cause to distrust them as ambitious2 so that he obtained most glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down4 ,which conduct1 as it excited no suspicion1 could occasion no ingratitude4 ,we see1 then1 that the commonwealth which would have no cause to be ungrateful1 must act as ,rome did2 and that the citizen who would escape ingratitude1 must observe those precautions which were observed by ,roman citizens4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4--,that the ,roman ,captains were never punished with extreme severity for ,misconduct2 and where loss resulted to the ,republic merely through their ,ignorance or ,want of ,judgment1 were not punished at all4 ,the ,romans were not only1 as has been said above1 less ungrateful than other republics1 but were also more lenient and more considerate than others in punishing the captains of their armies4 ,for if these erred of set purpose1 they chastised them with gentleness2 while if they erred through ignorance1 so far from punishing1 they even honoured and rewarded them4 ,and this conduct was well considered4 ,for as they judged it of the utmost moment1 that those in command of their armies should1 in all they had to do1 have their minds undisturbed and free from external anxieties1 they would not add further difficulty and danger to a task in itself both dangerous and difficult1 lest none should ever be found to act with valour4 ,for supposing them to be sending forth an army against ,philip of ,macedon in ,greece or against ,hannibal in ,italy1 or against any other enemy at whose hands they had already sustained reverses1 the captain in command of that expedition would be weighted with all the grave and important cares which attend such enterprises4 ,but if to all these cares1 had been added the example of ,roman generals crucified or otherwise put to death for having lost battles1 it would have been impossible for a commander surrounded by so many causes for anxiety to have acted with vigour and decision4 ,for which reason1 and because they thought that to such persons the mere ignominy of defeat was in itself punishment enough1 they would not dishearten their generals by inflicting on them any heavier penalty4 ,of errors committed not through ignorance1 the following is an instance4 ,sergius and ,virginius were engaged in the siege of ,veii1 each being in command of a division of the army1 and while ,sergius was set to guard against the approach of the ,etruscans1 it fell to ,virginius to watch the town4 ,but ,sergius being attacked by the ,faliscans and other tribes1 chose rather to be defeated and routed than ask aid from ,virginius1 who1 on his part1 awaiting the humiliation of his rival1 was willing to see his country dishonoured and an army destroyed1 sooner than go unasked to his relief4 ,this was notable misconduct1 and likely1 unless both offenders were punished1 to bring discredit on the ,roman name4 ,but whereas another republic would have punished these men with death1 the ,romans were content to inflict only a money fine3 not because the offence did not in itself deserve severe handling1 but because they were unwilling1 for the reasons already given1 to depart in this instance from their ancient practice4 ,of errors committed through ignorance we have no better example than in the case of ,varro1 through whose rashness the ,romans were defeated by ,hannibal at ,cann1 where the republic well-nigh lost its liberty4 ,but because he had acted through ignorance and with no evil design1 they not only refrained from punishing him1 but even treated him with distinction2 the whole senate going forth to meet him on his return to ,rome1 and as they could not thank him for having fought1 thanking him for having come back1 and for not having despaired of the fortunes his country4 ,again1 when ,papirius ,cursor would have had ,fabius put to death1 because1 contrary to his orders1 he had fought with the ,samnites1 among the reasons pleaded by the father of ,fabius against the persistency of the dictator1 he urged that never on the occasion of the defeat of any of their captains had the ,romans done what ,papirius desired them to do on the occasion of a victory4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4--,that a ,prince or ,commonwealth should not delay conferring ,benefits until they are themselves in difficulties4 ,the ,romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons at a season of danger1 when ,porsenna came to attack ,rome and restore the ,tarquins4 ,for the senate1 apprehending that the people might choose rather to take back their kings than to support a war1 secured their adherence by relieving them of the duty on salt and of all their other burthens2 saying that 8the poor did enough for the common welfare in rearing their offspring40 ,in return for which indulgence the commons were content to undergo war1 siege1 and famine4 ,let no one however1 relying on this example1 delay conciliating the people till danger has actually come2 or1 if he do1 let him not hope to have the same good fortune as the ,romans4 ,for the mass of the people will consider that they have to thank not him1 but his enemies1 and that there is ground to fear that when the danger has passed away1 he will take back what he gave under compulsion1 and1 therefore1 that to him they lie under no obligation4 ,and the reason why the course followed by the ,romans succeeded1 was that the ,state was still new and unsettled4 ,besides which1 the people knew that laws had already been passed in their favour1 as1 for instance1 the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes1 and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate1 and were not due merely to the approach of an enemy4 ,moreover1 the memory of their kings1 by whom they had in many ways been wronged and ill-treated1 was still fresh in their minds4 ,but since like conditions seldom recur1 it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful4 ,wherefore1 all1 whether princes or republics1 who hold the reins of government1 ought to think beforehand of the adverse times which may await them1 and of what help they may then stand in need2 and ought so to live with their people as they would think right were they suffering under any calamity4 ,and1 whosoever1 whether prince or republic1 but prince more especially1 behaves otherwise1 and believes that after the event and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by benefits1 deceives himself1 and will not merely fail to maintain his place1 but will even precipitate his downfall4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4--,when a ,mischief has grown up in1 or against a ,state1 it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with ,violence4 ,as ,rome grew in fame1 power1 and dominion1 her neighbours1 who at first had taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them1 began too late to see their mistake1 and desiring to remedy what should have been remedied before1 combined against her to the number of forty nations4 ,whereupon the ,romans1 resorting to a method usual with them in seasons of peril1 appointed a dictator2 that is1 gave power to one man to decide without advice1 and carry out his resolves without appeal4 ,which expedient1 as it then enabled them to overcome the dangers by which they were threatened1 so always afterwards proved most serviceable1 when1 at any time during the growth of their power1 difficulties arose to embarrass their republic4 ,in connection with this league against ,rome we have first to note1 that when a mischief which springs up either in or against a republic1 and whether occasioned by internal or external causes1 has grown to such proportions that it begins to fill the whole community with alarm1 it is a far safer course to temporize with it than to attempt to quell it by violence4 ,for commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel to the flame1 and hasten the impending ruin4 ,such disorders arise in a republic more often from internal causes than external1 either through some citizen being suffered to acquire undue influence1 or from the corruption of some institution of that republic1 which had once been the life and sinew of its freedom2 and from this corruption being allowed to gain such head that the attempt to check it is more dangerous than to let it be4 ,and it is all the harder to recognize these disorders in their beginning1 because it seems natural to men to look with favour on the beginnings of things4 ,favour of this sort1 more than by anything else1 is attracted by those actions which seem to have in them a quality of greatness1 or which are performed by the young4 ,for when in a republic some young man is seen to come forward endowed with rare excellence1 the eyes of all the citizens are at once turned upon him1 and all1 without distinction1 concur to do him honour2 so that if he have one spark of ambition1 the advantages which he has from nature1 together with those he takes from this favourable disposition of men's minds1 raise him to such a pitch of power1 that when the citizens at last see their mistake it is almost impossible for them to correct it2 and when they do what they can to oppose his influence the only result is to extend it4 ,of this ,i might cite numerous examples1 but shall content myself with one relating to our own city4 ,cosimo de' ,medici1 to whom the house of the ,medici in ,florence owes the origin of its fortunes1 acquired so great a name from the favour wherewith his own prudence and the blindness of others invested him1 that coming to be held in awe by the government1 his fellow-citizens deemed it dangerous to offend him1 but still more dangerous to let him alone4 ,nicol da ,uzzano1 his cotemporary1 who was accounted well versed in all civil affairs1 but who had made a first mistake in not discerning the dangers which might grow from the rising influence of ,cosimo1 would never while he lived1 permit a second mistake to be made in attempting to crush him2 judging that such an attempt would be the ruin of the ,state1 as in truth it proved after his death4 ,for some who survived him1 disregarding his counsels1 combined against ,cosimo and banished him from ,florence4 ,and so it came about that the partisans of ,cosimo1 angry at the wrong done him1 soon afterwards recalled him and made him prince of the republic1 a dignity he never would have reached but for this open opposition4 ,the very same thing happened in ,rome in the case of ,csar4 ,for his services having gained him the good-will of ,pompey and other citizens1 their favour was presently turned to fear1 as ,cicero testifies where he says that 8it was late that ,pompey began to fear ,csar40 ,this fear led men to think of remedies1 and the remedies to which they resorted accelerated the destruction of the republic4 ,i say1 then1 that since it is difficult to recognize these disorders in their beginning1 because of the false impressions which things produce at the first1 it is a wiser course when they become known1 to temporize with them than to oppose them2 for when you temporize1 either they die out of themselves1 or at any rate the injury they do is deferred4 ,and the prince who would suppress such disorders or oppose himself to their force and onset1 must always be on his guard1 lest he help where he would hinder1 retard when he would advance1 and drown the plant he thinks to water4 ,he must therefore study well the symptoms of the disease2 and1 if he believe himself equal to the cure1 grapple with it fearlessly2 if not1 he must let it be1 and not attempt to treat it in any way4 ,for1 otherwise1 it will fare with him as it fared with those neighbours of ,rome1 for whom it would have been safer1 after that city had grown to be so great1 to have sought to soothe and restrain her by peaceful arts1 than to provoke her by open war to contrive new means of attack and new methods of defence4 ,for this league had no other effect than to make the ,romans more united and resolute than before1 and to bethink themselves of new expedients whereby their power was still more rapidly advanced2 among which was the creation of a dictator2 for this innovation not only enabled them to surmount the dangers which then threatened them1 but was afterwards the means of escaping infinite calamities into which1 without it1 the republic must have fallen4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv4--,that the authority of the ,dictator did good and not harm to the ,roman ,republic3 and that it is not those ,powers which are given by the free suffrages of the ,people1 but those which ambitious ,citizens usurp for themselves1 that are pernicious to a ,state4 ,those citizens who first devised a dictatorship for ,rome have been blamed by certain writers1 as though this had been the cause of the tyranny afterwards established there4 ,for these authors allege that the first tyrant of ,rome governed it with the title of ,dictator1 and that1 but for the existence of the office1 ,csar could never have cloaked his usurpation under a constitutional name4 ,he who first took up this opinion had not well considered the matter1 and his conclusion has been accepted without good ground4 ,for it was not the name nor office of ,dictator which brought ,rome to servitude1 but the influence which certain of her citizens were able to assume from the prolongation of their term of power2 so that even had the name of ,dictator been wanting in ,rome1 some other had been found to serve their ends1 since power may readily give titles1 but not titles power4 ,we find1 accordingly1 that while the dictatorship was conferred in conformity with public ordinances1 and not through personal influence1 it was constantly beneficial to the city4 ,for it is the magistracies created and the powers usurped in unconstitutional ways that hurt a republic1 not those which conform to ordinary rule2 so that in ,rome1 through the whole period of her history1 we never find a dictator who acted otherwise than well for the republic4 ,for which there were the plainest reasons4 ,in the first place1 to enable a citizen to work harm and to acquire undue authority1 many circumstances must be present which never can be present in a ,state which is not corrupted4 ,for such a citizen must be exceedingly rich1 and must have many retainers and partisans1 whom he cannot have where the laws are strictly observed1 and who1 if he had them1 would occasion so much alarm1 that the free suffrage of the people would seldom be in his favour4 ,in the second place1 the dictator was not created for life1 but for a fixed term1 and only to meet the emergency for which he was appointed4 ,power was indeed given him to determine by himself what measures the exigency demanded2 to do what he had to do without consultation2 and to punish without appeal4 ,but he had no authority to do anything to the prejudice of the ,state1 as it would have been to deprive the senate or the people of their privileges1 to subvert the ancient institutions of the city1 or introduce new4 ,so that taking into account the brief time for which his office lasted1 its limited authority1 and the circumstance that the ,roman people were still uncorrupted1 it was impossible for him to overstep the just limits of his power so as to injure the city2 and in fact we find that he was always useful to it4 ,and1 in truth1 among the institutions of ,rome1 this of the dictatorship deserves our special admiration1 and to be linked with the chief causes of her greatness2 for without some such safeguard a city can hardly pass unharmed through extraordinary dangers4 ,because as the ordinary institutions of a commonwealth work but slowly1 no council and no magistrate having authority to act in everything alone1 but in most matters one standing in need of the other1 and time being required to reconcile their differences1 the remedies which they provide are most dangerous when they have to be applied in cases which do not brook delay4 ,for which reason1 every republic ought to have some resource of this nature provided by its constitution2 as we find that the ,republic of ,venice1 one of the best of those now existing1 has in cases of urgent danger reserved authority to a few of her citizens1 if agreed among themselves1 to determine without further consultation what course is to be followed4 ,when a republic is not provided with some safeguard such as this1 either it must be ruined by observing constitutional forms1 or else1 to save it1 these must be broken through4 ,but in a republic nothing should be left to be effected by irregular methods1 because1 although for the time the irregularity may be useful1 the example will nevertheless be pernicious1 as giving rise to a practice of violating the laws for good ends1 under colour of which they may afterwards be violated for ends which are not good4 ,for which reason1 that can never become a perfect republic wherein every contingency has not been foreseen and provided for by the laws1 and the method of dealing with it defined4 ,to sum up1 therefore1 ,i say that those republics which cannot in sudden emergencies resort either to a dictator or to some similar authority1 will1 when the danger is serious1 always be undone4 ,we may note1 moreover1 how prudently the ,romans1 in introducing this new office1 contrived the conditions under which it was to be exercised4 ,for perceiving that the appointment of a dictator involved something of humiliation for the consuls1 who1 from being the heads of the ,state1 were reduced to render obedience like every one else1 and anticipating that this might give offence1 they determined that the power to appoint should rest with the consuls1 thinking that when the occasion came when ,rome should have need of this regal authority1 they would have the consuls acting willingly and feeling the less aggrieved from the appointment being in their own hands4 ,for those wounds or other injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by choice1 and of his own free will1 pain him far less than those inflicted by another4 ,nevertheless1 in the later days of the republic the ,romans were wont to entrust this power to a consul instead of to a dictator1 using the formula1 ,videat ,,consul ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat4 ,but to return to the matter in hand1 ,i say briefly1 that when the neighbours of ,rome sought to crush her1 they led her to take measures not merely for her readier defence1 but such as enabled her to attack them with a stronger force1 with better skill1 and with an undivided command4 ,,chapter ,,xxxv--,why the ,creation of the ,decemvirate in ,rome1 although brought about by the free and open ,suffrage of the ,citizens1 was hurtful to the ,liberties of that ,republic ,the fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the ,roman people to make laws for ,rome1 in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of her freedom1 may seem contrary to what ,i have said above1 namely that it is the authority which is violently usurped1 and not that conferred by the free suffrages of the people which is injurious to a republic4 ,here1 however1 we have to take into account both the mode in which1 and the term for which authority is given4 ,where authority is unrestricted and is conferred for a long term1 meaning by that for a year or more1 it is always attended with danger1 and its results will be good or bad according as the men are good or bad to whom it is committed4 ,now when we compare the authority of the ,ten with that possessed by the dictator1 we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was out of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter4 ,for when a dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes1 the consuls1 and the senate1 all of them invested with authority of which the dictator could not deprive them4 ,for even if he could have taken his consulship from one man1 or his status as a senator from another1 he could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws4 ,so that the senate1 the consuls1 and the tribunes continuing to exist with undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right road4 ,but on the creation of the ,ten1 the opposite of all this took place4 ,for on their appointment1 consuls and tribunes were swept away1 and express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and do whatever else they thought fit1 with the entire authority of the whole ,roman people4 ,so that finding themselves alone without consuls or tribunes to control them1 and with no appeal against them to the people1 and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them1 and further being stimulated by the ambition of ,appius1 in the second year of their office they began to wax insolent4 ,let it be noted1 therefore1 that when it is said that authority given by the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth1 it is assumed that the people will never be led to confer that authority without due limitations1 or for other than a reasonable term4 ,should they1 however either from being deceived or otherwise blinded1 be induced to bestow authority imprudently1 as the ,romans bestowed it on the ,ten1 it will always fare with them as with the ,romans4 ,and this may readily be understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator good1 what to make the ,ten bad1 and by observing how those republics which have been accounted well governed1 have acted when conferring authority for an extended period1 as the ,spartans on their kings and the ,venetians on their doges2 for it will be seen that in both these instances the authority was controlled by checks which made it impossible for it to be abused4 ,but where an uncontrolled authority is given1 no security is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the people is not corrupted2 for in the briefest possible time absolute authority will make a people corrupt1 and obtain for itself friends and partisans4 ,nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority is vested1 that he is poor and without connections1 for wealth and every other advantage will quickly follow1 as shall be shown more fully when we discuss the appointment of the ,ten4 ,,chapter ,,xxxvi4--,that ,citizens who have held the higher ,offices of a ,commonwealth should not disdain the lower4 ,under the consuls ,m4 ,fabius and ,cn4 ,manlius1 the ,romans had a memorable victory in a battle fought with the ,veientines and the ,etruscans1 in which ,q4 ,fabius1 brother of the consul1 who had himself been consul the year before1 was slain4 ,this event may lead us to remark how well the methods followed by the city of ,rome were suited to increase her power1 and how great a mistake is made by other republics in departing from them4 ,for1 eager as the ,romans were in the pursuit of glory1 they never esteemed it a dishonour to obey one whom before they had commanded1 or to find themselves serving in the ranks of an army which once they had led4 ,this usage1 however1 is opposed to the ideas1 the rules1 and the practice which prevail at the present day1 as1 for instance1 in ,venice1 where the notion still obtains that a citizen who has filled a great office should be ashamed to accept a less2 and where the ,state itself permits him to decline it4 ,this course1 assuming it to lend lustre to individual citizens1 is plainly to the disadvantage of the community1 which has reason to hope more from1 and to trust more to1 the citizen who descends from a high office to fill a lower1 than him who rises from a low office to fill a high one2 for in the latter no confidence can reasonably be placed1 unless he be seen to have others about him of such credit and worth that it may be hoped their wise counsels and influence will correct his inexperience4 ,but had the usage which prevails in ,venice and in other modern commonwealths and kingdoms1 prevailed in ,rome whereby he who had once been consul was never afterwards to go with the army except as consul1 numberless results must have followed detrimental to the free institutions of that city2 as well from the mistakes which the inexperience of new men would have occasioned1 as because from their ambition having a freer course1 and from their having none near them in whose presence they might fear to do amiss1 they would have grown less scrupulous2 and in this way the public service must have suffered grave harm4 ,,chapter ,,xxxvii4--,of the ,mischief bred in ,rome by the ,agrarian ,law3 and how it is a great source of disorder in a ,commonwealth to pass a ,law opposed to ancient ,usage and with stringent retrospective ,effect4 ,it has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched by adversity or pampered by prosperity is the common lot of men1 and that in whichever way they are acted upon the result is the same4 ,for when no longer urged to war on one another by necessity1 they are urged by ambition1 which has such dominion in their hearts that it never leaves them to whatsoever heights they climb4 ,for nature has so ordered it that while they desire everything1 it is impossible for them to have everything1 and thus their desires being always in excess of their capacity to gratify them1 they remain constantly dissatisfied and discontented4 ,and hence the vicissitudes in human affairs4 ,for some seeking to enlarge their possessions1 and some to keep what they have got1 wars and enmities ensue1 from which result the ruin of one country and the growth of another4 ,i am led to these reflections from observing that the commons of ,rome were not content to secure themselves against the nobles by the creation of tribunes1 a measure to which they were driven by necessity1 but after effecting this1 forthwith entered upon an ambitious contest with the nobles1 seeking to share with them what all men most esteem1 namely1 their honours and their wealth4 ,hence was bred that disorder from which sprang the feuds relating to the ,agrarian ,laws1 and which led in the end to the downfall of the ,roman republic4 ,and although it should be the object of every well-governed commonwealth to make the ,state rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be allowed that in the matter of this law the city of ,rome was to blame2 whether for having passed it at first in such a shape as to require it to be continually recast2 or for having postponed it so long that its retrospective effect was the occasion of tumult2 or else1 because1 although rightly framed at first1 it had come in its operation to be perverted4 ,but in whatever way it happened1 so it was1 that this law was never spoken of in ,rome without the whole city being convulsed4 ,the law itself embraced two principal provisions4 ,by one it was enacted that no citizen should possess more than a fixed number of acres of land2 by the other that all lands taken from the enemy should be distributed among the whole people4 ,a twofold blow was thus aimed at the nobles2 since all who possessed more land than the law allowed1 as most of the nobles did1 fell to be deprived of it2 while by dividing the lands of the enemy among the whole people1 the road to wealth was closed4 ,these two grounds of offence being given to a powerful class1 to whom it appeared that by resisting the law they did a service to the ,state1 the whole city1 as ,i have said1 was thrown into an uproar on the mere mention of its name4 ,the nobles indeed sought to temporize1 and to prevail by patience and address2 sometimes calling out the army1 sometimes opposing another tribune to the one who was promoting the law1 and sometimes coming to a compromise by sending a colony into the lands which were to be divided2 as was done in the case of the territory of ,antium1 whither1 on a dispute concerning the law having arisen1 settlers were sent from ,rome1 and the land made over to them4 ,in speaking of which colony ,titus ,livius makes the notable remark1 that hardly any one in ,rome could be got to take part in it1 so much readier were the commons to indulge in covetous schemes at home1 than to realize them by leaving it4 ,the ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until the ,romans began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of ,italy and to countries beyond its shores2 after which it seemed for a time to slumber--and this1 because the lands held by the enemies of ,rome1 out of sight of her citizens and too remote to be conveniently cultivated1 came to be less desired4 ,whereupon the ,romans grew less eager to punish their enemies by dividing their lands1 and were content1 when they deprived any city of its territory1 to send colonists to occupy it4 ,for causes such as these1 the measure remained in abeyance down to the time of the ,gracchi2 but being by them revived1 finally overthrew the liberty of ,rome4 ,for as it found the power of its adversaries doubled1 such a flame of hatred was kindled between commons and senate1 that1 regardless of all civil restraints1 they resorted to arms and bloodshed4 ,and as the public magistrates were powerless to provide a remedy1 each of the two factions having no longer any hopes from them1 resolved to do what it could for itself1 and to set up a chief for its own protection4 ,on reaching this stage of tumult and disorder1 the commons lent their influence to ,marius1 making him four times consul2 whose authority1 lasting thus long1 and with very brief intervals1 became so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself consul other three times4 ,against this scourge1 the nobles1 lacking other defence1 set themselves to favour ,sylla1 and placing him at the head of their faction1 entered on the civil wars2 wherein1 after much blood had been spilt1 and after many changes of fortune1 they got the better of their adversaries4 ,but afterwards1 in the time of ,csar and ,pompey1 the distemper broke out afresh2 for ,csar heading the ,marian party1 and ,pompey1 that of ,sylla1 and war ensuing1 the victory remained with ,csar1 who was the first tyrant in ,rome2 after whose time that city was never again free4 ,such1 therefore1 was the beginning and such the end of the ,agrarian ,law4 ,but since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the commons and senate of ,rome preserved her liberties1 as giving rise to laws favourable to freedom1 it might seem that the consequences of the ,agrarian ,law are opposed to that view4 ,i am not1 however1 led to alter my opinion on this account2 for ,i maintain that the ambition of the great is so pernicious that unless controlled and counteracted in a variety of ways1 it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin4 ,so that if the controversy over the ,agrarian ,laws took three hundred years to bring ,rome to slavery1 she would in all likelihood have been brought to slavery in a far shorter time1 had not the commons1 by means of this law1 and by other demands1 constantly restrained the ambition of the nobles4 ,we may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than honours2 for in the matter of honours1 the ,roman nobles always gave way to the commons without any extraordinary resistance2 but when it came to be a question of property1 so stubborn were they in its defence1 that the commons to effect their ends had to resort to those irregular methods which have been described above4 ,of which irregularities the prime movers were the ,gracchi1 whose motives are more to be commended than their measures2 since to pass a law with stringent retrospective effect1 in order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic1 is an unwise step1 and one which1 as ,i have already shown at length1 can have no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the abuse leads2 whereas1 if you temporize1 either the abuse develops more slowly1 or else1 in course of time1 and before it comes to a head1 dies out of itself4 ,,chapter ,,xxxviii4--,that weak ,republics are irresolute and undecided2 and that the course they may take depends more on ,necessity than ,choice4 ,a terrible pestilence breaking out in ,rome seemed to the ,equians and ,volscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her4 ,the two nations1 therefore1 assembling a great army1 attacked the ,latins and ,hernicians and laid waste their country4 ,whereupon the ,latins and ,hernicians were forced to make their case known to the ,romans1 and to ask to be defended by them4 ,the ,romans1 who were sorely afflicted by the pestilence1 answered that they must look to their own defence1 and with their own forces1 since ,rome was in no position to succour them4 ,here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the ,roman senate1 and how at all times1 and in all changes of fortune1 they assumed the responsibility of determining the course their country should take2 and were not ashamed1 when necessary1 to decide on a course contrary to that which was usual with them1 or which they had decided to follow on some other occasion4 ,i say this because on other occasions this same senate had forbidden these nations to defend themselves2 and a less prudent assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw that prohibition4 ,but the ,roman senate always took a sound view of things1 and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best4 ,so that1 although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend their subjects1 and equally distasteful--both for the reasons given1 and for others which may be understood--that their subjects should take up arms in their absence1 nevertheless knowing that these must have recourse to arms in any case1 since the enemy was upon them1 they took an honourable course in deciding that what had to be done should be done with their leave1 lest men driven to disobey by necessity should come afterwards to disobey from choice4 ,and although this may seem the course which every republic ought reasonably to follow1 nevertheless weak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their minds to follow it1 not knowing how to do themselves honour in like extremities4 ,after ,duke ,valentino had taken ,faenza and forced ,bologna to yield to his terms1 desiring to return to ,rome through ,tuscany1 he sent one of his people to ,florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass4 ,a council was held in ,florence to consider how this request should be dealt with1 but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being granted4 ,wherein the ,roman method was not followed4 ,for as the ,duke had a very strong force with him1 while the ,florentines were so bare of troops that they could not have prevented his passage1 it would have been far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their consent1 than that he should pass in spite of them2 because1 while discredit had to be incurred either way1 they would have incurred less by acceding to his demand4 ,but of all courses the worst for a weak ,state is to be irresolute2 for then whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion1 so that if by chance it should do anything well1 this will be set down to necessity and not to prudence4 ,of this ,i shall cite two other instances happening in our own times1 and in our own country4 ,in the year #aejj1 ,king ,louis of ,france1 after recovering ,milan1 being desirous to restore ,pisa to the ,florentines1 so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty thousand ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being completed1 sent troops to ,pisa under ,m4 ,beaumont1 in whom1 though a ,frenchman1 the ,florentines put much trust4 ,beaumont accordingly took up his position with his forces between ,cascina and ,pisa1 to be in readiness to attack the town4 ,after he had been there for some days making arrangements for the assault1 envoys came to him from ,pisa offering to surrender their city to the ,french if a promise were given in the king's name1 not to hand it over to the ,florentines until four months had run4 ,this condition was absolutely rejected by the ,florentines1 and the siege being proceeded with1 they were forced to retire with disgrace4 ,now the proposal of the ,pisans was rejected by the ,florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted the good faith of the ,king1 into whose hands their weakness obliged them to commit themselves1 and did not reflect how much more it was for their interest that1 by obtaining entrance into ,pisa1 he should have it in his power to restore the town to them1 or1 failing to restore it1 should at once disclose his designs1 than that remaining outside he should put them off with promises for which they had to pay4 ,it would therefore have been a far better course for the ,florentines to have agreed to ,beaumont taking possession on whatever terms4 ,this was seen afterwards by experience in the year #aejb1 when1 on the revolt of ,arezzo1 ,m4 ,imbalt was sent by the ,king of ,france with ,french troops to assist the ,florentines4 ,for when he got near ,arezzo1 and began to negotiate with the ,aretines1 who1 like the ,pisans1 were willing to surrender their town on terms1 the acceptance of these terms was strongly disapproved in ,florence2 which ,imbalt learning1 and thinking that the ,florentines were acting with little sense1 he took the entire settlement of conditions into his own hands1 and1 without consulting the ,florentine commissioners1 concluded an arrangement to his own satisfaction1 in execution of which he entered ,arezzo with his army4 ,and he let the ,florentines know that he thought them fools and ignorant of the ways of the world2 since if they desired to have ,arezzo1 they could signify their wishes to the ,king1 who would be much better able to give it them when he had his soldiers inside1 than when he had them outside the town4 ,nevertheless1 in ,florence they never ceased to blame and abuse ,m4 ,imbalt1 until at last they came to see that if ,beaumont had acted in the same way1 they would have got possession ,of ,pisa as well as of ,arezzo4 ,applying what has been said to the matter in hand1 we find that irresolute republics1 unless upon compulsion1 never follow wise courses2 for wherever there is room for doubt1 their weakness will not suffer them to come to any resolve2 so that unless their doubts be overcome by some superior force which impels them forward1 they remain always in suspense4 ,,chapter ,,xxxix4--,that often the same ,accidents are seen to befall different ,nations4 ,any one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in all cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and passions as always have prevailed2 for which reason it should be an easy matter for him who carefully examines past events1 to foresee those which are about to happen in any republic1 and to apply such remedies as the ancients have used in like cases2 or finding none which have been used by them1 to strike out new ones1 such as they might have used in similar circumstances4 ,but these lessons being neglected or not understood by readers1 or1 if understood by them1 being unknown to rulers1 it follows that the same disorders are common to all times4 ,in the year #adid the ,republic of ,florence1 having lost a portion of its territories1 including ,pisa and other towns1 was forced to make war against those who had taken possession of them1 who being powerful1 it followed that great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose4 ,this large expenditure had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion to numberless complaints on the part of the people2 and inasmuch as the war was conducted by a council of ten citizens1 who were styled 8the ,ten of the ,war10 the multitude began to regard these with displeasure1 as though they were the cause of the war and of the consequent expenditure2 and at last persuaded themselves that if they got rid of this magistracy there would be an end to the war4 ,wherefore when the magistracy of 8the ,ten0 should have been renewed1 the people did not renew it1 but1 suffering it to lapse1 entrusted their affairs to the 8,signory40 ,this course was most pernicious1 since not only did it fail to put an end to the war1 as the people expected it would1 but by setting aside men who had conducted it with prudence1 led to such mishaps that not ,pisa only1 but ,arezzo also1 and many other towns besides were lost to ,florence4 ,whereupon1 the people recognizing their mistake1 and that the evil was in the disease and not in the physician1 reinstated the magistracy of the ,ten4 ,similar dissatisfaction grew up in ,rome against the consular authority4 ,for the people seeing one war follow another1 and that they were never allowed to rest1 when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of neighbouring nations who desired their overthrow1 ascribed it to the ambition of the nobles1 who1 as they believed1 being unable to wreak their hatred against them within the city1 where they were protected by the power of the tribunes1 sought to lead them outside the city1 where they were under the authority of the consuls1 that they might crush them where they were without help4 ,in which belief they thought it necessary either to get rid of the consuls altogether1 or so to restrict their powers as to leave them no authority over the people1 either in the city or out of it4 ,the first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune ,terentillus1 who proposed that a committee of five should be named to consider and regulate the power of the consuls4 ,this roused the anger of the nobles1 to whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority was about to set for ever1 and that no part would be left them in the administration of the republic4 ,such1 however1 was the obstinacy of the tribunes1 that they succeeded in abolishing the consular title1 nor were satisfied until1 after other changes1 it was resolved that1 in room of consuls1 tribunes should be appointed with consular powers2 so much greater was their hatred of the name than of the thing4 ,for a long time matters remained on this footing2 till eventually1 the commons1 discovering their mistake1 resumed the appointment of consuls in the same way as the ,florentines reverted to 8the ,ten of the ,war40 ,,chapter ,,xl4--,of the creation of the ,decemvirate in ,rome1 and what therein is to be noted4 ,wherein among other ,matters is shown how the same ,causes may lead to the ,safety or to the ,ruin of a ,commonwealth4 ,it being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in ,rome on the creation of the decemvirate1 ,i think it not amiss first of all to relate what took place at the time of that creation1 and then to discuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve notice4 ,these are numerous1 and should be well considered1 both by those who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those who would subvert them4 ,for in the course of our inquiry it will be seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate and people1 and that many were likewise made by ,appius1 the chief decemvir1 prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish in ,rome4 ,after much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of ,rome might be better secured1 ,spurius ,posthumius and two other citizens were1 by general consent1 despatched to ,athens to procure copies of the laws which ,solon had drawn up for the ,athenians1 to the end that these might serve as a groundwork for the laws of ,rome4 ,on their return1 the next step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft the new code4 ,for which purpose a commission consisting of ten members1 among whom was ,appius ,claudius1 a crafty and ambitious citizen1 was appointed for a year2 and that the commissioners in framing their laws might act without fear or favour1 all the other magistracies1 and in particular the consulate and tribuneship1 were suspended1 and the appeal to the people discontinued2 so that the decemvirs came to be absolute in ,rome4 ,very soon the whole authority of the commissioners came to be centred in ,appius1 owing to the favour in which he was held by the commons4 ,for although before he had been regarded as the cruel persecutor of the people1 he now showed himself so conciliatory in his bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and disposition4 ,this set of commissioners1 then1 behaved discreetly1 being attended by no more than twelve lictors1 walking in front of that decemvir whom the rest put forward as their chief2 and though vested with absolute authority1 yet when a ,roman citizen had to be tried for murder1 they cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them4 ,their laws they wrote upon ten tables1 but before signing them they exposed them publicly1 that every one might read and consider them1 and if any defect were discovered in them1 it might be corrected before they were finally passed4 ,at this juncture ,appius caused it to be notified throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten1 the laws would be complete2 hoping that under this belief the people would consent to continue the decemvirate for another year4 ,this consent the people willingly gave1 partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated1 and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without the aid of the tribunes1 who1 as has already been said1 were the judges in criminal cases4 ,on it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate1 all the nobles set to canvass for the office1 ,appius among the foremost2 and such cordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their votes1 that the other candidates1 8unable to persuade themselves that so much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly disinterested10 began to suspect him2 but fearing to oppose him openly1 sought to circumvent him1 by putting him forward1 though the youngest of them all1 to declare to the people the names of the proposed decemvirs2 thinking that he would not venture to name himself1 that being an unusual course in ,rome1 and held discreditable4 8,but what they meant as a hindrance1 he turned to account10 by proposing1 to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility1 his own name first1 and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he could depend4 ,the new appointments1 which were to last for a year1 having been made1 ,appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had committed1 for throwing off the mask1 he allowed his innate arrogance to appear1 and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit2 who1 to overawe the people and the senate1 instead of twelve lictors1 appointed one hundred and twenty4 ,for a time their measures were directed against high and low alike2 but presently they began to intrigue with the senate1 and to attack the commons2 and if any of the latter1 on being harshly used by one decemvir1 ventured to appeal to another1 he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance4 ,the commons1 on discovering their error1 began in their despair to turn their eyes towards the nobles1 8and to look for a breeze of freedom from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the republic to its present straits40 ,to the nobles the sufferings of the commons were not displeasing1 from the hope 8that disgusted with the existing state of affairs1 they too might come to desire the restoration of the consuls40 ,when the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an end1 the two additional tables of the law were ready1 but had not yet been published4 ,this was made a pretext by them for prolonging their magistracy1 which they took measures to retain by force1 gathering round them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen1 whom they enriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned4 8,corrupted by which gifts1 these youths came to prefer selfish licence to public freedom40 ,it happened that at this time the ,sabines and ,volscians began to stir up a war against ,rome1 and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned that the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position4 ,for without the senate they could take no warlike measures1 while by assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority4 ,nevertheless1 being driven to it by necessity1 they took this latter course4 ,when the senate met1 many of the senators1 but particularly ,valerius and ,horatius1 inveighed against the insolence of the decemvirs1 whose power would forthwith have been cut short1 had not the senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their authority4 ,for they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office of their own free will1 tribunes might not be reappointed4 ,wherefore they decided for war1 and sent forth the armies under command of certain of the decemvirs4 ,but ,appius remaining behind to govern the city1 it so fell out that he became enamoured of ,virginia1 and that when he sought to lay violent hands upon her1 ,virginius1 her father1 to save her from dishonour1 slew her4 ,thereupon followed tumults in ,rome1 and mutiny among the soldiers1 who1 making common cause with the rest of the plebeians1 betook themselves to the ,sacred ,hill1 and there remained until the decemvirs laid down their office2 when tribunes and consuls being once more appointed1 ,rome was restored to her ancient freedom4 ,in these events we note1 first of all1 that the pernicious step of creating this tyranny in ,rome was due to the same causes which commonly give rise to tyrannies in cities2 namely1 the excessive love of the people for liberty1 and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to govern4 ,for when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to freedom1 one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man1 and a tyranny at once springs up4 ,both parties in ,rome consented to the creation of the decemvirs1 and to their exercising unrestricted powers1 from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name1 and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes4 ,when1 on the appointment of the decemvirate1 it seemed to the commons that ,appius had become favourable to their cause1 and was ready to attack the nobles1 they inclined to support him4 ,but when a people is led to commit this error of lending its support to some one man1 in order that he may attack those whom it holds in hatred1 if he only be prudent he will inevitably become the tyrant of that city4 ,for he will wait until1 with the support of the people1 he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles1 and will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have been rooted out4 ,but when that time comes1 the people1 although they recognize their servitude1 will have none to whom they can turn for help4 ,had this method1 which has been followed by all who have successfully established tyrannies in republics1 been followed by ,appius1 his power would have been more stable and lasting2 whereas1 taking the directly opposite course1 he could not have acted more unwisely than he did4 ,for in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny1 he made himself obnoxious to those who were in fact conferring it1 and who could have maintained him in it2 and he destroyed those who were his friends1 while he sought friendship from those from whom he could not have it4 ,for although it be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize1 that section of them which finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant1 who can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by reason of their greed and ambition2 for no tyrant can ever have honours or wealth enough to satisfy them all4 ,in abandoning the people1 therefore1 and siding with the nobles1 ,appius committed a manifest mistake1 as well for the reasons above given1 as because to hold a thing by force1 he who uses force must needs be stronger than he against whom it is used4 ,whence it happens that those tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the nobles for their enemies1 are more secure than those who have the people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends2 because in the former case their authority has the stronger support4 ,for with such support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his ,state1 as did ,nabis1 tyrant of ,sparta1 when attacked by the ,romans and by the whole of ,greece2 for making sure work with the nobles1 who were few in number1 and having the people on his side1 he was able with their assistance to defend himself2 which he could not have done had they been against him4 ,but in the case of a city1 wherein the tyrant has few friends1 its internal strength will not avail him for its defence1 and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three shapes4 ,for either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person2 or he must arm the peasantry1 so that they may play the part which ought to be played by the citizens2 or he must league with powerful neighbours for his defence4 ,he who follows these methods and observes them well1 may contrive to save himself1 though he has the people for his enemy4 ,but ,appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the peasantry1 since in ,rome they and the people were one4 ,and what he might have done he knew not how to do1 and so was ruined at the very outset4 ,in creating the decemvirate1 therefore1 both the senate and the people made grave mistakes4 ,for although1 as already explained1 when speaking of the dictatorship1 it is those magistrates who make themselves1 and not those made by the votes of the people1 that are hurtful to freedom2 nevertheless the people1 in creating magistrates ought to take such precautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad4 ,but the ,romans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to keep them good1 dispensed with it1 making them the sole magistrates of ,rome1 and setting aside all others2 and this from the excessive desire of the senate to get rid of the tribunes1 and of the commons to get rid of the consuls2 by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into all the disorders which ensued4 ,for1 as ,king ,ferrando was wont to say1 men often behave like certain of the smaller birds1 which are so intent on the prey to which nature incites them1 that they discern not the eagle hovering overhead for their destruction4 ,in this ,discourse then the mistakes made by the ,roman people in their efforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by ,appius in his endeavour to obtain the tyranny1 have1 as ,i proposed at the outset1 been plainly shown4 ,,chapter ,,xli4--,that it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity1 or to a haughty bearing from a humble4 ,among the crafty devices used by ,appius to aid him in maintaining his authority1 this1 of suddenly passing from one character to the other extreme1 was of no small prejudice to him4 ,for his fraud in pretending to the commons to be well disposed towards them1 was happily contrived2 as were also the means he took to bring about the reappointment of the decemvirate4 ,most skilful1 too1 was his audacity in nominating himself contrary to the expectation of the nobles1 and in proposing colleagues on whom he could depend to carry out his ends4 ,but1 as ,i have said already1 it was not happily contrived that1 after doing all this1 he should suddenly turn round1 and from being the friend1 reveal himself the enemy of the people2 haughty instead of humane2 cruel instead of kindly2 and make this change so rapidly as to leave himself no shadow of excuse1 but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature4 ,for he who has once seemed good1 should he afterwards choose1 for his own ends1 to become bad1 ought to change by slow degrees1 and as opportunity serves2 so that before his altered nature strip him of old favour1 he may have gained for himself an equal share of new1 and thus his influence suffer no diminution4 ,for otherwise1 being at once unmasked and friendless1 he is undone3 ,,chapter ,,xlii4--,how easily ,men become corrupted4 ,in this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease wherewith men become corrupted1 and how completely1 although born good and well brought up1 they change their nature4 ,for we see how favourably disposed the youths whom ,appius gathered round him became towards his tyranny1 in return for the trifling benefits which they drew from it2 and how ,quintus ,fabius1 one of the second decemvirate and a most worthy man1 blinded by a little ambition1 and misled by the evil counsels of ,appius1 abandoning his fair fame1 betook himself to most unworthy courses1 and grew like his master4 ,careful consideration of this should make those who frame laws for commonwealths and kingdoms more alive to the necessity of placing restraints on men's evil appetites1 and depriving them of all hope of doing wrong with impunity4 ,,chapter ,,xliii4--,that ,men fighting in their own ,cause make good and resolute ,soldiers4 ,from what has been touched upon above1 we are also led to remark how wide is the difference between an army which1 having no ground for discontent1 fights in its own cause1 and one which1 being discontented1 fights to satisfy the ambition of others4 ,for whereas the ,romans were always victorious under the consuls1 under the decemvirs they were always defeated4 ,this helps us to understand why it is that mercenary troops are worthless2 namely1 that they have no incitement to keep them true to you beyond the pittance which you pay them1 which neither is nor can be a sufficient motive for such fidelity and devotion as would make them willing to die in your behalf4 ,but in those armies in which there exists not such an attachment towards him for whom they fight as makes them devoted to his cause1 there never will be valour enough to withstand an enemy if only he be a little brave4 ,and since such attachment and devotion cannot be looked for from any save your own subjects1 you must1 if you would preserve your dominions1 or maintain your commonwealth or kingdom1 arm the natives of your country2 as we see to have been done by all those who have achieved great things in war4 ,under the decemvirs the ancient valour of the ,roman soldiers had in no degree abated2 yet1 because they were no longer animated by the same good will1 they did not exert themselves as they were wont4 ,but so soon as the decemvirate came to an end1 and the soldiers began once more to fight as free men1 the old spirit was reawakened1 and1 as a consequence1 their enterprises1 according to former usage1 were brought to a successful close4 ,,chapter ,,xliv4--,that the ,multitude is helpless without a ,head3 and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave4 ,when ,virginia died by her father's hand1 the commons of ,rome withdrew under arms to the ,sacred ,hill4 ,whereupon the senate sent messengers to demand by what sanction they had deserted their commanders and assembled there in arms4 ,and in such reverence was the authority of the senate held1 that the commons1 lacking leaders1 durst make no reply4 8,not10 says ,titus ,livius1 8that they were at a loss what to answer1 but because they had none to answer for them20 words which clearly show how helpless a thing is the multitude when without a head4 ,this defect was perceived by ,virginius1 at whose instance twenty military tribunes were appointed by the commons to be their spokesmen with the senate1 and to negotiate terms2 who1 having asked that ,valerius and ,horatius might be sent to them1 to whom their wishes would be made known1 these declined to go until the decemvirs had laid down their office4 ,when this was done1 and ,valerius and ,horatius came to the hill where the commons were assembled1 the latter demanded that tribunes of the people should be appointed2 that in future there should be an appeal to the people from the magistrates of whatever degree2 and that all the decemvirs should be given up to them to be burned alive4 ,valerius and ,horatius approved the first two demands1 but rejected the last as inhuman2 telling the commons that 8they were rushing into that very cruelty which they themselves had condemned in others20 and counselling them to say nothing about the decemvirs1 but to be satisfied to regain their own power and authority2 since thus the way would be open to them for obtaining every redress4 ,here we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to ask a thing and with the same breath to say1 8,i desire this that ,i may inflict an injury40 ,for we should never declare our intention beforehand1 but watch for every opportunity to carry it out4 ,so that it is enough to ask another for his weapons1 without adding1 8,with these ,i purpose to destroy you20 for when once you have secured his weapons1 you can use them afterwards as you please4 ,,chapter ,,xlv4--,that it is of evil example1 especially in the ,maker of a ,law1 not to observe the ,law when made3 and that daily to renew acts of injustice in a ,city is most hurtful to the ,governor4 ,terms having been adjusted1 and the old order of things restored in ,rome1 ,virginius cited ,appius to defend himself before the people2 and on his appearing attended by many of the nobles1 ordered him to be led to prison4 ,whereupon ,appius began to cry out and appeal to the people4 ,but ,virginius told him that he was unworthy to be allowed that appeal which he had himself done away with1 or to have that people whom he had wronged for his protectors4 ,appius rejoined1 that the people should not set at nought that right of appeal which they themselves had insisted on with so much zeal4 ,nevertheless1 he was dragged to prison1 and before the day of trial slew himself4 ,now1 though the wicked life of ,appius merited every punishment1 still it was impolitic to violate the laws1 more particularly a law which had only just been passed2 for nothing1 ,i think1 is of worse example in a republic1 than to make a law and not to keep it2 and most of all1 when he who breaks is he that made it4 ,after the year #adid1 the city of ,florence reformed its government with the help of the ,friar ,girolamo ,savonarola1 whose writings declare his learning1 his wisdom1 and the excellence of his heart4 ,among other ordinances for the safety of the citizens1 he caused a law to be passed1 allowing an appeal to the people from the sentences pronounced by 8the ,eight0 and by the 8,signory0 in trials for ,state offences2 a law he had long contended for1 and carried at last with great difficulty4 ,it so happened that a very short time after it was passed1 five citizens were condemned to death by the 8,signory0 for ,state offences1 and that when they sought to appeal to the people they were not permitted to do so1 and the law was violated4 ,this1 more than any other mischance1 helped to lessen the credit of the ,friar2 since if his law of appeal was salutary1 he should have caused it to be observed2 if useless1 he ought not to have promoted it4 ,and his inconsistency was the more remarked1 because in all the sermons which he preached after the law was broken1 he never either blamed or excused the person who had broken it1 as though unwilling to condemn1 while unable to justify what suited his purposes4 ,this1 as betraying the ambitious and partial turn of his mind1 took from his reputation and exposed him to much obloquy4 ,another thing which greatly hurts a government is to keep alive bitter feelings in men's minds by often renewed attacks on individuals1 as was done in ,rome after the decemvirate was put an end to4 ,for each of the decemvirs1 and other citizens besides1 were at different times accused and condemned1 so that the greatest alarm was spread through the whole body of the nobles1 who came to believe that these prosecutions would never cease until their entire order was exterminated4 ,and this must have led to grave mischief had not ,marcus ,duilius the tribune provided against it1 by an edict which forbade every one1 for the period of a year1 citing or accusing any ,roman citizen1 an ordinance which had the effect of reassuring the whole nobility4 ,here we see how hurtful it is for a prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in constant alarm and suspense by continually renewed punishments and violence4 ,and1 in truth1 no course can be more pernicious4 ,for men who are in fear for their safety will seize on every opportunity for securing themselves against the dangers which surround them1 and will grow at once more daring1 and less scrupulous in resorting to new courses4 ,for these reasons we should either altogether avoid inflicting injury1 or should inflict every injury at a stroke1 and then seek to reassure men's minds and suffer them to settle down and rest4 ,,chapter ,,xlvi4--,that ,men climb from one step of ,ambition to another1 seeking at first to escape ,injury and then to injure others4 ,as the commons of ,rome on recovering their freedom were restored to their former position--nay1 to one still stronger since many new laws had been passed which confirmed and extended their authority1--it might reasonably have been hoped that ,rome would for a time remain at rest4 ,the event1 however1 showed the contrary1 for from day to day there arose in that city new tumults and fresh dissensions4 ,and since the causes which brought this about have been most judiciously set forth by ,titus ,livius1 it seems to me much to the purpose to cite his own words when he says1 that 8whenever either the commons or the nobles were humble1 the others grew haughty2 so that if the commons kept within due bounds1 the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them1 against which the tribunes1 who were themselves made the objects of outrage1 were little able to give redress2 while the nobles on their part1 although they could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their young men1 were yet well pleased that if excesses were to be committed1 they should be committed by their own faction1 and not by the commons4 ,thus the desire to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to make itself strong enough to oppress the other4 ,for this is the common course of things1 that in seeking to escape cause for fear1 men come to give others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from which they strive to relieve themselves2 as though the choice lay between injuring and being injured40 ,herein1 among other things1 we perceive in what ways commonwealths are overthrown1 and how men climb from one ambition to another2 and recognize the truth of those words which ,sallust puts in the mouth of ,csar1 that 8all ill actions have their origin in fair beginnings40#d ,for1 as ,i have said already1 the ambitious citizen in a commonwealth seeks at the outset to secure himself against injury1 not only at the hands of private persons1 but also of the magistrates2 to effect which he endeavours to gain himself friends4 ,these he obtains by means honourable in appearance1 either by supplying them with money or protecting them against the powerful4 ,and because such conduct seems praiseworthy1 every one is readily deceived by it1 and consequently no remedy is applied4 ,pursuing these methods without hindrance1 this man presently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear him1 and the magistrates to treat him with respect4 ,but when he has advanced thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition1 he has reached a point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him2 it being dangerous1 as ,i have before explained1 to contend with a disorder which has already made progress in a city4 ,nevertheless1 when he has brought things to this pass1 you must either endeavour to crush him1 at the risk of immediate ruin1 or else1 unless death or some like accident interpose1 you incur inevitable slavery by letting him alone4 ,for when1 as ,i have said1 it has come to this that the citizens and even the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends1 little further effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin whom he pleases4 #d ,quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt4 7,sall4 ,cat4 #ea47 ,a republic ought1 therefore1 to provide by its ordinances that none of its citizens shall1 under colour of doing good1 have it in their power to do evil1 but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may aid and not injure freedom4 ,how this may be done1 shall presently be explained4 ,,chapter ,,xlvii4--,that though ,men deceive themselves in ,generalities1 in ,particulars they judge truly4 ,the commons of ,rome having1 as ,i have said1 grown disgusted with the consular name1 and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be admitted to the office or its authority be restricted1 the nobles1 to prevent its degradation in either of these two ways1 proposed a middle course1 whereby four tribunes1 who might either be plebeians or nobles1 were to be created with consular authority4 ,this compromise satisfied the commons1 who thought they would thus get rid of the consulship1 and secure the highest offices of the ,state for their own order4 ,but here a circumstance happened worth noting4 ,when the four tribunes came to be chosen1 the people1 who had it in their power to choose all from the commons1 chose all from the nobles4 ,with respect to which election ,titus ,livius observes1 that 8the result showed that the people when declaring their honest judgment after controversy was over1 were governed by a different spirit from that which had inspired them while contending for their liberties and for a share in public honours40 ,the reason for this ,i believe to be1 that men deceive themselves more readily in generals than in particulars4 ,to the commons of ,rome it seemed1 in the abstract1 that they had every right to be admitted to the consulship1 since their party in the city was the more numerous1 since they bore the greater share of danger in their wars1 and since it was they who by their valour kept ,rome free and made her powerful4 ,and because it appeared to them1 as ,i have said1 that their desire was a reasonable one1 they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards4 ,but when they had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own party1 they recognized their defects1 and decided that individually no one of them was deserving of what1 collectively1 they seemed entitled to2 and being ashamed of them1 turned to bestow their honours on those who deserved them4 ,of which decision ,titus ,livius1 speaking with due admiration1 says1 8,where shall we now find in any one man1 that modesty1 moderation1 and magnanimity which were then common to the entire people80 ,as confirming what ,i have said1 ,i shall cite another noteworthy incident1 which occurred in ,capua after the rout of the ,romans by ,hannibal at ,cann4 ,for all ,italy being convulsed by that defeat1 ,capua too was threatened with civil tumult1 through the hatred which prevailed between her people and senate4 ,but ,pacuvius ,calavius1 who at this time filled the office of chief magistrate1 perceiving the danger1 took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions4 ,with this object he assembled the ,senate and pointed out to them the hatred in which they were held by the people1 and the risk they ran of being put to death by them1 and of the city1 now that the ,romans were in distress1 being given up to ,hannibal4 ,but he added that1 were they to consent to leave the matter with him1 he thought he could contrive to reconcile them2 in the meanwhile1 however1 he must shut them up in the palace1 that1 by putting it in the power of the people to punish them1 he might secure their safety4 ,the senate consenting to this proposal1 he shut them up in the palace1 and summoning the people to a public meeting1 told them the time had at last come for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles1 and requite the wrongs suffered at their hands2 for he had them all safe under bolt and bar2 but1 as he supposed they did not wish the city to remain without rulers1 it was fit1 before putting the old senators to death1 they should appoint others in their room4 ,wherefore he had thrown the names of all the old senators into a bag1 and would now proceed to draw them out one by one1 and as they were drawn would cause them to be put to death1 so soon as a successor was found for each4 ,when the first name he drew was declared1 there arose a great uproar among the people1 all crying out against the cruelty1 pride1 and arrogance of that senator whose name it was4 ,but on ,pacuvius desiring them to propose a substitute1 the meeting was quieted1 and after a brief pause one of the commons was nominated4 ,no sooner1 however1 was his name mentioned than one began to whistle1 another to laugh1 some jeering at him in one way and some in another4 ,and the same thing happening in every case1 each and all of those nominated were judged unworthy of senatorial rank4 ,whereupon ,pacuvius1 profiting by the opportunity1 said1 8,since you are agreed that the city would be badly off without a senate1 but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of the old senators1 it will1 perhaps1 be well for you to be reconciled to them2 for the fear into which they have been thrown must have so subdued them1 that you are sure to find in them that affability which hitherto you have looked for in vain40 ,this proposal being agreed to1 a reconciliation followed between the two orders2 the commons having seen their error so soon as they were obliged to come to particulars4 ,a people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their accidents in the abstract1 but on becoming acquainted with particulars1 speedily discovers its mistakes4 ,in the year #adid1 when her greatest citizens were banished from ,florence1 and no regular government any longer existed there1 but a spirit of licence prevailed1 and matters went continually from bad to worse1 many ,florentines perceiving the decay of their city1 and discerning no other cause for it1 blamed the ambition of this or the other powerful citizen1 who1 they thought1 was fomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to his own liking1 and to rob them of their liberties4 ,those who thought thus1 would hang about the arcades and public squares1 maligning many citizens1 and giving it to be understood that if ever they found themselves in the ,signory1 they would expose the designs of these citizens and have them punished4 ,from time to time it happened that one or another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief magistracy1 and so soon as he obtained this advancement1 and saw things nearer1 became aware whence the disorders ,i have spoken of really came1 the dangers attending them1 and the difficulty in dealing with them2 and recognizing that they were the growth of the times1 and not occasioned by particular men1 suddenly altered his views and conduct2 a nearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had been led into on a general view of affairs4 ,but those who had heard him speak as a private citizen1 when they saw him remain inactive after he was made a magistrate1 believed that this arose not from his having obtained any better knowledge of things1 but from his having been cajoled or corrupted by the great4 ,and this happening with many men and often1 it came to be a proverb among the people1 that 8men had one mind in the market-place1 another in the palace40 ,reflecting on what has been said1 we see how quickly men's eyes may be opened1 if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities1 we can find a way to make them pass to particulars2 as ,pacuvius did in the case of the ,capuans1 and the senate in the case of ,rome4 ,nor do ,i believe that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the people in questions relating to particulars1 as1 for instance1 in the distribution of honours and dignities4 ,for in such matters only1 the people are either never mistaken1 or at any rate far seldomer than a small number of persons would be1 were the distribution entrusted to them4 ,it seems to me1 however1 not out of place to notice in the following ,chapter1 a method employed by the ,roman senate to enlighten the people in making this distribution4 ,,chapter ,,xlviii4--,he who would not have an ,office bestowed on some worthless or wicked ,person1 should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked1 or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good4 ,whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular powers being chosen exclusively from the commons1 it took one or other of two ways1--either by causing the office to be solicited by the most distinguished among the citizens2 or else1 to confess the truth1 by bribing some base and ignoble fellow to fasten himself on to those other plebeians of better quality who were seeking the office1 and become a candidate conjointly with them4 ,the latter device made the people ashamed to give1 the former ashamed to refuse4 ,this confirms what ,i said in my last ,chapter1 as to the people deceiving themselves in generalities but not in particulars4 ,,chapter ,,xlix4--,that if ,cities which1 like ,rome1 had their beginning in ,freedom1 have had difficulty in framing such ,laws as would preserve their ,freedom1 ,cities which at the first have been in ,subjection will find this almost impossible4 ,how hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the laws needed to maintain its freedom1 is well seen from the history of the ,roman ,republic4 ,for although ordinances were given it first by ,romulus1 then by ,numa1 afterwards by ,tullus ,hostilius and ,servius1 and lastly by the ,ten created for the express purpose1 nevertheless1 in the actual government of ,rome new needs were continually developed1 to meet which1 new ordinances had constantly to be devised2 as in the creation of the censors1 who were one of the chief means by which ,rome was kept free during the whole period of her constitutional government4 ,for as the censors became the arbiters of morals in ,rome1 it was very much owing to them that the progress of the ,romans towards corruption was retarded4 ,and though1 at the first creation of the office1 a mistake was doubtless made in fixing its term at five years1 this was corrected not long after by the wisdom of the dictator ,mamercus1 who passed a law reducing it to eighteen months2 a change which the censors then in office took in such ill part1 that they deprived ,mamercus of his rank as a senator4 ,this step was much blamed both by the commons and the ,fathers2 still1 as our ,history does not record that ,mamercus obtained any redress1 we must infer either that the ,historian has omitted something1 or that on this head the laws of ,rome were defective2 since it is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer a citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure favourable to freedom4 ,but returning to the matter under consideration1 we have1 in connection with the creation of this new office1 to note1 that if those cities which1 as was the case with ,rome1 have had their beginning in freedom1 and have by themselves maintained that freedom1 have experienced great difficulty in framing good laws for the preservation of their liberties1 it is little to be wondered at that cities which at the first were dependent1 should find it not difficult merely but impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free and undisturbed4 ,this difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of ,florence1 which1 being subject at first to the power of ,rome and subsequently to that of other rulers1 remained long in servitude1 taking no thought for herself2 and even afterwards1 when she could breathe more freely and began to frame her own laws1 these1 since they were blended with ancient ordinances which were bad1 could not themselves be good2 and thus for the two hundred years of which we have trustworthy record1 our city has gone on patching her institutions1 without ever possessing a government in respect of which she could truly be termed a commonwealth4 ,the difficulties which have been felt in ,florence are the same as have been felt in all cities which have had a like origin2 and although1 repeatedly1 by the free and public votes of her citizens1 ample authority has been given to a few of their number to reform her constitution1 no alteration of general utility has ever been introduced1 but only such as forwarded the interests of the party to which those commissioned to make changes belonged4 ,this1 instead of order1 has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city4 ,but to come to particulars1 ,i say1 that among other matters which have to be considered by the founder of a commonwealth1 is the question into whose hands should be committed the power of life and death over its citizens' ,this was well seen to in ,rome1 where1 as a rule1 there was a right of appeal to the people1 but where1 on any urgent case arising in which it might have been dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial sentence1 recourse could be had to a dictator with powers to execute justice at once2 a remedy1 however1 never resorted to save in cases of extremity4 ,but ,florence1 and other cities having a like origin1 committed this power into the hands of a foreigner1 whom they styled ,captain1 and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this was a pernicious course4 ,altering this arrangement afterwards in consequence of changes in their government1 they appointed eight citizens to discharge the office of ,captain4 ,but this1 for a reason already mentioned1 namely that a few will always be governed by the will of a few and these the most powerful1 was a change from bad to worse4 ,the city of ,venice has guarded herself against a like danger4 ,for in ,venice ten citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without appeal2 and because1 although possessing the requisite authority1 this number might not be sufficient to insure the punishment of the powerful1 in addition to their council of ,ten1 they have also constituted a council of ,forty1 and have further provided that the council of the 8,pregai10 which is their supreme council1 shall have authority to chastise powerful offenders4 ,so that1 unless an accuser be wanting1 a tribunal is never wanting in ,venice to keep powerful citizens in check4 ,but when we see how in ,rome1 with ordinances of her own imposing1 and with so many and so wise legislators1 fresh occasion arose from day to day for framing new laws favourable to freedom1 it is not to be wondered at that1 in other cities less happy in their beginnings1 difficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances could remedy4 ,,chapter ,l4--,that neither any ,council nor any ,magistrate should have power to bring the ,government of a ,city to a stay4 ,t4,q4 ,,cincinnatus and ,cn4 ,julius ,mento being consuls of ,rome1 and being at variance with one another1 brought the whole business of the city to a stay2 which the senate perceiving1 were moved to create a dictator to do what1 by reason of their differences1 the consuls would not4 ,but though opposed to one another in everything else1 the consuls were of one mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator2 so that the senate had no remedy left them but to seek the help of the tribunes1 who1 supported by their authority1 forced the consuls to yield4 ,here we have to note1 first1 the usefulness of the tribunes' authority in checking the ambitious designs1 not only of the nobles against the commons1 but also of one section of the nobles against another2 and next1 that in no city ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests with a few to decide on matters1 which1 if the ordinary business of the ,state is to proceed at all1 must be carried out4 ,wherefore1 if you grant authority to a council to distribute honours and offices1 or to a magistrate to administer any branch of public business1 you must either impose an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed1 or ordain that1 on failure to perform1 another may and shall do what has to be done4 ,otherwise such an arrangement will be found defective and dangerous2 as would have been the case in ,rome1 had it not been possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of the consuls4 ,in the ,venetian ,republic1 the great council distributes honours and offices4 ,but more than once it has happened that the council1 whether from ill-humour or from being badly advised1 has declined to appoint successors either to the magistrates of the city or to those administering the government abroad4 ,this gave rise to the greatest confusion and disorder2 for1 on a sudden1 both the city itself and the subject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful governors2 nor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were pacified or undeceived4 ,and this disorder must have brought the city to a bad end1 had not provision been made against its recurrence by certain of the wiser citizens1 who1 finding a fit opportunity1 passed a law that no magistracy1 whether within or without the city1 should ever be deemed to have been vacated until it was filled up by the appointment of a successor4 ,in this way the council was deprived of its facilities for stopping public business to the danger of the ,state4 ,,chapter ,,li4--,what a ,prince or ,republic does of ,necessity1 should seem to be done by ,choice4 ,in all their actions1 even in those which are matters of necessity rather than choice1 prudent men will endeavour so to conduct themselves as to conciliate good-will4 ,this species of prudence was well exercised by the ,roman senate when they resolved to grant pay from the public purse to soldiers on active service1 who1 before1 had served at their own charges4 ,for perceiving that under the old system they could maintain no war of any duration1 and1 consequently1 could not undertake a siege or lead an army to any distance from home1 and finding it necessary to be able to do both1 they decided on granting the pay ,i have spoken of4 ,but this1 which they could not help doing1 they did in such a way as to earn the thanks of the people1 by whom the concession was so well received that all ,rome was intoxicated with delight4 ,for it seemed to them a boon beyond any they could have ventured to hope for1 or have dreamed of demanding4 ,and although the tribunes sought to make light of the benefit1 by showing the people that their burthens would be increased rather than diminished by it1 since taxes would have to be imposed out of which the soldier's stipend might be paid1 they could not persuade them to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude2 which was further increased by the manner in which the senate distributed the taxes1 imposing on the nobles all the heavier and greater1 and those which had to be paid first4 ,,chapter ,,lii4--,that to check the arrogance of a ,citizen who is growing too powerful in a ,state1 there is no safer ,method1 or less open to objection1 than to forestall him in those ,ways whereby he seeks to advance himself4 ,it has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles gained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them1 not only in providing for their military pay1 but also in adjusting taxation4 ,had the senate constantly adhered to methods like these1 they would have put an end to all disturbances in ,rome1 and have deprived the tribunes of the credit they had with the people1 and of the influence thence arising4 ,for in truth1 in a commonwealth1 and especially in one which has become corrupted1 there is no better1 or easier1 or less objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen1 than to anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to the ends he has in view4 ,this plan1 had it been followed by the enemies of ,cosimo de' ,medici1 would have proved a far more useful course for them than to banish him from ,florence2 since if those citizens who opposed him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people1 they would have succeeded1 without violence or tumult1 in taking his most effective weapon from his hands4 ,the influence acquired in ,florence by ,piero ,soderini was entirely due to his skill in securing the affections of the people1 since in this way he obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the commonwealth4 ,and truly1 for those citizens who envied his greatness it would have been both easier and more honourable1 and at the same time far less dangerous and hurtful to the ,state1 to forestall him in those measures by which he was growing powerful1 than to oppose him in such a manner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire republic4 ,for had they1 as they might easily have done1 deprived him of the weapons which made him formidable1 they could then have withstood him in all the councils1 and in all public deliberations1 without either being suspected or feared4 ,and should any rejoin that1 if the citizens who hated ,piero ,soderini committed an error in not being beforehand with him in those ways whereby he came to have influence with the people1 ,piero himself erred in like manner1 in not anticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew formidable to him2 ,i answer that ,piero is to be excused1 both because it would have been difficult for him to have so acted1 and because for him such a course would not have been honourable4 ,for the paths wherein his danger lay were those which favoured the ,medici1 and it was by these that his enemies attacked him1 and in the end overthrew him4 ,but these paths ,piero could not pursue without dishonour1 since he could not1 if he was to preserve his fair fame1 have joined in destroying that liberty which he had been put forward to defend4 ,moreover1 since favours to the ,medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and once for all1 they would have been most dangerous for ,piero1 who1 had he shown himself friendly to the ,medici1 must have become suspected and hated by the people2 in which case his enemies would have had still better opportunities than before for his destruction4 ,men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course which lies before them1 nor engage in it when it is plain that the dangers outweigh the advantages1 even though they be advised by others that it is the most expedient way to take4 ,should they act otherwise1 it will fare with them as with ,tullius1 who1 in seeking to diminish the power of ,marcus ,antonius1 added to it4 ,for ,antonius1 who had been declared an enemy by the senate1 having got together a strong force1 mostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of ,csar1 ,tullius counselled the senate to invest ,octavianus with full authority1 and to send him against ,antonius with the consuls and the army2 affirming1 that so soon as those veterans who had served with ,csar saw the face of him who was ,csar's nephew and had assumed his name1 they would rally to his side and desert ,antonius1 who might easily be crushed when thus left bare of support4 ,but the reverse of all this happened4 ,for ,antonius persuaded ,octavianus to take part with him1 and to throw over ,tullius and the senate4 ,and this brought about the ruin of the senate1 a result which might easily have been foreseen4 ,for remembering the influence of that great captain1 who1 after overthrowing all opponents1 had seized on sovereign power in ,rome1 the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the persuasions of ,tullius1 nor ever have believed it possible that from ,csar's heir1 or from soldiers who had followed ,csar1 they could look for anything that consisted with the name of ,freedom4 ,,chapter ,,liii4--,that the ,people1 deceived by a false show of ,advantage1 often desire what would be their ,ruin2 and that large ,hopes and brave ,promises easily move them4 ,when ,veii fell1 the commons of ,rome took up the notion that it would be to the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell there4 ,for they argued that as ,veii lay in a fertile country and was a well-built city1 a moiety of the ,roman people might in this way be enriched2 while1 by reason of its vicinity to ,rome1 the management of civil affairs would in no degree be affected4 ,to the senate1 however1 and the wiser among the citizens1 the scheme appeared so rash and mischievous that they publicly declared they would die sooner than consent to it4 ,the controversy continuing1 the commons grew so inflamed against the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued2 had not the senate for their protection put forward certain old and esteemed citizens1 respect for whom restrained the populace and put a stop to their violence4 ,two points are here to be noted4 ,first1 that a people deceived by a false show of advantage will often labour for its own destruction2 and1 unless convinced by some one whom it trusts1 that the course on which it is bent is pernicious1 and that some other is to be preferred1 will bring infinite danger and injury upon the ,state4 ,and should it so happen1 as sometimes is the case1 that from having been deceived before1 either by men or by events1 there is none in whom the people trust1 their ruin is inevitable4 ,as to which ,dante1 in his treatise 8,de ,monarchia10 observes that the people will often raise the cry1 8,flourish our death and perish our life40#e ,from which distrust it arises that often in republics the right course is not followed2 as when ,venice1 as has been related1 on being attacked by many enemies1 could not1 until her ruin was complete1 resolve to make friends with any one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them1 on account of which war had been declared and a league of princes formed against her4 #e 8,viva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita40 ,the quotation does not seem to be from the 8,de ,monarchia40 ,in considering what courses it is easy1 and what it is difficult to persuade a people to follow1 this distinction may be drawn3 ,either what you would persuade them to1 presents on the face of it a semblance of gain or loss1 or it seems a spirited course or a base one4 ,when any proposal submitted to the people holds out promise of advantage1 or seems to them a spirited course to take1 though loss lie hid behind1 nay1 though the ruin of their country be involved in it1 they will always be easily led to adopt it2 whereas it will always be difficult to persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of disgrace or loss1 even though safety and advantage be bound up with them4 ,the truth of what ,i say is confirmed by numberless examples both ,roman and foreign1 modern and ancient4 ,hence grew the ill opinion entertained in ,rome of ,fabius ,maximus1 who could never persuade the people that it behoved them to proceed warily in their conflict with ,hannibal1 and withstand his onset without fighting4 ,for this the people thought a base course1 not discerning the advantage resulting from it1 which ,fabius could by no argument make plain to them4 ,and so blinded are men in favour of what seems a spirited course1 that although the ,romans had already committed the blunder of permitting ,varro1 master of the knights to ,fabius1 to join battle contrary to the latter's desire1 whereby the army must have been destroyed had not ,fabius by his prudence saved it1 this lesson was not enough2 for afterwards they appointed this ,varro to be consul1 for no other reason than that he gave out1 in the streets and market-places1 that he would make an end of ,hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so4 ,whence came the battle and defeat of ,cann1 and well-nigh the destruction of ,rome4 ,another example taken from ,roman history may be cited to the same effect4 ,after ,hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in ,italy1 during which time the whole country had been deluged with ,roman blood1 a certain ,marcus ,centenius ,penula1 a man of mean origin1 but who had held some post in the army1 came forward and proposed to the senate that were leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any part of ,italy he pleased1 he would speedily deliver ,hannibal into their hands1 alive or dead4 ,to the senate this man's offer seemed a rash one2 but reflecting that were they to refuse it1 and were the people afterwards to hear that it had been made1 tumults1 ill will1 and resentment against them would result1 they granted the permission asked2 choosing rather to risk the lives of all who might follow ,penula1 than to excite fresh discontent on the part of the people1 to whom they knew that such a proposal would be welcome1 and that it would be very hard to dissuade them from it4 ,and so this adventurer1 marching forth with an undisciplined and disorderly rabble to meet ,hannibal1 was1 with all his followers1 defeated and slain in the very first encounter4 ,in ,greece1 likewise1 and in the city of ,athens1 that most grave and prudent statesman1 ,nicias1 could not convince the people that the proposal to go and attack ,sicily was disadvantageous2 and the expedition being resolved on1 contrary to his advice and to the wishes of the wiser among the citizens1 resulted in the overthrow of the ,athenian power4 ,scipio1 on being appointed consul1 asked that the province of ,africa might be awarded to him1 promising that he would utterly efface ,carthage2 and when the senate1 on the advice of ,fabius1 refused his request1 he threatened to submit the matter to the people as very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always acceptable4 ,i might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our own city1 as when ,messer ,ercole ,bentivoglio and ,antonio ,giacomini1 being in joint command of the ,florentine armies1 after defeating ,bartolommeo d',alviano at ,san ,vincenzo1 proceeded to invest ,pisa4 ,for this enterprise was resolved on by the people in consequence of the brave promises of ,messer ,ercole2 and though many wise citizens disapproved of it1 they could do nothing to prevent it1 being carried away by the popular will1 which took its rise in the assurances of their captain4 ,i say1 then1 that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a republic1 when the power is in the hands of the people1 than to suggest daring courses for their adoption4 ,for wherever the people have a voice1 such proposals will always be well received1 nor will those persons who are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy4 ,and as this occasions the ruin of ,states1 it likewise1 and even more frequently1 occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution of these proposals is committed2 because the people anticipating victory1 do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short means or ill fortune of the commander1 but to his cowardice and incapacity2 and commonly either put him to death1 or imprison or banish him2 as was done in the case of numberless ,carthaginian generals and of many ,athenian1 no successes they might previously have obtained availing them anything2 for all past services are cancelled by a present loss4 ,and so it happened with our ,antonio ,giacomini1 who not succeeding as the people had expected1 and as he had promised1 in taking ,pisa1 fell into such discredit with the people1 that notwithstanding his countless past services1 his life was spared rather by the compassion of those in authority than through any movement of the citizens in his behalf4 ,,chapter ,,liv4--,of the boundless ,authority which a great ,man may use to restrain an excited ,multitude4 ,the next noteworthy point in the passage referred to in the foregoing ,chapter is1 that nothing tends so much to restrain an excited multitude as the reverence felt for some grave person1 clothed with authority1 who stands forward to oppose them4 ,for not without reason has ,virgil said-- 8,if then1 by chance1 some reverend chief appear1 ,known for his deeds and for his virtues dear1 ,silent they wait his words and bend a listening ear40#f #f ,tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem ,conspexere1 silent1 arrectisque auribus adstant4 ,virg4 ,aen41 ,i4 #aed4 ,he therefore who commands an army or governs a city wherein tumult shall have broken out1 ought to assume the noblest and bravest bearing he can1 and clothe himself with all the ensigns of his station1 that he may make himself more revered4 ,it is not many years since ,florence was divided into two factions1 the ,frateschi and ,arrabbiati1 as they were named1 and these coming to open violence1 the ,frateschi1 among whom was ,pagolo ,antonio ,soderini1 a citizen of great reputation in these days1 were worsted4 ,in the course of these disturbances the people coming with arms in their hands to plunder the house of ,soderini1 his brother ,messer ,francesco1 then bishop of ,volterra and now cardinal1 who happened to be dwelling there1 so soon as he heard the uproar and saw the crowd1 putting on his best apparel and over it his episcopal robes1 went forth to meet the armed multitude1 and by his words and mien brought them to a stay2 and for many days his behaviour was commended by the whole city4 ,the inference from all which is1 that there is no surer or more necessary restraint on the violence of an unruly multitude1 than the presence of some one whose character and bearing command respect4 ,but to return once more to the passage we are considering1 we see how stubbornly the people clung to this scheme of transplanting themselves to ,veii1 thinking it for their advantage1 and not discerning the mischief really involved in it2 so that in addition to the many dissensions which it occasioned1 actual violence must have followed1 had not the senate with the aid of certain grave and reverend citizens repressed the popular fury4 ,,chapter ,,lv4--,that ,government is easily carried on in a ,city wherein the body of the ,people is not corrupted3 and that a ,princedom is impossible where ,equality prevails1 and a ,republic where it does not4 ,though what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown corrupted has already been discussed1 still ,i think it not out of place to notice a resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which ,camillus made to ,apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the ,veientines4 ,for this spoil having fallen into the hands of the people1 the senate1 being unable by other means to get any account of it1 passed an edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth part of what he had taken4 ,and although this edict was not carried out1 from the senate having afterwards followed a different course1 whereby1 to the content of the people1 the claim of ,apollo was otherwise satisfied1 we nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal1 how completely the senate trusted to the honesty of the people1 when they assumed that no one would withhold any part of what the edict commanded him to give2 on the other hand1 we see that it never occurred to the people that they might evade the law by giving less than was due1 their only thought being to free themselves from the law by openly manifesting their displeasure4 ,this example1 together with many others already noticed1 shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of religion prevailed among the ,roman people1 and how much good was to be expected from them4 ,and1 in truth1 in the country where virtue like this does not exist1 no good can be looked for1 as we should look for it in vain in provinces which at the present day are seen to be corrupted2 as ,italy is beyond all others1 though1 in some degree1 ,france and ,spain are similarly tainted4 ,in which last two countries1 if we see not so many disorders spring up as we see daily springing up in ,italy1 this is not so much due to the superior virtue of their inhabitants 7who1 to say truth1 fall far short of our countrymen71 as to their being governed by a king who keeps them united1 not merely by his personal qualities1 but also by the laws and ordinances of the realm which are still maintained with vigour4 ,in ,germany1 however1 we do see signal excellence and a devout religious spirit prevail among the people1 giving rise to the many free ,states which there maintain themselves1 with such strict observance of their laws that none1 either within or without their walls1 dare encroach on them4 ,that among this last-named people a great share of the ancient excellence does in truth still flourish1 ,i shall show by an example similar to that which ,i have above related of the senate and people of ,rome4 ,it is customary with the ,german ,free ,states when they have to expend any large sum of money on the public account1 for their magistrates or councils having authority given them in that behalf1 to impose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every man's estate2 which rate being fixed1 every man1 in conformity with the laws of the city1 presents himself before the collectors of the impost1 and having first made oath to pay the amount justly due1 throws into a chest provided for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to pay1 of which payment none is witness save himself4 ,from this fact it may be gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this people4 ,for we must assume that each pays his just share1 since otherwise the impost would not yield the sum which1 with reference to former imposts1 it was estimated to yield2 whereby the fraud would be detected1 and thereupon some other method for raising money have to be resorted to4 ,at the present time this virtue is the more to be admired1 because it seems to have survived in this province only4 ,that it has survived there may be ascribed to two circumstances3 first1 that the natives have little communication with their neighbours1 neither visiting them in their countries nor being visited by them2 being content to use such commodities1 and subsist on such food1 and to wear garments of such materials as their own land supplies2 so that all occasion for intercourse1 and every cause of corruption is removed4 ,for living after this fashion1 they have not learned the manners of the ,french1 the ,italians1 or the ,spaniards1 which three nations together are the corruption of the world4 ,the second cause is1 that these republics in which a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of their citizens either to be1 or to live as gentlemen2 but on the contrary1 while preserving a strict equality among themselves1 are bitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their neighbourhood2 so that if by chance any of these fall into their hands1 they put them to death1 as the chief promoters of corruption and the origin of all disorders4 ,but to make plain what ,i mean when ,i speak of gentlemen1 ,i say that those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the revenues of their estates1 without concerning themselves with the cultivation of these estates1 or incurring any other fatigue for their support4 ,such persons are very mischievous in every republic or country4 ,but even more mischievous are they who1 besides the estates ,i have spoken of1 are lords of strongholds and castles1 and have vassals and retainers who render them obedience4 ,of these two classes of men the kingdom of ,naples1 the country round ,rome1 ,romagna1 and ,lombardy are full2 and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth or free form of government has ever existed2 because men of this sort are the sworn foes to all free institutions4 ,and since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this condition were impossible1 if these are to be reformed at all1 it can only be by some one man who is able there to establish a kingdom2 the reason being that when the body of the people is grown so corrupted that the laws are powerless to control it1 there must in addition to the laws be introduced a stronger force1 to wit1 the regal1 which by its absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive ambition and corruption of the great4 ,this opinion may be supported by the example of ,tuscany1 in which within a narrow compass of territory there have long existed the three republics of ,florence1 ,lucca1 and ,siena1 while the other cities of that province1 although to a certain extent dependent1 still show by their spirit and by their institutions that they preserve1 or at any rate desire to preserve1 their freedom3 and this because there are in ,tuscany no lords possessed of strongholds1 and few or no gentlemen1 but so complete an equality prevails1 that a prudent statesman1 well acquainted with the history of the free ,states of antiquity1 might easily introduce free institutions4 ,such1 however1 has been the unhappiness of this our country1 that1 up to the present hour1 it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which would have enabled him to act in this way4 ,from what has been said1 it follows1 that he who would found a commonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen1 cannot do so unless he first gets rid of them2 and that he who would found a monarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails1 will never succeed1 unless he raise above the level of that equality many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament1 whom he must make gentlemen not in name merely but in reality1 by conferring on them castles and lands1 supplying them with riches1 and providing them with retainers2 that with these gentlemen around him1 and with their help1 he may maintain his power1 while they through him may gratify their ambition2 all others being constrained to endure a yoke1 which force and force alone imposes on them4 ,for when in this way there comes to be a proportion between him who uses force and him against whom it is used1 each stands fixed in his own station4 ,but to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom1 or a kingdom in a country suited to be a commonwealth1 requires so rare a combination of intelligence and power1 that though many engage in the attempt1 few are found to succeed4 ,for the greatness of the undertaking quickly daunts them1 and so obstructs their advance they break down at the very outset4 ,the case of the ,venetian ,republic1 wherein none save gentlemen are permitted to hold any public office1 does1 doubtless1 seem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen it is impossible to found a commonwealth4 ,but it may be answered that the case of ,venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary2 since the gentlemen of ,venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality1 inasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands1 their wealth consisting chiefly in merchandise and chattels1 and not one of them possessing a castle or enjoying any feudal authority4 ,for in ,venice this name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity1 and does not depend on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is given in other ,states4 ,but as in other ,states the different ranks and classes are divided under different names1 so in ,venice we have the division into gentlemen 7gentiluomini7 and plebeians 7popolani71 it being understood that the former hold1 or have the right to hold all situations of honour1 from which the latter are entirely excluded4 ,and in ,venice this occasions no disturbance1 for reasons which ,i have already explained4 ,let a commonwealth1 then1 be constituted in the country where a great equality is found or has been made2 and1 conversely1 let a princedom be constituted where great inequality prevails4 ,otherwise what is constituted will be discordant in itself1 and without stability4 ,,chapter ,,lvi4--,that when great ,calamities are about to befall a ,city or ,country1 ,signs are seen to presage1 and ,seers arise who foretell them4 ,whence it happens ,i know not1 but it is seen from examples both ancient and recent1 that no grave calamity has ever befallen any city or country which has not been foretold by vision1 by augury1 by portent1 or by some other ,heaven-sent sign4 ,and not to travel too far afield for evidence of this1 every one knows that long before the invasion of ,italy by ,charles ,,viii4 of ,france1 his coming was foretold by the friar ,girolamo ,savonarola2 and how1 throughout the whole of ,tuscany1 the rumour ran that over ,arezzo horsemen had been seen fighting in the air4 ,and who is there who has not heard that before the death of the elder ,lorenzo de' ,medici1 the highest pinnacle of the cathedral was rent by a thunderbolt1 to the great injury of the building8 ,or who1 again1 but knows that shortly before ,piero ,soderini1 whom the people of ,florence had made gonfalonier for life1 was deprived of his office and banished1 the palace itself was struck by lightning8 ,other instances might be cited1 which1 not to be tedious1 ,i shall omit1 and mention only a circumstance which ,titus ,livius tells us preceded the invasion of the ,gauls4 ,for he relates how a certain plebeian named ,marcus ,ceditius reported to the senate that as he passed by night along the ,via ,nova1 he heard a voice louder than mortal1 bidding him warn the magistrates that the ,gauls were on their way to ,rome4 ,the causes of such manifestations ought1 ,i think1 to be inquired into and explained by some one who has a knowledge1 which ,i have not1 of causes natural and supernatural4 ,it may1 however1 be1 as certain wise men say1 that the air is filled with intelligent beings1 to whom it is given to forecast future events2 who1 taking pity upon men1 warn them beforehand by these signs to prepare for what awaits them4 ,be this as it may1 certain it is that such warnings are given1 and that always after them new and strange disasters befall nations4 ,,chapter ,,lvii4--,that the ,people are strong collectively1 but individually weak4 ,after the ruin brought on their country by the invasion of the ,gauls1 many of the ,romans went to dwell in ,veii1 in opposition to the edicts and commands of the senate1 who1 to correct this mischief1 publicly ordained that within a time fixed1 and under penalties stated1 all should return to live in ,rome4 ,the persons against whom these proclamations were directed at first derided them2 but1 when the time came for them to be obeyed1 all obeyed them4 ,and ,titus ,livius observes that1 8although bold enough collectively1 each separately1 fearing to be punished1 made his submission40 ,and indeed the temper of the multitude in such cases1 cannot be better described than in this passage4 ,for often a people will be open-mouthed in condemning the decrees of their prince1 but afterwards1 when they have to look punishment in the face1 putting no trust in one another1 they hasten to comply4 ,wherefore1 if you be in a position to keep the people well-disposed towards you when they already are so1 or to prevent them injuring you in case they be ill-disposed1 it is clearly of little moment whether the feelings with which they profess to regard you1 be favourable or no4 ,this applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a people1 whencesoever it proceed1 excepting only the resentment felt by them on being deprived either of liberty1 or of a prince whom they love and who still survives4 ,for the hostile temper produced by these two causes is more to be feared than any beside1 and demands measures of extreme severity to correct it4 ,the other untoward humours of the multitude1 should there be no powerful chief to foster them1 are easily dealt with2 because1 while on the one hand there is nothing more terrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob1 on the other1 there is nothing feebler4 ,for though it be furnished with arms it is easily subdued1 if you have some place of strength wherein to shelter from its first onset4 ,for when its first fury has somewhat abated1 and each man sees that he has to return to his own house1 all begin to lose heart and to take thought how to insure their personal safety1 whether by flight or by submission4 ,for which reason a multitude stirred in this way1 if it would avoid dangers such as ,i speak of1 must at once appoint a head from among its own numbers1 who may control it1 keep it united1 and provide for its defence2 as did the commons of ,rome when1 after the death of ,virginia1 they quitted the city1 and for their protection created twenty tribunes from among themselves4 ,unless this be done1 what ,titus ,livius has observed in the passage cited1 will always prove true1 namely1 that a multitude is strong while it holds together1 but so soon as each of those who compose it begins to think of his own private danger1 it becomes weak and contemptible4 ,,chapter ,,lviii4--,that a ,people is wiser and more constant than a ,prince ,that 8nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude0 is affirmed not by ,titus ,livius only1 but by all other historians1 in whose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude condemning some citizen to death1 and afterwards lamenting him and grieving greatly for his loss1 as the ,romans grieved and lamented for ,manlius ,capitolinus1 whom they had themselves condemned to die4 ,in relating which circumstance our author observes 8,in a short time the people1 having no longer cause to fear him1 began to deplore his death0 ,and elsewhere1 when speaking of what took place in ,syracuse after the murder of ,hieronymus1 grandson of ,hiero1 he says1 8,it is the nature of the multitude to be an abject slave1 or a domineering master0 ,it may be that in attempting to defend a cause1 which1 as ,i have said1 all writers are agreed to condemn1 ,i take upon me a task so hard and difficult that ,i shall either have to relinquish it with shame or pursue it with opprobrium4 ,be that as it may1 ,i neither do1 nor ever shall judge it a fault1 to support opinion by arguments1 where it is not sought to impose them by violence or authority ,i maintain1 then1 that this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude1 may with equal reason be charged against every individual man1 but most of all against princes1 since all who are not controlled by the laws1 will commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled multitude4 ,proof whereof were easy1 since of all the many princes existing1 or who have existed1 few indeed are or have been either wise or good4 ,i speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the reins by which they are controlled1 among whom ,i do not reckon those kings who reigned in ,egypt in the most remote antiquity when that country was governed in conformity with its laws2 nor do ,i include those kings who reigned in ,sparta1 nor those who in our own times reign in ,france1 which kingdom1 more than any other whereof we have knowledge at the present day1 is under the government of its laws4 ,for kings who live1 as these do1 subject to constitutional restraint1 are not to be counted when we have to consider each man's proper nature1 and to see whether he resembles the multitude4 ,for to draw a comparison with such princes as these1 we must take the case of a multitude controlled as they are1 and regulated by the laws1 when we shall find it to possess the same virtues which we see in them1 and neither conducting itself as an abject slave nor as a domineering master4 ,such was the people of ,rome1 who1 while the commonwealth continued uncorrupted1 never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily2 but1 on the contrary1 by means of their magistrates and their ordinances1 maintained their place1 and when forced to put forth their strength against some powerful citizen1 as in the case of ,manlius1 the decemvirs1 and others who sought to oppress them1 did so2 but when it was necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the dictator or consuls1 obeyed4 ,and if the ,roman people mourned the loss of the dead ,manlius1 it is no wonder2 for they mourned his virtues1 which had been of such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all1 and would have had power to produce the same feelings even in a prince2 all writers being agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its enemies4 ,but if ,manlius when he was so greatly mourned1 could have risen once more from the dead1 the ,roman people would have pronounced the same sentence against him which they pronounced when they led him forth from the prison-house1 and straightway condemned him to die4 ,and in like manner we see that princes1 accounted wise1 have put men to death1 and afterwards greatly lamented them1 as ,alexander mourned for ,clitus and others of his friends1 and ,herod for ,mariamne4 ,but what our historian says of the multitude1 he says not of a multitude which like the people of ,rome is controlled by the laws1 but of an uncontrolled multitude like the ,syracusans1 who were guilty of all these crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit1 and which were equally committed by ,alexander and ,herod in the cases mentioned4 ,wherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the nature of princes1 since both equally err when they can do so without regard to consequences4 ,of which many instances1 besides those already given1 might be cited from the history of the ,roman emperors1 and of other princes and tyrants1 in whose lives we find such inconstancy and fickleness1 as we might look in vain for in a people4 ,i maintain1 therefore1 contrary to the common opinion which avers that a people when they have the management of affairs are changeable1 fickle1 and ungrateful1 that these faults exist not in them otherwise than as they exist in individual princes2 so that were any to accuse both princes and peoples1 the charge might be true1 but that to make exception in favour of princes is a mistake2 for a people in command1 if it be duly restrained1 will have the same prudence and the same gratitude as a prince has1 or even more1 however wise he may be reckoned2 and a prince on the other hand1 if freed from the control of the laws1 will be more ungrateful1 fickle1 and short-sighted than a people4 ,and further1 ,i say that any difference in their methods of acting results not from any difference in their nature1 that being the same in both1 or1 if there be advantage on either side1 the advantage resting with the people1 but from their having more or less respect for the laws under which each lives4 ,and whosoever attentively considers the history of the ,roman people1 may see that for four hundred years they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name1 and were constantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country1 and will find numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both particulars4 ,and should any allege against me the ingratitude they showed to ,scipio1 ,i reply by what has already been said at length on that head1 where ,i proved that peoples are less ungrateful than princes4 ,but as for prudence and stability of purpose1 ,i affirm that a people is more prudent1 more stable1 and of better judgment than a prince4 ,nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been likened to the voice of ,god2 for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil themselves1 and bring about marvellous results1 so as to have the appearance of presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe4 ,again1 as to the justice of their opinions on public affairs1 seldom find that after hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in opposite directions1 they do not adopt the sounder view1 or are unable to decide on the truth of what they hear4 ,and if1 as ,i have said1 a people errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and advantageous1 princes will likewise err when their passions are touched1 as is far oftener the case with them than with a people4 ,we see1 too1 that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far more honestly than a prince2 so that while you shall never persuade a people that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and profligate1 a prince may readily1 and in a thousand ways1 be drawn to do so4 ,again1 it may be seen that a people1 when once they have come to hold a thing in abhorrence1 remain for many ages of the same mind2 which we do not find happen with princes4 ,for the truth of both of which assertions the ,roman people are my sufficient witness1 who1 in the course of so many hundred years1 and in so many elections of consuls and tribunes1 never made four appointments of which they had reason to repent2 and1 as ,i have said1 so detested the name of king1 that no obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that name1 could shield him from the appointed penalty4 ,further1 we find that those cities wherein the government is in the hands of the people1 in a very short space of time1 make marvellous progress1 far exceeding that made by cities which have been always ruled by princes2 as ,rome grew after the expulsion of her kings1 and ,athens after she freed herself from ,pisistratus2 and this we can ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than the rule of a prince4 ,nor would ,i have it thought that anything our historian may have affirmed in the passage cited1 or elsewhere1 controverts these my opinions4 ,for if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples and of princes be carefully weighed1 it will appear that both for goodness and for glory a people is to be preferred4 ,and if princes surpass peoples in the work of legislation1 in shaping civil institutions1 in moulding statutes1 and framing new ordinances1 so far do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been established1 as to merit no less praise than they4 ,and to state the sum of the whole matter shortly1 ,i say that popular governments have endured for long periods in the same way as the governments of princes1 and that both have need to be regulated by the laws2 because the prince who can do what he pleases is a madman1 and the people which can do as it pleases is never wise4 ,if1 then1 we assume the case of a prince bound1 and of a people chained down by the laws1 greater virtue will appear in the people than in the prince2 while if we assume the case of each of them freed from all control1 it will be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince1 and less serious errors1 and such as admit of readier cure4 ,for a turbulent and unruly people may be spoken to by a good man1 and readily brought back to good ways2 but none can speak to a wicked prince1 nor any remedy be found against him but by the sword4 ,and from this we may infer which of the two suffers from the worse disease2 for if the disease of the people may be healed by words1 while that of the prince must be dealt with by the sword1 there is none but will judge that evil to be the greater which demands the more violent remedy4 ,when a people is absolutely uncontrolled1 it is not so much the follies which it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm1 as the mischief which may thence result1 since in such disorders it becomes possible for a tyrant to spring up4 ,but with a wicked prince the contrary is the case2 for we dread present ill1 and place our hopes in the future1 persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince may bring about our freedom4 ,so that there is this distinction between the two1 that with the one we fear what is1 with the other what is likely to be4 ,again1 the cruelties of a people are turned against him who it fears will encroach upon the common rights1 but the cruelties of the prince against those who he fears may assert those rights4 ,the prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this1 that any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly1 even when the government is in their hands2 whereas princes are always spoken of with a thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences4 ,but since the subject suggests it1 it seems to me not out of place to consider what alliances we can most trust1 whether those made with commonwealths or those made with princes4 ,,chapter ,,lix4--,to what ,leagues or ,alliances we may most trust2 whether those we make with ,commonwealths or those we make with ,princes4 ,since leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince with another1 or by one commonwealth with another1 and as conventions and treaties are concluded in like manner between princes and commonwealths1 it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith of a commonwealth or that of a prince is the more stable and the safer to count on4 ,all things considered1 ,i am disposed to believe that in most cases they are alike1 though in some they differ4 ,of one thing1 however1 ,i am convinced1 namely1 that engagements made under duress will never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth2 and that if menaced with the loss of their territories1 both the one and the other will break faith with you and treat you with ingratitude4 ,demetrius1 who was named the 8,city-taker10 had conferred numberless benefits upon the ,athenians2 but when1 afterwards1 on being defeated by his enemies1 he sought shelter in ,athens1 as being a friendly city and under obligations to him1 it was refused him2 a circumstance which grieved him far more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done4 ,pompey1 in like manner1 when routed by ,csar in ,thessaly1 fled for refuge to ,ptolemy in ,egypt1 who formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom2 by whom he was put to death4 ,in both these instances the same causes were at work1 although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less in the case of the commonwealth than of the prince4 ,still1 wherever there is fear1 the want of faith will be the same4 ,and even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who1 in order to keep faith1 will submit to be ruined1 this is seen to result from a like cause4 ,for1 as to the prince1 it may easily happen that he is friend to a powerful sovereign1 whom1 though he be at the time without means to defend him1 he may presently hope to see restored to his dominions2 or it may be that having linked his fortunes with another's1 he despairs of finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of his ally1 as was the case with those ,neapolitan princes who espoused the interests of ,france4 ,as to commonwealths1 an instance similar to that of the princes last named1 is that of ,saguntum in ,spain1 which awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of ,rome4 ,a like course was also followed by ,florence when1 in the year #aeab1 she stood steadfastly by the cause of the ,french4 ,and taking everything into account1 ,i believe that in cases of urgency1 we shall find a certain degree of stability sooner in commonwealths than in princes4 ,for though commonwealths be like-minded with princes1 and influenced by the same passions1 the circumstance that their movements must be slower1 makes it harder for them to resolve than it is for a prince1 for which reason they will be less ready to break faith4 ,and since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain advantages1 in this respect also1 commonwealths observe their engagements far more faithfully than princes2 for abundant examples might be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to break faith1 and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a commonwealth to do so4 ,of this we have an instance in the proposal made to the ,athenians by ,themistocles1 when he told them at a public meeting that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great advantage to their city1 but the nature of which he could not disclose to them1 lest it should become generally known1 when the opportunity for acting upon it would be lost4 ,whereupon the ,athenians named ,aristides to receive his communication1 and to act upon it as he thought fit4 ,to him1 accordingly1 ,themistocles showed how the navy of united ,greece1 for the safety of which the ,athenians stood pledged1 was so situated that they might either gain it over or destroy it1 and thus make themselves absolute masters of the whole country4 ,aristides reporting to the ,athenians that the course proposed by ,themistocles was extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable1 the people utterly refused to entertain it4 ,but ,philip of ,macedon would not have so acted1 nor any of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in breaking faith than in any other way4 ,as to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been observed by the other side1 ,i say nothing1 since that is a matter of everyday occurrence1 and ,i am speaking here only of those engagements which are broken off on extraordinary grounds2 but in this respect1 likewise1 ,i believe that commonwealths offend less than princes1 and are therefore more to be trusted4 ,,chapter ,,lx4--,that the ,consulship and all the other ,magistracies in ,rome were given without respect to ,age4 ,it is seen in the course of the ,roman history that1 after the consulship was thrown open to the commons1 the republic conceded this dignity to all its citizens1 without distinction either of age or blood2 nay1 that in this matter respect for age was never made a ground for preference among the ,romans1 whose constant aim it was to discover excellence whether existing in old or young4 ,to this we have the testimony of ,valerius ,corvinus1 himself made consul in his twenty-fourth year1 who1 in addressing his soldiers1 said of the consulship that it was 8the reward not of birth but of desert40 ,whether the course thus followed by the ,romans was well judged or not1 is a question on which much might be said4 ,the concession as to blood1 however1 was made under necessity1 and as ,i have observed on another occasion1 the same necessity which obtained in ,rome1 will be found to obtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which ,rome achieved4 ,for you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold out rewards1 nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards whereof you have held out hopes4 ,it was consequently necessary to extend1 betimes1 to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship1 on which hope they fed themselves for a while1 without actually realizing it4 ,but afterwards the hope alone was not enough1 and it had to be satisfied4 ,for while cities which do not employ men of plebeian birth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained1 as we have seen was the case with ,venice1 may treat these men as they please1 those other cities which desire to do as ,rome did1 cannot make this distinction4 ,and if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood1 nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age4 ,on the contrary1 that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed4 ,for where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence which are is supposed to bring1 it must be1 since the choice rests with the people1 that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble action which he has performed2 but when a young man is of such excellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal achievement1 it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable at once to make use of him1 but had to wait until he had grown old1 and had lost1 with youth1 that alacrity and vigour by which his country might have profited2 as ,rome profited by the services of ,valerius ,corvinus1 of ,scipio1 of ,pompey1 and of many others who triumphed while yet very young4 ,,book ,,ii4 ,,preface4 ,men do always1 but not always with reason1 commend the past and condemn the present1 and are so much the partisans of what has been1 as not merely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the records left by historians1 but also1 when they grow old1 to extol the days in which they remember their youth to have been spent4 ,and although this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one1 ,i can see that there are many causes to account for it2 chief of which ,i take to be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the whole truth1 those circumstances that would detract from the credit of the past being for the most part hidden from us1 while all that gives it lustre is magnified and embellished4 ,for the generality of writers render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors1 that to make their achievements seem more splendid1 they not merely exaggerate the great things they have done1 but also lend such a colour to the actions of their enemies1 that any one born afterwards1 whether in the conquering or in the conquered country1 has cause to marvel at these men and these times1 and is constrained to praise and love them beyond all others4 ,again1 men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy1 these two most powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are past1 because what is past can neither do us hurt1 nor afford occasion for envy4 ,the contrary1 however1 is the case with the things we see1 and in which we take part2 for in these1 from our complete acquaintance with them1 no part of them being hidden from us1 we recognize1 along with much that is good1 much that displeases us1 and so are forced to pronounce them far inferior to the old1 although in truth they deserve far greater praise and admiration4 ,i speak not1 here1 of what relates to the arts1 which have such distinction inherent in them1 that time can give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of themselves4 ,i speak of the lives and manners of men1 touching which the grounds for judging are not so clear4 ,i repeat1 then1 that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising obtains1 but not always true that it is wrong applied4 ,for sometimes it will happen that this judgment is just2 because1 as human affairs are in constant movement1 it must be that they either rise or fall4 ,wherefore1 we may see a city or province furnished with free institutions by some great and wise founder1 flourish for a while through his merits1 and advance steadily on the path of improvement4 ,any one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to praise the past more than the present1 and his error would be occasioned by the causes already noticed4 ,but any one born afterwards in that city or province when the time has come for it to fall away from its former felicity1 would not be mistaken in praising the past4 ,when ,i consider how this happens1 ,i am persuaded that the world1 remaining continually the same1 has in it a constant quantity of good and evil2 but that this good and this evil shift about from one country to another1 as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one nation to another1 according as the manners of these nations changed1 the world1 as a whole1 continuing as before1 and the only difference being that1 whereas at first ,assyria was made the seat of its excellence1 this was afterwards placed in ,media1 then in ,persia1 until at last it was transferred to ,italy and ,rome4 ,and although after the ,roman ,empire1 none has followed which has endured1 or in which the world has centred its whole excellence1 we nevertheless find that excellence diffused among many valiant nations1 the kingdom of the ,franks1 for example1 that of the ,turks1 that of the ,soldan1 and the ,states of ,germany at the present day2 and shared at an earlier time by that sect of the ,saracens who performed so many great achievements and gained so wide a dominion1 after destroying the ,roman ,empire in the ,east4 ,in all these countries1 therefore1 after the decline of the ,roman power1 and among all these races1 there existed1 and in some part of them there yet exists1 that excellence which alone is to be desired and justly to be praised4 ,wherefore1 if any man being born in one of these countries should exalt past times over present1 he might be mistaken2 but any who1 living at the present day in ,italy or ,greece1 has not in ,italy become an ultramontane or in ,greece a ,turk1 has reason to complain of his own times1 and to commend those others1 in which there were many things which made them admirable2 whereas1 now1 no regard being had to religion1 to laws1 or to arms1 but all being tarnished with every sort of shame1 there is nothing to redeem the age from the last extremity of wretchedness1 ignominy1 and disgrace4 ,and the vices of our age are the more odious in that they are practised by those who sit on the judgment seat1 govern the ,state1 and demand public reverence4 ,but1 returning to the matter in hand1 it may be said1 that if the judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or the past is the better in respect of things whereof1 by reason of their antiquity1 they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have of their own times1 it ought not to be at fault in old men when they compare the days of their youth with those of their maturity1 both of which have been alike seen and known by them4 ,this were indeed true1 if men at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way1 and were constantly influenced by the same desires2 but since they alter1 the times1 although they alter not1 cannot but seem different to those who have other desires1 other pleasures1 and other ways of viewing things in their old age from those they had in their youth4 ,for since1 when they grow old1 men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and discernment1 it must needs be that those things which in their youth seemed to them tolerable and good1 should in their old age appear intolerable and evil4 ,and whereas they should ascribe this to their judgment1 they lay the blame upon the times4 ,but1 further1 since the desires of men are insatiable1 ,nature prompting them to desire all things and ,fortune permitting them to enjoy but few1 there results a constant discontent in their minds1 and a loathing of what they possess1 prompting them to find fault with the present1 praise the past1 and long for the future1 even though they be not moved thereto by any reasonable cause4 ,i know not1 therefore1 whether ,i may not deserve to be reckoned in the number of those who thus deceive themselves1 if1 in these ,discourses of mine1 ,i render excessive praise to the ancient times of the ,romans while ,i censure our own4 ,and1 indeed1 were not the excellence which then prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the sun1 ,i should proceed more guardedly in what ,i have to say1 from fear lest in accusing others ,i should myself fall into this self-deception4 ,but since the thing is so plain that every one sees it1 ,i shall be bold to speak freely all ,i think1 both of old times and of new1 in order that the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings1 may be led to shun modern examples1 and be prepared to follow those set by antiquity whenever chance affords the opportunity4 ,for it is the duty of every good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the malice of ,time or of ,fortune has not permitted him to put in practice2 to the end1 that out of many who have the knowledge1 some one better loved by ,heaven may be found able to carry them out4 ,having spoken1 then1 in the foregoing ,book of the various methods followed by the ,romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their city1 in this ,i shall speak of what was done by them to spread their ,empire4 ,,chapter ,i4--,whether the ,empire acquired by the ,romans was more due to ,valour or to ,fortune4 ,many authors1 and among others that most grave historian ,plutarch1 have thought that in acquiring their empire the ,romans were more beholden to their good fortune than to their valour2 and besides other reasons which they give for this opinion1 they affirm it to be proved by the admission of the ,romans themselves1 since their having erected more temples to ,fortune than to any other deity1 shows that it was to her that they ascribed their success4 ,it would seem1 too1 that ,titus ,livius was of the same mind1 since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth of any ,roman in which he discourses of valour1 wherein he does not also make mention of ,fortune4 ,this1 however1 is an opinion with which ,i can in no way concur1 and which1 ,i take it1 cannot be made good4 ,for if no commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the ,roman1 it is because none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that growth4 ,for by the valour of her armies she spread her empire1 while by her conduct of affairs1 and by other methods peculiar to herself and devised by her first founder1 she was able to keep what she acquired1 as shall be fully shown in many of the following ,discourses4 ,the writers to whom ,i have referred assert that it was owing to their good fortune and not to their prudence that the ,romans never had two great wars on their hands at once2 as1 for instance1 that they waged no wars with the ,latins until they had not merely overcome the ,samnites1 but undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered2 nor ever fought with the ,etruscans until they had subjugated the ,latins1 and had almost worn out the ,samnites by frequent defeats2 whereas1 had any two of these powers1 while yet fresh and unexhausted1 united together1 it may easily be believed that the ruin of the ,roman ,republic must have followed4 ,but to whatsoever cause we ascribe it1 it never so chanced that the ,romans engaged in two great wars at the same time4 ,on the contrary1 it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one war1 another was extinguished2 or that on the termination of one1 another broke out4 ,and this we may plainly see from the order in which their wars succeeded one another4 ,for1 omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the ,gauls1 we find that during their struggle with the ,equians and the ,volscians1 and while these two nations continued strong1 no others rose against them4 ,on these being subdued1 there broke out the war with the ,samnites2 and although before the close of that contest the ,latin nations had begun to rebel against ,rome1 nevertheless1 when their rebellion came to a head1 the ,samnites were in league with ,rome1 and helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels2 on whose defeat the war with ,samnium was renewed4 ,when the strength of ,samnium had been drained by repeated reverses1 there followed the war with the ,etruscans2 which ended1 the ,samnites were once more stirred to activity by the coming of ,pyrrhus into ,italy4 ,when he1 too1 had been defeated1 and sent back to ,greece1 ,rome entered on her first war with the ,carthaginians2 which was no sooner over than all the ,gallic nations on both sides of the ,alps combined against the ,romans1 by whom1 in the battle fought between ,populonia and ,pisa1 where now stands the fortress of ,san ,vincenzo1 they were at last routed with tremendous slaughter4 ,this war ended1 for twenty years together the ,romans were engaged in no contest of importance1 their only adversaries being the ,ligurians1 and the remnant of the ,gallic tribes who occupied ,lombardy2 and on this footing things continued down to the second ,carthaginian war1 which for sixteen years kept the whole of ,italy in a blaze4 ,this too being brought to a most glorious termination1 there followed the ,macedonian war1 at the close of which succeeded the war with ,antiochus and ,asia4 ,these subdued1 there remained not in the whole world1 king or people who either singly or together could withstand the power of ,rome4 ,but even before this last victory1 any one observing the order of these wars1 and the method in which they were conducted1 must have recognized not only the good fortune of the ,romans1 but also their extraordinary valour and prudence4 ,and were any one to search for the causes of this good fortune1 he would have little difficulty in finding them1 since nothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so great a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid to engage him single-handed1 and stands in awe of him1 none will ever venture to attack him1 unless driven to do so by necessity2 so that it will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his neighbours1 while he studiously maintains peace with the rest2 who1 on their part1 whether through fear of his power1 or deceived by the methods he takes to dull their vigilance1 are easily kept quiet4 ,distant powers1 in the mean time1 who have no intercourse with either1 treat the matter as too remote to concern them in any way2 and abiding in this error until the conflagration approaches their own doors1 on its arrival have no resource for its extinction1 save in their own strength1 which1 as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly powerful1 no longer suffices4 ,i forbear to relate how the ,samnites stood looking on while the ,romans were subjugating the ,equians and the ,volscians2 and1 to avoid being prolix1 shall content myself with the single instance of the ,carthaginians1 who1 at the time when the ,romans were contending with the ,samnites and ,etruscans1 were possessed of great power and held in high repute1 being already masters of the whole of ,africa together with ,sicily and ,sardinia1 besides occupying territory in various parts of ,spain4 ,and because their empire was so great1 and at such a distance from the ,roman frontier1 they were never led to think of attacking the ,romans or of lending assistance to the ,etruscans or ,samnites4 ,on the contrary1 they behaved towards the ,romans as men behave towards those whom they see prosper1 rather taking their part and courting their friendship4 ,nor did they discover their mistake until the ,romans1 after subduing all the intervening nations1 began to assail their power both in ,spain and ,sicily4 ,what happened in the case of the ,carthaginians1 happened also in the case of the ,gauls1 of ,philip of ,macedon1 and of ,antiochus1 each of whom1 while ,rome was engaged with another of them1 believed that other would have the advantage1 and that there would be time enough to provide for their own safety1 whether by making peace or war4 ,it seems to me1 therefore1 that the same good fortune which1 in this respect1 attended the ,romans1 might be shared by all princes acting as they did1 and of a valour equal to theirs4 ,as bearing on this point1 it might have been proper for me to show what methods were followed by the ,romans in entering the territories of other nations1 had ,i not already spoken of this at length in my ,treatise on ,princedoms1 wherein the whole subject is discussed4 ,here it is enough to say briefly1 that in a new province they always sought for some friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb1 a door through which to pass1 or an instrument wherewith to keep their hold4 ,thus we see them effect their entrance into ,samnium through the ,capuans1 into ,etruria through the ,camertines1 into ,sicily through the ,mamertines1 into ,spain through the ,saguntans1 into ,africa through ,massinissa1 into ,greece through the ,etolians1 into ,asia through ,eumenes and other princes1 into ,gaul through the ,massilians and ,eduans2 and1 in like manner1 never without similar assistance in their efforts whether to acquire provinces or to keep them4 ,the nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to stand in less need of ,fortune's help than others who neglect it4 ,but that all may clearly understand how much more the ,romans were aided by valour than by ,fortune in acquiring their empire1 ,i shall in the following ,chapter consider the character of those nations with whom they had to contend1 and show how stubborn these were in defending their freedom4 ,,chapter ,,ii4--,with what ,nations the ,romans had to contend1 and how stubborn these were in defending their ,freedom4 ,in subduing the countries round about them1 and certain of the more distant provinces1 nothing gave the ,romans so much trouble1 as the love which in those days many nations bore to freedom1 defending it with such obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing valour4 ,for we know by numberless instances1 what perils these nations were ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their freedom1 and what vengeance they took against those who deprived them of it4 ,we know1 too1 from history1 what hurt a people or city suffers from servitude4 ,and though1 at the present day1 there is but one province which can be said to contain within it free cities1 we find that formerly these abounded everywhere4 ,for we learn that in the ancient times of which ,i speak1 from the mountains which divide ,tuscany from ,lombardy down to the extreme point of ,italy1 there dwelt numerous free nations1 such as the ,etruscans1 the ,romans1 and the ,samnites1 besides many others in other parts of the ,peninsula4 ,nor do we ever read of there being any kings over them1 except those who reigned in ,rome1 and ,porsenna1 king of ,etruria4 ,how the line of this last-named prince came to be extinguished1 history does not inform us2 but it is clear that at the time when the ,romans went to besiege ,veii1 ,etruria was free1 and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom1 and so detested the regal name1 that when the ,veientines1 who for their defence had created a king in ,veii1 sought aid from the ,etruscans against ,rome1 these1 after much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while they continued to live under a king2 judging it useless to defend a country given over to servitude by its inhabitants4 ,it is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among nations1 for we know by experience that ,states have never signally increased1 either as to dominion or wealth1 except where they have lived under a free government4 ,and truly it is strange to think to what a pitch of greatness ,athens came during the hundred years after she had freed herself from the despotism of ,pisistratus2 and far stranger to contemplate the marvellous growth which ,rome made after freeing herself from her kings4 ,the cause1 however1 is not far to seek1 since it is the well-being1 not of individuals1 but of the community which makes a ,state great2 and1 without question1 this universal well-being is nowhere secured save in a republic4 ,for a republic will do whatsoever makes for its interest2 and though its measures prove hurtful to this man or to that1 there are so many whom they benefit1 that these are able to carry them out1 in spite of the resistance of the few whom they injure4 ,but the contrary happens in the case of a prince2 for1 as a rule1 what helps him hurts the ,state1 and what helps the ,state hurts him2 so that whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free1 the least evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress1 nor ever increase in power or wealth2 but in most cases1 if not in all1 it will be its fate to go back4 ,or should there chance to arise in it some able tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms1 the advantage which results is to himself only1 and not to the ,state2 since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant1 lest afterwards he should have cause to fear them4 ,nor can he make those cities which he acquires1 subject or tributary to the city over which he rules2 because to make this city powerful is not for his interest1 which lies in keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately recognize him alone as its master4 ,in this way he only1 and not his country1 is the gainer by his conquests4 ,and if any one desire to have this view confirmed by numberless other proofs1 let him look into ,xenophon's treatise ,de ,tirannide4 ,no wonder1 then1 that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with such relentless hatred1 and so passionately loved freedom that its very name was dear to them1 as was seen when ,hieronymus1 grandson of ,hiero the ,syracusan1 was put to death in ,syracuse4 ,for when word of his death reached the army1 which lay encamped not far off1 at first it was greatly moved1 and eager to take up arms against the murderers4 ,but on hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of ,syracuse1 quieted at once by the name1 it laid aside its resentment against those who had slain the tyrant1 and fell to consider how a free government might be provided for the city4 ,nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible vengeance on those who deprived them of their freedom2 of which1 though there be many instances1 ,i mean only to cite one which happened in the city of ,corcyra at the time of the ,peloponnesian war4 ,for ,greece being divided into two factions1 one of which sided with the ,athenians1 the other with the ,spartans1 it resulted that many of its cities were divided against themselves1 some of the citizens seeking the friendship of ,sparta and some of ,athens4 ,in the aforesaid city of ,corcyra1 the nobles getting the upper hand1 deprived the commons of their freedom2 these1 however1 recovering themselves with the help of the ,athenians1 laid hold of the entire body of the nobles1 and cast them into a prison large enough to contain them all1 whence they brought them forth by eight or ten at a time1 pretending that they were to be sent to different places into banishment1 whereas1 in fact1 they put them to death with many circumstances of cruelty4 ,those who were left1 learning what was going on1 resolved to do their utmost to escape this ignominious death1 and arming themselves with what weapons they could find1 defended the door of their prison against all who sought to enter2 till the people1 hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the prison1 dragged down the roof1 and smothered the prisoners in the ruins4 ,many other horrible and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated in ,greece1 show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with more ferocity than a threatened freedom is defended4 ,when ,i consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were so much more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present day1 ,i am led to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes the present generation of men less vigorous and daring than those of ancient times1 namely the difference of the training of the present day from that of earlier ages2 and this1 again1 arises from the different character of the religions then and now prevailing4 ,for our religion1 having revealed to us the truth and the true path1 teaches us to make little account of worldly glory2 whereas1 the ,gentiles1 greatly esteeming it1 and placing therein their highest good1 displayed a greater fierceness in their actions4 ,this we may gather from many of their customs1 beginning with their sacrificial rites1 which were of much magnificence as compared with the simplicity of our worship1 though that be not without a certain dignity of its own1 refined rather than splendid1 and far removed from any tincture of ferocity or violence4 ,in the religious ceremonies of the ancients neither pomp nor splendour were wanting2 but to these was joined the ordinance of sacrifice1 giving occasion to much bloodshed and cruelty4 ,for in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered1 and this being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the worshippers4 ,moreover1 under the old religions none obtained divine honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory1 such as captains of armies and rulers of cities2 whereas our religion glorifies men of a humble and contemplative1 rather than of an active life4 ,accordingly1 while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity1 bodily strength1 and all those other qualities which make men brave1 our religion places it in humility1 lowliness1 and contempt for the things of this world2 or if it ever calls upon us to be brave1 it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do4 ,this manner of life1 therefore1 seems to have made the world feebler1 and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they please2 since the mass of mankind1 in the hope of being received into ,paradise1 think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them4 ,but should it seem that the world has grown effeminate and ,heaven laid aside her arms1 this assuredly results from the baseness of those who have interpreted our religion to accord with indolence and ease rather than with valour4 ,for were we to remember that religion permits the exaltation and defence of our country1 we would see it to be our duty to love and honour it1 and would strive to be able and ready to defend it4 ,this training1 therefore1 and these most false interpretations are the causes why1 in the world of the present day1 we find no longer the numerous commonwealths which were found of old2 and in consequence1 that we see not now among the nations that love of freedom which prevailed then2 though1 at the same time1 ,i am persuaded that one cause of this change has been1 that the ,roman ,empire by its arms and power put an end to all the free ,states and free institutions of antiquity4 ,for although the power of ,rome fell afterwards into decay1 these ,states could never recover their strength or resume their former mode of government1 save in a very few districts of the ,empire4 ,but1 be this as it may1 certain it is that in every country of the world1 even the least considerable1 the ,romans found a league of well-armed republics1 most resolute in the defence of their freedom1 whom it is clear they never could have subdued had they not been endowed with the rarest and most astonishing valour4 ,to cite a single instance1 ,i shall take the case of the ,samnites who1 strange as it may now seem1 were on the admission of ,titus ,livius himself1 so powerful and so steadfast in arms1 as to be able to withstand the ,romans down to the consulship of ,papirius ,cursor1 son to the first ,papirius1 a period of six and forty years1 in spite of numerous defeats1 the loss of many of their towns1 and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere throughout their country4 ,and this is the more remarkable when we see that country1 which once contained so many noble cities1 and supported so great a population1 now almost uninhabited2 and reflect that it formerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its conquest impossible to less than ,roman valour4 ,there is no difficulty1 therefore1 in determining whence that ancient greatness and this modern decay have arisen1 since they can be traced to the free life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which prevails now4 ,for all countries and provinces which enjoy complete freedom1 make1 as ,i have said1 most rapid progress4 ,because1 from marriage being less restricted in these countries1 and more sought after1 we find there a greater population2 every man being disposed to beget as many children as he thinks he can rear1 when he has no anxiety lest they should be deprived of their patrimony1 and knows not only that they are born to freedom and not to slavery1 but that they may rise by their merit to be the first men of their country4 ,in such ,states1 accordingly1 we see wealth multiply1 both that which comes from agriculture and that which comes from manufactures4 ,for all love to gather riches and to add to their possessions when their enjoyment of them is not likely to be disturbed4 ,and hence it happens that the citizens of such ,states vie with one another in whatever tends to promote public or private well-being2 in both of which1 consequently1 there is a wonderful growth4 ,but the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live in servitude1 and the more oppressive their servitude1 the more they fall short of the good which all desire4 ,and the hardest of all hard servitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another4 ,first1 because it is more lasting1 and there is less hope to escape from it2 and1 second1 because every commonwealth seeks to add to its own strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside4 ,a prince who gets the better of you will not treat you after this fashion1 unless he be a barbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries waste and destroy the labours of civilization2 but if influenced by the ordinary promptings of humanity1 will1 as a rule1 regard all his subject ,states with equal favour1 and suffer them to pursue their usual employments1 and retain almost all their ancient institutions1 so that if they flourish not as free ,states might1 they do not dwindle as ,states that are enslaved2 by which ,i mean enslaved by a stranger1 for of that other slavery to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens1 ,i have already spoken4 ,whoever1 therefore1 shall well consider what has been said above1 will not be astonished at the power possessed by the ,samnites while they were still free1 nor at the weakness into which they fell when they were subjugated4 ,of which change in their fortunes ,livius often reminds us1 and particularly in connection with the war with ,hannibal1 where he relates that the ,samnites1 being ill-treated by a ,roman legion quartered at ,nola1 sent legates to ,hannibal to ask his aid2 who in laying their case before him told him1 that with their own soldiers and captains they had fought single handed against the ,romans for a hundred years1 and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular armies2 but had now fallen so low1 that they were scarce able to defend themselves against one poor legion4 ,,chapter ,,iii4--,that ,rome became great by destroying the ,cities which lay round about her1 and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of ,citizenship4 8,crescit interea ,roma ,alb ruinis0--,meanwhile ,rome grows on the ruins of ,alba4 ,they who would have their city become a great empire1 must endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants2 for without a numerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful4 ,this may be effected in two ways1 by gentleness or by force4 ,by gentleness1 when you offer a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to come and dwell in your city1 so as to encourage them to come there of their own accord2 by force1 when after destroying neighbouring towns1 you transplant their inhabitants to live in yours4 ,both of these methods were practised by ,rome1 and with such success1 that in the time of her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens fit to bear arms4 ,for the ,romans loved to follow the methods of the skilful husbandman1 who1 to insure a plant growing big and yielding and maturing its fruit1 cuts off the first shoots it sends out1 that the strength remaining in the stem1 it may in due season put forth new and more vigorous and more fruitful branches4 ,and that this was a right and a necessary course for ,rome to take for establishing and extending her empire1 is proved by the example of ,sparta and ,athens1 which1 although exceedingly well-armed ,states1 and regulated by excellent laws1 never reached the same greatness as the ,roman ,republic2 though the latter1 to all appearance1 was more turbulent and disorderly than they1 and1 so far as laws went1 not so perfectly governed4 ,for this we can offer no other explanation than that already given4 ,for by augmenting the numbers of her citizens in both the ways named1 ,rome was soon able to place two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms2 while neither ,sparta nor ,athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand2 and this1 not because the situation of these countries was less advantageous than that of ,rome1 but simply from the difference in the methods they followed4 ,for ,lycurgus1 the founder of the ,spartan ,republic1 thinking nothing so likely to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens1 did all he could to prevent intercourse with strangers2 with which object1 besides refusing these the right to marry1 the right of citizenship1 and all such other social rights as induce men to become members of a community1 he ordained that in this republic of his the only money current should be of leather1 so that none might be tempted to repair thither to trade or to carry on any art4 ,under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that ,state could never much increase4 ,for as all our actions imitate nature1 and it is neither natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a great branch1 so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or countries stronger than herself2 or1 doing so1 will resemble the tree whose boughs being greater than its trunk1 are supported with difficulty1 and snapped by every gust of wind4 ,as it proved with ,sparta4 ,for after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of ,greece1 no sooner did ,thebes rebel than all the others rebelled likewise1 and the trunk was left stripped of its boughs4 ,but this could not have happened with ,rome1 whose stem was mighty enough to bear any branch with ease4 ,it was1 therefore1 by adding to her population1 and by1 adopting certain other methods presently to be noticed1 that ,rome became so great and powerful4 ,and this is well expressed by ,titus ,livius1 in the words1 8,crescit interea ,roma ,albae ruinis40 ,,chapter ,,iv4--,that ,commonwealths have followed three ,methods for extending their ,power4 ,any one who has read ancient history with attention1 must have observed that three methods have been used by republics for extending their power4 ,one of these1 followed by the old ,etruscans1 is to form a confederation of many ,states1 wherein none has precedence over the rest in authority or rank1 and each allows the others to share its acquisitions2 as do the ,states of the ,swiss ,league in our days1 and as the ,achaians and ,etolians did in ,greece in earlier times4 ,and because the ,etruscans were opposed to the ,romans in many wars1 that ,i may give a clearer notion of this method of theirs1 ,i shall enlarge a little in my account of the ,etruscan people4 ,in ,italy1 before the ,romans became supreme1 the ,etruscans were very powerful1 both by sea and land2 and although we have no separate history of their affairs1 we have some slight records left us of them1 and some indications of their greatness4 ,we know1 for instance1 that they planted a colony1 to which they gave the name of ,hadria1 on the coast of the upper sea2 which colony became so renowned that it lent its name to the sea itself1 which to this day by the ,latins is called the ,hadriatic4 ,we know1 too1 that their arms were obeyed from the ,tiber to the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater part of the ,italian peninsula2 although1 two hundred years before ,rome grew to any great strength1 they had lost their supremacy in the province now known as ,lombardy1 of which the ,french had possessed themselves4 ,for that people1 whether driven by necessity1 or attracted by the excellence of the fruits1 and still more of the wine of ,italy1 came there under their chief1 ,bellovesus2 and after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of the country1 settled themselves therein1 and there built many cities2 calling the district ,gallia1 after the name they then bore3 and this territory they retained until they were subdued by the ,romans4 ,these ,etruscans1 therefore1 living with one another on a footing of complete equality1 when they sought to extend their power1 followed that first method of which ,i have just now spoken4 ,their ,state was made up of twelve cities1 among which were ,chiusi1 ,veii1 ,friuli1 ,arezzo1 ,volterra1 and the like1 and their government was conducted in the form of a league4 ,they could not1 however1 extend their conquests beyond ,italy2 while even within the limits of ,italy1 much territory remained unoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed4 ,the second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions1 taking heed1 however1 to retain in your own hands the chief command1 the seat of government1 and the titular supremacy4 ,this was the method followed by the ,romans4 ,the third method is to hold other ,states in direct subjection to you1 and not merely associated with you as companions2 and this was the plan pursued by the ,spartans and ,athenians4 ,of these three methods1 the last is wholly useless1 as was seen in the case of the two ,states named1 which came to ruin from no other cause than that they had acquired a dominion greater than they could maintain4 ,for to undertake to govern cities by force1 especially such cities as have been used to live in freedom1 is a difficult and arduous task1 in which you never can succeed without an army and that a great one4 ,but to have such an army you must needs have associates who will help to swell the numbers of your own citizens4 ,and because ,athens and ,sparta neglected this precaution1 whatever they did was done in vain2 whereas ,rome1 which offers an instance of the second of the methods we are considering1 by attending to this precaution reached a power that had no limit4 ,and as she alone has lived in this way1 so she alone has attained to this pitch of power4 ,for joining with herself many ,states throughout ,italy as her companions1 who in most respects lived with her on a footing of equality1 while1 as has been noted1 always reserving to herself the seat of empire and the titular command1 it came about that these ,states1 without being aware of it1 by their own efforts1 and with their own blood1 wrought out their own enslavement4 ,for when ,rome began to send armies out of ,italy1 for the purpose of reducing foreign kingdoms to provinces1 and of subjugating nations who1 being used to live under kings1 were not impatient of her yoke1 and who1 receiving ,roman governors1 and having been conquered by armies bearing the ,roman name1 recognized no masters save the ,romans1 those companions of ,rome who dwelt in ,italy suddenly found themselves surrounded by ,roman subjects1 and weighed down by the greatness of the ,roman power2 and when at last they came to perceive the mistake in which they had been living1 it was too late to remedy it1 so vast was the authority which ,rome had then obtained over foreign countries1 and so great the resources which she possessed within herself2 having by this time grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of ,states4 ,so that although these her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by conspiring against her1 they were soon defeated in the attempt1 and remained in a worse plight than before1 since they too became subjects and no longer associates4 ,this method1 then1 as ,i have said1 was followed by the ,romans alone2 but no other plan can be pursued by a republic which desires to extend its power2 experience having shown none other so safe and certain4 ,the method which consists in forming leagues1 of which ,i have spoken above as having been adopted by the ,etruscans1 the ,achaians1 and the ,etolians of old1 and in our own days by the ,swiss1 is the next best after that followed by the ,romans1 for as in this way there can be no great extension of power1 two advantages result3 first1 that you do not readily involve yourself in war2 and1 second1 that you can easily preserve any little acquisition which you may make4 ,the reason why you cannot greatly extend your power is1 that as your league is made up of separate ,states with distinct seats of government1 it is difficult for these to consult and resolve in concert4 ,the same causes make these ,states careless to enlarge their territories2 because acquisitions which have to be shared among many communities are less thought of than those made by a single republic which looks to enjoy them all to itself4 ,again1 since leagues govern through general councils1 they must needs be slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one frontier4 ,moreover1 we find from experience that this method has certain fixed limits beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed2 by which ,i mean that some twelve or fourteen communities may league themselves together1 but will never seek to pass beyond that limit3 for after associating themselves in such numbers as seem to them to secure their safety against all besides1 they desire no further extension of their power1 partly because no necessity compels them to extend1 and partly because1 for the reasons already given1 they would find no profit in extending4 ,for were they to seek extension they would have to follow one of two courses3 either continuing to admit new members to their league1 whose number must lead to confusion2 or else making subjects1 a course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty in making them1 and no great good in having them4 ,wherefore1 when their number has so increased that their safety seems secured1 they have recourse to two expedients3 either receiving other ,states under their protection and engaging for their defence 7in which way they obtain money from various quarters which they can easily distribute among themselves72 or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign ,states1 and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them to carry out his enterprises2 as we see done by the ,swiss at the present day1 and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of those nations whom we have named above4 ,to which we have a witness in ,titus ,livius1 who relates that when ,philip of ,macedon came to treat with ,titus ,quintius ,flamininus1 and while terms were being discussed in the presence of a certain ,etolian captain1 this man coming to words with ,philip1 the latter taunted him with greed and bad faith2 telling him that the ,etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one side1 and then send their men to serve on the other2 so that often the banner of ,etolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps4 ,we see1 therefore1 that the method of proceeding by leagues has always been of the same character1 and has led always to the same results4 ,we see1 likewise1 that the method which proceeds by reducing ,states to direct subjection has constantly proved a weak one1 and produced insignificant gains2 and that whenever these gains have passed a certain limit1 ruin has ensued4 ,and if the latter of these two methods be of little utility among armed ,states1 among those that are unarmed1 as is now the case with the republics of ,italy1 it is worse than useless4 ,we may conclude1 therefore1 that the true method was that followed by the ,romans2 which is the more remarkable as we find none who adopted it before they did1 and none who have followed it since4 ,as for leagues1 ,i know of no nations who have had recourse to them in recent times except the ,swiss and the ,suevians4 ,but to bring my remarks on this head to an end1 ,i affirm that all the various methods followed by the ,romans in conducting their affairs1 whether foreign or domestic1 so far from being imitated in our day1 have been held of no account1 some pronouncing them to be mere fables1 some thinking them impracticable1 others out of place and unprofitable2 and so1 abiding in this ignorance1 we rest a prey to all who have chosen to invade our country4 ,but should it seem difficult to tread in the footsteps of the ,romans1 it ought not to appear so hard1 especially for us ,tuscans1 to imitate the ,tuscans of antiquity1 who if1 from the causes already assigned1 they failed to establish an empire like that of ,rome1 succeeded in acquiring in ,italy that degree of power which their method of acting allowed1 and which they long preserved in security1 with the greatest renown in arms and government1 and the highest reputation for manners and religion4 ,this power and this glory of theirs were first impaired by the ,gauls1 and afterwards extinguished by the ,romans1 and so utterly extinguished1 that of the ,etruscan ,empire1 so splendid two thousand years ago1 we have at the present day barely a record4 ,this it is which has led me to inquire whence this oblivion of things arises1 a question of which ,i shall treat in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,v4--,that changes in ,sects and ,tongues1 and the happening of ,floods and ,pestilences1 obliterate the ,memory of the ,past4 ,to those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from all eternity1 it were1 ,i think1 a good answer1 that if what they say be true we ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand years2 did it not appear that the memory of past times is blotted out by a variety of causes1 some referable to men1 and some to ,heaven4 ,among the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and tongues2 because when a new sect1 that is to say a new religion1 comes up1 its first endeavour1 in order to give itself reputation1 is to efface the old2 and should it so happen that the founders of the new religion speak another tongue1 this may readily be effected4 ,this we know from observing the methods which ,christianity has followed in dealing with the religion of the ,gentiles1 for we find that it has abolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship1 and obliterated every trace of the ancient belief4 ,true1 it has not succeeded in utterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who held that belief2 and this because the propagators of the new faith1 retaining the ,latin tongue1 were constrained to use it in writing the new law2 for could they have written this in a new tongue1 we may infer1 having regard to their other persecutions1 that no record whatever would have survived to us of past events4 ,for any one who reads of the methods followed by ,saint ,gregory and the other heads of the ,christian religion1 will perceive with what animosity they pursued all ancient memorials2 burning the works of poets and historians2 breaking images2 and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of antiquity4 ,so that if to this persecution a new language had been joined1 it must soon have been found that everything was forgotten4 ,we may believe1 therefore1 that what ,christianity has sought to effect against the sect of the ,gentiles1 was actually effected by that sect against the religion which preceded theirs2 and that1 from the repeated changes of belief which have taken place in the course of five or six thousand years1 the memory of what happened at a remote date has perished1 or1 if any trace of it remain1 has come to be regarded as a fable to which no credit is due2 like the ,chronicle of ,diodorus ,siculus1 which1 professing to give an account of the events of forty or fifty thousand years1 is held1 and ,i believe justly1 a lying tale4 ,as for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to ,heaven1 they are those which make havoc of the human race1 and reduce the population of certain parts of the world to a very small number4 ,this happens by plague1 famine1 or flood1 of which three the last is the most hurtful1 as well because it is the most universal1 as because those saved are generally rude and ignorant mountaineers1 who possessing no knowledge of antiquity themselves1 can impart none to those who come after them4 ,or if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed of such knowledge1 to give himself consequence and credit1 he will conceal and pervert it to suit his private ends1 so that to his posterity there will remain only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate1 and no more4 ,that these floods1 plagues1 and famines do in fact happen1 ,i see no reason to doubt1 both because we find all histories full of them1 and recognize their effect in this oblivion of the past1 and also because it is reasonable that such things should happen4 ,for as when much superfluous matter has gathered in simple bodies1 nature makes repeated efforts to remove and purge it away1 thereby promoting the health of these bodies1 so likewise as regards that composite body the human race1 when every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that they can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere1 every region being equally crowded and over-peopled1 and when human craft and wickedness have reached their highest pitch1 it must needs come about that the world will purge herself in one or another of these three ways1 to the end that men1 becoming few and contrite1 may amend their lives and live with more convenience4 ,etruria1 then1 as has been said above1 was at one time powerful1 abounding in piety and valour1 practising her own customs1 and speaking her own tongue2 but all this was effaced by the power of ,rome1 so that1 as ,i have observed already1 nothing is left of her but the memory of a name4 ,,chapter ,,vi4--,of the ,methods followed by the ,romans in making ,war4 ,having treated of the methods followed by the ,romans for increasing their power1 we shall now go on to consider those which they used in making war2 and in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned aside from the common path in order to render their progress to supreme greatness easy4 ,whosoever makes war1 whether from policy or ambition1 means to acquire and to hold what he acquires1 and to carry on the war he has undertaken in such a manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native country and ,state4 ,it is necessary1 therefore1 whether for acquiring or holding1 to consider how cost may be avoided1 and everything done most advantageously for the public welfare4 ,but whoever would effect all this1 must take the course and follow the methods of the ,romans2 which consisted1 first of all1 in making their wars1 as the ,french say1 great and short4 ,for entering the field with strong armies1 they brought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the ,latins1 the ,samnites1 or the ,etruscans4 ,and if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged1 from the foundation of their city down to the siege of ,veii1 all will be seen to have been quickly ended some in twenty1 some in ten1 and some in no more than six days4 ,and this was their wont3 ,so soon as war was declared they would go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at once deliver battle4 ,the enemy1 on being routed1 to save their country from pillage1 very soon came to terms1 when the ,romans would take from them certain portions of their territory4 ,these they either assigned to particular persons1 or made the seat of a colony1 which being settled on the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to the ,roman frontier1 to the advantage both of the colonists who had these lands given them1 and of the ,roman people whose borders were thus guarded at no expense to themselves4 ,and no other system of defence could have been at once so safe1 so strong1 and so effectual4 ,for while the enemy were not actually in the field1 this guard was sufficient2 and when they came out in force to overwhelm the colony1 the ,romans also went forth in strength and gave them battle2 and getting the better of them1 imposed harder terms than before1 and so returned home4 ,and in this way they came gradually to establish their name abroad1 and to add to their power4 ,these methods they continued to employ until they changed their system of warfare1 which they did during the siege of ,veii2 when to enable them to carry on a prolonged war1 they passed a law for the payment of their soldiers1 whom1 up to that time they had not paid1 nor needed to pay1 because till then their wars had been of brief duration4 ,nevertheless1 while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might thus wage longer wars1 and keep their armies longer in the field when employed on distant enterprises1 they never departed from their old plan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and circumstances allowed1 nor ever ceased to plant colonies4 ,their custom of terminating their wars with despatch1 besides being natural to the ,romans1 was strengthened by the ambition of their consuls1 who1 being appointed for twelve months only1 six of which they had to spend in the city1 were eager to bring their wars to an end as rapidly as they could1 that they might enjoy the honours of a triumph4 ,the usage of planting colonies was recommended by the great advantage and convenience which resulted from it4 ,in dealing with the spoils of warfare their practice1 no doubt1 in a measure changed1 so that in this respect they were not afterwards so liberal as they were at first2 partly1 because liberality did not seem so necessary when their soldiers were in receipt of pay2 and1 partly1 because the spoils themselves being greater than before1 they thought by their help so to enrich the public treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without taxing the city2 and1 in fact1 by pursuing this course the public revenues were soon greatly augmented4 ,the methods thus followed by the ,romans in dividing plunder and in planting colonies had1 accordingly1 this result1 that whereas other less prudent princes and republics are impoverished by war1 ,rome was enriched by it2 nay1 so far was the system carried1 that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he brought back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and spoils of every kind4 ,by methods such as these1 at one time bringing their wars to a rapid conclusion by invasion and actual defeat1 at another wearing out an enemy by protracted hostilities1 and again by concluding peace on advantageous terms1 the ,romans continually grew richer and more powerful4 ,,chapter ,,vii4--,of the ,quantity of ,land assigned by the ,romans to each ,colonist4 ,it would1 ,i think1 be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the ,romans allotted to each colonist1 for my belief is that they gave more or less according to the character of the country to which they sent them4 ,we may1 however1 be sure that in every instance1 and to whatever country they were sent1 the quantity of land assigned was not very large3 first1 because1 these colonists being sent to guard the newly acquired country1 by giving little land it became possible to send more men2 and second because1 as the ,romans lived frugally at home1 it is unreasonable to suppose that they should wish their countrymen to be too well off abroad4 ,and ,titus ,livius tells us that on the capture of ,veii1 the ,romans sent thither a colony1 allotting to each colonist three jugera and seven unciae of land1 which1 according to our measurement would be something under two acres4 ,besides the above reasons1 the ,romans may likely enough have thought that it was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its careful cultivation that would make it suffice4 ,it is very necessary1 however1 that every colony should have common pasturage where all may send their cattle to graze1 as well as woods where they may cut fuel2 for without such conveniences no colony can maintain itself4 ,,chapter ,,viii4--,why certain ,nations leave their ancestral ,seats and overflow the ,countries of others4 ,having spoken above of the methods followed by the ,romans in making war1 and related how the ,etruscans were attacked by the ,gauls1 it seems to me not foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two kinds4 ,one kind of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or republics who seek to extend their dominions4 ,such were the wars waged by ,alexander the ,great1 and by the ,romans1 and such are those which we see every day carried on by one potentate against another4 ,wars of this sort have their dangers1 but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants of a country2 what the conqueror seeks being merely the submission of the conquered people1 whom1 generally speaking1 he suffers to retain their laws1 and always their houses and goods4 ,the other species of war is when an entire people1 with all the families of which it is made up1 being driven out by famine or defeat1 removes from its former seat1 and goes in search of a new abode and a new country1 not simply with the view to establish dominion over it1 but to possess it as its own1 and to expel or exterminate the former inhabitants4 ,of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare ,sallust speaks at the end of his history of the war with ,jugurtha1 where in mentioning that after the defeat of ,jugurtha the movement of the ,gauls into ,italy began to be noticed1 he observes that 8in the wars of the ,romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery2 but that always in their wars with the ,gauls the struggle on both sides was for life40 ,for a prince or commonwealth1 when attacking another ,state1 will be content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs2 but an entire people1 set in motion in the manner described1 must destroy all who oppose them1 since their object is to subsist on that whereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted4 ,the ,romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars2 the first being that in which their city was actually captured by those ,gauls who1 as already mentioned1 had previously taken ,lombardy from the ,etruscans and made it their seat1 and for whose invasion ,titus ,livius has assigned two causes4 ,first1 that they were attracted1 as ,i have said before1 by the fruitful soil and by the wine of ,italy which they had not in ,gaul2 second1 that their population having multiplied so greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home1 the princes of their land decided that certain of their number should go forth to seek a new abode2 and so deciding1 chose as leaders of those who were to go1 two ,gaulish chiefs1 ,bellovesus and ,siccovesus2 the former of whom came into ,italy while the latter passed into ,spain4 ,from the immigration under ,bellovesus resulted the occupation of ,lombardy1 and1 subsequently1 the first war of the ,gauls with ,rome4 ,at a later date1 and after the close of the first war with ,carthage1 came the second ,gallic invasion1 when more than two hundred thousand ,gauls perished in battle between ,piombino and ,pisa4 ,the third of these wars broke out on the descent into ,italy of the ,todi and ,cimbri1 who1 after defeating several ,roman armies1 were themselves defeated by ,marius4 ,in these three most dangerous contests the arms of ,rome prevailed2 but no ordinary valour was needed for their success4 ,for we see afterwards1 when the spirit of the ,romans had declined1 and their armies had lost their former excellence1 their supremacy was overthrown by men of the same race1 that is to say by the ,goths1 the ,vandals1 and others like them1 who spread themselves over the whole of the ,western ,empire4 ,nations such as these1 quit1 as ,i have said1 their native land1 when forced by famine1 or by defeat in domestic wars1 to seek a new habitation elsewhere4 ,when those thus driven forth are in large numbers1 they violently invade the territories of other nations1 slaughtering the inhabitants1 seizing on their possessions1 founding new kingdoms1 and giving new names to provinces2 as was done by ,moses1 and by those tribes who overran the ,roman ,empire4 ,for the new names which we find in ,italy and elsewhere1 have no other origin than in their having been given by these new occupants2 as when the countries formerly known as ,gallia ,cisalpina and ,gallia ,transalpina took the names of ,lombardy and ,france1 from the ,lombards and the ,franks who settled themselves there4 ,in the same way ,sclavonia was formerly known as ,illyria1 ,hungary as ,pannonia1 and ,england as ,britain2 while many other provinces which it would be tedious to enumerate1 have similarly changed their designations2 as when the name ,juda was given by ,moses to that part of ,syria of which he took possession4 ,and since ,i have said above that nations such as those ,i have been describing1 are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes1 and forced to seek a new country elsewhere1 ,i shall cite the instance of the ,maurusians1 a people who anciently dwelt in ,syria1 but hearing of the inroad of the ,hebrews1 and thinking themselves unable to resist them1 chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their country in a vain effort to defend it4 ,for which reason1 removing with their families1 they went to ,africa1 where1 after driving out the native inhabitants1 they took up their abode2 and although they could not defend their own country1 were able to possess themselves of a country belonging to others4 ,and ,procopius1 who writes the history of the war which ,belisarius conducted against those ,vandals who seized on ,africa1 relates1 that on certain pillars standing in places where the ,maurusians once dwelt1 he had read inscriptions in these words3 8,we ,maurusians who fled before ,joshua1 the robber1 the son of ,nun20#g giving us to know the cause of their quitting ,syria4 ,be this as it may1 nations thus driven forth by a supreme necessity1 are1 if they be in great number1 in the highest degree dangerous1 and cannot be successfully withstood except by a people who excel in arms4 #g ,nos ,maurusii qui fugimus a facie ,jesu latronis filii ,nav4 ,procop4 ,hist4 ,bell4 ,vand4 ,,ii4 ,when those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers1 they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom ,i have been speaking1 since they cannot use the same violence1 but must trust to their address to procure them a habitation2 and1 after procuring it1 must live with their neighbours as friends and companions1 as we find neas1 ,dido1 the ,massilians1 and others like them to have lived2 all of whom contrived to maintain themselves in the districts in which they settled1 by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations4 ,almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to be from the cold and barren region of ,scythia1 because from the population there being excessive1 and the soil ill able to support them1 they are forced to quit their home1 many causes operating to drive them forth and none to keep them back4 ,and if1 for the last five hundred years1 it has not happened that any of these nations has actually overrun another country1 there are various reasons to account for it4 ,first1 the great clearance which that region made of its inhabitants during the decline of the ,roman ,empire1 when more than thirty nations issued from it in succession2 and next1 the circumstance that the countries of ,germany and ,hungary1 whence also these nations came1 are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort1 and consequently are not constrained to shift their habitations4 ,besides which1 since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race1 they serve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring ,scythians1 who for this reason do not venture to attack them1 nor attempt to force a passage4 ,nevertheless1 movements on a great scale have oftentimes been begun by the ,tartars1 and been at once withstood by the ,hungarians and ,poles1 whose frequent boast it is1 that but for them1 ,italy and the ,church would more than once have felt the weight of the ,tartar arms4 ,of the nations of whom ,i have been speaking1 ,i shall now say no more4 ,,chapter ,,ix4--,of the ,causes which commonly give rise to ,wars between ,states4 ,the occasion which led to war between the ,romans and ,samnites1 who for long had been in league with one another1 is of common occurrence in all powerful ,states1 being either brought about by accident1 or else purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot4 ,as between the ,romans and the ,samnites1 the occasion of war was accidental4 ,for in making war upon the ,sidicinians and afterwards on the ,campanians1 the ,samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the ,romans4 ,but the ,campanians being overpowered1 and1 contrary to the expectation of ,romans and ,samnites alike1 resorting to ,rome for aid1 the ,romans1 on whose protection they threw themselves1 were forced to succour them as dependants1 and to accept a war which1 it seemed to them1 they could not with honour decline4 ,for though they might have thought it unreasonable to be called on to defend the ,campanians as friends against their own friends the ,samnites1 it seemed to them shameful not to defend them as subjects1 or as a people who had placed themselves under their protection4 ,for they reasoned that to decline their defence would close the gate against all others who at any future time might desire to submit themselves to their power4 ,and1 accordingly1 since glory and empire1 and not peace1 were the ends which they always had in view1 it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship4 ,a similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the ,carthaginians1 namely the protectorate assumed by the ,romans of the citizens of ,messina in ,sicily1 and this likewise came about by chance4 ,but the second war with ,carthage was not the result of chance4 ,for ,hannibal the ,carthaginian general attacked the ,saguntans1 who were the friends of ,rome in ,spain1 not from any desire to injure them1 but in order to set the arms of ,rome in motion1 and so gain an opportunity of engaging the ,romans in a war1 and passing on into ,italy4 ,this method of picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful ,states when they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations4 ,for if ,i desire to make war on a prince with whom ,i am under an ancient and binding treaty1 ,i shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the friend of that prince1 very well knowing that when ,i attack his friend1 either the prince will resent it1 when my scheme for engaging him in war will be realized2 or that1 should he not resent it1 his weakness or baseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made apparent2 either of which alternatives will discredit him1 and further my designs4 ,we are to note1 therefore1 in connection with this submission of the ,campanians1 what has just now been said as to provoking another power to war2 and also the remedy open to a ,state which1 being unequal to its own defence1 is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant1--that remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects for its defender2 as the ,campanians gave themselves up to the ,romans1 and as the ,florentines gave themselves up to ,king ,robert of ,naples1 who1 after refusing to defend them as his friends against ,castruccio of ,lucca by whom they were hard pressed1 defended them as his subjects4 ,,chapter ,x4--,that contrary to the vulgar opinion1 ,money is not the ,sinews of ,war4 ,since any man may begin a war at his pleasure1 but cannot at his pleasure bring it to a close1 a prince before he engages in any warlike enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself accordingly4 ,but he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to his strength1 which he will always do1 if he measure it by money1 by advantage of position1 or by the good-will of his subjects1 while he is unprovided with an army of his own4 ,these are things which may swell your strength but do not constitute it1 being in themselves null and of no avail without an army on which you can depend4 ,without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants1 the natural strength of your country will not protect you1 and the fidelity and attachment of your subjects will not endure1 since it is impossible that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them4 ,lakes1 and mountains1 and the most inaccessible strongholds1 where valiant defenders are wanting1 become no better than the level plain2 and money1 so far from being a safeguard1 is more likely to leave you a prey to your enemy2 since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion which affirms it to be the sinews of war4 ,this opinion is put forward by ,quintus ,curtius1 where1 in speaking of the war between ,antipater the ,macedonian and the ,king of ,sparta1 he relates that the latter1 from want of money1 was constrained to give battle and was defeated2 whereas1 could he have put off fighting for a few days the news of ,alexander's death would have reached ,greece1 and he might have had a victory without a battle4 ,but lacking money1 and fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him1 he was forced to hazard an engagement4 ,it was for this reason that ,quintus ,curtius declared money to be the sinews of war1 a maxim every day cited and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be4 ,for building upon this1 they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great treasures2 not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed for victory1 ,darius of old had conquered ,alexander1 the ,greeks the ,romans1 and in our own times ,charles of ,burgundy the ,swiss2 while the pope and the ,florentines together would have had little difficulty in defeating ,francesco ,maria1 nephew of ,pope ,julius ,,ii41 in the recent war of ,urbino2 and yet1 in every one of these instances1 the victory remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist1 not in money1 but in good soldiers4 ,croesus1 king of ,lydia1 after showing ,solon the ,athenian much besides1 at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house1 and asked him what he thought of his power4 ,whereupon ,solon answered that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these treasures1 for as war is made with iron and not with gold1 another coming with more iron might carry off his gold4 ,after the death of ,alexander the ,great a tribe of ,gauls1 passing through ,greece on their way into ,asia1 sent envoys to the ,king of ,macedonia to treat for terms of accord2 when the king1 to dismay them by a display of his resources1 showed them great store of gold and silver4 ,but these barbarians1 when they saw all this wealth1 in their greed to possess it1 though before they had looked on peace as settled1 broke off negotiations2 and thus the king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his defence4 ,in like manner1 not many years ago1 the ,venetians1 with a full treasury1 lost their whole dominions without deriving the least advantage from their wealth4 ,i maintain1 therefore1 that it is not gold1 as is vulgarly supposed1 that is the sinews of war1 but good soldiers2 or while gold by itself will not gain you good soldiers1 good soldiers may readily get you gold4 ,had the ,romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron all the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having regard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they had to overcome in carrying them out4 ,but making their wars with iron they never felt any want of gold2 for those who stood in fear of them brought gold into their camp4 ,and supposing it true that the ,spartan king was forced by lack of money to risk the chances of a battle1 it only fared with him in respect of money as it has often fared with others from other causes2 since we see that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must either fight or perish by famine1 it will always fight1 as being the more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile4 ,so1 too1 it has often happened that a captain1 seeing his enemy about to be reinforced1 has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at once deliver battle1 or else1 waiting till the reinforcement is complete1 to fight then1 whether he will or no1 and at whatever disadvantage4 ,we find also1 as in the case of ,hasdrubal when beset1 in the ,march of ,ancona1 at once by ,claudius ,nero and by the other ,roman consul1 that a captain1 when he must either fight or fly1 will always fight1 since it will seem to him that by this course1 however hazardous1 he has at least a chance of victory1 while by the other his ruin is certain4 ,there are many circumstances1 therefore1 which may force a captain to give battle contrary to his intention1 among which the want of money may sometimes be one4 ,but this is no ground for pronouncing money to be the sinews of war1 any more than those other things from the want of which men are reduced to the same necessity4 ,once more1 therefore1 ,i repeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war4 ,money1 indeed1 is most necessary in a secondary place2 but this necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply1 since it is as impossible that good soldiers should lack money1 as that money by itself should secure good soldiers4 ,and that what ,i say is true is shown by countless passages in history4 ,when ,pericles persuaded the ,athenians to declare war against the whole ,peloponnesus1 assuring them that their dexterity1 aided by their wealth1 was sure to bring them off victorious1 the ,athenians1 though for a while they prospered in this war1 in the end were overpowered1 the prudent counsels and good soldiers of ,sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and wealth of ,athens4 ,but1 indeed1 there can be no better witness to the truth of my contention than ,titus ,livius himself4 ,for in that passage of his history wherein he discusses whether if ,alexander the ,great had invaded ,italy1 he would have succeeded in vanquishing the ,romans1 three things are noted by him as essential to success in war2 to wit1 many and good soldiers1 prudent captains1 and favourable fortune2 and after examining whether the ,romans or ,alexander would have had the advantage in each of these three particulars1 he arrives at his conclusion without any mention of money4 ,the ,campanians1 therefore1 when asked by the ,sidicinians to arm in their behalf1 must have measured their strength by wealth and not by soldiers2 for after declaring in their favour and suffering two defeats1 to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to ,rome4 ,,chapter ,,xi4--,that it were unwise to ally yourself a ,prince who has ,reputation rather than ,strength4 ,to mark the mistake made by the ,sidicinians in trusting to the protection of the ,campanians1 and by the ,campanians in supposing themselves able to protect the ,sidicinians1 ,titus ,livius could not have expressed himself in apter words than by saying1 that 8the ,campanians rather lent their name to the ,sidicinians than furnished any substantial aid towards their defence40 ,here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a distance have no facility1 or who from their own embarrassments1 or from other causes1 have no ability to render aid1 afford rather reputation than protection to those who put their trust in them4 ,as was the case in our own times with the ,florentines1 when1 in the year #adgi1 they were attacked by the ,pope and the ,king of ,naples4 ,for being friends of the ,french king they drew from that friendship more reputation than help4 ,the same would be the case with that prince who should engage in any enterprise in reliance on the ,emperor ,maximilian1 his being one of those friendships which1 in the words of our historian1 nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt4 ,on this occasion1 therefore1 the ,campanians were misled by imagining themselves stronger than they really were4 ,for often1 from defect of judgment1 men take upon them to defend others1 when they have neither skill nor ability to defend themselves4 ,of which we have a further instance in the ,tarentines1 who1 when the ,roman and ,samnite armies were already drawn up against one another for battle1 sent messengers to the ,roman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two nations1 and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the two first began hostilities4 ,the consul1 laughing at their threats1 in the presence of the messengers1 ordered the signal for battle to sound1 and bade his army advance to meet the enemy2 showing the ,tarentines by acts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved4 ,having spoken in the present ,chapter of unwise courses followed by princes for defending others1 ,i shall speak in the next1 of the methods they follow in defending themselves4 ,,chapter ,,xii4--,whether when ,invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it4 ,i have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs1 whether1 when there are two princes of nearly equal strength1 and the bolder of the two proclaims war upon the other1 it is better for that other to await attack within his own frontier1 or to march into the enemy's country and fight him there2 and ,i have heard reasons given in favour of each of these courses4 ,they who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country1 cite the advice given by ,croesus to ,cyrus1 when the latter had come to the frontiers of the ,massaget to make war on that people4 ,for word being sent by ,tomyris their queen that ,cyrus might1 at his pleasure1 either enter her dominions1 where she would await him1 or else allow her to come and meet him2 and the matter being debated1 ,croesus1 contrary to the opinion of other advisers1 counselled ,cyrus to go forward and meet the queen1 urging that were he to defeat her at a distance from her kingdom1 he might not be able to take it from her1 since she would have time to repair her strength2 whereas1 were he to defeat her within her own dominions1 he could follow her up on her flight1 and1 without giving her time to recover herself1 deprive her of her ,state4 ,they cite also the advice given by ,hannibal to ,antiochus1 when the latter was meditating a war on the ,romans4 ,for ,hannibal told him that the ,romans could not be vanquished except in ,italy1 where an invader might turn to account the arms and resources of their friends1 whereas any one making war upon them out of ,italy1 and leaving that country in their hands1 would leave them an unfailing source whence to draw whatever reinforcement they might need2 and finally1 he told him1 that the ,romans might more easily be deprived of ,rome than of their empire1 and of ,italy more easily than of any of their other provinces4 ,they likewise instance ,agathocles1 who1 being unequal to support a war at home1 invaded the ,carthaginians1 by whom he was being attacked1 and reduced them to sue for peace4 ,they also cite ,scipio1 who to shift the war from ,italy1 carried it into ,africa4 ,those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a disadvantage you must get him away from his home1 alleging the case of the ,athenians1 who while they carried on the war at their convenience in their own territory1 retained their superiority2 but when they quitted that territory1 and went with their armies to ,sicily1 lost their freedom4 ,they cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is figured that ,antus1 king of ,libya1 being assailed by the ,egyptian ,hercules1 could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within the bounds of his own kingdom2 but so soon as he was withdrawn from these by the craft of ,hercules1 lost his kingdom and his life4 ,whence the fable runs that ,antus1 being son to the goddess ,earth1 when thrown to the ground drew fresh strength from the ,earth1 his mother2 and that ,hercules1 perceiving this1 held him up away from the ,earth4 ,recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view4 ,every one knows how ,ferrando1 king of ,naples1 was in his day accounted a most wise prince2 and how two years before his death there came a rumour that ,charles ,,viii of ,france was meditating an attack upon him2 and how1 after making great preparations for his defence1 he sickened2 and being on the point of death1 among other counsels left his son ,alfonso this advice1 that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his own territory1 but to await the enemy within his frontier1 and with his forces unimpaired2 a warning disregarded by ,alfonso1 who sent into ,romagna an army1 which he lost1 and with it his whole dominions1 without a battle4 ,other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those already noticed1 are as follows3 ,he who attacks shows higher courage than he who stands on his defence1 and this gives his army greater confidence4 ,moreover1 by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many opportunities for using his resources1 since he can receive no aid from subjects who have been stripped of their possessions2 and when an enemy is at his gates1 a prince must be careful how he levies money and imposes taxes2 so that1 as ,hannibal said1 the springs which enable a country to support a war come to be dried up4 ,again1 the soldiers of an invader1 finding themselves in a foreign land1 are under a stronger necessity to fight1 and necessity1 as has often been said1 is the parent of valour4 ,on the other hand1 it may be argued that there are many advantages to be gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy4 ,for without putting yourself much about1 you may harass him by intercepting his supplies1 whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need3 from your better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements2 and because men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on distant expeditions1 you can meet him with more numerous forces1 if defeated you can more easily repair your strength1 because the bulk of your army1 finding shelter at hand1 will be able to save itself1 and your reserves will have no distance to come4 ,in this way you can use your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes2 whereas1 in leaving your country1 you risk your entire fortunes1 without putting forth your whole strength4 ,nay1 we find that to weaken an adversary still further1 some have suffered him to make a march of several days into their country1 and then to capture certain of their towns1 that by leaving garrisons in these1 he might reduce the numbers of his army1 and so be attacked at greater disadvantage4 ,but now to speak my own mind on the matter1 ,i think we should make this distinction4 ,either you have your country strongly defended1 as the ,romans had and the ,swiss have theirs1 or1 like the ,carthaginians of old and the ,king of ,france and the ,italians at the present day1 you have it undefended4 ,in the latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance from your country1 for as your strength lies not in men but in money1 whenever the supply of money is cut off you are undone1 and nothing so soon cuts off this supply as a war of invasion4 ,of which we have example in the ,carthaginians1 who1 while their country was free from invasion1 were able by means of their great revenues to carry on war in ,italy against the ,romans1 but when they were invaded could not defend themselves even against ,agathocles4 ,the ,florentines1 in like manner1 could make no head against ,castruccio1 lord of ,lucca1 when he attacked them in their own country2 and to obtain protection1 were compelled to yield themselves up to ,king ,robert of ,naples4 ,and yet1 after ,castruccio's death1 these same ,florentines were bold enough to attack the ,duke of ,milan in his own country1 and strong enough to strip him of his dominions4 ,such valour did they display in distant wars1 such weakness in those that were near4 ,but when a country is armed as ,rome was and ,switzerland now is1 the closer you press it1 the harder it is to subdue2 because such ,states can assemble a stronger force to resist attack than for attacking others4 ,nor does the great authority of ,hannibal move me in this instance1 since resentment and his own advantage might lead him to speak as he spoke to ,antiochus4 ,for had the ,romans suffered in ,gaul1 and within the same space of time1 those three defeats at the hands of ,hannibal which they suffered in ,italy1 it must have made an end of them2 since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to account as they did in ,italy1 not having the same opportunity for repairing their strength2 nor could they have met their enemy with such numerous armies4 ,for we never find them sending forth a force of more than fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province2 whereas1 in defending their own country against the inroad of the ,gauls at the end of the first ,carthaginian war1 we hear of them bringing some eighteen hundred thousand men into the field2 and their failure to vanquish the ,gauls in ,lombardy as they had vanquished those in ,tuscany arose from their inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy1 or to encounter him with the same advantages4 ,in ,germany the ,cimbrians routed a ,roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster2 but when they came into ,italy1 the ,romans could collect their whole strength1 and destroy them4 ,out of their native country1 whence they can bring no more than thirty or forty thousand men1 the ,swiss may readily be defeated2 but in their own country1 where they can assemble a hundred thousand1 they are well-nigh invincible4 ,in conclusion1 therefore1 ,i repeat that the prince who has his people armed and trained for war1 should always await a great and dangerous war at home1 and never go forth to meet it4 ,but that he whose subjects are unarmed1 and whose country is not habituated to war1 should always carry the war to as great a distance as he can from home4 ,for in this way each will defend himself in the best manner his means admit4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4--,that ,men rise from humble to high ,fortunes rather by ,fraud than by ,force4 ,i hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place from small beginnings without using fraud or force1 unless1 indeed1 they be given1 or take by inheritance the place to which some other has already come4 ,force1 however1 will never suffice by itself to effect this end1 while fraud often will1 as any one may plainly see who reads the lives of ,philip of ,macedon1 ,agathocles of ,sicily1 and many others like them1 who from the lowest or1 at any rate1 from very low beginnings1 rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command4 ,this necessity for using deceit is taught by ,xenophon in his life of ,cyrus2 for the very first expedition on which ,cyrus is sent1 against the ,king of ,armenia1 is seen to teem with fraud2 and it is by fraud1 and not by force1 that he is represented as having acquired his kingdom2 so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct1 as ,xenophon describes it1 is1 that the prince who would accomplish great things must have learned how to deceive4 ,xenophon1 moreover1 represents his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire ,cyaxares1 king of the ,medians1 in a variety of ways2 giving it to be understood that without such deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came4 ,nor do ,i believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to have attained great station1 by sheer and open force1 whereas this has often been effected by mere fraud1 such as that used by ,giovanni ,galeazzo to deprive his uncle ,bernabo of the ,state and government of ,lombardy4 ,the same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of their career1 must also be used by commonwealths1 until they have grown powerful enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone4 ,and because ,rome at all times1 whether from chance or choice1 followed all such methods as are necessary to attain greatness1 in this also she was not behindhand4 ,and1 to begin with1 she could have used no greater fraud than was involved in her method above noticed1 of making for herself companions2 since under this name she made for herself subjects1 for such the ,latins and the other surrounding nations1 in fact1 became4 ,for availing herself at first of their arms to subdue neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a ,state1 her power was so much increased by these conquests that there was none whom she could not overcome4 ,but the ,latins never knew that they were enslaved until they saw the ,samnites twice routed and forced to make terms4 ,this success1 while it added greatly to the fame of the ,romans among princes at a distance1 who were thereby made familiar with the ,roman name though not with the ,roman arms1 bred at the same time jealousy and distrust among those who1 like the ,latins1 both saw and felt these arms2 and such were the effects of this jealousy and distrust1 that not the ,latins only but all the ,roman colonies in ,latium1 along with the ,campanians whom a little while before the ,romans had defended leagued themselves together against the authority of ,rome4 ,this war was set on foot by the ,latins in the manner in which1 as ,i have already explained1 most wars are begun1 not by directly attacking the ,romans1 but by defending the ,sidicinians against the ,samnites who were making war upon them with the permission of the ,romans4 ,and that it was from their having found out the crafty policy of the ,romans that the ,latins were led to take this step1 is plain from the words which ,titus ,livius puts in the mouth of ,annius ,setinus the ,latin prtor1 who1 in addressing the ,latin council1 is made to say1 8,for if even now we can put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance1 etc0 ,we see1 therefore1 that the ,romans1 from the time they first began to extend their power1 were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving1 an art always necessary for those who would mount to great heights from low beginnings2 and which is the less to be condemned when1 as in the case of the ,romans1 it is skilfully concealed4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4--,that ,men often err in thinking they can subdue ,pride by ,humility4 ,you shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you1 but is even hurtful1 especially when used in dealing with insolent men1 who1 through envy or other like cause1 have conceived hatred against you4 ,proof whereof is supplied by our historian where he explains the causes of this war between the ,romans and the ,latins4 ,for on the ,samnites complaining to the ,romans that the ,latins had attacked them1 the ,romans1 desiring not to give the ,latins ground of offence1 would not forbid them proceeding with the war4 ,but the endeavour to avoid giving offence to the ,latins only served to increase their confidence1 and led them the sooner to declare their hostility4 ,of which we have evidence in the language used by the same ,latin ,prtor1 ,annius ,setinus1 at the aforesaid council1 when he said3--8,you have tried their patience by refusing them1 soldiers4 ,who doubts but that they are offended8 ,still they have put up with the affront4 ,they have heard that we are assembling an army against their allies the ,samnites2 and yet they have not stirred from their city4 ,whence this astonishing forbearance1 but from their knowing our strength and their own weakness80 ,which words give us clearly to understand how much the patience of the ,romans increased the arrogance of the ,latins4 ,a prince1 therefore1 should never stoop from his dignity1 nor should he if he would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily1 unless he be able or believe himself able to withhold it4 ,for almost always when matters have come to such a pass that you cannot give way with credit it is better that a thing be taken from you by force than yielded through fear of force4 ,for if you yield through fear and to escape war1 the chances are that you do not escape it2 since he to whom1 out of manifest cowardice you make this concession1 will not rest content1 but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you1 and making less account of you1 will only be the more kindled against you4 ,at the same time you will find your friends less zealous on your behalf1 since to them you will appear either weak or cowardly4 ,but if1 so soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed1 you at once prepare to resist though your strength be inferior to his1 he will begin to think more of you1 other neighbouring princes will think more2 and many will be willing to assist you1 on seeing you take up arms1 who1 had you relinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair1 would never have stirred a finger to save you4 ,the above is to be understood as applying where you have a single adversary only2 but should you have several1 it will always be a prudent course1 even after war has been declared1 to restore to some one of their number something you have of his1 so as to regain his friendship and detach him from the others who have leagued themselves against you4 ,,chapter ,,xv4--,that weak ,states are always dubious in their ,resolves2 and that tardy ,resolves are always hurtful4 ,touching this very matter1 and with regard to these earliest beginnings of war between the ,latins and the ,romans1 it may be noted1 that in all our deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve1 and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense4 ,this is plainly seen in connection with the council convened by the ,latins when they thought to separate themselves from the ,romans4 ,for the ,romans suspecting the hostile humour wherewith the ,latins were infected1 in order to learn how things really stood1 and see whether they could not win back the malcontents without recourse to arms1 gave them to know that they must send eight of their citizens to ,rome1 as they had occasion to consult with them4 ,on receiving which message the ,latins1 knowing that they had done many things contrary to the wishes of the ,romans1 called a council to determine who of their number should be sent1 and to instruct them what they were to say4 ,but ,annius1 their prtor1 being present in the council when these matters were being discussed1 told them 8that he thought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to do than what they were to say2 for when their resolves were formed1 it would be easy to clothe them in fit words40 ,this1 in truth1 was sound advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart4 ,because1 where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide on doing1 we know not how to suit our words to our conduct2 whereas1 with our minds made up1 and the course we are to follow fixed1 it is an easy matter to find words to declare our resolves4 ,i have noticed this point the more readily1 because ,i have often found such uncertainty hinder the public business of our own republic1 to its detriment and discredit4 ,and in all matters of difficulty1 wherein courage is needed for resolving1 this uncertainty will always be met with1 whenever those who have to deliberate and decide are weak4 ,not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late and tardy1 especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend4 ,for from their lateness they help none1 and hurt ourselves4 ,tardy resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength1 or to the perversity of those who have to determine1 who being moved by a secret desire to overthrow the government1 or to carry out some selfish purpose of their own1 suffer no decision to be come to1 but only thwart and hinder4 ,whereas1 good citizens1 even when they see the popular mind to be bent on dangerous courses1 will never oppose the adoption of a fixed plan1 more particularly in matters which do not brook delay4 ,after ,hieronymus1 the ,syracusan tyrant1 was put to death1 there being at that time a great war between the ,romans and the ,carthaginians1 the citizens of ,syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which nation they should take part2 and so fierce grew the controversy between the partisans of the two alliances1 that no course could be agreed on1 and they took part with neither2 until ,apollonides1 one of the foremost of the ,syracusan citizens1 told them in a speech replete with wisdom1 that neither those who inclined to hold by the ,romans1 nor those who chose rather to side with the ,carthaginians1 were deserving of blame2 but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay in taking one side or other2 for from such uncertainty he clearly foresaw the ruin of their republic2 whereas1 by taking a decided course1 whatever it might be1 some good might come4 ,now ,titus ,livius could not show more clearly than he does in this passage1 the mischief which results from resting in suspense4 ,he shows it1 likewise1 in the case of the ,lavinians1 of whom he relates1 that being urged by the ,latins to aid them against ,rome1 they were so long in making up their minds1 that when the army which they at last sent to succour the ,latins was issuing from their gates1 word came that the ,latins were defeated4 ,whereupon ,millionius1 their prtor1 said1 8,with the ,romans this short march will cost us dear40 ,but had the ,lavinians resolved at once either to grant aid or to refuse it1 taking a latter course they would not have given offence to the ,romans1 taking the former1 and rendering timely help1 they and the ,latins together might have had a victory4 ,but by delay they stood to lose in every way1 as the event showed4 ,this example1 had it been remembered by the ,florentines1 might have saved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the hands of the ,french1 at the time ,king ,louis ,,xii4 of ,france came into ,italy against ,lodovico1 duke of ,milan4 ,for when ,louis first proposed to pass through ,tuscany he met with no objection from the ,florentines1 whose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand neutral1 while the king1 on his arrival in ,italy1 was to maintain their government and take them under his protection2 a month's time being allowed the republic to ratify these terms4 ,but certain persons1 who1 in their folly1 favoured the cause of ,lodovico1 delayed this ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory2 when the ,florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify1 the king would not accept their ratification1 perceiving their consent to be given under constraint and not of their own good-will4 ,this cost the city of ,florence dear1 and went near to lose her freedom1 whereof she was afterwards deprived on another like occasion4 ,and the course taken by the ,florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of service to ,duke ,lodovico1 who1 had he been victorious1 would have shown the ,florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king4 ,although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort has already been discussed in another ,chapter1 nevertheless1 since an opportunity offered for touching upon it again1 ,i have willingly availed myself of it1 because to me it seems a matter of which republics like ours should take special heed4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4--,that the ,soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient ,warfare4 ,in all their wars with other nations1 the most momentous battle ever fought by the ,romans1 was that which they fought with the ,latins when ,torquatus and ,decius were consuls4 ,for it may well be believed that as by the loss of that battle the ,latins became subject to the ,romans1 so the ,romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the ,latins4 ,and ,titus ,livius is of this opinion1 since he represents the armies as exactly equal in every respect1 in discipline and in valour1 in numbers and in obstinacy1 the only difference he draws being1 that of the two armies the ,romans had the more capable commanders4 ,we find1 however1 two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle1 the like of which never happened before1 and seldom since1 namely1 that to give steadiness to the minds of their soldiers1 and render them obedient to the word of command and resolute to fight1 one of the consuls put himself1 and the other his son1 to death4 ,the equality which ,titus ,livius declares to have prevailed in these two armies1 arose from this1 that having long served together they used the same language1 discipline1 and arms2 that in disposing their men for battle they followed the same system2 and that the divisions and officers of their armies bore the same names4 ,it was necessary1 therefore1 that as they were of equal strength and valour1 something extraordinary should take place to render the courage of the one army more stubborn and unflinching than that of the other1 it being on this stubbornness1 as ,i have already said1 that victory depends4 ,for while this temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will never turn their backs on their foe4 ,and that it might endure longer in the minds of the ,romans than of the ,latins1 partly chance1 and partly the valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that ,torquatus slew his son1 and ,decius died by his own hand4 ,in pointing out this equality of strength1 ,titus ,livius takes occasion to explain the whole system followed by the ,romans in the ordering of their armies and in disposing them for battle2 and as he has treated the subject at length1 ,i need not go over the same ground1 and shall touch only on what ,i judge in it most to deserve attention1 but1 being overlooked by all the captains of our times1 has led to disorder in many armies and in many battles4 ,from this passage of ,titus ,livius1 then1 we learn that the ,roman army had three principal divisions1 or battalions as we might now call them1 of which they named the first hastati1 the second principes1 and the third triarii1 to each of which cavalry were attached4 ,in arraying an army for battle they set the hastati in front4 ,directly behind them1 in the second rank1 they placed the principes2 and in the third rank of the same column1 the triarii4 ,the cavalry of each of these three divisions they disposed to the right and left of the division to which it belonged2 and to these companies of horse1 from their form and position1 they gave the name wings 7al71 from their appearing like the two wings of the main body of the army4 ,the first division1 the hastati1 which was in front1 they drew up in close order to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy4 ,the second division1 the principes1 since it was not to be engaged from the beginning1 but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven in1 was not formed in close order but kept in open file1 so that it might receive the other into its ranks whenever it was broken and forced to retire4 ,the third division1 that1 namely1 of the triarii1 had its ranks still more open than those of the second1 so that1 if occasion required1 it might receive the first two divisions of the hastati and principes4 ,these divisions1 therefore1 being drawn up in this order1 the engagement began1 and if the hastati were overpowered and driven back1 they retired within the loose ranks of the principes1 when both these divisions1 being thus united into one1 renewed the conflict4 ,if these1 again1 were routed and forced back1 they retreated within the open ranks of the triarii1 and all three divisions1 forming into one1 once more renewed the fight1 in which1 if they were overpowered1 since they had no further means of recruiting their strength1 they lost the battle4 ,and because whenever this last division1 of the triarii1 had to be employed1 the army was in jeopardy1 there arose the proverb1 8,res redacta est ad triarios10 equivalent to our expression of playing a last stake4 ,the captains of our day1 as they have abandoned all the other customs of antiquity1 and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline1 so also have discarded this method of disposing their men1 though it was one of no small utility4 ,for to insure the defeat of a commander who so arranges his forces as to be able thrice during an engagement to renew his strength1 ,fortune must thrice declare against him1 and he must be matched with an adversary able three times over to defeat him2 whereas he whose sole chance of success lies in his surviving the first onset1 as is the case with all the armies of ,christendom at the present day1 may easily be vanquished1 since any slight mishap1 and the least failure in the steadiness of his men1 may deprive him of victory4 ,and what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is1 that provision is now no longer made for one division being received into the ranks of another1 which happens because at present an army is arranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect methods4 ,for either its divisions are placed side by side1 so as to form a line of great width but of no depth or solidity2 or if1 to strengthen it1 it be drawn up in columns after the fashion of the ,roman armies1 should the front line be broken1 no provision having been made for its being received by the second1 it is thrown into complete disorder1 and both divisions fall to pieces4 ,for if the front line be driven back1 it jostles the second1 if the second line endeavour to advance1 the first stands in its way3 and thus1 the first driving against the second1 and the second against the third1 such confusion follows that often the most trifling accident will cause the ruin of an entire army4 ,at the battle of ,ravenna1 where ,m4 de ,foix1 the ,french commander1 was slain1 although according to modern notions this was a well-fought field1 both the ,french and the ,spanish armies were drawn up in the first of the faulty methods above described2 that is to say1 each army advanced with the whole of its battalions side by side1 so that each presented a single front much wider than deep2 this being always the plan followed by modern armies when1 as at ,ravenna1 the ground is open4 ,for knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat1 forming themselves in a single line1 they endeavour1 as ,i have said1 as much as possible to escape confusion by extending their front4 ,but where the ground confines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of1 without an effort to prevent it4 ,troops traversing an enemy's country1 whether to pillage or carry out any other operation of war1 are liable to fall into the same disorder2 and at ,s4 ,regolo in the ,pisan territory1 and at other places where the ,florentines were beaten by the ,pisans during the war which followed on the revolt of ,pisa after the coming of ,charles of ,france into ,italy1 our defeat was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our own cavalry1 who being posted in front1 and being repulsed by the enemy1 fell back on the infantry and threw them into confusion1 whereupon the whole army took to flight2 and ,messer ,ciriaco del ,borgo1 the veteran leader of the ,florentine foot1 has often declared in my presence that he had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were fighting on his side4 ,for which reason the ,swiss1 who are the greatest proficients in modern warfare1 when serving with the ,french1 make it their first care to place themselves on their flank1 so that the cavalry of their friends1 if repulsed1 may not throw them into disorder4 ,but although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to put in practice1 none has yet been found among the commanders of our times1 who attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns4 ,for although these also have a tripartite division of their armies into van-guard1 main-body1 and rear-guard1 the only use they make of it is in giving orders when their men are in quarters2 whereas on active service it rarely happens that all divisions are not equally exposed to the same onset4 ,and because many1 to excuse their ignorance1 will have it that the destructive fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day many of the tactics used by the ancients1 ,i will discuss this question in the following ,chapter1 and examine whether artillery does in fact prevent us from using the valiant methods of antiquity4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4--,what importance the ,armies of the present day should allow to ,artillery2 and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just4 ,looking to the number of pitched battles1 or what are termed by the ,french journes1 and by the ,italians fatti d'arme1 fought by the ,romans at divers times1 ,i am led further to examine the generally received opinion1 that had artillery been in use in their day1 the ,romans would not have been allowed1 or at least not with the same ease1 to subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries1 and could never have spread their power in the astonishing way they did4 ,for it is said that by reason of these fire-arms men can no longer use or display their personal valour as they could of old2 that there is greater difficulty now than there was in former times in joining battle2 that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now2 and that in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery4 ,judging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are sound1 and how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of armies1 and whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for a good captain to behave valiantly1 ,i shall at once address myself to the first of the averments noticed above1 namely1 that the armies of the ancient ,romans could not have made the conquests they did1 had artillery then been in use4 ,to this ,i answer by saying that1 since war is made for purposes either of offence or defence1 we have first to see in which of these two kinds of warfare artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the greater hurt4 ,now1 though something might be said both ways1 ,i nevertheless believe that artillery is beyond comparison more hurtful to him who stands on the defensive than to him who attacks4 ,for he who defends himself must either do so in a town or in a fortified camp4 ,if within a town1 either the town will be a small one1 as fortified towns commonly are1 or it will be a great one4 ,in the former case1 he who is on the defensive is at once undone4 ,for such is the shock of artillery that there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter down1 when1 unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind covering works and trenches1 they must be beaten2 it being impossible for them to resist the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance through the breaches in their walls4 ,nor will any artillery a defender may have be of any service to him2 since it is an established axiom that where men are able to advance in numbers and rapidly1 artillery is powerless to check them4 ,for this reason1 in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern nations prove irresistible1 whereas the attacks of our ,italian troops1 who do not rush on in force1 but advance to the assault in small knots of skirmishers 7scaramouches1 as they are fitly named71 may easily be withstood4 ,those who advance in such loose order1 and with so little spirit1 against a breach covered by artillery1 advance to certain destruction1 and as against them artillery is useful4 ,but when the assailants swarm to the breach so massed together that one pushes on another1 unless they be brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks1 they penetrate everywhere1 and no artillery has any effect to keep them back2 and though some must fall1 yet not so many as to prevent a victory4 ,the frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns1 and more particularly the recovery of ,brescia by the ,french1 is proof sufficient of the truth of what ,i say4 ,for the town of ,brescia rising against the ,french while the citadel still held out1 the ,venetians1 to meet any attack which might be made from the citadel upon the town1 ranged guns along the whole line of road which led from the one to the other1 planting them in front1 and in flank1 and wherever else they could be brought to bear4 ,of all which ,m4 de ,foix making no account1 dismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback1 and1 advancing with them on foot through the midst of the batteries1 took the town2 nor do we learn that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy's fire4 ,so that1 as ,i have said1 he who has to defend himself in a small town1 when his walls are battered down and he has no room to retire behind other works1 and has only his artillery to trust to1 is at once undone4 ,but even where the town you defend is a great one1 so that you have room to fall back behind new works1 artillery is still1 by a long way1 more useful for the assailant than for the defender4 ,for to enable your artillery to do any hurt to those without1 you must raise yourself with it above the level of the ground1 since1 if you remain on the level1 the enemy1 by erecting any low mound or earth-work1 can so secure himself that it will be impossible for you to touch him4 ,but in raising yourself above the level of the ground1 whether by extending yourself along the gallery of the walls1 or otherwise1 you are exposed to two disadvantages2 for1 first1 you cannot there bring into position guns of the same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against you1 since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space2 and1 secondly1 although you should succeed in getting your guns into position1 you cannot construct such strong and solid works for their protection as those can who are outside1 and on level ground1 and who have all the room and every other advantage which they could desire4 ,it is consequently impossible for him who defends a town to maintain his guns in position at any considerable height1 when those who are outside have much and powerful artillery2 while1 if he place it lower1 it becomes1 as has been explained1 to a great extent useless4 ,so that in the end the defence of the city has to be effected1 as in ancient times1 by hand to hand fighting1 or else by means of the smaller kinds of fire-arms1 from which if the defender derive some slight advantage1 it is balanced by the injury he sustains from the great artillery of his enemy1 whereby the walls of the city are battered down and almost buried in their ditches2 so that when it comes once more to an encounter at close quarters1 by reason of his walls being demolished and his ditches filled up1 the defender is now at a far greater disadvantage than he was formerly4 ,wherefore ,i repeat that these arms are infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who defends it4 ,as to the remaining method1 which consists in your taking up your position in an entrenched camp1 where you need not fight unless you please1 and unless you have the advantage1 ,i say that this method commonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement than the ancients had2 nay1 that sometimes1 owing to the use of artillery1 you are worse off than they were4 ,for if the enemy fall suddenly upon you1 and have some slight advantage 7as may readily be the case from his being on higher ground1 or from your works on his arrival being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by them71 forthwith1 and without your being able to prevent him1 he dislodges you1 and you are forced to quit your defences and deliver battle3 as happened to the ,spaniards at the battle of ,ravenna4 ,for having posted themselves between the river ,ronco and an earthwork1 from their not having carried this work high enough1 and from the ,french having a slight advantage of ground1 they were forced by the fire of the latter to quit their entrenchments come to an engagement4 ,but assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be1 as it always should1 higher than that occupied by the enemy1 and your works to be complete and sufficient1 so that from your position and preparations the enemy dare not attack you1 recourse will then be had to the very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times when an army was so posted that it could not be assailed2 that is to say1 your country will be wasted1 cities friendly to you besieged or stormed1 and your supplies intercepted2 until you are forced1 at last1 of necessity to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle1 in which1 as will presently appear1 artillery will be of little service to you4 ,if we consider1 therefore1 for what ends the ,romans made wars1 and that attack and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns1 it will be clear1 if what ,i have said be true1 that they would have had still greater advantage1 and might have achieved their conquests with even greater ease1 had artillery been in use in their times4 ,and as to the second complaint1 that by reason of artillery men can no longer display their valour as they could in ancient days1 ,i admit it to be true that when they have to expose themselves a few at a time1 men run more risks now than formerly2 as when they have to scale a town or perform some similar exploit1 in which they are not massed together but must advance singly and one behind another4 ,it is true1 also1 that ,captains and commanders of armies are subjected to a greater risk of being killed now than of old1 since they an be reached everywhere by the enemy's fire2 and it is no protection to them to be with those of their men who are furthest from the enemy1 or to be surrounded by the bravest of their guards4 ,still1 we do not often find either of these two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss4 ,for towns strongly fortified are not attacked by escalade1 nor will the assailing army advance against them in weak numbers2 but will endeavour1 as in ancient times1 to reduce them by regular siege4 ,and even in the case of towns attacked by storm1 the dangers are not so very much greater now than they were formerly2 for in those old days also1 the defenders of towns were not without warlike engines1 which if less terrible in their operation1 had1 so far as killing goes1 much the same effect4 ,and as for the deaths of captains and leaders of companies1 it may be said that during the last twenty-four years of war in ,italy1 we have had fewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten years of ancient warfare4 ,for excepting the ,count ,lodovico della ,mirandola1 who fell at ,ferrara1 when the ,venetians a few years ago attacked that city1 and the ,duke de ,nemours1 slain at ,cirignuola1 we have no instance of any commander being killed by artillery4 ,for1 at ,ravenna1 ,m4 de ,foix died by steel and not by shot4 ,wherefore ,i say that if men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess1 it results not so much from the use of artillery1 as from the faulty discipline and weakness of our armies1 which being collectively without valour cannot display it in particular instances4 ,as to the third assertion1 that armies can no longer be brought to engage one another1 and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly with artillery1 ,i maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue1 and will always be so held by those who are willing in handling their troops to follow the usages of ancient valour4 ,for whosoever would have a good army must train it1 either by real or by mimic warfare1 to approach the enemy1 to come within sword-thrust1 and to grapple with him2 and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse1 for reasons presently to be explained4 ,but when you trust to your foot-soldiers1 and to the methods already indicated1 artillery becomes powerless to harm you4 ,for foot-soldiers1 in approaching an enemy1 can with more ease escape the fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could have avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots1 or any other of those strange contrivances which had to be encountered by the ,romans1 and against which they always devised some remedy4 ,and1 certainly1 as against artillery1 their remedy would have been easier1 by as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is shorter than the time during which elephants and chariots could4 ,for by these you were thrown into disorder after battle joined1 whereas artillery harasses you only before you engage2 a danger which infantry can easily escape1 either by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of the ground1 or by lying down while the firing continues2 nay1 we find from experience that even these precautions may be dispensed with1 especially as against great artillery1 which can hardly be levelled with such precision that its fire shall not either pass over your head from the range being too high1 or fall short from its being too low4 ,so soon1 however1 as the engagement is begun1 it is perfectly clear that neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer2 since1 if the enemy have his artillerymen in front1 you take them2 if in rear1 they will injure him before they injure you2 and if in flank1 they can never fire so effectively as to prevent your closing1 with the result already explained4 ,nor does this admit of much dispute1 since we have proof of it in the case of the ,swiss at ,novara1 in the year #aeac1 when1 with neither guns nor cavalry1 they advanced against the ,french army1 who had fortified themselves with artillery behind entrenchments1 and routed them without suffering the slightest check from their fire4 ,in further explanation whereof it is to be noted1 that to work artillery effectively it should be protected by walls1 by ditches1 or by earth-works2 and that whenever1 from being left without such protection it has to be defended by men1 as happens in pitched battles and engagements in the open field1 it is either taken or otherwise becomes useless4 ,nor can it be employed on the flank of an army1 save in the manner in which the ancients made use of their warlike engines1 which they moved out from their columns that they might be worked without inconvenience1 but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or other troops4 ,he who looks for any further advantage from artillery does not rightly understand its nature1 and trusts to what is most likely to deceive him4 ,for although the ,turk1 using artillery1 has gained victories over the ,soldan and the ,sofi1 the only advantage he has had from it has been the terror into which the horses of the enemy1 unused to such sounds1 are thrown by the roar of the guns4 ,and now1 to bring these remarks to a conclusion1 ,i say briefly that1 employed by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour1 artillery is useful2 but employed otherwise1 against a brave adversary1 is utterly useless4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4--,that the authority of the ,romans and the example of ancient ,warfare should make us hold ,foot ,soldiers of more account than ,horse4 ,by many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in their military enterprises the ,romans set far more store on their infantry than on their cavalry1 and trusted to the former to carry out all the chief objects which their armies were meant to effect4 ,among many other examples of this1 we may notice the great battle which they fought with the ,latins near the lake ,regillus1 where to steady their wavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount1 and renewing the combat on foot obtained a victory4 ,here we see plainly that the ,romans had more confidence in themselves when they fought on foot than when they fought on horseback4 ,the same expedient was resorted to by them in many of their other battles1 and always in their sorest need they found it their surest stay4 ,nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of ,hannibal1 who1 at the battle of ,cann1 on seeing the consuls make the horsemen dismount1 said scoffingly1 8,better still had they delivered their knights to me in chains40 ,for though this saying came from the mouth of a most excellent soldier1 still1 if we are to regard authority1 we ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth like ,rome1 and of the many great captains who served her1 than that of ,hannibal alone4 ,but1 apart from authority1 there are manifest reasons to bear out what ,i say4 ,for a man may go on foot into many places where a horse cannot go2 men can be taught to keep rank1 and if thrown into disorder to recover form2 whereas1 it is difficult to keep horses in line1 and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to reform them4 ,moreover we find that with horses as with men1 some have little courage and some much2 and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a faint-hearted rider1 or a dull horse by a courageous rider1 and that in whatever way such disparity is caused1 confusion and disorder result4 ,again1 infantry1 when drawn up in column1 can easily break and is not easily broken by cavalry4 ,this is vouched1 not only by many ancient and many modern instances1 but also by the authority of those who lay down rules for the government of ,states1 who show that at first wars were carried on by mounted soldiers1 because the methods for arraying infantry were not yet understood1 but that so soon as these were discovered1 the superiority of foot over horse was at once recognized4 ,in saying this1 ,i would not have it supposed that horsemen are not of the greatest use in armies1 whether for purposes of observation1 for harrying and laying waste the enemy's country1 for pursuing a retreating foe or helping to repulse his cavalry4 ,but the substance and sinew of an army1 and that part of it which ought constantly to be most considered1 should always be the infantry4 ,and among sins of the ,italian princes who have made their country the slave of foreigners1 there is none worse than that they have held these arms in contempt1 and turned their whole attention to mounted troops4 ,this error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of our rulers4 ,for the control of the armies of ,italy for the last five and twenty years resting in the hands of men1 who1 as having no lands of their own1 may be looked on as mere soldiers of fortune1 these fell forthwith on contriving how they might maintain their credit by being supplied with the arms which the princes of the country were without4 ,and as they had no subjects of their own of whom they could make use1 and could not obtain constant employment and pay for a large number of foot-soldiers1 and as a small number would have given them no importance1 they had recourse to horsemen4 ,for a condottiere drawing pay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the highest credit1 and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the princes who employed him4 ,and to effect their object with more ease1 and increase their credit still further1 these adventurers would allow no merit or favour to be due to foot-soldiers1 but claimed all for their horsemen4 ,and to such a length was this bad system carried1 that in the very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was to be found4 ,this1 together with many other ill practices which accompanied it1 has so weakened the militia of ,italy1 that the country has easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the ,north4 ,that it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry1 may be still more clearly seen from another example taken from ,roman history4 ,the ,romans being engaged on the siege of ,sora1 a troop of horse a sally from the town to attack their camp2 when the ,roman master of the knights advancing with his own horsemen to give them battle1 it so chanced that1 at the very first onset1 the leaders on both sides were slain4 ,both parties being thus left without commanders1 and the combat1 nevertheless1 continuing1 the ,romans thinking thereby to have the advantage of their adversaries1 alighted from horseback1 obliging the enemy's cavalry1 in order to defend themselves1 to do the like4 ,the result was that the ,romans had the victory4 ,now there could be no stronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse4 ,for while in other battles the ,roman cavalry were made by their consuls to dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and in need of such aid1 on this occasion they dismounted1 not to succour their infantry1 nor to encounter an enemy contending on foot1 but because they saw that though they could not prevail against the enemy fighting as horsemen against horsemen1 on foot they readily might4 ,and from this ,i conclude that foot-soldiers1 if rightly handled1 can hardly be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot4 ,with very few cavalry1 but with a considerable force of infantry1 the ,roman commanders1 ,crassus and ,marcus ,antonius1 each for many days together overran the territories of the ,parthians1 although opposed by the countless horsemen of that nation4 ,crassus1 indeed1 with the greater part of his army1 was left there dead1 and ,antonius only saved himself by his valour2 but even in the extremities to which the ,romans were then brought1 see how greatly superior foot-soldiers are to horse4 ,for though fighting in an open country1 far from the sea-coast1 and cut off from his supplies1 ,antonius proved himself a valiant soldier in the judgment even of the ,parthians themselves1 the whole strength of whose cavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army4 ,and though ,crassus perished there1 any one who reads attentively the account of his expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated1 and that even when his condition was desperate1 the ,parthians durst not close with him1 but effected his destruction by hanging continually on the flanks of his army1 and intercepting his supplies1 while cajoling him with promises which they never kept4 ,it might1 ,i grant1 be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of foot over horse1 had we not very many modern examples affording the clearest proof of it4 ,for instance1 at the battle of ,novara1 of which we have already spoken1 nine thousand ,swiss foot were seen to attack ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry1 and to defeat them2 the cavalry being powerless to injure them1 while of the infantry1 who were mostly ,gascons1 and badly disciplined1 they made no account4 ,on another occasion we have seen twenty-six thousand ,swiss march on ,milan to attack ,francis ,i4 of ,france1 who had with him twenty thousand men-at-arms1 forty thousand foot1 and a hundred pieces of artillery2 and although they were not victorious as at ,novara1 they nevertheless fought valiantly for two days together1 and1 in the end1 though beaten1 were able to bring off half their number4 ,with foot-soldiers only ,marcus ,attilius ,regulus ventured to oppose himself1 not to cavalry merely1 but to elephants2 and if the attempt failed it does not follow that he was not justified by the valour of his men in believing them equal to surmount this danger4 ,i repeat1 therefore1 that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry1 you must meet them with infantry disciplined still better1 and that otherwise you advance to certain destruction4 ,in the time of ,filippo ,visconti1 ,duke of ,milan1 some sixteen thousand ,swiss made a descent on ,lombardy1 whereupon the ,duke1 who at that time had ,il ,carmagnola as his captain1 sent him with six thousand men-at-arms and a slender following of foot-soldiers to meet them4 ,not knowing their manner of fighting1 ,carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen1 expecting to put them at once to rout2 but finding them immovable1 after losing many of his men he withdrew4 ,but1 being a most wise captain1 and skilful in devising new remedies to meet unwonted dangers1 after reinforcing his company he again advanced to the attack2 and when about to engage made all his men-at-arms dismount1 and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers1 fell once more upon the ,swiss1 who could then no longer withstand him4 ,for his men1 being on foot and well armed1 easily penetrated the ,swiss ranks without hurt to themselves2 and getting among them1 had no difficulty in cutting them down1 so that of the entire army of the ,swiss those only escaped who were spared by his humanity4 ,of this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops1 many ,i believe are aware2 but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the times in which we live1 that neither ancient nor modern examples1 nor even the consciousness of error1 can move our present princes to amend their ways1 or convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a ,state or province1 it is necessary to revive this branch of their militia also1 to keep it near them1 to make much of it1 and to give it life1 that in return1 it may give back life and reputation to them4 ,but as they have departed from all those other methods already spoken of1 so have they departed from this1 and with this result1 that to them the acquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain1 as presently shall be shown4 ,,chapter ,,xix4--,that ,acquisitions made by ill-governed ,states and such as follow not the valiant methods of the ,romans1 tend rather to their ,ruin than to their ,aggrandizement4 ,to these false opinions1 founded on the pernicious example first set by the present corrupt age1 we owe it1 that no man thinks of departing from the methods which are in use4 ,it had been impossible1 for instance1 some thirty years ago1 to persuade an ,italian that ten thousand foot-soldiers could1 on plain ground1 attack ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry2 and not merely attack1 but defeat them2 as we saw done by the ,swiss at that battle of ,novara1 to which ,i have already referred so often4 ,for although history abounds in similar examples1 none would have believed them1 or1 believing them1 would have said that nowadays men are so much better armed1 that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock1 to say nothing of a column of infantry4 ,with such false pleas would they have belied their judgment1 taking no account that with a very scanty force of foot-soldiers1 ,lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the cavalry of ,tigranes1 among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly resembling our own men-at-arms4 ,now1 however1 this error is demonstrated by the example of the northern nations4 ,and since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers is thus proved to be true1 men ought likewise to believe that the other methods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and useful4 ,and were this once accepted1 both princes and commonwealths would make fewer blunders than they do1 would be stronger to resist sudden attack1 and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in flight2 while those who take in hand to provide a ,state with new institutions would know better what direction to give them1 whether in the way of extending or merely of preserving2 and would see that to augment the numbers of their citizens1 to assume other ,states as companions rather than reduce them to subjection1 to send out colonies for the defence of acquired territories1 to hold their spoils at the credit of the common stock1 to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched battles rather than by sieges1 to enrich the public purse1 keep down private wealth1 and zealously1 to maintain all military exercises1 are the true ways to aggrandize a ,state and to extend its empire4 ,or if these methods for adding to their power are not to their mind1 let them remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of republics1 and so set bounds to their ambition1 wisely regulating the internal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances1 forbidding extension1 and looking only to defence1 and taking heed that their defences are in good order1 as do those republics of ,germany which live and for long have lived1 in freedom4 ,and yet1 as ,i have said on another occasion1 when speaking of the difference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those suitable for maintaining1 it is impossible for a republic to remain long in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier4 ,for should it forbear from molesting others1 others are not likely to refrain from molesting it2 whence must grow at once the desire and the necessity to make acquisitions2 or should no enemies be found abroad1 they will be found at home1 for this seems to be incidental to all great ,states4 ,and if the free ,states of ,germany are1 and have long been able to maintain themselves on their present footing1 this arises from certain conditions peculiar to that country1 and to be found nowhere else1 without which these communities could not go on living as they do4 ,the district of ,germany of which ,i speak was formerly subject to the ,roman ,empire1 in the same way as ,france and ,spain2 but on the decline of the ,empire1 and when its very name came to be limited to this one province1 its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and necessities of the ,emperors1 began to free themselves by buying from them their liberty1 subject to the payment of a trifling yearly tribute2 until1 gradually1 all the cities which held directly from the ,emperor1 and were not subject to any intermediate lord1 had1 in like manner1 purchased their freedom4 ,while this went on1 it so happened that certain communities subject to the ,duke of ,austria1 among which were ,friburg1 the people of ,schweitz1 and the like1 rose in rebellion against him1 and meeting at the outset with good success1 by degrees acquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under the ,austrian yoke1 they are become formidable to all their neighbours ,these are the ,states which we now name ,swiss4 ,germany is1 consequently1 divided between the ,swiss1 the communities which take the name of ,free ,towns1 the ,princes1 and the ,emperor2 and the reason why1 amid so many conflicting interests1 wars do not break out1 or breaking out are of short continuance1 is the reverence in which all hold this symbol of the ,imperial authority4 ,for although the ,emperor be without strength of his own1 he has nevertheless such credit with all these others that he alone can keep them united1 and1 interposing as mediator1 can speedily repress by his influence any dissensions among them4 ,the greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this country have been those between the ,swiss and the ,duke of ,austria2 and although for many years past the ,empire and the dukedom of ,austria have been united in the same man1 he has always failed to subdue the stubbornness of the ,swiss1 who are never to be brought to terms save by force4 ,nor has the rest of ,germany lent the ,emperor much assistance in his wars with the ,swiss1 the ,free ,towns being little disposed to attack others whose desire is to live as they themselves do1 in freedom2 while the ,princes of the ,empire either are so poor that they cannot1 or from jealousy of the power of the ,emperor will not1 take part with him against them4 ,these communities1 therefore1 abide contented within their narrow confines1 because1 having regard to the ,imperial authority1 they have no occasion to desire greater2 and are at the same time obliged to live in unity within their walls1 because an enemy is always at hand1 and ready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance4 ,but were the circumstances of the country other than they are these communities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions1 and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life4 ,and since the same conditions are not found elsewhere1 other nations cannot adopt this way of living1 but are compelled to extend their power either by means of leagues1 or else by the methods used by the ,romans2 and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but rather death and destruction4 ,for since in a thousand ways1 and from causes innumerable1 conquests are surrounded with dangers1 it may well happen that in adding to our dominions1 we add nothing to our strength2 but whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his dominions1 must needs be ruined4 ,he who is impoverished by his wars1 even should he come off victorious1 can add nothing to his strength1 since he spends more than he gains1 as the ,venetians and ,florentines have done4 ,for ,venice has been far feebler since she acquired ,lombardy1 and ,florence since she acquired ,tuscany1 than when the one was content to be mistress of the seas1 and the other of the lands lying within six miles from her walls4 ,and this from their eagerness to acquire without knowing what way to take4 ,for which ignorance these ,states are the more to be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them2 since they had seen what methods were used by the ,romans1 and could have followed in their footsteps2 whereas the ,romans1 without any example set them1 were able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves4 ,but even to well-governed ,states1 their conquests may chance to occasion much harm2 as when some city or province is acquired abounding in luxury and delights1 by whose manners the conqueror becomes infected2 as happened first to the ,romans1 and afterwards to ,hannibal on taking possession of ,capua4 ,and had ,capua been at such a distance from ,rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the disorders of the soldiery1 or had ,rome herself been in any degree tainted with corruption1 this acquisition had certainly proved her ruin4 ,to which ,titus ,livius bears witness when he says1 8,most mischievous at this time to our military discipline was ,capua2 for ministering to all delights1 she turned away the corrupted minds of our soldiers from the remembrance of their country40 ,and1 truly1 cities and provinces like this1 avenge themselves on their conquerors without blood or blow2 since by infecting them with their own evil customs they prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant4 ,nor could the subject have been better handled than by ,juvenal1 where he says in his ,satires1 that into the hearts of the ,romans1 through their conquests in foreign lands1 foreign manners found their way2 and in place of frugality and other admirable virtues-- 8,came luxury more mortal than the sword1 ,and settling down1 avenged a vanquished world40#h #h ,svior armis ,luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem4 ,juv4 ,sat4 vi4 #bib4 ,and if their conquests were like to be fatal to the ,romans at a time when they were still animated by great virtue and prudence1 how must it fare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs1 and who1 to crown their other errors of which we have already said enough1 resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms1 bringing upon themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the ,chapter following4 ,,chapter ,,xx4--,of the ,dangers incurred by ,princes or ,republics who resort to ,auxiliary or ,mercenary ,arms4 ,had ,i not already1 in another treatise1 enlarged on the inutility of mercenary and auxiliary1 and on the usefulness of national arms1 ,i should dwell on these matters in the present ,discourse more at length than it is my design to do4 ,for having given the subject very full consideration elsewhere1 here ,i would be brief4 ,still when ,i find ,titus ,livius supplying a complete example of what we have to look for from auxiliaries1 by whom ,i mean troops sent to our assistance by some other prince or ruler1 paid by him and under officers by him appointed1 it is not fit that ,i should pass it by in silence4 ,it is related1 then1 by our historian1 that the ,romans1 after defeating on two different occasions armies of the ,samnites with forces sent by them to succour the ,capuans1 whom they thus relieved from the war which the ,samnites ,were waging against them1 being desirious to return to ,rome1 left behind two legions to defend the ,capuans1 that the latter might not1 from being altogether deprived of their protection1 once more become a prey to the ,samnites4 ,but these two legions1 rotting in idleness began to take such delight therein1 that forgetful of their country and the reverence due to the senate1 they resolved to seize by violence the city they had been left to guard by their valour4 ,for to them it seemed that the citizens of ,capua were unworthy to enjoy advantages which they knew not how to defend4 ,the ,romans1 however1 getting timely notice of this design1 at once met and defeated it1 in the manner to be more fully noticed when ,i come to treat of conspiracies4 ,once more then1 ,i repeat1 that of all the various kinds of troops1 auxiliaries are the most pernicious1 because the prince or republic resorting to them for aid has no authority over them1 the only person who possesses such authority being he who sends them4 ,for1 as ,i have said1 auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other potentate1 under his own flag1 under his own officers1 and in his own pay1 as were the legions sent by the ,romans to ,capua4 ,such troops1 if victorious1 will for the most part plunder him by whom1 as well as him against whom1 they are hired to fight2 and this they do1 sometimes at the instigation of the potentate who sends them1 sometimes for ambitious ends of their own4 ,it was not the purpose of the ,romans to violate the league and treaty which they had made with ,capua2 but to their soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the ,capuans1 that they were readily led into this plot for depriving them of their town and territories4 ,many other examples might be given to the same effect1 but it is enough to mention besides this instance1 that of the people of ,regium1 who were deprived of their city and of their lives by another ,roman legion sent for their protection4 ,princes and republics1 therefore1 should resort to any other expedient for the defence of their ,states sooner than call in hired auxiliaries1 when they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them2 since any accord or terms1 however hard1 which you may make with your enemy1 will be carefully studied and current events well considered1 it will be seen that for one who has succeeded with such assistance1 hundreds have been betrayed4 ,nor1 in truth1 can any better opportunity for usurping a city or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth1 than to be asked to send an army for its defence4 ,on the other hand1 he who is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help1 not for purposes of defence but in order to attack others1 seeks to have what he can never hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person who helps him to gain it4 ,yet such is the perversity of men that1 to gratify the desire of the moment1 they shut their eyes to those ills which must speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this matter than in all those others of which ,i have spoken2 for were they moved by these examples they would see that the more disposed they are to deal generously with their neighbours1 and the more averse they are to usurp authority over them1 the readier will these be to throw themselves into their arms2 as will at once appear from the case of the ,capuans4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4--,that ,capua was the first ,city to which the ,romans sent a ,prtor2 nor there1 until four hundred years after they began to make ,war4 ,the great difference between the methods followed by the ancient ,romans in adding to their dominions1 and those used for that purpose by the ,states of the present time1 has now been sufficiently discussed4 ,it has been seen1 too how in dealing with the cities which they did not think fit to destroy1 and even with those which had made their submission not as companions but as subjects1 it was customary with the ,romans to permit them to live on under their own laws1 without imposing any outward sign of dependence1 merely binding them to certain conditions1 or complying with which they were maintained in their former dignity and importance4 ,we know1 further1 that the same methods continued to be followed by the ,romans until they passed beyond the confines of ,italy1 and began to reduce foreign kingdoms and ,states to provinces3 as plainly appears in the fact that ,capua was the first city to which they sent a prtor1 and him from no motive of ambition1 but at the request of the ,capuans themselves who1 living at variance with one another1 thought it necessary to have a ,roman citizen in their town who might restore unity and good order among them4 ,influenced by this example1 and urged by the same need1 the people of ,antium were the next to ask that they too might have a prtor given them2 touching which request and in connection with which new method of governing1 ,titus ,livius observes1 8that not the arms only but also the laws of ,rome now began to exert an influence20 showing how much the course thus followed by the ,romans promoted the growth of their authority4 ,for those cities1 more especially1 which have been used to freedom or to be governed by their own citizens1 rest far better satisfied with a government which they do not see1 even though it involve something of oppression1 than with one which standing constantly before their eyes1 seems every day to reproach them with the disgrace of servitude4 ,and to the prince there is another advantage in this method of government1 namely1 that as the judges and magistrates who administer the laws civil and criminal within these cities1 are not under his control1 no decision of theirs can throw responsibility or discredit upon him2 so that he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred4 ,of the truth whereof1 besides the ancient instances which might be noted1 we have a recent example here in ,italy4 ,for ,genoa1 as every one knows1 has many times been occupied by the ,french king1 who always1 until lately1 sent thither a ,french governor to rule in his name4 ,recently1 however1 not from choice but of necessity1 he has permitted the town to be self-governed under a ,genoese ruler2 and any one who had to decide which of these two methods of governing gives the greater security to the king's authority and the greater content to the people themselves1 would assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter4 ,men1 moreover1 in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority over them1 grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands2 and fear you less on the score of their freedom1 when they find you acting towards them with consideration and kindness4 ,it was the display of these qualities that moved the ,capuans to ask the ,romans for a prtor2 for had the ,romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them one1 they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown estranged4 ,but why turn for examples to ,capua and ,rome1 when we have them close at hand in ,tuscany and ,florence8 ,who is there but knows what a time it is since the city of ,pistoja submitted of her own accord to the ,florentine supremacy8 ,who1 again1 but knows the animosity which down to the present day exists between ,florence and the cities of ,pisa1 ,lucca1 and ,siena8 ,this difference of feeling does not arise from the citizens of ,pistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens of these other towns or thinking themselves inferior to them1 but from the ,florentines having always acted towards the former as brothers1 towards the latter as foes4 ,this it was that led the ,pistojans to come voluntarily under our authority while the others have done and do all in their power to escape it4 ,for there seems no reason to doubt1 that if ,florence1 instead of exasperating these neighbours of hers1 had sought to win them over1 either by entering into league with them or by lending them assistance1 she would at this hour have been mistress of ,tuscany4 ,not that ,i would be understood to maintain that recourse is never to be had to force and to arms1 but that these are only to be used in the last resort1 and when all other remedies are unavailing4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4--,that in matters of moment ,men often judge amiss4 ,how falsely men often judge of things1 they who are present at their deliberations have constant occasion to know4 ,for in many matters1 unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts1 the conclusions come to are certain to be wrong4 ,and because in corrupt republics1 and especially in quiet times1 either through jealousy or from other like causes1 men of great ability are often obliged to stand aloof1 it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common error judged to be good1 or are promoted by those who seek public favour rather than the public advantage4 ,mistakes of this sort are found out afterwards in seasons of adversity1 when recourse must be had to those persons who in peaceful times had been1 as it were1 forgotten1 as shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained4 ,cases1 moreover1 arise in which those who have little experience of affairs are sure to be misled1 from the matters with which they have to deal being attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to believe whatsoever they are minded to believe4 ,these remarks ,i make with reference to the false hopes which the ,latins1 after being defeated by the ,romans1 were led to form on the persuasion of their prtor ,numitius1 and also with reference to what was believed by many a few years ago1 when ,francis1 king of ,france1 came to recover ,milan from the ,swiss4 ,for ,francis of ,angoulme1 succeeding on the death of ,louis ,,xii4 to the throne of ,france1 and desiring to recover for that realm the ,duchy of ,milan1 on which1 some years before1 the ,swiss had seized at the instance of ,pope ,julius1 sought for allies in ,italy to second him in his attempt2 and besides the ,venetians1 who had already been gained over by ,king ,louis1 endeavoured to secure the aid of the ,florentines and ,pope ,leo ,x42 thinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part with him1 his enterprise would be easier4 ,for the forces of the ,spanish king were then in ,lombardy1 and the army of the ,emperor at ,verona4 ,pope ,leo1 however1 did not fall in with the wishes of ,francis1 being1 it is said1 persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand neutral4 ,for they urged that it was not for the advantage of the ,church to have powerful strangers1 whether ,french or ,swiss1 in ,italy2 but that to restore the country to its ancient freedom1 it must be delivered from the yoke of both4 ,and since to conquer both1 whether singly or together1 was impossible1 it was to be desired that the one should overthrow the other1 after which the ,church with her friends might fall upon the victor4 ,and it was averred that no better opportunity for carrying out this design could ever be found than then presented itself2 for both the ,french and the ,swiss were in the field2 while the ,pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the ,lombard frontier and in the vicinity of the two armies1 where1 under colour of watching his own interests1 he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came to an engagement2 when1 as both armies were full of courage1 their encounter might be expected to be a bloody one1 and likely to leave the victor so weakened that it would be easy for the ,pope to attack and defeat him2 and so1 to his own great glory1 remain master of ,lombardy and supreme throughout ,italy4 ,how baseless this expectation was1 was seen from the event4 ,for the ,swiss being routed after a protracted combat1 the troops of the ,pope and ,spain1 so far from venturing to attack the conqueror1 prepared for flight2 nor would flight have saved them1 had not the humanity or indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory1 and disposed him to make terms with the ,church4 ,the arguments put forward by the ,pope's advisers had a certain show of reason in their favour1 which looked at from a distance seemed plausible enough2 but were in reality wholly contrary to truth2 since it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great number of his men1 his loss being in battle only1 and not in flight4 ,for in the heat of battle1 while men stand face to face1 but few fall1 chiefly because such combats do not last long2 and even when they do last1 and many of the victorious army are slain1 so splendid is the reputation which attends a victory1 and so great the terror it inspires1 as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the slaughter of his soldiers2 so that an enemy who1 trusting to find him weakened1 should then venture to attack him1 would soon be taught his mistake1 unless strong enough to give him battle at any time1 before his victory as well as after4 ,for in that case he might1 as fortune and valour should determine1 either win or lose2 though1 even then1 the army which had first fought and won would have an advantage4 ,and this we know for a truth from what befell the ,latins in consequence of the mistake made by ,numitius their prtor1 and their blindness in believing him4 ,for when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the ,romans1 ,numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole country of ,latium1 that now was the time to fall upon the enemy1 exhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name1 while in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat1 and who might easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them4 ,whereupon the ,latins believed him1 and getting together a new army1 were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen to like counsels4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4--,that in chastising their ,subjects when circumstances required it the ,romans always avoided half-measures4 8,such was now the state of affairs in ,latium1 that peace and war seemed alike intolerable40 ,no worse calamity can befall a prince or commonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither accept peace nor support war2 as is the case with those whom it would ruin to conclude peace on the terms offered1 while war obliges them either to yield themselves a spoil to their allies1 or remain a prey to their foes4 ,to this grievous alternative are men led by evil counsels and unwise courses1 and1 as already said1 from not rightly measuring their strength4 ,for the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured his strength1 can hardly be brought so low as were the ,latins1 who made war with the ,romans when they should have made terms1 and made terms when they should have made war1 and so mismanaged everything that the friendship and the enmity of ,rome were alike fatal4 ,whence it came that1 in the first place1 they were defeated and broken by ,manlius ,torquatus1 and afterwards utterly subdued by ,camillus2 who1 when he had forced them to surrender at discretion to the ,roman arms1 and had placed garrisons in all their towns1 and taken hostages from all1 returned to ,rome and reported to the senate that the whole of ,latium now lay at their mercy4 ,and because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable1 and worthy to be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like occasion1 ,i shall cite the exact words which ,livius puts into the mouth of ,camillus1 as confirming what ,i have already said touching the methods used by the ,romans to extend their power1 and as showing how in chastising their subjects they always avoided half-measures and took a decided course4 ,for government consists in nothing else than in so controlling your subjects that it shall neither be in their power nor for their interest to harm you4 ,and this is effected either by making such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you injury1 or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly in them to seek to alter their condition4 ,all which is implied first in the measures proposed by ,camillus1 and next in the resolutions passed on these proposals by the senate4 ,the words of ,camillus were as follows3 8,the immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in the matter you are now considering1 that it lies with you to pronounce whether ,latium shall or shall not longer exist4 ,so far as the ,latins are concerned1 you can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by severity4 ,would you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and who have given themselves into your hands1 you can blot out the whole ,latin nation4 ,would you1 after the fashion of our ancestors1 increase the strength of ,rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of citizenship1 here you have opportunity to do so1 and with the greatest glory to yourselves4 ,that1 assuredly1 is the strongest government which they rejoice in who obey it4 ,now1 then1 is your time1 while the minds of all are bent on what is about to happen1 to obtain an ascendency over them1 either by punishment or by benefits40 ,upon this motion the senate resolved1 in accordance with the advice given by the consul1 to take the case of each city separately1 and either destroy utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more important of the ,latin towns4 ,to those cities they dealt with leniently1 they granted exemptions and privileges1 conferring upon them the rights of citizenship1 and securing their welfare in every particular4 ,the others they razed to the ground1 and planting colonies in their room1 either removed the inhabitants to ,rome1 or so scattered and dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever again in their power to inflict hurt4 ,for1 as ,i have said already1 the ,romans never1 in matters of moment1 resorted to half-measures4 ,and the sentence which they then pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers1 and ought to have been followed by the ,florentines when1 in the year #aejb1 ,arezzo and all the ,val di ,chiana rose in revolt4 ,for had they followed it1 they would have established their authority on a surer footing1 and added much to the greatness of their city by securing for it those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries of life4 ,but pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous in executing justice1 some of the ,aretines they outlawed1 some they condemned to death1 and all they deprived of their dignities and ancient importance in their town1 while leaving the town itself untouched4 ,and if in the councils then held any ,florentine recommended that ,arezzo should be dismantled1 they who thought themselves wiser than their fellows objected1 that to do so would be little to the honour of our republic1 since it would look as though she lacked strength to hold it4 ,reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound1 but are not really so2 for1 by the same rule1 no parricide should be put to death1 nor any other malefactor1 however atrocious his crimes2 because1 forsooth1 it would be discreditable to the ruler to appear unequal to the control of a single criminal4 ,they who hold such opinions fail to see that when men individually1 or entire cities collectively1 offend against the ,state1 the prince for his own safety1 and as a warning to others1 has no alternative but to make an end of them2 and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to chastise such offenders1 and not in incurring endless dangers in the effort to retain them4 ,for the prince who does not chastise offenders in a way that puts it out of their power to offend again1 is accounted unwise or worthless4 ,how necessary it was for the ,romans to execute ,justice against the ,latins1 is further seen from the course took with the men of ,privernum4 ,and here the text of ,livius suggests two points for our attention3 first1 as already noted1 that a subjugated people is either to be caressed or crushed2 and second1 how much it is for our advantage to maintain a manly bearing1 and to speak the truth fearlessly in the presence of the wise4 ,for the senate being met to determine the fate of the citizens of ,privernum1 who after rebelling had been reduced to submission by the ,roman arms1 certain of these citizens were sent by their countrymen to plead for pardon4 ,when these had come into the presence of the senate1 one of them was asked by a senator1 8,what punishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved80 ,to which he of ,privernum answered1 8,such punishment as they deserve who deem themselves worthy of freedom40 8,but10 said the consul1 8should we remit your punishment1 what sort of peace can we hope to have with you80 ,to which the other replied1 8,if granted on fair terms1 a firm and lasting peace2 if on unfair1 a peace of brief duration40 ,upon this1 though many of the senators were displeased1 the wiser among them declared 8that they had heard the voice of freedom and manhood1 and would never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought to remain longer than was needful in a position which gave them cause for shame2 since that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly2 whereas good faith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose servitude40 ,so saying1 they decided that the people of ,privernum should be admitted to ,roman citizenship1 with all the rights and privileges thereto appertaining2 declaring that 8men whose only thought was for freedom1 were indeed worthy to be ,romans40 ,so pleasing was this true and high answer to generous minds1 while any other must have seemed at once false and shameful4 ,and they who judge otherwise of men1 and of those men1 especially1 who have been used to be free1 or so to think themselves1 are mistaken2 and are led through their mistake to adopt courses unprofitable for themselves and affording no content to others4 ,whence1 the frequent rebellions and the downfall of ,states4 ,but1 returning to our subject1 ,i conclude1 as well from this instance of ,privernum1 as from the measures followed with the ,latins1 that when we have to pass sentence upon powerful ,states accustomed to live in freedom1 we must either destroy them utterly1 or else treat them with much indulgence2 and that any other course we may take with them will be unprofitable4 ,but most carefully should we avoid1 as of all courses the most pernicious1 such half-measures as were followed by the ,samnites when they had the ,romans shut up in the ,caudine ,forks1 and would not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them either to send their captives away with every honourable attention1 or else put them all to death2 but adopted a middle course1 and after disarming them and making them pass under the yoke1 suffered them to depart at once disgraced and angered4 ,and no long time after1 they found to their sorrow that the old man's warning was true1 and that the course they had themselves chosen was calamitous2 as shall1 hereafter1 in its place be shown4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4--,that1 commonly1 ,fortresses do much more ,harm than ,good ,to the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the ,romans1 that1 when they sought to protect themselves against the men of ,latium and ,privernum1 it never occurred to them to build strongholds in their cities to be a curb upon them1 and insure their fidelity1 especially when we remember the ,florentine saying which these same wise men often quote1 to the effect that ,pisa and other like cities must be held by fortresses ,doubtless1 had those old ,romans been like-minded with our modern sages1 they would not have neglected to build themselves fortresses1 but because they far surpassed them in courage1 sense1 and vigour1 they refrained4 ,and while ,rome retained her freedom1 and adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages1 she never built a single fortress with the view to hold any city or province1 though1 sometimes1 she may have suffered those to stand which she found already built4 ,looking1 therefore1 to the course followed by the ,romans in this particular1 and to that adopted by our modern rulers1 it seems proper to consider whether or not it is advisable to build fortresses1 and whether they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds them ,in the first place1 then1 we are to remember that fortresses are built either as a defence against foreign foes or against subjects ,in the former case1 ,i pronounce them unnecessary1 in the latter mischievous4 ,and to state the reasons why in the latter case they are mischievous1 ,i say that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects and in fear lest they rebel1 this must proceed from knowing that their subjects hate them1 which hatred in its turn results from their own ill conduct1 and that again from their thinking themselves able to rule their subjects by mere force1 or from their governing with little prudence4 ,now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that they can rule by mere force1 is this very circumstance of their people having these fortresses on their backs ,so that the conduct which breeds hatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or republics being possessed of fortresses1 which1 if this be true1 are really far more hurtful than useful ,first1 because1 as has been said already1 they render a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his subjects1 and1 next1 because they do not in reality afford him that security which he believes them to give ,for all those methods of violence and coercion which may be used to keep a people under1 resolve themselves into two2 since either like the ,romans you must always have it in your power to bring a strong army into the field1 or else you must dissipate1 destroy1 and disunite the subject people1 and so divide and scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you ,for should you merely strip them of their wealth1 spoliatis arma supersunt1 arms still remain to them1 or if you deprive them of their weapons1 furor arma ministrat1 rage will supply them1 if you put their chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest1 heads will renew themselves like those ,hydra2 while1 if you build fortresses1 these may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your subjects1 but in time of war they will prove wholly useless1 since they will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic1 whom together it will be impossible for you to resist4 ,and if ever fortresses were useless they are so at the present day1 by reason of the invention of artillery1 against the fury of which1 as ,i have shown already1 a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind fresh works1 cannot be defended4 ,but to go deeper into the matter1 ,i say1 either you are a prince seeking by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in check2 or you are a prince1 or it may be a republic1 desirous to control some city which you have gained in war4 ,to the prince ,i would say1 that1 for the reasons already given1 nothing can be more unserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your subjects1 since it only makes you the readier to oppress them1 and less scrupulous how you do so2 while it is this very oppression which moves them to destroy you1 and so kindles their hatred1 that the fortress1 which is the cause of all the mischief1 is powerless to protect you4 ,a wise and good prince1 therefore1 that he may continue good1 and give no occasion or encouragement to his descendants to become evil1 will never build a fortress1 to the end that neither he nor they may ever be led to trust to it rather than to the good-will of their subjects4 ,and if ,francesco ,sforza1 who was accounted a wise ruler1 on becoming ,duke of ,milan erected a fortress in that city1 ,i say that herein he was unwise1 and that the event has shown the building of this fortress to have been hurtful and not helpful to his heirs4 ,for thinking that by its aid they could behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects1 and yet be secure1 they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression1 until1 becoming beyond measure odious1 they lost their ,state as soon as an enemy attacked it4 ,nor was this fortress1 which in peace had occasioned them much hurt1 any defence or of any service them in war4 ,for had they being without it1 through thoughtlessness1 treated their subjects inhumanely1 they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from their danger2 and might1 thereafter1 with no other help than that of attached subjects1 have withstood the attacks of the ,french far more successfully than they could with their fortress1 but with subjects whom they had estranged4 ,and1 in truth1 fortresses are unserviceable in every way1 since they may be lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their defence1 or by the overwhelming strength of an assailant1 or else by famine4 ,and where you seek to recover a ,state which you have lost1 and in which only the fortress remains to you1 if that fortress is to be of any service or assistance to you1 you must have an army wherewith to attack the enemy who has driven you out4 ,but with such an army you might succeed in recovering your ,state as readily without a fortress as with one2 nay1 perhaps1 even more readily1 since your subjects1 had you not used them ill1 from the overweening confidence your fortress gave you1 might then have felt better disposed towards you4 ,and the event shows that in times of adversity this very fortress of ,milan has been of no advantage whatever1 either to the ,sforzas or to the ,french2 but1 on the contrary1 has brought ruin on both1 because1 trusting to it1 they did not turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving that ,state4 ,guido ,ubaldo1 duke of ,urbino and son to ,duke ,federigo1 who in his day was a warrior of much renown1 but who was driven from his dominions by ,cesare ,borgia1 son to ,pope ,alexander ,,vi41 when afterwards1 by a sudden stroke of good fortune1 he was restored to the dukedom caused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled1 judging them to be hurtful4 ,for as he was beloved by his subjects1 so far as they were concerned he had no need for fortresses2 while1 as against foreign enemies1 he saw he could not defend them1 since this would have required an army kept constantly in the field4 ,for which reasons he made them be razed to the ground4 ,when ,pope ,julius ,,ii4 had driven the ,bentivogli from ,bologna1 after erecting a citadel in that town1 he caused the people to be cruelly oppressed by his governor2 whereupon1 the people rebelled1 and he forthwith lost the citadel2 so that his citadel1 and the oppressions to which it led1 were of less service to him than different behaviour on his part had been4 ,when ,niccolo da ,castello1 the ancestor of the ,vitelli1 returned to his country out of exile1 he straightway pulled down the two fortresses built there by ,pope ,sixtus ,,iv41 perceiving that it was not by fortresses1 but by the good-will of the people1 that he could be maintained in his government4 ,but the most recent1 and in all respects most noteworthy instance1 and that which best demonstrates the futility of building1 and the advantage of destroying fortresses1 is what happened only the other day in ,genoa4 ,every one knows how1 in #aejg1 ,genoa rose in rebellion against ,louis ,,xii4 of ,france1 who came in person and with all his forces to recover it2 and after recovering it built there a citadel stronger than any before known1 being1 both from its position and from every other circumstance1 most inaccessible to attack4 ,for standing on the extremity of a hill1 named by the ,genoese ,codefa1 which juts out into the sea1 it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the town4 ,but1 afterwards1 in the year #aeab1 when the ,french were driven out of ,italy1 the ,genoese1 in spite of this citadel1 again rebelled1 and ,ottaviano ,fregoso assuming the government1 after the greatest efforts1 continued over a period of sixteen months1 at last succeeded in reducing the citadel by famine4 ,by all it was believed that he would retain it as a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune1 and by some he was advised to do so2 but he1 being a truly wise ruler1 and knowing well that it is by the attachment of their subjects and not by the strength of their fortifications that princes are maintained in their governments1 dismantled this citadel2 and founding his authority1 not upon material defences1 but on his own valour and prudence1 kept and still keeps it4 ,and whereas1 formerly1 a force of a thousand foot-soldiers could effect a change in the government of ,genoa1 the enemies of ,ottaviano have assailed him with ten thousand1 without being able to harm him4 ,here1 then1 we see that1 while to dismantle this fortress occasioned ,ottaviano no loss1 its construction gave the ,french king no sort of advantage4 ,for when he could come into ,italy with an army1 he could recover ,genoa1 though he had no citadel there2 but when he could not come with an army1 it was not in his power to hold the city by means of the citadel4 ,moreover it was costly for the king to build1 and shameful for him to lose this fortress2 while for ,ottaviano it was glorious to take1 and advantageous to destroy it4 ,let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within their own territories1 but in towns whereof they have taken possession4 ,and if the above example of ,france and ,genoa suffice not to show the futility of this course1 that of ,florence and ,pisa ought1 ,i think1 to be conclusive4 ,for in erecting fortresses to hold ,pisa1 the ,florentines failed to perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile to them1 which had lived in freedom1 and which could cloak rebellion under the name of liberty1 must1 if it were to be retained at all1 be retained by those methods which were used by the ,romans1 and either be made a companion or be destroyed4 ,of how little service these ,pisan fortresses were1 was seen on the coming of ,charles ,,viii4 of ,france into ,italy1 to whom1 whether through the treachery of their defenders or from fear of worse evils1 they were at once delivered up2 whereas1 had there been no fortresses in ,pisa1 the ,florentines would not have looked to them as the means whereby the town was to be held2 the king could not by their assistance have taken the town from the ,florentines2 and the methods whereby it had previously been preserved might1 in all likelihood1 have continued sufficient to preserve it2 and1 at any rate1 had served that end no worse than the fortresses4 ,these1 then1 are the conclusions to which ,i come1 namely1 that fortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful1 and that those built to retain acquired territories are useless2 and ,i am content to rely on the example of the ,romans1 who in the towns they sought to hold by the strong hand1 rather pulled down fortresses than built them4 ,and if any1 to controvert these views of mine1 were to cite the case of ,tarentum in ancient times1 or of ,brescia in recent1 as towns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their citadels2 ,i answer1 that for the recovery of ,tarentum1 ,fabius ,maximus was sent at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it even had there been no fortress there2 and that although he availed himself of the fortress for the recovery of the town1 he might1 without it1 have resorted to other means which would have brought about the same result4 ,nor do ,i see of what service a citadel can be said to be1 when to recover the city you must employ a consular army under a ,fabius ,maximus4 ,but that the ,romans would1 in any case1 have recovered ,tarentum1 is plain from what happened at ,capua1 where there was no citadel1 and which they retook1 simply by the valour of their soldiers4 ,again1 as regards ,brescia1 ,i say that the circumstances attending the revolt of that town were such as occur but seldom1 namely1 that the citadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city1 you should happen to have a great army nigh at hand1 as the ,french had theirs on this occasion4 ,for ,m4 de ,foix being in command of the king's forces at ,bologna1 on hearing of the loss of ,brescia1 marched thither without an hour's delay1 and reaching ,brescia in three days1 retook the town with the help of the citadel4 ,but here1 again1 we see that1 to be of any service1 the citadel of ,brescia had to be succoured by a de ,foix1 and by that ,french army which in three days' time marched to its relief4 ,so that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as against others of a contrary tendency4 ,for1 in the course of recent wars1 many fortresses have been taken and retaken1 with the same variety of fortune with which open country has been acquired or lost2 and this not only in ,lombardy1 but also in ,romagna1 in the kingdom of ,naples1 and in all parts of ,italy4 ,and1 further1 touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against foreign enemies1 ,i say that such defences are not needed by the prince or people who possess a good army2 while for those who do not possess a good army1 they are useless4 ,for good armies without fortresses are in themselves a sufficient defence3 whereas1 fortresses without good armies avail nothing4 ,and this we see in the case of those nations which have been thought to excel both in their government and otherwise1 as1 for instance1 the ,romans and the ,spartans4 ,for while the ,romans would build no fortresses1 the ,spartans not merely abstained from building them1 but would not even suffer their cities to be enclosed with walls2 desiring to be protected by their own valour only1 and by no other defence4 ,so that when a ,spartan was asked by an ,athenian what he thought of the walls of ,athens1 he answered 8that they were fine walls if meant to hold women only40 ,if a prince who has a good army has likewise1 on the sea-front of his dominions1 some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a few days1 until he gets his forces together1 this1 though not necessary1 may sometimes be for his advantage4 ,but for a prince who is without a strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his territories1 or upon his frontier1 is either useless or hurtful1 since they may readily be lost and then turned against him2 or1 supposing them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them by assault1 he may leave them behind1 and so render them wholly unprofitable4 ,for a brave army1 unless stoutly met1 enters an enemy's country without regard to the towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear1 as we read of happening in ancient times1 and have seen done by ,francesco ,maria della ,rovere1 who no long while ago1 when he marched against ,urbino1 made little of leaving ten hostile cities behind him4 ,the prince1 therefore1 who can bring together a strong army can do without building fortresses1 while he who has not a strong army ought not to build them1 but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he dwells1 and keep it well stored with supplies1 and its inhabitants well affected1 so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on1 or he be relieved by foreign aid4 ,all other expedients are costly in time of peace1 and in war useless4 ,whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive1 that the ,romans1 as they were most prudent in all their other methods1 so also showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of ,latium and ,privernum1 when1 without ever thinking of fortresses1 they sought security in bolder and more sagacious courses4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4--,that he who attacks a ,city divided against itself1 must not think to get possession of it through its ,divisions4 ,violent dissensions breaking out in ,rome between the commons and the nobles1 it appeared to the ,veientines and ,etruscans that now was their time to deal a fatal blow to the ,roman supremacy4 ,accordingly1 they assembled an army and invaded the territories of ,rome4 ,the senate sent ,caius ,manlius and ,marcus ,fabius to meet them1 whose forces encamping close by the ,veientines1 the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify the ,roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse1 and so incensed the ,romans by their unmeasured insolence that1 from being divided they became reconciled1 and giving the enemy battle1 broke and defeated them4 ,here1 again1 we see1 what has already been noted1 how prone men are to adopt wrong courses1 and how often they miss their object when they think to secure it4 ,the ,veientines imagined that they could conquer the ,romans by attacking them while they were at feud among themselves2 but this very attack reunited the ,romans and brought ruin on their assailants4 ,for the causes of division in a commonwealth are1 for the most part1 ease and tranquillity1 while the causes of union are fear and war4 ,wherefore1 had the ,veientines been wise1 the more divided they saw ,rome to be1 the more should they have sought to avoid war with her1 and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts4 ,and the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the confidence of both factions1 and in mediating between them as arbiter so long as they do not come to blows2 but when they resort to open violence1 then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side1 so as to plunge them deeper in hostilities1 wherein both may exhaust their forces without being led by your putting forth an excess of strength to suspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master4 ,where this is well managed1 it will almost always happen that you succeed in effecting the object you propose to yourself4 ,the city of ,pistoja1 as ,i have said already in connection with another matter1 was won over to the ,florentine republic by no other artifice than this4 ,for the town being split by factions1 the ,florentines1 by now favouring one side and now the other1 without incurring the suspicions of either1 brought both to such extremities that1 wearied out with their harassed life1 they threw themselves at last of their own accord into the arms of ,florence4 ,the city of ,siena1 again1 has never made any change in her government which has had the support of the ,florentines1 save when that support has been slight and insignificant2 for whenever the interference of ,florence has been marked and decided1 it has had the effect of uniting all parties in support of things as they stood4 ,one other instance ,i shall add to those already given4 ,oftener than once ,filippo ,visconti1 duke of ,milan1 relying on their divisions1 set wars on foot against the ,florentines1 and always without success2 so that1 in lamenting over these failures1 he was wont to complain that the mad humours of the ,florentines had cost him two millions of gold1 without his having anything to show for it4 ,the ,veientines and ,etruscans1 therefore1 as ,i have said already1 were misled by false hopes1 and in the end were routed by the ,romans in a single pitched battle2 and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds and by similar means against a divided people1 will always find themselves deceived4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4--,that ,taunts and ,abuse breed ,hatred against him who uses them1 without yielding him any ,advantage4 ,to abstain from threats and injurious language1 is1 methinks1 one of the wisest precautions a man can use4 ,for abuse and menace take nothing from the strength of an adversary2 the latter only making him more cautious1 while the former inflames his hatred against you1 and leads him to consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt4 ,this is seen from the example of the ,veientines1 of whom ,i spoke in the last ,chapter1 who1 to the injury of war against the ,romans1 added those verbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their soldiers to refrain4 ,for these are injuries which stir and kindle your enemy to vengeance1 and yet1 as has been said1 in no way disable him from doing you hurt2 so that1 in truth1 they are weapons which wound those who use them4 ,of this we find a notable instance in ,asia1 in connection with the siege of ,amida4 ,for ,gabade1 the ,persian general1 after besieging this town for a great while1 wearied out at last by its protracted defence1 determined on withdrawing his army2 and had actually begun to strike his camp1 when the whole inhabitants of the place1 elated by their success1 came out upon the walls to taunt and upbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit1 and to load them with every kind of abuse4 ,stung by these insults1 ,gabade1 changing his resolution1 renewed the siege with such fury that in a few days he stormed and sacked the town4 ,and the very same thing befell the ,veientines1 who1 not content1 as we have seen1 to make war on the ,romans with arms1 must needs assail them with foul reproaches1 advancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them1 and molesting them more with their tongues than with their swords1 until the ,roman soldiers1 who at first were most unwilling to fight1 forced the consuls to lead them to the attack4 ,whereupon1 the ,veientines1 like those others of whom mention has just now been made1 had to pay the penalty of their insolence4 ,wise captains of armies1 therefore1 and prudent governors of cities1 should take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches from being used by their soldiers and subjects1 either amongst themselves or against an enemy4 ,for when directed against an enemy they lead to the mischiefs above noticed1 while still worse consequences may follow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as sensible rulers have always taken for that purpose4 ,the legions who were left behind for the protection of ,capua having1 as shall in its place be told1 conspired against the ,capuans1 their conspiracy led to a mutiny1 which was presently suppressed by ,valerius ,corvinus2 when1 as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made their submission1 it was declared that whosoever should thereafter upbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this mutiny1 should be visited with the severest punishment4 ,so likewise1 when ,tiberius ,gracchus was appointed1 during the war with ,hannibal1 to command a body of slaves1 whom the ,romans in their straits for soldiers had furnished with arms1 one of his first acts was to pass an order making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin4 ,so mischievous a thing did the ,romans esteem it to use insulting words to others1 or to taunt them with their shame4 ,whether this be done in sport or earnest1 nothing vexes men more1 or rouses them to fiercer indignation2 8for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth1 leaves always behind it a rankling memory40#i #i ,nam faceti asper1 quando nimium ex vero traxere1 acrem sui memoriam relinquunt4 ,tacit4 ,an4 xv4 #fh4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4--,that prudent ,princes and ,republics should be content to have obtained a ,victory2 for1 commonly1 when they are not1 theft-,victory turns to ,defeat4 ,the use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by an insolent humour1 bred by victory or the false hope of it1 whereby men are oftentimes led not only to speak1 but also to act amiss4 ,for such false hopes1 when they gain an entry into men's minds1 cause them to overrun their goal1 and to miss opportunities for securing a certain good1 on the chance of obtaining some thing better1 but uncertain4 ,and this1 being a matter that deserves attention1 because in deceiving themselves men often injure their country1 ,i desire to illustrate it by particular instances1 ancient and recent1 since mere argument might not place it in so clear a light4 ,after routing the ,romans at ,cann1 ,hannibal sent messengers to ,carthage to announce his victory1 and to ask support4 ,a debate arising in the ,carthaginian senate as to what was to be done1 ,hanno1 an aged and wise citizen1 advised that they should prudently take advantage of their victory to make peace with the ,romans1 while as conquerors they might have it on favourable terms1 and not wait to make it after a defeat2 since it should be their object to show the ,romans that they were strong enough to fight them1 but not to peril the victory they had won in the hope of winning a greater4 ,this advice was not followed by the ,carthaginian senate1 but its wisdom was well seen later1 when the opportunity to act upon it was gone4 ,when the whole ,east had been overrun by ,alexander of ,macedon1 the citizens of ,tyre 7then at the height of its renown1 and very strong from being built1 like ,venice1 in the sea71 recognizing his greatness1 sent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good servants1 and to yield him all obedience1 yet could not consent to receive either him or his soldiers within their walls4 ,whereupon1 ,alexander1 displeased that a single city should venture to close its gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs open1 repulsed the ,tyrians1 and rejecting their overtures set to work to besiege their town4 ,but as it stood on the water1 and was well stored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence1 after four months had gone1 ,alexander1 perceiving that he was wasting more time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had sufficed for most of his other conquests1 resolved to offer terms to the ,tyrians1 and to make them those concessions which they themselves had asked4 ,but they1 puffed up by their success1 not merely refused the terms offered1 but put to death the envoy sent to propose them4 ,enraged by this1 ,alexander renewed the siege1 and with such vigour1 that he took and destroyed the city1 and either slew or made slaves of its inhabitants4 ,in the year #aeab1 a ,spanish army entered the ,florentine territory1 with the object of restoring the ,medici to ,florence1 and of levying a subsidy from the town2 having been summoned thither by certain of the citizens1 who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within the ,florentine confines they would arm in their behalf4 ,but when the ,spaniards had come into the plain of the ,arno1 and none declared in their favour1 being in sore need of supplies1 they offered to make terms4 ,this offer the people of ,florence in their pride rejected1 and so gave occasion for the sack of ,prato and the overthrow of the ,florentine ,republic4 ,a prince1 therefore1 who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful than himself1 can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat1 especially when overtures are made to him2 for however poor the terms offered may be1 they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous for him who accepts them1 and which he may construe as a partial success4 ,for which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens of ,tyre that ,alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at first rejected2 and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph that1 by their resistance in arms1 they had forced so great a warrior to bow to their will4 ,and1 in like manner1 it should have been a sufficient victory for the ,florentines that the ,spaniards had in part yielded to their wishes1 and abated something of their own demands1 the purport of which was to change the government of ,florence1 to sever her from her allegiance to ,france1 and1 further1 to obtain money from her4 ,for if of these three objects the ,spaniards had succeeded in securing the last two1 while the ,florentines maintained the integrity of their government1 a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to each4 ,and while preserving their political existence1 the ,florentines should have made small account of the other two conditions2 nor ought they1 even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater advantages before them1 to have left matters in any degree to the arbitration of ,fortune1 by pushing things to extremes1 and incurring risks which no prudent man should incur1 unless compelled by necessity4 ,hannibal1 when recalled by the ,carthaginians from ,italy1 where for sixteen years he had covered himself with glory1 to the defence of his native country1 found on his arrival that ,hasdrubal and ,syphax had been defeated1 the kingdom of ,numidia lost1 and ,carthage confined within the limits of her walls1 and left without other resource save in him and his army4 ,perceiving1 therefore1 that this was the last stake his country had to play1 and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried every other expedient1 he felt no shame to sue for peace1 judging that in peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his country4 ,but1 when peace was refused him1 no fear of defeat deterred him from battle1 being resolved either to conquer1 if conquer he might1 or if he must fall1 to fall gloriously4 ,now1 if a commander so valiant as ,hannibal1 at the head of an unconquered army1 was willing to sue for peace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his country must be enslaved1 what course ought to be followed by another commander1 less valiant and with less experience than he8 ,but men labour under this infirmity1 that they know not where to set bounds to their hopes1 and building on these without otherwise measuring their strength1 rush headlong on destruction4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4--,that to neglect the redress of ,grievances1 whether public or private1 is dangerous for a ,prince or ,commonwealth4 ,certain ,gauls coming to attack ,etruria1 and more particularly ,clusium its chief city1 the citizens of ,clusium sought aid from ,rome2 whereupon the ,romans sent the three ,fabii1 as envoys to these ,gauls1 to notify to them1 in the name of the ,roman people1 that they must refrain from making war on the ,etruscans4 ,from what befell the ,romans in connection with this embassy1 we see clearly how far men may be carried in resenting an affront4 ,for these envoys arriving at the very moment when the ,gauls and ,etruscans were about to join battle1 being readier at deeds than words1 took part with the ,etruscans and fought in their foremost ranks4 ,whence it came that the ,gauls recognizing the ,roman envoys1 turned against the ,romans all the hatred which before they had felt for the ,etruscans2 and grew still more incensed when on making complaint to the ,roman senate1 through their ambassador1 of the wrong done them1 and demanding that the ,fabii should be given up to them in atonement for their offence1 not merely were the offenders not given up or punished in any way1 but1 on the contrary1 when the comitia met were created tribunes with consular powers4 ,but when the ,gauls found these men honoured who deserved to be chastised1 they concluded that what had happened had been done by way of slight and insult to them1 and1 burning with fury and resentment1 hastened forward to attack ,rome1 which they took with the exception of the ,capitol4 ,now this disaster overtook the ,romans entirely from their disregard of justice4 ,for their envoys1 who had violated the law of nations1 and had therefore deserved punishment1 they had on the contrary treated with honour4 ,and this should make us reflect1 how carefully all princes and commonwealths ought to refrain from committing like wrongs1 not only against communities1 but also against particular men4 ,for if a man be deeply wronged1 either by a private hand or by a public officer1 and be not avenged to his satisfaction1 if he live in a republic1 he will seek to avenge himself1 though in doing so he bring ruin on his country2 or if he live under a prince1 and be of a resolute and haughty spirit1 he will never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the prince1 though he knows it may cost him dear4 ,whereof we have no finer or truer example than in the death of ,philip of ,macedon1 the father of ,alexander4 ,for ,pausanias1 a handsome and high-born youth belonging to ,philip's court1 having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by ,attalus1 one of the foremost men of the royal household1 repeatedly complained to ,philip of the outrage2 who for a while put him off with promises of vengeance1 but in the end1 so far from avenging him1 promoted ,attalus to be governor of the province of ,greece4 ,whereupon1 ,pausanias1 seeing his enemy honoured and not punished1 turned all his resentment from him who had outraged1 against him who had not avenged him1 and on the morning of the day fixed for the marriage of ,philip's daughter to ,alexander of ,epirus1 while ,philip walked between the two ,alexanders1 his son and his son-in-law1 towards the temple to celebrate the nuptials1 he slew him4 ,this instance nearly resembles that of the ,roman envoys2 and offers a warning to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to suppose1 that when wrong upon wrong has been done him1 he will not bethink himself of revenge1 however great the danger he runs1 or the punishment he thereby brings upon himself4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4--,that ,fortune obscures the minds of ,men when she would not have them hinder her ,designs4 ,if we note well the course of human affairs1 we shall often find things come about and accidents befall1 against which it seems to be the will of ,heaven that men should not provide4 ,and if this were the case even in ,rome1 so renowned for her valour1 religion1 and wise ordinances1 we need not wonder if it be far more common in other cities and provinces wherein these safeguards are wanting4 ,having here a notable opportunity to show how ,heaven influences men's actions1 ,titus ,livius turns it to account1 and treats the subject at large and in pregnant words1 where he says1 that since it was ,heaven's will1 for ends of its own1 that the ,romans should feel its power1 it first of all caused these ,fabii1 who were sent as envoys to the ,gauls1 to act amiss1 and then by their misconduct stirred up the ,gauls to make war on ,rome2 and1 lastly1 so ordered matters that nothing worthy of their name was done by the ,romans to withstand their attack4 ,for it was fore-ordained by ,heaven that ,camillus1 who alone could supply the remedy to so mighty an evil1 should be banished to ,ardea2 and again1 that the citizens1 who had often created a dictator to meet attacks of the ,volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations1 should fail to do so when the ,gauls were marching upon ,rome4 ,moreover1 the army which the ,romans got together was but a weak one1 since they used no signal effort to make it strong2 nay1 were so dilatory in arming that they were barely in time to meet the enemy at the river ,allia1 though no more than ten miles distant from ,rome4 ,here1 again1 the ,roman tribunes pitched their camp without observing any of the usual precautions1 attending neither to the choice of ground1 nor to surround themselves with trench or ,palisade1 nor to avail themselves of any other aid1 human or ,divine4 ,in ordering their army for battle1 moreover1 disposed it in weak columns1 and these far apart3 so that neither men nor officers accomplished anything worthy of the ,roman discipline4 ,the battle was bloodless for the ,romans fled before they were attacked2 most of them retreating to ,veii1 the rest to ,rome1 where1 without turning aside to visit their homes1 they made straight for the ,capitol4 ,meanwhile1 the senate1 so far from bethinking themselves how they might defend the city1 did not even attend to closing the gates2 and while some of them made their escape from ,rome1 others entered the ,capitol along with those who sought shelter there4 ,it was only in the defence of the ,capitol that any method was observed1 measures being taken to prevent it being crowded with useless numbers1 and all the victual which could be got1 being brought into it to enable it to stand a siege4 ,of the women1 the children1 and the men whose years unfitted them for service1 the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring towns1 the rest remained in ,rome a prey to the invaders2 so that no one who had heard of the achievements of the ,romans in past years1 on being told of what took place on this occasion1 could have believed that it was of the same people that things so contrary were related4 ,wherefore1 ,titus ,livius1 after setting forth all these disorders1 concludes with the words1 8,so far does ,fortune darken men's minds when she would not have her ascendency gainsaid40 ,nor could any juster observation be made4 ,and hence it is that those who experience the extremes whether of good or of evil fortune1 are1 commonly1 little deserving either of praise or blame2 since it is apparent that it is from ,heaven having afforded them1 or denied them opportunities for acting worthily1 that they have been brought to their greatness or to their undoing4 ,fortune1 doubtless1 when she seeks to effect great ends1 will often choose as her instrument a man of such sense and worth that he can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to him2 and1 in like manner1 when she desires to bring about great calamities1 will put forward such men as will of themselves contribute to that result4 ,and all who stand in her way1 she either removes by death1 or deprives of the means of effecting good4 ,and it is well seen in the passage we are considering1 how ,fortune1 to aggrandize ,rome1 and raise her to the height she reached1 judged it necessary1 as shall be more fully shown in the following ,book1 to humble her2 yet would not have her utterly undone4 ,for which reason we find her causing ,camillus to be banished1 but not put to death2 suffering ,rome to be taken1 but not the ,capitol2 and bringing it to pass that1 while the ,romans took no wise precaution for the defence of their city1 they neglected none in defending their citadel4 ,that ,rome might be taken1 ,fortune caused the mass of the army1 after the rout at the ,allia1 to direct its flight to ,veii1 thus withdrawing the means wherewith the city might have been defended2 but while thus disposing matters1 she at the same time prepared all the needful steps for its recovery1 in bringing an almost entire ,roman array to ,veii1 and ,camillus to ,ardea1 so that a great force might be assembled for the rescue of their country1 under a captain in no way compromised by previous reverses1 but1 on the contrary1 in the enjoyment of an untarnished renown4 ,i might cite many modern instances to confirm these opinions1 but since enough has been said to convince any fair mind1 ,i pass them over4 ,but once more ,i repeat what1 from all history1 may be seen to be most true1 that men may aid ,fortune1 but not withstand her2 may interweave their threads with her web1 but cannot break it ,but1 for all that1 they must never lose heart1 since not knowing what their end is to be1 and moving towards it by cross-roads and untravelled paths1 they have always room for hope1 and ought never to abandon it1 whatsoever befalls1 and into whatsoever straits they come4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4--,that really powerful ,princes and1 ,commonwealths do not buy ,friendships with ,money1 but with their ,valour and the ,fame of their ,prowess4 ,when besieged in the ,capitol1 the ,romans although expecting succour from ,veii and from ,camillus1 nevertheless1 being straitened by famine1 entered into an agreement to buy off the ,gauls with gold ,but at the very moment when1 in pursuance of this agreement1 the gold was being weighed out1 ,camillus came up with his army4 ,this1 says our historian1 was contrived by ,fortune1 8that the ,romans might not live thereafter as men ransomed for a price10 and the matter is noteworthy1 not only with reference to this particular occasion1 but also as it bears on the methods generally followed by this republic4 ,for we never find ,rome seeking to acquire towns1 or to purchase peace with money1 but always confiding in her own warlike valour1 which could not1 ,i believe1 be said of any other republic4 ,now1 one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any ,state1 is to observe on what terms it lives with its neighbours3 for when it so carries itself that1 to secure its friendship1 its neighbours pay it tribute1 this is a sure sign of its strength1 but when its neighbours1 though of less reputation1 receive payments from it1 this is a clear proof of its weakness ,in the course of the ,roman history we read how the ,massilians1 the ,eduans1 the ,rhodians1 ,hiero of ,syracuse1 the ,kings ,eumenes and ,massinissa1 all of them neighbours to the ,roman frontiers1 in order to secure the friendship of ,rome1 submitted to imposts and tribute whenever ,rome had need of them1 asking no return save her protection4 ,but with a weak ,state we find the reverse of all this happening ,and1 to begin with our own republic of ,florence1 we know that in times past1 when she was at the height of her renown1 there was never a lordling of ,romagna who had not a subsidy from her1 to say nothing of what she paid to the ,perugians1 to the ,castellans1 and to all her other neighbours ,but had our city been armed and strong1 the direct contrary would have been the case1 for1 to obtain her protection1 all would have poured money into her lap1 not seeking to sell their friendship but to purchase hers4 ,nor are the ,florentines the only people who have lived on this dishonourable footing ,the ,venetians have done the same1 nay1 the ,king of ,france himself1 for all his great dominions1 lives tributary to the ,swiss and to the ,king of ,england2 and this because the ,french king and the others named1 with a view to escape dangers rather imaginary than real1 have disarmed their subjects2 seeking to reap a present gain by wringing money from them1 rather than follow a course which would secure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country4 ,which ill-practices of theirs1 though they quiet things for a time1 must in the end exhaust their resources1 and give rise in seasons of danger to incurable mischief and disorder4 ,it would be tedious to count up how often in the course of their wars1 the ,florentines1 the ,venetians1 and the kingdom of ,france have had to ransom themselves from their enemies1 and to submit to an ignominy to which1 once only1 the ,romans were very near being subjected4 ,it would be tedious1 too1 to recite how many towns have been bought by the ,florentines and by the ,venetians1 which1 afterwards1 have only been a trouble to them1 from their not knowing how to defend with iron what they had won with gold4 ,while the ,romans continued free they adhered to this more generous and noble method1 but when they came under the emperors1 and these1 again1 began to deteriorate1 and to love the shade rather than the sunshine1 they also took to purchasing peace1 now from the ,parthians1 now from the ,germans1 and at other times from other neighbouring nations4 ,and this was the beginning of the decline of their great empire4 ,such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your subjects2 and this course is attended by the still greater disadvantage1 that the closer an enemy presses you the weaker he finds you4 ,for any one who follows the evil methods of which ,i speak1 must1 in order to support troops whom he thinks can be trusted to keep off his enemies1 be very exacting in his dealings with those of his subjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions2 since1 to widen the interval between himself and his enemies1 he must subsidize those princes and peoples who adjoin his frontiers4 ,states maintained on this footing may make a little resistance on their confines2 but when these are passed by the enemy no further defence remains4 ,those who pursue such methods as these seem not to perceive that they are opposed to reason and common sense4 ,for the heart and vital parts of the body1 not the extremities1 are those which we should keep guarded1 since we may live on without the latter1 but must die if the former be hurt4 ,but the ,states of which ,i speak1 leaving the heart undefended1 defend only the hands and feet4 ,the mischief which has thus been1 and is at this day wrought in ,florence is plain enough to see4 ,for so soon as an enemy penetrates within her frontiers1 and approaches her heart1 all is over with her4 ,and the same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the ,venetians1 whose city1 had it not been girdled by the sea1 must then have found its end4 ,in ,france1 indeed1 a like result has not been seen so often1 she being so great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier than herself4 ,nevertheless1 when the ,english invaded ,france in the year #aeac1 the whole kingdom tottered2 and the ,king himself1 as well as every one else1 had to own that a single defeat might have cost him his dominions4 ,but with the ,romans the reverse of all this took place4 ,for the nearer an enemy approached ,rome1 the more completely he found her armed for resistance2 and accordingly we see that on the occasion of ,hannibal's invasion of ,italy1 the ,romans1 after three defeats1 and after the slaughter of so many of their captains and soldiers1 were still able1 not merely to withstand the invader1 but even1 in the end1 to come off victorious4 ,this we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded1 while the extremities were but little heeded4 ,for the strength of ,rome rested on the ,roman people themselves1 on the ,latin league1 on the confederate towns of ,italy1 and on her colonies1 from all of which sources she drew so numerous an army1 as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to keep it in subjection4 ,the truth of what ,i say may be further seen from the question put by ,hanno the ,carthaginian to the messengers sent to ,carthage by ,hannibal after his victory at ,cann4 ,for when these were vaunting the achievements of ,hannibal1 they were asked by ,hanno whether any one had come forward on behalf of the ,romans to propose terms of peace1 and whether any town of the ,latin league or of the colonized districts had revolted from the ,romans4 ,and when to both inquiries the envoys answered1 8,no10 ,hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than on the day it was begun4 ,we can understand1 therefore1 as well from what has now been said1 as from what ,i have often said before1 how great a difference there is between the methods followed by the republics of the present times1 and those followed by the republics of antiquity2 and why it is that we see every day astounding losses alternate with extraordinary gains4 ,for where men are weak1 ,fortune shows herself strong2 and because she changes1 ,states and ,governments change with her2 and will continue to change1 until some one arise1 who1 following reverently the example of the ancients1 shall so control her1 that she shall not have opportunity with every revolution of the sun to display anew the greatness of her power4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4--,of the ,danger of trusting banished ,men4 ,the danger of trusting those who are in exile from their own country1 being one to which the rulers of ,states are often exposed1 may1 ,i think1 be fitly considered in these ,discourses2 and ,i notice it the more willingly1 because ,i am able to illustrate it by a memorable instance which ,titus ,livius1 though with another purpose1 relates in his history4 ,when ,alexander the ,great passed with his army into ,asia1 his brother-in-law and uncle1 ,alexander of ,epirus1 came with another army into ,italy1 being invited thither by the banished ,lucanians1 who gave him to believe that1 with their aid1 he might get possession of the whole of that country4 ,but when1 confiding in the promises of these exiles1 and fed by the hopes they held out to him1 he came into ,italy1 they put him to death1 their fellow-citizens having offered to restore them to their country upon this condition4 ,it behoves us1 therefore1 to remember how empty are the promises1 and how doubtful the faith1 of men in banishment from their native land4 ,for as to their faith1 it may be assumed that whenever they can effect their return by other means than yours1 notwithstanding any covenants they may have made with you1 they will throw you over1 and take part with their countrymen4 ,and as for the empty promises and delusive hopes which they set before you1 so extreme is their desire to return home that they naturally believe many things which are untrue1 and designedly misrepresent many others2 so that between their beliefs and what they say they believe1 they fill you with false impressions1 on which if you build1 your labour is in vain1 and you are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing but ruin can result4 ,to this instance of ,alexander ,i shall add only one other1 that1 namely1 of ,themistocles the ,athenian1 who1 being proclaimed a traitor1 fled into ,asia to ,darius1 to whom he made such lavish promises if he would only attack ,greece1 that he induced him to undertake the enterprise4 ,but afterwards1 when he could not fulfil what he had promised1 either from shame1 or through fear of punishment1 he poisoned himself4 ,but1 if such a mistake as this was made by a man like ,themistocles1 we may reckon that mistakes still greater will be made by those who1 being of a feebler nature1 suffer themselves to be more completely swayed by their feelings and wishes ,wherefore1 let a prince be careful how he embarks in any enterprise on the representations of an exile2 for otherwise1 he is likely either to be put to shame1 or to incur the gravest calamities4 ,because towns are sometimes1 though seldom1 taken by craft1 through secret practices had with their inhabitants1 ,i think it not out of place to discuss the matter in the following ,chapter1 wherein ,i shall likewise show in how many ways the ,romans were wont to make such acquisitions4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4--,in how many ,ways the ,romans gained ,possession of ,towns4 ,turning their thoughts wholly to arms1 the ,romans always conducted their military enterprises in the most advantageous way1 both as to cost and every other circumstance of war4 ,for which reason they avoided attempting towns by siege1 judging the expense and inconvenience of this method of carrying on war greatly to outweigh any advantage to be gained by it4 ,accordingly1 they thought it better and more for their interest to reduce towns in any other way than this2 and in all those years during which they were constantly engaged in wars we find very few instances of their proceeding by siege4 ,for the capture of towns1 therefore1 they trusted either to assault or to surrender4 ,assaults were effected either by open force1 or by force and stratagem combined4 ,when a town was assailed by open force1 the walls were stormed without being breached1 and the assailants were said 8aggredi urbem corona10 because they encircled the city with their entire strength and kept up an attack on all sides4 ,in this way they often succeeded in carrying towns1 and even great towns1 at a first onset1 as when ,scipio took new ,carthage in ,spain4 ,but when they failed to carry a town by storm1 they set themselves to breach the walls with battering rams and other warlike engines2 or they dug mines so as to obtain an entrance within the walls1 this being the method followed in taking ,veii2 or else1 to be on a level with the defenders1 they erected towers of timber or threw up mounds of earth against the outside of the walls so as to reach the top4 ,of these methods of attack1 the first1 wherein the city was entirely surrounded1 exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them more doubtful remedies4 ,for while it was necessary for them to have a sufficient force at all points1 it might happen that the forces at their disposal were not numerous enough to be everywhere at once1 or to relieve one another4 ,or if their numbers were sufficient1 they might not all be equally resolute in standing their ground1 and their failure at any one point involved a general defeat4 ,consequently1 as ,i have said1 this method of attack was often successful4 ,but when it did not succeed at the first1 it was rarely renewed1 being a method dangerous to the attacking army1 which having to secure itself along an extended line1 was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made from the town2 nay1 of itself1 was apt to fall into confusion and disorder4 ,this method of attack1 therefore1 could be attempted once only and by way of surprise4 ,against breaches in the walls the defence was1 as at the present day1 to throw up new works2 while mines were met by counter-mines1 in which the enemy were either withstood at the point of the sword1 or baffled by some other warlike contrivance2 as by filling casks with feathers1 which1 being set on fire and placed in the mine1 choked out the assailants by their smoke and stench4 ,where towers were employed for the attack1 the defenders sought to destroy them with fire2 and where mounds of earth were thrown up against the walls1 they would dig holes at the base of the wall against which the mound rested1 and carry off the earth which the enemy were heaping up2 which1 being removed from within as fast as it was thrown up from without1 the mound made no progress4 ,none of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the assailant1 if unsuccessful1 must either strike his camp and seek victory in some other direction1 as ,scipio did when he invaded ,africa and1 after failing in the attempt to storm ,utica1 withdrew from his attack on that town and turned his strength against the ,carthaginian army in the field2 or else recourse must be had to regular siege1 as by the ,romans at ,veii1 ,capua1 ,carthage1 ,jerusalem1 and divers other cities which they reduced in this way4 ,the capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected1 as by the ,romans at ,palopolis1 through a secret understanding with some within the walls4 ,many attempts of this sort have been made1 both by the ,romans and by others1 but few successfully1 because the least hindrance disarranges the plan of action1 and because such hindrances are very likely to occur4 ,for either the plot is discovered before it can be carried out1 as it readily may1 whether from treachery on the part of those to whom it has been communicated1 or from the difficulties which attend its inception1 the preliminary arrangements having to be made with the enemy and with persons with whom it is not permitted1 save under some pretext or other1 to hold intercourse2 or if it be not discovered while it is being contrived1 a thousand difficulties will still be met with in its execution4 ,for if you arrive either before or after the appointed time1 all is ruined4 ,the faintest sound1 as of the cackling of the geese in the ,capitol1 the least departure from some ordinary routine1 the most trifling mistake or error1 mars the whole enterprise4 ,add to which1 the darkness of night lends further terror to the perils of such undertakings2 while the great majority of those engaged in them1 having no knowledge of the district or places into which they are brought1 are bewildered and disconcerted by the least mishap1 and put to flight by every imaginary danger4 ,in secret nocturnal enterprises of this sort1 no man was ever more successful than ,aratus of ,sicyon1 although in any encounter by day there never was a more arrant coward4 ,this we must suppose due rather to some special and occult quality inherent in the man1 than to success being naturally to be looked for in the like attempts4 ,such enterprises1 accordingly1 are often planned1 but few are put into execution1 and fewer still with success4 ,when cities are acquired by surrender1 the surrender is either voluntary or under compulsion2 voluntary1 when the citizens appeal to you for protection against some threatened danger from without1 as ,capua submitted to the ,romans2 or where they are moved by a desire to be better governed1 and are attracted by the good government which he to whom they surrender is seen exercising over others who have placed themselves in his hands2 as was the case with the ,rhodians1 the ,massilians1 and others who for like causes gave themselves up to the ,roman people4 ,compulsory surrenders take place1 either as the result of a protracted siege1 like those we have spoken of above2 or from the country being continually wasted by incursions1 forays1 and similar severities1 to escape which a city makes its submission4 ,of the methods which have been noticed1 the ,romans1 in preference to all others1 used this last2 and for four hundred and fifty years made it their aim to wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat in the open field1 while endeavouring1 as ,i have elsewhere said1 to establish their influence over them by treaties and conventions4 ,it was to this method of warfare therefore that they always mainly trusted1 because1 after trying all others1 they found none so free from inconvenience and disadvantage--the procedure by siege involving expense and delay1 that by assault1 difficulty and danger1 and that by secret practice1 uncertainty and doubt4 ,they found1 likewise1 that while in subduing one obstinate city by siege many years might be wasted1 a kingdom might be gained in a single day by the defeat of a hostile army in the field4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4--,that the ,romans intrusted the ,captains of their ,armies with the fullest ,powers4 ,in reading this ,history of ,titus ,livius with a view to profit by it1 ,i think that all the methods of conduct followed by the ,roman people and senate merit attention4 ,and among other things fit to be considered1 it should be noted1 with how ample an authority they sent forth their consuls1 their dictators1 and the other captains of their armies1 all of whom we find clothed with the fullest powers3 no other prerogative being reserved to itself by the senate save that of declaring war and making peace1 while everything else was left to the discretion and determination of the consul4 ,for so soon as the people and senate had resolved on war1 for instance on a war against the ,latins1 they threw all further responsibility upon the consul1 who might fight or decline battle as he pleased1 and attack this or the other city as he thought fit4 ,that this was so1 is seen in many instances1 and especially from what happened during an expedition made against the ,etruscans4 ,for the consul ,fabius having routed that people near ,sutrium1 and thinking to pass onward through the ,ciminian forest into ,etruria1 so far from seeking the advice of the senate1 gave them no hint whatever of his design1 although for its execution the war had to be carried into a new1 difficult1 and dangerous country4 ,we have further witness to the same effect1 in the action taken in respect of this enterprise by the senate1 who being informed of the victory obtained by ,fabius1 and apprehending that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid forest1 and deeming it inexpedient that he should incur risk by attempting this invasion1 sent two messengers to warn him not to enter ,etruria4 ,these messengers1 however1 did not come up with the consul until he had already made his way into that country and gained a second victory2 when1 instead of opposing his further advance1 they returned to ,rome to announce his good fortune and the glory which he had won4 ,whoever1 therefore1 shall well consider the character of the authority whereof ,i speak1 will see that it was most wisely accorded2 since had it been the wish of the senate that a consul1 in conducting a war1 should proceed step by step as they might direct him1 this must have made him at once less cautious and more dilatory2 because the credit of victory would not then have seemed to be wholly his own1 but shared by the senate on whose advice he acted4 ,besides which1 the senate must have taken upon itself the task of advising on matters which it could not possibly understand2 for although it might contain among its members all who were most versed in military affairs1 still1 since these men were not on the spot1 and were ignorant of many particulars which1 if they were to give sound advice1 it was necessary for them to know1 they must in advising have made numberless mistakes4 ,for these reasons they desired that the consul should act on his own responsibility1 and that the honours of success should be wholly his2 judging that the love of fame would act on him at once as a spur and as a curb1 making him do whatever he had to do well4 ,this matter ,i have the rather dwelt upon because ,i observe that our modern republics1 such as the ,venetian and the ,florentine1 view it in a different light2 so that when their captains1 commissaries1 or provedditori have a single gun to place in position1 the authorities at home must be informed and consulted2 a course deserving the same approval as is due to all those other methods of theirs1 which1 one with another1 have brought ,italy to her present condition4 ,,book ,,iii4 ,,chapter ,i4--,for a ,sect or ,commonwealth to last long1 it must often be brought back to its ,beginnings4 ,doubtless1 all the things of this world have a limit set to their duration2 yet those of them the bodies whereof have not been suffered to grow disordered1 but have been so cared for that either no change at all has been wrought in them1 or1 if any1 a change for the better and not for the worse1 will run that course which ,heaven has in a general way appointed them4 ,and since ,i am now speaking of mixed bodies1 for ,states and ,sects are so to be regarded1 ,i say that for them these are wholesome changes which bring them back to their first beginnings4 ,those ,states consequently stand surest and endure longest which1 either by the operation of their institutions can renew themselves1 or come to be renewed by accident apart from any design4 ,nothing1 however1 can be clearer than that unless thus renewed these bodies do not last4 ,now the way to renew them is1 as ,i have said1 to bring them back to their beginnings1 since all beginnings of sects1 commonwealths1 or kingdoms must needs have in them a certain excellence1 by virtue of which they gain their first reputation and make their first growth4 ,but because in progress of time this excellence becomes corrupted1 unless something be done to restore it to what it was at first1 these bodies necessarily decay2 for as the physicians tell us in speaking of the human body1 8,something or other is daily added which sooner or later will require treatment40#aj #aj 8,quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget curatione40 ,as regards commonwealths1 this return to the point of departure is brought about either by extrinsic accident or by intrinsic foresight4 ,as to the first1 we have seen how it was necessary that ,rome should be taken by the ,gauls1 that being thus in a manner reborn1 she might recover life and vigour1 and resume the observances of religion and justice which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect4 ,this is well seen from those passages of ,livius wherein he tells us that when the ,roman army was #8sent forth against the ,gauls1 and again when tribunes were created with consular authority1 no religious rites whatever were celebrated1 and wherein he further relates how the ,romans not only failed to punish the three ,fabii1 who contrary to the law of nations had fought against the ,gauls1 but even clothed them with honour4 ,for1 from these instances1 we may well infer that the rest of the wise ordinances instituted by ,romulus1 and the other prudent kings1 had begun to be held of less account than they deserved1 and less than was essential for the maintenance of good government4 ,and therefore it was that ,rome was visited by this calamity from without1 to the end that all her ordinances might be reformed1 and the people taught that it behoved them not only to maintain religion and justice1 but also to esteem their worthy citizens1 and to prize their virtues beyond any advantages of which they themselves might seem to have been deprived at their instance4 ,and this1 we find1 was just the effect produced4 ,for no sooner was the city retaken1 than all the ordinances of the old religion were at once restored2 the ,fabii1 who had fought in violation of the law of nations1 were punished2 and the worth and excellence of ,camillus so fully recognized1 that the senate and the whole people1 laying all jealousies aside1 once more committed to him the entire charge of public affairs4 ,it is necessary then1 as ,i have said already1 that where men dwell together in a regulated society1 they be often reminded of those ordinances in conformity with which they ought to live1 either by something inherent in these1 or else by some external accident4 ,a reminder is given in the former of these two ways1 either by the passing of some law whereby the members of the society are brought to an account2 or else by some man of rare worth arising among them1 whose virtuous life and example have the same effect as a law4 ,in a ,commonwealth1 accordingly1 this end is served either by the virtues of some one of its citizens1 or by the operation of its institutions4 ,the institutions whereby the ,roman ,commonwealth was led back to its starting point1 were the tribuneship of the people and the censorship1 together with all those laws which were passed to check the insolence and ambition of its citizens4 ,such institutions1 however1 require fresh life to be infused into them by the worth of some one man who fearlessly devotes himself to give them effect in opposition to the power of those who set them at defiance4 ,of the laws being thus reinforced in ,rome1 before its capture by the ,gauls1 we have notable examples in the deaths of the sons of ,brutus1 of the ,decemvirs1 and of ,manlius ,frumentarius2 and after its capture1 in the deaths of ,manlius ,capitolinus1 and of the son of ,manlius ,torquatus in the prosecution of his master of the knights by ,papirius ,cursor1 and in the impeachment of the ,scipios4 ,such examples as these1 being signal and extraordinary1 had the effect1 whenever they took place1 of bringing men back to the true standard of right2 but when they came to be of rarer occurrence1 they left men more leisure to grow corrupted1 and were attended by greater danger and disturbance4 ,wherefore1 between one and another of these vindications of the laws1 no more than ten years1 at most1 ought to intervene2 because after that time men begin to change their manners and to disregard the laws2 and if nothing occur to recall the idea of punishment1 and unless fear resume its hold on their minds1 so many offenders suddenly spring up together that it is impossible to punish them without danger4 ,and to this purport it used to be said by those who ruled ,florence from the year #adcd to #adid1 that their government could hardly be maintained unless it was renewed every five years2 by which they meant that it was necessary for them to arouse the same terror and alarm in men's minds1 as they inspired when they first assumed the government1 and when all who offended against their authority were signally chastised4 ,for when the recollection of such chastisement has died out1 men are emboldened to engage in new designs1 and to speak ill of their rulers2 for which the only remedy is to restore things to what they were at first4 ,a republic may1 likewise1 be brought back to its original form1 without recourse to ordinances for enforcing justice1 by the mere virtues of a single citizen1 by reason that these virtues are of such influence and authority that good men love to imitate them1 and bad men are ashamed to depart from them4 ,those to whom ,rome owed most for services of this sort1 were ,horatius ,cocles1 ,mutius ,scvola1 the two ,decii1 ,atilius ,regulus1 and divers others1 whose rare excellence and generous example wrought for their city almost the same results as might have been effected by ordinances and laws4 ,and if to these instances of individual worth had been added1 every ten years1 some signal enforcement of justice1 it would have been impossible for ,rome ever to have grown corrupted4 ,but when both of these incitements to virtuous behavior began to recur less frequently1 corruption spread1 and after the time of ,atilius ,regulus1 no like example was again witnessed4 ,for though the two ,catos came later1 so great an interval had elapsed before the elder ,cato appeared1 and again1 so long a period intervened between him and the younger1 and these two1 moreover1 stood so much alone1 that it was impossible for them1 by their influence1 to work any important change2 more especially for the younger1 who found ,rome so much corrupted that he could do nothing to improve his fellow-citizens4 ,this is enough to say concerning commonwealths1 but as regards sects1 we see from the instance of our own religion that here too a like renewal is needed4 ,for had not this religion of ours been brought back to its original condition by ,saint ,francis and ,saint ,dominick1 it must soon have been utterly extinguished4 ,they1 however1 by their voluntary poverty1 and by their imitation of the life of ,christ1 rekindled in the minds of men the dying flame of faith2 and by the efficacious rules which they established averted from our ,church that ruin which the ill lives of its prelates and heads must otherwise have brought upon it4 ,for living in poverty1 and gaining great authority with the people by confessing them and preaching to them1 they got them to believe that it is evil to speak ill even of what is evil2 and that it is good to be obedient to rulers1 who1 if they do amiss1 may be left to the judgment of ,god4 ,by which teaching these rulers are encouraged to behave as badly as they can1 having no fear of punishments which they neither see nor credit4 ,nevertheless1 it is this renewal which has maintained1 and still maintains1 our religion4 ,kingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal1 and to have their laws restored to their former force2 and we see how1 by attending to this1 the kingdom of ,france has profited4 ,for that kingdom1 more than any other1 lies under the control of its laws and ordinances1 which are maintained by its parliaments1 and more especially by the parliament of ,paris1 from which last they derive fresh vigour whenever they have to be enforced against any prince of the realm2 for this assembly pronounces sentence even against the king himself4 ,heretofore this parliament has maintained its name as the fearless champion of the laws against the nobles of the land2 but should it ever at any future time suffer wrongs to pass unpunished1 and should offences multiply1 either these will have to be corrected with great disturbance to the ,state1 or the kingdom itself must fall to pieces4 ,this1 then1 is our conclusion--that nothing is so necessary in any society1 be it a religious sect1 a kingdom1 or a commonwealth1 as to restore to it that reputation which it had at first1 and to see that it is provided either with wholesome laws1 or with good men whose actions may effect the same ends1 without need to resort to external force4 ,for although this last may sometimes1 as in the case of ,rome1 afford an efficacious remedy1 it is too hazardous a remedy to make us ever wish to employ it4 ,and that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens helped to make ,rome great1 and how many admirable results they wrought in that city1 ,i shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them2 with which survey this ,third ,book of mine1 and last division of the ,first ,decade of ,titus ,livius1 shall be brought to a close4 ,but1 although great and notable actions were done by the ,roman kings1 nevertheless1 since history has treated of these at much length1 here ,i shall pass them over1 and say no more about these princes1 save as regards certain things done by them with an eye to their private interest4 ,i shall begin1 therefore1 with ,brutus1 the father of ,roman freedom4 ,,chapter ,,ii4--,that on occasion it is wise to feign ,folly4 ,never did any man by the most splendid achievements gain for himself so great a name for wisdom and prudence as is justly due to ,junius ,brutus for feigning to be a fool4 ,and although ,titus ,livius mentions one cause only as having led him to assume this part1 namely1 that he might live more securely and look after his patrimony2 yet on considering his behavior we may believe that in counterfeiting folly it was also his object to escape notice1 and so find better convenience to overthrow the kings1 and to free his country whenever an occasion offered4 ,that this was in his mind is seen first of all from the interpretation he gave to the oracle of ,apollo1 when1 to render the gods favourable to his designs1 he pretended to stumble1 and secretly kissed his mother earth2 and1 again1 from this1 that on the death of ,lucretia1 though her father1 her husband1 and others of her kinsmen were present1 he was the first to draw the dagger from her wound1 and bind the bystanders by oath never more to suffer king to reign in ,rome4 ,from his example all who are discontented with their prince are taught1 first of all1 to measure1 and to weigh their strength1 and if they find themselves strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim open war1 then to take that course as at once the nobler and less dangerous2 but1 if too weak to make open war1 then sedulously to court the favour of the prince1 using to that end all such methods as they may judge needful1 adapting themselves to his pleasures1 and showing delight in whatever they see him delight in4 ,such an intimacy1 in the first place1 enables you to live securely1 and permits you1 without incurring any risk1 to share the happy fortunes of the prince1 while it affords you every facility for carrying out your plans4 ,some1 no doubt1 will tell you that you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved in his downfall2 nor yet at such a distance that when he falls you shall be too far off to use the occasion for rising on his ruin4 ,but although this mean course1 could we only follow it1 were certainly the best1 yet1 since ,i believe it to be impracticable1 we must resort to the methods above indicated1 and either keep altogether aloof1 or else cleave closely to the prince4 ,whosoever does otherwise1 if he be of great station1 lives in constant peril2 nor will it avail him to say1 8,i concern myself with nothing2 ,i covet neither honours nor preferment2 my sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life40 ,for such excuses1 though they be listened to1 are not accepted2 nor can any man of great position1 however much and sincerely he desire it1 elect to live this life of tranquillity since his professions will not be believed2 so that although he might be contented to be let alone1 others will not suffer him to be so4 ,wherefore1 like ,brutus1 men must feign folly2 and to play the part effectively1 and so as to please their prince1 must say1 do1 see1 and praise things contrary to their inclinations4 ,but now1 having spoken of the prudence shown by ,brutus when he sought to recover the freedom of ,rome1 let us next speak of the severity which he used to maintain it4 ,,chapter ,,iii4--,that to preserve a newly acquired ,freedom we must slay the ,sons of ,brutus4 ,the severity used by ,brutus in preserving for ,rome the freedom he had won for her1 was not less necessary than useful4 ,the spectacle of a father sitting on the judgment1 and not merely sentencing his own sons to death1 but being himself present at their execution1 affords an example rare in history4 ,but those who study the records of ancient times will understand1 that after a change in the form of a government1 whether it be from a commonwealth to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a commonwealth1 those who are hostile to the new order of things must always be visited with signal punishment4 ,so that he who sets up as a tyrant and slays not ,brutus1 and he who creates a free government and slays not the sons of ,brutus1 can never maintain himself long4 ,but since ,i have elsewhere treated of this matter at large1 ,i shall merely refer to what has there been said concerning it1 and shall cite here one instance only1 happening in our own days1 and memorable in the history of our country4 ,i speak of ,piero ,soderini1 who thought by his patience and goodness to overcome the very same temper which prompted the sons of ,brutus to revert to the old government1 and who failed in the endeavour4 ,for although his sagacity should have taught him the necessity1 while chance and the ambition of those who attacked him furnished him with the opportunity of making an end of them1 he never could resolve to strike the blow2 and not merely believed himself able to subdue disaffection by patience and kindness1 and to mitigate the enmity of particular men by the rewards he held out to them1 but also persuaded himself1 and often declared in the presence of his friends1 that he could not confront opposition openly1 nor crush his adversaries1 without assuming extraordinary powers and passing laws destructive of civil equality2 which measures1 although not afterward used by him for tyrannical ends1 would so alarm the community1 that after his death they would never again consent to appoint a ,gonfalonier for life1 an office which he judged it essential both to maintain and strengthen4 ,now although these scruples of his were wise and good1 we ought never out of regard for what is good1 to suffer an evil to run its course1 since it may well happen that the evil will prevail over the good4 ,and ,piero should have believed that as his acts and intentions were to be judged by results1 he might1 if he lived and if fortune befriended him1 have made it clear to all1 that what he did was done to preserve his country1 and not from personal ambition2 and he might have so contrived matters that no successor of his could ever turn to bad ends the means which he had used for good ends4 ,but he was misled by a preconceived opinion1 and failed to understand that ill-will is not to be vanquished by time nor propitiated by favours4 ,and1 so1 from not knowing how to resemble ,brutus1 he lost power1 and fame1 and was driven an exile from his country4 ,that it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom as it is to preserve a commonwealth1 will be shown in the ,chapter following4 ,,chapter ,,iv4--,that an ,usurper is never safe in his ,princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it4 ,from what befell the elder ,tarquin at the hands of the sons of ,ancus1 and ,servius ,tullius at the hands of ,tarquin the ,proud1 we see what an arduous and perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and yet suffer him to live on1 hoping to conciliate him by benefits4 ,we see1 too1 how the elder ,tarquin was ruined by his belief that he held the kingdom by a just title1 since it had been given him by the people and confirmed to him by the senate1 never suspecting that the sons of ,ancus would be so stirred by resentment that it would be impossible to content them with what contented all the rest of ,rome4 ,servius ,tullius again1 was ruined through believing that he could conciliate the sons of ,ancus by loading them with favours4 ,by the fate of the first of these kings every prince may be warned that he can never live securely in his princedom so long as those from whom he has taken it survive2 while the fate of the second should remind all rulers that old injuries are not to be healed by subsequent benefits1 and least of all when the new benefit is less in degree than the injury suffered4 ,and1 truly1 ,servius was wanting in wisdom when he imagined that the sons of ,tarquin would contentedly resign themselves to be the sons-in-law of one whom they thought should be their subject4 ,for the desire to reign is so prevailing a passion1 that it penetrates the minds not only of those who are rightful heirs1 but also of those who are not2 as happened with the wife of the younger ,tarquin1 who was daughter to ,servius1 but who1 possessed by this madness1 and setting at naught all filial duty1 incited her husband to take her father's kingdom1 and with it his life2 so much nobler did she esteem it to be a queen than the daughter of a king4 ,but while the elder ,tarquin and ,servius ,tullius lost the kingdom from not knowing how to secure themselves against those whom they had deprived of it1 the younger ,tarquin lost it from not observing the ordinances of the old kings1 as shall be shown in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,v4--,how an ,hereditary ,king may come to lose his ,kingdom4 ,tarquin the ,proud1 when he had put ,servius ,tullius to death1 inasmuch as the latter left no heirs1 took secure possession of the kingdom1 having nothing to fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the way of his predecessors4 ,and although the means whereby he made himself king were hateful and monstrous1 nevertheless1 had he adhered to the ancient ordinances of the earlier kings1 he might have been endured1 nor would he have aroused both senate and people to combine against him and deprive him of his government4 ,it was not1 therefore1 because his son ,sextus violated ,lucretia that ,tarquin was driven out1 but because he himself had violated the laws of the kingdom1 and governed as a tyrant1 stripping the senate of all authority1 and bringing everything under his own control4 ,for all business which formerly had been transacted in public1 and with the sanction of the senate1 he caused to be transacted in his palace1 on his own responsibility1 and to the displeasure of every one else1 and so very soon deprived ,rome of whatever freedom she had enjoyed under her other kings4 ,nor was it enough for him to have the ,fathers his enemies1 but he must needs also kindle the commons against him1 wearing them out with mere mechanic labours1 very different from the enterprises in which they had been employed by his predecessors2 so that when ,rome overflowed with instances of his cruelty and pride1 he had already disposed the minds of all the citizens to rebel whenever they found the opportunity4 ,wherefore1 had not occasion offered in the violence done to ,lucretia1 some other had soon been found to bring about the same result4 ,but had ,tarquin lived like the other kings1 when ,sextus his son committed that outrage1 ,brutus and ,collatinus would have had recourse to him to punish the offender1 and not to the commons of ,rome4 ,and hence let princes learn that from the hour they first violate those laws1 customs1 and usages under which men have lived for a great while1 they begin to weaken the foundations of their authority4 ,and should they1 after they have been stripped of that authority1 ever grow wise enough to see how easily princedoms are preserved by those who are content to follow prudent counsels1 the sense of their loss will grieve them far more1 and condemn them to a worse punishment than any they suffer at the hands of others4 ,for it is far easier to be loved by good men than by bad1 and to obey the laws than to seek to control them4 ,and to learn what means they must use to retain their authority1 they have only to take example by the conduct of good princes1 such as ,timoleon of ,corinth1 ,aratus of ,sicyone1 and the like1 in whose lives they will find such security and content1 both on the side of the ruler and the ruled1 as ought to stir them with the desire to imitate them1 which1 for the reasons already given1 it is easy for them to do4 ,for men1 when they are well governed1 ask no more1 nor look for further freedom2 as was the case with the peoples governed by the two whom ,i have named1 whom they constrained to continue their rulers while they lived1 though both of them sought repeatedly to return to private life4 ,but because1 in this and the two preceding ,chapters1 ,i have noticed the ill-will which arose against the kings1 the plots contrived by the sons of ,brutus against their country1 and those directed against the elder ,tarquin and ,servius ,tullius1 it seems to me not out of place to discourse of these matters more at length in the following ,chapter1 as deserving the attention both of princes and private citizens4 ,,chapter ,,vi4--,of ,conspiracies4 ,it were an omission not to say something on the subject of conspiracies1 these being a source of much danger both to princes and to private men4 ,for we see that many more princes have lost their lives and states through these than in open warfare2 power to wage open war upon a prince being conceded to few1 whereas power to conspire against him is denied to none4 ,on the other hand1 since conspiracies are attended at every stage by difficulties and dangers1 no more hazardous or desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any private citizen2 whence it comes that while many conspiracies are planned1 few effect their object4 ,wherefore1 to put princes on their guard against these dangers1 and to make subjects more cautious how they take part in them1 and rather learn to live content under whatever government fortune has assigned them1 ,i shall treat of them at length1 without omitting any noteworthy circumstance which may serve for the instruction of either4 ,though1 indeed1 this is a golden sentence ,of ,cornelius ,tacitus1 wherein he says that 8the past should have our reverence1 the present our obedience1 and that we should wish for good princes1 but put up with any40#aa ,for assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring ruin both on himself and on his country4 #aa ,tac4 ,hist4 iv4 #h4 ,but1 to go deeper into the matter1 we have first of all to examine against whom conspiracies are directed2 and we shall find that men conspire either against their country or their prince2 and it is of these two kinds of conspiracy that at present ,i desire to speak4 ,for of conspiracies which have for their object the surrender of cities to enemies who are besieging them1 and of all others contrived for like ends1 ,i have already said enough4 ,first1 then1 ,i shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed against a prince1 and begin by inquiring into their causes1 which are manifold1 but of which one is more momentous than all the rest2 ,i mean1 the being hated by the whole community4 ,for it may reasonably be assumed1 that when a prince has drawn upon himself this universal hatred1 he must also have given special offence to particular men1 which they will be eager to avenge4 ,and this eagerness will be augmented by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen to have incurred4 ,a prince ought1 therefore1 to avoid this load of public hatred4 ,how he is to do so ,i need not stop here to explain1 having discussed the matter already in another place2 but if he can guard against this1 offence given to particular men will expose him to but few attacks4 ,one reason being1 that there are few men who think so much of an injury done them as to run great risks to revenge it2 another1 that assuming them to have both the disposition and the courage to avenge themselves1 they are restrained by the universal favour which they see entertained towards the prince4 ,injuries are either to a man's life1 to his property1 or to his honour4 ,as regards the first1 they who threaten injuries to life incur more danger than they who actually inflict them2 or rather1 while great danger is incurred in threatening1 none at all is incurred from inflicting such injuries4 ,for the dead are past thinking of revenge2 and those who survive1 for the most part leave such thoughts to the dead4 ,but he whose life is threatened1 finding himself forced by necessity either to do or suffer1 becomes a man most dangerous to the prince1 as shall be fully explained hereafter4 ,after menaces to life1 injuries to property and honour stir men more than any others1 and of these a ,prince has most to beware4 ,for he can never strip a man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some weapon wherewith to redress his wrongs1 nor ever so far dishonour him as to quell the stubborn spirit which prompts revenge4 ,of all dishonours those done to the women of a household are the worst2 after which come such personal indignities as nerved the arm of ,pausanias against ,philip of ,macedon1 and of many another against other princes2 and1 in our own days1 it was no other reason that moved ,giulio ,belanti to conspire against ,pandolfo1 lord of ,siena1 than that ,pandolfo1 who had given him his daughter to wife1 afterwards took her from him1 as presently shall be told4 ,chief among the causes which led the ,pazzi to conspire against the ,medici1 was the law passed by the latter depriving them of the inheritance of ,giovanni ,bonromei4 ,another most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire men feel to free their country from a usurper4 ,this it was which impelled ,brutus and ,cassius to conspire against ,csar1 and countless others against such tyrants as ,phalaris1 ,dionysius1 and the like4 ,against this humour no tyrant can guard1 except by laying down his tyranny2 which as none will do1 few escape an unhappy end4 ,whence the verses of ,juvenal3-- 8,few tyrants die a peaceful death1 and few ,the kings who visit ,proserpine's dread lord1 ,unscathed by wounds and blood40#ab #ab ,ad generum ,cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci ,descendunt reges1 et sicca morte tiranni4 ,juv4 ,sat4 x4 #aab4 ,great1 as ,i have said already1 are the dangers which men run in conspiring2 for at all times they are in peril1 whether in contriving1 in executing1 or after execution4 ,and since in conspiracies either many are engaged1 or one only 7for although it cannot properly be said of one man that he conspires1 there may exist in him the fixed resolve to put the prince to death71 it is only the solitary plotter who escapes the first of these three stages of danger4 ,for he runs no risk before executing his design1 since as he imparts it to none1 there is none to bring it to the ear of the prince4 ,a deliberate resolve like this may be conceived by a person in any rank of life1 high or low1 base or noble1 and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince4 ,for every one must1 at some time or other1 have leave to speak to the prince1 and whoever has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his design4 ,pausanias1 of whom we have made mention so often1 slew ,philip of ,macedon as he walked between his son and his son-in-law to the temple1 surrounded by a thousand armed guards4 ,pausanias indeed was noble1 and known to the prince1 but ,ferdinand of ,spain was stabbed in the neck by a poor and miserable ,spaniard2 and though the wound was not mortal1 it sufficed to show that neither courage nor opportunity were wanting to the would-be-assassin4 ,a ,dervish1 or ,turkish priest1 drew his scimitar on ,bajazet1 father of the ,sultan now reigning1 and if he did not wound him1 it was from no lack either of daring or of opportunity4 ,and ,i believe that there are many who in their minds desire the deed1 no punishment or danger attending the mere wish1 though there be but few who dare do it4 ,for since few or none who venture1 escape death1 few are willing to go forward to certain destruction4 ,but to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are engaged1 ,i affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have been contrived by men of great station1 or by those who have been on terms of close intimacy with the prince1 since no others1 not being downright madmen1 would ever think of conspiring4 ,for men of humble rank1 and such as are not the intimates of their prince1 are neither fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such attempts4 ,because1 in the first place1 men of low degree will never find any to keep faith with them1 none being moved to join in their schemes by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks2 wherefore1 so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three1 they are betrayed and ruined4 ,or1 assuming them fortunate enough to have no traitor of their number1 they will be so hampered in the execution of their plot by the want of easy access to the prince1 that they are sure to perish in the mere attempt4 ,for if even men of great position1 who have ready access to the prince1 succumb to the difficulties which ,i shall presently notice1 those difficulties must be infinitely increased in the case of men who are without these advantages4 ,and because when life and property are at stake men are not utterly reckless1 on perceiving themselves to be weak they grow cautious1 and though cursing the tyrant in their hearts1 are content to endure him1 and to wait until some one of higher station than they1 comes forward to redress their wrongs4 ,so that should we ever find these weaklings attempting anything1 we may commend their courage rather than their prudence4 ,we see1 however1 that the great majority of conspirators have been persons of position and the familiars of their prince1 and that their plots have been as often the consequence of excessive indulgence as of excessive injury2 as when ,perennius conspired against ,commodus1 ,plautianus against ,severus1 and ,sejanus against ,tiberius2 all of whom had been raised by their masters to such wealth1 honours1 and dignities1 that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the imperial name4 ,that they might not lack this also1 they fell to conspiring against their prince2 but in every instance their conspiracies had the end which their ingratitude deserved4 ,the only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding1 is the conspiracy of ,jacopo ,,iv4 d',appiano against ,messer ,piero ,gambacorti1 lord of ,pisa4 ,for ,jacopo1 who had been bred and brought up by ,piero1 and loaded by him with honours1 deprived him of his ,state4 ,similar to this1 in our own days1 was the conspiracy of ,coppola against ,king ,ferdinand of ,aragon4 ,for ,coppola had reached such a pitch of power that he seemed to himself to have everything but sovereignty2 in seeking to obtain which he lost his life2 though if any plot entered into by a man of great position could be expected to succeed1 this certainly might1 being contrived1 as we may say1 by another king1 and by one who had the amplest opportunities for its accomplishment4 ,but that lust of power which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the execution of the scheme was committed2 who1 had they only known how to add prudence to their villainy1 could hardly have missed their aim4 ,the prince1 therefore1 who would guard himself against plots1 ought more to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent1 than those to whom he has done great wrongs4 ,for the latter lack opportunities which the former have in abundance2 and the moving cause is equally strong in both1 lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of revenge4 ,wherefore1 a prince should entrust his friends with so much authority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and theirs2 that between the two something be still left them to desire4 ,otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who have been named above4 ,but to return from this digression1 ,i say1 that having shown it to be necessary that conspirators should be men of great station1 and such as have ready access to the prince1 we have next to consider what have been the results of their plots1 and to trace the causes which have made them succeed or fail4 ,now1 as ,i have said already1 we find that conspiracies are attended by danger at three stages3 before during1 and after their execution2 for which reason very few of them have had a happy issue2 it being next to impossible to surmount all these different dangers successfully4 ,and to begin with those which are incurred beforehand1 and which are graver than all the rest1 ,i say that he must be both very prudent and very fortunate who1 when contriving a conspiracy1 does not suffer his secret to be discovered4 ,conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made1 or by conjecture4 ,disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of those to whom you communicate your design4 ,treachery is to be looked for1 because you can impart your plans only to such persons as you believe ready to face death on your behalf1 or to those who are discontented with the prince4 ,of men whom you can trust thus implicitly1 one or two may be found2 but when you have to open your designs to many1 they cannot all be of this nature2 and their goodwill towards you must be extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and by fear of punishment4 ,moreover men commonly deceive themselves in respect of the love which they imagine others bear them1 nor can ever be sure of it until they have put it to the proof4 ,but to make proof of it in a matter like this is very perilous2 and even if you have proved it already1 and found it true in some other dangerous trial1 you cannot assume that there will be the same fidelity here1 since this far transcends every other kind of danger4 ,again1 if you gauge a man's fidelity by his discontent with the prince1 you may easily deceive yourself2 for so soon as you have taken this discontented man into your confidence1 you have supplied him with the means whereby he may become contented2 so that either his hatred of the prince must be great indeed1 or your influence over him extraordinary1 if it keep him faithful4 ,hence it comes that so many conspiracies have been discovered and crushed in their earliest stage1 and that when the secret is preserved among many accomplices for any length of time1 it is looked on as a miracle2 as in the case of the conspiracy of ,piso against ,nero1 and1 in our own days1 in that of the ,pazzi against ,lorenzo and ,giuliano de' ,medici2 which last1 though more than fifty persons were privy to it1 was not discovered until it came to be carried out4 ,conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when he talks so indiscreetly that some servant1 or other person not in the plot1 overhears him2 as happened with the sons of ,brutus1 who1 when treating with the envoys of ,tarquin1 were overheard by a slave1 who became their accuser2 or else through your own weakness in imparting your secret to some woman or boy whom you love1 or to some other such light person2 as when ,dymnus1 who was one of those who conspired with ,philotas against ,alexander the ,great1 revealed the plot to ,nicomachus1 a youth whom he loved1 who at once told ,cebalinus1 and ,cebalinus the king4 ,of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of ,piso against ,nero2 for ,scaevinus1 one of the conspirators1 the day before he was to kill ,nero1 made his will1 liberated all his slaves and gave them money1 and bade ,milichus1 his freedman1 sharpen his old rusty dagger1 and have bandages ready for binding up wounds4 ,from all which preparations ,milichus conjecturing what work was in hand1 accused ,scaevinus before ,nero2 whereupon ,scaevinus was arrested1 and with him ,natalis1 another of the conspirators1 who the day before had been seen to speak with him for a long time in private2 and when the two differed in their account of what then passed between them1 they were put to the torture and forced to confess the truth4 ,in this way the conspiracy was brought to light1 to the ruin of all concerned4 ,against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible so to guard as that either through treachery1 want of caution1 or levity1 the secret shall not be found out1 whenever more than three or four persons are privy to it4 ,and whenever more than one conspirator is arrested1 the plot is certain to be detected1 because no two persons can perfectly agree in a false account of what has passed between them4 ,if only one be taken1 should he be a man of resolute courage1 he may refuse to implicate his comrades2 but they on their part must have no less courage1 to stay quiet where they are1 and not betray themselves by flight2 for if courage be absent anywhere1 whether in him who is taken or in those still at large1 the conspiracy is revealed4 ,and what is related by ,titus ,livius as having happened in the conspiracy against ,hieronymus1 tyrant of ,syracuse1 is most extraordinary1 namely1 that on the capture of one of the conspirators1 named ,theodorus1 he1 with great fortitude1 withheld the names of all his accomplices1 and accused friends of the tyrant2 while his companions1 on their part1 trusted so completely in his courage1 that not one of them quitted ,syracuse or showed any sign of fear4 ,all these dangers1 therefore1 which attend the contrivance of a plot1 must be passed through before you come to its execution2 or if you would escape them1 you must observe the following precautions3 ,your first and surest1 nay1 to say truth1 your only safeguard1 is to leave your accomplices no time to accuse you2 for which reason you must impart the affair to them1 only at the moment when you mean it to be carried out1 and not before4 ,those who have followed this course have wholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies1 and1 generally speaking1 the others also2 indeed1 ,i may say that they have all succeeded1 and that it is open to every prudent man to act as they did4 ,it will be enough to give two instances of plots effected in this way4 ,nelematus1 unable to endure the tyranny of ,aristotimus1 despot of ,epirus1 assembling many of his friends and kinsmen in his house1 exhorted them to free their country2 and when some of them asked for time to consider and mature their plans1 he bade his slaves close the doors1 and told those assembled that unless they swore to go at once and do as he directed he would make them over to ,aristotimus as prisoners4 ,alarmed by his threats1 they bound themselves by a solemn oath1 and going forth at once and without delay1 successfully carried out his bidding4 ,a certain ,magus having fraudulently usurped the throne of ,persia2 ,ortanes1 a grandee of that realm1 discovering the fraud1 disclosed it to six others of the chief nobility1 telling them that it behoved them to free the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor4 ,and when some among them asked for time1 ,darius1 who was one of the six summoned by ,ortanes1 stood up and said1 8,either we go at once to do this deed1 or ,i go to the ,magus to accuse you all40 ,whereupon1 all rising together1 without time given to any to change his mind1 they went forth and succeeded in effecting their end4 ,not unlike these instances was the plan taken by the ,etolians to rid themselves of ,nabis1 the ,spartan tyrant1 to whom1 under pretence of succouring him1 they sent ,alasamenes1 their fellow-citizen1 with two hundred foot soldiers and thirty horsemen4 ,for they imparted their real design to ,alasamenes only1 charging the rest1 under pain of exile1 to obey him in whatever he commanded4 ,alasamenes repaired to ,sparta1 and never divulged his commission till the time came for executing it2 and so succeeded in putting ,nabis to death4 ,it was1 therefore1 by the precautions they observed1 that the persons of whom ,i have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the contrivance of conspiracies2 and any following their example may expect the like good fortune4 ,and that all may learn to do as they did ,i shall notice the case of ,piso1 of which mention has before been made4 ,by reason of his rank1 his reputation1 and the intimate terms on which he lived with ,nero1 who trusted him without reserve1 and would often come to his garden to sup with him1 ,piso was able to gain the friendship of many persons of spirit and courage1 and well fitted in every way to take part in his plot against the emperor1 which1 under these circumstances1 might easily have been carried out4 ,for when ,nero came to his garden1 ,piso could readily have communicated his design to those friends of his1 and with suitable words have encouraged them to do what1 in fact1 they would not have had time to withdraw from1 and was certain to succeed4 ,and were we to examine all similar attempts1 it would be seen that there are few which might not have been effected in the manner shown4 ,but since most men are very ignorant of practical affairs1 they commit the gravest blunders1 especially in matters which lie1 as this does1 a little way out of the beaten track4 ,wherefore1 the contriver of a plot ought never1 if he can help it1 to communicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed2 or if he must communicate it1 then to some one man only1 with whom he has long been intimate1 and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings as himself4 ,to find one such person is far easier than to find several1 and1 at the same time1 involves less risk2 for though this one man play you false1 you are not left altogether without resource1 as you are when your accomplices are numerous4 ,for ,i have heard it shrewdly said that to one man you may impart anything1 since1 unless you have been led to commit yourself by writing1 your denial will go as far as his assertion4 ,shun writing1 therefore1 as you would a rock1 for there is nothing so damning as a letter under your own hand4 ,plautianus1 desiring to procure the deaths of the ,emperor ,severus and his son ,caracalla1 intrusted the business to the tribune ,saturninus1 who1 being more disposed to betray than obey ,plautianus1 but at the same time afraid that1 if it came to laying a charge1 ,plautianus might be believed sooner than he1 asked him for a written authority1 that his commission might be credited4 ,blinded by ambition1 ,plautianus complied1 and forthwith was accused by ,saturninus and found guilty2 whereas1 but for that written warrant1 together with other corroborating proofs1 he must have escaped by his bold denial of the charge4 ,against the testimony of a single witness1 you have thus some defence1 unless convicted by your own handwriting1 or by other circumstantial proof against which you must guard4 ,a woman1 named ,epicharis1 who had formerly been a mistress of ,nero1 was privy to ,piso's conspiracy1 and thinking it might be useful to have the help of a certain captain of triremes whom ,nero had among his body-guards1 she acquainted him with the plot1 but not with the names of the plotters4 ,this fellow1 turning traitor1 and accusing ,epicharis to ,nero1 so stoutly did she deny the charge1 that ,nero1 confounded by her effrontery1 let her go4 ,in imparting a plot to a single person there are1 therefore1 two risks3 one1 that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you2 the other1 that if arrested on suspicion1 or on some proof of his guilt1 he may1 on being convicted1 in the hope to escape punishment1 betray you4 ,but in neither of these dangers are you left without a defence2 since you may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice of your accuser1 and the other by alleging that the witness his been forced by torture to say what is untrue4 ,the wisest course1 however1 is to impart your design to none1 but to act like those who have been mentioned above2 or if you impart it1 then to one only3 for although even in this course there be a certain degree of danger1 it is far less than when many are admitted to your confidence4 ,a case nearly resembling that just now noticed1 is where an emergency1 so urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety1 constrains you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you4 ,a necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired1 as two instances may suffice to show4 ,among the closest friends and intimates of the ,emperor ,commodus1 were two captains of the pretorian guards1 ,letus and ,electus1 while among the most favoured of his distresses was a certain ,martia4 ,but because these three often reproved him for his manner of living1 as disgraceful to himself and to his station1 he resolved to rid himself of them2 and so wrote their names1 along with those of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next night1 in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed4 ,but on his going to bathe1 a boy1 who was a favourite of his1 while playing about his room and on his bed1 found the list1 and coming out of the chamber with it in his hand1 was met by ,martia1 who took it from him1 and on reading it and finding what it contained1 sent for ,letus and ,electus4 ,and all three recognizing the danger in which they stood1 resolved to be beforehand with the tyrant1 and losing no time1 murdered him that very night4 ,the ,emperor ,caracalla1 being with his armies in ,mesopotamia1 had with him ,macrinus1 who was more of a statesman than a soldier1 as his prefect4 ,but because princes who are not themselves good are always afraid lest others treat them as they deserve1 ,caracalla wrote to his friend ,maternianus in ,rome to learn from the astrologers whether any man had ambitious designs upon the empire1 and to send him word4 ,maternianus1 accordingly1 wrote back that such designs were entertained by ,macrinus4 ,but this letter1 ere it reached the emperor1 fell into the hands of ,macrinus1 who1 seeing when he read it that he must either put ,caracalla to death before further letters arrived from ,rome1 or else die himself1 committed the business to a centurion1 named ,martialis1 whom he trusted1 and whose brother had been slain by ,caracalla a few days before1 who succeeded in killing the emperor4 ,we see1 therefore1 that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has almost the same results as the method already noticed as followed by ,nelematus of ,epirus4 ,we see1 too1 what ,i remarked almost at the outset of this ,discourse1 that the threats of princes expose them to greater danger than the wrongs they actually inflict1 and lead to more active conspiracies3 and1 therefore1 that a prince should be careful not to threaten2 since men are either to be treated kindly or else got rid of1 but never brought to such a pass that they have to choose between slaying and being slain4 ,as to the dangers attending the execution of plots1 these result either from some change made in the plan1 or from a failure in courage on the part of him who is to carry it out2 or else from some mistake he falls into through want of foresight1 or from his not giving the affair its finishing stroke1 as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put to death4 ,now1 nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance in human affairs1 as to be forced1 at a moment's notice and without time allowed for reflection1 to vary your plan of action and adopt a different one from that fixed on at the first4 ,and if such changes cause confusion anywhere1 it is in matters appertaining to war1 and in enterprises of the kind we are now speaking of2 for in such affairs as these1 there is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the exact thing intrusted to them4 ,but when men have for many days together turned their whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a certain order1 and the way and order are suddenly altered1 it is impossible but that they should be disconcerted and the whole scheme ruined4 ,for which reason1 it is far better to do everything in accordance with the preconcerted plan1 though it be seen to be attended with some disadvantages1 than1 in order to escape these1 to involve yourself in an infinity of dangers4 ,and this will happen when you depart from your original design without time given to form a new one4 ,for when time is given you may manage as you please4 ,the conspiracy of the ,pazzi against ,lorenzo and ,giuliano de' ,medici is well known4 ,the scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the ,cardinal ,s4 ,giorgio1 at which the brothers should be put to death4 ,to each of the conspirators a part was assigned3 to one the murder1 to another the seizure of the palace1 while a third was to ride through the streets and call on the people to free themselves4 ,but it so chanced that at a time when the ,pazzi1 the ,medici1 and the ,cardinal were all assembled in the cathedral church of ,florence to hear ,high ,mass1 it became known that ,giuliano would not be present at the banquet2 whereupon the conspirators1 laying their heads together1 resolved to do in church what they were to have done elsewhere4 ,this1 however1 deranged the whole scheme4 ,for ,giovambattista of ,montesecco1 would have no hand in the murder if it was to be done in a church2 and the whole distribution of parts had in consequence to be changed2 when1 as those to whom the new parts were assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds to their new tasks1 they managed matters so badly that they were overpowered in their attempt4 ,courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit1 or from his being overcome by some feeling of reverence4 ,for such majesty and awe attend the person of a prince1 that it may well happen that he softens or dismays his executioners4 ,when ,caius ,marius was taken by the people of ,minturnum1 the slave sent in to slay him1 overawed by the bearing of the man1 and by the memories which his name called up1 became unnerved1 and powerless to perform his office4 ,and if this influence was exercised by one who was a prisoner1 and in chains1 and overwhelmed by adverse fortune1 how much more must reverence be inspired by a prince who is free and uncontrolled1 surrounded by his retinue and by all the pomp and splendour of his station2 whose dignity confounds1 and whose graciousness conciliates4 ,certain persons conspiring against ,sitalces1 king of ,thrace1 fixed a day for his murder1 and assembled at the place appointed1 whither the king had already come4 ,yet none of them raised a hand to harm him1 and all departed without attempting anything against him or knowing why they refrained2 each blaming the others4 ,and more than once the same folly was repeated1 until the plot getting wind1 they were taken and punished for what they might have done1 yet durst not do4 ,two brothers of ,alfonso1 ,duke of ,ferrara1 conspired against him1 employing as their tool a certain priest named ,giennes1 a singing-man in the service of the ,duke4 ,he1 at their request1 repeatedly brought the ,duke into their company1 so that they had full opportunity to make away with him4 ,yet neither of them ever ventured to strike the blow2 till at last1 their scheme being discovered1 they paid the penalty of their combined cowardice and temerity4 ,such irresolution can only have arisen from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince1 or touched by his graciousness4 ,in the execution of conspiracies1 therefore1 errors and mishaps arise from a failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject1 when1 losing self-control1 they are led in their bewilderment to do and say what they ought not4 ,that men are thus confounded1 and thrown off their balance1 could not be better shown than in the words of ,titus ,livius1 where he describes the behaviour of ,alasamenes the ,etolian1 at the time when he resolved on the death of ,nabis the ,spartan1 of whom ,i have spoken before4 ,for when the time to act came1 and he had disclosed to his followers what they had to do1 ,livius represents him as 8collecting his thoughts which had grown confused by dwelling on so desperate an enterprise40 ,for it is impossible for any one1 though of the most steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to handle deadly weapons1 not to be perturbed at such a moment4 ,for which reason we should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had experience in similar affairs1 and trust no others though reputed of the truest courage4 ,for in these grave undertakings1 no one who is without such experience1 however bold and resolute1 is to be trusted4 ,the confusion of which ,i speak may either cause you to drop your weapon from your hand1 or to use words which will have the same results4 ,quintianus being commanded by ,lucilla1 sister of ,commodus1 to slay him1 lay in wait for him at the entrance of the amphitheatre1 and rushing upon him with a drawn dagger1 cried out1 8,the senate sends you this20 which words caused him to be seized before his blow descended4 ,in like manner ,messer ,antonio of ,volterra1 who as we have elsewhere seen was told off to kill ,lorenzo de' ,medici1 exclaimed as he approached him1 8,ah traitor60 and this exclamation proved the salvation of ,lorenzo and the ruin of that conspiracy4 ,for the reasons now given1 a conspiracy against a single ruler may readily break down in its execution2 but a conspiracy against two rulers is not only difficult1 but so hazardous that its success is almost hopeless4 ,for to effect like actions1 at the same time1 in different places1 is well-nigh impossible2 nor can they be effected at different times1 if you would not have one counteract another4 ,so that if conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent and dangerous1 to conspire against two1 is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate4 ,and were it not for the respect in which ,i hold the historian1 ,i could not credit as possible what ,herodian relates of ,plautianus1 namely1 that he committed to the centurion ,saturninus the task of slaying single-handed both ,severus and ,caracalla1 they dwelling in different places2 for the thing is so opposed to reason that on no other authority could ,i be induced to accept it as true4 ,certain young ,athenians conspired against ,diocles and ,hippias1 tyrants of ,athens4 ,diocles they slew2 but ,hippias1 making his escape1 avenged him4 ,chion and ,leonidas of ,heraclea1 disciples of ,plato1 conspired against the despots ,clearchus and ,satirus4 ,clearchus fell1 but ,satirus survived and avenged him4 ,the ,pazzi1 of whom we have spoken so often1 succeeded in murdering ,giuliano only4 ,from such conspiracies1 therefore1 as are directed against more heads than one1 all should abstain2 for no good is to be got from them1 whether for ourselves1 for our country1 or for any one else4 ,on the contrary1 when those conspired against escape1 they become harsher and more unsufferable than before1 as1 in the examples given1 ,florence1 ,athens1 and ,heraclea had cause to know4 ,true it is that the conspiracy contrived by ,pelopidas for the liberation of his country1 had to encounter every conceivable hindrance1 and yet had the happiest end4 ,for ,pelopidas had to deal1 not with two tyrants only1 but with ten2 and so far from having their confidence1 could not1 being an outlaw1 even approach them4 ,and yet he succeeded in coming to ,thebes1 in putting the tyrants to death1 and in freeing his country4 ,but whatever he did was done with the aid of one of the counsellors of the tyrants1 a certain ,charon1 through whom he had all facilities for executing his design4 ,let none1 however1 take this case as a pattern2 for that it was in truth a desperate attempt1 and its success a marvel1 was and is the opinion of all historians1 who speak of it as a thing altogether extraordinary and unexampled4 ,the execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or unforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to be carried out4 ,on the morning on which ,brutus and his confederates were to slay ,csar1 it so happened that ,csar talked for a great while with ,cneus ,pompilius ,lenas1 one of the conspirators2 which some of the others observing1 were in terror that ,pompilius was divulging the conspiracy to ,csar2 whose life they would therefore have attempted then and there1 without waiting his arrival in the senate house1 had they not been reassured by seeing that when the conference ended he showed no sign of unusual emotion4 ,false alarms of this sort are to be taken into account and allowed for1 all the more that they are easily raised4 ,for he who has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that others are speaking of him4 ,a word used with a wholly different purpose1 may throw his mind off its balance and lead him to fancy that reference is intended to the matter he is engaged on1 and cause him either to betray the conspiracy by flight1 or to derange its execution by anticipating the time fixed4 ,and the more there are privy to the conspiracy1 the likelier is this to happen4 ,as to the mischances which may befall1 since these are unforeseen1 they can only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious4 ,giulio ,belanti of ,siena1 of whom ,i have spoken before1 from the hate he bore ,pandolfo ,petrucci1 who had given him his daughter to wife and afterwards taken her from him1 resolved to murder him1 and thus chose his time4 ,almost every day ,pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman1 passing the house of ,giulio on the way1 who1 remarking this1 took measures to have his accomplices ready in his house to kill ,pandolfo as he passed4 ,wherefore1 placing the rest armed within the doorway1 one he stationed at a window to give the signal of ,pandolfo's approach4 ,it so happened however1 that as he came nigh the house1 and after the look-out had given the signal1 ,pandolfo fell in with a friend who stopped him to converse2 when some of those with him1 going on in advance1 saw and heard the gleam and clash of weapons1 and so discovered the ambuscade2 whereby ,pandolfo was saved1 while ,giulio with his companions had to fly from ,siena4 ,this plot accordingly was marred1 and ,giulio's schemes baulked1 in consequence of a chance meeting4 ,against such accidents1 since they are out of the common course of things1 no provision can be made4 ,still it is very necessary to take into account all that may happen1 and devise what remedies you can4 ,it now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after the execution of a plot4 ,these in fact resolve themselves into one1 namely1 that some should survive who will avenge the death of the murdered prince4 ,the part of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son1 a brother1 or other kinsman of the deceased1 who in the ordinary course of events might have looked to succeed to the princedom4 ,and such persons are suffered to live1 either from inadvertence1 or from some of the causes noted already1 as when ,giovann' ,andrea of ,lampognano1 with the help of his companions1 put to death the ,duke of ,milan4 ,for the son and two brothers of the ,duke1 who survived him1 were able to avenge his death4 ,in cases like this1 indeed1 the conspirators may be held excused1 since there is nothing they can do to help themselves4 ,but when from carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to live whose death ought to have been secured1 there is no excuse4 ,certain conspirators1 after murdering the lord1 ,count ,girolamo of ,forli1 made prisoners of his wife and of his children who were still very young4 ,by thinking they could not be safe unless they got possession of the citadel1 which the governor refused to surrender1 they obtained a promise from ,madonna ,caterina1 for so the ,countess was named1 that on their permitting her to enter the citadel she would cause it to be given up to them1 her children in the mean time remaining with them as hostages4 ,on which undertaking they suffered her to enter the citadel4 ,but no sooner had she got inside than she fell to upbraid them from the walls with the murder of her husband1 and to threaten them with every kind of vengeance2 and to show them how little store she set upon her children1 told them scoffingly that she knew how others could be got4 ,in the end1 the rebels having no leader to advise them1 and perceiving too late the error into which they had been betrayed1 had to pay the penalty of their rashness by perpetual banishment4 ,but of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot1 none is so much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be well affected to the prince whom you have put to death4 ,for against this danger conspirators have no resource which can ensure their safety4 ,of this we have example in the case of ,csar1 who as he had the love of the ,roman people was by them avenged2 for they it was who1 by driving out the conspirators from ,rome1 were the cause that all of them1 at different times and in different places1 came to violent ends4 ,conspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take part in them than conspiracies against princes2 since there is less risk beforehand1 and though there be the same danger in their execution1 there is none afterwards4 ,beforehand1 the risks are few1 because a citizen may use means for obtaining power without betraying his wishes or designs to any2 and unless his course be arrested1 his designs are likely enough to succeed2 nay1 though laws be passed to restrain him1 he may strike out a new path4 ,this is to be understood of a commonwealth which has to some degree become corrupted2 for in one wherein there is no taint of corruption1 there being no soil in which evil seed can grow1 such designs will never suggest themselves to any citizen4 ,in a commonwealth1 therefore1 a citizen may by many means and in many ways aspire to the princedom without risking destruction1 both because republics are slower than princes are to take alarm1 are less suspicious and consequently less cautious1 and because they look with greater reverence upon their great citizens1 who are in this way rendered bolder and more reckless in attacking them4 ,any one who has read ,sallust's account of the conspiracy of ,catiline1 must remember how1 when that conspiracy was discovered1 ,catiline not only remained in ,rome1 but even made his appearance in the senatehouse1 where he was suffered to address the senate in the most insulting terms1--so scrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty of all its citizens4 ,nay1 even after he had left ,rome and placed himself at the head of his army1 ,lentulus and his other accomplices would not have been imprisoned1 had not letters been found upon them clearly establishing their guilt4 ,hanno1 the foremost citizen of ,carthage1 aspiring to absolute power1 on the occasion of the marriage of a daughter contrived a plot for administering poison to the whole senate and so making himself prince4 ,the scheme being discovered1 the senate took no steps against him beyond passing a law to limit the expense of banquets and marriage ceremonies4 ,so great was the respect they paid to his quality4 ,true1 the execution of a plot against your country is attended with greater difficulty and danger1 since it seldom happens that1 in conspiring against so many1 your own resources are sufficient by themselves2 for it is not every one who1 like ,csar1 ,agathocles1 or ,cleomenes1 is at the head of an army1 so as to be able at a stroke1 and by open force to make himself master of his country4 ,to such as these1 doubtless1 the path is safe and easy enough2 but others who have not such an assembled force ready at their command1 must effect their ends either by stratagem and fraud1 or with the help of foreign troops4 ,of such stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of ,pisistratus the ,athenian1 who after defeating the ,megarians and thereby gaining the favour of his fellow-citizens1 showed himself to them one morning covered with wounds and blood1 declaring that he had been thus outraged through the jealousy of the nobles1 and asking that he might have an armed guard assigned for his protection4 ,with the authority which this lent him1 he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to become tyrant of ,athens4 ,in like manner ,pandolfo ,petrucci1 on his return with the other exiles to ,siena1 was appointed the command of the public guard1 as a mere office of routine which others had declined4 ,very soon1 however1 this armed force gave him so much importance that he became the supreme ruler of the ,state4 ,and many others have followed other plans and methods1 and in the course of time1 and without incurring danger1 have achieved their aim4 ,conspirators against their country1 whether trusting to their own forces or to foreign aid1 have had more or less success in proportion as they have been favoured by ,fortune4 ,catiline1 of whom we spoke just now1 was overthrown4 ,hanno1 who has also been mentioned1 failing to accomplish his object by poison1 armed his partisans to the number of many thousands2 but both he and they came to an ill end4 ,on the other hand1 certain citizens of ,thebes conspiring to become its tyrants1 summoned a ,spartan army to their assistance1 and usurped the absolute control of the city4 ,in short1 if we examine all the conspiracies which men have engaged in against their country1 we shall find that few or none have been quelled in their inception1 but that all have either succeeded1 or have broken down in their execution4 ,once executed1 they entail no further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a princedom4 ,for the man who becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and ordinary dangers in which a tyranny involves him1 and has no remedies against them save those of which ,i have already spoken4 ,this is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies4 ,if ,i have noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather than those wherein poison has been the instrument1 it is because1 generally speaking1 the method of proceeding is the same in both4 ,it is true1 nevertheless1 that conspiracies which are to be carried out by poison are1 by reason of their uncertainty1 attended by greater danger4 ,for since fewer opportunities offer for their execution1 you must have an understanding with persons who can command opportunities4 ,but it is dangerous to have to depend on others4 ,again1 many causes may hinder a poisoned draught from proving mortal2 as when the murderers of ,commodus1 on his vomiting the poison given him1 had to strangle him4 ,princes1 then1 have no worse enemy than conspiracy1 for when a conspiracy is formed against them1 it either carries them off1 or discredits them3 since1 if it succeeds1 they die2 while1 if it be discovered1 and the conspirators be put to death themselves1 it will always be believed that the whole affair has been trumped up by the prince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the goods and blood of those whom he has made away with4 ,let me not1 however1 forget to warn the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is directed1 that on getting word of it1 and before taking any steps to punish it1 they endeavour1 as far as they can1 to ascertain its character1 and after carefully weighing the strength of the conspirators with their own1 on finding it preponderate1 never suffer their knowledge of the plot to appear until they are ready with a force sufficient to crush it4 ,for otherwise1 to disclose their knowledge will only give the signal for their destruction4 ,they must strive therefore to seem unconscious of what is going on2 for conspirators who see themselves detected are driven forward by necessity and will stick at nothing4 ,of this precaution we have an example in ,roman history1 when the officers of the two legions1 who1 as has already been mentioned1 were left behind to defend the ,capuans from the ,samnites1 conspired together against the ,capuans4 ,for on rumours of this conspiracy reaching ,rome1 ,rutilius the new consul was charged to see to it2 who1 not to excite the suspicions of the conspirators1 publicly gave out that by order of the senate the ,capuan legions were continued in their station4 ,the conspirators believing this1 and thinking they would have ample time to execute their plans1 made no effort to hasten matters1 but remained at their ease1 until they found that the consul was moving one of the two legions to a distance from the other4 ,this arousing their suspicion1 led them to disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them out4 ,now1 we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever way we look at it4 ,for it shows how slow men are to move in those matters wherein time seems of little importance1 and how active they become when necessity urges them4 ,nor can a prince or commonwealth desiring for their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy1 use any more effectual means to do so1 than by artfully holding out to the conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present itself2 awaiting which1 and believing they have time and to spare for what they have to do1 they will afford that prince or commonwealth all the leisure needed to prepare for their punishment4 ,whosoever neglects these precautions hastens his own destruction1 as happened with the ,duke of ,athens1 and with ,guglielmo de' ,pazzi4 ,for the ,duke1 who had made himself tyrant of ,florence1 on learning that he was being conspired against1 without further inquiry into the matter1 caused one of the conspirators to be seized2 whereupon the rest at once armed themselves and deprived him of his government4 ,guglielmo1 again1 being commissary in the ,val di ,chiana in the year #aeja1 and learning that a conspiracy was being hatched in ,arezzo to take the town from the ,florentines and give it over to the ,vitelli1 repaired thither with all haste2 and without providing himself with the necessary forces or giving a thought to the strength of the conspirators1 on the advice of the bishop1 his son1 had one of them arrested4 ,which becoming known to the others1 they forthwith rushed to arms1 and taking the town from the ,florentines1 made ,guglielmo their prisoner4 ,where1 however1 conspiracies are weak1 they may and should be put down without scruple or hesitation4 ,two methods1 somewhat opposed to one another1 which have occasionally been followed in dealing with conspiracies1 are in no way to be commended4 ,one of these was that adopted by the ,duke of ,athens1 of whom ,i have just now spoken1 who to have it thought that he confided in the goodwill of the ,florentines1 caused a certain man who gave information of a plot against him1 to be put to death4 ,the other was that followed by ,dion the ,syracusan1 who1 to sound the intentions of one whom he suspected1 arranged with ,calippus1 whom he trusted1 to pretend to get up a conspiracy against him4 ,neither of these tyrants reaped any advantage from the course he followed4 ,for the one discouraged informers and gave heart to those who were disposed to conspire1 the other prepared an easy road to his own death1 or rather was prime mover in a conspiracy against himself4 ,as the event showed4 ,for ,calippus having free leave to plot against ,dion1 plotted to such effect1 that he deprived him at once of his ,state and life4 ,,chapter ,,vii4--,why it is that changes from ,freedom to ,servitude1 and from ,servitude to ,freedom1 are sometimes made without ,bloodshed1 but at other times reek with ,blood4 ,since we find from history that in the countless changes which have been made from freedom to servitude and from servitude to freedom1 sometimes an infinite multitude have perished1 while at others not a soul has suffered 7as when ,rome made her change from kings to consuls1 on which occasion none was banished save ,tarquin1 and no harm was done to any other71 it may perhaps be asked1 how it happens that of these revolutions1 some have been attended by bloodshed and others not4 ,the answer ,i take to be this4 ,the government which suffers change either has or has not had its beginning in violence4 ,and since the government which has its beginning in violence must start by inflicting injuries on many1 it must needs happen that on its downfall those who were injured will desire to avenge themselves2 from which desire for vengeance the slaughter and death of many will result4 ,but when a government originates with1 and derives its authority from the whole community1 there is no reason why the community1 if it withdraw that authority1 should seek to injure any except the prince from whom it withdraws it4 ,now the government of ,rome was of this nature1 and the expulsion of the ,tarquins took place in this way4 ,of a like character was the government of the ,medici in ,florence1 and1 accordingly1 upon their overthrow in the year #adid1 no injury was done to any save themselves4 ,in such cases1 therefore1 the changes ,i speak of do not occasion any very great danger4 ,but the changes wrought by men who have wrongs to revenge1 are always of a most dangerous kind1 and such1 to say the least1 as may well cause dismay in the minds of those who read of them4 ,but since history abounds with instances of such changes ,i need say no more about them4 ,,chapter ,,viii4--,that he who would effect ,changes in a ,commonwealth1 must give heed to its ,character and ,condition ,i have said before that a bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a commonwealth which has not become corrupted4 ,this opinion is not only supported by the arguments already advanced1 but is further confirmed by the examples of ,spurius ,cassius and ,manlius ,capitolinus4 ,for ,spurius1 being ambitious1 and desiring to obtain extraordinary authority in ,rome1 and to win over the people by loading them with benefits 7as1 for instance1 by selling them those lands which the ,romans had taken from the ,hernici17 his designs were seen through by the senate1 and laid him under such suspicion1 that when in haranguing the people he offered them the money realized by the sale of the grain brought from ,sicily at the public expense1 they would have none of it1 believing that he offered it as the price of their freedom4 ,now1 had the people been corrupted1 they would not have refused this bribe1 but would have opened rather than closed the way to the tyranny4 ,the example of ,manlius is still more striking4 ,for in his case we see what excellent gifts both of mind and body1 and what splendid services to his country were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness to reign which we find bred in him by his jealousy of the honours paid ,camillus4 ,for so darkened did his mind become1 that without reflecting what were the institutions to which ,rome was accustomed1 or testing the material he had to work on1 when he would have seen that it was still unfit to be moulded to evil ends1 he set himself to stir up tumults against the senate and against the laws of his country4 ,and herein we recognize the excellence of this city of ,rome1 and of the materials whereof it was composed4 ,for although the nobles were wont to stand up stoutly for one another1 not one of them stirred to succour ,manlius1 and not one of his kinsfolk made any effort on his behalf1 so that although it was customary1 in the case of other accused persons1 for their friends to put on black and sordid raiment1 with all the other outward signs of grief1 in order to excite pity for the accused1 none was seen to do any of these things for ,manlius4 ,even the tribunes of the people1 though constantly ready to promote whatever courses seemed to favour the popular cause1 and the more vehemently the more they seemed to make against the nobles1 in this instance sided with the nobles to put down the common enemy4 ,nay the very people themselves1 keenly alive to their own interests1 and well disposed towards any attempt to damage the nobles1 though they showed ,manlius many proofs of their regard1 nevertheless1 when he was cited by the tribunes to appear before them and submit his cause for their decision1 assumed the part of judges and not of defenders1 and without scruple or hesitation sentenced him to die4 ,wherefore1 ,i think1 that there is no example in the whole ,roman history which serves so well as this to demonstrate the virtues of all ranks in that republic4 ,for not a man in the whole city bestirred himself to shield a citizen endowed with every great quality1 and who1 both publicly and privately1 had done so much that deserved praise4 ,but in all1 the love of country outweighed every other thought1 and all looked less to his past deserts than to the dangers which his present conduct threatened2 from which to relieve themselves they put him to death4 8,such10 says ,livius1 8was the fate of a man worthy our admiration had he not been born in a free ,state40 ,and here two points should be noted4 ,the first1 that glory is to be sought by different methods in a corrupt city1 and in one which still preserves its freedom4 ,the second1 which hardly differs from the first1 that in their actions1 and especially in matters of moment1 men must have regard to times and circumstances and adapt themselves thereto4 ,for those persons who from an unwise choice1 or from natural inclination1 run counter to the times will for the most part live unhappily1 and find all they undertake issue in failure2 whereas those who accommodate themselves to the times are fortunate and successful4 ,and from the passage cited we may plainly infer1 that had ,manlius lived in the days of ,marius and ,sylla1 when the body of the ,state had become corrupted1 so that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his ambition1 he might have had the same success as they had1 and as those others had who after them aspired to absolute power2 and1 conversely1 that if ,sylla and ,marius had lived in the days of ,manlius1 they must have broken down at the very beginning of their attempts4 ,for one man1 by mischievous arts and measures1 may easily prepare the ground for the universal corruption of a city2 but no one man in his lifetime can carry that corruption so far1 as himself to reap the harvest2 or granting that one man's life might be long enough for this purpose1 it would be impossible for him1 having regard to the ordinary habits of men1 who grow impatient and cannot long forego the gratification of their desires1 to wait until the corruption was complete4 ,moreover1 men deceive themselves in respect of their own affairs1 and most of all in respect of those on which they are most bent2 so that either from impatience or from self-deception1 they rush upon undertakings for which the time is not ripe1 and so come to an ill end4 ,wherefore to obtain absolute authority in a commonwealth and to destroy its liberties1 you must find the body of the ,state already corrupted1 and corrupted by a gradual wasting continued from generation to generation2 which1 indeed1 takes place necessarily1 unless1 as has been already explained1 the ,state be often reinforced by good examples1 or brought back to its first beginnings by wise laws4 ,manlius1 therefore1 would have been a rare and renowned man had he been born in a corrupt city2 and from his example we see that citizens seeking to introduce changes in the form of their government1 whether in favour of liberty or despotism1 ought to consider what materials they have to deal with1 and then judge of the difficulty of their task4 ,for it is no less arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people disposed to live in servitude1 than to enslave a people who desire to live free4 ,and because it has been said above1 that in their actions men must take into account the character of the times in which they live1 and guide themselves accordingly1 ,i shall treat this point more fully in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,ix4--,that to enjoy constant good ,fortune we must change with the ,times4 ,i have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune of men depends on whether their methods of acting accord with the character of the times4 ,for we see that in what they do some men act impulsively1 others warily and with caution4 ,and because1 from inability to preserve the just mean1 they in both of these ways overstep the true limit1 they commit mistakes in one direction or the other4 ,he1 however1 will make fewest mistakes1 and may expect to prosper most1 who1 while following the course to which nature inclines him1 finds1 as ,i have said1 his method of acting in accordance with the times in which he lives4 ,all know that in his command of the ,roman armies1 ,fabius ,maximus displayed a prudence and caution very different from the audacity and hardihood natural to his countrymen2 and it was his good fortune that his methods suited with the times4 ,for ,hannibal coming into ,italy in all the flush of youth and recent success1 having already by two defeats stripped ,rome of her best soldiers and filled her with dismay1 nothing could have been more fortunate for that republic than to find a general able1 by his deliberateness and caution1 to keep the enemy at bay4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 could ,fabius have fallen upon times better suited to the methods which he used1 and by which he crowned himself with glory4 ,that he acted in accordance with his natural bent1 and not from a reasoned choice1 we may gather from this1 that when ,scipio1 to bring the war to an end1 proposed to pass with his army into ,africa1 ,fabius1 unable to depart from his characteristic methods and habits1 strenuously opposed him2 so that had it rested with him1 ,hannibal might never have left ,italy4 ,for he perceived not that the times had changed1 and that with them it was necessary to change the methods of prosecuting the war4 ,had ,fabius1 therefore1 been ,king of ,rome1 he might well have caused the war to end unhappily1 not knowing how to accommodate his methods to the change in the times4 ,as it was1 he lived in a commonwealth in which there were many citizens1 and many different dispositions2 and which as it produced a ,fabius1 excellent at a time when it was necessary to protract hostilities1 so also1 afterwards gave birth to a ,scipio1 at a time suited to bring them to a successful close4 ,and hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer1 and has a more sustained good fortune than a princedom1 because from the diversity in the characters of its citizens1 it can adapt itself better than a prince can to the diversity of times4 ,for1 as ,i have said before1 a man accustomed to follow one method1 will never alter it2 whence it must needs happen that when times change so as no longer to accord with his method1 he will be ruined4 ,piero ,soderini1 of whom ,i have already spoken1 was guided in all his actions by patience and gentleness1 and he and his country prospered while the times were in harmony with these methods4 ,but1 afterwards1 when a time came when it behoved him to have done with patience and gentleness1 he knew not how to drop them1 and was ruined together with his country4 ,pope ,julius ,,ii41 throughout the whole of his pontificate1 was governed by impulse and passion1 and because the times were in perfect accord1 all his undertakings prospered4 ,but had other times come requiring other qualities1 he could not have escaped destruction1 since he could not have changed his methods nor his habitual line of conduct4 ,as to why such changes are impossible1 two reasons may be given4 ,one is that we cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature4 ,the other1 that when a man has been very successful while following a particular method1 he can never be convinced that it is for his advantage to try some other4 ,and hence it results that a man's fortunes vary1 because times change and he does not change with them4 ,so1 too1 with commonwealths1 which1 as we have already shown at length1 are ruined from not altering their institutions to suit the times4 ,and commonwealths are slower to change than princes are1 changes costing them more effort2 because occasions must be waited for which shall stir the whole community1 and it is not enough that a single citizen alters his method of acting4 ,but since ,i have made mention of ,fabius ,maximus who wore out ,hannibal by keeping him at bay1 ,i think it opportune to consider in the following ,chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at all risks1 can be prevented by that enemy from doing so4 ,,chapter ,x4--,that a ,captain cannot escape ,battle when his ,enemy forces it on him at all risks4 8,cneius ,sulpitius when appointed dictator against the ,gauls1 being unwilling to tempt ,fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a disadvantageous position would every day render weaker1 protracted the war40 ,when a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to fall into1 ,i think it not amiss to mark it again and again with disapproval4 ,wherefore1 although ,i have already shown repeatedly how in affairs of moment the actions of the moderns conform not to those of antiquity1 still it seems to me not superfluous1 in this place1 to say the same thing once more4 ,for if in any particular the moderns have deviated from the methods of the ancients1 it is especially in their methods of warfare1 wherein not one of those rules formerly so much esteemed is now attended to4 ,and this because both princes and commonwealths have devolved the charge of such matters upon others1 and1 to escape danger1 have kept aloof from all military service2 so that although one or another of the princes of our times may occasionally be seen present in person with his army1 we are not therefore to expect from him any further praiseworthy behaviour4 ,for even where such personages take part in any warlike enterprise1 they do so out of ostentation and from no nobler motive2 though doubtless from sometimes seeing their soldiers face to face1 and from retaining to themselves the title of command1 they are likely to make fewer blunders than we find made by republics1 and most of all by the republics of ,italy1 which though altogether dependent upon others1 and themselves utterly ignorant of everything relating to warfare1 do yet1 that they may figure as the commanders of their armies1 take upon them to direct their movements1 and in doing so commit countless mistakes2 some of which have been considered elsewhere but one is of such importance as to deserve notice here4 ,when these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of their ,captains1 it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can give him is to charge him on no account to give battle1 but1 on the contrary1 to do what he can to avoid fighting4 ,wherein they imagine themselves to imitate the prudence of ,fabius ,maximus1 who by protracting the war with ,hannibal1 saved the ,roman commonwealth2 not perceiving that in most instances such advice to a captain is either useless or hurtful4 ,for the truth of the matter is1 that a captain who would keep the field1 cannot decline battle when his adversary forces it on him at all hazards4 ,so that the instruction to avoid battle is but tantamount to saying1 8,you shall engage when it pleases your enemy1 and not when it suits yourself40 ,for if you would keep the field and yet avoid battle1 the only safe course is to interpose a distance of at least fifty miles between you and your enemy1 and afterwards to maintain so vigilant a look-out1 that should he advance you will have time to make your retreat4 ,another method is to shut yourself up in some town4 ,but both of these methods are extremely disadvantageous4 ,for by following the former1 you leave your country a prey to the enemy1 and a valiant prince would far sooner risk the chances of battle than prolong a war in a manner so disastrous to his subjects2 while by adopting the latter method1 and shutting yourself up in a town with your army1 there is manifest danger of your being besieged1 and presently reduced by famine and forced to surrender4 ,wherefore it is most mischievous to seek to avoid battle in either of these two ways4 ,to intrench yourself in a strong position1 as ,fabius was wont to do1 is a good method when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not advance to attack you in your intrenchments2 yet it cannot truly be said that ,fabius avoided battle1 but rather that he sought to give battle where he could do so with advantage4 ,for had ,hannibal desired to fight1 ,fabius would have waited for him and fought him4 ,but ,hannibal never dared to engage him on his own ground4 ,so that an engagement was avoided as much by ,hannibal as by ,fabius1 since if either had been minded to fight at all hazards the other would have been constrained to take one of three courses1 that is to say1 one or other of the two just now mentioned1 or else to retreat4 ,the truth of this is confirmed by numberless examples1 and more particularly by what happened in the war waged by the ,romans against ,philip of ,macedon1 the father of ,perseus4 ,for ,philip being invaded by the ,romans1 resolved not to give them battle2 and to avoid battle1 sought at first to do as ,fabius had done in ,italy1 posting himself on the summit of a hill1 where he intrenched himself strongly1 thinking that the ,romans would not venture to attack him there4 ,but they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments1 drove him from his position2 when1 unable to make further resistance1 he fled with the greater part of his army1 and was only saved from utter destruction by the difficulty of the ground1 which made it impossible for the ,romans to pursue him4 ,philip1 therefore1 who had no mind to fight1 encamping too near the ,romans1 was forced to fly2 and learning from this experience that to escape fighting it was not enough for him to intrench himself on a hill1 yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town1 he was constrained to take the other alternative of keeping at a distance of many miles from the ,roman legions4 ,accordingly1 when the ,romans entered one province1 he betook himself to another1 and when they left a province he entered it4 ,but perceiving that by protracting the war in this way1 his condition grew constantly worse1 while his subjects suffered grievously1 now from his own troops1 at another time from those of the enemy1 he at last resolved to hazard battle1 and so came to a regular engagement with the ,romans4 ,it is for your interest1 therefore1 not to fight1 when you possess the same advantages as ,fabius1 or as ,cneius ,sulpitius had2 in other words1 when your army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not attack you in your intrenchments1 and although he has got within your territory has yet gained no footing there1 and suffers in consequence from the want of necessary supplies4 ,in such circumstances delay is useful1 for the reasons assigned by ,titus ,livius when speaking of ,sulpitius4 ,in no other circumstances1 however1 can an engagement be avoided without dishonour or danger4 ,for to retire as ,philip did1 is nothing else than defeat2 and the disgrace is greater in proportion as your valour has been less put to the proof4 ,and if ,philip was lucky enough to escape1 another1 not similarly favoured by the nature of the ground1 might not have the same good fortune4 ,that ,hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none will venture to maintain4 ,wherefore1 when he had to encounter ,scipio in ,africa1 it may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging the war he would have done so2 and1 possibly1 being a skilful captain and in command of a valiant army1 he might have been able to do what ,fabius did in ,italy4 ,but since he took not that course1 we may infer that he was moved by sufficient reasons4 ,for the captain who has got an army together1 and perceives that from want of money or friends he cannot maintain it long1 must be a mere madman if he do not at once1 and before his army melts away1 try the fortunes of battle2 since he is certain to lose by delay1 while by fighting he may chance to succeed4 ,and there is this also to be kept in view1 that we must strive1 even if we be defeated1 to gain glory2 and that more glory is to be won in being beaten by force1 than in a defeat from any other cause4 ,and this we may suppose to have weighed with ,hannibal4 ,on the other hand1 supposing ,hannibal to have declined battle1 ,scipio1 even if he had lacked courage to follow him up and attack him in his intrenched camp1 would not have suffered thereby2 for as he had defeated ,syphax1 and got possession of many of the ,african towns1 he could have rested where he was in the same security and with the same convenience as if he had been in ,italy4 ,but this was not the case with ,hannibal when he had to encounter ,fabius1 nor with the ,gauls when they were opposed to ,sulpitius4 ,least of all can he decline battle who invades with his army the country of another2 for seeking to enter his enemy's country1 he must fight whenever the enemy comes forward to meet him2 and is under still greater necessity to fight1 if he undertake the siege of any town4 ,as happened in our own day with ,duke ,charles of ,burgundy1 who1 when beleaguering ,morat1 a town of the ,swiss1 was by them attacked and routed2 or as happened with the ,french army encamped against ,novara1 which was in like manner defeated by the ,swiss4 ,,chapter ,,xi4--,that one who has to contend with many1 though he be weaker than they1 will prevail if he can withstand their first onset4 ,the power exercised in ,rome by the tribunes of the people was great1 and1 as ,i have repeatedly explained1 was necessary1 since otherwise there would have been no check on the ambition of the nobles1 and the commonwealth must have grown corrupted far sooner than it did4 ,but because1 as ,i have said elsewhere1 there is in everything a latent evil peculiar to it1 giving rise to new mischances1 it becomes necessary to provide against these by new ordinances4 ,the authority of the tribunes1 therefore1 being insolently asserted so as to become formidable to the nobility and to the entire city1 disorders dangerous to the liberty of the ,state must thence have resulted1 had not a method been devised by ,appius ,claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes4 ,this was1 to secure that there should always be one of their number timid1 or venal1 or else a lover of the general good1 who could be influenced to oppose the rest whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to the wishes of the senate4 ,this remedy was a great restraint on the excessive authority of the tribunes1 and on many occasions proved serviceable to ,rome4 ,i am led by this circumstance to remark1 that when many powerful persons are united against one1 who1 although no match for the others collectively1 is also powerful1 the chances are more in favour of this single and less ,i powerful person1 than of the many who together are much stronger4 ,for setting aside an infinity of accidents which can be turned to better account by one than by many1 it will always happen that1 by exercising a little dexterity1 the one will be able to divide the many1 and weaken the force which was strong while it was united4 ,in proof whereof1 ,i shall not refer to ancient examples1 though many such might be cited1 but content myself with certain modern instances taken from the events of our own times4 ,in the year #adhd1 all ,italy combined against the ,venetians1 who finding their position desperate1 and being unable to keep their army any longer in the field1 bribed ,signer ,lodovico1 who then governed ,milan1 and so succeeded in effecting a settlement1 whereby they not only recovered the towns they had lost1 but also obtained for themselves a part of the territories of ,ferrara2 so that those were by peace the gainers1 who in war had been the losers4 ,not many years ago the whole world was banded together against ,france2 but before the war came to a close1 ,spain breaking with the confederates and entering into a separate treaty with ,france1 the other members of the league also1 were presently forced to make terms4 ,wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many against one1 that this one1 if he have strength to withstand the first shock1 and can temporize and wait his opportunity1 is certain to prevail4 ,but unless he can do this he runs a thousand dangers3 as did the ,venetians in the year #aejh1 who1 could they have temporized with the ,french1 and so got time to conciliate some of those who had combined against them1 might have escaped the ruin which then overtook them4 ,but not possessing such a strong army as would have enabled them to temporize with their enemies1 and consequently not having the time needed for gaining any to their side1 they were undone4 ,yet we know that the ,pope1 as soon as he had obtained what he wanted1 made friends with them1 and that ,spain did the like2 and that both the one and the other of these powers would gladly have saved the ,lombard territory for themselves1 nor would1 if they could have helped it1 have left it to ,france1 so as to augment her influence in ,italy4 ,the ,venetians1 therefore1 should have given up a part to save the rest2 and had they done so at a time when the surrender would not have seemed to be made under compulsion1 and before any step had been taken in the direction of war1 it would have been a most prudent course2 although discreditable and probably of little avail after war had been begun4 ,but until the war broke out1 few of the ,venetian citizens recognized the danger1 fewer still the remedy1 and none ventured to prescribe it4 ,but to return to the point whence we started1 ,i say that the same safeguard for their country which the ,roman senate found against the ambition of the tribunes in their number1 is within the reach of the prince who is attacked by many adversaries1 if he only know to use prudently those methods which promote division4 ,,chapter ,,xii4--,a prudent ,captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own ,soldiers to fight1 and to relieve his ,enemy from that necessity4 ,elsewhere ,i have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by ,necessity1 and how much of their renown is due to her guidance1 so that it has even been said by some philosophers1 that the hands and tongues of men1 the two noblest instruments of their fame1 would never have worked to perfection1 nor have brought their labours to that pitch of excellence we see them to have reached1 had they not been impelled by this cause4 ,the captains of antiquity1 therefore1 knowing the virtues of this necessity1 and seeing the steadfast courage which it gave their soldiers in battle1 spared no effort to bring their armies under its influence1 while using all their address to loosen its hold upon their enemies4 ,for which reason1 they would often leave open to an adversary some way which they might have closed1 and close against their own men some way they might have left open4 ,whosoever1 therefore1 would have a city defend itself stubbornly1 or an army fight resolutely in the field1 must before all things endeavour to impress the minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no other course is open to them4 ,in like manner a prudent captain who undertakes the attack of a city1 will measure the ease or difficulty of his enterprise1 by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity which compels the inhabitants to defend it2 and where he finds that necessity to be strong1 he may infer that his task will be difficult1 but if otherwise1 that it will be easy4 ,and hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a revolt than to be taken for the first time4 ,because on a first attack1 having no occasion to fear punishment1 since they have given no ground of offence1 they readily surrender2 but when they have revolted1 they know that they have given ground of offence1 and1 fearing punishment1 are not so easily brought under4 ,a like stubbornness grows from the natural hostility with which princes or republics who are neighbours regard one another2 which again is caused by the desire to dominate over those who live near1 or from jealousy of their power4 ,this is more particularly the case with republics1 as in ,tuscany for example2 for contention and rivalry have always made1 and always will make it extremely hard for one republic to bring another into subjection4 ,and for this reason any one who considers attentively who are the neighbours of ,florence1 and who of ,venice1 will not marvel so much as some have done1 that ,florence should have spent more than ,venice on her wars and gained less2 since this results entirely from the ,venetians finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their resistance than the ,florentines theirs4 ,for all the towns in the neighbourhood of ,venice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom2 and those who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing masters1 nay are often eager for the change4 ,in this way ,venice1 though she has had more powerful neighbours than ,florence1 has been able1 from finding their towns less stubborn1 to subdue them more easily than the latter1 surrounded exclusively by free cities1 has had it in her power to do4 ,but1 to return to the matter in hand1 the captain who attacks a town should use what care he can1 not to drive the defenders to extremities1 lest he render them stubborn2 but when they fear punishment should promise them pardon1 and when they fear for their freedom should assure them that he has no designs against the common welfare1 but only against a few ambitious men in their city2 for such assurances have often smoothed the way to the surrender of towns4 ,and although pretexts of this sort are easily seen through1 especially by the wise1 the mass of the people are often beguiled by them1 because desiring present tranquillity1 they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these specious promises4 ,by means such as these1 therefore1 cities innumerable have been brought into subjection1 as recently was the case with ,florence4 ,the ruin of ,crassus and his army was similarly caused3 for although he himself saw through the empty promises of the ,parthians1 as meant only to blind the ,roman soldiers to the necessity of defending themselves1 yet he could not keep his men steadfast1 they1 as we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain1 being deceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies4 ,on the other hand1 when the ,samnites1 who1 at the instance of a few ambitious men1 and in violation of the terms of the truce made with them1 had overrun and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of ,rome1 afterwards sent envoys to ,rome to implore peace1 offering to restore whatever they had taken1 and to surrender the authors of these injuries and outrages as prisoners1 and these offers were rejected by the ,romans1 and the envoys returned to ,samnium bringing with them no hope of an adjustment1 ,claudius ,pontius1 who then commanded the army of the ,samnites1 showed them in a remarkable speech1 that the ,romans desired war at all hazards1 and declared that1 although for the sake of his country he wished for peace1 necessity constrained him to prepare for war2 telling them 8that was a just war which could not be escaped1 and those arms sacred in which lay their only hopes40 ,and building on this necessity1 he raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident expectation of success4 ,that ,i may not have to revert to this matter again1 it will be convenient to notice here those examples from ,roman history which most merit attention4 ,when ,caius ,manilius was in command of the legions encamped against ,veii1 a division of the ,veientine army having got within the ,roman intrenchments1 ,manilius ran forward with a company of his men to defend them1 and1 to prevent the escape of the ,veientines1 guarded all the approaches to the camp4 ,the ,veientines finding themselves thus shut in1 began to fight with such fury that they slew ,manilius1 and would have destroyed all the rest of the ,roman army1 had not the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for the ,veientines to retreat4 ,here we see that so long as necessity compelled1 the ,veientines fought most fiercely1 but on finding a path opened for escape1 preferred flight to combat4 ,on another occasion when the ,volscians and ,equians passed with their armies across the ,roman frontier1 the consuls were sent out to oppose them1 and an engagement ensued4 ,it so happened that when the combat was at its height1 the army of the ,volscians1 commanded by ,vectius ,mescius1 suddenly found themselves shut in between their own camp1 which a division of the ,romans had occupied1 and the body of the ,roman army2 when seeing that they must either perish or cut a way for themselves with their swords1 ,vectius said to them1 8,come on1 my men1 here is no wall or rampart to be scaled3 we fight man with man2 in valour we are their equals1 and necessity1 that last and mightiest weapon1 gives us the advantage40 ,here1 then1 necessity is spoken of by ,titus ,livius as the last and mightiest weapon4 ,camillus1 the wisest and most prudent of all the ,roman commanders1 when he had got within the town of ,veii with his army1 to make its surrender easier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation1 called out to his men1 so that the ,veientines might hear1 to spare all whom they found unarmed4 ,whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons1 the town was taken almost without bloodshed4 ,and this device was afterwards followed by many other captains4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4--,whether we may trust more to a valiant ,captain with a weak ,army1 or to a valiant ,army with a weak ,captain4 ,coriolanus being banished from ,rome betook himself to the ,volscians1 and when he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his countrymen1 came back to ,rome2 yet1 again withdrew1 not constrained to retire by the might of the ,roman arms1 but out of reverence for his mother4 ,from this incident1 says ,titus ,livius1 we may learn that the spread of the ,roman power was due more to the valour of her captains than of her soldiers4 ,for before this the ,volscians had always been routed1 and only grew successful when ,coriolanus became their captain4 ,but though ,livius be of this opinion1 there are many passages in his history to show that the ,roman soldiers1 even when left without leaders1 often performed astonishing feats of valour1 nay1 sometimes maintained better discipline and fought with greater spirit after their consuls were slain than they had before4 ,for example1 the army under the ,scipios in ,spain1 after its two leaders had fallen1 was able by its valour not merely to secure its own safety1 but to overcome the enemy and preserve the province for the ,roman ,republic4 ,so that to state the case fairly1 we find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers alone gained the day1 as well as many in which success was wholly due to the excellence of the captain4 ,from which it may be inferred that the one stands in need of the other4 ,and here the question suggests itself3 which is the more formidable1 a good army badly led1 or a good captain commanding an indifferent army2 though1 were we to adopt the opinion of ,csar on this head1 we ought lightly to esteem both4 ,for when ,csar went to ,spain against ,afranius and ,petreius1 who were there in command of a strong army1 he made little account of them1 saying1 8that he went to fight an army without a captain10 indicating thereby the weakness of these generals4 ,and1 conversely1 when he went to encounter ,pompeius in ,thessaly1 he said1 8,i go against a captain without an army40#ac #ac ,professus ante inter suos1 ire se ad exercitum sine duce1 et inde reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu4 7,suet4 in ,vita ,j4 ,caes47 ,a further question may also be raised1 whether it is easier for a good captain to make a good army1 or for a good army to make a good captain4 ,as to this it might be thought there was barely room for doubt1 since it ought to be far easier for many who are good to find one who is good or teach him to become so1 than for one who is good to find or make many good4 ,lucullus when sent against ,mithridates was wholly without experience in war3 but his brave army1 which was provided with many excellent officers1 speedily taught him to be a good captain4 ,on the other hand1 when the ,romans1 being badly off for soldiers1 armed a number of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by ,sempronius ,gracchus1 he in a short time made them into a serviceable army4 ,so too1 as ,i have already mentioned1 ,pelopidas and ,epaminondas after rescuing ,thebes1 their native city1 from ,spartan thraldom1 in a short time made such valiant soldiers of the ,theban peasantry1 as to be able with their aid not only to withstand1 but even to defeat the ,spartan armies4 ,so that the question may seem to be equally balanced1 excellence on one side generally finding excellence on the other4 ,a good army1 however1 when left without a good leader1 as the ,macedonian army was on the death of ,alexander1 or as those veterans were who had fought in the civil wars1 is apt to grow restless and turbulent4 ,wherefore ,i am convinced that it is better to trust to the captain who has time allowed him to discipline his men1 and means wherewith to equip them1 than to a tumultuary host with a chance leader of its own choosing4 ,but twofold is the merit and twofold the glory of those captains who not only have had to subdue their enemies1 but also before encountering them to organize and discipline their forces4 ,this1 however1 is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined1 that were many of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world1 called on to perform it1 they would be much less thought of than they are4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4--,of the effect produced in ,battle by strange and unexpected ,sights or ,sounds4 ,that the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected sights or sounds may have momentous consequences in combat1 might be shown by many instances1 but by none better than by what befell in the battle fought between the ,romans and the ,volscians1 when ,quintius1 the ,roman general1 seeing one wing of his army begin to waver1 shouted aloud to his men to stand firm1 for the other wing was already victorious4 ,which words of his giving confidence to his own troops and striking the enemy with dismay won him the battle4 ,but if a cry like this1 produce great effect on a well disciplined army1 far greater must be its effect on one which is ill disciplined and disorderly4 ,for by such a wind the whole mass will be moved1 as ,i shall show by a well-known instance happening in our own times4 ,a few years ago the city of ,perugia was split into the two factions of the ,baglioni and the ,oddi1 the former holding the government1 the latter being in exile4 ,the ,oddeschi1 however1 with the help of friends1 having got together an armed force which they lodged in villages of their own near ,perugia1 obtained1 by the favour of some of their party1 an entrance into the city by night1 and moving forward without discovery1 came as far as the public square4 ,and as all the streets of ,perugia are barred with chains drawn across them at their corners1 the ,oddeschi had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer wherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so that horsemen might pass4 ,when the only chain remaining unbroken was that which closed the public square1 the alarm having now been given1 the hammerman was so impeded by the crowd pressing behind him that he could not raise his arm to strike freely4 ,whereupon1 to get more room for his work1 he called aloud to the others to stand back2 and the word back passing from rank to rank those furthest off began to run1 and1 presently1 the others also1 with such precipitancy1 that they fell into utter disorder4 ,in this way1 and from this trifling circumstance1 the attempt of the ,oddeschi came to nothing4 ,here we may note that discipline is needed in an army1 not so much to enable it to fight according to a settled order1 as that it may not be thrown into confusion by every insignificant accident4 ,for a tumultuary host is useless in war1 simply because every word1 or cry1 or sound1 may throw it into a panic and cause it to fly4 ,wherefore it behoves a good captain to provide that certain fixed persons shall receive his orders and pass them on to the rest1 and to accustom his soldiers to look to these persons1 and to them only1 to be informed what his orders are4 ,for whenever this precaution is neglected the gravest mishaps are constantly seen to ensue4 ,as regards strange and unexpected sights1 every captain should endeavour while his army is actually engaged with the enemy1 to effect some such feint or diversion as will encourage his own men and dismay his adversary since this of all things that can happen is the likeliest to ensure victory4 ,in evidence whereof we may cite the example of ,cneius ,sulpitius1 the ,roman dictator1 who1 when about to give battle to the ,gauls1 after arming his sutlers and camp followers1 mounted them on mules and other beasts of burden1 furnished them with spears and banners to look like cavalry1 and placing them behind a hill1 ordered them on a given signal1 when the fight was at the hottest1 to appear and show themselves to the enemy4 ,all which being carried out as he had arranged1 threw the ,gauls into such alarm1 that they lost the battle4 ,a good captain1 therefore1 has two things to see to3 first1 to contrive how by some sudden surprise he may throw his enemy into confusion2 and next1 to be prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against him to discover and defeat it2 as the stratagem of ,semiramis was defeated by the ,king of ,india4 ,for ,semiramis seeing that this king had elephants in great numbers1 to dismay him by showing that she1 too1 was well supplied1 caused the skins of many oxen and buffaloes to be sewn together in the shape of elephants and placed upon camels and sent to the front4 ,but the trick being detected by the king1 turned out not only useless but hurtful to its contriver4 ,in a battle which the ,dictator ,mamercus fought against the people of ,fidenae1 the latter1 to strike terror into the minds of the ,romans1 contrived that while the combat raged a number of soldiers should issue from ,fidenae bearing lances tipped with fire1 thinking that the ,romans1 disturbed by so strange a sight1 would be thrown into confusion4 ,we are to note1 however1 with regard to such contrivances1 that if they are to serve any useful end1 they should be formidable as well as seem so2 for when they menace a real danger1 their weak points are not so soon discerned4 ,when they have more of pretence than reality1 it will be well either to dispense with them altogether1 or resorting to them1 to keep them1 like the muleteers of ,sulpitius1 in the background1 so that they be not too readily found out4 ,for any weakness inherent in them is soon discovered if they be brought near1 when1 as happened with the elephants of ,semiramis and the fiery spears of the men of ,fidenae1 they do harm rather than good4 ,for although by this last-mentioned device the ,romans at the first were somewhat disconcerted1 so soon as the dictator came up and began to chide them1 asking if they were not ashamed to fly like bees from smoke1 and calling on them to turn on their enemy1 and 8with her own flames efface that ,fidenae whom their benefits could not conciliate10 they took courage2 so that the device proved of no service to its contrivers1 who were vanquished in the battle4 ,,chapter ,,xv4--,that one and not many should head an ,army3 and why it is harmful to have more ,leaders than one4 ,the men of ,fidenae rising against the colonists whom the ,romans had settled among them1 and putting them to the sword1 the ,romans to avenge the insult appointed four tribunes with consular powers3 one of whom they retained to see to the defence of ,rome1 while the other three were sent against the ,fidenati and the ,veientines4 ,but these three falling out among themselves1 and being divided in their counsels1 returned from their mission with discredit though not with loss4 ,of which discredit they were themselves the cause4 ,that they sustained no loss was due to the valour of their soldiers ,but the senate perceiving the source of the mischief1 to the end that one man might put to rights what three had thrown into confusion1 resorted to the appointment of a dictator4 ,here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or in a town which has to defend itself4 ,and the case could not be put in clearer words than by ,titus ,livius1 where he says1 8,the three tribunes with consular authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have many leaders2 for each forming a different opinion1 and each abiding by his own1 they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies40 ,and though this example suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war of divided commands1 to make the matter still plainer ,i shall cite two further instances1 one ancient and one modern4 ,in the year #aejj1 ,louis ,,xii4 of ,france1 after recovering ,milan1 sent troops to restore ,pisa to the ,florentines1 ,giovambattista ,ridolfi and ,luca d',antonio ,albizzi going with them as commissaries4 ,now1 because ,giovambattista had a great name1 and was older than ,luca1 the latter left the whole management of everything to him2 and although he did not show his jealousy of him by opposing him1 he betrayed it by his silence1 and by being so careless and indifferent about everything1 that he gave no help in the business of the siege either by word or deed1 just as though he had been a person of no account4 ,but when1 in consequence of an accident1 ,giovambattista had to return to ,florence1 all this was changed2 for ,luca1 remaining in sole charge1 behaved with the greatest courage1 prudence1 and zeal1 all which qualities had been hidden while he held a joint command4 ,further to bear me out ,i shall again borrow the words of ,titus ,livius1 who1 in relating how when ,quintius and ,agrippa his colleague were sent by the ,romans against the ,equians1 ,agrippa contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with ,quintius1 observes1 8,most wholesome is it that in affairs of great moment1 supreme authority be vested in one man40 ,very different1 however1 is the course followed by the republics and princes of our own days1 who1 thinking to be better served1 are used to appoint several captains or commissioners to fill one command2 a practice giving rise to so much confusion1 that were we seeking for the causes of the overthrow of the ,french and ,italian armies in recent times1 we should find this to be the most active of any4 ,rightly1 therefore1 may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon service1 it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence1 than to two of great parts but with a divided command4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4--,that in ,times of ,difficulty true ,worth is sought after2 whereas in quiet ,times it is not the most deserving1 but those who are recommended by ,wealth or ,connection who are most in favour4 ,it always has happened and always will1 that the great and admirable men of a republic are neglected in peaceful times2 because at such seasons many citizens are found1 who1 envying the reputation these men have justly earned1 seek to be regarded not merely as their equals but as their superiors4 ,touching this there is a notable passage in ,thucydides1 the ,greek historian1 where he tells how the republic of ,athens coming victorious out of the ,peloponessian war1 wherein she had bridled the pride of ,sparta1 and brought almost the whole of ,greece under her authority1 was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to propose to herself the conquest of ,sicily4 ,in ,athens this scheme was much debated1 ,alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare very little in their thoughts1 but who hoped that the enterprise1 were they placed in command1 might minister to their fame1 recommending that it should be undertaken4 ,nicias1 on the other hand1 one of the best esteemed of the ,athenian citizens1 was against it1 and in addressing the people1 gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice1 that in advising them not to engage in this war1 he urged what was not for his own advantage2 for he knew that while ,athens remained at peace numberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him3 whereas1 were war declared1 he was certain that none would rank before him or even be looked upon as his equal4 ,here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the infirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens4 ,and this offends these persons for two reasons3 first1 because they are not given the place they deserve2 and second1 because they see unworthy men and of abilities inferior to their own1 as much or more considered than they4 ,injustice such as this has caused the ruin of many republics4 ,for citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted1 and perceive the cause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled1 will strive to change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare4 ,when ,i look for remedies for this state of things1 ,i find two3 first1 to keep the citizens poor1 so that wealth without worth shall corrupt neither them nor others2 second1 to be so prepared for war as always to be ready to make war2 for then there will always be a need for worthy citizens1 as was the case in ,rome in early times4 ,for as ,rome constantly kept her armies in the field1 there was constant opportunity for men to display their valour1 nor was it possible to deprive a deserving man of his post and give it to another who was not deserving4 ,or if ever this were done by inadvertency1 or by way of experiment1 there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger1 that the city at once retraced its steps and reverted to the true path4 ,but other republics which are not regulated on the same plan1 and make war only when driven to it by necessity1 cannot help committing this injustice1 nay1 will constantly run into it1 when1 if the great citizen who finds himself slighted be vindictive1 and have some credit and following in the city1 disorder will always ensue4 ,and though ,rome escaped this danger for a time1 she too1 as has elsewhere been said1 having no longer1 after she had conquered ,carthage and ,antiochus1 any fear of war1 came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would1 making less account of the valour of her captains than of those other qualities which gain favour with the people4 ,accordingly we find ,paulus ,emilius rejected oftener than once when he sought the consulship2 nor1 in fact1 obtaining it until the ,macedonian war broke out1 which1 being judged a formidable business1 was by the voice of the whole city committed to his management4 ,after the year #adid our city of ,florence was involved in a series of wars1 in conducting which none of our citizens had any success until chance threw the command into the hands of one who showed us how an army should be led4 ,this was ,antonio ,giacomini1 and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot1 all rivalry on the part of other citizens was suspended2 and whenever a captain or commissary had to be appointed he was unopposed4 ,but when a war came to be undertaken1 as to the issue of which no misgivings were felt1 and which promised both honour and preferment1 so numerous were the competitors for command1 that three commissaries having to be chosen to conduct the siege of ,pisa1 ,antonio was left out2 and though it cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our republic from his not having been sent on this enterprise1 we may reasonably conjecture that such was indeed the case4 ,for as the people of ,pisa were then without means either for subsistence or defence1 it may be believed that had ,antonio been there he would have reduced them to such extremities as would have forced them to surrender at discretion to the ,florentines4 ,but ,pisa being besieged by captains who knew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it1 held out so long1 that the ,florentines1 who should have reduced it by force1 were obliged to buy its submission4 ,neglect like this might well move ,antonio to resentment2 and he must needs have been both very patient and very forgiving if he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could1 by the ruin of the city or by injuries to individual citizens4 ,but a republic should beware not to rouse such feelings1 as ,i shall show in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4--,that we are not to offend a ,man1 and then send him to fill an important ,office or ,command4 ,a republic should think twice before appointing to an important command a citizen who has sustained notable wrong at the hands of his fellow-citizens4 ,claudius ,nero1 quitting the army with which he was opposing ,hannibal1 went with a part of his forces into the ,march of ,ancona1 designing to join the other consul there1 and after joining him to attack ,hasdrubal before he came up with his brother4 ,now ,claudius had previously commanded against ,hasdrubal in ,spain1 and after driving him with his army into such a position that it seemed he must either fight at a disadvantage or perish by famine1 had been outwitted by his adversary1 who1 while diverting his attention with proposals of terms1 contrived to slip through his hands and rob him of the opportunity for effecting his destruction4 ,this becoming known in ,rome brought ,claudius into so much discredit both with the senate and people1 that to his great mortification and displeasure1 he was slightingly spoken of by the whole city4 ,but being afterwards made consul and sent to oppose ,hannibal1 he took the course mentioned above1 which was in itself so hazardous that all ,rome was filled with doubt and anxiety until tidings came of ,hasdrubal's defeat4 ,when subsequently asked why he had played so dangerous a game1 wherein without urgent necessity he had staked the very existence of ,rome1 ,claudius answered1 he had done so because he knew that were he to succeed he would recover whatever credit he had lost in ,spain2 while if he failed1 and his attempt had an untoward issue1 he would be revenged on that city and ,on those citizens who had so ungratefully and indiscreetly wronged him4 ,but if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a ,roman citizen at a time when ,rome was still uncorrupted1 we should consider how it may act on the citizen of a ,state not constituted as ,rome then was4 ,and because there is no certain remedy we can apply to such disorders when they arise in republics1 it follows that it is impossible to establish a republic which shall endure always2 since in a thousand unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4--,that it is the highest ,quality of a ,captain to be able to forestall the designs of his ,adversary4 ,it was a saying of ,epaminondas the ,theban that nothing was so useful and necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the intentions and designs of his adversary4 ,and because it is hard to come at this knowledge directly1 the more credit is due to him who reaches it by conjecture4 ,yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy's designs than to construe his actions2 and not so much those actions which are done at a distance from us1 as those done in our presence and under our very eyes4 ,for instance1 it has often happened that when a battle has lasted till nightfall1 the winner has believed himself the loser1 and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this mistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself4 ,it was from a mistake of this sort1 that ,brutus and ,cassius lost the battle of ,philippi4 ,for though ,brutus was victorious with his wing of the army ,cassius1 whose wing was beaten1 believed the entire army to be defeated1 and under this belief gave way to despair and slew himself4 ,so too1 in our own days1 in the battle fought by ,francis1 king of ,france1 with the ,swiss at ,santa ,cecilia in ,lombardy1 when night fell1 those of the ,swiss who remained unbroken1 not knowing that the rest had been routed and slain1 thought they had the victory2 and so believing would not retreat1 but1 remaining on the field1 renewed the combat the following morning to their great disadvantage4 ,nor were they the only sufferers from their mistake1 since the armies of the ,pope and of ,spain were also misled by it1 and well-nigh brought to destruction4 ,for on the false report of a victory they crossed the ,po1 and had they only advanced a little further must have been made prisoners by the victorious ,french4 ,an instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps both of the ,romans and of the ,equians4 ,for the ,consul ,sempronius being in command against the ,equians1 and giving the enemy battle1 the engagement lasted with varying success till nightfall1 when as both armies had suffered what was almost a defeat1 neither returned to their camp1 but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought they would be safer4 ,the ,romans separated into two divisions1 one of which with the consul1 the other with the centurion ,tempanius by whose valour the army had that day been saved from utter rout4 ,at daybreak the consul1 without waiting for further tidings of the enemy1 made straight for ,rome2 and the ,equians1 in like manner1 withdrew to their own country4 ,for as each supposed the other to be victorious1 neither thought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy4 ,it so chanced1 however1 that ,tempanius1 who was himself retreating with the second division of the ,roman army1 fell in with certain wounded ,equians1 from whom he learned that their commanders had fled1 abandoning their camp2 on hearing which1 he at once returned to the ,roman camp and secured it1 and then1 after sacking the camp of the ,equians1 went back victorious to ,rome4 ,his success1 as we see1 turned entirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy's condition4 ,and here we are to note that it may often happen that both the one and the other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same disorder1 and be reduced to the same straits2 in which case1 that which soonest detects the other's distress is sure to come off best4 ,i shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own country4 ,in the year #adih1 when the ,florentines had a great army in the territory of ,pisa and had closely invested the town1 the ,venetians1 who had undertaken its protection1 seeing no other way to save it1 resolved to make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the ,florentines in another quarter4 ,wherefore1 having assembled a strong force1 they entered ,tuscany by the ,val di ,lamona1 and seizing on the village of ,marradi1 besieged the stronghold of ,castiglione which stands on the height above it4 ,getting word of this1 the ,florentines sought to relieve ,marradi1 without weakening the army which lay round ,pisa4 ,they accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers1 and equipped a fresh squadron of horse1 which they despatched to ,marradi under the joint command of ,jacopo ,,iv4 d',appiano1 lord of ,piombino1 and ,count ,rinuccio of ,marciano4 ,these troops taking up their position on the hill above ,marradi1 the ,venetians withdrew from the investment of ,castiglione and lodged themselves in the village4 ,but when the two armies had confronted one another for several days1 both began to suffer sorely from want of victuals and other necessaries1 and neither of them daring to attack the other1 or knowing to what extremities the other was reduced1 both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the following morning1 and to retreat1 the ,venetians towards ,berzighella and ,faenza1 the ,florentines towards ,casaglia and the ,mugello4 ,but at daybreak1 when both armies had begun to remove their baggage1 it so happened that an old woman1 whose years and poverty permitted her to pass unnoticed1 leaving the village of ,marradi1 came to the ,florentine camp1 where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit4 ,learning from her that the ,venetians were in retreat1 the ,florentine commanders took courage1 and changing their plan1 went in pursuit of the enemy as though they had dislodged them1 sending word to ,florence that they had repulsed the ,venetians and gained a victory4 ,but in truth this victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy's movements before the latter had notice of theirs4 ,for had that notice been given to the ,venetians first1 it would have wrought against us the same results as it actually wrought for us4 ,,chapter ,,xix4--,whether ,indulgence or ,severity be more necessary for controlling a ,multitude4 ,the ,roman ,republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and commons4 ,nevertheless1 on war breaking out1 ,quintius and ,appius ,claudius were sent forth in command of ,roman armies4 ,from his harshness and severity to his soldiers1 ,appius was so ill obeyed by them1 that after sustaining what almost amounted to a defeat1 he had to resign his command4 ,quintius1 on the contrary1 by kindly and humane treatment1 kept his men obedient and returned victorious to ,rome4 ,from this it might seem that to govern a large body of men1 it is better to be humane than haughty1 and kindly rather than severe4 ,and yet ,cornelius ,tacitus1 with whom many other authors are agreed1 pronounces a contrary opinion where he says1 8,in governing a multitude it avails more to punish than to be compliant40#ad ,if it be asked how these opposite views can be reconciled1 ,i answer that you exercise authority either over men used to regard you as their equal1 or over men who have always been subject to you4 ,when those over whom you exercise authority are your equals1 you cannot trust wholly to punishment or to that severity of which ,tacitus speaks4 ,and since in ,rome itself the commons had equal weight with the nobles1 none appointed their captain for a time only1 could control them by using harshness and severity4 ,accordingly we find that those ,roman captains who gained the love of their soldiers and were considerate of them1 often achieved greater results than those who made themselves feared by them in an unusual degree1 unless1 like ,manlius ,torquatus1 these last were endowed with consummate valour4 ,but he who has to govern subjects such as those of whom ,tacitus speaks1 to prevent their growing insolent and trampling upon him by reason of his too great easiness1 must resort to punishment rather than to compliance4 ,still1 to escape hatred1 punishment should be moderate in degree1 for to make himself hated is never for the interest of any prince4 ,and to escape hatred1 a prince has chiefly to guard against tampering with the property of any of his subjects2 for where nothing is to be gained by it1 no prince will desire to shed blood1 unless1 as seldom happens1 constrained to do so by necessity4 ,but where advantage is to be gained thereby1 blood will always flow1 and neither the desire to shed it1 nor causes for shedding it will ever be wanting1 as ,i have fully shown when discussing this subject in another treatise4 #ad 8,in multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet40 ,but compare ,annals1 ,,iii4 #ee1 8,obsequium inde in principem et mulandi amoi validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus40 ,quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than ,appius4 ,nevertheless the opinion of ,tacitus1 duly restricted and not understood as applying to a case like that of ,appius1 merits approval4 ,but since ,i have spoken of punishment and indulgence1 it seems not out of place to show how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the citizens of ,falerii4 ,,chapter ,,xx4--,how one humane act availed more with the men of ,falerii1 than all the might of the ,roman ,arms4 ,when the besieging army of the ,romans lay round ,falerii1 the master of a school wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught1 thinking to curry favour with ,camillus and the ,romans1 came forth from the town with these boys1 on pretence of giving them exercise1 and bringing them into the camp where ,camillus was1 presented them to him1 saying1 8,to ransom these that city would yield itself into your hands40 ,camillus1 however1 not only rejected this offer1 but causing the schoolmaster to be stripped and his hands tied behind him1 gave each of the boys a scourge1 and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging him as they went4 ,when the citizens of ,falerii heard of this1 so much were they pleased with the humanity and integrity of ,camillus1 that they resolved to surrender their town to him without further defence4 ,this authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly action may sometimes touch men's minds more nearly than a harsh and cruel one2 and that those cities and provinces into which the instruments and engines of war1 with every other violence to which men resort1 have failed to force a way1 may be thrown open to a single act of tenderness1 mercy1 chastity1 or generosity4 ,whereof history supplies us with many examples besides the one which ,i have just now noticed4 ,for we find that when the arms of ,rome were powerless to drive ,pyrrhus out of ,italy1 he was moved to depart by the generosity of ,fabritius in disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had made the ,romans to poison him4 ,again1 we read how ,scipio gained less reputation in ,spain by the capture of ,new ,carthage1 than by his virtue in restoring a young and beautiful wife unviolated to her husband2 the fame of which action won him the love of the whole province4 ,we see1 too1 how much this generous temper is esteemed by a people in its great men2 and how much it is praised by historians and by those who write the lives of princes1 as well as by those who lay down rules of human conduct4 ,among whom ,xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours1 and victories1 and how fair a fame accrued to ,cyrus from his being kindly and gracious1 without taint of pride1 or cruelty1 or luxury1 or any other of those vices which cast a stain upon men's lives4 ,and yet when we note that ,hannibal1 by methods wholly opposite to these1 achieved splendid victories and a great renown1 ,i think ,i am bound to say something in my next ,chapter as to how this happened4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4--,how it happened that ,hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by ,scipio1 wrought the same results in ,italy which the other achieved in ,spain4 ,some1 ,i suspect1 may marvel to find a captain1 taking a contrary course1 nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued the methods above spoken of2 since it must seem as though success did not depend on the causes ,i have named2 nay1 that if glory and fame are to be won in other ways1 these causes neither add to our strength nor advance our fortunes4 ,wherefore1 to make my meaning plain1 and not to part company with the men of whom ,i have been speaking1 ,i say1 that as1 on the one hand1 we see ,scipio enter ,spain1 and by his humane and generous conduct at once secure the good-will of the province1 and the admiration and reverence of its inhabitants1 so on the other hand1 we see ,hannibal enter ,italy1 and by methods wholly opposite1 to wit1 by violence and rapine1 by cruelty and treachery of every kind1 effect in that country the very same results4 ,for all the ,states of ,italy revolted in his favour1 and all the ,italian nations ranged themselves on his side4 ,when we seek to know why this was1 several reasons present themselves1 the first being that men so passionately love change1 that1 commonly speaking1 those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are badly off3 for as already has been said with truth1 men are pampered by prosperity1 soured by adversity4 ,this love of change1 therefore1 makes them open the door to any one who puts himself at the head of new movements in their country1 and if he be a foreigner they adopt his cause1 if a fellow-countryman they gather round him and become his partisans and supporters2 so that whatever methods he may there use1 he will succeed in making great progress4 ,moreover1 men being moved by two chief passions1 love and fear1 he who makes himself feared commands with no less authority than he who makes himself loved2 nay1 as a rule1 is followed and obeyed more implicitly than the other4 ,it matters little1 however1 which of these two ways a captain chooses to follow1 provided he be of transcendent valour1 and has thereby won for himself a great name ,for when1 like ,hannibal or ,scipio1 a man is very valiant1 this quality will cloak any error he may commit in seeking either to be too much loved or too much feared4 ,yet from each of these two tendencies1 grave mischiefs1 and such as lead to the ruin of a prince1 may arise4 ,for he who would be greatly loved1 if he swerve ever so little from the right road1 becomes contemptible2 while he who would be greatly feared1 if he go a jot too far1 incurs hatred4 ,and since it is impossible1 our nature not allowing it1 to adhere to the exact mean1 it is essential that any excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour1 as it was in ,hannibal and ,scipio4 ,and yet we find that even they1 while they were exalted by the methods they followed1 were also injured by them4 ,how they were exalted has been shown4 ,the injury which ,scipio suffered was1 that in ,spain his soldiers1 in concert with certain of his allies1 rose against him1 for no other reason than that they stood in no fear of him4 ,for men are so restless1 that if ever so small a door be opened to their ambition1 they forthwith forget all the love they have borne their prince in return for his graciousness and goodness1 as did these soldiers and allies of ,scipio2 when1 to correct the mischief1 he was forced to use something of a cruelty foreign to his nature4 ,as to ,hannibal1 we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his cruelty or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him2 but we may well believe that ,naples and other towns which remained loyal to the ,roman people1 did so by reason of the dread which his character inspired4 ,this1 however1 is abundantly clear1 that his inhumanity made him more detested by the ,romans than any other enemy they ever had2 so that while to ,pyrrhus1 in ,italy with his army1 they gave up the traitor who offered to poison him1 ,hannibal1 even when disarmed and a fugitive1 they never forgave1 until they had compassed his death4 ,to ,hannibal1 therefore1 from his being accounted impious1 perfidious1 and cruel1 these disadvantages resulted2 but1 on the other hand1 there accrued to him one great gain1 noticed with admiration by all historians1 namely1 that in his army1 although made up of men of every race and country1 no dissensions ever broke out among the soldiers themselves1 nor any mutiny against their leader4 ,this we can only ascribe to the awe which his character inspired1 which together with the great name his valour had won for him1 had the effect of keeping his soldiers quiet and united4 ,i repeat1 therefore1 that it is of little moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with such valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts4 ,for1 as ,i have said1 there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless corrected by extraordinary valour4 ,and now1 since ,i have spoken of ,scipio and ,hannibal1 the former of whom by praiseworthy1 the latter by odious qualities1 effected the same results1 ,i must not1 ,i think1 omit to notice the characters of two ,roman citizens1 who by different1 yet both by honourable methods1 obtained a like glory4 ,chapter ,,xxii4--,that the severity of ,manlius ,torquatus and the gentleness of ,valerius ,corvinus won for both the same ,glory4 ,there lived in ,rome1 at the same time1 two excellent captains1 ,manlius ,torquatus and ,valerius ,corvinus1 equal in their triumphs and in their renown1 and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed against the enemy2 but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment of their soldiers1 followed very different methods4 ,for ,manlius1 in his command1 resorted to every kind of severity1 never sparing his men fatigue1 nor remitting punishment2 while ,valerius1 on the contrary1 treated them with all kindness and consideration1 and was easy and familiar in his intercourse with them4 ,so that while the one1 to secure the obedience of his soldiers1 put his own son to death1 the other never dealt harshly with any man4 ,yet1 for all this diversity in their modes of acting1 each had the same success against the enemy1 and each obtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself4 ,for no soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle1 or rose in mutiny against them1 or in any particular opposed their will2 though the commands of ,manlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour came to be spoken of as a ,manlian order4 ,here1 then1 we have to consider first of all why ,manlius was obliged to use such severity2 next1 why ,valerius could behave so humanely2 thirdly1 how it was that these opposite methods had the same results2 and lastly1 which of the two methods it is better and more useful for us to follow4 ,now1 if we well examine the character of ,manlius from the moment when ,titus ,livius first begins to make mention of him1 we shall find him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both of mind and body1 dutiful in his behaviour to his father and to his country1 and most reverent to his superiors4 ,all which we see in his slaying the ,gaul1 in his defence of his father against the tribune1 and in the words in which1 before going forth to fight the ,gaul1 he addressed the consul1 when he said1 8,although assured of victory1 never will ,i without thy bidding engage an enemy40 ,but when such a man as this attains to command1 he looks to find all others like himself2 his dauntless spirit prompts him to engage in daring enterprises1 and to insist on their being carried out4 ,and this is certain1 that where things hard to execute are ordered to be done1 the order must be enforced with sternness1 since1 otherwise1 it will be disobeyed4 ,and here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to command1 and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured their power to enforce1 with the willingness of others to yield obedience2 and who issue their orders when they find these conditions combining1 but1 otherwise1 abstain4 ,wherefore1 a wise man was wont to say that to hold a republic by force1 there must be a proportion between him who uses the force and him against whom it is used2 and that while this proportion obtains the force will operate2 but that when he who suffers is stronger than he who uses the force1 we may expect to see it brought to an end at any moment4 ,but returning to the matter in hand1 ,i say that to command things hard of execution1 requires hardness in him who gives the command1 and that a man of this temper and who issues such commands1 cannot look to enforce them by gentleness4 ,he who is not of such a temper must be careful not to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty1 but may use his natural gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary4 ,for common punishments are not imputed to the prince1 but to the laws and ordinances which he has to administer4 ,we must believe1 therefore1 that ,manlius was constrained to act with severity by the unusual character of the commands which his natural disposition prompted him to issue4 ,such commands are useful in a republic1 as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and excellence4 ,and were a republic1 as ,i have before observed1 fortunate enough to come frequently under the influence of men who1 by their example1 reinforce its laws1 and not only retard its progress towards corruption1 but bring it back to its first perfection1 it might endure for ever4 ,manlius1 therefore1 was of those who by the severity of their commands maintained the military discipline of ,rome2 urged thereto1 in the first place1 by his natural temper1 and next by the desire that whatever he was minded to command should be done4 ,valerius1 on the other hand1 could afford to act humanely1 because for him it was enough if all were done which in a ,roman army it was customary to do4 ,and1 since the customs of that army were good customs1 they sufficed to gain him honour1 while at the same time their maintenance cost him no effort1 nor threw on him the burthen of punishing transgressors2 as well because there were none who trangressed1 as because had there been any1 they would1 as ,i have said1 have imputed their punishment to the ordinary rules of discipline1 and not to the severity of their commander4 ,in this way ,valerius had room to exercise that humane disposition which enabled him at once to gain influence over his soldiers and to content them4 ,hence it was that both these captains obtaining the same obedience1 could1 while following different methods1 arrive at the same ends4 ,those1 however1 who seek to imitate them may chance to fall into the errors of which ,i have already spoken1 in connection with ,hannibal and ,scipio1 as breeding contempt or hatred1 and which are only to be corrected by the presence of extraordinary valour1 and not otherwise4 ,it rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be commended4 ,this1 ,i take it1 is matter of dispute1 since both methods have their advocates4 ,those writers1 however1 who have laid down rules for the conduct of princes1 describe a character approaching more nearly to that of ,valerius than to that of ,manlius2 and ,xenophon1 whom ,i have already cited1 while giving many instances of the humanity of ,cyrus1 conforms closely to what ,livius tells us of ,valerius4 ,for ,valerius being made consul against the ,samnites1 on the eve of battle spoke to his men with the same kindliness with which he always treated them2 and ,livius1 after telling us what he said1 remarks of him3 8,never was there a leader more familiar with his men2 cheerfully sharing with the meanest among them every hardship and fatigue4 ,even in the military games1 wherein those of the same rank were wont to make trial of their strength or swiftness1 he would good-naturedly take a part1 nor disdain any adversary who offered2 meeting victory or defeat with an unruffled temper and an unchanged countenance4 ,when called on to act1 his bounty and generosity never fell short4 ,when he had to speak1 he was as mindful of the feelings of others as of his own dignity4 ,and1 what more than anything else secures the popular favour1 he maintained when exercising his magistracies the same bearing he had worn in seeking them40 ,of ,manlius also1 ,titus ,livius speaks in like honourable terms1 pointing out that his severity in putting his son to death brought the ,roman army to that pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against the ,latins1 nay1 he goes so far in his praises that after describing the whole order of the battle1 comparing the strength of both armies1 and showing all the dangers the ,romans ran1 and the difficulties they had to surmount1 he winds up by saying1 that it was the valour of ,manlius which alone gained for them this great victory1 and that whichever side had ,manlius for its leader must have won the day4 ,so that weighing all that the historians tell us of these two captains1 it might be difficult to decide between them4 ,nevertheless1 not to leave the question entirely open1 ,i say1 that for a citizen living under a republic1 ,i think the conduct of ,manlius more deserving of praise and less dangerous in its consequences4 ,for methods like his tend only to the public good and in no way subserve private ends4 ,he who shows himself harsh and stern at all times and to all men alike1 and is seen to care only for the common welfare1 will never gain himself partisans1 since this is not the way to win personal friends1 to whom1 as ,i said before1 the name of partisans is given4 ,for a republic1 therefore1 no line of conduct could be more useful or more to be desired than this1 because in following it the public interest is not neglected1 and no room is given to suspect personal ambition4 ,but the contrary holds as to the methods followed by ,valerius4 ,for though the public service they render be the same1 misgivings must needs arise that the personal good-will which1 in the course of a prolonged command1 a captain obtains from his soldiers1 may lead to consequences fatal to the public liberty4 ,and if this was not found to happen in the case of ,valerius1 it was because the minds of the ,roman people were not yet corrupted1 and because they had never remained for a long time and continuously under his command4 ,had we1 however1 like ,xenophon1 to consider what is most for the interest of a prince1 we should have to give up ,manlius and hold by ,valerius2 for1 undoubtedly1 a prince should strive to gain the love of his soldiers and subjects1 as well as their obedience4 ,the latter he can secure by discipline and by his reputation for valour4 ,but for the former he will be indebted to his affability1 kindliness1 gentleness1 and all those other like qualities which were possessed by ,valerius1 and which are described by ,xenophon as existing in ,cyrus4 ,that a prince should be personally loved and have his army wholly devoted to him is consistent with the character of his government2 but that this should happen to a person of private station does not consist with his position as a citizen who has to live in conformity with the laws and in subordination to the magistrates4 ,we read in the early annals of the ,venetian ,republic1 that once1 on the return of the fleet1 a dispute broke out between the sailors and the people1 resulting in tumults and armed violence which neither the efforts of the public officers1 the respect felt for particular citizens1 nor the authority of the magistrates could quell4 ,but on a certain gentleman1 who the year before had been in command of these sailors1 showing himself among them1 straightway1 from the love they bore him1 they submitted to his authority and withdrew from the fray4 ,which deference on their part aroused such jealousy and suspicion in the minds of the ,venetian senators that very soon after they got rid of this gentleman1 either by death or exile4 ,the sum of the matter1 therefore1 is1 that the methods followed by ,valerius are useful in a prince1 but pernicious in a private citizen1 both for his country and for himself1 for his country1 because such methods pave the way to a tyranny2 for himself1 because his fellow-citizens1 growing suspicious of his conduct1 are constrained to protect themselves to his hurt4 ,and conversely1 ,i maintain1 that the methods of ,manlius1 while hurtful in a prince are useful in a citizen1 and in the highest degree for his country2 and1 moreover1 seldom give offence1 unless the hatred caused by his severity be augmented by the jealousy which the fame of his other virtues inspires3 a matter now to be considered in connection with the banishment of ,camillas4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4--,why ,camillus was banished from ,rome4 ,it has been shown above how methods like those of ,valerius are hurtful to the citizen who employs them and to his country1 while methods like those of ,manlius are advantageous for a man's country1 though sometimes they be hurtful to the man himself4 ,this is well seen in the example of ,camillus1 whose bearing more nearly resembled that of ,manlius than that of ,valerius1 so that ,titus ,livius1 in speaking of him1 says1 8,his virtues were at once hated and admired by his soldiers40 ,what gained him their admiration was his care for their safety1 his prudence1 his magnanimity1 and the good order he maintained in conducting and commanding them4 ,what made him hated was his being more stern to punish than bountiful to reward2 and ,livius instances the following circumstances as giving rise to this hatred4 ,first1 his having applied the money got by the sale of the goods of the ,veientines to public purposes1 and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils4 ,second1 his having1 on the occasion of his triumph1 caused his chariot to be drawn by four white horses1 seeking in his pride1 men said1 to make himself the equal of the sun god4 ,and1 third1 his having vowed to ,apollo a tenth of the ,veientine plunder1 which1 if he was to fulfil his vow1 he had to recover from his soldiers1 into whose hands it had already come4 ,herein we may well and readily discern what causes tend to make a prince hateful to his people2 the chief whereof is the depriving them of some advantage4 ,and this is a matter of much importance4 ,for when a man is deprived of what is in itself useful1 he never forgets it1 and every trifling occasion recalls it to his mind2 and because such occasions recur daily1 he is every day reminded of his loss4 ,another error which we are here taught to guard against1 is the appearing haughty and proud1 than which nothing is more distasteful to a people1 and most of all to a free people2 for although such pride and haughtiness do them no hurt1 they nevertheless hold in detestation any who display these qualities4 ,every show of pride1 therefore1 a prince should shun as he would a rock1 since to invite hatred without resulting advantage were utterly rash and futile4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4--,that prolonged ,commands brought ,rome to ,servitude4 ,if we well examine the course of ,roman history1 we shall find two causes leading to the break-up of that republic3 one1 the dissensions which arose in connection with the agrarian laws2 the other1 the prolongation of commands4 ,for had these matters been rightly understood from the first1 and due remedies applied1 the freedom of ,rome had been far more lasting1 and1 possibly1 less disturbed4 ,and although1 as touching the prolongation of commands1 we never find any tumult breaking out in ,rome on that account1 we do in fact discern how much harm was done to the city by the ascendency which certain of its citizens thereby gained4 ,this mischief indeed would not have arisen1 if other citizens whose period of office was extended had been as good and wise as ,lucius ,quintius1 whose virtue affords a notable example4 ,for terms of accord having been settled between the senate and commons of ,rome1 the latter1 thinking their tribunes well able to withstand the ambition of the nobles1 prolonged their authority for a year4 ,whereupon1 the senate1 not to be outdone by the commons1 proposed1 out of rivalry1 to extend the consulship of ,quintius4 ,he1 however1 refused absolutely to lend himself to their designs1 and insisted on their appointing new consuls1 telling them that they should seek to discredit evil examples1 not add to them by setting worse4 ,had this prudence and virtue of his been shared by all the citizens of ,rome1 the practice of prolonging the terms of civil offices would not have been suffered to establish itself1 nor have led to the kindred practice of extending the term of military commands1 which in progress of time effected the ruin of their republic4 ,the first military commander whose term was extended1 was ,publius ,philo2 for when his consulship was about to expire1 he being then engaged in the siege of ,palopolis1 the senate1 seeing he had the victory in his hands1 would not displace him by a successor1 but appointed him ,proconsul1 which office he was the first to hold4 ,now1 although in thus acting the senate did what they thought best for the public good1 nevertheless it was this act of theirs that in time brought ,rome to slavery4 ,for the further the ,romans carried their arms1 the more necessary it seemed to them to grant similar extensions of command1 and the oftener they1 in fact1 did so4 ,this gave rise to two disadvantages3 first that a smaller number of men were trained to command2 second1 that by the long continuance of his command a captain gained so much influence and ascendency over his soldiers that in time they came to hold the senate of no account1 and looked only to him4 ,this it was1 that enabled ,sylla and ,marius to find adherents ready to follow them even to the public detriment1 and enabled ,csar to overthrow the liberties of his country2 whereas1 had the ,romans never prolonged the period of authority1 whether civil or military1 though they might have taken longer to build up their empire1 they certainly had been later in incurring servitude4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4--,of the poverty of ,cincinnatus and of many other ,roman ,citizens4 ,elsewhere ,i have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a commonwealth1 as one which enforces poverty on its citizens4 ,and although it does not appear what particular law it was that had this operation in ,rome 7especially since we know the agrarian law to have been stubbornly resisted71 we find1 as a fact1 that four hundred years after the city was founded1 great poverty still prevailed there2 and may assume that nothing helped so much to produce this result as the knowledge that the path to honours and preferment was closed to none1 and that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be found2 for this manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted4 ,in proof whereof ,i shall cite one instance only4 ,when the consul ,minutius was beset in his camp by the ,equians1 the ,roman people were filled with such alarm lest their army should be destroyed1 that they appointed a dictator1 always their last stay in seasons of peril4 ,their choice fell on ,lucius ,quintius ,cincinnatus1 who at the time was living on his small farm of little more than four acres1 which he tilled with his own hand4 ,the story is nobly told by ,titus ,livius where he says3 8,this is worth listening to by those who contemn all things human as compared with riches1 and think that glory and excellence can have no place unless accompanied by lavish wealth40 ,cincinnatus1 then1 was ploughing in his little field1 when there arrived from ,rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him he had been made dictator1 and inform him of the dangers which threatened the ,republic4 ,putting on his gown1 he hastened to ,rome1 and getting together an army1 marched to deliver ,minutius4 ,but when he had defeated and spoiled the enemy1 and released ,minutius1 he would not suffer the army he had rescued to participate in the spoils1 saying1 8,i will not have you share in the plunder of those to whom you had so nearly fallen a prey40 ,minutius he deprived of his consulship1 and reduced to be a subaltern1 in which rank he bade him remain till he had learned how to command4 ,and before this he had made ,lucius ,tarquininus1 although forced by his poverty to serve on foot1 his master of the knights4 ,here1 then1 we see what honour was paid in ,rome to poverty1 and how four acres of land sufficed to support so good and great a man as ,cincinnatus4 ,we find the same ,poverty still prevailing in the time of ,marcus ,regulus1 who when serving with the army in ,africa sought leave of senate to return home that he might look after his farm which his labourers had suffered to run to waste4 ,here again we learn two things worthy our attention3 first1 the poverty of these men and their contentment under it1 and how their sole study was to gain renown from war1 leaving all its advantages to the ,state4 ,for had they thought of enriching themselves by war1 it had given them little concern that their fields were running to waste ,further1 we have to remark the magnanimity of these citizens1 who when placed at the head of armies surpassed all princes in the loftiness of their spirit1 who cared neither for king nor for commonwealth1 and whom nothing could daunt or dismay2 but who1 on returning to private life1 became once more so humble1 so frugal1 so careful of their slender means1 and so submissive to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors1 that it might seem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change4 ,this poverty prevailed down to the days of ,paulus ,emilius1 almost the last happy days for this republic wherein a citizen1 while enriching ,rome by his triumphs1 himself remained poor4 ,and yet so greatly was poverty still esteemed at this time1 that when ,paulus1 in conferring rewards on those who had behaved well in the war1 presented his own son-in-law with a silver cup1 it was the first vessel of silver ever seen in his house4 ,i might run on to a great length pointing out how much better are the fruits of poverty than those of riches1 and how poverty has brought cities1 provinces1 and nations to honour1 while riches have wrought their ruin1 had not this subject been often treated by others4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4--,how ,women are a cause of the ruin of ,states4 ,a feud broke out in ,ardea touching the marriage of an heiress1 whose hand was sought at the same time by two suitors1 the one of plebeian1 the other of noble birth4 ,for her father being dead1 her guardian wished her to wed the plebeian1 her mother the noble4 ,and so hot grew the dispute that resort was had to arms1 the whole nobility siding with their fellow-noble1 and all the plebeians with the plebeian4 ,the latter faction being worsted1 left the town1 and sent to the ,volscians for help2 whereupon1 the nobles sought help from ,rome4 ,the ,volscians were first in the field1 and on their arrival encamped round ,ardea4 ,the ,romans1 coming up later1 shut in the ,volscians between themselves and the town1 and1 reducing them by famine1 forced them to surrender at discretion4 ,they then entered ,ardea1 and putting all the ringleaders in this dispute to the sword1 composed the disorders of the city4 ,in connection with this affair there are several points to be noted4 ,and in the first place we see how women have been the occasion of many divisions and calamities in ,states1 and have wrought great harm to rulers2 as when1 according to our historian1 the violence done to ,lucretia drove the ,tarquins from their kingdom1 and that done to ,virginia broke the power of the decemvirs4 ,and among the chief causes which ,aristotle assigns for the downfall of tyrants are the wrongs done by them to their subjects in respect of their women1 whether by adultery1 rape1 or other like injury to their honour1 as has been sufficiently noticed in the ,chapter wherein we treated 8of ,conspiracies0 ,i say1 then1 that neither absolute princes nor the rulers of free ,states should underrate the importance of matter1 but take heed to the disorders which it may breed and provide against them while remedies can still be used without discredit to themselves or to their governments ,and this should have been done by the rulers of ,ardea who by suffering the rivalry between their citizens to come to a head1 promoted their divisions1 and when they sought to reunite them had to summon foreign help1 than which nothing sooner leads to servitude4 ,but now let us turn to another subject which merits attention1 namely1 the means whereby divided cities may be reunited2 and of this ,i propose to speak in the following ,chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4--,how a divided ,city may be reunited1 and how it is a false opinion that to hold ,cities in subjection they must be kept divided4 ,from the example of the ,roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of ,ardea1 we are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may be composed1 namely1 by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to death2 and that no other remedy should be used4 ,three courses1 indeed1 are open to you1 since you may either put to death1 as these consuls did1 or banish1 or bind the citizens to live at peace with one another1 taking security for their good behaviour4 ,of which three ways the last is the most hurtful1 the most uncertain1 and the least effectual2 because when much blood has been shed1 or other like outrage done1 it cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men who are every day brought face to face with one another2 for since fresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting1 it will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury4 ,of this we could have no better instance than in the city of ,pistoja4 ,fifteen years ago this city was divided between the ,panciatichi and ,cancellieri1 as indeed it still continues1 the only difference being that then they were in arms1 whereas1 now1 they have laid them aside4 ,after much controversy and wrangling1 these factions would presently proceed to bloodshed1 to pulling down houses1 plundering property1 and all the other violent courses usual in divided cities4 ,the ,florentines1 with whom it lay to compose these feuds1 strove for a long time to do so by using the third of the methods mentioned2 but when this only led to increased tumult and disorder1 losing patience1 they decided to try the second method and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by imprisoning some and banishing others4 ,in this way a sort of settlement was arrived at1 which continues in operation up to the present hour4 ,there can be no question1 however1 that the first of the methods named would have been the surest4 ,but because extreme measures have in them an element of greatness and nobility1 a weak republic1 so far from knowing how to use this first method1 can with difficulty be brought to employ even the second4 ,this1 as ,i said at the beginning1 is the kind of blunder made by the princes of our times when they have to decide on matters of moment1 from their not considering how those men acted who in ancient days had to determine under like conditions4 ,for the weakness of the present race of men 7the result of their enfeebling education and their ignorance of affairs71 makes them regard the methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly impracticable4 ,accordingly1 they have their own newfangled ways of looking at things1 wholly at variance with the true1 as when the sages of our city1 some time since1 pronounced that ,pistoja was to be held by feuds and ,pisa by fortresses1 not perceiving how useless each of these methods is in itself4 ,having spoken of fortresses already at some length1 ,i shall not further refer to them here1 but shall consider the futility of trying to hold subject cities by keeping them divided4 ,in the first place1 it is impossible for the ruling power1 whether prince or republic1 to be friends with both factions4 ,for wherever there is division1 it is human nature to take a side1 and to favour one party more than another4 ,but if one party in a subject city be unfriendly to you1 the consequence will be that you will lose that city so soon as you are involved in war1 since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have enemies both within and without4 ,should the ruling power be a republic1 there is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension among them1 as having to control a divided city4 ,for as each faction in that city will seek support and endeavour to make friends in a variety of corrupt ways1 two very serious evils will result3 first1 that the governed city will never be contented with its governors1 since there can be no good government where you often change its form1 adapting yourself to the humours now of one party and now of another2 and next1 that the factious spirit of the subject city is certain to infect your own republic4 ,to which ,biondo testifies1 when1 in speaking of the citizens of ,florence and ,pistoja1 he says1 8,in seeking to unite ,pistoja the ,florentines themselves fell out40#ae #ae ,flav4 ,blondri ,hist41 dec4 ii4 lib4 #i4 ,basle ed4 #aeei1 p4 #ccg ,it is easy1 therefore1 to understand how much mischief attends on such divisions4 ,in the year #aeja1 when we lost ,arezzo1 and when all the ,val di ,tevere and ,val di ,chiana were occupied by the ,vitelli and by ,duke ,valentino1 a certain ,m4 de ,lant was sent by the ,king of ,france to cause the whole of the lost towns to be restored to the ,florentines2 who finding in all these towns men who came to him claiming to be of the party of the ,marzocco1#af greatly blamed this distinction1 observing1 that if in ,france any of the king's subjects were to say that he was of the king's party1 he would be punished2 since the expression would imply that there was a party hostile to the king1 whereas it was his majesty's desire that all his subjects should be his friends and live united without any distinction of party4 ,but all these mistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of rulers1 who1 seeing that they cannot hold their ,states by their own strength and valour1 have recourse to like devices2 which1 if now and then in tranquil times they prove of some slight assistance to them1 in times of danger are shown to be worthless4 #af ,the heraldic ,lion of ,florence4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4--,that a ,republic must keep an eye on what its ,citizens are about2 since often the seeds of a ,tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds4 ,the granaries of ,rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the city was visited1 a certain ,spurius ,melius1 a very wealthy citizen for these days1 privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the people at his own expense2 gaining thereby such general favour with the commons1 that the senate1 apprehending that his bounty might have dangerous consequences1 in order to crush him before he grew too powerful1 appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be put to death4 ,here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and unlikely to occasion harm to any one1 very often become hurtful1 nay1 unless corrected in time1 most dangerous for a republic4 ,and to treat the matter with greater fulness1 ,i say1 that while a republic can never maintain itself long1 or manage its affairs to advantage1 without citizens of good reputation1 on the other hand the credit enjoyed by particular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny4 ,for which reasons1 and that things may take a safe course1 it should be so arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as benefits1 and not for such as injures the ,state and its liberties4 ,we must therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired4 ,these1 briefly1 are two1 public or secret4 ,public1 when a citizen gains a great name by advising well or by acting still better for the common advantage4 ,to credit of this sort we should open a wide door1 holding out rewards both for good counsels and for good actions1 so that he who renders such services may be at once honoured and satisfied4 ,reputation acquired honestly and openly by such means as these can never be dangerous4 ,but credit acquired by secret practices1 which is the other method spoken of1 is most perilous and prejudicial4 ,of such secret practices may be instanced1 acts of kindness done to this or the other citizen in lending him money1 in assisting him to marry his daughters1 in defending him against the magistrates1 and in conferring such other private favours as gain men devoted adherents1 and encourage them after they have obtained such support1 to corrupt the institutions of the ,state and to violate its laws4 ,a well-governed republic1 therefore1 ought1 as ,i have said1 to throw wide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses1 and to close it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand means4 ,and this we find was done in ,rome4 ,for the ,roman republic1 as a reward to any citizen who served it well1 ordained triumphs and all the other honours which it had to bestow2 while against those who sought to aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues1 it ordained accusations and impeachment2 and when1 from the people being blinded by a false show of benevolence1 these proved insufficient1 it provided for a dictator1 who with regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed beyond them1 as instanced in the case of ,spurius ,melius4 ,and if conduct like his be ever suffered to pass unchastised1 it may well be the ruin of a republic1 for men when they have such examples set them are not easily led back into the right path4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4--,that the ,faults of a ,people are due to its ,prince4 ,let no prince complain of the faults committed by a people under his control2 since these must be ascribed either to his negligence1 or to his being himself blemished by similar defects4 ,and were any one to consider what peoples in our own times have been most given to robbery and other like offences1 he would find that they have only copied their rulers1 who have themselves been of a like nature4 ,romagna1 before those lords who ruled it were driven out by ,pope ,alexander ,,vi41 was a nursery of all the worst crimes1 the slightest occasion giving rise to wholesale rapine and murder4 ,this resulted from the wickedness of these lords1 and not1 as they asserted1 from the evil disposition of their subjects4 ,for these princes being poor1 yet choosing to live as though they were rich1 were forced to resort to cruelties innumerable and practised in divers ways2 and among other shameful devices contrived by them to extort money1 they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts1 and then be the first to give occasion for breaking them2 nor would they chastise offenders until they saw many involved in the same offence2 when they fell to punishing1 not from any zeal for the laws which they had made1 but out of greed to realize the penalty4 ,whence flowed many mischiefs1 and more particularly this1 that the people being impoverished1 but not corrected1 sought to make good their injuries at the expense of others weaker than themselves4 ,and thus there sprang up all those evils spoken of above1 whereof the prince is the true cause4 ,the truth of what ,i say is confirmed by ,titus ,livius where he relates how the ,roman envoys1 who were conveying the spoils of the ,veientines as an offering to ,apollo1 were seized and brought on shore by the corsairs of the ,lipari islands in ,sicily2 when ,timasitheus1 the prince of these islands1 on learning the nature of the offering1 its destination1 and by whom sent1 though himself of ,lipari1 behaved as a ,roman might1 showing his people what sacrilege it would be to intercept such a gift1 and speaking to such purpose that by general consent the envoys were suffered to proceed upon their voyage1 taking all their possessions with them4 ,with reference to which incident the historian observes3 8,the multitude1 who always take their colour from their ruler1 were filled by ,timasitheus with a religious awe40 ,and to like purport we find it said by ,lorenzo de' ,medici3-- 8,a prince's acts his people imitate2 ,for on their lord the eyes of all men wait40#ag #ag ,e quel che fa il signer1 fanno poi molti2 ,ch nel signer son tutti gli occhi volti4 7,la ,rappresentazione di ,san ,giovanni e ,paolo47 ,,chapter ,,xxx4--,that a ,citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his ,country1 must first stand clear of ,envy4 ,how a ,city should prepare for its defence on the approach of an ,enemy4 ,when the ,roman senate learned that all ,etruria was assembled in arms to march against ,rome1 and that the ,latins and ,hernicians1 who before had been the friends of the ,romans1 had ranged themselves with the ,volscians the ancient enemies of the ,roman name1 they foresaw that a perilous contest awaited them4 ,but because ,camillus was at that time tribune with consular authority they thought all might be managed without the appointment of a dictator1 provided the other tribunes1 his colleagues would agree to his assuming the sole direction of affairs4 ,this they willingly did2 8nor10 says ,titus ,livius1 8did they account anything as taken from their own dignity which was added to his40 ,on receiving their promise of obedience1 ,camillus gave orders that three armies should be enrolled4 ,of the first1 which was to be directed against the ,etruscans1 he himself assumed command4 ,the command of the second1 which he meant to remain near ,rome and meet any movement of the ,latins and ,hernicians1 he gave to ,quintius ,servilius4 ,the third army1 which he designed for the protection of the city1 and the defence of the gates and ,curia1 he entrusted to ,lucius ,quintius4 ,and he further directed1 that ,horatius1 one of his colleagues1 should furnish supplies of arms1 and corn1 and of all else needful in time of war4 ,finally he put forward his colleague ,cornelius to preside in the senate and public council1 that from day to day he might advise what should be done4 ,for in those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as the welfare of their country might require4 ,we may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act1 how much good he may effect1 and how serviceable he may be to his country1 when by the force of his character and worth he succeeds in extinguishing envy4 ,for this often disables men from acting to the best advantage1 not permitting them to obtain that authority which it is essential they should have in matters of importance4 ,now1 envy may be extinguished in one or other of two ways3 first1 by the approach of some flagrant danger1 whereby seeing themselves like to be overwhelmed1 all forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience to him who counts on his valour to rescue them4 ,as in the case of ,camillas1 who from having given many proofs of surpassing ability1 and from having been three times dictator and always exercised the office for the public good and not for his private advantage1 had brought men to fear nothing from his advancement2 while his fame and reputation made it no shame for them to recognize him as their superior4 ,wisely1 therefore1 does ,titus ,livius use concerning him the words which ,i have cited4 ,the other way in which envy may be extinguished1 is by the death1 whether by violence or in the ordinary course of nature1 of those who have been your rivals in the pursuit of fame or power1 and who seeing you better esteemed than themselves1 could never acquiesce in your superiority or put up with it in patience4 ,for when these men have been brought up in a corrupt city1 where their training is little likely to improve them1 nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw their pretensions2 nay1 to have their own way and satisfy their perverse humour1 they will be content to look on while their country is ruined4 ,for envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of those of whom it has taken possession4 ,and when fortune so befriends a great man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death1 his glory is established without scandal or offence1 since he is then able to display his great qualities unhindered4 ,but when fortune is not thus propitious to him1 he must contrive other means to rid himself of rivals1 and must do so successfully before he can accomplish anything4 ,any one who reads with intelligence the lessons of ,holy ,writ1 will remember how ,moses1 to give effect to his laws and ordinances1 was constrained to put to death an endless number of those who out of mere envy withstood his designs4 ,the necessity of this course was well understood by the ,friar ,girolamo ,savonarola1 and by the ,gonfalonier ,piero ,soderini4 ,but the former could not comply with it1 because1 as a friar1 he himself lacked the needful authority2 while those of his followers who might have exercised that authority1 did not rightly comprehend his teaching4 ,this1 however1 was no fault of his2 for his sermons are full of invectives and attacks against 8the wise of this world10 that being the name he gave to envious rivals and to all who opposed his reforms4 ,as for ,piero ,soderini1 he was possessed by the belief that in time and with favourable fortune he could allay envy by gentleness-and by benefits conferred on particular men2 for as he was still in the prime of life1 and in the fresh enjoyment of that good-will which his character and opinions had gained for him1 he thought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him1 without giving occasion for tumult1 violence1 or disorder2 not knowing how time stays not1 worth suffices not1 fortune shifts1 and malice will not be won over by any benefit ,wherefore1 because they could not or knew not how to vanquish this envy1 the two whom ,i have named came to their downfall4 ,another point to be noted in the passage we are considering1 is the careful provision made by ,camillus for the safety of ,rome both within and without the city4 ,and1 truly1 not without reason do wise historians1 like our author1 set forth certain events with much minuteness and detail1 to the end that those who come after may learn how to protect themselves in like dangers4 ,further1 we have to note that there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one conducted without method or system4 ,this is shown in ,camillus causing a third army to be enrolled that it might be left in ,rome for the protection of the city4 ,many persons1 doubtless1 both then and now1 would esteem this precaution superfluous1 thinking that as the ,romans were a warlike people and constantly under arms1 there could be no occasion for a special levy1 and that it was time enough to arm when the need came4 ,but ,camillus1 and any other equally prudent captain would be of the same mind1 judged otherwise1 not permitting the multitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and discipline of military service4 ,let him1 therefore1 who is called on to defend a city1 taking example by ,camillus1 before all things avoid placing arms in the hands of an undisciplined multitude1 but first of all select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm1 so that they may be wholly governed by him as to where they shall assemble and whither they shall march2 and then let him direct those who are not enrolled1 to abide every man in his own house for its defence4 ,whosoever observes this method in a city which is attacked1 will be able to defend it with ease2 but whosoever disregards it1 and follows not the example of ,camillus1 shall never succeed4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4--,that strong ,republics and valiant ,men preserve through every change the same ,spirit and ,bearing4 ,among other high sayings which our historian ascribes to ,camillus1 as showing of what stuff a truly great man should be made1 he puts in his mouth the words1 8,my courage came not with my dictatorship nor went with my exile20 for by these words we are taught that a great man is constantly the same through all vicissitudes of ,fortune2 so that although she change1 now exalting1 now depressing1 he remains unchanged1 and retains always a mind so unmoved1 and in such complete accordance with his nature as declares to all that over him ,fortune has no dominion4 ,very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who1 puffed up and intoxicated with their success1 ascribe all their felicity to virtues which they never knew1 and thus grow hateful and insupportable to all around them4 ,whence also the changes in their fortunes4 ,for whenever they have to look adversity in the face1 they suddenly pass to the other extreme1 becoming abject and base4 ,and thus it happens that feeble-minded princes1 when they fall into difficulties1 think rather of flight than of defence1 because1 having made bad use of their prosperity1 they are wholly unprepared to defend themselves4 ,the same merits and defects which ,i say are found in individual men1 are likewise found in republics1 whereof we have example in the case of ,rome and of ,venice4 ,for no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of the ,roman people1 nor did any success ever unduly elate them2 as we see plainly after their defeat at ,cann1 and after the victory they had over ,antiochus4 ,for the defeat at ,cann1 although most momentous1 being the third they had met with1 no whit daunted them2 so that they continued to send forth armies1 refused to ransom prisoners as contrary to their custom1 and despatched no envoy to ,hannibal or to ,carthage to sue for peace2 but without ever looking back on past humiliations1 thought always of war1 though in such straits for soldiers that they had to arm their old men and slaves4 ,which facts being made known to ,hanno the ,carthaginian1 he1 as ,i have already related1 warned the ,carthaginian senate not to lay too much stress upon their victory4 ,here1 therefore1 we see that in times of adversity the ,romans were neither cast down nor dismayed4 ,on the other hand1 no prosperity ever made them arrogant4 ,before fighting the battle wherein he was finally routed1 ,antiochus sent messengers to ,scipio to treat for an accord2 when ,scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into ,syria1 leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the ,romans as they thought fit4 ,antiochus refusing these terms1 fought and was defeated1 and again sent envoys to ,scipio1 enjoining them to accept whatever conditions the victor might be pleased to impose4 ,but ,scipio proposed no different terms from those he had offered before saying that 8the ,romans1 as they lost not heart on defeat1 so waxed not insolent with success40 ,the contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the ,venetians1 who thinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid1 in their pride addressed the ,french king as 8,son of ,st4 ,mark20 and making no account of the ,church1 and no longer restricting their ambition to the limits of ,italy1 came to dream of founding an empire like the ,roman4 ,but afterwards1 when their good fortune deserted them1 and they met at ,vail a half-defeat at the hands of the ,french king1 they lost their whole dominions1 not altogether from revolt1 but mainly by a base and abject surrender to the ,pope and the ,king of ,spain4 ,nay1 so low did they stoop as to send ambassadors to the ,emperor offering to become his tributaries1 and to write letters to the ,pope1 full of submission and servility1 in order to move his compassion4 ,to such abasement were they brought in four days' time by what was in reality only a half-defeat4 ,for on their flight after the battle of ,vail only about a half of their forces were engaged1 and one of their two provedditori escaped to ,verona with five and twenty thousand men1 horse and foot4 ,so that had there been a spark of valour in ,venice1 or any soundness in her military system1 she might easily have renewed her armies1 and again confronting fortune have stood prepared either to conquer1 or1 if she must fall1 to fall more gloriously2 and at any rate might have obtained for herself more honourable terms4 ,but a pusillanimous spirit1 occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as they relate to war1 caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions4 ,and so will it always happen with those who behave like the ,venetians4 ,for when men grow insolent in good fortune1 and abject inn evil1 the fault lies in themselves and in the character of their training1 which1 when slight and frivolous1 assimilates them to itself2 but when otherwise1 makes them of another temper1 and giving them better acquaintance with the world1 causes them to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less elated by success4 ,and while this is true of individual men1 it holds good also of a concourse of men living together in one republic1 who will arrive at that measure of perfection which the institutions of their ,state permit4 ,and although ,i have already said on another occasion that a good militia is the foundation of all ,states1 and where that is wanting there can neither be good laws1 nor aught else that is good1 it seems to me not superfluous to say the same again2 because in reading this history of ,titus ,livius the necessity of such a foundation is made apparent in every page4 ,it is likewise shown that no army can be good unless it be thoroughly trained and exercised1 and that this can only be the case with an army raised from your own subjects4 ,for as a ,state is not and cannot always be at war1 you must have opportunity to train your army in times of peace2 but this1 having regard to the cost1 you can only have in respect of your own subjects4 ,when ,camillus1 as already related1 went forth to meet the ,etruscans1 his soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy1 were filled with fear1 thinking themselves too to withstand its onset4 ,this untoward disposition being reported to ,camillus1 he showed himself to his men and by visiting their tents1 and conversing with this and the other among them1 was able to remove their misgivings2 and1 finally1 without other word of command1 he bade them 8each do his part as he had learned and been accustomed40 ,now1 any one who well considers the methods followed by ,camillus1 and the words spoken by him to encourage his soldiers to face their enemy1 will perceive that these words and methods could never have been used with an army which had not been trained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war4 ,for no captain can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at their hands2 nay1 though he were another ,hannibal1 with such troops his defeat were certain4 ,for1 as a captain cannot be present everywhere while a battle is being fought1 unless he have taken all measures beforehand to render his men of the same temper as himself1 and have made sure that they perfectly understand his orders and arrangements1 he will inevitably be destroyed4 ,when a city therefore is armed and trained as ,rome was1 and when its citizens have daily opportunity1 both singly and together1 to make trial of their valour and learn what fortune can effect1 it will always happen1 that at all times1 and whether circumstances be adverse or favourable1 they will remain of unaltered courage and preserve the same noble bearing4 ,but when its citizens are unpractised in arms1 and trust not to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration of ,fortune1 they will change their temper as she changes1 and offer always the same example of behaviour as was given by the ,venetians4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4--,of the methods which some have used to make ,peace impossible4 ,the towns of ,cre and ,velitr1 two of her own colonies1 revolted from ,rome in expectation of being protected by the ,latins4 ,but the ,latins being routed and all hopes of help from that quarter at an end1 many of the townsmen recommended that envoys should be sent to ,rome to make their peace with the senate4 ,this proposal1 however1 was defeated by those who had been the prime movers of the revolt1 who1 fearing that the whole punishment might fall on their heads1 to put a stop to any talk of an adjustment1 incited the multitude to take up arms and make a foray into the ,roman territory4 ,and1 in truth1 when it is desired that a prince or people should banish from their minds every thought of reconciliation1 there is no surer or more effectual plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on him with whom you would not have them be reconciled2 for1 then1 the fear of that punishment which they will seem to themselves to have deserved1 will always keep them apart4 ,at the close of the first war waged by the ,romans against ,carthage1 the soldiers who had served under the ,carthaginians in ,sardinia and ,sicily1 upon peace being proclaimed1 returned to ,africa2 where1 being dissatisfied with their pay1 they mutinied against the ,carthaginians1 and choosing two of their number1 ,mato and ,spendio1 to be their leaders1 seized and sacked many towns subject to ,carthage4 ,the ,carthaginians1 being loath to use force until they had tried all other methods for bringing them to reason1 sent ,hasdrubal1 their fellow-citizen1 to mediate with them1 thinking that from formerly having commanded them he might be able to exercise some influence over them4 ,but on his arrival1 ,spendio and ,mato1 to extinguish any hope these mutineers might have had of making peace with ,carthage1 and so leave them no alternative but war1 persuaded them that their best course was to put ,hasdrubal1 with all the other ,carthaginian citizens whom they had taken prisoners1 to death4 ,whereupon1 they not only put them to death1 but first subjected them to an infinity of tortures2 crowning their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect that every ,carthaginian who might thereafter fall into their hands should meet a like fate4 ,this advice1 therefore1 and its consummation had the effect of rendering these mutineers relentless and inveterate in their hostility to the ,carthaginians4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4--,that to insure victory in battle you must inspire your ,men with confidence in one another and in you4 ,to insure an army being victorious in battle you must inspire it with the conviction that it is certain to prevail4 ,the causes which give it this confidence are its being well armed and disciplined1 and the soldiers knowing one another4 ,these conditions are only to be found united in soldiers born and bred in the same country4 ,it is likewise essential that the army should think so well of its captain as to trust implicitly to his prudence2 which it will always do if it see him careful of its welfare1 attentive to discipline1 brave in battle1 and otherwise supporting well and honourably the dignity of his position4 ,these conditions he fulfils when1 while punishing faults1 he does not needlessly harass his men1 keeps his word with them1 shows them that the path to victory is easy1 and conceals from them1 or makes light of things which seen from a distance might appear to threaten danger4 ,the observance of these precautions will give an army great confidence1 and such confidence leads to victory4 ,this confidence the ,romans were wont to inspire in the minds of their soldiers by the aid of religion2 and accordingly their consuls were appointed1 their armies were enrolled1 their soldiers marched forth1 and their battles were begun1 only when the auguries and auspices were favourable2 and without attending to all these observances no prudent captain would ever engage in combat2 knowing that unless his soldiers were first assured that the gods were on their side1 he might readily suffer defeat4 ,but if any consul or other leader ever joined battle contrary to the auspices1 the ,romans would punish him1 as they did ,claudius ,pulcher4 ,the truth of what ,i affirm is plainly seen from the whole course of the ,roman history1 but is more particularly established by the words which ,livius puts into the mouth of ,appius ,claudius1 who1 when complaining to the people of the insolence of the tribunes1 and taxing them with having caused the corruption of the auspices and other rites of religion1 is made to say1 8,and now they would strip even religion of its authority4 ,for what matters it1 they will tell you1 that the fowls refuse to peck1 or come slowly from the coop1 or that a cock has crowed8 ,these are small matters doubtless2 but it was by not contemning such small matters as these1 that our forefathers built up this great republic40 ,and1 indeed1 in these small matters lies a power which keeps men united and of good courage1 which is of itself the chief condition of success4 ,but the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour1 for otherwise they can nothing avail4 ,the men of ,praneste1 leading forth their army against the ,romans1 took up their position near the river ,allia1 on the very spot where the ,romans had been routed by the ,gauls1 selecting this ground that it might inspire their own side with confidence1 and dishearten their enemies with the unhappy memories which it recalled ,but although1 for the reasons already noted1 this was a course which promised success1 the result nevertheless showed that true valour is not to be daunted by trifling disadvantages4 ,and this the historian well expresses by the words he puts in the mouth of the dictator as spoken to his master of the knights 8,see how these fellows1 in encamping on the banks of the ,allia1 have chosen their ground in reliance upon fortune4 ,do you1 therefore1 relying on discipline and valour1 fall upon then centre40 ,for true valour1 tight discipline1 and the feeling of security gained by repeated victories1 are not to be counteracted by things of no real moment1 dismayed by empty terrors1 or quelled by a solitary mishap4 ,as was well seen when the two ,manlii1 being consuls in command against the ,volscians1 rashly allowed a part of their army to go out foraging1 and both those who went out and those who stayed behind found themselves attacked at the same moment ,for from this danger they were saved by the courage of the soldiers1 and not by the foresight of the consuls4 ,with regard to which occurrence ,titus ,livius observes1 8,even without a leader the steadfast valour of the soldiers was maintained40 ,here ,i must not omit to notice the device practised by ,fabius to give his army confidence1 when he led it for the first time into ,etruria4 ,for judging such encouragement to be especially needed by his men1 since they were entering an unknown country to encounter a new foe1 he addressed them before they joined battle1 and1 after reciting many reasons for expecting a victory1 told them1 that 8he could have mentioned other favourable circumstances making victory certain1 had it not been dangerous to disclose them40 ,and as this device was dexterously used it merits imitation4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv4--,by what reports1 rumours1 or surmises the ,citizens of a ,republic are led to favour a ,fellow-citizen3 and-whether the ,magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a ,people or by a ,prince4 ,i have elsewhere related how ,titus ,manlius1 afterwards named ,torquatus1 rescued his father from the charge laid against him by ,marcus ,pomponius1 tribune of the people4 ,and though the means he took to effect this were somewhat violent and irregular1 so pleasing to everyone were his filial piety and affection1 that not only did he escape rebuke1 but when military tribunes had to be appointed his name was second on the list of those chosen4 ,to explain his good fortune1 it will1 ,i think1 be useful to consider what are the methods followed by the citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom they bestow honours1 so as to see whether what ,i have already said on this head be true1 namely1 that a people is more discriminating in awarding honours than a prince4 ,i say1 then1 that in conferring honours and offices1 the people1 when it has no knowledge of a man from his public career1 follows the estimate given of him by the general voice1 and by common report2 or else is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion which it has adopted concerning him4 ,such impressions are formed either from consideration of a man's descent 7it being assumed1 until the contrary appears1 that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished citizens their descendant will resemble them71 or else from regard to his manners and habits2 and nothing can be more in his favour than that he frequents the company of the grave and virtuous1 and such as are generally reputed wise4 ,for as we can have no better clue to a man's character than the company he keeps1 he who frequents worthy company deservedly obtains a good name1 since there can hardly fail to be some similarity between himself and his associates4 ,sometimes1 however1 the popular estimate of a man is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy action1 though not of public moment1 in which he has acquitted himself well4 ,and of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a man's favour1 none is so effectual as this last4 ,for the presumption that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is so often misleading1 that men are slow to trust and quick to discard it1 unless confirmed by the personal worth of him of whom they are judging4 ,the criterion of character afforded by a man's manners and conversation is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence1 but is far inferior to that afforded by his actions2 for until he has given actual proof of his worth1 his credit is built on mere opinion1 which may readily change4 ,but this third mode of judging1 which originates in and rests upon his actions1 at once gives him a name which can only be destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature4 ,those therefore who live in a republic should conform to this third criterion1 and endeavour1 as did many of the ,roman youth1 to make their start in life with some extraordinary achievement1 either by promoting a law conducive to the general well-being1 or by accusing some powerful citizen as a transgressor of the laws1 or by performing some similar new and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of4 ,actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your fame1 but also to maintain and extend it4 ,to which end1 they must continually be renewed1 as we find done by ,titus ,manlius throughout the whole course of his life4 ,for after winning his earliest renown by his bold and singular defence of his father1 when some years had passed he fought his famous duel with the ,gaul1 from whom1 when he had slain him1 he took the twisted golden collar which gave him the name of ,torquatus4 ,nor was this the last of his remarkable actions1 for at a later period1 when he was of ripe years1 he caused his own son to be put to death1 because he had fought without leave1 although successfully4 ,which three actions gained for him at the time a greater name1 and have made him more renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories1 though of these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other ,roman4 ,the explanation of which is1 that while in his victories ,manlius had many who resembled him1 in these particular actions he stood almost or entirely alone4 ,so1 too1 with the elder ,scipio1 all whose victories together did not obtain for him so much reputation1 as did his rescue1 while he was yet young1 of his father at the ,ticino1 and his undaunted bearing after the rout at ,cann1 when with his naked sword he constrained a number of the ,roman youth to swear never to abandon their country1 as some among them had before been minded to do4 ,it was these two actions1 therefore1 which laid the foundation of his future fame and paved the way for his triumphs in ,spain and ,africa4 ,and the fair esteem in which men held him1 was still further heightened when in ,spain he restored a daughter to her father1 a wife to her husband4 ,nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil honours1 who must act in this way2 the prince who would maintain his credit in his princedom must do likewise2 since nothing helps so much to make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth1 whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good1 and show him to be so magnanimous1 generous1 and just1 that he may well pass into a proverb among his subjects4 ,but to return to the point whence ,i digressed1 ,i say that if a people1 when they first confer honours on a fellow-citizen1 rest their judgment on any one of the three circumstances above-mentioned1 they build on a reasonable foundation2 but1 when many instances of noble conduct have made a man favourably known1 that the foundation is still better1 since then there is hardly room for mistake4 ,i speak merely of those honours which are bestowed on a man at the outset of his career1 before he has come to be known by continued proof1 or is found to have passed from one kind of conduct to another and dissimilar kind1 and ,i maintain that in such cases1 so far as erroneous judgments or corrupt motives are concerned1 a people will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince4 ,but since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character1 reputation1 and actions of a man1 thinking them better or greater than in truth they are1 an error a prince is less likely to fall into from his being informed and warned by his advisers1 in order that the people may not lack similar advice1 wise founders of republics have provided1 that when the highest dignities of the ,state1 to which it would be dangerous to appoint incapable men1 have to be filled up1 and it appears that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice1 it shall be lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in the public assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate1 that the people1 being made acquainted therewith1 may be better able to judge of his fitness4 ,that this was the practice in ,rome we have proof in the speech made by ,fabius ,maximus to the people during the second ,punic war1 when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards ,titus ,ottacilius4 ,for ,fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the consulship at such a crisis1 spoke against him and pointed out his insufficiency1 and so prevented his appointment1 turning the popular favour towards another who deserved it more4 ,in the choice of its magistrates1 therefore1 a people judges of those among whom it has to choose1 in accordance with the surest indications it can get2 and when it can be advised as princes are1 makes fewer mistakes than they4 ,but the citizen who would make a beginning by gaining the good-will of the people1 must1 to obtain it1 perform1 like ,titus ,manlius1 some noteworthy action4 ,,chapter ,,xxxv4--,of the ,danger incurred in being the first to recommend new ,measures2 and that the more unusual the ,measures the greater the ,danger4 ,how perilous a thing it is to put one's self at the head of changes whereby many are affected1 how difficult to guide and bring them to perfection1 and when perfected to maintain them1 were too wide and arduous a subject to be treated here4 ,wherefore ,i reserve it for a fitter occasion1 and shall now speak only of those dangers which are incurred by the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of a prince in being the first to promote some grave and important measure in such manner that the whole responsibility attending it rests with them4 ,for as men judge of things by their results1 any evil which ensues from such measures will be imputed to their author4 ,and although if good ensue he will be applauded1 nevertheless in matters of this kind1 what a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose4 ,selim1 the present sultan1 or ,grand ,turk as he is called1 being in readiness1 as some who come from his country relate1 to set forth on an expedition against ,egypt and ,syria1 was urged by one of his bashaws whom he had stationed on the confines of ,persia1 to make war upon the ,sofi4 ,in compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise with a vast army4 ,but coming to a great plain1 wherein were many deserts and few streams1 and encountering the same difficulties as in ancient times had proved the ruin of many ,roman armies1 he suffered so much from pestilence and famine1 that1 although victorious in battle1 he lost a great part of his men4 ,this so enraged him against the bashaw on whose advice he had acted1 that he forthwith put him to death4 ,in like manner1 we read of many citizens who having strenuously promoted various measures were banished when these turned out badly4 ,certain citizens of ,rome1 for instance1 were very active in forwarding a law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul4 ,this law passing1 it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth with the armies was routed2 and had it not been that the party in whose behalf the law was made was extremely powerful1 its promoters would have fared badly4 ,it is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of a republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma1 that if they do not conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their city or prince1 they fail in their duty2 if they do advise it1 they risk their places and their lives2 all men being subject to this infirmity of judging advice by the event4 ,when ,i consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be escaped1 ,i find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice you proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner with the measure you would see carried out1 but offering your opinion without heat1 and supporting it temperately and modestly1 so that if the prince or city follow it1 they shall do so of their own good-will1 and not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity4 ,when you act thus1 neither prince nor people can reasonably bear you a grudge in respect of the advice given by you1 since that advice was not adopted contrary to the general opinion4 ,for your danger lies in many having opposed you1 who afterwards1 should your advice prove hurtful1 combine to ruin you4 ,and although in taking this course you fall short of the glory which is earned by him who stands alone against many in urging some measure which succeeds1 you have nevertheless two advantages to make up for it3 first1 that you escape danger2 and second1 that when you have temperately stated your views1 and when1 in consequence of opposition1 your advice has not been taken1 should other counsels prevail and mischief come of them1 your credit will be vastly enhanced4 ,and although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your prince or city cannot be matter of rejoicing1 still it is something to be taken into account4 ,on this head1 then1 ,i know of no other advice to offer4 ,for that you should be silent and express no opinion at all1 were a course hurtful for your prince or city1 and which would not absolve you from danger1 since you would soon grow to be suspected1 when it might fare with you as with the friend of ,perseus the ,macedonian king4 ,for ,perseus being defeated by ,paulus ,emilius1 and making his escape with a few companions1 it happened that one of them1 in reviewing the past1 began to point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which had been his ruin4 ,whereupon ,perseus turning upon him said1 8,traitor1 hast thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things80 and so saying1 slew him with his own hand4 ,such was the penalty incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken1 and who spoke when he should have been silent2 and who found no escape from danger in having refrained from giving advice4 ,wherefore1 ,i believe1 that the course which ,i have recommended should be observed and followed4 ,,chapter ,,xxxvi4--,why it has been and still may be affirmed of the ,gauls1 that at the beginning of a fray they are more than ,men1 but afterwards less than ,women4 ,the bravery of the ,gaul who on the banks of the ,anio challenged any among the ,romans to fight with him1 and the combat that thereupon ensued between him and ,titus ,manlius1 remind me of what ,titus ,livius oftener than once observes in his history1 that 8at the beginning of a fray the ,gauls are more than men1 but ere it is ended show themselves less than women40 ,touching the cause of this1 many are content to believe that such is their nature1 which1 indeed1 ,i take to be true2 but we are not1 therefore1 to assume that the natural temper which makes them brave at the outset1 may not be so trained and regulated as to keep them brave to the end4 ,and1 to prove this1 ,i say1 that armies are of three kinds4 ,in one of these you have discipline with bravery and valour as its consequence4 ,such was the ,roman army1 which is shown by all historians to have maintained excellent discipline as the result of constant military training4 ,and because in a well-disciplined army none must do anything save by rule1 we find that in the ,roman army1 from which as it conquered the world all others should take example1 none either eat1 or slept1 or bought1 or sold1 or did anything else1 whether in his military or in his private capacity1 without orders from the consul4 ,those armies which do otherwise are not true armies1 and if ever they have any success1 it is owing to the fury and impetuosity of their onset and not to trained and steady valour4 ,but of this impetuosity and fury1 trained valour1 when occasion requires1 will make use2 nor will any danger daunt it or cause it to lose heart1 its courage being kept alive by its discipline1 and its confidence fed by the hope of victory which never fails it while that discipline is maintained4 ,but the contrary happens with armies of the second sort1 those1 namely1 which have impetuosity without discipline1 as was the case with the ,gauls whose courage in a protracted conflict gradually wore away2 so that unless they succeeded in their first attack1 the impetuosity to which they trusted1 having no support from disciplined valour1 soon cooled2 when1 as they had nothing else to depend on1 their efforts ceased4 ,the ,romans1 on the other hand1 being less disquieted in danger by reason of their perfect discipline1 and never losing hope1 fought steadily and stubbornly to the last1 and with the same courage at the end as at the outset2 nay1 growing heated by the conflict1 only became the fiercer the longer it was continued4 ,in armies of the third sort both natural spirit and trained valour are wanting2 and to this class belong the ,italian armies of our own times1 of which it may be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless1 never obtaining a victory1 save when1 by some accident1 the enemy they encounter takes to flight4 ,but since we have daily proofs of this absence of valour1 it were needless to set forth particular instances of it4 ,that all1 however1 may know on the testimony of ,titus ,livius what methods a good army should take1 and what are taken by a bad army1 ,i shall cite the words he represents ,papirius ,cursor to have used when urging that ,fabius1 his master of the knights1 should be punished for disobedience1 and denouncing the consequences which would ensue were he absolved1 saying3--8,let neither ,god nor man be held in reverence2 let the orders of captains and the ,divine auspices be alike disregarded2 let a vagrant soldiery range without leave through the country of friend or foe2 reckless of their military oath1 let them disband at their pleasure2 let them forsake their deserted standards1 and neither rally nor disperse at the word of command2 let them fight when they choose1 by day or by night1 with or without advantage of ground1 with or without the bidding of their leader1 neither maintaining their ranks nor observing the order of battle2 and let our armies1 from being a solemn and consecrated company1 grow to resemble some dark and fortuitous gathering of cut-throats40 ,with this passage before us1 it is easy to pronounce whether the armies of our times be 8a dark and fortuitous gathering10 or 8a solemn and consecrated company20 nay1 how far they fall short of anything worthy to be called an army1 possessing neither the impetuous but disciplined valour of the ,romans1 nor even the mere undisciplined impetuosity of the ,gauls4 ,,chapter ,,xxxvii4--,whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes2 and how1 avoiding these1 we may get knowledge of a new ,enemy4 ,besides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing anything to its utmost perfection1 it appears1 as ,i have already observed1 that in close vicinity to every good is found also an evil1 so apt to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible to have the one without accepting the other4 ,this we see in all human affairs1 and the result is1 that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural and common disadvantage1 we never arrive at any excellence4 ,i am reminded of this by the combat between ,titus ,manlius and the ,gaul1 concerning which ,livius writes that it 8determined the issue of the entire war2 since the ,gauls1 abandoning their camp1 hastily withdrew to the country about ,tivoli1 whence they presently passed into ,campania40 ,it may be said1 therefore1 on the one hand1 that a prudent captain ought absolutely to refrain from all those operations which1 while of trifling moment in themselves1 may possibly produce an ill effect on his army4 ,now1 to engage in a combat wherein you risk your whole fortunes without putting forth your entire strength1 is1 as ,i observed before1 when condemning the defence of a country by guarding its defiles1 an utterly foolhardy course4 ,on the other hand1 it is to be said that a prudent captain1 when he has to meet a new and redoubtable adversary1 ought1 before coming to a general engagement1 to accustom his men by skirmishes and passages of arms1 to the quality of their enemy2 that they may learn to know him1 and how to deal with him1 and so free themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame inspire4 ,this for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance1 and one which it might be almost fatal for him to neglect1 since to risk a pitched battle without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to know their enemy and shake off their fear of him1 is to rush on certain destruction4 ,when ,valerius ,corvinus was sent by the ,romans with their armies against the ,samnites1 these being new adversaries with whom up to that time they had not measured their strength1 ,titus ,livius tells us that before giving battle he made his men make trial of the enemy in several unimportant skirmishes1 8lest they should be dismayed by a new foe and a new method of warfare40 ,nevertheless1 there is very great danger that1 if your soldiers get the worst in these encounters1 their alarm and self-distrust may be increased1 and a result follow contrary to that intended1 namely1 that you dispirit where you meant to reassure4 ,this1 therefore1 is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh the good1 and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay hold of the one when you think to grasp the other4 ,and with regard to this ,i say1 that a good captain should do what he can that nothing happen which might discourage his men1 nor is there anything so likely to discourage them as to begin with a defeat4 ,for which reason skirmishes are1 as a rule1 to be avoided1 and only to be allowed where you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory4 ,in like manner1 no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into your country unless your whole army can co-operate2 nor are any towns to be defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin4 ,and as to those towns which you do defend1 you must so arrange1 both in respect of the garrison within and the army without1 that in the event of a siege your whole forces can be employed4 ,all other towns you must leave undefended4 ,for1 provided your army be kept together1 you do not1 in losing what you voluntarily abandon1 forfeit your military reputation1 or sacrifice your hopes of final success4 ,but when you lose what it was your purpose1 and what all know it was your purpose to hold1 you suffer a real loss and injury1 and1 like the ,gauls on the defeat of their champion1 you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in itself4 ,philip of ,macedon1 the father of ,perseus1 a great soldier in his day1 and of a great name1 on being invaded by the ,romans1 laid waste and relinquished much of his territory which he thought he could not defend2 rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation to lose territory after an attempt to defend it1 than to abandon it to the enemy as something he cared little to retain4 ,so1 likewise1 after the battle of ,cann1 when their affairs were at their worst1 the ,romans refused aid to many subject and protected ,states1 charging them to defend themselves as best they could4 ,and this is a better course than to undertake to defend and then to fail2 for by refusing to defend1 you lose only your friend2 whereas in failing1 you not only lose your friend1 but weaken yourself4 ,but to return to the matter in hand1 ,i affirm1 that even when a captain is constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by means of skirmishes1 he ought first to see that he has so much the advantage that he runs no risk of defeat2 or else1 and this is his better course1 he must do as ,marius did when sent against the ,cimbrians1 a very courageous people who were laying ,italy waste1 and by their fierceness and numbers1 and from the fact of their having already routed a ,roman army1 spreading terror wherever they came4 ,for before fighting a decisive battle1 ,marius judged it necessary to do something to lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army2 and being a prudent commander1 he1 on several occasions1 posted his men at points where the ,cimbrians must pass1 that seeing and growing familiar with their appearance1 while themselves in safety and within the shelter of their intrenched camp1 and finding them to be a mere disorderly rabble1 encumbered with baggage1 and either without weapons1 or with none that were formidable1 they might at last assume courage and grow eager to engage them in battle4 ,the part thus prudently taken by ,marius1 should be carefully imitated by others who would escape the dangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like the ,gauls to a disgraceful flight1 on sustaining some trifling defeat4 ,but since in this ,discourse ,i have referred by name to ,valerius ,corvinus1 in my next ,chapter ,i shall cite his words to show what manner of man a captain ought to be4 ,,chapter ,,xxxviii4--,of the ,qualities of a ,captain in whom his ,soldiers can confide4 ,valerius ,corvinus1 as ,i have said already1 was sent in command of an army against the ,samnites1 who were then new enemies to ,rome4 ,wherefore1 to reassure his soldiers and familiarize them with their adversaries1 he made them engage with them in various unimportant passages of arms4 ,but not thinking this enough1 he resolved before delivering battle to address his men1 and by reminding them of their valour and his own1 to make it plain how little they should esteem such enemies4 ,and from the words which ,titus ,livius puts in his mouth we may gather what manner of man the captain ought to be in whom an army will put its trust4 ,for he makes him say3--8,bear ye also this in mind under whose conduct and auspices you are about to fight1 and whether he whom you are to obey be great only in exhorting1 bold only in words1 and all unpractised in arms2 or whether he be one who himself knows how to use his spear1 to march before the eagles1 and play his part in the thickest of the fight4 ,soldiers6 ,i would have you follow my deeds and not my words1 and look to me for example rather than for commands2 for with this right hand ,i have won for myself three consulships1 and an unsurpassed renown40 ,which words rightly understood give every one to know what he must do to merit a captain's rank4 ,and if any man obtain it by other means1 he will soon discover that advancement due to chance or intrigue rather takes away than brings reputation1 since it is men who give lustre to titles and not titles to men4 ,from what has been said it will likewise be understood that if great captains when matched against an unfamiliar foe have had to resort to unusual methods for reassuring the minds even of veteran soldiers1 much more will it be necessary for them to use all their address when in command of a raw and untried army which has never before looked an enemy in the face4 ,for if an unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even in a veteran army1 how much greater must be the terror which any army will inspire in the minds of untrained men4 ,and yet we often find all these difficulties overcome by the supreme prudence of a great captain like the ,roman ,gracchus or the ,theban ,epaminondas1 of whom ,i have before spoken1 who with untried troops defeated the most practised veterans4 ,and the method they are said to have followed was to train their men for some months in mimic warfare1 so as to accustom them to discipline and obedience1 after which they employed them with complete confidence on actual service4 ,no man1 therefore1 of warlike genius1 need despair of creating a good army if only he have the men2 for the prince who has many subjects and yet lacks soldiers1 has only to thank his own inertness and want of foresight1 and must not complain of the cowardice of his people4 ,,chapter ,,xxxix4--,that a ,captain should have good knowledge of ,places4 ,among other qualifications essential in a good captain is a knowledge1 both general and particular1 of places and countries1 for without such knowledge it is impossible for him to carry out any enterprise in the best way4 ,and while practice is needed for perfection in every art1 in this it is needed in the highest degree4 ,such practice1 or particular knowledge as it may be termed1 is sooner acquired in the chase than in any other exercise2 and1 accordingly1 we find it said by ancient historians that those heroes who1 in their day1 ruled the world1 were bred in the woods and trained to the chase2 for this exercise not merely gives the knowledge ,i speak of1 but teaches countless other lessons needful in war4 ,and ,xenophon in his life of ,cyrus tells us1 that ,cyrus1 on his expedition against the ,king of ,armenia1 when assigning to each of his followers the part he was to perform1 reminded them that the enterprise on which they were engaged1 differed little from one of those hunting expeditions on which they had gone so often in his company2 likening those who were to lie in ambush in the mountains1 to the men sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops2 and those who were to overrun the plain1 to the beaters whose business it is to start the game from its lair that it may be driven into the toils4 ,now1 this is related to show how1 in the opinion of ,xenophon1 the chase is a mimic representation of war1 and therefore to be esteemed by the great as useful and honourable4 ,nor can that knowledge of countries which ,i have spoken of as necessary in a commander1 be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase4 ,for he who joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the character of the country in which it is followed2 and he who has made himself specially familiar with one district1 will afterwards readily understand the character of any strange country into which he comes4 ,for all countries1 and the districts of which they are made up1 have a certain resemblance to one another1 so that from a knowledge of one we can pass easily to the knowledge of another4 ,he therefore who is without such practical acquaintance with some one country1 can only with difficulty1 and after a long time1 obtain a knowledge of another1 while he who possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain spreads1 how that mountain slopes1 whither that valley winds1 and all other like particulars in respect of which he has already acquired a certain familiarity4 ,the truth of what ,i affirm is shown by ,titus ,livius in the case of ,publius ,decius1 who1 being military tribune in the army which the consul ,cornelius led against the ,samnites1 when the consul advanced into a defile where the ,roman army were like to be shut in by the enemy1 perceiving the great danger they ran1 and noting1 as ,livius relates1 a hill which rose by a steep ascent and overhung the enemy's camp1 and which1 though hard of access for heavy-armed troops1 presented little difficulty to troops lightly armed1 turned to the consul and said3--8,seest thou1 ,aulus ,cornelius1 yonder height over above the enemy1 which they have been blind enough to neglect8 ,there1 were we manfully to seize it1 might we find the citadel of our hopes and of our safety40 ,whereupon1 he was sent by the consul with three thousand men to secure the height1 and so saved the ,roman army4 ,and as it was part of his plan to make his own escape and carry off his men safely under shelter of night1 ,livius represents him as saying to his soldiers3--8,come with me1 that1 while daylight still serves1 we may learn where the enemy have posted their guards1 and by what exit we may issue hence40 ,accordingly1 putting on the cloak of a common soldier1 lest the enemy should observe that an officer was making his rounds he surveyed their camp in all directions4 ,now any one who carefully studies the whole of this passage1 must perceive how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the nature of places1 which knowledge had ,decius not possessed he could not have decided that it would be for the advantage of the ,roman army to occupy this hill2 nor could he have judged from a distance whether the hill was accessible or no2 and when he reached the summit and desired to return to the consul1 since he was surrounded on all sides by the enemy1 he never could have distinguished the path it was safe for him to take1 from those guarded by the foe4 ,for all which reasons it was absolutely essential that ,decius should have that thorough knowledge which enabled him by gaining possession of this hill to save the ,roman army1 and to discover a path whereby1 in the event of his being attacked1 he and his followers might escape4 ,,chapter ,,xl4--,that ,fraud is fair in ,war4 ,although in all other affairs it be hateful to use fraud1 in the operations of war it is praiseworthy and glorious2 so that he who gets the better of his enemy by fraud1 is as much extolled as he who prevails by force4 ,this appears in the judgments passed by such as have written of the lives of great warriors1 who praise ,hannibal and those other captains who have been most noted for acting in this way4 ,but since we may read of many instances of such frauds1 ,i shall not cite them here4 ,this1 however1 ,i desire to say1 that ,i would not have it understood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your plighted word1 or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed2 for though to do so may sometimes gain you territory and power1 it can never1 as ,i have said elsewhere1 gain you glory4 ,the fraud1 then1 which ,i here speak of is that employed against an enemy who places no trust in you1 and is wholly directed to military operations1 such as the stratagem of ,hannibal at the ,lake of ,thrasymene1 when he feigned flight in order to draw the ,roman consul and his army into an ambuscade2 or when to escape from the hands of ,fabius ,maximus he fastened lights to the horns of his oxen4 ,similar to the above was the deceit practised by ,pontius the ,samnite commander to inveigle the ,roman army into the ,caudine ,forks4 ,for after he had drawn up his forces behind the hills1 he sent out a number of his soldiers1 disguised as herdsmen1 to drive great herds of cattle across the plain2 who being captured by the ,romans1 and interrogated as to where the ,samnite army was1 all of them1 as they had been taught by ,pontius1 agreed in saying that it had gone to besiege ,nocera3 which being believed by the consuls1 led them to advance within the ,caudine ,valley1 where no sooner were they come than they were beset by the ,samnites4 ,and the victory thus won by a fraud would have been most glorious for ,pontius had he but taken the advice of his father ,herennius1 who urged that the ,romans should either be set at liberty unconditionally1 or all be put to death2 but that a mean course 8which neither gains friends nor gets rid of foes0 should be avoided4 ,and this was sound advice1 for1 as has already been shown1 in affairs of moment a mean course is always hurtful4 ,,chapter ,,xli4--,that our ,country is to be defended by ,honour or by ,dishonour2 and in either way is well defended4 ,the consuls together with the whole ,roman army fell1 as ,i have related1 into the hands of the ,samnites1 who imposed on them the most ignominious terms1 insisting that they should be stripped of their arms1 and pass under the yoke before they were allowed to return to ,rome4 ,the consuls being astounded by the harshness of these conditions and the whole army overwhelmed with dismay1 ,lucius ,lentulus1 the ,roman lieutenant1 stood forward and said1 that in his opinion they ought to decline no course whereby their country might be saved2 and that as the very existence of ,rome depended on the preservation of her army1 that army must be saved at any sacrifice1 for whether the means be honourable or ignominious1 all is well done that is done for the defence of our country4 ,and he said that were her army preserved1 ,rome1 in course of time1 might wipe out the disgrace2 but if her army were destroyed1 however gloriously it might perish1 ,rome and her freedom would perish with it4 ,in the event his counsel was followed4 ,now this incident deserves to be noted and pondered over by every citizen who is called on to advise his country2 for when the entire safety of our country is at stake1 no consideration of what is just or unjust1 merciful or cruel1 praiseworthy or shameful1 must intervene4 ,on the contrary1 every other consideration being set aside1 that course alone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and maintains its liberty4 ,and this course we find followed by the people of ,france1 both in their words and in their actions1 with the view of supporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of their kingdom2 for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience than that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king4 ,for their king1 they say1 can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take1 whether it turn out well or ill2 and whether it succeed or fail1 all maintain that he has acted as a king should4 ,,chapter ,,xlii4--,that ,promises made on ,compulsion are not to be observed4 ,when1 after being subjected to this disgrace1 the consuls returned to ,rome with their disarmed legions1 ,spurius ,posthumius1 himself one of the consuls1 was the first to contend in the senate that the terms made in the ,caudine ,valley were not to be observed4 ,for he argued that the ,roman people were not bound by them1 though he himself doubtless was1 together with all the others who had promised peace2 wherefore1 if the people desired to set themselves free from every engagement1 he and all the rest who had given this promise must be made over as prisoners into the hands of the ,samnites4 ,and so steadfastly did he hold to this opinion1 that the senate were content to adopt it1 and sending him and the rest as prisoners back to ,samnium1 protested to the ,samnites that the peace was not binding4 ,and so kind was ,fortune to ,posthumius on this occasion1 that the ,samnites would not keep him as a prisoner1 and that on his return to ,rome1 notwithstanding his defeat1 he was held in higher honour by the ,romans than the victorious ,pontius by his countrymen4 ,here two points are to be noted2 first1 that glory may be won by any action2 for although1 commonly1 it follow upon victory1 it may also follow on defeat1 if this defeat be seen to have happened through no fault of yours1 or if1 directly after1 you perform some valiant action which cancels it4 ,the other point to be noted is that there is no disgrace in not observing promises wrung from you by force2 for promises thus extorted when they affect the public welfare will always be broken so soon as the pressure under which they were made is withdrawn1 and that1 too1 without shame on the part of him who breaks them2 of which we read many instances in history1 and find them constantly occurring at the present day4 ,nay1 as between princes1 not only are such compulsory promises broken when the force which extorted them is removed1 but all other promises as well1 are in like manner disregarded when the causes which led to them no longer operate4 ,whether this is a thing to be commended or no1 and whether such methods ought or ought not to be followed by princes1 has already been considered by me in my 8,treatise of the ,prince0 wherefore ,i say no more on that subject here4 ,,chapter ,,xliii4--,that ,men born in the same ,province retain through all ,times nearly the same ,character4 ,the wise are wont to say1 and not without reason or at random1 that he who would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has been2 since all human events1 whether present or to come1 have their exact counterpart in the past4 ,and this1 because these events are brought about by men1 whose passions and dispositions remaining in all ages the same naturally give rise to the same effects2 although1 doubtless1 the operation of these causes takes a higher form1 now in one province1 and now in another1 according to the character of the training wherein the inhabitants of these provinces acquire their way of life4 ,another aid towards judging of the future by the past1 is to observe how the same nation long retains the same customs1 remaining constantly covetous or deceitful1 or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue4 ,any one reading the past history of our city of ,florence1 and noting what has recently befallen it1 will find the ,french and ,german nations overflowing with avarice1 pride1 cruelty1 and perfidy1 all of which four vices have at divers times wrought much harm to our city4 ,as an instance of their perfidy1 every one knows how often payments of money were made to ,charles ,,viii4 of ,france1 in return for which he engaged to restore the fortresses of ,pisa1 yet never did restore them1 manifesting thereby his bad faith and grasping avarice4 ,or1 to pass from these very recent events1 all may have heard of what happened in the war in which the ,florentines were involved with the ,visconti1 dukes of ,milan1 when ,florence1 being left without other resource1 resolved to invite the emperor into ,italy1 that she might be assisted by his name and power in her struggle with ,lombardy4 ,the emperor promised to come with a strong army to take part against the ,visconti and to protect ,florence from them1 on condition that the ,florentines paid him a hundred thousand ducats on his setting out1 and another hundred thousand on his arrival in ,italy2 to which terms the ,florentines agreed4 ,but although he then received payment of the first instalment and1 afterwards1 on reaching ,verona1 of the second1 he turned back from the expedition without effecting anything1 alleging as his excuse that he was stopped by certain persons who had failed to fulfil their engagements4 ,but if ,florence had not been urged by passion or overcome by necessity1 or had she read of and understood the ancient usages of the barbarians1 she would neither on this1 nor on many other occasions1 have been deceived by them1 seeing that these nations have always been of the same character1 and have always1 in all circumstances1 and with all men alike1 used the same methods4 ,for in ancient times we find them behaving after the same fashion to the ,etruscans1 who1 when overpowered by the ,romans1 by whom they had been repeatedly routed and put to flight1 perceiving that they could not stand without help1 entered into a compact with the ,gauls dwelling in the parts of ,italy south of the ,alps1 to pay them a certain sum if they would unite with them in a campaign against the ,romans4 ,but the ,gauls1 after taking their money1 refused to arm on their behalf1 alleging that they had not been paid to make war on the enemies of the ,etruscans1 but only to refrain from pillaging their lands4 ,and thus the people of ,etruria1 through the avarice and perfidy of the ,gauls1 were at once defrauded of their money and disappointed of the help which they had counted on obtaining4 ,from which two instances of the ,etruscans in ancient times and of the ,florentines in recent1 we may see that barbaric races have constantly followed the same methods1 and may easily draw our conclusions as to how far princes should trust them4 ,,chapter ,,xliv4--,that where ordinary methods fail1 ,hardihood and ,daring often succeed4 ,when attacked by the ,romans1 the ,samnites as they could not without help stand against them in the field1 resolved to leave garrisons in the towns of ,samnium1 and to pass with their main army into ,etruria1 that country being then at truce with ,rome1 and thus ascertain whether their actual presence in arms might not move the ,etruscans to renew hostilities against ,rome1 which they had refused to renew when invited through envoys4 ,during the negotiations which1 on this occasion1 passed between the two nations1 the ,samnites in explaining the chief causes that led them to take up arms1 used the memorable words--8they had risen because peace is a heavier burthen for slaves than war for freemen0 ,in the end1 partly by their persuasions1 and partly by the presence of their army1 they induced the ,etruscans to join forces with them4 ,here we are to note that when a prince would obtain something from another1 he ought1 if the occasion allow1 to leave him no time to deliberate1 but should so contrive that the other may see the need of resolving at once2 as he will1 if he perceive that refusal or delay in complying with what is asked of him1 will draw upon him a sudden and dangerous resentment4 ,this method we have seen employed with good effect in our own times by ,pope ,julius ,,ii4 in dealing with ,france1 and by ,m4 de ,foix1 the general of the ,french king1 in dealing with the ,marquis of ,mantua4 ,for ,pope ,julius desiring to expel the ,bentivogli from ,bologna1 and thinking that for this purpose he needed the help of ,french troops1 and to have the ,venetians neutral1 after sounding both and receiving from both hesitating and ambiguous answers1 determined to make both fall in with his views1 by giving them no time to oppose him2 and so1 setting forth from ,rome with as strong a force as he could get together1 he marched on ,bologna1 sending word to the ,venetians that they must stand aloof1 and to the ,king of ,france to send him troops4 ,the result was that in the brief time allowed them1 neither of the two powers could make up their mind to thwart him2 and knowing that refusal or delay would be violently resented by the ,pope1 they yielded to his demands1 the king sending him soldiers and the ,venetians maintaining neutrality4 ,m4 de ,foix1 again1 being with the king's army in ,bologna when word came that ,brescia had risen1 could not rest till he had recovered that town4 ,but1 to get there he had to choose between two routes1 one long and circuitous leading through the territories of the king1 the other short and direct4 ,in taking the latter route1 however1 not only would he have to pass through the dominions of the ,marquis of ,mantua1 but also to make his way into these through the lakes and marshes wherewith that country abounds1 by following an embanked road1 closed and guarded by the marquis with forts and other defensive works4 ,resolving1 nevertheless1 to take the shortest road at all hazards1 he waited till his men were already on their march before signifying to the marquis that he desired leave to pass through his country1 so that no time might be left him to deliberate4 ,taken aback by the unexpected demand1 the marquis gave the leave sought1 which he never would have given had ,de ,foix acted with less impetuosity4 ,for he was in league with the ,venetians and with the ,pope1 and had a son in the hands of the latter2 all which circumstances would have afforded him fair pretexts for refusal4 ,but carried away by the suddenness and urgency of the demand1 he yielded4 ,and in like manner the ,etruscans yielded to the instances of the ,samnites1 the presence of whose army decided them to renew hostilities which before they had declined to renew4 ,,chapter ,,xlv4--,whether in battle it is better to await and repel the ,enemy's attack1 or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset4 ,decius and ,fabius1 the ,roman consuls1 were each of them in command of a separate army1 one directed against the ,samnites1 the other against the ,etruscans3 and as both delivered battle1 we have to pronounce1 in respect of the two engagements1 which commander followed the better method4 ,decius attacked his enemy at once with the utmost fury and with his whole strength4 ,fabius was content1 at first1 merely to maintain his ground2 for judging that more was to be gained by a later attack1 he reserved his forces for a final effort1 when the ardour of the enemy had cooled and his energy spent itself4 ,the event showed ,fabius to be more successful in his tactics than ,decius1 who being exhausted by his first onset1 and seeing his ranks begin to waver1 to secure by death the glory he could no longer hope from victory1 followed the example set him by his father1 and sacrificed himself to save the ,roman legions4 ,word whereof being brought to ,fabius1 he1 to gain1 while he yet lived1 as much honour as the other had earned by his death1 pushed forward all the troops he had reserved for his final effort1 and so obtained an unexampled victory4 ,whence we see that of the two methods1 that of ,fabius was the safer and the more deserving our imitation4 ,,chapter ,,xlvi4--,how the ,characteristics of ,families come to be perpetuated4 ,manners and institutions differing in different cities1 seem here to produce a harder and there a softer race2 and a like difference may also be discerned in the character of different families in the same city4 ,and while this holds good of all cities1 we have many instances of it in reading the history of ,rome4 ,for we find the ,manlii always stern and stubborn2 the ,valerii kindly and courteous2 the ,claudii haughty and ambitious2 and many families besides similarly distinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities4 ,these qualities we cannot refer wholly to the blood1 for that must change as a result of repeated intermarriages1 but must ascribe rather to the different training and education given in different families4 ,for much turns on whether a child of tender years hears a thing well or ill spoken of1 since this must needs make an impression on him whereby his whole conduct in after life will be influenced4 ,were it otherwise we should not have found the whole family of the ,claudii moved by the desires and stirred by the passions which ,titus ,livius notes in many of them1 and more especially in one holding the office of censor1 who1 when his colleague laid down his magistracy1 as the law prescribed1 at the end of eighteen months1 would not resign1 maintaining that he was entitled to hold the office for five years in accordance with the original law by which the censorship was regulated4 ,and although his refusal gave occasion to much controversy1 and bred great tumult and disturbance1 no means could be found to depose him from his office1 which he persisted in retaining in opposition to the will of the entire commons and a majority of the senate4 ,and any who shall read the speech made against him by ,publius ,sempronius1 tribune of the people1 will find therein all the ,claudian insolence exposed1 and will recognize the docility and good temper shown by the body of the citizens in respecting the laws and institutions of their country4 ,,chapter ,,xlvii4--,that love of his ,country should lead a good ,citizen to forget private ,wrongs4 ,while commanding as consul against the ,samnites1 ,manlius was wounded in a skirmish4 ,his army being thereby endangered1 the senate judged it expedient to send ,papirius ,cursor as dictator to supply his place4 ,but as it was necessary that the dictator should be nominated by ,fabius1 the other consul1 who was with the army in ,etruria1 and as a doubt was felt that he might refuse to nominate ,papirius1 who was his enemy1 the senate sent two messengers to entreat him to lay aside private animosity1 and make the nomination which the public interest required4 ,moved by love of his country ,fabius did as he was asked1 although by his silence1 and by many other signs1 he gave it to be known that compliance was distasteful4 ,from his conduct at this juncture all who would be thought good citizens should take example4 ,,chapter ,,xlviii4--,that on finding an ,enemy make what seems a grave blunder1 we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind4 ,the consul having gone to ,rome to perform certain ceremonial rites1 and ,fulvius being left in charge of the ,roman army in ,etruria1 the ,etruscans1 to see whether they could not circumvent the new commander1 planting an ambush not far from the ,roman camp1 sent forward soldiers disguised as shepherds driving large flocks of sheep so as to pass in sight of the ,roman army4 ,these pretended shepherds coming close to the wall of his camp1 ,fulvius1 marvelling at what appeared to him unaccountable audacity1 hit upon a device whereby the artifice of the ,etruscans was detected and their design defeated4 ,here it seems proper to note that the captain of an army ought not to build on what seems a manifest blunder on the part of an enemy2 for as men are unlikely to act with conspicuous want of caution1 it will commonly be found that this blunder is cover to a fraud4 ,and yet1 so blinded are men's minds by their eagerness for victory1 that they look only to what appears on the surface4 ,after defeating the ,romans on the ,allia1 the ,gauls1 hastening on to ,rome1 found the gates of the city left open and unguarded4 ,but fearing some stratagem1 and being unable to believe that the ,romans could be so foolish and cowardly as to abandon their city1 they waited during the whole of that day and the following night outside the gates1 without daring to enter4 ,in the year #aejh1 when the ,florentines ,avere engaged in besieging ,pisa1 ,alfonso del ,mutolo1 a citizen of that town1 happening to be taken prisoner1 was released on his promise to procure the surrender to the ,florentines of one of the gates of the city4 ,afterwards1 on pretence of arranging for the execution of this surrender1 he came repeatedly to confer with those whom the ,florentine commissaries had deputed to treat with him1 coming not secretly but openly1 and accompanied by other citizens of ,pisa1 whom he caused to stand aside while he conversed with the ,florentines4 ,from all which circumstances his duplicity might have been suspected1 since1 had he meant to do as he had engaged1 it was most unlikely that he should be negotiating so openly4 ,but the desire to recover possession of ,pisa so blinded the ,florentines that they allowed themselves to be conducted under his guidance to the ,lucca ,gate1 where1 through his treachery1 but to their own disgrace1 they lost a large number of their men and officers4 ,,chapter ,,xlix4--,that a ,commonwealth to preserve its ,freedom has constant need of new ,ordinances4 ,of the services in respect of which ,quintius ,fabius received the surname of ,maximus4 ,it must happen1 as ,i have already said1 in every great city1 that disorders needing the care of the physician continually spring up2 and the graver these disorders are1 the greater will be the skill needed for their treatment4 ,and if ever in any city1 most assuredly in ,rome1 we see these disorders assume strange and unexpected shapes4 ,as when it appeared that all the ,roman wives had conspired to murder their husbands1 many of them being found to have actually administered poison1 and many others to have drugs in readiness for the purpose4 ,of like nature was the conspiracy of the ,bacchanals1 discovered at the time of the ,macedonian war1 wherein many thousands1 both men and women1 were implicated1 and which1 had it not been found out1 or had the ,romans not been accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders1 must have proved perilous for their city4 ,and1 indeed1 if the greatness of the ,roman ,republic were not declared by countless other signs1 as well as by the manner in which it caused its laws to be observed1 it might be seen in the character of the punishments which it inflicted against wrong-doers4 ,for in vindicating justice1 it would not scruple or hesitate to put a whole legion to death1 to depopulate an entire city1 or send eight or ten thousand men at a time into banishment1 subject to the most stringent conditions1 which had to be observed1 not by one of these exiles only1 but by all4 ,as in the case of those soldiers who fought unsuccessfully at ,cann1 who were banished to ,sicily1 subject to the condition that they should not harbour in towns1 and should all eat standing4 ,but the most formidable of all their punishments was that whereby one man out of every ten in an entire army was chosen by lot to be put to death4 ,for correcting a great body of men no more effectual means could be devised2 because1 when a multitude have offended and the ringleaders are not known1 all cannot be punished1 their number being too great2 while to punish some only1 and leave the rest unpunished1 were unjust to those punished and an encouragement to those passed over to offend again4 ,but where you put to death a tenth chosen by lot1 where all equally deserve death1 he who is punished will blame his unlucky fortune1 while he who escapes will be afraid that another time the lot may be his1 and for that reason will be careful how he repeats his offence4 ,the poisoners and the ,bacchanals1 therefore1 were punished as their crimes deserved4 ,although disorders like these occasion mischievous results in a commonwealth1 still they are not fatal1 since almost always there is time to correct them4 ,but no time is given in the case of disorders in the ,state itself1 which unless they be treated by some wise citizen1 will always bring a city to destruction4 ,from the readiness wherewith the ,romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners1 there came to be so many new citizens in ,rome1 and possessed of so large a share of the suffrage1 that the government itself began to alter1 forsaking those courses which it was accustomed to follow1 and growing estranged from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance4 ,which being observed by ,quintius ,fabius when censor1 he caused all those new citizens to be classed in four ,tribes1 that being reduced within this narrow limit they might not have it in their power to corrupt the entire ,state4 ,and this was a wisely contrived measure1 for1 without introducing any violent change1 it supplied a convenient remedy1 and one so acceptable to the republic as to gain for ,fabius the well-deserved name of ,maximus4 ,,the ,,end4